**IMISCOE Research Series**

## Aida Ibričević

# Decided Return Migration

Emotions, Citizenship, Home and Belonging in Bosnia and Herzegovina

**IMISCOE Research Series**

This series is the offcial book series of IMISCOE, the largest network of excellence on migration and diversity in the world. It comprises publications which present empirical and theoretical research on different aspects of international migration. The authors are all specialists, and the publications a rich source of information for researchers and others involved in international migration studies. The series is published under the editorial supervision of the IMISCOE Editorial Committee which includes leading scholars from all over Europe. The series, which contains more than eighty titles already, is internationally peer reviewed which ensures that the book published in this series continue to present excellent academic standards and scholarly quality. Most of the books are available open access.

Aida Ibričević

# Decided Return Migration

Emotions, Citizenship, Home and Belonging in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Aida Ibričević The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) PRIO Migration Center/Global Fellows Program Oslo, Norway

ISSN 2364-4087 ISSN 2364-4095 (electronic) IMISCOE Research Series ISBN 978-3-031-58346-9 ISBN 978-3-031-58347-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-58347-6

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#### **Contents**




#### **About the Author**

**Aida Ibričević** is a political scientist and migration researcher with a wide range of research interests, including political emotions and migration, citizenship, external voting, return migration, women in the diaspora, migration in the healthcare and ICT sectors, diasporic knowledge transfer, and diaspora engagement policies. She publishes her work in scholarly journals and provides peer-review to a number of international academic journals, including *International Migration* (Wiley) and *Emotions, History, Culture, Society* (Brill). Aida's academic credentials include a Bachelor of Arts in Economics from Middlebury College in the United States, a Master of Arts in Economics from Central European University (CEU) in Hungary, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Istanbul Bilgi University in Turkey. Ibričević is affliated as a Global Fellow at the PRIO Migration Center, Peace Research Institute Oslo, Norway. She is proud of her "BiH Diaspora Discussions," at www. aidaibricevic.com, a blogging space devoted to contextualizing contemporary academic and policy debates within the realities of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian diaspora.

#### **Chapter 1 Introduction**

"I want to go home,1 " a highly successful documentary series started broadcasting on various Bosnian TV channels in May 2016. The documentary program (Kenović, 2016) features the stories of artists, entrepreneurs, scientists, academics, and other professionals who have built their careers abroad and have now returned "home" to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Scenes of harmonious family life flled with homemade food and drink, breathtaking images of natural landscapes, and the nostalgic sounds of *sevdah* music are interwoven with the returnees telling their life stories. In the interviews, the participants acknowledge the benefts of greater career opportunities, economic advantages, democratic freedoms, and political stability of living in the West. However, almost every interviewee emphasized how they *feel* more content as *citizens* in their country of origin; how they *belong* there and how they are socially and spiritually more fulflled in their *home* environment. The returnees often invoked well-known phrases such as "There's no place like home," "Home is where the heart is," "Home sweet home," or a Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian saying that goes something like "Travel the world, but keep coming back home.2 " Such expressions seem to have universal appeal, often found dutifully embroidered on handcrafted ornaments stitching together an amalgamation of warmth and comfort. Yet, their direct application to a context of forced migration and displacement, where some returnees were victims of violence, mass expulsions, ethnic cleansing campaigns, and other forms of persecution, while others have endured considerable sacrifces to make their return a reality, seems to be highly questionable. The documentary series also appears to be in line with international community efforts3

<sup>1</sup>B-C-S: *Hoću kući*. The acronym B-C-S stands for Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian and refers to one shared language with three names.

<sup>2</sup>B-C-S: *Svijetom pođi, kući dođi*.

<sup>3</sup>Some examples include the recently completed United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Swiss government and International Organization for Migration (IOM) funded "Diaspora for Development" project or the ongoing "DiasporaInvest" project funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

towards diaspora engagement. Countless "diaspora business forums," networking events and roundtables are being organized by various levels of government to attract investment from members of the BiH diaspora. Faced with a dwindling tax base, because of high unemployment and emigration rates, the BiH authorities are trying to lure the desperately needed investment for job creation.4 The returnees' warm and "homely" responses were accepted and not questioned or problematized by the flmmakers, leading me to believe that the popular TV program was made to promote return and not present a more nuanced understanding of it. Unabated by the often overly sentimentalized, and at times saccharine portrayals of warm homecomings, and with my researcher curiosity piqued, I set out to investigate the phenomenon with scholarly rigor and present my fndings in this book.

I begin my exploration with a somewhat puzzling situation of voluntary return to a country with one of the largest diasporas relative to the native-born population in the world. Collyer (2013) ranks Bosnia and Herzegovina to be the third country in the world with the highest emigrant population relative to the total population, meaning that 40.4% of its citizens live as emigrants abroad. According to more recent, UNDP and BiH Ministry of Security, estimates between 2 and 2,2 million citizens originating from BiH (UNDP, 2014; BiH Ministry of Security, 2023), or more than one half of the prewar population, currently lives and works abroad. The newer estimates place Bosnia and Herzegovina at the top of the list of net emigration countries (relative to the total population) in Europe. Forced migration during the 1990s wars in the former Yugoslavia, together with overall failures in policies of sustainable refugee return, are mostly responsible for the widely spread BiH diaspora. However, the population movements of the tragic 1990s are not the only culprit. Even after close to three decades of peace and a "failed success" (Bieber, 2015), people of all ethnic backgrounds are leaving this small European country in droves to fnd employment and opportunity elsewhere. It is diffcult to obtain offcial numbers of people leaving, because there is no legal obligation to de-register residence in BiH. EU sources are indicative. Eurostat data for 2013–2021 register 295,090 frst time residence permits issued to BiH citizens in EU countries, with an observed trend of consistent increases from year to year. A politically dysfunctional state structure embedded in a Constitution which was set up to end a war and not to build the foundations for a lasting and prosperous peace; a society deeply divided along ethno-religious fault lines, years of lagging economic growth with high

<sup>4</sup>To gain a sense of the diaspora's relative importance for the BiH gross domestic product (GDP) it is useful to compare remittances and diaspora consumer spending to total foreign direct investment (FDI). According to the World Bank (see Ratha et al., 2023), offcial remittance infows to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2022 totaled USD 2,5 billion, comprising 9,7% of GDP. It is estimated that unoffcial fgures are signifcantly higher. Diaspora consumer spending during return visits and vacations in BiH are close to one billion USD per year, according to Naša Perspektiva, a Bosnian NGO facilitating diaspora investment. Meanwhile, the BiH Central Bank reports (Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2023) total FDI for 2022 to be USD 790 million. Although the FDI fgure is an aggregate, some percentage of this number are also direct investments from the diaspora.

unemployment rates, as well as widespread corruption and nepotism have been some of the main contributing factors to the startling numbers of BiH citizens leaving the country.

Within the general trend of alarming emigration rates, a small number of people are deciding to do exactly the opposite. They are leaving the relatively secure lives they managed to establish for themselves abroad to return and settle in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many of them have been forced to leave their homes during the 1992–95 war, and some are descendants of prewar labor migrants. They have lived in various countries and acquired citizenship of the host state. Now, they have returned to make a life for themselves in the country of their original citizenship. What puzzles is the obvious contradiction. Why would people with apparent alternatives for livelihood be coming back to a country from which so many seem to be desperately running away? What motivation drives their ostensibly "irrational" move from stable Western democracies such as Sweden, Norway, the United States, or Switzerland to a country still recovering from the aftermath of a devastating war? When they return to Bosnia and Herzegovina, what happens to them there? How well do they re-integrate? Is this type of return sustainable and successful? Beyond the romanticized visions presented in a popular television program and international aid efforts channeled towards promoting diaspora return, the puzzle remains. The situation of the returning diaspora is at the core of my study: a country with the highest number of emigrants relative to total population size in Europe is also receiving a small number of voluntary returnees.

This chapter sets the foundation for unlocking this puzzle. I begin by formalizing the research questions driving my investigation. Next, I examine Bosnia and Herzegovina as a "post-confict society" and unpack what this label means. I outline a brief historical overview of the 1992–95 war, and analyze Bosnia's constitutional setup established by the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). The chapter next examines the different types of postwar return migration, including forced return and assisted repatriation, the UNHCR's efforts at promoting minority return, and the subsequent acceptance of majority return as being the only reality. I trace the evolution of Bosnia's two-tiered citizenship regime, and discuss the importance of bilateral agreements on dual citizenship with neighboring states. The constitutional institutionalization of ethnic belonging through the "constituent peoples" category is considered in relation to elevating collective, while curtailing individual rights. In parallel, the consistent failures to implementing the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)5 Sejdić-Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina verdict is problematized. The fnal two sections of the chapter explain the research methodology, and present the book's structure.

<sup>5</sup>This chapter problematizes the Sejdić-Finci verdict, while analogous analysis could be carried out for the other four ECtHR verdicts in the Zornić, Pilav, Pudarić, and Šlaku cases.

#### **1.1 Research Questions**

The research purpose of this book is both to explain the reasons behind the decision to return to and remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to explore the concepts of emotional citizenship, home, and belonging in relation to voluntary return. To fulfll this purpose, I aim to answer the following research questions:


The conceptual framework in Chap. 2 surveys the relevant literature for each theoretical item found within the research questions, which guide all other research tasks. Discussing the return decision and the subsequent reintegration process in Chap. 3 sets the background for an exploration of the second research question on the emotional dimension of citizenship and the set of specifc emotions constituting it, presented in Chap. 4. Notions of 'home' and 'belonging' are investigated in Chap. 5. Collectively, results presented in these empirical chapters build the foundation for a lower-level abstraction conceptual model, linking voluntary return migration, citizenship, home, belonging, and a specifc set of emotions.

#### **1.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Post-confict Society**

The war as a "never-ending process" lies at the heart of the continued categorization of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a "post-confict" society. But, is this label justifed and what does it mean? On one hand, it is disappointing to keep referring to BiH as a post-confict society, close to three decades after the signing of a peace agreement that has brought an end to direct warfare. Children born when the Dayton Peace Agreement was put into place are now developing professional careers, starting families and raising their own offspring. These late 20-year-olds have no direct experience of the 1992–95 war, but their lives have been marked by the "postconfict" label. As a way of comparison, it would have been absurd to refer to BiH as post-confict in 1975, three decades after the Second World War. Generations entering adulthood around that time certainly did not consider themselves to be living in "post-confict" times. So, why is the context so different now? The answer lies in the nature of the 1992–95 war and the Dayton Peace Agreement that ended it. Creating ethnically homogenized territories through military means was an objective of warfare. The Dayton Peace Agreement stopped direct confict and established close to 30 years of peace, but it *de facto* legalized wartime territorial conquest.

On March 1, 1992, following a referendum and with the support of approximately 64% of its citizens, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence from a collapsing Yugoslavia. The SDS (Srpska demokratska stranka–Serb democratic party), called for Serbs in BiH to boycott the referendum. It is impossible to determine exactly how many Bosnian Serbs actually voted in the referendum and how they voted, as ethnicity was not recorded in voting data. According to the 1991 census, Bosnian Serbs comprised close to 31% of the BiH population and the referendum was largely boycotted in Serb-majority municipalities. These municipalities neither accepted the legitimacy of the BiH government nor the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state. With the support of the Yugoslav National Army and Serbia, the Bosnian Serb leadership started an insurgency, making substantial territorial gains and occupying up to 60% of the country. Serb territorial advancement was accompanied by a systematic campaign of "ethnically cleansing" all non-Serb elements, including people, cultural, historical, and religious heritage. The ethnically cleansed territory was frstly named "Srpska Republika Bosne i Hercegovine" (Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and instituted as "Republika Srpska" later on. Mass atrocities committed by Serb forces included the setting up of concentration camps, such as Omarska, Trnopolje, and Keraterm, mass rape, and expulsions of non-Serbs, crimes against humanity, and the 1995 genocide in Srebrenica.6 Two years into the war, the Bosnian Croats, supported by Croatia, replicated the Serb example; rejected the central BiH government and set up their own territory within the BiH state, frstly called "Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna" (Croatian Republic Herceg-Bosna) and later known in its abbreviated form as "Herceg-Bosna." Similar atrocities were carried out on Herceg-Bosna territory, including the setting up of the Dretelj and Heliodrom concentration camps where non-Croat BiH citizens were detained, tortured, and killed.7 Originally, the military arm of the central BiH government was a multi-ethnic army (ARBiH-Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine) established to defend BiH sovereignty on its entire, internationally recognized territory. Although not directly comparable with monoethnic Serb or Croat forces,8 as the war progressed, the ARBiH also strayed from its original multi-ethnic ideal.9

<sup>6</sup>For crimes committed by Serb forces, see for example the ICTY verdicts in the case against Radovan Karadžić: https://www.icty.org/en/press/tribunal-convicts-radovan-karadzic-for-crimesin-bosnia-and-herzegovina or the case against Ratko Mladić: https://www.icty.org/en/press/ icty-convicts-ratko-mladić-for-genocide-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity

<sup>7</sup>For crimes committed by military forces under command of the wartime Croat entity of Herceg-Bosna, see for example the ICTY verdict in the case against Prlić et al.: https://www.icty.org/en/ sid/11324

<sup>8</sup>For a comparison of war crimes committed by each army, see all 'Cases' at the ICTY: https:// www.icty.org/en/cases

<sup>9</sup>For crimes committed by the ARBiH, see for example the ICTY verdict in the case against Rasim Delić: https://www.icty.org/en/case/delic/

For a visual representation of changes in ethnic structure and how the war created ethnically homogenous territories, compare the municipality level census data from the prewar 1991 census to the 2013 census, the last census conducted in postwar BiH.10 The color (red for Serbs, green for Bosniaks, and blue for Croats) of each municipality is determined by the majority ethnic group. Darker colors show higher majorities, while lighter shades represent lower numerical majorities of a particular ethnicity (Figs. 1.1 and 1.2).

**Figs. 1.1 and 1.2** BiH census-ethnic composition. (Source: www.statistika.ba. This website compiles and visually displays information for BiH censuses conducted in 1991 and 2013. Original data for these censuses are available from the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and can be found at: https://popis.gov.ba)

<sup>10</sup>For more extensive data comparing the 1991 and 2013 censuses, see: http://www.statistika.ba

**Figs. 1.1 and 1.2** (continued)

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina lasted for three and a half years and resulted in a thorough and complete devastation of the country, its economy and people, its infrastructure and the fabric of society. According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) over 100,000 people were killed and two million people, which was more than 50% of the B&H prewar population, were forcefully expelled from their homes. The armed confict ended with the signing of the General Framework Agreement (Offce of the High Representative, n.d.), commonly referred to as the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), initially agreed upon at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio in November 1995 and offcially confrmed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (Fig. 1.3).

In Annex IV, the Dayton Peace Agreement delivers the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and establishes an ethnically based power-sharing state structure comprising two separate entities and a district. These are the Bosniak-Croat

**Fig. 1.3** BiH Administrative Map. (Source: Encyclopedia Britannica, available at: https://www. britannica.com/place/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina)

controlled Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), the Serb dominated Republika Srpska (RS) and Brčko district as a self-governing unit under jurisdiction of the sovereign BiH. The territorial breakdown agreed upon in Dayton is 51% for the FBiH and 49% for the RS. The Dayton Constitution envisions four vertical levels of authority in the FBiH: Federation, 10 cantons, cities, and 79 municipalities and two authority levels for the RS: 61 municipalities and Republika Srpska. Both the FBiH and the RS, as well as each canton in the FBiH have their own constitution, presidency, government, parliament, and judiciary. As Bieber (2006) sums it up, power-sharing in BiH operates on three levels: entities, cantons, and the state. When analyzing the defnition of consociational power-sharing put forward by Arend Lijphart, Bieber (2006) points to four characteristics of a power-sharing system: grand coalitions, mutual veto rights, proportionality, and segmental autonomy (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 25–44). For example, when looking at the formation of grand coalitions, both the RS and the FBiH require them to include members from all three ethnic groups or constituent peoples. Eight Bosniak, fve Croat and three Serb ministers are required in the FBiH, while each one of these ministers needs to have two deputies from the other two ethnic groups. By the same token, there need to be fve Bosniak and three Croat ministers in the RS. Power-sharing at the state level is based on entity representation, so that one third of the ministers need to come from the RS and two-thirds from the FBiH (Bieber, 2006). Overall, the entire constitutional structure is overwhelmingly characterized by the ethnicity element: Serb, Croat, and Bosniak, while the highly decentralized state structure of the Dayton Constitution grants the two entities unprecedented levels of autonomy.

The DPA successfully brought an end to the tragedies of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it did not create the foundation for functional governance and prosperity in peacetime. For a country of 3.5 million people, the BiH Constitution envisages fourteen parliaments (state, two entities–FBiH and RS, ten cantons and Brčko district) with fourteen governments and close to two hundred government ministries. While the consociational model of power-sharing (Lijphart, 1977) assumes that ethnic elites will cooperate so that conficts are managed, the BiH case attests to a reversed outcome of bitter rivalry and deepening divisions, partly aided by the constant involvement of international community representatives. Merdžanović (2015) makes a compelling case for understanding the post-war BiH political system as "imposed consociational democracy" in which the promised benefts of power-sharing, including preventing the "tyranny of majority," are reversed because of constant foreign intervention creating perverse incentives for ethnic elites. Thus, the reality of the BiH consociational democracy with the added element of a semi-protectorate status results in ethnic elites moving away from accommodation as predicted by Lijphart (1977) and towards further acrimony and extremism (Merdžanović, 2015). Analysts and commentators (see Keil & Perry, 2015) agree that Bosnia and Herzegovina is paralyzed and stuck, unable to fnd its way out of an ethnonationalist stranglehold. Perhaps their collective view is best summarized here: "None of us would deny that the *obscenely ineffective* (my emphasis) Dayton set-up of the country is a serious obstacle for any overall improvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (Jansen, 2014, p. 88). Twenty-nine years after its signing, the country still struggles with the "straightjacket" (Bieber, 2015) imposed by the Dayton Constitution.

The DPA instituted the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and the Offce of the High Representative (OHR) as responsible for monitoring the peace plan's implementation and effectively set up the BiH state as an international semiprotectorate. Offcially, the High Representative is working with the people and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina in consult with the international community to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable democracy on course for integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions,11" In reality, however, the OHR was and still is just one part of the overall international presence in BiH. Thus, BiH's effective status as an international semi-protectorate was sealed by three compounding factors: an institutionally weak, decentralized and fragmented state structure, the offcial position of the OHR, and an overwhelming presence of "international community" representatives. As is pointed out by Helms (2013), the "international community" cannot be conceived of as a monolithic entity, but it instead comprises diverse and often competing interests and policyagendas. However, Western representatives consistently reassert their stated goals of building BiH into a democratic state with full respect for human rights and a functioning market economy, with prospects for future NATO and EU membership.

In economic terms, ever since wartime hostilities ended, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been undergoing a three-fold transition. BiH's transformation from socialist self-management of the former Yugoslavia to the neoliberal prescriptions of the Washington consensus is comparable to other similar post-socialist countries, particularly those of Central and East Europe. In addition, unlike other post-socialist economies, BiH is making its transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy and from "donor-dependency12" (Papić, 2001) to a sustainable economy. Directly after signing the DPA, 80% of BiH's GDP per capita was lost because of wartime devastation (Pugh, 2002). Also, most of prewar GDP was generated by some twelve large, self-managed enterprises in heavy industry, whose operations were impossible to restart after the war both because of physical assets destruction and direct conditionality imposed by the OHR to break up these large conglomerates and privatize them (Stojanov, 2001). Some scholars, such as Donais (2005) argue that the continuing economic stagnation in BiH can be explained by the failure of neoliberal economic prescriptions, including a criminalized privatization process, and the criminal networks (Andreas, 2004; Festić & Rausche, 2004) of the three main ethnic political parties with their extensive systems of political patronage.

A brief macroeconomic snapshot of the BiH economy is characterized by consistently high unemployment rates, a currency board-induced, constrained monetary environment and a disproportionately high percentage of GDP funneled to public sector spending. The incredibly complicated, dysfunctional, and ineffcient public administration created by the Dayton Peace Agreement straddles, burdens and suffocates an economy of only USD 7585 per capita GDP (World Bank, 2023). According to the IMF, the size of the BiH public sector ranks it at the top of countries in the region, with most of its public sector funds spent on current items, such as wages and social transfers to its members. Years of postwar economic stagnation and widespread corruption have led to the overall unemployment rate reaching 29% in 2012, and a more than double youth (15–24 years) unemployment rate of 63,1% (ILO, 2013). The overall unemployment rate has since dropped to 14,9% (World

<sup>11</sup>OHR. (2015). *General Information*. Retrieved from http://www.ohr.int/?page\_id=1139

<sup>12</sup>Also see Bieber (2002) for further elaboration on the "dependency trap,"as it relates to international initiatives funding civil society organizations in BiH.

Bank, 2021), while the youth unemployment rate is approximately 39% and still among the highest in the region (World Bank, 2020c). However, the drop in the unemployment rates is not due to job creation, but because of emigration and the decrease in the working-age population. In other words, unemployment rates have decreased not because of people fnding jobs in the country, but because they have left to fnd opportunities abroad. While the currency board arrangement of the Central Bank of BiH fxing the national currency Konvertibilna Marka (KM) to the Euro in an approximately 1:2 ratio is certainly not without its demerits and critics (for example, see Silajdžić, 2005), overall, it has provided much needed price stability and increased confdence in the BiH fnancial sector.

From a microeconomic perspective, BiH remains to be one of the least business friendly climates, characterized by a cumbersome bureaucracy enabling rampant corruption, tax evasion and a general lack of transparency in business practices. According to the World Bank "Doing Business" reports (World Bank, 2017, 2020a, b), Bosnia and Herzegovina is consistently ranked at the bottom of European lists of favorable business climates and amongst the lowest performing business environments in the world. For example, due to multiple layers of government bureaucracy and long waiting periods, it takes slightly longer than 65 days to start a business in BiH, ranking the country 175th in a list of 190 countries surveyed worldwide. The burden of bureaucratic procedures in the conduct of business operations also gives rise to systemic corruption, which, according to Divjak and Pugh (2008), is a direct product of the Dayton Peace Agreement and its constitutional arrangement. In assessing the BiH corruption context, Divjak and Pugh (2008) are careful to defne political corruption as a narrow feld of "the abuse of public position for personal or fnancial gain" (p. 373) distinguishing it from a broad understanding of business corruption "at which accumulators and investors of capital in the core locations of global capitalism have been observed to excel" (p. 373). As Divjak and Pugh (2008) argue, corruption is a direct product of the DPA Constitution and an "absence of a liberal social contract" (p. 374). Governing BiH through a combination of ethnically based power sharing and an international protectorate has created a power vacuum whereby local communities are weakened as international administration shirk responsibility in a supposed state-building effort. Instead of creating a social contract between citizen and state, the depoliticized space of a semi-protectorate is colored by clientelism and ethnonationalist loyalties, leading scholars to report on BiH as "one of the most corrupt and criminalized spaces in Europe" (Hozić, 2006, p. 818).

The DPA has stopped the 1992–95 war, but, it has de facto legalized wartime territorial conquest. In turn, vindicating the "might makes right" principle has kept Bosnia in a perpetual "post-confict" society or "frozen confict" state. In the 7 years of research and writing of this book, the phrase "war by other means" has referred to various phenomena. These ranged from religious intolerance (Rose, 2015), linguistic discrimination in education (Jelin-Dizdar, 2007), to hate speech in public discourse (Žuna, 2018). Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the rapid change in regional geopolitics, the "war by other means" in Bosnia has moved ahead at an accelerating pace, toward further dismantling the DPA and threats of warfare. Some of the most worrying recent developments include the National Assembly of

Republika Srpska voting to annul rulings of the BiH Constitutional Court (Dimitrić, 2023) and Milorad Dodik, the RS President, issuing a decree that permits the RS to ignore any decisions made by the OHR (RFE/RL Balkan Service, 2023). The BiH Constitutional Court and the Offce of the High Representative (OHR) are the two pillars of the Dayton Peace Agreement, so undermining these two institutions is a direct threat to sustained peace in Bosnia. The background of the current crisis is a battle for BiH state property, which Milorad Dodik insists on resolving through an "inter-entity agreement." Regulating BiH state property through such an agreement would effectively lead to further dismantling of the BiH state. This outcome would serve the Croat nationalist agenda as it would aid their effort to push through with further election reform in the Federation of BiH with the ultimate goal of "carving out a Croat quasi-entity" (Bassuener et al., 2023, p. ii). The deliberation on whether BiH could be called a "post-confict" society is still useful, because it *is* absurd that Bosnia has had close to three decades of peace and has still kept the "post-confict" label. However, given the persistent "war through other means" and the dizzying array of recent political events, just keeping the" post" in "post-confict," and not moving to direct confict and renewed violence, could also be consider a success, or better said, another instance of "failed success" (Bieber, 2015).

#### **1.3 The BiH Diaspora and Post-war Return Migration**

Bosnia and Herzegovina has had a long history of emigration going back to the nineteenth century (Oruč et al., 2019), temporary labor migration during the 1960s and 1970s with the war causing the largest wave of forced migration from the country in the 1990s. Even two decades after the war, BiH continues to be a net emigration country with the trend of emigration changing to encompass both unskilled and highly skilled labor, causing both a demographic problem and a signifcant "brain drain" problem. According to BiH authorities, during the 1948–1991, an estimated 729,424 people from Bosnia and Herzegovina have emigrated to countries of Western Europe, Canada, the U.S. and Australia, mainly as labor migrants. Germany was a preferred destination for Yugoslav labor migrants, close to half a million of them (Gastarbeiter), with tens of thousands originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Valenta & Ramet, 2011). Most of the labor migrants from the prewar period have since changed their temporary residence statuses and permanently settled in the various host countries. Undoubtedly, the years 1992–1995 have seen the largest outfows of population from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Valenta and Ramet (2011) divide the war caused exodus into two waves: the beginning of the war in 1992 and the period following the Srebrenica genocide in July 1995. Table 1.1 presents a summary of the numbers of refugees and their destination countries.

Emigration from Bosnia and Herzegovina continued after the war with family reunifcation and persistent labor migration. Eurostat data for 2013–2021 indicate 295,090 frst time residence permits issued to BiH citizens in EU countries, with an observed trend of consistent increases from year to year. Particularly worrisome are


**Table 1.1** Refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1992–1995

Source: Valenta and Ramet (2011), p. 4

a As noted by Valenta and Ramet (2011), the U.S. Census Bureau reports much higher fgures than the ones presented in Table 1.1. According to the former source, 37,000 refugees and asylum seekers from BiH received legal permanent resident status, and another 80,000 attained this status during 2001–2008

the numbers of young, working-age people leaving the country. According to World Bank (2020c), 30% of those who left in 2018 were aged 18–35. Construction workers, drivers, mechanics, and technicians of various branches are leaving and creating labor shortages of these professions in Bosnia. Young people are leaving as soon as they graduate from university, but experienced professionals, especially medical staff, are also leaving (World Bank, 2020c). The continued emigration process is further aided by treaties on employment established between BiH and Slovenia, as well as BiH and Germany. These treaties signifcantly facilitate the employment of particular professionals, such as medical doctors and staff, engineers and technicians, computer programmers and IT personnel (IOM, 2022). The World Bank (2020c) projects that by 2050, due to a combination of increasing emigration, and a declining birth rate, the total population of BiH will shrink by approximately 20%, from 3.5 million to about 2.7 million. According to that estimate, it is expected that by 2050, 30% of the population will be of retirement age.

It is diffcult to provide exact numbers of emigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina, because currently, state statistics only keep track of people whose place of birth was in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus not accounting for the second and third generation. Valenta and Ramet (2011) also point to the discrepancies in how BiH emigrants are registered in the receiving countries as a source of inadequate data. Some host countries exclude naturalized migrants from their statistics, others record immigrants based on their citizenship, while some keep track of immigrants' origins based on their place of birth. According to BiH authorities (BiH Ministry of Security, 2023), the total number of BiH emigrants, including the second and third generations, is between 2 and 2,2 million people (Table 1.2).

When considering postwar return migration to Bosnia and Herzegovina, as Dahlman and Ó Tuathail (2005) assert, it is important to emphasize the "contradiction in the DPA between the partition of Bosnia into de facto mono-ethnic spaces and the peace plan's guarantee that the displaced could return to their prewar homes"


**Table 1.2** Global distribution of the BiH diaspora–Top 20 host states

Source: BiH Ministry of Security (2023)

(p. 582). On the one hand, the two entities have been formed because of ethnic cleansing and genocide and the peace treaty itself more or less legalized the status quo established by war, while the peace agreement seemingly provided for the tenuous possibility of reversing the effects of war. The right of return is provided in Annex 7, Chapter 1, Article 1 of the Dayton Peace Agreement: "All refugees and displaced persons have the right to freely return to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them." The glaring contradiction inherent in the Dayton Peace Agreement was additional compounded by the fact that the security of return of minorities was entrusted to the same authorities responsible for their expulsions in wartime (Alvarez, 2015). Despite the obvious contradictions, the return of refugees and displaced persons to their prewar homes was viewed by the international community as essential to the viability of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multiethnic state (Stefansson, 2006).

Key to rebuilding BiH's prewar multiethnic composition was the concept of "minority returns,"—the return of displaced persons and refugees to areas where they would now be in a numerical minority, according to their ethnicity. However, the actual dynamic of return was such that favored "majority return" from abroad, most intensely during the frst two years after the war (Pašić, 2015). The initial intensity of return in the frst couple of years after armed confict ended was also aided by Germany's policy on forced repatriation. Germany, according to Black (2002), had no choice but to force the return of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina, because of the disproportionate burden of hosting refugees (see Table 1.1). The refugees that came back during this initial period of involuntary return, confronted the reality of "monoethnic areas of control as entities and cantons" (Bieber, 2006, p. 31). Due to a stagnant economy and generally resentful attitudes expressed towards returnees by the stayees, return was diffcult for all refugees and displaced persons, however, minority returnees had the additional challenge of direct discrimination and physical attacks. In addition, although the DPA formally enshrined the "right to return" in its Annex 7, minority return was actively discouraged and prevented by nationalist leaders in order to preserve ethnic homogenization of territories (for more, see Lippman, 2019).

According to fgures provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the main organization in charge of refugee return, the refugee return process could be divided into three phases. The frst phase involved the return of over 500,000 people to their places of origin during the frst fve postwar years (1996–2000). During this time, it was recognized that most of the returnees were majority returnees and, in response, international efforts were gathered around the specifc policies and funding support for minority return. Close to 470,000 people were repatriated as part of the second phase of return, with their property restituted and restored under the Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP). In places where minority returnees were left to themselves, life became increasingly diffcult (Mayne, 2015; Eastmond, 2006; Tuathail & O'Loughlin, 2009, Dahlman & Ó Tuathail 2005). They had to face a combination of ethnically based violence, intimidation, and discrimination, as well as economic hardship. As a result, many could not stay. The third and fnal phase of return more or less accepted the de facto realities of ethnic divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, many of the most vulnerable displaced persons were assisted in their current places of displacement, with the implicit understanding that they could never actually return to their prewar homes (Mayne, 2015).

Although the Dayton Peace Agreement in its Annex 7 provided the legal and institutional framework for postwar return of refugees and displaced persons, its actual implementation did not have long-term success. The low numbers of people who returned, compared to the initial projections of the UNHCR, are a very clear indicator of failed policies (Black, 2002). Some of the displaced chose not to return because of traumas incurred during the war and a prolonged sense of insecurity, while others because of fnancial limitations and lack of job opportunities in BiH (Pašić, 2015). Many of the minority returnees simply returned to restore their property, sell it and move back, either to their residence abroad or the area of the country where they are part of an ethnic majority. Tuathail and O'Loughlin (2009) cite the pessimistic conclusions of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights which state that "BiH is today divided into almost ethnically pure territories, while consequences of war migrations have only deepened through long standing obstructions and administrative barriers of authorities at all levels" (p. 1049). The failure of return policies to reverse ethnic cleansing and allow the displaced to settle back to their prewar homes can also be illustrated by the protracted internal displacement of around 8500 people, housed in some 100 collective centers throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, even two decades after the war (Meyerhoefer, 2015).

To understand the failures to implement the Annex 7 provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement, it is important to compare and contrast minority/majority return with sustainable return. As Eastmond (2006) points out, the success of return was to a great extent determined by economic opportunities, even with majority return. In other words, even if the returnee faces no direct obstacles for social integration due to his/her ethnicity, still the economic reality of nearly every other person of working age being unemployed looms large. According to UNHCR estimates, 93% of property lost in the war was restituted by May 2005. However, the number of formally registered returnees is much higher than the number of actual physical returns (Eastmond, 2006). Therefore, people merely returning to reclaim or reconstruct their property, whether they belong to ethnic majorities or minorities, cannot be considered as sustainable. Sustainable return implies the possibility of returnees to generate an income; provide a livelihood for their families and "build communities in conditions of geographic or social marginalization" (Dahlman & Ó Tuathail 2005, p. 582). Despite success in property restitution, sustainable return in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whether majority or minority return, remains to be an overall failure. Eastmond (2006) aims to shed further light on the minority/majority vs. sustainable return, by emphasizing the need for a "(re)conceptualization of return" (p. 144), in which scholars would develop alternative understandings of return that would not be necessarily "permanent and place-bound" (p. 144).

#### **1.4 Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Present-day BiH citizenship is largely a product of historical development, marked by Bosnia belonging to various empires and the more recent Bosnian republican citizenship regime within the former Yugoslavia. Sarajlić (2010a) presents a thorough historical overview of BiH citizenship from Ottoman times to Dayton (also see Sarajlić, 2010b, 2012), with two main stages in development identifed as particularly relevant for a better understanding of the current Dayton citizenship regime. First, as Bosnia and Herzegovina was consistently incorporated into larger empires and states, such as the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the citizenship of BiH was also situated within a wider context which effectively prevented an independent development of a citizenship regime. Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1463 to 1878, Austro-Hungarian Empire from 1878 to 1918 and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1943. Second, although some of the frst elements of an independent BiH citizenship began developing during the reign of Austria-Hungary, it was within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) that Bosnia and Herzegovina's frst republican citizenship regime was established. As Shaw and Štiks (2012) astutely observe, post-Yugoslav states offer a unique opportunity for the study of citizenship from at least three different perspectives: post-socialist, post-partition, and post-confict.

From a citizenship perspective, it could be argued that Bosnia and Herzegovina is the most complicated one of the post-Yugoslav states, as it is the only one that does not have a core ethnic group. Thus, most relevant to a current study of BiH citizenship regarding its SFRY legacy is the simultaneous presence of federal and republican citizenships within the SFRY. As the SFRY functioned as a federation of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia), an individual citizen of the SFRY was at the same time a citizen of one of its constituent republics. Yugoslav federalism combined with a lack of an overriding nation, led to a "multilevel and bifurcated" (Medvedović, 1998 as cited in Sarajlić, 2012) SFRY citizenship. This feature of the SFRY citizenship regime is to fnd a clear echo later on in the Dayton "two-tiered" model of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Dayton Constitution of BiH establishes a two-tiered citizenship model with a state and entity level, whereby each citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also a citizen of either Republika Srpska or the Federation of BiH. The BiH citizenship regime is presented in Article 1, Paragraph 7 of the Constitution and further regulated in the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-C-S: Zakon o državljanstvu Bosne i Hercegovine, 2016). According to the legal framework, the "entity citizenship" of a BiH citizen is determined by the pre-war place of residence, unless the citizen's current place of residence is the other entity. Citizens of the Brčko District, an area not under direct jurisdiction of either entity, choose which entity (RS or FB&H) citizenship they prefer (Štiks, 2011). Džankić (2015) argues that the two-tiered model of B&H citizenship is derived from BiH being composed as an asymmetrical

federation in which the territorial autonomy of the two entities is supplemented by a consociation power-sharing of the three ethnic groups (Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs) or "constituent peoples" as they are referred to in the Constitution.

As the BiH Constitution is part of the Dayton Peace Agreement, it is the result of a negotiated compromise reached to end a devastating war. However, this compromise was not attained through internal political bargaining, but as Džankić (2015) rightly points out, imposed from outside and, besides Bosnia and Herzegovina, also ratifed by Croatia and Serbia. Consequently, as Sarajlić (2012) asserts, neither the BiH Constitution nor the ensuing citizenship regime was created to grant full-scale civil rights and liberal stipulations of membership. Guzina (2007) views the BiH Constitution as incorporating two opposing forces. On one hand, within the constitution, emphasis is placed on integrating elements such as democratization, market reform, and human rights, while exclusionary defnitions of "national community" (p. 228) serve as disintegrating factors. Central to the debate on the BiH Constitution is the notion of "constituent peoples," which can have an exclusionary and disintegrating impact on BiH citizenship.

The symbolic dimension of BiH citizenship, expressed through such elements as the fag, coat of arms, and the national anthem, has gone through several changes. Kolsto (2006) presents a thorough historical overview of developments related to the BiH fag and coat of arms, while the evolution of the BiH national anthem is covered in detail by Džankić (2016). The 1992 fag and coat of arms with the *feur de lis* upon white background motif was chosen by the BiH leadership because it had historical roots in the Bosnian Kotromanić dynasty from pre-Ottoman times. Stefan Kotromanić, declared himself King of the Serbs, Bosnia and the Coastland in 1376, later augmenting his title with the "King of Dalmatia and Croatia." Therefore, a symbolic association with the Kotromanićs was supposed to appeal equally to all three ethnic groups (Kolsto, 2006). However, this intent was not materialized. Instead, during the 1992–1995 war, both Croats and Serbs engaged in confict under their own ethnic symbols. The Serbs used a Serbian red, white and blue fag with a cross and four Cyrillic S letters, spelling the acronym "Samo sloga Srbe spašava – Only unity saves the Serbs," while the Croats resorted to the Croatian checkerboard fag. The originally proposed *feur de lis* fag, which was intended to have supraethnic characteristics was thus ethnicized as only the Bosniak identifed with it. Instead of becoming a symbol of a unifed state identity, it also became symbolic of division (Kolsto, 2006).

After the DPA was signed, it became necessary to abandon the *feur de lis* fag as the offcial BiH fag and choose another one with which all three ethnic groups could identify. In 1997, the BiH state parliament began working on selecting a new fag, however, after consistently failing to agree mainly because of Serb opposition, the Peace Implementation Council held in Bonn, Germany authorized the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, to manage a compromise and impose a state fag for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The intent was similar to the original *feur de lis* motif—fnd a symbol that would be unifying for all three ethnic groups, but this time turning to the future instead of the past. The adopted design for the fag and

coat of arms was a futuristic, highly stylized image of a yellow triangle, representing the geographic shape of the country, rimmed by stars representing the European Union (Kolsto, 2006). Although this fag was and still is meant as unifying for the country, its artifciality bothered even Sarajevo-based intellectuals led by the philosopher Muhamed Filipović, who deemed the fag "the fnal way to kill the nation" (Kolsto, 2006; Filipović, 2008). The current BiH state fag can be seen widely displayed only in Bosniak-dominated parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Croat and Serb ethnic fags continue to be used in other areas (see Bougarel et al., 2007; Jansen, 2015 or Palmberger, 2016).

The BiH national anthem underwent a similar set of changes, all designed to act in a unifying, nation-building direction. Džankić (2016) presents a brief historical overview of the evolution of the BiH national anthem and developments that led to the present situation where this anthem is one of four national anthems, together with those of Spain, San Marino and Kosovo, with only a melodic sequence and without an accompanying text. As the wartime BiH national anthem *Jedna si jedina* (You are the one and only) was criticized for excluding the Serbs and Croats, analogously to the fag, in 1999, the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp imposed a national anthem that was supposed to be unifying. Since then, numerous attempts were made to reach political consensus on lyrics to the national anthem. Although each proposal included references to a shared future, deliberately excluding any ethnic elements, until now, attempts at fnding common ground for lyrics of the anthem have been consistently failing. As Džankić (2016) concludes "failure to adopt the lyrics of the national anthem is refective of the ethnic divisions that have fractured the citizenship of this country, both as an identity of the state and as a community of membership" (p. 10). Džankić (2016) cites the results of the Ipsos (2011) survey, which illustrates this conclusion, whereby only 5% of Serbs, 35% of Croats and 68% of Bosniaks favor the national anthem.

To further complicate citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina is dual citizenship with the neighboring states of Croatia and Serbia. As stipulated by the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, BiH citizens can become dual citizens of those states with which B&H has signed bilateral agreements on dual citizenship. At the time of writing, these agreements have been signed with Croatia, Serbia, and Sweden. Most of the Serbs in BiH are also citizens of Serbia, while most of the BiH Croats are simultaneously citizens of Croatia. This is not only an issue in terms of citizenship as legal status but also one of identity, national belonging, and membership. The issue of "national home" is thorny for various countries of East and Central Europe, as there are numerous examples of core ethnic groups residing in neighboring countries, such as the Hungarians in Romania or the Russians in Belarus. Similarly, many, if not most, Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina consider Croatia to be their "national home", with the BiH Serbs affliating the meaning of "national home" with Serbia (Štiks, 2011). However, differently from other examples of cross border national affliation in other European countries, both Serbs and Croats are also "constituent peoples" of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

#### **1.5 "Constituent Peoples": Ethnic Belonging Institutionalized in the DPA Constitution**

The BiH citizenship regime derived from the Dayton Peace Agreement prioritizes the notion of "constituent peoples", i.e. Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs over all other minority groups such as Jews, Roma or BiH citizens who do not wish to align with either of the three constituent peoples. Territoriality and power-sharing through consociation, the two organizing principles inherent in the DPA, act as elements of stability *and* of exclusion. The intention of the power-sharing consociation is stability, while its unintended consequence is exclusion of all those who do not ft into the narrowly defned constituent peoples. Štiks (2011) vividly illustrates this situation by looking at how the three members of the B&H Presidency are elected. The Serb representative is elected from the Republika Srpska, while the Croat and Bosniak representatives come from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This means that a Bosniak citizen living in the RS could not vote for a Bosniak representative. Similarly, a Serb citizen living in the FBiH could not vote for a Serb representative. Guzina (2007) accurately summarizes this problem to a minority-majority discourse, whereby full citizenship rights are granted only to the citizen, fortunate enough to belong to the majority group living within the territory of any given entity. In addition, although the BiH Constitution recognizes a category of "Others" which lies outside of the constituent peoples, it also stipulates that the "others" are not eligible to be elected to the state Presidency or other ethnically defned positions of authority.

Obvious discrimination within the B&H Constitution leads to the welldocumented Sejdić-Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina case at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Dervo Sejdić, a Roma citizen of BiH and Jakob Finci, ethnically Jewish, fled a complaint with the ECtHR regarding the discriminatory nature of the BiH Constitution, which makes them ineligible for a post at the BiH Presidency or the House of Peoples simply because they are not affliated with any of the BiH constituent peoples. The ECtHR's verdict recognized the discrimination ingrained in the BiH Constitution both as it relates to non-constituent peoples and to members of constituent people who reside in an entity in which they are not part of the majority ethnic group. The court judged that the Dayton constitutional setup of Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to be changed in order to grant equal political rights to all citizens of the state, independent of their ethnic origin or their entity citizenship. Once again, it is important to reiterate that the DPA Constitution was instituted to end a horrendous war with military, political, and economic pressure from the international community. Any changes to the Constitution would need a similar amount of political will within the country, in addition to support from the international community. Consequently, the Sejdić-Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina case ruling had "virtually no effects" (Džankić, 2015, p. 527). The paralysis in the distribution of political rights caused by the notion of "constituent peoples" enshrined in the Constitution continues.

Elevating collective rights of the three ethnic groups, the constituent peoples, in B&H comes at a severe cost of curtailing the individual rights of citizens. What

becomes apparent is that the BiH constitution strongly favors a communitarian consociation, championing collective, ethnic belonging over a liberal, individual-based understanding of rights. According to many observers, this dynamic serves to push Bosnia and Herzegovina into a "quicksand of discriminatory, illiberal political and social practices" (Mujkić, 2007, p. 112). The BiH Constitution does not allow an individual citizen to be non-affliated with any ethnic group, meaning that the "liberal right to exit" is missing. (Guzina, 2007) In other words, a person can be *either* a Serb, *or* a Croat, *or* a Bosniak, *or* a member of the "Others" group, with entity citizenship determined by residence, which often coincides with the ethnic group since Serbs overwhelmingly live in the RS and Bosniaks and Croats live in the FBiH. But she or he cannot *just* be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The absolute dominance of the "ethnic principle" in organizing any and every sphere of life in BiH has led some analysts to conclude that living in Bosnia and Herzegovina implies that "Here we do not live as human beings, but as Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks" (Miodrag Živanović as cited in Mujkić, 2007, p. 118).

In multiple verdicts, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)13 has called for changes to the BiH constitution to reform BiH's ethnic-based election model in favor of a model with equality of all citizens. In fact, these changes should, according to the ECtHR, move towards abolishing the "constituent peoples" category as it stands contrary to fundamental values of the European Union.14 For example, Paragraph 43 of the ECtHR ruling in Zornić vs. Bosnia Herzegovina (Application 3681/06):

43. In *Sejdić and Finci* the Court observed that when the impugned constitutional provisions were put in place a very fragile ceasefre was in effect on the ground and that the provisions were designed to end a brutal confict marked by genocide and "ethnic cleansing" (see ibid., § 45). The nature of the confict was such that the approval of the "constituent peoples" was necessary to ensure peace (ibid.). However, now, more than eighteen years after the end of the tragic confict, there could no longer be any reason for the maintenance of the contested constitutional provisions. The Court expects that democratic arrangements will be made without further delay. In view of the need to ensure effective political democracy, the Court considers that the time has come for a political system which will provide every citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the right to stand for elections to the Presidency and the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina without discrimination based on ethnic affliation and without granting special rights for constituent people to the exclusion of minorities or citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the Zornić case, the ECtHR asks not only for equality of all BiH citizens but also the elimination of the "constituent people" as an outdated concept rooted in the ceasefre signed to stop warfare. Most recently, the ECtHR has affrmed the same position in the case of Kovačević vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Sejdić-Finci, Zornić, Pilav, Pudarić, and Šlaku cases treat *passive* voting rights, the rights to be elected, while the Kovačević case addresses *active* voting rights. However, the ECtHR rulings in all six cases express the same position towards the BiH Constitution. According to the ECtHR, the BiH constitution needs to change to

<sup>13</sup>ECtHR rulings in the cases of Zornić, Pilav, Pudarić, Šlaku, and Sejdić-Finci.

<sup>14</sup> *Inter alia* Article 2 and 9 of the Treaty on European Union, Article 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and Article 1 and 2 of the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC).

eliminate discrimination inherent in a combination of territorial and ethnic constraints. In addition, the ECtHR ruling in the Kovačević case is landmark, as it effectively calls for the creation of one electoral unit on the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Twenty-nine years have passed since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which gave Bosnia Herzegovina its Constitution and the current citizenship regime. Given the unduly complex, ineffcient, illiberal and discriminatory features of this constitution, a legitimate question to ask would be whether there is a possibility for constitutional reform? Would it be possible to use the peacetime to instigate constitutional change that would make Bosnia and Herzegovina a more functional state and its citizenship regime more democratic, liberal and inclusive? It is diffcult to speculate, since, on the one hand, the Dayton Peace Agreement is there to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina's fragile peace and however challenging state-building efforts, yet it does not provide the institutional setup for a truly prosperous society. According to some scholars (Džankić, 2015; Mujkić, 2007), it is the problem of collective rights enshrined in the BiH Constitution together with ethnic oligarchies who derive all their power from such constitutional arrangements that lie as the greatest obstacle to any substantial constitutional reform and a consequent change in the BiH citizenship regime.

#### **1.6 Research Methodology**

The research methodology of my study is frmly situated within the interpretivist scientifc paradigm, according to which social reality cannot simply be observed; it needs to be understood and interpreted. Ontologically, the interpretivist paradigm is both constructed and relativist, in the sense that the constructed realities vary among people, groups, and cultures. In epistemological terms, the paradigm is non-dualist and non-objective, as I, as the researcher, and my object of study are not independent from each other, but rather interdependent. Methodologically, my study follows the guidelines of interpretivism, according to which interaction between scholar and object of study is empathetic, and qualitative research methods are used (Corbetta, 2003). Thus, the knowledge produced inductively 'emerges' from the reality studied (Creswell, 2007). However, if one rigorously adheres to induction as the guiding principle for qualitative research, the issue that appears is whether a theoretically-rooted research question should guide inquiry or should the research participants, themselves, defne the research problem? A debate exists whether data collection and its subsequent analysis should be inductively conducted or should there be a conceptual framework, summarized within a research question (set of research questions), to drive the research process?

The debate on the role of deductive reasoning within the interpretivist paradigm had some opponents advocating for "ethnomethodological indifference" where all previous knowledge of social reality needs to be ignored. Some authors, such as Bogdan and Biklen (2007), argue against a predetermined research design and instead allow for a research design "in which the questions to be asked and the data

**Fig. 1.4** Qualitative research cycle. (Adapted from Hennink et al., 2010)

to be collected emerge in the process of doing research" (p. 79). Also. early versions of grounded theory, as developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) were strictly against the hypothetico-deductive view and proposed a completely inductive, "tabula rasa" approach to data collection, analysis and theory development (Kelle, 2005). On the other hand, many authors (Tesch, 1990; Bazeley, 2013; Hennink et al., 2010) advocate for a mixture of deduction and induction in qualitative research.

My study relies on mixing deductive reasoning within an overall inductive structure and it includes three interlinking cycles: research design, data collection and data analysis, summarized in Fig. 1.4.

The following sections of the chapter provide detailed explanations of each cycle of the research process, with particular attention paid to ethical considerations throughout the research project.

#### *1.6.1 Research Design*

The deductive conceptual framework produced in the research design cycle incorporates the existing literature and theory and provides the basis for a set of expectations, representing the etic or external perspective. The etic perspective is summarized within a conceptual framework and a resulting set of research questions. In other words, I defned the theoretical problem and formulated the research questions based on a literature review summarized in the Conceptual Framework (Chap. 2). The theoretically-rooted research questions drove all further inquiry, including the choice of feldwork approach and the design of the interview guide. As my project progressed, inductive and deductive reasoning interacted actively. For example, although the interview guide was created in reference to the conceptual framework, as the interviews progressed, I kept making inductive inferences (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007; Hennink et al., 2010) allowing for deeper investigation into the most pertinent issues. So, each subsequent interview was informed by the content of the previous one and my feld notes.

#### *1.6.2 Data Collection*

Completing the tasks in the research design cycle set the foundation for the creation of a research instrument, i.e. the interview guide, which was initially deductively derived and modifed throughout data collection by inductive inferences. Data were primarily collected through in-depth interviews and participants were recruited according to the set criteria. To generate richness of data and to invite study participants to tell their own stories, interview questions were phrased as open questions, each followed by topic probes as suggested by Bogdan and Biklen (2007). The goal of the topic probes was to provide substance to the more abstract concepts such as emotions and citizenship, belonging and home. In addition to conducting the interviews, I kept writing feld notes and a refective journal, both of which were used for verifcation in later stages of the project.

The principle of theoretical saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) guided the number of participants to be recruited. Strauss and Corbin (1998) provide a formal defnition of theoretical saturation to be "the point in category development at which no new properties, dimensions or relationships emerge during analysis" (p. 143). Thus, whenever data are collected through theoretical sampling, this means that the researcher will "go to places, people or events that will maximize opportunities to discover variation among concepts and to densify categories in terms of their properties and dimension" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 201). Although the principle of "theoretical saturation" is useful on a conceptual level, practical guidelines on how many participants need to be included in the sample are not entirely clear and the most frequent advice is "it depends" (Baker & Edwards, 2012, p. 43). Guest et al. (2006), also show how sample sizes in qualitative research are highly variable with theoretical saturation reached at much smaller sample sizes than initially projected. A notable exception from the general lack of methodological guidelines on adequate sample size for qualitative research is Creswell (2007), who advises conducting 20–40 in-depth interviews in the case of a typical grounded theory study. My study heeded both the principle of theoretical saturation and a generic "rule of thumb" set by Creswell (2007), so a sample size of 35 participants was fnally set.

To collect data, thirty fve in-depth interviews were conducted during summer and fall of 2017 in cities and towns throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. During my feldwork, I was based in Sarajevo and made trips to the various places where the study participants live and work. From Sarajevo, I travelled to Prijedor, Banja Luka, Kozarac, Sanski Most, Velika Kladuša, Trebinje, Ljubuški, Mostar, Nevesinje, Derventa, Gračanica, Maglaj, Počitelj, Jajce and Srebrenica. Most of the interviews were held either at the participant's home or offce. Sometimes, due to complicating family circumstances, such as a small child, some interviews were held in a neighboring café. Each interview was set up by e-mailing the Recruitment Letter and a followup telephone call, both of which allowed for the formation of an initial positive rapport. Trust between myself and each individual study participant was further strengthened once I explained the ethical dimensions of the project and the purpose of the Informed Consent Form. Prior to the beginning of the interview, I explained the interview structure, which comprised collecting demographic information involving short questions and answers, followed by the in-depth, second part of the interview, lasting approximately one hour to ninety minutes.

In addition to in-depth interviews, data were collected by keeping a log of feld notes and a refective journal. As suggested by Bogdan and Biklen (2007), I used feld notes to provide accurate descriptions of "people, objects, places, events, activities and conversations" (p. 118) which were part of the feldwork experience. Whenever possible, the feld notes were accompanied by a visual record of the interview setting. To increase rigor of the qualitative study and reveal any potential biases, I also kept a daily refective journal, in which I tried as much as possible "to refect on analysis, method and ethical dilemmas of the study" (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007, p. 122), but ended up mostly writing about my own feelings related to data collection, reactions, assumptions and expectations. Being so close to the research subject certainly is helpful because it provides greater insight, access and ultimately potential for scholarly contribution, but it also invites several unwanted byproducts such as the possibilities for bias or lack of analytical rigor. Although the feld notes and refective journal were not used as formal data sources during the analytical cycle of the project, both data sources contributed to the analysis by giving an objective context to the interview (the descriptive feld note) and a subjective one (the refective feld note–refective journal entry), thus helping to resolve the aforementioned potential problems resulting from my proximity and familiarity with the case. For example, here is my feld note from Jajce, where I interviewed Marija.

#### **Field note 33 September 13, 2017**

After saying goodbye to Ema in Derventa, I boarded a bus to Banja Luka. When I asked the driver to let me off at the Tabaco Factory, pronouncing as it is pronounced in Sarajevo (Fabrika *duhana*), he pretended not to understand what I was talking about. He 'understood' me once I used a more Serb-sounding pronunciation of Fabrika *duvana*. I stayed the night in Banja Luka in a Youth Hostel called 'Havana,' located on the First Krajina Corpus Avenue.

Today I am in Jajce, where there are all town celebrations of September 13, the "Day of Jajce's Liberation." I saw offcers dressed in uniforms of the HVO (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane-Croatian Defense Council), but also offcial HV uniforms (Hrvatska vojska-Croatian Army). The celebrations are accompanied by Marko Perković– Thompson songs, such as the infamous 'Čavoglave.' The waiter at the restaurant where I had lunch told me that the Bosniak side is organizing similar festivities to mark their own liberation of Jajce. Even with all the celebrations and festivities going on, the taxi driver informed me that people, people of all ethnic groups, were leaving Jajce en masse. Entire families are emigrating because they cannot provide for their basic needs in Jajce. These people are searching for their happiness somewhere far, far away from here. I also saw many different fags, some affrming and others contesting BiH sovereignty and its territorial integrity.

Jajce, September 13, 2017—"*Flags on Sale*"

(As the liberation festivities were ongoing, an entrepreneurial vendor made sure that a wide range of political sensitivities were well-represented in his offer. From left to right: BiH fag used during wartime, former Yugoslav fag, current fag of the Republic of Croatia, current fag of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the wartime fag of "Herceg Bosna.")

Jajce, September 13, 2017—"*Contesting Sovereignty*"—the BiH Flag (lower) and the "Herceg Bosna" Flag (higher)

The study participants are members of the BiH diaspora/transmigrants, who have lived abroad for a period of time ranging from fve to 30+ years and who have *voluntarily* returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina. What is meant by "voluntary return" is that the element of actual *free choice* is present in the decision to come back to the home country. The returnees in my study were not under any pressure to make this decision either from the host or home country. They could have easily continued to live and work in the host country from a legal, political, social, economic or even cultural perspective, as most of them are dual citizens, active voters in the host country, educated abroad, socially and culturally well-integrated with a developed career and economic wellbeing created in the host country. In addition, their return was not in any way compelled by home country factors, such as aging parents and the need for their care. Their return was entirely self-organized, so their decision to return was not in any way incentivized either from the host or home country. For example, they were not part of any assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) or talent attraction programs. Each one of these markers was carefully considered when evaluating whether they, in fact, *voluntarily* decided to return or whether extraneous circumstance or some type of outside force made this decision for them. Recruiting study participants based on voluntariness of return is key because it allows for providing a meaningful answer to the question of motivation and to producing sound explanations of their decision.

Research for this study was conducted to allow for maximal variation along the broad demographic categories: citizenship status, host country, ethnicity and current residence in BiH. To provide for greatest diversity according to citizenship status, 34 participants are BiH citizens and one participant is in the process of getting BH citizenship; 14 participants are single citizenship holders, 19 participants have dual citizenship, while two participants have triple citizenship. According to the host country: Germany–8, US–7, Switzerland–4, Turkey–3, Australia–2, Italy–2, Norway–2, Multiple (Croatia and Montenegro; Serbia and Argentina)–2, Argentina–1, Austria–1, Holland–1, Serbia–1, Slovenia–1. Looking at the ethnic composition of the sample: 15 participants are Bosniak, two are Croat, fve are Serb and 13 participants declared themselves to belong to the Others/BiH citizens category. In relation to the participant's current residence in B&H, Sarajevo (FBH)–12, East Sarajevo (RS)–1, Prijedor (RS)–4, Banja Luka (RS)–1, Sanski Most (FBH)–1, Kozarac (RS)–2, Velika Kladuša (FBH)–1, Trebinje (RS)–2, Ljubuški (FBH) -1, Počitelj (FBH) -1, Mostar (FBH)–1, Nevesinje (RS) -1, Derventa (RS) -2, Gračanica (FBH)–1, Maglaj (FBH) -1, Jajce (FBH) -1, Srebrenica (RS) -2. The choice of residence is relevant both for analyzing minority vs. majority return and rural vs. urban return. Also, the current residence criteria allowed for examining variation within the same ethnicity, including regional variation and intra-ethnic confict.15 For example, enlightening insights could be reached by comparing perspectives of a Croat from Bosnia with a Croat from Herzegovina or a Bosniak from Sanski Most with a Bosniak from Velika Kladuša.

Other relevant demographic criteria driving the selection of study participants were age, gender, religion, level of religiosity, majority vs. minority return, educational level, marital status, and income level. All the study participants are of working age, between 30 and 55 years. This criteria is important for a deeper examination of the motivation for return. The decision to return involved a considerable amount of fnancial risk for each study participant, because they are neither still in school nor have they attained retirement abroad. Variation in the time spent abroad included those who have only been abroad for 5 years, all the way to 30+ years. Also, their time of return varied from one to 21 years. 24 of the participants are men and nine are women. Variation in marital and family status is also present in the sample, with 23 participants being married with children, four divorced either with or without children, and eight participants who are single. Looking at citizenship from the perspective of either majority or minority return is highly relevant for this project, so 14 participants are minority returnees, while 21 are majority returnees. While 22 interviewees are Muslim, four Orthodox Christian, two Catholic, one Buddhist and fve agnostic, all levels of religiosity are present in the sample within each religious tradition, particularly for the three major denominations (Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism). The sample includes participants who have completed only 4 years of elementary schooling, to two participants who have earned

<sup>15</sup> In reference to the Bosniak intra-ethnic confict between the BiH Army and military units loyal to Fikret Abdić and his "Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia", centered in Velika Kladuša.

