HISTORIES OF URBAN PLANNING AND POLITICAL POWER

European Perspectives

Edited by
Victoria Grau and Max Welch Guerra

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Urban planning has always been a preeminent instrument of political power. In this volume, contributions from Europe and Latin America provide insight into the functions of planning under very different political and societal constellations over the last hundred years: dictatorships, parliamentary democracies, and illiberalism; capitalism and state socialism; state interventionism and neoliberalism; and societies in times of peace and societies marked by colonial, civil, world, or cold wars.

The dictatorships of the 1920s and 1930s made extensive use of the potential of planning for economic growth, for brutal repression, but also for the integration of certain population groups and as an effective means of propaganda. The legacy of these dictatorships still characterizes many European cities today and confronts planning with complex tasks. Dictatorial state socialism planned to establish a new social order with a particular technocratic rationality, which did not, however, cancel completely the tendential autonomy of the professional planning sphere. Parliamentary democracies and illiberal regimes have developed specific new practices of using planning to rebuild cities in the interests of neoliberal economic growth and populistic legitimization of power.

Histories of Urban Planning and Political Power takes the next steps in significantly expanding our understanding of planning and politics. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of urbanism, urban/town planning, spatial planning, spatial politics, urban development, urban policies, and planning history and European history of the 20th century.

Victoria Grau studied urban studies at the Bauhaus University, Weimar, and at University College Dublin. Since 2022, she has worked as a research assistant at the Chair of Spatial Planning and Spatial Research at Bauhaus-Universität Weimar.

Max Welch Guerra is a Senior Professor of Spatial Planning and Spatial Research and Head of the BSc and MSc Urbanistik at Bauhaus-Universität Weimar.

"With a continental-scale approach, this volume examines variations of urban transformation across decades and political systems. Each case study presents a deep analysis of how spatial planning itself is a political instrument that is never neutral or disengaged from society."

Kimberly E. Zarecor, *Professor of Architecture, Iowa State University, USA*

"This collection shows how important it is to identify the urbanism of the different European dictatorships as something more than the monolithic image of the monumental buildings and wide boulevards of political power. This transnational European perspective is urgently needed."

José Luis Oyón, *Professor of Urbanism, Escuela Técnica Superior de Arquitectura del Vallés, Universidad Politécnica de Cataluña, Spain*

"This volume serves as the perfect tool to reinforce the perception of cities as unique chronicles of political and social changes that need to be preserved and developed in their complexity."

Henrieta Moravčíková, *Professor of Architecture, Department of Architecture at the Institute of History, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Slovakia*

"In an era of homogenizing global forces, the insightful chapters in this timely volume remind us of the essential roles of national and local culture, political structure and human agency in shaping our built environment."

John Accordino, *Professor of Urban and Regional Planning, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, USA*

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ABOUT THE EDITORS

Victoria Grau (Frankfurt am Main, 1999) studied urban studies at Bauhaus-Universität Weimar (Germany), and at University College Dublin (Ireland). Since 2022, she has been working as a research assistant at the Chair of Spatial Planning and Spatial Research at Bauhaus-Universität Weimar. Her work centers on the connection between planning, politics, and economics in European metropolises in the 20th and 21st centuries. Her PhD project is dedicated to the development of Städtebau as a profession, science, and policy field between 1919 and 1935, with a particular focus on the period of the Nazi dictatorship in Germany. Since 2022, she has been a member of the research group "Urban Planning in Nazi Germany in a European Context (1933–1945)".

Max Welch Guerra (Chile, 1956) is a Senior Professor of Spatial Planning and Spatial Research and Head of the BSc and MSc Urbanistik at the Bauhaus-Universität Weimar. He studied political science at the Freie Universität Berlin and completed his doctorate and habilitation at the Technische Universität Berlin. His field of research concerns the congruence between space, planning, and society in Europe since the 20th century. He is a Member of IPHS, the Advisory Board of the Documentation Center Nazi Party Rally Grounds, Nuremberg, and Head of the Academic Advisory Board of the German Academy for Spatial Development (ARL). From 2013 to 2022, he was Director of the Bauhaus Institute for History and Theory of Architecture and Planning. Since 2022, he has been Co-Director (with Harald Bodenschatz) of the research group "Urban Planning in Nazi Germany in a European Context (1933–1945)". Recent publications include Max Welch Guerra et al: *European Planning History in the 20th Century. A Continent of Urban Planning* (Routledge, London/New York 2022); and with Harald Bodenschatz (ed.): *Städtebau als Kreuzzug Francos. Wiederaufbau und Erneuerung unter der Diktatur in Spanien 1938–1959* (2021).

CONTRIBUTORS

Paulo Álvarez (Chile, 1975), PhD (c) in Architecture and Urban Studies, is a teacher of geography and history and an anthropologist. He has presented in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and also at the Human Rights Watch and Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) on the topic of police violence in segregated neighborhoods in Chile. He has been a professor at various universities in the country and a guest lecturer at universities abroad. His areas of research involve topics such as oral memory and urban-space conflicts. Currently, he is part of the research on "New social vulnerability in Chile" (2023–2024). His recent publications include "La última entrevista a Miguel Eyquem Astorga" (2023) and chapters in the books "La oralidad diletante: un ejercicio etnográfico sobre la intervención policial en La Legua" (2023) and "La huella sin duelo de La Villa San Luis de Las Condes. Santiago de Chile" (2023). His published books include "Legua Emergencia: Una historia de Dignidad y Lucha" (2014), and he is a co-author of the books "Sí estos callan, las piedras gritarán, ensayos de teología práctica interdisciplinar" (2017) and "Mariano Puga: Cura obrero de la ciudad desigual" (2021).

Gruia Bădescu (Bucharest, 1983) is a research fellow at the Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz. He holds a PhD in Architecture at the University of Cambridge, and studied urban design, geography and history at Middlebury College, Sciences Po Paris, and the LSE's Cities Programme. His research examines the relationship between urban reconfigurations and dealing with a difficult past. He focuses on post-war reconstruction and urbanism during and after dictatorships, researching cities in Southeastern Europe and also in dialogue with other regions, specifically the Levant and the Southern Cone of Latin America. He is the co-convener of the Memory, Space, and Place working group of the Memory Studies Association. From 2015 to 2018, he was a lecturer and research associate at the University of Oxford, after which he joined Konstanz as a Humboldt fellow hosted by Jan and Aleida Assmann. Since 2020, he has led a research group on urban imaginaries after political ruptures at the Zukunftskolleg. Recent publications include the edited volume of Bădescu et al: *Synchronous Pasts: Transforming Heritage in the Former Yugoslavia* (2021) and articles such as "Difficult

Heritage in Southeastern Europe: Local and Transnational Entanglements in Memorializing Political Prisons after Socialism" (2023).

Harald Bodenschatz (Munich, 1946), a sociologist and urban planner, was a full professor of sociology of architecture and urban planning from 1995 to 2011. He is a member of the Center for Metropolitan Studies (Technische Universität Berlin) and the Bauhaus Institute of History and Theory of Architecture and Urban Planning (Bauhaus-Universität Weimar). He is the author/co-author of a wealth of books on urban issues, including *Städtebau im Schatten Stalins* (ed. with Christiane Post, 2003), *Urbanism and Dictatorship. A European Perspective* (ed. with Piero Sassi and Max Welch Guerra, 2015), and *The Power of Past Greatness. Urban Renewal of Historic Centres in European Dictatorships* (ed. with Max Welch Guerra, 2021). Since 2022, he has been a Co-Director (with Max Welch Guerra) of the research group Urban Planning in Nazi Germany in a European Context (1933–1945).

Florian Dierl (Germany, 1969), historian, is a senior officer at the Research Services of the German Federal Parliament. From 2014 to 2023, he was director of the Documentation Centre Nazi Party Rally Grounds, Nuremberg. He has written various papers and essays on the history of the German police, Nazi perpetrators in the Second World War, and the culture of remembrance in Germany. His recent publications include "Gedenkstätten, Dokumentationszentren und Museen als Akteure der Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung". In: Magnus Brechtken (Ed.): *Aufarbeitung des Nationalsozialismus. Ein Kompendium* (2021).

Marcell Hajdu studied Transport Engineering at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics and European Urban Studies at the Bauhaus-Universität Weimar. His main research interest is the entanglement of urban development and the politics of remembering. In his dissertation written as part of the DFG Research Training Group, "Identity and Heritage", he studies the role of urban heritage in the reproduction of the post-2010 Hungarian political regime.

Macarena Ibarra is an associate professor at the Institute of Urban Studies, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (PUC). She is a historian and teacher of geography and history from PUC Master of Arts, University of Leeds, United Kingdom; and PhD in Architecture, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom and was a Postdoctoral researcher at the PUC of Chile funded by Conicyt (2007–2012). She has been a researcher in national and international research funds, resulting in various publications on urban history and urbanism, as well as heritage studies. Some of her most recent publications include *Vísperas del Urbanismo en Latinoamérica 1870–1930. Imaginarios, pioneros y disciplinas* (2018) and *Enmarcando la ciudad planificada en América Latina, 1940–1980. Desarrollo, territorio y planes sectoriales* (2024), both co-edited with Arturo Almandoz, in addition to various articles in specialized journals and book chapters. She is currently leading the research project funded by ANID, Fondecyt Regular 1241635, La ciudad en dictadura. Institucionalidad, modernización autoritaria y planificación urbana en Chile, 1973–1990.

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Jannik Noeske (Germany, 1992) is a researcher at Bauhaus-Universität Weimar and associate PhD candidate at the Institute for Research on Society and Space (Erkner). His work focuses on the history of planning and urbanism as well as collective memory in public spaces. His earlier works have addressed the histories of technological and knowledge-based urbanism in the 20th century under dictatorial regimes and the history of electronic data processing in urban planning. Currently, he is involved in a project dealing with physical remnants of Nazi history in Weimar and elsewhere.

Petr Roubal, PhD (Prague, 1975), studied history and social anthropology at the CEU in Budapest and at Cambridge University. His dissertation dealt with the political symbolism of mass gymnastic performances (Spartakiads). A monograph on the subject published in Czech won a major literary prize (Magnesia Litera). The English translation was published in 2019 under the title *Spartakiads: Politics of Physical Culture in Communist Czechoslovakia*. Since 2008, he has been a researcher at the Institute of Contemporary History in Prague, where he dealt with topics of politics of memory and origins of post-communist neo-liberalism. Currently, he is heading the Working Group on Urban History at the institute, working mostly on the history of post-war Prague, in particular the city planning and socialist as well as post-socialist urbanism.

Piero Sassi (Italy, 1984) is a lecturer and research associate at the Universität Kassel, Department of Urban Regeneration and Planning Theory. He studied architecture and urbanism at the Ferrara University and the Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts in Copenhagen. From 2013 to 2022, he was a research associate at the Bauhaus-Universität Weimar, where he defended (2022) his doctoral thesis on urban planning and development in the capital city Madrid under Franco's dictatorship (title: *"El gran Madrid Capital de España"—Planung und Bau der Hauptstadt Madrid unter der Diktatur Francos 1939–1959*). Since 2013, he has been coordinator of the UEDXX (Urbanism of European Dictatorships during the XXth Century) scientific network; since 2022, a member of the Action Group "Integrated Approaches to Dissonant Heritage" (Urban Agenda for the EU); and since 2023, a member of the Scientific Committee of ATRIUM (Architecture of Totalitarian Regimes of the XX Century in Europe's Urban Memory). His main research foci are on 20th-century urbanism history, urban regeneration processes, and spatial planning in European Union policies.

Daniela Spiegel (Berlin, 1973) is professor of heritage conservation and architectural history at the Bauhaus-Universität Weimar. After her studies in art history, archeology, and heritage conservation, she worked as a research associate and lecturer, first at the Technical University of Berlin, where she also completed her doctorate, and then at the Bauhaus-Universität Weimar, where she completed her habilitation. From 2019 to 2023, she held the chair for architectural history and heritage conservation at the Anhalt University of Applied Sciences. She is part of the teaching staff of the DFG Research Training Group 2227, Identity and Heritage. Daniela's research interests include the theory and history of heritage conservation as well as the urban and architectural history of the 20th century, with a special focus on Fascist Italy and the former GDR.

Christian von Oppen (Hanover, 1971), architect and urban researcher, trained in Karlsruhe Berlin and New York, is a research associate at the Center for Metropolitan Studies (Technische Universität Berlin) and a member of the Bauhaus Institute for History and Theory of Architecture and Planning in Weimar. From 2007 to 2014, he was a research associate and lecturer at the Bauhaus-Universität Weimar. His academic activities span from recent urban history to contemporary urban design.

ABOUT THE COVER IMAGE

Until 1989, the border between East and West ran here, a tangible example of the Cold War: the riverbank was part of West Berlin; the waters of the Spree were already GDR territory. Today, the Paul Löbe House (Stephan Braunfels, 1997–2001) accommodates the meeting rooms of the committees of the German Bundestag.

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INVESTIGATING URBAN PLANNING IN VARIOUS FORMS OF RULE

An introduction

Victoria Grau and Max Welch Guerra

Urban planning is never a neutral practice. Contemporary urban and other scales of spatial planning were created as political instruments. Over time, they have constituted a policy field, initially as a measure to cope with the demands and consequences of industrialization in the leading capitalist countries. The academic discipline of urban planning emerged as a reaction to this complex process. This book is about the politics of planning or, more specifically, the use of spatial planning as a political instrument, a field of political practice, and a scientific discipline in relation to its function in the reproduction of society and the respective form of rule. This is one major component of a larger discussion on planning and power relations. In this volume, we define and investigate urban and spatial planning as an expression, a result, and an instrument of the continuously changing economic, political, and social determinants of spatial development.

Investigating the use of planning as an instrument of political rule requires delving into the characteristics of individual cases. The methods, objectives, and legitimizing narratives vary greatly from country to country and also over time. We argue that connections between politics and space often cannot be recognized as a snapshot, but instead must be read as the result of historical events, solutions to conflicts, reactions to challenges, consequences of crises, and, finally, an expression of power and disempowerment. In dictatorships, a form of rule that was widespread in Europe in the 20th century and still is today, the figure of the ruler, is regularly defined as the central decision-making body. Again and again since 1945, architectural or urban plans as well as realizations in Nazi Germany have been explained by Hitler's traumata or megalomania, for example. Such a simplification shrouds the fact that even in dictatorships, old and new interest groups pursue their own spatial policy goals and endeavor to achieve them. In reality, the actors involved may differ greatly, as power emerges from the most diverse constellations of social, economic, or institutional interests (cf. Brenner, 2004). Initiators of planning do not always have to be professionals. This is most visible in temporary mature democracies, where not only developing companies but also civil society organizations and even citizens' initiatives use planning instruments for their interests. The declared or tacit renunciation as well as the proactive implementation of public planning interventions must be investigated as specific expressions of planning politics. The aim of this book is to capture these very different histories and realities from a spatial perspective.

State of the art

In studies on the practice of political rule, the role of spatial planning as a political instrument, as a central means of steering social development, usually remains unmentioned or is reduced to prestigious projects. Even measures with an obvious spatial impact are rarely systematically evaluated in terms of their socio-spatial effects. In planning history and theory as well as generally in urban research, the political character of planning is examined with fluctuating intensity. In many countries, the basso continuo of this strand of urban and planning research is a critique that was initially understood, whether explicitly or implicitly, as anti-capitalist and, in some cases, still is. Henri Lefebvre stands out among the critics who raised their voices in the past to analyze and question the capitalist mode of spatial development (Lefebvre, 1974). Lefebvre made an fruitful approach leaning on Marxism as it was taken up in many regions of the world and continues today to stimulate a large number of critical positions. There is reason to believe that, around half a century after Lefebvre's most relevant publications on planning, critical planning research is currently in a new and tremendously productive phase. However, it can be understood as a continuation of the critical tradition.

Publications of recent years tend to primarily focus on contemporary phenomena and developments in planning and politics (cf. Bobic & Haghighi, 2023; Koch, 2022). The topics cover – to name only a few – the use of big data and artificial intelligence (cf. Mayer-Schönberger & Ramge, 2019; Sanchez et al., 2023), the relationship of urban security and control (cf. Beste, 2000; Harb & Gharbieh, 2012), border politics and migration (cf. Mbembe, 2019; Parizot, 2018; Su, 2022), and urban protest and violence (cf. Gualini et al., 2015; Smith, 2020). Recent streams of research have been expanding the field to encompass even broader questions. Feminist, gender, and queer approaches to planning have made their own contributions to expanding research not only on planning and politics through gender and sex but also on the relationship between private and public spaces (cf. Kern, 2022; Ruhne, 2011; Zibell et al., 2019). Here and in (post-)colonial studies, the application of methods is also critically scrutinized in addition to substantive questions on the significance of domination and space (cf. Kaltmeier & Corona Berkin, 2012; Parnell & Oldfield, 2017; Winkler, 2018). Fundamental debates on the positioning of the author, the relationship between quantitative and qualitative research, subjectivity and objectivity, and the definition and benefits of scientific research in general are examined (cf. Leitner, 2019; Nugraha et al., 2023).

The consequence of this current academic upheaval is a kaleidoscopic research landscape, the fragmentation of which, however, should be regarded as a successful and worthwhile stadium of academic advancement. The expansion of the field of observation, which is, above all, due to a new generation of researchers, is valuable not only with regard to its content but also because it contributes to the internationalization of the expert community and its debates from within (cf. Baisotti, 2022; Nehe & International Research Group on Authoritarianism and Counter-Strategies, 2022). The growing awareness and sensitivity toward approaches and topics that have been ignored or underrepresented to date are reflected both qualitatively and quantitatively in research projects and publications (cf. Nugraha et al., 2023).

Consequently, planning historiography is changing. While in the second half of the 20th century, it was primarily the Anglosphere (cf. Pojani, 2023, pp. 3–6) that held discourse sovereignty, the planning science debate, especially in the field of historiography, has now become globalized both in terms of experts involved and countries studied (cf. Njoh, 2009; Steel

et al., 2017; Watson, 2016; Welch Guerra et al., 2023). The changing profile of the leading International Planning History Society, its journal Planning Perspectives, and the publications of its members are important examples of this. Holistic approaches are gradually being abandoned and prerogatives of interpretation are being reflected upon and broken up (cf. Hein, 2019; Lees et al., 2023; Pojani, 2023).

We believe that examining spatial planning specifically under different forms of rule is an important desideratum in the current international debate. Examining the political dimension of spatial planning –both as an active and a passive instrument of development control – provides a profound insight into the complex, multilayered, and often seemingly abstract driving mechanisms of development in society as a whole. In doing so, we have to broaden our view to include types of societies that are usually overlooked in the international debate. This observation is the starting point for the conception of this publication.

Our research aim

This volume brings together researchers from urban studies, history, art history, sociology, political science, and architecture. Thirteen case studies offer a broad spectrum of constellations between spatial planning and types of political rule: they cover dictatorships, parliamentary democracies, and illiberalist regimes; capitalism and state socialism; state interventionism and neoliberalism. The studied planning activities are quite varied: the implementation of industrialized mass housing construction, the targeted tertiarization of a metropolitan center, the clear-cutting of the inner city, the use of almost all urban and landscape resources in preparation for war, and attempts to control society by means of scientizing planning. Furthermore, there is an often-underestimated range of planning activities: the careful preservation and the reuse of inherited buildings for the creation of historical memorials, the unsystematic assimilation of entire layers of politically tinged urban heritage, and even the reconstruction of entire cities. The framework conditions vary greatly; societies in times of peace, societies marked by coups or colonial, civil, world, or cold wars. In order to capture this breadth, we look at the history of the last hundred years.

Twelve of the 13 contributions deal with selected continental European countries. We chose the continent because of its multiplicity of planning cultures and political systems. Over the past 100 years, public planning has had a particularly strong impact on European countries. The contrasts that emerge between the respective situations might appear extreme sometimes, for example, between *reconstrucción* in the Spanish province in the precarious years after the Civil War and *Tertiärisierung* in the flourishing German financial metropolis. Also, the reader may be surprised that we have included Chile as a non-European case. In one example, we would like to explore the extent to which the use of planning interventions in space for disseminating interpretations of the history of a geographically very distant country goes beyond the framework of our European examples. In doing so, we follow a scholarly position that explicitly calls for thinking "beyond the North-South binary" (Gillespie & Mitlin, 2023). The emergence of global planning historiography and theory (cf. Avermaete, 2018) prompts us to pose the question of what distinguishes continental Europe in this case. We want to explore a very specific example of whether there are differences between the Global North and the Global South, to use this widespread categorization of the world that structurally contradicts a common approach.

The contributions originate from research projects that both younger and older scholars have developed based on an in-depth study of the subject. Our primary subject is always the planning and materialization of spatial programs in the context of political power relations. In all cases, sources have been evaluated in the respective national language and on-site investigations have been carried out. The inspiration for this volume originates from the annual conference of the Institute of European Urban Studies in Weimar in 2020 on "Spatial Planning and Political Forms of Rule". The last conference in 2023 was dedicated to a similar topic of "Authoritarian Urbanism: Global Manifestations, Knowledge Exchange and Contestation" chaired by Daniela Zupan and showcased how individual strands of research on space and power are constantly taking on greater contours.

The common approach of all the contributions in this volume, to capture the relationship between urban planning and political power in its historical dynamic, is reflected in very different ways in each case. The two shortest periods examined cover 12 years each. One text deals with the period of the Nazi dictatorship (1933–1945) and the other with the time since Victor Orbán's second election as Prime Minister of Hungary (2010–2022). The two longest periods span more than half a century. The text on the Valley of the Fallen in Spain discusses events from 1939 to the present day. The study of the Nazi Party Rally Grounds memorial site in Nuremberg beginns in 1945 in order to trace its development since then until 2021.

A superficial look at our 13 contributions might give the impression that a total of eight countries are being examined here: Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Chile, Romania, and Hungary. However, the contributions deal with far more constellations of rule. In some cases, it is the same territorial unit with a profound change in social order. This is the case of the contributions on Spain with the upheaval starting in 1975, when the Francoist dictatorship was replaced; on Romania, where the Ceaușescu dictatorship collapsed in 1989; and on Chile, where the military dictatorship had to step down in 1990. The contributions regarding Germany examine planning under five different constellations of rule. One contribution examines the Nazi dictatorship with the official name of the German Reich, two others begin with the period from 1945 to 1949 and deal first with the US occupation territory and the US-Great Britain "Bizone", then the forty years of the so-called old Federal Republic (1949–1990), and the united Federal Republic from 1990. Two further contributions deal with the German Democratic Republic, which existed in the former Soviet occupation territory from 1949 to 1990. One of the countries examined, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (*Československá socialistická republika*) has no longer existed since 1990. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (*Česká a Slovenská Federativní Republika*) existed from 1990 to 1992; after a peaceful split from Slovakia, today's Czech Republic was formed in 1993. Borders and forms of rule frequently changed in Europe in the 20th century.

The structure

The volume is divided into two sections: the first looks at right-wing dictatorships and the second at state-socialist dictatorships, a parliamentary democracy, and a system of rule whose label "illiberal" stems from its political leader and is now used worldwide.

The first section consists of eight articles and covers the period from the early 1920s to the present and focuses on urban planning under four European dictatorships that emerged in the interwar period in Europe. With the examples of Germany (*Deutsches Reich*), Spain (*Estado Español*), *and Portugal* (*Estado Novo*), the first three contributions examine dictatorships

whose rule was essentially based on the production and destruction of cities and space. All three contributions intend to refrain from simplistic, personalizing explanations toward an interpretation of planning politics that examines the socio-political strategies of dictatorships and their internal mechanisms. All three highlight the extent to which urban planning was an important instrument for establishing and expanding political rule.

In his study *A European perspective on National-Socialist urbanism*, Harald Bodenschatz offers a comprehensive approach to the relationship between planning and dictatorship. His periodization of the entire period of dictatorship identifies the main political motivations for the shifting use of planning. This goes hand in hand with determining who the main protagonists were and what features characterized the specific way in which urban planning was produced during a period. A further explicative achievement and a gain in differentiation are provided by international contextualization. Finally, by showing how the dictatorship used its own urban planning as a means of propaganda, one meets interpretations that are still effective today.

Max Welch Guerra's contribution *Reconstruction as a dictatorial power strategy. The multiple functions of an urban programme in the early years of the Franco regime (1938–1959)* on reconstruction after the Spanish Civil War provides an insight into the internal motivation and implementation mechanisms of the Franquist dictatorship. The Falange movement knew how to strengthen its position in the face of competing forces, thereby stabilizing and legitimizing the dictatorship as a whole. The two examples examined demonstrate a very pragmatic and surprisingly imaginative approach to urban design and the development of effective narratives.

Christian von Oppen's *The dictatorial modernization of Portugal* demonstrates how ambitious and successful the planning of a dictatorship was, despite being largely regarded as peripheral not only in geographical terms. In Portugal, planning had an essential impact on the conception and implementation of a socio-political program. On the one hand, the structure of the two most important cities was adapted to the new models of the time, favoring certain social classes. On the other hand, the past, which was presented as glorious, was given a convincing materialization through outstanding urban development projects. In order to achieve international standards in a country with a hitherto poorly established planning discipline, foreign expertise was immediately brought in.

The five following contributions show how the spatial legacy of right-wing dictatorships became the subject of historical-political attention under parliamentary-democratic conditions until today. In contrast to the strong internationalization that characterized the planning of the dictatorships before 1945 and also in contrast to the gradual emergence of a common debate on the politics of remembrance, the examples from Spain (*Estado Español* under Francoist dictatorship and since then *Reino de España*), the Federal Republic of Germany (*Bundesrepublik Deutschland*), Italy, and Chile (*Repubblica d'Italia* and *República de Chile*) illustrate the strong dependence on domestic and sometimes even foreign policy considerations.

In *Valle de los Caídos/Valle de Cuelgamuros: construction, use and "dispute value" of a gigantic legacy of the Franco dictatorship, 1939–2023*, Piero Sassi works out how much Spain is still divided today, almost half a century after the end of the dictatorship, by the lack of a general social consensus on the valuation of Francoism and the implementation of civil democratic rights. A major project from the 1940s concentrates and reignites the dispute over the interpretation of Franco's long dictatorship. In this respect, the dictatorial project was successful: the impact of the death cult monument in *Valle de los Caídos* – today *Valle de Cuelgamuros* – as the most important symbol of Franco's rule still has an effect today, as a

place of discord, but also because the mournful character of the site continues to create positive identification in a part of Spain's society – even after 80 years.

Florian Dierl's *Nuremberg: Nazi party rally grounds in a changing European culture of remembrance (1945–2021)* illustrates the change in interpretations and political intentions from 1945 to the present with protagonists as diverse as the US Army, the Federal Republic of Germany, the city of Nuremberg, and a committed local public. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the ongoing urban confrontation with the difficult legacy of the Nazi era is still a dominant subset of the country's state representation and political self-image.

Daniela Spiegel's *Italy's treatment of its fascist legacy: a history of development* (1943–2023) explores the almost ubiquitous legacy of fascism in Italy. The historical-political burden of the products of planning under Mussolini mostly takes a back seat here. It is not reasons of state that dominate here nor debates about individual objects that encompass the whole country, but rather pragmatism, waves of art and culture, party politics, and even commerce.

The fourth contribution of this section deals with the spatial legacy of a right-wing dictatorship from the second half of the 20th century. Macarena Ibarra with Paulo Álvarez's *Urban Heritage and political memory under dictatorship and democracy in Chile* retraces the heritage policy and public planning after the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1990 and juxtaposes this with the dictatorship's politics of remembrance.

The second section examines in the first step urban production through public planning in three state-socialist countries, the German Democratic Republic (*Deutsche Demokratische Republik*), the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (*Československá socialistická republika*), and the Socialist Republic of Romania (*Republica Socialistă România*). The division of Europe by the Cold War, which manifested itself very concretely soon after 1945 in a bifurcation of societal and spatial development, is still reflected today in planning history research, especially regarding the connection between planning and politics: planning in the countries of state socialism is largely terra incognita in the international debate on planning history and planning theory. The industrially constructed housing estate is still considered by many to be the defining characteristic of planning in the state-socialist countries of the 20th century and an example of the directives for urban development policy imposed by the Soviet Union. A closer look reveals major differences between the individual states. On the other hand, the widespread absence of market mechanisms enhanced the importance of the planning profession and applied science in questions of allocation in most countries under state socialism.

In *Planning, Politics and Panel Housing: Czechoslovak Housing Estates*, Petr Roubal examines the industrialization of housing construction as a demand made by various experts in the interwar period, which was implemented soon after 1945, long before Moscow decided on this path and began to export it as a model. Nevertheless, mass housing construction was a stumbling block for social development. Again, experts acted by expressing their professional criticism.

In *From comprehensive planning to small interventions. Urban renewal and rationalization in the German Democratic Republic*, Jannik Noeske works out how a complex of planning policy factors emerged in the GDR that supported and legitimized industrialized housing construction. The newly expanding field of computer science provided the scientific basis for deductive, centralized general development planning, the rationality of which led directly to the general neglect of old towns and the stock of the imperial era.

In *A twofold criticism of spatial planning. Unique academic experiences in the German Democratic Republic*, Max Welch Guerra traces how a powerful group of experts from

established university academia opposed the rationality of central government planning in the 1980s. The group made a catastrophic diagnosis of the prevailing urban development policy and formulated far-reaching reform proposals – without success.

In *Planning the "Victory of Socialism" and Its Afterlives: The Civic Center of Bucharest before and after 1989*, Gruia Bădescu analyzes how, in the 1980s, the Romanian state and party leadership focused its urban development policy on the creation of new centers in Bucharest and other cities, with the aim of increasing the regime's legitimacy by visibly modernizing the country. This center planning went hand in hand with the systematic destruction of inner cities. This contributed to the fall of the dictatorship and for a long time after 1990 made urban planning seem like a terrible communist idea. In the decade 1990 to 2000, the subsequent neoliberal political system was not able to realize a new Civic Center.

The section ends with two contributions that trace strong interventions in the city center, once as a neoliberal urban development policy under conditions of parliamentary democracy and the strong position of the municipality, and once as a means of consolidating the legitimacy of autocratic, illiberal rule using the examples of the Federal Republic of Germany and Hungary.

In *Sights set high. Steering the tertiarization in Frankfurt am Main (1945–1986)*, Victoria Grau presents a textbook example of entrepreneurial urban development politics in the FRG. Outstanding institutions of financial capital were allowed to shape the image of the city with a skyline that is unique by German standards, while a generous and very well-thought-out urban development of cultural facilities and the partial reconstruction of the old town successfully strengthened the attractiveness of the internationalized solvent middle class.

In *Between two Domes: Shifting political power relations in post-2010 Budapest*, Marcell Hajdu explains the recent transformation of symbolic spaces historically linked to the expression of political power that are redesigned to change the face of Budapest in line with the authoritarian-populist regime's ambition to consolidate its power and strengthen the figure of the prime minister. The top-down conception of the reconstruction program is based on nationalist narratives. Its implementation reflects and reproduces the dismantling of parliamentary-democratic codetermination and exploits the associated weakening of urban planning.

Contrary to still widespread academic practice, most of the contributions do not deal with newly built urban production. One result of our editorial work that should be emphasized is the finding that a relevant, often dominant task of urban planning since the second half of the 20th century at the latest has been the conscious handling of the urban legacy. The fact that most of the contributions in this volume deal with urban redevelopment reflects this reality.

Our volume ends with our concluding thoughts on the 13 contributions. Readers are nonetheless invited to draw their own conclusions, to gain inspiration for their own studies, and to contribute to the further internationalization of our professional debate.

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PART 1

Right-wing dictatorships and their heritage

1

A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE ON NATIONAL-SOCIALIST URBANISM

Harald Bodenschatz

This article[1] is based on my many years of research into the subject of urbanism and dictatorship in various European countries: the former Soviet Union, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.[2] An indirect, neither intentional nor expected, result of this work was a certain disaffection with the conventional national perspective regarding National-Socialist urbanism. In the public eye and in many professional circles, this urbanism continues to be identified with monumental buildings and wide boulevards. However, the content, places, and actors of urbanism and its European dimension were continually changing in the twelve long years of the dictatorship. The reasons for this are to be found not only at home but also within a European context – in the course of the gradual expansion of the German Reich, in the rivalry among the hegemonic dictatorships (Soviet Union, Italy, Germany),[3] and in the course of the war that already had its beginning in Spain. The conventional view of the National-Socialist dictatorship does not always take adequate account of these changes. In addition, examining the urbanism of other dictatorships facilitates the clarification of the specific characteristics of German urbanism during the National-Socialist dictatorship.

A both nationally and internationally substantiated periodization of National-Socialist urbanism that expands and clarifies our understanding of urbanism and dictatorship is therefore decisive for my argumentation. Fundamentally, everything I shall discuss is either known or could be known. There are numerous, very fruitful studies of National-Socialist urbanism, a multitude of committed initiatives that publish the results of local on-site investigations, and all of this information is becoming more and more precise.[4] Many of the results of these investigations remain within small circles, however: regional circles, disciplinary circles, generational circles, and thematic circles, making it difficult to integrate them into overarching discussions. Added to that is the dominating national tunnel vision of urbanist research toward its home dictatorship, not only in Germany but also in other European countries. This is, and remains, a huge problem. In the following, I can only touch on a few chosen facets of the subject area, but I hope that these will enable me to make my viewpoint clear.

In the spotlight: the period of 1937 to 1941

My starting point is a highly influential urban development exhibition. On November 8, 1941, the anniversary of the failed Munich Putsch by Hitler in 1923, the traveling exhibition *Neue Deutsche Baukunst*[5] was opened in Lisbon. In the capital of Portugal, the exhibition presented approximately 50 large photographs in addition to 26 models.[6] The subject was the monumental projects of the German Reich. Interest in the exhibition was great, and 100,000 visitors were counted in Lisbon alone.[7]

The exhibition, under the responsibility of the Foreign Office in cooperation with the Reich Ministry of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment as well as the General Building Inspector for the Reich Capital, had been prepared since 1939 and traveled in the period 1940 to 1943 to Belgrade, Sofia, Budapest, Lisbon, Copenhagen, Madrid,[8] Barcelona, Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir. It was attended by around 400,000 visitors, which means that roughly a quarter of the total number of visitors was recorded in the Portuguese capital. The exhibits were compiled slightly differently for each individual city. The exhibition was intended to demonstrate the superiority not only of the German *Wehrmacht* (German armed forces) but also of German urban development.

Lisbon was not simply one exhibition location among many, however. The Portuguese capital was obviously of particular interest to Germany. Albert Speer and Rudolf Wolters visited only Lisbon together and no other exhibition city. The exhibition was opened personally by Albert Speer. Present at the opening ceremony were representatives from Spain, Italy, Japan, and Rumania, but not Salazar. On the opening evening, the Portuguese dictator was given a private guided tour by Albert Speer without further company.

A small book has survived, which Rudolf Wolters, the organizer of the exhibition, published on his journey to Lisbon with Albert Speer in 1942.[9] In it, Wolters wrote the following:

> The exhibition has been extremely well received in Lisbon. Already on its first day the exhibition had to be closed several times due to overcrowding. This is all the more interesting as England had set up an architectural exhibition with small photographs in the same exhibition halls a few weeks earlier, and with practically no success. They presented small estate houses, schools and similar things with which they wished to ingratiate themselves with the Portuguese. It could be noted on this journey, however, as is always the case, that the best propaganda effect is achieved when the things you present are large and impressive.[10]

Those are remarkable words. They clearly show that the exhibition focussed entirely, for reasons of propaganda, on monumental urban development and not on "trivialities" such as residential buildings.

Rudolf Wolters names the reason for Germany's particular interest in Portugal a few lines later: "What currently interests us in Portugal is primarily tungsten; at present, however, most of the mines are in the possession of the English".[11] Tungsten is a rare metal that is extremely important for arms manufacturing. Portugal was one of the most significant countries in the world with regard to tungsten deposits and did very good business in the tungsten trade with Nazi Germany, with the additional help of Swiss banks.

The reception of the exhibition *Neue Deutsche Baukunst* in Portugal was not at all as favorable as Rudolf Wolters claimed, however. With regard to the choice of exhibits, a Portuguese building journal wrote in November 1941:

FIGURE 1.1   Exhibition Neue Deutsche Baukunst in Lisbon: Image on the cover of the Portuguese edition of the catalog, 1941. It shows the entrance to the New Reich Chancellery in Voßstraße.

Source: Speer, A. (ed.): *Moderna Arquitectura Alemã*. Berlin: Editorial Volk und Reich, 1941: Cover

> We had hoped for an exhibition of German architecture but what we got was simply an exhibition of military architecture. As a propaganda project the exhibition was a success due to the naturalness with which the huge and the monumental impressed the curious. [...] But when will Germany finally present us with an exhibition that shows its everyday architecture, the architecture of the little things created by life, a human architecture?[12]

Why is the exhibition *Neue Deutsche Baukunst* so interesting? Not only because of its quantitative importance, although it was certainly one of the most influential, effective propaganda exhibitions of German urbanism in the 20th century. And the accompanying catalog[13] is without doubt among the internationally most widely disseminated publications on German architecture and urbanism that have appeared to date, surpassed admittedly by Ernst Neufert's *Architects' Data*, the first edition of which appeared in 1936.

Even more significant is its qualitative importance. This exhibition represented a major contribution to the characterization, and the canonization, of a particular image of architecture

and urbanism under the National-Socialist dictatorship, both at home and abroad. Albert Speer, in his role as General Building Inspector for the Reich Capital, was responsible for the concept of the exhibition. The Generalbauinspektor (General Building Inspector) was a unique institution in Europe: a state architectural agency, an agency of the Reich directly under the auspices of the Reich Chancellor, i.e., Hitler, which was vested with unusual powers and financial resources.[14] This agency had only been created in 1937, based on a new law, the *Neugestaltungsgesetz* (Restructuring Law).[15] This law set new priorities for urban development and led to the stipulation of the "Führer's cities" ("Führerstädte"), which now had absolute priority with regard to urban construction, at least on paper. These were the cities of Berlin, Munich, Nuremberg, Hamburg, and Linz. The law was oriented toward urbanism whose form was to be an expression of the propagated rise of Germany under the dictatorship, i.e., toward the spatial composition of representative buildings of the state and the party. At the same time, that meant the creation of a new city center, either a concentration on the core of the city or on the fringes of the core. In this context, a major preparatory role was played by the regional capital Weimar, in which the first *Gauforum* was constructed.[16]

In order to establish this orientation among experts and politicians, an efficient media campaign was immediately prepared. Already in 1937, the leading journal for art and architecture, *Die Kunst im Dritten Reich*,[17] was founded, which contained an architectural supplement as of 1938: *Die Baukunst*. The journal was renamed *Die Kunst im Deutschen Reich* in September 1939. This journal introduced new, clear hierarchies, which all the experts could recognize: a ranking of the cities presented, of the quoted architects, and of the chosen construction programs. The person responsible for architecture and urban development in this journal was, again, the General Building Inspector for the Reich Capital, Albert Speer. The editorial board, in turn, was led by his right-hand man, Rudolf Wolters.

Speer's view of the National-Socialist dictatorship was thus established as dominant, but it was still not completely enforced. Munich and its actors continued to oppose the Berlin-centered viewpoint of the General Inspector throughout the following years. The catalog for the *Erste Deutsche Architektur- und Kunsthandwerkausstellung*[18] in the Haus der Deutschen Kunst in Munich at the beginning of 1938 initially presented only plans and projects from Munich. Berlin and Speer were conspicuously downgraded. The Munich exhibition did, however, conform to the concentration on party and state buildings in the inner city.

The priority of this building program was also emphasized in Rudolf Wolters' short text in the catalog for the exhibition *Neue Deutsche Baukunst*. Wolters described the central task of urban development as the "creation of new city centers" and the construction of "new city crowns",[19] which were to be marked by public buildings and find their expression in broad, representative streets and squares. Wolters himself clearly ranked the "new urbanism" above architecture. The Königsplatz (King's Square) in Munich, where the "petty greenery" gave way to a more austere, stone form, was celebrated as a model of the "new urbanism".[20]

The images that followed Rudolf Wolters' text were part of the catalog, in fact the actual message, which the text simply underpinned. They are better known, and they are more familiar to us than almost any other architectural or urbanist images: the Königsplatz and the Haus der Deutschen Kunst in Munich, the exhibition building of the International Exposition in Paris, the Nazi party rally grounds in Nuremberg, and the New Reich Chancellery in Berlin. These few buildings and facilities occupy almost half of the illustrations in the catalog. The other half also includes numerous constructions that were designed by Albert Speer or on behalf of the General Building Inspector. The final images are a series of six views of

bridges, the only infrastructural constructions that are presented as outstanding examples of engineering. Residential buildings are only shown in five pictures presenting the town of the Hermann-Göring-Werke (Salzgitter) and the residential estate Charlottenburg-Nord.

The names of those who were to be regarded as "universal building masters" of the National-Socialist Reich are also recorded in this catalog: first and foremost the deceased Paul Ludwig Troost, the designer of the Königsplatz and the Haus der Deutschen Kunst in Munich, then Hermann Giesler, the designer of the Weimar Gauforum and from the end of 1938 General Building Officer for Munich, the "capital city of the movement", and of course Albert Speer himself, from 1937 General Building Inspector and the boss of Rudolf Wolters, and also the supreme head of the exhibition, who is entrusted, according to Wolters, with the "crown of all urban development tasks", namely the restructuring of the capital of the Reich.[21] Further building masters are named with a respectful distance: Roderich Fick and Wilhelm Kreis.

This was the first time that an official image of architecture and urbanism in National-Socialist Germany was systematically constructed, or to put it more pointedly: the exhibition

Architekt Paul Ludwig Troost: Luftbild vom **Königlichen Platz in** München mit den Neubauten der Bewegung

FIGURE 1.2   Exhibition Neue Deutsche Baukunst: Königsplatz in Munich, architect Ludwig Troost, photo taken in 1941.

Source: Speer, A. (ed.): *Neue Deutsche Baukunst. Dargestellt von Rudolf Wolters.* Berlin: Verlag Volk und Reich, 1941, p. 18

and the accompanying catalog "invented" *the* architecture and *the* urbanism of the National-Socialist epoch in a way that many who are not part of the critical expert community still see it, or wish to see it, today. The exhibition was a radical abridgement of Nazi urban development to that which Speer and Wolters wished to be understood as urbanism and architecture. It reduced the diversity of buildings in the years 1933 to 1939 to the central public buildings, especially those in the planned "new city centers". It thus differed clearly from earlier publications of the Nazi epoch, which presented a much wider spectrum of architects and building activities: primarily residential building but also industrial building and the construction of infrastructure. Now only the *autobahns* were additionally presented, particularly the *autobahn* bridges. Wolters' text states explicitly: "Residential building is […] only touched upon in the illustrations. Its renewal is a matter of course and requires no further discussion".[22]

The harsh reduction is also shown in the choice of the architects singled out: Paul Ludwig Troost, Hermann Giesler, and above all Albert Speer. An apparently consistent standpoint was thus canonized that was very readily taken up again following the defeat of the National-Socialist German Reich – this time with a negative sign. Even today, many experts still identify National-Socialist architecture with the architecture of Speer and its content with all of the (for the most part) unrealized buildings presented at the exhibition, while the large numbers of homes that were built, the military facilities, the renewal of historic centers, the technical and social infrastructure, and the educational facilities and industrial plants hardly attract attention, never mind the repressive constructions of the later war years, e.g., the forced labor camps that characterized the entire Reich. Rudolf Wolters' text thus confirms prima facie all the stereotypes that are connected with architecture and urbanism during the National-Socialist dictatorship. It was an exceptionally successful attempt to establish precisely this perception and to amalgamate it into a coherent image of architecture, urbanism, and national socialism, to an image controlled by will, determined by a single leader.

This canonization de facto reduces the Nazi epoch to one single period, 1937 to 1941, the triumphal period of the dictatorship, the period with the greatest societal approval of the dictatorship, and the period of the great "victories" in the West. Both other periods, the beginning from 1933 to 1937 and the period from 1942 to 1945, are thus pushed to the background. But even for the triumphal period, this picture only presents the tip of the iceberg and ignores many building projects, leaving the actual mechanisms of the dictatorship in the dark, the way in which urbanism was produced, the internal rivalries and the actual broad range of construction, the production of approval, and the spatial organization of discrimination and exclusion. Such a reduced understanding of architecture and urbanism also obscures our understanding of the dictatorship, its efficiency, its risks, its dynamism, and its crimes.

In the shade: the period from 1933 to 1937

The canonized viewpoint coincides primarily with the period from 1937 onward. The urbanism of the early Nazi epoch was characterized by other programs; however, the purpose of which was often the creation of employment, for example, the first national historic city center renewal program in all of Europe, which implied a quite different city ranking: Berlin, Brunswick, Cologne, and Frankfurt am Main. In this early period, the construction of residential estates was of particular importance. This was complemented by the construction of infrastructure, e.g., the *autobahns*, which was also an employment program. All of this is well-known of course, but it usually fades into the background of most discussions regarding Nazi urban planning.

Aus verwahrloſten Höfen wird ein ſonniger Kinderſpielplatz

FIGURE 1.3   Brunswick: "Squalid courtyards become a sunny playground". Restructuring of the historic center by means of the demolition of buildings in inner courtyards, photo c. 1939.

Source: Flesche, H.: *Braunschweigs Altstadtsanierung.* Braunschweig: Friedr. Vieweg & Sohn, 1939, p. 21

Scarcely any attention is paid today to the extensive construction program of the Reich Air Ministry, which in many ways had a European dimension. The Treaty of Versailles prohibited the construction of warplanes, so in 1933 the *Luftwaffe* did not yet exist. It had to be almost completely rebuilt "from nothing" by the National-Socialists in a disguised form. The main actor here was the Reich Air Ministry under Hermann Göring and his secretary of state, Erhard Milch. In this Ministry, there was also a construction department, the importance of which for National-Socialist urban development has often been underestimated, even up to the present day.

In particular, the greater Berlin area was fundamentally transformed in the 1930s on the initiative of the Reich Air Ministry and converted into the presumably largest armament region in Europe.[23] This transformation concerned primarily the development of the area outside the city itself, which became an armament region of the new *Luftwaffe*. In many

FIGURE 1.4   Berlin: Tempelhof airport building, architect Ernst Sagebiel, illustration c. 1939.

Source: Das Neue Universum. Vol. 60. Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1939, opposite to the inner title page

places, military airfields, flying schools, aircraft factories, factory airfields, supplier companies, research institutions, and entire company housing estates were constructed, which, however, did not exist on maps. For reasons of air-raid protection, the Ministry made sure that the *Luftwaffe* locations were spatially dispersed. In view of the necessity of disguising all of these projects, we can speak of a "secret urban development" without any great use of propaganda in these early years, which was pushed ahead by the Reich Air Ministry. The sole purpose of this urban development was military rearmament.

However, the Reich capital, Berlin, itself also bore the mark of air armament production. The largest government building of the Nazi dictatorship for a long time was the Reich Air Ministry built in 1935/1936 on Wilhelmstrasse on the corner of Leipziger Strasse, which in the GDR became the House of Ministries, and is now the Federal Ministry of Finance. Compared to this building, the Reich Chancellor and Führer had to make do with the very unassuming building of the old Reich Chancellery – until 1939, when Albert Speer was able to hand over the New Reich Chancellery to him. The Reich Air Ministry was designed by Ernst Sagebiel.[24] Large administrative buildings for the *Luftwaffe* were also built elsewhere, e.g., in Munich. There, the building of the District Air Command stretches along the Prinzregentenstraße, a building designed by German Bestelmeyer and built from 1937 to 1938, which is far larger than the much better-known Haus der Deutschen Kunst (House of German Art). Today, the building complex is home to the Bavarian Ministry of Economics.

The Reich Air Ministry was also responsible for the planning of the largest building in the capital, in the entire Reich, indeed in the whole of Europe: the new main building of Tempelhof airport, built from 1936 to 1943, again designed by the architect Ernst Sagebiel.[25] Tempelhof was not the only airport to be expanded within Berlin, however. The old airfield in Johannisthal rose to become the hub of aerial armament research and production. Airplane production by the Henschel FlugzeugWerke and the Bücker-Flugzeugbau started there, and the headquarters of the Deutsche Versuchsanstalt für Luftfahrt (DVL) (German Experimental Centre for Aviation) were also located there. After 1933, the DVL developed into the largest German center for aerial armament research. For this reason, its location in Berlin was considerably extended. Technical buildings from this period still characterize the new urban district today. Staaken airport in Berlin West, which was extended from 1935 to 1938 and served from 1936 as a landing site for foreign military, has been somewhat forgotten.[26]

FIGURE 1.5   Workshop of the Heinkel-Flugzeugwerke at Oranienburg, architect Herbert Rimpl, photo c. 1940.

Source: Mäckler, H.: *Architekt Herbert Rimpl. Ein deutsches Flugzeugwerk. Die Heinkel-Werke Oranienburg.* Berlin: Wiking-Verlag, c. 1938, p. 51

FIGURE 1.6   Buildings of the Henschel Flugzeug-Werke at Schönefeld. In the center is the head end of the administration building, photo c. 1939.

Source: Monatshefte für Baukunst und Städtebau 5/1939, p. 133

Finally, in 1935 the Gatow air base was established, followed by a college for aerial warfare and a military academy for aerial warfare at this location.[27]

The most important locations for the production of aerial armaments were outside of Berlin, however – to the north and to the south-east, near the outer *autobahn* ring road that was already under construction. The most important aircraft factory in Greater Berlin was built at Oranienburg. The Heinkel aircraft factory there, with its airfield, was designed by another

chief architect from the Reich Air Ministry, Herbert Rimpl. 97 percent of the funding for the factory, which was built mainly between 1936 and 1939, was provided by the Reich Air Ministry.[28]

Another large concentration of factories for the production of aircraft was created to the south-east of the Reich capital. The main factory of the Henschel FlugzeugWerke was built from 1934 onward between Schönefeld and Diepensee. The airfield of this factory was the predecessor of the later Schönefeld airport.[29] This aerial armament installation was designed by Otto Biskaborn, an architect from the Henschel Corporation in Kassel. By the time of the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, a small aircraft production town had been created in Schönefeld – including the administration, a director's house, a Kameradschaftshaus ("comradeship house"), a canteen building, security buildings, training workshops, and many production halls. In addition, there was a location for flight trials on the other side of the airfield. The fact that today's BER airport had its beginning as a center for National-Socialist aircraft production is known to hardly any of its visitors.

Only a little to the south-west of Schönefeld, in Rangsdorf on Rangsdorfer Lake, several installations for air armaments were constructed, such as the Bücker-Flugzeugwerk in 1935 and the "Reichssportflughafen" Rangsdorf which was opened in 1936.[30] The factory was designed by Herbert Rimpl and the club building by Ernst Sagebiel. A little further to the west of Rangsdorf, in Genshagen, the corporation Daimler-Benz Motoren GmbH Genshagen was founded in 1936, and its workshops were largely financed by money from the Reich Air Ministry. "In a very short period of time it became the most important, most efficient, and most modern producer of aircraft engines in Europe".[31] To the southeast of Schönefeld, in Wildau, AEG (Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft) produced aircraft parts as of 1936, which were then transported to the Henschel Flugzeug-Werke.[32]

FIGURE 1.7 Premises of the Bücker-Werke in Rangsdorf, built in 1936, architect Herbert Rimpl, photo c. 1939.

