


Dorota Litwin-Lewandowska

The Polish Reason of State in Austria

The Poles in the Political Life of Austria
in the Period of the Dual Monarchy
(1867–1918)



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The monograph describes the history of the Polish diaspora in the Habsburg monarchy in the historical, institutional, legal, political, and organizational context. In the period of the Dual Monarchy (1867–1918), the Poles who lived under the Austro-Hungarian regime sought to influence the fate of their nation and state primarily through an active involvement in parliamentary life and state administration. The study of the social and political activity of the Poles in the Austrian partition reveals their political heritage, which influenced not only the Polish idea of patriotism but also the formation of the Polish political culture rooted in the European tradition of parliamentarism and constitutionalism.

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The Polish Reason of State in Austria

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Jerzy Gaul

PREFACE: Through Partitioning Austria to Independent Poland: the Political, Civilizational, and Military Dimension of the Polish Raison D'état in 1876–1918

Introductory Remarks

After the breakdown of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Polish lands became part of the three partitioning states. The partition of Galicia and Cieszyn Silesia by the Habsburgs in 1772 and 1795 caused that Poles shared the same fate as the Danube monarchy. They constituted not only a diaspora in the multinational state¹ but also a significant political force, which played a role in the supreme administrative institutions and the Austrian Parliament.² The citizens of the previously independent Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth participated in the life of other countries. In fact, this had manifold consequences and, sooner or later, had to lead to re-evaluation of the Polish reason of state.³

There are two ways of understanding the notion of reason of state.⁴ In the narrower sense, it designates “a justification for a political action of exceptional,

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- 1 H. Batowski, “Rozpad Austro-Węgier 1914–1918,” in: A. Waszek (ed.) *Sprawy narodowościowe i działania dyplomatyczne*, Kraków 1982, p. 19; *Polska Diaspora* (Kraków 2001), pp. 253–262.
 - 2 J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim 1948–1918* (Warszawa 1996); W. Łazuga, “Rządy polskie” w Austrii. *Gabinet Kazimierza hr. Badeniego 1895–1897* (Poznań 1991); W. Łazuga, *Kalkulować... Polacy na szczytach c.k. monarchii* (Poznań 2013); D. Szymczak, *Galicyjska ambasada w Wiedniu* (Poznań 2013).
 - 3 Arkady Rzegocki underlines the originality of the Polish approach toward reason of state, which emerged in opposition to absolutism and was based on the foundation of republican and libertarian ideas: “It was precisely by virtue of this reference to a timeless order – to the idea of justice binding all states, which appeared in Polish thinking about the state – that the main stream of political philosophy developing on Polish lands came close to the “classical *raison d'état*.” Arkady Rzegocki, *Racja stanu a polska tradycja myślenia o polityce* (Kraków 2008), pp. 22–23, 220–331.
 - 4 A. Rzegocki distinguishes two traditions of political thinking: the “classical” one, which can be traced back to antiquity, and the “modern” one, initiated by Nicolo Machiavelli.

one-off and temporary nature that intends to prevent a threat to existence of a state community.” A broader definition, in turn, draws attention to “political actions, particularly those of a long-term nature, that aim to secure the vital interests of the State.” It concerns such fundamental issues of the political community as the reason for the existence of a state, its survival and development, the protection of its fundamental interests, political realism or the need to consider objective circumstances.⁵

The regaining of independence and the reconstruction of the national state formed the canon of the Polish reason of state in the period of the partitions. The main difficulty was that the program of the struggle for independence had to be implemented in an international context, where the most important criterion for the actions of all powers was their reason of state, understood as the interest of the ruler or the state. *Raison d'état* guided the policy of the partitioning powers' leaders – Frederick the Great, Catherine the Great, and Maria Theresa. According to Stanisław Tarnowski, “the absolute monarchies of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, the reason of state, as the highest principle and the highest law, the reason of state, which acquits everything, allows everything to be committed, were the natural and inevitable result of this elevation of human reason and human will to a place they did not deserve.”⁶

The classical concept of reason of state has its roots in classical political philosophy. The state is presented in a metaphysical context: religious and ethical. The good of the State and the common good hold a very important position in this concept – not the most important, however, since there are norms (natural law, moral principles, the idea of justice, human rights) that should apply to all countries. The modern concept of reason of state (lat. *ratio status*, fr. *raison d'état*) dates back to the times of the Renaissance. The first use of the term “reason of state” is attributed to Archbishop Giovanni della Casa. Giovanni Botero defined state “as a permanently established authority over the people,” and reason of state – “as a knowledge of the means needed to create, maintain and extend this power.” The French political thinker Cardin Le Bret claimed that a king should rule fairly. However, there are cases (the Thirty Years' War and the French intervention) when the ruler should abandon ethics and act as the reason of state requires. According to Friedrich von Meinecke, “in order to enjoy freedom and independence, the state must respect the laws dictated by its own reason of state.” A. Rzegocki, *Racja stanu*.

5 A. Rzegocki, *Racja stanu a polska tradycja myślenia o polityce* (Kraków 2008), pp. 48–101.

6 S. Tarnowski, *Z doświadczeń i rozmyślań* (Kraków 2002), pp. 14–15; A. Rzegocki, “Racja stanu,” pp. 288–290.

There was also another difficulty to implement the Polish reason of state: the point was no longer to pursue the interests of an existing state, since the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was erased from the map of Europe as a result of the partitions, but it was to regain independence and reconstruct the statehood. Therefore, the key question was not how to preserve the state, but how to regain it, not how to ensure its security and sovereignty, but how to fight for national interests in captivity when confronted with the interests of the partitioning states. According to Józef Szujski (1867), “captivity is not external oppression alone, it is not the domination of this or that unpleasant system to a nation [. . .] it is more, because it is the deprivation of a nation of its own government and its own disposition of society. [. . .] Do you know what it means to be free? To be free is to become able to form a government and to reorganize society.”⁷

For Szujski, the Polish reason of state was not only to pursue Polish interests, because this could be done to a certain extent also in the conditions of captivity, but also to form a government that would carry out necessary, positive changes. “Politics of interest means self-governance, government means independence.”⁸

Szujski’s understanding of the Polish reason of state raised the bar so high that it was hardly possible to achieve it in the conditions of the captivity. The struggles of Polish patriots concerned the choice of tactics, since the strategic goal of an independent state seemed obvious. Still, many circles, for various reasons, did not have the courage to stand up for it. In the Habsburg monarchy of the mid-nineteenth century, significant opportunities for the realization of the Polish reason of state emerged as a consequence of the adoption of the Constitution, the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the granting of autonomy to Galicia. To solve the issue of the independence of the Commonwealth of Poland and to unite the Polish lands, Polish patriots had to choose between the interests of Poland and those of the Habsburg monarchy; in short, between patriotism and Austrophilism. The ideas of fighting for the Polish reason of state in the liberal Habsburg monarchy changed over time and ranged from loyalty and the Polish-Austrian agreement, through the fight for the separation of Galicia and the pro-Austrian orientation, up to the pursuit of independence.

One can agree with Dorota Litwin-Lewandowska that the offer of the Habsburg Monarchy to Poles in Galicia was also an opportunity for Poles living in the Prussian and Russian partitions. It gave an opportunity to execute many national

7 M. Król, “Przedmowa”, in: M. Król (ed.), *Stańcycy. Antologia myśli społecznej i politycznej konserwatystów krakowskich*, (Warszawa 1985), p. 62.

8 Ibid. See also: *Stańcycy*, p. 61.

interests and aspirations that were not possible in the territories annexed to the Reich and the tsarist empire.⁹ For the Poles from the Russian partition, limited by the repressive character of the autocracy, it was obvious to fight for the implementation of the independence program on the most promising grounds. After 1867, the conspirators from the Congress Kingdom did not have to emigrate, as the patriots after the lost uprisings had, since after the political changes there were opportunities for action in the liberal Danube monarchy. The fate of Józef Piłsudski and the socialists, and their relations with the Habsburg monarchy testify to the importance of Austro-Hungarian Empire for the representatives of Polish patriotic groups. Piłsudski did not see any problem in choosing an ally from among the partitioning states. It could not have been Russia, “this Asian monster, covered with a European varnish.” His deportation to Siberia cured him of all illusions about the significance and strength of the Russian revolution and cleared the way for the Western European influence. Piłsudski found an ally in the Austro-Hungarian constitutional state of law, which guaranteed broad autonomy and political and cultural freedoms to Poles in Galicia. As a result, Galicia became an operational base for the socialists from the Russian partition, and in the long term a bridgehead for military preparations to fight the biggest enemy – Russia.¹⁰

As I have already mentioned, the Polish reason of state was defined in different ways by representatives of particular political orientations in the years 1867–1918 in Galicia during the autonomous period. The same applies to other partitions, especially the Russian one, whose representatives (Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski) also fought for Poland beyond the battlefield. Indeed, they largely influenced the struggle for an independent state and national interests.

Thus, the focus of this preface will not be limited to the political context of the Polish reason of state, which required Poland to regain its independence, rebuild the Polish state and secure it with appropriate alliances. The Polish patriots sought to fulfil the Polish reason of state also on other levels – civilizational and military. The civilizational reason of state required Poland to be permanently connected with modern civilization and cultivate its values, while the military reason of state required Poles to organize independent arm forces, which would ensure the victory of an independent state and would guard its future borders.

9 D. Litwin-Lewandowska, *O polską rację stanu*, p. 366.

10 J. W. Pobóg-Malinowski, *Józef Piłsudski 1867–1914*, Łomianki 2015, pp. 216–217, 369–371.

The political dimension of the Polish reason of state

After the downfall of the Commonwealth, the Polish reason of state required an effort to rebuild the state. The defeat of the January Uprising and the loss of the opportunity for regaining independence brought an awareness of the necessity to seek an ally who would contribute to the pursuit of Polish interests. Naturally, Polish political circles saw Austria as a perfect fit for this role. This widespread belief rested on the assumption that the countries had common interests and enemies. In the memorandum from 1865 addressed to the Austrian Prime Minister Count Richard von Belcredi, Antoni Zygmunt Helcel, a conservative politician and legal scholar, saw the source of Poles' fondness for the Habsburgs in their earlier ties with the Jagiellonian dynasty, their attachment to Catholicism, and the threat from Russia.¹¹

After the defeat of Austria by Prussia in the battle of Königgrätz in 1866, Polish politicians from the nobility seemed to think that, in the next war, Austria in an alliance with France would defend the Polish interest against Prussia and Russia. The Polish noblemen also hoped for the help of the Austrian court in their conflict with peasants and Ukrainians. In the pro-Habsburg atmosphere, Adam Potocki wrote an address to the Diet of Galicia and Lodomeria (adopted on December 10, 1866), which he concluded with the following words: "With You, Your Majesty, we want to stand and we do stand!" It proclaimed the readiness of Poles to serve the Habsburg monarchy on the condition that they were granted autonomy, that their national rights were respected, and that Austria supported the Polish cause against Russia.¹² According to Henryk Wereszycki, it was an offer of an alliance between the Polish nation and the Habsburg dynasty.¹³ However, the situation changed after the agreement between the Austrian authorities and the Hungarians who remained in the opposition. The establishment of the Dual Monarchy caused disputes among Polish politicians. The "Polish Program" from

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- 11 W. Kozub-Ciembroniewicz, *Austria a Polska w konserwatyzmie Antoniego Z. Helcela 1846–1865* (Kraków 1986), p. 130; S. Pijaj, *Między polskim patriotyzmem a habsburskim lojalizmem. Polacy wobec przemian ustrojowych monarchii habsburskiej (1866–1871)* (Kraków 2003), p. 33.
 - 12 S. Kieniewicz, *Historia Polski 1795–1918* (Warszawa 1996), pp. 300–303; S. Grodziski, *W Królestwie Galicji i Lodomerii* (Kraków 1976), pp. 226–229; S. Grodziski, *Franciszek Józef I*, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk 1978, pp. 119–120; S. Grodziski, *Sejm Krajowy Galicyjski 1861–1914*, vol. 2 (Warszawa 1993), pp. 254–257; H. Wereszycki, *Historia Austrii* (Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk 1986), p. 232 ff.
 - 13 H. Wereszycki, *Historia polityczna Polski 1864–1918* (Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk-Łódź 1990), pp. 23 ff.

August 8, 1867, signed by Florian Ziemiałkowski and supported by the parliamentary Polish Circle, accepted the dualism of the monarchy; it also emphasized the need to create a strong Austrian state and to improve the administration of Cisleithania in a federalist spirit.¹⁴ Franciszek Smółka, in turn, requested to oppose, and not to send a delegation to the Imperial Council in Vienna, first demanding for Galicia a similar self-government and a status like the Hungarian Kingdom had obtained. Eventually the Diet of Galicia and Lodomeria adopted a compromise motion on September 24, 1867 and delegates from Galicia appeared in Vienna at the sessions of the Imperial Council.¹⁵ By the settlement reached in 1867 and the adoption of the December Constitution, Austria became the most liberal of all three partitioning states.¹⁶ In the Austrian partition, the

14 Z. Fras & S. Pijaj (eds.), *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w wiedeńskiej Radzie Państwa (lata 1867–1868)*, Kraków 2001, pp. 184–188; J. Zdrada, “Organizacja i stanowisko Koła Polskiego w wiedeńskiej Radzie Państwa (1861–1862),” *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Prace Historyczne*, vol. 12, 1963, pp. 62–76; S. Pijaj, *Między polskim patriotyzmem*, pp. 162–164.

15 E. Olszewski, “Franciszek Smolka – polityk i parlamentarzysta,” in: W. S. Kucharski (ed.), *Polacy w austriackim Parlamencie. W 130 rocznicę Koła Polskiego* (Lublin-Wiedeń 1997), p. 202; S. Pijaj, *Między polskim patriotyzmem*, pp. 381–386; D. Szymczak, *Galiczyjska ambasada w Wiedniu*, pp. 19–35.

16 According to Andrzej Dziadzio, the Dual Monarchy (1867–1914) combined the monarchic factor of government with the system of the liberal and constitutional legal order. “The Austrian constitutional monarchy has become the prototype of the modern rule of law, as it has created numerous institutions for the legal protection of citizens against arbitrary exercise of power.” Austrians have developed a way to safeguard civil liberties and rights in the form of an independent, special constitutional court. “The activities of the Imperial Court and the Administrative Court have contributed to forcing the state apparatus to respect the constitutional order of law.” The disadvantage of the Constitution of 1867 was the centralist structure of the state and the lack of a proper solution to nationality issues, which meant that the stabilization of the state depended on maintaining a strong position of the imperial power. “The political system of the Austrian monarchy did not, therefore, develop into a parliamentary system, but brought a return to the monarch’s authoritarianism, since in the end the legal system was increasingly based on special imperial regulations.” Nationalism and anti-Semitism that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, contributed to the gradual loss of the monarchy’s universalist character. Austrian state tribunals counteracted nationalist and anti-Semitic movements and saw this as an abuse of constitutional freedoms. The crisis of the liberal legal system in the late period of the existence of the Austrian constitutional monarchy led to the strengthening of governmental structures, which

constitution granted considerable autonomy to some Polish Crown's lands, including Galicia.¹⁷

The conservative Stanisław Koźmian raised a fundamental question: what was the Polish "post-partitions patriotism" supposed to look like? The constitutional reforms implemented in the monarchy, including the decentralization of the state and the liberalization of its policy toward non-German nations, inspired pro-Habsburg attitudes in Galicia at the time of the Autonomy. Thus, there was a growing acceptance in Polish society for the Austrian rule, which, to some extent, harmonized with the Polish reason of state. This created favorable conditions for the pursuit of Polish national interests and led to the popularization of the idea of Galicia as a Polish Piedmont.¹⁸ The considerable degree of self-government and the participation in ruling made it possible for Galicia to influence decision-making in the Habsburg state. This influence, however, had its limits set by the ruling elite and the emperor himself, the system of monarchy, and the interests of other nations, especially Germans, Czechs, and Hungarians. Loyalism and sober political calculation also determined the participation of Polish politicians in the parliamentary and governmental work of the Habsburg Monarchy.¹⁹

Polish politics in Galicia was dominated for a long time by the Cracow conservatives. The dilemma of how to preserve the fundamental goal of regaining independence at the time of captivity, while using evolutionary means for its pursuit, called for rejection of an irredentist program and advocated turning to reason rather than emotions. The Stańcycy stood for the loyalty to the partitioning state, but they also propagated statehood consciousness.²⁰ In his work, "Z doświadczeń i rozmyślań", S. Tarnowski pointed out that the nineteenth century was permeated by a pursuit of historical justice, which resulted, among

operated in a clerical and conservative spirit, thus being counteracted by independent courts with their jurisprudence. A. Dziadzio, *Monarchia konstytucyjna w Austrii (1867–1914). Władza – obywatel – prawo* (Kraków 2001), pp. 289–290; W. Łazuga, *Monarchia habsburska. Między idealizacją a alienacją* (Poznań 2010), pp. 5–7, 16–25.

- 17 H. Wereszycki, *Historia Austrii*, pp. 232–233; S. Kieniewicz, *Historia Polski*, pp. 300–303; S. Grodziski, *Franciszek Józef I*, pp. 119–120; *Ibid.*, *Sejm Krajowy Galicyjski*, vol. 2, pp. 254–257.
- 18 H. Wereszycki, *Niewygasła przeszłość. Refleksje i polemiki* (Kraków 1987), pp. 183–188; K. K. Daszyk, "Między polską racją stanu a habsburskim mitem. Dom Habsburgów w galicyjskiej myśli politycznej doby autonomicznej, in: W. Bogusiak, J. Buszko (eds.), *Galicja i jej dziedzictwo. Historia i polityka* (Rzeszów 1994), vol. 1, p. 78.
- 19 J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, *passim*.
- 20 M. Król, "Przedmowa," in: *Stańcycy*, pp. 15–19; A. Rzegocki, *Racja stanu*, pp. 64 ff.

others, in Polish uprisings. They did not contribute to the regaining of the independence, since the Polish cause was “an expression of a contradiction between the Christian conscience and civilization and the actual situation of Europe.” It consisted in a retreat from justice to a “struggle for existence,” in which the strongest countries, including invaders, win.²¹ In a world where both the conscience of the elites and the awareness of the law, to which all should submit, disappeared, there was no place for the Polish state, erased from the map of Europe by the policy of effectiveness.²² In the late 1870s, the persistent belief that the agreement with the Habsburg monarchy may be conducive to the Polish national cause led the *Stańcyzy* to embrace triple loyalism, which meant giving up Polish political aspirations also in the Russian and German partitions.²³

Galician democrats saw the reason of state as a long-term goal – the independence of Poland. They assumed that they could “rebuild our homeland through lawful means” (1897).²⁴ Such an attitude was consistent with their loyalty to Austria, especially to the emperor, and, to a lesser extent, to Austrian state institutions. However, their conciliatory position was in fact a political tactic: they were Polish patriots, not Austrian ones.²⁵

For National Democrats, it was crucial to answer the following question: can we strive for a united Poland and its political strengthening, even under a foreign rule? The endeavors of the ideological leaders – Roman Dmowski and Zygmunt Balicki – headed toward a realistic approach to the problem, i.e. to undertake modernization efforts, also relying on underestimated masses. They stressed the importance of understanding that the Polish national interest and its strength are the most important and fundamental element in the international relations.²⁶ According to Balicki, a consolidation of Poles into a strong nation was a necessary condition for Poland to gain recognition on the international arena and regain an independence.²⁷ In Dmowski’s conception, the Polish reason of the state in contemporary European reality came down to the principle that the ends

21 A. Rzegocki, *Racja stanu*, pp. 284–286.

22 A. Rzegocki, *Racja stanu*, pp. 292 ff.

23 M. Król, “Przedmowa,” in: *Stańcyzy*, pp. 28–36.

24 M. Janowski, *Inteligencja wobec wyzwań nowoczesności. Dylematy ideowe demokracji liberalnej w Galicji w latach 1889–1914* (Warszawa 1996), pp. 41 ff.

25 M. Janowski, *Inteligencja*, pp. 42 ff.

26 W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej 1864–1914* (Warszawa 1933), pp. 180–281; A. Rzegocki, *Racja stanu*, pp. 256–260.

27 W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej*, pp. 282–284; A. Rzegocki, *Racja stanu*, pp. 260–262.

justify the means. Thus, in appropriate conditions, Dmowski allowed the use of revolutionary methods, while, in other cases, he recommended the tactics of lawful action or even loyalism. The revived Polish state should adopt the principles of international relations, i.e. prepare for competition and struggle.²⁸

To be sure, it was utopian to believe that, in a short-term perspective, Poles could achieve this goal on their own. National Democrats considered two options. Initially, it was the Austro-Hungarian option and the idea of the division of Galicia into a separate entity within the Habsburg monarchy, borrowed from the Galician Democrats, that appeared to be most consistent with Polish national interests.²⁹ At the turn of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, however, National Democrats began to oppose the Austrian orientation, including the “Austrianization tendencies” in Galicia. This found expression in their loyalty to the partitioner at the expense of national solidarity.³⁰ According to National Democrats, the interests of the Habsburg monarchy and Poles were not identical. Therefore, they treated Galicia as a part of Poland and its future state. They accused conservatives of an excessive commitment to the Habsburg monarchy. It was not unreasonable, since in 1913 W. L. Jaworski claimed: “We do not see any differences between the Polish policy and the dynastic state policy.”³¹ They saw an alternative in developing an active national attitude and real patriotism in the society, a patriotism based on a sense of the national interest and a responsibility for collective actions.³² That is why National Democrats rejected the concept of Galicia as a “Polish Piedmont” as too backward. They also criticized any service to the state which, in internal politics, drove a wedge between Ukrainians and Poles, while, in foreign politics, was allied with the German Reich, the greatest enemy of Polish statehood.³³

Instead of supporting condemned Austria and hateful Germany, National Democrats stood for uniting all three partitions under the Russian rule.³⁴ After

28 A. Rzegocki, *Racja stanu*, pp. 262, 299–303.

29 W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej*, pp. 285–286; M. Janowski, *Inteligencja*, p. 242; G. Krzywiec, *Szowinizm po polsku. Przypadek Romana Dmowskiego (1886–1905)* (Warszawa 2009), p. 362.

30 T. Kulak, “Między austriacką lojalnością a polską narodowością. Narodowa Demokracja przeciw mitologizowaniu politycznych i narodowych walorów autonomicznej Galicji na przełomie XIX i XX w.,” in: *Galicja i jej dziedzictwo*, vol. 1, pp. 57 ff.

31 T. Kulak, *Między austriacką...*, pp. 62 ff.

32 T. Kulak, *Między austriacką...*, pp. 65.

33 T. Kulak, *Między austriacką...*, pp. 66–67.

34 B. Toruńczyk, “Wstęp,” in: B. Toruńczyk (ed.), *Narodowa Demokracja. Antologia myśli politycznej, Przeglądu Wszepolskiego 1895–1905* (Warszawa 1981), p. X.

the revolutionary events of 1904–1906, they decided that the best solution would be neither a revolution, which Dmowski had strongly criticized,³⁵ nor a war, for there was no hope for the modification of state borders. Dmowski called for an end to the fight against the Russian tsardom. Looking for real profits, he was ready to accept the postulate of the autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland and its belonging to Russia, which, together with Poland, was to act as a defender of Europe against Germany.³⁶ In 1906, National Democrats were elected to the Russian State Duma, where they followed the line of the conciliatory camp. Dmowski began to oppose the struggle for independence and to champion the Russian reason of state, as he believed that it was in the interest of Western states, not to weaken Russia, but to strengthen it. Despite the criticism of the tsarist government in the Kingdom, Dmowski's policy was designed to cooperate with the tsardom also in the event of war in Europe.³⁷ Dmowski's nationalism diverged increasingly from the traditional understanding of patriotism – democratic, focused on independence, and anti-Russian. Dmowski did not take into consideration the consequences of unifying the Polish lands under the conditions laid down by Russia, namely – captivity under the rule of a despotic satrap. Such a radical evolution of the leader's views caused further splits within the National Democracy, as his position did not meet with unanimous acceptance among the movement's members.³⁸

The shift in the tactics of the National Democracy influenced the perception of the Polish reason of state. This was reflected in the controversy between Dmowski and the historian Szymon Askenazy. Askenazy promoted the program of revival of the Polish reason of state, invoking the idea of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the historical imperialist traditions. His program met the

35 Dmowski called the revolution: “a political syphilis.” See A. Micewski, *Roman Dmowski* (Warszawa 1971), p. 131.

36 W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej*, pp. 324–325; A. Micewski, *Roman Dmowski*, pp. 132–144; J. Molenda, *Piłsudczycy a narodowi demokraci 1908–1918* (Warszawa 1980), pp. 91–95; B. Toruńczyk, “Wstęp,” in: *Narodowa Demokracja*, p. XVIII.

37 R. Dmowski, *Niemcy, Rosja i kwestia polska* (Wrocław 2013), pp. 140–141; A. Micewski, *Roman Dmowski*, pp. 137–144; B. Toruńczyk, “Wstęp,” in: *Narodowa Demokracja*, p. XIX.

38 A. Micewski, *Roman Dmowski*, pp. 146–148; T. Nałęcz, *Irredenta polska*, Warszawa 1992, pp. 141–148.

aspirations of the independence community in Galicia and Congress Poland.³⁹ National Democrats, in turn, promoted their notion of national interest instead of the reason of state based on the idea of a sovereign state. What defined this interest was the role and place of the ethnic community opposed to a hostile international environment. The interest of the Polish nation as a whole became “the highest measure of political values.” Without concealing his anti-Semitism, Dmowski described Askenazy’s program as a threat to the influence of the National Democracy: “He [Askenazy] invented the term ‘Polish reason of state’ in opposition to ‘national interest’ invoked by the All-Polish Youth [a youth organization of the National Democracy’s camp]. The first term could include the Jews, the second – had to oppose the Jews.”⁴⁰ Another difference in their understandings of the Polish reason of state was also based on the fact that Dmowski was ready to unite the Polish lands under the thumb of an authoritarian tsar, which meant giving up the autonomy of Galicia. Askenazy, in turn, believed that the reconstruction of Poland required a large-scale war based on a conflict between the partitioning powers. The result of such an international clash should be “the highest good: the regained existence, freedom, and independence.”⁴¹

Piłsudski dreamt of conducting political activity modelled on workers’ movements in Western countries, who enjoyed political liberties in their struggle against the capitalist system. In the Russian partition, this was impossible due to the existence of the “despotic tsarist government.”⁴² The Habsburg constitutional monarchy, in turn, tended toward the Western model, paving the way for legal political actions.⁴³ Indeed, the same applies to the German Reich in spite of its anti-Polish policy. Since 1882, Piłsudski’s contacts with socialists from the Austrian partition (Polish Social-Democratic Party of Galicia and Silesia – PPSD) furnished an opportunity to pursue the anti-Russian and independence agenda. Also, in order to make use of the “sword of parliamentarianism,” Piłsudski and the socialists from Congress Poland supported the PPSD’s efforts to become a member of the Imperial Council during the election of the fifth curia of

39 The representatives of the irredenta believed the national interest of Poland to be most important, accepting the rights of other nationalities. See: W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej*, p. 373; G. Krzywiec, *Szowinizm*, pp. 320–321.

40 G. Krzywiec, *Szowinizm*, p. 321.

41 S. Askenazy, *Uwagi*, pp. 8–9.

42 J. Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, vol. 1, pp. 153 ff.

43 Interestingly enough, Piłsudski mentioned that Galicia under the protectorate of Franz Joseph I of Austria was the “most liberated part of Poland;” *Pisma zbiorowe*, vol. VIII, s. 37; A. Garlicki, *Józef Piłsudski*, pp. 118 ff.

the general election in March 1897, which ended with the election of Ignacy Daszyński and Jan Kozakiewicz to the Chamber of Deputies of the Imperial Council of the 9th term (March 27, 1897 – Sept 7th, 1900).⁴⁴ Piłsudski was going “to make a fuss there and fight for our cause” and “to scold the Russian government.”⁴⁵ He highlighted the importance of the formation of the first socialist faction in the Austrian Parliament. “Undoubtedly, this is not enough for serious victories in the parliamentary legislative activity, but it is enough to keep the predatory appetites of the privileged classes in check and to awaken the masses of the working people unaware of the parliamentary struggle.”⁴⁶

Piłsudski did not lose sight of national interests, and saw that in the heated battle they were used for evil purposes. In 1901, he distinguished two types of patriotism – possessive and defensive. The former “is currently a political slogan in most European powers. It has millions of bayonets and cannons at its service, thousands of spokesmen in the form of ministers, journalists and scholars, plenty of money squeezed out of the working people. It pushes the nations to a fratricidal fight, it conquers countries and sucks them up like a spider and a fly.”⁴⁷ Piłsudski condemned possessive patriotism because it was “contrary to the simplest sense of justice, poisoning the moral atmosphere among the partitioning states and life among the oppressed that every decent man, regardless of his convictions, must speak out against it.”⁴⁸ The defensive patriotism, caused, for example, by the assault of the tsarist invader on oppressed Poles, Lithuanians and Jews in Lithuania was a manifestation of natural self-defense of national rights related to the interests and needs of various groups and layers of their population.⁴⁹ For Piłsudski, bringing the Polish *raison d'état* down to national interests only was a simplification, as it carried the threat of abuse of other national and social groups. Referring to the universal principles binding on everyone, he condemned Polish chauvinists who took advantage of cultural and economic superiority in Lithuania, often with the help of priests who often developed the

44 J. Buszko, “Józef Piłsudski w Krakowie 1896–1935, Kraków 1990, p. 5; J. Gaul, Józef Piłsudski wobec wyborów do parlamentu austriackiego oraz działalności polskich posłów socjalistycznych IX kadencji (1897–1900),” *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, 2018, vol. 4.

45 *Listy Józefa Piłsudskiego*, vol. 16: *Niepodległość*, 1937, p. 504; J. Gaul, *Czarno-żółty miraż*, pp. 23 ff.

46 J. Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, vol. I, p. 164.

47 J. Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, vol. II, p. 23.

48 J. Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, vol. II, p. 24.

49 J. Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, vol. II, p. 25.

activity of Polonization with the support of bishops. He also stigmatized the patriotism of possessing classes, who, in order to preserve their interests, sought help and support from the tsarist authorities.⁵⁰ The healthy core of patriotism consisted in “the natural feeling of love for one’s country and its culture, and the defense of the nation’s right to exist independently when this right is violated.”⁵¹ It was the most fully expressed in a sovereign state that referred to the imponderables, i.e. values necessary for the survival of a community and preservation of its identity⁵²: freedom, law, tolerance, also for other religions and nations, which are rooted in the tradition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Western civilization. It is for a reason that Piłsudski measured the civilizational development of a given country on the basis of its freedom of speech.⁵³

As a result of different assessment of the threat to national interests, there were formed the so-called orientations, i.e. siding with one of the partitioning states as a tactical ally in the conflict. Certain factions related the fate of Poland with Austria-Hungary, others sought support in Russia. The choice of a lesser evil had its price, because it also entailed choosing the most significant enemy. For the nationalists it was Germany, for the independence camp – Russia. The defeat of Russia meant either the incorporation of the Polish territories into the Habsburg Monarchy or the creation of a Polish state. Both possibilities were only a step toward gaining a triple-agreed independence, the ultimate goal of the independence parties associated since 1912 in the Temporary Coordinating Commission of Confederated Independence Parties (*Komisja Tymczasowa Skonfederowanych Stronnictw Niepodległościowych – KTSSN*).⁵⁴

The assassination of the heir of the throne Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, the difficult to accept ultimatum against the Serbian government and the manifesto “To My People” by Emperor Franz Joseph I led to the awaited by the Austrians war in the Balkans. It quickly turned into an armed conflict with Russia, France and Great Britain, and eventually into a world war, thanks to the system of alliances. For Poles, the outbreak of the war, with the participation of the partitioning countries fighting against each other, meant a shift in the international economic situation. The Polish Club and the Galician factions, as parts of the anti-Russian orientation, opted for resolving the Polish question with

50 J. Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, vol. II, p. 27.

51 J. Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, vol. II, p. 27.

52 A. Rzegocki, *Racja stanu*, pp. 308–310.

53 J. Suleja, *Józef Piłsudski*, pp. 33, 68.

54 J. Molenda, *Piłsudczycy*, pp. 25–39; 73 ff; W. Suleja, *Józef Piłsudski*, pp. 90–92.

the help of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, assuming the creation of an independent Polish state within the Habsburg Monarchy (trialism, personal union, secundogeniture). In order to gather all Poles capable of fighting the victorious fight against Russia in the ranks of the Polish Legions, the Supreme National Committee (Naczelny Komitet Narodoty – NKN) was appointed on August 16, 1914. The Committee consisted of Polish deputies to the Viennese Parliament of all political groups and it was chaired by president of the Polish Club Juliusz Leo.⁵⁵ The NKN actively promoted the Austro-Polish solution and fought pro-Russian attitudes.⁵⁶

The independence movement consisting of two currents: the socialist-independence and the nationalist-independence movement, was striving for full independence. Initially, the official minimum political program of Piłsudski during the war was to merge Galicia and the Kingdoms of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. He included that in the letter of September 1, 1915, to president of the Polish Club Jaworski; this was also what connected him to the NKN. Cooperation with Austria on the previous terms, without compensation for the recruitment that had been carried out on the lands of the Russian partition, did not give any benefit to the Polish case. From August 1915 onwards, the agitation of Piłsudski's proponents grew; it regarded the creation of the Polish state, which would include the Kingdom of Poland for its territorial base, with the possibility of incorporating other areas of the annexed lands, and with its own armed forces.⁵⁷

The attitude of many politicians, who were linked with the pro-Austrian orientation, changed in the summer of 1916. After negotiations, Austria and Germany decided to create a Polish state on the territory of the Kingdom of Poland; the Austrian authorities additionally decided to extend the autonomy of Galicia within the Habsburg Monarchy, which meant giving up the Austro-Polish solution. The abrupt reactions of the deputies of the Polish Club manifested in the resolution put forward by member of the peasant movement Wincenty Witos in

55 Fearing the loss of influence among society, National Democrats from Galicia initially opted for the Austro-Polish solution in order to unite the Polish lands and regain sovereignty. Later, they began to withdraw from loyalty toward Austria – D. Litwin-Lewandowska, *O polską rację stanu*, pp. 447–457, 462–463.

56 A. Hausner, *Die Polenpolitik der Mittelmächte und die österreichisch-ungarische Militärverwaltung in Polen während des Weltkrieges*, (Vienna: 1935), p. 44; J. Molenda, *Piłsudczycy*, pp. 15 ff; M. Drozdowski, *Naczelny Komitet Narodowy 1914–1918. Polityczne i organizacyjne zaplecze Legionów Polskich*, (Cracow: 2017).

57 J. Molenda, *Piłsudczycy*, pp. 266–268.

October 1916. According to the resolution, the Polish Club “protests as solemnly as possible against all attempts to divide Polish lands and expresses the conviction that our historical injustice will be fully repaired.”⁵⁸

On November 5, 1916, an act was proclaimed, in which the monarchs: German Emperor William II and Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph I, announced their decision to create the independent Polish Kingdom from the Polish lands, “liberated from the Russian subjugation,” with hereditary monarchy and constitutional system.⁵⁹ The event was momentous, regardless of the temporary maintenance of the new state’s management in the hands of the invaders and the real intentions of Austria-Hungary and Germany: whether it was a desire to replenish human resources in the armies of central states or a desire to define a framework for the implementation of German political plans and the establishment of a buffer Polish state, which is part of “Mitteleuropa.”⁶⁰

The act of November 5 was severely criticized by National Democrats. One of the reasons was the change of political concept under the influence of representatives residing in the West. They attempted to gain support of the authorities of the Entente states and the USA for the Polish cause. The mission was difficult, because France and England left the Polish question at the exclusive disposal of the tsarist authorities until the outbreak of the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia. Beside the unification of all Polish territories, the program of National Democrats included also a demand to create a separate country, instead of the previous state of autonomy, and to organize its forces to fight against the threat of the Germans.⁶¹ Nationalists put too much faith in the Entente’s selfless engagement in Polish affairs. They emphasized their realism, but were astonishingly blind to the dangerous consequences of reducing the *raison d’état* only to

58 ÖStA/KA Wien, Armeeoberkommando (AOK) Evidenzbüro (EvB), kart. 3550, EvB K. Nr. 21827. Polizeidirektion in Wien, Pr. Z. 34389/K; L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, II. 1915–1922, (Warsaw: 1925), pp. 100–104; W. L. Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, chosen and edited by M. Czajka, (Warsaw: 1997), pp. 133–135; W. Witos, *Moje wspomnienia*, part I, (Warsaw: 1998), p. 369.

59 *Powstanie II Rzeczypospolitej. Wybór dokumentów 1866–1925*, ed. H. Janowska, T. Jędruszczak, (Warsaw: 1981), p. 293.

60 J. Gaul, *Służby wywiadowczo-informacyjne Austro-Węgier wobec radykalnego ruchu niepodległościowego w Królestwie Polskim 1914–1918*, (Warsaw: 2006), pp. 276 ff; D. Szymczak, *Między Habsburgami a Hohenzollernami. Rywalizacja niemiecko-austro-węgierska w okresie I wojny światowej a odbudowa państwa polskiego*, (Cracow: 2009), pp. 214–217.

61 Molenda, *Piłsudczycy*, pp. 269–271.

the national interests of Poland. In confrontation with not only the partitioning powers but also the Western states, Poland did not have much chance, because in the game of interests the stronger side always wins.

Such mistake was avoided by the supporters of the independence option, who had no illusions about the discrepancy between the political goals of England and France and the interests of Poland, or about the submissiveness of National Democrats to the Entente.⁶² On March 21, 1918, Komisja Porozumiewawcza Stronnictw Demokratycznych (KPSD, Democratic Parties' Negotiation Committee) stated: "In our struggle for freedom, for the existence of the Polish nation, we did not reject any help from wherever it could have come, and therefore from the countries of the coalition. But we shall not build anything on the basis of this help. We consider the coalition only an objective fact that, regardless of its tendencies, its views on Poland, may to some extent distract the pressure of the hostile powers."⁶³ The only way out of the situation was an active policy of building the Polish statehood. This obliged the coalition "to take into account the fact that Poland as a state already exists and that if the states of the coalition want to play a role or at least keep up appearances of Poland's benefactors. . . they must work on improving the already existing form of the state. . . Should the coalition do something for us while reaching peace, it will only be as much as noticing us as an already existing state and if international customs allow it to interfere in our fate. If Poland were a territory conquered by the Central Powers and those territories could not be considered subdued, the coalition would consider itself completely removed from the right to speak on our behalf."⁶⁴ Let us add that the coalition would maintain a similar passivity if it were to win, and there would be no revolution in Russia, and the Tsarist would remain the quarterback in Central and Eastern Europe, who would dictate the conditions for solving the Polish case.⁶⁵ From this perspective and by virtue of the patent of September 1917

62 Piłsudski explained the failure to include representatives of the Interparty Club in the Provisional Council of State at the end of 1916 with their fear of dissatisfaction of the Entente – J. Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, vol. 6, p. 207; W. Baranowski, *Rozmowy z Piłsudskim 1916–1931*, (Warsaw: 1930), pp. 25 ff.

63 Molenda, *Piłsudczycy*, pp. 391 ff.

64 A letter from the beginning of 1918 of the Polish Democratic Committee in St. Petersburg to the left-wing independence parties in the Kingdom of Poland – Molenda, *Piłsudczycy*, pp. 391–392.

65 The coalition was ready to seek agreement even with Red Russia and, at the cost of Poland, to stop its march toward the West, as evidenced by British negotiations with the Bolsheviks in summer 1920 – A. Nowak, *Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu: 1920 – zapomniany appeasement*, (Cracow: 2015).

issued by the Regency Council we should assess the following: the importance of the act of November 5, 1916, the creation of independent Kingdom of Poland and the Provisional Council of State. They led to a gradual and slow, but increasingly far-reaching reconstruction of statehood, the most important dimension of Polish *raison d'état*.

When Charles I became Emperor of the Danube Monarchy after the death of Franz Joseph I, the attempt to repair the state and the program of “peace outside and reform inside” were of no use.⁶⁶ The radical attitudes of the Polish deputies the day before the resumption of the proceedings of the Imperial Council manifest in the resolution passed in May 1817, at the request of the people’s deputy Włodzimierz Tetmajer: “The Polish Club in the Diet states that the only aspiration of the Polish people is to reclaim an independent, united Poland with access to the sea; the Polish Club recognizes itself in solidarity with this aspiration. The Polish Club in the Diet further states the international nature of this matter and considers its implementation a guarantee of lasting peace. The Polish Club in the Diet hopes that the benevolent Emperor of Austria will take this matter into his own hands. The restoration of the Polish State with Austria’s help will provide it with a natural and lasting ally.”⁶⁷

Another shock for the supporters of cooperation with Austria was the peace treaty signed by the Central States, as well as Bulgaria and Turkey, with the representatives of the Ukrainian People’s Republic on February 9, 1918 in Brest. Putting its own interest above that of Poland, Ukraine promised to provide Austria with food supplies in exchange for recognizing its independence. It paid for this with the annexation to Ukraine of the Chełm and Podlasie Lands, which were inhabited mostly by the Polish population.⁶⁸ In the manifesto adopted on 16 February by the parliamentary committee in Vienna, it was stated that “we do not want to take other people’s good or territories, but we want the Chełm and Podlasie Lands, which had belonged to Poland for centuries and are Poland’s dearest and martyred children.”⁶⁹ After the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest,

66 E. Demmerle, *Kaiser Karl I. „Selig, die Frieden stiften. . .“*. *Die Biographie*, (Vienna: 2004), pp. 133–141.

67 I. Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2 (Cracow: 1926), pp. 262–266; *Powstanie II Rzeczypospolitej*, p. 340; W. Łazuga, *Ostatni Stańczyk*, (Poznań: 1982), pp. 152 ff; J. Pajewski, *Odbudowa państwa polskiego 1914–1918*, (Warsaw: 1978), pp. 195–197; Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, pp. 321, 323–324.

68 *Powstanie II Rzeczypospolitej*, pp. 394 ff; J. Pajewski, *Pierwsza wojna światowa 1914–1918*, (Warsaw: 1991), pp. 652–663.

69 *Powstanie II Rzeczypospolitej*, pp. 394–395; 400–401; J. Pajewski, *Pierwsza wojna światowa*, pp. 652–663; *Z burzliwej doby. Mowy sejmowe posła Ignacego Daszyńskiego*,

Ignacy Daszyński acknowledged that on that day “the star of the Habsburg Monarchy on the Polish firmament died out,” and joined the opposition; in March 1918, he left the Polish Club together with the socialists.⁷⁰

Emperor Charles tried to save the Monarchy and announced the creation of a new federal state on October 16. The belated manifesto did not save the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but facilitated the emergence of national councils, which were a central factor in the break-up of the Empire.⁷¹ On October 15, the Polish Club adopted a resolution put forward by Daszyński at the meeting of the Joint Delegations, stating that the Polish deputies “from that moment on consider themselves citizens of a free, united and independent Polish state,” and demanded the implementation of necessary economic agreements “between the sovereign Polish State and the rest of the Austro-Hungarian State.”⁷² The resolution marked the end of the Polish Club’s activity in the Imperial Council of Austria and the end of Galicia’s century-long relation with Austria.⁷³ On October 28, in Cracow, the Polish Liquidation Committee (Polska Komisja Likwidacyjna) was established, which declared itself a “temporary district government”; it was at the initiative of Polish deputies, with the exception of the Conservatives. On October 31, the Austrian rule was finally overthrown in Cracow and other cities of Western Galicia.⁷⁴

wy ogłoszone w czasie od października 1918 do sierpnia 1919. Według protokołów stenograficznych (Lviv: 1920), pp. 5–17.

70 Najdus, *Ignacy Daszyński*, p. 356.

71 E. Demmerle, *Kaiser Karl I*, pp. 161–165; G. Kucharczyk, *Ostatni cesarz. Bł. Karol I Habsburg*, (Poznań: 2004), pp. 66–67.

72 I. Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, p. 309.

73 D. A. Litwin, “Udział Polaków w naczelnym organach państwa austriackiego w okresie dualistycznej monarchii,” in: *Polacy w austriackim Parlamencie. W 130 rocznicę Koła Polskiego*, ed. W. S. Kucharski (Lublin-Vienna: 1997), p. 120; J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, p. 331.

74 Z. Lasocki, *Wspomnienia szefa administracji Polskiej Komisji Likwidacyjnej i Komisji Rządzącej*, (Kraków: 1931); M. Klimecki, “Likwidacja austriackiej państwowości w Galicji w październiku i listopadzie 1918 roku,” in: *Między Wiedniem a Lwowem. Referaty polsko-austriackiej sesji poświęconej 80 rocznicy wybuchu pierwszej wojny światowej, Warszawa 1994 r.*, ed. A. Rzepiewski, (Warsaw: 1996), pp. 63–68; D. Litwin-Lewandowska, *O polską rację stanu*, pp. 505 ff; M. Przeniosło, *Polska Komisja Likwidacyjna 1918–1919* (Kielce: 2010).

Civilizational dimension of the Polish *raison d'état*

The participants of the struggle for the Polish *raison d'état* were faced with the problem of more than its political dimension. If the *raison d'état* was not to be a short-term game of interests, in which victory belonged to the stronger side, as it happened during the period of the partitions, then there arose a need for additional security. For the society deprived of its own statehood, this could not be international political alliances, often changeable and impermanent, although rooted in the community which went beyond the occasional sphere of politics and which was based on values and norms. The civilizational community was a matter of priority. During the partitions, many Poles were aware of this dimension of *raison d'état*. The aim was not only to preserve tradition, but also to avoid such political choices that could prompt the elimination of existing values and norms and push the country into the orbit of another civilization. Poles were forced to answer the following question: “how to act politically in an enslaved country, while working for future independence, in current work not only not to violate basic moral values and norms, but to strengthen them and their development,” in other words, how to avoid conflict between the aspirations for independence and moral and civilizational goals.⁷⁵

The dilemma of what kind of civilization Poles needed was the subject of lively debate in the nineteenth century.⁷⁶ The problem concerned not only the degree of modernity, but above all its provenance, i.e. the choice between the West and the East. Poles felt they were the representatives of Western civilization,⁷⁷ although the *Stańczycy* pointed to moral and customary problems as a result of “the prematurity of our civilizational development.” Józef Szujski emphasized that Poland, based on the traditions of the West, but remaining in the geopolitical shadow of Russia, faced the question of the future: “what to do about the further East, a different, invasive civilization, based on the unity of the Church with

75 M. Król, “Przedmowa,” in: *Stańczycy*, pp. 18 ff.

76 J. Jedlicki, *Jakiej cywilizacji Polacy potrzebują? Studia z dziejów idei i wyobraźni XIX wieku*, (Warsaw: 1988). In the second half of the nineteenth century, the discussion on the level of Galicia's civilization was triggered by a publication “Nędza galicyjska w cyfrach i program energicznego rozwoju gospodarstwa krajowego” (1888) by Stanisław Szczepanowski, who wrote: “We have assimilated the needs and appearances of civilization, but not its power and creativity. We work with the ineptitude of barbarians, and we have European tastes and needs” – M. Śliwa, “Nędza galicyjska. Mit i rzeczywistość,” in: *Galicja i jej dziedzictwo*, vol. 1, pp. 145–153.

77 F. Konieczny *O wielości cywilizacji*, p. 316. Konieczny saw the Polish culture as one of the possibilities of the Latin civilization.

the state and the traditions of the Eastern empire.”⁷⁸ Felix Konieczny claimed that “whenever the ‘synthesis between the West and the East’ was sought in Poland, the East would always triumph. As a result, we turned away from the West and during the reign of the Saxons, we devoted ourselves to . . . expanding the Turanian civilization toward the West. Stuck in oriental ignorance, we could not understand the distinction between public and private law. Laboriously, we were converting back to the Latin civilization, having lost our independence in these struggles.”⁷⁹ As a result of the partitions, Poland’s role of a barrier and a defender of Europe against Russia failed. Adam Mickiewicz believed that the Christian Poland had the task of defending Western civilization against “idolatrous and Mohammedan barbarism.”⁸⁰ On January 1, 1864, Julian Łukasiński postulated in his will: “Poland must be and will necessarily be separated from Russia. The security of Europe, its future stability, requires that Poland, strong and orderly, protected it from Russia, just as it used to protect it from the Turks and Tartars. This was Napoleon I’s plan when the war of 1812 commenced. Until this plan is implemented, Europe will remain in fear.”⁸¹

In contrast to the Eastern provenance of the Tsarist regime,⁸² the two other partitioning states – the German Reich and the Habsburg Monarchy – took pride in constituting part of Western civilization. For the Polish politicians of the time of autonomy in Galicia, it helped to swallow the bitter pill of cooperation with the Austrian invader. The address prepared by Antoni Helcel and presented to the Austrian Prime Minister Anton Schmerling on January 4, 1861, included the conviction of the special dynastic and catholic ties between the Poles and Austria.⁸³ In September 1866, the journal „Czas” (Time), issued in Cracow, informed that the Habsburg Monarchy was to play the role of the barrier protecting Europe from Russia. The Tsarist policy was dangerous to Europe, “because the absorption of the Slavic peoples by Russia would create an enormous state no longer under the emblem of civilized Caesarism, but of barbaric Tsarism.”⁸⁴ In the aforementioned address to Emperor Franz Joseph, Adam

78 *Stańcycy*, pp. 18, 149–159.

79 F. Konieczny, *O wielości cywilizacji*, p. 314.

80 Rzegocki, *Racja stanu*, p. 238.

81 Askenazy, *Uwagi*, p. 386.

82 F. Konieczny considered Russia to be a mixture of civilisations based on the Toranian civilisation, composed of communities, but without society, and where the state is owned and controlled by a despotic ruler – Konieczny, *O wielości cywilizacji*, pp. 290, 314.

83 Kozub-Ciembroniewicz, *Austria a Polska*, p. 130.

84 Pijaj, *Między polskim patriotyzmem*, p. 95.

Potocki expresses the faith that “in order to exist and bloom stronger than ever, Austria, in its internal political system, will involve the strongest expression of respected freedom, and on the outside, it will be the shield of Western civilization, national rights, humanity and justice. The awareness of its own wellbeing and the conscience of other nations concerned with the Christian and civilizational thought, will not allow Austria to stand alone while exercising this mission.”⁸⁵ The May Declaration was an expression of hope that the Monarchy will remain the enemy of the tsarist empire due to the difference in terms of religion and civilization shared with the former Republic of Poland. The continuation of the cooperation depended on Emperor Franz Joseph’s insistence on the common principles of Western civilization, nationality rights and justice.⁸⁶

The need to maintain relations with Austria for civilizational reasons was brought up in the “Polish Program” of the Polish Club in 1867. “We want a strong Austria for it to fulfill the mission given in the course of history; so that it could form a strong shield for modern state life and for the freedom of national development against Moscow’s stiffened absolutism and Asian barbarism, increasingly overtaking more and more in the east of Europe and leveling everything out.”⁸⁷ On September 12, 1868, during a debate in the Galician Diet, Franciszek Smolka stated that “. . . Poland must be, that there must be erected a bulwark, without which Europe cannot and will not come to devote itself to the matters of peace, skills and civilization. For it to happen, it is necessary to give Galicia a national and independent government. . . make it the point of crystallization that would enable Poland to group itself.”⁸⁸ Stefan Buszczyński, who emphasized Poland’s ties with Western civilization, was a landowner, insurgent and emigrant; he settled in 1868 in Cracow. In his pamphlet “Przyszłość Austrii. Rozwiązanie kwestii słowiańskiej” (The Future of Austria. Resolution of the Slavic Issue), he argued that the Habsburgs should tie their dynastic interest with the interests of the non-German nations, giving them broad autonomy, and lead to a Slavic-Hungarian federation (excluding Austria, which would merge into a German state). “In this way, the whole Slavdom [without Russia – JG] would stand up for the Habsburgs, it would be the shield of Europe against Asian invasions; in this way, the Habsburgs providing freedom and national rights to the inhabitants

85 *Galicja w dobie autonomicznej (1850–1914). Wybór tekstów*, ed. S. Kieniewicz (Wrocław: 1952), p. 99.

86 Król, “Przedmowa,” in: *Stańcyzy*, pp. 14 ff.

87 *Protokoły Koła Polskiego*, p. 184; Z. Fras, *Florian Ziemiałkowski (1817–1900). Biografia polityczna* (Wrocław: 1991), pp. 102–103; Pijaj, *Między polskim patriotyzmem*, p. 162.

88 Litwin Lewandowska, *O polską rację stanu*, p. 376.

from over the Daugava River, the Dnipro, the Danube, the Elba, the Oder and the Vistula, can save Europe.”⁸⁹

According to the *Stańczycy*, after the French-Prussian War and the Berlin Congress, the Polish issue was losing its importance in European politics. Poland was the reservoir of the values of Latin civilization and its task consisted in maintaining the continuity of Western culture and avoiding at all costs the adoption of the Eastern tradition.⁹⁰ In 1876, Tarnowski referred to the civilizational thread of the Polish *raison d'état* and enumerated the reasons why Galicia would remain on the side of Austria in case of war with Russia: “. . . we trust that in such a war, the Austrian Emperor and the army will be on the good side and that their victory will be the victory of Western civilization over the Eastern one, Catholic civilization over the Byzantine or that of St. Petersburg, the victory of the rights of nations over the blind drive of races and masses, and therefore also the victory of the Polish spirit and interest, maybe even material benefit of the Polish cause.”⁹¹ In 1891, Tarnowski warned that “in the struggle between Western and Eastern civilization, which is carrying out quietly, and which may once break out openly, if we do not want to deny and lose ourselves, we must hold on to the West against the East.”⁹² On August 29, 1884, Wojciech Count Dzieduszycki put forward a concept of the “Jagiellonian ideas.” He drew there a parallel between the Jagiellonian Republic and the Habsburg Monarchy – the multinational and multicultural states. “The historical mission of Austria is completely in line with that of Poland. After all, the state ruled by the Jagiellonian dynasty was also the state, in which various nations of various beliefs and of various civilizations united to . . . defend mutual human dignity.”⁹³

The conviction that the Habsburg state was a part of Western civilization and served the Polish cause was not only an expression of pious wishes. As a consequence of the changes in science, education and culture during the autonomous period, Cracow and Galicia became the center of Polishness. When Marian Zdziechowski crossed the Russian-Austrian border in Szczakowa for the first time after completing his studies in Dorpat, he felt the breath of freedom and understood that “at that moment, Galicia with its autonomy, with Polish schools, with its influence on state affairs and Austrian politics, was for us what the Duchy

89 Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej*, p. 198; K. K. Daszyk, “Między polską racją stanu,” in: *Galicja i jej dziedzictwo*, vol. 1, pp. 71 ff.

90 Król, “Przedmowa,” in: *Stańczycy*, pp. 26 ff.

91 Król, “Przedmowa,” in: *Stańczycy*, p. 15.

92 *Stańczycy*, p. 249.

93 Daszyk, *Między polską racją stanu*, p. 74.

of Warsaw was at the beginning of the century – the focal point of great hopes and a promise of their realization.⁹⁴ Many foreigners expressed similar feelings. French historian Alfred Rambaud, who visited Cracow in 1873, noted that, while Warsaw seemed to be a Russified and depressing city, Cracow evoked more optimistic feelings.⁹⁵ The French diplomat, traveler and writer, Baron Adolphe d'Avril, stayed in 1887 in Lviv and Cracow. He recognized the Wawel Castle as the first European city after his arrival from the East.⁹⁶

The socialists from the territories of the Russian partition treasured the civilizational assets of Galicia. On many occasions, Piłsudski expressed his belief in the need to rebuild the independent Polish state with democratic political institutions and developed social legislation. He was inspired by the models he saw in Western Europe, where he learned about the benefits of living in the constitutional system for workers' affairs and political struggle during his travels between 1894 and 1899. By giving the proletariat a democratic system, the independent Poland was at the same time supposed to eliminate the impediments provided by the partitioning government to the civilizational development of the conquered nation. Already in 1895, Piłsudski stationed his companions and himself to guard history, at the easternmost outpost of European socialism, in the historic role of defending the West from the partitioning and reactionary tsarism.⁹⁷ The message formulated at the end of the nineteenth century by Piłsudski and the socialist became the basic commandment of the Polish *raison d'état*. The assessment of the founder of the Social Democratic Party of Austria Victor Adler, who saw Ignacy Daszyński as a representative of the Western Social Democratic Party “in the East,” may be a reliable example.⁹⁸ The anti-Russian and pro-Western direction taken by Piłsudski and Daszyński resulted in the fact

94 Zdziechowski, *Widmo przyszłości*, p. 35.

95 K. Dunin-Ławowicz, “Obraz Krakowa i Galicji w XIX wieku w relacjach francuskich podróżników i pamiętnikarzy,” in: *Galicja i jej dziedzictwo*, vol. 1, p. 125.

96 Cited in: Dunin-Ławowicz, *Obraz Krakowa i Galicji*, p. 125.

97 Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, vol. 1, p. 95; Pobóg-Malinowski, *Józef Piłsudski*, p. 124; J. Gaul, *Józef Piłsudski wobec wyborów do parlamentu austriackiego*, *passim*. Many German socialists, including August Bebel and Frederick Engels, were convinced of the necessity of pushing Russia to the east, detaching Poland from it and resurrecting it as a democratic state. Pobóg-Malinowski, *Józef Piłsudski*, pp. 97–98.

98 V. Adler, *Briefwechsel mit August Bebel und Karl Kautsky, gesammelt und erläutert von Friedrich Adler* (Vienna: 1954), p. 34; Najdus, *Ignacy Daszyński*, p. 127. Daszyński had no illusions that the only way to advance the civilizational development of Galicia was to develop modern capitalism, giving the opportunity to “adapt to Western Europe of our entire nation.” - Śliwa, *Nędza galicyjska*, p. 152.

that a few years later, on November 10, 1912, they found themselves together in KTSSN, and in August 1914, they fought alongside Austria-Hungary against the tsarist empire.

The civilizational theme appeared also in the speeches of National Democrats, who – at the turn of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries – settled in Galicia for good. In the pamphlet published in 1895 “Ugoda czy walka” (Settlement or Fight) Dmowski emphasized that the national struggle against invading Russia was not only of existential nature, but also international, because Poland served as a sanitary cordon of Europe against the expansion of Russia.⁹⁹ In “Ze studiów nad szkołą rosyjską w Polsce” (From Studies of the Russian School in Poland) published in 1900, Dmowski argued that the Polish-Russian conflict was a clash of two separate civilizations. The difference between Western and Russian culture consisted in the slave mentality of society shaped by long-term political tyranny. On the other hand, the Western world, including Poland, formed communities of free people.¹⁰⁰ Dmowski’s conclusions initially did not differ from the negative opinions of opponents of the tsarist: “despite all their state apparatus, I consider the Moskals an Asian horde, not because they carry the Moskal culture to the West, but because they carry destruction everywhere they go.”¹⁰¹

When Dmowski started to criticize socialists, he started including in his writings accents related with depreciating socialists in the civilizational field. In 1902, in his article “Historia szlachenego socjalista” (The Story of a Noble Socialist”), Dmowski, assuming the foreignness of socialism, distinguished, among other things, the social type created by social degenerates: Revolutionists who constituted a recidivism of barbarism and a dangerous anachronism.¹⁰² “They seem to be the representatives of primitive, wild peoples lost in the civilizational society, not tied to any higher social organization, striking at every step of the way against our traditional institutions as the bars of the cage.”¹⁰³ Dmowski compared them to “representatives of the Stone Age” or to the not yet assimilated and not pressed into the notches of the settled civilized life “descendants of the Pechenegs, Cumans and other Asian guests” and their “return to the qualities of the original man.” Among these types, Dmowski saw socialists, because they

99 Krzywiec, *Szowinizm*, p. 190.

100 K. Kawalec, *Roman Dmowski*, (Editions Spotkania 1996), pp. 46 ff.

101 *Narodowa demokracja*, p. 80.

102 Krzywiec, *Szowinizm*, pp. 294 ff.

103 *Narodowa demokracja*, p. 109.

were “the natural enemies of the civilized state existence.”¹⁰⁴ In an article from 1903 Dmowski argued that socialism depraved the native intelligentsia and contributed to crisis, disorder and degeneration. He prophesied that an intelligentsia left to its own devices would draw false patterns from the West, remaining a “absorptive crowd.”¹⁰⁵

Dmowski justified his opposition to the transfer of liberal elements of Western European democracy to Poland in his book of 1903, “*Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka*” (The Thoughts of a Modern Pole). He believed that Liberal Democracy cares only about the good of the citizens and freedom, and does not consider the national interest. “As a result of the lack of independence of Polish intellectual and political life in the last century, while formulating its tasks, our democracy almost slavishly followed the Western European one, without taking into account the importance of the fundamental difference between our society and Western European democracy in terms of traditions and political inclinations.” The solution to the dilemma was to be “Polish democracy,” which was opposed to “liberal democracy.”¹⁰⁶ He rejected the concept of a nation formulated under the influence of democratic concepts and the development of the English society as a relationship between an individual and a nation based on elements of awareness. He adopted a dangerous assumption about the relationship between an individual and a nation based not on free will but on obedience to the collective will of the nation.¹⁰⁷ The anti-Western accents in Dmowski’s writings, e.g. “*Wewnętrzna polityka narodowa*” (The National Internal Policy) of 1913, was a result not only of his condemnation of the liberal order and market economy in Europe, but also of his anti-Semitic obsessions. He put forward an absurd thesis about the influence of Jews on social life, leading to a crisis of European civilization.¹⁰⁸ Anti-democracy, anti-liberalism and anti-socialism meant a growing split with the West, because civilization community was only possible on the basis of identical values.

The anti-Western course of National Democrats was reinforced by the belief that Germany was a threat. In 1908, Dmowski wrote: “The European East is no longer a threat, and the main source of danger for other nations, as well as for

104 *Narodowa Demokracja*, p. 109. Dmowski made an exception for Piłsudski, who allegedly accidentally joined the socialists – Micewski, *Roman Dmowski*, pp. 67 ff; Krzywiec, *Szowinizm*, pp. 294 ff.

105 Krzywiec, *Szowinizm*, pp. 289 ff.

106 Micewski, *Roman Dmowski*, pp. 76 ff.

107 Micewski, *Roman Dmowski*, pp. 106–109.

108 Krzywiec, *Szowinizm*, pp. 314–315.

Poland itself, has become central, German Europe.”¹⁰⁹ In the work “Niemcy, Rosja i kwestia polska” (Germany, Russia and the Polish Issue), he criticized the methods used by the German state to combat the Polish culture, which, in his opinion, led to “taking up the foundations of one’s own system: and ‘lowering the legal sense of all its citizens.’”¹¹⁰

As a result of the criticism of the West and the anti-German attitude, the direction of the civilizational development for Poland was diverted in a completely different direction.¹¹¹ The implementation of the Polish national interest, which, according to Dmowski, consisted in the unification of all Polish lands under the Tsar’s control, led to the undermining of the independence program and the policy of reconciliation. Dmowski distanced himself from the civilizational dimension of *raison d’état* and stood on the side of Russia, siding against the Germans. The victim of this was the concept of Austria-Poland and Austria bound by an alliance with the German Reich. Although, after all, the choice of an ally in the view of the approaching war had a civilizational dimension as well. European countries divided into two blocks. The Triple Alliance concluded in 1882 between Austria, Germany and Italy, and later repeatedly renewed, had a Western civilizational dimension.¹¹² France and England bonded with Russia and formed the Triple Entente (*Entente cordiale*). It was a rather exotic alliance, as it included the democratic states of the West and despotic Russia, the representative of the East. Entering a direct alliance with Russia and offering in return all Polish lands, National Democrats placed Poland in the realm of Eastern civilization. Only the Russian revolution saved the country from deadly danger.

The attitude of Piłsudski was different. Together with the radical independence camp, he sided with the Central States, which were politically, militarily and economically in conflict with England and France, although which also belonged to Western civilization. It allowed the civilizational dimension of the Polish *raison d’état* to be taken into account. Recognizing Russia as the main enemy made it difficult to implement the political and military dimension of the Polish *raison d’état*, as the obstacle was the alliance with Central States and the Polish Legions, which were part of the Austro-Hungarian army. As long as

109 *Narodowa Demokracja*, p. 201.

110 Dmowski, *Niemcy, Rosja i kwestia polska*, pp. 26–27; Rzegocki, *Racja stanu*, pp. 305–306.

111 Krzywiec, *Szowinizm*, s. 334.

112 After Italy left, “Triple Alliance” involved Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, which signed an alliance with Germany on August 2, 1914. Bulgaria joined the war on the side of the Central States in 1915.

Piłsudski could not stand on the side of France and England and maintained on the side of Central States, Russia was not eliminated from the game, which happened eventually as a result of the Russian Revolution in 1917. As Piłsudski explained to the Russian General Longen Romei, the member of the Allied Commission: “I have always been a friend of the Entente, but above all I had to take care of my homeland’s welfare. This necessity forced me to fight the Tsarist, which did not imply that I had any intention of fighting the Entente.”¹¹³ This was not the ex-post confessions of a repentant sinner. As early as 1914–1915, Piłsudski made attempts to establish contacts with the countries of the anti-German coalition and inform the West about his position. The most famous was the mission of Stanisław Patek, who at the turn of 1914 and 1915 visited France and England to meet with French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, among others. During the talks, he informed his interlocutors about the struggle of the Polish Legions with Russia, instead of that with France and England.¹¹⁴

Many Polish politicians, including those from Galicia who supported the settlement with the Habsburg Monarchy, did not understand much about the multidimensional policy pursued by the Brigadier. Piłsudski’s military and political demands toward Central States after the occupation of Warsaw in August 1915 raised fears among the supporters of the Austro-Polish solution. President W.L. Jaworski noted on October 19, 1916: “Does [Piłsudski] believe in an independent Poland? Is he preparing his army, his PMO (Polish Military Organization), his militia, for the moment of the [conciliatory] congress in order to force independence? Will he not meet with National Democrats, the bishops, etc., in these efforts to overthrow all Western concepts? Indeed. Will he be the only one to go for independence, and they for giving the country away to Russia?”¹¹⁵

113 J. W. Borejsza, *Mussolini był pierwszy. . .*, (Warsaw: 1979), p. 165; W. Jędrzejewicz, J. Cisek, *Kalendarium*, II, p. 177.

114 Molenda, *Piłsudczycy*, p. 60; J. Gaul, *Na tajnym froncie. Działalność wywiadowczo-informacyjna obozu niepodległościowego w latach 1914–1918*, (Warsaw: 2001), pp. 149–150; M. Gmurczyk-Wrońska, *Stanisław Patek w dyplomacji i polityce (1914–1939)*, (Warsaw: 2013), pp. 18–19; W. Suleja, *Mundur na nim szary. . . Rzecz o Józefie Piłsudskim (1867–1935)*, (Warsaw: 2018), pp. 115–116. Piłsudski’s information campaign in the West was wider and related to the activities of, among others, Tytus Filipowicz, Nelly Grzędzińska, August Zaleski and Władysław Baranowski – more in: Gaul, *Na tajnym froncie*, pp. 149–150.

115 Jaworski, *Diariusz*, p. 139; W. Suleja, “Orientacja austro-polska w latach I wojny światowej (do aktu 5 listopada 1916 roku)”, *Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis, Historia*, vol. 103, no. 1421, (1992), pp. 320–321.

Jaworski's concerns were unjustified, as Piłsudski did not oppose the Western concept and precluded himself from joining the opposition to the Western countries in the future.¹¹⁶ According to the instruction given to his collaborators in the spring of 1917, he expected Western democracies to show "similar encouragement and hope to that brought by President Wilson's speech." After the outbreak of the Revolution and the fall of the Tsar, Piłsudski stopped fighting against Russia and caused a crisis and the refusal of many units of the Polish Legions to pledge. As a result of the internment of officers and soldiers by the authorities of Central States, the Legions practically ceased to exist.¹¹⁷

The arrest of Piłsudski on July 22, 1917, by the Germans, could have repercussions on the implementation of the Polish *raison d'état* on the civilizational level. Maria Dąbrowska expressed such fears by pessimistically assessing this event in her writings. She pointed out that the Commander's anti-Russian stance was to be seen not only as an expression of his tactical connection with Central States, which his political opponents accused him of, but as a desire to remain in the world of Western European civilization. On August 2, 1917, Dąbrowska noted in her journal: "Although I neither understood Piłsudski's recent policy, nor admired it, I think it happened very badly, very badly. For the wider world, Piłsudski, and no one else, was the symbol of our Western European position. Who knows anything about Sikorski, Szeptycki or politicians from LPP (Liga Państwowości Polskiej – League of the Polish Statehood). Now, for the world, Piłsudski's arrest means a failure of the anti-Russian attitude."¹¹⁸

After Poland regained independence in November 1918, the prioritized tasks were to rebuild the state, create an army and fight for the borders. Piłsudski had no doubt that the *raison d'état* of state dictated that the fate of the independent Poland in political, military and civilizational terms should be related with the West. To fight Bolshevik Russia, he sought allies in the Entente countries. "And now that there is no longer the Tsarist between me and the Entente, I may sincerely proclaim my friendship for the Entente, with whom we must necessarily forge ever closer ties."¹¹⁹

For Piłsudski, the civilizational thread was an important premise in defining the eastern borders of the Republic of Poland. In 1919, Piłsudski assured American deputy Hugh Gibson of his willingness to occupy only those lands

116 Baranowski, *Rozmowy z Piłsudskim*, pp. 40–41.

117 Borejsza, *Mussolini był pierwszy*, p. 165; Jędrzejewicz, Cisek, *Kalendarium*, II, p. 177.

118 Gaul, *Czarno-żółty miraż*, s. 315.

119 Borejsza, *Mussolini był pierwszy*, p. 165; Jędrzejewicz, Cisek, *Kalendarium*, II, p. 177.

in the East inhabited by the people with an unquestionably Western mentality. His approach to the extent of the eastern border did not involve the restitution of the borders of 1772; the Head of State justified it with the opposites between the political culture of the West and the East. Polish political culture was within the Western European circle because it contained elements of pluralism and democratism and was characterized by the ability of society to control those in power. Such features were not present in the Russian political culture, which was characterized by autocratism and the objective treatment of individuals. Piłsudski stressed the fact that the existence of an independent and free Poland was threatened by the existence of a strong and territorially large Russia, which was imperialist regardless of the nature of the government.¹²⁰

Military dimension of the Polish *raison d'état*

The loss of the homeland as a result of the partitions did not mean that the slogan “to break out” on independence was no longer attractive. Among the Poles from Galicia there were plenty of supporters of the armed act, as evidenced by their participation in the uprisings of 1830, 1848 and 1863. Some hoped for Austria to support the January Uprising and therefore the repressive policy of the Austrian government in Galicia – the declaration of a state of siege in February 1863 and the persecution of those who took part in the uprising – was later heavily criticized.¹²¹ H. Wereszycki formulated a thesis that the aspirations for liberation and tendencies hostile to the invading state ceased to exist in Galicia after obtaining autonomy. This distinguished the Austrian partition from the Prussian and Russian ones, in which organizations actively engaged in the fight against the partitioning states.¹²² A significant part in this was played by the Galician conservatives, who condemned the insurgent movement and came to an agreement with the Austrian authorities.

In the Polish society in Galicia, the anti-Russian attitudes did not disappear, and people did not abandon thinking about fighting the partitioning states. This was reflected in the birth of the Galician irredentism, the main goal of which was to gain independence through armed struggle. It was a radical concept, because for many supporters regaining sovereignty was an ideal goal, and intermediate goals, best suited to national interests, were seen in organic work and unification of Polish lands, even parts of them, under the common control of one of the

120 B. Grzełoński, *Dyplomaci USA 1919–1939*, (Pułtusk: 2004), pp. 11–12.

121 Homola Dzikowska, *Mikołaj Żybkiewicz*, pp. 28–32.

122 Wereszycki, *Niewygasła przeszłość*, pp. 182–183.

partitioning states. The armed conflict was condemned for fear of annihilating the achievements so far.¹²³

At the end of 1895, the National League still claimed that the nation should take an active role in case of war between the Germans, Austro-Hungarians and Russians. In the appeal of November 25, it was recommended to ally “with anyone who will start the fight with Moscow in our country” and to make military preparations.¹²⁴ Later, the National League abandoned the insurgent program.¹²⁵ During the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, National Democracy took a reluctant stance to engage on the Japanese side, warning against insurgent agitation and calling for the expectation of an internal revolution in Russia, which would inevitably be caused by the war. In the appeal of the Central Committee of the National League written in February 1904, it was stated: “The first attempts at agitation in this direction have already appeared and will undoubtedly be repeated with the subsequent military failures of Russia. They need to be opposed with all our strength. We cannot allow either foreign governments via their agents to lead our people in a direction that is beneficial to them, or for even a drop of Polish blood to be spilled in useless and thoughtless attempts caused by our own immature nature.”¹²⁶ The blade of this statement was directed against the military activity of the socialists, to whom the issue of independence and insurgent thought played a significant role. Dmowski, who visited the Land of the Cherry Blossom in 1904, took an active part in opposing Piłsudski’s efforts in order to get militarily involved on the side of Japan.¹²⁷

Piłsudski had no illusions that international relations at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were dominated by the politics of power and particular interests of individual states. The “simplest sense of justice,” which

123 Nałęcz, *Irredenta polska*, pp. 5–7, 18–27.

124 Wojtasik, *Idea walki zbrojnej*, pp. 144–145.

125 R. Wapiński, *Narodowa Demokracja, 1893–1939. Ze studiów nad dziejami myśli nacjonalistycznej*, (Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk: 1980), pp. 34–35, 88–91; Nałęcz, *Irredenta polska*, p. 69.

126 The position of the National League toward the insurgent plans after the outbreak of the Revolution in 1905 was similar – S. Kozicki, *Historia Ligi Narodowej (okres 1887–1907)*, (London: 1964), p. 547; L. Wasilewski, “Ze wspomnień (1899–1904). Część II,” *Z pola walki*, vol. 4, No. 68 (1974), p. 243; Wojtasik, *Idea walki zbrojnej*, pp. 156–158; Nałęcz, *Irredenta polska*, p. 103.

127 Micewski, *Roman Dmowski*, pp. 89–109; Kawalec, *Roman Dmowski*, p. 89–95; Suleja, *Józef Piłsudski*, pp. 63–67; R. Świętek, *Lodowa ściana. Sekrety polityki Józefa Piłsudskiego 1904–1918* (Cracow: 1998), pp. 210–220; Gaul, *Na tajnym froncie*, pp. 134–138.

he mentioned in 1901, suggests that he saw a need for norms binding on all states, including the powers whose violation should be condemned.¹²⁸ The solution was not to wait passively for the unfolding of events and the generosity of the partitioning powers, but to fight the armed struggle with Russia. After the outbreak of the Russian-Japanese War, Piłsudski cooperated with Japan, among others, in the field of intelligence, achieving only half-way military and political results.¹²⁹ Another challenge was the Revolution of 1905, in which Piłsudski and the Polish Socialist Party were militarily engaged, creating the Combat Organization to fight the Tsarist authorities in the Congress Poland.¹³⁰

The defeat of the Revolution of 1905 forced Piłsudski to answer the question: What next? He outlined the new concept of action in the article “Jak mamy się gotować do walki zbrojnej” (How Shall We Prepare for Armed Combat) published in February 1908.¹³¹ It consisted in, on the one hand, fighting for independence by means of an armed act (uprising), and, on the other hand, to select Galicia as the organizational base. Piłsudski reached the conclusion that the victory in the fight for independence does not require the support of only one social class, but of the entire nation, which would establish a government and declare war on the invader. Since the tactics consisting in a general strike failed, the revolutionary party in the Russian partition could not achieve its goals – independence and the fight against exploitation – by conducting a peaceful battle in a Western-European manner. It had to undertake a confrontation with the use of weapons, forming a people’s army to fight the tsarist army. In the aforementioned article, Piłsudski wrote: “And as it is unlikely in parliamentary countries to call aware a socialist who is not aware of the need to use the tools of parliamentarism and cannot explain to himself and others how these tools are used, so in a

128 “Such thinking leaves no room for justifying immoral actions by the means of the needs of the state, its interest, the necessity of territorial or material development. On the contrary, focusing only on satisfying one’s own aspirations and goals, without taking into account the needs of others is considered to lead to the situation of “one nation devouring another,” which is considered to be negative.” – Rzegocki, *Racja stanu*, pp. 309–310.

129 Garlicki, *Józef Piłsudski*, pp. 131–138; Nałęcz, *Irredenta polska*, pp. 62–66; Suleja, *Józef Piłsudski*, pp. 58–67; Świętek, *Lodowa ściana*, pp. 98–348; Gaul, *Czarno-żółty miraż*, pp. 28–29.

130 Garlicki, *Józef Piłsudski*, pp. 150–179; Nałęcz, *Irredenta polska*, pp. 67–88; Suleja, *Józef Piłsudski*, pp. 70–84; Pobóg-Malinowski, *Józef Piłsudski*, pp. 287–334; Gaul, *Czarno-żółty miraż*, pp. 30–33.

131 Garlicki, *Józef Piłsudski*, p. 191.

state that is not parliamentary but bayonet, one cannot call aware a socialist that who does not know how to oppose the bayonet and does not know what tool to use to oppose it, who cannot fight in the field where bayonet reigns.”¹³² The consequence of such a stance was the adoption of an irredentist program by the Revolutionary Faction of the Polish Socialist Party in November 1906.

The intensification of international relations after 1908 caused the Polish cause to be raised more and more vigorously by irredentist circles. In June 1908, the supporters of independence formed the secret organization called Union of Active Struggle (Związek Walki Czynnej – ZWC) with a broader political background.¹³³ The Union of Active Struggle aimed for a “revolutionary uprising of Poland against the Moscow invasion,” its goal was the “Independent Democratic Republic,” and its tasks included conducting preparations outside the borders of the tsarist state for a future armed uprising in the Russian partition.¹³⁴ Piłsudski’s intention was to act as a tactical ally of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the future armed fight.¹³⁵ Sławek expressed it bluntly: “Not only Austrian brains, but also the Polish ones, were not capable of thinking that the result of the war could be Independent Poland. Mostly it was reasoned that it could be the annexation of Poland from the Russian partition to this country, where Poles were best, so to Austria.”¹³⁶

An important issue was the legalization of military preparations conducted by the Union of Active Struggle. Piłsudski admitted that the transition to a legal form of military work took place after the meeting with the Imperial and Royal officers of the General Staff, so that the Austrian law would protect the revolutionaries coming from the Russian partition and Galician citizens from the unpleasantness of the administration.¹³⁷ Despite the fears of being unmasked, practical

132 Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, II, p. 294; Nałęcz, *Irredenta polska*, pp. 94–102.

133 W. Sławek, “Wspomnienia (1895–1910),” *Niepodległość*, vol. 22, (1989), pp. 141–148; M. Sokolnicki, *Rok czternasty*, (London: 1961), p. 23; Garlicki, *Józef Piłsudski*, pp. 133–134; Nałęcz, *Irredenta polska*, pp. 130–135.

134 J. Stachiewicz, “Początki Związku Walki Czynnej,” *Niepodległość*, II, (1933), pp. 51–57; S. Skwarczyński, “Twórca awangardy. Działalność Józefa Piłsudskiego w latach 1893–1918,” *Niepodległość*, VII, (1962), p. 162; Nałęcz, *Irredenta polska*, pp. 130–132.

135 Suleja, *Józef Piłsudski*, p. 101.

136 Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie (AAN), Akta W. Sławka, sign. 73, vol. 1, point 2, fol. 131–132; Lecture VII, pp. 3–4; Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, V, pp. 267–268; Świętek, *Lodowa ściana*, p. 526.

137 AAN, KTSSN, sign. 68, fol. 6: Stenogram wywiadu przeprowadzonego z W. Sławkiem w Instytucie Józefa Piłsudskiego odnośnie działalności KSSN i innych organizacji w latach 1905–1914; Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, IX, p. 281; *Pamiętnik generała Rybaka* (Warsaw: 1954), pp. 36–40; H. Jabłoński, *Polityka Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej w czasie*

considerations prevailed and there were founded the Riflemen's Association in Lviv in April 1910 and "Strzelec" association in Cracow in February 1911.¹³⁸

The rifleman's organizations, including among others the Polish Rifle Squads, were also formed by secessionists from National Democracy. The latter reluctantly embraced the idea of military training and preparations for war and did its best to create a virtual character for this activity. The paramilitary organizations Polowe Drużyny Sokole (Field Hawk Squads) and Drużyny Bartoszwowe (The Bartoszwowe Squads) were formed, although their independent character was limited by the party leaders.¹³⁹ According to H. Wereszycki, the activities of the National League before First World War were not of an insurrectionary nature, but were aimed at taming and neutralizing the irredent and hindering preparations for an anti-Russian uprising in the Congress Kingdom, led by a radical left-wing camp headed by Piłsudski.¹⁴⁰ Another aspect of the National Democracy's activity was the propaganda favoring the stand of the inhabitants of Galicia in the conflict between the great powers on the Polish territories and Russia.¹⁴¹

The culmination of the irredentist movement was the congress in August 1912 in Zakopane and the adopted resolution, according to which "the congregation is striving for Polish independence by the means of spreading awareness and organizing the Polish nation in order to enable it to fight the revolutionary struggle for independent existence." The participants of the congress agreed to support the independence factors and to fight the policy of reconciliation, primarily to "support the organizations aimed at acquainting the broadest circles of the nation with the tasks of armed struggle in particular" against Russia.¹⁴² At the beginning of 1914, Piłsudski was convinced that the military movement would be the factor "reintroducing the Polish cause into the European chessboard."¹⁴³

wojny 1914–1918 (Wrocław: 1986), pp. 62 ff; Nałęcz, *Irredenta polska*, pp. 198–199; Świętek, *Lodowa ściana*, p. 523.

138 AAN, Akta W. Sławka, sign. 73, vol. 1, point 2: Lecture VII, pp. 6–7; J. Dąbrowski, *Polska w latach ruchu niepodległościowego 1904–1918*, (Kraków: 1925), pp. 8–9; W. Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski 1864–1945*, I, (Paris: 1953), pp. 219–220; Wereszycki, *Niewygasła przeszłość*, p. 183; Nałęcz, *Irredenta Polska*, pp. 198–199.

139 Nałęcz, *Irredenta polska*, pp. 269–271.

140 Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej*, pp. 350–351.

141 Wereszycki, *Niewygasła przeszłość*, p. 183.

142 Nałęcz, *Irredenta polska*, pp. 227 ff.

143 Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, III, p. 252.

On August 6, 1914, Piłsudski set off for war with an open visor at the head of the riflemen to fight for the independent homeland. Against the opinion of “realistically” thinking politicians, he elevated this idea to the rank of the highest values.¹⁴⁴ After the fiasco of the anti-Russian uprising in the Congress Kingdom, the Austrians demanded the dissolution of the rifle divisions. In order to save the Polish armed act, the conservative politicians in Galicia began to form the autonomous regular Polish troops, which constituted part of the Austro-Hungarian army. At the beginning of August 1914, Juliusz Leo and Leon Biliński held talks with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Leopold Berchtold, the Chief of General Staff General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Minister of National Defence Friedrich Georgi and the Head of the Ministry for Galicia Zdzisław Morawski. The decision was made to form the Legions under Polish control, initially in the form of two legions, based on the already existing military organizations, which were to be used to fight against Russia on the Polish territory in relation with the Habsburg Monarchy, and have veterans’ rights.¹⁴⁵ The highest instance of the Polish Legions to provide political, organizational and financial protection was the Supreme National Committee. The Military Department of the Supreme National Committee, headed by Colonel Władysław Sikorski, conducted recruitment in the Kingdom of Poland.

The true attitude of National Democracy toward the legion act is best illustrated by the Eastern Legion case. Initially, it was planned to direct it to the frontline in the Eastern Carpathians. The National Democrats including Stanisław Grabski, Jan Gwalbert Pawlikowski and Aleksander Skarbek led the Eastern Legion to refuse to pledge and caused their dissolution in Mszana on September 21, 1914.¹⁴⁶ This action was to a large extent dictated by ideological and political prejudices of the National Democrats toward the creators of the Polish military act and their links with the socialist movement, treated as a phenomenon foreign to Polish society and imposed from the outside.¹⁴⁷ During the meeting in Warsaw on August 23, 1914, Dmowski announced to representative of Piłsudski’s proponents, Artur Śliwiński, that “the introduction of an armed

144 Suleja, *Józef Piłsudski*, p. 114.

145 *Dokumenty Naczelnego Komitetu Narodowego 1914–1917*, (Kraków: 1917), pp. 1–3; K. Kumaniecki, *Odbudowa państwowości polskiej. Najważniejsze dokumenty 1912 – styczeń 1924* (Warszawa-Kraków: 1925), pp. 16–17; *Powstanie II Rzeczypospolitej*, pp. 224–227.

146 Jabłoński, *Polityka Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej*, p. 119; M. Wrzosek, *Polski czyn zbrojny podczas pierwszej wojny światowej 1914–1918*, Warszawa 1990, pp. 97 ff.

147 Molenda, *Piłsudczycy*, pp. 200–203.

unit of revolutionaries into the fight against Russia may be explained by the revolutionary ideology, in which real politics is replaced by the dreams of independence, but the joining of responsible politicians is a testimony to the mood, cunningly evoked by Galician chisellers, winning the patriotic feelings of the population and skillfully inducing them to follow the crowd.”¹⁴⁸ For Dmowski, the most important element was the real politics, subordinated to the arbitrarily adopted pro-Russian option. He had no sympathy for patriotism and generosity, and their influence on the attitudes of social groups, especially of the youth, and indirectly on Galician rightwing politicians.

Despite the reluctance of National Democrats, the Legions fought heroically at Dęblin and Rokitna, Łowczówek and Kostiuchnówka, paying a generous tribute of blood for the dreams of free Poland.¹⁴⁹ Piłsudski proved himself as a leader and shared the hardships of the war epic with his soldiers. In his understanding of the *raison d'état*, the armed act was not of an autonomous character, but was inseparably connected with the fundamental goal – regaining independence. Thus, then the time came to subjugate the Legions not to Austrian and German interests, but to the Polish ones, in August 1915, Piłsudski put forward claims toward the central states. The appointment of the Polish government and Diet were to be the price of recruiting the Legions. This resulted in a conflict between Piłsudski and Komenda Legionów Polskich (The Polish Legions' Order), which secured the interests of the Habsburg Monarchy, and the Military Department of NKN, which sought to expand the Legions at all costs.

Piłsudski's understanding of the Polish *raison d'état* manifested in the instruction he gave in spring of 1917. Already during the war, Poland should pave its independence without looking at anyone else and forming its own armed force. This was to be executed on Polish territory with the help of the Central States. All that under the condition of the operation being guaranteed national character, using it only against Russia, which invaded the largest ethnically pure Polish territory.¹⁵⁰ Piłsudski assumed that the talks with the Germans would be honest, blunt and loyal, although related with the expectations of the same stance of the

148 Molenda, *Piłsudczycy*, p. 202.

149 Polish deputies also contributed to the Polish Legions as its members. J. Gaul, “Posłowie polscy do Rady Państwa w Wiedniu wobec ruchu niepodległościowego w okresie zawieszonoego parlamentu (sierpień 1914-maj 1917),” *Studia Humanistyczno-społeczne*, No. 7, (2013), pp. 13–36.

150 Baranowski, *Rozmowy z Piłsudskim*, pp. 40 ff.

Germans toward Poland. It was necessary to fight together with Austria against Russia, but not to bound the future of Poland to “any form of organization.”¹⁵¹

Piłsudski did not manage to accomplish the plans to form a national Polish army. Due to the crisis in the Polish Legions after the refusal to pledge in July 1917, and because of the repressions of the Austrian authorities, Polish deputies became more invested in the independence act. They undertook numerous interventions: they defended the legionnaires from the First and Third Brigade who were interned (the Russians) in the camps in Beniaminów and Szczypiorno or recruited (Austrian citizens) into the Austro-Hungarian army and sent back to the Italian frontline, as well as those from the Second Brigade who were detained for the attempt to cross the Russian frontline under Rarańcza in February 1918.¹⁵²

The deputies intervened in the case of Piłsudski, arrested by the Germans on July 22, 1917. On August 6, 1917, at the meeting of the Polish Club, at the request of the Polish People's Party, a resolution was passed, in which the following was stated: “The kidnapping of the Leader of the Legions, which vividly resembled the deportation of the patriots by Repnin, caused bitterness and indignation in the whole nation.” People demanded an immediate release of Piłsudski from prison, “whereby the Polish Club considers His arresting as an insult not only to the meritorious Creator of the Polish armed forces, but also to the entire nation.” The Polish Club also accepted Daszyński's motion: “The Polish Circle protests against the division of the Legions into units consisting of the Austrian citizens and into units of the Polish army consisting of the citizen of the Kingdom of Poland; the Polish Club would deem the incorporation of the legionnaires into the Imperial and Royal army to violate vital interests of the Polish nation, and it would have to stop trusting the Central Powers' willingness to form a Polish army.”¹⁵³ On August 6, 1917, in the Viennese Parliament, Moraczewski spoke against the repression of the Austrian authorities against the legionnaires refusing to pledge, demanding the release of the internees from the Szczypiorno camp.¹⁵⁴ At the meeting on October 14, 1917, the Polish Club addressed the Emperor to ask for the abolition of the legionnaires, which took place on September 27, 1918.¹⁵⁵

151 Baranowski, *Rozmowy z Piłsudskim*, pp. 40 ff.

152 Archiwum Państwowe (AP) Kraków, NKN, vol. 483 – stenogram procesu w Marmaros-Sziget; S. Czerep, *II Brygada Legionów Polskich*, Warszawa 1991, pp. 209–222.

153 Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, pp. 282–283; Serwatka, *Józef Piłsudski a Niemcy*, (Wrocław: 1997), pp. 71–72; Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, pp. 325–326.

154 ÖStA/KA Wien, K. u. k. AOK QuAbt, kart. 2487, MV Nr. 182328, 19.11.1917.

155 ÖStA/KA Wien, K. u. k. AOK QuAbt, kart. 2486, MV Nr. 181704, 20.11.1917.

The Great War gave hope for the resolution of the Polish issue. In March 1916, Askenazy wrote in that “international healing, thorough and lasting, is the main profit that all civilized nations shall seek from this war. But the prerequisite for that is the healing of the European invalidity caused by the vivisection of Poland. Only the restoration of a free Poland will restore a healthy Europe.”¹⁵⁶ The dreams of Poles came true in November 1918. Representing various political options, they often fought for the Polish *raison d'état* on opposite sides. The defeat of the partitioning countries and the victorious Entente helped to rebuild Polish statehood. Those who, faithful to the idea of active struggle for independence, fought in the ranks of the Polish Legions, the Polish Military Organization, the Polish Armed Forces and other military formations also contributed to the success. Also Galicia participated in the struggle for the Polish cause. The long-term support of the Austro-Polish solution was motivated not only by the political calculation, but also by the civilizational and military reasons, i.e. the belonging to the West and the Polish Legions, respectively. It should be remembered that one of the cornerstones of the Second Polish Republic was the Galician heritage.¹⁵⁷

Combining all the dimensions of the *raison d'état* into one tie requires extraordinary craftsmanship. Only statesmen succeed in such art. To a large extent, this was the case with Piłsudski, in the smaller – with Dmowski, who was ready to sacrifice the Western tradition at the price of unifying the Polish lands in the illusory hope of outwitting the Russian Goliath. For Piłsudski, the imponderables were the most important. Worth remembering are the canons of the Polish *raison d'état* established at the turn of 1918 and 1919 by the Chief of State, who understood it in its fullest sense: the democratic, law-abiding and self-governing Poland in its political, military and civilizational relations with Western Europe.

156 Askenazy, *Uwagi*, p. 46.

157 Wereszycki, *Niewygasta przeszłość*, pp. 173–192, 234–246; J. Buszko, “Galicyjskie dziedzictwo II Rzeczypospolitej,” in: *Galicja i jej dziedzictwo*, I, pp. 187–199.

CHAPTER 1: The Polish Diaspora in Indigenous Austria (1867–1918)

1. Terminology

The Spring of Nations had been a breakthrough moment in the formation process of many European nations. However, the national aspirations of the Poles from the Austrian partition had been blocked by the restoration of the absolute monarchy in Austria. The failure of the January Uprising and the following repression, the creation of dual monarchy with a parliamentary system afterwards and propagation of utilitarian policy by a part of the political elite of Galicia or publication of “*Teka Stańczyka*” (*Stańczyk’s Portfolio*),¹⁵⁸ a series of satirical pamphlets negating the liberum conspire, prompted Poles to enter a path of positive work – concentrating on an economic growth. However, a problem appeared how to reconcile the Polish national interest with the current interests of the monarchy. Patriotic ideas had to be put aside, which does not mean that Poles utterly abandoned their struggle for independence. Instead, independence became a long-term goal, while the struggle for autonomy received higher priority. At that time, patriotism had come to be replaced by loyalism.

Let us begin terminological considerations in this chapter by defining the term “nation.” It is not an easy task as both by a definition and a sociological analysis of the term, nation as one of many communities and collectivities builds a historical community. Furthermore, there are many definitions of the term, many theories that explains idea and genesis of the term nation. In this monograph, we assume that: “a nation is a community created in the course of historical development by the people who objectively recognize a specific language as their mother tongue and a specific territory as their homeland, who believe in the brotherhood of origin, and who have, or aim to have, their own political organization (state).”¹⁵⁹ Ludwik Gumplowicz’s definition of nation as *Kulturgemeinschaft* – cultural community, a term which underscores both a spiritual bond and a community of national interests – comes close to this conception.¹⁶⁰ At the same time, Gumplowicz differentiates this type of community

158 See K. Wyka, *Teka Stańczyka na tle historii Galicji w latach 1849–1869* (Ossolineum 1951).

159 J. Turowski, *Socjologia. Wielkie struktury społeczne* (Lublin 1994), p. 146.

160 W. S. Kucharski, *Polacy i Polonia w Austrii*, Part I, *Zasłużeni*, Lublin – Wiedeń 2001, pp. 64–65.

from *Nation* and *Stamm* (tribe, clan) adding that it is only such a community that has a right to fight for its language rights and national interest.¹⁶¹

As a consequence of Russian, Prussian, and Austrian politics, the historical, fully-constituted Polish nation has been dispersed into foreign states. Poles from the Austrian partition became part of in the multinational state, which the Habsburg monarchy was at that time, and its multiethnic community. Such a distinction is necessary given the level of interpenetration of different institutions of the Polish nation and those of the partitioning power. In a multinational state, many nations live together and develop their culture. That is why they are called nationalities: they do not aim to gain their own separate state organization but rather co-exist under the principle of equality, recognizing, and even co-creating, common state institutions. Many ethnic groups form an ethnic community, that is: an integrated community, which distinguishes itself by their partial cultural distinction, i.e. language, culture, ethnicity, customs and habits, denomination and racial or regional origins. One of these kinds of groups are immigrants' ethnic groups. Maintaining their distinctness, they live in the common state, co-creating culture and transethnic cultural institutions.¹⁶²

It does not seem difficult to define the role of Poles in multinational structure of the Austrian state and its multiethnic community. However, after a deeper analysis of the history of Poles living in the Austrian partition, it turns out that its role in the state and community resist easy conceptualizations within the framework of sociological theories. First of all, being one of many nationalities in the Habsburg monarchy, Poles never gave up their independence program, even though they were often guided by utilitarianism and loyalism, and during the First World War even aimed to establish an Austrian-Polish state under the Habsburg crown. In the case of Poles, the loss of independence had not stopped the process of formation of the nation. The lack of their own state found compensation in their struggle to restore the state and its sovereignty. Poles, along

161 The tribe, as distinct from the nation, is characterized by primitivism, uncomplicated social structure, lack of history and inadequate level of cultural and civilizational development. The nations of the Habsburg monarchy included only Germans, Czechs, Poles, and Serbo-Croats, while the tribes, according to this conception, were Ruthenians, Slovaks, Romanians, and Slovenians as ethnic and homogeneous groups. See M. Waldenberg, "Ludwika Gumpłowicza rozmyślenia o kwestiach narodowych i narodzie," in: *Idee a urządzenie świata społecznego. Księga jubileuszowa dla Jerzego Szackiego. Zbiór rozpraw*, ed. E. Nowicka, M. Chałubiński (Warszawa 1999) pp. 246–247.

162 J. Turowski, *Polacy i Polonia w Austrii*. . . , pp. 142–143.

with Austrian Germans, Czechs, Italians, and Croats were a historical nation.¹⁶³ Second, Poles, as part of Austrian society, were not characterized by a significant cultural difference from Austrian Germans, as both these nations shared the Roman Catholic religion and a considerable number of customs. Moreover, all ethnic groups of Cisleithania originated from the same cultural circle. The most important difference between them was language.

Here, it is worth emphasizing that the Austrian model of the multinational state bears specific features. The basis of Cisleithania's national policy was article 19 of the Constitution of 21 December 1867, which stipulates that all national groups have equal rights in the state and that each group has an inviolable right to protect and cultivate its national identity and language.¹⁶⁴

Andrzej Dziadzio observes that "this norm had been the most important feature and formed the foundation of national relations until the very fall of the Austrian Monarchy."¹⁶⁵ However, Stanisław Madeyski, Member of the Diet of Galicia and the Reichsgericht and Minister of Education, expressed a somewhat different opinion: "in the quoted words, there are not enough of such ordinances that one may infer from them some distinct, universal political right of national equality."¹⁶⁶ In his opinion, article 19 of the Constitution is characterized by a lack of precision and legal professionalism, vagueness, and ambiguity, which produce difficulties in interpretation. Such a formulation of the article, as Madeyski goes on to argue, aims at ending the national struggle between the German nation and other peoples belonging to the Habsburg state, regardless of whether they have the Stamm or Nation status: "The publication of article 19 has quietened representatives of non-German nations."¹⁶⁷

163 In Otto Bauer's view, a nation with a developed social structure. J. Chlebowczyk, *O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów. Kwestie narodowe i procesy narodotwórcze we wschodniej Europie Środkowej w dobie kapitalizmu (od schyłku XVIII do początków XX w.)* (Warszawa-Kraków 1983) pp. 21–22.

164 See *Staatsgrundgesetz vom 21. Dezember 1867, über die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsbürger für die im Reichrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder*, RGBL, no. 142, 1867.

165 A. Dziadzio, *Monarchia konstytucyjna w Austrii (1867–1914). Władza – obywatel – prawo* (Kraków 2001), p. 136.

166 S. Madeyski przedstawił dogłębną analizę i krytykę ustawy o powszechnych prawach obywateli poprzez pryzmat artykułu XIX ustawy, S. Madeyski, "Polityczne prawo wolności narodowej," *Czasopismo Prawno-Ekonomiczne* (CPE), 1902, no. 3, quote on p. 373.

167 S. Madeyski, *Z praktyki Trybunału Państwa*, CPE, 1905, no. 6, p. 296.

Doubtlessly, this model had a positive side, too. It created proper conditions for the development of national life, especially since the period of Eduard Taaffe. The model can be described as the most advanced one in respecting the rights and distinctness of ethnic-linguistic groups, nationalities, or national communities, both in terms of the political system and in terms of political practice. Thus, one may contend that the model itself already bore certain features, which determined its strength, but also weakness.¹⁶⁸ The weakness manifested itself especially in practice, that is, through the lack of consistent policy concerning nationality. It was usually replaced with the “divide et impera” principle, which, from the perspective of the interests of the monarchy, especially Austrian Germans, produced desirable, though makeshift, effects, causing an increase of national contradictions and conflicts. The most important determinant of their actions was a striving to maintain a privileged position in the state as compared to other nations, which legally enjoyed exactly the same rights. Hence, the whole period of the functioning of the Dual Monarchy was marked by centralizing tendencies, as the deputy Włodzimierz Czerkawski claimed: “centralization does not mean Germanization, for it is only on the foundation of national unity that a unified political system can be based.”¹⁶⁹ In turn, conflicts between the authorities and national groups were considerably rare. Thus, the process of state assimilation developed, shaping the “Austrian patriotism” and state-dynastic consciousness, which characterized mainly Galician peasants. The introduction of dualism slowed down the formation of the nation-state in the sense of a federation of nations, as Austrian Prime Minister Karl Hohenwart or Franciszek Smolka demanded, listing all historical nations as entitled to equal status in the state.¹⁷⁰ Therefore, dualism caused the transformation of nation-building processes into centrifugal forces, and this process was stimulated by the emergence of nationalisms.

One of the elements determining cultural distinctiveness is the language spoken by individual nationalities or ethnic groups. It is a value that unites individuals of a given nationality, distinguishing them from other national groups.

168 J. Chlebowczyk, *O prawie do bytu*. . . , pp. 334–335.

169 W. Czerkawski, *Wyodrębnienia Galicyi. Z pośmiertnej teki Włodzimierza Czerkawskiego* (Kraków 1914), p. 3, Biblioteka Narodowa (BN), sig. III 2.014.109 A.

170 E. Olszewski, “Franciszek Smolka – polityki i parlamentarzysta,” in: *Polacy w austriackim parlamencie. W 130. rocznicę Koła Polskiego. Materiały polsko-austriackiej konferencji naukowej zorganizowanej w parlamencie austriackim i Stacji Naukowej PAN w Wiedniu w dn. 11–12 września 1997, pod red. W. S. Kucharskiego* (Lublin-Vienna 1997), pp. 198–199.

Language is not only a means of communication but also a condition for the creation of culture. The value of language is therefore of fundamental importance for a given ethnic group or nationality. Therefore, despite the constitutionally guaranteed linguistic equality, in Austria there were specific actions aimed at the Germanization of nations other than Germans, while in Galicia – at the Polonization of Ruthenians (Ukrainians). The struggle for linguistic rights sometimes took a very dramatic course, as evidenced by the attempt to establish linguistic equality in Czech countries made by the government of Count Kasimir Felix Badeni. This was also evidenced by a resolution campaign conducted by Poles in the Austrian Parliament between 1868 and 1873, which demanded, among others, to introduce the Polish language into the Galician administration, education, and judiciary. After the fulfillment of the linguistic demands in the second half of the nineteenth century, this struggle was replaced by a call for “an institutionalization of the separate national existence.”¹⁷¹ This phase of the national movement led to the emergence of a phenomenon which – from the perspective of the formation of a national group – is called the national issue.

The second element of fundamental importance for a nation is territory, usually associated with homeland or home soil. According to Stanisław Ossowski, homeland is not only a geographical but also an axiological concept. This means that there is a spiritual bond between the individual and his or her homeland understood as the “land of fathers.” Homeland is therefore the legacy we inherit from our ancestors. Ossowski proposed a distinction between the ideological and the private homeland. The first one covers an entire national territory, all members of a nation, including ancestors; people come in contact with it indirectly, by intellectual and spiritual means. The private homeland, in turn, encompasses the area with which the individual is directly connected by maintaining close contacts with other members of the community in which he or she lives.¹⁷²

One may contend, without greatly distorting the facts, that the Poles from the Austrian partition had more than one homeland: not only in terms of Ossowski's distinction but also, and above all, because of their historical situation. Certainly, each individual had his or her own private homeland, a village, town, or city. Moreover, they identified with Poland as their home soil, which did not exist on maps but served the function of the ideological homeland. What is problematic

171 J. Chlebowczyk, *O prawie do bytu*. . . , p. 49.

172 For more on this issue, see: S. Ossowski, “Analiza socjologiczna pojęcia ojczyzny,” in: *Dziela*, vol. III, *Z zagadnień psychologii społecznej* (Warszawa 1967), p. 203 ff.

is whether only Poland, and no other country, was their ideological homeland. One should also consider what Galicia and Austria were for Poles. Following the political and social activity of Poles in the Austrian partition, one may conclude that both Galicia and Austria – more precisely, “Austro-Poland” – performed the function of ideological homelands. By the way, it should be added that “Austro-Poland” was an entity that did not exist formally, but only in the consciousness of loyalist-oriented Poles. During the First World War, Poles strived to turn this concept into a reality. In addition, Galician politicians and activists sought primarily the interests of their own province and treated the remaining partitions somewhat marginally. However, in the case of political crises between Austria-Hungary and Russia or Germany, they cared for the welfare of Poles living in the Prussian and Russian partitions.

The notion of nation and homeland is inextricably linked to another conceptual category, i.e. “Pole” in the sense of a member of the Polish nation, mentally connected with its heritage in the form of homeland, with the culture of the nation and Catholicism.¹⁷³ It follows that belonging to the Polish nation is not determined by any formal respects, but only by the awareness of an individual. One could therefore quote the following: “He is a Pole, who self-identifies as a Pole.”¹⁷⁴ Moreover, Poles are also considered to be those who do not have their own national consciousness, but live in their native land and feel their bond with the nation through language, religion, and customs.

Poles from Galicia, despite belonging to Austria, did not identify themselves with the German nation: “Just try to describe a Pole, an Italian, a Czech, a Ruthenian as an ‘Austrian’ – and he will consider it a heavy insult. At home, abroad, in private life and in political declarations, a Pole calls himself only a Pole [. . .] and they [Poles] will never agree to renounce his historical name in favor of the name ‘Austrian.’”¹⁷⁵ It should also be added that, in Austria, there was no “state nation,” that is, there was no Austrian nation.¹⁷⁶ The term “Austrian” was in use, but merely in the sense of a citizen belonging to the Austrian state.

173 For an informative description of relations between Catholicism and patriotism, see Walewander ks., *Echa powstania styczniowego w prasie austriackiej* (Warszawa 1989) pp. 76–80.

174 J. J. Wiatr, *Naród i państwo – socjologiczne problemy kwestii narodowej*, Warszawa 1969, p. 207.

175 P. Zwiedzicz, *Ustrój państwowy i stronnictwa polityczne w Europie zachodniej*, vol. I: *Austrja* (Warszawa 1905), p. 45.

176 J. Chlebowczyk, *O prawie do bytu. . .*, p. 335.

Nevertheless, as a result of mutual interactions between Poles and Germans, a phenomenon of assimilation occurred, becoming similar to the majority group in various respects, e.g. customs, mentality, culture, or language. Assimilation is a phenomenon, which consists in the evolutionary identification of a minority group with a majority group. This process depends on many factors, such as the motives of emigration, the choice of the country of settlement, the size and structure of the ethnic group, the displacement within the borders of a foreign country, which in most cases cause dispersion rather than concentration. It is also necessary to consider the change in the social position of individuals, resulting from the different socio-economic conditions in which they found themselves.¹⁷⁷

Assimilation consists of two phases. The first phase is linguistic, the second one – cultural and civilizational. Poles adopted a foreign culture on the basis of diffusion, as a result of a deliberate policy of the invader, whose task was to denationalize Poles or out of necessity, which most often concerned language as the basic condition of living in a foreign country. Assimilation was linked to the necessity to pick up the language of the majority group and, at the same time, to abandon linguistic particularism. The German language had three basic functions. First, it was a common language used on a daily basis, second, a literary language thanks to which communities joined the social life and cultural heritage, and third, a state language, an official language used in public life, whose knowledge enabled participation in many spheres of life, created opportunities for professional advancement, raising the standard of living, and ensuring social prestige. As Józef Chlebowczyk claims, the conditions for the alienation of members of a minority group in a community and for the assimilation of this group with the majority develop in the context of bi- or multilingualism. At the same time, Chlebowczyk emphasizes that the phenomenon, which occurred more often, was “semi-assimilation,” or cultural hybridization.¹⁷⁸

In a vast majority of cases, migrants coming from Galicia had the classical inferiority complex. Confronted with the higher foreign culture and higher material status of the population, they felt a kind of deprivation, which motivated them to adopt foreign patterns, cultural schemes, manner of conduct, style of dress, etc. Indeed, these circumstances accelerated the process of assimilation. Another favorable factor was the foreign language, which they were forced to

177 J. Kozłowski, “Geneza i ewolucja zbiorowości wychodźstwa polskiego w Europie,” in: *Polonia w Europie, prac. zbior. pod red. B. Szydłowskiej-Cegłowej* (Poznań 1992), p. 35.

178 J. Chlebowczyk, *O prawie do bytu. . .*, pp. 37–38.

use on a daily basis, not only in the working environment. Moreover, they were neophytes in their new social milieus, which accelerated the process of self-identification with the foreign group. Finally, there were also other factors – characteristic of the group of Polish officials in the Austrian administration – that influenced the process of assimilation to the majority group:

After he found himself on the pavement in Vienna, surrounded by unfriendly elements on every side, feeling an aversion to himself and to everything Polish, and not accustomed to be self-sufficient, to be without friends, to go in a defined direction, without seeing others, who follow the same path – he usually does not have enough strength of character to boldly and openly flow against the current [. . .] and this loneliness in which he found himself at the beginning slowly disappears; he enters closer relationships with his German friends, who first confronted him as an intruder, but later, seeing that he is harmless, gave him a casual coin of friendliness. Therefore, he is already standing on a new ground, but at the same time the habit and fear of disturbing this kind of friendly relations are beginning to work. This reserve, which was supposed to be only temporary, merely a means for a more effective action, transforms into a permanent system [. . .]. This Pole-clerk is afraid until the very end of his German career.¹⁷⁹

There is no convincing statistical research that would allow us to determine how many Poles have been assimilated and what was the extent of their assimilation. One of the criteria used to explain this phenomenon is the number of people who returned to Poland after 1918. It is also difficult to say how frequent was the denationalization of Poles serving in the Austro-Hungarian army. Jan Rydel claimed: “Severing children from their family environment, entering the officer corps [. . .] the impossibility of using the native language even in ordinary conversations between an officer and a soldier [. . .] the profession of an officer in the Austro-Hungarian Empire was closely connected with the risk of losing national awareness.”¹⁸⁰

Thus, the factors of cultural and civilizational assimilation include: the service of Poles in the Austro-Hungarian army, the susceptibility of Galician peasants to regalism (the myth of the good emperor Franz Joseph, the peasants’ sense of belonging to the emperor rather than the Polish nation), the doctrine of loyalism encapsulated in the following motto: “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s.” This assimilation gave rise to the creation of state assimilation and the pro-Habsburg orientation. The assimilation of the state was a process leading to a conscious, systematic, and permanent, not tactical and makeshift. . .

179 W. Czerkawski, *Wyodrębnienie Galicyi*. . . , p. 19.

180 J. Rydel, *Generałowie i admirałowie narodowości polskiej w siłach zbrojnych Austro-Węgier w latach 1868–1918* (Kraków 2001), pp. 167 ff.

...acceptance by a national minority (minority community with a clarified sense of national bond) of the fact that it belongs to a linguistically and nationally foreign state organism. As a result of the above process, there develops the phenomenon of political activism of a specific minority group, advocating for loyal (state-building) cooperation with the prevailing community (state-nation) on the grounds of full respect for linguistic and national identity and national holding of the minority group, on the one hand, and on the other hand, this minority's full respect for the integral unity and political interests of the multinational state.¹⁸¹

On these grounds, state patriotism was formed. It is not hard to explain mechanisms of its creation. A given group, in this case Poles, or more precisely Galicians, had a sense of local patriotism and a sense of attachment to the Habsburg crown and the Emperor, and their actions were guided by loyalty, on the basis of which they identified themselves with the symbolism and interests of a foreign country. In the Austro-Hungarian monarchy after 1867, the national-state bond assumed the form of a state-dynastic consciousness.¹⁸²

Simultaneously with assimilation, the process of nationalization took place, i.e. the acquisition of national consciousness by lower classes. At the same time, it is a readiness to include the plebeian strata of society into the national communities. This readiness is formed as a result of a sense of national bond between upper and lower strata, based on the awareness of the linguistic-ethnic, historical-traditional, and cultural-social community,¹⁸³ which was particularly visible in the case of Galician peasants.¹⁸⁴ One should also add that the characteristic feature of the nineteenth century was the awakening and strengthening of national consciousness. This process concerned mainly lower social strata, since other strata retained their inseparable links with the Polish history, tradition, culture, and Catholic religion. What is more, the Polish political emigration came mainly from higher strata, having significant achievements in the field of activity in favor of the Polish state.

In fact, the existence of this emigration and its activity influenced the awakening and formation of national consciousness. Moreover, many emigrants returned to Poland, especially from the 1870s. In Galicia, favorable conditions for independence, cultural, and educational activities emerged in connection

181 J. Chlebowczyk, *O prawie do bytu...*, pp. 64.

182 *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 98.

183 *Ibid.*, pp. 49–50.

184 See T. Kuczur, "Proces kształtowania się świadomości narodowej i politycznej chłopów galicyjskich a programy stronnictw ludowych na przełomie XIX i XX wieku," *Świat Idei i Polityki* (Bydgoszcz 2001), vol. I.

with the political-systemic changes that took place in the monarchy.¹⁸⁵ One such emigrant was Julian Klaczko. In exile, he cooperated with the Lambert Hotel and Alfred Potocki, and from 1867 he conducted a propaganda campaign for the Austro-Polish rapprochement. As a result of these actions, J. Klaczko was employed as a court advisor on 1 February 1870 in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁸⁶

In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, assimilation was often a process that was characterized by symmetry. Poles who came to native Austria as a minority group were forced to use German, which made it easier for them to assimilate. For example, the Austrian general Herman Colard, who was appointed as governor in 1915, officially introduced himself as a Pole, and in fact hampered Poles' independence efforts during the war.

One should also point out that “there was no language barrier in the intellectual spheres. The entire intelligentsia spoke German, as they learned this language already in high school.”¹⁸⁷ However, the Germans, who were sent to public service in Galicia (also as a minority), found themselves forced to use Polish as a common language in the contexts outside public institutions, which resulted in their assimilation. For this reason, the descendants of Austrian officials declared Polish identity: “In the second or third generation, they became promoters of Polishness.”¹⁸⁸ Moreover, many writers, journalists, and translators of Galician origin, brought up in bilingual circles, became promoters of Polish culture in Austria. This includes the Viennese translator and writer Oskar Tauschinski and the historian Otto Forst-Battaglia, who are listed as the leading figures in the Polish-Austrian borderland.¹⁸⁹

It is necessary to supplement these terminological remarks by clarifying the concept of diaspora, used to define, explain, and analyze communities, national and/or national groups living in foreign, heterogeneous or homogeneous societies. It is not a new term, but in recent years researchers have extended its conceptual scope. As a result, it has become general, but also universal, allowing

185 J. Kozłowski, “Znaczenie emigracji politycznej dla narodu polskiego w dobie zaborów,” in: *Polonia w Europie*. . . , pp. 72 ff.

186 “Klaczko Julian,” in: *PSB*, vol. XII, Wrocław 1966–67, pp. 531–535; H. Wereszycki, “Julian Klaczko – horfat austriacki,” in: *Niewygasta przeszłość. Refleksje i polemiki* (Kraków 1987).

187 K. A. Kuczyński, *Wielobarwność pogranicza. Polsko-austriackie stosunki literackie* (Wrocław 2001), p. 11.

188 *Tamże*, pp. 9 ff.

189 K. A. Kuczyński, *Ludzie i książki. Z polsko-niemiecko-austriackiego pogranicza kulturowego XX wieku* (Piotrków Trybunalski 1995), pp. 45–50, 101 ff.

for the framing of all individuals and communities or groups, who have left their country of birth for various reasons. The concept of diaspora has its historical connotations and was used to describe the migration of Greeks and the Mediterranean colonization of 800–600 BC. It appeared for the first time in the Bible to describe Christians living in dispersion. Initially, the diaspora had negative associations because it was a result of the exile or disintegration of ethnic, cultural or religious community, often following some tragic events. For centuries, it was identified primarily with the Jewish diaspora.¹⁹⁰

Since 1971, the term “Polish Diaspora,” used for the first time by Adam Bromke, entered the Polish language. Nowadays, the concept no longer has purely negative overtones: individuals live in diasporas not only because of their dramatic historical fate but also because of their reflective and voluntary choice, motivated by the desire to change their place of residence for personal or economic reasons, to start a new job, business, artistic or academic activity. An example of this is Gabriel Sheffer’s definition, which claims that the diaspora emerges as a result of voluntary or forced migration and settlement outside the group’s traditional place of residence: “Modern Diasporas are ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin – their homelands.”¹⁹¹ They are also characterized by internal solidarity. Robin Cohen described nine features of the diaspora, which do not necessarily occur all together: the forced dispersal as a result of tragic events or territorial expansion, the search for employment or educational opportunities, shared memory or the so-called “homeland myth,”¹⁹² the idealization of the family home together with collective actions for the benefit of the homeland, return migrations, the sense of collective identity, history, religion or culture, contradictions and conflicts with the majority, group solidarity, also with the minority’s members in other countries, the contribution to the life of the country of settlement, often very significant, providing grounds for cultural pluralism. R. Cohen also proposed certain types of diasporas: victim, labor, trade, and imperial diasporas (the latter is exemplified by the diaspora of warriors).

Already at this stage of the discussion, it becomes clear that the Polish diaspora in Austria went from the victim diaspora, which emerged as a result of the division of the lands of the First Republic between the three partitioning

190 W. Kopaliński, *Słownik mitów i tradycji kultury* (Warszawa 1987).

191 G. Sheffer, “A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics”, in G. Sheffer (ed.) *Modern Diasporas in International Politics* (London 1986), p. 30.

192 R. Cohen, *Global Diasporas* (Seattle 1997), p. 95.

powers, through the labor diaspora, which emerged after the defeat of the January Uprising and the adoption of the positive work program, to the diaspora of warriors, characteristic of the period preceding the First World War, when the calls for the creation of an independent Polish state became widespread.

Regardless of its causes and specificity, the diaspora is the result of population movements from one territory to another. This phenomenon is called migration and is associated with the concept of emigration. Derivative terms are “immigration,” meaning the arrival of an individual in a foreign country seen from the perspective of that country, followed by “emigration,” meaning the departure of a citizen of a given country to a foreign country, and “remigration” or “return migration,” meaning the return of the individual to his or her native country.

In conclusion, one should state that: “the Polish diaspora in the Danube country, which emerged as a result of voluntary and forced migration, has a centuries-old history and unique characteristics that distinguish it from diasporas in other countries.”¹⁹³ The common mental culture, similar customs, and religion connected Poles with the Habsburg state.

However, migration is a general concept. Due to the multiplicity and diversity of migration waves, there was a need to make them more specific, that is to say, to categorize and systematize them. Based on the observation and application of various criteria, scholars proposed various classifications of migration. Its most important criteria include: direction, duration, causes, motives, conditions, migrants’ qualifications and skills, and the way they make and carry out their migration decisions. Given the direction of migration, one may distinguish external migrations, when individuals move from their own country (the phenomenon called emigration), and internal migrations, when individuals change their place of residence within their own country. According to another typology, one may distinguish between overseas and continental migrations. The criterion of duration makes it possible to distinguish between permanent, periodic and seasonal migrations. Based on the criterion of reasons or motives behind migration decisions, one may list socio-economic, political, cultural, religious, and ideological migrations. In turn, the criterion of conditions makes it possible to examine the phenomenon of migration from the perspective of its determinants: whether they are voluntary migrations, resulting from an informed decision of the individual, or forced migrations, determined by circumstances or actions of other individuals and institutions. Yet another criterion concerns

193 W. S. Kucharski, “Polska diaspora w Austrii,” in: *Polska diaspora*, ed. A. Walaszek, Kraków 2001, p. 253.

the manner in which individuals make and carry out migration decisions: in this case, one may distinguish not only spontaneous and organized migrations but also legal and illegal ones. Finally, there are different types of migration depending on migrants' qualifications and skills: the migration of Gastarbeiters or professionals and the so-called "brain drain."¹⁹⁴

From the theoretical and formal point of view, the notion of emigration applies only to situations in which the individual leaves his or her home country (the country of birth) and migrates to a foreign country (the country of resettlement). That is how the Austrian authorities saw their migrants – as émigrés. In turn, Poles treated their migration from Galicia to the Austrian countries outside the partition in terms of emigration to a foreign country, not in terms of internal migration. Given the above reflections, and in order to avoid terminological confusion, I use the term "emigration" in the sense of going abroad and the term "emigrant" ("émigré") to designate a person leaving his or her home country. I reserve the term "migration" for relocations within the country of residence and the term "migrant" for a person who moves within the country of which he or she is a citizen.

For many years, Austrian emigration legislation identified emigration with the loss of citizenship.¹⁹⁵ The Basic Law of 1867 did not change this definition. Article 4 of the December Constitution on the universal rights of citizens contained basic principles of emigration and freedom of choice of settlement: "Free movement of persons and property within the territory of the state is not subject to any restrictions." First of all, citizens gained the right to freely leave the state, a right limited so far to military service exclusively. The freedom to emigrate was

194 L. Caro, *Emigracja i polityka emigracyjna ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem stosunków polskich*, Poznań 1914, pp. 315 ff.; P. Kraszewski, "Typologia ruchów wychodźczych z ziem polskich w XIX i XX stuleciu," in: *Polonia w Europie. . .*, pp. 48–51; W. Kucharski, Z. Tomkowski, "Wokół podstawowych pojęć i definicji," in: *Polacy w świecie. . .*, part I. . ., p. 20; A. Koprucki, "Rozmieszczenie Polonii w świecie," *Ibid.* p. 41; "Wstęp," in: *Emigracja z ziem polskich w czasach nowożytnych i najnowszych (XVIII–XXw.)*, pod red. A. Pilcha, Warszawa 1984, pp. 15–17; G. Janusz, *Polonia Republice Federalnej Niemiec*, Lublin 1990, pp. 23–24.

195 See: *Zbiór ustaw administracyjnych w Królestwie Galicji i Lodomerii z Wielkim Księstwem Krakowskim, zebrał i wydał J. R. Kasparek* (Kraków 1873) pp. 543–552; T. F. Grodyński, *Ustawodawstwo emigracyjne na tle porównawczym ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem projektu ustawy austriackiej z r. 1904*, CPE, 1911, vol. 12, pp. 91; W. S. Kucharski, *Polacy i Polonia w rdzennej Austrii w XIX i XX wieku* (Lublin-Wiedeń 1994), pp. 18 ff; A. Pilch, "Emigracja z zaboru austriackiego (od połowy XIX w. do 1918r.)," in: *Emigracja z ziem polskich. . .*, pp. 252 ff.

nothing more than a right to withdraw from the state union, i.e. to renounce one's Austrian nationality. However, it was limited to the individuals of non-regulated status in terms of state service: those who were of conscription age or currently performed military service. Article 6 of the Law stated that "Every citizen of the State may take up temporary or permanent residence in any part of the state territory, acquire and dispose freely of fixed property of any kind, and pursue any branch of economic activity under the conditions laid down by law."¹⁹⁶

Moreover, the authorities could not make emigration permits dependent on one's willingness to renounce Austrian citizenship; such permits were required only if the person in question had not fulfilled obligations imposed by the laws on military service.¹⁹⁷ The Immigration Act of 21 January 1897 had not broadened the concept of "emigration," limiting itself to distinguishing between external and permanent migration. It was only the Acts of 1904, 1908, and 1913, adopted as a result of an intensification of migration, that brought about a certain change.¹⁹⁸

The history of emigration from Poland can be divided into several periods. According to Piotr Kraszewski, one should divide migration waves from Poland to Austria into three periods distinguished by legal-systemic and political criteria. In the case of the first one, the author does not give the initial date, but believes that it ended at the end of the eighteenth century. The second period lasted from 1795 to 1918, while the third period lasted from the end of the First World War to the present day. The second period was characterized by the internal character of the Polish population's movement from the ethnically Polish territories incorporated into Austria to the native Austrian countries – in contrast to the other listed waves, which were external migrations, i.e. emigration. Migrations to the Polish lands under Russian and Prussian rule also belonged to this type.

The periods of emigration of Poles from Austria coincide only partially with the periods of emigration from the Polish lands to Austria. In this case, scholars

196 *Staatsgrundgesetz vom 21. Dezember 1867, über die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsbürger für die im Reichrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder*, RGBL, no. 142, 1867; J. Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw i rozporządzeń administracyjnych*, vol. I (Lviv 1899) pp. 224, 230; A. Pilch, *Emigracja z zaboru austriackiego*. . . , p. 253.

197 A. Dziadzio, *Monarchia konstytucyjna w Austrii*. . . , p. 100.

198 W. S. Kucharski, *Polacy i Polonia w rdzennej*. . . , p. 19; see L. Caro, *Emigracja i polityka emigracyjna*. . . , pp. 315–324; J. Okołowicz, *Wychodźstwo i osadnictwo polskie przed wojną światową*, Warszawa 1920, p. 8. A critique of the law of 1904 as compared to the legislation of other European countries and Cisleithania is presented in: T. F. Grodyński, *Ustawodawstwo emigracyjne na tle porównawczym*.

usually adopt a more nuanced division proposed by Władysław S. Kucharski. In his opinion, the periodization of the history of Polish emigration should distinguish eight periods. The first of them ranged from the 1820s to the post-industrial period, when in 1864 the first legal Polish association – the Polish Academic Association “Ognisko” – was founded in Vienna. In the second period, lasting from the establishment of the “Ognisko” until the First World War, there was a dynamic development of social, organizational, cultural, and educational life of the Polish diaspora in native Austrian countries. The third period encompassed the years of the First World War and was characterized by an influx of people from the areas affected by war operations, mainly from Galicia. As a result, the organizational life was subordinated to the war situation. Therefore, this period witnessed a development of humanitarian, welfare-social, but also educational and cultural organizations. The next period of Polish emigration encompassed the years 1918–1939. Its specific character was determined by the changes that took place on the European continent after the First World War. The fundamental problem for Polish emigrants at that time was to decide whether to return to the Polish state or stay in Austria and adopt the citizenship of a foreign country. The next, fifth period was the period of the Second World War, when the Nazi authorities, after the occupation of Austria, banned all Polish associations and organizations. The sixth period began with the end of the Second World War and lasted until 1945, the seventh period encompassed the years 1945–1980, and the eighth, the last one started in 1980.¹⁹⁹

The second period (1864–1914) and the third period (1914–1918) are most interesting from the perspective of this study. However, the first period can be used as a starting point for reflections on Polish emigration to native Austrian countries. Migrations in the years 1864–1914 were mainly of an economic character, while migrations during the First World War were dictated by the circumstances of warfare. One should note that Galicia was the main theater of war operations. In this period, migration was only seemingly voluntary. People often left Galicia because they wanted to save themselves and their families. In addition, there were also forced deportations and evacuations of people from areas affected by warfare.

199 W. S. Kucharski, *Polonia w Austrii*, in: *Polacy w świecie. Polonia jako zjawisko społeczno-polityczne*, ed. A. Kopruckowniak, W. S. Kucharski, Part II, Lublin 1986, pp. 159–160.

2. A Statistical View of the Polish Diaspora

It is not entirely possible to univocally determine the number of Poles or people of Polish origin living in native Austrian countries. Sometimes this task is even impossible due to the fragmentation of sources or the use of various criteria for determining the number of a population.²⁰⁰ There are several reasons for this. First, Polish emigrants from the Russian and Prussian partitions were not included in the Austrian censuses of population by nationality, but by citizenship. From the perspective of the formal and legal criteria, they were citizens of Russia and Prussia. In turn, immigrants from Galicia were treated as Austrian citizens.²⁰¹ From the Polish point of view, Poles migrating within the territory of the Polish state did not perceive themselves as emigrants, although from the formal perspective they were emigrants. Moreover, when migrating from Galicia to Austria, they believed that they emigrated to a foreign country, while, in fact, as citizens of the Austrian state, they were migrants, not emigrants. Second, it was not in the interest of the Austrian state to present the actual number of Poles in Austria. Third, the Polish organizations operating in Austria at that time did not have the opportunity to carry out statistical surveys and determine the actual number of Polish diasporas and their distribution in Austria.²⁰²

The oldest information about Poles living in Austria is a record from the fourteenth century about Polish students of the University of Vienna. Their number did not exceed a dozen or so people.²⁰³ In any case, it was academic youth who constituted the largest group visiting Vienna, although their stay was limited in time and usually ended with the award of a diploma. The Śniadecki brothers, Jan and Jędrzej, the astronomer Tomasz Żebrowski, the mathematician Stefan Łuskina, and the protomedicist Andrzej Krupiński studied at the University of Vienna.²⁰⁴ Jerzy Franciszek Kulczycki²⁰⁵ was one of the Poles who left his mark on the history of Vienna: he was not only the founder of the first Viennese café and

200 W. S. Kucharski, "Wielkość i rozmieszczenie polskiej grupy etnicznej w Austrii w XIX i XX wieku," *Rocznik Polonijny*, no. 2, 1981, pp. 25–46.

201 W. S. Kucharski, *Polonia w Austrii*. . . , p. 161.

202 W. S. Kucharski, *Polonia w Austrii*. . . , p. 162.

203 H. Barycz, "Uniwersytet w życiu umysłowym Polski," in: *Z dziejów polskich wędrówek naukowych za granicę*, Wrocław 1969, pp. 44–193; S. Brzozowski, "Studia Polaków w Wiedniu," in: *Polacy w Austrii*, pod red. A. Pilcha, (Kraków 1976), pp. 79–87.

204 S. Brzozowski, *Studia Polaków w Wiedniu*. . . , p. 81.

205 A. Konieczny, "Kulczycki Jerzy Franciszek," in: *Polacy w historii i kulturze krajów Europy Zachodniej. Słownik Biograficzny*, pod red. K. Kwaśniewskiego i L. Trzeciakowskiego (Instytut Zachodni, Poznań 1981), pp. 233 ff.

most probably a participant of the Battle of Vienna. Until the nineteenth century, Poles rarely settled in the capital of Austria; in fact, the same is true about all native Austrian countries. The exception was service in the Austrian army, which involved a longer stay or even permanent residence in Austria. However, initially Poles emigrated to Austria mostly for educational reasons. The character of emigration had changed after the First Partition of Poland and the incorporation of the southern part of the lands of the Commonwealth into Austria. At that time, partly because of socio-economic conditions, Polish emigration to Austria took on a typical form of labor migration, a search for additional sources of income. As a result, several Polish emigration centers were created in native Austrian countries already in the 1830s.²⁰⁶

According to successive censuses of population, in 1880 Austria was inhabited by 3.238.534 Poles, i.e. 14.9 % of the population of Cisleithania, in 1890 – 3.719.232 (15.8 %), in 1900 – 4.252.483 (16.6 %), and in 1910 – 4.967.984 (17.7 %). However, in the entire Austro-Hungarian Empire, the number of Poles was nearly 10 %.²⁰⁷

The Polish nation constituted the third largest population living in Cisleithania, after Austrian Germans (9.9 million, i.e. 35.6 % of the population) and Czechs and Moravian Slovaks (6.4 million, i.e. 23 %). The fourth largest group were Ukrainians (3.5 million, i.e. 15.6 %) Austria was also inhabited by Slovenians, Italians, Serbs, Croats, and Romanians. According to the 1910 census, the population of Cisleithania was 28.571.934 million.²⁰⁸

It is estimated that ca. 2000 Poles lived in Vienna in the 1830s. However, according to the official statistics of 1857, there were only 1700 Poles living in

206 P. Kraszewski, *Polacy w Austrii*, w: *Polonia w Europie, prac. zbior. pod red. B. Szydłowskiej-Cegłowej* (Poznań 1992), p. 535.

207 H. Batowski, "Die Polen," in: *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918, von A. Wandruszka u. P. Urbanitsch*, Band III, 1. Teiband, *Die Völker des Reiches* (Vienna 1980), p. 526. These data can be supplemented with the number of Poles in the whole Dual Monarchy, in which they were the fourth largest nation (after Germans, Magyars, and Czechs). For instance, in 1880 the population of Poles reached 3.239.000 that is to say, 8,6 %, and in 1910 – 4.686.000, that is to say, 10,0 % of the whole population, *Katalog des NÖ Landesmuseum*, Neue Folge Nr. 186, Wien 1987, 2. Teil: 1980–1916 Glanz und Elend, p. 41; qtd. after: <http://zeit1.uibk.ac.at/quellen/kuprian2.htm> z 12 III 2004.

208 M. Waldenberg, *Narody zależne i mniejszości narodowe w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej. Dzieje konfliktów i idei* (Warszawa 2000), p. 48.

whole Austria.²⁰⁹ Therefore, there are significant differences between these two sources of data.

After political reforms and liberalization of the political system in the second half of the nineteenth century, many Poles moved to native Austrian countries. In Vienna, in the 1870s, there were about 15.000 Poles living in the city (including 4.500 permanent residents). By the 1880s, this number had doubled to 30.000.

The greatest waves of Polish migration to Austria occurred in 1890–1914. For instance, in Lower Austria alone, the number of Poles reached 15.000 in the 1860s, in the 1880s it was more than 30.000, and in 1910 – 49.000. Large Polish communities lived also in other Austrian countries, such as Styria, Upper Austria, Carinthia, and Salzburg. On the eve of the First World War, ca. 40.000 Poles lived in Vienna and surroundings.²¹⁰ At the turn of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, there was a significant influx of seasonal migrants, mainly to Lower Austria, Carinthia, and Styria – their yearly numbers ranged between a few and even twenty thousand. Seasonal migration had basically the same determinants as seasonal emigration, i.e. a search for additional sources of income and more favorable civilizational conditions. Seasonal migration from Galicia to native Austrian countries, mainly Lower and Upper Austria, Styria, and Carinthia, became a more widespread phenomenon after the establishment of the Labor Office in Vienna, whose aim was to organize the recruitment of Galician workers and peasants to work in agriculture or for manual, often unskilled, labor. In the first year of the office's operation, 2.000 labor migrants left Galicia for Austria, in 1909 – 5.000, in 1912 – 7.843, and only in the first half of 1913 – over 9.000. If we supplement these figures with data from private employment agencies and the number of people travelling individually in search of work, the annual number of Polish migrants from Galicia ranged between 15.000 and 20.000.²¹¹

209 *Postępek* wrote: “Perhaps, few people know that the Russian capital has 4570 permanent Polish residents among the 10 nationalities which constitute its population – including military officers, students, artists, and private entrepreneurs, whose number has reached 10.000.” Qtd. after: W. S. Kucharski, *Stowarzyszenia i instytucje polskie w rdzennej Austrii w latach 1867–1918*, (Lublin 1984) p. 30; A. Pilch, “Migracje ludności na obszarze Austro-Węgier w XIX i XX wieku,” in: *Wiktoria wiedeńska i stosunki polsko-austriackie 1683–1983, pod red. W. Śladkowskiego i A. A. Witusika* (Lublin 1983), p. 190.

210 W. S. Kucharski, *Polonia w Austrii*. . . , p. 163.

211 W. S. Kucharski, “Statystyczny obraz Polaków i Polonii w Austrii w XIX i XX wieku (do 1990 roku),” *Studia Polonijne*, vol. 15, 1993, p. 9.

The greatest intensity of migration waves occurred at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1857–1890, most Poles migrated to Lower Austria and Bukovina, but also to Silesia, Moravia, and Bohemia. According to the censuses of 1900 and 1910, the largest group of Galicians lived in Silesia, followed by Lower Austria, Bukovina, Moravia, and Bohemia. In other Cisleithan countries, the figures were significantly lower.

From the perspective of this study, the most interesting phenomenon is Polish migration to native Austrian countries. In 1857, 1.637 Poles stayed or lived in Lower Austria, in 1869 – 9.466, in 1880 – 22.077, in 1890 – 24.320, in 1900 – 46.075, and in 1910 – 49.070.²¹²

The increase in the number of migrants to Lower Austria was mainly related to the influx of people to Vienna and surroundings in 1880–1890. The group of Polish migrants at that time amounted to ca. 30.000 people. It is estimated that at that time Galicia was the main place from which Jews migrated to Austrian countries, mainly to Vienna. In 1857, there were 2.167 Galician Jews in Vienna, and in 1900 as many as 146.000 people.²¹³ Apart from Vienna and Lower Austria, Poles eagerly migrated to Styria, mainly Graz and Loeben, Tirol, and Upper Austria.

Internal migrations in Austria were allowed. Thus, it follows that incomers from Galicia made their choice freely, even though they often searched for social advancement and were forced by material circumstances. Organized recruitment campaigns were also carried out because manual laborers in Galicia were a typical cheap labour force.

According to census data from 1900 and 1910, migrants arriving in Austria were came from both the eastern and western parts of the province. However, it should be noted that in 1900 the largest number of immigrants came from Lviv and the Biała-Tarnów poviats, and in 1910 from Cracow, Lviv, and Brody. At the same time, migrants from Western Galicia were exclusively Poles, while those from Eastern Galicia were both Ukrainians and Poles.²¹⁴

Seasonal emigration has often developed into a permanent phenomenon, although it is impossible to depict this phenomenon with precision because there are no relevant statistical data.²¹⁵

212 A. Pilch, *Emigracja z zaboru austriackiego*. . . , p. 288.

213 See: W. Łazuga, „Rządy polskie” w Austrii. *Gabinet Kazimierza hr. Badeniego 1895–1897* (Poznań 1991).

214 A. Pilch, *Emigracja z zaboru austriackiego*. . . , p. 292.

215 W. S. Kucharski, *Polska diaspora w Austrii*. . . , p. 255.

Official statistics probably underestimate of the number of Poles living in Austria. According to these statistics, in 1869 there were 10.700 people of Polish origin living in Austria, in 1880 – 24.700, in 1890 – 27.600, in 1900 – 50.300, and in 1910 it was 50.500 thousand people, in 1880 – 24.700, in 1890 – 27.600, in 1900 – 55.900.²¹⁶

It follows that the largest number of migrants arrived in Austria between 1880 and 1900. The data presented by Grzegorz Smólski differs significantly from official figures. Smólski points out that in Vienna alone the Polish community consisted of 30.000 people. This difference resulted from the specificity of the censuses, which did not take nationality into consideration, but focused on common language or religion. Therefore, the censuses carried out in Austria failed to present the actual situation of the population.

At the same time, however, the smallest increase in population was recorded between 1900 and 1910, when it amounted to only 5.600 people. Apart from the specificity of the censuses and the assimilation of the Polish population, it should be noted that the main reason for this might have been the change in the character of emigration from permanent to seasonal. This means that despite the significant size of the migrant population, only a small group of Poles decided to change their place of residence and settle permanently in Austria.²¹⁷

In the pre-war period, according to the 1910 census, nearly 4.7 million inhabitants of Galicia stated that the language they use on a daily basis is Polish. This census did not include people of Mosaic faith, so the number of Poles in Galicia was lower. The Roman Catholic faith was declared by 3.7 million inhabitants.²¹⁸ Henryk Batowski estimated that in 1910 the number of Poles living in Galicia was 3.7 million. There could have been about 4 million Poles in Galicia, although over 4.6 million recognized Polish as their common language.²¹⁹ However, the number of Poles and the population of Polish origin before the First World War, assuming various data, in Vienna alone ranged from 40.000 to 50.000.²²⁰ Based on the language criterion, it can be stated that in Vienna in

216 A. Pilch, *Migracje ludności na obszarze...*, p. 190.

217 P. Kraszewski, *Polacy w Austrii...*, p. 536.

218 M. Waldenberg, *Narody zależne i mniejszości...*, p. 81.

219 This was due to the fact that the census did not include the Jewish population, that is, nearly 900.000 people in Galicia. Some Jews considered themselves to be Poles, hence the author gave an estimate of the number of Poles. See H. Batowski, *Die Polen...*, pp. 527–528.

220 According to Austrian statistics, in 1910 over 29.000 people living in Vienna and surroundings spoke Polish on a daily basis. See W. S. Kucharski, *Polonia w Austrii...*, p. 163.

1900, 27.955 people spoke Polish, and in 1910 – already 29.071.²²¹ Given the above data, one may observe that in 1910 between 8.5 % and 10.0 % of Galician inhabitants speaking Polish as a common language lived in the Austrian capital.

However, an intensive increase in the number of Poles in Vienna and surroundings took place when World War I broke out. It is estimated that during the war about 800.000 people left Galicia. The place of escape, or external coercion, were native Austrian countries, Bohemia, Silesia, and Hungary. Some of the Galicians were also deported by the tsarist authorities to the depths of Russia.

It is problematic to determine the exact number of Poles living in Austria during the war. It is estimated that, as a result of the Russian offensive in 1914, 650.000 people were evacuated from Galicia to the western parts of Cisleithania. The largest group were Poles: ca. 360–370.000 of people forcibly expelled to native Austrian countries, but also to Bohemia and Western Galicia. In addition, about 20.000 workers from the Kingdom of Poland were sent to work in Austria.²²²

Estimates show that in October 1914, ca. 100.000 people from Galicia arrived in the monarchy's capital city. Soon this number doubled. Zygmunt Lasocki wrote that "Vienna was overcrowded with refugees. There were 200.000 refugees from Galicia in Vienna at the end of 1914 and at the beginning of 1915. On 1 October 1915, official statistics showed 137.000 more refugees in Vienna." This group consisted mostly of Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews.²²³

Official statistics differ from other statistics, and the discrepancy in determining the number of Polish refugees is between 640.000 and 800.000. Immediately after the outbreak of the war, between 160.000 and 200.000 people sought refuge in Austria in the spring of 1915 the figure was 145.000–150.000, and in October 1915 – 137.000.²²⁴

221 Ibid. See also: W. S. Kucharski, *Wielkość i rozmieszczenie polskiej grupy...*, p. 37; W. Bieńkowski, "Polen in Wien während des ersten Weltkrieges: ihre politische und kulturelle Tätigkeit," in: *Polen im alten Österreich. Kultur und Politik, herausgegeben W. Leitsch u. W. Trawkowski* (Wien-Köln-Weimar 1993), pp. 13.

222 K. Dunin-Wąsowicz, "Sytuacja demograficzna narodu polskiego w latach 1914–1918," in: Ż. Kormanowa, W. Najdus (eds.), *Historia Polski*, vol. III, part 3 (Warszawa 1974), pp. 510–511.

223 Z. Lasocki, *Polacy w austriackich obozach barakowych dla uchodźców i internowanych. (Wspomnienia z czasów wojny światowej byłego posła do parlamentu austriackiego)* (Kraków 1929), p. 11.

224 A. Senesib (ed.), *Szlakiem tułaczym. Księga pamiątkowa wychodźstwa polskiego 1914–1918* (Vienna 1919), pp. 33 ff; Z. Lasocki, *Polacy w austriackich obozach...*, pp. 6–10.

The return of war refugees to Galicia dates back to the second half of 1915, when Russian troops left this province. However, a larger wave of return migration came only after 1917. In May, about 42.000 Poles, nearly 18.000 Ukrainians, and 77.000 Jews returned to Galicia.²²⁵ Deported to Russia had the opportunity to return to Galicia only after the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest in March 1918.

Much fewer Poles took refuge in other Austrian countries, in September 1914 there were only several thousand refugees. The largest number of Poles migrated to Graz (2.000), Loeben and Marburg (900 each), and Cylia (700). Other migration centers were Feldbach (450), Bruck, Mürzyschlag, Judenburg (400 each), Litzen and Hartenberg (350), Deurschlandsberg (250), Pettau, Weiz, Leibnitz (200 each), and Vortsburg (150).²²⁶

The lack of adequate statistical data also makes it impossible to precisely determine the socio-occupational composition of the Polish community in Austria. It is known that the majority of migrants were men, but it is not possible to accurately reconstruct the social composition of groups of migrants, mainly due to the lack of sources. For this reason, the determination of the socio-occupational structure of the Polish community in native Austrian countries is based on estimates and a certain probability, and is therefore imprecise.²²⁷

This wave of Polish migration to Austria consisted mainly of seasonal migrants who left Galician villages in search for sources of income. This group included industrial workers, merchants, property owners, freelancers, and civil servants from the state administration and the judiciary. Representatives of higher social classes, such as rich landowners and aristocrats, also came to Austria. The division into three socio-occupational groups, the lower classes, the middle class, and the intelligentsia with aristocracy, is certainly vague and blurred, because belonging to the upper social class was often not associated with a high material status. Thus, there was a classic phenomenon of discrepancies in status determinants, e.g. in relation to representatives of freelance occupations, artists, or intellectuals. The author does not fully agree with the opinion presented by Piotr Kraszewski, who wrote that: "Such a division [. . .] was reflected also in the financial status of particular groups." Certainly, one may point to such a regularity, but it was not a principle.²²⁸

225 Ibid., p. 8.

226 W. S. Kucharski, *Stowarzyszenia i instytucje polskie*. . . , p. 194.

227 Ibid., p. 23.

228 P. Kraszewski, *Polacy w Austrii*. . . , p. 537.

Accurate representation of the socio-occupational structure is therefore not an easy task, not least because of insufficient figures. However, several groups can be distinguished, accepting the division proposed by W. S. Kucharski, from the whole group of Poles living and staying in native Austrian countries, i.e. workers and peasants, the middle class, civil servants, the intelligentsia with aristocracy, and academic youth.²²⁹ What is more, the Polish population in Austria was very diverse not only in social, material and professional terms but also in ideological and political terms.

The social composition of the Polish diaspora in Austria reflected the socio-occupational structure of Galicia. According to the 1910 census, in the socio-occupational structure of Cisleithania, Poles worked mainly in agriculture (65.6 % of the population). Only 15 % found employment in industry and crafts, and 14 % in the public service and administration.²³⁰

The group of Polish emigrants consisted mainly of two social categories: peasants and workers. They had some common features: first, they were emigrants from the lands of all three partitions, i.e. citizens of Russia, Prussia, and Austria; second, they had a low sense of national identity. This group, which represented the widest range of professional categories, varied between 75 % and 90 % of the Polish emigrant community. They found employment mainly in construction, river regulation, and road building, followed by business, crafts, and services, while peasants worked on farms. In his speech of 8 November 1898, Ignacy Daszyński said: "Here, in Vienna, thousands of Polish peasants build embankments to regulate the flow of the Vienna river."²³¹

Members of the middle class, i.e. merchants, industrialists, or property owners, constituted a much smaller group. However, the least numerous group, which nonetheless had the greatest intellectual potential and participated in the political life of the state, were freelance professionals, artists, scholars, writers, and aristocracy, including the founders, propagators, and activists of various Polish community associations and institutions.²³² There was also another group of

229 W. S. Kucharski, *Polska diaspora w Austrii*. . . , p. 255.

230 M. Waldenberg, *Narody zależne i mniejszości*. . . , p. 49.

231 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II (Wrocław 1951), p. 252; A. Pilch, *Emigracja z zaboru austriackiego*. . . , pp. 290 ff.

232 A. Konieczny, "Polonia austriacka", in: K. Kubiak i A. Pilch (eds.), *Stan i potrzeby badań nad zbiorowościami polonijnymi* (Wrocław 1976), pp. 611 ff; J. Buszko, A. Pilch, "Udział Polaków w Polonii w życiu politycznym i gospodarczym Austrii w XIX i XX wieku" in: *Polacy w Austrii, pod red. A. Pilcha*, Kraków 1975; W. Kucharski, *Wielkość i rozmieszczenie polskiej*. . . , pp. 32–39.

Poles, living mainly in Vienna, which had a similar character, namely – officials of the central authorities. Finally, Austria was populated by Polish student youth, educated at universities and academies in Vienna and other academic centers such as Innsbruck, Graz, and Leoben. It was a specific group of migrants with a high rotation rate associated with the period of study at universities. In the academic year 1882/83, there were 788 students in total (41 Poles and 133 Ukrainians), in 1890/921 – 879 (535 Poles and 115 Ukrainians), in 1900/1901 – 816 (530 Poles and 132 Ukrainians), and in 1912/13 – 2.019 (1.3776 Poles and 529 Ukrainians).²³³

Vienna's universities were the most popular among Polish youth. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the capital of Austria became the main academic center for Polish students. In the academic year 1876/77, 284 Poles studied in Vienna: 119 law students, 83 medicine students, 56 philosophy students, and 26 theology students. 121 Poles studied at the TU Wien (Vienna University of Technology), including 43 architecture and engineering students, 46 chemistry students, 27 mechanics students, and 5 shipbuilding students. In the academic year 1903/04, as many as 650 Poles studied in Vienna: 245 at the University of Vienna, followed by 128 at the TU Wien, 63 at the Agricultural Academy of Vienna, 16 at the Export Academy, 3 at the Consular Academy, 1 at the Academy of Veterinary Medicine. The Mining Academy in Leoben had 59 Polish students, the University of Chernivtsi – 42, the Mining Academy in Tabor – 22, the Mining Academy in Příbram – 20, Graz University of Technology – 9, the Trade Academy in Graz – 4, the Artistic Industrial School – 3, the University of Graz – 2. In 1909/10, the number of students increased to 850, and in 1913/14 – to 1.246.²³⁴

These data do not account for the specificity of individual years, e.g. the significant outflow of students from the University of Lviv in 1900/01, and later in 1903/04 as a result of the struggle to establish a Ukrainian university in Lviv. The

233 A. Pilch, *Emigracja z zaboru austriackiego*. . . , p. 294.

234 Z. Kamiński, *Młodzież polska w Leoben od r. 1877–1887. Pamiętka zjazdu koleżeńskiego d. 29 września w Krakowie* (Kraków 1887), Biblioteka Zakładu Narodowego im Ossolińskich (BZNIÖ), sig. 136911; A. Karbowniak, *Młodzież polska akademicka za granicą 1795–1910* (Kraków 1910), pp. 70, 256–258; W. S. Kucharski, *Polacy i Polonia w rdzennej*. . . , pp. 33 ff; *Stowarzyszenia i instytucje polskie*. . . , p. 24; Z. Tomkowski, “Polskie Stowarzyszenie Akademickie ‘Ognisko’ w Wiedniu w latach niewoli narodowej (1864–1914),” in: W. S. Kucharski (ed.), *Polonia i przyjaciele Polski w Austrii* (Lublin 1995), p. 107.

number of Ukrainians studying at the University of Vienna increased from 37 to 294 in 1900–1902.²³⁵

Polish youth also studied at the Leopold Franz University of Innsbruck, known as Oenipontana, which has a reputation for being “a breeding ground for the civil service and judicial elite.”²³⁶ The Department of Law and Theology enjoyed the greatest popularity among students. A greater influx of students from Galicia dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century, although Polish academic youth was never a significant force at the university. In the years 1865–1918, there were 65 Polish students at the Department of Law, while the Department of Theology educated 90 Roman Catholic priests, such as Adam Stefan Sapieha, and 50 Greek Catholic priests. Lay students were mostly sons or wards of the nobility, but there was also a significant number of people, who came from families of state officials.²³⁷

Polish youth also studied at military academies, but this was a very small group: in 1868–1918, it consisted of 508 people in total. At that time, 236 Poles studied in Vienna and Mödling, 28 in Fiume, and 244 in Wiener Neustadt. In the years 1868–1892, there was a systematic increase in the number of Polish students of military academies. The peak period was 1893–1895, when 15 Poles studied each year (the average ranged from 7 to 11 people). Since 1896, there has been a downward trend, with the smallest number in 1902–1906 (only 8 people in the yearbook). In Wiener Neustadt, Poles constituted an average of 4.4 % of students, the maximum was 6.2 % in 1875–1879, the minimum was 2.3 % in 1885–1889. However, in the Technical Military Academy Poles constituted an average of 5.6 % of students. An upward trend was noted in 1875–1889, and in 1889–1894 10.6 % of Poles studied at the Academy. Subsequent years brought a slight but regular decrease in the number of Poles. The most popular among Poles was the Department of Engineering (7.6 % of Polish students). In 1885, as many as 25 % students were of Polish origin. In 1880–1900, there was 11 Poles for every 100 candidates for the Academy. After 1900, there was a sharp and permanent decline in the number of Polish students. At the Naval Academy, Poles constituted a statistically insignificant group of students.

