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An Anthropology of Crosslocations

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Introduction: a crosslocations multigraph

The question of *where* a place, person, or object is located can be answered in many different ways. Take, for example, the University of Helsinki—this book's institutional and intellectual home. When asked where the university is located, we might just as well reply in Finland, in the European Union (EU), in the South Boreal ecoregion, in the borderland between Lutheran and Russian-Orthodox Christianity, or in a major port city at the fringes of the EU's free trade area. Underlying each of these answers is a specific logic or way of thinking that divides geographical space, classifies territories, and assigns value to places, thus situating them in meaningful terms and positioning them in relation to other places. While each of these different ways of locating the University of Helsinki are equally accurate, it usually makes more sense to talk about the university as being located in Finland, rather than the South Boreal ecoregion. Depending on context, some locating logics are more relevant than others.

One of the most visible and omnipresent ways of locating places in the world today is the logic driving contemporary states. This way of thinking distinguishes between territories and fixes their borders on maps. While there are many contested borders around the world, the underlying logic defining state territories and border regimes is clear: it classifies places as sovereign territories (land, sea, and the airspace directly above them), defining what is inside and outside, and what is connected and disconnected. One reason that the logic of state territories has become domi-

nant is that it is backed up by a great deal of power. State borders are regulated by certain laws for entry and exit; there are people who manage, patrol, and control the territory and its borders or border zones. At the same time, supra-national entities such as the EU or the African Union complicate this picture. More often than not, the coexistence of different locating logics leads to multiple locations in the same place and to hierarchical evaluations of the significance and value of some places over others.

Yet state territories are not alone in the world. There are several other ways to divide geographical space, several other logics that give answers to the question of where things are located. Many of the borders of these other locating logics do not appear on conventional maps or, if they do, these maps are different from the territorial ones with which most people have grown accustomed. One example is the logic that delineates ecosystems and classifies interactions between living organisms and their environments. Here, the value and meaning of locations are set by principles developed within modern biology and ecology. The borders introduced by the logic of ecosystems reflect the qualities of environments rather than the legal foundations of border regimes. From this perspective it makes sense to distinguish between aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems, to draw boundaries between deserts, tundras, forests, and grasslands, and to speak of ecological pyramids and food webs. While there are certainly overlaps (more about those below), this ecological logic is different from the locating logic of political borders. Its driving epistemological basis is also different, insofar as it is couched in scientific principles. This is a form of power that does different things and mobilises distinct processes in the world. By locating things in ecosystems, modern science has had the capacity to shape the way millions of people understand and engage with their environments.

A third locating logic involves religious structures and beliefs. When in Mecca, Varanasi, or Mount Athos, you are materially located on religious territory. The beliefs, rituals, and symbols associated with Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity oftentimes take precedence over the Saudi Arabian, Indian, and Greek nation-

states in which these holy sites are located, let alone the ecological zones in which these places belong. At the same time, there are significant overlaps between state territories and religious structures. The borders between several contemporary nation-states have, at least ostensibly, been drawn based on the religious affinity of people living in different territories. Often, such divisions have caused brutal violence and massive waves of forced migration, since religious homogeneity is typically a condition created *ex post facto*. That being said, religious beliefs and institutions are manifestations of a separate, religious locating logic. It provides a distinctive set of answers to the question of where in particular a person, place, or object is located.

A fourth prominent way to understand where something or someone is located concerns what we might call an economic locating logic: a classification of places according to their significance and value in monetary, financial, and trading terms. While that logic also significantly overlaps with state territorial logic, it simultaneously crosscuts state territories and even the spaces of supra-national entities such as the EU. The operations of US companies such as Apple and Tesla in China, as well as the transnational outsourcing of labour by many of these companies, provide two simple examples of what makes this spatial logic distinct. For a worker or commodity, it might be as important to be located in Tesla's value chain as it is to be located within the borders of a particular nation-state; the value and significance of a booming special economic zone, such as Shenzhen, are to a large extent determined by financial, logistical and monetary connections to trading partners and markets all across the globalised world.

In *An Anthropology of Crosslocations*, we are interested in how these kinds of locational dynamics create layers and tangles of connections and disconnections in the places in which people live and through which they move, and how that shapes just about everything. Drawing on ethnographic research, we examine how different locating logics coexist in the same place and how looking at things in that way changes what we can know of how people make sense of where they are located, as well as opening out dif-

ferent ways to understand the ongoing process of how places are shaped.[1]

We began this exploration with two basic concepts that had initially been developed by one of us (Sarah Green): *locating regimes* and *relative location*. As we discuss further below, we initially defined 'locating regime' as a logic that establishes the significance and value of location and is backed up by some form of power. We also emphasised that locating regimes work to connect and disconnect places from each other, thus emphasising that it is not only the connections that matter. Meanwhile, 'relative location' refers to an understanding of location as inherently relative, where the meaning and value of a place depends on how it compares with other places according to some kind of measuring scale. Our individual trajectories, training, and intellectual orientations meant that these key concepts implied different things to each of the book's authors. Those disagreements were never exclusionary, which signified that where our understandings overlapped, we were onto something interesting.

In addition to those two main concepts, we also started from the premise that different locating regimes coexist in the same place: that different ways of establishing the significance and value of where things are almost always overlap. Our shorthand for referring to this ongoing process of coexisting and overlapping locating regimes, relative locations, and connections and disconnections was: crosslocations.

We explored and developed our conceptual tools while carrying out a range of ethnographic research projects in different parts of the Mediterranean region. The simple idea was to experiment with what difference it made to think about how our various research projects might make use of these initial premises in their ethnographic research, and then to draw the results together to

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1   When we use 'crosslocations' as a noun, it refers to the concept. When we instead use 'Crosslocations' (with initial capital), it refers to the title of the European Research Council (ERC)-funded research project that enabled the research to develop the concept.

see what emerged. Here, we have come together to demonstrate that difference and some of the crosslocations to which it points: if the borders of any location we happen to be researching are cross-cut by a range of different ways to locate it, how does that change an understanding of what is going on there?

This approach is built up across seven different ethnographic and historical accounts covered in the book: a beach in Beirut and disputes about its use as a public space; a sacred site in central Greece called the Meteora and the tensions between monastic authorities and nearby residents about the meaning of that place; the nation-state of Egypt and how its official focus has shifted from being oriented towards Europe in an earlier period only to later turn towards Africa, the Soviet Union, the United States, the Arabic Gulf, and then, possibly, back towards Europe once again; a small town in Calabria, Italy, and attempts to draw on historical documents to revise its location relative to the processes of the town's emptying; the Spanish exclave of Melilla and what happens when a small patch of land is physically disconnected from the state to which it legally belongs; the Grand Bazaar of Istanbul and how stories told by carpet sellers about where the carpets came from overcame the challenge to the fine carpet trade that the arrival of scaled-up industrial production and cheap imports presented; and the transportation of livestock across the Mediterranean region, which is governed by a standardised locating logic that suits some parts of the world a lot better than others.

This book, collectively authored by seven of us, provides one outcome of that work: the effort to draw upon and develop that initial set of ideas and premises through ethnographic fieldwork. As we researched places, people, events, and themes in different locations, our research was guided by them; they shaped the kinds of questions we asked and opened out a range of ways to understand the dynamics of location as being both specific and deliberately shaped, but also always unfinished business, because of the coexistence of other ways to determine their shape and character. We think the book shows that ultimately, this way of understanding location provides a profound rethinking of the significance of

location: neither the nihilistic idea of fluidity (the idea that everything is always changing all the time, so there is no point in trying to hold it in place long enough to decide what is going on), nor the static idea of fixity (the idea that, ultimately, there is only one 'real' location, and only one 'real' set of forces that determines what is happening). Instead, we consider location to be part of a power-inflected and ongoing dynamic that always leaves a space for changing direction, because there is never only one way to establish where things are.

Locating regimes

As already briefly discussed, there are two key premises with which we began: *locating regimes* and *relative location*. While we do not always use these phrases in the same way, as will be evident in the following chapters, we all started from a common definition that understands locating regimes to refer to knowledge systems and structures that calibrate the relative meaning and significance of locations. Our curiosity is directed towards the logics that people use to classify, evaluate, and understand spatial differences, combined with some kind of power that imposes or even enforces such logics in practice. We call such combinations of logic plus power 'locating regimes'.

What we mean by the word 'logic' builds on a rich tradition of anthropological scholarship that addresses ways in which people around the world understand, organise, and classify their social and material environments. An obvious classic is Bourdieu's *The Logic of Practice* (1995), in which Bourdieu densely explores the interplay between different cultural logics and experiences. More recent studies include Rupert Stasch's *Society of Others* (2009), which outlines a distinct relation to place based on a logic of social relations that are about strangeness and otherness rather than closeness and familiarity; Frédéric Keck's *Avian Reservoirs* (2020), which combines structuralist and post-structuralist approaches in studying the different epistemologies that scientists and policy makers draw upon to understand bird flu and how to respond

to it; and Miriam Ticktin's *Casualties of Care* (2011), which critically studies the logic of humanitarianism in France. As these and a great many other anthropological studies illustrate, epistemological logics constitute a fundamental tenet of social interaction, cultural expression, economic change, political organisation, and more.[2]

We also take an interest in the logics by which people understand, organise, and inhabit the world. But our focus is distinct as well, insofar as we are specifically interested in *spatial*, and more specifically *locational*, patterns of classification. Daily life involves a density of multiple conditions, structures, regulations, environments, relations, and separations that generate alternative versions of what it means to be located somewhere in particular. In the first pages of this book, we described a number of obvious examples: the Westphalian system of nation-states, modern biology's definition of ecosystems, religious structures, and dynamics driven by the world economy. Our emphasis on distinct spatial logics and epistemologies resembles some other theories that distinguish between different domains of meaning and action, including Pierre Bourdieu's (1995) formulation of social fields, Ervin Goffman's (1974) frame analysis, and Niklas Luhmann's (1995) theory of social systems, among others. However, though we argue that there exist alternative ways of establishing the relative value and meaning of a location, we also begin with the premise of overlaps and encounters. The coexistence of different locating regimes in one and the same place means that no one of them is guaranteed to be able to control what happens next. The social or other out-

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2 Of course, epistemological structures of classifications have been a central focus of anthropological exploration and theorising since the discipline was established at the turn of the 20th century. Some obvious examples range from Durkheim's (2008) classic study of religion and totemism to structural-functional classificatory theories of kinship systems, and from Lévi-Strauss's (1992) structuralist explorations of the binary oppositions that undergird the human psyche to Mary Douglas's (2013) symbolic interpretation of purity and pollution.

comes of the encounter between locating regimes are not know-able in advance, but require empirical investigation.

Our point of departure, in other words, was that while it is sometimes possible and analytically useful to distinguish between different locating logics, this is rarely what happens in practice. Indeed, an important premise of much anthropological think-ing is that logics—however powerful and omnipresent—rarely, if ever, act in solitude. Consider, for instance, the logic of state ter-ritories that we discussed in the opening paragraphs. While state ideologies are often couched in neutrality and indifference (Her-zfeld 1992), research in political anthropology has consistently shown that nation-states are continuously shaped and intersected by other frames of meaning and action, including mass media (Anderson 1983), popular culture (Hall 2006), gender (Verdery 1994), and kinship (Thelen and Alber 2018), among many oth-ers. Similarly, students of political ecology and environmental anthropology have convincingly argued that modern science is neither immune from political influences, nor devoid of signifi-cant political implications (Descola 2013; Ingold 2000). Anthro-pologists of religion, on the other hand, have demonstrated that the various meanings and practices that fall under the rubric of religion are crosscut by material necessities (Schielke 2008, 2012), globalising processes (Hirschkind 2006; Robbins 2004), and geo-political power struggles (Li 2019). Finally, in the sub-field of economic anthropology, the tendency to cast 'the economy' as a market-driven logic detached from social relations has for dec-ades sparked intense criticism (Polanyi 1944) and given rise to an extensive body of scholarship that examines intersections between the economy and race (Hage 2017), gender structures (Bear et al. 2015; Federici 1975), and kinship (Sahlins 1972), to name a few.

We are also interested in identifying overlaps and understand-ing coexistence, yet, once again, our attention is explicitly con-cerned with locations. To be precise, rather than striving to pin locations down, we seek to explore the dynamic process of creat-ing a sense of where things are in the world and of calibrating the relative values of coexisting locations. Our premise that mul-

tiple locating regimes typically coexist and overlap in the same geographical space means that the logics driving them can take several different forms. These locating regimes may be politically, legally, economically, religiously, environmentally, infrastructurally, and otherwise inflected; more often than not, they involve a combination of several of the above. Encounters between them might be parallel, with no mutual effects; they might be collaborative; they might be contradictory; they might be hierarchical; they might be fractal; they might be cumulative—building up into something that is different from either one.

This brings us to the second element of a locating regime: power. A locational logic or classification system on its own is not sufficient to make an imprint on the world; only when a logic is backed up by power can it have a significant impact on where humans, animals, goods, and places are located; only then does it make sense to call the logic a 'regime'.

Here, it is worth briefly outlining what we take power to mean. We have not particularly concerned ourselves with power in a philosophical or ontological sense; we are more interested in how it works in shaping the value and significance of being somewhere in particular. Two somewhat contrasting understandings of power have arisen in our exploration of the idea of locating regimes. First, there is what Pulkkinen (2000, ch. 4) calls the liberal understanding of power, as classically described by the likes of Stephen Lukes (1974) and Robert Dahl (1969): the idea of coercive or controlling power, in which A has power over B. In that case, both A and B are understood as being separate and potentially autonomous entities, and the ability of B to act autonomously is restricted by A. The second form of power is more Foucauldian (as seen, for example, in Foucault 1986): this conceives of power as a technology in which a form of knowledge guides practices, systems, and structures which end up creating the entities that are within the sphere of that power. In this second meaning of power, there are no autonomous entities; power is about knowledge, about knowing how things are in a particular way, which then brings those things into existence in that form.

Combining these two, we intend power in this text to refer to the capacity to influence, orientate, constrain, control, relate, separate, and/or shape the relative value and significance of spatial locations. In other words, power in our work takes the form of practices, materialities, institutions, traditions, physical constraints, acts of violence, and more that render a particular spatial logic relevant, omnipresent, or even inescapable for particular groups of people in particular times and spaces. Needless to say, that capacity to enforce a logic can take many forms, both in practice and in thought, and a significant part of our ethnographic work has involved exploring how power manifests in different contexts.

The idea of locating regimes combining a spatial logic with some kind of power appears in every chapter in this book in one way or another. In Chapter 1, we look at how the logics of diverging notions of public space locate the beach in Beirut and how activists, scholars, and bureaucrats struggle to connect the beach to, and disconnect it from, other parts of the world. In Chapter 2, we turn to the Meteora, a rock formation in central Greece, and consider the spatial logics informing its 'holy' status and the adverse implications this status has for residents of a nearby town. In Chapter 3, we consider the Egyptian nation-state as a powerful, yet also transforming locating regime—nationalism backed up by state power—that work to change the orientation of the national location. In Chapter 4, we look at archives from Petrizzi in Calabria to consider whether history comes with a logic backed up with power that makes it count as a locating regime. In Chapter 5, we consider the incorporation of Melilla into the EU and Schengen Area, two powerful institutions that define transnational regional territories according to geopolitical and trading logics that do not always coincide. In Chapter 6, which focuses on the carpet trade in Istanbul's Grand Bazaar, we trace how the process of industrialisation and the powerful trading and market logic that accompanied it led to a radical relocation of the Grand Bazaar, an institution that had been a central hub of both the city and cross-regional trading relations for centuries before that

change occurred. Finally, in Chapter 7, which covers the regulation of livestock transport drawing on the standards set by the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH), we consider the locating logic of a global organisation, a regime that while asserting its logic is universal (i.e. 'scientific'), is based on an understanding of animal farming that is inevitably more suited to some parts of the world than others.

Each of these chapters takes a different aspect of the idea of locating regimes and builds on it through ethnographic material, combined with the particular approach each of us has chosen to take. These encounters between our initial premises and ethnographical nitty-gritty show how locating logics and their associated powers play pivotal roles in the process of establishing the value and significance of where people, goods, animals, and places are located. The encounters also shed light on how locating regimes become imbricated in dynamic and complex social, cultural, and political processes. The chapters embrace and dwell on this tension between initial premises and ethnographic encounters. On the one hand, we show that epistemology and classifying logics are powerful processes that matter in the world that we inhabit. On the other hand, a locating logic—however power-laden it might be—is never encompassing and all-dominant: its locating work always coexists with other logics, powers, actors, and historical processes and contingent events.

Chapter 3 on Egypt, based on Rommel's research, provides a compelling example of this ambivalence. It draws on the literal meaning of 'regime'—in this case, the actual government of Egypt. Starting from the premise that the nation-state could be understood as a locating regime, but also that it has to be 'scaffolded' by other logics and powers to be efficient, the chapter describes how the country's location vis-à-vis different ideological and power hubs around the world have shifted since the mid-20th century. The rebuilding of Egypt, both literally, in terms of huge building projects, and ideologically, in terms of the country's orientation, provides a means to examine explicit attempts to re-scaffold Egypt's location. This includes the efforts to implement particu-

lar locational perspectives in a context that is cluttered with historical traces that provide evidence of contrasting vantage points. Ultimately, the chapter showcases that even this most powerful of locating regimes never imposes its logic cleanly and in isolation.

Chapter 4 on Petrizzi's archives, which covers Viscomi's research, focuses squarely on the question of whether history could be conceived of as a locating regime. It considers how doing that might provide a different understanding of the interplay of location and the historical material drawn upon to create realities in the present. For example, in this small town in Southern Italy that has witnessed protracted emigration since the late 18th century and accelerated depopulation after the Second World War, engagement with the town's material landscapes through its historical documents provides a concrete way of locating it. By seeing historical documents as starting points for articulating histories, and histories as ways of drawing wider connections and separations, various actors in Petrizzi (including Viscomi) aim to give value to the place itself.

In our discussions of locating regimes we particularly focus on how connections and disconnections—established by a variety of structural, infrastructural, legal, economic, political, environmental, practical, and conceptual conditions—forge links between locations, or create barriers between them. In the chapters that follow, the effects of connections and disconnections appear in a variety of guises: from relatively straightforward processes such as the combined formal-informal management of the border crossing between Melilla and Morocco, to the more subtle process of trying to trace connections through historical documents in Petrizzi, to historical narrations and trading routes that give the Hereke carpet in Istanbul's Grand Bazaar its unique value. In these cases and others, we get a sense of the frequently performative character of locating regimes, the way physical walls, digital walls, and conceptual walls, or combinations of them, can often have much the same effects in practice. Ultimately, it is by tracing these connections and disconnections—thought of within this book as the operation of locating regimes and their interactions—that

the ethnographic chapters are able to explore how locations are assigned value and meaning, and how different 'heres' may exist in the same geographical space. We call these multiple and coexisting 'heres' *relative locations*.

Relative location

The second key phrase with which we began was *relative location*. For a number of years, the phrase had been used by Sarah Green to refer to the idea that the value and significance of any particular place is at least partly determined by its connections to and separations from other places (Green 2013b, 2017, 2018). One example illustrating this idea is the way that past connections and disconnections between the Greek Aegean islands and the western coast of Türkiye partly define the contemporary character of those places. Islands adjacent to the Greek–Turkish border, such as Lesvos or Rhodes, would not be the same locations, in political, historical, or social terms, if the connections and disconnections between the Turkish and Greek states were different. The Greek islands do not make total sense without taking their relations and separations from Türkiye into account.

What we have added to this understanding is the possibility that there may be many alternative ways of determining the relative value and significance of locations: a multiplicity of classificatory logics that generate different kinds of connections and disconnections and thus assign different kinds of meaning to the difference between here and somewhere else.

The Greek island of Lesvos once again provides an illustrative case in point. In terms of the logic of political borders, Lesvos is a part of Greece and connected to other nation-states in the EU. It is this relative location as part of the EU, combined with its geographical proximity to Türkiye, that contributed to making it a site of large-scale migration in 2015. The island is also located as part of the Greek state, or as part of the Orthodox Christian world. And that alternative Orthodox relative location, defined by a religious logic, was highly relevant in the separation between

the Greek and Turkish nation-states in the 1920s. In addition, the island has a very different relevance as the home island of the poet Sappho, a fact that became significant in the early 20th century when classical history was used by European sexologists and European media of the day to obliquely refer to the love that dare not speak its name (lesbianism; see Green 2023). This location runs parallel to the other ways to locate this island, not really touching them. Looked at that way, the island constitutes a criss-crossing of different relative locations.

The way in which the logic of political borders contrasts the logic of religious structures and organisations is not unique to the Aegean. Indeed, as a direct result of our initial premise that different locating regimes tend to coexist in one and the same place, we are suggesting that it is almost always the case that the same geographical space could involve several overlapping locations. In that sense, we understand relative location as a form of political, social, economic, and/or technical relative positioning, involving diverse classificatory logics and powers that calibrate its relative values.

In geography and most anthropology, location refers to the condition of being situated spatially: it refers to the fact of physically being somewhere in particular rather than somewhere else. That understanding of the word has appeared in many anthropological texts, perhaps most notably in the work of Gupta and Ferguson (1997), but elsewhere as well (e.g. Candea 2007; Ghannam 2002; Jansen 2007; Malkki 1995). An alternative, and equally powerful, meaning of the word is more metaphorical, and has often drawn on the work of Homi Bhabha (1994). This has focused on the history of hierarchical and oppressive relations attached to locational differences; or has drawn on debates about cultural interpretations of locality (as opposed to location), as seen particularly in the work of Arjun Appadurai (1995, 1996), but others as well (e.g. Grasseni 2009; Lovell 1998; Nitsiakos 1996; Wilson 2008).

The difference in meaning between locality and location highlights an important dividing line in these debates. Appadurai describes locality as being 'primarily relational and contextual rather than … scalar or spatial' (Appadurai 1995, 178). What this

draws out is that locality describes an abstract quality: what something is like. In contrast, location most commonly refers to where something is situated, and not what it is, as such. The difference in meaning between the phrase, 'that is a good locality' and 'that is a good location' makes this clear: a good locality draws attention to the quality of the place, the assertion that its quality, as a place, is good. In contrast, a good location draws attention to the spatial positioning of a place: what is good is *where* it is, rather than what it is. In that sense, location is axiomatically spatial; spatial positioning is what is being described by the word.[3]

Importantly, we argue that location is also a *relative* value: being positioned somewhere axiomatically implies the existence of other locations elsewhere, so that a location only makes sense by understanding where it is relative to other possible locations. That in turn implies that location is the result of a classificatory logic: a way of establishing where something is (not what it is) and ascribing some kind of relative or comparative value or significance to that. Take, for example, 39.7217° N, 21.6306° E, which are the geographical coordinates of the Meteora. Those numbers are part of the geographical coordinate system, which measures and describes location in terms of longitude and latitude. When one examines the coordinates of the Meteora in relation to those of a different location, it becomes possible to understand how they are positioned relative to one another. Indeed, the location of the Meteora in the coordinate system would make no sense without this relation to other locations with other coordinates.[4]

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3 The difference between location and locality overlaps with (but is not identical to) that between 'place' and 'space' (see Coleman and Collins 2006; Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga 2003).

4 The coordinate system has a distinctive logic and history behind it, and the story of how it came to globally dominate the method for describing where things are spatially located on the surface of the earth was not a straightforward one involving developments in scientific measurement; it also involved politics, economics, and social change (Bennett 1987; Howse 1980; Pickles 2004; Sobel 1996).

The underlying point of our examination of relative locations is to draw attention to the diversity of crosscutting influences that give relative meaning and significance to a location's *where* in relation to other locations, elsewhere. Eric Wolf (1982) thought of such crosscutting influences in terms of global trade and the development of capitalism. For Appadurai (1995, 1996), the key issue was cultural crosscuts, causing people to think and imagine differently. For Doreen Massey (1999), the key issue was what she called 'power geometries', the way powerful forces could shape, warp, and stretch the relations between places. Michael Herzfeld (2002, 2004) focused on how scholarship, and particularly classical history, contributed towards creating both mutual interdependence and a hierarchy of value between different peoples and parts of the world. Richard Wilk (1995) developed a similar hierarchy of value concept in his study of beauty contests in Belize, arguing that what is regarded as the standard for beauty comes from somewhere in particular. For Annelise Riles (2000), it is modernist epistemologies that inform the practices of transnational organisations, which at times come up against moments that contradict their logic. For Etienne Balibar (2016), the constant re-drawing of borders means that borders both challenge everything, by constantly changing, and determine everything, by powerfully shaping how people make use of and move across borders, and understand where they are themselves located. For David Harvey (2009), there is a power-inflected and ongoing dialectical relation between space, place, and environment, shaped by the general process of capital circulation and its internal contradictions, which leads to the need for a process-based approach towards the study of these kinds of crosscurrents.

The list could go on. The overall message, now a widely accepted idea, is that spaces and places are interdependent in both physical and conceptual terms, and that their boundaries are reliant on dynamics that stretch beyond the here and now. It is precisely in this sense that we postulate that the value and meaning of a location is relational: it depends on what you are comparing it to, and this is often determined by a variety of often hierarchical

connections and disconnections to other places. The idea is also that diverse ways of defining or asserting the difference between one location and another can coexist in the same physical space. Relative locations, in other words, are among the processes that result from what Doreen Massey once referred to as 'the principle of coexisting heterogeneity' (2005, 12).

In the Crosslocations project, we have been exploring what becomes visible when an ethnographer takes the coexistence of such relative locations seriously. Chapter 1, which discusses Lähteenaho's ethnographic study of disputes around the meaning of public space in Beirut, is an example of agonistic tension between different ways to ascribe the value and significance of locations. The chapter argues that both historical and contemporary transnational political, legal, and epistemological understandings of public space deeply affect how the relative location of a beach in Beirut is contested. Whether the beach as public space is located through the logic of property, or whether it is located through public space as a critical concept drawing on social science, has concrete consequences for relations that the beach has with the rest of Beirut and beyond. The first locates the beach in relation to other properties registered in the Lebanese land registry, while the second positions it in relation to other cases of enclosure of public space around the world. These coexisting relative positionings are used variously by actors with different stakes in the relative location of the beach, with the diverging logics variously being brought up in overt conflict or simmering agonism.

Chapter 2, which describes Douzina-Bakalaki's ethnographic study of the Meteora, a spectacular rock formation and major Orthodox monastic complex in central Greece, also involves tension, albeit of a different kind. The chapter explores the Meteora's implication in different registers of value, including geologic time, archaeology, Byzantine history, monastic tradition, and cultural heritage protection. The logics driving each of these registers emphasise certain aspects of the landscape, while concealing others, thus producing different versions of the Meteora. Each of

these multiple locations not only shifts the position of the Meteora, but also inserts it within different grids of spatial relationality. In other words, each of the coexisting 'heres' that are hosted in the Meteora is also connected to various 'elsewheres' and disconnected from other 'elsewheres'. However, the logics informing these multiple and coexisting locations are not always harmoniously aligned. The chapter zooms into the Meteora's 'holy' status, which has been protected by Greek law since 1995, and examines what happens when one locating regime overrides others, thus monopolising space and abating, or even eliminating, different versions of the place.

Both chapters 1 and 2 describe the encounter between different locating regimes in the same geographical space and the multiple relative locations that these encounters generate. In doing so, the chapters demonstrate that while conflict is often an important part of the story, it is never all there is. There are also alliances, synergies, and mutual dependencies which imply that, at times, some kinds of distinctions are important, and at other times they blend together seamlessly to such a degree that it would make no sense to speak of distinctions at all. We call these overlaps and imbrications in and across spatial locations 'crosslocations'.

Crosslocations

Eric Wolf once noted that in the past, anthropologists often treated peoples, societies, or cultures as if they were self-contained and timeless groups: 'we create a model of the world as a global pool hall in which the entities spin off each other like so many hard and round billiard balls' (Wolf 1982, 6). Wolf was criticising anthropologists of the day for failing to take historical change into account in their research on diverse peoples around the world, and for failing to realise quite how powerfully and constantly interactions with others, and particularly interventions from other 'fields of force' (18), can shape people's lives. Along with many scholars—e.g. Johannes Fabian ([1983] 2014), Kirsten Hastrup (1992), and Michael Herzfeld (1987)—Wolf made an important contribution

towards understanding that the world is interconnected and that peoples around the world are continually changing.

Wolf's point is now standardly accepted in anthropology, and it constitutes an underlying assumption for our research. As described in the sections above, our examination of locating regimes and relative location pays diligent attention to coexistence and interconnections. The world we depict is one of movement, change, and dynamism. Still, we are trying to take this general approach a few steps further. We suggest that there may not be only one main field of force, such as capitalism as Wolf suggested, but several coexisting locating logics and powers, and when they crosscut one another, they take on a variety of cumulative effects. This aligns well with the work of Aihwa Ong, Stephen Collier, and others contributing to the ground-breaking edited collection *Global Assemblages* (Ong and Collier 2005). This book draws on the work of Deleuze and Guattari to explore the way diverse threads of a historically shifting phenomenon, which the editors term 'global', come together in 'assemblages'. Convincingly, it points out that there is no necessary stable coherence to what is happening in any given place, and it shows how forces that go way beyond the local can play instrumental roles in shaping people's worlds.

While the ideas presented in *An Anthropology of Crosslocations* align with many of the main ideas presented in *Global Assemblages*, our focus is somewhat different: apart from our core concern with spatial positioning and location, we are more interested in exploring coexistence rather than assemblages, as such. The origins of the term 'assemblage' as an English translation of Deleuze and Guattari's (1988) *agencement* builds into the word a sense of constant churn or flow. The world described is more often than not one where things, objects, and realities emerge from particular but undefined or indeterminate circumstances and contexts at particular times in 'open-ended gatherings', as Tsing (2015, 22)

puts it.[5] Crosslocations' understanding of coexistence is different, and that difference is important. Rather than looking at how many diverse things come together to create something for a time, crosslocations is concerned as much with moments when they *do not* come together but instead generate dissonance, conflicts, and even indifferent parallel coexistence: the construction of a dam that cuts off Egypt from the rest of Africa (Chapter 3); discordant understandings of public space that make the Beiruti coastline appear in radically different ways (Chapter 1); and suspicious alliances between religious authorities and state structures that cause reason for concern (Chapter 2). Moreover, our research suggests that while contingency is certainly part of the story, emphasising that element draws attention away from deliberate efforts made to shape the world into a particular form. With this in mind, we include a focus on the operations of power within locating regimes that aim to create and maintain particular conditions, rather than only focusing on constant change.

This leads into a regular distinction we make between *connections*, *disconnections* (or *separations*), and *relations*. Connections and relations are often considered to be synonymous, but they are not. For our purposes, it makes more sense to speak of connections and disconnections rather than relations. First, connection and disconnection (or separation, which implies the possibility of some kind of connection despite the separation, whereas dis-

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5 Of course, Deleuze and Guattari pay considerable attention to power dynamics. For example, in *Anti-Oedipus* they write of territorialisation as the process of ordering bodies in an assemblage, and even if this (re) ordering is a constant flow, how it flows is a matter of the operations of power: 'The more the capitalist machine de-territorializes, decoding and axiomatizing flows in order to extract surplus value from them, the more its ancillary apparatuses, such as government bureaucracies and the forces of law and order, do their utmost to re-territorialize, absorbing in the process a larger and larger share of surplus value' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 34–35). Nevertheless, Deleuze and Guattari's approach is that all these transformations are transformations of an underlying singularity: the constant churn does not change the underlying singular form. In that sense, this approach also tends towards flatness.

connection does not) refer to concrete conditions, whereas relations are much less clear on that point. For example, the presence or absence of an internet cable could connect or disconnect Italy and Libya; that condition could not easily be described in terms of relations.[6] Second, the word 'connection' has an opposite, 'disconnection', whereas 'relations' does not: you can have good and bad relations and you can have no relations, but there is no term to describe the opposite of relations. Given that we are focusing on disconnections as much as connections in *An Anthropology of Crosslocations*, it could be confusing to draw on a word (relations) that can mean both.

This distinction is important for another reason studied in considerable depth by Marilyn Strathern. In *Relations: An Anthropological Account* (2020), Strathern points to the significant changes in the meaning of the English word 'relations'. She outlines the way the meaning of that word has changed over time, and also how it differs in different parts of the world. In particular, Strathern notes that in one understanding, a relation is imagined as a link between two separate things: there is something that connects them together—perhaps a similarity of some kind, or friendship, or nationality. In a contrasting meaning of the word, a status can be created *through* relations: the status is defined by its relations. For example, the status of fatherhood: a person cannot be a father without a relation with a child. Fatherhood depends for its meaning on the relation with the child. The first understanding of relation, as a condition that describes a link between two separate things, is easy to see as a form of connection: there is a connection/relation between one separate person and another separate person. The second form of relation, which describes a status that depends on relations, is not about links between things;

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6 These kinds of concrete connections and disconnections of various types, especially infrastructures (roads, rail, internet, sewers, electrical grids, etc.) have powerful consequences, and have been studied at length (e.g. Appel et al. 2015; Barry 2001; Blum 2012; Harvey and Knox 2015; Humphrey 2005; Lampland and Star 2009; Ong and Collier 2005; Robins 2014; Tawil-Souri 2012).

the relation defines a social status, such as father, mother, or sister-in-law. Calling someone a mother identifies the individual woman in terms of that relationship. In the past in many parts of Europe, women ceased to be called by their individual names once they had children and were simply referred to as 'mother': a woman's relation with her children defined her as a person. These kinds of relations are not the same as connections, and they are not the main focus of this book. Instead, our concern is mainly on locational connections and disconnections. When we mean social relations, we will say so.

It is likewise important to stress that our approach emphasises the absence of connections just as much as their presence. While the connections and interactions across political and other borders focused on by approaches such as actor–network theory are crucial to understanding how value is ascribed to a particular relative location, we think that disconnections are at least as important. After all, borders attempt to provide some kind of exclusivity, some cut, some distinction—a difference that makes a difference, as Bateson (1972, 453) once famously noted—even though that effort often fails, or does not succeed as intended, because of crosscutting influences and resistances.

Our emphasis on connection *and* disconnection appears in all the chapters, but is perhaps particularly visible in Chapter 5 on Melilla that is based on Laia Soto Bermant's research, which explores, among other issues, the transport of goods between the Spanish and Moroccan sides of the Melilla border. In Melilla, the efforts to maintain, or perhaps generate, a connection between Melilla and mainland Spain (and, by extension, Europe) is manifest in different ways across the entire 12 km^2 of the town. The place is defined by its connections and disconnections, its entire economy is a product of its condition as a 'dislocated' territory, geographically contiguous with Morocco yet politically disconnected from it. Melilla's relative location has shifted several times during its 500-year history, and each of these changes implied a reconfiguration of locating regimes (politically, economically, and even socially). Because locating regimes are hardly ever cotermi-

nous, their coexistence generates 'zones of awkward engagement' (Tsing 2005) across different scales. This (often uncomfortable, always dynamic) locational coexistence is one form of crosslocation.

In Chapter 6, which is based on Patricia Scalco's research on the Grand Bazaar, the coexistence of global trade routes and supply chains that pass through the Grand Bazaar and the efforts to fix the carpets on sale there in place, to fix them in an original and authentic route that brought them to the bazaar, is complexly crosscut by wider conditions concerning social, economic, and political changes that make it impossible to ever fully square the circle between the idea of authenticity and the conditions in which such authenticity might be produced. This chapter's focus on Hereke carpets, the ones that were developed by an Ottoman sultan as a response to the rise of industrial techniques which allowed for mass production that threatened the handmade carpet trade, demonstrates the crosscuts involved here. Hereke carpets were positioned somewhere in between these two poles— carpets made to order, designed to be so intricate and complex that they demonstrated the value of human skill in making them, and yet they were also designed to be scalable, produced in workshops, and to order, produced for the times. Those times marked a shift from a pre-industrial production and trading locational logic to an industrial logic, and the Hereke was the type of carpet that embodied that transition in this region, in that it was both finely handmade but also produced in a factory with newly imported French looms, and with the intention of competing with industrially produced carpets. The period also marked a shift of the Grand Bazaar from a centre of international trade to the peripheries of that trading regime. In that sense, the story of Hereke provides a trace of the transition of one locating logic into another one, and the profound spatial effects that had.

The final chapter on livestock transport (Chapter 7), based on Sarah Green's research, is an example of a crosslocations process at work across huge distances. It explores official efforts to globally regulate the transportation of livestock across the Mediterranean

and the rest of the world. WOAH sets the World Trade Organization (WTO) standards for the transportation of live animals. The main aim of this process is to avoid outbreaks of infectious disease despite a massive increase in the trade and transportation of live animals across the planet. That level of trade has been made possible by a combination of highly intensive animal farming and the development of huge animal transporter ships. Here, the locating logics involved in trade and intensive agricultural systems come together with scientific classification and standardisation techniques. The ultimate aim is to make location irrelevant: the animals should meet the same standards wherever they came from and wherever they are going to. Yet there is a paradox here: the standards intended to remove the relevance of location are designed to constantly monitor the specific conditions of all locations in which the animals reside and through which they travel. If any one of these locations fails to meet the standards, the animals cannot be transported any further. In effect, it is a system for creating both disconnections and a constantly monitored hierarchy of the relative value of different locations. In that sense, standardisation is a powerful calibrating mechanism.

The crosslocations come in when the account looks at how that particular global locating regime is encountered in different parts of the eastern Mediterranean, where it engages with a range of different animal locating systems that variously crosscut its standardising logic. What the crosslocations approach provides is a different kind of focus: one that looks at how WOAH organises connections and disconnections across space, and what happens when different ways of doing that are encountered. WOAH sets the standards used in regulations that legally impose its locating logic, but that cannot erase the coexistence of other locating logics in the process. The result is that, on occasion, this causes conflicts and trouble; on other occasions, people take on parts of that logic and make use of it in ways unintended by WOAH; and at other times, the standards work exactly as intended, creating a spatial network of connections and disconnections that achieves the aim of preventing the spread of infectious disease. The point is that

this is only one of several other possible outcomes, and a crosslocations approach allows us to take a look at the specific dynamics of that in each case, rather than simply concluding that life is unpredictable.

As all chapters in the book illustrate, we are not looking for billiard balls and there is no need for us, as researchers, to fix people in place at all. Instead, we are ethnographically exploring the dynamics involved in ongoing and multiple efforts by institutions, organisations, structures and infrastructures, and by people themselves, to fix or cut things in one way rather than another, while others are attempting to fix and cut differently.[7]

To be clear, this does not mean there is no *there* there (Stein 1937, 289), that there is nothing to describe because everything is ephemeral, nuanced, and complex. On the contrary, as Geertz once put it, 'it is still the case that no one lives in the world in general' (1996, 262), and here David Harvey's (1996, 81) suggestion that coexisting differences often 'crystallize' into isolable entities or domains which assume a relative permanence in the social and material world also resonates with our approach. Harvey focuses strongly on the operations of power and the inequalities that result from such 'permanences'. While our research has variously encountered instances of such power-inflected 'crystalizations', it has also revealed what Doreen Massey (2005, 9) describes as 'contemporaneous simultaneity'; the idea, in other words, that space (and, we would add, location) is 'never finished; never closed', but rather under perpetual construction. In this sense, the

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7 Here, we are borrowing from Marilyn Strathern's understanding of 'cutting' as outlined in 'Cutting the Network' (Strathern 1996). Note that this approach does not support the implication, argued in some globalisation research, that the world is becoming 'deterritorialized' (Kearney 1995): while there are some processes that are no longer geographically dependent as they used to be, there are many others that continue to be entirely spatially dependent. Even the internet is mostly reliant upon a network of cables running along the bottom of the world's seas and oceans, and whether people have access to it or not is highly dependent on where those cables go—and do not go (Blum 2012).

premises we propose in this book not only imply a vision of the world where locations are multiple, overlapping, and relative; they also shed light on the political struggles through which competing actors perform 'boundary work' that delineates which social orders should dominate and which relative locations should prevail (see Gershon 2019).

A focus on the political aspects of location and place-making can be found throughout the chapters. In Chapter 1, the account of the dispute over the beach in Beirut focuses closely on an open conflict between different interests and demonstrates this coexistence of intentional efforts to shape the value of locations. In Chapter 2, the account of the tensions over the sacred status of the Meteora shows how the coexistence of different locational logics generates multiple and at times conflicting versions of the landscape. In Chapter 3, the focus widens out to a much larger place, Egypt, and how geopolitics, social and economic change, and both governmental and personal appreciation for a better future repeatedly reorient Egypt's relative locations, and the directions in which Egypt is imagined to be facing in years to come. In Chapter 4, attention shifts back to the small scale of a village in Calabria; it explores what thinking of history as a locating regime can do for understanding the way archival records, as material things, become part of the political, economic, and material reality of the location of the village. Chapter 5 focuses on a patch of land (Melilla) that is itself dislocated or mislocated, and on the political work that goes into erasing that dislocation, and pretending that the city is *not* where it is (North Africa), but where it claims to be (Spain, but also Europe). Local place-making narratives pit Christians against Muslims, as they each find different ways to deal with the mismatch between Melilla's social reality and its political location. Chapter 6 shifts to Istanbul and the carpet traders working in the Grand Bazaar, and considers how historical and transnational changes in technical as well as political, social, and economic conditions are embedded within the sales pitches used to sell the carpets. Finally, Chapter 7 looks at the political implications of standardisation, in this case of livestock transport across

the Mediterranean and beyond. It shows both how the standards fit some places better than others, but also how people make use of standards intended for one purpose, with one locating regime in mind, in order to do something different, within the logic of another locating regime.

Brought together, the chapters demonstrate how the mutual engagement of locating regimes make distant places highly relevant to the way people experience the here and now. Wherever we look, we find a multiplicity of relative locations criss-crossed by locating logics and powers, connections and disconnections. In a sense, we all live our lives in crosslocations. And yet, the fact that many things are going on at once, and that things change over time, does not make the process fluid or incoherent in people's lives. This is important: recognising contingency and the coexistence of multiple ways to locate things does not mean having to hang up your hat and conclude, as an ending, that life is complicated. We are aiming instead to try and specifically identify what is going on in the process. This means that we will not attempt to generalise very often; instead, we will draw on ethnography in each case, every time, to describe and try to make sense of what is going on then and there. In short, we are attempting to see the dynamics of what happened in our ethnographies in terms of crosslocations, which are processes rather than things.

Mediterranean crosslocations

The geographical focus of this book is in and around the Mediterranean region, something that gave us an initial point of departure from a simple geographical perspective: the crosslocations that we study all appear in field sites that contain territories that have a coastline with the Mediterranean Sea, and we have included places that are geographically located in the southern, northern, western, and eastern Mediterranean regions. Within anthropology, the Mediterranean was, for a time, one of the discipline's regional foci, but its relevance to anthropology has changed dramatically in the first two decades of the 21st century (Soto Bermant and

Green 2023). In the heyday of Mediterraneanist anthropology in the 1960s and 1970s, the region was presumed to be coherent in its sharing of cultural traits that were imagined to be linked by historical proximity. Ethnographers self-identifying as Mediterraneanist anthropologists employed categorial containers—honour and shame (Campbell 1964; Peristiany 1966; Schneider 1971), patron–client networks (Boissevain 1966; Brown 1977; Gellner and Waterbury 1977; Gilmore 1982)—to tease out similarities and differences between communities and life-worlds across a region that became legible through that very comparative process. In the 1980s, the premises for this comparative-regional project was ruthlessly picked apart. 'The Mediterranean', a number of critics convincingly argued, is a constructed, contested, and political category (Herzfeld 1980, 1984; Pina-Cabral 1989). To compare cases across the region thus came across as both tautological and teleological: it problematically assumes that the region exists before proving through comparison that it does (see Rommel and Viscomi 2022a, 10–11).

In this book, and the research that fed into it, we take on the horns of Mediterranean region-making from a different angle. Inspired by a recent revival in the debate about the meaning of 'Mediterranean' among anthropologists and historians (see Ben-Yehoyada 2017; Ben-Yehoyada et al. 2020; Holdermann et al. 2020; Horden and Purcell 2000, 2020; Rommel and Viscomi 2022b; Soto Bermant and Green 2023), our aim is to depict Mediterranean locations characterised by dynamism, exchange, contingent developments, and border crossings. To this end, we rarely compare ethnographic cases in this book, nor do we assume that a shared set of regionwide historical processes manifest in a generalisable present. In directing our ethnographic attention to the making of particular relative locations and the workings of particular locating regimes, our exercise is rather one of tracing connections as well as separations, through time and space, across the Mediterranean region and often also far beyond it.

This approach fosters a livelier image of the region, and it has allowed a rethinking of what the concept of 'region' might mean

and the work that it does in different times and places. In another publication that has come out of the Crosslocations project, two of us theorised the historical traces and spatial connections and disconnections that our approach makes visible through developing the notion of 'constellations' (Rommel and Viscomi 2022a; see also Ben-Yehoyada et al. 2020, 7). There, Rommel and Viscomi argued that each and every relative location that we study is calibrated by '*constellations* of money, materiality, movement, and stories that cross or do not cross the Mediterranean Sea in space and through time' (Rommel and Viscomi 2022a, 15). They also suggested that 'region' is what comes into view when constellations—each of which makes up a Mediterranean world in its own right—are studied, described, and mapped out (Rommel and Viscomi 2022a, 12–15).[8]

In this book, our attention to region-making is implicit, and we have not addressed Rommel and Viscomi's concept of constellations in relation to region-making. In most cases, the region around the Mediterranean Sea does not emerge or does not come into view, calling into question whether we are discussing the Mediterranean at all. And yet, where the region called the Mediterranean—or *al-Bahar al-Abyad al-Mutawassit* in Arabic, *Mesoyios* in Greek, *Akdeniz* in Turkish, *Mediterráneo/Mediterraneo* in Spanish and Italian, *Agacac Amenzu* in Tamazight Berber (or variations on that phrase)—does not appear, other kinds of regions might surface. Paying attention to such cuts, realignments, and absences just as well as presences helps us see regional frames and logics where and when they are ethnographically significant.

All in all then, we are exploring a perspective which takes off from grounded ethnographic inquiry of crosslocations as a process, rather than comparison across a region that is already

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8 In a book comprising a multiplicity of empirical case studies, region can also be understood to be the accumulative end result of multiple constellations (our seven chapters) gathered together, sometimes overlapping, sometimes taking hold of each other, and at other times dissolving and falling apart (see Rommel and Viscomi 2022a, 12, 21).

assumed to be there. We are, in that way, at least partially side-stepping what Matei Candea has coined as anthropology's only but impossible method—comparison (Candea 2019). As Candea notes, to compare cultural traits across some kind of regionally circumscribed territory is an inherently contradictory manoeuvre. Not only does such 'lateral comparison' presume an unrealistic and overly static view of cultural traits spread out synchronically on a map, it also requires that the anthropologist has access to a neutral point of view, detached from and somehow located above that map, from which the comparative exercise can be carried out and regional coherence ultimately achieved (Candea 2018, ch. 5). Crosslocations is animated by an effort to break loose from this comparative straitjacket. Of course we do compare in this book; however, the regions that take shape across the pages of this volume are made up of connections, separations, stories, and interactions that unfold and make locations meaningful. The comparisons we make are not holding any of these places steady. Such a perspective generates a livelier view of how the Mediterranean appears and is experienced.