Source: Bongartz, Heinz: *Luftmacht Deutschland. Luftwaffe – Industrie – Luftfahrt.* Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1939, p. 172

FIGURE 1.8   Leegebruch housing estate near Oranienburg, built in 1936-1939 for employees of the Heinkel-Flugzeugwerke, architect Herbert Rimpl.

Source: Rittich 1938, p. 127

The custom-made production required qualified workers, who first had to be mobilized for the nascent *Luftwaffe*. In addition to the production plant itself and the administrative buildings, attractive facilities were created for the German company employees: a canteen building, "comradeship houses", training centers, and sports facilities. There were also – in some cases – residential buildings, graded according to employment position. A particularly large new housing estate was built according to plans by Herbert Rimpl for the Heinkel-Flugzeugwerke in Oranienburg: Leegebruch, a small new town with its own center, planned for 6,000 inhabitants, and largely completed in 1936–1939.[33] This estate, one of the largest of the Nazi epoch, is still little known today.

The aircraft built in the aircraft factories around Berlin were soon deployed in European combat zones including, from 1936 onward, the Spanish Civil War. In Spain, a leading role was played by fascist Italy, National-Socialist Germany, and the socialist Soviet Union. Many other countries were also involved, such as Salazar's Portugal, as were numerous volunteers from different countries. Their involvement in Spain brought the two dictatorships in Italy and Germany closer together, whereby the closeness between the two that is often assumed today was certainly non-existent from the very beginning. National-Socialist Germany not only supported the insurgents in Spain but also gathered its first military experience with the deployment of the *Luftwaffe,* which it had illegally established since 1933. In Spain, the new aircraft was tested; from a technical viewpoint, with regard to enemy aircraft such as those from the Soviet Union, with regard to the weapons employed, explosive bombs, and incendiary bombs, but also with regard to their effects, for example, on the civilian population. This included the destruction of important historical town centers, the precedent for which was the bombing of Guernica. The military organization under the leadership of Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen was also tested there.[34]

As a rule, the aircraft plants were created in a modern use of form. However, industrial architecture was not simply a niche as is often claimed. It was not a secret refuge for ostracized

architects, nor was it a secondary matter to which the National-Socialists paid no attention. Industrial architecture was an important facet of the architectural spectrum of the Nazi era, which was explicitly intended to look different to representative architecture and residential architecture. It is incorrect, by the way, to speak only of industrial architecture here, as it was often a question of industrial urban development, of the creation of large-scale manufacturing facilities. Here, too, there was no fixed scheme and each individual case had to be examined and analyzed in detail.

Hermann Göring, Reichsminister for Aviation, was the most important political urban planner of the dictatorship in addition to, and actually above, Hitler. He was simply less visible, and his role here has largely been forgotten. His architects have also not been evaluated appropriately, especially Ernst Sagebiel and Herbert Rimpl.[35] These two architects essentially shaped construction in Greater Berlin until the enthronement of Albert Speer as General Building Inspector.

In the dark: the period from 1941 to 1945

The years from 1941 to 1945 are even more obscured than those from 1933 to 1937. In works concerning the history of building and urban development, they are seldom adequately dealt with. In fact, the failure of a "lightning victory" to materialize following the invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 led to a fundamental change in direction in urban development. The triumphal urbanism and the plans for restructuring were postponed to the period after the "final victory". They were no longer emphasized in the propaganda. The plans for restructuring mutated in the course of the war into secret plans. The war required the construction of military infrastructure, such as the building of bridges. It also enabled a completely new dimension of criminality in spatial planning in the occupied Eastern territories that included mass extermination and expulsion. The planning furore shifted to the East and rampaged there in the shadow of the war. In view of the increasing air raids on German cities by the Allies, it was also necessary to build bunkers and shelters.

One new task for urban development became increasingly important: the further expansion of the armament industry, for which Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments as of 1942, was now responsible. Again, he succeeded in considerably increasing armament production. It was necessary, however, not only to increase the quantitative production of the armament industry, but in the final phase of the war also to protect it from air raids by relocating it, often underground.

When, in the course of the war, labor became scarce, it was necessary – often against the will of the enterprises – to mobilize new workers, beginning with more or less on a voluntary basis but later by coercion: foreign laborers, forced laborers, prisoners of war, and finally concentration camp prisoners.[36] New accommodation facilities had to be created for these laborers. This opened up a new field of urban development, the extent of which is often ignored or else completely underestimated: the construction of forced labor camps.[37] Of course, this field is not enshrined in our memory by contemporary illustrations, in strong contrast to the urban development of the period of triumph.

Particularly from 1942 onward, a gigantic camp landscape was created, not only in the vicinity of the armament factories but, of course, also in Greater Berlin. Forced labor was employed, for example, at Johannisthal airfield, but also Tempelhof airport. Forced labor was used on a large scale for production at Heinkel-Flugzeugwerke in Oranienburg from 1942

FIGURE 1.9   Berlin: Forced labor camp of the Weser Flugzeugwerke at Tempelhof airport, photo 1944.

Source: Wikimedia Commons, provided by Jochen Burghardt under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license

onward, followed by prisoners of war, and finally, for the first time in the aerial armament industry, concentration camp prisoners – from the concentration camp in Sachsenhausen. In the company Daimler-Benz Motoren GmbH Genshagen, foreign and forced labor was used from 1941 onward and later also 1,100 women and girls from the concentration camp at Ravensbrück. At the BMW Flugmotorenwerk Brandenburg, one of the largest camps for foreign and forced labor in Greater Berlin was built in Basdorf from 1942 onward, in which by 1945 about 6,000 people from 13 European countries were forced to work. The production of aircraft parts by AEG in Wildau (1936–1945) to the southeast of Berlin was also sustained by forced labor.[38] The armament region Berlin was transformed into a gigantic forced labor camp landscape. Hans Koschnik pointed out that alone in Berlin "400,000 people from 20 nations were deployed" (not only) in production essential to the war effort and were forced to live in "more than 1000 camps in the city or its surrounding area".[39]

   The fact that the General Building Inspector for the Reich Capital not only drew up great plans but was also heavily involved, following the invasion of the Soviet Union, in the construction of camps in Greater Berlin is little known.[40] At the beginning of 1942, he also took on the management and administration of camps. In 1944, there were 34 explicit GBI (Generalbauinspektor für die Reichshauptstadt) camps, in which more than 20,000 people were interned. As Minister for Armaments, finally, Albert Speer was responsible for the construction of forced labor camps throughout the Reich. As is well known, the Gauleiter of Thuringia, Fritz Sauckel,[41] was responsible for the enforced procurement of the people who were to fill these camps. An ordinance by Hitler of March 21, 1942, appointed him General Commissioner for Labor Deployment.

FIGURE 1.10 In his "Bauordnungslehre" published in 1943, Ernst Neufert, who had become known through his "Architects' Data", which was first published in 1936, presents several examples of shelters including these "houses as auxiliary permanent accommodation". He explains: "For the requirements of the armaments industry or for emergency accommodation stationary wooden structures are preferred. […]. The above illustration shows an example design with 2- and 3-roomed apartments with an internal toilet in each apartment […]". Neufert was appointed "Commissioner for Questions of Standardisation in the Construction Industry" by Albert Speer. (Authors translation).

Source: Neufert, E.: *Bauordnungslehre. Herausgegeben vom Generalbauinspektor für die Reichshauptstadt Reichsminister Albert Speer.* Berlin: Volk und Reich Verlag, 1943, p. 320

The final war years, it should be noted, were not at all a period without construction or without urban development. This is usually missing in publications about this topic, however. This is true of the construction of bunkers and of temporary accommodation settlements for those who had been bombed out, but it is true above all for the mass construction of camps. Certainly, concentration camps are present in memory, although not so much as an issue with regard to urban development. Until not very long ago, however, the quantitatively most important construction, the camp for forced laborers, was largely unknown to a wider public. Nevertheless, it was an important building program a type of National-Socialist forced accommodation or a type of National-Socialist housing construction. The common wooden barracks was probably the most common type of building in the Nazi epoch. It was used not only for repressive camps and forced labor camps but also for inclusion camps – for youth gatherings, for building workers, etc. It represents the urbanism of the dictatorship just as much as the "Volkshalle" (People's Hall) in Berlin.

The barrack had its own actors and special places, which have, however, been paid hardly any attention in the historiography of construction. One example is the small town of Niesky in Oberlausitz in eastern Germany, a center of barracks production and a largely unknown hub of National-Socialist architecture. The planning office FOKORAD,[42] a "research and construction cooperation of the Reichsarbeitsdienst (Reich Labour Service) and the Deutsche Holzbau-Konvention (German Timber Building Convention)", had its seat there. From 1933 onward, state norms for barracks were developed there. FOKORAD (Forschungs- und Konstruktionsgemeinschaft der Holzbau-Konvention und der Reichsleitung des Arbeitsdienstes) was thus one of the most important construction institutions during the dictatorship. Niesky was also the location of one of the largest producers of barracks in the Nazi period, the company Christoph & Unmack.

The camps in the German Reich served as forced accommodation for about 13 million people. Most of the foreign workers were abducted from the Soviet Union and Poland. The number of work camps for foreign civilian workers and prisoners of war in Germany is estimated

by Ulrich Herbert at 35,000.[43] Why has the existence of these camps been ignored? Further reflection on the reasons is needed. One thing is obvious: knowledge of their existence would have made many denazification processes more difficult. And many enterprises could have been made accountable. Compensation payments would have been more mandatory. The focus on the dictatorial construction of representative architecture concealed many crimes.

It is known that forced labor camps not only existed in the late phase of the Nazi dictatorship. The pioneer in this case was the Soviet Union.[44] Political decisions prepared the way for labor camps there in 1929/1930, and their construction began in 1930. By 1953, at least 18 million people had been interned in the camps. Labor camps were also set up on a large scale in Franco's Spain. The number of people interned there is estimated at a total of 700,000. In contrast, the number of forced labor camps in fascist Italy and in Salazar's Portugal was relatively low.[45] Neither the camps in the Soviet Union nor the camps in Spain have until now been adequately dealt with in the historiography of urban construction.

Periodization – more than chronology

What are the possible conceptual conclusions from my argumentation? First and foremost, I would like to recommend a precise periodization that makes it possible to capture the extraordinary dynamism of the dictatorship and of dictatorial urban development. A precondition for this is the generalization of knowledge that until now has been limited to isolated specialist circles. This periodization must also always take international relationships into consideration. Nazi urban development was continually changing, and it experienced a number of qualitative upheavals. These should not be interpreted rigidly, however – signs of new practices show themselves before the upheaval and practices that have been superseded continue to have an effect after the watersheds. I would also like to emphasize that such a periodization is, of course, not something that was invented by me but has often been applied in a similar way by others.

The year 1933 forms the starting point, but this, too, was not without preconditions. At that point in time, the rapidly enforced conformity, reorganization, and reconstituting of the urban development institutions began, while some of their contents – for example, housing and the renewal of historic centers – were continued in a modified form, and others, in contrast, were completely new – such as the development of air armaments.

I see the first upheaval in 1937 with the boom in great plans that bore the name of reorganization. This period reached its zenith in the summer of 1940 following the "Blitzkrieg", the fall of Paris, an event that shook the whole of Europe and forced the refugees who were living in Paris to move on, often as far as Lisbon. This victory is marked by a photograph showing Hitler together with Albert Speer and Arno Breker. This particular photograph underlines the will to express the military triumph in a triumphal renewal of the Reich Capital Berlin.

The second break can be seen in 1941/1942 following the invasion of the Soviet Union. The occupation of large parts of Eastern Europe created the preconditions for the murderous development plan for the East. Furthermore, the failure of a "Blitzkrieg" to materialize forced the dictatorship to abort the practical preparations for the restructuring, to reorganize the war economy, and to deploy forced labor on a massive scale. It also soon led, however, to the successive destruction of German towns and cities – with all its consequences for urban development.

FIGURE 1.11 Hitler with Albert Speer (left) and Arno Breker (right) on June 23, 1940, in Paris. On June 25, 1940, in a letter to Albert Speer, Hitler declared the restructuring of the Reich capital to be the "most important task".

Source: "Der Führer in Paris". Hitler in Paris. Heinrich Hoffman Collection. General Services Administration. National Archives and Records Service. Office of the National Archives. (ca. 1949–1985). NAID: 540180

A periodization alone is not sufficient, however. My thesis was as follows: in the public eye and in large parts of the academic world, the urbanism of the NS dictatorship is still identified with monumental buildings and large boulevards. Of course, these existed, and of course, they are important for our understanding of the NS dictatorship, but they characterize only the second period, and even that incompletely, while they cause the first to fade away and obscure the third. They therefore do not allow us to recognize the dynamic between the periods. They therefore also cannot explain the relationship between dictatorship and urbanism, even though their particular emphasis is itself a societal fact and therefore must also be taken notice of and examined.

There is another aspect: it does not become apparent that precisely this reduction was the central propaganda tool in the cultural power struggle of the great hegemonic dictatorships in Europe. It should be recalled here that National-Socialist Germany came onto the stage very late in this urbanist power struggle and then attempted to outdo the other two dictatorships, particularly with illustrations and models, and above all, with an urbanist upgrading

of the center of the capital conveyed by means of orchestrated images rather than realized projects, with a central building that dominated everything else, and with great axial boulevards that plowed through the metropolis and thus reorganized it.

The recommendation of a precise periodization is directly connected with another recommendation: to take other building programs into consideration, not only the representative state and party buildings. In this article, I have emphasized primarily two building programs: the urban development connected with air armaments and the construction of forced labor camps. In addition, the often underestimated medium of exhibitions should be examined. Also of extraordinary importance to the dictatorships were housing construction programs and, in addition, sports facilities, infrastructure programs, particularly for traffic, and the mass building of educational facilities that found their zenith in the planning of new university towns.

The periodization proposed is based on urban development, although it is aligned, even before 1941/1942, with military events. On closer examination, it can be seen that in the different periods, different cities, different building programs, and – not always, but often – different architects were of importance. It is also clearly shown that the crimes of the regime change and continually escalate. The periodization of urban development including its zenith in the corresponding triumphal period is timed quite differently in other dictatorships. The same is true, by the way, for the beginning of the war, which in the case of Italy began with the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, in Spain with the Civil War in 1936, and in the Soviet Union not until 1941.

The relationships of the three great dictatorships to one another were also very different from one period to another. Thus, relationships between the Soviet Union and Italy were relatively good – but only until 1935, when Italy invaded Ethiopia. In contrast, relationships between National-Socialist Germany and fascist Italy were not at all optimal and the two dictatorships did not move closer together until their alliance in the Spanish Civil War. Finally, relationships between National-Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union were normally very bad, but not during the two years of the Hitler-Stalin Pact from 1939 to 1941. All of this had an effect on urban development in the three dictatorships. However, the complex triangular relationship must still be examined in more detail.

I would like to raise another question: Should the deliberate destruction of historical towns and cities by bombing, first on the part of Germany but later also on the part of the Allies, not be thought of as urban development, as negative urban development, as urban destruction? With regard to the historic towns and cities of Europe, the year 1942, in particular, is altogether unique: never in history were so many historic centers in Europe (partially) destroyed in a single year as in 1942.

The culture of remembrance – more than the historiography of urbanism

Finally, I wish to emphasize that the urbanism of the dictatorships has not vanished as a material heritage but is, and remains, present even when it has been demolished. Again and again, we are faced with the question of how we should deal with these legacies. This is discussed nowadays under the significant banner of "culture of remembrance". From a professional point of view, we must differentiate here among at least three levels: the place or the building to which the remembrance refers must be defined very precisely; secondly, there must be a history of the reception of the building or place that is to be remembered for the period following the fall of the dictatorship; and finally, not always, but depending on the individual

FIGURE 1.12   Weimar: the former Gauforum (originally named Adolf-Hitler-Platz and after 1945 Karl-Marx-Platz, changed in 1999 to Weimarplatz, and in 2017 to Jorge-Semprún-Platz) on the occasion of the opening of the new Bauhaus museum. The large photograph shows Gilberto Salmoni, an Italian of Jewish descent who was abducted to Buchenwald on August 5, 1944.

Source: Bodenschatz, 2019

case, building projects for the handling of the building or place must be designed, which are not automatically derived from the first two levels.

We can recognize clearly, however, that there are societal developments that can come into conflict with scientific progress. Above all, we can recognize a renationalization of remembrance, which not only takes its own form but also cares very little about how the culture of remembrance is developing in other European countries. The Russian view of European history that was conveyed before and during the war in Ukraine is a particularly extreme case. But even within Germany, remembrance is fragmented. In Berlin, we hardly notice how, for example, things are being reorganized in Obersalzberg or what the Munich Documentation Center for the History of National Socialism is doing, and even the argument over the Nazi party rally grounds is hardly paid any attention. And Weimar? The important, exemplary project of a Weimar Quarter of Modernism with the former *Gauforum* as its linchpin is much too little known outside of Weimar.

What is happening in Italy would amaze many Germans, but hardly anyone still looks, even at the building that can be classified as the urban linchpin of the most extravagant project of fascist urban development in Italy, the *Palazzo della Civiltà Italiana*, constructed as a part, and as the climax, of the new quarter for the World Exposition in 1942 in Rome. This building is regarded in Italy as one of the most important buildings of the 20th century and is therefore used by one of the world's largest fashion houses as an advertising stage. A look at Italy should not give us cause for indignation. Rather, it should impress upon us the need to confront the cultures of remembrance in other countries with an open mind, and vice versa. That would be the first necessary step toward a reflected European culture of remembrance that is not at all uniform but many-faceted.

FIGURE 1.13   Rome, EUR – the end and the zenith of dictatorial urbanism: here the leading build-
ing Palazzo della Civiltà Italiana ("Colosseo Quadrato"), used today by the fashion
house Fendi as a stage for advertising. Sculptures from the Mussolini era can be seen
through the windows.

Source: Bodenschatz, 2016

Notes

1 The author wishes to thank Irene Wilson for the excellent translation.
2 Cf., e.g., Bodenschatz, Harald/Post, Christiane (eds.): *Städtebau im Schatten Stalins. Die internation-
ale Suche nach der sozialistischen Stadt in der Sowjetunion 1929–1935.* Berlin: Verlagshaus Braun, 2003;
Bodenschatz, Harald (ed.): *Städtebau für Mussolini. Auf der Suche nach der neuen Stadt im faschistischen
Italien.* Berlin: DOM publishers, 2011; Bodenschatz, Harald: Urban Design for Mussolini, Stalin, Sala-
zar, Hitler and Franco (1922–1945). In: *Planning Perspectives* 3/2014, pp. 81–92; Харальд Боденшатц/
Кристиане Пост (сост.): *Градостроительство в тени Сталина. Мир в поисках социалистического
города в СССР* 1929–1935. Санкт-Петербург: Verlagshaus Braun/SCIO Media, 2015; Bodenschatz,
Harald/Sassi, Piero/Welch Guerra, Max (eds.): *Urbanism and Dictatorship. A European Perspective.*
Basel: Birkhäuser, 2015; Bodenschatz, Harald/Flierl, Thomas (eds.): *Von Adenauer zu Stalin. Der Ein-
fluss des traditionellen deutschen Städtebaus in der Sowjetunion um 1935.* Berlin: Theater der Zeit, 2016;
Bodenschatz, Harald: Berlin Mitte: The Product of Two Dictatorships. In: Hökerberg, Håkan (ed.):
Architecture as Propaganda in Twentieth-Century Totalitarian Regimes. History and Heritage. Firenze:
Edizioni Polistampa, 2018, pp. 167–184; Bodenschatz, Harald/Welch Guerra, Max (eds.): *Städtebau
unter Salazar. Diktatorische Modernisierung des portugiesischen Imperiums 1926–1960.* Berlin: DOM
publishers, 2019; Welch Guerra, Max/Bodenschatz, Harald (eds.): *Städtebau als Kreuzzug Francos.
Wiederaufbau und Erneuerung unter der Diktatur in Spanien 1938–1959.* Berlin: DOM publishers,
2021; Bodenschatz, Harald/Welch Guerra, Max (eds.): *The Power of Past Greatness. Urban Renewal of
Historic Centres in European Dictatorships.* Berlin: DOM publishers, 2021.

3 I designate Fascist Italy, the Soviet Union, and Nazi Germany as hegemonic dictatorships – three dictatorships that developed their own, propagandistically simplified concept of urbanism and influenced, or attempted to influence, its development in other countries, for example, by the training and export of architects and by means of exhibitions.

4 A research milestone was the huge project of the Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung in the years 2018–2021 on building and planning under national socialism. The results are to be published. Cf. www.bbsr.bund.de/BBSR/DE/presse/presseinformationen/2018/2018-planen-bauen.html [20.04.2022].

5 On the exhibition itself, cf. the profound study by Düwel, J/Gutschow, N.: *Baukunst und Nationalsozialismus. Demonstration von Macht in Europa 1940–1943. Die Ausstellung Neue Deutsche Baukunst von Rudolf Wolters.* Berlin: DOM publishers 2015.

6 Zech, U.: Die nationalsozialistische Wanderausstellung. Neue Deutsche Baukunst und ihre Rezeption in Portugal (1941). Magister thesis. Technische Universität Berlin, 2005, p. 47.

7 On the presentation of the exhibition "Neue Deutsche Baukunst" in Lisbon, cf. Bodenschatz, Harald: Deutsche Ausstellungen in Lissabon 1941 und 1952. In: Bodenschatz, Harald/Welch Guerra, Max (eds.): *Städtebau unter Salazar. Diktatorische Modernisierung des portugiesischen Imperiums 1926–1960.* Berlin: DOM publishers, 2019, pp. 382–387, here pp. 382–384.

8 On the presentation of the exhibition "Neue Deutsche Baukunst" in Madrid, cf. Bodenschatz, Harald: Deutsche und spanische Städtebaupropaganda in Madrid 1942. In: Welch Guerra, Max/Bodenschatz, Harald (eds.): *Städtebau als Kreuzzug Francos. Wiederaufbau und Erneuerung unter der Diktatur in Spanien 1938–1959.* Berlin: DOM publishers, 2021, pp. 40–47, here pp. 40–42.

9 Wolters, Rudolf: *Reise nach Lissabon.* Berlin: Eigenverlag, 1942.

10 Ibid., pp. 32–33. (Authors translation)

11 Ibid., p. 33. (Authors translation)

12 A Arquitectura Portuguesa e Cerâmica e Edificação (Reunidas) 80/1941, p. 17.

13 Wolters, Rudolf: *Neue Deutsche Baukunst.* Berlin: Verlag Volk und Reich, 1941. On this catalog, cf. Bodenschatz, Harald: Propaganda für den NS-Städtebau. Kommentar zu: Rudolf Wolters: Neue Deutsche Baukunst (1941). In: Becker, Heidede/Jessen, Johann (eds.): *Stadt und Planung. Ein Lesebuch mit Texten aus 100 Jahren Städtebau.* Berlin: DOM publishers, 2021, pp. 55–66.

14 Erlaß über den Generalbauinspektor für die Reichshauptstadt, January 30, 1937.

15 Gesetz über die Neugestaltung deutscher Städte, October 4, 1937.

16 On the *Gauforum* in Weimar, cf. Wolf, Christiane: *Gauforen – Zentren der Macht. Zur nationalsozialistischen Architektur und Stadtplanung.* Berlin: Verlag Bauwesen, 1999, pp. 66–119; Korrek, Norbert/Ulbricht, Justus H./Wolf, Christiane: *Das Gauforum in Weimar. Ein Erbe des Dritten Reiches.* Weimar: VDG Verlag im Jonas Verlag, 2011; Bodenschatz, Harald: *Weimar. Modellstadt der Moderne? Ambivalenzen des Städtebaus im 20. Jahrhundert.* Weimar: Klassik Stiftung Weimar, 2016, pp. 19–31.

17 The journal "Die Kunst im Dritten Reich" appeared for the first time in January 1937. From October 1, 1938, onward, issue B of the journal contained an extra section for architecture with the title "Die Baukunst". In September 1939, the journal changed its name from "Die Kunst im Dritten Reich" (Art in the Third Reich) to "Die Kunst im Deutschen Reich" (Art in the German Reich). The final issue was the double one of August/September 1944.

18 1. Deutsche Architektur- und Kunsthandwerkausstellung im Haus der Deutschen Kunst zu München. 22. Januar bis 18. April 1938. Official exhibition catalog. Munich: Verlag Knorr & Hirth, 1938.

19 Wolters, Rudolf: Neue Deutsche Baukunst. In: Speer, Albert (ed.): *Neue Deutsche Baukunst. Dargestellt von Rudolf Wolters.* Berlin: Verlag Volk und Reich, 1941, p. 10.

20 Ibid., pp. 8 and 10.

21 Ibid., p. 11.

22 Ibid., p. 14. (Authors translation)

23 Bodenschatz, Harald: Großraum Berlin – Ein weithin vergessener Standort der Luftrüstung während der nationalsozialistischen Diktatur. In: Wékel, Julian (ed. on behalf of the executive committee of the DASL): *Stadt macht Arbeit – Arbeit macht Stadt.* Berlin: Eigenverlag der Deutschen Akademie für Städtebau und Landesplanung (DASL e. V.), 2021, pp. 122–125.

24 Cf. Bodenschatz, Harald/Geisenhof, Johannes/Tscheschner, Dorothea: Gutachten zur bau-, stadtbau- und nutzungsgeschichtlichen Bedeutung des "Hauses der Parlamentarier" (ehem. Reichsbankgebäude bzw. ZK-Gebäude der SED), des Treuhandgebäudes ("Detlev-Rohwedder-Haus", ehem. Gebäude des

Reichsluftfahrtministeriums bzw. Haus der Ministerien) und des ehemaligen Staatsratsgebäudes. On behalf of the Senatsverwaltung für Bau- und Wohnungswesen. Berlin, 1993, pp. 44–62; Dittrich, Elke: *Ernst Sagebiel. Leben und Werk (1892–1970)*. Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2005, pp. 141–152.

25 Cf. Dittrich, Elke: *Ernst Sagebiel. Leben und Werk (1892–1970)*. Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2005, pp. 156–174.

26 On Staaken airport, cf. Mehlitz, Uwe: *Riesenzigarren und silberne Kraniche über Berlin. Der Luftschiff- und Flughafen Staaken. Ein bedeutender Ort der Luftfahrtgeschichte*. Place of publication not given, 2021, pp. 364, 399–403, 408.

27 Cf. Zapf, Jürgen: *Flugplätze der Luftwaffe 1934–1945 – und was davon übrig blieb. Band 1 Berlin & Brandenburg*. Zweibrücken: VDM, 2001, pp. 24, 30–35.

28 Cf. Rhode, Norbert: *Das Heinkel-Flugzeugwerk Oranienburg*. Velten: VV, 2006; Rhode, Norbert: *Die Werksiedlungen des Heinkel-Flugzeugwerkes Oranienburg*. Velten: VV, 2018.

29 Cf. Bodenschatz, Harald /Bernhardt, Christoph/Brünenberg, Stefanie/Butter, Andreas: *Im Dienst des nationalsozialistischen Krieges: Der erste Flugplatz in Schönefeld*. Published by the Flughafen Berlin Brandenburg GmbH. Berlin: Wasmuth & Zohlen Verlag, 2022.

30 On Rangsdorf, cf. Wietstruk, Siegfried: *Flugplatz Rangsdorf bei Berlin. Von Rühmann bis Morosow*. Berlin: GVE, 2001; Dittrich, Elke: *Ernst Sagebiel. Leben und Werk (1892–1970)*. Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2005, pp. 181–184; Sollich, Jo: *Herbert Rimpl (1902–1978). Architekturkonzern unter Hermann Göring und Albert Speer. Architekt des Deutschen Wiederaufbaus. Bauten und Projekte*. Berlin: Reimer, 2013, pp. 47–50.

31 Lehweß-Litzmann, Jörn: Die Flugmotorenwerke von Daimler-Benz. In: Ahlbrecht, Bernd-Rüdiger/Kosanke, Klaus-Peter/Lehwes-Litzmann, Jörn/Neisser, Joachim: *Historische Luftfahrtstätten in und um Berlin*. Berlin: MediaScript, 2014, pp. 172–173. (Authors translation)

32 Cf. Schwermaschinenbau Wildau. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schwermaschinenbau_Wildau [16.06.2021].

33 Cf. Rhode, Norbert: *Die Werksiedlungen des Heinkel-Flugzeugwerkes Oranienburg*. Velten: VV, 2018.

34 On Guernica, cf. Bodenschatz, Harald/Welch Guerra, Max: Guernica/Gernika, Bild, Zerstörung und Wiederaufbau. Ein vergessenes Kapitel europäischer Städtebaugeschichte. In: *Forum Stadt* 3/2012, pp. 279–292.

35 On Sagebiel, cf. Dittrich, Elke: *Ernst Sagebiel. Leben und Werk (1892–1970)*. Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2005; on Rimpl, cf. Sollich, Jo: *Herbert Rimpl (1902–1978). Architekturkonzern unter Hermann Göring und Albert Speer. Architekt des Deutschen Wiederaufbaus. Bauten und Projekte*. Berlin: Reimer, 2013.

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2

RECONSTRUCTION AS A DICTATORIAL POWER STRATEGY

The multiple functions of an urban programme in the early years of the Franco regime (1938–1959)[1]

Max Welch Guerra

> Franco's staggering job is to remake Spain. The wreckers and excavators and masons and riveters and tinsmiths are making the heart-warming din of peace. It looks like a building boom!
>
> Life, 12 February 1940 (Spain Rebuilding 1940: 65–71)

As the Spanish Civil War drew to a close on 1 April 1939, some 192 settlements across Spain lay in ruins (Terán, 1982, p. 18). By this point, a policy of reconstruction was already being implemented by the insurgents, at whose head general Francisco Franco would swiftly install himself as the leading figure of a reactionary dictatorship. Initiated in 1938, urban reconstruction was seen as an urgent priority by the emerging regime and, alongside attempts to revitalise agricultural production and industry, was a fundamental component of its governing strategy. French historian Stéphane Michonneau describes the reconstruction as essential to the legitimisation of the regime: a crucial detail of the image of the "dictator-builder" (Michonneau, 2017, p. 60). But why was reconstruction so important? The present work seeks to answer this question, identifying the various functions of this branch of urbanism during the early years of Francoism, a period defined in the specialised historiography as beginning with the initial attempts to establish a State apparatus and lasting until the end of the 1950s.

Franco's reconstruction policy included projects in almost 200 settlements, but three towns are of particular note: Gernika, Belchite and Brunete. None of them had been home to more than 7,000 inhabitants prior to the Civil War, during which all three were almost entirely destroyed. Each acquired considerable symbolic importance within the narrative of the dictatorship: Gernika as a testament to the alleged brutality of the enemy; Belchite and Brunete as heroic sites; and all three as model examples of Francoist modernisation. Even before the war came to an end, the three cities were placed under the spotlight of regime propaganda and received priority public funding (Muñoz Fernández, 2006, p. 37). The present text focuses on Gernika and Belchite.[2]

El Caudillo de la Reconstrucción

FIGURE 2.1 "The Honourable Mr Francisco Franco Bahamonde, Generalísimo of the Armies of Spain, Head of State, Leader of National Reconstruction." Painting by Agustín Segura, Press Association of Madrid. Castilla-La Mancha Virtual Library. *Reconstrucción* No. 1, 4/1940. Here, Franco presented himself not as a general who conducts his troops into battle, but as the leader of national reconstruction. He took advantage of the ambiguity of the latter term, which can be understood to refer to both the reconstruction of the nation and, in the particular historical circumstances, to material regeneration – the urban reconstruction of a country ravaged by the Civil War.

Source: Montage, *Reconstrucción* 1/1940, p. 2

Policy field: the reconstruction and its historical background

The importance of reconstruction during the early years of Francoism can only be fully appreciated in light of preceding events. In the 1920s, Spain had been overshadowed by the regime of General Miguel Primo de Rivera, who installed a dictatorship with the consent of King Alfonso XIII. However, the monarchist, ecclesiastical and militarist forces on which Primo de Rivera depended were incapable of maintaining culturally and economically reactionary order, or of bringing about the modernisation of a stagnating society. The global economic crisis of 1929 exacerbated the political crisis, and on 29 January 1930, Primo de Rivera stepped down. On 12 April 1931, a broad republican alliance won the municipal elections. Two days later, the Second Republic was declared, and Alfonso left Spain voluntarily.

The coup d'état that ultimately triggered the Spanish Civil War took place on 17 July 1936. Soldiers stationed in the Canary Islands and in those regions of Morocco under colonial Spanish rule rebelled against the republican government and were joined the following day by others across the peninsula. Although the planning and execution of the military uprising involved a number of generals, it was Francisco Franco Bahamonde who secured exclusive command of the insurgents. The Civil War soon became an international affair as Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy stepped forward to provide support to the coup forces. Meanwhile, the republican faction received the support of thousands of volunteers, largely from Europe and the Americas. Around half a million people lost their lives; millions were subject to repression in various forms both during and after the war; and tens of thousands were executed by Francoist troops even in the wake of the dispute. A great many also sought safety in exile, which in a large number of cases was permanent.

Adopting the title of *Generalísimo*, Franco proclaimed himself Head of State in 1936. After winning the Civil War in 1939, he imposed a reactionary dictatorship that ruled the whole of Spain and would endure until shortly after his death in 1975.

During the early years of Francoism, the reconstruction of cities and other settlements was the primary task set out in urban and territorial policy. A programme of internal colonisation was also implemented and, as with the reconstruction, affected much of the peninsula. Colonisation during the Francoist period led to the creation of 300 new settlements (cf. Lejeune, 2019; Welch Guerra & Bodenschatz, 2021, pp. 326–381).

For the *Falange* (Traditionalist Spanish Phalanx of the Councils of the National Syndicalist Offensive, hereafter FET-JONS),[3] which was the regime faction responsible for efforts on this front, the reconstruction constituted a means of serving the interests of the institution itself and of the dictatorship in general. It also provided the opportunity for blame to be laid at the feet of the republicans, and for the widespread destruction to be used not as an opportunity to reproduce that which had been, but to forge a new Spain. A report printed in the official magazine *Reconstrucción* covering a meeting of experts from the General Directorate for Devastated Regions held in Zaragoza in October 1941 describes the programme using the same belligerent and anti-Semitic language that could even be found in technical documents:

> "The socialists who tyrannised the martyr zone behaved just as the Russian communists did…, not in vain were they tutored by the Jewish spirit of Pablo Iglesias, racial brother of Karl Marx, Lafargue and Leon Trotsky. The separatist red army set fire, blew up, destroyed… ("Congreso de técnicos de la reconstrucción nacional" 1941, 18-20)"[4] "The wretched village, the sickly town, the poorly conceived and malformed suburbs will be replaced by modern creations in line with national-unionist policy…"
>
> *(op. cit., 20)*

The architects commissioned by the Falange immediately, and quite correctly, recognised in the reconstruction policy the prospect of a wave of new projects and contracts. After a long period of reduced construction activity, this was warmly welcomed, along with the historic opportunity it presented to elevate the architectural discipline. From the very outset, however, the specific neighbourhood-, city-, regional- and national-level measures set out in the policy targeted political impact over and above urban accomplishments.

The highest authority in the area of reconstruction was Ramón Serrano Súñer (1901–2003), the leading politician during the early years of the Franco dictatorship.

In 1938, he was appointed Interior Minister, thus becoming the Head of Government and the Architect of the new State apparatus. Until his forced resignation in 1942, Serrano Súñer imposed an aggressive ideological agenda, and urban programmes became a key element of a policy that the regime termed a "crusade". This historically founded metaphor alludes to the conquest of territory by means of systematic, violent methods that, in the case of Spain, endured even after the war had come to an end and were justified by the aspiration of saving the West from barbarity (Mas Torrecillas, 2008, pp. 77–78). As such, the Francoist reconstruction explicitly dispensed with efforts to integrate the losers.

Serrano Súñer was also supreme leader of the Falange, the sole party of the Francoist regime, created in 1937 and uniting a number of entities under the umbrella of the FET-JONS, which itself dated back to 1934. José Antonio Primo de Rivera, third Marquess of Estella, member of the high nobility and son of the dictator deposed in 1930, was the ideologue and national head of the organisation from its foundation and until his execution by the republicans in the early days of the war. Following in the footsteps of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the Falange sympathised openly with Italian fascism and, alongside the dictatorship's various supporting entities, represented populist positions. Despite remaining the sole party of the Francoist regime until 1976, its power began to decline significantly from the 1950s onwards.

The insurgents' preoccupation with reconstruction was driven by a strategy that went beyond the scope of urban policy. The Falange's operations were governed by the dictatorship's own general interests and by those of the movement itself. The overall aim was the expeditious imposition of a State apparatus to consolidate the political power seized from the Republic and to coordinate the vital functions of those regions occupied by rebel troops. Barely six months into the Civil War, Franco issued a decree appointing an Attorney General for Housing, responsible for housing policy (Mas Torrecillas, 2008, 77f.). Later, in January 1938, a law was passed that created a number of entities within the Central State Administration in the territory held by the insurgents, including a Devastated Regions and Reparations Service. This institution became the General Directorate for Devastated Regions following the Francoist victory and rapidly grew in power. In March 1938, the Ministry of the Interior, firmly in Falangist hands, decreed that no reconstruction measure could be implemented without the approval of the Directorate (op. cit., 88).

The immense human and material losses brought about by the war limited the Francoist apparatus' power to act. The precariousness of the situation was one of the alleged justifications for the systematic use of forced labour in the reconstruction – a necessary measure, so it was said, in order for the agricultural workforce to remain dedicated to food production (Moreno Torres, 1941 a, pp. 43f.).

The reconstruction enabled the Falange to employ considerable economic, human and administrative resources, and presented the opportunity to create narratives relating to both the reconstruction in general and its various constituent projects. The Falange also astutely integrated a great many renowned architects and talented young people into the field of urbanism, which in both contemporary and present-day Spain is considered a branch of architecture.

Attempts to strengthen the policy field of urbanism sought inspiration in the dictatorships of Germany and Italy. One example is communication strategy. 1940 brought the publication of the first issue of *Reconstrucción* magazine, edited by the General Directorate for Devastated Regions' Press and Propaganda Secretary. The magazine enabled the Falange to inform, coordinate and explain the technical and ideological aspects of the reconstruction

FIGURE 2.2 The front cover of the first issue of Reconstrucción magazine bearing an almost mystic depiction of the San Martín de Tours church tower rising from the ruins of Belchite. Reconstruction of settlements was prioritised according to the propaganda potential for the dictatorship (*Reconstrucción* 1/1940, front cover).

from its monopoly position. Until its final issue in 1956, *Reconstrucción* served as a platform for the Falange to communicate ongoing developments in relation to its urban policy, and as a shop window in which to present potentially useful examples from abroad. The first issue dedicated 16 of its 36 pages to the work scheduled for Belchite and Gernika (Gómez Aparicio, 1940, p. 6).

Recreation of the symbolic capital of the Basque Country: Gernika[5]

The town of Gernika is of considerable historical relevance. It is the site of the *Gernikako Arbola*, an oak tree under which a Basque parliament had met since the Middle Ages and where the kings of Spain swore to uphold the Statutes, or *Fueros*, that guaranteed Basque autonomy. The events of 1937 and their depiction by Pablo Picasso – considered one of the most important artworks of the twentieth century – lent a new, dramatic element to the town's historical significance.

By contrast with its historical and cultural pre-eminence, the settlement's strategic and military potential were non-existent. Home to some 6,500 inhabitants, Gernika had grown south-eastwards towards the nearby railway line during the latter part of the nineteenth century. However, its medieval urban structure remained prominent, making Gernika one of the most attractive and therefore prestigious settlements in the Basque Country. The town was situated in an area that, in April 1937, was still under the control of republican troops.

On the afternoon of 26 April 1937, a busy market day, German and Italian war planes (the former belonging to the *Legion Condor*) launched an unexpected aerial bombardment that lasted over three hours, killing hundreds of civilians and razing the historic town to the ground. This was the *Luftwaffe*'s first trial of a tactic that it would go on to employ in Varsovia, Coventry and Minsk: the intentional annihilation of the civil population. On 28 April, reports describing the events in detail appeared in the *Times* of London and of New York, as well as in *L'Humanité* in Paris. Global public opinion denounced the attack, which could not, it was generally considered, have been carried out without the consent of the insurgents. In response to alarmed international criticism and condemnation from the republicans, the Francoist press accused "the reds" of intentionally destroying the town prior to abandoning it (Cárdenas, 1940 a, p. 25).

The insurgents swiftly heralded the reconstruction of Gernika as a flagship project. In July 1937, a commission was founded to oversee the works. Removal of wreckage began in February 1938, and building work commenced in October of the same year. The plans accounted for a population of 12,000 in the new Gernika, which was to become the second largest commercial centre in the Basque Country.[6] The project was intended to counteract fierce rejection of the Francoist uprising expressed even amongst bourgeois and conservative sectors of the Basque population. Beginning with a formal ban on the language, the regime sought to ensure that Basque culture would never again challenge the hispanicity of all Spain.

FIGURE 2.3   The commentary presented in the article in Reconstrucción regarding the situation in Gernika prior to the bombing sets out the programme's intentions for the new town. "The city had grown in a disorderly manner", but it was one of "the most beautiful cities in Vizcaya"

Source: Cárdenas, 1940 a, 26.

FIGURE 2.4   The new Gernika was structured according to functionalist principles. Residential areas were kept separate from industrial and agricultural sectors, while the centre maintained its "typical and traditional beauty" (Cárdenas, 1940 a, 5), with a degree of intermingling of functions. Modernising elements of note included the construction of an abattoir on the outskirts of town, along with a municipal market. A network of technical infrastructure was created below ground, and central public areas were given green spaces and attractive flights of steps scaling the topography. Construction of housing catered to both affluent sectors of society and more humble families.

Source: Cárdenas, 1940 a, p. 27

FIGURE 2.5   The civic centre of Franco's Gernika bears the hallmarks of an applied programme of Spanishness, with a main square set against the commanding backdrop of the church. The award of the work to a renowned Basque architect and the use of local raw materials inspired acceptance among the region's population.

Source: Reconstrucción 55/1945, p. 232

However, the reconstruction of Gernika was officially portrayed as a serious attempt on the part of the dictatorship to improve the living conditions of the population and as an act of good will towards elements seen as forming part of Basque culture.

In charge of major works in the new town centre was Manuel María Smith (1879–1956), a renowned regionalist architect of high standing within the Basque bourgeoisie. Smith bridged the gap between the Francoist narrative of Hispanic architecture and the Basque building tradition. He made use of wrought iron and regional materials such as sandstone and limestone, an appropriate decision given the country's precarious situation, of which the construction industry was also a victim.

The town's new heart would be true in form to the Francoist definition of the Spanish city: "*The characteristic main square, the classic Spanish* Plaza Mayor, *sits in its original location, but is now larger and accommodates City Hall, the Courthouse, the Post and Telegraph Office, and the School for Arts and Trades*" (Cárdenas, 1940 a, p. 26). All of these would be overlooked by the church, which is positioned outside the main square and towers over the surrounding buildings.

"Yo os juro que sobre estas ruinas de Belchite se edificará una ciudad hermosa y amplia como homenaje a su heroismo sin par".

FIGURE 2.6   "And I swear to you that from these ruins of Belchite will rise a beautiful and spacious city in homage to her unparalleled heroism." General Franco, 11 May 1938 in Belchite.

Source: Montage, *Reconstrucción* 1/1940, p. 10

Belchite

Belchite was home to fewer than 4,000 inhabitants and had long remained in relative obscurity. Considering it a suitable base from which to launch an assault on Zaragoza, the capital of Aragón some 50 km away, the republicans attacked it with the intention of occupation. However, the insurgents put up greater resistance than the republicans had anticipated, and the ensuing series of alternating attacks by the two factions laid waste to the town.[7] Eventually, in March 1938, the insurgents retook and held Belchite, and a couple of weeks later, Franco made an in-person visit to announce the reconstruction project.

Franco's speech made reference to an in-situ reconstruction of the town. However, in the 1940 inaugural issue of *Reconstrucción* magazine, whose front cover depicted the bombed Belchite church tower, a very different programme was announced. The ruins of the historic town would be left standing and a new Belchite would be built a short distance to the north:

> Beside the heroic stones of the old Belchite will rise the warm and welcoming visage of the new Belchite; beside the rubble, reconstruction; beside the heaped ruins wherein the seeds of Marxism were sown, serving as an unmistakable sign of its fleeting passage, the joyous monument to peace built by Franco's Spain.
>
> *(Gómez Aparicio, 1940, p. 6)*

In accordance with the housing policy set out during the early years of the regime, homes were built both for the middle class (e.g., the families of doctors and teachers) and for the less well-off social strata. The area to the north of the town was allocated to farming, while industrial activities were concentrated to the south.

FIGURE 2.7   A street in old Belchite. Here, twice a year, the Franco regime held solemn events to keep alive the spirit of the "crusade". Today, the local tourism board offers guided tours with a message of peace.

Source: Max Welch Guerra, 2015

FIGURE 2.8   The first issue of Reconstrucción magazine announced a sui generis plan for the reconstruction of Belchite. The ruins of the historic town would be left standing and a new town raised alongside it, complete with the advanced features of contemporary urbanism. The contrast between old and new would be unmistakable in terms of sanitation, technical infrastructure and green space. The new Belchite had sports facilities (10), a bus and fuel station (13), a bank and a cinema (16, 17). The town centre consisted of the church, town hall, Falange buildings and, less conspicuously, commercial premises (1, 3, 2 & 15). The abattoir was again situated on the outskirts of the town (19). Plans for a monument to the triumph of the insurgents, which was to occupy a commanding position over the town (20), never came to fruition (Cámara, 1940, p. 12); however, the new Belchite can in its entirety be considered a monument to Francoism (ibid.).

Construction of the new town was swift despite the shortage of materials and manpower. The dictatorship made considerable use of forced labour, and the accommodation provided for workers was poor. Some of their families moved to Belchite in order to be close to the prisoners but were excluded from the urban improvements being made. Houses were allocated to regime supporters, and preference was given to those who had fought on the side of the Francoists.

On 13 October 1954, Franco made another visit to Belchite to inaugurate the new developments. His speech retained the Manichaean spirit of "crusade", denouncing the communists as destroyers and championing both the heroism of Belchite's Francoist fighters and the conquests of the new urbanism (Franco, 1955, pp. 3–5).

The many functions of urbanism during the Francoist reconstruction

One feature of image management strategies that is common to all dictatorships is the projection of a monolithic vision. Historiography – including historiography of urbanism – tends to reproduce this vision. An examination of the Francoist reconstruction reveals how, under the figure of Franco, various power groups, in this case the Falange, attempted to expand their spheres of influence within the governing coalition. Francoism was a system of domination that from very early on, even in the midst of the Civil War, was a facilitator of autopoietic power mechanisms whose proselytism also served to strengthen the dictatorship as a whole. The plurality of protagonists is a further factor that serves to multiply the possible tasks of dictatorial urbanism.

Franco's reconstruction of Gernika and Belchite in particular provide us with a wealth of material with which to identify the many functions that can be assumed by public urbanism over time. In very basic terms, it is possible to distinguish functions of different types relating to political power, policies of inclusion and exclusion, and spheres of production and reproduction.

The reconstruction marked the inception of a State apparatus that had initially existed in parallel with the existing system. The Falange expanded and consolidated its management of administrative and economic resources, established a space for the creation and trialling of narratives, and generated an aesthetic in accordance with its ideology. Together, this served to bolster the "National Movement" (and, thus, the dictatorship) and increase the influence of the Falange over military, ecclesiastical and monarchist sectors in the country's leadership. Meanwhile, the conservative and reactionary forces, which with the collapse of the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera had lost considerable prestige as a governing alternative, found themselves attempting – under a set of very new conditions – to demonstrate their capacity to conceive and implement.

Here is a short-sighted tendency for characterisations of dictatorial systems of domination to be reduced to their mechanisms of repression and propaganda, *the implication being that a dictatorship could remain in power* solely through oppression, lies and exaggeration. The examples presented here, however, shed light on a dual logic of oppression and integration. The actions employed by the Falange enabled them to integrate a large number of architects and members of the extensive poorer sectors of the population into agricultural regions. In addition, the reconstruction presented instruments with which to punish the losers both symbolically and practically, reinforcing the regime's model of domination.

A *conditio sine qua non* of a system of domination that aspires to endure is the guaranteed material reproduction of society. By means of the reconstruction, the Falange sought to drive the revitalisation of agricultural food production and to mitigate rural to urban migration. To a great extent, and not only for those who benefited directly, the reconstruction created living conditions that were in line with mid-twentieth-century standards, and these contrasted strongly with the levels of sanitation, technical and functional infrastructure, and

FIGURE 2.9   The homes of the new Belchite featured many traditional elements of Spanish settlements and radiated an unpretentious typological modernity. One distinctive aspect is the numerous public spaces that form an integral part of the new urban design.

Source: Max Welch Guerra, 2015

general status of the prevailing urban reality in rural Spain and the country's pre-industrial settlements.

However, an abundance of functions does not necessarily equate to operational efficiency. Some of the key objectives of the Franco regime's programmes, and particularly those of the Falange, failed to achieve the expected results, and the reconstruction did not succeed in stemming the flow of migrants from countryside to town. Furthermore, new political, economic and cultural conditions diminished the role of the main protagonists, converting them into secondary actors and eliminating or weakening their power constellation and, in turn, their operational mechanisms. Towards the end of the 1950s, the dictatorship began to shift its political strategy away from State protagonism and to adapt its social strategy, steeped as it was in the spirit of the "crusade". Building on the gradual integration of Franco's Spain into the Cold War Western Bloc, the dictatorship opened up the economy to the world, gave free rein to market mechanisms and boosted its legitimacy by promising standards of living on a par with consumption levels in wealthy capitalist countries. The Falange was ushered aside to make room for Opus Dei as the architect of a new era, thus bringing to an end the first phase of the Franco regime. The General Directorate for Devastated Regions was dissolved in 1957, and the dictatorship's updated power strategy began to embrace a new urban policy that was more in line with those of other Western European countries.

Notes

1 My thanks to the translator Paul Colin Salter and to María Castrillo Morón, Universidad de Valladolid, for her insightful comments on a previous version of this text.
2 A more extensive account of the reconstruction of Belchite, Gernika and Brunete is available in Welch Guerra, M. & Bodenschatz, H. (eds.) (2021), Chapter 3 (pp. 48–73). The present article draws on data and sources from a research project whose results were published only in the aforementioned volume, written in German.

3 Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista in Spanish.
4 "Congreso de técnicos de la reconstrucción nacional" 1941, 18–20 Reference is made to Pablo Iglesias Posse (1850–1925) who co-founded the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party in 1879.
5 Gernika is the Basque name of the town which in Spanish is called Guernica.
6 The Francoists refused to use this term, referring instead to the region as Vizcaya in an effort to diminish the evocation of Basque culture.
7 There were many victims. The struggle for Belchite cost the lives of half of the US volunteer Lincoln Battalion (or Lincoln-Washington Battalion). Michonneau, 2011, p. 66.