Ph.D. titles. Diverse professions are present, ranging from a yoga instructor, bedand-breakfast owner, IT manager, painters, advertising executive, politician, educational specialist, farmer, manager, academic to ex-football player and current restaurant owner. Most participants are self-employed, either as small business owners or freelancers.

An initial list of potential interviewees was based on the list of participants in the Al Jazeera Balkans "I want to go home" (*Hoću Kući*) documentary (13 interviewees), a list of "successful examples" of returnees jointly prepared by the UNDP and the BiH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees–Diaspora Division (5 interviewees) and examples of returnees associated with the Sarajevo-based RESTART business enterprise (3 interviewees) and Naša Perspektiva, an NGO devoted to diaspora—home country cooperation (3 interviewees). I also contacted TUMED (*Türkiye Mezunları Dernegi*), a Turkish Alumni Association, to get access to two participants who returned from Turkey to BiH. Besides the aforementioned formal diaspora networks, I collected news stories broadcast on BiH TV stations and published in local newspapers and magazines, featuring the life stories of returnees. Six participants were recruited by following stories broadcast/published by Radio Television of Republika Srpska, Derventa TV, N1-a CNN affliate, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Two interviewees were recruited by "snowballing" from one interview to the next. Finally, I interviewed one returnee, who is also a personal acquaintance. Approximately 42 people were contacted and 35 accepted to take part in the study.

Research design was completed almost entirely deductively, and it represents the etic perspective. As in-depth interviews were progressing, inductive inferences started gaining importance. Insights drawn from the collected data and not from existing theory began to dominate the research process. As one interview was completed, key fndings from that interview were used to modify the questions on the interview guide to be then used in the following interview. In the data analysis cycle, an inductive conceptual framework emerged after the collected data were coded, described, compared, and categorized. The fnal goal of the inductive conceptual framework is to contribute to existing theory by representing the emic or internal perspective, the perspective originating directly from the study participants.

#### *1.6.3 Data Analysis*

The dictionary defnes 'analysis' as "a detailed examination of anything complex in order to understand its nature or determine its essential features" (Analysis, n.d.) and according to Tesch (1990), "no methodologist could say it better" (p. 113). The generic defnition of analysis gives us a clue as to the two most general elements of the analytic cycle: "detailed examination," which can be seen as "identifcation of themes" when translated to the language of qualitative data analysis (QDA) and "determination of essential features" or "understanding" viewed as "construction of propositional statements" or hypotheses that place the themes in relationship with each other (Tesch, 1990, p. 113). Defning qualitative data analysis as two intertwining processes of data organization (identifying themes) and data interpretations (discovering relationships between themes) is also characteristic of several other scholars, such as Boyatzis (1998) and Miles et al. (2014). Prior to proceeding with steps of data analysis, including coding, memoing and the associated tasks of description, comparison, conceptualization and explanation, two stages of data preparation were conducted: transcribing and anonymizing the data sources.

Since the in-depth interviews are the main source of data for this study, particular care was given to the accuracy and technical precision of the transcribing and anonymization processes. A trusted transcriber was hired and trained according to guidelines set by Bogdan & Biklen (2007) and Atkinson (2004), as well as elaborated on regarding validity and reliability by Perakyla (2004). The transcriber is a native speaker of Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian and could register each colloquialism, half-mumbling or diffcult to understand construction. Transcriptions were conducted parallel to data collection to insure maximum effciency and to allow me to anonymize, code, and pursue subsequent steps of data analysis almost as soon as the feld work had been completed. In explaining the *Ethics of Descriptive Reporting,* Bazeley (2013) asserts that in studies where anonymity and confdentiality have been promised to participants it might not be enough to simply substitute pseudonyms for the actual names and adjust participant ages, since the participant could remain identifable in cases of small and distinct groups under investigation. Thus, my anonymization process involved using pseudonyms instead of the study participants' actual names, as well as changing the names of particular locations, workplaces, or any other specifc information that could uncover the actual identity of the study participants. After completion of data analysis and selection of quotes to be used in the empirical chapters, I translated the selected quotes from B-C-S to English. I also included footnotes explaining any lexical or semantic particularities found to be relevant for accurate presentation of data analysis results.

Following how qualitative data analysis was defned previously, coding can be thought of as the frst step in analysis: organizing and managing the data by reducing and segmenting it to meaningful coding units, labeling these units with codes and categorizing them into a coding scheme. Besides viewing coding as segmenting and reducing the data, Coffey and Atkinson (1996) stress that coding cannot act as a replacement for analysis. However, seen more broadly, coding can be understood as both data organization and data interpretation. Strauss (1987) defnes coding as "the general term for conceptualizing data; thus, coding includes raising questions and giving provisional answers (hypotheses) about categories and about their relations. A code is the term for any product of this analysis (whether category or a relation among two or more categories)" (pp. 20–21). Strauss (1987) goes beyond the perspective on coding as the frst step in analysis to include further measures so that coding also encompasses data interpretation. My data analysis frstly employed line-by-line coding. Secondly, I used constant comparison to group similar codes into progressively more abstract units: categories and concepts. Tesch (1990) warns that concepts can only rarely be directly observed in the data and, thus, the creation of a frm structure, a codebook, that fts the data well is a slow and iterative process. My coding scheme evolved slowly over a period of close to nine months of data analysis. Following instructions on rules of formulating a good code found in Boyatzis (1998), a full list of codes–a codebook, with each code given a label and a clear defnition emerged.

Parallel to coding the dataset, I developed a habit of systematic and regular writing of analytic memos with the basic idea being similar to keeping a refective journal during data collection. With the use of both the refective journal and analytic memos, I got the chance to refect on data collection and analysis by recording my evolving understanding of the researched issues. Various methodology scholars (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Saldana, 2009; Yin, 2011) emphasize the importance of keeping a clear and transparent audit trail of qualitative data analysis. Yin (2011) advises preserving any and all ideas regarding data analysis as memos, even when they initially appear to be "half-baked" (p. 186). By doing this, I got to decide which analytical observations to include in the fnal analysis and which ones to exclude, based on a wide range of collected memos. Saldana (2009) presents a list of issues which the researcher needs to address in memo writing, such as refections on: code choices and their operational defnitions, emergent patterns, categories, themes and concepts, potential connections between codes, themes, categories and concepts, as well as emergent or related existing theory. Throughout the research process, memos progressively became more and more abstract, from the initial ones that are most descriptive to "metamemos" (p. 39) writing in later stages, which were more theoretical.

Strauss and Corbin (1998) accentuate the importance of memos throughout data analysis and present detailed guidelines on how to write them. I used my memos to "talk to myself about the data" (Clarke, 2005 as cited in Saldana, 2009, p. 32) and in that sense my memos were quite free-fowing in form. I paid particular attention to how visual representation of relationships between concepts, such as miniframeworks and diagrams, are used. Dey (1993) sums up the point of using diagrams in memos: "Diagrammatic displays are not just a way of decorating our conclusions, they also provide a way of reaching them" (p. 192 as cited in Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 140–141). In other words, coming up with a clear visual representation of relationships between concepts made it possible for me to establish those relationships in the frst place. Finally, the ultimate objective of writing memos is integration by keeping an audit trail of the complete analytic cycle (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), including description, comparisons, and explanation.

Analytic memos were a crucial component of my research project, followed by thick descriptions, constant comparison and a movement towards higher and higher levels of abstraction as patterns and associations in the data were recognized. Analytic memos were used to defne concepts, such as defning "Emotional citizenship" as the intersection of the "1st (BiH) citizenship" and specifc emotions or "Pragmatic citizenship" as the intersection of the "2nd (foreign) citizenship" and emotional indifference. These defnitions came as a result of extensive memo writing throughout data analysis, fnally resulting in a visual display (Fig. 6.1). Another example is building the conceptual model, as a series of steps in pattern identifcation with its visual display presented in the Chap. 6 (Fig. 6.2). Throughout data analysis I wrote thick descriptions (Bazeley, 2013) to be used later in building a "theorized storyline" (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007) in the empirical chapters of the study and I certainly tried my best to avoid the trap of simply listing "themes and quotes" (Bazeley, 2009) with no attempt of linking these themes into a more comprehensive model. When analyzing data qualitatively, I employed constant comparison as one of the essential components in cyclical reiterations of four interconnected tasks: developing codes, describing and comparing these codes, conceptualizing and categorizing the data, and fnally developing inductive explanations. The main reason for using constant comparison is that it enables deeper exploration of the data when associations and patterns are noticed within the dataset. Finally, an "analytical hierarchy" emerged–"the process through which qualitative 'fndings' are built from the original raw data" (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 217).

In order to suggest explanations that are a good ft to the data, I conducted a series of tasks including fnding and studying patterns in the data; developing initial explanatory "hunches"; going back and forth between the initial explanation and the data to check for closeness of ft; trying out rival explanations; and fnally producing a conceptual model. Explaining a phenomenon involves discovering why certain observed behavior occurs when existing theory fails to provide adequate answers. In that sense, "explanations eliminate puzzles and provide intellectual satisfaction" (Blaikie, 2010, p. 71). Ritchie and Lewis (2003) provide both a comprehensive understanding of explanatory research and practical advice on how to conduct it. Study participants often provided their own explanations for phenomena. Sometimes, I reported these explanations and at other times, I inferred my own explanations from their responses. When trying to explain patterns occurring in the data, I followed assumptions of common sense, but also checked them against the entire data set to make sure that the data support them. I also used the advice of Ritchie and Lewis (2003) on developing initial "hunches" or beginnings of explanations by comparison with other studies from existing literature and the guidance of Bazeley (2009) with a variety of practical steps and strategies for suggesting explanations for phenomena. As suggested by Bazeley and Jackson (2013), all data (interview transcripts, feld notes, refective journal, and analytical memos written during data analysis) for the entire study were stored in one NVIVO project with all demographic information about the interviewees attached so that matrix queries could be performed to identify patterns in the data. Seeking patterns based on co-occurrence of codes within coding units remained as the main tool to identify associations, put forward propositions, and formulate explanations. Matrix query results, together with the analytic memos, form the main structure around which a "theorized storyline" (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007) is built in Chaps. 3, 4 and 5 and the Conceptual Model presented in Chap. 6.

#### *1.6.4 Ethical Considerations*

In addition to the Belmont Report's (DHEW, 1978) three core principles of respect of persons, benefcence, and justice, my research project observes the ethical guidelines of informed consent, self-determination, minimization of harm, anonymity, and confdentiality (Hennink et al., 2010) in all three phases of the research cycle. This was particularly pronounced during data collection and data analysis. The interviewees are members of a very small and distinct group in a relatively small society. Some of them have also given interviews to the general press and have made other public appearances. Therefore, they could be recognizable if adequate measures to protect their identities were not taken. In answering the interview guide questions, the returnees generously revealed their most sensitive experiences, attitudes, and emotions. As a result, they have provided me with an incredibly rich dataset from which substantial conclusions could be drawn. However, their candid and elaborate responses were given under conditions of anonymity and confdentiality, therefore, upholding these ethical principles was of utmost importance throughout my project.

Although a researcher's closeness and familiarity with the case are benefcial and offer potential for valuable insights, they also come with their own set of limitations that need to be overcome, so that the research project adheres to high standards of verifcation. Throughout data analysis and subsequent writing, I used triangulation, researcher refexivity, peer review and confrmation with study participants to verify that the study was conducted in a rigorous and credible manner. The data collected for analysis comes from in-depth interviews, feld notes, and a refective journal. The collected data were triangulated between these various sources. I am a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina myself with life experience that parallels the experiences of my study participants, so it is only natural that I approach the study, as any scholar working within the interpretivist paradigm, with my set of underlying biases and prejudices. However, being aware of one's own subjectivity is the frst step towards limiting its potential infuence on data analysis and interpretation of the study's results.

Throughout the research project, I took active measures at overcoming limitations inherent in being in such proximity to the case. As was mentioned previously, during data collection, I kept a systematic record of my own refections on feldwork as a daily refective journal. Besides employing tactics encouraging self-refection, throughout data collection, data analysis and writing, I worked closely with three peer reviewers as part of a writing group. These three colleagues are qualitative researchers and they assisted me in improving the study's rigor and credibility by identifying possible biases and removing their infuence on data analysis. Finally, in order to validate my explanations, the fnal product of analysis was compared and contrasted with the raw data, as well as presented to the study participants to gain their reactions. A coherent explanation that is grounded in data should be recognizable to the study participants, perhaps not in each one of its details, but certainly in its general operating principles (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). To satisfy this requirement of verifcation, I contacted a small group of the study participants and presented to them the results of my analysis. To a large extent, they agreed with my proposed explanations.

#### **1.7 Book Structure**

This book sets out to answer the research questions listed in Sect. 1.1. **Chapter 2** defnes the theoretical problem and reviews the scholarly literature to develop the conceptual framework, while **Chaps. 3, 4, 5,** and **6** present the empirical results of my study. **Chapter 2** explores the concepts of return migration, diaspora/transnationalism, 'political' emotions, citizenship, emotional/affective/intimate citizenship, belonging, and home; establishes theoretical connections between them and identifes research gaps. **Chapter 3** looks at factors motivating "decided return" (Cassarino, 2008), the subsequent reintegration process, and the sustainability of this type of return migration. **Chapter 4** uses *citizenship,* seen as a "prism through which to address the political" (Nyers, 2007, p. 3), and identifes a set of specifc and distinct emotions that constitute the emotional dimension of BiH citizenship, as experienced by returning diaspora members. Since previous researchers (Ho, 2009; Jackson, 2016) have theorized emotional citizenship as *home* and *belonging*, **Chap. 5** explores how the returnees construct the notions of home and belonging in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In **Chap. 6,** I tackle the main theoretical problem by proposing a conceptual model connecting voluntary return migration, citizenship–emotional and pragmatic, home and belonging; and identifying feeling safe and secure as central to the existence of such connections. **Chapter 7** concludes by discussing the empirical results and placing them in conversation with relevant scholarly literature(s). Finally, I offer some insights of wider applicability that could be gained by an in-depth look at Bosnia and Herzegovina as the case country.

#### **References**


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#### **Chapter 2 Conceptual Framework**

This chapter begins by defning the main theoretical problem my book addresses and continues by situating it within existing scholarly literature. The conceptual framework needed to locate the main theoretical problem is developed by surveying and synthesizing works from political science, human geography, anthropology, sociology and political psychology. The interdisciplinary literature review provides meaning and substance to concepts relevant to my study; forms interlinking relationships between these concepts and identifes gaps where a theoretical contribution can be made. I begin by setting my study within the larger literature on return migration, by examining the defnitions and types of return migration, followed by a brief overview of the main theoretical approaches. The decision to return is examined by looking at the complex set of reasons and re-evaluating the "voluntariness" of voluntary return. Specifcs of post-confict return are evaluated in the context of reintegration, reintegration strategies and the sustainability of return. The following section develops a substantive defnition of the diaspora concept by examining its history; reviewing the defning criteria; and comparing and contrasting diaspora to the closely connected concept of transnationalism. Throughout this study, the returnees are referred to as diaspora members *and* transmigrants, as both terms ft their actual life experience. The third section of the chapter discusses how emotions have been neglected in the social sciences by a dominance of the rational-choice paradigm, by treating emotions as merely personal reactions and thus leaving them outside of the 'political' and by overemphasizing the methodological challenges involved in the study of emotions.

Scholarly literature on citizenship is presented in the fourth section of the chapter. Citizenship is discussed from the point of view of liberal theory, in constant relation to the nation-state, followed by a discussion on how citizenship enters the relationship between emigrants and the emigration state and concluded with an examination of the importance of studying how individual citizens conceptualize citizenship. Next, emotional/affective/intimate citizenship is discussed as the theoretical nexus between citizenship and emotions by looking at how scholars so far have established this connection, primarily through the concepts of home and

belonging. An understanding of emotional/affective/intimate citizenship is further developed by contrasting it with fexible/pragmatic/instrumental citizenship; followed by a review of the scholarly literature which establishes links between citizenship and the distinct feelings of "patriotic love", fear, security/safety and shame.

The concepts of home and belonging are elaborated in the next two sections of the chapter, as they also represent a 'meeting point' of the previously discussed theory areas. Scholarly literature points to the centrality of home and belonging in the theoretical connection between citizenship and emotions, while the two concepts also fgure prominently in deepening our understanding of diaspora/transnationalism. Home is investigated as the physical home, a 'sense of place', as movement itself, a site of conficting emotions, a set of social relations, links between the past, present and future, as well as the 'cornerstone of national identity.' Subsequently, theorizing belonging as place-belongingness and the politics of belonging is explored. Placebelongingness is further extended by examining its autobiographical, relational, cultural, economic, and legal aspects, while the politics of belonging connect directly to citizenship. The fnal section of the chapter concludes and identifes how resolving the central theoretical problem contributes to the existing literature(s).

#### **2.1 Theoretical Problem**

The theoretical problem this book addresses is the creation of a nexus between voluntary return migration, citizenship, home, belonging and a set of specifc and distinct 'political' emotions. The case of diaspora members/transmigrants voluntarily returning to the home state presents a unique opportunity to study this problem, particularly when the returnees are dual citizens; they have a highly complex relationship to *home* and *belonging* due to experiencing violent displacement; and when the disparity between their host and home states is as large as it is with developed Western democracies and a state still recovering from the aftermath of war.

Their return is "decided" or "chosen" (Cassarino, 2008), since they have a viable alternative of remaining abroad, often provided by citizenship of the host state, fnancially afforded by established sources of income and livelihood, and socioculturally offered by a knowledge of the host state language and overall high levels of integration. Put simply, if they wanted to, they could have stayed in the host state. Yet, they freely chose to go back. The motivation for this type of return is found to be primarily emotional, while the initial conceptual premise of the book is that emotions are neither placed in stark opposition to rationality1 nor are they considered as purely personal reactions.2 Instead, emotions are given their rightful place in the

<sup>1</sup>See Bleiker and Hutchison (2008) for a summary of the scholarly debate between the "bodily/ somatic approach" to emotions and the alternative "cognitive/appraisal approach."

<sup>2</sup>See Hutchison and Bleiker (2007) for a synthesis of explanations of why the study of emotions has previously been sidelined from the social sciences due to being perceived as purely personal and thus not worthy of political analysis.

analysis and are seen as signifcant forms of knowledge and appraising thought (Nussbaum, 2001; Solomon, 2003). Emotions are considered as crucial for a better

understanding of social reality with full respect awarded to their diversity and distinctiveness. They play an important role in politics and society, particularly "in the process of constituting identity and community attachments" (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2007, pg. 63). What largely remains unexplored within the general social sciences, and political science specifcally, is the role that emotions play in our conceptualization of political phenomena, namely citizenship.

The unifying conceptual framework of the study is *citizenship*, also seen as a "prism through which to address the political" (Nyers, 2007, p. 3), and more specifcally its *emotional dimension*, which scholars have so far conceptualized through *home* and *belonging*. This perspective on citizenship builds on the foundations set by George Marcus, inspired by David Hume, who presents a treatise of the connection between citizenship and emotions, radically asserting that, contrary to the conventional view in political theory, emotions enable rationality and good citizenship, mainly because they foster democratic action. Previous researchers (for example: Marcus, 2002; Ho, 2009; and Jackson, 2016) have established that studying emotions is relevant to a better understanding of citizenship; theorized 'emotional/affective/intimate' primarily through the concepts of home and belonging and made connections between some emotions, such as 'patriotic love', fear, security/safety and shame, however, much work remains to be done on creating a deeper understanding of the theoretical problem. By focusing on individual citizens, in this case returning diaspora members, my book aims to create robust theoretical connections between voluntary return migration, a set of specifc and distinct 'political' emotions, citizenship, home, and belonging.

#### **2.2 Conceptualizing Voluntary Return Migration to a Post-Confict Society**

"Return migration is the great unwritten chapter in the history of migration" (p. 7) wrote Russell King in 2000. He continued to say that the knowledge scholars have produced thus far on return migration is often summarized in an occasional footnote regretfully stating that "little is known of those who have returned" (King, 2000, p.7). More recently, the situation seems to have changed substantially with scholarship on return migration fourishing in the interim (see Carling et al., 2011; King & Kuschminder, 2022). Initially, scholarly work on return migration has been challenged by attempts to directly apply theoretical approaches developed to explain original migration from the home to host state (Nadler et al., 2016), so the predominant early theorizing of return migratory movements revolved around Ravenstein's Laws of Migration (1885, 1889), related explanatory generalizations (Bovenkerk, 1974) or push-pull explanations (Lee, 1966). It was in the mid-1970s that work on return migration gained momentum with studies conducted on "guest workers" (Gmelch, 1980; Cassarino, 2004; van Houte & Davids, 2008). Developed countries have started to pay more attention to patterns of return migration following the increases in asylum applications due to post-Cold war events (Kuschminder, 2017). Given the ongoing migration crisis, it could be expected that scholarly attention in this feld is likely to continue growing. Although, as emphasized by King (2000), much work remains to be done in both theoretical and empirical studies designed to explain and understand the specifc aspects of return migration, at least fve distinct theoretical approaches can be identifed.

Cassarino (2004) presents a systematic comparison of fve theoretical approaches to the study of return migration: neoclassical economics, new economics of labor migration (NELM), structuralism, transnationalism and social network theory. Analogously to how neoclassical economics explains initial migration as caused by wage differentials between the home and host states, return is viewed as a miscalculation on behalf of the migrant. According to this perspective, the migrant returns to the home state, having failed to beneft from the higher earning potential abroad. In contrast, NELM moves the level of analysis from the individual migrant to the household and explains the decision to return as a "calculated strategy" (Cassarino, 2004, p. 255). According to NELM, return is the natural result of achieving one's goals of higher earnings abroad, accumulated savings and attachment to the home state. Structuralism further moves the focus of analysis from the individual migrant and the household to wider social elements in the home state, the context and "reality" (Cassarino, 2004, p. 257) of return. The structural approach is most concerned with the impact returnees have on the home state, either along the lines of time or space. Implicitly, the structural framework assumes a strict separation between home and host societies, with very little informational transfer between the two. Transnationalism arises out of the need to better understand the growing social, economic and cultural connections between the sending and receiving societies. Seen from a transnational perspective, return migration is part of a dynamic exchange between the home and host states comprising back-and-forth movements, frequent return visits and remittances. Similarly, social network theory gives importance to the links between the sending and receiving countries, but it does not see these linkages as related to existing diasporas. Instead, these connections are viewed as resulting from the personal relations of the returnees and their previous migratory experiences.

Traditionally, return migration has been categorized as either forced or voluntary, however, different constraints (Carling et al., 2015; van Houte & Davids, 2014) and the often disputed element of "voluntariness" (Cassarino, 2008; Webber, 2011) have challenged scholars to fnd new classifcations. Kuschminder (2017) makes the important point that the distinction between the forced and voluntary categories can be made along two different axes. The original migration differentiates between a refugee and a migrant, while the return involves a difference between a deportee and a returnee. King (1986) considers repatriation to be a type of forced return since migrants themselves do not initiate the return, but it is rather political, natural or personal disasters forcing them to return. Whether the UNHCR considers repatriation to be a form of forced return or not still leaves open, the question of how many other actual options are left to the refugees. Since repatriation often is their only alternative, it can be categorized as "compelled" return (Kuschminder, 2017, p. 8). Black et al. (2004) conclude that the agencies involved in refugee return do not have a common defnition of voluntary refugee return and, instead identify gradations of "voluntariness," while van Houte and Davids (2014) base their distinction on the legal status of the migrant in the host country. If the migrant has a legal alternative to stay in the host state and still returns, then this type of return can be classifed as voluntary. Conversely, the return is defned as involuntary. In criticizing assisted voluntary return and reintegration programs, Cassarino (2008) calls for a new term: "decided or chosen return". Decided or chosen return is "mainly based on the migrants' own decision to return to their country of origin, on a temporary or permanent basis, without the assistance of a public body" (p. 12). Similarly, Webber (2011) questions the "voluntariness" of assisted voluntary return programs, which also seek for a more sophisticated understanding of the distinctions between forced and voluntary return migration. In case of truly voluntary return migration, the returnees' decision-making process deserves particular scholarly attention.

To understand the return decision-making process, differing classifcations of return motivations and reasons have emerged. Scholars as early as Bovenkerk (1974) have remarked on how little economic reasons impact return migration, simply because "economic betterment is the main cause of emigration in the frst place" (Bovenkerk, 1974, p. 21) and a reversal of relative differences in economic development between sending and receiving countries is highly unlikely. King (2000) summarizes the reasons for return migration to comprise economic, social, family/life-cycle and political reasons, also proposing that non-economic reasons are more dominant than economic ones. With second-generation return, King et al. (2008) argue that return can be seen as a "personal project of relocation to the ancestral homeland strongly infuenced by aspirations and emotions of belonging and identifcation" (p. 263). Kılınç and King (2017) look at "lifestyle migration" as another type of return migration, primarily motivated by non-economic reasons. Achenbach (2017) creates a classifcation of return motivations based on three areas of concern or "infuential spheres": career, family, and lifestyle, with each area further framed by the individual migrant's goals and other infuential factors. As was discussed previously, with full realization of the importance of economic reasons "whether from a neoclassical or Marxian perspective" (p. 242) Halfacree (2004) champions non-economic reasons as most appropriate in explaining return migration decisions.

The decision to return is highly complex, involving a combination of factors related to agency and structure. Halfacree (2004) cites Fielding's writing on the relationship between migration and culture found in the frst volume of *Migration Processes and Patterns* to illustrate the complexity of decision-making involved in return migration. Both Fielding (1992) and Halfacree (2004) primarily turn to culture as a complementary explanatory force to the dominant economic paradigm. When thoroughly reviewing the literature on migration decision-making Achenbach

(2017) also criticizes the rational choice model and the "homo economicus" as an over-simplifying device in decision-making, as well as pointing to inadequate attention paid to the migrants' own agency either at the individual or the household level. To better conceptualize the complexity of factors involved in the decision-making process, challenge the limits of rationality and incorporate both agency and structure, Black et al. (2004) build a model involving structural conditions in the home and host states, the particular migrant (individual or family) characteristics and possible public policy incentives to encourage return migration.

Within scholarship on return migration, the specifc elements of post-war return have garnered a lively academic debate. What most scholars (Black & Koser, 1999; Pedersen, 2003; van Houte & Davids, 2014) agree upon is that return to a postconfict society does not imply a restoration of order to the home state and a completion of the refugee cycle. Even where basic physical security is guaranteed, return might not be the most preferred step for the migrants as they have a lot to lose economically, socially, culturally, and emotionally by going back (Monsutti, 2008; Omata, 2013). Scholars do not view return to be a natural outcome and an end to the refugee cycle. Instead, if this type of return happens, it is seen as the start of an extensive process of re-integration (Pedersen, 2003) as both "home" and the refugees have changed substantially either with the confict, the time spent abroad or most often both. Differently from the "restoration of order" (van Houte & Davids, 2014, p. 76), the strand of research discussing "return as change" (p. 76) argues for the returnees and the home society to beneft from these differences (King, 1978; Bakewell, 2008), with the returnees using their position of in-betweenness to promote change and development in the home state.

An alternative perspective on return to post-confict societies uses the transnational in-betweenness of the returnees. Eastmond (2006) offers a look at return as an "open-ended process, one which often takes place over a longer period of time and may involve periods of dual residence and considerable movement back and forth" (p. 144). Transnational return thus presents new challenges to the understanding of "reintegration" or "home" with transnational lifestyles distributing different values of home to different places. Eastmond (2006) also identifes two different strategies of return: open-ended and seasonal returns. In the frst case, the returnees become "transnationals at home" (p.147), seeking to establish a more permanent base in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while maintaining an active connection with the host country. With seasonal returns, the returnees come back to BiH temporarily, through vacations or longer visits, but keep their base in the country of asylum. In addition, the novelty of Eastmond (2006) compared to many other studies that examine macro-structural processes and policies to understand international return is that it offers a "transnationalism from below" (Smith & Guarnizo, 1998 as cited in Eastmond, 2006, p. 145). Eastmond (2006) examines the refugees' own voices and viewpoints to gain a better understanding of the concepts used to set return policies from above. Scholarship on return migration to postwar settings gradually came to view return as both a "movement back" (van Houte & Davids, 2014, p. 71) where returnees restore some sense of social fabric that existed prior to the confict, and a "movement forward" (p. 71) in which the return aids economic development and transition to peace (Black & Koser, 1999; Faist, 2008). Whether a "movement back" or a "movement forward" post-war return involves a lengthy process of re-integration.

The prolonged process of re-integration has a considerable impact on the returnees themselves and the home society, calling for re-integration strategies and ultimately affecting the sustainability of return. Various scholars (Olsson & King, 2008; Carling et al., 2015; Paasche, 2016) compare the challenges of re-integration to the original diffculties migrants and refugees faced when integrating in the host countries. While the returnees need to re-integrate across different social contexts, including the family, community, society and the state (Carling et al., 2015) or different spheres of life: social, cultural, economic and political (Cassarino, 2008) several different studies (Rogge, 1994; Black & Koser, 1999; Hammond, 1999) show that re-integration is not a simple process of people returning to a familiar society, culture, and home (Kuschminder, 2017). The temporal dimension cannot be underestimated (Pedersen, 2003; Carling et al., 2015), as both the returnees and the home society change in the interim. This is particularly pronounced with post-confict return. Often, the population that stayed behind does not accept the returnees (Bovenkerk, 1974) or even shows direct mistrust, enmity and envy towards them (Black & Koser, 1999; Kibreab, 2002; and Stefansson, 2004). Although the comparison between strategies of integration and re-integration is not entirely smooth and there are many differences between the two processes, still there are important similarities. Given that the re-integration literature is not theoretically as developed, further theorizing of the adaptation refugees and migrants undergo upon return to their home states can beneft greatly from the more advanced integration theory (Kuschminder, 2017). In fact, for re-integration to be successful, strategies are needed on part of the returnees (Kuschminder, 2017) and focused public policy efforts (Arowolo, 2000) on part of the home state authorities. Ultimately, the success of returnees' re-integration determines the sustainability of return. The simplest measure of whether return was successful is whether re-emigration follows (Bovenkerk, 1974) with scholars (Black et al., 2004) developing additional criteria for measuring the sustainability of return migration.

#### **2.3 The Returnees: Diaspora Members and Transmigrants**

Diaspora, as a concept discussed by scholars, has gone through several different transformations (Faist, 2010). These changes have left much ambiguity (Weinar, 2010) around the three original characteristics of a dispersed group sharing a common ethnic or national background, maintaining organized networks which connect various points of dispersion, emotionally identifying with the homeland and preserving symbolic or actual linkages with it (Sheffer, 1986). Other authors (Cohen, 1997; Sheffer, 2003) suggest other defning features of diaspora such as "dispersion under pressure, choice of destination, identity awareness, networked space, duration

of transnational ties and relative autonomy from host and origin societies (Bruneau, 2010, p. 36-37). The ostensible vagueness of how diaspora has been defned within the scholarly literature has led Brubaker (2005) to refer to Sartori's 'concept stretching', wherein a concept is so widely used that it loses its meaning. To clarify the defnition of diaspora, Brubaker (2005) highlights its three key characteristics: dispersion, homeland orientation, and boundary-maintenance. "The term that once described Jewish and Armenian dispersion now share meanings with a larger semantic domain that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guestworker, exile community, ethnic community" (Tölölyan, 1991, p.4). Brah (1996) adds the highly relevant concepts of "home" and "belonging" (p.189) to defning the concept of diaspora. There is a "creative tension" (Brah, 1996, p. 189) between dispersion as one of the defning features of diaspora and "home." This tension is expressed by nurturing a "homing desire" as "discourses of fxed origins" are criticized. Dispersal implies that "home" is desired concurrent to a rhetoric praising mobility.

Faist (2010) presents a succinct historical overview of how the concept of diaspora has evolved. Diaspora is rooted in a distant past, beginning with its application to the historic experience of specifc peoples, originally the forced dispersal of the Jews. A more recent understanding of forced dispersal as a key characteristic of diaspora also includes the Palestinians; while most recently any type of dispersal, not necessarily forced, becomes a defning feature of diaspora, to include groups such as the Chinese, Turks or Mexicans. An older understanding of the "homeland orientation" characteristic of diaspora implied a "return to the (imagined) homeland" (Safran, 1991), while more recently, an emphasis on return is replaced by "dense and continuous linkages across borders" (Faist, 2010, p.12). Finally, in the more distant past the diasporic characteristic of sharing a common ethnic, religious, linguistic and/or cultural origin also implied that diaspora members were not integrating well into the host country. In more contemporary usage, this characteristic does not automatically imply problems with integration, but rather a "cultural distinctiveness of the diaspora vis-à-vis other groups" (Faist, 2010, p. 13). Thus, retaining some degree of "cultural distinctiveness" in the more modern understanding of diaspora does not necessarily imply poor integration in the host society.

Closely related to the concept of diaspora is transnationalism and the two overlap in certain points, while differing in others. Bauböck (2010) looks at how various classical defnitions of diaspora equally apply to transnational groups and analyzes each one of the criteria used to defne diaspora to see how it also applies to transnationalism. He concludes that the key difference between the two terms lies in their differing spheres of usage. "Diaspora is an evocative political term, whereas transnationalism is primarily an academic concept that refers to a set of empirical phenomena and a perspective that groups them together and suggests a framework for studying them" (Bauböck, 2010, p. 317). Faist (2010) also agrees with this distinction and adds that, while both diaspora and transnationalism refer to "cross-border processes" (p. 9) diaspora has been widely used in literary studies and history. In the language of social sciences, transnationalism is used more extensively to describe an abstract set of processes. Faist (2010) also proposes that, while diaspora refers to groups that share a common religious or national background living outside of an (imagined) homeland, transnationalism denotes "migrants' durable ties across countries….and all sorts of social formations, such as transnationally active network groups and organizations" (p. 9). According to Faist (2010) whilst a member of diaspora is located outside the (imagined) homeland, the transmigrant is at times inside and at other times outside of it. Bruneau (2010) also shares the view that "this relationship to place and territories enables us to distinguish between diasporism and transnationalism" (p.49).

Transnationalism as a theoretical approach within migration studies, looks at the development of links between sending and receiving societies and the emergence of "transnational communities." Migration is seen as a vehicle for the emergence of 'deterritorialized nation-states.' One of the frst (Mazzucato, 2010) to theorize the concept of transnationalism were Glick-Schiller et al. (1995) by focusing on migration in a globalizing context and questioning the role of the nation-state. As Glick-Schiller et al. (1995) argue, immigrants of modern times cannot be depicted as "uprooted" in the same sense as the word was used to describe traditional immigrants. The difference between a "traditional immigrant" and a "transmigrant" is that, while the former leaves the outbound country to become fully integrated in the new country and is more or less forced to sever ties to the old country, the later becomes rooted in the new country, but maintains active political, economic, social, cultural and other links to the old country.

The transmigrant is able to infuence and shape both the society of emigration and that of immigration. Portes et al. (1999) defne transmigrants as people who "live dual lives: speak two languages, have homes in two countries, and make a living through continuous regular contact across national borders" (p. 217). Transmigrants could have a sense of belonging in two different societies; fnd their home in both of them and make this state of fux to be their primary identity, source of income and cultural reference point. Both Glick-Schiller et al. (1995) and Portes et al. (1999) point to the overwhelming importance of technology, particularly communications technology, that has made transnational activities more feasible and accessible on a much wider scale than ever before. Vertovec (1999) calls for a need to "reconstruct locality or 'place'" (p. 455) and argues that communications technology coupled with higher social mobility contributes to "translocal understanding." The main conficting tendency is in the emergence of "translocalities" (Vertovec, 1999) and "deterritorialized nation-states" (Glick-Schiller et al., 1995), parallel to mainly capital-rich states enforcing more stringent controls on migration and tightening their borders together with globalizing forces accompanied by increasing nationalism (Glick-Schiller et al., 1995). Although these insightful observations were made towards the beginning of the twenty-frst century, they ring even more true today, in its third decade.

#### **2.4 Political Emotions: Moving Beyond the Reason/ Emotion Dichotomy**

Emotions play an important role in world politics, but, until recently have been understudied in the social sciences. Bleiker and Hutchison (2008), as well as several surveyed scholars (Mercer (1996), Mercer (2005), Crawford (2000), Balzacq & Jervis (2004), Lebow (2005), Hill (2003), Linklater (2004) as cited in Bleiker and Hutchison (2008)) point to the problematic lack of study of emotions and the effect that this defcit in research has had on the development of the social sciences. To explain the 'strange absence' of investigation into how emotions infuence world politics, Bleiker and Hutchison (2008) frstly point to the dominance of the 'rationalchoice' paradigm, which works within the emotions-reason dichotomy, champions cognition and treats emotion merely as a deviation from rationality. Second, Bleiker and Hutchison (2008) survey empirical studies to fnd that they do not address the historical evolution of feelings. Where feelings *are* included, investigation is conducted assuming that emotions are only personal reactions without considering wider societal dynamics. Third, to fnd possible explanations for a dearth of research in this area, Bleiker and Hutchison (2008) highlight the methodological challenges that arise when studying emotions in the social sciences.

The dichotomy which positions emotions in an opposing and adversarial relationship with rationality is the frst and most systemic reason serious inquiry into emotions has been missing from the social sciences. Maiz (2011) surveys a large body of political theory to argue frst that the reason/emotion dichotomy or dualism, resulting from a radical interpretation of the Enlightenment, is the foundation of other binary codes, which act as impediments to democratic and political development. Maiz (2011) also shows how the reason-emotion dichotomy has had a profound impact on the major paradigms of contemporary political theory: utilitarianism, Marxism, post-Kantian liberalism found in the work of John Rawls, as well as in Alasdair MacIntyre's communitarianism. In contrast, Maiz (2011) also explores the new theoretical approaches in political philosophy, starting with Remo Bodei and Martha Nussbaum, who reject the old reason-emotion dichotomy and set the stage for a new, non-dichotomic paradigm, crucial for further growth in political theory. This review concludes:


Considering the more recent developments in various disciplines, leads the way for a scholarly investigation into the role emotions play in social and political

phenomena and as Nussbaum (2013) concludes: although reason or 'rationality' has dominated the social sciences, emotions are gaining an increasingly important role.

Working within the reason-emotion dichotomy is the founding theory of emotions, independently formulated by James (1884) and Lange (1885). The James– Lange theory of emotions posits emotions are the consequence of bodily responses to outside stimuli. James (1884) argues that bodily changes follow the perception of an 'exciting fact' and our feeling of these bodily changes is the emotion. The physiological changes, e.g. constricting eyes and brows or throat clearing and coughing precede the associated emotions, e.g. worry and embarrassment. Cannon (1927) criticizes the James-Lange theory of emotions, by pointing out several apparent inconsistencies in the viscera (gut, internal body)—emotion connection. As an alternative, a theory of emotions based on thalamic processes is proposed. Dalgleish (2004) provides a historical overview of developments in affective neuroscience, starting with the work of William James and Charles Darwin, followed by a discussion of the work of Walter Cannon and Phillip Bard, James Papez and Paul MacLean, collectively referred to as early functional neuroanatomical models.

The dominant James-Lange theory of emotions or the "bodily/somatic approach" to emotions has been challenged by several scholars, proposing an alternative, "cognitive/appraisal approach" to emotions. Bleiker and Hutchison (2008) look at the growing literature that rejects the standard dichotomy between emotions and reason and dismisses categorizing emotions as purely irrational. The two most prominent scholars representing the cognitive approach to emotions, Robert Solomon and Martha Nussbaum, do not subscribe to the James-Lange theory of emotions as bodily reactions, but consider emotions to have an appraisal quality and to be "important forms of knowledge and evaluative thought." Bleiker and Hutchison (2008) identify a number of scholars who have successfully summarized the debate between the cognitive/appraisal vs. the bodily/somatic basis for emotions: Crawford (2000)), Marcus (2000), Mercer (2005), Ross (2006) and Connolly (2002). When contrasting emotions to rational self-interest, Elster (1998) presents, but also criticizes the standard tools of economic theory, namely cost-beneft calculations, encapsulated in a utility function and preference curves. Within the economic theory paradigm, emotions would enter the utility function with either a negative or a positive sign, just as any material reward. Drawing on fndings of Damasio (1994), Elster (1998) argues that emotions can help us decide and, in some cases, help us make the best decisions. Prinz (2004) argues that the James-Lange theory of emotions needs to be amended with 'embodied appraisal theory,' treating emotions as perceptions of changes in our somatic condition and appraisals. Mercer (2010) uses the appraisal/cognitive approach to emotions, which presupposes that beliefs precede emotions and that rational decision-making depends on emotions.

Emotions have been marginalized from the social sciences not only because of the reason-emotions dichotomy but also because they used to be considered as purely personal and thus not worthy of political analysis. Perhaps the feminist battle cry of the "personal is political" can be credited for moving emotions closer to the center stage of political theorizing. Emotions are not just personal reactions, instead, they have broader social and political signifcance. Hutchison and Bleiker (2007) survey the literature (Nussbaum (2001), Shilling (1997), Marcus (2000), Ahmed (2004) and Scheff (1994)) on emotions and security/terrorism to show how emotions are not only personal reactions and how they in fact have an important place in politics and society, particularly "in the process of constituting identity and community attachments" (p. 63).

Finally, studying emotions in the social sciences has been sidelined because it is confronted with certain specifc methodological challenges. Bleiker and Hutchison (2008) fnd that international relations scholarship, including constructivist approaches, relies on social science methods, which, even in their qualitative form are not entirely appropriate for the study of emotions. Acknowledging important feminist contributions to the study of emotions, the authors suggest three points of change in 'intellectual attitude' that may solve the problem of the identifed gap and include the study of emotions in the social sciences: (1) accepting ambivalence in the study of emotions and politics, (2) looking at emotions through representations (pictures) and communication and (3) expanding the intellectual toolset for the study of emotions and politics by borrowing from the humanities. According to Neuman et al. (2007), emotions are studied using a wide spectrum of methodologies, ranging from aggregate studies, survey sampling studies, content analysis, as well as experiments. However, regardless of which methodology is used, some of the major challenges in studying emotions are: establishing reliability and validity with measurement; relying on the subjects' introspective abilities to properly identify their emotions and accurately describe their emotional responses to various stimuli presented by the researcher; developing theoretical concepts that connect concepts of thinking, feeling and acting at the individual and aggregate levels (Neuman et al., 2007).

#### **2.5 Citizenship as Membership Status of a Community or a State?**

The classical liberal theory of citizenship can be grasped in the work of T.H. Marshall (1950), who proposes that citizenship is based on civil, political and social rights and focuses on how these rights have developed in Britain. "Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community" (Marshall, 1950, p. 28). Citing Stuart Hall and David Held, Yuval-Davis (2006) underlines that Marshall's defnition of citizenship makes no mention of the state, thus implicitly assuming complete overlap between the 'community' and the 'state.' However, as Guzina (2007) argues the assumed 'community' and 'state' overlap is primarily a result of historical circumstances and not inherent. Ingrained within this conceptualization of citizenship is the liberal 'neutrality of the state,' which states that cultural or any other particularities do not need to be considered because they can be satisfed by a 'neutral state' as they translate directly into a language of civil, social, or political rights (Guzina, 2007). This assumption is more easily implemented in culturally and nationally homogenous societies (Guzina, 2007). However, Yuval-Davis (2006) further questions the supposed universalistic character of liberal citizenship as it has also proven to be exclusionary and representing "hegemonic, majoritarian and 'westocentric' positions" (p. 207) as in fact, a complete overlap between national community and a state is illusory.

Further theorizing of citizenship as rights can be found in the work of other prominent citizenship scholars with differing views on the proper role ascribed to the nation-state. Soysal (1994) refers to her model of citizenship as "postnational" since its frst basis is found in the personhood of each individual bestowed upon with "entitlements" (p. 3), which were previously associated with "national rights." According to Soysal (1994), transnationalism and human rights structures give a normative framework for "postnational citizenship," which grants rights to any individual to participate and be a member of any political community regardless of whether she or he has any cultural or historical bonds to this community. Joppke (1999) views citizenship through the lens of rights as well, but emphasizes that the nation-state is still relevant for international human rights and norms. In the author's own words, his book "sets a counterpoint to current diagnoses of nation-states diminished by the external forces of globalization and international human regimes and discourses" (p.vii). For Joppke (1999), the nation-state remains highly relevant for our understanding of citizenship as rights and national citizenship continues to be the main conduit for immigrant integration, albeit with some nationally specifc patterns of multiculturalism. The multiculturalist theory of citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995) also includes rights as a dimension. However, the focus within multiculturalism is on the group and not on the universal rights seen in previous theories. The three types of group rights in Kymlicka's thought are: self-government, polyethnic and special-representation rights.

Various scholars examine the different dimensions of citizenship. Bloemraad (2000) views citizenship as a relationship between the individual and a sociopolitical community with at least four dimensions: legal status, rights, identity and participation. At the center of the debate presented by Bloemraad (2000) lies the naturalization of immigrants which questions the degree to which rights need to be attributed to personhood rather than membership in a nation-state and challenges a state's identity and cohesion by producing multiculturalist outcomes. Bauböck (1999) defnes citizenship as "a status of equal and full membership in a polity" (p. 5); distinguishes between thin and thick conceptions of citizenship and proposes the three main dimensions of citizenship to be: rights, membership and practices. Offering an alternative typology of the literature on citizenship, Kymlicka and Norman (1994) suggest legal, identity and civic virtue to be the three main dimensions of citizenship at the individual level. For Brubaker (1992), the key aspect of citizenship is membership and closely connected to membership is territoriality, as membership in a defned territory of a nation-state. In further inquiry into the connections between citizenship and the nation-state, Bosniak (2000) identifes the four dimensions of citizenship to be: legal status, rights, political activity and "a form of collective identity and sentiment" (p. 455).

Closely related to the concept of citizenship are the concepts of emigrant and emigration state. Various scholars (Collyer, 2013; Gamlen, 2008; Barry, 2006; Bauböck, 2009) address the issue that citizenship and migration literature has much more to say about immigrants and immigration than it does about emigrants and emigration. However, as was frst stressed by Abdelmalek Sayad (1977), every immigrant is also an emigrant. "Emigrant citizens are legal nationals and citizens of emigration states who voluntarily live physically outside those states. The term does not include refugees or asylum-seekers" (Barry, 2006, p. 13). An "emigration state" is one where the number of people leaving the country in search of better opportunities abroad is greater than the number of people arriving. Within the welldeveloped scholarly literature on citizenship and immigration, the immigrant's preexisting citizenship, citizenship of the emigration state, is signifcantly undertheorized and instead mainly used as a marker of the immigrant's "otherness" (Barry, 2006). However, emigration brings a particular perspective on citizenship and thus deserves specifc attention. To clarify this discussion, it is useful to think of citizenship as either a legal status or as membership of a community (Gamlen, 2008). Citizenship, when assumed to be "membership of a community in which one lives one's life" (Held, 1991, p. 20) implies a certain level of cohesion between citizens, yet this cohesion is signifcantly damaged in the case of emigration states. Emigration by itself can become an integral part of the citizenship experience (Barry, 2006).

The relationship between emigration states and emigrants can be complicated and in some cases conficting (Barry, 2006). Given the economic reality of emigrants primarily originating from the global South and migrating to the global North, the emigration state's main perspective on its emigrants is one of economic interest. Emigrants are a stable source of remittances and capital infows for the emigration state (Barry, 2006). Collyer (2013) recognizes the importance of the economic dimension in the state-emigrants relationship and illustrates it by the state's efforts to "mobilize" (p. 5) its emigrants. In addition, Collyer (2013) goes beyond the economic rationale when surveying the transnationalism literature to show how the state becomes a "transnational actor just like any other" (p. 6) in interaction with its diaspora/transnational migrants. Emigration also transforms the "territorial understanding of state sovereignty" (Collyer, 2013, p. 11) by challenging the inside-out dichotomy in international relations theory. In the language of transnationalism, the state becomes "de-territorialized" (Glick-Schiller et al., 1995). Gamlen (2008) builds an analytical framework to explore the emigration state–diaspora relationship and delineate "diaspora integration mechanisms," which focus on extending rights and extracting obligations and "diaspora building mechanisms" that center on cultivating existing diaspora communities and creating new ones.

Very few citizenship studies focus on individual citizens (Aker, 2014) and there is an "overemphasis on structures" (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994, p. 353). The importance of individual citizens to the understanding of citizenship is underestimated (İçduygu, 2005). Aker (2014) surveys some notable exceptions to this overall assessment: Miller-Idriss (2006), Caymaz (2008), İçduygu (2005) and Balta and Olcay (2014). Miller-Idriss (2006) shows that citizenship in the German case is constituted by territoriality, legal status and identity, an interpretation which moves away from the traditional "ius sanguinis" understanding of German citizenship towards "ius soli," membership, and cultural requirements. "Citizenship is not a static or uniform concept, but rather imagined and re-imagined by ordinary citizens in a variety of ways" (Miller-Idriss, 2006, p. 541). Generalized, structure-driven understandings of citizenship are not suffcient as they quickly become "static and uniform." Instead, conceptualizations of citizenship need to be produced by individual citizens. For example, Caymaz (2008) fınds that individual Turkish citizens in Turkey conceptualize citizenship primarily as duties. İçduygu (2005) emphasizes the relevance of attachment as a dimension of citizenship observed in Turkish and international migrants, with attachment to a particular state offering citizens "a world of predictable relationships" (İçduygu, 2005, p. 202). Balta and Olcay (2014) argue that transnational citizenship is commodifed and illustrate this phenomenon by Turkish elites acquiring U.S. citizenship.

#### **2.6 Emotional/Affective/Intimate Citizenship: Perceiving Citizenship as Feeling**

"The solution to good citizenship is located in our capacity to feel," (p.8) boldly contended George Marcus in his seminal *The Sentimental Citizen: Emotion in Democratic Politics*, a work with a "radical assertion" (p.7) that emotion makes rationality possible. Without emotions, argues Marcus, people are not capable of rationality and this relationship holds nowhere more strongly than with citizenship practices. The radical nature of this assertion stands in stark contrast to the conventional view of the previously discussed antagonism between rationality and emotion, reason and passion, as well as the ensuing forced choice between one or the other. If we choose reason, so the conventional understanding goes, a world of "freedom, justice, and rights equitably secured for one and all" (Marcus, 2002, p. 47) will follow, while choosing emotion will lead to creating often unreasonable connections with people. The radical nature of Marcus's argument places emotion and reason in a cooperative, non-competing, mutually enabling relationship, with a key reliance on Hume's insight (Hume, 1984) that emotions create action. For democratic citizenship to function, reasonable deliberation, made possible by emotional engagement, needs to result in action, again stimulated by emotion. In Marcus's view, citizens are capable of being "good" because they can feel.

Marcus's argument is radical, not only because it offers a change of perception in the relationship between rationality and emotions, but also because, unlike received knowledge, it pays serious attention to how emotions impact citizenship. Brown (2014) explains the relative lack of inquiry into the role emotions play in citizenship scholarship, by the presence of some uniform and relatively universal emotions such as "patriotic love" (p. 427). Patriotic love, similarly to hatred projected at national enemies, seems to be present in almost all national contexts, and thus not particularly interesting for scholarly investigation. As a notable exception, Johnson (2010) looks at how citizens are encouraged to feel in order to conceptualize a "good" (p. 500) citizen. Wood (2013) recognizes citizenship participation to be "thoroughly social and relational and inseparable from emotions that arise and fow between people" (p. 52). These individual emotions have a social character and form the basis of the "cohesion agenda" (Fortier, 2010, p. 22), which recognizes that individuals' feelings are produced by social interaction and the impact of a "community" (p.22). Marcus presented a novel mode of conceptualizing the interplay between emotions and citizenship, which was soon followed by innovative developments in emotional, affective and intimate citizenship.

The concept of emotional citizenship refers to how individuals perceive citizenship as feeling, rather than as citizenship presented by the state and politically received by the citizen. Emotional citizenship relies heavily on citizenship as practice (Wood, 2013), that is on the daily experience of citizenship (Nyers, 2007). The complexity of citizenship is most pronounced within everyday life, where it is experienced as feeling and not necessarily politically structured (De Graeve, 2010). To provide analytical rigor to the concept of emotional citizenship, Ho (2009) differentiates between emotional representations and emotional subjectivities. Emotional representations are defned as the "lexicon and metaphors that individuals use to give meaning to citizenship, such as "home" and "belonging" (Ho, 2009, p. 789), while emotional subjectivities "emphasize the way individuals experience the social world, especially the manner in which they emotionally negotiate the power relations of citizenship governance" (Ho, 2009, p. 789). These two categories are not mutually exclusive; they rather constitute each other. Similarly, Jackson (2016) fnds that the four main elements of emotional citizenship are: belonging, home, safety and roots, with home being "intrinsic to emotional citizenship" (Jackson, 2016, p. 824). Other authors (Magat, 1999; Wood, 2013; Howes & Hammett, 2016; Ahmed, 2016) place the focus of emotional citizenship on belonging, or a feeling of belonging.

Similarly to emotional citizenship, affective citizenship recognizes citizens' feelings as instrumental to how citizenship is constructed. The term is used by Jones (2005) to describe the "affection and loyalty" (p. 145 as cited in Johnson, 2010, p. 496) which "citizens are encouraged to feel about their nation" (Johnson, 2010, p. 496). Mookherjee (2005) uses the term affective citizenship as an "alternative approach to recognition" (p. 36), which, contrary to the abstract notions of unitary citizenship, recognizes how emotional relations act to form identities. According to Mookherjee (2005), those identities are strengthened by shared experiences of social disadvantage, marked by "direct or remembered pain, loss, humiliation or even the psychological disorientation which postcolonial writers associate with the effects of colonial domination" (Fanon, 1967, p. 78). Presented as a response to the postcolonial and feminist criticism of liberal universalism, affective citizenship aims to provide recognition to minority values (Mookherjee, 2005). In a similar manner, Fortier (2010) defnes the "affective citizen" to be a member of a community, where membership relies on personal feelings, which go beyond the "private" realm of family and kin and are instead projected towards the larger community.

Intimate citizenship, as defned by the sociologist Ken Plummer, stands apart from the previously described notions of emotional/affective citizenship and refers to the connection between human intimacy and citizenship rights. In Ken Plummer's defnition, intimate citizenship is concerned with "rights, obligations, recognitions and respect around those most intimate spheres of life–who to live with, how to raise children, how to handle one's body, how to relate as a gendered being, how to be an erotic person" (Plummer, 2001, p. 238). Intimate citizenship is seen as a "sensitizing concept" (Plummer, 2001, p. 238), primarily interested in rights, as they pertain to a particular area of life—the intimate sphere of each individual. Muchoki (2015) emphasizes the "bridge" (p. 61) characteristic of Plummer's intimate citizenship, since this concept creates a connection between the public and private arenas. De Graeve (2010) indicates that studies in intimate citizenship (as defned by Ken Plummer) concentrate on how "alternative spheres of life" (p. 365) are often discriminated against and excluded when differences between them and general society are negotiated. Another way of understanding the "alternative spheres of life" would be to consider them as people who have different ways of interpreting intimacy, compared to society at large. It is therefore important to underline the key difference between emotional/affective/intimate citizenship in authors such as Ho (2009), Jackson (2016), Magat (1999), Wood (2013), Howes and Hammett (2016), Ahmed (2016), Mookherjee (2005), Fortier (2010), or Johnson (2010) and intimate citizenship in Plummer (2001). The former considers emotions as instrumental for construction of citizenship, while the latter focuses on citizenship rights, as they pertain to a particular sphere of life–human intimacy.

A useful contrasting concept to help defne emotional/affective/intimate citizenship is the notion of pragmatic/fexible/practical/instrumental citizenship, also closely related to dual citizenship. Mavroudi (2008) introduces 'pragmatic citizenship' to describe a situation in which a passport is strategically acquired for economic, social or security reasons without a strong emotional dimension expressed towards the citizenship of the host state. The result could be belonging that is exclusively reserved for the original state, but it could also produce dual or multiple belonging with de/re-territorialized attachment. Mavroudi (2008) explains how the concept was previously termed by Ong (1999) as 'fexible citizenship' to signify the acquirement of multiple passports for security purposes and how it was also used by Waters (2003) to discuss Chinese migrants obtaining Canadian citizenship and their strategic "spreading out" (Waters, 2003 as cited in Mavroudi, 2008, p. 310) of families. Magat (1999) refers to the same concept as "passport identity" (p. 137), or the "formal membership that enables one to beneft from certain privileges bestowed by the state alone." The formal membership is only a matter of practical convenience with no effect on identity. Mavroudi (2008) also cites Aguilar (1999) as using the concept of 'instrumental citizenship' where home states accept that their citizens also have formal citizenship of another host state, but recognize that their primary emotional attachment is directed towards the home state. Thus, these emigrés are also considered being part of the nation by the home state, where the nation is

"spread out and de-territorialized" (Mavroudi, 310). Closely related is the concept of dual citizenship, where the home-state citizenship is kept for reasons of identity, belonging and emotional attachment, while the second one is obtained for purposes of security (Skulte-Ouaiss, 2013). The result could be 'hyphenated identities' (Mavroudi, 2008)–assuming multiple or dual attachments; 'cosmopolitan indifference'—a lack of attachment to any nation and the perception of citizenship as devoid of meaning (Lam & Yeoh, 2004); or perhaps a source of 'democratic infuence' (Kastoryano, 2000)—with the potential for dual citizens to apply values of Western democracy in the home state. In either respect, it is safe to conclude that, as emphasized by Lam and Yeoh (2004), one of the defning features of transnationals is their ambivalence in allegiances and commitments. Thus, while a strict binary between emotional/affective/intimate citizenship vs. pragmatic/fexible/practical/ instrumental citizenship might not be possible, the juxtaposition is still benefcial to understand both.

So far, the discussion on the conceptualization of emotional/affective/intimate citizenship has mainly hovered around notions of emotional representations, such as *belonging* and *home*, and emotional subjectivities such as the emotional experience of power relations between the citizens and the state. However, as is pointed out by other scholars, such as Mas Giralt (2015), a sorely missing element is an exploration of the distinct emotions which make up the emotional dimension of citizenship. Once a theoretical connection between emotions and citizenship is established, the question to be answered becomes: which particular, specifc and distinct emotions constitute citizenship? Within an overall scarcity of research into this subject, some theoretical connections between specifc emotions and citizenship have already been recognized within the literature. As was previously discussed, the most common emotion connected to citizenship is one of "patriotic love" and its oppositehatred towards the enemy of the country, nation or the state. Besides "patriotic love," scholars have also examined the nexus between the feelings of fear, security/ safety and shame.

According to Brown (2014), "patriotic love" (p. 427) is so similar across different national contexts that this universality explains why there has been relatively little attention paid to individual emotions within citizenship studies. Universally, citizens are encouraged to love the nation, so that this "national love" creates a "collective affective alignment towards the nation as an object of love" (Ahmed, 2004, p. 129). Ahmed sees national love to consist both of identifcation and idealization, where the subject/citizen longs to be more similar to the object of love/nation; as well as where the citizen sees his or her idealized form in the nation (Franz, 2015). Citizens are encouraged to 'love their country' with daily reminders as part of citizenship practice (Pantti & van Zoonen, 2006). The "fantasy of romantic love between citizen and nation-state" (Franz, 2015, p. 188) functions to create national cohesion, where the national body is held together by the love of its citizens. National love also serves to draw boundaries between 'real' and 'alien' citizens, such that the former engages in selfess love towards the nation and the latter is incapable of loving and thus only able to produce national pain (Franz, 2015). The 'real' citizen loves the nation and is loved by the nation, while simultaneously fearing the Other/'alien'.

