$$\frac{\mathbb{B}}{\mathbb{C}}$$

Yury Arzhanov **Sergius of Reshaina, Commentary on Aristotle's** *Categories*

## **Philosophy and Sciences in the Christian Orient**

Edited by Yury Arzhanov and Matthias Perkams

# **Volume 2**

# Yury Arzhanov **Sergius of Reshaina, Commentary on Aristotle's** *Categories*

Critical Edition and Translation

Research results from: Austrian Science Fund (FWF), grant-DOI: P-34900-G. Published with the support of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): 10.55776/PUB1119.

ISBN 978-3-11-144395-9 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-144453-6 ISSN 2942-254X DOI https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111444536

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#### **Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek**

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© 2024 Yury Arzhanov, published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. This book is published with open access at www.degruyter.com.

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TO THEODORE

## **Acknowledgements**

My first acquaintance with Sergius' commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* goes back to when I had just started my study of the Syriac translations of Greek philosophical and scholarly literature. Sergius' name was associated with the beginning of this cultural process. Since then, I have frequently come back to this figure and the legacy of his work, of which his extensive commentary on the *Categories* was traditionally mentioned as his most substantial contribution to the study of Aristotle in Syriac schools.

During my work at the University of Bochum, Germany, I several times had the chance to discuss Sergius' commentary with one of the main specialists in Syriac and Arabic translations of Greek texts, Gerhard Endress, who always stressed the value of this treatise in the transmission of Greek philosophy "from Alexandria to Baghdad". As a result of these conversations, I acquired images of manuscripts containing it and started to collate them. Since at that time I had a group of students who were interested in Syriac philosophical works and had some training not only in Syriac, but also in Greek and Arabic, I formed a reading group where we together studied Sergius' treatise, starting with the prologue and the first book and comparing it to the Greek and Arabic commentary tradition. This reading class contributed to my interest in Sergius' treatise and gave me the idea of publishing the complete Syriac text.

On various occasions, I had the chance to talk about Sergius' commentary with Henri Hugonnard-Roche and John Watt, who had translated parts of it into French and English and had published a number of studies on it. Both supported my interest in this treatise and assured me that, although they had originally intended to publish it themselves, due to various reasons they had to give up on such plans. These conversations encouraged me to do further research on Sergius and to proceed in my preparatory work for the future edition.

In prior years, my involvement with several scholarly projects prevented me from doing much work on Sergius' text. It was a grant which I received from the Austrian Science Fund *FWF* (*Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung*; project no. P34900G) that created the necessary position which allowed me to finish this task. Thus, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Austrian Science Fund *FWF* for financially supporting my work and for the excellent communication during the time of my project.

The position I acquired with the support of the *FWF* was based at the University of Salzburg, which afforded me ideal conditions for the project. Both the director of the Department of Biblical Studies and Ecclesiastical History, Dietmar Winkler, and the staff of the department provided me with their support and expertise (mostly in the form of friendly conversations during coffee breaks and lunches), which helped me a great deal during my work. Aho Shemunkasho was kind enough to spend a few hours answering my questions, and his knowledge of Syriac, his mother tongue, allowed me to better understand many difficult passages in Sergius' text.

I am most grateful to Sebastian Brock, whom I once called a *Schutzengel* of Syriac scholars and who fulfilled this role again in the present project. He has carefully read both the Syriac text of the present edition and my preliminary English translation of it and given his feedback on both. I am also indebted to Michael Chase, George Karamanolis, Stephen Menn, and Alexander Lamprakis, who read the draft version of this book and made multiple suggestions on it that helped me to better understand Sergius' arguments as well as the philosophical peculiarities of his treatise. The English parts of the book were proofread by Zachary Candy, whom I would like to thank for the work he has done in improving them. My special thanks go to Florian Ruppenstein from the publishing house, De Gruyter, for setting the book's layout.

To my wife, Olga, I owe more than I can possibly say, since it was her constant care and support that made it possible for me to finish this book in a short period of time. She was most patient with me, being aware of my obsession with the present project. I dedicate this book to our son Theo who was born in June 2022, shortly after our move to Salzburg, and who has completely changed our life, having brought so much light, love, and joy into it. So, just as Sergius originally addressed his commentary to his contemporary Theodore, let the modern edition of this commentary be dedicated to another Theodore, who was born in Salzburg, together with this book.

## **Contents**

## **Introduction**

#### **1 Sergius of Reshaina and his Commentary3**


#### **2 The Syriac Text of the** *Commentary***25**

	- 2.1.1 London, British Library, Add. 14658 (L) **25**
	- 2.1.2 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Syr. 354, Part I (P) **28**
	- 2.1.3 The Erbil Group (Mss. BCD) **32**
		- 2.1.3.1 The Common Source **35**
		- 2.1.3.2 Mss. B, C, and D as Independent Copies **40**
		- 2.1.3.3 Relation of the Prototype of BCD to Other Witnesses **44**

## **Sergius of Reshaina, Commentary on Aristotle's** *Categories***:  Syriac Text and English Translation**

Sigla, Abbreviations, and Signs Used in the Edition **61**

Prologue **62/63** Book One **70/71** Book Two **112/113** Book Three **166/167** Book Four **262/263** Book Five **328/329** Book Six **362/363** Book Seven **406/407**

#### **Appendix: Divisions Presented in the Diagram Form  445**

**Bibliography467**

**X** Contents

**Indices**  General Index **477** Index of Greek Words **486** References **487** Syriac Manuscripts **497** 

**Introduction** 

## **1 Sergius of Reshaina and his Commentary**

## **1.1 Sergius, a Christian Disciple of Ammonius**

Sergius of Reshaina (Syr. *Sargis d-Reš ʿAyna*, or *Rešʿaynaya*; d. 536) is a major figure in Syriac intellectual history1 . He is the first Syriac author known by name who translated Greek medical2 , scholarly3 , and philosophical works4 into Syriac and who made a major contribution to the knowledge of Aristotle's logic in Syriac schools (and, by extension, among later scholars writing in Arabic)5 . If al-Farabi's account of the transfer of philosophical and medical instruction from the late ancient Alexandria, firstly, to Ḥarran in Syria and then further to Baghdad (the "from Alexandria to Baghdad" complex of narratives)6 has any credibility, Sergius marks the beginning of this process of transition.

Sergius studied with Ammonius Hermeiou in Alexandria and, after his return to Syria, started to adapt and transmit the Alexandrian philosophical and pedagogical model to his Christian audience. In his letter about Syriac translations of Galen7 , Ḥunayn ibn Isḥaq, the most prominent figure in the history of scientific translations from Greek into Syriac and Arabic, makes Sergius his main object of criticism, thereby testifying to his authority as late as the ninth century. Thus, in his life and afterlife, Sergius is revealed to be the crucial link between late ancient Alexandria and the great translation movement of ʿAbbasid Baghdad in the 8th–10th centuries8 .

 **1** Sergius' role in the history of Syriac culture and philosophy was to some extent overemphasized in the 19th century, as a result of his being credited with a number of philosophical treatises which have come down to us as anonymous; cf., e.g., Renan 1852, Sachau 1870, Wright 1894: 89–93, and Baumstark 1894. A revision of his role and legacy has been made in a series of articles by Henri Hugonnard-Roche, see especially Hugonnard-Roche 1997b and 2004. For an up-to-date assessment of Sergius' place in the history of philosophy, see Watt 2018.

**<sup>2</sup>** For Sergius' translations of Galen, see Degen 1981, Kessel 2016, and Bhayro 2019.

**<sup>3</sup>** For Sergius' translations and adaptations of astronomical works, see Claude-Villey 2012.

**<sup>4</sup>** See a review of Sergius' philosophical writings in Hugonnard-Roche 1997b and Aydin 2016: 10–25.

**<sup>5</sup>** For the afterlife of Sergius in the Arabic world, see Watt 2011.

**<sup>6</sup>** Al-Farabi's account was analyzed by M. Meyerhof who was the first to introduce the expression "von Alexandrien nach Bagdad" (Meyerhof 1930). A number of scholars later questioned the historicity of al-Farabi's description and criticized Meyerhof's literal interpretation of it (see, e.g., Strohmaier 1987 and Gutas 1999).

**<sup>7</sup>** The Arabic text with German translation of Ḥunayn's letter was published in Bergsträsser 1925 and Lamoreaux 2016.

**<sup>8</sup>** For the role of Syrian scholars in the translation of Aristotle and Galen into Arabic, cf., e.g., Hugonnard-Roche 1991 and Tannous 2018. D. Gutas claims that this role has been overemphasized; cf. Gutas 1998: 20–24.

Nothing is known about the time and place of Sergius' birth. His traditional association with the town of Reshaina9 is based on the late stage of his career, when, following his return from Alexandria, he became the "main physician" (Gr. ἀρχίατρος, usually transliterated in Syriac) of this town. Our only source of information for Sergius' biography is the Chronicle of Ps.-Zacharias of Mytilene10, according to which "this man was eloquent and experienced in reading many books of the Greeks", which he studied (lit. "which he read together with a commentary") during the lengthy period he spent in Alexandria11. The chronicler turns out to be rather critical towards Sergius, presenting him as a person of low morals, and mentions that Sergius was "a believer through his own will"12. It is not immediately clear what Ps.-Zacharias means by this, and it is possible that his point is simply that Sergius pretended to be a Christian. However, it is also likely that the words of the chronicler refer to the fact that, at the time when Sergius first arrived in Alexandria, he was not yet a Christian, and it was during his time in the school of Ammonius that he came to the faith13. Since Ps.- Zacharias says nothing about the years which preceded Sergius' coming to Alexandria, we may state only roughly that he was born in the second half of the 5th century. The above-mentioned remark by Ps.-Zacharias leaves open the possibility that Sergius' family was not Christian; however, they must have been wealthy enough to send their son to what was at the time the best place to be educated in rhetoric, philosophy, and medicine.

Since medicine became Sergius' specialty after his return to Syria, it is apparent that he received not only a philosophical but also a medical education in Alexandria,

 **9** The town of Reshaina (Syr. *Reš ʿAyna*, Ar. *Raʾs al-ʿAyn*), which bore the Greek name Theodosiopolis (after Emperor Theodosius I who in 383 granted it a municipal status), was located on the river Khabur close to the border of the Roman Empire; cf. Takahashi & Von Rompay 2011 and Aydin 2016: 40.

**<sup>10</sup>** This work was originally compiled in the late 6th century by Zacharias of Mytilene, or Zacharias Rhetor, a member of the Christian *philoponoi* in Alexandria (discussed below). It is preserved only in the Syriac version, however, whose anonymous author (referred to as Ps.-Zacharias) updated and expanded its contents to include events up until to the reign of Justinian. For the Syriac text of the account of Sergius' life in this chronicle, see Brooks 1921: 136–138. English translation with an extensive introduction and commentary in Greatrex 2011. We find further references to Sergius in the Chronicle of 846, Chronicle of Michael the Great, and in Barhebraeus' *Ecclesiastical History*, which all seem to be dependent on the account found in Ps.-Zacharias.

<sup>̈</sup> Ə ƀƌܐ (...) ƢƟܐ ܗܘܐ ̈ ܕƦƃܒ ܓƀܐܐ ̈ ܘܓܒƢܐ ܗܘܐ ܗƌܐ ƍƍƤƆܐ ܘŻƇƉ ܗܘܐ ܒƍſƢƠܐ ܐ .Syr **<sup>11</sup>** ܕŴſ ̈ ƍƙƇܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܒܐűƍƐƄƆܪſܐ ܙܒƍܐ Ɩſűſܐ܂ ̈ܐ ܕƉ ܒƦƃܕ ܐƠƣŴƙܒ Ǝſܕ ųƆ (Brooks 1924: 136.4-8; cf. the English translation in Greatrex 2011: 368). Ps.-Zacharias' remark that Sergius "read together with a commentary" (ܐƠƣŴƙܒ Ǝſܕ ųƆ ܗܘܐ ܐƢƟ) books of various Greek authorities demonstrates author's familiarity with the details of the educational process in Alexandrian schools.

**<sup>12</sup>** Syr. ܐƍƊſųƉ ųƍƀܒƞܒ) Brooks 1921: 136.9; cf. the English translation in Greatrex 2011: 368–369). On this passage, cf. Fiori 2014: 62.

**<sup>13</sup>** Similar transformation that happened to Severus, the future patriarch of Antioch and the leading figure in the Anti-Chalcedonian movement of the early 6th century, is described in the *Life of Severus* written by Zacharias Rhetor.

as the chronicle of Ps.-Zacharias also mentions14. By the late 5th century, the Alexandrian *iatrosophists* had developed a systematic approach to the study of the works of Hippocrates and Galen that included some elements of the philosophical education with which it could be combined15. It is thus unsurprising to find a reference to Galen in Sergius' Prologue to the commentary, which speaks of Galen as the reason to turn to the study of logic (§§2–3).

Ps.-Zacharias further reports an embassy to Rome and Constantinople in which Sergius took part, as well as his death in Constantinople in 53616. Based on this evidence, it is traditionally assumed that the time he spent in Alexandria fell in the last decades of the 5th century and that his subsequent literary activity, including the composition of his commentary on the *Categories*, may be dated to the early 6th century. At this time, Alexandria was, alongside Athens, one of the main centers of philosophical education, one particularly attractive to Christian students, as the study of philosophy there was not so closely associated with pagan religious elements as was the case in Athens17.

Sergius' education in Alexandria coincides with the period of the teaching activity of Ammonius Hermeiou (435/445–517/526)18, a pupil of Proclus who began giving philosophy classes in one of the Alexandrian schools at some time after 470. Ammonius was the teacher of several prominent philosophers, including Philoponus, Simplicius, and Damascius, as well as (indirectly) Olympiodorus, David and Elias, who appear as the last representatives of the Alexandrian philosophical tradition, which, by the midsixth century, was deemed acceptable for Christians after the transformation of the philosophical curriculum that had taken place in the late 5th century.

Christian students were apparently not rare in the school of Ammonius, probably the most famous among these being John Philoponus (*ca*. 490–575), who became one of the editors of Ammonius' lectures19. It is obvious that some elements of philosophical education in Alexandria, including first of all the doctrine of the eternity of the world, but also religious elements associated with the Chaldean Oracles and Orphic texts, were problematic for Christian hearers of Ammonius' classes. Some of them, who labelled themselves *philoponoi* ("industrious")20, were eager to counterbalance these

 **<sup>14</sup>** Ps.-Zacharias writes that Sergius studied "books (βιβλία) of medicine" ( ܐƀƇ ̈ ܬܐŴƀƏܕܐ ܒƀܒ ( (Brooks 1921: 136.9; cf. the English translation in Greatrex 2011: 368).

**<sup>15</sup>** For the system of medical education in Alexandria in the late 5th century, see Overwien 2018 and Overwien 2019.

**<sup>16</sup>** Brooks 1921: 136–138. Cf. the English translation in Greatrex 2011: 369–371.

**<sup>17</sup>** For the forms of philosophical education in Athens and Alexandria in the late 5th century, see Watts 2006.

**<sup>18</sup>** For Ammonius and his school, see Blank 2010, Griffin 2016, and Chase 2020: 1–11.

**<sup>19</sup>** On Philoponus as a Christian student of philosophy, see Verrycken 1990, Zachhuber 2020: 145–169.

**<sup>20</sup>** The *philoponoi* was a socially active group of Christian laymen closely connected with the monastery of Enaton, which was situated close to Alexandria and whose monks had an active anti-

elements by suggesting Christian students of philosophy adopt an alternative course of reading, which, besides the Bible, also included works by Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus21.

The tension between Christian and pagan students of philosophy in Alexandria led to an open conflict in 48622. It was resolved by recourse to a compromise between the two groups, one with important consequences for philosophical education in the following decades. Among these was that by the end of the 5th century Ammonius had become the leading Alexandrian teacher of philosophy. In addition, the compromise between Alexandrian Church authorities and Ammonius most likely included alterations to the program of philosophical education that would make it more acceptable for Christian students23.

In his pedagogical activity, Ammonius generally followed the principle of combining Aristotelian and Platonic writings (introduced originally by Porphyry and becoming a general principle in the Neoplatonic schools) into a homogeneous curriculum24. While Ammonius apparently maintained interest in Platonic dialogues, on which he gave lectures, it was Aristotle's writings, especially his *Organon*, that dominated in the first part of the cursus of education25. Thus, Aristotle's *Categories* (together with Porphyry's *Isagoge*) served as the first philosophical text read by students of philoso-

<sup>――</sup>  Chaledonian position. Edward Watts stressed the role, which the *philoponoi* of Alexandria played in the transformation of the philosophical curriculum in Alexandria in the late fifth century, in a series of publications, see particularly Watts 2005 and Watts 2006: 211–230. Watts' arguments were largely criticized by Alain-Philippe Segonds (see Segonds *et al*. 2011: 461–462) and Ilsetraut Hadot (Hadot 2015: 20–25).

**<sup>21</sup>** This program of substitution of traditional Greek authorities with the works of Church Fathers developed by the Alexandrian *philoponoi* is described in the *Life of Severus* written by Zacharias Rhetor, who himself belonged to this group. The *Life* has been preserved in Syriac and published with a French translation in Kugener 1904. An English translation: Ambjörn 2008.

**<sup>22</sup>** The attack on the pagan philosophical schools was initiated by the *philoponoi* and monks of the monastery of Enaton near Alexandria, who were supported by the patriarch of the city, Peter Mongus. As a result, many philosophers were forced to flee from the city, thus leaving Ammonius as Alexandria's preeminent teacher of the philosophical curriculum. See Watts 2006: 216–225; cf. Hadot 2015: 18– 21.

**<sup>23</sup>** Ammonius' agreement with Alexandrian Christian authorities is reported in rather scornful fashion by Damascius; see his *Life of Isidore* (Athanassiadi 1999: 280). For various interpretations of Damascius' text and the historical events that underpin it, see Sorabji 2005, who states that the agreement concerned primarily Ammonius' "refraining from the open support of pagan ritual" (p. 204). Cf. Segonds et al. 2011: 463 and Hadot 2015: 21, who both admit that the agreement was primarily focused on financial issues and on increasing the number of Christian students in Ammonius' school rather than on the philosophical curriculum.

**<sup>24</sup>** On the tendency to harmonize Plato and Aristotle in Middle Platonism which resulted in the educational synthesis by Porphyry, see particularly Karamanolis 2006 and Hadot 2015. On Porphyry's contribution to the Neoplatonic curriculum, see Chase 2012: 1374–1376. For Ammonius' system of teaching, cf. Griffin 2016: 396–398.

**<sup>25</sup>** On Damascius' witness to Ammonius' interest in Plato, see Hadot 2015: 15–20; cf. Chase 2020: 1–3.

phy, preceded only by a general introduction to philosophy and logic centered on various preliminary questions (Greek τὰ προλεγόμενα, i.e. subjects discussed before a study of certain text)26. Among these questions, we find a general division of philosophy reflecting the educational system established in the school of Ammonius, a discussion of the role of logic as an instrument rather than a part of philosophy, and the correct division of Aristotle's writings27.

The events which took place in Alexandria in the 480s are known to us mainly from the *Life of Severus* by Zacharias Rhetor28. Both Zacharias and the eponymous Severus, the future patriarch of Antioch, had belonged to the *philoponoi* of Alexandria and were supporters of their philosophical and apologetic program. The latter is reflected by another treatise composed by Zacharias, a dialogue *Ammonius*, that describes a discussion between an unnamed Christian philosopher and Ammonius, who, at the end of the debate, is brought to silence and thus shown to be defeated by Christian arguments29. It would be a reasonable assumption that Serigus of Reshaina was also a member of the *philoponoi* during his stay in Alexandria. Although we have no direct evidence for this30, we do find in Sergius' work one of the earliest attempts to present Aristotle's philosophy not only as acceptable but as fundamentally necessary for Christian education.