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3

THE DICTATORIAL MODERNIZATION OF PORTUGAL

Christian von Oppen

Peaceful overthrow

St. George's Castle is one of the most popular tourist attractions in Lisbon. However, probably hardly any visitor would suspect, on seeing St. George's Castle, which seems to have towered over Lisbon for centuries, that the building is a new construction from the 1940s. As part of this project, the existing buildings were demolished, the fortress walls completely rebuilt, the watchtowers reconstructed, and tranquil gardens created in the courtyards. Even fewer tourists suspect that the story about the castle in their travel guide (Burmeister, 2012, 69) corresponds to the propaganda of the dictatorship that ruled Portugal from 1926 to 1974 and that the building was the key structure of a massive dictatorial urban redevelopment program (cf. von Oppen, 2021, pp. 107–109).

In October 1910, after 771 years of existence, the Portuguese monarchy was overthrown in a coup by the Republican Party with the support of a sympathizing wing of the military. To their dismay, the hopes, that the republic would solve the massive economic and social problems inherited from the monarchy, were not fulfilled. Instead, the country experienced political chaos, was under the threat of state bankruptcy, and was left with little room for the much-needed reform projects. During the nearly 16 years of the First Republic, "nine presidents and 44 ministers held office, 25 revolts and several military coups had to be put down; in addition, there were several hundred assassinations and bombings."

In 1926, the military successfully revolted against the First Republic and formed a military dictatorship. There was no social project upon which to build. It was simply a matter of restoring public order. It justified its claim to power solely on the promise of a new, strong, and capable government for all of Portugal and thus responded to the years of rapid succession of the democratic First Republic (cf. von Oppen, 2021, pp. 107–109). Two years later in 1928, the well-known professor of economics and finance António de Oliveira Salazar (1889–1970) was appointed as Minister of Finance. In this position, Salazar was granted jurisdiction over the budgets of all other ministries and as such was able to regain control over the country's finances. By stopping inflation and achieving a budget surplus for the treasury he became the "saviour of the nation" (*o salvador da pátria*) (Corkill & Almeida,

2009, p. 393). The political divergence among them combined with Salazar's financial and economic expertise in addition to his strong self-confidence helped Salazar to power. On July 5, 1932, the military leadership decided to cede power to Salazar. With a referendum in the following year, the military dictatorship was officially replaced by a new constitution that founded the *Estado Novo*. Salazar stayed in power until September 27, 1968. His legacy, the constitution, remained unchanged under his successor Marcelo Caetano (1906–1980) until April 25, 1974. (Marcelo Caetano tried, without success, to open the society toward a more democratic system but the maintenance of the colonial war made his "Spring" ((*Primavera Marcelista*) impossible (cf. Moniz & von Oppen, 2015, p. 89).)

Implementation of the political concept

In the winter of 1932, shortly before the constitutional referendum to impose the Cooperative Republic, the journalist and publicist António Ferro, later head of the Office of Propaganda, was given permission to conduct five interviews with Prime Minister Salazar. These had been arranged in anticipation of the constitutional referendum and were intended to praise Salazar's accomplishments over the past three and a half years. The five interviews, which appeared between December 19 and 23, 1932, in the influential daily *Diário de Notí-cias* and were later published as a book under the title *Salazar. O Homem e a Sua Obra* (this book became a best-seller and was translated into Italian, French, and English (Serapiglia, 2014, 9)) did not consistently follow the usual framework of a question-and-answer interview. Salazar had deliberately allowed Ferro great interpretative freedom with the intention of conveying as coherent a picture of his politics as possible.

In October 1932, Ferro, together with the actor Mário Eloy and the architect Jorge Segurado, who had just returned from Germany, had developed the idea of establishing an office for propaganda for Portugal. The task of this office was to put all areas of the arts at the service of the dictatorship. For this purpose, Ferro outlined the idea of the "*Política do Espírito*" for the first time. He had derived this "politics of the true spirit" from Paul Valéry's book *La Politique de l'Esprit*, which had been published shortly before. The guiding idea for the *Política do Espírito* was "one policy, one morality, one ideal"—a model that largely excluded political diversity and freedom of opinion. The positive result of the constitutional referendum for the Estado Novo seemed to confirm Ferro's strategy. In October 1933, the Office of Propaganda began its work under Ferro's leadership (Raimundo, 2015, pp. 153–154).

The Office of Propaganda controlled the *Estado Novo*'s external image, especially in the 1930s and 1940s. The entire press, radio, film, and theater industries had to submit to advance censorship (Friedrich, 2016, p. 142). The arts were also ordered by the office to put their skills at the service of the *Política do Espírito* through direct commissions, competitions, and prizes. Ferro also secured his influence over state-sponsored tourism and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He consistently followed the principle he formulated: "Politically […] exists, only what the public knows it exists" ("*Politicamente, só existe o que o público sabe que existe*") (Raimundo, 2015, p. 193).

Concept of the dictatorial society project

The dictatorship's conception of itself was that of a guarantor of a form of government that corresponded to the "true spirit of the nation," the Política do Espírito. From the perspective

FIGURE 3.1 The Monument to the Discoveries, which was erected in plaster in 1940 and replaced by a stone copy in 1960, depicts Henry the Navigator as a hero who led the Portuguese people to new greatness. The monument remains uncommented to this day and is still a popular photo motif.

Source: von Oppen, 2012

of the Estado Novo, this spirit was characterized by qualities of being Christian, pious, dutiful, honest, and modest—a spirit that would never question the given order, the social hierarchies, and the natural course of events, for the good of the fatherland. Thus, the model of society that was propagated but only partially implemented corresponded to an organism built on the fundamental values of God, fatherland, family, authority, and work.

The Portuguese dictatorship drew its legitimacy from the aberrations of the First Republic, whose parliamentary system had become discredited in the eyes of the state leadership (Salazar, 1938, p. 139). The metropolitan bourgeoisie was held responsible for the times of "confusion and insecurity" (ibid., p. 77). They were accused of indulging in "confused" political debates in coffeehouses (Prutsch, 2012, p. 42), while "anarchy [flourished] in the factories, among the authorities and in the streets" (Salazar 1938, p. 60).

In contrast to the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the rural population with its modest lifestyle was idealized as the true root of the Portuguese identity (Friedrich, 2016, p. 139). In the countryside, the cradle of patriotic virtues, the "natural order of things" (Salazar, 1938,

p. 157), had been preserved (Rosas 2001, p. 1035), and with it the social harmony that had been lost in the cities as a result of liberalism. The original harmony is part of an order that includes a natural hierarchy and authority (ibid., p. 1036). These qualities, he said, are the true essence of Portuguese society, reflected in the smallest cell of society, the family (Salazar, 1938, p. 88), the true place of morality and cohesion (ibid., p. 313).

Derived from the "natural" ordering principle of the family, in which the male parent was unquestionably considered the head of the family, the *Estado Novo* had developed its social project: the corporate state. The declared goal was to create a new community free of individualism, in which each citizen, each occupational group, was assigned a clearly defined position that was associated with privileges and duties (cf. Kühnen, 1967, p. 63). It was the idea of a social hierarchy, harmonious and not arbitrary, which, within the framework of an organic society, should offer everyone his worthy place (Rosas, 2001, pp. 1035–1036). The task of "an authoritarian and strong state system" was to ensure this "harmony and social coexistence" (Salazar, 1938, p. 93). The leadership of the *Estado Novo* had an entirely paternalistic understanding of the task it had set itself (Rosas, 2001, p. 1036).

Central importance of history construction

In addition to the constructed "true spirit of the nation," Portugal's 800-year history was used to legitimize the *Estado Novo*'s claim to leadership under Salazar. For this purpose, a unique narrative of Portugal's history was created (*História Única*) (Corkill & Almeida, 2009, p. 388), which divided it into a sequence of fateful occurrences. The outcome of this occurrence, which was fortunate for Portugal, was said to be influenced by heroes sent by God to lead the pious people out of misery. God's assistance, the message went, had never been unconditional. Portugal experienced God's help only when Portugal remembered its pious, humble spirit, and professed the Christian faith. Salazar himself was one of these God-sent saviors (*salvadores*). The made-up "*continuidade histórica*" allowed a direct linkage of Alfonso I (1109–1185), the founder of the Portuguese nation, and Dionysius the Agriculturist (1261–1325) with Salazar, the founder of the *Estado Novo* (cf. Polanah, 2011, pp. 39–62). Now it would be up to the Portuguese people to accept the help of God so that the dark years of liberalism during the First Republic could be overcome.

This new narrative of Portugal's history was disseminated by the Office of Propaganda through historical plays, commemorations, exhibitions, films, textbooks, and history books. The spectacles were accompanied by a monument of euphoria in honor of the heroes of the *Estado Novo* mythology (França, 1982, pp. 28–29). Preferred sites for the monuments were the new urban squares that had been created as part of urban redevelopment or urban expansion programs. They thus became places of memory that related the surrounding urban space to the new understanding of the history of the Estado Novo. But historical buildings were also linked to heroes from the Portuguese past with the help of statues in order to specifically convey the desired image of history. Thus, in cooperation with the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, the country was transformed into an ancestral gallery of the *Estado Novo* in a "*statue mania*." (Arlindo Caldeira (1995, pp. 121–139) coined the term "*Estatuamania*" in his article "*Poder e memória nacional. Heróis e vilões na mitologia salazarista*" for the *Estado Novo*'s enthusiasm for memorials.) Among the most prominent sites of this urban transformation and expansion is the Empire Square in front of the Hieronymite Monastery and St. George's Castle in Lisbon, as well as the Porto Cathedral.

Institutions, instruments, and foreign experts

The most important institution for the constructional implementation of the *Estado Novo*'s image program, designed by the Office of Propaganda, was the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. It was rebranded in the summer of 1932 from various functions of the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Transport (Decree 21454 of July 7, 1932, to restructure and rename the Ministry of Economy and Transport) with the intention of creating an efficient authority for the development of infrastructure to revitalize the economy—an objective that Salazar had already pursued as Minister of Finance (Salazar, 1938, pp. 101; 106–107).

The Ministry of Public Works and Transport was placed under Duarte José Pacheco, a longtime confidant of Salazar. Pacheco became the defining figure of the ministry during his two terms in office (1932–1936 and 1938–1943). He used the powers vested in him not only to develop infrastructure such as building construction, roads and landscaping, electricity and water supply, or to expand the rail network and port facilities as well as the postal and telegraph systems, but also to preserve the architectural heritage in line with the predefined understanding of history (cf. Costa, 2012, p. 98). For this purpose, Pacheco had at his disposal the General Directorate of National Buildings and Monuments (*Direcção Geral dos Edifícios e Monumentos Nacionais* (DGEMN)), which was subordinate to the Ministry. The mission of the DGEMN was to display Portuguese history through national monuments. Therefore, not only the reconstruction and preservation of historical buildings or ensembles fell within its remit, but also the extensive state program of new construction. This included the construction of schools, post offices, museums, prisons, state hostels, and, at the end of 1933, above all, social housing estates (Neto, 1999, p. 30).

In the fall of 1932, a Department for the Administration of Unemployment Assistance was created within the Ministry. This allowed the DGEMN to apply for funds from the Unemployment Assistance Fund and to attract workers for its activities through the unemployment lists in order to implement the extensive construction program (Decree 21699 of September 19, 1932, creating the Unemployment Office within the Ministry of Public Works and Transport). The idea of one historical truth, *História Única*, on which the *Política do Espírito* was built, determined the entire construction program of the DGEMN (Corkill & Almeida 2009, p. 388). Buildings to be classified as worthy of preservation would be decided by their commemorative value for the official historical image of the dictatorship. The substance and surroundings of the monuments were treated just as selectively. In order to clearly convey the *História Única*, all structural elements that distracted from the historical event to be commemorated were removed (Elias, 2007, pp. 43–45).

At the end of 1932, the DGEMN was given the right to propose protection zones near monuments and buildings of artistic or historical value to the Minister of Public Works and Transport. The Minister had the right to decide whether the protection zones should be established after consulting the municipality affected. Since no information was given on the possible size of the protection zones, nor was the definition of the term "monument" defined precisely, the DGEMN was given considerable room for interpretation in terms of urban planning (Decree 21875 of November 9, 1932, transferring sole design authority to the State within the protection zone of a monument). This gave the Minister a special reason to rebuild the older cities, which became particularly significant for the two major cities of Lisbon and Porto.

The authority could become effective only after municipal autonomy was eliminated. As early as 1927, still under the military dictatorship, municipal autonomy was de facto abolished by government agents (Decree 11875 of July 13, 1926, dissolving all administrative units in metropolitan Portugal and the adjacent islands). At the same time, the municipalities' expropriation rights were gradually strengthened from 1926 to 1929, and the formal procedure for expropriation proceedings was clarified (Steiger, 2014, pp. 36–37). At the end of 1927, the municipalities or the central government were granted a separate right of expropriation in cases of urgent need, initially only to safeguard public infrastructure (Decree 14794 December 27, 1927, on the separate right of expropriation in case of urgent need of municipalities or the state). Three months later, the compensation claims were fixed (Decree 15291 March 30, 1928, to regulate compensation claims). Also in 1928, the rights of expropriated persons to object were severely restricted (Decree 16055 of October 12, 1928, on the promotion of social housing). In 1929, a time limit regulation followed (Decree 16466 of February 1, 1929, to regulate the time limit for expropriation proceedings), and the Council of Ministers' competence regarding the determination of urgency in expropriations was defined (Decree 17508 of October 22, 1929, clarifying the jurisdiction of the emergency determinations).

After the constitutional referendum in 1933, however, the country's administrative system was reorganized once again. The constitution granted the cities of Lisbon and Porto a certain degree of independence, although it gave the central state a far-reaching right of intervention (cf. Constitution of the Portuguese Republic of April 4, 1933). Shortly after the referendum, laws on expropriation for urban planning reasons were tightened again. The continuous expansion of the municipalities' powers of expropriation formed the crucial basis for the implementation of social housing programs. In the summer of 1938, in view of the planned centenary celebrations in 1940 to mark the 800th anniversary of Portugal's founding, the municipalities' right of expropriation was once again extensively strengthened by a new legislative decree (Decree-Law 28797 of July 1, 1938, on the simplification of expropriations of land of public interest). In the case of urgent projects in public interest, land could be expropriated against the will of the owner. For this purpose, an arbitration court set a compensation sum that could not be legally challenged.

Duarte Pacheco had concentrated all the important competencies for administering state urban planning with the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. Nevertheless, he was unable to apply them directly, despite the considerably strengthened rights of intervention, because there were no urban planning experts in Portugal. In the spring of 1933, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport was granted 12,000 francs to commission the French urban planner Alfred Agache to prepare a general development plan for the Costa do Sol west of Lisbon (Decree 22444 of April 10, 1933, on the conclusion of a contract with Alfred Donath Agache). The commissioning was at the same time connected to the hope of strengthening the planning competence in Portugal through his help.

On the initiative of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, which was able to rely on the advice of the French town planner Alfred Agache, a town planning law was passed at the end of 1934 (Decree-Law 24802 of December 21, 1934, on the preparation of general development plans). The decree-law dictated that municipalities with more than 2,500 inhabitants or a population growth of more than 10 percent between two censuses, were obliged to draw up a general development plan by the beginning of 1940. The same applied to places of touristic, climatic, therapeutic, religious, historical, or artistic importance. The legislative

decree also contained guidelines on how a general development plan should be structured. For example, the plan was to be developed based on topographic maps, which had to be prepared beforehand on a scale of 1:500. However, the municipalities were slow to implement the guidelines, and in 1938 a supervisory commission for the preparation of the plan documents (*comissão de fiscalização dos levantamentos topográficos urbanos*) was additionally formed. This marked a decisive acceleration in urban planning throughout Portugal (Lôbo, 1995, pp. 38–40).

Great plans

The obligation to produce general development plans presented the two major cities of Porto and Lisbon with the challenge of finding suitable urban designers for the task. Not only did Portugal have no professionals, but there was also worldwide competition for the leading minds in the discipline (cf. the explanatory notes to the decree 22444 of April 10, 1933, on the conclusion of a contract with Alfred Donath Agache). Alfred Agache, Lisbon's preferred candidate, was no longer available because he had already committed himself elsewhere. However, on his recommendation, Étienne de Groër, a professor at the *Institut de l'Urbanisme de Paris*, was recruited to develop a master plan. Together with João Faria da Costa, a young Portuguese town planner, who had graduated from the *Institut de l'Urbanisme de Paris* in the summer of 1937 with the help of a state scholarship (Almeida, 2013, p. 30), de Groër drew up a radially organized general development plan on behalf of the city administration from 1938 to 1940 and from 1946 to 1948 (Mangorrinha, 2007, pp. 113–144).

FIGURE 3.2   Even though the expansion of the Avenida da Liberdade boulevard was only partially realized, the neighborhoods created as part of the project are among the most popular residential areas in Lisbon.

Source: Bodenschatz, 2017

The General Development Plan by de Groër became the most influential instrument of dictatorial urban planning. Although it was never approved for implementation by the central state (Almeida, 2013, p. 35), its influence extends to the present day. The fact that the plan could become a milestone in Lisbon's urban planning history (Cf. Camarinhas, 2009, p. 392) was favored by several constellations. De Groër continued the planning for the Costa do Sol by Alfred Agache in his sense. In doing so, he not only oriented himself on Agache's ideas for the coastal strip but also further developed his ideas for Lisbon. For the planning of Lisbon, de Groër had at his disposal the help of João Faria da Costa and António Emídio Abrantes, who had already begun the basic investigations for the general development plan on behalf of the city in 1932, and who shared his understanding of urban planning (cf. Camarinhas, 2009, pp. 381–382). In January 1938, Duarte Pacheco, the initiator of the 1934 urban planning law, was appointed the mayor of Lisbon. He placed the Planning Department for the General Development Plan directly under his position. In the summer of 1938, Pacheco additionally assumed the office of Minister of Public Works and Transport. Equipped with this dual authority, Pacheco had the necessary powers of intervention to implement the ideas that had emerged from de Groër (Lôbo, 1995 [1993], p. 37).

Lisbon's urban design was influenced by the ideas taught at the *Institut de l'Urbanisme* in the first half of the 20th century by Faria da Costa and de Groër. De Groër, together with Faria da Costa, had created an ordering, urban planning framework for the ambitions of spatial self-expression of the *Estado Novo*. The guiding principle of their design was a traffic system of radial and ring roads that resembled the image of a spider's web. At the center of this concentric order was the strictly orthogonal Baixa with the Praça do Comercio, the old and new power center of Portugal. (This was the site of the city palace of the Portuguese kings before the Great Sea and Earthquake of 1755. Even after the reconstruction under Marquis Pombal, the administrative and governmental center remained at the Praça do Comercio). The radial streets (the four most important radial streets were Avenida da Índia, Avenida da Liberdade, Avenida Almirante Reis, and Avenida Infante Dom Henrique (Henry the Navigator)) connected the Baixa with the surrounding countryside and were to be developed into representative axes of the urban propaganda of the *Estado Novo*. In the urban planning concept, they were the linear subcenter of the urban residential districts for the middle classes. These extended with their block-edge development into the side streets and along the inner ring roads. Social housing estates were planned outside the city's soft urban fabric. The *Estado Novo* aimed for a clear socio-economic order for Lisbon, which can be roughly divided into three areas: the business center including the government district, which was essentially limited to the lower city, the Baixa –the urban mixed quarters of the middle classes and the suburban settlements of social housing. The old town, Alfama, which is nestled on the hill of St. George's Castle, played a special role in that concept (cf. Bodenschatz & Welch Guerra, 2019, pp. 82–83).

De Groër's concept was hardly challenged by the urban planning ideas of the 1950s. This was also true to a certain extent in the 1960s when Lisbon's urban planning was once again under French influence with the commissioning of Georges Meyer-Heine. Thus, the general development plan of the French urban planner Meyer-Heine from 1967 was based on de Groër's development concept, but the model of the car-oriented city, which Meyer-Heine's plans followed, contributed to drastically different street spaces. This created barriers in the urban areas of Lisbon that were originally designed by de Groër as connecting spaces (cf. Bodenschatz & Welch Guerra, 2019, p. 84).

In contrast to Lisbon, Porto's urban design was initially entirely under the influence of Italian experts. Porto, which had ignored the requirements of the 1934 urban planning law for several years, was able to enlist the internationally sought-after Italian urban designer Marcello Piacentini to collaborate on the general development plan in 1939. Although Piacentini initially impressed the city with his work, the contract was dissolved in disappointment in early 1940 (cf. Bodenschatz & Welch Guerra, 2019, p. 191).

In the same year, a consulting contract was signed with the architect Giovanni Muzio, also from Italy. Although the cooperation between Muzio and the city was considerably better than before with Piacentini, Muzio did not succeed in designing a desirable model for the general development plan together with his Portuguese partner in the city administration, Antão de Almeida Garrett. Like de Groër, Muzio tried to integrate the theme of radial streets into his planning. But the idea he developed for a representative axis opening up the center from the north, remained a paper project. The same applied to his planning of the new Campo Alegre subcenter. Only the idea of connecting Porto's new overseas port to the center with an expressway was adopted by subsequent plans.

Almeida Garrett, who had previously supported Muzio's planning from the city side, was commissioned by the city of Porto in 1945 to develop a new general development plan. Garrett's plan focused on developing a contemporary transportation concept for Porto. The French urban planner Robert Auzelle continued this guiding idea so consistently that in 1958–1962, the design of Porto, like Lisbon before it, now had to submit to the dictates of car-oriented urban redevelopment. However, this reconstruction was much more radical in Porto than in Lisbon.

The ideas for the general development plans of the two major cities of the dictatorship were based on the international trends of the time. France was able to maintain its strong influence within the 48-year dictatorship despite the war and the occupation by German troops and despite the ideologically divergent positions on Portugal. The anti-metropolitan rhetoric of the *Estado Novo* is not reflected in the plans of foreign or domestic experts. Nor is there any discernible break with plans begun during the First Republic. The extent to which the Minister of Public Works and Transport, who was interested in urban planning, interfered in concrete planning is not known. However, he is said to have been particularly impressed by the plans for Berlin that were presented in Lisbon in 1941 (França, 1982, p. 28). His influence and the authority of his office made a large part of the realized planning possible. This was especially true for Lisbon. In Porto, whose general development planning did not reach implementation maturity until after Duarte Pacheco's death, the dwindling strength of the dictatorship after 1945 is evident, especially in the city center, in the form of unfinished street breakthroughs.

Transformation of the city centers

The city centers of Lisbon and Porto were of outstanding importance for the urban planning propaganda of the *Estado Novo*. The many postponed city center renewal projects of the First Republic were resumed by the dictatorship with the promise that they would be completed swiftly. In particular, the catastrophic structural condition of the old cities had become a symbol of the First Republic's inaction (cf. for Lisbon Christino, 1923, pp. 210–213). Their renewal offered the chance to demonstrate the ability to act and to embody in the smallest possible space the idea of return and promise developed by the Office of Propaganda.

FIGURE 3.3   View from the Praça dos Retauradores to St. George's Castle.

Source: Bodenschatz, 2017

Under the *Estado Novo*, renewal of the old town initially meant demolition. Structures that had been classified as worthy of preservation according to the criteria of the *História Única* were freed from the surrounding buildings and restored to such a structural condition that the historical event to which the structure was supposed to attest was immediately apparent. This approach initially led to the demolishing of areas near important monuments such as St. George's Castle in Lisbon, the Hieronymite Monastery in Belém, and the Cathedral of Porto. These three buildings were among the key structures of the urban propaganda of the *Estado Novo*. As testimonies of the glorious past, they were transformed into authentic stages for the centenary celebrations in 1940 (cf. Neto, 1999, p. 30). They embodied Christian faith and political authority, and thus the basic values that the *Estado Novo* wanted to convey for its social project (Corkill & Almeida, 2009, p. 385).

Since the new construction of St. George's Castle in Lisbon could not be completed as planned for the commemorative year 1940 (Silva, 1942, p. 1), the structure was not integrated into a concrete spectacle, unlike the Hieronymite monastery in Belém or the cathedral in Porto. Nevertheless, the castle was the core project of the urban image policy of the centenary celebrations. Its urban staging as the acropolis of the nation aimed to achieve a long-distance viewing effect and could already be experienced in part in 1940. Due to its exposed location, the castle could be seen from many places in the city. This meant that new buildings could be placed in relation to it, and thus to the desired history, via a line of sight. The new construction of the fort, which today is mostly read as an authentic testimony of the Portuguese founding history, is the most successful "magnificent building" of the urban planning propaganda of the *Estado Novo*. The reconstruction of St. George's Castle was the model project for a massive building program that included the reconstruction of more than 30 castles throughout Portugal.

However, most of the development of the old cities was not included in the renewal program of the 1930s and 1940s. This is also true for the Baixa, Lisbon's lower city, which was rebuilt as a regular urban layout after the 1755 quake under Marquis Pombal. The various projects conceived for this area of the city never progressed beyond the design stage. This is true of both the plans for the redevelopment of Rossio (Cf. Bodenschatz & Welch Guerra, 2019, pp. 87–89) Square and of designs for the construction of new ministries west of the Praça do Comércio (ibid., pp. 85–86; 89–90; 94). A serious intervention in the center renewal was the clear-cut redevelopment of the old quarter Mouraria. It fell victim to the planning of a sequence of squares that was to form the hinge between the Baixa and the important radial street, Avenida Almirante Reis. This renewal project, advertised with representations of the new city squares in the shadow of St. George's Castle, thus promising the rebirth of past greatness, remained a paper project except for the demolitions (ibid., pp. 96–97).

In the 1930s in Porto, unlike Lisbon, the *Estado Novo* was able to largely complete the construction of a new center for the commercial city (cf. Bodenschatz & Welch Guerra, 2019, pp. 204–206). In fact, the city also managed to realize a new city square, Praça de Dom João I, in the early 1950s (cf. ibid., p. 209). As in Lisbon, a significant part of the old town was demolished for a direct connection of the center with the surrounding urban hinterland. This road, which required an adjustment of the terrain in addition to the area demolitions, gapes as a wide aisle in the old town of Porto to this day (cf. ibid., pp. 210–212).

A turning point in official urban renewal policy did not occur until the 1960s, and that was in Porto. A study by the Porto Academy of Art developed for the first time proposals for how Porto's old city could be redeveloped without destroying its spatial and social fabric (cf. Bodenschatz & Welch Guerra, 2019, p. 213). A short time later, a similar study was commissioned for the center of Lisbon.

From the beginning, urban planning in the *Estado Novo* paid special attention to centers. The old town played a prominent role in the considerations about the center. Its propagandistic potential was recognized early on, and the dictatorship was also well aware of its importance for tourism in its structural totality. Nevertheless, the dictatorship did not succeed in renewing the old cities of Lisbon and Porto in accordance with its policy of recollection and promise. The desired urban image of a resurgent new state, conscious of its glorious past, does not emerge at any point in the two old cities, since all the new buildings realized in the two old cities, such as St. George's Castle, were executed as supposedly authentic old buildings. Also, a concept for the preservation of the old towns as a whole was not worked on until much later.

With its old-town building program, the *Estado Novo* barely got beyond the renovation or reconstruction of monuments of history-related commemorative culture. The conversion of the centers of the two large cities of Lisbon and Porto into administrative and business centers failed because of the scope of the project. The desired displacement of the lowest income strata from the centers to the suburban settlements of social housing was also largely unsuccessful. Yet the *Estado Novo* managed to shape the urban development of the centers according to its image of Portuguese history in such a way that the narrative of *História Única* lives on in large parts.

Lisbon and Porto: a mirror of the dictatorship's promise for the future

Lisbon, the old capital of Portugal, was purposefully developed by the dictatorship into a model city of state-owned urban development. It benefited particularly from the young

dictatorship's program to modernize. It was here that the most money was invested, and consequently where the strictest care was taken to ensure that central government guidelines were implemented.

In the 1930s and 1940s, the legal foundations were laid for the rebuilding and expansion of Lisbon, which lasted until the mid-1950s. The capital exemplified all of the renewal programs, which ranged from infrastructure development to the rebuilding of the center, to social housing, to the attempted control of privately financed urban as well as suburban housing. The sum of the programs resulted in a comprehensive urban redevelopment that was oriented toward the needs of the new middle classes. As a result, mixed inner-city neighborhoods for the middle classes with high urban qualities were created exclusively in Lisbon. In parallel, the cityscape was adapted to the dictatorship's interpretation of Lisbon's history as the capital of an empire created by heroes.

Porto, the old commercial city in Portugal's north, was the country's second largest and only major city after Lisbon. Like the rest of the country, it was included in the dictatorship's renewal program. In contrast to Lisbon, however, the central government's guidelines were implemented only reluctantly in Porto. Even though all the important infrastructure projects were taking place in Porto, they differed significantly in their late implementation and in their design from their twin projects in Lisbon. For example, Porto did not have any large neighborhoods from the dictatorship period, which exemplifies state-controlled private urban housing. Private suburban housing was also much less controlled in Porto than in Lisbon. Here, the capital city clearly received more attention from the *Estado Novo* than the commercial city.

Due to the extensive modernization programs for Lisbon as well as for Porto, the testimonies of metropolitan urbanism and their messages still have an impact today. The urban body of both cities but especially of Lisbon is a built image of the social model of the Portuguese dictatorship. The old town follows the ideal of one historical truth (*História Única*), the key element of the dictatorial regime. St. George's Castle, the symbol of the *Estado Novo*'s claim to power, dominates Lisbon as the city's crown. The urban fabric, with its business districts, neighborhoods, and social infrastructures, maps the order of the corporate state. The urban as well as suburban residential districts of the middle classes of the *Estado Novo* still enjoy great popularity. Their friendly and calm tone masks the history of expropriations and injustices on which they were built. The simple shantytowns for the lowest income brackets alone have largely disappeared and with them the memories of forced relocations. In contrast, the remodeled or newly created memorial sites of the *Estado Novo* have survived all political upheavals unscathed and without comment. For example, the Monument to His Discoveries in Lisbon (cf. Bodenschatz & Welch Guerra, 2019, p. 60) and the Monument to Colonizing Efforts in Porto (cf. ibid., pp. 227–228) still stand in the square of the Empire (!) in close proximity to the most popular suburban middle-class neighborhoods from the dictatorship period. The Empire, as the *Estado Novo* referred to its domain, went down with the colonial wars in 1974. The building blocks of dictatorial urbanism such as St. George's Castle remain and with them our adulterated joy in the dictatorial heritage.

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4

VALLE DE LOS CAÍDOS/VALLE DE CUELGAMUROS

Construction, use and "dispute value" of a gigantic legacy of the Franco dictatorship, 1939–2023[1]

Piero Sassi

> "The Valley of the Fallen is a place of recognised historical value, and is today the most important monumental symbol of the Civil War and the Francoist dictatorship, as well as of the National Catholicism of that period."
>
> Comisión de Expertos para el Futuro del Valle de los Caídos, 2011, p. 4

The lengthy siege of Madrid (1936–1939) during the Civil War, and the Franco dictatorship that followed, left profound marks on the region around the capital. Both the destruction caused by the conflict and Francoist urban development policy shaped a commemorative landscape around the capital city that was intended to portray and immortalise the victory of the Nationalists. A central element of this programme was, for example, the *Alcázar* in Toledo. The historical fortress, which was destroyed in the Civil War, had been the scene of bitter fighting between Nationalists and Republicans. It was celebrated by Francoist propaganda as a place of remembrance and was reconstructed in the 1950s. It was within this framework that, first and foremost, the National Monument of the Holy Cross in the Valley of the Fallen (*Monumento Nacional de Santa Cruz del Valle de los Caídos*), known simply as the Valley of the Fallen (*Valle de los Caídos*), was built. This triumphant, expansive construction, which was finally completed in 1959, lies in the mountainous area of the Sierra de Guadarrama, roughly 40 kilometres northwest of Madrid. The Valley of the Fallen contains the remains of thousands of fighters who fell in the Civil War. In 1975 the dictator, Francisco Franco Bahamonde (1892–1975), was also buried here.

The Francoist New State was established as the result of a putsch against the Second Republic, originated by colonial forces in Spanish Morocco and supported by Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany, which led to a bloody Civil War (1936–1939). The Franco dictatorship was supported by a number of power groups including primarily the military, supporters of the monarchy, the Catholic Church and the *Falange*, a mass organisation similar to that of the Italian Fascists. The dictatorship continued to exist for almost four decades until 1975. The first period, the "autarchy" (1939–1959), was characterised by extensive international and economic isolation, strong control by the public authorities and the marked protagonism

FIGURE 4.1 *Valle de los Caídos*: monumental cloisters are spread out at the foot of the huge cross with the rear entrance to the basilica in the centre. Photo: Piero Sassi, 2014.

of the *Falange*. The monument in the Valley of the Fallen was established during the phase of autarchy, between 1940 and 1959.

The "dispute value" (on the definition, cf. Dolff-Bonekämper, 2021; Warda, 2013) describes a special feature of urban legacies that are the subject of lively disputes, namely – to quote the German monument conservationist Gabi Dolff-Bonekämper – "that monuments can be valuable, not despite the fact that they are argued about but precisely because they are argued about" (Dolff-Bonekämper, 2021, p. 7). It is above all because of its "dispute value" that the Valley of the Fallen is today an outstanding example of Francoist urbanism. At the latest since the adoption of the Historical Memory Law (*Ley de la Memoria Histórica*) in 2007, the use and interpretation of the *Valle de los Caídos* have been the subject of a discussion that has uncovered an open flank of Spanish society: the conflicts over the appraisal of its dictatorial past.

Planning, construction, reinterpretation

The construction of the Valley of the Fallen was determined by decree on 1 April 1940, the first anniversary of the seizure of power by the Nationalists. The title of the decree announced the aim of the project: "the immortalising of the memory of those who fell in our glorious crusade" (Decree of 1 April 1940). The new national monument was to be a place "at which future generations can commemorate those who bequeathed to them a better Spain" (ibid.). The structure was intended – according to the decree – to equal "the grandeur of the monuments of old". The mortal remains of soldiers who had fallen in different places in Spain during the Civil War were to be interred in the planned mausoleum. Only those who had fought on the side of the Nationalists were meant here, however (Alted Vigil, 2015, pp. 265–266).

The most prominent Francoist architect of that time, Pedro Muguruza Otaño, then General Secretary for Architecture, was at first responsible for the planning until he was forced by illness to give up this work in 1949. In 1950, the architect Diego Méndez became the director (Méndez, 2009 [1982], p. 39).

Cuelgamuros Valley was chosen as the location. The *Caudillo* (Leader) Francisco Franco was personally involved in this decision. The location was particularly suitable for a number of reasons. The site lay directly on a hill, the Risco de la Nava, and could be clearly seen from a great distance. Furthermore, it was in the immediate neighbourhood of *El Escorial* (*Real Sitio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial*), the austere, magnificent structure from the 16th century that served as the abbey and burial place of the Spanish kings and was considered as a place representing the imperial history of Spain that the New State was attempting to revive. Last but not least, the Risco de la Nava was roughly in the geographical centre of the country. The nascent monument could therefore serve as a symbol of "the new unity of National Spain" (Bernecker & Brinkmann, 2011, p. 204).


FIGURE 4.2 Masterplan and longitudinal section of the monumental cult site, Diego Méndez, c. 1952.

Source: Méndez, 1959, p. 40. © Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Creative Commons Atribución 4.0

FIGURE 4.3 Building site of the underground basilica.

Source: Méndez, 1959, p. 58. © Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Creative Commons Atribución 4.0

The Valley of the Fallen was designed as a gigantic complex, the simple urbanist structure of which includes a number of components and a multitude of functions. The most prominent element is the over142-metre-high concrete cross, a sign of the monument that can be seen from a great distance. It was built according to plans drawn up by the head architect Diego Méndez in 1950 (cf. Méndez, 2009 [1982], pp. 173–215). Below the hill, a monumental church, with a total length of 262 metres, was hewn into the rock. In 1960, Pope John XXIII conferred on it the prestigious status of *Basílica Menor* ("minor basilica"). Here, not far from the gravestone of the founder of the *Falange Española*, José Antonio Primo de Rivera (since 1959) and the gravestone of Franco, which was added in 1975, the mortal remains of roughly 34,000 soldiers who fell in the Civil War were interred in eight crypts between 1959 and 1983.[2] To the east of the basilica, in front of its imposing main entrance, a large esplanade with a view of the landscape of the Sierra de Guadarrama extends over an area of roughly three hectares, which was planned for mass gatherings. On the western side of the hill, a monumental cloister was constructed in which the living and working quarters of the Benedictine monks are located. The surrounding valley of Cuelgamuros underwent a gigantic reafforestation programme during the construction of the monument. Between 1941 and 1980, more than two million new trees were planted, primarily Iberian species (Méndez, 2009 [1982], pp. 271–272).

Prisoners were also employed in the construction of the monument, particularly in the period immediately following the Civil War until the end of the 1940s. Forced labour was no exception in Franco's Spain; it was widespread, especially in large urban development and infrastructure projects. Private firms also participated in the realisation of the project.

FIGURE 4.4 Monument in the middle of the suggestive landscape of the Cuelgamuros Valley, photo c. 1959.

Source: Méndez, 1959, p. 41. © Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Creative Commons Atribución 4.0

These included the influential building companies *Constructora Huarte y Compañía*, which erected the huge cross, and *Inmobiliaria Banús*. Private donations also contributed to the financing of the project (Bernecker & Brinkmann, 2011, p. 208; Prutsch, 2012, p. 155).

The monument was not inaugurated until 1 April 1959, the 20th anniversary of the seizure of power. The dictator described it at that time as a "magnificent catacomb temple, hewn into the rock, above which the monumental cross soars that dominates this valley" ([Franco, speech of 1 April 1959], p. 7). Officially, the cult site was administered by the Foundation of the Holy Cross in the Valley of the Fallen (*Fundación de la Santa Cruz del Valle de los Caídos*), founded in 1957. In fact, the founding law already instructed the Benedictine abbey to run all the facilities of the place of worship (statutory decree of 23 August 1957). By the end of the 1950s, the socio-political situation in Spain had changed fundamentally. The treaties with the Vatican and the USA (1953), the government reshuffle (1957) and the stabilisation plan (1959) introduced a new phase of the dictatorship characterised by economic growth and international openness, the *Desarrollismo*. This led to a substantially changed message:

FIGURE 4.5   Central nave of the underground basilica, photo probably c. 1959.

Source: Méndez, 1959, p. 47. © Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Creative Commons Atribución 4.0

from being solely a symbol of victory, as it was originally conceptualised in the 1940s, the ensemble was reinterpreted as a symbol of reconciliation (Fuentes Vega, 2017, p. 80). With this intention, and under pressure from the Church, the mortal remains of Republican fighters were brought to the mausoleum shortly before its inauguration (Alted Vigil, 2015, p. 267). In addition, the monument was decoupled from its origins by laying more emphasis on its architectural qualities, and in this way, it was made more attractive to foreign tourists, who increasingly visited the Valley of the Fallen from the 1960s onwards (Cf. Fuentes Vega, 2017, pp. 84–85). This first reinterpretation of the Valley of the Fallen pertained above all to the official discourse, while in the perception of a large part of Spanish society the monument remained a symbol of the victory of the Nationalists in the Civil War.

As is well known, Franco's death on 20 November 1975 represented the end of the dictatorship and the beginning of a – for Spanish society difficult – transition to democracy, known as the *Transición*. For the Valley of the Fallen, the death of the dictator meant another momentous reinterpretation following the burial of the dictator's corpse there on 23 November. The fact that the mortal remains of the *Caudillo* were enshrined in the Valley of the Fallen, although the dictator did not fall in the Civil War, was not simply an exception but an unresolved contradiction. The monument was now no longer simply a place of remembrance for those who had fallen in the Civil War but was also the dictator's mausoleum. This new function became increasingly important in the years that followed. While Spanish society was taking its first steps towards a democratic life, the Valley of the Fallen became a place of pilgrimage for supporters and admirers of Franco, a stage for events in memory of the dictatorship.

FIGURE 4.6   Main altar of the basilica, photo probably c. 1959. 1975, after his death, Francisco
Franco's gravestone was placed behind the altar.

Source: Méndez, 1959, p. 49. © Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Creative Commons Atribución 4.0

The historical memory law[3] and the Committee of Experts for the future of the Valley of the Fallen[4]

It was only at the beginning of the 2000s that the changing socio-political situation led to a more open discussion on the interpretation and function of the Valley of the Fallen at a national level. A decisive contribution to this discourse was made by the excavations of mass graves from the Civil War that were carried out at that time. Since the demise of the dictatorship, these "had usually been carried out by private persons, accompanied by disinterest or resistance on the part of local and provincial institutions" (Alted Vigil, 2015, p. 271). Now the question was increasingly raised as to the identity of the mortal remains that were moved to the memorial in Cuelgamuros between 1959 and 1983. Throughout the country, relatives of the victims of Franco's regime formed associations to search for the burial places of their ancestors who had fallen in the Civil War and these exerted increasing political pressure on the government. Pressure was not only exerted bottom-up, however. In that period, Spain established itself, thanks to a prospering economy, as a major force in the process of European integration. Spain had joined the then European Economic Community in 1986. Its undeniable importance to Europe, however, confronted the country with the now urgent – and unpleasant – question of how to deal with the history of Franco's dictatorship. This was expressed first and foremost in the recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 17 March 2006 on "the need for international condemnation of the Franco regime", which paid particular attention to the handling of the monument in the Valley of the Fallen. The Spanish government was urged to "set up a permanent exhibition in the underground basilica at the Valley of the Fallen […] explaining how it was built by the republican prisoners […]" (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 2006).

The parliamentary elections of March 2004, which brought a new, socialist government led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero to power, formed a turning point in the handling of the difficult legacy of the Franco period. From then on the question of a new approach to the Valley of the Fallen was a central concern of the government, which in the following years was dealt with by means of two major innovations: the Historical Memory Law (2007) and the work of the Committee of Experts for the Future of the Valley of the Fallen (2011).

The passing of the Historical Memory Law (*Ley de la Memoria Histórica*) marked a radical change in the discourse in Spanish institutions and in Spanish society with the history of their own dictatorship. For the first time it was possible to have a comprehensive discussion on the treatment of this difficult legacy. The Law foresaw special measures for the Valley of the Fallen. These were of a very general character, however. The most important was the explicit prohibition of "activities of a political nature or the glorification of the Civil War, its protagonists or Francoism" (Law 52/2007 of 26 December 2007). An intensive discourse on the history of the building ensemble was therefore not envisaged. In order to avoid the foreseeable escalation of the political conflict, the Law avoided making specific decisions on changes to its interpretation and function. The new measures therefore fell significantly short of the expectations that had been formulated less than a year earlier by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The debate came to a head when the Valley of the Fallen was closed in December 2009 (Cf. Martínez-Fornés, 2012). The government justified its decision with the need to carry out urgently required repairs. The closure met with strong protest, however, among others from the Benedictine abbey and certain sections of the parliamentary opposition around the conservative People's Party (*Partido Popular*) (Alted Vigil, 2015, p. 273; cf. Los monjes del Valle de los Caídos desafían el cierre del templo, 2010; cf. Martínez-Fornés, 2012).

In order to resolve this difficult situation, in May 2011 the government established a Committee of Experts for the Future of the Valley of the Fallen and instructed it to prepare specific proposals for the future of the site (Cf. Order of the Ministry of the Presidency of 27 May 2011). The members of the committee were distinguished experts from a variety of disciplines and institutions (Cf. Comisión de Expertos para el Futuro del Valle de los Caídos, 2011, p. 5). The committee began its work on 27 May 2011 and presented its proposals in the form of a report on 29 November 2011. This report contained the most comprehensive and detailed proposal to date on the reinterpretation and change in function of the Valley of the Fallen. The first part of the report summarised the results of an extensive stocktaking, which covered everything from the institutional framework responsible for the administration of the monument to the natural environment surrounding the complex and the structural condition of the monument itself.

The committee developed recommendations for action based on this analysis. The measures proposed served the objective of an "all-embracing reinterpretation" ("*resignificación integral*") (ibid., p. 17) of the ensemble. The Valley of the Fallen was to be changed from a symbol of repression and a place of pilgrimage for supporters of the dictatorship to a "place of common memories" ("*lugar de memorias compartidas*") (ibid., p. 6), to a centre for the socio-political discourse on the history of the dictatorship. In order to achieve this, the state institutions should intervene more strongly in the administration of the Valley of the Fallen and take on the main responsibility. Its statutory area of responsibility should be extended to cover all the premises of the complex with the exception of the basilica, which as a place of worship should remain under the administration of the Church (cf. ibid., pp. 8–10). The role

of the Benedictine abbey, which had held the chief responsibility for decades, should thus be significantly reduced.

A few measures were proposed with regard to the buildings themselves. The ensemble should be retained and handed down to future generations. For this to be possible, urgent repairs would have to be carried out in order to prevent the decay of the building structures. The repairs should concentrate on the basilica and the external sculptures. In addition to the repair of the existing structures, further building measures were proposed with the objective of explaining the historical origin of the monument to visitors and – first and foremost – to make the Valley of the Fallen into a centre for the reappraisal of the history of the dictatorship. The measures were to be concentrated on the esplanade in front of the main entrance to the basilica. They included artistic installations in remembrance of the fallen, but the most important was the construction of an information centre in which visitors should not only be made aware of the meaning and controversial history of the monument: the new building, for the planning of which an international competition was proposed, should also present current research results on the history of the Valley of the Fallen and the dictatorship (ibid., pp. 17–19). In order to free the pathway to a fundamental reinterpretation of the complex, it was also recommended that the coffin of the dictator Francisco Franco be removed from the site (ibid., p. 21). The Committee of Experts was divided on this question, however (cf. ibid., pp. 25–26).

The recommendations of the expert committee represented a further major step in the discourse on the history and the future of the Valley of the Fallen. The lively discussions on this subject took place primarily at the national level. They were made possible by the particular political conditions that reigned during the socialist governments under the leadership of Zapatero (2004–2011). The recommendations of the expert committee were not implemented, however. Nine days before the submission of the report (on 29 November 2011) the political situation in Spain changed fundamentally. On 20 November 2011 the socialist government was voted out of office. The elections, which took place in Spain shaken by economic crisis, brought the conservative People's Party (*Partido Popular*) to power. This meant a preliminary stop to the discourse on the Valley of the Fallen, at least at the national level. The work of the Committee of Experts was soon forgotten. Three years later the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations, Pablo de Greiff, in the report on his journey to Spain (21 January to 3 February 2014), demanded that the Spanish government resume the implementation of the Committee of Experts' recommendations (Cf. United Nations, 2014, p. 21). Following the conclusion of the repairs begun in 2009 the site had been reopened in 2012.

The controversy on Franco's grave and the Democratic Memory Law[5]

In the years of the conservative government under the leadership of Mariano Rajoy (2011–2018) the Valley of the Fallen was put on the backburner of political discussion. Through its consistent inaction on the question of how to deal with the political history of the Valley of the Fallen, the *Partido Popular* succeeded in silencing the controversy. It was not until the summer of 2018, after a change of government brought the Socialists under the leadership of Pedro Sánchez back into power, that the discourse on the function of the memorial site was taken up again at the national level.

Following its assumption of office on 7 June 2018 the new national government declared the reinterpretation of the Valley of the Fallen to be one of its principal tasks. The process of reappraisal of the history of the monument that had been begun by the previous socialist government, the result of which had been the recommendations by the Committee of Experts for the Future of the Valley of the Fallen presented in 2011, was taken up again. The removal of the dictator's mortal remains, which the 2011 Report had already proposed, was to be realised as quickly as possible and the ground prepared for the reinterpretation of the monument. With a speed that was unusual for this issue, a statutory decree was passed on 24 August 2018, the historical importance of which is considerable. In the text it is emphasised that "the presence of the mortal remains of Francisco Franco at the complex hampers the implementation of the statutory mandate [of the Historical Memory Law of 2007] not to glorify Francoism, and impedes the realisation of the project to commemorate all the victims of the [Civil] War". Paragraph 16 of the Law of 2007 on the treatment of the Valley of the Fallen was now to be supplemented according to the statutory decree of 24 August 2018 by a section according to which "the Valley of the Fallen may only house the mortal remains of those who lost their lives in the course of the Spanish Civil War […]" (Royal Statutory Decree 10/2018 of 24 August 2018). Only one coffin was affected: that of the dictator. On 13 September 2018 the government's decision was confirmed in an animated sitting of the Spanish parliament by 172 votes in favour, largely from the Socialist fraction, 164 abstentions, from the ranks of the conservative *Partido Popular* and *Ciudadanos*, and two votes against (Díez, 2018). It was a historical day for Spanish democracy. Never before had a government dared to take such a step.

The statutory decree of 2018 at first remained without consequence, however. Various factors were responsible for this, first and foremost being the position of the dictator's family, who held the sovereignty of decision on the future place of burial, and the leadership of the Benedictine abbey, which was responsible for the administration of the underground basilica (Cf. Casqueiro, 2019a; Casqueiro, 2019b; on the dispute over the exhuming, cf. also Ferrándiz, 2022, pp. 231–232). In April 2019 the Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) won the parliamentary elections. Although the relationships of the parties in parliament did not allow the building of a stable government, Pedro Sánchez was able to remain Prime Minister and continue to be on the frontline of the campaign for the removal and reburial elsewhere of the coffin. On 24 October 2019, following a lengthy legal dispute between the Franco family and the incumbent government, the dictator's coffin was exhumed and reburied in Mingorrubio cemetery in the north of the municipal area of Madrid. This historical event was accompanied by bitter protests from Franco's supporters and by rejoicing on the part of those sections of Spanish society that for decades had been demanding the reinterpretation of the monument in Cuelgamuros (Cf. Elordi Cué & Junquera, 2019b).

In the early elections of November 2019, the second such within one year, the Socialist Workers' Party was again able to hold its ground. On 30 December 2019 it signed a government contract with its coalition partner, the left-wing alliance *Unidas Podemos*, in which significant steps towards the reappraisal of the history of the Franco dictatorship were promised (cf. Partido Socialista Obrero Español & Unidas Podemos, 2019, pp. 30–32).

In the legislative period, which ended in the summer of 2023, a comprehensive approach to the *Valle de los Caídos* was developed for the first time. In October 2022, the Democratic Memory Law (*Ley 20/2022, de 19 de octubre, de Memoria Democrática*) was passed, which replaced the law from 2007 and provides for various steps to deal with the *Valle de los Caídos*

as "a place of democratic memory" (Law 20/2022 of 19 October 2022). Thus, the complex was renamed *Valle de Cuelgamuros*, a name that distances itself from the propaganda of the Franco era and expresses the process of reinterpretation. As a consequence of the new law, "all mortal remains that occupy a prominent place in the ensemble will be relocated" (Law 20/2022 of 19 October 2022). This referred to the tombstone of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, directly opposite the altar of the underground basilica. His remains were exhumed on 24 April 2023 (cf. La exhumación del "Ausente", 2023). Furthermore, the law provides for a reorganisation of the administration of the place of worship. This includes the dissolution of the *Fundación de la Santa Cruz del Valle de los Caídos* and the declaration of the crypts as a civil cemetery (Law 20/2022 of 19 October 2022). These reforms will significantly limit the role of the Benedictine abbey in the future, in favour of that of state institutions.