Multigraph: who 'we' are

Many years ago, Derrida (1992) playfully critiqued the ease with which people write about how 'we' think, what 'we' do, and who 'we' are. He was writing about where Europe was heading in the early 1990s, shortly after the break-up of the former Soviet Union, which triggered a major realignment of the European region's border dynamics. That moment seemed to be calling into question just about everything, at least about geopolitics if not also about social relations, economic relations, and the meaning of Europe itself, the topic that Derrida was asked to write about. The break-up of the Soviet Union felt like something akin to an earthquake, throwing many unexamined assumptions into the air and raising new questions about where things were.

In his essay, Derrida wondered whether he should use the plural personal pronoun 'we' to discuss what it means to be Euro-

pean: should he say 'we Europeans'? Derrida (1991, 80) pointed out that he was born in Algeria while that country was subject to French colonial rule; he only later moved to France and, as he put it in the essay, 'undoubtedly' became a French intellectual. Was that sufficient, Derrida wondered, for him to write 'we Europeans' in his essay? He decided that he would temporarily say so; at the end of the essay, he returned to 'I'. Derrida concludes that there is both a 'we' and an 'I' in his relation to Europe, in that he is European, but not European 'through and through'; and in any case, the word itself, Europe, can never be fully identical with itself, so that there never can be a singular 'we'. The use of 'we' must always be temporary, always containing a hesitation: 'for now', 'perhaps', 'in some senses'.

The use of 'we' in this book is much the same. It always carries a hesitation, a 'perhaps'. We are all anthropologists, broadly trained in the same Euro-American anthropological traditions, with a strong influence from anglophone anthropology, and some crosscutting influences from francophone anthropology. For about five years, we all worked together in the same ERC-funded research project, also called Crosslocations, which was located at the University of Helsinki. We could therefore say 'we' and assert that we are writing a monograph, and that would be true. At the same time, we all started life in different places—Brazil, Britain, Finland, Greece, Spain, Sweden, the United States—and the trajectories we took that brought us to anthropology and then to particular field sites, to particular tours through the literature, and then, finally, that brought us together for the Crosslocations project, were quite different from one another. That matters, as Carsten et al. (2018) pointed out in their analysis of the relation between ethnography and biography. Each of us, including the initial instigator of the whole project, Sarah Green, might have a reason to question whether they should be included in 'we' and should instead perhaps say 'I'.

In that sense, it would be right to say that this book is a multigraph, not a monograph. In the process of writing the book, we continually returned to this question about how much is us and

how much is each one, how much is connection and how much is separation, a question that we also constantly addressed in our research. The answer, as so often, is that it is a bit of both; the final outcome would have been different without any one of us, and in that sense, none of it is our own doing, 'through and through'; and yet each of us has a distinctive voice, we each designed and carried out our own fieldwork and developed our own understanding of the core ideas, premises, and starting points of the project. So, we will say 'we' and also 'I' in this mono-multigraph; where collaborative and collective work is highlighted, we will refer to we/us; where the work described was done mostly while alone, we will talk about I/me. The reader can choose for themselves which would have been most appropriate.

The book overall provides both a coherent account, so that it can be read from beginning to end; and it also allows the reader to dip in here and there, to take up the story at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end. The first four chapters concern particular places: a beach in Beirut, a pillar formation in central Greece, Egypt and its location and orientation relative to elsewhere, and a village in Calabria. The next two chapters also concern places—the 12 km² Spanish territory of Melilla located in a place that is otherwise Morocco, and the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul—though both of them focus on the movement of things from one place to another (smuggled goods from Melilla to Morocco; carpets to and from the Grand Bazaar). The final chapter, which looks at the transportation of livestock across the Mediterranean, focuses more squarely on the idea of a logic that attempts to be global and that governs crossings and movement. In addition to the stand-alone chapters penned by individual authors, there are also short interventions which appear as separated-out texts (boxes) interspersed with the main text. Co-written by all of us, they provide commentary on particular themes, and give some sense of the way the authors worked both together and separately to generate this text.

Our key concepts—relative locations, locating regimes, and crosslocations—appear in all chapters, but each chapter puts them

to slightly different analytical and ethnographic uses. In this sense, as these concepts travel from one field site to another to shed light on different arrangements and configurations, they also transform to reflect the ethnographic realities that this book's authors have been describing and interpreting. This point overlaps with one that Donna Haraway (1988), along with many others interested in standpoint theory, once made: the idea that vision—what you can see—always depends on your position or vantage point, and positions are never equal but are instead power-inflected. Merging a multiplicity of vantage points into one co-authored book, *An Anthropology of Crosslocations* is a thought experiment, an effort to find ways to make the dynamics of spatial coexistence, connections, disconnections, and relations more open to description and discussion and, perhaps, also more visible. Ultimately, we believe that by shifting our approach towards looking for coexistence rather than coherence, and by paying attention to the constant effects of the crosscutting dynamics of diverse ways to establish the relative value of locations, we may begin to think otherwise about how things end up being somewhere in particular. And that matters.

CHAPTER 1

Beirut: locating 'public space'

Samuli Lähteenaho

It was one of the busy spring weeks in 2018 at Ramlet al-Bayda
public beach in Beirut. Rana, one of the founders of an NGO that
had been the custodian of the beach for the previous 15 years, was
seated on a couch sheltered from the increasingly hot spring sun,
under the roof of a wooden veranda constructed on the sands to
serve the beachgoers.[9] She was busy considering samples of cloth
for staff uniforms for the upcoming summer season. Many now
called the beach, a narrow stretch of white sand located on the
Lebanese capital's western littoral, the last public beach in Bei-
rut. Around the veranda sunbrellas were being set up by work-
ers, mostly Syrian, employed by the organisation, and they were
carrying out the world-famous monobloc white plastic chairs and
tables for rent by the beachgoers ready to enjoy the warmth of
spring. A little back from the veranda, at the main entrance to
the beach, stood a worn wooden announcement board greeting
those who entered. On the board several notices had been stapled.
A bilingual warning about marine pollution, an encouragement
to use biodegradable cups instead of plastic ones, and an Arabic
info poster on waste sorting were flanked by a price list for rental
chairs and tables on the beach. The price list was titled in English

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9 The names of my interlocutors, besides one person noted separately
   below, are pseudonyms and some of the details describing them have
   been changed to provide a degree of anonymity.

and Arabic: 'Free Public Beaches Program—*Barnamij limasaabeh almajaniya lil'umum*'.

This was the terminology Rana's organisation used to refer to the beach. I was somewhat surprised, as the English 'public beach' had been coupled with the Arabic *masbah majani lil'umum*, literally 'free-of-charge swimming place for the public'. Perhaps there was something of note conceptually in these terms, the public status and the free entrance. Yet the beach's public status was precarious. Since the 1990s, neoliberal urbanism in Beirut had led to many disputes over spaces claimed as public, with the city's civil society mobilising to protect coastal spaces, parks, and whatnot from construction and enclosure.[10] This campaigning for public space had been a central feature of urban political work in the 2010s as well. However, the sands around and under the veranda that Rana was busying herself in were divided in the property registry into privately and publicly owned plots on the one hand and an inalienable public maritime domain on the other. The majority of the land composing the public beach was in fact privately owned.

At the southern end of the beach, easily visible from the veranda, stood the most recent challenge to its public status. The Eden Bay luxury hotel had recently been built on ostensibly private land amid much uproar, with its 8 residential floors and 144 guest rooms encroaching on the beach's public status. For Rana and others interested in keeping the coastline publicly open, the hotel symbolised the creeping enclosure of the rest of the littoral by tourism and real-estate interests. In Rana's and many others' minds, the beach had a long and important history as a public

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10 I use 'civil society' in the emic sense, to refer to those organisations and subjectivities that the term would cover in local usage, without accounting for its problematisation in Lebanon (e.g. Salloukh et al. 2015, ch. 4) or elsewhere (e.g. Hann and Dunn 1996). Generally, the emergence of public space and civil society as terms organising the world in particular ways could be argued as parallel processes, mutually propelling each other forward. Unpacking this, including local discussions on the distinctions in Arabic between *mujtama' madani* and *mujtama' ahali*, is beyond the scope of this chapter.

space for the people of Beirut, stretching back to the early 20th century, or even further back in history. If the place had been a central node for urban sociability before, it was certainly worth a fight to keep it so.

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In approaching public space, I have been inspired by what Fadi Bardawil (2020; see also Boyer 2001) has recently called fieldwork in theory, taking theory to be an integral part of the ethnographic reality encountered. As Bardawil notes, 'anthropological practice is still by and large structured around a distinction between the anthropologist's theory and the people's lives and intellectual traditions, which she studies during her fieldwork' (2020, 9). When I first started my fieldwork in Lebanon, I had taken this structure somewhat for granted, even with all my readings in recent ethnographic theory and post-reflexive turn anthropology. Thus, it did cause me some epistemic anxiety when I learned that the concepts forming a supposed central part of my analytic toolkit had a wide significance in the ethnographic reality in front of me. This is perhaps an anxiety unique to anthropology and a result of its fetishisation of alterity. Nonetheless, the following passage from Bardawil in his ethnography of the 1960s generation of new left intellectuals in Lebanon struck home:

> When one observes strands of one's own 'theory' in the field—but not exclusively so, let me add—the presumed 'innocence' of the supposed first moment of immersion, observation, and experience evaporates, since the frames through which one sees, classifies, and records are themselves, in this particular case, the objects of inquiry. The back and forth between the stickiness, concreteness, and senses-drenched materiality of the field and the slick world of abstract theory comes to a halt. In this case the conceptual distance separating the tradition doing the inquiring and the one inquired about diminishes. For this is an internal traffic in theory. (Bardawil 2020, 11)

A similar relation has been described by Marilyn Strathern (1987) as 'auto-anthropology', the situation when anthropologists and the people they study have shared conceptual tools at hand, as opposed to indigenous anthropology, where similarity is dependent on national or cultural identity. In any case, it should not be surprising that professionals with social-scientific or urban-planning education should be active in campaigns around urban space in a place like Beirut.[11]

Around 2018 public space (*masaha 'ama*) was a common topic of discussion in Lebanon. This prominence was mainly due to a number of relatively high-profile contestations over urban space in the city related to parks, coastal places, and construction projects. The first times I encountered the term in Beirut were in this context—in the news covering protests against enclosure of public spaces, and later in social media and print materials produced by groups campaigning on the issue. As another example, as I initially framed my research project around the concept, most of my friends and interlocutors would respond to me explaining my work with a laugh followed either by a 'well there's a lot to study' or a 'there are no public spaces in Beirut!' That public space was simultaneously so over-present that it was 'a lot to study' yet it was hardly existent left me baffled. I gradually came to understand that the way the term 'public space' was presented in these utterances was itself an intervention in urban politics. The term was circulating widely in discussions and actions beyond activist and civil society circles, for example in casual conversations, media reports, and municipal plans. Ideas of public space formed a part of urban imaginations for many residents of the city, from municipal and state bureaucrats to those of my interlocutors not engaged in campaigning or bureaucratic work. Public space as a concept had gained special significance in the second decade of the 21st century in Beirut. This is not to say that the term did not

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11 Anthropologist Alice Stefanelli (2020a, 2020b) has examined in depth the role professional urbanists have played in campaigns related to urban space in Beirut.

exist or circulate in the city before that (it most certainly did), nor that there were no public spaces prior to 2010, but merely that the term had gained new-found power and significance.[12]

The meaning of public space in Beirut was not self-evident. It was a contested term, and in a situation of contestation the task of the anthropologist is not to discern the 'true' meaning of a term, but rather to describe the conflict over its meaning. When some meanings of the term overlap with the analytical terminology available to the anthropologist, it creates some complications. In other words, different meanings of 'public space' coexist, and connect (and disconnect) the beach to other places and times in diverse ways. When these iterations are deployed in a dispute, the emerging conflict makes the divergent and overlapping ways of locating the beach evident.

Public space is an issue much discussed in anthropology and critical geography. In the 1990s and early 2000s, scholars tackled public space and neoliberal urbanism amid a scholarly and general concern with a global trend of enclosing urban space and privatising what used to be public domain (e.g. Low and Smith 2006; Mitchell 1995; Staeheli and Thompson 1997). Much of the literature has been focusing either on the ongoing privatisation of life and space, or on public space and its importance for urban justice and well-functioning cities (Staeheli and Mitchell 2007). An important strand of the literature has examined the possibilities of social movements in the fight against privatisation, connected to the idea of right to the city (Erensü and Karaman 2017;

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12 Pre-2010 examples include historian Elizabeth Thompson: 'Public space existed in cities long before the French mandate. Streets, baths, fountains, bakeries, coffeehouses, and markets were accessible generally to the population. Custom, however, regulated access to certain groups, in what was a broad spectrum between the universally public and the most private' (2000, 175). See also Nadine Hindi (2020) on the turn to planning Westernised public spaces in 19th-century Beirut; Ilham Khuri-Makdisi (2013, 60–93) on the centrality of theatre as a public space in late 19th- and early 20th-century Beirut; Aseel Sawalha (2010, 91–96) on how pre-civil war cafés were conceptualised as public places.

Harvey 2012), or even suggested public space as formative of radi-
cal political practices (Kallianos and Fumanti 2021) and a central
vision for organising democratic movements against neoliberal-
ism (Springer 2011). In the context of Beirut, scholars have exam-
ined the issue of public space in relation to sectarian topographies
of space (e.g. Haugbolle 2010; Monroe 2016, 56–68), but also on
the tensions between 'Western' public space planning discourses
and their local application (e.g. Bou Akar 2019; Hindi 2020).
The political significance of public space has not been lost to the
scholarship, and neither was it lost to the civil society in Beirut.
Building on this literature, this chapter explores the significance
of a growing discussion on public space in Beirut. Instead of dis-
cussing what public space really is, or the state of public space(s)
in Beirut, nor for that matter processes of privatisation, this chap-
ter turns to examine what role the circulating ideas of public space
in their multiple iterations held on the changing coastline.

The term public space in its different iterations played a central
role in a number of contestations over privatisation or protection
of 'public space' on the coastline; in facilitating new hotel projects
and in campaigns against these projects. As Doreen Massey once
put it when discussing the political life of the concept of power
geometries, this chapter examines 'the way in which the concept
was further moulded by the very fact of its engagement in politi-
cal practice' (2009, 25). Beirut urbanist scholar Jala Makhzoumi
(2021) has examined the issue of public space in Beirut through
what she refers to as 'corporate' and 'activist' landscape narratives
of the public realm. Similar to her focus on 'landscape narratives'
utilised by activists and neoliberal developers, the chapter focuses
on the divergent meanings public space held as it circulated in
Beirut. Primarily, it examines what the term 'public space' does
in engaging with urban space, rather than what public space is.
That is, the focus is less on what significance the beach at Ramlet
al-Bayda held as a public space, and more on what effect Rana's
and others' use of 'public space' as an idea with multiple shifting
meanings had. In other words, there is no single meaning to the

phrase 'public space'. It is a contested concept, and a big part of this contestation is the meaning of the phrase in itself.

The way linguistic anthropologists have examined the dynamic character of public space or similar terms can be helpful for understanding the way it functioned in Beirut. Often, ideas of the public are composed in relation to ideas of the private and, accordingly, Susan Gal (2002) has argued that the binary of public/private is an indexical and fractal semiotic phenomenon. This means that one distinction between public and private can have other public/private distinctions nested within it. But according to her, these recursions, or reiterations, are never entirely mimetic—repetition of the binary always introduces some change in meaning (Gal 2002, 86). The meaning of public space in Beirut was likewise reproduced in a number of divergent iterations, with the semiotic content of these reiterations containing something same, but also something different. Public space had a character similar to what Bonnie Urciuoli (2003; 2008; see also Gershon 2012, 115–116) has called 'strategically deployed shifters'—that is, terms whose definition, use, and meaning depends on the context. As I describe below, public space was on occasion deployed strategically by my interlocutors, at other times less so. Nonetheless, it incorporated a range of divergent meanings that shifted dependent on the social context and trajectory of use. Public space was also somewhat akin to what Susan Leigh Star (2010), for example, has called 'boundary objects', objects with interpretive flexibility that allow for divergent parties to engage in collaboration without a consensus on meaning or significance. Again, public space was on occasion a common ground to rally and work around collaboratively in the sense Leigh Star suggests, without a consensus on interpretation. But in other situations, it was rather the subject of discordance, where its multiplicity of meanings allowed for a contestation or conflict to play out without a consensus on what actually was being fought over.

Parts of this chapter describe significant elements of the discussion on public space in Beirut, and through them trace the changing relative locations of coastal spaces. The first part traces two

iterations of public space. It starts from 'public space in the logic of property' based on the legally backed, bureaucratic separation of public and private, especially in the land registry. It describes how a restrictive logic embedded in this iteration relied on mainly by real-estate businesses, bureaucrats, and politicians made other modes of value redundant. The part continues by describing 'public space as a critical intervention'. It examines the ways in which a concept of public space based on critical social science was put to use in Beirut by activist campaigning groups and civil society, including the Dalieh campaign and Rana's group. This iteration involves an expansive logic, accommodating varying modes of value. The part concludes by examining the situation created by the overlap of these iterations, which spurred Beiruti scholar-activists to formulate a notion of 'spaces for the public' adjacent to the language of commons. The second part discusses a third iteration: 'public space as nostalgia for communality'. It describes how this iteration, deployed diffusively by both activists and lay urban residents, embedded understandings of public space with histories of sociability and communal life. The conclusion follows how the three iterations converged on the public beach of Beirut and how they formed provisional and emergent locating regimes, and describes the contestations over the futures and relative locations of the beach in a conflict over its public status and partial privatisation.

Public space in the logic of property and as a critical intervention

Legalistic and bureaucratic practices of public space formed a significant iteration of public space in coastal Beirut, especially in regard to how it was recorded in the Lebanese land registry. Land registry and 'propertied understanding of space' formed a central way for understanding the coastline (Lähteenaho 2022). The logic of property was grounded in bureaucratic and legal practice but was widely significant beyond them. 'Public space in the logic of property' was often the most powerful notion of public space around, setting the terms of the discussion due to its legal sta-

tus. It meant that space was understood as property and clearly divided into public and private, making other iterations of public space irrelevant or invisible. In this property division 'public space' could strictly mean either public domain (non-cadastred public land) or publicly owned property.

I will draw here on the case of Dalieh el-Raouche, a stretch of coastal rocks next to the famous Pigeon Rocks of Beirut. Dalieh was one of the few undeveloped bits of coastline on Beirut's western seafront, just half a kilometre north of the Ramlet al-Bayda public beach. The space of Dalieh was surveyed and registered in the land registry mostly as private property, yet had for a long time been used as an open public space by Beirutis. This is significant, as from a legalistic or bureaucratic perspective, the land was not really public except for a thin stretch of Maritime Public Domain close to the sea. The area was quite clearly privately owned property, subject to relevant zoning regulations set in law. This property logic of categorising space was recognised and engaged by activists and scholars working on issues of urban space. The lands of Dalieh were state owned during the Ottoman period and rented out to notable Beiruti families on permanent contracts. They were later registered as the families' property by the French mandatory authorities as part of a land registry reform in the late 1920s. In the 1990s the prominent Hariri family consolidated a significant part of the individual plots in their hands, making it possible to plan for the construction of a hotel on the site, a project different from but with similarities to the hotel project on Ramlet al-Bayda. Finally, in the 2010s a project was announced, and a famous Dutch architect commissioned to plan the site. The project attracted immediate opposition, as the space had been used as public space throughout the 20th century.

While the land had been privately owned since the French land registry reform, the fact that it was used as public space without any plans for development meant that the logic of 'public space in the logic of property' lay dormant, without significant consequences for its use. Once this meaning was activated in the 1990s and then resolutely so in the 2010s with the planned project, a

conflict between iterations of public space ensued. Divergent log-ics embedded in the understandings of public space could lay dormant, but once they became active simultaneously, everything changed. The fact that Dalieh was in fact privately owned was powerful. Even if the private status was circumscribed by zoning regulations and the Maritime Public Domain, it was nonetheless backed up by the state legal apparatus. This was similar to other locations on the coastline that were defended as public space by campaigners and activists.

To clarify: private property forms a frame where public space means just and only spaces owned by public entities or in the pub-lic domain. This property logic forced those working with other ideas to react and accommodate. The logic of public space as an entity registered in the land registry and separated from private space made construction projects planned on sites used as public to be possible to begin with. As many privately owned areas along the Lebanese coastline were used and continue to be used as 'pub-lic space', as open-access leisure space, their enclosure becomes possible through the property logic claim that they are not, in fact, public space. As a rather clear-cut judicial category, public space in the logic of property was also notably not accommodating of other frames of value or significance.

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

The concept of public space as developed in critical social theory was readily put into practice by people engaged in campaigns for threatened public spaces on the coastline. As I was working to figure out the many organisations engaged with the issue of pub-lic space, I spoke with Sarah Lily Yassine, an activist and a pro-fessional urbanist and landscape architect from the most signifi-cant group campaigning to protect Dalieh al-Raouche from the planned hotel project.[13]

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13 Not pseudonymous in order to give due credit for Sarah Lily Yassine's work, as agreed with her.

The Dalieh campaign was organised as a non-hierarchical group and launched in 2013 to stop the impending hotel construction on the rocks of Dalieh. According to Sarah, she co-founded the group to protect a place she loved, and which she did not want to lose. The group's first meetings attracted a crowd of professionals from diverse backgrounds, including urbanists, journalists, architects, and lawyers from the nearby American University of Beirut and beyond, but also fishermen and residents of close-by neighbourhoods. They quickly went to work, with activities focused on three areas: lobbying the government, studying the site, and making the place more known to the public.

I had become aware of the group's work already during my previous fieldwork in Lebanon years before talking to Sarah. Back then, I had been impressed by their carefully produced and well-researched brochures about Dalieh. What initially caught my attention then and captivated it again was the immense amount of knowledge the group produced about the stretch of rocks descending to the sea. The outcome of their work included detailed archaeological, geomorphological, botanical, socio-historical, and legal knowledge of the site, not to forget a new compound name for the place as Dalieh al-Raouche. They had discovered mostly forgotten references to the place as Dalieh (meaning a trellis, or a grapevine), related to the site's historical use for peri-urban agriculture, and coupled it with the name for the surrounding neighbourhood and nearby Pigeon Rocks, Raouche. In order to protect Dalieh, they needed to make the place known. This they had meticulously done, through as many forms of knowledge as they could muster. As Sarah told me, their campaign had unexpected results beyond its impact on the hotel project: 'I feel once we started talking about it, we changed it. It's not anymore this wild [place], you know, it is wild, but it is different now.' In becoming known, the place had changed. Or, as I will argue, its relative location had been reconfigured, its relations to other places rekindled.

What I initially did not quite realise, but that over time became clear, was how claiming to protect Dalieh as public space was itself a conceptual intervention. Anthropologist Alice Stefanelli, writ-

ing on the case of Dalieh, has described this by distinguishing two distinct logics of public space. The first is the property logic of public space, the second is that of the intervention by the campaigners. Both logics assigned a particular character to the location: 'The former definition follows a classical notion of public and private as determined by the liberal regime of private property, while the second focuses on a practiced version of the notion of "public" that emphasises concrete social relations, access and use' (Stefanelli 2017, 219; see also Stefanelli 2023). The campaigners were partly moving away from the property logic and offering an alternative formulation that emphasised histories and practices of actual use of the spaces. I call this formulation 'public space as a critical intervention', to emphasise the way it used public space as formulated in social theory to intervene in politics of relative location on the coastline. These two iterations of public space were contradictory, in discordance, and projected divergent futures for the coastline; one of open access for the residents of Beirut to use and enjoy without restrictions, the second of open access for real-estate businesses to develop tourism or leisure projects without restrictions beyond zoning laws.

As I was wondering about the issue and the language of public space used by the civil society movements in relation to my own analytical tools, I put the question to Sarah, asking her where she thought the concept as used by the civil society came from. It is worth quoting her reply to me at length:

> It's interesting that you ask that, as someone who has been working on public space in Beirut for the last ten years. I believe the concept is a mesh of several concepts and schools of thought, but also of local culture. For me personally, it's my experience of the city of Beirut in my childhood, spending time in its cafés, and in the Dalieh and the Sanayeh park. It is also my experience of Paris parks and the metro and squares, as I spent a lot of time there as a child. On the collective level, it's the influence of the American University of Beirut's planning studies, the introduction of landscape architecture theory by the Landscape Architecture depart-

ment, and at this specific moment in time the 'L'espace public' project with the Region Ile de France and Municipality of Beirut. This partnership aims at putting forward a strategy on public spaces. It's a big fund focused on urban mobility, street lighting and green spaces. So, my reading is that it comes from the European but also the American discourse on space, planning and the city. Some scholars are pushing towards the discourse about the right to the city and the South American experience.[14] What is interesting is that we took all these concepts and our personal experience, and we applied it to the Dalieh case, but also to Horsh Beirut and Ramlet al-Bayda.

What Sarah points to in her comment is the multiple concrete directions (in literature, research, funding, and personal experience) from which certain concepts of public space were introduced into the realities of planning and activism in Beirut. She does not, nor would I, suggest that these are the only concepts or iterations of public space around, nor the only influences beyond Lebanon that any notion of public space takes. However, it is worthwhile paying heed to the prominent impact of anglophone and francophone institutions of higher education (not to forget project funding) on what public space came to mean in this context. This was reflected by the fact that the concept of public space seemed to be more prominent as uttered in English (or French, for that matter) than in Arabic. The Arabic *masaha 'ama* used in media and activist publications carried with it the airs of a translation of the English (or French) concept—like when one of my other (native Arabic speaking) interlocutors replied to my question about how she would translate 'public space' into Arabic by being surprised

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14 Later, in 2022, Sarah told me that she no longer considers the analogy of the South American experience successful and appropriate to the context in Beirut, referring to anti-capitalist critical urbanism inspired by the slogan 'right to the city', focused on a critique of neoliberalism. In a connected vein she argued that the tendency of many Beiruti scholars to analyse state planning failures through a framework focusing on neoliberalism fails to centre political corruption, sectarianism, and clientelism as core issues.

and saying that usually they just use the English utterance, and then noting the Arabic translation.

Another thing that Sarah's statement shows is how the discourse of public space as she knew it was tied to the notions of urban planning and public amenities, as in the French project that focused on green spaces, mobility, and street lighting. However, she also pointed out that some scholars involved in public space campaigning were pushing the discourse in Beirut towards the 'right to the city and the South American experience' with the famous slogan from the French Marxist philosopher Henri Lefebvre's *Le Droit à la Ville* ([1968] 1996). Lefebvre's work has provided inspiration for swathes of urban activism and scholarship around the globe, especially since the emergence of a worldwide trend of neoliberal urbanism and protest against it in the 1990s (e.g. Harvey 2012). That Marxist theory ends up making change in the world is not such an interesting discovery—that supposedly should be its point anyhow—but what I would like to draw out here is the multiplicity of notions of public space entangling and creating a 'mesh of several concepts', in Sarah's words.

The activists applying public space as a critical intervention to Dalieh al-Raouche led to its relative location changing. While before it was perhaps wild, invisible, and unknown at least to some residents of Beirut, through the use of 'public space' it became something else—more connected, more present, more explicit. In quite concrete terms, the rocks of Dalieh were not known to many of my middle-class interlocutors before the campaign. Multiple times I heard people not directly engaged in the campaign comment that they learned about the place through this publicity and began to enjoy it on occasion for leisurely promenades. The work of Sarah and her peers also brought Dalieh into connection with multiple different domains of knowledge production, including the US-based World Monuments Fund that added Dalieh to its 2016 World Monuments watch list. Perhaps more significantly, it made the place known to and experienced by many of Beirut's ordinary residents who might have joined one of the many demonstrations, events, or other activities organised by the group. The

logic of public space as a critical intervention explicitly accommodated other frames inscribing value to the location, from ecological to heritage preservation, to the 'concrete social relations' of everyday activities taking place at the site. Claiming the space as public thus located it in particular ways, placing it 'on the map' both in terms of the value assigned to the notion of public space itself but also in terms of these other measures of value: ecological, heritage, and so on.

The work of the Dalieh coalition, utilising 'public space as a critical intervention', effectively stopped another kind of relocation for Dalieh, through putting a halt to the plans for the luxury hotel construction on the site (a project different from the one on Ramlet al-Bayda). After several years of demonstrations, lobbying, workshops, presenting alternative plans, cutting down fences put up to enclose the area, and other actions under the banner of 'public space', it was clear the hotel project was not proceeding. Or rather, the project was quietly dropped without public announcements, with no visible further developments. During the period of my fieldwork the plans for construction were on indefinite hold after the intensive campaign, even though actual information about what had transpired was scarce. The exact reasons for the change were left shrouded, as is often the case with matters related to economic and political elites in Lebanon, and the critical urbanists were left to wonder if the project will eventually be picked up again. Clearly the activist work and public outcry emphasising the importance of the site for the people of Beirut, with its vanishing open coastline, had pushed through the change, even if the details remained inaccessible. The proposed hotel construction would likely have done away with ecological, heritage, and other forms of value and, had it been built, it would have effected quite a different set of disconnections and connections. The place remained as an indeterminate space: used by the public, but not officially recognised or maintained by the state.

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Distinctions of different iterations of public space were not always clear in practice, and this created a problem for urbanist campaigners interested in opposing coastal enclosure. As the judicial 'public space in the logic of property' overlapped with other iterations in making claims on public and private in a recursive way (cf. Gal 2002), the distinction between the two proved troublesome in practice. How could the activists defend as public space a place that was quite clearly private in a legal sense? Furthermore, if the 'public space in the logic of property' was backed by state legal apparatus, what was to be the role of the state in relation to public space? The social-scientific literature against the neoliberalisation and privatisation of cities seems to assume a sovereign state and a unified concept of citizenship as the custodian of public space and as the basis on which to protest privatisation (Low and Smith 2006; Staeheli and Thompson 1997). Here the context of the Lebanese state caused complications. The campaigners had good reasons to be wary of relying on Lebanese state sovereignty as a custodian of public space (Fregonese 2012). The Lebanese sectarian neoliberal system (Karam and Majed 2022, 76) was not famed as a protector of the public good, in fact quite the opposite. This situation gave the Beiruti scholars and activists reasons for conceptual innovation.

To solve problems with state and property in working with public space, some scholar-activists moved to using the term 'spaces for the public'. As Beiruti urbanist scholar and activist Abir Saksouk-Sasso writes in her article on Dalieh and communal sovereignty: 'Instead of studying abstract "public spaces" associated with the modern nation-state, my research identifies "spaces for the public", generated by users' spatial practices rather than property maps' (2015, 302).[15] So public space is turned around into spaces for the public—from a notion of space based on state sovereignty to a notion of communal sovereignty. Saksouk-Sasso takes stock of the classics of critical urbanism like Lefebvre and

15 Saksouk-Sasso attributes the coinage of 'spaces for the public' to Marwan Ghandour.

Don Mitchell, reads them together with the experience of urban activism in Dalieh, and proceeds to develop a notion of communal sovereignty as a ground for making claims to space. In this, Saksouk-Sasso sounds similar to many neo-Marxian discussions on the commons and the city (e.g. Federici 2019; Stavrides 2016), where urbanist scholars have tried to circumvent the question of state so tightly lodged in the heart of the concept of public space.[16] Saksouk-Sasso explicitly notes how the notion of spaces for the public is antagonistic towards concepts of space constituted through property maps—that is, the judicial-bureaucratic separation of space into public and private through land registry practice.

While 'public space in the logic of property' was the state-recognised and legally powerful understanding of public space, it was not beyond contestation. As a bureaucratic logic of separation, it both opened up possibilities for real-estate development on the coastline through categorising publicly used spaces as 'not public', but also allowed for protesting new construction through the category of the Maritime Public Domain. It located coastal locations in particular ways through making other registers of value inconsequential, as for example through making invisible histories of social relationality of locations. In practice, sorting out public space in the logic of property from other iterations was a

16 Although the term 'commons' was not widespread in the wider discourse in Beirut according to my observations, it is very prevalent in a booklet produced by the Dalieh Coalition, including the cover page, which concludes: 'we invite everyone to join us in struggling for her/his right to the city, a city where private capital cannot trump the desires of the urban majorities in enlarging and improving the city's shared commons' (The Civil Campaign to Protect the Dalieh of Raouche 2015, 1). Moreover, the booklet suggests that it was the Ottoman, and later French authorities that entrusted these commons to private ownership (34). The Arabic term used is *musha'*, the standard translation of 'commons', but also denoting a specific historical system of utilising common agricultural or grazing lands in the Levant distinct from the Anglo system but with some similarities (e.g. Schaebler 2001).

troublesome endeavour, as seen in the scholar-activists' work to circumvent it through discussing 'spaces for the public'.

Public space as nostalgia for communality

One summer night I was spending time with some friends on the rooftop of one of their grandparents' apartment next to a famous set of steps in the increasingly gentrified neighbourhood of Gemmayze.[17] My friend Tareq, a talented musician in his mid-twenties with a sharp mind for social matters, had spent his childhood living in the apartment and the neighbourhood, and he remembered my research topic. He took me to the edge of the roof and looked down on the winding alleyways criss-crossing the steps. When he was a kid, he told me, this was his map of the area. He and his friends would run around the alleys below and play football on the steps. Now, as the neighbourhood was being gentrified and trendy hotels and hostels were gnawing at formerly residential houses, most of the alleyways had been closed off by the property owners, and no more kids could be seen playing around. For Tareq, thinking of the Gemmayze steps as public space was one way to articulate his unease with recent processes of gentrification and the spatial connections and disconnections brought about through them.

As Tareq remarked, the steps had been their public space, but now the side alleys were closed off and the stairs had changed. The way he used the notion of public space was in a way similar but in crucial ways also different from the one put to use by the activists on the coastline. Inasmuch as 'public space as a critical intervention' valorised communal sovereignty and usage of space by the people, it came quite close to how Tareq valorised his childhood experience of unfettered use of the space by the community (him

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17 For a detailed examination of gentrification in the adjacent neighbourhood of Mar Mikhael, see Fawaz et al. (2018). The building and adjacent neighbourhoods were later heavily damaged in the Beirut port explosion of 2020.

and his childhood friends). And yet, there were significant differences. One such difference was temporal. For Tareq, the ideal of public space was projected to a long-gone past. As Sarah told me, the founding members of the Dalieh campaign likewise built their affection for the public space of Dalieh through time they spent there in their childhood or youth. Yet, whereas their activism was decisively directed towards Dalieh's futures, Tareq's discourse remained in a nostalgic mood, focused towards a partly lost past. Perhaps in line with the nostalgic thinking Tareq deployed on the Gemmayze steps, the rocks of Dalieh would have been public space before the interventions by the developers and the counter-intervention by the urbanist activists. As Sarah lamented above, however, the activists' intervention with public space changed Dalieh in a way that made it more visible, prominent, and not the kind of wild, unknown place it had been. My friend, in his nostalgic mood, instead placed public space in the status of unchanged, ungentrified, beyond interest to the city-at-large. Now that the area had gained (market) value and the neighbourhood had been gentrified, the steps had in a way become more accessible to the wider public (with related ways of using the space). However, that process resulted in a disconnect from notions of public space reliant on the immanent community of resident-users.

This perception of past spatial arrangements reflects to some degree what Andrew Arsan (2018, 357) has called nostalgia for older, demotic forms of sociability in Beirut, a phenomenon argued by Sune Haugbolle (2010, 87; see also Deeb and Harb 2013, 118–119) to have become widespread in Lebanon since the 1990s. This mode of nostalgia is certainly not limited to Lebanon. As, for example, has been described by anthropologist Christa Salamandra (2004), a nostalgic reimagining of the Old City of Damascus became important not only for the tourism industry but also for new and old segments of Syria's upper class. While the existing literature has largely been focusing on commodification of the nostalgia in cafés and restaurants, what Tareq points out is rather a specific spatial arrangement understood in relation to the concept of public space. This notion of 'public space as nostalgia

for communality' inscribed space with value in relation to a perceived demotic history of communal use.

Tareq's thinking was reflected by Sarah. Talking of her grandparents' house in a central Beirut neighbourhood, she told me:

> Every house had a garden. There were many types of gardens, all the way from low-income to the wealthy gardens in Ras Beirut, Mousaytbeh, and Geitawi. So, people used to gather in their own gardens as public spaces. So, I feel like the discourse must be adjusted, as when people state 'we have no public spaces in Lebanon', or 'the Lebanese don't have the practice of public spaces'. I feel like no one is really talking about this and I find it interesting.

Even though Sarah was referring to gardens enclosed by buildings, and Tareq to supposedly open steps rising through the neighbourhood, these notions of public space were both based on the value of a nostalgic notion of historical sociability. In these ideas of 'public space as nostalgia for communality', the term 'public space' came to draw on a form of sociability that had been lost to time, but could perhaps be rekindled.

This uncanny notion of public space as shared communal space that they and others circulated was tangential to but distinct from the contemporary activist iterations of public space, and yet similarly tangential to and distinct from the legalistic notion of public space in the logic of property. No doubt the communal house-gardens, found in a variety of styles and social classes as Sarah describes above, and the semi-public steps for kids to play on were open for the community, but they most clearly were not public in the way Haussmann (nor Habermas in his writings on public sphere, for that matter) would conceptualise it (see Harvey 2006). This idea of the communal residential garden of ages past was repeated to me when my apartment building in a historically Armenian neighbourhood saw some old residents visiting. A Lebanese-Armenian family who had moved to the United States decades ago had returned to visit their childhood home. The first thing they noted when surveying the building was how the inner courtyard had been a communal space for socialising and chil-

dren's play, but to their vocal disappointment, it was now taken over by water tanks and other utility infrastructure.

These nostalgic ideas of communal relationality were taken up in relation to the wider discussion on public space in Tareq's and Sarah's thinking and beyond. They inscribed the discussion around public space with values of a historical understanding of sociability and space. Chapter 4 explores the role of history in more depth in terms of locating regimes; here, public space understood as 'nostalgia for communality' located places in particular ways in relation to their history, while drawing on this historicity to give value to locations in the present. While articulating a connection to past social life, the logic of nostalgia opened up grounds for arguments, or at least complaints, about how the places should be located in the present.

Conclusion: the public beach located

In 2016, discussions around public space became increasingly urgent at the Ramlet al-Bayda beach due to the launch of a hotel project there. The well-connected businessman Wissam Achour launched the hotel construction in one corner of the remaining stretch of beach and set off a debate on what it means to describe the beach as public space. This project, separate from the Dalieh hotel plan discussed above, threatened to enclose part of the previously open sands. Rana's organisation and other civil society and campaign groups responded with protest and legal challenge, but all the while the hotel continued rising at a fast pace.

In this contestation over the public status of the beach, all of the three iterations of public space this chapter has examined came into play. Whether the beach was public, what it meant in the current moment, and what it should mean for the future of the place were contested through bureaucrats, politicians, lay citizens, NGO workers, and activists making use of and applying different ideas of public space. The stakes of the discussion were whether the beach would be understood as privately owned property available for development, as a space with significant

histories of sociality for the people of Beirut, or as an open public space embodying 'right to the city', or some combination of these. In other words, the three different iterations of public space as in the logic of property, as a critical intervention, and as nostalgia for communality, were taken up both by those defending the beach and those interested in tourism development.

The hotel project itself was premised on a certain understanding of public space, namely that of public space in the logic of property: the majority of the beach was privately owned land, beyond a single municipally owned plot and the Maritime Public Domain. The hotel was ostensibly built on the private land above the Maritime Public Domain, with the legal status of the public domain area on the sands meaning that part was, at least supposedly, not built on. The activists argued that the hotel was nonetheless encroaching on the public domain. A complex legal contestation related to the building permits and zoning legislation ensued, but the construction progressed apace.

In the spring of 2018 the luxury hotel opened its doors, to the chagrin of Beirut civil society and much of the attentive public. The opposition from a wide array of civil society groups took a multitude of practical forms in addition to the legal challenge, including protests at the site, wide publicity on traditional and social media, public pressure, and a negative rating campaign for the hotel once it eventually began trading. As Rana's group and other activist and civil society groups protested the hotel and campaigned to protect the beach as public, they followed the understanding of public space this chapter has described as 'public space as a critical intervention'. My interlocutors as well as activist publications and statements described the beach time and again as public space that should be in its entirety open, public, and free to enter. In this, they moved beyond the property logic of public space, to understand public space as something more encompassing than the property record and legislation.

Lastly, ideas of public space as nostalgia for communality were also at play. Ramlet al-Bayda was depicted as a communal space related to the urban history of Beirut and deserving special safe-

guarding because of its importance in the history of the city for its people. Most explicitly, this was articulated in the celebrations of Job's Wednesday (*Arba'at Ayyoub*), held at the beach each spring on the last Wednesday of April, and the way the celebration was brought up in discussions and materials about the beach. The narrative behind the celebration itself relates to a legend about the biblical and Qur'anic prophet Job, who once descended on the white sands at Beirut to seek a cure from the pure waters of the beach and received it there. For my interlocutors it was not Job's visit itself that made a difference, but the fact that the beach had functioned as a place for a communal celebration connecting it to histories of sociality in the city.[18] The same narrative of how the families of Beirut used to descend on the beach to celebrate the event was reiterated to me by multiple interlocutors and reported in media outlets and activist publications. For example, journalist Habib Battah writes in his report on the event from 2015:

> For decades, Beirut families have gathered on the last Wednesday of April for a picnic in [Job's] honor. 'There were thousands of people, all of Beirut came out,' Samir, a 70-something local resident told me, reflecting wistfully on the 1950s. 'Everyone used to walk all the way from their houses to the sea. My father used to take me.' (Battah 2015)

What is significant here is that this spring celebration made the beach into a historic public space in a relation of proximity (socially speaking) to the city of Beirut and its people. This was in line with the way Tareq spoke nostalgically about the Gemmayze steps as a communal space of past sociability. In both cases, what gave the place value was the way it was seen as embodying a historical relationality from ages past, and how that allowed people to articulate something ethical about the connections and disconnections of the place in the contemporary moment.

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18 The interest in Job's Wednesday was thus not 'religious' in any simple sense of the term, as the contemporary narratives and re-enactments were quite secular.

These three different ways public space came into action had very different levels and strategies of access to power.[19] Here, at the juncture of the spatial logics in the different iterations of public space and power to ascribe value and generate relative location, they formed emergent locating regimes. These regimes were provisional, as their capacity to locate depended on a highly contextual balance of power and the actions of bureaucrats, activists, and real-estate capitalists in acting out the combination of spatial logic and power. Since the legal and bureaucratic separation of public and private had the ostensible backing of the Lebanese state (and thus was enforceable by the different police and security forces, for example), the contestation over what exactly would be the results and understanding of this division were often fought in legal terms. Public space as critical intervention could mostly not rely on legal status or state power and was instead backed by the creative powers and moral arguments of campaigners, activists, and scholars striving to change things on the ground. Lastly, the nostalgic notion of the beach as an intimate place for the people of Beirut relied on re-enactment and memory to give value to the location, without necessarily being put to use directly through the use of force. The way power functioned in these three registers was to a degree both restrictive and creative. The property logic too relied on forms of imagination and make-believe, while on the other hand activists tried to make room for their intervention through legal challenges trying to summon state power. However, if public space as critical intervention and nostalgia for communality opened up new possibilities for seeing and imagining the beach, relying on the property logic re-enforced property-based categorisations on the sands.

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19 An example of the workings of power and spatial logics in Beirut is given by Kanafani (2017). She outlines how claiming a right to park one's car on a street based on citizenship and public space was often prone to fail in front of informal parking brokers, since the claim to publicness detached from patriarchal power did not resonate 'on the street'. The logic that parking space should be open for all citizens was less powerful than the spatial logic of patriarchal deference.

In the end, Rana and her peers failed to put a stop to the hotel. The court cases trying to argue that the hotel was, in fact, infringing on public space in the logic of property were stuck in the courts while the hotel was built up at a quick pace. The critical 'Lefebvrian' claim that the whole of the beach should be public did not rouse enough protest to put a halt to the construction, nor did appeals to the significance of the beach for past forms of sociality. When the hotel opened around two years after the start of the construction, access was restricted only to paying customers.

What of the relative locations of the beach, then? How did the three iterations of public space locate the beach somewhere in particular? This multiplicity and the way different locations coexisted was an always-already fuzzy and contested process. The bureaucratic separation of lands into public or private space connected the beach to the urban-planning logics of the city, and to circuits of real-estate capital. It made possible the construction of a hotel project on the sands, opening the beach to tourism business, yet cutting off access to a part of the beach for many residents. Public space as a critical intervention linked the beach to Beirut's urban fabric, retaining free and open access while making the place known as the latest site in the ongoing contestations between public and private urban space in the city. In practice it also made the site legible in the sense of a wider (or global) discussion on neoliberal urbanism and a right to the city.[20] Finally, the nostalgic notion of public space as a communal space tied the beach to urban rituals, namely that of Job's Wednesday, and saw it as part and parcel of the history of Beirut. Through the staging of festivities, it reactivated these connections through history. In practice, these understandings of public space coexisted and were part of the same discussion, just as the beach itself was located in multiple ways.

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20 For example, the Environmental Justice Atlas, a project cataloguing social conflict related to environmental issues around the globe has a listing of the Ramlet al-Bayda case (EJOLT 2016; Temper et al. 2015).

To return to Rana lounging on the veranda at Ramlet al-Bayda in the opening vignette: for her and many others the beach was both important in being a public space in its entirety—or a space for the public, indeed—and in the nostalgic connection to the urban history of Beirut it embodied. Yet she was in a different location from the prospective customers of the luxury hotel just a stone's throw down the beach. This was rather more radically so than in the simple sense of a spatial separation between the space of the hotel and the space of what remained from the public beach. Indeed, the connections and disconnections that these now-existing parts of the beach had to and from different demographies, circuits of knowledge, and political discussions were completely different; in this sense their locations were 'further off' than their physical proximity might suggest. Yet in another way, through a discordance of ideas over what the proper location of such coastal places should be, they were intimately entangled as part of a contestation. So, simultaneously, the hotel was located differently from the public beach in terms of people making use of both as leisure spaces, yet on the level of conflict over public space they created a singular location.

The hotel, now visible in the distance from the veranda, embodied its own set of connections and disconnections. With its hundred-dollar nightly fees, it was actively disconnecting large swathes of the city from the sealine it occupied, but simultaneously making it more present for those Lebanese and international elites interested in taking the sun by the hotel pools or taking selfies in front of the very same Mediterranean waves washing on the sands in front of the hotel. While the space of the hotel and the space of the public beach were forcibly detached, the story does not end there. For as this chapter has described, reiterations of public space carried within them a contradiction—perhaps open for further enclosure of the beach, perhaps towards other, more common understandings and uses of public space.

Scale

Scale and how it relates to crosslocations came up repeatedly as we were working together. Chapter 1 on Beirut is one example of how scale comes into the story.

The dispute over the potential privatisation of the last public beach in the city involved several different concepts of public space: for example, as a legal status set out during French colonial rule, which set clear boundaries between private and public property; as an ideal public space as it appeared in theories of public space developed for Latin America; as a fragile ecological environment that would be harmed by further privatisation and development. On the other side, it involved the hotel business working in concert with financial and political interests to assert the inevitability of this kind of transformation.

Through these different arguments, the beach was linked to and separated from other places both in the immediate vicinity and on the other side of the world. This could be called a topological effect of relative location, in which the distance between Latin American public space and the beach in Beirut becomes no distance at all. In crosslocations terms, it is not so much that the distances are erased, but that a relation is created, in which the beach in Beirut is similar to urban spaces in Latin America in just one significant respect: their status as public spaces is under threat. They remain entirely separated in terms of geography and in terms of many other criteria; but a particular theory of public space draws them together, makes them part of the same conversation.