235 For the number of students who attended in this period, see K. Michalewska, “Sprawa uniwersytetu ukraińskiego w latach 1848–1914,” *Studia Historyczne*, 1984, vol. 1.

236 W. Ćwik, “Polacy w Innsbrucku do 1939 roku,” in: W. S. Kucharski (ed.), *Polonia i przyjaciele Polski w Austrii* (Lublin 1995), pp. 64 ff.

237 *Ibid.*, pp. 66 ff.

The social composition of a group of Polish students of military academies testifies to the group's loyalism. However, a large number of these students treated military service instrumentally. First of all, they were sons of high government officials – 30.2 % (153 students), military – 28.5 % (135 students, of which 16 were sons of officers), merchants and bourgeoisie – 17 % (86 students), land-owners – 14.4 % (73 students), people of unknown origin – 7.5 % (38 students), aristocracy – 4.4 % (23 students), and only 2 % (10) students came from poor families.²³⁸

Apart from the above mentioned five groups, the Polish diaspora in Austria consisted of soldiers serving in the Austrian army. It was a specific, small group, which differed significantly from all others. Full data on the number of professional military communities are available for the years 1894–1911, although most of the available data are only estimates. In 1894, 4.3 % of Poles served in the army, after Germans, Czechs, and Croats. In 1895–1900, there was a decrease in the number of soldiers, and in 1900 it amounted to 2.7 %.²³⁹

The Polish population in Vienna consisted mainly of the poorer social strata, which were composed of unskilled and manual workers, craftsmen, hotel service, waiters, and small trade workers. In turn, agricultural workers, apart from typical field and farm occupations, were employed for manual labor, which required no professional preparation, such as earthworks or river regulation.

3. Polish Politicians in the Life of the Polish Diaspora

Galicia residents willingly migrated to the monarchy's capital as a result of political reforms initiated during the Spring of Nations, the liberalization of law and socio-political relations, and economic transformations. Initial waves of migration had primarily educational purpose. Later waves, in turn, were determined by the desire to achieve social advancement or find additional sources of income. The settlement of Poles in Vienna and other urban centers gave rise to the integration of Polish immigrants. This was manifested in the establishment of various organizations bringing together individuals with similar goals, views, and interests. The process was supported by legal and political reforms, which offered greater opportunities for grassroots initiatives, which brought about the establishment of various associations.

238 J. Rydel, *Generałowie i admirałowie narodowości polskiej*. . . , p. 158.

239 *Ibid.*, pp. 153–154.

Article 12 of the Basic Law on the Universal Rights of Citizens: guaranteed the freedom of association and assembly: “Austrian citizens have the right to assemble and to form associations. It was further developed by the Associations Act and the Assembly Act, both of 15 November 1867. In A. Dziadzio’s interpretation: “The new law ended the period of licensing the participation of citizens in public life.”²⁴⁰ One could agree with this statement if it were not for the legislator’s distinction between two categories of associations: “general” and political.

If the enunciations of an association raised doubts among the Austrian authorities as to its loyalty toward the monarchy, they were regarded as dangerous actions and provided the basis for the dissolution of the association. The same applied to political speeches made by an association’s members. The definition of a political association was not specified in the law, and the authorities sought to give it the broadest possible meaning. In this case, the State Tribunal ruled that a political association, which defined its statutory goals in terms of national or religious tasks, was not a political association.²⁴¹ Polish academic associations, e.g. “Czytelnia Polska” (The Polish Reading Room) association, declared themselves to be apolitical.²⁴²

240 *Gesetz vom 15. November 1867 über das Vereinsrecht*, RGBl, no. 134, 1867, pp. 377–384; *Gesetz vom 15. November 1867 über das Versammlungsrecht*, RGBl, no. 135, 1867, pp. 382–384; W. S. Kucharski, “Usytuowanie cesarza, obywateli, stowarzyszeń i zgromadzeń w prawie austriackim w latach 1867–1918,” in: W. Kucharski (ed.), *Polacy w austriackim parlamencie. W 130. rocznicę Koła Polskiego. Materiały polsko-austriackiej konferencji naukowej zorganizowanej w parlamencie austriackim i Stacji Naukowej PAN w Wiedniu w dn. 11–12 września 1997* (Lublin-Wiedeń 1997), pp. 67–71.

241 Nonetheless, the ruling has not definitively resolved the ambiguity. Each case of refusal to establish an association or appeal against the decision to ban an activity was considered individually, and the previous activity of members of the association was also taken into consideration. For instance, one may contend that the celebration of national anniversaries, e.g. the January Uprising, was a political act giving rise to the dissolution of the association, i.e. to its recognition as a political organization. See: A. Dziadzio, *Monarchia konstytucyjna w Austrii. . .*, pp. 109, 118.

242 “Pismo urzędowe c.k. Starostwa Okręgu Leoben z dnia 20 sierpnia 1916 do c.k. Namiestnictwa w Grazu dotyczące Stowarzyszenia ‘Czytelnia Polska,’ Akta Statthalterei (Namiestnictwa) Polnische Lesehalle an der k.k. Bergakademie in Leoben, Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv – Graz, sig. 53–15517, p. 73. “Czytelnia Polska” was founded 1878; in 1894, it was renamed as “Czytelnia Polska Akademików Górniczych” (Ibid. pp. 2, 36).

There have been several types of Polish associations in Austria: youth's, illegal ("Nowa Polska" [New Poland], "Nowa Sarmacja" [New Sarmatia], "Haliczanie" [Halychans], "Synowie Ojczyzny" [Sons of the Fatherland]), legal (the already mentioned "Czytelnia Polska," the Academic Association "Ognisko" [Bonfire] in Vienna and Graz, the "Spójnia" Association of Polish Progressive Youth in Vienna, the "Promień" [Light Beam] Association Polish Progressive Youth in Leoben, the Polish Scouting and Guiding Association), workers' (Association of Polish Workers "Równość" [Equality] in Vienna, the Polish Association of Christian Male and Female Laborers "Ojczyzna" [Homeland] in Vienna), the Polish Workers Association in Vienna), and bourgeoisie or intelligentsia associations (the Polish Association "Zgoda" [Consensus] in Vienna, the Polish Association "Strzecha" [Thatch], the "Biblioteka Polska" [Polish Library] Society, the People's School Society, Polish Women's League in Vienna).²⁴³

The Poles who studied at Austrian universities were the first to create Polish organizations in this country. In the middle of the 1830s, the Memorial and National Association was established, an illegal self-educational organization. When Ludwik Hierowski took over the leadership of this organization, it not only changed its name to "Nowa Polska" (New Poland) but also changed its character, becoming a patriotic organization. It remained illegal. Later, in 1839, the association "Synowie Ojczyzny" (Sons of the Fatherland) was founded, grouping together different branches of such associations as "Sarmacja" [Sarmatia], "Wolni Haliczanie" [Free Halychans] or "Chrobaci" [White Croats]. After the discovery of secret unions in Galicia, the Austrian authorities focused on searching for their connections with youth organizations in Vienna. Their members were eventually exposed, arrested, imprisoned, and later pardoned, but the dynamics of founding new associations slowed down. It was only after the January Uprising, in 1864, that the first Polish legal organization in Vienna was established.

The Polish clergy played a significant role in the national life of Poles in Austria, which certainly contributed to the creation of long-lasting ties between Poles living in Austria: "Ethnic pastors are closer to the faithful in many ways and enjoy greater trust. They are not only united by language and culture but also know their fellow countrymen's mindset and spiritual needs, so that they can more satisfy their religious expectations in a fuller extent."²⁴⁴

243 W. S. Kucharski, *Polonia w Austrii*. . . , pp. 168 ff.

244 Fr A. Nadolny, *Polskie duszpasterstwo w Austrii po drugiej wojnie światowej* (Toruń 2004), p. 18.

The Polish Academic Association “Ognisko” (Bonfire) was the first legal organization of Poles in Austria and one of the longest operating Polish organizations in Vienna: it was established in 1864 and operated until 1951 (with a break during the world wars). The statutory goals of “Ognisko” included such fields of activity as: self-education, scientific, cultural, and educational activities, including student grants and loans.²⁴⁵ Despite its efforts, “Ognisko” never managed to draw all Polish students into its ranks.²⁴⁶ However, thanks to its pioneering activity, it had a significant impact on the formation of patriotic attitudes of young people and the youth association movement in other academic centers in Austria.

At the beginning of “Ognisko’s” activity, the association found strong support from Stanisław Szczepanowski and Jan Michejda, who served as Polish deputies to the Austrian Parliament. For their significant contribution to the work of the association, they were awarded honorary membership. Another distinguished member of the “Ognisko” was Władysław Dulęba, a deputy and future Minister for Galicia, who was active in the association’s legal and philosophical section already in the 1870s. As a vice-president of this section (1902–1908), he contributed greatly to the creation of Polish companies in Vienna (there were ca. 350 Polish companies in the first decade of the twentieth century).²⁴⁷ Also the parliamentarian Franciszek Smolka actively participated in the social life of the diaspora, supporting the social and cultural activities of Polish associations in Vienna with both his funds and authority. He also held a protectorate over the Polish Association “Zgoda” (Consensus), supported the Polish Academic Association “Ognisko” in Vienna and, as W.S. Kucharski wrote, “He did not miss

245 *Statut des Polnisch Akademischen Vereins ‘Ognisko’ in Graz*, Vereinsakten, Universität in Graz, sig. 64, pp. 7–11, 41; *Statut des Polnisch Akademischen Vereins ‘Ognisko’ in Wien*, Bundes-Poliziedirektion, Vereinsbüro–Vienna, sig. XIV-41; *Statut Polskiego Akademickiego Stowarzyszenia ‘Ognisko’ w Wiedniu (1865r.)*, NÖ-A, Kath. XIV-41; R. Taborski, *Polacy w Wiedniu*. . . , pp. 61 ff; W. S. Kucharski, *Stowarzyszenia i instytucje polskie w rżdennej*. . . , pp. 49–51; W. S. Kucharski, *Polska diaspora w Austrii*. . . , p. 258.

246 The association had 39 members in 1906/07 and 61 in 1913/14. See: Vereinsakten, *Statuten des Polnisch Akademischen Vereins ‘Ognisko’ in Graz*, Universität in Graz, sig. 63, p. 35, A. Karbowniak, *Młodzież polska akademicka*. . . , pp. 140 ff.

247 W. S. Kucharski, “Udział polskich parlamentarzystów w działalności rodzimych stowarzyszeń w Wiedniu w okresie monarchii austro-węgierskiej,” in: *Polacy w austriackim parlamencie*. . . , p. 130.

the events organized by Polish associations on the occasion of important historical anniversaries.”²⁴⁸

One of the main objectives of “Ognisko” was to maintain ties with Polish deputies to the Austrian Parliament. Indeed, Polish politicians, activists, officials, intellectuals, and members of higher social classes willingly participated in the association’s initiatives such as celebrations of national anniversaries and academic, cultural, or entertainment meetings. The association expressed its gratitude, e.g. by sending a letter of thanks “to the honorable Parliament Members for gracing the meeting with their presence.” Florian Ziemiałkowski read the letter publicly at the meeting of the Polish Club on 25 June 1867.²⁴⁹ Among the association’s supporters were Stanisław Głąbiński, Adam Jędrzejowicz, Witold Lewicki, Leon Poniński, Stanisław Potocki, and Pius Twardowski. Jerzy Czartoryski, the Parliament’s deputy and the future member of the House of Lords of the Imperial Council (Herrenhaus), participated in the celebrations of the anniversary of the 3rd May Constitution organized by “Ognisko.”²⁵⁰ It is also worth mentioning Julian Dunajewski, the future Minister of Finance, who often took part in the association’s meetings;²⁵¹ for instance, the one held on 27 November 1875 to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of Adam Mickiewicz’s death. In these milieus, it was popular to celebrate various anniversaries associated with the figure of Adam Mickiewicz, the oldest of the Polish Three Bards, which shows the association’s care for the preservation of the Polish tradition and culture. The celebrations of the centenary of Mickiewicz’s birthday held on 10 December 1898 featured many distinguished guests, such as Apolinary Jaworski (President of the Polish Club), Dawid Abrahamowicz, Wojciech

248 *Sprawozdanie roczne Wydziału Stowarzyszenia Polskiego „Zgoda” w Wiedniu z czynności za czas od 1. października 1888r. do końca grudnia 1889r. przedłożone na walnym zebraniu członków w dniu 26. stycznia 1890r.* (Vienna 1890), p. 17; *Sprawozdanie Wydziału z czynności Polskiego Stowarzyszenia Akademickiego ‘Ognisko’ w Wiedniu za rok 1876/7* (Lviv 1877), p. 12; W. S. Kucharski, *Polacy i Polonia w Austrii*, part I: *Zasłużeni* (Lublin–Vienna 2001), p. 150.

249 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego z dnia 25 czerwca 1867r. (o godzinie 9 wieczorem),” in: Z. Fras, S. Pijaj (eds.), *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w wiedeńskiej Radzie Państwa (lata 1867–1868)* (Kraków 2001), pp. 70–71.

250 W. S. Kucharski, *Udział polskich parlamentarzystów...*, pp. 131 ff. See also: “Trzeci Maj,” *Gazeta Wiedeńska*, no. 9, vol. 6 IV 1893, p. 6, Arch. ZBE, mkrf. 21.

251 J. Dunajewski worked also privately for the benefit of the Polish diaspora. Together with his wife, he served Easter breakfasts and organized Christmas Eves in his own home. In any case, the Dunajewski family ran an open house frequented by Galician and Viennese public figures. See K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 17.

Count Dzieduszycki, Adam Jędrzejowicz, Edward Rittner, Jan Stapiński, and Władysław Struszkiewicz. It is also recorded that the Parliament's deputies, Zygmunt Lewicki, Władysław Gniewosz, Cyryl Winkowski, Jan Milewski, Jan Stapiński, Adam Jędrzejowicz attended one of the association's meetings devoted to Mickiewicz's poetry.²⁵²

"Ognisko" had its own rich library and reading room with a large collection of books and Polish, German, and English journals. Part of this collection came from the Polish Club and private donors such as Pius Twardowski, Kornel Ujejski, Henryk Blumenstock, and Zenon Kaczkowski.²⁵³

The figures who rendered the greatest support to "Ognisko" were awarded honorary membership: Florian Ziemiałkowski in 1868,²⁵⁴ Julian Dunajewski in 1876, Jerzy Czartoryski in 1883, August Count Łoś in 1892, Władysław Struszkiewicz in 1898. On 21 March 1892, at the General Assembly of the association, honorary membership was granted to: Jerzy Badura, Józef Chociszewski, Hilary Filasiewicz, Jan Franke, Ferdinand Kowarski, Fr Franciszek Michejda, Fr Jan Michejda, and Stanisław Szczepanowski.²⁵⁵ The group of supporting members of "Ognisko" included also K. Bartoszewski, Baum, Maksymilian Bodyński, Jan Chełmicki, Jerzy Cienciała, Leon Chrzanowski, Jan Czaykowski, Julian Czerkawski, Aleksander Dworski, Edward Dzwonkowski, Edward Gniewosz, Kazimierz Grocholski, Władysław Haller, Tomasz Horodyski, Franciszek Hoszard, Józef Jasiński, Apolinary Jaworski, Maurycy Kabat, Zygmunt Kozłowski, Jan Krasicki, Kornel Krzczunowicz, Witold Lewicki, Ludwik Ruczka, Eustachy

252 W. S. Kucharski, *Udział polskich parlamentarzystów. . .*, p. 132; Z. Tomkowski, "Polskie Stowarzyszenie Akademickie 'Ognisko' w Wiedniu w latach niewoli narodowej (1864–1914)," in: W. S. Kucharski (ed.), *Polonia i przyjaciele Polski w Austrii* (Lublin 1995), p. 113.

253 Z. Tomkowski, "Polskie Stowarzyszenie Akademickie 'Ognisko'. . ." pp. 120 ff.

254 Since May 15, 1880, F. Ziemiałkowski was an honorary member of the "Przytulisko Polskie" association. On January 27, 1881, he also became an honorary member of the Towarzystwo Bratniej Pomocy Słuchaczy Wszechnicy Lwowskiej; Akta rodziny Ziemiałkowskich 1856–1917, APwRz, vol. 112 A, cols. 45–46.

255 *Sprawozdanie wydziału stowarzyszenia akademickiego "Ognisko" w Wiedniu za rok 1877/78* (Vienna 1878), BZNiO, manuscript 70550, p. 13; *Sprawozdanie wydziału stowarzyszenia akademickiego "Ognisko" w Wiedniu z czynności w roku 1879* (Vienna 1879), BZNiO, manuscript 246577, p. 13; *Sprawozdanie wydziału stowarzyszenia akademickiego "Ognisko" w Wiedniu z czynności w roku 1880/81* (Vienna 1882), BZNiO, manuscript 70550, pp. 17 ff; *Sprawozdanie Wydziału Polskiego Akademickiego Stowarzyszenia „Ognisko” w Wiedniu z czynności za rok administracyjny 1904*, Wiedeń 1905; W. S. Kucharski, *Udział polskich parlamentarzystów. . .*, p. 132.

Rylski, E. Sanguszko, Ludwik Smarzewski, Franciszek Smolka, Jan Tarnowski, Emil Torosiewicz, Ferdynand Weigel, and Józef Wereszyński. Many of them provided material and financial support for the association, including Julian Dunajewski, Franciszek Smolka, Apolinary Jaworski, Kazimierz Grocholski, Juliusz Twardowski, August Count Łoś, or the Czartoryski and Lanckoroński families.²⁵⁶

Another Polish association, which has operated for many years, was the Association “Strzecha” [Thatch] founded in 1894. In fact, it is still active under the name “Strzecha” Association of Poles in Austria. It was registered on 28 November 1894²⁵⁷ and consisted mainly of state officials, small entrepreneurs, traders, artists, writers, physicians, and craftsmen. Its first president was Pius Twardowski, a court counsellor, father of two distinguisher sons the philosopher Kazimierz Twardowski and Juliusz Twardowski, the Minister for Galicia.²⁵⁸ The latter supported the association during the war by subsidizing it with government funds.

In its activities, focused on cultivating the Polish tradition and culture,²⁵⁹ “Strzecha” was a particularly attractive association for the Poles living in Vienna, which is why it drew a large group of Polish parliamentarians, politicians, and officials of the central administration. Among its active members from the political circles, one may list the Minister of Railways Stanisław Głąbiński, the Minister of Finance and Governor of Galicia Witold Korytowski, the Minister for Galicia Juliusz Twardowski, and the Parliament’s deputies: Ludomił German, Józef Buzek, Ignacy Wróbel, Włodzimierz Przerwa-Tetmajer, Zygmunt Lasocki,

256 Z. Tomkowski, *Polskie Stowarzyszenie Akademickie „Ognisko”*. . . , p. 128; W. S. Kucharski, *Udział polskich parlamentarzystów*. . . , p. 132. “Ognisko” also invited Klemens Rutowski to become its member, *Towarzystwo Polsko-Akademickie “Ognisko”, Wiedeń 16 luty 1872r.*, “Korespondencja Klemensa Rutowskiego,” BZNiO, sig. 13382 II, col. 541.

257 Nieder-Österreichisches Archiv (NÖ-A), Vereinskataster, Index – Bd. 2, Kath. XV, V – 89619.

258 *Sprawozdanie Stowarzyszenia Polskiego „Strzecha” w Wiedniu za rok 1895* (Vienna 1896), pp. 5, 8; “Zjednoczenie towarzystw polskich w Wiedniu,” *Polska Gazeta Wiedeńska*, no. 34 of November 29, 1893; W. S. Kucharski, *Związek Polaków w Austrii „Strzecha” 1894–1994* (Lublin–Vienna 1996) pp. 35 ff; W. S. Kucharski, *Polska diaspora w Austrii*. . . , p. 260; W. S. Kucharski, “Zasłużeni dla Związku Polaków w Austrii ‘Strzecha’ – szkic do portretu,” in: W. S. Kucharski (ed.), *Polonia i przyjaciele Polski w Austrii* (Lublin 1995), pp. 17–19.

259 *Rocznik Stowarzyszenia Polskiego “Strzecha” w Wiedniu 1907*, Kraków brw, p. 1, W. S. Kucharski’s archive.

Wincenty Jabłoński, and Jan Zarański. “Strzecha” also honored several Polish deputies, such as L. German, J. Zamorski, and W. Jabłoński,²⁶⁰ for their special merits to the association. One should stress that the association drew individuals with very different political preferences and worldviews. What is more, it made it possible to create a platform for co-operation between different political groupings and Polish deputies in the Imperial Council regarding national goals and interests.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Poles were particularly interested in obtaining permission from the authorities to take care of two churches in Vienna, the Holy Cross for the Order of the Resurrectionist Congregation and St. Joseph’s on the Kahlenberg,²⁶¹ which “has become a symbol of Poland, the glorious traditions of Polish knighthood, while at the same time reminding the world of the nation, which had been deprived of its political existence in the last decades of the eighteenth century.” Poles obtained the first of these churches, together with its adjacent building, on the basis of the imperial decision of 27 January 1897. The second one became the Polish community’s property in 1906. The Church of the Holy Cross required renovation, which was supported by K. Lanckoroński,²⁶² A. Jaworski, W. Dzieduszycki, D. Abrahamowicz, and L. Piętaś, who created the Committee for the Church’s Reconstruction.²⁶³ K. Chłędowski claimed that Tadeusz Rittner, the Minister of Denominations and Education in Kazimierz Badeni’s government, contributed significantly to the transfer of the Kahlenberg church to Poles. He also suggested that A. Jaworski’s emphasis of the contribution of his predecessor Stanisław Madeyski is unfounded.²⁶⁴ In turn, one should underscore the efforts of Fr Ludwik Ruczka

260 *Sprawozdanie za rok 1911 Stowarzyszenia Polskiego “Strzecha” w Wiedniu*, Vienna brw, pp. 2 ff; W. S. Kucharski, *Związek Polaków w Austrii “Strzecha”* . . . , p. 62; W. S. Kucharski, *Udział polskich parlamentarzystów* . . . , p. 136.

261 See: A. Nadolny ks., *Polskie duszpasterstwo w Austrii 1801–1945* (Lublin 1994), pp. 114, 117–121, 123–128, 134–139, 182–185; J. Glinkiewicz, *Historia nabożeństwa i kościoła polskiego w Wiedniu* (Kraków 1901) BZNiO, manuscript 236513.

262 Karol Lanckoroński z Brzezia was a patron and collector of art, a co-organizer and member of the highest offices of the Austrian authorities dealing with art. He contributed to the protection of monuments and cultural heritage in Austria and Galicia and inspired the creation of modern conservation art. See R. Taborski, “Lanckoroński Karol z Brzezia,” in: *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. XVI. . . , p. 442.

263 W. S. Kucharski, *Związek Polaków w Austrii “Strzecha”* . . . , pp. 36, 44, 47; see: M. Roscobogdanowicz, *Wspomnienia*, vol. II, Kraków 1958, p. 177.

264 “At one of the last meetings of the Polish Club [November 1897], Jaworski stood up and in humorous terms called other deputies to thank Madeyski for the fact that he,

and Filip Zaleski (President of the Polish Club).²⁶⁵ The Parliament's deputies and priests took a number of joint initiatives for the benefit of the Polish community in Austria. The Resurrectionists repeatedly invited Polish deputies to services. The importance of these events for the Polish community in Vienna is evidenced by the records in the minutes of the meetings of the Polish Club. We can learn from them that it was deputy Löwenstein who proposed that a representative of the Polish Club would take part in the ceremonies, while D. Abrahamowicz decided that the entire Board of the Polish Club would attend the mass.²⁶⁶

Another important association in the organizational and national life of the Polish diaspora in Austria was the "Biblioteka Polska" (Polish Library) Association founded in 1887 by August Łoś, Jerzy Czartoryski, and Wilhelm Binder. It was an elite association of 90 to 150 members, which included professors, judges, lawyers, parliamentarians, officials, doctors, priests, and artists. The main goal of the association was to bring together people of Polish nationality, cultivate and teach the Polish language, culture and art, organize social events and meetings, and run a library and reading room.²⁶⁷

The chairmen of "Biblioteka Polska" were leading, prominent Polish politicians and parliament deputies: J. Czartoryski (1887–1894),²⁶⁸ a member

as the Minister of Education, negotiated with the Emperor that the Guard's Church at Rennweg will be given to the Resurrectionists. The Members stood up and thanked Madeyski, who was glad to hear it. In fact, however, Madeyski's ministry proceeded as if there was no hope for giving the church back to the Resurrectionists. It was not until Rittner, as Minister for Galicia, that a committee of Mrs. Abrahamowicz, August Łoś, and a few more deputies met and decided to make a request that the church should be given to the Poles, provided that the Resurrectionists would settle in and restore the church at the cost of 10.000 fl. I was asked to write a request; I wrote it, the committee brought it to the Emperor, Rittner asked Gautsch to support it. And the Emperor gave it to the Resurrectionists. P. Madeyski's contributed in no way to this." See K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 203.

265 A. *Nadolny ks., Polskie duszpasterstwo w Austrii 1801–1945. . .*, p. 137.

266 "Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 17 października 1907 r.," in: *Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa, IV: Sprawy polityczne, Teki Michała Bobrzyńskiego*, Biblioteka Jagiellońska (TB BJ), manuscript 8109 III, col. 9.

267 "Protokół z 1-go Walnego Zgromadzenia Towarzystwa 'Biblioteka Polska' w Wiedniu, odbytego w sali Hotelu Müllera (Graben Nr. 19) dnia 6 maja 1887r.," Archiwum Państwowe w Rzeszowie (APwRz), Archiwum ks. J. Łukaszewicza, vol. 1; *Statut Towarzystwa "Biblioteka Polska" w Wiedniu*, *ibid.*, p. 1; W. S. Kucharski, *Udział polskich parlamentarzystów. . .*, p. 133.

268 In 1864, F. Ziemiałkowski's countercandidate for the position of President of the Society was Karol Lanckoroński: "I did not accuse Lanckoroński of the desire for

of the Imperial Council, Florian Ziemiałkowski (1894–1900), the long-serving Minister for Galicia, and Leon Biliński (1900–1920), two-time Minister of Finance of Austria, Minister of Treasury of Austro-Hungary, and President of the Polish Club. J. Czartoryski also provided financial, and spiritual, support for the “Przytulisko Polskie” (Polish Relief Association) in Vienna. His special interests and concerns included education, expanding the library’s book collection, and the development of education in the Polish community.²⁶⁹ F. Ziemiałkowski, in turn, was an active participant in the life of the Polish diaspora and cooperated with various Polish associations since the 1880s. Already in 1868, Ziemiałkowski received the title of honorary member of “Ognisko.” In the 1880s, he and his wife, Helena Oksza-Ziemiałkowska, financially supported “Przytulisko Polskie”²⁷⁰ and “Biblioteka Polska,” to which he donated 43 Polish historical and literary works. In addition, he founded scholarships for young craftsmen studying at the the Artistic Industrial School in Vienna. He also had many achievements in the development of education and schooling.²⁷¹ For the last time, “at the request of the members of the association,” he was elected President of the “Biblioteka Polska” on 22 March 1900. He was 73 years old at that time. He died less than a week later, on 27 March. After his death, his wife devoted herself to working for the association, thus cultivating the memory of her husband. Thanks to her financial support, in 1907 the Polish community in Vienna purchased a tenement

popularity, and yet he was also under the influence of this passion. I heard a rather characteristic anecdote about him. The ‘Biblioteka Polska’ Society in Vienna somehow chose its president at the beginning of the last ten years of the nineteenth century. Lanckoroński, unpopular in Polish Clubs, necessarily wanted to become the president and competed with Ziemiałkowski in this respect. He told his friends to say that if he was elected, he would give a thousand guilders for the library. Despite the generous promise, his election met with great opposition and Ziemiałkowski became president, despite the fact that he did not make any financial promises. Lanckoroński became very angry about this and when six months or a year later the members of the library came to him to collect a fee, he gave them one guilder.” K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 146.

269 W. S. Kucharski, *Polonia i Polacy w Austrii*. . . , p. 43.

270 *Sprawozdanie z pierwszorocznej działalności Stowarzyszenia „przytulisko Polskie” w Wiedniu w roku 1880*, Vienna brw, p. 4; *Sprawozdanie z działalności Stowarzyszenia „Przytulisko Polskie” w Wiedniu w roku 1885* (Vienna 1886), p. 20; *Sprawozdanie Wydziału Polskiego Akademickiego Stowarzyszenia „Ognisko” w Wiedniu z czynności za rok administracyjny 1898–99* (Vienna 1900), p. 29; W. S. Kucharski, *Polacy i Polonia w Austrii*. . . , p. 180.

271 Z. Fras, *Florian Ziemiałkowski*. . . , pp. 164–165.

house called “Dom Polski” (Polish House). It was also active during the First World War. Maria and Wanda Czartoryska, J. Czartoryski’s wife and daughter, also became social activists.²⁷²

E. Rittner, K. Chłędowski, and, most importantly, Ludwik Ćwikiński, the Minister of Education, who in 1913 became the association’s Vice-President, also contributed greatly to its growth.²⁷³ A. Łoś managed the artistic and social section, organized concerts, poetry evenings, meetings with artists, exhibitions, theater, and cabaret performances.

Another Vienna-based Polish association, the Polish Association “Zgoda” (Consensus), had an educational and self-aid profile. It attracted mainly liberal-democratic circles, hence its members were many bourgeois and intellectuals. The association was registered on 7 June 1878.²⁷⁴ Its aim was to promote education among Poles in Vienna, cultivate the Polish language, history, and literature, teach children and youth Polish, and support industry and crafts.²⁷⁵ In the field of education, “Zgoda” cooperated with “Ognisko.”²⁷⁶ It operated under the patronage of Franciszek Smolka, deputy to the Galician Parliament and the Austrian Parliament from 1848, the Vice-President and President of the Chamber of Deputies from 1881 to 1893. As in the case of the previously discussed associations, “Zgoda” also attracted several members of the Imperial Council, Stanisław Szczepanowski, Włodzimierz, Count Dzieduszycki, Karol Lewakowski, and Tadeusz Rutowski.²⁷⁷

Apart from the discussed initiatives, Poles, as a socially diverse community, belonged to workers associations in native Austrian countries. The most popular was the Association of Polish Workers “Siła” (Strength) established in 1892 and registered in the Lower Austrian Governorate on 6 May 1868.²⁷⁸ Its

272 “Stypendium im. Ks. Czartoryskich,” *Gazeta Wiedeńska*, no. 12 of June 25, 1893, p. 2; W. S. Kucharski, *Polacy i Polonia w rdzennej*. . . , pp. 68 ff.

273 R. Taborski, *Polacy w Wiedniu*. . . , p. 90.

274 *Polnischer Verein „Zgoda”*, NÖ-A, Bd. 2, Kath. XV-661, G 4 15881.

275 *Wyciąg ze statutu Stowarzyszenia Polskiego „Zgoda” w Wiedniu*. *Druk ulotny*, Arch. ZBE, Zbiory W. S. Kucharskiego, vol. VII/1.

276 *Zbiór szczątków akt stowarzyszeń polskich w Wiedniu*. *Stowarzyszenie Polskie „Zgoda” 18 VII 1887–16 I 1892*, APwRz, vol. 62.

277 *Sprawozdania Wydziału Stowarzyszenia Polskiego „Zgoda” w Wiedniu*, APwRz, Archiwum ks. J. Łukaszkiewicza, vol. 62, col. 26; W. S. Kucharski, *Związek Polaków w Austrii*. . . , p. 21.

278 no. 13943, Arch. ZBE, vol. VIII.0; *Polnischer Verein „Siła”*, Nieder-Österreichisches Archiv (N-ÖA) – Wien, Index – Bd. 1, Kath. VIII-693, G. 4–30205; AAN, Zespół archiwalny MSZ, sig. 10978, p. 14; *Statut Stowarzyszenia Robotników Polskich „Siła” w Wiedniu z 1892r.*, Vereinsbüro, Bundes-Poliziedirektion – Wien, sig. III. 693; W. S.

goal was to raise workers' awareness, develop social life, provide material assistance, and represent the interests of Polish workers. In addition, the association also sought to "preserve and raise the national spirit in Polish fellows."²⁷⁹ "Siła" also supported the activities of the M. Konopnicka Folk School Society.²⁸⁰ The socialist deputies – Ignacy Daszyński, Herman Lieberman, Zygmunt Marek, and Jędrzej Moraczewski²⁸¹ – provided significant moral and material support to the association. Among its distinguished members was also Karol Forster.²⁸² In 1918, it was planned to rebuild workers' educational associations, whose activities were interrupted by the Second World War. After the outbreak of the war, singing and music groups disintegrated, and only the Polish dramatic theater group in Vienna remained.²⁸³

Another of the plebeian associations was the Polish Association of Christian Male and Female Laborers "Ojczyzna" (Homeland) co-founded by Father Stanisław Stojalowski,²⁸⁴ the precursor of the people's movement in Galicia. It functioned under W. Dzieduszycki's patronage and received funds from K. Lanckoroński. Father Julian Łukaszewicz, in turn, was involved in the association's educational projects.²⁸⁵ "Ojczyzna" was founded on 26 May 1899.²⁸⁶ Polish priests also joined the national life of the Polish diaspora. For instance, Józef Bilczewski, member of the House of Lords of the Imperial Council, became honorary member of the association.²⁸⁷ The celebrations of anniversaries

Kucharski, "Polskie stowarzyszenia robotnicze i młodzieżowe w Wiedniu w XIX i XX wieku (do wybuchu I wojny światowej)," in: Z. Tomkowski (ed.), *Z zagadnień współpracy polsko-austriackiej* (Lublin 2000), p. 51.

279 *Korespondencja Karola Forstera*, BZNiO, Dział Rękopisów, sig. 14338, p. 213.

280 *Sprawozdanie nr. 1 za rok 1914. Organ Polskiego Towarzystwa Szkoły Ludowej w Wiedniu* (Vienna 1915) p. 7.

281 W. S. Kucharski, *Udział polskich parlamentarzystów. . .*, pp. 134 ff.

282 *Karta przynależności do Stowarzyszenia Polskiego "Siła" w Wiedniu 1875r.*, Dokumenty i papiery Jana Karola i Karola Forsterów 1830–1878, BZNiO, sig. 14332 III, pp. 147 ff.

283 W. *Najdus, Polska Partia Socjalno-Demokratyczna Galicji i Śląska 1890–1919* (Warszawa 1983) p. 602.

284 Fr A. Nadolny ks., *Działalność społeczna, kulturalno-oświatowa i narodowa polskich księży w Austrii do 1945 roku*, in: W. S. Kucharski (ed.), *Polonia i przyjaciele Polski w Austrii* (Lublin 1995), p. 144.

285 Archiwum ks. J. Łukaszewicza, APwRz, vol. 86, col. 21.

286 *Polnischer Verein „Ojczyzna”*, NÖ-A, Vereinskataster, Index – Bd. I, Kath. VIII-1082, V-21675.

287 Fr A. Nadolny ks., "Działalność społeczna, kulturalno-oświatowa. . ." p. 144.

organized by “Ojczyzna” were attended by priests and deputies, e.g. Bishop Seweryn Morawski or Fr Ludwik Ruczka.²⁸⁸

Associations were not the only area of the Polish diaspora’s national life. Poles also exhibited individual interest in national matters, taking various initiatives aimed at strengthening patriotic attitudes of Poles and cultivating the Polish tradition, art, and culture. Euzebiusz Czerkawski, one of the most eminent Polish parliamentarians of the Dual Monarchy era and professor of the University of Lviv, often spoke in the Imperial Council in defence of the Polish minority’s language rights in Austria and was a proponent of the development of education. For example, he defended the National School Council in the years 1874–1875.²⁸⁹ In turn, Marian Dydyński, deputy to the Galician Parliament and the House of Lords, was also a conservator at the Central Commission for the Research and Conservation of Monuments of Art and History at the Ministry of Denominations and Education from 1895. He sponsored library collections and archeological excavations.²⁹⁰ After the death of Hans Makart, a German painter and professor of the Vienna Academy, Julian Dunajewski helped Tadeusz Ajdukiewicz take over the painter’s abandoned house: “Tadeusz started to be a very popular painter at that time, so Dunajewski told him to rent the building.”²⁹¹ J. Twardowski also provided financial support to artists. For instance, he supported refugee artists during the war by granting them 10,000 crowns from the funds of the Ministry of Denominations and Education. He also supported the artistic community in Cracow and contributed to the recovery of the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Museum.²⁹² The Minister for Galicia

288 Ibid., p. 148. L. Ruczka, member of the Diet and the Imperial Council, organized special help for the Siberians, Poles from Galicia, and the participants of the January Uprising in cooperation with Adam Potocki. His project concerned political prisoners from Galicia staying in Olomouc and “Austrian” Siberians. In the years 1863–1873, he helped nearly a thousand people and managed to free about 310 from Siberia and 198 from European Russia. Ruczka cared particularly for the priests, who were persecuted by the tsarist authorities. He provided material support to all these groups, gathering funds in Galicia. B. Kumor, “Ruczka Ludwik,” in: PSB, vol. XXXII, Wrocław 1989–91, pp. 596–597.

289 A. Knot, “Czerkawski Euzebiusz,” in: PSB, vol. IV (Wrocław 1938) p. 334.

290 M. Tyrowicz, “Dydyński Marian,” in: PSB, vol. VI (Wrocław 1948), p. 48.

291 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II (Wrocław 1966), p. 42.

292 *List Wojciecha Kossaka do Juliusza Twardowskiego z 7 kwietnia 1916r.*, Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), Akta Juliusza Twardowskiego, vol. 134, p. 63; *List Wojciecha Kossaka do Juliusza Twardowskiego z 14 VII 1916r.* in vol. 134, p. 77; *List Józefa Kallenbacha do Juliusza Twardowskiego z 5 X 1917r.* in vol. 134, p. 123.

Władysław Długosz was interested in the education of children and youth in the national spirit, which is why he often visited Polish schools in Vienna. However, Długosz refused to take patronage over the schools run by the People's School Society because of conflicts between Polish associations.²⁹³

After the outbreak of the First World War, a large part of Galicia and Bukovina residents sought refuge in Austria, especially Vienna. Masses of refugees came to the capital of the monarchy: only in the first two months of the war, 137.000 refugees came to Vienna. Lower social classes needed much assistance as distinct from the nobility, aristocracy, and landowners, who immediately "overcrowded first-class hotels and, having nothing to do, stayed in clubs and cafes all day long."²⁹⁴

During the war, it became a priority to organize aid for its victims – refugees, the interned, and prisoners of war. Many institutions, organizations, associations, and individuals undertook this task. It is worth mentioning several newly established entities, which provided aid to the largest groups of people: The Committee for Assistance to Refugees from Galicia and Bukovina, the Refugee Assistance Center, the Committee for the Protection of the Interned Poles from the Russian Partition.

It is important to add that, after the outbreak of the war, Poles had lost much of their influence on the state's decision making. The Imperial Council was dissolved and its building turned into a hospital. As a result, the Polish Club had lost an important official platform for expressing its position on various issues. Galician politicians and activists could only protest, present memorials, or file individual complaints to the Emperor or government. What is worse, the military, which naturally gained more influence on the state's policy, treated Poles with disfavor and suspicion – as a risky element. After all, an important aspect of this war was the so-called Ukrainian question, which directly affected the attitude of military circles toward Poles.

The Ministry for Galicia, headed by Zdzisław Dzierżykraj-Morawski (as Leiter and from 1915 Minister), was the first state institution to help war refugees. Juliusz Twardowski, a section director in the ministry, and Edward Neuman, the ministry Hofrat (Councillor), initiated assistance missions already

293 *Sprawozdanie nr. 1 Polskiego Towarzystwa Szkoły Ludowej w Wiedniu 1912r.*, Biblioteka Kórnicka Polskiej Akademii Nauk, manuscript; *List W. Długosza do ks. J. Łukaszkiewicza z 9 marca 1912r.*, Archiwum ks. J. Łukaszkiewicza, APwRz, vol. 34.

294 K. Srokowski, N. K. N., *Zarys historii Naczelnego Komitetu Narodowego* (Kraków 1923) pp. 279 ff.

in August. Other Polish officials in Vienna, such as Tadeusz Pilat and Maurycy Mandurowicz, also cooperated with the ministry.²⁹⁵

The assistance provided by the national ministry was not sufficient to meet the needs of such a large number of refugees. Therefore, in September 1914, on the initiative of Leon Biliński, the Committee for Assistance to Refugees from Galicia and Bukovina,²⁹⁶ called the Biliński Committee, was established. The main purpose of the Committee was to help all needy individuals regardless of nationality.²⁹⁷ L. Biliński became its first President. Among its members were many distinguished figures from the political and social worlds, including Juliusz Twardowski, Tadeusz Rittner, Edward Neuman, and Zygmunt Lasocki.²⁹⁸ From October 1914, the government took over the financing of the Committee due to the exhaustion of its funds. After the victorious offensive by the central forces on 31 December 1917, the Committee was dissolved and W. Jabłoński became responsible for further fundraising and distribution of aid.²⁹⁹

295 Z. Lasocki, *Polacy w austriackich obozach*. . . , p. 8.

296 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. II, Warszawa 1925, pp. 2 ff; *Wiedeński Kurier Polski*, no. 893 of November 2, 1914, p. 2, Arch. ZBE, mkrf. 21.

297 In the course of the Committee's activities, attempts to start cooperation with Ukrainians have been made. L. Lewicki and Wassilko approached Biliński with "a demand to include Ruthenians with their organization in our committee." L. Biliński was forced to agree with the executive committee on this matter, because – given the state of Polish-Ukrainian relations and "almost daily betrayal of the Ruthenians in the country and continuous slander against Poles in Vienna" – "there was a natural aversion." L. Biliński himself admitted that he was in favor of accepting them to join the Committee. The Committee treated Polish refugees in the same way as Ukrainian refugees. However, the creation of a separate organization in the Committee for the Ukrainians themselves was, in the opinion of L. Biliński, a superfluous complication. In the end, the Ukrainians were denied the right to participate in the Committee. They created their own organization to help refugees and started propaganda actions against Poles. L. Biliński assessed the whole situation as a mistake and soon made his own proposal to the Ukrainians to form a merger of the two committees, but the Ukrainian side refused. He claimed that: "The Ukrainians already believed at that time that nothing could unite us." The final breakup took place at the very beginning of the war on 21 October 1914. See L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, Warszawa 1924, pp. 316–317.

298 E. Bogdański, *Wspomnienie o Tadeuszu Rittnerze*, BZNiO, manuscript 13541 II, pp. 7 ff; L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, p. 315; W. S. Kucharski, *Polonia i Polacy w Austrii*. . . , pp. 163 ff; "R. Taborski, Rittner Tadeusz," in: PSB, vol. XXXI. . . , p. 315.

299 *Protokół spisany w Wiedniu dnia 23. czerwca 1917 w biurze Radcy Dworu Dra. Juliusza Twardowskiego w przedmiocie oddania w zarząd funduszków Komitetu*

Several thousand refugees remained under the constant care of the Committee. The largest number of beneficiaries ranged between 24,000 and 25,000. The Committee supported every household with a daily amount of 12–15 crowns for the head of the family, 7 crowns for his wife, and 5 crowns per child. Apart from financial support, the Committee provided material and medical assistance.³⁰⁰

One of the Committee's important initiatives was the opening of the "Polish House" for refugees in January 1915. It organized a Polish school and practical workshops, there was also a library and reading room with Polish journals and books, emergency room, and cafeteria. The Polish House was also a seat of the Refugee Assistance Committee. It functioned until the autumn of 1915, when the majority of refugees returned to Galicia.³⁰¹ The Biliński Committee also opened eateries, emergency centers, schools, and kindergartens, organized practical and professional workshops, expert meetings and lectures. It also managed the so-called "Family House," hostels, student dormitories, and the "The House of Artists."³⁰²

The Committee also provided assistance to Russian prisoners of war of Polish origin. With the help of L. Biliński, Habicht, Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme National Committee (NKN), supervised this operation:

Habicht was touring the prisoners of war camps with great sacrifice, inspired many improvements in the treatment of the prisoners, and was just about to liberate them and recruit to the Legions, when suddenly Emperor Charles suspended this action, for he became impressed with similar arguments as those made by Tisza against the imperial proclamation.³⁰³

In his activity, L. Biliński did not limit himself to working in the committees, which helped refugees from Galicia, Bukovina, or the Polish Kingdom. He also cooperated with other institutions involved in charity, often donating his own

zapomogowego dla Uchodźców z Galicyi i Bukowiny przy Wallnerstrasse 1A, AAN, Akta Juliusza Twardowskiego, vol. 21, pp. 1–4; Protokoll aufgenommen in der Sitzung des Regierungskomitees am 10. September 1918, in welcher folgende Beschlüsse des Wiener Hilfskomitees für Flüchtlinge aus Galizien und der Bukowina zur Kenntnis gebracht wurden, AAN, Akta Juliusza Twardowskiego, vol. 21, pp. 63a–63b.

300 *Wiedeński Kurier Polski*, no. 7 of December 6, 1914, p. 1; W. S. Kucharski, *Polonia i Polacy w Austrii*. . . , p. 38.

301 R. Taborski, *Polacy w Wiedniu*. . . , p. 168.

302 W. S. Kucharski, *Związek Polaków w Austrii "Strzecha"*. . . , p. 75.

303 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. II. . . , p. 4.

means, as in the case of the Galician Refugees Assistance Committee in the Duchy of Salzburg and Surroundings.³⁰⁴

Assessing L. Biliński's achievements, one may quote W.S. Kucharski:

Despite the preserved source materials, the published biographical notes do not adequately reflect the fact that he was a long-serving president of the "Biblioteka Polska" (Polish Library) Society in Vienna [. . .] and head of the Vienna Committee for Assistance to Refugees from Galicia and Bukovina during the First World War.³⁰⁵

Indeed, Biliński was one of the few Polish deputies to make special effort to improve the situation of refugees from Galicia and Bukovina.

Despite its efforts, the Committee for Assistance to Refugees from Galicia and Bukovina was unable to meet the basic needs of the mass inflow of refugees. However, the Austrian Ministry of the Interior supported Biliński's Committee by setting up a Refugee Center, which was to help ca. 125,000 people during the war.³⁰⁶ Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the Lviv-Warsaw philosophical school, managed "Shelter for Students," one of the Center's sections. The Committee provided assistance mainly to the Polish intelligentsia and the middle class, while the Center focused on lower social classes. It is worth noting that the cooperation between these two institutions was exemplary.

During the war, Adam Stefan Sapieha, Bishop of Cracow and member of the House of Lords, engaged in a wide range of activities at the pastoral, social, and national levels.³⁰⁷ Sapieha repeatedly turned to the Emperor and government, demanding help for war victims. When on 14 September 1914, the residents of Cracow were called to evacuate their homes, it was Sapieha who immediately intervened to prevent this operation.³⁰⁸ In January 1915, he requested an increase of funds to support war victims and, in October the same year, together with Archbishop Bilczewski and Bishop Teodorowicz, he applied for material assistance for displaced persons from Galicia.³⁰⁹

304 W. S. Kucharski, *Stowarzyszenia i instytucje polskie w rdzennej Austrii w latach 1867–1918*, Lublin 1984, p. 201.

305 W. S. Kucharski, *Polonia i Polacy w Austrii*. . . , p. 36.

306 W. Bieńkowski, *Polen in Wien*. . . , p. 16.

307 For an extensive discussion of A. S. Sapiecha's activities during the war, see Fr W. Wróbel., *Troska biskupa Adama Sapiehy o wysiedlonych i uchodźców w latach 1914–1916* (Kraków 1999).

308 He stayed in Vienna from 20 to 26 September. See Z. Wiglusz, "Kronika życia i działalności Adama Stefana kardynała księcia Sapiehy," in: *Kardynał Adam Stefan Sapieha. Środowisko rodzinne, życie i dzieło*, ed. S. Stępień, Przemyśl 1995, p. 210.

309 *Ibid.*, pp. 212, 215.

A. S. Sapiecha was also the initiator of the Central Committee for Moral Support of Refugees from Galicia. The Committee operated from 1 January 1915 to mid-November 1915 with deputy Antoni Górski as its head. Also other parliament deputies were active members of the Committee: Stanisław Starowieyski, Andrzej Lubormirski, Adam Jędrzejowicz, and Andrzej Kędzior. The Committee consisted of many sections specialized, for instance, in helping refugees imprisoned in barrack camps.³¹⁰

After the dissolution of the Committee, there was no other Catholic organization, which is why Vienna Delegation of the Cracow Bishop's Relief Committee for Victims of War (abbreviated as KBK) was established. The Committee provided financial support to people who did not receive any allowances.³¹¹ The KBK was established on the initiative of A. S. Sapiecha, it was open on 4 January 1915, although it was not officially approved until 19 May.³¹² In the Committee, A. S. Sapiecha cooperated with other members of the House of Lords of the Imperial Council, e.g. Witold Czartoryski or Władysław Sapiecha. It consisted of numerous sections: e.g. child care, emergency aid, provisioning. In 1917, additional sections were created to support Polish prisoners of war and the reconstruction of the country. In total, there were 22 sections. The KBK operated until 1920.³¹³ It had delegations in other locations apart from Vienna: for instance, its Przemyśl Delegation, headed by A. S. Sapiecha, turned out to be one of the most active aid centers during the First World War.³¹⁴

In autumn 1915, after the occupation of Eastern Galicia by the Russian army, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs founded the Committee for the Protection of the Residents of Eastern Galicia and appointed L. Biliński and Fr A. Lubomirski as its heads. Soon a second Committee was established, which focused on aid campaigns for the interned people. This Committee was headed by L. Biliński, Z. Lasocki, and K. Lagosz.³¹⁵

310 W. S. Kucharski, *Związek Polaków w Austrii „Strzecha”*. . . , pp. 80–81; W. Bienkowski, *Polen in Wien*. . . , p. 16.

311 W. S. Kucharski, *Związek Polaków w Austrii „Strzecha”*. . . , p. 81.

312 See *Trzy lata działalności Księżyco-Biskupiego Komitetu Pomocy* (Kraków 1918).

313 R. M. Zawadzki, “Biskup Adam Stefan Sapiecha podczas pierwszej wojny światowej,” in: *Kardynał Adam Stefan Sapiecha. Środowisko rodzinne, życie i dzieło, prac. zbior. pod red. S. Stępnia* (Przemyśl 1995), pp. 145–148.

314 For more on the activity of the KBK Przemyśl delegation, see: Fr A. Szal., *Działalność delegacji przemyskiej Księżyco-Biskupiego Komitetu w okresie I wojny światowej*, in: *Ibid.* pp. 152–155.

315 W. Bienkowski, *Polen in Wien*. . . , p. 17.

Commissariat Viennese, a legation of Cracow-based Supreme National Committee (NKN), was established in Austrian capital on 24 August 1914.³¹⁶ It was representing NKN in front of the Austrian authorities. Its' role was to provide help for the Polish people, financially support those in need and to train the Polish Legions' members.³¹⁷ The task of creating the Commissariat was entrusted to Roger Battaglia. The Commissariat Supreme Council was formed by: Alfred Zagórski – president, Władysław Staruszkiewicz – vice-president, Antoni Chmurski – secretary, Władysław Schramm – treasurer. At that time, Stanisław Kot was significantly involved in the Polish cause.

The chairman of the NKN, deputy Władysław Leopold Jaworski, was also not indifferent to the fate of refugees from Galicia.³¹⁸ To cooperate with the NKN on refugees matters, he managed to bring around one of the socialists deputies, Herman Diamand, an authority in the Chamber and an economy specialist.³¹⁹ In 1915, Diamand was already a 55 years old diabetic, so he could not join the Legions – he, then, decided to take care of the Poles from Russian army who were interned in the Austrian prisoner-of-war camps.³²⁰

Little is known about his activities, it can be, however, deduced from his diaries that he was involved in helping refugees: “I am trying to organize some moral and mental care for Russian prisoners – the Poles. [...] I made a commitment to Jaworski that I would manage or that I would supervise prisoners' work.”³²¹ In another part of the diary: “Yesterday I talked with Jaworski. We discussed different matters, not only prisoners. He wants me to take charge of the prisoners' operation.”³²² He also spared his own financial resources

316 A. Zgórski, “Wiedeński Komisariat NKN,” in: A. Chmurski (ed.), *Kalendarz “Legionów Polskich” na rok Pański 1915* (Vienna 1915), pp. 86.

317 W. S. Kucharski, *Polacy i Polonia w rdzennej. . .*, pp. 150–151; W. S. Kucharski, *Związek Polaków w Austrii „Strzecha”. . .*, pp. 70–72.

318 From early November 1914, the NKN operated in Vienna. Its first president, Juliusz Leo, resigned as early as the end of November and returned to Kraków. He was replaced by W. L. Jaworski. The NKN actions concerning refugees were primarily about helping refugees from Galicia and the Legionnaires, but also about recruiting the Poles to the Legions and about intervening with the Austrian authorities on behalf of the Polish case; K. Srokowski, *N. K. N. . . .*, p. 328.

319 S. Loewenstein, “Diamand Herman,” in: PSB, vol. V (Wrocław 1939–46), p. 152.

320 W. Najdus, *Dzieje Polskiej Partii. . .*, p. 573.

321 Letter to his wife from 7 January 1915, *Pamiętnik Hermana Diamanda zebrany z wyjątków listów do żony* (Kraków 1932), p. 131.

322 Letter to his wife from 22 February 1915., *Ibid.*, p. 133.

for helping refugees: "I am spending a lot of money because people need help."³²³

The Polish Club was also involved in helping refugees. It decreed many desideratums concerning refugees situation, it also instituted a Refugee Commission - it was chaired by L. German (at the time the vice-president of the Chamber) and its' rapporteur was Z. Lasocki.³²⁴ After one of the Polish Club's meetings, he reported: [. . .] on the 23rd inst. (of February, 1915 - D. L.-L.) political motions were put forward by the democratic group and it was decided that [. . .] the Presidium would address the government on the urgent issue of repealing special rules applied to Galician refugees in Vienna and other cities."³²⁵ As a part of the Club, a Refugee Committee was also established and it was formed by: Ludomił German - chairman, Andrzej Kędzior - vice-president, Rychcik - secretary, Z. Lasocki - rapporteur, Godek and Rauch - co-rapporteurs (the first for clerk affairs, the second for Jewish affairs). The Commission, individually or through the Club, intervened with the authorities. It accepted a series of applications, letters and complaints concerning the situation of refugees. I. Daszyński submitted many telegrams and letters from those who were ordered by the authorities to move to the camp in Chocień, but who did not want to leave their present place of residence. On March the 6th, a meeting with the Ministry of the Internal Affairs representative, Marchet, was held - he promised to withhold the decision to move the Poles to Chocień and to meet the demands of the Club.³²⁶

During the war, some associations also revived and reinvigorated their activity, doing charity work, providing people with information, care, education and cultural offers. Those associations which had their own funds, organized eating-houses, reading-rooms, shelters, schools, courses, apprenticeships, lectures and patriotic events. For example, "Ognisko" significantly helped academic youth and inspired an establishment of two kindred student associations at the University of Lviv and at the Jagiellonian University. Despite the difficult war situation and the main focus of associations' activities being put on charity work, educational activities were also given priority.³²⁷ "Strzecha", on the other hand, provided

323 Letter to his wife from 13 July 1915, *Ibid.*, p. 144.

324 W. S. Kucharski, *Związek Polaków w Austrii „Strzecha”*. . . , pp. 82-83; Z. Lasocki, *Polacy w austriackich obozach*. . . , pp. 17 ff.

325 *Ibid.*, p. 170.

326 *Ibid.*, pp. 172-173.

327 See: A. Kopruckowaniak, "Oświata i szkolnictwo polonijne," in: *Polonia w Europie*. . . , pp. 91-97.

material and financial support to Riflemen's troops.³²⁸ In November 1914, it also addressed the Poles and the Polish community in Austria, calling upon them to unify "the Polish element" but also to provide help to refugees from Galicia.³²⁹

A separate group of refugees was academic youth who came to Vienna after, firstly, the University of Lviv and, later, the Jagiellonian University had been both closed. They were enabled to continue their studies, provided with scientific, financial, social and moral support, offered access to book collections. Juliusz nad Kazimierz Twardowski raised funds for academic youth and contributed to creating three student dormitories, an eating-house and a fund for financial and material help. In November 1914, K. Twardowski and "Ognisko" assisted Polish students with establishing the "Committee on Mutual Assistance of the Polish Students at the University of Lviv" and the "Jagiellonian University Delegation", both of which became part of "Ognisko". Twardowski also run the "Student's Shelter" section, which operated within Refugee Care headquarters.³³⁰

The Polish community in Vienna made the "Polish House" available to refugees. In the first six months, it provided helped to 1.784 people, in year 1915 – to 2.384 people, in 1917 – only to 930.³³¹ The People's School Society operated together with the "Polish House" – it provided legal and medical counseling, run apprenticeships trainings, organized lectures, cultural events, school activities and offered childminding for preschool children. In December 1916, the TSL was replaced by the "Polish House" Foundation.³³²

Also active were members of the "Biblioteka Polska" Association and "Strzecha". "Biblioteka Polska" focused mainly on organizing and running schools for refugees' children and the so-called "courses of activities." They shared their premises with refugee committees and unions, they also opened

328 *Zespół archiwalny NKN, Dział Austria. Stosunki wewnętrzne i stanowisko wobec sprawy polskiej 1914–1918*, APwK, sig.25, p. 390.

329 *Ibid.*, pp. 391 ff.

330 *Wiedeński Kurier Polski*, no. 13 of December 13, 1914, p. 4; no. 23 of November 24, 1914, p. 7; W. S. Kucharski, *Polacy i Polonia w Austrii*, part I, *Zasłużeni* (Lublin – Vienna 2001), p. 166; D. Lis, "Stowarzyszenia Polskie w Wiedniu wobec ofiar I wojny światowej," in: Z. Tomkowski (ed.), *Z zagadnień współpracy polsko-austriackiej* (Lublin 2000), p. 79.

331 *Sprawozdanie Polskiego Towarzystwa Szkoły Ludowej w Wiedniu* (Vienna 1915), pp. 7–9; W. S. Kucharski, *Związek Polaków w Austrii "Strzecha"*. . . , pp. 85 ff. The permission to return to Galicia decreased the number of people in need of help.

332 W. S. Kucharski, *Związek Polaków w Austrii "Strzecha"*. . . , p. 86.

access to their library, reading-room and book collection.³³³ L. Biliński, at the time the president of “Biblioteka Polska,” cooperated with L. Ćwikliński to organize the so-called “courses of activities” – a Polish school for refugees’ children.³³⁴ The association also received support from the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the strength of the rescript from 27 November 1916.³³⁵

“Strzecha” organized anniversaries (of constitution, uprisings, birthdays and deaths of distinguished people of Polish science, culture, art) and lectures, intended mainly for intelligentsia and student youth. W.L. Jaworski, conservative deputy, president of the NKN, was one of the participants who attended the January Uprising anniversary, organized by “Strzecha” on 22 January 1915. He gave a solemn speech during which he referred to the internal situation at that time:

We are celebrating the January anniversary like never before in the last half-century. In the past, when we worshipped the fallen [...] our hearts were filled with sorrow and deep mourning [...] Today it is different. We do not recall the old fights, because we live among the new fights. [...] The biggest difference, however, is that the hope of return is so close we can almost grasp it.³³⁶

Stanisław Smolka, Roger Battaglia, Ludwik Ćwikliński, Józef Buzek, Ludomir Sawicki – they all took part in scientific meetings and shared their knowledge with the audience. Financial support was provided by J. Twardowski, who, as a minister for Galicia, could use ministerial funds.³³⁷

Individuals have also made efforts to enable children and young people to learn. L. Ćwikliński, the Minister of Education, strived to recapture school

333 *Wiedeński Kurier Polski*, no. 277 of July 3, 1915, p. 9; *Towarzystwo “Biblioteka Polska” w Wiedniu. Sprawozdanie Wydziału za lata 1914–1916* (Vienna 1917) pp. 3 ff; W. S. Kucharski, *Związek Polaków w Austrii “Strzecha”* . . . , p. 87.

334 *Wiedeński Kurier Polski*, no. 87 of January 13, 1915, p. 3; “Sprawozdanie za rok 1914 złożone na Walnym Zgromadzeniu w d. 15 maja 1915r. przez wiceprezesa Towarzystwa Dr. Ludwika Ćwiklińskiego,” in: *Towarzystwo „Biblioteka Polska” w Wiedniu. Sprawozdanie Wydziału za lata 1914–1916* (Vienna 1917), p. 5; W. S. Kucharski, *Polacy i Polonia w Austrii*. . . , s.39.

335 “Sprawozdanie za rok 1916 złożone na Walnym Zgromadzeniu w d. 19 maja 1917r. przez wiceprezesa Towarzystwa Dr. Ludwika Ćwiklińskiego,” in: *Towarzystwo “Biblioteka Polska” w Wiedniu. Sprawozdanie Wydziału za lata 1914–1916* (Vienna 1917), p. 13.

336 W. L. Jaworski, *Mowy 1914–1915* (Kraków 1915), p. 6.

337 *Wiedeński Kurier Polski*, no. 759 of March 16, 1917, p. 3; no. 776 of March 27, 1917, p. 5; W. S. Kucharski, *Związek Polaków w Austrii “Strzecha”* . . . , pp. 90–92.

buildings seized by the army. He undertook various initiatives to enable refugees' children to study and to help those of junior high school students whose education was interrupted by the war enroll to colleges without certificates of completions. Despite his busy schedule, he also visited schools and took part in classes.³³⁸ Thanks to the involvement of L. Biliński, J. Twardowski and Z. Lasocki, at the very beginning of the war fourteen secondary schools for more than 4.800 students were already established. A number of practical and vocational courses were also organized.³³⁹ Alfred Halban, professor, law historian, deputy of the Galician Parliament since 1908 and of the Austrian Parliament since 1911, organized three Polish junior high schools for refugee youth during the First World War.³⁴⁰

Despite such difficult and dramatic war events, the Poles tried to remember about the national and cultural side of life, to cultivate the Polish tradition and to celebrate their national holidays. The 1915 celebrations of the 3rd May Constitution anniversary could serve as an example. They were preceded by a mass held in the St. Michael's Church in Vienna. It was "overcrowded with the Poles" and bishop Bandurski delivered a solemn sermon, not deprived of political accents. In the afternoon, meetings were held to give occasional speeches. The Polish Club delegated S. Głębiński to celebrate this national anniversary.³⁴¹ There was also a Polish theater in Vienna – from 1915 it was run by Tadeusz Rittner, who, at that time, made his debut as a theater director. Between 1914 and 1916 the theater would regularly present stage productions.³⁴²

Refugees, fugitives and evacuees from Galicia and Bukowina, as well as prisoners of war from the Russian partition were all placed in barrack camps – they were built especially for this purpose or adapted from unused post-industrial

338 W. Leitsch, "Ludwik Ćwikliński (1853–1943). Sektionschef und Minister im k.k. Ministerium für Kultus und Unterricht," in: *Polen im alten Österreich. Kultur und Politik*, hrsg. von W. Leitsch u. S. Trawkowski (Wien-Köln-Wiemar 1993), pp. 72 ff.

339 *Wiedeński Kurier Polski*, no. 732 of December 23, 1914, p. 4; W. S. Kucharski, *Polacy i Polonia w rdzennej. . .*, p. 112, table 6.

340 K. Koranyi, "Halban Alfred," in: *PSB*, vol. IX (Wrocław 1960–61), p. 244.

341 S. Głębiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne* (Pelplin 1939), pp. 229–230.

342 W. S. Kucharski, *Życie kulturalne uchodźców z ziem polskich w Wiedniu w czasie I wojny światowej*, in: K. A. Kuczyński, D. Kucharska (eds.), *Gerda Leber-Hagenau a stosunki polsko austriackie w XX wieku* (Toruń-Płock 1998), pp. 160–163; J. Buszko, "Rittner Edward," in: *PSB*, vol. XXXI (Wrocław 1988–89) p. 315. For more on the Polish theater in Vienna during the First World War, see: R. Taborski, *Polacy w Wiedniu. . .*, pp. 173–175.

buildings. The largest camp for refugees from Galicia and the Russian partition was located in Wagna, near Leibnitz, and was designed for about 15,000 people. The remaining ones were built in St. Martin (Upper Austria), Waidhofen, Steinklamm (Lower Austria), Kaufstein, Schwaz (Tyrol) and Thalerhof (Styria), the latter being a camp intended mostly for those who were suspected of Moscovism and of betraying the interests of the monarchy. Thalerhof and Steinklamm were camps characterized by the most difficult living conditions.³⁴³ From the Leibnitz camp, the Poles were sent to forced labour, such as building roads, railway lines and trenches in Styria.³⁴⁴

Wincenty Witos wrote that two of these camps, Choczeń in Moravia and Leibnitz in Styria: “[...] are to be remembered in the memory of the Polish nation as the cruelest ones. They became a true hell of mindlessness and brutality for the victims of this war. The atrocity of what happened in those camps is beyond the most fertile of imaginations.”³⁴⁵

Zygmunt Lasocki was the first Polish deputies to become interested in the fate of Polish refugees and internees from Austrian camps located in the Czech Republic, Moravia and Styria. Sanitary and health conditions were difficult there. During the first three years of the war, he was strongly dedicated to dealing with

343 Z. Lasocki, *Polacy w austriackich obozach*. . . , pp. 121–122. The first transport of internees reached Thalerhof on September the 4th. For the first four days prisoners stayed in the open air, after that time they were placed in hangars and tents. It was not until mid-October that the first barracks were built, 80 for internees, and 30 for camp crew. Critical sanitary conditions led to the outbreak of typhus, internees were undernourished and cold, correspondence was censored, corporal punishments were applied (the infamous hand-hanging), mortality rate was high. The deceased were buried in a mass grave, a provisional cemetery “under pine trees.” Living conditions did not improve until 1916. Thalerhof is now a military aviation base, there is also a camping near Kalsdorf. It wasn't until 1936 that the bodies of the dead were exhumed and buried in a grave in the Feldkirchen cemetery, where a memorial chapel was erected. Between 1924 and 1934 four Thalerhof Almanacs were published and, after World War II, reprinted in the USA – today they are the basic source material for the study of those events; T. Olszański, “Austriackie represje w Galicji i obóz w Thalerhofie,” available at: <http://www.cmentarze.gorlice.net.pl/talerhofstrona.html> from December 6, 2003. The Almanacs available at: <http://www.ukrstor.com/talerhof/almanach1.html>; <http://www.ukrstor.com/talerhof/almanach2.html>; <http://www.ukrstor.com/talerhof/almanach3.html>; <http://www.ukrstor.com/talerhof/almanach4.html>.

344 W. S. Kucharski, *Polska diaspora w Austrii*. . . , pp. 26 ff.

345 W. Witos, *Moje wspomnienia* (Warszawa 1988), vol. 1, p. 344.

the problems that internees had to face. Initially, he conducted this activity individually, then through specially established committees. Having frequently visited the camps, he realized that internees were forced to live in conditions below human dignity, facing problems like infectious diseases or rapes. He, then, intervened not only with the central, the Styrian, and the Czech authorities, but also with the monarch, protesting against such difficult living conditions. His actions were not without effect – supported by the Polish Club, his interventions ended in partial success. He described the fate of the evacuees and the refugees – and documented widely his activities of that time – in the aforementioned work entitled “The Poles in the Austrian barack camps for refugees and internees. (World war memories by the former deputy of the Austrian Parliament).”

Z. Lasocki was also active as a member of the Polish Club and the State Council, which task was to improve the situation of refugees and internees. He belonged to the Polish Clubs’ Refugee Commission and to the Committee for Helping Former Legionaries from Congress Poland.³⁴⁶ In 1917, within the Polish Club, he proposed a number of bills on refugee matters and was actively working on the Refugees Protection Act. To help refugees, he was also using his own acquaintances in the Viennese circles and in the already existing charities. With the help of the Red Cross and politicians from the Polish People’s Party “Piast,” he contacted Polish prisoners of war in Russia.³⁴⁷ Thanks to his efforts, families of soldiers received higher cash benefits. At the request of L. Biliński, Lasocki joined the council advising to the government on matters of rebuilding the country from war damages. After the establishment of the State Council in May 1917, he was elected chairman of the Benefits Committee, where he managed to increase the amount of money appropriated for rebuilding Galicia.³⁴⁸ His co-workers were Średniawski, Banaś and W. Długosz.³⁴⁹ Lasocki’s and Rudolf Gall’s accomplishments in helping refugees and internees were emphasized by S. Głąbiński, who recalled that they were sacrificing their time and their own funds, intervening with the authorities, writing memorials and “had it not been for them, the fate of many refugees might have been tragic.”³⁵⁰

346 W. S. Kucharski, *Polacy i Polonia w Austrii*. . . , p. 93.

347 E. Michalik, “Dr Zygmunt Lasocki – parlamentarzysta, dyplomata, badacz,” in: *Polacy w austriackim parlamencie*. . . , p. 267.

348 A. Szklarska-Lohmanowa, “Lasocki Zygmunt Bronisław,” in: PSB, t. XVI, Wrocław 1979, p. 552.

349 W. Witos, *Moje wspomnienia*, vol. I. . . , pp. 344 ff.

350 S. Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , p. 231.

However, in a memorial to the president of the Polish Club, the bishops formed an accusation: "We regret to conclude that the Polish Club did not pay due attention to the sufferings of the forcibly expelled refugees. Out of all Polish and Christian deputies, it is only deputy Lasocki works with all his zeal and who has become a true guardian for the most unfortunate victims of this who war."³⁵¹ They emphasized also L. Biliński's merits. But bishops' remarks were consistent with assessments written down by Z. Lasocki himself: "After socialists and then the Stapiński group had joined, there were 80 people in the Club – but only a few took care of refugees."³⁵² However the criticism remained true, there were many deputies, politicians or social activists who acted individually or on behalf of institutions to help refugees.

Apart from the activities described above, J. Twardowski provided material support to former legionaries. As a token of gratitude, the Supreme Committee for Helping Former Legionaries offered to accept him as a member.³⁵³ Władysław Długosz, deputy, minister for Galicia, was one of the few Polish politicians who, during the war, helped refugees, evacuees and prisoners of war – mainly those who were in barrack camps. He appealed to the Austrian authorities to improve living conditions in the camps. In one of his speeches of 14 December 1917, delivered at a meeting of joint delegations, he denounced the military conduct toward civilians in Galicia and refugees in western Austrian provinces. He criticized the Austrian and Czech authorities for treating the Poles from internment camps particularly restrictively, e.g. by sending them to the hardest works or by denying them their rights. He also condemned indiscriminate decisions to direct physically handicapped, disabled, sick, elderly or minors to military service.³⁵⁴ As a member of the council advising to the government on the economic reconstruction of Galicia, he defended the interests of peasants disadvantaged because of the war.³⁵⁵ Zdzisław Dzierżykraj-Morawski was a Galician Minister during the war and despite the fact that his function was barely representative, he put a lot of effort into organizing aid for Galician refugees living

351 Z. Lasocki, *Polacy w austriackich obozach*. . . , p. 218.

352 *Ibid.*, pp. 53 ff.

353 *Naczelny Komitet Opieki nad byłymi Legionistami oraz wdowami i sierotami po poległych Legionistach*, Wiedeń, 19 X 1915, AAN, Akta Juliusza Twardowskiego, vol. 134, pp. 44 ff.

354 From Leibnitz, men were sent to the Serbian front to do groundworks, e.g. to dig trenches. About a fourth of the several thousand sent to work did not return, W. Witos, *Moje wspomnienia*, vol. I (Wrocław 1935), pp. 345–346.

355 Z. Lasocki, *Długosz Władysław*, in: PSB, vol. V, Wrocław 1939–46, pp. 182–184.

in the Czech Republic and Lower Austria.³⁵⁶ Stanisław Niezabitowski, deputy, the last Marshal of the Galician Parliament, established a separate national office for emigration matters in Vienna in the second half of 1914 and organized a large-scale charity campaign for refugees from Galicia. He was the founder of the Galician War Credit Facility (Galicyjski Wojenny Zakład Kredytowy) and the chairman of its' Administrative Board. It was also after his interventions that the government authorities promised to help dealing with war damages and rebuilding the country.³⁵⁷ Adolf Gross, a deputy for the State Council since 1907, a Jew, a member of the Polish Club, initially took care of Jewish-origin refugees from Galicia, and later of all who were in need. His joint initiative with J. Lea, supported by L. Biliński, led to the establishment of the Head Domestic Office for Economic Restoration of Galicia, within which, also thanks to his efforts, a separate department for cities matters only was established in 1916 under the name of Municipal War Department. In 1917, A. Gross proposed bills which would revise field courts sentences – consequently, it led to an amnesty for political criminals announced in 1917 (among pardoned were Czech leaders with death sentences³⁵⁸). Andrzej Lubomirski was a deputy for the national and the Austrian parliament, a State Council' House of Lords member, since the spring of 1915 a chairman of the Labour Committee intended to help the people of Poland, and, since November 1915, a member of the Committee for Helping the Poles Interned from the Kingdom of Poland. He organized material aid, visited camps and intervened with the Austrian authorities.³⁵⁹ W. Przerwa-Tetmajer submitted to the Polish Club a memorial concerning the inhuman treatment of refugees by the authorities of the Wagna camp.³⁶⁰ Socialist deputies were also active - they intervened in matters such as forced displacements, forced labour, living conditions for refugees and internees, benefits for refugees and soldiers' families, pensions for war invalids, benefits and compensations for forced labor, food rations, food supplies or drastically increasing prices. Particularly active were I. Daszyński, Z. Marek and H. Diamand.³⁶¹

During the war, Austria sought to eliminate Moscovophiles from Eastern Galicia. Those who did not manage to take refuge in Russia or did not go to the

356 Cz. Lechicki, "Morawski (Dzierżykraj-Morawski) Zdzisław Karol," in: PSB, vol. XXI (Wrocław 1976), p. 756.

357 B. Łopuszański, "Niezabitowski Stanisław," in: PSB, vol. XXIII (Wrocław 1978), p. 103.

358 K. Rolle, "Gross Adolf," in: PSB, vol. IX (Wrocław 1960–61), p. 1.

359 M. Tyrowicz, J. Zdrada, "Lubomirski Andrzej," in: PSB, vol. XVIII (Wrocław 1973), p. 3.

360 Z. Lasocki, *Polacy w austriackich obozach*. . . , pp. 17, 166, 168.

361 W. Najdus, *Ignacy Daszyński 1866–1936* (Warszawa 1988), pp. 325–326.

front, were met with numerous repressions and arrests. It is estimated that over 30.000 people were shot and hanged and about 80.000 were interned. Ignacy Daszyński submitted an appeal concerning this matter in 1917.³⁶²

After the establishment of the State Council in May 1917, Polish politicians gained an additional activity forum, where they could conduct their current activities in matters concerning refugees, prisoners of war, evacuees and internees. At that time, the most important issues for the Poles was the protection of war victims and granting benefits for them or their families. This is why some of the Polish deputies submitted parliamentary enquiries and worked on the Refugees Protection Act and on the War Compensations Act.

On behalf of the Polish Clubs' Refugee Commission, A. Halban and Z. Lasocki asked the government to issue appropriate regulations concerning refugee cases. It was on 23 June 1917. On the same day, a parliamentary Refugee Commission was established. Z. Lasocki was proposed as its' chairman, but he declined – the Poles, of whom there were not many left in the camps, were now trying to draw war compensations. Z Lasocki was, therefore, more interested in working on the Benefits Committee. The function of the parliamentary Refugee Commission' chairman was, then, given to A. Halban, who “did an excellent job.”³⁶³

At one of the first meetings of the Deputies Chamber, members of the Refugee Commission, following an initiative by the people's club deputies, considered a very extensive material concerning situation of refugees and refugee welfare committees. On behalf of the club spoke Z. Lasocki: “The Polish People's Party deputies are calling upon the Presidium of the Polish Club to protest vigorously against slanders and harms the People are suffering from and to present the following demands to the government [. . .]” He then presented a list of demands addressed to the competent state authorities, which concerned improvement of sanitary and epidemiological conditions in the camps, improvement of food quality, withdrawal of consent for sending the Poles to the Serbian front, compensations for forced labour, disabilities and deaths for workers or their families, releasing those internees who had their own means, who wished to emigrate to Western Europe or to work in Denmark and in the Netherlands.³⁶⁴

Herman Lieberman, a representative and a spokesman of the Polish Club, spoke in the Deputies Chamber on 4 July 1917: “[. . .] we, the Polish deputies, socialist deputies in particular, accuse the armies of Central Powers of barbaric

362 D. Matelski, *Ukraińcy i Rusini w Polsce 1918–1935* (Poznań 1996), p. 24.

363 *Ibid.*, p. 59.

364 *Ibid.*, p. 168. See also: W. S. Kucharski, *Związek Polaków w Austrii “Strzecha” . . .*, p. 83.

attitude toward the Polish population in occupied territories, of wild and bloody repressions.” Some deputies disapproved of his accusatory speech, the Germans tried to silence his speech with shouts and whistles. They also accused the Poles of not being able to defend their Austrian homeland, to which H. Lieberman replied:

Yes, from now on you must know that out of 25 million people living Austria, 16 million, that is, the whole non-German population, are traitors [...] and the Poles, despite everything that they suffered during the war from Austria and Germany, are still ready to shed a lot of their blood in the name of the principle of self-determination of nations.³⁶⁵

The Polish Club, especially Z. Lasocki, made efforts to adopt the Refugees Protection Act by the State Council. Text of the bill was written by Z. Lasocki and an Italian deputy Bugatto. It was to guarantee: the right to choose a place of residence, repeal of barrack constraint, regulations concerning transport of refugees and their property and regulations concerning rules of social coexistence in the camps. It also obliged barrack services staff (administrative and sanitary) to know refugees’ languages, increased benefits for refugees and enabled them to work and earn without losing the right to benefits. Z. Lasocki, R. Gall, Rauch, and A. Halban were members of commissions and sub commission working on the bill. Deputies Chamber adopted the act, despite the Germans being against any regulations concerning refugee matters. Difficulties arose in the Upper House – House of Lords was strongly against increasing benefits, as was the government. The bill was rejected and returned to the Chamber. After further discussions and debates with the government, a compromise was reached and the bill passed at the end of November 1917.³⁶⁶

The Club also contributed to passing the War Compensations Act, a draft of which was submitted to the parliament by Z. Lasocki and A. Gross. Demands concerning compensations had been made repeatedly. However, it was not until 1917/1918 that the government finally gave its preliminary consent to granting compensations to a person concerned or, should that person suffer death as a result of forced labour, to his children or family.³⁶⁷

The Poles also cared about the situation of their compatriots, citizens of the Russian state, often suspected of espionage. In May 1918, Jerzy Baworowski, the vice-president of the Club, and Z. Lasocki intervened with the Minister of

365 H. Lieberman, *Pamiętnik, wstęp i oprac. A. Garlicki* (Warszawa 1996), p. 131.

366 Z. Lasocki, *Polacy w austriackich obozach*. . . , pp. 240 ff, 243.

367 *Ibid.*, pp. 309–310.

National Defense on behalf of Former Legionaires from Congress Poland – the minister promised to support their demands in the government.³⁶⁸

It is worth mentioning some of the parliamentary enquiries submitted by the Polish deputies – because of the figures of those enquiring, if not for anything else. On June 14, 1917, W. Witos addressed the issue of not helping evacuated residents of the Brest district.³⁶⁹ On 26 June 1917, Z. Lasocki asked about the abuses refugees suffered – the government did not respond, he submitted his enquiry again, but it was not until February 26, 1918 that he received an answer.³⁷⁰ J. Moraczewski wrote in defense of railway workers after the introduction of a regulation obliging them to speak German language only.³⁷¹

368 *Ibid.*, pp. 306.

369 *Ibid.*, pp. 58 ff.

370 *Ibid.*, p. 59.

371 *Ibid.*, p. 144.

CHAPTER 2: Poles in the Main Bodies of State Administration

1. Council of Ministers

Poles in Austria greatly contributed to the sociopolitical and economic life of the Habsburg monarchy. The Austrian state provided Poles with considerable opportunities of social mobility, which cannot be said about the other two partitioning powers. However, it was thanks to proper education, preparation, solid work, and determination, but also own predispositions and abilities, that Poles achieved professional success and often reached high state offices.

Poles received greater opportunities of promotion when the monarchy adopted a liberal course of reforms, which began the process of transforming the country from an absolutist state into a constitutional monarchy. At that time, the situation of Polish society began to gradually improve, as did for other peoples who formed this multinational state. This favorable change was demonstrated for instance by the increase in the number of officials of Polish origin employed in local administration, which provided a possibility to receive promotion to central administration. Poles could expect promotion to higher central offices of the Galician Governorship relatively often.

Following the clerical careers of Poles, some regularities are noteworthy, as they show how Poles gained the highest ranks and positions in the Habsburg state. There were two paths of promotion: parliamentary and academic.³⁷² The parliamentary path led through the national parliament to the Austrian central parliament, in which deputies who gained their appropriate position in the Polish Club could count on the appointment to ministerial positions. In such a way was shaped the career of Kazimierz Grocholski, longtime President of the Circle as well as the first Minister for Galicia or Dawid Abrahamowicz, Vice-President of the House of Deputies of the Imperial Council and Minister for Galicia. In contrast, the academic path consisted mainly of gaining an appropriate position and rank in a field of science which allowed one to take his place in the political arena, as Rectors of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow and the Jan Kazimierz University in Lviv were part of the Galician parliament. Such path

372 S. Grodziski, "Udział Polaków w centralnych organach austriackiej administracji i sądownictwa," *ZN UJ. Prace polonijne*, 2/1976, p. 184.

was chosen by Leon Biliński, Ludwik Ćwikliński, Julian Dunajewski, Stanisław Głąbiński, Stanisław Madeyski or Edward Rittner.

It should be especially remembered that for Poles the path to promotion from Galicia to Vienna was long and undoubtedly difficult. Even though Austria transformed into a constitutional monarchy, allowed kingdoms and countries to co-govern and granted autonomy to Galicia, the attitude toward non-German nations within the Habsburg state was rather unfriendly. Nevertheless, some Poles were able to break the barriers of national resentment and, by means of professional ennoblement, achieve significant positions within the monarchy. Włodzimierz Czerkawski drew attention to another aspect of the difficulties and limited access to high positions in central administration:

The Austrian bureaucracy considers such positions as its sole domain, giving one of them to a Pole as an unlawful reduction of its acquired rights, as a violation of its assets . . . the same families have been controlling the ministerial departments, the so-called state machine, for over a hundred years. Involuntarily, you get the impression that here exists a real right of inheritance . . . whereas the real power rests in the hands of officials.³⁷³

This chapter aims at presenting the profiles of famous politicians of Polish origin and their achievements, with special regard for prime ministers and ministers of individual ministries of the Austrian government, including ministers without portfolio for Galician affairs.

Pursuant to Article 2 of the Act on exercising governmental and executive power of 21 December 1867, the highest governmental power within the state was granted to the emperor, who exercised it through accountable ministers, officials and functionaries.³⁷⁴ The Act introduced a distinction between governmental and executive powers but did not specify how they differ and what rights arise from their exercise. Article 1 clearly states that the emperor is sacred and, what is more, untouchable and unaccountable. Tying together these two Articles of the Act, it may be reasonably stated that the governmental power belongs to the emperor, for which he is not accountable, whereas ministers are only executors of this power. The Act provided the constitutional accountability of ministers before the State Court. Detailed provisions were included in a separate

373 W. Czerkawski, *Wyodrębnienie Galicyi. Z pośmiertnej teki Włodzimierza Czerkawskiego*, Kraków 1914, Biblioteka Narodowa (BN), sign. III 2.014.109, p. 16.

374 *Staatsgrundgesetz vom 21. Dezember 1867, über die Ausübung der Regierungs- und Wollzugsgewalt*, RGBl, 145/1867.

Act of 25 July 1867 on accountability of ministers.³⁷⁵ However, during the time of the dual monarchy, no minister was accused of unconstitutional conduct or countersigning of such acts. Therefore, there was no sitting of the State Court's adjudication panel in order to conduct proceedings and issue an appropriate decision.³⁷⁶

The Act listed in details the competences of the head of state in terms of exercising power.³⁷⁷ All acts were issued on behalf of the emperor, but also they had to be approved by the Imperial Council and countersigned by an accountable minister.

However, except for the above mentioned constitutional accountability of ministers, in the Act there is little information about the Council of Ministers. The executive power was granted the right to issue regulations and orders.³⁷⁸ Ministers were direct executors of the governmental power of the emperor. The lack of any appeal instance to the minister's decision provides evidence of an exceptionally close relation between the head of state and the departmental minister.³⁷⁹ Though on the other hand, this fact confirms strict dependence of ministers on the monarch. Among competences of the head of state, there was the right to appoint and dismiss heads of respective ministries. The constitutional requirement to countersign governmental acts of the monarch aimed to secure the state and people from lawlessness of the sovereign. This was the obligation of ministers which made them accountable to the parliament for the content of the emperor's decisions. The governmental power belonged to the monarch only and, as he was not accountable for his actions, the accountability rested on ministers who, with their handwritten signature, gave guarantee of the rightness of the monarch's legislative acts.³⁸⁰

375 *Gesetz vom 25. Juli 1867, über die Verantwortlichkeit der Minister für die im Reichsrath vertretenen Königreiche und Länder*, RGBl, 101/1867, pp. 208–212; for the full text of the bill, see J. Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw i rozporządzeń administracyjnych*, vol. I, Lviv 1899, pp. 281–284.

376 K. Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa Polski*, vol. IV, Warszawa 1982, p. 270; Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*, pp. 196–197.

377 The emperor was entitled to appoint and dismiss ministers, exercise supreme power over armed forces; he was the only one to have the right to decide about war and peace, he could conclude international treaties, give titles and decorations or state ranks.

378 Article 11 of the Act on exercising governmental and executive power, Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*, p. 197.

379 F. Kasperek, *Podręcznik prawa politycznego*, vol. II, Kraków 1881, pp. 35–36.

380 O. Balzer, *Historia ustroju Austrii*, Lwów 1889, p. 512; F. Kasperek, *Podręcznik prawa politycznego*, vol. II. . . , p. 35.

The Council of Ministers, which was composed of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Imperial House, the Minister of War, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Treasury, was established by means of the ministerial rescript of 17 March 1848.³⁸¹ The Council was created in order to implement the provisions of the March Constitution of 1848. The scope of the ministries' activity was specified by the paragraphs on the highest resolution of 12 April and 27 May 1852.³⁸² Since then, subsequent Austrian ministries were gradually created.³⁸³ Herein, it is worth listing them all in chronological order.

The Ministry of Interior was active from 17 March 1848. The Ministry of State, established on 20 October 1860, was abolished on 2 March 1867 and, in the same year, renamed to the Ministry of Interior, which had the same scope of affairs. It was the highest directorial body of central administration. Temporarily, the Ministry's scope of activity also consisted of the matters of public security which, pursuant to the highest resolution of 3 August 1852, were taken over by the Supreme Police Office, transformed into the Ministry of Police.³⁸⁴

Pursuant to the highest resolution of 12 April 1852, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Education, which was established on 17 March 1848, was granted competences in the scope of religious and educational matters and of fine arts and skills. Within the first group, the Ministry was obligated to deal with the Catholic church and all other legally recognized faiths, institutions and religious associations. As for the matters of education, the Ministry was granted competences concerning all levels of education, academic institutions and educational centers. The Ministry was also responsible for the institutions which activities concerned fine arts and skills.³⁸⁵ The highest resolution of 1852 on the

381 *Reskrypt ministerialny do wszystkich rządów krajowych z 17 marca 1848r.*, Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*, p. 199.

382 Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*, pp. 201–206.

383 Time of establishment and competences were presented by K. Grzybowski: K. Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa*, vol. IV. . . , pp. 295–297.

384 The Ministry of Interior also managed the main health and social security administration and was also the highest body adjudicating in criminal and police matters, even when bodies of other ministries were authorized to adjudicate in lower instances.

385 These were: the National Geological Institute in Vienna, established in 1849, the Central Institute for Meteorology and Earth Magnetism in Vienna, the Austrian Degree Measurement Commission, Zoological and Zootomic Experimental Station in Trieste, the Austrian Museum for Art and Industry in Vienna, the Academy of Learning in Vienna and Cracow, the Academy of Learning, Literature and Art in Prague, university libraries and national archaeological museums, Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*, pp. 694–697.

scope of activity of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Education was included in its entirety into the Act of 9 March 1867 and was published as the highest handwriting.³⁸⁶

The Ministry of Justice was also created on 17 March 1848 and, by and large, it dealt with court and prison administration, the management of the prosecutor's office and the supervision of notaries and advocates.

The Ministry of Finance existed from 1848 and was obligated to manage state property and all expenses and revenues of the state treasury if they were not reserved for another ministry. In certain cases, the Ministry of Finance was obligated to communicate with other ministries.³⁸⁷

The Ministry of National Defence was established after concluding a settlement with Hungary for matters unrelated to the permanent army, i.e. the national defence, *levée en masse* and gendarmerie. Thus, the Ministry did not deal with the matters that were in the scope of competences of the joint Ministry of War.

The Ministry of Trade and Industry was established on 17 March 1848, abolished on 21 August 1859 and then reopened on 10 April 1861. This Ministry dealt with the matters connected to trade, industry, shipping, communication, national culture and statistics. Belonging at first to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the matters of national culture were in 1868 handed under the management of the Ministry of Agriculture. Among the bodies of the Ministry of Trade and Industry there was the Central Maritime Authority, established pursuant to the ministerial directive of 26 April 1850, the Central Industrial Inspectorate and industrial inspectors, the Normal Commission of Weights and Measures, Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Patent Office and the Industrial and Agricultural Council.³⁸⁸

The Ministry of Agriculture existed from 1848 under the name of the Ministry of National Culture and Mining, was abolished on 16 May 1853 and reactivated on 29 January 1868. It covered activities connected to the so-called national culture. The scope of the Ministry's activity, in the form of an agenda of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, was defined pursuant to the highest resolution of 20 April 1861. Then, under the directive of 29 January 1868, the agenda

386 Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw* p. 693.

387 With the Ministry of Interior about increasing direct taxes, with the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice about deposit registers, with the Ministry of Trade about changing customs tariff, the statute of the Austro-Hungarian Bank or the Act on the stock exchange, with the Ministry of Agriculture about the duty change if this change concerned mining products, Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*, pp. 770–771.

388 Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*, pp. 700–702.

was extracted and thus, a separate Ministry of Agriculture was created. It was not authorized to deal with peasant matters, such as land consolidation and fragmentation, which were within the competences of the Ministry of Interior. These issues were passed to the Ministry of Agriculture in 1869, pursuant to the highest resolution of 13 August. The announcement of the Ministry of Agriculture of 24 January 1869 said that under the highest resolution of 15 October 1868, it takes over on 1 January 1869 the management of state studs and the institute of government stallions, covering only the administrative, technical and economic matters. Other obligations belonged to the Ministry of War. What is more, the management of national forests, mining plants, the goods of religious and academic fund were transmitted to the Ministry of Agriculture from the management of the Ministry of Treasury, pursuant to the highest resolution of 20 January 1872, announced by both ministries on 14 April 1872. By means of the highest resolution of 1 January 1869, the Ministry of Agriculture gained competences concerning settling cases on hunting, field police and fishery, except that the settling of criminal cases of the highest instance remained at the discretion of the Ministry of Interior.³⁸⁹

The Ministry without portfolio for Galicia was created on 11 April 1871. In the Austrian state there existed the institution of the ministries without portfolio. The ministers of such ministries were full-fledged members of the Council of Ministers, even though they did not have an appropriate portfolio. In contrast to other ministries without portfolio, the scope of activity of the Ministry for Galicia was strictly defined. The minister for Galicia received all draft resolutions or decrees concerning national matters. If positions of a departmental minister and a minister for Galicia were not aligned, then the Council of Ministers had the conclusive vote. The minister for Galicia had the right of legislative initiative in matters concerning his own country.³⁹⁰

The Ministry of Railways was created on 15 January 1896 and a corresponding announcement of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Railways was issued on 19 January. The scope of duties, which concerned the railways, the General Inspection and the General Directorate for National Railways, was excluded from the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Therefore, the Ministry was authorized to conclude local and international agreements and treaties concerning the construction of railway lines and its supervision. What is more, it was responsible for the legislation concerning the railways. The

389 Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*, pp. 748–750.

390 K. Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa*, vol. IV . . . , p. 297.

Ministry consisted of divisions (sections), which were divided into subdivisions (departments). The adjuvant offices of the ministry were the General Inspection of Austrian Railways, which supervised and controlled the construction of railways, and the Main Rolling Stock Office, which was responsible for record keeping and administering the rolling stock.³⁹¹

The Ministry of Public Works was active from 21 March 1908 and it was at the same time the main body of construction supervision. It took over mining matters from the Ministry of Agriculture.

In studies concerning the political history of Galicia in the second half of the nineteenth century, there is not enough coverage of the Ministry for Galicia. An accurate depiction of its activity is also difficult, as the archives of the Ministry were destroyed.³⁹² There are many more publications devoted to the first Minister for Galicia, Kazimierz Grocholski, and his successor, Florian Ziemiałkowski, mainly due to the circumstances of their nomination and the tradition, perpetuating from that moment, of appointing a Pole to this position. The Ministry for Galicia was more extensively discussed by the historians of the regime who emphasized the legal and constitutional aspect of this office but not its functioning. Therefore, the characteristics of the Ministry for Galicia may contribute to filling the gap in discussing the problem of Poles employed in the highest positions of the Austrian administration.

When describing the Ministry for Galicia, it should be mentioned that its creation was an exception to the existing practice based on the substantive separation of powers in favor of territorial division.³⁹³ Not only Poles, but also Czechs could be appointed to a position of state minister, but only in certain cabinets.³⁹⁴

391 Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*, pp. 721–725, 729.

392 The archives of the Ministry for Galicia, handed over by the Austrian authorities to Poland, were destroyed during warfare of the Second World War, *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w wiedeńskiej Radzie Państwa (lata 1867–1868)*, edition and introduction by Z. Fras and S. Pijaj, Kraków 2001, pp. 16–17; Z. Fras, *Florian Ziemiałkowski (1817–1900). Biografia polityczna*, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1991, pp. 147, 203.

393 Z. Fras, *Florian Ziemiałkowski*, p. 198.

394 J. Radzyner, *Orientacja austro-polska. Z dziejów sąsiedztwa, pod red. W. Leitscha, M. Wawrykowej*, Warszawa-Wiedeń 1989, p. 191. Officially, there was no institution of the minister without portfolio for Bohemia or Moravia; nevertheless, the Czechs obtained a possibility of having their own representative in the government. The Czech ministers were: Alois Pražák in the government of E. Taaffe in the years 1879–1881, then Antonín Rezek as a representative of the Young Czech Party in the government of E. Körber and Anton Randa, Bedřich Pacák, Karl Prašek and Jan Žaček. The changes were frequent and dependent on the political constellation, W. Goldinger,

In case of other nationalities it was a marginal occurrence. Germans³⁹⁵ also had their own minister without portfolio and in the last years of the First World War, a minister representing South Slavs was appointed.³⁹⁶

The idea of appointing a separate Minister for Galicia appeared around the mid-nineteenth century and this idea returned several times during the Spring of Nations. However, it was not until the 1860s that it was specified and presented as one of the postulates of the autonomous program. The demand of appointing a minister in the Imperial Council was included in the parliament's resolution of 24 September 1868.³⁹⁷ At last, on 11 April 1871, as a result of the resolution campaign and in exchange for the support of the Polish Club for the federalist government of Karl Hohenwart, Kazimierz Grocholski was appointed the first minister without portfolio for Galicia.

Thus, the Minister for Galicia had the right of legislative initiative in matters concerning Galicia, but he did not have an appropriate executive power. Denied this right, he could only issue opinions on the most significant matters for the country, but he could not settle them. Therefore, the Minister for Galicia was the defender of the Galician interest, which at that point constituted a prelude to conflicts with other members of the government. Simultaneously, he was also a

“Die Zentralverwaltung in Cisleithanien – Die Zivile gemeinsame Zentralverwaltung,” in: *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918*, Bd. II, *Verwaltung und Rechtswesen*, von A. Wandruszka u. P. Urbanitsch, Wien 1975, pp. 186–187.

395 At first, the German minister without portfolio was not authorized to represent national interests. The legitimacy of his appointment was rather questionable for logical reasons. He represented the interests of individual political parties. Therefore, his appointment encountered serious difficulties, because Germans within their own groups had difficulties with choosing the right candidate. For instance, German ministers without portfolio were: Grandolf Kuenburg, a representative of the German left in the government of E. Taaffe in the years 1891–92, he was not called a state minister, even though he had such competences, then Heinrich Prade, Franz Peschke o Gustaw Schreiner, W. Goldinger, *Die Zentralverwaltung in Cisleithanien*, p. 188.

396 It Ivan Žolger in the cabinet of E. Seidler, Goldinger, *Die Zentralverwaltung in Cisleithanien*, p. 189.

397 Point 8 of the resolution of the Galician parliament said: “the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria with the Grand Duchy of Cracow will receive a national board accountable to the parliament in matters of internal administration, education, public security, national culture and justice and a minister in the Imperial Council,” Z. Fras, *Florian Ziemiałkowski*, p. 150. It should be noted that, despite the significant reduction of Galicia's autonomous program, included in the parliament resolution, every subsequent Austrian cabinet planned the appointment of a minister for Galicia.

member of the government and thus, he was obligated to present a united front with the government and support its policies. The scope of competences of the Minister without portfolio for Galicia was not determined until 2 September 1871 on the basis of an instruction published as the highest resolution. According to this document:

A minister without portfolio has, in his own matters that are subject to discussions and resolutions of the Council of Ministers, during the sittings of the Council, a vote equal to the ones of other ministers. In matters concerning Galicia (with the exception of certain categories), other Austrian ministries are responsible to counterbalance the minister for Galicia in such a way that they shall provide substantive ordinances and final decisions related to Galicia. If the minister for Galicia does not agree with the proposed draft and if there is no agreement reached between him and the professional minister, then the issue shall be decided by the Council of Ministers. In the Galician matters, the minister for Galicia has the right of initiative.³⁹⁸

On 2 April 1873, Florian Ziemiałkowski became the next Minister for Galicia. Despite the extension of competences in June 1873, the formal and legal status of the minister did not change. In contrast to other ministers without portfolio, the Minister for Galicia still had a defined scope of activity; however, he did not have an appropriate portfolio.³⁹⁹ What is more, the successors of F. Ziemiałkowski received a copy of the directive regarding his competences, not the competences of the minister without portfolio: “his scope of activity was never published. This resulted in various illogicalities, each minister following Ziemiałkowski received a copy of the rescript on the scope of activity, but it was always a copy of the norms established for Ziemiałkowski, not for Zaleski, Jaworski etc.”⁴⁰⁰ It was only in January 1896 when the Ministry of Railways was created and it was possible

398 Z. Fras, *Florian Ziemiałkowski*, p. 152. I. Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim. Dzieje rezolucji sejmu galicyjskiego z 24 września 1868r.*, Lwów 1918, p. 203. During the time when K. Grocholski was the Minister for Galicia, he did not have specified competences but he could vote in the Council of Ministers and was a representative of the Galician matters in the Imperial Council, K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, Wrocław 1951, p. 14; W. Goldinger, *Die Zentralverwaltung in Cisleithanien*, p. 186; S. Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego czyli ustawy konstytucyjne austriackie*, Lwów 1901, p. 628.

399 Z. Fras, *Florian Ziemiałkowski*, p. 147.

400 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 12–13. In the same way the competences of the Czech minister were treated, they were specified for B. Pacák whose successors received copies of his competences, W. Goldinger, *Die Zentralverwaltung in Cisleithanien*, p. 187.

to systematize and write down the competences of the Minister for Galicia.⁴⁰¹ On the basis of the competences granted to F. Ziemiałkowski, the Minister for Galicia was authorized to:

oppose, in writing or orally, to a disposal that he considered inadequate or a nomination with which he did not agree. If a minister, to whom a certain matter belonged due to his scope of activity, changed the disposition in accordance with the request of Ziemiałkowski, then of course, the dispute ceased; however, if he maintained his existing opinion, then Ziemiałkowski had the right to demand the matter to be discussed and voted by the Council of Ministers. However, it rarely came to such extreme, as there usually was a middle ground to be found to settle the matter.⁴⁰²

Nevertheless, the minister was not limited and he had full freedom in appointing ministry officials. Though, he had still little room for manoeuvre, because when K. Grocholski was minister there was only one person employed in the ministry and F. Ziemiałkowski had three employees.

Zbigniew Fras cited a publication, entitled *Minister Florian Ziemiałkowski. Rzecz napisana z okoliczności 10-tej rocznicy jego ministerstwa* (*Minister Florian Ziemiałkowski. A book written for the circumstances of the 10th anniversary of his ministry*), in which the competences of minister F. Ziemiałkowski were described. The author of this publication wrote that, in addition to the competences that every member of the Council of Ministers was entitled to, that is the right to vote in all matters concerning the subject of sittings and proceedings, the Minister for Galicia had the right to give opinions and the right of initiative in all state matters. Thus, he could initiate state drafts and cooperate with departmental minister. Similarly to the case of the scope of competences of K. Grocholski, the Council of Ministers had the conclusive vote in disputes between ministers. Each minister, if a draft concerned national Galician matters, was obligated to submit it for an opinion of F. Ziemiałkowski, who could present his reservations in a written form. In the case of disagreement between the ministers, the Council of Ministers decided. However, there were exceptions to this rule. Firstly, if a given matter required an immediate resolution, the departmental minister was not obligated to consider the position of the Minister for Galicia, although, he had to explain his arbitral decision during the next government sitting. Secondly, in matters, such as governmental drafts for the parliament, an opinion without reservations of the Minister for Galicia was required. Thirdly, matters concerning army and police and certain resolutions of the Ministers of Treasury, Trade and Agriculture were exempted from the

401 Goldinger, *Die Zentralverwaltung in Cisleithanien*, p. 186.

402 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 13.

Minister's for Galicia obligation to give opinions. Nevertheless, the Minister for Galicia issued opinions on nominations of church dignitaries, officials on autonomous positions, high school and academic professors, folk school teachers and reassigning of the Polish officials from one ministry to another.⁴⁰³

Even when the competences were defined, the scope of activity of the Minister for Galicia remained informal. The minister for Galicia was an actual minister, even if in the legal sense he was a minister without portfolio: "the Minister for Galicia would be an institution, the minister without portfolio with some scope of activity assigned – just a minister – whose appointment is not needed. This is why officials were against the name of the minister for Galicia."⁴⁰⁴ Avoiding the use of the name "minister for Galicia" also resulted from the fear that: "the Czechs would demand to have a minister of such type for themselves."⁴⁰⁵ Even the ministerial correspondence was addressed to *An das polnische Ministerium* and the minister was called *der polnische Landsmannminister*.⁴⁰⁶

As mentioned above, one of the competences of the Minister for Galicia was particularly difficult. On the one hand, as a member of the government he was obligated to support the official policies. On the other, he was to defend the interests of Galicia. Such contradiction was sometimes used in order to remove inconvenient ministers from office. Such an example was the relation between Julian Dunajewski and F. Ziemiałkowski which is later presented in this chapter.

Numerous factors influenced the actual scope of activity of the Minister for Galicia, one of which was his personality. Waldemar Łazuga wrote that if "he was not a remarkable individual, his role was not prominent."⁴⁰⁷ However, the position of the minister was also influenced by the relations with departmental ministers. Certain ministers were obligated to send decisions to the minister for him to issue an opinion, but in practice, this requirement was not always respected. Thus, if the relations between the Galician and departmental ministers were not satisfactory, then this requirement was not met. A contemporary Austrian historian, Walter Goldinger, had a similar opinion and believed that ministers did not respect the competences of the Minister for Galicia and sometimes even

403 *Minister Florian Ziemiałkowski. Rzecz napisana z okoliczności 10-tej rocznicy jego ministerstwa*, Kraków, 1883, pp. 35–38, as cited in: Z. Frasz, *Florian Ziemiałkowski*, pp. 161–162.

404 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 13.

405 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, pp. 12–13.

406 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, p. 13.

407 W. Łazuga, *Michał Bobrzyński. Myśl historyczna a działalność polityczna*, Warszawa 1982, p. 192.

tried to limit them.⁴⁰⁸ W. Goldinger wrote about their pettiness and meticulousness.⁴⁰⁹ K. Chłędowski, long-time official of the Ministry and then the Minister for Galicia, described the discussed issue in such a way:

Ministries did not strictly comply with their obligation to send us more important matters, we often had to ask them to send them; if it did not suit this of that minister to give Ziemiałkowski some acts to read, he simply ordered no to send them to him and sometimes after a long time we discovered that some matters were kept a secret.⁴¹⁰

The relations between the Minister for Galicia and the Polish Club is also worth mentioning. The institution of the Minister for Galicia underwent parliamentarization over time, as every candidate for the office needed to gain the trust of the Polish Club and the emperor. In fact, every nominated minister had to have the emperor's trust. What is more, the governor and departmental ministers who were Poles also influenced the appointment of the Minister, as they had to co-operate with him in national matters. Particularly significant was their agreement on the direction of their policy, for instance in Russian matter. An example of such connections is the candidacy of Stanisław Głąbiński, who, despite his willingness to run the Ministry, did not become the Minister due to the objection of governor Michał Bobrzyński. Instead, he was appointed Minister of Railways in 1911.

Since the Polish Club had influence on appointing the Minister, it meant that there was a particular political group behind it. It was conservatives, who for many years influenced the Galician political scene and determined the direction of the Polish policy in Vienna. Therefore, a national democrat or a socialist were never appointed Minister for Galicia, even though representatives of, for instance, the National Democracy acted as presidents of the Circle and socialists as its vice-presidents. This office was dominated by conservatives, of eastern Galicia and Cracow, but sometimes it was held by other democrats.

Above cited W. Goldinger claimed that the Ministry for Galicia was the executive body of the Polish Club.⁴¹¹ According to him, the Minister supported the Polish national cause in Galicia.⁴¹² However, Edward Dubanowicz, who lived at that time, wrote that there existed "an organic relation" between the Minister

408 W. Goldinger, "Das polnische Element in der Wiener Hochbürokratie (1848–1918)," *Studia Austro-Polonica* 1, ZN UJ. Pr. Hist., 57/1978, p. 64.

409 W. Goldinger, *Die Zentralverwaltung in Cisleithanien*, p. 186.

410 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 13.

411 W. Goldinger, *Das polnische Element*, p. 65.

412 W. Goldinger, *Die Zentralverwaltung in Cisleithanien*, p. 186.

and the national government. It means that in Vienna, the Minister for Galicia did not defend the interests of the entire Polish society, but of the nobility and rich bourgeoisie.⁴¹³ E. Dubanowicz acknowledged that there was a close relation between the conservative majority of the national government and the Minister for Galicia. The Minister defended interests of cautious and conservative circles.⁴¹⁴ All in all, the opinions of W. Goldinger and E. Dubanowicz are not contradictory, the latter demonstrates in addition the source of dependence of the Minister.

Even though the Minister was granted the competences to secure *status quo* of the entire Crown land, he represented only the interests of the Polish people. What is more, over time he became *Schildwachen der Nation*.⁴¹⁵ He was treated as such by the deputies from the Polish Club. Democrat Roger Battaglia emphasized that: "The Minister for Galicia is both, Galician and Polish. The position of the Minister is reserved for a Pole, as Galicia shall be governed by Poles. Thus, he is a Polish minister for the nation."⁴¹⁶ From a formal point of view, the Minister for Galicia was a state minister, not a national one but in reality, he only defended the Polish assets; thus, he did not represent the interests of the Ukrainian people. Therefore, during the First World War, Ukrainians demanded the appointment their own minister without portfolio. Jakub Forst-Battaglia also emphasized the negative attitude toward the Ukrainian minority, writing: *die zwiete Nation des Kronlandes, die Ruthenen oder Ukrainer, wurde stiefmutterlich behandelt*.⁴¹⁷ Poles themselves highlighted the importance of this ministry, indicating that the principal rule of every minister should be the one introduced when K. Grocholski and F. Ziemiałkowski were in office, which stated that: "this minister is a kind of a Galician chancellor, who should not at all solidarize with each and every subsequent cabinet, but should protect the national interests in Vienna."⁴¹⁸

The influence of the Circle on the Galician ministry manifested mostly by influencing nomination of the Minister, whom became the person who was

413 E. Dubanowicz, *Prawno-państwowe stanowisko Królestwa Galicji i innych krajów przedlitawskich. Szkic prawno-historyczny*, Lwów 1916, p. 152–153.

414 Dubanowicz, *Prawno-państwowe stanowisko*, p. 57.

415 The guardian (sentry) of the nation, W. Goldinger, *Die Zentralverwaltung in Cisleithanien*, p. 65, citation p. 186.

416 Minutes of the sitting of the Polish Club of 30 October 1907, *Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa. Sprawy polityczne IV, Teki M. Bobrzyńskiego (TB)*, Biblioteka Jagiellońska (BJ), MS 8109 III, B. 27.

417 J. Forst-Battaglia, *Polnisches Wien*, Wien-München 1983, p. 67.

418 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 219.

trusted by the deputies. Therefore, the appointment of a particular person was often a bargaining chip in negotiation between the parties. It also resulted in unnecessary politicization of this office, rendering difficult the functioning of the Minister for Galicia. After the fall of the cabinet of Kazimierz Badeni in 1897 and the demission of Minister for Galicia Edward Rittner, Apolinary Jaworski stated that: “with all his strength, he will fight the idea of appointing an official minister for Galicia, as according to him, the Polish Club should not let go of this position.”⁴¹⁹

As it results from the above, even without a proper portfolio and without executive competences, the Minister for Galicia had considerable political significance. Above all, he was a symbol of individuality and recognition of partial autonomy of the Galician province in relation to other, non-German Crown lands and of a particular sympathy and trust of the monarch toward Poles. The Galician ministry was led by eminent statesmen, outstanding politicians who used their own political experience serving the Second Polish Republic.

The bureau of the Ministry was created under the presidium of the Council of Ministers⁴²⁰ and for many Poles it became a stepping stone to leading position in the bodies of Austrian administration. The Ministry was a place where Poles found employment and if their skills and the circumstances favored it, they became its head. Such was the path of K. Chłędowski, one of the noteworthy ministers, as he was witty, clever, intelligent and he developed his vibrant personality in various directions. At first, he was the ministerial secretary and then the Minister for Galicia in the years 1899–1900.⁴²¹ For many years Zdzisław Dzierżykraj-Morawski worked in the Lviv governorship and then in the bureau of the Ministry, in which in 1914 was promoted to the head of the section. He was the Minister for Galicia in years 1915–1916. Z. Morawski dealt with refugees and was one of the first people to meet their needs, which caused conflicts

419 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, p. 221.

420 From 1873, the bureau of the ministry was situated at Bankgasse and in 1876 it was moved to Schillerplatz 4, thanks to the efforts of F. Ziemiałkowski who, thanks to his connections, obtained better work conditions. During his term in office, the number of officials increased to three. They had five rooms at their disposal and one of them was intended for janitors: “You entered a long, dark corridor where even in July it was necessary to have a gas light in order not to break your nose,” K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . ., p. 5. From 1910 until the end of the dual monarchy, the bureau of the ministry was situated at Rennweg 1a Street, R. Taborski, *Polacy w Wiedniu*, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1992, p. 82.

421 J. Forst-Battaglia, *Polnisches Wien*, p. 32.

between him and departmental ministries, as he repeatedly stepped into their competences.

2. Prime Ministers

This section is focused on the Polish Prime Ministers and ministers. I will discuss their profiles, activity, and achievements in the field of political life in Austria during the dual monarchy.

At the beginning it should be noted that the path to promotion in the Austrian public service was rather difficult, as Poles in the monarchy were perceived as not trustworthy, prone to scheming and conspiracies. Therefore, initially those with clerical ambitions received only lower positions in the Austrian administration, primarily in the local administration.⁴²²

Agenor Gołuchowski senior⁴²³ was the first of Poles who managed to achieve a high position in the Austrian administration. Thanks to his predispositions, he broke the barrier of distrust and reached one of the highest positions available in the clerical career. He was the first and triple governor of Galicia, the Minister of State and the Minister of Interior in 1860. Marian Rosco-Bogdanowicz wrote about him: “at that time omnipotent and distinguished statesman and the governor of Galicia.”⁴²⁴ He is also considered to be the creator and ardent advocate of the pro-Austrian orientation and the loyalist policy.

The case of A. Gołuchowski is given as the flagship example of a clerical and then political career in the Austrian administration. He became some sort of symbol, a personality of the Galician scene, who cleared the trail for Poles in achieving offices, positions and national ranks. In the historiography, this view was established, which boils down to the problem of breaking the barriers and national resentment. It emphasizes the change in perceiving Poles by the German ruling class and, therefore, enabling them to participate in the political life of the

422 S. Grodziski, *Udział Polaków w centralnych*, p. 181.

423 “Gołuchowski Agenor d. Ä. Graf,” in: *Österreichische Lexikon*, (25.03.2002) <<http://www.aeiou.at/aeiou.encyklop.g/g561696.htm>>; K. Nizio, “Gołuchowski Agenor (senior),” in: *Polacy w historii i kulturze krajów Europy zachodniej. Słownik biograficzny*, eds. K. Kwaśniewski, L. Trzeciakowski, Poznań 1981, pp. 134–135; S. Kieniewicz, “Gołuchowski Agenor,” in: *PSB*, vol. VIII, Wrocław 1959–60, pp. 257–259; B. Gregorowicz, “Pamiętnik,” in: *Pamiętniki urzędników galicyjskich*, prepared for printing by I. Homola i B. Łopuszański, Kraków 1978, pp. 167, 193, 213, 284, 285, 303, 320.

424 M. Rosco-Bogdanowicz, *Wspomnienia*, vol. I, preface by A. Knot, preparation for printing, footnotes, translations of foreign texts by J. Gitel, Kraków 1958, p. 50.

state. It seems that this problem is unilaterally recognized, as the change in the attitude of Poles toward their role in the monarchy is not noticed.

A. Gołuchowski began his clerical career in 1835 and as Ludwik Dębicki recalled: “he paved himself a different way, regardless of the opinions – he continued this way, step by step toward power, behind the star which led him to important tasks for the state and in which he believed. To advance his career, he served for many years without pay.”⁴²⁵

In 1842, he became the governor secretary in Cracow and in the following year a deputy in the state parliament. In the first year of the Spring of Nations, that is from April 1848, he was a vice-president of Galicia and then, from 15 January 1849 to 1859, the first Polish governor of Galicia. When in office, he significantly facilitated gaining clerical positions for his compatriots⁴²⁶, in this way he broke above all their resentment toward public service and also the lack of trust of the monarchy in Polish officials. They came mostly from the impoverished nobility, represented conservatives views and were loyal to Vienna. This social characteristic of the administration survived until the First World War.⁴²⁷

When the emperor appointed a new government on 21 August 1859, he entrusted Gołuchowski with the portfolio of the Minister of Interior. This nomination aroused his astonishment: “But Your Majesty, I am Polish!”, in return he heard: “The Slavs are my most loyal subjects.”⁴²⁸ Archduke Wilhelm became the nominal Prime Minister, whereas Gołuchowski was the actual Prime Minister.

The appointment of a Pole to such a high position was associated with the implementation of legal and constitutional changes in the monarchy. Gołuchowski was an advocate for far reaching autonomy of kingdoms and Crown lands and the emperor chose him to change the political system of the monarchy. In 1860, he announced the so-called October Diploma which provisions made a distinction

425 L. Dębicki, *Portrety i sylwetki z XIX stulecia*, vol. I, Kraków 1905, p. 8.

426 Paweł Popiel wrote that: “he gave positions to Poles but he was able to get them used to work and accuracy,” P. Popiel, *Pamiętniki Pawła Popiela 1907–1892*, Kraków 1927, p. 180. One of such people was the future Minister of Finance, Leon Biliński, who came from a not so wealthy family. A. Gołuchowski saw in him a promising scientist and economist, gave him a scholarship and made it possible for him to find a job in the Governorship, W. Łazuga, „*Rządy polskie w Austrii. Gabinet Kazimierza hr. Badeniego 1895–1897*,” Poznań 1991, p. 52.

427 S. Grodziski, *Udział Polaków w centralnych*, p. 182.

428 As cited in: L. Dębicki, *Portrety i sylwetki*, vol. I, p. 23.

between Austria as an absolutist state and as a constitutional monarchy. It was also a starting point for transforming the state into a dual monarchy.

After its announcement in December 1860, Gołuchowski was forced to resign, even though he had at that time full trust of the emperor. The reasons for his dismissal are connected to the lack of acceptance for the concept of autonomous provinces on the part of Austrian Germans and also Hungarians. German liberals perceived the Diploma as an act directed against the German nation and its current leading position in the monarchy. In contrast, Hungarians thought that the concessions included in the Diploma were insufficient to gain separateness that they sought from 1848. The dismissal of Gołuchowski was also quickened by the opinion of the court circles. Vienna perceived him as too progressive and thus, there appeared numerous schemes directed against him. What is more, during Gołuchowski's rule, numerous German officials were dismissed in Galicia. The dismissal of Gołuchowski also prevented the implementation of the provisions of the October Diploma.⁴²⁹

Ultimately, Gołuchowski and his concepts failed. Regardless, his contribution to the political life of the Habsburg state and later to Austria-Hungary was significant. Emperor Franz Joseph appreciated his service and honored him with the ribbon of the Order of Saint Stephen. A privilege allowing Gołuchowski to incorporate half of the eagle from the Habsburg state emblem into his family coat of arms constituted the proof of the monarch's special favor.⁴³⁰

Gołuchowski was evaluated differently during his life and by contemporary researchers. A part of the Galician society welcomed him to the Governorship with great enthusiasm, expecting more autonomy in the province and maybe even an Austro-Polish solution of this national matter. However, he was criticized by centralists, bureaucrats and the left. According to some Polish studies, Gołuchowski was a politician who with his own effort directed Austria toward federalism and initiated the autonomy process of Galicia. L. Dębicki believed that Gołuchowski: "built lasting piers and laid a solid foundation for a new autonomous system of our country."⁴³¹ In studies written in German, he is often presented as not very skilful co-worker of Richard, count of Rechberg⁴³², although there are some positive opinions. Such was the opinion of Jakub Forst-Battaglia, who wrote: *zwei Gołuchowski* (father and son Agenor – D. L.-L.) *gehörten zu den*

429 A. Nowicki, *Historia Austrii konstytucyjnej 1860–1907*, vol. I, Wiedeń 1912, pp. 13–14.

430 J. Radzyner, *Orientacja austro-polska*, p. 192.

431 L. Dębicki, *Portrety i sylwetki*, vol. I. . . , p. 21.

432 S. Grodziski, *Udział Polaków w centralnych*, p. 180.

*führenden Staatsmännern der franzisko-josephinischen Ära.*⁴³³ In contrast, Irena Pannenkowa characterized Gołuchowski in such a way: “he is more an administrator and an official than a politician and a creator of a broader style.”⁴³⁴

All of the above statements contain some truth about Gołuchowski. It would be a mistake to over-exaggerate or to glorify his performance as a politician or to over-criticize him. The role played by Gołuchowski in the October Diploma genesis is beyond doubt and he deserves some recognition. It is worth emphasizing that even though he was a loyal subject of the emperor and the monarchy he did not renounce his Polishness, considering that numerous officials of Polish origin were denationalized and only their Polish names reminded them about their heritage. Thus, their achievements should not be classified as Polish.⁴³⁵

Numerous Poles followed Agenor Gołuchowski senior, while achieving their ambitions on various administrative positions. Besides the above-mentioned Minister of State Gołuchowski, count Alfred Potocki (1870–1871) and count Kazimierz Badeni (1895–1897) were appointed to position of Prime Minister.

Count Alfred Potocki⁴³⁶ was the first Pole, who after the creation of the dual monarchy, achieved such a high state position, that is the position of Prime Minister. He was able to gain the trust of the emperor and from 1867 his political role in Vienna grew systematically.⁴³⁷ On 30 December

433 “Both Gołuchowskis were leading statesmen in the Franz Joseph era,” J. Forst-Battaglia, *Polnisches Wien*, Wien-München 1983, p. 31.

434 I. Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*, p. 92.

435 S. Grodziski, *Udział Polaków w centralnych*, p. 180.

436 J. Zdrada, “Potocki Alfred Józef,” in: *PSB*, vol. XXVII, Wrocław 1982–83, pp. 762–765. The Parliament Library on its website provides information not exactly consistent with the facts, I quote: “as a hereditary member of the House of Lords, he joined the Polish Club,” see: *Potocki Alfred Józef (1822–1889)*, in: (05.12.2003) <<http://bib.ssejm.gov.pl/muz/phtml/potoc165.html>>. The members of the House of Lords were not members of the Polish Club, they could only attend its sittings. They gained such right only after the change of the suffrage in 1911, which allowed them to combine these, L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, Warszawa 1924, p. 156.

437 The trust of the emperor in the Polish aristocrat was confirmed when the resolution was adopted by the Galician government in 1868, which included a postulate of separating the province. At that time, Gołuchowski was dismissed from the governorship, whereas Potocki maintained his good position in the monarchy. The adoption of this resolution resulted in the cancellation of the trip of the imperial couple to Galicia. On this occasion, the emperor wrote to his mother: “Alfred Potocki behaved brilliantly and it is a comfort to find nowadays such characters,” as cited in: H. Wereszycki, *Niewygasła przeszłość. Refleksje i polemiki*, Kraków 1987, p. 153.

1867,⁴³⁸ he was appointed Minister of Agriculture in the government of Karl Auersperg, the so-called *Bürger-Ministerium*,⁴³⁹ and on 4 April 1870 the emperor entrusted him with a mission of forming a new government.⁴⁴⁰ A. Potocki was appointed Prime Minister on 11 April.⁴⁴¹

Potocki was a man of average intelligence and moderate views but he was very wealthy and partly to his property, as claimed Henryk Wreszycki, he owed his position in Vienna. Potocki, due to his loyalty to the monarchy and his conservative and clerical views, gained great trust of the monarch. Stanisław Tarnowski wrote about him that: "Among Poles, no character or mind had as much trust of the emperor as Alfred Potocki."⁴⁴² The emperor was certain of his loyalty because: "Probably none of the Galician aristocrats, who achieved such a high state position as Potocki, was so cold in his patriotism and so strongly connected to the Habsburg dynasty as the master of Łańcut."⁴⁴³ Not only the

See also: H. Wereszycki, "Bismarck o nominacji Alfreda Potockiego na namiestnika Galicji w 1875r.," *Studia Historyczne* (SH), 1/1986, p. 5.

438 *Wiener Zeitung* (WZ), no. 1 from 01.01.1868, p. 1.

439 At that time, Prince Karl of Auersperg was the Prime Minister and count Eduard Taaffe was one of the ministers, who to some extent was a supporter of the autonomists, in contrast to Dr. Carl Giskra, who was the Minister of Interior, a centralist and a firm opponent of the Polish cause. He was mainly responsible for the fate of the resolution. In the government there was also a Pole, count Alfred Potocki, the minister of Agriculture. This cabinet gained the name *Bürger-Ministerium*, even though it is not a very accurate term, as it was led by one of the most prominent German aristocrats and the ministerial portfolios were held by count A. Potocki and count E. Taaffe, F. X. d'Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna austro-węgierskiej monarchii od 1848 do 1881r., omówiona z uwzględnieniem walki autonomistów z centralistami*, Kraków 1881, pp. 116–121.

440 The conflict which took place within *Bürger-Ministerium* was brought to the forum of the House of Deputies and as a result of opposition of the autonomist deputies, a new central and liberal government of L. Hasner was forced to resign. The Polish Club had a rather significant contribution to it, when on 30 March 1870 its members left the parliament as a sign of protest. This event and the intensifying conflict between Czechs and Germans allowed Potocki to return to active political life.

441 WZ, no. 84 from 13.04.1870, p. 1.

442 S. Tarnowski, *Alfred Potocki. Wspomnienie pośmiertne*, Kraków 1889, p. 25.

443 H. Wereszycki, *Niewygasła przeszłość. Refleksje*, p. 152. His good position at the court was enforced by the fact that his great-grandmother, a duchess and a wife of a marshal, maintained great relations with three empresses, and the house of Potoccy at Herrengasse upheld this tradition, M. Rosco-Bogdanowicz, *Wspomnienia*, vol. I. . . , pp. 68–69; L. Dębicki, *Alfred hr. Potocki*, Kraków 1889, p. 14. The strong relationship between A. Potocki and the monarchy may be attested by the fact that only after his

emperor, but also other political circles gave Potocki their trust and acceptance, mainly because of his moderate views and as his nomination was not opposed by Russia, for instance.⁴⁴⁴

According to M. Rosco-Bogdanowicz, count Alfred Potocki was: “a conservative with some moderately liberal views in the English style, a monarchist and a clericalist.”⁴⁴⁵ In contrast, in the opinion of W. Łazuga he was: “a modern type of Polish gentleman, Polish diplomat and statesman, who presented the European model, perfect for our century.”⁴⁴⁶ Stefan Kieniewicz also wrote positively about Potocki:

In the history of Austrian Prime Ministers, the Master of Łańcut belongs to the group of the more likeable figures. He was a handsome man with noble emotions and of firm righteousness. Even though he grew up in Vienna and he was limited by his wife's great fortune in Russia, he felt Polish and he eagerly worked for the country as the first of the Galician masters. He was Catholic, supporter of autonomy and a loyal subject; the emperor gave him a mission to reconcile all peoples of the monarchy and to fulfil their wishes in the December Constitution – he was ready to make an attempt and to resign in case of failure. From the beginning, he thought about resigning, as he was a soft and indecisive man and also an incurable pessimist. It may be said that even his enemies respected him and his supporters did not reckon with him.⁴⁴⁷

Franz Joseph appointed Potocki the head of the government, assuming that he would be the best solution to the Czech-German conflict. Thus, the priority task of his cabinet was to resolve the above mentioned conflict. This move of the emperor would allow to release political tension in the monarchy, especially since the international situation was a sign of a future armed conflict between Prussia and France.

wedding with Maria Klementyna, the daughter of Prince Roman Sanguszko, in 1851 the Polish traditions were restored at the castle in Łańcut, L. Dębicki, *Portrety i sylwetki*, vol. I. . . , p. 326.

444 Potocki was known for his conservatism, and therefore there was no danger of him granting political concessions to Galicia, which the tsar was particularly afraid of, E. Lipnicki, *Hr. Alfred Potocki jako prezes gabinetu austriackiego*, “Biblioteka Warszawska,” 1889, vol. 3, pp. 9, 12.

445 M. Rosco-Bogdanowicz, *Wspomnienia*, vol. I. . . , p. 58.

446 W. Łazuga, „*Rządy polskie*” w Austrii, p. 49.

447 S. Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha 1828–1903*, Warszawa 1993, pp. 220–221. F. Beust accused Potocki of not believing in his own abilities and thought that it stood in the way of concluding an agreement with Czechs, B. Filarecka, “Alfred Potocki jako polityk,” *Rocznik Historyczno-Archiwalny*, vol. XIII, 1999, p. 78.

The beginning of Potocki's rule was not promising, as from the start he encountered some difficulties with forming the cabinet. He tried to create a government in which there would be representatives of various groups but also individuals of different worldviews and as Stanisław Pijaj claimed, it was one of the reasons why the formation of the government was prolonged.⁴⁴⁸ The idea of Potocki was to guarantee the creation of a broad platform of agreement, so the nations and their interests could be represented in the government. It seems though that the achievement of this goal and the formation of a coherent political program of the government was simply impossible.⁴⁴⁹

The priority of the Potocki's government was to conclude an agreement between Czechs and Poles by introducing federal changes but without violating the foundations of the December Constitution.⁴⁵⁰ In the monarchy there was an acute conflict between Czechs and Germans and Potocki seemed to be the best solution for it. He was a supporter of a concept of eliminating and preventing future national conflicts, since their intense course created a threat of violating the foundations of the monarchy.

Thus, the political program of the Prime Minister was based on two directives. Firstly, it was a solution of national conflicts and secondly, it was a turn to federalism but without introducing legal and constitutional changes, just an increase in autonomy in some Crown lands. Achieving these two directives seemed to be a difficult task, especially with the opposition composed of German liberals, Czech autonomists and Poles, who were at that time conducting the resolution campaign in the Imperial Council. The Prime Minister was accused of not having presented an actual program containing methods and means which would allow to achieve these goals. He was also accused of failing to keep his promise of not violating the provisions of the constitution.

448 S. Pijaj, *Między polskim patriotyzmem a habsburskim lojalizmem. Polacy wobec przemian ustrojowych monarchii habsburskiej (1866–1871)*, Kraków 2003, pp. 319–320.

449 Any future minister ostentatiously refused to accept portfolios that were proposed to him. The cabinet of Potocki had none left-wing politicians. Thus, the Prime Minister did not manage to form a coalition government, it had more of an administrative character. In the cabinet of Potocki there were no prominent personalities, except for Eduard Taaffe, who was one of the most important personalities of this government and the Minister of Interior and National Defence. Potocki kept for himself the position of the Minister of Agriculture until 6 May and then he took over from Taaffe the Ministry of National Defence (28 June to 23 November 1870), W. Łazuga, „Rządy polskie” w Austrii, pp. 15–16; J. Zdrada, *Potocki Alfred Józef*, p. 763.

450 Therefore, the cabinet of Potocki was called *Ausgleichministerium*.

Shortly after becoming Prime Minister, Potocki realized that there were major difficulties in controlling the Czech opposition and that the chances of reaching an agreement with them were slim.⁴⁵¹ With some reservations, Potocki began his mission of persuading Czechs to return to the Imperial Council. The Czech opposition boycotted the sittings, demanding recognition of separateness of the Czech countries, i.e. granting them the same legal and state status which had the Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen. The atmosphere surrounding the Czech matter was a sign that the negotiations with the opposition would not be easy. However, the Prime Minister hoped that his mission would succeed, because: “the moment has come when the regard for the monarchy will outweigh the particular regards.”⁴⁵² Already at the beginning, Potocki took some steps to ensure an adequate atmosphere of the negotiations.⁴⁵³

Initial talks with Czech oppositionists were conducted on 29 and 30 April 1870 in Vienna and then continued in Prague in mid-May. H. Clam-Martinitz, R. Belcredi, L. Thun and J. Lobkowitz participated in these talks. On 27 April, Potocki also negotiated with Czech national deputies in Vienna. The political position of the federalists clearly meant not abandoning the Czech legal and state program. Thus, the talks were unsuccessful. Czech deputies continued to refuse to return to the Imperial Council, even though the new Prime Minister was positively perceived by autonomists and a part of bourgeoisie.⁴⁵⁴

Potocki made his first trip to Bohemia in mid-May 1870. The talks were conducted in Prague from 16 to 18 May. One of the most prominent Polish politicians, federalist Franciszek Smolka and also Aleksander Petrino, the Minister of Agriculture in the cabinet of Potocki, took part in these talks. The Prime Minister offered Czechs language and administration concessions and a potential increase of the autonomy of the Czech countries, but Czechs considered the Austrian offer to be insufficient. Therefore, they continued their passive opposition, hoping that after the fall of Potocki the subsequent cabinet

451 From March 1862, they boycotted the sittings of the parliament and from mid-1868 also the Czech national parliament.

452 L. Dębicki, *Portrety i sylwetki*, p. 335.

453 On 22 April 1870, he announced amnesty in Bohemia, on 8 May, dismissed the criticized governor of Bohemia, A. Koller, and on 14 May, appointed A. Mensdorf-Dietrichstein, J. Zdrada, *Potocki Alfred Józef*, p. 763.

454 W. Łazuga, „*Rządy polskie*” w Austrii, pp. 16–17; J. Zdrada, *Potocki Alfred Józef*, p. 763.

would accept their demands.⁴⁵⁵ F. Smolka blamed Potocki for the failure of the negotiations.⁴⁵⁶

Due to the unfavorable situation in the House of Deputies, on 22 May 1870, the Prime Minister dissolved the parliament and the national parliaments, with the exception for the Czech parliament, hoping that new elections would bring a victory for the autonomists. On 22 July 1870, the Czech parliament was also dissolved. At the same time, Potocki assured Czechs about the possibility of revising the current legal and state relation of the Czech countries to the rest of the monarchy. However, this promise was insufficient for Czech oppositionists. Once again they presented their own national program, demanding recognition of their rights to the Crown of Saint Wenceslas. Shortly after it turned out that even in Austria there were opponents of the agreement with Czechs. On 20 September 1870, the House of Lords of the Imperial Council opposed such solution of the Czech matter.⁴⁵⁷

The situation was unfavorable and it was possible to predict that the cabinet of Potocki would not meet its expectations. Czechs did not abandon their program and German centralists began a fierce campaign against the Polish Prime Minister, as they were more confident about their own position in the monarchy after the Prussian victory in the war with France. The situation also worsened due to the divisions among the deputies of the Czech parliament, which resulted in the declaration of Franz Joseph of 29 September 1870, in which he declared that he was ready to crown a king of Bohemia if Czechs would recognize the constitution of 1867 and would cease the boycott of the Imperial Council. The government wanted to counteract these divisions by conducting direct elections to the parliament but as it later turned out, it was an imprudent move. As a result, 24 centralists and 30 Czech federalists gained their seats in the parliament.⁴⁵⁸ The parliament was also composed of German centralists who continued their campaign against the Polish Prime Minister.

In November 1870, a debate took place in the parliament, during which the policies of Potocki were strongly criticized. At the same time, there were no complaints against the Prime Minister, as it was known that the emperor trusted

455 The international situation also influenced their position. Czechs were certain that Prussia would lose and thus, they expected the decline of German authority in Europe, including the authority of Austrian Germans, J. Zdrada, *Potocki Alfred Józef*, p. 764.

456 H. Rządowska, "Listy Franciszka Smolki do Emanuela Tonnera," *SH*, YRBK XIV, 2/1971, pp. 259–262.

457 J. Zdrada, *Potocki Alfred Józef*, p. 764.

458 I. Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*, p. 200.

him. Potocki justified the position of the government and defended his own program in the House of Lords on 16 November and in the House of Deputies on 19 November. In a critical assessment, he acknowledged that he considered the failure of negotiations with Czechs as his political defeat. Both houses of the parliament passed a motion of no confidence for Potocki. A few days later, on 24 November, the entire cabinet resigned. The emperor did not accept their resignation, which is why the government of Potocki worked until the beginning of 1871. He received his demission on 4 February 1871.⁴⁵⁹ The emperor did not eagerly part with Potocki. After all, he was the first Pole, after A. Gołuchowski, whom he trusted this much.⁴⁶⁰

The political plans of Potocki to achieve the agreement between Germans and Czechs were unsuccessful. Having the resistance of Czechs on the one hand, the resistance of Germans on the other, Potocki was forced to resign: "All attempts of Potocki were ultimately broken down by the Czech resistance. The parliament in Prague did not agree to send its deputies to the Imperial Council as long as the emperor would not recognize the historical rights of "the Crown of Saint Wenceslas", Potocki resigned and in February 1870 the emperor appointed an unexpectedly federal cabinet of count Hohenwart."⁴⁶¹

Most likely, Germans did not accept not the Prime Minister himself but his program. However, he could count on the support of the Polish Club, hoping that the postulates included in the resolution of the Galician parliament of 1868 would finally be fulfilled.⁴⁶² The Polish deputies thought that Potocki would not oppose to the efforts of his compatriots. It should also be emphasized that:

459 WZ, no. 38 from 07.02.1871, p. 1. At the turn of 1870 and 1871, there were ongoing sessions of joint delegations and among others they were the reason why the resignation of Potocki and other ministers of the government was not accepted, Zdrada, *Potocki Alfred Józef*, p. 764.

460 Shortly after he was appointed national marshal, i.e. the head of the National Division and the president of the parliament. In 1875, after the resignation of Gołuchowski, he was appointed governor of Galicia. L. Dębicki assessed very positively the period of Potocki's rule in Galicia, indicating that: "In Vienna, the power was in hands of centralists, in order to protect the country a prominent statesman was needed. Towards the government of Auersperg-Lasser, he took a diplomatic, defensive position based on the crown," L. Dębicki, *Alfred hr. Potocki*, p. 23.

461 S. Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*, p. 225.

462 The past of Potocki gave hope for that, as he was one of the initiators of the address of the eastern Galician nobility to emperor Franz Joseph of 1851, which included the postulates of internal reforms and the "offer" of an agreement between Poles and the Habsburg dynasty.

When it comes to Galicia, the nomination of Potocki was a spot-on manoeuvre on the part of the emperor, Poles could not make difficulties for their own compatriot. As the conferences of the government with Polish leaders were held in a friendly atmosphere, Potocki eventually abolished German lectures at the Jagiellonian University and promised the appointment of a Polish governor, a minister “for Galicia” and the inclusion of a considerable part of the Resolution.⁴⁶³

F. Ziemiałkowski and A. Gołuchowski opposed his policy, and especially his attempt to federalize the monarchy. The resentment toward these plans was motivated by the fear of increasing the influence of the Cracow conservatives on the life of the Galician province and the monarchy.⁴⁶⁴

Galician politicians did not put their hope in Potocki: “In 1870, during the desperate struggle of Polish politicians, the then president of the Vienna cabinet, Alfred Potocki, remained alienated.”⁴⁶⁵ He was known for his moderate patriotism and loyalty to Vienna; moreover, he promised to fulfil only part of the demands in exchange of the support of the government’s policy toward Czechs. Nevertheless, when a Pole became Prime Minister, the situation of the Polish deputies in the Imperial Council improved. The Galician Resolution was discussed in the parliament as a governmental draft, not as a deputy proposal as it was before. However, the priority task for the government was to achieve an agreement with the Czech opposition, not to satisfy the aspirations of the Polish parliamentary representation.

A. Potocki negotiated with Polish politicians in Vienna from 20 to 29 May and in the talks participated: Jerzy Czartoryski, Józef Dietl, Agenor Gołuchowski, Kazimierz Grocholski, Kornel Krzczunowicz, Adam Potocki, Leon Sapieha, Ludwik Skrzyński, Seweryn Smarzewski, Franciszek Smolka, Ferdynand Weigel, Henryk i Ludwik Wodziccy, Florian Ziemiałkowski, Mikołaj Zyplikiewicz, oraz Rusin, Julian Ławrowski.⁴⁶⁶ The talks concerned the Czech matter and the parliamentary resolution. At that time, the Prime Minister promised to fulfil some of their postulates⁴⁶⁷ in exchange for their support of the government’s policy.

463 S. Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*, p. 221.

464 S. Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*, p. 221.

465 W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej 1864–1914*, with the preface of L. Wasilewski, Warszawa 1933, p. 109.

466 The presence of J. Ławrowski S. Pijaj explains with a desire to give this representation not only Polish, but also Galician character, S. Pijaj, *Między polskim patriotyzmem*, pp. 330–331.

467 These were: appointing a Pole to the position of governor and increasing his competences, appointing a Minister for Galicia, increasing the competences of the national parliament and a partial separation of the national budget. However, Potocki

In accordance with the position of the entire Council of Ministers, he refused to implement all postulates of the resolution of 1868, i.e. the program of the separation of Galicia. Potocki agreed to appoint a state minister, but as S. Pijaj argued: “on his part, it was an element of a broader policy, not only a desire to please his compatriots.”⁴⁶⁸ Without a doubt, his attitude toward this matter undermined the trust of the Polish Club for him and his policy.

It seems that the policy of Potocki on the Polish matter did not bring Galicia measurable advantages, excluding the autonomy concessions. The school postulates, that Poles wanted the most, were not met: “Galicia owes to Potocki only the Polonization of the Jagiellonian University, which is a small part of the promises made by the Prime Minister in May and at the turn of September and October.”⁴⁶⁹

He did not take into account, for instance, the international situation before and during the Franco-Prussian war.⁴⁷⁰ Potocki did not support the concept of an alliance between Austria and France against Prussia and Russia. He was an advocate for the policy of neutrality in the Franco-Prussian war. In the summer of 1870, he opposed to the Austrian participation in this conflict. Such a position of the monarchy guaranteed that the centrifugal movements would not occur in the state, thereby inseparability of the monarchy would be preserved. He was also afraid that Poles would start an uprising. According to Potocki, there was a danger that if Prussia suffered defeat in the war, then Russia would take steps that would threaten the loss of Galicia.⁴⁷¹

Perhaps, his lack of knowledge about the monarchy’s foreign policy prevented him from undertaking efforts to create Austria-Poland. However, the author is far from overestimating the chances of its implementation, especially in the face of Russia’s resentment toward Poles, it could effectively block the actions of the monarchy in the international arena.

did not agree to the creation of the national government, accountable to the parliament, which Poles badly wanted.

468 S. Pijaj, *Między polskim patriotyzmem*, p. 333.

469 In August, there was another round of negotiations between the government and Poles, but in principle it was dominated by the situation within the monarchy in the aspect of the international situation, i.e. the approaching conflict between Prussia and France, Pijaj, *Między polskim patriotyzmem*, pp. 345–346, 364.

470 See: H. Wereszycki, J. Zdrada, “Polska działalność dyplomatyczna (1860–1900),” in: *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, vol. III, 1795–1918, ed. L. Bazyłow, Warszawa 1982.

471 H. Wereszycki, *Sojusz trzech cesarzy*, Warszawa 1965, p. 149; Zdrada, *Potocki Alfred Józef*, pp. 764–765.

After the resignation of Potocki, Polish politicians felt disappointed. Thus, they began to criticize him. M. Zybkiewicz stood out particularly at that time saying: "he did not do a thing for our country."⁴⁷² Two fundamental goals of Potocki were not fulfilled. He did not achieve an agreement with Czechs and he fulfilled only a part of what Poles hoped him to do in the Polish matter. Neither Czechs nor Poles gained the legal and political status in the monarchy they sought. The main reason for this was not the ineptitude of the Polish Prime Minister, but the position of the emperor, the provisions of the December Constitution and the position of Hungary in the matter of the autonomy of kingdoms and countries in the monarchy.⁴⁷³ Also, the international situation influenced it. Thus, it is worth reflecting on whether Potocki had the possibility to undertake solutions that would give Galicia and Czechs greater autonomy. Above all, Potocki was Prime Minister of Austria, not a spokesperson for the Polish interests; thus, firstly he protected the state interests, and only then he could meet national demands. He himself was a conservative and an Austrophile. If as Prime Minister he played the role of a rescuer of Poles, he would encounter strong opposition of German centralists and Czech autonomists. If he defended the interests of the Czech countries, he would meet German opposition and he would commit a political suicide in the eyes of numerous Poles. What is more, he could not lean on the centralist majority in the parliament, as the emperor appointed him so he would end the conflict between Czechs and Germans and persuade the Czech deputies to return to the Council. It seems that considering the complex internal situation, he chose one of the best solutions, namely a compromise solution. He hoped that he could reconcile Germans and Czechs, and satisfy Poles by partially meeting the postulates of the parliamentary resolution. However, neither Polish politicians, nor the Galician opinion were satisfied with Potocki. On the other hand, Czechs did not trust him. After all, he was Polish and in their minds this fact predetermined the autonomy aspirations of the Polish nation as a priority. Therefore, the author considers the opinion of K. Chłędowski to be prejudicial, as he wrote that:

472 As cited in: J. Zdrada, *Potocki Alfred Józef*, p. 764.

473 There were political discrepancies between A. Potocki and Prime Minister I. Andrassy concerning the introduction of autonomy in the Austrian provinces. The Prime Minister of Hungary repeatedly implicated that he would not accept the aspirations of Slavs in Cisleithania, as they were a direct threat to the Hungary's interests and its equal position to Austria in the monarchy.

He was an insignificant minister, an infirm marshal and even more infirm governor; he did nothing good for anyone . . . his incompetence was saved by one but great virtue: an impeccable honor, and as today there are few honorable people, the world seeing his honor forgot about his incompetence.⁴⁷⁴

The next and last Pole to be Prime Minister was count Kazimierz Badeni.⁴⁷⁵ He was perceived as a pragmatic politician, an effective negotiator who was able to: “execute firmly and ruthlessly.”⁴⁷⁶ During his seven years in office in Galicia, the governor made himself known as a man of “a firm hand.” His firmness and intransigency were particularly seen in the treatment of the participants of workers’ demonstrations.⁴⁷⁷ What is more: “This resilient Polish nobleman was a vivid contrast to very clerical and lifeless politicians of the monarchy . . . he was a man of action, he had a fresh and original personality.”⁴⁷⁸

K. Badeni came from the nobility from Podole, but he represented the views of the Cracow conservatives, for instance, the equality and cooperation with the Jewish population (he was fluent in Yiddish), the necessity of an agreement between Poles and Ukrainians, the support of a moderate Ukrainian movement and the fight against the supporters of Russia. S. Kieniewicz wrote: “He was from Podolia and he made his career among jesters,”⁴⁷⁹ while Wilhelm Feldman claimed that: “In Galicia, the Prime Minister was the personification of the authority of the Cracow nobility mixed with temper of a carefree boy from Podolia.”⁴⁸⁰

K. Badeni had also the trust of the emperor, who believed that he would be the best person to normalize the national relations in the monarchy. Apparently, the emperor said that: “in his life he will not need to appoint another government.”⁴⁸¹

474 As he wrote it was: “a political obituary” that he included for Potocki in his memoirs, K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 63.

475 S. Starzyński, *Badeni* “Kazimierz hr.,” in: *PSB*, vol. I, Wrocław 1935, pp. 205–207, 209–210; K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. I, Kraków 1957, p. 53; “Badeni, Kasimir Felix Graf,” in: *Österreich Lexikon*, (12.04.2003) <<http://www.aeiou.at/aeiou.encyklop/b/b030720.htm>>.

476 W. Łazuga, „Rządy polskie” w Austrii, p. 49.

477 He fought populists in a dual character: as a conservative and as a Vienna representative. He did it though with tremendous energy, ruthlessness and cleverness; however, he did not always gain the desired result, S. Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*, p. 340.

478 W. Łazuga, “Kazimierz hr. Badeni. Szkic do portretu austriackiego premiera,” in: *Polacy i Niemcy. Dziesięć wieków sąsiedztwa. Studia ofiarowane prof. J. Pajewskiemu w 80-tą rocznicę urodzin*, ed. A. Czubiński, Warszawa 1987, p. 181.

479 S. Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*, p. 338.

480 W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*, p. 202.

481 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, p. 94.

In Vienna, it was thought that Badeni was the best solution to resolve the conflict between Czechs and Germans: “Austria after the fall of Taaffe needed Poles more than ever. The emperor chose Badeni to be his rescuer and distinguished him at every turn.”⁴⁸² It was a similar case with Alfred Potocki, when the emperor appointed him Prime Minister in 1870. It should also be emphasized that the Polish nation played the role of a stabilizer in the monarchy, which was often torn by national conflicts. An example of such conflicts is the situation in Galicia after the year 1890, in the first years of the Polish-Ukrainian agreement, which was implemented by Badeni. In the monarchy there was a view that a man like Badeni was the antidote to the Czech-German conflict.

Among candidates for Prime Minister Badeni was mentioned already in 1893, after the resignation of E. Taaffe, but he did not receive a nomination. The emperor then established an interim cabinet of Erich Kielmansegg, during the functioning of which the influence and significance of K. Badeni: “were so great that it was said in Vienna that the emperor ordered the Prime Minister to “listen to Badeni in everything.”⁴⁸³ Around mid-August, the emperor summoned Badeni to Ischl and unofficially ordered him to create a new cabinet.⁴⁸⁴ The nomination of Badeni was welcomed by the Minister of Finances, Julian Dunajewski, who: “when he could, gave Badeni his support,” and was opposed by Filip Zaleski: “who hating Badeni in his soul, treated badly his ministerial ambitions.”⁴⁸⁵ In 1897, Badeni was from a long time mentioned as a certain candidate for the office of Prime Minister.⁴⁸⁶

482 S. Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*, p. 443.

483 W. Łazuga, *Kazimierz hr. Badeni. Szkic*, p. 181.

484 K. Badeni consulted in this matter with L. Biliński and it may be said with high probability that the composition of the government was the result of a mutual agreement, accepted by the emperor, K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 153.

485 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, p. 157.

486 In September, *Naprzód* wrote that K. Badeni would be Prime Minister in a couple of days and the government would be composed of officials who were: “completely independent of the powerless government and guided only by the will of the emperor. Thus, soon we will be able to see that this “man of a firm hand” can achieve something more important and more fundamental than the elections in a peasant curia in Galicia! However, we give count Badeni that much reason that if he has an electoral reform ready, he will not hide it and he will show it to the world. If the reform is fair, there is no need to hide it, *Naprzód*, no. 38 from 19.09.1895, p. 1. Although, as later events showed, this helplessness was not a feature of the Austrian parliament.

Thus, it was not a surprise, when on 2 October *Wiener Zeitung* informed about his appointment.⁴⁸⁷

With the nomination of Badeni, the period of peak influence of Poles in the monarchy, called “the Polish rule” or “the Polish preponderance,” as Germans called it, began.⁴⁸⁸ Badeni was not only the Prime Minister, but also the Minister of Interior. In his cabinet, ministers also were: Leon Biliński, the Minister of Treasury, and Edward Rittner, the Minister for Galicia from 17 January 1896.⁴⁸⁹ Agenor Gołucjowski junior was also in his government, as he was the joint Minister of Foreign Affairs from May 1895. What is more, from 1895, Dawid Abrahamowicz was the Vice-president of the House of Deputies of the Imperial Council and from 12 November 1897 its President. Badeni also appointed Poles, or rather Jews-neophytes with liberal views, on high positions because: “he did not want to appoint Poles because someone could say that he employs his own people.”⁴⁹⁰ His fears were justified because when E. Rittner was appointed to the cabinet, it was negatively viewed, even though at the same time a German, E. Gutenberg, a protégé of L. Biliński, was also nominated and became the head of the newly created Ministry of Railways.⁴⁹¹ It meant that the ratio of Polish and Austrian ministers stayed the same. The person of the Minister for Galicia did not change the government of Badeni in any way; thus, the

487 At first, on 29 September, K. Badeni received an order to form a new cabinet and on 30 September, he was appointed Prime Minister, *WZ*, no. 229 from 02.10.1895, p. 1. The information given by L. Biliński about appointing a new cabinet on 2 October is not true, L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 92.