Delimiting the 'real' citizen from the 'alien' is one of various uses of fear in constructing citizenship. Within this specifc form of "governing through affect, which places the affective subjective at its center", (Fortier, 2010), the alien Other is perceived as a threat to the national body and fear is used to protect and to defend it from outsiders. Not surprisingly, the described dynamic forms the foundation of anti-immigration rhetoric (Franz, 2015). Ho (2009) fnds fear and aversion to be fundamental to the "maintaining and challenging" (p. 792) of the social contract and the basis of the nation-state. In a similar vein, Isin (2004) explores how a nationstate's border intact involves a process referred to as the 'neuroticization of the border' (Isin, 2004, p. 231) whereby citizens are encouraged to have fears and anxieties about the Other, most commonly the migrant. Although, mobilizing affect for governance has a history going back to Aristotle (Charteris-Black, 2005; Johnson, 2010), fear has had a long history of being used for these purposes (Robin, 2004; Bourke, 2005; Johnson, 2010). As fear of the migrant 'other' is the most widely spread (Johnson, 2010), it is not surprising that fear as a mobilizing device has gained importance with a worldwide increase in the terrorism threat and a general rise in violence.

Feeling safe and secure is one of the main components of "citizenship as feeling" (Jackson, 2016, p. 826). Connecting citizenship to home, belonging and rootedness, participants in the Jackson (2016) study consistently reiterated the importance of feeling safe in order to maintain the emotional attachment to place. In an analysis of dual citizenship, Skulte-Ouaiss (2013) concludes that the main reason participants in her study pursued a second passport is security. The desire for security is multidimensional–"physical, economic, religious, social and, above all, practical (Skulte-Ouaiss, 2013, p. 137). Interestingly, Yuval-Davis (2006) points out that the emotional constituents of people' identities become more important proportional to how threatened and insecure they feel. An increase in the level of insecurity and threat will bring more attention to emotional attachments.

Besides patriotic love, fear and safety/security, shame is a potent emotion in constituting citizenship. Two studies with very different contexts theorize how shame takes part in the emotional dimension of citizenship. Brown (2014) examines how the German national feeling is "broken," with shame dominating the civic emotional landscape as a legacy of the Holocaust and the Nazi-era. Practices of citizenship in modern Germany include an active rejection of patriotism (Fulbrook, 1999; Jarausch, 2006; Brown, 2014) with even low-key expressions of national pride and national symbols considered to be inappropriate and taboo. Instead, public displays of civic emotion in modern Germany regularly contain elements of "ritual shame" (Fulbrook, 1999; Brown, 2014) and "ritualized regret" (Olick, 2007; Brown, 2014). Aguilar (1996) looks at transnational shame felt by Filipino professionals working in Singapore because of the deeply ingrained 'Filipino as maid' image. Since acquiring Singaporean citizenship is surrounded by legal obstacles, Filipino professionals combat the mainstream stereotypes by establishing between themselves and the maids, accentuating higher socioeconomic status and professional skills. An

additional source of shame in this context is exaggerated attention that the mainstream society pays to the "potential inferiority of co-nationals, on the 'weaknesses' of the 'race' that, by implication, one carries 'in the blood'" (Aguilar, 1996, p. 123). As a result, Filipino professionals continue to distance themselves not only from the domestic workers but also from their own citizenship, which is perceived as a source of shame. The two very different cultural and historical contexts both show how the emotion of shame acts to constitute citizenship in substantial ways.

#### **2.7 Home: Place, Time, and a Set of Social Relations**

Understanding the concept of home involves a series of interlinking connections with the concepts of belonging and emotional citizenship, both in relation to the host country and the country of emigration (Howes & Hammett, 2016). According to Magat (1999), there is the "Little Home", a place for daily activities, and the "Big Home- where one belongs, the place of ultimate return" (p. 120). Home, in that sense is not just one place, but perhaps many different places that encompass different elements of home: a house, a sense of place, familiar people and bonds of kinship, rootedness, connections between the past, present, and a projected future, nostalgic yearning for the innocence of childhood, homeland, "an affective core" (Rapoport, 1995) or "a mythic place of desire in the diasporic imagination" (Brah, 1996). Home is a complex concept, which, according to Boccagni (2017), is defned by the key attributes of *security, familiarity,* and *control*.

The brick and mortar of the house, the geographical landscape, the smells, and senses of the air and water all form part of the physical or the "material home" (Taylor, 2009). While some researchers (Lam & Yeoh, 2004), fnd that only a small minority of study participants consider economic concerns of homeownership to be important to their understanding of home, others (Taylor, 2009) consider the "material home" to be of fundamental importance. In the study of Cypriot refugees in London, Taylor (2009) fnds that the material home "is not just seen as the house, but also the felds, orchards, farmland and cemetery where ancestors are buried" (p. 16). Particularly for people from rural areas, the value of the physical land goes beyond its economic worth. The land provides sustenance, meaning, and a place of labor. According to Taylor (2009), other elements of the natural environment such as plants, animals, trees, crops and fowers fgure prominently into the "material home", as well as the tastes and smells of the local cuisine.

Home can also be seen as a 'sense of place.' Geographers have long established the difference between space and place, as basic concepts. According to Tuan (2001), an abstract space becomes a place, as it gains "defnition and meaning" (p. 136). A space gains meaning through "daily practices, burial rites, festivals and religious and political discourses' (Taylor, 2009, p.12). As space is transformed into place, it gains meaning and defnition and represents security, while space remains a bastion of freedom. Humans are attached to place and security, as they yearn for space and freedom (Tuan, 2001). Home, in Tuan's view is "an intimate place"

(p. 144). Blunt and Dowling (2006) show home to be a place, but also an "imaginary that is imbued with feelings." (p. 2) These feelings can range from belonging, desire and intimacy to fear, violence, and alienation (Blunt & Dowling, 2006). The emotional substance created by lived experience forms individual and collective memories; ties a community of people to a physical location–a space, and thus creates home as a 'sense of place.'

In contrast to the understanding of home as a specifc place is the notion that home can be found in multiple locations, as well as in movement itself. In a study of transnational professionals, Erkmen (2015) concludes that home, for these individuals, is two-fold: an emotional anchor to their homeland, as well as the "key element of cosmopolitan identity construction" (p. 38), the belief that home can be found anywhere, including mobility itself. Similarly, Rapport (1997) views movement to be crucial to our understanding of home. "In place of the conventional conception of home as the stable physical centre of the universe—a safe place to leave and return to—a far more mobile notion comes to be used: a home which can be taken along whenever one decamps." (Rapport, 1997, p. 73) This perspective of home underplays the importance of fxity and connection to a physical place. In this respect, Lam and Yeoh (2004) compare home to the 'body', where both "function as portable repositories for desires, anxieties and personal memory attached to the self"(p. 143). These authors extend the home-body analogy to a gendered perspective, where the mobile home is more akin to male endeavors, while female ones are more suited for a fxed understanding of home. Viewing home as essentially gendered sheds light on the possibility for home to be a site of multiple different emotions, both positive and negative. Blunt and Dowling (2006) assert that home is a gendered concept and point to feminist scholars who view home to be a site of oppression and violence against women. Henderson (2011) further analyzes home as a gendered concept without it including direct violence and overt oppression, by exploring Simone de Beauvoir's distinction between immanence and transcendence (de Beauvoir, 2011), and Hannah Arendt's differentiation between labor and work (Arendt, 1998).

Home is also constructed through connections created between the past, present, and future. Howes and Hammett (2016) point out the "temporariness and precariousness and attachments to multiple, transnational locations" (p. 22) Home, in this sense, is constructed symbolically through the migrants' memories and through their life stories. An idealized past often becomes a peaceful harbor to which the migrant escapes from the discomfort of the present. An inevitable consequence of this escape is longing and nostalgia, often expressed towards childhood to which there is no return (Lam & Yeoh, 2004). The 'temporal home', as described by Taylor (2009), refers to the refugees' place in time as much as space. For people who have lost their physical homes, the present is marked by exile, the past characterized by their lost home, and the future shaped by an uncertainty of return or continued exile.

Home is often thought of as a set of social relations, friends, family, and roots. Jackson (2016) fnds that home is described as 'roots, a sense of rootedness', also found in Blunt and Dowling (2006). For the Chinese-Malaysian participants in Lam and Yeoh (2004), their strong family and friendship bonds locate 'home' in Malaysia, despite their daily life in Singapore. In the same vein, the destruction or deterioration of these social relations is the most important reason participants in the same study cease to refer to Malaysia as home. Taylor (2009) demonstrates how the destruction of social relations, because of forced migration and expulsions, presents the greatest source of loss to refugees. Also, when trying to reconstruct their homes in exile, diaspora members rely on 'community organizations, shops, cafes and social venues" (Taylor, 2009, p. 19). Reviving social relations gives those who have been uprooted, a chance to reestablish their homes.

The concept of home is closely related to the nation. In fact, it is often perceived as the "cornerstone of national identity." (Macpherson, 2004, p. 92) Barrington et al. (2003) emphasize the importance of territoriality, which in their interpretation is understood as home and homeland, for national identity. In addition, emotional attachment to the homeland is developed in parallel to the development of national self-consciousness (Barrington et al., 2003). An alternative contrast between the concepts of 'home' and 'nation' is provided by Isin (2004). For this author, home becomes the place where the neurotic citizen is produced. The 'home security' industry of surveillance mechanisms and gated communities in fact exploits the anxieties of the neurotic citizen and becomes a parallel to 'homeland security'. "Thus, the home and nation become both the same and different–the same because they provide models for each other and different because each provides an evasion or sanctuary from the other" (Isin, 2004, p. 231). The result is not a rational, selfinterested citizen, but a neurotic citizen whose stable home is placed in service of the homeland.

It can be claimed that the broad notion of 'Home' evokes similar images for people around the world; however, there is some research to suggest that the concept might not be universal. For example, Magat (1999) points out that different people attach different meanings to the concept of home and that these meanings also differ for the same person at different periods of their life. Differences in how home is conceptualized are particularly pronounced when contrasted with national identity. By comparing Japanese and Israeli immigrants in Canada, Magat (1999) demonstrates how the two groups have different interpretations of home depending on the relative strength of their national identity and on how strongly the concept of 'home' is confated with that of the 'nation.' While the strong national identity of Israeli immigrants prevents them from establishing homes elsewhere, it is possible for Japanese immigrants to have multiple homes and still keep a strong Japanese national identity. For the Israelis, 'home' and 'nation' are synonymous and the only true home is in Israel. For the Japanese, these two concepts are separated from each other, which makes it possible for these immigrants to establish multiple homes and senses of belonging. In a similar vein, Lam and Yeoh (2004) discover that the defning features of home specifc to the Chinese-Malaysian transmigrants are: social relations, nostalgic memories, national identity and practical lifestyle needs. Keeping these fndings in mind, it might be necessary to provide some contextspecifc features of the concept 'home', while framing the discussion within universalizing elements.

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#### **2.8 Belonging: Place-Belongingness and the Politics of Belonging**

For some social theorists, the concept of belonging is "self-explanatory" (Antonsich, 2010) and therefore with no need for a defnition. However, as it appears in a range of felds: human geography, political science, sociology, cultural theory, even without clear defnitions, some general characteristics of the concept can be identifed. The classical examples of how the concept of belonging has been used include Tonnies's distinguishing between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, Emile Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity and Karl Marx's conception of alienation (Yuval-Davis, 2006). Mee and Wright (2009) view belonging as primarily a geographical concept, because belonging "connects matter to place" (p. 772). Similarly, Ignatieff (1994) proposes belonging to be "a dynamic emotional attachment that relates individuals to the material and social worlds that they inhabit and experience." Furthering the emotional attachment focus, for a number of authors (Yuval-Davis, 2006; Jackson, 2016), the concept of belonging is closely related to feeling at home, feeling safe and secure.

Antonsich (2010) provides an analytical framework to help us think through the concept of belonging, by identifying its two distinct dimensions: place-belongingness and the politics of belonging. Mas Giralt (2015) presents a succinct clarifying distinction between these two dimensions, in which place-belongingness refers to "personal emotions of feeling in place" (p.4), while the politics of belonging relates to whether society, formally or informally, recognizes the person as "being in place" (p.4). Antonsich (2010) defnes place-belongingness to be characterized by feeling safe, feeling at home. The "place is felt as home" (p. 646). The politics of belonging involves a boundary-making process designed to separate humanity into an "us" and a "them," referred to by some authors as the "dirty work of boundary maintenance" (Crowley, 1999). These boundaries defne the political community, founded with guardians and administrators who decide on who gets to be "inside" and who is left "outside" of that political community. On this boundary, there is a lively interaction between two contrary sides, the claimant and the grantor of belonging, and it includes a constant interplay of rejecting, violating, and transgressing. The grantor establishes requirements of belonging, which might range from the most restrictive categories, often with assimilatory objectives, such as common: race, origin, place of birth, a "myth of common descent", language, culture and religion to the more open categories of shared values based on "human rights" and "democracy" (Yuval-Davis, 2006. p. 209). Political belonging is instrumental to citizenship because the claim to belonging is often accompanied by a residence and work permit. The personal feeling of belonging is negotiated with social practices of inclusion/exclusion (Antonsich, 2010). In the words of Yuval-Davis et al. (2005), the "sociology of emotions" is negotiated with the "sociology of power." Boundaries between "us" and "them" are constructed by both the personal dynamic of the individual seeking to belong and the political project of those in power to defne what constitutes belonging.

Citizenship and belonging are closely related and intertwined. While conducting a literature review on the relationship between citizenship and belonging, Antonsich (2010) fnds that the two terms are often used synonymously in geography, political science, sociology, anthropology, and history. In contrast, Yuval-Davis (2006), argues that the two concepts are not identical, since most of the current discussions on the politics of belonging center on "who belongs and who does not" (p. 207), regardless of citizenship status. The subject of these debates is the lowest common denominator in terms of descent, as well as cultural and other norms thought of as necessary prerequisites for belonging. Also, the political struggle for full participation in citizenship has been the focus of many socially excluded and marginalized groups, seeking to gain "full and legitimate belonging (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 206). Other authors, such as Bloemraad et al. (2008) defne a "sense of belonging" to be a dimension of citizenship, together with "legal status, rights, political and other forms of participation in society" (as cited in Ahmed, 2016, p. 113). According to Ho (2009), emotions act as an intermediary between the belonging aspect of what citizenship represents and what citizens subjectively perceive to be their rights for meaningful participation in society.

Belonging should not be only seen through a cognitive perspective, but as having a strong emotional component. Constructions of belonging "refect emotional investments and desire for attachment" (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 202). People "long" (Probyn, 1996), to create attachments to places and social collectivities. As Antonsich (2010) claims, longing is always expressed toward some place 'there', a place of perceived belonging, while the 'here' is seemingly devoid of belonging. A frequent outcome of this *neither here, nor there* phenomenon is the immigrants' "myth of return" (Antonsich, 2010, p. 651) to the lost place of intense yearning. On the other side, developing belonging to the newly arrived at place, the 'here' involves emotional attachments through "everyday practices of belonging" (Fenster, 2005; Mas Giralt, 2015) as well as "collective practices of belonging" (Fortier, 2000; Mas Giralt, 2015). The performances and practices of belonging, learning about the places of settlement as well as establishing oneself in social networks, serve as vehicles for the immigrant to develop emotional attachments, which produce a sense of belonging.

Belonging can be viewed as an element of emotional citizenship. Jackson (2016) fnds that the four common dimensions used by participants in her study to discuss emotional citizenship are: "belonging and connection, home, safety, and the laying down of one's roots (p. 822). On one hand, these four dimensions are closely related and have signifcant areas of overlap; however, there are also points of difference. For example, Ho (2009) asserts that the "fgurative use of emotional metaphors, such as roots, home, family and friends" (p. 794) serves as an instrument to generate meaning for citizenship. The "emotional metaphors" are not identical in substance, but are in fact instrumentally used to give meaning to a broader concept, citizenship. Belonging is often referred to as "thicker" (Crowley, 1999) than citizenship because belonging goes beyond the formal acquisition of equal rights and political entitlements. Belonging can be conceived as an "emotionally constructed category" (Ho, 2009, p. 791) producing meaning for citizenship or it can be conceived as an element/dimension of emotional citizenship.

To further clarify the role of belonging in the construction of the emotional dimension of citizenship it is useful to contrast it to citizenship without exclusive belonging. Skulte-Ouaiss (2013) demonstrates this distinction when examining the case of Lebanese citizens also holding various European citizenships. On one hand, there is citizenship based on "residency and a contract between the individual and the state" (p. 145). This understanding of citizenship may or may not include belonging, but it is certainly not premised on national belonging. Opposite to this conceptualization is citizenship based on "national belonging being the bedrock" (Bloemraad, 2004 cited in Skulte-Ouaiss, 2013, p. 145). Depending on the developing notions of citizenship in Europe, the Lebanese dual-citizens might be forced to choose between holding onto their Lebanese citizenship with full national belonging or renouncing it in favor of a more secure, but alien European passport. Similarly, Mavroudi (2008) theorizes the concept of pragmatic citizenship and shows its application in the case of the Palestinian diaspora. Brown (2014) explains "performances of emotional labor" (p. 428), which seem to be necessary for immigrants to invest in order to gain national belonging. The specifc type of emotional labor refers to the "uniquely German form of negative civic emotion", but the analysis could be foreseeably extended to other cases. The problem of the absence of belonging from the individual perspective of the immigrant is described by some authors (Antonsich, 2010; Howes & Hammett, 2016) as a "sense of loneliness, isolation, alienation and dis-placement (Antonsich, 2010, p. 649). Antonsich (2010) is also careful to point out that this situation is the outcome of the absence of place-belongingness and not necessarily exclusionary politics of belonging.

Numerous empirical studies (as cited in Ehrkamp & Leitner, 2006) have also pointed to the existence of multiple belonging in contemporary migration. Multiple belonging refers to migrants being embedded, identifying with and taking part in multiple communities, while not even being anchored in one. Connections created through "complex webs of mobilities and belongings" (Howes & Hammett, 2016) also act as a challenge to state-bound understanding of citizenship. Multiple allegiances and loyalties "question the very concept of citizenship," (Kastoryano, 2000, p. 308) as they blur the lines between rights and identity. In fact, "engaging in transnational practices may result in an institutional expression of multiple belonging, where the country of origin becomes a source of identity, the country of residence a source of rights, and the emerging transnational space, a space of political action combining the two or more countries" (Kastoryano, 2000, p. 309). According to this interpretation of belonging, the immigrant is not faced with an "either/or" situation, as with Skulte-Ouaiss (2013) or, to some extent with Mavroudi (2008). The newly created transnational space allows for multiple belongings to fourish, as opposed to the immigrant facing the dilemma of mutually exclusive choices of citizenship or belonging.

#### **2.9 Conclusion**

To sum up, this chapter presented a survey of how the concepts of return migration, diaspora/transnationalism, 'political' emotions, citizenship, emotional/affective/ intimate citizenship, belonging and home have been developed within an interdisciplinary literature. The conceptual framework is built on the broad foundation of defning and debating the concepts of return migration and diaspora/transnationalism; followed by an investigation into how emotions have (not) been studied in the social sciences and ending with a brief review of citizenship scholarship. The second part of the conceptual framework delves into greater detail of the nexus between citizenship, emotions and diaspora/transnationalism, starting with Marcus's premise that emotions are relevant for the study of citizenship and on the fndings of Ho (2009) and Jackson (2016) that the way individual citizens conceptualize the emotional dimension of citizenship is through the concepts of home and belonging. The fnal two sections of the chapter explore the nature of home and belonging, by examining how these concepts have been defned, debated and developed along various dimensions and disciplinary perspectives.

The review has revealed substantial gaps in the surveyed literature(s). First, voluntary, or using more specifc terminology "chosen or decided" (Cassarino, 2008), return migration to post-confict societies has been understudied, particularly when discussing its non-economic motivations (Halfacree, 2004). Second, although highly signifcant for our understanding of political phenomena emotions have been signifcantly understudied. The systemic reasons for this historical neglect of emotions from the social sciences and political theory have been surveyed. Third, emotions are relevant for the study of citizenship, yet scholarly inquiry into the 'emotional dimension' of citizenship is in its infancy. Fourthly, studies within citizenship scholarship which place the primary focus on how individual citizens conceptualize citizenship are gravely missing (Aker, 2014), with only a few such examples. Similarly, return migration scholarship severely suffers from an overemphasis on structure and insuffcient attention given to the migrants' own agency, whether at the individual or household level (Achenbach, 2017). Finally, previous researchers have established a frm connection between emotional citizenship and the concepts of home and belonging. Further inquiry into these areas revealed that, although work on connecting the distinct emotions of "patriotic love", fear, safety/ security and shame has been completed, still much research needs to be done on the specifc and distinct emotions constituting citizenship. Thus, when offering a solution to the theoretical problem central to my book, the point of contribution lies at an interdisciplinary intersection of literatures on return migration, citizenship, home, belonging, and distinct 'political' emotions as experienced by individual citizens.

#### **References**


Bovenkerk, F. (1974). *The sociology of return migration: A bibliographic essay*. Martinus Nijhoff.


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## **Chapter 3 Decided Return and Reintegration in a Post-Confict Society**

The people my study attempts to understand are part of a small cohort in absolute terms, and particularly small relative to the staggering numbers of people either leaving or trying to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their return is voluntary because each study participant could stay in the host state, as most of them have also attained full citizenship status. There was also no direct political, economic, social, or family pressure for them to return, and they were not part of an assisted return program. They are of full working age, still in the process of building a retirement nest egg and thus, the decision to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina entailed a considerable amount of fnancial risk. The circumstances of their departure from BiH were, most times, violent and traumatic, while their years of life as a refugee in the host state were flled with other kinds of struggle. However, at the time of their return, they are no longer refugees. After gaining citizenship of the host state and managing to rebuild their shattered lives abroad, they decide to come back. This chapter attempts to understand why and what happens to them later on?

Specifcally, this chapter provides an answer to the following research questions: Why did the diaspora members choose to return and remain in the home state? What are the main drivers behind their decision(s)? How do they reintegrate? While the question of what initially motivated their decision is important for explaining the movement from host to home state, looking at the returnees' reintegration process–the challenges they face and the strategies they employ to overcome these challenges allows for an explanation of their continued stay. Results of qualitative data analysis are presented against the BiH contextual background and in reference to previous literature on return migration, diaspora, and transnationalism. I frstly discuss the full complexity of the decision to return, with the simplifying distinction made between economic and emotional reasons. What follows is an in-depth look at each set of reasons, with interpretive answers provided on the relative importance of each for the motivation to return. Next, I investigate the obstacles my study participants face upon return and their reintegration strategies. After looking into the returnees' own evaluation of the success of their return, the fnal section of the chapter provides a summation of qualitative data analysis answering the frst set of research questions.

#### **3.1 The Decision to Return**

The decision to return is complex, involving many different variables, which escape neat categorization. Often, the decision is highly personal (Janis & Mann, 1977) and can sometimes even be characterized as "irrational" (Black et al., 2004, p. 12). While Black et al. (2004) recognize that the factors contributing to the decisionmaking process are "hard to disentangle even for the person making the decision" (p. 12), they suggest a model of decision-making factors. Their model builds upon previous literature (Koser, 1998; Faist, 1999; King, 2000) on comparisons made between structural conditions in the host state to those of the home state. The model Black et al. (2004), present reduces these factors to three broad categories: social, economic and political conditions in the home and host states, the individual characteristics of the migrant, or the migrant family, and any public policy programs designed to either encourage or discourage return. Similarly, to Black et al. (2004), while recognizing the inherent complexities of the decision to return, I suggest the simplifying distinction between reaching an economic minimum, as a prerequisite for return, and emotional reasons as the primary driver of the decision to return.

Distinguishing between an economic minimum and emotional reasons for return migration builds upon the cognitive-appraisal approach to the study of emotions and greater attention paid to non-economic factors in the decision-making process. The "cognitive/appraisal" approach, championed by scholars such as Martha Nussbaum and Robert Solomon, treats emotions as "important forms of knowledge and evaluative thought" (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2008, p. 124). Unlike the reason-emotion dichotomy, the "cognitive/appraisal" perspective does not place emotions in stark opposition to rationality, nor does it dismiss them as purely irrational. Instead, emotions are given their rightful place in the analysis and are not marginalized simply because they do not ft into the rational-choice paradigm. The dominance of rationalchoice within neoclassical economics and new economics of labor migration to explain return migration has been questioned by several scholars (see Cassarino, 2004), leading them on a search for alternative explanations. Various authors have proposed different ways of classifying all other reasons which do not neatly ft under the principle of a cost-beneft calculation primarily concerned with maximizing economic self-interest. For example, when shedding light on the "non-economic" reasons for return migration, Halfacree (2004) turns to culture and more of a biographical approach, Kılınç and King (2017) refer to "lifestyle," King et al. (2008) discuss a "personal project" or Achenbach (2017) looks at life spheres of "family and lifestyle." While implicitly rejecting the reason/emotion dichotomy by espousing the "cognitive/appraisal" approach to the study of emotions, I do not intend to create a new grand dichotomy. Instead, what is meant by "emotional reasons for return" are all those factors which cannot be classifed as directly maximizing economic self-interest, while the rest is categorized as "satisfying an economic minimum." A possible interpretation of this categorization is a challenge to the inherent notion of "rationality" when considering decision-making based on maximizing economic self-interest, as well as the "irrationality" of decisions based on noneconomic/emotional factors.

My argument is that the decision to return voluntarily to a post-confict society, when there is a viable alternative to remain abroad, is overwhelmingly emotional in nature, meaning that the emotional reasons outweigh the economic ones. Overall, the returnees discussed their responsibility and duty to "give back" to their country of origin, expressing their "mission" or "higher purpose," which were often stated during the interviews using the English-language variants of the terms. Their mission is related to Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a sight of their own suffering and tragedy, for which they have compassion as one would have, in the words of the returnees, towards a "special-needs child" and the "perpetual underdog-turned hero of the story." In the initial stages of return, participants expressed their enthusiasm both to be back home and to pursue their stated mission of societal contribution and betterment. The returnees are keenly aware of the economic opportunity cost of return and express their conscious preference towards non-materialistic pursuits. They expressly value closeness to family members, daily encounters with friends and neighbors, and the sense of community over wealth accumulation. However, the danger with this line of reductivism is an essentialist and over-sentimentalized idealization of "home sweet home," more appropriate for an embroidered needle-pad than a serious scholarly investigation treating emotions with the respect they deserve. In order to avoid this trap, my presentation of results frstly elaborates on the economic motivations followed by discussions of emotional factors. Because, although return *is* emotionally motivated, it would be naïve to assume that economic reasons play a completely marginal role.

When considering the economic reasons infuencing the decision to return, my argument is that the returnee needs and requires a minimum level of economic security in order to make this choice. The returnees have been purposively selected to incorporate a notion of fnancial risk when deciding to return. These are not retirees who have attained a certain level of economic security abroad and therefore minimized the risk of fnancial failure once they return to the home state. In terms of a life-cycle perspective, the returnees are people who have perhaps accumulated some capital while working abroad, but are still looking at their work life in BiH to provide for their retirement. They are of working age and thus their decision to return carries the full risk of any fnancial investment in a post-confict environment. In order to make this investment, the returnee needs to have a minimum level of economic security, which in no way should be confused with maximizing economic self-interest. Returning to a post-confict society does *not* maximize economic selfinterest. Ceteris paribus, the returnees would have been better off fnancially had they stayed in their host societies, however, without the *minimum* level of economic security in the home state, return is not possible. The economic minimum is often provided through self-employment in the home state and without it, the returnee is simply not in a position to consider the decision to return. Once the minimum level of economic security is attained, the returnee gains the freedom to consider emotional reasons. Without the minimum economic requirement being satisfed, emotional reasons do not enter the decision-making equation.

#### *3.1.1 The Necessary Economic Minimum Requirement Enabling Return*

Within the economic reasons for return, having a business opportunity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is the most dominant pull factor for return. For example, Siniša left his dental practice in Argentina to grow fruit crops near Trebinje.

Siniša1 : When we came here for the frst time, we travelled everywhere, even going to Belgrade. We searched everywhere and this opportunity turned up, which we saw as giving us the possibility to live and work here. Orcharding and fruit growing were attractive to us and we saw it as a chance to develop our own business in a place where there was so much work to be done, on land that was practically untillable. I felt that this was the right moment for somebody with the proper knowledge and experience.

Ema left a marketing career in Austria to start an organic herb farm in Northern Bosnia. Although her corporate career offered Ema the opportunity to continue advancing and increasing her material comfort, the prospect of a new business venture was exciting.

Ema: Well, the other thing is that I had this business idea, and that I recognized the potential that Bosnia and Herzegovina has, as regards its nature and the long-term, cooperative, sustainable use of its natural resources. This idea simply would not leave me alone. I continued with my job in my comfortable, safe environment, earning lots of money and consuming whatever I wanted, but long term, this lifestyle was simply not fulflling. My business idea would simply not let me go and the only thing I needed to do was start.

Marija returned from Germany with her husband, where they both worked in sustainable energy production, to start a renewable energy company in Jajce.

Marija: I believe we had a good business opportunity in BiH, where we are more free than we would have been in Germany, which has clearly defned rules. So, I think we had more space to develop here, to gain a capital base before getting bogged down with all the rules. Over there, everything is much better regulated and more expensive, so the success of this business enterprise in Germany is quite questionable to me.

Husein left a successful career in Switzerland and came back with his family to manufacture dress shirts in his native Maglaj.

Husein: After the war ended, I knew everything has been destroyed in this country so that it would be a long time before we would see any international companies coming here. At that time, I was in a dilemma about what I could

<sup>1</sup>All returnees' names are pseudonyms, see the Research Methodology section in Chap. 1.

do? What could be the frst step I could take to help the local population, my friends, my local community and to fnd my happiness in doing so? My conclusion was that, unfortunately, the least proftable, cheapest branch of the textile industry, in prior existence in the area of Doboj, Maglaj, Tešanj and Žepče, would still be the best feld for me to start my business.

The stories of Siniša, Ema, Marija or Husein ft well within the general tendency of returnees towards self-employment and setting up small-businesses upon return, which has been extensively researched and more recently surveyed by Black and Castaldo (2009). Case studies examining this phenomenon range from different contexts and regions, including Italy (King, 1986), Turkey (Gitmez, 1988), Portugal (Mendonsa, 1982), Mexico (Massey et al., 1987; Cornelius, 1990), Somaliland (Ahmed, 2000) and China (Murphy, 2000).

Although most returnees started their own businesses directly upon return, for some, a job offer, facilitated through multiple return visits, was the strongest pull factor. Such is the case of Admir, a jazz musician, and a music instructor.

Admir: Sooo, at one point I had employment offers from some people here [in Bosnia and Herzegovina] and I simply wanted to try it. I had no other obligations over there [in the United States] in the sense that I had a signed a contract. I was working as a freelancer and I used to come here regularly for visits. Each year, the visit was about a month and I always had the feeling that it was too short, as I loved spending time here. I used to leave with a certain sadness, thinking to myself–how I'd love to stay longer. Then, in 2011, I fnished a project in the U.S. and I visited for 3 months to test the waters. The job offer came during my 3-month stay. I gained a professional foothold pretty quickly, as I had many friends here who were in the same line of work. They helped me fnd my frst gigs and projects. Then, I got married, my wife came and so on….

When discussing "work-related infuences" on the decision to return, Carling et al. (2015) point to strictly economic factors, such as a job offer and the promise of a livable salary, but also the general work culture and opportunities for career advancement. When Admir received a job offer that fulflled both the economic and noneconomic factors, he decided to return. His return was facilitated by multiple return visits, a "particular transnational practice" (Carling & Erdal, 2014, p. 4) or "diasporic performativity" (Axel, 2004, p. 4) which is a point extensively covered in the literature (King et al., 2008; Carling et al., 2015; Asiedu, 2005; Duval, 2004; King et al., 2013; Lulle, 2014; Mason, 2004; Oeppen, 2013; Oxfeld, 2004; Carling & Erdal, 2014).

The recession caused by the global fnancial crisis of 2008–2009 has acted as a push factor, particularly with returnees from the U.S. Both based in New York City, Mirela was in advertising and Lejla was teaching yoga at the start of the fnancial crisis.

Lejla: Then, in this period of my own dilemmas, America was hit by a massive economic recession. Wall Street crashed in 2008 and this was horrendous. I mean, it was horrible. I stayed over there for another year after the crash of Wall Street, but I could see some changes within myself. From a yoga perspective, all these external events were only refections of my inner state. For me, this horrifc fnancial crash brought back memories of war. Over there, I saw the brutality of people who lack any sort of humanity. These thoughts kept bringing me back to Bosnia, because I was here during the war as a child. I told stories of war to my American friends and I told them how, unfortunately, the most beautiful part of my life was spent in wartime. The war was terrifying, but it also brought us closer to our family and neighbors. People had to share everything they had because this was the only way for them to survive. Witnessing the behavior of people around me in New York [during the height of the fnancial crisis], I would think to myself: these people would not stand a chance in war. They could not survive, because the only way towards survival is to connect to others around you and not only to look out for yourself.

The advertising sector in the U.S. was particularly struck by the global fnancial crisis, and Mirela lost her job.

Mirela: I came back here when I lost my job in the U.S., during the crisis. This was in 2009. I was laid off and I, I was always planning to come back and was continuously very connected. My mom insisted I return so that I could start a family, so that we could all be together. When I lost my job, the situation was such that fnding new work in America would be very diffcult, so I decided to start my own business in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Well, this situation [global fnancial crisis of 2008] certainly gave me a push, although return was something I was planning all along. You know, it was an event that just pushed me towards achieving this long-term goal faster.

Although both Lejla and Mirela could have found other employment in the U.S. and their return to BiH was not compelled, still the fnancial crisis acted as a push factor. This fnding regarding return migration was recognized as early as Bovenkerk (1974) who writes that "by far the most important cause of mass return is undoubtedly the economic recession in the country of immigration" (p. 20).

The respondents who were most aware of the relationship between labor and capital under conditions of global capitalism seemed to have had the greatest success both with integration in the host state and with their return to the home state. Draško discusses the role of competition, branding, and credit in a developed capitalist economy, such as Switzerland.

Draško: Well, when you see that in some country in the West, let's say Switzerland or some other country, you have 10 professionals and you are the 11th professional there…mmmm…well the competition there is much higher. Here, this competition is much lower, if it even exists at all. There it is more diffcult to succeed because of higher competition. Also, it depends

on what one considers to be a success. For some, success means going to Switzerland, earning [a monthly salary of] CHF 4,000 then buying a car worth EURO 30,000 and coming back here [to BiH] to show off as somebody who's "made it." Me, I am not interested in that. I want to create a product and a brand, so that I can say. "This is my creation."


Some parts of Draško's story are consistent with the literature, and others are radically different. For example, mentioning limited competition and taking advantage of this aspect of a post-confict market can be seen in studies of voluntary return migration to Afghanistan (van Houte & Davids, 2014; van Houte, 2016). However, Draško's pragmatic attitude towards investment radically departs from fndings (Pedersen, 2003; Şirin, 2008; Cassarino, 2004) emphasizing the returnees' tendency towards conspicuous consumption and particularly the "building of big houses and the *purchase of luxury cars*" (emphasis mine, Cassarino, 2004, p. 260).

#### *3.1.2 Emotional Reasons as the Primary Motivation for Return*

The motivation for voluntary return migration to a post-confict society primarily comprises a variety of emotional reasons. The participants did not identify particular emotions motivating their return, but discussed emotionally charged factors which could not be directly linked to pursuing economic self-interest.

#### **3.1.2.1 Giving Back**

The dominant emotional reason the returnees expressed is having a higher purpose, a mission, or simply a strong sense of responsibility to give back to the country of their birth. Depending on their profession and feld, this sense of responsibility was expressed in different ways, such as cross-cultural cooperation and peace activism, job creation and economic development, participation in the local academic community and the educational sector, or helping family members. The responsibility of "giving back" to the home country has been recognized in the literature, particularly in post-confict settings (Carling et al., 2015; Paasche, 2016), however, knowledge of the specifc BiH context is useful for better informed interpretation. Anastasija saw an opportunity for making her contribution in the feld of cultural development, the civic sector and peace activism, and returned from Serbia to her native Mostar.

Anastasija: Anyway, I thought it was my responsibility to make sure that I contribute to my local community my, my city, my country. So, I chose culture as a channel, since culture is a universal mechanism to connect people, to regenerate torn ties, to create some new connections…well…damn, we do not all have to be politicians! I thought that, if I prove how serious I am in all of that, you know it would all fall into place and it would be feasible. However, as I became more and more effective and as the results improved, doors kept closing and funding sources dried up. The last straw was this club "Aleksa", with which I really suffered, because you know Aleksa is a Serb. We are also Serbs…so…what was I thinking??? My dad told me, "don't call the club "Aleksa," they will all say that this is because they are Serb…. you know what people will say" And I told him: "Listen, why don't you google this a little bit…you have your phone. Aleksa is not *just* a Serb! Aleksa Šantić is the true paradigm of life in Mostar, representing the civic option. This is the path I have chosen, and my path does not need to go through a political party. It can just be a healthy civic option.

Anastasija's story is set against a historical background in which the "collapse of Yugoslavia was destructive in Mostar" (Hromadzic, 2012, p. 33). At the beginning of the war the mainly Serb JNA (Yugoslav National Army) launched attacks at the city from the East, encouraging Serbs to leave the city and forcing the city's other inhabitants to search for protection in the Western parts of the city. At the start of the war, Bosniak and Croat forces fought the JNA together, but clashes between them fnally led to the complete separation of Mostar between its eastern side dominated by Bosniaks and the western side held by Bosnian Croats (Vetters, 2007). Most Mostarian Serbs left the city at the beginning of the confict, leaving the Serb community in Mostar "marginal" (Vetters, 2007, p. 188) and the city effectively divided between the Bosniaks and Croats.

By returning to Mostar Anastasija was hoping to make a difference and contribute to the city's reunifcation and revival of its pre-war multiethnic and multicultural social composition. Her work in peace activism was recognized by multiple international awards, but she does not feel that this type of engagement has the potential of reversing entrenched divisions. The failure of her "Aleksa" club, named after the famed Mostarian poet, Aleksa Šantić, seems to prove this point. Interestingly, Aleksa Šantić is the author of "Stay Here," a poem devoted entirely to discourage emigration from Bosnia and Herzegovina. "Stay Here"2 was written in 1896 and

<sup>2</sup>The poem belongs to the larger opus of Šantić's work associated with his home town and the suffering of his compatriots under imperial oppression (Javarek, 1958).

addressed to Bosniak citizens of Mostar who were leaving *en masse* for Ottoman lands after Bosnia and Herzegovina was annexed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1878 (Mihailovich, 1988).

Other study participants saw their role in improving the home state's economy by creating jobs and spurring economic growth. Damir, who now employs over 100 workers in the metal-producing sector, saw his role in rebuilding the war-torn BiH economy.

Damir: And…I told myself, "Germany is a developed country and this country [BiH] needs people to build it." Simply, circumstances were such. I was only 18 years old when the war started and I hadn't even served in the military. But, I said to myself: 'When the war ends. I will make a difference.' This country needs people to build it and I decided to contribute to making things better in BiH with my own work. This is my work and I hope that what I have done so far is good. Of course, it can always be better, but my mission is one of building and making things better. I could not stop the war and I could do nothing about it at that time. Thank God that it [the war] has ended.

Damir left Sanski Most at an age when he could have been conscripted to the BH Army. Instead, his parents sent him frst to Serbia and later to Germany. Several times throughout the interview, he mentioned his feelings of regret at not being able to help with armed resistance in BiH and his need to compensate for this omission once the war ended. The desire to assist in economic development, particularly in post-confict settings, has been recognized within the literature, such as Paasche (2016).

Many of the returnees were educated abroad and view their contribution to be most meaningful in academia and the educational sector. After completing an M.A. and Ph.D. degree in Belgium, Mahir continued his academic career in BiH.

Mahir: I felt more that my role is one of an educator, under quotation marks, in BiH society. As a person who has been abroad and who has learnt much, seen much and experienced a lot in a certain period of my life…as such I have a lot to give in a professional sense. I believe it is better to make use of my educational role here, in this society and that this would have a much greater impact on my life and on the meaningfulness of what I am doing. The alternative would have been for me to have stayed in the West, within the competition of Western mainstream academia. I believe that what I am doing here is much more meaningful. I feel a calling. I feel that I have been given life and I ask that it has meaning. Simply put, in the analysis of whether I should or should not return, there was really no dilemma, because I never actually left emotionally. My return here represented just my physical relocation and never an emotional one. I always lived two lives–one on Skype with my mom and family and another, physical and bureaucratic life, somewhere over there [in the host state].

Mahir's experience fts within migration studies debates in which returnees are increasingly seen as "brokers of knowledge transfer and capacity building" (Kuschminder, 2017, p.2). Also, they are believed to have gained skills and education abroad, all of which situate them "in between" the home and host countries and thus enable them to act as mediators between cultures and as negotiators of change (King, 1978; Sørensen et al., 2002; van Houte & Davids, 2014).

#### **3.1.2.2 Personalizing Collective Tragedy and Trauma Recovery**

Besides the rather abstract notion of "the higher good" or "making an altruistic contribution," which could apply to other contexts of collective tragedy and disadvantage, the returnees are specifc in making Bosnia and Herzegovina as their sole focus of attention. Alma returned from Germany to start a Waldorf kindergarten in BiH and views the education of children to be the area of her contribution.


Alma views her contribution to BiH society as a form of "giving back" and fulflling a "higher purpose," but, like many other participants, she is specifc in her contribution because of her own experience of the BiH tragedy. Similarly to returnees who discussed their individual processes of confronting traumatization, Alma's fulfllment of a "higher purpose" is bundled with a deeply personal quest for healing from wartime trauma.

<sup>3</sup>To illustrate what she means by "one of those types" Alma used a very common proverb "U se, na se i poda se", which refers to a strictly self-interested satisfaction of human primary needs for food, clothing and sex. When translated literally, the proverb goes something like this: "Take care of what you put *in* (food), what you put *on* (clothing) and what you put *underneath* (sexual partner).

A number of respondents view return as part of their recovery from traumatization incurred during the war, forced migration, and life abroad. Senad felt that he would recover from the loss of control over his life with his return to BiH.

Senad: Well, emotions supported the rational calculation. There was a dominant feeling that I left Sarajevo against my own will. I left under extreme conditions and my question is as follows: 'if peace has returned to Sarajevo and that has been the case for a long time, why wouldn't I live in my city, with my group of friends, with my family? With more frequent visits, the desire intensifed to spend time with my family, with my sister, with my friends. Why would I not try to move there when I left against my own will? I want to see what would happen in Bosnia and Herzegovina.' I wanted to live there and if I decided to leave again, I wanted this decision to be my own. I wanted to be in the position to say 'I am leaving now, not because of a three-year military siege, but because I want to leave.' I wanted to reprogram history and to decide for myself.

Arif, who survived three concentration camps,4 now has an offce overlooking a road sign for the notorious Trnopolje camp. He explains the de-traumatizing effect constant exposure to places of unimaginable pain has on his psyche.

Arif: The "Trnopolje Camp," my third concentration camp, is located three kilometers from here. People ask me 'why did you return to live in the neighborhood of a concentration camp?' and I tell them: 'well, it would be like a Jewish person returning to start a business next to Auschwitz.' I pass by Keraterm each and every day and I see images of past events: the killings of people and the torture, but I keep in touch with all that. You keep seeing these images wherever you are. You can leave, but you cannot escape these images. Within the human psyche, it is impossible to escape your own experience. You could even go to Tasmania, but these images stay alive in front of your eyes. When you close your eyes and start talking to the dead, you wake up in the morning, exhausted from the long conversations you had with them in your sleep. You feel no fear. When you return here, you retain physical contact and you can see everything directly.

Diagnosed with PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) and later becoming a certifed trauma release therapist, Lejla discusses the impact of return on her ability to recover from traumatization.

Lejla: And then, all of a sudden, what came back to me is everything we went through and how deprived we were. Somehow, this caused me so much pain that I just wanted to give love to all people in Bosnia. I felt so much pain, which we all carry inside and as I realized the pain, I wanted to come and hug everybody (laughter). I just wanted to share my feelings with people here and this is mainly how I decided to return and start my yoga studio here [in BiH].

<sup>4</sup>The three concentration camps are: Trnopolje, Omarska and Keraterm. For historical background on the camps see Sivac-Bryant (2016).

The fnding that wartime experience features prominently in the returnees' motivation to return confrms previous studies of voluntary return to BiH, such as Porobić (2012) and Porobić (2017). In her more recent study, Porobić fnds "clear inter-linkages between trauma, remembrance, and return motivations and experiences" (p. 120) and creates connections to her previous work with Bosnian refugees in Sweden, where she found that resilience was directed towards a state of "in-betweenness" and that attitudes toward return varied from viewing it is a form of healing the trauma of displacement to seeing it as a possible source of new traumatization. The stories of Senad, Arif, and Lejla are consistent with the former interpretation where return to the place of originally induced trauma seems to bring about recovery.

#### **3.1.2.3 Closeness to Family Members and Religious Traditions**

Connections with family members and a desire to be close to them were also reported as an important reason for return. Being close to aging parents and extended family members is of great signifcance to Adnan, who returned to BiH from Turkey.

Adnan: I don't have a single regret about returning. In fact, I am very happy about it. I believe I have done the best thing that I could have done. I even wish I had taken this step earlier, because my family, my children, and my parents are here, together. I now see my parents and friends much more. Also, the work that I do reaches people in ways that I have provided jobs to many. All of this gives me a sort of energy that I am really very happy that I have returned.

I considered whether the returnee's parents require special care and whether they are able to live independently to be of such importance that I included it in the demographic section of the interview. This question was so important to me because it might present a constraint which would interfere with one of the most important sampling criteria, i.e. "voluntariness" of return. Given the close-knit structure of the typical Bosnian family, parents in need of assisted living could present a constraint which would deem the return to be somewhat "compelled" and thus not entirely voluntary. An overwhelming majority of the returnees replied their parents are capable of independent living, however, that their proximity has great signifcance for their lives. Adnan's story is typical and to a large extent recognized in the return migration literature as "life stages and transitions not only of the migrants, but of their family members" (p.20) where ageing parents in the home country can "incentivize return" (Carling et al., 2015, p.20).

Having the opportunity to raise their children in smaller towns and close to the family's religious traditions is an important factor in deciding to return. Siniša, who grew up in Argentina within a dominant Catholic societal religious tradition, is happy to provide his seven children with an Orthodox Christian upbringing in BiH.

Siniša: Actually, as I said, this huge assimilation down there, in Argentina, never really happened to us. So that, although I was born there, my parents have always, let's say, left a certain feeling that we belong to a different, let's say, a different nation. They always spoke Serbian in the house and we always celebrated the "Slava5 " and we celebrated Christmas according to our own Orthodox traditions, although we lived in a Catholic country. What does this mean? They could not give up any of that and they just transferred it to us, so at one point I asked myself, ok 'Who am I?' Also, there is my wife, whose background is also from these parts and the question of educating our children came up. We have lots of children!


Siniša's story resonates with the fnding of Carling et al. (2015), who note that the decision to return is often not just a personal issue, but one concerning primarily the re-integration of children, particularly if they are of school age. Also, since Siniša's return6 is technically "ancestral," (Sardinha, 2008), making him a "root migrant" (Wessendorf, 2007) or a "counter-diasporic returnee" (King & Christou, 2009), what also corresponds to the literature is a "return ideology" (Sardinha, 2008, p. 322), which seems to have been present in Siniša's family while they were growing up in Argentina. Sardinha (2008) cites Chamberlain (1995), whose study of Barbadian families living in the U.K outlines the major family characteristics necessary for the development of a "return ideology." Sardinha (2008) points to the importance of regular instilling of a "sense of ethnonationalist feeling" (p. 322) in the second-generation by their parents.

Similarly to Siniša, Gavrilo discusses the importance of being close to his family members in connection with a religious mission to help his community. Gavrilo is also an Orthodox Christian, but similar views combining religiosity and familial bonds are present in participants of other religious traditions.

Gavrilo: There are another ten people employed in our dairy farm, so our entire family is together. Also, I have given a chance to several people around me. If they want to work, they could also be fnancially sustainable. In my opinion, this is some kind of contribution, a kind of God's mission. I have managed to do something for myself and for others.

<sup>5</sup>Celebrating the 'slava' is an Orthodox Christian tradition of observing a family's patron saint.

<sup>6</sup>See King and Christou (2009) for a thorough explanation of why second-generation "return"is still classifed as return migration, although the "returnee"is actually returning to the parents' homeland. Also, see Carling et al. (2015), who conclude that "memories and attachment to country of origin may matter more than birthplace"(p. 19), when classifying this type of migration as in fact return.

Author: Religion is important to you?

Gavrilo: Very important! We are all God's souls, and we all have our missions to fulfll. We all need to be good and to help people.

To some extent, Gavrilo's story could be placed within the "return as fulfllment of a higher purpose" category, except that the spiritual dimension is more directly articulated through the profession of a particular religious tradition and tied to proximity to family members.

#### **3.1.2.4 Postmaterialist Value System**

Attaching little value to materialism and material goods was an important factor in their decision to return. In deciding to return, Ema did not prioritize the comfort of her corporate job in Austria. Instead, she sees her return as meaning-making from the collective tragedy of war.

Ema: Hmmm…this thing constantly kept reappearing in my mind and this emotional reason was mixing with the one rational reason I did this. If we look at this emotional reason only, ahm, so many young people died in this war and I kept thinking about what is that they died for exactly? For thorns7 ! They fought for a piece of land, because in the end, that is what it comes down to. It is as if 'I protected my home. I was defending it from whomever…8 " All these young people, they are no longer with us and I thought to myself…wait a second. Now, these felds lie empty, overgrown and untilled, used by nobody. The village is empty. Everybody is gone. Let's try to give all of this [the victims' deaths] some sort of meaning. Somebody died for some ideals. We don't need to get philosophical about whether these ideals were good or bad. They gave their life for that small piece of land and now we don't have the ability to recognize that and make use of it. The apple trees are unpicked. The fruit lie scattered on the ground. Nobody collects them. Nobody cares anymore. Somebody, somebody gave their life for that and this needs to be respected.

Elvis contrasts human relations in BiH and the West to conclude that they are more developed in the home state. These strong social bonds are what he values most.

Elvis: And then if we focus again on the meaning of life…Does this include having coffee with our friend today, chatting about all our troubles for an hour, waving hello from across the street…If something were to happen, God forbid, there would be thousands of people around you, ready to help you.

<sup>7</sup>The metaphor "thorns" is often used to refer to anything of little or no value. "Thorns" is a descriptive term meaning nothingness and worthlessness.

<sup>8</sup>Ema's voice changes here from the impersonal "they" to the frst person singular "I". In later parts of the interview she reveals that her uncle was killed during the war in the prime of his youth, while defending their family home.

Does this mean that, for me as a Bosnian-Herzegovinian, people here, regardless of their ethnicity, are more important to me than somebody from the West? I don't know, but I guess each person needs to answer this question for themselves. I think that we here still have a much greater sense of ethics and that the friendships are much stronger. We get back to the meaning of life, and again, those small moments of happiness make a man happy.

Life in New York, according to Lejla, was devoted to the acquisition of greater material wealth and she simply did not see herself as part of that lifestyle.

Lejla: Honestly, I believe that I just started getting really depressed over there [in New York City]. This is actually completely normal for New York, as everybody is depressed. They all take some sort of anti-depressant. I started to feel that it was only yoga that kept me away from this general mood around me. I was spending so much time by myself and for everybody around me, the meaning of life was contained in being ambitious and expressing these ambitions. Simply, when I faced this crossroad in my life to ask myself whether I would continue living this way or whether I would return…when I projected my life 10–15 years into the future in New York, this was not fulflling to me. I could see the direction in which my life was going – making money, spending money, the life of money and materialism. My spirit was being killed.

The decision to return could be conceived as premised on assigning relatively lower value to materialist concerns such as "economic and physical security" and higher worth to *postmaterialist* values such as "freedom, self-expression and the quality of life" (Inglehart, 1971; Inglehart & Abramson, 1994). It is important to note that although the consequences of their decision are evident in a post-confict society, the returnees originally made their decision in societies (with Ema, Elvis and Lejla, it was Austria, and the U.S. respectively) which qualify as "advanced industrial" (Inglehart, 1971; Inglehart & Abramson, 1994) and therefore, the value change argument originally advanced by Ronald Inglehart could apply to their decisionmaking processes.

In addition, although Ema's reasoning which assigns lower value to material comfort is directly related to wartime events, Elvis's and Lejla's views, at least in this instance, seem quite typical of "lifestyle migration" (Kılınç & King, 2017). Particularly in Ema's case, as she has returned to a rural community outside of Derventa, the "rural idyll" as a type of "lifestyle migration" seems to provide a good ft. Benson and O'Reilly (2009) discuss rural areas as offering lifestyle migrants an "image of the 'simple' or 'good life,' stepping back in time, getting back to the land, and experiencing the 'traditional' and 'authentic' values of rural community cohesion which have been lost in urban-industrial modernity (p. 611 as cited by Kılınç & King, 2017, p. 1495). Olsson and King (2008) make a similar observation in commenting Sardinha (2008) and "specifcally the tradeoff between economic downsizing ("The only thing for me to do here was to milk cows") and the feelings of belonging and spiritual proximity to a landscape, society and lifestyle" (p. 258). It is worth re-emphasizing that the particular nature of post-confict return prevents direct and one-to-one comparisons with "lifestyle migration". However, there are some shared characteristics and those are also important to note. The crucial and defning aspect of post-confict return, however, is the incurrence of wartime trauma and subsequent recovery.

#### **3.1.2.5 Initial Enthusiasm**

Respondents were, at least initially, highly enthusiastic about their decision to return. Admir, a jazz musician, talks about a gradual decrease in enthusiasm about his return.

Admir: When I frst came here, everything was interesting to me and I was full of enthusiasm. I had been away for a long time and it took me almost two years to experience life here in a more realistic sense. Well, because I lived in a different system for ten years, a completely different country. Many things here changed, and you hadn't seen your friends in such a long time. That sort of beginner's enthusiasm exists in the sense 'I am having a good time. I missed so many things…It's all so wonderful.' And then, after a while, this period passes as you mature. Then, you begin to live real life as a citizen of this country and then you take life a little more seriously. You worry about things, your family…you know…You worry about economic survival. In a business sense, you understand how is it that things work.

Ervin, an IT expert, discusses the diffculties inherent in return, but is also cautiously optimistic about the future.

Ervin: We [Ervin and his wife] have lots of small victories, which together are big victories for me…So we are pushing an agenda on an infnite number of different levels in government. We are creating a type of ripple effect9 So, our initial focus is the IT industry, for this critical mass to be created, for these companies to get serious and turn Bosnia and Herzegovina into a serious destination for IT services, which are extremely well-paid and which could be a strategic industry for Bosnia…And then, also to stop these kids from running away, going abroad, because, you know they [IT experts] can all fnd jobs in Berlin and London, for twice the money. So, we have to create the conditions for them to stay here, for things to be comfortable for them here, making a kind of Disneyland for them here. I like to say, an IT Disneyland. Perhaps in the beginning we had more enthusiasm in the sense that we had more…. Actually, no..not really. We still have the same level of enthusiasm or it might have even increased when we

<sup>9</sup>Although the translation cannot refect this phenomenon, it is important to observe its existence. Many of the returnees use English words, without translating them to Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian in their daily speech. "Ripple effect" is an example of this type of response.

decided this to be the priority. Because in the beginning, we were not exactly sure 100% that we need to stay here until retirement. Actually, we are still not completely certain that we want to stay here all the way, 'til death. But, we are trying. We are working on it. That is the thing.

Initial enthusiasm at seeing friends and family and a return "home," followed by subsequent disappointment and disillusionment, is widely reported in the return migration literature. Bovenkerk (1974) ascribes the loss of enthusiasm and onset of disappointment to the idealization of the home country during emigration. He cites examples ranging from Italians returning from the U.S. (Nelli, 1970), Greek returnees (Saloutos, 1956) or the Pakistanis returning from Britain (Dahaya, 1973). More recently, King et al. (2008) discuss the disillusionment felt by second-generation Greek Cypriots returnees and Paasche (2016) elaborates feelings of disappointment particularly related to post-confict return to Iraqi Kurdistan. Although most participants in my study discussed feeling enthusiastic about their return, they seemed to have quickly developed a rather mature attitude toward BiH, re-adjusting their expectations and thus avoiding major disillusionment.

#### **3.2 Encountering Obstacles Upon Return**

The greatest obstacle faced by returnees is the overwhelming presence of corruption and other types of unethical behavior, such as nepotism in employment practices. Scholarship on return migration, particularly to post-confict societies with inherent weaknesses in the rule of law, agrees with this assertion, claiming corruption to be even more of an obstacle to return than insecurity (Oeppen, 2009). In the case of returnees to BiH, this obstacle most often co-occurs with the general diffculties in conducting business. Alija, who works on promoting and facilitating investment made in BiH from diaspora members, discusses the debilitating effects corruption has on general economic growth.

Alija: Corruption is more of a problem when making investment decisions. People want to start a business and then they get pushed around from one government offce to the next. They lose patience and go back abroad in 3 weeks. Then, they become frustrated and disappointed and they discuss their experience with others in the diaspora. I tell them please don't do that. That is the worst thing that could happen.

Corruption has been discussed as the greatest obstacle for the returnees, with effects of discouraging those in the diaspora who might contemplate their return to BiH. This fnding is consistent with Carling et al. (2015) who discuss its presence across various contexts and transnational felds, where "the realities of return for some individuals are connected to the possibility of return for others" (p. 1). This is because transnational communication is lively and by sharing their experiences with other diaspora members, the returnees take part in "shaping imaginations and decisions about return in diaspora" (p. 1) Alija's work is devoted to attracting investment from diaspora members and as a result he is fully aware of the importance of such information transfers. To support his concerns, Carling et al. (2015) consider the role of rumors to be so important that analyzing their substance "provides insights into the information gaps, hypotheses, collective sense-making and conficting truth claims that affect migration processes" (p. 18). Of course, the spread of rumors about different aspects of return can either encourage or discourage it, but this is true for levels of corruption, mainly because of their pervasive and decisive effect on the return decision.

Faced with racketeering and constant bribe requests, the returnees turn to the law and attempt to fght for their rights using the available legal means, thus rejecting the corruptive business culture. While aware of the realities of doing business in BiH, Ema has no desire to participate in widespread bribery, and instead follows the law, fully realizing how diffcult it is actually to put legal principles in practice.

Ema: This is just horrible! So many things function through bribes, but I don't want to have any part in that type of thing. No chance! Somebody needs to change how things work. I have my principles and I simply don't want to be a part of it. This means that I am not prepared to pay bribes, and this is the reason everything I do takes suuuuch a long time. As far as the legal system is concerned, the laws here change so frequently that it is simply impossible to follow all of that and honestly, sometimes common sense blocks my efforts to follow each and every law and regulation 100%. This does not mean that I am cheating the state and fnally I follow through, but in the beginning I felt blocked when I read about all the requirements, all the criteria, which need to be met. When I compare all that with the experience in Europe, just for a company to get started, to get a VAT number, this is incredible. It's literally a madhouse what we have here. A total madhouse.

As reported by Carling et al. (2015) corruption in the home state is one of the leading reasons discouraging return migration, and it "cuts across social and economic spheres" (p. 22). Throughout the interview, Ema kept referring to EU standards and "the way things are run in Austria," however, unlike the fndings of Carling et al. (2015), the comparisons she makes between the low levels of corruption in the host state in absolute terms, but particularly relative to the home state, do not "produce a feeling of social alienation" (p.22). Pedersen (2003) fnds that with return to Lebanon the "Northern European state came to symbolize a political system devoid of the corruption and clientelism that is so widespread in Lebanon" (p. 37) Instead of feeling "socially alienated" or idealizing Austria as a corruption-free state, Ema takes a more pragmatic and conciliatory attitude,10 where she rejects the locally prevalent culture of bribery and corruption, but also somewhat adapts to BiH legal complexities and the lack of an effective rule of law.

<sup>10</sup>To some extent, it is to be expected that some adaptation to prevailing legal values and practices will inevitably happen over time. Indeed, there have been studies, such as Kubal (2014), illustrating the course of such adaptation.