In his *Commentary*, Sergius stresses several times that logic should be considered an instrument31 necessary for Christian education, since without it "neither will one be capable of studying the books on medicine nor will the arguments of the philosophers be comprehensible", nor even will "the divine books" be correctly interpretable, unless a person is illuminated from above (see the concluding §450). Aristotle's natural philosophy too is presented by the Syriac scholar as indispensable for education and compatible with Christian views. Sergius writes (§256) about his plans to "sufficiently explain everything what we have learned not only from this man (i.e., Aristotle), but also from other philosophers and from our Christian writers who have diligently searched for truth", thus presenting non-Christian and Christian philosophers to be in

 **26** As Elias remarks in the introductory part of his commentary on the *Categories* (*In Cat*. 107.24–26), the traditional set of the *prolegomena*-questions goes back to Ammonius' teacher, Proclus. For the genesis and formation of the tradition of the study of *prolegomena*, see Hadot 1990 and Mansfeld 1994. For the development of this tradition in the Greek, Syriac, and Arabic worlds, see Hein 1985.

**<sup>27</sup>** For the structure of philosophical curriculum in the school of Ammonius as reflected in the introductory treatises that derive from it, see Westerink 1990, Hadot 1990, Hadot 1991, and Hoffmann 2012. **28** Ed. Kugener 1904; English translation in Ambjörn 2008.

**<sup>29</sup>** Ed. in Colonna 1973, English translation in Dillon, Russel, and Gertz 2012. Another pagan figure who appears in this dialogue is the medical philosopher (*iatrosophist*) Gessius, which makes apparent that medical education in Alexandria in this period was connected with similar debates between Christian and non-Christian students characteristic of the school of Ammonius.

**<sup>30</sup>** Cf. Fiori 2014: 86–88.

**<sup>31</sup>** See the extensive discussion of whether logic is a part of philosophy or its instrument in Sergius' *Commentary*, §§30–48.

some sort of agreement acceptable for his fellow believers. Thus, in Sergius' *Commentary* we find the same apologetic bias as in, e.g., the works of Severus of Antioch, one characteristic of the approach of the Alexandrian *philoponoi*, which Sergius in turn suggests as the pedagogical template for Syriac schools.

The term *philoponoi* turns out to play an important role in the history of the West Syriac (Syriac Orthodox) anti-Chalcedonian movement pioneered by Severus32. The intellectual elite of the West Syriac Church, who were interested in the study and translation of the Greek philosophy and who were associated mainly with the monastery of Qenneshre, took over this label, either using the Greek word or a Syriac calque33. In so doing, the Syriac scholars of the 6th–7th centuries presented themselves as the hairs of the Alexandrian Christian laymen who first sought to Christianize the essentially pagan philosophical program and to adapt it for Christian schools largely associated with monasteries.

#### **1.2 Sergius' Commentary on the** *Categories*

The treatise by Sergius edited in this volume (henceforth *Commentary*) is in many aspects a product of the exegetical method established in the school of Ammonius by the end of the 5th century. Sergius composed his *Commentary* probably shortly after his return from Alexandria, having adapted it from written notes that he brought with him. Given that such notes by students "from the voice" (ἀπὸ φωνῆς) of their teacher formed the basis of the commentaries on the *Categories* and *Prior Analytics* ascribed to Ammonius himself (as the titles of these works make clear34), we cannot state with certainty whether Sergius' own notes were made by him personally for his private use, or whether he had access to some "official" version of Ammonius' lectures prepared by someone else.

Indeed, many passages in Sergius' treatise are very similar to (sometimes verbatim reproductions of) the text of the commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristo-

 **32** On Severus' promotion of the apologetic program of the *philoponoi* in the Syriac milieu, which resulted in the appropriation both of the program and of the term in West Syriac intellectual circles, cf. Arzhanov 2019: 152–174.

**<sup>33</sup>** The 8th century author Phocas called Athanasius of Balad and Jacob of Edessa, the famous Syriac translators of Aristotle's works who were connected with the monastery of Qenneshre, "lovers of toil" (ܐƇƊƕ ƁƊŶܪ̈(, using a calque of the Greek φιλόπονοι (see the text in Wright 1871: 494). The only Syriac manual on rhetoric composed in the 9th century by Antony of Tagrit, was addressed to a certain Syriac *philoponos* (ܣŴƌŴƘŴƇƀƘ), according to a later note by Barhebraeus (see Abbeloos & Lamy 1872: 363).

**<sup>34</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat*. 1.1–2 and *In An. Pr*. 1.1–2. Among the works ascribed to Ammonius, only his commentary on Aristotle's *On Interpretation* is considered to be written by him personally, while his other commentaries on Porphyry and Aristotle are compositions of his students (cf. Blank 2010: 661– 662 and Griffin 2016: 402–404).

tle's *Categories* ascribed directly to Ammonius, as well as to Philoponus' commentary on the *Categories* likewise written on the basis of Ammonius' lectures, suggesting that these works all derive either from multiple individual sets of notes taken in the classroom or from some official version of them authorized by Ammonius himself. As such, the Greek texts, containing parallels to Sergius' *Commentary* are quoted *in extenso* in the footnotes to the English translation. Although we cannot take for granted that Sergius' text has any direct relation to them beyond a common source in Ammonius' lectures35, they contain the Greek terminology that Sergius most certainly had in mind while composing his commentary, allowing us better to understand the technical vocabulary of the published work36.

The structure of Sergius' treatise clearly reflects the Alexandrian approach to the *Categories*, that considered this book not merely the first part of the *Organon*, but indeed, the very first text to be read by the student of philosophy (albeit accompanied by Porphyry's *Introduction* and other introductory materials, as mentioned). Sergius himself stresses that he has composed his treatise (Syr. *maktbanuta*, "writing, book") with a specific structure in mind, speaking of its seven parts as *memre* (sg. *memra*, "treatise, part"), each of which is generally dedicated either to a single issue or to a group of questions pertaining to such a single issue (Syr. *šarba*, "subject matter")37.

Thus, the first half of Sergius' treatise, which includes the Prologue and Books I and II, focuses on the traditional preliminaries (*prolegomena*) discussed prior to Porphyry's *Isagoge* and to Aristotle's *Categories*. At the end of Book II, Sergius briefly outlines the first chapter of the *Categories* dealing with homonymy, synonymy, and heteronymy (the *antepraedicamenta*) and in this way embarks upon the second half of his work. This half in general follows the text of the *Categories* and hence may be designated a commentary, although it does not include *lemmata* from Aristotle's text. Books III to VI are dedicated to the *praedicamenta*, the four primary categories discussed at length by Aristotle himself: substance, quantity, relation, and quality. The last Book VII deals with the rest of the categories (the *postpraedicamenta*) 38. The contents of Sergius' work can be outlined as follows:

 **35** Furlani claims that Sergius used Philoponus as his source ("dipende in tutto"): Furlani 1922: 172. This assumption, however, turns out to be rather unlikely for chronological reasons, cf. Aydin 2016: 56–57.

**<sup>36</sup>** Cf. an attempt at reconstructing the Greek terms that underlie the epitome of Sergius' *Commentary* in Aydin 2016: 295–302.

**<sup>37</sup>** Cf. the opening paragraphs to Books II–VII, i.e. §§49–50, 122, 234, 313, 353, and 405.

**<sup>38</sup>** Such division of the *Categories* into three parts is discussed by Ammonius in *In Cat*. 14.3–4 and is assumed by Sergius, cf. *Commentary*, §406.


As becomes apparent from this overview, Sergius' work is not limited to the text of Aristotle's *Categories*, but has a much broader task, i.e., giving a general introduction to philosophy. As he notes, Aristotle's treatise is "an introduction into and a beginning of the study of logic" (§449), addressed to those who are "at the beginning of their learning" (§64)39. It is thus possible that Sergius designed his work as a manual for students who might have limited their education in philosophy to an introductory course and not be interested in further study or in other Aristotelian works40.

In the Prologue to the *Commentary*, Sergius reports a dialogue between him and his disciple Theodore41 (to whom he addresses the treatise as a whole) concerning

 **39** Cf. §186 and §275.

**<sup>40</sup>** Cf. §60, where Sergius describes various parts of the *Organon* and proceeds to Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. Having enumerated all these treatises, however, Sergius stresses that his main focus will be the *Categories*.

**<sup>41</sup>** According to Ḥunayn b. Isḥaq's *Letter*, Theodore at certain point of his career became bishop of the town Karḫ Ǧuddan, see Bergsträsser 1925: 12.22. Cf. Hugonnard-Roche 1997: 124 n. 13 and Aydin 2016: 10 n. 1. Theodore was a disciple of Sergius (see *Commentary*, §§4–7) and assisted him in translating the works of Galen into Syriac, revising Sergius' raw translations and correcting their style (see §2). Several translations of the Greek astronomical and medical works made by Sergius (e.g., the treatise *On the* 

Galen (§2). Theodore had inquired as to the source of the clear logical structures found in Galen's works, and Sergius replied that the famous doctor had learned the science of logic from Aristotle, who holds a special position in the history of philosophy, given that it was Aristotle who had brought together all of human knowledge into one coherent system (§3). In the following paragraphs (§§4–7), Theodore begs Sergius to teach him this science which underlies Galen's works. Notwithstanding the artificial character of the described dialogue, the Prologue gives us an idea of Sergius' purposes with his treatise, which was clearly not intended *prima facie* to be a line-by-line commentary on the text of the *Categories*: rather, it is meant to explicate more general questions of the role of Aristotle's philosophy and particularly of his logic.

From Sergius' brief remarks scattered throughout the *Commentary* we may deduce that he had a much broader audience in mind than just his disciple Theodore (cf. §240 where Sergius says explicitly that he is addressing "many"). In the beginning and the concluding paragraphs of nearly every book, Sergius stresses his constant concern for those who are going to read his treatise42, for whom he did his best to make his explanations as clear as possible, "so that even little children might not to be confused by our answers" (§234). While addressing Theodore on one occasion (§418), Sergius writes: "This is how you can clearly explain and make apparent to the students the teaching on the six kinds (of change) which have been discussed thus far." It is thus possible that he was also thinking of teachers who could use his work for an introductory course in philosophy, since in §380 he mentions those who will "listen" to what he is writing. However, his primary audience was evidently the students themselves: it is these he has in mind when discussing such questions as which kinds of speech exist, what makes a definition, in how many ways a division is possible, etc.

Thus, in terms of methodology, Sergius first of all intended to compose a manual containing a general introduction to philosophy and logic. The Alexandrian tradition of commentary on the *Categories*, with its extensive *prolegomena* and general excurses into basic philosophical questions, provided Sergius with a useful framework that, however, required further adaptation to suit the needs of Syriac schools. This necessarily involved shifting the focus from Aristotle's text itself to the more general philosophical topics treated within it. As a result, what distinguishes Sergius' work from the Alexandrian tradition that served as his model is the near total absence of Aristotle's *ipsissima verba*. The text of the *Categories* is quoted neither systematically by way of full *lemmata* nor in the abbreviated form which would have allowed readers to follow Aristotle's text. It is only sporadically that we find any quotations from the *Categories* at all — even these, however, derive not from Aristotle's treatise, but most likely from the Greek commentary tradition that Sergius made use of (see 1.3, below).

<sup>――</sup>  *Influence of the Moon* and Galen's *On Simple Drugs*) are dedicated to Theodore, who is called "a priest" (ܐƤƀƤƟ), i.e. has not yet at that time received the position of a bishop.

**<sup>42</sup>** Cf. *Commentary*, §§29, 138, 239, 261, 380, etc.

This state of affairs is unsurprising if placed in the context of the pedagogical aim pursued by Sergius, i.e., to give a general introduction to philosophy. It also explains the author's remark at the end of the *Commentary* (§449) that he could have composed his treatise even if Aristotle's work were not at his disposal. While Sergius on several occasions (§§60 and 450) discloses his plans to write commentaries on further parts of the *Organon*, meanwhile, no such works have come down to us. Although two East Syriac authors, Timothy I and ʿAbdishoʿ bar Brikha, refer to Sergius' commentaries in the plural43, they may have meant short logical treatises transmitted under Sergius' name44.

There is little doubt that two expositions of logical figures based on Aristotle's *Analytica Priora* and attributed (either by medieval scribes or by modern scholars) to Sergius do not really belong to him45. Another short work bears the title *Natural demonstration by the chief physician Sergius*, having come down to us in the same codex (London, BL Add. 12155) that contains a selection from Sergius' *Commentary* (ms. E, see 2.2, below)46. This collection of various definitions may indeed ultimately derive from Sergius, although it must have been revised and reshaped by the compilers of the codex that contains it (cf. the extent of the revisions to Sergius' *Commentary* in the collection of excerpts appearing on the next folio of the same codex, discussed in 2.2, below).

Two further treatises on logic, on the other hand, may with good reason be attributed to Sergius, although, as in the previous case, their texts may have undergone revision at the hands of later Syriac scholars. Ms. London, BL Add. 14658, which opens with Sergius' *Commentary* (ms. L in the present edition, see 2.1.1, below), contains on fols. 124v–129r a short work with the title *On Genus, Species, and Individuality*, which is attributed to the "priest and chief physician Sergius" and which contains an exposition

 **43** The East-Syriac Catholicos Timothy I (d. 823) refers in *Epistle* 19.20 to "commentaries on the books of logic" ( ܐƠƣ ̈ <sup>ܐ</sup> ƎƀƆܕܗ ŴƘ ̈ ܬܐŴƇƀƇƉܕ ܒƦƃ ), which he attributes to the authoritative Greek philosophers Olympiodorus, Stephanus, and Alexander, mentioning also Sergius (ed. Heimgartner 2021a: 105.2; transl. Heimgartner 2021b: 80). The plural form used by Timothy may thus be explained by the fact that he referred to multiple authors and not to multiple works by each individual author. In his catalogue of Syriac writers, ʿAbdishoʿ bar Brikha (d. 1318) also uses the plural when referring to Sergius, noting that he "composed commentaries on logic" ( ܐƠƣ ƋƏ ̈ ܬܐŴƇƀƇƉܕ ŴƘ ), see Assemani 1725: 87 (cap. LXIV). The compressed expression of ʿAbdishoʿ in all likelihood goes back to Timothy's letter, however.

**<sup>44</sup>** See two reviews of philosophical works which are for some reasons attributed to Sergius in Hugonnard-Roche 1997b: 126–129 and Aydin 2016: 10–17.

**<sup>45</sup>** These consist of a *scholion* on the term "scheme" preserved in ms. BL Add. 14660 and explicitly attributed to Sergius (unpublished, an Italian translation in Furlani 1926a), as well as a treatise *On Three Conversions* in ms. BL Add. 14658, which has been identified by D. King as the second part of the commentary on *Prior Analytics* traditionally ascribed to Proba.

**<sup>46</sup>** Unpublished; Italian translation in Furlani 1926a.

of the Tree of Porphyry47. Another treatise preserved in three different versions (in mss. BL Add. 14658, DS 27, and DS 28) bears in the BL codex the title *On the Division of Substance*. While not being explicitly ascribed to Sergius, it may in fact go back to him48.

If the three aforementioned treatises may indeed be considered to derive from Sergius, they may all be characterized as very general introductions to logical issues that have clearly been designed for school use. All three of them are associated either with Aristotle's *Categories* or with Porphyry's introduction to this treatise and thus corroborate the assumption that Sergius' commentary on the *Categories* was designed not as the first part in a series of expositions of all parts of the *Organon*, but rather as an independent work that primarily served as a general introduction to philosophy.

It is in keeping with Sergius' approach that one of the logical treatises ascribed to him bears the title *Natural Demonstration*, even though it focuses primarily on logical categories. Sergius discusses natural philosophy in various parts of his *Commentary*, another distinct feature that differentiates his work from the mainstream Alexandrian tradition. Indeed, in Book IV (see §256 and further) he goes so far as to depart completely from the text of the *Categories*, turning instead to Aristotle's *Physics*. While the Greek commentators, including Ammonius, also referred to the *Physics* as proper source of information on space and time, Sergius goes much farther in incorporating large portions from this work directly into his treatise (sometimes in the form of periphrases and sometimes as quotations).

Thus, in spite of Sergius' multiple statements (see §§27, 240, and 256) that he plans to comment on Aristotle's works on natural philosophy on some other occasion, he clearly considered it necessary to include at least some elements of these works in his commentary on the *Categories*49. It would be a reasonable assumption that the Syriac scholar was thinking of those teachers and students of philosophy who might never turn to further philosophical subjects, confining their teaching and training to a general introduction to philosophy, which ought properly to count among its indispensable components some elements of physics50.

Sergius' *Commentary* proved to be an influential text in the history of Syriac philosophy. We find revisions of it and quotations of various length taken from it in a number of later works:

 **47** Unpublished; Italian translation in Furlani 1925. This work has been traditionally considered a genuine work of Sergius; cf. Furlani 1925, Hugonnard-Roche 1997b, Aydin 2016.

**<sup>48</sup>** Unpublished. This treatise includes several parts, which appear in different order in the three versions and one of which goes back to Ammonius' commentary on the *Isagoge*.

**<sup>49</sup>** Cf. §261 where Sergius anticipates and refutes a possible criticism of this approach.

**<sup>50</sup>** Cf. further examples of the combination of *Categories*-derived logical notions with natural philosophy in Arzhanov 2021a: 24–25.


 **51** Paul composed several introductions to philosophy and logic as well as a commentary on Aristotle's *On Interpretation*; see on him Hugonnard-Roche 2000, 2011, and 2018. It is not clear whether he wrote in Syriac or in Persian. His treatise on logic preserved in Syriac is published in Land 1875: 1–32. Fragments from his introduction to philosophy preserved in Arabic by Miskawayh are analyzed and translated into English in Gutas 1983. For a parallel between Paul's text and Sergius', cf. Gutas 1983: 233 and *Commentary*, §3.

**<sup>52</sup>** Ed. with a French translation in Scher 1908, English translation in Becker 2006. For the parallels between Barḥadbshabba and Sergius, see Perkams 2019.

**<sup>53</sup>** On Gabriel Qatraya and his work, see Brock 2014. The text of Gabriel's treatise is partially edited in Neroth van Vogelpoel 2018. The passage dealing with Pythagoras and Aristotle (cf. *Commentary*, §§129– 130) is published with an English translation in Brock 2016: 146–147.

**<sup>54</sup>** On one of the mss. containing it (London, BL Add. 14658), see 2.1.1, below.

**<sup>55</sup>** On ms. E, see 2.2, below.

**<sup>56</sup>** Ed. in Scher 1954, French translation in Hespel & Draguet 1982. The discussion of logical topics, starting with a definition of "substance", appears in Theodore at the beginning of Book VI, which focuses on the New Testament. Cf. Scher 1954: 9–14 and *Commentary*, §§217–231; Scher 1954: 14–15 and *Commentary*, §§138–149; Scher 1954: 16–17 and *Commentary*, §§98–107; Scher 1954: 17–18 and *Commentary*, §§203–212 (Theodore's version is in most cases a summary of Sergius' text).

**<sup>57</sup>** For the dating of Theodore's work, see Griffith 1981: 162.

**<sup>58</sup>** For the dating of this compilation, see Abramowski 1999.

chael Badoqa59. Similar to (5), the *Book of Definitions* is addressed to those just beginning their studies.


The transmission history of the *Commentary* does not belong only to the medieval period. Its latest stage dates from the early 20th century, when the youngest manuscript containing it was commissioned by Alfonse Mingana. This manuscript, Mingana Syr. 606, was copied in Alqosh in 1933 by the famous scribe Mattai bar Pawlos (d. 1947) on the basis of ms. B (on the Erbil group of mss., see 2.1.3, below). This manuscript was produced 11 years after the first scholarly article analyzing Sergius' work had been published.