488 J. Radzyner, *Orientacja austro-polska*, p. 190. Initially, in the government of K. Badeni there were seven and then eight ministers: three Poles, four Germans and one Czech, J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim 1848–1918*, Warszawa 1996, p. 178.

489 “The choice could not have been better, because Kazimierz could be certain that Rittner will be completely loyal to Badeni”, Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 159

490 K. Badeni: “he avoided even the slightest semblance of doing something specifically for Poles and did not increase their number in the ministries, despite the fact that Galicia rightly deserved it.” In the other part of the memoir K. Chłędowski wrote: “It was said in Vienna that Badeni surrounded himself with Jews, as Jews only have influence.” Ignacy Rosner became a member of the Presidium and the head of the Press Office and Henryk Halban became the head of one of its sections. The Prime Minister appointed only one Pole to a clerical position in the ministry, Grotowski, who was his cousin. The officials of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers were also: Chłędowski, Morawski, Mikiewicz and Marchwicki: “he almost governed in the Governorship in Lviv under Badeni, but here he did not have the slightest influence nor did he receive any special material benefits,” Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, pp. 160, 167, 179, 186.

491 He was a staff officer who dealt with railways and the author of various publications in this field, J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, p. 181.

objections were not justified. After the announcement of ministerial nominations, *Naprzód* commented it as follows: “It is a clerical ministry, dependent only on the will of the crown, the parliament was not even asked about its opinion and even the parliamentary holidays were not paused.”⁴⁹²

The inauguration of K. Badeni began with an informal banquet attended by all ministers. This meeting reminded more of a conspiracy meeting.⁴⁹³ The official inauguration took place on 3 October 1895.

On 22 October, after the opening of a new session of the Imperial Council, K. Badeni delivered a speech in the House.⁴⁹⁴ At that time, he did not present the program of the government nor did he specify its general tasks. In the Council, he delivered a quasi-program speech, in which he presented a schedule of the government’s work, rather than its program. In the House, the statement of the Prime Minister made a great impression, in which he said that the government would not be led by the parliament or factions and that he would rule with “an iron hand.”⁴⁹⁵

This speech belonged to statements characterized by clever rhetoric and avoidance of sensitive issues. The government committed itself to unite, not divide, the nations living within the monarchy. In the speech, it was announced that the government would not oppose any faction nor favor any of them. At the same time, Badeni claimed that it would be the government that would set the policy direction and that it would not submit or subjugate itself to the external tendencies. He explained this role with the sense of responsibility of the ministers for the fate of the monarchy. The speech of Badeni, especially its conciliatory tone and agreeability caused its positive reception by the entire House.⁴⁹⁶ The speech also contained a fragment about the leading role of the German culture, which was not accepted by Czech deputies, who ostentatiously left the meeting room.⁴⁹⁷ The speech of Badeni did not cause the applause from socialists who were critical of the Prime Minister’s program:

492 *Naprzód*, no. 40 from 04.10.1895, p. 1.

493 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 92.

494 WZ, no. 42 from 23.10.1895, p. 2–4.

495 According to K. Chłędowski, it was a non-political move, especially since the government intended to also “run” the parliament. Such a statement obviously caused a protest, of Germans above all, Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , pp. 161,171.

496 W. Łazuga, „Rządy polskie” w Austrii, p. 63.

497 W. Łazuga. “Niemiecka opinia publiczna wobec „rządów polskich” Kazimierza hr. Badeniego w Austrii (1895–1897)”, in: *Studia z najnowszej historii Niemiec i stosunków polsko-niemieckich*, ed. S. Sierpowski, Poznań 1986, p. 99.

from which, unfortunately, nothing new is learned. That count Badeni was and is an official who would rule the most comfortably . . . without the parliament, that we know; that he is an enemy of socialism, we also knew it for a long time; that he is a zealous Austrian, it was no secret either. However, in the flood of words of count Badeni, at once we point out that he already promised in this session an electoral reform! It is the only point unknown to the world, but the Prime Minister said nothing specific about this reform.⁴⁹⁸

The government of Badeni had several important problems to solve and as Chłędowski stated: “Badeni could confess truthfully that he does not know any of these issues; obviously he read about each of them . . ., he had some shallow understanding of them, but he did not have his own opinion, based on a reliable belief.”⁴⁹⁹ However, the beginning of Badeni’s term in office was promising. The budget was adopted, the negotiations with Hungary went smoothly, which was a promise of a successful conclusion. Nevertheless, the government faced two serious issues, firstly – carrying out the electoral reform, and secondly – normalizing the national relations in the Czech countries. But before he undertook their implementation, a trivial matter appeared, the so-called *Wiener Frage* (the Vienna issue). It was not a priority for the monarchy (it concerned only the capital) nor the government; however, as it later turned out, the implementation of Badeni’s program depended on the way it was solved. At the heart of the *Wiener Frage* was the Jewish issue.⁵⁰⁰ At the end of the nineteenth century, it was a rather

498 *Naprzód*, no. 43 from 24.10.1895, p. 1. In the next issue the journal reported about: “saying nothing but very ceremonial speeches of count Badeni”, *Naprzód*, no. 44 from 31.10.1895, p. 1.

499 K. Chłędowski added: “Badeni was never present in the parliament, he never met with Czech or German deputies . . . he saw the Vienna relations insofar as one can see them from the windows of the Imperial Hotel, learn in the Jockey Club or in the Vienna underworld. Thus, he was appointed to an important position while he was completely ignorant of these relations”, Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . ., p. 160.

500 During the reign of Joseph II, about five hundred Jews lived in Vienna, mostly merchants and artisans. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Jews began to be noticed, mainly because of their civilizational and cultural differences. During the rule of Bach, Jews were forbidden to settle in towns and for non-compliance with this prohibition serious sanctions were imposed. This law was repealed in 1860. At that time, it turned out that the number of people of Jewish origin increased to six thousand, that is 2,2 % of the total Vienna population. Along with the advancing industrialization and development of trade and banking, the Jews began to be identified with trade, industry, stock exchange, shops, usury, financial frauds, etc. In 1868, emperor Franz Joseph sanctioned the emancipation acts that resulted in, among others, an increase in the number of Jewish students at the University of Vienna. At the end of the 1880s,

sensitive issue, which the government had to deal with and which caused some difficulties.

This problem appeared with a striking clarity during the elections of the mayor of Vienna.⁵⁰¹ K. Badeni was very opposed to one of the candidates, Karl Lüger.⁵⁰² The emperor had a similar attitude and claimed: “as long as I reign, K. Lüger will never be appointed the mayor of my capital.”⁵⁰³ The position of the emperor complied with the political plans of the government, which at that time sought a majority composed of conservatives and liberals. Badeni prepared the right conditions for concluding a future agreement between Czechs and Germans. In Vienna, it was expected that Badeni would support the Jews and oppose K. Lüger, which the Prime Minister did not hide at all, announcing that he would be critical toward all anti-Semite speeches and actions.⁵⁰⁴

Preventing the election of K. Lüger as mayor would be a step toward creating the right atmosphere for talks between Czechs and Germans. Thus, the government did not accept this choice. This decision was met with a disapproval of the Imperial Council and inhabitants of Vienna. The Viennese demonstrated their discontent on the streets. The government met all formal conditions, so in this regard its decision could not be challenged. Despite this, the anti-government

every second doctor, every fourth lawyer and every fifth (sixth) graduate of the Faculty of Philosophy was Jewish, Łazuga, „*Rządy polskie*” w *Austrii*, pp. 88–89.

501 One of the candidates was Karl Lüger, the leader of United Christians, grouping conservatives, anti-Semites and clericalists. His speeches were addressed mainly to the petty bourgeoisie, were preached in an anti-Jewish spirit and against major capital. He convinced his voters that it was the Jewish people that were to blame for the poor economic and social situation of lower classes, as they possessed all the capital, H. Wereszycki, *Historia Austrii*, Wrocław 1986, p. 246. K. Chłędowski wrote: “In fact, Lueger could not be underestimated; he was a people’s tribune in the whole sense of the word, a man who convinced masses . . . After all, with Lueger getting the leadership, it was supposed to be heaven on Earth: meat was to become cheaper, apartments were to be almost given for free, because as a result of Jews leaving, there would be numerous vacant apartments for the poor . . . Lueger had the support of the entire Catholic clergy and the Viennese aristocracy who, seeing what social and communist promises mean, that they cannot be taken seriously, saw in him a fall of the advantage of the liberal and Jewish faction”, Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 169.

502 K. Lüger, lawyer, born on 24 October 1844 in Vienna, died on 10 March 1910 also in Vienna, “Wiener Bürgermeister” – *Biographische Notizen*, (26.08.2003) <<http://www.magwien.gv.at/ma08/bgmg.htm>>.

503 W. Łazuga, „*Rządy polskie*” w *Austrii*, p. 90.

504 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 160.

actions of the people did not stop. The subsequent elections confirmed the sympathies of the Viennese. Lüger received 96 votes and his opponent Grübl received 42. In this situation, it was necessary to conclude an agreement with Lüger, especially since the government was in the middle of preparing the electoral reform and the conclusion of the Czech issue. The meeting between the Prime Minister and Lüger was one of the most spectacular episodes of *Wiener Frage*.⁵⁰⁵ It took place in the Ministry of Interior and was kept a secret. As a result of these talks, which course is unknown, they reached a compromise. The Prime Minister proposed Josef Strobach⁵⁰⁶ for the office of mayor and Lüger for his deputy.

3. Ministers

When the minister for Galicia received a telegram from the prime minister István Tisza informing about the readiness to accept the conditions of the Polish Club (*Polenklub*), it was no longer viable to reach a compromise with the government.⁵⁰⁷ The enactment of the vodka tax was facilitated by Kazimierz Grocholski, the president of the Club, who, as an elderly person, “for the last time forced the Polish Club to vote for the vodka tax.”⁵⁰⁸

The circumstances of Dunajewski reaching a compromise with the Polish Club are interesting: “Grocholski acted gingerly and in stages until he eventually made a deal with Dunajewski, who, as I have seen with my own eyes, had to depart to the lower vestibule, where ill Grocholski sat in a carriage. In such a situation, two of our greatest contemporary statesmen reached an agreement. The tax passed.”⁵⁰⁹ Thus, the draft bill about distillery tax was amended with an article according to which Galicia was assigned compensation of one million Gulden annually for twenty years: “this sum facilitated the parliament to purchase from distillery owners the right to sell alcoholic beverages. Thus, the Polish nobility finally threw away the eternal burden of profiting from inducing the peasants to drink alcohol.”⁵¹⁰

505 K. Badeni reportedly found out in a dental chair that the leader of the Christian and social faction wanted to meet with him.

506 J. Strobach was a bookseller by trade, born on 24 December 1852 in Werbstadt in Bohemia, died on 11 May 1905 in Vienna, “Wiener Bürgermeister” – *Biographische Notizen*, (26.08.2003) <<http://www.magwien.gv.at.ma08/bgms.htm>>.

507 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 1. . . , p. 49.

508 S. Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*. . . , pp. 423–424.

509 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 1. . . , pp. 48–49.

510 S. Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*. . . , pp. 423–424.

Eventually, the disputed tax passed on June 20, 1888⁵¹¹ “opposed by the distillery owners who could not judge its implications; it proved to be a huge benefaction to the distillery industry and the basis for its excellent development.”⁵¹²

Implementing the tax had not only the economic and social consequences but also the political ones. It was probably Dunajewski who contributed to Ziemiałkowski’s resignation: “The winner Dunajewski, somewhat from animosities, but mostly for the sake of further political goals, demanded from Viscount Taaffe the dismissal of Ziemiałkowski for breaking solidarity with the cabinet in the distillery case.”⁵¹³ It appears to be entirely understandable from political and tactical standpoints, since in the cabinet solidarity should reign supreme, particularly between ministers-compatriots. The dismissal of Ziemiałkowski and appointing governor Filip Zaleski instead, who was replaced in Galicia by the candidate of the Minister of Finance, Kasimir Badeni, was “the culmination of successes of the Minister of Finance and his politics”⁵¹⁴

On January 22, 1891, Dunajewski requested to be dismissed, and having received acceptance, resigned from the political life.⁵¹⁵ On February 4, in “*Wiener*

511 . At the same time, the government obliged itself to pay compensations for these private owners and cities who lost the right to sell alcoholic beverages, which amounted to one million, that is one hundred thousand Guldens annually until 1911, which was specified in article 2b of the vodka tax bill: “Podatek od wódki. Ustawa z d. 20 czerwca 1888r., in: *Mowy Juliana Dunajewskiego*. . . , vol. II. . . , p. 431. The government’s submission passed in the house with no substantial difficulties, especially since it was estimated that thanks to the vodka tax, the state revenue would increase to 9.2 million Guldens: J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 137. The relevant bill was also passed by the Diet of Galicia and Lodomeria on August 13, 1888. S. Grodziski, *Sejm krajowy galicyjski*. . . , p. 183.

512 They received significant compensation for the implementation of this tax; in fact, it was a great business for them. The spirits became an export commodity; it was transported out of Galicia on a considerable scale. Due to maintaining the cartel, its price remained high. It caused the emergence of new distilleries and breweries in the state, sometimes competitive with the Austrian ones: M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , p. 76.

513 F. Ziemiałkowski, *Julian Dunajewski i moja dymisja, Pamiętniki Floriana Ziemiałkowskiego*, BJ, manuscript 6397, vol. 4; L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 49.

514 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , pp. 50–51.

515 As an acknowledgment of his merits, the emperor nominated Dunajewski as a life-long member of the House of Lords and rewarded him with the Order of Saint Stephen. J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 146, L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 46. After the resignation, he returned to Cracow and continued

Zeitung” appeared a piece of information that the Minister of Finance Dunajewski willingly resigned on January 22 and left the government on February 2. At the same time, he was nominated for lifelong membership in the House of Lords.⁵¹⁶ After the resignation he was a deputy in the Diet of Galicia and Lodomeria and actively participated in its works, even if, as Josef von Schenk claims, as he grew older his health worsened: “his eyes were seriously ill” and, in a different part of the biography, “Dunajewski was a very old man, almost blind.”⁵¹⁷

Reasons for Dunajewski’s resignation were political in their nature.⁵¹⁸ Between January 22 and February 2, the Minister of Finance was not called for the audience by the Emperor. Only at the beginning of February, he was asked about his stipulations for staying in the government. Apparently, they appeared to be impossible to accept by Taaffe, and that is why, on the very same night, Dunajewski received a document with his dismissal.⁵¹⁹ Zoll underlines that “one cannot pass over in silence his dignified resignation from the ministerial position. He stepped back because he was a man of unflinching principles and did not wish to remain among the ministers for a single moment if they would pass an act contrary to his convictions.”⁵²⁰ Chłędowski notices a different aspect of this dismissal as well, that is the conduct of Dunajewski, his despotism, or a

his suspended academic career as a professor of Academy of Learning. Despite nomination for a life-long membership in the House of Lords, he did not participate in its sessions. However, he actively participated in the works of the Diet, and he was the head of the budget committee.

516 WZ, no. 27, February 4, 1891, p. 1. On his own accord, Dunajewski received a handwritten annotation that he leaves the ministry on his own request. J. Peniżek, p. 23.

517 It was August 1895. J. Schenk, op.cit, pp. 154, 164.

518 During the absence of Dunajewski at the ministerial session, Taaffe commenced talks with the German left aimed at constructing a new majority. The Minister of Finance was outraged by this fact. His opinion as the politician who guided the monarchy’s politics in previous years was not considered. Dunajewski sternly opposed negotiations with the Germans and seeking a common *modus vivendi* in politics with them. He also thought that these talks would not have a successful ending, and he was right about it. J. Peniżek, p. 25.

519 J. Peniżek recalls contemporary events: “After the ministerial session on January 22, at 6 pm, he came angry at his office and said to . . . Witold Korytowski . . . ‘Sir, give an order to bring me two fifty-cent stamps.’ After an indignant question regarding what for he needs the stamps and what happened, he replied after lengthy defending: ‘If you want to necessarily know: I resign.’ He was ultimately exasperated . . . He did not mention a word about his resignation to anyone. Peniżek, p. 24–25.

520 F. Zoll, p. XXI.

clear sense of superiority in relation to the minister-president and ministers, inconstancy and spite. In Vienna, his resignation was received with relief, since “they did not want to forgive him the one sentence he once directed to the Germans: *Wir können auch ohne Deutschen regieren*” [We can govern without Germans as well].⁵²¹

When it comes to Dunajewski’s merits for the Austrian country, one has to underline primarily the achievement of the intended goal, that is eliminating the budget deficit and stabilizing the Austrian currency by introducing a general currency reform: “his work, full of merit and indeed epochal: the definite end of the deficit and discontinuing the system of loans as a means to patch it”⁵²² And in the case of country finances, “he passed them to his successor in a blossoming state with very significant financial reserve.”⁵²³ Along with the revenue growth, he increased the empire spending for goals such as agriculture, industry, railway construction, regulating rivers, and in this way, he fostered the economic-social development of the country. Due to effective financial politics, the treasury purchased railways from the private owners. The efficacy of Dunajewski’s politics blossomed in the growth of spending for military defense of Austria and other areas of the state value. His activity increased the monarchy’s prestige in the international politics and ensured the independence from political factions in the Imperial Council. One has to objectively admit that many of his solutions favored petit-bourgeoisie. Through adequate social and financial policies, they were meant to minimize the growing nationalist and socialist movements.

521 “Having returned to Vienna, I encountered very strained relations between Dunajewski and Taffe and some other ministers. . . Taaffe treated him very warily, through gloves, but Dunajewski began to behave rudely toward Taaffe, imposed his own will, meddled in political issues, which primarily concerned the minister-president, and when the prime minister did not want to follow the Minister of Finance, Dunajewski was resigning, he felt so confident on his seat. It worked a few times, three or so: Taaffe valued the services of Dunajewski, so he did not want his resignation and thus was mitigating and asked the emperor not to accept the resignation; but eventually, in early 1891, both the emperor and Taaffe had enough of these despotic fantasies of the Minister of Finance and his resignation which he requested once more had been accepted on February 4, 1891. Dunajewski did not believe that the emperor would accept the resignation, almost until the last moment he jokingly talked to Korytowski: ‘Tell Halban that if he comes with some news to me, I will have him thrown down the stairs.’ K. Chłędoski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , pp. 115–116.

522 J. Penížek, op. cit., p. 14.

523 F. Zoll, op. cit, p. XIX.

Despite some critique, one has to objectively admit that Dunajewski had some significant achievements for the economic and social development of Galicia. Soon after taking the ministerial position, he prevented the imposition on Galicia of the unfavorable land tax and lowered it to an adequate level. He also cured state finances by means of definite dealing with reparation debt, finally enabled Galicia to purchase the right to sell alcohol. He supported the development of education and to a large extent, influenced the increase of the level of education in Galicia. In every budget of Dunajewski, there were finances for universities.⁵²⁴

Apart from his desirable character traits and predispositions,⁵²⁵ Julian Dunajewski was considered as one of the best Ministers of Finance in Austrian history, as Stanisław Grodziski⁵²⁶ claims. Josef von Schenk, the author of the German biography of Dunajewski, ends it with the following words: “he was Austria’s benefaction.” Nonetheless, German scholars value Dunajewski’s achievements as the Minister of Finance very highly.⁵²⁷

Dunajewski was not only one of the best Ministers of Finance in Austria, but also the longest-serving one. He occupied the position for eleven years, “which was a record in this ministry.”⁵²⁸ The favoring circumstance was the functioning of the coalition of the “Iron Ring.”

The disapproval of Dunajewski’s achievements did not lack. Aleksander Świętochowski was critical toward the minister and wrote about the new Minister of Finance that he is “the economic pump for Galicia”⁵²⁹ Stanisław Szczepanowski judges that:

524 F. Zoll, pp. XIX–XX.

525 “Dunajewski was an uncommon mind, he quickly oriented in situations, he was exquisite polemist with his opponents and most importantly had energy, which was a rarity among the Austrian statesmen at that time.” K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 23.

526 S. Grodziski, *W Królestwie Galicji*. . . , p. 252.

527 J. Schenk.

528 R. Taborski, *Polacy w Wiedniu*. . . , p. 84.

529 “He expressed his opinion after reading the ministerial draft of the reparation debt bill, which Dunajewski presented before the Diet of Galicia and Lodomeria. Świętochowski writes: “where does this particular love and trust to our compatriot come from? . . . I dare to conclude with the following hypothesis. The one who chooses ministers in Vienna thought: I see no financial prodigies, so it is all the same. And since neither a Magyar nor a Czech would let to bleed their populations dry, then what remains is the Galician Lechite, more so that his compatriots are used to pay for each seat in the cabinet generously. That is how Mr. Dunajewski became the Minister of Finance.” *Prawda*, no. 43, October 28, 1882, <http://monika.univ.gda.pl/~literat/alekss/0022.htm> December 3, 2003.

He left behind him an impression full of severe dubieties, also in the realm of experts schooled in finances. Neither the Austrian budget was at that tame as scarce, nor the means used by the minister lead to curing the relations in the monarchy; since they did not base on healthy economic policies strengthening the tax efficacy of populace by increasing wealth, but on ruthless fiscal policies. When it comes to Dunajewski's administration's influence on the Galician relations, oftentimes this influence was detrimental and quite severely hindered the developing petrol industry, instead of elevating the creative force of the country; also Galician cereal and trees suffered, not protected by the government in tariff arrangements with the Germans.⁵³⁰

Without a doubt, thanks to Dunajewski, but also due to the functioning of the "Iron Ring" coalition, the Poles enjoyed significant influence in monarchy, even if "this achieving of 'meaning in government' were paid by other sacrifices from our side, meaning: taxing the oil."⁵³¹

Dunajewski was considered to be one of the greatest Ministers of Finance in the history of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, who was "a universal thinker, whom the Polish delegates possessed neither earlier, nor later, and will not possess soon."⁵³² Dunajewski, "one of the finest statesmen and most noble sons of the Polish nation," died on December 29, 1907.⁵³³ When recalling Dunajewski, Leon Piniński writes: "he was neither a fundamental protectionist nor a free market supporter, nor a fundamental supporter or enemy of certain taxation systems, whether direct or indirect, he was a thoughtful eclectic in this field."⁵³⁴ Taking

530 S. Szczepanowski, *Ministerstwo Taaffe-Dunajewski, Ekonomista polski 1890*, quoted after: W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli. . .*, p. 201. From the sixties onwards, between the autonomous authorities and the central government unfolded a legal conflict regarding qualifying crude oil as a restricted resource. The laws were not adjusted to a dynamically developing oil mining industry in Galicia. Despite that, in the mid-eighties, the Galician oil mining was world-class, and the oil extraction was high. This hindered the interests of the Hungarian refineries opposing the reform of the mining regulations and the introduction of protective tariffs. P. Franaszek. "Warunki rozwoju galicyjskiego przemysłu naftowego do roku 1914," in: *Galicja i jej dziedzictwo, vol. II, Społeczeństwo i gospodarka*, ed. A. Bonusiak, J. Buszko, Rzeszów 1994, pp. 266–268.

531 The project of Taaffe's government considering the issue of reparation debt was unfavorable for Galicia. That is what Feliks Lewicki claims, most probably the author of a brochure quoted below: F. Lewicki, *Do wyborców. Nasza reprezentacja wobec rządu i kraju*, Cracow 1885, p. 6. One can hardly agree because, at this time, half of Galicia's reparation debt was abolished.

532 J. Peniżek, pp. 6 ff.

533 F. Zoll, p. V.

534 L. Piniński. "Wspomnienie o Julianie Dunajewskim," *Przegląd Współczesny*, 1925, no. 44, p. 320.

into account his achievements, the following commentary sounds bitter: “when he achieved what nobody achieved before, they dismissed him”⁵³⁵

His successes as the Minister of Finance influenced the assessment of Poles as well, who began to be considered agile and effective financiers. Thus, he paved the way for many compatriots. Among his successors, one can enlist a few Polish ministers of finance, which are Leon Biliński, Seweryn Kniaźołucki, Witold Korytowski, Waclaw Zaleski.⁵³⁶ The position of the Minister of Finance after the death of Waclaw Zaleski was offered by the minister-president Karl von Stürgkh also to Michał Bobrzyński, who refused it.⁵³⁷ After all, during his service Dunajewski employed in the ministry gifted and promising economists. He could choose his collaborators. One of them was Arnold Rapaport, “first-class financier-practitioner”⁵³⁸ or later minister of finance, Leon Biliński, who developed the projects of many legislations and presented them in commissions and the house and Witold Korytowski. But he also supported for instance Kasimir Badeni for taking the position of the prime minister, even before he became the governor of Galicia. Nonetheless, none of his successors repeated his successes. Stanisław Tarnowski rightly notices: “is it not strange, and in any case glorious for us, that Austria in its treasury problems appoints these crucial and most difficult issues to the Poles?”⁵³⁹

Leon Biliński was a two-time Minister of Finance of Austria and the Minister of Finance for Austro-Hungary, but neither when it comes to achievements nor the duration of service, surpassed Julian Dunajewski with his achievements. Nonetheless, his political career was far longer and more versatile.⁵⁴⁰ For the first time, he was appointed the Minister of Finance in the government of Kasimir

535 ? J. Penížek, p. 17.

536 P. Franaszek. “Polen als Finanzminister in der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie und ihre Rolle im Wirtschaftsleben des Staates,” *Austro-Polonica* 4, ZN UJ. Pr. Hist., 1989, no. 90, pp. 91–92, 94.

537 M. Bobrzyński. *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , pp. 381–384.

538 J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 137.

539 S. Tarnowski, *Waclaw Zaleski. Wspomnienie pośmiertne*, Cracow 1914, p. 8.

540 The academic promotion enabled him to commence a political career because the deans of universities took part in the Diet as virilists. Soon Biliński refrained from the scholarly activity and engaged in politics. From 1883 he sat in the Viennese parliament. Initially, he did not prove to be much active in the house, partially due to the president of the Club Grocholski preventing deputies from freely expressing their opinions. But gradually, he got involved in parliamentary works, belonged to various commissions, gained experience as a speaker, took part in the development of various draft bills.

Badeni in 1895 and served until its fall in 1897. Biliński took the position of the Minister of Finance at the moment when Poles achieved the peak of their influence in the monarchy. He quickly established a very advantageous position in Badeni's cabinet, and his merits for the monarchy were valued. In the years 1909–1911, he served as the Minister of Finance in Austria again in the bureaucrat cabinet of Richard von Bienerth, and in the years 1912–1915 as the Minister of Finance in Austro-Hungary. During Badeni's term, he prepared and implemented the reform of the Austrian direct taxes in 1896, developed the project of the settlement with Hungary, and a new statute for Austro-Hungarian Bank.

After returning from the international railway congress in London,⁵⁴¹ he received an invitation from Badeni for a conference in Busko. The future prime minister offered Biliński, whom he trusted, taking the Ministry of Finance.⁵⁴² After a brief hesitancy⁵⁴³ Biliński accepted the offer and, together with Badeni, completed the cabinet. The new Minister of Finance belonged to the most energetic ministers in the government, primarily due to his position. And thanks to his friendship with Badeni, he was able to represent the government outside wholly independently.⁵⁴⁴

He received his nomination on September 30, 1895.⁵⁴⁵ Biliński in Vienna was perceived as a sound bureaucrat, an expert, it was spoken that he would become “a decent minister, but he lacks talent and initiative to hold such an important position, especially in such hard times.”⁵⁴⁶

In February 1896, when Badeni's government successfully resolved the issue of electoral reform, the time came for establishing the budget. Biliński took care of preparing the project. He also delivered the budget exposé in the house. In the first budget in 1896, he mentioned two fundamental issues; first, the financial one, connected to the renewal of the Austro-Hungarian settlement, and, second, the rise of pension for widows and orphans of government officials and the payments for active officials.⁵⁴⁷

541 See: L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , pp. 81–85.

542 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 158.

543 Biliński did not intend to leave the railways presidency, but Badeni threatened that if he refuses to take the position of the Minister of Finance, then he would not take on the mission of creating the government. In the face of such an ultimatum, Biliński accepted the proposition of the future prime minister. L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumentu*, vol. I. . . , p. 87.

544 W. Łazuga, *Rządy polskie w Austrii*. . . , p. 76.

545 WZ, no. 229, October 2, 1895, p. 1.

546 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 161.

547 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*. . . , vol. I, pp. 96–97.

Biliński gained the society's sympathy, primarily due to regulating the so-called *Beamntenfrage* (the clerical issue), which comprised of two problems. First, it was the rise of pension for widows and orphans surviving officials, second, regulation of income of actively working officials. The issue of the death grant was inspired by Bańkowski, who described it as "misery of widows and orphans surviving officials."⁵⁴⁸ Biliński committed to regulating this problem, and as an effect, the pension bill was created. Its passage met with some resistance in the ministry, mainly on the side of a noticer in the department of finance. Soon, a government project was presented in the house, to which "the House's commission created countless difficulties, and finally the full House, having only cut the pensions of ministerial widows, passed the project." The pension bill entered into force on April 16, 1896, and became the part of officials' *Magna Carta*.⁵⁴⁹

According to the bill, the annual child-raising allowance grew five times, and the three-month-long posthumous allowance for the widows was introduced. Much more controversy was caused by the issue of the pay raise for the officials. The rise for this occupational class was necessary; it stemmed from their difficult material position and increasingly radical spirits among this group, which in the clerical state was not without meaning. Despite many difficulties in the house, the pay rise for the officials in the number of one hundred Gulden per year passed. However, the execution of this bill was postponed until the ministry would find the necessary funds to pay the promised rise. This fact disheartened the society in relation to Badeni's government, but "this mistake burdens Biliński, who wanted to become popular, wanted to satiate the officials, and, having no money at the time, made them a promise."⁵⁵⁰

However, one of the first cases he committed to regulating was taxes, including land tax and income tax. The land tax was adjusted every fifteen years, and this interval occurred in 1896. The factions proposed a discount of two million Gulden, which comprised a considerable number in these times. Biliński could agree to 750 thousand at most, and in this version, the bill passed through the commission. The situation in the house presented much worse. Even the prime minister Badeni resented the minister for not making more concessions since he had to face protests from the Czech deputies and the Polish Club. They demanded the sum of two million Gulden. The Polish Club wanted to reach an agreement

548 As he writes, the idea was suggested to him "in a letter from my Lviv friend Bańkowski".

L Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*. . . , vol. I, p. 97.

549 L Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*. . . , vol. I, pp. 96–97.

550 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 189.

with the minister and invited him through Badeni to the sessions of the Club's parliamentary commission in order for him to: "willingly assign a discount of two million. What one could do with a principal who advised concessions for the sake of political goals?! I went to the Polish Club, delivered a statement welcomed with joy, next, in the house the deputy Eugeniusz Abrahamowicz . . . put down an amendment for two million and justified it by my agreement." In the next day, Biliński spoke in the house "circumspectly, but sharply, against the Polish amendment, which, however, after severe attacks . . . was passed with a huge majority"⁵⁵¹ The concession did not contribute to building a strong position of Badeni's government; on the contrary, it was a sign of its weakness.

Regulations regarding income tax were initiated by Ignacy Plener, the former Minister of Finance, in 1862. Despite the Czech opposition, he managed to introduce an array of bills. The issue of dividing tax revenue between the country and states remained unregulated. It was not an easy task, neither in the House of Deputies nor in the House of Lords, mainly in the face of resistance from grand nobility. The bill passed in both houses with the extensive support of Plener. The emperor's agreement was given in October 1896, and it entered into force on January 1, 1898, one month after Biliński's resignation. The executive ordinance was introduced already when he was the minister. When it received the monarch's agreement, Biliński wrote that Austria finally "joined the European civilization regarding fiscal matters."⁵⁵²

The budget for 1897 comprised of two parts, permanent positions, and investment budget. For covering the spending connected to investments, Biliński proposed to use the emission of securities with a 3.5 % interest rate. He ensured the favoring bank rate, which he negotiated on the one side with Rothschild's group and, on the other, with the Unionbank and the Berlin bank of Mendelson. Biliński succeeded in selling 130 million Guldens of pension with a 3.5 % tax rate priced at 93.5 for one hundred. "This business, so financially great that the Austrian treasury never before or after conducted such, unfortunately, remained an exemption."

In the house, the proposition of Biliński did not meet with acceptance.⁵⁵³ Even the Polish Club, requesting more investment, "sent the speaker Piniński against

551 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , pp. 103–105.

552 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , pp. 105–106.

553 During the talks of the project, some difficulties emerged regarding the government's discretionary fund, and thus in the commission occurred the vote of confidence for the government. However, Badeni's cabinet survived.

me.” The debates over the minister’s project lasted for a long time, and finally, he managed to implement a solution shaped just as he presented it before, both in the budget commission and in the house.⁵⁵⁴

In the second half of 1897, the political situation in Austria, in the Imperial Council, and on the streets of Vienna, suggested an inevitable resignation of Badeni’s cabinet. On Sunday, the prime minister ordered to telephone Edward Rittner, who at the time discussed with Biliński the government’s chances, with an order to appear at 3 pm in the Interior Ministry, where the minister-president resided. Badeni informed ministers that the emperor accepted the government’s resignation and given the mission of creating a new cabinet to Paul Gautsch.⁵⁵⁵

As Waldemar Łazuga claims, the achievements of Biliński are comparable to the achievements of the most significant German scholars. Without a doubt, he was one of the greatest financiers in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.⁵⁵⁶ Chłędowski judges him positively as well: “Biliński was one of the most hard-working persons I ever knew . . . He was not considered to be smart; indeed, among his colleagues, it was quite common to think that his head is weak, and he works wonders only due to his diligence. . . . Always hardworking, in the Imperial Council, he tried to be elected to the most important parliamentary commissions and to receive the most difficult things to present. A few times, he presented the budget, many bills of great economic value and even the Hungarian settlement of 1888, he gained the positions of one of the most useful members. . . . Slightly red-headed, always in a hurry, always bowing, Biliński walked toward his goal.”⁵⁵⁷

After the resignation of Badeni’s government, “Biliński survived this catastrophe; he had a remarkable speech when saying farewell to the officials; the fox squirmed.”⁵⁵⁸ For himself the necessity of leaving the cabinet was a bitter

554 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 176.

555 On the eve of this meeting, the emperor called Gałuchowski Jr. and Badeni. The prime minister left the conversation satisfied and concluded that the emperor wants to maintain him. However, we do not know whether Gołuchowski expressed such an opinion or if he advised the emperor to dismiss the cabinet. The description of Biliński overlaps with Chłędowski, who presented the same version of the events. Biliński received the order to resign from a very young clerk and, not as per usual, from the director of the cabinet office. Legal-wise it was an insult to Badeni, K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 118–120.

556 W. Łazuga, “*Rządy polskie*” w Austrii. . . , p. 52.

557 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , pp. 175–176.

558 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 218.

experience: “dismissal from the office in which at every step I strived to include next to the Austrian issues primarily the Polish ones, just as the wishes of Polish spheres and interested parties, in the circumstances so tragic, seeming like a constant and unchanging political demise, touched me significantly. The pitiful farewell with the official body in the blue room of the ministry contributed to this.”⁵⁵⁹

Biliński became the Minister of Finance for the second time on January 10, 1909,⁵⁶⁰ in the cabinet of baron Reinhard von Bienerth, the former education minister. Unfortunately, Bienerth did not succeed in constituting a parliamentary cabinet due to the lack of agreement with Czechs and Germans. In such a situation, Biliński refused to accept the position of the Minister of Finance. There was only one Pole in the government, the former minister for Galicia, Dawid Abrahamowicz. Only in February 1909, the prime minister gained the capability of creating a parliamentary government and then Biliński and Władysław Dułęba, the state minister, joined the cabinet.⁵⁶¹

The prime minister offered to Biliński the Railway Ministry, but he did not accept this position because, despite his perennial experience in Directorate-General of the Austrian State Railways and pleasant memories, the role of the railway minister was less prestigious than the role of the Minister of Finance which he fulfilled during Badeni’s tenure. The Railway Ministry was also less politicized, and thus Biliński’s career as a minister could last longer. But neither this argument convinced Biliński. Only at the end of January, he discovered that Bienerth agreed to offer him the position of the Minister of Finance: “Thus, I accepted the distinction of the minister for the second time, without much convenience for myself. For this reason, I did not contact the Polish Club before accepting [the position of the Minister of Finance], but only just after.” Nonetheless, the members were glad about his nomination.⁵⁶²

559 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 122. After the resignation of Badeni’s government, he became the governor of the Austro-Hungarian Bank. Then he replaced gold used in international settlements with the so-called merchant money. This system of settlements was implemented by other European countries, as well. S.Grodziski, *W Królestwie Galicji*. . . , p. 252.

560 WZ, no. 33, January 11, 1909, p. 1.

561 M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , pp. 144–145.

562 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 167–168. The Vienna officials welcomed the appointment with satisfaction and welcomed him in an unexpectedly pleasant way in the Ministry: “the entire, impressive staircase up to the first floor was filled with hundreds of clerks in full dress. They were clerks from ministry and from other financial authorities, who wanted with this unprecedented applause show

The entire cabinet was sworn in on February 3, 1909, and just after this, Biliński commenced his tenure. When welcoming the officials in the ministry, Biliński reminded that while leaving the office in 1897, he had left 300 million Guldens in the treasury in cash, and now he commenced his reign with an empty treasury. Some of his successors after 1897 felt hurt by this speech, particularly Witold Korytowski, who “for the entire duration of my tenure undermined me.”⁵⁶³

The period of the second tenure of Leon Biliński was significantly more difficult than the one in the years 1895–1897 and had plenty of humps and crises. The first one, from March 1909, was connected to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. Since the Austrian treasury was basically empty, and the monarchy was endangered by the threat of war with Serbia, Biliński was forced to take a loan for covering the possible war spending. Moreover, the Imperial Council did not deliberate, and the emission of securities would be unprofitable because the pension rate was as low as eighty percent. In such a situation, Biliński decided to take a short-term loan and thus reached a beneficial agreement with the Rothschild group. By this mean, he achieved 200 million with a four percent interest rate at the rate of ninety-six percent to be paid after two years. In the cabinet, some tried to influence Biliński to postpone the deal until the parliament session would be called, but he did not agree and confirmed the deal with the Rothschild group as soon as possible. At that time, he was accused that he acts without including the parliament. Against such an interpretation of the Minister of Finance Władysław Duleba protests: “there is no basis for Biliński being indifferent toward the parliament. After all, he is a member and wishes to achieve a balanced budget, and this is impossible without the parliament.”⁵⁶⁴ Biliński writes that this loan contributed to maintaining peace. But it induced numerous discussions in the Imperial Council as well, the Czechs were particularly opposed toward Biliński: they attacked me through Kramarz’s lips very aggressively, but the majority of the house additionally supported the loan, without accepting my legal-political position regarding the right of emission, but they gave me the so-called *Indemnitäet*.⁵⁶⁵

gratitude for my former care for their fate.” L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 169 .

563 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , pp. 169–170.

564 *Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 14 grudnia 1907r.* Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa. IV Sprawy polityczne, BJ TB, manuscript 8109 III, book 50.

565 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , pp. 170–171.

Biliński wanted to eliminate the shortages in the treasury also by increasing direct taxes on victuals such as alcohols, beer in particular. The increase in the tax would not be significant, almost unobservable, but the revenue would be substantial.⁵⁶⁶ He already mentioned it while referring the budget and before the government, and the proposition did not meet with resistance. Biliński prepared an exposé and on August 19, presented it to the prime minister for acceptance: “Bienenrth did not show any sign of opposition, neither with a word nor with facial expression.” On the same day, there appeared a journalist in Biliński’s house and informed him that, according to their sources, the beer tax would not pass in the house. The information appeared to be credible. The Council did not accept Biliński’s project, and the very minister-president asked the minister not to leave his office. Biliński suspected that rejecting the project was a provocation aimed at causing his resignation. The will of conspirers did not come into being, and the minister proclaimed before the house: “I will not neglect my colleagues in such a financially difficult circumstance, and I will strive to fulfill the program differently.” In the fall, a new tax project emerged: “*broader and stricter*, leading aimless life until the war began.”⁵⁶⁷

Biliński recalled the period of his second time in ministry without enthusiasm: “I could not count among the pleasantries of the ministerial life the deliberations in the tax commission regarding tax projects developed according to the bills of government from August 19, 1909. During the entire winter there lasted these ponderous deliberations, with a slight shade of abstraction, caused by the fact that no faction wished to sacrifice for the sake of treasury. The deliberations lingered until 1910 and lasted almost ceaselessly through spring, summer, and fall unless they were interrupted by different budget talks.”⁵⁶⁸

566 Ignacy Daszyński disagreed with Biliński and considered these taxes not to be unobservable to the populace. Biliński, during an exposé he delivered in April, presented his program: “It stems from the assumption that state revenues increase 100 million Guldens annually and spending increases 165 million.” Biliński intended to raise the tax on hectoliter of beer from 3.4 to 7.6 Guldens, on spirit from ninety to 141 Hellers, he also proposed the tax on mineral and soda water, and meat, sugar and oil: “For the socialist incrustation Mr. Biliński increased inheritance tax by ten million and pension tax by ten million.” He also intended to increase railway tickets, which would burden those who were not affluent. The highest revenues came from the 3rd class, as much as seventy-five percent. I. Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , pp. 57 ff.

567 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , pp. 178–181.

568 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , pp. 194–195.

In the Spring, the works of the budget commission were at the same stage of development as before: “No faction wanted to assume the responsibility for the entire program: the socialists supported only direct taxes, *the bourgeois* only indirect ones, and there was no majority for anything. The deliberations lingered until the end of our rule and lasted unsuccessfully during the times of the Minister of Finance Waław Zaleski.”⁵⁶⁹ Ignacy Daszyński did not hide his satisfaction with this state of affairs: “The projects of mister Biliński did not come into being. The fight over them lasted until his resignation.”⁵⁷⁰

At this time, Biliński wanted to implement the match tax, without revenue-producing monopoly. It was meant to be a public tax in the form of an excise stamp, through the “Solo” society dependant on the Länderbank. The project assumed the minimal price increase, but the revenue was estimated at many millions. At the same time, all match factories, especially those in Galicia, were meant to be concentrated. Getting the majority in the house, which was somewhat reluctant toward eliminating state monopolies, caused trouble. Biliński did not gain support for this tax project.⁵⁷¹

The next political crisis during his tenure as the Minister of Finance was connected to the so-called canal bill.⁵⁷² He wrote: “I fell into a new crisis, this time lethal because caused by my own faction.”⁵⁷³

In the issue of building canals, engaged not only the Club but also the Polish ministers, that is Witold Korytowski, Dawid Abrahamowicz, and Wojciech Dzieruszycki. The issue remained unresolved, as Biliński claims, mainly due to the lack of acceptance on the part of particular prime ministers. He and the minister for Galicia Władysław Dułęba met with the same difficulties on the part of Bienerth.⁵⁷⁴ Biliński explained that the issue turned in an unsatisfactory direction

569 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 196.

570 I. Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 58.

571 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , pp. 196–197.

572 The bill from June 11, 1901, promised the construction of canals, for instance, Danube-Odra-Vistula, Vistula-Dniester, and regulation of rivers in Galicia. The works were to commence in 1904, but for various reasons, often political, the canal bill was not executed. The potential benefits for Galicia were obvious, but they were hindered by nobility’s interests and Vienna. In 1904, along with the bill about the Alp railway, the canal bill was published. This issue was basically in the daily schedule of the Polish Club. The commencement of construction was postponed each year, whereas the Czechs completed the construction of their canals much earlier.

573 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , pp. 199–200.

574 S. Głąbiński provides a different version of the events, see: S. Głąbiński, *Wspomnieniapolityczne*, Pelpin, 1989.

due to the stubbornness of the Polish deputies, who largely influenced the particular minister until the issue appeared at the government. The fundamental postulate of the Club was providing loans for building a Cracow-Zator line.

The club's demands were in contrast with realizing the government program, which intended to increase the spending for military goals. Biliński and the minister for Galicia Dułęba were in a difficult situation as well; on the one hand, they noticed the necessity of building canals in Galicia, and, on the other hand, were members of the government: "In this hard collision of duties I started to think of compensating the states interested in the would-be construction of canals by means of state funds in cash, from which each state could either build its own canals or satiate other, more pending needs. . . I offered to the Club the highest sum of all for Galicia: 125 million in the Austrian pension." In this issue, he contacted the president of the Club Stanisław Głąbiński and other members. The prime minister also had his meetings with all interested state representatives. With slight changes, the government project was accepted: "It occurred on the Polish side as well, I don't recall the delegates, naturally next to Abrahamowicz, the president Głąbiński was an obstacle." The government project was soon rejected by the Club: "A triumvirate Kozłowski-Korytowski-Głąbiński emerged and aimed at influencing the Club to stand for the canals." As a result, the Club proclaimed that it would not change its position regarding the canal issue and would demand its construction in Galicia. The resolution of the deputy Włodzimierz Kozłowski was accepted as well, which categorically requested the building of canals in Galicia. The Polish Club was visibly divided; on the one side, there was Biliński supported by Jan Stapiński, the president of the peasant party, and on the other side conservatives and national democrats. The government feared the transition of the Polish members to the opposition. Biliński claims that the president of the Club asked Bienerth for the dismissal of the Minister of Finance and proposed himself for the position.⁵⁷⁵ These events caused the cabinet crisis and Bienerth's resignation at the beginning of December 1910. Biliński ceased to be the Minister of Finance on January 9, 1911.⁵⁷⁶

During his tenure as the Minister of Finance in the years 1909–1911, Biliński could not pride himself on many successes. Michał Bobrzyński writes: "He failed to fulfill expectations because he was not capable of implementing the financial plan. Since he became closer to the peasant party and kept them under his

575 S. Kozicki, "Przegląd spraw polskich," *Przegląd Narodowy* (PN), December 1910, p. 732; L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , pp. 199–202.

576 WZ, no. 7, January 10, 1911, p. 1.

influence in certain moderation, he was attacked by the national democrats with the already passionately tested method⁵⁷⁷ which was visible in the strive of Biliński, the minister for Galicia, and the Polish Club to execute the canal bill.

The press also wrote negatively about Biliński: “the one who forsook the canals.”⁵⁷⁸ Biliński achieved more successes directly after the resignation issued by the prime minister Bienert. Still as the actual minister, in December, Biliński referred in the house the new bank statute. He also answered numerous questions from the deputies, delivered three speeches, which met with the applause of the deputies: “Thus the fate *in statu demission* brought me the entire array of real oratory and expertly triumphs in the house.”⁵⁷⁹

Despite the evident lack of successes, the dismissal was for Biliński “significantly less bitter than the first (1897) and the third (1915).”⁵⁸⁰ However, it did not mean the end of his political career. At the turn of 1911 and 1912, he was called for an audience by the emperor, and then he discovered that he is to replace the minister Stephan Burián von Rajecz at the position of the Joint Finance Minister of Austria-Hungary.⁵⁸¹ Bobrzyński claims that Waclaw Zaleski, the current Minister of Finance, suggested the prime minister Karl von Stürgkh to “promote Biliński for the just vacated position of the Joint Finance Minister and thus remove him from the parliament.” Biliński, the current president of the Club, did not hide his critique of the extra-parliamentary cabinet, and in certain groups, he was considered a candidate for a future minister-president. Such a state of affairs could not be satisfactory for the prime minister, and thus there was a probability that his nomination was a result of the system of political forces.⁵⁸²

He resigned from the position of the Joint Finance Minister on January 28: “It meant further limitation and weakening of the Polish political position in the

577 M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , p. 224.

578 *Gazeta Niedzielną* writes on July 23: “Biliński is an exceptionally cunning and ambitious politician, his patriotism is almost not present. Living in Vienna for twenty years . . . Biliński lost all sympathy with state and nation.” M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , pp. 190–191.

579 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , pp. 202–203.

580 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 205.

581 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 227.

582 He also wrote that Zaleski talked about his own initiative and considered it as “his grand work.” The governor Bobrzyński thought differently: “I did not hide from him that it scared me because I know no candidate for the president in the Polish Club which would have gravity similar to Biliński’s. M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , p. 268.

country. Here there resigned from the government a Polish statesman, influential, having a position at the emperor, and invoking respect among the government bureaucrats.”⁵⁸³ He also could no longer participate in common delegations.

In the period before the Great War, he maintained the financial balance in the country based on the division of competences, which in the face of war and increasing spending had a particularly important meaning. He also controlled the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁵⁸⁴ In the eve of the war, he was one of the initiators of creating the Supreme National Committee. After the end of the war, he returned to Poland and assumed the position of the Minister of Finance in the government of Ignacy Paderewski. He held this position from August to November 1919. Herman Lieberman claims that “he failed the resurrected Poland, he was for her a slightly better minister than mediocre. . . . On the Polish soil, he dried-up and wilted, as an exotic greenhouse plant moved to a cold climate.”⁵⁸⁵ In 1920, he returned to Vienna to take the position of the president for the Polish-Austrian Bank.⁵⁸⁶

Seweryn Kniaziółucki⁵⁸⁷ was the head of the Ministry of Finance in the transitional cabinet of Manfred Clary from October 2, 1899,⁵⁸⁸ to January 1900. Kazimierz Chłędowski as the minister for Galicia was the second Pole in this government.

Kniaziółucki was the head of the ministry during the governmental negotiations with Hungary regarding the prolongation of the settlement. When the prime minister Manfred Clary did not succeed in implementing this, he resigned, and the emperor passed the prime ministry to the former Railway Minister, Wittek. His first goal was to complete the cabinet with ministers and so-called *Leiters*, that is heads of departments. Leon Biliński claims that Wittek wanted to have Kniaziółucki in his cabinet not because he was a Pole and had a position in the former cabinet, but because “in the last few years he worked on the settlement very energetically and effectively. That is, he now only had completed all of the deals with the Hungarian government and Austro-Hungarian bank

583 K. Srokowski, N. K. N. *Zarys historii Naczelnego Komitetu Narodowego*, Cracow, 1923, p. 316.

584 J. Forst-Battaglia, *Polnisches Wien*. . . , pp. 31–32.

585 H. Lieberman, *Pamiętniki*, Intr. and ed. A. Garlicki, Warsaw, 1996, p. 124.

586 “P. Kraszewski, Biliński Leon” in: *Polacy w historii i kulturze krajów Europy Zachodniej. Słownik Biograficzny*, ed. K. Kwaśniewski, L. Trzeciakowski, Instytut Zachodni, Poznań, 1981, p. 51.

587 J. Buszko, “Kniaziółucki Seweryn” in: *PSB*, vol. XIII, Wrocław 1867–68, p. 120.

588 *WZ*, no. 226, October 3, 1899, p. 1.

predicted by my and Thun's bank bill, but additionally, he convinced Hungarians to a certain, admittedly small, raise for common goals."⁵⁸⁹

There was a disagreement between the prime minister and the minister Kniaziołucki regarding the way of implementing the settlement. Wittek wanted to use the Article 14 of the constitution, and the minister was sternly opposed: "Thus, Wittekcaressed Kniaziołucki's hand in vain by offering him the fulfillment of all the presented conditions, particularly nomination as an actual minister; nothing helped him, not even referring to the emperor's will: Kniaziołucki refused."⁵⁹⁰ The refusal had a detrimental effect not only on himself but also on other heads of ministries. Kniaziołucki's conduct "burdened him for his entire life, not only career-wise. . . but also regarding his demeanor and even health."⁵⁹¹ He waited for a long time to be given the title of the secret adviser, and he received it only when Witold Korytowski was the Minister of Finance in 1908. After retiring, he received a low pension of a department's head.⁵⁹²

Biliński criticized the activity of Kniaziołucki, especially the bill about the abolishment of the journalist stamp: "I was not satisfied, since this reform, free-thinking in itself, moved the impact of the conservative journalism to the radical one, more wide-spread."⁵⁹³ Biliński was not wrong in predicting that the abolishment of the journalist stamp would lead to the development of the radical press. For this decision, Kniaziołucki was recognized by the Society of the Polish Journalists and awarded the honorary membership.

When the cabinet of Wittek fell, Kniaziołucki returned to his former position of the department head in the Ministry of Finance. He actively contributed to developing the retirement bills in 1898 and 1906. In 1907, he was the main inspiration and executioner of the law regarding officials' income.

Witold Korytowski⁵⁹⁴ commenced his career in the Ministry of Finance from the position of a legal clerk in the Presidential Office to which he was appointed

589 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , pp. 134–135.

590 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 135.

591 During the farewell meeting of the emperor with the members of Wittek's cabinet, the heads of ministries did not participate. The emperor ordered to tell them: "*Die sollen in IhreBuroszuruckkehren*" [They should return to their offices], L. Biliński, *Wspomnieniaidokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 135.

592 In another part of his diary, Biliński writes: "the head of section Kniaziołucki retired, opulently honored and provided with safe, affluent income." L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , pp. 135, 178.

593 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , pp. 130–131.

594 A. Konieczny "Korytowski Witold," in: *Polacy w historii i kulturze*. . . , p. 213; J. Buszko, "Korytowski Witold," in: *PSB*, vol. XIV, Wrocław 1868–69, pp. 155, 157.

in 1880 by Julian Dunajewski. This at this point thirty years old clerk was considered as one of the most trusted coworkers of Dunajewski.⁵⁹⁵ Just seven years later, he was promoted to the position of a sectional adviser and a director of the Presidential Office. In 1890 he gained the position of the ministerial adviser: at this point, he was counted among the most famous and important persons in Vienna. After Dunajewski's resignation, Korytowski was transferred to Lviv to the position of the head of the National Direction for the Treasury.⁵⁹⁶

Korytowski was appointed as Minister of Finance on June 2, 1906,⁵⁹⁷ in the bureaucratic cabinet of Vladimir Beck and kept his ministerial position until November 15, 1908,⁵⁹⁸ that is until the fall of Beck's cabinet in mid-November. The government fell, even though it could boast with significant achievements, that is completing the settlement with Hungary and finalizing the electoral reform, and the accusation of corruption was one of the causes.

In May 1906, the goal of Beck's cabinet was to conduct the electoral reform in a way that would satisfy both socialist, liberal-democrat, and conservative deputies. The votes of the Polish Club were important, and thus in the government there were both Korytowski, who received the position of the Minister of Finance, and Wojciech Dzieduszucki, as a state minister.

Korytowski also participated in completing the financial deal with Hungary and in the parliamentary electoral reform, and he regulated the incomes of the clerks. He was accused, particularly by the national democrats, that during his

595 Dunajewski asked him not only to take care of important professional issues but also to care for his family assets. As Chłędowski writes: "Korytowski, coming from the Poznan area, a son of landowner. . . arrived in Vienna to study, befriended local Poles, and here became a clerk in the Treasury Solicitors. From there, Dunajewski took him away. Korytowski. . . soon became the minister's handyman, had a lot of influence, and was a known person on Viennese streets. Initially, he was very pleasant, heartily boy, tall, handsome, women's favorite, in time he becomes unusually unpleasant careerman, unhelpful bureaucrat and he became a despicable amalgamate of the Austrian financier implanted to a Prussian corporal." K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 18.

596 After Dunajewski's resignation, his successor Steinbach systematically removed all the Poles from the ministry. The Korytowski was transferred to the position of vice-president of the National Treasury Direction in Lviv: "Korytowski was not harmed, since the vice-president's position was one of the best in the country, but soon his fast career went into Witold's head: it seemed to him that he goes to Lviv for a moment, that soon he has to return to Vienna as the Minister of Finance." K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 18.

597 WZ, no. 127, June 3, 1906, p. 1.

598 WZ, no. 266, November 17, 1908, p. 1.

tenure, he gave concessions for creating the People's Bank to the peasant party and thus committed to the act of bribery.⁵⁹⁹

The nomination of Leon Biliński to replace Witold Korytowski after the fall of Vladimir's Beck cabinet induced not only his disappointment but also jaundice toward the newly appointed minister and caused the worsening of relations with Michał Bobrzyński on whose protection before the prime minister Richard von Bienenrath he counted: "The change of the cabinet influenced Korytowski the most. He never said anything good about Biliński . . . he was consummated by hatred toward him and started a war with him."⁶⁰⁰

The last of the Polish Ministers of Finance was Waclaw Zaleski,⁶⁰¹ the son of Filip. He was nominated to the cabinet of Paul Gautsch on November 19, 1911.⁶⁰² Previously he was the head of the section in the Ministry of Agriculture.

When Meyer, the Minister of Finance in the government of Karl Stürgkh, died unexpectedly, the possibility of proposing the Polish candidature for this vital position in the government opened to the Polish Club. There were two candidates from the Polish side, the Minister for Galicia Waclaw Zaleski and the head of the section in the Ministry of Finance Kazimierz Gałeczki. For the obvious reasons, the state minister had bigger chances with both the prime minister and the Polish Club. The conservative politician would additionally strengthen the position of the Club, both with the government, the parliament, and the state authorities. The attempts of the Club for the position of the Minister of Finance had their habitual rationale stemming from "Dunajewski's tradition."⁶⁰³

Zaleski was not convinced to take this position, mainly due to the lack of sufficient knowledge in the area of economics. However, Biliński advised him to accept the ministerial position, especially since "as the Minister for Galicia he has an amazing opinion and without a doubt, he would gain it in the Ministry of Finance as well."⁶⁰⁴ Waclaw Zaleski did not possess a suitable, expert preparation for tenure as the Minister of Finance, but as Stanisław Tarnowski writes: "That is where his capability showed itself in its full greatness." He faced such issues with resolving as regulating the clerk incomes or rescuing national finances. Zaleski created the so-called "small financial plan," which assumed the raise of personal

599 Korytowski supported the access of the peasant party to the Polish Club. M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , pp. 119, 190.

600 M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , pp. 145–146

601 A. Poniatowska, "Zaleski Waclaw," in: *Polacy w historii i kulturze*. . . , p. 473.

602 WZ, no. 266, November 21, 1911, p. 1.

603 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 219.

604 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 220.

and income tax, vodka and wine tax, race tax, car tax. He abolished the speculation lottery, which provided the budget with significant revenues, but was unethical, and replaced it with a class lottery. As Tarnowski claims, “his ‘small financial plan’ was huge.”⁶⁰⁵

The period when he assumed the office, and the internal and the international situation did not foster effective management of state finances, but “Zaleski soon grew into the new department and could handily present in the parliament even these things he could not understand well.”⁶⁰⁶ There existed the opposition to Zaleski in the Imperial Council. For instance, Jan Stapiński threatened on the pages of “Przyjaciel Ludu” [People’s Friend], that he would not let to the passing of his tax projects in the Imperial Council.⁶⁰⁷ But most importantly, the parliament had difficulties in creating the majority: “There was no possibility of a constant, reasonable, based on the commonality of goals majority, since every part, every group, focused on their voters, trembled about their popularity. . . . In such circumstances, Zaleski assumed the leadership of financial matters.”⁶⁰⁸

His work as the minister was hindered significantly by the events from the political, international scene. At this time, the Balkan War outburst, which meant the necessity of increasing spending on military goals.

Zaleski was also negatively influenced by the issue of the purchase of “The Illustrated Daily Courier” (IKC) by Stapiński.⁶⁰⁹ When the affair with IKC was revealed, Zaleski spent time in Merano in the Alps; at this time, he was gravely ill. He behaved much worse than the state minister Władysław Długosz: “he had every reason and pretext to remain silent since he caused all that trouble. But he did not do so and sent the telegram to the newspapers that he knows about the existence of the document signed by Stapiński.”⁶¹⁰ It was a purchase

605 *Czas*, no. 283, December 1911, p. 5; no. 284, January 1912, pp. 1 ff; S.Tarnowski, *Wacław Zaleski. Wspomnienie pośmiertne*, Cracow, 1914, p. 10.

606 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 220.

607 M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , p. 325.

608 S. Tarnowski, *Wacław Zaleski. Wspomnienie*. . . , p. 9.

609 The Minister for Galicia Długosz, connected to the president of the peasant party, insisted that Zaleski saved some means from press fund to purchase the newspaper. Długosz was pressured by Stępiński, to whom the minister promised fifty thousand Guldens, with the next fifty thousand coming from the government fund. The state minister wanted to include Bobrzyński in this issue, but he refused. See: M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , pp. 326–327, 377–379.

610 M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , p. 377.

agreement, including Stapiński's political obligations of supporting the policies of the Stańcycy group in Galicia and Vienna.⁶¹¹

In such unfavorable circumstances, Zaleski doubted in the success of his tenure: "As the Minister for Galicia, everything could and even had to be achieved. What can the Minister of Finance achieve in this country, in this parliament."⁶¹²

In the period when Zaleski was the Minister of Finance, the canal bill was executed, which was fought for by the Polish Club since 1904. In December 1911, the cornerstone for building canals in Galicia was laid. During a speech he delivered, Zaleski ascribed the merit only to himself, since as the current minister he assigned finances for commencing this investment. Biliński writes, that "Zaleski had and did not have right. . . I pinpointed that here are sitting three ministers for the treasury who all earnestly wanted the canals: Korytowski, me, and Zaleski. If only the third succeeded in realizing it, that is only because he had the president-minister behind him. Because, indeed, I did not tell it clearly, Beck was indifferent toward the canals, Bienert was their stern opponent, and only Stürgkh was . . . their proponent."⁶¹³

In the Spring of 1912, the Ukrainian members started the obstruction of the Imperial Council due to the prolongation of the works on parliament reform and the issue of establishing the Ukrainian university: "Minister Zaleski informed me with great joy, that he found a mean of resolving the university issue. It was supposed that he himself presented it." The emperor was supposed to write to the Minister of Education and oblige himself to create a separate Ukrainian university comprised of three departments, excluding the medical one, in ten years, and in this time, the academic personnel of the future school would be educated. The idea seemed to be acceptable to both sides. Its doubtless asset was turning the attention of the Ukrainians away from their demands for the university and focusing on education.⁶¹⁴

Zaleski was not indifferent to the state issues. He monopolized Długosz, the Minister for Galicia, so basically, he decided about the state issues as well.⁶¹⁵ He engaged himself particularly in the development of the electoral reform to the Diet. He supported the project from 1913, even though he did not consider it to be perfect, but he perceived the necessity of reaching the settlement with the

611 M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , p. 378.

612 S. Tarnowski, *Wacław Zaleski. Wspomnienie*. . . , p. 9.

613 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 221.

614 M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , pp. 310–311.

615 M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , p. 326.

Ukrainians. He participated in talks in Lviv and positioned himself in favor of this project, but, nonetheless, it was rejected.

He was engaged in conversations regarding the electoral reforms to the Diet, for instance, he participated in the conference on November 3, 1912, in which the minister Długosz took part as well. When the governor Michał Bobrzyński threatened with resignation, “the further direction of the issues, particularly the case of the electoral reform, was captured by Zaleski, who as the Minister of Finance could craftily gain the trust of the prime minister, count Stürkgh.”⁶¹⁶ The resignation of Bobrzyński from the position of the governor would cause detrimental effects both on the talks and on the plans of Vienna. The government, especially the prime minister and Zaleski, pressured the Ruthenians to soften their position. At the Minister of Finance, a conference with the Polish politicians took place and as a result the Ruthenians assumed a more conciliatory stance.⁶¹⁷ While leading the talks regarding the electoral reform, Zaleski sought agreement with the bishops, primarily with Józef Bilczewski and priest Teodorowicz. From his initiative, the conference took place at the marshal Adam Gołuchowski, in which the representatives of the Galician factions participated. Zaleski assumed the role of the mediator and at any cost, wanted to reach a compromise between the quarreling political forces. However, despite all his efforts, the conference ended with a fiasco.⁶¹⁸

Stanisław Tarnowski judged Zaleski's predispositions highly: “he had both a good head and high heart. In this head there was political education, political experience, the ability to advise, and ability to execute. In this heart, there were no secondary, clandestine intentions or calculations. What he did, he did not for his position or meaning, not for his party . . . but for the cause, for the good of the state and nation.”⁶¹⁹ Analyzing the directions of Zaleski's activities, one can claim with full responsibility, after Tarnowski, that “in the state government he meant and acted a lot.”⁶²⁰

When Zaleski decided to assume the position of the Minister of Finance, “he delved deep in its problems, but also eventually died young from a severe heart illness.”⁶²¹ As Tarnowski writes: “Zaleski worked himself to

616 M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , pp. 278, 373.

617 M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , p. 373.

618 M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , pp. 373–374.

619 S.Tarnowski, *Wacław Zaleski. Wspomnienie*. . . , pp. 5–6.

620 S.Tarnowski, *Wacław Zaleski. Wspomnienie*. . . , p. 6.

621 “But despite his great talent, the complete success was prevented not only by his worsening health but primarily certain conceit or sense of grandiosity, and partially,

death.”⁶²² This versatility and sense of responsibility of the Polish minister regarding the realization of the goals of the Austrian politics, but also the state one, and executing goals stemming from them, allow counting Zaleski among one of the most energetic ministers.

After Zaleski's death, the Ministry of Finance was led by the head of the section Engel, and the ministry for Galicia by the head of the section Zdzisław Morawski.⁶²³ The chair of the Minister of Finance was proposed by Stürgkh to Bobrzyński, who refused and justified it with his lack of adequate expert preparation.⁶²⁴

Since the seventies of the nineteenth century, the Poles achieved high official positions in the Ministry for Confessions and Education, oftentimes heading it. There existed a necessity not only due to national reasons but also the political ones. In the years 1868–1873, Galicia fought for the status of the autonomous province, and the activity of the Poles in the Viennese parliament in the following years was meaningful.⁶²⁵ At the front of the ministry there were a few Poles, but they were appointed for different reasons than the ministers for the treasury. Primarily, it was caused by the structure of the monarchy as a multi-ethnic state.

a certain desire to one-sided influencing Stürgkh in cases not only financial but also political.” L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 220.

622 In Spring 1912 he became severely ill, admittedly he recovered but was not as physically capable as before the illness. S. Tarnowski, *Wacław Zaleski. Wspomnienie. . .*, pp. 11 ff.

623 M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników. . .*, p. 384.

624 Bobrzyński mentions that “the President of the Polish Club Leo loudly aspires to this ministerial position, who, as I hear, tells his colleagues that he would not accept the position of the Minister for Galicia, just vacated due to Długosz's resignation, because he deserves the position in the Ministry of Finance.” But the prime minister did not intend to appoint Juliusz Leo to the Ministry of Finance because he “does not invoke the emperor's trust if you accept the Ministry of Finance, we would have to strive severely to talk the emperor into appointing Leo as the Minister for Galicia. M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników. . .*, pp. 380–381. Jaworski claims that “After Zaleski's death Stürgkh intended to make Bobrzyński the Minister of Finance . . . but Korytowski, from the fear of national democrats and the Podolacy, did not let this happen. How different would be our position if for the period of the war a Pole, even more so Bobrzyński, would be the Minister of Finance. “Note from March 12, 1916,” W. L. Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, sel. and ed. M. Czajka, Warsaw 1997, pp. 85–86.

625 W. Goldinger, *Das polnische Element. . .*, p. 68.

The first Pole who assumed the position of the Minister of Cult and Education in the coalition cabinet of Alfred Windischgrätz on November 11, 1893, was Stanisław Madeyski.⁶²⁶ “Among many titled candidates for ministers, among Poles it boiled like in a kettle, envy and ill-heartedness had no boundaries. And on the day of the nomination, I [K. Chłędowski] met Stanisław Badeni. . . ‘Well, you have a pretty minister! What a disgrace to make a minister of such clowns.’ Madeyski always had many enemies, and now there was a whole legion of them.”⁶²⁷

He was, after Julian Dunajewski, one of the most exceptional Polish ministers and one of the more outstanding parliamentary speakers: “Madeyski belonged to the most talented members of my times, he spoke very well, concisely and logically, but his superiority naturally was an eyesore to many colleagues positioned much lower than him. He was particularly hurt by seeking all possible sinecures bringing income.”⁶²⁸

Madeyski took care of linguistic issues. As a deputy in the Imperial Council he was noticed when on January 29, 1884, he opposed to acknowledging the German as the official language. Based on the legal-state criterium, Article 19 of the constitution from 1867 was interpreted liberally, that is as a guarantee of enabling all citizens the national rule of free choice of the state language. Madeyski claimed that “there is no place for the official German language in existing Austria.” At the same time, he was one of the most competent experts in the linguistic issues in the monarchy.⁶²⁹

During his tenure as the minister, on March 30, 1895, he opposed the celebrations of the eightieth birthday of Otto von Bismarck. He opposed the initiative of the professors of the University of Innsbruck and motivated

626 WZ, no. 260, December 12, 1893, p. 1; Cz. Lechicki, “Madeyski Stanisław Jerzy” in: *PSB*, vol. XIX, Wrocław 1974, pp. 124–125.

627 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 127.

628 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 91.

629 Cz. Lechicki, “Madeyski Stanisław Jerzy,” *PSB*, vol. XIX. . . , p. 124. The rationale for this view was: “IN reality it is difficult to fit in the internal politics any Polish representative after 1879 with the main thought differing from the one expressed by deputy Madeyski . . . not only one nationality but also one of its factions was appointed to govern Austria and provide with a coherent character and that instead a new idea emerged, fully responding to the internal nature of the state and its external goals, that is the idea of coalition supported on broad foundations, comprised of different nationalities and various factions.” W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej*. . . , pp. 203–204.

his decisions with the fact that honoring Bismarck would be a political issue since the pan-German interests would be emphasized. He underlined that the professors might cultivate the traditions and spread the patriotic ideas, but only the Austrian ones. After all, the monarchy authority showed in this case a certain restraint.⁶³⁰

At the same time, he supported the Slavic linguistic and educational postulates, and this issue soon became one of the primary markers of the minister's politics. Certainly, the most known case during Madeyski's time at the office was the case of the Slovenian gymnasium in Cilla in northern Styria. When the coalition government of Windischgrätz refrained from the policy of national equality, Madayski stood in defence of the Slovenians demanding the creation of the gymnasium in Cilla. This issue was important and interesting from the other standpoint as well. That is, Madeyski was perceived by the Slovenians not as their political ally but as an antagonist. Their opinion regarding this issue was entirely justifiable since Madeyski claimed that the Slovenians had no sufficient national consciousness at this time. Thus he did not favor the postulate of their independency. It undoubtedly influenced the lack of trust for Madeyski. Moreover, the Slovenian deputies feared that after the coalition of the "Iron Ring" would fall, he would decide on cooperation with the German left-wing parties, just like the Polish Club.⁶³¹ However, one needs to admit that even if he did not accept their autonomous needs, he did not oppose the realization of the national postulates, which is distinctly visible in defence of the Cilla gymnasium.

His decision regarding the Slovenian gymnasium was made in the period of Taaffe's government. Windischgrätz did not mean to revoke it in order to reconcile the quarrelling parliamentary coalition. However, the political plans of the prime minister led to the increase of discrepancies between parties in the Imperial Council. The Slovenian members threatened at that time to leave the coalition, and the German liberal-left did not see the possibility of creating such a gymnasium.⁶³²

The project of creating parallel Slovenian classes in the gymnasium in Cilla was included in the talks on the plan of the electoral reform when the opposition

630 J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 168

631 A. Cetnarowicz, "Polacy i Słoweńcy w monarchii habsburskiej. Uwagi na temat wzajemnych stosunków w drugiej połowie XIX wieku," *Studia Austro-Polonica* 5, ZN UJ. Pr. Hist., 1997, no. 121, pp. 219–220.

632 J. Gruchała, *Koło Polskie w austriackiej Radzie Państwa wobec kwestii czeskiej i Śląska Cieszyńskiego*, Wrocław 1882, p. 51.

obstructed its passing.⁶³³ Madeyski approved the proper request at the parliamentary commission in March 1895. The commission approved it with 19 to 15 majority. This issue appeared uncomplicated until the moment when the members of the United German Left did not inform the prime minister Windischgrätz that they are leaving the coalition. The government found itself in a very unfavorable circumstance, and its fate was eventually decided by the voting on the case of the gymnasium on June 11. The Polish Club supported the Slovenian postulates and presented a statement that for the sake of community with Slovenian interests it will be jointly standing with the Czech members at the forum of the house.⁶³⁴

The conflict appeared to be difficult to resolve, and the interests of the sides unreconcilable.⁶³⁵ Meanwhile, the liberals commenced seeking *modus vivendi* with the Slovenians through the Polish deputies. They offered Madeyski to get involved in mediations and talk the Slovenians into refraining from the creation of the gymnasium in Cilla.⁶³⁶

A few days later, on June 14, Kasimir Badeni arrived at Vienna to conduct the political consultations. The crisis was resolved through the resignation of

633 Windischgrätz intended to reform the electoral regulations by implementing the universal right of vote. On March 4, 1894, the first session of the Club's presidents and men of confidence of coalition parties took place. The Polish Club was willing to support the postulates of draft reform, it was not accepted by the Hohenwart's club, it was attacked by the Czech deputies, firmly rejected by the socialist deputies who even threatened with a general strike. The debate in the Council took place in April 1894 and had a very tumultuous course. Madeyski spoke as the representative of the Polish Club and ensured of the Club's full support for the Taffee-Plener project; it was criticized by a dissident Karol Lewakowski. J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 170–171.

634 J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 171–173.

635 The Germans raised the arguments of still too weak national consciousness of Slovenians, which would not allow them to have their own Gymnasiums, the necessity of maintaining them from the money of German taxpayers, the danger of Slavization of the German inhabitants of Cilla who comprised half of the populace. They proposed the creation of gymnasiums in Rann (Brežice) or Luttenberg (Ljutomer). But the Slovenians did not refrain from their postulate of creating gymnasium and did not accept any other city but Cilla as the most convenient center for them. B. Sutter, *Die politische und rechtliche Stellung der Deutschen in Österreich 1848 bis 1918*, in: *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918*, vol. III, 1. Teilband, *Die Völker des Reiches*, A. Wandruszka, P. Urbanitsch, Vienna 1980, p. 223; Zwiedzicz, *Ustrój państwowy i stromnictwa polityczne*. . . , p. 166.

636 J. Gruchała, *Koło Polskie w austriackiej Radzie*. . . , p. 51.

the government on the emperor's request on June 19, 1895.⁶³⁷ The prime minister was replaced by Count Erich Kielmansegg, who was appointed to create an interim cabinet. The ministries remained under their former ministers or their deputies; Apolinary Jaworski was the state minister at that time.⁶³⁸

One of the reasons for the prime minister's resignation was a German-Slovenian conflict. Czesław Lechicki, the author of the biographical note on Madeyski, thought that his demise was facilitated by the very minister who "stood behind the issue of the Slovenian gymnasium in Cilla so stubbornly," that he invoked the conflict with the Germans and the coalition's disintegration.⁶³⁹ Roman Taborski had a similar opinion.⁶⁴⁰ However, Biliński formulated the issue as follows: "and that is what *Nemesis* wished for, to the cabinet to be finally overthrown by the Germans based on the department of education, on the issue of the Slovenian gymnasium in Cilla."⁶⁴¹

After these changes, the obstruction in the house ended, and on July 10, 1895, the budget passed, and the bill on the parallel classes in the gymnasium in Cilla passed with 173 to 143 majority.⁶⁴² Finally, the decision to create the gymnasium in Cilla achieved the required majority in the Imperial Council. The Polish Club decided to vote along with the Slovenian aspirations, just like the German-conservative members did.⁶⁴³

As Joanna Radzyner notices, the author of the monograph on Madeyski, the conflict on the issue of education which emerged between the Slovenians and the Germans was one of the examples of a dramatically difficult situation of the Poles in the Viennese parliament. As a result of this conflict, "none of the Slovenian parties could forgive Madeyski, that he, being a Pole, did not want to take an unambiguously pro-Slavic position but referred to the super-national, Austrian rationales."⁶⁴⁴

637 WZ, no. 142, June 20, 1895, p. 1.

638 J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 171–173.

639 Cz. Lechicki, "Madeyski Stanisław Jerzy," in: *PSB*, vol. XIX. . . , p. 124.

640 R. Taborski, *Wśród wiedeńskich poloników*, Cracow 1974, p. 90.

641 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , p. 70

642 J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 174

643 J. Gruchała, *Koło Polskie w austriackiej Radzie*. . . , p. 52. The case of Cilla had far-reaching consequences in the form of the German nationalist movement, which more brightly revealed itself after Kazimierz Badeni in 1897 presented language decrees for Czechia and Moravia. B. Sutter, *Die politische und rechtliche Stellung*. . . , p. 223.

644 J. Radzyner, *Orientacja autro-polska*. . . , p. 199.

The resignation did not hinder his further career and soon, on September 29, 1898, after the request of the House of the Deputies was nominated as the member of the Imperial Court. Then he also resigned from his parliamentary seat.

Edward Rittner was the successor of Stanisław Madeyski.⁶⁴⁵ Having the established position in the world of academia, he was nominated to work in the Ministry for Cult and Education in October 1886 as a ministerial adviser: “first he was the ministerial adviser, then the head of a section and finally, in the interim cabinet of Kielmansegg, substituted the minister of education.”⁶⁴⁶ He presented himself as a strict and brave official, which was apparent in his reports on the theme of Galician relations in which he defended the state matters. Edward Rittner achieved increasingly higher levels in the ministry; in 1891, he became the head of the section of universities. In the cabinet of Erich Kielmansegg, on June 18, 1895, he became the head of the Ministry for Cult and Education and was dismissed on September 30, 1895.⁶⁴⁷ From January 17, 1896,⁶⁴⁸ he was the state minister in the government of KasimirBadeni. He was the author of the linguistic decree for the Czech states, regarding also the knowledge of both languages by Czech and German officials.

Ludwik Ćwikliński,⁶⁴⁹ the respected Polish scholar, the classical philologist, began his work in state administration in 1902 from the position of a state adviser and ministerial adviser, the head of a section in the Ministry of Cult and Education.⁶⁵⁰ He became the minister of the department in 1917 and served until July 25, 1918.⁶⁵¹ As the minister, he strived for the increase of the level of education and the development of the Polish universities and scientific societies in Cracow and Lviv.

Not much can be discovered about the life and activity of Ludwik Ćwikliński in Polish literature. Among the memoirs of the contemporary politicians, Stanisław Głąbiński⁶⁵² and Jakub Bojko write about him and mention that he was “a nice, well-behaved man.”⁶⁵³ Michał Bobrzyński also mentions him and writes that

645 J. Buszko, “Rittner Edward,” in: *PSB*, vol. XXXI, Wrocław 198–889, pp. 313–314.

646 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 182.

647 *WZ*, no. 229, October 2, 2895, p. 1.

648 *WZ*, no. 15, January 19, 1896, p. 1.

649 K. Liman. “Ćwikliński Ludwik” in: *Polacy w historii i kulturze*. . . , pp. 92 ff.

650 He was appointed as the head of the section in the Ministry of Cult and Education on June 23, 1917. *WZ*, no. 144, June 26, 1917, p. 2.

651 *WZ*, no. 169, July 26, 1918, p. 1

652 S. Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , p. 329

653 J. Bojko. “Dziennik 1911–1919” in: J. Bojko. *Goraçe słowa. Wybór pism*. Intr. and ed. F. Ziejka, Cracow 2002, p. 186.

in October 1908 Ćwikiliński was the head of the section in the ministry of education.⁶⁵⁴ However, in the quoted memoirs of Leon Biliński, Kazimierz Chłędowski, Ignacy Daszyński, Wincenty Witos, or Władysław Leopold Jaworski, I did not find any information about Ludwik Ćwikliński.

In the works of Polish authors, for instance, Roman Taborski, one can discover that he was educated as the classical philologist, the professor, and the dean of the University of Lviv. Next, in years 1899–1902, the deputy in the Imperial Council, and from 1902 he worked in the Ministry of Cult and Education as the head of the section. In the last years of the war, in 1917–1918, he was the minister of this department. Ćwikliński was also involved in social work for the sake of the Polish diaspora in Austria and occupied the position of the vice-president of the Polish Library Society in 1913.⁶⁵⁵ His name also appears in the appendix present in the compilation of Józef Buszko as a deputy to the Austrian parliament.⁶⁵⁶

The activity of Ludwik Ćwikliński was exhaustively described in the German study of Walter Leitsch.⁶⁵⁷ He was appointed as the head of the section and the ministerial adviser on February 26, 1902,⁶⁵⁸ and after fifteen years of service, on August 30, 1917, he was nominated as the Minister for Cult and Education as the oldest head of section in the ministry.⁶⁵⁹ He was dismissed from the Ministry on July 25, 1918.⁶⁶⁰

His tenure as the minister did not pass without conflicts and crises. Such a critical moment in his career occurred at the beginning of 1918. At this time, the cabinet crisis emerged based on the issue of the lack of sufficient majority in the house required to pass the budget bill. In such a situation, the government resigned on February 8, which was not accepted by the emperor.⁶⁶¹

The next breaking point was a situation that appeared after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed by Austro-Hungary with Ukraine, according to which

654 M. Bobrzyński. *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , pp. 138, 140.

655 R. Taborski, *Polacy w Wiedniu*. . . , p. 90.

656 *Reprezentacja polska w parlamencie wiedeńskim w latach 1848–1918*, ed. Cz. Brzoza, K. Stepan, in: J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . .

657 W. Leitsch, "Ludwig Ćwikliński (1853–1943), Sektionschef und Minister im k. k. Ministerium für Kultus und Unterricht," in: *Polen im alten Österreich. Kultur und Politik*, Vienna, Cologne, Weimar 1993.

658 WZ, no. 50, March 1, 1902, p. 1. On Ćwikliński's career in the Ministry, see: W. Leitsch, *Polen in alten Österreich*. . . , pp. 60–67.

659 WZ, no. 199, August 31, 1917, p. 1.

660 WZ, no. 169, July 26, 1918, p. 1.

661 W. Leitsch, *Polen in alten Österreich*. . . , p. 68.

the newly created Ukrainian state was given the eastern part of the Kingdom of Poland. This fact induced a stern opposition of the Polish Club and the transfer of the deputies to the opposition, which threatened with obstruction of the budget vote and war credits. Leitsch described the role of Ćwikliński during this crisis as not fully explainable in an unambiguous way. In contrast to the Minister for Galicia, Juliusz Twardowski, obliged to defend the interests of Poles and Galicia, Ćwikliński was primarily the imperial official and the member of the government. Moreover, he was born under the Prussian partition, in Gniezno. Nonetheless, the author of his biography underlines that he did not find any facts which would undermine his patriotism. He also wrote that the Polish politicians did not treat the minister of education as their representative.⁶⁶²

On February 18, 1918, both Polish ministers did not participate in the session of the government.⁶⁶³ During the cabinet crisis of the government of Karl Strügkh caused by the opposition of the Polish Club, the minister Ćwikliński and the minister for Galicia Twardowski intended to resign, but it was not accepted by the emperor.⁶⁶⁴ This crisis did not mean the end of Ćwikliński's political career. The emperor did not agree to the request of the Polish ministers. It seems that the Brest issue gave the Polish politicians the moral right to manifest their convictions. Thus, even though they were members of the Austrian government, they could show solidarity with the Polish deputies.⁶⁶⁵

It is worth underlining that as the Minister of Cult and Education, Ćwikliński fulfilled his goals effectively and with engagement. At the same time, we have to remember that his activity was hindered, since the period of his service took place during the war, and, thus, the country had at its disposal limited means for funding undertakings not related to war. Ćwikliński struggled with this problem and could not fully complete his duties given to him by the law. Despite that, he succeeded in regaining the buildings of some schools confiscated for military use. He also contributed to enabling formal education to the children of refugees. Moreover, he created special classes for older teenagers whose education was disrupted by the war or conscription. The minister introduced a certain innovation conditioned by the war situation; that is, he enabled access to higher education to those whose education was disrupted by the war without the need to pass the final high school exams.⁶⁶⁶ Ćwikliński also planned to develop the city and

662 W. Leitsch, *Polen in altenOsterreich*. . . , pp. 69 ff.

663 WZ, no. 40, February 19, 1918, p. 4.

664 S. Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , p. 329.

665 W. Leitsch, *Polen in altenOsterreich*. . . , p. 70.

666 W. Leitsch, *Polen in altenOsterreich*. . . , p. 72.

vocational schools, the reform of law studies and medicine, and the continuation of women's education.⁶⁶⁷

On the eve of the end of the war, Ćwikliński discovered in the press that in Warsaw there emerges the Polish government. Soon he was asked to become the Polish Minister of Education. Leitsch asks without giving the answers to the presented question: what could Ćwikliński feel when he was at the same time the Austrian minister and the minister of the informal Polish government? How should he behave in the changed conditions, when up to this point he remained loyal to the monarchy? And how was he perceived by the Polish politicians, when the Polish government emerged in Warsaw and Ćwikliński still served as the Austrian minister?⁶⁶⁸ Only after regaining the independence by Poland, Ćwikliński returned to his place of origin. He continued the academic career at the University of Poznan.

The last of the Poles on the position of the Minister of Cult and Education was Jerzy WiktorMadeyski, the son of the former minister of beliefs StanisławMadeyski.⁶⁶⁹

After completing studies and gaining the title of law doctor, he found employment in 1896 in the Ministry of Cult and Education. After getting promotion in 1913, he became the ministerial adviser; during the war, he was the head of the section of administering common schools, teacher seminars, and the general education supervision.⁶⁷⁰

He was the candidate of the Polish Club for the position of the minister in the penultimate Austrian government of Maximilian Hussark. On July 25, 1918, he assumed the position of the Minister of Cult and Education.⁶⁷¹ The period of his service amounted to as little as three months. He resigned on October 27, even before the dismissal of the entire cabinet.⁶⁷² He did not accept the proposition to assume the position in the next cabinet of Heinrich Lammasch. He wrote of himself that in 1916 he became "the subject of political concession of the Austrian

667 Despite this activity, Ćwikliński dealt with nominating professors, school headmasters, examiners, librarians, and museum custodians. Moreover, he visited schools and participated in school classes. Every week he devoted one hour for accepting petitioners. W. Leitsch, *Polen in altenOsterreich. . .*, pp. 73–74.

668 W. Leitsch, *Polen in altenOsterreich. . .*, pp. 76 ff.

669 Cz. Lechicki, "Madeyski Jerzy Wiktor," in: *PSB*, vol. XIX, Wrocław 1974, pp. 121mff.

670 Cz. Lechicki, "Madeyski Jerzy Wikor," in: *PSB*, vol. XIX, Wrocław 1974, p. 121.

671 *WZ*, no. 144, July 26, 1918, p. 2.

672 *WZ*, no. 250, October 29, 1918, p. 2.

government for the parliamentary Polish Club in Vienna.⁶⁷³ During the war, he was directed to help the governor in Lublin, general Kuk.⁶⁷⁴

Stanisław Głąbiński was the only Minister of Railways, he received the position in the cabinet of Richard von Bienenrth on January 9, 1911,⁶⁷⁵ and occupied the position until June 24, 1911.⁶⁷⁶ Ignacy Daszyński claimed that the government of Richard von Bienenrth “strengthened itself in winter of 1911 due to the nomination of mister Głąbiński as the Minister of Railways.”⁶⁷⁷

The not entirely resolved so-called canal issue was the reason for the fall of Richard von Bienenrth’s government. The prime minister claimed that despite the support from his side and some ministers, the issue fell, because Leon Biliński, the current Minister of Finance, did not refer it in a proper way. The Minister for Galicia Władysław Dulęba also supported Biliński. But Stanisław Głąbiński, the president of the Polish Club, was outraged by this fact and claimed that both ministers should resign. The president of the Club wrote that the prime minister had a conference with him on December 10, 1910, in which he informed him about his intentions. He wished to resign with the entire cabinet. The emperor accepted the resignation on December 12 and at the same time appointed Richard von Bienenrth for temporary service at this position.

Richard von Bienenrth’s cabinet was supposed to function in the changed manning. Głąbiński was proposed to appoint two candidates to assume the ministerial positions. He proposed Waclaw Zaleski as the Minister for Galicia and professors Stanisław Starzyński and Józef Buzek. No doubts were raised for these candidatures, excluding the emperor’s clear wish for Głąbiński to participate in the cabinet, who as a member of the cabinet would guarantee the support for government’s policies: “but Bienenrth received the mission to establish a new cabinet and decided to introduce in it the president of the Club Głąbiński to gain the Club’s support.”⁶⁷⁸ There were no additional conditions regarding the taking of particular resorts but the Ministry of Finance: according to the rule, a Pole could not be a successor of another Pole, the Minister of Finance.

The attitude of the Club to the cabinet was important, and that is why the prime minister wanted to gain Głąbiński’s provision of the Club’s support for

673 Qtd. after: Cz. Lechicki, “Madeyski Jerzy Wiktor,” in: *PSB*, vol. XIX. . . , p. 121.

674 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. II. . . , p. 23.

675 *WZ*, no. 7, January 10, 1911, p. 1.

676 *WZ*, no. 145, June 27, 1911, p. 1.

677 The prime minister was dissatisfied with this fact and claimed that Głąbiński “breaks with knees into the cabinet.” I. Daszyński. *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 84.

678 M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , p. 224

the government's politics. He received it under a stipulation that the new cabinet would strive to execute the bill regarding the construction of canals in Galicia and would commence the construction of the Zator-Sambir line and give credit guarantees to build the next canal lines. Bienerth accepted these conditions.⁶⁷⁹

Appointment as the Minister of Railways department he owed in a sense to Bobrzyński. Bienerth intended to appoint Głąbiński as the Minister for Galicia. The national democrats were also interested in the state ministry since Głąbiński at this position could influence the government, for instance in order to dismiss the governor Bobrzyński. Removing him and nominating a democrat or a national democrat would be connected to taking control over elections to the Diet. For that reason, and also due to the defense of his own position and the *status quo* of conservatives in Galicia, Bobrzyński intervened with the prime minister and opposed the candidature of Głąbiński for the minister for Galicia.⁶⁸⁰ The governor did not approve of this idea since he predicted that the cooperation of the Stańczyk and the national democrat would not go smoothly⁶⁸¹ That is why he suggested the prime minister appoint Głąbiński to the extra-parliamentary Railways department, claiming that as an economist, he would have no significant difficulties in governing this resort. In the technical issues, he could use the expert knowledge of the ministry's clerks. Bienerth accepted the governor's suggestions.⁶⁸²

As he himself recalled, he was not satisfied with his appointment as the Minister of Railways: "I refused this demand, because I had a distaste for the ministerial *career*, and I also sensed that there are some behind-the-scenes intrigues to take away my presidency in the Club and in the state politics." Then Głąbiński was threatened with the resolution of the parliament if he does not accept a ministerial position. The unanimous declaration of the parliamentary commission of the Club appeared, as a result, saying that the president has to take the ministerial nomination and demand the Ministry of Railways. After these events, he wrote: "It was a tragic day in my life. What some politicians

679 S. Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , p. 140.

680 A. Wątor, *Działalność Stronnictwa Demokratyczno-Narodowego w zaborze austriackim do roku 1914*, Szczecin 1993, p. 119.

681 , which was proved by the later events and the engagement of both politicians in the opposing political factions. As the minister, he was active in a fight between the "block" of Michał Bobrzyński, comprised of Cracow conservatives, democrats, adjectiveless, and the peasant party members, and the "anti-block" of national democrats and the Podolacy.

682 M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , pp. 225–226.

considered *the career* and the crowning of all political doings, for me was a moral defeat, because it pushed me from a clear political path and led me astray in a foreign and unsightly bureaucratic world.⁶⁸³

The nomination of Głąbiński as the Minister of Railways was a result of contradictory political interests of conservatives and national democrats, but it also stemmed from the will to remove the president of the Club from the current problems of the monarchy. Bienierth wanted in this way to deprive Głąbiński of influence on the ongoing Czech-German conflict.⁶⁸⁴ The appointment as the Minister of Railways imposed on him new, more serious duties, and thus the clerical resort guaranteed him not to mix into internal politics.⁶⁸⁵ The governor Bobrzyński wrote, that the Minister of Railways Głąbiński did not engage too much in his work: “he thought that now it is his turn for the great political role and by touring different states, particularly the Czech, for inspecting railways, he used this possibility to deliver political speeches and conduct his own policies independent from the prime minister and mix into the Czech-German conflict. It invoked the general surprise, worsened his position in the cabinet, and pushed count Bienierth from him.”⁶⁸⁶

Głąbiński writes in his diaries about intrigues constructed against him. It seems likely that Głąbiński rightly suspected that he fell victim to some political plots, and thus the defeat of getting the ministerial position was received by him much worse: “Now I got the forced, sad *promotion* to the minister.”⁶⁸⁷

As the member of the government, he was partially responsible for executing the canal bill and fulfilling the obligations of Bienierth’s government. Thus, he led talks with factions that were likely to support the bill. They ended successfully — the law with small changes passed in the house. Głąbiński also led to the creation of a special commission that supervised the execution of government’s obligation, which promised, for instance, that in the budget for 1912, there would be funds for canal construction. In the commission, there sat the Ministers of Railway, Industry and Trade, Public Works, and the Minister for Galicia. Judging the preparations to fulfill the canal bill, one can write that “it seemed that this time the issue stood on the firm ground.”⁶⁸⁸ Głąbiński meant to engage the deputy

683 S. Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , p. 141

684 This intention did not succeed, because Głąbiński, when visiting railways stations, delivered political speeches regarding the Czech issue.

685 “Nowy gabinet,” *Czas*, no. 14, January 1, 1911, p. 1; W. Łazuga, *Michał Bobrzyński. Myśl historyczna*. . . , pp. 145–146.

686 M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , p. 227.

687 S. Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , p. 142.

688 S. Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , p. 142.

Andrzej Kędzior, the former director of the melioration office in the National Department to work in direction and control of canal works. He even offered him the position of the head of a section, but the deputy refused to work with the government.

In his diaries, he mentions that his main goal was to conduct decentralization and commercialization of the Austrian railways, despite the opposition of military and financial Austrian factions. He also wanted to introduce the Polish language in the railways in Galicia.

But soon, the events turned to the minister's disfavor. After half a year of work of the interim cabinet a new election took place and Głębiński resigned, thus fostering the fall of the government: "in the cabinet he could not gain political influence and still identified with the national democrats: when they failed in the elections, he resigned, which was accepted on June 24."⁶⁸⁹ The new political constellation created a new government, the relations in the Polish Club changed as well, and Billiński "had the courage to blame the former government and the former Club for *mudding* the canal issue."⁶⁹⁰

4. Ministers Without Portfolio for Galicia

At the beginning of this section, it is necessary to note that *Pamiętniki* by K. Chłędowski provides much valuable information about the national ministers and the functioning of the ministry itself; therefore, the author often refers to the text. Apart from political zeal, Chłędowski also had a literary gift. He wrote under the pseudonym "Ignotus" (Unknown) and created many satirical portraits of contemporary Viennese and Galician politicians. His *Pamiętniki*, which appeared for the first time thirty years after his death, made a significant contribution to history.⁶⁹¹

Indeed, one can regard Grocholski's appointment as the national minister as a breakthrough event. In Vienna: "people welcomed Grocholski as the new Minister for Galicia in a friendly manner. Mr. Kazimierz even became the hero of the day in Vienna and aroused curiosity full of kindness in the highest and social spheres. Everyone wanted to get to know this Sarmatian, who was to take a seat in Polish costume in the Habsburg Crown Council!"⁶⁹² Franciszek

689 M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , p. 249.

690 S. Głębiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , p. 142.

691 Forst-Battaglia, *Polnisches Wien*, p. 102; S. Wasylewski, "Chłędowski Kazimierz," in: PSB, vol. III, Wrocław 1937.

692 "As we know, Mr. Kazimierz never took off his national costume, once he had put it on, and we owe it to him that he transformed the costume from a sign of agitation into

Ksawery d'Abancourt described the Minister for Galicia in the following words: "Grocholski declares himself in terms of confession of political faith as a conservative autonomist and therefore he is a firm opponent of federalism . . . due to these characteristic Polish traits and an outstanding autonomous tendency, Grocholski was not a well-suited element in Hohenwart's Cabinet, which sometimes used all available means to achieve goals and which respected only Czech representatives regardless of the needs of other crown countries."⁶⁹³

One tends to emphasize that as a minister, Grocholski Polonized the lectures at the University of Lviv, but Grocholski only executed governmental decisions.

When Grocholski resigned together with Hohenwart's government, despite the emperor's request to remain as the Minister for Galicia, Grocholski said: "this is not a question of people, but a question of the system, we were bound together by one thought or not, I do not separate myself from my colleagues."⁶⁹⁴ The next Prime Minister was Karl Auersperg, a centralist, who, together with his appointment, received an order from the emperor to present a candidacy for the Minister for Galicia: "since Grocholski's solidarity with Hohenwart's Cabinet did not allow him to continue to hold the office."⁶⁹⁵ However, Grocholski's successor, Florian Ziemiałkowski, was appointed only two years later: "the opportunist Ziemiałkowski . . . received a ministerial chair after Grocholski, and he will curry the favor with the lords of Cracow."⁶⁹⁶

a national affirmation," S. Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego w Radzie Państwa 1879r.*, Kraków 1879, p. 8.

693 D'Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna monarchii*, p. 168.

694 J [. . .], "Dwutygodnik polityczny," in: *Przegląd Lwowski*, 1871, no. 22, p. 737.

695 D'Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna monarchii*, p. 190.

696 Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej*, p. 106. However, Prime Minister Auersperg's first candidate for the office of the national minister was Antoni Wodzicki. After it had perused the government's political program, the Polish Club decisively opposed the idea that the Pole would become a member of the centralist cabinet. Even the emperor intervened in this matter, but Wodzicki refused to accept the nomination. The government resumed the negotiations on the manning of the national ministry only a year later, at the turn of 1873. The nomination of the minister who was a compatriot became then a bargaining chip in the hands of the government, which made the appointment of the national minister dependent on the support of the Polish Club for the draft law on direct elections to the Imperial Council. Perhaps the Polish Club did wrong when it insisted on its program and thereby did not man the national ministry. The presence of a Pole in the government, although without much power, could have had some influence on the fate of the resolution. The emperor was the person who was very keen to fill the vacant office, and in this way, he wanted to mitigate the failure of Poles in the resolution campaign. Agenor Gołuchowski senior

Ziemiałkowski came to Vienna on April 7, 1873, and immediately met with Auersperg and Lasser, who offered him to assume the national ministry. Ziemiałkowski formally gave his consent on April 19, the nomination was signed on April 21, on the same day that the mandates of the members of the Imperial Council were annulled, and the nomination was announced on April 23.⁶⁹⁷ The next day, on April 24, Ziemiałkowski assumed the office of minister. The office was a compensation for the defeat suffered as a result of the resolution campaign. The emperor wanted Galicia to accept changes in the electoral law peacefully.⁶⁹⁸

The assumption of the ministerial portfolio has been interpreted differently. S. Kieniewicz assessed that Ziemiałkowski was the only Pole who could: “agreed to join a clearly anti-Polish Cabinet, despite such a recent violation of the rights of the Diet. So a three-time prisoner of state wore a uniform with a gold collar; Ziemiałkowski contributed more than once to the Polish question in Vienna, but he never regained his former popularity among his compatriots.”⁶⁹⁹ Ziemiałkowski became the minister: “as if as a sign that this nomination was only an act of the highest grace of the monarch and the recognition of Governor-general Gołuchowski’s efforts, as there is no doubt that the nomination of Ziemiałkowski resulted from the introduction made by Gołuchowski, and was a result of his strong support.”⁷⁰⁰ Nevertheless, Ziemiałkowski’s assumption of the office: “was accompanied by the wishes of all sensible people and true patriots, and the hopes attached to such an important newly acquired position of the

was the mediator between the Polish Club and the government. The negotiations with the government began in December 1872. The Council of Ministers also devoted to the issue of the agreement between the Polish Club and the government, one of its sittings on February 7 in which the emperor and A. Gołuchowski participated. The government made some concessions, promised to appoint a national minister, and favorably locate constituencies to give Poles a better chance for election to the House than Ruthenians. However, the Polish Club was tenacious, and on February 22, it decided to leave the sitting of the Imperial Council, which happened on March 6, Fras, *Florian Ziemiałkowski*, pp. 156–157.

697 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 95 of April 21, 1873, p. 1. Most probably, the Governor-general A. Gołuchowski, who was a member of the same Mamluk faction as F. Ziemiałkowski, significantly contributed to the nomination, Fras, *Florian Ziemiałkowski*, pp. 157–158.

698 Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, p. 75; Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*, p. 267.

699 Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*, p. 229.

700 D’Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna monarchii*, p. 211.

Minister for Galicia, particularly since a man, who was to assume it, was politically uncommon.⁷⁰¹

However, after the assumption of the office, the most controversial issue was the determination of the minister's scope of powers. Ziemiałkowski expected not only that he will have the same scope of powers as his predecessor, but also that it will be extended. Ziemiałkowski conducted negotiations with Lasser on this matter, but the character of the demands he made is not known. After the beginning of his term of office, the number of Ministry officials increased to three, and the supreme decision of June 12, 1873, determined the scope of activity of the national minister.⁷⁰² The competences of the national minister were never officially published.⁷⁰³

Ziemiałkowski first appeared in the Imperial Council in 1874. Ziemiałkowski opposed then the draft law on the renunciation of Galician Diet of its legislative rights regarding polytechnics in favor of the Imperial State at the cost of obtaining funds for the construction of a new building of the Lviv Polytechnic.⁷⁰⁴ The Minister of Education, Karl Stremayr, also supported the stance of the

701 Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego*, p. 225.

702 During F. Ziemiałkowski's term of office, three officials worked in the national ministry: Filip Zaleski and Jan Lidl: "the first figure in the office," the former municipal councillor in Lviv, Władysław Mikiewicz, chancellery official, F. Zaleski's protégé: "well-read individual who knew a lot of things, which even went beyond the scope of his position." The minister had a small cabinet at his disposal, and he accepted clients in a larger one, Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, pp. 5–6, 14. The composition of official positions in the national ministry often changed, also due to the intrigues of the minister's wife, Helena Oksza-Ziemiałkowska. In the period between 1873 and 1888, the Ministry for Galicia hired: F. Zaleski, J. Lidl (in 1883, he was transferred to the Galician office in the Ministry of the Interior, in 1888, he became the vice-President of the Governorate of Lviv), Henryk Roża until 1881, who was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior, K. Chłędowski since 1881, W. Mikiewicz, who died in 1889. Count Kazimierz Borkowski, Antoni Chamiec, Count Włodzimierz Łoś, and Roman Szymanowski worked a short time in the national ministry, see Goldinger, *Das polnische Element*, pp. 65, 73–75.

703 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 14; Goldinger, *Die Zentralverwaltung in Cisleithanien*, p. 187.

704 At one of its meetings, the Polish Club discussed the issue of the division of competences between the Diets and the Imperial Council in terms of legislative rights regarding schools. At that time, deputies claimed that the competences of national authorities should not include the power over polytechnics, because their maintenance would entail significant costs, Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego z dnia 23 listopada 1867 r., in: *Protokoły Koła Polskiego*, pp. 118–119.

national minister. However, the budget committee of the parliament adopted the draft, although it had to withdraw it because A. Gołuchowski had previously signed a contract for the construction of the university building.⁷⁰⁵

Ziemiałkowski spent the first years of the term of office of the national minister on building his own political party, organized in cooperation with Gołuchowski, whose program was based on the foundation of utilitarianism and loyalty to the monarchy. Z. Fras wrote that: “December 17 was the beginning of the activity of the government party *par excellence*.”⁷⁰⁶ It was to serve primarily the minister himself, who needed political support in Vienna to implement his own policy. He did not have the support of the Polish Club, in which Grocholski’s followers held a dominant position. Ziemiałkowski rarely managed to persuade Polish deputies to support the policy of the government. At the time, Ziemiałkowski was: “an intermediary, and more so in a technical than a political sense, between the deputation and the government.”⁷⁰⁷

Two years after the assumption of the ministry, Ziemiałkowski’s position was still weak. The attempt to limit the powers of the National School Council, one of the significant achievements of the autonomy, may serve as an example. At that time, Ziemiałkowski came into conflict with the Minister of Education, K. Stremayr, and the powers of the National School Council were a contentious issue.⁷⁰⁸ When K. Stremayr intended to limit the powers of the National School

705 Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, p. 85.

706 Fras, *Florian Ziemiałkowski*, p. 170.

707 The national minister also did not have the trust and support of the Galician public opinion. The Galician public opinion claimed that he was incompetent as a minister and did not contribute to the Polish national cause in the monarchy, but merely conducted a behind-the-scenes policy, which was full of intrigues and ineffective, Fras, *Florian Ziemiałkowski*, p. 171.

708 M. Bobrzyński, “Statut Rady Szkolnej Krajowej Galicyjskiej. Studium prawno-polityczne,” in: CPE, 1903, no. 4, p. 40. See: *Michał Bobrzyński w Radzie Szkolnej Krajowej*, Kraków 1901. On November 30, 1874, an Austrian deputy, a professor from Innsbruck, T. Wildauer, filed a motion in the house against the Tyrolean clergy, but which also aimed at limiting the powers of the National School Council, granted to it in 1867 based on the regulation. The centralists intended to use the motion against their cabinet until they could pass a vote of no confidence. However, thanks to the contribution of Minister Lasser, this did not happen. The house resolved the problem by postponing the consideration of Wildauer’s motion until the next parliamentary session. As a response, or rather a protest, against the initiative of the deputy, the Diet of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria adopted a resolution in which the Diet stated: “The National School Council fully meets the needs of the country and conducts a salutary activity regarding folk education.” The case of the National School

Council,⁷⁰⁹ Ziemiałkowski threatened to resign,⁷¹⁰ but he remained in the office: “when the President of the Polish Club strongly advised him to do it.”⁷¹¹

After the incident, the powers of the national minister were extended, thereby his position in the Council of Ministers was strengthened, and there was also an improvement in relations with the Minister of Education: “from now on, there was no accident of omission of the nomination of directors or professors who were proposed by the National School Council”⁷¹²

Fras believes that: Ziemiałkowski remained in the government thanks to his utilitarian policy. However, Fras negatively evaluates Ziemiałkowski’s decision, as he claims that the policy of utilitarianism caused the differences between

Council was brought to the session of the Education Committee after the beginning of the next session of the house in March 1875, and it adopted Wildauer’s motion with a majority of votes. Noteworthy, the National School Council was not subject to the All-Austrian School Act of 1868, so it was free to nominate school directors and professors or to choose school textbooks. The Minister of Education predicted that submission of the draft, which limited the powers of the Council to the house could cause opposition of the Polish Club, which would put the government in a disadvantageous position. K. Stremayr solved this problem before Wildauer’s motion was submitted to the house. He used the existing regulation of October 23, 1875, under which nominations of directors in secondary schools require sanctions, and professorial nominations belong to the powers of the Minister of Education. Avoiding parliamentary debate, Stremayr did not prevent Wildauer’s motion from being passed in the House of Deputies, but it did not pass in the House of Lords. Thus, there was a conflict between the minister and the Polish Club, which opposed the intervention within the competences of the National School Council. For instance, deputy E. Czerkowski spoke about destroying the bridges that could guarantee cooperation between Polish deputies and the government party. Eventually, the issue of the competences of the National School Council was resolved following the intentions of the Minister of Education, that is, in the way of regulation, D’Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna monarchii*, pp. 216–219, 221–224.

709 Stremayer made such a decision after the insistence of the Ruthenians and the Galician press, which negatively assessed the activities of the National School Council, D’Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna monarchii*, pp. 224–225.

710 In fact, Ziemiałkowski resigned when he sent the decision to the emperor, who was in Gödöllő at the time. In response, he received a handwritten letter from the emperor with a negative decision and an order to continue to act as the Minister for Galicia, Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego*, p. 238.

711 F. Zaleski and the deputies: Baum, Jaworski, and Gniewosz, knew about the planned resignation, D’Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna monarchii*, pp. 224–225.

712 D’Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna monarchii*, p. 227.

compromise and opportunism to fade: "Hiding behind the slogans realpolitik and practical politics, Ziemiałkowski headed toward opportunism."⁷¹³

The period of the significant influence of Poles in the monarchy began in 1879. Along with Czech and German-Clerical deputies, they created a political base for Eduard Taaffe's Cabinet. Apart from Ziemiałkowski, there was Julian Dunajewski, the Minister of the Treasury, in his government.⁷¹⁴

The relations between the two Polish ministers were not successful, and from the very beginning, there were many conflicts. When Dunajewski assumed office, Ziemiałkowski suggested that Dunajewski consults with him on more critical decisions, arguing that he wanted to avoid accusations that Poles could not cooperate. The Minister of the Treasury did not accept such a proposal, as he suspected that Ziemiałkowski had not quite honest intentions.⁷¹⁵ K. Chłędowski played a particular role in the conflicts between the ministers-compatriots.⁷¹⁶

The conflict between ministers aggravated in the second half of the 1880s, and the deterioration of relations resulted from a change in the existing distillery tax. At that time, Ziemiałkowski defended the interests of distillery owners, agricultural associations, and mayors of towns who were subject to the propination laws.⁷¹⁷ To some extent, Ziemiałkowski was also a spokesman for the policy of the Polish Club. When, in February, a draft amendment to the land tax, opposed by the Polish Club, was brought to the Imperial Council, the Polish Club decided to send a deputation to the national minister to make every effort to ensure "that the draft amendment did not become a law."⁷¹⁸

713 Fras, *Florian Ziemiałkowski*, p. 177.

714 Along with the appointment of ministers to the Taaffe Cabinet, the emperor decorated Ziemiałkowski in 1879 with the Order of the Iron Crown of the First Class: "One can regard this distinction as a triumph of the autonomous idea, which this tireless minister in work for the good of the country substituted in the most difficult circumstances in the Crown Council," D'Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna monarchii*, pp. 297–298.

715 Fras, *Florian Ziemiałkowski*, p. 198.

716 Both Dunajewski and Ziemiałkowski discussed with him their resentment toward each other, which put an official of the national ministry in an ambiguous situation. Therefore, Chłędowski gave both of them only information that was flattering to them. Thereby, he wanted to contribute to the mitigation of the conflicts between them, Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 94.

717 On the conflict between the Minister of the Treasury, the Minister for Galicia, and the Polish Club on the issue of distillery tax, see subchapter 3.

718 Posiedzenia Koła Polskiego nr. 274 z dnia 19 lutego 1879 r., in: *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, BCz, MS 1241, ff. 404, 480.

Eventually, the disputed distillers' tax was adopted in June, and Dunajewski demanded then the resignation of his antagonist and the appointment of Filip Zaleski, the former Governor-general of Galicia. In such a situation, Badeni, a friend of Dunajewski, who had been running for this office for a long time, would become the Governor-general. The success of the Minister of Finance would also be Badeni's success. Meanwhile, Henryk Halban, the direction of the House of Deputies' Chancellery, visited Ziemiałkowski, and he suggested that Ziemiałkowski resign. However, it was only the Prime Minister's visit that caused the Minister for Galicia to resign. The conflict within the Taaffe-Dunajewski government resulted in the resignation of Ziemiałkowski, who was dismissed from the position of the Minister for Galicia on October 11, 1888.⁷¹⁹

Immediately after his nomination for the position of the national minister, Ziemiałkowski said: "I consider myself to be in an advanced position; poI will hold it until worthier and more appropriate individual replaces me."⁷²⁰ Whether he managed to do it, according to Kieniewicz, yes: "With the patience of many-year effort, Ziemiałkowski reached the peak of his career and served his country at the same time."⁷²¹ Chłędowski, a ministerial official who remained in contact with him on a daily basis, also claimed that the national minister had done a great deal of work for Galicia: "And this minister did much good for the country, because the very fact that every more important act was to be presented to him, caused hateful referees in the ministries to mitigate so that they hide their claws a little. Some people feared that Ziemiałkowski would complain that he would go to the emperor, who was our only friend."⁷²²

Undoubtedly, his personality traits helped him in this: "Highly political temperament and sense, great abilities, flexibility, diligence, acumen, cleverness, and even cunning, a desire for being important, these are the first-rate qualities which made Mr. Ziemiałkowski one of the most important personalities in our country and which helped him to have important and undeniable merits."⁷²³

After his death, the socialist press positively assessed him and rated him among: "the last Polish democrats of the old type," the generation that: "attempted to inaugurate in 1848 the spring of freedom and the brotherhood of the peoples." The obituary published in *Naprzód* stated that: "he was a man who was

719 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 237 of October 13, 1888, p. 1. J. Buszko claims it happened on October 24, 1888, Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, p. 129.

720 Quote in: Fras, *Florian Ziemiałkowski*, p. 159.

721 Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*, p. 235.

722 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 14.

723 Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego*, p. 326.

personally impeccable and noble. He will leave behind a good memory of himself as a man in the nation.”⁷²⁴

Filip Zaleski became the Minister for Galicia on October 11, 1888.⁷²⁵ The appointment for the office of a minister without portfolio meant somewhat a departure from the arena of high politics. The case of F. Zaleski itself may serve as an example, as he regarded the dismissal from the office of the Governor-general as a personal failure and professional degradation. One may explain that Zaleski was disappointed with the appointment for the national minister because he was perfectly aware of the end of his political career: “The exchange of the position of the governor of a country of seven million people, the head of an extensive administration for the office of a minister without portfolio consisting of several rooms, the head of one counsellor, one secretary, and one janitor, lost in the chaos of big Viennese bureaucracy, was the definitive end of his career.”⁷²⁶

The very notification of nomination to Zaleski occurred in interesting circumstances: “Dunajewski came to the sessions for a short time, and Governor Filip Zaleski invited us, the deputies, along with the rest of the Lviv Society, to a grand reception in honor of the Minister of the Treasury. At about 11 o'clock at night Dunajewski took — here is what I saw and understood — the host by the hand and went with him carefully to his office, where Dunajewski handed him a letter from Taaffe, who, by the imperial order, demanded his resignation from the office of the Governor-general and offered him a portfolio of the Minister for Galicia.”⁷²⁷

Feldman perceived Zaleski primarily as an employee of the state administration, not a politician: “a weak, soulless bureaucrat.”⁷²⁸ Chłędowski claimed that: “Zaleski did not care much about the office, but having much administrative routine, he sometimes did more than the minister, who sits a lot in the

724 “Floryan Ziemiałkowski,” in: *Naprzód*, advance copy of March 29, 1900, p. 3–4.

725 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 23 of October 13, 1888, p. 1.

726 Rosco-Bogdanowicz, *Wspomnienia*, vol. I, p. 293.

727 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, p. 49. Rosco-Bogdanowicz similarly described those events: “he took the Governor-general’s hand and moved him to the office at the end of the apartments.” Their conversation lasted quite a long time, and when they returned: “the minister smiled freely, the Governor-general was apparently low-spirited . . . no one knew what could have been the reason.” The situation clarified only the next day in the Diet, where F. Zaleski’s dismissal from the position of the Governor-general was announced along with the nomination for the position of the Minister for Galicia, Rosco-Bogdanowicz, *Wspomnienia*, vol. I, p. 293.

728 Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*, p. 193.

office and understands little. At the same time, Zaleski, befriended with a few colleagues, sometimes used these friendships to obtain something that others were not able to achieve officially. Taaffe underestimated Zaleski quite a bit, but Taaffe had sympathy for him.”⁷²⁹

Paweł Popiel emphasized the lack of Zaleski’s predispositions to perform the function of the Governor-general, and he added: “Average abilities, eastern cunning inherited with blood, and great initial diligence paved him a way for further activity.”⁷³⁰

Zaleski intervened along with Minister Dunajewski in the matter of canceling of Galicia’s indemnification debt, and he discussed it at the meeting of the parliamentary committee in May 1890, saying that the size of the debt exceeded Galicia’s financial capabilities.⁷³¹ Biliński emphasized the minister’s cooperation with the Prime Minister: “After all, Mr. Zaleski was a brave assistant to Taaffy as a minister.”⁷³²

In November 1893, after the submission of Alfred Windischgrätz’s government program, the Polish Club assessed it rather negatively. Noteworthy, at the time, the Polish Club did not have president, and therefore it was unreliable in its proceedings. Zaleski himself demanded that the guidelines of an autonomous nature supplement the program, and he prepared a resolution to this end. The members of the Polish Club did not oppose itself, but they proposed to rewrite the content of the resolution. Ultimately, therefore, it was demanded that the government take into consideration autonomous demands in its program, which consisted in granting equal rights to all countries of the monarchy. The Polish Club, as distinct from the liberal center and the German left, supported the government in the hope that these demands would be considered. Zaleski was dismissed on November 11, 1893.

729 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 109.

730 Popiel wrote that Zaleski obtained such a high position in administration thanks to Gołuchowski senior, who educated him to become a competent and professional official. However, the substantive basis did not guarantee him any significant successes because Zaleski: “did not have enough energy.” Popiel negatively assessed Zaleski as the Governor-general: “One could say that for a few years now Galicia has not been administered, laws and regulations have not been properly enforced, the rural police have not been able to do anything, business lingers — in a word, one can feel a great breakdown,” Popiel, *Pamiętniki Pawła Popiela*, pp. 203–204.

731 Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, pp. 137–139.

732 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, p. 50.

The next Minister for Galicia was Apolinary Jaworski, who received nomination on November 11, 1893, in the coalition government of A. Windischgrätz, and after its dissolution, he was the national minister in the government of Erich Kielmansegg.⁷³³ Jaworski was dismissed on September 30 1895.⁷³⁴

The term of office of A. Jaworski was short, and it lasted only two years. According to Chłędowski, Jaworski did not have proper predisposition to perform function in the administrative apparatus: “While in the parliament Jaworski spoke well, concisely, he could not write anything in the office; I had to watch him closely, so that he would not make any inappropriate note, which he sometimes wanted to do . . . During the sessions of the Councils of Ministers, Jaworski completely surrendered to Madeyski and almost always went hand in hand with him.” Chłędowski also added that the cooperation between the minister and the officials of the Ministry for Galicia was successful: “it was very comfortable for me; Jaworski did not understand much about the official activities, so I arranged everything and submitted it only for his signature. My relationship with him was enjoyable; he was polite, friendly, but this jester had a great deal of respect for the Prime Minister so that he would maintain his position.”⁷³⁵

When the Badeni began forming a new cabinet in 1895, Jaworski, like Madeyski, resented the fact that Badeni had not left them in government on their current positions.⁷³⁶

Before Badeni appointed Jaworski’s successor, Leon Biliński, Minister of the Treasury, headed the Ministry for Galicia from September 30, 1895, to January 17, 1896: “Therefore, there was an interregnum at Schillerplatz for three months.”⁷³⁷ In practice, Chłędowski performed the function of the minister, because Biliński dealt with issues related to the function of the Minister of the Treasury, such as the functioning of the Ministry’s agendas: “Biliński almost entirely left me a

733 *Wiener Zeitung* no. 260 of November 12, 1893, p. 1; *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* as the date of nomination gives the date of its publication in the press, that is, November 12, J. Buszko, “Jaworski Apolinary,” in: PSB, vol. XI, Wrocław 1964–65, p. 104. Apart from Jaworski, Stanisław Madeyski was the Minister of Education in the government.

734 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 229 of October 2, 1895, p. 1.

735 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, pp. 127–128.

736 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 188. Biliński mentioned that: “Jaworski, the Minister for Galicia at the time, was very much incensed at Badeni and me because of this replacement. During my visit, which I made as his nominal successor, he responded to Badeni’s diplomatic assurances with open anger and bile,” Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, p. 92.

737 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 229 of October 2, 1895, p. 1; no. 15 of January 19, 1896, p. 1.

household at Schillerplatz; I only went to him, to the Ministry of Finance, almost every day with documents to sign, and once a week, usually on Sunday, Biliński would come to Schillerplatz for two hours to give audiences as Minister for Galicia.”⁷³⁸ Thus, Biliński was only formally Minister for Galicia, while in fact, Chłędowski performed the function.

During this “interregnum” period, neither the minister for Galicia nor the ministry for Galicia was in use, and therefore the name “Leiter” was not used, and as Chłędowski recalled: “At the time, someone invented extremely unwise formula, namely that ‘the emperor entrusts Biliński with the agendas that Jaworski led.’”⁷³⁹

With the nomination of Tadeusz Rittner and Emil Guttenberg, *Wiener Zeitung* published acknowledgments to Biliński for running the national ministry and the ministry of national railways.⁷⁴⁰

Before Edward Rittner⁷⁴¹ became the national minister, he was the head of the Ministry of Religion and Education.⁷⁴² Rittner was nominated only on January 17, 1896, and only so that the ministerial nominations of Poles to the government did not arouse dissatisfaction among the Germans. Moreover, at the same time, Emil Guttenberg was appointed the head of the Ministry of Railways.⁷⁴³

Chłędowski positively assessed Rittner, as Chłędowski wrote about him that: “the most talented man came to the ministry with Rittner.”⁷⁴⁴

738 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 175.

739 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 13. The phrase originally was: “betraue Sie gleichzeitig provisorisch mit den bisher vom Minister Ritter von Jaworski versehenen Agenden,” in: *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 229 of October 2, 1895, p. 1.

740 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 15 of January 19, 1896, p. 1.

741 J. Buszko, “Rittner Edward,” in: PSB, vol. XXXI, Wrocław 1988–89, pp. 313–314.

742 A colleague, a friend of the future national minister and Badeni’s brother, Stanisław Badeni, proposed candidacy of Rittner. Stanisław Badeni was Kazimierz’s brother, and Rittner was his school friend and colleague, and Rittner maintained close contacts with the Badeni family.

743 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 15 of January 19, 1896, p. 1; Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 158.

744 Since the beginning of his career in administration, Rittner has been known as a reliable official and, more importantly, a defender of the Polish affairs: “in his department, Rittner worked with great firmness and civil courage, which Vienna bureaucrats usually did not have. I have read several of his reports to the emperor on Galician affairs, in which Rittner so openly, so courageously, and so convincingly defended national affairs in a way that no official has so far dared to do so. Rittner’s style was clear, and his thought was sensible; his coverage of the subject accurate and precise . . . apart from Dunajewski, Rittner is the most outstanding of Polish ministers we have ever had in Vienna, Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II,” pp. 182–183.

Rittner played a significant role during Badeni's two-year rule. It was him whom the Prime Minister entrusted with the task of preparing the electoral law reform regarding the Imperial Council: "Rittner's draft was received much more cordially than all the others that had ever been created in the heads of deputies and ministers." However, Chłędowski stressed that it was not without flaws. Namely, the combination of the principle of universal suffrage in the fifth curia and the principle of representation of interests in the four remaining curiae resulted in the fact that elected members of the fifth curia were represented by a much more significant proportion of voters than members of the other curiae.⁷⁴⁵

Rittner was also the author of another important project, namely the language regulations for Bohemia and Moravia. The essence of this project was to introduce linguistic equality between the Czech and German populations. The regulations were the cause of the dissolution of the government and caused a prolonged crisis in the Austrian parliamentary system. They caused a sharp conflict between the Czechs and the Germans. Both Polish ministers in the Badeni government, Rittner, and Biliński mediated in talks between the two parties on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The Minister for Galicia conducted negotiations with Czech politicians and the Minister of the Treasury with German politicians. The national minister consistently explained to the Czechs that these regulations treat both sides fairly, and they respect the national interests of each of them. Resistance on both sides of the conflict caused the dissolution of the government, and on November 28, all the ministers resigned. At the time, Rittner withdrew from political life, and his medical condition was not favorable to more significant public activity.⁷⁴⁶ Neither Rittner nor Biliński regretted leaving their positions in the government. Even before his resignation, Rittner said to the Minister of the Treasury: if only we knew how to abandon the ministry!⁷⁴⁷

The current political conditions in the country also influenced nominations for the office of Minister for Galicia. As an example may serve the situation that arose after the dissolution of the Badeni government. Badeni's successor was Paul

745 During one of the discussions in the house, Daszyński told Wojciech Dzieduszycki: "Count Dzieduszycki does not represent anyone to me; 20,000 citizens elected me, while some dinner society of a dozen or so noblemen elected Mr. Dzieduszycki, Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II," p. 183.

746 See: Łazuga, „Rządy polskie” w Austrii.

747 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 197. "On the eve of the dissolution of Badeni's cabinet, Chłędowski visited Rittner, who: says, like every resigning minister, that he is happy for this hectic life to be over," Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, pp. 216, 224.

Gautsch, and at the very beginning of his term of office, Gautsch encountered skepticism on the part of the Polish Club. Polish politicians refused to accept the portfolio of Minister for Galicia in his office. Leon Piniński, Leonard Piętak, and Wojciech Dzieduszycki acted this way.⁷⁴⁸ The Prime Minister preferred to appoint to the office someone with parliamentary experience, that is, a member of the Polish Club. There was no consensus in the Polish Club itself when it came to the nomination of the national minister. There was an opinion among the deputies that the new Prime Minister should not count on an eminent person, but he should offer the ministry to a higher official. Jaworski expressed opposite opinion, as he claimed that: “the Prime Minister would fight with all his might against the idea of the nomination of an official for the office of Minister for Galicia because, in his opinion, the Polish Club should not let this position out of its hands.” Rittner recommended Prime Minister to nominate Leonard Piętak as a candidate of the Polish Club or Chłędowski if an official were to become a minister. Zaleski proposed to Gautsch that Herman Loebel become a minister. Eventually, H. Loebel, the former Governor-general of Moravia, a member of the State Tribunal, Badeni’s adversary, became the minister.⁷⁴⁹ Loebel received nomination on December 16, 1897.⁷⁵⁰ He was known for his talkativeness.⁷⁵¹

Loebel held the office for several months, and during this time, he participated in the ministerial meeting on the conclusion of the Czech-German conflict and the resolution of the parliamentary crisis. At the time, Loebel proposed three

748 Piniński and Piętak refused after a few days of reflection. In mid-December 1897, the parliamentary committee of the Polish Club unanimously decided that Dzieduszycki would become Minister for Galicia: “Rutowski proposed a motion others did not oppose. The committee includes: Jaworski, Kozłowski, Piniński, Jędrzejowicz; each of them reviles Dzieduszycki, laughs at him, says that he would only disgrace Poles, and when it comes to voting, none of them has civil courage to say that Dzieduszycki entirely does not qualify as a minister,” Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 221. However, Dzieduszycki refused the portfolio proposed to him, K. K. Daszyk, *Osobliwy Podolak. W kręgu myśli historiozoficznej i społeczno-politycznej Wojciecha hr. Dzieduszyckiego*, Kraków 1993, p. 15.

749 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 221; Łazuga, *Austria po upadku „rządów polskich”*, p. 55.

750 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 290 of December 17, 1897, p. 1.

751 “Nowadays, the first impression I got from a conversation with Loebel was that the talkativeness alarmingly increased with age (he was sixty-two), that he generally grew old, but he was still a sage and experienced man . . . As a result of his talkativeness, Loebel needed ten times as much time to receive guests than ordinary ministers generally need to receive them,” Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, pp. 225–226.

conclusions, and one of them, of which the emperor was most likely to consent, was to grant autonomy to the Austrian provinces and slavice Austria. Prime Minister and A. Gołuchowski junior were of a similar opinion. The applicant himself was not satisfied with the choice of this solution because it was risky. It was very likely that Germans but also smaller crown countries, that would not be granted autonomy, would oppose it. At the same time: “although he anticipates the danger that this project would entail, he could not oppose it because he is already a representative of the Slavic province.”⁷⁵² This fact undoubtedly proved the problematic role of the national minister, who, despite the right to decide only on Galician matters, was obliged to cooperate with departmental ministers and to settle matters of statewide importance. Thus, the national minister was exposed to criticism of the public opinion, when his views and presented stance were not in line with its expectations.

Loebl was dismissed on March 7, 1898, and on the same day, a new government was appointed along with Adam Jędrzejowicz as the Minister for Galicia.⁷⁵³

The Polish Club was a place that enabled many Poles to achieve higher state positions, including ministerial nominations. The promotion of Adam Jędrzejowicz may serve here as an example.⁷⁵⁴ Jędrzejowicz owed his career to Badeni, who: “promoted his Adaś as the vice-president of the Polish Club. After becoming the vice president of the Polish Club, Adaś was just one step away from the ministerial bench, and he managed to make this step.”⁷⁵⁵ For a certain period, Jędrzejowicz was an official of the Governorate: “however, he did not exert himself, he proved to be an incapable official and left the governmental service, fortunately for himself and the Governorate.”⁷⁵⁶

In Jędrzejowicz’s case, the decision to nominate him was made most probably without consultation of his candidacy with the Polish Club, as Chłędowski claimed: “Rapaport informed me about the nomination of Jędrzejowicz two days before its announcement; Rapaport knew this from Jędrzejowicz himself, his protégé; the deputies, apart from Jaworski, did not know anything yet.”⁷⁵⁷

Jędrzejowicz became the national minister in E. Thun’s Cabinet in March 1898, and he remained at the office until October 1899.⁷⁵⁸ During this period,

752 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 231.

753 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 55 of March 8, 1898, pp. 1–2.

754 J. Buszko, “Jędrzejowicz Adam,” in: PSB, vol. XI, Wrocław 1964–65, pp. 238–239.

755 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 249.

756 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, pp. 248–249.

757 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, pp. 233–234.

758 Buszko, “Jędrzejowicz Adam,” p. 239.

Jędrzejowicz tried to contribute to national affairs, but Chłędowski was very strict about his superior.⁷⁵⁹ Similarly, Biliński did not mention him in a very favorable way, as he wrote that in principle Jędrzejowicz was dependent on the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister was as sympathetic to Polish affairs as the national minister strove for them.⁷⁶⁰ During that period, the normalization of the situation in Czech countries was a much more critical issue for the government than the Galician issues.

At the end of September 1899, the parliamentary committee of the Polish Club decided not to allow Jędrzejowicz to accept nomination for the office of the Minister for Galicia. The main reason was to decide whether the national minister should be an official or a member of the Polish Club. Włodzimierz Kozłowski, Wojciech Dzieduszycki, and Milewski were against the appointment of a deputy to the office of the Minister for Galicia, while Apolinary Jaworski, Dawid Abrahamowicz, and Adam Jędrzejowicz were in favor of maintaining the current practice. The Polish Club decided that a deputy of the Polish Club should not be the national minister: I waited for the result of this resolution in the apartment of Jędrzejowicz, who rushed in terribly upset and greeted me with words: “Kozłowski made it impossible for me to join the future ministry.”⁷⁶¹

It was quite evident that a candidate for a minister had to appear, regardless of whether he was to be a deputy or an official. S. Koźmian, an interview with Chłędowski, told him: “You have run this office for many years, you deserve to become the Minister for Galicia.”⁷⁶² Jędrzejowicz was sure that he would not receive a portfolio of the national minister in the next cabinet. In this situation, Jędrzejowicz agreed with Chłędowski. Jędrzejowicz promised to support him, and in return, the future minister was to inform Jędrzejowicz about all planned changes of staff in the ministry. Chłędowski also promised that after the

759 Chłędowski wrote about Jędrzejowicz: “If there was not a word ‘prat’ in Polish, it would have been necessary to invent the term for Minister Jędrzejowicz. He seems to be not stupid, he even has much tact, but he walks as if he was dumb, and one usually has to explain something twice or three times to him so that he understands it. After a few days, he does not understand it again.” Moreover, Chłędowski wrote in another place: “More than six months passed when Jędrzejowicz became the Minister for Galicia, and every day he proves how little intelligence the minister needs. If there was not a word ‘prat,’ it would have had to be invented for ‘Adaś,’” Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, pp. 241, 248.

760 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, p. 124.

761 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 255.

762 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, pp. 255–256.

appointment of a permanent cabinet, he would “cede” the minister’s portfolio to Jędrzejowicz.⁷⁶³ Jędrzejowicz was dismissed on October 2 1899.⁷⁶⁴

Kazimierz Chłędowski was a long-time official of the ministry for Galicia.⁷⁶⁵ In 1881, Chłędowski was appointed to work in the national ministry, where, with short breaks, he worked for eighteen years, first in the position of the secretary of the ministry, then as the head of the office⁷⁶⁶ and finally as the minister from October 2 1899 in the Cabinet of Clary and Wittek.⁷⁶⁷ Kazimierz Chłędowski was a long-time official of the ministry for Galicia. In 1881, Chłędowski was appointed to work in the national ministry, where, with short breaks, he worked for eighteen years, first in the position of the secretary of the ministry, then as the head of the office and finally as the minister from October 2, 1899, in the Cabinet of Clary and Wittek. One cannot deny that Chłędowski had a predisposition and experience necessary to hold the office of the national minister. However, in the

763 Metaphorically speaking, they also added a clause to the agreement. Jędrzejowicz offered Chłędowski: “Moreover, please, forgive me for saying such things — Jędrzejowicz added a little bit worried — but since your nomination will probably occur on September 30, and I will probably not get a salary on October 1, so maybe you will share it with me. . . .’ ‘With the greatest pleasure I will give you the whole October salary.’ ‘No, no, only half of it’ This is how we talked, and Jędrzejowicz kept his promise,” Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 256.

764 At the same time, Jędrzejowicz was awarded the Order of the Iron Crown of the First Class, *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 226 of October 3, 1899, p. 1.

765 S. Wasylewski, “Chłędowski Kazimierz,” in: PSB, vol. III, Wrocław 1937, pp. 307–308. Chłędowski was the author of the first Polish detective novel entitled *Po nitce do kłębka*, Forst-Battaglia, *Polnisches Wien*, p. 102

766 Chłędowski worked in the Ministry for Galicia since 1881, when Ziemiałkowski was the Minister for Galicia. In May 1882, Chłędowski was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior, Chamiec, the husband of Mrs. Ziemiałkowska’s friend replaced him in the position. The person and conduct of Chamiec and the disagreements between the minister’s wife and Mrs. Chamiec resulted in the fact that as early as May 1883, Chłędowski returned to the national ministry: “Ziemiałkowski, who was bored with Chamiec and irritated by the fact that as a deputy in the Imperial Council, Chamiec spent the time in parliament and not in the office, got rid of him . . . Ziemiałkowski made efforts to grant me the promotion, and as the secretary of the ministry, I returned to Schillerplatz.” In the summer of 1885, Chłędowski was also transferred to the press office, and Henryk Halban took his place. Chłędowski’s new occupation extended if not completely closed the path to a career as a civil servant. Only after Ziemiałkowski’s efforts did he return to the Ministry for Galicia the very same year, Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, pp. 51–53, 57–58, 69–71.

767 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 226 of October 3, 1899, p. 1.

case of this government, which was provisional, appointed for three months, it was not professionalism but haste in completing the composition of the Cabinet that was crucial. Chłędowski mentioned it himself: “I served about thirty-three years, and in recent months I have made a remarkable career in Austria, because being initially a Hofrat, I became the minister and the secret counsellor”⁷⁶⁸

Besides, Chłędowski was not sure whether he would become a minister, especially as, after he had learned that Seweryn Kniaziołucki was appointed as Deputy Minister of Finance, he was convinced that there would be no room for two Poles in Clary’s provisional Cabinet: Although I knew that Clary visited Jaworski and Jaworski recommended me for the position of the Minister for Galicia and that Clary agreed to do it even without seeing me. However, I could not be sure about it. A. Jaworski brought him the information about the nomination: “As an official, you have to accept the office of a minister.” On the same day in the evening, the Prime Minister held the first meeting with the ministers, during which he granted them ministerial appointments.⁷⁶⁹

After the dissolution of Clary’s government, Wittek’s provisional cabinet was appointed, in which Chłędowski once again received a portfolio of the Minister for Galicia. Chłędowski was the emperor’s candidate, and the Prime Minister only executed the orders of the monarch. The Polish Club also supported his candidacy: “Jaworski told me on behalf of the parliamentary committee of the Polish Club that whoever will be the Prime Minister, I shall remain in the cabinet.”⁷⁷⁰ Chłędowski fondly recalled his term of office during the functioning of Wittek’s Cabinet: “Wittek’s ministry was an idyll; we adopted what was necessary to conclude the Hungarian settlement on the basis of § 14, we rarely attended sessions, and after a month, on January 20, when Mr. Körber declared that he had a ready cabinet, we peacefully resigned.”⁷⁷¹

768 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 292.

769 Chłędowski mentioned that: “I was ashamed to look into this letter in front of others, but I was curious to know whether I was a minister or just a ‘Leiter.’ Only an hour later, when we parted, did I read the letter and learned with my own eyes that I was a minister,” Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, pp. 257–258.

770 “I was thus promoted to the oldest minister after Welsersheimb,” Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 289.

771 Biliński wanted to receive the portfolio of the Minister for Galicia, but the new Prime Minister offered him the post of governor of the Austro-Hungarian Bank. Biliński had the support of the Polish Club, which was criticized by Chłędowski when he wrote that: “The Polish Club was greatly inconsistent when it recommended a member of its group for the position of the Minister for Galicia to the official Cabinet, because four months ago it established the principle that no member of the Polish Club should enter

After the establishment of the permanent cabinet of Ernst Körber, Chłędowski was dismissed on January 18 1900:⁷⁷² he left with a bright and cheerful face.⁷⁷³

Leonard Piętak was Minister for Galicia in three consecutive Austrian cabinets: E. Körber's from January 18, 1900, to December 27, 1904, P. Gautsch's from January 1, 1905, to April 30, 1906, and K. Hohenlohe-Waldenburg's from April 30, 1906, to June 2, 1906.⁷⁷⁴ Piętak assumed the office of Minister for Galicia with the consent of the Polish Club. At that time, Piętak also resigned from work at the University of Lviv.

Piętak was the first national minister who did not come from conservative parties. Seemingly, this fact could have caused some of the Polish Club's members to dislike him and to criticize him: "The Polish Club behaves shamefully toward Piętak; after all, Mr. Kozłowski, Mr. Dzieduszycki Wojciech and the company made him the Minister for Galicia, and today in the most shameful way they disregard him so that he would walk away and leave them the vacant position of the minister."⁷⁷⁵ W. Dzieduszycki was to assume the ministry.

The merits of Minister L. Piętak certainly include efforts to pass a law on the regulation of Galician rivers and participation in preparatory works for the introduction of general elections to the Imperial Council.

Piętak's successor, Wojciech Dzieduszycki, became the national minister on June 2 1906 in the government of Wladimir von Beck.⁷⁷⁶ Before his appointment, Dzieduszycki contributed to the resignation of P. Gautsch's Cabinet. Dzieduszycki resigned on November 20, 1907.⁷⁷⁷

the official Cabinet. At that time, this principle was good when it came to Jędrzejowicz, but today it was about Biliński, so it was possible to change the principle. Körber somehow did not want to burden his Cabinet with Biliński's intrigues." Jaworski also opposed this candidacy. In such a situation, Biliński was left with the governorship of the bank, Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, pp. 290–291.

772 The emperor also granted him the title of secret adviser and ordered him to hold the previous positions in the Ministry for Galicia, *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 15 of January 20, 1890, p. 1.

773 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, p. 136. However, it seems that K. Chłędowski hoped to become the Minister for Galicia in the next government, he wrote in his memoirs: Jaworski, who: "wanted to serve Körber, abandoned my candidacy and agreed to the candidacy of Piętak," Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 291.

774 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 127 of June 3, 1906, p. 1; cf. Zdrada, "Piętak Leonard," in: PSB, vol. XXVI, p. 201.

775 Entry from February 23, 1901, Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, p. 355.

776 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 127 of June 3, 1906, p. 1.

777 Daszyk, *Osobliwy Podolak*, p. 15.

Tadeusz Rutowski, a democratic deputy, involved in running the candidacy of W. Dzieduszycki. Although the Polish Club supported him, he did not become the Minister for Galicia. Most likely, as Chłędowski believed, Rutowski hoped that Dzieduszycki would not hold the position of the national minister for long, and then Dzieduszycki in exchange would support Rutowski.⁷⁷⁸

In November 1907, Dzieduszycki resigned because the government granted Ukrainians the concessions without his knowledge; thus, the government violated the agreement concluded with the Polish Club, according to which the Prime Minister undertook not to make any binding decisions without consulting Polish deputies.

At that time, Ukrainians efforts included the establishment of the Ukrainian university. The Ukrainians proposed to establish their own university as early as the late 1890s.⁷⁷⁹ However, the parties were aware of the fact that there were substantial obstacles to the establishment of a Ukrainian university. Primarily, there were too few Ukrainian students⁷⁸⁰ and there was a shortage of professor's staff, what W. Beck and the Polish Club emphasized.⁷⁸¹ For this reason, there was a high demand for the utraquisation of the university in Lviv, which was not a very appropriate demand given the national character of Lviv.⁷⁸² The problem that was directly connected with the establishment of a Ukrainian university was

778 H. Kramarz, *Tadeusz Rutowski. Portret pozytywisty i demokracji galicyjskiego*, Kraków 2001, p. 79.

779 One can regard the parliamentary question of a deputy, and priest D. Taniaczkiewicz submitted on December 20, 1898, in the Imperial Council as the beginning of the efforts to establish a Ruthenian university. This demand soon became one of the priority demands of Ukrainians, K. Michalewska, "Sprawa Uniwersytetu ukraińskiej w latach 1848–1914," in: SH, 1984, no. 1, p. 41; Cz. Partacz, *Od Badeniego do Potockiego. Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie w Galicji latach 1888–1908*, Toruń 1997, p. 127.

780 More than 300 students studied at secular faculties at that time, for instance, only ten at the Faculty of Medicine. The remaining 300 were alumni of the Greek Catholic seminary, that is, they were students of theology, Partacz, *Od Badeniego do Potockiego*, p. 128.

781 Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 29 października 1907r., Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa, BJ TB, MS 8109 III, f. 19.

782 Lviv: "was the capital of a great country of Polish character, the headquarters of the supreme state and local government authorities, the Diet and its Department, it was at the same time . . . a school of independent political thinking in the Polish national spirit. Educational and social life concentrated in Lviv, and there were times when Lviv radiated as the ideological capital of Poland," Głabiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, p. 163.

the linguistic equality of Polish and Ukrainian students. S. Głębiński presented in the Imperial Council opinion on the rights of both languages at the University of Lviv. On this basis, the Ministry of Religious Denominations and Education approved on March 20, 1902, the Polish character of the university, but also the State Tribunal did similarly in its ruling of April 22, 1904. In 1907, a Polish deputation went to Vienna to protest in defense of the national character of the university. An appropriate declaration was submitted to Prime Minister M. Beck, Minister of Education Gustav Marchet, and Minister for Galicia W. Dzieduszycki. It was the result of the discussion and the resolution of the Polish Club of October 29. The Polish deputies did not oppose the idea of granting concessions to Ukrainians, but also did not agree to the introduction of bilingualism at the University of Lviv. Głębiński claimed that if Poles followed this path, they would achieve *utraquisation*. Głębiński suggested that the Polish character of the university should be reserved: “we should demand the Act on Polishness, or if this were impossible, at least an imperial decree.” Battaglia supported him, while Korytowski opposed him.⁷⁸³ The Cracow conservatives did not oppose the Ukrainian initiative, for example, Biliński, who, during his speech in the House of Deputies, supported the Ukrainian motion, although Biliński stated clearly that neither professors and students were discriminated at the University of Lviv, and the lack of establishment of new Ruthenian departments did not result from the animosity of Poles, but from not meeting the relevant formal and substantive requirements.⁷⁸⁴ National Democrats and Podolian circles were decisive opponents of granting any national concessions to Ukrainians.⁷⁸⁵

Prime Minister Beck conducted the negotiations with the Ukrainian club, and he committed himself to grant Ukrainians a concession for the university. Beck agreed without consultation with the Polish Club, which caused understandable

783 Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 29 października 1907r., Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa, BJ TB, MS 8109 III, ff.19–20.

784 *Gazeta Lwowska* of 25 III 1907; “Wniosek posła Oleśnickiego,” in: *Gazeta Narodowa* of February 16, 1907; “O uniwersytet galicyjski,” in: *Gazeta Narodowa* of February 20, 1907; *Partacz, Od Badeniego do Potockiego*, p. 237.

785 For instance, at the end of 1909, the budget included the funds that would allow for the creation of two additional Ukrainian departments at the University of Lviv, but National Democrats and Podolian circles effectively opposed their establishment, despite the fact that Głębiński and Abrahamowicz accepted these proposals, J. Skwara, “Konserwatyści wschodniogalicyscy – Podolacy wobec kwestii ukraińskiej w okresie namiestnictwa Michała Bobrzyńskiego 1908–1913,” in: *Rocznik Historyczno-Archivalny*, vol. XI, 1996, p. 21.

indignation on the part of the Polish deputies.⁷⁸⁶ For instance, the Battaglia claimed that: “The government directs the Ruthenians to the path of constant concessions,”⁷⁸⁷ and Kozłowski believed that the government had no right to make concessions over the Diet and the Governor: “If this is was to be settled in Vienna, there will still be *divide impera*.”⁷⁸⁸ Other consequences were much more critical. The government “gained” for itself the right to interfere in Polish-Ukrainian relations without communication with the Polish side. Thus, it broke the agreement between the government and the Polish representation, according to which no decisions related to Ukraine could be made without the consent of Polish politicians.

Therefore, Beck’s earlier assurances were not entirely credible. The government’s agreement with the Ukrainians encountered considerable opposition to the Polish deputies in the Imperial Council, especially as it was made without the consent of the Polish Club and Dzieduszycki, the Minister for Galicia but only with the participation of Korytowski, the Minister of Finance.⁷⁸⁹

From the very beginning of negotiations with the Ukrainian side, the Minister for Galicia was excluded, the Prime Minister negotiated only with the Polish Club and the Governor-general. This fact became one of the issues raised during several meetings of the club. Governor-general A. Potocki positively assessed the Prime Minister’s actions: “Beck acted loyally and correctly in his negotiations with the Ruthenians . . . he does not want to promise anything without the opinion of the Polish Club.”⁷⁹⁰ Józef Ptaś, who questioned the sincerity of the Prime Minister’s conduct, was of a different opinion: “If Beck was loyal to the presidium, why he was not to the Minister for Galicia? The Minister for Galicia was responsible for the affairs concerning Galicia. It is necessary to ensure respect for the minister.”⁷⁹¹ Józef Buzek also spoke on this matter, and he demanded an explanation for the exclusion of Dzieduszycki in negotiations

786 Partacz, *Od Badeniego do Potockiego*, p. 237.

787 Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 29 października 1907r., Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa, BJ TB, MS 8109 III, f. 21.

788 Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 14 grudnia 1907r., Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa, BJ TB, MS 8109 III, f. 50.

789 J. Gruchała, *Rząd austriacki i polskie stronnictwa polityczne w Galicji wobec kwestii ukraińskiej (1890–1914)*, Wrocław 1982, p. 76.

790 Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 29 października 1907r., Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa, BJ TB, MS 8109 III, f. 18.

791 Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 30 października 1907r., Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa, f. 27.

with the Ukrainian side.⁷⁹² The deputies decided that: “The lack of consultation with Dzieduszycki is an insult to the Polish Club, not to the Minister.” In this matter, Dzieduszycki submitted a motion so that he would not be overlooked in talks with the Ukrainian side and the government.⁷⁹³ Dzieduszycki also had a conversation with Beck, who in a rather naïve way explained his understatement of the Minister for Galicia, as he claimed that he had simply forgotten about Dzieduszycki.⁷⁹⁴

In autumn 1907, *Neue Freie Presse* published an article in which the author listed all concessions granted by the government to Ukrainians. This news caused the outrage of Biliński: “I made a violent scene in front of Beck, and I invoked his mentioned promise.”⁷⁹⁵ Biliński learned from the Prime Minister that the granting of the concession to the Ruthenians occurred with the knowledge and consent of Minister Dzieduszycki and the Presidium of the Polish Club. In such a situation, the positions of the Prime Minister, Dzieduszycki, Abrahamowicz, Głębiński, Dulęba, and Stapiński were confronted: “All the gentlemen firmly denied that they had agreed to concessions. Thus, we went with Dzieduszycki and Beck, whom we invited, to the ministerial room, and there we found out about the complete vagueness and insincerity of the situation. The crisis was to result from it in which, despite my will, I had a decisive role to play. Thus, Dzieduszycki had to resign but also Abrahamowicz.”⁷⁹⁶

The dismissal of W. Dzieduszycki occurred on November 20 1907.⁷⁹⁷

S. Kieniewicz believed that as the national minister, Dzieduszycki could not boast of significant achievements because: “he was not meant to hold the office. His excellent knowledge of human characters based on strong will, diligence, and the gift of the speech made him a first-class parliamentarian.”⁷⁹⁸ *Przegląd Narodowy* presented a similar assessment of Dzieduszycki, as it underlined his outstanding abilities as a politician and parliamentarian, his care for the interests of not only one party or partition, but the entire Polish society. Moreover: “No

792 Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 30 października 1907r., Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa, f. 25.

793 Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 30 października 1907r., Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa, f. 21.

794 Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 30 października 1907r., Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa, f. 25.

795 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, pp. 157–158.

796 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, pp. 157–158.

797 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 270 of November 23, 1907, p. 1.

798 Kieniewicz, “Dzieduszycki Wojciech,” in: PSB, vol. VI, Wrocław 1948, p. 127.

one could criticize the disinterestedness and purity of his intentions in public service.”⁷⁹⁹

In the official cabinet of Richard Bienert, Dawid Abrahamowicz was the only Polish minister. Abrahamowicz was appointed to the office of Minister for Galicia on November 20, 1907,⁸⁰⁰ and resigned on March 3, 1909.⁸⁰¹

Initially, D. Abrahamowicz's activity did not arouse any doubt, and Bobrzyński wrote that as a minister: “Abrahamowicz did his job well.” However, Bobrzyński soon contributed to the adoption of the vote of no confidence against Abrahamowicz by the Polish Club. The conservative deputies were then in the minority in the Polish Club after the victory of the National Democrats in the elections in 1907. However, Abrahamowicz also did not have enough support from his political supporters and had to resign with the entire Cabinet. The reconstruction of Bienert's government was the reason for the conflict. At that time, Abrahamowicz did not intend to leave the position, and it was only pressure from the members of the Polish Club that caused him to resign. In such a situation, leaving him at the head of the Ministry for Galicia would create a dangerous precedent for the future. After all, there was a principle that said that each of the national ministers was a “trustee” of the Polish Club.⁸⁰² The author believes that the National Democrats intended to deprive the conservatives of their influence over Galician politics by manning the national ministry with a member of their own party. Stanisław Głąbiński, who was then the president of the Polish Club, was a natural candidate for this position. However, a compromise solution was chosen. A liberal democrat became the new minister, while Głąbiński, despite numerous efforts at the turn of 1910 and 1911, did not receive a portfolio of the Minister for Galicia.