The returnees experience the effects of bribery and corruption regardless of their ethnicity or their ethnic minority or majority status. Gavrilo is a Serb doing business in Nevesinje, which has been almost entirely "ethnically cleansed" of its prewar non-Serb residents. As he is not a part of the local oligarchy, he suffers from the effects of unethical business practices and crony-capitalism. He also fnds some creative solutions to these obstacles by trying to attract local media attention.

Gavrilo: Let me tell you how this happened in Nevesinje, who, what and how politics looks upon all of this. I will tell you about a case. I don't care. I will tell this to anybody. For example, we, I, organized production…in my house. This is where we started our small crafts shop. My sister is the one who started doing this frst and then we started expanding. Soon, we started running into the problem of lack of space. I looked around for land in the industrial zone to buy, so that we could move our factory. Believe me that, at the time, I could not buy anything from the municipality, because they distributed the entire industrial zone to some quasi business people, without any idea of what they could do on this empty lot. How were they allotted the land? I have no idea. They [the municipality offcials] didn't give me any land, so I asked for former military barracks, where I could move my storage refrigerators, because I keep increasing my production. They wouldn't allot me land, so I asked for the barracks.

> So, listen to this. I called a person from the media, a friend of ours, and asked if he could send a TV crew, because I wanted to tell people about what is happening to the economy of Nevesinje. He nicely said that he would send a TV crew, but that I need to call the municipality mayor to inform him we would pay a visit. After that call, two hours later, he [the municipality mayor] called my sister and said 'you have the barracks, go over there and move your storage refrigerators.' The media are incredibly powerful. They can play a very important role in everything. So, what happened next? I could not buy land from the municipality, but still everything was settled.

Gavrilo's approach to solving the problems caused by crony-capitalisms shares Ema's adaptability and pragmatism and counters the "feeling of social alienation" (Carling et al., 2015, p. 22) found elsewhere in the literature connecting corruption and return migration. However, although turning to the media can sometimes, as in the story Gavrilo narrated, have positive effects, media attention can in no way substitute for a functioning judicial system,11 whether the issue is related to business, criminal or any other legal feld.

<sup>11</sup>Unfortunately, this point is poignantly illustrated by the parallel nature in treatment of the still unresolved murders of Dženan Memić in Sarajevo and David Dragičević in Banja Luka. For more on the international press coverage of these two cases, see among others Surk, B. (2019, January 9). In Bosnia, a Father's Grief Swells Into an Antigovernment Movement. *New York Times*. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/world/europe/bosnia-davor-dragicevicmilorad-dodik.html

Not only do the effects of corruption transcend ethnic boundaries, they are also counter-intuitive in terms of ethnic belonging. Arif, a Bosniak, returned to Kozarac in the RS, as a minority returnee. However, he experienced the worst cases of racketeering when he expanded his business operations to the Bosniak-dominated town of Bosanski Petrovac, in the FBiH.


Although a number of authors (Carling et al., 2015; Pedersen, 2003) point to the importance of studying the specifc effect corruption has on return migration, particularly to post-confict societies, it is surprising that this feld is in its "embryonic" stages (Carling et al., 2015, p. 33). A notable exception is Paasche (2016), whose study looks at the impact of corruption on return and reintegration in Iraqi Kurdistan.

A couple of points from Paasche (2016) resonate and connect strongly to Arif's experience. First, as Paasche (2016) argues, returnees might be more likely to be subjected to bribery requests because of their relative and perceived wealth accumulated abroad. Second, their wealth could also represent a type of "social capital" (p. 1077), which would give the returnees a certain amount of independence from the local power structure. Finally, Paasche (2016) points to the necessity for returnee entrepreneurs to "cultivate personal ties with party offcials" (p. 1087) and narrates the story of a returnee to Iraqi Kurdistan.

We had a business idea, but they wanted 75 percent of the proft to themselves. So I didn't bother. Then I got a good idea for an import business in Kurdistan, but a potential business partner told me, 'Someone from the Barzani family runs this business there. Don't even think about it. Others have tried before you.' I had gone through all the hassle planning my business, but when I heard this, I dropped it. All the big businesses there are run by the Talabani and Barzani families.

<sup>12</sup>Bakir Izetbegović is the current head of the SDA party and the son of the late Alija Izetbegović, the frst BiH President.

The similarities between Arif's story and experiences of returnees to Iraqi Kurdistan are strikingly parallel, which points to the importance of considering social structure and context, in this case return to a post-confict society combined with state weakness. Differently from returnees in the Paasche (2016) study, Arif still continues to battle the local racketeers, determined to continue living and working in Kozarac,13 together with his family members.

Besides the cross-cutting effects of corruption, returnees of different ethnicities in different parts of the country faced ethnic divisions and discrimination based on their ethnicity. Vlado, a Serb returnee to Trebinje, speaks of the general state of social polarization along ethnic lines.

Vlado: When I travel, for example, from Trebinje to Stolac, and as I drive through, I begin to feel the schizophrenia, although I have not been here during the war. I mean, there, somewhere along the lines of demarcation between the Bosniaks on one side and the Croats on the other side, this is where I begin to feel that unease and madness. I try meditating. I try emptying my mind, but nothing seems to work. The amount of human stupidity simply paralyzes me. Still, there is one fag on the Bosniak side and another one on the Croat side. When you add the Serbs as you start entering Republika Srpska that creates a total schizophrenia in my mind. A totally schizophrenic situation.

Elvis, a Bosniak minority returnee to Prijedor in Republika Srpska discusses direct and personal experiences of ethnic discrimination.


<sup>13</sup>Paasche (2016) also makes important commentary on how returnees might be prone to criticize corruption in the home state in order to retain a positive self-image. He compares this tendency to researchers "exploiting the paternalistic tool to moralize over 'less-developed" Others (Blundo & de Sardan, 2006; Lindberg & Orjuela, 2014 as cited in Paasche, 2016, p. 1078), returnees may engage in the same discourse to position themselves as morally impeccable and ideologically superior 'torchbearers of progress' whose return brought them from modernity to backwardness (Parry, 2003, p. 244 as cited in Paasche, 2016, p. 1078)." Factors such as continuing to live in the home state, making consistent public and media appearances discussing the easily verifable corruption activities, as well as continuing to generate employment for local residents, could arguably be used to counter the possibility that returnees' claims of systemic and debilitating corruption could be categorized as described above.

Elvis: Of course, all of the time. For example, on the road, when you get stopped by the police, you can feel it. When they see your papers, you can see that you get discriminated against. You can also feel it in restaurants, although this type of thing can be avoided because you simply don't go where you are 'not supposed to go'. Let me tell you simply, your biggest obstacle is your ethnicity, your identity!

Hrvoje, a Croat returnee who divides his time between his native Sarajevo and the Herzegovinian town Ljubuški, is pessimistic about the future of ethnic demarcation.

Hrvoje: Regardless of how much we focus on solving the problems, some people want it differently, and I am afraid that we have already lost the battle. All of this is going in a completely wrong direction, towards greater and greater separation. People are separating from each other territorially, more and more. The territories of segregation are becoming smaller and smaller and people are becoming more and more closed off. Looking at the situation from a geopolitical standpoint, people like me don't have a bright future here. These are people who are used to living together in the brotherhood and unity of the past. I absolutely do not care *who* you are. I only care about *what* you are like.14

The problems of ethnic discrimination inherent to minority return have been widely discussed in the literature on post-war BiH (among numerous examples, see Bieber, 2006, Bougarel et al., 2007; Keil, 2013; Lippman, 2019), so obviously this is a major obstacle for returnees. As Hromadzic (2012) points out, institutionalizing ethnicity in Bosnia and Herzegovina has long historical roots. Historically, BiH society has been multiethnic with ethnoreligious background always playing an important role (Bougarel, 1996; Kasapović, 2005), however the new addition of the DPA setup is in the *territorializing* of ethnic groups, created by brutal campaigns of ethnic cleansing conducted during the 1992–95 war. The DPA brought an end to the physical fghting, but in effect legitimized and strengthened ethnic divisions, ultimately creating a "spatial governmentality" — an ideological, political, and social mechanism of territorial segregation and disciplining of ethnically conceived peoples (Hromadzic, 2012, p. 32).

The stories of Vlado, a Serb returnee to the predominately Serb-populated Trebinje in Republika Srpska, who often travels to the Bosniak and Croat dominated areas of Stolac; Elvis, a Bosniak minority returnee to Prijedor, which has been almost entirely "cleansed" of all its non-Serb citizens and Hrvoje, an ethnic Croat and born Sarajevan, who now is considered a minority returnee in his native, now Bosniak-majority Sarajevo and a majority returnee to the Croat-dominated town of Ljubuški all speak to the same phenomenon of "spatial governmentality" with the resulting ethnic discrimination. In addition, as Hromadzic (2012) summarizes, "This marriage between consociational democracy, spatial govermentality, and

<sup>14</sup>Another way of translating the second part of this phrase would be "…I only care about the kind of person you are."

cultural fundamentalism in BiH has led to the ethnicization of political and social life, generating "total exclusion of 'others' or 'citizens' from the power-sharing arrangement" (Bieber, 2006, p. 56)" (p. 32) Therefore, ethnic discrimination is not just directed towards members of an ethnic group in territories where they do not comprise the majority. It leads to the actual exclusion of all those who do not identify with a particular ethnic group and instead claim to be primarily citizens of BiH. The ethnocentric focus on the understanding of territory in BiH, obviates the creation of shared public spaces, which are instrumental for a functioning democracy (Barry, 1990; Young, 1990; Hromadzic, 2012).

A rather intangible, but very important, obstacle for the returnees is the general mentality in BiH and a sense of victimization. Badema, an inspirational young woman, who returned together with her family from Germany to live in their native Srebrenica, discusses the detrimental impact of the general atmosphere of postwar apathy.

Badema: Disinterested people are the biggest obstacle. When I, or anybody else, get an idea on how to solve a problem, the tired, jaded, lethargic people become the biggest obstacle. These are people without goals, living each day as it comes. This is the greatest obstacle in our country. The youth, people my age, are apathetic. They simply don't want anything to change. Let me give you an example! I get an idea of something we could do together and I talked about this in school. I get butterfies futtering inside thinking about and talking about all the positive benefts of my idea. And what is the reaction? What do they say? They say: 'You fool! What, for God's sake, are you talking about?' They literally brand you a fool and then you get so disappointed. You feel disappointed for even trying and inside you know, you know that the potential for making things better does exist. But, nothing can be done because of people like that.

Vedad was wounded during the war, and now only has 5% eyesight on one eye. Although he was an excellent student of electrical engineering, he had to change professions and become a physical therapist. Now, he has a successful practice, employing an assistant and feeding a family of six. When I asked him about his reaction to lethargy among the youth in BiH, instead of judgement, he showed compassion.

Vedad: That person in question is perhaps physically healthy, but he is not fully mentally healthy. That is the main issue. To learn more, we need to investigate his psychological background, his mental health. We need to see what else is going on in his life. To move such a person, you need to know why is it he is in such a state. Is it his family? Is it his girlfriend? Perhaps he has some emotional problems. I mean, these are simple things, but these are just some examples. The worst happens when this young person sees himself as a victim.

The questions of victimization, victimhood and the subsequent moral claims in a post-confict setting are undoubtedly complex (see Helms, 2013) and I do not intend to dwell on the multitude of layers they imply. Although the sentiment of a general "victim mentality" was echoed by many of the returnees and viewed as a serious impediment to progress, I highlighted the views of two individuals, a young Bosniak woman from Srebrenica, the site of the 1995 genocide perpetrated against the Bosniak people, and a middle-aged Bosniak man from Sarajevo, physically disabled during the 1992–95 siege of Sarajevo. Their stories present counter-examples to the analysis espoused by Helms (2013),15 where victimhood and innocence in BiH are both gendered as female and ethnicized as Bosniak. With no traces of denial of wartime atrocities, their own tragedy or the crimes committed against their own people, Badema and Vedad actively reject the "victim role" and recoup their own agency. They are highly critical of this general tendency and search for compassionate venues to counter the destructive effects of the "victim philosophy" (Helms, 2013).

Two obstacles which often co-occur are complicated bureaucratic procedures and diffculties in conducting business. Hrvoje gives an illustrative example of the destructive effects of prolonged waiting periods on the overall economy.

Hrvoje: Ok, I will give you a concrete example of obtaining an import permit. For example, you import some goods, which have been vetted under European standards. The imported products can be traded anywhere in Europe for the past couple of years. As far as this country is concerned, besides making all permit payments in advance, your application won't even be considered in the next 6 or 7 months. During this time, you are in complete standby. Everything is frozen and you are at the mercy of the authorities. You wait and wait. They took your money in advance and then 6 months need to pass for you to fnd out whether you can do this job. Everybody loses during these 6 months. The state loses tax revenue for sure. Even the person living off of taxpayers' money, he also loses, because his salary is paid from your taxes. Something needs to get taxed and with these waiting periods, nobody gains. Why? As I can't sell anything, the state has nothing to tax [VAT tax] and everybody loses. This is absurd.

Alma expresses her frustration with the lack of understanding government employees show towards the returnees' efforts, which sometimes seem to add inordinate changes in established practices.

Alma: I mean, you go, for example, to the Cantonal Ministry of Education and you experience a trip in a time machine, going back 60 years in history. You have some people sitting there who do not care about anything. Even just visiting that place is frustrating, not to mention trying to explain that

<sup>15</sup>To be fair to the thoroughly researched analysis, Helms (2013) makes a point that these constructions are mostly imposed from outside and not self-created: "There is no denying that Bosniac women were the most numerous among those who survived ethnic cleansing and rape, but through a variety of dominant representations they have become the only victims, and, more worryingly, *only victims*. These representations have been constructed largely without the voices of Bosnian women themselves, or in ways that downplay their agency, leaving intact an Orientalized image of silenced, shamed, and powerless victims of patriarchal, Muslim culture." (p. 27)

we are a Waldorf kindergarten and that we do things slightly differently. They [the Ministry staff] just look at you with distrust. Then they say something like…'so, you bring something new…since that is the case, even longer and more complicated procedures apply to you.' And what do you do? You just continue running around from one place to another, as they concoct new rules that you must obey.

In a study of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in BiH, Delalić and Oruč (2014) conclude that institutional factors, namely government bureaucracy, severely impede the growth of individual businesses and hamper the country's general business climate. The authors point to the World Bank's "Doing Business" reports, which consistently rank BiH at the bottom of European lists of favorable business climates.

The high unemployment rate coupled with low living standards and general stagnation are an obstacle the returnees confront. According to Elvis, widespread poverty contributes to deepening ethnic divisions.

Elvis: This is because our economic situation, the poverty, has affected Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks equally. You would expect that poverty would be a motivator for people to cooperate. In the case of normal people, that is something to be expected, but here…poverty just keeps people stuck deeper and deeper in those unhealthy thought patterns.

Hrvoje fnds the continued economic stagnation to be a source of great disappointment. He feels strongly about the inability of the BiH economy to rebound fully from the devastation of war.

Hrvoje: What this means is that if you do not have a strong material base, the spiritual side simply cannot develop, regardless of how much we would like yoga to help us. Without an economic base, you cannot be emotionally and spiritually relaxed. There needs to be a material base, not just for you as an individual, but for all of society. I mean, we cannot lie to ourselves. The material base is foundational for everything. On the economic front, I am very disappointed. Why? Because I know that this country could have developed ten times faster and better, but we again turn to this ugly thing called politics and our political environment, which simply does not let you breathe.

Elvis's, Hrvoje's and other returnees' perceptions of economic realities in BiH are not far from offcially reported economic indicators. Wartime devastation had reduced the BiH GDP per capita to only 20% of its prewar level (Pugh, 2002) and subsequent economic growth was mainly fueled by donor programs. The unemployment rate, depending on the methods of measurement (see Efendić, 2016) ranges from 28% at the lower end of estimates to 45% at the higher end. Whatever unemployment rate estimate is considered, the problem of persistently high unemployment and particularly high youth unemployment remains as one of the greatest economic challenges in BiH.

Finally, a major obstacle the returnees experience is a constant sense of political uncertainty in the country. Mehmed returned from Australia to live and work in BiH, but like so many others, he is doubtful of a peaceful future.

Mehmed: Uncertainty. Uncertainty caused by a number of things, such as what we talked about before: threats of a new independence referendum and the general political situation….the uncertainty of not knowing where all of this could be going. Nobody knows whether we might have a new war, as the secession threats keep coming all of the time. On our side, our politics…we see the incompetence of our politicians to manage their own affairs and to deal with the international scene, this entire complicated set of events in the region and that point to the possibility of new war, confict…What exactly will happen…nobody seems to know.

Political uncertainty is a matter of daily life in BiH, most of which is rooted in the reality of institutionalized ethnic divisions, but also aided by consistent national and international media efforts16 to keep alive an overall sense of political unpredictability characteristic of the general "Balkan powder keg" and the specifcity of the fragile peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a study on emigration intentions in BiH, Efendić (2016) fnds that, contrary to conventional expectations, high unemployment and low economic growth, although important, are not the most signifcant drivers of emigration from BiH. According to this study, the differences in emigration intentions between returnee and domicile population are not statistically signifcant, however, specifcally post-confict factors such as "perceptions of the country's political prospects" (Efendić, 2016, p. 349) rank highest.

#### **3.3 Strategies for Overcoming the Challenges of Return**

The primary strategy for overcoming obstacles is self-reliance and resilience. The same qualities and skills which made it possible for them to succeed in the host societies are the ones best used in reintegration. Damir was only 18 years old when the war started in Sanski Most and he found refuge in Germany.

Damir: And when I arrived there [Germany] and when I slept that night on a park bench, I told myself one thing–'just give me the right to work!'

Author: How did you feel on that bench?

<sup>16</sup>Some of the more recent examples of this trend include alarmist headlines, from both Western and other media sources, such as Dudik & Kuzmanović (2018, September 12). Is Europe sleepwalking into a new Balkan war. *Bloomberg*. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ features/2018-09-12/playing-with-fre-in-europe-s-powder-keg or Joksimović, N. (2018, June 7). Foreigners giving up on Bosnia: country close to collapse. *Sputnik Srbija*. Retrieved from https:// rs-lat.sputniknews.com/analize/201806071115894984-bih-izmene-izbornog-zakona-/

Damir: At that time, I did not think about feelings at all. Nothing. Emotions were completely irrelevant to me. I had no emotions. Survival was the only important thing for me. I felt happy that I was out of Bosnia at that moment, because even the park bench was better than a concentration camp or something even worse.

Author: You always have a positive attitude?

Damir: Yes, always! This is clear, because had I stayed, I would have ended up like any of my classmates – in a concentration camp or killed. Unfortunately, that was our situation. We didn't have organized resistance in Sanski Most.

While in Germany, Damir worked for a metal manufacturing company for 4 years. He returned to his native Sanski Most in 1996 and started a similar company at the age of 22. Now, his company employs close to one hundred workers.


Damir's story seems consistent with fndings of other studies of voluntary return to post-confict settings, such as van Houte and Davids (2014), who also emphasize the "voluntary returnees' creativity, resilience and innovativeness, along with their entrepreneurial mentality" (p. 80), but are much more skeptical of the returnees' capacities to impact actual social change. To some extent, Damir seems to contradict the second part of this conclusion. Perhaps it cannot be said that he has singlehandedly "innovated" (Cerase, 1974) his native Sanski Most. Also, there has been considerable local push-back against many of his initiatives. But that he has continuously lived, worked and generated employment in BiH seems to attest to the possibility of personal resilience to have some positive societal effect.

<sup>17</sup>This number was close to double the national average for this type of position, at the time of data collection (July, 2017).

Similarly to Damir, Gavrilo left Nevesinje during the war and went to Italy. Although trained with a degree in mechanical engineering, at times he found himself homeless in Italy, where he spent 7 years. Turning to resourcefulness he learnt Italian and using his engineering background he worked his way up to managerial positions in the dairy industry. Upon return to BiH, the same self-reliance which led to his success abroad helped him in overcoming the challenges of return and reintegration. He is disappointed at people leaving BiH and advocates for turning to creative problem-solving instead.

Gavrilo: Why do people say 'there is no life here,' in this entire country? Do you know why? Do you know what the problem is? This country is perfect for anybody with even a bit of creativity. Here, you need to make something, create something out of thin air. We have nothing and we need to make something. What I see as one of our biggest burdens is our experience of communism. This system dragged us into a situation where everybody was given a job in some factory, placed there to fll some machine with something, given an apartment and taken care of. All this person needed to do was get married, have two, three kids and await his retirement. With all the resources we have–the sun, the water, the lumber, and everything else, all we need is creativity. Creativity and what we have been given by God, who said: 'you need to live, suffer and work. Outside of that, there is nothing.'

Resilience and creativity are the defning features of various strategies for overcoming obstacles employed by the returnees. In reviewing Cerase's (1974) typology of return, Cassarino (2004) also underlines the diffculties faced by the returnees when they assign themselves the role of "carriers of change" (p.258). In a later part of the interview, Gavrilo revealed his attitude succinctly: "The challenge here is creating *something* when there is *nothing*!" Although his optimistic outlook is certainly heartening, its second part is not entirely accurate. What is there is not *nothing,* but in fact, a web of "vested interests which prevent innovators from undertaking any initiatives that could jeopardize the established situation and the traditional power structure" (Cassarino, 2004, p. 258). Similarly to Damir and most others returnees, equipped with resilience, creativity and self-reliance, Gavrilo continues to confront that power structure.

Political activism, being proactive and organized are strategies to combat the negative effects of the post-war apathy, sense of victimization, as well as low living standards and stagnation. For example, Senad joined an opposition party and is now serving in the Sarajevo Canton Parliament as a representative.

Senad: The strategy I use to overcome obstacles is to…hmm..is to help improve living standards in my microenvironment. This is the reason I entered politics. I started a political career because of water shortages. I simply could not believe that we have water shortages in the center of the city, the capital city of a European country. When I met the people, who are in charge of these companies [water supply companies] I saw the extent of their incompetence. I saw that there is a vacuous space, which I need to enter. That is when I joined the party.18


Senad found that entering party politics is the way for him to affect positive change, however there are other routes besides formal political engagement. Vedad is civically active in his local municipality.

Vedad: For example, while the water shortages were going on, I frequently attended all our local municipal meetings on how we could solve this problem. I was active in all our local chapters handling this issue. I met with the head of our city water supply company to see what could be done and how I could contribute towards a better situation. This is how I see it. One needs to contribute and be active towards fnding a solution.

The paradoxical nature of frequent water shortages occurring in a country known for its abundance of clean water supplies present an excellent illustration of the severity of mismanagement of public utilities in BiH. The water shortages were certainly not caused by a shortage of water supply, but by the inability of the corrupt, party-affliated management to properly service the crumbling distribution infrastructure. As opposed to feeling despondent, victimized, or expecting somebody else to do the job instead of them, Senad and Vedad took an active role in bringing about a solution.

Self-employment is the response to the high unemployment rate in the country. Most of the returnees frstly created their own jobs and then started hiring others. Aware of the abysmal economic situation Bosnia and Herzegovina found itself right after the war ended, Damir had no expectations of "fnding a job." Instead, he came back from Germany with very little initial capital and the intention of employing himself.

Damir: My frst motivation when considering how I could return was not building a company that now employs 100 workers. This was not my primary motivation. When I frst returned, my motivation was to create a job for myself and earn a monthly salary. My only concern was that I could have a source of monthly income, so that I could live from my labor. What happened later, how the company developed those are things I could not expect 20 years ago. In the beginning, I just wanted to create my job and nothing else.

<sup>18</sup>Senad joined a liberal, social-democrat party, one of the leading opposition parties in BiH.

Likewise, Alija returned from Holland to start a diaspora investment promotion agency. Instead of despairing about how high the unemployment rate is in BiH, he created his own job and help other returnees do the same.

Alija: As far as the unemployment problem is concerned, my answer to that is job creation! I created my job and now we help others fnd jobs. This is something that we can do. When discussing the political situation, we [Alija's investment promotion agency] simply don't want any part in all of that. It's a jungle! That is just how it is.

As was explained in the previous section, the tendency of returnees towards selfemployment has been well-documented in the literature. Also, as was pointed out during the discussion on motivations driving the decision to return, all other forms of reintegration are "conditioned upon economic reintegration" (Paasche, 2016). Therefore, faced with close to a 40% unemployment rate, nepotistic employment practices based on party-affliation and not qualifcations, and losing many of the social contacts that could lead to job offers, self-employment seems to be the only viable option for the returnees. Therefore, self-employment does not seem to be a choice they make, but a necessity that enables return. I*n ord*er to return, they *need* to provide employment for themselves. The returnees' attitude towards selfemployment is characterized by the same level of self-initiative, resilience and creativity noticed in other aspects of their reintegration.

Cultivating patience, persistence and politeness are seen as useful in overcoming general apathy, bureaucratic hurdles, as well as managing problems in day-to-day business practices. When discussing her frustration with apathetic reactions to her proposals for progressive change in Srebrenica, Badema believes that being patient is her best strategy.

Badema: I really love philosophy and I don't know exactly who had this teaching, but virtues can be taught. Virtues can be acquired. I believe this to be true. Whatever the problem might be, patience will lead the way towards a solution, step by step, one small step at a time. Have patience and time will tell, all the pieces will fall into place one day. The important thing is to continue building.

When being forced to wait 6 months for an import permit, Hrvoje had no other choice but to be patient with the customs and tax authorities.

Hrvoje: Patience. Yes, you wait. There is nothing else that could be done. As a single individual I have no other way, except for being patient. In my opinion, this problem has a simple solution. All the taxpayers, registered within the tax system could say 'dear ladies and gentlemen of the tax authorities, we reject paying any taxes for the next 2 months until you do the following. When you complete your tasks, we will pay our taxes to you retroactively.'

Being respectful of the opinions of others and an emphasis on confict-resolution is Siniša's best strategy for overcoming adversity.

Siniša: I always, always use dialogue to solve any dispute. There are so many conficts between people here and the way I see it, many people feel they are not being respected. Sometimes I need to talk and take extra care about how I talk. I believe this to be an issue of normal humanity and I sometimes see that it needs to be emphasized even more here–respecting the other. In the past ten years that I have lived here, I believe I lost my temper only once or perhaps twice.

Faced with the daily challenges of life in BiH and having decided to make their return a success, the returnees are not likely to quit easily.19 Instead, they persist patiently and politely.

With ethnic divisions, discrimination and political uncertainty, some returnees are most likely to tune out, by actively staying outside of the daily news cycle, as they largely feel powerless to affect fundamental change. Vlado is an artist and feels that the surrounding environment is destructive.

Vlado: I created my own fairy tale and my parallel world. The only people I allow to enter this world are those whom I fnd agreeable. The others, I see all of it as a catastrophe. I cannot allow this catastrophe to penetrate my world and dictate how things will be run in my life.

Emir has consciously secluded himself in his bed-and-breakfast located in a forested area outside of Sarajevo.

Emir: One of the main reasons I live in my bubble – in this space where I do not consume the news and do not follow any daily politics – is that I am not interested. Of course, I am not completely isolated, although I should be. Even within the bubble, I know what is going on, but within it all, I feel as a hostage to a project.

By being highly selective about members of her social network, Mirela attempts to limit her exposure to the reality of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mirela: But I do live in a parallel universe. That is exactly the point! I am here physically, but in reality I am not here. I simply do not want to live the local lifestyle. I do not want to listen to all these stories of moaning and groaning and complaining all of the time! I have my story and that story is a literal copy-paste of the New York City lifestyle: you work, you create your life and your fun and nothing else enters my world.

<sup>19</sup> "No, I don't give up easily!"was Admir's response when I asked him whether he had moved back to Chicago, 1 year after I conducted the interview with him in Sarajevo. I kept in touch with all the study participants after completing my data collection by e-mail, telephone and social media. One morning, I received a notifcation that Admir's phone number had changed from a Sarajevo area code to one based in Chicago. I contacted him to ask about his whereabouts for my study records and he explained that his number had indeed (temporarily) changed as he was on a two-month tour in the U.S. with his jazz band.

"Tuning out" as a coping mechanism in many ways counters its opposite of "proactive engagement," which speaks to the diversity of reintegration strategies employed. For some returnees, direct engagement with BiH political reality through party politics or civil society organizations is the preferred response, while others choose to ignore BiH complexities with the goal of focusing on outcomes, which are more directly within their control, such as their businesses, families or close circle of friends.

Political uncertainty is also the leading factor in returnees contemplating other alternatives for themselves and their families. Thinking of other alternatives is practiced by returnees, like Hrvoje, who consider their return to be a success.

Hrvoje: There is always a Plan B. Let's say my right foot is in BiH and my other foot is somewhere in between, waiting to see what will happen next, how will things develop. Unfortunately, this is how, I believe, most of the returnees think. They always keep another reserve option in the back because of the uncertainty of life in BiH.

Similarly to Hrvoje, Mensura is happy to be back in BiH and believes that her return is successful, but still keeps open the reserve option of re-emigrating to the host state.

Mensura: Again, nobody knows exactly how life will evolve and how our country will develop. So, my Plan A is, normally, to stay in Bosnia, to raise my children here and to create my future in this country. However, if I see that there are no opportunities and that it is simply too diffcult, I always have the option of going back to Norway. That is in case, this move becomes really, really necessary.

Nervan is one of the rare study participants who claim to be dissatisfed with his decision to return to BiH 2 years ago. For him, re-emigration is not just a reserve option while he continues to live in BiH. In fact, he is actively attempting to re-emigrate.

Nervan: Well, I am constantly frustrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This frustration slowly turns into real anger and rage and fnally, when it lasts too, too long it turns into indifference. At that point, the only thing that I truly want, since there is nothing I can do to change the situation here, the only thing that I want is simply to leave this place and go somewhere else.

Most of the returnees in my study consider their return projects to be successful. Nevertheless, constantly considering other alternatives is a frequently encountered coping mechanism, observed by other researchers and indicating an "open-ended return" (Porobić, 2017, p. 118), particularly of those with dual citizenship and access to the host state's employment opportunities and social services (Stefansson, 2006).

Many of the returnees mentioned that they often use humor as a coping mechanism. Emir discusses the origin of what is often referred to as "specifcally Bosnian humor"20

Emir: I channel my anger towards humor. This is what I do most! Humor comes from, I don't know…it comes from desperation. It probably comes from despair. Dark humor, is always the best, in my opinion. The healthy kind of dark humor that we used to have during the war. I had a Slovene friend who could never understand how we could laugh about our misery during the war. But, for us in Bosnia, during the war, especially, humor was a way to escape from our horrid circumstances.

In an excellent analysis of the role dark humor plays in how memory is constructed in post-confict BiH, Sheftel (2011) argues for the importance of treating dark or gallows humor as "an especially subversive form of counter-memory, that allows Bosnians to express dissent from dominant narratives of the Bosnian War they perceive as unproductive or divisive" (p. 145). To illustrate the argument, she draws on many examples from flms such as Danis Tanović's "*No Man's Land*", monuments, such as the ironic "Monument to the International Community, from the Grateful Citizens of Sarajevo" or other examples of cultural production, such as the Sarajevo Survival Guide21 (FAMA, 1993), a mock guidebook for tourists visiting a besieged city, covering in Monty Pythonesque style the main topics of interest such as "running from sniper fre," "dining with UN rations" or "shrapnel pieces as souvenirs." Most signifcantly, the argument presented in Sheftel (2011) focuses on the role dark humor plays in escaping narratives of victimhood and victimization, mainly by contradicting an image of "downtrodden masses without agency" (Sheftel, 2011, p. 152) and thus restoring dignity to the people who are so willing to participate in self-mockery, making fun of their naivete and foolishness as opposed to wallowing in self-pity.22

In other instances, humor is discussed in the context of affecting positive social change. Vedad even had an idea of creating a comedy program that would problematize the nearly infnite set of absurd daily life situations in post-Dayton BiH.

<sup>20</sup> "We are the only region to have a good sense of humor, Bosnians. I think it's a way of surviving. Humor gives you a distance. So we laughed a lot during the war. It was our secret weapon. So I thought why not treat a subject that was serious with a good sense of humor. It eases up certain things." (Danis Tanović, discussing his flm *No Man's Land* in an interview given to Paul Fischer in 2002, as cited in Sheftel, 2011, p. 145.)

<sup>21</sup>See Stephenson (1994) for a review.

<sup>22</sup>On the hilarious aspects of pity, Sheftel (2011) presents an excellent analysis of a scene from Danis Tanović's *No Man's Land* where a Bosnian front-line soldier pities the genocidal violence in Rwanda.

Vedad: We were just talking, among friends, you know, about all the absurd situations we face each day in this country. For example, I went to our municipal health center and I was supposed to see a doctor. I was patiently waiting across from the counter and each time I would try to ask my question to the receptionist, her telephone would ring. I mean I would start talking; the phone would ring and she picked it up. I tried asking my question for four or fve times, but was interrupted each time by the phone ringing. There I was, standing in complete disbelief. I couldn't believe that the receptionist could be so rude that she would not let me fnish my sentence even after my ffth attempt! I started to think that this could be a case of a candid camera flming, I mean it was that bizarre. Finally, I asked her: 'Do you think that your behavior is polite. I mean you interrupted me with picking up the phone at least fve times, while I patiently keep standing here, waiting to ask my question and get my doctor's appointment?' What she told me is that she has orders from her boss that she has to pick up the phone after it rings three times and that this is not her choice. I responded by asking her, whether it is better for me to go home now, call her and try to set up my appointment over the phone! (laughter) Actually, that is exactly what the woman standing in line behind me did. She walked across the ambulance offce and hid behind the wall; used her mobile phone and got her appointment set way before me! Isn't this absurd?!

Author: Yes, it is…absurd, but it is also pretty hilarious.

Vedad: (Laughter). Of course, this is the humor of absurdity that I was telling you about.

On one hand, humor might produce positive political change, such as with political satire, but it could also stife it.

To a large extent, the direction of change affected by humor, could depend on one's vantage point. Sheftel (2011) suggests "taking humor seriously" and viewing it in certain cases *as* political action itself. As a BiH citizen I do not share her optimism, because, if humor is overused it can also have an undesired effect of simply protecting the status quo and maintaining existing power relations. When I asked Emir about the positive and negative effects of turning to humor as a coping strategy, he was adamant about the possibility for a humorous response *to prevent an actual resolution* to an obviously problematic situation.

Emir: Well, it [humor] is positive only in the sense that it keeps people afoat and sometimes outside the septic tank. It keeps them breathing; you know. But, it can be negative because it doesn't solve anything. We keep making jokes and sinking deeper and deeper. Do you understand? There comes a point when it all stops being funny. The joke becomes cruel!

Alma laughed when she narrated the story of the different treatment her husband and one of their sons, who are dual Bosnian and Slovene citizens, would get each time when they crossed the Slovene border together as a family. Alma and their second son are solely BiH citizens and the two of them would often be made to wait,

strip searched with their luggage checked and re-checked. As she told the story, her laughter quickly turned to a painful expression of mistreatment.

Alma: We always used to make jokes about it, you know we [Alma and the elder son] are Bosnians and you [Alma's husband and their younger son] are Slovenes (laughter). Yes, yes we used to make jokes about it, but it was clear to all of us that the main issue was one of direct discrimination.

Perhaps the most satisfactory answer to the role of humor as a coping strategy or its role in affecting actual political change comes from Payne (2005) and her work on memory in post-authoritarian regimes.23 Although Payne (2005) recognizes the power of humor to be subversive and "make trouble" as well as give a voice to the individual, she views its actual potential to affect political change much more modestly. Humor, in this sense, can complement political action, but it cannot and should not substitute it.

#### **3.4 "So, What Do You Think?": Evaluating the Success of Return**

Overall and so far, the returnees consider their return to Bosnia and Herzegovina to be successful. In fact, only three participants in the study expressed their dissatisfaction with having returned. From the outset, it is important to note that the evaluations of the success of each participant's return is entirely subjective, meaning that they are based on their individual perception and not on some objectively set criteria. This distinction is important and has been recognized within the return migration literature. The "perceptions of the individual returnees themselves" (Black et al., 2004, p.26) are often used as the most reliable measure of the sustainability of return, because this measure includes the greatest respect toward the individual returnee's agency. Ultimately, he or she *decides* if return has been successful and acts accordingly: remains in the home state or re-emigrates to the host state. This is particularly true in cases of truly "decided return" (Cassarino, 2008), e.g. return of dual citizens, who have kept the legal and social facility of re-emigration.

Although perceptions of the return's success, failure or a combination of both, are highly subjective, data analysis revealed some consistent patterns linking the success of each individual returnee and their strategies for overcoming obstacles inherent in return migration to a post-confict society. The dominant strategy for overcoming obstacles and achieving success with return seems to be resilience and self-reliance. After Ema told me about the diffculties, she experiences daily, including threats of physical violence, insults and fear of retribution, she discussed how happy she is to be back in BiH, summarizing her evaluation in one word: "Fantastic." I found the contrast puzzling and wanted to know more.

<sup>23</sup>For a closely related example discussing the post-Yugoslav context, see Drakulić (1993).

Author: Are you being serious?

Ema: Yes [I am serious]! I am not being ironic. Yes, fantastic. Yes, because the realization of my idea has come so far and this is all because of my endurance, suffering and tears. Yes, there were lots of tears too, but I still think that there was nothing better I could have done for myself, nothing that would be better for my life. But, you see Aida, this medal has two sides. I am now telling you the entire story. This has been fantastic for me as a person, for me to grow, to develop with new experiences. My company and I grow together with different people, those which treat me nicely, as well as those, who are horrible.

The key characteristic I found to be in common with returnees who view their return to be successful is an in-built expectation of obstacles and a preparedness to resolve them, primarily relying on personal resilience. This fnding is consistent with Cassarino (2004), who argues that the success of return ultimately depends on the returnees' "preparedness", which "refers to a voluntary act that must be supported by the gathering of suffcient resources and information about post-return conditions at home" (p. 271). In other words, "decidedness" of return is a necessary condition for success, but "preparedness" is what makes return successful and sustainable.

On the other hand, those participants who perceive their return to be unsuccessful also have expectations of others and general society. When these expectations remain unfulflled, they are likely to characterize their return as unsuccessful. Nervan, who returned to Gračanica, BiH from Istanbul, Turkey is a young architect with a degree from one of Turkey's most prestigious architecture schools. He expected to fnd a job in BiH that would satisfy his skill-level and income-earning potential. When confronted with the reality that this expectation will not be automatically met within the BiH context, he became disappointed, viewing his return as unsuccessful and contemplating the option of re-emigration.

Nervan: My return has defnitely lacked success, at least until now. This does not mean that the situation could not change, but still…I developed some scenarios for fnding a well-paid job. A good salary is important, but this is only one element. There are other requirements too. My general quality of life was better abroad. Here…it will be diffcult.

As was elaborated many times previously, all forms of reintegration depend on economic reintegration and without it return is not possible, regardless of any other emotional factors. Disappointment that follows unmet expectations in returnees has been documented in previous studies: Bovenkerk (1974); King and Christou (2009) or Paasche (2016), just to name a few. There could be many reasons returnees' expectations remain unmet, thus jeopardizing the sustainability of return, and certainly "limited job opportunities with lower standards of living" (Bovenkerk, 1974, p. 26) in the home state occupies a prominent place. However, when placing the focus on the returnee's individual agency, it again seems that "preparedness" (Cassarino, 2004) or lack thereof still plays a key role.

Stepping outside of the realm of returnees' agency and instead turning to structure, the most important economic reasons co-occurring with success of return is an acute awareness of the characteristics of global capitalism, regardless of the actual country of residence, as well as the success of the business enterprise in the home state. When looking at the co-occurrence of economic reasons for return and the returnees' evaluation of return as successful, Damir discusses both economic reasons and connects them to his successful return. When I asked him whether he thinks his business enterprise could have been more proftable in Germany, he compared and contrasted the potential business outcome in Germany to the actual outcome in BiH.


As was noted previously, a key characteristic of returnees who deem their return to be successful is their resilience, self-reliance and a highly pragmatic attitude. Unlike previous studies (for example, Pedersen, 2003; Şirin, 2008; Cassarino, 2004), positioning return migrants mainly as relatively passive conspicuous consumers, my fndings show much greater awareness, decidedness and pragmatism to characterize them both as producers and investors. These qualities seem to determine their success under conditions of global capitalism, regardless of the obvious gap in the level of economic development between a country like Germany and BiH.

When evaluating return, the most important emotional reason co-occurring with the success of return is the development and strengthening of family ties. Vedad was single while he lived in Germany. When he came back to BiH, he also got married. Within the frst couple of years of his marriage, he and his wife welcomed a baby girl and then a set of triplets to their family. He evaluates his return as successful mainly because of getting married and, together with his wife, raising a family of four children.

Vedad: First and foremost, I am happy because of my family. I got married and now we have four children. I now have that which I dreamed of having. I have a family life, which is what I wanted. My brother has children her [pointing to his fve-year-old daughter riding her bike] age and they all love each other as cousins. They do everything together and are simply best friends.

Arif considers being close to his daughter, son-in-law and newborn grandson to be the biggest factor in the success of his return.

Arif: I am overjoyed because my daughter also returned. I now have a grandson. He is growing up and growing each day. I am not the one to determine his destiny, because this child has the chance to choose where is it that he wants to live. He can live in Norway or the UK, his mother has the necessary citizenships and they can choose their place of residence. But, I think my daughter has also realized that this is a country [BiH] where production can be organized successfully. We can be a link between local production and foreign placement. We can secure foreign markets for our products, as this is actually a very diffcult task for most people from BiH. She can live anywhere she wants in all of Europe and what I teach all my children is to be citizens of the world. My son-in-law is also here. He is a young attorney, who was valedictorian of his class in Banja Luka. He now acts as my deputy in our family business.

These fndings are consistent with other studies of return to Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as Porobić (2017), who reports almost identical results. Porobić (2017) also surveys several other studies (Handlos et al., 2015; Eastmond, 2000; Ahearn, 2000) with strikingly similar results. To sum up, return migration to BiH is overwhelmingly characterized by "Bosnian values that involve a richer family-centered social life, in which the core family has quality time together every day, a situation not achieved in the settlement country" (Porobić, 2017, p. 114). The contribution my study makes to this overall, already well documented characterization, is that the *success of return* is also measured against the centrality of family ties.

Prioritizing the improvement of family ties over their business enterprise is a pattern noticed in many of the returnees who evaluate their return to be successful. Although Sanela came back to BiH to establish a scholarship foundation, she also got married and built her own family in the meantime. When I asked her about the success of her foundation, she was not entirely satisfed with its development, but her overall evaluation of return was mainly infuenced by the progress of her family.


over there [the US] dictates a certain understanding of success where your earning potential defnes your level of overall quality of life. These values slowly became my own values. Now, my values here [BiH] are completely different, because I understood how wrong that previous lifestyle really was, at least for me. Looking at that other life from this perspective, I see it as wrong. I am not sure what my perspective will be fve years from now, but my highest priorities right now are my family, my daughter, the time I spend with my husband and our friends. Each day I can spend an hour or two taking a walk or reading a book. In the States, this was simply unthinkable! If I honestly look at my happiness I can say that I am 100% happier now than I was before. In that sense, my return is a success.

As was explained previously, giving priority to the family over other aspects of social life, including the business enterprise has been well documented in the case of return to BiH. However, this tendency is certainly not exclusive to BiH, as it has been noticed in many other studies of return migration. For example, Kılınç and King (2017) fnd that a search for better work-life balance is a major factor motivating "lifestyle migration" of Turkish citizens from Germany to coastal areas, such as Antalya. King et al. (2008) note that return from the US is often motivated by the "wish to immerse oneself in the Greek (Cypriot) way of life, perceived as characterized by human warmth, family values, generosity and hospitality, a relaxed and slower pace of life" (p.269). King et al. (2008) are critical of the "romanticized, essentialized reading of the attractions of life in the homeland" (p. 269), but also report on the actual sense of wellbeing the returnees gain from a better work life balance, as well as stronger family bonds and a more active social life.

Although the returnees face different obstacles to their reintegration in BiH society, for the most part, they are satisfed with their decision to return, qualifying their return project as successful. However, political uncertainty and general economic conditions of life in BiH keep alive "open-ended return" (Porobić, 2017), characterized by a constant re-examination of alternatives and actual re-emigration. Ultimately, the success of this type of return migration will need to be evaluated primarily on the criteria of sustainability. The return migration literature offers several ways to measure sustainability (see Black et al., 2004), however, most of these measurement methods use the one-year benchmark. The purposive sampling did not include any returnees which have spent less than 1 year in BiH post return, but a conscious effort was made to recruit participants who have returned as early as 20 years ago, directly after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, or as recently as 2 years prior to data collection (Summer of 2017). Referring to the sustainability measurement of the "perceptions of the individual returnees themselves" (Black et al., 2004, p.26), as was stated before, out of the 35 returnees only three participants regret their decision to return and are actively considering re-emigration. As most returnees are also dual citizens and thus have a higher level of mobility, their commitment to living and working in BiH will continue to be tested with time.

#### **3.5 Conclusion**

The argument I present in this chapter is that the decision to return to a post-confict society, when legal, economic, socio-cultural and other opportunities of remaining abroad abound, is primarily driven by emotional factors. These factors range from a responsibility and duty to "give back" to their country of origin, a "mission" or a "higher purpose" expressed towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a place of the returnees' own suffering, personal tragedy, and ultimately a place of recovery from trauma. The returnees are characterized by a post-materialistic value system, championing closeness to family members, daily encounters with friends and neighbors or the sense of community over wealth accumulation. Return in its initial phases is described with greater enthusiasm both to be back home and to pursue their stated mission of contributing to society. However, the decision to return cannot be considered without a satisfed economic minimum requirement, acting as a pull-factor from the home state.

The economic minimum prerequisite usually comes as a business opportunity leading to self-employment or a job offer. It is important to stress the difference between an *economic minimum* as a precondition for return, as opposed to the standard motivation for migration being the *maximization of economic self-interest*. Since, ceteris paribus, the returnees would have been economically better off had they stayed in the host state, their return decision *is not* motivated by a maximization of economic self-interest. However, without the economic minimum being satisfed, the return decision *cannot* be considered. An additional push factor from the host state, like job loss because of an economic downturn, makes the choice to go back seem less risky compared to staying in the host state. Having a good understanding of the dynamics between capital owners and workers in a global capitalist system allows the returnees to decide by comparing their situation in the home and host states.

Returning to live and work in a post-confict society is fraught with obstacles, which the returnees keep overcoming with diverse strategies. The obstacles range from widespread corruption and a business culture based on racketeering and bribery, which affect all ethnicities including minority and majority returns, to direct ethnicity-based discrimination, particularly directed at minority returnees. Low living standards, high unemployment rates, overly complicated bureaucratic procedures and a lack of basic services are further diffculties associated with living in BiH. In addition, a general mentality of victimization coupled with ever present political uncertainty make it diffcult for the returnees to build their businesses, careers, families and lives. Determined to make their return projects a success the returnees use various strategies to overcome the obstacles set on their path. Their dominant strategy is self-reliance and resilience, most directly demonstrated in their strong tendency towards self-employment. Their attitude towards the political reality of life in BiH ranges from being politically active, proactive and organized in their local communities all the way to tuning out from news and media reports of current events in order to preserve their sanity. They actively use strategies of patience, persistence, and politeness, while also turning to humor as a coping mechanism. Always keeping a reserve option open abroad while re-building their lives in Bosnia and Herzegovina in many ways improves their chances of a successful return. Thinking of alternatives and potential re-emigration can also be considered as a strategy for overcoming the obstacles of return.

The returnees' own evaluations of the success of their return projects are taken as a measure of sustainability of this type of return migration. This measurement is particularly appropriate for the case of "decided return" (Cassarino, 2008), since the returnees keep the option of re-emigrating, given their dual citizenship status and their transnational positioning. The returnees' own agency and volition is key to the success of their return, summarized in previous literature as "preparedness" (Cassarino, 2004). A crucial structural reason determining the returnees' success of return is their keen awareness of capital-labor relations under conditions of global capitalism, whether in the home or the host state, and their pragmatic positioning as producers and investors, and not solely as relatively conspicuous consumers. The most important emotional reason co-occurring with the success and sustainability of return is the improvement and development of family ties and their prioritization over any economic concern, including the continued success of a started business enterprise.

#### **References**


Migration Research. https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110220155644/http:/rds. homeoffce.gov.uk/rds/pdfs04/rdsolr5004.pdf


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The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

### **Chapter 4 The Emotional Dimension of BiH Citizenship**

The argument presented in my study is that the motivation to return to a post-confict society, like Bosnia and Herzegovina, given a viable alternative of livelihood and successful integration abroad is primarily emotional. This premise makes the returnees particularly sensitive to the emotional experience of citizenship and therefore, their understanding of "citizenship as feeling" is expected to be particularly pronounced, nuanced and diversifed. In addition, most of the participants are dual citizens, and as such, they are in a position to compare their emotional experiences, or lack thereof, of both home and host state citizenships. Emotional citizenship relies heavily on citizenship as practice (Wood, 2013), that is on the daily experience of citizenship (Nyers, 2007), so for analytical purposes, the concept of "emotional citizenship" is defned as the area of intersection between the daily experience of citizenship and an emotional response. Some examples of the daily experiences of citizenship discussed with the returnees include remembering events from BiH's recent past and the 1992–95 war; experiencing commemorations of genocide and war atrocities, seeing the BiH fag or hearing the BiH national anthem; using the BiH passport at border controls; attempting to resolve an administrative issue; voting; or paying taxes to the BiH government. The overarching research questions this chapter aims to answer are: What understanding do return migrants have of the 'emotional dimension of BiH citizenship'? Which specifc emotions do they associate with citizenship?

This chapter adds to the growing literature on the distinct emotions constituting emotional citizenship, such as studies conducted on citizenship and patriotic love (Ahmed, 2004; Pantti & van Zoonen, 2006; Brown, 2014; and Franz, 2015), fear (Isin, 2004; Johnson, 2010; Fortier, 2010; and Franz, 2015), security (Jackson, 2016; Skulte-Ouaiss, 2013), or shame (Aguilar, 1996; Brown, 2014). But, as Mas Giralt (2015) points out, scholarly literature on a wider diversity of emotions constituting the emotional dimension of citizenship is still sorely missing. Although the much researched (Brown, 2014) emotion of "patriotic love" is certainly part of the returnees' emotional landscape, other emotions play an equal, and in most cases more important role. Their emotions are highly diversifed and range from rage,

anger, frustration to fear, guilt, denial, disgust, shame, disappointment, pity and empathy, to nostalgia and powerlessness. On the opposite side of the emotional spectrum, there is patriotic love, pride, defance, joy, happiness, and hope. When presenting results, individual voices of the returnees are interpreted within the historical, institutional, political, economic, and socio-cultural context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, since an understanding of the particular context explains the reasons for the existence of these emotions. In addition, some emotions, such as dimensions of guilt, disappointment, and joy, are also traced back to the wider literature on return migration, diaspora, and transnationalism.

#### **4.1 Specifc Emotions Constituting the BiH Citizenship**

#### *4.1.1 Rage, Anger and Frustration*

Anger, rage, and frustration were expressed at events from BiH's recent past, what happened during the 1992–1995 war. The main sources of such emotions are war crimes, such as genocide, ethnic cleansing and mass expulsions, committed in the past, as well as the apparent lack of post-war justice. Badema is a twenty-year-old Bosniak woman who returned from Germany to live with her family in Srebrenica. She expresses her anger at symbols of perceived Republika Srpska "statehood", such as entity fags displayed around the Potočari memorial cemetery and the consistent genocide denial of RS authorities.

Badema: Whenever I pass by the place where those fags are set up, the fags of this so-called republic, the RS, I feel a sense of tremendous anger, because I cannot understand that one person, or a group of people can…I don't understand it and I don't want to understand how something like that could happen. I simply cannot accept that all of this happened. I feel so frustrated when I see that RS fag, because I know it fies with sheer force. How could it be blowing in the wind with such ease, after everything that had happened here? And then you look at BiH politics, at our [Bosniak] politicians and at their [Serb] politicians and you feel incredibly angry and you sometimes feel like quitting and saying: 'I cannot go on like this. I must leave this place!'

The anger felt by Badema is directed at events from the past, but what keeps these events alive for her is the fact that "might makes right" seems to be vindicated. The Potočari commemoration site would not exist if it were not for international pressure on RS authorities (Duijzings, 2007). Also, the main reason the site exists to commemorate the Srebrenica genocide and not other wartime atrocities committed throughout BiH is because of both the massive scale of the Srebrenica massacre and the complicity of the international community (Duijzings, 2007). Alija, a dual BiH and Dutch citizen from Prijedor, expressed his anger at being forced to leave his home in Prijedor in 1992.

Alija: I mean I was defnitely angry! Although I was a child, still I felt anger and disappointment. These were the emotions of a child, but it was only later that I fully realized them. I mean, I was angry because it was not fully clear to me why is it I needed to leave? Why did my friends from school get to stay in Prijedor, while I had to leave? In the end, I was the only non-Serb from my grade to stay in Prijedor. I was confused and angry because of being forced to leave.

The historical circumstances of Alija's expulsion from his family home in Prijedor, according to the Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), UN Doc. S/l994/674 (May 27, 1994) also included:

Over Radio Prijedor, the Serbs also demanded that Muslims and Croats living in the areas with mixed ethnic populations of Serbs and non-Serbs should mark their housing by hanging out a white fag, and identify themselves by wearing white armbands when they move outdoors as a sign of surrender (Greve et al., 1995).

To properly understand the role of pressure made by the international community in the case of the Srebrenica commemoration and its lack in the case of mass atrocities in Prijedor is the "White Armband Campaign." In 2012, the initiative by a group of activists to commemorate the mass expulsions of non-Serbs from Prijedor was banned by Marko Pavić, the Mayor of Prijedor with commentary that it was "yet another gay parade" (*Nezavisne novine*, 2013 as cited in Mihajlović-Trbovc, 2014), thus qualifying the commemoration as "unfounded political exhibitionism" (Mihajlović-Trbovc, 2014, p. 36).

Rage and anger directed at crimes committed during wartime are obviously not reserved only for the Bosniak, because, although greatest in numbers, the Bosniak were not the *only* victims of war. For Anastasija, a 45-year-old Serb woman, who returned to her native Mostar after years spent in Serbia and Montenegro, a source of anger is the counting of the dead from the past war and the political manipulation with the numbers of victims.


Ema, a 35-year-old woman returnee to Derventa feels angry that people in Bosnia and Herzegovina have still not found a way to move on from the past and make amends with the tragedies of the war. Besides feeling angry, she also feels ashamed of the collective inability to stop living in the past.

Ema: You can see it by yourself. You can see it in my gestures, my body language. I feel anger and rage and I simply cannot believe that we keep celebrating death, that we celebrate the past. I feel angry, but I also feel ashamed. There, that is the emotion. I feel angry and embarrassed.

In 2001, an effort to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Bosnia and Herzegovina (TRC for BiH) was made to complement the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and "to provide an offcial forum for *all* victims and perpetrators to tell their story and ensure that their experience and that of their relatives and friends is preserved as part of the publicly acknowledged history of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (Kritz & Finci, 2001, p. 53, emphasis added). In a situation of "competing commemorative practices" (Duijzings, 2007) and "competing narratives" (Mihajlović-Trbovc, 2014) and where a large percentage of Serbs in BiH believe to have been targeted disproportionately by both the ICTY and the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber (Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002; Barria & Roper, 2008; Karabegović, 2019), the goal of the TRC for BiH would be "producing an authoritative historical narrative that would support nationbuilding in the fragile and divided country" (Dragovic-Soso, 2016, p. 297). In addition to complementing the work of the ICTY in documenting all acts of violence and human rights abuses committed against citizens of *all* ethnicities during the 1992–95 war, the TRC was envisioned to assemble a collection of "acts of humanity" (Kritz & Finci, 2001, p. 53).

As part of its mandate to document the abuses suffered by all victims in the recent confict, the Commission will attempt to document the stories of the real war heroes, i.e., those individuals of all ethnic groups who, despite grave risks, resisted ethnic cleansing and acted to protect victims of other ethnic groups. If Bosnian society is to really reconstruct itself, its citizens need to be informed not only of the crimes committed but also, against that backdrop, of the potential for goodness and brotherhood which remained even amid barbarity and insanity. (Kritz & Finci, 2001, p. 53)

As Dragovic-Soso (2016) explains, because of several reasons, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Bosnia and Herzegovina has still not been established.

Anger, rage, and frustration are not only reserved for events from the past. These emotions are expressed towards the present state of affairs, an outcome of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Salih, an internationally acclaimed painter who has returned to BiH from Italy, expresses his anger at the de facto division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as can also be seen by how the BiH state fag is perceived in Serb and Croat-dominated areas.

Salih: So, I live within the category of respecting and accepting this fag, but I feel frustrated and angry that members of my people have not accepted it. I am frustrated that they love other fags more and that they still want to secede. This is very frustrating for me! Why do they love other fags more than their own? Why? This is an emotion of revolt. I feel revolted and frustrated. So, as I told you, I accepted this fag fairly, and let us say that I even feel happy, but I feel angry and frustrated that others have not accepted it.

As was previously discussed, regardless of efforts invested by the OHR essentially to impose a state fag that would symbolically be unifying (Kolstø, 2006), the present-day BiH state fag can be seen widely displayed only in Bosniak-dominated parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Croat and Serb ethnic fags continue to be used in other areas (see Bougarel et al., 2007; Jansen, 2015 or Palmberger, 2016).

Ervin, an IT professional returnee from the United States feels angry at the lack of progress the country has made and at being pitied as a citizen of BiH.


When discussing his frustration with the current state of affairs in BiH, caused by irresponsible political elites, Ervin is referring to the "dependency syndrome," identifed as early as 1999 by Wolfgang Petrisch, the High Representative (1999–2002). Unlike his predecessor, Carlos Westendorp, who referred to BiH as an "intensive care patient" (see section of this chapter on pity and empathy), Petrisch discussed the "dependency syndrome," criticizing the local politicians for their "tribalistic battles."

This is because, at heart, the leaders of the three ethnic groups-the Bosniacs, the Croats and the Serbs—know what needs to be done to secure a future for their country. But our presence here has inadvertently absolved them of their responsibilities as democratically elected leaders. We enable the local politicians to fght their tribalistic battles, and then to place the blame for potentially unpopular compromises squarely on the shoulders of foreigners. I call this the "dependency syndrome". (Petrisch, 1999)

International aid dependency, with either economic (Papić, 2001) or political (Bieber, 2002; Fischer, 2006) ramifcations, has been recognized as an impediment early on in BiH's transition from a donor-dependent to a self-sustaining economy and in efforts at sovereign state-building. The disempowering effect (Chandler, 1999; Bieber, 2002) of both types of dependencies are cause for citizens, like Ervin, to experience their BiH citizenship with rage and anger.

Corruption in administrative offces and an overly complicated bureaucracy are major obstacles the returnees experience and important sources of anger and frustration. While they were both covered in Chap. 3 when discussing reintegration, here I just look at the emotional response and identify rage, anger and frustration to be dominant. Marija is frustrated as she feels disrespected as a citizen.


Alma feels frustrated with government authorities, who do not have understanding for any new initiatives, such as her Waldorf kindergarten, previously unrecognized within the BiH educational system.

Author: How do you feel when trying to solve an administrative issue?

Alma: Angry. Just angry. That is just horrible. For example, I can tell you about the time when I was registering my kindergarten. That was simply awful, and it made me question my decision to return here. There were times when I said to myself: 'I cannot go on. I have to get out of this country and live a normal life!'

When discussing his frustration with both bureaucracy and corruption in BiH Elvis invokes the often-cited phrase of "normal life" (Jansen, 2015).


Author: What are your emotions in such situations?

Elvis: Aaaa, very negative. I feel dissatisfed, frustrated and wishing I could live in a normal country with respect for the rule of law. When I came back to live here, it felt as if I went 200 years back in time. Frustration. Nothing but constant frustration.

A longing for "normal life," which can be either expressed towards life in a country different from present-day BiH or towards BiH's pre-war past, has been recognized by a number of scholars (for example, Jansen, 2015; Palmberger, 2013a; Palmberger, 2016). There are several different aspects to "normal life" as is often discussed by citizens of BiH, some of which are "the social security and economic well-being people fondly remembered from Yugoslav times" (Palmberger, 2013a, p. 19).