In 1922, Giuseppe Furlani made a brief summary of the contents of the *Commentary* in an article published in Italian, including lengthy quotations taken mainly from books I–IV and based on the version of the *Commentary* preserved in ms. L62. Furlani's article has until now remained the only general presentation of the whole text of Sergius' *Commentary*, although some parts of it have been translated into other European languages. In 1997, Sebastian Brock made an English translation of a short fragment from the Prologue63. Henri Hugonnard-Roche, who dedicated a number of articles to the figure and legacy of Sergius, published a French translation of the Prologue and Book I64. John Watt translated a large portion of Book II into English65. These scholars all supplied their translations with extensive commentaries that made apparent both the dependence of Sergius' treatise on the philosophical school of Ammonius and its value for the history of the Syriac philosophical tradition. The recent edition of the

**64** Hugonnard-Roche 1997c and Hugonnard-Roche 1997d. The translation was based on mss. M and P (see 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, below).

**65** Watt 2014. The translation was based on mss. L, M, and P.

 **59** Ed. in Furani 1922. Since Furlani knew Sergius' treatise from ms. L, he pointed to a number of parallels between the two texts in the commentary to his edition of the *Book of Definitions*.

**<sup>60</sup>** See the entry "Aristotle" in Duval 1901: 290, containing a quotation from the *Commentary*, §59.

**<sup>61</sup>** Published in Aydin 2016.

**<sup>62</sup>** Furlani 1922. On ms. L, which is the earliest witness to the *Commentary*, see 2.1.1, below.

**<sup>63</sup>** Brock 1997. Brock's quotations were taken from the very beginning of the treatise and from the last part of it. Brock's translation has been quoted several times in other publications, see, e.g., Penn et al. 2022: 278–279.

epitome by Sami Aydin66, which contains multiple references to the *Commentary*, reveals further parallels to the Alexandrian commentary tradition and attempts to contextualize it in the history of Syriac philosophy.

## **1.3 The** *Commentary* **and the Syriac Aristotelianism in the Early 6th Century**

The Syriac philosophical tradition67 has much to do with the reception of and attitudes towards Greek philosophy, and thus is sometimes considered secondary to it, since the philosophical contributions specific to Syriac are either translations from the Greek or attempts to follow Greek models of philosophy68. It is characteristic that the early period of Syriac literature started with the two figures, Bardaiṣan and Ephrem, who held the opposite views on the Greek culture. Bardaiṣan, the first "Aramaic philosopher", was eager to introduce some elements of Platonism into his writings, so that in the *Book of the Laws of the Countries* he appears as Socrates in a Platonic dialogue69. Ephrem, on the other hand, was active in criticizing it, making first of all Platonic ideas the object of his criticism70.

In the late 5th century, a new period in Syriac reception and adaptation of Greek philosophy starts which is characterized by the interest in Aristotle rather than Plato and which appears to be closely associated with the tradition of Neoplatonism known to us from the Alexandrian school. Sergius of Reshaina who received his philosophical and medical education in Alexandria in the late 5th century marks the beginning of this period. Sergius turns out to be the first Syriac scholar known to us by name who introduced the main features of the Alexandrian exegesis of Aristotle into the Christian education in Syria. First, his interest in both Aristotle and Galen, and secondly, his focus on producing commentaries on the Organon which served as a general introduction to philosophy and logic, are two features which become characteristic of Syriac philosophy in the pre- and early Islamic period.

Sergius opens his *Commentary* with a short Prologue71, in which he praises Aristotle for having brought all sciences into a coherent system and compares him to a wise

 **66** Aydin 2016.

**<sup>67</sup>** On the Syriac philosophical tradition in general, see Endress 1987, Daiber 2012, Hugonnard-Roche & Watt 2018.

**<sup>68</sup>** For Syriac attitudes towards Greek culture, see the classical study of Brock 1982.

**<sup>69</sup>** For the figure and legacy of Bardaiṣan, see Drijvers 1996. Ilaria Ramelli has explored the reception of Platonic ideas by Bardaiṣan in detail in Ramelli 2009. See also Jurasz 2019.

**<sup>70</sup>** For Ephrem's attitude towards Greek philosophy, see Possekel 1999.

**<sup>71</sup>** The Prologue has become an object of interest in several recent studies. It was first (partly) translated into English in Brock 1997. A French translation with an extensive commentary was published in Hugonnard-Roche 1997c. I made an edition of the Syriac text of the *Prologue* (unfortunately on only a

doctor (an image which appears fitting in context of Sergius' reference to Galen) who has mixed a number of simple drugs into one perfect remedy72. On a number of occasions (see particularly §§54 and 450), Sergius reiterates the value of Aristotle's philosophy in general and of logic in particular. These persistent attempts make clear that the place of Aristotle and his writings in Syriac schools in the early 6th century had not yet been settled73.

The period when Sergius was writing his *Commentary* was a tumultuous one characterized by intense theological debates that, following the Council of Chalcedon (451), had begun to integrate Aristotle's logical terminology more extensively74. Although Church authorities never mentioned Aristotle in this context, the terms which they applied in their exposition of the Trinity and the two Natures of Jesus Christ ("substance", "nature", "hypostasis") ultimately go back to the *Categories* and the Neoplatonic commentaries on this treatise, which thus had a significant impact on early Christian theology75. We may hardly doubt that Sergius had these theological discussions in mind when working on his *Commentary*. It is worth noting that Book III, which deals with the term "substance", is longer than any other part his treatise, due probably to the importance of this term and the number of questions connected with its application76.

The reception history of the *Commentary* makes apparent that Sergius' work was subsequently integrated into theological discussions, sometimes as a substitute for the *Categories* itself. One of the earliest textual witnesses to the *Commentary* has come down to us in the form of a collection of excerpts from it preserved in an 8th-century florilegium composed with the purpose of providing help in theological debates (ms. E, see 2.2, below). This collection has two subtitles. In the first one, the sixth book of the *Commentary* is pointed out as the direct source of the quotations. The second part of the collection, however, is called plainly an exposition of Aristotle's *Categories*, which in fact contains extracts from Sergius' *Commentary*. This polemical florilegium, thus, gives good reasons to assume that Sergius' treaties was read and used in the context of

<sup>――</sup>  limited ms. basis) for the volume published by D. Gutas (Gutas 2022: 224–227). An English translation of this text was made by D. King (Gutas 2022: 189–192).

**<sup>72</sup>** This image goes back in all probability to a *topos* that presents Plato as the one who brought together all the sciences for the first time and that was most likely created in the Academy of Athens. Cf. the quotation from the 2nd-century head of the Athenian Academy, Atticus, in Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* XI.2.2–4.

**<sup>73</sup>** See general overviews of the reception of Aristotle in Syriac schools in Baumstark 1900, Daiber 2001, Bruns 2003, King 2010: 1–17.

**<sup>74</sup>** For the role of Aristotle's logic in the Christological debates, see Bradshaw 2004: 154–186, Krausmüller 2011, Karamanolis 2013: 117–143, Edwards 2019: 129–148, and Zachhuber 2020. **75** See Edwards 2019: 129–146.

**<sup>76</sup>** Cf. the remark by G. Furlani on the importance of Book III in context of the current theological debates in Furlani 1922: 163.

#### **18** Introduction

theological debates, and not simply as a commentary on Aristotle, but, in a sense, as a replacement for him.

It was not only the philosophical education in the school of Ammonius that gave Sergius an impulse to promote Aristotle's logic in Syriac schools. Like his fellow Christian students, the *philoponoi*, Sergius was eager to make Greek philosophy part of Christian intellectual discourse77, stressing in his *Commentary* the role of Aristotle's logic not only in medicine, but also in other parts of human knowledge (see §450). The increasing post-Chalcedonian trend of incorporating philosophical terms into Christian theology in turn prompted Sergius to provide a systematic exposition of Aristotelian logic that might be applied in theological debates of his time.

Sergius was, however, not the first Syriac intellectual to attempt this expository work. Several passages in the *Commentary* give good reason to assume that Aristotle's logical works were known to Syriac scholars before Sergius, although the tradition of their study had not yet achieved a rigid scholastic form. In §293, Sergius gives an example of certain differences between the terms used by the "ancients", i.e., the Greek philosophers of the past, and those used by their Syriac commentators:

Now, we shall consider that of things that are said, some exist primarily and in the strict sense, and some of those things that are said exist secondarily and accidentally. In the Syriac language, we are accustomed to call these two kinds "truly" (*šarriraʾit*) and "seemingly" (*šaʾilaʾit*), so that what the ancients named "strictly" (*ḥattitaʾit*) and "primarily" (*qadmaʾit*) we usually call "truly" (*šarriraʾit*), while what we designate as "seemingly" (*šaʾilaʾit*) they referred to as "accidentally" (*gedšanaʾit*) and "secondarily" (*trayyanaʾit*). Thus, there are quantities in the true and strict sense, namely those which have been divided and discussed thus far, and there are those of another kind, seeming and derivative, of which we say that they are quantities only in belief and not in reality.

This is an example of nuances which Sergius finds in rendering the two Greek terms, κυρίως and κατὰ συμβεβηκός, that appear in *Cat*. 5a38–39. The point that Sergius makes is rather general, i.e., that there are various ways of understanding and translating the Greek terms. But in so doing, he also gives us an example of the development of the Syriac logical lexicon in the period that precedes his work, as he speaks of an established custom of using particular terms.

On other occasion, Sergius appears more critical. He comments several times on the Syriac translation of the Greek term ποιότης, "quality". The first comment comes in §99:

We have just now spoken about sweetness and bitterness, and about all colours and shapes. <…> All such (words) he (i.e. Aristotle) subsumed under one universal genus which he called *pw'ṭws*

 **77** Another *philoponos*, Severus of Antioch, was likewise particularly eager to apply the philosophical knowledge acquired in Alexandria in his polemical writings that formed the basis of anti-Chalcedonian theology in the West Syriac (Syriac Orthodox) tradition; cf. Zachhuber 2020: 119–144.

(ποιότης, "quality"). As for us, we call it sometimes *ḥayla* ("capacity") and sometimes *muzzaga* ("mixture"), since up to this time we haven't found among Syriac names one which would suit it perfectly.

Here, Sergius refers to a custom that has not been fully established, since he gives examples of various attempts at rendering the Greek term. Further remarks on this topic appear at the beginning of Book VI, which focuses on the category (or genus, as Sergius often puts it) of quality. In §§354–355 (see also §365), we read:

So, first of all, you ought to know that concerning this genus there has been no established teaching and knowledge among those who spoke the Syriac tongue in the old days, since their notions of it are quite different everywhere. Also, those who earlier translated particular writings from the Greek language into the tongue of the Syrians interpreted the name of this genus in many different ways, sometimes calling it *ḥayla* ("capacity") and sometimes designating it as *zna* ("quality"), while some of them who as it seems to me were completely ignorant of the meaning of this name rendered it as *muzzaga* ("mixture"). For myself, I am sure that one term seems to be particularly suitable for rendering it, so that I will call it *zna* ("quality").

Sergius remarks later on that he sees no need to quarrel about words but rather to pay heed to the meaning of the Greek terms underlying them. In spite of this generally conciliatory tone, though, he is eager to stress that the diversity in rendering a given Greek term stems from misinterpretation and that the use of a single, set term (*zna*) will facilitate proper understanding.

Again, Sergius' notes make apparent that at the time when he wrote his *Commentary*, there was an established tradition of exegesis of Aristotle's logical writings, although no representatives of this tradition prior to Sergius are known to us by name78. In the period shortly following Sergius' death (i.e., the mid-6th century), however, we know of two Syriac authors, Paul the Persian and Proba, who had similar philosophical interests to Sergius. Paul the Persian, who was active at the court of the Sassanian king Khosraw I Anushirvan (reigned 531–578), composed several introductions to philosophy and logic and a commentary on Aristotle's *On Interpretation*79. One of his introductions, which has not been preserved in its original language, but appears in

 **78** ʿAbdishoʿ bar Brikha wrote in his catalogue of Syriac authors (Assemani 1725: 85, cap. LXI) that "Ibas, Kumi, and Proba translated from Greek into Syriac the books of the Interpreter (*i.e*. Theodore of Mopsuestia) and the writings of Aristotle" ( Ɓ ƥܒſ ܐƀſܪŴƐƆ ܐƀƌŴſ ƎƉ ܘܒܐƢƘܘ ƁƉŴƃܘ ܒܐſܗ ̈ ܒƦƃ ŴźƏܕܐܪ ܬܗŴƍܒƦƄƉܘ ܐƍƠƤƙƉ). Based on this evidence and on the fact that Ibas was bishop of Edessa in the early 5th century, some scholars formerly assumed that philosophical studies and translation of Aristotle's works took place already in the 5th century in what was traditionally called the "school of Edessa" (cf., e.g., Vööbus 1965: 12–24). This assumption, however, has been refuted by S. Brock, who gives solid arguments for separating both Proba and his work on Aristotle from the two other figures who were interested in Theodore of Mopsuestia's writings (see Brock 2011).

**<sup>79</sup>** On Paul, see Hugonnard-Roche 2000 and Hugonnard-Roche 2011.

Arabic in the form of quotations by Miskawayh80, contains passages that clearly go back to Sergius' *Commentary*81 and testify to the broad dissemination of the latter work shortly after Sergius' lifetime. Proba in all likelihood also belongs to the mid-6th century82; he was the author of a commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and on Aristotle's *On Interpretation* and *Prior Analytics* I.1–7, all of which proved very popular in Syriac schools83. Both Paul and Proba belonged to the next generation of Syriac teachers of philosophy, who shared Sergius' interest in general introductions to Aristotle and similarly depended on the Alexandrian exegetical tradition.

Sergius' remarks on the Syriac translation of the Greek ποιότης, "quality", quoted above include a reference to translations from Greek into Syriac which were made apparently before or during his lifetime. Indeed, further evidence for a prior tradition of translation from Greek to Syriac may be represented by two anonymous Syriac translations of logical treatises (Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories*, respectively) belonging to the 6th century, although it remains a matter of debate whether their composition was prior, posterior, or contemporary relative to Sergius' career. Both translations have been preserved in the same codex now located in the British Library of London, Add. 14658, which also contains Sergius' *Commentary*. The translation of the *Isagoge*84 has sometimes been considered to be a product of Sergius himself85. However, the only quotation from the *Isagoge* (12.24–25) that Sergius includes (in §160) differs in many aspects from the anonymous translation and thus does not speak to any connection between them. There is similarly no apparent link between Sergius' *Commentary* and the early Syriac translation of the *Categories*86.

While Sergius' work focuses on and comments on the text of Aristotle's treatise, this text itself, as it has been already noted above, is basically absent from the *Commentary*. Unlike his contemporary Greek commentators (Ammonius, Philoponus, Simplicius), Sergius does not include *lemmata* from Aristotle's text (either in full or in abbreviated form) be explained by his subsequent commentary. In fact, although his exposition generally follows the order of the topics in the *Categories* such that we are able to indicate (as it is done in the margins of the present edition) the assumed passages in the Greek text to which Sergius' comments refer, it is not always clear to which exact passage from the *Categories* his discussion corresponds, and so these

 **80** See the analysis and English translation of the quotations from Paul in Gutas 1983.

**<sup>81</sup>** See Gutas 1983: 233 and §3 of Sergius' *Commentary*.

**<sup>82</sup>** On Proba and his legacy, see besides Brock 2011, also Suermann 1990 and Hugonnard-Roche 2012a.

**<sup>83</sup>** See Van Hoonacker 1900, Hugonnard-Roche 2012b and Hugonnard-Roche 2017.

**<sup>84</sup>** Ed. Brock 1988; cf. the online edition at: https://hunaynnet.oeaw.ac.at/isagoge.html (retrieved on 20.08.23). On this version, see Brock 1989, Hugonnard-Roche 1994, Hugonnard-Roche 2012c.

**<sup>85</sup>** This attribution was suggested by Renan 1852: 27, but was rejected by later scholars.

**<sup>86</sup>** Ed. King 2010; cf. the online edition of this version at: https://hunaynnet.oeaw.ac.at/categoriae.html (retrieved on 20.08.23). For the differences between the two editions, see Arzhanov 2021b. On this Syriac translation of the *Categories*, see Hugonnard-Roche 1987.

indications in many cases turn out to be rather conjectural. At the end of the *Commentary* (see §449), moreover, Sergius makes a remark that reflects his general attitude towards the text of the *Categories*: "Even if I had not this treatise at my disposal while I was writing down these things, I would still have urged you to meditate about them…" The remark may be understood to describe a merely hypothetical scenario, but one can also interpret it to mean that Sergius in fact *did not* have the text of the *Categories* at his disposal while writing down the *Commentary*, neither the Greek original nor the Syriac version of it87.

Even if Sergius did have access to the separate text of the *Categories*, he did not make much use of it, since in the *Commentary* we find very few passages where Sergius actually quotes Aristotle. Rather, in most cases (see §§231, 293, 296, etc.88), Sergius simply paraphrases the text of the *Categories*, including longer or shorter portions of it into his exposition of particular topics. Often such periphrastic manner of combining Aristotle's own words with an exposition of them finds close parallels in the commentaries of Ammonius and Philoponus, although the latter authors include the corresponding passages from the *Categories* in the form of *lemmata* before giving their exposition of the text. Given Sergius' general tendency to paraphrase Aristotle rather than to cite him, we are unable to say if there are any passages from the *Categories* at all included by Sergius in his *Commentary* that might qualify as direct quotations. One can point to eight instances in Sergius' treatise where he gives the impression of quoting Aristotle's words rather than paraphrasing them:


In none of these cases does the text of the *Categories* quoted by Sergius fit with the anonymous Syriac translation of this tract89. Thus, we have good reason to assume that Sergius did not use the anonymous Syriac version during his work on the *Commentary*, which is unsurprising given Sergius' own statement in §449 that he would have composed his treatise even without access to Aristotle's text.

**88** See also §§299, 300, 306–307, 327–329, 333–334, 343, 350, 370, 376, 380, 383, 385, 388, 409, and 440.

 **87** This is what G. Furlani suggests in his Italian translation of this passage based on ms. L only (Furlani 1922: 136). However, the Syriac text as it is preserved in mss. B and D allows for the interpretation reflected in my English translation of this passage.

**<sup>89</sup>** Cf. the comparison between the Syriac versions of the *Categories*, including the quotations from it by Sergius, in Hugonnard-Roche 1987 and King 2011.

A closer look at instances (1) and (2) makes the differences between the two texts apparent:


Quotation (1) by Sergius belongs to the *prolegomena* part of his treatise and apparently goes back to the Greek commentaries which considered the problem of the scope of Aristotle's work. In this context, the passage of *Cat*. 1a16–17 was traditionally mentioned as an argument that Aristotle's aim was to discuss simple words rather than simple things or notions. It is likely that it was such commentaries that Sergius used as a source of this quotation90. Similarly, we may surmise that quotation (2) by Sergius goes back not to a separate version of the *Categories* (be it in Greek or Syriac) but to the commentary tradition, since the Syriac author takes *Cat*. 1a24–25 as a definition of "accident", i.e. of a term that does not actually appear in Aristotle's text. In chapter 2 of the *Categories*, Aristotle speaks of "being in something as subject" and "being said of something as subject" and of various combinations of them which result in four different types91. It fell to later commentators to interpret these terms used by Aristotle as referring to universal and particular, on the one hand, and to substance and accident, on the other92. In the *Commentary*, Sergius defines the term "accident" with reference to the quotation from Aristotle's text, making no mention of the fact that the term he defines is not found there, which makes it very probable that the source of his quotation is to be found among the Alexandrian commentaries rather than in Aristotle himself93.

 **90** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 9.3–5, Philoponus, *In Cat*. 8.29–33, and Simplicius, *In Cat*. 9.12–13.

**<sup>91</sup>** On Aristotle's terminology in *Cat*. 2, cf. Ackrill 1963: 74–76.

**<sup>92</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 25.14–15 and Philoponus, *In Cat*. 29.1. For the ancient commentaries dealing with Aristotle's terms, see Thiel 2004: 73–78.