The dismissal was a significant experience for Abrahamowicz. He also believed that he owed it to Biliński, who would prefer not to sit in the same cabinet with him. This experience led Abrahamowicz to write a letter to *Neue Freie Presse* in 1908 and a memorial to *Gazeta Codzienna* in 1909, in which Abrahamowicz criticized Galician politicians for the fact that they were guided the political interest of their own groups during the process of filling the official posts in the state.⁸⁰³

799 A. Sadzewicz, “Przegląd spraw polskich,” in: *Przegląd Narodowy*, April 1909, pp. 492–493.

800 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 270 of November 23, 1907, p. 1.

801 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 52 of March 5, 1909, p. 1.

802 A. Sadzewicz, “Przegląd spraw polskich,” in: *Przegląd Narodowy*, February 1909, p. 226.

803 The memorial was published in Lviv's *Gazeta Codzienna* in the issues from 735 to 739 between July 1 and 6 1909.

Abrahamowicz also gave an important argument, that is, the lack of such a resolution of the Polish Club that would express a vote of no confidence against him as the national minister. This meant that there were no substantive grounds to deprive Abrahamowicz of his portfolio of the Minister for Galicia, none other than political ones. Disappointment and resentment, which undoubtedly contributed to the writing of this memorial, caused that: “The scandal was terrible, it boiled in the state and the Polish Club, but to the detriment of the author, who was widely condemned and for a long time the conservatives of Podolia, that is his closest supporters, boycotted him in the elections for any outstanding position. The government did not want the minister to announce anything similar.” Abrahamowicz tried to disassociate from the text, claiming that it was published without his consent, but no one in Galicia or Vienna trusted him. These facts had unpleasant consequences for him. The government withdrew from the nomination of Abrahamowicz as a member of the House of Lords.⁸⁰⁴

After the appointment of the new government, Waclaw Zaleski informed his father, Filip Zaleski, on March 25, 1909: “Dawidow’s crisis has finally been solved. It was a shame to see how, without dignity, until the last moment, he tried to regret and flooded the whole world with letters and complaints. After the nomination of Dulęba, Abrahamowicz immediately left the office, gave his keys to Morawski, and declared that he did not want to see Dulęba and he would not expect Dulęba in the office.”⁸⁰⁵

Władysław Dulęba,⁸⁰⁶ the successor of Dawid Abrahamowicz, was the Minister for Galicia from March 3, 1909,⁸⁰⁷ to January 9, 1911.⁸⁰⁸

W. Dulęba’s term of office was an example of how difficult the Minister’s for Galicia situation was, when the interests of the state and Galicia clashed, and how much diplomacy this position required from him. He was a “trustee” of the Polish Club, and at the same time, he greatly depended on the Polish Club, and he was a member of the government. Dulęba cooperated with Polish deputies, the Prime Minister, and departmental ministers, and was at the same time obliged by the principle of solidarity in relations with them. The only difference was that as a member of the Polish Club, the principle of solidarity formally

804 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, p. 145.

805 The letter from Waclaw Zaleski to Filip Zaleski of March 25, 1909, Listy W. Zaleskiego, BJ, MS 8090/III, f. 298; W. Rudziński, *Władysław Dulęba. Minister dla Galicji*, Poznań 1998, p. 87.

806 Z. Lasocki, “Dulęba Władysław,” in: PSB, vol. V, Wrocław 1939–46, pp. 456–457.

807 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 52 of March 5, 1909, p. 1.

808 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 7 of January 10, 1911, p. 1.

applied to him, and as a member of the government, he was supposed to obey it due to ethical reasons. The author of Dulęba's biography, Władysław Rudziński, emphasized his many-sided activity as the national minister. At the same time, Rudziński noted that Dulęba had to repeatedly consult his decisions with the government, parliament, the Governor-general, and the Polish Club. It is precisely this consulting with Polish deputies that Rudziński describes as the most challenging task because it required a lot of tact and diplomacy.⁸⁰⁹ Moreover, observation of his career in the ministerial position can prove the complexity of ties the mutually dependent relations between the national minister and the government, the Polish Club, and the Governor-general of Galicia.

In Bienierth's Cabinet, Dulęba was not the only Polish minister, apart from him, there was Leon Biliński as the Minister of the Treasury. The Prime Minister consulted with Governor-generals Bobrzyński and Biliński the issue of manning of the national ministry.⁸¹⁰ The decision to nominate Dulęba and to dismiss Abrahamowicz was made during Bienierth's audience at the emperor's.

809 Rudziński, *Władysław Dulęba*, p. 86.

810 The Governor-general was in friendly relations with Korytowski, but he could not recommend Korytowski to Bienierth. The resigning Treasury Minister was charged with specific allegations of shortcomings in the management of state finances. On the other hand, Korytowski counted on Bobrzyński's protection and on the fact that he would either keep his current portfolio or receive another one. In the matter of manning of the national ministry, the Prime Minister also held conferences with Biliński, whose candidate was Antoni Górski: "a talented man and a professor of law, but he was an oddball with a very volatile temperament, no one treated him seriously in the Polish Club, and I would be responsible for his nomination as a member of the Cracow party, and it would charge me in the face of democracy. Thus, I proposed Władysław Duleba, who was the vice-president of the Polish Club, and who, as a member of the Polish democrats, was the closest in his views to the conservative party. Biliński and Bienierth agreed to this immediately." In the meantime, Bienierth encountered difficulties in completing a parliamentary cabinet, due to the resistance of the Czechs and Germans, and was forced to create an official cabinet in which Biliński did not want to participate. Dulęba turned out to be a lousy candidate in such a situation, and as a result, Abrahamowicz remained the national minister. It was not until March 3 that both Polish ministers, Biliński and Dulęba, a democrat supported by the majority of deputies, sat in Bienierth II's Cabinet, *Bobrzyński, Z moich pamiętników*, pp. 144–145. The ministry had four ministerial advisors: Dr. Ignacy Rosner, Dr. Zdzisław Morawski, counselor of the Governorate Dr. Count Zygmunt Lasocki and Deputy Secretary of the Ministry, Edward Neuman. Detailed information about the employees, offices of the national ministry in: "Ministerstwo dla Galicyi," in: *Nasz Kraj*, no. 89 of March 5, 1909.

After receiving the nomination, Dulęba gave a speech at the session of the Polish Club on March 9, which deputies received with great recognition:

I am very excited at the moment because of the importance of the tasks and duties that await me . . . As the Minister for Galicia, I consider my primary duty to guard the national affairs carefully, to strive persistently to raise the moral and material interests of our country. I will be able to perform this task only in cooperation with this great Club and only supported by the trust of the Club. Without this trust, the Minister is not able to fulfill his tasks, and if I had ever lacked this trust and support of the Club, then I would have to consider my mission to be finished. Therefore, I ask you to support me because, with your support, you will help me and make it easier for me to fulfill the difficult task.⁸¹¹

Dulęba dedicated much of his activity as the minister to the canal issue. The Polish Club demanded the implementation of the canal law, but the government did not have sufficient financial means to execute this undertaking. Biliński, the Minister of the Treasury, also took his stance in this matter. In such a situation, the national minister had to oscillate between all interested parties. At the same time, Dulęba did not want to cause the aggravation of already recessionary relations between the government and Biliński, the Polish Club, and the Governor-general. It is necessary to note that Austrian ministries provided assurances that construction works would begin, and the Polish Club did not anticipate any other option than to implement the act from 1901. A few days later, on May 11, the Presidium of the Polish Club held a conference with the Prime Minister and with Biliński, Dulęba, and Richard Weiskirchner, the Minister of Trade, during which the government assured the participants that the construction of canals had begun.⁸¹²

However, the situation became more complicated, and there were many indications that the construction of the canals would not begin: “Due to the difficult financial position, the government cannot now think about serious launching of construction of canals; the Circle (an illegible word —D.L.-L.), and especially the enthusiasts of the canals Kozłowski, Kolischer, and Sikorski, relying on the law, regardless of the changed situation, demand that preparatory work . . . be started immediately. These demands are all the more insistent as the budget committee was forced to pass a resolution that demands the construction of canals.”⁸¹³

811 Quote in: Rudziński, *Władysław Dulęba*, pp. 88–89.

812 Rudziński, *Władysław Dulęba*, pp. 92–93.

813 Letter from Władysław Dulęba to Michał Bobrzyński of June 13, 1910, TB BJ, MS 8093/III, f. 253.

Moreover, a few months ago, the Ministry of Trade published offers for the construction of four facilities, which should be handed over to contractors, which was demanded by the Polish Club.

A few days later, the Ministry of Trade suspended the decision to commission the works, mainly because of the strong opposition of the budget committee of the House of Lords. On the other hand: "The Polish Club, and the canal enthusiasts, in particular, urge the government and me to distribute the offers, and only after strenuous insistence did we manage to suspend the more violent steps of the Polish Club up to the twenty-fourth day of this month, that is, until the moment when a resolution for the construction of the canals is to be passed in parliament, which, as you know, the budget committee of the House almost unanimously adopted due to the strenuous efforts of the Presidium of the Polish Club."⁸¹⁴

Minister Dulęba also participated in a conference organized by Biliński, who also invited the Presidium of the Polish Club. The aim of this meeting was to cause the normalization of relations in the Polish Club. One of the issues discussed was the canal issue. The Minister of the Treasury intended to influence the Polish Club to withdraw from the postulate of construction of the canals and accept the solution proposed by Biliński in the form of compensation. However, the Polish Club did not agree with such a solution.⁸¹⁵

The canal issue was the subject of a debate that lasted several hours during the session of the Council of Ministers.⁸¹⁶ After consultation with the Prime Minister, Biliński presented a draft law on the compensation for the failure to implement the canal law. There were objections to such a solution. The people, who raised them, noted that other crown countries could make their claims, and by setting a precedent, the government would have to yield to them. Bienert suggested a final settlement. He claimed that the situation in the Council was

814 Letter from Władysław Dulęba to Michał Bobrzyński of June 20, 1910, TB BJ, MS 8093/III, f. 261.

815 Biliński's draft provided for the government to allocate a sum of one hundred million, which would be divided proportionally to the length of the canals in a given crown country. In this regard, Galicia would receive the most substantial sum, around sixty million. The government would pay compensation for ten years, which the Diets would be free to dispose of. The financial resources could, therefore, be used both for river regulation and for education, or industry, Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, pp. 199–202.

816 Letter from Władysław Dulęba to Michał Bobrzyński of June 20, 1910, TB BJ, MS 8093/III, ff. 261–262.

not satisfactory, and inclusion of the issue of compensation within the agenda of the session would only trigger unnecessary protests of the parties and parliamentary clubs. Finally, it was agreed that Biliński should not submit a draft law on the compensation to the Polish Club, and the Prime Minister, on his part, would try to persuade the Polish Club to postpone the canal issue until autumn 1910. Despite the difficult situation, the Minister for Galicia supported the stance of the Polish Club. During the sitting of the Polish Club in October, Kozłowski said that Dułęba was not to blame for the failure to construct the canals. The Polish Club, on the other hand, spoke out against Biliński and accused him of hindering the implementation of the canal law.⁸¹⁷ Negotiations between the government and the Polish Club marked the following months. During the negotiations, the Polish deputies presented a tenacious stance on the canal issue, and they demanded a ruthless commencement of their construction in Galicia. The Polish ministers also supported the Polish Club, and they promised to resignation in case the demands of the Polish Club were not met. The Polish Club did not yet allow to grant financial compensation for the failure to meet the obligations of the government. The parliamentary committee of the Polish Club, upon the motion of the deputies of National Democracy, demanded the appointment of deputy A. Kędzior as the Minister of Public Works. Thus, Poles would gain additional support in the government, and the minister himself would be the guarantor of the implementation of the law.⁸¹⁸

One could describe the situation that existed at that time as a stalemate. Dułęba mentioned it in a letter to Bobrzyński: “For a long time, there has not been such a situation as it is now in the Polish Club. The Polish Club is in permanency, and the indignation, instead of easing, grows day by day. A few days ago, I had a conversation with Bienierth, and I bluntly presented him what kind of bitterness prevails in the Polish Club, and I made it clear that the government will have to conclude an agreement with the Polish Club on the canal issue, otherwise the radical direction will prevail in the Polish Club, the consequences of which are unpredictable.”⁸¹⁹

In 1910, Polish deputies categorically demanded that the Bienierth government comply with the agreement, and they eventually led to its dissolution.

817 Rudziński, *Władysław Dułęba*, pp. 140–142.

818 Bobrzyński opposed the idea, and he even threatened to resign and thus cause the Governor-general's crisis, S. Kozicki, “Przegląd Spraw polskich,” in: *Przegląd Narodowy*, January 1911, p. 103.

819 Letter from Władysław Dułęba to Michał Bobrzyński of December 8, 1910, TB BJ, MS 8093/III, f. 406.

Dulęba and Minister Biliński also resigned.⁸²⁰ The government resigned on December 12, 1910, but the ministers remained in office until a new government was formed.⁸²¹

One can conclude from the analysis of Dulęba's activity in the canal issue that the charges against him according to which he did not favor the implementation of the canal law were unfounded.⁸²² Therefore, the following statement seems to be biased: "as a minister, Dulęba behaved passively and did not gain any influence."⁸²³

Political circles began to wonder who would hold the office of the national minister. The President of the the Polish Club, Stanisław Głąbiński, was one of the candidates for the minister's chair, people behind the scenes listed also a peasant activist, Jan Stapiński, the Vice-President of the Polish Club, who, however, had neither proper predispositions nor bigger chances to assume the office of the minister.⁸²⁴ A Cracow conservative, Bobrzyński, for whom the cooperation with the minister, who was the national democrat, would become difficult, opposed Głąbiński's candidacy. Bobrzyński proposed the Ministry of State Railways for him, a ministry that belonged to the group of the official ministries, and recommended Waclaw Zaleski as the national minister: "Zaleski surpassed

820 Z. Lasocki, *Dulęba Władysław*, PSB, vol. V, pp. 456–457.

821 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 283 of December 13, 1910, p. 1. Formally, the Benerth's government was dismissed on January 9, 1911, *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 7 of January 10, 1911, p. 1. After the dismissal, Dulęba did not withdraw from political life. While still in office in 1909, he was elected to the Diet of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, and from 1911 he was also a deputy in the Imperial Council. His political career ended in 1912. Dulęba was appointed a life member of the House of Lords on May 19, 1917, upon the motion of Bobrzyński, the Minister for Galicia. As Rudziński notes: "According to the information in the archives of the parliament, Dulęba did not speak at the plenary meetings. He probably participated in the committees." After Poland gained independence, Dulęba did not participate in public life, Rudziński, *Władysław Dulęba*, p. 168.

822 Rudziński, *Władysław Dulęba*, p. 161.

823 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, p. 224.

824 The National Democrats in the Polish Club made an agreement with Stapiński's peasant activists: "the President of the National Democracy in the Circle, Ptaś and Stapiński decided to form a political alliance and annul all the former fiercest battles and differences in the program, and recommend Stapiński as the second minister along with Głąbiński, which both sides managed to achieve. In order to appease the conservatives, the deputies decided to entrust Starzyński, who sympathized with the National Democracy, with the presidency of the Polish Club," Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, pp. 224–225.

all others with his talent and knowledge of public matters.” At the same time, Bobrzyński mentioned his negative traits of character: “he was meant to rule over all with intrigues.”⁸²⁵

Wacław Zaleski,⁸²⁶ grandson of Wacław Zaleski, the Governor of Galicia and son of Filip Zaleski, the Governor-general and former national minister, became the Minister for Galicia on January 9 1911, in the office of R. Bienert III.⁸²⁷ Before his appointment, Zaleski was head of the section at the Ministry of Agriculture. He was dismissed on November 3 1911.⁸²⁸

The nomination of W. Zaleski caused indignation in the Polish Club, especially after the conclusion of the alliance of the National Democrats with the peasant activists. Deputies even told Bobrzyński that if the decision about the office of the national minister was not changed, then: “The Polish Club would fall.” Mr. Kozłowski brought such news from the Polish Club to the Governor-general. The circumstances for the new minister were not favorable: “At the very beginning of his term of office, Zaleski went through difficult moments, he could not easy the opposition at all. Only after the new elections, when the new majority in the Polish Club was formed, did he rely on it and with great cleverness cooperated with it.”⁸²⁹ Biliński recalled: “I had an excellent relationship with Zaleski as the minister for Galicia; we both worked zealously for the national affairs, especially for the construction of canals.”⁸³⁰

Władysław Długosz⁸³¹ was nominated as the national minister on November 19 1911.⁸³² J. Stapiński recommended his

825 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, p. 225.

826 A. Poniatowska, “Zaleski Wacław,” in: *Polacy w historii i kulturze krajów Europy Zachodniej. Słownik Biograficzny*, ed. K. Kwaśniewski, L. Trzeciakowski, Instytut Zachodni, Poznań 1981, p. 437. He worked in the Governorate, where L. Piniński from the head of the Presidential Bureau supported him to become court advisor to the ministry, and: “Potocki, having appointed Zaleski again as head of the Presidential Bureau, quickly sent him back to Vienna with a promotion to head of the section,” Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, p. 225.

827 At the same time, he was appointed to the office of the head of the Ministry of Agriculture, *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 7 of January 10, 1911, p. 1.

828 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 253 of November 4, 1911, p. 1.

829 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, p. 226.

830 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, p. 221.

831 Z. Lasocki, “Długosz Władysław,” in: *PSB*, vol. V, Wrocław 1939–46, pp. 182–184.

832 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 266 of November 21, 1911, p. 1.

candidacy.⁸³³ Długosz became minister in the provisional Cabinet of P. Gautsch, after R. Bienierth's resignation.

W. Długosz: "a man without higher education and political mind, but an oil industrialist who, with his work and luck, achieved a great fortune. The reason for his nomination was the desire to involve the peasant activists even more strongly in the field of positive work." Bobrzyński did not want to influence the appointment, mainly because of the experience he had with the creation of Bienierth's Cabinet. However, Bobrzyński approved it in a telephone conversation he held with the new Prime Minister for this purpose.⁸³⁴

Długosz did not want to accept the portfolio offered to him, primarily as the president of the Polish Peasants' Party did not support this candidacy strongly enough: "The relationship between the two men was therefore touchy, because Mr. Długosz, as a very wealthy, enriched oilman, had to make financial sacrifices for the party naturally, and when Mr. Stapiński accepted the money for the party, he exposed himself to . . . the accusation that he used it for himself"⁸³⁵ Moreover, Stapiński put pressure on Minister Długosz through a weekly *Przyjacieli Ludu* and threatened him with opposition in the Imperial Council. The minister was concerned about this because, as a member of the Polish Peasants' Party, he depended on the President of the party: "he depended on their behavior in parliament . . . If it turned out that he would not stop the peasant activists from the opposition, he would lose all *raison d'être* as a minister."⁸³⁶

Despite his reluctance to assume the office of the Minister for Galicia: "Długosz diligently set to work, searched for important matters, watched over them carefully, and reported them to the Polish Club to the satisfaction of the Polish Club."⁸³⁷ One of the most notable successes of Długosz in this position was the acceleration of the construction of canals in Galicia. Długosz also dealt with

833 The first candidate of the peasant activists for the national minister was Stapiński, who was not approved by the Prime Minister K. Stürgkh, the next one was A. Kędzior, supported by Biliński, who resigned at his request, and the next one — deputy Wróbel, the Deputy Director of State Railways, whom W. Zaleski did not approve. Finally, Długosz was nominated, Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, pp. 223–224; Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, pp. 249.

834 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, p. 249.

835 The reluctance of Długosz to assume the national ministry was so great that he intended to go abroad and Biliński and Stapiński managed to stop him from doing so, Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, p. 224.

836 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, pp. 325–326.

837 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, p. 225.

issues that resulted from the problem of economic emigration from Galicia and formed a special commission for this purpose. Długosz also marked his contribution in the preparation of the electoral law reform to the Diet of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria. Długosz did not gain popularity in the circles of supporters of National Democracy, and they criticized him.

One of the problems Długosz had to face during his term of office was the ongoing case of the Ukrainian university. The draft imperial manifesto on the establishment of the university was announced at the beginning of June 1912. The government was particularly interested in the solution of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict at that time because, in 1912, the threat of war with Russia began to take real shape.

The draft provided for the establishment of a university only in the academic year 1921/1922, which for the Ukrainian side was too distant period, and therefore the Ukrainian side rejected the draft. Moreover, the Ukrainian deputies started the obstruction in the Imperial Council, which only complicated the situation even more.⁸³⁸ The obstruction stopped after the Minister of Education Max Hussarek stated that the date of establishment of the university was only a proposal of the government, which could be subject to negotiations.⁸³⁹ At that time, the Polish Club began to protest and demand the resignation of the Minister of the Interior, Karl Heinold, who on June 18 received a deputation from the Ukrainian deputy club and expressed his satisfaction with the attitude of Ukrainian deputies for their cessation to obstruct the Imperial Council during debates on the budget for military purposes.⁸⁴⁰ When Minister Heinold took on the side of the Ukrainian deputies, he got into conflict with the Polish Club. It was also then, on June 18 and 19, that the turbulent debates of the Polish Club took place, which could have been a sign of a break of good relations with the Austrian government. In fear of the opposition of the Polish Club in the Imperial Council, the government assured Polish deputies that no decisions would be

838 Gruchała, *Rząd austriacki i polskie*, p. 97–98.

839 *Czas*, no. 267 of June 15, 1912, p. 1.

840 *Czas*, no. 274 of June 19, 1912, p. 1. J. Bojko wrote that at that time: a row began because minister Heinold ordered the emperor to praise the Russians that they ceased the obstruction, what justifiably bittered the Poles, and they decided to break ties with Heinold. At that time, the talks with the Czechs continued, and the government wanted to keep the peace in the house. The situation was so serious that the dismissal of the entire Cabinet and not only the resignation of Minister Heinold was in question, Bojko, *Dziennik 1911–1919*, in: J. Bojko, *Gorące słowa. Wybór pism*, ed. F. Ziejka, Kraków 2002, p. 122.

made about the Ukrainian university without taking into account the Polish side, especially the Minister for Galicia.⁸⁴¹ In any case, the situation in the Galician ministry was not well either. As a result of these events, Długosz resigned, but the emperor did not accept and eased the conflict itself. The emperor in the audience: “explained that it was a coincidence, etc., and told Długosz that he would not accept the resignation. The emperor spoke the same way to Leo, the President of the Polish Club.”⁸⁴²

Together with Bobrzyński, Długosz also supported the campaign, based on the draft made by a deputy, S. Stefczyk, to increase the government loan for the Raiffeisen’s savings banks, in order to give it to the Galician communities for the purchase of grain for sowing. Both of them also applied to the Austrian government and received a government subsidy to help the Galician communities.⁸⁴³

Długosz participated in the sessions of the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL) as a result of which, on January 9, 1912, the peasant activists adopted a resolution to grant 26.4 % of the seats to the Diet to the Ukrainians. At the time, people accused Długosz of participating as a minister in the meetings of one of the parties, which conducted its policy on electoral law reform, and thus he weakened the position of Poles in negotiations with Ukrainians.⁸⁴⁴ When the Ukrainians began to withdraw from the current arrangements, Bobrzyński threatened to resign, which the Austrian government did not want to accept. At the time, Vienna tried to influence the Ukrainians to change their stance. Polish ministers, W. Zaleski and W. Długosz, but also leading Galician politicians D. Abrahamowicz, W. Korytowski, L. Czaykowski, J. Leo. L. German, or J. Stapiński, also worked on a compromise.⁸⁴⁵

Długosz also got into conflict with President Stapiński. When the national minister refused to grant a loan for the purchase of the daily newspaper *Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny* (IKC) by Stapiński, he intended to remove him from the ministry at all costs. However, these efforts did not bring any results. The conflict moved to the parliament after Długosz revealed the transaction of purchase of IKC by Stapiński with money from government subsidies obtained through the circle of Cracow Conservatives. This matter became the basis for parliamentary questions and discussions in the Imperial Council and one of the major

841 Czas, no. 278 of June 21, 1912, p. 1.

842 Bojko, *Dziennik 1911–1919*, p. 122.

843 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, p. 42.

844 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, pp. 263, 278, 282, and 322.

845 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, pp. 322–3; Buszko, *Sejmowa reforma wyborcza*, pp. 239–240.

political scandals in Austria.⁸⁴⁶ The socialists were also critical of this issue: “On December 20, 1913, comrade Diamand and I, we brought the compatriot minister down,” — I. Daszyński wrote — “He did not even dare to appear in the House and resigned without delay! However, as a result, Mr. Długosz fragmented the powerful Polish Peasants’ Party into two parts, and as a rich man and a man of ‘strong’ nerves (when he was a young man he was a circus strongman in Pardubice), he survived this fall quite well.”⁸⁴⁷ One cannot fully agree with Daszyński because this scandal caused the resignation of Długosz from the Ministry of Galicia. His resignation was accepted on December 26, 1913.⁸⁴⁸

After the IKC affair, Długosz published a booklet in which he introduced himself as: “a hero and a victim,” and he claimed that he intentionally engaged in the IKC case in order to discredit and lead to the removal of Stapiński from the political life. Długosz is also the victim because this case forced him to resign from the national ministry.⁸⁴⁹ Seemingly, excessive dependence of Długosz on Stapiński or the peasants’ party caused him not to be fully independent politician: “He could not gain wider influence beyond the peasants’ party, because he supported all kinds of demands of each of the deputies in various ministries, and thereby he transform the ministry into a kind of agency, mostly of private affairs, and he did not arouse a sense for his position as a member of the government responsible for its actions. He also had no vote in the government in public affairs, not even in Galicia, for this vote passed entirely to Zaleski.”⁸⁵⁰

Like Kazimierz Chłędowski, Zdzisław Karol Dzierżykraj-Morawski was a long-term official of the Ministry for Galicia, and then the national minister.⁸⁵¹

On January 28, 1914, when Biliński resigned from the portfolio of the Minister of Common Finance, Prime Minister Stürgkh: “in order to maintain a certain

846 See: J. Stapiński, *Pamiętnik*, ed. K. Dunin-Łasowicz, Warszawa 1959, pp. 386–390; Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, p. 312; Bojko, *Dziennik 1911–1919*, p. 135; A. Garlicki, “Rozłam w Polskim Stronnictwie Ludowym w 1913 r.,” in: *Roczniki Dziejów Ruchu Ludowego*, vol. V, Warszawa 1963.

847 Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, pp. 136–137.

848 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 298 of December 28, 1913, p. 1; *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* as a date of resignation of W. Długosz gives the date of its announcement in the press, Lasocki, “Długosz Władysław,” in: PSB, vol. V, pp. 183–184.

849 The booklet entitled *Moja odpowiedź* was published in 1914 in Polish and German, Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, p. 377.

850 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, pp. 325–326.

851 Cz. Lechicki, “Morawski (Dzierżykraj-Morawski) Zdzisław Karol,” in: PSB, vol. XXI, Wrocław 1976, pp. 756–757.

balance” in the government, he presented for the appointment the former head of the Ministry for Galicia, Zdzisław Dzierżykraj-Morawski. After the resignation of Długosz from the ministry, the Polish Club departed from the principle and did not customarily propose a deputy for the position, but agreed that the oldest official, namely Morawski, would become the temporary national minister. The emperor officially nominated Morawski on January 1, 1914, but as the head of the section and not as a minister, and he became the actual head of the section only on May 2.⁸⁵² This temporary function lasted until May 30, 1914, when Morawski became the *de facto* Minister for Galicia, before that the Polish Club did not agree to his nomination.⁸⁵³

K. Srokowski wrote that this nomination could not: “fill the gap created in the system of Polish political influence by the dismissal of Biliński. Morawski was not a parliamentarian and politician, but an official of the ministry he now headed. Morawski did not have a prominent position in the government, and he did not strive for one, as he does not have the political temperament.”⁸⁵⁴ Jaworski evaluated Morawski as a politician: “without influence and significance. It is a terrible situation to have a Governor-general, a marshal, and a minister at such a time without the gift, will, courage, and significance.”⁸⁵⁵

It is necessary to note that during the warfare, the Ministry’s activities focused on assisting victims and refugees, who escaped from Russia and sheltered, among others, in Galicia. Since the very beginning of the war, the influence of the national authorities on internal relations in Galicia has significantly decreased. It was often the case that decisions in Galician cases, contrary to previous commitments and practices, were made without consultation with the Polish Club.⁸⁵⁶

852 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 2 of January 3, 1914, p. 1.

853 Lechicki, “Morawski (Dzierżykraj-Morawski) Zdzisław Karol” p. 756. J. Leo wanted then to become Minister for Galicia, but from Jaworski’s diary, one can learn that Prime Minister Stürgkh opposed him: “According to Rosner, Stürgkh will never agree to Leo as a minister. Rosner rightly claims that the Polish Club is of no significance at present. However, Rosner is also against the nomination of Morawski as the minister, and he is also rightly afraid of a general, if only temporarily, Entry from October 31, 1914, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 11.

854 Srokowski, *N. K. N.*, p. 316.

855 The note of October 31, 1914, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 11.

856 J. Gruchała, “Austro-Węgry a sprawa ukraińska w latach I wojny światowej,” in: *SH*, vol. XXVIII, 1985, no. 4 (111), p. 563.

There was also a change in the government's stance in the Ukrainian issue, manifested in demand for the dismissal of the Governor-general Witold Korytowski, presented by Stürgkh at the session of the joint Cabinet on October 21, 1914. Stürgkh proposed that Korytowski be replaced by General Herman Colard, because he would be a more appropriate person in this highest office in the national administration, given the military situation.⁸⁵⁷ Colard was F.C. von Hötendorf's protégé: "As the Governor of the occupied Polish territory, I proposed Hermann von Colard, an infantry general, with whom I was friends from a young age . . . He knew the country and the people. Absolutely conscientious."⁸⁵⁸ Biliński was of a different opinion about the change of person at the Polish autonomous office. He emphasized that the appointment of a German general as the Governor-general was a painful experience for the Poles. Despite his loyalty, Biliński was not uncritical of the Austrian authorities, and he wrote: "to painfully hurt Poles . . . A great method of Austro-Polish politics!"⁸⁵⁹

The Poles proposed for this position General Tadeusz Rozwadowski, who was politically connected with the Podolian circles, but the Austrian staff strongly opposed this candidacy.⁸⁶⁰

Although Colard assured the deputies that he was and felt Polish and that he would cooperate with Polish politicians, but he: "We knew so much about his actions that . . . he is politically the enemy of Polishness, as he supports at every step the unjustified demands of the Ruthenians on the one hand and the military on the other."⁸⁶¹

857 Colard was a German born in Tarnopol; he spoke Polish and often admitted his Polishness, although he did not give it any practical confirmation. Łazuga claimed that there were justified suspicions that Bobrzyński himself contributed to his nomination, see Łazuga, *Michał Bobrzyński*, pp. 181–182; K. Lewandowski, "Sprawa ukraińska a państwa centralne w latach 1914–1916," in: *Studia z dziejów ZSRR i Europy Środkowej*, vol. VIII, 1972, p. 34.

858 The note of August 22, 1914, F. C. von Hötendorf, "Z czasów mej służby," in: *Polska w pamiętnikach Wielkiej Wojny 1914–1918*, ed. and comp. M. Sokolnicki, Warszawa 1925, p. 556.

859 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. II, p. 18.

860 Biliński's account showed that the emperor was also in favor of Rozwadowski's candidacy, who was called to Vienna from the front, particularly for this reason, but the emperor had to yield to the Austrian staff and nominate Colard, Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. II, pp. 18–19.

861 *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. II, p. 21. On February 12, 1916, the Governor-general issued a rescript, which prohibited the activities of local organizations in Galicia, which were subject to the Supreme National Committee. Thus, it prevented the functioning of the Committee structures, mainly due to the destruction of organizational

While the Ukrainians were satisfied with Colard's nomination and they treated it as: "a preliminary step to the division of Galicia."⁸⁶² Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski claimed that Colard openly supported the Ukrainians: "in his daltonic conviction that they would allow themselves to be used as a disinterested tool against Russia, and out of mere hatred for Poles, they would agree with enthusiasm for Austrian military rule in the separate eastern half of Galicia."⁸⁶³

Thus, when, in June 1915, Collard became the Governor-general of Galicia, the role of Z. Morawski and the Ministry for Galicia was reduced to a minimum, mainly to representative functions and conducting aid agencies for refugees. During this period, Morawski primarily focused on the reconstruction of the country, and he took particular care of both Galician universities. Morawski also counteracted repression and police and military terror. Due to his function and his involvement in Polish affairs, Morawski attended Biliński's dinners with Bertchold, Conrad, Georgi, and Leo, during which the legions were discussed, and famous words were uttered: "je mehr Bajonette, desto besser."⁸⁶⁴

After the dissolution of the Stürgkh's government, he resigned: "Morawski resigned, but the emperor will not accept the resignation. Stürgkh told him that in the event of his resignation, because he is an official, he would not replace the successor."⁸⁶⁵ Formally, Morawski stopped serving as the Minister for Galicia on October 31, 1916. At the same time, the emperor ordered him to continue to perform the duties of an official of the Ministry for Galicia, but Morawski retired at his request.⁸⁶⁶

In Ernst Körber's government, Michał Bobrzyński assumed the Ministry for Galicia: "he entered the cabinet in rather unusual circumstances, without following the procedure applicable in such cases; since the emperor decided

units, including those established to raise funds for the activity of the Supreme National Committee. Former Governor-general Bobrzyński intervened in this matter in Vienna, and he obtained from S. Burian the assurance about the revocation of the Colard's decision, Notes of February 12, 15, and 21, 1916, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914-1918*, p. 81.

862 J. Gruchała, "Sprawa ukraińska w Galicji w polityce Austro-Węgier 1914-1918," in: *Studia z dziejów ZSRR i Europy Środkowej*, vol. XX, 1984, p. 49.

863 W. Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski 1864-1945*, vol. I, Paryż 1953, p. 281.

864 Głębiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 195-199; Srokowski, *N. K. N.*, p. 122.

865 Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914-1918*, p. 46.

866 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 251 of November 1, 1916, p. 1, Lechicki, "Morawski (Dzierżykraj-Morawski)," p. 757.

about everything, who, in consultation with the Polish Club (as custom has it), expressed the wish that Michał Bobrzyński should sit in the ministerial chair, 'because of the importance of the task of constructing Galicia's autonomy.'⁸⁶⁷ Jaworski wrote that Bobrzyński became the minister at the explicit request of the emperor.⁸⁶⁸ The Polish Club was not consulted on this occasion, which was an unprecedented case.

Bobrzyński received nomination as the national minister on October 31 1916.⁸⁶⁹ On the same day, Polish Club held a meeting, at which the deputies expressed a vote of confidence to Bobrzyński if he decided to join the Polish Club. In this situation, the Polish Club, in fact, granted Bobrzyński a credit of trust after the fact. Jaworski, who described the meeting with the new minister immediately after Bobrzyński assumed the office, wrote: "I saw Bobrzyński. Very satisfied. He accepted the ministerial chair at the explicit request of the emperor, due to the importance of constructing the autonomy of Galicia."⁸⁷⁰ Łazuga was of a different opinion, as he claimed that Bobrzyński: without enthusiasm, he began to perform his new duties. They would not have been great at any other time; the Minister for Galicia was formally a minister without a portfolio, and unless it was an outstanding individual, he did not play a significant role. Now, however, when the war was in progress, and the Austrian general became the Governor-general, the ministry gained a different rank and became — as Sikorski put it — "today perhaps the most important Polish post."⁸⁷¹

In a letter addressed to Bobrzyński, the head of the Military Department of the Supreme National Committee, W. Sikorski wrote: "Me and my associates have often counted during the war on the fact that we would be able to work under the indirect guidance of your Excellency . . . entrusting the elegant hands of Your Excellency with the management of Polish affairs would ensure the complete victory for the ideals that we all cherish . . . Excellency enjoys general trust person of the majority of the Kingdom to Your person — and the great hopes that the local politicians associate with Your activity."⁸⁷²

867 "Newspapers bring news that Bobrzyński is to become the Minister for Galicia and Antoni Górski is to become the Minister of Agriculture. The nomination of Bobrzyński would be his great personal success, and it would strengthen our party," Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 142; Łazuga, *Michał Bobrzyński*, p. 192.

868 The note of November 1, 1916, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 143.

869 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 251 of November 1, 1916, p. 2.

870 The note of November 1, 1916, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 143.

871 Łazuga, *Michał Bobrzyński*, p. 192.

872 The letter from W. Sikorski to M. Bobrzyński of December 19, 1916, TB BJ, sign. 8099, ff. 197–198.

Undoubtedly, Bobrzyński was one of the prominent Galician politicians, but also the national ministers. K. Srokowski presented an interesting description of his character: “Bobrzyński, although he did not participate directly in the parliamentary life, gained a special position in the governmental spheres of Vienna.”⁸⁷³

Bobrzyński's most essential tasks included management of the action of separating Galicia, preventing the irredentism, and protecting the eastern borderlands: “Bobrzyński told me today that the Council of Ministers and the subcommittee discussed the rescript on Galicia for two days. It ended successfully. Biliński told me about this rescript that it was frigid because it was written by a frigid man (M. Bobrzyński - D. L.-L.).”⁸⁷⁴ The fundamental provisions of the draft law on the separation of Galicia, whose author was Minister Bobrzyński, appeared in the form of the emperor's handwriting on November 4, 1916. Körber added to the act: *auf gesetzlichem Wege*, that is, to be dealt with on a statutory basis. This meant that the parliament had to approve the rescript on the separation of Galicia.⁸⁷⁵ Biliński considered the annotation of the Prime Minister to be “deadly” for the cause of separation of Galicia.⁸⁷⁶

873 “People valued his opinion was valued for the perseverance of the thought, the precision of his arguments, and the purity of his personal motifs. Bobrzyński often visited Franz Joseph I, formerly officially, as the Galician Governor-general, and later privately, as a secret counselor, asked by the monarch for his opinion on various matters. Bobrzyński's answers, always clear and accurate, appealed to the emperor. Bobrzyński's argumentation was always simple and realistic. It was usually as easy to understand as it was hard to resist. Finally, under cover of this masculine and a bit rough nature, every instinctive expert on the human soul felt a great wealth of sincerity and deep idealism, which gave special importance to Bobrzyński's statements. Moreover, the old emperor knew his way around people . . . Thus, Bobrzyński belonged . . . to this tiny group of people, toward whom the emperor most often came out of his cold rigidity, with whom he not only confer but also — he spoke freely and trustingly . . . Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne, once qualified Bobrzyński as ‘klugen, kühlen Kopf’. In the hierarchy of the Australian statesmen, it was, therefore, a designation of a very high place for Bobrzyński,” Srokowski, N. K. N., pp. 167–168.

874 The note of November 2, 1916, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 143; Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. II, pp. 108–109.

875 At that time, the Imperial Council did not gather. It is also not difficult to predict that there would be severe difficulties in getting two-thirds of the votes needed to adopt the draft, especially on the part of the Czech and Ukrainian deputies. The introduction of a rescript based on the imperial patent seemed to be a safer way for the solution of the problem, which the Polish Club will later strive for.

876 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. II, p. 109.

Essentially, the Act of 5th November shattered the Polish initiative and meant a failure of the efforts to separate Galicia. Soon, at the end of December 1916, Körber's government resigned: "so that it would not be said that everything was left as it was,"⁸⁷⁷ Bobrzyński "was first dismissed 'in grace,' at the special request of the emperor, he remained in the Cabinet. On the other hand, Bobrzyński informed the Polish Club that within the work on the separation, which had just begun, he kept the initiative for himself and then, unsuccessfully, tried to create a special committee at his office."⁸⁷⁸ At the time, Bobrzyński actively participated in the works on the draft law on the separation of Galicia, for instance, he claimed that the Galician constitution should be submitted to the Imperia Council in the form of a governmental submission with a guarantee from the Cabinet that it would be adopted. Prime Minister Clam-Martinitz opposed this, as he did with the entire project of the separation of Galicia.⁸⁷⁹

The matter of separation of Galicia did not turn out to be successful, and Bobrzyński said that: "he will not be a screen and that he will resign if the separation issue is not successful."⁸⁸⁰ The minister already then predicted that the project of separation of Galicia would not be executed: "Bobrzyński sees that the government does not treat the issue of separation of Galicia from the 'European' point of view but in Hofrat terms. If this does not change, he will resign. Bobrzyński thinks that Clam would cause the most difficulties,"⁸⁸¹ and, as later events have shown, he was not mistaken. To some extent, it resulted from the fact that the relations between the national minister and the Prime Minister were not good: "Bobrzyński, as Biliński told me, is irritated, because Clam has not yet talked to him about separation. Clam is tired, sleepless, and he reportedly told the emperor that he is not able to do all the things the emperor requires of him."⁸⁸²

At this stage of efforts to adopt the draft law on separation of Galicia, both the Polish Club and Bobrzyński were aware of the inevitability of the fall of this idea. Jaworski wrote: "Bobrzyński is in a terrible mood. Tomorrow (March 23, 1917 — D.L.-L.), he is to have a decisive conversation with Clam. If it turns out that

877 M. Bobrzyński made the first request for resignation on the same day, December 20, rejected by the emperor, *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 295 of December 22, 1916, p. 1; Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. II, p. 125.

878 Łazuga, *Michał Bobrzyński*, p. 195.

879 Łazuga, *Michał Bobrzyński*, p. 196.

880 The note of March 19, 1917, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 174.

881 The note of March 20, 1917, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 174.

882 The note of February 6, 1917, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 162.

separation is an empty phrase, he will go. He is overwhelmed and depressed by the thought of a new defeat. Thus, dealing with him is very unpleasant, because he thinks only about himself. His egoism comes out of him quite brightly.”⁸⁸³ One can learn from Jaworski’s account that Bobrzyński, after a conversation with Prime Minister: “was sure that there the separation is impossible. Therefore, he will resign on Wednesday.”⁸⁸⁴ The draft law on the separation of Galicia had no chance for acceptance of the Imperial Council. Besides, Austrian ministers learned that the emperor did not want draft law on the separation to be submitted in the form of a government rescript, but a bill and to be approved by two-thirds of the House. Therefore, the emperor also did not facilitate negotiations between Poles and the government, as he opposed the separation of Galicia based on the emperor’s patent, that is, based on **granting the constitution**, although he counted for Bobrzyński to remain in government.⁸⁸⁵

In such a situation, which already meant a failure of the Polish side’s efforts at this stage, Bobrzyński resigned:⁸⁸⁶ “he announced that the decision in this matter was irrevocable and that this time he would not give in, even if the emperor himself asked for it, because ‘hat sein Ehrenwort verpfandet.’”⁸⁸⁷ The emperor did not accept Bobrzyński’s resignation because he did not feel obliged by Bobrzyński’s will.

The situation that arose after the February Revolution was very unfavorable for Poles. Bobrzyński predicted that he would resign, and Biliński planned to resign from the chairmanship of the Polish Club. Besides, on May 16, 1917, the Polish Club adopted famous W. Tetmajer’s resolution, which demanded the creation of a free Poland with access to the sea. The next day, on May 17: “Bobrzyński told me that he resigns,”⁸⁸⁸ it was “a shocking

883 The note of March 22, 1917, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 176.

884 The note of March 24, 1917, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 177. The disappointment and resentment of the national minister had to be significant, because, in the most challenging talks with the government which regarded economic independence, Poles managed to negotiate concessions on tariffs, that is, real taxes, transfer fees, salary tax, meat tax, lease tax, goods tax, domains tax, and salt tax, but also the percentage of consumption taxes. Moreover, social and industrial legislation, the abolition of the dualism of the authorities, the Chancellor and the Secretaries of State, national couriae, the Chancellor’s accountability to the Diet, The note of March 28, 1917, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, pp. 177–178.

885 The note of April 20, 1917, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, pp. 182–183.

886 It was Bobrzyński’s second request about the resignation, declined by the emperor on April 26, *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 97 of April 28, 1917, p. 1.

887 Łazuga, *Michał Bobrzyński*, pp. 198–199.

888 The note of May 18, 1917, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 193.

step⁸⁸⁹ for him. The Minister had been in bad shape for a long time, and these events only made it worse: “Bobrzyński made an impression of a resigned and powerless man on me.”⁸⁹⁰

In a conversation with Bobrzyński, Jaworski wondered what to do after the May resolution of the Polish Club, and the minister advised to explain that the Poles were in favor of the independent and united Poland, but under the scepter of Emperor Charles.⁸⁹¹ Łazuga interpreted it as follows: “Therefore, Bobrzyński suggested to emphasize the last sentence of Tetmajer’s resolution —words that perhaps only the Conservatives interpreted literally. Anyway, was there anyone else besides Bobrzyński?”⁸⁹²

When the emperor heard about Bobrzyński’s final decision, he strongly opposed it and even tried to intimidate the outgoing Minister for Galicia, as he said that in the event of Bobrzyński’s resignation, he would not nominate anyone for this position. The emperor was against the idea that a politician “who adds color to his government,” was about to resign. However, Bobrzyński did not change his decision and resigned.⁸⁹³

The emperor agreed to the third, final request for the resignation of Bobrzyński on June 1, 1917. At the same time, he thanked Bobrzyński for his patriotic attitude and his activity.⁸⁹⁴ Jaworski wrote: “Today, Goetz informed me that in an audience yesterday (June 1, 1917 — D. L.-L.) Bobrzyński resigned. He stood firm.”⁸⁹⁵

At this stage of the war, the pro-Austrian orientation continued to lose its supporters, and the Cracow conservative camp was no longer a large, significant, and influential force: “Everyone abandoned Bobrzyński. He was left alone with his Austrian policy. Everyone left him. The most painful thing is that the conservatives did it.”⁸⁹⁶

After Bobrzyński’s resignation, none of the leading Polish politicians in Austria became the national minister. Juliusz Twardowski was the head of the ministry, who was ordered to hold office until the appointment of the national

889 Quote in: Łazuga, *Michał Bobrzyński*, p. 200.

890 The note of March 18, 1917, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 172.

891 The note of June 1, 1917, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 196.

892 Łazuga, *Michał Bobrzyński*, p. 200.

893 The note of June 1, 1917, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 196; Łazuga, *Michał Bobrzyński*, p. 203.

894 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 126 of 3 VI 1917, p. 1.

895 The note of June 2, 1917, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 196.

896 The note of June 2, 1917, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 196.

minister.⁸⁹⁷ After the dissolution of Clam's Cabinet, he became the real Minister for Galicia in the new government of Ernst Seidler. Twardowski received nomination on June 23, 1917, and was dismissed a year later, on July 25, along with the appointment to continue to work in the ministry.⁸⁹⁸

After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, he was the initiator of talks in which members of the Presidium of Polish Club and German deputies participated.⁸⁹⁹ Jaworski and Twardowski communicated with Biliński about the agreements with the Ruthenians. Biliński claimed that the Germans should undertake the mediation in the negotiations. He also wanted to participate in them and agreed for Stapiński, German, and Baworowski at the same time. However, Twardowski did not consider it desirable for representatives of the government to participate in the negotiations. Three possible outcomes of the agreements were anticipated: "Galicia becomes a province, Galicia will be separated, or Galicia will be merged with Poland. In the latter case, Twardowski would give the Ruthenians districts with a Russian majority to govern."⁹⁰⁰

The peasant activists also approved of this point of view. In 1914, they claimed that: "the Polish Peasants' Party very firmly opposes any attacks on the entirety of our self-government or any Ukrainian proposals of the division into the Polish and Ruthenian part, and the party would refute such attacks as vigorously as possible."⁹⁰¹ And at the end of the war, they already presented a different stance: "The

897 Born on January 23, 1874, in Vienna, Twardowski was a student of Theresianum, then studied law at the University of Vienna, the University of Lviv. In April 1898, he joined the Lower-Austrian State Treasury Solicitor's Office, and in the same year, he was transferred to the Ministry of Trade, where from November 1907, he worked as Ministerial Secretary and was responsible for the organization of work on the newly established Ministry of Public Works. In this ministry, Twardowski headed two departments: the administration of construction and exhibition administration. In June 1911, he was appointed the head of the section at the Ministry for Galicia. During his term of office, he headed the Committee for Assistance to Refugees from Galicia and Bukovina. After the war, he J. Piłsudski appointed him as a plenipotentiary of the Central Liquidation Office on April 8, 1919, where he was responsible for settlements between Poland and pre-war Austria. He was a representative of Poland at the Vienna Peace Conference, *Życiorys Juliusz Twardowski, Archiwum Aktów Nowych (AAN), Akta Juliusza Twardowskiego*, vol. 135, pp. 93–103.

898 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 169 of July 26, 1918, p. 1.

899 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. II, p. 171.

900 The note of May 28, 1918, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 263.

901 *Piast*, no. 6 of February 8, 1914; "1914 luty, 1, Kraków – Rezolucja Wincentego Witosa, uchwalona jednomyślnie na I Kongresie PSL 'Piast' pt. 'Konieczności narodu i ludu

Congress considers the resolution of the Ruthenian-Polish question in the spirit of the principles of freedom, equality, and justice to be in the mutual interest of both peoples, and undertakes to strongly and actively support this rapprochement.⁹⁰² Daszyński directly mentioned the need to share the country: “This issue is a question of two nations . . . no matter between nations can be resolved according to the unilateral interest of one nation. This statement is of bronze, and it is a commandment of Polish democracy. If Ruthenian democracy begins to believe in Polish democracy, then the ice will break, then we will sit down at the same table to share the country in which both nations live.”⁹⁰³

The declarations of the national democrats on the Ukrainian question were unambiguous: “we do not intend to renounce Eastern Galicia, which is considered to be a Ruthenian or Russian country in Russia.”⁹⁰⁴ One could say that at the beginning of the war, the Polish parties were politically mature enough to come to terms with the necessity of coexistence with the Ukrainian nation in Galicia. Seemingly, J. Szujski’s appeal could materialize: “Toward the Ruthenians and Ruthenian affairs, we shall cease to behave like Pole, who repulse them, we shall be representatives of liberal Poland . . . We should not deny them the right to develop their nationality, as we did not deny it during the days of the Commonwealth, we shall not order one not to exist when one wants to exist, because our denial will only become a new force of the opposing camp, it will strengthen hostile influences, it will benefit Moscow, schism or, at best, the Austrian centralization and bureaucracy.”⁹⁰⁵

Twardowski also participated in a meeting initiated by deputy Ludomił German, and a session of the Presidium during which the participants discussed the issue of sending a delegation of Polish deputies to the emperor on the division of Galicia. The group of participants included: Zieleniewski as the chairman, Baworowski, Tetmajer, German, Stapiński, Gołuchowski, Biliński,

polskiego,” in: *W. Witos, Wybór pism*, ed. J. Borkowski, Warszawa 1989, p. 59; *Ruch ludowy wobec niepodległości Polski*, ed. A. Kołodziejczyk, Siedlce 1996, p. 111.

902 [1918 June 2]. – *Uchwały Zjazdu Inteligencji Ludowej PSL z Królestwa Polskiego, PSL Piast i PSL Lewice w Krakowie w sprawie jedności działania ruchu ludowego, jego miejsca w walce o niepodległość Polski i reform społeczno-politycznych*, Raport sytuacyjny Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych rządu Rady Regencyjnej nr. 92 z 13 VI 1918 r., in: *Materiały źródłowe do historii polskiego ruchu ludowego*, pp. 477–478.

903 *Mowa posła Daszyńskiego wygłoszona w parlamencie wiedeńskim dnia 3 października 1918 R. (wedle stenogramu)*, no place of publication 1918, p. 26.

904 Głabiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, p. 192.

905 J. Szujski, *Dzieła*, vol. I, Kraków 1885, in: *Galicja w dobie autonomicznej*, p. 86.

Goetz-Okocimski, German, and Steinhaus. Twardowski mentioned that he had heard from Prime Minister Seidler Twardowski mentioned that he heard Prime Minister Seidler when he spoke about: “‘the date and limits of division,’ as if these were the things unknown to him.” Thus, Twardowski claimed that the Prime Minister, without denying the division of Galicia, admitted that such plans existed. At the same time, Twardowski said that he had not investigated the facts, because if he had received a positive answer, he would have had to resign.⁹⁰⁶ However, it was finally agreed that the deputation would not be sent to the emperor.⁹⁰⁷

Not only the difficult situation which resulted from the ongoing war but also the internal conflicts in the Polish Club led to Twardowski's resignation. Jaworski claimed that a national democrat, Tadeusz Tertil, had contributed to the resignation: “Thus, Tertil expelled Twardowski. He spoke of him with hostility. Tertil mentioned as a political argument that Witos gave him a free hand and that in case of removing Twardowski, all the peasants' activists would be in favor of the budget.”⁹⁰⁸

The policy of some members of the Polish Club was unacceptable to the emperor: “the emperor is angry due to the loss of Twardowski, and he cannot understand what kind of policy it is that it consists in overthrowing — Clam, Bobrzyński, Seidler, Twardowski, etc.”⁹⁰⁹

A few years after the war, Władysław Sikorski, in his own Cabinet, offered Twardowski a portfolio of the Minister of the Interior.⁹¹⁰

The last Minister for Galicia before the fall of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was Kazimierz Gałęcki, who held the office since July 25: “I am disturbed because of all of this. The peasant activists rule and good-for-nothings are chosen . . .

906 The note of May 28, 1918, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 257. A letter that belong to Twardowski's legacy explicitly states: “Diese Bestrebung fanden ihren Ausdruck in einem anlässlich des Friedensvertrages mit der ukrainischen Volksrepublik zu Stande gekommen Abkommen, dessen Inhalt, wie bisher offiziell nicht bestritten wurde, die geplante Zweiteilung unseres Kronlandes bildet, Abschrift. 23. Luli 1918. Eure kaiserliche und königliche apostolische Majestät Allergrnädigster Kaiser und König,” AAN, Akta Kazimierza Twardowskiego, sign. 34, f. 13.

907 The note of April 25, 1918, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 258.

908 The note of July 27, 1918, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 273. Jakub Bojko described him in a not very flattering way: “he is a careerist. His face confirms it,” *Bojko, Dziennik 1911–1919*, p. 186.

909 The note of July 27, 1918, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 273.

910 *Sprawa zaofiarowania mi teki ministra spraw wewnętrznych w gabinecie Sikorskiego dnia 18 grudnia 1922*, AAN, Akta Juliusza Twardowskiego, sign. 51, f. 16.

This is a hopeless thing. What will we do with such a person as, for instance, Gałęcki as a minister.”⁹¹¹

Even before he became the national minister, Gałęcki mediated as the head of the section in talks between the government and the Polish Club. On June 17, 1918, the head of the section in the Ministry of Treasury met with Jaworski, and he presented a proposal from Seidler to reach a compromise with the Poles. His mission was secret. The Pole was to receive the position of the Governor-general, gymnasium in Biała was to be nationalized, and economic demands would be met in exchange for the support of the budget bill. However, Seidler did not promise anything regarding the division of Galicia in order not to cause conflicts with Ukrainians. The issue was much more complicated. Firstly, the Prime Minister was obliged to maintain an agreement with the Ukrainians on the division of Galicia, which actually tied his hands and was an obstacle to the conclusion of any other agreement that would harm the interests of the Ukrainians, and therefore threatened to break the agreement. Secondly, the Prime Minister himself was an obstacle to the conclusion of an agreement between Poles and Germans due to the Czech question. The third problem was the attitude of the peasant activists, about whom Jaworski wrote that: “even if one spreads honey on them, they will do what Skarbek tells them to do.” So he proposed to Gałęcki to first reach an agreement with the peasants in the matter of support for the budget: One can try to do this if one tells the peasant activists that it is them whom the country will owe Polish Governor-general — and then lead to a solution of the Ruthenian question. Jaworski judged the situation to be complicated, and he also said that: “I have little hope,” but he did not advise against carrying it out.⁹¹²

On July 23, 1918, Prime Minister M. Hussarek promised the Polish Club that he would appoint such ministers as it wished in exchange for the support for the budget and war loans.⁹¹³ The candidates appeared the very next day, and it was Kazimierz Gałęcki and Stanisław Madeyski. These proposals encountered protests from the conservative deputies, who preferred Juliusz Twardowski to remain the national minister. In such a situation, Tertil informed the Prime Minister by phone that the Polish Club would nominate a candidate within one day, on July 25.⁹¹⁴ At the same time, Twardowski was informed that his

911 The note of May 13, 1917, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 192.

912 The note of June 17, 1917, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 192.

913 The Polish Club with 26 votes in favor and 20 against adopted the six-month provisional budget, the note of July 24, 1918, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 272.

914 The note of July 24, 1918, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 192.

resignation impended and, as Jaworski wrote: “This is an unbearable terror of Witos.” For instance, Goetz continued to inform the national minister of the progress of the situation. Galecki was not a candidate of the conservative party, and he was perceived as: “a man without political culture, without an understanding of the Polish cause, associated with the peasant activists. For us, this position would have been lost. He would inform the peasant activists about everything.”⁹¹⁵

915 However, Tertil acted disloyally toward us and Twardowski, because he acted in a sneaky manner, The note of July 24, 1918, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 192.

CHAPTER 3: Poles in the Austrian Parliament

1. The Imperial Council

The origins of the Austrian parliament can be traced back to the so-called Adjunct Council (*Beirath*), established during the rule of Maximilian I and Ferdinand I. Only under Maria Theresa did it grow in significance. It was renamed the Council of State in 1760.⁹¹⁶ Subsequently, following the Spring of Nations, in 1849, it assumed certain characteristics of a representative body and was renamed the Imperial Council. The basis for this change was established by the March Constitution, octroyed by the Emperor in 1848.⁹¹⁷ The creation of the Imperial Council was also predicted in other draft constitutions, i.e. of April 1848 and the so-called Kroměříž draft constitutions of 1849. However, due to their excessively liberal nature and the ongoing revolution, they did not come into effect.

We also need to highlight the fact that it is the Spring of Nations that we should consider as the beginning of the Habsburg monarchy's systemic transformations toward constitutionalism in its modern sense. In the literature we can find an established view which posits that the dramatic events of that period initiated the process of systemic transformations in Austria. This view is equivalent to considering this date as the starting point for any discussions on the absolute state's transformation into a constitutional state.

On April 25, 1848, the Constitutional Charter of the Austrian Empire, commonly referred to as the April Constitution, was enacted. Its scope was

916 F. Kasperek, *Podręcznik prawa politycznego*, vol. 2 (Cracow: 1881), p. 9.

917 In response to the events of March 1848 in Vienna, the emperor decided to grant certain concessions to the protesters, which resulted in a promise of rebuilding the state in the direction of liberal constitutionalism. The direct, almost immediate consequence of the riots in the capital was the announcement of an imperial manifesto on March 15, announcing, among other things, the adoption of a new constitution and the abolition of censorship. In the Manifesto, Emperor Ferdinand I undertook to convene a gathering of representatives of the provincial parliaments of the various provinces of the empire, whose task would be to prepare a draft of a new constitution. The full text of the Patent of March 15, 1848 can be found in: S. Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego czyli ustawy konstytucyjne austriackie* (Lviv: 1901), pp. 2–3.

limited to the so-called hereditary lands,⁹¹⁸ that is, Austrian and Czech lands together with Galicia and Bukovina.

What was most important about this constitution was its source of origin. It was not the will of the citizens, but the monarch's inspiration. This source of origin means that the constitution was octroyed, imposed. This fact was clearly confirmed by the Emperor's Patent of April 25, 1848.⁹¹⁹ This constitution was not fully democratic, yet it already granted certain freedoms and political liberties.⁹²⁰

Under the April Constitution, a bicameral parliament was to be established, consisting of the upper chamber, i.e. the Senate and the lower chamber, i.e. the House of Deputies. The Senate, with no more than 200 members, would consist of 150 elected delegates of large-scale landed property estate, appointed for a period of five years by large-scale landed property owners, and imperial princes, aged twenty-four and over, appointed for life by the Emperor regardless of their origin. It follows that only a quarter of the Senate's members would be nominated, while the others would be representatives of large-scale landed property estate. The House of Deputies, on the other hand, was to consist of 383 members elected for five years in indirect and census elections.⁹²¹

918 This provision was reflected in the Constitution of April 1848, section two; Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , p. 13. Limiting its validity only to these lands seems justified, as the Hungarian lands received a separate constitution sanctioned by the emperor on April 11, while the exclusion of Italian lands was caused by the warfare that took place there, and therefore the status of their belonging to the Austrian Empire was not yet established, M. Sczaniecki, *Powszechna historia państwa i prawa* (Warsaw: 1973), p. 497.

919 See: Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , p. 12.

920 Section three of the April Constitution, establishing the fundamental rights of citizens, placed in the foreground the principle of equality before the law, which was to be expressed in the abolition of state differences and equal access of all citizens to public offices, regardless of their social status. It also guaranteed freedom of religion, personal freedom, freedom of speech and the press, the right to petition and establish associations, and the right to equal treatment by the judiciary and the police, Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , pp. 14–15. According to Stanisław Tarnowski, this constitution contains all the principles, requirements and provisions that serve the freedom of citizens: abolition of privileges, equality before the law, civil liberties, separation of powers, establishment of assize courts and transparency of the judiciary, responsibility of ministers, S. Tarnowski, "Siedem projektów konstytucji w Austrii," *Przegląd Polski*, vol. 3, no. 9 (1867), p. 459.

921 In both the municipal and the rural curiae, the institution of primary elections was introduced — each of the 500 constituencies entitled to vote would elect one voter, who would then elect a deputy from among the candidates. Under the Provisional

The Parliament had the right to adopt budget and tax laws, to determine the amount of public debt, and to grant its consent to annual military conscription.⁹²² The right of legislative initiative did not belong only to both chambers, but also to the emperor and the government. Every law passed by the parliament required the monarch's sanction. Thus, the principle of equal rights of the head of state and parliament in the field of legislation was introduced, which was emphasized in article thirty-four of the April Constitution.⁹²³ In article forty-two, the Constitution also guaranteed two basic principles of parliamentary life, i.e. freedom of speech and parliamentary immunity, stating that no member of the Chamber could be prosecuted or arrested during the term of office of the lower chamber without the express permission of the chamber to which he belonged, except for his apprehension in the act of committing an offence.⁹²⁴

This constitution never came into effect. The fact that it was octroyed and did not designate the nation as sovereign adversely affected its fate. It was badly perceived by liberal-democratic forces, and the main reason for its rejection was the fact that it was imposed by the monarch. These questionable aspects of the issued constitution were one of the reasons for the May Revolution of 1848.

The domestic situation in the monarchy forced the emperor to take decisive action. By order of May 16, 1848, he suspended the constitution and ordered the convening of a new parliament, which, like the previous one, was to draft a new fundamental law, but with a more democratic overtone. On the basis of the proclamation of the general and equal elections to the unicameral parliament (*Reichsversammlung*), on July 22, the Constitutional Parliament (*Reichstag*) held its first session.⁹²⁵

The sessions of this Parliament were soon moved to Kroměříž (Kremsier in the region of Moravia), as a result of the third consecutive revolution, of October 1848, and lasted until March 1849. This unicameral parliament, which held its sessions at the turn of 1848/49, was the only case in the history of Austria where the entirety of the legislative power was in the hands of the monarch and

Electoral Code annexed to the Constitution, Galicia would be entitled to 40 representatives in the Senate and to 96 representatives in the lower chamber, Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , pp. 20, 24; J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim 1848–1918*, (Warsaw: 1996), pp. 14–15.

922 P. Sarnecki, *System konstytucyjny Austrii* (Warsaw: 1999), p. 6.

923 Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , p. 16.

924 A. Nowicki, *Historia Austrii konstytucyjnej 1860–1907*, vol. 1 (Vienna: 1912), pp. 53–54.

925 Sarnecki, *System konstytucyjny Austrii*, p. 6.

the constitutional authorities, because in that period no national parliaments assembled.⁹²⁶

Work on the new constitution was preceded by the solution of one of the most pressing problems of the monarchy of the period, namely the abolition of serfdom and feudal service.⁹²⁷

However, particular attention should be paid to the proposals for the establishment of a legislative authority, which the Constitutional Parliament presented. At that time, two draft constitutional laws were prepared in parliamentary committees, entitled: *The Fundamental Rights of the Austrian People* and *The Constitutional Document for the Austrian States*, but they were not voted on due to the dissolution of the constituent assembly. These two laws, called the Kroměříž projects, significantly contributed to the transformation of the monarchy's system toward constitutionalism. We should describe them as very liberal and democratic for the social and political realities of the time. They clearly delineated the relationship between the powers of the head of state and the legislature: "The legislative power is exercised by the Emperor along with the Parliament; the legislative power left to each state is exercised by the Emperor, as the head of state, along with the Parliament, or the regional assembly."⁹²⁸

926 As Konstanty Grzybowski noted, this "constitutional parliament" was also to function as a legislative body, and its main task was to create the political foundations ensuring the transformation of the absolute state into a parliamentary monarchy, K. Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa Polski*, vol. 4, (Warsaw: 1982), p. 347. The constitutional parliament was still in session on 28–31 October during the siege of Vienna, and its last session took place on 1 November, with 136 members of parliament present, and was secret. The MPs voted on Franciszek Smolka's motion to adjourn the session until mid-November, but it was rejected due to the opposition of a group of deputies favoring the policies of the emperor and the monarchy, J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 26–27. See: K. Widman, *Franciszek Smolka, jego życie i zawód publiczny*, (Lviv: 1884).

927 Discussions on the draft law on enfranchisement lasted from July 26 to September 7, when the feudal burden on peasants, together with the judicial and police authorities of the nobility, were finally, although formally rather than practically, lifted, and the payment of compensation for the landowners was enacted, Sczaniecki, *Powszechna historia*. . . , p. 497. For the detailed arrangements on the payment of compensation for the abolition of serfdom, see: I. Jaworski, *Zarys powszechnej historii państwa i prawa* (Warsaw: 1983), pp. 303–304.

928 There was also a separation of competences between the head of state and the executive power: "The executive power is vested in the Emperor alone, and is sometimes exercised by the ministers responsible," and the judiciary: "Judicial power is exercised

The Austrian Parliament was to consist of two chambers, i.e. the People's Chamber, which would be directly elected for a period of three years, with 360 deputies, and the Chamber of States, which would include representatives of national parliaments and district councils. In the projects, the exercise of the principle of equality was clearly visible, as each of the parliaments would have the right to dispatch six deputies, and each district council would have the right to dispatch one. The elections to the People's Chamber were held with the application of the relative majority rule and with the participation of at least one-fourth of the voting-eligible citizens. The right to vote was granted to every citizen who had attained twenty-four years of age, had full civil rights and paid direct tax or rent or lease rent. On the other hand, the right to stand for election was granted only to Austrian citizens who had lived in the state for at least one year, had full civil rights and had reached the age of twenty-eight. The parliamentary term in the lower chamber was to be six years, with half of the chamber being replaced every three years. The rules of election to the Chamber of States were identical to those to the provincial assembly.⁹²⁹

The real legislative authority was in the hands of the parliament, with a significant restriction of the monarch's power to sanction legislative acts of this body. Both chambers of parliament had the right to pass resolutions which, after obtaining the imperial sanction, became binding state laws. The emperor had the right to refuse to grant his sanction. In such a case, the resolution could be resubmitted to the monarch during the very same parliamentary session. If, during the following session, the resolution, unamended, was submitted to the emperor and did not receive his sanction again, both chambers would be dissolved. However, if the next parliament adopted the same position, the emperor would not have the right to refuse to grant his sanction again.⁹³⁰ The draft Kroměříž constitutions also confirmed the principle of parliamentary immunity, expressed for the first time in the March Constitution.⁹³¹

throughout the state, in accordance with the same laws, by non-removable judges on behalf of the Head of State," Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , pp. 94–95.

929 Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , pp. 81–83.

930 Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , p. 81.

931 In the 1849 constitution, paragraph eighty-two had the same wording as paragraph forty-two of the April Constitution: "From the date of convening the State Parliament and during its sessions, no member of parliament may be prosecuted or arrested without the express permission of the Chamber to which he belongs, with the exception of an apprehension in the act of committing an offence. If the Chamber so requests, the arrest must be rescinded or the prosecution postponed for the entire duration of the session," Nowicki, *Historia Austrii*. . . , pp. 49–50.

The formal dissolution of the constituent assembly formally took place on March 7, 1849⁹³², but in reality, it already happened on March 4, when the Imperial Patent was issued, dissolving the parliament and simultaneously announcing the issue of a new state constitution.⁹³³

Announced by the Imperial Patent of March 4, 1849, the constitution⁹³⁴, the so-called Olomouc Constitution, was already of a completely different character than the Kroměříž projects. First of all, it was an expression of the power and will of the monarch, but it retained the principle of parliamentary immunity.⁹³⁵ It was received very negatively by the population and seen as an act of self-government by the head of state. It was not evaluated very favorably by the government either, but for a completely different reason, namely because it was still too liberal and therefore treated as a necessary evil.⁹³⁶

In the light of this constitution, the Austrian parliament was to be bicameral. The Upper Chamber was to consist of state representatives elected from among the deputies of provincial parliaments. However, the lower chamber was to be composed of deputies elected in direct, albeit curial, elections.⁹³⁷

932 "Kaiserliches Patent vom 7. März 1849, wodurch die Ausübung der Jagdgerechtigkeit geregelt wird," *RGBl*, no. 154 (1849), pp. 173–175.

933 "Kaiserliches Manifest vom 4. März 1849," *RGBl*, no. 149 (1849), pp. 148–150; "Kaiserliches Patent vom 4. März, über die, durch constitutionelle Staatsform gewährleisteten politischen Rechte," *RGBl*, no. 151 (1849), pp. 165–167. This patent referred in its tone to the tradition of the idea of the absolute state, emphasizing the necessity of maintaining the current social relations in the state and highlighting the indivisibility of the Austrian monarchy. The Patent of March 4, 1849 can also be found in: Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , pp. 94–95.

934 "Kaiserliches Patent vom 4 März 1849, wodurch die Durchführung der Aufhebung des Unterhaus-Verbandes und der Entlastung des Grund und Bodens angeordnet wird," *RGBl*, no. 152 (1849), pp. 167–173; "Kaiserliches Patent vom 4 März 1849, die Reichverfassung das Kaiserthum Österreich enthaltend. Reichverfassung für das Kaiserthum Österreich," *RGBl*, no. 150 (1849), pp. 150–165.

935 Two paragraphs of the Olomouc Constitution mentioned this principle, namely paragraph sixty-two, which prohibited the prosecution of a deputy and holding him or her liable for his views and paragraph sixty-three, which was a supplementary provision to it, according to which the Member could not be prosecuted and imprisoned without the consent of the Chamber, with the exception of his apprehension in the act of committing an offence, Nowicki, *Historia Austrii*. . . , p. 50.

936 S. Tarnowski, "Siedem projektów konstytucji w Austrii," *Przegląd Polski*, vol. 4, no. 10 (1867), p. 74.

937 Sarnecki, *System konstytucyjny Austrii* (Warsaw: 1999), p. 7.

In this very constitution, there were already provisions heralding the end of the process of liberalization of the system and the return to absolute rule. This thesis is confirmed by two facts. Firstly, it is article twelve of the Constitution, which states that if legislative bodies are not established, all legislative acts requiring the form of a law may be issued in the form of ordinances: “As long as the organic laws provided for by this State Constitution do not come into effect by constitutional means, a corresponding decree is issued by way of ordinance.”⁹³⁸ Secondly, it is a failure to implement the constitutional provision of the appointment of the supreme legislative bodies, contained in article thirty-seven: “The legislative authority on state affairs is exercised by the Emperor in conjunction with the state parliament; on national affairs — by the Emperor in conjunction with the national parliaments.”⁹³⁹

Thus, the emperor was once again the real and sole lawmaker. What proves the strength of his position in the eyes of the law at the time is the lack of any codification of the powers of the head of state. It should be clearly emphasized that the scope of the monarch’s authority was practically unrestricted during the formal validity of the Constitution of March 4, 1849, because even in this Constitution, which he instigated, no representative bodies were established. As a result, the emperor regained full legislative power, although partially limited during the Spring of Nations. This discrepancy between the factual and legal situation was, to a certain degree, eliminated under the Patent of December 31, 1851.⁹⁴⁰

The return to the Emperor’s sole unrestricted authority meant, first of all, a disruption to the process of transforming the absolute state into a constitutional state. The attempts of political reforms undertaken in the years 1848–49, focusing on the creation of institutions and mechanisms limiting the power of the emperor and the administrative apparatus, as well as the establishment of representative institutions, ended in failure. In place of the repealed 1849 constitution, no other fundamental law was presented, and as a result, in the era of neo-absolutism, the Austrian state functioned without this supreme normative act. The gap was filled in part by the New Year’s Eve Patent, whose annex entitled *Principles of organic law in the crown lands of the Austrian Empire* only referred to the construction of the state apparatus subordinate to the emperor and did not contain any regulations determining the position of the emperor in the state.⁹⁴¹

938 Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , p. 102.

939 Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , p. 113.

940 “Kaiserliches Patent vom 31. Dezember 1851”, *RGBl*, no. 2 (1852), pp. 25–26.

941 Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa*. . . , vol. 4, p. 268. In his New Year’s Eve Patent, the Emperor described the March Constitution as incompatible with the political

The fundamental change in legal and political relations in the Austrian monarchy was brought by the Diploma issued on October 20, 1860⁹⁴² by A. Gołuchowski senior⁹⁴³, who, from August 21, 1859, was Minister of the Interior in the government of J. Rechberg and, on the day of promulgation of the Diploma, was nominated as Minister of State.⁹⁴⁴

foundations of the monarchy and as impossible to implement in the entire Austrian state, Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , p. 137. Despite the apparent regression in the legal and political domain, some of the achievements of the Spring of Nations period were preserved. Equality before the law was among those civil rights and liberties which were not revoked in the neo-absolutism period, although its definition was significantly limited, namely to the lack of state differences. The remaining rights and freedoms were repealed by the patent of December 31, 1851; the patent only ensured freedom of operation for legally recognized churches and religious associations, Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , pp. 137–139; Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa*. . . , vol. 4. . . , p. 349.

942 “Kaiserliches Diplom vom 20. Oktober 1860,” *RGBl*, no. 226 (1860), pp. 336–338; “Kaiserliches Patent vom 20. Oktober 1860,” *RGBl*, no. 227 (1860), pp. 339–349. Before this constitution was issued, the emperor, in the Patent of March 5, 1860, “strengthened” of the Imperial Council, “Kaiserliches Patent vom 5. März 1860,” *RGBl*, no. 56 (1860), pp. 97–10. This body was an advisory institution in the period of neo-absolutism, starting from 1851. Strengthening the Council was the first step toward limiting the monarch’s power by depriving him of full legislative power, and it consisted in supplementing the Council with additional members. The Imperial Council, a budding legislative body, was comprised of imperial archdukes appointed by the Emperor for life, high ecclesiastical dignitaries, civilians and military officers meritorious to the state, and also, which constitutes the real turning point, the representatives of crown lands, in the number of 38, elected for a period of 6 years. The Council was responsible for adopting the budget and issuing opinions on general legislation; however, it did not have the right of legislative initiative, but only the right to issue opinions on projects and to examine motions, the so-called “proposals of national parliaments,” Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , pp. 151–153. In the course of the budget deliberations, the Council obtained additional, insignificant powers. On July 17, the Emperor undertook, of his own free will, not to take any significant decisions on state finances without the consent of its members. These decisions stipulated that no changes should be made to the taxation and loaning systems, Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , pp. 159–160; A. Nowicki, *Historia Austrii konstytucyjnej*. . . , pp. 4–5.

943 The October Diploma was formed by the Hungarian historian W. Majlath, L. Dębicki, *Portrety i sylwetki z XIX stulecia*, vol. 1 (Cracow: 1905), p. 31.

944 Nowicki, *Historia Austrii konstytucyjnej*. . . , p. 5. It is believed that it was A. Gołuchowski who was the actual creator of the monarchy’s internal policy at that time, and he was also requested by the emperor to implement the political reform.

In the Diploma of 1860 was invoked the Pragmatic Sanction of April 19, 1713.⁹⁴⁵ It emphasized the “inseparability” and “non-severability” of the components of the monarchy and pointed to the need to create appropriate legal and political relations between the crown lands.⁹⁴⁶ The authors of the Diploma therefore intended to make an attempt at reforming the monarchy’s system in the direction of federalism and it seems that the solutions contained therein gave an unambiguous direction to the transformation of the state. This statement is supported by the fact that the institution of a wider and stricter Imperial Council was introduced. It was the first such institution competent to represent the whole state, because it consisted of representatives of all the provinces. It was also possible to exclude the Hungarian delegation from the sessions – then the Council assumed a stricter form and was responsible for resolving state issues, excluding Hungarian affairs. Therefore, the Diploma provided for the creation of one body with two different functions and two different groups of councilors, i.e. in the field of common affairs for all Austrian provinces — the Imperial Council strengthened by a delegation of national parliaments, and in the field of common affairs for all provinces and Hungarian lands — the same Council supplemented

O. Balzer, *Historia ustroju Austrii*, (Lviv: 1899), p. 486. In an official letter, the monarch communicated to A. Gołuchowski his obligations resulting from the Diploma: “You are to accept as a permanent rule that all states and interests of each individual country are to be replaced in the Parliament in an appropriate proportion . . . In particular, the ordinances and national statutes are to secure the right for countries to cooperate in the exercise of their legislative power . . . After issuing and announcing national ordinances and statutes, you are to immediately present to me your decisions as to the time of convening the Parliaments. I then request you to elaborate and submit to my judgement, as soon as possible, the proposals for the implementation of the principle of separation of the judiciary from the administration.” In: Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , pp. 162–163.

- 945 This was a legal act on the succession to the throne, enacted by Emperor Charles VI, who, having no male descendants, decided to determine the principles of the succession to the throne through the act. It also emphasized the indivisibility and inseparability of the components of the monarchy. The inheritance of the crown of the empire was tantamount to the acquisition of the entirety of the land belonging to the Habsburg Empire. The principle of indivisibility also applied to Bohemia and Hungary, K. Fiedor, *Austria. Od gospodarki żarowej do Unii Europejskiej*, (Opole: 2000), p. 47.
- 946 The Diploma stated that “[t]hese warranties can only be fully provided by institutions and legal relationships which correspond to both the historical legal sense of the existing diversity of our kingdoms and lands and to the requirements of their inseparable and indissoluble strong cohesion,” J. Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw i rozporządzeń administracyjnych*, vol. 1 (Lviv: 1899), p. 76.

by delegates of the Hungarian Parliament.⁹⁴⁷ The Imperial Council was common to the whole state, but its competences and composition were determined by strictly defined boundaries. Thus, the distinction between the Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen and other parts of the monarchy was emphasized once again. The dual character of the Council also seemed to herald the later dualism of the Danube monarchy.

By virtue of the Diploma of 1860, the composition and competences of the Imperial Council were modified. The number of representatives of national parliaments was increased from thirty-eight to one hundred members⁹⁴⁸, excluding the nominees.

Nevertheless, the Council was still not a representative body in the full sense of the word, although the greater number of members provided opportunities for individual kingdoms and crown lands to express their own interests and aspirations more fully. At the same time, the essence of the Council underwent a fundamental change, which seems important from the viewpoint of the necessity of the functioning of bodies competent in legislation. It was granted the right to pass laws and was no longer only an advisory body: "We and our successors shall exercise the right to pass, change and repeal (abolish) laws, only with the cooperation of legally assembled parliaments or the Imperial Council, to which Parliaments are to send a number of members we shall indicate."⁹⁴⁹

Thus, there appeared a division of legislative competences between the head of state and the Council and a separation of powers, with regard to the objects of national legislation, between the Council and the national parliaments. The thesis of the period of absolutism, according to which the emperor was the only source of the law in force, became obsolete in 1860, although only seemingly. This clearly defined concept, introduced by the creators of the October Diploma, was overshadowed by a provision under which the emperor could refer those affairs which were not mentioned in the Diploma to the Council for consideration.

The October Diploma granted the individual provinces of the empire partial independence, also introducing the principle of presumption of competence for the benefit of national parliaments. It clearly defined the scope of legislative affairs within the jurisdiction of the Council, and all other affairs, not exclusively reserved for the Council, were referred to the parliaments: "All other subjects

947 K. Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa Polski*, vol. 4, p. 273; H. Wereszycki, *Historia Austrii*, (Wrocław: 1986), p. 223.

948 Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , p. 161.

949 Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*. . . , p. 77.

of legislation that are not covered by the above points are to be constitutionally resolved in the respective parliaments' sessions."⁹⁵⁰

The adoption of federalist political solutions was possible due to the Diploma's confirmation of the position of the monarch and his government apparatus in affairs concerning the entire state and, above all, the maintenance of the principle of emperor's full power, although it was undoubtedly the twilight of the *rex absolutus*. The proposal only changed the principles regarding the implementation of this power, by allowing the subjects to participate in the exercise of power, both in legislation and in administration. The principle, however, was only theoretically a limitation of the emperor's power, and it referred primarily to its exercise and only to the extent defined by law: "the theoretical distinction between the 'substance' of power and its 'exercise' had a certain practical meaning — it limited the competence of bodies appointed by the people."⁹⁵¹

The turn toward centralism happened with the publication of the next act regulating legal and state relations in the monarchy — the Patent of February 26, 1861.⁹⁵² The preamble of the Patent referred to the Diploma and suggested that this was a new constitution, created according to the concept of A. Gołuchowski, although the actual creator of the then politics was Anton von Schmerling, a German centralist and moderate liberal.⁹⁵³

The February Patent was an Austrian constitution, although it formally assumed the form of an implementing law to the Diploma of 1860. It was composed of two annexes. The first one was a fundamental law on the representation of the state, applicable in the whole monarchy, while the second one (appendices II.a–II.p) contained national statutes for the individual provinces of the state, electoral systems for the parliaments, and the rules for dividing parliamentary seats among electoral curiae.⁹⁵⁴

950 The powers of provincial parliaments are defined in point three of the Diploma, while those of the Imperial Council are defined in point two; see: Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw. . .*, pp. 77–78. Also see: Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa. . .*, p. 286.

951 Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa. . .*, p. 268.

952 "Landes-Ordnung und Landtags-wahlordnung für das Erzherzogthum Österreich unter der Ems," *RGBL*, no. 20 (1861), pp. 69–75.

953 A witness of these events, S. Tarnowski, criticized the new constitution: "How could the principle inaugurated so beautifully and so wisely in the October Diploma be so distorted and corrupted in the February Patents, which were but its complement, that only the form and name of the constitution was left, that instead of freedom, we only received ruthless centralisation?," Tarnowski, *Siedem projektów konstytucji. . .*, p. 86.

954 Appendix two included the statute for Galicia, "Landes-Ordnung und Landtags-wahlordnung für das Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien sammt dem

The February Patent of 1860 introduced a bicameral parliament, called the Imperial Council, which consisted of the House of Lords and the House of Deputies.⁹⁵⁵ The members of the upper chamber were appointed by the emperor for life and in any number from among the members of the Imperial Chamber, representatives of aristocratic and noble families, archbishops and bishops with a title of nobility, military and civil dignitaries, meritorious to the state, church, science, culture and art⁹⁵⁶, hence its aristocratic and conservative, if not reactionary, face. Apart from the members of the dynasty, all the others were members of the council, by the explicit will of the emperor, and therefore the House of Lords was a body closely related to the monarch, which in turn was reflected in the acceptance of and support for his actions. Among all the European chambers of parliament, it was the body most devoted to the monarch.⁹⁵⁷ The lower chamber was the real representative body, but only in the sense that was allowed by the socio-political realities of the time. It consisted of 343 delegates, including the delegations of the Hungarian and Italian parliaments, elected in indirect curial elections. The national parliaments elected representatives directly from among their members, by an absolute majority of votes, and sent a delegation to the central parliament. The elections to the lower chamber of the Imperial Council were therefore indirect. The emperor had the right to call for direct elections to the lower chamber of the Imperial Council, also with the preservation of the curial system, if the provincial assembly could not meet or if it did not intend to dispatch a national delegation, as part of its political strategy.⁹⁵⁸

The scope of activity of the Imperial Council, delineated in the October Diploma, was not changed; its competences in the light of the February Patent concerned all subjects of state legislation. The Council maintained its full legislative capacity. The previously sanctioned dualism in legislative affairs concerning Hungarian and non-Hungarian lands was also confirmed by the Patent. The Council's scope of activity could be wider or narrower, with the only difference that for non-Hungarian lands it was much wider than established by the Diploma. The Council's powers covered all those affairs that were not explicitly reserved for national parliaments. The presumption of competence in favor

Großherzogthume Krakau, Beilage II, o," *RGBl*, no. 20 (1861), pp. 280–196; Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa...*, vol. 4. . . , p. 264; Sarnecki, *System konstytucyjny Austrii*, p. 8.

955 Balzer, *Historia ustroju Austrii*, p. 488.

956 Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego...*, pp. 166–167.

957 Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa...*, vol. 4, p. 284.

958 Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego...*, p. 167; Nowicki, *Historia Austrii...*, p. 39.

of the central parliament could cause disputes between the Council and the parliaments, therefore in the February Constitution the right to resolve them was reserved for the Emperor.⁹⁵⁹

Paragraph thirteen of the Patent was important, as it allowed considerable leeway: “If, at the time when the Imperial Council is not assembled, sudden ordinances must be made on a certain subject within its scope of activity, the ministry is obligated to present the reasons for and consequences of the ordinance to the nearest Imperial Council.”⁹⁶⁰ This provision transformed the constitutional Law on State Representation into a fiction. Although there was an article in the Constitution stating that the Council would be convened annually by the Emperor, there were no mechanisms to guarantee its fulfilment. Paragraph thirteen, first of all, created a possibility of making decisions without the participation of a body established for this purpose, and secondly, allowed for a complete suspension of the constitution and for decision-making in state affairs through temporary acts.

The February Constitution was suspended in 1865.⁹⁶¹ It was the first and only Austrian Constitution whose provisions were implemented and on the basis of

959 Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , p. 169. The national parliaments were obliged to send delegates to the lower chamber of parliament, elect members of the National Division and decide on certain affairs concerning the state, e.g. in the field of culture, public construction projects, charities, management of national property, and issue of national orders in accordance with generally applicable laws, Wereszycki, *Historia Austrii*. . . , p. 227.

960 Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , p. 169.

961 The revocation of the Schmerling Constitution was preceded by an imperial manifesto *To my peoples!*, proclaimed on September 20, 1865. In the manifesto, the emperor referred to the Diploma of 1860, emphasizing above all the unity of the state, taking into account its diversity, and guaranteeing the right of nations to participate in the management of the state, “An meine Völker!,” *RGBL*, no. 88 (1865), pp. 301–302. The manifesto was accompanied by a patent suspending the 1861 Law on the Representation of the State, which also referred to the need for an agreement with the lands of the Hungarian crown, “Kaiserliches Patent vom 20. September 1865,” *RGBL*, no. 89 (1865), pp. 303–304. The full text of the manifesto and the Imperial Patent of September 20, 1861 can be found in: S. Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , pp. 213–216. At the same time, there were also changes at the highest levels of authority. The emperor dismissed A. Schmerling, whose centralist policy course was not accepted by Hungarians, Czechs and Poles; in his place was appointed Count Belcredi, supporter of the idea of transforming the state into a federalist one, Wereszycki, *Historia Austrii*. . . , p. 227.

which a joint parliament was called.⁹⁶² It should be stressed, however, that in the years 1861–65, it did not operate very efficiently.⁹⁶³

Suspending the February Patent created formal conditions for the conclusion of a future settlement with Hungary.⁹⁶⁴ After the defeat of Austria at Sadova, it was known that there was a high probability that the Hungarian question

962 Balzer, *Historia ustroju Austrii*, p. 490.

963 During this time, Hungary did not participate in the sessions of the so-called wider Imperial Council. From 1863, the parliament was also boycotted by the Czechs. In the same year, the January Uprising erupted in the Kingdom of Poland, in which Galicia also participated. Sessions of the Galician Parliament were convened on January 12, but already on January 31 the Parliament was closed, precisely because of the insurgent actions. A year later, on February 24, a state of siege was declared in Galicia, and on April 18, 1865 it was lifted. At that time, the national parliament did not deliberate, so it was not possible to send delegates to the Imperial Council, J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 40. The introduction of a state of siege in Galicia was predicted at the end of 1863, during the Cabinet Council meeting of November 1, although it was already officially discussed in Vienna in April. Austria was deterred from this decision by the issue of its loan from France, which would most probably have refused it if the monarchy had taken restrictive measures against Polish people from Galicia. As we know, France and Russia were in conflict at the time, and the Galician Poles helping the insurgents from the Kingdom of Poland were, in a sense, Napoleon's allies. The turn in international politics came on November 5, after Napoleon's speech, read as a willingness to communicate with Russia. In such a situation, Austria was no longer bound by any external circumstances, but only awaited the end of the parliamentary session to be able to impose a state of emergency in Galicia on the basis of paragraph thirteen of the Constitution. At the turn of 1863 and 1864, the uprising in the Russian partition terrains began to collapse and in Vienna, the desirability of introducing a state of siege was questioned, especially as Galicia had been pursuing a restrictive policy for many months. It was only as a result of Russia's diplomatic efforts that the Council of Ministers decided, on February 18, to declare a state of emergency in Galicia. It was introduced on April 29, 1864 and lifted on April 16, 1865, H. Wereszycki, *Austrija a powstanie styczniowe*, (Lviv: 1930), pp. 245–246, 249–250, 275–276, 282–283, 291–292, 294, 301.

964 The agreement with Hungary was also accelerated by events in the international arena. In that decade, Austria suffered significant losses in two wars: the Italian war of 1859, accelerating the introduction of constitutional rule, and the war with Prussia of 1866, which became one of the reasons for the division of the monarchy into Austrian and Hungarian parts. As H. Wereszycki claimed: "the Austrian defeat in 1866 was certainly caused by the weakness of the leadership in all domains, in the game determining not only the fate of the Habsburg monarchy and Germany, but, to a large extent, the whole of Europe," Wereszycki, *Historia Austrii*. . . , p. 228.

would be resolved and a settlement with the Magyars would be reached. The starting point for this possible settlement was the adoption of a legislative separation between Hungary and the rest of the monarchy. In February, the emperor restored the Hungarian constitution of April 1849, under which, on February 17, the Hungarian cabinet was formed, with I. Andrassy as Prime Minister.⁹⁶⁵ The Council of Ministers prepared a draft law on the execution of common affairs, which was subsequently approved by both chambers of the Hungarian Parliament. The next step toward the settlement was the coronation of Emperor Franz Joseph as King of Hungary in Budapest in July 1867.

In February 1867, in non-Hungarian lands, the February Patent was reinstated so that a stricter Imperial Council could meet. The aim of this reinstatement was to create a formal and juridical basis to enable the Council to convene and adopt the provisions of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. In May 1867, the Act on the Execution of Common Affairs, was sanctioned on December 21, 1867, and thus the Austro-Hungarian compromise was finalized.

The operation of the wider Imperial Council ended during the period when the dual monarchy emerged and two separate parliaments were created, one Austrian and one Hungarian. Ultimately, the Imperial Council was abolished by the Law of June 12, 1868.⁹⁶⁶

In practice, concluding a settlement and, as a result, establishing a dual monarchy, meant the creation of two separate states, with separate authorities and independent internal policies. What united them was the person of the monarch, who, in the western part of the monarchy, acted as the emperor of Austria, and, in the eastern part, acted as the king of Hungary; and also, common institutions and their competences.

The Constitution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was not a uniform legal act, but a set of fundamental laws, referred to as the December Constitution⁹⁶⁷,

965 The composition of the first Hungarian cabinet can be found in: *F. X. d'Abancourt, Era konstytucyjna austro-węgierskiej monarchii od 1848 do 1881r., omówiona z uwzględnieniem walki autonomistów z centralistami*, (Cracow: 1881), pp. 105–106; Balzer, *Historia ustroju Austrii*, p. 493.

966 Kasperek, *Podręcznik prawa politycznego*, vol. 2, p. 9.

967 “Staatsgrundgesetz vom 21. Dezember 1867, über die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsbürger für die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder,” *RGBl*, no. 142 (1867), pp. 394–396; “Staatsgrundgesetz vom 21. Dezember 1867, über die Einsetzung eines Reichsgerichtes,” *RGBl*, no. 143 (1867), pp. 397–398; “Staatsgrundgesetz vom 21. Dezember 1867, über die richterliche Gewalt,” *RGBl*, no. 144 (1867), pp. 398–400; “Staatsgrundgesetz vom 21. Dezember 1867, über die Ausübung der Regierungs- und Vollzugsgewalt,” *RGBl*, no. 145 (1867), pp. 400–401; “Staatsgrundgesetz vom

which defined the specificity of the state's political system only in combination with earlier acts. The newly created dual monarchy was based essentially on three acts of law. They were the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of March 1867, in the form of two identical laws, the Austrian Law and the Hungarian Law, sanctioned by the Emperor of Austria and the King of Hungary. These laws regulated the so-called affairs common to both parts of the monarchy. Under the Fundamental Law of December 21, 1867 on common affairs, three joint ministries were established, i.e. of foreign policy, of war and of finance. They were established because of the designation of the scope of common affairs and the need to tackle them in a manner consistent with the interests of the whole of the Habsburg Monarchy.⁹⁶⁸ Secondly, it was the constitution of the Hungarian kingdom, octroyed in 1848, revoked due to the Hungarian uprising in 1849, and reinstated in 1867. Thirdly, it was the constitution of the Austrian Empire, which consisted of the fundamental laws of 1862–1867, the October Diploma of 1860 and the February Patent of 1861, which were also in force after 1867, but only in Cisleithania. In the hierarchy of acts, these two constitutions were above the package of fundamental laws, contained general constitutional principles, were never changed in practice, there was no procedure guiding their potential change, and they were at times contradicted by the fundamental laws.⁹⁶⁹

As emphasized above, the Austrian constitution was composed of laws of a fundamental nature. A specific feature of the Austrian system of that period was the uniform legal status of these acts.⁹⁷⁰ Moreover, the legislator did not take into account the scope of their validity, neither on the state nor on the local levels. Their equal position in the hierarchy of acts determined the difference between the Austrian political system and those of other European states.

The Law on State Representation of 1867 changed, but did not abolish the February Patent of 1861, preserving some of its solutions to the issue of organization and competence of the legislative power. The emperor still had the right to convene parliamentary sessions, he could also postpone or disband the House of Deputies and then order new elections. The division of the parliament into two chambers, i.e. the upper chamber — the House of Lords and

21. Dezember 1867, betreffend die allen Ländern der Österreichischen Monarchie gemeinsamen Angelegenheiten und die Ort über Behandlung,” *RGBl*, no. 146 (1867), pp. 401–406.

968 Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa*. . . , p. 294.

969 Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa*. . . , pp. 263–264; Sczaniecki, *Powszechna historia*. . . , pp. 498–499.

970 Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa*. . . , vol. 4, p. 264.

the lower chamber — the House of Deputies, was also retained. The Law on State Representation listed in detail the competences of the central parliament, preceded by the following statement: “The scope of activity of the Imperial Council covers all affairs regarding the rights, duties and interests common to all kingdoms and lands represented in the Imperial Council, unless, under an agreement with the lands of the Hungarian Crown concluded between them and other lands of the monarchy, a given kingdom or land is to be treated as separate.”⁹⁷¹ The State Council was entitled to conclude trade and state treaties introducing territorial changes in the province or directly affecting citizens of the State. It was responsible for affairs regarding compulsory military service, e.g.: conscription to the army and determination of taxes, tributes or stamp duties, fiscal control, incurring loans and credits, disposing of state property, then monetary, pecuniary, customs and commercial affairs, regulations concerning post, telegraph, railways, sea transport and other means of communication. The powers of the Council included: credit-banking legislation, industrial legislation (excluding legislation on propination laws), legislation on measures and weights, on medicine, on police, on associations (including religious associations), on education and universities, on criminal and judicial affairs, on police and criminal affairs, on civil law affairs, commercial, maritime, mining and fief legislation, the right to grant and deny citizenship, and legislation on courts and administration, implementing the Fundamental Law of 1867; also legislation on duties and relations with the Crown lands, and regulation of the implementation of the Law on Common Affairs.⁹⁷²

Like the February Patent, this act limited itself to a rather enigmatic definition of the rights of national parliaments. Namely, it stated that those subjects of legislation which are not reserved for the Council fall within the competence of provincial parliaments. There was therefore a presumption of competence for the benefit of the parliaments. The actual division of powers between the central and national parliaments was implemented only through practice. This fact gave rise to many conflicts of theoretical and practical nature.⁹⁷³ Like the parliament

971 Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*. . . , p. 85.

972 Paragraph eleven (a–o) of the 1867 State Representation Act, Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*. . . , pp. 85–87.

973 Paragraph twelve of the Act on the Representation of the State of 1867 stated: “All other objects of legislation, not expressly reserved by this law for the Imperial Council, fall within the scope of activities of the parliaments of the kingdoms and lands represented in the Imperial Council, and settled in these parliaments and with them in accordance with the Constitution.” In paragraph eleven of this law, the powers of the central

parliament were listed in detail, J. Piwocki *Zbiór ustaw. . .*, pp. 85–87. At the same time, it was limited to a fairly concise definition of the powers of national parliaments. The actual division of powers between the central and provincial parliaments was executed only through practice, Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa. . .*, vol. 4, p. 266. Although the December Constitution created certain opportunities for the provinces to broaden their autonomy, they were not satisfied with them. The monarchy hoped that a strict definition of the scope of activity of the Imperial Council would allow the kingdoms and crown countries to acquire a fairly broad autonomy on the basis of the presumption of competence. However, the Act of 1867 not only strictly, but also broadly approached the powers of the parliament, thus not leaving the provincial parliaments with too much room for maneuver. The aforementioned paragraph twelve of the Act also provided for the possibility of transferring some of the already modest powers of the parliaments to the Imperial Council. Therefore, it was possible for the government to use this provision in the interest of the monarchy. The positive scope of Galicia's national legislation at that time included competences in the field of legislation on local government bodies, national culture, communication and public buildings, charities, schools, and churches. The powers of the national parliaments were not negotiable, given the formal provisions. However, the scope of their competences as defined in the Act on the Representation of the State seemed disputable. These reservations arose on the basis of the principle of presumption of competence for the benefit of the parliaments. Moreover, apart from the powers listed in paragraph eleven of the Act as common and reserved for the Council, no other matters common to the kingdoms and crown lands which would be vested only in the Council were given. This meant that the change in the scope of national parliaments' powers could be introduced not only by the parliaments, whose right to do so was guaranteed in national statutes, but also by the Council, by means of a law. It was known that a change in the competences of the parliaments and the Council could only take place by way of a procedure specified in the statutes or in the Act on the Representation of the State. In both cases, the consent of the parliament and the Council was required to change the scope of powers. The provisions of the Act resulted in the fact that the actual scope of activities of the parliaments was narrower than the one sanctioned by law. Starting from 1867, therefore, there was a conflict of competence between the State Council and national parliaments, with the national parliaments being the weaker party. Edward Dubanowicz claimed that the main reason for this situation was the lack of an appropriate criterion that would allow the adoption of an objective and general principle of division into common and national affairs, E. Dubanowicz, "Zakres ustawodawstwa sejmowego Król. Galicyi w świetle ustaw konstytucyjnych a historycznej rzeczywistości," *Czasopismo Prawno-Ekonomiczne (CPE)*, no. 16 (1915–1916), pp. 51–52; S. Starzyński, "Sprawa § 14 ustawy zasadniczej o reprezentacji państwa," *CPE*, no. 5 (1905), pp. 162–179; M. Rostworowski, "Opinia w sprawie stosunku autonomii do § 14 ustawy zasadniczej o reprezentacji państwa," *CPE*, no. 15 (1914), p. 187.

or the government, the provincial parliaments had the right of legislative initiative, and the bills were submitted in the form of governmental submissions. An absolute majority in both chambers was required for their adoption. The Act on Representation provided for the possibility to amend the laws on representation by a two-third majority with at least half of the members of the House of Deputies present.⁹⁷⁴ Every law required the emperor's sanction. The date of the law's entry into force was the date of the emperor's signature, so many laws had the same implementation date.⁹⁷⁵

In the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments, the composition of the House of Lords and the Chamber of Magnates did not differ. They had almost the same social structure, and therefore they had identical aristocratic and conservative faces. The members of the House of Lords were nominated. The Law on State Representation of 1867 provided for four groups of members composed of, first, adult imperial princes; second, representatives of wealthy noble families, holding a hereditary seat in the chamber; third, church dignitaries, archbishops and bishops, holding the title of prince; fourth, those especially distinguished for the state, science, culture and art, appointed as lifetime members of the chamber.⁹⁷⁶

The lower chamber of the Austrian Imperial Council was different from its counterpart in the Hungarian Parliament. In Austria, it was initially dominated by the nobility and rich landowners or bourgeoisie. However, changes in socio-economic and political relations, including reforms of electoral law, resulted in an increase in the representativeness of the House of Deputies. The situation was different in Hungary, where the phenomenon of Magyarization of the Transleithanian nation was taking place. There was also a reason why the term "Hungarian elections" was used to describe a situation of electoral fraud.⁹⁷⁷

Members of the House of Deputies were elected in indirect elections, which were held under the curial system. From April 1873, the deputies were elected in direct elections, therefore the national parliaments lost their influence on the

974 Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*. . . , pp. 87–88.

975 Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa*. . . , vol. 4, p. 266.

976 Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*. . . , p. 82.

977 This "electoral fraud" was due to the fact that Hungarians wanted to prevent national minorities, with the exception of Croats, from becoming deputies. Croats enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy and political freedom, although the exercise of their mandate was limited to voting on matters concerning their own country, I. Jaworski, *Zarys powszechnej historii*. . . , pp. 306–308.

Chamber's composition and character.⁹⁷⁸ Until 1896, Austria had four electoral curiae, i.e. of large-scale landed property, towns and cities, chambers of commerce and industry, and rural communes. The fifth curia, of universal voting, was introduced under the rule of Casimir Badeni, in June 1896.⁹⁷⁹ While its introduction was a step toward limiting the privileges of the upper classes, it was only the establishment of the principle of universality of the electoral law in January 1907 that was a real advance in the democratization of political relations in Austria.⁹⁸⁰ B. Sutter also emphasized another aspect of the struggle for the change of electoral law, namely the fight against the German element in the monarchy, the essence of which was reducing the number of seats for Germans in the House of Deputies of the Imperial Council: "Der Kampf um eine Änderung des Wahlrechts bis zur Reform von 1907 ist von da an zugleich ein Kampf gegen die Vorherrschaft der Deutschen im Reichsrat."⁹⁸¹

The deputies were guaranteed freedom of expression, for which they could not be held criminally responsible, but this right did not protect them from the Chamber. While a session was in place, they could avoid criminal and judicial liability, unless the Chamber authorized it, or unless a deputy was apprehended while the offence was committed. In the latter case, the Chamber could demand that the arrest be rescinded or that the criminal proceedings be adjourned. This privilege was applicable both while sessions were in place and in the time between them.⁹⁸²

978 "Gesetz vom 2. April 1873, wodurch des Grundgesetz über die Reichvertretung vom 21. Dezember 1867 (R. G. Bl. Nr. 141) abgeändert wird," *RGBl*, no. 40 (1873), pp. 161–164.

979 "Gesetz vom 14. Juni 1896, wodurch das Grundgesetz über die Reichvertretung vom 21. Dezember 1867, R. G. Bl. Nr. 141, beziehungsweise die Gesetz vom 2. April 1873, R. G. Bl. Nr. 40, und vom 12. November 1886, R. G. Bl. Nr. 162, abgeändert und ergänzt werden," *RGBl*, no. 168 (1896), pp. 529–530; "Gesetz vom 14. Juni 1896, wodurch die Reichsratswahlverordnung abgeändert, beziehungsweise ergänzt wird," *RGBl*, no. 169 (1896), pp. 530–536.

980 "Gesetz vom 26. Jänner 1907, wodurch die ss. 1, 6, 7, 12 und 18 des Grundgesetz über die Reichvertretung vom 21. Dezember 1867, R. G. Bl. Nr. 141, beziehungsweise die Gesetze vom 2. April 1873, R. G. Bl. 40, vom 12. November 1886, R. G. Bl. Nr. 162, und vom 14. Juni 1896, R. G. Bl. Nr. 168, abgeändert werden," *RGBl*, no. 15 (1907), pp. 57–58.

981 B. Sutter, "Die politische und rechtliche Stellung der Deutschen in Österreich 1848 bis 1918", in: *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918*, Bd. III, 1. Teilband, *Die Völker des Reiches*, (Vienna: A. Wandruszka and P. Urbanitsch, 1980), p. 287.

982 Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*. . . , p. 88.

The December Constitution did not provide for a legislative body common to both parts of the monarchy. Only bodies with legislative powers operated, and only in strictly defined cases. These were so-called joint delegations, elected by the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments from among their own deputies for one year.⁹⁸³

Both the Austrian and the Hungarian constitutions were modelled on the typical monarchist constitutions of the nineteenth century, so the state system was closely dependent on the composition of both chambers of parliament and the relationship between the head of state and the legislative body. In the December Constitution, there was no section on the rights of the head of state. The powers of the head of state were stipulated in laws that set forth the bodies which cooperated with the emperor, i.e. the Imperial Council, or through which he acted, i.e. the Council of Ministers, or which acted in his name, i.e. the courts.⁹⁸⁴

The Austrian system combined the principle of the right to the crown and the full power of the monarch with constitutionalism based on the parliamentary system. While we can speak of Austria as a typical nineteenth-century constitutional monarchy, we cannot say that a system of parliamentary governance

983 They had 60 members each, 20 of whom came from the upper chamber and 40 from the lower chamber. These delegations were responsible for establishing the budget for joint expenditure. They also had the power to supervise ministers of foreign affairs and to hold them accountable for infringements of the Law on Common Affairs, paragraphs Sixteen and Seventeen of the Act on Common Affairs of 1867, Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*. . . , pp. 21–22. In order for the budget to be passed, unanimity of both delegations and their separate resolutions were required. In the event of disagreement as to the content of the budget resolution, the law allowed the adoption of a concessive resolution adopted at a joint meeting of both delegations. In both cases, an imperial sanction was required. Resolutions were passed by an absolute majority of votes, Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*. . . , pp. 21, 23; Jaworski, *Zarys powszechnej historii*. . . , p. 308. As Michał Sczaniecki wrote, delegations were supposed to deliberate alternately in Vienna and Budapest, but in practice the sessions were held separately and their members agreed on a common position in writing, Sczaniecki, *Powszechna historia*. . . , p. 499. This manner of operation was not entirely in accordance with the Act on Common Affairs, which clearly stated that delegations communicated in writing — the Austrian side sent the content in German and the Hungarian side in Hungarian, both of them accompanied by certified translations. However, the joint session could be held at the express request of one of them. However, if the request was rejected three times, the delegation of the next term of office was obliged to accept it. This was referred to in paragraphs thirty and thirty-one of the Act on Common Affairs, Piwocki, *Zbiór ustaw*. . . , p. 23.

984 Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa*. . . , vol. 4, pp. 268–269.

developed there, unlike in the Hungarian kingdom. In a land with many nationalities with different interests and aspirations, there were serious obstacles to creating a parliamentary majority that would be able to conduct a stable policy. Democratization of the electoral law also, in a way, served, albeit in a negative sense, to disrupt the chamber's operation, because its composition began to include social strata with different interests than the landowners or bourgeoisie. Austrian parliamentarianism was in an almost constant crisis, mainly due to excessive political diversity of the chamber. The deputies were organized into numerous clubs, but none of them was strong enough to provide a majority. Hence, the practice of forming various parliamentary coalitions, generally unstable and short-lived, became well-established. The exception to this is the period of rule of the "Iron Ring" coalition from 1879–1891, which was formed by German conservatives with a clerical inclination and Polish and Czech deputies.

The Austro-Hungarian monarchy disintegrated in the autumn of 1918 and this disintegration was the result not only of the ongoing war, but also of the lack of acceptance of the monarchy's individual nations for the existing system. The 1867 Act on the Representation of the State contained two competitive principles, i.e. the idea of national sovereignty and the idea of the monarch's sovereignty. For this reason, at the end of 1918, Austria began to create new, structured legislation. Existing laws⁹⁸⁵, partially amended or supplemented, and completely new ones, became elements of the new system. The new electoral law, on the basis of which elections to the constituent assembly were held on February 16, 1919, was soon adopted, as early as December 18, 1918.⁹⁸⁶ All members of the lower chamber were previously members of the House of Deputies, and the majority of the upper chamber came from among the members of the House of Lords of the Imperial Council.⁹⁸⁷

2. Poles in the House of Lords of the Imperial Council

The political activity of Poles in the House of Deputies of the Austrian parliament attracts great interest of researchers and was described in numerous studies; however, this is not the case for the House of Lords of the Imperial Council. In part, this phenomenon may be explained with the following quotation: "In the

985 In the Constitution of the First Republic of Austria, par. 11 and 12 of the Fundamental Law of December 21, 1867, including the amendment of 1907, were still in force.

986 "Gesetz vom 18. Dezember 1918 über die Wahlordnung für die konstituierende Nationalversammlung," *SGBl*, no. 115 (1918), pp. 166–172.

987 *Parlament Republiki Austrii*, ed. H. Schambeck, (Warsaw: 1997), pp. 9, 11–12.

complicated and rusty state mechanism of Austria-Hungary, the House of Lords was a calm and moderately “oiled” cog. Its sittings were shorter than those of the House of Deputies, current affairs were done right away; on a daily basis, it was empty and majestically boring there.”⁹⁸⁸ About the parliamentary activity of the members of the House of Lords wrote, among others, Stanisław Grodziski⁹⁸⁹ and Stanisław Pijaj.⁹⁹⁰ The part of the monograph of Adam Sapieha by Stefan Kieniewicz, which covers the period from 1879 to 1903, when he was a member of the House of Lords, also provides numerous valuable remarks.⁹⁹¹

The activity of members of the House of Lords was rather minimal: “Archdukes, bishops and magnates were rarely present at sittings and did not set the tone; life peers ruled instead: professors, geheimrats, financiers, they were all old liberals brought in by Schmerling and Auersperg.”⁹⁹² A greater participation in the parliamentary works had, among others, Karol Jabłonowski,⁹⁹³ Kazimierz Lanckoroński, Mikołaj Romaszkan and Władysław Sanguszko. On the other hand, Agenor Gołuchowski Senior did not participate at all during the first three parliamentary terms. Even though he was appointed in 1861, he took the oath in 1867 and his contribution to the works of the House of Lords is dated from 1871.⁹⁹⁴

The House of Lords of the Imperial Council, a body in some respects important in the legislative process, remained in the shadow of the House of Deputies’ activity. Even though it was the upper house of the parliament, that is a body

988 S. Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha 1828–1903*, Warszawa 1993, p. 316.

989 He raised this problem while discussing the issue of Poles’ access to the central bodies within the Habsburg monarchy, see: S. Grodziski, “Na drogach karier politycznych Polaków w Austrii,” in: *Austria-Polska. Z dziejów sąsiedztwa*, eds. W. Leitsch and M. Wawrykowa, Warszawa-Wiedeń 1989, pp. 179–183.

990 S. Pijaj, “Polscy reprezentanci w izbie wyższej wiedeńskiej Rady Państwa w latach sześćdziesiątych XIX w.,” in: *Z przeszłości Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, ed. J. Hoff, Rzeszów 2002, pp. 19–37.

991 Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*, p. 312 et seq.

992 Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*, pp. 314–315.

993 For instance, during the works of the Imperial Council in 1867 on drafting basic laws, Jabłonowski consulted the position of the Polish members of the House of Lords with the position of the Polish Club. The Club: “thanked prince Jabłonowski for his sense of citizenship and that he consults this matter with the Club,” “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego z dnia 20 listopada 1867r.,” in: *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w wiedeńskiej Radzie Państwa (lata 1867–1868)*, preparation and introduction by Z. Frasz and S. Pijaj, Kraków 2001, p. 116.

994 Pijaj, *Polscy reprezentanci w izbie wyższej*, pp. 25–26.

of a greater rank, its significance in the legislative process was less meaningful. Before acts adopted in the House of Deputies were sanctioned by the emperor, they had to be accepted by members of the House of Lords. This group of people was strictly connected to the monarch and used for political games. It may be said that the upper house was some kind of the emperor's dependent assistant body, as he had the right to appoint a part of its members. Therefore, the emperor could determine the composition of the House of Lords, and thus, to the certain degree, its political face.

One should also realize that a refusal of a nomination could be negatively viewed. After all, an appointment to the House of Lords was an ennoblement and a distinction, even though in reality it meant a lesser influence on politics. However, for certain politicians, the activity in, for instance, the House of Deputies was a priority. This was the case of deputy Dawid Abrahamowicz, president of the Polish Club and president of the House of Deputies, who did not exercise his granted right to sit in the House of Lords.

Members of the House of Lords had the right to consult and cooperate with the deputies of the Polish Club but could not be its members. Thus, the emperor could deprive of their sit those who were inconvenient for him in the House of Deputies by nominating them to the House of Lords. An example of such practice was the nomination of Jerzy Czartoryski for a hereditary member of the House of Lords, mainly so his liberal views did not influence the policies of the Polish Club. However, it was a partial solution and it could not prevent him from contacting the Polish Club, since the participation in its sittings and discussions was allowed and voluntary. The statute of the Club of 1861 provided that members of the House of Lords and the Galician parliament have the right to participate in works of the Club, despite not having the right to vote.⁹⁹⁵

Until 1911, the membership in the House of Lords precluded the membership in the House of Deputies, it was not allowed to perform these two functions simultaneously. Only after the electoral reform of 1911, which introduced the four-adjectives law, this prohibition was lifted.⁹⁹⁶ The elimination of the formal obstacles made it possible to combine these two functions. Moreover, each parliamentarian could exercise his mandate in the Galician parliament.

995 See: Appendix no. 2, items 18 and 19, *Protokoły Koła Polskiego*, pp. 183–184; J. Zdrada, “Organizacja i stanowisko Koła Polskiego w wiedeńskiej Radzie Państwa (1861–1862),” *ZN UJ. Pr. Hist.*, 12/1963, pp. 73–74.

996 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, Warszawa 1924, p. 156

It seems, and this opinion may be viewed as rather reasonable, that a nomination to the House of Lords was not an ennoblement for the interested parties. It did not deprive politicians and activists of the possibility to influence the fate of the Austrian state but at the same time it gave them little room for manoeuvre. It should also be remembered that the House of Lords, despite its paramount position in relation to the House of Deputies, had a lesser significance in the legislative process. Moreover, in certain cases its members were unable to participate in the parliamentary works due to their old age, poor health or their lower intellectual capacity.

The House of Lords was composed, besides archdukes and members of the imperial house, of archbishops and bishops with a princely title treated as virilists, hereditary members and people appointed for life in recognition of their merits for the state, the Church, science, culture or art.

Clergymen as virilists had their seats in the House of Lords, in which were present the representatives of the three rites, that is Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic and Armenian Catholic.⁹⁹⁷

Among the members of the House of Lords were the following archbishops of Lviv of the Roman Catholic rite: Franciszek Wierchlejski, from April 29, 1861, died on April 17, 1884, Seweryn Dąbrowa-Morawski, from April 16, 1885, died on May 2, 1900 and Józef Bilczewski, from October 17, 1901. On the other hand, among bishops⁹⁹⁸ and Cracow cardinals in the House of Lords were: Albin Dunajewski, from December 19, 1889, died on June 18, 1894, knyaz Jan Puzyna, from October 22, 1894, died on September 8, 1911, prince Adam Sapieha, from March 9, 1912 and bishop of Przemyśl Józef Pelczar, from May 30, 1917.

Subsequently, the Greek Catholic archbishops should be listed: Spirdion Litwinowicz (1810–1869), member of the House of Lords from November 12, 1864, who replaced late archbishop Jerzy Jachimowicz (1792–1863), member from April 29, 1861, Józef Sembratowicz, who renounced his episcopacy in 1882, Sylwester Sembratowicz, from April 16, 1885, died on August 5, 1898, Józefat Kuilowski, from October 18, 1899, died on May 4, 1900 and Andrzej Szeptycki, from February 5, 1901.

997 The names of the specific members, the clergymen of the House of Lords lists: Grodziski, *Na drogach karier*, p. 182. They are also included in: "Reprezentacja polska w parlamencie wiedeńskim w latach 1848–1918," preparation by Cz. Brzoza and K. Stepan, in: J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, p. 353 et seq.

998 The bishop of Cracow received the right to sit in the House of Lords in 1889.

The Armenian Catholic archbishops constituted the last group: Grzegorz Szymonowicz, member of the House of Lords from April 29, 1861, died on June 14, 1875, Grzegorz Romaszkan, from December 13, 1876, died on December 11, 1881, Isaak Mikołaj Isakowicz, from December 14, 1882, died on April 29, 1901 and Józef Teodorowicz, from October 25, 1902.

Clergymen did not play a significant political role, similarly to other members of the House of Lords. Nevertheless, some of them by means of their pastoral or social activity went down permanently in the history of Austria and Galicia. Therefore, it is worth describing some of them. Due to the subject matter of this work, the main focus is on the Roman Catholic clergymen.

One of the archbishops of Lviv was Józef Bilczewski.⁹⁹⁹ The emperor appointed him archbishop of Lviv on October 30, 1900. This nomination was the result of a request directed to the monarch by the Galician elites who saw in Bilczewski not only a good priest, but also an excellent academic and pedagogue. Subsequently, Franz Joseph presented his candidature for archbishop to pope Leo XIII. The Vatican approved it and on December 17, 1900 Bilczewski became archbishop of Lviv.¹⁰⁰⁰ One year later, on October 17, he became a member of the House of Lords.

Besides focusing on his academic, pedagogical and pastoral work, Bilczewski was also engaged in the current political and social affairs. He was the founder of churches, chapels, schools and orphanages and he preached the need for education. Regarding social issues, he always protected the poorest and sided with peasants, workers and the poor.¹⁰⁰¹ He was never a politician, but he had his political views, at the source of which lied the convictions of patriotic and national character. He was guided by the motto: "God and Fatherland." His actions were directed at protection of Polishness on Eastern Borderlands.¹⁰⁰² During the First

999 See: S. Szurek, "Bilczewski Józef," in: *PSB*, vol. II, Wrocław 1936; <http://www.wilamowice.bielsko.opoka.org.pl/bilczewski.htm> (November 25, 2003). Beatified by John Paul II during his pilgrimage to Ukraine (June 23–27, 2001), "Dokumenty Rzymsko-Katolickiego Kościoła na Ukrainie," <http://www.rkc.lviv.ua/Cx1D.pnp.3?Lp&D=b> (December 2, 2003).

1000 http://www.vatican.va/news_services/liturgy/documents/ns_lit_doc_20010626_bilczewski_pl.html#top (December 3, 2003).

1001 In accordance with his will, after his death on March 20, 1923, he was buried in the Janowski cemetery, where at that time the poor were buried. On the other hand, his embalmed heart is in the chapel of blessed Jakub Strzemię in the Lviv cathedral Basilica, <http://www.opoka.org.pl/biblioteka/T/TS/swieci/b-j-bilczewski2.html> (November 25, 2003).

1002 <http://www.wilamowice.bielsko.opoka.org.pl/bilczewski.html> (November 25, 2003).

World War, he began his cooperation with Adam Sapieha, as their views on how to deal with the issue of the poorest and those in need were similar. Bilczewski helped not only Poles, but also Ukrainians, personally intervening with governor Szeremietiew and asking him to release the interned. Moreover, when Austria regained Lviv, lost temporarily during warfare, he defended the Ukrainians accused of Russophilia.¹⁰⁰³

The first bishop of Cracow who sat in the House of Lords was Albin Dunajewski, the older brother of the multiannual Austrian Minister of Finances, Julian Dunajewski. The nomination for the position of the bishop of Cracow on April 21, 1879, which was at the initiative of pope Leo XIII himself, was the turning point in his life. Dunajewski became bishop of the Cracow diocese, which in the previous forty-four years impoverished and was damaged.¹⁰⁰⁴ The new bishop took care of not only clergymen, but also of the Church's material goods, he contributed to the revival of the Theological Faculty of the Jagiellonian University and to the renovation of the Wawel chapel and cathedral, which are considered to be a part of the cultural heritage goods.¹⁰⁰⁵ In January 1880, Cracow became an independent diocese and in 1889, with the approval of the emperor, the Cracow bishops regained their princely title and thereby they received the obligatory right to sit in the House of Lords as virilists. The nomination of Dunajewski for a member of the House of Lords took place on December 19.¹⁰⁰⁶

Jan Puzyra¹⁰⁰⁷ became the successor of Dunajewski. He received the episcopacy of Cracow and the seat in the House of Lords instead of a Jesuit, Henryk Jackowski, who refused the position and whom the emperor wanted to nominate.

Puzyra was known as a firm opponent of the people's movement and of Rev. Stanisław Stojałowski. It was Puzyra who removed him from his position of the parson of the Kulikowo parish and then suspended him. Together with the archbishop of Lviv, Seweryn Morawski, and the bishops of Tarnów and Przemyśl dioceses, he published in 1895 a pastoral letter, in which he warned of the agitation

1003 F. Płaczek ks., "Arcybiskup lwowski Józef Bilczewski," <http://www.lwow.com.pl/bilczew.html> (November 25, 2003).

1004 T. Glemma ks., "M. Tyrowicz, Dunajewski Albin," in: *PSB*, vol. V, Wrocław 1939–46, pp. 462–463.

1005 W. Maleja ks., "Rektorzy Metropolitalnego Seminarium Duchownego w Warszawie 1863–1958," <http://www.wmsd.edu.pl/~kalexand/liber/htm/xdunajew.htm> (December 3, 2003).

1006 Glemma, "M. Tyrowicz," p. 464.

1007 J. Kracik, "Puzyra Jan Duklan Maurycy Paweł," in: *PSB*, vol. XXIX, Wrocław 1986, p. 488.

activities of Stojałowski. He also had a negative attitude toward Ukrainians. He did not support the strikes of workers and fought against socialists. Regarding his worldview, it was similar to the one of the conservative circles, especially of the *Stańcycy*, a Galician political faction, though in principle he was apolitical.¹⁰⁰⁸ After his death in December 1911, Jakub Bojko noted in *Dziennik*: “finally, cardinal Puzyna, who did not gain the friendship of Poles, died.”¹⁰⁰⁹

Adam Stefan Sapieha¹⁰¹⁰ became the bishop of Cracow after the death of Jan Puzyna in 1911. His candidature was accepted unanimously during the sitting of the Imperial Council of October 13, 1911, thanks to the support of the Cracow conservatives and in agreement with the governor of Galicia, Michał Bobrzyński.¹⁰¹¹ In a conversation with archbishop Bilczewski, the governor said: “I believe that due to social reasons prince Sapieha should be proposed, so that the aristocracy also has their representative in the episcopate’s body.”¹⁰¹² After all, he had a positive attitude toward Sapieha and during a festive dinner in the bishop’s palace, he committed himself to help him and to cooperate with him: “supporting you . . . will be my great responsibility not only as the head of

1008 Kracik, “Puzyna Jan Duklan,” pp. 489–490.

1009 J. Bojko, “Dziennik 1911–1919,” in: J. Bojko, *Gorące słowa. Wybór pism*, introduction and preparation by F. Ziejka, Kraków 2002, p. 118.

1010 S. Kieniewicz, “Sapieha Adam Stefan,” in: *PSB*, vol. XXXIV, Wrocław 1992–93, pp. 539–540, 553.

1011 Kieniewicz, “Sapieha Adam Stefan,” p. 540. On September 10, Bobrzyński began discussions with archbishop Bilczewski on the takeover of the Cracow episcopacy after late bishop Puzyna. Two days later, he proposed Sapieha the position of the bishop. On November 8, after the Imperial Council accepted his choice, he was appointed by the emperor and on December 18, consecrated by pope Pius X in St. Peter’s Basilica. The ceremonial ingress took place on March 3, 1912 in which participated, among others, the Minister of Finances, Waclaw Zaleski, the Minister for Galicia, Władysław Długosz and governor Bobrzyński, Z. Wiglusz, “Kronika życia i działalności Adama Stefana kardynała księcia Sapiehy,” in: *Kardynał Adam Stefan Sapieha. Środowisko rodzinne, życie i dzieło*, ed. S. Stępień, Przemyśl 1995, pp. 206–207. In the cited publication, it was wrongly written that the candidature of Sapieha was accepted by the Imperial Council of Austria-Hungary. The Imperial Council was solely the Austrian parliament. Within the monarchy, there did not exist a joint parliament for Austria and Hungary, Wiglusz, “Kronika życia i działalności,” p. 207.

1012 As cited in: J. Wołczański ks., “Adam Stefan Sapieha w korespondencji z biskupami Galicji (Małopolski) w latach 1900–1939,” in: *Kardynał Adam Stefan Sapieha. Środowisko rodzinne, życie i dzieło*, ed. S. Stępień, Przemyśl 1995, p. 114.

the national government, but also as a citizen of this country . . . without a doubt, we will do agreeably the tasks that are given to us.”¹⁰¹³

However, the then Minister for Galicia, Waclaw Zaleski, who was Sapieha's school friend, sought in Vienna the acceptance of his appointment for the bishop's position. Stanisław Badeni, marshal of the Galician parliament, also supported him, as he took into account the political reasons: “to calm down the Sapieha family who so far countered the authorities.” Sapieha was also supported by the nobility and the ruling Galician circles; on the other hand, the bishops opposed his candidature.¹⁰¹⁴

The activity of Sapieha after he became the bishop of Cracow abounded in launching patriotic initiatives, including, among others, the organization of ceremonial services on the occasion of national anniversaries, for instance, on the fiftieth anniversary of the beginning of the January Uprising. He also engaged himself in solving problems of social and economic character. His participation in the meeting with miners in Jaworzno in 1913 was unprecedented in the history of the Church's relations with the society. Moreover, he visited poor labor neighborhoods. He also helped to provide social welfare and help for the poor who lived in the Cracow diocese. This initiative was the beginning of the organization of the so-called parish committees, which activity consisted of offering social help. His predecessor was the author of the idea of establishing Catholic trade unions, but it was Sapieha who developed this idea and actually realized it.¹⁰¹⁵

His world and political views were similar to those of the Cracow conservatives, but he did not always support them. For instance, he and other Cracow bishops did not support governor Bobrzyński during voting in the Galician parliament on changes of the electoral ordinance. Moreover, they contributed to his removal from office by signing the declaration of April 16, 1913.¹⁰¹⁶ Sapieha also marked his participation in the conflict of the Tarnów bishop, Leon Wałęga, with

1013 M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, p. 349.

1014 J. Urban ks., “Pierwsze lata posługi księcia biskupa Adama Stefana Sapiehy w diecezji krakowskiej,” *Ogólnopolski Zjazd Prezesów KIK w Zakopanem. XX-lecie tatrzańskiego KIK w Zakopanem*, <http://porozumienie.kik.opoka.org.pl/tekst/spotkania/2001/zakopane/sapieha.html> (December 3, 2003).

1015 W. Wróbel ks., *Troska biskupa Adama Sapiehy o wsiędzonych i uchodźców w latach 1914–1916*, Kraków 1999, pp. 17–18.

1016 See: “Episkopat polski w Galicji wobec reformy wyborczej,” *Przegląd Powszechny*, vol. CXVIII, IV–VI, 1913; J. Buszko, *Sejmowa reforma wyborcza w Galicji*, Warszawa 1956; M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, p. 349.

Wincenty Witos and Jakub Bojko from the Polish People's Party "Piast" by opposing the bishop.¹⁰¹⁷

However, his image of a guardian of the First World War victims was preserved in social consciousness. It was him who was the initiator and also the servant of those in need of material and spiritual help, the refugees and the oppressed. For instance, thanks to his initiative, the Central Committee of the Moral Care for Refugees from Galicia was established in Vienna in 1915. He also held talks with the then president of the Polish Club, Leon Biliński, on organizing help for the Galician people by Poles living in Austria.¹⁰¹⁸ Along with the marshal of the Galician parliament, Stanisław Niezbitowski, he participated in the emperor's audience during which the monarch committed himself to help the victims of the war.¹⁰¹⁹ Moreover, he systematically visited hospitals, charities, refugee camps and parishes and also provided spiritual support and financial and material help.¹⁰²⁰

He also demonstrated his patriotism. On November 3, after the restoration of Poland's sovereignty, he held a ceremonial service: "on the occasion of the creation of Poland," during which a ceremonial sermon was delivered by archbishop Teodorowicz.¹⁰²¹

Among members of the Polish aristocratic families, it was the Potocki, Sapieha and Lanckoroński who sat in the House of Lords from the beginning of its existence, that is from 1861. Later, the Bawarowski, Czartoryski, Gołuchowski, Lubomirski and Sanguszko joined them, although their membership in the House of Lords was not always continuous. This was the case of the Sanguszko family, as after the death of Władysław in 1870, the seat in the House of Lords remained empty until 1879, when it was taken by Eustachy, marshal of the Galician parliament and governor of Galicia.¹⁰²² Occasionally, other names also appeared, such as, for instance, count Jan Zdzisław Tarnowski or count Tadeusz Dzieduszycki. In the group of the hereditary members there were also those who, thanks to their merits for the state, at first received a nomination for a life peer

1017 Kieniewicz, "Sapieha Adam Stefan," p. 541.

1018 See more on this subject: W. Wróbel ks., *Troska biskupa Adama Sapiehy wysiedlonych i uchodźców w latach 1914–1916*, Kraków 1999.

1019 Wigłusz, "Kronika życia i działalności," p. 211.

1020 R. M. Zawadzki, "Biskup Adam Stefan Sapieha podczas pierwszej wojny światowej," in: *Kardynał Adam Stefan Sapieha. Środowisko rodzinne, życie i dzieło*, ed. S. Stępień, Przemyśl 1995, pp. 144–150.

1021 Wigłusz, "Kronika życia i działalności," p. 219.

1022 Grodziski, *Na drogach karier politycznych*, p. 180.

and then for a hereditary peer. An example of such a case may be the former marshal of the Galician parliament, count Stanisław Marcin Badeni, the brother of Kazimierz, the Austrian Prime Minister. He became a hereditary member shortly before his death; he was appointed in March and died in October 1912. Still as a life peer, he was in favor of the electoral reform executed by means of applying the principle of universality of elections. He was also a supporter of accepting the Ukrainians' postulates, that is granting them a proper number of seats in the Galician parliament.¹⁰²³ Similarly to count Andrzej Potocki, governor of Galicia, life peer from 1901 and hereditary peer from 1907.

On April 18, 1861, the emperor nominated the first hereditary members of the House of Lords, whom were fifty-six. Among them there were only six Poles; moreover, they were appointed at a slightly later date, i.e.: count Agenor Gołuchowski Senior, from April 29, 1861, took the oath at a later time, in May 1867, died on August 3, 1875, count Kazimierz Lanckoroński, from April 29, 1861, died on August 6, 1874, count Kajetan Lewicki, from April 29, 1861, died in 1869, count Alfred Józef Potocki, from May 11, 1861, died on May 18, 1889, prince Władysław Sanguszko, from May 11, 1861, died on April 15, 1870 and prince Leon Sapieha, from June 1, 1861 (an interval from 1871 to 1873), died on September 10, 1878.¹⁰²⁴

In the following years, the number of the Polish representatives in the House of Lords did not fundamentally change. For the second term of the Imperial Council (1867–1870) nominated were: prince Konstanty Czartoryski on May 20, 1867, died on September 30, 1891 and prince Jerzy Lubomirski on March 19, 1868. During the third term (1870–1871), the number of Poles diminished due to the death of some of them or the absence of Sapieha. Therefore, Galicia had only five representatives.

The situation was similar during the following parliamentary terms until 1918. It should be emphasized that the number of members of the House of Lords nominated hereditarily did not fundamentally change at that time; it reached its peak, that is fourteen people, between 1911 and 1918.

Herein, it is worth listing, for each term of the Imperial Council, the names of the nominated people and the dates of their appointment.

During the fifth term of the parliament (1873–1879) nominations received: count Agenor Gołuchowski Junior on January 14, 1876 and count

1023 S. Starzyński, "Badeni Stanisław Marcin," in: *PSB*, vol. I, pp. 210–211.

1024 "Reprezentacja polska w parlamencie wiedeńskim," pp. 354, 357, 363, 367, 372, 380 and 389.

Karol Lanckoroński on November 26, 1874, during the sixth term (1879–1885): count Józef Baworowski, from October 7, 1879, died on July 21, 1885, count Eustachy Sanguszko, from October 27, 1879, died on April 3, 1903 and prince Adam Sapieha, from December 6, 1879, died on July 21, 1903, during the seventh term (1885–1891): count Emil Baworowski, from December 19, 1889, died on July 8, 1908, prince Andrzej Lubomirski, from March 16, 1888 and count Roman Potocki, from March 12, 1890, died on September 24, 1915, during the eighth term (1891–1897): prince Jerzy Czartoryski, from April 24, 1891, died on December 23, 1912, during the ninth term (1897–1900): count Tadeusz Dzieduszycki, from February 22, 1900, died on August 5, 1917, during the tenth term (1901–1907): no one received a nomination, during the eleventh term (1907–1911): count Rudolf Baworowski, from November 18, 1909, count Andrzej Potocki PhD, from June 17, 1907, died on April 12, 1908, prince Władysław Sapieha, from July 23, 1907, count Stanisław Siemieński-Lewicki, from October 26, 1907, died on April 6, 1918 and count Jan Zdzisław Tarnowski, from June 20, 1907 and during the last, twelfth term (1911–1918): count Stanisław Badeni, from March 9, 1912, died on October 12, 1912, count Stanisław Henryk Badeni, from November 13, 1912, prince Witold Czartoryski, from November 13, 1913 and count Alfred Potocki, from May 30, 1917.¹⁰²⁵

Clearly, only certain Polish families could count on the emperor's trust and a nomination for a hereditary member was an undeniable ennoblement for them. However, the group of hereditary peers was rather small. The representatives of other magnate families could only hope for a nomination for a life member of the House of Lords. However, this position could also be acquired by people of merit who came from lower social classes. An example of such a case is, for instance, Florian Ziemiałkowski, son of a cook, or Mikołaj Zyblikiewicz, son of a poor furrier.

We may therefore contend that the group of the Polish hereditary members was not particularly numerous. In the scale of the Austrian part of the monarchy, their number equaled less than ten per cent.¹⁰²⁶ They also did not mark their presence by a greater parliamentary activity. Due to these reasons, the significance and achievements of this group are marginalized in the literature of the subject matter. Therefore, it seems desirable to present their political figures and to indicate their potential merits for the so-called Polish cause within the monarchy.

1025 "Reprezentacja polska w parlamencie," p. 357 ff.

1026 Grodziski, *Na drogach karier politycznych*, p. 181.

As it was indicated above, only some of the Polish aristocratic families could count on the emperor's trust and thus, receive a nomination for a hereditary member of the House of Lords. It seems that the membership was granted not only thanks to an aristocratic lineage, but also an intention of having a close relation with the emperor and the monarchy. Therefore, it is not difficult to conclude, emphasizing at the same time the generality of this conclusion, that the nominated people were characterized by the pro-Habsburg attitude, expressed by their loyalty to the monarch and indirectly by their acceptance of the Austrian policies' directions. However, in the author's opinion, Poles in the House of Lords did not form a homogeneous group regarding their world and political views; therefore, they were not internally coherent. The welfare of the monarchy and the interests of the ruling class in Galicia constituted their priority; however, these issues were understood differently. Moreover, the paths to their realization did not look the same for everyone.

Among these members were those, who explicitly emphasized their pro-Austrian attitude and dedication to the Crown, that is Agenor Gołuchowski Senior, Alfred Potocki, Andrzej Lubomirski or Konstanty Czaratoryski.

An adequate example is Agenor Gołuchowski Senior, the initiator of the utilitarian policy, the opponent of the resolution of 1868 and also the supporter of the dualism. He was also a representative of the Podolacy, an extreme conservative political faction, which expressed the interests of the nobility of eastern Galicia.

Alfred Potocki, politician of conservative and clerical views, former Prime Minister and also Minister of Agriculture, may also be included in this group. He had considerable trust of the emperor: "Probably none of the then Galician aristocrats . . . was to such an extent cold in his Polish patriotism and this strongly connected to the Habsburg monarchy."¹⁰²⁷ It is known that after his demission from the position of Prime Minister, he did not return to the arena of great politics. However, as a member of the House of Lords, he participated in the sittings of joint delegations of the parliaments of Austria and Hungary and in 1874, he was the vice president of the Austrian representation. He was a hereditary member from 1861 and in 1867, when he was chosen to the House of Deputies, he resigned from this mandate. Therefore, it seems that the membership in the House of Lords had greater significance for him. Moreover, the House of Lords constituted some kind of a body of the monarch's authority and taking into account Potocki's dedication to the imperial house, his decision becomes understandable.¹⁰²⁸

1027 H. Wereszycki, *Niewygasła przeszłość. Refleksje i polemiki*, Kraków 1987, p. 156.

1028 Zdrada, "Potocki Alfred Józef," p. 764.

Andrzej Lubomirski, who was connected to the Podolacy, had a similar, pro-Austrian position. In the Galician parliament, he was the leader of the National Right-Wing Party and in the Polish Club he belonged to the conservative faction. In the middle of 1917, he was a supporter of the resolution of the Polish cause with the Austrian participation, even though he accused the government of having no specified policy concepts in this matter. It was the provisions of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that caused a change in his views. At that time, he openly supported the creation of an independent Polish state.¹⁰²⁹

Konstanty Czaratoryski was a supporter of the utilitarian policy of Gołuchowski, in contrast to Jerzy, about whom it is written below. He was opposed to the resolution of 1868 and at the same time to the federalization of the monarchy. However, he believed that the incorporation of Galicia into Hungary constituted a chance for it. He became a hereditary member in 1867 and after some time, he became the vice president of the House of Lords, whom he remained until his death in 1891. He was repeatedly chosen to be a part of joint delegations and in 1881, he became the vice president of such a delegation.¹⁰³⁰ Czaratoryski was also the vice president of the House of Lords from 1879 to 1897.¹⁰³¹

More progressive, liberal and thus, less pro-Habsburg and perhaps not so loyalist were: Andrzej Potocki, Leon Sapieha, Adam Sapieha or Jerzy Czaratoryski.

Andrzej Potocki had a rather rich political activity. He began his career in the diplomatic service and then he became a deputy to the Imperial Council and to the Galician parliament. He was also its marshal from 1901 and the governor of Galicia from 1903. In 1901, he became a life peer of the House of Lords and six years later its hereditary member. Therefore, he was a member of the House of Lords when he was also the governor and the latter position required a much greater commitment. Thus, Potocki is more known as a politician rather than a member of the upper house of the Imperial Council. It seems that it is worth describing his political views of this particular period of time.

He was a supporter of the national cadaster, the implementation of which would hamper the access to the Galician parliament for the Ukrainian nationalists and radicals. However, he was not so restrictive toward socialists. He supported striking workers by convincing their employers to consider their postulates. Nevertheless, he firmly opposed the strikes that were the result of the Revolution

1029 M. Tyrowicz, J. Zdrada, "Lubomirski Andrzej," in: *PSB*, vol. XVIII, p. 2.

1030 S. Kieniewicz, "Czaratoryski Konstanty ks.," in: *PSB*, vol. IV, p. 286.

1031 A. Ajnenkiel, "Historia sejmu polskiego," vol. 2, part 1, *W dobre zaborów*, Warszawa 1989, pp. 290–292.

of 1905. Moreover, he believed that a political alliance between conservatives and members of the People's Party was necessary.¹⁰³²

Leon Sapieha was also one of those members of the House of Lords who did not present themselves as declared loyalists through their political views or their expressed attitudes. In April 1866, as a member of the House of Lords from 1861, he put in the emperor's hands the address of the parliament on granting Galicia a national chancellor. He was a federalist and a supporter of the resolution of 1868, who resigned in 1869 from the position of the marshal, when the Austrian government did not demonstrate the will to fulfil the postulates of the Galician government. His demission was not accepted by the emperor and Sapieha did not withdraw it, even though he remained on his position. Such a state lasted until 1875, when he was dismissed by Gołuchowski. This fact influenced the Galician public opinion which evaluated positively the actions of Sapieha. On the other hand, the Austrian opinion forming circles, such as newspapers, took a negative view on him and accused him of insufficient loyalty.¹⁰³³

After the death of Leon Sapieha, his seat in the House of Lords was inherited by his son Adam, even though: "he was not at all eager to take over this dignity."¹⁰³⁴ He did not also hurry to thank the emperor for this nomination. Although, as Kieniewicz wrote: "father and son did not understand each other at all in terms of politics,"¹⁰³⁵ Adam Sapieha wanted in this way to express his protest regarding his father's demission from the National Division. Moreover, he did not intend to participate in the works of the House of Lords.¹⁰³⁶ However, he eventually made such a decision and sat in the House of Lords for the first time on December 6, 1869. For the entire time of his membership in the House of Lords, Adam Sapieha represented the pro-Polish position and sought the acquisition of a greater political autonomy for Galicia by supporting the linguistic equality or by fighting for

1032 J. Buszko, "Potocki Andrzej," in: *PSB*, vol. XXVII, pp. 779–780.

1033 S. Kieniewicz, "Sapieha Leon," in: *PSB*, vol. XXXV, p. 80.

1034 Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*, p. 312.

1035 Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*, p. 311.

1036 He was discouraged from this idea by Jerzy Czartoryski who wrote him in a letter that it is: "an ideal position for you . . . You may be in the Polish Club but you do not have to be in it, you may speak in the Polish Club how much, when and what you want but you are not constrained by the statute . . . you may speak in the House of Deputies when and if you deem it necessary and desirable for the country, you may have influence and significance as if you were in the Club and yet, you may act as if there was no Club or Stańczycy in the world," as cited in: Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*, p. 313.

the amendment of the act on folk schools. He was an opponent of centralists and German liberal left. Technically, he was not a part of any political faction but he fought against the Stańczy and partly supported democrats.

Jerzy Czartoryski was a supporter of Adam Sapieha in the fight with Agenor Gołuchowski and Mikołaj Zyblikiewicz. After all, in 1879, both of them were designated to keep in contact with the Polish Club. The reality demonstrated that this "constant contact" consisted of consulting important, for the interests of Galicia, decisions and political moves.¹⁰³⁷

Unlike Konstanty, Jerzy Czartoryski was a supporter of the resolution of 1868, federalism, the agreement with the Ruthenians and the cooperation with the Czech deputies, he also proposed the implementation of liberal reforms. His activity in the House of Deputies, that is opposing the political deals with the government in the light of the implementation of direct elections, the attempts at convincing the Polish Club to the absence policy, which became successful in 1873, or a systematic submission of the postulates on greater autonomy of Galicia, was rather inconvenient for Vienna. In order to diminish Czartoryski's influence on the Polish Club, which was accused of being too submissive toward the monarchy, he was nominated for a member of the House of Lords in 1891. He was not connected with any political faction.¹⁰³⁸

The members nominated for life constituted another group of Galicia's representatives in the House of Lords. Firstly, it should be indicated that this group was rather diverse and among its members may be enumerated certain representatives of the aristocracy, for instance, Andrzej Potocki, Artur Potocki and Adam Gołuchowski, Polish academics, for instance, Józef Dietl, Leon Biliński, Fryderyk Zoll, Julian Dunajewski and Michał Bobrzyński and also rich burghers and entrepreneurs. Therefore, one of the characteristic traits of this group of the members of merit was their diverse social background. Numerous people who were nominated for life began their careers in Galicia, in time obtained a deputy mandate to the Imperial Council and then received the employment in the central bodies of the Austrian administration. The nomination and the membership in the House of Lords were in these cases the continuation and at the same time the crowning of their public activity.

In terms of quantity, the number of life peers was significantly larger than the number of hereditary members. However, the size of this group was sometimes determined by the political reasons.

1037 Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*, p. 315.

1038 S. Kieniewicz, "Czartoryski Jerzy Konstanty ks.," in: *PSB*, vol. IV, p. 278.

In 1861–1862, the emperor appointed only five Poles: Adolf Teodor Hasse, superintendent of the Evangelical communes in Galicia and Bukovina, on April 29, 1861, died in 1870, prince Karol Jabłonowski, on April 29, 1861, died on April 19, 1885, baron Mikołaj Romaszkan, on April 29, 1861, died on April 6, 1882, Jan Schindler von Schildenheim, abbot in Mogiła near Cracow, on April 29, 1861, he did not take the oath until his death on June 4, 1890 and count Kazimierz Starzeński, on May 8, 1861, died on November 22, 1877.¹⁰³⁹ In the subsequent years, this group did not significantly enlarge. The nomination received (in the alphabetical order): Józef Dietl MD, president of Cracow, from January 29, 1869, died on January 18, 1878, count Kazimierz Krasicki, from April 22, 1869, died on July 28, 1882, count Wilhelm Siemieński-Lewicki, from December 19, 1872, died on August 17, 1901, count Włodzimierz Dzieduszycki, from June 26, 1874, died on September 16, 1899 and count Ludwik Wodzicki, from June 3, 1878, died on August 12, 1894.

From 1879, the number of Poles who were life peers in the House of Lords increased. It may be concluded that this fact was connected with the end of the rule of German liberals.

The increase of the number of Poles in the House of Lords was the consequence of the functioning of the Czech-German-Polish alliance, that is the “Iron Ring” coalition in the House of Deputies of the Imperial Council. On a side note it should be added that it was one of the longest periods in the history of Polish-Austrian relations within the dual monarchy when Poles achieved significant and serious influence on the state’s fate. Therefore, it seems that the appointment of Poles to the House of Lords had to be connected with this fact.

In the end of the fifth term of the Imperial Council, on May 22, 1879, there were seven Poles in the House of Lords,¹⁰⁴⁰ from October 7, 1879, that is the beginning of the next term, there were nine Poles¹⁰⁴¹ and during this term, until April 23, 1885, eight new members were nominated.¹⁰⁴²

1039 “Reprezentacja polska w parlamencie,” p. 354.

1040 These were: count Włodzimierz Dzieduszycki, prince Karol Jabłonowski, count Kazimierz Krasicki, baron Mikołaj Romaszkan, Jan Schindler von Schindelheim PhD, count Wilhelm Siemieński-Lewicki and count Ludwik Wodzicki, “Reprezentacja polska w parlamencie,” p. 372.

1041 Along with the opening of the sixth term, Józef Majer MD, president of the Academy of Learning, was nominated, “Reprezentacja polska w parlamencie,” p. 379.

1042 At that time, the nomination received: count Justyn Koziembrodzki-Bolesta, general off duty, from February 20, 1884, died on February 5, 1885, Antoni Małecki PhD, from December 12, 1881, died on October 7, 1913, Stanisław Polanowski, from February 14, 1883, died on January 16, 1898, Edward Stadnicki, from February 19,

The subsequent years demonstrated that with each term of the Imperial Council, the Polish representation in the House of Lords systematically grew. In 1885–1891, there were sixteen Poles in the House of Lords, five newly nominated,¹⁰⁴³ in 1891–1897, there were twenty-six of them, twelve newly nominated,¹⁰⁴⁴ four of whom were nominated in 1895, when the Prime Minister was count Kazimierz Badeni, in 1897–1900, there were twenty-eight of them, eight newly nominated,¹⁰⁴⁵ in 1901–1907, there were twenty-nine of them, nine newly nominated,¹⁰⁴⁶ in 1907–1911, there were thirty-one of them, seven newly

1881, died on May 20, 1902, Józef Szujski PhD, from February 19, 1881, died on February 3, 1883, count Jan Tarnowski, from January 29, 1881, died on May 12, 1893, count Henryk Wodzicki, from December 12, 1881, died on October 20, 1884 and Mikołaj Zyblikiewicz PhD, from 1882, died on May 16, 1887, “Reprezentacja polska w parlamencie,” p. 380.

1043 These were: count Jan Krasicki, from October 15, 1885, died on January 16, 1893, count Artur Potocki, appointed on January 30, 1889, died on March 26, 1890 before taking the oath, Stanisław Starowieyski-Biberstein, from April 26, 1887, died on March 18, 1895, count Stanisław Tarnowski, from October 15, 1885, died on December 31, 1917 and Florian Ziemiałkowski PhD, from November 7, 1888, died on March 27, 1900, “Reprezentacja polska w parlamencie,” p. 389.

1044 Stanisław Badeni, from April 9, 1891, a hereditary member from March 9, 1912, Jan Czaykowski PhD, from May 28, 1895, died on February 23, 1897, Julian Dunajewski PhD, from May 21, 1892, died on December 28, 1907, August Gorayski, from December 20, 1892, died on March 21, 1915, baron Adolf Jorkasch-Koch, from May 21, 1892, died on August 27, 1902, Zdzisław Marchwicki PhD, from December 30, 1895, died on July 23, 1912, Franciszek Myciejski, from May 28, 1895, died on March 2, 1901, Zygmunt Romaszkan, from December 14, 1892, died on August 7, 1893, Franciszek Smolka, from December 23, 1893, he did not take the oath, died on December 4, 1899, count Jan Stadnicki, from February 21, 1895, Stefan Zamoyski, from March 23, 1893, died on January 22, 1899 and Fryderyk Zoll, from April 13, 1891, died on April 1, 1917, “Reprezentacja polska w parlamencie,” p. 398.

1045 Leon Biliński PhD, from March 6, 1900, count Mieczysław Ignacy Borkowski-Dunin, from March 22, 1897, died on November 11, 1906, Herman Loebl PhD, from March 21, 1898, died on March 12, 1907, Stanisław Madeyski-Poray, from October 18, 1899, died on June 19, 1910, count Andrzej Potocki, from October 18, 1899, he became a hereditary member in 1907, count Jan Szeptycki, from October 18, 1899, died on November 13, 1912, count Filip Zaleski, from May 13, 1897, died on September 20, 1911 and Ignacy Zborowski from March 21, 1898, died on June 22, 1911, “Reprezentacja polska w parlamencie,” pp. 406–407.

1046 Konstanty Czechowicz, from December 1, 1905, died on April 28, 1915, Władysław Kraiński PhD, from January 22, 1903, Władysław Łoziński PhD, from January 22, 1903, died on May 20, 1913, Józef Michałowski, from January 30, 1903, died on

nominated¹⁰⁴⁷ and in 1911–1918, during the last term, there were thirty-six of them, eleven newly nominated.¹⁰⁴⁸

This listing demonstrates that from 1879 the emperor appointed a more or less constant number of Poles as life peers of the House of Lords.

As it is indicated above, a significant increase of the number of life peers in the House of Lords occurred in 1879, after the end of the liberal rule. Herein, it should be considered whether the systematic increase of this group's size in the following years had its political justification.

The most significant increase of the number of Poles occurred in 1891–1897 and 1911–1918, when the emperor appointed respectively twelve and eleven new life peers. In the case of the first period of time, it occurred thanks to the appointment of a Pole to the position of Prime Minister, the second one was influenced by the unfavorable international situation.