#### *4.1.2 Fear*

Although scholarly literature on Bosnia and Herzegovina and media reports are saturated with writings on how fear of one ethnicity from another is dominant, I argue that, even though this ethnicity-based fear is present, it is certainly not the only one. My analysis identifes at least three sources of fear: ethnicity, economic uncertainty, and abuse of political power. A fear of renewed violence and ethnic confict is part of daily life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fascist symbolism and imagery function to keep the ethnicity-based fear alive and show up in various shapes and forms, of which countless examples range from the appearance of "*Srbe na vrbe*<sup>1</sup> " graffti in the Vrace neighborhood of Sarajevo, the burning of an effgy of ICTY President Judge Carmel Agius in Livno,2 the frequent chanting of slogans at football matches such as "*Gazi balije*", "*Nož, žica, Srebrenica*<sup>3</sup> " and "*Za dom spremni*<sup>4</sup> ", or even statements made by offcials in power, such as the RS President,

<sup>1</sup>The phrase "Srbe na vrbe" is an example of hate speech directed against Serbs. Translated, it means (Hang) the Serbs from the willow trees. The graffti appeared in April 2015, spray-painted on a supporting wall and was quickly re-painted by a group of outraged Sarajevo citizens. For more on this incident, see *Ne primitivizmu: Samir Hodović iz benda Velahavle prekrečio uvredljivi graft na Vracama* at https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/ne-primitivizmu-samir-hodovic-iz-benda-velahvaleprekrecio-uvredljivi-graft-na-vracama/150423131

<sup>2</sup>The event occurred at a children's festival in February 2018 in response to the ICTY's (International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia) fnal verdict in the Prlić et al—appeals case. The ICTY convicted Prlić, Stojić, Praljak, Petković, Ćorić, and Pušić of crimes against humanity, violations of the laws of customs of war, and grave breaches of the Geneva Convention.

<sup>3</sup> "Balije" is a derogatory term for Bosniaks and the slogan "Gazi Balije" means "Stomp out the Balije". Literally translated, the phrase "Nož, žica, Srebrenica" means "Knife, barbed wire, Srebrenica." Both phrases are examples of hate speech directed against Bosniaks.

<sup>4</sup>The literal translation of the slogan "Za dom spremni!" is "Ready for the (home) land". It was used during World War II by the Ustaša, as an offcial salute of the Independent State of Croatia (Croatian: NDH), analogous to the Nazi "Sieg Heil!". "Za dom spremni" has recently been a subject of considerable controversy in Croatia. A thorough discussion of this controversy is beyond

Milorad Dodik professing that "Ratko Mladić is a true hero and a patriot.5 " Alma is a child psychologist who returned from Germany and established a childcare center in Sarajevo. She identifes as a Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizen and an agnostic, making a point of rejecting any ethnic or religious labels in her self-identifcation. I asked her how she feels as a BiH citizen when she travels through different parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in response she turned the discussion to her experiences in Serb-dominated areas of the country.


<sup>7</sup> Jahorina and Bjelašnica are mountains and skiing resorts outside of Sarajevo. Jahorina is located in Republika Srpska and Bjelašnica is in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

the scope of this book, however, "Za dom spremni" was used solely as an Ustaša salute in the context this study addresses.

<sup>5</sup>The statement was made in response to the ICTY convicting Ratko Mladić, former Commander of the Main Staff of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) of genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws or customs of war. For background on this statement, see Radio Slobodna Evropa. (2017, November 22). *Dodik: Mladić je istinski heroj i patriota*. Retrieved from https:// www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/28870085.html

For more on reactions to the Mladić verdict, see Vulliamy, E. (2017, November 22). Ratko Mladić will die in jail. But go to Bosnia: you'll see that he won. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/22/ratko-mladic-bosnia-campsmass-murder-torture-rape-serbian

<sup>6</sup>St. Vitus Day is a Serbian religious and national holiday and an important date in Serbian national history.

<sup>8</sup>Romanija is a mountainous region close to Sarajevo, now located in Republika Srpska.

entrance of town you fnd a humongous image of Draža Mihailović<sup>9</sup> and all of Gacko is decorated with posters of Šešelj.10

Author: And how does that make you feel? Alma: Frustrated and, and full of fear.

Alma's experiences produce a fear of exclusion, discrimination, or persecution based on ethnicity, in this case directed toward non-Serbs. However, it is important to note that an ethnic Serb who rejects the lionizing of WWII war criminals and nationalist leaders could also feel the same type of fear. Also, even though Alma rejects ethnic categorizations in favor of civic identity in her self-identifcation, a well-acquainted observer could easily place her into a certain ethnic category just by the sound of her frst or last name and use this categorization as the basis for discrimination, entirely independent of her self-identifcation. While analogous examples certainly exist in both Bosniak and Croat areas of the country, the exclusionary nature of street names in the present example suggests that only members of a single ethnic group inhabit them. January 9th11 continues to be celebrated in Republika Srpska as a national day, although the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina deemed it unconstitutional. Finally, the public celebration of ultranationalist leaders adds weight to the ethnicity-based fear.

A shared fear among citizens of all ethnic backgrounds is a fear for their economic survival. In a country with a 14.9% overall unemployment rate (World Bank, 2021), and a youth unemployment rate of approximately 39% (World Bank, 2020a, b), citizens across the board live in fear of poverty and further economic decline. Ethnic divisions are exploited by local ethnonationalist elites and politicians in power to gloss over economic deprivation and to use manufactured fear as a governing mechanism. "*Dobro je dok ne puca*"—"*The situation is fne, as long as the guns are quiet*" is an adage frequently heard in BiH, functioning to keep social expectations low and to prevent more serious social unrest. Anastasija, a 45-year-old Serb woman, award-winning peace activist, lawyer, and community organizer, returned from Serbia to her native Mostar, a city deeply divided between Bosniaks and Croats.12 Although she narrated several instances of discrimination she experienced as a Serb living in Mostar, she dismissed the possibility of future ethnic confict and

<sup>9</sup>Dragoljub Draža Mihailović was a World War II Serb royalist commander and head of the Chetnik movement, sentenced to death by Yugoslav authorities for collaboration with the Nazis. In 2015, he was rehabilitated by a court in Serbia. The controversy surrounding the rehabilitation of Draža Mihailović is beyond the scope of this study.

<sup>10</sup>Vojislav Šešelj is the Founder and President of the nationalist Serb Radical Party.

<sup>11</sup> January 9 is the much disputed «Day of Republika Srpska» celebrating the establishment of this BiH entity during wartime. It is regarded as unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of BiH and declared as such by a decision made in 2015, followed by the annulment of referendum results on the right to celebrate this date as an offcial holiday. Regardless of the position of the Constitutional Court, January 9 continues to be celebrated throughout the RS, while March 1, the offcial Day of Independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina is entirely ignored.

<sup>12</sup>For more on the divisions in Mostar, see Hromadžić (2012).

explained the current situation as caused by warmongering politicians manipulating peoples' fears for votes and personal fnancial gain.

Instead of focusing on issues of ethnicity, Anastasija placed the greatest emphasis on the dire state of the BiH economy and pointed to economic hardship as her biggest source of fear.


Returning to live in Mostar, a deeply divided city, to practice human rights law and promote peace activism has not been an easy task for Anastasija. Although she fts entirely into the "minority return" category, she does not view ethnic intolerance, in and of itself, as the biggest problem. She recognizes the ability of selfserving populist leaders to prey on the weaknesses of a traumatized citizenry. As long as the traumas of war remain unhealed, nationalist rhetoric continues to win votes, leaving aside the pressing need for higher living standards, economic development and growth. Anastasija's thoughts were echoed throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, during the protests of 2014 and the organizing of civic plenums to address the injustices of corrupt privatization practices resulting in massive asset striping and further degradation of workers' rights. In the words of Svjetlana Nedimović, 13 a political analyst and one of the key plenum organizing fgures, the protests were one of the frst opportunities for citizens to fnd expression as part of the "social" and not solely of the "ethnic." "*Gladni smo na tri jezika"—"We are hungry in three languages*14*"* was one of the most popular protest signs and a poignant summary of the state of social justice. For Anastasija and other BiH citizens, the state does not provide any sort of economic certainty and, as such, citizenship is experienced through fear.

Abuse of political power, corruption and a general lack of the rule of law are problems of such scale in postwar BiH that they have become a source of fear for its citizens. My interviewees are very brave and resilient people, but regardless of their

<sup>13</sup> Interview with Svjetlana Nedimović conducted by FAMA Methodology in 2014 and available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5\_LiD7qj0pQ

<sup>14</sup>The three offcial languages of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian.

courageous response, a realistic basis for this fear exists. Arif is a 56-year-old Bosniak man, a survivor of Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje, the three concentration camps set up by Bosnian Serb forces in Northwestern Bosnia during the 1992–95 war. He was expelled from Kozarac by the Army of Republika Srpska in 1992 and came to Norway as a refugee. After spending 20 years in Norway, running two successful businesses there and acquiring Norwegian citizenship, he returned to his native Kozarac to start a dairy farm. Although returning to live in Republika Srpska as a Bosniak meant he had to overcome various obstacles inherent to minority return, the greatest challenges he currently faces are racketeering ambitions of local Bosniak politicians, with death threats attached.

Arif has recently expanded his operations to a small plant in the predominately Bosniak part of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The small town of Arif's newest business expansion also has a sizeable Serb returnee population, which Arif's company now employs. Arif has repeatedly rejected extortion requests from the local Bosniak politicians and as a result has gained considerable opposition from the local power elites. In an ironic and truly mind-boggling twist of fate, the racket-hungry Bosniak politicians have labeled Arif, a "Serb-collaborator," since he brought jobs to a number of the local Serbs. I asked him how he feels when he receives daily death threats from members of the corrupt ethnonationalist elite consumed in racketeering efforts.

Author: Don't you ever feel afraid?


Arif's life story is truly inspirational from various perspectives: an ability to overcome diffcult-to-imagine circumstances during wartime, a postwar commitment towards building a multiethnic and peaceful society, an orientation towards progress and development, and remarkable courage in the face of postwar threats.

The home state has failed Arif at least twice–during wartime and in peacetime. The state apparatus was not strong enough to protect Arif from the horror of Bosnian-Serb run concentration camps and it is also not strong enough now to protect Arif from death threats of corrupt Bosniak politicians. In either case, Arif has the basis to constitute his BiH citizenship through fear, however, he chooses to be brave in relation to a state, which is not designed to keep its citizens safe. Arif, similarly to other participants in my study, continues to live and work in the home state, regardless of the obstacles he encounters, mainly because of his individual agency, courage and dedication and despite a state structure set up to defeat its citizens. Abuse of political power and the fear it creates is an important element of the everyday experience of BiH citizenship. While fear forces some to leave the country and join the over two million BiH citizens living abroad, others choose to stay and show great courage in facing the challenges of life in Bosnia, perhaps courage greater than what was required during wartime.

Facing fear and the daily threat of violence and choosing to be brave is also Ema's strategy of making her return to her small hometown in Northern Bosnia a success. She is a 35-year-old former marketing executive, who refuses the standard ethnic and religious categories and refers to herself as European regarding her ethnic background and Christian15 in terms of her faith. Ema left the comfort of a corporate job in Austria determined to grow an organic herb farm in the BiH entity, Republika Srpska. She came back by herself, while most of her family members still reside in Austria. When I asked about her attitude towards fear, she narrated her direct and daily experience with violence and the threat of violence.

Ema: No, I am not afraid. I know this sounds strange, but I just expect that somebody would attack me here, even physically. One of the frst arrangements I made with my family is what would happen to the farm if something were to happen to me.

(We both get teary-eyed and stop the conversation for a couple of moments, so that we could collect ourselves and continue our interview. I look at her with partial disbelief and shock.)

Ema: Yes, I am serious. I get emotional, because I am tired of the daily struggle. I am tired, but I am not afraid. I told you. I simply knew from the beginning what is it was that I am getting myself into and I had a long talk about it with my family. This is all because we found weapons and unexploded shells in our felds. Any day, I could step onto a mine while we plow the felds. If I were to step onto it, it would all be fnished, end of the story. I

<sup>15</sup>She rejects categorization within either the Catholic or the Orthodox Church, as well as religious practice and organized religion, however, she considers the teachings and values of Christianity to be guiding her life.

wouldn't need to get shot by anybody. An unexploded mine would be enough to do the job. Although, I also experienced being attacked right in front of the offce.

Author: What happened?

Ema: A half-drunk guy walked up to me angrily, yelling and waving a brick in his hand, getting ready to throw it at the front offce. "What is this green color on your door? Is this some kind of Muslim joint?"–he screamed at me in rage.

I asked whether he was literate and if so, that he could read what our company is all about as it is described on our front door. He kept waving his brick at me and moved back after hurling a few more slurs and insults. He was referring to the green color of our company branding, the color of grass, vegetables, fruit, you know. We produce organic healing herbs and we use the color green for our advertising, a natural choice for us. I just simply could not believe that the war hadn't taught us anything. I sometimes feel that we would be ready to get back to guns and attack our next-door neighbor again.

Author: Did you report the incident to the police?

Ema: Oh no, no. People here have advised me I should not contact the police. I did that when I noticed that lumber was being stolen from a forest next to our felds. I called the police to report the theft, but I was later told that this is not how life works here. I was warned not to call the police too often, that is, unless I wanted my felds burnt to the ground in retaliation.

When I asked her whether she was happy to have returned, Ema responded with a resounding, "Yes, of course!" From her tone, I was not sure whether she was being ironic or serious, so I rephrased the question and asked whether she would consider her return to BiH to be successful. Re-affrming her initial answer, and leaving me entirely perplexed, she said, "Fantastic!"

Ema is a 35-year-old woman with an extremely positive attitude towards life and her business. She wants to contribute to her home state and make a positive difference. Ema is very well aware of the dangers of living and working in a state that is not there to protect or support her. In fact, her daily experience of citizenship is flled with fear, while her response to fear is one of courage. She says she is not afraid, because she rejects acknowledging the fear. She responds with courage to threats of violence, ethnic slurs, and a general sense of insecurity, where calling the police might cause retaliation.

#### *4.1.3 Guilt*

Guilt, as part of the emotional dimension of citizenship, is present on a collective level expressed by others and experienced internally. Lejla, a Bosniak woman who spent the entire war in besieged Sarajevo, experiences both denial and hints of collective guilt when traveling to Serbia.

Lejla: Whenever I go to Serbia, let's say to Belgrade, what I notice is a constant attempt to cover up the truth. Anytime I take a taxi there and the driver asks me where I am from and I answer, they immediately start saying nice things about Sarajevo. They say things like 'I just don't know why is it we needed to go through all that….' I mean, what is the purpose of such comments? I believe it is because they do feel guilty. I don't think that this person feels individually guilty because of something he had done, but there is some collective sense of guilt. So, when learning that I am from Sarajevo and that I was in Sarajevo during the war, maybe, perhaps, or this was at least my sense that they, the Serbs, carry a certain guilt with them.

Anastasija, an ethnic Serb woman living in Mostar, a city divided between Bosniaks and Croats, feels the collective guilt of Serbs regarding the Srebrenica genocide.

Anastasija: So, Srebrenica, Srebrenica is my total agony. This is probably the worst example of hypocrisy in our entire country. I'll tell you what I mean by this. Every year, I watch the funeral for the identifed victims. The Bosniak politicians beneft from this collective tragedy throughout the year. So, I as Anastasija, a Serb by birth, I have no right to even mention Srebrenica, because my own are the guilty ones. Who are "my own"? We cannot talk about people, human beings here [in BiH]. We can only talk about Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks and God forbid, the Others. And the only reason for this separation is maintaining power, control, and the status quo.

In presenting their vision for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for BiH, Kritz and Finci point to Karl Jaspers' four dimensions of guilt: criminal, political, moral and metaphysical, which needed to be addressed by German society in order to deal effectively with its Nazi past.

As was previously discussed, the work of the TRC for BiH was envisioned to complement the work of the ICTY. The court is responsible for prosecuting criminal guilt, thus individualizing it and countering the tendency towards collective guilt that could lead to further revenge, violence, and bitterness. Establishing criminal guilt clarifes that specifc individuals, and *not* entire ethnic groups, committed atrocities for which they need to be held accountable. However, moral guilt assumes that wartime atrocities are not committed in complete isolation from the rest of society.

Beyond individual criminal accountability, a society which has been sullied by the commission of genocide or other widespread atrocities in its midst must also explore and reckon with the problem of passivity when war crimes are committed in the name of one's people. (Kritz & Finci, 2001, p. 52)

The role of the TRC for BiH would be primarily to deal with the moral guilt, such as experienced by Anastasija. As was mentioned previously (Dragovic-Soso, 2016) the TRC for BiH has not yet been established.

As part of the rare and "lucky" group, having both survived the war and established themselves abroad, the returnees speak of "survivor's guilt". Sanela was expelled from Banja Luka during the war and fnally found refuge in the U.S. Her family's story is in many ways the "American dream". Her family own a successful family business in Los Angeles, California, while she decided to return to BiH and run a foundation providing scholarship opportunities to disadvantaged children.


Boccagni and Baldassar (2015) discuss how an analysis of guilt is to a large extent absent from the literature connecting migration to emotions, nevertheless "guilt, guilt, guilt is what all migrants face" (Baldassar, 2015, p. 81). Baldassar (2015) provides an extended psychological analysis to illustrate how guilt is inherent in the migration process itself. In an earlier study, Baldassar (2001) shows how post-war Italian migration from the *paese* (home country) was internalized by the migrants as an act of abandonment, one which must be continuously redeemed by demonstrations of economic status and return visits to prove emotional ties to those who stayed behind in the homeland. Although Sanela's story is different in that she was forced to leave her home, it is similar to the fndings of Baldassar (2001) and Baldassar (2015), as she also internalized her departure from BiH as an act of abandonment, one to be redeemed, in her case with her physical return.

#### *4.1.4 Hatred*

A peculiar lack of hatred as an emotion is observed among the study participants. On the contrary, hatred is actively rejected by them. Arif, a Bosniak man, who was held captive by Bosnian Serb forces in three different concentration camps, narrates his experience in the camps, his testimony in front of the ICTY and the imperative for both Bosniaks and Serbs to live together again.

Arif: Perhaps people cannot understand that the torture and crimes one16 survived…perhaps people cannot understand that the day I loaded 250 people in Keraterm's room number 3, that was the day from which, even if I had any hatred prior to that and I did not, I simply could not go on hating anybody. There is simply nobody I hate, I mean, not even the one facing opposite me in the Hague. I had no hatred toward him even when I testifed against him, telling about what he did; how he did it and how we picked up the pieces of human fesh, how we picked up human bodies. This same person ended up crying after hearing my testimony. Whether or not these tears were honest is really not important. I spent my days fghting with their lawyers and proving to them that my children and their children must live together again here, under the Kozara mountain. Otherwise, we will all face mutual extinction.

Arif is not in denial of the horrifc atrocities perpetrated during the war. In fact, he participates in memorial ceremonies in his native Kozarac and frequently speaks of his personal experiences in the concentration camps. Despite the past, he believes in the possibility of building a better future for both Serbs and Bosniaks. The future he envisions is based on justice and truth with no place for denial, however, he also sees no place for hatred either. As an ethnic Serb, with no experience of war and emotionally indifferent towards BiH citizenship, Siniša also expressly rejects hatred.

<sup>16</sup>Arif uses the impersonal "one" when discussing a personal experience and then switches to "I" in the second part of the sentence.


Although the returnees, regardless of their ethnicity or their wartime experience, do not discuss hatred as part of their "citizenship as feeling," they perceive varying expressions of hatred throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While actively rejecting hatred in themselves, the returnees, however, observe the hatred of others in their environment. Examples of acts motivated by hatred include those directed towards state symbols, such as the BiH state fag or coat of arms in Serb or Croat dominated areas of BiH or towards sites of cultural and religious heritage. Selim is a Bosniak man who returned to the now-predominantly Serb Banja Luka, where symbols of BiH statehood are generally treated destructively. He considers hatred to be counterproductive to him, but observes it in others around him.

Author: I noticed that there are absolutely no BiH fags here [Banja Luka].


According to the returnees, although incidents of inter-ethnic hatred are observed and discussed, what is also mentioned is that inter-ethnic hatred is intentionally stirred by self-serving politicians for their personal gain.

Damir: In my opinion, these events17 need to be commemorated. We cannot deny everything that has happened. We need to mark these events and we need to keep remembering. However, the problem is that the politicians in power use victims for their personal gain. They stir up hatred in our people, while only thinking about their personal interests. This is how they preserve power and control. This is true of nationalistic parties in both entities and, in the third part, in areas of Herzegovina.

<sup>17</sup>The events Damir is referring to are commemorations of the Srebrenica genocide or the White Armband Campaign in remembrance of the mass expulsions of Bosniaks from Prijedor.

As "segmentation of politics along ethnic lines" (Zdeb, 2019, p. 12) remains to be the defning characteristic of party politics in BiH, inter-ethnic hatred, resentment, bitterness and memories of wartime atrocities continue to be chief devices for electorate mobilization.

#### *4.1.5 Denial*

Genocide denial is a source of much disappointment and pain for the returnees, regardless of their ethnicity. For Anastasija, an ethnic Serb, the greatest problem is a general lack of empathy of Serb politicians towards victims of the Srebrenica genocide.

Anastasija: I feel horrible when Serb politicians devalue these things, when they negate and deny what actually happened. But, I am telling you again that I also feel frustrated that there is no empathy, no humanity expressed towards the victims. They should just hold their heads and be quiet. They need to at least show some humanity. Thousands and thousands of people are buried underground. There is nothing to talk about. There is simply nothing that can be said. So, that is how I feel about it.

Vedad, an ethnic Bosniak, views genocide denial and historical revisionism as sources of continued tension in the Balkans, most importantly BiH, robbing all of its citizens of a more prosperous future.

Vedad: As far as bigger things are concerned, I also feel pain and disappointment, because there is no collective catharsis, particularly in Serbia. You know when the German thing [WWII] was over, they said: 'we are guilty for all of this and we feel sorry' and they keep saying the same thing until today. Of course, there is a fundamental difference between Serbia in the late 1990s and Germany towards the end of WWII, in terms of being militarily defeated. Of course, of course, this is also one of the reasons. You can see what is happening over there [in Serbia] for yourself. Recently, historical facts are being corrupted and history revised, so the partisans are being declared as criminals and Draža Mihajlović and the like are being rehabilitated. Similar things are also happening in Croatia. I simply cannot understand that a country like Croatia, a member of the European Union, with all necessary conditions for continued progress, still dwells in fascism. You know, all of this is very disappointing to me, because their [Serbia's and Croatia's] attitudes affect us profoundly. The Serb and Croat peoples live here and all of these tensions are transferred over to them. In the end, we don't have the comfortable, relaxed environment for co-existence. We spend all our lives, our entire lives trapped in tensions, running around within all this insanity.

Anastasija's and Vedad's frustration is with denial and tendencies towards historical revisionism. While a detailed examination of the phenomenon of historical revisionism in countries of the former Yugoslavia and its detrimental effects on peace and reconciliation in the region lies beyond the scope of my study, it is important to note the brave individual voices, such as Sonja Biserko, Founder and President of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia.

Therefore, even though Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, former top-level Bosnian Serb war leaders, were fnally—after the run—arrested in Serbia and transferred to The Hague Tribunal on trial for genocide, genocide is still denied in Serbia. True, some crimes are no longer denied, but they continue to be justifed or relativized. The establishment in 1995 and the steady entrenchment of the Bosnian entity, Republika Srpska, as a state within the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, reinforces the culture of denial and Serbia's elites' belief that fulflling the dream of a Greater Serbia might still be—in the end—just a matter of time (Biserko, 2012, p. 4).

Denial is part of the daily experience of BiH citizenship, felt strongly by returnees of different ethnicities. In July 2021, Valentin Inzko, the High Representative at the time, imposed an addition to the BiH Criminal Code banning the denial of genocide and all war crimes. According to the Srebrenica Memorial Center (2023), high ranking Republika Srpska offcials, members of the Serbian Parliament, as well as the President of Croatia, have been amongst the most public genocide deniers. As of 2023, not a single indictment has been fled on charges of genocide denial.

#### *4.1.6 Disgust*

The way local politicians use collective tragedy and manipulate victimhood for personal gain is cause for disgust. While being aware that Serb politicians consistently engage in genocide denial, Anastasija is also disgusted at Bosniak politicians, who view genocide memorials with political opportunism.

Anastasija: I feel disgusted. I'll tell you now…disgusted. I feel disgusted, disgusted by the hypocrisy in everything. In all segments. I feel disgusted that, in the end, there is absolutely no respect for all the victims of the war.

Disgust with SDA politicians' attempts to capitalize, both politically and fnancially, on the pain of genocide victims is shared by non-Serb returnees. Alma is appalled at how individual Bosniak politicians and the SDA have beneftted from the collective tragedy of the Bosniak people, particularly from the Srebrenica genocide.

Alma: Then, the whole things makes me feel disgusted, the politicization of so much pain makes me feel awful. As I see it, the SDA is manipulating with all of this and I simply do not understand how is it that a person, who I cannot really call a human being, like Bakir Izetbegović stands there and celebrates this genocide in Srebrenica, while missing every chance we had for a court case against Serbia at the Hague. So, on one hand he did nothing to improve our situation politically, while on the other side collecting personal points for this tragedy. As a citizen of this country, I feel disgusted and repulsed. I simply cannot understand how is it that somebody who has not done anything for the people of Srebrenica, how is it that that person can stand in front of those people expressing his condolences, telling them stories. I cannot understand. Is there no sense of ethics?

To analyze the Srebrenica commemorations Duijzings (2007) uses a framework initially developed by Timothy Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper in their introduction to *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration* (Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, 2000, p. 3–85 as cited in Duijzings, 2007, p. 144), in which there are two distinct levels of commemoration: political and psychological. The distinction is made "between commemorating from above (with elites engineering and orchestrating these processes mainly for political reasons) and from below (where the focus is on the subjective and psychological needs of individuals), and between hegemonic (publicly articulated) and sectional (marginalized, subordinated, suppressed and/or oppositional) narratives (Duijzings, 144). Following this framework, disgust felt by Alma and Anastasija is directed at the commemorating from above, representative of the "elite engineering and orchestrating these processes mainly for political reasons."

#### *4.1.7 Shame*

The returnees feel shame from being treated as a victim. Ervin, a high-skilled IT professional with an established career in the U.S. with dual U.S. and BiH citizenship, feels embarrassed when assigned the role of a victim, solely based on his citizenship. He does not want to underplay or hide his BiH identity when in professional settings in the U.S., but also resents being placed in the powerless and denigrating victim role.

Ervin: I also feel shame, but this depends on the circumstances. So, the shame appears here within our circumstance when faced with people from, let's say, more developed, more civilized, more modern countries. That is when shame shows up. My anger is directed towards the local authorities, but when placed in contact with foreigners here or when I am abroad, I often feel ashamed, particularly in professional settings. Feeling as a victim and feeling ashamed go together. This is terribly frustrating to me and I keep fghting it. Bosnia has had this image of victimhood, refugees, and the pity one feels towards victims. To me, this is shameful and frustrating.

Mirela assists businesses from BiH in fnding investors abroad and is often ashamed at the local business owners, mistaking a for-proft business incentive with charity or goodwill.

Author: How do you feel when people 'beg' for donations?


A certain "learned helplessness" has developed in post-war BiH, given the amount of international humanitarian aid BiH has received in the period 1995–2000, estimated at between 46 and 53 billion USD including military costs (Papić, 2001, p. 18), as well as postwar reconstruction assistance in the proximity of 1.03 billion EUR (725 million EUR in loans and 305 million EUR as grants) according to estimates made by the BiH Ministry of Finance (Maglajlic & Stubbs, 2018). The "dependency syndrome" (Petrisch, 1999) and the "victim philosophy" (Helms, 2013) cause the returnees to experience BiH citizenship through the emotion of shame.

The overall disfunction and resulting poverty in Bosnia and Herzegovina cause the returnees to feel shame. The shame returnees feel comes both from being citizens of one of Europe's poorest countries and "Europe's most complex state" (Džankić, 2015, p. 526). Salih is an internationally recognized painter with contacts from around the world and dual Italian citizenship, however, he associates shame with his experience of BiH citizenship.

Salih: I had a guest from France. I had to hide some things from her. I didn't want her to see the flth, the lack of hygiene everywhere. I was ashamed of all of it.

Author: Did you feel ashamed?

Salih: Yes. (very quietly)

Author: Where does this shame come from?

Salih: There is shame in all these elements. Shame of how many parliaments we have; of how divided we are; of how complicated and expensive our administration is. When I go to Marijin Dvor and look at that huge building18–it looks as big as the UN palace. For this small country, there are so many offces, secretaries, cars…and then they cannot agree on anything. They can't even hold regular sessions.

Author: How does this make you feel?

Salih: Shame. Shame is the only emotion I feel.

The shame felt by Salih is similar to the shame Maček (2007) observes with her interlocutors in wartime Sarajevo.

When talking about their situation Sarajevans would not only use the notion of 'normal life' but also express the shame they felt: because they could not invite me for a decent (normal) meal, because their homes were not as tidy as they wanted them to be, because they had lost their dignity by losing control over their lives and destinies (p. 43)

Shame noted by Maček (2007) in wartime circumstances and shame discussed by Salih in peacetime have different origins, but they share an important common characteristic–a sense of disempowerment because of citizens "losing control over their lives and destinies" (Maček, 2007, p. 43).

The constant reminders of past atrocities on one hand and the denial of these atrocities, together with the frequent glorifcation of their perpetrators, produce shame from what is perceived as "collective celebration of death."

Ema: I look at this subjectively, but it seems to me that we are proud of having killed each other. People around the world would be ashamed of such behavior, but we here….we celebrate killing and celebrate the dead, people who have killed while killing others. It doesn't matter what their ethnicity might be. We are all Bosnians and we share the same culture, regardless of our religions. Now, you can see my gestures and my body language that I get consumed with rage when thinking about it. I feel a deep sense of shame that we celebrate the dead and the past. That is the emotion–shame. That is exactly it. I feel ashamed of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of our people. I am not ashamed of myself, because I know that I am on the right path and that I am trying to change something in this country, with my little project, which I hope will grow, God willing, inshallah (laughter).19

Ema is ashamed of what she refers to as the "collective celebration of death," combining both the political level of commemoration (Duijzings, 2007) and consistent denial accompanied by an active lionization of war criminals. Both of these lead to a question of whether constant reminders of wartime atrocities serve to assist or impede inter-ethnic reconciliation and societal recovery (see Karabegović, 2019).

<sup>18</sup>Salih refers to the building housing the Council of Ministers and the BiH Parliament, among many other institutions.

<sup>19</sup>Ema, who stated that Christianity is central to her worldview, uses the Arabic expression "inshallah" to refer to a hopeful future shared by BiH Muslims and Christians alike.

#### *4.1.8 Pity and Empathy*

Pity and empathy constitute the returnees' emotional citizenship in very different ways. While pity is cause for concern and frustration, empathy is deeply appreciated. Nervan and Amir have both spent considerable periods of their life studying, working and living in Turkey. While Nervan is annoyed and frustrated with being pitied as a Bosniak in Turkey, Amir appreciates the empathy his Turkish host family expressed towards him, particularly during wartime.

Nervan: I became quite immune to such behavior in Turkey after a certain while, but in the very beginning I was very annoyed, very frustrated. When I frst came to Turkey, I felt so happy, because I was convinced that I came to a friendly and brotherly country, whose people had brotherly affnities towards us. After some time passed, I remember thinking to myself: 'who do these people think we are? The war had passed such a long time ago. I don't even remember the war, but there [in Turkey] all the Bosniak are automatically seen through the war lens.' I did not come here to be pitied. Actually, I really wanted to study in the West, but I won a scholarship to study architecture at a prestigious school in Istanbul and that is why I went to Turkey. I was so happy, because this was one of the best architecture schools.

Nervan's frustration with being assigned the "victim role" in Turkey, corresponds to other returnees' attitudes towards victimization as an impediment to progress. Like many other returnees, Nervan is aware that other BiH citizens have, unfortunately, embraced their own sense of victimization.

Nervan: When I came to Turkey, I was viewed as a victim of war, someone to be pitied. I simply did not want that, but I noticed that some of the students from Bosnia did not have any problems with playing the victim role, because this is how they garnered attention. I did not want this type of attention. I wanted to be recognized for my hard work, talent, and other qualities.

The difference between being pitied and being empathized with is stark. Amir illustrates how the two differ, using mutual identifcation as the distinguishing characteristic.

Amir: Yes, they pitied us, but it was more like they identifed with us. We were children at the time and they look at us in the same way they regarded their own children. I mean, my Turkish friend's mother behaved towards me as she did towards her own son. There was simply no difference. I mean, he and I even looked very much alike. He was also blonde and blue-eyed, like me. She would give him a hug and hug me right after. Anytime that there were any news from Bosnia on TV, she would start crying and she would hold me tight. I mean, this woman…she was like a second mother to me.

The stories of Nervan and Amir are both related to their experience of being a BiH citizen in Turkey, yet the emphasis in the frst story is on a negative impression of pity, while the second one is a positive experience of empathy. The difference between pity and empathy is readily observable when contrasting these two stories, as both experiences relate to the same host state.

Experiencing citizenship through the pity of others is metaphorically compared either to being a "special needs child" or a perpetual "underdog." In the case of "citizenship as feeling" being compared to having a disability, pity is internalized, resulting in its active rejection. Mahir explains what he means by internalizing pity, while simultaneously being pitied because of his citizenship status.


While Mahir is resentful towards being pitied by others as a citizen of a non-standard state, Mirela externalizes her pity towards the state. She compares Bosnia and Herzegovina to the perpetual underdog going through a journey and ultimately attaining heroic status.

Mirela: Aaa what I feel towards BiH, is like the feeling one has for an underdog. I feel as if BiH is the constant underdog. I am not exactly sure how to translate this word.20 The underdog status is very emotional for me, because it offers the possibilities for the little underdog to make great results. I particularly feel that BiH is like the underdog because of everything that has happened during the war, from all our tragedies to our current state of complete corruption. But, then I also see those little stars, which create excellent results and make wonderful progress. These types of results could not have been created in a more regulated society. Supporting BiH, for me, is about being on the side of the underdog, the poor, the disadvantaged, the handicapped and the powerless. That is what I feel as a BiH citizen. I had this feeling throughout the war and then when the war fnally ended; I had an incredible need to make a change. Yes, this is also out of pity, because I know that people here are on the verge of poverty with a 60% unemployment rate. This is a burden that I also bear, but I want to contribute to the betterment of my community. Yes, it is about pity. Because I could be working in google now for an absurd amount of money in New York, but that this is nothing to me compared to being side by side with the underdog. However, although the underdog evokes pity at the beginning of the story, the underdog is the ultimate hero of the story. The underdog's starting point is one of disadvantage and handicap, evoking pity, but ending up victorious.

An extract of a speech (OHR, 1997) made to the North Atlantic Council by Carlos Westendorp, the former High Representative in BiH (1997–1999) could contextualize both a rejection of internalizing pity and active externalizing of pity towards BiH,

If I were a doctor, I would tell you that the Bosnian patient is alive / that he needs the life support machine less and less / but that he is still in intensive care / and that further intensive care is necessary. What I also know is that the patient wants this treatment and, providing that the medication is non-addictive, he will survive; the treatment is prescribed in the Dayton Peace Accords although what I cannot tell you is the duration of that treatment. I am not a doctor of course but I am the High Representative, and, therefore, as the individual charged with implementing those accords, I will give you my prognosis.

Viewing the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a patient in need of intensive care understandably invites pity. However, there is a considerable difference in the vantage point between being a citizen and a non-citizen of that state.

<sup>20</sup>Mirela kept using the English word "underdog" during our Bosnian-medium conversation.

#### *4.1.9 Sorrow*

The returnees grieve over events from BiH's recent past: being forced to leave the country because of war, fnding refuge abroad, the pointlessness of war and mass killings and ultimately the deep sorrow of genocide. Damir left his native Sanski Most at eighteen to fnd refuge in Germany.

Damir: I felt very, very sad. I cried. I cried all the way from Sanski Most to Banja Luka, from Banja Luka to Belgrade. When we landed in Belgrade, I fnally stopped crying, because I saw nothing will come out of all that and that I had to come to my senses. I felt horrible, leaving my parents and my home at 18 years of age. I felt horrible, particularly because I knew that the war was approaching. Diffcult times were ahead. It was very, very diffcult for me. I can easily say that this was crushing. Those were very sad times. As I told you before, the population in Sanski Most was very mixed and the war was fought between the Serbs and Bosniaks. I felt very, very bad that my old friend Goran would not be my friend anymore.

Amir was expelled together with his family from Prijedor. His father was killed by Bosnian Serb forces and Amir was separated from his mother and brother. At the age of 15, he was completely alone, fnding safety in Turkey.

Amir: I felt horrible, horrible. How else could I feel? There was shooting everywhere, shooting everywhere. How could I have felt not even being able to talk to my parents or see them or anything. There were eight boys from Bosnia and countless times we would just each lock in our room and cry for hours. What else could we do? We didn't speak the language. We didn't know anything. We didn't know anybody. We felt completely lost and disconnected.

Anastasija, who escaped warfare in Mostar to fnd safety in Serbia, feels the grief of all ethnicities in Bosnia and Herzegovina caused by the overall tragedy of war.

Anastasija: It is completely pointless, pointless. What did we fght for? For absolutely nothing. Nothing at all. Excuse me, what do those people do protesting in front of the Parliament? What are those tents for? They were set up by former soldiers who fought and bled for the peace we have today. Now, what do they have? They can't even survive. They have nothing to eat.

Badema is a young Bosniak woman living in Srebrenica, for whom the deepest sorrow of genocide constitutes her emotional dimension of BiH citizenship.

Badema: Aaaa, I was born after the war so that whenever this July 11 comes around, when this day dawns, I mean I have not experienced the war, so that I can't speak from my own experience. Each person experiences this collective funeral in his or her own way. For me, when the coffns pass by me I feel chills run through my bones, tears rolling down my cheeks. I don't know, then I look at the valley of white gravestones, listening to the deadening silence…a feeling of overwhelming sadness overpowers me.

In addition to direct losses suffered during the war, the tragedy of lost opportunity is a source of sadness to many of the study participants, whether they were in BiH during the war or not. Hrvoje spent the entire war in besieged Sarajevo and laments at the loss incurred by his entire generation.

Hrvoje: The frst emotion experienced is one of great tragedy. We know about all the tragic events that occurred in our region. All of us, who spent the war here are in one respect tragic fgures. This is particularly true for people my age, let's say those who were born between 1965 and 1970. These are people who were caught in war when they could have given their maximum potential. They got stuck in a ghetto and lost four or 5 years of their lives, losing the best years of their lives. While we were devastated here, others were developing, putting us in a position of never being able to catch up. We will never be able to attain the EU level of development.

Adnan's family and friends were in Zenica during the war. Due to a set of circumstances directly prior to the beginning of the war, he managed to escape to Turkey. Adnan is well aware of how the wartime years affected his loved ones and discusses his sadness at the lost opportunities of their lives.

Adnan: I felt so sorry for the people I love, sorry for my friends, who did not have an opportunity to leave, those who stayed. I feel sorry because they spent the best years of their lives fghting for something and now they have entered an age when there are no more opportunities. So many doors opened for me and when I talk to my friends, I can see the difference between us. The difference is immense. There is a difference in the way of thinking, attitudes towards life and all these things. I probably would be exactly like them if I had spent the last 20 years of my life here.

In addition to sadness felt towards events from BiH's recent history, the returnees express their sorrow at the current situation.

The postwar reality, the present state of BiH carries grief and sadness for most of BiH's citizens. The returnees discuss their sadness of a dysfunctional peace, not allowing Bosnia and Herzegovina to have a more prosperous present and future. Reuf talks about the general mood in BiH being "broken."

Reuf: When I look at the situation and the, the outcome of the war, at what happened in the war it all looks negative, negative, negative. You know what I mean? When I frst came here I was like wow, why doesn't someone do that? Why doesn't someone do that? Every single person kept saying the same thing to me. Really short answers like it's impossible. You can't do it. It can't be done in Bosnia. That was when I frst came: It was always like these, these guys they are close-minded. They are held back. They are stuck. I feel like Bosnians generally are broken people. Broken. Coming from Australia that makes me feel really sad, because I see the potential of the people. The corruption works hand in hand with all of that. I mean, the system here, the system does not work. It just doesn't work.

Senad discusses the sadness of an ineffcient and expensive state lacking economic progress, which results in a continuous stream of young and talented people emigrating.

Senad: Aaam, I mainly feel sadness, sadness because people accepted to be much less than their actual potential. Much less than what they used to be before. I feel sad because we accepted to be a third-rate country in the region, that we are practically a colony of neighboring states, a protectorate. I simply feel sad that people do not have a bit more pride. I am not referring to patriotic pride, but to their own personal pride. Why is that they do not stand up and say 'I think that we really could do things much better.' Sadness, that is my dominant emotion.

Sorrow and sadness as constituting the emotional dimension of BiH citizenship is discussed regarding both BiH's past and present, leading to a pessimistic outlook for the future.

#### *4.1.10 Disappointment*

From the initial enthusiasm characterizing the experience of return, when confronted with the political and economic realities of life in BiH, the emotional response to BiH citizenship often turns to disappointment. Disappointment is present both in cases of majority and minority return. Ervin, ethnically Bosniak, who came back to Sarajevo from the U.S. with great expectations for progress in the IT sector, expresses his disappointment in irresponsible politicians, who he sees as one of the greatest obstacles to any progress in the country.

Ervin: Well, I feel disappointed mostly by certain candidates, who had historical chances to transform the country. They did not use these opportunities and instead; they fell into the traps of self-aggrandizement and egocentrism, with no understanding of how to create prosperity for everybody, for all of society. No, they were not thinking about the people, the nation, or the country. They were only thinking about their own narrow, individual interest.

Nusret, a Bosniak who returned to his native Prijedor, now in the RS, experiences all the challenges of minority return and expresses his disappointment at the lack of

support provided to him and others like him by Bosniak politicians, seated in Sarajevo.

Author: You are far from administrative Sarajevo and how does this make you feel? Nusret: Nothing. Disappointed. Forgotten and neglected. I used to believe that with relatively low investment, so much could be done for returnees. So much more could have been done, but not with these politicians, who only care about themselves and nobody else. I simply don't see anybody in real life, who managed to convince me that they care about the ordinary citizen. They only work for their own private interests and nothing else.

In addition, and regardless of majority or minority return status, returnees are disappointed in the BiH business environment.

Ema: As far as the business side is concerned, anytime I think of my BiH citizenship, I feel frustration and aggressiveness, a sort of disillusionment, partly a loss of hope. I used to have high hopes regarding the business side. I thought it would be much easier, more logical and according to some European standards. That was not the case, and it was and still is a daily struggle of disappointment.

Experiencing the home state citizenship through disappointment upon return is not unique to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, return migration literature has extensively studied how disappointment sets in once the returnees are confronted with realities of life in a variety of different home states. As early as Bovenkerk (1974), disappointment has been studied because of idealizing the home state during times of emigration, which turns out not to correspond to the realities of life there. Bovenkerk (1974) also surveys other studies confrming disappointment inherent in return migration, such as Nelli (1970), who looks at Italians returning from the U.S., Saloutos (1956) studies Greeks returnees and Dahaya (1973), who examines disappointment felt by Pakistanis returning from Britain. More recently, King & Christou (2009) explore second-generation Greeks returning from Germany and the U.S., and their disappointment caused by the corruption, chaos, and xenophobia they encounter upon their return to Greece.

#### *4.1.11 Powerlessness*

As citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the returnees often feel helpless, and powerless to affect change. For Emir, powerlessness is rooted in a deeply unjust peace and a dysfunctional state as its end product.

Emir: I feel much more powerless now than I did during the war. During the war, it was different, there was a sense of common struggle. Now, the powerlessness is ingrained in all pores of society. During the war, I was in Sarajevo in the BH Army, in an army unit which was attached to several different army divisions. So, I was in Sarajevo and outside of Sarajevo.


Hrvoje adds pessimism to the possibilities of democratic change and his feeling of powerlessness extends to citizenship practices such as voting.


The phrase "post-Dayton *straightjacket*" is often used to refer to the BiH Constitutional setup, both in scholarly discourse (see for example, Donais, 2005; Keil & Perry, 2015; Deiana, 2018; Perry, 2019) and the general media. In fact, "the straightjacket" has become a "popular metaphor" (Keil & Perry, 2015) for the "frozen confict" (Perry, 2019), leaving individual BiH citizens, including the returnees, feeling entirely powerless. In *Gender and Citizenship: Promises of Peace in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Deiana (2018) summarizes:

The perversity of the post-Dayton aftereffects, however, does not stop at the institutional level…Ethnicity is continuously mobilized in many aspects of political and social life such as housing segregation and voting, as well as culture, written and spoken language and education. Further to this, the post-Dayton straightjacket has worked to preserve ethnonational discourses within the politics of BiH. It enforces a highly divisive political life. Dominant nationalist parties continue to mobilize the legacy of confict and the negative constructions of the "Ethnic Other" to ensure support for nationalist politics (p. 10).

Thus, the overwhelming feeling of powerlessness is experienced by the individual citizen, when the citizen views him or herself as an autonomous individual within a citizenship regime designed for ethnic collectivities of "us" versus "them," in what seems to be a "frozen, stuck, stalled or just muddling through" (Perry, 2019) state of affairs.

The powerlessness felt by returnees is compounded by a sense of humiliation as part of the emotional dimension of BiH citizenship. Alma describes experiences of mistreatment when travelling with her BiH passport.

Alma: Well, in the frst couple of years after the war ended, we were defnitely maltreated. We had to go to every embassy to apply for visas; stand in line for two-three hours.

Author: How did this make you feel?

Alma: Extremely humiliated. For example, at the border crossing. My husband would show his Slovenian passport and the border guards wouldn't even give him a second look. I would hand them my Bosnian passport and they would make me open each piece of luggage. Humiliated, defnitely humiliated. That is how I felt.

To avoid feeling humiliated at the border crossing, Emir, a dual BiH, and Slovenian citizen, prefers using his host state passport.


Related to powerlessness are the feelings of mistreatment and humiliation as BiH citizens, particularly pronounced as part of citizenship practices such as border crossings, or previously while standing in visa queues. The experiences described by Emir and Alma confrm and extend the fndings of Jansen (2009), who looks at cross-border mobility and "zones of humiliating entrapment through documentary requirements–experienced by citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia–as the EU's shrinking 'immediate outside' (p. 815). As Jansen (2009) points out, citizenship allows or disallows "bodies" (p. 815) to have cross-border mobility, producing various forms of affect. Specifc to the case of BiH, particularly prior to the visa relaxation, what Jansen (2009) fnds is a dominant "atmosphere of entrapment" (p. 820) and a "sense of collective humiliation" (p.827) felt by BiH passport holders, particularly when contrasted to the freedom of movement once granted to holders of the "red," Yugoslav passport. Similarly to other authors (Maksimović, 2017; Palmberger, 2013b), Jansen (2009) refers to this type of Yugonostalgia as more of a

yearning for "normal life, " (p. 827) perceived to have been free from the current entrapment and humiliation.

#### *4.1.12 Nostalgia*

Nostalgia towards the past and Yugoslavia is expressed as a longing for a state and the security it provided. Although Mensura is not old enough to have lived experience of Yugoslavia, when I asked about the stories her parents told her about the former state, her response succinctly echoed similar views, communicating a yearning for law and order.

Mensura: Well, everybody says that everything was much better [in Yugoslavia], that the country was much better organized than what we have today. There was more respect for the laws, law enforcement, and state institutions, all of what we talked about earlier. We lack all of that today.

It is common parlance to discuss the Yugoslav past as a time when "you could not say whatever you wanted, but you could sleep safely on a park bench, wherever you wanted"–a saying summarizing the lack of freedom of expression in Yugoslavia together with a strong emphasis on security. In addition, the declared values of the Yugoslav Communist regime, such as equality and solidarity, are the causes of nostalgia.

Anastasija: And this, this BiH citizenship thing. It doesn't mean absolutely anything to me, because I always was and will remain a Yugoslav. That has always been my identifcation and the only country which I consider to be my own. That is the only fag [the Yugoslav fag] which I consider to be mine and with which I can identify. Whatever people might say about communism and Tito today, about what things used to be like in the past….the only thing that matters for me is the solidarity we used to have. We used to treasure our peace, freedom, brotherhood, and unity. These are the values that shaped me and I will never give them up.

The phenomenon of yearning for a return to the stability of the communist past, characterized by "law and order and steady incomes" (Kolstø, 2014, p. 761), can be found in other places, such as successor states of the former Soviet Union and countries of Central and Eastern Europe (see Boym, 2001). In the Yugoslav case, the phenomenon is of a proportion to merit its own term: Yugonostalgia, politically21 defned as a "continued attachment to the SFRY as a state" (Kolstø, 2014, p. 763).

<sup>21</sup>Kolstø (2014) makes the important distinction between cultural and political Yugonostalgia, where the latter can and does affect nation-building and citizens' loyalties to states born out of the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Whether real or imagined ethnic tolerance, present in Yugoslavia is a subject of nostalgic longing among returnees of different ethnicities. Elvis, a Bosniak from Prijedor, who was expelled from his home together with other non-Serbs in 1992, reminisces about how people of different ethnicities related during Yugoslav times.


Alma, who declares herself primarily as a BiH citizen, rejecting ethnic categories, is nostalgic for the values of "brotherhood and unity" among peoples in Yugoslavia and connects these to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Alma: Well, my generation…we identifed with Yugoslavia. When I was growing up, we did not identify with Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was present everywhere really, perhaps most visibly in school. For example, in our singing of the national anthem, Tito's portrait in each classroom, using Tito's quotes all the time, such as 'protect our brotherhood and unity as the apple of your eye' and such things. There was also the celebration of Tito's birthday and our traditional relay races. With the dismantling of Yugoslavia, I understood that all these values for me actually meant an identifcation with Bosnia and Herzegovina. All the Yugoslav values of multiculturalism and living with people who differ from yourself. We in BiH lived these values more than anybody else in the former Yugoslavia, more than the Slovenes, the Serbians or the people in Dalmatia. At one point, I understood that what I loved most about the former Yugoslavia was being destroyed.

<sup>22</sup>Elvis is using the names "Saša" and "Mehmed" to illustrate a Serb and Bosniak identity, respectively.

<sup>23</sup>Ethnic differences.

The "Yugoslav civil religion of brotherhood and unity" (Perica, 2002; Bošković, 2013; Flere, 2007) with the stated goal of designing Yugoslavism as a supraethnic and suprareligious identity (Bošković, 2013), was arguably most ardently practiced in Bosnia and Herzegovina out of all other ex-Yugoslav states. Ironically, this is where its failures were most catastrophic.24 However, it would not be fair to conclude that the returnees, when discussing a longing for Yugoslav ethnic tolerance, are in denial of its ultimate demise. Instead, a more balanced interpretation would be consistent to the fndings of Hofman (2008), who concludes that Yugonostalgia in BiH, at least regarding its "brotherhood and unity" dimension, appears simply in response to the unbearable ethnic tensions of present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Returnees are also nostalgic for the economic system of the former Yugoslavia with its main emphasis on social security. Siniša, who recalls the stories told by his parents, discusses the developed social safety net in Yugoslavia and the feeling of economic security it created.

Siniša While we were in Argentina, my parents, and others always used to say that we were Yugoslavs. Nobody talked about Serbs or Croats or something else. Everybody [in Argentina] knew about all of us as Yugoslavs and it was the most normal thing for us to say that we are Yugoslavs. I would say that most people who experienced living in Yugoslavia are nostalgic for those times and for socialism. They used to get their apartment from the state, paid leave and a completely fantastic system. I mean, I cannot speak from experience because I did not live in Yugoslavia. My parents were also emigrants from Yugoslavia, but they always had a strong sense of belonging to the Serb people, the Orthodox Church, and so on. They always looked upon Yugoslavia as something positive. They were born in this state and its economic system. The country was unifed and they could easily travel from one area to the next.

The Yugoslav legal, political and economic systems created an overwhelming sense of security, particularly as compared to the state of these affairs in the current makeup of BiH. However, perhaps most importantly, the overall values of solidarity, ethnic tolerance, contribution to the common good are what brought about a feeling of security. Vedad emphasizes taking pride in aiding community development in Yugoslavia.

Vedad: I wouldn't exactly call this Yugonostalgia, but I remember my childhood and, from the perspective of a child, I remember a different system that took care of everybody, including children and young people. I remember the Youth Labor Action, which promoted completely different values from the ones we seem to have today. In the past, as a young person, you needed

<sup>24</sup>Drawing upon results of a large-scale quantitative survey conducted by IPSOS and the University of Oslo in 2011, Kolstø (2014) argues that despite its traumatic past, BiH still scores among the highest for Yugonostalgia compared to other ex-Yugoslav states, with affection towards the former state shared by Bosniaks and Serbs alike.

to apply to take part in the Youth Labor Action. If you deserved your place, you would be admitted and allowed to dig and build as a volunteer. Nowadays, the idea would be laughable to any young person. They would say something like: 'what are you talking about? I won't be digging or building for nobody! For free? Are you joking???' Many things have changed about our values and mentality. Young people used to take pride in helping their communities and contributing to the public good.

Hrvoje is nostalgic for the quality of friendships in Yugoslavia and sees an ideological explanation for the difference he perceives in current times.

Hrvoje: I would say that the most valuable aspect of Yugoslavia were the human bonds we used to have, our excellent human relations. I mean, we could say that we had freedom of movement that simply does not exist today. In Yugoslavia you could not talk about whatever you wanted, but you could sleep under any tree or on any bench. At some point during your sleep, somebody might come to wake you up to see how you are doing or to offer you something to eat and drink. This is certainly not the case now. Today, you can say whatever you like, but your freedom of movement is limited. There is no freedom of movement that we used to have. The aspect of human friendships and a safe environment is missing. Perhaps, that was also imposed through the political system, however, I was young at the time and I simply did not think about such things. Yes, I was young at the time. This is also nostalgia for youth. That is also an important point.

As Hofman (2008) introduces and Kolstø (2014) re-asserts, political Yugonostalgia can be viewed as having two distinct strands: ideological and territorial. Territorially, Yugonostalgia is a simple longing for a larger state, where the new states are seen as small or "petty" (Jansen, 2009) with the resulting freedom of movement being restricted, such as pointed out by Hrvoje. Ideologically, Yugonostalgia is a longing for a Titoist version of Marxism as a guiding social philosophy, with the accompanying socialist self-management as an economic system. Although, there are certainly elements of both territorial and ideological Yugonostalgia in views expressed by the returnees, I would also have to agree with Maksimović (2017), who terms this type of Yugonostalgia as "normalostalgia" or a longing for a "normal life" (p. 1071), characterized by socioeconomic security, as well as ethnic tolerance (Palmberger, 2013b).

A noticeable lack of Yugonostalgia is present with some returnees, because of the former state's relations with religious communities and memories of persecution on religious grounds. Gavrilo, who discussed the importance his Orthodox Christian faith has in his daily life, says that he is not nostalgic for Yugoslav times, mainly because of the atheistic or anti-theistic25 aspects of communist ideology.

<sup>25</sup>See Flere (2007) for details on this distinction in the context of Yugoslav "civil religion."

Gavrilo: I am not nostalgic at all. I'll tell you one thing. If that country had been so well organized, it would not have failed. It was very badly setup, relations between people were very poorly developed. There was so much laziness, red tape, and the greatest tragedy of all–communism, a disaster worse than any wildfre. It set us back at least 40 years, perhaps even 50, it devastated all the people living here.

Author: So, you only see problems with communism?

Gavrilo: Only within communism! This system frstly destroyed all the morals of people. People became disbelievers, atheists, not believing in anything, ready to do anything. If people were true believers, the war probably would have never happened. There was nothing good about it. Absolutely nothing. Trust me.

Author: Not even the ideals of brotherhood and unity?

Gavrilo: Oh, please what are you talking about?! If this brotherhood and unity were real and true, would we have slaughtered each other like animals [during the war]?!

Mehmed, a practicing Muslim, expresses similar views towards Yugoslavia, based on his family stories of persecution.


Looking at Yugoslav history, it can be said that the Communist authorities, particularly after Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform, acted vigilantly to suppress religious expression (Malcolm, 1994). The Yugoslav state had a distinctly anti-theist stance and viewed the major religious traditions (Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Roman Catholicism) as divisive and undermining "brotherhood and unity" (Flere, 2007). However, the question of exactly how free were Yugoslav citizens to practice their various religions is a subject of some controversy. The Yugonostalgics are likely to focus on some semblance of religious freedom granted to practicing religious traditions, particularly in private, while the anti-Yugonostalgics26 tend to overstate the degree of direct and indirect persecution of religious communities. Albeit important, the historical context cannot overshadow the respondents' subjective experience. Gavrilo's and Mehmed's personal stories speak of discrimination on religious grounds, which makes them have no longing for the Yugoslav state.

#### *4.1.13 Patriotic Love*

At frst glance, it can be confusing to examine the notion of "patriotic love" in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a post-confict and deeply divided society, and the returnees, most of whom are dual and in some cases triple citizens. To clarify the apparent confusion, I have tried to introduce some distinct forms of patriotic love as a result of data analysis: divided or split, unreserved, "hurt," conditional/tempered, as well as viewing patriotism as the founding block of democratic state-building.

In some cases, the returnees' patriotic feelings are divided or split between two or more states. Admir, a dual BiH and U.S. citizen, while considering his primary emotional attachment to lie with the BiH citizenship, also acknowledges some patriotic love for his host state.

Admir: I have spent 10 years in the US, which was a really wonderful period of my life. There, I made so many friends and fell in love with the city of Chicago. I lived in Chicago for 10 years and I miss so many things. I am a big fan of the Chicago Bulls and I have all kinds of other connections with this city. I would say some patriotic love as well. I mean, my primary feelings are towards the citizenship of my birth [BiH citizenship] and if I had to, it would be very diffcult for me to renounce it, to renounce our citizenship.

The case of divided or split patriotism becomes more complicated when it is directed towards a kin-state, such as Serbia or Croatia. While being emotionally indifferent to the BiH citizenship, primarily attached to his home state citizenship of Argentina, Siniša also feels patriotically inclined towards his third, Serbian citizenship.

Siniša: Whenever I go to Serbia, I always have the same experience. For example, when driving through Šumadija, I don't know whether you ever had the chance to visit, but the people there are so hospitable, open and just so cheerful. One can sense a connection with the medieval state, the monasteries and all the cultural heritage. These are certainly highly positive emotions, because, I mean, we are talking about the history of our people. As a Serb, I feel that our roots are there in that medieval heritage, before the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian invasions or any other foreign powers occupying these territories. I feel connected through Serbia's sovereignty.

<sup>26</sup>See Kolstø (2014) for an explanation of the term "anti-Yugonostalgic", particularly as it applies to Croatia.

I feel connected to Serbia's sovereignty and statehood when visiting all the old monasteries and the cultural heritage which has been preserved.

Within the range of patriotic love, a few of the participants express an unconditional, unreserved patriotism. Gavrilo, an ethnic Serb from Nevesinje, expresses his love for Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly its natural landscape.

Gavrilo: I don't know what to tell you, but I love this country extremely. There are so many things we can't change, but we still need to hope for the best. If we have any intelligence, we will understand that we need to live together. If we are smart we will live like normal people. I have no plans to leave this country. I don't want any of my family members or anybody else to leave either. This is especially true for anybody who loves hiking and mountaineering. Just walk around our mountains and you will see how beautiful our country really is. The only problem is that we do not appreciate it.

Arif, ethnically Bosniak, expresses his love for the country and readiness to defend it in case of renewed confict.