**<sup>93</sup>** Cf. also Sergius' definition of the 11th type of being-in-something in §149. Where the version of Ammonius and Philoponus have: "as in a subject, as an accident is in a substance" (ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὡς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐσίᾳ, see Ammonius, *In Cat*. 29.17 = Philoponus, *In Cat*. 32.25–26), Sergius skips the first part of the definition. This interpretation seems to be a result of deliberate choice, and it gives good reason to assume that Sergius supposed that no separate text of the *Categories* needed to be consulted alongside his own treatise.

Sergius' dependence on the commentary tradition in his quotations of Aristotle's text is also apparent in case (5). While quoting *Cat*. 4a10–11 (τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν), Sergius omits the word ἀριθμῷ. This term is likewise omitted in the corresponding part of Ammonius' commentary (see *In Cat*. 52.12) which contains not the lemma (where the word is present), but its later exposition by Ammonius that includes once again the quotation from Aristotle's text. These examples, together with Sergius' general tendency to paraphrase Aristotle's text rather than to quote it, show that the Syriac scholar most likely did not make use of the text of Aristotle's *Categories* itself, either in Greek or in Syriac translation.

This conclusion makes Sergius' treatise irrelevant for the dating of the anonymous Syriac version of the *Categories* (for the sake of brevity hereafter abbreviated as *Anon*.), since he apparently borrowed the quotations from Aristotle's text from those Greek commentaries that he brought from Alexandria and used for his work, not from a separate copy of the *Categories*. What nevertheless brings Sergius' *Commentary* and the *Anon*. close to one another is the fact that both works belong to the same early period of the reception of Aristotle's logic in Syriac schools94.

Since during this period the Syriac logical lexicon has not been fully established, it is unsurprising that both in Sergius' *Commentary* and in the *Anon*. we find different attempts at interpreting particular Aristotelian terms and finding proper Syriac equivalents for them. In some cases, these attempts go in different directions (cf. the two examples above). It is worth noting, however, that it is not only between Sergius and the *Anon*. that we see differences in terminology and in how Aristotle's text is rendered; even within the *Anon*. itself we find various ways of interpreting the text of the *Categories* and different ways of rendering the same Greek terms95. There are some passages in Sergius' *Commentary*, conversely, which use terminology similar or identical to what we find in the *Anon*.:


 **94** Cf. King 2011: 230–235.

**<sup>95</sup>** Cf. King 2010: 30–35.

#### **24** Introduction

with the later Syriac versions of the *Categories*, all of which appear to represent the same tradition of interpretation of Aristotle's text in this respect.

(4) In §383, the *Commentary* refers to *Cat*. 10a29–30, where Aristotle speaks of things that are called "paronymously" (παρωνύμως). In order to make this Greek term comprehensible, Sergius applies the Syriac expression ܬܗŴܒƀƐƍܒ Ǝſ ̈ ,ܐƎƀƇſ ܕܗܘ "such things which derive from something". Similar explicative translation appears also in the *Anon*., which renders the Gr. παρωνύμως λέγεται in *Cat*. 10a29– .ܒƀƐƍܒŴܬ Ɗƣܐ ƦƉܐƢƉܐ as 30

These examples demonstrate that in both the *Commentary* and in *Anon*. we see different attempts at understanding Aristotle's logical terminology, which in many cases turn out to belong to the same tradition. If we recall Sergius' remarks quoted above about Syriac translations and interpretations of Aristotle's logical texts which predate him, we may assume that neither Sergius nor the author(s) of the *Anon*. were completely isolated in their work. Rather both texts appear as part of a general process of reception and creative adaptation of Aristotle's logic in Syriac schools in the late 5th early 6th century, a process that was taken up by subsequent generations of Syriac Aristotelians, whose names are also known to us.

Sergius' contribution to this process may hardly be overstated. Given the long history of reception of his *Commentary* (see 1.2, above), we may assume that this text was studied in both West and East Syriac schools, having been preserved to the present day both in full and in abridged form (as selected quotations, paraphrases, and epitomes). These textual witnesses, which will be discussed in the following sections, contribute to our knowledge of the afterlife of Sergius' work.

## **2 The Syriac Text of the** *Commentary*

## **2.1 Manuscripts Containing the Full Version of the** *Commentary*

#### **2.1.1 London, British Library, Add. 14658 (L)**

The London codex BL96 Add. 14658 is the oldest witness to the text of Sergius' *Commentary*97. This parchment manuscript came to London in 1843 as a result of the purchase of a large collection of codices from the Coptic monastery Dayr al-Suryan, located in the Nitrian desert in Egypt98. It has been preserved without the first and the last folios. Thus its colophon, if there ever was one, is lost. However, based on a paleographical analysis of its writing, William Wright dated it to the 7th century, and this dating, which brings this codex quite close to Sergius' lifetime, has been generally accepted by later scholars.

The codex is written in two columns, containing 36 to 40 lines. In its present condition, it includes 188 folios, and apart from the large portions at the beginning and at the end, a considerable number of folios is missing from it, while some of the folios are bound in an incorrect order, a state of affairs mostly affecting the first quires of the codex, which contain Sergius' *Commentary*. The manuscript was copied by an unknown scribe in the regular *Estragela* script. Parts of the text (see, e.g., fol. 42r) which were either damaged or unreadable have first been erased and later written anew in somewhat smaller letters but in the same *Estrangela* script as the main text.

The text also contains interlinear or marginal corrections written in the same or very similar *Estrangela* script and probably dating from the time of the manuscript production. Apart from these, a number of paratextual marks have been added to the text at a probably much later date. They have, first, the form of a square bracket (<)99 or of ligatures combining either Syriac or Arabic letters, and they appear in all parts of ms. L, indicating how the codex was likely used at various periods of time100. The West Syriac vowels (which reflect Greek vowel signs) attached to some proper names and Greek loanwords in the text seem also to belong to the later period than the original text.

 **96** It was originally housed in the British Museum (hence it is referred to as "BM"), but is now part of the manuscript collection of the British Library.

**<sup>97</sup>** See the description of the codex in Wright 1872: 1154–1160.

**<sup>98</sup>** For the history of the collection of the monastery Dayr al-Suryan and its migration to several European libraries, see Wright 1872: i–xvii; Brock & Van Rompay 2014: xv–xviii.

**<sup>99</sup>** This sign usually served in Syriac manuscripts as a marker of a quotation that appears in the text, cf. Wright 1872: xxviii.

**<sup>100</sup>** The marginal notes that are found in other parts of the codex include the imperative "write" (ܘܒƦƃ), which gives reason to assume that this manuscript was used as a *Vorlage* for further copies (see fols. 99v, 124v, 129v, etc.). This is quite apparent in the case of the Syriac sentences of Menander (on fol. 163v), as the corrections found in ms. L were included in the later copy of this text on the flyleaves of another codex; cf. Arzhanov 2017.

The contents of this codex have been described multiple times101. Scholars have stressed the importance of not only concrete works included in it (for many of which the codex remains the only witness) but also of the structure of this remarkable collection as a whole102. In its present state, the codex opens with Sergius' *Commentary*, which is followed by a number of further texts on logic103, as well as treatises on grammar104, natural philosophy105, and psychology106, but also some pseudepigraphic works attributed to Plato107. Thus, this collection reflects the full cursus of late ancient higher education, which began with introductory texts and concluded with the study of Platonic works108. Sergius' *Commentary*, with its extensive *prolegomena* part, thus plays the role here of an introductory work with which the course of philosophical study commences, a role apparently in line with Sergius' intention.

Due to the loss of a number of folios both at the beginning and in various other parts of the codex, Sergius' *Commentary* has been preserved in ms. L only partially, so that about a quarter of the text has been lost. Fortunately, one of the missing pages from this codex has been identified among the individual folios preserved in the collection of the University of Leipzig (this folio now bears the shelf-mark "Or. 1078/I")109. However, ms. L is still characterized by a number of large lacunae and by an incorrect order of the folios110. We may describe the state of the text of Sergius' *Commentary* in this manuscript (supplied now with the Leipzig folio) as follows:

 (lacuna at the beginning comprising ca. 8 folios) fol. 1 (lacuna comprising ca. 2 folios) fols. 2–7 (lacuna comprising ca. 2 folios) fols. 8–16 + fols. 30–39

**110** Cf. Wright 1872: 1154 and Furlani 1922: 137.

 **101** See the earliest descriptions in Renan 1852b: 294–310, Sachau 1852: 71, Wright 1872: 1154–1160. Many original attributions have been corrected by later scholars, cf. Hugonnard-Roche 2007: 279–281. **102** See Hugonnard-Roche 2007, King 2010b, and Arzhanov 2019: 190–193.

**<sup>103</sup>** The anonymous Syriac translations of Porphyry's *Isagoge* and of Aristotle's *Categories*, as well as some short texts on logic, on which see section 1, above.

**<sup>104</sup>** The Syriac version of Dionysius Thrax' *Techne grammatike*.

**<sup>105</sup>** Ps.-Aristotle's *De mundo*, Alexander of Aphrodisias' *On the Universe*, and Paul of Alexandria's *On the Motion of the Sun*.

**<sup>106</sup>** Ps.-Aristotle's *On the Soul*.

**<sup>107</sup>** The dialogue "Sokrates", Ps.-Platonic *Definitions*, and Plato's *Advice to his Disciple*.

**<sup>108</sup>** Cf. Arzhanov 2019: 190–193.

**<sup>109</sup>** See Kessel 2019: 398. This folio belonged to the collection of Constantin Tischendorf, with the shelf-number "XV.b.3" (according to the note that is visible on the photo of this codex); cf. Tischendorf 1855: 67–68, where the folio has the number XVI.D. See also the description in the catalogue of Vollers 1906: 381, who refers to it as part of the "Codex Tischendorf XVI" and describes it as the first fragment bound together in this manuscript.

```
 (lacuna comprising ca. 1 folio) 
fol. 29 + fol. 17 
 (lacuna comprising ca. 4 folios) 
fols. 20–25 + fol. 19 + fol. 18 + fols. 26–28 + fols. 40–42 
 (lacuna comprising ca. 1 folio) 
fols. 43–46 
 (lacuna comprising ca. 1 folio) 
fols. 47–52 + Leipzig folio 
 (lacuna comprising ca. 1 folio) 
fols. 53–61r
```
Besides the highly lacunose character of the manuscript, the text preserved in it turns out to contain multiple errors which distinguish it from the other textual witnesses (cf. the stemma in 2.4, below) and make it, in most cases of textual variety, a rather unreliable source. The following cases demonstrate the most obvious errors in L:

```
̈ܬܐ 100.13
         ̈ܬܐ :BCDP ܨܒŴ
                        Ŵܒƞܒ L 
 L ܕŴƠƊƕܬ :BCDP ܕŴƠƐƕܬ 118.19
196.5 ܐƀƌŴƉܐܪƆ BCD, Epit.: ܬܐŴƍƉܐܘƆ L
198.3 ܐſƮŶܐ BCDP: ƎƘܐ L
̈Ɗƀܐ 202.15
           Ɵ BCDP: ܐƉ̈
                       ŴƍƟ L
204.20 ܐƢܒƕ BCDP: ܐűܒƕ L
̈Ɖܐ 216.20
          ŴƍƟ BCDP: ܐƉ̈
                        ŴƀƟ L
224.3 ƎƀƙƀƠƌܘ BDP, Epit.: ƎƀƙƀƠƌܕ L
232.23 ƎƘܘܐ BDP, Epit.: ܐܦ L 
̈ܬܐ 244.18
         ŴƍƉܕ BDP, Epit.: ܬܐ̈
                             ŴƀƉܕ L
̈ܗܝ 384.12
        Ŵƣܐܕ BDP: ܗܝŴƣܪ̈ L
```
One might provide a much longer list of errors in L which distinguish it as an isolated line of the transmission of the text. As it will be shown below (see 2.2), this line probably includes ms. E, which contains a selection from the *Commentary*, but does not comprise further witnesses known to us to date.

The *Commentary* in ms. L contains schematic divisions (Syr. ܓܐƆ̈ ŴƘ) of the subject matter at the end of Books II, IV, V, and VI, which are also found in other manuscripts. The loss of such divisions at the end of Books I and III may be explained by the loss of the corresponding folios of ms. L, which originally might have contained them. However, no divisions are found in the extant fol. 61r, which contains the final part of the *Commentary*. In L, the seventh and final book ends with a short remark111 followed by a small ornament separating the *Commentary* from the next treatise in the codex. Apart from ms. L, the only mss. we have that contain the final portion of the *Commentary* are mss. B and D. Both of these are rather late (19th century) copies of the same prototype (cf. 2.1.3, below), which thus serves as our only witness to the presence of

 **<sup>111</sup>** Fol. 61r: ܐƖ ܐƢƉܐƉ ƋƇƣ ̈ ܒƣܕ ," Book VII came to end".

the divisions at the end of Book VII. It remains unclear whether the original text of the *Commentary* contained divisions at the end of the *Commentary* or not, but their absence in the oldest copy of the work, ms. L, makes it possible that the divisions were not originally appended to all the books, but with some of the divisions perhaps being added at a later stage of transmission.

Ms. L contains nearly no rubrics or subtitles. The titles of each book of the *Сommentary* are clearly marked in the codex by means of red ink, which is also used in the extant divisions that appear (as noted just above) at the end of some books. But no other subtitles are found in this codex save for one occasion: on fol. 33r we encounter the rubric ܀ ܐƀƏܐܘ ƈƕ ܀ ," On substance", which is marked by red asterisks and thus clearly has the role of a subtitle for the corresponding part of Book III that indeed discusses this category112. No other examples of this kind are found in L, thus suggesting that the rubrics found nearly exclusively in the Erbil group of mss. were attached to the text not by Sergius, but by later scribes.

#### **2.1.2 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Syr. 354, Part I (P)**

Ms. Paris Syr. 354 (which formerly belonged to the collection of the monastery of Seert, where it bore the number 91113) is a paper manuscript, which consists of two parts originating from two different codices114. Presently, it contains 147 folios. The second, shorter part includes folios 138–147; it is written in the East Syriac script and, according to a note on fol. 145r, was copied in the year 1224115. The first part, in which Sergius' *Commentary* is found and which comprises folios 1–137, was written by multiple hands in various forms of the East Syriac script. According to a note attached to the title of Book II of the *Commentary*, this codex was copied in the year 1187116.

The text of the manuscript (i.e., of the first part of the ms., hereafter simply "manuscript/codex") is written in a single column with a widely differing number of lines depending on the folio. Indeed, the type of writing varies considerably throughout the manuscript; we may thus presume that not a few different scribes contributed to its production. The writing style sometimes changes only after several folios; thus, we see a change in hand in the middle of fol. 5v, in the middle of fol. 46v, at the beginning of fol. 52r, at the beginning of fol. 59v, and at the end of fol. 62v. In other places, however,

 **112** It is interesting to note that Ammonius mentions two subtitles which he found in the text of Aristotle's *Categories* that he made use of during his lectures, "On substance" and "On relatives" (*In Cat*. 66.14–19). It is thus possible that at least this rubric found both in L and in the Erbil mss. derives from Sergius himself.

**<sup>113</sup>** Cf. Desreumaux 1991: 231. Cf. the description of the Seert ms. in Scher 1905: 67–68.

**<sup>114</sup>** See the description of the codex in Nau 1911: 306–310.

**<sup>115</sup>** See Nau 1911: 309.

**<sup>116</sup>** Fol. 13v: ܐܬܨܚ Ʀƍƣ ̄ Ŵ̄ ſܕ ," the year 1498 of the Greeks", i.e., 1187 AD.

such change occurs within the same page, which one may observe on fol. 73r: there, the first seven lines of the text are written in one hand, but in the middle of line 7 the hand changes, and then in line 11 it changes once again. A similar situation is found on fol. 74r: the first alteration of the hand is apparent in line 5, but the new hand goes only as far as line 12, when still a new hand may be seen, which in turn is replaced by another one in line 15. This final change in hands resulted in the repetition of the last words written by the previous scribe117.

This frequent change of hands in the ms. yields not only cases of dittography, like the one just mentioned, but also a large number of errors. In general, the codex is characterized by a rather negligent way of writing. Some portions of the text are in the wrong place, with the correct text simply added below118. On fol. 27r, half of the page is crossed out; a marginal note at the first line of the passage states that "corrupted text begins" here119. It seems likely, moreover, that ms. P was copied from a manuscript that was either destroyed or corrupted in some parts, as we find unexplained omissions of text on fol. 18r. The scribe(s) have in turn left parts of several lines unfilled, suggesting they were aware that words were missing, probably with the hope that these gaps could be filled in if a better copy became available.

At the end of the first part of the Paris codex, one finds a note that a certain Zeno (whose full name is recorded) "polluted and corrupted these pages"120. However, it may hardly be taken as reporting the name of one of the scribes (or *the* scribe) who produced this codex. Rather it refers either to the author of multiple marginal notes found throughout the codex, written rather carelessly and usually not directly connected with the main text121; or whomever drew a number of marginal pictures depicting both human figures and animals122. However, apart from these additions, ms. P contains quite a few marginalia which may be understood as scholia to the Syriac text, containing either short explanations for difficult terms or different readings, some of which are transmitted by other textual witnesses. All such variants that are significant for the history of the Syriac text are documented in the critical apparatus of the edition.

Sergius' *Commentary* occupies the main part of the codex. It starts on fol. 1v and breaks on fol. 109v, after which several pages are added that derive from another commentary on the *Categories*123. In its present state, P lacks only a small portion of

**121** See, e.g., fols. 13v, 14r, 29v (all three notes are crossed out), 39r, 96r, 85v, 94v, and 99v.

**123** Cf. the end of the text on fol. 117v: ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ ܐſܪŴܓųźƟܕ ܒƦƃ ܨܘܪܬ ƦƊƇƣ ܣŴƄƉŴƠƀƌ, "finished is the writing of the *Categories* of Aristotle, (son of) Nicomachus". The text deals

 **117** The words ܐƦƇƉ ܬܘܒ ܐƆܘ appear twice in lines 14 and 15.

**<sup>118</sup>** See the cases of the transposition of the text abbreviated as "transp." in the critical apparatus of the edition.

**<sup>119</sup>** Fol. 27r, note in the right margin: ܘܗܝƦſܐ ܐƌŴƖŹ ܪŴƣ.

**<sup>120</sup>** Fol. 117v: <sup>ܐ</sup> ƈܒŶܘ ƥŹƢŹ ̈ ܐƢſƞܒ ܢŴƍƌܙ ƎƀƆܗ ƙƇƠƆ ̄ Ƌ̄ Ƥܕܒ ̄ Ƌ̄ Ɓ Ƣܒ ƤƉ ̄ Ƥ̄ Ɓ ƎƍƊƀƆŴƏ Ɵ ̄ Ƥ̄ ƋƇƏŴܐܒ Ɵܕ ̈ŷܐ ƍƉ.

**<sup>122</sup>** See fols. 1r, 65v, 99v, and 117v.

Sergius' treatise, namely §§448–450, which contained the epilogue of the work and which probably occupied no more than one or one-and-a-half folios (if the divisions were included). However, the compiler of the codex, which has been transmitted to us (i.e. with the missing last folios of the *Commentary*), found it necessary to add the final part of another work that deals with the *postpraedicamenta* (i.e. the categories of opposition, priority, simultaneity, and some other topics) covered by §§405–447 of Sergius' work that were and still are extant in P.

The attached text turns out to be very close to the commentary on the *Categories* by Dionysius Bar Ṣalibi (d. 1171). The text preserved in P contains many parallels to Dionysius' work but is not identical to the version that has come down to us only in the ms. Cambridge, University Library, Gg 2. 14124. Dionysius himself admitted that he integrated a large number of earlier texts in his compendium. It is thus possible that P has preserved for us one of those sources which Bar Ṣalibi utilized for his compendium at approximately the same time when ms. P was put together in its final form.