However, it seems that these reasons may be called “farfetched.” The author would rather be in favor of a different, more probable and logical explanation of this fact. In Austria, there was a general tendency, which was present in numerous public life spheres, connected to the increase of trust toward the Galician political elites. Poles were more frequently and eagerly employed in administration or judiciary. If that was the case, this tendency also occurred in the House of Lords.

October 2, 1908, Aleksander Mniszek-Tchórzycycki, from January 22, 1903, died on January 8, 1916, count Leon Piniński PhD, from December 12, 1903, Stanisław Smolka PhD, from April 19, 1902, Stanisław Stadnicki, from December 1, 1905, died on January 16, 1915 and count Antoni Wodzicki, from December 1, 1905, died on February 23, 1918, “Reprezentacja polska w parlamencie,” pp. 414–415.

1047 Władysław Wiktor Czaykowski, from July 2, 1907, died on October 3, 1917, count Adam Gołuchowski, from April 25, 1910, died on April 15, 1914, Adam Jędrzejowicz PhD, from June 17, 1907, Witold Korytowski, appointed on December 28, 1909, Kazimierz Morawski PhD, professor of the Jagiellonian University, from June 20, 1907, Leonard Piętał PhD, from June 17, 1907, died on February 25, 1909 and Tadeusz Wojciechowski PhD, appointed on December 28, 1909, he did not take the oath, “Reprezentacja polska w parlamencie,” p. 423.

1048 Dawid Abrahamowicz, from March 9, 1912, Michał Bobrzyński, from June 6, 1917, Władysław Dułęba, from May 30, 1917, Marian Dydyński, from June 27, 1912, Stanisław Koźmian, from May 30, 1917, Jerzy Myciejski, from May 30, 1917, Stanisław Niezabitowski, from May 30, 1917, Tadeusz Rutowski PhD, from May 30, 1917, died on March 30, 1918, Stanisław Starzyński PhD, from July 30, 1917, Jan Kanty Steczkowski PhD, from May 30, 1917 and Alfred Zgórski, from March 9, 1912, died on March 13, 1916, “Reprezentacja polska w parlamencie,” pp. 431–432.

It is also worth noting that the downfall of the parliamentary system in Austria, which was without a doubt the legacy of Badeni's government, favored the emperor's actions, which consisted of surrounding himself with trusted people, that is those, who during the performance of their function or office repeatedly demonstrated their loyalty to the throne and the monarchy.

At the same time, this fact cannot be justified with the emperor's gratitude toward Poles for their pro-Habsburg attitude. Poles from the House of Lords did not seek the introduction of the pro-Austrian policy to such an extent and on such a scale as did the conservatives from the Polish Club. After all, the members of the House of Lords were somehow subject to it and often consulted with the deputies the manner of voting during the sittings. Moreover, the membership in the Club was much more desirable than a nomination to the House of Lords.

Another explanation of the increase of the Poles' number in the House of Lords also seems right. In the end of the nineteenth century, the House of Deputies became more radicalized in terms of political and social aspects, its members became socialists, members of the People's Party and national democrats, about whom the emperor was rather cautious. Therefore, the House of Lords was supposed to be a counterbalance to these factors.

In the initial remarks to the present chapter, it was emphasized that in the House of Lords life peers had a superior position and were recruited from, among others, the political elites of the monarchy and Galicia. Thus, this part of the subchapter is devoted to them. Above all, this group was composed of former Austrian ministers, that is Leon Biliński, Julian Dunajewski, Stanisław Poray-Madeyski, Leonard Piętak, Leon Piniński, Filip Zaleski or Florian Ziemiałkowski. Their membership in the House of Lords was the recognition and at the same time the crowning of their existing political careers. In the eyes of the politicians, such a nomination was perceived as a recognition of their merits rather than as an achievement of a higher status.

For Ziemiałkowski, former and multiannual minister for Galicia, who greatly participated in the political life, beginning with the conspiracy organizations, through the Galician parliament, the Imperial Council and the presidency in the Polish Club, the membership in the House of Lords was: "a substitute of great politics."¹⁰⁴⁹ In general, he did not speak in the House of Lords; however, he tried

1049 Zbigniew Fras also claimed that spending time with this group of people: "inclined maybe even more to reminisce old, better times than to deal with the current events, which also had its benefits. Thus, in all, it was a rather pleasant and not too exhaustive occupation, a good one for the retirement," Z. Fras, *Florian Ziemiałkowski (1817-1900). Biografia polityczna*, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1991, p. 199.

to adapt in the Galician parliament but his age and poor physical health did not allow him for greater activity.

However, Dunajewski, former Minister of Finances, particularly merited for the monarchy, did not use the possibility of continuing his political activity in Vienna. After his demission in 1891, he returned to Galicia and settled down in Cracow, where he was occupied with the academic work and also took part in the sittings of the Academy of Learning. Josef Penížek, Czech publicist, recalled: "I met him when he was eighty-three years old and in an impressive shape of body and mind . . . He does not visit Vienna and he does not frequent at all the House of Lords. Not because he cannot be there, but because he does not want to."¹⁰⁵⁰

It is relatively little known about Leon Biliński as a life peer, even though he was an exceptionally active politician. Therefore, it might be presumed that he would also mark his presence in the House of Lords in a particular manner. However, even he devoted little space to this matter in his memoirs, which are evaluated as rather detailed. Perhaps he did not treat his membership as a priority matter or, what is more probable, performing other functions consumed more of his time and energy.¹⁰⁵¹ He recalled, among others, the mediation between the government and Wojciech Dzierżycki and the Polish Club in the beginning of 1909, that is in the period of the electoral reform preparation for the parliament. When the compromise was achieved in the House of Deputies, other difficulties appeared, this time in the House of Lords. Most likely, the act, passed by the deputies, would be rejected in the House of Lords. Thus, Biliński organized a conference of all Polish members of the House of Lords, as a consequence of which the changes in the electoral law were approved: "After a long discussion, all agreed,

1050 J. Penížek, *W dwudziestą piątą rocznicę. Dr. Julian Dunajewski*, Kraków 1906, p. 26. The author of Dunajewski's biography and *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* do not mention that he led any kind of activity in the House of Lords. In both of these sources, one may only find the information on the act of nomination for a life peer of the House of Lords, see: J. Schenk, *Dr. Julian Ritter von Dunajewski. Ein österreichischer Finanzminister 1821–1907*, Wien-Leipzig 1934, p. 96; S. Głąbiński, "Dunajewski Julian," in: *PSB*, vol. V, pp. 465–468.

1051 He was nominated to the House of Lords in 1900 and he was its member until 1918. At that time he performed, in the chronological order, functions of: the governor of the Austro-Hungarian Bank (1900–1909), the Minister of the Treasury (1909–1911), the president of the Polish Club (1911–1912), the joint Minister of Finances (1912–1915) and the president of the Polish Club (1915–1917).

more or less eagerly, to vote in favor of the act: only prince Jerzy Czartoryski remained faithful to his contrary position.”¹⁰⁵²

Stanisław Poray-Madeyski was another ex-minister who, after leaving the department of religions and education in 1895, was appointed only in 1899. He was one of the most remarkable Polish politicians, appreciated by his contemporaries and thus, shortly after, he became the vice president of the national right in the House of Lords. Madeyski was also chosen to be a part of joint delegations. In 1907, he became vice president and a year later – the president of the Austrian delegation. Madeyski, unlike other life peers, treated seriously his activity in the House of Lords, in which he was very successful. The membership in the House of Lords meant for him: “the peak moment of his political career.”¹⁰⁵³ His activity was noticed and appreciated by the monarch, who personally requested his mediation between the government and the Polish Club, so that it led more compliant policy. At that time, in the Imperial Council, it was debated on the adoption of the budget for 1899 and on the preparation of the conditions of the agreement with Hungarians. Probably, thanks to the talks between Madeyski and the Polish deputies, Wojciech Dzieduszycki on behalf of the Club supported the current policy of the government and thereby protected it from its downfall.¹⁰⁵⁴

Other former ministers were Leonard Piętaś and Leon Piniński, who both were Ministers for Galicia.

Piętaś sympathized with Galician democrats and liberals and he was also the vice president of the Polish Club. He was the head of the Ministry for Galicia from 1900 to 1904. He was appointed to the House of Lords in 1907 and as its member he was a part of three committees. Not long after that, he withdrew from public life, but he stayed in Vienna. He died in 1909.¹⁰⁵⁵

It is little known about the activity of Austrophile and antisocialist Leon Piniński, member of the House of Lords from 1903 to 1918. In the House of Lords, he was a part of the right wing, as he belonged to the Podolacy, of whom he was one of the most exceptional representatives. He was known as an opponent of the electoral reform to the Imperial Council, against which he firmly spoke

1052 The proposed changes in the electoral law were, among others, the four-adjectives electoral law and the possibility of joining the mandate in the House of Deputies with the membership in the House of Lords, which was not allowed until that time, L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I, pp. 155–156.

1053 Cz. Lechicki, “Madeyski Stanisław,” in: *PSB*, vol. XIX, p. 125.

1054 Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, pp. 233–234.

1055 J. Zdrada, “Piętaś Leonard,” in: *PSB*, vol. XXVI, p. 201.

in the parliament. He also had a leading position in the Polish Club. Besides his parliamentary activity, he lectured Roman and criminal law at the University of Lviv and he was a member of the Imperial Court.¹⁰⁵⁶

Among other life peers may be enumerated Józef Dietl,¹⁰⁵⁷ known doctor and mayor of Cracow, and Fryderyk Zoll, founder of a Cracow family of lawyers.

J. Dietl was particularly committed to Cracow and its inhabitants. He was appointed a life peer of the House of Lords in 1869, when he still acted in the Galician parliament and in the local bodies of Cracow. His progressing rheumatism did not allow him for an active participation in the political and social life but he was oriented in the current events and he kept in touch with his friends. From 1877, he generally stayed at home and: “he did not go at all to Vienna for the sittings of the House of Lords.”¹⁰⁵⁸

Zoll, a Cracow conservative, lawyer, scholar, and codifier, was a member of the House of Lords from 1891. He already had some parliamentary experience, as in 1882–1901 he was a deputy of the Galician parliament. He was appreciated by the legal and university communities and he was repeatedly a member of joint delegations in the House of Lords, that is in 1896, 1898, 1900 and 1901.¹⁰⁵⁹

3. Poles in the House of Deputies

The first of the organizational forms, created on the initiative of Galician MPs in the Austrian parliament was the “association” created in 1848. It cannot be defined as solely a Polish club, because its members was also a Ruthenian, Cyryl Wienkowski. Seweryn Smarzewski became the president of the association, and the vice-president was Jan Tarnowski. Forty-two MPs signed the founding charter, including the above-mentioned ones and among others Nikodem Bętkowski, Antoni Zygmunt Helcel, Karol Hubicki, Michał Popiel, Franciszek Smolka, and Florian Ziemiałkowski. This association differed from the Polish

1056 J. Zdrada, “Piniński Leon,” in: *PSB*, vol. XXVI, pp. 334–335.

1057 He was the doctor of, among others, the Potocki family, see: *Świadek epoki. Listy Elizy z Branickich Krasińskiej z lat 1835–1867*, vol. 4, July 1863 – May 1876 (letters no. 1540–2085), from the manuscript read, chose, commented on and provided the introduction Z. Suchodolski, Warszawa 1996.

1058 Józef Dietl died on January 18, 1878 due to pneumonia, I. Homola-Skąpska, *Józef Dietl i jego Kraków*, Kraków 1993, pp. 373, 375–376; A. Wrzosek, “Dietl Józef,” in: *PSB*, vol. V.

1059 *Wspomnienia Fryderyka Zolla (1865–1948)*, prepared by I. Homola-Skąpska, Kraków 2000, p. 12.

Club established later, for instance it did not strictly observe the principle of club solidarity. Moreover, it was more of a discussion forum than a united MP club.¹⁰⁶⁰

Polish MPs, who came mostly from the nobility, bourgeoisie, and intelligentsia, belonged to left-wing groups in the parliament. Conservatives occupied the right side of the chamber, while in the center there were pro-government parties, including Polish and Russian peasants and Greek Catholic priests.¹⁰⁶¹

In 1861, two Galician parties joined the parliament. One of them was the so-called Lytvynovych group. It was a pro-government group and consisted of Uniate priests, and Polish and Russian peasants. The second party consisted of twenty-five autonomists, mostly from the nobility and Polish intelligentsia, who opposed the centralism of Vienna.¹⁰⁶²

1060 In 1848, in the Austrian Parliament, Galicia was represented by seventy-one deputies, including forty-three Poles, twenty-five Ruthenians, two Jews, and Governor Franz von Stadion. The founding act of the association was signed by forty-one Polish MPs and one Ruthenian, "Protokoły Koła Polskiego" (Protocols of the Polish Club), pp. 27–29. Among the Galician group of MPs, there are seventeen peasant MPs and fifty-four MPs, known as "Polen in Frack" (Poles in tuxedos), which included seven aristocrats, nineteen noblemen, six priests, ten lawyers, four doctors, three officials, one teacher, and one officer. For more information on the composition of the Polish representation, see: J. Urbańczyk, "Die polnische Abgeordneten aus Galizien im österreichischen konstituierendn Reichstag 1848–1849," in: *Austro-Polonica 2, Academic Journal of the Jagiellonian University*, Pr Hist., 1980, no. 68, pp. 152–153, 155–156.

1061 After the June elections of 1848, the Imperial Council included twenty-seven landowners, twenty-four intellectuals, seventeen Polish peasants, fourteen Russian peasants, nine Uniate priests, and six Roman Catholic priests. The representation of Galicia constituted more than one-fourth of the chamber's composition. Members of parliament were heterogeneous in national, social, and political terms, so they did not usually take on a unified perspective, e.g. the landowners with Adam Potocki and Jerzy Lubomirski supported the government. Peasants held pro-government positions, with the exception of voting on indexation. On the other hand, the townsmen occupied the left and the central side of the chamber., A. Ajnenkiel, *Historia sejmu polskiego*, vol. II, Part I. . . , pp. 87–88.

1062 J. Zdrada, *Organizacja i stanowisko Koła Polskiego*. . . , p. 46. Under the February Patent of 1861, Galicia had the right to elect thirty-eight members of the lower house of the Imperial Council from among 105 members of the national parliament, S. Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , p. 167. The first elections to the provincial parliaments that followed the provisions of this constitution were scheduled for March 1861, and the first meeting was scheduled for April 6, A. Nowicki, *Historia Austrii*, p. 34.

Both parties reached an agreement, according to which they would solidarily represent the same line in the parliament.¹⁰⁶³ Relations between Poles and Ruthenians improved temporarily after the introduction of the February patent in 1861. National antagonisms revived only in the face of the elections to the Austrian parliament. However, the Polish side did not prevent the representatives of the Russian people from entering the Imperial Council, especially in view of the election of: “Russian priests to the Imperial Council, even in case of these districts, where one could choose someone else on condition that in domestic matters the whole delegation stands together, which was to be promised by priest Lytvynovych, then a suffragan bishop.”¹⁰⁶⁴

Leon Sapieha and Wojciech Dzieduszycki conducted the negotiations with the Ruthenians on behalf of the Polish Club. Bishop of Lviv Spirydion Lytvynovych intended to obtain a mandate to the Imperial Council and probably without the support of the Poles he would have failed. For this reason, he reached an agreement with Poles and on April 25, 1861 he declared on behalf of the Russian MPs’ club that he considers “all the grievances and demands of the Russians as a purely domestic matter,” which is why he will not raise the problems arising from the Galician relations between Poland and Russia in the Imperial Council. Moreover, he promised that together with Poles, he would speak out against the policy of centralism and the Austrian bureaucracy. He also promised that in the absence of a unified, not crystallized Russian language, he would not oppose teaching at schools in Polish. This agreement allowed Lytvynovych to obtain a mandate to the Council of State.¹⁰⁶⁵ Bartoszewicz emphasized the conciliatory attitude of Polish politicians toward Ruthenians during the talks before the parliamentary elections: “During the elections of the delegates to the Imperial Council,

1063 Talks with Spirydion Lytvynovych conducted in the house of Vladimir Dzieduszycki preceded the agreement. Poles persuaded him to act together in the Austrian parliament as a representative of the whole of Galicia, and not any nationality. After all, it was in the interest of Poles and Ruthenians to strive for the greatest possible independence of the province, hence they should speak out in solidarity against central policy Lytvynovych acknowledged these arguments by committing himself to join the Polish deputies in the Council, but he did not keep this promise. It should be added that Lytvynovych was in a way rewarded for his support for government policy. He was appointed Sectional Counsellor in the Ministry of Public Enlightenment, and then became the Vice-President of the Imperial Council, K. Bartoszewicz, “Przyczynki do ‘kwestyi ruskiej;’” *Przegląd Narodowy* (PN), July 1908, pp. 43–44.

1064 S. Kaczała, *Polityka Polaków względem Rusi*, Lviv 1879, p. 305.

1065 S. Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*. . . , p. 353.

the conciliatoriness of Poles manifested itself very strongly.”¹⁰⁶⁶ Nevertheless, the mutual commitment was soon broken and Russians joined the club of German Unionists, the largest centrist-liberal club in the House.¹⁰⁶⁷

Therefore, during this period the Russians were significant allies of Vienna. F. X. d’Abancourt pointed out that thanks to the presence of Russian Members of Parliament in the Imperial Council, Schmerling was able to:

to freely use the votes of the same priests and ten voices of Russian peasants, who were not able to read nor write, nor in Russian nor in German, but who could stand up perfectly and sit down at the command of their bishop in partibus Lytvynovych and for his merits the Lviv metropolitan.¹⁰⁶⁸

W. Feldman also emphasized the exploitation of the Ruthenians, who: with complete political illiteracy were blind instruments in the hands of the government – creatures of Schmerling, the fierce enemy of national autonomy and Polishness.¹⁰⁶⁹

These facts meant opposition to the Polish Club: “Everyone’s eyes opened, but it was too late. The Ruthenians headed by the Lytvynovs became Schmerling and centralists’ supporters. They voted against all the federalist motions. They even took a hostile stance toward Poles and Galician autonomy.”¹⁰⁷⁰ As Feldman, a Russian peasant, claimed: “he came with his priest, who also demanded ‘foxes and pastures,’ openly connected supported centralism and was already an anti-national element.”¹⁰⁷¹

1066 K. Bartoszewicz, *Przyczynki do „kwestyi ruskiej”* . . . , p. 42.

1067 S. Kaczała, “Przeгляд,” pp. 305–306; I. Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim. Dzieje rezolucji sejmu galicyjskiego z 24 września 1868r.*, Lviv 1918, p. 29. The Unionist Club was a pro-government party with an extreme left-wing orientation. Apart from the Unionists, also Russian MPs and the Club of Great Austrians supported Schmerling’s centralism. On the other hand, Poles sat on the opposite side of the house with the Czech MPs. German autonomists who were a centrist group. Despite their liberal program and centrist orientation, they pursued a more moderate policy, J. Zdrada, “Udział Koła Polskiego w pracach ustawodawczych pierwszej austriackiej Rady Państwa (1861–1862),” in: *Małopolskie Studia Historyczne*, 1962, chapter 5, no. 1–2, p. 50. Out of thirty-eight MPs from Galicia, thirty-five were Polish and only three were Ruthenians, F. X. d’Abancourt, p. 109.

1068 D’Abancourt, p. 58. Lytvynovych became also a section councillor in the Ministry of Public Enlightenment, and at that time: “he harmed Polish language,” K. Bartoszewicz, *Przyczynki do „kwestyi ruskiej”* . . . , p. 44.

1069 W. Feldman, *Stronnicwa i programy polityczne w Galicji 1864–1906*, vol. I, Kraków 1907, p. 58.

1070 K. Bartoszewicz, *Przyczynki do „kwestyi ruskiej”* . . . , p. 44.

1071 Feldman, *Stronnicwa i programy polityczne* . . . , p. 202.

The action described in the quotation below, would be present throughout the entire period of the monarchy's functioning: "According to the need, the Austrian government supported the Ruthenians, when it was necessary to stop the Poles, and then the other way round."¹⁰⁷² Kieniewicz emphasized the strategic significance of the Ruthenian issue: "For Austria, die treuen Ruthenen were mainly a tool in the anti-Polish game, – a tool quite dangerous because of their Moscow sympathies." But when Vienna needed the support of the Poles, "it sacrificed Ruthenia, ensuring only that it was not oppressed by the Poles completely."¹⁰⁷³

As a result of the division of the delegation of the Galician Parliament, a national Polish parliamentary club, known as the Polish Club, was formed. The establishment of a temporary twenty-one-person Polish Club on May 10, 1861 preceded the formation of the Polish Club. The unanimously elected head of the Pole's Club was Kazimierz Grocholski.¹⁰⁷⁴ The Polish Club consisted of twenty-five members, i.e. all Polish MPs, who were against the Austrian government's policy.¹⁰⁷⁵ Jerzy Zdrada lists all these Members of Parliament as members of the Polish Club. However, the quoted study by Czesław Brzoza and Kamil Stepan shows that A. Bocheński, A. Golejowski, and K. Szeliski although elected to the Council did not sit on it. The list also shows that during the first term of the Imperial Council (1861–65) there were thirty-five, not thirty-eight MPs in Vienna including thirteen from the Lytvynovych group. Three of the MPs

1072 Kaczała, "Przegląd," p. 306.

1073 S. Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*. . . , pp. 349.

1074 Zdrada, *Organizacja*, p. 49.

1075 For the term of office of the Imperial Council, lasting from April 29, 1861 to July 27, 1865, the following men received the mandate: from the curia of landowners – Włodzimierz Cielecki, Józef Dietl, Kazimierz Dzieduszycki, Kazimierz Grocholski, Tomasz Horodyski, Karol Hubicki, Leonard Wężyk, Kazimierz Wodzicki, Mikołaj Zyblikiewicz; from the curia of the city – Julian Gutowski, Antoni Zygmunt Helcel, Jakub Krzysztofowicz, Feliks Rejzner, Franciszek Smolka, Teodor Szemelowski; from the curia of the rural communities – Nikodem Będkowski, Fr. Stanisław Morgenstern, Adam Count Potocki, Antoni Rogalski, Karol Rogawski, Fr Ludwik Ruczka, and from the curia of chambers of commerce and industry from the curia of chambers of commerce and industry – Wincenty Kirchmajer. In 1866, the following men received a mandate to the House of Deputies from the curia of landowners, but they did not sit in the House, as the Parliament had already finished its session: Alojzy Bocheński, Antoni Golejowski, Kazimierz Szeliski. During the term of office of the Council, they resigned: Antoni Zygmunt Helcel in 1862, Kazimierz Dzieduszycki and K. Wodzicki in 1863. One more seat was open due to the death of Nikodem Będkowski in 1864, *Reprezentacja polska w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 354–357.

resigned and one died. After simple calculation, it appears that in the House, just before the closing of the third and last session of the parliamentary term, there were eighteen members of the Polish Club.

Membership in the Polish Club was voluntary. Each of the deputies representing Galicia could join the Club. It was an institution established on the model of the Polish Club operating in the Prussian Sejm, but as the following years have shown, it was much more conservative and influential.¹⁰⁷⁶

The task of the Pole's Club was to develop a program for Polish deputies and to define a political stance toward the parties in the Lower House of the Imperial Council. The Galician Parliament formulated the main guidelines of the program, therefore, the Polish Club itself soon formulated their program. Galician deputies were mainly responsible for confronting the program assumptions of the Polish Club with the guidelines of the government program, current political situation, and the balance of power in the Council. Along with the program, the government introduced the Law on the MPs' Club of the Galician Parliament elected to the Imperial Council as the internal regulations of the club, modeled on a similar law of Polish members of the Reich's Parliament.¹⁰⁷⁷

The Polish Club¹⁰⁷⁸ based its program on the idea of the autonomy of the Galician province, which was reflected in paragraph one of the program: "as Polish deputies in the Council of State we want to strive for as much political independence as possible." The next paragraph of the program referred to the October Diploma of 1860 as a legal and political basis that would enable the realization of national aspirations:

based on the well understood principles of the Diploma of October 20, 1860, which, although it cannot satisfy all our demands, must be a necessary starting point for our today requirements and our legal opposition against the laws of February 26, 1861, which oppose the principles and content of the laws of October 20, 1860.

The idea of autonomy of Galicia determined the direction of the policy of the Club and defined future political alliances in the Council. Therefore, the constant undermining of the validity of paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Act on

1076 K. Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa*. . . , vol. IV. . . , pp. 287–288. See also the general study on the parliamentary clubs of Polish MPs in the Parliaments of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, Ajnenkiel, "Polskie reprezentacje w ciałach przedstawicielskich państw zaborczych w latach 1848–1918," *Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne* (CPH), vol. XXXVI, no. 1, 1984.

1077 Zdrada, *Organizacja*, p. 49.

1078 I quote the regulations of the Polish Club from Zdrada, *Organizacja*, pp. 75–76.

the Representation of the State of 1861 served the implementation of national aspirations.¹⁰⁷⁹ Changes in the rules of dividing the legislative matters caused opposition from Polish MPs, which is why they were reflected in the program of the Polish Club. The Club, which actively opposed entralism and Germanization, considered the alliance with the autonomists as undisputed and did not exclude the possibility of concluding agreements with other clubs, if necessary. The attitude toward the Hungarian part of the monarchy was also clear, yet quite generally formulated: "If the political position of Hungary were to be discussed in any way in this House, then we cannot oppose the general principle of the legal separation of the Hungary." The program of the Club announced the legal opposition to the central policy of Vienna, but it was supposed to be a moderate opposition. From the very beginning of its activity, the Club resigned from a very important element of parliamentary tactics, which was to remain in the Council. Participation in the work of the house became the guiding principle, although the program did not exclude the possibility of boycotting the parliament. The decision to adopt a resolution on the boycott of the house's deliberations was to be made together by the members of parliament. Such action could only take place in certain situations defined in the program, i.e. in the event of a reduction of province's autonomy, overstepping the boundaries of authority by the Council, and in other unforeseen circumstances. There was another condition for leaving the House, namely the anticipated effectiveness of such a measure assessed in the light of the benefits which Galicia could have obtained by doing so. Moreover, the program also states that it would be advisable to leave the Council with the other Members of the Council, the autonomists. The program of the Club provided for a fight for the federalization of the monarchy: "the political separation of Hungary from Austria does not intend to involve Galicia in a second great political entity of all non-Hungarian provinces."

The program of the Polish Club was balanced and moderate and, in a sense, general. It did not contain any economic or social postulates. However, it stressed the direction of Galician politics, which should be important also for the Ruthenians, as it emphasized the autonomy of the provinces. Polish MPs

1079 Both of these paragraphs defined the scope of competences of the Imperial Council, which, under the February Patent, were significantly extended at the expense of national parliaments. The October Diploma introduced the principle of presumption of competence in favor of provincial assemblies, while the aforementioned patent deprived them of these rights. Therefore, the powers of the Imperial Council covered all those matters which were not explicitly reserved for the Diet. S. Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , pp. 168–169.

could not reach an agreement in case of one of the political postulates, i.e. their attitude toward the federalization of the monarchy. The program did foresee the federalization, but the formulation of this policy was quite enigmatic. It can be assumed that the intention of the authors of this program was to strive for unity in the Club, which was guaranteed, among other things, by the generality of its individual points.

The program of the Polish Club reflected only the needs and interests of the Polish lands under Austrian rule. It failed to emphasize national interests and did not contain anything that could be related to the broadly understood Polish issue. As the deputies of Galicia, the MPs took on the duty to act only in the interest of the Polish nation. People criticized them and accused of being only a Galician delegation, even though they call themselves the Polish delegation.

The Club updated the program. Each newly elected president announced a new program when they took up the function. Moreover, individual deputies could submit a draft of a program. Ignacy Kamiński submitted one of such drafts due to the events related to the Balkan conflict 1877–1878. The first point stipulated: “Defending and supporting the Polish cause whenever the opportunity arises.” The events in the Balkans are also reflected in point five: “After the Eastern issue is over, cooperate with the parties in the Imperial Council that intend to reduce the military budget, make savings” and in point nine: “In the oriental case, resist any actions of the Austro-Hungarian government, characterized by its interaction with the Moscow government.”¹⁰⁸⁰

Together with the program, the Galician MPs elected to the Imperial Council adopted the Act of the Deputies.¹⁰⁸¹ Any deputy of the Galician Parliament could become a member of the Club after the approval of his candidacy by the club in a secret ballot and obtaining a majority of 2/3 of votes. For the duration of the meeting of the Imperial Council, members elected a president, vice-president, and two secretaries. The president’s duties included convening sessions, chairing them, setting agendas, and deciding in the event of a tied vote. In the absence of the President, the Vice-President took over the responsibilities. There was no unanimity rule in the Club – only an absolute majority of votes with at least 2/3 of the MPs voting could adopt a resolution. On the other hand, outside, all

1080 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 254 z 27 maja 1878r.,” “Protokoły Koła. . .,” Biblioteka im. Ks. Czartoryskich (BCz), rkps 1241, k. 257, 276, 282.

1081 Full text of the act in: Zdrada, *Organizacja*, pp. 73–74. Handwritten regulations of the Club is available in resources of Antoni Z. Helcla, Biblioteka PAN (Library of Polish Academy of Sciences) Kr, rkps. Nr. 102, k. 354, 357.

members of the Club had to act according to the adopted resolutions. Moreover, all speeches in the House, motions, interpellations, and the way of voting had to be previously determined and approved by the Club. Members of Parliament were bound by a rigid club discipline: "One must vote as the whole Club decided." However, the Act provided for a derogation from this rule. For important reasons, after making a statement, a club member could abstain from voting by absence. The situation in which a member could vote against the club's decision or abstain from vote in the forum of the house was not expected. An absence of a Member of the Polish Club during the vote was the best solution. There were probably two reasons for this. The first one resulted from the statutory principle of club solidarity, while the second one was connected with "saving face" by Polish MPs and the consolidation of their perception of them as a homogeneous party. However, the principle of solidarity did not apply in voting on laws regulating purely religious issues, although the MP was still obliged to notify the club of his appearance in the House. In special cases, the Club could also waive the principle of club discipline and leave the issue up to the members. The Act of the Deputies also defined the manner of reaching agreement with other parliamentary clubs. The chairman or a committee appointed for this purpose spoke on behalf of the Club.

Undoubtedly, the principle of internal solidarity of the Polish Club was one of the factors that determined the strength of its influence on the forum of the Austrian parliament. It should also be noted that thanks to the application of the rule, groups more radical than the conservative-peasant ones could not force their postulates. Moreover, the loyalist policy adopted by the Club at the beginning of its functioning could be continued in the following years.¹⁰⁸² According to some, the principle of club solidarity became a dogma, which meant that "the opposition has been tied for many years."¹⁰⁸³

Jan Mioszowski, MP since September 1874, was the first one to break the principle of the club's solidarity. Mioszowski left the Polish Club because he was discouraged with what Kornel Krzczunowicz and Ludwik Chrzanowski were doing. He was critical of the activity of the Club during the Balkan conflict. Moreover, Mioszowski did not sign the Club's question concerning the Polish issue and the Berlin Congress, which resulted in a negative assessment of his conduct. However, Mioszowski returned to the group of Polish MPs in the Council in January 1878, mainly in fear of losing his political position.¹⁰⁸⁴

1082 S. Grodziski, *Na drogach karier politycznych*. . . , p. 184.

1083 W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*. . . , p. 107.

1084 Zdrada, "Jan Stanisław Mioszowski (Mioszowski)," in: *PSB*, vol. XXI. . . , p. 4.

Another Secessionist from the Polish club was Kornel Ujejski, who in 1878, as a result of the Balkan crisis, left the Club. Allegedly, he said: "This solidarity practiced by the most Club's members is glitter and sand thrown at people's eyes, and the country does not benefit from it."¹⁰⁸⁵ In similar circumstances, Wolski broke the principle of solidarity, but in a letter to K. Grocholski, the President of the Polish Club, withdrew the motion to release him from this principle.¹⁰⁸⁶ Due to the failure to respect the Club's resolutions Wolski, was not invited to all meetings of the club. The matter of his membership was the subject of several meetings of the Polish Club. Additionally, Wolski wrote letters to the president, in which he asked for an explanation of the essence of the principle of solidarity and the resulting rights and obligations of the member of the Club. Wolski asked: "If I am not allowed to use the rights of a member freely, I shall also feel free from my duties."¹⁰⁸⁷ In a sense, in 1880, Podolak and Wojciech Dzieduszycki, renounced allegiance to the principle of solidarity and to the Eastern Galician nobility creating their own party under the name *Ateńczycy* (Athenians).¹⁰⁸⁸

In the years 1863–65, Polish MPs in the Council did not show much parliamentary activity. The reason for this were mainly the accidents associated with the January Uprising, its defeat and the numerous repressions that affected the Polish population, such as the declaration of a state of siege in Galicia.

In 1867, the Polish Club met for the first time on May 19, not counting the session of the Imperial Council convened in February to adopt the amendment to the Constitution. Although the minutes of the meeting were not preserved, from the press and correspondence, we know that during the first session of the Club, members formed the club, elected the authorities and commission.¹⁰⁸⁹

It seems probable, and this is what many think, that the statute of the Club adopted in 1861, was in force also in the following years. However, there were some minor changes to the rules for selecting the committee. Initially, it consisted of three members and one deputy, and in the years 1867–68, the Club abandoned its election.¹⁰⁹⁰

1085 Quote from: I. Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II, Warszawa 1957, p. 85.

1086 "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 219 z dnia 18 lutego 1878r.," "Protokoły Koła. . ." BCz, rkps 1241, k. 57.

1087 "Do Szanownego polskiego Koła poselskiego we Wiedniu," "Protokoły Koła. . ." BCz, rkps 1241, k. 161. See also: "Do Wielmożnego Kazimierza Grocholskiego jako Prezesa polskiego Koła poselskiego," "Protokoły Koła. . ." BCz, rkps 1241, k. 157.

1088 Feldman, *Stronictwa i programy polityczne. . .*, p. 232.

1089 *Czas* 117/1867 (22 May); *Gazeta Narodowa* 119/1867 (23 May); "Protokoły Koła. . ." pp. 32–38.

1090 "Protokoły Koła. . ." p. 38.

Members of the Club made some changes in the statute after discussions initiated by the secessionist MPs who opposed the policy of the Polish Club against the Balkan crisis of 1877–1878. In May 1878, the Polish Club proposed a draft of a new statute, which was not much different from the one currently in force, but introduced more freedom for MPs. Ludwik Starzyński, requesting partial declassification of the committee's deliberations was the one who proposed a change in the regulations of the Polish Club on April 10, 1878. Julian Dunajewski was one of the people against this motion. Leon Chrzanowski proposed to first draw up draft amendments to the statute and only then debate on the motion, which was eventually accepted.¹⁰⁹¹ At the next meeting, MPs proposed to limit the principle of solidarity to national affairs, national autonomy, and those principles that serve the general national interest of Poland, and to leave Members free to speak without Club's permission. Another proposal concerned the election of committee members. The idea was to elect by chance from the willing ones and not secretly using ballot papers as before.¹⁰⁹² The Club, in fear of losing its internal cohesion, soon adopted a resolution, the essence of which is in these words: "only an MP who follows the statute may be a member of the Club," while a Polish MP may be the one who: "will always give assurance that he follows the statute of the Club."¹⁰⁹³ For example, in the statement of MP Roman Włodek, we read: "Hereby, I declare that I surrender to the provisions of the Act binding the members of the Polish parliamentary Club in Vienna and allow this declaration to be published in the National Journal of Public Laws."¹⁰⁹⁴

Returning to the above-mentioned draft of statutory changes, it should be stated that it was an extension and clarification of the existing statute of the Club. It contained 22 paragraphs. Artur Gołuchowski, Kornel Ujejski, Ludwik Skrzyński, and Otto Hausner were the ones who signed the project.¹⁰⁹⁵ They simply repeated most of the paragraphs, and in some cases added proposed new rules. Already in § 1, the project imposed on the members of the Club the obligation to observe the principle of solidarity: "The Polish Club consisted of those MPs of Galicia and Silesia who observe the principles set out in § 4 and who

1091 "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 236 z 10 kwietnia 1878r.," "Protokoły Koła. . ." BCz, rkps 1241, k. 123–124.

1092 "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 237 z 11 kwietnia 1878r.," "Protokoły Koła. . ." k. 127–129.

1093 "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 238 z 15 kwietnia 1878tr.," "Protokoły Koła. . ." k. 145.

1094 "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 238 z 15 kwietnia 1878r.," "Protokoły Koła. . ." k. 145.

1095 "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 250 z 10 maja 1878r.," "Protokoły Koła. . ." k. 193.

follow to the provisions of these regulations.” The mentioned § 4 stipulated: “The principle of the circle is the solidarity of its members with each other and with the Galician National Sejm in order to effectively represent Polish interests and defend the national autonomy, constitutional freedoms, and civil rights.”¹⁰⁹⁶ According to § 3, the Presidium of the Club was to consist, just like before, of the President and Vice-President, elected for each new session of the Parliament, and two secretaries, whose duties included, among others, preparing minutes of club meetings.¹⁰⁹⁷ The draft also provided in § 5 that the agenda of the club’s meeting could be changed not only on the basis of a resolution of the Club, but also at the request of five MPs.¹⁰⁹⁸ In § 6, 7, the draft also extensively discussed the rules for holding meetings and drawing up minutes.¹⁰⁹⁹ Another change was the number of members required to adopt resolutions by the Club. So far, it was an absolute majority, according to the draft it could be only 15 members (§ 8).¹¹⁰⁰ Members proposed a fundamental change in paragraph 12. Until now, the statute stated that “Members of the Club speak in the House only after the authorization of the Club,” while the draft said “Members of the Club speak in the House only after previously informing the Club.”¹¹⁰¹

Then, starting from May 26, discussions on the amendments to the club regulations started in the Club. Amendments to paragraphs four and twelve evoked the most controversies. For example, Jaworski, the opponent of the amendment to the statute and Dunajewski, said that the adoption of the principle of unauthorized speech in the House was the most controversial: “it will diminish the seriousness of the Club, which it represented so far. Our solidarity is not only in the resolutions but also in the motives of our vote.”¹¹⁰² Jaworski was against limiting the principle of solidarity to certain matters: “the principles

1096 In the then in force statute, the paragraph limited to the following statement: “The principle of the Club is solidarity of its members,” “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 250 z 10 maja 1878r.,” “Protokoły Koła. . .,” k. 183–184. The project of the amendments to the Club’s status can be found in: “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 258 z 26 maja 1878r.,” “Protokoły Koła. . .,” k. 239–247, zał., ark. 139/2.

1097 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 250 z 10 maja 1878r.,” “Protokoły Koła. . .,” k. 183.

1098 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 250 z 10 maja 1878r.,” “Protokoły Koła. . .,” k. 184.

1099 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 250 z 10 maja 1878r.,” “Protokoły Koła. . .,” k. 185–186.

1100 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 250 z 10 maja 1878r.,” “Protokoły Koła. . .,” k. 186.

1101 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 250 z 10 maja 1878r.,” “Protokoły Koła. . .,” k. 189.

1102 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 258 z 26 maja 1878r.,” “Protokoły Koła. . .,” k. 237–238.

independent of any changes in the regulations were from the very beginning of the establishment of the Polish Club in Vienna in 1861 the main idea of its activity, they are and will remain the most important, and they are already covered by the very name of the ‘Polish’ Club.” In addition, Jaworski did not agree that Members who intended to appear in the House would just inform the President of the Club and not ask for permission to speak. In the end, Jaworski said that the draft was unacceptable, because some of the proposals were unfounded, and others: “erode its basic elements e.g. solidarity, and that it’s not the time to decide on small amendments that can be made to the rules of procedure due to the very important ongoing issues that the Club must deal with.” At the discussion, the Club continued with the agenda.¹¹⁰³ The public opinion of Galicia was also involved in the matter of changing the regulations of the Club.¹¹⁰⁴

Polish Club amended its statute partially after the parliamentary elections of 1897. The changes concerned the increase of the possibility to submit questions and make speeches by the members of the Polish Club. After the amendments, in order for a member of parliament to be able to take such an initiative in the House, he needed consent of only fifteen members of the club, and not the majority. However, if an MP’s speech or question was to relate to foreign policy issues, the previous rules applied. This “liberalization” of the statute of the Club did not concern the policy pursued by the Club in the Imperial Council. The Galician MPs’ club was to remain a monolith, although, as we all know, it was never like that in reality, because it was not uniform in terms of its program.¹¹⁰⁵

The election of Kazimierz Grocholski by acclamation in 1861 crowned the organizational work of the Polish Club. The fact Grocholski became the president of the Club was rather due to political reasons, although he could not be denied personal aptitude to perform this function. The division of the Galician delegation and the transition of Russian MPs to the pro-government club of Unionists

1103 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 258 z 26 maja 1878r.,” “Protokoły Koła. . .” k. 256–257.

1104 Members of local council sent their own propositions on how to change the stylistics of paragraph four of the statute: “The principle of the Polish Club is the solidarity of its members with each other and with the Galician national parliament, which aims to effectively represent Polish interests and defend national autonomy, constitutional freedoms, and civil rights.” They expressed hope that: “This motion, transformed into a resolution of the Club, will become a program of its activity, the Honourable Polish Club!” See: “Protokoły Koła. . .,” k. 287–305, ark. 143/2.

1105 J. Buszko, “Ludowcy w parlamencie wiedeńskim,” in: *Chłopi. Naród. Kultura*, vol. 2, *Działalność polityczna ruchu ludowego*, ed. S. Dąbrowski, Rzeszów 1996, p. 116.

resulted in a weakening of the position of Polish MPs, not only in quantitative terms. Galician MPs had a total of thirty-eight seats, and the departure of thirteen Russian MPs significantly weakened the representation of Galicia. This was a very unfavorable arrangement, as the influence of Galician MPs in the House weakened. On the other hand, this division contributed to an increase in the position of the Eastern Galician conservatives, whose leader was Grocholski. The break-up of the delegation was therefore also justified. Otherwise, the Podolaks would be forced to cooperate and, most likely, constantly work out a common position with the Russian MPs, but also with the two remaining parties, i.e. the democrats and conservatives of Cracow. Although the idea behind the agreement with the Russian MPs was to speak in solidarity in the House, it seems that in certain matters there would be obstacles in its implementation. We should take into account that among these thirteen MPs there were Polish and Russian peasants. Their aspirations did not coincide with the demands of the great landowners of Eastern Galicia. One of the problems would have been the peasant issue. In this case, the differences of opinion concerned e.g. easement. Moreover, conflicts occurred between Poles and Ruthenians. At their root was the issue of national awareness and the aspirations of the Polish population to assimilate Ruthenians. In this sense, the split of the delegation deprived the conservatives of unnecessary "burden" in the form of Polish and Russian peasants. However, the split of the Galician delegation cannot be assessed in terms of a fact of positive significance. The departure of the Lytvynovych group had an impact on internal relations in the Club as it consolidated the groups forming it around the issues of the Polish nation. Therefore, the departure determined the directions of the policy, although one cannot ignore the fact that there were some program discrepancies, but the efficiency of Club's operation definitely improved. Nevertheless, the division weakened the importance of Galicia's representation in the Imperial Council and for many years determined the nature of the policy pursued by Polish MPs supporting conservatism. This issue was also visible in relations between the Austrian government and the Polish Club, which often had to play tactical games, mainly in order to achieve the most satisfactory solution to given problems. Moreover, Vienna repeatedly exploited conflicts between the Polish court and the countryside in order to persuade the members of the Club to accept projects beneficial to the monarchy.

To a large extent, the parliament electoral system determined the face of the Polish Club. The representative body was the Imperial Council, in which only one of the houses, the House of Deputies, was elected. The monarchy had a curial system. During the constitutional period, the deputies of the lower house were elected by the provincial assemblies, from among their members. The change

came on April 2, 1873 in the form of a law on the representation of the state in the Imperial Council, which introduced direct elections and upheld the curial system. This law deprived the national parliaments of decisive influence on the composition and thus on the work of the central parliament. It was in force during the elections of 1873, 1879, 1885, 1891, before the electoral reform of the government of Count Kazimierz Badeni introduced the fifth curia, called the curia of universal suffrage.¹¹⁰⁶ In 1896, the government amended the electoral law to allow all voters in the fifth curia to vote. The Curia won seventy-two seats i.e. 17 % of all parliamentary seats. The modernization of the electoral law was the first step toward breaking the privileges of the upper classes thanks to the existing electoral system.¹¹⁰⁷ Another aspect of progress in the democratization of political relations in the whole of Austria was the introduction of the principle of universality in 1907. The new electoral law was not yet perfect, as only men over twenty-four and permanently resided in a given electoral district for at least one year were entitled to vote. During the successive reforms of the electoral law, the number of seats in parliament for Galician MPs also changed. By 1873 Poles had thirty-eight seats, after the introduction of direct elections sixty-three, thanks to the establishment of the fifth electoral curia this number increased to seventy-eight, and the introduction of the principle of universality of the electoral law increased it to 106 seats.

The year 1907 was a landmark year in the history of Austrian parliamentarism, because, as a socialist MP Herman Lieberman claimed:

This was the parliament of the first universal suffrage. In the old parliaments, there was the intellectual, financial, and family elite, and now the people and the tribune of the social pits entered the Burgring building. Therefore, their grievances and demands were expressed in ruthless form, often brutally; antagonisms often collided too violently, leading to fights and trials unworthy of the temple of legislation.¹¹⁰⁸

On the other hand, from the point of view of the history of the Polish Club, from this year on, we can talk about a change in the political image of the Club and a decrease in its popularity in the Polish society.

In general, the Polish Club was against the democratization of the electoral law because it threatened the position of conservatives in the Imperial Council.

1106 Zdrada, "Galicyjskie wybory sejmowe i parlamentarne w latach 1861–1889," *Roczniki Biblioteki PAN* (Yearbook of the Library of Polish Academy of Sciences), 1973, p. 236.

1107 W. Łazuga, „Rządy polskie” w Austrii. *Gabinet Kazimierza hr. Badenigo 1895–1897*, Poznań 1991, p. 133.

1108 H. Lieberman, *Pamiętniki*, ed. A. Garlicki, Warszawa 1996, p. 73.

Nevertheless, the Club was willing to accept the changes, but only to such an extent that it would not violate the previous status of Poles and only in such a situation if, for political reasons, it was forced to do so. National democrats also protested against the government's project to reform the elections. Głąbiński criticized the position of the supporters of the reform. He wrote: "Some kind of psychosis in fear of losing of the huge crowd due to the electoral reform bewitched the minds of its supporters. Every demand to improve the project in the national interest was condemned as a cunning trick to overthrow the reform."¹¹⁰⁹ The position of the national democrats was similar to the views of the Podolaks, especially with the opinion of Dzieduszycki, who claimed that the Polish Club could approve the draft electoral reform on condition that it would guarantee him one-third of the seats in parliament.¹¹¹⁰ The national democrats did not accept the principles of the division of seats that Minister-President Paul Gautsch presented in the parliament on November 28, 1905.¹¹¹¹ On the other hand, Stapiński's folk party stressed the need for a reform. In the Imperial Council, on February 12, 1906, the President of the PSL (Polish People's Party) presented to Minister-President Gautsch the postulate to introduce general, secret, equal, and direct elections.¹¹¹² At Głąbiński's request, the Polish Club decided that it would support the electoral reform if the government guaranteed the Poles the political status they had

1109 S. Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, Pelpin 1939, pp. 76–77. Głąbiński spoke out against the introduction of general elections as early as 1902. He did not accept it mainly because they would undermine the political status of Poles in Galicia. Głąbiński called such an idea demagogic. According to him, it posed a danger of losing the leading position in terms of nationality status.

1110 *Słowo Polskie* 466/1905 (October 7), p. 1; *Gazeta Narodowa* 2301905 (October 8), p. 1; 274/1905 (October 27), p. 1; A. Wątor, *Działalność Stronnictwa Demokratyczno-Narodowego w zaborze austriackim do roku 1914*, Szczecin 1993, p. 80.

1111 Under the influence of demonstrations and protests in November 1905. Gautsch announced that a draft reform introducing universal suffrage would be introduced: "It was the first victory. It closed the first stage of the struggle for democratic electoral law." The government proposed that the number of seats for each province of the country should be based on criteria such as the population, the tax capacity of the country, and the economic interests of the country. After the introduction of such provisions, Galicia's role would have deteriorated dramatically, as it would have received only seventy-eight seats, not 120., W. Najdus, *Szkice z historii Galicji*, vol. II, Warszawa 1960, p. 166.

1112 It was the result of 700 local councils resolutions passed in thirty-nine Galician counties, J. Jachymek, *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe-Lewica 1913–1924. Studium o powstaniu, działalności i rozkładzie ugrupowania politycznego*, Lublin 1991, p. 15.

held so far. The distribution of seats was supposed to correspond to the percentage of the Polish and Ukrainian population.¹¹¹³

Poles emerged victorious from the struggle for electoral reform. Out of 516 members of the Imperial Council, they had 106 seats, seventy-eight for Poles and twenty-eight for Ukrainians.¹¹¹⁴ Compared to the previous state, Galicia held 20.5 % of all seats in the House of Deputies of the Imperial Council. National democrats considered the reform to be a success: "The Poles emerged from the struggle not just without losing their position, but even formally strengthened by the extension of their political and administrative autonomy."¹¹¹⁵

After the 1907 elections, the Polish Club had fifty-four members. In comparison with other parliamentary clubs, the position of the Polish Club weakened and from the second position it moved to the third after Karl Lüger's Christian-Social Club and the Socialist Club. Another consequence of the introduction of universal suffrage to the Imperial Council was bringing up this issue in the context of elections to the Galician Sejm. Moreover, apart from the hitherto functioning Polish political parties, in the House, there were now also national democrats, who achieved a significant electoral success in 1907. Apart from the Club, there were also Polish socialists, and this fact clearly destroyed the myth of unanimity and solidarity of the political representation of Galicia. From then on, we can also speak of a gradual decline in the importance of the Polish Club, not only as an emanation of conservative governments but also of their policy. Their concept of the pro-Austrian policy was initially supplemented and later replaced by the postulates of the popular and national-democratic parties, and

1113 The draft electoral reform proposed by the Gautsch government provided for a division of seats in such a way that the Russian population was entitled to 60 % of the seats and the Polish population to 40 %. This division was not an equal and not fair division. At the same time, it did not guarantee that the Poles would maintain their current state of possessions. Moreover: "Such electoral reform pushed Poles in Austria to the level of a political factor that was completely dependent on the government and the Jews, because only with their help could Poles count on election in districts with a majority of the Russian people," S. Głębiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , p. 76.

1114 Thanks to the introduction of universal suffrage, Ukrainians significantly increased the number of their representatives, yet their position was much worse than that of the Polish MPs. The Polish MP was represented on average by 52 000 voters, while the Ukrainian MP was represented by 102 000 voters, H. Wereszycki, *Pod berłem Habsburgów. Zagadnienie narodowościowe*, Kraków 1957, p. 260.

1115 S. Głębiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , p. 81; A. Wątor, *Działalność Stronnictwa Demokratyczno-Narodowego*. . . , p. 85.

during the war even by the socialists: “The first People’s Parliament was a huge leap forward toward democracy and, at the same time, toward the demands of national rights.”¹¹¹⁶

There were also twenty-eight Ukrainian MPs elected to the parliament, i.e. fourteen nationalists, five Old Ruthenians, six radicals, and two socialists.¹¹¹⁷ Together with the Bukovina MPs, the Ukrainian club had thirty members.¹¹¹⁸ Clearly concerned about this result was M. Bobrzyński: “We have a strong Russian club. The same thing forces us to be careful. Every obstacle that we put clumsily in the House or in the commissions . . . will be exploited by the Russians. The Russians will make the life of the government difficult.”¹¹¹⁹ Pastor was also concerned: “The necessity requires reckoning with the Ruthenians, there are thirty of them, and the folk party supports them.” Another concerned man was J. Buzek: “You have to take into account the strength of the Ruthenians. Their strength will increase. Hence, today’s Russian trophies are only the beginning . . . they are small, but they will not be enough for a long time.”¹¹²⁰

The House of the Deputies of the Imperial Council elected some of the Polish MPs to perform important parliamentary functions, as President or Vice-President of the House.

1116 Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 9.

1117 A very detailed description and analysis of the results of the 1907 parliamentary elections can be found in: W. Czerkowski, *Pierwsze powszechne głosowanie w Austrii, Broszury z chwili obecnej*, z. IX, Kraków 1907. Głębiński wrote that directly after the elections of 1907, the Club had fifty-five members, i.e. 10.8 % of the total number of MPs., Głębiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , p. 89. Głębiński mentioned that “in parliament, through the mouth of the vice-president Wassilki, Ruthenians publicly thanked me as the speaker for the kind conduct of their demands and expressed the hope that from now on their relations with Poles would be more correct. In the view of the turbulent past, such a statement in parliament was a great novelty.” However, Głębiński added that this was an empty declaration, and that the strength of Ukrainians in the Council was growing, because before the 1907 elections they had eight seats, and after the 1907 elections – twenty-eight, Głębiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , p. 81. I. Winiarski wrongly stated that Ukrainians had twenty-seven seats, I. Winiarski, *Rusini w Radzie Państwa (1907–1908)*, Lviv 1909, p. 24.

1118 Głębiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , p. 89.

1119 “Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 17 grudnia 1907r.,” “Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa. . .,” BJ TB, rkps 8109 III, k. 14.

1120 “Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 30 października 1907r.,” “Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa. . .,” BJ TB, rkps 8109, k. 24.

The first Polish parliamentarian to be entrusted with such a function was a democrat, Franciszek Smolka.¹¹²¹ Smolka became famous during the sessions of successive parliaments in the period from 1848 to 1849, he was also involved in the closing of the sessions of the Constituent Assembly in March 1849 on the explicit order of the emperor and bypassing the law.¹¹²² Smolka was the author of the famous resolution which became the basis for the resolution of the Galician Parliament of 1868 and the five-year struggle for the autonomy of the Galician province. In a dualistic monarchy, he was a Member of the Imperial Council for many years. A clear example of the fact that Smolka enjoyed the recognition of Members was that they repeatedly appointed him President of the House of Deputies of the Imperial Council. After obtaining his mandate in 1879, at one of the first sessions of the Polish Club, members elected Smolka as the candidate for the Vice President of the House,¹¹²³ and at the beginning of the session, on October 15, the House elected him as the First Vice President of the House, shortly afterwards on March 14, 1881 as the President of the House. MP's entrusted him this function in the subsequent parliamentary terms, in 1885 and 1891. Smolka held the post until March 2, 1893. For this reason, he was also the President at some joint delegation meetings in 1882, 1884, and 1886. Smolka's character traits did not allow him to let other's impose on him the way in which he should treat his MPs. In this respect, he was relentless even toward Minister-President Eduardo Taafé. Smolka became famous for his proficiency in resolving procedural disputes. In the House, he had a great deal of authority as a Member of Parliament, already known from parliamentary debates, since the

1121 See: "A. Konieczny, Smolka Franciszek," in: *Polacy w historii i kulturze krajów Europy Zachodniej. Słownik Biograficzny*, eds K. Kwaśniewskiego, L. Trzeciakowskiego, Instytut Zachodni, Poznań 1981, p. 404; J. Białynia Chłodecki, *Franciszek Smolka*, Lviv 1913, p. 76; K. Widman, *Franciszek Smolka, jego życie. . .*, pp. 241–734.

1122 Karol Widman, quoted above, described in detail the circumstances of the closing of the Sejm proceedings and Smolka's behavior during these events. We should note that together with the MPs Smolka intended to oppose the lawlessness and made efforts to ensure that the last of the sessions, scheduled for March 7, was held. In spite of this, the Emperor closed the session on March 4 and announced the March Constitution on the same day. This jeopardized all the achievements of the Sejm, including the projects of the liberals prepared in the wake of the so-called Kremsier Constitution, see: K. Widman, *Franciszek Smolka, jego życie. . .*, pp. 746–751. After these events, the absolute government returned. See also: J. Urbańczyk, *Die polnische Abgeordneten. . .*, pp. 170–178.

1123 "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 4 z dnia 12 października 1879r.," *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, BCz, rkps 1241, k. 504.

period of the Revolutions of 1848. Even in his old age, Smolka was still able to cope with maintaining discipline in the House. Undoubtedly, this was thanks to his efficient mind and good physical condition. Although Chłędowski mentioned that: "Sitting in the chair of the President, in the Imperial Council, he usually slept a little, so that Taaffe said to that spoke 'You will see that at one point a few opposition MPs will come, put him on the bench, they will want to beat him up, and Smolka, just awakened, will say the nicest thing: 'MP Menger has the floor.''" As a result, the secretaries who informed Smolka about what was going on in the House, conducted the sessions. Smolka had so much experience in presiding over the debates that "even if just awakened, he immediately knew what was going on."¹¹²⁴ That is why he was not very willing to resign from his presidency and MP mandate. On April 1, government nominated him life peer the House of Lords, although he did not participate in its work anymore and was given the title of secret advisor.¹¹²⁵ In evidence of Smolka's merits for Austrian parliamentarism, he was honored with a bust, which hangs in the building of Austrian parliament till this day.¹¹²⁶ The opinion of the author of the biography and memoirs of Smolka, Karol Widman, is fully justified. He wrote: "his name is inextricably linked today with the history of Poland as one of its first-class patriots."¹¹²⁷

David Abrahamowicz, elected on November 12, 1897, was also the long-standing President of the House of Deputies. The reason behind this election was the critical situation in the House of Deputies, which arose as a result of the announcement of language regulations introduced by Badeni's government. Abrahamowicz's task was to fight the obstruction in the House. It was during his presidency that for the first time in the history of the Austrian parliament, the government introduced disciplinary measures against MPs. A critical moment in his term of office was the end of 1897, when Badeni's cabinet

1124 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 49–50.

1125 S. Kieniewicz, "Smolka Franciszek Jan," in: *PSB*, vol. XXXIX. . . , p. 317. See also E. Olszewski, "Franciszek Smolka – polityk i parlamentarzysta," in: *Polacy w austriackim parlamencie. W 130. rocznicę Koła Polskiego. Materiały polsko-austriackiej konferencji naukowej zorganizowanej w parlamencie austriackim i Stacji Naukowej PAN w Wiedniu w dn. 11–12 września 1997*, ed. W. S. Kucharski, Lublin-Vienna 1997.

1126 "Franz Smolka – Ein Pole verkörpert das Vielvölkerparlament. Die österreichische Karriere eines Revolutionärs aus Galizien," in: *Parlamentskorrrespondenz/09/05.11.2001/Nr. 727*, http://www.parlament.gv.at/portal/page?_pageid=908,255533&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL z 11 I 2005.

1127 K. Widman, *Franciszek Smolka. Wspomnienie biograficzne*, Lviv 1913, p. 159.

collapsed after the adoption of language regulations favorable to the Czechs. At that time, a strong German obstruction emerged in the House. Polish socialists also protested against Badeni's actions.¹¹²⁸ There were even riots in the chamber and Abrahamowicz had to use the police force to restore order and peace in the proceedings.¹¹²⁹ He was then exposed to a series of harassment, and insults. People called him "an old Armenian dog."¹¹³⁰ Abrahamowicz was sometimes powerless in the face of the obstruction of MPs: "even a skilled man like David Abrahamovich [...] will fail to cope with the frisky German group."¹¹³¹

Other Presidents of the House of Deputies were also Stanisław Starzyński between 1907–1909, and Juliusz Sylwester between 1909–1914.¹¹³²

Among the vice-presidents of the House of Deputies, we should also mention Florian Ziemiałkowski.¹¹³³ He was the vice-president between 1867–1868. Stanisław Madeyski, who enjoys the recognition even today, became the vice-president in 1892 and held this function until September of the following year when he was appointed to the position of Minister of Religion and Education.¹¹³⁴ On October 20, 1899, Leonard Piętaś became the first vice-president of the House.¹¹³⁵ Ludomił German, a deputy since 1907, also served as vice-president. The House of Deputies entrusted him with the function for the period from 1911 to 1918.¹¹³⁶

MPs in the House of the Imperial Council and in the Polish Club worked in committees. Eugeniusz Abrahamowicz was a member of the parliamentary committee for immunity, new civil procedure, and budget.¹¹³⁷ Herman Diamand was a member of the economic and economic affairs committee recognized by the House.¹¹³⁸ Władysław Dułęba was almost a permanent member of the

1128 Herman Lieberman mentions that Badeni, together with the Slavic-German majority, voted for him to avoid obstruction in the house: "He [Badeni] took on this task with great effort and determination." Lieberman, *Pamiętniki*. . . , p. 124.

1129 Łazuga, „Rządy polskie” w Austrii. . . , p. 189.

1130 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. I. . . , pp. 117–118.

1131 J. Bojko, *Ze wspomnień, do druku przygotował, przedmową i przypisami opatrzył K. Dunin-Wąsowicz*, Warszawa 1959, p. 242.

1132 Ajnenkiel, *Historia sejmu polskiego*, pp. 290–292.

1133 See; Z. Fras, *Florian Ziemiałkowski*.

1134 Cz. Lechicki, "Madeyski Stanisław," in: *PSB*, vol. XIX. . . , p. 124.

1135 Zdrada, "Piętaś Leonard," in: *PSB*, vol. XXVI. . . , p. 201.

1136 W. Hahn, "German Ludomił," in: *PSB*, vol. VII. . . , p. 397.

1137 S. Starzyński, "Abrahamowicz Dawid," in: *PSB*, vol. I. . . , p. 10.

1138 S. Loewenstein, "Diamand Herman," in: *PSB*, vol. V. . . , p. 152. See also: *Pamiętnik Hermana Diamanda zebrany z wyjątków listów do żony*, Kraków 1932.

parliamentary committee.¹¹³⁹ Ludomił German was in charge of education and it was on his initiative that the Club established a school committee in 1908, which he presided over.¹¹⁴⁰ During the war, Agenor Maria Gołuchowski, son of Agenor Romuald Gołuchowski was the head of the political commission of the Club and participated in the project of Galicia separation.¹¹⁴¹ Władysław Koziębrodzki, MP between 1891–1893, was elected to the Club's committee on economy and maritime regulations.¹¹⁴² Kornel Krzeczunowicz was competent in financial, tax, and cadastral matters. He was a member of the constitutional commission of the Imperial Council from 1867 and a representative of the Club in budget and tax debates, on December 16 and 18, 1880 respectively.¹¹⁴³ Stanisław Łazarski worked in parliamentary committees: as a vice-president in a legal committee, and in tax, budget, mandate, national affairs, and press committees.¹¹⁴⁴ Stanisław Madeyski was twice elected President of the juridical committee.¹¹⁴⁵ Jan Mieroszewski dealt mainly with economic issues, he worked in numerous committees.¹¹⁴⁶ Jędrzej Moraczewski was active mainly in the railroad committee.¹¹⁴⁷ Leonard Piętaś was a member of the parliamentary committee to renew the settlement with Hungary, the school committee, the copyright law committee, the tax law committee, the budget law committee, in which he was a vice-president, he was also a permanent referee of the budget of the Ministry of Justice.¹¹⁴⁸ Leon Piniński worked mainly in financial and legal committees, in 1895–1896 he was the president of a standing committee preparing a draft civil procedure code, he was also the president of a penal committee and a speaker on the draft penal code. In the budget committee, he presented the budget of the Ministry of Faith and Education. Moreover, Piniński was a member of the address, currency, and verification committee.¹¹⁴⁹ Aleksander Poniński, MP between 1903–1907, worked in many of the Club's committees, e.g. in customs and vodka tax committees.¹¹⁵⁰

1139 Z. Lasocki, "Dulęba Władysław," in: *PSB*, vol. V. . . , p. 456

1140 Hahn, "German Ludomił," p. 397.

1141 Buszko, "Gołuchowski Agenor Maria Adam," in: *PSB*, vol. VIII. . . , p. 261

1142 Zdrada, "Koziebrodzki Władysław," in: *PSB*, vol. XIV. . . , p. 617.

1143 Zdrada, "Krzeczunowicz Kornel," in: *PSB*, vol. XV. . . , p. 512.

1144 Zdrada, "Łazarski Stanisław," in: *PSB*, vol. XVIII. . . , p. 291.

1145 Cz. Lechicki, "Madeyski Stanisław Jerzy," in: *PSB*, vol. XIX. . . , p. 124.

1146 Zdrada, "Mieroszewski (Mieroszewski) Jan Stanisław," in: *PSB*, vol. XXI. . . , p. 4.

1147 W. Bieńkowski, "Moraczewski Jędrzej (Andrzej) Edward," in: *PSB*, vol. XXI. . . , p. 684.

1148 Zdrada, "Piętaś Leonard," in: *PSB*, vol. XXVI. . . , p. 201.

1149 Zdrada, "Piniński Leon Jan," in: *PSB*, vol. XXVI. . . , p. 333.

1150 A. Stelmach, "Poniński Aleksander Oskar Franciszek," in: *PSB*, vol. XXVII. . . , p. 516.

Arnold Rapoport, worked in committees dealing with economic and financial matters.¹¹⁵¹ Edmund Rauch sat on the Council's Foreign Trade Price Committees and in the State Railroad Council.¹¹⁵² In the Council, Tadeusz Reger worked in the social and political committee, in which he spoke mainly on labour protection issues, and in the school committee, subcommittee for miners and industrial workers, in which he was the secretary and also presented drafts of insurance laws.¹¹⁵³ Edward Rittner worked mainly in the field of political and administrative legislation. Therefore, he was a member of the legal committees, also for the theoretical examinations of the governmental departments of the legal-historical and judicial division.¹¹⁵⁴ Seweryn Smarzewski was the rapporteur for the budget committee of the Ministry of Agriculture. In 1880, he presented the draft state budget. For many years, Smarzewski was the president of the national farming committee and a member of the parliamentary committee of the Club.¹¹⁵⁵

In the Club, there was no shortage of outstanding parliamentary speakers, such as J. Dunajewskior W. Dzieduszycki, who "distinguished himself in the parliament as a speaker with a great style, he just did not like when he was interrupted [...] if he was, he was angry, deviated from the subject, and spoke like an unconscious person."¹¹⁵⁶ Other great speakers were W. Kozłowski and D. Abrahamowicz: who "was a good speaker, the tone of his speeches was sometimes irritating and provocative, but correct."¹¹⁵⁷ There was also H. The diamond with his "powerful voice, agility, clarity of mind, and the conquering logic of his words."¹¹⁵⁸

However, a Polish MP could achieve the greatest splendor and, at the same time, most power through the post of the president of the Polish Club. This problem is discussed below.

Finally, one should also note the difficulties in accurately reconstructing the activities of the Polish Club, resulting from the lack of resources in the archives of the Polish Club in Vienna. Literature reports that after being handed over to Poland, the documents were destroyed in the fire of the Sejm Library and the

1151 Zdrada, "Rapoport (Rapaport, Rappapor) Arnold Chaim," in: *PSB*, vol. XXX. . . , p. 584.

1152 A. Szklarska-Lohmanowa, "Rauch Edmund," in: *PSB*, vol. XXX. . . , p. 649.

1153 W. Bieńkowski, "Reger Tadeusz," in: *PSB*, vol. XXX. . . , p. 730.

1154 Buszko, "Rittner Edward," in: *PSB*, vol. XXXI. . . , p. 313.

1155 Buszko, "Smarzewski Seweryn Walenty Konstanty," in: *PSB*, vol. XXXIX. . . , p. 190.

1156 Lieberman, *Pamiętniki*. . . , p. 125.

1157 Lieberman, *Pamiętniki*. . . , p. 124.

1158 Lieberman, *Pamiętniki*. . . , p. 73.

Archive of New Files.¹¹⁵⁹ During the research, Zbigniew Fras did not find any evidence for the existence of such an archive. The information he managed to obtain is residual.¹¹⁶⁰

4. Presidents of the Polish Club

It seems that a description of the leading figures of the Polish Club, i.e., its presidents, may provide much valuable information concerning the internal character of the Polish Club. They were the ones to decide on the political line of the club, its tactics, position on current problems of the Monarchy and Galicia, and finally on forming alliances and coalitions.

In the literature, the Polish Club is regarded as an internally organized and coherent entity. Generally, the characteristics of the Club are concerned with the policy of the Club and factions forming it. Therefore, it seems that putting forward and verifying a thesis about a significant influence of presidents of the Polish Club on its specific character, internal relations and directions of the policy may extend the existing knowledge about the Polish Club. Especially since many studies emphasize the influence of Kazimierz Grocholski on the works and character of the Club, marginalizing or even neglecting other chairmen.

It is worth including some preliminary remarks here. The Polish Club functioning was based on the statute and agenda adopted in 1961. This problem was discussed in the previous subchapter. Its political platform consisted of conservative, eastern Galician and Cracowian factions, democrats, later also populars,

1159 See Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 12;

1160 Moreover, until 1884 the Polish Club did not have a permanent seat, but used rented rooms. Many times, the Club rented rooms in the Hotel de France. Only after the construction of a new parliament building in 1884, the Club obtained its own seat, but as a result of war it was taken away from it. At that time, there was a hospital in the building of the Imperial Council, Biliński, *Pamiętniki i wspomnienia*, vol. I. . . , pp. 36–39; vol. II. . . , pp. 5–8, 145; “Protokoły Koła Polskiego. . .,” pp. 16–17. Additionally, the MPs collecting the documentation did not order it systematically. K. Chłędowski wrote that at the very beginning of Filip Zaleski’s presidency, Zaleski intended to order the documentation and settle all matters, but after some time his enthusiasm weakened: “Usually, the members of the Club did not handle various important files and petitions commig from Poland. There was a special corner in the Club’s meeting room, where all such papers would form a chaotic pile [. . .] FOR a few days, Zaleski borrowed from us before lunch Mr. Mikiewicz so that he could help him end this chaos but Zaleski’s energy quickly began to flag,” Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. II. . . , p. 130.

national democrats, and – in the period of the First World War – also socialists. However, the political program of the Club was not a result of the consensus between the factions. The primary goal of the Club was to pursue a loyalist policy toward the Habsburg Monarchy. Although, this policy was implemented along with utilitarianism and the endeavors of the clubs of the conservative landed nobility's clubs to maintain the socioeconomic status quo.

The political orientation of the Polish Club determined the composition of its presidium, which means that a representative of a faction holding the majority or that of a coalition of factions became president. However, according to the statute of the Club, it was the president who decided on all activities of the deputies in the parliament. For this reason, the president often had significant input and influence on the activity of the Polish Club.

Not only the statute but also the operating practice created a special place for the next presidents in the Club. What decided on the peculiar character of the Club was appointing K. Grocholski the first president in 1861. He formally held this function until 1888.

Before discussing individual political profiles of the presidents of the Polish Club, it is necessary to list all of them in chronological order and point out the specifics of their presidencies.

As previously mentioned, the first meeting of the Polish Club took place on May 19, 1867. It was then that the Club was constituted and the authorities elected. In the new political reality, when the question of establishing a dual monarchy was already decided, the first president of the Polish Club to be appointed was a mamluk, Florian Ziemiałkowski. As a result of internal conflicts and the breakup of the Club, but also the reluctance of some of its members toward Ziemiałkowski, on October 23, 1868, Grocholski, the leader of the Podolacy (an East Galician conservative movement), was re-elected president. It is fully justified to state that he presided over the Club indivisibly. He was chairman until 1882, although formally until December 1888.¹¹⁶¹ After him, the function of president of the Club was taken over by Apolinary Jaworski. In 1893, he was nominated for national minister and his substitutes were a moderate

1161 Since then K. Grocholski's health was deteriorating, making him unable to perform the duties of a president. In 1884, he suffered an apoplectic stroke for the first time. As a result, he withdrew from an active political life. However, it should be emphasized that in the last year of his life he was able to mobilize himself to coerce the Club to approve the Vodka Act, and thus support the position of the government, S. Kieniewicz, "Grocholski Kazimierz," *PSB*, vol. 8, (1959–1960), p. 586.

conservative, Atanazy Benoe, president until March 9, 1894,¹¹⁶² and a *stańczyk* (a member of Galician conservative faction), Filip Zaleski, president until December 2, 1896, when Jaworski resigned from chairing the Club. Reinstating as president in fall 1896, Jaworski encountered the problem of disorganization of the deputies and loosening of relations in the Club. Since 1900, vice president Wojciech Dzieduszycki held the function of president in his replacement. After Jaworski's death in 1904, Dzieduszycki took over as president of the Club and chaired it from September 17, 1904 to June 2, 1906. His successor was Dawid Abrahamowicz, chairman in the years 1906–1907, who closes the period of presidencies of the representatives of East Galician conservatives. The following years were no longer characterized by such stability in terms of leadership of the Club, resulting primarily from the political composition of the club and, consequently, of its presidium. The victory of the national democracy in the elections to the Imperial Council in 1907 after forming an alliance with the democrats without adjectives made it the largest group in the Club, and, according to the statute, the candidate of the majority became president. On November 12, 1907, Stanisław Głąbiński took over as president, but resigned on January 9, 1911. It was the first time, a precedent in the history of the Club when the command was not in the hands of a conservative. After Głąbiński's resignation, the next president was Stanisław Łazarski, a supporter of the national democracy. He was president of the Club twice. His first presidency was relatively short, as it lasted from January to November 1911. The unfavorable balance of political powers that emerged in the parliamentary election that year forced Łazarski to resign from the post of president. At that time, the situation required an individual with great political and tactical skills to lead the Club. For this reason, the next president became Leon Biliński, with the approval of conservatives, populars, and so-called democrats without adjectives. Biliński, who was ideologically associated with Cracow conservatives, chaired the Club from November 1911 until the beginning of 1912, when he was nominated for the Minister of Finance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Like Łazarski, he served as president twice. On March 4, 1912, he was replaced by Juliusz Leo, professor at the Jagiellonian University, politician and social activist, merited to the city of Cracow. As a conservative, he continued the traditional pro-Austrian Polish policy in Vienna. Despite long interruptions in the works of the Parliament caused by the war, Leo contributed to the cause of the Polish Legions. He resigned from the post of president on January 30, 1915. His withdrawal collided in time with Biliński's

1162 L. Strojek, M. Friedberg, "Benoe Atanazy," *PSB*, vol. 1, (1935), p. 437.

demission from the Ministry of Finance. On February 20, 1915, Biliński was appointed president of the Polish Club for the second time and held the office until May 15, 1917. One of the most notable facts from the period of his presidency was the joining of socialists to the Polish Club in the face of the possibility to execute the idea of establishing an independent Polish state. When Biliński resigned from presiding over the Polish deputies, they re-elected Łazarski as the new president on May 28, 1917. Soon after, on September 4, 1917, he resigned, mainly as a result of conflicts within the Club revolving around the content of the club's resolution of May 1917 adopted at the request of Włodzimierz Tetmajer. Between September 4, 1917, and January 1918, the Club functioned without a president. Discrepancies and conflicts divided the factions to such an extent that they were unable to make decisions. One of the last presidents of the Polish Club was Jan Albin Goetz-Okocimski, a neoconservative elected on January 31, 1918. He resigned one month later, on February 27. However, the Club did not accept his resignation, so he formally remained the president until June. The period of his presidency was extraordinary in some respects, namely, at that time, the Club was forced to abandon the current political line – loyalism. The last of the presidents, Tadeusz Tertil, a National Democrat, presided over the Club since June 21, 1918. His activity came to an end on October 24, with the dissolution of the Polish Club in the Imperial Council on October 25, 1918.

The summary above shows that in the time of the dual monarchy, the Polish Club, functioning in the Imperial Council, was under the lead and control of presidents from the group of the Podolacy, a representation of East Galician landed nobility, for 37 years. It lasted from 1849 to 1907, with a break in the years 1894–96, when Benoe and Zaleski held the office.

It is necessary to emphasize that changes in the position of chairman were not frequent at that time. Given this fact, it could be said that the Club was characterized by the stability of leadership. Its members elected a new president only when the previous one was nominated for a ministerial post, like in the case of Jaworski, or died. Until 1907, when the national democrats won in the elections, the presidents of the Club had strong political backing in the form of conservative factions. Undoubtedly, it facilitated the decision-making process and, simultaneously, boosted the efficiency of the entire Polish Club.

It is appropriate to ask here: why the Podolacy were appointed presidents, and not the Cracow conservatives who had the majority in the Club and well-established influence in Galicia and Vienna? If it were a Stańczyk to become the head of the Club, such choice would be in line with the statute of the Polish Club. There seems to be only one way to answer this question, probably the most logical and convincing one. Despite the existing divergences in the agenda of the Cracow

and East Galician conservatives, mainly in terms of implementing socio-economic reforms in Galicia, they pursued a relatively coherent policy. They were united, above all, by their priority interest, namely maintaining power and, in consequence, ensuring the right to decide on matters concerning the Galician province. This also involved interests of a particular nature, i.e., maintaining its current position in the social and political structure. The coalition of conservative factions guaranteed to maintain the status quo. It was enough of a reason for the conservatives from West and East Galicia to be able to conduct a relatively uniform policy. This forced them to perform their duties as members of the Club, such as respecting the rule of solidarity in the Club. Later, when the Club was more politically diversified, the members of the Club did not enforce the obligations as rigorously. The liberalization of the Club's statute fostered that.

Maintaining the conservative coalition was not a demanding task, as the *Stańczycy* and the *Podolacy* did not have any serious competitors. Apart from relatively small in number liberal democrats and politically unexperienced populars, there existed no other power capable of disturbing this ratio in the Club until 1907. From that moment on, for the next 21 years of its activity, the president of the Club became either a Cracow conservative or National Democrat. Despite the rather strong position of the populars, none of their representatives held the chair. Whereas, they could serve as vice presidents of the club, like *Stapiński*, who was the first non-conservative member of the presidium. At that moment, the Club gained its next, third vice president.¹¹⁶³

Moreover, changes of the chairman of the Club were frequent and the periods of their presidencies ranged from a few months, e.g., *Tertil*, in 1918 (June – October) or *Łazarski*, in 1917 (May – September), to 3–4 years, e.g., *Głąbiński* (1907–11) or *Leo* (1912–15).

The character of the period of the First World War should also be emphasized as unfavorable for parliamentarism. The last elections in the Monarchy took place in 1911, and the political system established then functioned until October 1918, which was also the year of the dissolution of the Polish Club. The years 1914–18 were critical to the activity of the Polish deputies, as due to war, the changing situation made it necessary to modify not only the Club's programs and activities

1163 The vice presidents of the Polish Club were among others: *Atanazy Benoe*, *Józef Buzek*, *Leonard Pięta*k, *Adam Jędrzejowicz*, *Władysław Dule*ba, *Stanisław Głąbiński*, *Wojciech Dzieduszycki*, *Apolinary Jaworski*, *Dawid Abrahamowicz*, *Aleksander Skarbek*, *Józef Pta*ś, *Juliusz Leo*, *Józef Baum*, *Jerzy of Baworowski* coat of arms, *Euzebiusz Czerkawski*, *Wojciech Dzieduszycki*, *Jan Czajkowski*, *Jan Stapiński*, *Ignacy Daszyński*.

but political alliances between its members. Hence the frequent changes of the Club's president, who in most cases resigned from the appointed functions, as well as lack of a sustainable political line and switching from one idea of solving the Polish issue to another. It is shown through the discussed problem. The chair of the Club was passed from the conservatives to national democrats (Biliński, Łazarski, Goetz, Tertil), and from September 1917 until January 1918, the Club did not have a president. This function was performed by the vice presidents.

Florian Ziemiałkowski¹¹⁶⁴ was appointed president probably at the first meeting of the Polish Club, on May 19, 1867. Jan Czajkowski became vice president, Zygmunt Sawczyński and Waclaw Wyrobek were secretaries, Adam Potocki, Mikołaj Zyblikiewicz and Kornel Krzeczunowicz¹¹⁶⁵ were appointed to the House Committee. Ziemiałkowski was a remarkable figure, although his personality and character traits did not always win over supporters. Various sources show how controversial his behavior, political activity, and finally he himself were.

His contemporaries formed various opinions on him. Stanisław Koźmian wrote: "he was the first of us to proclaim the constitutional era."¹¹⁶⁶ Later, he and Agenor Gołuchowski the father were one of the promoters of utilitarian policy. Chłędowski noted in his journals that he always defended "the interest of practical politics,"¹¹⁶⁷ and that "the Cracow faction, even the Stańczycy, supported him persistently and not without sacrifice."¹¹⁶⁸ He also contributed to forming a political faction in the Imperial Council known as the mamelukes.

1164 See: F. Ziemiałkowski, *Pamiętniki*, I, (Kraków, 1904); Z. Fras, F. Ziemiałkowski, (1817–1900). *Biografia polityczna* (Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków, 1991); K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, I, (Kraków, 1957), p. 174.; S. Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego w wiedeńskiej Radzie Państwa*, (Kraków, 1879), p. 230.

1165 According to the press articles, the first meeting of the Polish Club, when the authorities were elected, took place on May 19, 1867. According to the first saved protocol from May 21, Ziemiałkowski was already chairman at that time. It may be presumed that the Club members elected him on May 19 or 20, "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego z dnia 21 maja 1867r.," *Protokoły Koła Polskiego*. . . , p. 49.

1166 Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego*. . . , pp. 225–226.

1167 F. Ziemiałkowski claimed that "having two alternatives: either to take part in the work of political organization which is not in accordance with our beliefs. . . or to refrain from any work, we chose the former, as it was lesser evil." The excerpt is taken from F. Ziemiałkowski's parliamentary speech given in 1867 in a debate over the law on State representation, K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, I, (Wrocław 1951), p. 175.

1168 Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego*. . . , p. 230.

Ziemiałkowski's presidency was relatively short. Nevertheless, he was extremely active, also as a deputy, and participated in works of several parliamentary committees; he was also the author of many parliamentary proposals. As president of the Polish Club, he performed various functions in the House. In May 1867, he was appointed vice president of the House of Deputies by the Emperor and functioned as a member of the Constitutional Committee occupied with revision of the Basic Law. He worked on preparing the December Constitution. As a member of the first Austro-Hungarian committee, he participated in preparing the conditions for the settlement between the two states of the Monarchy. He was also elected to the Committee on Budgets of the Delegation of the Austro-Hungarian common governments.¹¹⁶⁹ Zieiałkowski was also engaged in implementing the resolution of the Galician Diet conducted by the Club in the years 1868–73. During the first resolution campaign, he advocated submitting a resolution in the form of a motion of the Galician Diet instead of a parliamentary motion.¹¹⁷⁰ Finally, it is worth quoting Koźmian's words: "Highly political sense and temperament, great abilities, flexibility, diligence, efficiency, dexterity and even cunning, desire for meaning – all these prime advantages. . . helped him achieve significant and undeniable merits."¹¹⁷¹

On October 23, 1868, Kazimierz Grocholski took over the chair of the Club.¹¹⁷² From that moment until 1907, the head of the Polish Club was a representative of the group with the most reactive views.

As the leader of the conservative group of East Galician landowners, the Podolacy, Grocholski opposed the socioeconomic reforms proposed, among others, by the Cracow conservatives. He was also against federalism, although he strongly advocated for Galicia to achieve legal and state independence. Grocholski supported separating Galicia; he was a referee and the "father" of the resolution from 1868. The national autonomy, handed over to the Poles, would create the possibility to rule the province, and one of the aims of the autonomous policy would be to marginalize the Ukrainian people. The opposing position of the Polish deputies in the Diet and the Imperial Council, who were disappointed

1169 Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego*. . . , pp. 233–234.

1170 As he wrote: "members of the Club demanded that the resolution was proposed the House as the 'motion of the Galician deputies'. I firmly resisted, justifying that the Imperial Council will have more respect toward the 'Diet's motion' than the 'deputies' motion,' which they may simply ignore." The Club accepted the idea, Ziemiałkowski, *Pamiętniki*, I, p. 38.

1171 Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego*. . . , p. 236.

1172 Kieniewicz, "Grocholski Kazimierz," p. 585.

with the outcome of the settlement with the Monarchy, created the foundation for Grocholski to become the first president of the Polish Club, and soon after, in 1871, also the first minister for Galicia.

The president of the Club did not stand out in any particular way, nor did he have any parliamentary experience, unlike several members of the Club. Although, his personality ensured maintaining the anti-Ukrainian course of politics: “of mediocre abilities, narrow-minded, obstinate in the noble Podolian traditions.”¹¹⁷³ Irena Pannenkowa claimed that “he lacked the creative qualities of Smolka, such as the brightness and flexibility of Zyplikiewicz or Ziemiałkowski.” On the other hand, Pannenkowa admitted that Grocholski was a sincere and reliable man; Stanisław Koźmian shared this opinion, writing about the “crystal clear personality” of Grocholski.¹¹⁷⁴ Koźmian wrote very fondly of him: “Valued and regarded in his country, indispensable in the Club, respected in the court, in the House surrounded by respect. . . he gained a somewhat exceptional position,” and then: “sometimes he lacks the words in German, although prepared, he speaks well. . . He belongs to those lucky men to whom others in the House listen. Everyone pays attention to what he says because he always speaks on behalf of Cisleithania and its 5-million population.”¹¹⁷⁵

Grocholski imposed a conservative character on the Club and improved its efficiency. The internal cohesion of the Club was possible not only because of the adopted principle of solidarity but also of its composition. During Grocholski's presidency, the Club was composed in majority of the deputies recruited from the East Galician nobility that: “did not overthink, did not argue, only obeyed the command.”¹¹⁷⁶ This fact also fostered Grocholski himself, whose personality and authority among the Podolian nobility allowed him to carry out the political tactics and agenda. Undoubtedly, one of the characteristic traits of the president was his assertiveness, if not imperiousness: “he had his opinion and the others had to nod in agreement.”¹¹⁷⁷ Leon Biliński, a longstanding member of the Club and eventually its president, recalled Grocholski in such way: “relations within the Club under the heavy hand of Grocholski were ideal for the public cause, although for individuals – especially the younger ones – they were

1173 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, II, p. 60.

1174 Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego*. . . , p. 7; Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z*. . . , p. 93.

1175 Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego*. . . , pp. 9–10.

1176 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, II, p. 60.

1177 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, II, pp. 60–61.

unfortunate. . . According to the principles of Grocholski's rule, a young deputy should listen passively until the president appointed him to work.¹¹⁷⁸

For many years of his presidency, he was very popular among the deputies. For instance, in the election for the president of the club, which were held with each new session of the Imperial Council, he won forty-one supporting votes and his rivals, i.e., Czartoryski – eight, Smarzewski – three and Baum – one vote.¹¹⁷⁹

Due to tragic family events, in 1867, he did not sit in the Imperial Council, but he returned there the next year.¹¹⁸⁰ Grocholski was the personality of the Club and a widely respected politician, but also an extremely active deputy. He sat in several Diet Committees, including the *komisja adresowa* (*Address Committee*) and *komisja rezolucyjna* (*Resolution Committee*). In 1871, he became the first minister for Galicia. This nomination was very favorably received in the province: “the general respect that accompanied him everywhere, and made him pleasantly welcomed as minister for Galicia even in Vienna.”¹¹⁸¹ After his resignation, in 1873, he was re-elected to the Austrian Parliament and from there five times to the common delegations. Moreover, Grocholski participated in the works on renewing the settlement with Hungary.¹¹⁸² For his merits, he received the title of a *Hofrat* (Court Councilor), one of the most prestigious titles of honor given by the Monarch.¹¹⁸³ In October 1888, he gave his last speech in Parliament. He died suddenly on December 10, in Opatija, where he was in treatment numerous times.¹¹⁸⁴ Kazimierz Chłędowski wrote that: “he grew into a true power in the Austrian Parliament,” also stressing that he owed it exclusively to himself, mainly to his persistence and reliability.¹¹⁸⁵

1178 Leon Biliński mentioned that when he came to Vienna as a deputy and joined the Polish Club, he found himself in a modest role of a trainee. It was not adequate for him, as he was associated with the Academy of Learning as an active member and its rector, Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, I, pp. 32, 37.

1179 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 1 z 7 października 1879r.,” *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu* (BCz), MS 1241, f. 486.

1180 Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego*. . . , p. 6.

1181 Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego*. . . , p. 8.

1182 Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego*. . . , p. 9.

1183 Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej 1864–1914, z przedmową L. Wasilewskiego*, (Warszawa, 1933), p. 131.

1184 “Teki Dworzaczka. Materiały historyczno-genealogiczne do dziejów szlachty wielkopolskiej XV-XX wieku,” *Dziennik Poznański*, 286/1888, (Kórnik-Poznań, Biblioteka Kórnicka PAN: 2004), http://teki.bk.pan.poznan.pl/index_regesty.html; S. Kieniewicz, “Grocholski Kazimierz,” p. 586.

1185 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, II, p. 60.

The preservative character and political orientation of the Polish Club were maintained by its next president, Apolinary Jaworski.¹¹⁸⁶ Even in the way he presented himself on the forum of the House, he was similar to the previous president. Both of them preferred the noble type of customs and fashion. Jaworski arrived at the Council sessions wearing a frock coat.¹¹⁸⁷ He was elected president in 1888, although he held the function from 1882. After Grocholski left, he actively chaired the Club until 1900, and formally until 1904.

After introducing direct elections to the Imperial Council in 1873, he gained a significant position in the Parliament. He was a longstanding vice president of the Club and Grocholski's trusted and close associate. From 1882, he replaced him, and on December 12, 1888, he formally took over as president of the Club. His popularity among the deputies was reflected during the election for president in 1891, when they elected Jaworski president of the Club by acclamation. After the voting, he thanked the deputies for their trust and announced that this choice represented the country's and Club's responsibility for the fate of Poles in the Monarchy.¹¹⁸⁸ Undoubtedly, Jaworski's political career reached its peak when he was appointed national minister on November 12, 1893.¹¹⁸⁹

As a result, the chair in the Club was taken over by Atanazy Benoe.¹¹⁹⁰ Valued and respected by the members of the Club, he was initially elected vice president and then president of the Club. Shortly afterward, on March 9, 1894 in Vienna, he died. The next president did not belong to the faction of the Podolacy, but was associated with a group of East Galician politicians of moderate views. His presidency was a short break in the period when the lead of the Club was in the hands of the Podolacy.

Benoe's successor was Filip Zaleski, president until October 2, 1896, when he offered his resignation from the post to the vice president Adam Jędrzejowicz.¹¹⁹¹ Zaleski justified the decision by his deteriorating health – partial loss of hearing.¹¹⁹² Waldemar Łazuga claimed that it was not just an excuse. According

1186 J. Buszko, "Jaworski Apolinary Jakub," *PSB*, vol. 11 (1964–1965), p. 104.

1187 Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 132.

1188 "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 1 z 7 marca 1891r.," *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu* (BCz), MS. 1241, f. 951.

1189 J. Buszko, "Jaworski Apolinary Jakub," *PSB*, vol. 11 (1964–1965), p. 104.

1190 L. Strojek, "M. Friedberg, Benoe Atanazy," *PSB*, vol. 1 (1935), p. 437.

1191 Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 191.

1192 Chołędowski agrees with this fact and writes: "Behind Jaworski sat Filip Zaleski and the situation was rather complex, as one is deaf in the right ear and the other in the left." At the same time, in his opinion, Zaleski was not satisfied with his function in the Club: "the Club's meetings bored him extremely, he often did not know what was

to Zaleski's letter from November 17, 1886, he was not convinced with the validity of his work in the Club.¹¹⁹³

Zaleski's low activity in the Polish Club is also emphasized. It seems that it may either be the result of his reluctance to lead the Club or a feature of his character. Compared to Zaleski's earlier activity, when he climbed up the administrative career ladder, we may assume that he was a self-seeking man, and since working in the club did not bring him any advantages, he was not engaged in it. He owed the promotion to his qualities: "not brilliant, but dexterous and flexible, he owed his advancement to his loyalism."¹¹⁹⁴

Jaworski was reappointed president in fall 1896: "Zaleski, who was soft and going deaf, was replaced by Apolinary Jaworski – not young but still full of energy."¹¹⁹⁵ During the three-year period, when the Club technically remained without a leader, changes in its functioning occurred. First of all, relations in the Club relaxed and the deputies did not respect the rules of the Club as they did before. The lack of discipline became an additional problem for the already internally quarreled Club. A similar situation emerged within the Club after Jaworski's death on October 24, 1904.

According to the characteristic presented by Koźmian, Jaworski was not an outstanding figure: "people do not pay attention to a man who speaks little and thinks least of the impression he may give the audience."¹¹⁹⁶ This was not entirely true. Jaworski's outfit alone captured interest. His other qualities also attracted attention. He was a cheerful, friendly and smiling man. Moreover, he was often absent-minded, not paying attention to what was happening around him: "he lived only in his Polish Club."¹¹⁹⁷

He combined his interests with his parliamentary duties, so he usually took part in committees occupied with economic affairs. He eagerly participated in discussions on the budget. When Minister of Finance Julian Dunajewski

discussed and only thought of how to relieve himself of this burden that does not offer anything to him," Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, II. . . , pp. 130, 351.

1193 Zaleski wrote: "I am glad that I abandoned the presidium of the Club, as in these days and circumstances, I would encounter more unpleasantness and worries than satisfaction," Łazuga, "Rządy Polskie" w Austrii. . . , p. 227.

1194 Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*. . . , p. 325.

1195 Łazuga, "Rządy polskie" w Austrii. . . , p. 141.

1196 Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego*. . . , p. 76.

1197 Chłędowski wrote: "At first, Jaworski dressed in a very untidy way; he wore some ancient black and white checkered trousers, his ties went up to his ears, his hat had traces of many storms," Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, II, pp. 101–102, 128.

managed to balance the budget with his fiscal policy, the president, speaking on behalf of the Club, stressed the importance of this fact for the country and, foremost, for all the nations of the Monarchy.¹¹⁹⁸

After the announcement of the regulations on language by the government of K. Badeni, the political crisis in the country started. The Czech-German conflict intensified, and, in consequence, work of the Parliament was virtually impossible. Jaworski decided then to put an end to the obstruction and paralysis of the House of Representatives at its session on June 2, by closing the debate after 15 minutes. Simultaneously, the session of the Imperial Council was postponed until fall. Thus, despite the personal animosities between the Prime Minister and the president of the Club, Jaworski prioritized Polish interests over interpersonal conflicts.

Whether it was defending Dunajewski, although he did not agree with all of his moves, or undertaking negotiations between the Czech and the German side in order to mitigate the tension and start a normal workflow in the Parliament, one could say that Jaworski: “has a pithy political intuition, which will always tell him where a significant Polish interest is and how to successfully defend it at a given moment.”¹¹⁹⁹ Koźmian’s stand partly contradicts the opinion of the author of Jaworski’s biographical note, Józef Buszko, who wrote: “His austrophilic policy, strongly criticized even by the Galician press. . . undermined his political position.” Nevertheless, he admitted that Jaworski could negotiate a number of beneficial economic and fiscal concessions for Galicia, especially for the landowners and bourgeoisie.¹²⁰⁰

During his presidency, the Club’s policy did not change. It continued to be pro-Austrian and compromising, agreeing with the order introduced by the first president. It stayed like this in the following years, when the chair of the Club belonged to the representatives of the faction of the Podolacy, Wojciech Dzieduszycki and Dawid Abrahamowicz, although the policy partially evolved.

Before W. Dzieduszycki¹²⁰¹ became president of the Club, he already had a good reputation among other deputies: “endowed with undeniable abilities and extensive knowledge, familiar with the practice of parliamentary life, and highly valued for his abilities, the certainty of character and consistency” of beliefs.¹²⁰²

1198 Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 134.

1199 Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego*. . . , p. 78.

1200 J. Buszko, “Jaworski Apolinary Jakub,” *PSB*, vol. 11, (1964–1965), pp. 104–105.

1201 S. Kieniewicz, “Dzieduszycki Wojciech,” *PSB*, vol. 6, (1948), p. 126.

1202 Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego*. . . , p. 54.

In the first period of Dzieduszycki's parliamentary activity, from 1879 to 1885, it was hardly ever that president Grocholski allowed him to speak on the forum of the Council. Only after his death did Dzieduszycki gain the possibility to be more active in the Parliament. In the last years of the nineteenth century, he gradually gained influence and position in the Club, and in 1900 he became vice president of the Club, and president in 1904.¹²⁰³ In this period (years 1900–04), he was the active president of the club, as his predecessor Jaworski was unable to preside over the Polish deputies in the Council due to his elderly age and poor health.

Dzieduszycki was elected president of the Polish Club on September 17 and resigned on June 2, 1906, due to his nomination for national minister. He stepped down shortly afterward, on November 20, 1907, due to the government's failure to obey the principle of consulting the decisions concerning Ukraine with the Polish side. After returning to the Parliament, he took over the post of vice president in the Polish Club.¹²⁰⁴ He was involved in parliamentary and political activities until his death.

Dzieduszycki differed slightly from the standard idea of members of the nobility faction from East Galicia: "a Podolian type of conservative, Wojciech Dzieduszycki gave direction to his whole political surroundings and dominated it with a broad approach toward the Polish cause and his patriotism, far from Podolian particularism."¹²⁰⁵ The confirmation that Dzieduszycki was not a reactionary politician are the words of Chłędowski, Dzieduszycki's political adversary and supporter of utilitarian politics: "and today only people like Wojciech Dzieduszycki think of extending the autonomy sufficient for our needs to the disadvantage of commonality with the country!"¹²⁰⁶ Herman Lieberman's opinion proves that he was a politician of moderate views, i.e., accepting the autonomy of the province: "he did not understand and did not want to understand the spirit of the new era and people's cries for equality and civil rights, he despised and hated the plebeian crowd which, through the mouth of their tribunals, so violently struggled to participate in the public life and to influence the state. Poland for him was nothing but nobility and gentry."¹²⁰⁷

1203 S. Kieniewicz, "Dzieduszycki Wojciech," *PSB*, vol. 6 (1948), p. 126.; in his journals, Bobrzyński wrote that Dzieduszycki was vice president of the Club also in the years 1895–1900, M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników, oprac. A. Galos*, (Oss. 1957), p. 116.

1204 S. Kieniewicz, "Dzieduszycki Wojciech," *PSB*, vol. 6 (1948), p. 127.

1205 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , p. 142.

1206 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, I, p. 175.

1207 Lieberman, *Pamiętniki*. . . , p. 126.

Dzieduszycki, perhaps due to his non-conformism, should not be considered a legal member of the Podolacy faction. He was not satisfied with Grocholski's model of government, which required unconditional obedience from the deputies. Nor was he a supporter of loyalism in the form promoted by Grocholski, among others. However, in 1905, he decided not to support the project of the universal election, acting together with the conservatives and arguing with a socialist, Ignacy Daszyński. As the initiator and founder of his centrist faction in the Galician Diet, known as *Ateńczycy* (*Athenians*), he opposed the policy of extreme compliance with the Habsburg Monarchy. He and his supporters never held the majority in the Diet. Nevertheless, they exerted political influence on the conservatives, whose aim was to assert independence from Vienna.¹²⁰⁸

Dzieduszycki was an extraordinarily colorful figure. Not only was he an activist and an engaged politician, but he was also occupied with publicity, essays, lyric, novel-writing, philosophy, psychology, pedagogy, art history, or archeology. He was interested in spiritualism, as well. He was widely known and valued for being the life of the parties, mainly due to his unique sense of humor.¹²⁰⁹

While evaluating Dzieduszycki's activity in the Parliament, some wrote that "in discussions and works, it is difficult to be more sober, attentive and focused. . . He speaks well, always clearly and logically, sometimes very lively and eloquently. . . Intensive during discussions, he has a lively temperament. . . he tactfully eludes everything that could cause confusion and breakout."¹²¹⁰ Lieberman, however, questioned his predispositions to exercise the function of president of the club: "He was not one of those who gave direction to the policy of the Polish Club, because, despite his brilliant intellect, he was devoid of political instinct."¹²¹¹ Michał Bobrzyński, who wrote about him after his death, was of a different opinion: "There was no candidate who could really replace him."¹²¹²

Dawid Abrahamowicz¹²¹³ was the last of the East Galician conservatives to serve as president of the Polish Club. He presided over the youngest generation of the members of the Podolacy faction. Lieberman claimed that: "Politically,

1208 S. Kieniewicz, "Dzieduszycki Wojciech," *PSB*, vol. 6, (1948), pp. 126–127.

1209 K. K. Daszyk, *Osobliwy Podolak. W kręgu myśli historyzoficznej i społeczno-politycznej Wojciecha hr. Dzieduszyckiego*, (Kraków, 1993), p. 12.

1210 Koźmian, *Reprezentacja kraju naszego. . .*, pp. 52–53.

1211 Lieberman, *Pamiętniki. . .*, p. 126.

1212 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników. . .*, p. 142, Sz., "Śmierć Ateńczyka," *Nowa Reforma*, vol. 137 (1909), p. 2.

1213 S. Starzyński, "Abrahamowicz Dawid," *PSB*, vol. 1 (1935), pp. 9–10; Lieberman, *Pamiętniki. . .*, p. 124.

he was, what we call, an extreme reactionist. He did not moderate his extremely reactionary views but presented them straightforwardly, strongly emphasizing them. While listening to him, one had the impression he is the aggressive nature.”¹²¹⁴ His conservative views manifested in the negative attitude toward concessions to Ukrainians, i.e., in terms of the electoral reform to the Galician Diet.

In the fall of 1897, during the governmental crisis and the prolonging obstruction in the Imperial Council, Abrahamowicz, chairman of the House of Representatives, took the initiative to counter the opposition preventing the Deputies from performing their parliamentary duties. Meanwhile, in the Club, more voices were raised for withdrawing support for Badeni and Abrahamowicz to calm down the emotions in the House and on the streets of Vienna.¹²¹⁵

Abrahamowicz was perceived as an “agreeable, hardworking, skillful organizer.”¹²¹⁶ Chłędowski recalled that “he was unarguably one of the most gifted members of the Polish Club and one of the most brilliant political plotters.”¹²¹⁷ The author of Abrahamowicz’s biographical note, Stanisław Starzyński, emphasized his tactical abilities and political intuition, which made him an effective leader of the majority of the Diet and the Polish Club. He often occurred as *spiritus movens*. Moreover, he possessed the traits typical for skilled Parliamentary speakers: “as an English debater, far from oratory and literature, he was very lively and sharp, and the unusual mask of his face intensified the effect of his speeches.”¹²¹⁸

In the last years of Abrahamowicz’s presidential term, changes were introduced in the electoral code. After implementing the universal election in 1907, Vienna’s influence on the Galicia’s internal affairs increased. The Polish Club could not prevent it, even though Prime Minister Wladimir Beck assured the Polish deputies that no decisions concerning the Ukrainian cause would be made without their approval. Abrahamowicz demanded this guarantee during the meeting of the minister for Galicia, vice presidents of the Club with the Prime Minister: “he demanded from the president that no actions concerning the Ruthenians are undertaken outside of the Club. The president agreed to this.” At the same time, he informed that he did not intend to take a stand on the Polish-Ukrainian affair,

1214 Lieberman, *Pamiętniki*. . . , p. 124.

1215 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, II, p. 214.

1216 Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*. . . , p. 426.

1217 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, II, p. 78.

1218 S. Starzyński, “Abrahamowicz Dawid”, *PSB*, vol. 1 (1935), p. 10.

but only to mediate the negotiations between the parties.¹²¹⁹ The Polish side, on the other hand, was categorical about the Ukrainian question: “The Ruthenians must understand that the government without us cannot do anything for them. There is only one condition – we must solve the Ruthenian issue.”¹²²⁰ The government, despite the assurances, conducted a double-sided political game.

These events caused reshufflings on the critical posts of Poles in Austria. Abrahamowicz replaced the national minister Wojciech Dzierduszycki, who was opposed by national democrats.¹²²¹ Both of them were criticized by the national democratic press.¹²²² Abrahamowicz motivated his resignation as president of the Club with: “the awareness of the change that occurred in the relations within the Club as a result of the reform of suffrage and the previous election to the House of Representatives”; he was also proposed the post of national minister.

The direction of politics concerning the Ukrainian cause pursued by Abrahamowicz and the Club was continued by Stanisław Głąbiński, who took over the chair of the Club after the national democrats won in the election in 1907.

Apart from the Podolacy, a large group of presidents belonged to the National-Democratic Party or were its supporters. The first of them was the aforementioned S. Głąbiński. In fact, in the years 1902–07, he was the only politician in the Polish Club from the faction of national democrats. He took over the chair when the party gained a significant advantage over the conservatives.¹²²³ The

1219 “Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 17 października 1907r.,” *Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa*. . . , BJ TB, MS. 8109 III, f. 8.

1220 “Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 17 października 1907r.,” *Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa*. . . , BJ TB, MS. 8109 III, f. 12.

1221 Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , pp. 86–87; Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, I, p. 157; J. Buszko, *Sejmowa reforma wyborcza w Galicji 1905–1914*, (Warszawa, 1956), p. 101.

1222 “Sytuacja w Kole Polskim,” *Nowa Reforma*, vol. 503 (1907), p. 1; “Z powodu ustępstw Rusinom,” *Słowo Polskie*, vol. 515, (1907), p. 1; “Koncesje ruskie,” *Słowo Polskie*, vol. 519, (1907), p. 1.

1223 According to the statute of the Polish Club, a representative of a faction that achieved the highest result in the elections was appointed president. In 1907, it should have been a popular, as they obtained a total of seventeen mandates, while the national democrats – one less. However, as a result of the agreements within the Club, the function was passed to Głąbiński. The author considers it the right decision, taking into advantage the lack of cohesion of programs among the popular factions. Ignacy Daszyński was content with that decision: “The populars actually deserved the presidium, but the efforts of the nobility and the national democrats protected the Club from this *shame*,” Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*. . . , II, p. 11.

beginnings of Głębiński's political career dates back to the earlier period when he actively began to participate in the works of the organizations and factions under the protectorate of the national democracy. He was also the first president of the National-Democratic Party.

Głębiński¹²²⁴ was elected president of the Polish Club on November 12, 1907. Forty-three out of forty-nine present deputies voted in favor of his candidature.¹²²⁵ The conservatives were against him because they lost a significant influence on the activity of the Club. However, later events proved that the first national-democratic president did not intend to abandon the traditional pro-Austrian Polish policy in Vienna.

In 1902, Głębiński claimed that the Polish Club was not an appropriate representative of the Polish interests, and he spoke similarly of the Austrian Parliament. Along with these views, he raised the issue of Galicia's economic independence and broad national and administrative autonomy. Only under such conditions could the lower social groups freely develop. This idea met with a negative response of the conservatives, democrats, but also populars and socialists. In September 1903, Głębiński put forward similar demands, adding to them that the Club shall defend parliamentarism and constitutional government. At that time, in the face of the constant crisis in the Council caused by the regulations on language for Germans and Czechs, the Monarchy was governed using the famous Article 14 from the Constitution, i.e., the Emperor's regulations.¹²²⁶ It seems that the weakened Polish Club with about twenty members was unable to prevent either the Parliamentary obstruction or the Czech-German conflict. Therefore, Głębiński's demand should be considered in terms of a political fight aimed at discrediting the Polish Club, especially conservative politicians.

The Polish Club under the lead of Głębiński did not significantly change its attitude toward the Austrian government. Before Głębiński began his work in the Club, there was no certainty as to the direction the policy would take with Głębiński as president. L. Biliński's in his journals includes information that the

1224 A. Konieczny, "Głębiński Stanisław," in: *Polacy w historii i kulturze krajów Europy Zachodniej. Słownik biograficzny*, ed. K. Kwaśniewski, L. Trzeciakowski (Poznań 1981), p. 130; A. Galos, "Głębiński Stanisław," *PSB*, vol. 8, (1959–1960) pp. 102 ff. The author of the memoirs of S. Głębiński, his son, also Stanisław, based on materials he had collected, informs that he died "with symptoms of cardiac arrest" after long sickness in the NKVD prison in Charkow, on August 14, 1941, at 2:00 pm, S. Głębiński, *W cieniu ojca*, (Warszawa 2001), pp. 132–133.

1225 Wątor, *Działalność Stronnictwa Demokratyczno-Narodowego*. . . , p. 96.

1226 Wątor, *Działalność Stronnictwa Demokratyczno-Narodowego*. . . , pp. 31, 33–34.

Emperor was to express his mistrust toward the new president.¹²²⁷ However, given the activity of the Club of that period, it does not seem that the remark has any practical justification, especially as the Club did not change the direction of the Polish policy. Moreover, the attitude of the president himself was also important: “he exaggerated the symptoms of loyalty toward Austria.”¹²²⁸ We need to admit that Głąbiński’s proceedings were justified. His loyalist attitude resulted from higher motives than only his eagerness to please the Monarch. It was just a means to achieve the goal of increasing the political significance of the Polish society in Galicia and defending it against the Ukrainian nationalism. Indirectly, it also resulted from the world view of national democracy.¹²²⁹

However, the policy of Głąbiński as president of the Club in the years 1907–1911 was not a straight continuation of the policy of his predecessors. Indeed, it was contained in four fundamental points, i.e., respecting the principle of loyalty toward the Hapsburg Monarchy, extending national autonomy, aiming to conclude the settlement with the Ruthenians, and introducing the populars to the Club. National ideology and his own socioeconomic views also had to be reflected in his political agenda. According to it, the issues of national and economic autonomy of the Poles in Galicia were emphasized more strongly.

It also seems that Głąbiński sometimes found himself in ambiguous situations, i.e., as a national democrat, he could not support the idea of the Slavic Union against Germany but had to defend the interests and position of the Polish Club in the Imperial Council. The Polish Club often appeared in the House of Representatives together with moderate German factions.

The introduction of new program guidelines encountered some difficulties, as no other National Democrat belonged to the presidium of the Polish Club. At that time, vice presidents were Wojciech Dzieduszycki and Paweł Stwiertnia.¹²³⁰

1227 The candidature of Głąbiński for the president of the Club was put forward by Biliński: “I strongly encouraged Głąbiński’s candidature.” However, the Emperor did not fully consider it to be the right idea, especially that Głąbiński was the leader of *wszepolacy* (*All-Poles*). The Monarch doubted if the new president would be able to continue the pro-Austrian policy. Only after Głąbiński offered allegiance, the Emperor approved his candidature, L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, I, p. 158.

1228 The author of this quote was Michał Bobrzyński. We may assume that Głąbiński’s attitude must have been particularly flagrant, since it was a Cracow conservative who pointed it out, Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiątek*. . . , p. 136.

1229 Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , pp. 46–49.

1230 Wątor, *Działalność Stronnictwa Demokratyczno-Narodowego*. . . , p. 96.

The national ministry was led by Dawid Abrahamowicz, and the Viceregency – by Andrzej of Potocki coat of arms until 1908, and then by Michał Bobrzyński.

The Club continued to demand the respect for the deserved right to decide on the national issues of the country, so it did not accept the settlement of the government with Ukrainians, although at the same time, it avoided open conflict with the Council of Ministers.¹²³¹ Only Głębiński addressed the Imperial Council, reserving the right for the national minister to decide together with the Polish deputies and the government on granting concessions to the Ukrainian side. He also spoke about this during the meeting of the Club on October 29, proposing that Prime Minister W. Beck formally asserts in the House that he would not award any concessions to Ukrainians without the Club's approval.¹²³² The president of the Club obtained Prime Minister's assurance that the government would communicate with the Polish deputies on the Ukrainian issue, both on awarding national concessions to Ukrainians and on ongoing negotiations.¹²³³

During his presidency, Głębiński prepared the principles of cooperation with the Austrian government, which applied even after his resignation. The set of rules consisted of obligations which were supposed to enable cooperation between the Polish Club and the subsequent cabinets. The most important of them were: firstly, for the government to support the activity of the Club and the national Diet in terms of extending the national autonomy and Polish language rights, so that the electoral reform could be implemented and that Polish was introduced into the gendarmerie, prosecutor's office, prisons and fiscal accounting; secondly, for the government to make decisions concerning the Ukrainian cause together or in accordance with the Polish politicians, especially with the president of the Club, without whose approval no concessions to Ruthenians could be granted and who should be informed of all Ukrainian claims, thirdly, to implement the canal reform of 1901, fourthly, to pass the law on building local railway in Galicia, fifthly, to decentralize the supplies for state

1231 During the meeting of the Club on October, 29, 1907, the deputies adopted a law, according to which no decisions concerning awarding national concessions to the Ukrainians should be made without the Club's approval. They reserved the Polish character of the University of Lviv, "Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 29 X 1907," *Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa. . .*, BJ TB, MS. 8109 III, f. 29.

1232 "Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 29 X 1907," *Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa. . .*, BJ TB, MS. 8109 III, f. 20.

1233 Buszko, *Sejmowa reforma wyborcza. . .*, p. 101.

offices and companies, but also to accept the demands and economic needs of Galicia.¹²³⁴

During the presidency of Głąbiński, another attempt at settlement was made in the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations. Leon Biliński, then governor of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, initiated contacts and started negotiations between Poland and Ukraine. He contacted the president of the Ukrainian club in the Imperial Council. Głąbiński also participated in the talks, though he was skeptical about Biliński's idea: "he deludes himself into hoping that the Ruthenians would really accept a similar project; he does not take into account with their main agenda to divide the country and overtake East Galicia."¹²³⁵ Later events proved the president of the Polish Club to be absolutely right.

Despite that, neither the president nor the Club opposed the action of Biliński, who mentioned that: "my good relationship with the new president of the Club made it easier to implement the agreement of the Club with Ruthenians. . . President Głąbiński approved my proposition to invite deputies Kostio Lewicki and Wasilko to discuss the settlement." The debate took place in the summer, in Biliński's office in the Austro-Hungarian Bank, and was chaired by Głąbiński. It lasted from July to September and ended with preparing a project of concessions that the Polish side could grant to Ruthenians. On the other hand, the Ukrainian side made a list of the demanded postulates. The two documents, "the proof of great patriotic compliance on both sides," were to become the basis for discussion both in the Polish Club and in the Russian club. Biliński wrote that the Polish Club contributed to the failure of the project, although not because of the lack of will to reach an agreement with Ukrainians, but because Biliński was supposed to patronize it.¹²³⁶

In order to reach the settlement, Biliński prepared the preliminary draft of the agreement. In Galicia, the interest in the negotiations was large, but their content was kept secret: "The content of the initiated negotiations between Poles and Ruthenians is so far unknown. It is only known that they are carried out on behalf of the government by minister Biliński, and on behalf of the Polish Club – by its president Stanisław Głąbiński, but also by Jan Stapiński on his own behalf, self-authorized and unasked. . . It is difficult to predict whether and what will be the outcome of the negotiations." Further: "the compromise may in no way be

1234 Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , pp. 90, 91.

1235 J. Gruchała, *Rząd austriacki i polskie stronnictwa polityczne wobec kwestii ukraińskiej (1890–1914)* (Wrocław 1982), p. 84.

1236 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, I, pp. 158–159.

reached at the cost of reducing the rights and holdings of the Polish society, it cannot equal a one-sided concession at the expense of Poles.”¹²³⁷ Biliński’s journals include *Schemat wyników konferencji polsko-ruskiej* (*Scheme of the outcomes of the Polish-Russian conference*), and its results were presented in ten points consisting of concrete proposed concessions.¹²³⁸ The Ukrainian side did not accept this project. Apart from the substantive reasons, the Ukrainians, knowing the plans of the Viennese government, still counted on larger concessions than those offered by the Poles.¹²³⁹ After all, president Głąbiński would have a much more difficult

1237 A. Sadzewicz, “Przegląd spraw polskich,” *PN*, vol. 4, no. 7 (1909), p. 110, 112. The expectations concerning the mutuality of concessions and obligations were presented in the periodical *Przegląd Narodowy* when the negotiations with the Ukrainians began in 1908: “Public opinion already firmly objects to understanding the Polish-Ruthenian *compromise* as one-sided concessions in favor of the Ruthenians and at the expense of the Poles. . . [people] express sincere eagerness to achieve the agreement with Ruthenians, because the current fight paralyzes the cultural and economic development of the country, although [they] demand sustainable assurances. . . and declarations that the possible pacts will not be brutally stepped on by Ruthenians the next day after forming them,” A. Sadzewicz, “Przegląd spraw polskich,” *PN*, vol. 2, no. 8 (1908), p. 233.

1238 They concerned: firstly, increasing the number of posts in the national administration office for Ukrainians and appointing higher Ukrainian administrative to the Ministry for Galicia, secondly, establishing the draft law on the University of Lviv, according to which it would maintain its Polish character and systematically increase the number of Russian institutes, and creating the Ukrainian university when a proper academic staff would be formed, thirdly, raising the government subsidy for the Ukrainians, fourthly, changing the voting system to the national Diet and implementing the national cadaster, under the condition of maintaining the Polish ownership in East Galicia, fifthly, developing Ukrainian education, but also cultural and educational institutions, sixthly, obliging the Ruthenian club to accept the political and administrative unity of Galicia, seventhly, waiving the Ukrainians from politics and radical activities, eighthly, both sides pledging to conduct common policy in the Imperial Council, ninthly, deciding to achieve the approval of the Polish and Ukrainian national-democratic factions for the program of the settlement, and tenthly, announcing both sides to accept the resolutions above as an indivisible whole, which after passing should be implemented by both sides at the same time, Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, I, pp. 159–165.

1239 Biliński wrote: “How much political worry we would have avoided in the future, if only we had reached the settlement with Ruthenians! How much easier our attitude toward them would have been during the war! And who knows if the innocent blood shed in 1918/19 by our unfortunate brothers in Lviv was not the consequence of our mistake from 1908, when the ‘Ukrainians’ had not felt empowered and the

task to reach the settlement with the Ukrainians, partly due to the assassination of the Viceroy. Nevertheless, there was a clear need or even necessity to regulate mutual relations, which was emphasized by the minister for Galicia. Władysław Dułęba wrote to Bobrzyński: “After all, from time to time we should do something for Ruthenians, especially when it comes down to small things.”¹²⁴⁰

Internal discrepancies in the Club, attacks on Głąbiński and propaganda campaign against National Democracy caused that the national democrats were unable to form a majority in the Club. The issue of constructing canals aggravated the situation. Members of the Club and its president disagreed in this matter. Głąbiński was against implementing the reform of 1901 and warned the opposition against the governmental draft budget. The support of the Club determined whether the cabinet would be demised, and did not like such a solution. Differences in opinions led to the crisis in the government and the Club. Faced with the impossibility of further cooperation, Głąbiński searched for a possibility to form a majority in the Club, but his efforts did not bring the expected results. It is impossible to predict how the crisis would finish because, on January 9, 1911, the president was nominated for the minister of railways, which required his resignation from the post of president of the Polish Club.¹²⁴¹ He was the head of the Ministry until June 24.¹²⁴²

It seems that in these situations, appointing a president of the Club with clearly defined political views would only worsen the situation among the Polish deputies. There was a high probability that the candidature of Stanisław Łazarski¹²⁴³

Austrian bureaucracy and military had not strengthened their role to almost prior in the country!” Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, I, p. 165.

1240 “List Władysława Dułęby do Michała Bobrzyńskiego z 29 czerwca 1909r.,” *TB BJ*, MS. 8091 III, f. 307.

1241 According to *Polski Słownik Biograficzny (Polish Biographical Dictionary)*, Głąbiński was president of the Polish Club from July 16, 1911. It is controversial information, as the next president was chosen on January 18 or 19, 1911. Moreover, at that time he already was Minister of Railways, A. Galos, “Głąbiński Stanisław,” *PSB*, vol. 8 (1959–1960), p. 103; cf.: Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , p. 226; Wątor, *Działalność Stronnictwa Demokratyczno-Narodowego*. . . , p. 119.

1242 Głąbiński mentioned that the post he was appointed did not satisfy him, mostly because he felt uncomfortable as an official. Moreover, he accepted the office on the explicit request of the Emperor. He claimed that this nomination was a result of behind-the-scenes operations of Galician conservatives who in this way wanted to remove him from the post of president. The short ministerial career of Głąbiński ended up with his request of demission, which the Emperor accepted, Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , p. 141.

1243 J. Zdrada, “Łazarski Stanisław,” *PSB*, vol. 18 (1973), p. 291.

could guarantee calming down the emotions in the Club. Michał Bobrzyński describes him as “a democrat not belonging to any faction,”¹²⁴⁴ similarly to Biliński: “independent deputy Łazarski.”¹²⁴⁵ Was Łazarski indeed independent and apolitical? It does not seem so. Bobrzyński, quoted before, emphasized that according to his views, he was a democrat. Although, we should add that he was also a supporter of the national democracy, a guest member of the parliamentary club SDN (National-Democratic Party) founded on June 15, 1907 in Vienna.¹²⁴⁶ In the Polish Club, he belonged to the so-called *dzicy* (*wild*), i.e., the deputies formally not associated with any party. Undoubtedly, at the beginning of his political career, from the 1880s, he was affiliated with the Polish democrats. In 1908, he joined the national democracy. In 1911, when he became president of the Club for the first time, he was a democratic activist, but sympathizing with the National Democracy. Łazarski should be thus classified as one of the presidents of the Club of national democratic views.

He was the Club president twice. For the first time, he became president on January 18, 1911.¹²⁴⁷ He was reappointed on May 28, 1917.¹²⁴⁸ In the Diet and Parliament, he was considered to be a good speaker. He participated in works of the committees occupied with legal affairs, taxation, mandates, budget, domestic affairs and press.

Łazarski found the Club internally broken up and it seemed them that thanks to his impartiality it would be possible to bring balance to the club. He was

1244 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiątek*. . . , p. 226.

1245 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, I, p. 206.

1246 Wątor, *Działalność Stronnictwa Demokratyczno-Narodowego*. . . , p. 89.

1247 This date is passed by: Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiątek*. . . , p. 226; J. Zdrada, “Łazarski Stanisław,” *PSB*, vol. 18 (1973), p. 291; J. Bojko, “Dziennik 1911–1919,” in: J. Bojko, *Gorące słowa. Wybór pism, wybór i oprac. F. Ziejka*, (Kraków 2002), p. 109. However, January 19 is passed by: Wątor, *Działalność Stronnictwa Demokratyczno-Narodowego*. . . , p. 119.

1248 J. Zdrada, “Łazarski Stanisław,” *PSB*, vol. 18 (1973), p. 291. J. Bojko claimed it to be May 29. Sixty out of sixty-seven votes were for Łazarski, six votes were invalid and one vote against was from Ludomił German. He also wrote that a sure candidate for the post of president was Lubomirski, although after voting on the resolution of Włodzimierz Tetmajer from May 28, 1917, he committed suicide, as he was the only one voting against it, Bojko, *Dziennik 1911–1919*. . . , p. 185. The voting does not reflect the facts or what Bojko wrote in the memoirs: “Abrahamowicz managed to turn against only ingenuous Lubomirski and then they exited the room not having voted,” J. Bojko, *Ze wspomnień, do druku przygotował i przypisami opatrzył K. Dunin-Wąsowicz*, (Warsaw 1959), p. 233.

perceived rather positively by the deputies, although they emphasized his “insufficient energy and lack of initiative.”¹²⁴⁹ He was not considered a brilliant figure with leading skills and ability to lead the Club efficiently – these were the desired traits at the moment, as they would encourage the effective organization of the Club’s work and easing conflicts: “Łazarski, because the Club could not agree on anybody more prominent yet. He was trying to maintain the unity of the club and proceeded very correctly.”¹²⁵⁰ It seems that Łazarski himself was aware of the situation in the Club and of his own abilities, and thus the probability of resigning from the post. His successor, Biliński, mentioned that “president Łazarski informed me on numerous occasions that I should be in charge of managing the Polish affairs.”¹²⁵¹

The elections of November 1911 relieved Łazarski of the possibly too overwhelming duties, although there is no way to state this for sure. At that time, a majority composed of conservatives, democrats, and populars was created in the Club. It was then necessary to designate someone capable of keeping the majority in line for performing the function of president. After Łazarski’s resignation, Leon Biliński became the new president.

Łazarski was elected president again in 1917. It was him that read out loud Włodzimierz Tetmajer’s resolution. Its content was, in a sense, groundbreaking, as it contained an idea expressed in the following statement: “the only desire of the Polish nation is to regain a united and independent Poland with direct access to the sea.”¹²⁵² The members of the Club, for the first time, put forward a demand to rebuild the Polish state, united from the lands of the three partitions, an independent and sovereign entity, independent of the neighboring powers.

It was not difficult for Łazarski to justify the position of the Club in the face of the war events, e.g., mass murders of Poles, which he did in the resolution of May 28, 1917. According to Wincenty Witos, “his speech made a great impression and each member of the Club openly congratulated him.”¹²⁵³

During his second presidency, Łazarski also sought the Emperor’s help in implementing the demands presented in the resolution. To achieve it, he conducted negotiations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was also interested in the successful resolution of the issue of the Polish Legions. His efforts

1249 W. Witos, *Moje wspomnienia*, I, ed. E. Karczewski, J. R. Szaflik, (Warsaw 1988), p. 247.

1250 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiątek*. . . , p. 227.

1251 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, I, p. 210.

1252 Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 323–324.

1253 Witos, *Moje wspomnienia*, I, p. 152.

were appreciated in the post-war period by Józef Piłsudski. Łazarski was decorated with *Krzyż Legionów* (*Cross of the Legions*) and the Commandoria of the Order of Polonia Restituta.

The Tetmajer's resolution was one of the causes of growing internal conflicts in the Club. Łazarski was also unable to break the resistance of the conservatives, which resulted in his resignation from the post of president on September 4, 1917, approved by the Club the following day.¹²⁵⁴

It seems that for cognitive reasons, it is worth discussing the problem of choosing Łazarski's successor, which was described in detail in the journals of Władysław Leopold Jaworski or Jakub Bojko. They presented how Galician groups conducted negotiations, although it would be adequate to use the colloquial term "clinched the deal," how much animosity there was in such circumstances, and how antagonized the Club was. People's activist, Bojko, wrote that: "choosing the president must fall through," and that "there is no agreement in the Club."¹²⁵⁵ Herman Diamand confirmed that: "The Club is like a hive but without any honey or order. They cannot choose the president, so there is no end to quarrels, negotiations and conferences. Since I participate in all of them, I am running on fumes."¹²⁵⁶ The factions in the Club could not communicate on a couple of issues: firstly, on presenting their own candidates, secondly, on forming a majority that could push through their representative. Objectively, we should admit that the geopolitical and internal situation of the Monarchy itself fostered divisions.

The first candidates, although not formally nominated yet, emerged the day after Łazarski announced his resignation on September 6. The deputy Ludomił German claimed then that the next president would be a popular, Władysław Długosz. W.L. Jaworski made a malicious remark: "The final fall, because he is a pig." S. Głębiński and I. Daszyński were listed as well.¹²⁵⁷ According to Jaworski and Bojko, Ignacy Daszyński supposedly strived for the presidency and wanted to reach a settlement with the conservatives and take over the faction after they fulfilled certain conditions.¹²⁵⁸ On September 20, the populars announced that

1254 J. Zdrada, "Łazarski Stanisław," *PSB*, vol. 18 (1973), p. 292.

1255 Bojko, *Dziennik 1911–1919*. . . , p. 188.

1256 "List z dnia 25 września 1917r.," *Pamiętnik Hermana Diamanda*. . . , p. 173.

1257 J. Bojko claimed that: "Głębiński would be the most capable for this, but they will not choose him as he is badly regarded by the government. Then Daszyński, although he has no chances either, so there is no president," Bojko, *Dziennik 1911–1919*. . . , p. 188.

1258 Daszyński then decided to present an ultimatum to the conservatives in the form of three demands, i.e. resolving the NKN (*Supreme National Committee*), freeing

they would put forward their own candidate. On the same day, a telegram from Długosz arrived, saying that he will not accept being elected president. On the other hand, the conservatives decided to boycott the election by returning blank ballot papers if the minority presented their own candidate. Allegedly, their candidate was Bojko.¹²⁵⁹

The meeting of the Club on September 23, 1917, was attended by sixty-two deputies. It turned out that Wincenty Witos, supported by populars, national democrats and independent deputies obtained, twenty-eight votes, and Ignacy Daszyński – eight from socialist deputies. Długosz did not stand as a candidate. The conservatives were against both candidates. However, the endeavors of the National Democracy to gain socialists' support for their own candidate began. The national democrats presented a fundamental condition – approving the Act of November 5th and the Regency Council. If the socialists had agreed to that, the conservatives would have voted as well. Otherwise, the election shall be postponed until the next week.

Jaworski was against making any agreements with the socialists, predicting that it would cause a breakup of the coalition of the Stańczycy and the Podolacy. He was surprised by Daszyński, who probably was aware of his small chances for becoming president. On the other hand, he accused the National Democracy of insincerity. The democrats, in favor of Witos, “a peasant who does not speak German,” planned to make him the figurehead, giving the actual power over the Club to Głąbiński.¹²⁶⁰

At the next meeting on September 24, the rivals of Witos were proposed in the last moment Łazarski, Juliusz Leo and Daszyński. The sixty-six present members of the Club did not manage to elect its president, because none of the candidates obtained the required absolute majority. Witos received twenty-eight votes, Łazarski – twenty-six, Daszyński – eleven, and J. Leo – one. During the second voting, it turned out that the result was identical to the first try.¹²⁶¹ Diamand

J. Piłsudski and admitting all dismissed volunteers to the Polish Legions. This way he induced opposition of the conservatives who left the Club. Then, Daszyński's demands were outvoted, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*. . . , p. 220; Bojko, *Dziennik 1911–1919*. . . , p. 188.

1259 He wrote: “The conservatives claim that if my candidature was presented, everybody would vote for it,” Bojko, *Dziennik 1911–1919*. . . , pp. 188–189.

1260 Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*. . . , p. 220.

1261 Jaworski's observations written down directly after the meeting were as follows: “Długosz is raging to become president. He wants to talk with conservatives. When Halban told him that the National Democracy defends access to populars, he answered: perhaps we shall talk at night. Reubenbauer and some other populars

recalled the events writing: “Indeed, it was hell here yesterday. Populars and National Democrats put Witos forward as a candidate for president of the Club, admitting that he cannot speak German and that he will manage the politics and negotiate with the government and other factions only through vice presidents. This must fall through.”¹²⁶² It was only in the third voting that the president was chosen, thanks to the agreement between the conservatives, national democrats and socialists.¹²⁶³ The election showed that the members of the Polish Club were not willing to give the power to the populars, who occupied the posts of vice presidents, and especially not to socialists, with whom they preferred to deal.

The National Democrats had yet another opportunity to chair the Polish deputies in the Imperial Council. In June 1918, a lawyer and former mayor of Tarnów (1903–23), Tadeusz Tertil, was elected president; he was also the last president of the Polish Club.

The voting took place on June 21. Tertil obtained thirty-two votes, Jan Goetz – eleven, two votes were blank and one was for Andrzej Kędzior. Jaworski wrote that it was at his prompting that the conservatives voted for Goetz. He personally did not like him anyway: “In the group, I was very much against Tertil – the mayor of Tarnów, using his policy to please the streets, a cock. . . Everybody in the group shared this view.”¹²⁶⁴

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk imposed on the deputies of the Polish Club a change in the policy toward Austria. One of its manifestations was change in the attitude toward the issue of cooperation between Slavic nations. Tertil was a supporter of the cooperation of Slavs against Germany. However, according to Witos, Tertil stayed cautious and prudent in that matter, not wanting to provoke either the Austrians or his political rivals. Nevertheless, the speech of the president in the Imperial Council reflected current aims and expectations, and especially the revision of the Club’s stand toward the events from mid-1918.¹²⁶⁵

At the very beginning of Tertil’s presidency, the problem concerning the Club’s support for Prime Minister Ernest Seidler and the government occurred. The stand of the Polish deputies toward the head of the government was related

have enough of the National Democracy’s governance and would like to talk with us [conservatives – D.L.-L.]. Daszyński is burning like a flame. Socialists offered democrats to vote for Daszyński too, then he would resign and then socialists will vote for whichever democrat,” Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*. . . , p. 221.

1262 “List z 24 września 1917r.,” *Pamiętnik Hermana Diamanda*. . . , p. 173.

1263 Witos, *Moje wspomnienia*, I, p. 403.

1264 Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*. . . , pp. 265, 267.

1265 Witos, *Moje wspomnienia*, I, p. 411.

to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and creating the Ukrainian country of parts of the Polish lands. The Club suspected Seidler of conducting a double-sided policy. In this matter, the president was called upon by the Emperor and from the talks between them it may be concluded that the support of the Club for the draft budget depended on the Prime Minister's demission. Seidler also participated in the negotiations with the president, assuring him that he would offer a resignation if the Club voted against the Czech motion to prosecute him and Minister of Foreign Affairs Friedrich von Toggenburg in the House of Representatives. The presidium of the Polish Club would take advantage of the offer, gaining prestige and maintaining relatively good relations with Germany at the same time. Tertil's and the populars' stand toward the Prime Minister's offer was not compliant with the views shared by the conservatives and the faction of Jan Stąpiński. The president wanted to avoid taking a definitive stand while voting on the motion of prosecution in the House. When the demission of the government was practically a *fait accompli*, Tertil intended to leave the Council simply. Thanks to the efforts of PSL (Polish People's Party) and the conservatives, it was possible to convince the president to vote in favor of the motion. Jaworski mentioned that the president "fears that the populars will abolish him. A small-town clog, this Tertil."¹²⁶⁶

This issue, which revealed the discrepancies between the president, members of the Club and particular factions, and finally the unkept promise given to the Emperor and Seidler, were the reasons for the resignation of the president and three members of the presidium from chairing the Club. Tertil and the vice presidents, with the exception of Andrzej Kędzior, resigned on July 24, 1918, but the members of the Club refused to accept their demission.¹²⁶⁷

After Emperor Charles I announced a manifesto about the federalization of Austria on October 16, a parliamentary meeting was held to determine the composition of the future Polish government. Tertil, Daszyński and Głębiński traveled to Warsaw to meet with Józef Świeżyński. During the unofficial talks, which took place over the next few days, only Głębiński decided to join Świeżyński's cabinet and become Minister of Foreign Affairs. Daszyński withdrew, understanding that the socialists would not support the government. Tertil was cautious, even reserved, not showing much interest in the initiative.¹²⁶⁸

1266 Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*. . . , p. 269.

1267 Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*. . . , p. 270.

1268 W. Najdus, *Ignacy Daszyński 1866–1936*, (Warsaw 1988), pp. 373–374.

The announcement of the manifesto about the federalization of Austria and successive enunciations of Poles about establishing their own independent state marked the end of the functioning of the Polish Club, which was dissolved on October 25, 1918.

Apart from the Podolacy and the national democrats, the functions of presidents of the Polish Club were also performed by Cracow conservatives. One of them was Leon Biliński.¹²⁶⁹

For the first time, L. Biliński¹²⁷⁰ became president of the Polish Club in 1911, after Łazarski's resignation in November. The choice of a new president was supposed to correspond with the new balance of political power in the Club, established during the last parliamentary election. They were a success for the conservatives, democrats and populars, and as Bobrzyński noticed: "they (the parties – D. L.-L.) wanted the president to be a man who would organize and maintain the greatness of the Club. Such seemed to be Biliński."¹²⁷¹ At the same time, although not liked by everyone, Biliński was himself a conciliatory man who "forgave personal hurts with exceptional ease, welcomed compromise and agreement." He also possessed a trait that should not be praised: "he treated people and factions only as tools of his ambition."¹²⁷²

Biliński held the post of president of the Polish Club after a four-year-long period of the governance of the national democrats and could not count on their support in the Club. His candidature was put forward by the populars, who were grateful for the successful resolution of the case of *Bank Parcelacyjny*. His presidency was most probably put forward during the electoral campaign. Biliński mentioned it when he wrote that Jan Stąpiński and Ludomił German suggested him not to refuse the post of president in the Club.¹²⁷³ The populars presented the

1269 Biliński may be described as a conservative of moderate views. In a sense, he was a critic of the policy of the conservatives in Galicia. In his essay announced in 1882, entitled *Jakie są znamiona Stańczyków* (*What are the characteristics of Stańczycy*), he questioned the guidelines and measures of the Cracow conservatives, finding them detrimental to the general socioeconomic situation of the province. Simultaneously, he did not criticize their pro-Austrian and loyalist policy toward Vienna, claiming that it is in line with Polish political and national interest. The essay gave rise to the discussions and disputes in Galicia, and eventually the author himself withdrew from the proclaimed views, Głąbiński, "Biliński Leon," *PSB*, vol. 2 (1936), p. 97.

1270 Głąbiński, "Biliński Leon," *PSB*, vol. 2 (1936), p. 97; P. Kraszewski, "Biliński Leon," in: *Polacy w historii*. . . , p. 51.

1271 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , pp. 250–251.

1272 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , p. 250.

1273 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, I, p. 210.

official proposal after the election at the meeting of the conservative club: “they entered as guest envoys of the populars’ party to present my candidature for president of the Club to the conservatives. . . they openly presented my choice, but based on written *pacta conventa* for the construction of canals.” Biliński agreed to fulfill the conditions of the agreement, i.e., the construction of the canals provided by the state, although he himself was a proponent of a different solution. The following day, he was elected president the next day with the entire Club, apart from the national democrats, voting for him.¹²⁷⁴ This fact may indicate that the decision was made beforehand together with the conservative deputies, populars, and democrats without additional specification.

For this reason, Biliński gained the National Democracy’s disfavor. The relations between the two sides worsened when the new president announced his political program in the Club, emphasizing a commonality of Polish and Austrian interests, simultaneously opting for an alliance with the Monarchy. At the first meeting of the Club in July, he also mentioned the Polish-Ukrainian settlement as one of the priority tasks of the Polish policy. In this way, Biliński broke one of the principles of conducting policy by the Club, i.e., not to transfer internal conflicts to the forum of the Imperial Council.¹²⁷⁵ As a consequence, the Club adopted a resolution in which the Polish deputies showed their support for Viceroy M. Bobrzyński and gave him a mandate of trust in the matter of his Ukrainian policy. The club of the national democratic deputies voted against the resolution, and four deputies abstained.¹²⁷⁶ At the same time, the Viceroy was criticized for his own concepts of the Ukrainian policy. The basis for that was the motion from July 27, submitted by the national democratic deputies, A. Skarbek and A. Dębski. Among the members of the National Democracy, only J. Buzek opposed to holding a vote of no confidence to the Viceroy. The motion was rejected by forty votes. At the Club meeting, fifty-four deputies were present.¹²⁷⁷ A. Wątor claimed that the election constituted “the climax of the political game in the Polish Club. The National Democracy was outvoted. . . Unbounded by the political responsibility, they moved over to the definitive opposition of the

1274 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, I, pp. 212 ff.

1275 J. Skwara, “Konserwatyści wschodniogaliccyjscy – Podolacy wobec kwestii ukraińskiej w okresie namiestnictwa Michała Bobrzyńskiego 1908–1913,” *Rocznik Historyczno-Archiwalny*, vol. 11 (1996), pp. 29 ff.

1276 *Słowo Polskie*, no. 329 (1911), p. 1; *Słowo Polskie*, no. 351 (1911), p. 2.

1277 *Słowo Polskie*, no. 348 (1911); *Słowo Polskie*, no. 351 (1911); “Wszechpolskie wakacje,” *Czas*, no. 363 (1911).

block majority in the Club and of the government.”¹²⁷⁸ Already at the end of 1910, National Democrats assessed the establishment of such political constellation for conducting Polish politics somewhat unfavorably: “Unfortunately, there is no hope for the Polish politics to change anytime soon. The conservative faction in power, supported by the populars, consistently holds on to the conciliatory system. The President of the Polish Club, Biliński, the Viceroy and the Marshall are strong supporters of this system.”¹²⁷⁹

Like every newly elected president, Biliński as well was obliged to give a speech in the Imperial Council, where the political directions of the Polish Club were normally defined. An unintended consequence of the speech was the resignation of baron Paul Gautsch from the cabinet.¹²⁸⁰ This fact, however, had a significant impact on the Polish Club. The new Prime Minister, K. Stürgkh, proposed cooperation between the government and Polish deputies, and what is essential, on the terms determined by the Club. The basis for the agreement was the issue of the construction of canals financed by the State Treasury.¹²⁸¹

During his first presidency, Biliński was involved in deliberations with the Ruthenian deputies, although with no significant results. At that time, Ukrainians were more interested in the electoral reform to the national Diet; hence most of the talks took place in Galicia.

As a consequence of the election result and the position of the Club on the Ukrainian issue, Biliński invited the Ukrainian club to begin deliberations concerning the agreement on the electoral reform. It was already the second initiative undertaken by the politician; the first one from 1908 failed through. Moreover, we shall emphasize the role of Marshal Stanisław Badeni and Michał Bobrzyński,

1278 Wątor, *Działalność Stronnictwa Demokratyczno-Narodowego*. . . , p. 125.

1279 S. Kozicki, “Przegląd spraw polskich,” *PN*, vol. 6, no. 12 (1910), pp. 715 ff.

1280 Prime Minister was not certain whether to maintain his own current government or to establish a parliamentary system. Biliński opted for the latter idea, causing confusion in the House of Representatives. A few days later, Prime Minister and the ministers resigned. Recalling those events, he wrote: “I emphasized the demand for the parliamentary system, which the Polish Club has always advocated for. . . I did not think for a minute to blast Gautsch’s governance. . . All I wanted was to ardently defend the parliamentary system,” Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, I, pp. 214 ff.

1281 According to Biliński, the Prime Minister payed him a visit in his apartment, in order to “offer alliance with the Polish Club.” A common stance on the construction of canals was then agreed on, which was officially confirmed during a conference in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers with members of the parliamentary committee of the Club, Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, I, p. 215.

who were “the unifying and solidarizing factor,”¹²⁸² and the democrat Tadeusz Rutkowski,¹²⁸³ an advocate for the compromise with Ukrainians.

Biliński consulted Karol Lewicki about a mutual agreement on urgent matters. The Ukrainian deputy determined the preconditions for the forthcoming negotiations, which were accepted by the Polish Club.¹²⁸⁴ Buszko noted that during preliminary consultations between the parties none of them demanded the implementation of the four-point electoral law, which, in his opinion, was due to the fact that “the Ukrainian nationalists did not try to defend the rules of democracy or equality of their nation. Out of the numerous slogans they had promoted. . . none was left in the backstage negotiations.” The motive for the settlement with Poles was the willingness to maintain the primacy over the rest of the political groupings, i.e., the radicals and moscophiles.¹²⁸⁵

On the one hand, this idea was a continuation of the activity started in 1911. On the other hand, it contradicted the current concept of policy on the Ukrainian matter related to not transferring national disputes to the forum of the Austrian parliament – a practice Poles attempted to avoid in the previous decades. J. Gruchała explains this by the fact that in the House of the Imperial Council, in contrast to the national Diet, the opposition was too weak in number to oppose the efforts of those in favor of the concessions to Ukrainians.¹²⁸⁶ Nevertheless, the actions of the majority of the Club were criticized by the national democrats.

The agreement with the Ukrainian club, however, did not come into being due to divided opinions on the number of seats in the Galician Diet that Ukrainians

1282 W. L. Jaworski, *Listy z sejmu 1910r.*, (Cracow 1911), p. 153.

1283 In 1910, he conducted negotiations with the Ukrainians, which aim was to persuade them to stop obstruction in the Diet. He coedited the draft electoral reform, which pleased the Ukrainian side, Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , p. 223; H. Kramarz, Tadeusz Rutowski. *Portret pozytywisty i demokracji galicyjskiego*, (Cracow 2001), p. 84.

1284 Firstly, not relating the matter of the reform with other Polish-Ukrainian controversial issues, secondly, making amendments to the electoral system as a primary task, and thirdly, possibility of referring to the government as an arbitrator in negotiations between Poles and Ukrainians. Moreover, the negotiations shall be conducted regarding the rule of equality of the sides. Ukrainians, in their demands requested 1/3 of the mandates in the Diet and increasing the number of members in the Galician government, but also granting them the right to decide on such matters as Ukrainian basic and secondary education, excluding the principle of proportionality and plurality of voting, Buszko, *Sejmowa reforma wyborcza*. . . , pp. 200–201.

1285 Buszko, *Sejmowa reforma wyborcza*. . . , p. 201.

1286 Gruchała, *Rząd austriacki i polskie*. . . , p. 120.

would be granted as a result of the reform.¹²⁸⁷ Summarizing the works around the Polish-Ukrainian settlement on the reform of elections the Diet, in 1910 Jarowski wrote: “the relentless commission for the electoral reform has brought a poor harvest of its year-long work to the Diet.”¹²⁸⁸

At the beginning of 1913, Biliński was appointed Minister of Finance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.¹²⁸⁹ This meant he would have to resign from the position of president of the Polish Club. He was then replaced by the mayor of Cracow, Juliusz Leo. Biliński was elected president of the Club for the second time on February 20, 1915. In January 1915, his resignation from the post of common minister of finance was confirmed. Biliński stepped aside on February 1.¹²⁹⁰ At that time, Leo also intended to resign from heading the Club.¹²⁹¹

When Biliński decided to resign from the presidency, Jaworski did not hide his resentment: “Yesterday (May 13, 1917 – D. L.-L.) during [the gathering of] the Parliamentary Committee, Biliński announced that he was resigning from the presidency. He feels the hurt others cause him. What an incredible stupidity – they remove the greatest men and replace them with lowlives.”¹²⁹² Herman Lieberman also had a favorable opinion on Biliński, describing him as “a very wise man,” although he did not spare him words of criticism: “as a politician and a statesman, he seemed dangerous with his cunning, the impression of following any suggestion from other political groups, and his lack of honesty.”¹²⁹³

1287 At the end of 1911, in November and December, the head politicians of the Club discussed with the Ukrainian Club, although without any results.

1288 Jaworski, *Listy z sejmu z 1910r.*, Sejmowa Komisja Reformy Wyborczej (*Diet's Electoral Reform Committee*) was set up in 1907, S. Grodziski, *Sejm Krajowy galicyjski 1861–1914*, (Warsaw 1993), p. 68.

1289 Leaving the Club, he mentioned: “All I needed was to farewell with the Club after a relatively short period of presidency, and I needed to say farewell with the voters and return them the mandate the absence of which hurt me,” *Biliński, Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, I, p. 232.

1290 Biliński demised on his own request, which the Emperor accepted on February 7, WZ, no. 31 (1915), p. 1.

1291 Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*. . . , p. 27, 28, 30.

1292 This remark probably related to the popular deputies, about whom he wrote: “they drag lowlives. Even Łazarski and Lubomirski have chances with them,” Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*. . . , p. 192.

1293 The deputy appreciated also other traits of the resigning president, such as: sobriety of his speeches, using convincing argumentation and the fact that “he was a kindhearted man who, as a minister or president of the Polish Club, eagerly stepped in when it came to alleviating human poverty and misery,” Lieberman, *Pamiętniki*. . . , p. 123.

Officially, Biliński resigned from presiding over the Club on May 14, 1917, and his demission was accepted by the Club the next day.¹²⁹⁴ Biliński was exceptionally active as a politician and deputy, and he held the post of Minister of Finance multiple times. Chłędowski assessed his pre-war activity, writing that “every minister who is stepping down thinks of himself as indispensable, he thinks that he has to act somehow and that he has to have some political significance. When he finds out that the state continues its course. . . then he calms down. . . Only Biliński is the exception to this respect.”¹²⁹⁵

The end of the presidency in the Club did not mean that Biliński was finishing his political career as well. In May 1915, he was almost seventy-one years old. After the end of the First World War, in 1919, he took over the Ministry of the Treasury under the government of Ignacy Paderewski, and in the following year, after his return to Vienna, he was appointed President of the Polish-Austrian Bank.¹²⁹⁶

After being appointed as the minister of finance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Biliński was forced to resign from the presidency; Juliusz Leo replaced him.¹²⁹⁷ A professor for the Jagiellonian University and a deputy of the national parliament since 1901, merited to Cracow, he began his parliamentary career relatively late, in 1911. However, he soon gained the support of the Club, becoming its vice president in 1910, and president on March 4, 1911.¹²⁹⁸

As a conservative politician,¹²⁹⁹ the new president continued the traditional policy in Vienna. He took over as head of the Club in the period when the war

The author considers Biliński's social sensitivity worth-noting, as other sources tend to picture him mostly as a pragmatic politician.

1294 Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*. . . , p. 192. The first entry in Biliński's memoirs confirms the information from W.L. Jaworski's journal, Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*. . . , II, p. 1.

1295 Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, II, p. 130.

1296 Kraszewski, “Biliński Leon,” in: *Polacy w historii*. . . , p. 51.

1297 C. Bąk-Koczarska, J. Buszko, “Leo Juliusz,” *PSB*, vol. 17 (1972), pp. 67–68.

1298 Bojko claims that Leo became president on March 5, Bojko, *Dziennik 1911–1919*. . . , p. 120.

1299 Initially, Leo belonged to the faction of Cracow conservatives, but due to political discrepancies and breakup in the City Council of Cracow, he joined democrats without adjectives in 1907. In the Diet, he belonged to the camp of the democratic left, soon becoming the president of its club. Leo contributed to creating of the Democratic Union in 1907, which was a grouping of democrats. This fact led to the removal of conservatives from power in the Polish Club, and to the election of Głabiński as president of the Club. However, soon afterward, in January 1909, he broke up with the national democrats and joined the conservatives again. This

between the superpowers was expected to break out. This fact placed Polish deputies in a problematic situation. They were forced to establish a political agenda that corresponded to the changing situation in Europe. The premise were laid out in the resolution of the Club of October 1912, and then presented by the new president. The Polish Club continued to support the policy pursued so far, i.e., to lean on Austria. It was firmly against any cooperation with Russia. Even though Poles did not accept the Austro-Hungarian foreign policy, they did not openly oppose the Monarchy's alliance with Germany. This stand was evident in the speech given at the gathering of the common delegation by Leo, who highlighted the unique value of Polish people in Europe as the only Slavic nation to stand so firmly against the Russian state and its policy. At the same time, the president expressed his dissatisfaction with the position of the Hapsburg Monarchy, in alliance with Germany, which was conducting the visibly anti-Polish policy for years. Leo's words are characteristic – he stated that even though the foreign policy of the Monarchy harms the Polish interests, Poles would support Austria's diplomatic actions and endeavors in the name of higher truths, i.e., the international situation.¹³⁰⁰

Leo's presidency coincided with an unfavorable period for the Galician policy in Vienna. The Polish Club, as the parliamentary club of Polish deputies, actually had no opportunity to influence the Austrian government, as sittings of the Imperial Council were not held. Thanks to the current practice of the Club, the Council was considered an important subject in the policy of the Monarchy. Not once did it tip the balance. The Monarchy and government thus could not ignore the stand of the Club. In the altered situation, the Club was deprived of the primary measures of influence: "I cannot see any way other to pressure the government. There is no Parliament, so it cannot be scared with the Polish Club."¹³⁰¹

Nevertheless, after the deliberations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of National Defence, the Chief of Staff and Zdzisław Morawski, performing the duties of the Minister for Galicia, conducted in August 1914, Leo obtained permission to create the Polish Legions. He also managed to negotiate the formal approval of the Legions by the Austrian military authorities. He soon

decision was influenced by Bobrzyński's initiative to create the "Viceroy's block", bringing together conservatives and populars, Bąk-Koczarska, Buszko, "Leo Juliusz," *PSB*, vol. 17 (1972), p. 68.