Coexisting with that thread, there is the evocation of ecological fragility. This generates a different relation, one that draws on the logic of a delicate balance between living things that, if disturbed, could cause trouble for everyone. That thread pulls on the idea of dense interconnectivity of everything with everything else. And coexisting with that, there are the legal regulations concerning public and private spaces, which entirely crosscut both the aspirational view of public space expressed by the activists and the ecological logic of

environmental interconnectedness. The law deliberately disconnects things, especially in terms of questions of property.

A crosslocations approach provides a way to explore how these different scales coexist and overlap at this beach, both historically and at any given moment—to study the power dynamics involved, and to look at how they work together, in parallel or in contradiction. Importantly, this does not require a resolution: it does not need a single structure, assemblage, or network to appear.

Scale here is both a logic and a concrete experience. The logic provides the reason to bring things into relation: why think of a park in Brazil as having anything to do with a beach in Beirut? The regulations controlling whether and how you can visit the beach, and the understanding of how that beach is connected to, or disconnected from, other parts of the city, other groups, other parts of the world, all affect how people experience the beach.

In this, local and global are not opposites, but coexist in the same places, generating different kinds of locations and experiences. Scale in this sense is about relations, connections, and disconnections, as they are experienced in a world that is multiply crosslocated.

Meteora: crosslocating enclosure and enclosing crosslocation

Phaedra Douzina-Bakalaki

In the previous chapter, a group of committed activists sought to protect the public status of Beirut's Dalieh al-Raouche by deploying knowledge. The coastal rocks were submitted to various fields of knowledge, rendered legible, and kept public. 'Public space' in this formulation features both as the physical object of activist investment, as well as a distinctive logic of relative positioning that draws on critical theory to envision relations between people, environment, and property in particular ways. 'Public space', in other words, is theorised both as locating regime and regimented location, thus blurring clear-cut distinctions between conceptual and material renditions of space. As Samuli Lähteenaho shows, his activist informants resisted privatisation by resorting to a distinctive conceptual vocabulary, the application of which effectively shifted the beach's relative location. In the place of what would have originally been a luxury hotel, now stands a popular beach, a symbol of activist struggle, and the object of elaborate social-scientific analysis.

This chapter also takes interest in the multiplicity of relative locations afforded by different logics of positioning. Yet, whereas Lähteenaho narrates, among others, the precarious victory of public over private, as well as that of connection over disconnection, this chapter recounts a peculiar process of privatisation that severs connections and culminates in the gradual monopolisation

of space by one logic at the expense of others. Some 2300 km to the north-east of the coastal rocks of Dalieh al-Raouche lie the rocks of the Meteora. The Meteora is a spectacular formation of sandstone megaliths that rise above the Thessalian plain of central Greece. At the western foothills of the pillars lies the village of Kastraki, and some 6 km to the south is Kalambaka, a town of 20,000 people. The Meteora's unique geomorphology has historically been imbued with spiritual significance. Ascetic life on the Meteora dates back to the 11th century, when hermits began dwelling on some of the megaliths' lower peaks. By the 16th century, the Meteora hosted a total of 24 Orthodox Christian monasteries.

In modern Greek, a person or object that is *meteoro* may be elevated and suspended, they may exist in a state of liminality, or they may simply be indecisive and lack direction. Indeed, perched on the peaks of pillars as high as 500 m, the Meteorite monasteries give the impression of hovering in the sky. The four monasteries and two nunneries that are currently active on the Meteora constitute one of the largest Orthodox Christian monastic complexes in the world and are claimed to receive somewhere between 1,000,000 and 3,000,000 visitors annually—pilgrims and tourists alike. Yet, prior to the establishment of the Athens–Kalambaka railway connection in 1886 and the construction of the Meteora's highland driveway in the 1960s, the rocks were nearly inaccessible. The International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), in their evaluation to support the inscription of the Meteora on the UNESCO World Heritage listing, described the location thus:

> Built under impossible conditions, with no practicable roads, permanent though precarious human habitations subsist to this day in the Meteora, but have become vulnerable under the impact of time. The net in which intrepid pilgrims were hoisted up vertically alongside the 373-meter cliff where the Varlaam monastery dominates the valley symbolises the fragility of a traditional way of life that is threatened with extinction. (ICOMOS 1987)

The magnificent landscape, coupled with the strenuous efforts people took to reach it, captured the imagination of several 19th-century European travellers, who documented their itineraries in travelogues. Lengthy references to the Meteora can be found in the writings of English topographer W.M. Leake 1841 (1821), German writer Otto Magnus Freiherr von Stackelberg (1830), and noted French archaeologist Leon Heuzey (1860), among others. Replete with exoticising undercurrents, these travelogues provide historical information on life in the Meteora as seen by Western observers and are often supplemented by engravings that reflect 19th-century topographic trends (Baroutas 2001).

The first extant topographical depiction of the Meteora, however, does not belong with 19th-century travelogues, but rather with Christian sacred cartography. A copper engraving dated 1782 and attributed to priest-monk Parthenios of Elason depicts 23 monasteries arranged on the Meteora's pinnacles. The monasteries overlook a total of ten villages. Scattered around the foot of the rocks are small figures ascending the pinnacles by means of ladders and nets. At the top in the centre sits the exaggerated monastery of Megalo Meteoron, positioned on a disproportionately high pinnacle that hovers over the village of Kalambaka. Depicted in the upper corners of the engraving are the Mother of God and the monastery's founding fathers, Athanasios and Joasaph. In her detailed analysis, geographer Veronica Della Dora notes that the engraving employs Byzantine iconography techniques to offer a bird's-eye view, and observes that the sizes of the depicted features vary to reflect their spiritual significance:

> Looking at its horizontal axis, that is, as from the artist's imagined viewpoint on the hills in the foreground, the landscape can be taken almost at face-value and read, to some extent at least, as a somewhat inaccurate (geodetically speaking) topographical map of the region. Considering it as a vertical construct, it can be read as a different type of map, this time as a map of pathways to heaven. (Della Dora 2013, 225)

The hierarchical relationship that Parthenios drew between the Meteora and the town of Kalambaka persists to this day, albeit in different guises. Unlike the Meteora, which has saturated travelogues, tourist guides, coffee-table books, and social media, Kalambaka has been far less photographed. In related publications, as well as my conversations with tourists and other visitors, Kalambaka is often discussed as the last stop en route to the Meteora. Alternatively, it features as a rather unremarkable location where one can spend a few nights at most.

Indeed, while Kalambaka's proximity to the Meteora has given rise to a relatively robust tourist industry that occupies more than 60 per cent of the local population in accommodation and hospitality services, many Kalambakiotes feel that the relation between Kalambaka and the Meteora is not how it should be. Complaints vary. Some reminisce about older times, when the Meteora is located 'at a breath's distance' (*mia anasa makria*), and constituted a place of pastoralism and small-scale farming, but also daily walks and casual worship. They feel that, having transformed into a mass-tourism destination, the Meteora is now remote and disconnected.

Others recall previous times, when the Meteora was not simply one among several stopovers offered by holiday packages, but a destination in itself. Memories of Kalambaka's packed squares, frequented by returning tourists who stayed in campsites and cheap rental rooms, are contrasted with today's fleeting sightings of packed buses. Some lament the transitory nature of Kalambaka, which deprives the town of important profit and burdens it with pollution and other administrative costs. The fact that the majority of trips to the Meteora are organised by tourist agencies that are not based in Kalambaka, but rather the capital, Athens, and other major urban centres, also causes discontent.

Yet another complaint concerns the 'monoculture of religious tourism' (*i monokalliergia tou thriskeftikou tourismou*), which deters other forms of tourism that could benefit the local population. Finally, members of the organisation 'Meteora for all' have dedicated themselves to a struggle against the Meteora's privati-

sation and so-called 'sacrosanct' status (*to avato ton Meteoron*).
What they refer to is Law 2351/1995, also known as the 'holy law'
(*ieros nomos*), which was passed in 1995 and established that the
5500 acres covered by the Meteora constitute 'holy land' (*ieros
horos*). In essence, the 'holy law' recognised monastic communi-
ties as the ultimate power-holders over the space and its uses and
introduced a series of prohibitive ordinances aimed at protecting
the area's 'religious nature'.

These grievances are not of the same kind and, predictably,
they are not shared by everyone. Moreover, even those most
indignant with the situation often recognise that, 'had it not been
for these rocks above, we would be nothing', pointing to the fact
that neighbouring one of the country's most popular destinations
brings important benefits. What these complaints do share in
common, however, is the contention that Kalambaka's relation to
the Meteora is neither fixed (for it has, could, and even should be
otherwise) nor unambiguous (for it forms the object of reflection
and perhaps even contestation).

This chapter treats the Meteora as a crosslocation—that is, as a
space that becomes conceived, defined, and valued through mul-
tiple and coexisting locating logics. Each of these logics ascribes
significance to certain aspects of the area and obscures others.
While geologic framings situate the beginnings of the Meteora to
a billion years ago, the accounts of Byzantine archaeology begin
at the 11th century. And similarly, while the Meteora's UNESCO
inscription turns the rocky formations into the property of 'man-
kind', their ascription as Orthodox Christian 'holy land' casts
them as property of the monastic authorities.

In the Meteora, the calibration of multiple 'heres', or 'relative
locations', mediated through logics as varied as geologic time,
archaeology, Byzantine history, Orthodox monasticism, heritage,
environmental protection, and mass tourism, also produces mul-
tiple 'elsewheres'. Inasmuch as the Meteora is connected (by cer-
tain measures) to Mount Athos, they are also connected (by meas-
ures of a different kind) to Malibu, California. While, however,
the Meteora's multiple 'heres' connect them to multiple 'theres',

they also disconnect them from other 'elsewheres', and perhaps most importantly, they occasionally disconnect them from their immediate surroundings. The Meteora's multiplicity, in other words, does not make them immune to exclusionary claims or processes of enclosure.

The first half of this chapter takes its cue from Doreen Massey's theorisation of space as a 'simultaneity of stories so far' (2005, 9). It addresses some of the stories built around the Meteora and pays attention to the 'imaginations, theorisations, understandings, meanings' (89) that open up once space is conceived in terms of relationality, heterogeneity, and open-endedness. To this end, the chapter reflects on various cartographic and other representations that variously situate and construe the Meteora and its surroundings. These representations vary in terms of the relations they map out, the effects they produce, and the powers they exert. By plotting the site in divergent maps we may begin to make sense of the 'power geometries' (Massey 1994) that various locating logics mobilise and assemble. Additionally, by taking multiplicity as a starting point, we may begin to understand to how different locating logics come to be recognised and classified, to either be separated, or to be joined in relations of overlap, cooperation, competition, or even friction. Echoing scholars who insist that anthropologists take seriously people's investment in boundary work (Candea 2011; Gershon 2019; Mitchell 1991; Spencer 2007), the first half of this chapter addresses the peculiar contiguity of Kalambaka and the Meteora as a lens into the coexistence of multiple locations in a given place, and sets out to explore how multiplicity and coexistence may transform into vehicles of reflection, contestation, and resistance.

The second half of the chapter zooms into the operation of one locating regime. More specifically, it focuses on the Meteora's 'holy' status and traces what several of my interlocutors understood to be the co-optation and monopolisation of space by 'religion'. The use of inverted commas is not incidental, but rather intended to allude to the polysemy of 'religion'. 'Religion' is particularly receptive to spatial imagery (Hovland 2016; Ivakhiv 2006), and its

polysemy is in many ways a function of spatiality. Depending on whether one grasps 'religion' as occupying the inner self, as manifesting in churches and sacred sites, as entering secular spaces such as the parliament, the court, hospitals, and classrooms, or as looming over the nation and extending beyond it, one is likely to reach different understandings of 'religion'. In this regard, 'religion' may be grasped as an unstable signifier that both materialises through space, and variously signifies and orders space. This understanding brings to mind Doreen Massey's observation that, 'space is imbued with power and … that power in its turn always has a spatiality' (2009, 19). Seen from this perspective, inasmuch as 'religion' orders space, different spatial configurations produce different conceptions of 'religion'.

For some of my interlocutors, the framing of the Meteora as a 'religious destination' secures their livelihoods. For others, its designation as 'holy land' amounts to corruption, for it serves the profiteering and privatising interests of monastic authorities. Many feel that the predominance ascribed to the landscape's 'religious nature' obscures several other important aspects, thus abating, or even eliminating, different versions of the place. Often, local debate on the Meteora's 'holiness' transgresses into discussions about relations between Church and State, the porous boundaries of authorities that should remain distinct, and more broadly, the place of Orthodoxy in contemporary Greece. At stake in these conversations are not only the material manifestations of 'religion' in physical space, but also its conceptual contours and boundaries vis-à-vis other equally slippery, locating, and located entities such as the 'state', 'society', and the 'economy'. Taken together, the ethnographic threads of this chapter demonstrate that the encounter between space and locating regimes often transforms both, thus challenging their separation and assumed autonomy and making it difficult to distinguish between the two, or knowing what came first.

Crosslocating enclosure: a space of many parts and wholes

'Meteora: a billion years of geological history in Greece to create a World Heritage Site' reads the title of an article published in the journal *Geoheritage* (Rassios et al. 2020). The authors attribute the existence of the Meteora to ten geologic episodes, spread over the course of a billion years, and observe that the Meteora's geo-environment is similar to the offshore canyons of California's Malibu coast. Stressing the precedence of geo-historical time over monastic history and touristic development, the authors emphasise 'that had any of these essential geologic processes been different in nature, the geomorphologic features that host the Byzantine monastic district and today's touristic infrastructure would not have developed' (Rassios et al. 2020, 2). The geologists, in other words, tell us that there exist alternative ways of historicising the site and calibrating its value.

In the geologists' account, the site's anchoring in monasticism and heritage tourism is juxtaposed with the vastness of geological time. To the question 'how old are the rock spires of Meteora?', the authors respond that, 'they are as old as the oldest rocks of Greece and as young as today' (Rassios et al. 2020, 15). The Meteora in this geological framing not only emerge as a 'spatiotemporal event' (Massey 2005, 131) but also as 'being always in the process of being made. It is never finished; never closed' (Massey 2005, 9). The authors of the *Geoheritage* article discuss the effects of natural processes of water and wind erosion, ice fracturing, and vegetation, and issue warnings over the potentially destructive effects of urban development, tourist infrastructures, buses' exhaust gases, and climbers' pitons. In short, even if the time elapsed between the settlement of monks in the 11th century and, later, the inclusion of the Meteora on the list of World Heritage Sites in 1988 entails but a tiny sliver of deep time (Irvine 2014), this sliver appears to be disproportionately perilous.

Michael Herzfeld also takes an interest in the effects of monumentalisation on time and space, but his angle is different. He

distinguishes between what he terms 'social' and 'monumental time', and argues that the two are 'entangled in a struggle of sinewy complexity' (Herzfeld 1991, 6) and divided by a 'discursive chasm, separating popular from official understandings of history' (10). In contrast to 'social time', which is unpredictable and unravels through everyday experience, 'monumental time' is contingent on official understandings of history and, therefore, 'encounters events as realisations of some supreme destiny and reduces social experience to collective predictability' (10). As Herzfeld demonstrates in his lengthy ethnography of a historic conservation project in the Cretan town of Rethemnos, processes of monumentalisation can be an ambivalent blessing (see also Breglia 2006). While they often bring tourists and money, they also materialise in enclosure, gentrification, and alienation. This explains, according to Herzfeld, why the monumentalisation of time and history is so often vested in tensions between 'socially experienced time and administratively reified place' (1991, 40).

The cartographic implications of this tension became apparent to me on my first fieldwork trip to Kalambaka in June 2018, when I noticed that, spread around the town, were two different maps. The first map is available at several points across the central street of Kalambaka, but is also distributed abundantly by tourist agencies, cafeterias, and hotels. It was created in 1996 and, akin to Parthenios' 18th-century engraving, it provides a bird's-eye view of the landscape that combines different scales. Unlike the pillars of the Meteora, which are enhanced and sketched out in detail, Kalambaka and the village of Kastraki are represented as clusters of red-tiled rooftops. The labelling is offered in Greek, English, German, Italian, French, and Dutch. The majority of pins are distributed in the upper part of the map and locate monasteries, chapels, hermitages, pathways, and car parks. The only pins in Kalambaka concern the bus and train stations, a couple of banks, and the post office.

The second map, on the other hand, is less frequently encountered and is nothing less than a conventional civil map that cuts off at Kalambaka's administrative borders. All streets and squares

are named, and the map gives directions to the library, the town hall, the open-air theatre, the forestry, the police station, and the hospital. Produced with different audiences in mind, both maps selectively conceal and reveal, as well as enhance and downgrade aspects of the landscape, thus producing different versions of it (see also Green and King 2001). The first map illustrates a monument detached from the social life that unravels in the town below, whereas the second depicts a town separated from its monumental backdrop behind and above. Indeed, the Meteora's iconicity appears to be deeply vested in their separation from the rest of social life. This separation is a function of altitude as well as a function of meticulous regimentation and active curation. Sometimes distilled as a 'rare collaboration between man and God' and at others as one between 'man and nature', the Meteora is situated 'in between worlds', thus throwing dominant polarities into sharp relief and inviting their collapse.

The Meteora's efficacy in coalescing separate realms in admittedly dramatic ways is also suggested by their inscription as a 'mixed' World Heritage Property—meaning both natural and cultural heritage.[21] The Meteora's inscription, which dates back to 1988, is representative of UNESCO's shifting agenda and the gradual expansion of the concept of heritage. Originally confined to artefacts, from the 1970s onwards heritage regimes began to also be applied to sites, places, and environments, which were framed as entities of universal value and subjected to a series of standardised global management protocols and conservation

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21 UNESCO's 'cultural materialism' (Harrison and Rose 2010, 247) and the related operational dichotomy it draws between nature and culture have received extensive scrutiny over the years (Harrison 2013). Despite growing recognition of the inseparability of natural and human heritage, the concept continues to animate a series of pervasive polarities between nature and culture, as well as between material and non-material worlds (Geismar 2015; Lowenthal 2005). The implications of these dichotomies are both conceptual, insofar as they distinguish between the natural environment and human creation, and material, insofar as they activate different management and conservation strategies.

procedures (Geismar 2015; see also Chapter 7 of this volume). A total of 39 sites are included in UNESCO's 'mixed heritage' world map. Denoted by half-green and half-yellow map points, these sites range from Machu Picchu to Swedish Lapland, and from Mali's Bandiagara to Palau's Rock Islands. Before taking on their new life with World Heritage status, these sites have been measured against UNESCO's criteria, rendered commensurable, and marked as being of 'outstanding universal value'.[22]

'Heritage regimes', as Haidy Geismar calls them, are embedded in power relations and constitute a ' "cunning" politics of recognition' (Geismar 2015, 72; see also Povinelli 2002), the locational implications of which are stark. My interview with Vassilis, the owner of a tourist agency in Kalambaka, on a hot afternoon in the summer of 2019 was illuminating. The Meteora's inscription on the World Heritage List in 1988 not only multiplied visitors but also signalled a transition from 'itinerant tourism' (*periigitikos tourismos*) to 'mass tourism' (*mazikos tourismos*). Vassilis explained that itinerant tourism is nature oriented, slow paced,

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22 From a total of ten UNESCO criteria, the Meteora meet six. They represent 'a masterpiece of human creative genius', for they entail a 'unique artistic achievement and are one of the most forceful examples of the architectural transformation of a site into a place of retreat, meditation, and prayer'. They exhibit an 'important interchange of human values', for their frescoes, 'executed in 1527 by Theophanes the Cretan, became the basic reference of the fundamental iconographic and stylistic features of post-Byzantine painting, which exerted widespread, long-lasting influence'. They are an 'outstanding example of type of building, architectural, and technological ensemble of landscape', for they constitute examples of 'monastic construction, which illustrate a significant stage in history, that of the 14th and 15th centuries, when the hermitic ideals of early Christianity were restored to a place of honour by monastic communities, both in the western world (in Tuscany, for example) and in the Orthodox Church'. They are 'an outstanding example of traditional human settlement', which is representative of 'human interaction with the environment, especially when it has become vulnerable under the impact of irreversible change'. Lastly, they 'contain superlative natural phenomena or areas of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance' (ICOMOS 1987).

and often multi-sited. It began to develop after the fall of the military junta in 1974, and even more so after the 1981 James Bond film *For Your Eyes Only*, which was partly shot in the Meteora. By contrast, the touristic patterns introduced by the UNESCO inscription are fast paced and often take the form of organised guide trips that are part of package deals.

After 1988, the Meteora attracted unprecedented numbers of tourists, mainly French, German, Austrian, and Swiss. This list has now expanded to include an increasing number of visitors from Orthodox majority countries, such as Russia, Serbia, and Ukraine, as well as people from China, Australia, Mexico, and Brazil. Monastic sites, Vassilis continued, gradually transformed into 'touristic businesses' (*touristikes epiheirisis*), actively involved both in the promotion of the Meteora and its capitalisation. The steady touristic development of the Meteora also had important benefits for Kalambaka's economy, with agriculture and animal husbandry giving way to hospitality and accommodation services. Vassilis explained that only ten hotels operated in Kalambaka and Kastraki in the 1990s, as compared to the 5000 hotel rooms and 1000 Airbnb apartments that are available today. Even so, Vassilis insisted that the late 1980s and 1990s were a period of rapid economic growth. Those who had migrated to Athens and other urban centres began to return, those planning on leaving changed their minds, and others from neighbouring villages decided to relocate.

In Vassilis's demonstrative words, 'Kalambaka made it to the map in 1988' (*i Kalambaka bike ston harti to 1988*), and it did so thanks to UNESCO. Rooted in a long history of internationalism, UNESCO supplants individual and national property rights—at least in principle—and asserts a 'global locality' (Appadurai 1990) that belongs to a global 'imagined community' (Anderson 1983). UNESCO's heritage regimes are heavily vested in notions of universal commonality, or what Michael Herzfeld (2004) refers to as the 'global hierarchy of value'. In the words of Christoph Brumann, 'once a property lands on the World Heritage List, it becomes a legally hybrid space of which, by an act of voluntary self-restric-

tion of national sovereignty, humanity in its entirety is a co-owner and co-custodian' (2018, 1211).

As a number of scholars have pointed out, however, UNESCO's humanitarian cosmopolitanism is neither innocent of marginalising indigenous people, violently expropriating their lands, and privatising their environments, nor is it incompatible with the logics and practices of the sovereign nation-state. In fact, UNESCO's World Heritage Convention, adopted in 1972, is premised on a contradiction. While on the one hand it operates on the assumption that certain parts of heritage are of 'outstanding universal value' and thus ought to be 'preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole', on the other hand the convention respects 'the sovereignty of the States on whose territory the cultural and natural heritage … is situated' (UNESCO 1972). The tensions underpinning global and national modes of heritage governance have interesting implications for conceptualisations of both 'mankind' and property.

The partiality of UNESCO's humanitarian cosmopolitanism has been addressed by several scholars, who have variously scrutinised the organisation's imperialist origins, Eurocentric practices, and nationalist inclinations (De Cesari 2010); the unresolved tensions between universalism and relativism are latent in the organisation's mission and agendas (Eriksen 2001), and in the organisation's increasing domination by diplomatic realpolitik and economic interests (Meskell 2015). The contradictions inherent in UNESCO's enclosure of the common heritage of 'mankind' have also come under scholars' scrutiny for petrifying the past, reifying culture, and enabling exclusive claims of ownership and belonging (Byrne 2009; Collins 2011; Olwig 1999; cf. Brumann 2009). In this line of critique, heritage is what remains once social relations, past, and place have become objectified into circumscribed property and assigned to various kinds of legitimate stakeholders.

Seen from this angle, UNESCO's extraterritorial and inclusive notions of property are in practice shown to be heavily dependent on Western legal notions of property as exclusive possession (De Cesari 2010). In short, the property of 'mankind' most often trans-

forms into the property of a few men. Some of my interlocutors, however, would beg to differ with this analysis. Their disagreement stems from the fact that, since the Meteora belong to 'mankind', then it cannot possibly belong to those who have claimed it as their own and misappropriated it. The Meteora's extraterritoriality, in other words, not only enables collective claims of ownership but also generates space for the contestation of exclusive claims of possession. But first, it is worth considering who these interlocutors might be, and with what kinds of claims they take issue.

A quick Google search on the Meteora, or alternatively a brief look at the promotional material distributed by Kalambaka's tourist agencies, suffices to understand that the Meteora constitutes a place of multiple heritage credentials and protection regimes. In addition to being a UNESCO mixed heritage property, the Meteora, together with the Antichasia Mountain complex and the town of Kalambaka, also constitute a European Union (EU) Natura 2000 protected site. According to the 1995 listing, 'an exceptional feature of the area is its biodiversity; it is of great botanical and zoological value due to the presence of a large number of endemic and threatened species, legally protected at national and international level'.[23]

Parallel to this history of international accolades, runs one of domestic distinctions (Poulios 2014). In 1921 a royal decree inscribed four monasteries as 'Byzantine heritage monuments',[24] and a presidential decree issued in 1962 designated another four as 'historic preservation sites' to be safeguarded by the Greek state.[25] Five years later, the Ministry of Culture designated the Meteora, the neighbouring village of Kastraki, and part of the town of Kalambaka, as a single archaeological site, to be overseen

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23 The listing is available at: https://natura2000.eea.europa.eu/Natura2000/ SDF.aspx?site=GR1440005.

24 These are the Varlaam, the Great Meteoron, the St Stephen, and the Holy Trinity monasteries.

25 These are the Roussanou, the St Nikolaos Anapafsas, the Coming of Christ, the Hagia, and the Ipsilotera monasteries.

by the Directorate of Byzantine Antiquities. Lastly, and perhaps most dramatically, the 'holy law' (Law 2351/1995), passed by the Greek parliament in 1995, recognised the Meteora as a 'holy site', and declared that its distinctive 'religious nature' (*thriskeftikos charaktiras)* ought to be safeguarded. The precise implications of this will become clear shortly.

Now that we have a better idea of the Meteora's 'crosslocated-ness', meaning the area's implication in different registers of protection and management, it is worth briefly reflecting on these registers' locating and locational effects. The geologists compared the Meteora to Malibu. UNESCO joined them to China's Mount Emei, Türkiye's Pamukkale, and the Spanish Pyrenees. Additionally, it transformed them into a mass-tourism destination, thus shifting the relative location of the rocks, the priorities of their monasteries, the urban outlook of Kalambaka, and the economy of the broader region. Natura 2000, on the other hand, inserted the Meteora in a list of 27,312 sites that span 787,606 km^2 of EU territory, home to threatened habitats and species. Their recognition as an archaeological site by the Greek state connected the Meteora to the Acropolis, Delphi, and Knossos in both administrative and symbolic ways. According to Archbishop Ieronymos, as well as several of my interlocutors who quoted him, the Meteora amounts 'to the Acropolis of religious destinations', a remark that reminds us of the uneven significance assigned to Classical Greek and Byzantine cultures (Herzfeld 1986; Yalouri 1993).

The locating logics and regimes that these distinctions are premised upon are vastly different, as are the locational (and symbolic) conjunctions they draw. Simply put, the Meteora is connected both to the Acropolis and Malibu, both Mount Athos and Machu Pichu. While the terms of these connections evidently vary, underlying these different iterations are processes of standardisation, commensuration, and comparison that have been cast as connection. Importantly, however, inasmuch as the Meteora's accolades connect it to other locations and the world beyond, they also enclose it, thus disconnecting it from its immediate surroundings—often in quite literal ways.

Each of the Meteora's inscriptions—natural, cultural, histori-
cal, archaeological, and religious—comes with a map drawn by
different authorities that turns parts of the space into areas of
invested interest and designates what is (and is not) to be done
with it and in it.[26] The powerful ordering implications of these
spatial circumscriptions are perhaps most notable in the carto-
graphic representation of the Meteora as a 'holy site'. The Greek
government map divides the space into two zones, also referred
to as 'no build zones' (*adhomites zones*). Zone A, which coin-
cides with the boundaries of space designated as 'holy', covers
5500 acres. It includes the four monasteries and two nunneries
that are currently active, as well as their immediate surroundings,
and prohibits any activity that 'may upset in any way the holy
character of the area and obstruct the exercise of monastic life
or the worship of God' (Greece 1995, article 1). These activities
include commerce, farming, agriculture, and hunting; all kinds
of construction work; cultural activities, such as music concerts
and festivals; camping, climbing, tightrope walking, parachuting,
and motocross; and finally, all video recording and photography
for professional, commercial, or advertising purposes, including
wedding photoshoots.

Zone B of the heritage site, on the other hand, also referred to
as a buffer zone, includes the village of Kastraki and the northern-
most part of Kalambaka. To the detriment of many landowners,

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26 Note that, with the exception of the maps designating the 'holy site' and
the archaeological site, the rest of these maps have no executive pow-
ers. Each of UNESCO's mixed properties is accompanied by a map of
the heritage site. In the case of the Meteora, the UNESCO map con-
sists of a core and buffer zone. The core zone covers 271.87 hectares
that contain most of the Meteora's rocks and six monasteries, while the
buffer zone covers 1,884.14 hectares and contains the remaining rocks,
the village of Kastraki, and the northern outskirts of the town of Kal-
ambaka. UNESCO's map can be accessed at: https://whc.unesco.org/
en/list/455/maps/. The Natura 2000 map can be accessed at: https://
natura2000.eea.europa.eu/. The boundaries of the archaeological site
can be seen at: https://www.arxaiologikoktimatologio.gov.gr/el/monu-
ments_info?id=33236&type=Zone.

any construction work, the selling of property, and a number of other activities cannot take place in Zone B, unless permitted by the monastic authorities and the Directorate of Byzantine Antiquities. It is this estrangement from their erstwhile daily activities, their properties, economic prospects, but also their environment, that Kalambakiotes refer to when they speak of the 'sacrosanct' (*avato*) character of the Meteora, alluding to Mount Athos, another UNESCO mixed heritage property located in Greece, where women are not allowed.

Here, UNESCO's purportedly extraterritorial and inclusive conception of property becomes an important ally (see also Franquesa 2013). In the words of Kalliopi, a librarian and member of the organisation 'Meteora for all':

> The Meteora have been recognised as a World Heritage Site (*mnimio pagosmias klironomias*). They belong to humankind (*anikoun stin anthropotita*). They [the monasteries] don't own them any more than I do, I don't own them any more than you do, and you don't own it any more than the French, the Russian, or the Chinese. The Meteora belong to everyone.

It is this co-optation and monopolisation of space by 'religion' that this chapter turns to next, to examine both its implications for locals' lives and livelihoods, as well as for their conceptions of 'religion'.

Enclosing crosslocations: a holy place

Dichotomies between the religious and the secular, but also sacred and profane, or Church and State, are often framed in spatial terms, as in the deployment of language that concerns 'domains', 'spheres', and 'realms' (Levinson 1996; see also Lakoff and Johnson 2003). Adherents of secularism often frame their struggles in terms of 'space', its legitimate uses and potential abuses (Asad 1993, 5; Calhoun 2011, 38). Religion can also yield geographical-cum-cultural divisions. For instance, according to Huntington's *Clash of Civilisations*, which famously divides the world between the

West and the rest, 'Greece is an anomaly, the Orthodox outsider in Western organisations' (1998, 122). The parochial, irrational, and even violent attributes that feature in Orientalist visions of Orthodoxy have served to exclude Eastern Europe from the West, and to allegedly compromise its prospects for modernity, development, and democratisation (Hann 2014; Makrides 2005). Michael Lambek (2002, 19), on the other hand, distinguishes between immanent and transcendent manifestations of 'religion'. Lambek argues that understood as being immanent to society, religion emerges as an entity that is inseparable from social life and organisation, whereas understood as transcendent to society, religion transforms into a separate and circumscribed institution, or indeed a circumscribed place, as in the case of the Meteora.

In official narrativisations, the so-called 'holy law' that establishes the Meteora as a 'holy site' is traced back to 1994 and the commissioning of a private company, known as the Centre for the Development of Kalambaka and Pyli (KENAKAP), to conduct a study. KENAKAP, which is responsible for the allocation and supervision of EU funds for local development, produced a report that sought to feed two birds with one scone. On the one hand, the report proposed a plan of action that sought to protect the monastic function of the site. On the other, it advanced a series of recommendations aimed at upgrading the role of Kalambaka and Kastraki in the management of the Meteora (Poulios 2014, 77–79).

The commissioned report divided interested parties. Unlike local government and community members, who welcomed the opportunity to insert themselves into the growing tourist industry developing around the Meteora, the monastic communities claimed that the proposed changes would threaten the monastic function of the area and expose it to the perils of mass tourism. The Assembly of the Holy Monasteries of Meteora mobilised the support of important ecclesiastical, monastic, and political power-holders and launched a campaign against KENAKAP. The Assembly not only terminated ongoing discussions on management protocols for the Meteora but was also able to lay the foun-

dations for the opportune 'holy law' that was passed by the Greek government a year later.

Marios, a vocal opponent of the so-called 'holy law', author of several newspaper articles on the topic, and a local council candidate in the elections of 2019, put a different spin on the story. According to Marios, Law 2351/1995 should in fact be referred to as the 'Mimi law' (*nomos Mimi*). He went on to explain that the 'holy law' had been sketched out at a time when Andreas Papandreou—founder of the centre-left PASOK party, a dominant figure in contemporary Greek politics, and at the time prime minister—had fallen ill. His wife, Dimitra (Mimi) Liani, a former flight attendant 37 years his junior, sought solace in one of the Meteora's convents. The nuns offered care and hospitality, reassuring Liani that the prime minister's healing was in the hands of God, but also made sure to promote their interests and gain her support. By the end of Liani's stay in the Meteora, Marios explained with a tone of intrigue, the 'holy law' had been essentially approved. The Meteora's 'holiness' was declared in parliament shortly afterwards.

Marios's rendition of the story is interesting not only because it provides a commentary on the arbitrariness of governance, here presented as having become corrupted by female machination, but also because it touches upon the serendipitous circumstances that the Meteora's 'holiness' is vested in. The idea that what may appear to belong to the sphere of 'religion' is anything but 'religious' was shared among many of my interlocutors. When I first visited Kalambaka in June 2018 and informed my few contacts that I had arrived with the intention of studying 'religious tourism' (*thriskeftikos tourismos*) and 'pilgrimage tourism' (*proskinimatikos tourismos*), I was emphatically told that I had picked the wrong place. With the exception of a few Greeks, Russians, Romanians, Serbians, and Ukrainians, the majority of the Meteora's visitors were not religious, and certainly not Orthodox Christian. My interlocutors often drew a distinction between 'religious tourism' and 'cultural tourism' (*politismikos tourismos*), and insisted that what takes place in the Meteora amounts to 'cultural tourism'. In Kalliopi's words, 'the hordes [of tourists] don't come here because

they want to see the monasteries. They come here because the monasteries hang from the sky.'

The Meteora's framing as a destination of 'religious' and 'pilgrimage' tourism dates back to the early 2000s when the Greek Holy Synod established the Department of Greek Orthodox Christian Pilgrimage Tours. According to the official protocol, the department's aim is the 'development of Greek pilgrimage tours and religious tourism in Greece and abroad, and the promotion of the holy monuments, temples, and pilgrimage destinations of the Greek Orthodox Church, for the benefit and spiritual growth of their visitors'. Eleven years later, the Protocol of Collaboration between the Church of Greece and the Ministry of Tourism was also signed. The protocol recognises tourism 'as a basic pillar of culture, history, ethos, and tradition, and economic growth' and commits the signing parties to the bilateral promotion of 'pilgrimage tourism'.[27] In the years following the signing of the protocol, a growing number of agencies started offering 'pilgrimage tourism packages', the National Tourism Organisation invested funds in the production of brochures and other promotional material dedicated to popular Greek pilgrimage destinations, and vocational schools began to offer degrees in 'religious tourism'. In this emerging landscape of religious tourism, the Meteora has consistently constituted the single most advertised and celebrated destination.

While probing my interlocutors on the 'holiness' of the place, intentionally highlighting that the Meteora is, after all, an important Orthodox monastic complex, I was often told that this representation might have been accurate in the past but does not apply today, as the monasteries have transformed into profit-making businesses. Entrance to the monasteries costs three euro unless you are Greek, overpriced souvenir shops operate in all six monasteries, and all profits are exempted from taxation, as is the Greek Orthodox Church at large. In a bid to gain control over

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27 The text of the protocol can be found (in Greek) at: https://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/commitees/tourism/mnimonio_paideias.pdf (accessed 27 January 2024).

the local council and the communities of Kalambaka and Kast-raki, the monasteries are said to have established a robust network of patronage. Monastic communities offer employment, provide assistance to the poor, and cover local administration costs, such as school heating. Excluded from this extended economy of favours is anyone challenging monastic authorities.

The Meteora's perceived moral and spiritual degeneration was related not only to the monasteries' scandalous profiteering practices and business-like operation but also to their intrusion, occupation, and corruption of domains that should be kept separate from religious matters. The monasteries' representation as both imperious and impervious was often accompanied by lengthy reflections on issues of power and the abusive alliances that operate between monastic authorities and other authorities, be they the local council, the local Bishopric and the Church of Greece, the Archaeological Service and the Directorate of Byzantine Antiquities, or the government and its members of parliament. In short, authorities that should be kept separate had merged and combined, and were put to the service of 'religion'.

Jose Casanova (2006, 2007) discusses relations between modernisation and secularisation; he argues that what Max Weber referred to as the 'disenchantment of the world' involves three interrelated processes. Secularisation involves, first, an increasing structural differentiation of social life and organisation into distinct spheres, such as politics, science, economy, education, and so on, with religion constituting one sphere among many; second, secularisation leads to a privatisation of religion, understood both as faith and practice; and third, secularisation marks the gradual decline of religious institutions (cf. Asad 2003). Here, we begin to get a sense of how religion-as-locating-regime acquires its differentiated logic, thus transforming into one of several locating regimes—at least in normative discourse.

The division between different spheres of organisation segments the world; it prescribes the confines of secular and religious domains, and attaches them to separate logics. Once the logics that pertain to different domains have been distinguished and the

desired separation of domains has been proclaimed, the overlaps, tensions, and conflicts that cut through different domains may begin to come into view. The classification of life into secular and religious domains, in other words, underscores the incongruence of separate logics and causes discontent over religion's interference in matters non-religious. Locational logic transforms into both an object and proof of such tension and conflict.

Rumours of 'invented' Byzantine ruins that have been used to justify the extension of prohibitive ordinances circulate widely in Kalambaka. Construction work in areas that belong in 'no build' zones has been documented widely and is taken as proof of the partiality and arbitrariness of the regulations. Some of those who have been most vocal against the deeds of the monastic authorities have allegedly found themselves marginalised, blackmailed, and unemployed. In these stories, the power exerted by the monastic site is shown to be rogue and coercive, while the monopolisation and misappropriation of physical space by 'religion' is understood also to coincide with a degeneration of 'religion' itself. I was surprised when, after a two-hour interview that largely concentrated on the monasteries' misdoings, Marios felt the need to clarify that he is deeply religious. His religiosity, however, is different to that of the monastic communities:

> They often think that those of us who fight the sacrosanct [law] are atheists, or maybe worse. Well, I am not a churchgoer, I never have been and never will be. But I believe in Christ, I pray, and I baptised my son, and all I can say is that this [the rocks] is not religion, it's not Christianity. It's their version, but no thanks, I won't take it.

In widely circulating tales of corruption, the Meteora does not feature as an exception, but rather as a concise synopsis and illustration of the rule. According to several members of the organisation 'Meteora for all', the Meteora's privatisation amounted to yet another incident in a long series of abuses. Elpida was eager to list them. She remarked that the Orthodox Church continues to issue its own building permits, without interference by civil authorities;

Orthodox clergy continue to fall under the category of 'civil servants'; blasphemy continues to constitute a penal offence; despite civil channels being available, many non-religious people continue to settle marriages, namings, and funerals through the more accessible and acceptable avenues of the Church; the Holy Fire of Jerusalem continues to be received with the honours due a head of state, as do relics that occasionally arrive from abroad for public worship; and, perhaps more importantly, the Church continues to interfere in all matters political. The Meteora, in other words, constitutes yet another example of how Greek Orthodoxy operates in places where it does not belong—be it personal freedom, human rights, civil law, or governance—thus transgressing its designated confines.

To complicate matters further, while some of my interlocutors have invested themselves in what they understand to be a struggle over the privatisation of public space, others are occupied in struggles over the landscape and its public representation. 'Kalambaka is a backstage town' (*poli paraskiniou*) said Mr Nikos, the owner of one of Kalambaka's hostels. The attraction of a 'backstage town', he explained, stems from its views, rather than itself. Indeed, the priciest and most sought-after hotel rooms in Kalambaka are those that offer views of the Meteora's rocks and monasteries. And yet, despite the iconicity of the landscape, which has earned it a spot among the most 'Instagrammable' locations in Greece, not everyone can capitalise it. Rather, for residents of Kalambaka and Kastraki, terms and conditions apply.

Mr Dalakas, the middle-aged owner of a bar and small-scale hotel, remembered receiving a reservation from the producers of the world-famous TV series *Game of Thrones*.[28] To his great disappointment, I had not watched the series. Had I watched it, I would have known that the fictional Vale of Arryn, located in Westeros,

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28 Other audiovisual productions that depict the Meteora include *Tintin and the Golden Fleece*; *Pokemon: Arceus and the Jewel of Life*; *Tomb Raider*; *Young Indiana Jones*; and *Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3*. In 2003 the music group Linkin Park released an album titled *Meteora*.

is in fact the Meteora. Or a digitised version of it, to be exact. The producers arrived in Kalambaka in the late 2000s full of promise. Mr Dalakas's business was set to receive a constant flow of actors and other staff for the series' duration. The producers' plan was to shoot on one of the Meteora's 150 rocks—the more isolated and distant to the monasteries the better.

The producers followed the indicated procedure: they submitted the script and a formal request to the Directorate of Byzantine Antiquities. The project, however, was found to be incompatible with the 'religious nature' of the Meteora. Met with the monastic and archaeological authorities' refusal, the producers requested to shoot the Meteora from a distance. That too was considered a violation of the area's holy character. Eventually, the producers settled for a few blank takes, on the condition that they would include them only after they had digitally remastered them. Once they shot the blank takes, the producers left, never to return. In Mr Dalakas's words,

> Meteora was seen by everyone in the world, and not a single euro was left to this town. That's why I tell you. We, here in Kalambaka, don't even own our view (*den mas aniki oute i thea mas*). I am telling you, soon, we won't even be allowed to have our coffees on our balconies.[29]

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29 Mr Dalakas's story is reminiscent to ones around the 1980 James Bond film, addressed on 22 October of the same year in the national newspaper *Ta Nea*: 'A clash broke around the filming of the new movie of the "Agent 007" in Meteora, due to the monks' strong opposition to the filmic "sacrilege" of the space, while the residents of the area—who would participate in the film—threaten to occupy the monasteries'. The producers, who had obtained permission from the Minister of Culture, eventually resorted to using a replica of the Meteora, despite allegedly trying to bribe the monks. *Ta Nea* continues: 'When the producers put up the monastery's replica, [the monks] threatened to set it on fire, but later, in an instance of highly inventive sabotage, they hang plastic bags outside the monasteries, in order to "destroy" the backdrop and director's plans'.

What's in a name?

This chapter began by tracing the Meteora's 'crosslocatedness' and proceeded to explore what happens when the 'simultaneity of stories so far' (Massey 2005, 9) is overridden by one such story. If the Meteora's World Heritage designation turned the site into extraterritorial property of 'mankind', their increasingly sacrosanct territorialisation turned them into the enclosed property of a few. And while, on the one hand, the communities of Kalambaka and Kastraki 'made it onto the map' by means of their proximity to the Meteora, their contiguity with the 'holy site' effectively inserted them in a map made of borders, boundaries, and prohibition zones. Finally, while these communities' enfoldment into the monumental landscape came with important benefits, it also brought the burden of a hierarchy vested in engulfment and inundation. In this capacity, Kalambaka and the Meteora are as dynamic as the 6 km road that separates them: at times contracting in length and thus joining the two within a unified whole, and at others extending so much as to transform them into distant points, or even polar opposites. Depending on which side the coin lands, Kalambaka may thus emerge as exterior to the Meteora, transitory, or integral to them.

Yet, not everyone in Kalambaka and Kastraki is willing to question the Meteora's sacrosanct status and, in fact, some explicitly engage in it as a simultaneously empowering and subjugating (self-)display directed to outsiders (see Kalantzis 2019). After all, the Meteora's framing as a religious destination brings important benefits, including a unique branding strategy that distinguishes the Meteora from its usual 'sea and sun' competitors; the added interest from Russia and other Orthodox countries in the Balkans and Eastern Europe; and lastly, the invested support of both Church and State. To this end, in July 2018 the Municipality of Kalambaka, which consists of seven administrative units and the capital of which is the town of Kalambaka, changed its name to the Municipality of Meteora. In a mass-mediated interview at the

time the decision was originally made in 2014, then mayor Christos Sinanis stated:

> It took us four years, but, despite all hurdles, we finally won this fight. … The change of our Municipality's name does not hinder the authority of Kalambaka. On the contrary, Kalambaka will be elevated, for it will now be the capital of a municipality which bears the globally recognised name 'Meteora'. Any attempt at development will now carry the stamp of this natural, historical, and religious monument. This is a historical victory for our land and a vindication for all those who fought this fight.[30]

Locating regimes entail power-inflected logics that calibrate the relative meaning of location and generate versions of what it means to be somewhere in particular. Indeed, for good or ill, those who up until recently found themselves in the Municipality of Kalambaka, now find themselves in the Municipality of Meteora. One may be tempted to treat this development in terms of anchorage and closure. Yet, insofar as this act of anchoring recognises that while places cannot physically move, their relative positions may very well shift, this closure is necessarily conditional, open-ended, and subject to revision.

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30 See https://kede.gr/o-dimos-kalabakas-metonomazetai-se-dimo-meteoron/ (in Greek; accessed 2 February 2024).

Identity

One of the key questions we discussed as a research team when the Crosslocations project began was what thinking about location (or crosslocations) implied and, consequently, what it did not imply. Sarah Green suggested that it did not imply focusing on identity. This initially seemed to jar with some of our projects (most clearly, perhaps, the project on Melilla). Yet Sarah suggested that one aim in Crosslocations was to put identity aside for a moment, to shift attention from the who to the where. How was the *where* of some-thing/someone/someplace determined? What did it mean to be *here* and not *there*? And what did it mean to be somewhere *in particular*?

As time went by and the different research projects pro-ceeded, it became clear that these questions were intercon-nected: there was no 'where' without a 'who' or, at least, a 'what'. Despite our shift in perspective, identity appeared anyway. As a result, this multigraph speaks volumes about identity: it gives examples of how the identity of particular places shifts over time and in relation to one another; about how particular places are absorbed in larger 'wheres'; and about how people mobilise the 'wheres' and the 'where nots' in order to navigate a multiply located world.