The folios of ms. P have been bound in the wrong order. Modern pagination was introduced on the recto side of every page, but presently it does not correspond to the actual order of the folios. Additionally, one page, which appears between fols. 49 and 50 and whose text has been destroyed nearly completely so that only the margins have survived, was excluded from the pagination. Moreover, the pages that follow this unnumbered folio have not been bound properly. This reordering of the pages must have taken place rather early, since at the bottom of fol. 55v we find a note written in Syriac by a careful reader who indicated that the rest of the text is missing125 (when in reality the text continues on fol. 51r).

The correct order is the following:

fols. 1–49 folio without number fol. 57 fol. 56 fols. 52–55 fol. 51 fol. 50 fols. 58–109

<sup>――</sup>  with the categories of opposition, priority, and simultaneity, and thus elaborates the last part of Aristotle's treatise, the *postpraedicamenta*.

**<sup>124</sup>** This codex is dated to the 16th/17th century, cf. the description in Wright 1901: 2.1008–1023. The fragment preserved in ms. P is very similar to the text on fols. 137v–151v of the Cambridge ms. but not identical to it.

**<sup>125</sup>** Fol. 55v, a marginal note at the bottom: ܐƌŴƖŹ ܐܘ ƢƀƐŶ ܐƃܗܪ," the rest is wanting or erroneous".

As noted, ms. P, written by multiple hands in a rather negligent manner, also contains a large number of errors that distinguish it from all other textual witnesses. The most obvious examples (from which only a small selection is given below) are the following:

136.5 ܐܙܠ BCDL, Epit.: ܐܬܐ P ̈űܐ 172.3 P ܒƖܒƮܐ :BCDL ܒƖܒ 182.23 ܐƤŷƍܒ BCDL, Epit.: ܐƤƀƍܒ P 192.21 ƈܒŷƉ BCDL, Epit.: ƈܒƠƉ P 210.21 ܬܐŴƀŷƆܘ BCDEL: ܬܐŴƀŶ ŴƆܘ P 216.13 ܪܐƦƀƉ BCDL: ܪܐƦƏ P ̈ƦſƦܬܐ 222.2 Ŷܘ BCDL, Epit.: ܬܐƮſƦſܘ P 240.22 ܘܡƦƉ ܐƆ BDL: ܘܡƦƊƆ P 244.6 ܐƦƖܒ BDL: ܐƦƇƉ P 244.7 Ɨſŵƌܕ BDL: ܥűƌܕ P

As it becomes clear from these examples (and one might make this list much longer), most of the errors can be explained by the carelessness of the scribes, who appear to have had little experience in copying texts and easily misinterpreted the readings of the original. While the *Vorlage* of P was deficient in some parts (see above), it is apparent that the scribes further contributed to this deficiency. It is also worthy of note that it is only in ms. P that we find the words ܐƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ and ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ with two *lamads*; these appear in this form throughout the whole manuscript and are not found in any other textual witness of the *Commentary*.

Ms. P shares no defective readings with ms. L126, but has a large number of errors in common with the Erbil mss. and with the epitome (see the concrete examples in 2.1.3 and 2.3, below). Thus P, BCD, and Epit. belong to the same line of transmission, distinct from that of ms. L and including several extant textual witnesses.

Ms. P contains graphic divisions after each one of Books I–VI. Since the final portion of the *Commentary* (§§448–450) is no longer extant in P, we do not know whether the divisions were also attached to Book VII (as in case of mss. BCD, see below) or not (as in case of ms. L, see 2.1.1, above). Similar to ms. L, ms. P does not contain any rubrics in the text of Sergius' *Commentary*, although there are some rubrics written in red ink in the fragment of the above-mentioned exegetical work which pertains to the commentary of Bar Ṣalibi and which was included in the codex after fol. 107, thus replacing the missing end of Sergius' work.

 **126** In one case, both P and L turn out to contain similar errors, which, however, do not fully match; see 334.23: ܐƙƌܒܐ P: ܐƙƕܒܐ L: ܐƙƕܘܐ BD.

#### **2.1.3 The Erbil Group (Mss. BCD)**

The three codices, which derive from the same old copy of Sergius' text, are now situated in Erbil in Northern Iraq. Before this, their location changed several times due to the social and political upheaval in the region127. The production of these manuscripts was connected with the activity of Gabriel Danbo, who in 1808 initiated a reopening of the monastery of Rabban Hormizd situated in the mountain region near the village of Alqosh for his newly founded Chaldean Antonian Order of St. Hormizd128. For the sake of security, the manuscripts were later transferred to the nearby convent of Our Lady of the Seeds (Notre Dame des Semences)129. In the second half of the 20th century, the manuscripts were brought first to the monastery of St. George near Mosul and later on to the convent of St. Antony in Baghdad. At the beginning of the 21st century, due to the new period of instability in Northern Iraq, the collection was transported again first to the monastery Notre Dame des Semences and then to Erbil, where it remains preserved in the new cultural center of the Chaldean Antonian Order of St. Hormizd, the "Scriptorium Syriacum". Thus, at different periods of time, the three manuscripts described below were referred to as either the Alqosh or the Baghdad codices, while in the two modern descriptions of them they are designated as mss. of Erbil-Ankawa, O.A.O.C. ("Antonian Order of St. Ormizda of the Chaldeans")130.

Ms. Erbil-Ankawa, O.A.O.C., Syr. 169 (B)131, previously bore the shelf-marks Alqosh, Notre Dame des Semences, ms. 51132, and Baghdad, Chaldean Monastery, ms. 169133. This paper manuscript contains 260 folios134 and was written in a single column (with 25–27 lines per page) in regular East Syriac script. The copyist, deacon Šemʿon135, indicates his name several times in this codex, first in the decoration on fol. 1v and second at the end of Sergius' *Commentary* on fol. 158r. On fol. 1v, Šemʿon also notes the year "2133 of the Greeks", which points to 1821/1822 as the date of the production of the codex. This is the period of time that followed the restoration of the monastery of St. Hormizd, with the manuscript most likely produced for its library and for use in the education

 **127** For an overview of the history of this collection and its various locations, see Kessel 2023: 151–152.

**<sup>128</sup>** For the history of the monastery of Rabban Hormizd the Persian, see Wilmshurst 2000: 258–270.

**<sup>129</sup>** Cf. Wilmshurst 2000: 270–274.

**<sup>130</sup>** The description of these mss. by Manhal Makhoul was published online on the platform *e-Ktobe*; see http://syriac.msscatalog.org/ (accessed on 17.07.2023). An alternative description of six philosophical manuscripts (Syr. 169–174) of this collection was provided in Kessel 2023.

**<sup>131</sup>** See: http://syriac.msscatalog.org/71255 (accessed on 17.07.2023) and Kessel 2023: 152–160.

**<sup>132</sup>** Vosté 1929: 22 (codex LI).

**<sup>133</sup>** Ḥaddad & Isḥaq 1988: 82.

**<sup>134</sup>** A foliation was made in 2022, but it is not present on the photos which I had at my disposal for my edition. The folios of the codex contain earlier numbers written by means of Syriac letters on both recto and verso side of the folios. The first no. (Syr. *Alaf*) appears on fol. 1v.

**<sup>135</sup>** He belonged to the Asmar scribal family from Telkepe. See Wilmhurst 2000: 226–227 and Kessel 2023: 153–154.

of the monks136. More than a hundred years later, ms. B was used as a *Vorlage* for the production of another copy, i.e. ms. Birmingham, Mingana, Syriac 606, dated to 1933137.

Ms. Syr. 170 of the same collection (C)138, *olim* Alqosh, Notre Dame des Semences 49 (as noted on the current fol. 1r)139 or 52140, *olim* Baghdad, Chaldean Monastery 170141, has been preserved until now only in the fragmentary form. This paper codex is written in the East Syriac script in one column, with 20 lines per page, and presently contains 149 folios. Neither the name of the scribe nor the exact date of its production is known. It is possible that both were indicated in the colophon, which is now lost. However, since we have good reasons to state (see 2.1.3.2, below) that the scribe of C knew and during his work made use of ms. D, which is dated to 1840, we may assume that ms. C was copied either in the middle or in the second half of the 19th century142. Moreover, one folio which derives from another manuscript is included just before the text of Sergius' *Commentary*, which is here preserved in an incomplete form due to the loss of the final folios.

The third codex, Syr. 171, from the same collection (D)143, *olim* Alqosh, Notre Dame des Semences 50 (as indicated on fol. 1r)144 or 53145, *olim* Baghdad, Chaldean Monastery 171146, is a paper manuscript written in one column, with 28–29 lines per page. Presently, it contains 233 folios. Neither the name of the scribe nor the date of production of the manuscript are indicated. However, at the last folio, one finds a note that the volume came into the possession of the monastery of St. Hormizd in the year ƋƘܐ, i.e., 1840. Provided that this codex was commissioned for the library of this convent, it is likely that this year should also be taken for its actual dating.

The three afore-mentioned codices are collections of philosophical works that to a large extent have the same contents, although each one of them also contains works that are not found in other ones. The treatises included in mss. BCD may be outlined as follows:

**141** Ḥaddad & Isḥaq 1988: 82–83.

 **136** For Gabriel Danbo's interest in education in general and in philosophy in particular, see Kessel 2023: 144–147.

**<sup>137</sup>** See below, 2.1.3.2.

**<sup>138</sup>** Cf. http://syriac.msscatalog.org/71256 (accessed on 17.07.2023) and Kessel 2023: 160–165.

**<sup>139</sup>** Cf. Scher 1906: 498.

**<sup>140</sup>** Vosté 1929: 22 (codex LII).

**<sup>142</sup>** Wilmhurst 2000: 268 mentions that in 1850 the monastery of Rabban Hormizd was raided by the Kurds, followed by a flood which destroyed a large number of mss. (ca. 1000). It is possible that the production of ms. C resulted from the restoration process of the lost part of the collection.

**<sup>143</sup>** Cf. http://syriac.msscatalog.org/71257 (accessed on 17.07.2023) and Kessel 2023: 165–173.

**<sup>144</sup>** Cf. Scher 1906: 498.

**<sup>145</sup>** Vosté 1929: 22–23 (codex LIII).

**<sup>146</sup>** Ḥaddad & Isḥaq 1988: 83.


Since ms. C is presently incomplete both at the beginning and at the end, it is now impossible to reconstruct the original extent of its contents. However, it becomes apparent from the comparison above that all three manuscripts share the same core of texts that were used for the study of Aristotle's logic in Syriac schools:


The compiler of C added the two pseudepigraphical *Vitae* of Aristotle148 before the text of the *Categories*, a practice with parallels in other philosophical compilations, e.g., in ms. Vat. Sir. 158, dated to the 9th/10th centuries149, and in ms. Berlin, Petermann I. 9, which contains the epitome of the *Commentary*150. It is also found in one of the manuscripts now preserved in the Chaldean Patriarchate of Baghdad (CPB 223, *olim* Mosul

 **147** On the scope of the logical curriculum in Syriac schools, cf. Watt 2017.

**<sup>148</sup>** Published in Sachau 1899: 1.335–336 and Baumstark 1900: 2–3.

**<sup>149</sup>** See the description in Assemani 1759: 304–307. On ms. Vat. Sir. 158 as reflecting the philosophical curriculum of the Qenneshre monastery, see Tannous 2010.

**<sup>150</sup>** See 2.3, below.

35)151, and it is possible that the latter codex served as the source for the *Vitae* in ms. C. The compiler of ms. D, on the other hand, included at the beginning of the collection the treatise on the division of philosophy attributed to John bar Zoʿbi152. It provides a short general introduction to philosophy, which the compiler of D found necessary to put in front of Proba's commentary on the *Isagoge*, even though this commentary also contains an introductory part dealing with the *prolegomena*.

All three manuscripts preserved now in Erbil-Ankawa exhibit a pedagogical background similar to that of ms. L described above. It is thus likely that they were produced to be used for introductory classes in logic and philosophy (since logic was considered a general introduction to philosophical studies). However, in their composition and concept, the three mss. differ slightly from one another. Their compilers apparently had the same pedagogical aim in mind but decided to include some treatises that we do not find in other witnesses. These differences make it clear that we cannot consider either of these codices as mechanical copies of another representative of the Erbil group in spite of the similarities between them.

All three Erbil mss. include graphic divisions after each book of Sergius' *Commentary*, including Book VII (after which no divisions appear in ms. L, cf. 2.1.1, above). Apart from the latter case, these divisions match those found in the earlier witnesses and thus probably reflect an old tradition. However, it remains unclear whether this tradition goes back to Sergius himself or to the later stage of the transmission of his work. It is remarkable that Sergius never refers to them in the text of his *Commentary*, but this may not serve as a decisive argument against his authorship of them. Both the older (L and P) and the younger (BCD) witnesses turn out to be quite consistent in their transmission, which makes it possible that they derive from Sergius himself.

The same, however, does not hold for the subtitles, which are found either in the text or in the margins of the Erbil codices and which apparently go back to a common source (see the next section). Apart from the Erbil group, we do not find these rubrics in any other witness (for the only case in ms. L, see 2.1.1, above), and it is likely that they were introduced into Sergius' text at a late stage of its transmission.

#### **2.1.3.1 The Common Source**

The differences in contents among the three mss. make it possible that their scribes made use of various sources, while compiling them. However, a comparison of the texts of Sergius' *Commentary* as found respectively in mss. B, C and D allows us to assume that the text of Sergius' work in all three of them was copied from one and the same prototype independently from one another. Their common source:

 **151** Cf. Kessel & Bamballi 2018.

**<sup>152</sup>** Cf. Daiber 1985. For further mss. containing it, see Kessel 2023: 167 n. 22.

#### **36** Introduction


All three Erbil mss. share the above-listed characteristics of the common prototype:

(1) B and D contain several lacunae in Book VII of Sergius' *Commentary* (the text in ms. C breaks earlier), which coincide completely in both mss. The first lacuna appears in B on fol. 154r and in D on fol. 125v. In both mss., the extant text breaks with the same word and begins the new passage with the same word as well. While the scribe of B has left about two-thirds of the page blank, the scribe of D has left only half of the page blank (i.e. the remaining room on it). Neither space, however, corresponds to the actual size of the missing text, which might have occupied no less than two full folios in B and about a folio and a half in D. It is thus likely that the space left in both mss. was not intended to be filled in on the basis of a better copy of the text, but rather to indicate that a large portion of the text was missing in the original.

The next lacuna appears in B on the immediately following fol. 154v, occupying several lines of this page and about two-thirds of the following fol. 155r. In D, it starts at the end of fol. 126r and occupies more than a half of the following fol. 126v. As in the previous case, the extant text breaks and then starts again with the same words in both codices. This time, the size of the lacuna corresponds more or less to the actual size of the text which was damaged or missing in the common source of B and D. It is more likely that part of the page was completely missing in the *Vorlage* of B and D as the next extant portion of the text has approximately the same size as the previous one — and that it was contained on the verso side of the damaged folio of the original. After it, a third lacuna appears in B on fol. 155r and goes as far as the first half of the following fol. 155v. In D, the lacuna occupies the second half of fol. 127r. The lacunae in both mss. again correspond approximately to the size of the actual gap in the text.

The next blank space is present in ms. B in the last part of fol. 155v and in the first half of fol. 156r. In D, it occupies the second half of fol. 127r. The last lacuna in the text of Sergius' *Commentary* is found in ms. B on fol. 156v and in the first lines of fol. 157r. In D, it extends from the last lines of fol. 127v until the middle of fol. 128r. In both cases, the space that was left blank in mss. B and D corresponds more or less to the actual extent of the missing text. More lacunae are found in the other parts of the Erbil mss. and they make apparent that they were produced on the basis of the same copy which was damaged in some of its parts. The scribes who produced later copies of this codex evidently had no other exemplar of Sergius' text at their disposal that would have allowed them to fill the gaps present in their source. It is worth keeping this conclusion in mind when we come to point (3) below.

(2) Although in one case we find one subtitle in L (see above), neither L nor P contain any further titles save for the headings of each of the seven books and the divisions attached to them. All three Erbil codices, on the contrary, include a large number of additional rubrics, which are very similar to what we find in various Syriac mss. containing works on Aristotle's logic, i.e., either translations of the *Organon* and Porphyry's *Isagoge* or commentaries and scholia on both works. It seems that this tradition originally goes back to the rubrics included in Porphyry's *Isagoge* at a very early period and found in nearly all Syriac works pertaining to it153. The Erbil mss., which have Proba's commentary on the *Isagoge* in common as their first component text, also mark each section of Proba's work with a rubric written in red ink, i.e., "On genus"154, "On species", "On differentia", etc., all of which either stand as first words in the line (as in ms. C) or as separate titles between the lines (as in mss. B and D). The same or similar rubrics appear further in those parts of the codices that contain the text of the *Categories*. Thus, at the beginning of chapter 5, the codices indicate the subject under discussion, "On substance", at the beginning of chapter 6 we find the title "On quantity", and so on through the rest of the categories155. It was thus logical for the compilers of the Erbil mss. to put the same rubrics in the text of Sergius' *Commentary* that allow the reader, first, to navigate it, and, second, to understand the correspondence between passages in the *Commentary* and those in Aristotle's and Porphyry's treatises.

The rubrics in the text of Sergius' *Commentary* are identical in all three mss., which makes it probable that they derive from the common *Vorlage*. This assumption is corroborated by the fact that one of the subtitles is misplaced in all three codices. The rubric, "On the goal of the treatise *Categories*", is found at the beginning of §66, when it would make more sense to put it in front of §65, i.e. just before the words, "Concerning the goal of this treatise…" It is thus probable that this rubric was introduced in the wrong place already in the *Vorlage* of the Erbil mss. and that the mistake was carried over into its later copies.

(3) The three Erbil codices contain a number of corrections to the text of Sergius' *Commentary* that, while taking somewhat different forms in each of these manuscripts, are clearly related to one another. It is possible that the individual scribes of

 **153** On Greek mss. of Porphyry's *Isagoge* containing rubrics, cf. Barnes 2003: xvii–xviii.

**<sup>154</sup>** Ms. C lacks it due to the loss of the first folios of the codex.

**<sup>155</sup>** These subtitles are found already in the early anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories*, in all extant witnesses to Jacob of Edessa's version (which is included in the Erbil mss.), and in the only ms. containing the translation of it by George of the Arabs.

mss. B, C, or D were responsible for some of these corrections in particular, but the main bulk of them most likely goes back to the common *Vorlage* of the three codices:

66.6 ܬܗŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ CDP: ųſŴƍ ̈ ܒƦƄƉܕ B, add. D in marg. — The variant is added by the scribe of D in the margin (thus probably reflecting the correction in its source) and introduced into the main text of B (ms. C does not contain it).

68.9 ƦſܐƢƀƙƣܘ CDP: ƦſܐƢſƢƣܘ B, add. D in marg. — Similar to the previous example, D indicated the alternative reading which was most likely suggested in the *Vorlage* in the margin, while the copyist of B took it for the correct reading of the text (again, C does not contain it).

128.17 Ʀſܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ LP: Ʀſܕܐ ܗܘܐƦƌܕ BCD — The additional letters *nun* and *dalat* are clearly marked as such in mss. BCD by means of red ink (in B only *dalat* is written in red, in C the letter *nun* stands above the line).

130.8 ܪܘܬܐŴƖƏ BCDL: ܬܐŴſܘƢܒ P: ܐƆܗܘ add. BD in marg. — The variant of P and the additional variant of B and D both look like glosses which aimed to elucidate the difficult passage in Sergius' text.

134.18 ܬܐŴƍƙƇƊƆ LP: ܬܗŴƍƙƇƊƆ BCD — The possessive suffix (the latter *he*) is written in red ink *supra lineam* in mss. CD which have the same main text as LP, while ms. B contains the variant with the suffix in the main text. It is thus probable that the correction was present in the common *Vorlage*, and while the scribe of B introduced it into the main text, the scribes of C and D preferred to copy the original variant together with the correction proposed in their *Vorlage*.