1300 Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 308.

1301 Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*. . . , p. 9.

became the president of the NKN (*Supreme National Committee*), contributing to its establishing.¹³⁰²

He resigned from the presidency on January 30, 1915. He died on February 21, 1918, after a long sickness.

Jan Goetz-Okocimski¹³⁰³ was one of the last presidents of the Polish Club. He belonged to the faction of the younger generation of the Cracow conservatives, brought together in the Conservative Club. He was the most active politician during the war, especially at its end.

He was vice president of the Polish Club from May 31, 1917 until January 31, 1918. He was appointed the head of the Club on the last day of January, 1918, but resigned already on February 27, 1918. Formally, he was president of the Club until June 1918.¹³⁰⁴

The presidency of Goetz-Okocimski coincided with a very difficult period in the history of the Monarchy and Galicia, but also of the Polish Club. It should also be noted that since September 1917 until the election of Goetz, the deputies of the Council formally did not have a president. The function was partly performed by the vice presidents.

The election of the new president took place in the last days of January, and it was not until the third ballot, on January 30, 1918, that the president was elected. Goetz-Okocimski was supported by the conservatives, democrats and two deputies belonging to the Catholic popular faction led by Antoni Matakiewicz, with twenty-nine out of fifty-five votes. The national democrats and the populars of Wincenty Witos voted against him, while the socialists were not present. The election was, in a sense, a political demonstration of the enemies of the Galician conservatism, who returned blank ballots. The new president was surprised by the outcome to the point that he intended to refuse to accept the presidency.¹³⁰⁵

1302 C. Bąk-Koczarska, J. Buszko, "Leo Juliusz," *PSB*, vol. 17 (1972), p. 69. About Leo's activity in the NKN see: K. Srokowski, *N. K. N. Zarys historii Naczelnego Komitetu Narodowego*, (Cracow 1923).

1303 A. Galos, "Goetz-Okocimski Jan," *PSB*, vol. 8 (1959–1960), p. 200; J. M. Włodek, *Goetz-Okocimscy. Kronika rodzinna 1590–2000*, (Cracow 2001), pp. 50–51.

1304 *Polski Słownik Biograficzny (Polish Biographical Dictionary)* gives different dates, i.e. February 1 as the beginning of his presidency, and July 1918 as the closing date of the period, A. Galos, "Goetz-Okocimski Jan," *PSB*, vol. 8 (1959–1960), p. 200. In his journal, Jaworski described the election of Goetz-Okocimski's successor, Tadeusz Tertil, appointed by the Club on June 21, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*. . . , p. 265, 267.

1305 Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*. . . , pp. 242–243.

The author of the chronicle of the Goetz-Okocimski's family, Jan Maria Włodek, claimed that: "Under his governance, a short period of the great significance of the Polish Club began."¹³⁰⁶ Doubtlessly, it was a challenging period for the Club and Poles from Galicia, who hoped, on the one hand, to rebuild the Polish state founded on the Monarchy, and on the other hand, to establish a united and independent Poland. In Goetz's program speech, which he gave a week before the election in the Club, on January 24, he expressed the expectation of Poles for the Monarchy to support them in building their own statehood. The way to do this was to create the Polish state from the lands of the three partitions and hand them over to Prince Charles I, the successor of the Polish throne. He also stated that Polish lands should not be partitioned and given to other subjects.¹³⁰⁷ Goetz referred then to the lands of the Congress Poland. In a sense, it was a prosthetic statement, as not long afterward, a part of the so-called *kongresówka* (Congress Poland) was used to create the Ukrainian state.

In February 1918, the Central Powers signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, giving the Chełm Land and Podlachia to the newly created Ukrainian state. It was a blow for the Galician politicians, especially since up to the last days before signing the treaty, they were promised a successful solution to the Polish issue. The speech of Goetz-Okocimski was the last event in the history of Polish politics in the Monarchy conducted in a pro-Austrian direction.

The president of the Club, who up to this point supported the Austro-Polish solution consisting of handing over the Polish crown to the Hapsburg Monarchy, became its strong opponent after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Together with the members of the presidium, without consulting the factions, he decided to present the stand of the Polish Club on the current policy of the government, i.e., the Club joining the opposition. The declaration of the deputies of February 12 was an unprecedented event in the history of the Polish Club¹³⁰⁸, which caused agitation in Galicia. The Polish Club released an appeal to the Polish nation and unanimously passed a protest at a specially convened meeting on February 20, 1918. It was read on the forum of the Austrian parliament and, as Witos claimed: "However new the president of the Club, Goetz may not have given it enough force due to his not really strong voice, but the seriousness with which he did it and the arguments he put forward echoed both in the parliament and

1306 Włodek, *Goetz-Okocimscy*. . ., p. 51.

1307 Włodek, *Goetz-Okocimscy*. . ., p. 52.

1308 Włodek, *Goetz-Okocimscy*. . ., p. 54.

in the country. I myself saw the concern with which he approached the matter, expressing his fear that maybe he was not able to present it in a deserved way.”¹³⁰⁹

The period of the presidency of Goetz-Okocimski was very significant regarding the diametral change in the Polish Club. The geopolitical changes sanctioned by the treaty of Brest-Litvosk made the deputies aware of how wrong they were about the Austrian policy toward Poles. The situation forced the Galician deputies to break up with the traditions of the pro-Hapsburg orientation and the Austro-Polish solution. Changing the direction of the politics of the Polish Club was not an easy task. Nevertheless, it was successfully achieved.

The presidency of Goetz-Okocimski lasted only for a month, but it shall be described as exceptional. At that time, the Club worked solidly and the deputies agreed in terms of the most crucial matters for Poles and Galicia. Nevertheless, animosities and conflicts within the Club emerged not long afterward, as already the crisis in the Club began on February 27. The reason was mostly the political fight for primacy in the Club. The president and presidium were not informed on the activities of individual deputies or factions. The statute of the Club was thus not respected. The lack of internal solidarity, loyalty and ignoring the figure of the president, but also backstage activities, questioned the sense of any further activity of the Club. In this situation, Goetz-Okocimski resigned, leaving his duties to vice president Kędzior, representative of the populars – the largest faction in the Club. The president’s demission was not accepted after the first resignation, and nor was it when he expressed his will to resign for the second time. Goetz-Okocimski thus formally stayed the president until the election of the next president, T. Tertil, at the end of June, 1918.

5. Political Factions Represented in the Imperial Council

Socialists from Galicia expressed solidarity with the striking peasants from Ruthenia: “Ruthenian peasants, our brothers in Eastern Galicia, are currently fighting a battle to improve the existence. . . Polish peasants! A peasant from Ruthenia is closer to you than a Polish landowner. . . A Polish peasant shall not harm his brother, Ruthenian, when he fights to escape from poverty and desperate misery.”¹³¹⁰ The Podolacy decidedly opposed the strikes. The strike movement developed mainly in Eastern Galicia, where their estates were located.

1309 Witos, *Moje wspomnienia*, I, pp. 410–411.

1310 Leon Misiólek and Zygmunt Marek, on behalf of the Polish Social Democratic Party of Galicia, signed the appeal of July 24, 1902, “Do chłopów polskich!” (“To the Polish peasants!”), *Naprzód*, no. 202, (1902), p. 1.

They could not support the peasants' protests, as in that way, they would oppose their possession, and, at the same time, their socioeconomic interests. Because of that, wanting the Polish peasants to discontinue the strikes, they argued that Ukrainians pursuit is, in fact, not an economic but a national fight aimed against the Polish peasants. This position was presented in the speech given by Abrahamowicz and the interpellation submitted by Jaworski to the House of Representatives in the Imperial Council.¹³¹¹ The Cracow conservatives also did not support the strikes, which resulted in the disfavor of the members of the National-Democratic Party (SND) toward them. After the experiences from the period of the peasants' strikes, Głąbiński was delegated by the Polish Club as a speaker on the Ruthenian issue: "I have decided to present the Ruthenian cause in the Parliament in a clearly and firm, and to push away the notorious attempts at defaming our history and the Polish politics."¹³¹² After presenting much statistic data involving the economic situation of Galicia, the composition of nationalities of its population, and the Ruthenians' tactics aiming at antagonizing social relations in the country, Głąbiński said: "I have presented to you the bleak image of our relations and symptoms concerning the peasants' strikes in Eastern Galicia. I leave it to you to draw a conclusion as to whether the factions and persons that bring a terrifying storm upon our country, are right when they try to take advantage of it here in this House, and to threaten us."¹³¹³ The speech given by the president of the national democrats met with general acceptance from the society and all political factions. Its firm opponents were Ukrainians and socialists: "The Polish socialists (Daszyński) eagerly seconded the Ruthenians, who, in the period of the strikes, forgot they were Poles and that maintaining the Polish land in our hands is the main condition for securing our rights and political aspirations involving this country."¹³¹⁴

One of the outcomes of the peasants' strikes was active and determined opposition to the Ukrainian national movement and defense of the Polish status quo in Eastern Galicia.¹³¹⁵ The credit for special merits in the field of political activity

1311 *Czas*, no. 205, (1902), p. 1; *Czas*, no. 206, (1902), p. 1; *Gazeta Narodowa*, no. 220, (1902), p. 1.

1312 Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , pp. 43, 56.

1313 *Mowa posła Dra. St. Głąbińskiego*. . . dnia 29 października 1902. . . , pp. 45–46.

1314 Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , p. 44.

1315 *Czas*, no. 193, (1902), p. 1. *Przegląd Narodowy* wrote: "From now on, illusions were to disappear. It occurred that the 'Ukrainian' movement turned mainly and exclusively against Poles, that it was often negative, that its entire 'ideological' content was exhausted with hatred toward Poles. The rest of the expectations and theories turned out to be fiction. From that moment, since the peasants' strikes and later the attacks

should be given to the Central Electoral Commission (CKW) and Włodzimierz Kozłowski.¹³¹⁶

The policy of the landed gentry from Eastern Galicia approximated it to the national democracy in terms of the political program, which played the main role in strengthening the national awareness of Poles: “The group of the conservative Polish nobility from Podolia found an ally in the national democrats. The coalition of the Podolacy and National Democrats formed after the peasant’s strike of 1902 survived longer than the Hapsburg Monarchy in Galicia.”¹³¹⁷ Therefore, the National-Democratic Party strengthened its political influence in the eastern part of Galicia. National Democrats did not support them due to their nationalistic character. Opting for the Polonization of the Ruthenian population, they could not support the endeavors of the Ukrainians at the same time. Moreover, the National Democracy’s concept of rebuilding the Polish state was also supposed to include the Ukrainian lands in the borders of reborn Poland.¹³¹⁸ The populars, on the one hand, accepted the strikes, as the Polish and Ruthenian peasants opposed the economic exploitation, and, on the other hand, did not support their national dimension, because the populars’ program involved attachment to the Polish lands and its defense. The program of the Polish People’s Party (PSL) of 1903 included a telling postulate: “Let the slogan ‘Fatherland for

of the Ruthenian youth on the University of Lviv, the beginning of an overturn of the public opinion on the so-called Ruthenian cause. . . [People] understood the necessity of taking a defensive stand on the Ruthenians, and the first step in this direction was to raise the national awareness among the ruthenized or completely unaware of the national issues Polish nation in Eastern Galicia,” A. Sadzewicz, “Przegląd spraw polskich,” *PN*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1908), p. 371. It was an opinion expressed by *Przegląd Narodowy* affiliated with the National Democracy, so we could accuse it of partiality in perceiving the problem. Although, it does not seem to be wrong, especially as the opinion was confirmed by further events, such as the assassination of Viceroy A. Potocki in 1908, D.Litwin-Lewandowska, “Elity polityczne Galicji w opinii *Przeglądu Narodowego* w latach 1908–1914,” in: *Annales UMCS, Sectio K*, vol. 11, (2004), pp. 213–222.

1316 Kozłowski was one of the more active Polish deputies. In 1902, he returned his mandate to the Imperial Council and took over the chair of the Central Electoral Commission, Gruchała, *Rząd austriacki*. . . , p. 63; Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne*. . . , p. 240.

1317 Dunin-Wąsowicz, *Dzieje Stronnictwa Ludowego*. . . , p. 147.

1318 Gruchała, *Rząd austriacki i polskie stronnictwa*. . . , pp. 64–65; R. Wapiński, *Narodowa demokracja 1893–1939. Ze studiów nad dziejami myśli nacjonalistycznej* (Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow-Gdańsk Oss. 1980), p. 83.

Poles' fly over the lands of the country, and let it awaken the sense of national unity."¹³¹⁹ The socialists' stance consisted in negating the national character of the peasant's strikes, and stressing, above all, their economic dimension: "They were a purely economic phenomenon, despite the cries of *wszeczpolacy* (All-Poles) and *wszechrusini* (All-Ruthenians), who wanted to satisfy the peasants with a legal state program against the current Galician system and even, upon Głabiński's request, against the dynasty."¹³²⁰ Regarding the demands made by the strikers, we cannot deny him rightness. Simultaneously, Daszyński blamed the current situation in the Polish and Ruthenian rural areas on the populars, and accused them of contributing to the outbreak of the peasant's strikes: "It is a crime of Fr. Stojałowski, and the memorial of populars' misunderstanding of peasants. . . Today no one goes to the countryside with a clear program; only we try to do that with all the seriousness."¹³²¹

The stand of the Polish factions practically excluded the endeavor to stabilize the Polish-Ukrainian relations and to reach a national settlement. As J. Gruchała claimed: "At most, the possibility of tolerating the Ukrainian national movement was allowed."¹³²² The voice of reason was the statement of deputy Władysław Gniewosz presented at the meeting of September 1, in Złoczów: "Let us defend everything that is Polish, let us not miss an atom, but we shall not interrupt the Ruthenians in their civilizational progress. . . We could not make Poles out of Ruthenians. . . Today, I reckon, no one considers polonizing Ruthenians, but may the Ruthenians let themselves be told that they will not ruthenize us, Poles, nor will we let them take away a Polish unit. However, we shall unlearn the principle of bargaining with what the Ruthenians deserve, what we owe them, progressing in culture, in the development of our language and science."¹³²³

1319 The populars also rejected the idea of dividing Galicia, calling for the implementation of the program of separating the country, which was accepted on the basis of the motion of Smolko in 1868. The official stand on this matter was presented in 1903, in the PSL program. At the same time, the Populars did not present the concept of solving the Ukrainian issue, but only that of granting them liberties and national development, "1903 luty 27, Rzeszów. – Program Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego w Galicji," in: *Materiały źródłowe do historii*. . . I, pp. 76, 78.

1320 "Strajki rolne," *Naprzód*, no. 9 (1903), p. 2; "5 I 1903. Referat na VIII Kongres PPSD w Przemysłu pt. 'Strajki rolne,'" in: *I. Daszyński, Teksty, wybrał, opracował oraz wstępem opatrzył Jerzy Myśliński, przypisy sporządzili Jerzy Myśliński i Jacek Szczubiński*, (Warsaw 1986), p. 110.

1321 "5 I 1903. Referat na VIII Kongres PPSD. . .," p. 107.

1322 Gruchała, *Rząd austriacki i polskie*. . . , p. 65.

1323 "Przegląd polityczny," *Naprzód*, no. 242 (1902), p. 2.

Another matter dividing the political factions was their attitudes toward the electoral reform to the Galician parliament.¹³²⁴ The advocates for implementing the parliamentary reform were the Cracow conservatives and Viceroy of Galicia, Michał Bobrzyński, who admitted that: “Once, my ambition used to be that Poles and Ruthenians alone, without any intervention of the Viennese government, or only with the participation of the Polish ministers at most, reach a settlement with the Ruthenians.”¹³²⁵ Their policy was not supported by the circles of the National Democracy and the Podolacy, who feared that by increasing the number of seats for the Ukrainian people in Eastern Galicia, the Diet would lose part of its ability to pursue strictly Polish national politics. The confirmation of this may be Edward Dubanowicz’s words that, seemingly, could also be used as the motto for the conservatives’ activity in the struggle for implementing the Diet reform: “Not to wander from the path of real and objectively motivated interests of the whole country concerning the parliamentary reform, to free from the suggestions imposed by the deceptive and fallacious slogan of the so-called Polish-Ruthenian settlement, to work firmly and calmly, avoiding any unnecessary delay or exaggerated rush, and without any concessions to the Ukrainian faction, which would enhance the Polish-Ruthenian political fight, and leave the next generation in a dead-end situation.”¹³²⁶ A Cracow conservative, Jaworski, was also of the same opinion. He claimed that the fight of Ukrainians was not only a fight for political rights and national equality, but also for the access to the posts, offices and for taking over the lands belonging to the Polish landowners. For this reason, “the Poles, by defending their position in Eastern Galicia, at the same time, defend the country and state against the revolutionary endeavors.”¹³²⁷ The concessions that the conservatives, both the Stańczycy and the Podolacy, could have agreed to were, in fact, not supposed to violate their status quo. The adjectiveless democrats favored the reform, and this fact threatened the disintegration of the democratic camp. The populars also opted for the reform, since its implementation would award more seats to the curia of peasants, and thus increase the representation of the peasantry: “The Supreme Council shall revoke all concessions related to the electoral reform made to the landowners, and

1324 See: J. Buszko, *Sejmowa reforma wyborcza w Galicji 1905–14*, (Warsaw 1956); W.L. Jaworski, *Listy z sejmu 1910r.*, (Cracow 1911)

1325 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*. . . , p. 376.

1326 Dubanowicz, *Sejmowa reforma wyborcza*. . . , p. 27.

1327 Jaworski, *Listy z sejmu 1910r.* . . . , pp. 149–150.

demand the implementation of the four-point electoral law.¹³²⁸ Fr. S. Stojałowski also advocated the reform on the election system to the Diet, proposing an increase in the number of the electoral curiae, for the craftsmen, rural teachers, and railwaymen. He believed that the Diet should be a “mirror of society.”¹³²⁹ However, the demands for the modernization of the electoral law were the most far-reaching in the case of the socialists. Even before implementing the universal election to the Austrian parliament, Daszyński claimed that “it would be the best and far-sighted policy toward the Austrian Poland to grant full electoral rights not only to a few noblemen but to all Poles.”¹³³⁰

These discrepancies became one of the bases for the creation of two opposing entities in the form of the vice-regal “Bloc,” consisting of the Cracow conservatives, adjectiveless democrats, populars, secessionists from the national-democratic faction, some socialists, and of the “Anti-Bloc,” which gathered the national democrats and the Podolacy.¹³³¹

The turning point in the fight for the reform on the electoral law to the Diet was the resolution of the parliamentary Polish Club of January 1912, on opening the negotiations between the factions of the Club and the Ukrainian opposition and parties. It was a consequence of the Club’s resolution of November 5, in which it was stated that: “The Polish Club considers the change of the electoral system to the Diet to be a political necessity, and calls on its presidium to initiate the vigorous steps. . . in order to enact the electoral law.”¹³³² After reaching a compromise, on March 17, 1913, a meeting of the Reform Committee was held, at which the draft parliamentary reform was voted through, with the opposition of the National Democrats and the Podolacy.¹³³³ The conviction of political success was momentary. The Polish bishops sitting the Galician Diet, in the pastoral letter published in the press, presented their stance against it, which resulted in

1328 “13 Grudzień 13., Rzeszów – Uchwały Rady Naczelnej PSL (późniejszej PSL Lewica) w sprawie sytuacji w ruchu ludowym,” in: *Materiały źródłowe do historii*. . . , I, p. 147.

1329 “Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 5 listopada 1907r.,” *Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa*. . . , BJ TB, MS. 8109 III, f. 31.

1330 The quote comes from the parliamentary speech of I. Daszyński of December 5, 1905, given in the House of Deputies of the Imperial Council, in: Daszyński, *Teksty*. . . , p. 129.

1331 Skwara, *Konserwatyści wschodniogalicjyjscy – Podolacy*. . . , pp. 28–29.

1332 “Protokół z posiedzenia Koła Polskiego z 5 listopada 1907r.,” *Różne akta z czasów namiestnictwa*. . . , BJ TB, MS. 8109 III, f. 31.

1333 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiątek*. . . , p. 323; Buszko, *Sejmowa reforma wyborcza*. . . , pp. 239–240.

the failure of the draft reform.¹³³⁴ After some perturbations, the reform on the electoral system to the national parliament was eventually adopted on February 14, 1914, in the form proposed by the former Viceroy Bobrzyński¹³³⁵: “The resolutions of the parliament concerning the change of the electoral law were passed without hindrance, and often unanimously.”¹³³⁶

Politicians and other opinion-forming circles evaluated the parliamentary reform variously. Witos, although he did not assess the new electoral law very favorably, claimed that “it brought rather far-reaching changes for the better,” i.e., the extension of electoral rights in the rural curia and the increase in the number of seats for peasant deputies.¹³³⁷ The official stance of the Polish People’s Party “Piast” (PSL “Piast”) was as follows: “The PSL congress acknowledges with pleasure the settlement in the matter of the parliamentary electoral reform, which shall become the beginning of a sincere and reliable settlement between Poles and Ruthenians.”¹³³⁸ Daszyński was critical of the adopted draft reform: “The electoral reform. . . did not come into force, fortunately. Thus, this legal record of disgrace and stupidity of nobility will only lie around in the dustbin of history as a subject of research for hardworking academics.”¹³³⁹ *Przegląd Narodowy*, quoting *Gazeta Warszawska*, wrote that: “The implementation of the electoral reform is, undeniably, a fact of great importance for the internal politics in Galicia and for the whole political situation of our nation. However, we may not claim that it is the end of the Ruthenian-Polish conflict,” and further: “There should be a full awareness of the fact that nothing has really changed in the relations between

1334 The letter was signed by Abp. Iwowski Józef Bilczewski, Bp. of Przemyśl Józef Peczar, Fr. Bp. of Cracow Adam Sapieha, Abp. Józef Teodorowicz, Bp. of Tarnów Leon Wałęga. See: “Episkopat polski w Galicji wobec reformy wyborczej,” *Przegląd Powszechny*, vol. 118, (1913), pp. 295–299.

1335 Buszko, *Sejmowa reforma wyborcza. . .*, pp. 263–264. The reform did not introduce the principle of equality, but only extended the electoral rights to some groups, especially the poorer, by lowering the financial qualifications. Moreover, it maintains the system of the representation of interests, completed by the rule of representation of the Polish and Ruthenian nations. The number of seats increased to 227, Grodziski, *Sejm Krajowy galicyjski. . .*, pp. 69–70.

1336 Only Stapiński and the Ukrainian socialist deputies voted against it, Witos, *Moje wspomnienia*, I, p. 269.

1337 Witos, *Moje wspomnienia*, I, p. 269.

1338 “1914 Luty 1, Tarnów – Rezolucja W. Witosa i J. Dębskiego, uchwalone na Kongresie PSL (późniejsze PSL Piast) w sprawie programu i taktyki wyborczej,” in: *Materiały źródłowe do historii. . .*, I, p. 149.

1339 Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, II, p. 103.

Ruthenians and Poles, that the methods of the Ruthenian policy may currently undergo some kind of change at the most.”¹³⁴⁰

As a conclusion, we shall state that the breakthrough in the activity of the Polish Club occurred with the implementation of changes to the electoral law to the Imperial Council. Firstly, it was the establishment of the fifth curia of popular voting, and secondly, the adaptation of the principle of universality. In both cases, the result was almost identical – granting seats to the politicians in opposition to the political line represented by the conservatives. When the populars and socialists received the parliamentary seats, the Club was forced to cooperate with them; otherwise, its position would have become considerably weaker. This process took place gradually, and not without some resistance on both sides. After the elections of 1907, *Przegląd Narodowy* wrote that: “The Galician conservatives, in their fight against the raising significance of the democratic elements, seek support, on the one hand, in the catholic factions, and on the other hand, in the field of the agrarian politics, which is to become a connection between the populars and us. The alliance between the conservatives and populars in the Polish Club in Vienna would be sought by the conservatives above all – they see the democrats as rivals who may want to claim their succession of power, while the popular faction cannot be a dangerous competitor in this respect.”¹³⁴¹

The fundamental problem that stood in the way of the politicians from the Polish Club at that time was the breakdown of the Galician representation in the parliament. It should be stated that it had neither the influence in the House and in the relations with the government nor the exclusive right to represent the interests of the Galician population anymore. Similarly to the Monarchy in 1867, the Polish Club needed political support as well. The only ally could turn out to be the populars. Reaching an agreement with the socialists seemed impossible, mainly due to their radicalism. We also shall add, that the chair of the Club no longer fully belonged to its conservative part, but was passed into the hands of the national and adjectiveless democrats. National Democrats, in turn, were the second-largest parliamentary club, with sixteen seats in the House. At that time, Dawid Abrahamowicz was president of the Club, although when the democrats founded the “Democratic Union,” he was replaced by Stanisław Głąbiński: “The change in the presidium of the Polish representation in Vienna was a statement of this overturn toward the democratization of the leading factors.”¹³⁴² In order

1340 S. Kozicki, “Przegląd spraw polskich,” *PN*, no. 2, vol. 13 (1914), pp. 203–204.

1341 A. Sadzewicz, “Przegląd spraw polskich,” *PN*, no. 1, vol. 1 (1908), p. 92.

1342 A. Sadzewicz, “Przegląd spraw polskich,” *PN*, no. 1, vol. 1 (1908), p. 89.

to maintain the current position of the Club and not to let the democrats take over the power, the conservative deputies were forced to ally with the populars.

In November 1907, the conservatives reached a secret agreement with the populars, given the upcoming elections to the national Diet. The agreement was the basis for them joining the Polish Club in April 1908. As a result, the Polish Club became the representation of the entire Galicia again. The Polish opposition in the House consisted of only six socialist deputies at that time. At that moment, the Club was composed of the Cracow conservatives, the Podolacy, National Democrats in alliance with the Stojałowczycy, “adjectiveless” democrats and populars.

The next election of 1911 brought a significant improvement to the situation of the conservative politicians, who were then granted twenty seats. In the new parliament, the national democrats could no longer play such an essential role as they did in the previous one, especially with the much better position of the conservatives and populars.¹³⁴³

So far, the Polish Club was a monolith on the forum of the Austrian parliament and wanted to be perceived as such, although, in reality, the politicians affiliated with the club did not agree in the matters related to the ideology and program. It seems that until the end of the nineteenth century, the members of the Club took a relatively unified stance on the issue of mutual relations between Austria and Poland, i.e., they approved the pro-Austrian orientation and accepted the necessity of expanding the autonomy of Galicia. What divided the deputies, among other things, was their attitude toward the peasants’ or Ruthenians’ issues.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the main objectives of the current policy of the Club remained unchanged. Following the tradition, the Club aimed to maintain the loyalty toward the crown, and, with it, to the internal autonomy. The expansion of the political platform in the Club resulted in the necessity to reconcile the policy with new goals, represented by the populars and national democrats, and during the war also by the socialists. These were primarily social issues, raised by the populars and socialists, but also the national policy included in the political program of the National Democracy. Obviously, attempts to

1343 The national democrats intended to reach a settlement with the populars, and to subjugate the peasants’ faction to them. National Democrats maintained close relations with Karol Lewakowski, leader of the Popular’s Party. They even intended to vote for him in the elections to the Imperial Council in 1900, while they were unable to present their candidate themselves. However, Lewakowski denied, fearing that, in that way, he would become obliged and forced, as a deputy, to fulfill it, Wątor, *Działalność Stronnictwa Demokratyczno-Narodowego*. . . , pp. 26–27.

reconcile such ideologically various programs could not take place without any conflicts. Moreover, the internal relations in the Polish Club began to deteriorate, especially in the case when the objectives of the Monarchy's policy contradicted the program of one of the opposing factions. This problem was particularly evident when the incompatibility of the aims of the policies of Austria and the Club concerned the issues of Galicia. It should also be noted that the relations in the Club deteriorated during the First World War. At the bottom of the discrepancies in the Club were the differences concerning the fundamental solution for Poles, i.e., the question of regaining independence.

The events preceding the outbreak of the First World War and the emergence of programs with the independent-related content brought about a significant change. The postulate concerning the creation of the free Polish state and the downfall of the pro-Austrian orientation during the war resulted in the conservatives losing their electorate, and, consequently, their position in the Polish Club. This was also influenced by the endeavors of Ukrainians initially to create a separated province from the lands of Eastern Galicia, and later the free Ukraine. In such a situation, the most popular were the groups emphasizing the national contents, i.e., the National-Democratic Party and the Podolacy.

CHAPTER 4: Conceptions of the Polish National Interest in Austria

1. The Austro-Polish Compromise

The Emperor's rescript of November 17, 1866 was a turning point in the history of the Habsburg Monarchy, and in principle sanctioned its division into the Austrian and Hungarian parts. At that point, Hungarians already acquired their own statehood within the historic borders. From the point of view of the interior relations, their position was more convenient than that of Germans in Austria, due to their dominating position compared to other nations. The Hungarians were capable of creating their own state policy without the help of other nations. In turn, the Austrian part of the Monarchy was in a lack of a nation capable of conducting independent politics. The difference, resulting from ratio of power between the Austrian Germans and, for instance, Poles or Czechs with an established national awareness, was too insignificant to ensure the independence of Germans.¹³⁴⁴ These conditions caused the need to conclude an agreement with one of the nations of Cisleithania and, effectively, to obtain an unrestricted decision efficiency. However, the future showed that despite the alliance, the Austrian government was affected by crises and its political situation was unstable. This situation was often exploited by the Galician politicians, who decided to establish cooperation with the Austro-Hungarian Empire by agreeing to its transformation into a dual monarchy.¹³⁴⁵

Therefore, when the issue of the division of the Habsburg state was practically decided, there emerged a necessity for reaching a compromise between the Austrian Germans and one of the nations of Cisleithania – Czechs, Ruthenians (Ukrainians), Slovenians or Poles. Czechs consistently stood in opposition.¹³⁴⁶

1344 In 1867, the nations of the Habsburg monarchy included the Austrian Germans in Cisleithania and the Hungarians in Transleithania, even though they constituted a minority compared to the Slavs. The Austrian part of the country was inhabited by 35.78 % of Germans, while in the Hungarian part the Magyars constituted 45 % of the total population. In the whole Monarchy the Slavic peoples outnumbered the others – there were 30 million Slavs per 52 million inhabitants, J. Buszko, *Austro-Węgry w latach 1870–1914* (Warsaw; 1957), p. 5.

1345 H. Wereszycki, *Historia polityczna Polski 1864–1918* (Ossolineum, 1990), p. 23.

1346 A day before the Austro-Hungarian settlement, the Czechs tried by all possible means to prevent its conclusion and therefore boycotted the deliberations of the Council of State. In this way, using Section 15 of the Basic Law on State Representation, which

In the case of the Ruthenian or Slovenian population, the compromise would not have the appropriate political significance since, at that time, both of these nations exhibited a weak national awareness and, most importantly, had a limited possibilities to exert a political influence. From the point of view of the Monarchy's interests, the compromise should have been concluded with Poles. In fact, it was a settlement between the Galician nobility, and not between the inhabitants of Galicia and Germans.¹³⁴⁷ The choice of Poles was also determined by the regards of international significance. Austria attempted to balance between the alliance with Prussia and Russia. In the both cases, the Poles were the factor that could either dynamize or stabilize this political set-up. Stanisław Głąbiński, a National Democrat, president of the Polish Circle from 1907 and the Ministry of Railway in 1911, wrote: "In this case, the eyes of Austrian monarchs and politicians turned to the Poles and the future Poland, with the help of whom it was possible to check the opponents and even gain a new ally."¹³⁴⁸

The day before the division of the Habsburg Monarchy into the Austrian and Hungarian parts, a political leaning toward the Habsburgs was already evident among Poles. The reason for this state of affairs should be considered foremost the autonomous concessions granted in the constitutional period and the appointment of Agenor Gołuchowski the father the viceroy of Galicia in 1859. The pro-Austrian attitude weakened with the declaration of the state of siege in Galicia in 1864, which was the consequence of the January Uprising. However, the following events, i.e., the announcement of the September's Manifesto by the Emperor,¹³⁴⁹ resulted in the return to the previously pursued policy. The text of the manifesto expressed the

states that the consent of 100 Members of Parliament and 40 members of the House of Lords is required for a resolution to take effect, they intended to nullify the plans of Austria and Hungary, S. Grodziski, *Sejm krajowy galicyjski 1861–1914* (Warsaw; 1993), p. 147; S. Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego czyli ustawy konstytucyjne austriackie* (Lviv; 1901), p. 435.

1347 H. Wereszycki, *Pod berłem Habsburgów. Zagadnienie narodowościowe* (Cracow; 1957), pp. 192–193.

1348 S. Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne* (Pelplin; 1939), pp. 31–32.

1349 The Imperial Manifesto of 20 September 1865 announced that the Monarch's primary aim would be to return to the ideas contained in the October Diploma and to strive to maintain the power of the state "by common treatment of its highest tasks," and by ensuring the unity of the State, "given the diversity of its constituent parts". Moreover, the Emperor assured the peoples of the monarchy to enable them to participate in the law-making and financial management of the state through participation in legislative bodies, K. Bartoszewicz, *Dzieje Galicji, jej stan przed wojną i "wyodrębnienie"* (Cracow; 1917), pp. 127–128.

Monarch's willingness to reach an agreement with the nations of the Habsburg state, which already in 1865 seemed inevitable, and the defeat in the war with Prussia in 1866 only speeded the necessity for the compromise. The view that this war determined the transformation of the Habsburg Monarchy into a dual monarchy, while the position of Austria in the talks with Hungary was significantly weaker, should be considered true: "No settlement was reached with Hungary before the war broke out, and after [the battle of] Sadowo all their demands had to be accepted."¹³⁵⁰

The Poles positively accepted the Emperor's declarations and, according to Kazimierz Bartosiewicz, from that moment on we may witness a definite "turn of Galicia toward the Crown."¹³⁵¹ According to Krzysztof Kamil Daszyk, this fundamental change in the course of the Polish politics was determined not only by loyalty to the Monarchy, but also "the serious political reckonings."¹³⁵² The alliance with the Crown was also in the interest of the ruling classes in Galicia – the nobility and the large group of landowners. At this point, it is worth explaining what factors decided on their support for the Austro-Hungarian dualism.

The first one of those factors may be described as social, since it concerned the relations in the Galician countryside. One of the reasons for the existing conflicts between the court and the countryside was the unresolved question of forest and pasture easements.¹³⁵³ That was the argument evoked in political games with the landowners. The issue of easements was related to the question of the Galician administration. The nobility aimed to take over the apparatus of power in Galicia, which would allow it to gain control and the possibility to impose sanctions directed against the peasants. The following factor was the so-called Ukrainian question, which was not only the internal nationally-marked problem of Galicia, but also of Austria. Apart from the issue of peasants, it constituted yet another argument in the government's policy, which was used to persuade the Polish politicians to support solutions beneficial to the Monarchy. Moreover, under the February

1350 The war showed that the monarchy is a *conglomeration of several "kingdoms and countries"*, kept loyal to the dynasty by bureaucracy and the army. This overturn naturally had an immediate impact on the balance of power within the Monarchy, S. Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha 1828–1903* (Warsaw; 1993), pp. 185–186.

1351 Bartosiewicz, *Dzieje Galicji, jej stan. . .*, p. 128.

1352 K. K. Daszyk, "Między polską racją stanu a habsburskim mitem," in: *Galicja i jej dziedzictwo*, I, *Historia i polityka*, ed. W. Bonusiak, J. Buszko (Rzeszów; 1994), p. 70.

1353 During the process of liquidation of the feudal system in the Monarchy, the law on exploiting forests and meadows that belonged to the nobility by peasants was not regulated. It was in the interest of landowners to resolve this issue in their favor, while the Austrian government deliberately left it unresolved.

Patent, the Emperor had the right to order direct elections to the Imperial Council in the event when the national Diet, as a tactical measure, did not intend to elect representation to parliament. The elections were open, and therefore allowed for manipulation of voters, especially in the rural curia. On the other hand, the electoral constituencies could be situated in such a way as to provide the advantage to a given group or social class.¹³⁵⁴ All of the above solution posed a threat to the position of the nobility. Therefore, in contrast to the Czech deputies, Poles very rarely resorted to the policy of absence. It is also important to stress the significance of the factor concerning foreign situation. The day before the outbreak of the French-Prussian war, Poles anticipated the recurrence of the Polish cause on the international stage. The Austro-French and Russian-Prussian alliances were expected to be formed. Austria used the hopes of the Poles to coerce them into supporting the centralist policy. It was proved to be a deliberate move, in return for which Poles gained control over the administrative apparatus in Galicia. In practice, this meant the resolution of the issue of easements, in accordance with the interest of the landowners and control over the Ukrainian movement.¹³⁵⁵

The Austro-Prussian war interrupted the session of the Galician Diet, which was not resumed until November 19, and ended on December 31, 1866.¹³⁵⁶ During the session, on December 10, 1866, the Galician politicians adopted the famous address to the Emperor. The address included a direct request to the Monarch to remember about his nations, their rights and aspirations for freedom. The Galician politicians stressed that centralist policy jeopardizes their development and that of Austria at the same time. The Poles expressed there the opinion that the nations that the country is composed of may determine the strength of the state, provided that they are granted appropriate conditions, that is granted autonomous concessions. The address formulated this view in the following way: "Austria shall be strong and powerful. . . its entirety will be secured, its prosperity and power will increase as all the moral and material powers of the crown countries will develop and grow on the historical and national foundations through their autonomous establishment." The basis for the address was the October Diploma of 1860. In it, Poles appealed to the Monarch to put off the centralist policy. They also entrusted him Galicia and the Polish nation. The trust in the Monarch was expressed in the

1354 Starzyński, *Kodeks prawa politycznego*. . . , p. 167; A. Nowicki, *Historia Austrii konstytucyjnej 1860–1907* (Vienna; 1912), vol. I, pp. 39, 41.

1355 Wereszycki, *Pod berłem Habsburgów*. . . , pp. 193–194.

1356 S. Grodziski, "Walka o wyodrębnienie Galicji," *Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne (CPH)*, vol. 1 (1985), p. 63.

following sentence: “Without fear of deviating from our national mind, with faith in the mission of Austria and with confidence in the firmness of the change that your Monarchic word spoke as an unchangeable intention, from the depths of our hearts we declare that by thee, Gracious Lord! we stand and want to stand.”¹³⁵⁷

The deputies of the national Diet were then accused of “servilism” (*szużalstwo*) to the Emperor and the Monarchy.¹³⁵⁸ The very circumstances of the creation of the address and the work on its final form speak against this opinion. Before passing it, the Diet held heated discussions on the content and wording of the address. Stanisław Tarnowski wrote: “We cannot say if there ever has been a discussion as versatile and exhaustive in our Diet.”¹³⁵⁹ The general situation of the Monarchy was stated in L. Rodakowski’s speech, whereas the detailed issues were described by Adam Potocki and Ludwik Wodzicki, and the Galician affairs were referred to in the speeches of Kornel Krzeczunowicz, Stanisław Grocholski and Mikołaj Zybliekiewicz.¹³⁶⁰

1357 The entire text of the address in: M. Bobrzyński, W. L. Jaworski, J. Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego Galicji 1859–1873* (Warsaw; 1905), pp. 120–122.

1358 Bartoszewicz, *Dzieje Galicji, jej stan...*, p. 147.

1359 S. Tarnowski, “O adresie sejmii galicyjskiego,” *Przegląd Polski*, vol. 1 (1867). See also: M. Bobrzyński, W. L. Jaworski, J. Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego...*, p. 260.

1360 Two drafts of the address to the crown were submitted to the Galician Parliament. One of them was written by Polish deputies, while the other was formulated by Ruthenians. Its pronunciation was unambiguous. The Ruthenian representation expressed their dissatisfaction with the departure from the centralist political course, and thus with the negative assessment of Richard Bellegri’s rule. The Russians also opposed the implemented autonomous reforms and the appointment of Agenor Gołuchowski as viceroy of Galicia. They believed that in a country where there was a conflict between Poles and Ruthenians, between landowners and peasants, there existed a need to appoint a person who could reconcile the interests of both sides. The nomination of Gołuchowski did not guarantee a solution to these conflicts, on the contrary, it was a promise of favoring the Polish population, especially the landed nobility. The address of the Ukrainian deputies also included a postulate to introduce separate curia and a national department. It seems that this address, despite its conciliatory tone, would not have produced tangible benefits for Galicia. The proposal to divide it into Polish and Ukrainian parts, withdraw from autonomous concessions and introduce separate national departments and electoral curia cannot be assessed positively. Its reading by the Ukrainian deputy, Fr Dobrzański (who later changed his name to Dobriański) was preceded by the speeches of the Polish deputies L. Rodakowski and L. Borkowski. Rodakowski outlined the general situation of the Monarchy, which in his opinion should become an advocate of the Slavic peoples’ interests. Such a policy would be beneficial for Austria, especially in terms of relations with Russia. Thus, his speech clearly stressed two ideas of the address of December 10,

i.e. the reciprocity of relations between Galicia and the monarchy and the compatibility of interests with the neighboring powers, i.e. Russia and Prussia. In order to establish an internal balance, Austria should consider the needs of the Slavic nations. The benefits provided by such a policy would be mutual. The Crown countries would be granted autonomy, while the monarchy, not affected by internal conflicts, could focus on strengthening its position toward its neighbors. Borkowski's speech contained mainly criticism of the economic and social situation of the monarchy. Thus, he stressed the problem of carrying out financial reforms and improving the level of education, otherwise the decentralization of the state would not bring any tangible benefits. The next speaker was A. Potocki. In his speech, Potocki included the idea that the adoption of the address by the Diet would initiate the process of Galicia's fight against the centralism of Vienna. He also claimed that centralism leads to the elimination of national identity, and therefore should not be the main objective of Austria's internal policy. He assessed the state's efforts to internationalize and restrict political freedom negatively. In his opinion, not only the monarch, but also the current government were trustworthy enough to make efforts to reach an agreement with them. Potocki was followed by L. Wodzicki, who stated that entrusting the Polish cause to the Monarch was not tantamount to giving up the fight for autonomy. Wodzicki believed that taking an opposing position would be the last resort. However, he did not exclude this possibility, especially in a situation where national aspirations were clearly threatened. Moreover, he also spoke on behalf of other peoples of the monarchy, claiming that only in a situation of general political freedom would Galicia be able to maintain its autonomy. Wodzicki thus became an expression of the national aspirations of all Slavic nations. The speech of Fr Naumowicz, a Ukrainian deputy, was directed against the Polish position concerning the pronunciation of the address to the crown. He stressed that the address did not take into consideration the needs and aspirations of the Ruthenian nation. Therefore, he proposed to move to the agenda and vote on the draft address. At the same time he emphasized that both the current government and viceroy A. Gołuchowski do not secure the rights of Ruthenians. The response to that was the speech of K. Krzeczynowicz, who recalled the vote in the Diet on the municipal law. At that time the Polish and Ruthenian deputies jointly supported that no governmental approval was required for the election of the mayors. The act voted through together freed the mayors from being dependent on the government. M. Zyblikiewicz's speech was directly directed against the minority draft address. He accused the Ukrainian deputies that the postulated return of the centralists not only to the Polish nation, but also to everyone else, would not bring any benefits, but would give the Germans an advantage. Zyblikiewicz also said: "I am a Ruthenian too [. . .] as a Ruthenian, I oppose this address on my own as well as on my fellow Ruthenians' behalf." At the same time, however, Grocholski recalled some facts that were inconvenient for Russians. He stressed the inconsistency of their behavior toward the Polish representation in the Imperial Council. It was important that the Polish-Russian alliance in the House was broken and the Ruthenians took the side of German centralists. Then, at their request, the Poles stayed in the country because of the holidays, but the Russians went. The absence of Poles was explained by political reasons. K. Grocholski also recalled the

The debate was followed by the vote on the draft address. Dobrzański's motion to vote on the project of the majority was supported by twenty-three deputies, thus not even all the Ruthenians voted for it. Afterwards, particular parts of the address were discussed. During the discussion, the Ruthenians used filibustering, although they obtained no significant results. Eventually, the draft was adopted with the majority of eighty-four supporting votes and forty votes against.¹³⁶¹

The address of December 10, 1866 has its established place in the history of Poland, primarily as the means for expression of the attitude of Galician politicians, who criticized the centralist policy of the Monarchy, and at the same time counted on the Emperor's support in resolving the Polish question. In the opening words, the national Diet announced that it would not give up its national aspirations, regarding them as the basis of the conducted policy. Only in the further part of the sentence did it express its stand toward the Monarch and the Emperor, whom Poles perceived as the guarantor of autonomous aspirations. In the eyes of a part of the Polish society, the address was condemned and considered a resignation from the pro-independence postulates, as a voluntary recognition of the partition of Poland. For others, the intention of the national Diet and the author of the address, A. Potocki,¹³⁶² was to reach a mutual agreement between the Emperor and Galicia. Provided that the monarch had granted autonomy to the province and acted as the "man of the moment," Galicia would have remained loyal to the dynasty. At the same time, Austria would have gained an ally. Despite the fact that the Emperor

statement of one of the Ruthenian deputies about the state of the siege of Galicia, who did not assess this situation negatively. In defense of the Polish address project spoke the Ruthenian deputy, Teodor Szemelowski. He noted that the minority project is an expression of aspirations of only a certain faction. He pointed out the fact that there was a consensus of interests between the two nations living in Galicia in terms of independence from Vienna. He saw the discussion in the Galician Parliament as a debate on the future of Galicia, shared by both sides. He also stressed the lack of a real conflict between Ruthenians and Poles, which in his opinion is artificially provoked. The last speaker was A. Gołuchowski. He was on the side of the majority. He emphasized that the minority project could not get much support, because it was against logic. Moreover, he defined the position of the government which did not seek to favor any nationality. The course of the parliamentary debate, which was presented above, can be found in: Bartoszewicz, *Dzieje Galicji, jej stan. . .*, pp. 147–153.

1361 Bartoszewicz, *Dzieje Galicji, jej stan. . .*, p. 153.

1362 W. Feldman wrote that the author of the last phrase of the address from 1866 was supposedly Adam Potocki, but the spiritual father of this venture and the entire settlement policy was Agenor Gołuchowski the father, W. Feldman, *Stronnicstwa i programy polityczne w Galicji 1864–1906*, I (Cracow; 1907), p. 63.

rejected Galicia's offer, the province kept the agreement. Undoubtedly, this fact did not have a positive impact on the assessment of the address of December 10.¹³⁶³

In 1867, *Przegląd Polski* published a dissertation of Stanisław Tarnowski, in which he presented the current political views of the Galician deputies and evaluated the address of December 10, 1866. In his opinion, the text of the address was in favor of the Galician Diet, which aspirations were consistent with the Polish *raison d'état*. Such was the pronouncement of the address, which contained the principle of national policy, based on logical grounds and historical necessity.¹³⁶⁴

In Polish historiography, there exists an established view that the intention of the authors of the address was to sell Poland to the Habsburg Monarchy. It is based on the fragment of the final part of the address, as follows: "from the depths of

1363 Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*. . . , pp. 190–191.

1364 S. Tarnowski expressed uncertainty as to whether the plans of the Galician Diet would be properly interpreted by the Emperor, and if so, whether Austria would commit to their implementation. He believed, and expressed it categorically, that: The Diet could and, therefore, should have declared on behalf of the state that without fear of a deviation of our national thought, it wished to support the Monarchy in its mission and that it would stand by it. He stressed that the fundamental goal of Polish politics is to oppose the policy of centralization, which was clearly emphasized. If so, the Galician Diet cannot be accused of embezzling autonomous aspirations. The essence of the address lies in this famous statement: *by thee, Gracious Lord! we stand and want to stand*, which S. Tarnowski explains as a necessary overriding principle of Galician politics. According to S. Tarnowski, Galicia's position on the Austrian side and national aspirations are not contradictory. The ideal situation would be if the monarchy could respect the rights of nations, then these nations could freely exercise their right to freedom. Therefore, as was demonstrated in the article, the address cannot be seen as a manifestation of the national parliament's extreme loyalty to the Monarchy. The author also raises the problem of a wider meaning of the address than only Galician. The national Diet insisted on taking into consideration national interests, although not only Polish, but also those of other nationalities that are part of Austria. In this way, S. Tarnowski argued that the success of the state's endeavours in internal politics depend upon its attitude toward individual nations. He then claimed that the situation within the Austrian state would affect Austria's relations with its neighbors, and thus determine the monarchy's foreign policy. On this basis, S. Tarnowski believed that the pronouncement of any of the addresses of the Crown countries does not go as far as the address of the Galician Diet: *because their matters settled or likely to be settled within the Monarchy itself do not need to be concerned about its foreign relations. In contrast, it is different for us, whose "most European" matter goes beyond the scope of the internal affairs of the Austrian state*, S. Tarnowski, "O adresie sejmu galicyjskiego," *Przegląd Polski*, vol. 1 (1867), pp. 108–149. The text was also published in: Bobrzyński, Jaworski, Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego*. . . , p. 255.

our hearts we declare that by thee, Gracious Lord! we stand and want to stand.”¹³⁶⁵ Wilhelm Feldman was of the opinion that the address was “the sanction of Galicia’s annexation to the Austrian crown.” He also thought that the address itself was “an official act of merging with the House of Habsburg, a voluntary incorporation into the Australian homeland, which was handed the ideals and Jagiellons’ mission as a statue.”¹³⁶⁶ Irena Pannekowa was of a different opinion. She claimed that the address did not contain any statement that could be considered as “the sanction of Galicia’s annexation,” although she highlighted that “this is how the era of small compromises and national tenders was initiated in Galician politics.” Moreover, she claimed that the address was a kind of alliance with the crown based on common political interest.¹³⁶⁷ Kazimierz Bartoszewicz was of a similar view. He analyzed this famous fragment of the address and concluded that the national Diet did not state: “and we will always stand but want to stand.”¹³⁶⁸ That would indicate that the position of Galicia depends directly on the Austrian policy, though it does not equal sanctioning the partition. Relying on Austria and giving oneself to it does not mean unconditional loyalism and selling out, but a condition for cooperation. If the Monarchy took into consideration Galicia’s aspirations, then it could count on a loyal ally.¹³⁶⁹ *Przegląd Lwowski* gave a similar meaning to the address: “the only haven left for the Polish nation, the only anchor for the future of the nation. We dropped this anchor and reached this haven, and it was not a provincial, Galician, but a national policy.”¹³⁷⁰ Andrzej Ajnenkiel shared this opinion. He claimed that the address of 1866 should not be interpreted exclusively as an expression of the: “opportunistic attitude of the Polish nobility from the Austrian partition, dictated by narrow class interests.” He emphasized the necessity to take into consideration the national rights of Poles in Austria.¹³⁷¹ L. Wodzicki, a deputy to the Imperial Council, interpreted the authors’ intentions in the following way: “we

1365 Bobrzyński, Jaworski, Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego*. . . , p. 122.

1366 Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne*. . . , pp. 62–63.

1367 I. Pannekowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim. Dzieje rezolucji sejmu galicyjskiego z 24 września 1868r.* (Lviv; 1918), p. 45.

1368 Among the group of the Polish deputies in the Galician Diet, only one of them, Ignacy Lipczyński, postulated that the following phrase should be included in the address: *by thee. . . we stand*, but drop: *we will stand*, but his proposal was not supported, and the deputy himself exposed himself to many persecutions and ridicule, W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej 1864–1914* (Warsaw; 1933), p. 57.

1369 Bartoszewicz, *Dzieje Galicji, jej stan*. . . , p. 147.

1370 Z. J., “Ogólne położenie europejskie i stanowisko narodowe polskie,” *Przegląd Lwowski*, b. XV (1877), p. 163.

1371 A. Ajnenkiel, *Historia sejmu polskiego*, II, p. 1., *W dobie zaborów* (Warsaw; 1989), p. 102.

give ourselves to Austria but we do not sell ourselves to it.”¹³⁷² Henryk Wereszycki also did not consider the address a manifestation of an ultra-loyalist attitude, but something similar to an alliance with the crown. He suggested that it was not only the content of the address that supported this opinion, but also the circumstances in which the text was written, as well as the general situation of the Monarchy the day before reaching an agreement with Hungary.¹³⁷³ Stanisław Głąbiński assessed the meaning of the address in a similar way, claiming that it: “was in its conditional form almost an offer to enter into a mutual alliance,” whereas its consequence and, at the same time, “the sealing of the pact” would be the concession of Vienna for Galicia and the extension of its autonomy.¹³⁷⁴

On February 17, 1867, when the agreement with Hungary was reached, the Habsburg Monarchy had in fact already transformed into a dualistic state. There remained one last condition for the agreement to become a reality, namely the approval of the representation of the national diets and the Imperial sanction. For this reason, the Emperor convoked the diets to elect deputies to the parliament on February 18. The diets were also given the Imperial rescript of February 18, which informed on the conclusion of the agreement with Hungary and the revocation of the suspension of the Patent of February 26, 1861.¹³⁷⁵

In such a situation, in question was the position of nations other than Germans, to whom the transformation of Austria into the dual monarchy indicated an end to any further transformations toward a federation. It was known that the chances of obtaining a legal and political status that Hungarians had just gained were slim. The resistance from the German centralists was significant. The consent to the Austro-Hungarian dualism was the price they were willing to pay for consistently opposing the the autonomous demands of other Cisleithanian nations.¹³⁷⁶

1372 The full passage from L. Wodzicki’s speech was: “We are giving up to Austria, but we are not selling ourselves to it; it would be a great misfortune if we were to join the opposition in the future, however, there are positions in which we, the always faithful subjects, would have to do so.” Qtd. after: *Pannenkowa, Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim. . .*, p. 44.

1373 Wereszycki, *Historia polityczna Polski. . .*, p. 23.

1374 Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne. . .*, p. 32.

1375 Bobrzyński, Jaworski, Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego. . .*, p. 16.

1376 W. Feldman characterized in this way the turning point in Austrian history, which was the settlement with Hungary: A storm was brewing. Every politician felt that this was an opportunity, which may never happen again, for a thorough transformation of the entire country. As a result of the separation of the Hungarians, other nations will find themselves in the central parliament against the German majority, devoted to their grace and disfavor; only the introduction of federalism will save the Slavic peoples from centralism, Feldman, *Stronictwa i programy polityczne. . .*, pp. 66–67.

For Vienna, convoking a more restricted Imperial Council and the binding acceptance of the Austro-Hungarian agreement by the national representations became the matter of paramount importance. At this crucial moment for history, out of all delegations, the Galician representation became the most important. For the Austrian politicians, the current internal situation in the Monarchy did not guarantee the settlement with Hungarians. The resistance from the side of the Slavic nations was the main obstacle. The only ally could become the Poles from Galicia. The ruling clubs were aware of the fact that they may win the support of Poles at the price of autonomous concessions. In this situation, Vienna came forward with an offer for Galicia, which could be summed up in a sense of a mutual compromise – the Galician Diet will designate a delegation to the Imperial Council, for which it will be granted concrete autonomous concessions. However, it was not known what concessions Galicia would demand. On February 6, 1867, Friedrich von Beust presented to the Council of Ministers a project concerning separating Galicia submitted by A. Gołuchowski the father. In the literature on the subject, as observed by Andrzej Dziadzio, this fact is neglected, and due to this we should provide a more detailed description. Especially that of its program assumptions, since even the new draft of the parliamentary resolution of 1868 did not contain such far-reaching demands, despite being based on it.

The draft on separating the Galician province enumerated several postulates: to enhance competences of the national Diet by granting it powers in the fields of municipal, ecclesiastical, military and school legislation together with universities and technical colleges, as well as to guarantee Galicia a special position in terms of administration. Furthermore, it was also proposed to establish a national government to which all matters relating to political, educational and religious administration, judicial and financial administration would be subject. The position of the Galician administration should be equal to that of individual Austrian ministries. This project also predicted the establishment of the supreme court of third instance for civil and criminal matters.¹³⁷⁷ It should be stated that the program of separating Galicia presented by A. Gołuchowski, if implemented, would grant the province liberties and considerable autonomy within the Monarchy. After the defeat of Austria in 1866, it was evident that chances for transforming the country into a federation were very slim. A policy of passive resistance similar to the Czech one would deprive the Galician

1377 A. Dziadzio, "Austria wobec Galicji i Czech w dobie przemian ustrojowych monarchii habsburskiej (1861–1871)," *Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne (CPH)*, vol. 50, b. I (1998), pp. 98–99.

politicians of any influence on the future of the province. Therefore, reaching a compromise was the most logical solution in this situation. Nevertheless, the demands presented by Galicia were too high. Not only the Austrian Germans, but also the Emperor could not afford losing control over a part of the Western half of the Monarchy. The idea of establishing an independent national government arouse much controversy in the Council of Ministers. This was a postulate that the Austrian state could not agree to. Giving the entire administration into the hands of Poles and making it independent of Vienna would in practice mean removing and maybe discriminating against the Ruthenian people, who proved on many occasions to be more loyal than the Poles. If this scenario had come true, the Ruthenians could have turned their political sympathies to Russia, the antagonist of the Habsburg Monarchy.¹³⁷⁸ The second important reason for rejecting the postulate was related to the Czech cause. It was expected that the Czechs would present similar demands. Germans could not accept them, as it would significantly weaken their position in relation to the Slavic nations. In turn, a failure to meet them would cause another political crisis in the Monarchy. The situation was additionally complicated, as the Austrian government was not entirely convinced how the Poles would act. At that moment, two possible scenarios were predicted – either another national uprising will break out, or Galicia will maintain its internal peace. This governmental meeting, which was

1378 In the second half of the nineteenth century, Russians began to form their national consciousness, which was influenced by the clerical party, the so-called “Świętojurcy,” proclaiming, among other things, the unity of Galician Ukrainians with the Russian nation and the desire to annex Eastern Galicia to Russia. This situation was not convenient for Vienna. Thus, another argument emerged to take advantage of Polish politicians and urge them to reach an agreement with the Monarchy. Vienna was well aware that it was in the interest of the monarchy to exploit national antagonisms. A deliberate national policy gave Austria a guarantee that it would conduct its both domestic and international policy fairly freely. Thus, in order to ensure a favorable position for Austrian Germans, Vienna was forced to support the nations that pursued a policy of loyalty and to withdraw this support when their position was much more favorable than that of others. At that time, the Monarchy opposed one nation to another. This was also the case here, Polish interests were contrasted with those of the Russians; see J. Kozik, *Ukraiński ruch narodowy w Galicji w latach 1830–1848* (Cracow; 1973), p. 272. Moreover, Russia itself was interested in the Polish cause in Austria and manifestations of political life in Galicia, such as elections to the national Diet or celebrations of patriotic anniversaries. Its position on this issue was motivated by the fear of possible insurgent actions. Therefore, it was not in Russia’s interest to increase the autonomous freedoms of the province, H. Wereszycki, J. Zdrada, “Polska działalność dyplomatyczna (1860–1900),” in: *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, III, 1795–1918, red. L. Bazylow (Warsaw; 1982), p. 673.

important for the Austrian state, but to a great degree also for Galicia, was closed by the Emperor, who did not agree to the establishment of the Galician national government. Nor did he approve the postulate on Poles overtaking legislation on universities and technical colleges. In conclusion, Vienna agreed only to enhance the competences of the national Diet. The Emperor's consent to certain points of the program of separating Galicia was tantamount to the commencement of negotiations between the Austrian government and viceroy A. Gołuchowski.¹³⁷⁹

The fact is that the Monarchy was forced to make a compromise with Poles,¹³⁸⁰ however, it was in no way obligated to meet all the demands of the crown country. Current composition of forces and the policy pursued by the nations of the monarchy were the factors that to a certain extent made the situation in Galicia dependent on the nations. During the meeting of the Polish Circle on May 22, 1867, Mikołaj Zybliekiewicz stated that if the Polish deputies accepted the compromise with Hungary: "the die will be cast, and then they would not be concerned about our autonomy."¹³⁸¹

The thesis is primarily seen in the confrontation of the positions of Poles and Czechs. It seems that the implementation of the autonomous program for Galicia could only be carried out to an extent that would not cause the Czech nation to present similar demands. It is unknown how many autonomous concessions the ruling clubs of the Monarchy would be willing to make if there was no Czech question; Poles would be most probably pushed to the margin of the political life. It is known, however, that the internal situation of the Austrian state until the outbreak of the First World War depended on the mutual relations between Poles and Czechs, but also their relation with the Austrian Germans and the politics they conducted. Federalism does not seem to be advantageous either from the perspective of the Polish interest, as it would: "push Galicia down in the hierarchy," mainly because of its weaker economical situation in relation to the Czechs.¹³⁸²

Faced with the threat to their interests, the non-German nations moved into opposition to Vienna's policy. The Czech, Moravian and Carniolan Diets refused to send their delegations to the Imperial Council and were therefore dissolved by

1379 Dziadzio, *Austria wobec Galicji i Czech*. . . , pp. 99–100.

1380 The Austro-Polish compromise is often described as a *small compensation* (*kleiner Ausgleich*), indispensable in the case of the compromise between Austria and Hungary, J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim 1848–1918* (Warsaw 1996), p. 49.

1381 "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego z dnia 22 maja 1867r.," in: *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w wiedeńskiej Radzie Państwa (lata 1867–1868)*, edited and introduced by Z. Fras, S. Pijaj (Cracow; 2001), pp. 51–52.

1382 Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 50.

the monarch. New elections to their parliaments were then ordered, so as to lead to victory of the parties favoring Viennese politics through electoral manipulation.¹³⁸³

The decided attitude of the Slavs put into question the stand of the Galician Diet. At that time, there were already two clashing conceptions. The former, represented by the deputies from the western part of the province, may be described as opposing to the policy conducted by Austria and its transformation into the dual monarchy.¹³⁸⁴ The latter, also known as the conciliatory conception, which was presented by the deputies from eastern Galicia, was concerned with the agreement to the dualism at the price of obtaining concessions. Several fundamental dissimilarities differentiated those two positions. Firstly, they both concerned the place of Galicia in the Monarchy. The supporters of the agreement treated Galicia as one of the many Austrian provinces, whereas the opposition saw it as a center around which the free Polish state would be organized in the future, acting therefore as a Polish equivalent of Piedmont. Secondly, the differences were related to the role of the Galician province. For the conciliators, Galicia should only be granted a range of necessary rights that would allow it to function fairly freely. According to the opposition, Galicia required a full range of autonomous freedoms, which would grant it the status of an independent part of the Monarchy with its own domestic policy. Regarding its stand in the Imperial Council, the supporters of the conciliatory policy considered it to be the only way for Galicia. At the same time, however, the Cracow circles claimed that the adoption of utilitarianism would be tantamount to recognizing Galicia as one of the provinces of the Austrian state.¹³⁸⁵

The representative of the utilitarianists was, among others, Florian Ziemiałkowski, who even before the convocation of the Imperial Council in

1383 Bobrzyński, Jaworski, Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego*. . . , p. 16. The Czechs, Moravians and Slovenians in Carniola feared that the compromise with Hungarians would completely disable or hinder the revision of the February Constitution in the federalist or autonomous direction, Bartoszewicz, *Dzieje Galicji, jej stan*. . . , p. 157.

1384 Florian Ziemiałkowski criticised the position of the oppositionists, the “gentlemen of Cracow,” accusing them of having concluded themselves an agreement with the Czech deputies, promising them to refrain from sending the delegation to the Imperial Council. When this fact was revealed, it did not produce a positive response in public opinion in Lviv. That is why Ziemiałkowski went to Cracow, and then to Vienna for the autonomists’ convention and declared there that the Galician Diet would elect the national representation to the parliament, Bartoszewicz, *Dzieje Galicji, jej stan*. . . , p. 157.

1385 Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne*. . . , p. 67.

December 1866, kept convincing deputies that the Diet should not send a delegation to the Parliament: “convoking Schmerling’s Imperial Council would mean digging Austria a grave.” He changed his view in January 1867, when the Emperor proclaimed the convening of the Imperial Council a patent.¹³⁸⁶

As a result of the clash of these two positions, the Galician Diet intended to adopt a resolution, based on the motion presented on March 1, 1867. It consisted of a couple of points – the first one concerning the enactment of the address to the Emperor¹³⁸⁷ and the second one, which could serve as the basis for the election of the national representation to the Viennese Parliament. On that day, the deputies were strongly against sending the delegation to the Imperial Council: “we cannot and should not send a delegation without any notice on why we are doing so, so that we are not accused of anything; and we withdraw from what the former Diet adjudicated and also from its provisions, therefore we should send the address together with the delegation and inform in the address that we disagree with the February endeavors.”¹³⁸⁸ On the next day, the Diet was to hold an extensive debate over the draft address to the Crown, however, it did not take place because in the morning of March 2, A. Gołuchowski received a

1386 *Z powodu listu otwartego Floriana Ziemiałkowskiego do Józefa Szujskiego przez L. (Lviv; 1867), p. 6.*

1387 On March 1, 1867, a draft address for the Emperor was put on the agenda of the Diet, in which deputies expressed some concerns about the position of Galicia after the settlement with Hungary. The intention of the authors of the address was to take into consideration the right of Galicia to obtain political independence, expressed directly to the Emperor: “If the aspirations for autonomy are shared by many countries, obedient to your rule, Gracious Lord, our country still has special reasons to stand by them.” The address included a stand for the rights of the Polish nation, which as a historical nation has its own individuality and culture and needs, which: “enslaves it to the demands of self-governing institutions.” It also criticized the February Constitution of 1861. Nevertheless, the address expressed permission for an agreement with Hungary and an assurance that sending the delegations to the Imperial Council was a proof that: “we do not wish to hinder any attempt to reach an agreement which would aim to place the internal relations of the Monarchy in order.” The deputies also asked the Emperor, on the occasion of transforming the state: “not to allow our historical and national individuality to be violated or to strain the law that comes with it, and to decide only in his national Diet on national matters, indicated by the very essence of that individuality.” Bobrzyński, Jaworski, Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego. . .*, pp. 129–133. An account of the debate on the content of the address to the Emperor can be found in: *Pannenkowa, Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim. . .*, pp. 57–63.

1388 *Z powodu listu otwartego Floriana Ziemiałkowskiego. . .*, p. 15.

notice from Vienna, the message of which was clear. If the national Diet had not intended to send the representation to the Imperial Council, it would have had to be resolved and new elections would have been ordered. The position of Vienna triggered an immediate reaction from the deputies. They revoked the motion of the Address Commission and decided to send the delegation to the central Parliament. Ninety-nine deputies voted for such solution and thirty-four were against it.¹³⁸⁹ One of the deputies satisfied with the outcome was Paweł Popiel, who stated: "This is how a non-political discussion was avoided." In his opinion, the address prepared by the Diet was: "unreasonable, unnecessary and harmful."¹³⁹⁰

Stanisław Grodziski was of the opinion that that was the moment of the commencement of the so-called utilitarian policy consisting of: "obedience to the crown," in return for which Poles expected concessions to the national autonomy. Its main advocates were A. Gołuchowski and F. Ziemiałkowski, supporters of small but sure profits. Beside, F. Ziemiałkowski was blamed for adopting such course of policy by the Diet: "the policy defended by Ziemiałkowski, which was the cause of the decisions of March 2, 1867, is not the policy of an enlightened mind, exalted spirit and a valued heart; on the contrary, it is the policy of ignorance, crawling and cowardice."¹³⁹¹ The initiation of such a line opened up greater opportunities for the conservative clubs and representatives of the landowners from the eastern part of Galicia to create and influence the Polish policy in

1389 Bobrzyński, Jaworski, Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego. . .*, p. 17.; S. Pijaj, *Między polskim patriotyzmem a habsburskim lojalizmem. Polacy wobec przemian ustrojowych monarchii habsburskiej (1866–1871)* (Cracow; 2003), pp. 134–136. The motion to send the delegations to the Imperial Council was supported mainly by Ruthenians and Polish peasants, while the prominent figures of the Galician political scene, such as Władysław Badeni, Juwenal Boczkowski, Leszek Borkowski, Leon Chrzanowski, Jerzy Czartoryski, Edward Dzwonkowski, Konrad Fihauser, Kazimierz Grocholski, Piotr Gross, Cezary Haller, Ludwik Helcel, Franciszek Hoszard, Zygmunt Kozłowski, Maurycy Kraiński, Kornel Krzczunowicz, Włodzimierz Niezabitowski, Franciszek Paszkowski, Adam Potocki, Klemens Rutowski, Szymon Samelson, Zygmunt Sawczyński, Ludwik Skrzyński, Seweryn Smarzewski, Franciszek Smolka, Stanisław Starowieyski, Jan Tarnowski and Stanisław Tarnowski, Franciszek Trzeciecki, Józef Tyszkowski, Ludwik Wodzicki and Henryk Wodzicki, Waław Wyrobek, Józef Zduń and Faustyn Żuk-Skarszewski voted against it, *Panmenkowa, Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim. . .*, pp. 63–67; Grodziski, *Sejm krajowy galicyjski. . .*, p. 148.

1390 P. Popiel, *Pamiętniki Pawła Popiela 1907–1892* (Cracow; 1927), p. 192.

1391 *Z powodu listu otwartego Floriana Ziemiałkowskiego. . .*, p. 21.

Vienna.¹³⁹² In that period, the term *mameluke* appeared and was used to denote politicians opting for the conciliatory course of policy toward Vienna, as well as F. Ziemiałkowski himself.¹³⁹³

The decision of the Galician Diet to send the delegation to the Imperial Council meant resignation from the policy which main objective was to transform the Monarchy into a federal state. Józef Szujski described this step as “an abdication”¹³⁹⁴ – from the policy conducted in favor of the government, the German national centralists, but also the autonomist and federalist deputies, to whom the Poles objected. He also highlighted the voluntary submission to pressure of Vienna that, apart from sending the notice dated March 2, did not apply any coercive measures. Therefore, all responsibility for the future position of Galicia in the Monarchy should fall on the shoulders of the national Diet. In the final part, he wrote: “for the evil done in the Lviv Parliament was at least partially amended in the Viennese Parliament.”¹³⁹⁵ M. Zyblikiewicz assessed the decision similarly, saying with skepticism that, by sending the delegation, the deputies chose: “out of two evils – the lesser evil, and evil never brings any good.”¹³⁹⁶ Further events show that the representation of the national Diet in the Imperial Council had multiple occasions to take initiative to defend the interests of Galicia, e.g., during the resolution campaigns. Nevertheless, the efforts of the Polish deputies did not produce the expected results. Regardless of the efficiency of the deputies, we should state that neither the Monarch, nor the German centralists intended to pursue a conciliatory policy toward Galicia on a continuous basis. Instead, they were willing to grant small concessions to the Poles when their votes were needed in the Imperial Council. Even later on, the political

1392 Grodziski, *Sejm krajowy galicyjski*. . . , pp. 148–149.

1393 F. Ziemiałkowski, *Z teki mameluka galicyjskiego, ułożył Kulik z nad Wisły* (Leipzig; 1871), pp. 6–7.

1394 “Uchwała sejmowa z 2 marca 1867r.” in: *Galicja w dobie autonomicznej (1850–1914), wybór tekstów w opracowaniu S. Kieniewicz* (Ossolineum 1952), p. 101. See: *Przegląd Polski*, vol. 10 (1867), p. 133.

1395 J. Szujski criticized the law of March 2, 1867, but at the same time he justified the deputies, giving a number of reasons for such a decision. The first is a certain solution of the Diet, and the second is the order of direct elections to the Council, in which through electoral manipulations the majority would gain the so-called unenlightened layers, i.e. peasants and Ruthenians, who approve of the government policy. As the third one, J. Szujski mentioned the probable resignation of A. Gołuchowski from the position of viceroy, *Galicja w dobie autonomicznej*. . . , pp. 101–104.

1396 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego z dnia 22 maja 1867r.” in: *Protokoły Koła Polskiego*. . . , p. 52.

situation of the state forced them on numerous occasions to join forces with the Polish Circle through forming alliances which had to be favorable for Galicia and its authorities.

Entering into an agreement with the Monarchy determined the position of Galicia in the Austrian state for many years. The adoption of the resolution provided the basis for the Galician Diet to pass the resolution in 1868, and to fight for its implementation in the years 1868–1873. However, the direct consequences of the agreement impacted not only Galicia, but also several individuals. In May 1867, before the start of the Parliamentary session, through the efforts of F. Beust, Florian Ziemiałkowski was appointed the second vice president of the House of Deputies of the Imperial Council, and, as a result of the stepping aside of Kazimierz Grocholski – also the president of the Polish Circle. Jan Czajkowski was elected the deputy chairman of the club.¹³⁹⁷

In 1867, during the debates in the Imperial Council on the draft projects of the constitution of the Monarchy, they turned out not to be very beneficial for the Monarchic province. This remark concerns primarily the Article 13 of the Act on the state representation, which significantly limited the powers of the national Diets in favor of the central parliament. For this reason, the Polish Circle approached the problem of accepting the draft laws during several meetings. At the outset, it is necessary to empathize that the Club had a negative approach toward Article 13, and thus its decision to support the act on representation depended on its final formulation. Korlen Krzeczunowicz proposed that the Polish Circle rejected the article, which: “is to make the Imperial Council stronger; we should be afraid that the strengthened Imperial Council in the further revision of the Constitution of Law did not grant itself the right proper to the national autonomy, thus harmful to us. After multiple discussions, the Club agreed to demand the rejection of Article 13, provided that it would manage to win the support of one third of the deputies in the House.”¹³⁹⁸ Thus, a decision was made to form a common club with the Slovenian and Tyrolean deputies.¹³⁹⁹

1397 Z. Frasz, *Florian Ziemiałkowski (1817–1900). Biografia polityczna* (Ossolineum, 1991), p. 98.

1398 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego z dnia 22 czerwca 1867 r. (o godzinie 7 wieczorem),” in: *Protokoły Koła Polskiego...*, pp. 67–68.

1399 Poles and Slovenes, supporters of federalism, feared the hegemony of the Austrian Germans in the planned dual monarchy, but their aspirations were only partly convergent. The Slovenes, unlike the Poles, were supporters of pan-Slavicism. The opponents of cooperation with them were mainly utilitarianists, and the supporters – the democrats and conservatives of Cracow. The Polish deputies managed to convince the Slovenians and the Tyroleans to create a joint parliamentary club and to

In October, however, the Club was not decided whether to support the draft constitution, making its decision dependent on many issues, such as the powers of the Diet in the field of education. After the debate in the Club, it was decided at the request of M. Zybkiewicz that the Club abstained from making a decision on accepting the draft until the second reading, and that it would keep the resolution secret – such was the request of Wiktor Zbyszewski.¹⁴⁰⁰ Three days after the meeting, on October 16, at the request of F. Ziemiałkowski, the Club unanimously adopted a resolution on rejecting the act on state representation at the third reading.¹⁴⁰¹ In turn, as for the other draft acts – i.e., the law on the exercise of governmental and executive power, on the state tribunal, on the judiciary and on the basic rights of citizens – the Polish Circle managed to support them at the third reading.¹⁴⁰² Eventually, the Polish Circle accepted all the acts, despite the earlier voiced doubts. Moreover, the deputies did not participate in the general discussion. The constitutional laws were passed on December 7, and the imperial sanction was obtained on December 21.¹⁴⁰³

The discussions were accompanied by conflicts in the Polish Circle. The opponents of the utilitarian policy criticized F. Ziemiałkowski for not being able to negotiate appropriate concessions for Galicia at the turning point for the Monarchy. The ones that were obtained extended the existing autonomy, but according to the deputies, Polish politicians and public opinion, they were not sufficient. Having supported the agreement, Galicia gained the Act on the National

form a joint coalition with the Club in the Imperial Council. Out of the group of 7 Tyrolean deputies, only 3 cooperated with the Club, while the Slovenian club as a whole, i.e. 9 deputies. The cooperation was not always successful, as the Club did not fully meet its commitments. This resulted, for example, in the failure to support the resolution of the Galician Diet of 1868. The Slovenian-Tyrolean Club was formed after the meetings of June 23 and 24, 1867, “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego z dnia 22 czerwca 1867r. (o godzinie 7 wieczorem),” in: *Protokoły Koła Polskiego...*, p. 70; A. Cetnarowicz, “Polacy i Słowacy w monarchii habsburskiej. Uwagi na temat wzajemnych stosunków w drugiej połowie XIX wieku,” in: *Prace Historyczne. Studia Austro-Polonica 5, Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego*, vol. 121 (1997), pp. 209–211.

1400 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego z dnia 13 października 1867r.,” in: *Protokoły Koła Polskiego...*, pp. 94–95.

1401 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego z dnia 16 października 1867r.,” in: *Protokoły Koła Polskiego...*, p. 96.

1402 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego z dnia 5 grudnia 1867r.,” in: *Protokoły Koła Polskiego...*, pp. 121–122.

1403 *Protokoły Koła Polskiego...*, p. 123.

School Council and the Polish language was introduced into the organizations of the judiciary.¹⁴⁰⁴

In a way, the crowning achievement and confirmation of the Poles' agreement with the dynasty was the announcement of Emperor Franz Joseph's visit to Galicia, and as such it was perceived. Its initiator was viceroy A. Gołuchowski, who believed that it should take on greater significance than a courtesy visit of the monarch to his people. On September 1, he presented to the Emperor his own political program, also supported by the conservatives. The aim of the viceroy was to show the Polish society and political elites of Galicia that there was a reconciliation between the Habsburgs and Poles, and that this fact would produce mutual benefits in the future.¹⁴⁰⁵

It seems that the offer that the Monarchy made to the Poles was an opportunity not only for Galicia, but also for the compatriots remaining under the Prussian and Russian partitions. The agreement between Poles and the dynasty guaranteed the creation of such conditions, under which national interests and aspirations could be pursued. It also seems that in a situation when dualism became a fact, the transition to passive opposition would mean withdrawing from any participation in the political life of the state. By adapting this course of policy, Galicia would have denied itself the right to decide on its own future and initiative. By contrast, the conclusion of the compromise not only resulted in Galicia obtaining a certain level of autonomy, but also created the basis for further efforts and fight for its expansion. The ruling circles established the legal and

1404 See: K. Grzybowski, *Galicja 1848–1914. Historia ustroju politycznego na tle historii ustroju Austrii* (Ossolineum, 1959).

1405 In return for the recognition of the national rights of Poles, reflected in the granting of autonomous freedoms, the population of the Galician province committed themselves to the allegiance to the House of Habsburg. The agreement was also of international importance. The exceptional treatment of Poles, manifested in the creation of appropriate conditions for the reconstruction of the Polish state, which would be headed by the Emperor in the future, was tantamount to testing Russia's tolerance for the actions of Polish politicians. It seems that the deterioration of Austrian-Russian relations was too high a price that the monarchy could pay for the implementation of Gołuchowski's program. Further events connected with the resolution campaign caused not only the failure of the viceroy's political plans, but also the crisis in Galicia and the cancellation of the imperial visit to Galicia and the resignation of A. Gołuchowski. However, the decisive factor that caused the cancellation of the monarch's visit was the protests of St. Petersburg, Wereszycki, *Zdrada, Polska działalność dyplomatyczna. . .*, pp. 646–647; H. Wereszycki, *Sojusz trzech cesarzy* (Warsaw 1965), pp. 102–103, 107.

political framework within which Poles could pursue their own national policy and participate in co-governing the entire Austrian state. To some extent, it was up to the Galician politicians how they would use the set conditions. Political interest required the strive for expanding the autonomy and taking control over national administration. The larger was the degree of independence from Vienna, the greater the opportunities of managing national affairs would be, and the less chance the Monarchy would have of taking advantage of the peasant and Ukrainian issues against the Poles. Thus the possibilities of conducting free policy in the Imperial Council and pursuing Polish national interests would also increase.

Poles had some possibilities to influence the decision-making processes in the Habsburgs' state. Their limits were determined mainly by the Emperor together with the ruling clubs, but also by the legal and political system of the Monarchy. We should mention the remaining nations of the Monarchy, especially Germans, Czechs and Ruthenians, but also Hungarians. Their political and national aspirations collided with those of Poland, resulting in a complex structure of mutually determined interests. The realization of one of them entailed the necessity to realize others. It should be also remembered that two actions were carried out simultaneously – on the one hand, the implementation of constitutional provisions for all the nations of the Monarchy, and on the other hand, the realization of Germans' aspirations to maintain their primacy in Cisleithania. The position of the countries neighboring the Monarchy – Russia and Prussia – was important, too.

In summary, after 1867, that is after the transformation of the Habsburg Monarchy into a dual monarchy, there was little chance for the Poles to obtain the status equal to that of Hungarians or even Slovenians in Transleithania.

We must also answer the question whether such conditions existed before 1866, when Poles formulated the famous address ending with the following words: "by thee, Gracious Lord! we stand and want to stand." This fact already proves that Poles were then more willing to enter the agreement than to obtain independence. It was a logical consequence of political intentions of the Galician elite. Moreover, it is highly probable that circumstances that could help the far-reaching process of obtaining autonomy by the province were not present. It seems that after the failure of the January Uprising, followed by the siege in Galicia which ended in 1865, Poles showed neither political nor mental readiness to make efforts to separate Galicia or to federalize the Monarchy. Moreover, at that time, the position of the Monarchy regarding external relations remained intact. Subsequently, Austria's defeat in the battle of Königgrätz resulted in a deterioration of its international position and in an internal crisis. The alternation

of Austria's position was not conducive to federalists' aspirations, which could worsen the situation even more. At that time, all the national Diets, including the Hungarian one, issued loyalist addresses to the crown. Restoring the position of Austria was in the interest of all the state's provinces. The Diets' addresses also included conceptions of "rearranging" the Monarchy, though we may state that, in a nutshell, Germans proposed centralism, Hungarians – dualism, and the Slavic nations – federalism, although understood in various ways. Poles, for instance, defined it rather in the categories of a far-fetched decentralization and the act of granting independence to certain provinces.¹⁴⁰⁶ Therefore, the year 1866 was not the appropriate moment for the introduction of legal and political changes into the Monarchy. Nevertheless, the nation that took advantage of the situation were Hungarians, who had been carrying out their own program since the Spring of Nations. The year 1867 happened to be favorable for dualism or, in reality, dual centralism. Would it also be beneficial for the endeavors of Poles? It does not seem so. The influential power of Hungarians had much greater potential than that of any other non-German nation of the Monarchy, hence the success of their program. Moreover, dualism was the least unfavorable solution to the problem of national aspirations of the population in the Habsburg Monarchy.

2. Struggle for the Separation of Galicia

The facts mentioned in the previous section influenced the change in the attitude of the Diet of Galicia, which from that moment on could be described as conciliatory and compromising. We may enumerate several causes of such a shift. The direct factors that influenced the change were: firstly, the transformation of Austria into a dual state and, secondly, the implementation of the December Constitution, which was unfavorable to the province of the state due to its centralist character. Additionally, the change of stand was indirectly influenced by the opposition of the non-German nations to the Constitution, especially to the Basic Law on State Representation. Other factors were the fact that Hungarians granted more political freedoms to Croats than any other nation of Cisleithania had,¹⁴⁰⁷ and the position of the Galician politicians, as well

1406 For more details on the issue see also: W. Felczak, "Przy Tobie, Najjaśniejszy Panie. . . W sprawie adresu sejmu galicyjskiego z 1866 roku," in: *Prace Historyczne. Studia Austro-Polonica* 3, *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego*, vol. 26 (1969), pp. 24–28.

1407 It may be stated that the Hungarian-Croatian Settlement of 1868 was a direct outcome of the Austro-Hungarian Settlement, the consequence of the dualism in Transleithania. Poles in Galicia noticed an analogy to their own situation in the

as negative attitudes of its population caused by the consequences of the law of March 2, 1867.

The first manifestation of the change in the political course of Galicia was F. Smolka's presentation of a motion on withdrawing the resolution of March 2

Monarchy, therefore they closely followed the events in the Kingdom of Hungary. The Croats started fighting for independence already in the 1860s. The Austro-Prussian war hindered the efforts, causing the Croatian program to be less likely to be implemented than the political plans of Hungarians. At the same time, the war accelerated dualism, resulting in the final victory of the Hungarian population over the rest of the nations in Transleithania. Nevertheless, dualism created the basis for the implementation of the autonomous program of Croats, except that the relations between Hungarians and Croats were determined by the general situation of the Monarchy, and not by mutual talks of the interested subjects. Not only Hungarians were not in favor of the Croatian plans, but also Vienna. Prime Minister, R. Belcredi did not include Croatia in his federalization program for Austria. His successor, F. Beust, was a supporter of dualism, and thus he could not support the autonomous efforts of the Monarchic province. The crucial talks of Hungarians and Croats were held in the years 1867–1868, and resulted in a settlement consisting of four parts (the main one, on the common matters, on autonomy and the territory of Croatia, and the final provisions). The settlement adopted similar principles as that concluded between Austria and Hungary. The both nations were united by the figure of the king and the so-called common matters, namely military, treasury, trade and industry, shipping, rail and post. Legislative and executive power in common matters was exercised by the common parliament and central government, where Croats had their own Minister without portfolio. Croats gained much more autonomy than Poles from Galicia in Cisleithania. Such matters as: internal, religious, educational and justice affairs became an exclusive responsibility of Croats. The Croatian language was the official language in national legislation and administration, as well as in the common bodies; the deputies could use their own national language in the Hungarian Diet in “delegations.” Moreover, the autonomous offices were obligated to display the Croatian national colors and emblem, and the common offices – the colors and emblems of both countries. Sabor (the Croatian Diet) accepted the text of the settlement on September 24, 1868, and the king sanctioned it on November 8. He actually signed the counterfeit, the case of forgery did not come to light until the 1880s., W. Felczak, *Ugoda węgiersko-chorwacka 1868 roku* (Ossolineum, 1969), pp. 127–128, 135, 208–210. Although Galicia did not conclude as beneficial settlement with Austria as Croatia did with Hungary, its position in the Monarchy was eventually more satisfactory. Undoubtedly, it was the result of the policy conducted by the Galician conservative factions. Moreover, Hungarians conducted the policy of Magyarization, which in 1883 started to touch also the population of the autonomous Croatia, J. Kochanowski, *Węgrzy. Od ugody do ugody 1867–1990* (Warsaw; 1997), p. 35.

on August 22, 1867, and not sending the delegations to the Imperial Council.¹⁴⁰⁸ The submission of the motion was an individual initiative of F. Smolka. Its content was the following: “The Diet of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria: 1. withdraws the resolution of March 2, 1867, by which it gave a mandate to the delegates to the Imperial Council, and 2. calls on the delegated to give in the mandate to the Imperial Council.”¹⁴⁰⁹ The sole motion was only a means – the aim that F. Smolka intended to achieve was to obtain for Galicia a position equivalent as that of Hungarians after having concluded the settlement with the Monarchy. This position was expressed in the justification for the motion, the sense of which could be presented in the following quote: “The country of ours. . . has the undeniable right to demand a separate independent position in the state composition of the Monarchy.”¹⁴¹⁰

Given the historical importance of the motion of August 22, 1867, it is worth quoting the excerpts from its justification. The applicant motivated his stand in the following way: “The system of Austria, uniting all the non-Hungarian countries of the Monarchy into a single organic whole. . . without taking into account the rights and needs of its separate organic components. . . which, despite the diversity and interests, were united into one representative body with a unifying aspiration – the centralist one.”¹⁴¹¹ It was furthermore stated that this system does not provide the conditions supporting the realization of the national interests of Galicia. Therefore, it was needed to create appropriate legal and civil basis in order to allow the countries of Cisleithania to freely develop. In the fourth point, F. Smolka enumerated the Crown countries that should gain independence within the Monarchy. According to his claims, those should be: “the lands

1408 Grodziski, *Sejm krajowy galicyjski*. . . , p. 149. For the first time, F. Smolka submitted an autonomous program for Galicia in 1848, in the form of the Lviv Adress, S. S. Nicieja, “Franciszek Smolka – romantyczny pragmatyk,” in: *Problemy narodowościowe Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w XIX i XX wieku. Księga pamiątkowa dla Profesora Przemysława Hausnera, pod red. A. Czubińskiego, P. Okulewicz i T. Schramma* (Poznań; 2002), p. 103.

1409 *Wniosek posła Franciszka Smolki, przedstawiony na 2 sesji 2 periodu sejmku galicyjskiego i mowy jego miane z tego powodu* (Lviv; 1868). The version of the motion quoted by S. Grodziski reads in the following way: “The Superior Diet shall withdraw the resolution of March 2, 1867, on sending the delegations to the Imperial Council, and shall call on delegates to surrender their mandates to the Imperial Council. The Superior Diet shall compose the Committee of fifteen members, to which the matter is to be entrusted;” Grodziski, *Sejm Krajowy galicyjski*. . . , pp. 149–150.

1410 Grodziski, *Sejm Krajowy galicyjski*. . . , p. 150

1411 Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne*. . . , p. 72.

of the Crown of Saint Stephen, the so-called German hereditary countries, the lands of the Crown of Saint Wenceslas, the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria together with the Grand Duchy of Cracow and Bukovina, each of which should have its own government in the broadest sense of the word. The governments should cooperate with each other in the federal union, i.e., a union that manifests itself in the common representation exclusively for all the common matters, necessary for the establishment of the unity and power of the state, with no exaggeration, which mutual relationship the countries belonging to one group would regard as the most appropriate for each other.¹⁴¹² F. Smolka also emphasized the centuries-old history and tradition of the Polish nation. The lack of one's own statehood and belonging to another country could not be an obstacle to having one's own political rights and one's own individuality in the Monarchy. Therefore, the efforts of the Polish nation to gain the status similar to that of Hungary was fully justified.

Mikołaj Zyplikiewicz expressed his opinion on the subject. He argued that it was somewhat unreasonable to treat the December Constitution as a fact since the Poles did not adopt it by voting. They were thus not obliged to recognize or respect it. Zyplikiewicz also proposed that the Diet of Galicia issued an opinion on the Basic Laws of December 1867. M. Zyplikiewicz addressed his comments on the motion of F. Smolka in the form of an amendment. The initiative of M. Zyplikiewicz had a much smoother pronunciation than the proposal of F. Smolka. Foremost, he postulated that the Diet of Galicia issued an opinion on the December Constitution. Moreover, he suggested convocation of a special committee composed of nine members, the aim of which was to be the formulation of a report on the issue of the Basic Laws of 1867.¹⁴¹³

In the future, the both separate motions became the basis for the discussion in the Diet, as a result of which the Diet passed the resolution on September 24, 1868. The Diet of Galicia supported the proposition of M. Zyplikiewicz, however, the motion of F. Smolka gained only the minimum support specified by the regulations. S. Grodziski wrote that it was only around a dozen votes.¹⁴¹⁴

There was a probability that had it not been for M. Zyplikiewicz's initiative, F. Smolka's motion would fail for being too radical. The position of Galicia toward

1412 Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne*. . . , p. 73.

1413 The motion of M. Zyplikiewicz gained the support of thirty-seven deputies, Grodziski, *Sejm krajowy galicyjski*. . . , p. 152. See: I. Homola-Skapska, *Mikołaj Zyplikiewicz (1823–1887)* (Ossolineum, 1964), pp. 48–52.

1414 Grodziski, *Walka o wyodrębnienie Galicji*. . . , p. 66.

Vienna was for the most part conciliatory, whereas F. Smolka proposed to openly oppose the policy of the Monarchy regarding the Polish cause. This objection concerned mainly the supreme principle of the December Constitution, namely centralism, which put the non-German nations of Cisleithania at a disadvantage. The acceptance of dualism without taking into consideration the population of Galicia, Bohemia and Moravia, and at the same time favoring Germans, would have been an undesired solution for the population of these provinces. In the long term, Austria should have made federalism the direction of change. According to S. Grodziski, F. Smolka intended to start a political crisis, in order to cause a crisis and force the federalization of the state on the government clubs.¹⁴¹⁵

This motion initiated the years-long debates and fights in the Diet and the Austrian parliament. As noted above, it was not well received in the Galician Diet. Especially that in 1866, in the famous address of December 10, the Diet of Galicia entrusted the Polish cause to the Monarch, forming an alliance with the crown based on the promise of mutual benefits at the same time. This address designated a different direction in politics from that proposed by F. Smolka in 1867. In the former case, the position of Galicia, especially its legal and state position, would have been closely dependent on the will of the Monarch and the governing clubs. In the latter case, however, that is under federation, Galicia would have an equal position as Hungary, similarly to the indigenous Austrian countries, Czechs and Moravia. Federalism would have provided the countries of Cisleithania with relative sovereignty, involving separate institutions of executive, legislative and judicial power, followed by the administration, budget and their own army. The internal independence of the Crown countries would have enabled them to pursue a free policy on national matter, i.e., resolving conflicts of a national nature, managing finances, administrating and ensuring cultural and national development. It is impossible to interpret the intentions of its author of the motion directly from the text, but its consequence would have been the gradual gain of independence from Vienna by Galicia. In the longer term, maybe the creation of the basis for rebuilding the Polish statehood of the lands of the three partitions. The center, around which the activities of the Poles would have been concentrated, was to be Galicia, playing the role of the “Polish Piedmont,” whereas the place that the activities were to be carried out on the forum of the Austrian parliament.

The debate over F. Smolka’s motion in the Diet of Galicia was very turbulent, and eminent speakers of the times participated in it. During the discussion, the

1415 Grodziski, *Walka o wyodrębnienie Galicji*. . . , p. 67.

Diet approached the subjects that were the most important from the point of view of Galicia.¹⁴¹⁶ It seems appropriate to present its course here.

Punktem wyjścia debaty, jak zaznaczono powyżej, były dwa wnioski, F. Smolki i M. Zyplikiewicza, które na porządku dziennym obrad stanęły w dniu 28 sierpnia.

The starting point of the debate were the beforementioned two motions of F. Smolka and M. Zyplikiewicz, which were presented in the agenda on August 28.¹⁴¹⁷

In the justification of the motion, M. Zyplikiewicz postulated that the Diet of Galicia determined its stand on the December Constitution and the position that Galicia should take in the Monarchy. M. Zyplikiewicz claimed that the deputies should not just criticize the December Constitution, but also consider if: "it consists of the moments of the better future for us, therefore, if it grants enough independence to our country that it needs for its real development." M. Zyplikiewicz also noted that there exists an option of legally introduce the motion on the basis of the Article 19 of the national statute.

The next speaker was F. Smolka, who spoke against M. Zyplikiewicz's statement about the December Constitution as an accomplished fact. According to him, since the Polish deputies in the Imperial Council did not vote for it, it could be considered binding for Galicia. However, the following statement seems to be the most significant: "Until now [...] we always gave immediately everything they demanded from us, and they would always just promise us, then it turned out that they did not keep their word, that they maneuvered us. Let us do the opposite for once: let us promise them what we are to give, let us take what they give us immediately and demand a sufficient guarantee. Then, once we have and hold on to what is rightfully ours, we will keep our word to them."¹⁴¹⁸

1416 W. Feldman wrote that: *In the discussion on the issues, Galicia's greatest political and rhetorical talents shined out*, and further: *opportunists were far from the small-minded or cowardly politics. They were driven by reasons of tactical and substantial nature*, Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne*. . . , p. 75. S. Grodziski described the debate as: *excellent parliamentary fencing imbued with demagogy and platitudes, but also constituting an exchange of factual arguments*, Grodziski, *Walka o wyodrębnienie Galicji*. . . , p. 68. J. Buszko wrote about its: *sharp course*, Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 53. K. Wyka highlighted that F. Smolka's motion started one of: *the most passionate national political debates of the Diet of Galicia*, which was characterized by its generality and referring to: *great political principles*, K. Wyka, *Teka Stańczyka na tle historii Galicji w latach 1849–1869* (Ossolineum, 1951), p. 142.

1417 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 105–106.

1418 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 106–107.

On the following day, August 29, a committee counting nine members was elected in order to examine the motions of the both deputies. The committee: “through Grocholski’s mouth projected to reject Smolka’s motion, and then adopt the prepared resolution.”¹⁴¹⁹ The committee was composed of F. Ziemiałkowski, M. Zyplikiewicz, F. Smolka, K. Grocholski, W. Czerkawski, Pietruski, L. Chrzanowski, J. Ławrowski (a Ruthenian) and Wolny (a peasant). The committee was mainly composed of the right-wing and centralist members, except for F. Smolka. After the committee was formed, A. Gołuchowski, satisfied with its composition, left for Vienna. The committee adopted a conciliatory resolution on the basis of Article 19 of the national statute on the amendment of the December Constitution and the granting of a separate legal and political position to Galicia, on more or less the same basis as Croats in Transleithania. The report on the committee’s works was presented in the Diet on September 21, and became the basis for the debate. It should be noted that the motion of F. Smolka was not supported, therefore it was submitted to the Diet as an amendment to the motion of the committee.¹⁴²⁰

The first speaker was L. Dunin-Borkowski, whose speech was full of vivid descriptions of the current situation within the Monarchy and aphorisms, e.g.: “what is an exception by revenge there, here is the rule by love.” However, he did not take a decided stand either toward the motion of F. Smolka, or that of the committee.¹⁴²¹

The motion of F. Smolka, however, was severely criticized by F. Ziemiałkowski.¹⁴²² He noticed in F. Smolka’s motion a personal element that should not have prevailed over the province’s interest: “if it were to satisfy my personal wishes, I would like the Diet to be dissolved today, but it is about the state.”¹⁴²³ His speech also involved the criticism of the idea of transforming Austria into a federation.¹⁴²⁴ He also stated that the consequences of F. Smolka’s motion

1419 Bartoszewicz, *Dzieje Galicji, jej stan...*, p. 164.

1420 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim...*, p. 109.

1421 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim...*, pp. 109–110.

1422 His speech started with the words: “I admit, however, that today I am devoid of courage, because, speaking for the motion of the committee, I am forced to turn against the motion of the man, who I adored in my youth, and, being a man myself, I loved more than my own self, with whom I suffered, with whom I worked for the common good, and whom, with my heart breaking, I see in the opposite camp.” Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim...*, p. 110.

1423 Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne...*, p. 76.

1424 “[We were not inherited, no covenants were made with us, we were taken and joined, but not incarnated, for the organism to which we belong is alive and we live by its life

would not have guaranteed calm in the country or in Austria: “its result would be an immediate dissolution of the Diet.”¹⁴²⁵ At that time, F. Ziemiałkowski chaired the committee charged with examining the motion. He was also very interested in the rejection of the motion: “he played a very subtle game: foremost, he wanted to reject the motion of Smolka, for the dismissal of the Delegation would be equivalent to breaking with the government and burning all the bridges. . . indeed, may the Diet present its tasks, or even strengthen the position of Poles in Vienna, as long as it does not deviate from the legal path.”¹⁴²⁶

K. Krzeczumowicz presented his response to the proposal of carrying out a substantive critic of the December Constitution; his speech also partly concerned F. Ziemiałkowski’s statement. He considered that the powers of Galicia in the field of municipal legislation and folk education guarantee it autonomy.¹⁴²⁷

Moreover, K. Krzeczumowicz raised one of the more important problems of Galicia, namely the issue of a bad economic situation of the province.¹⁴²⁸ The

and have the right to live as long as we do not renounce this right ourselves. Here is the legal title to the new government, a title unequally stronger than any written law. But we are also a part of the Australian Monarchy. The loyalty that the Polish nation has always had requires that our goal be sought from Austria.” Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne*. . . , p. 77.

1425 “The committee, while proposing a resolution, takes the path indicated by constitutional laws. We demand a self-government not only for the country’s good, but also for the state. The country enforced by the self-government, it will not only strengthen Austria now, but also in the future will it open up a broad range of possibilities for the development of power.” Bartoszewicz, *Dzieje Galicji, jej stan*. . . , p. 167.

1426 Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*. . . , pp. 199–200.

1427 Ziemiałkowski said that Galicia, having municipal legislation and the administration of folk schools, has in its hands: “the levers so influential that if used properly, they will raise the country to such a power that it would have to fear neither the Viennese Germanization, nor pan-Slavic desires.” Bartoszewicz, *Dzieje Galicji, jej stan*. . . , p. 167. K. Krzeczumowicz stated that the scope of the activities of communes and district councils depends on the Imperial Council, while folk education with the Imperial School Council (Rada Szkolna Krajowa) do not have sufficient constitutional guarantees, Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 111–112.

1428 In his opinion, this was one of the reasons why the motion of F. Smolka should have been rejected. Galicia was not prepared for such far-reaching changes, i.e., obtaining relative sovereignty. For that, the most sensible solution was to rely on Austria and strive for the greatest possible autonomy. He therefore demanded an extension of the legislative powers of the Diet of Galicia and Lodomeria on taxation and finance, and an increase in the amount of funding from the Austrian treasury for Galicia.

speech of Michał Popiel also touched upon the necessity of improving the situation of Galicia; the speaker raised the issue of the low level of education among the folk social classes.¹⁴²⁹ Galicia's social issues were also highlighted by Adam Potocki, who postulated the need for social work. Alike the previous speaker, he stressed the necessity of cooperation with the lower social classes.¹⁴³⁰

A. Potocki spoke twice. In his second speech, he presented his position against the transformation of the Monarchy into a federation of provinces and for the restriction of the autonomous demands included in the motion of the Diet Committee. A crucial point of the project was to grant the Diet of Galicia the exclusive right to choose the way of electing the representation to the parliament, which would protect Galicia from direct elections.¹⁴³¹

Another main opponent of F. Smolka was A. Gołuchowski. He also did not speak favorably of the Diet's motion, which he described as *immature and underdeveloped*. Moreover, he stressed that Poles should not only be concerned about Galicia's welfare, but also afraid of its future, which, for obvious reasons, was related to the Monarchy. He also spoke of the flaws of his compatriots: "We despise centralism, but we realize and admit that we as well constitute the

He suggested that the demands were included in the Diet's resolution, Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne*. . . , p. 78.

1429 According to him, the strength of Galicia may be its people, but the people aware of their national belonging and common history, as well as of the mutuality of various political interests. At the same time, he stressed that the legislation of the Diet does not take sufficient notice of the problem: "We say that education must be spread among the people, and in the law on subsidies for folk schools we stated that the court competes to the heads of the heads of the rural population." Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne*. . . , p. 78.

1430 He also stated: "We must bring ourselves closer to the mass of people and involve it into political activity; for only there is power and greatness today, and here we are not the representatives of only one social class, but of the whole population." Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne*. . . , p. 79.

1431 Potocki presented also his own project, in which he included the demands for the extension of the current political freedoms, although restricting them to the necessary minimum. According to A. Potocki, it would be sufficient for Galicia to obtain the legislation on the public education, universities, on the organization of national judicial and administrative authorities, furthermore, the national Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Minister of Galicia, a subsidy from the budget proportional to the needs of the country, as well as the control over national goods and salt mines, Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne*. . . , p. 79.

cause of our depletion.”¹⁴³² In the final part of his speech, Gołuchowski deemed F. Smolka’s motion inappropriate.

Just like F. Ziemiałkowski and A. Gołuchowski, K. Grocholski delivered one of the best speeches in the Diet. Simultaneously, he acted as the reporter of the committee. He stated that the Diet agreed on two issues: firstly, the stipulations of the December Constitution did not create the appropriate basis for the realization of Galicia’s endeavors, and secondly, it is in the country’s interest that Austria gained a sufficiently strong position. K. Grocholski described these two issues in terms of a purpose, to which the sides agreed. However, there was none in terms of the ways of the realization of the endeavors, and thus the Diet did not agree on the measures. The argument of K. Grocholski against the motion of F. Smolka concerned foremost the inappropriate timing for the federalization of the state. In his opinion, the implementation of this endeavor would have been more probable before the Hungarians had obtained independence. He considered the decision not to send the delegation to the Imperial Council to be belated; the Diet should have taken it in March 1867.

During the debate in the Diet, F. Smolka spoke multiple times. I. Pannenkowa wrote that: “He argued in the right, simple and understandable way.”¹⁴³³ At the same time, however, W. Feldman described the character of his speech as follows: “Simple, factual, lacking Potocki’s pretentiousness or Ziemiałkowski’s advocacy, he cut the accusations that were made against him.”¹⁴³⁴ While responding to deputies’ arguments, he invoked facts from history among others. He also claimed to have the power of predicting the consequences of the initiated measures. He reminded the deputies of his program of 1848.¹⁴³⁵ Based on this statement, he concluded the rightness of his views. He also accused the deputies of not being provident enough to foresee the results of the resolution of March 2,

1432 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 116–117.

1433 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 106.

1434 Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne*. . . , p. 80.

1435 “Smolka is a federalist, his system expresses the most precisely the idea of Austria’s union, he completely rejects the idea of centralization.” K. Widman, *Franciszek Smolka. Wspomnienie biograficzne*, bmrw, p. 169; see also: K. Widman, *Franciszek Smolka, jego życie i zawód publiczny od roku 1810 do 1848* (Lviv 1886), p. 194; J. Białynia-Chołoddecki, *Franciszek Smolka* (Lviv 1913); E. Olszewski, “Franciszek Smolka – polityk i parlamentarzysta,” in: *Polacy w austriackim parlamencie. W 130. rocznicę Koła Polskiego. Materiały polsko-austriackiej konferencji naukowej zorganizowanej w parlamencie austriackim i Stacji Naukowej PAN w Wiedniu w dn. 11–12 września 1997*, pod. red. W. S. Kucharskiego (Lublin-Vienna 1997), p. 204.

1867. F. Smolka decidedly opposed the view that the Poles should not be occupied with the systemic issues. In his opinion, it was not entirely true to state that the shape of the Monarchy does not affect the fate of the Polish people. He did not agree with the statement on ruining the opportunity for a restoration of the Polish state after having transformed Austria into a federation, and created a union with it. His opinion on this subject was drastically different. He believed that, having obtained the independence similar to that of the Hungarians, Galicia would become the origin of the future free Polish state. He said: "I am convinced that Poland has to exist, that there has to be raised the foundation, without which Europe cannot and will not transition to freedom, to the matters of peace, skills and civilization. Thus, in order to make it come true, the national independent government of Galicia has to be created. . . and Galicia has to be made the crystallization point for the Poles to group around."¹⁴³⁶ F. Smolka also opposed the views concerning the mutual independence of the Monarchy and Galicia. He claimed that Galicia, as part of the Monarchy, is directly linked / related with and dependent on it; at the same time, the position of the Monarchy depends on the situation of each of its provinces, including that of Galicia. In order to ensure favorable conditions for its development, it is necessary to introduce transformations in the entire state. The idea of F. Smolka concerned, in the first place, the liquidation of centralism as the means of organizing power that acts as a brake to the development of particular kingdoms and Crown countries. He also emphasized the significance of the tactics of passive opposition, mentioning as its example Hungarians, who obtained state independence because of it. An important element of his speeches was referring to the text of the resolution, which he had criticized for not meeting the needs of Galicia. The resolution involved demands, which fulfilled would result in the establishment of self-government in Galicia. According to F. Smolka, only by gaining wider powers, the province would be able to fulfill its needs efficiently. Moreover, he claimed that the presentation of the demands of the Diet in Vienna would not bring the expected results and, as later events have shown, he was not wrong.¹⁴³⁷ He ended his last speech with these words: "I see that you will move on over my proposal to the agenda and bury it. And I tell you, gentlemen, before you leave this room, my motion will be resurrected, and by flying through the country, it will have so many supporters that the truth of my motion will soon win. . . And now vote, gentlemen, as you like."¹⁴³⁸

1436 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 120.

1437 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 119–122.

1438 Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne*. . . , p. 82.

It is important to summarize the parliamentary debate at this point. F. Smolka's motion was negatively received by the Diet of Galicia. It should be stated that despite the use of platitudes by his adversaries, the allegations were essentially of a substantive nature. Above all, the very idea of the federalization of Austria was considered inappropriate, mainly for political reasons, although those of an economic or social nature were not overlooked. It was also argued that it was not in the interest of Poles to pursue the political shape of a foreign, partitioning country. Moreover, the federalization of the monarchy would be connected with the emergence of a specific legal and state relationship (real/personal union) between Austria and Galicia. According to F. Ziemiałkowski, it would significantly limit the possibility of the rebirth of the Polish state as a whole. He claimed that the Polish lands of the Austrian partition could be permanently absorbed by the Monarchy. This thought may be considered too far-reaching, but certainly the power of its influence was significant. However, if the idea of F. Smolka was accepted, the time for such a reorganization of the state would have been late. Poles should have strived for this before having established the dual Monarchy. Therefore, the presence of Poles in the Imperial Council at the moment of the dualistic transformations should be considered a bad political move. In the situation when the tactics of absenteeism were rejected and the December Constitution was passed, this fact should be considered accomplished and appropriate measures should be taken to increase the independence of Galicia. This path seems to be the right one and the most appropriate from the point of view of the situation in the country and the situation of Galicia in the Monarchy. The deputies feared that by using the tactics of passive opposition, they might encounter the Monarch's hostility and sanctions from the government in the form of unfavorable solutions for Galicia.

The effects of the parliamentary debate on F. Smolka's motion were various. First of all, the debate showed that the content of the resolution was not directly aimed against the December Constitution, although it did criticize it. The debate on Smolka's motion contributed to a certain extent to the opposing stand of the Galician deputies during the vote on the basic laws in the Imperial Council. Moreover, it caused the abandonment of participation in the discussion on the political shape of the Austrian state. Poles also did not intend to give up their participation in the session of parliament, considering the strategy of absenteeism an undesirable form of political activity due to its ineffectiveness. They claimed that only the adoption of legal methods of parliamentary fight could bring tangible benefits to the Galician province. For this purpose, they intended to use Article 19 of the national statute, which provided for the right to amend laws. As regards to the scope of the demands, the deputies agreed that they should not

exceed those determined by the essence of autonomous freedoms. This meant that at a threshold of the functioning of a dualistic state, Poles decided to give up their endeavors, the implementation of which could have led to the status of independence and autonomy, and not just the self-government.

Undoubtedly, despite F. Smolka's personal defeat and the fact that his motion was outvoted, the text of the resolution of 1868 may be counted among the achievements of the Diet of Galicia. Even though the essence of the motion had changed fundamentally and the aspirations for a federation were replaced by autonomous postulates: "Had not it been for the motion, had it not been for Smolka's threat that the country would renounce its deputies, unless they insist on their rights, the Diet would not even have passed the resolution."¹⁴³⁹ The resolution thus became the political program of the Poles from Galicia, although this was not the intention of the applicant. It was also a tool to fight the policy of German centralists, and the demands contained in it were to ensure a more favorable position of Galicia in the Monarchy and protect it from the national endeavors of the Ruthenians: "Finally, the field for a truly Polish policy was opening up in Galicia."¹⁴⁴⁰

Over the years 1868–1873, there was a political argument in the Diet of Galicia and in the Viennese parliament, known as the resolution campaign, the main aim of which was to attempt to grant Galicia autonomous freedoms to a greater extent than it had had thus far. The starting point for the actions taken by the Polish politicians was the conclusion of the Austro-Hungarian settlement, establishment of a dualistic state and adoption of the Constitution in 1867. According to the opinion of that time, the Constitution removed the chains: "from individuals to enchain nations."¹⁴⁴¹ This view fully reflected the situation of individual nationalities in the Austrian part of the Monarchy, who were deprived of autonomous freedoms. In turn, the Constitution guaranteed the right to carry out a legal or political struggle. As a result, the Galician politicians began to seek to increase the power of Galicia.

The lack of satisfaction of the Galicians related to their legal and political position in the Monarchy was expressed in the address to the Emperor of September 24, 1868. The Diet of Galicia stated pointedly that: "we were the more painfully

1439 *Wniosek posła Franciszka Smolki*. . . , pp. 55–56.

1440 Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*. . . , p. 204.

1441 Z. Frasz, *Galicja* (Wrocław 1999), p. 168. This quote is by Leszek Borkowski, I Pannekowa provides it in the following version: "the chains were removed from individuals to enchain nations." I. Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 77.

affected by the fact that the Basic Laws of December 21, 1867 in many provisions do not meet our needs and rights.”¹⁴⁴²

K. Bartoszewicz stated that: “the basic laws of the new Constitution have been strongly attacked.”¹⁴⁴³ In the opinion of the deputies, the granting of freedom and political rights was not sufficient when national rights and the distinct identity and needs of Galicia were neglected. At that time, the Diet considered the right of self-determination in internal affairs to be the most important. In the resolution, the Diet of Galicia stated: “The following subjects. . . are to be removed from the scope of activity of the Imperial Council, designated by the State Basic Law, and will be transferred, pursuant to Article 12 of this law, to the Diet.”¹⁴⁴⁴ Those subjects comprised the proposed competences of the Diet of Galicia, listed in paragraph 3 of the resolution and relating to nation legislation.

The text of this address revealed that the Poles were not fully satisfied with the outcome of the agreement with the Monarchy. It should be remembered that it was thanks to the presence of Polish deputies in the Austrian Parliament that the Austro-Hungarian agreement could come into effect. They were the reason for which the formal absolute majority requirement was met, thanks to which the vote in the Imperial Council could take place, and after obtaining the imperial sanction the settlement could be implemented. At that moment, Poles expected from the Emperor some form of gratitude for having given up federalist policy, which might have happened to be beneficial for Galicia. The Poles, unlike the Czechs, concluded an agreement with the Viennese government in order to gain greater internal independence in return for their support for dualism. Aside from considering the problem of which of the solutions had a greater chance of success and would have given more opportunities for political participation at the same time, it should be stated that in a sense the settlement was in Galicia’s interest.

In the address of September 24, 1868, the Galician deputies emphasized their longstanding efforts for self-government and national institutions as well as their attachment to the Monarchy and care for its welfare: “While requesting a more extensive national self-government for our country, we had and have in mind the power and prosperity of the entire state. For we are deeply convinced that

1442 Bobrzyński, Jaworski, Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego. . .*, p. 149.

1443 Bartoszewicz, *Dzieje Galicji, jej stan. . .*, p. 165.

1444 E. Dubanowicz, “Zakres ustawodawstwa sejmowego Król. Galicyi w świetle ustaw konstytucyjnych a historycznej rzeczywistości,” in: *CPE*, vol. 16 (1915–1916), pp. 51–52; Bobrzyński, Jaworski, Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego. . .*, p. 151.

the power and prosperity of the Monarchy depend on such a system that would ensure the free development of our historical and national individuality. Further, we read that: the Diet of the country would not respond to its responsibilities, it would disappoint the trust of Your Imperial Highness and the nation, if it concealed this truth and its fear of this danger, if it did not seek, by all legal means, to give the country its due autonomous position.¹⁴⁴⁵

Together with the address, the Diet of Galicia passed the resolution on September 24, 1869, which included an autonomous program for Galicia. The resolution clearly and unambiguously stated that: “the system of the Monarchy, established by the Basic Law of December 21, 1867, does not give our country as much legislative and administrative autonomy as it deserves because of its historical and political past, separate nationality, degree of civilization and breadth, and does not correspond to either the wishes or conditions of national development, or to the real needs of our country; and the prolonged existence of this state, causing widespread discontent, must have a disastrous effect on the prosperity of our country and on the good of the whole State.”¹⁴⁴⁶

The deputies also formulated a motion which comprised the postulates of the autonomous program in eight points. It was demanded that the Diet of Galicia decided exclusively on the elections to the Imperial Council. The next demand was for the Galician representation to participate only in those parliamentary activities that were common to Galicia and the other Crown countries. It seems that the most important postulate was included in the third point, which determined the scope of competence of the Diet of Galicia. It demanded that the matters concerned with the parliamentary houses and commercial bodies, legislation on national education and universities, on banks, credit unions and saving banks, on the organization of judicial and administrative authorities legislation on the police and criminal, civil and mining law, legislation implementing the Basic Laws of 1867, and on relations with other parts of the monarchy were excluded from the competence of the Imperial Council. The resolution also called for the allocation of an appropriate amount from the state budget to cover expenses related to the functioning of the state administration bodies. It was also important for Galicia to obtain supervision of the sale, conversion or encumbrance of salt mines. The Diet of Galicia also demanded the establishment of a national council, responsible to the Diet in matters of internal administration,

1445 Bobrzyński, Jaworski, Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego*. . . , pp. 149–150.

1446 The full text of the resolution can be found in: Bobrzyński, Jaworski, Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego*. . . , pp. 150–153.

education, public security, national culture and justice. Together with them, the appointment of a national minister in the Austrian government was postulated.

After the debates in the national Diet, the fight for the resolution moved to the central parliament. As later events showed, five so-called resolution campaigns took place there. The first one coincided with the parliamentary session between October 17, 1868 and May 15, 1869.

The Polish Circle already submitted the motion to the government as early as on October 30, so that the government submitted it to the parliament. It seemed that in this way there was a better chance of a successful implementation of the resolution. Initially, however, the members of the Club did not agree on the undertaken tactics of action. K. Grocholski claimed that it would be better to submit a resolution directly to the House of Deputies. The opposite opinion was held, among others, by F. Ziemiałkowski, who advocated in a sense circuitous route, i.e. the government submission. The fundamental argument put forward by F. Ziemiałkowski was to give the resolution an appropriate rank, he wrote: "everyone will admit that there is a huge difference between the resolution adopted by the Diet, and the motion of a deputy, even if it contains a literal content of this resolution." He also claimed that submitting the resolution as an individual deputy motion would be tantamount to a defeat of the Polish side, before the parliamentary struggle for its implementation starts.¹⁴⁴⁷

In the first case, this initiative could be interpreted as an individual request from a Polish deputy, but it would give a chance for a quick solution of the resolution. In the second case, however, as a request from the national representation, it would involve staggering the implementation of the issue. Therefore, there was a debate in the Polish Circle on how to submit the resolution. K. Grocholski, who was in favor of the first solution, was supported by a Club's minority. Because of that, F. Ziemiałkowski succeeded to promote his proposition, and after the discussions, the Club made a decision which was consistent with his stand. Undoubtedly, the outcome was fostered by the principle of intra-Club solidarity.¹⁴⁴⁸

After having submitted the motion, the Polish deputies' anticipation for the government's response was puzzling, especially considering the fact that the tactics of Vienna should have been readable to the Poles: "the government lavished and waited, so as not to irritate the Poles. The procedure was discussed for three months, and only in January the motion was passed to the Committee, and in

1447 Ziemiałkowski, *Z teki mameluka galicyjskiego*. . . , p. 7.

1448 X. d' Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna austro-węgierskiej monarchii*. . . , p. 134.

April the House ruled that it agrees to the Resolution, provided it does not violate the Constitution. It was equal to rejecting it all.”¹⁴⁴⁹

Therefore, the Club did not take any action up to the point when K. Grocholski submitted an appeal of January 19, 1869, in which he asked about the government’s decisions on the resolution: “When does the government intend to submit to the House for constitutional treatment the demands of September 24 formulated by the Diet of Galicia?”¹⁴⁵⁰ In the response of January 22, K. Giskra announced that: “according to the rules of the House, which only regards independent motions of the House members, or governmental submissions, the government would only be able to make the request in the form of a governmental submission – the government did not recognize that the request of the Galician Parliament could be made the content of a governmental submission for constitutional proceedings.”¹⁴⁵¹ It seems that the government deliberately delayed the presentation of the motion in the form of a submission, taking advantage of the existing legal vacuum. The Diet had the right to submit motions, while the government was not obliged to present them to the House. An unfavorable position was taken by K. Giskra, who declared that he did not intend to be: “a postman of the Galician Diet.”¹⁴⁵²

A special committee was appointed in the Imperial Council to examine the motion of the Polish Circle, but it did not show any initiative either. Therefore, the Polish deputies stated that the situation prompted them to decide to leave the parliament. The threat of the Club only had a partial effect, namely the acceleration of the work of the parliamentary committee. The result of its proceedings was not satisfactory. The members of the committee decided that the motion of the Polish Circle was inconsistent with the Act on State Representation, and therefore it was not submitted to the House. There was also another important reason for hindering the implementation of the Club’s initiative, namely the Czech opposition.¹⁴⁵³

As I. Pannekowa wrote, during the unofficial talks of the Polish Circle with K. Giskra, the Minister of the Internal Affairs advised the Poles to ask the whole House to call on the government to submit a motion to the Imperial Council. In

1449 Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*. . . , p. 210.

1450 X. d’ Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna austro-węgierskiej monarchii*. . . , p. 134; G. Kolmer, *Parlament und Verfassung*, I (Vienna; 1902–1914), p. 365.

1451 Kolmer, *Parlament und Verfassung*. . . , p. 365; Pannekowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 140.

1452 Bartoszewicz, *Dzieje Galicji, jej stan*. . . , p. 169.

1453 Bartoszewicz, *Dzieje Galicji, jej stan*. . . , p. 169.

this situation, the motion of the Club would be placed on the agenda of the government. This would only seem to be a more favorable solution. In reality, however, it meant treating the proposal differently. Consideration of the proposal by the parliament would consist of dealing with its content, while the cabinet would deal with its formal side.¹⁴⁵⁴ From the government's point of view, it would therefore be a much better way out of this situation, as it would be given the opportunity to extend the time for processing the application.

A few days later, on January 26, 1869, F. Ziemiałkowski presented to the House of Deputies the motion consistent with the recommendations of K. Giskra, the content of which reads as follows: "The House calls on the government to submit to the Imperial Council the Resolution of the Diet of Galicia for constitutional consideration."¹⁴⁵⁵ For this reason, in Galicia, it became known as a "ministerial motion." K. Giskra was obliged to present the government's stance on this issue within four days and, as is not difficult to predict, the answer was positive. Then, on January 30, it was submitted to the Constitutional Department. To deal with this matter, a special seven-member committee was established, which, apart from the centralist-oriented politicians and deputies, included also F. Ziemiałkowski. As a result of the committee's work, on February 4, the Constitutional Department, on behalf of the House of Deputies, submitted a request to K. Giskra to deal with the matter of resolutions of the Diet of Galicia.¹⁴⁵⁶

The case of the motion of the national Diet stalled again. Admittedly, various activities and discussions were initiated, but without much significance for this matter. It was only the day before the budget bill was passed, on March 11, that K. Grocholski gave a speech in the Parliament, stating that the Polish deputies would refrain from any discussions on state finances. The Polish Circle then limited its actions only to voting on the budget.¹⁴⁵⁷

1454 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 141–142.

1455 X. d'Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna austro-węgierskiej monarchii*. . . , p. 135.

1456 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 143–144. As a result of the committee's work, this motion was rejected, with one vote against from F. Ziemiałkowski. The Constitutional Department decided that under the current law, the government is not obliged to submit motions of national parliaments to the Imperial Council if they relate to state affairs. It was only as a result of K. Giskra's "intervention" and his statement that the government can handle its examination that he was put on the agenda of the House of Deputies. On February 4, the Constitutional Committee decided to send the Diet's motion to the House of Deputies for its examination, to which the deputies in the Imperial Council agreed on February 16, X. d'Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna austro-węgierskiej monarchii*. . . , p. 135.

1457 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 148.

The question of the resolution did not return to the deliberations until April 7, 1869, when the Constitutional Department presented the conclusions concerning the substantive content of the motion of the Diet of Galicia. According to the justification, the most important was point eight of the resolution, which expressed the need to appoint a national government accountable to the Diet. Moreover, it was stated that the implementation of the Polish demands would necessitate a change in the Constitution. The Department's motion was unambiguous. It postulated the rejection of the Galician resolution as too risky a solution for the welfare of the Monarchy. Complying with the motion of the Diet of Galicia would create a precedent that other Crown countries could invoke. Moreover, Galicia, as a country situated on the border of the Monarchy, should not have such far-reaching autonomy. Otherwise, there would be a danger of separatist endeavors. The Department's motion also included a proposal that Galicia's aspirations should be pursued through detailed state legislation or administrative solutions. The government's position was presented by K. Giskra, who stated that the resolution contained a demand to amend the Constitution adopted in 1867 and for formal and legal reasons it is impossible to implement it. However, taking into consideration the substantive aspects, i.e. the demands of the resolution, it could not be implemented because its idea was contrary to the idea of indivisibility of the Monarchy.¹⁴⁵⁸

After the presentation of the motions of the Constitutional Department, the Imperial Council held discussions during its meetings on April 7, 8 and 16. The meetings were essentially purely formal. During the vote on the subsequent points of the resolution, they were rejected one by one. The exception was the postulate for chambers of commerce, which was not questioned. The meetings did not lack lively discussions. The Germans often argued that Poles perceive the monarchy as a state with the obligation to satisfy their needs. This statement outraged the deputy Mikołaj Zyblikiewicz, known for his impulsive character. In response, he stated that: "The Diet of Galicia anticipates and expects nothing from Vienna or the Imperial Council; over a century Poland has been deceived a thousand times, the Diet wants freedom to help itself. Galicia does not want to continue begging in Vienna."¹⁴⁵⁹

It was already known, in fact, that the question of the resolution would not be taken up again at the closing session of Parliament. Therefore, any parliamentary action that could possibly be taken by the Polish Circle would be illogical and of

1458 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 148–150.

1459 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 150.

little importance. There was, however, a risk that Polish deputies would leave the Imperial Council.¹⁴⁶⁰

A few days before the end of the Council's proceedings, on May 11, the chairman of the House of Deputies, Kaiserfeld, asked whether the House would not oppose the introduction of a resolution at the last sitting. At the time, only a few Polish deputies were present in the House, including Alfred Count Potocki. He announced that he would answer the question at the next sitting, after consulting the members of the Club. Two days later, on behalf of the Galician representation, A. Potocki made a statement underlining that for six months the Parliament had not found time to consider the motion of the Galician Diet. The motion submitted on the basis of the rights of the Diet, the idea of which was to create a strong foundation of the Monarchy, by granting the nations inhabiting it appropriate powers. The content of the statement of the Polish Circle was criticized by the chairman of the House. He accused the Polish deputies that it was not the Council that was responsible for not resolving the resolution, but the applicants themselves. He also stressed the fact that the Parliament dealt with many problems, not only those of Galicia, and that there was no reason why Polish affairs should be prioritized. Kaiserfeld's answer ended this session of the parliament. The issue of the resolution remained unresolved and was automatically moved to the next session. The postponement of this matter was a good tactical move, used by the opponents of the resolution.¹⁴⁶¹

To sum up the first resolution campaign, it should be stated that it ended with the defeat of Polish deputies in the Imperial Council. It seems that it was neither the content nor the demands of the resolution of the national Diet, but the applicants that ended this parliamentary session in disgrace. As a proof, certain facts should be mentioned. Immediately after the session ended, the consequences of the campaign's failure affected some of the Polish politicians. Galicia was disappointed with the results of the fight for the resolution, and therefore expressed its vote of no confidence in F. Ziemiałkowski and A. Gołuchowski by not electing them to the national Diet.

It may be assumed that the Polish Circle, on the one hand, was striving to implement the demands of the resolution of 1868, while on the other hand, it

1460 The Secession of the Polish Circle was not in Vienna's interest; for this reason, the Emperor forced the government to fulfill a promise previously made to the Poles, i.e. to introduce Polish as an official language to the administration and judiciary. This was done by virtue of the regulation of June 4, 1869.

1461 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 158–160; Kolmer, *Parlament und Verfassung*. . . , p. 366.

wanted to maintain good relations with Vienna at all costs. The Austrian government delayed and postponed the realization of Polish demands, but also the Poles themselves did not show much initiative in their own case. Subsequent campaigns illustrate precisely the problem of lack of dynamics in the activities of the Polish Circle in the Imperial Council.

At that time the Polish Circle was seeking allies in the Viennese Parliament, for instance the Ruthenians. The support of the resolution by the Ruthenian deputies would have its political meaning; for instance, Adam Sapieha claimed that if the Ruthenians supported the resolution: “the matter could be considered a victory.”¹⁴⁶²

The talks were initiated in the summer of 1869. The participants included Franciszek Smolka, who, as the initiator of the draft resolution, was particularly interested in the implementation of its postulates, although the motion eventually submitted to the Imperial Council had been modified by the Diet of Galicia. The course of negotiations between Poles and Ruthenians is unknown, but their outcome was the parliamentary motion of a national activist and Austrophile, deputy Julian Ławrowski. In the motion, he included demands of cultural and educational nature. When assessing this motion, it must be noted that the demands of the Ruthenian deputy were not excessive, although, in this way, he undoubtedly intended to make as many national concessions as possible.¹⁴⁶³

The Parliamentary Committee was charged with the examination of the motion, and committee selected within the National Department handled the language demands, however, until 1870 they did not present any binding solutions, only reports on their work. Thus, in the absence of interest from the parties, the attempt at settlement ended in failure. Moreover, there was a

1462 Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*. . . , p. 361.

1463 In return for the implementation of the postulates, J. Ławrowski promised to cooperate with Poles and resign from the postulate of the division of Galicia, which was a significant concession from the Ruthenians' side. At the same time, he set the conditions for the conclusion of a settlement, i.e. ceasing the assimilation and Polonization of the Ruthenian population. The motion was accepted by all the Ruthenian deputies. The deputy demanded that the University and Technical University in Lviv should establish Russian chairs, a Russian grammar school in Lviv, and that the existing schools opened up Russian classes parallel to the Polish ones. He also demanded that the Diet protocols were printed in both languages. He also demanded subsidies for cultural purposes, Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*. . . , pp. 361–362; J. Forst-Battaglia, “Die polnisch-ukrainischen Beziehungen in Galizien zwischen 1866 und 1873,” in: *Prace Historyczne. Studia Austro-Polonica 1, Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego*, vol. 57 (1978), pp. 55–56.

high probability that the Diet's resolution would not be implemented in the Parliament. Some members of the Polish Circle were also convinced that the concessions obtained by Galicia were sufficient, and therefore the settlement with the Ruthenians was no longer necessary. There was yet another, additional reason for the failure of the settlement, namely negative experience from the previous mutual relations: "in the atmosphere of mutual mistrust, Lawrowski's application also drowned: all Polish concessions consisted in giving the Russians the one grammar school in Lviv."¹⁴⁶⁴ W. Feldman wrote that at the beginning of the 1870s: "Stańczycy tried to find a *modus vivendi* with the Ruthenians, but they abandoned this idea, relying only on declarations and assurances of a conciliatory attitude toward the Ruthenians, and thus leaving the charge to the Poles and the government."¹⁴⁶⁵ To some extent, the failure of the settlement was due to the position of Vienna, which stopped taking advantage of the Ukrainian issue against the Poles.¹⁴⁶⁶

1464 The evaluation of the motion by the specially appointed committees was nothing more than a typical stalling. In order to compensate the Ruthenians for their willingness to reach the settlement, the Diet granted 4,000 zlotys of subsidies to the Russian theatre in Lviv, Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*. . . , pp. 362–363.

1465 Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne*. . . , p. 200.

1466 Although the idea came back in 1871, thanks to the intervention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrásse it was not realized. Andrásy, like Beust, treated Poles as an asset in the Ruthenian policy, seeing them as the only Slavic nation with a hostile attitude toward Russia, Wereszycki, *Pod berłem Habsburgów*. . . , pp. 206–207. The change of tactics in Vienna was also influenced by Polish politicians, especially Agenor Gołuchowski and Florian Ziemiałkowski, whose arguments managed to persuade the Emperor to change his position on the Ukrainian issue. K. Chłędowski claimed that Vienna did not see the danger threatening the Austrian state from the Ruthenians, especially from the Moscovites: "The Viennese bureaucracy saw the split between Ruthenians and Poles in Galicia as an advantage only for itself; for it was easier to control the two sacked nations than the politically dense population. It was not until the slow, long work of Gołuchowski and Ziemiałkowski that the eyes of the Emperor were opened, and under the influence of the Monarch, the high bureaucracy *nolens volens* was forced to take a different stance on the dispute between Poles and Russians." Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, I. . . , p. 292. S. Kaczała criticized their behavior and negatively assessed the activities of Polish loyalists: "This false utilitarian policy of the Galician Poles in support of every government put them and the Russians at the feet of the centralists. The Poles, in order not to lose power over the Ruthenians, the Ruthenians out of fear of the Polish hegemony." S. Kaczała, *Polityka Polaków względem Rusi* (Lviv; 1879), pp. 336–337.

The National Diet resumed its proceedings on September 15, 1869 and the session lasted until November 13. During the first sitting of the Diet, on September 21, F. Smolka's motion not to send representation to the Imperial Council was put forward once again, except that he already received much more support than during the previous session. The motion fell, but with a minor loss, 55 to 57.¹⁴⁶⁷ F. Smolka wrote that: "Although this vote did not eventually remove my motion, as I will submit it at the hearing as an amendment to any committee motion, they will have to hear about it."¹⁴⁶⁸ The motion to submit a resolution of 1868 to the Imperial Council, as well as the address to the Monarch,¹⁴⁶⁹ were passed again in the Diet. The deputies also passed draft laws on the National School Council, district and local school councils and on teacher seminars. These drafts were formulated in such a way that they could only be passed if a resolution was adopted.

The Emperor convened a session of the Imperial Council for December 11, 1869, and its proceedings ended on April 8, 1870. Also during the second resolution campaign the motion of the Galician Diet was not adopted. Nevertheless, the situation seemed to be more favorable for the Poles. The German centralists intended to push through the law on direct elections to the lower house of the Imperial Council, but they did not have the required majority of two thirds in the Council. In such a situation it would be desirable to gain an ally. Therefore, they treated the demands of Polish deputies in a different way.

The Austrian government, consisting mostly of centrist politicians, maintained an unfavorable stance toward Poles. Along with them in the cabinet there were Alfred Count Potocki, Eduard Taaffe and Berger, who advocated a reconciliation of national conflicts, including a positive reaction to the Polish cause. On this ground, a dispute arose within the government.¹⁴⁷⁰ The conflict moved to the

1467 H. Rządowska, "Listy Franciszka Smolki do Emanuela Tonnera," in: *Studia Historyczne*, vol. 14, no. 2 (1971), p. 259; Grodziski, *Walka o wyodrębnienie Galicji*. . . , p. 73. Wrong result of the vote – fifty-four to fifty-seven – passed. See: X. d'Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna austro-węgierskiej monarchii*. . . , p. 143.

1468 Rządowska, "Listy Franciszka Smolki do. . .," p. 259.

1469 See: Bobrzyński, Jaworski, Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego*. . . , pp. 160–163.

1470 Two memorials of December 25, 1869, submitted to the Emperor together with motions for his resignation, were an expression of his different views on the Polish cause. In their memorials, the majority found no reason why Galicia could gain more independence than other Crown countries. However, they did provide the effects of a possible granting of sovereignty to Galicia. The most important was the worsening of relations with Russia and the creation of a precedent for the other countries of Cisleithania. In the memorial of the minority, the authors accused the German

forum of the Imperial Council, where the discussion and voting on the memorial of the government majority took place.¹⁴⁷¹ As a result of the ministerial crisis, the Emperor accepted the resignation of Taaffy, Potocki and Berger on January 15, 1870.

Against this background, there was a struggle to push through the proposal of the Galician Diet. The resolution was submitted on December 18, 1869 in the form of a motion of the Polish Circle. After the first reading in the House, it was forwarded on January 17, 1870 to the committee, the Resolution Department, which for the first time met less than a month later, on February 8. In the discussions on the resolution, the deputies applied the tactics from the previous campaign, namely deliberate delay, prolongation and detailed consideration of each of the points of the resolution.¹⁴⁷²

centralists that their electoral reform would take place without the consent of the nationalistic opposition. Moreover, Potocki, Taaffe and Berger believed that in a situation of disregard for Galician demands, the Polish Circle would decide to leave the Council. Thus, Austria would gain another oppositionist, besides the Czechs. The important thing about the motion of the Galician Diet was the statement that the discussion on the constitution of the monarchy was inevitable, precisely because of the resolution of 1868. Therefore, addressing the problem of the legal and constitutional basis of the Monarchy should not be postponed by the Imperial Council and the government, Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim...*, pp. 180–182.

1471 In the Imperial Council, the composition of the House allowed this motion to be handled without major difficulties. However, not all the proposals of autonomous content were accepted. In the discussion, the deputies sometimes argued strongly with each other, e.g. Weidele, Weigel and Czerkawski. Weigel expressed in the following way: “We, the Poles, will share a feast table with you [...] But we do not demand equality to go so far that where everyone eats together, everyone has to eat one and the same dish. Just as we do not force our Polish borscht into you, do not treat us with German knedls.” Weidele, a former Galician official, claimed that the Poles could not get a separate position, because by virtue of the treaty concluded in 1773 between Maria Teresa and the Republic of Poland, Galicia renounced its rights, while transferring them to the monarchy. This statement moved Czerkawski, who replied that the fact recalled from the history of the Polish nation is not adequate to reality. It was not the Poles who renounced their rights, but they were taken away from them: “He quotes documents which show that physical help was used, works which clearly show that arrangements under the pressure of terrible threats have been made.” Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim...*, p. 183, 185.

1472 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim...*, p. 183, 185.

In the Resolution Department, a group of deputies, positively inclined toward Polish demands, decided to make the fulfillment of some of them dependent on the position of the Club toward electoral reform. Moreover, they tried to force the Poles to accept the demands received and not to make any further demands.¹⁴⁷³ The last sitting of the Department was held on March 29, at which the motion of the following was read out: "If the extension of the autonomy of kingdoms and countries can only take place with the simultaneous strengthening of central power, the latter can only be achieved by means of an appropriate reform of the elections to the Imperial Council, therefore, before the introduction of the latter, proposed by deputy Grocholski and his companions, the amendments to the State Constitution are currently unacceptable, and are being passed on to the agenda."¹⁴⁷⁴ This motion was addressed to the House and was known to be accepted.

On the next day, March 30, 1870, a meeting of the Polish Circle took place, at which the decision to leave the Council of State was made unanimously. After the resolution was passed, on the last day of March, Poles submitted their resignations to the Marshal of the national Diet, at the same time sending a letter to the Presidium of the House of Deputies with a justification for this decision. At this stage of the efforts to adopt the resolution, the Club acted simultaneously in two ways: on the one hand, it pursued a fundamental policy, and on the other hand, it was able to stand in opposition to the government, which was reflected in the absence of the deputies. The tactics changed when A. Potocki became Prime Minister of the government. The Polish deputies then took the path of a conciliatory policy.¹⁴⁷⁵

In a situation where the parliamentary session ended in a few days' time, the fact of leaving the Council would be virtually irrelevant and, similarly to the first resolution campaign, could be described as a demonstration and not a parliamentary action of tangible importance. This would have been the case had it not been for the effects it had caused. The Polish deputies were followed by Slovenians,

1473 Another condition was to grant the same concessions to all the Crown countries, to which the Poles obviously did not want to agree, since in such a situation the position of Galicia and other countries would be equal, Ziemiałkowski, *Z teki mameluka*. . . , p. 106.

1474 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 189.

1475 Feldman, *Stronnictwa i programy polityczne*. . . , p. 85. F. Ziemiałkowski wrote that: "in the presence of the Prime Minister, a compatriot, the opposing stance seemed inappropriate, not in the Polish style, not even polite." Ziemiałkowski, *Z teki mameluka*. . . , p. 105.

Romanians and Italians. In the Council, except for one Ukrainian deputy, only German deputies from the indigenous Austrian provinces remained, 129 deputies in total.¹⁴⁷⁶

The government found itself in a much more difficult situation than the Parliament which was still working. Prime Minister Hasner made a proposal to the Emperor to dissolve the Diet of Galicia and the others, but the Monarch did not agree to it. In this situation, the Council of Ministers resigned. The Emperor appointed a new government with Alfred Potocki as Prime Minister. The Pole was to be the “way” to resolve the Czech-German dispute, but despite attempts to alleviate the conflict, the problem remained. A. Potocki did not make a special contribution to the resolution of the Polish case either. His only achievement was the introduction of the Polish language as the language of lectures at the Jagiellonian University, with the exception of the lectures on German literature and language.¹⁴⁷⁷

A. Potocki negotiated with the majority of the Diet of Galicia. From May 20 to 29, 1870, Vienna held talks with national politicians, including Leon Sapieha, National Marshal Adam Potocki, Henryk and Kazimierz Wodzicki, Franciszek Smolka, Florian Ziemiałkowski, Agenor Gołuchowski, Kornel Krzeczunowicz and Seweryn Smarzewski. At the time, A. Potocki was in a rather inconvenient position. As Prime Minister, he was forced to make decisions in line with the interests of the Monarchy, which at the time of the struggle to implement the resolution were in clear contradiction with the demands of the national Diet. The talks with the deputies did not bring any tangible solution to the Polish case, and ended when the Prime Minister clearly stated that Galicia could not obtain an autonomous position in the Monarchy. It should be noted that the lack of consent for its separation was not due to the lack of good will of A. Potocki, but was an expression of the government's position.¹⁴⁷⁸ F. Ziemiałkowski was of a different opinion; he wrote that: “Through Giskra's loquacity, the delegation learnt that a compatriot minister had voted in the Council of Ministers in favour of the government not being obliged to submit the Galician resolution to the Imperial Council, as there is no provision for the government to do so, and secondly, the government disagrees with the demands.” He also added that all decisions concerning the Galician matters were made in the Council of Ministers unanimously, and thus with A. Potocki's consent.¹⁴⁷⁹

1476 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 190–191.

1477 See: Bobrzyński, Jaworski, Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego*. . . , p. 164.

1478 X. d'Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna austro-węgierskiej monarchii*. . . , pp. 153–154.

1479 Ziemiałkowski, *Z teki mameluka*. . . , p. 19.

A major turn on the resolution occurred during the third campaign. The motion of the Polish deputies was submitted to the Imperial Council in the form of a government submission, which was requested by the deputies during the two previous sessions of the Imperial Council. However, the importance of the Polish case has diminished in the face of the Czech-German conflict, which recently intensified.

Faced with the resistance of the centralists and their motion to dismiss A. Potocki on November 21, the government stepped aside. The head of the new government became Karol Hohenwart, an opponent of centralist policy. It was a government based on minorities, autonomists and federalists. Together with A. Potocki, the new Prime Minister prepared a project of autonomy for Galicia.

On April 25, K. Hohenwart submitted to the House a proposal to the government to grant the national parliaments the right of legislative initiative, also within the framework of the matter, which was explicitly reserved for the central parliament. The second point of the submission was to close the gap in the Constitution concerning the Council's obligation to accept or reject motions of the Diet formulated on the basis of national statutes. Both proposals were rejected in the Committee and in the Chamber – in the Committee all centralists except for five Polish deputies voted against, while the House obtained fifty-eight supporting votes and eighty eight votes against.¹⁴⁸⁰

Despite its failure, the Hohenwart government did not fail to act in the interests of the provinces and to pursue their autonomous aspirations. The submission was a sort of a prelude to a further political game with a centralist parliamentary majority. The next initiative of the government was already directly related to the Polish cause. On May 5, the second government submission was submitted, this time it was a few demands taken from the project of separating Galicia. One of the important points on the agenda was the appointment of a minister without portfolio for Galicia. This would have been an extremely important achievement, as the national minister would be a member of the Council of Ministers and would have a consultative role in Galician affairs.¹⁴⁸¹

1480 X. d'Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna austro-węgierskiej monarchii...*, p. 173; Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim...*, pp. 206–207.

1481 The governmental project for the autonomy of the Galician province, which was based on the Diet's resolution of 1868, was, however, a significant limitation of the postulates contained therein. It envisaged that school and university legislation would be the responsibility of Galicia, but with the proviso that it would be retained to the extent of the resources that are granted by the Council, in the same proportion as in other countries. In addition, the government project limited the competence in the field of civil and criminal legislation and the organization of justice as compared to

The deliberations on the government submission began in the Constitutional Committee on May 10, 1871. Two objections were raised during the proceedings. The first one was to ensure that acceptance of the project depended on support for changes in the electoral law toward direct elections. The second was to obtain assurances from the Polish side regarding the acceptance of the concessions contained in the draft of K. Hohenwart.¹⁴⁸²

A discussion on the government's proposal and objections was held in the Committee. M. Zyblikiewicz spoke about the content of the proposal. In his opinion, the draft should be supplemented with demands formulated by the national Diet in the resolution of 1868. If this were to happen, and the Polish Circle would strive for it, the problem of support for the electoral reform would not arise.¹⁴⁸³ Polish deputies could agree to this, because after having obtained independence, they would have voted in the Council of State only on the issues that directly affected them.

On the basis of a government submission, the Constitutional Committee adopted a resolution to amend Article 11 of the Act on State Representation to increase the legislative powers of the Galician Parliament. It was also resolved that Polish deputies would not be obliged to participate in deliberations that did not directly concern the affairs of Galicia.¹⁴⁸⁴ This issue was not in line with the intentions of the government, for which the Polish votes were significant, especially when it came to voting against the liberal German left wing.

It seemed that the course of political events was beneficial for Galicia and that there was a reasonable chance that the demand for its separation would be satisfied. An obvious obstacle was the matter of direct elections to the Imperial Council. Shortly afterwards, another problem arose, namely the Czech issue. At the first sitting of the House of Deputies, the centralist deputy Lasser asked whether, apart from the project of separating Galicia, the government intended to address a similar project for the Czech Republic. The Prime Minister replied that the Czechs had not expressed such a will so far, but if they did, then the government would prepare a similar project. The Prime Minister's statement caused

the national resolution of 1868. Instead of a separate Court of Cassation and Supreme Court, a separate Senate was proposed within the Supreme Court of Justice. The government project also included a postulate already implemented, i.e. the appointment of a national minister in the Austrian government. See: Bobrzyński, Jaworski, Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego...*, pp. 168–171.

1482 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim...*, p. 211.

1483 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim...*, p. 211.

1484 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim...*, pp. 211–212.

strong protest among the Germans. They formulated an address to the Emperor, in which the following sentence is important for the Polish cause: "We strive to separate Galicia, because it is in the Germans' interest."¹⁴⁸⁵ In the following sentences they spoke out against the recognition of similar demands from other, non-German nations of Cisleithania. The authors of the address also expressed a lack of trust for the Prime Minister and the government.

Despite the Monarch's positive attitude toward the authors of the address and thanking them for their loyalty, the Emperor did not intend to dismiss K. Hohenwart from his post, as he enjoyed his trust. The Head of State's position on the government's national policy had the following consequences. First of all, the position of the centralists weakened considerably. Secondly, K. Hohenwart's cabinet strengthened its position. Thirdly, Galicia gained a wider range of autonomy. In addition to the then already existing minister for Galicia, first appointed on April 11, 1871, A. Gołuchowski's father became viceroy again. Galicia was also granted further concessions regarding the Polish language, as well as the establishment of the Academy of Learning in Cracow by virtue of the imperial decree and the Minister of Religious Affairs and Public Education.¹⁴⁸⁶

The autonomous concessions were compensation for not meeting the demands of the resolution. The government also failed to implement its own project to separate Galicia. The obstacle to this was the opposition of centralists, who would have to accept a similar project concerning the Czechs or, in case of its failure, reckon with the Czech opposition. It seems that K. Hohenwart's government gave priority to the issue of the autonomy of the Czech countries, and made the issue of the implementation of Galicia's demands dependent on the success of solving the Czech problem.

Roughly at the same time, the Diet of Galicia, which held its meetings from September 14 to October 17, 1871, passed an address to the Emperor, by Julian Klaczka, on October 2. It included a suggestion that the government project

1485 In this address, the Germans also included a justification for the "acceptance" of the Poles' aspirations: "the separation of Galicia is to be granted only for the purpose that the Germans in the remaining countries find their political homeland afterwards and that the legal and political settlement itself is to be settled." Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 212–213.

1486 The Emperor's "Handwritten Note" ("Pismo odręczne") dated January 28, 1872, which established the Academy of Learning in Cracow and gave it its statute, Bobrzyński, Jaworski, Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego*. . . , p. 175; Grzybowski, *Galicja 1848–1914. Historia ustroju*. . . , p. 109.

did not fully reflect the needs of Galicia.¹⁴⁸⁷ In fact, the initiative of the Diet did not have much significance as K. Hohenwart's cabinet collapsed at the end of October 1871 as a result of the inability to resolve the Czech-German conflict. The rule of the Austrian state was once again in the hands of the centralists, and Fr Adolf Auersperg became Prime Minister of the next cabinet.

It should be acknowledged that at this stage of the struggle for the resolution of the Diet of Galicia of 1868, Poles were in a much better position than, for instance, Czechs, who pursued a firmer national policy. It seems that the adopted political course in the form of utilitarianism brought much better results than the "aggressive" Czech policy. Admittedly, there was no better chance to implement all the demands of the national Diet, but it was still possible to obtain further small concessions. Moreover, the existing autonomous achievements provided grounds for a positive assessment of the past resolution campaigns.

From the introduction of dualism to the collapse of K. Hohenwart's government, the Poles managed to negotiate favorable conditions that would allow them to conduct their national policy in a relatively unrestricted manner. In 1869 the Polish language was introduced as an official language, also to the judiciary. Education was also completely Polonized. At the universities of Cracow from 1870 and in Lviv from 1871 on, lectures in the mother tongue began to be offered, just like at the Lviv University of Technology. From 1871 Poles also had their own national minister in each Austrian government, and all decisions concerning Galicia were to be consulted with him. For the third consecutive time the governor of Galicia was A. Gołuchowski the father.¹⁴⁸⁸

The resolution of the Diet of 1868 lost its validity, mainly due to the tension in relations between Austria-Hungary on the one hand and Prussia and Russia on the other. It seems that the Polish politicians were aware of this and, at the same time, placed greater hopes in solving the Polish issue on the international scene.

The next session of the Imperial Council, during which the fight for a resolution took place, began on December 27, 1871.¹⁴⁸⁹ At that time again there were chances to push through the project of separating Galicia. The general situation in the Monarchy had a considerable influence on this. As mentioned above, the

1487 Cf. the bill submitted to the Chamber of Deputies of the Council of State by the Constitutional Committee on June 13, 1872, Bobrzyński, Jaworski, Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego*. . . , pp. 176–180.

1488 H. Batowski, "Die Polen," in: *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918*, ed. A. Wandruszka, P. Urbanitsch, vol. 3, no. 1, *Die Völker des Reiches* (Vienna; 1980), pp. 531–532.

1489 Grodziski, *Sejm Krajowy galicyjski*. . . , p. 75; according to Pannenkowa, the date was December 28, *Pannenkowa, Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 233.

resistance of the Czechs and their formulation of Fundamental Articles caused the collapse of K. Hohenwart's cabinet.¹⁴⁹⁰ His resignation was tantamount to a failure to implement the Articles. These factors spoke in favor of Polish politics. Undoubtedly, K. Hohenwart's government was the first one to favor Polish politics among the cabinets during which resolution campaigns were held. On the one hand, its downfall can be treated as a loss to Polish aspirations. However, on the other hand, the government's favoring of the policy of autonomy of the western provinces of the monarchy was not very beneficial to Polish interests. According to the centralists, this government was driven by too progressive ideas. While the separation of Galicia would have been convenient for the Germans, the same agreement with the Czech Republic would have put the German people at a great disadvantage. K. Hohenwart's declarations of granting independence to the provinces not only contributed to the collapse of his government, but also intensified the Czech-German conflict and impeded for some time the execution of Polish policy.