Doreen Massey once wrote that the identity of places is tied up with 'the histories which are told of them, how those histories are told, and which history turns out to be domi-nant' (1995, 186). The crosslocations approach encourages researchers to notice when there are competing—or at least parallel—histories (or, better, stories) operating across several different scales simultaneously, and it is not always easy to determine whether any one of them is dominant. Our research across different corners of the Mediterranean shows that to speak about location is to speak about identity, but not in order to find a fixed set of characteristics (cultural or otherwise). Rather, thinking about location as we under-stand it—that is, as the coexistence of different ways to know where things are—necessarily implies thinking about identi-fication and place-making as dynamic processes that involve

conflict, tensions, struggles, and contradictions, as well as alliances, scaffolds, collaborations, and articulations. These processes connect things, people, and locations for a certain amount of time (or from some perspectives) and disconnect them at other times (or from other perspectives), generating different sets of relations and separations. This is the logic by which multiple locations exist in the same place; or, to put it differently, the logic by which places can be differently and multiply located at the same time.

One of the ethnographic goals of this project has been precisely tracking the dynamic coexistence of locations and relating that to processes of identification. In other words, the shift in perspective that Sarah Green proposed at the outset of the project allowed us to rethink identity as *identification*: a dynamic, multiple, and ongoing process that is shaped (or at least affected) by power-inflected 'locating regimes', and not something that has to be revealed as a single ontological reality. Seen in this light, the identity of places is neither random nor fluid, despite it certainly being dynamic.

CHAPTER 3

Egypt: scaffolding and reorienting the nation

Carl Rommel

The multiplicity of the spatial is a precondition for the temporal: and the multiplicities of the two together can be a condition for the openness of the future.

<div align="right">Doreen Massey, For Space</div>

Locating the nation

If Chapter 1 examined how multiple locational logics subsumed under the notion of 'public space' manifest in a variety of historical, material, and political configurations in contemporary Beirut, Chapter 2 considered a scenario where a plurality of locating regimes come together and begin to look like a single one. Zooming in on the relative location of the monastic and touristic rock formations of the Meteora in central Greece, Chapter 2 demonstrated how the locating capacities of 'religion', or more specifically Greek Orthodoxy, is always interdependent with overlapping logics and structures (state institutions, UNESCO, Natura 2000 maps, etc.) that locate the Meteora in several ways at once. Despite that, as the chapter showed, Orthodoxy again and again appears as a singularity. Through a patchwork of processes that are always both epistemological and material, 'religion' in one sense appears as hegemonic, monopolising all other locating regimes involved. On the face of it, this monopolisation marginalises the other locating logics that nevertheless remain in operation

there, and constantly asserts that it has fixed the Meteora as a reli-
gious location. Yet the existence of the other locating logics led, as
the chapter described, to a sense from Kalambaka villagers that
the Orthodox Church was constantly interfering in things that
were none of its business and that it was also presenting activities
that were not religious (e.g. cultural and natural heritage tourism)
as if they were precisely that. The coexistence of different regimes
made both the hegemony of the Church and the way its locating
logic was crosscut more visible.

In this chapter, the empirical spotlight is moved a few thou-
sand kilometres to the south-east, across the Mediterranean Sea,
but the analytic ambition stays relatively intact. The focus here is
on Egypt as a national location and on the Egyptian nation-state
as a locating regime that at certain moments and from particular
vantage points looks hegemonic, but which on closer inspection
inevitably starts to break apart.

It is fair to say that nationalism takes on a special primacy
in Egypt. Among anthropologists and historians working in the
country, the national frame has often been axiomatic. It does not
seem to matter whether the research topic is film (Armbrust 1996),
television series (Abu-Lughod 2005), music (Danielson 1997; Van
Nieuwkerk 1995), the fine arts (Winegar 2006), gendered domes-
ticity (Pollard 2005), physical exercise (Jacob 2011), popular mass
media (Fahmy 2011), urban emotions (Prestel 2017), tourism
development (Ahlberg 2017), football fandom (Rommel 2021),
the Islamic Revival (Hirschkind 2006), experiences of time and
temporality (Barak 2013), or the emergence of the bourgeois inde-
pendence movement in the early 20th century (Ryzova 2014). In
all of these cases, the formation of national identities and debates
about the nation's status and prestige have constituted the over-
arching thematic and analytical frame. Actors, events, and social
processes have been analysed as *Egyptian* actors, events, and pro-
cesses more or less by default.[31]

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31 In comparison to the scholarship on other Arab countries, such as
  Morocco (e.g. Elliot 2021) and Lebanon (e.g. Hage 2021), this emphasis

This preoccupation with the Egyptian nation is partly a case of scholarly self-referentiality. As academics position their research with references to existing regional scholarship, certain themes inevitably become dominant and a canon gradually takes shape. But it also results from the ethnographic encounter. During the multiple periods of long-term fieldwork that I have conducted in Cairo since 2011, it has often struck me how present the nation is as an emic category.[32] People from all walks of life discuss the fate of 'Egypt' and the character of 'the Egyptian people' in a most casual manner. Debates about the nation's image (Ahlberg 2017) and threats posed by outsiders (Pratt 2005; Saad 1998) abound in the media as well as in everyday conversations. In Egyptian politics, too, all relevant factions—whether secularist, Islamist, revolutionary, or military—take pains to portray themselves as nationalist (*watani*, *qawmi*) (see Rommel 2021). In short, life in Egypt has been and still is pivoting on the national scale, discursively, institutionally, and perhaps also phenomenologically. It might contradict fundamental anthropological instincts, yet a certain, if careful, measure of 'methodological nationalism' (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002) is arguably both sensible and necessary in the Egyptian case.

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on nationalism and national affairs stands out. Scholars have variously attributed this accentuated nation-centrism to Egypt's particular geography, where 95 per cent of the population inhabit a narrow river valley surrounded by empty deserts (Mitchell 2002, 209–243), to the country's long and presumably uninterrupted history going back to Pharaonic times (Bagnall 2005), or to the establishment of particularly strong national institutions, infrastructures, and power-knowledge regimes as early as in the 19th century (Fahmy 1997; Hanley 2017; Pollard 2005).

32 At the time of writing, I have conducted almost five years of doctoral and postdoctoral fieldwork in Cairo. The research has primarily been carried out with football journalists, supporters, and coaches (Rommel 2014, 2016, 2018, 2021). In recent years, I have also worked with lower-middle-class men who contrive and launch small business projects (*mashariʿ*) in central Cairo as well as in satellite cities built in the Eastern and Western Deserts (Rommel, forthcoming).

The location under consideration in this chapter is neither a Beiruti beach nor a spatially limited rock formation dotted with Greek Orthodox monasteries; it is the Egyptian nation as a whole. The Crosslocations project, the chapter will show, has the potential to rethink locations at this magnified scale too. By insisting on interrogating *where* rather than *what* things are, the conceptual apparatus and methodology that we propose cast the nation-centrism found in Egypt in a partly new light. When we leave aside questions about how the nation is conceptualised, represented, and contested, and instead ask how the ever-present national framework *locates* Egypt 'somewhere in particular', the analytical emphasis shifts from nationalism as an ideology saturating subjectivation and identity formation to the Egyptian nation-state as a potent locating regime. Within Crosslocations, we define a locating regime as a locational logic backed up by power (see the introduction to this volume), and it is difficult to imagine a more pervasive one than the combination of nationalism (a territorial logic par excellence; see, e.g., Elden 2013) and power-laden state institutions that one encounters in Egypt. Egyptian nationalism constitutes an overdetermining locational logic in a wide variety of contexts, and it enjoys the backing of well-patrolled borders, school curricula, mass media, state propaganda, popular culture, and more.[33] In that sense, the nation-state is time and time again the dominant locating regime in Egypt. It locates the nation squarely *on* Egyptian territory, *inside* the national borders.[34]

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33 The way in which nation-states combine narrations and ideologies about an ostensibly primordial past with distinctly modern technologies, practices, and institutional apparatus has been explored extensively since the early 1980s (see, e.g., Anderson 1983; Chatterjee 1986, Gupta 1992). While this scholarship has primarily taken interest in the nation-state's unmatched ability to foster national identities and imagined communities, this chapter rather focuses on the nation as a location. The shift in emphasis implies that the question of *where* the Egyptian nation is located is foregrounded at the expense of questions about *who* national citizens feel or believe that they are.

34 As generations of anthropologists and political scientists studying 'the state' have illustrated, states are never homogenous and easily delineated

But Crosslocations' analytical invitation does not end there. To identify the Egyptian nation-state as a locating regime is but the first step towards reconceptualising Egypt as a *relative* location. How could Egypt's locatedness be rethought as inherently relative? How could the national experience of being located 'somewhere in particular' be envisaged as the result of connections to and separations from other locations, elsewhere?

Posing such questions means thinking the world anew. When the spotlight slides from what goes on inside the national borders to how the nation reaches out to a multitude of elsewheres, even a peculiarly self-centred national location, such as the Egyptian, unfolds and exceeds its purported limits.[35]

Relativising Egypt as a location also means accepting that the nation-state is not the only locating regime around. Nationalism might be the most pervasive logic at work, its imprints on space and social life oftentimes hegemonic, yet its overall efficacy is always a result of a contingent coming-together of interlocking structures and logics (trade, finance, language, migration, infrastructures) that align with the nation-state, connect it to what lies beyond it, and modifies its always relative and relational locational capabilities.

This chapter conceptualises such alignments of multiple locating regimes through the notion of *scaffolding*. The nation-state is clearly the most powerful locating regime determining Egypt's relative location, but its ability to locate the nation at any given moment is also contingent on other locating regimes that prop it

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entities (see, e.g., Sharma and Gupta 2006). However, the 'state effect'—the *impression* of the state as unitary—might well be (Mitchell 1991). What interests me in this chapter is the latter rather than the former. Telling a story of how the Egyptian state first managed to control the nation's location and later on lost its ability to do so, I am primarily referring to local/emic understandings of the Egyptian state's scope, outreach, and prowess. When writing about the Egyptian 'state', I am, in other words, indexing a loose agglomeration of people, institutions, and processes that Egyptians typically refer to as *al-dawla* or *al-hukuma*.

35 For another call to rethink the postcolonial nation by means of stepping outside its taken-for-granted borders, see Gupta (1992).

up. Ultimately, this notion of locating regimes as scaffolded facilitates an examination of how and in what directions the nation is *oriented* as well as how such orientations become contested and transform over time. The specific and always provisional constellations of scaffolded locating regimes—and the multiplicity of connections and separations that they spawn—do not only predicate Egyptian experiences of being located somewhere in particular. They also lay out the vectors along which Egypt's national location tilts.[36]

To substantiate these somewhat abstract ideas, the chapter's empirical sections delineate the scaffoldings, locations, and orientations of a series of 'national projects' in post-1952 Egypt. As Etienne Balibar (1991, 86–87) once noted, the progression of the nation through time is often figured as a 'project' of work and incremental fulfilment. In Egypt, such figurations are everywhere. The national project (*al-mashru' al-qawmi*) is a topic of endless public and private discussions; it is habitually referred to by political leaders; it frequently materialises as concrete infrastructural projects that function as a metonym for the national whole.[37] In short, what Egyptians from all walks of life speak about as 'national projects' are at the same time idealised visions, political gestures, and concrete, steel, and mortar on the ground. As we shall see, precisely this ubiquity and plasticity makes national projects generative empirical entry points for an examination of locating regimes being scaffolded by other locating regimes and distinctly oriented national locations.[38]

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36 For a discussion on location as a result of 'constellations' of interlocking structures and logics, see Rommel and Viscomi (2022a). For a parallel argument that theorises territory as an effect of networked socio-technical practice, see Painter (2010).

37 For an anthropological examination of projects functioning as contested metonyms for nations, see Ssorin-Chaikov (2016). For a review of the social-scientific literature on projects and project temporalities, see Graan and Rommel (forthcoming).

38 National projects are but one kind of project packaging dreams of improved futures in contemporary Egypt. As I explore in another publication (see Rommel, forthcoming), much more small-scale, individual dreams of social and economic stability (*istiqrar*) are also habitually formatted as 'projects' (*mashari'*).

The chapter's first two sections revisit parts of the historiography of the national projects under President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954–1970) and President Anwar Sadat (1970–1981). The ambition here is to consider a small selection of highly popularised standard narratives and to analyse how they illuminate the nation's location and orientation. The third main section draws on ethnographic material collected in Cairo between 2011 and 2013 to delineate two revolutionary national projects taking shape in the wake of the 25 January 2011 revolution. The aim is not to cover these projects in full but to tease out their orientations vis-à-vis the world outside the nation-state's political borders.

The chapter tells a story about how political imaginaries of affinity, similarity, and difference articulate with structures, materiality, and institutions so to constitute Egypt as a location with a particular tilt and orientation (cf. Ben-Yehoyada 2017). In conclusion, it reflects on how such an analysis of the nation-state as a scaffolded locating regime is also inevitably an analysis of contested national futures. The fluidity of national orientations and locations is always a source of agonism and a particular kind of spatiotemporal politics. This becomes especially pertinent in times of revolution, periods when both the national where and the national when are in flux and up for grabs.

Taming the Nile

> Here are joined the political, social, national, and military battles of the Egyptian people, welded together like a giant mass of rock that has blocked the course of the ancient Nile. Its waters now spill into the largest lake ever shaped by human kind and which will be an everlasting source of prosperity.
>
> President Gamal Abdel Nasser, May 1964

In the historiography about the national project under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the most popularised narratives tell a story of postcolonial nationalisation paired with reorientations. On the one hand, readers learn how the military regime that came to

power after the 1952 Free Officers' coup disassociated Egypt from an interconnected European-Mediterranean world, of which the country had previously formed an integral part. Even though Egyptian nationalism had constituted a pervasive political and cultural idiom in the anti-colonial movement since the turn of the 20th century (e.g. Cole 1993; Jacob 2011), the nation-state had always faced competition from other logics and powers. Vestiges of British colonialism and the Ottoman Empire (Genell, forthcoming), expanding technologies and infrastructures (Barak 2013), transnational postcolonial socialist and anarchist movements (Khuri-Makdisi 2013), the movements of armies during the two world wars (Anderson 2021), multigenerational labour migration (Viscomi, forthcoming), and overlapping legal codes (Hanley 2017) had assembled a complexly entangled socio-political world that is sometimes referred to as 'colonial modernity' (see Jacob 2011). Even at seemingly epitomic moments of national awareness, such as the 1919 revolution and the declaration of nominal independence in 1922, the national framework was not uncontested, the transition from empire to nation never inevitable (Getachew 2019). If anything, the polity and society that took shape in the wake of Egypt's 'Wilsonian Moment' in 1919 comprised a multiplicity of trends and forces that at times supplemented and at other times challenged nationalism's core assumptions of one people, one territory, and one uncontested sovereignty (Manela 2007; Genell, forthcoming).

In the 1950s and 1960s, the standard narrative of Nasserism suggests, this multivariable world came to an end. The new regime expelled European migrants, sequestered and 'Egyptianised' British and French financial assets, strengthened the national army, confronted and cut ties with former colonial powers, and nationalised the Suez Canal (see, e.g., Jankowski 2002). During the heyday of Arab socialism, there is a sense that the national project was purified, increasingly state-driven, and turned inwards. If it had previously comprised a disparate set of discourses, practices, aspirations, and associations set up in opposition to colonialism and the corrupt, British-leaning monarchy, the project now became

more harmonised under a political leadership which turned nationalism into an integrated aspect of most if not all state institutions (Ikram 2018, 162–188; Jankowski 2002). In Crosslocations terms, we might depict this as a moment when nationalism (locational logic) and state (power to enforce said logic) wed. During Nasser's 16 years in power, the postcolonial state was, for the first time, able to grab hold of and control the nation (see Gupta 1992). In the process, Egypt increasingly became a national location for Egyptian nationals only; the nation-state's hegemony as *the* locating regime that truly mattered was entrenched.

On the other hand, the historiography also speaks of new connections to other postcolonial nation-states in the Arab world, Africa, and Asia. Especially after the 1956 Suez War—when the Egyptian army fought back an invasion by Great Britain, France, and Israel and completed the nationalisation of the canal—Nasser surfaced as a champion of pan-Arab unity and the nascent Non-Aligned Movement (Gupta 1992; Jankowski 2002, 65–100). Nasser was a main act at the Bandung conference in 1955; Arab journalists, students, and artists flocked to Cairo (Ibrahim 1985, 28); Egyptian students travelled to other non-aligned countries, such as Tito's Yugoslavia (Li 2019, 149–169). The most concrete political manifestation of strengthened south–south ties was the United Arab Republic, a political union comprising present-day Egypt, Syria, and the Gaza Strip that functioned as a sovereign state with Cairo as the capital between 1958 and 1961 (Abou-El-Fadl 2018, 259–286; Jankowski 2002, 101–178). A more soft-power example of Egypt as region-maker was the transnational radio channel *sut al-'arab* (Voice of the Arabs), which propagated Nasser's message of Arab unity, backed up by the legendary singer Umm Kulthum's unmatched popularity (Danielson 1997). Egypt's leading role in the establishment of the Confederation of African Football and the first Africa Cup of Nations in 1957 is also worth mentioning in this tale of reorientation (Ayoub 2010). All in all, by cutting ties to former powerhouses and appending the Egyptian nation-state to alternative organisations, institutions, and logics elsewhere, the

national project's orientation tilted markedly to the south as well as to the east.[39]

The construction of the High Dam in Aswan (1960–1971) constitutes an outstanding and most concrete illustration of how the Egyptian nation-state fused with infrastructures, planning, finance, and engineering to build a nation with a specific location and orientation. Nasser's national project par excellence, the High Dam was always much more than an imposing hydroelectric power station. Its construction came to work as a metonym for the national struggle for self-determination and for the progression towards a truly modern and national future. 'After the dam', the president and other political leaders often proclaimed, perennial problems would find everlasting solutions: agricultural land would be expanded; irrigation would become plentiful and independent of the Nile's annual floods; 10 TW of cheap electricity would spur industrialisation, light up villages, and create millions of new jobs (Ikram 2018, 149–161, 164–165; Mossallam 2014, 300–301; Reynolds 2017, 214–215).

It is also worth noting that the dam was portrayed as a project *for* and *by* the Egyptian people. This made it different, both from previous dam constructions at Aswan and the Suez Canal—constructed a century earlier—which had been built by Egyptians but predominantly benefited foreign capitalists and powers. As Alia Mossallam's (2014) oral history of workers who toiled at the building site describes, many builders invested large parts of their identity in the project, taking immense pride in their work and sacrifices. Often conceiving of themselves as 'warriors' fighting a 'battle' against colonialism and feudalism, the dam builders' taming of the powers of the Nile was framed as a collective struggle for a modern, national, and classless future (Mossallam 2014).

But what kind of national modernity was this? Where, in relational terms, was the dam located, and whereto did it orient Egypt? The answer to such questions depends on where and how one

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39 On the challenges of fostering an imagined community across such transnational spheres, see Gupta (1992).

looks. In terms of geography, the showcase project always entailed a paradox. While portrayed as a vital step towards postcolonial self-determination by a nation-state keen on forging closer ties with Africa, the dam severed Egypt from the continent in general and from its southern neighbour, Sudan, in particular. As Lake Nasser—the world's largest reservoir at the time—slowly filled up, 550 km of the Nile valley was inundated, turning the lake into a de facto state border (Fahim 1981). Egypt's earlier, proto-colonial ambitions to establish political and socio-cultural 'unity of the Nile valley' were once and for all aborted (Waterbury 1979; see also Powell 2003). By contrast, the dam 'marked a new vision of the Nile as a *nationalized* river' (Shokr 2009, 11, emphasis added). Scaffolded by the valley's topographical specificity, the infrastructural project concretised a more inward-oriented nation-state that prioritised nationalised development over international ties. As a consequence, the national location known as Egypt was cut off from the African continent in a most concrete manner.

If one instead considers the dam's financing, a different constellation of locating regimes becomes legible. The series of events that led Nasser to first nationalise the Suez Canal to fund the dam (triggering the 1956 Suez War) and later, in 1958, to ask the Soviet Union for the necessary loans is well documented (e.g. Bishop 1997; Ikram 2018, 155–162; Waterbury 1977, 9–15). The latter move came with a number of auxiliary effects. Not only did it decisively tilt the ostensibly non-aligned Egyptian nation-state closer to the socialist power sphere, causing long-term consequences for the Egyptian economy (Ginat 2004; Ikram 2018, 153–154), it also led to an influx of Soviet-made products on the Egyptian market and to a large number of Soviet (and other Eastern European) engineers and experts participating in the dam-building on the ground in Aswan (Bishop 1997). As is vividly depicted in Youssef Chahine's 1972 movie *al-nass wi al-nil* (One Day, The Nile; set during the dam construction in 1964), these transfers of people, goods, and knowledge resulted in professional collaborations and friendships between (primarily middle-class) Egyptians and Rus-

sians. Connections of this kind tilted the national project ever further eastward and appended it to socialist visions of the future.

Finally, the dam project also transformed the relative location of the city of Aswan. As Nancy Y. Reynolds (2017) has documented, Aswan's urban fabric underwent rapid development during a decade of construction. The population quadrupled because of the influx of Egyptian and European workers, experts, and engineers. The city also launched expansive urban redevelopment projects and several new industries were established. While the stated purpose of these initiatives was to transform a segregated colonial frontier town into a model city for the modern, inclusive, and self-sufficient nation-state (Reynolds 2017, 214–219), this idealised Nasserite microcosm was always ambivalently oriented vis-à-vis the world outside. On the one hand, Ibrahim Salem, the chief administrator of the Aswan Regional Planning Authority, envisioned the city's flourishing future as 'the Pittsburgh of Egypt' in an often-quoted 1967 interview in the *New York Times* (Reynolds 2017, 220). On the other, communist experts from Russia and Czechoslovakia marked an important presence; in terms of housing and leisure activities, the new cityscape constituted an enactment of a Soviet-inspired modernity (Reynolds 2017, 219–225).

And yet, with top-down city planning segregating the daily lives of people of different nationalities, the 'postcolonial promise' was only ever partly fulfilled (Reynolds 2017, 222). Cosmopolitan connections between Egyptians and African workers and street vendors were often more organic than those with the Soviet specialist who had come to Aswan to once and for all 'sever Egypt from Africa' (Reynolds 2017, 231). In sum, therefore, while the dam project was always cast as a national one—that is, as controlled by and benefitting the Egyptian people—it established a variety of connections and separations that scaffolded the nation-state's locational logic and structures, and which provided the nation with distinct and not always compatible orientations. The bright future that the dam's rising waters conjured for the rising nation might have been firmly located amid stones, streets, and industries springing up along the banks of the Nile at the nation's

southernmost end, but it also appended Egypt to other futures and visions, whether in Pittsburgh, Prague, Lagos, or Moscow.

Opening the doors

The nation that Nasser sought to build in the 1950s and 1960s stands in stark contrast to the national project that took shape under President Anwar Sadat (1970–1981) and spilled over into Hosni Mubarak's presidency (1981–2011). In the historiography of this makeover (e.g. Shechter 2019; Waterbury 1983), the storyline typically centres on the free trade and pro-investment 'opening up' (*infitah*), launched formally in 1974.[40] In the years that followed, these shifts in economic policy fostered a new class composition and a rewritten social contract that left many heroes of Nasserism disappointed. Sadat might have been the president who officially inaugurated the High Dam in January 1971, yet Aswan was never more than peripheral to his vision. Workers who had sacrificed the best years of their lives building the dam found themselves neglected as the nation-state directed its attention elsewhere (Mossallam 2014, 312–313). Similarly, for the university-educated middle classes—a pampered and swelling demographic in Nasser's Egypt—the 1970s saw a noticeably lower quality of life: salaries were eroded by inflation; it became increasingly difficult for civil servant families to reproduce their class position (Shechter 2019, 36–110).

Other social sectors experienced rapid upward social mobility. As a minor trading partnership or a job in construction in a country like Kuwait could be more profitable than 'respectable' white-collar state employment, people with good contacts but no formal education were suddenly making unprecedented amounts

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40 Although often portrayed as a radical break, the transition was actualised in incremental steps that preceded the formal launch of *infitah* in 1974: the military defeat to Israel in 1967; Nasser's death and Vice President Sadat taking over (1970); Sadat purging his government of Nasserists and leftists during the 'corrective revolution' (1971); the 'victory' in the October War against Israel (1973).

of money (Shechter 2019, 111–93; Waterbury 1983). More gener-
ally, President Sadat, and later also Mubarak, oversaw a shift in
emphasis from production to consumption as being at the heart
of the Egyptian national project. If the citizens had participated
in Nasserist Egypt as builders, workers, and civil servants, *infitah*
instead interpellated them as entrepreneurs and consumers of for-
eign goods (Shechter 2019, 46–52, 111–151). In a book published
shortly before his assassination in 1981, President Sadat described
this as a liberatory path towards prosperity, harmonising with the
fundamentals of human nature. Reflecting on his presidency's
overarching mission, he argued that *infitah* had 'open[ed] the door
for fresh air and remove[ed] all the barriers that we [had] built
around us to suffocate ourselves by our own hands'. Famously,
he also expressed a conviction that young Egyptians ultimately
desired to 'get married, own a villa, drive a car, possess a television
set and a stove, and eat three meals a day' (Sadat 1981, 12, cited in
Ghannam 2002, 29).

But the fresh air that Sadat let in through the nation's wide-open
doors was not completely new. Nor did it blow from all directions
at once. As we have seen above, Nasser's Egypt had been open too,
especially towards the recently decolonised Third World and the
socialist Eastern bloc. When Sadat opened Egypt's doors to 'the
world', the world was located elsewhere. Historical accounts of
infitah rarely fail to mention that the open-door policies strived to
develop Egypt with Western economic aid, Western technology,
Western goods, and Western experts (see, e.g., Ibrahim 1985, 28;
Ikram 2018, 213–216, 229–260). To achieve this, Sadat's govern-
ment forged new ties with the US, Israel, and the rising oil econo-
mies in the Gulf, through trade deals, aid, peace agreements, and
labour migration (see, e.g., Sadowski 1991; Waterbury 1983, 391–
422). In this sense, the policy shifts glossed as *infitah* not only
instigated a fundamental reorientation of economic policy: by
embedding the Egyptian nation-state in a refashioned constella-
tion of locating regimes—trade, diplomacy, religion, migration—
the open-door policies also reoriented Egypt's relative location.

Anthropologist Farha Ghannam's monograph *Remaking the Modern* (2002) provides one illuminating example of what these reorientations looked and felt like from the bottom up. The book is essentially an ethnography of a community dealing with relocation in the name of 'modernity'. In the late 1970s the people with whom Ghannam worked were forcibly moved from an old neighbourhood in central Cairo that had been singled out for capitalist redevelopment (Bulaq Abu al-'Ala) to an estate with 'modern' apartment blocks at what was then the city's northern edges (al-Zawiya al-Hamra). As Ghannam puts it, this 'move in space promised a leap in time' (2002, 34). City planners, politicians, journalists, and (to some extent) the rehoused citizens themselves agreed *both* that the relocation to clean apartments was long overdue *and* that the redevelopment of archaic neighbourhoods, such as Bulaq, was necessary to turn Cairo into a presentable, 'global' city (Ghannam 2002, 30–34). The uprooting of economic, kinship, and social networks promised to bring prosperity and progress to the 'entire nation' (Ghannam 2002, 36). It was one of many smaller projects scaffolding Sadat's overarching national project.[41]

But the spatial leap into modern times was also spatialised on a more zoomed-out scale. The relocation was planned and carried out in ways that epitomised a reoriented national location and a concomitant reorientation of the national project's futures. When Sadat's predecessor had made up plans for a modernised Cairo, these had often borne Soviet socialist and Third World interna-

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41 Ghannam conducted her fieldwork in the 1990s, more than ten years after Sadat's assassination and Mubarak taking over as president. Still, reading her book makes it clear that her protagonists were living in a national project that bore President Sadat's signature. Whether with admiration, respect, or scorn, Ghannam's interlocutors talk about Sadat all the time: as the president who deprived them of their old life-worlds in Bulaq; as the leader who gave them new apartments in Zawiya; as the one who created an open economy to travel, exploit, be exploited by, or thrive in. Mubarak, by contrast, is notably absent. When at all mentioned, the reigning president is not talked about as a visionary or initiator, but as a manager excelling at maintenance and small fixes (e.g. Ghannam 2002, 168–169).

tionalist marks. Nasserism had typically emphasised large-scale industries, expansive housing estates for workers, rent controls to ensure decent living conditions, and a grand remaking of the Nile corniche that would make the riverfront accessible to people of all social classes (AlSayyad 2011, 229–254; Ghannam 2002, 27; Ibrahim 1985, 27; Rodenbeck 1998, 215–226). Sadat's redevelopment of Bulaq represented a differently tilted urban vision. Freeing up space for five-star hotels, shopping malls, and freeways in prime locations along the Nile, it aimed to turn Cairo into a thriving 'global city', where consumption, speculation, and car ownership constituted idealised lifestyle norms (Ghannam 2002, 28–40; Ibrahim 1985, 28). This is a telling example of how urban planning and engineering work to scaffold the nation-state and specify its effectiveness as a locating regime. Simultaneously cutting off the capital city from the socialist and non-aligned world in the East and South and reconnecting it to the free-market countries in the West, urban regeneration projects in central Cairo shifted Egypt's relative location and gave it a distinctly new orientation. The particular American cities from which President Sadat drew inspiration are also worth noting. Whereas President Nasser's model city, Aswan, had sometimes been compared to Pittsburgh, a northern city building its fortunes on heavy industry and steel production, Sadat preferred to look elsewhere. For him, the Cairo of the future should ideally model sunny, sprawl-and-mall conglomerates such as Houston or Los Angeles (Ibrahim 1985, 28).

However, for ordinary citizens, the national project under Sadat and Mubarak was not only or even primarily tilted towards America. In a majority of Egyptians' everyday lives, the government's repositioning in the Cold War and pushes for US-oriented city planning played secondary roles to lifted labour migration restrictions and a regional oil boom. From the early 1970s onwards, skilled and unskilled Egyptian labour migration to petrostates such as Libya and the Gulf States expanded at pace, and it fundamentally transformed the lives of migrants' families back home. Remittances skyrocketed, wages in the agricultural sector rose steeply as a result of reduced labour supplies, nationwide con-

sumption patterns shifted as migrants brought home appliances and other international products to small communities all across the country (LaTowsky 1984). Ghannam's ethnography provides a telling illustration also in this case. As she demonstrates, going abroad was for her interlocutors first and foremost a project of building a better home in al-Zawiya. In contrast to the odd family who migrated to places further afield, such as Canada or Australia, the typical migrant to Kuwait or Saudi Arabia was a lone male who took economic and moral risks, and sacrificed several years without his loved ones to improve the quality of life of his family back home through savings and incremental investments. In the process, millions of lives and futures changed course, in al-Zawiya as well as in towns and villages all over Egypt. The labour facilitated by the migratory trajectory did all take place abroad. But a vast chunk of its costs and benefits were shared by Egyptian nationals living their entire lives inside Egypt's borders (Ghannam 2002, 143–148; see also Schielke 2020).

One thing that all of this suggests is that President Sadat's open-door nation-state was a locating regime scaffolded by several other logics and structures: urban planning, international aid, migration, trade, and diplomacy. Another thing that we see is that this scaffolded nation-state reoriented Egypt (the national project and location) in at least two directions at once. Through cutting the ties to former patrons and brother states while forging new connections to the oil-rich Gulf and consumption patterns associated with the United States, the Egyptian nation of the 1970s and 1980s materialised in several overlapping relative locations: on the one hand distinctly Americanised, on the other much more Gulf-aligned than ever before. The modernity that Ghannam's interlocutors were busy remaking in Sadat's Egypt might have unfolded in an inherently national location, yet the *orientation* of the nation's modern projects was undergoing quick and pretty radical change.

Shaking off the past

Fast-forwarding now to another momentous shift in Egypt's mod-
ern history: the 25 January 2011 revolution that ousted President
Hosni Mubarak after 30 years in power. If the Nasserist 1952 coup
was a moment at which the locational logic of nationalism wed
with the powers vested in the state apparatus to produce an all-
dominant locating regime that for the next few decades appeared
as more or less hegemonic, the 2011 revolution instigated a rever-
sal of that process. If anything, the revolutionary years might be
characterised as a time when nation and state drifted apart, the
Egyptian nation-state's hyphen losing its hold. Between January
2011 and the military coup in July 2013, the actors and institu-
tions that Egyptians typically refer to as 'the state' (*al-dawla* or
al-hukuma) were blatantly unable to monopolise the national
project. As previously suppressed actors found space to enter the
public debate, staking out alternative visions for the national pro-
ject and its concomitant future (see, e.g., Rommel 2021; Ryzova
2020; Shenker 2016; Winegar 2016), the scaffoldings that had
previously propped up the nation-state were dismantled. In their
stead, new constellations of locating regimes—inside as well as
outside of 'the state'—were brought together so as to re-envision
where Egypt should be located. In the process, the revolutionary
nation also began to tilt in a series of new directions, taking on
new, purportedly 'revolutionary' orientations.

   To render this point more concrete, this section will examine
two individuals' revolutionary visions for how the nation should be
remade, reoriented, and relocated. These are merely two of a wide
range of national projects that proliferated in the revolutionary
years. The key reason for analysing these and not some other visions
for change is simply that they are represented by two men whom I
came to know well during my doctoral fieldwork in Cairo between
August 2011 and March 2013. The intention is in other words not
to provide a complete account of Egypt's revolutionary project, but
to give two ethnographic examples of how the national location was
reoriented in a moment when the locating regime known as the
nation-state faced challenges and lost much of its hegemonic hold.

Ultras

Let me first introduce Hamdi, an accountant and member of the football supporter group Ultras Ahlawy. Egypt's most influential ultras groups—Ultras Ahlawy and Ultras White Knights, supporting the Cairo football clubs al-Ahly and al-Zamalek, respectively—were both established in 2007. Inspired by similar associations in the Maghreb, they introduced new principles and practices for supporting their teams at the stadium, a novel and dedicated subculture that attracted tens of thousands of Egyptian youths. From the outset, the ultras were critical of the way football was consumed, financed, and politicised in the late-Mubarak era. Before long, they found themselves demonised by the media and clashing violently with security forces. The latter experience in particular rendered the fans key players during the revolution's various rounds of street fights. Especially after a massacre of 72 Ultras Ahlawy supporters at a stadium in Port Said in February 2012, the supporter movement transformed into a forward-leaning revolutionary force. Their spectacular campaign for retribution (*qasas*) and reforms of Egypt's security forces and football institutions fought for—and all but achieved—a revolution inside Egypt's national game (Close 2019; Rommel 2021, 85–164).

I first came to know Hamdi in April 2012, a few months after the Port Said tragedy. Like most members of Ultras Ahlawy, Hamdi, then in his late twenties, spent that spring attending funerals of slain friends, although recently the group's focus had shifted to demonstrations demanding justice and retribution. Ultras Ahlawy vowed that the Port Said martyrs should not have died in vain. When Hamdi tried to explain to me what the ultras wanted to revolutionise in Egypt, he often returned to his personal experience of protest in Tahrir Square in early 2011. He was convinced that the revolutionary moment had transformed both him and his country forever. The people had finally come together to demand true change and his fan group constituted a vanguard of the new national project that was taking shape. But Hamdi would also tell me that being an ultra had made him a revolutionary well before 2011. Once he put it in the following terms:

Cairo Stadium was like a second home. I was there at every game with my friends, and we sang and danced and burned *shamarikh* (pyrotechnic flares). The police tried to stop us, but we fought back. This prepared us for 2011, not only in terms of fighting but also mentally. You know our song *hurriyya* (Freedom)? You know that we sing that we told the oppressor that freedom would come? There is this line, *liberta kanit maktuba* (liberty was written).[42] I mean, we felt that something was happening already in 2009 and 2010 … This revolution is generational. Old people don't understand us. The future of any nation belongs to the youth.

The revolutionary project that ultras such as Hamdi fought not only had a particular affective timbre and generational composition, topics that I have explored in some detail elsewhere (Rommel 2021, 85–164), the young fans also proposed a *relocated* nation with a novel *orientation*. During a meeting in a coffee shop in Downtown Cairo in May 2012, Hamdi explained this:

The ultras' way of cheering is fundamentally international (*tashgiʿ al-altras huwa tashgiʿ dawli aslan*). Medhat Shalaby [a reactionary television pundit] is shocked to see us dancing for 90 minutes and insulting the police in the stadium, but that's because he never paid attention to what's happening in Europe or Tunisia or Morocco. … The Egyptian ultras were established in 2007. This is when social media and YouTube started to become big. We could see what was happening at other stadiums in the world. The guys who started the group had travelled to Morocco to get inspiration, and the Moroccan guys had been in Italy. I mean, the ultras style is international, but each country is special. Now we're one of the biggest groups in the world. Fans in Europe watch us on YouTube, they try to mimic *us*, especially after what happened in Port Said.

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42 One version of this song can be found in a YouTube clip at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CiffzFIVEZ4. The lyrics tell a powerful narrative about the people rising up against their oppressors and claiming their freedom.

In Hamdi's view, their supporter movement was at the same time distinctly national and firmly located in a wider Mediterranean world. Their revolutionary project envisioned a reoriented national project, which would break loose from the state institutions and mainstream media's hegemonic location work and instead reach out to like-minded football supporters through social media, recognisable affective registers, and a widely shared antipathy against the police.

The football ultras were not the only revolutionary force in Egypt to depict their project as one of national reorientation. Egypt's self-identifying revolutionaries (*thuwar*, *shabab al-thawra*) were always heterogenous, comprising among others, activists and journalists (El Chazli 2020), working-class youth from informal suburbs (Ryzova 2020), Islamists with different ideological profiles (Vannetzel 2020), independent trade unions (Abdalla 2019), and a disparate range of citizens who for one reason or another 'said no' (Schielke 2015, 191–215). While the overwhelming majority of these actors considered their struggle to be a nationalist one, the location and orientation of the revolutionary nation were always in the eye of the beholder and very often a matter of contestation and debate.

For revolutionaries gravitating towards the left, to take one example, it often seemed logical to locate Egypt's 2011 moment in a transnational wave of uprisings against neoliberalism (see Achcar 2013; Armbrust 2011; Hanieh 2013). Spearheading several simultaneous protest movements across Europe and the US (Indignados, Syntagma, Occupy), Tahrir Square surfaced in this rendering as a central point of anti-capitalist future-making in the wake of the 2008 economic meltdown.

For others—for brevity called liberals here—the master narrative was rather one of a nation belatedly breaking free from Arab despotism and joining the liberal-democratic West. This narrative of the revolution as primarily a kind of catch-up Westernisation enjoyed enthusiastic international and institutional backing. In 2011 and 2012, European cultural centres in Cairo expanded their democracy promotion programmes; the chances for Egyp-

tian artists to travel to Europe to showcase arts representing the 'revolutionary experience' proliferated (Eickhof 2019); Western journalists, researchers, and photographers flooded Cairo to document graffiti, music, and political mobilisation that fit a liberal definition of being 'revolutionary' (Abaza 2011; see also Abd el-Fattah 2021). Notably, most such efforts focused on activities and developments in Downtown Cairo (*wust el-balad*), a relatively small neighbourhood adjacent to Tahrir Square made up of grand yet fading *fin de siècle* apartment buildings, lower-middle-class shops, cafés, restaurants, and bars.[43] Downtown has a unique liminal character that is much enjoyed by leftists, artists, foreigners, and flirting (or harassing) youth (Armbrust 2019, 15–16, 29–52; Ryzova 2015). Due to its architecture, it is nostalgically associated with the 'cosmopolitan' and 'liberal' nation that ostensibly existed prior to Nasser's projects of nationalisation (see Abaza 2011; El Kadi and ElKernady 2006).

To cast Downtown as the revolution's obvious epicentre was, in other words, never neutral. By contrast, it implied taking up a liberal-cosmopolitan torch left behind by all of Egypt's post-1952 presidents, thus depicting the revolution as aimed at reconnecting Egypt to a highly idealised and largely ahistorical notion of the liberal-democratic West. Similar to the ultras' vision of connecting the revolutionary football nation to like-minded supporters across the Mediterranean, then, this example shows how national projects that took shape in Egypt the wake of 2011 at the same time looked backward and forward, inward as well as outward. While the revolutionary project was an unquestionably national one, the question of how the revolutionary nation should be located, tilted, and oriented was never obvious, but a contested part of the struggle.

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43 Even though crucial protests, strikes, and massacres took place in cities and towns all across the country (see, e.g., Shenker 2016), the dominant narrative of the Egyptian revolt pivoted consistently around the spectacular action in Cairo's urban space, most famously Tahrir Square and Downtown.

Islamists

As a second example, let us listen to my friend Ahmed, a sports teacher and entrepreneur, who supported the Islamist strand of the revolution. Egypt's Islamist movement—whether the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists, or some middle-ground version—has long been portrayed as non-patriotic and untrustworthy by its adversaries (see, e.g., Armbrust 2019, 157–180; Mitchell [1969] 1993). For supporters like Ahmed, however, it was always beyond doubt that the Islamists constituted the true popular core of the 25 January revolt. In contrast to secular politicians who promoted the values of a small elite and who in many ways constituted a continuation of the Mubarak era, Ahmed believed that the Muslim Brotherhood spoke for a vast but silenced majority of the Egyptian people and a national project that had always actually been Muslim at its core. Thus, he liked to tell me, the path towards a truly revolutionary Egypt had to be an Islamist path, the revolutionary dream a national-*and*-Muslim vision. 'Islamist politicians know us and live among us,' he explained in January 2012, 'they are pious like all of us, that is why they won the [recent parliamentary] elections.' But it was not only a case of piety. For Ahmed, the Islamists had also proved to be moral, decent, and hard-working. 'In a truly Islamic system (*nizam islami ha'i'i*)', he asserted, 'there is no corruption nor any privileges. Only your deeds and efforts matter. Islam means justice (*islam ya'ni 'adala*). Everyone in Matariyya [the working-class neighbourhood in which he lives] votes for the Muslim Brothers or the Salafists. We know who they are. We trust them.'[44]

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44 As Marie Vannetzel (2020) has shown, the Brotherhood built up a vast network of grassroots charity organisations and business networks during the final decades under Mubarak. In the first 18 months after January 2011, this organisation, renown, and trust translated into landslide victories in the parliamentary elections in December 2011 and January 2012 as well as a (narrower) win for their candidate Mohamed Morsi in the first free presidential elections in May and June 2012.

Ahmed's willingness to associate Islamism with 'normal people' in popular suburbs should not come as a surprise. In comparison to secular activists and citizens who supported liberal, leftist, or social democratic parties, the Islamist constituency was less urban, less polyglot, more conservative, and certainly less in sync with the liminal and European colonial streets of Downtown.[45] Comprising a multiplicity of thriving business and trading networks, the Muslim Brotherhood did not lack financial means, but they did not possess the social and cultural capital necessary to have their voices heard among Western journalists, researchers, NGOs, and cultural institutes. As a consequence, the national project supported by people such as Ahmed came with a distinct location and orientation. If football fans like Hamdi tended to look along and across the shores of the Mediterranean for inspiration and dreamful thinking, Ahmed's revolutionary-and-Islamist nation was directed elsewhere. Indeed, for him 'the West' (*al-gharb*) most of all conjured up images of suspicion. It was a cultural and political sphere that Egyptian society and culture had been *too* immersed in under Mubarak, and from which the revolution promised to make a decisive break. 'Our corrupt elites have lived in one country and the people live in another,' he told me in late 2012. 'They drink alcohol and travel to Paris for shopping. This is not the life we want to have. Never. The West cannot be the solution.'

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45 Although many of the Muslim Brotherhood's biggest demonstrations were organised in Tahrir Square, their connection to Downtown was never as organic that of leftist-liberal revolutionaries. As has often been noted (and sometimes exaggerated), Islamist protesters often arrived in central Cairo in chartered buses originating in the provinces (see Armbrust 2019, 140–156). Moreover, towards the end of the revolutionary period, it was seemingly unproblematic for Egypt's Islamist forces to claim a whole new centre for their then embattled revolutionary cause. After the 3 July 2013 military coup that ousted President Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood organised a sit-in in Rabaa al-Adawiya Square in Nasser City, some 10 km east of Downtown. The sit-in was violently dispersed by the army on 14 August 2013, leaving more than 800 Morsi supporters dead.

At the same time, by no means did Ahmed's dream of a revolutionised nation hark back to the medieval Islamic society that existed in the days of the Prophet Muhammad. What he envisioned was instead a technically advanced, fair, and morally just society modelled on existing Muslim success stories. In autumn 2012—the brief moment when Mohamed Morsi was Egypt's first elected president and the Islamist influence over civil and state institutions peaked—efforts to connect Egypt to such model nations could be witnessed everywhere. New media channels and diplomatic, financial, touristic, and cultural cooperation initiatives were set up at pace with Tunisia, Türkiye, Malaysia, Qatar, and (more controversially) Saudi Arabia as well as Iran (Ahlberg 2017, 247–258; Armbrust 2019, 150). For Ahmed, these ties gestured to a promising and, in his view, revolutionary reorientation of the national project. He was especially happy to see investments flowing into the country from friendly and more wealthy Muslim nations, such as Türkiye and Malaysia. While Ahmed was wary of American and European Union leaders promising investments and loans from the International Monetary Fund —'we've tried that before; we don't want the Americans to rule us again'—he was delighted to see Turkish president Erdoğan visiting Cairo and was supportive of the government's attempts to turn to Qatar for much-needed infrastructural investments. 'We're a country that has been ruled by thieves for decades and we have many problems,' he told me in early November 2012. 'It's clear that we need help, but we should get it from the right people. It's important to build alliances with people who are similar to you.'

The ambition to reach out to the right people extended to Ahmed's private life too. Prior to 2011, Ahmed had often dreamed of migrating. He had saved up money and made plans to travel to Europe, but the right opportunity had never materialised. After the revolution, this dream took new shapes. On the one hand, Egypt had proved possible to change. Maybe a bright future for himself and the family he soon hoped to have could be located inside the nation's borders? At the same time, he also saw new

opportunities opening up. One time after watching a football match together, he told me this:

> It's amazing how many friends have travelled to Türkiye recently. Tourist visas are much easier now. It's a beautiful country. Green mountains, mosques, Istanbul … And they're Muslims, so everything is easy. With the food and prayers and everything. No racism. Maybe after I get married, I could go there on honeymoon?! It'd be amazing. … I've also heard about Egyptians moving there to start businesses. It's easy. The people there like Egyptians. You just have to work hard. I don't think I will leave Egypt right now, but maybe later. I'd like to go to Türkiye and see it with my own eyes.

When Ahmed told me this, it was October 2012 and it felt logical that Türkiye and Istanbul were locations to dream about and aspire to. That autumn, Turkish politics, economy, and culture were mentioned constantly in the press and formed a recurrent topic of conversation among my Egyptian friends and interlocutors. Typically depicted as a modern-yet-Muslim nation on the northern shores of a shared Mediterranean Sea, the country was seen as an idealised role model by government officials, travel advertising, and Islamist-leaning media channels alike. No surprise, then, that Ahmed, like millions of other Islamist-leaning Egyptian citizens, drew on images of Türkiye as they attempted to make sense of what a revolutionary nation (let alone a revolutionary life) could look like. Like all other political regimes prior to them, President Mohamed Morsi's short-lived administration worked hard to scaffold the nation-state with its own set of supplementary locating logics and powers. As a result, it oriented the Egyptian nation in its own desired directions.