Research into the history of the site, a key step towards its reinterpretation, has also been promoted in recent years. Archaeological excavations are being carried out around the cult site with the aim of investigating the conditions under which it was built and the use of prisoners on the site (Cf. Patrimonio Nacional, 2021). Furthermore, the exhumations and identifications of the remains in the crypts began in order to provide answers to those families who have been searching for the remains of relatives who died in the Civil War for decades (cf. Vega, 2023). Finally, in recent years, the conditions for a longer-term process of reinterpretation of the place of worship have been established (cf. Ministerio de Política Territorial y Memoria Democrática, 2023). Whether, and when, these projects can be completed, however, appears today to depend not only on the tenacity of the incumbent government[6] but also on the power of those reactionary sections of Spanish society that oppose an open discourse on the dictatorial past.

The "dispute value" of the *Valle de los Caídos/Valle de Cuelgamuros*

The *Valle de los Caídos* was relieved of its most problematic function, namely that of Franco's mausoleum, in October 2019 by the removal of the dictator's coffin. After all, the debate on the future of the Valley of the Fallen, which had occupied Spanish politics and professional circles with varying intensity since the early 2000s, had hardly any practical consequences until 2019. In the last two decades, however, the discussion on the *Valle de los Caídos* has made a significant contribution to the reappraisal of the dictatorial past. The polarising dispute over the Valley of the Fallen drew the attention of a wide public to the history of the Spanish Civil War and the Franco dictatorship.

The *Valle de los Caídos* – today *Valle de Cuelgamuros* – is unique in the urban legacy of the Franco dictatorship. The exceptional character of this monument has contributed to the fact that similar debates have not – or only to a very limited extent – taken place with regard to other legacies (Cf. Bravo, 2018; Junquera, 2022c). Nevertheless, the often bitter and always animated discourse on this unique item – the "dispute value" of the Valley of the Fallen – has supported the creation of a new sensibility with regard not only to history but also to the legacy of the Franco dictatorship. This – together with the new tools provided by the Democratic Memory Law – could increase the pressure in the coming years on local politicians and stimulate a new, more reflective handling of further parts of the Francoist legacy, for example those parts that are located in the region surrounding Madrid and which, together with the *Valle de Cuelgamuros,* form the symbolic memorial landscape that still demonstrates today the problematic history and the multi-faceted urban policy of the Franco dictatorship.

FIGURE 4.7 *Valle de los Caídos*, the monumental cross towers over the monastery buildings and the neighbouring football pitch. Photo: Piero Sassi, 2014.

Notes

1 The following contribution is based on a chapter of the book "*Städtebau als Kreuzzug Francos*" (Urban development as Franco's crusade), which was published in German in 2021. Cf. Sassi, 2021b, pp. 322–339; Sassi, 2021a, pp. 74–175. The author wishes to thank Carolina Rodríguez López (*Universidad Complutense de Madrid*) for the friendly support for his research into the history of the *Valle de los Caídos*, Francisco Ferrándiz (*Ministerio de la Presidencia-CSIC*) for his discussion of the latest developments at the symposium "*¿Qué hacer con el patrimonio incómodo?*" (What to do with dissonant heritage?), Madrid, December 15, 2023, as well as Hans-Rudolf Meier (*Bauhaus-Universität Weimar*) for his inspiring comments at the conference "*Räumliche Planung und Politische Herrschaftsformen*" (spatial planning and forms of political rule), Weimar, December 11, 2021. English translation by Irene Wilson.
2 The official number is 33,847 for the period 1959–1983. This cannot be regarded as accurate, however (Comisión de Expertos para el Futuro del Valle de los Caídos, 2011, p. 11).
3 Law 52/2007 of 26 December 2007.
4 Cf. Order of the Ministry of the Presidency of 27 May 2011.
5 Law 20/2022 of 19 October 2022.
6 After the last elections, on July 23, 2023, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez was able to form a new government under the leadership of the PSOE.

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5

NUREMBERG

Nazi Party Rally Grounds in a changing European culture of remembrance

Florian Dierl

The derogatory phrase "Rubble from a Nazi past" was used in a newspaper article in 2014 to describe the current public discussion on the maintenance or the possible, perhaps even desirable, decay of the "Zeppelin Tribune", one of the monumental building relics on the former Nazi Party Rally Grounds in Nuremberg. This was preceded by an argument over the historical and evidential value of the Nazi buildings remaining on the site. In view of their lack of potential practical usage, the historian Norbert Frei raised the question:

> Where do we actually wish to go with this remembrance policy that is being endlessly perfected from the point of view of its infrastructure but which is increasingly running dry conceptually, that no longer has any opponents, no longer touches anyone – and is in danger of producing only, at best, high-class entertainment, or in the language of the media: infotainment?
>
> *(Przybilla, 2014)*

With this sharply formulated question, Frei was referring to the "unease regarding the culture of remembrance" in Germany which criticised the way in which the Nazi past was being ritualised in public political debate. At the same time, the argument pointed out the fundamental problem that the significance of material evidence cannot be determined by aesthetic or functional characteristics but must be "decoded" by being placed in its historical context through pedagogical explanation. This is particularly true of the buildings and parade grounds of the Nazi Party Rally Grounds, which were planned exclusively for large-scale political events and which were, post-1945, only in a very limited way amenable to "denazification" through everyday use. Today the site is perceived by the public both as an urban area largely fragmented by the urban development of the 1960s and 1970s and as the quasi-archetypal symbol of the "megalomania" of the Third Reich.

The term "Nazi Party Rally Grounds" refers in general to an area of roughly 11 square kilometres (4.25 square miles) in south-east Nuremberg, which was designed as a place to hold mass events with hundreds of thousands of participants along with all the necessary organisational facilities and logistics. Between 1933 and 1939, various facilities as well as

functional and ceremonial buildings were constructed. They were intended for the Party's public parades, internal Party Congresses, sports and leisure events, military parades of the Wehrmacht (armed forces), and the feeding and accommodation of the participants. As the icon of the self-portrayal of National Socialism, the Nazi Party Rally Grounds were seen by the public as the Nazi dictatorship's "friendly face" and as a manifestation of the so-called Nazi years of peace. Because of this apparently documented characteristic, the party rallies and their staging were held by many in an uncritical and affirmative regard for a long time after the Second World War. This is why for many years, the dominant reaction was restricted to a mere symbolic dissociation from National Socialism and the verbal debasement of the building relics – in so far as they could not be removed.

The question of how to deal appropriately with this "difficult inheritance" has presented a challenge to the political leadership and the urban community of Nuremberg since the end of the Second World War. It is a question that has been answered in varying ways over the decades. Maintenance and conversion, demolition, and gradual decay are options that have repeatedly been under discussion. Their implementation, however, was always dependent on the currently prevalent legal and economic situation and the objectives of municipal policy and the constellation of social actors. The city's attitude therefore oscillated between ignoring the unpleasant past and committing to a permanent public discourse on the history of National Socialism.

Since the 1990s, the maintenance of the remains on the "grounds" has often been described as Nuremberg's contribution to the accomplishment of a "national task" due to the large investments required by the necessary restoration work. Given the financial assistance promised by the Federal government and the State of Bavaria, taken together with the annually increasing number of visitors from all over the world, plus the continuing media attention, the status of the site as a "national inheritance" (Schmitt, 2015) within the German culture of remembrance appears quite plausible. Nonetheless, against the background of the financial burden involved, the question of the proportionality between the expense and purpose of such a political commitment remains on the agenda and must be answered anew from one generation to the next based on current experience and problems.

From "temple city" to "lost place"

The plans for the Nazi Party Rally Grounds were drawn up by Nuremberg architects and the building authority of the city of Nuremberg from 1934 onwards. The planning process in general was under the direction of Albert Speer and his Berlin office. Significantly, it did not follow a basic design that was then further developed. Instead, at the beginning of Speer's involvement, some buildings had already been constructed or were in an advanced stage of planning, and these were followed by further building projects of increasingly large dimensions with designs that varied greatly from year to year. Public presentations such as the model of the Nazi Party Rally Grounds, which was shown and awarded a prize at the Paris World Fair in 1937, implied a conceptional completeness that was in fact never achieved. A draft plan from 1941, for example, shows that the proposed connection of the grounds to the Nuremberg Old Town would have required the dismantling and reconstruction of already existing buildings and would therefore have meant abandoning the timing and procedural parameters of the project. Even the realisation of a part of the facilities and buildings remained behind the ambitious schedule goals until construction was stopped altogether at the

FIGURE 5.1   Hitler (centre) and architect Franz Ruff (right) are visiting the construction site of the Congress Hall, ca. 1937. On the left is a 1:1 model of the future façade of the building. Photo: Documentation Centre Nazi Party Rally Grounds, Nuremberg.

beginning of the war in 1939. All that was completed at that point were the Luitpold Arena, the Zeppelin Field, parts of the participants' accommodation and the Great Road. Monumental buildings such as the Congress Hall, which was planned to hold 50,000 spectators, or the German Stadium were never more than a building shell or sometimes never even passed the planning stage. Nevertheless, the "major construction sites", the newly created, extensive transport infrastructure and the layout of the natural areas all entailed radical interventions in the city landscape – interventions that continue to mark the structure of south-east Nuremberg to the present day (Dietzfelbinger & Liedke, 2004, pp. 31 ff., 44 ff.).

In view of the heterogeneous development of the grounds, the individual buildings designed in the neoclassical style became the focus of the dictatorship's propaganda: progress in their construction signalled the step-by-step development of the "temple city of the movement" – as it was formulated at the time (Schmidt, 2017, p. 189). The architecture of the Party Rally buildings, being aimed to impress, was a powerful visual representation of the increasingly real "concrete utopia" (Kroll, 1999, p. 312) of the Third Reich. The setting of the "Führer" as the brilliant master builder or the enthusiastic masses appearing as one collective body before the "backdrop of power" became a fixed motif in the regime's picture gallery. It also provided evidence of economic and technical achievement and, together with the annual expansion of events surrounding the Party Rallies, it served to illustrate the dynamism and organisational capabilities of the Nazi regime. Up to the present day, this is still what characterises the public notion of the exercise of power under the National Socialist "dictatorship by consent".

What was ignored, however, was the urban counterpart in the form of standardised wooden barracks, which were originally built as part of the complex for the accommodation of Party Rally participants, but which, as of 1939, were used for the internment of tens of thousands of prisoners of war and slave labourers. With the expansion of the slave labour system during

the war, they became a ubiquitous phenomenon in Nuremberg's city landscape, reflecting everyday life in the racist and terrorist dictatorship more realistically than the now largely abandoned buildings of the Nazi Party Rally Grounds (Leßau, 2021, pp. 110 ff.).

Following the Second World War, the fixation with the individual buildings on the grounds remained symptomatic of the way the properties that had now been transferred into the hands of the city were dealt with. This was due, for one thing, to the fact that for many years, the American occupying forces continued to claim numerous areas for their own purposes, and these could therefore only be used by the city to a limited extent. In addition, the city limited itself to the pragmatic use of what was available and made structural modifications such as the conversion of the Luitpold Arena into a park in 1959/1960 simply based on what appeared opportune in the given situation. A land-use plan from 1956 designates the area as a "people's park" and as "sports grounds" (Schmidt, 2017, p. 252). In the following decades, a patchwork of residential settlements and industrial zones, sports and leisure areas arose on the former Nazi Party Rally Grounds, all primarily based on the functional requirements of the expansion of the city. The remaining Nazi buildings fell into a twilight state of gradual decay. Although they were visited by large numbers of tourists and made use of by the townspeople for various leisure activities, they gave the impression of being an anachronistic "lost place", rather than a historically important monument. It was only with the establishment of the Documentation Centre Nazi Party Rally Grounds in 2001 and the information panels erected on the original site from 2006 onwards that the traces of the past were publicly identified and that the former urban context, to a certain extent, was made visible again.

Dealing with the past as an identity-forming practice

The end of the war in May 1945 and the collapse of Italian Fascism and the National Socialist Third Reich initiated a phase of transition in domestic and legal policies in almost all the previously occupied European states. This transitional phase was closely bound up with the discourse on the classification and assessment of the recent past. In an attempt to stabilise the societies that had been profoundly shaken by the Second World War, the governments of many countries practised a remembrance policy oriented towards national heroism in which the adverse facts and their own responsibilities or guilt were largely ignored. By combining victim myths and the glorification of their own resistance, it was possible to translate individual memories of the war into a meaningful narrative in the national discourse, even though this often ran counter to different memories of families, small groups and opposition circles (cf. Bauerkämper, 2012, pp. 379 ff.; Bauerkämper, 2021, p. 22). In Germany, a strategy of the externalisation of guilt by means of exemplary punishment of perpetrators and their exclusion from national society could only be applied to a limited extent, given the previous wide support for the Nazi regime in society and the trials initiated by the victorious powers. In both societies, a general "communicative silence concerning the past" (Lübbe, 2007, p. 32) therefore remained dominant.

It was not until the 1960s that in European countries, the culture of remembrance, which was characterised by either national patriotism or anti-Fascism, could be observed to gradually give way to more self-critical narratives. These narratives remained fragile, however, and usually went no further than the national framework, even though there were some early cross-border processes of exchange such as rituals of reconciliation or city partnerships between previous enemies (Bauerkämper, 2021, pp. 27 ff.). From 1961, as a result of the

Eichmann trial, international interest in the fate of the victims of the National Socialist tyranny grew. Increased awareness due to the intensified media coverage of the Holocaust, as the murder of the European Jews was called from the 1970s onwards, led to a discourse in Western European societies on aspects of their own guilt and collaboration. Over time, in these societies, a "negative" communicative memory developed that also allowed for complexity and contradictions in the national historical narratives. Whereas in the earlier phase of this period of transition, it was primarily former detainees from the concentration camps and prisoners of war camps who commemorated the suffering of victims, from the late 1970s onwards, activists of a "new historical movement from below" emerged. Based on their research, they depicted a more specific and comprehensive picture of persecution and resistance and sought to link this to an explicit reference to the importance of human rights and commitment to a value codex in the activities of the state and civil society (Dierl, 2021, pp. 250 f.).

The evolution of public remembrance in Europe since 1945 has therefore gone through three phases (Baldissara, 2018, pp. 304 f.). The first *identity policy* phase from the end of the war until the end of the 1970s was characterised by the emergence of a homogenised national narrative that was sustained primarily by governments and political representatives. This was followed in the 1980s and 1990s by an *institutional-pedagogical* phase, in which the identity-forming discourse on remembrance was increasingly institutionalised, and these educational institutions were seen as the trustees of the civic obligation to maintain remembrance. At the turn of the millennium, a *normative-transnational* phase began in which the confrontation with the past took on a universalistic direction: Europe, because of its historical experience, was to be understood as the guardian of the values of peace and freedom and thus as a bulwark against every form of totalitarianism. The major differences between the remembrance discourses in Western and Eastern Europe, however, stood in the way of such a master narrative of the historically founded "obligation to a European identity". In the face of such a homogenising and morally charged interpretation of history, the Eastern European countries laid emphasis on the special characteristics of their own historical processes and their practice of collective commemorating. Thus, it remains a challenge for European cultural policy to make possible a shared remembrance of an epoch that was experienced differently without slipping into superficial levelling rituals or mystification.

In the period immediately following the war, the political leadership of the city of Nuremberg faced the task not only of organising physical reconstruction but also of restoring peace to a heterogeneous urban society with its competing and extremely conflict-ridden memories of the World War and National Socialist rule. Those who had been evacuated because of bombing, displaced persons, "repatriated" prisoners of war, those persecuted by the Nazi dictatorship and Nazi perpetrators "found guilty" in the denazification trials had very different interpretations of the recent past and therefore also had diverging expectations regarding the publicly visible treatment of that past. In an attempt to find a common expression for dealing with these experiences, the Social Democratic City government emphasised in public memorial events above all the losses suffered by the German population in the bombing and the military conflicts. The public display of grief that concentrated on one's own suffering therefore linked itself both spatially and symbolically to older traditions such as the lamenting of those killed in action in the First World War. The public responded enthusiastically to memorial services held in the Hall of Honour in the former Luitpold Arena, where the National Socialists had previously glorified the alleged "heroes" of the "Hitler putsch" of 1923, or at the mass graves of the southern Nuremberg cemetery. On the other hand, the thousands

of slave labourers and prisoners of war from the formerly occupied territories or the victims from the satellite concentration camps of Nuremberg and Hersbruck who were also buried there received barely any attention (Gregor, 2008, pp. 171 ff.; Schmidt, 2021, p. 265).

Under these circumstances, the city's attitude towards the remains of the Nazi Party Rally Grounds long appeared less than clear. Possible ways of making greater economic use of the buildings were discussed and rejected. With the demolition of the former camp barracks and the towers of the "March Field", the way was paved for one of the largest urban development projects since 1945 – the construction of the suburb of Langwasser. At the same time, the past was dealt with in the style of "tabula rasa". The partial demolition in 1967 of the Zeppelin Tribune (innocuously described as "stone tribune") was part of the attempt to deal with the unloved inheritance by placing a taboo on its historical context (Schmidt, 2021, p. 275 ff.).

A change of mentality did not begin to emerge until the generational change of the 1970s. New attitudes to the history and treatment of the Nazi buildings established themselves with Bob Dylan's major rock concert on 1 July 1978 (and a series of open-air festivals that has continued until the present day) as well as the first exhibition "Fascination and Terror" on the site in 1985. Instead of an embarrassed evasion of the past, younger members of Nuremberg society with no historical baggage took the opportunity to appropriate the historical site for their own purposes and, at the same time, to demand a self-critical elucidation of Nuremberg's inglorious role in a publicly visible form. After some initial hesitation, the city leadership recognised both the urgency for the municipal policy of a frank discussion and the potential that this offered for a convincing presentation of the city to the outside world. As a visible contribution to the intended change in the city's image from the "City of the Nazi Party Rallies" to the "City of Peace and Human Rights", a work of art by the Israeli

FIGURE 5.2   Documentation Centre Nazi Party Rally Grounds, located in the historic Congress Hall, 2018. Photo: Documentation Centre Nazi Party Rally Grounds, Nuremberg.

artist Dani Karavan was opened in 1993, called the "Way of Human Rights". This was followed in 2001 by the Documentation Centre Nazi Party Rally Grounds and in 2010 by the Memorium Nuremberg Trials as institutions for dealing with the past and for launching a moral appeal to all citizens to take up action for a more just world. In this way, the ethically connoted discourse on the Nazi past contributed to the positive self-image of the city as it had, in the past, been coined by the slogan of Nuremberg as "Dürer-City" (Bühl-Gramer, 2019, p. 110).

The rapid popular success of the Documentation Centre Nazi Party Rally Grounds following its opening in 2001 was not only a result of Günter Domenig's expressive architecture. It was for the first time that the exhibition and communication concept expounded the close personal, organisational and economic ties between the city of Nuremberg and the Nazi regime, based on the then most recent research. Telling the history of the Party Rallies with a focus on the activities and the self-presentation of the "perpetrators and fellow-travellers" underlined the self-critical approach of the project. As an expression of the frank and honest process of dealing with the past, the centre developed over the following years into a showpiece which was increasingly also used for prestigious occasions. An example of this was the celebration of the German-Israeli partnership association's "Feast of Tabernacles" held on the roof of the building in 2020 and visible from a great distance away. Furthermore, in 2018, the city council decided to develop the site of the Zeppelin Tribune and Zeppelin Field into a "place of learning and encounter" in the next years. With the proposal made in Nuremberg's candidacy for the title of "European Capital of Culture 25" for a more intensive cultural use of the Congress Hall as a sign of solidarity with the diverse minorities in European societies, the city also attempted to implement a decidedly future-oriented agenda for the culture of remembrance (Gnad, 2021). Overall, the city's culture of remembrance over the decades followed the various phases that were characteristic of (Western) European societies. By changing the international perception of Nuremberg to that of a city which has come to terms with its past, the "Nuremberg Way" was able to establish itself as a recognised and illuminating model for municipal remembrance policy.

Remembrance in dialogue as an expression of the European value consensus

The remembrance narrative for the grounds has recently been extended to include the period starting from the establishment of the People's Park next to the Dutzendteich Lake towards the end of the 19th century up until the present day. With the description of the former Nazi Party Rally Grounds as a "palimpsest", it is possible to depict the history of the site not only with reference to the residual building but also to understand and interpret it in its original urban context. This means that the focus can now also be on time periods for which there are no longer any visible physical traces in the urban environment – such as the Second World War camp complex. The hitherto dominant narrative of a setting for Nazi propaganda has been contrasted with the dimension of violence and crimes against Jews from northern Bavaria, foreign prisoners of war and slave labourers during the Second World War, and later the suffering of German displaced persons. This opens up the opportunity to link local remembrance practice to the internationally oriented commemoration of the victims of National Socialism and thus to establish the Nazi Party Rally Grounds as a pan-European place of "remembrance in dialogue".

Nevertheless, the narrative of "Crime and Punishment" is thus limited to the German "society of perpetrators", while the groups of mostly foreign victims are only represented in the Nazi Party Rally Grounds via brief texts on information panels. To this day, there is still no place of commemoration that adequately reminds us of the fate of the tens of thousands of prisoners of war and slave labourers, and that would make visible the former site of the camp complex as a place of violence and persecution. As demonstrated by the reactions of relatives from all over Europe following the exhibition "The Nazi Party Rally Grounds during the War. Imprisonment, Mass Murder and Slave Labour", shown in 2019 in the Documentation Centre, there is certainly a wish that the fate of their family members should be remembered in the place where they suffered. Even more, there should be a dialogue with interested parties about this part of their history, which is still partly under a taboo in their home countries. This task sees the Documentation Centre and its team of workers as conveyors of expert knowledge but also as communication partners and as students of how such communication about a history shared, but experienced very differently, can be successful (Dierl & Leßau, 2019, pp. 14 ff.).

Aligning remembrance not only with one's own national historical narrative and gaining an understanding of the multidimensionality of the European "memorial room" through the comparison with other experiences of suffering can be a great opportunity to become aware of existing transnational civil society interrelationships (Assmann, 2019, pp. 137 f.). In this sense, the further development of the Nazi Party Rally Grounds into a place of transnational dialogue would be desirable, for example by interlinking the municipal memorial function of the Hall of Honour in the former Luitpold Arena with a nearby memorial site for the victims of National Socialism from all over Europe. This could create a strong urban symbol of mutual understanding across national borders and of an explicit European consensus of values. As the Swiss writer Adolf Muschg so aptly put it (quoted according to Bauerkämper, 2012, p. 399), "What holds Europe together, and what divides it, is at the core one thing: its common memory."

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6

ITALY'S DEALING WITH ITS FASCIST LEGACY

A history of development

Daniela Spiegel

From the perspective of architectural history, the two decades of fascist rule between 1922 and 1943, also known in Italy as the *Ventennio*, were a very diverse era. The construction industry was highly productive – quite a few cities were re-planned on the drawing board, almost every city was enlarged and rebuilt, and there were also extensive infrastructure projects with which Benito Mussolini wanted to modernise the country and at the same time make it rise to a renewed imperial greatness. The architecture was just as diverse as the construction projects themselves. By no means was there a single fascist style; on the contrary, the *Ventennio* was characterised by a distinctive stylistic diversity, which – as this article endeavours to show – had a decisive influence on the way the architectural heritage of fascism was handled.

The existence of various architectural currents under fascism can first be explained historically by the fact that the beginning of the regime coincided with the general period of upheaval in architecture in the 1920s that gave rise to new styles throughout Europe. The most important currents in Italy included *Novecento*, which combined classical forms with a modernised, graphically reduced sensibility; *Razionalismo* as an Italian version of classical modernism, as well as regional traditionalist trends; and, in the second half of the regime, the dominating forms of Neoclassicism. In the late 1920s, a lengthy debate about whose style could best express the aims of the Fascist revolution was ignited. The rationalist movement that demanded an internal renewal of Italian architecture and identified with the ideals of the Fascist revolution competed for Mussolini's favour against a front of well-established traditionalists (Nicoloso, 1999). The latter wanted to maintain their influence and claimed their right to design the new regime's architectural language.

The resulting stylistic pluralism was – to put it simply – generally divided according to building tasks. Building tasks with connotations of modernity, awakening and progress, such as buildings for sports, transportation, communication and youth, often took on a modern character, while government construction projects (court and government buildings, monuments, etc.) tended to rely on traditional design. Of course, this categorisation is obviously too general. The style that was chosen for a given building depended on local circumstances and, above all, personnel constellations as well. Moreover, in addition to the parallelism of styles, there was certainly also a chronological development that went hand-in-hand with the

political development over the two decades of the fascist rule (cf. Bodenschatz & Spiegel, 2011). This fact was an important factor for the question of subsequent handling.

The theoretical treatment

The question of how Italy dealt with its fascist legacy after the end of the regime must be discussed both at the level of theoretical reception and at the level of practical treatment. Theoretical reception began almost immediately after the end of the regime. The plurality of styles described above played an important role in this, since the debate initially focused on which of the styles was to be defined as fascist in the first place. In some respects, this can certainly be seen as continuity: already during fascism, an extremely active culture of discourse was developed concerning the nature and the form of "fascist" architecture (Spiegel, 2010, pp. 61–92). At the centre of the debate was the (moral) evaluation of *Razionalismo*. An internationally recognised style stood for the opposite political orientation in other countries. The key question was therefore as follows: how does "good" architecture fit with an "evil" regime?

The discussion began immediately after the end of the war, and the main protagonists were architects and architectural historians of the successor generation who themselves still had points of contact with the era but had not been actively involved themselves during the regime. Among the most important protagonists was undoubtedly Bruno Zevi. Born in 1918, he had begun his architectural studies in Italy, but as a Jew, he had emigrated after the enactment of the Race Laws in 1938, first to Great Britain and then to the USA, where he completed his studies at Harvard under Walter Gropius. In 1943, at 25, he returned to Italy to join the *Resistenza*. Just five years later (1948), he was appointed professor of architectural history at the prestigious IUAV in Venice. In the first post-war period, Zevi was one of the strictest anti-fascists in the Italian architectural academic landscape, condemning all legacies of the regime – including the architectural ones – per se as harmful relics of a dictatorship. For contemporary building, he demanded a clear break and propagated organic architecture in the sense of Frank Lloyd Wright and Avar Aalto as a viable architectural alternative, since it was founded on the values of freedom and democracy (Conforti, 2009, pp. 237–240).

It should be noted that Zevi was not acting and arguing as a historian at the time, but as a former victim of the regime, a contemporary critic and above all as a young university teacher whose colleagues were still dominated throughout the country by those who had experienced successful careers under Benito Mussolini. Foremost among these was Marcello Piacentini, who had probably influenced the country's architectural fortunes more than any other person during the regime, in multiple functions and offices as well as a freelance architect. Thanks to a network of relationships that continued to function excellently and the intervention of political friends, he and numerous other professors were able to retain their posts after a brief suspension. Piacentini even managed to be re-elected in 1951 as the president of the Rome University's Department of Architecture at the age of 71 (Nicoloso, 2018, p. 319). In fact, the majority of the university architecture departments in Venice, Rome, Naples, Florence and Milan had hardly changed their faculties, and their successors were mostly students of those professors. Bruno Zevi was an absolute exception, for whom it was thus a great challenge to establish a new beginning.

Nevertheless, Zevi gained potent fellow campaigners, interestingly including some colleagues who had already started their careers as representatives of *Razionalismo* in the

interwar period, among them Luigi Piccinato, Mario Ridolfi and Pier Luigi Nervi. Together, they founded the *Associazione per l'Architettura Organica* (APAO) as a new school of architecture and produced the *Manuale dell'Architetto*, the fundamental work of building design theory that is still considered a standard resource today. During this personal collaboration, Zevi began to reflect on his former harsh criticism of the movement and removed the rationalist part of the fascist legacy from his overall condemnation of the era. The reasons for this were, on the one hand, probably the desire not to discredit his immediate colleagues, with whom he worked closely and collegially in professional terms; on the other hand, it was the architectural quality, which could not be ignored, that demanded art-historical appreciation and a place in architectural history for certain buildings.

The first important step on Zevi's new path was the exculpation of the architect Giuseppe Terragni. His main work – the Casa del Fascio in Como – was, of all things, the fascist party headquarters, which was indisputably one of the absolute masterpieces of Italian rationalism.

In order for Bruno Zevi, as a persecuted Jew and Communist, to nevertheless revere, Terragni's work required that it be detached from the fascist fabric. Zevi achieved this by equating the purity of rationalist formal language with moral purity. In reality, Terragni's work was "anti-fascist" and "conspiratorial", he posited (Zevi, 1950, pp. 188–190).

The acquittal also included the architect himself, although he had demonstrably been a convinced, ardent supporter of fascism. According to Zevi, Terragni first believed in a "virtual, imaginary and sincere fascism", while his later projects showed his "resistance against fascist appropriation" (Zevi, 1980). This could not be contradicted, because Terragni had

FIGURE 6.1 Como, Casa del Fascio, Giuseppe Terragni, 1932–1936. Photograph by Danny Alexander Lettkemann, 2017.

already died in July 1943 as a result of cerebral venous thrombosis, which he had contracted as a soldier on the German Italian front in Russia. His death also became part of the apologia, in which it was interpreted by Zevi as a presumed suicide, committed out of despair or even remorse for the former political adherence (cf. Dulio, 2008, pp. 89–91). This interpretation, not supported by sources, still exists today on the Italian Wikipedia page about the architect.

Bruno Zevi's apologetic umbrella was supported by other important figures in the post-war period, first and foremost the art historian Claudio Giulio Argan. He was ten years older than Zevi and thus already active even during the regime; in the 1940s, he had published regularly in the journal "Primato" of the fascist propaganda agent Giuseppe Bottai. Beginning in 1959, he taught as a professor of modern art history in Rome and was politically active at the same time – as a member of the communist party. From 1976 to 1979, he was the first communist mayor of Rome. Despite his different background, his assessment of the architecture of the *Ventennio was* quite similar. Like Zevi, Argan also distinguished the architects created under Mussolini into two camps. In his article "Art under Dictatorships" in Volume 12 of *Propyläen Kunstgeschichte* (1977), for example, he postulated that in fact, modernism had nothing to do with the regime and thus shared no responsibility with it, unlike the other styles, especially Neoclassicism. His worst verdict was on Marcello Piacentini, whom he described as the promoter of the reactionary establishment in the capital city, in contrast to the modern, quasi-enlightened Milan (Argan, 1977, pp. 23–28).

Another early apologist was the architect and architectural historian Leonardo Benevolo. He was born in 1923 and thus a lot younger, but he had also been a professor of architectural history in Rome since 1956. In his *Storia dell'architettura moderna*, published in 1960, he too primarily declared the architecture of the traditionalists to be fascist with his rhetorically skilful description of the realisation of modern architecture as a kind of lucky coincidence. The polemics against rationalist projects, which were often fierce during the regime, served him as a vehicle for questioning the affiliation of Italian modernism with fascism. He built his narrative on this frontal clarification, according to which some good works could be realised despite the regime's stubborn opposition to modernism, virtually as the fruit of the system's internal contradictions (Benevolo, 1994 [1960], p. 236).

The practical treatment

The practical level of handling the fascist legacy was initially characterised above all by pragmatism. Thanks to the immense construction activity, there was a large pool of brand-new, functional buildings, which therefore simply continued to be used, including the prestigious representative projects, where ideological or propagandistic content was firmly interwoven with both the architecture and the urban planning. The best example of this is the Sports Forum of Rome – formerly *Foro Mussolini*, now neutralised and called *Foro Italico*. The construction of the complex facility had dragged on with various strategic changes throughout the regime period and was now being continued. The originally very simple *Stadio dei Cipressi* (= Cypress Stadium), which was then expanded at the end of the 1930s, for example, underwent an expansion in the early 1950s to become the "Stadium of the 100,000" (= *Stadio dei Centimila*), in the planning of which the former chief planner of the Sports Forum, Enrico Del Debbio, was also involved. And after the city of Rome won the bid for the 1960 Summer Olympics, further adaptions were carried out.

FIGURE 6.2   Rome, Foro Italico, Piazzale dell'Impero, Luigi Moretti, 1937. Historical Postcard.

In addition to the sports facilities, however, there was also plenty of visual art at the Sports Forum. More problematic than most of the figurative representations in the form of statues or frescoes, which remained martial in their style but acceptable as sports themes, was the pictorial design of the central axis of access leading from the Tiber to the stadium.

The prelude to the boulevard, designed by Luigi Moretti in 1937, is an obelisk with an inscription that clearly praises Mussolini as a leader. On the pavement of the axis, which is richly decorated with mosaics, as well as on the circular plaza, the fascist *Impero*, which had been proclaimed a year earlier, was emphatically celebrated and legitimising connections to the Roman Empire were drawn. Supplemented by athletes and ancient motifs, such as deities, sea creatures or eagles, it is easy to read the fascist propaganda: men in antique garb showing the fascist salute, the *Fascio Littorio* (= the fascist party symbol, since 1926 the official state emblem) over and over again, the M as the abbreviation for Mussolini as well as slogans set in repetition such as "DUCE A NOI" (= our leader) or Mussolini's quote "MOLTI NEMICI, MOLTO ONORE" (= many enemies, much honour).

Due to the lack of maintenance and the interim military use of the site by the Allies, the mosaic floors had fallen into a state of disrepair. Critical reports in the communist magazine *Vie Nuove* were followed by a parliamentary debate on October 6, 1959, in which the communist party demanded the removal of the fascist inscriptions so that visitors would not get the impression that Italy was still celebrating fascism (Vidotto, 2004, pp. 118–119). The debate accordingly questioned whether the inscriptions were now pure historical facts or still fascist propaganda. Ultimately, the DC-led government decided that the *Foro Italico*

represented a dark side of history but was in fact a part of Italy's past whose traces should not be erased (Petersen, 2020, p. 117). The decision to preserve the mosaics appears bold, but at the same time, its effect was more than questionable, since it was not explained. Neither on location nor in accompanying information, material was there any explanation or even contextualisation of the site and its pictorial design for visitors to the Olympics. Furthermore, the restoration of the mosaics did not distance itself from the original content – for example, by refraining from restoring lettering in a manner true to the original. On the contrary, the National Olympic Committee (CONI) entrusted the restoration to the same company that had once created these decorations. Thus, the mosaics and the obelisk continued to send the same messages – as did the urban planning of the *Foro Italico as a* whole. Giulio Andreotti, then not only Minister of Defense but also President of the Organizing Committee of the Olympics, repeatedly emphasised that the Olympics were completely international and apolitical (Bothworth, 2010, pp. 20–22). And indeed, the fascist setting of the facility was hardly discussed in the international media. However, the promotional brochures for the Games praised the "classical" tenor of the facility.

The only modification in the sense of a confrontation with the fascist propaganda art concerned the row of stone stelae laterally flanking the axis, on which the most important stages of the fascist rule were engraved with dates. Here, at the end of the row, three new stelae were added, with the inscriptions: "July 25, 1943: End of the fascist regime", "June 2, 1946: Referendum for the proclamation of the Republic", "January 1, 1948: Constitution of the Italian Republic". The addition was intended to historicise the propaganda of the existing stelae and, at the same time, to show the international public that the Italian timeline did not end in the fascist *Impero*, but in the founding of a democratic republic.

Reuse and depoliticisation

The other major urban projects of fascism were also continued and reused in a quite pragmatic way. Some of these were not yet completed, such as the World's Fair site EUR or the new towns in the former Pontine marches. For these, the original concept was retained in terms of urban planning, but the new buildings themselves were built using the then contemporary architectural language of the 1950s. Buildings already under construction were largely completed, sometimes in a reduced form. The fact that no deliberate break was sought was also because the originally commissioned planners and architects of the regime period continued to be active in many projects. For example, the development of EUR was once again placed in the hands of the former chief planner Marcello Piacentini (until his death in 1962).

Reception in films

The public's attitude towards the regime's architectural legacies was also influenced by their representation in the film industry. In Roberto Rossellini's documentary epic *Roma, città aperta,* filmed immediately after the end of the war in 1945, the unfinished buildings of the EUR were still placed in a historical relationship to the war and the regime by forming the background for *Resistenza* attacks on Nazi convoys. In 1962, however, now completed, they functioned as a stage for Anita Ekberg's larger-than-life performance as a sex goddess in Federico Fellini's first colour film, *Le tentazioni del dottor Antonio* (part of the episodic

FIGURE 6.3   Anita Ekberg in front of the *Palazzo della Civiltà Italiana*. Film still from *Le tentazioni del dottor Antonio, 1962.*

work *Boccaccio '70)*. The intentional false-scaling exposed, disenchanted and perhaps even ridiculed the monumental World's Fair grounds as a mere backdrop.

Films of the 1970s, on the other hand, repeatedly addressed and at the same time subliminally criticised the extensive housing construction of the regime era. For example, Ettore Scola chose the *Palazzi Federici* as a backdrop for his film *Una giornata particolare* (1977), set in 1938 on the day of Hitler's visit to Rome. Completed in 1936, the imposing apartment complex – a result of fascist building speculation – illustrated the Janus-faced nature of the regime, as did the two main characters trapped in their social roles.

An equally famous contemporary of Fellini, Pier Paolo Pasolini, dealt with the legacies of the regime in a very different way. The filmmaker harboured a special, almost personal sympathy for the fascist new town of Sabaudia. Because of its location directly on the sea, in a largely untouched coastal landscape not too far from Rome, the icon of Italian rationalism had meanwhile become the preferred summer resort of the Italian art and culture scene. Pasolini felt extremely comfortable in Sabaudia, which was not only due to the surrounding nature. In 1973, in the documentary *Pasolini e ...la forma della città*, looking out over the new town from a dune, he postulated that the "imperial" gesture of the complex had given way over the years to rationalism, revealing that it was built for real people who lived their ordinary lives there with their families. Despite its fascist forms, he claimed

the architecture had its roots in rural, pre-industrial Italy. Fascism had never managed to put its cultural stamp on Italy. Therefore, there was nothing fascist about Sabaudia; except for a few facades, he maintained.

Theoretical reception of architecture in the 1970s and 1980s

At the same time as Pasolini's acquittal of Sabaudia, architectural criticism also took up the subject again. Two major exhibitions with international appeal – the Milan Triennale XV in 1973, curated by Aldo Rossi, and the 1976 Architecture Biennale in Venice – brought this part of the fascist legacy into the public spotlight and honoured it as artistically outstanding architecture (Patetta & Danesi, 1978). Like Zevi 25 years earlier, Aldo Rossi celebrated the purity of rationalist forms and attested to the artists' basic socialist-progressive attitude (Rossi, 1973, p. 16). The political context in which these forms were produced remained almost completely hidden. Ulrich Pfammatter called this the "strategy of de-historicisation" or "liquidation of historical thinking" (Pfammatter, 1990, p. 31). For the first time, the Venetian Biennale did not limit itself to rationalism, but even showed projects of other styles, such as the Milanese *Novecento* or even neoclassical buildings of the World's Fair site E42.

This then became a matter of course in the 1980s. The increasing amount of research now dealt in detail with urban planning and architecture, including those architectural movements that had been declared by the first post-war generation to be the actual fascist architecture. The great architects of the regime, such as Marcello Piacentini or even Enrico del Debbio, were rendered acceptable again. Here, too, exhibitions were the medium of choice. The first highlight was the large Milan retrospective of *Gli Anni Trenta in* 1982. In his preface, the mayor of Milan stressed the need for an objective assessment of the 1930s at last: "To condemn fascism morally and politically because of its anti-democratic and repressive character must not lead to an ignorance of the characteristics of social and cultural life in our country at that time" (Tognoli, 1983, p. 3).

For this "objective evaluation", the focus was on a comprehensive review of graphic and photographic sources. The 1987 exhibition *E42. L'Esposizione universale di Roma. Utopia e scenario del regime* was exemplary of that. The exhibition and its two-volume catalogue presented an impressive collection of sketches, drawings and written sources, with the help of which the genesis of the last great manifesto of Mussolinian urbanism was presented in a very comprehensive, but also very neutral way (E 42, 1987).

Restoration and rehabilitation

On a practical level, the newly awakened interest in dealing with the legacy was not yet noticeable in the 1970s. On the contrary, numerous buildings of the regime period, including key works of such highly esteemed rationalism like Luigi Moretti's *Casa delle Armi* and *Casa GIL*, and the post office buildings by Mario Ridolfi, Adalberto Libera and Angiolo Mazzoni, were in a deplorable condition in the meantime, be it due to the vacancy and successive decay, or to the lack of facility maintenance, disfiguring alterations or long-term effects of construction-period building defects. Thus, in the source-based research, there was an increasingly urgent demand for the preservation of these objects, hardly any of which were listed at the time (Ruggieri, 1987). The reason for this is a passage in Italian law on monuments (enacted in 1939), which specifies that only buildings older than 50 years can be placed

FIGURE 6.4   Cover of the do.co.mo.mo dossier 6, 2003.

under protection. With the passing of the 50-year threshold, the monuments offices took on the extensive heritage but had no proper expertise in restoring 20th-century buildings. Consequently, the main protagonists were universities and initiatives such as the *docomomo Italia* faction, founded in 1990, which focused primarily on engineering issues of restoration. A complex classification in the socio-cultural and political context was still missing.

The initiatives for the protection and preservation of the architectural heritage of fascism received unfortunate support in the 1990s – namely through political instrumentalisation in the context of Silvio Berlusconi's periods in government and the strengthening of the post-fascist *Alleanza Nazionale*. The general change of mood led to a new perception and an intensified, exclusively transfiguring recollection, especially in the new cities. The fascist myth of the "redeemed field", fought for by the fathers and grandfathers through toil and privation, experienced a veritable renaissance and was celebrated in an abundance of jubilees and local history publications that in their composition sometimes strongly recall the propaganda reports of the time of their origins.

Since the turn of the millennium, however, contextualising research has been on the rise. More and more comparative studies have been devoted to the topic, including extensive international studies, for example, in the context of *Critical Heritage Studies*. Accordingly, Italy's handling of its fascist heritage is also being observed much more closely internationally.

There was extensive criticism, for example, when the *Palazzo della Civiltà Romana*, the iconic flagship building of the World's Fair site EUR, was sold to the Roman fashion house

Fendi, which had chosen it as its new corporate headquarters. Fendi CEO Pietro Beccari dismissed accusations of political incorrectness, which came mainly from abroad, saying that the building had no political significance to the citizens of Rome or Italy in general. The palazzo, he said, is pure aesthetics, a masterpiece of architecture. This "sensational time-less and metaphysical building" represents Fendi, he said, because "it is a modern building that celebrates Italian excellence, refers to our Roman roots and to the everlasting dialogue between tradition and modernity" (Fendi, 2015). The Fendi company saw the building as a "symbol of Italian creativity, spirit and craftsmanship" (Kirchgaessner, 2015). Beccari was thus referring – surely not unwittingly – to the widely visible inscription on the Attica, in which Italy is praised as "A nation of poets and artists, heroes and saints, thinkers and scien-tists, sailors and emigrants". It is a quotation of Mussolini, taken from a speech in October 1935, with which he summoned the masses to turn against the League of Nations in response to the sanctions they imposed after the invasion of Ethiopia.

Of course, the case of the *Palazzo della Civiltá* cannot be generalised, but it testifies to the fact that Italy maintains a much more unbiased relationship with its fascist past – in compari-son with Germany. This impartiality sometimes has a disturbing effect on outsiders: In 2014, for example, the official announcement of Rome's Olympic candidacy for 2024 was held at CONI headquarters in front of the fresco "The Apotheosis of Fascism", of all places.

Critical treatment

But there are also examples of a more reflective approach to fascist heritage. These include the *Casa del Fascio* in Bolzano, designed by Guido Pelizzari, Francesco Rossi and Luis Plattner. The main facade of the party building, erected in 1939–1942, is emblazoned with a monu-mental relief entitled "The Triumph of Fascism". In the centre, Mussolini is depicted as a horseman performing a Roman salute, flanked on either side by registers recounting the main events of Fascist historiography.

In the post-war period, the responsible State Monuments Office in Trento proposed the removal of the relief, but without success; in fact, in 1957, three relief panels were added that had not yet been installed due to the war. Nevertheless, the relief remained a subject of conflict in Bolzano and its surroundings. The German-speaking South Tyroleans demanded its removal, whereas the Italian-speaking inhabitants protested against the idea, defending its existence as a central element of Italian sovereignty in South Tyrol. After decades of dispute, it was decided in 2016 to turn it into a museum and a memorial, and a competition was initi-ated for the artistic redesign (Autonomous Province of Bozen-Bolzano, 2017).

The winning contribution was realised in 2017 by Arnold Holzknecht and Michele Ber-nardi. Their design consists of a meaningful commentary. The relief was left in place, but in front of it, they mounted a neon sign with the (shortened) quote "No man has the right to obey" by Hannah Arendt in the three national languages Ladin, Italian and German. Arendt's quote contrasts with Mussolini's directive *credere, obbedire, combattere* ("believe, obey, fight") depicted on the relief, thus reinterpreting the construction as a warning against blind obedience.

Three years earlier, the fascist Victory Monument by Marcello Piacentini, also located in Bolzano, had already undergone a critical contextualisation, in this case not artistically, but through a comprehensive permanent exhibition in the basement, to which a neon sign on one of the lictor pillars refers. Again, this was preceded by decades of debate. The fact that these

FIGURE 6.5   Bozen, Casa Littoria (1939–1942) with light installation designed by Arnold Holz-knecht and Michele Bernardi (2017). Photograph by Leo Angerer, 2022.

rare examples of a critical contextualisation of fascist architecture are both located in Bolzano/South Tyrol is, of course, no coincidence, but rather owed to this special geopolitical border location, with a high proportion of non-Italian population that suffered particularly under the Mussolini regime. Outside of South Tyrol, attempts to transform fascist propaganda art have far less chance of realisation. When in 2015, the then president of the Chamber of Deputies Laura Boldrini demanded that at least the obelisk inscription MVSSOLINI DUX on the Foro Italico be removed; there was fierce opposition across party lines (Gasser, 2015).

Conclusion

In summary, it is evident that Italy's approach to its fascist legacy has always been much more unconcerned than that of Germany. The regime period is accepted as an almost normal part of the past, as a closed era like all others. There are various reasons for this:

Italy always emphasised the independent detachment from the regime. The independent murder of the Duce by the partisans and the desecration of his corpse functioned as a symbolic act of liberation and reckoning. Moreover, also due to the retention of personnel and institutional apparatus, there was no purposeful institutional reappraisal of the crimes, some of which were not begun until the 1990s, conversely to the reception of art and architectural production, which, as seen, started very early. As a result, a very inconsistent picture of history emerged.

The largely careless handling of fascist symbols can be explained in part by visual habits, since there has never been a comprehensive removal of fascist symbols. To remove them even

today seems nonsensical to many, whereby mainly three arguments are brought into the field: firstly, a self-confident, open approach to the heritage is better than a *damnatio memoriae*. In this way, Italy accepts and shows that fascism belongs to Italian history as a "difficult" chapter. Secondly, it is pointed out that Italy also has plenty of uncomfortable heritage from other eras, especially antiquity, and deals with it openly. After all, the Colosseum is not a monument to human virtues. Thirdly, most of the objects were works of fine art, which therefore had to be treated and accepted as such.

Furthermore, the architectural and artistic products of fascism have always been considered separately from their political–socio-cultural production situation. The cornerstone for this was already laid in the post-war period by focusing solely on the artistic qualities of the objects. Over the decades, this decontextualisation and lack of concern about the question of what messages and impact these high-quality works could unfold led to a trivialisation of the entire era. This was further reinforced in the 1990s by the rise of the political right.

It is therefore even more important that the law, which declares the propagandistic use and sale of fascist and National Socialist symbols and gestures to be a punishable offence and which had already passed the Chamber of Deputies in September 2017, will be ratified. It remains to be seen whether this, together with the increase in international research, but also the discourse initiated by the Black Lives Matter movement on the principle of dealing with politically problematic monuments, will lead to a stronger contextualisation of the architectural testimonies also beyond the borders of the South Tyrol region.

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7

URBAN HERITAGE AND POLITICAL MEMORY UNDER DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY IN CHILE[1]

Macarena Ibarra and Paulo Álvarez

Introduction

The period of the civil-military dictatorship (1973–1990) and the first decade of progress towards the restoration of Chile's democratic institutions was a time of emerging political and other forms of memory and saw considerable changes in conceptions of urban space and its relationship to heritage. In general terms, the notion of urban heritage was a source of refuge for the military regime, and later became a key element in the social process of reparation and democratisation of the city that began with the transition to democracy in 1990. However, a more detailed analysis of the data reveals that the role of urban heritage in the process of political memory formation was marked by the tense political dynamics of the early years of democracy, posing challenges to reparation efforts.

The specialised literature from the period (1973–1990) is scarce. As such, the present work draws on primary sources such as data and decrees from the National Monuments Council (NMC), presidential messages and reports such as those issued by the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (1991) and the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (2005). These sources reveal how urban heritage was perceived in cities across Chile, as well as its use as a means of reparation following the human rights violations perpetrated by the dictatorship.

In a review of the urban landscape in the shadow of the dictatorship, the present article reflects on how the regime fostered a discourse of refoundation that perpetuated a single official history originating from the earliest legislation on monuments, passed at the beginning of the 20th century. There follows an overview of a number of urban heritage sites in the context of the democratic transition and their significance in regard to issues of human rights.

Rather than offering a comprehensive review, the chapter reflects upon the role of urban heritage in two political contexts, seeking to make fresh contributions to the study of authoritarian regimes and transitions. Drawing on debates connecting collective memory with memory in contexts of totalitarianism (Todorov, 2000, p. 13) or with official and historical memory (Halbwachs, 2004, p. 211), the present work understands built heritage not only

as an element of urban planning but also as part of the ground in which political, social and cultural memory will be unfolded in post-dictatorship Chile. In this context, the political victims weighed heavily on the nation's past (Schindel, 2009; Alegría et al., 2018) and the construction of collective memory found expression within the urban context. Finally, the present research helps to explain certain reflections on Chilean cities by authors who assert that the model imposed by the regime persisted, giving a degree of continuity – in urban terms – between 1975 and 2000 (Valencia, 2006).

Political memory from the period has been addressed from various perspectives within the field of urban historiography. Some works have focused on the so-called demonstration days that took place during the 1980s in response to the negative effects of the newly implemented market economics, the dismantling of the Chilean State, the privatisation of services and the subsequent withdrawal of social welfare in areas such as healthcare, education and housing. Thus, in addition to the human costs of political repression by the dictatorship, there was a decline in urban living conditions for much of the Chilean population, driving problems of overcrowding, joblessness and poverty (Bravo, 2012; 2017). The mass protests that erupted in cities across the length of the country on 11 May 1983 and lasted until 1986 are considered by historiographers to be important urban phenomena in Chile's recent history, as they brought about the symbolic commitment of urban areas and involved a broad cross section of Chilean society (De Ramón, 2007; Salazar, 2006; Álvarez et al., 2001). Historical ethnographers have addressed aspects such as the burning of barricades on the streets, urban symbols of rebellion (such as the painting of slogans on walls) and forms of confrontation and reappropriation of public space by means of the occupation of streets and areas of the city centre (Bravo, 2012; 2017; 2019; Garcés & De La Maza, 1985). The response was an unprecedented mobilisation of the military, the *carabineros* police force, and the National Information Centre, leading to the repression, torture and extrajudicial execution of many Chileans (De Ramón, 2007; Salazar, 2006).