Seemingly, only the return to centralist policy was not equivalent to burying the chances of Poles to implement the project of separating Galicia, especially after the fall of the Czech program. The Emperor's Speech from the Throne,

1490 The Emperor appointed K. Hohenwart, among other things, to lead the Monarchy to an agreement with the Czech Republic. However, the initiatives taken by the Prime Minister ended in failure. The concessions made to the Czechs went much further than Galicia would have expected. For example, by virtue of the Imperial Record of September 1871, Vienna recognized the historical rights of the Czech Republic and announced the coronation of the King of Bohemia with the crown of St. Wenceslas. Additionally, the government submitted a draft nationality law to the Czech Diet, which guaranteed equal rights for Czechs and Germans. As a result, the Czechs presented their own demands in the form of the so-called Fundamental Articles, which referred to the 1868 program of statehood distinctiveness. The program ensured equal language rights for Germans living in the Bohemian countries in administration and education. However, it deprived them of the majority in the Diet. As a result, the Germans took a strong stance against the Czech program. The Emperor's adoption of it would be tantamount to breaking the advantage of the Germans over the Slavic nations, just like the Hungarians in Transleithania. It is not difficult to predict that the Czechs were to be followed by Poles and Slovenians. Acceptance of the Fundamental Articles would involve the entry of the entire Austro-Hungarian monarchy into the process of federalization, which would mean the end of dualism, or otherwise double centralism. Germany could not agree to such a solution. In the end, K. Hohenwart's government collapsed, as did the Czech program, Wereszycki, *Pod berłem Habsburgów*. . . , pp. 203–205.

delivered on the occasion of the beginning of the new session, in which the Monarch pointed out the need to extend Galicia's autonomy.¹⁴⁹¹ There were also some discrepancies among politicians with a centralist orientation. Baron Kellersperg, the candidate for the post of Prime Minister, firmly opposed Galicia's autonomy. In contrast to Lasser, who undertook this task, of course, in concern for the interests of the Austrian Germans in the first place.¹⁴⁹²

The issue of separating Galicia was handled in the same way as during previous resolution campaigns. The starting point in this case was the government project of K. Hohenwart and A. Potocki. After being put on the agenda on December 29 by the Polish Circle, or more precisely by M. Zyblikiewicz, it was submitted to the Constitutional Committee on January 13, 1872.¹⁴⁹³ Each subsequent point of the draft was discussed. As a result, another project, called the project of Edward Herbst, was created, being a significant restriction of the previous version. I. Pannenkowa wrote that in Herbst's draft, the Galicia case was "mentioned only briefly."¹⁴⁹⁴ Similarly to the previous campaigns, the adoption of the project for the autonomy of Galicia was made dependent on support for direct elections to the Imperial Council.¹⁴⁹⁵

1491 The Emperor dedicated a separate paragraph to Galicia in his speech from the throne: "While the separate properties and relations of the kingdom of Galicia require special consideration in legislation and administration, my government will be ready to contribute with all its willingness to make the wishes that have arisen in the wake of the state representation come true within the limits of the unity and power of the whole state." Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 233.

1492 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 229.

1493 Within the framework of the Constitutional Committee, there was a subcommittee to deal with the issue of Galicia and direct elections, both of which were strictly interdependent. Apart from five centralists, the committee included M. Zyblikiewicz and Janowski, a deputy from the faction of Świętojurcy. The Germans intended to push through an amendment to the electoral law, if not with the help of the Polish, then Ukrainian votes. Direct elections would enable them to gain more influence on the composition of the Imperial Council and thus to implement the pro-German policy, Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 235–236.

1494 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 233.

1495 The Polish Circle could then resort to the tactics of absence, but M. Zyblikiewicz agreed to cooperate with the German deputies. It should be admitted, however, that he declared to the Germans that they wanted to support the Poles during the voting on the election amendment, but they were not willing to agree to the Polish postulates, Homola-Skapska, *Mikolaj Zyblikiewicz*. . . , pp. 63–64.

When the issue of the resolution stalled, M. Zyplikiewicz, as the only representative of the Polish side in the Constitutional Committee, opposed any agreements on Galicia's autonomy and direct elections. His vote was the only one that opposed the project of separating Galicia in the committee.¹⁴⁹⁶ This draft was passed already on February 10, 1872, less than a month after it had been submitted for examination. In the situation when the Germans wanted to introduce changes in the election law, the commission was able to work efficiently and quickly, unlike the activities of the commission from the period of previous resolution campaigns.

The position of the Polish Circle at that time was clear. K. Grocholski stated in the committee that: "there is nothing in the resolution to change, nor to examine; for its adoption by the Diet proves the need, and if the Diet demands more, then more must also be allowed."¹⁴⁹⁷ The Polish side was not willing to abandon even a part of the demands, and the centralists did not intend to make concessions to the Poles. It may be said that there was an impasse in relations between the Polish Circle, the government and parliamentary majority. That is why the matter of resolutions of the Galician Diet was postponed for some time.

It seems that during this period there were some opportunities to obtain further autonomous concessions. The government planned to make changes to the electoral law and needed a two-thirds majority of the votes in the House for this. Therefore, it was also interested in the votes of Polish deputies, but the Club strongly opposed them in fear of losing control over the composition of the Galician representation to the Imperial Council. Already in May, at the Club's meeting, it was decided to refrain from any work on the preparation of the electoral amendment. During the general debate, M. Zyplikiewicz presented the position of the Club.¹⁴⁹⁸ However, it is impossible to determine the further course of the resolution if the Poles would take a more consensual stance. It is known, however, that both the current and previous governments were not favorably inclined toward the motions of Polish deputies. It may be assumed that even a conciliatory tone of Polish policy in the Council would not bring the expected

1496 At that time, M. Zyplikiewicz took a very reckless step, asking for the withdrawal of the 1871 draft resolution. As a result, he lost his popularity with the Polish society of Galicia. K. Grocholski prevented the realization of this idea then, Homola-Skapska, *Mikolaj Zyplikiewicz*. . . , pp. 63–64.

1497 X. d'Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna austro-węgierskiej monarchii*. . . , pp. 202–203.

1498 "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego z dnia 20 maja 1868r.," in: *Protokoły Koła Polskiego*. . . , p. 148.

results, especially since it was in the interest of the government to deal negatively with the issue of the resolution, while maintaining the appearance of good will.

This observation finds confirmation in the government project by E. Herbst, which not only significantly limited the scope of autonomous freedoms compared to Hohenwart's project, but also contained two unfavorable solutions. The first one concerned the possibility of excluding Galician deputies from participation in parliamentary deliberations in matters which are the competence of the national Diet, i.e. financing and subsidizing of schools and administration. The second was the determination of the moment when the law came into force, i.e. its approval by the Diet of Galicia and its inclusion in the national statute. This was the necessary condition for introducing the changes included in the Act on Autonomy. It was highly probable that if such a law had been created, it could have met with the protest of the Ruthenian deputies in the national Diet, who would have prevented it from being passed. However, should the Diet manage to pass it, it would have eliminated the possibility of Polish efforts to make further concessions, as stated in the governmental draft.¹⁴⁹⁹

Lasser was a skillful and forward-looking politician, so one day before the adoption of the Constitutional Committee's draft for Galicia on February 9, he submitted a new election amendment to the House. It can be said that in this way he intended to figure out how much support there was for the draft on direct elections. At the same time, this knowledge would serve him in the Polish case. If the amendment had been properly accepted by the House, the government would not have had to solicit the votes of the Club. Therefore, concessions for Galicia could be marginal or none at all. The Czechs were absent from the House at the time, standing by the tactics of absence, and the Poles voted against the amendment. Through small concessions, Lasser was able to win over parliamentary minorities and thus have a guaranteed majority of two-thirds of the votes. On February 20, 1872, the House of Deputies adopted the electoral amendment by 104 votes against forty-nine.¹⁵⁰⁰

The vote on the amendment showed that K. Auersperg's government was not forced to take into consideration the aspirations of the Poles, as it could gain the majority in the Council it needed at less expense than by making concessions to Galicia. This fact had a decisive influence on the efforts to separate the Galician province.

1499 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 241–242.

1500 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 245–247.

Since the vote on the election amendment, the Constitutional Committee has significantly slowed down its activities. The government had already properly solved the issue of direct elections, and the rush was inadvisable in terms of the resolution. The Herbst project did not appear on the House's agenda until June 13. It should also be stressed that the Polish side was not active during this period. Of course, this does not speak in favor of the Polish Circle. The delay of the matter of the resolution forced K. Grocholski to make an appeal to the House on June 14. Prime Minister K. Auersperg responded, assuring him of the government's good intentions regarding the Polish cause. In fact, his speech was the last action taken during this Council session concerning the autonomy of Galicia. Two days later, on June 16, Parliament's deliberations were concluded.¹⁵⁰¹

As a consequence of another defeat during the resolution campaign, the session in the Galician Diet began with the arrangement of the address to the Crown. The session of the Diet lasted very shortly, from November 5 to December 7, 1872, but the deputies actively participated in it.¹⁵⁰²

The pronouncement of the address to the Emperor was unambiguous and may be described as a sign of resignation and doubt about the successful conclusion of the struggle for the separation of Galicia. In Vienna, Polish deputies encountered: "prejudices and difficulties." At the same time, they stressed that: "The narrow boundaries of self-government. . . do not allow for the introduction of laws. . . to meet the needs of this country, and the constant temporariness, contradictions in the interpretation of unclear laws, and disputes over competences are hampering legislative activities and the activities of administrative authorities." The issue of direct elections to parliament was also raised, defending the right of the national parliament to elect delegations to the Imperial Council: "To violate this right or to take it away from the Diet without its permission would be to shake faith in the constitutional laws and undermine the basis of an order based on these laws."¹⁵⁰³ The tone of the address was balanced,

1501 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 245–247. According to F. X. d'Abancourt, the response was given on June 19, and the session of the House of Deputies were concluded on June 21, X. d'Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna austro-węgierskiej monarchii*. . . , p. 204.

1502 Grodziski, *Sejm krajowy galicyjski*. . . , p. 161.

1503 Address to the Crown adopted by the Diet of Galicia at its meeting of November 25, 1872, Bobrzyński, Jaworski, Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego*. . . , pp. 180–182.

seen by some as almost pleading.¹⁵⁰⁴ The discussion on its content took place on November 25.

During the further work of the Diet, on December 5, Fr Jerzy Czartoryski submitted a motion, which was a protest against the political situation that had arisen, rather than a simple parliamentary motion.¹⁵⁰⁵ Its essence was contained in the statement: "The Diet. . . reserves its right to oppose the way in which direct elections to the Imperial Council in our country were conducted."¹⁵⁰⁶

Both the content and tone of the address to the Crown, as well as J. Czartoryski's initiative, meant that the struggle of Polish deputies for the resolution of the national parliament of 1868 was coming to an end. The Polish Circle was aware of the fact that the Austrian government, with or without its help, was able to push through the electoral reform in the parliament. In such a situation, any action by Polish deputies to separate Galicia would be rather symbolic.

The subsequent session of the Imperial Council began on December 12, 1872 and was dominated by discussions and debates on the electoral reform. The government already had a certain majority of two-thirds in the House, thus it did not have to solicit the votes of the Polish Circle,¹⁵⁰⁷ as in the context of the

1504 Adam Sapieha criticized the words addressed to the Monarch: *The Diet. . . expects help and care from You*, judging it as the voice of a begging beggar. He stated that it was not prejudices but a clear hostility on the part of the German parties, and therefore suggested that this phrase should be replaced with: *a hostile attitude toward the country*, Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim. . .*, pp. 252–253.

1505 S. Kieniewicz wrote that the applicant acted in agreement with L. Sapieha and S. Smolka. He caused a sensation among the politicians, e.g. Stańcyczycy were confused, knowing that one should oppose the present circumstances, at least seemingly. On the other hand, lodging a protest could be problematic, Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha. . .*, p. 230.

1506 The entire text of J. Czartoryski's motion is quoted in: Grodziski, *Sejm krajowy galicyjski. . .*, pp. 161–162. The vote on it took place only at the next session of the Diet on December 17, 1873. The motion was rejected at first reading, without discussion of its content, by seventy-two or seventy-three votes, supported by fifty-two or fifty-three deputies. Grodziski, *Sejm krajowy galicyjski. . .*, p. 162.

1507 I. Pannenkowa omitted the fact that the government held talks with the Polish Circle between December 15 and 18. The aim of these meetings was to gain Polish votes to support the electoral amendment. It seems that despite a sure majority in the House of Deputies, the government wanted to secure the support of the Club just in case. However, these talks did not lead to any agreement, X. d'Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna austro-węgierskiej monarchii. . .*, p. 207. This initiative was also taken up by governor A. Gołuchowski, who intended to persuade Polish deputies to vote for the election amendment. Such talks were held, among others, with A. Sapieha.

recent elections in the Czech Republic and electoral fraud there, it gained additional supporters for its policy.¹⁵⁰⁸ It was also known that the resolution campaign would fail. The Polish politicians, K. Grocholski, M. Zyblikiewicz and L. Wodzicki were soon invited by Lasser to a meeting, during which on January 16, 1873 an offer was presented to them. In fact, it was an ultimatum that the government had set for the Polish Circle. Lasser demanded that the Poles supported the electoral reform in exchange for granting autonomous concessions. The agreement was not concluded because the Poles opposed the government's plans regarding the reform. Instead, they expressed their will to cooperate and form political alliances in any other matter. The government still tried to negotiate with the Club through the viceroy of Galicia A. Gołuchowski, but it did not give any result. Finally, on February 17, K. Grocholski stated in the Constitutional Department that the Polish Circle was unwilling to cooperate with the government on the electoral reform.¹⁵⁰⁹

Shortly afterwards, on February 22, a meeting of the Club took place, during which the club took a decisive decision on the resolution. A. Gołuchowski, who was opposed to the plans of withdrawing from the work of the House of Deputies, participated in the sitting with the deputies. It seems that in a sense, he favored the government's policy, as evidenced by the attempts to persuade the Club to adopt the elaborate by E. Herbst, the government's draft resolution. The deputies did not have any guarantees regarding the government's compliance with the agreement, so before making the final decision, they intended to address it with a proposal. In fact, the Club would have supported the electoral reform project if the government had previously implemented the resolution.

The Poles had no illusions that the government was able to carry out a successful electoral reform in the Imperial Council, so resorting to the opposition would condemn the Polish deputies only to ridicule. A. Gołuchowski assured A. Sapieha that the emperor was ready to grant further autonomous concessions, as long as the Club supported the amendment. However, the prepared compromise did not succeed. The Germans were not willing to make concessions, and the Poles were not able to make firm demands. The situation was so bad that the government did not even want to implement the E. Herbst's project, S. Kieniewicz, *A. Sapieha*. . . , pp. 228–229.

1508 The elections in the Bohemian countries and the abuses to which the Austrian government resorted resulted in negative financial and economic consequences. They were the cause of the stock market crash, which significantly affected the economic life of the Monarchy. The Auersperg-Lasser cabinet, which committed this type of practice was called "Krachministerium."

1509 X. d'Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna austro-węgierskiej monarchii*. . . , p. 208.

The Club was internally divided on the planned activities. For example, J. Czerkowski proposed to leave the Council immediately. L. Wodzicki believed that in case of rejection of the Polish proposals, one should withdraw from the Council before the second reading of the draft electoral reform. However, according to M. Zyblikiewicz, small concessions should have been demanded in exchange for remaining in the Council. A. Sapieha and Seweryn Smarzewski tried to convince the deputies that staying in the House of Deputies, in the face of such an unfavorable government, would be humiliating. As a result of the meeting, after seven hours of stormy discussion, the Polish Circle adopted the resolution to leave the Council of State at second reading. The deputies decided not to support the draft law on direct elections to the Imperial Council. The Club therefore finally passed a resolution to leave the House, especially as the government denied it any guarantees.¹⁵¹⁰

This time, the Club's position was different from the actions taken during previous resolution campaigns. By deciding to leave the Imperial Council, the Club resigned from any influence on the laws undertaken in the House of Deputies. Moreover, there was a high probability that the government would invalidate the mandates of members of the Imperial Council, which was soon to happen anyway. And after amending the election law and introducing direct elections to the Council, it will gain greater opportunities for electoral control and abuse in the province.

The adoption of this resolution may be considered not a very logical move of the Club. However, the decision may be explained by the fact that the government held a parliamentary majority. Therefore, any action taken by the club would not prevent it from voting on the election law in the House. However, if the Club had not passed a resolution to leave the Council but submitted a separate vote, it could not have been accused of not being able to predict the effects of its own decisions.

It is worth quoting here the statement of K. Grocholski. He spoke out against the practice followed by the government, i.e. introducing changes through state legislation without the prior consent of the Diets, which was contrary to the national statutes. He declared that according to the February Constitution of 1861, the statutes are its integral part, and therefore a violation of the statute is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, the Polish Circle

1510 Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 259–261; Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*. . . , p. 229.

would not participate in the deliberations on the government project.¹⁵¹¹ From this point of view, the Club's decision not to participate in the violation of state and national rights was right.

During the campaign for the electoral reform and the introduction of direct elections, discrepancies between Polish and Ruthenian deputies were also revealed. Fearing the loss of influence on the composition of the parliamentary representation, Poles were strongly opposed to them. A different position was taken by the Ruthenian deputies, who in this way intended to become independent of the Diet's decision on the composition of the parliamentary delegation to the Imperial Council. As early as in March 1871, the Moscovophiles and their political organization called the Ruthenian Council, through the Ukrainian deputies, petitioned in the forum of the Imperial Council for the introduction of direct elections: "the deputies of the Ruthenian nationality, the faction of Świętojurcy, wishing to serve the centralists, of whom they were a blind instrument in the Imperial Council, although they did introduce resolutions in favor of direct elections, this one was rejected by 101 votes against nineteen."¹⁵¹²

On March 6, 1873, a meeting of the House of Deputies was held, which should be considered historic as it was then that the decision was taken to introduce direct elections to the Imperial Council. Voting on the project was basically a formality and took place in a calm atmosphere. There were only 122 out of 203 deputies present in the House, of whom only two voted against the draft.¹⁵¹³ Given the victory of the majority in both Houses of Parliament, the Emperor sanctioned the law on April 2, 1873.

Poles feared changes in the electoral law, predicting, firstly, that the new rules of elections to the Imperial Council would significantly reduce the number of

1511 A similar statement was made by Czartoryski in the House of Lords during the voting on the project on March 27, Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 262–264.

1512 X. d'Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna austro-węgierskiej monarchii*. . . , p. 209; J. Gruchala, *Rząd austriacki i polskie stronnictwa polityczne w Galicji wobec kwestii ukraińskiej (1890–1914)* (Wrocław; 1982), p. 26.

1513 This voting cannot be considered fully valid as the requirement of an absolute majority to vote on a law was not met. The government has therefore committed a certain abuse. Before the vote, it had been found that 167 of the deputies were sworn in, 45 of whom abstained, Pannenkowa, *Walka Galicji z centralizmem wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 263. Galicia was then represented by only three deputies, one Ruthenian and two Mazurian deputies, X. d'Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna austro-węgierskiej monarchii*. . . , p. 209.

seats held by them and, secondly, that they would lose control over the political and social composition of the Council. In either case, these fears were exaggerated. In 1867, the Diet elected thirty-eight out of 203 deputies to the Imperial Council, i.e. 18.71 % of the entire House. According to the new law, Galicia held sixty-three out of 353 seats. It reduced the number of Galician deputies in relation to the others, but not significantly. In 1873 and in the following years, the Poles in the Imperial Council constituted 17.84 % of all deputies. However, as far as the political and social face of the Galician representation was concerned, the following years showed that the Conservatives were perfectly capable of mastering the factors that could have harmed their politics. It was only the emergence of the socialist, peoples' and nationalist movement at the turn of the centuries that changed the position of the *Stańczycy* and the *Podolacy* in the Austrian parliament.

It seems that leaving the Imperial Council by the Polish deputies, regardless of the legitimacy of this action, saved the honor of the Polish Circle. The Poles finally decided to take decisive steps, especially since the interest of the Galician province was threatened. Admittedly, this move was not compliant with the adopted line of utilitarian policy and parliamentary tactics, consisting in active and continuous participation in the work of the Imperial Council, but it gave a sense of exploiting all possible actions for the benefit of the Polish cause. Nevertheless, the "victory" of the Polish delegation was more expressive than tangible. Overall, the struggle for the implementation of the resolution of 1868 ended in failure. The autonomous concessions, granted by Vienna to Galicia, could most probably have been granted to it through the so-called "small steps," without the necessity of a large-scale action, in this case a resolution campaign. Włodzimierz Czerkawski expressed a critical judgment after the fight for the implementation of the demands of the national Diet was over: "We lost the political campaign for this program firmly."¹⁵¹⁴

Michał Bobrzyński called the year 1873 the end of: "an era of great politics," after which it was time to start organic work. The work on the development of the country, under the conditions defined by the legal and political framework, inherited from previous years of political efforts and struggles for a better position for Galicia in the monarchy.¹⁵¹⁵

1514 W. Czerkawski, *Wyodrębnienie Galicji. Z pośmiertnej teki Włodzimierza Czerkawskiego* (Kraków; Biblioteka Narodowa: 1914), p. 4.

1515 Bobrzyński, Jaworski, Milewski, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego*. . . , pp. 30–31.

It is worth posing at this point the question whether a certain stage in Galicia's political life, which M. Bobrzynski called great politics, really passed with the end of the resolution campaigns. In part, the answer to this question may be found in the very effects of the struggle for the separation of Galicia, which over time transformed into an effort to extend only its autonomy.

Leaving aside the problem of F. Smolka's concept of transforming the Monarchy into a federal state and determining whether this would be the right way to do so and beneficial for Galicia, it should be acknowledged that it was pushed out by supporters of the conciliatory course of Polish policy toward Austria. Later historical events showed that the Polish side was not able to defend the project of separating Galicia, included in the resolution of the national Diet of 1868. Over time, due to the not very effective policy of the Polish Circle and the tenacity of the German centralists, but also because of the influence of the international environment, this project was replaced by the program of autonomization of the Galician province. Moreover, the concessions made to Galicia were disproportionately small compared to the contribution made by Polish politicians during the struggle for independence of their own province. After five years of efforts, the Poles obtained, among other things, Polonization of administration and education and an increase in the legislative competence of the national Diet.¹⁵¹⁶ Some of the autonomous achievements were "granted" to Poles by the Austrian authorities. From October 1, 1869, the Polish language was introduced in Galicia as an official language in courts and administration.¹⁵¹⁷ However, the Poles – and

1516 The powers of the Diet included: the right to pass laws on culture, education and social care, i.e. national culture, public buildings, charitable institutions, including hospitals and shelters. The Diet also had some powers in the area of municipal and school legislation concerning primary, vocational and secondary schools. The national authorities also had the right to enact taxes, but only for certain purposes and of local scope. See: *Dzieje narodu i państwa polskiego*, III, ed. J. Buszko, A. Garlicki (Warszawa; 1989), p. 10.

1517 Schools were Polonized early, so important autonomous concessions were granted to Poles during the period of centralist rule. When F. Beust decided to make these concessions, France and Prussia were in a political crisis. F. Beust: "was constantly thinking about revenge on Bismarck [...] and that he could not have exercised his vengeance any other way than in an alliance with France." Moreover, in the face of the approaching war, the Monarchy was forced to pass a military budget, so also the voices of Polish politicians were needed and although: "this circumstance having nothing to do with the interests of our country was the reason of Beust's great kindness to Polish deputies." X. d'Abancourt, *Era konstytucyjna austro-węgierskiej monarchii*. . . , pp. 137–138.

this should be seen as their unquestionable success – managed to appoint their minister without portfolio for the Galician affairs in 1871, which from that moment on was always in the hands of the Polish people.

Answering the question posed above, one may contend that from the point of view of the benefits obtained in the course of the resolution campaigns, Galician policy was not very effective. In the clash with the clubs ruling the Monarchy, Poles achieved only partial success, too meagre to be seen in terms of great politics. Also, the scope of activities undertaken by the Diet of Galicia and the Polish Circle in the Imperial Council was not wider in scope. The Poles limited their involvement only to such political activity, which was within the legal and political framework, but was also consistent with utilitarian policy or the very idea of the Polish-Austrian settlement. The tactics undertaken by Polish deputies in parliament did not lead to risky actions. The Polish Circle was ultimately forced to leave the Imperial Council, and ordering new elections to the Diet was enough of a threat. Compared to the campaign conducted by the Czechs, the behavior of Poles in the House can be described as balanced and thoughtful, sometimes too secure.

Given the above observations, it could be concluded that it was due to the incompetent national policy that the Galicians did not achieve their intended goal. And we could agree with this stance if only the activities of the Polish Circle were considered. However, we should take into consideration the fact that the Club did not function in a political vacuum. There was a convergence of national interests between the Polish and Czech deputies. Both nations pursued the same goal, namely – to obtain a national identity within the Austrian state. Their intentions, of course, interfered with the interests of the monarchy. Moreover, the aspirations of Poles and Czechs led to mutual rivalry, because Austria could not in any way afford to lose control over two provinces at once. These two Slavic nations were perfectly aware that the consent of the Monarchy to the autonomy of one province would entail the granting of the same powers to the other. Such a solution was not acceptable to the monarchy. Therefore, each of the national representations sought to achieve the intended status before its rival did. The Poles and the Czechs were also unwilling to pursue a common national policy in the House. The differences were partly due to a lack of agreement on the strategy of actions. The Polish Circle was far from pursuing the absenteeism policy, which the Czechs very often resorted to. The aspirations of the Slavs were contrary to those of the Austrian Germans, who, after the monarchy had transformed into a dualistic state, tried at all costs to maintain the primacy in its western part. Austria's attitude toward Poles was also determined by the balance of power in the international arena. Both Prussia and Russia had no interest in granting

autonomy to Galicia: “both of them (O. Bismarck and Tsar Alexander II) were tormented by the fear of democracy and the compromise policy of Austria toward Poles.”¹⁵¹⁸ The monarchy’s relations with Russia and Prussia against the backdrop of the events of the Franco-Prussian war, and consequently the conclusion of an agreement by the three emperors, caused a significant deterioration in the climate for the Polish cause. The situation of that time is reflected in the following sentence: “There is only a fear that Austria would not sacrifice the Triple Alliance of Poles.”¹⁵¹⁹ The success of the resolution campaigns was also complicated by the internal situation in the monarchy, which was connected with the implementation of changes in the electoral law, i.e. the introduction of direct elections to the Imperial Council.

Jakub Forst-Battaglia claimed that the year 1873 was an important time caesura also in Polish-Ruthenian relations, because it closed a period in which Ruthenians enjoyed the support of Vienna for their political aspirations. The Russophiles, like the Ruthenian nationalists, received nothing in return for supporting the Monarchy over the last quarter of a century.¹⁵²⁰ In the following years, the Polish-Ruthenian relations were marked by the search for ways of agreement. However, it should be clearly emphasized that the Polish side did not agree on the form of the settlement with the Ruthenians and the scope of concessions to which the Poles could possibly agree.

The presented problems of international nature not only shaped the position of the Polish Circle toward the policy of the monarchy, but also directly depended on them. When deciding on conciliatory steps regarding the Poles, Austria was also forced to take into consideration the attitude of the neighboring powers toward the Polish cause, and not only the internal situation in the country. If we compare the discussed problems with the national aspirations of Poles from Galicia, it seems fully justified to describe the actions taken by the Polish politicians as great politics. The author would like to emphasize at this point, however, that in her understanding such a policy did not end in 1873; it was only a certain stage in the political life of the Polish nation under the Austrian partition that was closed. The obtaining of autonomous concessions and the subsequent adoption of the program of relying on Austria gave rise to a new period in the history of Polish-Austrian relations, in which Poles marked their active and tangible participation.

1518 Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*. . . , p. 105.

1519 Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*. . . , p. 110.

1520 Forst-Battaglia, *Die polnisch-ukrainischen Beziehungen*. . . , p. 61.

3. The Pro-Austrian Orientation

It seems that the decisive moment to adopt a pro-Austrian orientation during the period of the dual monarchy was the 1870s. During this period – which abounded with events of significant importance for the Polish cause – the Poles entered the path of cooperation with the partitioner. The aim of this cooperation was both to increase the autonomy of the Galician province and to strengthen the leading position of the nobility. It seems that it is not entirely possible to give a specific date that would determine the pro-Austrian policy course of Poles. It is due to several factors, which are both of internal (in Galicia and all of Cisleithania) and international nature.

In this regard, a significant breakthrough happened in 1879, when a parliamentary coalition was formed by German clerical members of the parliament, Czechs, and Poles called the “Iron Ring.”¹⁵²¹ It resulted in the establishment of a pro-Austrian political line, represented by Galician conservatives. Then, it was a period of the reign of Kazimierz Count Badeni, to whom a separate chapter of work was devoted.¹⁵²²

Austro-Polish relations were partially modified at the turn of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, mainly due to the emergence of new ideologies and political movements. It was the beginning of the period of the opposition parties’ activity: socialists, the People’s Party, and National Democracy. Their activity resulted in the fact that Polish politics in Vienna soon became a resultant of various political programs. Apart from the Polish Circle, there were also socialists, and for some time also People’s Party activists. However, it was challenging to maintain discipline and solidarity within the Circle, so helpful in its previous activities. The Austrian orientation was also influenced by the Ukrainian question and international events, especially the Balkan crises.

The last moment of the popularity of the pro-Austrian concept was the years of the First World War, when initiatives and activities of an independent character appeared. Thus, the war years were characterized by a decline in the popularity of the Austro-Polish policy. Besides, loyalism enjoyed fewer and fewer supporters. Only the Conservatives of Cracow, but not all of them, remained loyal to the Emperor until the end of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

1521 J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 105–143.

1522 See Chapter 2. 2 of this book.

The subject literature also distinguishes other stages of shaping and strengthening the pro-Austrian orientation.¹⁵²³ The author of the paper is closest to the view represented by W. Feldman.¹⁵²⁴

The pro-Austrian orientation went through numerous changes over time. Indeed, its dynamic development was a function of current political events. Before discussing the successive stages of this development, it is useful to refer to the origins of the concept of this political position. For the problem of the pro-Austrian orientation had much deeper roots. It is also worth recalling some facts from the history of the Austrian-Polish relations that influenced the discussed problem.

The roots of the pro-Austrian orientation¹⁵²⁵ can be traced back to the middle of the nineteenth century and are related to the process of reevaluation in the sphere of national policy. As a nation with its statehood and rich history, culture, and traditions, Poles, like no other subjugated nation living in a monarchy, were characterized by a sense of their distinctiveness and a desire to regain their sovereignty. Thanks to their well-established national consciousness and a clearly defined program of struggle to regain statehood, Poles distinguished themselves from other nationalities of the Austrian state in a particular way. When the compatriots from the Russian and Prussian partition tried to regain their sovereignty through national liberation riots, Poles from Galicia began to perceive the issues of regaining independence differently. This process began already during the Spring of Nations, and the defeat of the January Uprising only accelerated it. The Cracow conservatives, criticizing the *liberum conspiro*, put forward a program to break with the Romantic traditions in politics, calling at the same time for acceptance of the status quo and for work to improve the existence of the Polish nation within the partitioning states. Such events as, for

1523 K. K. Daszyk mentions as crucial dates in the history of Polish-Austrian relations the period of resolution campaigns, then the turn of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, and then 1908 and the period of the First World War as the beginning of the collapse of pro-Austrian sentiments. See: K. K. Daszyk, "Między polską racją stanu a habsburskim mitem. Dom Habsburgów w galicyjskiej myśli politycznej doby autonomicznej," in: *Galicja i jej dziedzictwo*, t. 1, *Historia i polityka*, ed. W. Bonusiak, J. Buszki, Rzeszów 1994, p. 69–80. See also: H. Wereszycki, "Rola Polaków w monarchii habsburskiej," *Małopolskie Studia Historyczne*, no. IX, 1966, vol. 3/4, pp. 45–53.

1524 W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*. . . , p. 57 ff.

1525 This problem was widely discussed by W. Feldman. W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*. . . , p. 57 ff.

example, the appointment of Agenor Gołuchowski as the governor of Galicia in 1866, the granting of partial autonomy to the province during the constitutional period and the settlement of Poles with the monarchy in 1867 and gaining further concessions as a result of resolution campaigns in the years 1868–1873 and events on the international scene in the 1870s only consolidated the pro-Austrian political course.

In the subject literature, the view was established that the precursor of this orientation was A. Gołuchowski's father¹⁵²⁶, who was the first of the Poles to achieve the position of Minister of the Interior in 1859, and in 1860, Minister of State, when in fact he became a Prime Minister. The monarchy also owes him a famous diploma from 1860, announcing legal and political changes toward a federation.¹⁵²⁷ W. Feldman thus characterized Gołuchowski: "A politician who enters a wider historical audience with Gołuchowski and who, until then, knew how to be a tool of centralist-reactionary tendencies, and having found himself on the dance floors of grand politics, he stood on a firm footing, combining [. . .] Austrian loyalty with the Polish cause."¹⁵²⁸ Initially not very positively evaluated by his contemporaries, he gained recognition and acceptance of his political program only after the defeat of the January Uprising, while he became popular at the end of his life. In the 1860s, he was criticized by the so-called young conservatives from Cracow, who nota bene took over the program of the settlement with the dynasty. They appreciated his merits for the country in a later period.¹⁵²⁹ Józef Szujski wrote about Gołuchowski in 1875: "For the first time a man who stood alone on loyalty, happily came to an end among the most complete and widespread popularity, for the first time a Polish province is on the

1526 J. Radzyner, "Orientacja austro-polska," in: *Austria-Polska. Z dziejów sąsiedztwa*, ed. W. Leitsch, M. Wawrykova, Warszawa-Vienna 1989, p. 192.

1527 K. Nizio, "Gołuchowski Agenor," in: *Polacy w historii i kulturze krajów Europy Zachodniej. Słownik biograficzny*, ed. K. Kwaśniewski, L. Trzeciakowski, Poznań 1981, p. 134.

1528 W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*. . . , p. 35.

1529 When the vocation of A. Gołuchowski's as governor of Galicia was decided, S. Koźmian wrote: "chcielibyśmy go widzieć raczej powołanego na to stanowisko jak na inne; dlatego tylko nie pragniemy hr. Gołuchowskiego jako namiestnika, iż obawiamy się tem samem stracić najlepszego kanclerza. Nikt niezaprzeczenie w Galicyi nie zna lepiej i Galicyi i Austryi, nikt w równym stopniu nie posiada zaufania monarchy i prowincyi, nikt dzielniej i z większą znajomością rzeczy nie potrafi bronić w Wiedniu interesów polskich wobec rozmaitych dążeń i wpływów, nikt lepiej nie zdoła pogodzić ich z interesem państwa, nikt jak hr. Gołuchowski," *Przegląd Polski*, March 1866, p. 654.

road where its national feelings are combined with a sincere favor for the dynasty and the country to which it belongs.” The author described him further: “In his official career, Count Gołuchowski had the opportunity to get to know all the shades of bureaucratic devouring of Poles, and he came out as the bravest Polebiters’ opponent.”¹⁵³⁰

A. Gołuchowski was a supporter of the concept of national autonomy and loyalty policy. He claimed that undertaking an armed struggle involves accepting an absolute risk, and in a situation of defeat, it may mean the withdrawal of the already existing autonomous achievements. Moreover, in the face of the disasters of national uprisings and the much worse situation of Poles remaining under Prussian and Russian partition, Galicia gained the status of an entity that could be the seed of the future, reborn Polish state. The merits of A. Gołuchowski are also emphasized at a breakthrough moment for the Habsburg monarchy and Galicia, i.e., in the year when Austro-Hungarian Empire was founded: “although not without hesitation and difficulties [...] the country followed Count Gołuchowski’s political program one step further when in the spirit of the Diet’s resolution of March 2, 1867, on the election of the Council of State, he entered into positive politics, with loyal intentions not only toward the dynasty but also toward the state. [...] From that time on, he connected the country with his Governor in such a strict, inseparable knot of shared thoughts and aspirations that never existed in any Polish district between the public and the representative of the government.”¹⁵³¹

It seems that the concept initiated by A. Gołuchowski of cooperation with the partitioning state, but in the interest of his nation, gained more and more recognition. It should not be defined in terms of collaboration or selling the leftovers of national independence, but of a settlement or compromise that could bring the Poles as much benefit as possible.

As time passed, the understanding of patriotism began to change. A person regarded as a patriot was no longer necessarily just the one who decided to sacrifice his life for his homeland. The patriot was also the one who, using his knowledge and skills, was able to legally influence the improvement of the situation of the nation and country. Therefore, it became even a national duty to strive to gain offices and positions, and through them to participate in governing the state.

1530 Qtd. after: B. Łoziński, *Agenor hr. Gołuchowski w pierwszym okresie rządów swoich (1848–1859)*, Lviv 1901, p. 249.

1531 B. Łoziński, *Agenor hr. Gołuchowski*. . . , pp. 250, 251.

On such grounds, Poles undertook various initiatives, the main goal of which was to gain autonomy for the Galician province. In the initial period of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, such an initiative was the struggle for a resolution of the Galician Parliament.

It is well known that the Polish case in Austria was a result of the balance of power between the forces. Galicia had hoped many times for the “internationalization” of the Polish cause.¹⁵³² The relations between the partitioners significantly influenced the actions taken by the Polish side. Analysis of the history of pro-Austrian orientation, starting from the first partition, Stefan Kieniewicz noted that all the concepts of rebuilding Poland based on Austria had: “an anti-Russian blade”; moreover, they were put forward in moments of political rapprochement between Prussia and Russia, which predetermined their failure. The year 1914 came as an exception.¹⁵³³ This is evidenced, for instance, the memorial given to the Emperor by Paweł Popiel in 1885, in which he wrote: “War [...] would be so blessed in my understanding that I would be willing to offer my blood and my children’s blood for this result.” He added: “Every state in anticipation of war with Russia takes into account the Polish revolutionary movement.”¹⁵³⁴ Julian Czerkowski confirms this thesis: “since always, we have forecasted on the Eastern war [...] that when it comes to the Eastern question, it will also be the turn of the Polish question.”¹⁵³⁵ For this reason, the discussion of the process of shaping and changing the pro-Austrian orientation should begin with a presentation of the external situation and its influence on the above problem.

1532 The term is, in a sense symbolic, since the Polish case was not only a matter of internal politics but also of international relations in Europe. First of all, it was in the orbit of German and Russian interests, but also, although to a lesser extent, of France or England. Admittedly, it was of particular importance when the foreign policy objectives of the partitioning powers were opposed. Nevertheless, the government and diplomacy of Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Germany took it into account in their moves, treating it as part of political tactics. It should be noted that it was considered particularly dangerous and sensitive by the Tsar, who was afraid of the next Polish nationalist rush.

1533 S. Kieniewicz, “Orientacja austriacka w Polsce porozbiorowej,” *Roczniki Historyczne*, no. 18, 1949, pp. 211, 214.

1534 “Memorjał wręczony cesarzowi Franciszkowi Józefowi (z dnia 10 kwietnia 1885r.)” in: *P. Popiel, Pamiętniki Pawła Popiela*. . . , pp. 247–248.

1535 “Przemówienie dra Juliana Czerkowskiego na zgromadzeniu przedwyborczym w Brzeżanach z dnia 11 grudnia 1878r. przy wyborze delegata do Rady Państwa z grup większych posiadłości,” Lviv 1878, p. 6.

At the end of the 1860s, the international situation on the European continent was marked by an impending military confrontation between the world powers. The Poles were counting on Austria joining the war, and thus on the renewal of the Polish cause and perhaps regaining independence. F. Smolk explicitly expressed these sentiments: “there is a growing sympathy for the French Republic, in which victory I have never doubted, and today I have the most definite conviction that it will wipe the Prussians to the pulp so that this mischief will not be mastered in the third generation yet.”¹⁵³⁶

O. Bismarck’s diplomatic procedures and the conclusion of the treaty in the Ems in June 1870 by Prussia and Russia created a very unfavorable balance of power for France and Austria-Hungary, and thus indirectly for the Polish cause. According to the Prussian-Russian agreement, any concessions made by the Austro-Hungarian monarchy to the Poles posed a real threat to the interests of the world powers. Thus, the militarily weak Austro-Hungarian Empire decided not to participate in the war alongside France.¹⁵³⁷

Austria’s neutral stance in this war announced on July 18, 1870, meant that hopes of Poles regaining their sovereignty as a result of the war between the partitioners were fiery. Galicia could not become a political center around which Polish national aspirations would focus, threatening the interests and stability of the Prussian and Russian invaders. Both the Tsar and O. Bismarck realized that only Austria-Hungary could stop Poles. The pressure was therefore exerted on them, suggesting that Vienna favored Polish claims and that Prime Minister F. Beust was sympathetic to the anti-Russian aspirations of Poles. Russia soon managed to obtain a declaration of the monarchy not to support the Polish cause.¹⁵³⁸

Nevertheless, the Poles hoped that this state of affairs was temporary and that Austria would change its position soon. However, the anti-German and anti-Russian sentiments in 1871 quickly dissipated when it turned out that Bismarck’s political plans did not include the creation of a conflict with Russia. Maintaining good relations with the Russian Empire meant that the issue of the Slavic peoples would not become a matter of European policy, and therefore there would be no chance for their liberation.

1536 Qtd. after: H. Rzadkowska, p. 263.

1537 H. Wereszycki, *J. Zdrada, Polska działalność dyplomatyczna...*, pp. 694–696; H. Wereszycki, *Sojusz trzech cesarzy...*, pp. 150–165.

1538 H. Wereszycki, *J. Zdrada, Polska działalność dyplomatyczna...*, p. 697.

After the fall of France in the war with Prussia in 1870, the mood in Galicia was pessimistic. It is reflected in the words of Valerian Kalinka, published in a brochure entitled: "A Defeat of France and the Future of Europe."¹⁵³⁹ The defeat of Napoleon created a new balance of power in Europe. France became potentially the most dangerous enemy of the German Reich, which is why O. Bismarck sought an alliance with Austria-Hungary to prevent the establishment of an Austrian-French coalition in the future. Bismarck's plans coincided with the direction of the monarchy's foreign policy, which, for fear of Russia, was forced to win an ally, and it could not be France after 1870. Moreover, Germany was not interested in breaking off good relations with Russia, which gave the monarchy security guarantees. This constellation became the basis for the 1872 agreement between the powers, the League of the Three Emperors.¹⁵⁴⁰ It took place on the hundredth anniversary of the First Partition of Poland, so it had its symbolic meaning. It was: "a manifestation of monarchist and conservative forces."¹⁵⁴¹ Its direct effect on the Polish cause was the refusal to make further autonomous concessions to Galicia, mainly due to the intervention of O. Bismarck. For the Poles, the alliance meant the end of the concept of renewing the Polish cause on the international arena, as the agreement concluded meant that from that moment, the foreign policy objectives of the powers were to coincide.

The League of the Three Emperors was, therefore, of vital importance to the Polish cause. The rapprochement with Germany meant that not only the directions of foreign policy but also internal relations in the country would change. The new geopolitical situation forced the Poles to adopt a more consensual stance toward the Viennese government.¹⁵⁴² For the Polish cause, however, this balance of power in Europe did not promise any beneficial changes: "In his times, however, Bismarck did not encounter any powerful personality who would be a counterbalance to him on the continent [. . .]. Austria was a mechanical conglomerate without ideas and internal strength [. . .]. France was in the hands of a decadent, who had lost himself and was pulling his nation into the abyss; Russia, a colossus, on clay legs, willingly leaned on Bismarck's friendship

1539 The text is included in: W. Kalinka, *Galicja i Kraków pod panowaniem austriackim. Wybór pism*, ed. W. Bernacki, Kraków 2001, pp. 168–217.

1540 This problem is widely discussed by H. Wereszycki: H. Wereszycki, *Sojusz trzech cesarzy. . .*, pp. 150–165.

1541 K. Piwarski, "Zmiany w sytuacji międzynarodowej i nowa pozycja ziem polskich 1864–1900," in: *Historia Polski*, vol. 3, part 1, ed. W. Najdus, Ż. Kormanowa, Warszawa 1974, pp. 113–114.

1542 H. Wereszycki, *Pod berłem Habsburgów. . .*, p. 211.

as he did on his neighbor's muscular body; this embrace broke Poland in the middle."¹⁵⁴³

However, further accidents have shown that the partitioners' policies could not enter the phase of good neighborly relations. In 1878, Germany entered into a secret alliance with Austro-Hungary of a defensive nature, in fact against Russia. This alliance was based on the fact that in case of an attack by Russia, the other party would provide it with military assistance. It was the beginning of the policy of blocks of states on the European ground¹⁵⁴⁴, on which in the future the Poles will be given a chance to resume the Polish cause on the European ground.

Another issue of international importance that influenced the formation of pro-Austrian orientation was the Balkan crisis of the second half of the 1870s. At that time too, Poles hoped that there would be a chance to start a conflict on a European scale and thus also hopes for a renewal of the Polish cause in the international arena.

In 1875, an uprising broke out in Herzegovina and in 1876 in Bosnia and Bulgaria. Initially of an agrarian character, later also of a national character, the uprisings were directed against Turkish oppression. Russia was involved in the uprisings, supporting plans to liberate the Balkan Slavs, but also Austria-Hungary, England, France, and Germany.¹⁵⁴⁵ For the monarchy, the Balkan crisis became a fundamental foreign policy issue during this period. Chancellor F. von Beust preached that either Turkey or Austria could influence Bosnia. Such a stance was not in line with the aspirations of Russia, which saw the Balkans as a place to pursue its Pan-Slavic interests. The contradiction of the political goals of the powers could lead to an armed conflict between Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany. It was prevented by the agreement of July 1876 on neutrality, and, in the event of a possible defeat in Turkey, on the division of spheres of influence. Under this agreement, the Habsburg monarchy was to receive Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁵⁴⁶ The further course of events, Turkey's defeat in the war with

1543 W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*. . . , pp. 103–104.

1544 Three years later Italy joined this alliance, K. Piwarski, *Zmiany w sytuacji międzynarodowej*. . . , pp. 118–119.

1545 The causes, outburst, course of events and consequences of the uprisings in the Balkans are discussed: A. Giza, *Bośnia i Hercegowina w dobie tureckiego i austriackiego panowania (1800–1914)*, Szczecin 2002.

1546 During their visit to St. Petersburg, the Emperor and the Tsar concluded an agreement under which Austria committed itself to maintain neutrality in its relations with Russia in the event of a conflict with Turkey, conducted in the interests of the Southern Slavs. This peculiar non-aggression pact was a consequence of the

the Tsar and the conclusion of peace in San Stefano in March 1878, made it possible to strengthen Russia's position concerning European states. Thus, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy felt that its interests in the Balkans had become threatened. A chance to regain the lost position *vis-à-vis* Russia was the revision of the provisions of the Turkish-Russian Treaty, which was carried out during the Berlin Congress. As a result of the talks, which lasted from June to July 1878, it was agreed, among other things, that Austria-Hungary would take over Bosnia and Herzegovina as its protectorate for 30 years.¹⁵⁴⁷ The Berlin Congress was tantamount to the end of Poles' hopes for a solution to the Polish question through the Russian-Turkish conflict. The occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina meant that the borders of the monarchy moved deep into the Balkans. Austria began to exploit national antagonisms between Croats and Serbs as well as religious, Catholic, and Orthodox ones.

The Circle did not take a position on the Balkan conflict for a long time. A sign of caution exercised by Polish MPs in Parliament was to refrain from participating in the debate on the Balkan issue,¹⁵⁴⁸ although there was an opportunity to make a parliamentary question.¹⁵⁴⁹

Thus, in the initial period of the conflict, the Circle behaved passively, unlike the national parliament and public opinion in Galicia. As a result of the intervention of the leadership and the early closure of the Diet's session, on August 30, 1877, the Poles tried to put pressure on the deputies in the Council to take a stand against the conflict in the Balkans. At that time, Ludwik Skrzyński, MP, came up against the public expectations. He made a statement intending to ask about the legality of Russian actions related to the transport of war transports through Austrian territory. After the intervention of the conservatives from the

League of the Three Emperors, concluded in 1872, K. Fiedor, *Austria. Zarys dziejów politycznych*, Łódź 2000, p. 111; A. Giza, *Bośnia i Hercegowina*. . . , pp. 75–76.

1547 The two provinces were initially under the responsibility of the joint foreign minister of the monarchy and then the joint minister of finance. However, until 1882 the Austrian commander of the occupying army had actual power over them. Then, as a result of the uprising in Hercegovina, they established a civilian governess, which for 20 years was in the hands of Benjamin Kallay, Hungarian Minister of Finance, A. Giza, *Bośnia i Hercegowina*. . . , pp. 78–80, 84.

1548 J. Buszko, *Die Politik der galizischen Polen zur Zeit der Orientkrise (1876–78)*, *Austro-Polonica 1*, ZN UJ. Pr. Hist., vol. 57, 1978, pp. 22–25.

1549 Austria did not intervene when the army and military supplies were transported through its territory, precisely through Galicia. The monarchy was not directly involved in the Balkan conflict, so this was a violation of its neutrality. Neither did the MPs from the Polish Circle oppose it.

Circle, the deputy resigned from questioning the matter. The majority in the Polish Circle believed that Poles should not act in the interest of Turkey, and this was the intention of L. Skrzyński.¹⁵⁵⁰

In October and November, the Council of State held heated debates on the Balkan events. Centralists, Slovenians, and Czechs: “except for the members of the Polish Circle,” were against the Austrian government and Eastern policy. The Galician press negatively assessed this fact.¹⁵⁵¹ There were also many voices approving of the Polish Circle’s restraint. The author of an anonymous letter to the President of the Polish Circle in the Council of State wrote: “the Polish general public has the right to demand undeniably that Galicia beware of false steps and national harm, especially that the unwise and non-political conduct of the position of the most extensive district, under the rule of Russia, should not be obstructed.”¹⁵⁵² Moreover, the Polish Circle in its policy toward the Balkan conflict, Russia and Pan-Slavism was internally divided. Two groups, a conservative and a liberal-democratic one, were at odds.

The proponents of utilitarian policy refrained from taking a stance for a long time, and it was only in the later phase of the conflict that they decided to support Austrian policy while emphasizing the superiority of the monarchy’s interests over those of the Galician ones and asserting the loyal attitude of the Poles toward Austria: “during the Eastern War, the *Stańczycy* accused the program of provoking a war between Austria and Russia for restitution of Poland.”¹⁵⁵³ Thus, the Conservatives decided not to support the national aspirations of the Southern Slavs, but also did not define their position toward Turkey. Instead, they were severely criticized for the tsarist policy and Pan-Slavism. Julian Czerkowski spoke at a meeting of the Polish Circle: “The fight against Pan-Slavism should only be undertaken by Austrians to raise the Polish question – because the Eastern question cannot be resolved without it.”¹⁵⁵⁴ Conservative MPs did not see the advisability of plans to lean on Russia, which in the opinion of Poles, was not a guarantee of freedom for Slavic peoples. From the Polish point of view, this position should be regarded as correct/understandable. However, one can wonder whether Polish conservatives should accept the occupation of Bosnia

1550 J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , p. 90.

1551 F. X. d’Abancourt, pp. 238–244.

1552 The letter was written on April 24, 1878, “List do J. W. Grocholskiego, Prezesa koła polskiego w Wiedniu,” *Wiedeń* 1878, p. 4.

1553 W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*. . . , p. 121.

1554 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 263 z 3 listopada 1878 r.,” *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, Biblioteka im. Ks. Czartoryskich (BCz), manuscript 1241, c. 356.

and Herzegovina. It seems that it was not in the interest of the Poles to support the Balkan policy of Vienna: "And above all, it was clear to the Poles that the occupation policy, from now on directing the plans and forces of Austria to the south instead of to the north, is a heavy blow to the Polish cause."¹⁵⁵⁵ At the same time, the question arises whether the conservatives were guided by the good of the province, making its "prosperity" dependent on the position of the partitioning state, or whether they wanted to maintain the continuity of utilitarian policy and loyalty, bringing them tangible benefits.

Democrats had a different view of the situation, namely – they believed that Poles should not support the Balkan policy of the monarchy, especially since the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina resembled the occupation. This view was also expressed by the country's Marshal Ludwik Wodzicki in August 1877, although other motives probably motivated him: "the Diet should stay away from influences that want to use it in foreign interest so that it is not appropriate for him to raise his voice on the eastern issue."¹⁵⁵⁶ Nevertheless, the Diet Galicia, on the initiative of K. Grocholski and 66 MPs, decided to arrange an address to the throne with a loyalist pronouncement. However, there was no debate on it due to the sudden closure of the session by the Emperor on the 30 of August.¹⁵⁵⁷

At the same time, however, there was a consensus in the Circle on the relationship with Russia. Both groups were in favor of the government's anti-Russian policy because it was in the interest of the Polish nation. It was the position of almost the entire Polish Circle. Włodzimierz Kozłowski said: "only the settlement of the Polish issue can secure peace."¹⁵⁵⁸ Only Kornel Ujejski reported a

1555 W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*. . . , p. 128. The Poles wanted to direct Austria's annexation plans to the east and northeast of the continent and to dissuade from Balkan politics, but: "Austria does not even dream about the Dnieper and Daugava River, the annex of Poland neither, does not consider the gains by the Vistula River to be beneficial for its interests, does not and cannot even involve Poland itself in its political plans." "List do J. W. Grocholskiego. . .," p. 10.

1556 F. X. d'Abancourt, p. 249.

1557 The national parliament mostly criticized the Balkan policy of the monarchy: "This war reveals an attempt, the end of which will be subjugation in the name of Pan-Slavism of all Slavic nations, which is as dangerous for the monarchy as the means used to carry it out. Only those nations which have not renounced their independence are the only ones against these attempts; the Polish nation will never renounce its national allegiance," F. X. d'Abancourt, pp. 249–250.

1558 "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 263 z 3 listopada 1878r.," *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, BCz, manuscript 1241, c. 355.

dissenting opinion (*votum separatum*).¹⁵⁵⁹ The anonymous author of an open letter to the President of the Circle, K. Grocholski, ironically stated: “how much the citizens of Galicia smile about the prospect of war between Austria and Russia. The old is a Polish addiction, the passion for war [. . .] we immediately imagine that an independent Poland will emerge from here.”¹⁵⁶⁰

Following the moves of the Polish deputies at that time, one can find an answer to the question of their attitude toward the Austrian state, and thus determine whether the Circle’s policy at that time was pro-Austrian. It should also be noted that it was only under pressure from the Democrats that the Circle gained a chance to determine its attitude toward the Balkan conflict.

In the face of the Balkan crisis, Poles faced a serious dilemma: whether to support the Slavs, and thus indirectly Russia, which supported their aspirations, or Turkey, the antagonist of Russia, but at the same time, the oppressor of the South Slavic nations. The situation was further complicated by the agreement between Austria and Russia concerning the sphere of influence in the Balkans. It should be noted at this point that the attitude of Poles toward the Tsar, in contrast to the Ruthenians, South Slavs, and Slavs living in Transleithania, was negative. Neither were Poles in favor of Pan-Slavism. They were critical of the idea of leaning Slavs on Russia, arguing their point of view primarily with the ambiguous attitude of the Tsarist toward the Slavic nations.

On the eve of the Balkan conflict, K. Krzeczunowicz, like S. Smarzewski and W. Kozłowski, were in favor of abstaining from speaking on the possible conflict in the Balkans.¹⁵⁶¹ It was also the position of the chairman of K. Grocholski’s Circle, who advised the MPs not to speak on this matter and thus not to present the Polish issue, as this could be seen as a provocation of Russia. W. Czerkawski was of the opposite opinion, who demanded that a motion be made on the Eastern issue and that the Circle take part in the discussion in the Council of State, but he gained the support of only 5 MPs.¹⁵⁶² The Circle also did not support L. Skrzyński’s motion to make an appeal to the government on the Eastern

1559 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 263 z 3 listopada 1878r.,” *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, BCz, manuscript 1241, c. 361.

1560 “List do J. W. Grocholskiego. . .,” p. 12.

1561 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 138 z 2 listopada 1876r.,” *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, BCz, manuscript 1240, c. 125.

1562 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 165 z 6 maja 1877r.,” *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, manuscript 1240, c. 334–341.

issue.¹⁵⁶³ W. Kozłowski demanded that Austria present an official position on the crisis. The Circle voted in favor of W. Kozłowski's proposal with 15 MPs against 19 votes.¹⁵⁶⁴ Only this voting/ballot reflected the internal divisions within the Circle on the Balkan issue.

As the situation in the Balkans developed, the position of the Circle has evolved. At the end of June, L. Chrzanowski stated that the time had come to take a position on the Eastern issue.¹⁵⁶⁵ He was supported by W. Kozłowski, who thought that it was the last moment to present his own opinion on this issue, just like Rev. S. Ruczek. F. Smolka and K. Krzeczunowicz were against all declarations, especially against appeals to the Chamber. Finally, the Circle rejected the idea of submitting an appeal to the Chamber on the Eastern issue. Also, W. Kozłowski's motion to take part in the debate in the State Council was not accepted. Ten members voted for it, 15 against.¹⁵⁶⁶ J. Dunajewski also spoke on this issue. According to him, if a debate on the Eastern issue were to take place in the Chamber, the Circle should participate in it. He was also elected by the Members of Parliament to speak in this debate.¹⁵⁶⁷

The position of the Polish MPs was also presented by the speech of February 22, 1878, of the President of the Circle K. Grocholski, who pointed out the differences between Russia's actions toward Poles from the Polish Kingdom and the promises made to other Slavs. He also presented a reluctant attitude toward Russia and Pan-Slavism on December 12th, 1877, during the delegation meeting¹⁵⁶⁸, emphasizing the identity of Polish and Austrian interests. He sharply criticized Russia's policy toward the Slavs, but also the idea of annexing Turkish provinces through Austria. K. Grocholski claimed that international

1563 "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 216 z 10 lutego 1878r.," *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, manuscript 1241, c. 39.

1564 "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 139 z 3 listopada 1876r.," *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, manuscript 1240, c. 127–128, 131.

1565 "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 173 z 27 czerwca 1877r.," *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, manuscript 1240, c. 407–409, 423.

1566 "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 174 z 28 czerwca 1877r.," *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, manuscript 1240, c. 432.

1567 "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 175 z 1 lipca 1877r.," *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, manuscript 1240, c. 441.

1568 The representatives of the Polish Circle during the meeting of the Joint Delegation were Kazimierz Grocholski and Julian Dunajewski, elected on December 10, 1878, "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 265 z 10 grudnia 1878r.," *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, manuscript 1241, c. 365.

treaties should precede any arrangements concerning the Slavic peoples.¹⁵⁶⁹ The chairman of the Circle also saw the need to support the monarchy in its actions against Russia, and therefore he claimed: “maybe the war will have to be waged, which is why the Polish delegation accepts and considers necessary those burdens which serve to preserve the power of Austria.”¹⁵⁷⁰ Moreover, two days later, on December 14, K. Grocholski said: “Our monarchy should then strive to create such relations which would once and for all deprive that power (Russia) of the character of a constant threat to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.”¹⁵⁷¹

The loyalist policy obliged the Polish Circle to adopt a position consistent with the interests of the monarchy, although this expansion was directed toward the south of the continent and not toward the north as the Poles would have wished. The national interest, on the other hand, was to speak out against Russia. On the one hand, therefore, the Circle should not support the Balkan policy of Vienna, and on the other hand, it could not openly speak out against the monarchy, which would be the same as supporting Russian policy. Thus, Poles found themselves in a stalemate situation. Taking any action could expose them to adverse consequences. For this reason, the Circle kept silent for a long time, waiting for the further course of events. It was not until March 21, 1878, after the victory of the Russians over the Turks at Pleva, that K. Grocholski stressed that the peace treaties would lead to the stabilization of relations in the Balkans, but Pan-Slavism would always threaten the position of Austria. He added: “If you ask me then, where, if not on the Balkan peninsula, would it be appropriate to try to restore the destroyed relations of state power in the interest of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy? – I will not hesitate to answer: on the Vistula! In the Polish countries, *ex officio* called the Western governments by the Tsarate of Moscow!”¹⁵⁷² Julian Dunajewski also spoke in a similar spirit: “the real interests

1569 Fragments of K. Grocholski's speech of December 12th, 1877 (original text in German), and March 21, 1878. (text translated into Polish) are in: “Przemówienie dra Juliana Czerkawskiego na zgromadzeniu przedwyborczym w Brzeżanach z dnia 11 grudnia 1878r. przy wyborze delegata do Rady Państwa z grup większych posiadłości,” Lviv 1878, pp. 10–14. In the quoted minutes of the Polish Circle, there is a piece of information that during the joint delegation meeting K. Grocholski presented his own opinion, his own views, on the Balkan conflict, because the Circle did not yet have an official position, “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 266 z 12 grudnia 1878r.,” *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, BCz, manuscript 1241, c. 65.

1570 Qtd. after: J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 90–91.

1571 Qtd. after: W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*. . . , p. 124.

1572 “Przemówienie dra Juliana Czerkawskiego. . . z dnia 11 grudnia 1878 r. . . ,” p. 13.

of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy are always in line with the interests of our homeland, that both are in the same danger and that they must therefore both seek defense in the same direction.”¹⁵⁷³

The Balkan crisis only led to the strengthening of pro-Austrian orientation and, as J. Buszko stated, during its duration, the Circle was: “faithful.”¹⁵⁷⁴ It was also evidenced by the result of the vote in the State Council at the end of 1878 on the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. 160 MPs voted against it, and only 70 supported it, including the Polish Circle.¹⁵⁷⁵ W. Feldman also criticized the position of the Polish Members of Parliament: “They [Stańcycy] followed the simplest line: government policy toward Vienna,” and further on in the text: “Those opponents of independent Polish policy – the Stańcycy.”¹⁵⁷⁶ He also claimed that: “The diplomacy of the Stańcycy calls through the mouth of St. Tarnowski for patience, for politics with the government: not talking about the Polish issue, but only about the eastern one.”¹⁵⁷⁷ Julian Czerkawski explained the behavior of the conservatives, claiming that the silence of the Polish delegation in parliament on the Balkan conflict should not be treated as a willingness to avoid presenting a position: “it was only a matter of choosing the right time.”¹⁵⁷⁸ However, the Polish Circle voted against the Berlin Treaty, at the request of K. Ujejski, because there was no Polish case in it. The Club accepted it only to its knowledge.¹⁵⁷⁹

Given the international events of the 1870s, the author believes that they had a fundamental influence on the establishment of the pro-Austrian orientation, especially since, as J. Dunajewski claimed at the time: “Austria set out to break

1573 “Zatwierdzenie traktatu berlińskiego,” in: *Mowy Juliana Dunajewskiego w Sejmie Krajowym i w Radzie Państwa, przetłumaczył, objaśnił i wydał Władysław Leopold Jaworski*, vol. 2, *Mowy sejmowe i parlamentarne*, Kraków 1914, p. 289.

1574 J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie*. . . , p. 101.

1575 The vote in the Austrian parliament had a symbolic dimension because the occupation was already a fact. The decision of the parliament had no actual meaning in the situation at the time, F. X. d’Abancourt, p. 254.

1576 W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*. . . , p. 122.

1577 W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*. . . , p. 123.

1578 J. Czerkawski presented in detail the arguments which determined the Circle to refrain from declaring on the Balkan issue, “Przemówienie dra Juliana Czerkawskiego. . . z dnia 11 grudnia 1878r. . . ,” p. 5, 14.

1579 For the whole course of discussion see: “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 269 z 14 stycznia 1879r.,” *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, BCz, manuscript 1241, c. 373–380.

the power of Russia.¹⁵⁸⁰ The community of interests of Poles and the monarchy in terms of foreign policy certainly fundamentally favored this. The adoption of such a political line meant that Polish politics in Vienna lost an important feature, namely its autonomy. From that period on, Poles became loyal subjects of a dual monarchy, showing their loyalty and devotion. The author wants to clearly emphasize that, in her opinion, at this stage of Polish-Austrian relations, the Polish *raison d'état* was identical to the *raison d'état* of the partitioning state. It is confirmed by the words of S. Tarnowski, who wrote: "to take care of Austria so far, its internal peace and military strength, of the goodwill of the emperor."¹⁵⁸¹

Describing the formation of pro-Austrian orientation in Polish society, one cannot ignore the influence of the state of Galician affairs on the attitude of Poles toward the problem. Their underestimation could have a negative impact on the definition of the motives, which guided the Poles from Galicia when they chose the concept of leaning on Austria.

It seems that in the initial period of the dual monarchy, the issue of fighting for the resolution of the Diet of Galicia, the result of which was not entirely satisfactory for the Polish side, was a priority for the pro-Austrian orientation. In the years 1868–1873, the legal and political status of Galicia was not entirely determined. Although it was clearly defined by the December Constitution of 1867, the national statutes were in some contradiction with it, hence the efforts of Poles to grant Galicia more independence than that guaranteed by the Constitution. The Poles sought to obtain at least the powers that the Croats had in the Hungarian part of the monarchy.

Until 1873, Poles were in a somewhat ambiguous situation. On the one hand, they cooperated with the monarchy, emphasizing their attachment to the emperor and the state. In this period, loyalist attitudes prevailed. On the other hand, they acted against the monarchy, demanding far-reaching independence of the Galician province. The year 1873 eliminated this ambiguity of the legal and state position of Galicia and the nature of the actions of Polish politicians, and thus began a new stage in relations between Austria and Poland. According to the author, it should be regarded as an essential moment in the matter of strengthening the pro-Austrian orientation, based on the assumption that only

1580 "Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 270 z 19 stycznia 1879r.," *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, manuscript 1241, c. 383.

1581 S. Tarnowski, "Obrachunek Przeglądu Polskiego," *Przegląd Polski*, July 1, 1876; *Droga do niepodległości czy program defensywny? Praca organiczna – programy i motywy*, ed. T. Kizwalter, J. Skowronek, Warszawa 1988, p. 204.

close cooperation with Vienna can bring Poles tangible benefits: “Galicia has a safe haven underneath Austria for some time, and we can be in it truly and be loyal to the Emperor.”¹⁵⁸²

It seems that Galicia’s internal situation determined the choice of this policy concept. The loyalist policy was particularly close to the conservative circles, the Stańcycy and the Podolacy. They needed to ally with Vienna to maintain their leading position. Therefore, it was an unwritten agreement between the Crown and the nobility and landowners, bringing tangible benefits until the Ukrainian nationalist movement became strong enough to resist the unequal treatment of Ruthenians by the Galician ruling circles. It should be added that, apart from the conservatives, no other political elite in Galicia was prepared to take up any other than loyalist policy. The bourgeoisie was economically weak and, above all, not very numerous. The peasants were uneducated and existed on the margins of social and political life. They were the ones who were most attached to the Emperor, seeing him as their only defender against the arbitrary nobleman. At the same time, the love for the Emperor did not mean acceptance of Austrian politics, although the representation of the Galician manors in the Austrian parliament often expressed their loyalty to Vienna. During voting in the chamber, peasants often took a pro-government stance, while being in opposition to the Polish Circle. However, it meant, above all, opposition to the policy of the Podolacy, i.e., when voting with the government, the peasants voted against the Eastern Galician conservatives. In fact, this state of affairs was characteristic of the 1870s.¹⁵⁸³

There was a mutual relationship between the two objectives, conducting a loyalist policy and maintaining the primacy of the politically dominant classes. The ruling classes guaranteed the conduct of pro-Austrian politics, and the sustainability of this political line depended on them. Cooperation with the invader supported the preservation and strengthening of the political and socio-economic status quo of the aristocracy, the nobility and the landed nobility.

One should also add that this loyalist attitude and orientation toward Austria was inscribed in a specific sense of patriotism. It was based on the belief that only at the side of the monarchy do Poles have a chance to survive as a historical nation. The invader thus became a partner, coalitionist, ally of the Polish cause. Of course, such thinking was a wishful one. Poles often expressed their devotion to the Austrian state, and the monarchy was not always able to reciprocate these

1582 W. Kalinka, *Galicja i Kraków pod panowaniem*. . . , p. 213.

1583 S. Kieniewicz, *Orientacja austriacka w Polsce*. . . , p. 222.

intentions and actions equally. Poles were forced to be satisfied with what they received, not what they would like to receive.

However, it would be a considerable simplification to say that 1873, for Galician interests, closed a particular stage in the history of Polish-Austrian relations and opened another one at the same time. The author of the work believes that the pro-Austrian orientation was gradually becoming established.¹⁵⁸⁴

In Galicia, the liberal bourgeoisie was opposed to loyalism and conservatives. Relations between the two groups deteriorated thanks to the National Government, led by, among others, Adam Sapieha, Artur Gołuchowski, who was to lead the uprising against Russia. This action failed.¹⁵⁸⁵

The Polish Circle was very reluctant to these plans, in which, after the 1873 elections, the Podolacy dominated and the Stańczycy were still pretending to take precedence in the Circle, while liberal democrats had the least importance in it. Rarely did they have the opportunity to speak in the Chamber, which was prevented by the President of the Circle, K. Grocholski. However, the situation in the Diet of Galicia was different, as the majority of it opted for a break with the loyalty policy. There were also voices of criticism expressed by the secessionists from the Polish Circle.¹⁵⁸⁶

1584 H. Wereszycki claimed that the end of the resolution campaigns was equivalent to the stabilization of internal relations in Galicia and Polish-Austrian relations. He also wrote that for the next quarter of a century Poles were a factor stabilizing and integrating the internal policy of the Austrian state, H. Wereszycki, *Historia polityczna Polski*. . . , p. 34. We cannot disagree with the view about the positive/beneficial role of Poles in the monarchy starting from the period of the struggle for the resolution of the Galician Parliament of 1868. As indicated above, the establishment of the pro-Austrian orientation followed an evolutionary path. In support of this position, one can cite the opposition of the Galician bourgeoisie and liberal democrats in the Polish Circle against the politics of the conservatives in the second half of the 1870s.

1585 S. Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha*., pp. 339–340; see also W. Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia polityczna*. . .

1586 During this period there were conflicts in the Polish Circle. Liberal, opposition-minded MPs Skrzyński, Wolski, and Hausner, left the club. As a result of these events, President Grocholski was forced to review the Circle's policy toward Austria and to lead to its partial liberalization. Abrahamowicz was the spokesperson for the settlement with the secessionists from the Circle. Dunajewski, Konstanty Czartoryski from the House of Lords and the Emperor also took a stance on this conflict: J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*. . . , pp. 89–94, 96–100. Members' memorials were presented by: W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*. . . , pp. 185–186.

After these events,¹⁵⁸⁷ the emperor dismissed the liberals from power and entrusted the mission of forming a new government to E. Taaffy. K. Grocholski received the title of secret counsel. The secessionists returned to the Circle after the parliamentary elections of 1879. In the Polish Circle, the president tightened discipline, arguing that excessive democratization was disastrous, comparing relations in the Circle to the period of golden freedom of the nobility when liberum veto contributed to the collapse of the Polish state. The participation of Poles in the “Iron Ring” coalition meant their peak influence on the policy of the Austrian state, just as during the period of K. Badeni’s rule. The Minister of Treasury was then Julian Dunajewski, President of the Chamber of Deputies Franciszek Smolka, who: “now subordinated to the political directives of the Conservatives.”¹⁵⁸⁸

The Circle lost this influence after the collapse of the coalition, even though it did not move from being an essential factor on the political scene. After the opening of a new session of parliament, in March 1891, the President of the Circle A. Jaworski held conferences with Prime Minister E. Taaffe, during which the continuation of cooperation from the previous period was discussed. D. Abrahamowicz doubted this possibility.¹⁵⁸⁹ It should be added that there were no Old Chech Party members/Old Chechs present in the Council at that time, who were replaced by the Young Chech party. So when Fr. S. Ruczka asked at the meeting of the Circle if the club would cooperate with the Young Czechs, A. Jaworski answered that they were not the same Czechs and: “We with the Czechs cannot have any parliamentary connections.” There were also talks with the K. Hohenwarth’s club, in which, apart from the President of the club, K. Czartoryski and J. Czerkawski participated. The Circle resolved that it will

1587 Moreover, in the 1879 election, the Polish and Austrian Liberals were defeated. The Emperor was forced to dismiss K. Auersperg, and after two transitional governments, he entrusted the mission of forming a new government to E. Taaffy. The new prime minister built the majority based on a landowner-clerical camp. The government was joined by the Czechs, in exchange for language concessions, and by Poles, who were given the freedom to decide on Galician matters.

1588 J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, pp. 89–94; J. Buszko, “Galicja i Śląsk Cieszyński w dobie walki o autonomię. Program trójjolingizmu,” in: *Historia Polski*, vol. 3, part 1. . . , p. 341.

1589 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 2 z 8 marca 1891r.,” *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, BCz, manuscript 1241, c. 963.

take a “free hand” position and will be ready to communicate with the parliamentary clubs on particular matters.¹⁵⁹⁰

The end of the 1870s meant breaking the bourgeois opposition and with it the idea of rebuilding the Polish state. Thus, the conservatives were able to strengthen their position without any obstacles, conducting pro-Austrian policy and, in principle, indivisibly exercising power not only in Galicia but also in the Austrian Parliament. Therefore, The pro-Austrian orientation was, to some extent, also influenced by the relations between Galician groups, conservatives, and liberal democrats in Parliament and the Diet. In Galicia, the conservatives strengthened their position at the expense of the bourgeoisie, represented by the liberal democrats. For example, Mikołaj Zyblikiewicz was forced to resign from the post of National Marshal. He came into conflict with Governor Alfred Potocki, and the reason was the project to industrialize Galicia. Galicia's aristocratic circles forced M. Zyblikiewicz to resign from his post because, although he had conservative views, he was of bourgeois origin.¹⁵⁹¹ In the clash with the landowners, the liberal bourgeoisie failed.

After the end of the resolution campaigns, the introduction of general elections to the parliament, the Berlin Congress and the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the acquisition of the conviction that it would be impossible for Galicia, at least at that time, to achieve greater autonomous freedoms, Conservative politicians have moved to adopt a different approach. It did not mean abandoning the autonomous program, but only changing the tactics of action. In this period, until the turn of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, it can be stated in general terms that Poles supported every Austrian government and the foreign and military policy of the monarchy, contributing to the internal stability of the state. Much earlier F. Ziemiałkowski had already claimed: “However, in the choice of measures, we should avoid everything that would violate the existence of Austria, because by doing so we would jeopardize even our future.”¹⁵⁹²

Another issue that influenced the state of Polish-Austrian relations was the Ukrainian one. The Balkan crisis caused the situation of the monarchy on the international arena to be less favorable. As a result, Vienna began to pay more

1590 “Posiedzenie Koła Polskiego nr. 1 z 7 marca 1891r.,” *Protokoły Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu*, manuscript 1241, c. 952–954.

1591 I. Homola-Skańska, *Mikołaj Zyblikiewicz*. . . ; J. Buszko, “Galicja i Śląsk Cieszyński w dobie. . .,” p. 341.

1592 “Mowa Florjana Ziemiałkowskiego miana na ostatnim zgromadzeniu wyborców miasta Lwowa dnia 1 lipca 1870,” Lviv 1870, p. 10.

attention to the state of national relations between Poles and Ruthenians in Galicia, especially since, in the late 1880s, the Ukrainian national movement revived, and thus the importance of the Ruthenian question in Cisleithania increased. This issue was in orbit of Russian interests and could have been the cause of the Austro-Hungarian-Russian conflict, especially since Ukrainians from Kyiv were interested in it.¹⁵⁹³ For this reason, the monarchy was interested in establishing and maintaining a settlement between the two peoples living in Galicia, especially as the newspaper *Czas* wrote: “The Ruthenians must not be believed, because one part holds with Russia, the other thinks of a new Ukraine with some democratic-revolutionary ideas, and the third is a socialist-anarchist enemy.”¹⁵⁹⁴ The stabilization of relations in Galicia became one of the important objectives of Austrian state¹⁵⁹⁵ policy during this period and, as Julian Hrycak claimed: “in order to secure its back in case warfare started, the Austrian government tried to reconcile Ukrainians and Poles.”¹⁵⁹⁶ Therefore, it was not in the interest of Galicia, but in the interest of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and: “not with Polish society, but with the dynasty and government. Vienna

1593 Ukrainian nationalists living in Russia saw Galicia as the only country where the cultural and national life of the Ruthenian population could develop freely. For this reason, it is considered that their stance toward a possible war with Russia was one of the factors influencing the monarchy's efforts to bring about a Polish-Ruthenian settlement in Galicia, H. Wereszycki, *Pod berłem Habsburgów. Zagadnienie narodowościowe*, Kraków 1957, pp. 219–220.

1594 *Czas*, no. 269 of November 22, 1889, p. 2.

1595 Austrian headquarters were the first to seek contacts and understanding with the Poles, the court and government were also interested in it. It was planned that the Poles and the forces organized by them could be used for a possible war with the Tsar. On the other hand, the government was primarily interested in an agreement with conservative politicians. The Poles did not notice that Vienna had any specific plan for Poland, so they behaved in a rather reserved way and did not get too much involved in the foreign policy of the monarchy, confirming only their loyalty. As early as 1886, S. Grocholski asked the emperor whether the Poles could count on any concrete solutions in the Polish case, but Franz Joseph gave an evasive answer. However, for strategic but also political reasons, more importance was attached to the position of the Ruthenians, especially under the influence of Hungarian politicians, who did not want to strengthen the position of Poles in Cisleithania. This opinion was primarily expressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs: “the weapon against Russia he saw not so much in Poles as in Ukrainians,” H. Wereszycki, *J. Zdrada, Polska działalność dyplomatyczna. . .*, p. 732.

1596 J. Hrycak, *Historia Ukrainy 1772–1999. Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu*, Lublin 2000, p. 96.

began to take into account its foreign policy of the Ukrainians – above the heads of the Poles, and from then on, they were no longer to be an exponent of war and imperialist possibilities for Vienna.”¹⁵⁹⁷ Vienna entrusted the conclusion of the settlement to a politician who had the reputation of a “strong hand,” Kazimierz Count Badeni.¹⁵⁹⁸ However, the settlement of 1890 did not create suitable conditions for regulating Polish-Ruthenian relations in Galicia, because the main idea behind its conclusion, i.e., the weakening of the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia, was not realized.

The Polish-Ruthenian settlement became particularly important in the light of the elections to the Council of State in 1891. Conservative politicians in Cracow wanted the Council of State to include representatives of the moderate wing of the national camp. It would ensure that the Ukrainian question would not become a matter for the parliament, and would thus remain an internal matter for Galicia.¹⁵⁹⁹ It was the direction promoted by *Stańcycy*’s newspaper *Czas*: “it is natural and advisable for us to come closer and compromise with those who [...] are loyal to the Austrian dynasty and state, as well as purely national

1597 W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*. . . , p. 193.

1598 For a Polish-Ukrainian settlement of 1890, see: J. Gruchała, *Rząd austriacki i polskie stronnictwa polityczne w Galicji wobec kwestii ukraińskiej (1890–1914)*, Wrocław 1982; Cz. Partacz, *Od Badeniego do Potockiego. Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie w Galicji w latach 1888–1908*, Toruń 1997., Cz. Partacz, “Przyczyny i przebieg konfliktu ukraińsko-polskiego w Galicji na przełomie XIX i XX w.,” *Przegląd Wschodni*, vol. 2, 1992/93, no. 4(8); T. Dudek, “Pod znakiem polsko-ukraińskiej ugody. Kazimierz Badeni i galicyjscy konserwatyści wobec kwestii ukraińskiej w latach 1888–1895,” *SH*, y. XXVI, 2003, no. 1 (180); J. Forst-Battaglia, *Die polnisch-ukrainischen Beziehungen*; L. Wasilewski, “Kwestia ukraińska jako zagadnienie międzynarodowe,” *Prace Ukraińskiego Instytutu Naukowego*, vol. 28, Warszawa 1934; J. Wiśnicki, “Konserwatyści polscy w Galicji wobec kwestii ukraińskiej (1864–1914),” *Przegląd Humanistyczny*, no. 5, 1999; J. Hrycak, *Historia Ukrainy 1772–1999. Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu*, Lublin 2000; L. Kulczycki, *Uгода polsko-ruska*, Lviv 1912.

1599 The issue of not taking up the disputed Polish-Russian issues on the forum of the Council of State was necessary for the Polish MPs, mainly due to the course of events in the Czech Republic. In 1890 a Czech-German settlement was concluded there, which was at the same time a foretold defeat of the Old Czech Party. In this situation, Poles would lose their political ally in the chamber, and the coalition of the “Iron Ring” would fall apart. So the Polish Circle had not enough certainty, that in case of submitting applications by Ruthenian deputies, it would have enough strength to prevent with the help of political allies to pass them, J. Gruchała, *Koło Polskie w austriackiej Radzie Państwa wobec kwestii czeskiej i Śląska Cieszyńskiego (1879–1899)*, Wrocław 1982, pp. 38–39.

aspirations without social unrest and resistance to Russian influence [. . .]. Thus, a compromise between the Polish central committee and the Ruthenian national committee may arise completely independently.¹⁶⁰⁰ The Polish and Ukrainian electoral committees for the first time managed to agree on many issues.¹⁶⁰¹ Events on the political scene soon showed that the arrangements made earlier were not reflected in practice. Initially, the Russian deputies in the Council of State did not show any political activity, taking a wait-and-see attitude. The position of the Russian MPs was positively evaluated by A. Wachnianin, who wrote that thanks to the fact that the Ruthenians did not act against the Viennese government and the Polish Circle they gained a lot, without giving up their own political programme.¹⁶⁰² Shortly afterward, Ruthenian MP Julian Romańczuk openly demanded the government's position on national equality in Galicia.¹⁶⁰³ However, the actions of the Polish MPs resulted in the withdrawal of the motion by J. Romańczuk.¹⁶⁰⁴

These events, as mentioned earlier, had a direct impact on the perception of the place and role of the Polish nation in the monarchy. They also predestinated the abandonment of the concept of independent politics and the idea to give up the pursuit of independence. This state of affairs forced the Conservatives, the leading political force in Galicia, to create a new political program, above all, with patriotic accents. S. Koźmian, in an article from 1878, stressed that in the current situation of Poles, activism is not desirable.¹⁶⁰⁵

1600 *Czas*, no. 35 of February 13, 1891, p. 1.

1601 It was agreed that the Central Election Committee (CKW) would support the national candidates, and the Ukrainians committed themselves to agree with the Polish Circle on matters concerning Galicia. In the electoral struggle, there was a rule that the Poles would support the nationalist, and the nationalists would support the Polish candidate in case of competition with Moscovophiles/Russophiles. It was committed that in 10 constituencies in the small land ownership curia the CKW will not issue Polish candidates, in return Ruthenians will not raise in the chamber of parliament the issues that have been the subject of conflict in Polish-Ukrainian relations so far, "Zapiski parlamentarne Wachnianina z lat 1890–1894," *Świat Słowiański*, 1908, vol. 2, p. 983; W. Łazuga, „Rządy polskie” w Austrii. *Gabinet Kazimierza hr. Badeniego 1895–1897*, Poznań 1991, p. 47; Cz. Partacz, *Od Badeniego do Potockiego*. . . , p. 51.

1602 "Zapiski parlamentarne Wachnianina. . ." p. 984.

1603 He then applied for the establishment of a Ukrainian gymnasium in Buczacz and Ukrainian classes in Przemyśl, J. Gruchała, *Rząd austriacki i polskie stronnictwa*., p. 43.

1604 J. Gruchała, *Rząd austriacki i polskie stronnictwa*. . . , p. 43; *Czas*, no. 116 of May 24, 1891, p. 2; no. 118 of May 27, 1891, p. 2.

1605 M. Jaskólski, *Kaduceus polski. Myśl polityczna konserwatystów krakowskich 1866–1934*, Warszawa-Kraków 1990, p. 138.

The pro-Habsburg mood among the Poles was witnessed during Emperor Franz Joseph's visit to Galicia. His journey through the Galician province in 1880 showed Poles' affection and devotion for the Emperor. The monarch's visit was long-awaited, especially since it was not announced in 1869. For this reason: "the reception of the Emperor was the best that Galicia could afford" – a performance and ballet, balls and *fackelzug*, and the Emperor himself gave several dinners.¹⁶⁰⁶ However, not everyone was generally enthusiastic about the Emperor's visit.¹⁶⁰⁷

The farewell of Franz Joseph by governor Andrzej Count Potocki and national marshal Ludwik Count Wodzicki at the railway station in Łupków, which was attended by more than 500 people belonging to the Galician elite, went down in history. Leaving, the Emperor said: "My heart stays with you," to which K. Grocholski answered: "And you are taking ours with you, our Brightest Lord."¹⁶⁰⁸ The Emperor rewarded the Conservatives for their devotion and loyalty. Thanks to this, they strengthened their influence in Galicia and, most importantly, the idea of rebuilding the Polish state collapsed at this stage. According to S. Kalembska: "two decades after 1870 was a time of lethargy of the

1606 K. Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 1, Wrocław 1951, pp. 293–296.

1607 Among this group was, for example, Adam Sapieha, who wrote in a letter to his wife: "All the women are embarrassed that they do not have tails, nobles drill and patch up their overcoats, convert their wives' manchenes into military hats, and brooches and earrings into soffits and pins. You will understand how glad I am that you are in Boulogne and that my father's house is not finished. It will make the Sapieżno role in these festivities much easier." S. Kieniewicz, Adam Sapieha. . . , p. 198.

1608 The Emperor's farewell ceremony could not miss the solemn words. L. Wodzicki, saying goodbye to the monarch, not only thanked for his visit but also: "the fruits of your generous resolutions toward us. The self-government, respect for nationality, the restoration of mother tongue at school and in office, the freedoms you have given us, have become a lever and a basis for the proper development of the country, they have secured social peace, strengthened and consolidated the knots that connect us with the Monarchy". L. Wodzicki also entrusted the Polish nation into the care of the Emperor, saying: "Please, The brightest Lord keep in the grace of Your monarch Your faithful and attached people, who have given themselves to Thee with all their heart and rely on Thee" The words of farewell, uttered by the Emperor, were full of courtesy phrases, he thanked for hospitality and: "the joyful days you have prepared for me, which I will always keep in mind" and he wished the country and its people every success; qtd. after: F. X. d'Abancourt, pp. 302–303.

Polish thought of independence in its strict understanding.”¹⁶⁰⁹ Internal relations in the monarchy did not seem to be very stable, and the general situation for the Polish cause did not indicate the possibility of continuing an active struggle for the separation of Galicia.

At that time, the Polish Circle did not show much activity, despite the possibility of increased influence on state policy: “What will help us with the increased impact when the delegation hardly uses it at all [. . .]. The results of the parliamentary work from 1879 to the present day are not politically significant, while in economic terms, they have been severely detrimental to Galicia.”¹⁶¹⁰ Tadeusz Romanowicz also stressed the lack of dynamism in the work of the Circle: “the Circle advises a lot, does little.”¹⁶¹¹

After the fall of E. Taaffe’s cabinet in November 1893, a new period in Austria’s history began, determined by the general situation in the country and Europe: “it was a period of setting the imperialist era together with increasing nationalist movements.”¹⁶¹²

The idea of separating Galicia appeared as early as 1880, but it did not gain popular support. The Galician conservatives were not interested in it, for whom Vienna, the clergy and the army were a guarantee of maintaining their leading position in the country. Neither was autonomy desired by the socialists, who, once Galicia had become independent, would have had less chance of pursuing their own interests, both political and economic. They only gained such an opportunity after they started working with the Austrian socialists. It should be remembered that Galicia was a poorly industrialized country, so the proletariat was not numerous. Greater independence of the province was tantamount to putting it into the hands of conservatives and pushing the socialists to the margins of political life. People were afraid of similar effects of the separation of the country. In their view, the independence of the Galician authorities from Vienna, with the curial electoral system in force, would mean that conservative and landed classes’ factors would lead to a reduction in the number of peasant MPs in the national parliament. In the end, the Ukrainians were not interested

1609 S. Kalembka, *Spojrzenie na polskie drogi do wolności w epoce rozbiorów*, w: *Studia z dziejów polskiej myśli politycznej*, vol. 5, *Dążenia do niepodległości Polski a ocena rządów zaborczych w XIX w. Zbiór studiów*, ed. S. Kalembka, Toruń 1992, p. 38.

1610 T. Rayski, *Stronnictwa w Radzie Państwa i polityka Koła Polskiego*, Lviv 1882, p. 2

1611 Z. Romanowiczówna, *Tadeusz Romanowicz. Listy i wspomnienia*, Lviv 1934, p. 93.

1612 H. Wereszycki, *Historia Austrii*, Wrocław 1986, p. 246.

in increasing their autonomy. They, like the peasantry, envisaged depriving them of some of their seats in the Diet.¹⁶¹³

However, due to the inability to pursue effective Galician policy, Poles were forced to find an ally in the monarchy. They used the concept of leaning against the Crown. The tradition of attachment to and trust in the Emperor was popular in Polish society, especially among the peasants and conservative politicians. At the turn of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, the Austro-Polish orientation was clearly outlined among Galicia's ruling circles, and Polish MPs in the Council of State often expressed it.

Nevertheless, Polish-Austrian relations deteriorated at the turn of the centuries, when groups with a different orientation, i.e., socialists, People's Party, and national democrats, began to enter the political arena of Galicia.¹⁶¹⁴ Soon their

1613 H. Wereszycki, "Rola Polaków w monarchii habsburskiej," in: *Małopolskie Studia Historyczne*, 1966, vol. 9, no. 3-4, p. 48.

1614 K. K. Daszyk represents this position. The author of this work partly disagrees with him, claiming that it is not the Austro-Polish relations that have deteriorated, but only centrifugal tendencies appear, and therefore the support for pro-Austrian Polish policy is weakening. In a sense, the coalition of *Stańcacy* with the *Podolacy* is breaking up. The Cracow conservatives remain faithful to the pro-Austrian orientation, while the *Podolacy* are getting closer to the nationalists, mainly due to their relatively common position on the Ukrainian question. At the same time, however, the Cracow conservatives are cooperating with the People's Party activists, although this cooperation is changeable over time. Peasant parties had strong support in the folk masses in Galicia, but at the same time were very weak in terms of organization, and had no influence in the national administration. Therefore, they cooperated with the conservatives to gain political influence in this way. Conservatives also benefited from this alliance, and by marshaling the people's masses, they gained an additional ally and control. The national democrats from Galicia, after taking over the Polish Circle in 1907, continued their pro-Austrian policy. The socialists represented the independence trend and were members of the Polish Circle only for a short period, so their influence on Polish politics in parliament was negligible. Moreover, they formed a joint club with socialist members from all over Austria and criticized liberals and conservatives, both Austrian and Galician. Being against the ruling layers of Austria and Galicia, they became their common enemy, and they were allies in this fight. At the same time, they did not intend to launch an armed action that would result in the separation of Galicia from the monarchy. Only the problem of the position of Galician groups on the issue of pro-Austrian orientation, outlined in this way, makes it possible to reject the thesis about their negative influence on Polish-Austrian relations. However, the discussed problem makes it possible to state that the new Galician parties were not as strong advocates of loyalty as the conservatives of Cracow at

representatives also found themselves in the Austrian Parliament, causing the Polish Circle to change its position. None of them found any political arguments to support Galician conservative-landed classes' factors in program issues. As a result, one Polish policy ceased to exist, and different shades of it appeared.

The Austro-Polish orientation was also experiencing its crisis due to the internal situation in the country. It was in the interest of the monarchy that Poles should agree with the Ukrainians, deciding to make further concessions to them. The government's pressure on the Polish Circle caused it to move from a policy of unconditional support for the government to one: "the policy of acrimonious bargaining with the Crown and increasingly laboriously struggling to make compromises."¹⁶¹⁵ In the same way, Włodzimierz Czerkawski described the situation of Poles in Austria: "it was not at all easy to gain concessions, that there was extreme resistance in Vienna, so the whole national policy started to circulate around one point by itself, around the bargain with the government about the demands, whose consideration depended on the central authorities."¹⁶¹⁶

The improvement of Polish-Austrian relations, and thus a return to the concept of leaning on the Crown and continuing pro-Austrian policy, was caused by the events of 1908 on the international arena, related to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the deterioration of relations with Russia. At that time, there were no significant differences between the Galician parties in the direction of Polish policy in Vienna. All Polish groups supported the path of Polish-Austrian cooperation, although the question of Poland's independence was also raised: "the whole development of our nation and our party so far has been striving for this complete independence, for standing on its own feet, in short: for independence. Our greatest spirits, our strongest companions, saw this independence not as a vague dream, but as a necessity for our development."¹⁶¹⁷

In 1908, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, provoking the possibility of conflict with Russia. At that time, Ukrainians emphasized the tactical importance of their own nation, which could be a barrier to Russian politics. For this reason, the interests of the monarchy should take into consideration the demands of the Ukrainian side, not the Polish side, which at that time had no arguments to influence Vienna's decisions. At the same time, the monarchy

that time. Therefore, the view of weakening support for the pro-Austrian policy is legitimate.

1615 K. Daszyk, *Między polską racją*. . . , p. 75.

1616 W. Czerkawski, *Wyodrębnienie Galicyi. Z pośmiertnej*. . . , p. 13.

1617 "List otwarty Ignacego Daszyńskiego posła krakowskiego do Rady Państwa w Wiedniu i redaktora *Naprzodu* w Krakowie," Kraków 1906, p. 5.

also had a Mosophilic/Russophilic problem. It was not a strong movement at that time, but one that was in close cooperation with Russia. The Balkan crisis caused greater interest in Russia in Galician Moscophiles/Russophiles.¹⁶¹⁸ Leon Wasilewski wrote: "The future of Austria, as a country, is presented in gloomy colors, and who knows if the changes we are now seeing in the whole of Eastern Europe will not blow up this artificial construction, which has become a cage for so many nations."¹⁶¹⁹

Tensions in international relations began in 1912, as a result of the intensified conflict of interests between Austria and Russia in the Balkans. Thus, there was another hope in Polish society for a renewal of the Polish cause. This time, as a result of armed conflict between the powers. At that time, political orientations began to take shape in Polish society.

The Ukrainian question, besides its national dimension, clearly evident in Galicia, was also of strategic importance for the foreign policy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, especially when there was a threat of war with Russia. For understandable reasons, it became a priority in the face of the decomposition of the European order on the eve of the First World War. A derivative of this problem, of equal importance for the monarchy, was maintaining balance in relations with Poles. This balance could have been ensured by Austria balancing its commitments to the legal and political future of the Poles and Ukrainians. Taking into consideration several factors, one can conclude that during the First World War, Austria was forced to abandon its attempt to bring about a *modus vivendi* between the two conflicting nations in Galicia. Therefore, throughout this whole period, it played a double political game, and, depending on the international political situation and the state of internal relations, it favored once Polish and once Ukrainian demands. The prospect of armed conflict and war forced Austria to change its approach to the Ukrainian question, giving it primacy over the Polish question at specific periods, especially when the external situation forced it or when the Polish Circle was moving to parliamentary opposition. Therefore, this period was also associated with increased interference by Vienna in the internal affairs of Galicia.

It should be noted that the Ukrainian question did not threaten the status quo of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and was not a factor that could disorganize the state. Even the postulate to divide Galicia into two provinces was not a threat to the unity of the monarchy. Nor did Vienna take seriously the

1618 J. Gruchała, *Rząd austriacki i polskie*. . ., pp. 85–91.

1619 L. W. [Leon Wasilewski], *Austria Spółczesna*, Warszawa 1907, p. 82.

postulate to merge all the ethnic Ukrainian lands into one state, treating it as: “a manifestation of political vision.”¹⁶²⁰ Some Polish politicians similarly perceived this problem, for example, S. Głąbiński, who wrote that: “they were delirious (the Ukrainians – according to the author of this text) about the idea of creating a free Ukraine.”¹⁶²¹ However, Vienna aimed to eliminate Moscovophilic/Russophilic influences, mainly from Eastern Galicia. Hence its actions consisted of strengthening the Ukrainian national movement and the persecution of Moscovophiles/Russophiles and Ukrainians with pro-Russian sympathies.¹⁶²² The Ukrainian question posed a real danger only if the monarchy was threatened by Russia or in the event of an Austro-Hungarian-Russian armed conflict, which is why military circles were greatly interested in it, much more Ukrainophilic than the monarchy’s civil authorities.

Therefore, during the war the position of military circles took on significant importance, which influenced the perception of the role and importance of Poles in Austria: “The Emperor and part of the Austrian government understood that the Poles’ independence is – as they were enchanted enemies of the Russian Tsar – making them natural allies of Austria, fighting for life with the Russian power. The closest to such a point of view by nature should have been the military, i.e., those who were to fight against Russia in the future. Nevertheless, it was precisely among them that the vast majority of the Austrian military was not aware of Austria’s attitude toward Poland.”¹⁶²³ Their importance for the Polish cause and the aspect of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict was similarly assessed by the contemporary historian Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski: “‘The Polish cause’ passed entirely into the hands of Austrian military spheres, and they – in a peculiar hierarchy of issues – considered the Ruthenian problem to be much more significant and more critical, while the Polish [. . .] they were thinking to close as part of the count for the friendly attitude of the population and help in the form of the partisan movement.”¹⁶²⁴

1620 M. Waldenberg, *Narody zależne i mniejszości narodowe w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej. Dzieje konfliktów i idei*, Warszawa 2000, p. 80.

1621 S. Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*. . . , pp. 232–233.

1622 This policy was criticized by I. Daszyński, although at the beginning of the war he was a commissioner in Miechów and then: “he fought passionately against Moscovophiles/Russophiles,” Note of July 19, 1916, W. L. Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, ed. M. Czajka, Warszawa 1997, p. 109. W. L. Jaworski’s diary is in the collection of the Archives of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw, W. L. Jaworski, *Diariusz z lat 1914–1921 (z notami z lat 1924–28)*, Arch. PAN Kr., typescript, sig. III–84.

1623 I. Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2. . . , pp. 98–99.

1624 W. Pobóg-Malinowski, p. 246.

4. Initiatives and Independence Actions on the Eve of the First World War

It is important to discuss the fate of the so-called Polish question and various views on this question. It would be also instructive to verify it by analyzing pre-war events. The central thesis is that the striving for liberation and unification of Polish lands extruded a Polish pro-Austrian attitude toward the monarchy and the Polish loyalist policy. We discuss this problem against the backdrop of two periods, i.e., right before and throughout the First World War.

Complicated as it is, the discussed matter requires supplemental theses. First, the Polish society in Galicia was not unanimous in choosing the concept of regaining independence. This phenomenon was especially noticeable in programs and actions of political groupings both in the province and in the Austrian parliament. At the same time, there were discrepancies among proponents of particular views. Therefore, it is somewhat challenging to draw a clear distinction between supporters and opponents of a given view. This problem went through a variety of changes over time, as the shifting political setting conditioned it.

Second, I shall determine the priority of the Poles' activities in the monarchy during the First World War. This issue is discussed based on the importance of the Polish question for various individuals and political groupings. In fact, it often came down to a choice between the Polish *raison d'état* and state interests of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

Third, patriotism – in the sense it earned throughout the period of national uprisings – extruded loyalism and Austrophilism.

Let us mention the foundation of quasi-representative organs like the Temporary Commission of Confederated Independence Parties (TCCCIP), Supreme National Committee (SNC), or Central National Committee (CNC). Thanks to their work and activity, Polish society earned an extra representation of their interests in this crucial period. To some extent, they were not only an alternative for the Polish Circle but they also competed with the Club for dominance in Polish society and for influence on settling the Polish question.¹⁶²⁵

Poles aimed to seize the arising opportunity of incoming conflict between annexationists to renew the Polish question at the international forum. Thereby, political orientations and propositions of different concepts to regain independence formed in Polish society. In such a situation, Galician political clubs

1625 A. Ajnenkiel, "Polskie reprezentacje w ciałach przedstawicielskich państw zaborczych w latach 1848–1918," *CPH*, vol. 36, no. 1 (1984), pp. 181–182.

dynamized their actions in behalf of regaining Polish state sovereignty, and the question of subjectivity became a priority to some political groupings.

Several political clubs not only prepared their programs but undertook attempts to communicate with each other to acknowledge the optimal solution for the question of Poland's independence as well. To be sure, this process did not pass without conflicts. Even before the war, their programs on Poland's independence matter were different. Polish Socialist Party (PSP) and Polish Social Democratic Party of Galicia (PSDPG), who represented the socialist movement in Galicia, combined the independence question with a universal revolution that supposed to truly liberate the Polish nation not only from the power of annexationists but from the power of capitalists and landowners as well. Thus, socialists' eventual goal was socialism, and the independent Polish state was only a transition stage. The peasant movement headed for independence too, but rather in gradual changes toward the democratization of public life. Hence, the political and social subjectification of peasant masses combined with the idea of independence. National Democracy (ND) movement expressed the national idea in the best way. *Przegląd Narodowy* wrote: "There must come a period of Polish policy after a period of Galician policy"¹⁶²⁶ and: "Besides pro-Austrian and pro-Russian orientation, there is a third one – pro-Polish."¹⁶²⁷ Right-wing groupings, and among them *Stańczycy* (Cracow conservatives), sided with tri-loyalism policy. Efforts to regain the sovereignty intensified shortly before the First World War.¹⁶²⁸

In this subsection, we attempt to retrace initiatives of given Galician political clubs that aimed for regaining independence. All of them fitted in pro-Austrian political orientation.

In general, the pro-Austrian orientation dominated in the Austrian partition; even national democrats espoused it.¹⁶²⁹ Leon Biliński stated: "Then, everybody

1626 S. Kozicki, "Przegląd spraw polskich," *PN*, May (1913), p. 539.

1627 Z. Balicki, "Ferment przedwojenny Galicji," *PN*, November (1912), p. 456.

1628 Z. Stankiewicz, "Problem państwa w myśli politycznej polskiego ruchu narodowyzwoleńczego w XIX w.," in: *Studia z dziejów polskiej myśli politycznej*, ed. Sławomir Kalembka (Toruń, 1992), vol. V, *Dążenia do niepodległości Polski a ocean rządów zaborczych w XIX w. Zbiór studiów*, p. 57; J. Molenda, *Piłsudzcycy a narodowi demokraci 1908–1918* (Warszawa, 1980), pp. 80, 83–84.

1629 The problem of political orientations in Polish society during the First World War was deeply analyzed in the literature, so there is no need to discuss it. However, let us quote W. Feldman and emphasize two main directions in implementation of national aspirations: "Thus, Polish society collapsed on the eve of world war into two separate ideological groups concerning the most critical issues of national policy. Apart

in Galicia and Vienna had the “pro-Austrian” orientation and it was not because of “loyalty,” or the impossibility of combating the government’s policy, but because of love for the same Poland we served directly or indirectly continuously throughout our fifty-year policy.”¹⁶³⁰ This is why, in this subdivision, we only analyze the problem of the Austro-Polish solution.

Confidence about the convergence between Polish and Austro-Hungarian monarchy interests was the axis of the pro-Austrian orientation. A belief about the existence of a common enemy, i.e., Russia, and a belief about its expansionary policy, reasoned the confidence. The individualistically understood unity of Galicia and Austria, its autonomic privileges, and a chance to influence the policy of the Austrian state were significant for this matter, too. Long traditions of connections between Poles and the Habsburgs, and devotion to the emperor Franz Joseph was no less meaningful.

Orientation toward Austro-Hungary also generated specific difficulties because the monarchy appeared in an alliance with Germany in the war, and some Poles had a negative attitude toward Austria’s ally. Moreover, Germany had a stronger position than Austria and thereby had a casting vote in possible disputes with their coalition partner. Nevertheless, Galician political clubs

from individual differences, we see consistent views among irredentists and their opponents from National Democracy. The first treat all matters from the position of the closest Polish state interest, the second from the position of condensing and strengthening the nation. The first are in favor of alliance with Austria and fighting with Ruthenia, recognizing the rights of other nationalities and seeking federation with Lithuania and Russia; the other are opponents of Austria and Germany; they are in favor of relying on Russia, strengthening ethnographic Poland, but also for the struggle for possession where it exists, regardless of national minorities within themselves, and other non-state nationalities.” See W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej*, p. 373. Above all, the Polish Eastern Galician nobility was in favor of pro-Russian orientation. The Ukrainian question and the favorable attitude of the Austrian government toward Ukrainians were crucial reasons for this orientation’s popularity. Eastern Galician nobles anticipated that the monarchy would not want to pursue the nobility’s interests, which is why nobles turned their political socio-economic plans toward Russia, A. Garlicki, *Geneza legionów. Zarys dziejów Komisji Tymczasowej Skonfederowanych Stronnictw Niepodległościowych* (Warszawa, 1964), p. 14. Opponents of the relying on Austria concept put forward the argument in the form of a threat from Germany: “The independence of Austrian policy and its disposition to support the Polish question were doubtful, but there was no doubt that Germany would use the future war to annihilate Poland,” Feldman, *Dzieje*, p. 354.

1630 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty* (Warszawa, 1925), p. 59, vol. 2, 1915–1922.

counted on the western direction of German expansion. The clubs anticipated that Germans would not be interested in augmenting the population of Poles in the borders of their state. Thereby, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy would manage decisions on the Polish question.¹⁶³¹

Noteworthy, cooperation between Poles and Ukrainians within the pro-Austrian orientation was not possible. Admittedly, Ukrainian nationalists were pro-Austrian and anti-Russian alike Poles, but their political plans excluded mutual collaboration. Polish national aspirations headed for rebuilding the Polish statehood. Ukrainians strived for creating their state on the lands of, among other things, Eastern Galicia. The idea of territorial and administrative distinction of Galicia and granting the autonomy to the Ukrainian part of the province revived right before the war. The prospect of war between annexationists opened a possibility to fulfill Ukrainian legal and state aspirations. We can use the following motto to comment on this subject: "The political direction of the Ukrainian side is a direction which cannot be reconciled with the legal and political statements of Poles within the country and the state."¹⁶³²

There was a real conflict of interest between the Polish and Ukrainian sides. The conflict also influenced chances for executing the Austro-Polish conception and cooperation with Vienna; especially because Austrian military and political factors set great store on the tactical meaning of the Ukrainian question during the war: "Ruthenians pursue their external nationalist policy that they not only fight Poles in the country . . . , but they strain all their efforts and use all means to cause the greatest damage to our nation outside country's borders too."¹⁶³³ Thus, the position of Poles was seriously threatened as Austria could not disregard demands of Ukrainians who called for the division of Galicia into Polish and Ruthenian parts.¹⁶³⁴ Austria had to consider aspirations of the Polish side who, thanks to the loyalty and rejecting pro-Russian orientation, guaranteed the essential advocacy for Austria's domestic policy because of Galicia's cross-border location. Besides, we also have to add demands of Ukrainians who were used by Vienna in a political game with the Polish side and were suspected of Moscovophilism.¹⁶³⁵ As M. Waldenberg said: "The Ukrainian question related

1631 Garlicki, *Geneza legionów*, p. 13.

1632 E. Dubanowicz, *Sejmowa reforma wyborcza*, p. 22.

1633 S. Kozicki, "Przegląd spraw polskich," *Przegląd Narodowy*, January (1914), p. 93.

1634 H. Batowski, *Rozpad Austro-Węgier. Sprawy narodowościowe i działania dyplomatyczne* (Kraków, 1982), pp. 115–116.

1635 The Moscovilic movement was a threat for the monarchy primarily because it became a clearly irredentist movement at the beginning of the twentieth century,

to the Polish community's character, its position in Galicia and its situation in Austria in a large degree.¹⁶³⁶

Right before, and in the initial phase of the First World War, the pro-Austrian orientation empowered as it became more current among political circles associated with conservatives, liberal democrats and socialists, and Jan Stapiński's peasant movement; thereby, we can argue more supported this orientation. The first thing that decided about its strength was a quantity factor, yet not only. The quality factor prejudged the superiority of pro-Austrian orientation too. First, because the Polish Circle, i.e., the representation of Galician Poles in the Austrian parliament, supported it.¹⁶³⁷

Politicians organized many independence initiatives in the period preceding the outbreak of the war. Regardless of chances for the execution of independence concepts, propounding the Polish question over all other problems of political and social-economic life contributed to restoring the public life, the growth of national awareness, and the consolidation of Polish society to a significant extent. We should give an indisputable credit in this field to the Temporary Commission of Confederated Independence Parties (TCCCIP) or the founders

J. Gruchała, "Austro-Węgry a sprawa ukraińska w latach I wojny światowej," *SH*, vol. 28, no. 4 (111), 1985, p. 558; see also: J. Gruchała, "Polityka zagraniczna Austro-Węgier a stosunki polsko-ukraińskie (1908–1914)," *Studia z dziejów ZSRR I Europy Środkowej*, vol. 14, 1998.

1636 M. Waldenberg, *Narody zależne i mniejszości narodowe*, p. 81.

1637 Noteworthy, after the 1911 election, the Polish Circle was one of the strongest clubs in the Austrian parliament. It had 75 members out of 516 total deputies in the Imperial Council, which accounted for 14.5 % of the chamber. At that time, the most influential grouping in the Polish Circle was conservatives, who had 18 seats, and democrats without adjectives allied to them, who had 13 seats. The peasant movement formed a strong grouping: they had 24 seats, but its strength weakened after the split in 1913. When the Polish People's Party (PPP) affiliated with the opposition and withdrew from the Club's activity, it had only five seats, and the right-wing PPP-"Piast" had 14 representatives. National democrats then reduced from 21 to 13 seats. There were also 3 Christian-peasant movement deputies and several independent representatives in the Polish Circle. There were eight Polish socialists outside the Club, and since the by-election of 1913; J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, pp. 300–301, 314. Thus, the Club could influence the parliament and the government through parliament too. In fact, each of the Austrian cabinets had to consider the position of the Polish representation when making state decisions. W. Feldman argued that: "In Vienna, the Polish Circle constituted such a significant numerical strength that it decided about the majority of things considering the weak government that had to deal with it," Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*, p. 321.

of the Central National Committee (CKC). TCCCIP came into life from political clubs of Austrian and Russian partition, irredentists, and Polish Military Treasury. The author of this work believes that retracing those initiatives allows determining the attitude of specific groupings and persons toward the matter of Poland's independence right before the First World War.

Although all those initiatives were pro-Austrian, different groupings realized them variously. We may classify actions of political clubs as precautionary and relatively passive. (e.g. *Stańczycy*) or dynamized and active (e.g. Józef Piłsudski or leftist independence movements). National Democrats were also active, though their concepts of settling the Polish question were not so strongly pro-Austrian. It is hard to define the independence concept of the Polish People's Party (PPP), who stated their viewpoint only after the secession in December 1913. PPP-"Left" acceded to TCCCIP, and PPP-"Piast" acceded to CNC. We discuss this subject more explicitly in a further part of the subdivision.

Declaring war on Turkey on September 29, 1911, Italy made the outbreak of the Balkan conflict possible, and Russia could participate in it. In a further perspective, such a situation could provoke a war in Europe. This meant that the Polish question could rise to the rank of the international issue. Thereby, another chance for regaining independence would appear. Politicians discussed this problem during informal talks in Vienna, summoned from the initiative of Wilhelm Feldman and Włodzimierz Tetmajer. Representatives of different political groupings participated in those talks. However, talks did not lead to any binding agreements. Mostly because of differences in social and political programs: "Antagonisms rooted too deeply so the coordination could happen fast, especially with socialism's domination."¹⁶³⁸ Still, meetings went on. Finally, the so-called irredentists' congress took place on August 25 and 26, 1912, in Zakopane. It was primarily a congress of activists, not a congress of political clubs' representatives. Thereupon, the rank of this undertaking was not big. Nevertheless, the congress' was significant in shaping attitudes and independence endeavors. Irredentists were representatives of specific groupings, and they expressed views consistent with their political programs. They were also members of the Polish Socialist Party (PSP), Polish Social Democratic Party of Galicia (PSDPG), Polish Liberal Democratic Party (PLDP), Peasants' National Union, Independence Union, and Organization of Independent Youth "Zarzewie." During the congress, irredentists enacted the project of creating the Polish Military Treasury. Its mission was to collect funds, educate, and finance

1638 Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*, p. 337.

war preparations and military associations. Members of the congress accepted the project unanimously.¹⁶³⁹ Henryk Kunzek was the framer of this initiative. The Treasury supposed to be an all-party organization and a stirring of the future national government.¹⁶⁴⁰

Consecutive undertakings confirmed existing discrepancies in choosing the way to regain independence between political clubs. In the period of the First Balkan War in 1912, official meetings¹⁶⁴¹ and secret talks between politicians of different political forces concerning the Polish independence took place in Galicia. We know from the sources that Władysław Leopold Jaworski together with conservatives, proposed that Hipolit Śliwiński organized an informal and confidential meeting. Irredentists and representatives of political clubs were to participate in the meeting. An assembly was supposed to assess the current international situation. Views of members of the independence side were dissonant on this initiative. Herman Diamand wrote in letters to his wife: “Discrepancies are adumbrating in the Club – the People’s Party strives toward our side (i.e. socialists). National democrats, East Galicia conservatives, and for sure Cracow conservatives too will turn against us, and so-called democrats will stand in the middle without any firm decision,” but Polish politics agreed in one matter. In essence, there had to be moderation and caution in the actions they undertake.¹⁶⁴²

Ignacy Daszyński, among others, was against Śliwiński’s meeting. There were voices, for example, Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz’s, for calling two meetings. Representatives of PSP, PSDPG, PLDP, and peasant party activists supposed to participate in the first one;¹⁶⁴³ while National Democracy representatives, Juliusz

1639 Read about this event and I. Daszyński’s resolution in: *Naprzód*, no. 196 (08/30/1912), p. 1.

1640 Garlicki, *Geneza legionów*, pp. 41–42.

1641 The so-called public orientation discussions happened in Galicia. During the discussions, representatives of individual groups, including I. Daszyński, tried to convince listeners of their ideas. For example, the editors of *Kurier Lwowski* and *Gazeta Narodowa* organized such meetings, “Zebranie polityczne urządzone przez ‘Gazetę Narodową’” *Gazeta Narodowa*, no. 297 (12/24/1912), pp. 1–2, no. 298 (12/25/1912), pp. 1–2, no. 299 (12/28/1912), pp. 1–2; I. Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, pp. 107–109; Molenda, *Piłsudczycy a narodowi demokraci*, pp. 115–116.

1642 Letters from October 24 and 25, 1912. *Pamiętnik Hermana Diamanda zebrany z wyjątków listów do żony* (Kraków, 1932), pp. 102–103.

1643 Independence parties could then only count on the partial support of the People’s Party, i.e., from the so-called Wyslouchi’s group who were independent representatives of PPP. Later, PPP involved in cooperation, mainly through W. Tetmajer. Moreover,

Leo, and Władysław Leopold Jaworski supposed to participate in the second meeting.

On October 25, the Polish Circle carried a resolution in which it stated: "Aware of consequences that could harm the Polish nation because of the present international ravel . . . , the Polish Circle most strongly forewarns the Polish society before an outside national circle stem inflammatory job. Mindful of the solidarity duty and the unified action, we call fellow countrymen to leave the management of the national policy entrusting it to the legal representatives."¹⁶⁴⁴ Democrats and the peasant movement also advocated Club's resolution, yet the resolution destroyed plans for a joint, cross-party agreement of political groups at this stage.

Pre-war years created an opportunity for Club's representatives to demonstrate an initiative about the Polish question and strive toward regaining independence. They did it by using formal conditions, i.e., a parliamentary activity. However, politicians did not exhaust their possibilities. They used the tactics of holding back and delaying decisions. A resolution from October 12, 1912, proves this fact and warns: "Before an outside the national circles stem inflammatory job." At once, the resolution demands: "To leave the management of the national policy entrusting it to the legal representatives."¹⁶⁴⁵

Noteworthy, the Club was faithful to the pro-Austrian orientation in the classic form from the years preceding the war until its end. The form was namely: "Coordinating the Polish *raison d'état* with the vital interest of the Habsburg monarchy."¹⁶⁴⁶ In 1913, W. L. Jaworski claimed: "Let us not make differences between the Polish policy and the dynastic government policy."¹⁶⁴⁷

Ignacy Daszyński was critical about the Polish Circle's statement. In the parliament, Daszyński said: "This resolution is not sustainable. I have no fear because of this resolution here in Vienna. Polish Circle's resolutions have short legs, and they exist very shortly. They run around the world for several hours, and then die . . . All the weight, all the meaning of the resolution is in the fourth point, where the Club gives a warning *ex-cathedra*. It warns the Polish nation

he was one of the participants of the Zakopane irredentists' congress in 1912. Because of him, the independence camp established cooperation with J. Stapiński.

1644 Cited from: Garlicki, *Geneza legionów*, pp. 54–55.

1645 S. Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, p. 182; Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, p. 310.

1646 Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*, p. 356.

1647 Cited from: M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, p. VI.

“about troublemakers coming from the foreign circles.” A puzzle of fear! Tell me, gentlemen, who were you keeping an eye on? Austrian influences? No!”¹⁶⁴⁸

The Polish Circle pursued a reserved policy and hesitated with making decisions that would precise its stance on the possible international conflict. The Diet of Galicia and Lodomeria and Polish ministers in the Austrian parliament adopted a similar stance. Agenor Gołuchowski Jr., the shared minister of foreign affairs in Austro-Hungary, opted for the three-empire solution that was not so beneficial for Polish national interests. Leon Biliński, the shared minister of finances, did not display any more determination or engagement. Galicia did not pursue the proper policy, either. Michał Bobrzyński, the intendant in Galicia, engaged more in solving the Ukrainian question than, for instance, war preparations or creating a universal political agreement that would effect in paneling a management organ in the shape of a national government.¹⁶⁴⁹ It seems that lack of distinctly pro-Polish policy in such a crucial historical moment as the perspective of war between annexationists cannot influence the positive assessment of the Polish Circle, country’s parliament, or the Galician administration.

In such a situation, other persons of the political scene, for example, Józef Piłsudski,¹⁶⁵⁰ as well as political groupings in Galicia, took over the initiative.

1648 “Polityka ludu polskiego w razie wojny z Rosją. Mowa posła Ignacego Daszyńskiego wygłoszona 30 października 1912 w parlamencie austriackim (Przekład ze stenogramu),” pp. 20–35, in: I. Daszyński, *Teksty* (Kraków, 1912), pp. 175, 177. In general, socialists were in favor of war against Russia alongside Austria, and so were the conservatives. However, socialists were more determined to choose this option. Noteworthy, not all socialists agreed on the choice of a specific path. For instance, H. Diamand was fundamentally opposed to this option. However, Diamand believed that in the event of war, all forces should be mobilized. Jędrzej Moraczewski was in favor of the war, Józef Hudec supported the path of an uprising, Tadeusz Reger believed that there should be a fight on two fronts, i.e., against Russia and Austria. H. Diamand summarized: “It is good that the fifth speaker was not there, because he would probably challenge the whole Europe,” *Pamiętnik Hermana Diamanda*, p. 103.

1649 W. Pobóg-Malinowski, pp. 227–228.

1650 Supporters of J. Piłsudski sought an agreement with national democrats, even though there was a conflict of interest between them. This conflict related to taking primacy and the struggle for influence in Polish society. For that, politicians organized meetings with considerable participation of parliamentarians and representatives from the Parliamentary Fraction. These discussion forums began immediately after the outbreak of the Balkan war and took place in the office of the Lviv’s vice president, Tadeusz Rutowski. From 1913, T. Rutowski participated in the consultations to support democrats in joining the Commission, yet to no avail. A year later, Rutowski participated in orientation discussions. Discussions’ main goal was to

The first parties that did it were the Polish Socialist Party and the Polish Social Democratic Party of Galicia.

Those parties created the so-called independence fraction and planned to solve the Polish question relying on Austria, similarly to the Polish Circle. However, PSP and PSDPG stressed the need for regaining independence through the active participation of the Polish nation more boldly. PSP and PSDPG thought the lower social strata should be especially active in fighting for the liberation of Polish lands.

The Polish Circle proposed the way of greater precaution and abstaining on political declarations, unlike National Democracy or the independence left-wing that presented more dynamic conceptions. There were fundamental differences between conservatives, democrats without adjectives, socialists, and national democrats at this stage of rather declarations and discussions than real actions. Therefore, already at the end of 1912, the divergences clearly outlined among Poles. Individual political groupings pushed their concepts of regaining sovereignty and tried to get the most significant support among the public possible.

The Polish Circle stayed faithful to its previous tactics. A Parliamentary Fraction resolution from December 8, 1912, was the expression of passiveness and loyalism. The resolution stated: "Far from all thoughtless effusions, we can prepare Polish society for meeting national tasks by continuous and hard work on strengthening and developing moral, and physical energies," and further: "all Poles inhabiting this state are consistent and united in willingness to fulfill their duty to the state, and magnanimous, just monarch, who understood us in our misfortune, acknowledged our national rights, and constantly bestows us with his trust." Simultaneously, Polish politicians assured of the political and military support for the monarchy in case of war.¹⁶⁵¹

It is thought-provoking that despite probably keen political discussions happening at that time, the tone of the resolution expressed such a compromise

adopt a political orientation in the event of war between Austria and Russia. Both groups, the independence left-wing and the national democratic camp, were so strong and determined in choosing their political option that they failed to agree on a common position. Therefore, the question: for Russia or against Russia, remained open at this stage of the struggle for orientation. The question's final settlement was the creation of the Supreme National Committee in 1914, Molenda, *Piśsudczycy a narodowi demokraci*, pp. 116–117; H. Kramarz, *Tadeusz Rutowski. Portret pozytywisty i demokracji galicyjskiego* (Kraków, 2001), pp. 111–112.

1651 "Uchwała Koła Sejmowego z 8 grudnia 1912 r.," in: *Galicja w dobie autonomicznej*, pp. 377–378.

attitude. Considering that all leading representatives of the Galician parties and members of the Parliamentary Fraction worked on the resolution's final shape, it is surprising.¹⁶⁵² Konstanty Srokowski emphasized resolution's practical importance: "It somewhat closed the period of establishing the pro-Austrian orientation, which was adopted definitively and without any objection by Cracow conservatives, democrats, peasant movement, and social and progressive movements." The only difference between them was that Cracow conservatives and democrats did not belong to the TCCCIP, and other groupings did.¹⁶⁵³ This resolution: "Became a directive for the Poles in Galicia."¹⁶⁵⁴

Polish left-wing independence movement treated the matter differently, despite accepting the content of December 8 act. On December 17, 1912, in the Imperial Council, Herman Lieberman said: "If Russia was to attack us despite our expectations, we, Polish socialists, will faithfully and honestly fulfill the obligation that our belonging to the state and the community of nations we live in imposes on us . . . We enter the independence movement as Poles and as socialists, with our heads raised."¹⁶⁵⁵

Same as Poles, Ukrainian political fractions enacted the declaration of loyalty to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in case of an armed conflict with Russia. This event happened on a congress in Lviv on December 11, 1912. The core of the Ukrainian declaration was a hope that Austria will instigate the Ukrainian

1652 A specially appointed commission prepared the resolution's text. The commission included: T. Cieński, I. Daszyński, S. Głabiński, Adam Gołuchowski, W. L. Jaworski, W. Kozłowski, A. Lisiewicz, T. Rutowski, F. Stefczyk. L. Piniński and F. Stefczyk edited the text.

1653 K. Srokowski, *N.K.N. Zarys historii Naczelnego Komitetu Narodowego* (Kraków, 1923), p. 58. Undoubtedly, intendant M. Bobrzyński, who presented the government's position on the resolution in an official speech, contributed to this. Resolution's content and tone certainly suited the Austrian authorities, as well as Cracow conservatives. Cracow conservatives were satisfied with emphasizing their orientation toward Austria, military assistance, loyalty to the emperor, and monarchy, and disowning ill-considered national uprisings. However, Bobrzyński advised not organizing of society in the event of war and preventing young people from participating in military organizations, Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, pp. 294 and further.

This resolution: "Became a directive for the Poles in Galicia." Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, p. 295.

1654 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, p. 295.

1655 Fragment of a speech by H. Lieberman in the Imperial Council from December 17, 1912, according to the shorthand protocol, in: H. Lieberman, *Pamiętniki*, ed. A. Garlicki (Warszawa, 1996), pp. 83–84.

question correspondingly to Ukrainians' intentions in the event of war with Russia: "There are conditions and possibilities for the independent national and political development of the Ukrainian movement in a legal and state system of Austria . . . In case of an armed conflict between Russia and Austria, the interests of Ukrainian people fully coincide with the interests of Austro-Hungary . . . The entire Ukrainian society will defend this monarchy." Michał Bobrzyński commented on this declaration: "If the Polish declaration made an impression in Vienna, then so the Ukrainian one did it – and even to a higher degree." M. Bobrzyński believed that because Ukrainian loyalism was a reasonably young and strategically desired phenomenon – i.e., the geopolitical location of Eastern Galicia – Austrians saw Ukrainians in a more favorable light than Poles.¹⁶⁵⁶ Janusz Gruchała had a different opinion: "The concepts were not fully justified. Before the First World War broke out, the plans concerning territorial conquests on Russia did not exist. Concededly, there were concepts of using the Ukrainian question against Russia, but the Polish question got the priority."¹⁶⁵⁷ Gruchała did not specify what those concepts were. Therefore, let us present the Austrian government's intentions for the Ukrainian question in the first period of the war. It is probable that at this stage of the war, Austria did not plan any particular legal or system changes. As in the past, Austria only intended to use the Ukrainian and the Polish questions against Russia. To this end, Austro-Hungary had to pursue a double political game – separately with Poles and separately with Ukrainians – to gain allies through promises of changing their status in the monarchy. Projects of cleaving off Galicia and its partition confirm such a policy. Leon Wasilewski claimed: "Austria's policy toward Ruthenians supposed

1656 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, pp. 296–297. The Ukrainian National Council (UNC) created by national activists, radicals, and social democrats in Lviv, August 1914, supposed to be the coordinator of actions for Ukrainian sovereignty. UNC initiated the creation of Sich Rifleman formations. It also cooperated with the informal secessionist Kyiv organization, Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (ULU). ULU started functioning again after the 1905 revolution ban in 1912 or 1914, according to different sources. In August, The Austrian government, under the influence of military circles, issued permission for the Union to operate in the monarchy. However, the government limited the cooperation with the Union in February 1915 as a result of fear before a possible uprising of "Austrian" Ukrainians, J. Gruchała, *Austro-Węgry a sprawa ukraińska*, pp. 560–563; J. Chlebowczyk, *Między dyktatem, realiami a prawem narodów do samostanowienia. Prawo do samookreślenia i problem granic w wschodniej Europie Środkowej w pierwszej wojnie światowej oraz po jej zakończeniu* (Warszawa, 1988), pp. 33–34, 55.

1657 Gruchała, *Rząd austriacki i polskie stronnictwa*, p. 103.

not only to keep Russia away but to keep Poles controlled, in case they did not rate enough the freedom of cultural development within the black and yellow monarchy, too. Also, the monarchy wanted to use both Polish and Ukrainian cases simultaneously against Russia in secret plans of east-bound expansion that Austria undoubtedly took from time to time.”¹⁶⁵⁸

As mentioned above, one of the initiatives was to constitute the TCCCIP. The factor that decided about the founding was not a social nor political program of clubs. First of all, it was the attitude toward Poland’s independence and ways to regain it. The main common ground for the agreement was the independence idea. Andrzej Garlicki stated that in this respect, the Commission was an unwonted alliance.¹⁶⁵⁹ Moreover, the analysis of the Commission’s postulates and actions shows that cooperation of TCCCIP component groupings was not based on the class solidarity principle but the consolidation of national political goals.¹⁶⁶⁰ The social and political program of the left-wing was an obstacle for conservatives and national democrats to agree with the Commission and undertake joint actions. We shall discuss this matter more explicitly in a further part.

TCCCIP stated in its proclamation from December 10, 1912: “And with the war breakout moment the most terrible fate awaits our nation: it will push Poles in the Russian army against Poles in Austrian and German armies to a mutual murder. All this war horror, all those countless sacrifices, and suffering that await us will become our defeat and a further sequence of destroying our future. It is all going to happen if Poland will bleed only for foreign interests. If it will not wake up and get into action – to a battle for its rights, for its future, unity and nation’s independence.” Commission emphasized too that: “Passiveness and humbleness will not preserve Poland from any lawlessness. Contrary: it will most strongly justify this lawlessness in the eyes of the enemy.” The proclamation also defined the attitude of the TCCCIP toward the Austro-Hungarian monarchy: “As long as Austro-Hungary will fight in the interest of its own statehood against Russia,

1658 L. Wasilewski, “Sprawa podziału Galicji na tle stosunków austriacko-ukraińskich,” *Przegląd Współczesny*, no. 41, chap. IV, September (1925), p. 459.

1659 Politicians founded TCCCIP in Vienna on a meeting in the apartment of H. Śliwiński, on November 10, 1912. Śliwiński was the cashier of the Polish Military Treasury (PMT). W. Tetmajer, H. Diamond, and the chairman of PMT, Bolesław Limanowski, also took part in it. During the Commission’s congress on November 30 and December 1, 1913, members enacted a resolution to abandon the adjective “temporary.” CCCIP ended its activity on August 17, 1914. A. Garlicki, *Geneza legionów*, pp. 5, 11, 68; W. Najdus, *Ignacy Daszyński 1866–1936* (Warszawa, 1988), p. 297.

1660 Molenda, *Piłsudzczyca i narodowi demokraci*, p. 76.

it is our natural ally. Austrian's victory will be in favor of our intentions. It will be in our interest, just like absolutely fighting Russia in the incoming war is. Nevertheless, let us not take off eyes from our position and, first, of our rights. We shall defend the rights of the Polish nation."¹⁶⁶¹

We can isolate primary differences in understanding the role of Polish society in the situation of war between the annexationists and the attitude toward the monarchy by comparing the content of the Parliamentary Fraction's resolution and the TCCCIP's proclamations. Proclamation and resolution issues happened basically at the same time (December 8 and 10). Representatives of the Austrian parliament emphasized the principle of loyalty to the monarchy and defending Austro-Hungary's status quo in outer intercourses. Founders of the Commission emphasized it too. However, conditioned that loyalism will not be an obstacle for Polish national endeavors. The founders implicated that Russia is the most significant threat in regaining Polish sovereignty. Polish representatives' position categorically determined Galicia's political stance in case of armed conflict. Politicians also recommended not undergoing the pressure to organize an uprising. Therefore, the Fraction was against any unjustified and reckless military actions, yet did not refuse Austria a military aid. The Commission even assumed a fight and was undertaking actions toward it. The goal was to give a military resistance to the Russian annexationist. The resolution stressed the necessity to rely on all Poles in Galicia. In the proclamation, a force that will enable performing military actions was the Polish nation. Members of the Commission realized that even if the Galician bourgeoisie could support military actions with financial means, they will not become any base of the military units in any form. Only the working class could provide the force.

The personnel of TCCCIP changed in time, similarly to the Commission's program. In general, groupings that created the Commission stood with the pro-Austrian position. The position assumed that Poles should endeavor to liberate lands of the Russian partition and incorporate them into Galicia. PSDPG and PLDP opted to take such a course.¹⁶⁶² Cracow conservatives and national

1661 "Odezwa Komisji Tymczasowej S.S.N.," in: K. W. Kumaniecki, *Odbudowa państwowości polskiej. Najważniejsze dokumenty 1912 – styczeń 1924*, pp. 1–3, see also: "1912 grudzień [10], Kraków, Odezwa Komisji Tymczasowej Skonfederowanych Stronnictw Niepodległościowych" (03/18/2002).

1662 PLDP was an organization with a low impact. PLDP's electorate was primarily Galician intelligentsia and middle class. In fact, intelligentsia and the middle class intended to achieve more considerable political influence alongside J. Piłsudski. Noteworthy, the intelligentsia was the factor that consciously and determinedly sought independence in the contemporary situation. Dedicated supporters of J. Piłsudski recruited from

democrats could not accept it as those parties did not stress independence postulates in their programs at that time. The Executive Committee of PSDPG approved the party's accession to the Commission on November 14, 1912. The Executive Committee chose Ignacy Daszyński for a delegate in the TCCCIP.¹⁶⁶³

The stance of the leading representative of PSDPG positively influenced the social democrats' attitude toward the Commission. Ignacy Daszyński was a supporter of fighting for independence. His stance was that fighting could only result well if broader masses of people will engage in the fight. He also set the condition for peasants' and workers' situation improvement: "Therefore, let our officers value as sanctity the economic, social and national needs of the people . . . There is no other way toward freedom than through the people." At the same time, Daszyński claimed that only a universal national agreement could result in the creating of a national government in the form of a common political platform of Polish society. Daszyński subsequently forewarned about the revolutionary movements: "If there will not be unity, a sudden movement may come. Then, we will tear one another with claws." Daszyński also marked the need for financial support of independence initiatives claiming that it will be possible to obtain it from the Austrian government.¹⁶⁶⁴

PLSP. PLDP had two representatives in the parliament, Hipolit Śliwiński and Adam Lisiewicz. Although H. Śliwiński was not a talented politician, J. Piłsudski needed him in the Imperial State. The future Polish Marshal was not forced to use the help of the PSDPG when he intended to carry out his own actions in Vienna. On the other hand, the social and political program of the PSDPG did not coincide with the program of Piłsudski's Polish Socialist Party, but it was compliant on the issue of Poland's independence, Garlicki, *Geneza legionów*, pp. 36–37, 65–66.

1663 In early December 1913, PSDPG held its thirteenth Congress, during which one of the discussed issues was the party's participation in CCCIP. Bolesław Drobner said: "The PSDPG's cooperation with bourgeois or hostile to socialism organizations is contrary to the principles, resolutions of the XII Congress, and previous practice. The XIII Congress of the PSDPG calls the party board to dismiss its delegate from the Temporary Commission." I. Daszyński opposed this, saying that PSDPG's participation in the Commission is simply necessary. H. Lieberman and H. Diamand felt the same. The left wing of PSDPG was still weak, so B. Drobner withdrew his request, and the congress unanimously adopted the participation of PSDPG in the CCCIP. PSDPG held this position until the end of Commission's functioning, Najdus, *Ignacy Daszyński*, p. 297; Garlicki, *Geneza legionów*, pp. 39–40.

1664 Cited from: Garlicki, *Geneza legionów*, pp. 39–40.

The next grouping that Commission wanted to endear was democrats gathered in the Polish Democratic Club (PDC)¹⁶⁶⁵ led by Juliusz Leo. One of the PDC's activists was Roger Battaglia. On January 23, 1913, Battaglia sent a message about the PDC's decision to join the Commission to Witold Jodko, who was Commission's secretary.¹⁶⁶⁶ This would mean a significant increase in the prestige of the Commission because the PDC's chairman was the president of the Polish Circle. Thus, the case of Leo's accession to the Commission would be tantamount to acknowledging it. However, this did not happen. PDC's supreme board could not make such a decision. Board's mandate expired at the end of 1912. Soon, in February, the TCCCIP received a notification from PDC's supreme authorities that the party will not cooperate with the Commission, yet will remain neutral toward it.¹⁶⁶⁷

Bolesław Wysłouch from the Independent Peasants' Club (IPC) and Jan Stapiński from the Polish People's Party (PPP) also supported the independence movement. We can assume that this way, J. Stapiński wanted to strengthen his position in the Polish Circle, as well as in the Polish society of Galicia. Stapiński gained the opportunity to blackmail representatives from the Polish Circle, and future members of the TCCCIP by opting for cooperation with irredentists. Officially, Wysłouch's group joined the Commission on December 11, and PPP – on December 28, 1912.¹⁶⁶⁸ Włodzimierz Tetmajer became the delegate of the People's Party, and Wincenty Witos became his deputy.¹⁶⁶⁹

1665 PDC was rather a weak grouping. However, the grouping significantly influenced society with its press organ, which was *Nowa Reforma*. In a Viennese parliament, PDC cooperated with the National Democracy, conservatives, and centrists

1666 R. Battaglia wrote: "PDC's supreme board decided to participate in the confederation and it delegated me as a member to the Temporary Commission. The board also delegated dr. Tadeusz Dwernicki, an attorney from Lviv, as a deputy," cited from: Garlicki, *Geneza legionów*, p. 80.

1667 Garlicki, *Geneza legionów*, pp. 80–81.

1668 Stapiński submitted his party's accession to TCCCIP without consulting the party members. On the one hand, this fact indicates the unpredictability of Stapiński's moves. On the other hand, however, it points to his openness and readiness to enter political alliances. By supporting the Commission, Stapiński defined his position toward the monarchy, the Polish question, and possible political allies, i.e., socialists, J. Jachymek, *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe PSL – Lewica 1913–1924. Studium o powstaniu, działalności i rozkładzie ugrupowania politycznego* (Lublin, 1991), pp. 24–25.

1669 W. Witos was only a formal deputy because he did not take part in any TCCCIP's congress, just like J. Stapiński, Garlicki, *Geneza legionów*, pp. 67–68, 77.

Stapiński's accession to the Commission did not suit nor conservatives, who related to the Commission cautiously, nor national democrats, who faced the threat of political isolation. That is why both conservatives and national democrats tried to attract Stapiński.

Noteworthy, members of TCCCIP and national democrats tried to convince Stapiński's party each for their side's undertakings. Both sides realized that rural people would be a basis for military organizations in case of war. The approval of the People's Party's president would only make drafting peasants easier. However, the Polish Circle and Cracow conservatives could not allow losing the People's Party's approval in the Imperial Council, as this would severely weaken their position concerning other parliament clubs. Hence, the pre-war situation made Stapiński's party a subject of strategical importance to every major Galician political club. In consequence, the struggle for gaining PPP's approval started. Moreover, one of the struggle's aspects was a significant inner fracture in PPP.

After the fracture in PPP,¹⁶⁷⁰ Stapiński faced a difficult choice – whether to join the National Democracy and centrists or PSDPG with PLDP and Ukrainian representatives. Stapiński preferred the second solution rather, as this way, he could oppose conservatives and the Polish Circle.¹⁶⁷¹ Accessing TCCCIP was a step to do so. However, accession did not mean a full breakup with conservatives and leaving the Club. Accession only allowed strengthening the position of PPP concerning these groups.

Before M. Bobrzyński's deposition in April 1913, facing the threat of weakening the Cracow conservatives' position that was made by the People's Party's departure from the coalition, Stapiński was offered with a profitable deal of

1670 A corruption scandal related to the purchase of the *Daily Courier Illustrated* by J. Stapiński caused the split of PPP. On February 1, 1914, CCCIP adopted a resolution condemning the peasant movement's deed: "CCCIP notes massive violations against public morality in both factions of PPP in the solstice that PPP is going through, and deeply regrets the disregard for the steadfast rules of public ethics. However, CCCIP believes that the People's Party's participation in the independence movement is indispensable and asks all independence activists in both factions of PPP not to cease in supporting the activities of CCCIP," I. Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, p. 136.

1671 Stapiński informed the intendant M. Bobrzyński about his decision: "So, on December 28, 1912, I announced to intendant Bobrzyński that relations forced me to move to the opposition . . . I justified the change in tactics with my highest commandment to protect PPP from fracture," J. Stapiński, *Pamiętnik*, ed. K. Dunin-Wąsowicz (Warszawa, 1959), p. 378.

buying the *Daily Courier Illustrated* (DCI).¹⁶⁷² The deal meant that Stapiński pledged to make some kind of a political deal with Cracow conservatives and democrats without adjectives for offering him obvious financial benefits. DCI's sale transaction ended with a scandal and eventually leading to political divisions in the peasant movement.

When in 1912 PPP joined TCCCIP, and PSDPG definitively made their political stand and expressed willingness to cooperate in the Commission after the congress in 1913, national democrats found themselves in a somewhat unfavorable position. Therefore, they made efforts to attract the People's Party and create a political alliance with them. Stapiński was the obstacle in national democrats' intentions, so they intended to diminish his influence in PPP. Not so much because of his social radicalism, but rather because of his involvement in the Commission's work.

National democrats succeeded in shortening Stapiński's influence on his party. Thus, they improved their position among Galician groupings. Ultimately, Stapiński lost the president's post in his party. H. Diamand wrote to I. Daszyński: "What had to happen, happened. Peasant movement followed Korytowski's policy, and openly and publicly knocked Stapiński off the leadership. He gathered up fools and bastards in his club, and they sold him at the first opportunity."¹⁶⁷³

The initiatives of national democrats who did not remain passive in the struggle for choosing the way for independence were an alternative to TCCCIP's actions. First, those, whom J. Buszko called dissenters because they propagated pro-Austrian orientation rather than pro-Russian, joined this political conflict.¹⁶⁷⁴

Let us clarify that the adoption of the pro-Russian orientation in Galicia was difficult to accept for national democrats. National-Democratic Party (NDP) members believed that relying on Russia involves a particular risk and does not guarantee regaining the sovereignty to Poles. Also, opting for a Russian-Polish solution led to the elimination of independence slogans from the program of Galician national democrats. Pro-Russian orientation would only enable building the autonomous Kingdom of Poland with national liberties, local

1672 J. Leo and W. L. Jaworski mediated in magazines' sales. The newspaper was to serve J. Stapiński to counter attacks of the right-wing press, national democrats, clergy and East Galician nobility, Stapiński, *Pamiętnik*, pp. 386–390.

1673 Cited from: Garliński, *Geneza legionów*, p. 177.

1674 Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, p. 310.

government, and more favorable conditions for agriculture and industry within the Russian state.¹⁶⁷⁵ However, the place and role of Galicia were uncertain in case it became a part of the Russian state together with the Kingdom. National democrats predicted that Galicia most likely would divide into two parts: Polish (western) and Ruthenian (eastern), to which tsar claimed a right. This was an opinion of, among others, Stanisław Głąbiński. Głąbiński's views on regaining the independence differed from the program of the National League, or some activists from the Russian partition, for instance, Roman Dmowski.¹⁶⁷⁶ Dmowski was a supporter of the concept of concurrent unification of Polish lands and then regaining independence. Dmowski was also aware that due to different political conditions in each partition, Poles could not put forward such slogans at the same time. That is why Dmowski would propose to realize this concept in stages, beginning with the Austrian partition, which provided the best conditions for the Polish question. Dmowski was the supporter of the Austro-Polish solution. It was primarily due to formal reasons, i.e., the status of Galicia in the monarchy and achievements resulting from Poles' participation in the political life of the state. Dmowski wrote: "We in Austria can raise such a slogan . . . For us, those under the Austrian partition, the slogan of Polish lands' unification under Russian monarch's scepter, is also impossible. We do not think about giving up Eastern Galicia, which Russia considers a Ruthenian country, that is, Russian." After Austria's war declaration on Serbia on July 28, S. Głąbiński convened an NDP board's meeting, at which the program of action for the war supposed to originate. Despite some discrepancies, the board eventually decided that the party would advocate the simultaneous pursuit for the Polish lands' unification

1675 Molenda, *Piłsudczycy a narodowi demokraci*, pp. 91, 96.

1676 Dmowski argued that: "For Poland, Russia's loss is not necessary; on the contrary – we must have a healthy, strong Russia that is thriving, R. Dmowski, *Polityka polska i odbudowanie państwa polskiego*, ed. T. Wituch (Warszawa, 1989), vol. 1, p. 201. Dmowski agreed with Poles from Galicia despite different views on the orientation: "The loyal attitude of Poles toward Austria does not come from the fact that they renounce the Polish national idea and exchange it for an Austrian one. It comes from the fact that Austria does not fight with Polish patriotism and does not prevent it from work for the future. Thus, such a situation enabled a compromise between Polish patriotism and the duty of citizens of the Austrian state," Dmowski, *Niemcy, Rosja i kwestia polska*, ed. T. Wituch (Warszawa, 1991), p. 251. For this reason, Dmowski was not too critical toward Galician national democrats, who opted for relying on Austria. Dmowski was aware that the anti-Russian attitude among national democrats was significant, W. Bułhak, *Dmowski – Rosja a kwestia polska. U źródeł orientacji rosyjskiej obozu narodowego 1886–1908* (Warszawa, 2000), p. 181.

and its independence. Głąbiński wrote: "I stood by this program consistently throughout the war period."¹⁶⁷⁷ Noteworthy, on this basis, the monarchy was treated fairly instrumentally by national democrats on the way for regaining the sovereignty. The monarchy seemed like a mean to achieve the overarching goal, that is, the independent homeland.

National Democrats took various attempts to create a competing organ regarding TCCCIP relatively early. The establishment of TCCCIP provoked Tadeusz Cieński's principal concerns. At the time, others saw Cieński as a politician closely cooperating with NDC and as an actual leader of East Galicia Conservatives, and more precisely, of their centrist fraction.¹⁶⁷⁸ Cieński believed that TCCCIP and its military detachments patron, Józef Piłsudski, could contribute to a war breakout between Austria and Russia. The war breakout would engage other European countries in it, resulting in an international conflict. In October 1912, he wrote: "Some enthusiastic circles and socialists . . . are arranging an uprising." Cieński intended to prevent the influence of left-wing groups on the Polish policy. On November 10, 1912, Cieński convened a congress of national organizations' delegates in Lviv, and on November 16 – the National Council meeting.¹⁶⁷⁹ The result of these activities was the establishment of the Citizens' Committee on December 13, 1913. Committee's representatives were mainly national democrats and East Galicia conservatives. The National Council enacted a resolution in which it stated: "The Council authorizes the executive committee to create a committee in our district to organize social work and to create a national vigor and deepen the understanding of Council's tasks among the widest layers of Polish society. The Council will strive to prevent disintegration and acting in divergent directions with the cooperation of the committee."¹⁶⁸⁰

1677 Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 191–193.

1678 Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, pp. 239–242, 244–246.

1679 The National Council dealt with the appointment of candidates for deputies and managed the election campaign in Galicia. In the interval between elections, the Council's activity was low. In 1907 the Council actively joined the political life by getting involved in matters related to, e.g., electoral reform in Galicia. In 1913, NDC had four out of sixteen Council members, including Stanisław Grabski, Aleksander Skarbek, while East Galicia conservatives had five members, incl. T. Cieński, acting as the chairman of the Council, A. Wątor, *Ziemiańin – polityk Tadeusz Cieński 1895–1925. Z dziejów konserwatyzmu galicyjskiego* (Szczecin, 1997), pp. 61–68; Molenda, *Piłsudzczyca narodowi demokraci*, pp. 108–109; Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, p. 241.

1680 Cited from: Molenda, *Piłsudzczyca narodowi demokraci*, p. 113; Garlicki, *Geneza legionów*, pp. 74–75.

Adam Wątor stated that at the end of 1912, positions of TCCCIP and the Committee were even and “equally strong.”¹⁶⁸¹ Wątor’s statement is easy to negate. As events unfolded, especially those related to Commission’s and J. Piłsudski’s activities, the balance of power between the independence left-wing and national democrats shifted to NDC’s disadvantage. Stapiński movement’s accession to TCCCIP and the activity of the Polish Circle in the parliament influenced the power shift. The activity of the Polish Circle included criticizing National Democracy’s actions and opposing their three-partitions concept for regaining sovereignty. Conservatives and national democrats also divided because of military enterprises. “Sokół” and *Drużyny Bartoszone* (Bartosz’s Teams) were a threat to J. Piłsudski’s military plans. Also, conservatives had useful contacts in Vienna. By the contacts, conservatives forced their ideas, whereas Piłsudski and his military units were necessary to them to convince Austrian authorities to approve the Austro-Polish solution.

After the congress of autumn 1913, the first meeting of CCCIP took place on February 1, 1914. Then, on July 28, 1914, CCCIP issued an appeal calling Poles to oppose Russia alongside CCCIP actively: “Our victories and our rights after the war depend on our strengths, our value, and determination. Since today, “Whoever is not with us is against us” must be our slogan. We must create one Polish side . . . Our military organizations, a seedbed of the Polish Army, shall fulfill their task . . . CCCIP, aware of the responsibility for its deeds before the history, will continue conducting the preparatory work for the liberation until the Commission brings the National Government to life.”¹⁶⁸² Commission’s proclamation caused a stir and an objection on the opponents’ side of national democrats and conservatives.

Cracow conservatives had a difficult task as actions undertaken by J. Piłsudski were pro-Austrian. Hence, they could not criticize Piłsudski’s actions. For this reason, too, they remained silent on the proclamation for some time, waiting for the course of events to continue. However, CCCIP did not exclude conservatives as their potential allies. Conservatives and democrats without adjectives thought the same.

In the last days of July, groupings took attempts to reach an agreement, yet a meeting did not take place. I. Daszyński also planned a gathering of all political

1681 Wątor, *Ziemianin – polityk Tadeusz Cieński*, pp. 68–69.

1682 “Polacy!”, *Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN)*, Komisja Skonfederowanych Stronnictw Niepodległościowych in Cracow, sig. 43, col. 39.

figures on August 4. What undoubtedly prevented establishing cooperation was socialists' too radical social program.¹⁶⁸³

At the same time, however, National Democrats undertook outright actions that were an outcome of the resolution enacted in 1914 by NDP. On the initiative of T. Cieński and S. Głąbiński a Central Committee was established, later the Central National Committee (CNC), in Lviv. The presidium of the Central Committee composed of: T. Cieński as the chairman, and K. Czartoryski, S. Głąbiński, L. Piniński, and W. Witos. CNC's main goal became the fight against left-wing groupings of the independence political camp. The Central Committee comprised of NDP, PPP-”Piast,” National Christian-People's Union, Catholic-People's Party, Lviv Bourgeois Party, Centrist Club, Autonomists' Club, “Rzeczpospolita” group and military organizations: “Sokół,” Drużyny Bartoszwowe, and a part of Polish Rifle Squads.¹⁶⁸⁴

Immediately after CNC's constitution, it sent S. Głąbiński to Vienna for talks with the government. The former president of the Polish Circle came to Vienna on August 1, i.e., on the day the German-Russian war broke out. Głąbiński talked with the minister of foreign affairs, Count Berchtold, and with the chief of the general staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf already on August 2.¹⁶⁸⁵

Talks with the minister showed that Austria could not support Poles. Instead, Austria hoped that an armed uprising would break out at the back of the Russian army. This matter divided politicians. Berchtold claimed that he obtained assurances about such an action, and Głąbiński said that those who made such a promise did not have adequate social support and that the uprising will fall. Głąbiński also demanded that Austrians guarantee the creation of a free Polish state by making an appropriate agreement with Russia. This task was beyond Austrian diplomacy's possibilities, mainly because of Austro-Hungary's dependence on Germany. Germany was not interested in an alliance with the tsar. The chief of staff, who clearly defined Austria's expectations from Polish military organizations, provided Głąbiński with more information: “I shall openly tell you, your excellence, for what purpose we want to use your military formations. Not at all for direct objectives of the fight . . . We only hope for your intelligence forces.”¹⁶⁸⁶

1683 Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, pp. 163–165.