On time, and power

This chapter has examined the Egyptian nation-state as a locating regime and Egypt as a predominantly national yet always shifting and ultimately relative location. Zooming in on how national-

ism (logic) backed up by state institutions (power) has located the nation throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the historical account outlined two national projects with distinct orientations: Nasser's Egypt stretching its financial, technological, and diplomatic tentacles towards Eastern Europe and the decolonising Third World; and Sadat's and Mubarak's nation reaching out intermittently to capitalist America and petroleum-rich Arabia. The ethnographic part moved on to explore two national-and-revolutionary projects in the wake of Egypt's 25 January 2011 revolution, a moment when the state's institutions lost significant portions of their control of the national project. Whereas Hamdi, the football ultra, strove to orient revolutionary Egypt towards a Mediterranean and to some extent 'Western' world, Ahmed's Islamist inclinations instead tilted the nation in the direction of 'successful' Muslim countries such as Türkiye and Malaysia.

In each of these cases, the Egyptian nation-state constituted one influential locating regime, yet it never worked in solitude. The way in which the national location twisted and turned was also a result of the nation-state being *scaffolded* by other locational logics—capitalist vs socialist, Islamic vs non-Islamic, the First, Second, and Third World—backed up by powerful structures and institutions: labour migration, finance, engineering and expertise, media networks, tourism, etc. In other words, the Egyptian nation-state could very well be thought of as a locating regime insofar as it encompasses both a distinct locational logic and potent powers to implement that logic. Yet its actual capacity to locate the Egyptian nation at particular moments in time is ultimately the result of a constellation of coexisting regimes, logics, and fields of power that overlap, scaffold, and exceed national borders.

The story about the nation's relative locations has also been a story about relative futures. Whether under Nasser or Sadat, let alone during the turbulent revolutionary period, this chapter has outlined how spatial reorientations ground imaginaries of desirable hereafters and vice versa. To make sense of such imbrications between space and time, the work of geographer Doreen Massey is

useful to consider. In her 2005 book *For Space*, Massey makes the argument that space is best understood as a continuous 'thrown-togetherness' predicated on complex interrelations: an inherently fluid bundling of 'trajectories' and 'stories so far' that ultimately drives social transformation. True change, notes Massey (2005, 55), requires contingent interactions of trajectories across difference, and such interaction requires 'coeval' diversity in one and the same space. Hence, spatial multiplicity and connectivity are preconditions for futures to be open-ended. 'For time to be open,' she writes at one point, 'space must in some sense open too' (Massey 2005, 48).[46]

Massey's relational notion of space has many similarities with Crosslocations' concept of relative location, and that is no coincidence. The geographer's work constituted an important source of inspiration for Sarah Green's original formulation of the Crosslocations research project, albeit with some key differences, the most important being that Crosslocations focuses on 'location' rather than 'space', as such (see the introduction to this volume, and Green 2020, 178–185). What particularly interests me here is the ways in which Massey's approach towards space can illuminate how a national-and-relative *where* (location) structures a national-and-relative *when* (future). As described above, the Egyptian national location has undergone a series of reorientations since the 1950s, reorientations which are the outcomes of shifting constellations of locating regimes (dis)connecting the nation (from or) to locations elsewhere. Massey would describe this as a sequence of rebundlings of stories-so-far. She would also tell us how and why this matters for time and for futures. Because, as the nation twists and turns—now opening up in one direction, now closing down in another—so do the coeval trajectories (or

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46 Massey's theorisation of 'coevalness' is in turn inspired by anthropologist Johannes Fabian's discussion of the same concept in his classic *Time and the Other* ([1983] 2014). Whereas Fabian's analysis focuses on how the anthropological discipline has denied the coevalness that is inherent in the relationship between researcher and informant, Massey's interest is the dynamic constitution of space.

stories) that intersect in the location called Egypt. And so also does the possibility to envision new, always-oriented, futures. Indeed, if spatial connectivity is a prerequisite for 'coevalness', and if such coevalness is a necessity for time to be dynamic, then it follows that spatial reorientations hold the key, not only to the nation's relative location but also to its provisionally staked-out future. By contrast, whenever the open-ended 'throwntogetherness' that locates a nation in space is curtailed, that means, by definition, that the nation's time becomes stale and is stifled, too.

These insights do not only allow us to push beyond modernist conceptions of national temporalities as linear, empty, and homogenous (see, e.g., Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983). Massey's theoretical apparatus also helps us pinpoint the political charge of the different national projects' (cross)locating work. By reaching out, aligning or cutting off Egypt from a particular subset of stories-so-far, political leaders and activists are not only determining the nation's relative location and orientation. They also designate what national futures are deemed thinkable, attractive, and achievable. Seen in this light, one thing that this chapter has analysed is the nation-state as the playing field for a specific modality of spatiotemporal political action. Intervening in the constellation of logics and structures that scaffold the nation-state means wielding a pervasive form of power—over locations in space, surely, but also in many ways over time. Sometimes it happens that this locational power-play is monopolised by a hegemonic constellation of locating regimes that obfuscates its transitory nature. At such moments—1952 is one good example—the open-ended national *where* and *when* momentarily appear to freeze; the nation-state as an interdependent locating regime propped up by other logics momentarily surfaces as an unproblematic singularity. And yet, such a mirage cannot last forever. There always comes a moment when the centre cannot hold, a moment when the question of the nation's *where* again takes precedence. Egypt's 2011 revolution was such a moment of renewed spatial reconfiguration. As state and nation drifted apart, the location that Egypt had held during the Mubarak era was fundamentally relativised and up for grabs.

In its stead, a series of mutually exclusive national projects that all claimed to be revolutionary came to the fore. These were all political projects, and all of them attempted to tilt the nation's location and time in ways deemed desirable by particular groups and perspectives.[47] As none of them were in full control of the powers vested in the state apparatus, none of them managed to hegemonise the national location; eventually they were all outcompeted by the military-led counterrevolution.

Let us also note how this perspective recasts revolutionary politics as an inherently spatiotemporal affair. It is fair to say that the literature on revolutionary moments to date has most often mobilised temporal idioms: revolutions, we learn from the works of anthropologists and political theorists, are liminal moments (Armbrust 2019; Thomassen 2012) marked by contingent action in time (Arendt [1963] 2006), contestations over pasts and memories (Legrás 2017), and lives lived in the future tense (Schielke 2015). As exceptional times, they are often followed by feelings of stagnation, haunting, and lost futures (Scott 2014). Despite their many differences, these are all analyses of revolutionary *time*. It is time that is contingent and rushing, time that eventually slows down, time that is available to act in and on, time that counterrevolutionary forces want to close down and stifle. As I have shown in this chapter, however, a revolution could just as well be read as a *spatial* struggle over overlapping connections, separations, and orientations—that is, as contestations over what we in Crosslocations call relative locations. For in the end, the two battles are arguably one and the same. If one wants time to twist and turn, location must in some sense twist and turn too. One crucial thing that happened during Egypt's explicitly nationalist revolution was that it became obvious to everyone who bothered to take a look

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47   For other anthropological works that from different angles have identified the acts of cutting and compartmentalisation as central political acts, see Strathern (1996) and Gupta and Ferguson (1992). For a parallel argument about the nation and state merging to produce a dominant structure, see Appadurai (1990, 12–14).

that the state apparatus could no longer monopolise the locational logic of nationalism. As a result, the Egyptian nation turned in all kinds of directions all at once. And so did also the prospects for the nation's revolutionary futures.

That raises the question of the relation of time, or more specifically history, with location. In order to explore that, Chapter 4 draws on the archival and ethnographic work carried out by Joseph J. Viscomi in Petrizzi, a small and depopulating town in Southern Italy.

Petrizzi: locating history

Joseph J. Viscomi

In 2018 I arrived in Petrizzi to begin archival research on depopulation, the processes of 'emptying' that marked much of rural Southern Italy and elsewhere in rural Europe (Dzenovska 2020). After having introduced myself to the municipal council in the *comune* (municipality; Figure 1), the mayor stopped me as I passed through the piazza (Figure 2) in the afternoon. He knew that I had been given the keys to the old municipal office, where the archives had been stored at least since the 1920s. The mayor asked if I had found the material useful. I told him I had. Continuing as though I had not said anything, he interrupted me: 'You know, if those are useful documents, you can take them back [to London] with you, we can figure that out.' I would eventually learn that, to the mayor, the documents stood in the way of a potential municipality-run apartment for tourists.

One year later, Ciccio, a member of the municipal council, stopped me in the same piazza with another, quite different, enquiry about the documents. It is worth pausing on his biography. In the 1990s Ciccio had moved to Turin, where he became involved in labour organising. After large-scale redundancies in 2008, he returned to Calabria, first to Lamezia Terme, where his wife's family lived. There, he unsuccessfully ran for a mayoral position with the communist party, Rifondazione comuni-

Figure 1: The *comune* (municipal council building) in Petrizzi. (Photo: Joseph J. Viscomi)

Figure 2: Piazza Regina Elena, Petrizzi. (Photo: Joseph J. Viscomi)

sta.[48] After the election, he and his family relocated to Petrizzi, where he had been raised and where his father had worked in the municipality for around 25 years. He again inserted himself in local politics, working as a member of the opposition within the municipal government. He described his involvement with a mayor and council that leaned strongly to the political right: 'you wouldn't believe how many programmes of the Left I'm able to push through by being part of a right-wing administration'. Ciccio claimed that his return to the South was a blessing in disguise. He has become a self-described 'neo-Bourbonist',[49] subscribing to the belief that Southern Italy enjoyed better days prior to national unification in 1861. The neo-Bourbonic movement portrays the Italian South as a colonised territory and people, victim to the systemic violence of the North and, more specifically, Piedmont, the region from which many early leaders of the unified nation had originated (Sonetti 2020). He casually cursed the Piemontesi and claimed that life in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies had been idyllic, benefitting from productive industry and agriculture. He was enthusiastic about my archival investigations and hoped that I would help uncover the town's historical richness—to place the town 'back' within a hierarchy of value that reached beyond the modern nation-state.

When Ciccio stopped me in the piazza, he asked if I had seen 'a document' that would attest to the town's 'ownership' of coastal Mediterranean land, nearly 8 km south of the town's mountain location. He assured me that said document would be present and

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48 In 1991 the Italian Communist Party (PCI) was refounded as the Partito Democratica della Sinistra, a progressive, democratic socialist party. Around one-third of PCI's membership joined the newly formed PCI.

49 This term, *neoborbonismo*, loosely refers to a popular movement that has questioned the validity of Italian national unification and idealised the situation of Southern Italy prior to 1861, of the Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Although it has earlier precedents, the movement has been widely influenced by the publication of the journalist Pino Aprile's *Terroni: Tutto quello che è stato fatto perché gli italiani del Sud diventassero 'meridionali'* (2010).

that it needed to be pulled from the archive. The administration planned to use this document to claim rights to a small portion of the coastline from the neighbouring *comune*.

These scenes took place in a town located at the point in the province of Catanzaro with the shortest distance between the Tyrrhenian and Ionian seas. Despite its closeness to the sea, the town has historically been more connected to the mountains and, like many towns in Calabria, isolated by its relative lack of transport routes. In 2019 it had 1054 residents.[50] Its population has steadily declined since it peaked at around 2500 in the mid-1930s. It is not as emptied, or abandoned, as the better-known region of Reggio Calabria and is surrounded by several 'revivalist' projects that have been used as models for regenerating value in emptied landscapes.

Petrizzi is said to have been constructed by earlier populations that fled raids on coastal towns during the late Middle Ages. It expanded considerably under the feud of Squillace and was sold in the 16th century to Salvatore Marincola, from Aragon, Spain, when it became a (small) duchy. It remained under the Marincola family until the abolition of feudalism in 1806, although the Marincola family and local nobility dominated local politics and labour patterns for several generations (Diego Marincola, for example, was installed as the *podestà*, a leadership position imposed during the fascist period by the National Fascist Party in Rome). Built on the edge of the mountains, the town's economic life has centred historically around (small-scale) agricultural production, the area being known from the 16th to 19th centuries for its vineyards, olives, and cactus fruit (*Opuntia ficus-indica*), the last of those useful as much for containing soil erosion as for its fruit. The old part of town runs along one mountain ridge with a granite bedrock; a narrow road passes from an overgrown area, Santa Caterina, named after a church that once marked the promontory, to the *piazza vecchia* (as it has been called since at least

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50 Figures from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT, https://demo.istat.it/bilmens2019gen/index.html).

the 1840s). The road winds upwards, past the town's church and eventually arrives at the central piazza, once the limit of the town and point of market exchange with neighbouring towns and merchants. It continues, passing through *le baracche* (the barracks), a road lined with housing constructed in the aftermath of the 1783 earthquake, which destroyed much of the old town, to a smaller square (*'a menzuchianu*) and cluster of homes (*timpanello*) developed in the 19th century and inhabited largely by agricultural workers and artisans. Since the early 20th century, due to destruction caused by erosion, the town has expanded upwards along the ridge as houses crumbled, collapsed, and were abandoned due to flood and earthquake damage. Although Petrizzi's population has halved since the end of the Second World War, the town itself has nearly doubled in physical size.

This chapter draws on the crosslocations approach to claim that the material histories behind both the mayor's offer to me to take away the documents and Ciccio's request for one particular document together demonstrate how histories multiply and layer in order to constitute Petrizzi's relative location. These two requests are fundamentally linked through the *comune*, the local institution of authority and political power; one that has become increasingly separated from the state (and its resources) since the national government implemented devolution after the 1970s (Walston 1988). The chapter will focus mainly on Ciccio's appeal, although I will return to the mayor towards the conclusion. On the one hand, the request represents a particular temporal mapping of the town. It inscribes the territory with value in relation to its potential (a tourist destination); but this value would have to be legitimised or confirmed through the physical document which stands as 'evidence' of its location in history. On the other hand, such physical documents do exist (they are not imagined) and are stored (or left) in abandoned archives, archives that are, according to the mayor, disposable, as they stand in the way of his current project to convert the town into a tourist destination—he offered them to me without concern for the procedures required for this kind of operation. He would have been required first to consult

the Soprintendenza archivistica, the state authority over archives for the Ministry of Culture, created in 1974 at the same time that a number of laws would link archives, historical artefacts, and the political economy of tourism.[51]

Anthropologist Vito Teti—writing from another town in Calabria—states:

> Abandonment signifies the end of a town (*paese*), but generally entails the birth of one or more new towns (*paesi*). On the other hand … every history of a town's construction is almost always accompanied by a myth or a history of abandonment of a preceding town. The myth of foundation is none other than the myth of abandonment. It's the veritable point of departure (*punto a quo*). The beginning of a place is linked to the end of another. (Teti [2004] 2014, 297)

Teti writes these words in his monumental *Il senso dei luoghi* ([2004] 2014), an ethnographic account of memory and history in abandoned towns in Calabria. He argues that the work does not aim to construct a metaphysics of places (*luoghi*), but rather aims to account for the abandonment and reconstruction of places that coexist and extend across time and space, through the materials of the towns. As Teti writes, abandonment is the ending of a town, but also the birth of one or more new ones. This chapter shows how 'abandonment'—a word which in the case of Southern Italy refers to the slow emptying of towns and villages as a result primarily of environmental events or emigration—conjures connection, even when it separates; and it declares separation, even when it is inevitably connected. The chapter argues that the documentary materials through which one encounters the past, and the archives that house them, mark and are marked by depopulation and, in turn, they locate Petrizzi relative to multiple historical dimensions.

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51 *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, 332, 115 (19 December 1974).

Documents, archives, and history

These documents, in their more abstracted historical sense, are forms of evidence. They are materials that originate in and endure through time, and from them we can gain deeper knowledge of the meanings and processes that mark Petrizzi's landscape at various moments in the past (Ginzburg 1991). Yet the mapping of the town in Ciccio's request, the histories to which the physical documents attest, and the trajectories evoked by the material histories of abandonment—in the case of the archives, abandoned to uninhabited buildings and left to decay through natural processes—tell only partial stories. In relation to one another, they give dimension to historical time. Chapter 3 examined the 'scaffolding' of nation and state (and nation-state) in the popular historiography of Egypt's various post-revolutionary periods (in the aftermath of the establishment of the modern Egyptian nation-state in 1953 and following the uprisings in 2011). It explored how different scales of this popular historiography invoked or conjured constellations of locating regimes (Ben-Yehoyada 2017; Rommel and Viscomi 2022a). This chapter inverts that scaffolded approach, looking not at wider processes of signification but instead at the microhistorical landscapes materialised in Petrizzi's multiple emptyings.

Carlo Ginzburg and Carlo Poni define microhistory as the 'science of lived experience' (*scienza del vissuto*). As the rapprochement of anthropology and history, its dual purpose is to reconstitute 'lived experience' in a way inconceivable in other forms of historiography and to investigate the 'invisible structures within which that lived experience is articulated' (Ginzburg and Poni 1979).[52] While a lot of microhistories deal with historical persons or events belonging to distant pasts, microhistory's methodo-

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52 Note that the same essay has been translated and included in Muir and Ruggiero (1991, 8). In their text, *scienza del vissuto* is translated as 'science of real life'. I have chosen to go with my own translation of *vissuto* as 'lived experience' in attempt to capture the micro-application of the term for an *event* experienced or lived by historical characters, rather than the abstracted macro-scale analysis of a life (a whole life, that is).

logical foundations offer much assistance in our apprehension
of more recent histories and, indeed, currently inhabited worlds
(Levi 1991, 109; see also Revel 2006; Viscomi 2020). This approach
has taught us that the stories concealed in archival documents
abound in their own historical narratives, their own itineraries
(Davis 1987, 2007; see also Stoler 2009). These itineraries have
become compelling occasions for articulating a methodology that
navigates scales and, in doing so, embraces an analytic dynamism
between the 'micro' and 'macro' (Peltonen 2001).

Passing from one history to another, through a variety of
scales, outlines the cartography of lived and shared experiences
(see Revel 2006). Here, the concept of 'lived experience' can be
expanded to include the material histories of towns and villages.
Moving away from a microhistorical approach that emphasises a
Geertzian synchronic imagination of cultural symbolism over one
that is diachronic and admits difference and separation as relative,
I suggest that the dimensions of temporal scale-crossing stratify
this social cartography.[53] It approaches what some scholars have
called 'micro-spatial histories' (De Vito and Gerritsen 2018; see
also the work on global and microhistory in Trivellato 2011 and
2015). Edelstein et al. (2021) have argued that while multiplicity is
key to temporal analyses, the question of power within these emer-
gent hierarchies must be integrated into the analysis to understand
how time unfolds. They open space to consider how conflicting
temporalities cross and shape one another. As we argued in the
introduction, power is central to understanding locating regimes.
In the study of the smallness of a place marked by emptiness on
the one hand, and deep connections to processes reaching outside
the limits of that place's material landscapes on the other, such a
methodology can shed light on how places 'stretch through time',

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53 I refer here specifically to the fact that many microhistorians drew inspi-
ration from Clifford Geertz, including Ginzburg (1980), and replicated
Geertz's tendency to focus on 'flat' cultural models as if they were texts.
These are, I contend, models of symbolic structures out of time, and,
in their stasis, they are unable to account for historical time (and thus
change; see Levi 1985).

as Doreen Massey (1995) so eloquently put it. Importantly, by examining the role of documents as forms of evidence within these material landscapes, it is also possible to begin to understand how power and time together come to constitute a location through their multiple processes. Petrizzi's archives accounted for its long history of emigration, environmental change, and political corruption. Although they physically stood in the way of a potential tourist destination (a new place), Ciccio, with the backing of the municipal administration, sought in them confirmation of Petrizzi's past relative location in order to legitimise the town's future.

In his now classic study of the uses and abuses of time in anthropology, Johannes Fabian railed against the tendency of anthropologists to place their subjects in a time distinct from their own. His threefold division of the 'times' of anthropology—physical, mundane/typological, and intersubjective—is meant to characterise anthropologists' use of 'distancing devices' to separate themselves from their subjects. Fabian defines the 'denial of coevalness' as 'a persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the producer of anthropological discourse' ([1983] 2014). Fabian's approach lacks the acknowledgement that the same devices he sees as problematic furnishings of the anthropologist's toolkit are those often used by its subjects (and perhaps those which emanate from its objects). He privileges a temporal equivalency whose validity can only exist in a reductive sense of universally coeval time: if Fabian's critique of other anthropologists is that they banish their subjects from the present, one might propose that he instead imposes the present upon his subjects.[54] Fabian's post-structuralist critique flattens time. To imply an essential *presence*—of any historical moment, of any point in time—would be to ignore the 'denial of coevalness' that is key to elaborating the dimensions connecting porous and

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54 A similar approach underlies Alfred Gell's *Anthropology of Time* (1992), wherein he insists on the ultimate materiality of chronological time and contemporaneity as overcoming any other configuration of possible temporalities.

permeable stories told by interlocutors and those that surface in archival documents. In essence, Fabian reinforces a form of presentism (Hartog 2015).

Fabian's formulation describes broader trends in the humanities and social sciences following the linguistic turn.[55] Berber Bevernage has revisited Fabian's argument. Bevernage calls for a more complex appreciation of how temporality factors into historical (and ethnographic) analyses. He suggests that scholars embrace non-coevalness in their studies of the politics of time and temporality, asking how connections between distinct temporal periods are valued, measured, and approached (Bevernage 2016). Relations to time, in this sense, are not merely epiphenomenal aspects of social life that rest on a material substrate, but instead they index *actual* temporalities, ways of being in time (à la Heidegger) or in history (De Martino) that shape an individual's or group's possibilities within the world.

There is a final caveat to accepting the multiplicity of time as seen through the material encounters (or abandonment) of documents as evidence: it incorporates a movement towards the future. Here, Reinhart Koselleck's ([1979] 2004, 2002) suggestion that historical categories are not merely testimonial (or descriptive), but that the unfolding of historical time occurs in the balance between experience and expectation, is useful. Koselleck ([1979] 2004, 258) claims that experience and expectation 'embody past and future' and are concepts through which scholars of the past can apprehend the concrete (empirical) processes of historical time.[56] As he argues, the future, although open and indeterminate,

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55 Whether it is due to Fabian's critique is uncertain, but clearly Fabian's work speaks to a broader trend that, in many ways, runs parallel to the linguistic turn in post-structuralist studies. For a good summary and critique of these trends as they apply to the discipline of history, see Hartog (2005, 2014).

56 For an insightful engagement with Koselleck's work, see the *American Historical Review Forum* entitled 'Histories of the Future', and specifically, Andersson (2012); Connelly et al. (2012); Engerman (2012); Goswami (2012). For a similar approach, see Yurchak (2005).

is not always new and surprising. Within 'historical structures of experience', futures are anticipated, and a degree of prognosis signifies 'metahistorical' durations (Koselleck 2002, 146). History's unfolding permeates each form of 'evidence', shaping lived experience. Neglecting the scale of the past's propulsion into the future, scholars risk inadvertently concealing the ways in which subjects (and objects) anticipate (and channel) 'history' as well as how such expectations themselves contour historical events (Koselleck 2002, 135, 146).[57] This danger is inherent in Fabian's flattened approach to time; and it is one which denies the shifting and multiple connections and separations which inflect the narrative of this book.

Building upon these critiques, the particular ordering of time around Petrizzi's abandoned archives opens out a new awareness of how multiplied experiences and expectations in tension—and sometimes outright conflict—give dimension to history.[58] Yet, to adopt a more dimensional understanding of historical time, it is important to first understand how various 'regimes of historicity' are at work, and how they compete in asymmetrical, power-laden relations where some lose and others win. In other words, it is not enough to say that historical time is non-synchronous and multiple. The mayor's efforts to empty the building—and the town—of its archive are part of a long, battled process through which the power of local administration has undermined possibilities for people to establish secure futures in Petrizzi.

These claims lay the basis for the argument, at the heart of this chapter, that history can be employed as a locating regime. This book's introduction formulates three criteria for understanding a locating regime: 1) it has a logic; 2) there is power that imposes that logic in practice; 3) it affects the significance and value of

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57 Koselleck asserts that there are 'enduring conditions within which what is new appears'. These conditions—what he calls 'structures of experience'—are what aid our 'prognostic certainty', or our capacity to think the future (Koselleck 2002). For an anthropological exploration of the future, see Bryant and Knight (2019).

58 This dimensionality is close to what is described in Rovelli (2017).

location and the connections and disconnections between places. Given these criteria, it can be argued that history is, indeed, a locating regime.

The question of logic is primarily a hermeneutic problem directed at *historicity*. On the one hand, people's understandings and experiences of time have taken radical shifts at various moments.[59] On the other, the way that both personal and shared experiences of time interact with broader historical processes of change remains rather vague. In other words, most people tend to read history as a form of consciousness, as an abstraction of the world that is separated from its immediate experiences. They read history in the realm of the ideational, thanks in large part to philosophers who have informed anthropologists' understanding of temporality and the scant attention given to historical theory itself. This chapter draws attention instead to the material form that histories take and to the connections among them, from document to archive to the multiple socio-political worlds of which they are part. As a basis for this, history as locating regime could be thought of as the space (or act) of the separation between *the experience of time* (think of Ciccio's evocation of an idealised, prosperous time in the past prior to national unification) and the certain idea of how *one is located within time* (his position in an administration seeking to profit from contemporary tourism trends and utilising the emptied landscapes whose abandonment was precisely a product of the structural asymmetries that shaped Petrizzi's long history of departures). History, here, is cast as the space (or act) which endows the past with dimensionality, which distances the past from or relates it to the present. This dimensionality is fundamental to how history renders people's relations with the past so complex. That space (or act) of separation is the logic of history. It also sets the tempo for the future.

The anthropologist Ernesto de Martino reflects on what happens in this overcoming of the separation between past and pre-

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59 For two different historical explorations of changing temporal regimes, see Ogle (2015) and Fritzsche (2010).

sent, especially with regard to what he called the 'crisis of presence' and the dehistoricisation of experience—De Martino was working against Benedetto Croce, whose idealist approach to history did not conform to De Martino's own inclinations about the materialist experience of the world, which he then set out to show in his ethnographic work on magic and religion in Southern Italy.[60] For De Martino, 'presence' implies, but also goes beyond, an existential 'self'. Presence renders community possible. It entails a materialised 'being-there in history' (*esserci nella storia*). De Martino's argument raises important considerations with regard to historical temporality. In the 'crisis of presence', the desire 'to be present' in history confronts the 'risk of not being present there'. De Martino does not situate these questions in the realm of philosophy, but rather in the class dynamics of Southern Italy over the course of the late 19th and 20th centuries, elaborating upon Gramsci's ideas of the subaltern in Italy's Southern Question. De Martino writes, 'On a global scale the popular masses are fighting to enter history (*per entrare nella storia*) and overthrow the order that keeps them subaltern' (2017). The struggle described by De Martino is not one of metaphysics, it is a materialist endeavour against logics which aim to detach a subject from the world in which they are immersed.

For De Martino, the possibility of dehistoricisation accompanies the irreversibility of historical time (the time of *chronos*). As described by George Saunders, '[t]he crisis of presence … entails the possible loss of a place in history, since history is the work of thinking, acting, feeling, and, perhaps above all, "distinguishing" human beings'. Unhinged histories, on the other hand, alienate their subjects. And alienation generates suffering, what Saunders interprets from De Martino as 'anguish over not being-there in a human history' (Saunders 1995). Elsewhere, De Martino refers to a similar sentiment of collapsed out-of-placeness/out-of-timeness as *angoscia territorial* (De Martino 1951). For the latter,

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60 For an extensive introduction to De Martino's anthropological work, see Ferrari (2012).

the 'redemption' or 'release' (*riscatto*) from this temporal 'crisis' comes through magic. This present chapter is less interested in the mechanisms of 'magic' per se, but sees in De Martino's framework a means to describe how historical logics and material encounters locate individuals and places within temporal dimensions that implicate constellations of social, economic, and political relations which extend beyond and cut through particularity.

This leads to the second criterion of a locating regime: any given locating logic needs the power to impose that logic on the world in order to be a regime. The suggestion in this chapter is that the space (or act) of separation that adds dimensionality to history provides insight into how power operates. It is in the distancing. Here, the problem becomes rigorously empirical, for when the imposing powers that unveil mechanisms of distancing are fleshed out, they do indeed tend to appear to be multiple or they function on the scales revealed through the kind of historical practices described above (as will be seen more clearly in the following section). Koselleck's often overlooked notion of layered and plural historical times comes close to this.

Multiplicity leads on to the third criterion of a locating regime: that locating regimes work to generate the significance and value of location, thus creating connections and disconnections between places (leaving aside for the moment the premise of coexistence—that no locating regime exists alone, but is always crosscut by others). If the imposing powers that distance, that separate historical temporalities are multiple, they must *not* be equivalent; they are most certainly asymmetrical. Those 'sides' of anything historical—anything consecrated with the materiality of history—lend significance and value to location, and in their fractures or separations, the angles through which they give shape to history, they extend to and through other locations. Like the archives, houses emptied by Petrizzi's departed emigrants have been interpreted by the municipal council as possible tourist destinations, and for this reason the archives were in the way, according to the mayor. Although many inhabitants may see their presence (and even

decay) as a manifestation of life, only one of these historical logics enjoys the legal authority to assess and repossess.[61]

Documents and territory in time

In 2016, select parts of the 18th-century cadastral survey (*catasto onciario*) were reproduced and published by Petrizzi's Pro-Loco, an organisation formed in 1975 to promote the town's history and tourism (only one year after the creation of the Ministry of Culture). The *catasto onciario* was compiled to create a uniform taxation system in the Kingdom of Naples. In Petrizzi, it was completed in 1742, although its completion took over a decade in many places. Stemming from Carlo III of Spain's rule, the *catasto* was part of a wider reform meant to grant the Kingdom of Naples greater autonomy from the Spanish Bourbons and to reorganise the bureaucratic structure of towns and villages around Naples (this process might have been analogous to Mehmed Ali's semi-autonomy from the Ottoman Empire in early 19th-century Egypt, which shaped later ideas of the Egyptian national imagination) (Davis 2006, 37). As a survey or census aiming to assess the value of property and possessions, it was organised by local administrations and elected officials in cities, towns, and villages throughout Southern Italy. Such surveys also account for the presence and size of families living under one roof, known as *fuochi* (fireplaces). The *catasti* (pl.) have been exploited on a large scale by lay historians and genealogists as a means to explore lineages and gain a sense of historical landscapes in local communities. The editors of the Pro-Loco's volume note in their introduction:

> [The *catasto*] functions as a historical document because it gives us a 'still image' of society, economy, and judicial relations in Southern Italy: a definitive point of departure to understand, by means of that which we were, what we became and what we are

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61 On the politics of decay and entropy in landscape, see DeSilvey (2017).

(attraverso ciò che eravamo, quell che siamo diventati e ciò che siamo). (Anzani and Piperata 2016, 11)

The document itself is rich in details—it records professions, live-stock ownership, credits and debts, numbers of cohabitants in households, and other forms of property (for example, whether someone owns a house or rents from another). It notes how plots of agricultural land were covered ('planted with…'), their size, and, although it does not include coordinates for mapping, the descriptions of the confines of agricultural properties (*fondi*) and inhabited areas help to vividly conjure the landscape.[62]

The *catasto*, as the editors claim, offers a snapshot: it is espe-cially valuable in this part of Calabria because it depicts a world that, 41 years later, would be turned upside down by a massively destructive earthquake. The earthquake of 1783 not only levelled Petrizzi, it also unsettled the administrative structure and power hierarchies of the town that are portrayed in the *catasto*'s descrip-tion of relations between inhabitants and land (Placanica 1997; see also Cecere 2013). It is part of the ending and beginning of towns in Calabria. The 1783 earthquake opened pathways for regional reforms intended to draw power (and resources) out of local religious authorities indebted to feudal elite and place them into emerging state institutions. The government in Naples created the Cassa Sacra, an administrative organ whose purpose was to liqui-date ecclesiastical accounts and invest them in the reconstruction of towns, in doing so reorganising and centralising power through Naples, a process linked to the justification for the *catasti* nearly half a century prior. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 1783 earth-quake the ducal family of Petrizzi, which had acquired the town by royal decree in the early 17th century, transferred their wealth and personal archives out of the town (there are records that until the mid-19th century their palazzo, the current municipal build-

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62 Archivio dello Stato di Napoli (ASN), Catasti onciari, 1741–1797, 'Petrizzi 1742'. Daniel Smail (1999) describes how this approach to understanding mapping reveals how people thought about personal and collective geographies.

ing, was left abandoned in ruins, in a state that it would take again after 1973).[63] The bureaucratic transformation would be exacerbated when Napoleon's troops occupied Southern Italy and officially abolished feudalism in 1806. Administrative powers were increasingly transferred to municipal councils composed of local nobility and a nascent class of liberal professionals (notaries, lawyers, doctors, etc.) and to separate committees representing the interests of peasants and artisans.

For members of the Pro-Loco—like Ciccio—the *catasto* as historical document functions to draw together past and present. Yet they have only presented a partial and one-dimensional view of the document. From the perspective of one encountering the archive, to apprehend the document as a 'still image' and portray it as a testament to the town past without considering the various processes which constituted its emergence is to generate distance between past and present. The cadastral survey indeed referred to past realities as much as it was produced by them, but it was also part of a wider constellation of encounters with the land across the 18th and 19th centuries and into the present. It was archived (in Naples, where the administrative centre of the state was at the time) and largely forgotten on the ground while social, economic, and judicial relations transformed.

Reading the *catasto* in dialogue with documents from later periods, a rather different sense emerges of how the landscape was cultivated, worked, and inhabited, and to which plots of land were attached value and signification. Documents detail a selling 'mania' as landowners sought to move capital outside of the town in the early 19th century, driving emigration as smallholders or artisans attempted to acquire cash to purchase land. Some years later, in the 1830s, plots of feudal lands were converted into communal lands and distributed to landless peasants. These lands have played an important role in the town's history and have been a

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63 ASN, Suprema Giunta di corrispondenza con quella della Cassa Sacra di Catanzaro. Processi fasc. 98, 'Atti per il Duca di Petrizzi e i corpi feudali e giuridizionali di Petrizzi e Soverto'.

point of frequent contention in times of economic recession when the municipal administration looked towards them as a possible resource and attempted to reappropriate them for its own fiscal benefit. Moreover, one can see how social and political networks overlapped in various ways with changing regimes of landowner-ship. For example, one document in the municipal archive records the quotidian financial transactions from 1850 to 1880 (known as a *libro mastro*; Figure 3) of the Carnovale family, who inherited large amounts of land from the Marincola family. The *libro mastro* demonstrates how a tight network of peasants, carpenters, labour-ers, and others, over several generations, depended on continued employment for their income and sometimes for their housing. Changing seasons, and events such as heavy snows or rains, exten-sive harvests, the introduction of new crops, and the mobility of migrant labourers who arrived in Petrizzi for temporary employ-ment, all punctuate this document. As landownership fragmented and traditional structures of power were dismantled, land main-tained symbolic value locally even while it lost economic value. Precisely around Italian unification in 1861, artisans began to emigrate to North and South America, using remittances to pur-chase land sold at inflated rates by landowning families like the Carnovale (many of these elite families began to disappear from the social landscape of Petrizzi during this same period, following their 18th-century predecessors to urban centres such as Naples or Rome and taking their wealth with them).

This emigration to the United States and Argentina was quickly followed by peasants, many of whom previously depended on employment by families like the Carnovale. The emptying of land due to emigration began to create visible 'problems' for the local administration and the state. For example, in 1911 the regional engineer corps attributed the drastic rise of devasting fires to the absence of manual labourers available to maintain agricul-tural land. The landscape also witnessed an increase in damage caused by floods and erosion. The occurrence of fires, floods, earthquakes, and other disasters became more impactful, creat-ing material barriers to Petrizzi's inhabitants' ability to cultivate

Figure 3: *Libro mastro,* 1850–1880. (Photo: Joseph J. Viscomi)

land and live in the town, without outside intervention. As land was privatised and its ownership diversified, its value in terms of potential yield fell and the cost of maintenance rose. Migration became a crucial conduit for filtering capital into the local economy (and when migration was prohibited during the 1930s under Mussolini's attempt to control emigration, voluntary military service rendered individuals and their families eligible for state subsidies and pensions in many ways serving the same purpose as emigration).

The departure from the land, at once informed by its importance and centrality, in turn fuelled historical processes. In other words, in looking at the *catasto*, one can see hints of the centrality of land, but as a 'snapshot' of Petrizzi's agricultural past it does

nothing to help us understand how that land and its use in the past relates to the value that holds in the present. Absent from these documents is a record of Petrizzi's wealth and prosperity prior to Italian unification—as the myth of Ciccio's neo-Bourbonism dictates, and which guides his commitment to 'restoring' Petrizzi to an idealised world in which sea and land are joined. Indeed, these documents recount a different history altogether; one of struggle over ownership, profit, and connection to the land. Importantly, they recount a history in which the sea itself does not often figure. They demonstrate how a small number of families who historically held power and property accumulated wealth and progressively extracted and distanced their wealth from the community, at the same time attempting to market property as valuable to those from whom it had been dispossessed. And how, various states (first Naples, then Rome) sought to channel funds from traditional institutions of power and reform hierarchies in their own interests. This tracing of a series of events between the 18th and early 20th centuries provides key insights into future-making within various regimes of power, law, landownership, agriculture, and production. The temporal constellations which these events unveil illustrate shifts from imperial systems to the consolidation of bureaucratic institutions administering policies for the modern nation-state, a drama in which Petrizzi persists as a small place but, due to the reconfiguring of local, regional, national, and global futures, experienced fundamental changes in terms of its social, political, and environmental locations. As we see, for the Pro-Loco, the *catasto*'s value manifest in its potential to reference what was, what became, and what is in Petrizzi's landscape, to create a particular temporal mapping of the town's relative location in history. During a walk around the emptied part of town, Antonio, a member of the Pro-Loco's leadership, narrated the landmarks of which there is no living memory—multiple churches of which nothing remains but the knowledge that, once, Petrizzi had more churches than its current two. He told me that this knowledge is based on notations in the *catasto*, a collection of documents that he acquired while working in the municipal office for 25 years,

and as a carer for the last living member of the landowning Carnovale family. As we walked through the old, narrow streets, it was possible to observe how they were overcome by wilding, but formerly cultivated, terrain. Fig trees, *fichi d'India*, vines, wild fennel, wild mint, and oregano filled the hollowed shells of homes; a plate remained posed on a shelf in a house where the floor had fallen down through two storeys. Antonio said that the documents bring the town alive; we walked through multiple Petrizzis, he and I, each made present through material evidence.

Leaving the land

This section turns to how the emptying of Petrizzi manifested not only in its archival traces but also in the state of its documents. This comes back to the request with which this chapter began. After the Second World War and the collapse of the Fascist government, which had imposed local authorities (*podestà*) from feudal, ducal, and baronial families throughout Southern Italy, there was a moment of unrest that—in some places—recalled the political turmoil of earlier periods. In several towns in Calabria peasants declared independent republics, as in the case of the Red Republic of Caulonia that lasted for three days in March 1945; or in Melissa where several peasants who occupied land were killed by the landowners, sparking protests throughout the countryside (Forlenza 2021). In Petrizzi, the war was followed by a gap in political power when the National Fascist Party leader was removed. An earthquake in 1947 and severe floods in the winter of 1950/51 (on one occasion nearly 2 m of rain fell in around 100 hours) brought uncertainty upon the town's future.[64] Around 48 towns in Calabria were affected by flooding and landslides caused by the 1950/51 storms, with the province of Reggio Calabria the worst hit.[65] Petrizzi's standing administrative leader (not technically a

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64 Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, 22 June 1948. See also, Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, 12 November 1951.

65 Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, 31 January 1950.

mayor) at the time regularly sent petitions to regional and national offices beckoning prompt intervention in the town's deteriorating situation. The roads had suffered greatly: the main route in and out of the town, which runs down the mountain towards the sea, remained blocked for months and was only cleared through the efforts of local volunteers, a story that is replicated throughout Calabria in this post-war moment and even fills the pages of a more recent novel-cum-film by Pietro Criaco, *Via dall'Aspromonte* (2019), which reflects on remoteness and isolation. In municipal assemblies and around Petrizzi, discussions were held about the possibility of relocating most of the population to the nearby *frazione* Farnia, a smaller town that had emerged further 'inland' and was attached to agricultural lands farmed by many of Petrizzi's inhabitants. While the full relocation never took place, some *case popolari* (public housing) units were built and the conversations have been registered in local memory (Pipyrou 2016). Repairs from the earthquake and flooding required extensive state subventions and, as they concurrently marked a horizon of greater distance from the state in its delayed intervention, they fuelled emigration to Northern Italy and Europe, which lasted through Italy's so-called economic boom.

Discussing the wider implications of this moment, Vito Teti notes that while the earthquakes and floods that occurred in the post-war years were unforeseen 'natural' events, they accelerated ongoing historical processes: 'the seed of refuge and abandon pre-existed the floods and would constitute no more than a pretext for fulfilling or giving legitimacy to a process of mobility already underway' ([2004] 2014, 460). In letters attesting to the damage caused by the earthquake and floods, many inhabitants drew attention to their 'small' plots of land, but concurrently emphasised the importance of that land as a means of subsistence. They also noted that damaged land had acquired historical value and significance, as in many cases it had been attained through the remittances of past migrations. Funding for the reconstruction of both urban and agricultural lands was delayed for nearly a decade, despite continued requests for the intervention of the Genio Civ-

ile (State engineering corps). It was in 1959 that a law (the Legge dell'alluvione of 24 July 1959) was passed to provide assistance to families who had suffered material damages in floods caused by storms on the Adriatic. This law would enable the release of funds in Calabria, long after departures became concrete realities in Petrizzi's landscape. The law had its origins in another region, Puglia. The fact that the Legge dell'alluvione was meant to bring change elsewhere in Italy, and only reached Petrizzi by travelling—metaphorically—from Puglia, through channels of the state to Rome, and then back south to Calabria, adds further dimension to this history.

In 1973 the town was struck again by devastating floods. It is this moment to which many people link Petrizzi's so-called abandonment. It is worthwhile here returning to Teti's articulation of the conjunction and overlap of old and new towns, noting that every abandonment is the beginning of one or more new *paesi*. Here, another town, another history, folds into the landscape of Petrizzi. After the floods, houses in Petrizzi's 'old town'—where I walked with Antonio—were determined by the local administration to be at risk of collapse. Around 200 families were evacuated and relocated (temporarily housed in the public school and on other communal properties such as a clinic built in the 1930s that had remained vacant).[66] At this point, the mayor who offered me 'the archive' at the beginning of this chapter enters the story as a young engineering consultant for the municipality. He was among the few who decided that a vast portion of the town was 'uninhabitable' and he was also the engineer behind plans to develop large (four-storey) apartment complexes and a new road just outside the old town. In the mid-1970s, through his involvement with the municipal authorities, he designated another part of the town 'off

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66 Archivio comunale, Petrizzi. As described in this chapter, this municipal archive was consulted in July 2018, before it was moved by the municipal administration without proper authority. It was previously uncatalogued and, after the move, many of the documents are no longer available.

limits' for development using the precedent of the damage from the 1973 floods; meanwhile, he blocked attempts by others to resettle further up the mountain.

Around the same time, in 1975, the Pro-Loco was constituted in collaboration with the administration of the time and with national and regional tourism agencies. The town's value changed radically in these years vis-à-vis the legislative procedures of the Italian state, local networks of power, and 'natural' events, as did its relative location: it was transformed from a site of agricultural production, the livelihood of many inhabitants, to a destination for migrants returning in summer from Domodossola, Milan, or further afield in Switzerland, Canada, the United States, or Argentina. The new homes, and the town's history, were marketed to those who had left.

In 2018 I catalogued and photographed documents in the archive of the former municipal building (Figure 4), the building which was earmarked by the local council to be converted into a hotel as part of the 'albergo diffuso' project. The building was without electricity. Among the folders that were strewn about were files from the mid-to-late 19th century that included municipal meetings, accounts, and balances; extensive records from the 20th century; and, thrown on the floor, public works files from the 1950s to the 1990s. Some were placed on the shelves and left untouched; others hand been taken and utilised or reorganised (for example, to make a case for the extension of one road in the 1960s, a series of documents dating back to 1811 had been pulled and rearranged into another file). These were the documents that, as described above, the mayor suggested I take with me when I left, unburdening the administration from this clutter. These are also many of the documents that helped to construct the above narrative. While reading and note-taking in a small room above the archive, three individuals visited from the organisation (based in Lamezia Terme and connected with Ciccio) that was to oversee the larger project of transforming the town hall into an open hotel. They looked curiously at the documents as they assessed the space and its possibilities for renovation.

Figure 4: The state in which the Petrizzi archives were left in the emptied municipal building. (Photo: Joseph J. Viscomi)

When I returned to the archives in 2019, many of the documents which implicated the mayor in the assessment of development possibilities after 1973 had disappeared. The documents from the old building had been relocated to the current municipal building, a process that was in violation of multiple laws. Assessing the new placement of the archive, I learned that most of the public works documents had disappeared and others had been haphazardly placed in the building's attic. The chaotic organisation of the old municipality archive—where the documents were stacked and distributed according to time and which reflected one historical temporality of the town—had been disrupted, disturbed,

and reordered. The administration flouted laws which require the authority of the Soprintendenza Archivistica to relocate or transfer archives from one building to another.

After 2019, members of the administration have repeatedly asked me to find documents that would legitimise a historical claim to coastal land.[67] The extension of the town's territory towards the sea has been matched with an attempt to repossess communal lands provided to peasants in the early 19th century. These lands could—as has happened elsewhere in the region—be converted into wind farms (with large companies and corrupt money behind them), which would require the designation of massive plots of land as uncultivable (which some in fact are becoming, in part due to the rising population of destructive wild boars). At the same time that members of the administration seek access to documents (which may not exist) that would position Petrizzi's future in relation to its history, they remove and disappear documents from the past that help to understand the confluence of material processes shaping the town's presence. The leader of the local opposition movement, Petrizzi rinasce (Petrizzi reborn), and one of the founders of a cooperative ('A Menzalora) working to make the town 'liveable' for its inhabitants, defined the preceding administration and its leadership as capable of dealing with only 'concrete and cash'. Multiple layers of historical time, invested and driven by different forms of power, locate Petrizzi within these changing hierarchies, all of which fold out from the liveliness of material evidences and overlap with other forms of locating the small, emptying town. The presence in history (*presenza nella storia*) to which De Martino alluded (often interpreted by religious and ritual practice) challenges ideas about belonging to or being in *certain* locations that are constituted by and accessed through their material histories. Keeping with this chapter's argument that history is a locating regime, the multiple, layered histories of documents, land, and depopulation modify Petrizzi's relative location.

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67 The administration was voted out in 2022.

Emplacement and mobility

Thus far, we have explored the potential of a crosslocations approach by focusing on the dynamics of emplacement in three small places (a beach in Beirut, the Meteora, and Petrizzi) and one large place (Egypt). The first four chapters explored the logic of locating regimes in terms of disputes, articulations, and changes as they affected the relative locations in and of these places.

The next three chapters shift their focus more towards following things that move across space, crossing both political and other kinds of borders (smuggled goods, carpets, and livestock). They explore movement across and through locating regimes, and how that might affect the value and significance of the things that are on the move, and the relative locations of the places crossed. Here, the focus is more on the significance and value of where mobile things come from and where they are going, and the engagement between different locating regimes and things as they move across space. This allows us to explore how locating regimes and relative locations affect not only places, but also the things that move across these crosslocated spaces.

Together with the previous chapters, the next three chapters cumulatively provide a profoundly different way to understand 'the field': as a dynamic set of relations, connections and disconnections, overlapping logics and forces, both concrete and imagined, that affect both the places in which people live, and the meaning and experience of moving through and across them.