Present-day studies have addressed memory, political violence and human rights violations at specific locations within the urban space. As practices and mechanisms of State repression were undocumented and applied in secret locations, the use of personal testimonies has been fundamental to the identification of barracks, houses and other buildings used for such purposes (Caerols, 2018; Schindel, 2009). This ongoing recollection process has been accompanied by testimonial work, which has considerably expanded knowledge of State interventions from the perspective of political violence and the city (Fernández-Droguett, 2015; Schindel, 2009; Winn et al., 2014). Finally, Hidalgo (2014), Errázuriz and Leiva (2012) and Raposo (2012) adopt an approach that draws on the testimonial perspective, analysing the transformations imposed by the dictatorship on urban public space. The authors identify changes to the most prominent symbolic locations around the city and the imposition of ideological nomenclature upon certain public spaces during the early years of the regime. This was the case with the presidential palace, *La Moneda*, which was bombed during the coup of 11 September 1973 and subsequently rebuilt, and with changes to the names of residential areas, neighbourhoods, streets, avenues and public squares. As such, it is vital that reference be made to the urban stage upon which these processes played out, and to how it was managed during the period.

FIGURE 7.1   Bombing of Palacio de La Moneda, 1973.

Source: Archivo CENFOTO-UDP, [Fondo diario La Nación, Cenfoto-UDP], ap-111-golpede-estado-011-

The city and urban planning

In the early 1970s, the oil crisis wreaked havoc on the regional economy, and by the end of the decade, international neoliberalism made a stark contrast with Latin America's exhausted industrial and Keynesian developmentalism.[2] The 1980s were dubbed the "lost decade" in reference not only to the economy but also to the city and other spheres of life, as urban disconnection and poverty rocketed and standards of living crashed (Da Silva & Rezende, 2017). Inspired by this and other factors of failed modernisation, democracies across the continent began to fall victim to military coups. These dictatorships – first Brazil in 1964, then Chile and Uruguay in 1973 and finally Argentina in 1976 – installed "authoritarian liberal regimes", dismantling the development model that had prevailed for the past 30 years (Almandoz, 2015). In Chile, which became a pioneer in its replacement of the incumbent model, the deregulation of urbanism lasted well into the dictatorship period. The first phase of military rule saw the imposition of a tired developmentalist agenda and, towards the end of the regime's first decade in power, the introduction of its main principles of operation in the urban context.

Following the coup d'état of 1973, the institutionalised urbanism of the late 1920s (Ibarra, 2018), consolidated since the 1930s within the framework of a developmentalist modernisation agenda (Almandoz, 2015), underwent a stark reconfiguration. The centralised State planning apparatus was eliminated and a move was made towards greater deregulation, which saw the role of the State reduced to the prescription of more general territorial policy guidelines (De Mattos, 2001). Both the Production Development Corporation, created in 1939 and the National Planning Office (ODEPLAN), created in 1955, remained in existence as central administrative bodies. Despite ODEPLAN's work to profile the objectives of urban

development established by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MINVU), created in 1965, its continued existence under the new regime was subject to changes in terms of local urbanism (MINVU, 1981, p. 1). Transportation was sectorised with the creation of its own Ministry and the MINVU was restructured in order to adapt its administrative framework to the regionalisation process (Hidalgo, 2005) and increase the efficiency of State activity in response to the principles of subsidiarity proposed by the military regime.

The principal piece of urban policy imposed during the dictatorship was the National Urban Development Policy (PNDU) of 1979 (MINVU, 1979; Raposo, 1979; Trivelli, 1981; Alvarado & Elgueda, 2021). The legislation liberalised the urbanisation process, freeing it from State oversight and subjecting it directly to the provisions, adjustments and dictates of land market trends. The process consisted of the destatisation and privatisation of urban planning, giving priority to the protection of private property and the repeal of municipal regulatory plans, removing restrictions on land use (Daher, 1991). The reorganisation and stratification of the urban fabric that followed these changes was a major contributor to the segregation and exclusion of the resident urban population (Sabatini, 2000). The process was accompanied by an overhaul of policy relating to social housing, which came to be considered just another consumer good (Trivelli, 1991), and by the so-called slum clean-up policies (Hidalgo et al., 2016). The above goes some way to illustrating how the urban mobilisations of the 1980s were motivated not only by political repression but also by the deterioration in living conditions.

FIGURE 7.2   Mobilisation in Santiago de Chile, "población La Legua", 1983.

Source: Antonio Reynaldos

This cycle in Chile's planning history came to its conclusion with the transformation of the ODEPLAN into the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation, coinciding with the return to democracy in 1990. Thus, following lengthy periods of dictatorship across Latin America, the return to democracy saw urban planning take off in renewed constitutional and professional contexts. There was an explosion of fresh institutions, regulations, policies and interest in issues such as sustainability, environmental protection and the value of land (Da Silva & Rezende, 2017), along with concern for the historic centres of towns and cities. In contrast to the subordination of urban space to the region and to the country, such a feature of the 1970s and early 1980s, the strategic urban planning of the 1990s focused on milestones and urban design (Duque, 2013; Almandoz, 2015) while discussions began on the subject of political memory. Thus, Chile's return to democracy heralded new urban planning debates and the emergence of contemporary visions of national heritage.

Dictatorship and restoration (1973–1990)

On 11 September 1973, Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, appointed commander-in-chief of the army by President Salvador Allende just weeks earlier, led a coup d'état that overthrew the coalition government of left-wing parties, known as Unidad Popular. Proclamations made by the military junta every 11 September, the anniversary of the 1973 coup, show that the first two years of the dictatorship were promoted as a period of restoration. A speech made in 1974 claimed that the Ministry of Public Works and its various departments had, until that point, been acting on the margins of global public works planning, giving rise to short-lived programmes that distorted its activity (Pinochet, 1973, p. 175). The pronouncement went on to say that, under military administration, the Planning and Urbanism Directorate would fully regain the functions of planning, coordination, evaluation and control of public works, meaning that sectoral transportation planning would come under the direct control of the respective sub-departments pending the creation of the corresponding Ministry (ibid., p. 179). The message of institutional renewal proclaimed by the dictatorship highlighted as its main achievement the regionalisation and decentralisation of administration of the urban sector, resulting in a more efficient and appropriate institutional framework through the definition of State action in regard to this activity (Pinochet, 1977, p. 504). Thus, the dictatorship's political message, phrased in terms of restoration, order and control over urban expansion, grew in strength from 1976 onwards. It was in this context that the PNDU of 1979 and the new political constitution of 1980 led the transition towards a discourse of change in the name of modernisation: one that conceived all modifications and additions to the institutional structure as necessary to the future development of the national and urban territory.

Alongside the administrative restructuring, the military regime was exercising a programme of sustained political repression (Informe de la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, 1991; Lira & Loveman, 2000) and thousands of people (Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura, 2005; Stern, 2013) were detained and transferred to premises converted into clandestine torture centres and concentration camps (Informe sobre calificación de víctimas de violaciones de Derechos Humanos y de la Violencia Política, 1996). Furthermore, social and cultural life began to shrink, a phenomenon that has come to be known as the "cultural blackout" (Correa et al., 2001; Donoso, 2019), and the regime decreed a state of siege, imposed a curfew, banned grassroots organisations and suspended all social gatherings and cultural activities (Errázuriz & Leiva, 2012). Interventions were made

FIGURE 7.3   Demonstration Artists for Democracy, outside the National Library in Santiago de Chile, 1983.

Source: Álvaro Hope Guiñez

to universities and other education establishments dependent on State funding or administrative management (Verdugo et al., 2004) and it was common for their boards to be replaced by military functionaries or regime sympathisers in the new context of media control.

In this political and cultural context, urban heritage acquired a political purpose and was used to support the creation (or recreation) of a relationship with the past in the midst of a nation-building process (Marsal, 2012, p. 100). The National Monuments Law (No. 17,288) was passed in 1970, towards the end of the presidency of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1965–1970) and remains in force today. The law had its roots in pioneering legislation from 1925 – the result of a presidential decree by Arturo Alessandri Palma – that created the NMC, answerable to the then Ministry of Public Instruction. The law passed in 1970 consisted of an update to this 1925 legislation, the main purpose being the addition – alongside the existing categories of national monuments, namely public monuments, historic monuments and archaeological and palaeontological sites – of conservation areas (*zonas típicas y pintorescas*) and nature sanctuaries. The NMC, as a technical body of the State, reflected during this period the influence of political will, not only due to it being an authoritarian period but also because it was a time before the community had an impact on the decision-making regarding national monuments. It was dependant on the Ministry of Education until 2018 when the Ministry of Cultures, Arts and Heritage was created.

Up until the eve of the coup, the discourse of national identity as symbolised by national monuments had been expressed primarily through the declaration of sites of military, religious, and, to a lesser extent, republican significance. The Council's activities in the early years

(1925–1938) consisted of the sporadic declaration of Spanish forts, certain private properties and Easter Island as national monuments. The only historic monument declared between 1938 and 1949 was the O'Higgins Museum in Talca. Between 1949 and 1954, when only three meetings were held each year, 24 monuments were declared, including 16 religious buildings, five forts and two other properties. Between 1955 and 1964, only six historic monuments were declared, again of similar types. Finally, in the period beginning in 1964 and ending in September 1973, declarations were made of religious monuments, the house belonging to former president Manuel Montt and the tomb of the poetess Gabriela Mistral. In this way, since the first decades of the 20th century, the elaboration of a unique national identity, from the perspective of urban heritage, tended to reinforce the military, religious and Republican values of the country.

From 11 September 1973 onward, the declaration of national monuments took on the refoundation discourse proclaimed by the military junta. There was evident interest in declaring buildings or locations within historic city centres, and the Chilean capital became home to a large number of monuments, including public and private buildings from the republican period. The first site to be declared a historic monument during the dictatorship was the "Club de Septiembre" in December 1973. Belonging to the Edwards[3] family, this old palace was named by the Partido Liberal during its occupation of the building, and the decree highlighted its importance to the country's political history (Decreto 2086, 1973) while expressing a degree of patriotism in relation to the commemoration of 11 September 1973.

Emblematic declarations were also made in Pisagua, in northern Chile. In 1977, the Pisagua theatre and clock tower were declared historic monuments for belonging "(…) to an important period of our history, the height of the saltpetre industry" (Decreto 746, 1977, p. 1)[4] in a decree signed by Augusto Pinochet. The declaration was itself paradoxical, in that it overlooked the human rights violations committed – and which would continue into the 1980s – at the Pisagua theatre in its role as a detention centre for political prisoners of the dictatorship.

Throughout the military regime, a large number of religious properties and entities were declared historic monuments. NMC records indicate that, of the 362 monuments declared

FIGURE 7.4   Clock tower in Pisagua, 2017.

Source: Sebastián Pérez/Archivo Fotográfico del Consejo de Monumentos Nacionales

by 1989, over 70 were churches, chapels, shrines and associated religious buildings, a considerable number of which were dedicated to Our Lady of Mount Carmel, patron saint of the Chilean army. The dictatorship thus established an association between the Catholic faith and respect for the nation and fatherland (Larraín, 1996), projecting the image of the army as custodian and proponent of the highest values of society. It is likely that this apparent piety stemmed from the more conservative sectors of the Catholic Church, while the so-called liberating current, which had a stronger hold in poor urban neighbourhoods, was highly critical of the military regime and its human rights violations (Aldunate et al., 2001).

Another group of monuments declared during the dictatorship was infrastructural. Despite the decline of the railways and the crumbling influence of its union during the period, and although the promotion of railway heritage did not get fully underway until the return to democracy, a number of high-profile railway-related monuments were declared by the regime (Ortega & Ibarra, 2021).

In addition, particular emphasis was put on certain more remote parts of the country in light of their geopolitical and military significance (Alegría & Landaeta, 2019). This was central to sustaining the idea of the fatherland in the collective imagination and to reinforcing sovereignty in border areas, which from the local and military perspectives seemed permanently under threat. Illustrating this spirit are declarations such as the Braun Menéndez Palace, home to a renowned Patagonian trading family, to "celebrate" the colonial domination of the "world's most southerly lands" and the success of European descendants in conquering the "wild" (Stefoni, 2011; Tijoux, 2016); the wreck of the "Lord Lonsdale" (1973), an English frigate that sank in the Falkland Islands; the wreck of the "Ambassador" (1973), an English clipper bought by the Menéndez family; and the wreck of the German cruiser "Dresden" (1985). Also, of significance as part of the commemoration of Spanish colonisation were the declarations of the San Carlos de Purén (1975), Santa Juana (1977), Santa Bárbara (1979) and other forts and fortifications, whose conservation again served as a means of military glorification.

As such, endorsement of memory, history and, in particular, heritage becomes a key to power that can be used to legitimise a tradition based on the recognition of places or symbols, preferably – but not exclusively – religious, consistent with a martial worldview; in other words, it is a means of championing a homogeneous and uniform past, cloaked in the military appropriation of the concept of the fatherland (Giannini, 1993). The refoundation discourse dominated the dictatorship's heritage agenda with the grandiloquent slogan of "national reconstruction", whose symbolic element could be linked to the destroyed presidential palace of La Moneda (Bianchini, 2015).

An early initiative by the regime was the creation of the role of Cultural Consultant to the government junta, a post occupied by the writer, politician and diplomat Enrique Campos Menéndez, which responded to the need for cultural consultation to coordinate and guide relevant cultural activities in order to assert the reformist role of the system (Alegría & Landaeta, 2019, p. 41). Alegría and Landaeta (2019) highlight the proposed "Draft Regulation Bill No. 17,288 on Protection of Historical and Cultural State Heritage", which came within the domain of the Defence Council.[5] Although the project never came to fruition, it constitutes another interesting aspect of the regime's restoration logic.

Furthermore, urban heritage assumed a role in the official discourse of the dictatorship, contributing to its message of refoundation. Until that point, the concept of heritage as an inherited past on which value is placed in urban life has bestowed a tutelary role upon the State and kept a tight leash on civil society, making major sectors of the population invisible

in their differences (Assies, 2004; Anderson, 1991; Hobsbawm, 2004). But while the State was putting itself in charge of heritage in Chile, fresh debates were emerging on the subject around the world, leading to novel views on its meaning and expanding the audiences and actors committed to it. The resulting increase in participation on the part of the general public only began to take effect in Chile during the 1990s.

Heritage and the transition to democracy (1990–2000)

In Chile, the restoration of democracy coincided with a gradual acceptance of the community as an active agent in the heritagisation processes, which until that point had been led exclusively by the State, local government and specialists (Ibarra, 2016). During the first decade of the transition, a considerable number of national monuments were declared with a view to protecting neighbourhood life, which was under threat from inadequate territorial planning instruments (Ibarra & González, 2020). At the same time, there was a gradual and growing interest in safeguarding the first sites of memory and human rights.

The three first transitional governments made progress in regard to cultural policy. For example, the Fund for the Development of Culture and the Arts (FONDART) came into operation under the mandate of Patricio Aylwin Azocar, the first president of the transition (1990–1994), in 1992, with the aim of supporting the development of the arts, the dissemination of culture and the preservation of Chile's cultural heritage while certain regional public buildings were renovated (Aylwin, 1992, p. 65). Progress with FONDART and other initiatives continued under Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994–2000), son of President Frei, who preceded Allende, and interest was declared in developing a new cultural institutional structure for the country (Frei, 1999, pp. 51–52). Ricardo Lagos Escobar (2000–2006) strove to improve the cultural infrastructure (Lagos, 2000, p. 25) and emphasised the need for urban regeneration, promoting the renovation of old houses in historic centres as a means of stimulating densification and the conservation of architectural heritage in Antofagasta, Concepción and Valparaíso (Lagos, 2001, p. 123).

A landmark step taken under the auspices of these fledgeling cultural policies was the initiative to begin applications for inclusion on the World Heritage List in 1990. Despite the fragility and lack of resources on the part of cultural institutions, the formulation of a heritage policy was conceived as a contribution to the consolidation of democracy and to the country's reintegration into the global community. During the 1990s, Chile nominated its first two World Heritage Sites, resulting in the declaration in 1995 of the Rapa Nui National Park for its universal authenticity, integrity and value, and in 2000 of the Churches of Chiloé for the exceptional construction techniques that they demonstrate.

Over the same decade, the declaration of historic monuments focused on the infrastructure of various categories, particularly the railways. Although a great many religious buildings were included, an increasing number of public and private buildings were declared in cities across the length of Chile. Of particular note are two houses belonging to Pablo Neruda and one to Gabriela Mistral, a declaration of which opened up new spaces for heritage appreciation and the importance of which had not as yet been considered.

In light of the detentions, torture and murders perpetrated by the dictatorship in Pisagua, a process of recognition and awareness was launched upon the return to democracy. In December 1990, a decree signed by then President Aylwin and the Minister for Education,

FIGURE 7.5   Hospital in Pisagua, 2017.

Source: Sebastián Pérez/Archivo Fotográfico del Consejo de Monumentos Nacionales

Ricardo Lagos, established that the Pisagua church, hospital and public prison would be added to the declaration of 1977 (Decreto 780, 1990) (Figure 7.5). However, the 1990 declaration identified the properties as historical elements of the saltpetre port but did not acknowledge their role as memory sites. This omission was not remedied until 2008, when a decree signed by Minister for Education, Yasna Provoste, declared other properties on the site as historic monuments, namely the school, multisports court and the mass grave, refer-ring, for the first time ever, to the memory of the dictatorship's systematic human rights violations (Decreto 466, 2008). The Decree also highlighted that these places had been used for repressive purposes on two other occasions in the country's history: during the rule of Gabriel González Videla and during the second term of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo.

Failure by the decree of 1990 to acknowledge the importance of Pisagua in terms of his-torical memory may have been due to the political fragility of the time, which did not allow for public recognition of the human rights violations. Furthermore, despite the creation of the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in the same year, only two historic monuments were declared memory sites in the first decade following the return to democ-racy. The first was Hornos (kilns) de Lonquén in the district of Talagante in Santiago, which, in 1996 "was recognised as the resting place of several victims of the political violence of 1973 and has since become a site of pilgrimage and recollection for the families" (Decreto 24, 1996, p. 1).[6] This was the first instance of heritage protection granted to a space used by agents of the State during the dictatorship (Figure 7.6). The second was the erection in 1991 of a memorial to the victims of the regime in the city of Arica, an initiative promoted by the Communist Party, the City Council and both lay and religious organisations, in memory of Salvador Cautivo and Luis Contreras (Figure 7.7).

What is certain is that this was a complex process for a society scarred by 17 years of dicta-torship, in which the emergence of its memory sites served as both an act of recognition and a form of social reparation. Moreover, through testimonies from those who experienced po-litical imprisonment and suffered torture between 11 September 1973 and 10 March 1990,

FIGURE 7.6   Kilns in Lonquén ("Hornos de Lonquén), 1978.

Source: Álvaro Hope Guiñez

FIGURE 7.7   Public Monument to Salvador Cautivo and Luis Contreras, victims of the civil-military dictatorship, Arica, Chile, 2024.

Source: Jorge Oliva Erices

the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture was able to register some 1,132 locations used for such purposes across Chile's 13 regions (2005, p. 261).

On the basis that the declaration of historic monuments as memory sites implies a process of "memorialisation", that is, of practices that manifest the ways in which societies remember and elaborate the past (Schindel, 2009, p. 70), the heritage debates of the time seem to be in line with more recent interpretations. In fact, while in the 1990s, built heritage was understood partly in terms of use value, in the 2000s this concept exceeded the relevance of the site itself, promoting its understanding as a social construct and leading to the coining of the concept of "patrimonialisation" (Van Geert & Roigé, 2016). Thus, the narratives of consensual heritage regarding the nation and national identity came to be challenged by the diversity of communal experience and calls for identification. In response, heritage-related practices and debates began to give recognition and commitment to dissonant themes and to the use of memory in the formation of heritage and identity (Smith, 2006). The communities already active in these processes were important drivers, as civil society actors became central to the recovery of locations used for detention, torture and extermination (Schindel, 2009). During the transition to democracy, many social organisations led memorialisation processes involving the installation of inscriptions in public places to commemorate the victims of the dictatorship (Aguilera & Cáceres, 2012; FLACSO, 2007), or the regeneration of buildings or the addition of plaques to their façades to mark the location at which victims of repression had been murdered (Aguilera, 2013, p. 3).

During Aylwin's presidency, the Memorial to the Detained, Disappeared and Executed was erected in the General Cemetery as an official homage to the victims of the dictatorship (Figure 7.8). Although Eduardo Frei Ruíz-Tagle (1994–2000) was less receptive to the demands of human rights organisations, following a lengthy conflict, the State expropriated the site of the National Intelligence Directorate's main repression centre, Villa Grimaldi, permitting its conversion into a public park between 1994 and 1997 (Aguilera, 2013, p. 3).

FIGURE 7.8   Memorial for the victims of the civil-military dictatorship in the General Cemetery, Santiago de Chile, 2016.

Source: Pablo López Rómero

(Figures 7.9 and 7.10) This was a particularly poignant case given the site's role in the detention and torture of victims of the military regime, despite the fact that some of its buildings had already been destroyed with dynamite by the time the families of the disappeared, neighbourhood associations, members of the Catholic Church and human rights organisations were able to intercede and take control. The Chamber of Deputies' Commission on Human Rights and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development backed the project, showing how, in critical circumstances, an initiative driven by civil society can benefit from the support

FIGURE 7.9   Mobilisation for recovering the public space. Former cuartel Terranova, now re-named as "Park for the Peace Villa Grimaldi"

Source: Fondos y Colecciones del Archivo Documental de la Corporación Parque por la Paz Villa Grimaldi [1994]. Santiago, Chile: N° of identification (1.5.6.118D)

FIGURE 7.10   Memorial in the Park for the Peace Villa Grimaldi, n/d.

Source: https://www.monumentos.gob.cl/monumentos/monumentos-historicos/parque-paz-villa-grimaldi

of State entities (Schindel, 2009, p. 71). The site was eventually opened to the public in 1994, inaugurated as the Park for Peace in 1997, and declared a historic monument in 2004.

Thus, the transition governments operated in accordance with the same law from 1970, placing value on similar attributes. However, the horizon of expectations as a characteristic of the democratic transition was also played out within cultural policy (Lechner, 2016). In the absence of a single policy capable of managing heritage from the recent past, Chilean society ran the risk of becoming embroiled in a new episode in the so-called battle for memory (Illanes, 2002), in which various civil society groups mobilised to situate memory within a predominantly urban scenario. Beyond the consensus that these groups were able to muster in regard to their purpose and democratic values, memory sites were subject to clashing viewpoints and tensions regarding how they should be integrated and promoted, making them an uncomfortable (Smith, 2006), dissonant (Tunbridge & Ashworth, 1996) and difficult heritage that, to this day, resists categorisation but is protected by the figure of the historic monument.

The emergence of political memory

The trajectory of political memory in late 20th-century Latin America can be understood in the context of the discussion on human rights that arose during the transition to democracy after democratic breakdowns and civil-military coups that ushered in dictatorships. Such was the case in Chile when the end of Pinochet's authoritarian regime generated, at best, transitional processes (Hayner, 2008) whose central goal was to elucidate the truth and administer justice, initiate processes of reparation and prevent new similar episodes in the future (Hayner, 2008). The development of political memory in Chile as it transitioned from dictatorship to democracy must be approached, first and foremost, in the knowledge that the city itself had played a material role in political repression during the military regime, while at the same time, urban living conditions had been deteriorating. The political experience of the dictatorship involved sites that, following the return to democracy, needed to be given new meaning, while debates on the subject of heritage towards the end of the 20th century became part of a conversation that was also cultural. The notion of heritage had expanded beyond monuments: the attributes of sites suitable for conservation were no longer limited to values set out by specialists, but now included those relating to the diversity of experiences, identities and groups. In fact, some have described the broadening of the concept to encompass a greater number of audiences as a "desacralisation of heritage" (Dormaels, 2012).

The phenomenon of political memory emerged and evolved under democracy and granted urban heritage a central role in the elaboration of new memories rooted in the dictatorship, as the general public began to participate in processes of patrimonialisation. The category of memory came to challenge the backward, monument-based vision of cultural heritage from the late 20th century, channelling novel elements – new heritage assets – that acquired meaning as democracy took hold and the conflict began to be processed (Alegría et al., 2018). Thus, the relationship between memory and heritage post-dictatorship served to drive the memorialisation of public space in its connections to the military regime, within a nation whose heritage had, until that point, tended towards the glorification of a republican past (Fernández-Droguett, 2019).

However, political memory has also constituted a means of greater democratisation of the city. In other words, beyond the political application of memory and identity construction, it contributed to successful processes of peace and social justice (Van Geert & Roigé, 2016) – progress greatly needed by a society scarred by a lengthy authoritarian regime that

emphasised a form of heritage founded on an authorised national discourse (Smith, 2006). As mentioned earlier, this became relevant with the deregulation triggered by the PNDU of 1979, which had a considerable effect on both urban design and urban social rights.

Let us adopt a view of memory as a cultural rather than an individual faculty. It arises in the past but is lived from the present, and forms in places that may be material, symbolic or immaterial, but in which memory and history co-exist (Halbwachs, 2004; Nora, 2009). Thus, discussion of historical memory in a context where facts that remain unclear within a country's history are being subjected to reinterpretation can be identified as political and associated with nation-building projects. The emerging political memory embraced the possibility of consigning diverse and new memories to the city's material legacy, nevertheless occurring very gradually over the course of the first decade of the return to democracy – a critical period of political transition.

Thus, as the relationships between memory and human rights and between memory and cultural heritage are situated within the territory, sites apparently devoid of significance were transformed into places of memory. In Chile and across Latin America, political memory began to play an important role in the democratic transitions that began to occur in the wake of the human rights violations perpetrated by the dictatorships of the 20th century. Of increasing relevance are studies of memory sites and memorials where the nation's past comes face to face with the living history of victims and relatives of the disappeared (Schindel, 2009; Alegría et al., 2018). Such research has supported reflection on the relationship between heritage and memory in public space and through citizen organisations, revealing how memory becomes a form of resistance and dispute in the urban context. This was particularly relevant in Chile, both in response to urban life and in relation to the status of cities in reparation processes.

As Halbwachs (2004) reflects, memory is not restricted to the official and historical: there is another memory that is alive, collective and formed through relationships between different groups, where individuals share their experiences, reinforcing and complementing recollections of a common past (Halbwachs, 2004, p. 211). This challenges the imposition of a unique and official memory, and, indeed, of a consensual heritage. In the mid-1990s, debates began to embrace the notion of *dissonant heritage* as an expression of discomfort regarding certain elements associated with conflict – in the case of Europe, with the World Wars or the Nazi concentration camps. The concept poses the challenge of how to conserve heritage of this type – which is indisputably of historical value – without highlighting, for example, fascist ideologies. The question, therefore, is what to conserve and what not to and how to present that which is conserved: from what perspective or perspectives, and through what sort of narration (Hernández & Lozano, 2019, p. 399). The notion of dissonance is relevant to the context of post-dictatorship Chile, riddled with "difficult heritages" associated with places that are racked with tension but whose continued heritage condition facilitates the construction and reparation of memory relating to human rights violations (Smith, 2006, p. 296). Thus, just as the so-called restoration imposed by the dictatorship perpetuated a single official memory, so the return to democracy brought with it new interpretations of the nation's past.

Notes

2 The oil crisis, on the one hand, and the exhaustion of the import substitution model promoted by developmentalism, on the other, led to a decrease in Latin American exports within the total world market, which deepened the foreign debt and the logic of dependence on foreign capital.

Neoliberalism, initiated in dictatorial Chile in 1975, abruptly cut short the previous model. Based on the social and economic withdrawal of the State, the importance of private capital and the market was exacerbated, opening the so-called lost decade of the 1980s, so called precisely because of low economic growth without distribution and a profuse level of inequality.

3 Family enriched by mining activity since the late 19th century, whose fortune diversified over time, highlighting the creation of the journalistic chain El Mercurio, which, during the dictatorship, was characterized by supporting it.

4 Translated by the author.

5 The Council for the Defense of the State (CDE) was established in 1895 with the purpose of representing the patrimonial interests of the Treasury and the State. Although its powers have been modified, especially with the 1980 Constitution, which expanded its powers to civil, criminal, and tax areas, it essentially maintains a role as a defender or plaintiff in legal matters that legally involve the State.

6 Translated by the author. Decree 24, 19 January 1996. Declares the site "Hornos de Lonquén" a historic monument.

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PART 2

State socialisms, parliamentary democracy, illiberalism

8

PLANNING, POLITICS AND PANEL HOUSING

Czechoslovak housing estates

Petr Roubal

Introduction

In a poem that Jaroslav Seifert, the only Czech literary Nobel Prize laureate, wrote in the early eighties and published in *samizdat,* he described a nightmare he had had about the destruction of Prague.[1] In the dream, the city fell victim to "the claws of housing estates," which besieged Prague from all sides and devoured it with its panel teeth (as well as with "menacing fangs of high-rises") (Seifert, 1985, p. 9). The same representation of panel houses as a mortal threat to the city was also common in the early reflections of communist-era architecture during the 1990s. For instance, architect Petr Starčevič in his analysis of the development of Prague architecture in the 20th century also speaks about the city being "besieged by panel housing estates" and exposed to policies that were "Asian or certainly at least Balkan" in nature. The architects and urbanists are presented in the text as victims of the Communist Party persecution who are manipulated into drawing plans that eventually "destroy" the city (Starčevič, 1990, p. 25).

In this chapter, I will argue that the story of panel housing in Czechoslovakia is a bit more complicated than the simple narrative of the evil communist regime destroying the urban landscape and enslaving the architects to do its evil bidding. This is only possible due to the extensive work done by historians of architecture who in the last two decades studied the phenomenon extensively exploring its intellectual roots in the interwar avant-garde movement (Zarecor, 2011; Švácha, 2017; Novotná, 2020), outlining its periodization (Flekačová, 2014), technology (Janečková, 2017) or post-modern challenges (Krivý, 2016). A recent large research project on the Czechoslovak architecture of the 1980s also brought further insight into the final phase of state-socialist panel housing (e.g., Vorlík and Guzik, 2023). The history of Slovak housing estates that shared a general political and economic context but developed to a large degree separately is also well covered (Moravčíková, Szalay, Pastoreková, 2024; Moravčíková et al. 2020; Spurný, 2021). The present chapter will build upon this large volume of knowledge accumulated by art historians and expand it from the perspective of political history by studying more closely the interaction between the Communist Party and the architects exploring the complex relationship between the world of politics and the world

of expertise. It will try to show that the introduction of the panel housing technology was far from a Communist Party invention, but an initiative of the architects who took advantage of the state-socialist program of "material pacification" and tried to realize their modernist ideas. I then follow the trend in the Czechoslovak panel housing that especially after the Soviet intervention of 1968 turned into a travesty of their initial dreams of creating equal, affordable and modern housing for all.

Modernist roots

Unlike in many other Soviet satellite countries but similar to East Germany, in Czechoslovakia, the story of panel housing does not begin as a Soviet Union import. As was shown by Kimberly E. Zarecor and a number of other historians of architecture, the panel housing technology in its various mutations had its own strong local intellectual roots already in the 1930s mainly in two surprisingly divergent backgrounds (Zarecor, 2011; cf. Švácha, 2017). First, a network of young leftist architects, Progressive Architectural Group, mainly Jiři Voženílek (1909–1986), Karel Janů (1910–1995) and Jiři Štursa (1910–1995), were inspired by a theoretician of art and art critic Karel Teige that sought to apply the ideas of CIAM to the radically socialist program (Cf. Dluhosch & Švácha, 1999). Though these young socialist architects followed the current Soviet urban theory and practice, they were much more preoccupied with the idea of transforming architecture into a science and housing construction into a mechanized industry. Second, these principles resonated with experiments in architectonic and urbanistic design in Baťa Company, the first and only truly global enterprise in Czechoslovakia. Based in the small Moravian town of Zlín, Baťa Company, the world's largest producer of shoes between the two wars, sought typification and standardization of housing as one of the key elements of its long-term business strategy, which was to allow it to control all inputs of production. Apart from this autarkic strategy, Baťa Company also saw the industrialization of the building industry as a central instrument for global expansion of the Zlín model of factory towns (Jemelka & Ševček, 2013). Bohumír Kula and several other designers experimented with prefabricated concrete panels though initially only intended for detached or semi-detached small-size family houses. This politically unlikely coalition was further strengthened by the fact that Baťa Company provided some of the young avant-garde architects with a refuge during the Nazi occupation, when educational institutions were closed.

 After the war, the careers of Progressive Architectural Group members flourished. Karel Janů was appointed director general of the Czechoslovak Construction Works, which was founded in 1948 by nationalizing all construction companies. That same year, Jiři Voženilek became the first director of *Stavoprojekt*, a state-directed system of design and architecture offices, which associated all former private studios into one mammoth organization with 11,000 employees (Nový, 1973, p. 488). Both of these architects used their positions to develop their interwar program of scientification of design and architecture practice on a large scale. The aim was to produce well-researched and experimentally verified standardized projects and to pursue industrialization and mechanization of the building industry through the construction of prefabricated panel buildings. Though Baťa Company was nationalized already in 1945, its designing and planning offices continued in their experiments with prefabrication, and according to the designs of Bohumír Kuba, the first multi-story panel house was built in Zlín, now renamed Gottwaldov after the first communist president Klement

Gottwald (Novotná, 2020). The arrival of socialist realism, which only affected architectural works in 1951, did not result in the complete abandoning of this trend. Despite losing their privileged posts, Janů and Voženílek were able to continue with the preparation of prefabricated panel housing construction as heads of architecture research institutes.

Therefore, the sudden shift in Soviet architecture that came with Nikita Khrushchev's speech on architecture in 1954 fell to the fertile grounds (Khrushchev, 1954). In his speech, the Soviet leader denounced socialist realism as wasteful and promoted the typification and standardization of design and construction. Khrushchev summed up the beauty of standardization for socialist governance: "Once one decides to build, there is already a plan in existence, and it is known how large the site must be, what parts and materials will be needed, and how many workers will be required. Everything is clear" (ibid., p. 186). The transparent nature of standardization put a quick end to the aesthetic and political project of socialist realism, which placed all power in the hands of the politician-cum-artist (Cf. Groys, 1992). Instead, a space was created precisely for the type of expertise that Teige and his pupils Voženílek and Janů were calling for. The architect was to become a scientist who with the help of rational and scientifically verifiable procedures finds a permanent technical and spatial solution to social problems (Cf. Roubal, 2018). There was very little space left for the decision-making of the architect–artist or politician–artist in this new technocratic mode. (For more details on the state-socialist technocratism, see Spurný, 2019.)

The Czechoslovak political leadership adopted the new Soviet policy very early on. Already in 1955, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia issued a decree on "Measures towards industrialization of construction and its further development" that mandated the preparation of new standardized housing types. The same year, the career of a major proponent of socialist realism in architecture Jiří Kroha abruptly ended signaling a definitive break with the Stalinist architectonic legacy even before the Khrushchev anti-Stalinist speech at the Twentieth Party Congress of 1956 (Zarecor, 2007). The political shock of the Hungarian and Polish crises of 1956 was possibly even more important for the implementation of panel housing technology than the destalinization policies. This experience, combined with political backing by Khrushchev leadership, led to a radical program of "strategy of material pacification" as Christoph Boyer calls it or more simply the adoption of the Kádárist policy of "Goulash Socialism", in which the leadership mobilized resources toward an immediate improvement of living conditions of the population rather than focusing on the long term and often utopian goals of building communist society (Boyer, 2005).

The housing shortage was one of the key areas that this new policy addressed. In March 1958, the Central Committee passed a decree that promised to "permanently remove the deplorable heritage of capitalism" of housing shortage by building 1,2 million new apartments till 1970 (Komunistická strana Československa, 1958). This goal, which required more than doubling the existing speed of the construction, was to be achieved primarily by the technology of panel prefabrication, which would eliminate the time-consuming traditional methods of brick laying. The decree ordered the full use of the existing panel housing types and the development of more effective types for the next five-year plan. Though the decree reminded the designers and architects that the approved housing program was "constituting the conditions for socialist way of life and laying grounds for condition of life in communist society", it focused nearly exclusively on the economic and technical aspects of the program. While it listed very specifically all the resources required, especially in terms of material, the decree failed entirely to mention the aesthetic and urbanistic dimensions of the process. The party

decree alluded to urban planning only by stressing the importance of land preservation, which implied a preference for high-density housing. The economic imperative manifested itself also in the size of the planned apartments, which on average could not exceed 37 square meters. In a speech that introduced the decree, Oldřich Černík who later became a prime minister during Prague Spring admonished the architects who insisted on larger apartments: "/they/ propose these apparently in order to be able to employ their 'creative potential' in design. These views are outcome of individualistic tendencies that disregard the all-state possibilities and needs"[2] (ibid.).

The anti-utopian tone of the decree, which was consciously employed to contrast with the Stalinist-era grand schemes, was not, however, fully adopted in the expert milieus, which managed to preserve at least initially part of the revolutionary dreams of the interwar modernism. Modernist architects, such as Voženílek and Štursa, who were important members of a commission that the Central Committee of the Communist Party established to oversee the housing program, attempted to reconcile the goal of securing affordable housing for all with the aesthetic aspirations of modernism. This goal was easier to achieve in the 1960s than in the later years as the political authorities were willing to invest some resources into experimentation in order to find the best model to be replicated on a larger scale. A number of aesthetically and technologically ambitious housing estates were completed during the 1960s such as Brno housing estate Lesná (1962–1970) inspired by its interaction with the landscape by Finish "new town" Tapiola or Prague housing estate Ďáblice (1966–1975), which formed semi-opened courtyards and created space for shops and services in its ground floor. These housing estates reflected the results of the All-State Discussion on Housing in 1960 that were on the instructions of the Communist Party organized by a number of institutions such as the Ministry of Construction, the Union of Architects and the Union of Women with over a thousand events in which more than one hundred thousand people took part. Though the party intended the All-State Discussion on Housing primarily as a mobilization campaign, it generated a wave of critical comments on the planned housing program that were partly reflected in the next stage of planning, for instance, in an increase in the floor space per individual (Novotná, 2018).

Post-1968 "Normalization" era

The new consolidation regime, which took over power gradually after the Soviet intervention, returned under the policy of so-called normalization to the strict economic discipline of the 1958 party decree. With a new urgency, the post-intervention leadership aimed at pacifying the population through improvement of living conditions, and indeed, in the sphere of housing it eventually did achieve what the previous administrations failed to accomplish, that is to "resolve in principle the housing question" (for a more thorough discussion of the housing strategy of this period, see cf. Krivý, 2017). Dissatisfaction of Prague inhabitants, especially of the youth, was identified by the Communist Party as one of the main reasons for the Prague Spring, and consequently, housing needs of the capital received a preferential treatment, which also included a massive investment in the underground system as the transportation and housing were planned in unison. Therefore, the term "Socialist Prague" essentially refers to the massive construction of the 1970s and 1980s. By capitalizing on the long-term experiences in panel housing technology, the ambitious plans for constructing completely new quarters (called "cities") with tens of thousands of inhabitants were successfully completed.

Despite the economic downturn of the 1980s, ten thousand new units were built in Prague alone every year throughout the "normalization era".

In Prague, there were two main housing estates built during the 1970s and 1980s, the Southern City with nearly one hundred thousand inhabitants and the somewhat smaller South-Western City. Locations for both these housing estates were determined by the Urban Master Plan of 1964, and both stemmed from the urban and architectonic competition of the second half of the sixties. The authors of both estates tried in their design to compensate for the deficiencies of the previous plans for housing estates that were criticized for being mere "dormitories" without their own urban life. In both these housing estates as well as in the biggest housing estate in Czechoslovakia, Petržalka, in Bratislava, an autonomous center of these "cities" was planned that would satisfy most of the needs of its inhabitants. In the early 1970s, however, the political pressure to build as quickly as possible the maximum number of apartments led to significant changes to the design of the estates, especially in Prague Southern City. As the rapid construction of apartment houses took preference, the building of the center of the quarter was postponed indefinitely. Moreover, the planned number of apartments was increased, which meant, however, adding stores to the planned houses with a detrimental effect on the overall design of the housing estate, but also, even more seriously, the spaces dedicated to the construction of the center as well as for the light-industry sites that were to provide employment for the inhabitants were taken over by the additional apartment houses. As a result, the drawbacks of monocultural "dormitories" were replicated, but this time on a much larger scale than was the case in 1960.

In comparison with its larger predecessor, the South-Western City urban design fared much better. It was built approximately seven years later, and the principal architect of the housing estate, Ivo Oberstein, could learn at least partly from the lessons of the planning and construction of the Southern City. Also, the specific linear design of the South-Western City with its centers concentrated around each of the five underground stops proved quite resilient against political and economic pressures to increase the number of constructed apartments. In order to achieve the "human scale" of the housing estate, Oberstein drew inspiration from the liveliness of the traditional historic centers, adjusting his plans for housing estate centers according to the layouts of the Prague Old Town Square or the Wenceslas Square (Oberstein, 2018). As a means to get the perspective of future pedestrian users, Oberstein experimented with video technology navigating a micro-camera through a model of the housing estate (ČST, 1986). Though the housing estates proved relatively successful in terms of urban design, providing good access to public transport as well as specific local identity to each segment of the housing estate, the enormous energy that the architect Ivo Oberstein invested in attempts to adjust existing panel technology to a more bearable architecture failed. The sculptor Kurt Gebauer, with whom Oberstein cooperated in decorating the housing estate, commented on the final architectonic outcome by asking: "Is our way of construction really so profitable, that it is worth of it being so ugly?" (Fragner, 1987 qtd in Zadražilová, 2013).

Critique of the panel housing estates

Judging by the number of flats built, the "normalization" housing program was a great technological and political success. Though a decade later than the original 1958 plan envisioned, by the year 1980, the ambitious program of building 1,2 million new homes was completed and the housing shortage was greatly reduced. Yet at the same time, the panel

housing technology became a target of widespread criticism that no longer dwelt on the usual accompanying "deficiencies" of the panel housing estates, such as lack of pavements and grass lawns, but targeted the very modernist principles on which these projects rested. Industrialized housing construction based on mass-scale prefabrication as well as strict functional zoning was increasingly seen as incompatible with the "socialist way of life". Initially, since the mid-1960s, the criticism was shared only among the expert circles of architects and urban planners, but by the early 1980s, the critical stand was adopted by part of the communist leadership and the official media.

The critique of the panel housing among the experts, including those who promoted the prefabrication technology during the late 1950s, started as part of the politically more relaxed period of the late 1960s but did not stop with the onset of the "normalization" era. A good example is Jiří Hrůza (1925–2012), the most well-known urban planner of the time and one of the authors of the Prague *Master Plan of 1964*, a radically modernist urban design that envisioned complete redevelopment of Prague with the exception of its medieval core. Hrůza started publishing his critical views in the second half of the 1960s, but his criticism only took on a solid form in the early 1970s. His main critical work *Hledání soudobého města* [In the Quest of a Contemporary City] is strongly influenced by Jane Jacobs' *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. Hrůza initiated the translation of Jacob's text into Czech and wrote an extensive epilogue to the book as well as adding endnotes, in which he explained to the Czech reader the American context and corrected some of the author's alleged "mistakes" (Hrůza, 1973; Jacobsová, 1975).[3] Echoeing Jacobs Hrůza criticized that the city is currently understood as a conglomerate of buildings and communications rather than a living social organism whose functions and development are governed by the laws that the urban planners need yet to fully understand (Hrůza, 1973, p. 58). These conceptual failures are, according to Hrůza, aggravated in Czechoslovak cities by the dominant use of panel housing technology, which has a direct effect on the spatial composition of the cities. Locations for the new housing are determined by the industrial method of housing construction, which prefers flat suburban areas where the cranes can be used most effectively and where the housing process is not delayed by the need to resettle the original residents. This has, Hrůza says, negative effects of consuming fertile land, excessively expanding the city and increasing transportation times. Hrůza therefore poses a rhetorical question: "Why should the needs of the industrial construction methods determine the spatial composition of the housing estates, which will be a living environment for many decades?"

The same question was increasingly asked by a wide spectrum of experts and political actors. In preparation for the Union of the Architects Congress in 1982, *Československá architektura*, the official journal of the Union of Architects, organized a poll among architects asking them an indicative question: "What lacks our architecture?". With few exceptions, all the 24 published answers were highly critical listing the planning and execution of panel housing estates as particularly troublesome. The architects, often in quite emotional terms, complained that they were let down and "betrayed" by all other players in urban planning and architecture (Welz, 1982). They described their attempts to create a truly "socialist living environment" as a solitary, quixotic struggle seen by the investors and construction industry at best as a hobby or eccentricity (Zima, 1982). The combined pressure of investors, who cared only about the number of completed apartments, and the "supplier", i.e., construction industry that tried to make their task as easy and as profitable as possible, resulted in poor quality monotonous housing estates without the basic social amenities. One of the

leading architects, Václav Hilský, an author of the famous collective house in Litvínov, even contrasted negatively with the tabooed socialist realist architecture: "Wrong idea is better than no idea. 'Sorela' (pejorative term referring to the socialist realist architecture) is therefore better, than a housing estate of randomly dispersed buildings on a field" (Hilský, 1982; for a more thorough view of the critique, see Roubal, 2023).

A number of the critical points raised in the discussion found a way into a lengthy governmental decree *Towards further development of socialist architecture and urbanism* that was drafted with active participation of the Union of the Architects and passed shortly before its congress in November 1982 (cf. Jirkalová, 2020). The decree, the only systematic attempt to deal with the issue on the governmental level of the "normalization" era, claimed that the current state of affairs in architecture and urbanism does not correspond to the excellent conditions that the socialist revolution created for them. Though the design of the cities as well as buildings is no longer determined by the exploitive class but by the "entire working people" and though the architecture is no longer bound by interests of private ownership of land, "neither over-all esthetic level nor the urbanistic hospitability" corresponds to the increasing aesthetic needs of society. The decree also disputed one of the basic modernist tenants by demanding that the strict application of functional zoning should be abandoned in favor of the mixing of urban functions. Most importantly, the decree mandated that the power of the investor, i.e., the state, should be greatly enhanced so it could act on behalf of the entire society against the particular interests of various ministries and especially the all-powerful construction companies.

The governmental decree was a signal to the state media that criticism of panel housing estates is a legitimate subject. The archives of the Czechoslovak State Television contain several hundred items dealing with housing estates ranging from comedies to panel discussions and documentaries. Positive treatment of panel housing is practically absent. Occasionally, it is admitted that the chosen technology played a positive role in dealing with the housing shortage *in the past*. As a current method, it is presented as entirely inadequate, and increasingly, it is contrasted negatively with the liveliness, aesthetic appeal and craftsmanship of the Belle Époque housing, so despised by the modernist architects of the interwar period. For instance, a TV documentary on the life of children in housing estates shows a social and pedagogical experiment with a small group of children led by psychologist Bohuslav Blažek who dealt with the topic of housing estates systematically. He asks the children to build an ideal city using a wooden building set based on typical 19th-century small-town housing types. The children, who arranged the wooden blocks into a traditional urban design with squares and streets, were asked to tell how their living environment at the housing estates differs from the model of their own making. The pedagogical experiment ends with a clear statement by one of the boys saying: "Here at our housing estate, there is nothing but block of flats".

Yet despite the political statements and media criticism, the structural panel remained the only available technology for the new housing projects till the very end of communism. The specific institutional design of state socialism as well as its permanent economy of shortage made it extremely difficult to change track in the housing program. Czechoslovakia was a party dictatorship only in the name. In fact, it operated in the "jungle of economic interests" as one of the architects in the mentioned discussion in 1982 called it. The Communist Party did not have either the capacity or the expertise to navigate all the vested interests of scores of players involved in the housing construction. Indeed, it did not have even the capacity to control its own competing factions. For instance, a painstakingly designed plan of the

Prague-Central Bohemian metropolitan area that was to address the interrelationship of the two regions in a long-term strategy failed because the Central Bohemian Regional Committee of the Communist Party feared it might lose some of its power. Instead, a political compromise was found in extending substantially the territory of the capital without addressing the underlying problems of the metropolitan area, and in fact, it made them worse (Koukalová, Roubal, 2023).

The main challenge for the party was to force a change in the mode of operation of large construction companies with their vested interests in the status quo. These companies, which were de-facto monopolies and acted in tandem with the panel construction companies, operated powerful contacts at the construction ministry, possessed all the technical and planning expertise and most importantly employed tens of thousands of workers. These companies were far more than just employers; through myriad of services to their workers, they were guarantors of social peace and stability. To go actively against these powerful interests proved to be too politically challenging for the conservative Communist Party leadership already weakened by the reform policies of Gorbachev perestroika. The change of housing program would also require massive investment, western currency and at the same time it would mean at least a temporal *decrease* in the number of completed apartments, one of the few remaining legitimization tools of the party.

The history of panel housing estates in Czechoslovakia thus concludes with a paradox. The program started in the second half of the 1950s as an example of an ambitious state-socialist project that heavy-handedly and with a great expense employed modernist urban planning ideas and used them for a radical goal of providing equal, hygienic housing for all. By the mid-eighties, state socialism proved too weak to stop the program that meanwhile lost intellectual, political and popular support. What started as a show of strength of the state concluded as a symbol of its weakness.

Notes

1 This text is a result of a research project *In search of the Postmodern City. Transformation of Prague and Bratislava between 1970 and 2000* (n. 22-17295S) of the Institute of Contemporary History, Czech Academy of Sciences supported by Czech Science Foundation.
2 Unlike many other reform communists, Oldřich Černík was permitted to stay in a leading position after the post-invasion purges. He became a deputy head of the Study and Typization Institute that among others specified the norms for the construction panels.
3 However, Hrůza pointed out that the first systematic criticism of modernism emerged "under extremely dramatic circumstances" in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. The fact that it was a sort of practical laboratory of different avant-garde architectural and urban concepts later led to another extreme in the form of socialist realism. This was, Hrůza felt, both "illuminating and alarming".

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9

FROM COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING TO SMALL INTERVENTIONS

Urban renewal and rationalisation in the German Democratic Republic

Jannik Noeske

When the Berlin Wall fell in the autumn of 1989, the old and inner cities of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were in a deplorable state. A grey creep of neglect lay over them. In the 40 years of socialist Germany, not enough had been done for the renewal of the cities. In this article, we want to explore the planning history of urban renewal in the GDR. Approaches to the heritage-making of urban monument preservation will not be considered: Rather, we are interested in the relationship between spatial planning and central state economic planning, in particular its economic framework of old town renewal. Essential for this discussion are the processes of knowledge production and the role of science in planning, which – according to my thesis – are strongly associated with crisis-like phenomena. Have economic crises led to an increase in planning and science? To answer this question, we will look at various exemplary developments in spatial planning in the GDR, always with side glances at global transformations.

In state socialism, the boundaries between "planning as a scientific discipline and planning as a technique of government" (Vallye, 2020, p. 24) were particularly blurred. Statistics, models and case studies served as rhetorical instruments to mediate between these worlds. In the GDR, there was a tendency, due to the limited possibilities in execution, for the scientific field to be very pronounced. For this reason alone, the material is rich.

We will first look at the 1950s, when the period of *Khrushchev Thaw* led to a first surge in the scientification of planning and construction, which was continued in the 1960s. The failure of Walter Ulbricht's economic policy reforms (Ahrens & Steiner, 2018) and the economic and governmental crisis in 1969 brought about the change of power. The government under party secretary Erich Honecker initially stopped the efforts to open up the economy and science.