136.12 ܬܐƢſƢƣ BCDL: ܪܐƢƣ P — As the reading in P indicates, this word has changed during the transmission; this fact is corroborated by BCD. In all three latter mss., the two letters of the word (*yud* and *taw*) are marked with red ink, thus indicating that this word originally had the form ܪܐƢƣ but was corrected to ܬܐƢſƢƣ. Additionally, one letter (*waw*) of the next word, ܬܐŴƇܕܓ, is also written in red in all three mss., thus making apparent that it was transmitted as ܐƦƇܕܓ but later corrected. All these corrections were most likely made *supra lineam* in the *Vorlage* of BCD and introduced into the main text by the copyists of the latter.

144.10 ܐƆܘ BEP: ܐƆܕܘ CD — Mss. C and D add the letter *dalat* to the particle ܐƆܘ, probably indicating that it should be changed into ܐƆܕ. The additional letter is written in red in both codices and was most likely copied from the interlinear correction in the common prototype.

̈ƀƉܐ 166.12 űƟ CLP: ܐƀ ̈ ƊſűƟ BD — The variant of BD is written in such a way that the additional *yud* is marked with red ink and remains unattached to the following letter, thus making it probable that this was a correction written above the line in the scribes' source, which they then introduced into the main text. This correction, however, is not present in ms. C. Similar corrections of the same word (ܐƀƉ̈ űƟ vs. ܐƀ ̈ ƊſűƟ) are found two more times in the following lines.

190.12 ܐƦƀƍƊŶƦƉ BCDLP: ܗƦƀƍƊŶƦƉ corr. BC — The correction (the letter *he*) is written above the line in C and just after the letter in the line in B (it is not present in D). In both cases it is marked red.

A limited number of corrections in BCD, which stand in contrast to the previous cases in being written not between the lines or in the main text but mostly in the margins, contain variants found in other textual witnesses. Thus, they reflect the work of a scholiast or a commentator on Sergius' text who had access to a number of textual witnesses and noted alternative readings in the form of scholia to the text.

̈ܬܐ 64.11 ŴƍƉ P, D in marg.: ܬܐ̈ ŴƍܒƦƄƉ BCD — It is likely that mss. BCD transmit an erroneous form that appeared as a corruption of the variant preserved in P. Only ms. D indicates the correct reading in the margin, one that most likely derives from a gloss in the common *Vorlage* of BCD.

70.13 ܐſƢƊƉ P, D in marg.: ܐƀƉűƉ BCD — While all three codices contain a clearly erroneous variant, ms. D adds the correct reading (found in P) in the margins. Given that this reading is absent from B and C, it is possible that this was a correction made by the scribe of D only, but it is likely that it goes back to a scholion in the common *Vorlage* of BCD.

168.6 ܐŷƄƤƉ LP, D in marg.: ܐſƞƉ BCD — All three Erbil mss. contain a variant that differs from what we find in L and P. Both variants seem possible at this place in the text, but it is a characteristic of D only that it suggests the variant of LP in the form of a marginal gloss.

̈ƦƇƇܐ 172.5 ƕܘ LP, D in marg.: ܐƦƕűſܘ BCD — Ms. D contains the correct reading found in LP and indicated in the margin of D.

262.19 ŴƉܕ BDP: ܐƇƀŶ Epit., add. BDP in marg. — In this case, we find the variant of Epit. in the form of a gloss both in BD and in P. This makes it probable that some of the glosses found in mss. BCD derive from an even older copy than their common prototype.

358.14 ܒܐƐƌƦƉ LP, add. D in marg.: ܐƢƉܐƦƉ BD, add. P in marg. — The correction or the alternative reading found in the margins of P appears as the main reading in mss. BD, while D indicates the main reading of LP in the margin.

360.2 ܕܪܫƦƌܕ LP, add. D in marg.: ܪܕܐƦƌܕ BD: ƥƕƦƌܕ add. DP in marg. — As in the previous case, both P and D contain same glosses in the margins, while D additionally suggests the variant found in the main text of L and P.

378.18 ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ LP, Epit., BD in marg.: ƎƀƇſܐ BD — Both B and D suggest in the margins the correct reading that we find in all other witnesses.

Point (1) above makes apparent that the scribes of mss. B and D (and probably that of C) did not have access to any other copy of Sergius' *Commentary* save for the old and lacunose codex that served as their common source. Given that some of the corrections in their text are based on other manuscripts containing Sergius' work, these corrections were most probably present in their common source and copied together with the main text. It is noteworthy that the scribes of each codex (B, C, and D) worked independently from each other in this respect, so that the alternative readings found in the *Vorlage* are sometimes noted in one ms. only, and other times appear in multiple mss. However, these scholia in all probability go back to the glosses in the common prototype, which, in turn, carried them over from an even older copy (cf. the case of 262.19 above). As will be shown below, some of these scholia found their way not only into BCD but also into P. Hence, they most likely derive from a codex that predates these witnesses (see the examples in 2.1.3.3, below).

(4) Finally, the three Erbil mss. share the following errors that reflect their common *Vorlage*:

70.8 ƈƃ P: ƈƄƆ BCD ̈ƣܐ :LP ̈ܪƤſܐ 172.15 BCD ܐܕ 174.20 ƦſܐƀƇƊƤƉ L: ܐƀƇƊƤƉ BCD 180.9 ܐƦƍƤܕܒ LP, Epit.: ܐƦƖƤܕܒ BCD ̈ ƀܐ 194.5 Ɖܕ LP, Epit.: ܐƍ ̈ ̈ ƍܐ :CD ܕܒ B ܕܙܒ 228.23 ƦſܐƊƀܓƣ LP: ƦſܐƊƀŷƣ BD 232.6 ܘܢųƇƄƆ LP, Epit.: ܘܢųƇƄƆ ŴƆ BD ̈ƣܐ 246.13 űܓƆ LP: ܐƤܓƮƆ BD

250.14 Ƣſƞܒ LP: ƢſƦſ BD BD ܘƀƌŴƃܐ :LP ܘƍƀƃܐ 322.17 328.16 ܐƐƄŹ LP: ܐƐƘŴŹ BD ̈ƦƇƇܗܘܢ :L ܕƦƇƕܗܘܢ 346.15 ƕܕ P: ܘܢųƀƇƕܕ BD 372.4 ܬܗܘܐ LP: ܬܘܒ BD, Epit. BD ܘŴſƦƘܬܐ :LP ܘŴƇſƦƘܬܐ 382.10 384.4 ̇ ųƊŶܘܬ LP: ̇ ųƊŷƆܘ BD

These examples are the most evident cases of textual corruption. As the critical apparatus of the edition makes clear, the three Erbil codices also share a large number of textual variants that cannot be classified as clear errors but that still demonstrate the interrelation between them. All told, the four points outlined above give good reasons to conclude that each of the copies of Sergius' *Commentary* contained in the three Erbil mss. were copied from the same prototype. Apart from the *Commentary*, as the manuscripts differ from one another in terms of the precise extent of their component works, it is possible that additional exemplars were used for other parts of them.

#### **2.1.3.2 Mss. B, C, and D as Independent Copies**

In addition to the common errors listed in (4) above, all of which derive from the common *Vorlage*, each of the Erbil codices contains its own errors that show them to be separate copies of the old prototype which were made independently from one another. Ms. B, which is chronologically the earliest copy in the group, contains multiple unique errors not found in two other codices:

```
̈ƍſܐ 72.10
         ŵŶƦƉ CDP: ܐƕűſƦƉ B 
̈ƍƀܐ 176.10
          ƃ CDLP: ܐƍƀ̈
                      ƍƉ B 
 B ܐƌƢŶܐ :CDLP ܐƍſܐ 178.5
178.13 ܘܡƦƉ CDLP: ܡűƉ B 
182.4 ƎƉ CDLP, Epit.: űƃ B 
188.23 ̇
      ųƇƀŶ CDLP: ܐƇƀŶ Epit.: ̇
                              ųƤƀƌ B 
202.21 ̇
       B ܐܦ :CDLP ܐܘ
262.19 Ʀſܐƍƀƃ DP, Epit.: ƦſܐƢſƦſ B 
        ̈ ܢ 262.20
        ŴƉܕ DP, Epit.: ܐſܗܘ B 
        ̇ ܘ 270.18
        B ƈƕ ܕƤƉܐܠ :DP ܘƍƖƌܐ ܗ
272.17 ƢƖ ̇
         Ə DP, Epit.: ŪƃƢƉ B 
̈ƀܐ 272.18
         ƌŴܓ DP, Epit.: ܐſ ̈
                          Ŵܓ B 
 B ܗƌܐ :DLP ܗƣܐ 280.10
```
All unique errors of B, of which only a small sample has been given above, are present in the copy that was produced on the basis of B nearly one hundred years later than the B156. Manuscript Mingana Syr. 606 (M), which is now preserved in the Cadbury

 **156** Cf. Kessel 2023: 154.

Research Library in Birmingham157, was commissioned by Alfonse Mingana and produced in Alqosh in 1933 by Mattai bar Pawlos158. Mattai copied the original manuscript with much diligence, reproducing in his copy all the characteristics of the original, including all errors found in B. Thus, we find in B some additions to the main text written *supra lineam* that are found within the text of M (cf. the inclusion of the word ܬܘܒ in 112.10); the marginal glosses of B are faithfully copied in the margins of M (cf. the addition of two words in 84.8 in both codices); and even the words written twice in B (cf. the case of dittography in 204.16) are mechanically copied in M. Additionally, ms. M contains errors not found either in B or in any other ms. from the Erbil group, making it apparent that the scribe had no other copy in front of him except B. Here are two examples of errors unique to M (neither of which are indicated in the critical apparatus of the present edition):

̈źƀܐ 64.9 ƤƘ BCDP: Ǝźƀ̈ ƤƘ M 106.3 ŴƀƖܐܬܒ BCDP: ŴſƢܐܬܒ M

The next codex from the Erbil group, ms. D, that was produced chronologically after B, contains the following unique errors:

 D ܐܘ :BP ̣ܗܘ 100.20 120.4 ƎƀƇſܕܐ BCLP: ƎƀƇſܐƆ D D ܗƎƀƆ :BCLP ܘ̈ܪƍƀƕܐ 122.13 122.22 Ʀƀܒ BCLP: űƀܒ D 124.15 ƎſƢƉܐ BCLP: ƎƍſƢƉܐ D 148.21 ŪſƦſ BCELP: ܒƦſ D D ܐſƢŶܐ :BCLP ܐƌƢŶܐ 176.7 186.17 ƋŷƆ BCLP: ƋƆ D 188.5 Ŵƌܗ BCLP: ܢŴƌܗ D D ܕܐƦſ ܗܘܐ :BCL ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ 192.1 192.13 ܕܐܦ BCLP: ƅſܕܐ D 196.6 ܐƦƍƀƠƆܘ BCL, Epit.: ܪܐƦƀƠƆܘ D 250.12 ̇ ܐܘ ƢſƦſ B: ܐƢſƦſ P: ƦſܐƢſƦſ D 264.6 ܐƃܐܘܪƆ BP, Epit.: ܐƠƉŴƖƆ D

The errors found in D in those parts of the *Commentary* that have not been preserved in C do not allow us to confirm whether these errors are characteristic of D only or were also shared by C. However, the variants listed above give good reasons to conclude that D was copied from the common *Vorlage* of the Erbil group independently and was not based on B.

There are few erroneous variants that D shares with B only and not with C. The number of such cases, found in the part of the *Commentary* represented in all three

 **157** For the description of this codex, see Mingana 1939: 1.1163–1166.

**<sup>158</sup>** Cf. the extensive colophon on fol. 232v of the codex, quoted in Mingana 1939: 1.1165–1166.

Erbil mss., is rather limited. However, they allow us to assume that the copyist of D (the codex produced at a later date than B), in addition to the old *Vorlage*, also had B at his disposal. The following errors are shared by B and D:

```
 BD ܒƦܪƦƀƕܗ :CP ܒƢ ܬܪƦƀƕܗ 68.14
70.14 ̇
    ųſƦſܕܐ CP: ̇
                ųſƦſܐ BD 
 BD ܘŴƠƀƐƀƉܪܘܬܐ :CP ܘŴƠƀƏŴƉܪܘܬܐ 74.7
78.9 ܐƢƀƕܘ C: ܐƢƀƉ BD: ܐſűƀƕܘ P 
82.7 ƢƉܐ CP: ƢƀƉܐ BD 
206.2 ̇
    ųſƦſܐ CLP: ƎſųſƦſܐ BD 
208.15 ƢƉܐƌ CLP: ƢƉܐƌܕ BD
```
Ms. C, which was in all likelihood produced as the latest copy of the same old prototype, contains the following unique errors:

```
88.3 Ǝܒŵܒ BDP: Ǝܒŵܘܒ C 
90.2 ̇
    ̇ :BDP ܕܐܘ
              C ܐܘ
98.15 ܐűܒƕ BDP: ܢűܒƕ C 
116.4 ŴƠƀźƐƘŴƏ LP: ŴƠƀźƐƀƘŴƏ BD: ŴƠƀƐƘŴƏ C 
126.7 ܐƦƇƉ BDLP: ܢƦƇƉ C 
154.20 Ǝ
       ̈
       ƘܬŴƤƉ BDLP: ƎƘܬ̈
                         ŴƉ C 
168.19 ܬŴƆ BDLP: ܬܗŴƆ C 
 C ܪܗŹܐ :BDLP ܪܗƢŹܐ 188.11
188.13 ܐƢŹܗƢƆ BDLP: ܐŹܗƢƆ C 
206.5 ܐƦƀƍƀƃ BDLP: ܐƦƍƀƃ C
```
C shares some errors with B and/or with D. Thus, similar to the case of D and B (see above), it is likely that the copyist of C not only had the old copy in front of him, but also consulted with those copies that had been produced previously whenever he was uncertain how to understand the text of the old *Vorlage*.

128.2 ܐƌƢŶܐ BLP, Epit.: ܐſŵŶ C: ܐſŵŶܕ D — C shares the error of D, although the two variants differ slightly from one another.

144.10 ܐƆܘ BEP: ܐƆܕܘ CD — Both mss. C and D make the addition of *dalat* to the particle ܐƆܘ) cf. point (3), above).

154.13 ܐƀƌŴƄƆ BLP: ܐƀƌŴƃ ŴƆ C, D in marg.: ܐƍƀƃ ŴƆ D — B has the correct reading, while the reading of D is a clear corruption that, however, is corrected in the margin. The variant of ms. C has the correct form ܐƀƌŴƃ, but adds the negative particle to it, possibly on the basis of D.

154.19 ܐƍܒŵܘܒ [+ ƎƉ CD — The addition of this particle is characteristic of the mss. C and D only, not of B or any other witness.

158.7 ƑſܐܪƘ DP: ܐƀƏƢƘ BCL — Among the Erbil mss., only D has the correct reading, whereas both B and C share the error of L. See also the divisions of Book II on 164.8, where we find DL *vs*. BCP.

180.16 ܡűƉ BLP, Epit.: ܡűƊܒ CD — The erroneous variant is found in C and D only.

There are, however, many more examples where C does not contain the erroneous readings of D and/or B and serves as an independent witness to the common *Vorlage*:

68.14 ܗƦƀƕܬܪ Ƣܒ CP: ܗƦƀƕܪƦܒ BD — Both B and D contain an error, not present in C, which has the correct reading also preserved in P.

92.3 ܪܘܬܐŴƖƏܘܕ ܐſܕܬܐܘܪ BCP: ܪܘܬܐŴƖƏܘ ܐſܬܐܘܪ D — C, like B, does not contain the error of D.

116.6 ܢŴƍܕܐܪܓ CLP: ܢŴƍܕܒܐܪܓ BD — The error of B and D is not present in C, which shares the correct readings with older witnesses.

120.4 ƎƀƇſܕܐ BCLP: ƎƀƇſܐƆ D — The error is found only in D, but not in B and C.

122.22 Ʀƀܒ BCLP: űƀܒ D — Again, neither B nor C share the error of D.

142.22 ƎſųƉŴƍƟ BCP, D in marg.: ƎſųƊſŴƟ D: ƎſųƉŴƍƠܒ add. BD in marg. — While B and C maintain the correct reading, D suggests here the erroneous variant in the main text that is corrected in the margin by means of two other variants, one of which is erroneous too.

186.17 ƋŷƆ BCLP: ƋƆ D — The error is found in D only, while C together with B contains the correct variant.

190.12 ܐƦƀƍƊŶƦƉ BCDLP: ܗƦƀƍƊŶƦƉ corr. BC — This "correction" (which in reality is a *Verschlimmbesserung*) is not present in D and thus could derive only from the common prototype directly.

190.19 ܗܝ [om. BD — One word is omitted by both B and D but is present in C.

̈ Ʀſܐ 206.18 ųƆܐ ƈƕ CLP: ܐƦſ ̈ ųƆܐ D: ܐƦſ ̈ ųƆܐƆ B — Here, all three Erbil Mss. differ from one another, and C turns out to be the only witness among them containing the correct variant.

210.16 Ǝƀ ̈ Ɖܕ [+ ŭƇƘƦƉ D — D's addition is not found in C.

Such cases are much more numerous than presented here. On the basis of those presented, though, we can already discount the possibility that D or B was the only source of C, as the latter in a number of cases suggests correct readings where B and D contain errors. It is apparent that the scribe of C had access to the same copy of Sergius' *Commentary* as the scribes of B and D did, but it is possible that on some occasions he consulted other copies. It is also worthy of mention that in C we do not find any of the marginal glosses present in B and/or D that derive from a copy older than their common prototype.

Summing up the data presented in sections 2.1.3.1 and 2.1.3.2, one might draw the following conclusions that contribute to establishing the *stemma codicum*:


The question of the relation of the common source of BCD to other textual witnesses of Sergius' *Commentary* will be discussed in the next section.

#### **2.1.3.3 Relation of the Prototype of BCD to Other Witnesses**

Mss. BCD and L share nearly no variant readings that might be considered clear errors. In some cases, we find in mss. BCD variants transmitted by L, but these cases may be explained by the assumption (based on the arguments presented in 2.1.3.1, above) that the common prototype of BCD contained a number of marginal glosses. These glosses, which remained as additional elements also in B and D (the scribe of C decided not to copy them), probably derived from some learned commentator who had access to other witnesses of Sergius' *Commentary*. Overall, it can be concluded that BCD on the one hand and L on the other belong to two different lines of transmission of the text of Sergius' *Commentary*, which remained separate in spite of some cases of cross-contamination.

Such cases are mainly found in B, whose scribe, Šemʿon, preferred the readings of L (i.e. of some witness pertaining to the line of L). However, the interlinear corrections in D suggest that at least some cases where B and L share a common variant may be explained by variant readings present in the margins of the prototype of BCD.

̈ƣܐ 172.21 ܘܐܕ BCDP: ܐƣܘܕܐܕ L, add. D supra lin. 192.17 ܘƢŶܕ CDP: ƢŶܕ BL 202.23 ƎƤſƮƘܕ BL, add. D supra lin.: ƎƀƤſƢƘܕ C: ƥſƢƘܕ P 206.14 ̈ ƎƊƀƏܬƦƉ CDP: ƎƀƊƀƏܬƦƉ BL

226.9 ƎܒŵƇƄܒ BL: ƎƃܪƦܒ DP — D shares the error of P that was probably characteristic of the common prototype of BCD, which in turn most likely contained the reading of L in the form of a gloss, it being the latter that was carried over into B.

228.5 ƦſܐƢſƢƣ BL, D in marg.: om. P — It is probable that not only P but also the *Vorlage* of BCD omitted this word, which, however, was restored in the margin in the form of a gloss, that was in turn copied as a gloss in D and included in the main text of B.

DP ܐƄſܐ :BL ܐƄƊſܐ 308.1

378.22 ܐƦƤŶ DP, Epit.: ܐƦŷƤŶ BL

The last case is the only example of a common error shared by one of the Erbil mss. and L. However, it is possible that this error entered the text of B in the same way as the rest of common variants between L and BCD, i.e., by introducing into B one of the glosses that were present in the common prototype of BCD. Based on this evidence, we may assume that L and BCD belong to two separate lines of transmission of Sergius' text.