Melilla: a crosslocated border

Laia Soto Bermant

A few months before Joseph J. Viscomi's accidental encounter with the mayor of Petrizzi across the town's piazza, I found myself in another piazza over 1000 miles away, standing in the middle of a crowd and holding up my phone to record a speech delivered by the governor of the city. In this case, the city was Melilla, a North African enclave under Spanish sovereignty since the late 15th century. Esther, my companion, was right behind me, dressed in her Sunday best, a proud smile on her face. The sun was setting, and the old *plaza de armas* was filled with Melillan families who had come to celebrate the Day of Melilla. It was 17 September 2017, exactly 520 years after Don Pedro de Estopiñán and his troops landed on the shores of the North African headland where stood the old (and by then probably abandoned) citadel of Melilla and claimed it for the Spanish Ducate of Medina Sidonia.[68] Every year since the holiday was invented in 1991, Melilla's establishment gathers on this day to commemorate the Spanish occupation of the citadel.

The setting where the celebration takes place is symbolic: the main square of the old medieval citadel, a 15th-century fortress

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68 There is some disagreement among historians about the exact date when it took place and what exactly happened, so neither the date nor the facts are entirely clear. See: https://elfarodemelilla.es/2011/09/16/en-busca-del-dia-de-melilla/ (accessed 29 November 2023).

built by the Spanish on the ruins of an old Islamic *taifa*[69]. The cita-
del was entirely renovated in the early 2000s as part of a govern-
ment initiative to encourage 'cultural' tourism, and the fake 'old'
stone walls give it a distinctly staged feel. The citadel is located
on a hill overlooking the sea and is surrounded by the walls of an
ancient medieval fortress. Below it, spreading south, lies the 'new'
city, built in the early 20th century after the Spanish defeated the
Moroccan sultan in the War of Africa (1859) and acquired new
territories around Melilla.

On the stage, surrounded by an entourage of military officers
and prominent personalities, the President of the City[70] was deliv-
ering his traditional speech:

> It's been 520 years, the same time since the construction of the
> Spanish nation and the discovery of America. How extraordi-
> nary the merit of so many generations who, with such strong
> will, efforts, and sacrifice, have seen our flag waving over these
> very same stones. Oh, their heroism, the hardships they endured,
> and how much faith and decision they showed to always remain
> united with Spain. And this despite the incomprehension of some
> of their own! Melilla is a millenary city, based not on race, nor
> religion, but on its capacity to assimilate different cultures …
> Today is the day of all *Melillenses*. There can be no exclusions
> or self-exclusions. It is difficult or impossible to understand that
> someone could not celebrate this day as the most important of
> our city. There can be no legitimate reasons for this … Because we
> cannot be Spain for some things, and not for others.

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69 The taifas (from the Arabic term طائفة meaning band or faction) were
    independent kingdoms of Al-Andalus (the name given to the parts of
    the Iberian Peninsula that were under Muslim rule between 711 and
    1492 AD) that emerged after the decline of the Umayyad Caliphate of
    Córdoba in the 11th century.

70 Since 1995, Melilla is considered an Autonomous City, equivalent to
    mainland Spain's Autonomous Communities (a first-level political and
    administrative division established in the Constitution of 1978). Auton-
    omous Communities are governed by presidents, who are elected every
    four years.

The crowd cheered in response: 'Well said!', 'Yes, that's right!'

Imbroda, who at the time had been the president of Melilla for over 20 years (a reign that ended in the elections of 2019), continued reading his speech, which I noticed had started to sound less like a commemorative speech and more like a state of the nation address:

> I think Melilla is part of—and should resemble more each day— peninsular Spain. And it must distance itself from the image that we give at the crossing points, which resemble another country [Morocco]. We have to reorganise the transit of commodities and passengers … Every day we invest more resources, but every day the problem gets bigger. We need a European border, to all effects.

Suddenly, the lights on the stage went out, and the sound vanished. It was not the first time this had happened. Every summer, the city suffers from general blackouts, but that summer had been particularly bad. Being in North Africa, Melilla is cut off from the Spanish national grid, and depends on a small electricity plant which struggles to meet the needs of a rising population. For the same reason, there is no natural gas installation in Melilla, and the entire population still relies on bottled butane gas for cooking and heating. The water supply, which is also subject to regular cuts, comes partly from a natural source in Morocco that is still under Spanish jurisdiction, and partly from a water desalination plant financed with European Union (EU) funding. With the exception of one or two public fountains, the water from the tap is not drinkable, so Melillans depend on shipments of bottled water from Spain.

For a few minutes, we were left in the dark under the moonlight. I took this opportunity to put down my phone and look around. It was getting late, but the plaza was still crowded. A girl and a boy of no more than five and three years of age were sitting on the floor. The girl, her hair perfectly arranged into two side braids, was holding her younger brother as they both played with the small flags we were all gifted at the beginning of the ceremony: a red and yellow Spanish flag and a blue EU flag.

Overhead, I could hear the military helicopter patrolling the skies of the city, controlling the perimeter of the security fence standing 6 m tall that surrounds the city of Melilla and separates it from Moroccan territory. I thought of the sub-Saharan African migrants camped on the Gourougou mountain, waiting for a chance to jump over the fence into European territory.

The lights came back on, and Imbroda resumed his speech. He was no longer talking about Melilla:

> I want to express my support and that of my government (and I think of all Melilla) to the national government and our president Rajoy in the noble task of defending our nation from the act of sedition from those felons who want to 'break' Spain against all Spaniards, including the majority of Catalan people who also feel Spanish.

'Bravo!', 'Long live Spain!', 'Long live Spain!' came the final chorus.

Imbroda took a few more minutes to thank the military police and the army for their valuable work, and, following a bugle call to arms from the watch towers, the replicas of the 19th-century canons that look out from the citadel's defensive walls were fired. This was followed by a spectacular firework show synched to the epic song *Cantos de España* by Spanish composer Isaac Albeniz, which marked the end of the ceremony. Like the rest of the event, with the nationalist iconography and the constant references to the military, the choice of this song was intended to establish a spatial continuity between Melilla and Spain (and not just any Spain, but *northern* Spain, hence the explicit reference to the Catalan 'problem', which was felt with surprising intensity in Melilla) and a temporal continuity between the medieval citadel and the Melilla of today.

A border out of place

Melilla is an unusual place, perhaps the most unusual in this collection of Mediterranean stories. Located on the north-eastern coast of Morocco, some 60 km west of the border with Algeria,

it is a city of over 80,000 inhabitants, hosting a mixed population of Christians and Muslims, with a small minority of Jews and Hindus. A remnant of Spain's early colonial ambitions in North Africa, Melilla was seized by the Spanish in 1497 as part of a military effort to secure a number of garrisons along the North African coast following the end of the Reconquista (1492). For the first three centuries after the Spanish arrived, Melilla was little more than a small military prison manned by a handful of Spanish soldiers and engaged in intermittent warfare with neighbouring Berber tribes. But things changed following the War of Africa, when Spain acquired new territories around the citadel and Melilla grew more than tenfold in size (from 1 km² to 12 km²), allowing the civilian population to grow. At a time when European colonial powers were 'scrambling' for Africa, Melilla was declared a free port, quickly becoming an important trading hub in the region. Over a century later, when Spain joined the European Economic Community (1986) and later the EU (1992), Melilla became one of the only two EU land borders in Africa (the other was the twin enclave of Ceuta, located across the Strait of Gibraltar). Within a few years, a security fence was built around both territories to mark the difference between the EU territory and the Moroccan land outside of it and to prevent unwanted migration flows (Figure 5). Yet both territories remained entirely outside the EU Customs Union and partly outside the Schengen Area.[71]

A European enclave on African soil, Melilla is the archetype of a crosslocated space. It is crosslocated in geopolitical terms, for it is part of Spain, yet it is physically separated from Spain by the Mediterranean Sea and is surrounded by a different state. As the opening vignette suggests, this distance matters in very material ways. There may well be a Spanish flag hoisted over the citadel, but

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71 Technically, the two cities were incorporated into the Protocol of Accession of Spain to the Schengen Agreement in 1991 as exceptions where visa requirements could be waived on condition of imposing strict controls at the port and airport of the city to avoid migrants reaching the European continent. So, the city itself operates as if it were outside Schengen, and the Schengen Area begins at the port and airport.

Figure 5: Border surveillance system in Melilla. (Philippe Rekace-wicz, 2017)

the frequent electricity blackouts, such as the one that interrupted the president's speech, and general difficulties with the regular supply of basic infrastructure (from drinking water to butane gas) are a constant reminder that Melilla is cut off from national grid-lines and very much *not* where it says it is. It is also crosslocated

in the sense that it stands at the intersection between two political and economic regimes—inside the EU but outside the European Free Trade Association and Schengen—and it is therefore, as this chapter will show, neither entirely here nor entirely there, or partly here *and* partly there.

But Melilla is also, as it were, crosslocated in time, for it is a remnant of an earlier territorial logic (the logic of empire and colonialism), which struggles to make sense of itself in today's terms, not only socially, politically, and economically, but also conceptually. Former colonial structures are still present in Melilla, but they coexist with a new and fundamentally different territorial, spatial, and political logic. The temporal loops between Melilla's past and its present established in the president's speech during the ceremony are, therefore, not just rhetorical figures of Spanish nationalism (although they are that as well), but also a testament to a particular way of locating Melilla in both space and time. The intersecting layers of borders and 'borderings' (Sassen 2009) that cut across Melilla are a product of this mismatch between past and present territorial arrangements, as well as an exemplification of the complex Venn diagram of overlapping borders that draws the different contours of Europe (Green 2013a). Location in a place like this is necessarily a matter of political contestation.

The previous chapters have focused on how locating regimes are mobilised in order to draw spatial boundaries and attribute value to particular places. Chapter 1 took us to Beirut and looked at how the circulation and mobilisation of certain spatial concepts (such as 'public space') can affect the relative location of particular places. Chapter 2 shifted the focus to central Greece and examined how one particular locational logic (specifically, Greek Orthodoxy) can co-opt a diversity of locating regimes in operation, effectively removing them from sight; Chapter 3 placed us in Egypt to consider how the nation-state can operate as a locating regime scaffolded by other logics; and Chapter 4 took us from Egypt to Italy in order to show how history itself could be considered a locating regime insofar as it separates 'the experience of time … and the certain idea of how one is located within time'.

These chapters explored how the crosslocations framework can help to think through classical anthropological questions such as time, religion, and nationalism in a different light.

This second half of the book turns attention towards movement (of people, commodities, and animals) between places and how these trajectories overlap with or cut across existing locating regimes. The question of how places are located in history remains central in the chapters that follow, but as this ethnographic journey across the Mediterranean continues, the focus shifts towards places located near the classificatory and/or physical edges of the Mediterranean, at border areas or crossroads that stand at the interstice between different political, economic, social, and religious domains and that are traversed and articulated by diverse kinds of flows.

The overarching question running through this chapter concerns what happens and what problems arise when, over time, locating regimes change and come into conflict with previous territorial and socio-spatial arrangements. The focus is on two aspects of this question. First, on how the border of Melilla itself was transformed with Spain's incorporation into the Schengen Area and how the new bordering regime that resulted from this transformation is made up of different layers of selective permeability that respond to the need to reconcile the tension between social, political, and economic interests at different scales. An important development in this regard is cross-border trade and how commodities are moved between one and the other side of the border. This is explored in the first half of the chapter and illustrated with a series of conceptual maps hand-drawn by Philippe Rekacewicz, the experimental cartographer of the project, who visited my fieldsite in 2017.[72]

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72 Philippe Rekacewicz is a geographer, cartographer, and information designer specialising in geopolitics and international relations. His work explores questions relating to migration, refugees, forced displacement of populations, and borders. The full collection of his maps for this project will be published in a forthcoming volume.

The second important aspect concerns how Spain's incorporation into the EU affected local identity politics. More specifically, it explores how the creation of a new immigration law transformed relations between Christians and Muslims, leading to the creation of a new social category, Spanish Muslims, which challenged the long-standing conceptual divide between the two communities. This is discussed in the second half of the chapter, which deals with the relative location of people and how it changed when Melilla became a European (i.e. EU) enclave. These two examples show that places are not fixed entities. Rather, they are the crystallisation of relations and processes of exchange that assume relative permanence, for a time, in the social and material world (Harvey 1996). Ethnography offers a still picture of a moment in time, but it is only by unravelling the different ways in which particular locations are connected to and disconnected from other locations over time, and how they acquire a certain kind of value through these relations, that we can begin to understand the complexity of place-making and identity-making processes.

Rethinking border regions through crosslocations

A triple security fence standing 6 m tall marks the difference between the EU territory and the Moroccan land outside of it. This constitutes Melilla as a buffer zone where sub-Saharan African migrants can be detained almost indefinitely. But there are also holes in the fences: crossing points through which tons of goods flow from Melilla on a daily basis, wrapped up in big bundles carried on the backs of thousands of people. Trucks are not allowed through; it is only people, carrying these huge bundles on their backs, and cars, loaded until their bellies almost touch the ground, that are let through. The borders here are therefore multiple, not only in physical terms but also legally, symbolically, and even religiously, making Melilla into multiple locations all at once. The aim here is to analyse the overlapping, intersecting, and

criss-crossing structures or regimes that locate this place in several, sometimes contradictory ways.

Our take on that issue constitutes an important departure from the literature on border studies. In recent border studies scholarship, there are two opposing but also complementary tendencies or lines of thought: one sees the border primarily as a form of action and a social practice, emphasising the flexible and porous nature of borders and bringing attention to the processes of negotiation and contestation taking place in border regions (see Álvarez 1995). The literature on border identities could be seen as part of this trend (Wilson and Donnan 1998), as could the literature on smuggling and 'fiscal disobedience' (Roitman 2005). The other approach focuses on the border as a *dispositif* established by the state and places its emphasis on the mechanisms, both ideological and practical, put in place to enforce and maintain borders (Bigo 2002; De Genova 2002). These are two sides of the same coin: borders are not only 'barriers', but also 'conduits' and 'opportunities' (Nugent and Asiwaju 1996).

The argument here goes beyond this duality, which takes the border itself for granted. In line with a wider literature exposing the shifting and spatially ambiguous nature of contemporary borders (Coutin 2010; Del Sarto 2010; Green 2013a, 2018; Weber 2006), this chapter proposes instead to analyse the border as one among many forms of bordering that are present in border regions and focus on the sets of connections and disconnections that locating regimes (of which political borders are but one expression) bring about. In essence, borders are not so different from other kinds of spatial ordering (what we here call 'locating regimes'); they not only divide and separate but they also *produce* the spaces they demarcate, transforming old sets of relations and generating new ones between the units they bring into existence. This way of thinking about borders also shifts the focus away from the question of border identities as something peculiar to border regions and introduces a more nuanced understanding of identity as a dynamic and historically changing process of locating people in relation to places.

One could think of 'place' as a knot made up of different threads or rings that come together at a certain time and in a particular way. The more the threads (or rings) seem to coincide (when political borders, geographical borders, religious borders, and so on *appear* to be the same), the less visible they are, and the more sense they seem to make, the more natural they become (this is, indeed, the fantasy of nationalism).[73] And, conversely, it is only when there is a discrepancy between them—that is, when the units they bring into existence are neither identical nor entirely separate—that one begins to notice them as anomalies or glitches. This is the power of the logic of the nation-state, which still holds a tight grip over our social imagination. For example, consider the particular situation facing Melillan Muslims, who are symbolically located between two forms of bordering (the political, which separates Spain from Morocco, and the religious/social, which separates Muslims and Christians) and therefore also partially excluded from both their own and the Christian group, belonging neither fully to one nor to the other. Another example is smuggling, which is only possible because of the internal contradiction between the political border that separates Melilla from Morocco and a bilateral agreement between Melilla and the Moroccan town of Nador that allows residents of both to circulate freely across the border (more on this later).

The sections that follow explore how Melilla's relative location changed following Spain's entry into the EU and the Schengen Area. The focus is on how this change in relative location reconfigured cross-border relations and how this reconfiguration in turn appeared to generate 'glitches' of the kind described above at the social, political, and economic levels. This approach constitutes a departure from the literature on border identities, which sees border regions as hybrid, multiple, and structurally liminal (that

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73 This is a recurring theme in our research. See, for example, Carl Rommel's argument on the 'mirage of national singularity' (Chapter 3) and how it conceals the multiple and changing nature of the nation-state in Egypt.

is, liminal by virtue of their geopolitical position).[74] In fact, one could argue that it is precisely in border regions where identities appear more fixed, permanent, and non-negotiable. But this view also entails a departure from the idea that borders are paradigmatic spaces of subversion and sites of 'resistance' to state power (Soto Bermant 2015a). In fact, more often than not, illegal cross-border activities occur not despite or against state control but as a consequence of economic and governmental interests. This is certainly the case in Melilla, where the whole city benefits from an underground economy that yields considerable revenues (in the form of import taxes) for the local government. Rather than trying to understand the border as a uniform entity, this analysis shows how different bordering combinations come together to define Melilla as a location, both to the outside world and to the people who live there.

These specific bordering combinations constitute what some anthropologists have called 'assemblages' (Ong and Collier 2005), in the sense that they articulate specific sets of relations and situations. However, we have chosen to dispense with this terminology for a number of reasons (see the introduction to this volume). Among them is the implicit idea in actor–network theory that the social field is composed of flat networks of abstract actors, with each individual unit holding the same value as the next and no hierarchies established between them (see Piliavsky 2021). On the contrary, the trajectories we are concerned with here have volume (Elden 2021), both in the sense that spatial practices are always imbricated in vertical structures of power and in the sense that these trajectories cut across layers of both space and time. They connect *and* disconnect at multiple levels; they bring together and separate; they run across, behind, above, and below, jumping across temporal and spatial scales. Perhaps 'entanglements' is a better word than 'assemblages', to avoid the implication of any

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74 See Álvarez (1995), Anzaldúa (1987), Baud and Van Schendel (1997), Gupta and Ferguson (1992), Hannerz (2000), Rosaldo (1989), Rösler and Wendl (1999), or Wilson and Donnan (1998).

flatness. How then should the temporal and spatial specificity of this entangled coexistence be understood? Framing the present moment in terms of a specific trajectory in history (one that is clearly separated from other such moments) is certainly one way to do this (see Chapter 4), but it is equally important to consider the ways in which temporal trajectories intersect spatially, creating multiple locations in the same place.

Locating the border: a cartography of selective permeability

The first time I saw the border of Melilla was in July of 2008. I had just landed on a plane coming from Málaga and had been instructed by my future host family in Morocco to take a taxi to 'the border' (*la frontera*). I confidently did as instructed. I retrieved my suitcase from the baggage belt, found the taxi stop outside, got into one of the taxis, and asked the driver to be taken to 'the border'. Imagine my surprise when he turned around and asked, 'Which border?' I made a frantic call to my Moroccan hosts, who were initially perplexed by my enquiry, and it became clear that I needed to specify which of the three active border checkpoints I wanted to be taken to. To my hosts, who lived on the Moroccan side, it was obvious that 'the border' (*la frontera*) stood for the crossing point of Beni Enzar, which is the largest and most crowded of the three. To the cab driver, accustomed to locating things differently, 'the border' could mean any of the three. I did not realise it then, but the question was pertinent in more ways than it seemed.

It took no more than 10 minutes to drive from the airport to the crossing point. In that time, I learned that it would be impossible to cross the border in a taxi ('I won't do it for less than a hundred euros!') because the lines of cars were so long that a 20-minute journey would end up taking three or four hours. This was because of 'contraband', my driver informed me, and 'it wasn't always like that'. Before we reached the crossing point, I could already see the long lines of cars heavily loaded with smuggling

goods. Crowds of people carrying plastic bags and big bundles made of cloth gathered around what looked like the entrance to a toll area but was in fact the car park of the crossing point.

The crossing point was around 20 m wide and measured 100 m from one end (in Spain) to the other (in Morocco), with three lanes for cars going in either direction and flanked by a series of small booths for passport and customs control. Transit in both directions was ceaseless, with people coming in and out both on foot and by car. There were Spanish police and customs officers controlling the Spanish side of the border, but the passage itself was mostly unmanned, with the exception of the occasional Moroccan police officer cruising around with a look of boredom in his eyes. There were groups of women pushing through, carrying large, heavy plastic bags filled with goods purchased in Melilla. There were old, disabled men begging and very young children tapping on the car windows to get the drivers' attention and sell them a pack of tissues or chewing gum. There were also young men idling in the shade, with no clear purpose or destination; young men holding a pack of customs documents and a pen, offering their services to unprepared travellers waiting in line at the passport control booths. Women and men, young and old, military and civilian, hundreds of people move in and out of this in-between space. For many of them, the passage itself was a workplace; for others, it was a means to get to their job on the other side. In any case, this was very far from the impermeable border I had imagined. How did this come to be? And how did it coexist with the image of sub-Saharan migrants desperately climbing over a 6 m security fence?

It took me a while to put all the pieces together, partly because no one in Melilla could tell me exactly what the legal status of this border was. Was Melilla inside the Schengen Area, or was it not? I received a different answer every time I asked. Was the trade of commodities across the border legal or illegal? Again, the answers varied. Were the waters of the sea surrounding Melilla Spanish or Moroccan? Even the commander of the Civil Guard (the Spanish military police) I interviewed once did not seem to know for sure.

The more I tried to find out about the border, the more elusive it became. This was hardly surprising, though, considering the complex system of selective permeability that was put in place after Spain joined the EU so as to preserve the economic viability of Spain's North African territories, combined with the fact that this continues to be disputed territory between Spain and Morocco.

Far from an impenetrable fortress, Melilla is a layered border based on different zones and different types of migrants, with a clear distinction made between four categories: EU citizens from the continent (who can access Morocco but must have their passport stamped in order to enter the country), Melillan citizens (who are free to move between Melilla and Morocco by simply showing their ID), Moroccan citizens with a residency ID from Nador (who can also access Melilla freely, but *not* mainland Spain), and finally all other Moroccan and non-Moroccan citizens (e.g. from sub-Saharan African, Middle Eastern, and South Asian countries) who are subject to strict visa restrictions and cannot enter Melilla unless they have a special permit. This in turn generates four separate zones (Figure 6): EU/Schengen territory (marked in red); EU non-Schengen territory (marked in red and green); Moroccan special territory with access to Melilla (marked in blue and green); and non-EU territory, including the rest of Morocco and beyond (marked in blue).

The selective management of the border, designed to simultaneously fulfil EU expectations regarding securitisation and allow the daily cross-border flow of thousands of Moroccan frontier workers and smugglers, is the result of a combination of different security, economic, and political interests and needs originating at different scales (Ferrer-Gallardo 2008, 310). On the local scale, Melilla benefits from the proximity of a large pool of frontier workers willing to work at a very low cost—from domestics to home caregivers, construction workers, waiters, handymen, and even sex workers—but also, above all, traders and smugglers (more on this in the section below). This workforce is called into the city during the daytime to perform basic services, only to return to the other side of the border after the working day is fin-

Figure 6: A layered border system. (Philippe Rekacewicz, 2017)

ished. Much like in a typical gated community, a discourse of fear of the outside is used to legitimise policies and strategies of exclusion (Low 2003), concealing the fact that the living standards of the very few depend on the labour of many outsiders who provide all the essential services. Moroccan border towns, in turn, profit from privileged access to this source of employment, one of the very few in this long-neglected region of Morocco.

If we look at the larger picture, this vertical relationship is a legacy of former colonial structures that locate the southern Mediterranean (more often called North Africa) in a particular relation to Europe, creating links of interdependence between the two shores of the Mediterranean. But this is also an eminently modern phenomenon found in border regions across the world. Much like Christmas Island in Australia or Lampedusa in Italy, Melilla operates as an offshore borderland that serves to contain and control

unwanted migration flows from Africa and keep them away from the continent while due processing takes place.

As Del Sarto (2010) argued, the image of the EU as an entity with clearly defined territorial and identity boundaries is misleading. Instead, what we find is a 'variable border geometry' (150) that has expanded to the periphery, engulfing a number of countries in the southern Mediterranean through the outsourcing of border control. This process of expansion has transformed the dynamics of border control in the southern Mediterranean, generating a relationship of dependency between the EU and its peripheries organised around the generous financial packages allocated for border control.

Places like Melilla are trapped, as it were, within this complex cartography of overlapping and criss-crossing border regimes, and in the process they become objects of intervention for policies that are invariably designed and decided elsewhere, and that are often the result of a complex history of interlocking interests and shifting alliances operating at different scales. When this constellation of border regimes changes, as happened when Spain joined the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Schengen Area, the relative location of particular places (that is, how they are connected to and disconnected from other locations) shifts, as in the case of Melilla, which went from being a far-flung and nearly forgotten offshore territory to becoming one of the key hubs in migratory routes linking Africa to Europe. The immediate consequence was that the local economy became increasingly dependent on EU funds for border control, which were used to finance not only the adequate maintenance of the fence, security equipment, and personnel but also numerous development projects ranging from basic infrastructure (a water desalination plant, a refuse dumping ground, an industrial park, and an incinerator plant, to name a few) to transport communications, the restoration of public spaces, and even training programmes to encourage the growth of the private sector in the city. However, behind this political project aimed at making Melilla appear more 'European',

there was an equally significant local interest in preserving commercial relations with the other side of the border.

Locating commodities

Over 500,000 tonnes of commodities are shipped into Melilla every year and smuggled across the border into Morocco (---). Known among smugglers as *trabando* (probably from the Spanish *contrabando*) and among Melillans as *comercio atípico* (atypical commerce), this form of trade is a scaled-up version of older commercial networks developed in the 19th century,[75] and consists of legally importing goods into Melilla and hiring couriers to take them across the border clandestinely to be sold in Morocco (Figure 7). Goods imported through Melilla pay a local tax (IPSI) which is significantly lower than regular Spanish customs duties, and smuggling the goods across the border allows merchants to avoid having to pay Morocco's customs duties. This form of trade developed in the 1980s and 1990s and grew to the point of becoming one of the enclave's most significant sources of tax revenue, amounting to 40 per cent of the city's annual budget, informally employing an estimated 45,000 people, and generating over 400,000,000 euro per year in 2008 (Cembrero 2008).[76] Taxes levied on these imports are entirely kept and managed by Melilla's government (rather than by the Spanish central government, as is

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75 Melilla was declared a free port in 1863, four years after the Spanish won the War of Africa against the Moroccan Sultanate and obtained new territories around the original military citadel. Over the second half of the 19th century, the city was incorporated into a regional network of weekly rural markets linking the *presidio* with inland Morocco and Algeria. Caravans from French Algeria came to Melilla to buy English products shipped in from Gibraltar (sugar, tea, cotton, and candles), while Moroccan traders sold fresh produce and bought manufactured products to be exported to the Moroccan hinterland (Pennell 2002).

76 López-Guzmán and González-Fernández (2009) put the number even higher. According to them, atypical commerce generates annual revenues of 600,000,000 euro.

Figure 7: Volume of imports passing through Melilla. (Philippe Rekacewicz, 2018)

the case with regular custom duties), so there has always been a local interest in preserving this trade.

Planet (2002, 269) explains how the extraordinary commercial activity of the enclaves is organised through a binary scheme of legality and illegality that benefits from enabling tax structures and that facilitates the entanglement between different types of illicit activities, including not only commodity trade but also drug trade and money laundering. Legal economic activity, related to the redistribution of goods to locals and tourists, exists alongside illegal (or informal) economic activity, through which goods are redistributed outside the enclaves. The enclave's exceptional tax regime, which is associated with the deep economic asymmetries that exist between the two sides of the border, provides the grounds for intensely developed smuggling activity between Ceuta and Melilla and their hinterlands (Aziza 2009; Driessen 1999; McMurray 2001; Planet 2002). The border facilitates this by generating two distinct legal spaces where different currencies,

banking regulations, security apparatuses, and criminal codes apply. Someone who had been directly involved in money laundering schemes told me, for example, that a common practice among drug lords in Nador was to pay poor Moroccan peasants to open a non-resident bank account in Melilla and make them authorised users of this account. The peasant was then paid a small fee for setting up the account, and the drug lords would then carry out transactions that could never be traced back to them. Other methods included forging invoices by using information from real companies abroad to justify incoming revenues, setting up a cover business and inflating the costs, or arranging international transfers via a third party. All of these were possible precisely because of the vast volume of commercial activity taking place in Melilla on account of 'atypical commerce', which provided a relatively safe environment where import and export companies (both real and fictitious) could operate without hindrance.

The range of products smuggled these days is wide and includes tobacco, alcohol, food, toiletries, electronic commodities, car tyres, home utensils, clothes, blankets, shoes, and even old furniture. Anything can be sold across the border (Figure 8), from imported trainers to, as an informant once told me, the empty Heineken bottles that an old man used to collect for a Moroccan emigrant who had returned from Europe to build a house in Morocco and wished to use the shattered green glass to decorate the facade of his new home. Products to be smuggled across the border reached the port of Melilla once or twice a week in cargo ships filled with legal merchandise coming from Europe, Asia, and South America (Planet 1998). The sale of these goods in Morocco is not actively prosecuted, and many street markets in Moroccan cities have a section stocked with products from the Spanish enclave, usually known as *suqayyāt Melilia.*

During my first field trip to Melilla in 2008, it was still fairly common to see old Moroccan ladies gearing up with big, heavy bundles strapped across their backs to walk up the road leading to the border crossing point of Barrio Chino. At that time, one of the members of my Moroccan host family (the one who had

Figure 8: Border-crossing routes for people and goods. (Philippe Rekacewicz, 2018)

directed me towards the border upon my arrival) made a living importing ceramic tiles to Melilla and smuggling them out into Morocco to sell them to Moroccan retailers. With him and his employees (a small group of three or four younger relatives), I had a chance to see how the transit of goods was organised. Smuggling goods arriving at the port in containers were taken by truck and van to an industrial park and stored in large warehouses. The heavier goods (car tyres, construction materials, electronics, etc.) were then loaded into cars 'redesigned' for smuggling purposes —doors unhinged to hide goods in the sides, back seats lifted or simply taken out, spare wheels removed—while the rest were put together in large, heavy bundles and distributed among couriers.

This all occurred in plain sight, for taking goods out of Melilla was never a crime in the eyes of Spanish authorities. In fact, by 2017, in one of my more recent trips to Melilla, the Spanish police and Civil Guard had actively taken charge of organising the pas-

sage of smugglers across the border to avoid further chaos. Every morning, hundreds of couriers were neatly lined up in a cleared field next to the crossing point on the Spanish side and instructed to walk across the border in groups, one at a time, in a carefully choreographed sequence of movements that ensured the smooth passage of goods out of Melilla.

Paradoxically, the construction of the border fence around Melilla played a crucial role in the development of this form of trade. Stricter controls at the border meant that contacts, financial resources (for bribes), and residency permits became necessary to conduct any kind of trade across the border. Small traders gradually disappeared and were replaced by prosperous businessmen with the capital to bribe customs officers and hire a cheap workforce to carry the merchandise across.

However, towards the end of 2017, things began to change. The local government began to limit the hours during which the couriers were allowed to go through the border. ACSEMEL, the association of Melillan merchants who are involved in this kind of trade, organised several demonstrations against this decision, but their protests fell on deaf ears. The Melillan government was already determined to end 'atypical commerce' and find alternative sources of tax revenue for the city. By then, the Moroccan government was also determined to put an end to this trade (they had already started building infrastructure in Nador, including a vast industrial port, to redirect trade routes), and it was only a matter of time before they stopped turning a blind eye to the transit of commodities across this border. This is why no one seemed surprised when the Moroccan government decided to completely shut down its land borders with Melilla and Ceuta at the beginning of the Covid-19 crisis in March 2020. The border remained shut for over two years, with no passage allowed in either direction, until it was reopened in May 2022. Whether the reopening will bring back the cross-border informal economy of contraband remains to be seen.

In fact, the closure of the border put a sudden and drastic end to cross-border flows, providing an opportunity for a change in economic strategy. Both Spain and Morocco are eager to put an

end to smuggling and promote other sources of revenue. Morocco is developing several upscale tourist resorts in Nador, as well the large industrial complex noted above. Melilla is considering putting forward a formal request to enter the EU Customs Union as a special economic zone (in the same way as the Canary Islands), and the local government has devised a new regulatory strategy to attract European capital, offering a 50 per cent tax discount to online betting companies willing to relocate to the exclave. The long-term aim appears to be to attract not only betting companies based in mainland Spain but also those based in Malta and Gibraltar, which may be looking for a new home after Brexit. These new developments will once again change Melilla's relative location vis-à-vis the rest of the world, establishing new threads, connections, and disconnections across the Mediterranean and adding yet another layer to the Venn diagram of political, economic, and social borders and border dynamics that cut across this North African city.

Locating people

In 1946, at the height of Franco's dictatorship, Spanish historiographer Américo Castro, who was then living in exile in the US, wrote his magnum opus *España en su Historia*. In this long essay, which was banned in Spain during the dictatorship, Castro made a simple but revolutionary claim: contrary the predominant view among Spanish scholars that Spanish culture originated at the time of the ancient Iberians and was influenced by the successive arrival of Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians, Romans, and Visigoths, only to come under threat with the arrival of the Muslim invaders in 711 AD, Castro argued that Spain developed, precisely at this historical juncture, as a product of centuries of interaction following those Muslim invasions. The mark left by Al-Andalus on Spanish society, he argued, was of paramount importance, and the history of Spain was the history of an attempt to obliterate or ignore this mark. The publication of this book started one of the most productive disputes in Spanish historiography, between

a majority who defended Spain's Iberian and Visigoth origins and those who saw the Islamic and Jewish influence as decisive.

This struggle to locate Spain in relation to North Africa and, concomitantly, to Europe (not only as a political territory but also as an idea) has a long history stretching both back and forward in time. As Castro and many others after him have argued (Stallaert, Goytisolo, etc.), the ambivalent relationship with the Muslim world has been decisive in the construction of a common Spanish identity. It was in opposition to the Muslim (and, to a lesser extent, Jewish) invader that a notion of Spanishness tied to Christianity (and, more specifically, to Catholicism) developed. The imagery of a Muslim invasion, tied to a particular reading of the past, has been co-opted politically by right and centre-right parties on a national scale. But this goes far beyond political rhetoric, lending significance and value to particular locations and the relations between them. Thus, when Spain became implicated in the process of rebordering (as it were) the Mediterranean, the arrival of Moroccan immigrants to work in the Spanish fields was seen by many as a threat and as a 'return of the Moor'. It is little wonder that this process was felt with particular intensity in the North African enclaves, where the Muslim Other could neither be expelled nor fully integrated.

Up until 1985, Muslims born in Melilla were in a situation of complete social and economic exclusion. They were neither Spanish nor Moroccan citizens and therefore had no rights in either country. All they had was a 'statistical card' granted by the local government of Melilla, which served to identify them. When Spain passed the new immigration law in 1985, a few months ahead of its entry into the EEC, the vulnerability of their position became evident (see Soto Bermant 2015a). If followed strictly, the new immigration law would consider them illegal immigrants and thus liable to be deported. Tensions between Muslims and Christians were at a high point, and the impending threat of deportation was the straw that broke the camel's back. It took two years of organised Muslim strikes, protests, and demonstrations to force the hand of the Spanish government. Melillan Christians organ-

ised their own demonstration asking for the full implementation of the immigration law. Between 35,000 and 45,000 people took to the streets waving Spanish flags and chanting national slogans. But eventually, the Spanish government gave in, and Muslims in Ceuta and Melilla were granted Spanish citizenship (for a detailed account of this protracted process, see Gold 2000).

For the first time since 1497, Muslims were legally and politically recognised as citizens, and had access to free healthcare, public education, social welfare, and, most significantly, political representation. In a relatively short period of time, what was once a unified category defined against a unified Other (i.e. Christians against Muslims, and its equivalent, Spaniards against Moroccans) dissolved into thin air. The logic that had ordered relations between the two groups disappeared almost overnight, and Christians and Muslims had to reinvent both the nature of this religious/conceptual boundary and the rules of engagement between the two sides. Muslims began to divide themselves between those who had Spanish citizenship and those who did not, and a new social category—Spanish Muslims—was created. Its existence was the result of a mismatch between the long-standing conceptual divide separating Muslims from Christians, and a more recent political border between Spaniards/Europeans and Moroccans. Meanwhile, the Christian population saw its political hegemony challenged for the first time and began to fear the rising numbers of Muslims living in the enclave.

The 1985–1987 protests and the situation of Muslims prior to 1985 are still sensitive topics in Melilla, not to be discussed across religious boundaries. Those who lived through those tumultuous years only speak about it among their own: Muslims speak of the lack of Christian support during their protests as an unexpected act of betrayal that cannot be forgotten; Christians emphasise that many of the Muslims who received Spanish citizenship after the protests were not in fact Melillan, and took advantage of the law to settle in the city. There was never any political reflection or a public conversation about Melilla's past colonial entanglements, nor any kind of historical awareness that could be passed on

to future generations. The young on either side of the religious divide know little about the conflicts of the past and attempts by some members of the Muslim party (CPM, *Coalición por Melilla*) to generate this awareness have mostly fallen on deaf ears. This is the backdrop for the opening vignette of this chapter. In his opening statement, the president said: 'Today is the day of all Melillenses. There can be no exclusions or self-exclusions. It is difficult or impossible to understand that someone could not celebrate this day as the most important of our city. There can be no legitimate reasons for this'. This was in fact a direct reference to CPM, which has always refused to participate in the celebration of the Day of Melilla precisely because it commemorates a very particular (and indeed partial) reading of the past, which inevitably excludes the Muslim/Berber population.

Indeed, the entire ceremony was set up as a performance of Spain's rule over the North African territory. The setting, the speech, the military parades, the firing of the canons, the flags, the religious iconography, and even the music are all important references pointing to a particular vision of the history and identity of Melilla as a place and to its connections with the northern shore of the Mediterranean. The celebration in 2017 took place at a time of heightened tensions between Christians and Muslims due to the local government's decision to ban the entry of lamb from Morocco a few weeks before Eid El-Adha, a religious celebration during which Muslims are called to slaughter the animals. The effusive response of the audience ('Long live Spain!'), reminiscent of the slogans chanted during the counter-demonstrations of 1985, was a reminder to the Muslim population that they were seen as living on borrowed land.

One of the most striking features of this performance is how effective it is at pulling people in. The majority of Christians living in Melilla are first-, second-, or, at most, third-generation immigrants from mainland Spain. Very few families can trace their ancestry back to Melilla's early inhabitants, and most of those who can are of Moroccan-Sephardic descent. And yet newcomers are almost immediately integrated into local structures. The pro-

cess is both external and internal. The city integrates strangers by reproducing the dichotomy that pits Muslims against Christians. Newcomers respond by assuming the logic of those structures as their own. First comes the linguistic move: Spaniard becomes synonym for Christian in a genealogical dichotomy that absorbs even the fiercest of atheists. Then, the contours of the city begin to take shape. The external border of Melilla begins to fade away, while people learn to circumvent the internal borders of the city, avoiding certain neighbourhoods, eluding sensitive topics of conversation. Soon enough, the distance between Melilla and mainland Spain seems shorter than the 100 m that separates Melilla from the Moroccan hinterland, and, in a topological sleight of hand, the Mediterranean disappears from sight. Melilla becomes a continuation of Spain; the fence that separates it from Morocco, an insurmountable wall.

In her reformulation of hierarchy in India, Anastasia Piliavsky (2021) argues that, contrary to the dominant egalo-normative stance in the social sciences that sees hierarchy as a pyramid of oppression, hierarchy in fact operates as a highly valued and productive cultural resource. As a form of order, hierarchy *locates* people in the world and attributes them value based on a logic of mutual (though asymmetrical) responsibility. The worst that can happen to someone within this system is not to be at the bottom of the scale but to be outside of the classificatory map. Part of the problem is that, while the language of pluralism is delocalised (Dresch 1995), the place of groups within an integrated social and political system is not. The question, then, is how to incorporate these shifts in meaning, how to retain or reformulate local hierarchies under a new ideological form.

In the mid-1990s, as Europe was being configured as a political space, the vision of liberal democracy upon which the European project relied required that minorities should be integrated in socio-political rhetoric at least nominally as equals (Taylor 1994; cf. Asad 2003). The naturalisation of Muslim citizens in Ceuta and Melilla was part of Spain's new engagement with the European 'politics of recognition'. This shift in modes of governance and

representation came at a time when the rhetoric of multicultural-
ism was flourishing in European capitals as part of a new language
to think about, organise and act upon 'the city' (Florida 2002; Lan-
dry 2008). Discussions then centred on urban 'innovation', 'crea-
tivity', and 'design', and 'multiculturalism' emerged as a popular
choice in the deliberate construction of place-branding discourses
(see, e.g., Nofre i Mateo 2010). Melilla was gradually drawn into
this current, partly through the influence of other Andalusian cit-
ies like Granada (Soto Bermant 2015b).

First came the recognition (and therefore the constitution) of
Jewish, Muslim, and Hindu populations as equivalent 'religious
communities' (*comunidades religiosas*); then came the transition
to 'culture'. Differences in customs, holidays, dress code, gastron-
omy, and architecture became a sign of Melilla's multiculturality
(*multiculturalidad*), and the city was branded by the Department
of Tourism as the 'Land of Cultures' (*tierra de culturas*). Streets
and landmarks were renamed to match the new social reality: the
old Plaza de los Carros (Carriage Square) was remodelled and
renamed Plaza de las Cuatro Culturas (Four Cultures Square);
decorative stones engraved with the new logo of the city (the letter
'M', from Melilla, in Arabic, Hindi, Hebrew, and Latin script) were
placed in key locations throughout the city; and the tourist office
started running a weekly guided tour of Melilla's most prominent
religious buildings (the synagogue, a Hindu temple, a mosque,
and a church), named 'The Route of the Temples'.

But the new rhetoric of multiculturalism has not simply
replaced local hierarchies. Instead, the two different locating
regimes operate in the same location and at the same time: for-
mer colonial structures are still present in Melilla, but they coex-
ist with the new identity politics of recognition. For the people
living there, the problem became how to reformulate local hier-
archies under the new ideological form. Old tropes of invasion
merged with the new political rhetoric of border control, and the
relationship with mainland Spain was resignified as a relationship
with Europe. It was then that the problem of identity came to be
experienced with a particular force, and the performative work to

symbolically relocate Melilla on the northern shore of the Mediterranean acquired unprecedented significance.

Connections and disconnections

This chapter has picked up a thread explored in earlier chapters: how the relative location of particular places can change over time as new, or transformed, locating regimes come into play. But it has also introduced a different theme in shifting attention from emplacement to movement, and analysing how shifts in the relative location of places (that is, in how they are connected to and disconnected from other locations and how this lends them a particular value) can alter social, political, and economic relations on several different scales at once, leaving behind traces that have consequences for the way places are conceived, organised, and hierarchically structured, and generating new kinds of frictions and tensions.

Melilla is a good example of what happens when one kind of territorial locating regime is transformed into another one in a relatively short period of time, and of the adjustments and accommodations that then become necessary to manage any conflicts that result. Consider, for example, the 'border acrobatics' (Ferrer-Gallardo 2007) required to keep Melilla's border operational. Political and economic interests on a wider scale (EU–North Africa) come into conflict with local interests (Melilla–Nador) in preserving cross-border mobility, showing how processes of border demarcation and management are not the result of a unified and coherent strategy, but rather the result of a history of several interlocking logics and interests at a local, national, and supranational levels.

At the same time, Melilla's awkward position as a territory that is somehow out of place belies the nation-state logical alignment between nations, territories, and the nationals (Green 2012; Herzfeld 1986), and begs the question of how identity, place-making, and location are connected both analytically and ethnographically. Melilla is not where it says it is. This dissonance between

the identity of a place and its physical location means that the performative work of establishing meaningful continuities and discontinuities with other locations, both in practice and symbolically, becomes of critical importance. This is why places like Melilla can appear somehow fake or staged, as in the celebration I described in the opening vignette; hence, the symbolic paraphernalia displayed during the celebration of the Day of Melilla (the military parade, the flags, the music, etc.), and the president's insistence on connecting Melilla to pressing issues in mainland Spain and in Europe. And this is also why places like Melilla are interesting to consider when thinking about location, for their anomalous condition reveals the internal contradictions of coexisting locating regimes and, in particular, the troubles that arise when, over time, the logic of such regimes changes, but the territories remain the same.

Things moving across space

The final two chapters explore how crosslocations could rethink the movement of things from one place to another. Chapter 6 explores the carpet trade in Istanbul's Grand Bazaar and discusses how carpet traders' accounts of where the carpets came from are crucial for their value. Chapter 7 discusses livestock transport, and looks at the significance of standardisation in the process of tracking the animals' origins and health as a crucial part of their value within the logic of livestock trading.

In Chapter 6, the pitch used to sell carpets emphasises that they are handmade by people who are reproducing a craft passed down to them across many generations, and that each piece is unique. These accounts emphasise that the carpets in the bazaar have come from distinct and distant places and times, ones that are the opposite of the modern industrialised world. The material form that each carpet takes embodies that special and unique character, which is the result of the item coming from somewhere in particular.

In contrast, the livestock described in Chapter 7, which are produced through intensive farming, gain their value from being standardised, ideally so that any animal is exactly the same as the next one, at least in terms of it being disease-free. When such animals are certified by the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) as being fit to be transported, the aim is to ensure that it makes no difference where the animal came from in terms of its state of health: the animal will be the same.

In that sense, the account given by carpet traders about the origins of the carpets carries the opposite logic to the account given in the WOAH livestock certification process. The carpets must always come from somewhere in particular and that gives them their value; whereas the livestock must match international standards of health irrespective of where they came from.

Yet in another sense, the two cases could also be part of both logics: the carpets only need a story of origins and uniqueness because of the possibility that instead, they might come from a different, more industrial, production chain; and the livestock only need certification because they are inevitably from somewhere in particular, which becomes especially clear from the microbes that they carry along with them. The carpets might not be unique, and the animals are inevitably unique.

Rethinking the movement of things with a crosslocations lens allows the possibility of overlaps: modernity is not always what it appears to be.

The Grand Bazaar: a crosslocated market

Patricia Scalco

Today's town squares often serve as public areas providing gathering opportunities for leisure time or political contestation, and both chapters 4 and 5 began their ethnographic journeys through events and interactions taking place in such squares, or piazzas. These are urban focal points enabling the circulation of people and ideas, and around which social and economic life unfold. For centuries, public squares around the Mediterranean also had another crucial role: they acted as marketplaces, and a marketplace is the focus of this chapter, which concerns the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul, geographically located in the east of the region, about 3000 km away from Melilla in the far west.

The Istanbul Grand Bazaar, a marketplace in operation since the 15th century, was once a pivotal infrastructure of the Ottoman Empire and an important reference point in the organisation of urban life in the city. A bit like a public square, the bazaar, along with the mosque, constituted a centralising infrastructure around which social life could be organised in synergistic interaction with the rhythms, flows, and growth of the city (Gharipour 2012). The bazaar was also a central feature of the trading network of the Ottoman Empire.

In crosslocations terms, one could say that the Grand Bazaar came into existence through the logic of empire and trade, and its location at the heart of that locating logic (which relied on

historically specific political, economic, and manufacturing conditions) remained for centuries. Eventually, a range of changes, most particularly industrialisation and the break-up of empires to be replaced by nation-states, marginalised the bazaar, shifting its location away from the centre of things and into the peripheries. Although over the centuries it retained its characteristics as a place of trade, it increasingly became recognised mainly as a site of cultural heritage and tourism.