At the same time, the 1970s marked the beginning of what was seen as a decade of crisis, the global economic context not leaving the production conditions of urban planning in the GDR untouched. In the history of planning, the 1970s stand for a turn towards urban renewal in an "era of crisis" (Baumeister et al., 2017) and a distancing from comprehensive strategic

planning, accompanied by a change in urban planning models as well as in the planning profession (Hall, 1996, p. 333). This also applies to Eastern socialist Europe (cf. Ladd, 2001).

With this chapter, we are primarily concerned with planning methodologies from a historical perspective (cf. Batey, 2017), in particular the relationship between planning knowledge production in the historical urban context and urban production relations under state socialism. A brief look at the 1990s can shed light on the international sustainability of professional interdependencies just as much as it can symbolise the continuity of urban planning production relations across upheavals.

Survey before plan

The second half of the 1950s in the GDR was characterised by consolidation and assertion of power by the SED and other state organs – especially symbolised by the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 – but also by a cautious opening of debate spaces and economic reform approaches. The year 1956 also marked the beginning of large-scale mass housing construction by the use of prefabricated panel systems (Pugh, 2015, p. 93). The strict industrialisation of the building industry – accompanied by the research on construction principles – promoted the erection of new tenements on the outskirts of the cities, on war-relict inner-city sites as well as in newly founded industrial cities. Yet not only newly built structures were tackled in the process of rationalising the construction sector. One of the key problems of urban planning was the question of urban renewal and living conditions in the old towns and turn-of-the-century workers' tenements.

To demonstrate this shift, we focus on the case of the old Hanseatic city of Stralsund. Left with few destructions in the city centre after World War II, the municipal planning authorities created a comprehensive reconstruction plan in 1953, just after the town was declared a "construction city" (Aufbaustadt), with the shipyard industries fostered in particular. The first reconstruction plan shows how a modernist, yet traditionally shaped, city centre was to be created by widening streets and squares but also by landscaping and clearing inner courtyards, following pre-war concepts of inner-city redevelopment (diradamento) mainly developed in fascist Italy (Spiegel, 2015).

A research project in 1956 of the *Deutsche Bauakademie* (German Architecture Academy), led by traditionalist architect Kurt W. Leucht and conducted by Werner Grundmann, Ruth Günther and Herbert Riecke, followed the Scottish planner Patrick Geddes' principle "survey before plan" (Muller, 1992). Grundmann, Günther and Riecke conducted comprehensive research on the structure of the old city of Stralsund (cf. Deutsche Bauakademie, 1958). They examined not only topography, building stock and the dwellings' age and condition but also the physical and population density per block, population age and size of the apartments. They compiled the results of the research in a special issue of the then influential professional journal *Städtebau und Siedlungswesen*. The issue did not include any planning or urban design documents. Yet it is obvious that the research is not neutral either – it stands for the approach to revalue the inner city by seemingly objective data. Also, it can be seen as an attempt to introduce and consolidate a standard repertoire of urban analysis (Figure 9.1). The sophisticated graphic design of the results represents the maps, façade figures and data visualisations as heuristic devices. However, it seems that the study has hardly been received.

FIGURE 9.1   A map from the 1956 study showing the population density per block. Less dense neighbourhoods are shown in lighter colours and those with high population density in darker colours. The hatching indicates areas destroyed during the war.

Source: Deutsche Bauakademie, 1958, Figure 69

From blueprint to process

At the end of the 1950s, the GDR was also undergoing an economic upheaval. In 1958, the second Five-Year Plan was abandoned, and in 1959, the state leadership drew up the Seven-Year Plan, which was valid until 1965. The GDR tried to improve living conditions significantly. Of course, this also included a substantial improvement in the conditions in the older flats, which were almost exclusively at a pre-war level and were often only provisionally and superficially repaired even after war damage.

After the rather traditionalist approaches to urban renewal had flopped, architects and planners developed new planning methodologies. According to Peter Halls's observation, the new approach "meant also a fundamentally different concept of planning. Instead of the old master plan or blueprint approach, which assumed that the objectives were fixed from the start, the new concept was of planning as a *process*" (Hall, 1996, p. 329).

A research project for the renewal of the workers' tenement neighbourhood around Glauchaer Straße in Halle/Saale sought to further rationalise the methods of renewal (Doehler et al., 1960; Doehler, 1961). Led by architect and economist Peter Doehler, it stands for an advanced approach to economical survey and strategy of comprehensive renewal. At the time, Doehler was the head of the department at the Institute of Architecture and Urban Planning at the *Bauakademie* and responsible for the economisation of old town renewal. Doehler, who has been considered a "pig-headed numbers cruncher" (Urban, 2006, p. 78), and his team analysed the neighbourhood thoroughly regarding the condition of the dwellings, their fittings and amenities and other factors relevant to the renewal. While Doehler and his team proposed the demolition and re-design of large parts of the neighbourhood, some parts have been earmarked for preserving renewal. The most influential outcome of this research project was the definition of a classification for the assessment of the buildings' respective condition. By introducing the four-stage model of decay and making it one of the foundations of further planning, Doehler combined several scientific approaches to urban renewal.

Doehler's research represents a first attempt to quantify the decay of the area in the town of Halle/Saale by means of the four building condition stages. The background is an internationally influential thesis in the 20th century, namely, buildings have a certain lifespan and are subject to a corresponding cycle of regeneration. Urban (2006, pp. 71–89) describes that the concept of *obsolescence* of buildings was developed in the USA in the 1930s. Economists in the Soviet Union later incorporated it into a Marxist interpretation with the terms "physical" and "moral depreciation". Doehler (1961, p. 2) was the first to use the term "moral depreciation" in relation to buildings in his dissertation.

By *quantifying* old town renewal, as Doehler did using the example of Halle/Saale as a representative of the entire republic, he placed the old town reconstruction as a "technical problem" and not as a "political task" (Bouk, 2021, p. 726). With the approach of quantifying and making comparable the buildings' conditions mostly in dense urban areas, Doehler sought to overcome the heuristics of the planners' experience (cf. Reuter & Jessen, 2019). Whereas numbers and figures and their urban location by cartographies served mainly to support the experts' approaches to urban planning, Doehler sought to objectify this relationship by putting the numbers and figures beforehand. Yet it is obvious that the quantification of a building's life cycle of roughly 80 to 100 years in 1960 meant nothing else than justifying the decay and demolition of large parts of the turn-of-the-century tenement buildings of which large parts of the housing stock of the GDR consisted. What Doehler ignored is the

fact that by 1961 large parts of the housing stock counted at least 90 years, most of them older. For example, in the northernmost district of Rostock in the year 1961, 25 percent of all dwellings were constructed before 1870 (Zentralverwaltung für Statistik, 1961), a fact that demonstrates that there was a political backstory to the hypothesis of the 80-year obsolescence, namely, that the urban planning sector necessitated a strategy in dealing with this building stock.

The quantification of a building's lifecycle yet was not at all mere ideology. Instead, it helped to establish the connection between the planned economy and comprehensive urban planning. At the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, the GDR state officials sought to re-organise and develop the effectiveness of the planned economy. Doehler started to parameterise the costs of urban renewal. Thus, he built upon the reference numbers that Junghanns et al. (1954) had introduced for "Wohnkomplexe" (housing complexes, microrayons) in newly erected cities and neighbourhoods a few years earlier. The difference to newly built structures can be seen in introducing the method of *variant planning*, which was based heavily on calculating the costs of urban renewal from a long-term perspective. With this research project in Halle/Saale, Doehler and his colleagues tried to lay the foundations of large-scale urban renovation. Even if the execution was lean and, in some cases, not even resulted in visible

FIGURE 9.2   The plan shows the planning area in Halle/Saale. It shows the mapping of "stage III" of the *re-design proposal*, so it is by no means to be understood as blueprint planning but as a possible result of the development process after about 30 to 40 years.

Source: Doehler et al., 1960, Figure 80

effects, GDR planners adapted international tendencies. By applying standardised instruments of planning surveys, also in Western Germany, the federal construction and housing ministry had published guidelines for urban surveys only one year earlier (Mittelbach, 1958).

In the USA, in the meantime, first planning scholars had implemented the use of automated data processing (Duke, 1961) and thus paved the way for the data revolution in urban planning. At the end of the 1950s, the creative individualism of the planner was globally replaced by a systematic attempt to rationalise spatial planning processes significantly through scientific methods. This included the standardisation of methods, the definition of parameters and their introduction into planning procedures and variant decisions and, last but not least, changed professional profiles of the urban and economic planners themselves.

A push in rationalisation?

After Doehler introduced the system of the four building condition levels, these subdivisions were first applied on a large scale in the 1961 housing census. 1961 also saw the first experiences with sorting machines, which helped with data evaluation in the 15 regional and 200 local census bureaus (Rowell, 2007, p. 352). From the mid-1960s onwards, GDR statisticians increasingly used methods of automated data processing (ADP), and it was used in urban planning. Computers were introduced to the GDR construction sector in the course of the 1960s, while the *Bauakademie* and the Ministry of Construction had stipulated for the cities to compile comprehensive planning documents (Generalbebauungsplanung) in 1966 (Ministerium für Bauwesen, 1966). At the same time, scholars at the University of Transportation in Dresden had begun to implement urban travel forecasting to transit planning and long-term traffic surveys (Boyce & Williams, 2015, pp. 341–342).

The government and planning authorities put high hopes in the potential rationalisation of planning processes by means of ADP. The 1967-founded state-owned company VEB ZOD[1] supported the East-Berlin planning authorities with mass data processing, utilising two IBM 360/40 machines that the US-American computer company had introduced in 1964. The GDR economic planning commission had purchased ten of these IBM computers in 1965, of which two ended up in the construction sector (Thiel, 2019, p. 14). Based upon theoretical groundwork (cf. Putz, 2020, p. 12), the VEB ZOD also developed computational procedures for urban survey and urban analysis (Stempell & Tollkühn, 1970).

The 1967 housing census came to the conclusion that the GDR had the oldest building stock on average in an international comparison of the ECE states, that is, most European states and the USA (Paulick et al., 1967, p. 71). In their evaluation, the researchers Paulick, Rank and Wolfram point to the difficulties of planning the renovation of old buildings. They focus even more intensely than Doehler did a few years before them on the processuality of planning procedures. They argue that the effectiveness of comprehensive urban planning must be constantly reviewed. In this way, they plead for overcoming the bi-polar, blueprint conception of urban planning, which only knows an actual and a to-be state, and for more strongly adapting development processes of urban development with control mechanisms. The authors attributed a correspondingly high degree of importance to variant planning (Paulick et al., 1967, p. 72).

A subsequent macro census in 1971, which collected and processed not only building data but also social data, allowed for a much greater depth of analysis. The aggregation of population data down to the analytical size of a single dwelling allowed planners to make

Bild 55. Ablochbeleg

Bild 56. Lochkarten entsprechend Beleg Bild 55

FIGURE 9.3 Above is an index card from the 1967 building census, filled in by hand, and below is the translation of the same card onto an 80-column punch card. The results of the 1967 building census were the first mass data to be introduced and digitally processed in the centralised state-socialist construction sector.

Source: Stempell, 1971, Figures 55 and 56

accurate assessments of demographic and socio-economic compositions of neighbourhoods. The results of the 1971 population and building census thus laid an important foundation, not only for the renewal projects in Berlin's Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg neighbourhoods but in the realisation of the housing programme as a whole from 1973 onwards (Rowell, 2007, pp. 356–357). The housing programme, the most important element of state socialist legitimisation under the new party secretary Erich Honecker (since 1971), is considered the centrepiece of the GDR's social policy in the 1970s and 1980s.

Building census 1979/1980

After the global economic development had significantly impaired the economic growth of all industrialised countries, two oil price crises in 1973 and 1979 had made the entire world aware of its dependence on resources that were not infinitely available, and the first signals towards a general change of tendency in economic and thus also urban planning production were demanded; for example, by the report of the Club of Rome in 1973, a rethinking of urban planning policy also took place in the GDR's construction sector (Putz, 2020, p. 20).

In 1979, the Ministry of Construction passed a law prohibiting the demolition of housing that was generally still usable. As a result, municipal authorities could only demolish buildings in building condition levels 1 to 3 with special permission from the Minister of Construction. This law also had far-reaching consequences for planning practice. I will illustrate this with the example of the city of Bernau, not far from the Capital Berlin.

The Institute for Housing and Social Construction of the *Bauakademie* carried out a research and experimental project in the municipality of Bernau. The town had a compact old town core. It was now to be renewed by demolishing a large part of the old buildings and replacing them with prefabricated slab buildings adapted for old city use. The project had already begun at the end of the 1960s, but the first master planning dates back to 1974, and the ground-breaking ceremony was in 1976.

After the first buildings were erected, the planning for the second construction phase had to be adjusted again three years later. The reason for this was a demolition law passed in 1979 (Urban, 2007, p. 21). The planners of the IWG saw the change in the overall global economic situation as one of the reasons why the plans had to be adjusted, as the GDR was struck by the economic upheavals the late 1970s brought to all industrialised nations, in this case, namely, the second oil price crisis of 1979 (Stokes, 2013; Steiner, 2014). Figures 9.4 show the two plans for the construction phases. It becomes obvious that the plans were adjusted according to the preservation of larger areas of the old town. In the argumentation, the planners mentioned the changed legal framework of demolition and preservation of 1975 (monument preservation law) (Demshuk, 2020, p. 24) and 1979 (demolitions).

This legal adjustment is first of all an expression of the fact that the existing housing fund is even more perceived by the state as an economic resource and included in the calculations. Each demolished old flat reduces the average age of the housing stock but also depletes the state's substance. The GDR's construction industry therefore had to build one new housing unit for every unit demolished in order to maintain the existing stock.

It became thus necessary to evaluate the building stock regarding its condition with the aim to quantify the need for demolition and subsequently the costs of maintaining and renewing the old cities. Therefore, a 1979 building census evaluated the conditions of all buildings in towns with over 3,000 inhabitants. The counting resulted dauntingly obvious how

FIGURE 9.4   The development plan from 1976 for the replacement of almost the entire building structure. In the amended plan of 1980, larger areas are planned for preservation, for example, in the area around the Marienkirche in the north of the old town.

Source: BBSR-Spezialarchiv Bauen in der DDR Informationszentrum Plattenbau, 05001, Stadtkern Bernau, Planungsstand 10/1980 für den 1. u. 2. BA nach aktualisierter Leitplanung des IWG

critical the state of the building stock had become. In their evaluation of the 1979 census, scientists of the Institute of Economics of the Bauakademie demonstrated how decay and demolitions put the housing production in question.

The research group of the Institute's director, the economist Hans-Joachim Krehl, calculated that in 1971, a total of 6.1 million flats were available in the GDR. Ten years later, in 1981, there were 6.6 million—although 1.1 million had been built in the meantime. Thus, the scientists concluded that only about half of all newly built flats contributed to the expansion of the housing supply. At the same time, the condition of the housing stock had not improved significantly: in 1971, 84 percent of all dwellings were in good or acceptable condition; in 1979, the figure was only 83 percent. Thus, according to the Institute of Economics, for every new flat built, one flat fell into disrepair.

Small steps towards no clear goal

The early 1980s in the GDR were characterised by the management of scarcity of building resources. A decision by the Politbüro in 1982 was intended to significantly promote inner-city building and urban renewal. However, it soon became apparent that the mammoth task posed by the decay of the old town could not be solved in this way.

The results of the building condition survey of 1979/1980 were used to aggregate deterioration curves and maintenance costs with the help of the APSIREWO programme (Oswald, 1996, p. 12), which contrast the deductive model of lifespan with an evidence-based reproduction cycle and thus represent a rather inductive model of the renewal of old buildings. In this way, it constitutes a departure from the models of maximum lifespan, which, however, were further qualified by Doehler (Doehler, 1982; 1989) until the 1980s, whose research though was no longer acclaimed in professional circles.

In the 1980s, the instrument of general planning had meanwhile degenerated into a mere location conception for housing construction. Although plans were drawn up for various cities for the periods 1981–1986 and 1986–1990, they were neither comparatively and centrally assessed nor publicly exhibited to experts. In 1986, the Politburo finally decided on behalf of the Ministry of Construction that new general development plans for the period 1990 to 2000 should be prepared for all cities in the GDR, which were to be more uniform and binding than the location concepts of the 1980s.

This was preceded by the demand of various researchers who had proposed a strengthening of comprehensive planning for city-wide rationalisation. There were only a few voices, such as the AG Stadtzentren (Urban City Centre Working Group) of the Bund der Architekten der DDR (Association of Architects of the GDR), who called for a general rethinking towards a "planning of small steps" (AG Stadtzentren, 1981) and thus called for a paradigm shift in the way cities were produced, which was, by all means, common in international discourse at the time.[2]

Although there was no political change of course in terms of planning methods, the urban planning strategy in most municipalities was nevertheless characterised by piecemeal urbanism. New building sites were to be constructed mainly in inner-city locations, where prefabricated slab construction methods adapted to the context conditions of old cities were applied (Figure 9.5). The construction projects often comprised only around 100 housing units, which was a vanishingly small number compared to the suburban housing construction sites.

FIGURE 9.5   Planning in small steps: A worker places a slab in a construction area of Stralsund's old town with just 100 residential units. Photo: Harry Hardenberg, source: Municipal Archive Stralsund, VIII-17-03-115.

After the housing program?

The planning for the period 1990–2000 represented nothing less than squaring the circle. At the end of the 1980s, the GDR was in a veritable economic and legitimacy crisis. Not only the old towns but the entire infrastructure was in a deplorable state. Since the housing construction programme was supposed to be completed in 1990, the housing issue was anything but "solved". The 28 master plans for all major cities in the GDR were centrally assessed at the *Bauakademie*. Wilfried Pfau, head of the department at the Institute for Urban Planning and Architecture and responsible for the master plan appraisals, complained in the summer of 1989 that the loss of urban quality that had occurred so far had become unmistakable and disturbing (Bauakademie der DDR, 1989). However, too little was happening, in his opinion. In cities like Greifswald or Leipzig, about 40 percent of the old building stock was still planned for demolition. At the same time, all of the cities would grow in the surface by another 5 percent on average into the surrounding countryside (Bauakademie der DDR, 1989).

While the master plans of 1988/1989 were still mainly developed using conventional methods, a group of young scientists worked on the further development of cost–benefit analyses of urban renewal, in particular using automatic data processing (Baganz, 1989). Once again, the researchers had the goal of upgrading the renewal as opposed to demolition and subsequent replacement building.

The databases were much more elaborate, and computing technology had developed profoundly. The GDR had started to unify the variety of databases and software to analyse the building stock with the scope of establishing a complex information system "building condition" (Oswald, 1996, p. 11). Klinger (1988), a West German economist, criticised the propagandistically tinged reporting on CAD/CAM machines as exaggerated back in 1988.

He stated that the internal integration of the machines was particularly lacking. Although the computer scientist Klaus Garbe at the Technical University of Dresden, for example, prepared and conceptualised the exchange of data between computers by means of a local area network (Garbe, 1991), the technological means to implement this were lacking. The planned complex information system "building condition" thus remained unfinished – the step towards a network society was not executed in the GDR.

Transformation

Some computer systems of the GDR have proven to be quite persistent. The housing policy data repository, which had already been systematically maintained since the 1970s as housing statistics and the basis for housing allocation, was later continued by the statistical offices. After reunification, the data of the 1979/1980 building status survey were considered politically tainted, which is why a new survey of building conditions in East Germany was initiated in 1995. But not everything was obsolete. Figures from the 1971 population and building census, for example, were used to select the sample for the 1995 census (Oswald, 1996, p. 18).

A systematic examination of the establishment of comprehensive urban planning after German reunification is still pending, although it must be assumed that not all data and existing plans were discredited. In particular, the surveys of the general master plans drawn up in 1988 and 1989 served as a database for urban development in the 1990s, especially in smaller cities with limited planning capacities. Those who had still worked in the field of data processing in GDR times were still considered experts in demand and could transfer their knowledge to the new conditions and also commodify it there. At the same time, scepticism about comprehensive urban development planning is also noticeable. It was not until around the year 2000 that the *strategic turn* rehabilitated the integrated development planning (cf. Albrechts, 2004; Friedmann, 2004).

Contradictions of urban renewal

In the beginning, there was the thesis that scientification tendencies in the field of spatial planning in the GDR took place as responses to crisis phenomena. The examples of the abandonment of the Five-Year Plan in 1958/1959, the economic crisis around 1969, the oil price crisis and the ongoing crisis of legitimacy in the second half of the 1980s seem to confirm this suspicion. More detailed investigations are still pending, however. Nevertheless, some general observations can already be sketched out.

As examples from Stralsund, Halle/Saale and Bernau show, model projects played an important role in finding and formulating new urban development strategies. Models are always to be understood as aids in the generalisation of individual phenomena. Particularly in the sense of the epistemological goals of the case studies presented, it becomes apparent that models start from the imagination of disturbance-free processes (Danyel & Schuhmann, 2018, p. 383). Thus, they represent an attempt to reduce the complexity of urban planning processes, partly in order to be able to predict and thus control them via methods of mass data processing.

The field of spatial planning is therefore moving away from the evidence- and experience-based blueprint planning of the post-war period towards the development and application of

deductive urban development models (cf. Boeing et al., 2021, p. 4) but also, for example, models of depreciation on residential buildings. The determinism inherent in these models served as a legitimisation for intervening in property rights to urban land. But to make this absolute would be to distort history. Rather, the observation is that the scientification of planning, that is, the fitting of urban development into deductive models, represents a search for a strategy that was fed by an economically, culturally and socially urgently needed urban planning strategy in dealing with old cities.

As in all areas of the first implementation of IT technologies, around 1980, there was an adjustment of the horizons of expectation to the new economic conditions, which meant a final shift to crisis management instead of formative planning. Despite all the rhetoric and economic professions of state leadership, all signs also point to similar developments in East Germany in the 1980s.

The history of urban renewal in the GDR is essentially marked by contradictions that reach into all areas of economic, cultural and social life. Although Erich Honecker had declared the "solution of the housing question as a social problem until 1990" to be his most important political project, the housing question around 1990 was anything but solved: it was perhaps more pressing than ever. Hundreds of thousands were on the waiting lists for new flats, and dissatisfaction was generally very high. But instead of directing all resources to the renewal of the old and inner cities, the cities were still supposed to grow by an average of 5 percent in the period 1990–2000. This meant new construction "on greenfield sites" with slab housing. There was no other way to guarantee the planned housing construction figures. With regards to the economic planning of tenement production, the large housing construction combines (WBK) had invested significantly in prefabricated housing technology only a few years earlier: Research funds, production facilities and skilled workers – construction technology bundled the lion's share of investments in the construction sector of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. A change of direction would not have been possible from a purely inner-company economic point of view. Smaller craft enterprises that had taken over building repairs to a large extent did exist, but they could not come close to covering the demand. It was not until the 1980s that there was an increase in the number of smaller companies in the building sector. However, the myth of the loss of craftsmanship hardly stands up to historical scrutiny. An enormous amount of craft but informal knowledge had been established in the GDR population (Kreis, 2018) – one of the foundations for urban renewal after 1990.

In the field of urban planning, approaches of comprehensive and long-term planning contrast with piecemeal urbanism approaches. From the 1970s onwards, technology-focused methods of urban renewal survey and forecasting are increasingly giving way to the evidence-based crisis management skills of the planners themselves. At the same time, a sense of powerlessness is also spreading among professionals, leading to the engagement of many professionals in the democracy movement (Breßler et al., 2021).

Historical or ideological charges hardly play a role. With few exceptions, urban renewal projects seem to be retrospectively justified by historical-political or socialist argumentation; examples where they would have been the direct cause of the architectural intervention seem to be rare.

In the end, the discussion of old towns in the GDR is more a negotiation of future plans than a return to the heritage, according to this essay. Although there was a veritable heritage fever in the private sphere, which of course could not be ignored by the state and the party, too little happened to preserve the towns and cities. Individuals have achieved remarkable

things. But it was not until the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s that old and inner cities could be thoroughly redeveloped.

After German reunification, new contradictions arose. Emigration and vacancies characterise the new realities. Euphorically announced demolition stops in the autumn and winter of 1989 are more symbolic successes of the East German democracy movement. The demolitions soon continued. A law granting former owners the right to apply for restitution of expropriated housing led to a massive re-privatisation wave of urban land. This did not necessarily make it easier for urban renewal. In the course of austerity efforts by the municipalities, urban housing stock was being sold off. In East Berlin districts, on the other hand, attentive and critical observers soon complained about gentrification with the support of the state. Thus, after 1990, the old and inner cities of East Germany remain a symbolic topos of the economisation of spatial development – in the austerity or the commodification sense.

Notes

1 Volkseigener Betrieb Zentrum Organisation und Datenverarbeitung im Bauwesen roughly translate to State-owned Company Centre for Organisation and Data Processing in the Construction Sector.
2 The demand for planning of small steps moves the expertise close to the planning-theoretical approach of disjointed incrementalism, which the US theorists David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom developed at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s, whose theses were first published in German in 1972 (Braybrooke & Lindblom [1963] 1972). In urban planning theory, these theses were later widely received and further developed, but not qualified or politically appropriated in the GDR.

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10

A TWOFOLD CRITICISM OF SPATIAL PLANNING

Unique academic experiences in the German Democratic Republic

Max Welch Guerra

In the state socialist countries of the 20th century, the production and reproduction of society in its entirety were intended to be largely liberated from market economy mechanisms, crises and injustices. This was also true of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In 1969, 20 years after the founding of the East German state, 20 years before its end, a fundamental work that was published on behalf of the Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) announced: "The defining characteristic of the socialist economic system is the socialist planned economy" (Politische Ökonomie, 1969, p. 337).[1] This specification remained in place until 1989.

Paradoxically, this choice of "defining characteristic" for the socialist planned economy did not lead to vigorous spatial planning. The assertiveness of politically favoured sectoral planning – of technical infrastructure, for example, industrial locations or residential buildings – stood in contrast to the weak position of urban and the other scales of spatial planning. The results of this inherent contradiction in the system were recognised by East German academics early on as a danger to socialism and as a hindrance to the improvement of living conditions. Experts who were part of the political system formulated a fundamental criticism vis-à-vis the state and party leadership, a criticism that was based on the official doctrine. An informal reform wing emerged from the Hochschule für Architektur und Bauwesen Weimar (HAB Weimar) that has provided us with major insights into the internal mechanisms of the development model of the GDR, which was considered the most advanced and richest country in the world of state socialism.

An early fundamental critique

The HAB Weimar was founded in 1949. In its academic journal it can already be seen at the end of the 1950s how unequivocally individual academics were criticising political stipulations and the extent to which proposals for changes to the socialism model and their own academic work emerged from this. In 1957 Professor Ludwig Küttner, holder of the Chair of Locational and Urban Planning, published an apparently harmless

article together with two co-authors: "Entwicklungsstand der räumlichen Planung und Schlussfolgerungen für die Ausbildung von Architekten und Ingenieuren" [State of development of spatial planning and conclusions for the education of architects and engineers] (Küttner et al., 1957 / 1958). Exploiting the partial autonomy of academia under the dictatorial conditions of the GDR, they pointed out that the dominant concept of the economy was strongly concentrated on the rationality of individual enterprises. What may have sounded like a detailed specialist issue was in fact an explosive socio-political statement. Economic rationality played a very important role in the GDR for justifying and legitimising political decisions and in particular spatial decisions. The historical moment makes their concern understandable. A reform of the State (Gesetz über die Vervollkommnung und Vereinfachung des Staatsapparates 1958 [Law on the completion and simplification of the State apparatus 1958]) had just strengthened the position of spatial planning in the GDR, at least formally, although this was done as a means to improving the realisation of the expansion of heavy industry.

The authors attempted to avert the excessively preferential treatment of the sphere of production in relation to the sphere of reproduction, such as the preference granted in locational planning to industrial plants over other elements of settlement structure. Economic rationality, they argued, required an appropriate spatial distribution of workplaces, homes, and social and technical infrastructure. The rationality of societal development required spatial decisions, the appropriateness of which could not be measured or calculated in terms of money or other numerical quantities alone. Harmonic societal development also required that the cultural level be taken into account, which meant paying attention to artistic and creative criteria.

This criticism by Küttner and his comrades was anything but an expression of theoretical eccentricity. They could invoke a finding that stemmed from the 18th century – the tableau economique of the French physiocrat François Quesnay from 1758 – and which was also advocated by Marxist political economy: a society, if it wishes to survive, must regularly distribute its resources proportionally among the various branches of the economy. The basic textbook on the political economy of socialism articulated this quite clearly 12 years after the criticism from Weimar:

> The economic laws of socialism ... are not the laws of a single enterprise, nor of a single industry or a single branch of the economy. ... Their conscious application therefore always emanates from the requirements of society as a whole.
>
> *(Politische Ökonomie, 1969, p. 328, authors translation)*

How should Weimar University react to this new stage of the development of society? "A creative debate on a broad basis" (Küttner et al., 1957 / 1958, p. 38) should result from the integration of the professorial chairs and increase the quality of the university itself. The university should take up a position vis-à-vis practice, whereby "practice" was without doubt to be understood as the prevailing political system. This concept of a dispute-friendly university is complemented by the demand for a postgraduate study programme under the name, for example, of "urban development", which would train experts to recognise and take into account these different aspects from the beginning.

The founding of the faculty and study program "urban development and regional planning" in 1969

It was not until ten years later that the founding of a planning study programme was actually tackled. In the summer of 1968, the professor of urban development and design, Hermann Räder, presented a concept with the objective of founding a study programme "regional, urban and village planning" (Räder, 1968). This study programme was to combine technical and economic disciplines with artistic design. The social sciences were poorly represented. Whereas according to the study regulations presented, the students had to provide documentation of their attendance at 75 hours of "economics of the building industry" and 30 hours of "reconstruction of the centres and historical townships", only 15 hours of "sociology" were planned.

This concept was answered by the professor of urban development, Joachim Bach, in January 1969 in his "Remarks on the Faculty Regional, Urban and Village Planning" (Bach, 1969 a), which would have considerable consequences. Bach, born in 1928, belonged to the first generation of GDR academics. He had studied in Weimar from 1947 to 1952 and was one of the first to graduate there with a doctorate in the field of urban development. Before he came to Weimar, he had been the deputy head architect for the industrial development of Halle-Neustadt. He was therefore immediately influenced by his experiences in the construction of a model project, an industrially developed new town, which at the time had roughly 50,000 inhabitants.

Bach's twelve-page paper became the founding document for the study programme "Regional planning and urban development", which was established six months later. Bach takes as his starting point the politically defined task of the further development of the settlement structure and the transformation of the cities and presents a brief yet highly contoured definition of the faculty that is now to be founded:

> The historical uniqueness of this development, which will take place over the space of the next 20 to 50 years and is presently pushing ahead, presents research and practice with problems that cannot be solved within the current framework of architecture or engineering because they always occur as a complex of sociological, economic, technical, and artistic questions
>
> *(Bach, 1969 a, p. 1). authors translation.*

The paper further explains the necessity of founding a new study programme by pointing to developments in other socialist countries, but also in the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), capitalist West Germany. The discussion on the further development of architectural training in the FRG and the concept of the University of Dortmund in West Germany, in which the first planning study programme in the Federal Republic was concurrently being prepared – all these were explicitly cited and reflected on in a very conscious way.

Bach resolutely extended the contemporary understanding of social development. The fixation on the economy must be overcome and attention must henceforth be paid to the broadly defined cultural dimension. It is emphasised repeatedly that it is a societal necessity to integrate "sociological, economic, engineering-technical, and design components" (Bach, 1970, p. 236) into the faculty as the basis for the new study programme. It should not be

ignored here that sociology in the GDR, as elsewhere, was understood at that time in the broader sense of a social science that also concerned itself with political-administrative and governance issues.

With his push for the strengthening of spatial planning, Bach conformed to a tendency that was also on the agenda of local and national practice in various capitalist countries at that time. This was an expression of the contemporary transition to a new type of social governance that was accompanied by a boost in scientification.[2] The upgrading of urban planning to a separate course of university study in its own right and the combination of analytical and conceptional, scientifically-based disciplines with creative-artistic ones became a preferred means of modernisation of industrial societies, in state socialism too.

On 30 January 1969, the university's scientific council decided to establish the Chair of "Urban development (Urban land-use planning and the planning elements of urban development)", to appoint Bach to the Chair and to found the faculty "Spatial planning and urban development" as of 1 September 1969.[3] Bach was immediately appointed head of the faculty (Bach, 1969 b). In the same month the viewpoint became established that the field of "basic sociology" should "be completely restructured" since the social sciences were "of fundamental importance for the profile of the faculty".[4]

The official founding document of the study programme – "Spatial planning and urban development" was to remain the only planning study programme in the GDR – was agreed upon in April 1969. The programme announced a profile for the graduates that was equivalent to that applying to urban planning in the FRG: an expert with an academic qualification who is capable of perceiving the social, economic, settlement-structural, urban-technological, and design-related dimensions of spatial development, to integrate them and to process them into a long-term, well-thought-out programme of action (cf. Hochschule für Architektur und Bauwesen Weimar, 1969).

This programme is clearly a product of its time. Monument conservation, environmental concerns and citizen participation are hardly hinted at in this founding phase. Similarly to the situation in the FRG and many other countries, these would not play a greater role until the 1970s. Competences in administrative and political science, such as the conveying of planning instruments, are not specifically mentioned. Internationalisation appears to be understood above all passively, as the perception of what is happening abroad.

In the GDR greater reforms were on the horizon at the end of the 1960s since the policies that had been adopted in the second half of the 1960s under the Secretary General of the SED and Head of State Walter Ulbricht were considered to have failed. In the course of the replacement of Ulbricht by Erich Honecker in May 1971 there was a change of course: a strategy of "the unification of economic and social policy" was henceforth adopted and implemented that was intended to increase perceivably the quality of life of the population. On October 2, 1973, the Central Committee of the SED adopted a residential building programme that was regarded as the key component of this strategy and was intended to solve the "housing question as a social problem" by 1990. The solving of the housing question became the most important political means of legitimising the social system. The leadership of the Party and the State placed their emphasis on new buildings. This meant that industrialised new housing construction became the most important determinant of urban development up until the demise of the GDR almost two decades later. This also increased the economic and political weight of the housing combines. They determined the architectural and urbanist design of the country. They became the most important determinant of changes in the

settlement structure and strengthened an extensive, i.e. spatially expansive, model of urban development, because the logic of industrial building technology meant the construction of new large settlements on the periphery.

The faculty of area planning and urban development

The role that was now played by the Faculty of Area Planning and Urban Development can be explained first of all by its internal development. In the second half of the 1980s, the faculty had a range of professorial chairs that are still impressive today. From 1969 on, the architect and founder of the faculty, Joachim Bach, was the Chair of Urban Development. Traffic planning received a Chair of its own in 1972, held by Hans Glißmeyer. The cultural sociologist Fred Staufenbiel was called to the Chair of Marxist-Leninist Sociology in September 1977.

This multidisciplinarity was continued under some of the Chairs, most consistently under the Chair of Sociology. In the 1980s representatives of six different disciplines were employed there: an urban planner, a civil engineer, a sociopsychologist, a philosopher, an architect and, finally, a sociologist as chairholder. The students of the study programme "Spatial planning and urban development" in turn came from two different fields: architecture and civil engineering (Hunger, 2008).

In 1978 a new and consistently interdisciplinary teaching format was introduced. The "internships in the communes" took place annually from 1978 to 1989 and shaped the profile of the study programme. Its political fruits were to have far broader implications, however.

The internships consisted of a period of four weeks at the end of the second semester under the direction of Fred Staufenbiel and his assistants, Rolf Kuhn and Bernd Hunger, in which as a rule roughly 50 students participated. The students mainly examined new and historical building areas in cities and medium-sized towns in the GDR. During this period they lived in the town or city they were examining. In addition to their internship, their leisure time offered a further opportunity for intensive and spontaneous discussion among the participants.

The students compiled a portrait of the city with respect to its functional, design, social and cultural aspects by means of urban development inventories and analyses of the urban landscape, systematic observations of the socio-spatial relationships as well as the actual use of the area examined, by investigation of the population structure, by numerous qualitative discussions with individuals and groups, brief interviews and documentary analysis. This work, as one of the directors said many years later, did not "normatively examine the socialist way of life, but specifically examined social relationships, activities, and the level of the satisfaction of needs" (Hunger, 2008).

The aim was not simply to analyse the urban area in question, but also to develop proposals based on this analysis for its further development. The work combined the spatial and social aspects of the areas in a way that must be regarded as pioneering far beyond the borders of the GDR. The analytic and conceptional results of the investigation did not remain within the university but were presented to the city architects and other representatives of the city and discussed with them.

To begin with, the students' work concentrated on the analysis and conceptual processing of selected urban districts. Thus, in 1980 in Erfurt, the northern inner city was investigated, and in 1982 in Rostock urban districts with industrialised housing construction. In 1984 in Halle, an entire town was the subject of research for the first time, divided into different areas

depending on the type of urban development: historical city, buildings from the Gründerzeit (Wilherminian period), areas of detached houses and areas with prefabricated housing (cf. Staufenbiel, 1987). The students participating in the internships increasingly began not only to formulate planning concepts in the narrow sense of the word but also to critically question the political framework itself and to make counterproposals. This often led to conflict with organs of the State and Party, but the results were nevertheless always published – with the exception of the final year, 1989, the year the GDR collapsed.

The internships in the communes can be interpreted as a major building block in the reorientation of urban development that took place at the end of the 1980s, also in most Western European cities. This reorientation, both in the GDR and in Western Europe, meant that things were looked at from the perspective of the city as a whole; urban development should respect the inherited urban layout and the testimonials to the different phases of urban history; the inherited city should become the foundation for a settlement development that attempted to avoid the extension of land use. The centre of the city again became the focus of expert discussion, with the emphasis being laid on participatory and environmental issues.

The reorientation of the Weimar planners coincided at another point with the changed perspectives of Western European experts: in their particular regard for the differentiation of social groups, which cried out for the diversification of planning instruments aiming at an equally varied development of urban districts (cf. Bodenschatz et al., 1994). Throughout the documents of the internships it is demanded that the specifics – an often used East German term – of the urban districts be recognised, preserved and further developed. This is not only a question of principle regarding urban development. It is also explicitly a question of accommodation for a growing GDR middle class: highly qualified workers placed their own functional and aesthetical demands on their residential districts and on the city centres. This social group was ignored by Honecker's strategy for the residential building programme.

The emergence of a critical academic and political position

The internships in the communes enabled very detailed and reliable insights to be gained regarding the structural-spatial and functional deficits in many urban districts and cities, but also regarding the social, cultural, economic and ecological living conditions. In the course of time, considerable knowledge was therefore gained concerning the reality of urban development in the GDR. The Weimar mode of operation led to the generalisation of the knowledge gained among all the participants. An annually growing cohort of junior professionals was formed, who had in common not only an innovative, interdisciplinary and methodically ambitious education but also an elaborated, critical political attitude to their field. They had obtained this not so much from textbooks as from the active, problem-oriented confrontation with urban reality. The graduates were aware of the social relevance of their work due to direct experience. The foundation was laid for a solid networking of these students with one another and with experts in the cities. This cooperation also brought advantages for the latter since the results generally strengthened the position of the local experts (Kuhn, 2008).

The internships were the most important, but certainly not the only, source for the expansion of the disciplinary and political horizons of the faculty members. A higher level of collective self-reflection was facilitated by historical and theoretical doctoral theses on the field of

activity and the discipline. For example, the faculty's graduate, Harald Kegler, defended his doctoral thesis in 1987. In his thesis, he traced the formation of the academic discipline of urban planning in Germany from the second half of the 19th century and presented in detail, among other things, the operating methods and the importance of communicative institutions such as journals and congresses for the formation and strengthening of an academic public (cf. Kegler, 1987). It was not a coincidence that the young researcher was able to present the internationalisation of communication among the experts as academically necessary and of advantage to society.

Articles in academic journals continued to be a third working format. For example, Gerold Kind, Professor of Spatial Planning, wrote at the beginning of 1988 in the academic journal of the HAB, that planning "must go far beyond economics because of its immediate importance for the sphere of life of human beings" (Kind, 1988, p. 123). The intention here, too, was to question the rationality of the ruling economic policy with its pattern of extensive urban development. Kind writes that "it could be regarded as certain that the energy-related approach to spatial planning will provide new insights which will make the effectiveness of economic structures appear in a completely new light" (ibid., p. 124). This criticism of the economism of the development model came from no less a person than the new director of the faculty "Area Planning and Urban Development", who was the national coordinator for the project Urban Ecology under the UNESCO Programme Man and the Biosphere.

Professor Kind's criticism converged with the criticism of other professors in its rejection of the ruling spatial development model of the GDR. The urban development division criticised the loss of architectural values and functional quality in everyday urban production, the devaluation of aesthetic and artistic aspects in design and the degradation of the field of activity of the architect. The area planning division was able to show the negative developments in settlement structure that were detrimental to economic rationality and caused further environmental damage. Finally, the sociology division drew attention to the growing discrepancy between the production of built environment and societal needs.

Fred Staufenbiel, the professor of sociology, concentrated particularly on calling into question the concept of the working class as it had been defined in the Weimar Republic. The SED leadership not only fostered this outdated understanding of the working class rhetorically and as the basis for its authority but also took it as the foundation for the transformation of the reproduction of the population, which had immediate effects on urban development and architecture.[5] As a matter of fact, the traditional picture of the homogenous working class with its supposedly homogenous needs was owed not only to the backward-looking ideas of a Party and State leadership that had been socialised in the period between the two world wars. It was also convenient for the building industry, which created an extremely homogenous product range and used this viewpoint to justify it.

In the second half of the 1980s this criticism of Weimar's provenance obtained a new quality when the directorships of two important institutions were filled by exponents of the critical forces. These institutions were the Institute for Urban Development and Architecture (Institut für Städtebau und Architektur - ISA), the most important institute within the Bauakademie der DDR (Building Academy of the GDR), the central institution for consultation on, and implementation of, spatial policy in the GDR, and the Bauhaus Dessau, the task of which was, first and foremost, to serve to foster the international prestige of the GDR as a cultural nation.

A contemporary forecast for urban development

At the end of the 1980s a unique product of urban research in the GDR emerged at the Institute for Urban Development and Architecture of the Bauakademie (ISA), which was copied and unofficially distributed in November 1989 – the Wall fell on the 9th of that month (Hunger, 1989). Earlier versions of the 143-page typescript with the rather dull title of "Urban development forecast" had already been in circulation at the beginning of the year but their publication had been prevented by the Ministry of Building. The "Urban development forecast" summarises the results of a research project that had been on-going since 1986, "Urban development fundamentals for the long-term intensive development and reproduction of the cities", which had been discussed, for example, in seminars at the Bauhaus Dessau.

The "Urban development forecast", strictly speaking, does not contain a prognosis but is, above all, an eloquent diagnosis, a comprehensively critical, even scathing presentation of the condition and development of the cities in the GDR. The irritating title is due, first of all, to the explosiveness of the undertaking. For the debate on the spatial development of the GDR criticism of the residential building programme of 1973 was regarded as taboo. Discussion therefore centred on the ensuing phase of spatial development. The word "forecast" was particularly suitable as the general title for research on the spatial development of the GDR because it implied the scientifically based extrapolation of development tendencies and not a position statement on the present situation.

In addition, forecasts had had a high value in the state-socialist – as in capitalist – industrial societies since the end of the 1960s. This explains the emphatic statement in the basic textbook on the political economy of the GDR "The conscious, planned management of the societal reproduction process objectively requires scientific foresight with regard to its development, i.e. forecasting" (Politische Ökonomie, 1969, p. 329).

The urban development forecast is remarkable in the narrow sense of the word due to the coherence of its line of argument with greatly varying disciplines – urban planning and architecture, civil engineering and economics, landscape planning and sociology – as well as with publications from capitalist countries.

The criticism of the situation in the GDR developed in the study can only be dealt with briefly here.[6] One starting point of the authors' argumentation is the knowledge gained from the internships that in the GDR, there was an increase in working activities which with regard to their consequences for the reproduction of the population had requirements differing considerably from those of the industrial age. The usual production of the built environment did not correspond to workers' needs. For example, the results of surveys are quoted which show that housing satisfaction is higher in cities with a high percentage of old buildings than in newly built areas. In Halle-Neustadt, for example, far fewer inhabitants gave a positive answer to the question as to whether they felt comfortable in their city than in towns such as Halle or Eisenach, which were significantly characterised by an older building stock.[7] This result is explained by pointing out deficits in the new buildings; for example, the layout of the apartments did not correspond to the social differentiation of the population.

A further deficit concerned the greater travelling distances due mainly to the growth of peripheral residential areas. The daily journeys are cited not so much because of the fuel costs as because of the loss of time involved, which has an adverse effect on the contentment of the urban population. The deterioration of the "socio-spatial organisation" (Hunger, 1989, p. 27)

gives rise to a general criticism of urban culture that it is not only uneconomic but also annuls the specific qualities of life in the city.

Extensive urban development reduces the material quality of the city by causing the deterioration of urban technologies, already in an unsatisfactory state of repair, and contributes to an increase in environmental pollution (cf. ibid., pp. 77–88). The locational decisions for residential buildings, according to a further criticism, also strengthen the "shrinking process" in the countryside (cf. ibid., p. 46), and the construction of new buildings causes an undesirable rural exodus.

The criticism of the situation is expressed in the study in such a way that it is compatible with the ruling socio-political self-understanding and even appears to be mandatory from that point of view. Even though the basic textbook on political economy from 1969 is not explicitly mentioned, the study can be read as a case study for examining its application. The pattern of argumentation also promises to optimise the societal conditions of reproduction in the GDR, especially the enforceability of the economic strategy of the SED following the conclusion of the residential building programme in 1990.

Of particular importance is the demand that socialist policy should treat social distinctions in a more differentiated way than hitherto. Social inequality inhibited the development of society, whereas specific social characteristics should be recognised and respected (cf. ibid., p. 25). The specific characteristics of a milieu and an urban quarter should be used as a driving force for societal development. This did not mean reversion to the aestheticising of the cities but the maintenance of the historical, characteristic urban environment including the historical old towns and the upgrading of the cities to actors in the political governance of the entire country – at the expense of the defining power of the building combines (cf. ibid., p. 10). It was necessary to take the social and ecological dimensions of urban production much more strongly into account. From now on the cultural, ecological and economic qualities of cities were in demand. These could only be achieved by a transition to the intensification of urban development.

Greater importance should be placed on the cities, counties and districts as the levels responsible for the coordination of the complex economic and social development of their territory, and spatial planning must become a place for the resolution of conflicts. Greater use should also be made of economic, meaning market-oriented, management tools. This would enable investment decisions, generally speaking, to attain a greater rationality; it would also increase the transparency of planning, enable a better orientation to the needs of the citizens and the participation of citizens would be facilitated. The political core of this proposal is the promise that the reorientation of the territorial planning and urban development policies, and in particular the deployment of urban construction would lead to the optimisation of the national economy and an increase in the political legitimation of the system

> It is a great, at present only hesitantly grasped, opportunity for the culture and economy of the city to activate the participation of its inhabitants in the planning of the city. It belongs to the further development of socialist democracy that the citizens can increasingly feel themselves to be owners and take on responsibility for the planning of their environment (cf. ibid., p. 37).

> *(authors translation)*

The most remarkable thing about the urban development forecast is the explicit formulation of a new type of urban production that would have changed the foundations of society. The disempowerment of the building combines was "mandatory" (ibid., p. 123); more cautious, but nevertheless clear, is the demand for the partial introduction of market mechanisms. The line of argument does not question the framework of societal relationships within the official understanding of the political economy of socialism. The answer to the question whether these reforms could have been implemented within the then so-called real socialism can only be mooted here.

From a Weimar school to a GDR-wide reformist wing

The urban development forecast can be read politically as the strictly systematised and further developed outcome of the internships. This is not a coincidence. "Person responsible for the results and head of the editorial collective" was Bernd Hunger, who was an assistant at the Weimar Chair of Sociology from 1978 onward, one of the three key figures in the internships. He had been employed at ISA since 1986, where he was soon entrusted with the direction of the department "Urban development forecast".

Bernd Hunger had been summoned to the ISA by the institute's director Bernd Grönwald. Following his doctoral thesis in the field of structural engineering, Grönwald qualified as a professor under Fred Staufenbiel in 1979. From 1971 to 1978 he was the secretary of the university party organisation of the SED, i.e. the most senior party functionary at the HAB Weimar. In 1980, he became director (dean) of the Faculty "Architecture", and at the beginning of 1986 director of the Institute for Urban Development and Architecture as well as vice-president of the Bauakademie of the GDR. Bernd Grönwald was the most influential reformer in the field of spatial development policy.

Grönwald practised a multi-level strategy. Together with the professor of building history, Christian Schädlich, he devised the "Bauhaus Colloquium" in the mid-1970s (Weizman, 2019), a biannual conference on controversial issues with experts from Eastern and Western Europe. In December 1986, 60 years after the inauguration of the Bauhaus building in Dessau, the "Bauhaus Dessau – Center for Design in the GDR" was founded there. This was due to the persistence of Bernd Grönwald, who won Rolf Kuhn as director of the institution. Kuhn had a degree in area planning and urban development. From 1977 to 1986 he had been an assistant to the Chair of Sociology and became the third key figure alongside Staufenbiel and Hunger in the internships. Grönwald was able to get him appointed rather than the candidate of the Ministry for Residential Building. A major objective of the re-establishment of the institution for Grönwald was the expansion of the possibilities for exchange with experts from abroad (Kuhn, 2008). This was a success. Within a short space of time, the Bauhaus Dessau became a place of exchange between GDR experts and academics and practicians from East and West with a background in research and practice that was particularly relevant for the spectrum of the reformist wing.

From 1985 on, the increasingly clear emergence of changes in the Soviet Union, which are generally associated with the person of Michail Gorbatschow and the concept of Perestroika, encouraged the search for a different model of state socialism. This still contradicted the declared political will of the party and state leadership in the GDR, however. This was also true of urban development policy. In his address on behalf of the central committee of the SED on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of the Bauakademie on December 8, 1986, Honecker

placed the focus of his message on the cooperation of the Bauakademie and the building combines. This should be further intensified (cf. Grußadresse des Zentralkomitees der SED, 1987). In this discourse, building research, with its focus on technology, makes urban development research and urban research irrelevant. The spatial science and planning capacity of the country is placed in the service of increasing productivity in the building industry. The economic rationality of the individual building firms continues to programmatically replace the rationality of the national economy and of the entire system.

An informal reformist wing

Originating from Weimar, by the autumn of 1989 an ensemble of experts and institutions had been formed that had a common diagnosis concerning the policy field of spatial development, urban development, and land development and also a concept for the fundamental reform of the system of spatial production in the GDR. This was de facto a reformist wing. The members of this ensemble never called themselves that, however. Again, this is quite understandable as it would have led to their being accused of the formation of a fraction and destroyed the professional and political existence of those involved while at the same time annihilating the de facto reformist wing itself.

The cohesive force of the de facto reformist wing arose from a professional and political affiliation. Despite the disciplining by the political regime of the party and the state, it was apparently possible to establish a certain domain for reflection and activity at the HAB Weimar; this granted a partial but manifestly fruitful, autonomy. The intellectual, organisational and financial basis that made the chain of researchers from Küttner to Staufenbiel possible, was a university.