There is much greater affinity between the Erbil mss. and ms. P. They share a great number of errors that bring them close in the scheme of transmission of the Syriac text of Sergius' *Commentary*. The following cases are examples of the errors shared by BCD and P:

```
100.15 ̇
     ųƊſŴƟ L: ̇
               ųƉŴƍƟ BCDP
```

```
130.3 ŴƆ L: ܗܘܐ ܐƆ BCDP 
 BCDP ܕܗƣܐ :L ܗƣܐ 132.15
152.16 ܐƊſŴƟ L: ܐƊƀƟ BCDP 
̇ :L ܕųƊƣܘ 166.6
               ųƊƣܕ BCDP 
 BCDP ܕƇƃܒܐ ܘƀƏŴƏܐ .:Epit ,L ܕƀƏŴƏܐ ܘƇƃܒܐ 182.15
230.15 ƎƀŷƤŶƦƉ L, Epit.: ƎƍƀŷƤŶƦƉ BDP 
280.8 ƎƍſƢƄƉ L: ƎƍƀƌܐƊƉ BDP 
 BDP ܕܓƇܐ :L ܕܪܓƇܐ 298.11
304.14 ܐƌƢŶܐ L: ƎſƢŶܐ BDP 
330.9 ̇
     ܬܗŴƙƀƠƌ L: ̇
                           ̇ ŴƙƀƠƆܬܗ
                           ųƆ BDP 
 BDP ܗܘ :L ܗܘܐ 344.6
362.7 ܥűƊƆ L: ܬܕܥ BDP
```
Besides these common errors, the prototype of BCD is connected to P through a number of marginal glosses found in the Erbil mss. One of these glosses contains an alternative textual variant that turns out to be the same as the readings of P:

148.2 ųƀƌŴƃ BCDL: ųƍƀƃ P, add. B supra lin., add. D in marg. — The reading of P is a clear corruption of the correct variant found in all other witnesses. It was most likely noted in the form of a gloss in the *Vorlage* of B and D.

In some cases, we find either the readings of BCD or marginal glosses preserved in the Erbil mss. also in the margins of P:

272.13 ܐƦƀƍƕűſƦƉ] + ܐƦƀƍƀƕܪƦƉ BDP in marg. — All three mss. contain the same gloss, which suggests either an alternative reading (no other witness supports it) or a correction to the text. 328.16 ܐƐƄŹ LP: ܐƐƘŴŹ BD, add. P in marg.

372.6 ƦſܪܐƢƤƉ] + ƦſܐƣܪűƉ BDP in marg.

378.18 ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ LP, Epit., add. BD in marg.: ƎƀƇſܐ BD, add. P in marg. — Apparently, both P and the common prototype of BCD contained in their margins alternative readings found in the main text of P or BD.

All such cases corroborate the conclusion that the source for alternative readings used by both P and the prototype of BCD were not the corresponding mss. (i.e. the *Vorlage* of BCD was not contaminated by P), but the scholia in their common prototype.

Two cases are of particular interest in this regard. In 390.6, we find in ms. D a marginal gloss that is also included into the main text of P and that clearly represents a commentary on Sergius' text. The gloss is attached to Sergius' remark that "contraries belong to the same genus" and contains a quotation from the *Cat.* 14a19–20, where Aristotle states that contraries must "either be in the same genus or in contrary genera or be genera themselves". The quotation derives from the 7th century Syriac version of the *Categories* made by the famous West Syriac scholar Jacob of Edessa (d. in 708)159.

 **159** Ed. in Georr 1948. Cf. the online edition in https://hunaynnet.oeaw.ac.at/categoriae.html (accessed on 11.10.23).

Hence, this scholion most likely belonged to a West Syriac commentator on Sergius' treatise and was preserved in the margins of the manuscript that served as a source for both the prototype of BCD and for P. While the former upheld the paratextual character of this scholion, the scribe of P included it in the main text.

Another example of this kind is found in 400.19, where mss. B and D contain marginal glosses. The glosses paraphrase the last part of the paragraph, which refers to the change in the vision that results from what is visible. Similar to the previous case, the variant is found in the main text in P but put in the margins in mss. B and D. Hence, it is likely that it entered the prototype of BCD from another copy of Sergius' work related to P and containing a marginal note.

All these examples make apparent that the similarities between the source of BCD and P are twofold. On the one hand, they share a number of common errors that make them part of the same line of transmission of the text of Sergius' *Commentary*. On the other hand, they contain a number of additional elements that most likely go back to a common prototype.

Summing up the observations above, one may state the following:


## **2.2 Collection of Excerpts in Ms. London, British Library, Add. 12155 (E)**

The codex now preserved in the British Library of London as Additional 12155160 is dated to the 8th century and thus appears to be the second oldest witness after ms. L, which is now located in the same collection. However, in contrast to the latter, ms. E does not contain the full text of Sergius' *Commentary*, but only a number of excerpts, which are reproduced mostly in abridged and revised form.

This manner in which the text of the *Commentary* has been reproduced fits with the overall state of the materials included in this large collection of heterogeneous writings. The codex bears the title, "A volume of testimonies from the holy fathers

 **160** Cf. the description in Wright 1871: 921–955.

against various heresies"161, which discloses the polemical and probably pedagogical purpose of its composition. The BL ms. contains a large number of fragments taken from the works of the Church authorities (among whom Cyril and Gregory of Nazianzus have the most prominent position). Several non-Christian authors (e.g., Alexander of Aphrodisias) appear in this codex too, probably serving as additional and exotic materials which could also be used for polemic162. On fols. 178v–180v, we find a large collection of fragments divided into two parts. The first part is ascribed to "the archiatros Sergius" (i.e. to Sergius of Reshaina); the second part contains the name of Aristotle in the title.

This collection of fragments, the greater part of which derives from Sergius' *Commentary*, also includes materials from other logical texts and works of *prolegomena*-literature. The two sub-titles of the collection mentioned above both appear on f. 178v, the first one in the right column, the second one in the left column. In what follows, I will briefly describe each fragment included in the compendium, indicating the number of the folio, recto or verso (r/v), the column (a/b), and the lines containing the text:

I. The first part has the sub-title (178va.6–8), "And further, from Sergius, the chief physician, from Book Six"163. The first fragment included in it indeed derives from Book VI of Sergius' *Commentary*.

I.1 (178va.8–35) Fragment of Book VI, §§374–375. The quoted text is close to the version which we find in other witnesses, although ms. E has some specific readings with no parallels in other mss. Some of the variants found in E bring it close to ms. L, e.g., the transliteration of the Greek κύκνος as ܣŴƍƠƀƟ and not as ܣŴƍƟŴƟ which we find in all other witnesses. In addition, both mss. L and E contain a similar (although slightly different) error in transliterating the Greek Ἰλλυριοί, the Illyrians, as ܐƀƆܪ̈ܐܘ and ܐƆܘƢſܐ respectively.

I.2 (178va.36–39) Short fragment on the three persons (Syr. ܐƘܪܨܘ̈ܐƘ, a loanword which renders the Gr. τὰ πρόσωπα), the first one is "the one who says", the second is the one "towards whom it is said", and the third is "about whom it is said".

I.3 (178va.40–b32) The list of six introductory questions (Syr. ܐܐƇ̈ ƙƟ = Gr. τὰ κεφάλαια) which should be discussed before the study of every book. Although it is stated twice at the beginning of this fragment that these questions are seven in number, only six are further discussed: (i) the goal of particular book, (ii) its usefulness, (iii) its exact order (Syr. ܐƐƄŹ = Gr. τάξις), (iv) the reason for the title, (v) the division

 ̈ Ɵ ܕƟŴƆܒƈ ܗ̈ܪƑƀƏ ƦƙƇŷܐ ̈ ܕܐܒ Ƥſűܐ ̈ ܕܬŶ ųܬܐ ̈ ƦƀƠƍƘܐ ƦſŴܐ .Syr **<sup>161</sup>** ƤƉ .

**<sup>162</sup>** On the non-Christian materials in the codex, see Arzhanov 2019: 187–188.

 <sup>.</sup>ܘܬܘܒ ܕƢƏܓƑƀ ܐܪƢźƀƃܘܣ ƎƉ ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܐƦƣܐ .Syr **163**

into chapters, (vi) from whom it derives164. These points are further explained in the rest of this fragment. Point (vi), which inquires whether the text was really written by the author to whom it is attributed is elucidated by the fact that there are many unscrupulous people who lead the simple persons astray by invoking the authority of great names. The need for point (iii) is explained with reference to a saying of Plato, namely that one should not extend the step of his foot farther than necessary165. A further argument is that one should investigate these questions so as not to be led astray by false teachings. These remarks point to theological debates as the context for the interest in Aristotle's logic displayed by the compilers of the codex.

II. The second part of this collection has the sub-title (178vb.32–34), "Further selected fragments from Aristotle's *Categories*"166. It contains a number of excerpts from Sergius' *Commentary*, most of which appear in periphrastic form.

II.1 (178vb.34–39) A short quotation from §10 on two powers of the soul.

II.2 (178vb.39–41) One sentence from §9 on God's possessing two principle powers.

II.3 (178vb.42–50) A summary of the argument that logic is not a part of philosophy but rather its instrument, combined with a quotation from §44 to the effect that parts together make up the whole, whereas this is not the case with instruments.

II.4 (178vb.50–54) Periphrastic quotation from §45 to the effect that a hand is both a part (of the body) and an instrument (of the soul).

II.5 (178vb.54–179ra.2) Periphrastic quotation of one sentence from §51 on the completion of theory and practice.

II.6 (179ra.2–6) Adapted quotation of the opening sentence of §56, stating that the end of theory is the beginning of practice and vice-versa.

II.7 (179ra.6–13) Adapted quotation of §67, to the effect that the same things are called differently by different nations.

II.8 (179ra.13–17) A summary of the argument in §§72–78 (without mentioning its Platonic source) that things exist in three ways: naturally, with the Creator, and in the memory of those who know them.

II.9 (179ra.17–23) Adapted quotation of the last part of §125, listing the four combinations resulting from the fourfold division in *Cat*. 2.

II.10 (179ra.23–25) Definition of accident based on §137.

**<sup>166</sup>** Syr. ܐſƮܓźƟ ƎƉ ܐƦƀ ̈ .ܬܘܒ Ɖ ܕܐܪƑƀƇźźƐſ ̈ Ƈܐ Ɖܓܒ

 **164** Cf. the list of six κεφάλαια which one shall investigate with regard to every Aristotelian treatise in Ammonius, *In Cat*. 7.15–8.10, Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 1.10–13, and Elias, *In Cat*. 127.3–129.3 (cf. also Philoponus, *In Cat*. 7–13 and Olympiodorus, *In Cat*. 9–20). All these authors list six points which differ somewhat in order, but in general maintain the same scheme. Some of these points are discussed by Sergius in the introductory part (Prologue and Books I–II) of the *Commentary*.

 <sup>.</sup>Cf .ƐƄŹܐ ܕƎſ ܕƦƉܒƖܐ ܕƆܐ ܙܕܩ ܕƈƖƆ ƎƉ ܕܪܓܐ ܪܓƇܐ ƦƊƌܘܚ ܐƅſ ƦƇƉܐ ܕŴźƇƘܢ .Syr **165** a similar reference to Plato' *Phaedrus* 237b in Elias, *In Cat*. 127.7–9.

II.11 (179ra.25–179rb.10) A periphrastic quotation of selected passages taken from §§138–149, which first lists eleven modes of saying that something is in something else and then further explains these modes.

II.12 (179rb.10–27) Periphrastic and selective quotation of §154 characterizing the correct way of making a definition.

II.13 (179rb.27–36) This fragment does not match with the transmitted text of Sergius' *Commentary* but appears as a summary of or rather as a scholion on §§157–163, dealing with various kinds of accidents.

II.14 (179rb.36–43) Periphrastic quotation of §164.

II.15 (179rb.43–54) Adapted quotation of several sentences selected from §§173–174 dealing with a division of substances into the simple and the composite.

II.16 (179rb.54–179va.6) A periphrastic account of §177, to the effect that substance is prior to the other nine categories which require it in order to subsist.

II.17 (179va.6–21) Adapted quotation of selected sentences from §§178–179 concerning the division of substance into primary and secondary.

II.18 (179va.21–47) Adapted quotation of §§180–181 and the first sentence of §182, describing the three kinds of division (the rest of §182 is quoted later, see II.24).

II.19 (179va.48–179vb.20) A short summary of §204–207, with an exposition of the types of property.

II.20 (179vb.20–28) A short summary of §96 on the difference between substance and accident.

II.21 (179vb.28–49) A summary (with extensive quotations) of §§84–86, describing the four kinds of speech.

II.22 (179vb.49–180rb.22) Adapted quotation of §§97–108, with an overview of the ten categories.

II.23 (180rb.23–52) Adapted quotation of §114–115 on various types of definition.

II.24 (180rb.52–180va.9) Fragment addressing the precise nature of substance' division into primary and secondary. It starts with an adapted quotation from the second half of §182 (starting shortly after the quotation in II.18), proceeds with a summary of §183 and a slightly modified quotation from §184, and concludes with the last sentence of §185.

As becomes clear from this overview, most of the excerpts appear not as faithful quotations of Sergius' *Commentary* but rather as free periphrases or even as short summaries of the contents. This form probably owes to the purpose of the florilegium as a whole, which was prepared as an aid in polemic (cf. the title of the whole codex).

Thus, it seems unnecessary in most cases to indicate all the variants of ms. E in the critical apparatus of the edition, as these variants turn out to be the result of the work of the compilers of ms. E rather than actual variants in the transmission of Sergius' text. Only in few cases are the variants of E indicated in the critical apparatus, the first of which is the case of I.1, which appears as an actual quotation rather than periphrasis. It is in this case only that some conclusions may be drawn as to the place of the ms.

E in the stemma. Additionally, in the cases of II.11, II.18, II.22, II.23, and II.24, which contain at least in some parts faithful quotations from the transmitted text of the *Commentary*, some variants have been included in the critical apparatus.

## **2.3 Epitome in Ms. Berlin, Petermann I. 9 (Epit.)**

The collection of excerpts from Sergius' *Commentary* in ms. E discussed in the previous section gives an example of an adaptation of this work that combines direct quotations with periphrastic summaries and supplies them with additional materials deriving from other sources. Ms. E is dated to the 8th century and testifies to the popularity of Sergius' treatise in Syriac schools in the centuries following his death. A very similar kind of adaptation of Sergius' *Commentary* has been preserved in a later codex167. Though much larger than the collection of excerpts in E, it shares most of the characteristics of the latter, for here too we find direct quotations from the *Commentary* together with passages that appear as adaptations of the original text supplied by a number of additional materials, which, just as in ms. E, mostly appear in the opening part of the text.

In contrast to ms. E, this version of the *Commentary* may be called an epitome, since it was clearly composed not as a collection of fragments but as a separate treatise. It has been preserved in the only manuscript, Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Petermann I. 9 (Sachau 88)168. This paper codex written in the East Syriac script is dated to 1260 AD169 and constitutes a large collection of various philosophical texts. Neither the name of its scribe nor the location of its production are known to us. On fols. 83v–104r, it contains a treatise (Syr. *memra*) on Aristotle's *Categories* attributed to Sergius and addressed to a certain Philotheos170.

The epitome in the Berlin codex contains a few passages which are not found in the *Commentary*. Their inclusion may be explained by the fact that the compiler of the epitome did not mechanically put together short and long excerpts from the *Commentary*, but also made use of additional elements for a more coherent final product. Thus, we find a longer introduction at the beginning and a short conclusion at the end that do not derive from the *Commentary*. A number of sentences were intended to serve as bridges between the excerpts taken from the *Commentary*, although in some

 **167** Edited with an English translation in Aydin 2016. See also Hugonnard-Roche 1997.

**<sup>168</sup>** For a description of this codex, see Sachau 1899: 321–335. In the catalogue of Sachau, it appears under no. 88 (hence the no. in the brackets). Sachau noted that the ms. belonged to the collection of Petermann of the Königliche Bibliothek in Berlin under no. 9.

**<sup>169</sup>** According to the note on fols. 36r and 112r, it was written down in the year 1571 of the Greeks, i.e. in 1260 AD.

**<sup>170</sup>** Syr.: ƑƀƇŹŴźƏܕܐܪ ܣŴſܪŴܓźƟ ƈƕ ܐƀƍƀƖƤſܪ ܘܣƢźƀƃܐܪ ƑƀܓƢƐƆ ƢƀƉܕܐ ܐƢƉܐƉ .ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ

cases there are no such bridges, with the compiler having mechanically attached one fragment of Sergius' work to another or simply adding "and so on" (Syr. ܐƃƢƣܘ( 171 at the point where the original text breaks off.

This work has sometimes been considered an independent treatise composed by Sergius himself172, although already G. Furlani noted in his overview of the *Commentary*, that the treatise preserved in the Berlin codex is nothing else than an abridged version of the latter173. The epitome lacks the rhetorical elegance of the *Commentary* and its clear logical form. It is not merely these stylistic deficiencies, moreover, that speak against its attribution to Sergius:



 **171** Cf. Aydin 2016: 158.22.

**<sup>172</sup>** Cf. Hugonnard-Roche 1997: 346–349; Aydin 2016: 67–70.

**<sup>173</sup>** Furlani 1922: 135.

#### **52** Introduction

cob, entered the Syriac philosophical lexicon nearly two centuries after Sergius' time.


The last point is of particular value. The compiler of Epit. has freely moved around passages of the *Commentary*. For instance, the excursus on prime matter appears in §236–238 of the *Commentary* as the first topic which Sergius discusses in Book IV focused on quantity in context of the question of the sequence of the categories and why the category of quantity appears just after substance by Aristotle. It is worthy of note that in ms. P, whose folios were bound in an incorrect order, this passage appears before Book IV. The same sequence is characteristic of the epitome, which includes the excursus on prime matter in the concluding part of the section on substance. While this may be a coincidence, this feature of the epitome may well indicate a relation to P.

As noted above, the text of the epitome has come down to us in a single, rather late copy. Thus, we may assume that some of the errors in the latter derive from the scribes who copied the epitome. However, there are a considerable number of errors which connect the text of the epitome to the line of transmission of Sergius' text represented by mss. BCD and P. Epit. shares with P the following errors that in some cases are also found in BCD:

```
288.9 ܐƃܘűܒ BDL: ܡűƊܒ P, Epit. 
336.16 űƀܒ L: űŷܒ BDP, Epit. 
 .Epit ܘƃƢƣܐ ܕܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ :P ܘƃƢƣܐ :BDL ܘܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ 418.1
```
Thus, there is only one error which Epit. shares exclusively with P, while in two other cases it turns out to be related to BCD. Often Epit. shares errors with BCD only:

 **178** Aydin 2016: 104.4.

178.12 ŴƆ LP: ŴƆܘ BCD, Epit. 190.8 ܐƞƉ LP: ܐſƞƉ BCD, Epit. 220.21 ƎſűƉ LP: Ǝſܕ BCD, Epit. 284.23 ܐƀƇܓ LP: ܐƊƣŴܓ BD, Epit. ̇ ܘ 334.16 ̇ ܘ :LP ܗ ܕܗ BD, Epit. 348.9 ܗܘ̣ LP: ܗܘܐ BD, Epit. 372.4 ܬܗܘܐ LP: ܬܘܒ BD, Epit. 434.7 ŴſŵŶܐܬ LP: ŴſŴŶܐܬ BD, Epit.

Additionally, in mss. BCD and P, we find two marginal glosses that represent the readings of Epit.:

262.19 ŴƉܕ BDP: ܐƇƀŶ Epit., add. BDP in marg. 292.6 ܐƦſƮܕܒ DLP, corr. B in marg.: ܬܐ̈ Ŵܕܨܒ B, Epit. — Only B shares the same error with Epit., indicating the correct variant in the margin.