Arif: At any mention of Bosnia and Herzegovina disappearing, I am instantaneously prepared to stand in its defense. I am ready to leave all this (gesturing at the offce and out the window towards the dairy farm) and, if need be, take to guns in its defense. I left for Norway only after fnishing my work here, work which was necessary here. After being released from the camps, I joined the BiH Army and demobilized after the war ended. It is only after serving my duty that I re-united with my family in Norway. I also served my duty, testifying at the Court in the Hague and collecting the documentation on wartime happenings in Kozarac. I spent 6 or 7 years in Norway; started successful companies there and returned to Bosnia again. All this means only one thing—there is no force, other than an act of the Almighty, that could tear the bond between myself and the homeland. I also have an obligation to leave a homeland for my children. Can I wait in Norway for somebody else to do this for my children instead of me? No, I need to make my contribution right here.

Several returnees report their patriotic feelings being hurt in postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina. Regardless of the diffculties imposed on BiH citizens by the current Dayton constitutional setup, Mahir feels it to be his duty to respect and love his home state. He uses a familial analogy to explain his patriotic love for BiH.

Author: How do you feel when you see the BiH fag or hear the national anthem?

Mahir: I think I have a duty to respect and love these things. It's actually more respect that I feel, the way you feel about a grandfather, who wasn't exactly nice towards you. He loved some other grandchildren more than he loved you, but he is still your grandfather and you love and respect him. Still, he is not your favorite person in the world. That would be the best association I could fnd. It comes because of the respect I feel towards my father or my uncle, who died because of the war or were killed. These people used to

believe that the survival of this state is important, that resisting assimilation is important. Simply, this was their vision and I feel it to be disrespectful for the next generation to abandon this vision. Their sacrifce is the reason I can live in a free country now, in my apartment, in my old neighborhood. We need to make our own contribution.

Vedad also uses a familial analogy to discuss the necessity of loving one's country. Similarly to Mahir, he is aware of the diffculties associated with BiH citizenship, but he also focuses on the importance of each BiH citizen taking an active part in improving this situation.

Vedad: The problem is that the struggle of people has been altered into a slide to what is more comfortable. For example, students in the past used to fght for their rights. They were brave, and they took part in protests to secure a better future for their country. Nowadays, young people say things like 'look at how worn out the streets are here, I have to leave his country.' To me, this is surrender, giving up. I choose to take a different path. I want to contribute so that things improve. I am not going to give up on my mother just because she slapped me. She is still my mother. Even if she makes me happy or sad, she is still my mother and I love her.

Due to the frequent abuse of patriotic feelings, the participants are quick to point out that true patriotic love is viewed through action. Senad, an opposition politician, criticizes the local power elites whose representatives consistently call on values of patriotism with only their own interests in mind and not their communities'.


To avoid being labeled either the "naïve patriot" or the "exploitative patriot," the returnees often discuss a conditional or tempered patriotism.

Admir: First of all, I am not too patriotic, as I have a simple goal of living a normal life in this country. I was born here and, of course I have some patriotic feelings. I was so happy when we went to the World Soccer Cup. Our success in sports or music events makes me very happy, but, above all, I am interested in having the complete conditions for a normal life in my country.

Finally, the returnees consistently bring to the fore the importance of an active and engaged citizenry, viewing their contribution as citizens to be the founding block of state and democracy building.

Arif: Let's ask a different question: 'Did Norway as a homeland give to the Norwegian people all of what they have today in 1945 or did the Norwegian people build their country; created an equitable distribution; made laws; destroyed bribery and corruption; developed a society of equal opportunity?' The Norwegian people produced all of this through their voting and constant pressure. They created a fantastic political system and a Constitution, which says that all citizens are equal in front of the law, including the king. Nobody is above the law. The question we have now is whether the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina want to make something similar to Norway? We will probably never have a Norway here, but let's say that we want Bosnia and Herzegovina as an average Western European country, where we could afford social welfare, pension funds and migration policy that would provide an incentive for people to stay here and improve our demographics. Our situation is such that the Muslims are awaiting Allah to do all this work instead of them, while the Catholics and Orthodox are waiting for the Almighty God. Is God responsible for an assignment given to the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including you writing this Ph.D. thesis [now monograph]? Can we build a better and more prosperous BiH? What do you think? I think that we certainly can!

The fnal perspective on patriotic love as key to democratic politics echoes the original work connecting citizenship and emotions, George Marcus' *The Sentimental Citizen: Emotion in Democratic Politics* (2002). The main premise of the "citizenship as feeling" idea formulated by Marcus is that citizens are capable of being "good" because they can feel. Patriotic love, with all its faws and imperfections, seems to be the major catalyst in this process.

#### *4.1.14 Pride*

The professional successes of fellow compatriots are the sources of pride for many of the returnees. Admir takes pride in the success of individual BiH citizens, such as the soccer player, Edin Džeko.

Admir: Of course, I am really happy when a local band makes it internationally. Dubioza Kolektiv is an international musical success. They are a wonderful group of musicians for such a small country, where there are no investments made in art and culture. Regardless of their diffculties, they found a path to world fame. I feel proud of their success. Of course, there are other examples from sports, such as Edin Džeko, who used to play in our soccer league and went on to international stardom. These people are the most important promoters and cultural ambassadors for our country. I mean, we have so few positive examples here that their successes need to be talked about. In my opinion, they are very important for all of us.

While taking pride in their success, Senad also laments the fact that these successful people no longer reside in BiH.

Senad: Our social fabric has been destroyed as the best and brightest left this country. We lost our human resources. These people have been replaced with those who I would, without meaning to be a snob, I would describe as second-rate. Professionals from Bosnia and Herzegovina have made it in Europe and all over. One of our people, a talented engineer became the general manager of the Austrian Telecom. This actually happened. Another example is a person who used to work at our Youth radio station. He is now one of the most important marketing experts in North America. We gave all our human resources to foreign corporations. We lost huge numbers of people like that from all parts of our country. Their successes abroad could make all of us proud. We share the same citizenship.

Returnees also fnd pride in the experience of collective suffering. Lejla, who works on trauma release techniques with victims of post-traumatic stress syndrome views survival and perseverance as a source of great pride.

Lejla: For me, what ties me most to Bosnia is certainly not our cuisine of burek and čevapčići. I don't even eat meat. I am a vegetarian and could not care less about these dishes. My most important connection to citizenship is our common struggle and our shared, tragic experience. We need to be proud of ourselves for going through hell and still surviving, succeeding and continuing to exist. We need to be proud of that.

Nusret, a Bosniak returnee to Prijedor in Republika Srpska, views return to a place from which he was once forcibly expelled as the reason for his pride.

Nusret: Pride. I certainly feel proud. This is what gives me added motivation to carry on, regardless of all the problem we encounter daily. I feel proud to be Bosnian, to have gone through all this and to have survived. In spite of everything, we collected ourselves and we continue to live here, to feel equal with everybody else inhabiting this region.

Perspectives offered by Admir, Lejla and Nusret illustrate how pride constitutes the emotional dimension of BiH citizenship through either the examples of individual successes of BiH citizens or the experience of collective survival.

The returnees, particularly in the case of minority return of Bosniaks to Republika Srpska, fnd pride in state symbols and the state, as guarantor of national survival.

Selim: It is normal for the BiH fag, particularly if you see it somewhere abroad, to stir positive emotions. These are highly positive emotions. Pride, pride, because in spite of everything that has happened, Bosnia and Herzegovina survived and it continues to exist. In whatever shape or form, it still exists

within its borders. I can say with pride that I am a Bosnianherzegovinian and that I have a homeland.

Similarly, many of the returnees take pride in civic belonging and being distinct from the three, clearly defned ethnic or religious groups.

Sanela: I am defnitely proud to be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I belong to this country, as its citizen. This connection is much more important to me than religion or ethnicity. Although, I feel under pressure to align myself with a religious and ethnic group, still my main identifcation is with the state of BiH. My parents raised me to be proud of our country. We never felt ashamed of our home country, of our origin. We always proudly spoke of being citizens of BiH.

As Džankić (2016) emphasizes, supported by fndings of the IPSOS Survey (2011), loyalty to the state of BiH is most pronounced with ethnic Bosniaks, also the only ethnicity to be 'very proud' with their BiH citizenship. On the other hand, the majority of Serbs and Croats either feel 'somewhat proud' or 'not proud at all' as BiH citizens. Responses of Selim and Sanela are also consistent with the IPSOS Survey (2011) results, while not even one returnee who self-identifed as Serb or Croat directly expressed pride in being a BiH citizen.

#### *4.1.15 Defance*

The famous *bosanski inat* (Bosnian defance/spite) has deep historical roots, acting as what Amila Buturović refers to as "a cultural catalyst against liminality," when discussing passages from Meša Selimović's novel *The Death and the Dervish.* Buturović analyzes "spite and defance" as "liminality transformed into a metaphorical struggle for collective identity, not acting as complicit in internal divisions" (Buturović, 2009, p.46) In other words, it is out of spite and defance in Bosnia and Herzegovina that seemingly impossible to sustain notions continue to survive. Amir, whose father was murdered by Bosnian Serb forces during the ethnic cleansing campaigns in Prijedor, returned to BiH, to live in the same family home where he was born and raised as he himself says "out of spite!"

Author: How important do you think is Bosnian defance/spite?

Amir: As you can see, it is always important! It's kind of like the joke. I don't know if you've heard it?

Somebody asked a Muslim from Bosnia, a Bosniak, whether he would want to convert to Christianity in exchange for 10,000 marks?

He said: 'No!'

'How about a million?'

'No', he repeated.

'Not for ten thousand, not for a million?'

'No.'

'So, how would you convert to Christianity?'

'Only out of spite. Out of spite and defance, I would!' the Bosnian man shouted back.

Author and Amir: Laughter! Amir: That is how important our Bosnian defance is for us.

Bosnian defance or spite is pervasive to the extent that it has its own jokes and humor associated with it. This particular joke refers to a stubborn adherence to a particular religious creed, denied only as an act of defance, however, it is certainly not limited only to religion, in general, or to a specifc religious denomination. As Buturović points out, defance is seen as an antidote to liminality, whatever its source might be.

Returning to BiH was an act of defance for many of my study participants. They have returned, despite events from the past. Alija, a Bosniak minority returnee to Republika Srpska discusses defance as key in his decision to return and in his understanding of citizenship.

Alija: You will see when you visit Kozarac that the people of that area have gone through unimaginable horror, but still you will see them defant. In spite of these horrifc experiences, they love Kozarac even more passionately. They are investing in its reconstruction and development. They are rebuilding their destroyed houses and lives. A similar thing is also happening in Prijedor. In some ways, we can conceive of two reactions after tragic events. Either people say 'I will never go there. I never want to recall those events,' or the contrary 'now, I will visit even more. I will show the people who expelled me I am still alive and that this is my city too.' I feel that the second option is what I have chosen to do. I have chosen to say intentionally: 'you see, even after everything that has happened. I am still here. I am still alive and I am a citizen of this country!'

In addition, as Arif points out, defance is completely separate from a desire for revenge. Instead of the destructiveness of revenge, defance plays a crucial role in the pursuit of justice.

Arif: You see, what we have here is the rebuilding of an entire town from the ground up. Kozarac was literally wiped off the face of the Earth during the war and what we have done is to rebuild it with 5000 new houses. We, the people from Kozarac, did this within three to 4 years. A new town was born here–simply out of our defance!

People who were expelled during the 1990s, have made their fortunes abroad and are now returning to show that they remain unvanquished. Abroad, regardless of their success, they are and will always remain refugees, people who were thrown out of their homes, defeated men, those who have accepted the law of force, who has accepted that these horrible crimes have largely gone unpunished, regardless of the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal [ICTY]. It was impossible to process each and every crime, due to their sheer immensity. Returnees to the Prijedor and Kozarac areas have also aided international justice here, as so many of the war criminals have been processed as a direct result of refugee returns. When we started to return, many of the arrests started to happen.

Are we going to accept that fascism has won in these areas? No, we will not accept this! I am not talking about any kind of revenge. I am not talking about returning so that the killing could go on. This is important to underline. I am only talking about justice and the appropriate punishment for crimes commited.

Arif's perspective on return to Kozarac is consistent with Sebina Sivac-Bryant's *An Ethnography of Contested Return: Re-Making Kozarac*, who writes of the debates between members of the kozarac.ba online community and returnees to Kozarac:

On the emotional level, it had spawned some very interesting and very self-aware debates about victimhood, the struggle to come to terms with the past, and recently (since the International Court of Justice failed to convict Serbia for complicity in genocide) a need to share stories of those who were killed as a way of reclaiming their presence within the community. At the same time, narratives are constructed in such a way as to illustrate, through individual stories, the resilience and strength of communal life despite everything, reaffrming its continuation (Sivac-Bryant, 2016).

Pursuit of justice and *not* revenge, resilience and strength *as opposed to* victimhood, are the building blocks of defance as part of the emotional dimension of BiH citizenship.

Loyalty to BiH citizenship and refusal to renounce it, even when required to obtain a second citizenship is an act of defance. When asked about applying for dual Turkish citizenship, Amir refused, explaining that he would face pressure to renounce his BiH citizenship as there is no bilateral agreement between Turkey and BiH on dual citizenship.

Amir: No, I did not want it out of spite. In order to gain Turkish citizenship I would have to give up my BiH citizenship and I would never do that. I did not want to do this out of defance. Actually, this is the same reason I rejected getting any other second citizenship. I wouldn't even hear of it. My wife is Turkish. We have been married for 19 years and I defnitely have met all the requirements for citizenship. I don't want it–out of defance. I feel defant.

Bilateral agreements on dual citizenship exist only between BiH and Serbia, Croatia and Sweden. However, as was elaborated throughout the study, most of the participants are dual, and in some cases triple citizens, with combinations such Swiss-BiH, US-BiH, Norwegian-BiH or Australian-BiH. The explanation is a tacit recognition by both BiH and the host state that dual citizenship is a reality although bilateral agreements do not exist. Dual citizenship status will not be endangered as long as one of the states does not demand renouncing the second citizenship. In the case of Turkey, the fact that the highly politicized nature of dual citizenship does not allow for the offcial signing of a bilateral agreement between BiH and Turkey, does not preclude Turkish authorities to require applicants to renounce their BiH citizenship as pre-condition for obtaining Turkish citizenship. This is the reason Amir feels defant in retaining his BiH citizenship.

#### *4.1.16 Happiness and Joy*

The returnees derive happiness and joy from contributing and from witnessing progress and the possibility for change. Alija views his contribution as active participation in economic development.

Alija: So, if I were to sum it all up it would be about my job that I love passionately and for which I see a purpose because I work on involving diaspora members in economic development. I have a satisfactory level of income and I have a sense of contributing to my home country. All these factors make me a happy man.

Ervin derives joy from aiding economic development and being an "agent of change," rejecting the possibility of taking a sidelines position.

Ervin: I feel more joy than pride. The joyous part of me confrms each day that change is actually possible. Perhaps I look at all the issues through my individual prism, the prism of an agent of change,27 one who inspires others to change. I really am not in the position of a passive observer, one who attends a soccer game, cheers for our team and says things like: 'Look at us now! Now, we have our own state.'

When discussing the happiness and joy they derived from being BiH citizens, the returnees frequently referred to what they were doing to improve the overall state of affairs in BiH, their status as "agents of change." The return migration literature has devoted considerable attention (for example, Bovenkerk, 1974; King, 1978; Gmelch, 1980; Portes, 1999) to the opportunities and limitation for returnees to act as agents of change. Some authors are hopeful about the returnees catalyzing positive social change in the home state, while others are much more skeptical. Particularly relevant to returnees who derive happiness and joy from their sense of contribution to BiH society is the concept of "vernacularization", introduced by Levitt and Merry (2009) and discussed in Kuschminder (2017). In brief, vernacularization is the process of translating and adapting internationally relevant phenomena to a local context (Kuschminder, 2017) and "vernacularizers take the ideas and practices of one group and present them in terms that another group will understand" (Levitt & Merry, 2009, p. 446). Examples of successful vernacularization in Alija's case is

<sup>27</sup>Although the interview was conducted in Bosnian, Ervin often interjected English terms into the conversation, such as "agent of change."

facilitating diaspora investment in BiH and Ervin's IT startup hub and co-working space in Sarajevo.

Besides taking an active role in the BiH economy, the returnees see themselves as members of a politically active citizenry, whether their political engagement is conducted through direct party affliation, work with municipal authorities or voting. Senad joined one of BiH leading opposition parties because he "wanted the water supply problem solved" and says that "fnally, I started doing and stopped complaining. This is my source of happiness." Vedad regularly attends meetings in his municipality and feels that he has a voice in local decision- making.

Vedad: But, do you know why is it that I am happy? I am happy because my municipality is fnally starting to care for its citizens. In the past, their only accomplishment was selling a piece of land to some Arab guy, while now they are really talking about the interest of all of us–building schools, sports and cultural facilities. It's easy to sell the land to a foreigner, who will setup his own business and make it impossible for our children to even have their playground here. When I see that the municipality authorities are starting to think of the citizens, of us–this is what makes me happy!

Alma, who takes an active role in educating kindergarten children in the values of "love for one's country" also fnds happiness in her voting preferences.

Alma: Well, what can I say…I always vote for some parties, which I hope could create change at least at the level of our canton. And I am very happy. I am talking about "Our Party." So far, they have held their promises and I have not been disappointed. They are not a very strong party, but they always have my vote. I am happy about it.

Deriving happiness and joy from political participation and performing other citizenship practices, such as voting, counters the view (Pedersen, 2003; Carling et al., 2015) of returnees as often socially alienated upon return. The concept of "vernacularization" (Levitt & Merry, 2009) fnds direct application to the returnees' political engagement. In fact, the model was originally applied to international human rights and women's rights movement and checked against their local adaptation. Senad, Vedad and Alma with experiences from the U.S. and Germany seem to be playing their roles in political vernacularization and deriving happiness from their status as BiH citizens.

#### *4.1.17 Hope*

Hope is an act of desperate defance against monstrous odds. Ivo Andrić, *Bosnian Chronicle*

Elections, with their possibility for positive change, are seen as both a source of hope and hopelessness. Admir is hopeful about the possibility for elections to bring about progress.

Admir: Well, there is always hope. I am an optimist generally in life. I still hope and believe that things will get better here. So, I have this hope every time I vote in elections that something could change.

Marija and Selim, on the other hand, are pessimistic about the prospects brought about by elections.

Marija: Well, yes. I would like the situation to change, but I doubt it can. The people who win elections work only for their own selfsh interests, while hiding behind their nationalities and their religious communities. In reality, they care for nobody except for themselves.

Besides the abuse of ethnonationalist rhetoric, Selim believes that elections are corrupted by how campaigns are fnanced and votes bought.

Selim: I mean I have absolutely no hope from elections, particularly not in these areas where votes are regularly bought through beer and pork roasts. Elections are bought and the person spending the most on a campaign is the one who wins. The winners are not the educated or the capable; they are usually criminals and war profteers. These are people with no vision for how to develop our economy. In such circumstance, my vote literally means nothing.

A major outside factor providing hope is the prospect of BiH joining the EU. Damir hopes that BiH joining the EU will make renewed confict an impossibility.

Damir: I see great hope in BiH joining the EU. I believe that all this talk of secession and referendums will lose their point once we become a member. We will live in a big community with borders erased, including our internal borders. This is my hope. Even the current talk of secession is only rhetoric for personal gain and staying in power, nothing else.

For some returnees, people of different ethnicities continuing to live together is perceived as a source of hope for a better future. Gavrilo fnds hope in everyday activities he pursues as a citizen of BiH, together with people of different ethnic backgrounds.

Gavrilo: Well, other countries had conficts, and they went through similar things as us. Most probably, things will somehow get back to normal and we will all understand that we need to work on building peace and co-existence. Through my mountaineering societies, I am friends with Croats, Serbs, and Muslims [Bosniaks] and we don't talk much of our painful past. This is hopeful to me.

For Arif, the mere act of survival against such diffcult circumstance and the courage necessary for survival is a source of hope.

Arif: And as I pass by Keraterm, each time I walk by, I get these thoughts running through my mind: 'a generation of those close to me and of my friends has been killed in one day, but still somebody, somebody survived. I survived. I am here and I can testify about everything that has happened, about each murder and each scene of torture. Somebody survived to tell the story.' Having hope is important, but having courage is more important. You need to be brave here, more so now than during the wartime camps.

Although hope is not a dominant emotion in the returnees' understanding of BiH "citizenship as feeling," still the glimmers of hope seem to be offered by some possibility for democratically induced change, BiH joining the EU and continued, albeit problematic, ethnic co-existence. Most importantly, hope seems to come from survival "against monstrous odds" (Andrić, 2015).

#### **4.2 Conclusion**

This chapter examines the specifc emotions constituting the emotional dimension of BiH citizenship for the returnees, answering the question of how does it *feel* to be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The emotions range from rage, anger, frustration to fear, guilt, denial, disgust, shame, disappointment, pity and empathy, to nostalgia and powerlessness. On the more positive side of the emotional spectrum, there are patriotic love, pride, defance, joy, happiness and hope. In interpreting results of qualitative data analysis, I have provided commentary on the historical, political, economic, social, and cultural context of Bosnia's recent past and current realities. In doing so, I have developed the core argument of this chapter: the specifc emotions constituting citizenship are context-dependent, so a thorough understanding of the particular context is key. For my study, context is both the particular case country, but also voluntary or "decided" (Cassarino, 2008) return migration – more broadly understood. There are instances where the returnees' responses are consistent with wider themes in migration research, such as the various dimensions of migrants' guilt (Baldassar, 2001; Baldassar, 2015; Boccagni & Baldassar, 2015), the onset of disappointment upon return (for example, King & Christou, 2009), or the returnees' positioning as vernacularizing agents of social change (Levitt & Merry, 2009; Kuschminder, 2017).

Overwhelmingly, however, the specifc emotions constituting BiH citizenship for the returnees are rooted in Bosnia's recent history and the state's structure engrained in the DPA, a peace agreement which stopped a horrifc war while failing to create the conditions for a long-term and prosperous peace. Some of the main characteristics of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a return migration setting are: the failure to sustainably implement Annex 7 provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement with the result of de facto legalizing ethnic cleansing and genocide; entrenched ethnic divisions; a bureaucratic structure envisioned by the DPA not conducive to economic growth and development; and the DPA producing signifcant power vacuums within the BiH state structure, thus providing plenty of room for corruption, with the rule of law becoming the exception and the abuse of political power by oligarchic ethnonationalist elites the effective norm. The returnees are people who have voluntarily decided to leave the relative comfort of the lives they managed to build for themselves in a variety of host countries such as Germany, United States, Australia, Austria or Switzerland, so that they could attempt to rebuild their wartorn past and contribute to the rebuilding of their home country. Their response to the various emotions constituting BiH citizenship is to persist in their efforts with determination and courage. While acknowledging the emotions they feel as citizens, they are not deterred. However, it is important to note that their courage and determination is the result of their own agency, while the success of their return is not due to state structure, but *in spite* of the obstacles it presents.

#### **References**


Bovenkerk, F. (1974). *The sociology of return migration: A bibliographic essay*. Martinus Nijhoff.


Dahaya, B. (1973). Pakistanis in Britain, transients or settlers? *Race, 14*(3), 241–277.


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## **Chapter 5 Losing, Creating and Re-creating Home and Belonging**

So far, geography scholars have theorized the emotional dimension of citizenship to be as conceptualized as *home* and *belonging*, while relevant scholarly literature treats both concepts as complex and multi-dimensional. This chapter aims to contribute to this literature by exploring the returnees' understanding of home and belonging. The life experience of my study participants makes this exploration particularly interesting, as its simplifed version includes at least three phases: the initial loss of home in BiH, followed by an effort at homemaking in the host state, and ending with an attempt to re-create their home upon return. Along these three stages, the returnees experience various types of belonging, exclusion from belonging both at home and abroad, as well as in-betweenness and multiple belonging. Throughout the process of loss, building and re-building of home and the associated types of belonging, the returnees experience specifc emotions, which create links to the overarching concept of emotional citizenship. Expressly, this chapter answers the research questions: What do 'home' and 'belonging' mean to the returnees? What do they associate these concepts with? Which specifc emotions do they convey?

The frst section of the chapter looks at the returnees' conceptualization of home within family relations, various time periods, and particular places. The possibility of "feeling at home" on the entire territory of the BiH state is investigated in-depth. How study participants understand belonging is explored next. Because of its pronounced ethnic and religious plurality, Bosnia and Herzegovina presents a unique learning opportunity to develop a more nuanced and substantiated conceptual understanding of belonging. The returnees' diversity of belonging due to life abroad adds further possibilities for enhanced interpretation of belonging. Relational, ethnic, religious, linguistic, landscape, and economic types of belonging are identifed and analyzed. Particular attention is given to civic belonging and its importance for citizenship. Parallel to "feeling at home" on the entire territory of the BiH state, civic belonging is challenged from various directions. The following section examines how the process of boundary-making often excludes the returnees from belonging both at home and abroad, leaving them in a "*neither* here *nor* there" position. In contrast, the position of "*both* here *and*

there" signifes an "in-betweenness," where the returnees exhibit multiple belonging and the transnational space becomes an arena for political, economic, cultural and other types of action. The fnal section of the chapter presents a summary of empirical results.

#### **5.1 Home as Family, Time, and Place**

#### *5.1.1 Family as Home*

The "family as home" at times refers to the nuclear family only, i.e. spouse and children for married respondents. For example, Admir used to feel as if his parents and brother provided him with the feeling of "being at home". However, ever since he got married, his wife and son give this meaning to his life.


It is important to note that the spouse and children refer to the "family as home" for happily married participants. Adnan compares how his "family as home" has changed from the time he was growing up in his parents' house, to his frst marriage, which ended in divorce, to his currently harmonious family life with his wife and their children.


couple of nights, I don't feel at home. I don't feel that their house is my home any longer, because my wife and children are not there. The rituals, our rituals are not there. My bed is not there and after two or 3 days I want to go back home, back to my home. The house I described is the place where I was born and where I grew up, but my family is not there and I no longer feel at home. The same thing happens to my wife when she visits her family in Istanbul. I guess this is only normal.

As was seen from the stories of Admir and Adnan, the "family as home" seems to depend on the marital status of the person, but it also exists with people who are neither married nor with children.

For single people, "family as home" refers to being close to their parents, as well as closeness to extended family members. For Nervan, his feeling of being at home is connected to the place where his parents live.


In some cases, the extended family, including aunts, uncles, grandparents, and cousins is taken to embody the concept of "family as home". Being surrounded by his extended family members gives Vedad a feeling of comfort and security, of "being at home."


In Vedad's case, the extended family provides the social context he associates with home, one in which he grew up and one which he wants for his children to grow up in. His and others' conceptualization of "family as home" points to a distinction made within the wider literature on the migration-home nexus between home as a "product" and home as a "process."

Its popular usage [*of home*] seems to involve its being used *in lieu of house* or *dwelling*, possibly because it is "warmer". This creates one of the major problems with its usage, since it is also used to describe certain *mental states*. There is thus confation between its use to refer to a *product* (the thing) and a *process* (a mental state or positive evaluation). These need to be distinguished clearly, and the current confusion is another major general problem. The *mental states* seem to involve an *affective core*, feelings of *security, control, being at ease and relaxed, are related to ownership and to family, kinship, comfort, friendship, laughter, and other positive attributes; it involves personalization, owned objects, and taking possession* (Rapoport, 1995, p. 29).

In the sense described above, "family as home" can be understood as a process or a mental state. The "mental state" could imply a happy marital life with a spouse and children, one's parents or extended family recreating the childhood experience for the next generation. Particularly relevant for the returnees, who have moved from one place to the next is the role family life plays in the continuing process of homemaking (Boccagni, 2017) and "emplacement of home" (Allen, 2008). Ultimately, as the stories of Admir and Adnan show and as the migration-home literature also confrms (Boccagni, 2017), the understanding of "family as home" leads to the "portability" (p. 12) of home itself. In Adnan's words, "family as home" can be summarized as: "I could build that place [*home*] with my family anywhere in the world."

Although the phenomenological approach to home (Antonsich, 2010) almost universally attributes security as its defning dimension, home here does not simply refer to the "domestic(ated) material space" (Antonsich, 2010, p. 646), often criticized by feminist scholars for re-enforcing patriarchal power relations. Home as a "gendered concept" was revealed when the returnees discussed feeling happy and free at home. For Marija, "being at home" is about joy and happiness in the daily routine of child rearing and family life. However, she emphasizes the repetitive aspects of her home life. As the wife and mother, she said that most of the household chores are her responsibility, so she also feels some of the burden of home life.

Author: What does home feel like to you?

Marija: I am at home. I take the children to daycare and school. Then I go to the offce and I pick up the kids after work. I prepare lunch and rest a bit afterwards. After that, we do homework together. That is what home feels like to me. It is a routine. It's a comfortable, safe routine, but still, it is a routine, repeating itself day after day. Well, it is peaceful (laughter). Peace, calmness, happiness, and joy with the children.

Gavrilo, a divorcee discusses feeling free as "being at home." He associates this feeling to his house and the more general "outside".

Author: What does home feel like to you?

Gavrilo: Joy, freedom, safety.

Author: Where do you get the sense of freedom?

Gavrilo: Anywhere. In my house and outside. If something happens to me on the road, I know that there won't be any problems, because people here help each other out.

Joy, happiness and freedom are the feelings both Marija and Gavrilo associate with being at home, however, they have different attitudes towards them. As the homemaker, Marija places her emphasis on repetition and the routine aspects of home, while Gavrilo's focus is on freedom, echoing the analysis presented in Henderson (2011) where she points to Simone de Beauvoir's distinction between immanence vs. transcendence and Hannah Arendt's labor vs. work. As de Beauvoir would predict, the home represents an anchor for the man who is left to pursue transcendent activities, while the woman is left to the immanent tasks of home keeping, including taking care of the children.

#### *5.1.2 Temporal Understanding of Home—Home in Time*

Nostalgia is associated with conceptualizing home in the past. For Amir, a Bosniak minority returnee to Prijedor, the familiar scents from his childhood make him feel at home.

Amir: Hmmm….all the emotions come rushing through. This is where I went to elementary school and on the way to school there was a cookie factory, now owned by Kraš. The smell of cookies early in the morning on the way to school tells me that this is where I belong. Of course, cookies can be found anywhere around the world, but this smell brings me back to my childhood, brings me back home.

I asked Sanela how is it she feels more at home in Banja Luka than in Sarajevo when she was forcefully expelled from Banja Luka and when Banja Luka has transformed in the meantime. She answered by discussing her feelings of being at home in the Banja Luka of her childhood.

Sanela: I don't know what to tell you. I don't want to go in, because I feel that my childhood is locked inside of me. I have no desire to enter that apartment anymore, because I don't feel it to be mine anymore. That is not my home anymore. When I go inside there, the old furniture will not be there and it won't look like my apartment. There will be nothing but walls and those walls do not make that place my home. I feel that way [at home] in the past. In the past.

Author: What feelings do you have when you think of your home in the past?

Sanela: I defnitely feel nostalgic for it all. I had the most beautiful childhood, actually perfect. That is where I feel at home–in Banja Luka of my childhood. Right now, in the present, I have no home, so it almost doesn't matter to me where is that I am located. Since Banja Luka, the way it was in 1987 is gone for good, I could be in Zimbabwe.

Due to Bosnia's painful recent history, some returnees, such as Vlado, express a direct desire to consciously break with the past.

Vlado: When I came back to my family's village estate I threw out about 99% of the things that were lying around–the ancient plow or other belongings of my ancestors. I thought about restoring all these objects, some with historical value, but, instead, I piled them up and set them of fre. This is old energy and carries a certain spirit. I need to live my life. I need to live life and not build an ethnographic museum. These types of things are why wars are fought, because people value objects more than they value each other. All of that is just frustrating to me. All I could do is bow down to my ancestors' heritage with gratitude, thanking them for all they have left behind, but also frmly deciding that I need to live my life independently.

As discussed by scholars from different disciplines, home has a strong temporal dimension. For example, for Howes and Hammett (2016), "home is also constructed in relation to temporality through the grounding of these emotional connections to the past, present and future in social and material, visual and audible everyday practices" (p. 22). The idealized past is often seen as a peaceful harbor, a place of nostalgic escape from present hardships, often in reference to childhood, to which there is no actual return (Lam & Yeoh, 2004). The "temporal home", as discussed by Taylor (2009), refers to the refugee's place in time as much as in space. Stories of either Amir's "idealized past", Vlado's conscious desire to create a break with the past and Sanela's "temporal home," which seems independent from the spatial dimension of home, which "could be in Zimbabwe" seem to illustrate these theoretical points. In fact, all three stories point to a displacement in both time and space.

[M]igration involves not only a spatial dislocation, but also a temporal dislocation: the "past" becomes associated with a home that it is impossible to inhabit, and be inhabited by, in the present. The question then of being at home or leaving home is always a question of memory, of the discontinuity between past and present. (Ahmed, 1999, p. 343)

Perhaps the awareness of the dual time-space displacement, leads some returnees to fght the tendency of recreating home in the past and relying on memory to do so.

As a result, some returnees actively reject any notions of feeling at home in the past, whether it is to wax nostalgic for it or to denounce it. Instead, they favor feeling at home which is frmly anchored in the here and now. Adnan feels at home with his wife and children only in their current station in life, where they are together.

Adnan: No, no, no, I do not like that at all. We never talk about the past. This might be even too much. I don't like looking at old photographs, watching my old soccer matches, even scoring important goals. For example, I never even watched my wedding video. These kinds of things simply do not make me happy.

Emir is aware of problems with feeling at home in the past, by witnessing the behavior patterns of his friends. Instead, he fnds his home in the present.


Conceptualizing home in the past comes with a set of problems both on a personal and a collective level. Adnan, who had a successful international career as a soccer player does not want to "live in the past" because he feels that this will take away from his present career and family life. Emir feels his friends keep reliving the war, thus making it impossible to create a more peaceful present and future.

#### *5.1.3 Spatial Understanding of Home—Home as Place*

Those returnees who view their physical house as their home are also prone to exclude other types of home. Vlado discusses the house he built on his family estate as making him "feel at home." While discussing his physical house as home, he excludes other parts of Trebinje or BiH as making him feel at home.

Vlado: I only feel at home on my estate. Wherever I go, I come back eagerly, because in my little heaven I feel that my heart is in its place and I feel at ease with myself. There is no distraction. I feel safe, centered, in my right place. There are no dilemmas because everything is familiar. Interestingly, I do not have this feeling in the house where I was born. I only have it at the village estate, in the house that I built myself. In front of this house there is a salvia bush dispersing its fragrance into the air, giving the place a smell, one I have known since I was a child.

Mahir spent most of his adult life moving from one country to the next, one rented apartment to the next. For him, even his own couch would start the feeling of being at home. Owning an apartment in BiH is what completed the feeling.

Mahir: For a very long time, I used to say that I would feel at home when I buy my frst couch–a couch, a TV set, and a glass bowl in which to throw the house keys. So, that was the feeling I was seeking–this glass bowl for the keys and my last name written on the front door of the apartment.

Arif connects feeling at home in his physical house to the experience of being once forced to leave that house.

Arif: Well, this is very simple. If you have been expelled from your home for so many years and when you fnally come back, you realize you are here again and that you have an enormous feeling of security. If we are talking about feeling at home, then this relates to my house, to the garden around my house.

Mostar, Anastasija's native city, has transformed because of the war. Consequently, she does not feel at home anywhere else in the city or the country, except for her prewar family apartment.

Anastasija: You see, the only remaining thing is this apartment, and that is why I invited you over here. What I mean to say is that this is the only place where I feel like I belong, from the entire country. It is only when I park my car down here (gesturing towards the parking lot in front of the building); when I pass through the corridor between the two buildings and I walk into my apartment that I feel at home. Only here.

The physical house is often viewed as the exclusive home, and in some cases, the returnees feel at home in other very specifc and relatively small places. As substituting for the lack of security provided by the state of BiH. Emir, feels at home in his village home in the mountain of Romanija, outside of Sarajevo.


When analyzing the data and surveying the relevant scholarly literature, the feeling of "being at home" has been found to be primarily characterized by security. Such as with conceptualizing home as only the physical house or another relatively small place, where one feels safe.

Similarly, if the city or town is expressed as the place where the returnees feel at home other cities or towns in BiH are excluded. Amir was expelled as a non-Serb from Prijedor together with his family. He found refuge in Turkey and returned to Prijedor with his Turkish wife and their two children. Although he is a minority returnee in the RS, he prefers this status to moving to another city where he would be part of the ethnic majority.


Author: You would not consider moving to Sarajevo or somewhere else?

Amir: I don't know. I had a job offer in Sarajevo, but I politely thanked the people. I mean I was very thankful, but I simply don't feel like I belong in Sarajevo. Of course, Sarajevo is the capital of my country, but it is also a big city and the reason I came back was to be here, close to nature.

Although Sanela, who was born and raised in Banja Luka now lives in Sarajevo, she still feels most at home in her native Banja Luka, a city from which she was expelled as a non-Serb in 1992.

Sanela: Actually, I feel much more at home in Banja Luka than anywhere else. Although, even there…. Although, the feeling I have there is strange, very strange. I mean, I spent 10 days or close to 2 weeks in Banja Luka. I guess that this was the longest I had stayed in Banja Luka in recent times. Usually, I go there for 2 or 3 days. I was born and raised in Banja Luka. I lived there for 11 years. Let's say I am walking down a street and I think to myself, my aunt used to live there. That is where my grandmother had her hair done. Over there is where I went to school. Now, when I go there and tell people about how things used to be in Banja Luka it could easily seem that I have gone mad. I mean, I have no proof that any of these things actually existed, that these people lived here and how it really used to be.

Author: As if it never happened?

Sanela: Yes! And I now look at this school and remember the playground where I used to play as a child, but it all seems as part of a dream. It is no longer there.

In addition to security, Boccagni (2017) adds *familiarity* to be the second "basic attribute" (p. 7) of home:

(2) Familiarity: both in an emotional sense, pointing to intimacy and comfort, and in a cognitive one, standing for orientation in space, stability, routine, continuity or even permanence–all implicit expectations that are not easy to reconcile with increasingly mobile life courses. The frequent connections between home and notions such as household, kinship, or neighborhood are telling of the centrality of this factor (p. 7)

For both Sanela and Amir, their native cities and towns (Banja Luka and Prijedor, respectively) are home to them, not necessarily because they feel safer in the place from which they were once forcefully expelled, but because these *places* are more *familiar* to them. Banja Luka and Prijedor are more familiar to them than is Sarajevo, although they are part of the ethnic majority in Sarajevo and, because of ethnic cleansing campaigns of the 1992–95 war, are now ethnic minorities in Republika Srpska. This point is further illustrated when examining the dividing lines drawn by internal displacement.

Not feeling at home in cities and towns of BiH, outside one's own birthplace is also the result of internal displacement. Bakir is Badema's father, who returned from Germany to Srebrenica together with his wife and fve daughters. He is critical of fellow Bosniaks who prefer living in Bosniak-majority areas of the Federation of BiH (such as Vogošća or Tuzla) instead of returning to their native Srebrenica.


Bakir is critical of Bosniak women who have not returned to Srebrenica to the point of accusing them of "continuing with Mladić's genocide," as their failure to return to Republika Srpska has solidifed results of ethnic cleansing campaigns against non-Serbs. Interestingly, he uses the same standard to judge the Serbs, who have voluntarily (see Armakolas, 2007 for further clarifcation) left Sarajevo and moved to Republika Srpska so that they could be part of an ethnic majority. To a large extent, the fndings of Armakolas (2007) echo what Bakir seems to say about the "displaced sense of place" (p. 89) of Sarajevan Serbs who now live in rural parts of Republika Srpska.

On the other hand, the constant invocation by Sarajevan Serbs of their former urban identity can be seen as an attempt to create a boundary between themselves and the local population. Among young people this is usually expressed through complaints about the backwardness of local people, their lack of style, or their funny preferences when it comes to entertainment. Socializing, going out and dating mostly with 'their own' people is one consequence of this. A hesitant acceptance or denial of locality, of local culture and people, maintains a dis-placed sense of place. (Armakolas, 2007, p. 89)

<sup>1</sup> "Mladić" refers to General Ratko Mladić, Chief of General Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) and a convicted war criminal, found guilty by the ICTY for committing war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

<sup>2</sup> "these women"refers to Bosniak women who, after surviving the genocide in Srebrenica, continued to live in Bosniak-majority areas in the FBiH.

Although the case of Bosniak returnees to Republika Srpska and Bosnian Serb returnees to the Federation of BiH cannot be directly compared because of the radically different nature of their initial departure, what can be observed is an interplay of both security and familiarity, as the defning characteristics of home.

Regardless of whether the returnee is part of the ethnic majority, the native town provides a feeling of home. As a Croat from Jajce, Marija did not feel at home in the Croat-dominated parts of Mostar, which she perceives as overly nationalistic.


Marija feels at home in her native town of Jajce, which is more ethnically mixed, while she distinctly did not feel at home as part of an ethnic majority, while she was a student in Mostar. A description of events leading up to the Croatian National Congress of 2000 provided by Grandits (2007) could serve as contextual background to Marija's experiences:

With the help of the media under its control, the HDZ tried to discredit non-HDZ Croat candidates by revealing 'true' details of their pasts, such as their failure to observe the Catholic faith or to join the HVO during the war, their readiness to cooperate with non-Croat parties, or their own fnancial misdeeds. Epithets such as 'communists', 'traitors' and 'Judases' were systematically sprayed on opposition campaign posters (Grandits, 2007, p. 117).

Both Marija's story and Grandits (2007) analysis of ethnic loyalty and political factionalism among BiH Croats go beyond the often simplifying and reductive thinking based on ethnic allegiances alone.

To complicate the "Bosnian mosaic" (Bougarel et al., 2007) besides the various dimensions of inter-ethnic confict, the 1992–95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina also had an episode of Bosniak intra-ethnic fghting. As Ramet explains:

Clashes between Serbs and non-Serbs in Bosnia actually began in August 1991, but it was not until the following April that the Serbian assault on Bosnia-Herzegovina began in earnest. By October, if not before, the Croatian army was engaging in collaborative behavior with Serbian forces…The war eventually became a four sided confict, with Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Bosnian forces loyal to the elected government of Alija Izetbegović and forces loyal to Fikret Abdić, self-declared head of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, variously fghting or in collaboration with each other (Ramet, 2002, p. 573).

Fikret Abdić's declaration of "autonomy" of an area of North Western Bosnia centered in the town of Velika Kladuša resulted in bitter clashes between his supporters and the Fifth Corpus of the BiH Army, loyal to the elected government of Alija Izetbegović in Sarajevo. Elmir grew up in Velika Kladuša; lived and worked in Germany; returned to BiH and now divides his time between Sarajevo and Velika Kladuša. I asked him whether he feels more at home in Sarajevo or his birthplace.


Although Elmir was initially hesitant to discuss Velika Kladuša as his "home" with full awareness of the painful history of the "Autonomy Movement," he later retreated to "feeling best in Kladuša," as the place of greatest familiarity, if for no other reason, the immutable fact of his ancestors being buried there.

The entire region of the former Yugoslavia, a country that no longer exists, is referred to as home in almost the same number of occasions as the current state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When I asked Hrvoje about why he considers all the former Yugoslavia to make him feel at home, he emphasized the similarities between people of various ethnicities living in the region.

Hrvoje: Well, I think this is all about our genetic makeup. Yes, I guess there is nothing else but our genetics. Although we might think we are so different in the Balkans and even though some countries, like Slovenia and Croatia, might consider themselves to be outside of the Balkans, still, this geographic area is one whole–a natural bridge. All the former Yugoslavia is included and as much as we consider ourselves to differ from each other, in fact, we are all very similar.

Similarly, Gavrilo sees more similarities between people of diverse ethnicities in the region, contrasting them to people he encountered while living abroad.

Gavrilo: It is about all the peoples inhabiting the Balkans. I will just give you one example. Go anywhere you like throughout the Balkans and try hitchhiking. Every third car will stop to pick you up. Go to Italy and try doing the same thing. You could stand there for an entire week and nobody would bother to stop (laughter).

While similarities between the various ethnicities of the former Yugoslavia certainly exist, those same similarities are also present in the current state of BiH, so turning to whether the state of BiH is felt as home by different ethnicities and the challenges this notion presents seems to be more relevant.

#### *5.1.4 State Territory as Place: Is it Possible to "Feel at Home" on the Entire BiH State Territory?*

The idea of "feeling at home" on the entire territory of a deeply divided state with an intensely traumatic recent history comes with several different challenges for all BiH citizens, including the returnees. In fact, only a very few of the returnees talked without reservation about feeling at home in all different parts Bosnia and Herzegovina, while most problematized the notion from different angles. Damir is a Bosniak from Sanski Most and one of a few returnees who say that they feel equally at home in different parts of BiH.

Damir: This means that I do not have a feeling that somebody would give me dirty looks or would make insulting remarks, regardless of where I might be, regardless of any ethnic divisions: I could be in Pale or Mostar, I don't experience any problems. I simply do not care about any of the ethnic barriers.

Author: Do you feel "at home", having coffee in Foča,3 for example?

Damir: Yes, I feel 'rahat4 ' (laughter).

Gavrilo, a Serb from Nevesinje, also feels at home in different parts of BiH, regardless of the various ethnic divisions. I asked him whether he feels "at home" in BiH and he answered positively and enthusiastically!

Gavrilo: Yes! I feel that way all over the country, throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The general challenge of feeling "at home" in public spaces, and particularly a relatively large space, such as the territory of a state, poses the question of how can "a special relationship with place" (Boccagni, 2017, p. 89) be established? As Boccagni (2017) suggests: "The political, here, lies in the unequally distributed potential to attach a sense of *security*, familiarity and control to outer living environments such as streets, parks, shops, "hangout" and recreational facilities and so forth; and possibly, in the most radical sense, to claim a place as one's own home" (p. 89). Damir and Gavrilo are the two rare cases of returnees who say they feel equally "at home" in different parts of BiH, while the more typical response is that in BiH it is close to impossible to attach security, familiarity and control to areas of the country which have been "cleansed" of one's ethnic kin with constant reminders of recent history, such as open and public celebrations of convicted war criminals.5

<sup>3</sup>Foča is a town in Eastern Bosnia, now located in Republika Srpska. The town was almost entirely "ethnically cleansed" from its Bosniak inhabitants during the 1992–95 war.

<sup>4</sup>Damir seems to have purposively used the Turkish-origin word "rahat," meaning "peaceful and comfortable" to talk about his imagined experience of having coffee in Foča.

<sup>5</sup>For most recent examples, see Delauney, G. (2016, March 24). Mixed reaction to Radovan Karadzic verdict in Bosnia. *BBC News*. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-35897367 discussing billboards erected throughout Republika Srpska with pictures of Radovan Karadžić entitled "Serbian Hero"in reaction to the ICTY verdict declaring him guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes and convicting him to lifetime imprisonment.

The main reason it is diffcult for citizens of different ethnicities to "feel at home" on the entire territory of BiH comes as a direct result of the war. Alma lives in Vrace, a Sarajevo neighborhood close to the inter-entity border with Republika Srpska. Although the area she describes is practically in her neighborhood, it has changed because of ethnic cleansing to where she, as a non-Serb, does not feel at home while walking around.

Alma: I mean, I could not say that I feel at home in all parts of BiH. I defnitely could not say that. I look at Bosnia and Herzegovina like scattered pieces of a colorful kaleidoscope. I love the individual pieces, but I cannot really think of it as one whole country. Well, since we are divided in two…I cross the hill to go to East Sarajevo, where I have my dear friends and I walk down a street called Serbian Heroes Street (Ulica srpskih heroja), or another one called St. Vitus Day6 Street (Vidovdanska ulica).

Author: How do you feel as you walk down these streets?

Alma: Very strange, because after all aren't we in Bosnia and Herzegovina? The names of these streets are more Serb-sounding than the names of streets in Belgrade.

Alma's experience of "not feeling at home" while walking around public spaces in East Sarajevo7 has a signifcant background in public policies of exclusion (Palmberger, 2012) practiced in various parts of BiH, at various intensities. Palmberger (2012) focuses on the renaming of public spaces such as city streets, parks, squares, airports and in entire towns in the Croat-dominated West Mostar, but fnds similar tendencies throughout BiH. The goal of postwar "national screening" (Palmberger, 2012, p. 3) of street names is twofold:

First it eradicates the old name and thereby aims to "de-commemorate" the event/person/ place that was previously remembered and in a second step, by renaming, it establishes a new commemorative space (Azaryahu, 1997). In the case of West Mostar, the decommemoration concerns the socialist past while the new commemorative space is dedicated to Croat national history.

Palmberger's analysis concerns specifcally the Croat-dominated West Mostar, but her conclusions analogously extend to Serb-dominated or Bosniak-dominated areas

<sup>6</sup>St. Vitus Day is a Serbian religious and national holiday and an important date in Serbian national history.

<sup>7</sup>East Sarajevo comprises suburban municipalities of Sarajevo (East Ilidža, East New Sarajevo, East Old Town, RS section of Pale, RS section of Sokolac and Trnovo), now located in Republika Srpska. East Sarajevo is the offcial capital of Republika Srpska, although its administrative center is in Banja Luka. East Sarajevo was previously called Serb Sarajevo (*Srpsko Sarajevo*), but the name was changed due to a decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As Feldman (2005) observes, the Constitutional Court of BiH had found that the National Assembly of Republika Srpska had "renamed various cities and towns in the territory of RS in that presented them as having an exclusively Serb identity, violated the constitutional rights of the other two constituent peoples of BiH to collective equality and the right of all citizens to be free of discrimination, taken together with the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes of origin and the right of all citizens to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of the state" (p. 649).

of BiH. She concludes that the renaming of streets in West Mostar to make them more Croat-sounding is "a policy of exclusion that unequivocally signals the non-Croat population that this part of the city is no longer their home" (p. 24).

Feeling at home in all of BiH is also challenging as an indirect result of the war. Undoubtedly, the majority Bosniak areas of BiH have also changed with some of these changes happening directly after the war8 and some happening because of globalization and increasing global migratory fows. Siniša, a Serb from Trebinje was made not to feel at home in Sarajevo, while he was visiting with his wife.

Author: Do you feel that way [feel "at home"] in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Siniša: Well, I can say that I do, more or less, although I don't really feel at home in some places in the country. Aaam, I think I can understand that other people might have similar feelings in different environments. Perhaps if somebody is surrounded by Serb people in the center of Serbdom and even though we Serbs are a hospitable people and always welcoming, still I could understand that somebody who is not Serb could feel a bit strange. We congregate around our churches and have our customs. I felt a bit like that the other day in Sarajevo. I could even show you a photo I took.

We were sitting in a café and at one moment we noticed that everybody around us was Arab or Middle Eastern. All the women were wearing black burkas. Although I respect everybody this scene was completely foreign to me. I mean if we were in an Arab country, I would expect it, but not here [in Sarajevo]. I did not feel threatened or scared, but I just felt totally foreign. I felt like a foreigner, a foreigner.

Author: You did not feel at home?

Siniša: At that moment I did not. My wife and I took a selfe in that café so that we could remember the scene with covered women everywhere around us. It looked like we were in the Emirates. I don't mean to denigrate anybody, it's just that I felt so strange in that situation.

Siniša was describing his experience of visiting the Sarajevo City Center, the biggest shopping mall in BiH, fnanced by Saudi investors with an approximate cost of EURO 57 million.9 This building in downtown Sarajevo is part of ongoing real estate investment projects throughout BiH, such as the controversial "Buroj Ozone"

<sup>8</sup>See Robinson et al. (2001) on the work of an administrative commission appointed by the Sarajevo Canton government directly after the war to rename streets and other public spaces in Sarajevo. Also, see Robinson and Pobrić (2006) for an analysis of the protests in Sarajevo at the SDA proposal to change the name of Sarajevo's main street from Marshall Tito to Alija Izetbegović street. Due to these city-wide demonstrations and a decision of the OHR, the main street in Sarajevo is still called Marshall Tito's street (*Ulica Maršala Tita*).

<sup>9</sup> von der Brelie, H. (2018, April 27). Foreign infuence taking over Bosnia and Herzegovina? *Euronews*. Retrieved from https://www.euronews.com/2018/04/26/insiders-foreign-infuencetaking-over-bosnia-and-herzegovina

mountain resort, funded by investors from Saudia Arabia and other Gulf States.10 In an interview11 for a Sarajevo-based news portal, Professor Esad Duraković, a renowned scholar of Arabic studies at the University of Sarajevo, expressed concern, criticizing the BiH authorities' encouragement of such investment projects as they could "hurt the delicate religious balance in Bosnia." His greatest concern was regarding the possibility for additional fueling of Bosnian Serb ambitions for secession as "they will not want to live in 'Muslimstan.'" (Depo.ba, 2016) In Boccagni's (2017) theoretical construct of home as being determined by security, familiarity and control, the case of Arab real estate purchases in BiH are primarily endangering the elements of familiarity and control. The investment projects are bringing with them cultural, social and religious practices, which are almost equally unfamiliar to either Bosniaks, Croats or Serbs, while the local population, be they Serb, Croat, or Bosniak does not feel that they control the process. Ultimately, the "hurt delicate religious balance," could lead to a *security* threat.

Closely connected to feeling at home in all of BiH are the contrasting perceptions returnees have of BiH as a state, ranging from an impassioned opinion characterizing the BiH state as a national home to a disengaged stance relativizing its importance. When I asked Arif about the continued statehood of BiH, he felt strongly and directly connected it to his own physical existence and the national survival of the Bosniak people.

Arif: What would have happened if the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not survive as a state during the war? What would have happened to all the Bosnian and Herzegovinian people? Some would be buried in mass grave sites, while others would be scattered all around the world. Within a 100 years they would all assimilate and cease to exist as a people.

While some participants view the continued statehood of BiH to be a matter of their own physical existence, others are much more nonchalant. Lejla, also a Bosniak and a yoga teacher, is emotionally indifferent towards the state of BiH and does not view it as her home. Instead, she chooses India, as her "spiritual home".

Lejla: As far as considering the state as my home, I have no such feelings for Bosnia and Herzegovina. I need to be honest about this. Actually, I do have some similar feelings for India, which I consider to be my spiritual home.

Relating the concept of home to the homeland, nation, and national identity has been studied widely (see MacPherson, 2004; Barrington et al., 2003). For MacPherson (2004) home is the "cornerstone of national identity" (p. 92) and Barrington et al. (2003) underline the importance of territoriality, understood as

<sup>10</sup>For details see: Sito-Sucic, D. (2016, August 21). Gulf tourism frenzy in Bosnia delights business, polarizes locals. *Reuters*. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-arabsinvestment/gulf-tourism-frenzy-in-bosnia-delights-business-polarizes-locals-idUSKCN10W08L

<sup>11</sup>See Depo.ba. (2016, August 11). *Esad Duraković: Arab settlements in BiH are part of a project endangering the state's survival*. Retrieved from https://novi.ba/clanak/86224/esad-durakovicnaseljavanje-arapa-u-bih-je-projekat-koji-ugrozava-opstanak-drzave

home and homeland, for the development of national identity. Arif's views might be theorized within an established and strong relationship between home, homeland and national identity. On the other hand, Lejla's view could be placed within a general criticism of confating the concepts of home, nation, homeland and fnally the state, as the confation leads to the production of the "neurotic citizen" (Isin, 2004) whose stable home is placed in service of the homeland and "homeland security." To a large extent, the second view is consistent with criticism of conceptualizing the state as home and as "domopolitics" (Walters, 2004).

#### **5.2 Disentangling Belonging**

#### *5.2.1 Relational Belonging and Neighborliness*

Relational belonging often supersedes ethnic belonging among the returnees. Selim, a Bosniak returnee to Banja Luka fnds a greater sense of belonging with his prewar neighbors, other Serb residents of Banja Luka, than with members of his own ethnicity from other parts of BiH.

Selim: I felt wonderful when I came back. I could not believe how nicely everybody treated me. Of course, this was true for people who were born and raised in Banja Luka. The butchers who committed all the war crimes were not from this city. They came from outside. They were outsiders.

Author: When you came back, could you recognize anybody from wartime?

Selim: No! No! I could not recognize one Serb who did some evil to me. Not even one. Although, you need to realize the horrors that Banja Luka went through. But, if you look at the Serbs, the local Serbs had terrible problems from those Serbs who came here from Knin. They had terrible problems.

Author: What kind of problems?

Selim: All kinds of problems. They have completely different mentalities. For example, guests of all different nationalities come to my restaurant, but the Knin Serbs and the local Serbs simply cannot stand each other. There is so much animosity between them.

Author: Do Knin Serbs live here?

Selim: Sure. They are around here too. The Serbs who grew up with me and who went to school with me tell me about the problems they have had with them. They have no common ground. Their mentalities are completely different, while the mentalities of the Bosniak from Banja Luka and the Serbs from Banja Luka are much closer together. The same is true for me. I will always fnd ways to talk to a Serb from Banja Luka easier than to a Bosniak from Sarajevo.

Building and fostering relational belonging is essential to the returnees' sense of wellbeing. Nusret, a Bosniak returnee to Prijedor, relies on his neighbors Serbs and Bosniaks in Prijedor for support and assistance, not looking to authorities in Sarajevo for protection.

Nusret: We created a local community for ourselves here. That is what we did and believe me, my neighbor, who takes care of just two cows and feeds his family in that way is more important to me than the president of the country. Believe me that this is how it is.

Mahir compares his wellbeing in Sarajevo, where he found relational belonging among his friends, to his relative social isolation abroad.

Mahir: Yesterday, I was going to a movie screening at the Sarajevo Film Festival with friends from America, Israel, France, Croatia, literally from all over….from Switzerland. There were seven or eight of us together and we were walking through the city together. While walking from the National Theater to the Hotel "Europe", I said hello to 15 or 16 people. That could never, ever have happen to me in either Brussels or Budapest. I felt wonderful. I felt like I was a part of something.

There exist a number of scholarly works (see for example Sorabji, 2008; Helms, 2010; Henig, 2012) examining relational belonging or neighborliness (*komšiluk*) in BiH and giving it centrality in formulating explanations of social relations—past and present. In *How Generations Remember: Conficting Histories and Shared Memories in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Monika Palmberger presents a succinct understanding of relational belonging in BiH (Palmberger, 2016):

A central discourse about people's coexistence (*suživot*) is the concept of *komšiluk* (neighbourliness). If people speak about komšiluk when narrating the past, they are usually referring to the good pre-war neighbourliness. Even if Sorabji (2008) rightly reminds us that the concept of komšiluk cannot be reduced to cross-ethno-national relations, in discourses about the past it is usually referred to in this meaning. Komšiluk is then a way to express what was and what no longer is, and to emphasise today's corrupt relations between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Pre-war komšiluk is narrated as the art of being neighbourly regardless of national affliation (although the Roma are usually excluded in this discourse), meaning neighbours who help each other out (for example, during illness) but who also celebrate festivities together and share daily practices, such as drinking coffee with one another (see Helms, 2010; Stefansson, 2010).

Although, as Palmberger (2016) explains, the concept of neighbourliness is much more associated with discourses of BiH's pre-war past, the stories of Selim, Nusret and Mahir seem to suggest that some remnant of the good *komšiluk* is also a part of the BiH present.

#### *5.2.2 Ethnic Belonging: Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, and "Others"*

Although ethnic belonging is declared among all three ethnic groups, it is more pronounced with the Serbs and Croats than with the Bosniak. Although Vlado rejected declaring himself as part of any ethnic group within the demographic information section of the interview, also asking me to categorize him as a "nomad" and an "extraterrestrial", soon within the in-depth part our conversation, he openly discussed his relation with his ethnic group, the Serbs.


Hrvoje, a Bosnian Croat, discusses his ethnic belonging as a dual citizen of Croatia and BiH.

Hrvoje: You see, whenever I am abroad, I never declare myself as a Croat or a citizen of Croatia, regardless of the fact that I travel with my Croatian passport and that all my business dealings are related to the Croatian passport. However, my Croatian passport includes my address in Sarajevo and states Sarajevo as my city of birth. What this means is that I have not given up anything and I do not want to give up on anything, because this place [Bosnia and Herzegovina] is mine too. This is the place where I was born and where I live. Also, within our family we always thought of ourselves as Croat. It has always been like that with us.