The resistance on the part of the apparatus, the risk of being spied upon and of repressive measures that could destroy one's professional career can only be generally mentioned here. In view of the harsh and often openly repressive political environment the academic character of the work at the HAB Weimar proved to be all the more important. Only here was it possible to specify the subject matter of research and teaching not exclusively in line with the contracting parties from the politico-administrative system and the building industry. At least partially – and to an ever greater degree – it became possible to conduct, personally and directly, an empirical examination of social reality within an important specialist segment.

One source of the productivity of the reformist wing was the innovative educational programme. Students from throughout the Republic, intermediate academic staff and professors formed a collective. This increased the quality of the education at least in as far as it produced not simply executors but specialists who, from the details of apartment facilities to fundamental questions of the GDR model of development, grasped correlations that did not conform to the ruling viewpoints; specialists who, as mature planners, were capable of presenting their opinion to public debate; and, finally, of formulating socio-political alternatives in their specialist field.

In another respect, too, the systematic inclusion of the future cohorts had consequences, far-reaching consequences. The generations of the 1940s and 1950s cohorts were themselves an expression of changing relationships. Bach and Staufenbiel's students personally experienced many of the deficits of urban development policy. They epitomised the diversification of lifestyle culture postulated by themselves and others, the overcoming of the values, including the spatial concepts, of the model of socialism, characterised by an industrial society.

The development, forming and formulation of critical knowledge in the field of urban development policy and urban research in the GDR ran transversely to Party membership. The key figures of the reformist wing were all SED members. But then almost every fifth adult in the GDR was an SED member (cf. (m.k. 2010)). It seems to be obvious that the leading personalities of the reformist wing, like those of its forerunner in the 1950s, had to be members of the SED. This did not guarantee that they would be able to assert their position, however. The representatives of the opposite position were also SED members and held leading offices in the Party and government as well as in the building industry. The passing of the residential building programme in 1973 greatly enhanced the importance of the Ministry for Building – Minister Junker headed this Ministry from 1963 to November 1989 – vis-à-vis the other ministries; the interests of the industrial residential buildings had the support of a powerful economic policy interest bloc. The SED was not a monolithic institution but a sphere in which quite varying interest groups and ideological viewpoints competed.

In retrospect it is striking how much the development of spatial planning as a field of teaching and research in Weimar was consistent with international developments and how much this development corresponded in particular to that in West Germany. In the 1960s spatial planning was institutionalised – far beyond the morphological and functional characteristics of the discipline of urban development – in connection with the transition of the respective societies to a new type of political control. As of the end of the 1970s, and particularly in the course of the 1980s, major steps were taken which not only led to the overcoming of post-war urban modernism but also brought about a fundamental reform of a society that, despite all the differences, in both East and West can be described as growth-driven.

The experts of the Weimar planning school confronted the requirements of their time under the conditions of their country. The new epoch, which many years later led to the programme, of sustainability becoming the official government policy of the united Federal Republic, began not only in West Germany but also in East Germany, under quite different societal conditions. The criticism originating in Weimar came too late for a reform of the GDR, however. The critical professionals only became aware of the state of affairs in the twilight of their society. They were able to recognise it, but they were too late to change it. The faculty "Area planning and urban development" was closed down in 1990, the course of study was renamed "Urban and regional planning" in 1990 and closed down in 1996 – despite protests by the Federal planning associations and university departments.

In January 1991 Bernd Grönwald committed suicide. Joachim Bach retired in 1992 and Fred Staufenbiel in 1993.

Notes

1 The 1968 Constitution of the GDR, chapter 1, article 1, granted political leadership to the SED.
2 "Scientification" means a substantial intensification of the use of both natural and social science methods in industry, the military and politics as a means of decision-making as well as of legitimising decisions. In the Federal Republic this phase is particularly apparent in the neo-Keynesian Stability Law [Stabilitätsgesetz] of 1967 and the Urban Development Law [Städtebauförderungsgesetz] of 1971. Cf. Welch Guerra (2015).
3 Exactly one month before the Dortmund undergraduate course under the name of "Spatial planning in the capitalist FRG" began.
4 Memo of 26.2.1969.

5 Interview with Bruno Flierl, 8.2.2007. The differentiation of the reproduction needs of the popula-
   tion had already been the main topic at the Second Congress of Marxist-Leninist Sociology in the
   GDR, 15-17 May 1974. Staufenbiel had played a central role at the congress. Cf. The review of the
   congress, Dieck & Bohme 1974.

6 The urban development forecast is elucidated in a very readable form in a corrected reprint: Cf.
   Hunger, Bernd et al. (1990). Städtebauprognose, Berlin. For further details on the urban develop-
   ment forecast see Welch Guerra (2009).

7 The study contains information on a total of ten cities.

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11

PLANNING THE "VICTORY OF SOCIALISM" AND ITS AFTERLIVES

The Civic Center of Bucharest before and after 1989

Gruia Bădescu

Introduction

In the wake of Ceaușescu's regime collapse in December 1989, Romania's transitional authorities abrogated two laws, which had attracted the wrath of public opinion: the first was the 1966 decree prohibiting abortions and imposing a draconic system of control on women's bodies.[1] The second was the 1974 "Law of Systematization", which was the main act of territorial and urban planning in the country. It took Romania 11 years until the passing of a new law regulating planning activities. The dictatorship was associated with many things, but planning, in its Romanian incarnation of "systematization", was made culpable for a decade of demolitions and evictions, the destruction of cultural heritage, and an imposition on private lives, which was regarded as an indication of the regime's totalitarianism. The extensive demolitions and displacement, all in the name of building "a new socialist city" for a "new human", led according to prominent intellectuals of the time, to an urban trauma. While the state invested its resources in these spatial remakings in the 1980s, the population underwent severe economic shortages. Policies of austerity affected access to food, electricity, and gas in cities. In the villages, systematization was depicted by various actors as a threat to their existence, with the plan to demolish most of the country's small villages and consolidate them in reconfigured agro-industrial centers. Planning was deemed to be a most political and ideological of pursuits, and as such, it was almost expulsed from the country after 1989. While state withdrawal and the neoliberal transformation of city-making overall affected Central and Eastern Europe after 1990, in Romania, the demise of the public occurred within this rejection of the state seen under the totalitarian paradigm. Romania's socialist regime departed from the other countries in Central and Eastern Europe since the 1970s in its vast urban remaking projects, and it continued to depart in the 1990s through a lack of a new legal framework for planning, followed by decades of property restitution and private-led urbanism. In examining the relationship between politics and planning, Romania thus offers an example of two extremes: until 1989, a planning process subordinated to ideology and the will of an individual in power, and afterward one that expresses a complete reversal through the withdrawal of the state and the privileging of private initiative.

FIGURE 11.1   The Palace of the Parliament (former House of the Republic), as the centerpiece of the Bucharest City Center. Photo: Gruia Bădescu, 2022.

The relationship between planning and politics is well evoked by the remaking of capital cities. In Romania's capital, Bucharest, a third of the historic center was demolished to make place for the new political-administrative center, the Civic Center, organized around the Victory of Socialism Boulevard (*Victoria Socialismului*), having, at one end, the House of the Republic, intended to be the largest building in Europe. Nicolae Ceauşescu himself oversaw the project, which aimed to give a socialist center to a city criticized by the leader for its petty bourgeois character and a past as the "Little Paris of the Balkans". Bucharest's remaking became an infamous case, called as an example of totalitarian city-making since the 1990s by Romanian and foreign authors alike (de Cavalcanti, 1992; Petcu, 2003; Duijzings, 2011, 2018; Light and Young, 2015). This chapter examines the Civic Center project not only as an expression of the idiosyncratic relationship between politics and planning in late socialist Romania but also as a lens to see the weakness of post-socialist planning in addressing the large urban voids resulting from the incomplete intervention of the 1980s. Consequently, the contribution highlights the relationship between spatial planning and urban reconfigurations with forms of political rule in a country that has experienced two contrasting systems.

Romanian socialist planning and the systematization of territory

The prevailing narrative suggests that before the idiosyncratic 1980s, the interplay between planning and politics in socialist Romania generally conformed to regional patterns, albeit with local variations: a break with interwar modernism after the installation of communist rule and the advent of socialist realism, then a return to modernism through an embracement of CIAM precepts[2], with Soviet influences such as *cvartal* and *microraion* as planning units (Popescu, 2009; Zahariade, 2011; Iuga, 2016; Maxim, 2018; Grama, 2019; Stătică, 2023).

In the case of Bucharest, as elsewhere, the focus was on the construction of housing estates outside of the city center. A single intervention in the center—square of the Palace Hall of the Socialist Republic of Romania (RSR), which replaced the royal gardens—brought socialist modernism next to the representative buildings of the deposed Monarchy (Celac et al., 2005; Maxim, 2018). While the 1980s have been singled out as a distinctive trajectory from other socialist countries, the roots of this transformation are in the 1970s (Zahariade, 2011). New legislation changed the ways of city-making: the Housing Law (1973), Streets Law (1975), and, as a culmination, Investment Law (1980) brought a change in the modernist planning and architecture, which dominated 1960s Romania. The new laws imposed higher densities and more-compact housing estates. In Bucharest, several neighborhoods previously built with the open urbanism of CIAM saw new constructions of collective housing on previously green spaces, a densification of the Charter of Athens city (Cina, 2010; Zahariade, 2011). The Investment Law prescribed total industrialization, the use of prefabrication, and the replacement of architecture with a "typified design"(Zahariade, 2011, p. 83). Moreover, the new laws oversaw the creation of street corridors, which also led to the dominance of perimeter blocks in 1980s neighborhoods. These transformations echoed the postmodern turn against the CIAM, and the return of the street and traditional urban typologies in many other contexts. However, one other law was rooted in the specificity of the urban planning tradition in Romania and was later used to express a radical political project: the Systematization Law.

In October 1974, the Great National Assembly—the RSR's legislative—adopted Law 58, known as the Systematization Law. The concept of systematization, referring to the introduction of a rigorous order in the organization of space, has a long tradition in Romania and was, in fact, distinctively central in the Romanian planning tradition (Vais, 2022). In 1930s Romania, echoing the usage of *sistemazione* in Italian journals, influential urban planner Cincinat Sfințescu used the term *sistematizare* as a depiction of general planning practice and urban transformations (as opposed to the specific, technical *plan regulator*) and translated "planning" from English with this term (Vais, 2022, p. 210). During socialism, the judicious spatial organization of the territory was essential for the planning apparatus, and training of future specialists was done in both "architecture and systematization". The profession of the architect encompassed both architectural design and planning (Enescu, 2006; Vais, 2022), which thus included systematization. Even before Law 58 was passed, the Communist Party announced a political program of systematization of the Romanian territory in 1972. The program addressed various scales of transformation: a national program, based on hierarchy and functional relationships between cities, towns, and villages; a rural program, aiming to reduce the number of "unviable" villages and obtain more land for agriculture (Gabanyi, 1989)[3]; and an urban program, which was closely related to the idea of constructing new centers for cities with administrative roles, acting as an expression of socialist reality: the civic centers (Răuță, 2013).

The direction of planning was connected to broad ideological aspects. The rapid construction of housing and industrial facilities was the goal of the socialist development program. Planning professionals were expected to deliver according to the political line, but there was no direct involvement of leaders in decision-making. Certain architects like Horia Maicu and Cezar Lăzărescu had leeway and influence with the party heads. Nevertheless, neither the early communist leaders, like Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej, nor Nicolae Ceaușescu, in his early

years, had a direct impact on planning or stylistic matters (Zahariade, 2011). This was about to change in the 1970s with Nicolae Ceauşescu's increasing interest in city-making as a political project. The remaking of city centers in order to represent the "socialist cities for the new socialist man" was a key endeavor.

Civic centers as the focus of 1980s planning

The 1980s systematization of urban centers was not the first time in Romania when political power was interested in reshaping the centers of cities and creating civic centers. The idea of civic centers emerged in Romanian debates in the 1920s and was actually influenced by the US City Beautiful civic center program (Răuţă, 2013, p. 13). In 1926, Cincinat Sfinţescu envisioned the Arsenal Hill of Bucharest as a possible civic center for the capital city. With little expropriation, he argued that this area of 16 ha could be hosting a series of institutions—the Seat of the Romanian Patriarchate, a number of ministries, and museums—creating a "civic center as understood in the United States" (Răuţă, 2013, p. 69). While Sfinţescu previously connected the need for civic ensembles to an invocation of the Vienna Ringstrasse, this time it was the US City Beautiful civic centers that inspired his vision. From the City Beautiful planning and the US-inspired Art Deco architecture changing Bucharest's previous Paris of the Balkans profile, the late 1930s brought a more sober classical public architecture, as well as a continuation of the national style, also called neo-Romanian, inspired from vernacular and 18th century architecture, and popular in previous decades. Late 1930s Romania, which ran under a royal dictatorship after 1938, envisioned the transformation of both rural and urban areas as a form of modernization in a national style.

Civic center ideas were quickly shelved and only returned four decades later, after much change in both political and architectural realms. In their 1980s understanding, civic centers referred to large public spaces surrounded by political and administrative buildings. According to Augustin Ioan (2004, pp. 106–107), 1930s fascist architecture in Italy was a possible source for the Romanian socialist civic centers. In any case, the approach was similar, which was either motivated by inspiration or by a similar echoing of the Roman roots of Romanians, as emphasized by Romanian national communism in the 1970s (Ioan, 2009). He emphasized that administrative buildings featured a *piano nobile*, from where the communist leader spoke to the masses gathered in the square. Consequently, these public spaces were neither agoras nor spaces of communal and deliberative politics but places of domination.

The revival of civic centers bridged the interests of the political elites with those of architects and planners, making the built environment an arena of political display. However, as Alex Răuţă (2013, p. 153) argues, it was also a discreet reference to the pre-war, pre-communist tradition of the profession in Romania, where debates about civic centers were important, while no actual project had been realized then outside of rural areas. Moreover, while in the post-communist narratives, the whole endeavor of systematization and transformation of cities was attributed to Ceauşescu himself, the agency of architects (with work attributions of both architects and planners in other contexts) should not be minimalized. For many architects, the opportunity to reshape centers, more than just design housing estates, was met with interest. Furthermore, particularly in the extra-Carpathian regions of Wallachia and Moldavia (the so-called Old Kingdom), there was a belief that the historic urban centers were not valuable to be preserved, as they were less dense, less compact, and less historic than their Transylvanian counterparts, shaped in the Middle Ages largely by German settlers. The 19th-century architecture of the Old Kingdom, eclectic and influenced by French Beaux Arts

and then by the national style, was seen as disposable in an act of modernization that embodied both the party's socialist ambitions and the architects' desires to reshape space. Consequently, tens of cities that served as administrative centers in Romania, mostly in the Old Kingdom, were reshaped from the center to the periphery through political will and an entangled agency of local and national authorities and architects (Răuţă, 2013). Additionally, several cities in Transylvania received civic centers outside of their historic cores, which were deemed to be more valuable than their Old Kingdom counterparts. While in the Old Kingdom, Bucharest received a treatment more similar to the former: the new Civic Center was to replace parts of the old neighborhoods but did not affect most of the historically shaped center—contrary to the reports that the entire center was erased. Nevertheless, being the national capital, its Civic Center, also called the "Political Administrative Center", embodied the connection between planning and political power at its highest.

The Victory of Socialism: the Civic Center project for Bucharest

The first mention of a socialist Civic Center for Bucharest appeared in the speech of Nicolae Ceauşescu on 22 March 1977 (Ioan, 2009, p. 184). The speech was given in the aftermath of a devastating earthquake in Bucharest—which destroyed hundreds of buildings, including signature interwar modernist buildings, and killed 1391 people in the capital city. The timing led to an interpretation that the major intervention of the 1980s came as a result of this earthquake. The earthquake did trigger the first actions to reshape the central area. Moreover, it led to the 1977 closing of the National Cultural Heritage Directorate—allegedly after the institution criticized the destruction of a church during post-earthquake ruin clearing—which paved the way for ambitious demolitions later (Ioan, 2009). However, beyond the earthquake trigger, it is important to underline that the Civic Center emerged in the broader framework of the national systematization project of the 1970s (Zahariade, 2011).

The 22 March 1977 meeting concluded with the proposal to organize an architectural competition to systematize the center of Bucharest. Yet the process that followed departed from usual competitions and mirrored the transformations of the political system in socialist Romania: a limited number of state institutions that had a role in spatial systematization were invited to submit proposals,[4] yet there was no jury, stated aims, nor competition brief and documentation, with information arriving to designers confidentially (Vais, 2016; Zahariade, 2011, p. 126). Between 1977 and 1989, there were neither public presentations of projects nor articles in Arhitectura, the main professional journal (Zahariade, 2011). Of the initial 17 teams invited, six went to further discussion rounds in 1979. Ceauşescu took on the role of the key decision-maker on the projects, en lieu of a professional jury, and reputedly did not like any of the proposals as they were not ambitious enough in scale (Ioan, 2009, p. 189). Several reputed architects left the competition—and some, the country. Moreover, many participants were confident that Cezar Lăzărescu, the dean of the architecture institute and perceived as influential with Ceauşescu, would be chosen. He introduced the idea of a single building to house all political functions, which also mirrored Ceauşescu's 1979 decision to have one centralized structure (Zahariade, 2011, p. 127). Yet, despite Lăzărescu's position and flexibility to match the leader's view, Ceauşescu preferred a member of the Young Architects team, who showed an even higher malleability and responsiveness to his views: Anca Petrescu, who "was willing to give form to Ceauşescu's desires and intentions" (Vais, 2016, p. 144).

The area of focus was the southern part of the city center, including Union Square, as well as a number of neighborhoods to the East and West. A new administrative center for the country, embodying the civic center idea, was to be planned on Arsenal Hill. One interpretation of this choice was the alleged seismic resistance of this part of Bucharest. However, the same area was the subject of several plans in the past, ranging from the 1926 Sfinţescu plan, which proposed a Civic Center, to plans for a Patriarchal Cathedral on the site in the 1920s, to the 1960s plans for a new university. The 1980s plan included a new Central Committee of the Communist Party, the State Council, the Presidency of the Republic, the Government, and its ministries, envisioned as an ensemble of tall, monumental buildings (Ioan, 2009, p. 187). The spine of the project was the Victory of Socialism Boulevard (Bulevardul Victoria Socialismului). Its name made a double reference. On the one hand, it echoed the main avenue of old Bucharest, Calea Victoriei, thus named after the 1877 War of Independence, and representative of the "Little Paris" urban imaginary. On the other hand, it highlighted the triumph of socialism as a system in Romania (Celac et al., 2005).

The only documentation trip was made to Pyong Yang in 1978, including a delegation of architects and engineers who were taking part in the competition. Ceauşescu himself expressed his admiration for the urban makeover in North Korea, considering the cities rebuilt after the devastating Korean War as an example of what a socialist city should look like. Bucharest, with its aristocratic and bourgeois palaces, its hodgepodge of styles, heterogeneous cityscape evoking both the Paris of the Balkans and interwar inequalities and uncontrolled sprawl, needed to be tamed and become a proper, dignified capital city of socialist Romania. Thus, the Victory of Socialism also had an urban dimension, transforming the inherited city into a city evoking socialism and its modernity.

Demolitions affected around 485 ha (similar to the surface of Venice) (Ioan, 2009), including some of the city's oldest churches, the Unirii market hall, and the Republican stadium. More than 40, 000 residents were hastily displaced; even Lăzărescu had his house demolished (Vais, 2016, p. 144). A select number of national heritage buildings were not demolished but were the subject of encasing, being surrounded and isolated by 10-floor buildings that removed visual access to the respective churches and synagogues (Celac et al., 2005). These demolitions and displacements led to alternative names circulating amid the urban population, including "the Victory of Socialism against the entire city", together with broader names for the Civic Center such as "Beirut on Dâmboviţa"[5] and Ceauşima, a juxtaposition of Ceauşescu with Hiroshima.

The professionals involved in the planning and design of the Civic Center related to the project in a number of ways. While many emphasize today that they had to do it because of political pressure, others, like Alexandru Beldiman, also point out that the demolitions of important parts of the city and the creation of a new urban area were nothing scandalous for the generations of architects trained in the spirit of the Athens Charter (Iosa, 2006, p. 131). While the architecture wanted by the leader was not modern, the spirit of the operation could be seen as such. Moreover, the architectural expression echoed contemporary postmodern treatments, which existed in the West. Consequently, the profession was less scandalized by the endeavor than it was later accounted for. Opposition to the project or withdrawals were rare, which also has to be, however, understood in the sensitive climate of the party state.

The Bucharest Civic Center was projected by the planning institute Proiect Bucureşti and consisted of a main axis, the Victory of Socialism Boulevard, having, at one end, the House of the Republic and a square with ministries and, at the other, a large square surrounded with

FIGURE 11.2   Map of the Uranus area of Bucharest, highlighting with red the Civic Center buildings erected in the 1980s, on display during an exhibition in the Bucharest City Hall.

Source: Wikimedia Commons

residential buildings. Along the way, a new national library and an opera house were projected. By 1989, most buildings were in an advanced state of construction, or finished, with the exception of the Opera House, which still had not begun. A third of the way, the Union Square, a traditional market square of Bucharest, was reshaped as the country's largest open space. The Dâmbovița River was channeled and put underground in this node of the Civic Center. The Boulevard had monumental dimensions yet was somehow removed from actual

mobility routes in Bucharest. Its western section, from the Union Square to the House, remains little circulated to this day, particularly by pedestrians, in an otherwise bustling city. While intended to be a civic center, which would imply a center for citizens, it was designed, in fact, as a rather exclusive area: the state ministries, the House of the Republic, and the residential building for party members were served by streets with restricted public circulation, paved with artificially colored granite. The obsession with security and protection led to hasty decisions: in the autumn of 1989, residents of a new block on 13 September Avenue, who had moved there in 1985, had to leave the building as Elena Ceaușescu complained that they had visual access to the yard of the House of the Republic (Ioan, 2009, p. 191). The House of the Republic itself was realized by numerous subteams of architects who neither had access to the other plans nor to the site itself, seemingly for secrecy and security reasons. This led to the approach being called by architect Andrei Pandele (2009, p. 57) as "veterinary architecture"—while in human medicine, doctors can hear from patients what problems they have, veterinarians need to guess; similar guessing games were made by architects involved in the design of the house—which led to a lack of coherence of the project.

The architectural language marked a stark departure from the modernism of the previous decades: using columns, decorations, and classical registers, the buildings evoked at once 19th-century historicism, socialist realism, and contemporary postmodernism. Ceaușescu expressed his liking for two eclectic historicist buildings from the United Nations Square, just north of the designated Civic Center, and asked that to be a reference for the architecture of the new boulevard. This created a rupture with the decades of modernist construction in interwar and socialist Romania. While the designed apartment buildings were not significant departures from the mass housing designs elsewhere, architects used the occasion to create pastiches of historicist decorations, in a postmodern gesture that echoed the 1980s debates abroad, and particularly Ricardo Bofill's postmodernist projects such as Antigone (Ioan, 2007). Nevertheless, the quick deadlines and dwindling budgets accounted for oversized structures, the use of poor materials, and low-quality execution.

The Boulevard, flanked by tall buildings, hid the remnants of the old city behind. The connections with the old streets with houses and gardens were limited to low pedestrian passages, which did not permit a visualization of the old city. As such, it served as a Potemkin village façade of representation of the Ceaușescu regime's goals for the Civic Center. This approach was not new: since the mid-1970s, several other avenues in Bucharest were widened for traffic and "screened" ("*ecranate*") with tall buildings, which hid the old city behind. First, these tall buildings were modernist tower blocks, but the 1980s brought even more opaque perimeter blocks, a typology that was actually not characteristic of Bucharest before (Cina, 2010, p. 233). The Civic Center streets also used the technique in the guise of perimeter blocks, but this time featuring heavy ornamentation of the facades, thus replicating a 19th-century typology of European cities, which was actually absent in Bucharest itself. The focus on the urban façade, the ornaments and composition types, and the presence of classical and eclectic elements recalls postmodern architecture. Nevertheless, the irony of postmodernism is lost on this serious, political project.

The unfinished project: planning and the political economy after 1990

In the aftermath of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989, the Civic Center was largely constructed, with the exception of the yet unfinished House of the Republic and the

Opera complex. The evolution of the project mirrored the transformation of planning and design in post-1990 Romania. In the aftermath of the abrogation of the Systematization Law, between 1990 and 1996, there was no extant legal framework for planning. However, local councils could still issue urban planning directives, yet there was little funding for any public investment at a national level. In the case of the Bucharest Civic Center, the state allocated money to finalize the buildings under construction, including the House of the Republic. Nevertheless, buildings that were at foundation level only, such as the new Opera, or areas where construction had not yet begun by 1989, did not receive funds for completion in the early 1990s, and became the object of debate later on.

The colored granite of the Boulevard, intended for little traffic and costly to maintain once the streets were opened to general traffic, was replaced by asphalt. Its name was also changed: the Victory of Socialism Boulevard became the Boulevard of the Union—from a projection of the future to a memory of the past—the 1918 Unification was deemed a key moment of the Romanian state, with the new national holiday, 1 December enshrining Transylvania's 1918 union (Bădescu, 2020). The Civic Center denominator remained in public parlance, while the House of the Republic was frequently called the House of the People and later became the Palace of the Parliament, thus realizing what Ceauşescu had initially wanted for the building (Bădescu & Stătică, 2023).

The Civic Center as a planning and urban design project was, however, stopped. In 1996, while there was still no specific planning legislation, the executive issued a governmental decision, which created a new planning framework. In 2001, Law 350 was issued. It was criticized for prioritizing private interest over the public, by permitting privately led area plans (*plan urbanistic zonal*), which would create derogations from the general urban plan (*plan urbanistic general*) (Nae & Turnock, 2011). These developments reflected a new relationship between planning and politics and had repercussions on the fate of the Civic Center: the difficulty of implementing a large project, the continuities in a security-obsessed political class, and the controversies of private-led urbanism.

Bucharest 2000: from promise to deception

Just months after the overthrow of Nicolae Ceauşescu, the Union of Architects of Romania (UAR) and the National Commission for Urban Planning organized an exhibit called "Bucharest. The state of the City", in which the impact of the demolitions of the 1980s and the not yet finished Civic center was shown to the public. A Franco-Romanian team, composed of Jean Laberthornière, Raluca Butnariu, Dana Harhoiu, and Andrei Sassu, proposed a major intervention to address the impacts of the disruptive 1980s (Harhoiu, 1997). The head of the UAR, Alexandru Beldiman, advocated for an international competition, intended not only to bring different specialist opinions but also to bring the Civic Center to the public agenda (Iosa, 2006).

The Civic Center was a matter of discussion for both the municipality of Bucharest and the Romanian Government. The process of legislative and institutional transformation was slow, while the deconstructed central area began to be the subject of restitution of real estate claims, as well as a fledgling real estate pressure, both common to post-socialist societies (Stanilov, 2007). According to a former chief architect of Bucharest, the lack of a cadastre structure, and especially the economic crisis, made it difficult to find an investment formula for the Civic Center of the Capital (Gabrea, 2019). Moreover, political instability affected foreign

investment, seen at the time as the main hope. In the Izvor area of the Civic Center, as early as 1991, a British financial group hired Norman Foster to develop a master plan. Because of unclear ownership, the authorities chose to create a development agency for the land, which envisioned that entitled owners would either receive the land value or remain in the project as shareholders. According to the chief architect, this replicated the mechanisms of the Solidere project in Beirut (Bădescu, 2011), as well as the East German approach to use investment to unlock the reconstruction of the Capital (Gabrea, 2019). Nevertheless, the collapse of the Petre Roman government because of the mineriads in Bucharest—the descent of Transylvanian miners on the capital, at the call of the president, to end anti-government protests in Bucharest—led to the end of the project. Investors stated that they would not come until the Romanian state became politically stable (Gabrea, 2019).

The authorities eventually supported the initiative of the UAR to organize an international competition. Bucharest 2000 was supported by the Ministry of Public Works and Spatial Planning, under the patronage of the President of Romania. The Bucharest Municipality was invited, as organizer and co-funder. As such, the competition set off with a great premise to be a national priority project. Moreover, it generated significant interest internationally, for the opportunity to remodel a city center at the end of the 20th century. The competition was headed by Kenneth Frampton, and jury members also included Vittorio Gregotti, Fumihiko Maki, and Claude Vasconi, with Maki calling it "the best organized competition" he had witnessed in 20 years (Fezi, 2010, p. 126). A total of 235 teams from 35 countries took part in the competition.

The competition brief asked to address the "urban wounds" and "urban trauma" created by the 1980s intervention (Barris, 2008). The brief, shaped by a team from the Bucharest architecture school (IAIM), included the results of studies led by the IAIM.

The stated goals for projects included "the mitigation of the aggressions provoked by the urban operations realized from 1980 to 1989" through the creation of a flexible, open framework for sustainable development, a vision for the use of this central area, highlighting the site characteristics, the historic ensembles, and previous urban culture (Iosa, 2006, p. 89). This was an idea competition, with the actual solutions to be determined later by the municipality. As Barris (2000) noted, this makes an "intriguing parallel to Ceauşescu's advisory role to the architect-in-chief of the House", as the winning team would become an advisor to the city.

The projects proposed a variety of solutions, including the mitigation of the volume of the palace by new, dense construction, often of tall buildings, or its inclusion in a landscaped space. Many proposals used the perimeter block typology, demarcating exterior public space and private space inside the site, a formula with a good real estate yield but uncharacteristic of Bucharest before the 1980s (Cina, 2010; Gabrea, 2019). Some entries partially dismantled the People's House or covered it with grassy landscaping. There were proposals to fragment the route of Victoria Socialismului Boulevard—the new Unirii Boulevard—through placing constructions on the route, compact planting, or the demolition of some 1980s buildings and the reconfiguration of older streets. The great prize was awarded (11 votes from 13) to the German practice of Meinhard von Gerkan and Joachim Zeis. They proposed the construction of high-rise buildings northwest of the palace to mitigate its size, as well as a reorganization of green space and the urban fabric considering the destructions endured (Tureanu, 1997).

(a)

(b)

(c)

FIGURE 11.3   Winning solution and alternative proposals for Bucharest 2000.

Source: Bucharest 2000 archive

In 1997, the General Council of the Municipality of Bucharest decided to adopt the results of the competition and to create a working group for its implementation. The Municipality commissioned and created an urban plan for the area, based on the winning solution. The negotiations to establish an institution—in the form of a public development agency—saw numerous hesitations from different public actors (Gabrea, 2019). In 1999, the government gave a decree to declare the Civic Center an area of national interest. This aimed to include the owners in a financial mechanism to realize a project inspired by Bucharest 2000. The decree was canceled by the new government in 2000, after severe criticism by the new Housing and Public Works minister, Miron Mitrea, who supported the Esplanada project instead (Iosa, 2006, p. 151). Bucharest 2000 was abandoned, which von Meinhard von Gerkan declared the greatest frustration of his 40 years of professional life ("We could not realise one single project", 2006). The German architect highlighted that there was a major lack of commitment of the political class for the realization of this project for Bucharest (ibid.). While the

House of the Republic was transformed through political will in the Romanian Parliament (Bădescu & Stătică, 2023), the Civic Center, once a core political project, was perceived as being abandoned by politics.

The only interventions to disrupt the massive volume of the Palace and the Civic Center plan were two architectural insertions. First, the National Museum of Contemporary Art, supported by Prime Minister Adrian Năstase in the early 2000s, aimed to bring life to the vast expanse of the palace, but faced opposition, both from Anca Petrescu as a breach of copyright and the Chamber of Deputies as a security threat (Bădescu &Stătică, 2023). Second, since 2011, the National Salvation Cathedral has been under construction just behind the Palace of the Parliament, a large Orthodox church that was the object of much contestation, but also showed the increased role of the Church as an institution in post-socialist Romania (Tateo, 2020). As for the Civic Center itself, in recent decades, the impact of the Civic Center on the neighborhoods just south of the former Victory of Socialism Boulevard as well as urban voids remaining after the 1980s demolitions became the focus of various initiatives, from the Integrated Urban Development Plan (PIDU) for Central Bucharest (2011) to cultural memory projects such as Uranus Now (2021–2022) (Figure 11.4).

FIGURE 11.4   Reconnecting the city: Participatory mapping for the "Uranus Now" project (2021–2022), a grassroots initiative led by architects. Uranus now responds to the Civic Center's demolitions with small-scale markers in contemporary Izvor Park, which refer to the erased cityscape, reclaiming public memory. On a planning level, after the EU accession in 2007, PIDUs became a common tool. The Central Bucharest PIDU, which is not implemented yet, tackles Bucharest's N-S disruption by the former Victory of Socialism Boulevard by reconnecting severed areas with bridges over the river and a connected network of public spaces, emphasizing pedestrian and cycle mobility in a city dominated by cars.

Source: Uranus Now, exhibit at the National Museum of Contemporary Art, 2021

Esplanada: post-socialist PPPs and their discontents

The Esplanada project, proposed in a large swath of empty land in the Civic Center, reflects the tensions inherent to the post-socialist transformation of urban space very well. Up to the 1980s, this was an area of single-family homes, many with individual gardens; however, it was cleared out in 1984 to make space for the new National Opera, as part of the Civic Center project. Till 1990, the space remained unbuilt. Various plans for the area were drawn in the subsequent periods, reflecting the new post-socialist realities and priorities. On the one hand, there were the claims of former owners to get their properties back. Romania's restitution policies in the decades after 1989 were oscillating between giving the right to buy state property by tenants and restitution in kind, as opposed to financial compensation for the 1949 nationalization of property (Stan, 2010). Restitution became the framework after 2000, when the city's older housing stock, but also the empty land resulting from the 1980s demolitions in the center, became objects of restitution claims (Șerban & Studio Basar, 2010). For the unbuilt land for the Opera, by 2004, there were already 66 persons who had notified the right of ownership under Law 10/2001 of certain land plots, with ten additional people already in possession of land (Savaliuc, 2008). On the other hand, in a city hungry for office space and where privatization had become a national priority, a much-touted project emerged, which included the selling of the area space from the public domain and the creation of an ample multiuse development.

The Esplanada project was born in 2004, initiated by the former Minister of Transport Miron Mitrea and aimed to redevelop the vacant land previously dedicated to the Civic Center Opera, officially called "The Chant of Romania Center" (Centrul Cântarea României). Baptized "Esplanada", it was the object of the Government Decree no. 373/2004, signed by Mitrea and Prime Minister Adrian Năstase. The Decree declared it a site for functional reconversion, for which a public–private partnership should be initiated in order to build a polyfunctional urban center on an area of over 10 ha. The 2004 decision also mentioned the purchase of land from the owners or their expropriation for reasons of public utility. That year, the Ministry of Transport led by Mitrea concluded a project agreement with a "selected investor", identified as the Hungarian- Canadian-owned Trigranit Holding Limited. The rationale for this selection was criticized as lacking transparency by the Romanian media (Savaliuc, 2008). Trigranit proposed to build dozens of high-rises with offices and housing, as well as hotels and shopping malls, alongside a concert hall, within ten years. The City Mayor at the time, Adrian Videanu, was a supporter of the one billion Euro proposal, particularly of the possibility of having skyscrapers in the eastern part of the Civic Center while the skyscrapers of the western part envisaged by Bucharest 2000 did not come to be. The Ministry of Transport, which owned the land, stated it would transfer the property to the City Hall after having a signed contract with the developer—as the public domain in Bucharest belongs to a variety of state actors—at times with different views for a site. A Memorandum of Negotiation was concluded in May 2006 between Trigranit and the Ministry of Transport, led by Laszlo Borbely from the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania, the Hungarian minority party that consistently took part in Romanian governments after 1989. The two parties agreed that the public authority would make the land available for 49 years, with the buildings to become state property afterward.

Romanian media criticized that the private properties that were already returned to owners were then rebought with public money to be given over directly to Trigranit (Savaliuc,

2008). This point became a hot potato during the 2008 elections for the Bucharest Mayor. One candidate, Aurelian Pavelescu from a Christian democratic party, called it "a crime against the people of Bucharest", calling it "unacceptable for the Government to get involved in Bucharest's urban planning issues", which, he added, should be taken by the community (Gabrea, 2019). The candidate who actually won, Sorin Oprescu, running for the social democrats and seen as the inheritor of the Communist Party, launched an alternative view: the space should become a park. The media extensively used his description of an Esplanada park with free-roaming deer and waterfalls, and this became one of the candidate's trademarks. Oprescu won the elections. However, both the Esplanada deal and the park project were locked because of property restitution claims (Gabrea, 2019). Moreover, the chief architect at the time, Gheorghe Pătraşcu, later stated that the contract with Trigranit was signed by the government, but the Ministry of Finance did not give its approval, and with the change of government, the approval was interrupted (Digi24, 2018). In 2011, Trigranit withdrew from the investment.

The story of this case reflects how the changing political economy of post-socialism had impacts on planning: first, a solution based on the privatization of space was found, reflecting how privatization is the centerpiece of transition (Verdery, 1999); a return of the "public", motivated by an understanding of politicians of the population's desire for green public spaces; and, finally, the challenge of property restitution, one of the peculiar trademarks of the post-socialist transformation. In the words of a planning executive at the City Hall interviewed in June 2008, the first twenty years after 1989 have been a "non-stop revolution" of procedures, systems, and views of the "public" and "private", which had a clear impact on urban spaces. Moreover, as the former chief architect of the city Pătraşcu said "Unfortunately, we have lost the strategic approach to development" (Digi24, 2018). At the time of writing, the area still stands empty, while there are new talks coming from the Government to build a Justice district, to bring city tribunals and the National High Court together, as well as the Bucharest Court of Appeal. The plan has not yet been approved, but if it does, it might signal a departure from the decades of lack of successful public-led projects in the area.

Conclusion

The Bucharest City Center showcases the relationship between planning and political systems. In the 1980s, the Civic Center organized around the Victory of Socialism Boulevard reflected the aspirations of the regime to remake society, as well as the planning tools that were available in the Socialist Republic of Romania. Under authoritarianism, the Civic Center managed to pull resources in a country otherwise undergoing austerity and saw the completion in less than ten years of a major project. It expressed both a strong ideology of a regime wanting to recreate space to reflect a new political project and the strong power to implement—from demolitions to planning and construction. It reflected the lack of participation, societal debate, and dissent and resistance in a state that reached in the 1980s the height of a personality cult and repression.

1989 constituted a radical change. In 1990, various actors vilified urban planning as a tool of dictatorship, and a new approach based on property rights replaced the old. It took Romania a decade to adopt new regulations for urban planning. After 1989, most major ideas connected to the area were not implemented, with competitions such as Bucharest 2000 being

in the end fiascoes reflecting the weak coordination of state actors in post-1989 Romania. In this context of state withdrawal, the actions undertaken to complete the yet unfinished Civic Center project showed not only the challenges of large-scale planning but also the potential that EU-led programs and bottom-up actions can have.

Acknowledgments

Notes

1 Repeated pregnancy tests for all women and the absence of contraceptives were aimed to lead to an increased birth rate; the abortion ban resulted in an abortion black market, self-made interventions that led to death, and a steep increase in abandoned children that led to the infamous orphanage issue made a cause célèbre by Western media in the 1990s (cf. Kligman, 1998). All this to say that the law was perceived as one of the regime's worst, which puts into perspective also the fact that the urban planning law came second in an ensemble of laws of an unpopular regime.
2 The CIAM (Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Modern), the International Congresses of Modern Architecture, founded in 1928 and dissolved in 1959, held events across Europe to promote the principles of the Modern Movement.
3 In 1986, from 13 123 existing villages, 3931 were slated for demolition- nevertheless, until 1989, only 6 villages were actually destroyed (Fezi, 2013; Vais, 2022). In contrast to the information disseminated in the West by Hungarian diasporas (Kurti, 2001), these six were not Hungarian villages in Transylvania, but villages next to Bucharest, as the program had the scale of the entire state.
4 These included the Party's design institute IP Carpați, the Bucharest planning institute Proiect București (IPB), the Bucharest architecture school IAIM, and the Polytechnic Institute of Iași.
5 Dâmbovița is one of the two rivers passing through Bucharest, in this case through its central area. It was the object of systematization itself, with the actual river flowing under a concrete case, where water is released (and stopped for periods during the summer, leaving the channel empty).

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12

SIGHTS SET HIGH

Steering the tertiarisation in Frankfurt am Main (1945–1986)[1]

Victoria Grau

Introduction

Figure 12.1 shows Frankfurt am Main from its most prominent angle. Against a blue sky rises the city's trademark, its unique selling point and outstanding urban landmark: the skyline. The high-rise development of "Mainhattan" is unmatched in Germany. Eighteen of the 19 tallest German skyscrapers are located in Frankfurt (Voss, 2023). Anyone searching for Frankfurt am Main on the Internet will find numerous pictures of the skyline. As the main banking capital of Germany and one of the most important financial centres of the continent, Frankfurt likes to show off its high-rise buildings as an expression of its prestige. But Figure 12.1 shows more than just the skyline. The Paulskirche – where the first liberal constitution and the founding of a German national state were decided, but not executed – can be seen in the middle foreground. To the left, one can see the gabled roofs of the Ostzeile, a part of the old town that was reconstructed at the end of the 1970s. This chapter examines the role of high-rise development as the defining means of an urban development policy unique to the Federal Republic of Germany.

This chapter concentrates on the period 1945–1986. In those 42 years, high-rise construction was tested (late 1940s), was systematically used by urban planning for economic purposes (1950s and 1960s), protested by the public (1970s) and finally strategically integrated in the form of a development model (1980s), which is still valid today. Frankfurt was one of the first cities to use high-rise construction as a strategic instrument of economic growth and a means of steering ongoing tertiarisation since the 1950s. However, high-rise development was often reduced to the architectural level. Constructional developments and technology have been extensively documented (cf. Böhm-Ott & Rodenstein, 1998; Burgard, 2000; Flierl, 2000; Müller-Raemisch, 1998; Mohr, 1998; Müller-Vogg & Zimmer, 1999; Rodenstein, 2000). Yet, this only covers part of the process. In the long term, high-rise construction as an expression of economically oriented expansionism could only be socially legitimised in conjunction with cultural policy. The construction of the banking quarter, the central business district, is thus directly linked to the construction of museums and the reconstruction of the old town. The intensive expansion of the cultural infrastructure can be seen as a cultural extension of planning policy. In the 1970s, urban planning used elements

FIGURE 12.1   Scenic photograph of Frankfurt's inner city, reproducing the logic of the development model. In the foreground are the outlines of the previous historical city centre which, together with the high-rise buildings in the immediate background, form an ensemble of economic power and city history.

Source: Thomas Wolf, 2019, www.foto-tw.de, CC BY-SA 4.0

of housing, social and cultural policy to develop a comprehensive approach to an entrepreneurial urban development policy (cf. Schipper, 2013).

Pioneer Frankfurt: the beginnings of high-rise construction in 1947

High-rise buildings first attracted worldwide attention at Chicago's World Fair in 1893 (Rodenstein, 2015, p. 131). Although building laws in Germany did not allow the construction of buildings with more than six storeys until 1921,[2] architects, civil engineers and representatives of the steel industry observed the international advances in construction with great interest (cf. ibid; Rodenstein, 2020, p. 269). The general public was, however, more critical, opposing high-rise construction as an expression of competitive capitalism. For example, one of the major German newspapers wrote in 1921:

> The ugliness of New York City is familiar to everyone. Tower-like behemoths that owe their existence to the unbridled hunger for power of predatory entrepreneurship, stand there side-by-side, untamed and unregulated, often clad inside and out with an ostentatious, illusionistic architecture that in no way corresponds to their highly profane purposes. In Germany, of course, the construction of this type of building is not allowed, and it will not be allowed.
>
> *(Frankfurter Zeitung quoted in Volk & Kracauer, 1997, p. 17, authors translation)*

Nevertheless, restrictions on building heights were lifted in the course of the 1920s and the first high-rise attempts were realised in a few cities.

It was not until the post-war period, however, that high-rise construction started to gather real momentum. After 1945, Frankfurt was one of the most severely damaged cities in Germany. In total, 33 per cent of its residential buildings were uninhabitable, and 47 per cent of public buildings were no longer utilisable; the old town was almost completely destroyed (Knabe, 1995, p. 4). The initial years of reconstruction under Mayor Walter Kolb were of a pragmatic character. Following the clearance of rubble, first of all, housing was to be created and the infrastructure rebuilt (cf. Göpfert, 2010, p. 25).

In 1947, the British and American occupation zones in post-war Germany merged to form the Bizone. Due to Frankfurt's central geographical location and its connection via the airport and autobahn, the *Wirschaftsrat des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes*, the economic council, one of the three central administrative bodies of the Bizone and a core of the new constituting West-German state, was located there (Müller-Raemisch, 1998, p. 34). Due to the new economic importance, numerous financial institutes moved locations to Frankfurt in the course of a few years, including some of Berlin's major banks (Beste, 2000, p. 83). The increasing demand for offices and housing triggered the first big wave of building development after the war, which also brought up the topic of high-rise buildings (Müller-Raemisch, 1998, p. 34; Rodenstein, 2015, p. 137). Proponents argued that high-rise construction offered

FIGURE 12.2   Aerial photograph of the destroyed medieval city centre around Frankfurt's Cathedral in 1945.

Source: US Air Force, 1945

a decisive opportunity to stand out in competition with other cities but also to keep pace with international advancements in construction – particularly in the USA. The high-rise construction of the state-socialist countries was paid no attention to (ibid., p. 131). The final realisation of high-rise construction was enabled from two sides: a large number of the political positions in the city administration were occupied by architects, who decisively supported high-rise construction (Flierl, 2000, p. 8). More important, however, was the prevailing mood of reconstruction. Cities such as Munich, Hamburg, London, Vienna, Paris, and Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg) rejected high-rise construction, at least for their inner cities, in order to maintain their historical silhouette. Reconstruction in Frankfurt, however, did not follow the principle of restoring historical layouts (Burgard, 2000, p. 148). Only the most important historical monuments, such as the house in which Johann Wolfgang von Goethe – regarded as one of the greatest German poets – was born and the Paulskirche, were very soon restored. Primarily, support was to be given to a contemporary approach to urban development, which was expressed predominantly in infrastructure (Mohr, 1998, p. 20). The construction of high-rise buildings on destroyed plots outside of the old town centre was henceforth allowed to a maximum height of 40 to 70 meters (Mohr, 1998, p. 20). The cathedral with its height of 95 meters was to remain the highest point in the city.

   Frankfurt am Main was thus the first German city that targeted its urban development towards high-rise buildings. Accordingly, urban planning could not draw on any experience. Close attention was paid to the progress in building technology but not to the effects of the high-rise buildings on urban space. Consequently, at first, there was no coordinated planning of high-rise construction. Therefore, buildings of varying heights and forms were built here and there throughout the city. In this period, the high-rise buildings usually served exclusively as office buildings. Mixed usage such as housing or commerce was not established until later (Flierl, 2000, p. 8). In addition to the city's architectural and spatial development, the population also grew from 269,000 to 523,037 between 1945 and 1950 due to the flourishing labour market and the high level of building activity. In 1950 alone, 170,000 people migrated to the city, primarily comprising displaced persons[3] and war refugees (Balser, 1995, p. 141; Beste, 2000, p. 85).

High-rise city Frankfurt: tertiarisation in the 1950s

Following the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, Frankfurt am Main was established as the location of the *Bank deutscher Länder*, i.e. the Federal German central bank, which was later renamed the *Bundesbank*, as compensation for the fact that the city had not been chosen as the capital city of the Federal Republic. The city's objective of becoming a financial centre[4] thus became increasingly tangible (Arndt, 1975, p. 15). In the 1950s, the number of high-rise buildings grew rapidly. The city was struck by a veritable high-rise fever (Rodenstein, 2015, p. 136). After a short time, the developers demanded that the restrictions on the height of the buildings be eased. In order to curtail the feared "North American uncontrolled growth" (Pehnt, 2016, p. 14), more specific urban development plans were drawn for the first time. A "renovation plan" (1952) identified individual high-rise buildings along the site of the historical city walls that were allowed to be built higher (ibid.; Rodenstein, 2020, p. 275). The "high-rise plan" (1953) carried this idea forward and specified plots for high-rise buildings that were to function as gateways to the inner city (Rodenstein, 2020, p. 275). The property developers had to negotiate individually with the city over building permits and the height of the buildings (ibid.) Due to financing

FIGURE 12.3 The high-rise plan of 1953 with the identified high-rise buildings (marked in black) attempts to utilise the high-rise buildings as prominent characteristic pinnacles of the inner city.

Source: Frankfurter Neue Presse of January 31, 1953

difficulties, the majority of buildings in the 1950s were limited to a height of five or six storeys (Müller-Raemisch, 1998, p. 47; Pehnt, 2016, p. 14).

In 1955, for the first time, the highest position on the planning board was no longer held by an architect, but an economist, Hans Kampffmeyer (Burgard, 2000, p. 146). He is regarded as the spiritus rector of the systematic instrumentalisation of high-rise construction on behalf of the economic interests of the city. Kampffmeyer was a follower of the French economist and sociologist Jean Fourastié.[5] *Fourastié* targeted future urban development through requirements of a modern industrial society and of the service sector (ibid., p. 141). The planning followed a clear zoning logic or "functional differentiation" of urban spaces (Stöber, 1964, p. 38). The central inner-city area consisting of the inner city, the old town and the main station were to be restructured into a development area specially marked for services, consumption and culture: the "City". All important financial institutes and enterprises were to be concentrated in the City. Today's *Bankenviertel* (central banking district) was created (Stöber, 1964, p. 14; cf. Huf, 2000).

Kampffmeyer's approach proved successful: with an increase in employment of 160 per cent, the banking and stock exchange sector registered the highest growth rates in the tertiary sector in the Federal Republic (FRG) between 1950 and 1961 (ibid.). In 1960, 50 per cent of Frankfurt's population was employed in the service sector (ibid.; Ronneberger & Keil, 1995, p. 292). However, as a result of its continuing growth, the city was confronted with a fundamental problem at the beginning of the 1960s: it was not large enough. With a total area of 250 square kilometres, Frankfurt is a comparatively small city. To use the available space as efficiently as possible, high-rise buildings were no longer built in single plots but in clusters (cf. Stracke, 1980, p. 47). To increase the attraction of new companies, no superordinate planning apart from the general zoning was made (Stöber, 1964, p. 40).

Nevertheless, the city required more space for further expansion. For this purpose, the neighbouring district *Westend*, a residential area that had barely been destroyed during the Second World War, was to be converted into a commercial area (ibid.). This reclassification had gradually begun in the 1950s and was systematically pursued in the 1960s: In order to accelerate the restructuring and make it more attractive, all municipal requirements for high-rise construction in the Westend were suspended (Michels, 2010b). This meant, for example, that after the acquisition of property, no further permission was required to demolish existing buildings – for the most part, residential properties – in order to build new ones with commercial use (Michels, 2010a). The absence of building regulations attracted in particular large investors, who purchased 12 per cent of the entire quarter within a few years. For the construction of high-rise buildings, usually several properties were purchased since a larger site area allowed a larger number of storeys (Beste, 2000; Michels, 2010b). In 1972, every residential block was at least partly used for commercial purposes (Beste, 2000, p. 105; Stracke, 1980, p. 67). As a result, land prices in Westend increased sixty-fold between 1950 and 1970 (Stracke, 1980, p. 46; Vorlaufer, 1975).