A focus on the synergistic relations, as well as the disconnections, between the bazaar and its many locations (Samourkasidou and Kalergis 2021) can contribute to an exploration of how the logic informing those locations and their relations have changed over time. In this way, paying particular attention to the Grand Bazaar's carpet trade, this chapter extends one of the threads in Chapter 5 focusing on the transition from one locating logic to another, and the traces and layers that this process leaves in the multiple and overlapping connections and disconnections of the Grand Bazaar. As one of the bazaar's foundational activities, the carpet trade has been intimately intertwined with the survival of the bazaar for centuries, which made it an ideal entry point from which to think about the bazaar's involvement in those locational transformations at various scales.

Dis/connections, overlaps, and synergies: locating Istanbul

Geographically distributed between the territories that are today described as Europe on the one side and Asia on the other, Istanbul is Türkiye's largest economic centre and its most densely populated city (Keyder 2005; Keyman and Koyuncu 2005). Cut through by the Bosphorus Strait, which connects the Aegean and Black seas via the Sea of Marmara, the city's distinctive topography has been a strategic geopolitical asset for centuries, contributing towards the area's key position as the capital of three empires—Roman, Byzantine, and Ottoman (Gür 2002; İnalcık 1969, 2000).

Unlike Melilla, Istanbul does not have any international land borders. However, its geopolitical relevance in connecting and disconnecting global trade and migratory flows lends the city a sense of being a 'border city' (Ribas-Mateos 2005). These 'borderly attributes', which also evoke the indexical character of borders (Green 2012), were particularly prominent when I arrived in Istanbul in the early days of January 2017. A mass shooting on New Year's Eve 2016 added to a tragic list of Islamic State-inflicted terrorist attacks which had occurred during the previous year and were set to continue in the months ahead. Between that, the Syrian refugee crisis, and the instabilities generated by an attempted coup in 2016, the turmoil in Türkiye had a significant impact on various segments of the domestic economy, with particular consequences for the tourism industry all over the country, and Istanbul in particular.

As one of the most popular touristic attractions of Istanbul, the Grand Bazaar was significantly impacted by the sharp reduction in tourist numbers. Usually crowded with thousands of visitors each day, by the time the research for this chapter began in 2017, its 64 streets and more than 3000 shops were virtually devoid of the usual hustle and bustle. Nevertheless, and in spite of the reduced number of tourists and the near-empty stores, the bazaar sellers were still there. They stood by the doors of their shops drinking tea and chatting with friends from neighbouring shops. Whenever possible, they also engaged in banter with the occasional potential customer. Alongside haggling, the bantering practice has been a distinguishing feature of the Grand Bazaar's daily social interaction and the subject of much criticism, especially from local residents: while Istanbulites appreciate the historical and touristic significance of the bazaar, it was common to hear locals bemoaning what they believed to be the low quality of the products, the exaggerated prices, and what they saw as less-than-honest interactions between sellers and tourists. These views were particularly strong in relation to the bazaar carpet trade, whose tradesmen (*halıcı*) were believed to exploit tourists through unfair prices, deceitful practices, fake goods, and customer harassment.

Contours of a pattern and 'the original Hereke'

The Grand Bazaar's streets were traditionally organised by differ-
ent trades, with those associated with the carpet trade historically
located around the Cevahir Bedesteni, the foundational structure
of the bazaar (İnalcık 1985), where carpets have been sold since
the 15th century. However, due to the high rents in this privileged
space, it is increasingly common to see carpets being sold within
more peripheral areas of the bazaar, as well as immediately out-
side its covered walls.[77]

It was not difficult to identify and locate the carpet tradesmen
within the bazaar and, after having established a good network
of collaborators, it became increasingly clear that the circulation
of Hereke carpets in the bazaar was a source of opportunity for
some, and a source of discomfort for others. I also started to iden-
tify contours of what seemed to become a discrete but observable
pattern. The shops located closer to the Cevahir Bedesteni tended
to look somewhat more formal and the salesmen in these shops
rarely engaged with tourists as they were passing by. These shops
did not advertise Hereke carpets. Contrasting with these shops,
carpet sellers working further away from the Cevahir Bedesteni
were more persistent in their pursuit of tourists outside their
shops, which often announced the availability of 'original Hereke'
carpets.

The remainder of this chapter will outline how shifts in the
relative location of the Grand Bazaar, of Istanbul as a city, and,
ultimately, of the whole region, contribute to the contradictions
and tensions that accompany the circulation of the Hereke car-

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77 In this case, I am referring to small stalls or shops right outside the walls
of the bazaar, but is important to note that carpets are not only sold
at the Istanbul Grand Bazaar and that there are specialised, high-end
carpet shops in its vicinity. Despite their claims to the contrary, it is not
definitively possible to ascertain that the products sold in these shops
are any different from the products sold in the bazaar. Yet the sales pitch,
attention to customer care, as well as the aesthetics of these spaces are
curated to clearly convey that they are distinct, more refined, and more
reliable than the bazaar shops and their respective sellers.

pets. Whereas in Melilla relations between places and people were subject to overlapping and overt regulation, in the context of the bazaar, contradictions and tensions could not be overtly regulated. The contradictions, suspicions, and doubts surrounding the quality of the products circulating in the bazaar—and more specifically, in this case, the authenticity of Hereke carpets—emerge as traces of the dis/mis/connections and locational shifts embedded in the material conditions and circulation of the Hereke carpets. This particular example demonstrates how historically momentous locational shifts in the region, which strongly affected the relative location(s) of the bazaar, can be traced through the trade in Hereke carpets.

Carpets without a place: the Hereke carpets as an 'itinerant entanglement' of (dis)connections

Named after the city where they were once produced, Hereke carpets are highly praised in the media and appreciated for their superior craftsmanship. Made of wool (sometimes mixed with cotton) or silk, they are woven with double knots (Gordes knots) numbering between 100 and 400 knots per square centimetre (Sevi 2010; Yiğit 2011). This contributes towards making these carpets particularly sturdy, but producing them is also extremely laborious, involving about 1,000,000 knots per square metre. An experienced weaver will take about a year to produce a Hereke even of that small size. While these and other specificities about these carpets are of particular interest to collectors, dealers, or enthusiasts of Hereke as a craft, the regular customer interested in these items in the bazaar will be more struck by their distinctive beauty. In the case of silk-made Hereke, the shimmer effect caused by the silk thread adds to the allure of these items to regular customers. For the same reason, Hereke carpets are also excellent props in sales pitches where the seller flamboyantly exhibits the Hereke's shimmering colours and sturdiness, made apparent through a dexterous move whereby the carpet is thrown in the air and lands perfectly on the floor.

I was introduced to the Hereke carpet during my initial efforts to make acquaintance with local carpet sellers at the bazaar. I came to know Serkan, who later became an important collaborator, as I walked around the area of the Cevahir Bedesteni. As any tourist might have done, I walked into one particular carpet shop after being invited by the seller, who stood at the door greeting potential customers. He greeted me in Arabic first, and upon seeing no response from me, he switched to French, then Spanish. I replied to his greetings in Turkish, which surprised him, prompting the beginning of a conversation between us during which he tested whether I could engage in discussion in Turkish beyond the initial greeting. In Turkish, I briefly explained I was not a tourist in search of a carpet, but rather an anthropologist trying to understand more about carpet-selling in the bazaar. Despite my being explicit that I was not interested in buying a carpet, he invited me into the shop and offered me tea, confirming my guess that I was still being treated as a potential customer. I looked around at some of the items inside the shop and reassured him that if he was busy, I could come another day, as I would not want to inconvenience him while he was dealing with customers. Understanding I would not buy a piece, he explained that business was very bad these days and that, if I had questions about carpets, he would be happy to answer. The tea arrived, and we sat down—him in a plain chair, me on a small but comfortable sofa clearly reserved for customers.

It was during this introductory conversation that I was told about the prestigious Hereke carpet for the first time. Reaching out to a pile of rugs, Serkan pulled from the very bottom of one of the piles a piece of medium size, which he threw in the air with a flamboyant gesture. The piece flipped and turned in the air, landing on the wooden floor. The gestures of the seller and the shimmering effect caused by the reflection of the ceiling lights on the finely woven silk threads of the carpet were impressive. He then explained that what I was seeing was a Hereke carpet, but not only that: an original Hereke carpet.

Another round of tea was expected at any moment. I observed the carpet lying on the floor, and it was, indeed, really beautiful. A

piece like that would retail for about 6000 US dollars, he said. The tea arrived, and as we removed it from the round tray and took the first sip, Serkan's assistant, a man in his early twenties, rolled up and folded the carpet on the floor, returning it to its pile. As the conversation with Serkan went on, he asked me whether I thought the item just returned to the pile was a real Hereke. Slightly confused, I replied that, now that he was asking, I was no longer sure about it but that I would have no reason to doubt that he had shown me a real Hereke. My criteria were simple, I explained: he sounded very credible in his explanations when showing me the carpet and the piece, at least to my untrained eye, seemed to be of superior craftsmanship. As there were no customers, he lit up a cigarette and through a smirk, proceeded to tell me that carpet-selling in the bazaar can involve a measure of deception. And, as had just happened to me, an untrained customer would not know the difference between original and counterfeit items, and it would also be difficult to estimate the actual value of the pieces.

At this early stage of my fieldwork, the Hereke carpets were simultaneously highly visible, especially through advertisements in shops indicating that they particularly carried these items; but they were also highly invisible—or rather, invisibilised—through the deliberate decision by certain shops to avoid offering Hereke carpets at all.

The contrast between shops which traded Hereke carpets alongside other types of tapestry and shops that did not was striking. As I learned over time, the decision to avoid selling them was informed by more than just business acumen or commercial pragmatism. Some of the elements troubling the circulation of the Hereke carpets in the bazaar were articulated by Safet Bey, one of my most experienced collaborators. Once a collector and a dealer of antique carpets, Safet gave up his passion—which he said he now considered to be an illness more than a passion—to dedicate himself solely to trade in the bazaar.

One day, Safet Bey and I were sitting in front of his shop observing people passing by. Safet Bey never approached potential customers, preferring to give them time and space to decide if

they would walk into the store. On this particular day, I told him I had started to notice that some shops invested in announcing they had Hereke carpets in store, but that I had never seen one of these apparently much sought-after carpets in his shop. He smiled at my question, slowly leaned onto the small tea-table in front of us, rested his tea upon it, and started to explain:

> Well, I can tell you this … No carpet seller, collector, or connoisseur, would actually even conceive of buying a Hereke. These carpets are part of another chain … They are recent carpets, from the end of the 19th century … They became famous because the sultan of the time wanted to encourage industrialisation. So, it was a carpet already produced to fit to the idea of industrialisation, and that completely contradicts the idea of weaving that a collector or connoisseur has.

Both Safet Bey and Serkan had extensive experience in the bazaar, having been trained as carpet sellers since they were teenagers. Yet their trajectories were markedly different: Serkan was 35 years old by the time we met. He had lived in Central Anatolia until the age of 16. Serkan abandoned formal schooling when he was in the fifth grade and focused only on working to support his family. He herded sheep and helped his mother with weaving and carpet-mending, both trades he learned from her. His move to Istanbul happened when he was 16 years old, motivated by concerns about a particular family conflict in which he did not want to be involved. His weaving and mending skills made it possible for him to find a job as an apprentice in the carpet-selling business of the bazaar. Safet Bey, on the other hand, was in his late forties when we met. He had lived in Istanbul all his life and had grown up in the bazaar area. He attended excellent schools as a youth and, by the age of 13, in his spare time, he became an apprentice in one of the carpet shops of the bazaar. Unlike Serkan, Safet Bey never approached tourists passing by his store. Potential customers were encouraged to be by themselves within his shop and to take in the colours and patterns of the truly impressive pieces hanging on the walls and piled up around the room. He would sit on a stool

placed against one of the columns in front of his shop, sipping tea and sometimes smoking a cigarette that he had rolled himself.

Safet Bey made subtle but significant efforts to distance his shop, himself, and his business from widespread stereotypes associated with bazaar tradesmen as cunning salesmen, offering low-quality goods at exploitative prices. For one thing, all items in Safet Bey's shop had price tags, unlike several other places in the bazaar. This was a subtle way of indicating to tourists that the prices were not established on a whim, fluctuating according to the individual customer's nationality or demeanour. This did not mean that price negotiation would not be possible, but rather that if it happened, it should be approached without expectations of a very significant reduction. The idea was that the items had been expertly evaluated in terms of their quality and were priced accordingly. Secondly, Safet Bey and his colleagues working in that shop were in agreement that they should not sell Hereke carpets, which, as he explained, were 'part of a different chain'.

The fact that Safet Bey's shop could afford not to trade in Hereke carpets—which are much sought after by tourists—indicates that his shop enjoyed a more solid and sustainable trade than the shop where Serkan worked. Unlike Safet Bey, Serkan found himself in a more vulnerable position, not having the possibility of avoiding trade in Hereke carpets. He also did not see them as a problem, but instead as an opportunity to increase his earnings. The social and economic inequalities and levels of vulnerability separating Serkan and Safet Bey became especially visible during the various moments when Serkan switched his shop from carpet retail to other goods (purses and scarves), and indeed, by the several times he went to work in other shops in different areas of the bazaar in the course of one year.

Through a set of carefully selected products and curated practices, Safet Bey and the two men who assisted him during the sales pitch made sure that their customers were steered away from anything that might detract or reduce the value of the bazaar in the customer's eyes, away from any material or immaterial traces

that suggested the location of the bazaar, the trade, and the goods being sold were somehow not what they seemed.

Drawing on this background, the remainder of the chapter focuses on the *relations between locations/places* (the connections and disconnections articulating regional separations and hierarchies, often approached as background, contextual, or secondary data) and then contemplates *relations between people* (everyday socialities, aspirations, interpersonal and collective struggles, mobilities, meaning-making strategies, and so on).

'Carpets of another chain': locating Hereke carpets

Hereke carpets can be approached, in crosslocations terms, as an 'itinerant entanglement' of connections and disconnections, moving across space as well as through history. They move across space when they travel from the places where they were made to the places where they are sold (in this specific case, the Grand Bazaar) and finally to their destination—homes, museums, official institutions—in many parts of the world. These carpets also travel through history in the sense that they acquire more market value as they age (i.e. as they gain a history): in that sense, the contemporary circulation of carpets that were woven decades or even centuries ago, in a market in which the age of the carpet is highly significant in determining its value, can be understood as circulation 'across time'.

Despite their good reputation among dealers and collectors who are not associated with the Grand Bazaar, Hereke carpets were the object of much, albeit quiet, controversy in the bazaar. They were simultaneously highly visible and yet not spoken about, but when they were the focus of a conversation, they led all the interlocutors into expressions of doubt and mistrust—about the materiality and authenticity of the piece, its market value, the story being told by the seller, the intentions and moralities of everyone involved in a sales pitch, including the customer's intentions and moralities, and so forth. As the perceptions of Serkan and Safet Bey about

these carpets showed, while some sellers carried these items in their shops—whether or not they were 'original' Hereke carpets—there were experienced sellers who went as far as refusing to recognise these items as belonging to Turkish or Ottoman weaving traditions at all. These different approaches are closely tied to the connections and disconnections articulated through the materiality and circulation of these carpets, not only across space but also as historical objects. In one sense, they can be understood as a by-product of a combination of disconnections caused by shifts in locational logics and which are the product of the very conditions that they were designed to try to fix.

Locating the Hereke carpets in time: the Industrial Revolution and the peripheralisation of the eastern Mediterranean

The tensions associated with Hereke carpets in the context of the contemporary Grand Bazaar can be traced back to the disconnections and locational shifts resulting from the rise of industrialisation in the 19th century in Western Europe. Between its foundation in 1456 and the 19th century, the Grand Bazaar operated as a core infrastructure of the Ottoman Empire, projecting Istanbul as a powerful trading hub connecting and disconnecting flows of people and goods circulating along the East–West axis of the Mediterranean and beyond (İnalcık 1969). However, by the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th, developments beyond the coast of the Mediterranean in Northern and Western Europe posed significant challenges to the weakening Ottoman Empire. Among those developments was the rise of industrialisation and, more specifically, the advances in the British textile industry in the 19th century, both of which played an important role in the ultimate demise of the Ottoman Empire (Quataert 1993). On the one hand, the mass production of machine-made cotton-based textiles from Britain flooded Istanbul, and on the other, changes of dress code regulations in civil and military attire also created a new interest in fashion (İnalcık 1969, Quataert 1993). The change

in taste and the availability of more affordable and sturdier textiles contributed to a loss of interest in the local products among the Istanbul market's customers. Despite being the main centre for trade in textiles, the products offered at the bazaar were handmade, more rudimentary, less durable, and less affordable than the new imports.

The aesthetic, technological, and economic transformations precipitated by the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe captured the imagination of one of the sultans of the period, Sultan Abdülmecid I. He had already taken the initial steps of what became known as the Tanzimat reforms—a period during which the Ottoman Empire committed to processes of modernisation and an increasing orientation towards 'the West' (İnalcık 1969). One of the steps in that direction was the creation of the Hereke Imperial Factory in 1843. Following that, and as a result of a visit to Lyon in 1851, Sultan Abdülmecid I—who had been educated in Western Europe, spoke fluent French, and was an enthusiast of many forms of artistic expression—came into contact with mechanised looms for the first time. He was particularly impressed by the embroidery patterns produced by the Jaquard looms (Turan 2009). These looms enabled the production of what came to be known as the Hereke carpets, which were in effect a material expression of the sultan's embracing of ideals of modernity emerging from Western Europe. The looms were a nod towards the pursuit of industrialisation and the superior craftwork that they enabled. They made the creation of Hereke carpets possible; once created, those carpets' superior craftsmanship could be recognised and associated with the highest quality of products emerging from the Ottoman Empire (Turan 2009; Velipaşaoğlu 2018, 95).

Importantly, the Hereke carpets produced at the Hereke Imperial Factory were not for public consumption: they were made exclusively to adorn the sultan's residence and, significantly, they were also woven to be gifted in the process of establishing diplomatic relations between the empire and other locations (Turan 2009; Velipaşaoğlu 2018). The carpets were thus entirely associated with the political power of the day, the one that was ushering

in a series of strongly modernising measures that were changing the relation between the empire and other parts of the world.

Locating the Hereke carpets in place: the dislocation of the bazaar from centre to periphery

The introduction of the Jaquard looms brought from France to counter the impact of the technological revolution taking place in Britain had profound consequences on several levels in Istanbul. The foundation of the Hereke factory and its consolidation as the new weaving centre of the empire in 1843 marked the moment that carpet-weaving was removed from the context of the Istanbul Grand Bazaar, putting in place the conditions for the bazaar's future redundancy as a central hub for trade. These changes also marked an important geographic relocation of the administrative centre of the Ottoman Porte away from the Eminönü district, where the bazaar is located, to Pera, around the Dolmabahçe Palace—the new centre of power, inaugurated in 1851. This locational shift simultaneously exposed and consolidated the impending anachronism of the bazaar and, in doing so, exposed the anachronism of the pre-industrial trading logic that had been associated with the Ottoman Empire.

Looked at in crosslocations terms, these changes bore the traces of the reconfiguration, or perhaps rearticulation, of the locating regime that had, under the logic of empire, placed the Grand Bazaar at a crossroads that was located at the heart of things. Pre-industrial capitalism provided certain routes across which the carpets and other trade travelled, and those conditions placed Istanbul's Grand Bazaar in the centre of that network of routes; from the Industrial Revolution onwards, the logic of nation-state and industrialisation dominated the way in which trade occurred, both of which changed what was being connected to—and disconnected from—what; the routes and the goods traded changed and, over time, the bazaar was relocated to the periphery.

In sum, the new technologies brought about by the Industrial Revolution in Britain constituted a driving force in the reconfiguration of relations that significantly threatened the locational logic of the Grand Bazaar. The sultan of the day responded by founding the Hereke Imperial Factory, which produced Hereke carpets that were intended to counter the impact of the new locating logics advanced by the rise of industrial capitalism and the logic of the nation-state emerging in Western Europe—but which also drew upon the new technologies in order to do it, thus building those transformations into the actual production of the carpets. What remains is to bring the story up to date and situate the circulation of the Hereke carpets in the Istanbul Grand Bazaar in the 21st century.

Locating the Grand Bazaar in 21st-century Istanbul

The period between the 15th and 18th centuries was when the Ottoman Empire had the most significant control over the trade routes of the Mediterranean. During that period, the eastern Mediterranean figured as a central and centralising trading region connecting disparate trade routes across the world. It was during this period that the Istanbul Grand Bazaar played its most pivotal role in the concentration of wealth and in strengthening the political and economic power of Ottoman capital. Throughout this period the centrality of the bazaar, which is physically located in the oldest part of Istanbul within walking distance of the Golden Horn urban waterway (an estuary of the Bosphorus), was unquestionable. The Golden Horn separates the oldest part of Istanbul from the more recently developed parts of the city. During that period between the 18th and 18th centuries, the Grand Bazaar was strongly visible in the life of the city, with most social and political events of daily life unfolding within or around its quarters. Nowadays, Istanbul is a polycentric metropole (Ciraci and Kundak 2000, Ozus et al. 2011) and, while there are historical buildings and heritage sites all over the city, it was in the contiguous areas of Eminönü, Çemberlitaş, and Beyazıt—all of which are

close to the Grand Bazaar and are located at the margins of the Golden Horn—which were the locations of the core administrative, religious, and commercial infrastructures of the Ottoman Empire; and those same locations contained the core infrastructures of the Byzantine Empire before it.

While many of the historical structures in the Golden Horn have now been repurposed as museums or administrative offices, a few of them, such as mosques, public baths, and marketplaces, have retained their original purpose. Located in the 'historic peninsula'—one of the ways the Golden Horn is described in academic and non-academic sources these days—the area where those buildings are located is well connected to other parts of the city, particularly because of the area's significance for tourism. Yet the area is also detached from the rest of the city, in the sense that it is now a cultural heritage site more than a core part of the city's contemporary daily life. The tourists and museums mark it out as being a literally historic district—meaning, not really a part of today's world (which echoes the commentary on the way history separates, discussed in Chapter 4). The area is no longer part of the lives of those Istanbul residents whose activities are unconnected with the tourism and hospitality sectors.[78] In that sense, the area around the Grand Bazaar has been disconnected from the rest of the city, set apart.

To be clear, this is not to say that tourism is not part of today's Istanbul: on the contrary, it is an economically essential and highly contemporary activity. The point is more that the location has been rendered historic, and that is precisely what the tourists wish to visit: Istanbul's past. It is in that sense that the area has been separated from the rest of the city, has been relocated so that it belongs to another time. This is an important form of locational layering visible in many parts of the world, not only Istanbul.

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78 The area designated as the 'historical peninsula' is also a mid-to-low-income residential area and, as such, it is well supplied by services within reach of its residents, not binding them to the economy of the touristic areas.

Locating the Hereke carpets in the contemporary Istanbul Grand Bazaar: ambiguity, mistrust, and dis/connections across time and space

The Istanbul residents who participated in this research and who were not involved in the Grand Bazaar's activities recognised the bazaar as an important historical institution and expressed a sense of pride when talking about tourists' interest in what is one of the most visited tourist sites in Türkiye. However, that pride was tempered by a simultaneous discomfort about the idea that the bazaar was saturated with deceitful sellers offering products of low quality at exploitative prices to gullible visitors. As mentioned earlier, Hereke carpets can be approached as an 'itinerant entanglement' of connections and disconnections travelling between locations—moving from the places where they were made, to the places where they were sold (in this specific case, the Grand Bazaar), and on to somewhere else in the world once they had been sold. These carpets are also presented as being part of cultural heritage, as belonging to a past that is no longer present. Yet they entered into circulation in the 19th century through efforts aimed at connecting the dwindling empire to the Industrial Revolution, which means they had both the past and the future built into them. Eventually, some of these carpets reached the bazaar in the contemporary moment. As the carpets circulated, the connections and disconnections embedded in them also provoked doubt and mistrust from experienced carpet traders, and were often the source of one of the most common critiques levelled against the bazaar and particularly against the carpet traders, the bazaar's most iconic trade alongside gold and jewellery.

Initially not available to the common public, with the end of the Ottoman era and the proclamation of the Republic of Türkiye in 1923, Hereke carpets became a troubling reminder of the conditions that led to the break-up of the empire and foundation of the republic. The Hereke Imperial Factory, having been so closely associated with the sultan and the empire that subsequently col-

lapsed, itself went through a series of transformations. In 1925, two years after the final collapse of the Ottoman Porte, it was transferred to the responsibility of the Turkish Industry and Metal Bank; subsequently, in 1933, it was transferred to the Sümer-bank. In line with the 1980s reforms that sought to liberalise the domestic economy and promote the integration of Türkiye into the global economy, the Hereke Imperial Factory was, ultimately, privatised in 1990 (Cizre-Sakallioglu and Yeldan 2000; Keyman and Koyuncu 2005; Önder 1998). Finally, in 1993—at the cusp of the economic crisis of 1994 which led to the radical devalua-tion of the Turkish lira (Cizre-Sakallioglu and Yeldan 2000; Öza-tay 2000)—the Hereke Imperial Factory was permanently closed (Velipaşaoğlu 2018, 95).

In light of this somewhat tortured locational history of Hereke carpets and the factory that created them, experienced carpet trad-ers in the bazaar offered contradictory and ambivalent accounts of the circulation of the Hereke carpets and the status of their con-temporary production. However, the most common understand-ing was that Hereke carpets produced up to the 1990s were 'proper' Hereke, and that these are rare and sold at very high prices. Yet Hereke carpets continued to be produced after the 1990s; those carpets belong to a production chain that can be traced back to carpets produced by a cooperative of master weavers who, in the 1970s, attempted to reinvigorate their production in various parts of Türkiye, independently of the Hereke Imperial Factory. In addi-tion, Hereke carpets had become famous and sought after around the world by the 1990s, with the result that some carpet producers in China began to invest in the production of counterfeit Hereke carpets, creating yet another production chain.

Since the closure of the Hereke factory in 1993, counterfeit Hereke carpets made in China have flooded the bazaar. The machine-made Chinese version of the Hereke is made of bam-boo silk, a cheaper but still effective material, which reproduces the shimmer effect of natural silk well. That shimmer is one of the main appeals of Hereke carpets for non-specialist buyers. The counterfeit Hereke carpets circulating in the bazaar range from

rudimentary copies which can be easily identified as fake by the buyers, up to the more complex products with a more sophisticated finish which, if not for the use of bamboo silk, could indeed be mistaken for an original piece. This latter kind of counterfeit can be sold at the same price as an original piece; despite being mass-produced and machine-made, they could easily be presented by the seller as an original.

This background makes sense of my experience that Hereke carpets were simultaneously ubiquitous and elusive in the context of the Grand Bazaar. Likewise, that background provides insight into the various dis/connections—and indeed, misconnections—requiring adjustment during interactions between sellers and customers interested in these items. The sales pitch became an exercise in identifying the relations between locations, providing a narrative which located the Hereke carpet that the trader was trying to sell within the right chain, the one that marked the carpet as being a part of the right history, part of cultural heritage. That chain represented the best kinds of relations between locations so as to maximise the chance of completing a sale. The different trajectories by which the Hereke carpets circulating in the bazaar were effectively being managed and reconfigured by the trader. It is in that reconfiguration that the so-called 'crisis of trust' which permeates the sale of Hereke carpets might be differently understood as a process of spatial and temporal relocation: a management of the locating logic by which these carpets were assigned relative value and significance. The carpets embodied more than one kind of relative location; the sellers effectively disconnected them from the least valuable ones.

When approached from this perspective, Safet Bey's view that no serious carpet collector would ever deal in Hereke carpets makes sense. The Hereke carpets were, after all, the material expression of the Ottoman Empire yielding to the pressure of the Industrial Revolution, which was rapidly marginalising the trading logic that had, until then, located the Ottoman Porte and the Grand Bazaar at the heart of it, in the middle of a trading crossroads. The arrival of the Hereke signalled the relocation of the

Grand Bazaar to the peripheries. Without physically going anywhere, the relative location of the bazaar radically changed, turning it into a peripheral place in trading terms on the one hand, and a central cultural heritage tourist attraction on the other. When Safet Bey refused to recognise the Hereke carpets as being worthy of collecting, he was also rejecting that transformation.

Serkan was different, however. He did offer Hereke carpets in his store and, as such, he had to engage with the ambivalence (and eventual stigma) attached to Hereke carpets on a daily basis. He approached the various chains associated with Hereke carpets as opportunities to maximise his gains, which he did by adjusting in his sales pitch and, through that, locating the Hereke carpets in the highest value chain. The sales pitch involved selective concealments and disclosure (Scalco 2019) which connected the Hereke to certain trajectories (the Ottoman Empire) while also disconnecting it from others (China and machine production) so as to finally convey to the potential customer that the carpet which interested them was part of the right locational chain—or, in other words, the right set of connections and disconnections between places, both historical and locational. In asking whether I thought the piece I had just seen was a real Hereke, Serkan was also asking me whether I was capable of recognising the relations between locations embedded in the item in front of me. In other words, would the customer know that the carpet in front of them might connect Türkiye to China more than to its Ottoman past? In the end, understanding that I was not a customer, Serkan agreed to disclose the status of the carpet which, in that case, connected the carpet—and the Grand Bazaar—to China. As Serkan once explained to me, disclosing the route by which the carpet in fact arrived in the bazaar was not something he could afford to do normally, as it would result in loss of business. Fixing the carpet in a given production chain meant concealing the carpet's contemporary and locational connections with China, so that the more desirable historical connections with the Ottoman Empire could be emphasised. And given the Hereke's history as precisely the carpet made in the Ottoman Empire that embedded industrialisa-

tion into the very reason for its creation, Serkan's sales pitch was simultaneously deceitful and truthful. It depends on the location from which you look at it. This goes to the heart of the crossloca-tions idea of exploring how the significance and value of locations are generated and how they change over time.

In sum, this example outlines how a curated account of the history of a carpet given to a customer can appear to be an act of deceit on a smaller scale, but also reflects a layered history of shifting relations between locations and between people, goods, and places on a much wider scale. This approach also provides a different way to understand what might be at stake in a con-text in which scarcity of information, informality, and the absence of strict regulation seem to be more pervasive—as is the case in what Clifford Geertz (1978) described as the 'bazaar economy'. This is the final aspect that this chapter examines in exploring the transformations in the relative locations of the Grand Bazaar: the apparent informality and unregulated character of the bazaar. Seen through a crosslocations framework, that apparent lack of regulation could also be seen as a performative expression of the informal regulation of contradictory locating logics.

A crosslocations approach towards informality, lack of regulation, and information scarcity

The stereotypical moral condemnation of the deceptive selling practices voiced by Istanbul residents was often accompanied by additional commentary about ways to prevent such practices. It was at this point that my conversations with people tended to turn to the relationship between informality and lack of regulation, two of the features in what Geertz (1978) argued are inherent to a 'bazaar economy'. According to Geertz, informality and lack of regulation are important components in the maximisation of profit in those economies—a view later endorsed by Franz Fanselow (1990). Istanbul residents criticising the ways of doing business in the bazaar generally expressed negative moral judgements about these informal activities, suggesting that the combination of lack

of regulation and a desire to maximise profit encouraged negative characteristics such as 'greed' and 'selfishness'. These conversations often led some people to recommend that these moral faults (presumably an attribute of the bazaar traders' character) should be disciplined in order to protect tourists and, through that, also to protect the image of Türkiye abroad. In other words, regulatory efforts could prevent tourists from being harmed by 'greed' while also upholding Türkiye's relative location in the 21st century by embracing contemporary forms of trade (indexed by formality, standardisation, and regulation) and within the locational logics of the nation-state (indexed by regulation of origin, controlled modes of circulation and identification, and so on).

Aware of local critiques of their trade, the sellers I met provided a rebuttal of these requests for more regulation, more certification, and more standardisation. Responding to the stigma associated to their trade, Safet Bey explained:

> Yes, I am aware that people think we are all liars … first, I say that these are people who never came here. And second, these are people who order a coffee in Starbucks and believe they are having organic and fair-trade coffee just because there is a label [somewhere] saying that. The coffee is coming from another place, they never see the people [who produce it] and this is what makes them believe that the coffee is organic [*laughter*]. Then they come here and here there is no system, there is a person. There is no label … we have to do business looking in the eyes. This is why they can't trust what we do here. They prefer to believe the Starbucks label.

Safet Bey sought to convey his distinct approach to the business by implementing a few measures which could act as some kind of certification of authenticity, but drawing on a different means of establishing trust, not the one based on official or formal regulation. First and foremost, he distanced himself and his business from 'the carpets of another chain'—his understanding of Hereke carpets. This in itself highlighted his sense of the secure position of his business, the idea that he could make a living without sell-

ing those ambivalent carpets—something also indicated by the location of his shop, close to the foundational structure of the bazaar. However, not dealing in Hereke carpets is not enough to convey his distinctive approach to the trade: he also implemented tacit rules of engagement with customers, aimed at distinguishing himself and his shop from practices more commonly associated with exploitation and deceit. As mentioned earlier, he discouraged haggling, did not invite passers-by to walk into his shop, and only provided information about goods when asked. He combined his low-profile demeanour with a tacit policy of fixed prices conveyed by stipulating reasonable prices inscribed on labels attached to the reverse side of the goods. These were not only performative labels: there was a margin of negotiation to the price, but relative to other shops it was minimal and accepted by the customer, who picked up on the dynamic 'informal but not unregulated' implied by the measures implemented by Safet Bey.

As for Serkan, who dealt in Hereke carpets, the options were different. He had ambivalent feelings about deceiving people, sometimes interpreting difficulties in his personal life as God's punishment for the lies he felt compelled to tell to be able to finalise a sale and make ends meet every month. This is the most common kind of seller in the trade, increasingly suffering from international and domestic hardships that have prevented regular circulation of tourists in recent years.

It is in Serkan's case that the anachronism of the Grand Bazaar becomes more significant. As I described through my earlier exchange with Serkan, when he introduced the Hereke carpet to me, he emphasised elements such as the characteristics, origin, and price of the item, indirectly revealing that they can vary according to the quality of the interaction between the seller and the buyer. When this interaction is approached through a crosslocations frame, the anachronism of the bazaar—often understood in terms of its informality—becomes particularly relevant. It is against the backdrop of this anachronism—conveyed by business done through 'looking someone in the eye'—that the history of shifting relative locations that left their traces in the Hereke carpets

became visible. These were the changes that marked the beginnings of the peripheralisation of the bazaar—changes that meant the Hereke carpets were circulating through different chains, but would now be 'fixed' in place by Serkan. In other words, the sellers who do not have the option of extricating themselves from direct dealings with Hereke carpets and who may not be able to trade in the Hereke carpets that belong exclusively to the 19th century chain, find themselves dealing with the ambivalence of the carpets. It is for these late 20th-century carpets, the ones that followed more closely the industrial logic that had ushered in the original Hereke carpets, that the sales pitch had to make the adjustments needed to relocate each carpet so it could be credibly fixed in place in the more high-value locational chain. The late-made Hereke carpets had been fully dislocated and needed to be relocated in an earlier locating logic, one that in fact no longer existed. In short, the 'right' chain was one that erased the disconnections and peripheralisation of the bazaar and, along with it, the relative locations of the Istanbul of the Ottoman Empire and the whole eastern Mediterranean—or at least that part of Istanbul and the eastern Mediterranean that had been connected to other parts of the world through the locating logic of imperial trade. Note here, however, that once Serkan understood that the researcher would not become a customer, a new set of connections and disconnections was immediately brought forward, revealing that the carpet in front of us embodied another set of connections, the ones that linked the Grand Bazaar to China and the reconfigured trading regime of which it was now a part. Of course, China had been a significant part of much earlier global trading routes between the Ottoman and Chinese territories through the Silk Road (or rather, Silk Routes); and the relative locations of those routes had also been radically altered by the period during which the Hereke carpets came into existence (Elisseeff 2000; Whitfield 1999).

Layered relocations

As Chapter 5 described, Melilla's legal and political location in Spain but geographically surrounded by Moroccan territory generated a series of activities that constantly sought to resolve Melilla's awkward, even ambivalent, positioning, particularly since the city's relocation following Spain's accession to the European Union (EU). The ongoing process of symbolically and structurally disconnecting Melilla from Morocco and reconnecting it with Spain and the EU involved a continuous public display of power—seen particularly in the conspicuous and intense regulation of flows of goods and people, but also in the periodic ritual events held in the piazzas. Of course, such processes also exposed Melilla's double location: such displays and infrastructures would not be needed if Melilla was not geographically located in Morocco while being legally located in Spain. In the Grand Bazaar, the Hereke carpets were also doubly or even multiply located, a condition that was both created and revealed through the origin stories told by the carpet traders to their prospective customers, which were accompanied by the pervasive doubts stereotypically expressed about their veracity. Exploring those doubts through a crosslocations way of thinking about ethnography brought into view the radical locational shift of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the one that moved the Grand Bazaar from a centre to a periphery. The Hereke carpets circulating in the bazaar carried the traces of both the earlier locating logic of trade during the period of empire, as well as the clear marks of the new locating logic of trade following the Industrial Revolution. In that sense, Hereke carpets could be described as embodying an 'entanglement of locating regimes' woven into their creation. The task of the carpet traders was to disentangle them, locating the Hereke only within the chain of production and trading relations associated with the Ottoman Empire, even though it was the Hereke, in particular, which was marked by the new locating logics that would soon replace that regime. Once the new production and locating logics had entirely replaced the Ottoman ones, any Hereke carpets produced would

have to be, in effect, a lie, and the carpet traders were left with the task of telling this lie in order to sell the piece.

In that position, the dilemma in which the carpet traders were placed when selling Hereke carpets could expose the precariousness of different shopkeepers as much as they could expose the peripheral location, and thus precariousness, of the Grand Bazaar itself.

The momentous shift that was able to move such a centuries-old institution as the Grand Bazaar from one relative location to another also relocated Istanbul, ushered in the new nation of Türkiye, and relocated the entire Mediterranean region. As Ben-Yehoyada (2017, 7) noted in his anthropological analysis of the Mediterranean, many anthropologists have suggested that the Mediterranean no longer exists as the political, social, cultural, and economic entity described by classical scholars. And in terms of the place that existed during Ottoman times, they were right; but that does not prevent the Mediterranean relocating and reappearing in a different form. In crosslocations terms, the process through which the Mediterranean appeared in a certain form, then disappeared and now has apparently reappeared for many scholars, including Ben-Yehoyada, could also be understood as shifts in locating regimes which created new kinds of connections and disconnections. Trade in Hereke carpets shows the traces of how that process played out across several scales.

Intertwined with a set of drastic transformations propelled by changes in modes of production (handmade/machine-made) and by shifts in locational logics (empire/nation-state) that ultimately resulted in the peripheralisation of the Grand Bazaar (and Istanbul, the Ottoman Empire, the eastern Mediterranean), the relocation was covertly regulated through a set of disclosures and concealments operated in loco, by the sellers. Overt regulation of the materiality and circulation of the Hereke carpets could have undesirable consequences—such as rendering the appealing anachronism of the bazaar into an undesirable position of precarity. Nevertheless, the efforts to relocate the Hereke in the Ottoman locational world implicitly exposed the transformations that

placed these carpets in the inevitably wrong location and, through that, also implicitly exposed the transformed relative location of Istanbul and the Mediterranean region as a whole. Nevertheless, the stories the carpet sellers told marked a locational layering that remained and was recreated by them. And the Grand Bazaar is still there; looked at from the locational logic of cultural heritage, it remains at the centre—it is only from the earlier logic of trade that it has moved to the margins.

CHAPTER 7

Livestock transport: crosslocating standards

Sarah Green

The development of the Hereke Imperial Factory in 1843 captures a moment when the location dynamics of the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul began to shift in response to more mechanised and industrialised forms of production. It was a period of intensification, of 'scaling up', to borrow Anna Tsing's (2015, 39–40) phrase. Industrialisation generated different kinds of connections and disconnections between places, people, and things, ones that tended towards cross-border standardisation: an effort to ascribe the same value system everywhere, so that all differences could be weighed against the same scale (Herzfeld 2004; Lampland and Star 2009). Chapter 6 explored that in terms of the challenge such standardisation and scaling up presented for fine carpets, items that are unique, slowly produced, and from somewhere in particular—the antithesis of being able to make ever more of the same. Following on from that, this final chapter explores the locational implications of standardisation and intensification by looking at changes in, and regulation of, the cross-border livestock trade. It draws on my fieldwork on the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE/WOAH[79]), a transnational organisation that sets the

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79 OIE is an acronym of the organisation's original French name: Office International des Epizooties. In May 2022, the official acronym was changed to WOAH to reflect the English name.

standards for the transportation of livestock and for animal health more widely; and it considers how such standardising techniques work in the crosslocated world we have been describing in this book. Given the multiple layers, tensions, scaffolding, and overlapping locating regimes that operate in the Mediterranean region and beyond, how do efforts to standardise something across the globe engage with all of that, and what does it mean in terms of relative locations?

Transnational standards and the regulations that develop from them which oversee the cross-border livestock trade were introduced in the early 20th century in an effort to prevent the spread of animal-borne diseases that accompanied such trade. Inevitably, disease outbreaks increased in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as animal farming techniques intensified in some parts of the world, and as cross-border livestock trade expanded with the development of mechanised transportation. That historical context means that the regulations and standards were designed with intensive animal farming and industrialised trade in mind. Other forms of livestock management in the Mediterranean region, most particularly those based on the regular movement of animals around different landscapes, were organised quite differently. Intensive farming requires that livestock is kept contained in one place until transported for sale and/or slaughter (Phillips 2015).

These differences in managing livestock have meant that regions with more industrialised and intensive animal farming have been more compatible with WOAH standards than those with other forms of livestock management. That has perhaps inevitably led to a mirroring, or even amplification, of existing regional inequalities across the Mediterranean region. And yet that predictable outcome is not the end of the story: some of the crosslocations involved created other dynamics as well, ones that are not necessarily aligned with the most obvious hierarchical arrangements in the region. And it is here, where the story becomes less coherent, that the crosslocations become more visible.

Looking into the dynamics of this issue is our final contribution towards exploring how thinking of locations in terms of crosslocations might add something to what can be understood about the meaning of being somewhere in particular. Having explored political and social conflict over the meaning and use of public space in Beirut; tensions in the efforts of the Orthodox Church to maintain control over the locational dynamics of the Meteora; the repeated re-scaffolding of the relative location of Egypt; efforts to put historical archives to work in both separating and reconnecting the relative locations of Petrizzi; the dynamics of dealing with the paradox of incompatible locations in Melilla; and the major transformation in the locating logic of trading regimes that resulted in constant efforts to realign the location chain of carpets in the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul, this final chapter considers the dynamics of efforts to impose uniform standards across this diverse, criss-crossed set of crosslocations. For brevity, I am focusing on the southern and eastern Mediterranean regions in this chapter; the tensions in the coexistence of different locating regimes were more obvious in those areas.

The logic of transporting livestock in the Maghreb

'There are no borders in North Africa where animals are concerned,' said Anwar, a veterinarian based in the Tunis office of WOAH (still called OIE at the time), whom I was visiting in 2018 with my Crosslocations research team colleague, Viljami Kankaanpää-Kukkonen. It was part of my early efforts to gain an understanding of the workings of WOAH and how that related to the transportation of livestock across borders. Anwar's colleague, Pietro, another veterinarian, agreed that there were no borders for animals (meaning livestock) in North Africa. Pietro added that there was also no effective database of livestock in the region, nor formal recording, tagging, or identification. Both men spoke of some specific situations, such as the current political instability in Libya, the lack of proper controls over animal husbandry in

Sudan, the arrival of those Sudanese animals in Egypt and Libya, and their subsequent movement into other countries across North Africa; and they spoke of the free, unhindered movement of animals between Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. They also mentioned the Sahara in the south of the region—a place, they said, that does not easily lend itself to surveillance or management of livestock movements. Such untrackability was not well aligned with the transnational regulations imposed following the standards set by WOAH. Those regulations relied on the ability to know where animals are at all times, in order to monitor any potential spread of disease. That was exceedingly difficult to achieve in North Africa in general and the Maghreb region in particular. Despite this, both Anwar and Pietro also argued that WOAH was doing significant work in the region, and that the work was effective, in its own way.

I encountered that ambivalence about the attempted standardisation of the transportation and trade in livestock almost everywhere I went, particularly in the southern and eastern Mediterranean regions.[80] On the one hand, people reported a mismatch between WOAH's standards and what happens in practice in relation to the cross-border transportation of livestock in many parts of the region. On that level, many reported that the logic informing WOAH's efforts to standardise practices seemed to be amplifying existing differences and hierarchies between places. Repeatedly, the way the regulations were designed for large-scale, intensive farming came up in my conversations with veterinarians, livestock farmers, traders, and even zoological researchers. In addition, the way that those standards seemed to imagine an otherwise level playing field, in which all the participants were somehow equally pursuing the same aims, seemed to many people to be unrealis-

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80 These are often referred to as Middle Eastern and North African regions (MENA). I do not do so here for two reasons. First, I want to continue to draw attention to their Mediterranean geographical location, and MENA does not; and second, 'Middle Eastern' already implies a location from which the region is viewed, and a crosslocations approach attempts to provide several vantage points from which to view any location.

tic—and I give a brief example below involving the Bedouin and the complex border regimes in the Israel-Palestine region.

Yet, on the other hand, there were many other comments which pointed in other directions. There were environmental activists and ecologists who were frustrated with small-scale pastoralists and other livestock farmers for their use of intensive farming techniques (e.g. the heavy use of antibiotics, processed feed, and pesticides), even if their practices in other senses did not at all match intensive farming. There were those who felt that WOAH's regulations and veterinary standards provided some protection against what they saw as bad practices locally, even if it was hard to meet those standards. There were those who hoped that adopting WOAH's standards might improve the condition of their animals and improve their livelihoods. There were those who believed it was a good idea to standardise veterinary training, while others felt that such standardisation ran the risk of teaching veterinary medicine in a way that looked at the world from a 'scaled up' perspective, the perspective of intensive farming, rather than recognise the diversity of farming practices on the ground. So, even though many places did not fit the implicit relation between livestock farming, environment, and trade embedded within WOAH's standards, there were diverse efforts at standardisation that had the effect of intervening somehow.

One thing was widely agreed upon wherever I travelled: that relations between people, animals, and the land had changed radically in recent decades just about everywhere. The core change was identified as being the outcome of intensification, not only in terms of farming practices but also in terms of the massive scaling up of livestock transportation, as well as dramatically increased surveillance and bureaucratic techniques for monitoring every aspect of livestock management and trade. It was not only that small-scale farmers were unable to comply with all the regulations because the amount of work and equipment it involved was either beyond their means or not worth the effort when balanced against the income from their farming; it was also that many understood

the relation between animals, land, and movement quite differently from the logic informing WOAH-derived regulations.

I came across a somewhat stark example of the way different locating logics crosscut one another during a visit to some Bedouin camel, goat, and sheep herders in 2019, some of whom were based in the West Bank and others in the Negev desert. Before going on to provide an overview of the history and workings of WOAH, it is worth drawing on this example to offer a sense of how these crosscutting locating logics worked in practice.