Although a majority of the participants were in some way associated with Islam as a religion and some self-identify as Bosniak, not even one provided any sort of elaboration of his or her Bosniak ethnic belonging. Instead of the returnees' discussion of Bosniak ethnic belonging, see for example Helms (2013) for a succinct explanation of differences between the terms Bosnian, Bosniak (also spelled as Bosniac) and Muslim.

#### *5.2.3 Religious Belonging: Monotheistic Traditions with Fluidity and Change*

Although the returnees acknowledge the diffculties of developing strong civic belonging in Bosnia and Herzegovina, many of them insist on its importance and contrast it to religious and ethnic belonging. Both Alija and Nervan are most closely associated with the Bosnian Muslims in terms of religious belonging and the Bosniak in ethnic terms, but they both express their preference for civic belonging.


As was discussed previously, a number of returnees expressed their civic belonging, however, several points need to be emphasized. First, the returnees expressing Bosnian-Herzegovinian civic belonging are mostly in some way associated either with the Bosniak ethnicity or with Muslim religious belonging, which is consistent with claims made by Helms (2013). Second, civic belonging is always contrasted to ethnic and religious belonging.

Religious belonging in some cases takes precedence over ethnic belonging. From a religious perspective, Bakir rejects the ethnic categorization because he feels it severs him off from other Muslims. Religious belonging is most important to him, so he rejects the ethnic category of Bosniak.

Bakir: BiH citizenship is important to me as a religious person. I am Muslim, a Bosnian Muslim. I am not Bosniak.

Salih favors religious belonging over ethnic categorization because he feels that this division would strengthen civic belonging in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this respect, emphasis would be placed on a shared civic BiH belonging, with three distinct religions.

Salih: Why are there Serbs and Croats in this country? They did not used to exist here. This was a country inhabited by three religions: Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim.

<sup>12</sup>The term Alija uses is "*narod*," which is rather diffcult to translate directly into English. To a large extent, I share Palmberger's ambivalence (see Palmberger, 2012; Palmberger, 2016) when translating *narod* as either people or nation, since the term is used to describe group identities, alternatively: 'nation' or 'national identity,' as well as 'ethnicity' or 'ethnic identity'.

In contrasting Bakir's and Salih's views another aspect of the ethnic-religious-civic triad is revealed. For Bakir, his religious belonging (Muslim) takes precedence over ethnic belonging (Bosniak), as ethnic belonging is not encouraged by the universality of Islam as a faith. For Salih, the most important type of belonging is civic (Bosnian and Herzegovian), followed by religious belonging (Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox) with disdain towards ethnic belonging (Bosniak, Croat and Serb) as ethnic allegiances weaken BiH as a state.

The differences between Muslim religious, Bosniak ethnic, and BiH civic belonging are most visible in relation to Turkey, as a host state. Both Amir and Nervan consider themselves to be BiH citizens frst, thus rejecting ethnic categorization. Also, both Amir and Nervan declare Islam to be their religion. Amir, who considers himself a moderate Muslim felt a sense of religious belonging while he lived in Turkey.

Amir: I feel as a foreigner anywhere outside BiH. This is a simple fact. However, while I was in Turkey, I did not feel different in terms of my religion. I would sometimes go to Friday prayers and this was acceptable behavior in Turkey. If I were in some Western country, I would probably be labeled an Islamic terrorist or something like that. In Turkey I did not feel any of that.

Nervan problematizes both the Bosniak ethnic belonging and the tendencies to Islamize it in Turkey.

Nervan: OK, this was supposed to be an association of Bosnian students and it was later translated to Turkish as Bosniak students, *Genc Bosnaklar Dernegi (GBD).*13 So, it was not translated as Bosnalilar, but instead as Bosnaklar. For example, why did they have Bayram celebrations? I mean, how could you have a Bayram celebration and expect Croats or Serbs to attend? Also, how could you put together the Bosniak who pray fve times a day and those who don't care at all about religion? Personally, I would come to a Bayram celebration and I would not drink, although normally I drink alcohol. I came to one such celebration organized by GBD and I was shocked to see that men were sitting separate from women! That was never the case in Bosnia. We never used to segregate males and females in that way. This was horrible, just horrible.

Due to the Ottoman historical legacy in the Balkans, the most nuanced perspectives on both being Muslim as a religious belonging and on being Bosniak as an ethnic belonging are probably offered by returnees from Turkey. In providing explanations on how the Ottoman historical legacy has been interpreted in Balkan national historiographies, Schad (2015) turns to the analysis presented by Fikret Adanır, who concludes that the post WWII historiographies of the Ottoman Balkans are dominated by the "national view on history" (Schad, 2015, p. 9), according to which the

<sup>13</sup>*Genc Bosnaklar Dernegi* is an association of Bosniak-origin students studying at universities in Turkey.

"Ottoman past is generally perceived as a dark chapter, as the "Turkish yoke", responsible for the Balkans' backwardness and underdevelopment" (p. 9). As a result, the popular perception of Turkishness in the Balkans becomes fueled by the "notion of the Turk and Islam as the threatening Other" (Jezernik, 2010 as cited in Schad, 2015, p. 9). Obviously, such stereotypical images of Turks, Turkishness, Islam and the Ottoman legacy have the most signifcant ramifcations for the Bosniak in BiH, as the notions Bosniak, Bosnian and Muslim, within Serbian nationalist mythology is often simply confated as "Turk," (see Boose, 2002). Thus, I would argue that the returnees from Turkey who identify as either Bosniak, Bosnian or Muslim had a unique opportunity of rediscovery of both how the generalized national Balkan historiographies have formed their views of their own ethnic, civic or religious belonging, and how these stereotypical notions are contrasted to their lived experience of study, life and work in the present-day Turkish Republic.

Levels of religiosity among returnees of all three major religious denominations in BiH vary from practicing and devout to culturally observant to non-observant. For some returnees, the general level of religiosity is too low in BiH, while others believe that the secular system is under-threat because of an ever-increasing infuence of religion. Both Mehmed and Sanela are Muslim, with varying degrees of religiosity. Mehmed feels like he does not belong to the overly secular establishment in BiH.


Author: You also feel that way in BiH?

Mehmed: Yes, in BiH. There are lots of people in BiH who do not practice the religion. For example, there are some people who observe the Friday prayers, but many of them do not. The same is true for fasting during Ramadan. I always need to ask my boss, who is not a practicing Muslim, for permission to attend Friday prayers. I mean, this is diffcult for me. My brother, he lives in Qatar and there, Friday is not a working day.

Sanela, albeit nominally Muslim, does not consider religion to be a part of her life and disagrees with the role of religion, namely Islam, in BiH public life.

Sanela: When I frst came I remember being shocked by how religious people are here. I do not remember it being that way before the war. I left BiH when I was 11 years old, but still I was mature enough to remember…When I frst came back this was a huge shock to me. I felt like I did not belong because everywhere I turn I would see religious practice: in politics, in the media and in each aspect of daily life. It makes me feel like I do not belong. This country is going in the wrong direction, where religion has become so public, too much of a public issue. Religion should be something private!


To situate the debate on secularism in BiH, it is important to note that religious belonging is set against a historical legacy of communism, offcially discouraging religious practice. Gavrilo, an Orthodox Christian, who considers his faith to be the most important part of his life, is resentful of the communist legacy.

Gavrilo: Nothing makes me happier than seeing a person practicing his or her religion, regardless which religion. This person upholds moral norms and understands the difference between good and evil. This person will not harm me, because no religion propagates evil-doing. The greatest evil was in this atheism, communism! That was the greatest of all evils. The people one needs to fear the most are those who do not believe in anything.

Hrvoje a Catholic Christian presents a different view of the communist legacy in relation to religious belonging. He believes that Yugoslav communism allowed ample space for religious practice, while the current emphasis on religious freedom in actuality promotes the politicization of religious belonging.

Hrvoje: I always proudly say that, ethnically, we are Croats and that our religion is Catholicism and all the rest of it. I mean, my father was a member of the Communist Party and I was also a member of the Communist Party, but my mother used to go to church every Sunday. There was no problem with that. In the past, only true believers used to go to church or the mosque, but nowadays, they go to win political favors. All of this modern church and mosque going is just hypocrisy. I don't go and I will not go, because I cannot stand the surrounding hypocrites. I cannot stand their hypocrisy.

Finally, to conclude the discussion on differing levels of religiosity among the returnees, it can be observed that because of either infuences at home or abroad, religious belonging among the returnees is fuid and changing, between different religions and within one religion. After spending a considerable number of years in

a religiously monolithic environment in Serbia and Montenegro, Anastasija, an Orthodox Christian, discovered that her sense of religious belonging lies in the mixing of religious traditions, as in her native Mostar.

Anastasija: I remember it was summer, hot, windows were wide open and after a day spent with my friends, family, neighbors, I was lying on my bed summing up all the events of the day. All of sudden, the sound of the ezan, the hoca calling to prayer! That was the sound of belonging for me, the sound of my city. My building is right next to the mosque and for me this was the sound of familiarity. The hocas were not screaming at 100 dB as they do now. When I heard that ezan, I thought to myself–this is where I was born and raised. I lived here.

When Amir left BiH for Turkey, he was a practicing Muslim, however, his attitude towards the role of Islam in his life changed considerably after returning from Turkey.


Amir's experience of a decreased level of religiosity after living in Turkey could seem counter-intuitive, however it does not come as a surprise to a reader informed on how the Ottoman legacy has been portrayed within national Balkan historiographies and the stark difference of actual life in the Turkish Republic.

#### *5.2.4 Linguistic Belonging: Do We Speak a Common Language?*

Linguistic belonging is essential to the returnees and has been one of the main features of their life abroad. Alija discusses the importance of using the Bosnian language at home with his family members, while living in Holland.

Alija: Yes! We expressed our ethnic belonging even while we lived in Holland. At home we always used our language. Our parents insisted on this point, mainly because they did not want us to forget and they wanted us to keep our sense of belonging. My sister and I continued to speak our language to each other.

Adnan, whose wife is Turkish, values the importance of keeping both Turkish and Bosnian alive in their home. His wife also speaks Bosnian, and they used to speak Bosnian at home while they lived in Istanbul. Now that he has returned with his family to BiH, they speak Turkish at home so that the children could retain their bilingualism.

Adnan: Aaah, I don't have such prejudices about language use at home. At home we mainly use Turkish. I speak to my wife in Turkish because I don't want to forget the language and also for the children to keep it up, too. By living here [in Bosnia], the children use Bosnian all the time. I consider it an advantage that they are bilingual. Now, I usually speak to the children in Bosnian. I speak to my wife in Turkish. They speak Turkish between each other and they speak Bosnian and English with their friends.

Linguistic belonging is among the most important sub-categories under the general umbrella of cultural belonging (Buonfno & Thomson, 2007), as it can instill a communal sense between people, who "not only merely understand what you say but also what you *mean*" (Ignatieff, 1994, p. 7, emphasis added). This is true for the returnees, such as Alija and Adnan, particularly while they were living in the host state. During the time they lived in the host state, the common language, Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian14 was an important anchor of belonging, which felt as an "element of intimacy" (hooks, 2009, p. 24 as cited in Antonsich, 2010, p. 648). However, as Antonsich (2010) asserts, aside from providing a safe feeling inherent in placebelongingness, language can and is often used in the politics of belonging to separate "us" from "them". This certainly is how language is used in BiH.

Although linguistic belonging is essential to the returnees, even naming the language(s) of BiH is problematic. Emir, whose mother is Serb and whose wife is Finnish, discusses their use of language at home. He is ambivalent about naming the "mother tongue".


Naming the common language either Bosnian, Serbian or Croatian and how the language is used in all offcial correspondence is a highly politicized issue with an assortment of consequences from the somewhat comical, but costly "translations" of identical texts (see Pisker, 2018) to the more severe examples, such as practices

<sup>14</sup>According to the *Declaration on the Common Language*, Bosnian, Croatia, Montenegrin and Serbian are a common language with four different names, but without signifcant linguistic differences to distinguish them as separate languages. The basis of the *Declaration* was *Language and Nationalism*, the scholarly work of the Croatian linguist Snježana Kordić, as well as four academic conferences held during 2016 in Split, Sarajevo, Belgrade and Podgorica. Since May 2017, linguists, journalists, academics and thousands of citizens across the former Yugoslavia signed the Declaration (Ilić, 2017). The full text of the *Declaration on the Common Language* can be retrieved from http://jezicinacionalizmi.com/deklaracija/

of direct segregation in education. The most extreme example of using language as the politics of belonging to separate "us" from "them" (Antonsich, 2010) in BiH comes as "two schools under one roof." This phenomenon refers to schools in several ethnically mixed Bosniak-Croat towns and cities in FBiH where students of both ethnicities attend the same school, but are ethnically segregated in classes using different languages (Bosnian and Croatian) and different educational curricula. The phenomenon has been characterized as the "most visible example of discrimination in education" by a recently published OSCE report, used to "justify practices that enforce the segregation of students based on ethno-national affliation" (BiH Report of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur as cited in OSCE, 2018, p. 5). Similar types of linguistic-based discrimination are also practiced in Republika Srpska. Amir, a non-Serb minority returnee to Prijedor, discusses the political signifcance of labeling the Bosnian language in schools of Republika Srpska.


Amir does not identify as Bosniak (rejecting ethnic belonging), although he is Muslim (accepting religious belonging). His preferred self-identifcation is the civic belonging of Bosnian-Herzegovinian and he insists on calling his native language Bosnian, however, the RS authorities do not recognize the Bosnian language in offcial education. Instead, the term "language of the Bosniak people" is used in transcripts. The explanation given by Serb authorities in the RS for the disputed name of the language is the "perfdious attempt by ethnic Bosniaks to impose their language as the dominant one in Bosnia" (Pisker, 2018).

#### *5.2.5 Landscape Belonging—An Emotional Attachment to the Natural Environment*

Regardless of ethnic background, the returnees discussed their emotional attachment to the natural environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Siniša discussed his love for the general geographical terrain of the Balkan region.

Siniša: When I look around myself, I can just say how much I love these mountains, these rivers, forests, and the entire environment. I feel a great sense of belonging to this geography.

<sup>15</sup> "Mr. Mile" refers to Milorad Dodik, the current President of Republika Srpska.

Bakir is more specifc in his elaboration of toponyms in his native Srebrenica and the surrounding hills.

Bakir: Srebrenica has many frst and last names. Each tiny spot around Srebrenica has its own name. If you wish, I could list some of them. For example, there is Black trash, Eye water, White water, Živko's hill, Gamber's place, Lamiz's hill….Gamber and Lamiz, these are Bogomil names. There is Golden water, Jovo's hill…There is also Slaughter stream, yes that is its exact name! It is also sometimes called Slaughtered stream. There is a legend of how a man was slaughtered at the top of the stream, which is how it was named. Even the land registry lists it under this name— Slaughtered stream.

For Amir, the natural environment is part of his family history, flled with memories of times spent together with family members.

Amir: Everything here reminds me of my history: the fruit trees I planted with my father before the war. There is a cherry tree over there and an apple tree in the other corner. Our house was destroyed during the war, but at least the trees remained. My father and I cut these trees together, we pruned them and took care of them. Now, look at them now—they are all grown up.

Landscape belonging is often expressed as a preference of country living compared to city life and as attachment to land. Badema explains her belonging to the natural environment of Srebrenica through her love for the landscape.


For Gavrilo, the thought of somebody else tilling his land in Nevesinje was unbearable to the extent of motivating his return to BiH.

Gavrilo: I don't know. I will tell you of a dream I had, better say a nightmare. I woke up in anguish, covered in sweat as I dreamt that somebody else was tilling my land. That was an incredible feeling. I woke up in terror. I stood out of bed and went for a walk outside, just to calm myself down. It was horrendous how I felt. This happened while I was still in Italy. Memories of working the land together with my grandfather fooded my psyche followed by the smell of earth in springtime. That is when I decided: 'I can't go on like this. I am going back.'

I found striking parallels between the stories of Gavrilo, Badema, Siniša, Bakir and Amir, who discussed their sense of belonging to the landscape of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the narratives of home of exiled Cypriots in the work of Taylor (2009). Throughout data analysis regarding home and belonging care was taken to treat these two concepts separately, to maximize explanatory power and increase analytical rigor. Here, Taylor (2009) discusses the natural environment of Cyprus as "home," while Gavrilo's, Badema's, Siniša's, Bakir's and Amir's refections are conceptualized as "landscape belonging." To sort out any possible confusion between the two perspectives and create a basis for comparison, *emotional attachment to the natural environment* is stressed as the common denominator in both cases. As Taylor (2009) notes,

In the Cypriot context, home is not just seen as the house but also the felds, orchards, farmland, and cemetery where ancestors are buried (Zetter, 1998: 309). Originating largely in rural communities, Cypriots have a relationship to the material home, which goes beyond the economic value of crops and rather determines the colour, taste and smell of home. The close relationship with the land brought about by working on it, being surrounded by it and being sustained by its produce means that material aspects of home feature strongly in Cypriot refugee narratives (p. 16).

Taylor (2009) is also clear in distinguishing between fnding home and safety in materiality beyond the physical house, which I refer to here as landscape belonging and its *misuse* expressed in ethno-nationalist discourses equating "soil" and "nation."

#### *5.2.6 Economic Belonging—Having a Stake in the Domestic Economy*

Preferring domestically produced goods over imports is a channel for the returnees to show economic belonging. Senad from Sarajevo actively participates in the "*Buy Domestic*" campaigns making a point of transcending ethnic boundaries by favoring a product from Banja Luka over a foreign-produced good.


Author: How do you justify it being an economic decision?

Senad: If you want to make long-term gains, which would be visible through higher standards of production and stronger local production, you need to make an investment. Perhaps we will pay a slightly higher price for similar quality, but we will invest in those long-term gains. Also, it is a question of belonging.

Draško from Derventa discusses the same subject from a slightly different angle. He also believes that buying domestically produced goods stimulates the economy, but, interestingly, he frst turns to a good produced in Banja Luka and secondly gives an example from Sarajevo.


Economic belonging is also expressed in the returnees' willingness and conscientiousness as taxpayers. When I asked Mahir about how he feels when paying his taxes, he was enthusiastic and discussed tax payments in terms of civic duty.

Mahir: I feel fne about it. I feel fne paying taxes. Any time I have coffee in a café, I ask for the receipt, just to make sure that taxes are paid. I am one of those people who would rather have the waiter spit in their drink than allow him to sell the drink paying no taxes on it. So, I always ask for the receipt. Any time I spend, let's say 80 KM on a night out, I think to myself 'this is great, at least some 10–12 KM went to the state budget.

After leaving a successful career in Switzerland, Husein started manufacturing shirts in Maglaj. His business plan was set by conditions particular to his native town. His economic decisions were based on and constrained by what he could do in Maglaj. The decision to start his own business was determined by what was feasible in this place.

Husein: At that time, I was in a dilemma of what I could do? What could be the frst step I could take to help the local population, my friends, my local community and to fnd my happiness in doing so? My conclusion was that, unfortunately, the least proftable, cheapest branch of the textile industry, in prior existence in the area of Doboj, Maglaj, Tešanj and Žepče, would still be the best feld for me to start my business.

Whether it is making consumer choices based on factors other than the price/quality ratio, starting a business adapted to the needs of the local economy, or tax payments that refect one's sense of civic duty, economic embeddedness is recognized within the literature as important in order "to make a person feel that s/he *has a stake* in the future of the place where s/he lives" (Jayaweera and Choudhury 2008, 107; Sporton and Valentine 2007, 12–13 as cited in Antonsich, 2010, p. 648, emphasis added).

#### *5.2.7 Civic Belonging: Can Citizenship Be the Main Expression of an Individual's Identity in BiH?*

Although returnees often discuss their civic belonging and talk about themselves primarily as citizens of BiH, their civic belonging is defned mostly *in relation* to their own ethnic belonging. Anastasija discusses being a Bosnian and Herzegovinian, but also points out that ethnically she is a Serb.

Anastasija: The young man who came to us from the Census Bureau was shocked when we declared ourselves as Bosnian and Herzegovinian, because he knew we were Serbs. Let's say 10 years ago, I actually believed that this change towards a civic option could actually happen, but now…For example, when the BiH soccer team plays against any other country and particularly when they play against Serbia, nobody here believes me I cheer for BiH. Nobody would believe me, that I, as a Serb, support the team of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Similarly, Gavrilo expresses his civic belonging to BiH, but quickly moves to his ethnic belonging of being a Serb.


In the demographic part of the interview, Marija, a dual citizen of BiH and Croatia, self-identifed as a Bosnian Croat. She championed her civic, BiH, belonging in the in-depth part of our conversation.

Marija: As for the question of ethnic belonging, unlike many others, I consider myself frst and foremost a citizen of BiH. I am Bosnian, because I was born here.

As the perspectives of Anastasija, Gavrilo and Marija show, civic belonging also exists among returnees, who ethnically align themselves with either the Serbs or Croats, however, civic belonging is almost always expressed *in relation* to their ethnic belonging. Keeping in mind the description of Bosnian-Herzegovinian provided in Helms (2013), Anastasija's, Gavrilo's and Marija's BiH civic

belonging falls either into the category of "geographic area," "affliation to a multiethnic polity, support for the existence of the state, non- or anti-nationalist orientation" (p. 35).

Civic belonging is also defned in relation to the ethnic belonging of others. Sanela declares herself as a Bosnian and Herzegovinian, and is frustrated with the nationalism of others, whether Bosniak, Croat, or Serb.


As was already discussed, civic belonging is noticeably more pronounced with returnees, who might reject Bosniak ethnic categorization, but have some, even just cultural identifcation with Islam. Sanela's perspective on civic belonging includes a frustration with nationalism and a strong pro-BiH state attitude.

The returnees who self-identify primarily as Bosnian and Herzegovinian, thus rejecting ethnic categories discussed the importance of building and developing civic belonging, however, many others questioned its sustainability. Siniša is doubtful about the development of a strong sense of civic belonging in BiH.

Siniša: I mean ordinary people, such as myself, my friends, business associates, and others, we simply don't make these kinds of distinctions. We don't make these [ethnic] distinctions between people, but when you watch the news or read the newspapers, although I try to stay away from all of that as much as possible, still you can notice that there really is no realistic togetherness in this country. I guess all ethnic groups in BiH have strong roots within their own traditions.

Alma, who works with children, tries to instill a sense of civic belonging in her kindergarten's educational activities discussed the challenges of singing the national anthem with the children, as it, due to political disagreements, does not have any lyrics. Instead, Alma teaches a commercial song, popular in the former Yugoslavia, called "My Country.16"

Alma: In the kindergarten, we work so hard with the children on this point. That is why I told you that we sang "My country" with them. We also went to the National Museum to see the tombstones (stećak). Recently, there was an exhibit by Nasiha Kapidžić-Hadžić and the girls were fascinated by her poetry. We had a gentleman from the National Archives visit us to explain to the children how newspapers were made 100 years ago. We also teach the children about our folklore, folkloric traditions of all ethnicities.

In her efforts as a kindergarten educator, Alma is trying to facilitate what Kolstø (2006) calls "learning national identity." As he explains:

Like any other identity, national identity has to be learnt. Important instruments in any learning process are various kinds of audiovisual aids, and so also in the school of national identity construction. That is why national symbols fags, coats of arms, national anthems play such a crucial role in nation building and nation-maintenance. (p. 676)

According to Kolstø (2006) learning national identity is systematically conducted in states around the world, however, two examples stand apart as "particularly explicit strategies for patriotism-training by means of national symbols" (p. 676). The frst such example comes from a statement published by the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party in 1996 entitled 'Teach the General Public and Especially the Young to Love the National Flag. A second example he gives is the National Anthem' Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag, conducted in schools throughout the U.S. every morning during the entire school year. Viewed from this perspective, how can Alma's efforts at "teaching national identity" succeed when all she has at her disposal as "audiovisual aids" (Kolstø, 2006, p. 676) are a national anthem with no lyrics, a fag with no endogenous signifcance, or a commercial song originally written for a country that no longer exists?

<sup>16</sup>The song "My Country" is a patriotic song written and performed in the mid 1970s, with lyrics discussing the love one feels for one's country and its natural beauties. The lyrics are neutral in the sense that there is no direct mention of the name of *the* country, so in that sense it could be repurposed. Originally, it was devoted to the Yugoslav guest workers (gastarbaiter) leaving Yugoslavia as labor migrants. The song was performed by the *Ambassadors*, a popular Sarajevo-based band. It was also one of Josip Broz Tito's favorite songs, often performed at offcial state ceremonies in Yugoslavia.

#### **5.3 Outsiders Here and Outsiders There: Boundary Making and the Politics of Belonging**

With the returnees, the process of boundary-making, focused on creating lines of separation between an "us" and a "them" (Crowley, 1999; Yuval-Davis, 2006), runs parallel in both the host and home states. To construct clear dividing lines between place-belongingness and the politics of belonging expressed through processes of boundary-making is to view the former as stemming from the individual internally, while the latter as placed upon the individual externally. Mas Giralt (2015) effectively summarizes the difference, where place-belongingness relates to "personal emotions of feeling in place" (p. 4) and the politics of belonging provide answers to whether society, formally or informally, perceives the person as "being in place" (p. 4). The common requirements of belonging formulated by the politics of belonging are different at home from those abroad, but these requirements exist in both spaces and my study participants are often left outside of the "us" category both at home and abroad. As data analysis reveals, the returnees are often left feeling as "outsiders here and outsiders there" along differently set boundaries, but nevertheless outside.

#### *5.3.1 Boundary Making at Home*

The dominant boundary the returnees feel in BiH is the boundary of ethnicity, however, also noticeable are intra-ethnic boundaries, either based on a legacy of intraethnic confict or on regional differences. When discussing ethnic boundaries, participants in my study, like many other citizens of BiH often kept referring back to ethnic relations within Yugoslavia. For Elvis, ethnic boundaries in Yugoslav Prijedor were simply non-existent, while they are heavily present within the current situation.

Elvis: Yes, yes. I discovered this in Prijedor. I'll repeat it here, Prijedor is the city of my birth, where I was raised and where people, my fellow citizens, used to know me and my family. What happens to me now when walking down a street, out of the thousand people I encounter, perhaps I'll recognize four or fve familiar faces. It seems as the rest of the population landed here from space. You just feel like an outsider. You go to the police station, the municipality, social security offce, the bank, or any other institution and you don't know anybody working there. Prijedor is a small town, and in the past, everybody knew each other. Now, this is not the case. How can somebody from Bosansko Grahovo, who came to live here after the war, understand our way of life, what we had before the war? He can't! The only thing this person sees is your ethnicity and nothing else. Your frst and last name.

Other participants, like Hrvoje, although nostalgic for much less obvious ethnic boundaries in the former Yugoslavia, acknowledge their implicit existence.

Hrvoje: Although, even in our previous system, the education facilities knew about this issue. It was not public, but still some distinctions were made. If you go back in time and look at, for example, how elementary school functions were allotted, you will see who was the class president…who was the minute taker and who was the class hygienist. You will notice a pattern across classes and see that there are three different groups. The students did not know about this, but the school administrators took this into account and you could see that the Croats, Muslims, Roma or some other groups had to be represented. Again, I would like to emphasize that this was not done publicly, as it is in our current system. That is a major difference.

Elvis, a Bosniak citizen of prewar Prijedor, feels othered and excluded from belonging to the Serb-dominated postwar Prijedor, while a Serb from the rural area of Bosansko Grahovo is included. Elvis is nostalgic for the Yugoslav times of "brotherhood and unity" when ethnic boundaries did not seem to exist, while Hrvoje is more skeptical of the Yugoslav past. Elmir was born and raised in Velika Kladuša, the center of Fikret Abdić's "Autonomy Movement" and the site of major intra-Bosniak confict between the forces loyal to Abdić and those allied with Alija Izetbegović, headquartered in Sarajevo during the 1992–95 war. Elmir now lives with his wife and children in Sarajevo, while the rest of his family remained in Velika Kladuša. I asked him about his sense of belonging to either Sarajevo or Velika Kladuša.

Author: You said that you have many friends in Velika Kladuša.

Elmir: Yes!

Author: Are their opinions divided regarding autonomy?

Elmir: Well, what can we say about that? Twenty years have passed and these topics have faded for most people. I mean, there are people who have much to gain by keeping them alive, but most ordinary people have forgotten about all those unfortunate events. No, no, this is not a problem anymore. It used to be, up until some 5 or 6 years ago. Not anymore. This is in the past. I mean if somebody lost a close family member or friend during the confict, of course they feel rage and resentment towards the current political setup. But, this is true for all groups throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region. We have no alternative but to live together. The economy connects all of us.

Regional differences also produce intra-ethnic boundaries. Marija, a Croat from Jajce in the Bosnian part of BiH, did not feel the existence of intra-ethnic boundaries while she lived in Germany, but felt them in Mostar among other Croats in BiH.


Ethnic boundaries in BiH are also strongly felt by the returnees. As can be expected, ethnic boundaries have, as Bougarel et al. (2007) contend, become "more pervasive and rigid after war and ethnic cleansing" (p. 20). However, in examining the full complexities of BiH society, it is necessary to move "beyond ethnicity" (Bougarel et al., 2007).

Depending on the circumstances, war related categories can undermine, override, reinforce, or complicate ethno-national identifcations, even rendering them all but irrelevant (Bougarel et al., 2007, p. 21)

The intra-ethnic boundaries based on memory of intra-ethnic confict and regional differences are both examples that "complicate ethno-national identifcations," while the boundaries set by internal displacement not only serve as additional illustrations of intra-ethnic divisions but also as deepening the "long-standing confict between the urban, marked by 'culture' and 'Europeanness', and the rural associated with 'non-culture' and 'backwardness' (Bougarel et al., 2007, p. 22)

One of the strongest boundaries for the returnees is the boundary set by internal displacement. Going back to the time he and his family were forcefully expelled from their home in Foča, together with other non-Serb residents, Admir has felt the boundary of displacement, whether at home or abroad.

Admir: Ever since I was 12 years old, I was labeled a refugee. I was expelled from my home in Foča and I came to Sarajevo. While in Sarajevo, I lived in several neighborhoods, moving around all the time. Finally, I moved to the U.S. and there I lived in a couple of different cities. That is how it is for me–constantly on the move. I mean, ever since I was twelve, I have been a refugee, living with a permanent feeling of not-belonging.

Feeling excluded has become the norm for Admir, whether in the home or host state, yet the boundary of internal displacement seems the most counter-intuitive. He was expelled from Foča as a non-Serb, thus violently experiencing the ethnic boundary. Upon settling in Sarajevo, he experienced the boundary of internal displacement, although he was now part of the ethnic majority.

In fact, internal displacement has created much resentment in BiH, which the returnees also feel. When I asked Badema, who returned to Srebrenica from Germany and now studies and works in Sarajevo, to compare her sense of belonging to Srebrenica and Sarajevo, she was determined in her answer.


Author: How do you view such divisions?

Badema: With a dose of pity. Actually, with a dose of disgust. Really! Literally. I cannot understand that people need to separate themselves as 'those from Čengić Vila' and 'those from Dobrinja'!? It is just silly. Funny. Stupid. Pointless. That is exactly what it is–pointless!

Both Badema and Admir feel the boundary of internal displacement, but their attitudes towards it are different. While Admir accepts his position as a "permanent feeling of not-belonging" and continues to live in Bosniak-dominated Sarajevo, not returning to his native Foča. Badema returned to Srebrenica and adopted a more cosmopolitan outlook ridiculing the pettiness of boundaries imposed in Sarajevo.

Badema, a Bosniak minority returnee to Srebrenica feels more excluded from belonging in the Bosniak-dominated capital of Sarajevo. This conclusion might appear paradoxical only to the "foreigners" (Stefansson, 2007).

Foreigners entering Sarajevo are therefore likely to be in for a surprise if they expect the local population to subscribe to the popular notion of a 'civil war' that was fought between antagonistic ethno-religious communities (narodi), carrying out brutal ethnic cleansing fueled by an ancient history of communal hatred in this unruly and confict-ridden Balkan region. While not dismissing the 'ethnic' explanation altogether, Sarajlije18 tend to portray the siege and the shelling of Sarajevo as a war that village or mountain people waged

<sup>17</sup>Nedžarići, Čaršija, Čengić Vila and Dobrinja are different neighborhoods and quarters of Sarajevo.

<sup>18</sup>Sarajlije is a Bosnian term for the citizens of Sarajevo.

against the urban population and its refned style. Similarly, the central social cleavages in post-war Sarajevo seem to be those separating Sarajlije from newcomers, urban from rural people, returning refugees from those who stayed behind, and the economic elite from the lower classes, all of which, in today's Sarajevo, often amounts to an *internal confict among Bosniacs*, and not between the Bosniac, Bosnian-Serb and Bosnian-Croat parts of the population (Stefansson, 2007, p. 65, emphasis added)

Besides the social cleavages listed above, Stefansson (2007) correctly refers to the "popular imagination" (p. 61), which ascribes higher levels of wealth, cosmopolitanism, 'Europeanness' and lower levels of religiosity to urban Sarajevans. These are the "imagined" attributes, which create the boundary between the Sarajevans and the "more or less rural, poor, primitive, traditional, religiously radical and 'non-cultured'" (Stefansson, 2007, p. 61), the internally displaced such as Admir and Badema.

Participants in my study feel labeled as "returnees" by their compatriots. Anastasija considers the "returnee" boundary to have had a deeply negative effect on her life.

Anastasija: I came back here as a citizen of Mostar. I neither left Mostar as a Serb, nor did I return as a Serb. I left as a woman from Mostar and that is how I returned. But, the entire system here treated me as a returnee. A returnee.

Author: What does being 'a returnee' mean to you?

Anastasija: It is very bad. Very bad, Aida. Being "a returnee" means that you are directly placed into a kind of second-rate category. The immediate questions are: 'Where were you in '92, in '93?' The comments that follow are something like: 'So, you left us during hard times, and now you are back..' and so on. How do they know how we left? Who are they to judge us? The whole thing makes me so mad, but 'returnee', that is what returnee means…It means second-class.

Damir, who returned to Sanski Most directly after the war ended, feels that the situation has improved regarding the "returnee" boundary.

Damir: It is much better now. Yes, in the past it was really very diffcult. Right after the war, as soon as you would say that you are a returnee, the automatic question was 'So, where were you during our hard times??' Being a returnee from Germany in Sanski Most really was not an easy thing to be. It was not easy.

The feeling shared by Damir and Anastasija, has been documented extensively within the literature on post-war return and particularly scholarly works on return to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As early as Bovenkerk (1974) it was recognized that the stayees in the home state do not readily accept the returnees, in some cases showing direct mistrust, enmity and envy towards them (Koser & Black, 1999; Kibreab, 2002; Stefansson, 2004). Anders Stefansson's work on the particular animosity towards returnees in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been widely cited (see Pedersen, 2003; Şirin, 2008; Kuschminder, 2017) and the point he makes is that the strained relations between the stayees and the returnees result from a lack of mutual understanding and the stayees' belief of having a "monopoly of suffering" (Stefansson, 2004). Maček (2000) makes a similar point when discussing the relationship between stayees and returnees in the BiH case also adding the "symbolic capital" (p. 45) asserted by the stayees when a pragmatic choice of staying in BiH during the war, for example, to protect possessions or due to fear of starting anew abroad, gets transformed into a moral choice. From this perspective, the stayees gain moral ground for a judgmental attitude towards the returnees, summarized within a moralizing question directed at the returnees: "Where were you when it was the worst of all?" (Stefansson, 2004).

Unlike the BiH case, Pedersen (2003) does not fnd the same level of vitriol and resentment hurled at returnees in the case of return after the war in Lebanon. In a footnote comparing the BiH case to Lebanon, Pedersen (2003) concludes:

I believe that this difference between our fndings is related to the fact that the Lebanese civil war ended six years before the war in Bosnia, and that people in Lebanon have gained more distance to the war than people in Bosnia. It seems that social relations change over time as society is reconstructed. (p. 59)

Although this conclusion seems quite reasonable, I must disappoint to draw on the examples of my study participants, such as Damir and Aleksandra, who still occasionally get asked the same old question: "Where were you when it was the worst of all?" Pedersen (2003) reports the experience of her study participant, Fuat M. who, upon coming back to post-war Beirut meets his old friends and colleagues who were happy to see him and to revive their old friendships. After a while, they would tell him "You have changed". "Of course," he replied, "and so have you". Keeping in mind Damir's optimism and his witnessing of some positive changes during the past two decades, still it seems that the returnees in BiH have a long way to go before attaining the level of relaxed societal acceptance, as observed in post-war Lebanon.

#### *5.3.2 Boundary Making Abroad*

Boundary making abroad at the level of religion is most dominant among the Muslim returnees, regardless of the level of their religiosity. Vedad, who does not consider Islam to have a prominent role in his life and to a large extent is a nonpracticing Muslim, discusses the Islamophobia he experienced while living in Germany.

Vedad: Since I worked as a physical therapist, I was in constant contact with people. I mean in the hospital, patients, colleagues, and others. They all knew that I am a Muslim from Bosnia and there was talk behind my back, about this and that. Most of it was not exactly nice to hear. I would often say that I am Muslim, a European Muslim. I mean, I would do this intentionally. In response, they would be amazed… 'How could you be Muslim?' They would ask.


Vedad's story seems to be consistent with research presented in Valenta and Ramet (2011), where Bosniaks were found to keep a low profle when it comes to public display of their religiosity (Kalčić & Gombač, 2011); to self-identify as atheists, cosmopolitans or Europeans (Coughlan, 2011; Mišković, 2011) or to place additional emphasis on their "European Islamic" heritage. As Valenta and Ramet (2011) point out, the "European Islamic" focus comes as the "migrants' response to global political tensions which contribute to anti-Muslim discourse and Western Islamophobia" (p. 19).

Boundary-making around socio-economic status affected the study participants profoundly. Lejla talks about her experience of baby-sitting in an upper-class family in the U.S.

Lejla: So, I came to a household of actual multimillionaires and they literally treated me as a piece of garbage. I mean, I came there with the knowledge of four different languages and whatnot, but this was not respected one little bit! They saw themselves as above me and I immediately understood that this is going to be an issue of discrimination. Fortunately for me, I was always a fghter and I would not stand being placed in such a position, not for one minute! I would not allow for somebody to disrespect me. This family was not right for me and I left them very quickly.

Class boundaries as observed in the U.S. were shocking to Lejla, who grew up in Yugoslav-styled socialist self-management (see Horvat, 1969) with very slight class differences and lived through the war in BiH, which furthered her beliefs in solidarity and the importance of community. She resisted "being placed" in an inferior position due to her socio-economic status, frstly leaving the original family and ultimately the U.S., where she experienced this type of exclusion.

There is a noticeable difference in how the entire region of the former Yugoslavia factored in boundary-making in European countries compared to the U.S. Vlado discusses the discrimination people from different parts of the former Yugoslavia experience in Switzerland.

Vlado: There [in Switzerland] you feel differently. I mean they [the Swiss] do not distinguish between Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia, this and that. We are all ex-Yugoslavs to them. To them, we are more or less like the Turks in Germany. We, all of us, are just a bunch of 'Yugos' to them. I was pretty lucky because my last name does not end in a 'vić', so they could never directly put me in the Yugo category automatically. My last name sounds sort of Italian, so the discrimination was always delayed in my case. It took them a while to fgure out my background. The people whose last names end in 'vić' got discriminated against right up front, with job applications, apartment searches, their children taking high school entrance exams–any place, really!

Ervin compares the European experience to that in the U.S. to conclude that the dominant variable of discrimination in the U.S. is race.

Ervin: I never felt as a second-class citizen over there [in the U.S.], while there are so many examples of people feeling that way in European countries. In case their last names are not Schmitt or Francois, they have no business living there. That is simply not true in the U.S. The main divisions in America are along racial lines, not ethnic. These [ethnic] divisions have been pretty much erased in the U.S. The system works with no problems. You are accepted based on what you can do, what you know and the quality of your character. Other than that, nobody really cares.

While I am not aware of scholarly works directly comparing the experience of BiHoriginated refugees and migrants in Switzerland and the U.S., there is research confrming and situating individual claims made by Vlado and Ervin. For example, Behloul (2011) discusses how in 1969, immigrants in Switzerland were positively or negatively perceived depending on whether they originated from Western or Southern Europe, with Italians being the most negatively perceived group in 1969. In the decades that followed, particularly with intensifed migration from the former Yugoslavia because of the wars of the 1990s, the 'Jugos' became the most unpopular group (Hoffman-Nowotny, 2001; Wimmer, 2004; Behloul, 2011). Regarding the status of the Bosnian diaspora in the U.S., Mišković (2011) asserts that they could be "simultaneously placed within the normalized race (i.e. whites) and a targeted, negatively profled community which is often racialized (i.e. Muslims)." That most Bosnian refugees in the United States are Muslims presents a puzzle to such discourse, which is recognized in the words of a Bosnian in St. Louis who summarized it as: "right skin color, wrong religion" (Martin, 2008 as cited in Mišković, 2011, p. 235). In other words, although Mišković (2011) underlines how the Bosnian diaspora in the U.S. has beneftted from "white power and privilege", still she acknowledges the "racial/ethnic/religious" ambiguity.

Coming from the region of the former Yugoslavia is a factor in boundary-making abroad. I asked Nusret whether he ever felt like he did not belong, or as a secondclass citizen, an outsider, while he lived and worked in Switzerland. He elaborated on the various dimensions of discrimination he experienced during his time in Switzerland.


For example, Behloul (2011) discusses the history of Bosniak migration to Switzerland as beginning in the 1960s and continuing in the 1970s as part of migrant quotas. Bosniaks came to Switzerland as labor migrants and were virtually nondistinguishable from Croats, Serb and other ethnicities coming from the SFRY. These immigrants met in "Yugoslav clubs" (p. 310) and until the 1980s had no separate ethnic, cultural or even religious infrastructure. It is this historical legacy, which still places the ex-Yugoslavs into one broad category and the boundary, which often includes direct and indirect discrimination, is drawn based on coming from the region of the former Yugoslavia.

#### **5.4 The "Myth of Return": Being "in Between" and Multiple Belonging**

Ideas inherent in the "myth of return" are perhaps best formulated in the wise words of Heraclitus: "no man ever steps in the same river twice, for it's not the same river and he's not the same man." Alma discusses her own sense of loss and attempt at recreating meaning for her twice-lost homeland.

Alma: From the people I know who have left BiH, lived somewhere abroad and then came back, I can say that we have all lost our homeland at least twice. We went to live abroad and returned, thinking that we were coming back home. When we came back, we discovered that the country is no longer the place we used to know. This was not our homeland. That is what happened to us. But, I really don't mind it anymore. I have gotten used to it.

When discussing the temporal dimension of home, there always exists a tense relationship between imagining the memories of home and the "reality" of the physical places to which these memories connect (Boccagni, 2017). The difference between the "ideal" and the "real" of past home(land) exists for all, but "may get still wider for international migrants, because of their extended detachment from the material bases of home" (Boccagni, 2017, p. 73). Widening the gap even further are both the conditions of war, which have entirely devastated the material bases of home, and the forced nature of the migrants' departure from home. These two factors together create what Alma referred to as "twice losing our homeland", once when forced to leave and the second time upon return with the realization that the homeland has been irreparably disfgured by war.

While an *actual* return home could be a philosophical impossibility characteristic of the general human condition, the particular nature of the returnees' life experience situates them in an "in-between" position, which could be viewed as "*neither* here *nor* there," thus stressing a loss of belonging. However, it is also possible to position the returnees as belonging "*both* here *and* there, "expressing gain—a dual belonging to the home and host states. Alija, a dual BiH, and Dutch citizen, feels a sense of belonging to both countries.

Alija: In Holland we lived in a small town close to Amsterdam, with mainly Dutch people living there. I was only friends with the Dutch. We went to school together, played tennis and everything else. I defnitely felt accepted in that society. Now, I cannot say that I belonged 100%, but this is really about living in two different worlds and being yourself at the same time. Sometimes, I also felt a bit stuck in between. I felt confused. If somebody were to ask me how is it I feel, I would say that I am Bosnian, but also Dutch.

A dual citizen of Switzerland and BiH, Vlado feels a greater sense of belonging to Switzerland when back home in Trebinje, BiH.

Vlado: I had an experience with some people from Switzerland, who came to visit Trebinje. I belong to a mountaineering society and we go hiking every weekend. The Swiss guys wanted to join me and my childhood friends for a hike up mountain Leotar, above Trebinje. As we were walking up I kept asking myself questions about who I felt closer to–to the Trebinje guys or to the Swiss? When we came to the top, instinctively I joined the Swiss by hanging the Swiss fag on top of that mountain. It was a strange realization. I was at home in Trebinje, with my own, feeling more Swiss than ever before in my life.

Conversely, for Ervin, a dual US, and BiH citizen, it is important to keep his Bosnian identity while in the U.S.

Ervin: Everybody in Sarajevo knows me as Jack. This was my nickname even before the war, before going to America. I mean, everybody who knows me in Sarajevo, except for my mom and sister, called me Jack. Nobody even knows my real name [in Sarajevo]. This is because I did a pretty good job imitating Jack Nicholson, and that is how I got the nickname. The nickname stuck with me and for my entire social life in Sarajevo, people knew me by 'Jack,' my nickname. In Sarajevo, everybody knew me as Jack, but in the U.S. I felt it was wrong to introduce myself to people using this nickname. I felt it was wrong because the name has a completely different connotation in the American context. I always introduce myself as Ervin in the U.S. I would just feel so stupid referring to myself as Jack in America, because I do not want to sound like an Americanized Bosnian. So, my Bosnian identity is very important to me, even in the U.S.

Author: Do you feel you belong both here and there?

Ervin: Absolutely, absolutely! Anytime my plane lands either here or there, I automatically feel at home. I feel at home in both places.

The migration studies literature (see Ehrkamp & Leitner, 2006) is replete with empirical studies demonstrating the existence of dual and multiple belonging in contemporary migrants, expressed through "complex webs of mobilities and belonging" (Howes & Hammett, 2016, p. 21). These complex relationships often blur the lines between rights derived from citizenship and individual identities. According to Kastoryano (2000), "engaging in transnational practices may result in an institutional expression of multiple belonging, where the country of origin becomes a source of identity, the country of residence a source of rights, and the emerging transnational space, a space of political action combining the two or more countries" (p. 309). Although Kastoryano (2000) refers to migrants residing in the host state, this perspective might be customized for the returnees to say that the country of "pragmatic citizenship" becomes a "source of rights."

Because of multiple belonging, i.e. belonging both here and there, the transnational space becomes an arena for political, economic and other types of action. The in-betweenness of the returnees becomes a useful survival strategy, making it possible for the returnees to remain in the home state, while maintaining transnational ties becomes key to making their return to BiH a success. When I asked Hrvoje about his in-betweenness, he presented it as a pragmatic response to the level of risk associated with returning to BiH.

Author: Do you ever feel you belong here and there, somewhere in between?

Hrvoje: Well, absolutely! I guess this also depends on your personal views. I defnitely am somewhere in between. Why? Well, because this is a good position to be in. I am always one foot in and one foot out. There is always a backup plan. Due to our political situation, this is necessary. Certainly not because of the people, but because of the economic and political situation, there always needs to be a Plan B.

In response to a question comparing the citizenships of Switzerland and BiH, Husein elaborated on the benefts of being a citizen of both countries.

Husein: Aaah, I am happy with what both citizenships offer. How could I say anything negative? I produce and work in Bosnia and sell in Switzerland. How could I be any happier?

The "in-betweenness" of Hrvoje and Husein, dual BiH-Croatia and BiH-Switzerland citizens respectively, with strong commercial and other types of ties with the host states made their return to BiH possible in the frst place, as well as sustainable long-term. This fnding has been recognized in the literature as paradoxical, because it is in fact the citizenship of the host state that enables return to the home state, since it provides "transnational mobility back to the destination country and serves as a safety valve in case of unsuccessful return" (Mortensen, 2014 as cited in Carling & Erdal, 2014, p. 4). Cassarino (2008) looks at how transnational ties among "migrants, who are anchored (socially, culturally and physically) neither in their place of origin nor in their place of destination" (Al-Ali & Koser, 2003, p. 4) lead to the "gradual deterritorialization of citizenship" (p. 263). Carling and Erdal (2014) emphasize the importance of transnationalism for the economic sustainability of return, while Black & Castaldo (2009) argue that "the networks, contacts and wider experiences that migrants gain abroad" are even more signifcant for a successful outcome of return than their investment of fnancial capital.

#### **5.5 Conclusion**

Confrming already established relational, temporal, and spatial conceptualizations of home from previous scholarly debates, home or the feeling of "being at home" for the returnees is found in family relations, various time periods, and particular places. When home is found within the nuclear or extended family, the concept can be interpreted as a "mental state," and "a process" (Rapoport, 1995) and leads to an understanding of home as "portable" (Boccagni, 2017). Within "family as home," data analysis reveals home to be a "gendered concept" with some differences in how it is perceived by male and female returnees. The temporal dimension of home is at times found in a nostalgic longing either for childhood memories or recollections of life in Yugoslavia. In other cases, home is found only in the here and now. Home in time is conceptualized as an "idealized past" (Lam & Yeoh, 2004) or a conscious desire to break away from burdens of the past. Common to conceptualizing home as family and a particular time period is the "portability" (Boccagni, 2017) of home either through social relations or memory. When home is primarily conceptualized as place, the "sense of place" can refer to the physical house, the native town or city, a neighborhood, and even the entire Balkan region. Recognizing the ethnic minority versus ethnic majority status and comparing it "sense of place" often leads to a "displaced sense of place" (Armakolas, 2007), whether looking at Sarajevo Serbs now living in rural parts of Republika Srpska or Banja Luka Bosniaks now living in Sarajevo. Losing ethnic diversity because of warfare and population movements of the 1990s leads to the most problematized notion of "feeling at home" on the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Regardless of whether the feeling of "being at home" is found in the family, place or time, to feel "at home" for the returnees means to feel safe and secure, which is often confated with feeling comfortable, satisfed and relaxed.

Similarly to the multi-dimensional understanding of home, the returnees exhibit various types of place-belongingness (Antonsich, 2010). Disentangling the different types of place-belongingness is key to understanding how the categories of ethnicity, religion, language, economic contribution, civic participation and other types of social relations interact with each other. Simplifying the diversity of Bosnia to *just* three ethnicities, which coincide with three religions, where the Bosnian Serbs are Orthodox Christian, the Bosnian Croats are Roman Catholic and the Bosniak are Muslim is reductive and inaccurate, as many other combinations are possible. For example, there are members of all three ethnic groups who identify with some other religion, who are agnostic, or atheistic-actively rejecting any religion. Also, there are citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who belong to different ethnic groups, such as the Roma or the Jews, or who do not want to declare their belonging to any ethnic group, but see themselves solely as citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of course, ethnicity and religion are important when trying to understand Bosnia, but they are certainly not the *only* relevant categories. To disentangle belonging, what is important to recognize is that place-belongingness, as defned by Antonsich (2010) is primarily characterized by a feeling of safety, or as Ignatieff (1994) puts it, "Where you belong is where you are safe and where you are safe is where you belong" (p. 25).

The feeling of safety and security can be found in various types of placebelongingness at different times more or less pronounced, and often competing with each other. Adding to the classifcation found in Antonsich (2010), my data analysis has revealed seven distinct types of place-belongingness among the returnees: relational, ethnic, religious, linguistic, landscape, economic and civic. Relational belonging is most frequently observed, and it refers to fnding belonging in social relations, such as neighbors, friends, classmates or other social organizations, independent of family members, one's own ethnicity or religious community. Ethnic belonging pertains to one's identifcation of membership in an ethnic group in BiH and religious belonging refers to the self-identifcation of membership in a religious community. Linguistic belonging is expressed through the use of a shared language with three different names: Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian. Landscape belonging discusses the emotional attachment people feel towards the geographic terrain and natural environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Economic belonging refers to economic decision-making infuenced by an affective bond to the home state. Finally, civic belonging denotes prioritizing one's citizenship status, being a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, over other types of belonging.

The main boundary of belonging the returnees face in BiH is their ethnicity. Ethnicity, as a boundary set by the politics of belonging, is markedly different from ethnic belonging, in the same way that any aspect of place-belongingness differs from the politics of belonging (Crowley, 1999; Yuval-Davis, 2006). For example, a person might or might not identify with the Bosniak ethnic group, however, most times, in the eyes of society, even his or her frst or last name will place them frmly within this ethnic boundary. As expected, the ethnic boundary is most pronounced in cases of minority return. It is important to mention that ethnic boundaries are not completely clear cut, simply as Bosniak, Croat or Serb, as there also exist intraethnic boundaries, because of wartime tensions, such as the autonomy movement led by Fikret Abdić or because of regional differences, for example Croats from Bosnia as compared to Croats from Herzegovina. Internal displacement is also a signifcant boundary which cuts across ethnicity. Finally, being labeled as the "returnee" by the local population is a boundary that also cuts across different ethnicities. The phenomenon of the "returnee" in BiH (Stefansson, 2004), characterized by betrayal, cowardice and resentment by the stayee population, is so engrained that it holds a particular place in return migration literature (see for example, Pedersen, 2003; Şirin, 2008; Kuschminder, 2017).

Study participants are also painfully aware of boundary-making abroad. When discussing boundary-making abroad, the returnees of Muslim faith often invoked the Islamophobia they faced, particularly in countries of Western Europe. They discussed other boundaries, such as race, which distinguishes them vis-à-vis most other Muslims living in countries of Western Europe. It is also important to note that religion, and not necessarily the level of religiosity, was the basis of boundarymaking. What this means in practice is suffering the effects of Islamophobia reported by people who do not identify as practicing Muslims, but who nevertheless see themselves as culturally Muslim. Coming from a legacy of Yugoslav-styled communism, boundary-making, particularly in the U.S. on the level of class differences, was also signifcant in discussions. Returnees who had experiences with living in both Western Europe and the U.S. compared how they were excluded from common belonging based on ethnicity and religion in Western Europe and included in the U.S. because of their race. Beneftting from "white power and privilege" in the U.S. was also reported in other studies of Bosnian diaspora (see Valenta & Ramet, 2011). Ironically, ethnicity that appears most signifcant for boundary-making at home becomes virtually erased abroad, since regardless of their ethnicity, while living abroad, the study participants were labeled simply as "ex-Yugoslavs or Yugos." This is particularly true in countries of Western Europe, which have a history of reliance on a steady supply of *gastarbeiter* labor coming from the former Yugoslav region.

When considering exclusionary boundary making at home and abroad, the returnees are often left "*neither* here *nor* there." However, this position can be transformed into an in-betweenness of "*both* here *and* there" with multiple belonging and developed transnational ties. The transnational "in between" space then becomes instrumental for both the success and the sustainability of return.

#### **References**


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#### **Chapter 6 Connecting the Dots: Conceptual Model**

After presenting a wealth of empirical material to illustrate the complexity of observed social reality, which often includes conficting and puzzling elements, the question emerges: is there some unifying pattern that could produce an overall explanation, re-storying the data "into a framework that makes sense" (Creswell, 2007, p.56)? This chapter aspires to provide the "intellectual satisfaction" (Blaikie, 2010, p. 71), promised by qualitative research by presenting a lower-level abstraction conceptual model as a response to the main theoretical problem. On a conceptual level, my study tackles the creation of a nexus between voluntary return migration, citizenship, home, belonging and a set of specifc 'political' emotions. When laying out the foundation for my contribution, I defned the theoretical problem; reviewed the existing literature(s) to examine how the relevant concepts have been explored previously; and I identifed the research gaps. The research design of my study operates within the interpretivist paradigm, which requires the researcher not only to observe social reality, but to understand and interpret it. This chapter aims to deliver an empathetic understanding, the Weberian notion of *Verstehen*, by offering a solution to the theoretical problem driving my book.

In this chapter I introduce feeling safe and secure as central to understanding how the key concepts are connected. To build the conceptual model, I frst look at the difference between emotional and pragmatic citizenship. Second, I examine how the feeling of safety is associated with pragmatic citizenship, home and belonging. Feeling secure is associated with the second citizenship, obtained during residence abroad. Also, home and belonging co-occur with feeling safe. However, feeling safe/secure is not found to constitute the emotional dimension of BiH citizenship. There are two exceptions to this overall conclusion: "feeling at home" on the entire territory of the BiH state and civic belonging, both of which come with their own challenges. The fnal section presents the full conceptual model offering a solution to the theoretical problem of creating a nexus between voluntary return migration, citizenship, home, belonging and a set of specifc and distinct 'political' emotions.

#### **6.1 Building the Model: Citizenship, Emotions and Emotional Indifference**

In my study, emotional citizenship, as a concept, is defned as occurring at the intersection of discussions of the daily experience of citizenship and expressions of emotional responses. Conversely, pragmatic citizenship is defned as the intersecting area between everyday citizenship experience and emotional indifference. What this means practically is that results of matrix queries revealed all coding units which were coded with both citizenship practices and an emotional response or emotional indifference. Usually, discussions of either emotional or pragmatic citizenship happened in response to the question of "What does being a BiH/foreign citizen make you feel? Which emotions do you feel?" and the corresponding probes either referring to emotionally charged events or phenomena of life in BiH, national symbols, such as the fag, coat of arms and national anthem or everyday citizenship practices, for example border crossings and tax payments. While most of the emotional responses are reserved for the BiH citizenship and the foreign citizenship is experienced with emotional indifference, alternative combinations are also possible. In other words, BiH citizenship is in some cases experienced with emotional indifference, while primarily security, but also gratitude are associated with the foreign citizenship. Figure 6.1 summarizes the relationship between emotions, emotional indifference and the differing understanding of citizenship: emotional and pragmatic.

Since most of the study participants are dual, and in some cases, triple citizens, the differences in emotional versus emotionally indifferent experiences of citizenship could be usefully compared and contrasted. Ervin is a dual BiH and U.S. citizen and he provides the standard view of the second citizenship as pragmatic. He is respectful of the host state's citizenship, but also states his emotional indifference towards it.

**Fig. 6.1** Pragmatic and emotional citizenship

Ervin: Now, do I have any national pride [towards the U.S. citizenship] or not? The answer to this question is absolutely not. There is no national pride. This is purely pragmatic. I mean, I deeply respect this American component; the way they think and how their system is set up. I mean this in a sort of progressive, human sense. I mean that they [the U.S./Americans] are infnitely ahead of everybody else, particularly when it comes to being accepting of others.

Arif, a dual BiH and Norwegian citizen, besides being emotionally indifferent towards the host state's citizenship, also expresses his emotional preference for the BiH citizenship, if forced to choose between the two.

Arif: Realistically looking at it, this is a citizenship that one obtained. It was offered, and the offer was accepted. However, if I had to choose between one citizenship or the other. I would certainly give up the Norwegian one and keep my Bosnian citizenship.

Although not a typical response (see Štiks, 2011; Džankić, 2016), Hrvoje, a dual BiH and Croatia citizen, and ethnically a Bosnian Croat illustrates the pragmatic nature of the second citizenship, even with kin-states.

Hrvoje: As far as the Croatian one is concerned, this is strictly professional. I mean there are no emotional attachments towards it or any kind of tax system connection. Nothing connects me to Croatia. This is purely professional, because the Croatian passport allows for easier, more relaxed travel and looking at it practically and pragmatically, you simply have no problems. That's where the story ends.

When asked about their experience of the second citizenship, most respondents view it with emotional indifference, confrming expectations from previous scholarly discussions.

#### **6.2 Building the Model: Feeling Safe/Secure Takes Center Stage**

#### *6.2.1 Pragmatic Citizenship Offers a Feeling of Security*

Although most of the respondents are emotionally indifferent towards the second citizenship, the feeling returnees overwhelmingly associate with the host state's citizenship is security. Confrming scholarly discussions of pragmatic citizenship, the host state's citizenship provides security. Mehmed, a dual BiH, and Australian citizen,1 strongly associates security with the second citizenship.