The ungovernable City: Contested realities of the 1960s

In the late 1960s, resistance began to form within the city's population. At first, the protest was quite moderate and was primarily supported by middle-class citizens who were not fundamentally opposed to restructuring but demanded a greater planning regulation of the builders (Beste, 2000, p. 107; Ronneberger & Keil, 1995, p. 293). As the investors became increasingly ruthless, including threatening families and small businesses who refused to vacate their dwellings and entire streets became uninhabitable, the protests gained momentum and the first squats were initiated (ibid., p. 105). In 1970s, ten houses were occupied (Michels, 2010c). The protesters were mostly residents of the buildings, mainly migrant workers[6] and students, who criticised the fundamental distribution of economic and political power in Frankfurt (Ronneberger & Keil, 1995, p. 293). The city government criminalised the squatters (cf. Scholz, 1989, p. 54). The police used considerably more force when clearing the squats but also during demonstrations (Archiv der Revolte, 2020, p. 52). The high-rise buildings became a symbol of a hated urban development policy. In the night of 23 August 1973, the Selmi-Hochhaus burned (Flagge, 2018, p. 13). The owner, Ali Selmi, was one of the central investors and drivers of high-rise construction. Contrary to early speculation, however, it was not a case of arson (ibid.). An article in the leading conservative newspaper described the atmosphere in that night:

FIGURE 12.4   The expansion of the City into the neighbouring Westend. The plan shows impres-
sively how small the City area was in comparison to the rest of the city. The expansion
increased the area significantly.

Source: Illustration by the author

On the faces of many citizens there was something like pleasure. [...] It could be seen in a
flash just how far the process of estrangement between the citizens and the form of their
urban environment has already progressed. High-rise buildings, once gazed at in wonder
and revered, now stand as a hostile element in the urban landscape. Residential areas
were destroyed for them and people were displaces from the inner city to satellite towns.
They take away the light from those who still remain in their shadow and, as a ring drawn
around the City area, they form a barrier. [...] The burning of the high-rise building [...],
which [...] stands in the crisis area of Westend, [...] reveals how deeply felt the anger of the
people in the city must be [...].

(*FAZ, 24.08.1973 quoted according to Stracke, 1980, pp. 71–72, authors translation*)

In 1974, the street fighting in and around the Westend increased further. The press called it a "civil war in a residential area" (quoted in Beste, 2000, p. 111).

Outside of Frankfurt, these side effects of the economic miracle were observed with horror. Attributions such as "the dirty city", "the ungovernable city" and "Bankfurt" circulated in the FRG (cf. Farni, 1985, p. 6). At first, this had no negative effect on the economic upswing. Within the FRG, Frankfurt had the lowest unemployment rate (Stracke, 1980, p. 38). With its 217 banks, the city had securely established itself as the economic centre of the Federal Republic. In 1976, the then highest building in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Westend-Gate, with a height of 159.3 metres, was inaugurated (Flierl, 2000, p. 140).

Empty City: the crisis of the 1970s

Towards the end of the 1970s, however, the constructional and economic successes could no longer compensate for the precarious conditions in large parts of urban society. High rents, land speculation, traffic problems and the destruction of housing showed the contours of increasingly diverse shortcomings (Stracke, 1980, p. 11). During the 1970s, more and more people left the city. In particular, younger households with a higher income moved into the hinterland to increase their living space, to improve their residential environment or to purchase property (ibid., p. 82). People who stayed did so because they could not afford to move due to lower income and often insecure employment conditions. This urban exodus could be observed not only in Frankfurt but in the 12 largest cities in

FIGURE 12.5   Photo of the rapidly growing banking district in the 1980s, taken from the opposite riverside of the Main. The high-rise buildings from the 1950s and 1960s that can be seen in the foreground were considerably outdone in the 1970s. The urban silhouette of today is already emerging.

Source: Flierl, 2000, p. 140

West Germany which lost than nine per cent of their population between 1964 and 1985 (Häußermann & Siebel, 1987, p. 27).

Until into the 1970s, the governmental activity of financially oriented cities such as Frankfurt had focused on meeting the economic and infrastructural requirements of global competition. In "Die Großstädte und das Geistesleben" ("The Metropolis and Mental Life"), Georg Simmel described this standardisation as "emptying the city" of culture, tradition and identity [1903] 2020, p. 71). This emptying was criticised in the 1970s leading to a fundamental redefinition of the quality of life in the city: urban centres were imagined as places for the realisation of individual lifestyles, constantly adapting to the needs of the citizens and offering new impulses for orientation, amendment and differentiation (Prigge, 1987, p. 186; cf. Durth, 1977). Culture was no longer simply a question of leisure activities but served personal fulfilment and was regarded as an expression of the quality of urban life (cf. Hoffmann, 1979).

This new understanding of urbanity initiated a recalibration of the competitive conditions for the cities: economic growth policy had to be combined with a social and cultural integration strategy for the growth-stimulating population groups (cf. Ronneberger & Keil, 1995, p. 294; Beste, 2000, p. 122; Hoffmann, 1999, p. 161). This balance was to be achieved by means of a strategic image policy. In Frankfurt, the image policy had targeted the socio-politically re-legitimisation of economic expansionism, especially the high-rise construction. In order to further advance growth in the inner city, spaces for cultural compensation had to be created for the population. Encouraged by the European Monument Conservation Year in 1975, it was decided to reconstruct parts of the historical old town and to rebuild the Old Opera. The development of the cultural infrastructure on the bank of the Main River was initiated with the first draft plans for a museum riverbank. In 1976, the necessary decisions were taken unanimously by the municipal authorities (Leppert, 2010). Public procurement policy strived to act more transparent including new forms of participation. Various projects proved, however, that building permission and liberties could still be purchased from the city with corresponding monetary payments. The communal elections in 1977 introduced a political turnaround. The social-democratic SPD – one of the two major political parties in the FRG – which had governed Frankfurt since 1945, lost the election due to its unfortunate high-rise policy and a scandal concerning party donations. The election was won by the CDU, a Christian-democratic, conservative party and the second "people's party"[7] in the Federal Republic. The 1980s determined the further development of Frankfurt as an international metropolis. In ten years, the CDU succeeded in radically redefining Frankfurt's negative image (Huf, 2000, p. 137).

Frankfurt for all? Integrated approaches to urban development in the 1980s

The conflicts in the Westend and the resulting overthrow of the SPD had demonstrated what could happen when relevant sections of the population did not support an urban development model. In contrast to the SPD, the CDU did not rely its political success simply on parliamentary majorities but planned to achieve political stability through social consensus (cf. Ronneberger & Keil, 1995). Protagonist of this strategy was Walter Wallmann who was elected mayor in 1977. His importance as the front man of the new urban policy cannot be overestimated. Wallmann was a self-promoter with a profound feeling for publicity and personal marketing. In his inaugural speech, he referred to the new urbanity:

> We want Frankfurt am Main not only as a functioning community that satisfies rational needs. We want a Frankfurt am Main in which people's desires, hopes and feelings are fulfilled. We must again communicate the aura of this city, its urban spirit, its cosmopolitanism, its warm atmosphere and its lifestyle. The standing of the city will also be determined by these features.
>
> *(1983, p. 74, authors translation)*

By means of numerous city events, he presented himself as close to the people and found resonance in many different sections of the population.

Despite the proclaimed upheaval, the CDU had no intention of actually changing the established growth strategy. On the contrary, compensation mechanisms were to be created to enable further growth using the same methods. Economic growth was to become the goal of the entire population, not just of the very few. To do so, high-rise construction had to be temporarily suspended.

Instead, the CDU created the image of Frankfurt as an up-and-coming metropolis which was intended to subliminally re-legitimise the construction of high-rise buildings (Ronneberger & Keil, 1995, p. 295). The notional relationships of the population to their actual living conditions were to become "cosmopolitan" and spatially interpreted via symbols and signs by planers and architects (Prigge, 1994, p. 63). The immaterial interest policy of the city was complemented by an identity-creating objective. Historical architectural interventions into the cityscape were to conceal the effects of the profit-oriented urban structure and the cityscape adjusted to the new standards of competition (Durth, 1977, p. 56). This was made possible by a cost-minimising, effect-maximising decoration of the cityscape (Scholz, 1989, p. 50). The marketing of representative locations was to create identification spaces, in particular for the middle classes (Göpfert, 2010, p. 29; Scholz, 1989, p. 48). Therefore, the CDU finished numerous projects of the SPD: the *Ostzeile* (Eastern row) of the historical old town was reconstructed and the Old Opera was rebuilt. The reconstructions were implemented superficially. The *Ostzeile* was constructed in concrete as an imitation of timber framing, and the Old Opera was adorned with a Wilhelmine façade covering a modernistic core (Esser & Steinert, 1991, p. 40). The built environment was to satisfy the different claims on its utilisation and at the same time fulfil the representation requirements of the new tertiary sector classes by endowing the centre not only with historical reconstructions but also with office buildings, luxurious shopping malls, bistros and art galleries (Noller & Ronneberger, 1995, pp. 11, 39). The city thus successfully achieved the balancing act between traditional-local and modern-urbanist activity (Beste, 2000, p. 129). Provinciality and globalisation were to be united through metropolisation. This development should be classified as a cultural expansion of politics, which used urbanity as an idealistic construction for the management of societal and political – or migrational and electoral – behaviour (cf. Heterich, 1987, pp. 212–215).

The population was actively involved in questions of design. The importance of participation was unceasingly emphasised (cf. Wallmann, 1978; 1979). Citizen participation and "efficient planning" (Wallmann, 1979) were to be combined. Paradoxically, this efficiency meant the retraction of more recent participation models that had been introduced as a result of the Westend conflict (Beste, 2000, p. 124). The complex criticism of post-war urban development functionalism was thus addressed by the conservative city government but its causes were reduced to a lack of aestheticism in urban design (Prigge, 1987, pp. 177–194).

The protest against the capitalist production of built environment was thus depoliticised (Durth, 1977, p. 98; Ipsen, 1987, p. 145).

The construction of the *Museumsufer* (museum riverbank) at the Main, a massive extension of the cultural infrastructure and a doubling of the number of museums, was one of the most impressing projects of the new development strategy. However, the museum infrastructure had been given relatively low priority up to the beginning of the 1970s; cultural policy was granted unique support, both financial and political, in Frankfurt but in larger cities. In the 1990s, one-third of all the museums in the Federal Republic were established between 1971 and 1981 (Häußermann & Siebel, [1993] 2000, p. 206). Cultural institutions became the target of mass tourism. Between 1962 and 1985, the number of visitors rose from 14 million to 61 million (Flagge, 1988, p. 175). The strengthened cultural industry attracted qualified workers. Culture became an economic and locational factor.

The museum riverbank was principally intended to increase the quality of life of the new middle class in the Main region. The project was of decisive importance for urban development. The museum riverbank and the central banking business district now stood exactly opposite to one another as urbanist counterpoints, separated by the river. This symbolic vis-à-vis of high-rise buildings as an expression of economic importance and museums as a sign of

FIGURE 12.6   The finished Ostzeile with the Commerzbank in the background, photo from the 1990s. The dualism of financial city and historical old town was particularly clear in the inner city and was a popular subject for photographs.

Source: Photograph by Bruno Flierl, Flierl, 2002, p. 136

cultural class was intended to represent the diversity of Frankfurt and its dualistic urban policy at a single glance (cf. Hoffmann, 1979).

Winners and losers of a development model

Whereas the new middle class, in particular, was the target group of the development model, other groups were driven out of the city or were at least intended to become invisible. In Frankfurt, the same process could be marvelled at what Friedrich Engels had already described in Manchester as "a concealment of everything which might affront the eye and the nerves of the bourgeoisie" ([1845] 1970, p. 72). The population was divided into growth-inhibiting (poor, old, unemployed people and foreigners) and growth-enhancing (wealthy, property-holding and higher qualified people) groups (cf. Esser & Steinert, 1991, p. 38). Homeless people and drug users, for example, were driven out of the inner city by repressive measures, the transformation of public spaces and an increase in security surveillance (cf. Beste, 2000, pp. 194–197). The neighbouring district near the main railway station, a location dominated by prostitution, was officially classified as a safety concern by the city. Truly, it was not considered an appropriate entrance to the city and the site was planned but never realised to be remodelled into a representative boulevard (Flagge, 1988, p. 190). Urban space was not only functionally and economically zoned but also socially segregated and culturally differentiated (Mayer, 1995, p. 125).

  The hierarchy of population groups was particularly obvious in housing construction. Between 1968 and 1987, 77 per cent of all housing was built as detached and semi-detached houses contrary to general demand forecasts (Scholz, 1989, p. 157). Social housing largely stagnated since the 1970s with the result that 20,000 households were on the waiting list in 1980 (Beste, 2000, p. 128). Only 3,500 social housing units were ready for occupancy by 1985, while in the same time period, 800 flats were lost annually due to disrepair or conversion to other uses (Balser, 1995, p. 432). One reason for the low level of housing construction was the high level of municipal debt. While the funds for most areas of the administration were cut, the cultural budget even increased between 1977 (DM 1.773 m.) and 1988 (DM 2.516 m.) (ibid., p. 141). Wallmann showed no understanding for the criticism of his priorities (cf. Wallmann, 1983). He considered only a mere fraction of the housing applicants as "genuine" emergencies (Wallmann, 1981). Here he was alluding to the high percentage of foreigners in the population. At 18.1 per cent, Frankfurt had the highest percentage of foreigners in the Federal Republic, and in 1988, it was already 23 per cent (Balser, 1995, p. 328). Foreign workers were accepted as labour, but their integration was actively obstructed and prevented (Ronneberger & Keil, 1995, p. 295). In 1980, the city attempted to stop to the admission of asylum-seekers. Later immigration bans and restricted zones were set up (ibid.). The fact that the population of the city had changed considerably since 1950 due to the immigration of German displaced persons and refugees and that the share of those born in Frankfurt was only 38 per cent even at that time was ignored (Balser, 1995, p. 141).

Metropolis Frankfurt

With 370 banks and a total gross value of almost DM 50 billion, Frankfurt was the most economically successful city in the FRG in the 1980s (Balser, 1995, p. 447; Beste, 2000, p. 125). In 1986, Walter Wallmann was appointed the first Federal Minister for the Environment,

Nature Protection and Reactor Safety by Helmut Kohl – in recognition of his accomplishments in Frankfurt. The CDU, however, lost the communal elections in 1989.

Not only the city's image but also that of the high-rise buildings had been successfully transformed. Although the construction of high-rise buildings had temporarily been reduced at the end of the 1970s, the national and international competition and changes in design criteria were closely observed in Frankfurt. The dark, unpretentious, low-cost facades were replaced by glass and steel, the ground plans were arranged more polygonally and public amenities such as restaurants, shops, recreation and sports facilities were integrated (Balser, 1995, p. 394; Flierl, 2000, p. 146). Ten new high-rise buildings were built during the 1980s. In order to guarantee continuous growth, the city set the objective of an increase in office space of 100,000 square metres annually (Balser, 1995, p. 432). In 1991, the *Messeturm* (trade fair tower) was finished as the highest building in Europe with 256.5 metres (Flierl, 2000, p. 139). In 1992, Frankfurt was decided as the new seat of the European Central Bank. In 1997, the new Commerzbank headquarters with a height of 259 metres set once more a record in European high-rise construction (Rodenstein, 2020, p. 276).

The international successes and the visual appeal of the skyline appeared to rebut all the longstanding criticism:

> An entire generation of egalitarian architects, planners and sociologists are rubbing their eyes in astonishment that a policy which flagrantly ignores social relationships now has hardly any problems with legitimation in the cities, even in those that once were considered the strongholds of social protest movements.
>
> *(Heterich, 1987, p. 211, authors translation)*

While the Selmi tower was the symbol of speculative urban development and destruction, almost 20 years later, the Messeturm was hailed by the public as a symbol of international standing (Heterich, 1988, p. 150).

Notes

1 Many thanks to Bastian Kniza for his critical comments on the previous versions of this text and to Lenia Barth for the helpful suggestions for the finishing touches.
2 The reason for the limitation was the length of the firemen's ladders, which could only be extended up to 22 metres.
3 Persons of German origin who lived, before the Second World War and after it ended, in the occupied territories in Eastern, Central and Southern Europe and who were expelled. Roughly 12.3 million people fled to the GDR and the BRD after they were established in 1949.
4 Frankfurt had already been an influential financial centre in the Middle Ages, but it had lost its importance with the foundation of the Second German Reich and the German Reichsbank in 1876 in Berlin. Banking and commerce continued to be the main pillars of the Frankfurt economy, however (Cf. Flierl, 2000; Stöber, 1964). At the beginning of the 19th century, the successful borrowing activities and the issuing of bonds on the part of Frankfurt banks, characterised for example by the Rothschild and Bethmann families, began, which led to the city's gaining in importance throughout Europe (Beste, 2000, p. 81; Stöber, 1964). The number of banks decreased from 182 to 119 in the years 1933 to 1939, however, due to the displacement and annihilation of the Jewish population (Ronneberger & Keil, 1995, p. 291).
5 In 1949, in "Le Grand Espoir du XXe Siècle", Fourastié had put down in writing his hypotheses on living and working in the year 2000 (Hospers, 2003, p. 11). In his reflections, new technologies paved the way for economic and social progress (ibid.). Their effects, in particular on industrial

production, would lead to a change in the pattern of employment and a gain in importance for the tertiary sector (Rhode, 1977; Burgard, 2000, p. 148).

6 Migrant workers who were systematically recruited in the 1950s and 1960s because of labour shortages in the period following the Second World War and who contributed significantly to the "economic miracle" in the BRD. The designation "guest worker" was intended to emphasise their temporary residence in Germany. Recruitment ceased in 1973.

7 Parties with voters in all sections and classes of the population.

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13

BETWEEN TWO DOMES

Shifting political power relations in post-2010 Budapest

Marcell Hajdu

Introduction

Budapest, the capital of Hungary, is renowned for the spectacular view provided by the slightly curving Danube at the core of the city, the several bridges connecting flat Pest with hilly Buda, and the countless representative buildings that frame the river from both sides. One of the most emblematic structures defining this view is the Royal Palace that stands atop the Castle Hill on the western bank of the Danube. Throughout the last decade, along with the palace's green dome, the thin and tall silhouettes of construction cranes have become an inseparable element of the Castle District's view. They mark an extraordinary building spree that has barely left any important symbolic spaces in the capital untransformed since the country's current governing coalition came to power in 2010. The countless large-scale symbolic developments initiated and led by the national government play a key role in the post-2010 regime's material and ideological reproduction.[1]

Contemporary Hungarian politics – especially the regime's leader figure – receive considerably more attention internationally than what would be warranted by the global weight of this small Central-Eastern-European country. It is a constant point of reference in scholarly investigations into the global democratic regression and the rise of right-wing populist political actors that characterise our time (e.g. Geiselberger, 2017; Pappas, 2019). In recent years, much research on various aspects of the regime's increasingly authoritarian politics has been published, documenting rather well how the 2010 landslide victory and the resulting two-thirds majority of the right-wing coalition enabled a wide-reaching transformation of Hungary's liberal democracy into – in the words of the prime minister (Orbán, 2014) – an illiberal state[2] (e.g. Kovács & Trencsényi, 2020; Bos & Lorenz, 2023).

That the new regime could solidify its power so swiftly and to such a remarkable extent is owed to two main factors. The first concerns the thoroughgoing polarisation of the country's political space. From the late 1990s onwards, Hungarian politics were dominated by two elite blocks opposed to each other, defined as "left" and "right" in cultural and identitarian terms, as well as by their differing relationship to Western capital (Palonen, 2009; Gagyi, 2016). The socialist-liberal government that was in power between 2002 and 2010 was mired in several

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controversies during its two terms, leading to the left's profound delegitimisation by 2010 (Palonen, 2012). The effects of austerity measures that were introduced in its second term as a corrective against the country's excessive indebtedness were exacerbated by the effects of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Rapidly rising discontent was channelled by the right into their agenda of a "political freedom fight" against international monetary institutions and domestic socialist-liberal elites (Gagyi, 2023).

With the left in tatters, the 2010 general elections brought the overwhelming success of the right. Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance) and its junior coalition partner KDNP (Christian Democratic People's Party) came to power with an absolute majority of the votes cast, while the radical right Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary) also gained significant support. Here, a second factor came into play, one that concerns some "unintentional […] mistakes" in the post-communist Hungarian constitution (Scheppele, 2013). The approximately 53 percent of the votes that the winning coalition received in 2010 translated into 68 percent of the seats in the National Assembly owing to the "somewhat majoritarian tendency" of the electoral system (Tóka, 2014, pp. 311–312). As the post-communist constitution was designed to be "flexible in the time of rapid change" (Scheppele, 2013, p. 560), the winning coalition's highly disciplined two-thirds majority in Parliament was sufficient for the government to change the constitution as it pleased and to push any legislation through without having to rely on the votes of oppositional representatives. In the words of economist János Kornai (2015, p. 35), the new government turned the parliament into a "law factory". It rewrote the constitution (Jakab & Bodnár, 2023) and passed an unprecedented number of laws under its first term, effectively dismantling the country's rule-of-law guarantees (Pap, 2017, pp. 15–25).

Spatialising "The System of National Cooperation"

As legal scholar Renáta Uitz (2020) has demonstrated, the "Declaration of National Cooperation" adopted by the National Assembly shortly after the 2010 elections can be read as a rather flexible ideological base for this thoroughgoing transformation of the Hungarian state's democratic structures. In this document, the government interpreted the results of the elections as a "revolution in the voting booth", a break with the politics of the two preceding decades and a mandate to build a new political and economic system on the basis of a "popular democratic will" (National Assembly, 2010). This new order was dubbed "the System of National Cooperation", in which the government steers the country as the direct representative of the will of an ostensibly united nation. Exclusionary nationalist and populist articulations became essential to the reproduction of this undivided national subject (Palonen, 2018).

The narrative of a wide-reaching national consensus is opposed to the concept of a deliberative form of government – to the logic of parliamentary debate between representatives of different social groupings. The new system is founded upon the idea that the constitutional majority won by the governing coalition mandates it to carry out all changes it deems necessary. In what follows, the focus will be on the spatial dimension of the resulting power imbalance between the executive and legislative branches of government that materialised in Hungary since 2010 (Ilonszki & Vajda, 2021). Budapest, as the capital city, has been the central stage of political struggles throughout the history of the modern Hungarian nation state. Changes in the capital's material space are always intimately entangled with political agendas

(Therborn, 2017). The spatial dimension of the Parliament's post-2010 emptying of its political function and the concurrent empowerment of the national government on the grounds of an ostensible national unity is best studied through the transformation of the Hungarian Parliament building, the square surrounding it, and the reconstruction of Budapest's Castle District partially as a government district.

Methodologically, the study relies on discourse analysis as it was developed by scholars of the "Essex-school" (Marchart, 2017). Based primarily on the political thought of philosophers Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), this strand of discourse analysis assumes that any social order is constituted as a symbolic order, and is an historical and contingent construct that has no transcendental ground, and thus no absolute necessity (Marchart, 2017, p. 57; see also Marchart, 2008). Discourses in this context are not mere linguistic phenomena, but relational structures from which the very meaning of our social reality arises. From this perspective, identities or subjects do not pre-exist discourses; they are first constituted within discourse. If that is the case, the basic unit of analysis cannot be the different social groupings that work to solidify, or on the contrary, to contest the hegemonic order.[3]

Here, Laclau's concept of democratic demands (Laclau, 2005) provides a good base for the analysis of social change: demands point towards a lack within existing social structures, dislocating the standing order. The practice of articulation refers to the process in which different demands are connected into "chains of equivalence" forming particular social identities. Chains of equivalence can, however, only remain stable when articulated against a negative outside. In this process, certain signifiers are emptied of their particular content and come to stand for the entire set of demands. The task of the discourse analyst in this context is to map the specific form these theoretically derived positionalities take within a concrete political context (Marchart, 2017, p. 62). Here, the focus is how the transformation and shifting meanings of two material spaces in the national capital are entangled in the discourse of the "System of National Cooperation" that structures Hungarian social reality since 2010.

From this perspective, the 2010 elections marked a historical turning point, in which various previously unsatisfied democratic demands were articulated into a chain of equivalence organised around values promoted by the newly elected right-wing coalition, and against the politics of the preceding socialist-liberal government. The overwhelming electoral success gave way to the "the System of National Cooperation". As the dichotomous structure of the Hungarian political space collapsed, a "united nation" was articulated as the subject of the new order. Along with the charismatic leader-figure, the main signifiers around which the post-2010 system is structured include religious and conservative values, the family, the concept of a "work-based society", etc. At the same time, the identity of the regime is articulated against numerous outside threats ranging from the government's allegedly corrupt "left-liberal" opposition to ostensible global forces aiming to replace the Hungarian population with migrants (Palonen, 2018).

The above-described weakening of the legislative and strengthening of the executive as well as the parallel transformation of the Parliament's surroundings and of the Castle District are integral elements of the discourse of "the System of National Cooperation". As Uitz (2020) argues, the thoroughgoing legal changes that cemented the current Hungarian government's power since 2010 were legitimated by the articulation of a revolutionary break and the parallel emergence of a unified national subject represented directly by the executive. Here, the emphasis is on how the two studied symbolic spaces are entangled within these articulations. The chapter is based on observations made within the studied spaces, particularly

during political events, a review of planning documents and media communications by the organisations and officials responsible for the re-development of the spaces, legal documents, as well as speeches held by the prime minister.

Before taking a closer look at precisely how these two spaces are entangled in the discourse of the "System of National Cooperation", the development of their relationship throughout the history of the modern Hungarian nation state is briefly introduced. The recent transformation of these spaces and their shifting relationship can only be fully understood in the light of this longer history. The subsequent section focuses on the Kossuth square around the Parliament, exploring its role in the articulation of a united nation as the subject of the new regime. Consequently, shifts in the relationship of the Kossuth square and the Parliament building after 2010 are studied in the light of the legislative's weakening. Lastly, the role of the Castle District's transformation, particularly the relocation of the prime minister's office in the re-production of the executive's empowerment, is explored. The chapter is concluded by a short summary.

The two domes

In the beginning of the 19th century, Buda, the local seat of royal power, and Pest, a rapidly growing industrial town, were separate cities. The idea of their unification as the Hungarian capital – the "Budapest-thought", as historians refer to it – was, however, a central concern of the Hungarian Reform Age in the first half of the 19th century (Csorba, 1993). The construction of the Chain Bridge – the first permanent bridge between the twin cities that was built between 1842 and 1849 – was an important step towards this goal. The rising national consciousness of the first half of the 19th century peaked in the 1848/1849 revolution and freedom fight, which was defeated by the Habsburgs. With dreams of democratisation and national sovereignty shattered, the issue of the unification was relegated to the background too.

Only in 1867 did the "Compromise" establish Hungary as largely independent within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Three years later, in 1870, the Council of Public Works was founded, a planning authority responsible for the development of the twin cities, a last step towards the unification of the cities of Pest, Buda, and Óbuda that happened in 1873. Soon, Budapest officially became the capital of the Hungarian Kingdom. It was the beginning of a period which is often referred to as the "Golden Age" of the city that finally ended with World War I and the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Within these four decades, the city has seen an unprecedented boom, its historical core as it is known today is largely a product of this era.[4]

By the end of the 19th century, the view over the Danube was dominated by two representative structures: the Royal Palace and the Parliament. The royal residence has long been located upon the Castle Hill, but following Budapest's unification and the coronation of Franz Joseph as the King of Hungary, it was expanded. The expansion started with the construction of the Castle Bazaar on the Danube side of the hill in 1875 and ended in the beginning of the 1900s as the Palace reached its final form and was crowned by a large dome (Sisa, 2016, pp. 812–820). Throughout the period, the Castle District served as a governmental quarter where most ministries were located.

Ambitions to construct a permanent location for the Hungarian National Assembly had arisen already in the first half of the 19th century and were from the beginning on closely

FIGURE 13.1 The view of Budapest from the southern tip of the Margaret Island. The Parliament is visible on the left; the Royal Palace can be seen in the distance, in the middle of the picture. Photograph by the author.

entangled with shifting ideas regarding the ideals of liberalism and democracy in Hungary (Dányi, 2015). Nevertheless, only in 1880 was the decision made to construct a new parliament building. Through a competition, plans for a neo-Gothic edifice were chosen. Construction works lasted from 1885 to 1904, with the exterior being completely finished for the 1896 Millennial celebrations (Sisa, 2016, pp. 792–802). Similarly to the Royal Palace across the river, the Parliament building was topped off with a large dome, resembling, according to the architect, a temple of the constitution (Gerő, 2009, pp. 25–26).

The two structures and the spaces surrounding them are the products of the same era, and both were meant to represent the greatness and wealth of the Hungarian Kingdom at the time. Nevertheless, they also represented the increasing tension between the old logic of the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire and the emerging ideals of national sovereignty, constitutionalism, and liberal democracy that defined this historical period. The axis of political power, which was set in stone at the end of the 19th century with the construction of the Royal Palace and the Parliament, has subsequently been fundamental to the representation of political power under any regime. What does the transformation of these spaces since 2010 tell us about the state of Hungarian democracy?

The main square of the nation

The reconstruction of the Kossuth Square around the Parliament was initiated in July 2011. The project was later named after the Parliament's architect, Imre Steindl, and featured the renovation of the square, the construction of a new visitors' centre and underground garage, as well as the renovation of the buildings surrounding the square. This included the

demolition of a modernist building from the state-socialist period and the construction of a new office for the National Assembly in its place based on plans from the late 1920s. At the time of writing, the renovation of the Palace of Justice and the Ministry of Agriculture facing the Parliament from the east is also under way.

As historian András Gerő (2009, p. 29) wrote, the Parliament has been the main symbol of political power in the country since it was built, despite the fact that real political power dwelled outside of the building for most of the 20th century:

> When the building was erected everybody knew that without Francis Joseph there could be no meaningful political decisions. Yet the ruler saw to the affairs from Vienna and never worked from the Parliament building. Between the two wars everybody knew that Miklós Horthy, the regent of independent Hungary, lived in the Buda Castle and had generally the same sphere of authority as Francis Joseph. During the communist era everybody knew that the essential power resided at the party headquarters, […] (Actually the important decisions were not made there, but in Moscow). The known power center could be in the Buda Castle or in the capital of the Soviet Union, the Parliament still became fixed as a building of symbolic power.
>
> *(Gerő, 2009, p. 29)*

The square around the country's symbolic centre of political power accordingly became the space where "the people" standing behind this power – or on the contrary, against it – were staged. It has been the central stage for the manifestation of support for the hegemonic order but also played a central role in the choreographies of all the revolutions that shook the country throughout the 20th century (Gerő, 2009, pp. 30–37). Within this context, it is not surprising that the Kossuth square has also been central for the representation of the "united nation" in the wake of the 2010 elections that were stylised by the new government as a "revolution in the voting booth". From then on, the Kossuth square has been referred to as the "main square of the nation" (Zsuppán, 2020).

On 29 May 2010, one-and-a-half months after the elections, the newly sworn in prime minister held a programmatic speech at Kossuth square. "This square is symbolic for us" – he said – "It is the symbolic space of the nation's togetherness, of national cooperation, of the nation's freedom" (Orbán, 2010). In the coming years, Kossuth square has repeatedly been used as the stage of mass political events organised by the regime. The most important such displays of power have been the so-called peace marches, organised by a civil organisation with close ties to the government (Greskovits, 2020, p. 263). Between 2012 and 2022, eight marches took place in the capital, almost always coinciding with one of the country's national holidays either on the 15 March or the 23 October, remembering the 1848 and the 1956 revolutions, respectively. Peace marches held in 2014, 2018, and 2022, years in which elections were held, always fell on the former date, demonstrating the popular base of the regime – the unity of the nation – shortly before the country went to the polls.

The architectural transformation of the space made it more accessible, better suited for mass events. Cars were banned from the square, green surfaces were renovated, and the majority of memorials replaced by statues that stood here during the interwar period (Palonen, 2019b, pp. 191–193). Questions of security played a central role in the new state-of-the-art design. The fence that was installed by the preceding socialist-liberal government in the wake of the 2006 demonstrations around the Parliament was removed, and much less conspicuous

FIGURE 13.2   The Kossuth square as seen from the North. The Parliament is visible on the left side of the picture. Photograph by the author.

design solutions were used to enable control over the masses.[5] This included the creation of elevated surfaces, inaccessible green spaces, and water elements that were suggested by numerous designs submitted for the planning competition organised by the previous regime in 2007 (Csepely-Knorr, 2007). The most important public space of the country was rebuilt to enable the powerful display of publics supportive of the hegemonic order, at the same time providing the means to hinder the emergence of new popular subjects.

Democratic facade

The interactive map that opens the website of the organisation responsible for the Kossuth square's transformation (Steindl Imre Program Nonprofit Zrt, 2023) is based on a photograph taken from the Parliament's dome. It signals that the building only plays a marginal role in the project, the focus being the main square of the nation. As Gerő (2009) argued, however, the square's symbolic function derives from the presence of the Parliament. Although no significant changes were made on the structure itself, its relationship to the square has been altered considerably.

Visual and physical access from the Kossuth square to the Parliament building has improved significantly with the demolition of the fence with which it was surrounded under the preceding regime, and with the construction of the new underground visitors' centre. These measures project an opening up of the legislation to the square, enabling "the people" – that is the unified nation – to enter and take pride in the building. The most important sight of the organised tours offered through the Parliament is a display located in the representative Dome Hall that showcases the Holy Crown and Coronation Insignia that were moved there under the first Fidesz government in the year 2000 (Nyyssönen, 2008, p. 177). In contrast

to, for example, the German Reichstag in Berlin, visitors are unlikely to get a glimpse of parliamentary representatives, as the tours proceed through the northern part of the Parliament, the former Upper House, while the National Assembly convenes in the former Lower House in the south. The focus of visits is not on the legislative process and the ideals of a liberal democracy but much rather spaces and artefacts that stand for national greatness.

In fact, the legislative process has become less and less visible since 2010, reflecting and re-producing the diminished weight of this branch of government. The Kossuth square's reconstruction did not only include the creation of a garage for the Parliament but also a tunnel connecting the building with the new office building of the National Assembly. These underground infrastructures enable parliamentary representatives to enter and go about their business without having to encounter the public. Areas within the Parliament that can be accessed by journalists have also been narrowed to a minimum, so that members of parliament unwilling to engage with remaining independent media outlets can bypass these with ease (Smuk, 2017, pp. 20–22). While parliamentary debates are still broadcasted, their relevance with regard to political decision-making is rather limited as the governing coalition's two-thirds majority is a guarantee for the passing of bills supported by the government.

Expressions such as the "hollowing out" of democracy are used commonly to describe how contemporary authoritarian regimes strive to retain the appearance of democratic structures, while circumventing the limits that these would place on their executive power. In this context, the Parliament building can be understood as a democratic facade that covers up the fact that the legislative has lost its political weight as the result of the current regime's thoroughgoing transformation of the Hungarian state. The public is given an opportunity to take a look behind this facade, but only the symbols of an ostensible national unity are showcased there, instead of an assembly of representatives from different parties that would reflect precisely the impossibility of such a national unity.

The real centre of political power

On the other side of the Danube, the reconstruction of the Castle District was started in 2014. Mainly conceived of as a representational project partially catering for tourists, the National Hauszmann Programme – named after the architect of the Royal Palace complex – was paralleled by the moving of government offices into the area. Just as in the case of the Kossuth square's transformation, this meant the restoration of the quarter to its pre-Second World War state.[6] Plans included the relocation of the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Finance into the Castle District. The Prime Minister's Office moved into its new building adjacent to the Sándor Palace – the residence of the President – in 2019, putting the head of the government nearby the Royal Palace. The reconstruction of the building for the Ministry of Finance is well underway, the moving of the Ministry of Interior has, however, been dropped from the plans. The moving of parts of the Ministry of Defence into the former building of the Museum of Military History in the Castle District was announced in the summer of 2023.

Political power has increasingly been centralised in the hands of the prime minister since 2010. With the relocation of the prime minister's office, the *Karmelita* – the building of the former Carmelite Monastery in which it is now located – has become the material expression of this centralisation of power. This is where government meetings are held, where the prime minister receives protocol visits, where most political decisions are taken. The building,

FIGURE 13.3   The small street in front of the Prime Minister's Office. Photograph by the author.

especially its large terrace towering over the Danube, is used as a setting for images that are essential for the construction of political narratives and figures. The staging of the country's leader figure in the company of other politicians and public personae above the Parliament and occasionally with the Royal Palace in the background is essential to the reproduction of the power imbalance between the executive and the legislative.

Unlike that of the Parliament, beyond the images produced by this highly organised public relations operation, the heavily protected street-facade of the Karmelita remains impenetrable to all, except the closest associates of the head of government. Scrutiny of political decision-making is impossible as no audio recordings have been made at government meetings since 2018. Journalists from independent media outlets, who were ousted from the hallways of the Parliament, temporarily concentrated their efforts at questioning members of the national government into the small street in front of this building. Recently, however, even this street has been fenced off allegedly due to construction works, in a way reminiscent of the preceding government's fencing off of the Parliament.[7] Any such scrutiny is portrayed as an affront to the regime's unquestionable mandate provided by the will of an ostensibly united nation.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to show how the transformation of Budapest is entangled in shifting power relations between Hungary's legislative and executive branches of government since 2010. Concentrating on two of the capital's most important symbolic spaces closely entwined with the country's political history, it firstly explored the role of the Kossuth square around the Hungarian Parliament building in the articulation of a united national subject by the country's current regime. National celebrations and political mass events organised in this space are central to the staging of the united people that serves as the legitimation

for the government's unrestrained use of its executive power. In a second step, the shifting relationship between the Kossuth square and the Parliament building was explored, showing the parallel movements of the Parliament's seeming opening up for "the people" and the practical invisibilisation of decision making. Lastly, the relocation of the Prime Minister's Office into the Castle District of Budapest was studied in the light of the executive's growing power. The methodological approach based on the Essex-School strand of discourse analysis proved rather helpful in the conceptualisation of urban transformations not as mere consequences or instruments of larger political changes, but as their integral, mutually co-constitutive parts. It enabled a "reading" of the studied spatial processes as parts of the discourse of the "System of National Cooperation" that structures Hungarian social reality since 2010.

Notes

1 They are the main instruments of an increasingly authoritarian form of neo-liberal governmentality (Akçalı & Korkut, 2015) and are central to the government's entangled nationalist and populist political articulations (Palonen, 2019a).
2 While the term "illiberalism" correctly reflects the regime's dismantling of liberal democratic institutional structures since 2010, the term is avoided here due to its complex entanglement in the regime's anti-liberal and anti-Western narratives that cannot be explored in detail (e.g. Palonen, 2018, p. 316).
3 Laclau and Mouffe's theoretical project builds on Gramsci's concept of hegemony to account for how certain political projects attempt to universalise their values (Howarth, 2015, pp. 6–11).
4 The definitive work on Budapest's architectural and planning history under the Council of Public Works remains to be the 1931 book 'How was Budapest Built? (1870–1930) by László Siklóssy (1985).
5 One of the most notorious civil disobedience actions of Fidesz politicians in opposition was the demolition of the fence surrounding the Parliament in 2007. Images of the former and future prime minister carrying off elements of the defensive structure circulated through the media widely. In the above-cited 2010 speech, he highlighted the issue of the fence, arguing that the square was "not fenced off accidentally by those, who always feared the unity of the nation" (Orbán, 2010).
6 Similar plans were made under the first Fidesz government between 1998 and 2002 (Kiss, 2019, pp. 117–118), which were, however, not realised then.
7 One of the remaining independent media outlets made an informative video explaining the situation (Telex, 03.07.2022).

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URBAN PLANNING UNDER POLITICAL POWER FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

Concluding thoughts

Victoria Grau and Max Welch Guerra

The complex relationship between urban planning – and other scales of spatial planning – and the respective form of rule can be better understood if two functions of urban planning are taken into consideration and seen as complementary. Urban planning is a means of organizing the continual material reproduction of society as a whole in spatial terms. At the same time, urban planning contributes to the reproduction of the respective form of rule. Material and political reproduction can often only be distinguished theoretically. The reconstruction of cities after wars or the state-led production of housing – only to name two of the major programs in European history since 1945 – contributed to a significant improvement in the housing and living conditions of the population and were important means of stabilizing and strengthening the respective form of rule. The allocation of resources via urban planning was never simply the result of technical or economic logic, but rather bowed to the interests of strong institutions that were supporting and benefiting forces of the respective form of rule. These institutions included branches of industry, large enterprises, ministries, parties, and often complex interest blocs. These institutions have often integrated parts of the expert planning community into their midst.

Subordination and relative autonomy

Spatial planning was and continues to be an important tool to increase the ruling system's ability to act and its legitimation. Experts from the field of urban planning repeatedly provided the respective executive with urban planning models and concrete examples that were valuable suggestions for optimizing the material and political reproduction of the respective system of rule. These proposals were often suitable for creating credible narratives on glorious pasts, a magnificent present, and inviting futures. Planning served, for a large part, as an aid in decision-making for political, social, and economic processes as well as their justification.

Nevertheless, the fundamental employment of urban planning for the interests of the ruling system did not necessarily lead to the complete subordination of the experts. A certain distance and autonomy were often retained through the exchange of knowledge and experience

among experts – in the 20th century, especially via journals – an intensive and critical examination of the current state of the discipline, knowledge about spatial planning in other countries, and an in-depth analysis of the spatial dimension of social reality. Planners, or at least the planning community, can draw on systemic knowledge, which enables them to discover problem constellations at an early stage, suggest possible corrections, or draw attention to alternative development paths. The tendency toward partial autonomy is a precondition for the further development of both the academic discipline and the field of practice and has enabled independent proposals or the articulation of system-critical reform programs even under dictatorial conditions. This relative autonomy offers room for emancipatory action.

Specific treatment of social groups

We gain revealing insights into the political function of planning when we examine which social groups, classes, or communities were the target group of spatial policies. Every system of rule that was portrayed in this volume targeted its planning programs at particular groups of society. In most cases, it was the new middle classes that benefited from this approach. Existing areas were changed to keep privileged population groups in the city or to draw them there; new areas were designated to offer attractive spaces for expansion. The question raised as to whether the collapse of state socialism can also be explained by the fact that state socialism did not provide the middle class with the urban spaces that they aspired to.

The reverse of this priority for the middle classes was often the displacement of subaltern population groups from their habitats, either explicitly or by accepting the indirect effects of urban renewal or urban redevelopment. However, urban planning also served as a means of providing for disadvantaged sections of the population. One motivation for this was the attempt to win their support for the respective system of rule. Economic considerations were also decisive, for example, to create the conditions for new industrialization boosts, ensure agricultural production, or slow down the rural exodus. Neoliberal steering modes have developed their own mechanisms for this. The deregulation of housing policy in particular has had a depoliticizing effect, making housing shortages and displacement appear not as the result of political decisions but as a natural consequence of changes in supply and demand. The political character and the intentionality of neoliberal planning tend to become invisible where disadvantages arise for entire population groups.

Urban planning as an instrument of propaganda and self-portrayal

Ruling systems have defined and updated their political representation for centuries by means of urban development. Numerous examples presented in this book show how the urban products of these projects were – both historically and in the present – systematically presented as the political systems' achievements and exploited for propaganda purposes. Products of urban planning are extraordinary convincing propaganda vehicles. Whether these were actually realized or merely planned projects was of secondary importance. Government districts, monuments, places of mass events, and cultural buildings were of particular importance for both internal and external representation. The preservation, conversion, and systematic destruction of historical sites were intended to increase the validity of the narratives that served the respective form. Today, illiberally governed countries are increasingly exercising such practices.

Global economic competition, which can also be regarded as competition for international cultural hegemony, has resulted in competition between locations. An effective urban development policy is pursued, which puts inner cities, and in particular city centers, under strong pressure to adapt to what has been defined as the standards of competition. The reputation of certain cities – not just capital cities – and the political effectiveness of the executive are measured by the implementation of representative projects. Compared to the public interest as the goal of planning, the planners' assertiveness gains in importance.

Recourse to urbanist legacies of past periods of rule

Among the far-reaching new developments in urban planning in the second half of the 20th century, there is a practice in Europe, but also elsewhere, that has developed very strongly to a field of spatial planning to which urban research and planning education have only gradually reacted. It concerns paying attention to urban ensembles that belong to painful chapters of a country's past. In some cases, these are products of toppled dictatorships, which become the subject of extensive discussions and thus offer an opportunity for societal processes of self-definition that have not yet taken place. In some countries, the comprehensive processing of such legacies is embedded in a lengthy history of debates on the political past. Decisions on the function and design of these facilities are then part of a state-sanctioned, historical-political understanding of *raison d'état*, which is based on a broad consensus. In other countries, urbanistic interventions do not play a comparable role in the collective processing of a painful past. It is tribunals, literature, and films or public controversies that serve as the primary media for defining and redefining the common history. However, depending on their professional profile and socio-political self-conception, planners can become protagonists in these negotiations.

Urban planning as a constant political instrument

As demonstrated in the example of Germany, urban planning was an instrument that enabled various and even opposing forms of rule, such as the state-controlled capitalism of Nazi Germany, the centralistic state socialism of the GDR, and the neoliberal capitalism of the FRG since the 1980s, to control the further transformation of society. This is also true, however, for periods of dictatorial forms of rule in countries whose spatial planning has been paid little attention until now, such as Portugal under Salazar and Spain under Franco. The new type of rule, which, following Victor Orbán's own term, is generally referred to as "illiberal", also relies on urban planning. Even the first country in which neoliberal deregulation was applied consistently and without opposition – Chile from mid-1975 under a military dictatorship – was only able to avoid public urban planning for a short time. This applies all the more to the parliamentary democracy since 1990, which only partially modified the neoliberal development model.

On the other hand, it should be recalled that experience with the planned economy under state socialism in some countries, such as the Czech Republic and Romania, rendered the mere idea of planning, including urban planning, a communist anachronism. There is some evidence that the urge to belong to the EU was an important reason for the introduction of urban planning in some countries. The peculiar effect of the supranational institution of the EU on the spatial planning of what are now 27 states with almost half a billion inhabitants

is a task in its own right, which we have not been able to deal with here. It is likely to be underestimated outside the member states. Especially from the perspective of global planning research, this is an immense field of research.

Multiple factors in the internationalization of planning

Parallels in the application of urban planning, even between countries that embody very contrasting forms of governance, arise from quite different factors. Technological change spurs of industrialization and restrictions due to scarcity of resources and ecological crises, for example, lead to the use of comparable planning approaches and the establishment of comparable instruments – obviously depending on the local conditions of governance and the state of the planning system. Shifts in the development strategy are of great importance. Neo-Keynesian or neoliberal turnarounds, opening or closing to the world market, or conversion to sustainability goals sometimes lead to similar spatial restructuring under very different forms of rule. This was also supported by the exchange of experience across system boundaries. The parallels between the countries of European state socialism are likely to find much stronger explanatory content among these supranational determinants of spatial development than is generally assumed. The Western view of European state socialism, which was influenced by the Cold War for decades, exaggerated the direct influence of the hegemonic Soviet Union. The term Eastern Bloc is part of this distortion.

Since the 1990s, the internationalization of capital movements, the expansion of means of communication, and the mobility of planning experts have brought about a qualitative change in working conditions. The generalization of the level of information about world events alone has increased significantly. The range of accessible foreign experiences with planning, as well as the exchange of information about conflicts and debates that are sometimes even geographically very distant, has also broken down boundaries for research. Our non-European study on planning in Chile by Chilean researchers proves to be a further contribution to a joint scientific community. This dimension of globalization has immediate consequences for the profession, and especially for the training of the new generation of planners.

Current phenomena in global politics

We are finishing this volume in January 2024. At the point of publication, several correlations indicate that the intensification of past and recent societal conflicts could reinforce the significance of spatial policies and change the methods of implementation.

Globalization has experienced a strong boost since around 1990 and led to the reconfiguration of entire countries and regions of the world. The world economy is currently experiencing a new phase of internationalization, with consequences for planning worldwide. This new phase is characterized by an increasingly regionalized internationalization, which resulted from the COVID-19 pandemic, trade conflicts, and the redistribution of power between the global economic forces and their military strength in the course of the ongoing armed conflicts. Governments and supranational organizations are resorting to a policy of partial self-sufficiency in order to avoid dependence on imports of energy, pharmaceuticals, or food, for example. The international division of labor and thus also the economic functions of entire regions are being reshaped. Sooner or later, such upheavals will take on a spatial dimension and trigger new ecological and demographic effects. The pressure to adapt

is enormous, as the speed and precision of adaptation to the new conditions will determine whether a country or a region can retain its position in the international division of labor. The consequences of this new phase of internationalization, which goes hand in hand with massive militarization, cannot yet be predicted. Nevertheless, it is certain that this pressure to adapt will directly lead to new challenges for planning.

There is no guarantee that this transition to a new phase of spatial planning will proceed under democratic conditions. Illiberal urbanism, which is currently remodeling Budapest to serve an autocracy, is also unfolding with its own characteristics in Romania. The government of the radical right-wing Giorgia Meloni has not yet had any structural consequences for Italy's spatial development. However, illiberalism is casting its shadow over the Czech Republic and Chile. If we broaden our view to countries not covered in this volume, countries such as Russia and Turkey come to mind. For better representation of autocratic rule, vertical planning is used to radically rebuild cities – not just capitals – and to further privilege select classes, to benefit real estate capital and the construction industry. Along with the intensified economic and military competition in the world, many indications suggest that such forms of rule will become a permanent, or at least a strongly assertive phenomenon as a political determinant of spatial planning.

Challenges in light of the climate crisis

The most important task today not only to urban planning but also to society as a whole is finding answers to the hazards of intensified ecological crises. As the construction and operation of buildings cause over 40 percent of all carbon emissions worldwide, changes and adaptations in architecture and construction are already on the political agenda. Movements like Architects for Future are the first wave of politicized new generations of professionals, who also collaborate internationally.

The level of innovation in the construction sector has increased significantly in recent years in view of the ecological challenges and continues to shape the contours of global competition. The driving force behind these developments and high investments are predominantly economic interests. Growth coalitions consider their legitimacy threatened and try to maintain their existing growth strategies by pursuing innovative measures. Instead of a real upheaval, high and smart technologies are being implemented that are primarily intended to compensate for environmental impact. Sustainability, essentially a guiding principle for intergenerationally and environmentally responsible action is often exploited by authoritarian governments as a marketing label and synonym for technical advancement and innovation in global competition. This greenwashing is particularly common in high-profile megaprojects.

However, the effects of the multifaceted ecological crisis demand a fundamental renegotiation of the status quo. The climate crisis cannot be addressed solely by the technical implementation of individual measures. The role of spatial planning as a coordinating and cross-scale discipline is significantly consolidated.

The urgency of this demand is even more evident considering the global spatial justice in terms of natural resources, the limits of growth, and in questions of alternative energy supply, with hydrogen in particular being a topic of current debate. It requires overcoming a way of life that, even under the determinants of parliamentary democracy meant, the depletion of resources, the destruction of flora and fauna, and the dissolution of material and immaterial culture. Urban planning is still the accomplice of its midwife, the growth-driven society.

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