Boxing in Bedouin

The Bedouin communities our team visited in October 2019 lived in the West Bank (Area C) and the Negev desert near Beersheba. They were among those who still keep animals (sheep, goats, camels, and some chickens and ducks), and they make their living mostly by selling the products of these animals in local markets. In the recent past, many had regularly travelled long distances across multiple borders with relative ease—up until 1948 when Israel declared independence and the borders began to be more strictly controlled (McKee 2016). As is well known, there followed the imposition of a dizzying array of strong political borders, perimeter fences, and military security zones that have generated a complex set of fragmentations and disconnections of the entire region (Weizman 2007). All of this crosscut the pastoral and trading routes and territories of the Bedouin, seriously affecting the degree to which they could move across the region with their animals. People in the West Bank reported that some of their camels were shot by military personnel if the animals wandered too far across the wrong hill; they reported that one Israeli settlement nearby had set up its sewage system so that it poured into Bedouin water sources; they reported that movement was restricted to such a degree that it was no longer possible to move with the seasons, yet when the group settled down somewhere, their dwellings were destroyed multiple times because the settlement was not officially recognised by the Israeli authorities. Recently, one of the

residents responded to this lack of state recognition by setting up Airbnb accommodation there—in part so that the location could be found by anyone on Google Maps.[81] The place was now on the map, whether or not the Israeli authorities recognised it.

There were also informal practices involving the health certificates of consignments of livestock that were transported across borders, which sometimes led to the spread of new diseases among Bedouin livestock. The certificates, which were designed in compliance with WOAH standards, were intended to prove that the animals had no infectious diseases. Several Bedouin reported that occasionally, consignments of livestock destined for Israel would contain a few animals that were in some way diseased, and therefore did not comply with the certificate of health for the whole consignment. They claimed that instead of refusing entry to the consignment, the importer either sold the sickly animals to Bedouin or dumped them in one of the Palestinian areas. The result was that some Bedouin herds were now infected with diseases that had not existed in the region before, which meant that other Bedouin groups could no longer graze their animals together, nor interbreed their animals. In effect, the new diseases caused a social disconnection across groups in the area, in addition to the disruption of their pastoral and trading routes.

Nevertheless, some Bedouin continued to find ways to keep at least some animals (fewer goats and camels, more sheep, which were easier to manage with the border regulations), and while the restrictions in the West Bank meant that camels had dramatically declined in those areas, others reported that in the Negev desert there had been a significant increase in camel numbers, which were being bred mostly for camel hair, milk, and meat, not for work. In contrast, in the West Bank there were too many contradictions between the ideal conditions for Bedouin pastoralists and the conditions generated by the complex border regime imposed on the landscape.

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81 As of 6 April 2024, this location could still be found by searching for 'Amazing Bedouin Hospitality' in Google Maps.

WOAH: the appliance of standards and science

It was into this kind of complicated landscape that WOAH has attempted to impose cross-border livestock transportation and health standards. WOAH was founded in 1924 following a severe outbreak of rinderpest in cattle in 1920 that spread across three continents.[82] The outbreak was traced to the transportation of a single consignment of cattle from India destined for Brazil, which made a stop at Antwerp in Belgium along the way. The outbreak was devastating for many livestock farmers, and it severely affected the international cattle trade.

Initially created as a coalition between 28 countries, WOAH's officially stated key task is to help to prevent the spread of infectious diseases among livestock through a combination of monitoring disease outbreaks and setting standards for the transportation of livestock across borders. The overall idea is to achieve early detection of outbreaks, formal public notification of them, and, through that, control the spread of infectious disease.

At first, WOAH's approach to this was quite simple: prevent any diseased animals from being transported. It devised standards for determining the health of animals and developed certificates that could be issued for consignments of animals destined to be transported. This remains the core task of the organisation today, though requirements for providing improved standards of transportation and animal welfare have since been added: without a health and animal welfare certificate that meets the criteria and standards of WOAH, no consignment of live animals is allowed entry into a WOAH member state. Almost every country in the world, 182 states in total, are members of WOAH; the only exceptions are some very small islands and the Holy See.[83]

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82 See https://www.woah.org/en/who-we-are/mission/history/ (accessed 26 November 2023).

83 For a list of the WOAH member states, see https://www.woah.org/en/who-we-are/members/ (accessed 26 November 2023). The exceptions are: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, the Holy See, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, Palau, Saint Kitts and

This history identifies the core motivation for the formation of WOAH: the late 19th and early 20th centuries saw a period of substantial increase in international trade, particularly following the development of steam ships and improvements in railways, and it was a period of massive intensification of both livestock farming practices and development of industry (Chaiklin et al. 2020; Phillips 2015). Over the century since WOAH was founded, the main breeds of cattle, sheep and goats, pigs, and chickens have been narrowed down to a small number, and some breeds have been thoroughly industrialised (most especially pigs and cattle). In more industrialised regions, there are very few local farm animals anymore; the transportation systems have been radically changed, with increasingly large vehicles, vessels, and aircraft specially designed to transport livestock across the world, in response to a massive increase in demand for meat and other animal products. This is the outcome of both increased human population and, more importantly, demand for the products of urban modernity (e.g. ever higher demand for hamburgers); and changes in rural landscapes as a result of intensive farming techniques have been quite radical in many regions, leading to significant changes in the behaviour and movements of many wild animals (Anderson 2006; Melville 1994; Phillips 2015; Vialles 1994; Wolch and Emel 1998). In addition to the disappearance of many species that in the past had depended on less intensively farmed landscapes, there has also been a rise in the populations of some animals. This notably includes wild boar and feral pigs (farmed pigs which have gone wild), which have appeared in ever increasing numbers everywhere across the Mediterranean region (Cheshire and Uberti 2017; Warner 2019; Weeks and Packard 2009; Wolch 2002).

These transformations brought about by intensive farming and radical changes in the use of the landscape have physically altered the land, the environment, the animals (both wild and farmed), as

Nevis, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Taiwan and the Palestinian Authority are not officially recognised as states, and so are not included.

well as fundamentally transformed the connections and disconnections between places. The founding of WOAH was aimed at addressing one of the unintended consequences of that intensification: the potential for animal-borne diseases to spread a great deal faster and across a much wider distance than had been possible before. A mechanism was needed to allow the trade to continue, while stopping diseases from spreading.

In those terms, the creation of WOAH was part of the developing global trading system; it became part of the cross-border infrastructure needed to enable trade to expand while counteracting potential threats to that trade. This transnational approach towards potential epidemics in animals paralleled a much longer tradition of transnational cooperation in efforts to control the spread of human infectious diseases such as plague and cholera (Baldwin 1999; Bulmuş 2012; Engelmann and Lynteris 2019; Varlık 2015).

That history gives a strong sense of the locational logic informing the work of WOAH: the location of livestock needed to be traceable at all stages of the animal's life and its transportation across trade routes. It is in fact the *locations* that are marked as being free of any WOAH-listed diseases, not the particular animals that are being transported. Any animals that are based in or have passed through an area that has recently reported a listed disease cannot be transported. This means that certification for a consignment of animals destined to be transported is dependent upon being able to accurately locate where the animals have come from and tracking the route taken on any of their travels. This information is cross-checked against a constantly updated list of reports of outbreaks of infectious disease across the world, a system that is now called the World Animal Health Information System, or WAHIS.[84] WOAH establishes the standards for certification and gathers the information upon which it is based. Once a consignment of animals has been certified as originating in a

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84 https://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/wahis-portal-animal-health-data/ (accessed 3 July 2021).

disease-free location, the animals are then permitted to be transported. At the arrival port, officials check the certificate against any reports of disease in the area specified in the certificate, and check that the route for the animals has not involved any contact with other areas reporting disease outbreaks. If all of this checks out, the animals are permitted to disembark and enter the destination.

Quite how significant this system of certification is can be seen through what happens when something goes wrong. In early 2021, two livestock transport ships, the *Karim Allah* and the *El Beik*, which were carrying consignments of cattle from Spain to Türkiye, were denied entry at any port for almost three months, leaving the animals stranded on the ships.[85] Had everything gone according to plan, the animals would have been unloaded onto dry land in just over a week. However, neither ship was allowed into the two Turkish ports they tried to enter because the certificates indicated that some of the cattle were from an area in Spain that had reported bluetongue disease in late 2020. Both ships ended up sailing from port to port, unable to offload the animals. Eventually, both ships returned to their original ports in Spain and all the animals were killed.[86]

This example, while extremely rare in terms of the extent to which something appears to have gone wrong, demonstrates the material consequences of the locational issues involved here: WOAH's task is to set standards for establishing the articulation between the location of the animals, the location of identified

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85 See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-cattle-outbreak/the-long-trail-after-months-at-sea-over-infection-worries-spanish-cattle-ship-returns-to-port-idUSKBN2AP2C9 and https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/feb/25/cattle-stranded-at-sea-face-slaughter-if-ship-docks-in-spain-says-manager (both accessed 2 July 2021).

86 See https://www.reuters.com/article/spain-cattle-outbreak/update-3-spanish-report-calls-for-killing-of-more-than-850-cattle-on-pariah-ship-idUSL1N2KW3EG and https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-cattle/more-than-1600-cattle-on-second-spanish-cattle-ship-to-be-killed-idUSKBN2BE2MJ (both accessed 3 July 2021).

disease, and the movement of animals across space. It could be called a literal locating regime: it provides both the logic and the data that identifies the value and significance of where the animals are located, including the route they take to get from one place to another place. The potential material consequences of the enforcement of that regime on the transportation of the animals could not be higher.

Over time, WOAH became a more complex organisation, and its role expanded into one involving setting standards for diagnosis and animal welfare, the monitoring of aquatic as well as terrestrial animals, and the monitoring of disease outbreaks in wild animals. Most recently, WOAH has been working to promote the standardisation of veterinary practice and training. The organisation currently has six officially stated missions related to these tasks.[87] In all of them, WOAH emphasises that its activities are technical and science-based and carried out at the request of its member countries. The representatives from member states are almost invariably qualified veterinarians, and all the representatives with whom I spoke emphasised that WOAH is basically a technical and scientific agency, providing standards for others to apply. In the description of its six missions on its website, WOAH's role in promoting animal welfare, a potentially politically sensitive issue, is carefully worded to underline this point: 'As a mark of the close relationship between animal health and animal welfare, WOAH has become, at the request of its Member Countries, the leading international organisation for animal welfare.' The message here is clear: WOAH has not itself chosen to promote animal welfare; its members requested it. This is a distinctive characteristic of WOAH: being able to claim the role of a purely scientific, standard-setting body that takes no policy decisions on its own is key to making WOAH possible.

In addition, WOAH also emphasises its status as a cross-border, transnational organisation that is not from somewhere in particu-

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87 See https://www.woah.org/en/who-we-are/mission/ (accessed 26 November 2023).

lar, but instead includes everywhere. The organisation strongly emphasises the principle of scientific universalism—knowledge and standards that are equally valid everywhere—and, as an organisation, of literally providing the view from nowhere (Latour 1987; Nagel 1986). And WOAH has quite a bit of company in this transnational, everywhere-nowhere location: it has signed agreements with 75 transnational intergovernmental organisations and NGOs to date, including the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization, World Trade Organization (WTO), World Veterinary Association, World Customs Association, International Organization for Standardization, and Global Early Warning and Response System for Major Animal Diseases including Zoonoses. WOAH's most powerful role to date is that it is responsible for providing animal transport standards for the WTO.[88]

In sum, WOAH has been working since 1924 to develop an internationally standardised system for monitoring, diagnosing, and locating outbreaks of animal diseases around the world, and for certifying the origin and health of consignments of animals destined to be transported between locations.[89] The locational logic here is clear: a mapping of the planet's locations according to constantly developing outbreaks of disease in animals that are regularly transported across borders, drawing on scientific principles that allow standard analysis, diagnosis, and establishing processes for evaluating the situation. The standards are crucial: they are a means to provide a single scale of value and significance across all territories, conditions, and relations. Although standards are never quite up to their designated task, as they are 'always already incomplete and inadequate compared to some ideal character' (Lampland and Star 2009, 14), they can also have a power-

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88 See https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/wto_oie_e.htm (accessed 26 November 2023).

89 WOAH has developed a detailed system for reporting observed cases of what is currently a list of 172 animal diseases; see https://www. woah.org/en/what-we-do/animal-health-and-welfare/animal-diseases/ (accessed 26 November 2023).

ful effect on the world that they calibrate. Martin Lengwiler notes that, 'as an instrument of authority, standards are used … to distinguish between normal and abnormal or between accepted universal and marginalized (local or traditional) forms of knowledge' (2009, 96). Lengwiler was discussing the history of life insurance and how standards were developed to establish what counted as a 'normal human being'. The WOAH standards have some of the same characteristics: a single scale of evaluation of the relation between animals, places, and disease that determines whether or not the animals can be transported from one place to another.

Tensions in animal locating logics

When Anwar, as noted earlier, commented that there are no borders in North Africa where animal movements are concerned, he was referring to a gap between the way livestock is predominantly managed there and the monitoring standards of WOAH. The surveillance and reporting of disease outbreaks in the manner required by WOAH is virtually impossible to implement when there is a large number of small-scale animal herders who regularly move their animals around according to constantly shifting conditions—of the seasons, of market prices, even of relations with other pastoral groups in the area. In addition, people's management of disease outbreaks tended not to follow WOAH recommendations; and in any case, several diseases on the WOAH list are believed to be endemic among the animal populations in the region.

This inability to account for the location of the animals or treat them as required, Anwar noted, meant that transportation of livestock from the southern Mediterranean (North Africa) to the northern Mediterranean (Southern Europe), where such tracking was implemented, is almost entirely prohibited by law. Here, the issue is not that some animals are more diseased than others; the problem is the ability to comply with the standards and regulations.

There was more. Anwar noted that when there was an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the UK in 2007, it led to the mass

slaughter of many thousands of animals and a widespread ban on any movement of livestock for many miles around the affected area for large periods of time.[90] That response would be utterly impossible in North Africa, he added: not only would destroying people's animals be totally unacceptable in the region, it would also make no sense, given that the animals were regularly moved, so the idea of containing an infectious disease to a limited area was not feasible. This contrasts with industrialised farming practices, in which animals are only transported for sale or slaughter and are otherwise kept in one place. This is important: WOAH depends on a relatively static relationship between geographical areas and the location of animals in order to establish the location of an outbreak of disease. When animals regularly move with the seasons along with their owners, when they often travel on foot rather than in motorised transport, when the pastoralists rarely if ever report where they are going next, it is not possible to comply with WOAH standards.

This difference in the relation between animals and location has profound implications: understanding location as a collection of static points with links in between them, as against imagining location as a series of routes along which people, animals, goods, and information constantly travel, affects just about every part of relations between people, animals, and land.[91] In Anwar and Pietro's view, most animal management techniques in North

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90 This 'scorched earth' approach is relatively recent even in the UK: in the past, foot and mouth was accepted as an endemic disease in Britain as well as most other countries. It was the logic of industrialisation that changed this (Woods 2004).

91 This is a difference I have explored before—e.g. Green (2021) and Green (2005, ch. 4). Others have also considered it from different angles—e.g. Ingold (2007), who draws on phenomenological approaches to focus on the idea of 'wayfaring' as the means by which people engage with their world; and Keck (2014, 2020), who works with a distinction between 'pastoral' and 'cynegetic' (hunter/hunting) approaches towards dealing with others in the environment: pastoral approach creates walls or fences to keep potential predators out, while hunters coexist in the same environment and learn to intimately engage with their prey.

Africa are based on the approach involving regular movement and routes. This not only involved the animals and their location; it also involved the people, the places, and their interrelations.

This point does not imply any significant cultural difference between animal herders in North Africa and other people. Rather, it is a point about the dynamics of location, about the understanding of the articulation between people, animals, and land. Moreover, the point reinforces Emanuel Marx's (2015) argument, based on his research with the Bedouin peoples of Mount Sinai, that most nomadic pastoralists coexist in a relation of mutual dependence with the cities and states in the region. Marx goes so far as to argue that without the development of cities, most nomadic animal herding groups would not exist at all. Whether that argument is persuasive or not is difficult to say based on the research I have done thus far; but I do recognise Marx's description of how the Bedouin continually articulated with and adapted to changes in the overlapping social, political, and economic regimes in which they found themselves. At times, it was possible for them to move regularly with their animals, shifting between markets, grazing and watering territories, important annual social events, and political conditions. At other times, when state and other border regimes crosscut their routes, or when the introduction of new diseases made it impossible to interact with certain other groups, those practices changed. In crosslocations terms, that could be described as the dynamics of managing a crosslocated world.

In any case, both Anwar and Pietro, along with the Bedouin we met, provided the view that where pastoralists in this region did regularly herd their animals, their understanding of the territory was based on routes, of territories made up of connections and disconnections, not static places linked by separate connections. It is not that this understanding of territories did not include borders and boundaries, for it certainly does; it is more that the logic about the relations of the parts was different. Whereas WOAH understood relations across territories in terms of zones, in which some areas might currently contain certain infectious diseases and others are disease-free, Bedouin understood relations

between places in terms of networks of social relations, grazing lands, roads, routes, and markets, across which people continually moved. In practical terms, that meant a basic inability to monitor the location of animals in the way required by WOAH. Yet that did not mean that the animals could not be tracked, as such; a small ethnographic fragment from a camel market outside Cairo gives a sense of how that might work.

Birqash camel market outside Cairo

The Birqash camel market, nestled in the Nile valley about 35 km from Cairo, has been there for a few decades, since it was moved from the city of Cairo. Nowadays, the market is regularly listed as being among the more unusual things a tourist could see while visiting Cairo, and the camels are only sold for meat, as they are no longer the essential work animals they once were (Albrecht 2018, 145–158, 267). There are some stalls where visitors can buy camel liver sandwiches. The place is bustling, full of men carrying distinctive wooden canes used to direct the camels. Some of the men were immensely skilled with the canes, able to tap the neck of a camel in just the right way to persuade the animal to change direction; others were far less skilled, whacking the animals on the side of the head repeatedly, with mostly unsatisfactory results. There were hundreds of camels in the place, many of them marked with a spray-painted sign on their hindquarters. Carl Rommel, who accompanied me for this trip, soon learned that the markings indicated that the animal had been sold. There were also young boys in the market selling cans of spray paint.

The camels came from many places, though most were from Sudan or Somalia, a trader said, and some were from upper Egypt. We asked whether the veterinarian visited the market often, and what kind of certification the animals had to go through in order to cross state borders. The trader smiled, pointed at the office of the veterinarian, and said he did not visit that often, but that it was unnecessary, as the animals had a blood test taken at the border, and that was enough. There was no certification of compliance

with the standards set by WOAH; the camels had been brought from the south via the same routes for as long as anyone could remember, and certainly well before any certification was required. Carl and I visited the veterinarian's office: it was locked shut and did not look like it had been visited for quite a long time. There were posters stuck on the outside of the building, advising people of the proper care and welfare of camels, and strongly advising against beating them on the side of the head, as it tended to cause eye injuries. One of the posters pointed out that an injured camel fetches a lower price. The trader said that the average price for a camel in this market was about 1000 US dollars per animal.

One man, who said that he bought and sold camels as a hobby (his main job being to arrange weddings), suggested that the camel trade had been badly affected by the wars in Sudan.[92] This was notable, as those involved with animal trade and animal movements in other parts of the Mediterranean—FAO representatives in Tunis, WOAH representatives and traders in Lebanon, traders in Israel-Palestine—had all reported that conflicts in nearby states had not affected animal trade in those countries. Indeed, in Lebanon, a veterinarian based in Beirut reported that the conflict in Syria had actually increased the level of cross-border transportation of animals into Lebanon. He suggested that it was mostly illegal trade, which was in part because it is not very easy to do anything legally when a country is at war; nevertheless, the trade, across the same routes and via the same markets, had continued apace.

This small sample of some of the places I visited in looking at the cross-border movement of animals and attempts at regulating that movement across the Mediterranean region gives a glimpse of the criss-crossing interests and histories that were constantly informing those efforts. One of the strongest of these criss-crossing interests involved the regional markets. Somalia, which was the source

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92 During the 20th and 21st centuries there have been regular civil conflicts in Sudan, which is geographically located directly south of Egypt and shares a very large border with Egypt.

of many of the camels on sale at Birqash, is about 3000 km from Egypt as the crow flies, and more like 4000 km by road, via Ethiopia and Sudan. According to local traders, many of the camels are traded multiple times on their way to Birqash from Somalia, through a chain of connections across multiple borders and other kinds of territories. It was a well-worn set of paths, often involving families of traders who had been in the business for generations. And the key locational focus was the markets: that was the way, most people reported, to keep track of animals in the region.

Following animals in North Africa

Anwar and Pietro agreed that if anyone wants to know where livestock is located in the North African region, they should follow the price of meat: the animals will be found where the best prices for them are found. Many other people in the region also suggested that this is the most predictable way to keep track of livestock.

Overall, the logic informing that dense chain of connections and disconnections involving livestock across the region incorporated the idea of the continual movement of the animals, continual exchanges between the herds to avoid in-breeding, carefully arranged connections and separations between the groups of people involved in animal husbandry and trade, and continual circulation of information—about the price of meat, milk, wool, and other animal products; about outbreaks of disease; about treatments; about outbreaks of war and other conflicts that might affect the movement of animals and trade; about the condition of grazing lands and crops; and about many other things.

In this sense, the comment that 'There are no borders in North Africa where animals are concerned' was not a reference to the idea that there is a seamless flow of animals across North Africa, nor that—somehow—these pastoralists were not part of the contemporary world; on the contrary, they were entirely engaged with contemporary trading markets and both rural and urban areas, as many others have also noted (Bollig et al. 2013;

Galaty and Bonte 1991; Marx 2015). Rather, it was a reference to the dynamics involved in the overlaps between political borders and the network of routes for moving animals between significant places. This was not a statement that people did not understand state borders, nor that they did not understand WOAH-informed regulations; it was simply drawing attention to the way in which animal movements work in that region, which crosscut the logic of political state borders.

Yet that is not the end of the matter. In Anwar and Pietro's account, WOAH also appeared to achieve an accommodation with these North African conditions. Knowledge drawn from veterinary science and from some of the bureaucratic and diagnostic practices, and at times also from treatments for diseases and techniques for preventing disease, was useful for many people in the region, even if their animal farming and trading techniques were not in keeping with WOAH requirements. Both Anwar and Pietro expressed regret that there was less standardisation than they would have liked, particularly in veterinary training, and they also complained that almost all animal disease reference laboratories (diagnostic centres that identify particular diseases) were located in the Global North; yet at the same time, they believed that WOAH was providing helpful knowledge and services to pastoralists and other livestock farmers in the region.

The implication of this ambivalence was that it was perhaps possible to disengage the veterinary knowledge that informed WOAH from the industrialised locating logic that also guided it. In fact, many people with whom I discussed this issue, particularly in the southern and eastern parts of the Mediterranean region, tended to think of WOAH as work in progress. The general sense was that this was in part because WOAH was better designed for some kinds of animal farming than others; but it was also because the WOAH standards are regularly crosscut by other interests. Despite the standardising logic of the organisation, the coexistence of other locating regimes generated the need for a continual process of adjustment. One further example from Egypt, this time from Alexandria, draws this out.

Pigs in Alexandria

Carl Rommel and I also visited a former mortadella producer in Alexandria, whom I will call Luigi. Mortadella is a distinctive Italian cooked pork sausage that is popular across the world, particularly in the US. Joseph J. Viscomi had put us in touch with Luigi, whom he had met years earlier when Viscomi was researching the history of Italians in Egypt. Luigi's family had produced mortadella in Alexandria for 75 years until it finally became too difficult. By 2011, obtaining the pigs needed to make the product and selling the product became virtually impossible.

Luigi explained that Egypt had a long history of pig farming, initially of African pigs, which were then crossbred with European pigs after the British arrived in the 1880s. The British also provided an innovative design of slaughterhouse for the animals, which required a different process of slaughter from what sheep and goats required. The slaughterhouse was built at the port near the lazaretto (a building that had been used for human quarantine) of the city, a proximity that Beirut had also selected for their slaughterhouses. Neither of those cities have slaughterhouses near their ports anymore; as Vialles (1994) notes in her history of abattoirs in France, once the industrialisation of the meat industry increased, the location of the place where the animals were killed moved far out of town and into highly mechanised and sanitised factory buildings located in the middle of nowhere.

Luigi reported that when his family first started selling mortadella, it was to foreigners; not even the Egyptian Christians would buy such products, even though the Coptic monasteries did keep pigs, somewhat quietly. During the nationalist period under Nasser, pig imports were banned, which led to a considerable increase in pig farming in Egypt. That was a good time, Luigi said: good quality meat, and good markets for the products. By the 1970s, local Christians were also buying his family's products.

That good situation did not continue. Since the early 2000s, things had dramatically taken a turn for the worse. In 2009 there was an outbreak of swine flu which led to a renewed ban on the

importation of animals from abroad, and huge numbers of the pigs being bred in Egypt were ordered to be destroyed. The outbreak of swine flu was cited as the reason for slaughtering the animals, but Luigi believed that this was just an excuse: the Egyptian leadership did not want any pigs in Egypt anyway. The Coptic monasteries still kept some pigs and were allowed to continue to do so, but for Luigi, that was the end of his ability to run his business. In 2011 he finally gave up producing mortadella.

Luigi has since begun producing mozzarella, ricotta, and gouda, which do not attract nearly the same level of attention from the government as do pork products, he said. Nevertheless, Luigi spent some time heavily criticising the industrialisation of dairy production in Egypt, saying that he believed almost all the available milk in the country was reconstituted from powder, and what was fresh milk was often inoculated with what he said were various noxious chemicals. For this reason, he worked cooperatively with a cheese factory with a direct link to a herd of dairy cattle used for the milk, located in 6th of October City, one of the new desert cities in Egypt.

Looked at through a crosslocations lens, this one conversation palpably demonstrated how overlapping locating regimes affected Luigi's life—colonial, contemporary state politics, religious, and social. Standardisation and industrialisation dovetailed into this mix in a way that persuaded Luigi that they were deeply inflected by political interests, both internal and external. He also believed that the scaling up and industrialisation of production had fragmented things, had led to a separation between the location of farmed animals, the processors and traders, and the consumers, and that this left a lot of space for what he saw as corruption. He suggested that in the past, when the connections linking breeders, traders, producers, and resellers were more visible and identifiable, even in conditions of rapid urbanisation, it was actually easier rather than more difficult to keep track of the animals and their progress through the production, sale, and consumption process.

Finally, it was in a sense impossible to identify any single meaning in the mass slaughter of the Egyptian pigs during the period

of swine flu. Undoubtedly, the slaughter was in line with WOAH standards and with the regulations written following those standards. Yet the coexistence of diverse political, religious, economic, and scientific knowledge and interests, all of which had somewhat different stakes in the location of those pigs in Egypt, made it difficult to identify a definitive cause for their slaughter. It can perhaps be said that their coexistence led to that outcome on that occasion: but that outcome could not predict what might happen the next time. This was precisely because of the coexistence of different locating regimes, which means that the engagement between them is never entirely predictable.

Patchy crosslocations

The period that led to the founding of WOAH was a historical moment that generated both a more interconnected but also more unequal world (Chakrabarty 2008; McClintock 1995; Stoler 1991; Wolf 1982). The techniques developed within WOAH to locate things and keep track of them inevitably drew upon the logics that brought WOAH into existence: the logic of global trade, the scaling-up logic of industrialisation, and the logic of veterinary science. This required WOAH to define locations and the connections and disconnections between them in a particular way. On the one hand, it required a constant monitoring of outbreaks of disease anywhere in the world, and the creation of barriers to try to prevent the spread of the disease while allowing livestock trade to continue. That implied a particular form of livestock farming, which did not suit those who based their animal farming on moving the animals continuously across well-worn routes that included chains of markets, grazing and watering territories, and significant social places. That amplified the inequalities across the region. At the same time, people adjusted and made use of the shifting conditions to carve out something other than what was imagined by the standards and regulations, an articulation of locating regimes in a variety of forms, and with unpredictable

results. The coexistence of different locating regimes made the outcome of every encounter contingent.

Finally, that points towards an important effect of looking at the imposition of standards in crosslocations terms. Doing so highlights that universalising logics are always also localising and localised logics: however universal the standards appear to be, they always come from somewhere and somewhen, and they are designed with a particular idea of the world in mind. When those standards inform regulations and laws, the standards can have the effect of imposing that underlying idea of the world onto diverse conditions—basically, standardising them. Yet crosslocations also implies that there is always the chance that something else happens as well, that there may always be encounters with other locating regimes, with results that are neither predictable nor quite what was intended. If there is one advantage to thinking about location in terms of crosslocations, it is that things could always turn out otherwise.

Conclusion:
the making of a multigraph

We began this project with some premises about location, hunches that had grown out of Sarah Green's ethnographic encounters in the past, most particularly in Epirus, on the Greek–Albanian border (Green 2005). It was a simple idea: that different ways of connecting and disconnecting places coexist; that they overlap in the same physical spaces, sometimes in tension, sometimes in alliance, sometimes simply coexisting in parallel with no mutual influence at all.

We also understood that thinking in that way had potentially radical implications. First, it implied that no single, overarching power can control and determine every place in its entirety—there is always something else going on, crosscutting it with a different locational logic. Second, it implied that while the world is contingent because of that coexistence of different logics (you can never quite know what will be the outcome of their mutual encounters), the world is also quite strongly shaped by the powerful forces that build locations. This in turn implies that it is possible to identify much of what is behind complexity: it is not enough to simply end with the idea that it is complicated, or to assume that change is entirely random; there is always more that can be known, ways to disentangle the diverse logics and powers involved. Third and finally, it implied that while most people are capable of simultaneously managing several different logics, ideologies, or paradigms, this does not undermine their sense of being somewhere and something in particular. We are of course not alone in identifying

that third implication: as Ilana Gershon has noted, 'many anthropologists these days are interrogating what happens when their fieldwork interlocutors live among multiple social orders that are kept distinct yet have porous boundaries' (2019, 404). Our focus on this frequently noted social condition was a distinctly spatial one: how does that coexistence work in terms of location—*where* you are in the world, rather than what or who you are?

There was a hope that this collective five-year effort to tease out these various ideas of crosslocations, and to work with them as we carried out ethnographic research in different places around the Mediterranean, would allow us to think about location differently. We understood this as being similar to what happens when you change the angle at which you look at a painting: it changes what you see, allows the recognition of something that has always been there, and is now seen in and through a different light and angle. Not the invention of a new thing, but another way to understand what was always there. In that sense, we did not set out to discover locating regimes, to find them hiding somewhere in the places we were studying. Instead, we were looking to see if thinking in this way about our encounters during fieldwork would provide a different way to understand those encounters. This book has drawn together some small samples of the results of these individual and collective efforts to experiment with that idea, and readers can draw their own conclusions about them. One thing is for certain: it is still the beginning of the exploration, not the end. The book marks a moment in the journey.

That raises the challenge of how to end the conversation in this text, for it is still in progress. We decided to meet that challenge by lifting the lid a little on how we got to this point in the process—the story so far, as Doreen Massey (2005, 12) put it—by taking a look at one of the more distinctive parts of the work we carried out: the collaboration between a group of anthropologists coming from different intellectual and regional backgrounds. In this conclusion, we are focusing on how the collaboration worked and what it meant—that is, we reflect on the events, structures, and processes that got us this far.

This is a reflexive move, yet a somewhat different one than what became common during the discipline's reflexive turn in the 1980s and 1990s. In that earlier moment, anthropology focused mostly on ethnographic writing and the embedded inequalities between the authors and their subjects—political, economic, regional, historical. The main point of that form of reflexivity was to critically reassess the way that anthropologists constructed their truths through particular genres—both those of its authors and that of Euro-American anthropology in general (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Herzfeld 1997; Marcus and Fischer 1986; Strathern 1981, 1987; Wolf 1992). These were crucial issues, and they remain so to this day. And yet, the question of how anthropologists engage with each other and with the world around them in order to generate a collaborative result as part of a joint project was not the focus of that debate. We are taking up that issue here, both because it is a relatively new phenomenon in anthropology (in the past, anthropologists famously mostly worked alone), and because we found that it has had important implications for the conceptual possibilities that opened out to us.

Coexistence

As is increasingly common across our discipline, we were working together on the same project, even though we had different field sites, intellectual backgrounds, and different relations to the underlying premises of the project. We coexisted as we were carrying out our research, visiting each other occasionally in the field, holding regular collective discussions about our work in an effort to gather together the threads and understand what was emerging. As we each considered our colleagues' interests, approaches, and ethnographic reports, the comparisons we made no doubt included conscious or unconscious evaluations of each other as much as comparisons of the substance and analysis of the ethnographic materials. Perhaps that kind of personal evaluation is more often part of anthropological coexistence than is acknowl-

edged in the more commonly reported forms of comparison in anthropology.[93]

Our coexistence was layered by the structural differences involved: one of us was a tenured full professor and the leader of the project; others were postdoctoral researchers, some more advanced in their careers than others; and some were PhD students. Two postdocs were initially part of a different research project funded by the Research Council of Finland, and they later joined Crosslocations; one participant was never able to commit to the project full-time, dropping in occasionally when he could carve out a small space from his other heavy academic commitments; and one PhD student's fieldwork was so disrupted and delayed by the restrictions on movement imposed by various governments in response to the Covid-19 pandemic that he was unable to contribute to this text. Furthermore, the need for most of the team to move to Finland had its inevitable disruptive effects on people's own lives, effects that will be highly familiar to most early career scholars. That disruption was one more marker of what comes under the umbrella of academic precarity, a condition that directs and motivates a considerable amount of activity for every scholar who finds themselves in that position. Every member of the full-time Crosslocations team, except for the project leader (Green), was in that position.

Over time we developed good collective working relations, even though the structural differences between us were self-evident, and experienced daily. The challenge was how to manage the coexistence of these differences, and how we would distinguish them from, or incorporate them into, the more conventional (not to say more formally legitimate) comparisons of ethnographic field sites and topics studied, and the ideas, both individual and collective, that were bubbling up out of them. The process was energising and occasionally both enervating and surprising in the same way that ethnography can be: it prompted—sometimes

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93 For a wonderful summary of more conventional anthropological comparison, see Candea (2019).

shoved—us to think again and otherwise, to get out of our own obsessions and understand in another way.

In this sense, we were living at least two different but strongly related logics: the logic that informs academic careers and trajectories, in this case particularly involving the timings, expectations, and limitations imposed by the European Research Council's (ERC) institutional and structural logic;[94] and the crosslocations logic we were testing and developing. In doing so, we also occupied at least two distinct locations: first, there was our location within the academy, both geographically and institutionally; and second, there were our different locations within our respective ethnographic field sites. There were other locations as well, related to our own particular biographies (Carsten et al. 2018) and our personal connections with different parts of the world. More than that, there were the divisions in regional expertise: those who were focused on Middle East and North African anthropology, as against those more focused on European or Mediterraneanist anthropology.

The whole project was itself located at a kind of crosslocated crossroads, as it covered the entire Mediterranean region—north (Southern Europe), south (North Africa), as well as west (gateway to the Atlantic) and east (gateway to the Black and Red seas). Many of the depictions of these places were inbuilt and ingrained—ready-made, so to speak. These were the well-worn stereotypes promoted by holiday brochures and oversimplified media coverage about the Mediterranean region and its bits and parts. These ready-made depictions made it important to focus on the crosscuts, to look for times and places where something else coexisted. We were constantly encouraged to take a step back and, from another angle, to look again.

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94 For an examination of the specific logics, agencies, and temporalities inherent in the project's unique organisational form, see Graan and Rommel (forthcoming).

Mediterranean crosslocations (design: Sarah Green).

That process was at times irritating and invigorating in equal measure, generating the sense that we were either expanding the ideas so far that they became meaningless, or that we were arguing about small details that did not really matter and losing sight of the main point. And we regularly experienced a sense that déjà vu was meeting Groundhog Day: a replaying of ideas, conclusions, and arguments that had appeared in the same way in another location, which was also simultaneously the same location. Talk of various geometries—fractals and topologies in particular—came up regularly.[95]

This process of coexistent ethnography, thoughts, arguments, and readings generated huge amounts of material, and endless ways to try to keep track of what can be thought of as a constant process of comparison: with the original project proposal; with the fieldwork; with each other's shifting interpretation of the key

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95 The use of mathematical metaphors became such a key issue at one point that Green (2020) decided to look into the use of these terms in mathematics so as to compare that to the social science use of the terms.

premises; with the ideas and work of others; and with the way the ideas were playing out. The collective work that emerged from our coexistence has been incorporated into each chapter, usually without being made explicit. Because of the way we interacted and worked together, the comparisons were inevitably made long before the chapter was written.

Collaboration

In the early stages, our conversations focused on the concepts laid out in the research proposal: relative location, locating regimes, and crosslocations. The task was to explore epistemologies, structures, and logics that calibrate the relative meaning of coexisting, overlapping locations. For example, while still in Helsinki, we set out to identify what we really might mean by the phrase 'locating regimes'. Our conversations were often organised around six key themes: law, bureaucracy, and borders; infrastructures and digital technologies; trade, banking, and finance; environment and agriculture; language and social relations; and religious structures. The idea at the time was that we might only need to imagine places as being crosscut by a limited and fixed number of locating regimes. The thinking behind that was that each regime would have its own basic logic, its own underlying paradigms. If a set of activities or way of classifying the difference between here and somewhere else was guided by the same underlying logic as a different set of activities or classifications, then it would be part of the same regime.

A topological analogy Sarah Green occasionally used at the time might help in understanding what we meant by this line of thinking. Imagine a plasticine sphere and a cube. Although they have different three-dimensional shapes, within the logic of topology they are the same, as the cube can be reshaped into the sphere (and vice versa) without cutting, joining, glueing, or tearing. A plasticine torus (doughnut shape), however, is not the same according to that rule because in order to turn a sphere into a torus you have to punch a hole in it. The point of this analogy is

that topology provides an underlying logic: a set of rules about what is the same and what is different.

This is somewhat similar to Bourdieu's (1995, 66–68) concept of the field as involving a distinct 'feel for the game': an understanding and sensibility of experience that emerges from having a knowledge of the logic by which things are happening. People understand the complex logic by which a football match is played both in terms of the formal rules of the game and in terms of the informal rules, but both carry a particular logic, one that informs what the game of football involves, including the physical infrastructure, the laws, the audience, the players, everything. And a similar logic informs the playing of cricket, even if the game is different: the underlying logic of game-playing of that type is the same. Our initial idea was that the logics informing locating regimes would work like that: if financial arrangements that distributed assets across space drew on the same logic as Church authorities did in organising their distribution of buildings across space, then the two activities would be different versions of the same locating regime.

From these beginnings, we started the task of 'cutting the network' (Strathern 1996) in this way and that, seeing if we could draw on past ethnographic experiences and literature reviews to locate the logical differences between one kind of locating logic and another. Strathern noted that when social science shifted into drawing on metaphors of networks and hybrids rather than thinking of cultural and social entities as whole things, the problem arose about identifying where and how it all stops: how do you make cuts between one kind of hybrid or networked entity and another? Strathern (1996, 404) concluded that part of the task of analysis and understanding is indeed to both search for and impose those kinds of cuts in the apparently endless flow of life, to hold things steady for long enough to make sense of them in one way rather than another. This was a particularly important process for us as we began to formulate individual ethnographic projects that we imagined as being both wholes in themselves and also parts of a greater whole, of the idea of experimenting with

crosslocations as a way to make sense of the material we were gathering.

As expected, as soon as each of us took off to our respective field sites, our shared premises began to be filtered through the ambiguities, irregularities, and complexities of ethnographic research. The list of possible locating regimes began to expand as the initial ideas stretched and loosened following encounters in the field, and as each of us grasped the underlying ideas differently. That original approach of focusing on the underlying logic as the key element that shaped locating regimes began to fade in favour of looking at particular events, activities, and institutions as providing traces of locating dynamics at work. As we grappled with the difficulties of the task, there was constant slippage between approaching the idea of locating regime as a thought, as a way to understand a dynamic set of processes, and locating regime as a thing in the world that could be identified and catalogued. The first approach was about describing the continual activity that makes up the sense of being somewhere in particular; the second was more aligned with labelling and identifying, and it was more prone to encourage us to think about locating regimes as fixed entities.

Attempts to label locating regimes in that second sense were a regular activity within the research team. Could history be considered a locating regime (see Chapter 4 for one answer to that question)? And if so, then what about time and temporality? What about food, music, tourism, the media, or even social theory? How were we to understand locating regimes that were driven by separate logics, but which, in practice, seemed to overlap and merge? What did it really mean to ask where things are without also asking what they are? How could we reconcile our initial premise that multiple locations may coexist in any given place with our interlocutors' frustration over processes of erasure and homogenisation that appeared to remove just about any alternative locations?

Those questions have been partly resolved by returning to the initial idea of drawing on crosslocations premises as a way to look at places from another angle, not as a way to try to press the

events and encounters into a particular shape. The key aim was to notice how people manage the coexistence of different locating logics in their lives, not so much to impose them on people. This is analogous to Ilana Gershon's (2019) description of 'porous social orders', as we discussed in the introduction. The previous chapters provide numerous examples of how we tried to resolve these issues in each case, or at least made an initial effort to do so. It turns out that the effort, and having to talk to each other about it, to explain what we thought it meant, was one of the most intellectually productive parts of the collaborative work.

Documents

Once the research team was assembled in Helsinki, we began doing what projects do. We held weekly meetings, organised workshops, participated in conferences, and we reached out to colleagues in anthropology and beyond. Over the years these encounters were also written out in various agendas, minutes, and reports that served to structure, record, and digest our exchanges. Many of these conversations have not been included in this text, though they are reflected in the documentation that was being constantly generated as we proceeded. Location is perpetually present in these documents, in the form of meeting venues, time zones, travel itineraries, and hotel addresses. In this sense, these documents remind us that, just like the people we address in this book, who are always somewhere in particular, our vantage points are no less located. They also remind us that, just as we have been navigating places that host multiple and coexisting relative locations, our accounts are no less relative and partial, telling some stories among many.

Seen as 'artifacts of modern knowledge practices' (Riles 2006, 7), the documents that we began to amass proliferated in filing cabinets and in computers. Unlike our individual field notes, they were collectively produced, often with the help of administrative staff. And also unlike fieldnotes, to date, they remain relatively unexamined for content and meaning, except for having been

consulted by the leader of the project for the periodic reviews and reports that were sent to the funder, the ERC. For now, they simply leave a silent, voluminous trace of the work done, and they provide a faint promise that one day, they might offer insights on aspects of collaborative research that tend to go unnoticed. They might expose the social and material infrastructures that enable synergy and reveal overlaps between processes of knowledge production and structures of audit culture. They might disclose the mundane realities of intellectual labour and address some of the challenges involved in collaborative research. They will certainly reveal the various loose threads we failed to weave into this book and the several paths we took only to later abandon them.

Pandemic crosslocations

Covid-19 arrived just as we were completing an intensive joint week-long workshop together in Epirus, north-western Greece, in early March 2020. We went through a number of complicated adventures to get back home on 11 March 2020, which was the same day as the World Health Organization declared that Covid-19 had become a pandemic, and borders began closing as airlines began cancelling flights all over Europe and the rest of the world. One of us had decided to stay in Greece for an extra two weeks which ended up being more than a year; another, Viljami Kankaanpää-Kukkonen, who had only recently begun his PhD fieldwork in Spain on transhumant beekeeping, had to abandon his work there and return to Finland so he could get back to his young family. He made it just in time as the Spanish and Portuguese borders closed behind him. He would not be able to return to complete his fieldwork until 2022.

After March of 2020, and despite many Zoom calls and email exchanges, we never fully retrieved the synergy that we had developed as a team during the first part of the project. We also missed out on some additional planned fieldwork trips together to visit every researcher's field site, and we were unable to entirely complete our planned work to generate photographic and mapping

accounts of crosslocations, drawing on the expertise of a cartographer (Philippe Rekacewicz) and photographer (Lena Malm). However, we were fortunate in that we did manage to complete the bulk of the fieldwork, photography, and mapping before the borders closed. The photographic part of the project is now available as a book that demonstrates an impressive selection of different ways to understand and literally picture crosslocations, and also provides an account of collaboration between ethnographers and a photographer.[96] The work we have done with Philippe Rekacewicz on mapping, some of which can be seen in Chapter 5, is forthcoming as a full book as this text is being finalised.

The pandemic demonstrated the simultaneous coexistence of both connections and disconnections more starkly than perhaps any of the material in the previous chapters. The whole planet appeared to be completely interconnected, looked at from the perspective of an airborne virus (eventually named SARS-CoV-2, but not before everyone had become used to calling it the generic 'coronavirus'): the virus had spread across the whole world, at least to the human-populated areas. In the first few weeks, live maps of the spread of the virus were being obsessively checked by millions on the internet. At the same time, the disconnections across the planet became painfully visible as well: supplies of all kinds of medical equipment, now in extremely high demand, became available more or less only to the richest countries; hospitals became rapidly overwhelmed in many countries; when a vaccine finally became available, it was only certain countries that could access sufficient doses to make a significant difference. As such, the moment highlighted the vulnerability of a globalised but highly unequal world economy. As the usual logistics supply chains became unreliable or entirely broken, the way high

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96 See https://www.rosebud.fi/2020/?sivu=tuote&ean=9789527313381 and available freely as a PDF at https://www.helsinki.fi/en/researchgroups/crosslocations/news/new-crosslocations-book-published-photography (both accessed 14 November 2023).

dependence on transnational trade had created serious social and economic weaknesses became blatant.

At the same time, we became aware that crosslocations provided a novel way to comprehend the pandemic in terms of overlapping locations that created synergies in some places, conflicts in others, and indifference in yet others. The irony was that a massive event that affected our own work together also highlighted the importance of understanding the dynamics of the multiple connections and disconnections between places that we were all in the process of studying.

Openings

In anthropology, there is sometimes the hope that all of it, the entire conceptual and analytical narrative that we generate, will come from the ethnographic encounter. It is a hope that we can resolve the intellectual and moral puzzles constantly presented to anthropologists by echoing, reformulating, and translating the understandings learned in the field (Candea 2018, 6–7; Lebner 2017). That assumption informed our efforts as well, though we were also looking for something else: a way to go beyond the search for a single conceptual narrative; a way to get at partial layers, overlaps, engagements, and connections, while always keeping in mind the parts that remain disconnected, separated, bounded, and fragmented; an account that neither sees the world as entirely separated out into neat epistemological or ontological differences, nor entirely interconnected; and finally, a vision that would allow us to gain a sense of how things could be otherwise.

The crosslocations approach begins with the idea that no logic, however powerful, is ever alone in the world. This idea, combined with our focus on where things are and how things proceed, provided us a sense of possibility: of something being left open, however overpowering the situation might seem at any given moment. This open-endedness is not based on ignoring the operations of power and their effects on the world, but rather the opposite. It seeks to allow for the coexistence of multiple powerful dynam-

ics that act with and through various forces. Paradoxically, our constant focus on those powerful forces that shape where we are in the world and create constraints, hierarchies, inequalities, and exclusions, provided us with an understanding that there is often the possibility that things could be reshaped. Our attention to locational plurality—to those multiple, relative, and power-inflected ways of understanding where something is—enabled us to see things otherwise, to understand location differently, and to imagine alternatives. As we complete this book, people are living a moment during which the sheer uncertainty of what might happen next, both in particular places and at a planetary level, is generating a great deal of doubt in the present and anxiety about the future. Crosslocations provided us with a method to meet and understand people where they were, as they managed their multiple worlds, and in doing so, it helped us locate new possibilities in the present and envision alternative futures.

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