<sup>1</sup>Bosnia and Herzegovina has offcially signed bilateral agreements on dual citizenship only with Croatia, Serbia and Sweden, however, as can be seen throughout the study, there are numerous examples of dual and triple citizenship holders. Although, offcial agreements are not in place, dual citizenship is a political reality, relying on the tacit approval of the involved states.

Mehmed: Well, I don't have any special feelings towards the Australian citizenship, except for security. It's there as an alternative if, God forbid, we would need it in case of an illness or just to have that option. Also, when travelling, I have the option of using it.

The security returnees derive from their second citizenship is regarding the possibility of re-emigration and continued life in the host country, as illustrated by Elvis, a dual BiH and U.S. citizen.

Elvis: America is a country where I found refuge; completed my education and where I gained my frst professional experience, together with my family. This is the country where we, let's say, regained some sort of normal life. There, we continued living and started standing on our own two feet again. I am thankful to that country for having their citizenship. My child is also a U.S. citizen, so this is another reason for my gratitude. The U.S. citizenship gives me security. Yes, that is what it gives me. It gives me security … it gives me the option to go back there and continue living a normal life. Those are some of the positive sides of being a U.S. citizen. Again, this security also needs to be re-examined, as even the U.S. is not as safe as it used to be. You know this yourself. New York is different from Vermont, but still, overall, and particularly when considering economic security, there you feel insured, normal and protected.

It is important to recognize that security is associated *only* with the second citizenship and *not* with BiH citizenship. Typically, the returnees do not associate any sort of security with the BiH citizenship. When I asked Elvis about whether he gets any feeling of security/safety from his BiH citizenship, he answered with no doubt and with full clarity: "Nothing. Nothing at all." The key feeling of safety/security is missing from the emotional dimension of BiH citizenship. BiH citizenship does not make the citizens feel safe and secure. In case of dual citizens, the feeling of security is derived from the pragmatic (foreign) citizenship.

Added to the security of always keeping open the option of return to the host state and a continuation of "normal life," the second citizenship provides greater security to the returnees even while living in BiH. In case of an emergency, without exception, the returnees would turn to the authorities of their second citizenship for protection and not to those of BiH. This is particularly true of Bosniak minority returnees to Republika Srpska, but also true in some cases of majority returnees to the Federation of BiH.

Admir: Well, I feel that somebody would take care of me if I were in some sort of danger. I don't know. I feel that I could turn to the U.S. Embassy in case I needed to. And it's not just that. You have greater privileges as a U.S. citizen. You can travel without any problems and so many more doors open. I feel secure and privileged. I have greater security and privilege than with just BiH citizenship.

Security associated with the second, pragmatic citizenship has been extensively studied in the literature (for example see Ong, 1999; Waters, 2003; Magat, 1999; Aguilar, 1999; Mavroudi, 2008; Skulte-Ouaiss, 2013) and has been confrmed in my study.

Besides feeling greater security as dual citizens, the returnees also feel increased freedom of movement and a sense of gratitude. Marija, a dual citizen of BiH and Croatia, speaks of the freedom of movement provided to her by her Croatian passport.

Marija: Well, actually I am Bosnian, because I was born here. The Croatian citizenship just makes my life easier, since I never have to apply for any entry visas. My travel is more relaxed and my daily life is relieved.

Alija, a dual BiH and Dutch citizen, expresses his gratitude towards the host state for providing a place of refuge for him and his family.

Alija: And about the Dutch citizenship and Holland as a country, I feel a great sense of gratitude. I feel grateful for being given the opportunity to go there in 1992, that my family and I could settle in this country and that we were provided with everything we needed to live a normal life and to succeed. I feel grateful for the opportunity to get an education. So, I have some emotions towards it. They are different, but I believe that gratitude is the most important one. What I mean is that I have a sense of gratitude for everything that this country gave to me and my family. This citizenship allowed me to develop as a human being.

Security as a key component of the second citizenship has been observed by previous scholars, with the closely related freedom of movement provided by the foreign passport. Gratitude is the result of the particular circumstances of acquiring the citizenship. The participants were expelled from their homes and found refuge in the host country, for which they feel gratitude towards the host state.

In addition to the general emotional indifference towards the second citizenship and the feelings of security, freedom and gratitude, the respondents have no negative feelings towards the second citizenship. A notable exception to this general observation is the case of Alija, who expresses anger, frustration and rage towards his Dutch citizenship regarding the Srebrenica genocide. Alija's situation was such that his feelings were torn between two states in confict over the Srebrenica genocide.


Alija: Well, I don't know how to explain this exactly. I was searching for some answers, some answers as to "why did this happen"? I, as a Dutch citizen, was angry at my country for what it did to my country Bosnia. I was looking for answers, I was trying to understand why did this happen? So, I was lost and angry, full of rage, but also shame because of being a Dutch citizen.

To properly understand Alija's feelings towards his Dutch citizenship, a brief historical review is necessary (for further depth of historical context see Honig & Both, 1997; Nuhanović, 2007, Delpla et al., 2012; Nettelfeld & Wagner, 2013). The Srebrenica genocide occurred in July 1995 when more than 8000 Bosniak men and boys from Srebrenica and the surrounding villages were massacred by units of the Bosnian Serb Army the VRS (Army of Republika Srpska) under command of General Ratko Mladić and the Scorpions, a paramilitary unit from Serbia. The besieged enclave of Srebrenica was declared a "safe area" under UN protection in April 1993, but UNPROFOR's Dutchbat soldiers failed to prevent Srebrenica's capture by the VRS and the ensuing slaughter of Bosniak civilians.2 The Netherlands was found responsible for failing to prevent over 300 of the deaths, by a verdict of the Dutch Supreme Court and the Hague District Court in 2013 and 2014.3 Alija is the only returnee to express any negative emotion towards the second, host-state citizenship and only regarding this specifc circumstance of the Dutch government's involvement in the 1992–95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Overall, the frst citizenship is experienced emotionally while the second, or in some cases third, citizenship is primarily pragmatic. In all but two cases, the returnees' frst citizenship is BiH, and the relationship described above holds in each case. This relationship holds even with the respondent whose frst citizenship is Argentinian. Siniša explains that he obtained BIH citizenship solely for "simplifying his life in Bosnia and Herzegovina," while his emotional attachment lies with the Argentinian citizenship.

Siniša: Well, the emotions I have connected with Argentina have to do with my growing up there. I have beautiful memories…and they are relived any time I visit Buenos Aires.

Author: How do you feel as an Argentinian citizen?

Siniša: Yes, yes…hmmm…it's as if something starts to move inside of me, because I grew up there. I have friends there, memories of childhood appear. All kinds of emotions show up. I believe this to be normal, natural. And then, when I realistically examine this document [BiH passport], I needed to acquire this document so that I could live and work here, to

<sup>2</sup>The brief historical background is based on the ICTY's Case No. IT-98-33, The Prosecutor vs. Radislav Krstić, section entitled "Finding of Facts", paragraphs 18 and 26. Retrieved from: http:// www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf

<sup>3</sup>For media coverage of these verdicts see: Holligan, A. (2014, July 16). BBC News. *Dutch state liable over 300 Srebrenica deaths*. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28313285

live here with my family and to develop our business. I believe that the more we develop our economic ties the more people will cooperate with each other, naturally respecting one another. This mutual respect is necessary for any kind of progress, I believe. If I were to sum up my feelings towards this passport [BiH passport], I don't view it in the same way that I look at my Argentine passport, because I was born there [Argentina] and then there is Argentine football and I am a huge fan of our [Argentinian] national team!

Siniša reserves emotional attachment for his frst citizenship, while the second citizenship is viewed as a contractual relation with the state, including rights and obligations.


Siniša's case illustrates the premise of frst citizenship as emotional, yet his case also sheds light on the case of dual, BiH and kin-state citizenship.

To complicate his situation even further, Siniša also holds a Serbian passport. In fact, the way he acquired BiH citizenship is through his Serbian citizenship, because of the bilateral agreement between Serbia and BiH.

Siniša: Yes, yes, I got Serbian citizenship at one point because of my roots. Well, since there is an agreement between these two states,4 you can have dual citizenship. This was voted and we have this law. Well, I obtained BiH citizenship through my Serbian citizenship. It is paradoxical, since we can look at how much Serbia is against BiH and BiH against Serbia, but this Serbian citizenship made it possible for me to get BiH citizenship. Thanks to this law, I was enabled to grow my business in BiH and to develop the BiH economy.

<sup>4</sup>Bilateral agreement on dual citizenship between BiH and Serbia.

As Siniša's home state is Argentina, the theoretical expectation has been satisfed. The frst citizenship has the strong emotional dimension, while the second/third, in his case, BiH, citizenship is pragmatic. As was explained previously, BiH has bilateral agreements on dual citizenship signed with the neighboring states of Serbia and Croatia and with Sweden. In addition, the case of triple Argentina-Serbia-BiH citizenship, points to a wider observation of ethnic particularity when expressing emotional indifference towards BiH citizenship.

Emotional indifference in the everyday experience of BiH citizenship is noticeably stronger with respondents who have declared themselves as ethnically either Croat or Serb, than it is with those who are expressly Bosniak or Bosnian-Herzegovinian. Vlado is an ethnic Serb from Trebinje, who grew up in Switzerland and identifes with Yugoslavs, mainly because of how this boundary has been established abroad.

Vlado: Well, I don't know Bosnia as Bosnia and me as a Bosnian….I mean, I was born in Yugoslavia, so that, I mean…Bosnia for me, is well….I don't know…It is nothing. I mean this is something I cannot identify with. I have absolutely nothing to do with it. Aaah, all of that sort of comes in one package, so that I didn't even get the passport issued. That is how disgusted I feel with the whole thing. I mean, I know the integration efforts I underwent there [Switzerland]. Over there, whenever you mention you are from some part of the former Yugoslavia, you are immediately thrown into a package. Here, I cannot identify with any of it. I just live here. I feel as if I am living in a circus, and…I simply can't take anything seriously.

Anastasija is an ethnic Serb from Mostar and a dual citizen of Serbia and BiH. She is indifferent towards the BiH citizenship and explains this indifference through a nostalgic sense of belonging to Yugoslavia.

Anastasija: And this, this BiH citizenship thing. It doesn't mean absolutely anything to me, because I always was and will remain a Yugoslav. That has always been my identifcation and the only country, which I consider to be my own. That is the only fag [the Yugoslav fag] which I consider to be mine and with which I can identify. I mean, this is about love, loyalty, and a sense of belonging. This is about one entire life. Simply this is about the meaning of life. That is what the Yugoslav fag is to me.

Marija is an ethnic Croat and a dual citizen of Croatia and BiH. She expresses emotional indifference towards BiH citizenship, with similar pragmatism towards her Croatian citizenship.



Based on fndings of an IPSOS Survey5 conducted in 2011, Džankić (2016) makes a similar argument about the relative emotional indifference felt towards the BiH citizenship by Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs, concluding that both Serbs and Croats are "more affliated to their ethnic kin, or the kin-state, than to Bosnia and Herzegovina" (p. 16). However, although BiH citizenship is primarily experienced emotionally, there are exceptions even within the Bosniaks and those who declared themselves as Bosnian-Herzegovinian, particularly towards national symbols, such as the fag and national anthem.

Emotional indifference is expressed towards BiH state symbols across different ethnicities because of the nature of these symbols. Alma declares herself as a Bosnian-Herzegovinian, but expresses her indifference towards state symbols, because these have been imposed by the international community.

Author: What do you feel when you see the BiH fag?

Alma: Nothing. I simply don't feel anything, because I feel that this fag is completely abstract and that it does not represent Bosnia and Herzegovina at all! I mean these stars, the colors blue and yellow on the fag–there is nothing characteristic on this fag. We used to have a fag with which I identifed, the golden feur-de-lis and we don't have it anymore. The lilies used to be a symbol of all of Bosnia and Herzegovina and over time they too became politicized and symbolizing the Bosniaks only, which really has no connection at all. So, it is really diffcult.

Author: How do you feel when you hear the national anthem?

Alma: Well, what can you feel? Very abstract. I don't know really and would like to know what is it that you feel? How can anybody feel anything for that anthem?!? I mean I cannot identify with that anthem because there is nothing Bosnian about it, nor is there any sort of emotion there. It is completely abstract, just like the fag. I often ask myself whether this is a random coincidence that we have such abstract national symbols or is it that the foreigners imposed them on us with a purpose?

<sup>5</sup>The IPSOS Survey was conducted in 2011 by the University of Oslo and the University of Rijeka under the project "Symbolic Nation-Building in the Western Balkans." IPSOS carried out the survey simultaneously in all states of the Western Balkans (all former Yugoslav states, excluding Slovenia and including Albania). The sample size was around 1500 participants per country with the survey containing a total of 89 questions, most of which related to perceptions of citizenship.

As was previously described, the present BiH state fag was imposed by the then High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, intending to fnd a compromise with BiH state symbols that would be acceptable to all three ethnic groups. Even though there was a conscious effort made at fnding unifying symbols, the current BiH state fag can be seen widely displayed only in Bosniak-dominated parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Croat and Serb ethnic fags continue to be used in other areas (see Bougarel et al., 2007; Jansen, 2015 or Palmberger, 2016). Alma has diffculties identifying with the BiH fag not because of an alternative with which to identify, as is often the case with the Serbs and Croats in BiH, but because the current BiH fag has no autochthonous signifcance. An analogous analysis can be made for the BiH national anthem.

When emotional indifference toward the home citizenship is stated, citizenship is viewed as either a set of benefts or a set of institutions. Lejla says she is Muslim by faith and Bosniak by ethnicity with very few feelings towards BiH as a state. As a student of yoga, she considers her spiritual home to be in India. For her, citizenship is solely a source of benefts based on residence. I asked her whether she would ever renounce her BiH citizenship if this were required for dual citizenship status.

Lejla: Well, this depends on where I would want to live. That would be my only concern. So, if I want to live here, then I would take that into consideration. My current life is here [BiH], so I don't think I would be giving it [BiH citizenship] up. Because, in my opinion, the only important thing for me regarding citizenship is whether you live in that country. We reap the benefts of citizenship if we live in that country.

Senad, who considers himself to be primarily a BiH citizen and an atheist, also views BiH citizenship with emotional indifference as he considers citizenship to be simply an expression of state institutions.

Senad: In our daily life, citizenship of this country or any other country is just the same. This is a state, just as any other state. Well, we have our problems… .I mean we are not exactly France, but still… I think we are very similar to Serbia and Croatia. Our constitutional organization is not similar to theirs, but I guess ordinary people do not concern themselves too much with the Constitution on a daily basis. When you go out to get some administrative matter sorted out, 90% of this work is at the municipal level, a little on the cantonal and almost nothing at the state level, except for identifcation cards and passports, which one does every few years. This procedure is just like any other. That's right. All around the world, there are states with some vices and virtues. I mean Pakistan is also a state. It's great that we look up to Germany and France and that we want to be like them, but Pakistan is also a state and we are like the EU compared to them.

Both Lejla and Senad are single citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina and ethnically they are neither Serb nor Croat. Lejla declares herself as a Bosniak, while Senad rejects ethnic categories and identifes as a Bosnian and Herzegovinian. In both cases, citizenship is viewed in pragmatic terms, however, unlike the pragmatism associated with the second citizenship of dual citizens, neither of them associate security with the BiH citizenship in the way that dual citizens relate a feeling of security/safety to their foreign citizenship.

The fndings of my study on emotional and pragmatic citizenship are largely consistent with those conducted with Lebanese (Skulte-Ouaiss, 2013) and Palestinian (Mavroudi, 2008) diasporas, where, overwhelmingly, the frst citizenship offers national belonging and emotional attachment, while the second, and perhaps more alien, citizenship offers security. My fndings are also consistent with Kastoryano (2000), who places the home and host state interaction in a transnational space, where the home state is a source of identity, the host state a source of rights and the resulting transnational space "a space of political action combining two or more countries" (p. 309). In some ways it could be paradoxical, but holding a second and more secure citizenship promotes return to the less secure home state. As Carling et al. (2015) point out:

A secure status abroad creates the opportunities for return. The uncertainty of return migration makes irrevocable return an intimidating prospect. Having the possibility to reconsider makes return much more appealing. For this reason, the ultimate form of structural integration in the destination–acquiring citizenship–can facilitate return to the country of origin. (p. 18)

Thus, once full legal integration in the host state has occurred, and the person has gained citizenship can the risk-taking of return migration take place. Having the security implied in holding a second citizenship promotes return to the home state.

#### *6.2.2 "Feeling at Home" and Place-Belongingness Means Feeling Safe*

The returnees are a group of people with a highly complex understanding of home, with feeling safe and secure as the emotion defning what "being at home" means. They have been forcefully expelled or have left their original homes to establish new homes in host countries. They have now returned to the home state attempting both to re-build their actual homes and their emotional understanding of home as a concept. The feeling of "being at home" comprises specifc emotions, which are found in the family, in specifc time periods, and in particular places. Almost all the study participants discussed feeling safe and secure as making up their feeling of "being at home," but perhaps the most telling example of this is Badema, a young Bosniak woman returnee to Srebrenica. It was a sunny summer day, and we were having coffee in front of her family house, located only a couple of kilometers away from the Potočari memorial cemetery, commemorating the Srebrenica genocide. I asked her whether she feels at home here and what this feeling means to her.

Author: Would you say that you are at home now? Badema: Yes! I am defnitely at home now. This is where I belong. Author: How do you feel here?

Badema: Somehow peaceful, calm….I feel at home…This means that I feel protected. There is a sense of security. I feel safe here.

Badema is fully aware of the events of July 1995 in Srebrenica and together with her family she attends the annual funerals of victims of the Srebrenica genocide, whose remains were found during that given year in mass grave sites surrounding the neighboring hills and valleys. She is not in denial of historical facts, but the place where she feels safe, where she feels "at home" is in her garden and family home, surrounded by loving family members and pets. When she uses the word "home" it refers only to *this* place and does not extend to other parts of Srebrenica, Republika Srpska or even Sarajevo, where Badema studies and works.

Connected and often confated with feeling secure, the emotions constituting "being at home" are feeling comfortable and satisfed. Ema discusses the emotions that give meaning to "feeling at home" for her, with particular emphasis on feeling secure and comfortable.

Ema: Aaahm….the emotions of home are feeling relaxed, smiling, security, feeling safe, the coziness.6 How do we say it in Bosnian? Comfort. Safety. Yes, those are the emotions that I connect to feeling at home, to belonging.

Upon returning from the U.S., Senad got married and moved away from his parents into a new apartment. For Senad, "being at home" brings a sense of satisfaction and safety.

Senad: I would say satisfaction and safety. I feel satisfed because I live in an apartment now, which I used to want and couldn't really have. Something like that.

Hrvoje discusses "being at home" as a feeling of satisfaction with life in general, connecting it to daily habits and relational belonging.


Feeling "at home" for Ema, Senad and Hrvoje mean either feeling comfortable and satisfed, both of which can and often are directly confated with feeling safe and secure.

<sup>6</sup>Ema uses the English word "coziness" and then asks about its B-C-S translation.

<sup>7</sup>The Turkish origin word "rahatluk" is used throughout the Balkans to signify comfort, satisfaction and peacefulness.

Feeling secure is also a defning dimension of home as a concept discussed in the relevant scholarly literature. Boccagni (2017) is clear when stating:

In my view, the most basic attribute of the home experience is that of (1) Security: a sense of personal protection and integrity which is attached to a place of one's own, where outsiders should not have free access and one's identity–whatever that means–is not in question (p.7).

For Boccagni (2017) home is frstly characterized by security. Similarly, Hagemann (2015) agrees with several authors who look at home as a "sense of place," which often designates such personal and intimate bonds that encompass feelings of being secure and at peace (Blunt & Dowling, 2006; Fenster, 2004; Tuan, 2001; Hagemann, 2015). According to Lam and Yeoh (2004) and Jackson (2016), home refers to an "affective core (Rapoport, 1995, p 27), representing an emotional connection to a secure, 'stable physical centre of the universe' (Rapport, 1997, p. 73) from which an individual is formed together with connections to a particular community. Home interacts with belonging and identity to produce an emotional, physical and symbolic security (Howes & Hammett, 2016).

Antonsich (2010) defnes place-belongingness to be characterized by feeling safe, feeling at home, where "place is felt as home" (p. 646). The fve aspects identifed as key to understanding place-belongingness, as feeling at home are: "autobiographical, relational, cultural, economic and legal" (p. 647). The auto-biographical aspect is most directly expressed as childhood memories, with the premise that the place of birth and growing up retains a dominant and formative position for adult life. Social ties to a place whether strong bonds to family and friends or less emotionally intense relations with fellow-countrymen comprise the relational element. Among the cultural aspects, Antonsich (2010) view language to be the most important, as it "resonates with one's auto-biographical sphere, and, as such, contributes to generate a sense of feeling at home" (p. 648). A sense of "economic embeddedness" (p. 648) is shown to have an important effect on place-belongingness and is achieved by an individual building a professional career in a specifc place. Finally, the legal aspect, such as gaining citizenship or a residence permit, is crucial for an individual to feel safe. "Where you belong is where you are safe; and where you are safe is where you belong." (Ignatieff, 1994, p. 25). Antonsich (2010) sums up the discussion of the various elements of place-belonging by re-emphasizing the importance of "feeling safe."

#### **6.3 Conclusion**

The main theoretical argument of my study is summarized in the conceptual model (see Fig. 6.2), which assigns *feeling safe and secure* as the central concept. The conceptual model is built on two premises:

**Fig. 6.2** Conceptual model


The frst citizenship, which is dominantly the citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina for my study participants, is experienced emotionally. However, the emotional dimension of BiH citizenship does not co-occur with feeling safe and secure. Pragmatic citizenship does co-occur with feeling safe and it mostly refers to the host state's citizenship, acquired during time spent abroad. The feeling of safety is associated with home, found in family, different places, and across various time periods. Similarly, belonging, or more specifcally place-belongingness, whether relational, ethnic, religious, landscape, linguistic, or economic is strongly associated with feeling safe and secure.

Given their emotionally motivated "decided" (Cassarino, 2004) return and their dual citizenship, the study participants present a unique opportunity to study the emotional dimension of the home state citizenship. Emotional citizenship is defned as the co-occurrence of emotional responses and various citizenship practices and the daily experiences of citizenship (see Fig. 6.1). Qualitative data analysis revealed a set of historically rooted and context-dependent 'political' emotions constituting the returnees' conceptualization of BiH citizenship. These emotions range from rage, anger, frustration to fear, guilt, denial, disgust, shame, disappointment, pity and empathy, to nostalgia and powerlessness. The opposite side of the emotional spectrum includes: patriotic love, pride, defance, joy, happiness and hope. My

argument is that the specifc emotions constituting the citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the returnees are rooted in BiH's recent history and the state's structure, engrained in the Dayton Peace Agreement, a treaty that successfully stopped direct warfare, but continuously fails to produce the conditions for longterm peace and prosperity. The BiH citizenship is *not* a source of feeling safe and secure for the returnees and thus unlike previous studies creating this link (Ho, 2009; Jackson, 2016), the emotional dimension of BiH citizenship *is not* conceptualized as home and belonging for the returnees. There are two exceptions to this general conclusion:


There is a weak association with feeling safe/secure; "feeling at home" on the entire territory of the state; and civic belonging. Data analysis reveals that the notion of "feeling at home" on the entire territory of the BiH state is challenged by direct and indirect consequences of the 1992–95 war. Similarly, civic belonging is contested by the disintegrating pull mainly of ethnic and religious place-belongingness, as well as the exclusionary politics of belonging inherent to BiH's state structure ingrained in the Dayton Peace Agreement.

The arguments advanced above are supported by qualitative data analysis of 35 in-depth interviews comprising inductive and deductive thematic coding and iterative procedures of pattern seeking, assisted by the technical functionality of NVIVO 11. Seeking patterns based on co-occurrence of codes within coding units was the main tool to: identify associations; put forward propositions and formulate explanations. Matrix query results together with the analytic memos, form the main structure around which a "theorized storyline" (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007) was built in Chaps. 3, 4, and 5. Finally, putting everything together resulted in a conceptual model, which captures most of the dataset and "re-stories" the interviews "into a framework that makes sense" (Creswell, 2007, p.56). The conceptual model is supported by matrices used for Chaps. 3, 4, and 5 and represents a summation of data patterns, as they were revealed throughout data analysis. A detailed account of the exact methods used to reach this conclusion together with a description of an audit trail tracing each conclusion to raw data is provided in Sect. 1.6–Research Methodology.

#### **References**

Aguilar, F. V. (1999). The triumph of instrumental citizenship? Migrations, identities, and the nation-state in Southeast Asia. *Asian Studies Review, 23*(3), 307–336. https://doi. org/10.1080/10357829908713241

Antonsich, M. (2010). Searching for belonging – An analytical framework. *Geography Compass, 4*(6), 644–659. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8198.2009.00317.x

Blaikie, N. (2010). *Designing social research* (2nd ed.). Polity Press.


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## **Chapter 7 The Road Less Travelled: What Can Be Learnt?**

According to a recently published Gallup poll, Bosnia and Herzegovina scored −32% on the potential net migration index (PNMI).1 This score ranked BiH at the bottom of the list of European countries, with only Kosovo ranking lower. The situation is even more alarming when looking at the indices for brain drain and youth migration, for which BiH scored −40% and −57%, respectively. These results ranked BiH at the bottom on an international scale, with El Salvador, Haiti, Liberia, and Sierra Leone scoring lower. Amidst such abysmal emigration prospects, there appears a truly puzzling phenomenon: voluntary return migration. I embarked on a journey to unravel the mystery of why people are coming back to a place that so many seem eager to escape? I was initially inspired to answer this and related questions after watching the "I want to go home" (Kenović, 2016) documentary in May 2016. While wrapping up my data analysis 3 years later, I was captivated by another documentary flm produced by the same news organization. As the show notes state, "Disappearing" (Nestajanje),2 tells the story of "young, highly educated people from Bosnia and Herzegovina who, despite their different backgrounds, fnd themselves on the same road. This road, unfortunately, takes them far from their home country, which didn't give them a chance to realize their full potential." Leaving BiH is the dominant trend, while deciding to come back, although highly interesting for theoretical purposes, deviates from that norm. In the years of working on this puzzle, I hope to have shed some light on its various facets and contributed to its

<sup>1</sup>PNMI measures the potential net gains and losses to a country's adult population by subtracting those who would like to move out of a country from those who would like to move into a country. The same methodology is applied to the brain drain and youth migration indices. For more see: Gallup. (2019). *Potential Net Migration Index*. Retrieved from http://news.gallup.com/migration/ interactive.aspx?g\_source=link\_newsv9&g\_campaign=item\_245204&g\_medium=copy

<sup>2</sup>The documentary with English subtitles can be found at: Al Jazeera Balkans. (2018). *Regioskop: Nestajanje*. Retrieved from http://balkans.aljazeera.net/video/regioskop-nestajanje

better understanding. So, what can we learn from those who have taken the proverbial "road less traveled"? The focus of this chapter is to discuss the fndings of my study and how they contribute to the current debates on relevant concepts.

#### **7.1 Deciding to Return: The Diasporic "Homeland Orientation" Actualized**

My study contributes to a better understanding of how the diasporic "homeland orientation" (Brubaker, 2005) is actualized. Brubaker (2005) identifes three key features of the diaspora concept: dispersion, orientation to homeland, and boundary maintenance. The physical actualization of the second criteria of Brubaker's diaspora defnition, i.e. return migration to the home state, remains relatively understudied (Olsson & King, 2008). Although "homeland orientation" (Brubaker, 2005) with an implied "return to the (imagined) homeland" has been a defning characteristic of diaspora since Safran (1991), there were some modifcations in which the "homeland orientation" (Brubaker, 2005) did not necessarily imply physical return, but it rather involved "dense and continuous linkages across borders" (Faist, 2008). The "homing desire" characterizing diasporas is often in "creative tension" with "dispersal" (Brah, 1996) resulting in a form of mythical return, which defes the idea of "return migration as a clear-cut concept" (Carling et al., 2015, p. 3). The "mythical" element here is that the actual return of diaspora members to the state of origin is simple and straightforward. My fndings confrm many previous studies of return migration, particularly to post-confict societies, and further illustrate that actualizing the diasporic "homeland orientation" is in fact highly complex and deserving of focused scholarly attention.

To avoid a confusion of terms between diaspora and transnationalism, as well as to focus on return migration, I refer to my study participants mostly as returning diaspora members, or simply as returnees. They could, however, also be considered as transmigrants. Although most returnees have been forced to leave the home state through campaigns of ethnic cleansing and have indeed been "uprooted" (Glick-Schiller et al., 1995, p. 48), their frequent and active economic, social, political and cultural connections with the home state (Glick-Schiller et al., 1995) as well as their "dual lives" (Portes et al., 1999) make it possible to qualify them as transmigrants. Indeed, as seen from the discussion on the success of return, maintaining transnational ties is vital. As emphasized by Carling and Erdal (2014), the lines conceptually distinguishing between return migration and transnationalism are not entirely clear as the two affect each other from return intentions to actualization of return and from reintegration in the home state to the potential decision to re-emigrate. For example, there is a long-established link in the literature (Brown, 1997; Fokkema et al., 2013; Gubert, 2002; Carling & Erdal, 2014) between the transnational practice of remittance sending, as a form of facilitating reintegration and return migration. For all the listed reasons, my study participants could be qualifed as transmigrants, yet the "state of fux" (Glick-Schiller et al., 1995) is not their primary identity and it is also not the focus of my study. My study focuses on their return to the home state and, in later analysis, particularly on their status as citizens of that state. Therefore, having acknowledged the importance of transnationalism for return migration, preference is given to the participants' positioning as returnees.

More distinctions are needed beyond just "forced" and "voluntary" return (Carling et al., 2015). The returnees discussed in my study are "voluntary," according to the defnition presented in van Houte and Davids (2014), as each one of them had a legal alternative to stay in the host country when they decided to return. They truly ft the "decided" or "chosen" return as defned by Cassarino (2008), as they decided to go back with no "assistance from a public body" (p. 12). Thus, not only is there an "absence of force" (Black et al., 2004) required when considering voluntary return in the widest sense possible, but their return is voluntary in the narrowest sense as well, as it was also not assisted. Aging parents needing care did not compel their return, as the parents of my study participants either live independently or had passed away. For my study, "voluntariness" of return is understood in terms of Cassarino (2008) as "decidedness" or simply "free choice." Participants in my study have decided or chosen to return. From a life-cycle perspective, the returnees are all of working age and still in the process of earning their retirement. Thus, they bear the full risk of their choice to return as the success of their return project determines their economic wellbeing. Any decision-making based on non-economic factors comes at a substantial opportunity cost.

The decision to return to a post-confict society, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, when legal, economic, socio-cultural and other opportunities for a continued stay in the host state exist, is primarily driven by emotional factors. However, this decision is made possible only once a minimum of economic well-being is secured. A debatable point would be what that economic "minimum" would comprise. The returnee's priority is securing a source of income necessary to cover their subjectively determined minimum economic needs in the home state. For many of the returnees, the possibility of attaining that minimum level of economic security came either as a business opportunity in the home state or as a job offer. Once the opportunity materialized, each participant could decide whether to pursue the higher risk option of return or to continue their safer life abroad. "Chosen" or "decided" return (Cassarino, 2008) to a post-confict society is dominantly emotionally motivated, but it comes with an economic opportunity cost of remaining in the host state. The economic-emotional set of motivations was positioned against a background criticizing the reason-emotion dichotomy.3 This criticism leads to further questioning of

<sup>3</sup>Halfacree (2004) presents an interesting analysis on simplifying dichotomies: "The danger of dualistic forms of thinking is unlikely ever to go away because, for example, in any piece of work we are almost certainly going to have to use some form of categorization (Bourdieu, 1990) and we almost always end up "hitting (our) head against the ceiling of language" (Olsson, 1980, p. 3)" (p. 246). In that sense, while criticizing the reason-emotion dichotomy, espousing the appraisal theory of emotions and viewing emotions as essentially rational, I propose a slightly alternative dichotomy of the emotional vs. the economic, which I argue, has greater explanatory power.

the "rationality" of strictly economic decision-making and, conversely, the "irrationality" of decisions based on non-economic/emotional factors alone. Although economic explanations form the dominant discourse on migration decision-making, there is a growing literature "challenging economism" (Halfacree, 2004, p. 242). For example, research on counter-urbanization is making use of the "cultural turn" in human geography to search for alternatives. The challenge to economistic thinking comes under the following broad banner: "Thinking a market economy through to the end, people would not have any family ties." (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995, p. 35 as cited in Halfacree, 2004, p. 246). Similarly, I suggest an alternative approach to return migration decision-making that aligns with the more general "affective turn" in social sciences.

The pull-push framework is useful in organizing the reasons for economic selfinterest. A related key insight is that relations between labor and capital under global capitalism have very little variation from home to the host state. Although previously criticized for its relative reductivism and failure to conceptualize the full complexity of the decision to return, the paradigm of neoclassical economics with its emphasis on utility maximization, rational choice, the existence of differentials in capital/labor prices (wages, interest, and return) between various regions and the accompanying mobility of the factors of productions (King, 2012), is appropriate for explaining the reasons strictly related to economic self-interest. Push-pull models work within the paradigm of neoclassical economics to explain migratory movements at both the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels (Massey et al., 1998). On a macroeconomic level, labor will move from areas of lower to higher wages, driven by an uneven distribution of capital. In capital-intensive areas, labor will be scarce and wages high. The opposite is true of areas where capital is scarce. Migration will continue until general equilibrium is reached and prices of labor and capital in both sending and receiving areas are equalized. On a level of microeconomics, the individual "rational agent" decides to migrate based on price signals (wage differentials), perfectly available information, and a cost-beneft calculation (Sjaastad, 1962; Borjas, 1989). Explanations for economically self-interested reasons are found within the heavily criticized (see Arango, 2004 as cited in King, 2012) paradigm of neoclassical economics, push-pull models (see King, 1978 for an early list of push and pull factors), or its variations adapted for return migration as a repulsion-retention matrix (Carling et al., 2015).

Only working-age participants are included in my study, excluding non-employed students and retired individuals who earned pensions in a capital-intensive area. The reason for excluding such candidates from the sample is that their decision to return does not include the same level of risk. A person of working age who decides to return to a post-confict society bears the full amount of fnancial risk this decision entails. Upon return, they are left with the challenge of not only providing for current living expenses but also earning for retirement in the home state. Having a viable pull factor, such as an opportunity for self-employment or a job offer, from the home state mitigates the level of risk and makes return possible. It is important, however, to create a strong demarcation between the necessity of a minimum economic requirement and the maximization of economic self-interest, as it is understood in neoclassical economics. Securing an economic minimum is a precondition to return, but maximization of economic self-interest means foregoing return and remaining in the host state. A push factor from the host state, such as loss of employment because of an economic recession, facilitates the decision to return as it makes it appear as carrying a lower level of risk relative to the situation of unemployment in the host state. Overall, awareness of relations between owners of capital and labor under conditions of global capitalism creates the conditions for the returnees to compare directly their situation in the home and host states.

Return migration to a post-confict society, even when it is entirely voluntary, as well as deemed overall successful from the returnees' viewpoint and thus presumably sustainable from a social perspective, still involves a complex process of reintegration (Olsson & King, 2008). My study adds to scholarship on the reintegration of voluntary returnees by examining a distinct set of challenges and reintegration strategies. I also add to the scholarly understanding of the sustainability of this type of return by looking at the returnees' subjective evaluations of its success. Carling et al. (2015) summarize a frequent characterization of return as representing a "tension between the 'good state' abroad–with its transparent, democratic institutions– and the 'good society' back in the country of origin–with its strong social relations" (p. 21). While parts of this claim have certainly been confrmed by the fndings of my study, other parts have been challenged. Social relations at 'home' have been scrutinized with the conclusion that they may not be as strong as envisaged by this useful dichotomy. As was amply shown, besides the comforting feelings associated with closeness to family and friends, the returnees' social relations are strained with other phenomena characteristic of a post-confict society, such as differing social perspectives on the acceptability of corruption or a dominant social narrative of victimization. The tension involving the 'good state'-whether home or host–positions the returnees as citizens, and most often dual citizens of BiH and a state from which they have returned. This perspective takes citizenship, particularly its emotional dimension, as its primary focus, while the "deeper existential issues" (Carling et al., 2015, p. 1) associated with any and every migrants' contemplation of return, evoke feelings of "belonging" (Carling et al., 2015, p. 1).

#### **7.2 What Emotions Do the Returnees** *Feel* **as BiH Citizens?**

Understanding the concept of "citizenship as feeling" relies on an in-depth exploration of political emotions. As was explained previously, the reason-emotion dichotomy has infuenced the history of political thought and the social sciences, separating rationality and equating emotions with irrationality. The reason-emotion dichotomy has had an infuence on contemporary political theory: utilitarianianism and rational-choice, Marxism, post-Kantian liberalism and communitarianism (Maiz, 2011). The foundational theory of emotions, formulated by James (1884) and Lange (1885) relies on the reason-emotion dichotomy (Cannon, 1927). It is also referred to as the mind-body dualism and it proposes that emotions are solely bodily responses to outside stimuli. This approach to emotions has been challenged by the "cognitive-appraisal" perspective, which views emotions as enabling rationality and as "important forms of knowledge and evaluative thought" (Nussbaum, 1995 as cited in Bleiker & Hutchinson, 2008, p. 124). In economics, Jon Elster draws on the fndings of Damasio (1994) criticizing rational-choice models of behavior to conclude that emotions help us decide, and often help us make the best decisions (Elster, 1998). In sociology, voices calling for a reconceptualization of emotions as essentially rational, particularly for practical purposes (Barbalet, 2002) keep growing stronger. Following the "cognitive appraisal" perspective, emotions are not to be dismissed as "irrational" and, instead, need to be viewed as enabling rationality. In terms of democratic politics, perceiving emotions as stimulating social action leads to an examination of the role emotions play in "good citizenship" (Marcus, 2002).

To start a meaningful discussion on how individuals conceptualize citizenship, it is instructive to create connections to the beginnings of citizenship studies ranging back to classical liberal notions found in the work of T.H. Marshall (1950). Citizenship is conceived as a set of civil, political and social rights and "a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community" (Marshall, 1950, p. 28). Referring to the work of Stuart Hall and David Held, Yuval-Davis (2006) emphasizes that Marshall's defnition of citizenship does not mention the state directly. A key implication is that the "community" and the "state" coincide. As was amply proven in this study, with unconsolidated and post-confict states, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, this is *not* the case. As Guzina (2007) shows, the assumed "community" and "state" overlap does not hold everywhere and at all times. In fact, this overlap is mainly a product of historical circumstances and therefore cannot be assumed. Inherent to the liberal conceptualization of citizenship is the notion of the 'neutrality of the state.' In this sense, cultural or any other particularities do not need to be considered because they can be satisfed by a 'neutral state' as they translate directly into a language of civil, social or political rights (Guzina, 2007). Again, this assumption is more easily satisfed in culturally and nationally homogenous societies (Guzina, 2007). Marshall's work focuses on Britain, which simply cannot be taken as the only benchmark.

Another seminal work in citizenship studies, Brubaker's *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, offers a powerful distinction in how citizenship is conceptualized–civic versus ethnic. In summary, Brubaker (1992) presents an argument rooted in historical institutionalism, wherein the state in France historically had a central role in nation-building. Thus, relations between citizens and the state refected territory, leading to the *jus soli* or civic understanding of citizenship, based on membership and submission to common laws. In contrast, the historical context of the German state is such that it was founded by unifcation of a people of common, e.g. German, ethnic descent. The ethnic, or *jus sanguinis* understanding of citizenship thus underscores the signifcance of citizens sharing a common ethnicity, language, culture and history. As Džankić (2015) shows, the civic vs. ethnic dichotomy in understanding citizenship is also not entirely applicable to states such as Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Although the citizenship regime in BiH is formally conceived as a relationship between the individual and the state, as was demonstrated by Mujkić (2007), elevating collective above individual rights leads to an ethnicization of citizenship. Džankić (2015) summarizes the relationship between competing ethnicities and an unconsolidated, post-communist state as:

The group that claims ownership over the state will acquire a strong state-oriented identity based on the ethnic principle. In contrast, the identifcation of competing groups is more likely to be with their ethnic kin, or another kinstate, and thus citizenship in terms of such groups' belonging to the state is much weaker. This implies that there is no clear dividing line between 'civic' and 'ethnic' citizenship. (p. 7)

It can be argued that, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, those BiH citizens who adopt the Bosniak ethnic and certainly the BiH civic identity have a stronger stateorientation, while the majority of Serb and Croat BiH citizens have weaker stateorientation and a stronger identifcation with their respective ethnic kin and kinstates. To study the particular conceptualization of citizenship in states such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Džankić (2015) introduces the notion of "post-ethnic citizenship" as the "capacity of individuals to be loyal to the state instead of to the ethnic kin in practicing citizenship; to show solidarity with all members of community and not only to the ethnic kinship group" (p. 43). As was shown in my study and confrming fndings in Džankić (2015), "post-ethnic citizenship" remains to be a challenged concept in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

When analyzing the relations between national homelands, national minorities and nationalizing states, Džankić (2015) draws on models presented in Brubaker (1996) and its upgraded version in Smith (2002) to conclude that neither of these two models addresses the "difference between citizenship as an expression of the state's identity and citizenship as an identity of individuals" (p. 27). Seen from one of three perspectives, Brubaker's triadic nexus refers to the national minority as "caught between two mutually antagonistic nationalisms–those of the nationalizing states in which they live and those of the external national homeland to which they belong by ethnonational affnity though not by legal citizenship" (Brubaker, 1996, p. 6). Smith (2002) adds a fourth perspective to the nexus, by looking at the role of the international community in identity formation in Central and Eastern European states after the fall of communism. Smith (2002) asserts that, essential to a better understanding of nation building in the post-communist world are the processes of Euro-Atlantic integration and how they interact with the three layers of Brubaker's nexus: nationalizing state, external homeland and national minorities. As Džankić (2015) argues, neither Brubaker (1996) nor Smith (2002) are fully adequate for looking at how individual citizens conceptualize citizenship. The important difference is between "how the *state* constructs its membership and how its *citizens feel* towards it" (Džankić, 2015, p. 27, emphasis mine).

My study aims to fll this gap by answering the question of how it *feels* to be a BiH citizen from an individual citizen's perspective. My aim was to contribute to the literature on emotional citizenship by examining how a range of distinct emotions constitute the experience of "citizenship as feeling." With a citizenship like that of Bosnia, the main beneft of using the individual citizen's perspective is escaping the trap of the ethnicization of citizenship. My study participants are citizens with universally understood, complex, human emotions expressed in relation to their citizenship and varying from fear, anger, love, disappointment, nostalgia, to hope and various others. Wherever relevant for analysis, their religion or ethnicity is noted, but my goal throughout the study was to focus on the individual citizen and thus avoid rarifying ethnic differences by an overemphasis on structures. A highly nuanced disentangling of place-belongingness produces a language that includes ethnicity and religion, but also goes beyond these two dominant categories. This stated goal is especially relevant for the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina where the Dayton Peace Agreement includes discriminatory provisions elevating collective rights of "constituent peoples": Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs, and Others above the rights of individual citizens. Whether Bosniak, Croat, Serb, or "Other" my study participants are primarily viewed as BiH citizens. Whether Bosniak, Croat, Serb, or "Other" what they *feel* as BiH citizens is placed in the universally understood language of human emotions.

However, the *reason* certain emotions and not others constitute citizenship is context-dependent and historically rooted. This approach follows other similar studies, such as Brown (2014) and Aguilar (1996), that contextualize the connection between citizenship and emotions, while turning to two very different historical and institutional contexts to provide explanations. Brown (2014) looks at how the German national feeling is dominated by shame because of the legacy of the Holocaust and the Nazi-era. Aguilar (1996) explores transnational shame of the "Filipino as maid" image in Singapore and the "potential inferiority of co-nationals, on the 'weaknesses' of the 'race' that one carries 'in the blood' (Aguilar, 1996, p. 123). Although these two studies present directly incomparable contexts, they both argue that the connection between citizenship and a specifc emotion, in this case shame, is rooted in a particular historical context and institutional setup.

My argument is that the individual emotions constituting the emotional dimension of BiH citizenship originate from the historical context of the 1992–95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the nature of state-formation produced by the Dayton Peace Agreement. The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) ended a horrifc war and, although envisaged as a consociational power-sharing arrangement, in reality legalized genocide and ethnic cleansing, recognized a de facto division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The DPA established an ineffcient administrative structure and public sector not conducive to economic development and growth. As a result, economic insecurity is prevalent among BiH citizens. For a country of 3.5 million people, the DPA BiH Constitution envisages fourteen parliaments (state, entity, and cantonal) with thirteen governments and close to two hundred government ministries. The incredibly complicated and dysfunctional public administration created by the Dayton Peace Agreement straddles, burdens and suffocates an economy of only USD 7585 per capita GDP (World Bank, 2023). The ineffciencies of the BiH state structure make room for ample corruption, racketeering and intimidation to thrive. Under such circumstances, it is oligarchic political power and not the rule of law that determines the livelihood and wellbeing of each BiH citizen, independent from his or her ethnic, religious and even socio-economic background.

#### **7.3 Return Migration as a Search for Home and Belonging**

Scholarly literature on the meaning of home is vast and covers several disciplines: political science, sociology, anthropology, psychology, human geography, architecture, philosophy and history (for example, see Mallett, 2004; Jacobson, 2012; Boccagni et al., 2018). As some authors point out, "while being overwhelming by now, it [the literature on home] also tends to be dispersed and parcelized" (Boccagni et al., 2018, p. 1). To provide for greater integration in conceptual understanding and consistency, the focus of my study is chosen to be the nexus between home and migration (Boccagni et al., 2018). In this sense, home has a daily, vernacular meaning with multidimensional conceptual signifcance. The literature on migration and the search for home looks at home as a set of relations with family, friends, and roots (Jackson, 2016; Blunt & Dowling, 2006; Lam & Yeoh, 2004; Taylor, 2009), home as relationship with place (Tuan, 2001; Erkmen, 2015; Rapport, 1997) or home as connection to a particular time (Howes & Hammett, 2016). In either the relational, spatial or temporal conceptual understanding of home, home implies "an attribution of a sense of security, familiarity and control to particular settings over all others" (Boccagni, 2017, p. 1). As was illustrated in my study, the feeling of safety/security is identifed as dominant for the returnees to "feel at home."

Questioning the "portability of home" is looking at home, as "frst and foremost, a special kind of place" (Easthope, 2004, p. 135). Home, as human geographers have argued, is most properly understood as a "sense of place, " with the important difference made between space and place. There are at least two different ways of looking at differentiating space and place: human geography and cultural history. From the perspective of geographer Yi-Fuan Tuan, while space is an abstract bastion of freedom, place is imbued with security (Tuan, 2001). Seen from this angle, an abstract space becomes a place as it attains "defnition and meaning" (Tuan, 2001, p. 136). "What begins as undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to know it better and endow it with value" (Tuan, 1977, p. 6, as cited in Isomaa et al., 2013, p. xii). As Easthope (2004) asserts, to extend and deepen the notion of the "sense of place," Tuan coins the term "topophilia" to discuss "the affective bond between people and place" (p. 129). In contrast, the cultural historian Michel de Certeau associates himself with Foucault's idea of space as a "network of power," but also acknowledges the "daily acts and meaning that emerge in the various uses of space" (Isomaa et al., 2013, p. xii). For de Certeau, the distinction between space and place invokes a difference between place as physical entity and space as a social construct (Pedersen, 2003, p. 6). "In short, space is a practiced place. Thus, the street geometrically defned by urban planning is transformed into a space by walkers" (de Certeau, 1984, p. 117).

My study uses Tuan's notion of the "sense of place" to understand home as place, which is consistent with *security* being a key feature of home. In Tuan's differentiation between space and place, not only is space more abstract than place but also, "from the security and stability of place we are aware of the openness, freedom, and threat of space and vice versa" (Tuan, 1977, p. 6 as cited in Isomaa et al., 2013, p. xii). Seen as place, home takes a variety of forms for the returnees. The returnees "feel at home" in their physical house, their city or town, the entire region of the former Yugoslavia, and most problematized of all, the entire territory of the BiH state. As Easthope (2004) asserts:

A person's sense of place can provide them with a sense of belonging and of comfort. It can be a wonderful thing to share with people from other areas and other cultures. It can also be defended (in some cases literally) to the death if it is seen to be threatened (p. 131–132).

It is this "dark side of topophilia [and sense of place] as manifested in the naturalization of the nation-state" (Duncan & Duncan, 2001 p. 41) that is the main subject of discussion when problematizing the "domopolitics" (Walters, 2004) of feeling at home on the entire territory of the BiH state, the possibility of "framing the state as home" (Boccagni, 2017, p. 95).

The analytical framework used to explore belonging distinguishes between place-belongingness and the politics of belonging (Antonsich, 2010). The distinction between the two types of belonging is clarifed by Mas Giralt (2015). Placebelongingness relates to "personal emotions of feeling in place" (p. 4), while the politics of belonging refers to whether society, either in formal or informal ways, acknowledges the person as "being in place" (p. 4). Place-belongingness refers to the *internal*, while the politics of belonging relate to an *externally* determined understanding of belonging. Antonsich (2010) understands place-belongingness as defned by the feeling of security, and feeling "at home". Similarly to Boccagni (2017), Antonsich (2010) looks at home as a "symbolic place of familiarity, comfort, security, and emotional attachment" (p. 646). Putting the three concepts together, place belongingness implies feeling "at home, " which means feeling safe and secure. The politics of belonging refers to a boundary making process of creating an "us" and a "them," i.e. providing external defnitions of the criteria of belonging, resulting in outcomes of who gets to be considered "inside" the political community and who gets left outside (Yuval-Davis, 2006).

My study aims to contribute to the literature on home and belonging by examining existing analytical frameworks and introducing new categories. The main starting point for conceptualizing home was Boccagni (2017) three criteria defning home: security, familiarity and control. Within this analytical framework, home was viewed through the lens of spatiality, temporality and a set of social relations, particularly family relations. When examining place belongingness, my study adds categories of analysis to the existing fve aspects identifed by Antonsich (2010): "auto-biographical, relational, cultural, economic and legal" (p. 647). My data analysis reveals the seven relevant categories to be: relational, ethnic, religious, linguistic, landscape, economic, and civic belonging (place-belongingness). There are some overlaps between the categorization presented in Antonsich (2010) and my own, but to draw better conclusions in a case such as Bosnia, it is useful to distinguish between, for example, ethnic, religious and linguistic belonging, as opposed to confating them under the more generic "cultural" category. Disaggregating cultural belonging into ethnic, religious and linguistic whilst comparing these three to civic, which corresponds to legal in Antonsich (2010) also allows for a greater variety of individual combinations. For example, a more nuanced understanding of belonging encompasses several returnees who are expressly Muslim in terms of their religious belonging. They declare their BiH civic belonging and also reject all ethnic belonging. Their linguistic belonging is expressly Bosnian, which they recognize to be the same language as Croatian and Serbian.

The "myth of return" can be conceptualized in at least two different ways. On one level, the "myth of return" refers to the "psychological, cultural and political processes through which migrants sustain the idea of future return even as it becomes increasingly unlikely" (Carling et al., 2015, p. 3). Migrants while living abroad often continue to nurture their "homeland orientation" even as their actual connections with the host state grow stronger and those with the home state weaker, making physical return less and less possible or even attractive. As Antonsich (2010) points out, this type of "myth of return" results in a "neither here nor there" state for the migrants, a continuous "longing to belong" (Probyn, 1996; Ilcan, 2002), a constant source of tension characteristic of diasporas around the world (Ilcan, 2002). In this sense, home becomes "a mythic place of desire in the diasporic imagination" (Brah, 1996), a place of intense yearning to which the displaced "long to belong" (Probyn, 1996; Ilcan, 2002), but never actually return, as their settlement in the host country becomes a permanent reality. A second way of thinking about the "myth of return" is to perceive the idea of "return migration as a clear-cut concept" (Carling et al., 2015, p. 3) as mythical. The "mythical" element here is that the physical return of diaspora members to the home state is simple and straightforward.

My study adds to the scholarly understanding of the "myth of return" by demonstrating how the physical return of diaspora members to their homeland is anything but simple and straightforward. In fact, the return "home" is fraught with obstacles, challenges, adaptive development of strategies for overcoming these obstacles with continuous evaluation and re-evaluation of the success of return and the subsequent consideration of the possibilities for continued residence in the home state or further re-emigration. Also, similar to the frst understanding of the "myth of return," even when they do return, my study participants are often left in a *neither* here *nor* there position, excluded from belonging both in the home and host state. At other times, my study participants fnd themselves in a *both* here *and* there position with multiple transnational belonging becoming instrumental to the sustainability and success of their return project.

#### **7.4 Feeling Safe/Secure, Citizenship, Home and Belonging**

Results of my study add to scholarship on "citizenship as lived experience" (Nyers, 2007), "citizenship as practice" (Wood, 2013), "citizenship as feeling" (Jackson, 2016), and ultimately emotional/affective/intimate citizenship (Ahmed, 2016; Fortier, 2010; Ho, 2009; Howes & Hammett, 2016; Jackson, 2016; Johnson, 2010; Magat, 1999; Mookherjee, 2005; Wood, 2013). Although these concepts have been developed with contributions from feminist scholars, geographers, social psychologists, and anthropologists, a thorough analysis of the theoretical connections between citizenship and emotions is still in its initial stages. Also, an analysis of the actual, distinct emotions comprising home, belonging and the emotional dimension of citizenship, is missing. So far, the emotional dimension of citizenship has been theorized by geography scholars, such as Ho (2009) and Jackson (2016), by using the concepts of *home* and *belonging*. Unlike previous studies on emotional citizenship, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who decided to return to the home state, do not associate their feeling of "being at home" and their sense of belonging directly to their BiH citizenship. In other words, the emotional dimension of BiH citizenship is not conceptualized as home and belonging. The main explanation for why the returnees do not conceptualize the emotional dimension of citizenship as home and belonging is because the citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an unconsolidated, fragmented state and a post-confict society, does *not* make the respondents feel secure. In other words, when asked what it feels like to be a BiH citizen, the returnees do *not* invoke the notions of home and belonging, mainly because the feeling of "being at home" and "belonging" requires the key component of security/safety. Security is derived from the second, pragmatic citizenship, as well as various dimensions of home and belonging, but *not* from the BiH citizenship.

Although the opposition is not stark and directly binary, there is an illuminating contrast between emotional and pragmatic citizenship. As discussed by Mavroudi (2008), the second or 'pragmatic' citizenship is obtained in order to beneft economically and socially or to increase security. Other scholars (Ong, 1999; Waters, 2003; Magat, 1999; Aguilar, 1999) interchangeably use the terms instrumental, fexible or practical citizenship to refer to the acquisition of the host state's citizenship in order to gain certain benefts, *security* being the most important one. The pragmatic citizenship allows "formal membership that enables one to beneft from certain privileges bestowed by the state alone," producing what Magat (1999) refers to as "passport identity" (p. 137). The strategically acquired second passport has pragmatic value, but not a strong emotional dimension (Mavroudi, 2008). Home state citizenship is the primary source of identity, belonging and emotional attachment, while the second citizenship provides security (Skulte-Ouaiss, 2013). However, emotional and pragmatic citizenships are not in direct opposition to each other, because the dual citizenship situation could also result in dual or multiple belonging with de-territorialized attachment (Mavroudi, 2008).

The conceptual model (see Fig. 6.2) explains and formalizes the key insight that the feeling of safety/security is derived from the returnees' pragmatic citizenship, their conceptualization of home, understood as family, place or time and the various place-belongingness: relational, ethnic, religious, linguistic, economic, and landscape. "Feeling at home" for all citizens of BiH on the entire territory of the state of BiH to a small extent provides the possibility for the emotional dimension of BiH citizenship to be conceptualized as home. However, direct and indirect consequences of the 1992–95 war impede this proposition. Similarly, there is a weak possibility for civic belonging to create the link between the emotional dimension of BiH citizenship and belonging. Challenges in developing sustainable civic belonging that would supersede other forms, such as ethnic and religious belonging, come both internally, from "place-belongingness" (Antonsich, 2010) and externally, from the "politics of belonging" (Yuval-Davis, 2006).

#### **7.5 What Does the Future Hold?**

The Dayton Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina sets up Europe's "most complex state" (Džankić, 2015, p. 526) and violates basic human rights, as repeated ECtHR rulings show. However, within the DPA setup, does BiH remain to be a "normal" state? As Štiks (2011) asserts, it is common practice for analysts and commentators of the BiH Constitution to emphasize its curiously ineffcient and "abnormal" structure. However, an important premise to this argument is that "a more or less ethnically, culturally or linguistically homogenous and unitary nation-state is "normal" and therefore the norm" (Štiks, 2011, p. 255). However, Bosnia and Herzegovina was never a nation-state, and as Sarajlić (2010) shows, there is a severe tension between the idiosyncrasies of the BiH historical development and standards set by the European nation-state. Most post-communist countries, including former Yugoslav states, that declared independence after the Cold War are nation-states with a "core ethnic group" (Štiks, 2011, p. 245). So, if we are to assume that a nation-state is the "norm" then Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a "normal" state. However, this assumption certainly cannot remain unchallenged. Komel (2008), by referring to Hannah Arendt's criticism of the nation-state questions the "normalcy" of nation-states as such, where ethnic and religious uniformity demands a "stain of violence" (p. 142) with haunting echoes all the way to the Srebrenica genocide and other types of "ethnic cleansing" committed during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s.

Komel (2008) draws an interesting parallel between the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, further elucidating the nation-state dilemma as it applies to Bosnia and Herzegovina. He argues it is perhaps not by accident that the nation-state system dates back to the Westphalian Peace Treaty, which ended a century of religious warfare in Central Europe. The organizing principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* (Whose realm, his religion) adopted by the Westphalian system establishes a direct link between religion and territory at a time in history when religious and national belonging were virtually inseparable. Komel (2008) examines how the current crisis of citizenship in the European nation-state, through the "loss of national identity" due to newly established supranational arrangements such as the European Union, is in fact not a crisis of the state, but one of the nation. To resolve this tension, Komel (2008) calls for a pan-European "secularization", not only on the level of separating Church and state, but for the modern European context, on the level of separation between the nation and the state, citizenship and ethnic belonging. Seen through this lens, it is not appropriate to compare directly the citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina with one of a regular, "normal" European state, such as France, Germany or Slovenia, because Bosnia was never and still is not an ethnically, culturally or religiously homogenous society. Not ftting the Eurocentric vision of a nation-state. As Štiks (2011) reminds us that historically, it is through "violence against civilians, expulsions, and ultimately mass killings" (p. 262) that the traditional European nation-state has been created.

Genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass atrocities should not and cannot be the path towards state formation, not post WWII, after the horrors of the Holocaust, and following the international community's stated commitment towards "Never again!" However, there is an intense battle between professed European values, as expressed by rulings of the ECtHR, and realities on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These daily realities are dominated by ethno-national oligarchies furthering secessionist agendas, and, unfortunately, an increasingly appeasing attitude towards them, by individual European governments, the EU, and other international actors, including the United States. On December 15, 2022, Bosnia and Herzegovina was offcially granted EU candidate status. The BiH Constitution needs to change according to rulings of the ECtHR in order for BiH to join the EU, however, these changes cannot come with the cost of renewed violence. "Politics of belonging" need to change, to create an inclusive polity, encompassing everybody, all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet, these changes require domestic and international political will. If seen as a small, insignifcant country in the hinterlands of Europe, BiH, with all its troubles, can easily be dismissed and ignored. But Bosnia is also an open wound, a dire warning, and a haunting question for the modern nation state, itself under pressure from ethnic, racial, and religious diversifcation due to increasing migratory fows and changing demographics. What path to take towards a more peaceful and democratic future for the citizen, any citizen? This question is as relevant to Bosnia, as it is to any other modern European nation state.

#### **References**


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