1684 Wątor, *Ziemianin – polityk Tadeusz Cieński*, pp. 74–75.

1685 Transcription of conversations with the minister of foreign affairs and fragments of conversations with the chief of staff can be found in: Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 195–199.

1686 Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, p. 197.

When S. Głąbiński held talks with Austrian government representatives, on August 2, 1914, a meeting of Polish Circle's presidium took place in Cracow. Cracow conservatives and democrats without adjectives convened the meeting on their initiative. After the meeting, presidium announced a message, which stated: "Poles will not disappoint the trust of this country's monarch."¹⁶⁸⁷ Głąbiński wrote: "The fearful tone and content of this message without submitted Poland's actual rights remained a glaring contradiction toward demands and conclusions, which I presented on the same day to Count Berchtold."¹⁶⁸⁸

The creators announced CNC's empaneling only after some time. They delayed an appeal until August 5.¹⁶⁸⁹ Two issues determined the event of delaying the appeal. First, the result of talks between Głąbiński and Austrian dignitaries. Second, the position of PSDPG on the idea of creating a joint steering body. Expectations of national democrats did not fulfill in both cases.¹⁶⁹⁰

CNC stated in its first appeal: "The first order of a political reason is to be able to remember. Poles remember that they are free only in the Habsburg monarchy in terms of national development, which they do not have everywhere else. At the time when the monarchy was in danger of war, every Pole in this country felt and understood that Polish honor must stand up without skimming the greatest

1687 Cited from: Garlicki, *Geneza legionów*, p. 236.

1688 Głąbiński abnegated the representativeness of the Club, which was: "An artificial product of 1911 election. That is why proclamations and actions of the Polish Circle did not mirror the feelings and will of most of Poles under the Austrian partition," Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 199–200.

1689 Garlicki, *Geneza legionów*, pp. 238–239.

1690 The Committee's meeting took place in August. After the meeting, S. Grabski informed I. Daszyński that they did not officially announce the activity of CNC yet. Earlier, Grabski intended to communicate with CCCIP and determine whether it is possible to create a joint management body. Before Daszyński answered Grabski's questions, he wanted to find out whether CNC was ready for open-armed struggle with Russia and whether it wants to merge *Drużyny Bartoszowe* and "Sokół" with the Unions and Rifle Squads. CNC did not intend to combine its military forces with CCCIP's forces, but Grabski did not rule out the fight against Russia. However, Grabski did not think the fight would happen immediately after the outbreak of the war. Besides, Grabski made the fight dependent on Austria's position on the Kingdom's matter. Grabski argued that if the monarchy gave a guarantee, CNC would decide to take armed action against Russia. The meeting ended with no binding decisions, but talks between the two competing centers continued, Garlicki, *Geneza legionów*, pp. 232–234.

victims of blood and property for a country from which we obtained so much good in times of peace.”¹⁶⁹¹

Therefore, the meaning of the appeal was not entirely consistent with what we would expect from national democrats. The appeal opted for the Austro-Polish solution. A. Wątor described it as: “A kind of declaration of loyalty to the state.”¹⁶⁹² However, the different situation of the National Democracy in the Austrian partition than in the Russian one explains the position. National Democracy’s program did not fully coincide with the National League’s program. Still, politicians stipulated that adopting the anti-Russian course could only be meaningful if Poles from all partitions agreed on the issue of policy. The Polish nation of the Austrian partition would fulfill their military duty and stand alongside the dynasty and the state, but nothing more than that if: “The conviction will bear in this nation that other Polish territories would share state sovereignty.”¹⁶⁹³

It seems that the reason for National Democrats’ efforts was not only to defend the status quo but also to fear that CCCIP would take over the initiative of representing the Polish society in diplomacy with Austria. Especially that there were talks between J. Piłsudski and members of the Polish Circle.¹⁶⁹⁴

The possible alliance of conservatives and democrats from CCCIP was an evident threat to the position of the Central National Committee, which would find itself in political isolation. Therefore, national democrats were in a very unfavorable situation. National democrats faced the danger of losing their influence, the

1691 Kumaniecki, *Odbudowa państwowości polskiej*, p. 14.

1692 Wątor, *Ziemianin – polityk Tadeusz Cieński*, p. 75.

1693 Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, p. 198.

1694 J. Piłsudski tried to create Polish Legions; W. Sikorski prepared the appropriate memorial to the Supreme Headquarters of the Austrian Army. Piłsudski wanted to gain the support of the Polish Circle for his initiative in these circumstances. Piłsudski intended to bring the Club and CCCIP together. On August 12, 1914, on a meeting of CCCIP, politicians presented a project by R. Battaglia (PDC) about a nationwide organization. The organization’s goal would be to represent the Polish society of the Austrian partition and support the military movement. Two days later, R. Battaglia presented a report on talks with conservatives and democrats. He also informed CCCIP that a meeting of the Polish Circle was to take place on 15 August, and the next day there supposed to be a joint meeting of delegates from Galician political parties. The result of the deliberations with conservatives and democrats was establishing a management body consisting of ten delegates, one from each party. This institution supposed to consist of three departments: tax, aid, and a political one. J. Stapiński strongly opposed this project; R. Battaglia, H. Śliwiński and Sokolnicki defended it, Garlicki, *Geneza legionów*, pp. 257, 259–260.

inability to organize a significant military force. National democrats also could not influence PPP anymore.

Besides, national democrats could not count on the support for their initiatives in Vienna because conservatives held the leading position there. L. Biliński, the shared minister of finances, and J. Leo, the president of the Polish Circle, obtained information about the meeting of S. Głąbiński and the minister of foreign affairs and the chief of the Austrian staff that took place August 2, 1914. Głąbiński claimed that it was thanks to them that CNC, whose goals were not compliant with Cracow conservatives' and Austrian government's interests, collapsed: "They decided to liquidate the Central National Committee by putting forward the Polish Circle's slogan of national unity and the proposition of creating the "Supreme National Committee."¹⁶⁹⁵ Biliński also wrote about this event.¹⁶⁹⁶

At that time, the president of the Polish Circle, J. Leo, was in Vienna from August 10 to 13. In Vienna, Leo was favorably received by Viennese governmental authorities regarding the creation of Legions. Undoubtedly, this fact influenced the consolidation of Galician groupings and the creation of a joint organ in the form of the Supreme National Committee.¹⁶⁹⁷ We know from the sources that Leo did not receive any specific declarations from the Viennese

1695 Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 197, 204.

1696 Głąbiński quoted the following fragment of Biliński's diaries: "At the beginning of August he (Biliński – D. L.-L.) went with the Club's president to Berchtold, and there they decided to create Polish Legions and the Supreme National Committee (SNC)," Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, p. 204. The fragment does not sound like Głąbiński presents it, but as follows: "I sat with him (with J. Leo – D. L.-L.) all day at Berchtold's in the company of chief of staff, Conrad. Polish legions' creation came to the fore," L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 1, p. 294. The meeting was probably a result of talks between Głąbiński and Austrian politicians, which we discussed above. Let us remind that during the meeting, Głąbiński denied that Poles willed to cause an uprising on the Russian army's back. Głąbiński also demanded the creation of a Polish army and a guarantee for Poles for any assistance in military operations. Such a declaration caused consternation and fear among Austrian politicians. Nevertheless, Biliński did not mention the SNC's creation, but only the creation of legions. Therefore, his account is different from the one presented by Głąbiński.

1697 Immediately after returning from Vienna, in the evening, there was a meeting with E. Bandrowski, J. K. Federowicz, L. German, W. L. Jaworski, T. Rutowski, J. Sare, K. Srokowski and T. Starzewski. The meeting discussed the results of Leo's Vienna talks. The president of the Polish Circle said that Poles could count on substantial monarchy assistance, but they also have to support the state, e.g., by setting up armed troops in the form of Legions. Leo presented the problem in such a way that Galician politicians had the impression that he had a specific assurance from

government regarding the Polish question. As indicated above, it could only be a positive attitude that was conditioned by the interests of the monarchy, and not the will to resolve the Polish question the way inhabitants of Galicia wanted it. Vienna adopted a fundamental position, which was that in the event of war with Russia, Polish military fractions should take the role of the intelligence, sabotage, and subversive operations in the back of the tsar's army. The minister of foreign affairs and the chief of staff clearly emphasized the position to Głębiński during their talks.¹⁶⁹⁸ We can conclude from this that Leo knew about Vienna's good intentions regarding legions, yet he did not fully know the purpose of legions' destination. The author of the work believes that Poles' actions in the first days of the war based primarily on the so-called "wishful thinking," not actual arrangements between the government and Polish politicians. Conservatives, first of all, conveyed high hopes regarding the Polish question's solution basing on Austria's support to the other politicians after talks in Vienna. The result of the August 12, 1914 conference in Vienna, which discussed the matter of Legions, is a confirmation of this position. L. Biliński, J. Leo, count Berchtold and F. Conrad von Hötzendorf participated in the conference. The chief of staff opposed Polish demands. In a conversation the next day, Leo once again submitted the request of creating Legions in Cracow, Lviv, and Warsaw. However, once again, Leo received a negative answer. On August 14, Berchtold ordered to convey to F. C. von Hötzendorf a negative reply on creating Polish military fractions. Berchtold only proposed recruiting volunteers to the Landsturm formation.¹⁶⁹⁹

On the morning of August 15, a meeting of the parliamentary commission of the Polish Circle took place. Leo reported on the Viennese talks at the meeting. Polish Circle selected a commission to conduct talks with CCCIP and CNC. A joint meeting, at which I. Daszyński, S. Kot from the Commission, W. L. Jaworski, Zdzisław Tarnowski, L. Piniński, A. Lubomirski, Ignacy Rosner (of the Parliamentary Fraction) were present together with T. Cieński, E. Dubanowicz,

Austria. T. Rutowski commented on the meeting: "Leo must have something big in his pocket!" K. Srokowski, *N.K.N.*, pp. 119–121.

1698 Just before leaving Vienna, J. Leo was at a dinner organized by L. Biliński. At the dinner, among others, were present: Berchtold, Georgi, i.e., the minister of national defense, and Z. Morawski, the minister for Galicia. The meeting took place in a friendly atmosphere, which assured Leo about Vienna's positive attitude toward Legions. A famous statement rang out at the dinner: "*je mehr Bajonette, desto besser* (the more bayonets, the better)."

1699 F. C. von Hötzendorf, "Z czasów mej służby," in: *Polska w pamiętnikach Wielkiej Wojny 1914–1918*, ed. M. Sokolnicki (Warszawa, 1925), pp. 554–555.

S. Stroński (from CNC), happened in the afternoon. After the opening of the meeting, Leo defined the aims of the gathering, i.e., the unification of parties and the creation of two Legions with the Polish commandment.¹⁷⁰⁰

CCCIP also had its meeting on the same day. The most important thing was that CCCIP fully supported the unification of parties. Also, CCCIP allied with conservatives at the meeting. The alliance was a result of a confidential consultation of W. L. Jaworski, S. Starzewski, and I. Rosner, and, from the Commission's side, I. Daszyński, M. Sokolnicki, and W. Sikorski.¹⁷⁰¹ The consultation initiated a nearly two-year period of cooperation between conservatives and J. Piłsudski's group. The meeting also determined the creation of the Supreme National Committee.

The next day, August 16, the Parliamentary Fraction met with delegates from CCCIP and CNC. Sessions of the Parliamentary Fraction were calm, and not much discussion happened. The session was calm and quiet due to the need to establish a joint steering organ priority. Thus, all other matters remained unsaid. The meeting adopted a resolution on the appointment of SNC as the highest military, fiscal and political organization authority of the Polish armed forces unanimously. The resolution said: "We are united in this solemn historical moment by this deep conviction that the unification of all Polish parties during the ongoing war is necessary." It also stated that: "To implement this thought into action, the existing separate organizations unite at the call of the Polish Circle: Central National Committee, Coordinating Commission of Confederated Independence Parties, and those groups that did not belong to any of these organizations. Those organs form the Supreme National Committee as the highest instance of military, fiscal, and political organization of Polish armed forces."¹⁷⁰² The resolution also specified the personnel of SNC, headed by J. Leo.¹⁷⁰³

1700 "Aneks, Protokół posiedzenia przewodniczących klubów sejmowych i delegatów Komitetu Centralnego tudzież Komisji Tymczasowej S.S.N.," in: Srokowski, *N.K.N.*, pp. 353–354.

1701 Pobóg-Malinowski, p. 252.

1702 "Uchwały Sejmowego Koła polskiego (brochure)," in: Kumaniecki, *Odbudowa państwowości polskiej*, pp. 17–18; Kumaniecki, *Zbiór najważniejszych dokumentów do powstania państwa polskiego* (Kraków, 1920), pp. 20–22.

1703 SNC consisted of 40 members – 20 real and 20 deputies – grouped in two sections: Western – a Cracow section, in which Cracow conservatives and democrats dominated, and Eastern – a Lviv section, consisting mainly of national democrats, East Galicia conservatives and centrist conservatives. A Cracow conservative, W. L. Jaworski, headed the first section. A conservative centrist and supporter of the National Democracy party, T. Cieński, headed the second section. In the Western

The SNC's press organ was a journal called *Prawica Narodowa* (National Right-Wing) published each two weeks, and edited by Kazimierz Tetmajer. It issued since June 15, 1915. After the war, *Przegląd Narodowy* became a nationwide magazine.¹⁷⁰⁴

The Polish national interest undoubtedly guided members of the Polish Circle. Hence their united votes, which should be called solidarity or voting in the same way for the nation's sake. It seems that K. Srokowski, who critically referred to such a way of making decisions, was right: "But you, the inflammatory, nervous Polish society, make a great mistake and you will always make

Section, the secretaries-general (for political and press matters) were: a democrat Konstanty Srokowski (deputy Roman Krogulski) and a national democrat Jan Rozwadowski (deputy Stanisław Głabiński, NDC). The head of the military department was Władysław Sikorski from PLDP (deputy Stefan Surzycki, a centrist). The head of the organizational department was a conservative centrist, Stanisław Stroński (deputy Zygmunt Marek from PSDPG). The treasury department's head was a conservative, Tadeusz Starzewski (deputy Jan Kanty Fedorowicz from PDC). In the Eastern Section, the head of the organizational department was Stanisław Kasznica, a centrist conservative (deputy Józef Hudec from PSDPG). A national democrat, Aleksander Skarbek (deputy Artur Hausner from PSDPG), headed the military department. The tax department head was a democrat, Ludomił German (deputy Stanisław Badeni, conservative). The two SNC sections also included: Witold Czartoryski, Ignacy Daszyński, Jan Dąbski, Władysław Długosz, Stanisław Grabski, Andrzej Lubomirski, Józef Neuman, Leon Piniński, Szymon Przybyło, Edmund Riedl, Józef Sare, Ignacy Steinhaus, Władysław Stesłowicz, Hipolit Śliwiński, Andrzej Średniawski, Zdzisław Tarnowski, Bolesław Wicherkiewicz, Wincenty Witos, Franciszek Wójcik, Aleksander Vogiel, Józef Zajchowski, Edmund Zieleniewski, Garlicki, *Geneza legionów*, p. 270; Najdus, *Polska Partia Socjalno-Demokratyczna Galicji i Śląska 1890–1919* (Warszawa, 1983), p. 571; Srokowski, *N.K.N.*, pp. 114–115; Najdus, "Galicja w pierwszym roku działań wojennych 1914–1915," in: *Historia Polski*, ed. Ż. Kormanowa, W. Najdus, vol. 3, part III (Warszawa, 1974), pp. 75–76. About the author of *N.K.N.*, read in: Cz. Lechicki, "Z papierów po Klemensie Borkowskim," *Małopolskie Studia Historyczne* (1966), vol. 3–4, ch. 9, pp. 113–116.

1704 Z. Myśliński, "Prasa polska w Galicji w dobie autonomicznej 1867–1918," in: *Prasa polska w latach 1864–1918*, ed. J. Łojek and others (Warszawa, 1976), pp. 170–172. Also, *Wiadomości Polskie* published from the end of 1914. *Wiadomości Polskie* was a pro-Austrian magazine for legionnaires and Legions, which also reached abroad. In the spring of 1915, *Wiadomości Polskie's* circulation was 25,000 exemplaries. S. Kot was the editor of the magazine, H. Florkowska-Frančić, "Działalność Stanisława Kota w Naczelnym Komitecie Narodowym," in: *Stanisław Kot – uczonej i polityk. Pokłosie sesji naukowej*, ed. A. Fitowa (Kraków, 2001), pp. 13, 15–16, 22; T. P. Rutkowski, *Stanisław Kot 1885–1976. Biografia polityczna* (Warszawa, 2000), pp. 30, 32, 50.

mistakes, whenever you take voting in the same way for unanimity!¹⁷⁰⁵ It soon turned out that differences in the approach to the Polish question are so extensive that they prevent all SNC's groupings from cooperating soon after the establishment of SNC.

SNC was a compromise solution, and groupings that created it: "Eventually joined on the principle not of uniformity, but on the opposite of their political orientation."¹⁷⁰⁶ M. Sokolnicki claimed that in addition to the common goal of creating a steering organ, parties also sought to control and block each other's actions so none of them would gain an advantage over others and take the ruling.¹⁷⁰⁷

As A. Garlicki writes, national democrats decided to participate in a joint steering organ, along with CCCIP, conservatives, and democrats only to weaken the position of the Commission from within.¹⁷⁰⁸ S. Głąbiński explains the decision to join SNC in another way: "For now, we could lean on a power that was generally favorable to us and create the personnel of armed forces freed from the military duty in the Austro-Hungarian army."¹⁷⁰⁹ Noteworthy, national democrats could gain some profits from participating in SNC. If parties forming the Committee did not join this common political platform, national democrats could expect to lose influence among Galicia's society. Especially since NDP was rather an elite group, and others had not a very large electorate. SNC was a patriotic organization, so the Galician public opinion could poorly receive not joining it.¹⁷¹⁰

SNC's drawback was that it did not have executive eligibility. SNC engaged in collecting the funds and military and political organization of the armed forces. Organizing forces determined the direction of the Committee's activity, i.e., the implementation and strengthening of the pro-Austrian orientation.¹⁷¹¹

1705 Srokowski, *N.K.N.*, p. 133.

1706 Srokowski, *N.K.N.*, p. 127.

1707 Relations between socialists and national democrats occupying extreme positions in the SNC were particularly unfavorable. Conservatives, democrats without adjectives, and peasant movement were rather neutral, Srokowski, *N.K.N.*, pp. 150–157.

1708 Garlicki, *Geneza legionów*, p. 263.

1709 Głąbiński also wrote that the motivation for joining the SNC was the lack of common political orientation except for fear of Germany and Russia. Głąbiński added: "We could not be passive when the expected hour for Poland arrived," Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 207–208.

1710 Najdus, *Galicja w pierwszym roku*, p. 74.

1711 Srokowski, *N. K. N.*, pp. 143–145.

SNC's activity also became a flashpoint for the parties. SNC initially reduced the number of its members and then collapsed. Undoubtedly, granting a right to organize military forces to the Committee was a deliberate and thoughtful effort of those who wanted to implement the Austro-Polish concept. On the other hand, the consent of all Galician groups to establish a joint steering organ in the form of SNC was a factor enabling enforcement of the pro-Austrian solution. Probably, supporters of the pro-Austrian orientation, even before the outbreak of the war, intended to guarantee one common direction of Polish policy for all politicians.

The establishment of SNC was synonymous with the end of CCCIP's activity on August 17, 1914. Summing up Commission's activities, we can state: "The greatest merit of the Commission was that it even existed, and that, in the face of the impending European conflict, there was a Polish organ thinking about international politics, about Polish statehood and forcing its countrymen to think about Poland in state categories."¹⁷¹²

5. The Decline of the Austro-Polish Orientation

When it turned out that the monarchy was not strong enough to win the unfolding war, the policy of loyalty toward Austro-Hungary became less popular. Therefore, the First World War brought a gradual change. On the one hand, the war united all the Galician political forces, but on the other hand it showed that parties' programs differ in settling the Polish question on the international forum: "The fact that Polish society turned away from Austria in the World War proved that the Polish question entered a favorable phase."¹⁷¹³

As reflected in press, attitude of Polish society from all partitions transformed. *Kuryer dla Wszystkich* (Courier for All) wrote: "Today, Austria fights in the war for the "Prussian King's" interest. Galician politics, who stuck to the Habsburg dynasty as a drunk to the fence, now state that Austria fights for its own interests. On the other hand, Galicia fights for national liberties, and the biggest liberty is the career of various Austro-Galician excellences, creators of the *Stańczyk's Portfolio* or its ardent followers."¹⁷¹⁴

The Supreme National Committee approved the Austro-Polish solution as the base of its program; however, the solution was not approved by all the groupings. Noteworthy, national democrats joined SNC not exactly because they approved

1712 Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli*, p. 338.

1713 S. Kieniewicz, *Orientacja austriacka w Polsce*, p. 214.

1714 "Polityka hrabiów galicyjskich," *Kuryer dla Wszystkich*, no. 9 (08/31/1914), p. 1.

the pro-Austrian orientation. Nevertheless, all members of SNC accepted the Austro-Polish solution. From the national point of view, the solution had some chances for succeeding. Moreover, the solution could result in regaining independence with Austria's support and in taking efforts to join Galicia and other annexed Polish lands. As the later events showed, the concept did not finalize. Politicians did not know about all the facts that related to the Polish question in this crucial moment. Politicians also were not sure about Austrian government's attitude toward Polish Legions, as J. Leo's and S. Głabiński's Vienna talks proved. Only certain politics knew about the ultimatum for J. Piłsudski.¹⁷¹⁵ No one could predict that on August 22, 1914, Istvan Tisza, the Hungarian prime-minister would block Polish endeavors by opposing the trialist concept.¹⁷¹⁶ Moreover, no one sufficiently considered the position of the other two partitioners.¹⁷¹⁷

To present the further fate of the Austro-Polish concept we have to comment on Galician parties' position over SNC. Basing on W. L. Jaworski's opinion, Aleksandra Kosicka-Pajewska claims that Cracow conservatives had a weak political position on the verge of war: "The first generation of Cracow conservatives encountered years of the First World War intellectually weakened and misjudged the situation. Conservatives faced stronger opponents regarding those they had in earlier stages of activity. Neoconservatives most often also misjudged the

1715 After units' departure from Cracow, the Austrian authorities demanded J. Piłsudski to dissolve the units within 24 hours or submit them to the command of Landstrum. In such a case, Polish volunteers would have to swear an oath of loyalty to the monarchy, K. Srokowski, *N.K.N.*, p. 115.

1716 It was very probable, as Hungarians were against further law and system transformations since the beginning of the dualism.

1717 Let us add that the position of Poles was completely different from Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians or Croats, as those nations fully inhabited the monarchy. The Austrian state only included part of the Polish nation, and not even the largest one. The concepts of rebuilding the Polish statehood also derived from the three-partition policy's assumptions. A strong emotional relationship and bond with compatriots from the Prussian and Russian partitions influenced the three-partition policy. Other nations pursued a policy of opposition only toward one annexationist, i.e., Austro-Hungary. Thus, Poles had to consider international interests of the monarchy as well. Moreover, unlike Italians, Serbs or Romanians, Poles did not have their own state, and for logical reasons could not strive for unification. Therefore, the situation of the Polish nation during the First World War was much more complicated and required much greater efforts to change, H. Batowski, "Die Polen" in: *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918*, eds. A. Wandruszka and P. Urbanitsch, vol. 3, Ch. 1, *Die Völker des Reiches* (Vienna, 1980), pp. 553–554.

situation. The days when aristocracy and political leadership, who belonged to it, were the strength of Cracow conservatives, were gone. Conservatives of the first generation burned out and slowly faded away. Young intellectuals took their place.¹⁷¹⁸

PSDPG members were especially active in SNC. The executive commission of SNC included: I. Daszyński, Zygmunt Marek and Jędrzej Moraczewski. An unambiguous negative attitude toward Russia got conservatives and socialists closer. Conservatives and socialists accepted J. Piłsudski's actions. I. Daszyński was a great supporter of Piłsudski as both of them derived from the left wing. The power Piłsudski had, i.e., the military forces, was significant for conservatives. In the beginning of war Polish Legions were a great advantage that conservatives used in talks with the government.

From the beginning of its activity, SNC gained J. Stapiński's and PPP-"Left's" support.¹⁷¹⁹ Stapiński did not enter SNC, mainly due to the lack of will to participate in the Committee's work, but also to the Juliusz Leo's and Andrzej Średniawski's opposition. Stapiński did not participate in the later activities of SNC either. Even Władysław Sikorski, the chief of the Military Department of SNC, did not manage to convince Stapiński on joining SNC. Noteworthy, Stapiński did not hide his dissatisfaction about the Commission's personnel, as PPP got only two out of forty seats. One was for Szymon Przybyło, and one was for Franciszek Wójcik as Przybyło's deputy.¹⁷²⁰

It is hard to assess PPP-"Left's" activity on pro-Austrian policy in the war period because in fact PPP-"Left" ceased its activities.¹⁷²¹ In contrast, PSL-"Piast" used the situation to strengthen its influence among the rural population, not

1718 W. L. Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 37; A. Kosicka-Pajewska, *Zachowawcza myśl polityczna Galicji w latach 1866–1914* (Poznań, 2002), p. 281.

1719 A few days after SNC's constitution, PPP-"Left" issued a proclamation calling the rural population to support Committee's activity, "1914, sierpień 23. – Zarząd PSL Lewica wzywa chłopów do popierania działalności NKN," in: *Materiały źródłowe do historii*, vol. 1, pp. 355–356.

1720 Srokowski, *N.K.N.*, pp. 133, 146–157; J. Jachymek, *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, p. 42; K. Dunin-Wąsowicz, "Ludowcy galicyjscy w czasie pierwszej wojny światowej," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, no. 1/1958, p. 41.

1721 This was mainly due to the split in the peasant movement in December 1913. PPP split into two competing centers, i.e., PPP-"Left" and PPP-"Piast," Stapiński withdrew from political life and the issue of *Przyjaciel Ludu* suspended. Many other events influenced the fracture, too, e.g. the departure of many party's activists to serve in the Austrian army or the Polish military forces, or the displacement and internment of Polish peasants in the camps in Austria. Undoubtedly, PPP-"Piast" benefited from

only through agitation actions, but also through an active and measurable help for Polish peasants.

However, Stapiński played both sides. War years most explicitly showed that Stapiński could not work out a lasting position toward the Austro-Polish solution and, thereby, Poland's independence. Stapiński's indecisiveness was visible in switching between opting for and against the pro-Austrian orientation. In addition, Stapiński switched sides many times without considering the broader context of the Polish question, i.e., the international situation. Stapiński could not decide to choose a political ally, so he cooperated with conservatives and socialists. Such an attitude adversely affected the condition of Stapiński's grouping. During the war and after its end, in the Second Polish Republic, PPP-"Left's" forces were clearly depleted and the movement's importance was secondary: "Jan Stapiński's great political role in fact ended in 1914, when the outbreak of the First World War prevented him from continuing political activity and the development of his Party." During the war Stapiński was not consistent but rather changeable in terms of attitudes and given problems. At first Stapiński supported SNC and the pro-Austrian orientation; then he withdrew from public life and did not take a stand on any international matters. However, in the end of war Stapiński again supported the Austro-Polish solution.¹⁷²²

Stapiński came back to the political scene only in 1917 due to the Imperial Council's session resumption for the first time since the outbreak of war. Stapiński adapted a pro-government position.¹⁷²³ Stapiński's position is thought-provoking. In 1917, Stapiński supported the government and Polish Circle's pro-Austrian policy, although earlier he repeatedly expressed a distrustful attitude toward the monarchy or the purpose of the Austro-Polish solution and SNC's activity. Jan Jachymek wrote that Stapiński's reasons were equally political as they were personal. Peasant movement's leader held a grudge against certain Galician politics, e.g. Władysław Leopold Jaworski, because they "acted against" PPP contributing to party's fracture. Stapiński was also reluctant toward national democrats because of their contribution to the PPP fracture and a campaign against peasant

those events, gaining more and more support among the peasant masses as basically their only representative, Jachymek, *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, pp. 43–46.

1722 Dunin-Wąsowicz, "Wprowadzenie," in: *J. Stapiński, Pamiętnik*, pp. 91–92.

1723 Until that time, Stapiński first of all dealt with his finances. Stapiński undertook many initiatives to improve his material situation. Admittedly, Stapiński announced after the outbreak of war that he and his sons would join the army to actively contribute to regaining independence. However, this was only an empty promise, Jachymek, *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, pp. 49–50; W. Witos, *Moje wspomnienia*, vol. 1, p. 383.

movement's leader in national democrats' press.¹⁷²⁴ National democrats also were reluctant toward Stapiński.

Initially, PPP-"Piaśt" was positive about SNC. Immediately after the establishment of the SNC "Piaśt" wrote: "The united Polish nation elected an open government that includes representatives of all parties and layers. Today, this government under the name of the Supreme National Committee is the highest authority in Poland . . . It is the duty of every Pole to listen to SNC absolutely and in every case."¹⁷²⁵

Nevertheless, "Piaśt's" representatives did not participate in Committee's works actively. SNC included: A. Średniawski, W. Witos, W. Długosz and Jan Dąbski.¹⁷²⁶ Noteworthy, PPP-"Piaśt" had a pro-National Democracy attitude since the party's foundation. This is how we can explain "Piaśt's" low engagement.

PPP-"Piaśt" raised a question of the Polish independence already at the first party's congress on February 1, 1914. Basing on Witos' resolution "Piaśt" stated: "PPP congress believes that the highest, eternally living law of the Polish nation for building the independent People's Poland should be the starting point and the center of all efforts and endeavors of the Polish people organized in PPP" "Piaśt" also adapted an assumption that PPP will "fight servile and conciliatory directions that weaken Polish society's independence endeavors." Therefore, the program referred to the slogan of independence, although "Piaśt's" activists stood for trialist concept. "Piaśt" also believed that conservatives are the force that breaks the Polish Circle from within. However, conservatives guarded

1724 "1915 grudzień 29, Kraków. – List Jana Stapińskiego do Hipolita Śliwińskiego w sprawie polityki wiedeńskiego parlamentarnego koła polskiego i stanowiska wobec niego Polskiej Partii Socjalno-Demokratycznej Galicji i Śląska oraz Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego," in: *Materiały źródłowe do historii*, vol. 1, pp. 401–402; Jachymek, *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, pp. 48, 53.

1725 *Piaśt*, no. 34 (08/23/1914), p. 1; "1914 sierpień 23. – Artykuł z 'Piaśta' pt. 'Zjednoczenie całego narodu polskiego' witający powstanie NKN," in: *Materiały źródłowe do historii*, vol. 1, pp. 353–354; "1914 sierpień 23. – Apel PSL Piaśt o wstępowanie do Legionów Polskich i składanie świadczeń na ich wyekwipowanie," in: *Materiały źródłowe do historii*, pp. 354–355.

1726 W. Długosz did not take part in any session. J. Dąbski did not participate in sessions often. W. Witos was not interested in the Committee, too. At the time Witos resided in his property in Wierzchosławice. W. L. Jaworski ordered to prepare a separate study room for Witos with a "Vice President's Witos' office" sign. Yet "Witos did not spend even five minutes in his official room," Srokowski, *N.K.N.*, p. 157; Jachymek, *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, p. 42.

the solidarity within the Club.¹⁷²⁷ Thus, “Piaśt’s” view was not relatable to conservatives’ actions.

Both in the period before the war and after its outbreak, East Galicia conservatives were particularly inactive as a political club. Some of East Galicia conservatives favored only national democrats, mainly due to national democrats’ negation of Michał Bobrzyński’s policy on the Ruthenian question. In principle, the orientation dispute was not a priority in the program of the East Galician nobility, who was more engaged in defending their economic and social status quo.

The establishment of SNC undoubtedly satisfied national democrats because thus the danger of establishing a national government by J. Piłsudski reduced. Moreover, SNC’s activity limited to the Austrian partition according to national camp’s intentions.

Roman Wapiński stated that during SNC’s creation national democrats, or at least some of them, hoped for a positive solution of the Polish question relying on Austria: “Hence, I would treat national democrats’ entry to SNC as a determined by general political considerations procedure, but also a response to specific tendencies manifesting in the national democratic camp.”¹⁷²⁸

Galician national democrats began to withdraw from the coalition of parties supporting pro-Austrian policy shortly after the First World War started – in fact, after first weeks of fighting. National democrats and East Galicia conservatives left SNC on October 20, 1914.¹⁷²⁹ The reason for such a quick shift was the conviction of little chance to implement the Austro-Polish concept. National democrats were not active from August 1914 to March 1917, and were “generally lacking of new initiatives.” It was not until the spring of 1917 when national democrats actively joined independence aspirations’ implementation. At the

1727 The resolution also said: “PPP congress considers the solidarity of Polish representation necessary in order to maintain its strength and seriousness in the Austrian state. Attempts to break the Polish Circle, that has a democratic majority today, are only for the benefit of conservatives and activists who want to weaken our Viennese delegation.” “Piaśt” stated in the editorial: “Cracow conservatives are our primary, greatest opponents . . . and must be excluded from all relations, and even from political coexistence,” A. Garlicki, *Powstanie Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego „Piaśt” 1913–1914*, Warsaw, 1966, pp. 148–149, 153–154, 156–157; *Piaśt*, no. 17 (04/26/1914), no. 3 (01/18/1914).

1728 R. Wapiński, *Narodowa demokracja 1893–1939. Ze studiów nad dziejami myśli nacjonalistycznej*, p. 134.

1729 I. Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, pp. 198–199.

time, national democrats appeared as one of the groups that put forward the slogan of unification and Poland's independence. An evidence for this is national democrats' participation in Polish Circle's resolution in May 1917, that was based on W. Tetmajer's request.¹⁷³⁰

S. Głąbiński, a leading politician among Galician national democrats, supported the policy of loyalty to Austria even after Russian troops entered Lviv in 1915. The change happened in October 1916. During Polish Circle's meeting Głąbiński together with W. Dębski opposed the Austro-Polish solution of the Polish question. The opposition to the concept of creating a Polish state only from the lands of Austrian partition was the basis for such a stance. In April 1917, Głąbiński resigned from working in the parliamentary committee of the Polish Circle on the creation of Galicia's autonomous region.¹⁷³¹

National democrats and "Piast" members started cooperation in the autumn of 1915. Leaders of PPP-"Piast" took part in the three-partition congress organized by the National League in the summer. W. Witos positively assessed national democrats and their political activities. Witos believed that national democrats are objective and can "see things rationally," and "they reason without prejudice."¹⁷³² Apart from SNC, the Polish Circle fought for the orientation too, although some factors hindered Club's activity at the time. During the war, parliamentary activity of the Club reduced, mainly because of not convening the Imperial Council. Polish representatives had the possibility of political activity, however, to a limited extent. The activity mainly contained reporting protests, submitting memorials and individual conversations with particular ministers: "So what was the Polish Circle supposed to do? It tried to act through the minister of foreign affairs and the president of ministers, both very weak."¹⁷³³

On October 12, 1914, W. L. Jaworski wrote: "I do not remember such a weakened position of Poles in Austria. We have no one, who deserves the name of a

1730 Wapiński, *Narodowa demokracja*, pp. 134, 146.

1731 U. Jakubowska, "Z dziejów narodowej demokracji w parlamencie wiedeńskim," *SH*, Ch. 26, vol. 2, p. 253.

1732 Wapiński, *Narodowa demokracja*, pp. 137–138. "Piast" members often took part in congresses organized by national democrats. Both groupings cooperated in the Cross-Party Club. On this basis there is a view saying that W. Witos was a member of the National League.

1733 L. Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, pp. 67–68. Polish politicians' initiatives mainly concerned matters of Silesian countries, Western Galicia or refugees from territories spanned with an armed actions, J. Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, pp. 317–318.

statesman except for Bobrzyński . . . The fact is that the government's dislike and antipathy toward Leo affects us all," and on December 6: "So we have no favorable person in Austria. This is a tragedy. On top of that, nobody of Poles has an access to the emperor except Biliński . . . The situation is really desperate."¹⁷³⁴ During the war, L. Biliński also very badly assessed the possibilities of Polish politicians' influence on decision taken in the monarchy, whether by civil or military authorities. Biliński wrote: "intendant Korytowski had to personally beg the archduke (Friedrich) about everything."¹⁷³⁵ There also was a lack of adequate forces on the Polish side that could effectively influence monarchy's policy on the Polish question: "In fact, we have two politicians behind us, i.e., Biliński and Bobrzyński. Two, but the brightest ones."¹⁷³⁶ At that time, for example, Galicia's intendant had a weak position. W. Korytowski had to submit to pressure from military factors. For instance, by force Korytowski had to arrest his political allies, i.e., T. Cieński¹⁷³⁷ and A. Skarbek, whom Korytowski advised to emigrate.¹⁷³⁸

Despite all that, a loyal attitude, attachment to the Crown, and a strive to keep and tighten Austro-Polish relations still functioned. In January 1915, the Poles addressed the emperor referring to the message of the Galician parliament from 1866. The Galician nobility's address repeated one again in words: "With this wish, with this hope, we make once again our old statement solemnly at the feet of Your Imperial and Royal Majesty's Throne: "With You, Lord, we stand, and we want to stand." The address began with a direct appeal to the monarch: "In this beginning year, let the Polish noblemen of your scepter pay a homage of honor, gratitude, and faithfulness." The address was another expression of loyalty and devotion as the following fragments show: "We know, Sire, that under your banner and in your camp, there is a good cause and our safety," and: "We found the recognition of our national being and the possibility of its development in your fatherly, gracious heart", and: "Our faithfulness goes hand in hand with our gratitude." The address did not contain national or even independence demands.

1734 A note from October 12 1914 and December 6 1914, W. L. Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, pp. 14, 16.

1735 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, p. 15.

1736 A note from March 7, 1915, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 33.

1737 See: A. Wrzosek, "Prześladowanie Tadeusza Cieńskiego przez austriacką policję podczas I wojny światowej," *Niepodległość i Pamięć*, vol. 1, 1999, pp. 27–37.

1738 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, p. 15.

However, the address was a confirmation of the policy initiated by the national parliament and the Polish Circle in the beginning of the dualist monarchy.¹⁷³⁹

Biliński and Poles in Vienna developed a program to transform the dualistic monarchy into a trialistic one. Galicia was to be the third part of the monarchy. In the middle of August 1914, conservatives put forward the trialistic concept on the initiative of L. Biliński and M. Bobrzyński. H. Lieberman judged the concept from the time perspective: "One can consider this position as an expression of boundless naivety with a smile of pity."¹⁷⁴⁰

The emperor and the then minister of foreign affairs Bertchold accepted the address. As a consequence, the monarch submitted a manifesto for Poles.¹⁷⁴¹ L. Biliński arranged the text of the manifesto entitled "*Polacy!*" (Poles!). The text contained the phrase: "Less than 50 years ago, the Galician Parliament of my Kingdom gave me a memorable promise in its address: "With You, Lord, we stand, and we will always stand." For this long time Poles who lived in my country did not forget about this vow. Yet I, too, in my father's solicitude, constantly tried to support their national, cultural, and economic development." The rest of the manifesto contains words significant to Poles: "If Almighty God gives victory to allied armies, your country shall be inseparably incorporated into the multitude of my countries. Together with my country, inhabited by your countrymen, your country shall make a unified Polish Kingdom. I shall entrust the administration of the Kingdom to the national government responsible to the Parliament in Warsaw, considering the highest interests and whole monarchy's needs."¹⁷⁴²

Initially, Vienna accepted the trialist concept, although the emperor changed

1739 150 people signed the address. Signing the document lasted for several hours.

L. Biliński recalled meeting signers as one of the most important meetings in his life: "This assembly belongs to my most interesting memories because the view of almost all gathered noblemen brought to my mind a picture of happy Polish history, Poland's ups and downs." Biliński and Galicia minister, Zdzisław Dzierżykraj-Morawski, did not sign the address because of their administrative functions, Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 1, pp. 312–313. See also: K. K. Daszyk, *Między polską racją stanu*, p. 77.

1740 H. Lieberman, *Pamiętniki*, ed. A. Garlicki (Warszawa, 1996), p. 121.

1741 About the possibility for this concept's realization in: Batowski, "Trialismus, Subdualismus oder Personalunion zum Problem der österreichisch Lösung (1914–1918)," in: *Austro-Polonica 1*, ZN UJ. Pr. Hist., vol. 57, 1978, pp. 7–10.

1742 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 1, pp. 304–306. K. Srokowski was the first who published the manifesto's text and analyzed it, K. Srokowski, *N.K.N.*, pp. 120–124, 359–360.

his position influenced by Hungary, mainly by the prime minister, Istvan Tisza. Hungarians did not want Poles to have an equal to Magyars position because then the role of Hungarians in the monarchy and their influence on monarchy's policy would weaken. I. Tisza argued that after trialist conception's announcement "the emperor could never resume diplomatic and personal relations with tsar Nicolas II."¹⁷⁴³ Germans also opposed this position.¹⁷⁴⁴ I. Tisza stand against the trialistic concept, yet he put forward another concept in the shape of subdualism, i.e., a monarchy based on double dualism.¹⁷⁴⁵ Tisza held this position until the war's end.¹⁷⁴⁶

1743 L. Biliński argued that Tisza's remark manifested prime minister's and emperor's recklessness. The emperor took the interpretation of the manifesto presented by I. Tisza. A few weeks later, the tsar came to Lviv and proclaimed himself a Galician pivot man from the balcony of Galician intendant, Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 1, pp. 306–307, 311–313.

1744 Germans did not want Vienna's self-reliant policy on the Polish question, nor were willing to accept the Austro-Polish solution, Batowski, *Die Polen*, p. 550. I. Tisza argued that in certain circumstances Austria and Poland could strive to gain a majority over Hungary. That is why Tisza preferred a connection between and Poland in a way as between Hungary and Croatia. Tisza proposed that Kingdom of Poland's lands remain under the Russian rule. In case of joining the lands with Galicia and creating a trialist state, the monarchy would have to make legal and political changes, and Tisza was against such changes, J. Andrassy, "Dyplomacja i wojna światowa," in: *Polska w pamiętnikach Wielkiej Wojny 1914–1918*, ed. M. Sokolnicki (Warszawa, 1925), pp. 421–422. However, some Hungarians, i.e., G. Andrassy, A. Apponyi or M. Károlyi, were for the trialistic solution. The minister of foreign affairs L. Berchtold or prime minister K. Strürgkh, also did not oppose the concept, J. Chlebowczyk, *Między dyktatem, realiami a prawem do samostanowienia. Prawo do samookreślenia i problem granic we wschodniej Europie w pierwszej wojnie światowej oraz po jej zakończeniu* (Warsaw, 1988), pp. 237–239.

1745 Each half of the monarchy would consist of two parts, i.e., there would be Austro-Poland and Hungaro-Bosnia. This way, Hungarians would still maintain a balance in their relations with the second part of the monarchy. On the other hand, if a trialist monarchy came to life, there was a danger that two countries would oppose the third one. Analyzing Tisza's concept, we can conclude that subdualism would be an excessive complication. We also can predict that Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose position was weaker considering Galicia, would gain little autonomy, while Austria would not allow Galicia's equality. Such a transformation could only weaken the monarchy and provoke a Czech conflict, Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, pp. 64–65; Batowski, *Trialismus, Subdualismus oder Personalunion*, pp. 7–10.

1746 This was evidenced by I. Tisza's letter to O. Czernin from February 22, 1917. Tisza wrote that already at the beginning of the war, the position of decision-making

Another problem of legal, systemic and territorial nature was still the current division of Galicia. As noted above, Austria did not have specific plans in that matter, and played both sides. Austria assured Ukrainians that their territorial demands shall be fulfilled at the expense of Polish lands. At the same time, Austria held talks with Poles guaranteeing not only province's indivisibility, but also its connection with the Kingdom of Poland. S. Burian and W. L. Jaworski held talks on this matter: "The Kingdom will be undivided and united with Galicia . . . Today, it is not so much about the legal construction of the state. In any form the Kingdom will be united with Galicia. Poland's independence will not be deniable."¹⁷⁴⁷

A document described by Leon Wasilewski entitled "Statements and promises of representatives of Austria and Germany regarding the post-war configuration of Ukrainian lands, occupied since the beginning of war until October 1916" discussed Austrian government's plans regarding the Ukrainian question. The document clearly showed that talks on Galicia's division into Polish and Ukrainian sides between Ukrainians and Austrians took place between August 12, 1913 and March 19, 1916.¹⁷⁴⁸ Moreover, the demand for Galicia's division gained the favor of the Viennese military circles. The favor resulted from a negative attitude of the circles toward the Austro-Polish solution. Transforming the dualist monarchy into a trialist one would require a further decentralization of state structures. Decentralization would be tantamount to the loss of primacy by the Austrian Germans in the army for the benefit of Poles and Hungarians.¹⁷⁴⁹

factors on the Polish question in the state established. The position rejected the Austro-Polish concept. Tisza argued that: "Making a third, equal to Austria and Hungary, subject out of Poland would mean introducing an uncertain and risky element to our constitutional organism. Such a solution threatens our policy's orientation within the Habsburg country. From the point of view of monarchy's global meaning it would concern me the most is this new Russian-Polish factor was to receive such a preponderate role and significance. Moreover, the factor is in many ways contrary to us, and from the point of view of both Austrian and Hungarian vital interests is arouses so little trust," Count Stefan Tisza to Count Ottokar Czernin, Budapest, February 22, 1917, in: *Polska w pamiętnikach*, pp. 589–590.

1747 A letter from August 27, 1915, *Pamiętnik Hermana Diamanda*, pp. 145–146.

1748 The document's author was Eugeniusz Oleśnicki. Oleśnicki wrote the text according to the Ukrainian policy management's account, i.e., Konstanty Lewicki's and Mikołaj Wassilki's, L. Wasilewski, "Sprawa podziału Galicji na tle stosunków austjacko-ukraińskich," *Przegląd Współczesny*, no. 41 (September 1925), Ch. 4, p. 459.

1749 J. Gruchała, *Sprawa ukraińska w Galicji*, p. 48.

Therefore, military circles were more eager to support Ukrainian demands, although demands' main goal was not defending monarchy's state interests, but creating an own state. Ukrainians treated instrumentally the alliance with Austria during the war – only as a mean to create a free Ukraine. S. Głąbiński was wrong when he wrote about Ukrainians: “Ukrainians did not have big independence ambitions but they hoped for transforming Austria into a national state and dividing Galicia in such a way.”¹⁷⁵⁰

Vienna's position on the Ukrainian question was a signal for Poles to prepare their concepts and projects of solving the East Galicia's case.¹⁷⁵¹ PPP-“Left” strongly opposed the division: “Dividing the country into two administrative parts cannot be justified, and shall never happen. East Galicia is a land inhabited together by Poles and Ruthenians. PPP is convinced that only a harmonious life based on national equality and justice is suitable for both nations.”¹⁷⁵² W. L. Jaworski claimed that making the territorial division of Galicia would be very difficult, if not impossible, due to the national meaning of the province and mixed Polish-Ukrainian districts. In return, Jaworski proposed a national autonomy for Ukrainians.¹⁷⁵³ Whereas, L. Biliński developed a project according to which Galicia would be divided into six voivodships, i.e., two Polish (Cracow and Rzeszów), two with Polish majority (Lviv, Przemyśl) and two with Ukrainian majority (Stanisławów, Tarnopol). The official language in Lviv and Przemyśl was to be Polish, the voivode was to be Polish, and his deputy was to be Ukrainian. The Ukrainian language was to be the official one in Stanisławów and Tarnopol, the voivode was to be Ukrainian and his deputy – Polish.¹⁷⁵⁴ A discussion on national autonomy for Ukrainians took place in March. Participants of the meeting critically referred to L. Biliński's project as the fact of establishing voivodships with a Ukrainian majority could lead to the outvoting of the Poles and a desire to detach the mixed voivodships from Galicia: “The project makes two voivodships a purely Ruthenian country, where the Polish element will disappear . . . We cannot give offices to Ruthenians forever.”¹⁷⁵⁵

1750 Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, p. 203.

1751 “Podział Galicji na dwie prowincje (Zur Frage der Teilung Galiziens), *TB BJ*, manuscrypt 8130 III, col. 1–33, cols 35–48.

1752 “1914 Kwiecień – Uchwały programowo-polityczne kongresu krakowskiego PSL Lewica I stosunek do nich Związku Chłopskiego,” in: *Materiały źródłowe do historii*, vol. 1, pp. 152–153.

1753 See: W. L. Jaworski, “Nasze zadania,” *Wiadomości Polskie*, no. 44 (11/09/1915), p. 2.

1754 Note from January 16, 1916, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, pp. 75–76.

1755 Note from January 16 and March 11, 1916, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, pp. 76, 85.

Austro-Hungarian military weakness became apparent already in the early stages of the war. The weakness did not positively influence the consolidation of the pro-Austrian orientation or the consolidation of Polish political groups operating in SNC.¹⁷⁵⁶ However, unfolding of war events did not influence the growth of confidence among Polish politicians that the Austro-Polish solution has a chance for implementation.

Further we discuss events of the First World War that enable tracing the decline in supporting the pro-Austrian orientation, and the fate of the Polish question. SNC lost its significance at the very beginning of the war and national democrats notably contributed to this. Not accepting the Austro-Polish solution was particularly evident in the context of swearing in the Eastern Legion. National democrats were against using Polish armed formations to fight with Russia in East Galicia from the very beginning. I. Daszyński wrote: "National Democracy proposed a slogan: "Go to the Austrian army, not Legions! . . . Do not "expose" Poland to the suspicion that it fights against Russia."¹⁷⁵⁷ Thus, the Eastern Section of SNC worked less efficiently than the Western one. The Eastern Section delayed swearing in the legionnaires and that is why from the formal point of view Polish volunteers were still an assembly rather than a legion formation, and thus were not subjects of Austrian military authorities. SNC's Eastern Section tried to prevent Eastern Legion from forming.¹⁷⁵⁸ J. Leo, under the influence of circumstances, convened a meeting of SNC's Eastern Section. Politicians finally decided about legions' fate by obliging legionnaires to swear an oath. S. Głąbiński wrote about circumstances preceding the meeting in his memories.¹⁷⁵⁹

1756 Unfavorable changes took place in Galicia itself. Collard, an Austrian general, who was German, took the office of intendant. Moreover, authorities created military martial courts. Courts' aim was to punish suspected or proven of cooperating with Russia. Polish society increasingly became negative about Austrian authorities. The image of Austria as an ally on which Poles could rely supplanted to the image of Austria the oppressor.

1757 Daszyński, *Pamiętnik*, vol. 2, p. 185.

1758 In such a situation, the commander of the Eastern Legion, Colonel Fiałkowski, resigned. Fiałkowski motivated his decision in the following way: "The political factors deprived military commandment of power over the army, and arbitrary actions of those factors did not allow me to take responsibility for the fate of the Legion;" qtd. after: Srokowski, *N.K.N.*, p. 245. Srokowski gives the incorrect name of the commandant. In fact, commandant's name was Piotr Fijałkowski.

1759 S. Głąbiński questioned the fact that J. Leo had talks with SNC's management. Therefore, we have to provide information about the prior the Committee's decision

After the meeting, on September 20, the Eastern Section military department's head, Aleksander Skarbek, sent an appeal to the legionnaires instead of complying with SNC's resolution and issuing appropriate instructions. According to the appeal, legionnaires had time to decide on their further membership in the Legions. First, legionnaires could swear an oath just like the Western Legion and remain in their formation; second, join the Austrian army, or third – resign from military service.¹⁷⁶⁰ Such a step was relatively reckless and we can treat it

events. When S. Głębiński learned about Western Legion's oath of Austrian mass mobilization he decided to prevent volunteers from the Eastern Legion from swearing in. Therefore, Głębiński initiated a conference in Vienna. The minister of national defense, Georgi, who was responsible for the mass mobilization units, Polish Circle's president, J. Leo, Polish ministers, SNC's members, and SNC's military department clerk, W. Sikorski participated in the meeting. Due to the fact that the Legion case was a rather sensitive topic, it was discussed at the end of the long conference. Eventually, Georgi agreed to include the words: "I swear to fight for Poland's independence until the last drop of blood" to the oath. At the same time, Georgi did not want to be fully responsible for the decision, so he left it for Poles to settle. Georgi proposed that S. Głębiński and J. Leo communicate on the oath's matter with Eastern Legion's Supreme Commandment, and make the final decision. According to Głębiński's memories, J. Leo deliberately delayed the trip to the Eastern Section of SNC. Finally, Głębiński learned that J. Leo already communicated with the Committee but obtained a negative decision. In such a situation, Głębiński himself met with SNC's Eastern Section's chairman, T. Cieński and the head of the military department, A. Skarbek. Politicians decided that the decision whether to remain in the Legions should depend on the volunteers, Głębiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 219–221. Deciding whether Głębiński's version is real is problematic as Głębiński's version bases only on his account. Therefore, we can assume that it is both true and untrue. There are no different sources that could definitively deny or confirm Głębiński's account. Eastern Legion's matter is important as accusing national democrats of deliberately leading to Eastern Legion's end relates to national democrats' attitude toward the way of regaining independence. We only can assume that leaving a choice of the oath to the legionnaires was the best option regarding political favors and Eastern-Western sections' contradiction. However, we cannot assess the matter of choice positively from the military tactics' and Legions' participation's point of view.

1760 SNC's military department motivated issuing the appeal in the following way: "We authorized Tadeusz Cieński to try to change the conditions for more suitable to our feelings and national desires (we talk about the oath's content – D. L. -L.). Currently, when Mr. Cieński's attempts were unsuccessful – regarding Western Legion's oath – and representatives set conditions definitely, SNC's military department informs honorable headquarters about the event and asks to announce it." Next, the appeal

as a tactical mistake, especially since Russian army moved faster and deeper into Galicia taking further territories. It seems that A. Skarbek's intention was to reduce the number of people in the Eastern Legion, which ended successfully. Authorities decided to create the third Legion regiment out of remaining volunteers, and send it to Hungary. Thus, the Eastern Legion ceased to exist, actually before it began to participate in hostilities.¹⁷⁶¹

The Western Section discussed the matter of the Eastern Legion on October 13, 1914. Basing on K. Srokowski's request, the assembly made a resolution: "The Western Section of SNC considers the dissolution of the so-called "Eastern Legion" made by a group of volunteers a highly harmful in general national terms and contrary to the act of August 16, 1914 idea . . . The Western Section of SNC states that it is not responsible for Eastern Section's fate."¹⁷⁶²

SNC's Eastern Section also discussed the problem of the Eastern Legion on October 19 in a company of T. Cieński, O. Hausner and A. Skarbek. During rough deliberations, O. Hausner submitted a request for the motion of no confidence against A. Skarbek and the presidium of SNC's Eastern Section. T. Cieński blocked Hausner. The assembly made a resolution saying that the Eastern Section is not responsible for military department's decisions. The Section motivated the decision by the fact that despite the decision to make an oath by the legionnaires, the military department did not comply to the oath and acted arbitrarily.

gave instructions on further participation of volunteers in the Legions, K. W. Kumaniecki, *Zbiór najważniejszych dokumentów*, p. 27.

1761 In September 1914, the Eastern Legion had 1600 volunteers. 800 of the volunteers belonged to *Drużyny Podhalańskie* (Podhale Team – a paramilitary organization), and 300 of them belonged to the Silesian unit. 5000 legionnaires left the Legion: 2000 went to the Austrian army, 2000 returned home, and 1000 "spread around", Srokowski, *N.K.N.*, pp. 246–247. I. Daszyński recalled: "They dispersed the Legion so thoroughly that out of 5000 soldiers only 350 left. The rest of the soldiers went into misery and mistreatment, they were caught all over the country by gendarmes as obliged to the Austrian military service," Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, p. 185. Later, some legionnaires returned to their units. J. Piłsudski instructed Nachaj, the second lieutenant of the first Legion regiment, to: "Gather" volunteers who resigned from service and joined the Legions again. There were about 500 of volunteers: "They were workers. National democrats told volunteers that they should spare strength for later, and that National Democracy will signalize when it is time to rush. Hence the distrust for our Legions," a note from November 13, 1914, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 14.

1762 The minutes from the SNC's Western Section's meeting from October 13, 1914 went public at I. Daszyński's instance, see: *Dziennik obwieszczeń N. K.N. Sekcji zachodniej*, no. 4 (10/16.1914); Srokowski, *N.K.N.*, p. 261.

Therefore, the Eastern Section of the SNC cannot bear the consequences of military department's activity.¹⁷⁶³

Next, a meeting of the whole SNC took place on October 20, 1914.¹⁷⁶⁴ The speech of I. Daszyński destroyed the calm course of the proceedings, during which politicians discussed factually, basing on substantive arguments. Daszyński blamed the Eastern Section members for ruining the Legions. Daszyński also offended some of his opponents, especially Witold Czartoryski.¹⁷⁶⁵ Daszyński's speech provoked a secession of the so-called W. Czartoryski's group that included Cieński, Głąbiński, Lubomirski, Rozwadowski, Skarbek, Stroński, Surzycki and Vogel. The group depended their stay in SNC from the Committee's decision on the Eastern Legion. If the meeting adopted a resolution expressing the regret from the failure to form the Legion, Czartoryski's group would stay in the Eastern Section. Otherwise, i.e., after finding the Eastern Section is clearly guilty the group would be forced to leave SNC. A discussion arose after Daszyński's speech.¹⁷⁶⁶ In the speech, political arguments of particular parties prevailed over the general national interest. This led to taking two mutually exclusive resolutions. The first resolution passed a motion of no confidence for the Eastern Section and the second one, at the request of A. Dąbski from "Piast" contained a regret regarding breaking the Eastern Legion.¹⁷⁶⁷

1763 Srokowski, *N.K.N.*, pp. 261–262.

1764 An exact course of SNC's deliberations from October 20, 1914 is in: Srokowski, *N.K.N.*, pp. 262–267.

1765 In his memories, Daszyński wrote: "Breaking the Eastern Legion was a denial of entire Legions, a denial of Polish Circle's resolution, and a denial of August 16 agreement, Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, p. 185.

1766 Daszyński's statement referred to anonymous brochure's content. Socialists were most probable authors of the brochure. The brochure stated: "Mr. Cieński, Count Skarbek and their associates are guilty of a treason against the Polish nation." Authors entitled the brochure "Bring to trial! The history of the Eastern Legion" and issued it in 1914. The brochure became recognizable in Vienna, e.g., in ministries. As a result, authorities interned T. Cieński. A. Skarbek avoided arresting after charges of SNC's cash embezzlement after W. Korytowski's intervention. Korytowski together with S. Głąbiński persuaded Skarbek to leave for Switzerland. On the other hand, authorities did not intern Głąbiński because the emperor objected, Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 221–222.

1767 Srokowski wrote that politicians enacted the motion of no confidence with one or two votes prevalence, Srokowski, *N.K.N.*, p. 262. W. L. Jaworski gave a number of ten voting for such a solution and twelve who expressed a regret, a note from October 20, 1914, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 6.

Austrian civil and military authorities also disapproved the breakup of the Eastern Legion. W. Sikorski wrote to W. L. Jaworski: "Arrangers of the Eastern Legion scandal, especially nonmajor agitators currently face repression."¹⁷⁶⁸

These events decided about SNC's breaking. The idea that formed the Committee collapsed in the first weeks of SNC's activity. It became clear that it is difficult to achieve the general purpose of the cross-party agreement when secessionists announced their withdrawal from SNC on October 24. Legions were the only core for SNC. On the other hand, national democrats' departure strengthened the pro-Austrian option. As W. L. Jaworski recalled: "The Austrian government sees now who is on its side. We cut off the people who damage the Polish question with their uncertainty and instability even in case if they are not in relation with Moscovites."¹⁷⁶⁹

Events related to the Eastern Legion case sparked reforms in SNC. Therefore, on November 22, 1914, members announced a Committee's full meeting at which necessary changes were to come. The internal reform could take place only after excluding national democrats and the "Rzeczpospolita" group, i.e., Cieński, Stroński, Surzycki.¹⁷⁷⁰ J. Leo did not submit his resignation from the Club's president's post by October 20, which was the date from Jaworski's diary. SNC's personnel then counted nine members less than before.

On February 19, 1915, Jaworski wrote: "The unclear representatives' assembly's resolution of August 16, 1914 allows such an interpretation that the president of the Polish Circle is also SNC's president. Therefore, I must strive to clarify the situation and force Biliński to either accept SNC's president's post or clearly renounce the post. After various negotiations, Biliński agreed to renounce the post and this supposed to happen tomorrow. The whole transition gave me the satisfaction as everybody expressed contentment about my staying on SNC's president's post. It was a formal ovation that I shall not forget."¹⁷⁷¹ I. Daszyński was skeptical about W. L. Jaworski. Daszyński claimed that choosing a Cracowian conservative for this post: "Decided about the SNC's advantages, but also about

1768 "Do Prezydium NKN w Wiedniu, Cieszyn, dnia 13 listopada 1914," in: *Listy Władysława Sikorskiego do Władysława L. Jaworskiego I Prezydium Naczelnego Komitetu Narodowego (1914–1919)*, eds. Z. Koziński and Z. Pietrzyk (Kraków, 1987), p. 28.

1769 Notes from October 21 and 22, 1914, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 7.

1770 A note from November 20, 1914, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 15.

1771 A note from February 19, 1915, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 30.

its necessary collapse.”¹⁷⁷² Most likely, Daszyński meant that under conservative’s leadership SNC would implement the pro-Austrian concept rather than independence initiatives, which Daszyński wished.

W. L. Jaworski willingly proposed his presidency to L. Biliński. Biliński did not agree to the proposal as he had numerous duties after taking the president’s office in the Polish Circle. Biliński also did not agree because he highly rated Jaworski’s contribution to SNC. At the same time, Biliński realized that in the future there will be a conflict between the Club and SNC based on the competences’ division. In the Club, there was an opinion that SNC seized all the political power, taking away Club’s leading position. Among others, extremely conservative Artur Gołuchowski made such allegations. W. L. Jaworski claimed the situation saying that he will consult with the Polish Circle all political decision taken by SNC. At the beginning of SNC’s activity, for the first few months there was a compliance between the Committee and the Polish Circle. During one of SNC’s meetings L. Biliński stated: “The Club pursues the Austro-Polish policy correspondingly to its previous tradition, and I could not pursue a different policy in SNC;” and SNC’s secretary, Sokolnicki, replied that: “SNC pursues only such a policy.”¹⁷⁷³ PSDPG’s chairman strongly negated Club’s and SNC’s cooperation on implementing the Austro-Polish policy: “Not a year passed, and SNC became – at first slowly, then faster and faster – an Austrian branch and Cracowian conservatives’ tool of class conservative struggle.”¹⁷⁷⁴

A letter to the pope was a reason the crisis in Polish Circle’s and SNC’s relations happened.¹⁷⁷⁵ In such a situation, two competing authorities decided to determine the competences of each side. According to the decision, SNC would take care of matters only related to Legion’s military organization and with journalistic activity. The Polish Circle supposed to take care about the political activity. SNC resolved that: “The Polish question should return to the scope of the Polish Circle’s competences;” the Committee and the Club should have one common president, and that both sides should represent the whole nation, i.e., all political

1772 Daszyński claimed that SNC: “Became more and more Austrian under prof. Jaworski’s leadership,” Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, p. 203.

1773 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, pp. 43–44.

1774 Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, p. 203.

1775 L. Biliński opposed sending the letter after consulting the idea with the nuncio. Biliński talked with W. L. Jaworski on this matter. Jaworski supposed to announce Club’s president’s position on SNC’s meeting. However, SNC wrote the letter and sent it. Biliński learned about the fact later, Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, pp. 45–46.

groupings should participate. Negotiations based on SNC's resolution did not go so well as they dragged until the turn of 1915 and 1916. As a result, the scope of SNC's competence limited to matters related to the Legions and popularizing, while all other matters were in Club's management.¹⁷⁷⁶

The matter of reintroducing national democrats and East Galicia conservatives to SNC was much more difficult. L. Biliński talked this matter with Piniński, Dąbski, Starzyński and Garapich who were determined to cooperate with SNC, but they intended to discuss some issues, hence their visit to Biliński in Vienna. Eventually, politicians agreed to join SNC. One more issue remained: namely, the need to change parliamentary clubs. Garapich tried to solve this question after Biliński's earnest requests and persuasions: "It costed me a lot of heavy correspondence before I got Garpich for our action. But also, having acquired him, I had his vote and influence at my disposal without further efforts."¹⁷⁷⁷ Thanks to Garapich, the entire undertaking ended successfully and on April 30, in the City Council's meeting room, the Club gathered in a new setting and adopted a unification resolution. At the meeting, the Polish Circle and SNC united, and L. Biliński became the shared president of both organs.¹⁷⁷⁸

After Eastern Legion's and SNC's Eastern Section's dissolution, the Committee lost its initial character and transformed from nationwide representation organ into an organ of fractions approving the pro-Austrian orientation. Therefore, creating a common political platform again for SNC and the Polish Circle was a separate problem.

The parties that remained in SNC also did not fully agree on the pursued policy. PSDPG's views did not coincide with Cracowian conservatives' views. According to W. Najdus: "Conservative allies caused PSDPG considerable trouble with their loyalty and attitude toward the military hierarchy." The contradictions concerned, among other things, approaches to Poles' participation in Austro-Hungarian army.¹⁷⁷⁹

Although conservatives still maintained their leading position, they had to compromise with socialists within the parliament in order to pursue the policy effectively and accurately to war situation requirements. Therefore, the best solution would be to convince socialists to join the Polish Circle.¹⁷⁸⁰ Conservatives

1776 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, pp. 46–47.

1777 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, p. 48.

1778 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, pp. 49–50.

1779 W. Najdus, *Polska Partia Socjalno-Demokratyczna*, pp. 571–572.

1780 W. L. Jaworski tried to persuade I. Daszyński that socialists join the Polish Circle: "It would be a very clever step that would checkmate omni-Poles. I see that Daszyński

were very eager to involve socialists into the Club because thanks to socialists, position of conservatives against national democrats would increase significantly. Peasant movement also shared this opinion.¹⁷⁸¹

However, there was an opposition inside PSDPG itself for which joining the Polish representatives in the Imperial Council would mean a denial of so far pursued policy. So, while creating SNC was not a problem, being in the same political club was difficult to accept for PSDPG. Initially, there was little support for such an idea. During PSDPG's meeting party board discussed joining the Club. A minority of socialist representatives supported the idea. However, the supporting group expanded during the discussion. On January 10, board adopted a resolution to join the parliamentary club. Socialists joined the Polish Circle only on March 23, 1916.

Initiatives mentioned above seemed pointless, as the international and Austria's policy toward Poles gave little chance of implementing the Austro-Polish solution. In these circumstances, SNC's activity became less and less useful and purposeful. Therefore, some political parties did not see the need to participate in Committee's structures. This is how Stapiński's supporters assessed SNC. Noteworthy, Stapiński's supporters did not propose their candidates for the Committee in April.¹⁷⁸² "Piaśt" representatives, who joined the Committee, yet did not engage in its performance, assessed SNC similarly to Stapiński's supporters.¹⁷⁸³ In addition, some thought of SNC as too pro-Austrian. Franciszek Bardel from PPP-"Piaśt" said: "We cannot imagine Poland different than under Austria's apron." I. Daszyński did not agree with this statement ironically answering: "We, Poles, are the only Austrians in Austria."¹⁷⁸⁴

feels like joining, yet he is afraid to talk about it and would prefer that it came out, for example, from Moraczewski, a note from October 28, 1914, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914-1918*, p. 10.

1781 L. Biliński wrote that even peasant movement's activists who earlier negotiated not allowing socialists to join the Club did not protest against socialists' joining now: "We all may had an involuntary side-effect thought that the Polish Circle would soon cease to exist and a Polish parliament would form. In a parliament, of course, socialists would also have their own club, they would not sit jointly with other parties as now. So why not take them for a short time as a minority to the Club?" Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, p. 47.

1782 Jachymek, *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, p. 48.

1783 J. Molenda, "Królestwo Polskie i Galicja, sierpień 1915 - luty 1917," in: *Historia Polski*, eds. Ż. Kormanowa, W. Najdus (Warsaw, 1974), vol. 3, P. 3, p. 213.

1784 Qtd. after: W. Najdus, *Polska Partia Socjalno-Demokratyczna*, 576.

Therefore, the current political situation in the monarchy and parties' activities forced another SNC's reform. Politicians adopted appropriate resolutions at the Parliamentary Fraction's meeting on April 29, 1916, in Cracow. Representatives of all political parties participated this meeting. I. Daszyński became one of the vice presidents. Emil Bobrowski, H. Diamand, Atrut Hausner, Z. Marek, J. Moraczewski also joined SNC as PSDPG's representatives.¹⁷⁸⁵

The reached compromise did not mean unanimity. The differences between the parties on the Polish question clearly outlined already in 1916. Soon, on May 23, "Piast" accused SNC management of loyalist policy. On September 10, on behalf of PSDPG's party board, I. Daszyński requested to call the emperor to: "create a self-contained Polish State consisting of the indivisible and secured Kingdom of Poland and Galicia in the Austro-Hungarian's monarchy union, expanded on the East." We can conclude from the appeal's content that PSDPG treated Galicia as inseparable part of the Polish lands and that PSDPG accepted Club's methods, i.e., submitting addresses to the monarch. Polish Circle approved I. Daszyński's request. L. Biliński had a different position. Biliński attracted criticism from some representatives when on October 4, 1914, spoke of "small Poland" and the fall of the Polish Circle's program from August 16, 1914.¹⁷⁸⁶

One of important events concerning the Polish question was the act of November 5, 1916. The act announced creating the Kingdom of Poland from part of the Austrian and Russian partitions. Act was to create: "an independent state with a hereditary monarchy and constitutional system . . . The new Kingdom will find guarantees needed for the free forces' development in relation

1785 Najdus, *Ignacy Daszyński*, p. 330; Najdus, *Polska Partia Socjalno-Demokratyczna*, p. 575.

1786 Especially national democrats opposed Biliński. L. German described Biliński's speech as "scam." Socialists (I. Daszyński) applied for the vote of no confidence for L. Biliński reasoned with an improperly conducted Austro-Polish policy. Peasant movement (W. Witos) applied for the vote of no confidence for minister Burian. The talks in the Club lasted until late night and were very rough. Whereas Daszyński was kind toward L. Biliński, the peasant movement representative, M. Rey acted ill-mannered and his speech was so insulting that L. Biliński had to ask him out of the meeting. The Club rejected Daszyński's request and adopted the vote of no confidence against Burian with a small advantage of votes. As a result of Club's decision, the government collapsed shortly after the meeting, Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, pp. 101–103.

with both allied powers.¹⁷⁸⁷ At the same time, emperor Franz Joseph issued a rescript on the Galicia's separation, preceded by a letter to E. Koerber.¹⁷⁸⁸ J. Bojko mentioned that: "Austria does Poland . . . A little bit too late and too little, but it is something. Ha! We wait what is going to happen."¹⁷⁸⁹

J. Andrásy was the first to raise the Polish question as an international problem. Andrásy, as he wrote, was the first who perceived the Polish question this way.¹⁷⁹⁰ Andrzej Ajnenkiel emphasized that the act of raising the Polish question to the rank of an international problem "had a huge international meaning" as the two partitioners, Prussia and Austro-Hungary denounced partition treaties. At the same time, the partitioners promised the creation of a substitute Polish state on the lands taken from Russia. Concededly, the state was to be constitutional, yet with limited sovereignty.¹⁷⁹¹ Ludwik Mroczka was also of

1787 The full text of November 5, 1916 act is in: K. W. Kumaniecki, *Zbiór najważniejszych dokumentów*, pp. 48–49; see also: "Akt 5 listopada," in: <http://members.lycos.co.uk/wielkawojna/docs/docs.php?dokument=akt511> from 03/26/2004.

1788 In the letter the emperor wrote: "I think about the many proofs of devotion and fidelity that I obtained throughout my reign from the country of Galicia with a moved heart. I also think about many great and hard sacrifices this country . . . had to bear in the present war for a victorious defense of the monarchy's eastern borders. Those sacrifices provide Galicia with a lasting right to my dearest fatherly protection. Therefore, it is my will to give Galicia the right to independently arrange its national privilege in compliance to Galicia's belonging to the whole state and its agreement, and thus give the people of Galicia a guarantee of its national and economic development, Kumaniecki, *Zbiór najważniejszych dokumentów*, p. 49. Letter's purpose was most likely to maintain Poles' faith in the Austro-Polish solution. Emperor, strengthening Polish nation's aspirations, could have sincere intentions or it was a purely diplomatic move, L. Mroczka, *Galicji rozstanie z Austrią* (Cracow, 1990), p. 19.

1789 J. Bojko, "Dziennik," in: *Gorące słowa. Wybór pism*, ed. F. Ziejka (Cracow, 1990), p. 19.

1790 In an article from September 1915, published in *Neue Freie Presse*, Andrásy wrote: "First . . . we must tear the Russian Poland from Russia," and further: "However, liberated Polish population should not be divided between Germany and us, but . . . should rather constitute a one state body . . . with a nationally Polish character, with the Polish government. It is a necessary condition for Poland's satisfaction," cited from: J. Andrásy, "Dyplomacja i wojna światowa," in: *Polska w pamiętnikach*, pp. 415–416. However, on December 17, 1915, in the Hungarian parliament, Andrásy said: "The only proper policy was to do anything to win the Polish nation for our interest," Andrásy, *Dyplomacja i wojna światowa*, p. 419. Of course, Andrásy's point of view on the Polish question depended on monarchy's state interests. In Andrásy's opinion, Poland supposed to secure the eastern border from Russia's expansion.

1791 Russia's tsar, Nicolas II was not passive about this fact and on December 25, 1916 he issued an order saying that one of war's goals is to create an independent Poland,

this opinion: “This was undoubtedly a significant step forward in Berlin’s and Vienna’s policy on the Polish question. Yet, it was also the negation of Austria’s supporters’ still vivid hopes for connecting Galicia with the Kingdom as a part of more or less rebuilt monarchy.”¹⁷⁹²

Basing on the source material, we can state that deputies knew about decisions to be taken on the Polish question. The material allows us to conclude that the content of the November 5 act should not come as a surprise to Polish politicians. The problem of uniting Galicia with the Kingdom of Poland was the subject of the Polish Circle’s meeting on October 3 and 4, 1916.¹⁷⁹³ W. Najdus wrote that we also can learn about politicians’ knowledge of the subject from the meeting of the SNC’s executive commission from October 5.¹⁷⁹⁴ Also L. Biliński confirms this fact by writing that he knew about decisions to be made in the Polish question, yet could not reveal them for obvious reasons.¹⁷⁹⁵ I. Daszyński recounted this fact as well.¹⁷⁹⁶

Furthermore, politicians acceded to W. Witos’ demand: “The Polish Circle stands steadfastly on its position on the Polish question and protests against all intentions of separating Polish lands.”¹⁷⁹⁷ In principle, Witos’ request could

A. Ajnenkiel, “Międzynarodowe uwarunkowania suwerenności państwowej i niezależności narodowej II Rzeczypospolitej,” in: *Polska myśl polityczna XIX i XX w.*, vol. 11 – *Między irredentą, lojalnością a kolaboracją. O suwerenność państwową i niezależność narodową (1795–1989)*, ed. W. Wrzesiński (Wrocław, 2001), pp. 217–218. The text of tsar’s order is in: Kumaniecki, *Zbiór najważniejszych dokumentów*, p. 52.

1792 L. Mrocza, *Galicji rozstanie z Austrią*, p. 18. Poles not only hoped for solving the Polish question but also had assurances from the Austrian government. Already at the beginning of war, Poles learned during the meeting of Biliński, Leo, Czartoryski and Berchtold that: “The government’s program essentially assumes that in case of defeating Russia, the entire Kingdom of Poland shall tear from Russia and attached to Galicia. From these two countries we shall create an independent Polish state within the Austro-Hungarian union, Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, p. 58.

1793 *Vertrauliche Sitzung des Polenklubs vom 3. und 4. Oktober 1916r*, Archiwum Państwowe, Oddział w Krakowie (APKr), Inwentarz Tymczasowy, manuskrypts no. IT 1367, col. 1–15.

1794 Najdus, *Polska Partia Socjalno-Demokratyczna*, pp. 566–567.

1795 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, pp. 101–102.

1796 Daszyński reported that at the Polish Circle’s political commission’s meeting on July 21, 1916, somebody read two letters from S. Burian. The first letter presented the monarchy’s position on the Polish question in a rather general way. The second letter recommended that L. Biliński should not reveal the content of the first letter to anyone, Daszyński, *Cztery lata wojny. Szkice z dziejów Polskiej Partii Socjalno-Demokratycznej Galicji i Śląska* (Cracow, 1918), pp. 38–39.

1797 Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, p. 252.

not have any political significance as the already made decisions on the Polish question were irreversible. On the other hand, we should recognize request's expressive sense as a protest of Polish deputies against Austria's and Germany's decisions taken without the participation of the interested side.

However, the November 5 act revived the political life bringing enthusiasm among some circles over the creation of a Polish state ersatz. L. Biliński read an appropriate speech at the Parliamentary Fraction's meeting on November 10 preceded by a solemn mass at St. Mary's Church. The meeting also enacted to formulate addresses of gratefulness to both emperors. L. Biliński cried at the end of the meeting: "Long live Poland, free and independent!"¹⁷⁹⁸ However, L. Biliński adopted the November 5 act at the Parliamentary Fraction's meeting of November 12, 1916: "with a lively and cordial joy." Biliński also confirmed the continuity of the Austro-Polish policy assuring the emperor of: "Steadfast fidelity and deepest gratitude for extending Galicia's autonomy."¹⁷⁹⁹ J. Stapiński, absorbed in this period with his finances, assessed the act similarly. However, Stapiński misinterpreted the events of that time. After act's announcement Stapiński cheered: "Long live free Poland! Let us be happy, the beginning is done!"¹⁸⁰⁰

Nevertheless, leading Polish politicians acknowledged November 5 act in different manners. For example, national democrats saw the act as a new Poland's division that would weaken the forces of the Polish nation even more.¹⁸⁰¹ Socialists represented the same position. Socialists developed a project in the Imperial Council that stated: "By no means can Poles recognize . . . the changing of Galicia's governing way as a matter of resolving the Polish question – even less as a payment for the immortal right's loss of the Polish nation to freedom and independence."¹⁸⁰² The Club decided to accept W. Tetmajer's request. The peasant movement was against separating Galicia as this idea was not satisfactory for them: "We are against separating Galicia because it is no national interest for Poles."¹⁸⁰³

November 5 act's announcement meant that chances of implementing the Austro-Polish concept reduced to minimum, as well as the implementation of

1798 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, p. 112.

1799 Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 254–255.

1800 Dunin-Wąsowicz, *Ludowcy galicyjscy w czasie*, p. 47.

1801 Wapiński, *Narodowa demokracja*, p. 138.

1802 Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, pp. 265–266.

1803 Bojko, *Dziennik*, pp. 182–183. Despite this, J. Bojko was in the group of representatives who worked on the Galicia's autonomy project.

Ukrainian legal and state demands.¹⁸⁰⁴ The announcement of extending Galicia's autonomy, i.e., separating Galicia, meant that the demand for province's division lost its relevance at the time. Already on April 24, 1917, the Ukrainian club recognized in the Imperial State's resolution that: "all measures leading to separation of Galicia are a provocation toward endangered Ukrainian nation."¹⁸⁰⁵ Also government did not support the Ukrainian concept at the time. W. L. Jaworski wrote that S. Burian was to declare to Ukrainian politics that they should not count on dividing Galicia.¹⁸⁰⁶

Ukrainians protested the November 5 act's settlements. Ukrainians feared that in case act's postulates implement, Poles' position in Galicia will strengthen: "The Polish question will overshadow their ideal (free Ukraine – D. L.-L.)."¹⁸⁰⁷ The day before the announcement of the November 5 act, Ukrainian club adopted a resolution opposing Galicia's autonomy extension. Ukrainian representatives thought that autonomy extension poses a serious threat to the Ukrainian question. The Ukrainian side stated that there should not be any decisions on matters regarding Galicia without the knowledge and consent of Ukrainian representatives.¹⁸⁰⁸

In such circumstances, despite evident opposition from most groupings, the Polish Circle began to work on preparing Galicia's constitution. The project anticipated a transfer of power in Galicia to the parliament and the national government. In fact, the emperor would empanel the government, yet it supposed to be responsible to the parliament. Constitution also anticipated that political relations in Galicia should change. Authors of the project intended to achieve the democratization by introducing a general parliamentary election. Also, Polish Circle intended to introduce a financial and fiscal independence. However,

1804 L. Mrocza believed that Ukrainians received some kind of compensation at the time, i.e., the appointment of W. Decykiewicz as deputy intendant, leaving Sich Riflemen, increasing the Ukrainians' status and prerogatives. Ukrainians, as Mrocza believed, gained the following privileges: a concession for a bank, seat in the intendant's presidium and in the National Scholar Council and four seats in various ministries, and, most importantly, a promise to suspend Galicia's separation, Mrocza, *Spór o Galicję*, p. 56.

1805 Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, p. 268.

1806 Gruchała, *Sprawa ukraińska w Galicji*, p. 51.

1807 Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, p. 268.

1808 M. Seyda, *Polska na przełomie dziejów. Fakty i dokumenty. Od wybuchu wojny do zbrojnego wystąpienia Stanów Zjednoczonych* (Poznań-Warsaw-Vilnus-Lublin, 1927), pp. 357–360; Gruchała, *Sprawa ukraińska w Galicji*, p. 51.

M. Bobrzyński and A. Gołuchowski did not believe in the implementation of such an idea.¹⁸⁰⁹ The project included the Ukrainian question as well. The constitution anticipated establishing a Ukrainian university and thus increasing the Ukrainian autonomy. However, the project did not intend to expand the political rights of Ukrainians, e.g., by increasing the number of seats in the national parliament.¹⁸¹⁰

However, the project to separate Galicia did not go well. Works prolonged and it was not because of the Polish Circle but rather of M. Bobrzyński and Austrian officials. Meanwhile, a revolution broke out in Russia. Together with the revolution, the right of nations to self-determine popularized. The new minister of foreign affairs, Count Ottokar Czernin also accepted the revolution. Czernin announced the convening of the Imperial Council for May 30, 1917.¹⁸¹¹ At that time, the monarchy had a new emperor and a reconstructed government.¹⁸¹²

1809 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, p. 132.

1810 *Projekt wyodrębnienia Galicji*, APKr., Zespół NKN, sig. 100266, mkrf. Galicia's separation project's text is also in: Biliński, "Załącznik C," *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2. The author outlined the project's text in: Biliński, "Załącznik C," *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, p. 127. The work on the project took place in four committees: constitutional, financial, economic and war compensation. Representatives of all parties attended the committees: democrats: J. Leo and Stesłowicz, socialists: I. Daszyński, H. Diamand, peasant movement: A. Kędzior, A. Średniawski, J. Bojko, conservatives: A. Gołuchowski, S. Starowieyski and a national democrat S. Głabiński. L. Biliński wrote that J. Leo, H. Diamand, S. Głabiński and M. Bobrzyński made the greatest merits. Also, experts from Galicia, lawyer S. Starzyński, abp. J. Biliczewski and bp. S. Pelczar, participated. The works lasted from mid-December 1917 until mid-April 1917, Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, pp. 126–127; Głabiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, p. 257. The project of separating Galicia contained a real danger of losing part of the Silesian lands. Therefore, the Silesian section of SNC put forward a project to divide Silesian lands and only join Cieszyn Silesia with Galicia. However, activists did not publicize this postulate as not to give an additional argument to the Ukrainians demanding Galicia's division, Najdus, *Polska Partia Socjal-Demokratyczna*, p. 591.

1811 The Austrian parliament did not meet since July 25, 1914 because, as I. Daszyński stated, K. Stürgh: "Hated parliamentarism and he paralyzed it as much as he could." At that time, the famous article 14 of the State Representation Act regulated the power in the monarchy. Authorities issued 167 decree-laws. In comparison, from January 1868 to July 1914 authorities issued only 156 such acts, Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, pp. 100–101.

1812 Emperor Franz Joseph died on November 21, 1916. One of emperor's last decisions in the Polish question was the November 5 act and the resulting extension of Galicia's autonomy, i.e., Galicia's separation. Charles I (Charles IV as King of Hungary)

Jakub Bojko remembered Franz Joseph with emotion: “This aged monarch was kind to us, Poles, and we all together mourn him . . . Franz Joseph had a lot of heart for us, Poles.”¹⁸¹³

Meanwhile, socialists changed their views and gave up the Austro-Polish solution under the influence of the revolution in Russia. National democrats also had a different attitude toward particularly this solution. National democrats were convicted that regaining Poland’s independence in not only a dream but a real possibility. However, national democrats could not predict the future shape of the independent Polish state nor the time when it would be created.¹⁸¹⁴ The previous experience and the above-mentioned changes dynamized NDP’s action. A breakthrough came also in PPP-”Piaśt’s” activity. The club openly opposed the Austro-Polish solution, the Polish Circle and conservatives. The cooperation initiated between “Piaśt” and national democrats in the earlier period now could develop.

S. Głąbiński, considering O. Czernin’s approval of the nations’ right to self-determine, concluded that the work on the Galicia’s separation was unlogic. Therefore, in Głąbiński’s view, politicians should aim at solutions that would allow the recovery of an independent Polish state. On April 15, 1917, Głąbiński wrote a letter to L. Biliński referring to the proclamation of the Russian government that approved freedom and independence of all Polish territories. Also, letter expressed monarchy’s attitude toward revolutionary events and stated that Austrian government’s forming: “Imposes the obligation on the Polish representation to revise the program of separating Galicia.”¹⁸¹⁵ Members of the Polish

replaced his cousin, Franz Joseph. J. Buszko described Charles I as: “young and inexperienced, not of the most outstanding character. Charles I was the last Habsburg on the throne and he treated the Polish question rather subordinately. For the new emperor, the Polish question was just one of many issues related to the Great War and deserved consideration only in case it helped to solve other problems. Also changes in the higher authority positions happened. Heinrich Clam-Martinitz became the premier-minister, while Count Ottokar Czernin, reluctant to Poles, took the post of the minister of foreign affairs, Buszko, *Polacy w wiedeńskim parlamencie*, p. 323; S. Grodziski, *Habsburgowie. Dzieje dynastii* (Ossolineum 1998), pp. 207–208; G. Kucharczyk, “Ostatni na tronie Habsburgów – cesarz Karol I (IV). W 80 rocznicę śmierci,” P. 2, *Pro Fide Rege et Lege*, no. 2 (43), 2002, pp. 21–22.

1813 Bojko, *Dziennik*, p. 180.

1814 Wapiński, *Narodowa Demokracja*, p. 146.

1815 The text of the letter to the Polish Circle’s president is in: Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 262–263. Głąbiński also made participation in the work on the constitution dependent on the Club’s opinion over Galicia’s separation. After the emperor’s death, Głąbiński concluded that the war’s fate would be in the hands of Entente

Circle did not accept Głabiński's position. Therefore, on April 25, Głabiński sent another letter to president Biliński. In the letter Głabiński stated: "Polish Circle dealing with Galicia's separation in this historical moment when the monarchy prepares peace with Russia we consider a tradition and Club's duties slurring activity that is harmful to national interests."¹⁸¹⁶ Głabiński believed that, in the new political situation, an independence program and the creation of a free Polish state from the lands of three partitions should replace Galicia's separation intentions: "Such treatment of the case raises doubt and weakens Polish question's position in the world. Acting this way expresses a disbelief in the possibility of realizing our national ideals, and, what is worse, manifests a partial resignation from those ideas."¹⁸¹⁷

The letter's content caused a stir in the Polish Circle. W. L. Jaworski demanded the removal of S. Głabiński from the Club. Therefore, the Club's president convened a meeting for May 15, 1917, during which S. Głabiński was to present the reasons for the allegations against the Polish Circle.¹⁸¹⁸

However, Głabiński's position was safe. Although only a few representatives constituted the national democrats' club, the president of NDP could count on "Piaśt's" support. Already on May 5, 1917, national democrats adopted a resolution in which they called for stopping the project of separating Galicia, for revising the Polish Circle's policy, and for removing their members from the SNC. The resolution accorded to Głabiński's position on the Club's policy in the Polish question.¹⁸¹⁹ Therefore, on the peasant movement's initiative, the Club adopted a resolution on May 14. The resolution concluded that there is no reason to discuss Głabiński's letter from April 25. Thus, the Club discussed completely

countries. Thus, not Austro-Hungary, Germany or Russia would solve the Polish question but rather an international conference. After the February Revolution's outbreak Głabiński said: "I believe that it (work on the Galicia's constitution – D. L. -L.) offends the dignity of the Polish nation and discredits the Polish question in foreign eyes. For this reason, I decided to act against this policy which humiliates us in the world's eyes together with my political friends," Głabiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 258–259.

1816 "List Eksc. S. Głabińskiego do prezesa Koła Polskiego w Wiedniu z 25 kwietnia 1917r.," *Wiadomości Polityczne* (Cracow: Biblioteka. Polskiej Akademii Nauk w Krakowie (Bibl. PAN Kr.), sig. 7817, pp. 1–2; "List otwarty Eks. Dr. Stanisława Głabińskiego do Eks. Prezesa Koła Polskiego Leona Bilińskiego, Wiedeń, 25 IV 1917," *BN, MAG DŻS. IA 5 Cim.*, pp. 1–2; S. Głabiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, p. 264.

1817 Głabiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, p. 264.

1818 Głabiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 267–268.

1819 Głabiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, p. 268.

different issues at the meeting on May 15. As a result, L. Biliński resigned from the Polish Circle's president function.

Noteworthy, Głąbiński's letter became an opportunity to discuss the solution of the Polish question in the Polish Circle. A first major debate on this topic took place in mid-May 1917.

The first speaker at the May 15 meeting of the Polish Circle was Głąbiński. Głąbiński requested to adopt a resolution according to which independent Poland with an access to the sea should be the only aspiration of the Polish nation. Jaworski opposed Głąbiński's request. W. Tetmajer spoke as well, and he fully supported Głąbiński's request. However, Tetmajer proposed to reedit the request. The next day, all parliamentary clubs except for conservatives submitted motions for similar resolutions.¹⁸²⁰ The Club accepted W. Tetmajer's proposal which contained a bold formula: "The only aspiration of the Polish nation is to regain an independent, united Poland with an access to the sea. The Polish Circle solidarizes with this endeavor."¹⁸²¹ Tetmajer's initiative put conservatives: "The most petted by the Austrian government, which distinguished them above other nation's layers" in a very uncomfortable position. J. Bojko, recalling those events, wrote: "When late Tetmajer put a resolution in the Club . . . conservatives petrified and began to protest against it."¹⁸²²

The Polish Circle adopted the resolution on May 16, 1917. There were twenty-three votes for and seventeen against.¹⁸²³ The session of the Parliamentary

1820 There were mainly J. Leo's requests: "Facing the international recognition of Poland's law to independence and the right of nations to self-determination, the Polish Circle, wishing to express the nation's aspiration at the historical moment that requires resolving the Polish question, calls the presidium to convene a Parliamentary Fraction soon," while I. Daszyński's request was: "Watered with a socialist sauce," Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 269–270. Noteworthy, W. Tetmajer's and I. Daszyński's projects raised a problem of creating a united and independent Polish state. However, the projects differed somehow. Daszyński postulated creating the Polish state from all Polish territories, i.e., without Ukraine. While W. Tetmajer emphasized Poland's access to the sea. Eventually, Daszyński withdrew his project, so the Club discussed only Tetmajer's idea.

1821 Dunin-Wąsowicz, *Ludowcy galicyjscy w czasie*, p. 48.

1822 Bojko, "Na mogiłę śp. Włodzimierza Tetmajera pośmiertne wspomnienie," in: *Gorące słowa*, p. 479.

1823 Peasant movement, i.e., Długosz, Rey, Lasocki, Kędzior, Lewicki, Tetmajer, Angerman, Jachowicz, Śmiałowski, Fila, Dyło, Siwula, socialists, i.e., Daszyński, Diamand, Bobrowski, Lieberman, Marek, Klemensiewicz, and Śliwiński, Głąbiński, Baworowski, Wróbel, Łazarski supported the Tetmajer's resolution. Those, who were against were: democrats, i.e., Gross, Rauch, Leo, German, Rychlik, Klęski, Krogulski,

Fraction lasted on May 27 and 28 and was turbulent.¹⁸²⁴ The resolution was too radical for conservatives to accept it indisputably. Therefore, Tetmajer's resolution obtained a courtesy wording in its final part. The wording somewhat softened the resolution's tone: "The Polish Parliamentary Fraction hopes that the kind emperor of Austria will take this issue into his hands."¹⁸²⁵ Next, on May 28, the Polish Circle adopted the resolution unanimously. J. Bojka's words reflect the best the meaning of the Tetmajer's patriotic behavior and resolution: "Tetmajer thought about the future of whole Poland and hoped that Poland must exist."¹⁸²⁶

A few months later some politicians tried to overturn the resolution.¹⁸²⁷ During the Parliamentary Fraction's session from September 2, 1917, Count Zdzisław Tarnowski made a declaration that aimed at minimizing the resolution's significance. Tarnowski postulated not to make too far-reaching demands in the current situation but rather focus on demands that are achievable at the time. Underestimating the importance of the resolution and a minimalist approach to the Polish question approached understandable disapproval from other representatives. Leading opposition party activists, I. Daszyński, S. Głąbiński, Władysław Jahl, J. Stapiński, H. Śliwiński and W. Witos protested against Tarnowski's request. Opposition believed that it would be a political mistake to change mind. Opposition activists left the meeting at the request of I. Daszyński to protest against conservatives' proposals. Leaving, W. Witos shouted: "Our ways have already split." Therefore, S. Łazarski, the newly chosen Polish Circle's president had to close the session.¹⁸²⁸

Zieleniewski, and Stern, Steinhaus, Halban, Goetz, Tetril, Jabłoński, Jaworski, Czajkowski and Lubomirski. PPP-"Left" did not vote because this club did not belong to the Polish Circle at the time, "Szczegóły z posiedzenia Koła pol. w dn. 16. maja," in: Z. Lasocki, *Wspomnienia szefa administracji P.K.L I K. RZ.* (Kraków, 1931), p. 91.

1824 Sixty representatives participated in the Parliamentary Fraction's session. Ten of them were from the House of Lords, twenty were representatives of the Galician parliament and two were bp. A. S. Sapięha and abp. J. Teodorowicz. The rest was people invited from the Kingdom of Poland, Bojko, "Na mogiłę śp. Włodzimierza Tetmajera," p. 479. A critical attitude of the public opinion toward conservatives' policy accompanied the session, *Apel kół narodowych*, APw K, sig. 10000267-100269, mkrf, col. 379.

1825 Najdus, *Polska Partia Socjal-Demokratyczna*, pp. 591-592. We should treat the appeal to the emperor as: "A rhetorical turn which was to neutralize possible oppositionists recruiting from persistent supporters of the Asutro-Polish solution," Wapiński, *Narodowa demokracja*, p. 146.

1826 Bojko, "Na mogiłę śp. Włodzimierza Tetmajera," p. 477.

1827 Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, p. 321.

1828 Leading representatives left the Parliamentary Fraction's meeting: I. Daszyński, W. Jahl, S. Głąbiński, J. Stapiński, H. Śliwiński and W. Witos. Also, members of

Both the resolution of the Polish Circle and the resolution of the Parliamentary Fraction expressed established a direction of a common policy whose axis was the simultaneous pursuit for unification and independence: “For the first time, resolutions openly set the maximalist goal of the Polish society’s aspirations and defined the direction and scope of any Austrian assistance. Yet, at the same time, resolutions internationalized the Polish question.”¹⁸²⁹ Noteworthy, the May resolution was: “A kind of necessity after the collapse of programs that politicians considered “positive.”¹⁸³⁰ Assessing Tetmajer’s resolution we should mention J. Buszko’s opinion: “Thus, for the first time, the representation of the Polish society of one of the partitions officially postulated the reconstruction of independent and united Poland.”¹⁸³¹

At the same time, politicians decided the fate of the draft Galicia’s constitution. As noted above, the project was to be sent to the parliament in the form of a government rescript.¹⁸³² Before submitting the draft constitution, the Club held talks with the government to set a common position not to obstruct the parliamentary session in the very beginning. Talks began on May 2, 1917, with attendance of L. Biliński, D. Abrahamowicz, S. Głabiński, L. German, J. Leo, and A. Kędzior. Prime minister H. Clam-Martinitz, the minister of foreign affairs Handl, the minister of treasury Spitzmüller, the minister of railroad Förster and M. Bobrzyński represented the government’s side. In general, the talks dragged on a bit, and when the Polish Circle talked with minister Spitzmüller he replied that he was so busy with other, more important issues and will have time only in two weeks. Thus, neither the Parliamentary Committee, nor the Polish Circle on May 15 could discuss the project.¹⁸³³ Therefore, after opening the session of the Imperial Council, the project went off the agenda. L. Biliński’s view on Galicia’s

the following clubs: PSDPG, NDP, PDC, PPP-”Piast,” PPP-”Left,” and democrats left the meeting, Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, p. 286; Głabiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 295–297; Jachymek, *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, p. 52; Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, p. 326.

1829 Mroczka, *Galicji rozstanie z Austrią*, pp. 22–23.

1830 Daszyński, *Cztery lata wojny*, p. 42.

1831 Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, p. 321.

1832 The Club had no chance of carrying out the project in the Imperial Council because it would have less than 2/3 of the votes. Germans and Ukrainians would oppose the project. However, there was a chance to introduce the project by the emperor himself. The main provisions of the Galicia separation project determined on November 4, 1916 and appeared in the form of emperor’s letter. Subsequently, the next day, two emperors issued manifestos in the form of November 5 act.

1833 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, pp. 135, 138–139.

autonomy that “could replace Poland for some time and prepare the country properly for joining with Poland”¹⁸³⁴ had to be verified. Eventually, politicians abandoned the project after the Brest Treaty of 1918. Then, another concept showed up, namely the personal union of Galicia with the monarchy.

Meanwhile, the struggle for debating the Tetmajer’s resolution began in the Imperial Council. The struggle was a logical consequence of the resolution’s adoption by the Polish Circle and Parliamentary Fraction. Polish politicians entrusted the task of presenting the resolution in the Imperial Council to Stanisław Łazarski. Łazarski was a guarantee of a substantive resolution motives’ presentation. Noteworthy, the very election of S. Łazarski for the Club’s president and the rapporteur of Polish deputies’ position was a result of compromise, thus it had to satisfy all the groupings of the Club.¹⁸³⁵ Łazarski defended the Polish position citing the May resolution of the Polish Circle and Parliamentary Fraction as a political program of Poles.¹⁸³⁶ Also W. Witos and I. Daszyński referred to this case on the parliamentary tribune.

Daszyński’s speech from June 15, 1917 was full of expressive phrases and an emotionally approached the problem. Daszyński justified Tetmajer’s intentions in his speech. Regarding Poland’s access to the sea, Daszyński argued that it should be: “An access through a piece of the canalized Vistula to the port of Gdańsk.” Daszyński later admitted that this statement was a political mistake. Consultations with the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs in the Club’s presidium preceded Daszyński’s speech. As Daszyński explained, he presented the case the way O. Czernin asked him to do. However, it is thought-provoking why a moment after resolution’s adoption on June 15, 1917, I. Daszyński, an independence camp representative, did not demand resigning from the Austro-Polish solution. During his speech in the parliament, Daszyński spoke about Poland’s access to the sea, however, about a restricted access. It seems that Daszyński presented the problem such a way because he believed that Polish society still trusts the monarchy and believes that Austria will support Polish independence demands, as long as Poles do not directly threaten Germany’s interests.¹⁸³⁷ Whereas, on June 16, 1917, W. Witos delivered his speech in Polish because of insufficient knowledge of German. Referring to the Polish

1834 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, p. 131.

1835 Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, pp. 323–324.

1836 Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 279–280; W. Witos, *Moje wspomnienia*, vol. 1, p. 394.

1837 Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, pp. 269–270.

Circle's resolution and the Parliamentary Fraction's resolution, Witos emphasized national matters. At the same time, Witos stressed the rich historical and cultural traditions of the Polish nation.¹⁸³⁸

The situation of that time created favorable conditions for pushing Polish national demands. A debate on the provisional budget was to happen in the parliament. There was a high probability that without the support of Polish representatives, the parliament would not adopt the state budget, which will result in the dismissal of the cabinet. The dismissal happened, as the later events showed.

At that time, Germans accused Poles of betraying Austro-Hungarian monarchy's interests by departing from the traditional pro-Austrian policy. S. Głabiński then defended the Polish reasons. Głabiński said that the accusation of betrayal is unfounded because Poles, acting in their own case, also act in favor of the monarchy: "After the war, Poles must be united in one own independent state. The emergence of a strong, viable and united Poland is in the interest of peace and security in Europe and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy."¹⁸³⁹

The issue of the Club's support was important for the government. That is why the government invited the Polish Circle's presidium for talks. Vienna promised Poles to restore the civilian administration in Galicia and to repair war damage in return for the support in the budget debate. However, the Polish Circle refused.¹⁸⁴⁰

Ukrainians also became active in this eventful year of 1917. The Ukrainian club stated on November 7, 1917 in the Imperial Council: "The Ukrainian nation will never recognize Galicia's separation under the Polish rule and will never renounce its right to a national autonomy and creation of a separate Ukrainian crown within Austria."¹⁸⁴¹ Events from Russia, i.e., February Revolution influenced this situation. After overthrowing the tsar, the Central Council of Ukraine (CCU) took over the power. It seems that it was a notable moment in Polish-Ukrainian relations. The Council's establishment accelerated Germany's efforts to implement the concept of using non-Russian nations against Russia. To convince the Council to fight against Russia the government had to sign a peace treaty saying that the Council would receive conquered territories. Germany proposed the Council to take not only Chełm Land but also

1838 Witos, *Moje wspomnienia*, vol. 1, pp. 394–395.

1839 Głabiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 280–281.

1840 The Club did not want to support H. Clam-Martinitz's cabinet mainly because of introducing a military authority in Galicia, executions of the rural population and Germanization, Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, p. 324–325.

1841 Cited from: J. Chlebowczyk, *Między dyktatem, realiami*, pp. 339–340.

East Galicia.¹⁸⁴² The Austro-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs did not agree to Germany's proposals regarding the division of Galicia. The minister was convinced that Germany's proposal would only result in Polish representatives affiliating the opposition, and without Polish representatives support it is not possible to adopt the state budget, including war loans. We can say that such a situation enabled signing a peace treaty with Ukraine in Brest-Litovsk in 1918. W. L. Jaworski assessed that the situation of Poles at that time was very uncomfortable. Meanwhile, the work on the Galicia's separation project continued. However, external conditions could hinder the project: "However, in this situation, there is a Ruthenian danger for us in a new guise. I was right again to raise the alarm all the time. Now, I less believe in Galicia's separation. It is an account without Ruthenians, whose assets go up against the fall of Russia."¹⁸⁴³

To sum up, 1917 was a breakthrough in the Galician parties' activities, both supporters of the Austro-Polish solution and their opponents. The November 5 act was one of breakthrough moments regarding Poland's independence and orientation toward Austria. First of all, the act dispelled Poles' hopes for uniting Kingdom of Poland with Galicia within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Politicians quite rightly predicted that Germany would not allow Austro-Hungary to rule over Kingdom's lands. The act's consequence was Tetmajer's resolution which set the direction of Poles' aspirations. Most of Galician parties sided against pro-Austrian policy. The slogans for liberation, independence of Polish lands and creation of an independent Polish state dominated political programs. Therefore, around mid-1917 the only supporters of the Austro-Polish solution were Cracow conservatives and democrats without adjectives. On the opposite side, there was a majority of Polish political parties, i.e., national democrats, East Galicia conservatives, socialists and peasant movement of PPP-"Piast."

After the November 5 act and the May resolution of the Polish Circle, the Austro-Polish solution lost its *raison d'être*. At the same time, the resolution was

1842 CCU soon proclaimed Ukrainian People's Republic. This fact provoked a justified fear in Vienna and among Poles. Proclamation meant that since the Ukrainian state established it would soon make a firm demand for Galicia's division and detaching its eastern part. At the time, Vienna anticipated two options. The first said that constituting a sovereign Ukrainian state would lead to losing Galicia. To prevent such an event, it would be necessary to give East Galicia to Poles. The second option said that in case Ukrainian state could not constitute, then it would be purposeful and rational to create a separate Ukrainian province to "keep" Ukrainians within the monarchy, Gruchala, *Sprawa ukraińska w Galicji*, pp. 52–53.

1843 A note from March 15, 1917, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 171.

important for the further activities of SNC. The slogans of unification and independence of Polish lands questioned the desirability of the Committee's actions. SNC gradually lost control over parties and it seems that it was unable to maintain an internal unity. At the Parliamentary Fraction's session on September 2, 1917 members discussed the situation in SNC. Noteworthy, it was this session that some tried to overthrow Tetmajer's resolution. At the time S. Głąbiński said that national democrats do not recognize the Committee. In addition, Głąbiński claimed that the November 5 act is: "A mean of preventing our national ideals from realization."¹⁸⁴⁴

The main board of PPP-"Piaśt" withdrew its representatives from the Committee already on May 6, 1917, mainly due to disapproval of the Austro-Polish solution of the Polish question. A few months later, on September 2, 1917, W. Witos submitted a request to establish a liquidation commission for SNC because the Committee became an unrepresentative organ. After all, SNC then included only conservatives and democrats. "Piaśt" members believed that maintaining SNC's further existence is illogical, also because the lack of chances for creating a real union with the monarchy.¹⁸⁴⁵ Also I. Daszyński demanded dissolution of SNC. Officially, socialists reported withdrawal from SNC on September 3, and a few days later, on September 9, they submitted their request for approval to the executive committee of PSDPG. On October 27 and 28 the PSDPG party board had its session which resulted in a decision to withdraw from SNC.¹⁸⁴⁶ Soon, a request came from I. Daszyński and H. Śliwiński to dissolve SNC and replace it with a three-partition organization. Of course, conservatives, democrats and House of Lords members opposed the idea.¹⁸⁴⁷

Events which proved decisive for the decline in importance of the Polish Circle – such as the fall of the Galicia's separation concept, the May resolution, and the failure of SNC's activities – actually exaggerated Committee's

1844 Głąbiński *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 295–297.

1845 Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, p. 285; Jachymek, *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, pp. 51–52.

1846 Discussions in PSDPG about leaving SNC confirmed the existing disagreements among socialists. Of the thirteen present, five were against taking such a step. This group included: Emil Haecker, Jan Jasiński, Kazimierz Krzysztoń, Leon Misiólek and Wilhelm Topinek. Similarly, there was no agreement during the party board's discussions in which twenty-three people participated, Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, pp. 285–286; Najdus, *Polska Partia Socjalno-Demokratyczna*, pp. 592–593.

1847 Witos, *Moje wspomnienia*, vol. 2, pp. 160; Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, pp. 325–326.

total decision-making power on the Polish question. Only conservatives and democrats remained in the Polish Circle. The fall of the Club progressed gradually, so it is worth to pay more attention to it.

After adopting the May resolution, a certain problem emerged. Namely the problem was the issue of socialists remaining in the Polish Circle. Emanuel Chobot, a representative from Silesia, submitted a request to withdraw socialists from the Club. Chobot believed that the activities of PSDPG in the Polish Circle could only detriment the party's image. Yet, not the socialists' parliamentary activity, but connections with conservatives would influence this. Eventually, E. Chobot withdrew his request after I. Daszyński's stated that he supports withdrawing from the Club but at the moment such a decision would not be appropriate. Therefore, Chobot withdrew his request.¹⁸⁴⁸ Noteworthy, independence was the priority matter to socialists.¹⁸⁴⁹

National democrats could pursue a free activity after departing from the Polish Circle. In new conditions, national democrats above all criticized the policy of the Club, i.e., the loyalty to the monarchy. However, beside national democrats, socialists carried out similar activities.

Stapiński's supporters acted unlike most Galician parties. Although Stapiński was critical about the purpose of participating in the Polish Circle and SNC, he joined along with three other party members. However, already in February 1918, Stapiński announced his withdrawal from the Club. Not hard to guess, the declaration turned out to be empty. Stapiński still maintained good relations with conservatives and opposed "Piaśt" within the Club. At that time, Stapiński also supported the Austro-Polish solutions, even after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Noteworthy, Stapiński criticized the treaty earlier, when there still were chances for a successful implementation of this concept. Stapiński even participated in talks that took place in the spring of 1918. Also Austrian politicians, the presidium of the Polish Circle, and the minister of Galicia, Juliusz Twardowski participated in the talks. During the meeting, politicians discussed the issue of

1848 Najdus, *Polska Partia Socjalno-Demokratyczna*, pp. 592–593.

1849 I. Daszyński emphasized this in his parliamentary speeches at the Imperial Council and in common delegations. Daszyński, among other things said: "We want to have a Polish state and, as the Polish part, move to independent united Poland, "Sprawa polska. Mowa pośła Daszyńskiego," *Naprzód*, no. 20 (01/24/1918), p. 1; "Mowa pośła Daszyńskiego w delegacjach," *Naprzód*, no. 24 (01/29/1918), p. 1; no. 30 (01/25/1918), p. 1; no. 26 (01/31/1918), p. 1; Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, pp. 291–293.

resolving the Polish question relying on Austria.¹⁸⁵⁰ Stapiński's attitude is startling, especially since in February 1918 he allied with socialists and supported I. Daszyński when he gave one of his famous speeches after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The speech claimed that the star of Habsburgs gone out in the Polish sky. Stapiński himself categorically opposed the agreement with Austria on March 6, 1918 at the Polish Circle meeting: "I was for the possible agreement with the government. I thought the emperor would find some charity for us, yet we got a slap in the face. Gentlemen! Our policy had a lot of mistakes but let us give it a break. However, if they could betatter and humiliate us, do not let them dishonor us today."¹⁸⁵¹

Conservatives being in minority did not have such an important impact on Polish policy directions. Therefore, the policy evolved toward more and more outright independence demands.

Therefore, at the beginning of 1918, we can distinguish three clearly shaped centers on the political scene. Those three centers concentrated political forces with different programs in the then fundamental issue, i.e., the unification and independence of Poland. The first center was the Polish Circle and SNC, still advocating the Austro-Polish solution and creating a joint political platform around this program. PSDPG basically represented the second center which, after temporary relations with conservatives, aimed to renew the progressive-independence orientation. In general, we can say that PSDPG's program referred to the CCCIP's activities. The third center was the Cross-Party Association represented by NDP and PPP-"Piast" who were strongly anti-Austrophilic.

In such a situation, March 1918 in Brest-Litovsk, politicians made decisions¹⁸⁵² that eventually decided about the fall of the pro-Austrian orientation. The words of W. L. Jaworski happened to be predictive. Jaworski noted on the morning of February 11, after receiving information about the peace with Ukraine: "It shocked me deeply. The ground is moving under the feet," and: "For us, conservatives, the role is over."¹⁸⁵³

1850 Jachymek, *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, pp. 53–54; Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, p. 171.

1851 Cited from: Dunin-Wąsowicz, *Ludowcy galicyjscy w czasie*, p. 49.

1852 At the turn of 1917 and 1918 peace negotiations took place in Brest-Litovsk between Austro-Hungary, Germany, Bulgaria, and Turkey and Russia. The talks finally ended with signing of the peace treaty on March 3.

1853 Note from February 11, 1918, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 246.

Signing an agreement between the Central Powers and Ukraine¹⁸⁵⁴ on February 9, 1918, preceded the treaty of Brest-Litovsk.¹⁸⁵⁵ The agreement gave Chełm Land and Podlachia to Ukraine in exchange for grain and food supplies.¹⁸⁵⁶ Hence the treaty was called the “bread treaty” (*Brotfrieden*). The treaty contained a secret protocol in which Austro-Hungary pledged to make a separate crown country from the lands of East Galicia and Bukovina. The most important fragment of the protocol was: “To achieve this goal, the Austrian government will submit a law project to both chambers of the Imperial Council. The project will state that those parts of East Galicia where the Ukrainian population dominates will be separated from the Kingdom of Galicia and joined with Bukovina in one uniform crown country.”¹⁸⁵⁷ However, the secret protocol did not specify a

1854 The Ukrainian People’s Republic was proclaimed as an independent and sovereign state on the basis of the Fourth Universal announced on January 24 by the Central Council of Ukraine. On February 1, the Central Powers recognized the Republic. Thus, Central Powers conducted talks with two separate states, although Ukraine was formally in a relationship with the Russian state. The Russian side did not oppose the separateness of Ukraine regarding the right of nations to self-determination, L. Wasilewski, *Kwestia ukraińska jako zagadnienie*, p. 111; A. Serczyk, *Historia Ukrainy* (Ossolineum), pp. 265–266.

1855 The text of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk is in: <http://members.lycos.co.uk/wielkawojna/docs.php?dokument=brest> (date of access: 26.03.2004).

1856 The Ukrainian delegates were Hołubowycz, Lewicki, Lubiński and Sewrjuk: “Unknown people, the last two of them were completely young boys. They demanded to join Chełm Land and Podlachia as well as East Galicia and northern Bukovina to Ukraine. O. Czernin, who lead the negotiations was in a rather unfavorable position. On the one hand, Germans urged Czernin to meet Ukrainian demands, on the other – Czernin was aware that he would be exposed to: “Deadly anger of Poles.” Eventually, the outcome of the negotiations was not favorable for Poles. This was largely due to food supply aspects, Wasilewski, *Kwestia ukraińska jako zagadnienie*, pp. 113–114.

1857 See: S. Biegański, “Tajny układ między Austro-Węgrami a Ukrainą z 8 lutego 1918 r.,” *Niepodległość*, vol. 12 (New York, London, 1979). The original text of the protocole from the February 9 treaty is lost. Here is a fragment in translation: “Plenipotentiaries of the People’s Republic of Ukraine acknowledge that the Austrian government decided . . . to take steps . . . to further protect national and cultural development of the Ukrainian nation living in Austria. To achieve this goal, the Austrian government will submit a law project to both chambers of the Imperial Council. The project will state that those parts of East Galicia where the Ukrainian population dominates will be separated from the Kingdom of Galicia and joined with Bukovina in one uniform crown country. The Austrian government is to implement this intention by July 31

border between West and East Galicia, while the term: “Those parts . . . where the Ukrainian population dominates” was very general and any interpretation was possible.¹⁸⁵⁸ It is worth noting that Austro-Hungary never ratified the treaty hence its decisions could not enter into force because of formal reasons.

The Polish side learned about the secret agreements already in February.¹⁸⁵⁹ L. Biliński wrote that it was Adam Tarnowski who first: “Revealed Czernin’s betrayal.”¹⁸⁶⁰ It seems that Polish politicians, or at least some of them, already knew about Vienna’s plans regarding the belonging of East Galicia: “Halban saw Einchof’s division plan for Galicia. Wassilko told him that Ukrainians demanded Galicia’s division in Brest-Litovsk.”¹⁸⁶¹ Besides, in January 1918, E. Seidler assured Ukrainians in the Imperial Council that he would be able to convince the majority to approve the division of Galicia.¹⁸⁶²

The secret protocol was not the most important decision of the treaty, yet it was significant for the Polish question. First of all, the protocol clearly demonstrated the monarchy’s attitude to Polish national aspirations. Eventually, the protocol canceled hopes for connecting the Polish question with the monarchy.¹⁸⁶³ Thus, Poles received the loss of the Chełm Land as: “Actual perspective of the Austro-Polish orientation.” Therefore, Polish society began to: “Abnegate all existing concepts of any connections with the Habsburg monarchy or a loyal

of this year, at the latest . . . This document and its content are to remain secret, Wasilewski, *Kwestia ukraińska jako zagadnienie*, pp. 118–119.

1858 Maximalist demands of Ukrainians associated with detaching about a third part of Galicia’s territory from the monarchy. It was about 60 thousand square kilometers inhabited by about five million people including large Polish, Romanian and Jewish minorities, Batowski, *Rozpad Austro-Węgier. Sprawy narodowościowe i działania dyplomatyczne* (Cracow, 1982), p. 190.

1859 One of Ukrainian delegates did not maintain a secret and shared information about the talks at the diner with Galician Ukrainians. This information spread quickly and also got to Polish representatives, Wasilewski, *Kwestia ukraińska jako zagadnienie*, p. 119.

1860 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, p. 168. *Czas* magazine issued an article written under *Matin* pseudonym. The article was about a secret protocol of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. In the fourth paragraph, Austro-Hungary pledged to divide Galicia in such a way that part of its territory joined Bukovina and created a new crown country, *Czas*, no. 117 (03/12/1918). It is hard to guess if *Matin* was A. Tarnowski.

1861 A note from January 30, 1918, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 244.

1862 Gruchała, *Sprawa ukraińska w Galicji*, p. 55.

1863 L. Bazyłow, “Odrodzenie sprawy polskiej w kraju i w świecie (1900–1918),” in: *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, vol. 3 – 1795–1918, ed. L. Bazyłow (Warszawa, 1982), p. 917.

policy toward Vienna.”¹⁸⁶⁴ The author believes that this abnegation is not entirely true because both the emperor and the Austrian ministers did not intend to fully resign from the Austro-Polish solution. The emperor and ministers were aware of Brest-Litovsk treaty’s consequences on the Polish question and at the same time they considered the complexity of the issue. Above all, Germany opposed the Austro-Polish solution seeking to completely subordinate the lands of so-called Kingdom of Poland. First, given Germany’s superiority over Austro-Hungary, this solution would still fail. Second, the monarchy faced famine and was ready to make far-reaching concessions to Ukrainians to obtain food aid. The grain supply was the priority demand of the Austrian side, and annexing East Galicia was the priority of the Ukrainian side. In this situation, the monarchy sacrificed the territorial unity of the Galician province for saving the population from starvation. Next, there were predictions that even facing Polish representatives’ opposition in the Imperial State, the government would still be able to obtain the required 2/3 of votes. Despite such circumstances, the Austro-Polish solution still remained an open issue.¹⁸⁶⁵

Austria siding with Ukrainians and wishing to fulfill territorial and national demands of Ukrainians was a stroke to all political forces in Galicia, as well as to society. Thus, such a situation ultimately determined the change in Poles’ attitude toward the monarchy. The secret protocol in the February 9 treaty: “Resulted in unpredicted consequences for the monarchy. As a result, the treaty undermined one of the last bases in Austria’s parliamentary system – Poles.”¹⁸⁶⁶

Negotiations in Brest-Litovsk caused widespread outrage. Individual politicians as well as the Polish Circle and Poles from the House of Lords protested. Poles treated treaty’s decisions as: “An introduction to any division of Polish lands, that suits interests of partitioning powers.”¹⁸⁶⁷ W. L. Jaworski assessed that the treaty with Ukraine was: “A defeat and a blow” for Poles. Jaworski also predicted dangerous consequences of the treaty regarding Polish interests: “The evil will increase through the rise of irredentism in East Galicia, through the conflict with Ukrainians in East Galicia, through the collapse of the Austro-Polish concept, and through the beginning of Poland’s new partition.”¹⁸⁶⁸ Thus, the treaty ultimately determined the change in Poles’ attitude toward the monarchy. However,

1864 Chlebowczyk, *Między dyktatem, realiami*, p. 338.

1865 O. Czernin, “W wojnie światowej,” in: *Polska w pamiętnikach*, pp. 517–521.

1866 Chlebowczyk, *Między dyktatem, realiami*, p. 323.

1867 J. Holzer, “Ostatnie lata okupacji 1917–1918,” in: *Historia Polski*, vol. 3, P. 3, p. 279.

1868 A note from February 11, 1918, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 247.

Ukrainian society reacted in the exactly opposite way, treating the treaty as: “An international confirmation of the Ukrainian state’s independence.”¹⁸⁶⁹

The Club unanimously adopted a protest regarding the treaty already on February 12, 1918. Then, Club’s chairman, Jan Albin Goetz-Okocimski personally went to the prime minister E. Seidler and announced that the Polish Circle since now on strongly opposes the government regarding the situation. This was the first unprecedented case in the history of the Club. Moreover, only the presidium decided to take such steps without consulting other club members. Immediately after Goetz-Okocimski’s and Seidler’s conversation, prime minister went to the emperor and gave him an account of the talk with the Club’s president. Next, Seidler resigned without waiting for budgetary deliberations. However, the emperor did not accept Seidler’s resignation. In the evening, the monarch summoned J. A. Goetz-Okocimski for an audience. Only Daily Courier Illustrated notes this fact.¹⁸⁷⁰

The Club also adopted an appeal to Polish society in Galicia on February 16, 1918 at a joint meeting of representatives and members of the House of Lords: “To compatriots.”¹⁸⁷¹ The Club’s president, J. A. Goetz-Okocimski delivered the representatives’ declaration on the Brest treaty at the plenary meeting of the Imperial Council on February 20, 1918. Goetz-Okocimski, among other things, said: “The Brest agreement is born of the German militarism spirit and the powerless hypocrisy of old Austrian diplomacy. The treaty will become a source of a fratricidal struggle between Poland and Ukraine. In the face of the whole world we solemnly protest against this deliberate plunder of the Polish land. Feeling that our national law is not time-barred, we will never renounce our land and our right to create an independent state of all Polish districts . . . No enemy violence or deceit will break a powerful nation that is ready for all sacrifices and struggle for a united, independent Poland.” Members of the House of Lords approved the appeal.¹⁸⁷² Members of the House of Lords claimed in their statement that: “Count Czernin broke the solemn promise that the Austrian government gave to us several times regarding the inviolability of the Chełm Land.”¹⁸⁷³

1869 Holzer, *Ostatnie lata okupacji*, p. 383.

1870 *Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny*, no. 32 (02/09/1918), p. 4.

1871 Witos, *Moje wspomnienia*, vol. 1, pp. 408–409.

1872 Kumaniecki, *Zbiór najważniejszych dokumentów*, p. 113. The text of the statement, as other J. A. Goetz-Okocimski are in: *Ku pamięci potomków Jana Goetza-Okocimskiego* (Kraków, 1929), pp. 69–164; Witos, *Moje wspomnienia*, vol. 1, pp. 408–409.

1873 Kumaniecki, *Zbiór najważniejszych dokumentów*, p. 113; Witos, *Moje wspomnienia*, vol. 2, p. 409.

The treaty also provoked an outrage among politicians known for their loyalty. L. Biliński stated at the meeting of the House of Lords: “We cease all our relations and arrangements with the dynasty and government. We move to the most energetic opposition until . . . the dynasty and government return to the previous policy regarding Poland.”¹⁸⁷⁴ On the other hand, A. Gołuchowski undertook an independent initiative and went to the prime minister Seidler to announce him that Polish members of the House of Lords moved to opposition. Polish politicians also adopted a resolution and read it at a joint meeting of Polish parliamentarians: “In fact, it was sharper than Daszyński’s resolution read on the behalf of the representatives.”¹⁸⁷⁵

Jan Maria Włodek believed that Polish representatives’ declaration is: “The end of the pro-Austrian orientation . . . and the end of the so-called Austro-Polish solution.”¹⁸⁷⁶

Later, during a conference with the Club’s presidium in April, E. Seidler avoided an unambiguous answer about the future of East Galicia: “Considering Galicia’s division, Seidler said that there is no such project but it can *aufstachen* (occur – D. L.-L.) any time.” When someone asked Seidler how would he relate to this project, he did not answer. Politicians suspected that such a project existed and that emperor Charles would support it: “Everybody except Gołuchowski believed that Seidler lied to the presidium on Saturday and that in fact he made an agreement on Galicia’s division.”¹⁸⁷⁷ However, in June Seidler admitted that the deal on Galicia’s division in fact happened: “Seidler told Biliński and Korytowski in Twardowski’s presence that the agreement with Ruthenians on Galicia’s division was a part of the Brest treaty. Seidler also said that he had to sign the treaty that came to him two weeks after its conclusion.”¹⁸⁷⁸

1874 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, p. 167.

1875 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, p. 166.

1876 Włodek also positively assesses the period of Goetz-Okocimski’s presidency claiming that: “Politicians could do a lot for Poland by acting jointly and severally as ordered by the Club’s status. Unfortunately, lawlessness of some members did not allow for solidarity.” Already at the end of February there was another breakthrough in the Polish Circle as a result of informal talks between some Polish and Czech deputies. Breaking the solidarity and the announcement of these representatives that they would not cease own policy forced J. A. Goetz-Okocimski to resign from the president’s office, J. M. Włodek, *Goetz-Okocimscy. Kronika rodzinna 1590–2000* (Kraków, 2001), pp. 55–56.

1877 A note from April 20, 1918, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, pp. 257–258.

1878 A note from June 29, 1918, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 266.

The Brest-Litovsk treaty significantly influenced Polish-Ukrainian relations: "Therefore, the Brest issue became a reason for deterioration of relation between Poles and Ukrainians."¹⁸⁷⁹ Polish protests and cancelling the secret protocol of Brest treaty sparked the opposition of Ukrainian politicians, who threatened to resign from their seats in the Imperial State. At that time, emperor Charles assured Ukrainians about the sustainability of the Galicia's division program. However, the Ukrainian side recognized that the monarchy's position is ambiguous and it does not guarantee the fulfillment of Ukrainian territorial and state demands. In such a situation, Ukrainians intensified their efforts to separate East Galicia from the Austrian state.¹⁸⁸⁰ Thus the Polish-Ukrainian conflict entered a new, more dynamic phase. Soon, on March 25, 1918 a congress of all Ukrainian parties took place. Politicians decided to implement secret protocol's settlements, establish a combat organization and create a national defense fund. However, the congress did not unite all the groups around a joint program because the Ukrainian club in the Imperial Council still remained with a program supporting autonomy. On the other hand, radicals opted for an immediate detachment of East Galicia and creation of a sovereign Ukrainian state.¹⁸⁸¹

Cancelling the Brest treaty meant that the Galicia's division postulate lost its validity. Much more significant consequence of the Brest treaty was that the Ukrainian question ceased in Austro-Hungary's plans. In the end of July, 1918, the next prime minister, Max Hussarek told the Polish Circle that Galicia's division was impossible: "Hussarek promised that he would not make any "changes" without both nations' agreement. Hussarek thinks that the division of Galicia is out of the question."¹⁸⁸²

At that time, the government avoided giving an unambiguous answer to Ukrainian politicians' questions. Ukrainians: "Insulted by everybody . . . took care only of their affairs, thinking rather about preparations for taking power in East Galicia at the right time. However, Ukrainians did not want to take power against Austria but, of course, against Poles."¹⁸⁸³

1879 Holzer, *Ostatnie lata okupacji*, p. 383.

1880 Holzer, *Ostatnie lata okupacji*, p. 386.

1881 Holzer, *Ostatnie lata okupacji*, pp. 393–394.

1882 This was a compensation for adopting a provisional budget for six months by the Polish Circle. Twenty-six of the Club's deputies were for the budget, and twenty, mostly from peasant movement, were against. At that time, M. Hussarek obliged to approve all Club's conditions, including the appointment of Club's candidates for ministers. A note from July 24, 1918, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 272.

1883 Batowski, *Rozpad Austro-Węgiei*, p. 226.

The Brest treaty was important because the international community drew attention to the fact that the monarchy is not an indivisible state. Thus, the postulate to separate national states from Austro-Hungary appeared.

The agreement between Central Powers and Ukraine was also a great surprise for all political groups. For instance, PSDPG considered the treaty a fourth partition of Poland. Also national democrats assessed the treaty negatively. In February 1918, national democrats adopted a resolution opposing signing a peace agreement with Ukraine, and Austria's policy toward Ukraine. As a consequence, national democrats left the Polish Circle in June. This time, national democrats undertook outright steps, unlike after November 5 act when they did not determine their position toward the monarchy, Russia or the Polish question's solution. National democrats' tactics at the time was to adopt an expectant attitude. Members of PPP-"Piast" followed suit. After leaving the Club, national democrats formed their own parliamentary club that opposed not only the government but the Polish Circle as well.

After the Brest treaty, I. Daszyński spoke in parliament on behalf of the Polish Circle. Daszyński's speech lasted more than one hour and it incisively criticized Austria's position regarding Poland. Daszyński spoke about the ambiguous attitude of the monarchy that manifested in conflicting one nation against another. Daszyński also said that: "We have a right to demand West Prussia, Poznań, both Silesia's, West Galicia – all Polish territories. Polish since thousands of years, tamed only with violence of a sword, chained to foreign countries with cunning, rape, robbery because of our weakness." The following fragment of Daszyński's speech caused a lot of controversy and protests: "In the future, we cannot link the nations' cause with interests of dynasty . . . February 9, the Habsburg star went out on the Polish sky."¹⁸⁸⁴ Conservatives, democrats and some of peasant movement's deputies strongly opposed Daszyński's speech. Those representatives demanded amendments to the shorthand minutes from the meeting. Representatives were primarily concerned with the word "went out (*erloschen*)."¹⁸⁸⁵ However, Daszyński insisted on his statement. Daszyński's speech influenced his position in the Polish Circle. As the current Polish Circle's vice president, Daszyński could not remain in the Club any longer, that is why he decided to leave. In the middle

1884 "Mowa posła Daszyńskiego wygłoszona w parlamencie w dniu 20 lutego 1918 (stenogram)," *Naprzód*, no. 45 (02/25/1918), p. 1; no. 46 (02/26/1918), p. 1; Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, p. 299.

1885 Głąbiński, *Wspomnienia polityczne*, pp. 321–322.

of 1918, Daszyński ultimately distanced from the Austro-Polish solution saying that: “Poles will not shed a single more tear, since previous wasted.”¹⁸⁸⁶

At the time, national democrats were in a separate parliamentary club. S. Głąbiński spoke in a similar tone as Daszyński: “Many Poles long believed the beautiful dream of having a second homeland here in Austria. But, during this war the dream completely dispelled.”¹⁸⁸⁷

Conflicts in the Club deepened and evinced in the voting on the budget and war loans. It seems that the support of the Polish Circle had a significant meaning for Vienna at that time. Emperor Charles even made a conciliatory gesture toward the Club by inviting Polish representatives for talks in Baden. Those, who took part were, among others: vice president J. Baworowski, and “Piaśt” members: Zieleniewski, Kędzior and J. Stapiński. Baworowski said that the opposition of the Club is not directed against the emperor and monarchy but against the government. I. Daszyński and S. Głąbiński did not participate in this conference.¹⁸⁸⁸ Monarch’s initiative aimed at obtaining assurance from the Polish side that it supports Austria’s policy and the emperor. The emperor wanted representatives to promise that they would represent him with the same attitude as toward Franz Joseph. In return, emperor promised to meet Poles’ demands if it is possible. Baden talks were successful for the emperor. Charles obtained assurance of the conducive attitude of the Club in adopting the budget and war loans. E. Seidler’s government would collapse if the day before the vote on the budget and war credits Polish representatives held their previous decision. Deputies did not support the budget project but during the vote were absent which enabled adopting the both laws.¹⁸⁸⁹ With votes of forty-two against twenty-one the Polish Circle enacted the absence at the voting thereby cancelling the decision from February.¹⁸⁹⁰ As J. Buszko wrote: “It was undoubtedly opportunism tantamount to the abandonment of new Polish allies, i.e., Slav deputies. However, the opportunism was not successful.”¹⁸⁹¹ Polish representatives’ opposition was

1886 Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, p. 329; Najdus, *Polska Partia Socjalno-Demokratyczna*, p. 597.

1887 Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, pp. 329–330.

1888 See: *Ostatnie wypadki w Kole Polskim*, np.

1889 Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, p. 300.

1890 Mroccka, *Galicji rozstanie z Austrią*, p. 30.

1891 Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, p. 329.

so problematic to the Austrian government that it eventually resigned from the treaty with Ukraine.¹⁸⁹²

Bulgaria's capitulation on September 29, 1918, accelerated Polish question's resolution. On the very same, a gathering of PSDPG, PPP-"Piast" and NDP decided to finally break with Austria. I. Daszyński initiated and lead the meeting. Also H. Diamand, Z. Marek and J. Moraczewski from the socialist camp were present. Politicians also held talks with the Polish Circle in order to jointly adopt a political declaration which would state Poles' attitude toward the current political situation, the monarchy and the Polish question. Joint meeting of Polish representatives happened on October 1. Politicians discussed the draft declaration by I. Daszyński in which the author above all stressed the right of nations to self-determination. Daszyński also criticized the widespread view that the Polish question is a matter of the portioning powers' internal policy. Opposing such a position, Daszyński postulated that the Polish question should be on the agenda of the peace conference as because of its specificity it should be an international issue. Ongoing talks also concerned the issue of the future Polish state borders. According to I. Daszyński, Poland should get the lands inhabited mostly by the Polish population, including the coast and the Polish part of Silesia.¹⁸⁹³ Peasant movement's members submitted a competing project according to which: "The Republic of Poland is to cover all the lands that belong to Poland by means of language and culture." Conservatives still hoped for the Austro-Polish solution and therefore they did not raise the problem of Poland's sovereignty.¹⁸⁹⁴

Despite the complete lack of trust in the monarchy's government some parties continued to rely on Austro-Polish policy. The only center which concentrated the efforts of Poles was the emperor and the Habsburg dynasty.¹⁸⁹⁵

1892 The treaty contained a provision that in case any of sides fails to fulfill their obligations, the provisions of the secret protocol would not implement. Ukrainians did not provide Central Powers with the promised grain deliveries. Moreover, Austro-Hungary never ratified the treaty which means that for formal reasons the deal could not implement, Batowski, *Rozpad Austro-Węgier*, pp. 190–191.

1893 "Demonstracja polska w parlamencie wiedeńskim. Projekt posła tow. Daszyńskiego," *Naprzód*, no. 219 (10/03/1918) p. 1.

1894 "Manifestacja polska w parlamencie," *Naprzód*, no. 218 (10/02/1918), p. 1; Najdus, *Polska Partia Socjalno-Demokratyczna*, pp. 616–617.

1895 W. Suleja, "Ostatnia próba obrony austro-polskiej koncepcji," in: *Z dziejów Galicji, Śląska, Polski i Niemiec. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi i doktorowi Adamowi Galosowi w 70. Rocznicę urodzin*, eds. A. Czaplinski, R. Gells and K. Matwinowski (Wrocław, 1994), pp. 175 and further.

Only conservatives were persistently in favor of the Austro-Polish solution. W. L. Jaworski wrote: "Instinct tells me that, correspondingly to society's position, we should not leave the Habsburgs. The situation can change so much that it would be necessary for someone to remain who could speak with them."¹⁸⁹⁶

Michał Jaskólski criticized the position of Cracow conservatives writing it was: "An obvious evidence of the internal sealing within Cracow conservatives. Moreover, this was an evidence of Cracow politicians' inability to come out with their concepts beyond the modified Habsburg state system."¹⁸⁹⁷ Why war events such as November 5 act or the Brest-Litovsk treaty did not force Cracow conservatives to redefine their policy is thought-provoking.

After the Brest treaty, only strong loyalists, mainly Cracow conservatives, remained by the Austro-Polish concept. However, other political groups did not perceive loyalists as representatives of Polish nation: "The congress regrets that the depleted Polish Circle having renounced slogans of May 28, is not at the moment an exponent of Polish nation's aspirations and feelings."¹⁸⁹⁸ The other Poles definitely moved away from any relationships with the monarchy: "The isolation of pro-Austrian groups, which now deepened significantly, helped to increase Poland's contribution to the work of consolidating the centrifugal aspirations of the monarchy's nations." The treaty also caused a decline in trust for the monarchy, although it did not eliminate: "Austrophilism from predictions of pro-Austrian parties."¹⁸⁹⁹

Austro-Polish concept's final breakdown happened on October 4 when Austro-Hungary addressed the U.S president, Woodrow Wilson, with a peace request accepting the Fourteen Points. USA answered only on October 19.¹⁹⁰⁰ In the meantime, on October 16, the emperor announced a manifesto: "*An meine*

1896 A note from February 11, 1918, Jaworski, *Diariusz 1914–1918*, p. 247.

1897 M. Jaskólski, *Kaduceus polski. Myśl polityczna*, p. 142.

1898 "[1918 czerwiec 2]. – Uchwały Zjazdu Inteligencji Ludowej PSL z Królestwa Polskiego, PSL Piast i PSL Lewica w Krakowie w sprawie jedności działania ruchu ludowego, jego miejsca w walce o niepodległość Polski i reform społeczno-politycznych, Raport sytuacyjny Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych rządu Rady Regencyjnej, nr. 92 z 13 VI 1918r.," in: *Materiały źródłowe do historii*, vol. 1, p. 475.

1899 Mroccka, *Galicji rozstanie z Austrią*, pp. 28–29.

1900 On January 8, 1918, in Congress, W. Wilson delivered his famous Fourteen Points considering war goals and peace conditions in Europe. The tenth point was: "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." The peace offer from October 4 was a second one directed toward USA. The first offer was from September 14, and USA rejected it, J. de Launay, *Historia tajnej dyplomacji*

getreuen österreichischen Völker! (To my faithful Austrian peoples!)” that promised to transform the monarchy into a federation.¹⁹⁰¹

Events on the front prognosticated the end of the war. In this situation, socialists and national democrats showed greater initiative and persuaded Polish Circle’s representatives to accept postulates, commonly referred to as the resolution of I. Daszyński, S. Głąbiński and T. Tertil. The resolution based on Daszyński’s project. However, the project transformed during the discussion, for instance, the word independence changed to sovereignty. In this way, politicians tried to stop Ukrainians’ reluctance from growing and also to satisfy national democrats who demanded the right to independence for Czechs and Southern Slavs. The resolution entered House of Deputies on October 2, 1918, that is, in the last month of war. The resolution was against loyalism and conciliatory policy of Poles toward the monarchy. Due to resolution’s significant importance, we shall present it fully:

We ask the House of Deputies to enact: We recognize the right of every nation to self-determination about its state form and we strive for world peace on the basis of agreement between all nations. To realize and ensure each nation’s full state sovereignty we firmly cease all secret diplomacy that wishes to decide the fate of nations without their knowledge and permission. We combat the militarism and imperialism of every nation, and we express a conviction that world war shall end with the creation of a free nations’ union and an international arbitral tribunal. Guided by these principles, we declare as representatives of the Polish nation in Austria: 1. We consider the division of Poland to be an act of violence against the Polish nation. We demand the restoration of an independent Polish state composing of all parts of Poland, i.e., the coast and of those parts inhabited by mostly Polish population, i.e., especially Silesia. 2. We stand against considering and treating the Polish question as an internal political matter of any of the powers that divided Poland. We reject any unilateral solution of the Polish question. We demand Polish representatives to participate in the world peace congress that should solve the Polish question. 3. Striving for our freedom, far from the intention to rule over another nation, we support the efforts of every nation to achieve its full sovereignty.¹⁹⁰²

od 1914 do 1945, przedmowa H. Batowski (Kraków, 1970), p. 114; Batowski, *Rozpad Austro-Węgier*, pp. 196, 227, 235.

1901 *Wiener Zeitung*, no. 240 (10/17/1918), Extra-Ausgabe. The manifesto’s fragment was: “Austria, according to the will of its peoples, should become a union state in which each nation within its territory forms its own state organization.” At the same time, the emperor claimed the integrity of the Hungarian Crown lands and announced the inclusion of Austria’s Polish areas into the independent Polish state.

1902 “Z izby posłów. Wspólny polski wniosek,” *Naprzód*, no. 220 (10/04/1918), p. 1.

The next day, on October 3, I. Daszyński gave his last speech in the parliament. Daszyński emphasized that Poles were shamefully deceived, even though they participated in the war alongside Austria, shed blood for a foreign state, believing that it would defend Poles' national interests. Daszyński said: "Instead of a real state, they gave us a rump state. Then came the famous Breast treaty which was the new partition of Poland."¹⁹⁰³ Daszyński's position was unambiguous. Daszyński definitely resigned from any relationship with Austria.

Daszyński spoke in a similar tone in joint delegations. On October 15, Daszyński announced a resolution in which he stated that all representatives from now on also¹⁹⁰⁴ consider themselves citizens of a free and united, independent Polish state.¹⁹⁰⁵

During the delegations' last session in October 1918, parties made declarations. I. Daszyński proposed to write that Poles feel citizens of a future Polish state. "My colleague Jędrzejowicz and I raised the accusation that such a statement contradicted our uncomfortable character of Austrian parliament's delegates at the moment." L. German and L. Biliński were of the opposite opinion. Both of them agreed completely on Biliński's idea to add the word "also" to the resolution, which would mean a dual citizenship.¹⁹⁰⁶ This fact clearly suggests that even in the situation of monarchy's agony and the bankruptcy of the Austria-oriented political line,¹⁹⁰⁷ conservatives were still loyal to the partitioner's side.

1903 *Z burzliwej doby. Mowy sejmowe posła Ignacego Daszyńskiego, wygłoszone w czasie od października 1918 do sierpnia 1919. Według protokołów stenograficznych* (Lviv, 1920), pp. 5–17, Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, pp. 306–309; Najdus, *Polska Partia Socjalno-Demokratyczna*, pp. 617–618.

1904 The text of the resolution was in German and contained the word *auch* which translates as "also" but also "as well as." Hence, there are both versions in different sources.

1905 The word "also" was in the text on L. Biliński's request. Only then, Biliński agreed to sign the resolution. In order for Daszyński to submit an own resolution, he had to meet the formal requirement, i.e., six signatures. W. Długosz, L. German, S. Głębiński, W. Tetmajer, and, of course applicant himself, agreed. L. Biliński and A. Jędrzejowicz also were in delegations. Therefore, formal considerations determined the final shape of the resolution. The word "also" meant that Poles were both citizens of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and of the Polish state, which yet did not exist. In fact, this did not matter that much because the further course of events and the establishment of authorities by Poles ultimately determined the state belongingness of the Polish nation, Buszko, *Polacy w parlamencie wiedeńskim*, p. 331; Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, p. 310; Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, pp. 174–176.

1906 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, pp. 174–175.

1907 Jaskólski, *Kaduceus polski. Myśl polityczna*, p. 143.

The next day, on October 16, emperor Charles I announced the quoted manifesto about federalization of Austria which did not solve the Polish question, yet talked about transferring: "Polish areas within Austria to the independent Polish state." However, the emperor left the issue of East Galicia's state belonging open.¹⁹⁰⁸ L. Biliński assessed the emperor critically writing: "The monarch himself voluntarily, without the need and without the winner's pressure, divided his great state into small independent, incoherent parts. It was a surprise for the entire political world, except perhaps the emperor himself, who threw the old Habsburg crown on the street."¹⁹⁰⁹ Also H. Lieberman assessed emperor's deed without enthusiasm, although from a different point of view: "The emperor issued a manifesto on the nations' autonomy which passed without impression because it was too late."¹⁹¹⁰ Whereas Jakub Bojko commented on the monarchy's fall the following way: "A change in the world! Austria – this sweet, treacherous monarchy, this artificial conglomerate – collapsed into rubble."¹⁹¹¹

Most likely, after emperor's manifesto, there still were plans to rescue the monarchy, as H. Lieberman wrote. We do not know exactly if the initiative started before or after the manifesto's announcement. H. Lieberman reported that this took place: "In the last days of October." The Polish Circle summoned Lieberman for a conference in the Club's parliamentary commission. Also a member of the House of Lords, H. Lammasch, participated in the conference. Lieberman was the only socialist who stayed in Vienna during this period. Lieberman learned that the emperor entrusted forming a government to H. Lammasch. The government's task was to: "Peaceful liquidation of Austria." The condition for the government's creation was, among other things, the participation of all political parties' representatives. Conservatives made joining this government conditional on the participation of socialists. Lieberman refused to speak on this issue on behalf of the entire socialist club. At the same time, Lieberman said that he would not join the government himself: "Poles are actually already outside

1908 Chlebowczyk, *Między dyktatem, realimiam*, p. 416.

1909 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 2, p. 179.

1910 Lieberman, *Pamiętniki*, p. 144. Lieberman also wrote: "The approaching Austria's end for me was only a rhetorical phrase. In every nerve I felt that the program of a great state approached, and it would not pass without shocks and suffering of the whole population . . . Austria shall die almost quietly and discreetly, without violent convulsions and without thunder because it is completely rotten," Lieberman, *Pamiętniki*, pp. 142–143.

1911 Bojko, *Gorące słowa*, p. 195.

Austria in their thoughts. Therefore, Poles have no national interest or moral obligation to deal with Austria's liquidation."¹⁹¹²

Austro-Hungary recognized Poland's independence in Charles' I declaration from October 16, 1918. The declaration spoke of unification of Polish areas within Austria with the independent Polish state. On November 11, authorities accepted the truce based on W. Wilson's Fourteen Points. Next, also Germany recognized the right of independent Poland.¹⁹¹³

L. Biliński commented bitterly on these facts: "We still (February 1920) feel and we will feel for a long time the effects of the accusation that we did not achieve our homeland ourselves but that "strangers gave it to us."¹⁹¹⁴

After emperor Charles announced the manifesto on Austria's federalization – which did not solve the issue of East Galicia – on October 16, in Lviv on October 18 and 19, 1918, a congress of Ukrainian politicians took place. The congress appointed the Ukrainian National Council (UNC) as the supreme representation of Austro-Hungarian Ukrainians.¹⁹¹⁵ The congress' purpose was to create a framework of Ukrainian state. Already during the first day of the meeting, politicians proclaimed the establishment of the Ukrainian state¹⁹¹⁶ not

1912 Lieberman, *Pamiętniki*, p. 143.

1913 A. Ajnenkiel, *Międzynarodowe uwarunkowania*, p. 218.

1914 Biliński, *Wspomnienia i dokumenty*, vol. 1, p. 302.

1915 UNC was the first Ukrainian legislature organ. UNC composed of politicians from both Austrian parliament chambers, from Galicia's and Bukovina's parliaments, plus three members from each Ukrainian party. After UNC established, on October 19 it issued a decree on the creation of a Ukrainian state from ethnically Ukrainian lands. A few days later, on October 25, prime minister M. Hussarek found out about UNC's establishment from the note that demanded transferring an administrative power over East Galicia to UNC. However, Austrian authorities did not meet this demand. The next day, UNC sent a note to the U.S president, W. Wilson, informing about the foundation of the Ukrainian state and asking Wilson to support Ukrainian national aspirations. At the same time, UNC formed local authorities in order to prevent overtaking control in the East Galicia. On October 30, UNC issued an appeal to inhabitants not to submit to the Polish Liquidation Committee's decisions. Galicia's intendant, K. Huyn refused to recognize the legitimacy of URN. However, after Huyn's resignation, the new intendant, W. Decykiewicz accepted UNC and gave the power over East Galicia to the Ukrainian organ, O. Pawłyszyn, "Ukraińska Rada Narodowa. Najwyższy organ ustawodawczy Zachodnio-ukraińskiej Republiki Ludowej (październik 1918–czerwiec 1919)," in: *Biuletyn Ukrainoznawczy*, no. 5 (1999), pp. 20–21.

1916 National democrats announced the creation of a West Ukrainian People's Republic at a rally on St. George's square in Lviv. Radicals and socialists did the same. At that

mentioning the further connection with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, yet demanding a separate delegation to the peace conference in Paris.¹⁹¹⁷

The end of the First World War meant the fulfillment of hope and the finalization of aspirations and independence initiatives of Poles that they undertake throughout the whole period of national slavery. An essential condition for creating the foundations of Polish statehood was to take over the power in Galicia from Austrian civil and military administration. That is why politicians established the Polish Liquidation Committee (PLC).¹⁹¹⁸

PLC established on October 27, 1918, in Cracow. PLC composed of twenty-three deputies of the Austrian parliament.¹⁹¹⁹ Members elected W. Witos the chairman, and I. Daszyński, T. Tertil, A. Skarbek and Fr. Londzin from Silesia created the presidium. PLC's main task was to seize power from Austrians and act as a temporary government over Galicia and Cieszyn Silesia. In principle, PLC's activity limited only to West Galicia.¹⁹²⁰ The next day, on October 28, PLC enacted a resolution stating: "Polish deputies of Austrian Imperial State once again state that Polish lands within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy already belong to the Polish state."¹⁹²¹ Also the prime minister, H. Lammash, obtained

time, national democrats began secret negotiations with the Viennese government through the intendant of Galicia, general K. Huyn, demanding to bring Ukrainian troops to East Galicia and take over the government buildings.

1917 Batowski, *Rozpad Austro-Węgier*, pp. 241–242.

1918 At the same time when PLC constituted, I. Daszyński received a letter from Mykola Hankiewicz in which Hankiewicz urgently asked for a Polish-Ukrainian agreement as he predicted that tragic events would take place in Galicia otherwise. Polish side delegated Artur Hausner to talks with the Ukrainian side. However, the Poles' decision turned out to be late because on the same day the Ukrainian army entered Lviv, Daszyński, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 2, p. 318; Najdus, *Polska Partia Socjalno-Demokratyczna*, pp. 621–623.

1919 Representatives were from the following clubs: six of PPP, four of NDC, four of PSDPG, 3 of democrats without adjectives, two of conservatives, one of PLDP and other smaller groupings, and one Silesian representative.

1920 Lasocki, *Wspomnienia szefa administracji P. K. L. i K. Rz.* (Cracow, 1931), pp. 7–8; Bazyłow, "Odrodzenie sprawy polskiej w kraju i w świecie (1900–1918)", in: *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, vol. 3 – 1795–1918, ed. L. Bazyłow (Warsaw, 1982), p. 934.

1921 Lasocki, *Wspomnienia szefa administracji*, p. 96.

the resolution.¹⁹²² The formal constitution of PLC took place on November 4 in Cracow.¹⁹²³

The first Polish independent authorities constituted in November 1918. It was Provisional People's Government of the Republic of Poland established on the night of November 6–7. This organ included representatives of PSDPG, PSP, PPP and other smaller groupings. I. Daszyński became the prime minister. The government issued a proclamation: "To the Polish people!"¹⁹²⁴ and operated only four days. A few days later, on November 11, the Regency Council gave the military power to Józef Piłsudski. On November 14, the Council dissolved. Then, J. Piłsudski transferred power to I. Daszyński and ordered him to convene the legislative parliament. On November 17, Jędrzej Moraczewski became the head of the Polish government.

1922 M. Klimecki, "Likwidacja austriackiej państwowości w Galicji w październiku i listopadzie 1918r.," in: *Zwischen Wien und Lemberg. Die Vorträge der polnisch-österreichischen Tagung zum 80. Jahrestag des Ausbruches des Ersten Weltkrieges, Warschau, den 17. November 1994* (Warsaw, 1996), p. 66.

1923 Lasocki, *Wspomnienia szefa administracji*, p. 19–20.

1924 "Do ludu polskiego!," *AAN, Instytucje Tymczasowego Rządu Republiki Polskiej – zbiór akt*, no. 1266, p. 8.

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