These glosses most likely derive from the same common prototype of BCD and P, which contained a number of alternative readings (see above). Among these scholia, the variants of Epit. are also found, and they most likely derive from a codex related to the copy from which the epitome was compiled.

Summing up the data above, one may assume that Epit. was produced by an unknown compiler at the time after the 7th century (cf. the witness of Jacob of Edessa) on the basis of a codex that belongs to the same line of textual transmission of the *Commentary* as BCD and P. The address to a certain "Philotheos" (which might have been a general reference to any "God-loving" reader) seems to be a fictional substitute for the addressee Theodore found in the *Commentary*. Hence, the epitome serves for us as an additional witness to the text of the *Commentary*. One should bear in mind, of course, that the person who compiled this epitome has deliberately changed certain terms and otherwise added to it. Still, in many cases of textual divergence between the various witnesses to Sergius' work, the text of the epitome may serve as an additional witness supporting one of the variants.

## **2.4 Relation Between Textual Witnesses and Principles of Edition**

The characteristics of various textual witnesses to Sergius' *Commentary* outlined above may be summarized as follows:


#### **54** Introduction

ularly excerpts I.1, II.11, and II.18), on the basis of which one can conclude that ms. E belongs to the same line of transmission as L.


These observations, which reflect the process of *recensio*179, yield the following *stemma codicum* of textual witnesses to Sergius' *Commentary*, which has served as the basis for the critical edition:

 **179** On the process of evaluation of the extant textual witnesses known as *recensio*, see Maas 1960: 5– 9, West 1973: 29–47, Chiesa 2002: 57–83, Tarrant 2016: 49–64. Cf. Timpanaro 2005: 58–74.

As noted above, the following edition is a critical one; that is, the result of an attempt to come as close as possible (the process of *emendatio*) to the original form of what may be called the final version of the text written by Sergius at the beginning of the 6th century180. The dotted lines in the stemma represent cases of contact between different lines of transmission that nonetheless falls short of full-scale contamination between the sources, since most of the alternative readings deriving from other textual witnesses were introduced in the form of scholia and glosses into some of the representatives of the [Epit.]–[A]–P line. To a large extent, these variant readings maintained their paratextual character in the later copies, so that we still find them in the form of interlinear corrections and marginal notes in mss. BCD, which form the latest stages of textual transmission. Thus, we are still able to deal with Sergius' text as a closed textual tradition and to evaluate the variants of various textual witnesses based on the stemma above, notwithstanding possible contamination between them.

In order to make the process of establishing the text in the critical edition (the *examinatio* together with the *constitutio textus*) 181 as transparent as possible, I have supplied the edition with a positive critical apparatus, thus making explicit which textual witnesses contain which individual variants. The edition includes no *apparatus fontium*, as all textual witnesses are indicated in the outer margins of the Syriac text. The only exceptions to this rule are two witnesses that contain excerpts from the *Commentary* and revisions of it, namely ms. E and the epitome, which do not appear in the margins and which appear in the critical apparatus only in those cases when variants contained in it support readings of other witnesses (for the limitations on their use in the critical edition, see 2.2 and 2.3, above).

**<sup>180</sup>** Cf. West 1973: 33.

**<sup>181</sup>** Cf. Maas 1960: 9–13, West 1973: 47–59, Chiesa 2002: 83–99.

The critical apparatus claims to be exhaustive. It contains both meaningful words and different variants of the same words that appear in different witnesses and that in some cases allow the reader to see the relations between them. The only forms that do not appear in the critical apparatus are such variants of Syriac words as reflect individual habits of scribes of the manuscripts (e.g., such variants as ܐƤ̈ ܒ ܐƤƌܐ ̈Ɓƍ / ܒƍƀƍ and ƈźƉ / ܠŴźƉ are not indicated). However, I have included in the apparatus various spellings of personal names (of Aristotle, Porphyry, Plato, and other Greek authors) and of Greek words182, which might be relevant not only for the textual history of Sergius' treatise, but also for the history of the Syriac language. The variety in transliteration of these names might contribute to our knowledge of the spread of Greek language among Syriac scholars in different periods of history183.

The use of punctuation marks (dots)184 in the Syriac text is rather limited and does not reflect any particular manuscript. The use of *Seyame* is restricted to nouns in plural and plural feminine participles185. Although in some mss. *Seyame* is attached to numbers, it is not applied with this function in the edition. The sign of *Pasoqa* marks the end of a clause, but in those cases where the sentences were too long, they have been further sub-divided by means of *Šwayya* and *Taḥtaya*186. When applying these punctuation marks, I was eager to follow the extant manuscripts as far as possible. The latest codices that are now preserved in Erbil-Ankawa turned out to be particularly helpful in understanding the structure of the Syriac text and its division into smaller units. However, it did not always prove possible to adhere to the extant witnesses; thus, in some cases, the division of sentences and the use of punctuation dots reflect editorial choices rather than extant codices.

The tables with divisions that appear after each book of Sergius' treatise presented specific technical problems. Since there are certain divergences between mss. in the details of these tables, it seemed best to give the divisions in the form of plain text, since variant readings, which are bound to the line numbers, could thus be denoted in the critical apparatus. All divisions are presented in the form of diagrams in the Appendix to the edition.

The content of the footnotes to the English translation of Sergius' treatise is limited to (1) such differences in the transmission of Syriac text as are relevant for the translation, and (2) Greek parallels to the *Commentary* which allow for a better under-

 **182** E.g., the systematic use of the forms ܐƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ and ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ with two *Lamads* in ms. P; see 2.1.2.

**<sup>183</sup>** For the influence of the Greek language on Syriac in various historical periods, see Butts 2016.

**<sup>184</sup>** On the use of dots in Syriac manuscripts at different periods of Syriac history, see Segal 1953. Cf. also a general introduction in Kiraz 2015.

**<sup>185</sup>** Since the application of *Seyame* in Syriac manuscripts is often random, those cases where it is absent from plural nouns and present for singular nouns are not indicated in the apparatus.

**<sup>186</sup>** On the use of these three punctuation marks in the period when Sergius was composing his treatise, see Segal 1953: 58–77, particularly 73–75.

standing of the Syriac terminology used by Sergius in his work. Although we cannot say that the *Commentary* is wholly derivative of any particular Greek source, it evidently goes back to written notes of the oral lectures of Ammonius Hermeiou (see 1.2, above). Given that extant commentaries deriving from the school of Ammonius (which are attributed either to the latter or to his disciples) provide us with the same or very similar materials as those Sergius utilized for his work, these texts are either referred to or quoted *in exenso* in the footnotes.

The footnotes also include some observations on the philosophical terminology used by Sergius and the relation of this terminology to both contemporary and later Syriac philosophical treatises. However, due to the limitations of such kind of annotations, these observations represent only the first soundings of the study of Sergius' philosophical vocabulary. A full-scale commentary on the Syriac text of the treatise as well as an extensive glossary of its terminology with corresponding Greek terms could not, for obvious reasons, be part of the present volume (which has already grown too voluminous) and must be postponed to a later date.

Since Sergius most likely made use of some sort of Greek text while working on his *Commentary*, it is unsurprising that the latter contains a large number of Greek loanwords, which are indicated in brackets in the English translation. A list of these Greek words appears as a separate index at the end of the book, together with a general index, which includes both subjects and proper names, together with a list of references to parallels with Sergius' text.

Finally, a short note on transliteration: Following the practice in my two previous books, the transliteration of Syriac terms in the present edition reflects East Syriac vocalization, whereby long and short vowels in both Syriac and Arabic words remain undifferentiated.

 **Sergius of Reshaina Commentary on Aristotle's** *Categories*

Syriac Text and English Translation

## **Sigla, Abbreviations, and Signs Used in the Edition**

## **Sigla**


## **Abbreviations and Signs**


B58r | ƑــƀܓƢƐƆ ܐűــƀܒƕܕ ܬܐŴــƍܒƦƄƉ ܒƦــƄƊƆ ƎــƍſƢƤƉ ܐųƆܐ űƀܒ ܬܘܒ C85r-v | D51v | P1v ܂ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟܕ ܐƤƀƌ ƈƕ ܘܣƢźƀƃܐܪ

̇ ܘ ̈Ɖــƀܐ ܐܘ ܐŶــŴܢ ܬܐܕܘܪܐ܂ ܕƕــƘŴܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> űƟ ƎƉ̣ ܐƢƀƉܐ ܐƦƇƉ <sup>1</sup> ܐƍƀƣ ƎƉ̣ ųƤƙƌ ܘܫƢƙƌ űƃ :ƎƤƕƦƉܘ ܐű ̇ Ŷ Ǝſűſܗ ܪܒܐ܉ŴŶ ųƉƦƤƉܕ


̈ܬܗ ܕܓŴƍƀƇܣ ܐƀƏܐ ƎƀƠƤƙƉ ŴƍܒƦƄƉ ƎƉ̣ ܡűƉ ܡűƉ ƈƀƃܗ űƃ <sup>2</sup> ơــƤƙƉ Ǝــ ̇ ̈ ƀƌܐ ƆܒــƢܬ ƟــƇܐ ܕƏــŴ̈ܪƀſܐ܉ ܐƌܐ Ɖ Ŵſܕ ܐƇƇƊƉ ƎƉ Ǝſܗܘ ̈ Ƈܐ ŴƏ̈ܪƦƀſܐ <sup>Ɖ</sup> Ʀſܗܘ ܪܨƦƉ űƃ ܪܝƦܒ Ʀſܗܘ ܒƦƃ Ǝſܕ Ʀƌܐ :Ʀſ ̇ B58v ܗܘ ̈Ɔܓܐ ƀƙƣــƮܐ ŴــƘ ƦſŵŶ űƃܘ ܐ܂ƌܗ ܐƍƤƆܕ ųƇſܕ ܐƇƇƊƉ Ɨ ̇ P2r ܕܬܒ ƅſܐ ̈ Ʀſܐ ܕƎƀƊƀƏ ̈Ɖܐ ܘܬŴŶ ܕƦƇƉܐ ܕܐƦſ ܒƦƄƊܒŴƍ <sup>20</sup> ̈ܬܗ ܕܓܒƢܐ: ܘܬŴŶ

̇ ــƎ ܬƆــƦܐ܂ :D ܬܘܒ :P ܬܘܒ ܒƀــű ܐƆــųܐ **1** ̇ ܘ ܕܒűŷ Ɖ ƈƕ ƏܒƢܐ ܕŴƕܕܪƌܐ ܕűŶ ܬſƦƀƆܐ܂ ܗ ̇ Ǝ ܓƢƀ ܒܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ܗܕܐ ܕƎſ ܒƉŴƍƠܐ ܕƢƠſƦƉ ܘƦƐƉܓű ̇ ܝ Ɖ ܒƦƆƦܐ ܕƎſ űŶ űſƦƉܥ܂ ܗ Ǝƀſ ̈ ܗܘ ƈƃ ƎƉ̣ B: űŶ Ǝſܕ ܐƦƆƦܒ ܐ܂ƦƆܬ <sup>Ǝ</sup> ̇ ̇ ܘ ܕܒűŷ Ɖ ƈƕ ƏܒƢܐ ܕŴƕܕܪƌܐ ܕűŶ ܬſƦƀƆܐ܂ ܗ ̈ Ǝƀƌ ܒƏŴƍܐ ܒƢ ̇ Ǝ ܓƢƀ ܒܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ܗܕܐ ܕƎſ ܒƉŴƍƠܐ ܕƦƐƉܓű ̣ƎƉ ƈƃ ܗܘ ̇ ܝ Ɖ űſƦƉܥ܂ ܗ ̈ܬܐ ŴــƀƉܕ ܐƉܗŴــŹ C | ܐűــƀܒƕܕ BCD: űــƀܒƕܕ P | ƑــƀܓƢƐƆ BCD: ƑــƀܓƢƏ ܝƢــƊƆ P **2** ܘܣƢــźƀƃܐܪ CDP: ܘܣƢــŹܐƀƃܐܪ B | Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــźƟܕ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓــźƟܕ B: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــųźƟܕ D: ƎــſųƇƃ ܬܗŴــƍܒƦ̈ ƄƉܕ P | ƑƀƇŹŴــźƐſܕܐܪ C: ƑƀƇŹŴــźƏܕܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƏܕܐܪ D: ̇ Ǝ ܒܓƐƍܐ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ܕƎſ ܒƌŵܐ + ;P ܕܐܪŴƀƇźźƐſܣ Ɖ ƑƀŹƢܓųźƏ BCD **3** ܐƦƇƉ] + Ǝſܕ D **7** ܪܐܙܐ P: ܪܙܐ̈ܐ BCD **8** ųــƇƃ] om. P **9** ܐܦ BCD: ܘܐܦ P **10** ܪܗƦــƐܒƆ BCD: ܪܗƦܒــƆ P **12** ŴܒƦƃܐܬ BCD: ܒƦƃܐܬ P **14** ܐŶܕܐܘܪ BCD: ųŶܕܐܘܪ P **16** ܣŴƍƀƇܕܓ BDP: ܣŴƍƇܕܓ C P ܐƆܐ :BCD ܐƌܐ **17**

#### *Further, with God's help, we begin to write the treatise composed by the chief physician Sergius on the goal of Aristotle's Categories<sup>1</sup>*

#### *[Prologue]*

There is a story, O brother Theodore2 1 , told by the ancients about the bird called stork. It rejoices and becomes strong at the time when it separates itself from the cultivated land and retreats into a desert place, and it lays down in its first abode until the moment when its life is completed3. In the same manner, as it seems to me, a man will not be able to comprehend the ideas of the ancients and to enter into the mystery of knowing their writings, unless he separates himself from the whole world and its concerns, and also abandons his body not physically but intellectually — and casts behind him all its desires. For only then will his mind be emptied and able to turn to itself and contemplate by itself, clearly seeing what has been written by them and properly distinguishing between those things that are stated correctly and those that are not put like that. Then nothing opposed to his lightness will be able to impede him through the weight of his body in the course of such a path as this4.

2 So, when we were translating certain writings of Galen the doctor from the Greek language into the tongue of the Syrians5, I was the one who translated, while you wrote down after me and improved the Syriac text as the style of this tongue demands it. And when you saw the clear divisions of the terms that are in the writings of this man, the definitions and demonstrations that are fre-

**<sup>1</sup>** The reference to the *Categories* in the title is characteristic of mss. BCD. The last part of the title in P, "...on the goal of all Aristotle's writings", reflects the contents of Books I–II that deal with the whole corpus of Aristotle's texts with a focus on the logical treatises (the *Organon*).

**<sup>2</sup>** Sergius addressed his treatise to Theodore, who, according to Ḥunayn b. Isḥaq, was bishop of the town Karḫ Ǧuddan (cf. the introduction). In what follows (§§2–5), Sergius explains that Theodore became his disciple and assisted him in the translation work.

**<sup>3</sup>** The same Syriac word (spelled either as *ḥorba* or as *ḥurba*) may be translated either as "desert place" or as "stork". This specifically Syriac wordplay makes it likely that the "story" quoted by Sergius was known to him in Syriac and not in Greek.

**<sup>4</sup>** The question of how one should prepare himself for the study of philosophy was treated as one of the *prelolegomena* points, cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 6.21–24. Similar to Sergius, David starts his *Prolegomena philosophiae* with the notion that the person who begins to learn philosophy should "bid farewell to all earthly cares" (πάσῃ τῇ τοῦ βίου φροντίδι χαίρειν εἰπόντες), see David, *Prolegomena* 1.4–5 (trans. in Gertz 2018: 83).

**<sup>5</sup>** Sergius translated a large corpus of writings of Galen which are listed in a letter of the 9th century Syriac translator and physician Ḥunayn b. Isḥaq (see Bergsträsser 1925, Lamoreaux 2016) and of which only some portions have come down to us.

ųــƆ ŪــƐƌ Ɓƃ ܐƄƊſܐ ƎƉܕ ܉ƁƌƦƆܐƣ ܉ƦſܐƀƇƖƉܘ ƦſܐƐƀܒƏ Ǝſųܒ ܓܒƢܐ ܗƌܐ ƦƇƕܐ ܘŴƣܪſܐ ܕܪܕŴſܬܐ: ܘƍƟܐ ŴƇƉܐܐ ܕܐſــƅ ܗƌܐ܂ ̈ ƍܐ ܕŴƉűƟܗܝ܂ ܒƦƄƉ ƎƉ̣ ƎſƢŶܐ ƥƌܐ ƎƉ ̇ ܐܘ ųƤƙƌ ƎƉ

C86v ܐƤſܕܪ ܂ƅܕܒ ܐƍƙƆŴſ ƦƊŶƢƆ ܐƊܓƦƘ ƦƀƍƘ ƎƀƆܗ ܬŴƆ Ǝſܕ ܐƌܐ 3 ܘƣــŴܪſܐ ܘƇƕــƦܐ ܕƇƃــų <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܪܕſــŴܬܐ ܐܪźƐſــƑƀƇŹŴ ܗܘܐ܂ ƆــŴ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ̈ ƍܐ ̈ܬܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܘܐܦ ųƇƄƆܘܢ ƦƄƉܒ ƆܓŴƍƀƇܣ ܘƆܐƌƮŶܐ ŶܒƮܘܗܝ ܐŴƏ ̈ųƊܐ ܕܗܘܘ ̣ƉــƎ ܒــƦܪܗ܂ ƕــƉűܐ ܓƀــƢ ŵƆܒــƍܐ ܕܒــų ƤƉ ܐƘ ̈ ܘŴƐƇƀƘ ̈ــŴܬܐ ƍƉ ƎــſųƇƃ :ܐƤــƍƀ̈ ̇ ſƦſــų ƆܓܒــƢܐ ܗƌܐ ƖƆــƢƉŴܐ ܕܒƍ ƀƃــƍܐ ܐ ܝ ̈ ̈ƀــźܐ Ɖܒــű̈ܪܢ ܗܘ ̇ ܒŴƉűܬ ƠƕــƮܐ ƤƘ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ ܘܕܪܕŴſܬܐ ųƇƃ ܘܙ̈ܪƎƠſ ܒƇƀƇܐƦſ ܘƆܐ ƖſűſܐƦſ ŴƆܬ ųƇƃܘܢ ƦƄƉܒ <sup>10</sup> ̈ ƍܐ܂ ܗƌܐ ܕƎſ ̣ܗܘ ̈ܬܐ ŴــƍƉ ƎــſųƇƄƆ Ǝــƀ̈ ܒŷƇــŴܕܘܗܝ ܒƉűــŴܬ ܐƏــƀܐ ƀƄŶــƊܐ: ƍƃــƥ ܐƌ ƎــſųƍƉ ܟűƉܘ :ƦſܐƌƦƕܘűſܘ ƦſܐƍƉܐܘ Ǝƀ̈ ̈ ܝ܉ ܘܪŪƃ ܐƌ ܕƉܒű̈ܪܢ ܗܘ ̈ــƦܐ ܕܐƀƇſــƎ Ƥƙƌ ƎــƉ̣ ƈźܒƉܘ ƢƠƕܕ ܬܗ܉ŴƍƙƇƉܕ ܐƊƇƣ ܐƌܕܪŴƕ űŶ ̈ܬܗ: ƃــŴܪܗƌܐ ƀƐƌــƐܐ ܕƆܐ ŴــƍܒƦƄƉ ܬŴــƆ Ʀــſܐƙƀƃܐ ƎــƀܒƢƟƦƉܕ Ʀƕűſܐ܂ ܐƌŵƃܐ ܓƢƀ ܕܗ r87C ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕƕܒſűــƎ ܐűƌ̈ܪƍſــźܐ: ŷƇƃــűܐ Ŷــűܐ ƉــƎ ܪƦܒــ ܐűŶ ƎſųƆ ƎƀܒƃƢƉ Ǝƃܘ : ̇ ̇ ܘųƆ ųƍƉ ̇ ųƆ ƎƀƇƤŶ ܐƊƆܕܨ ܬܗŴ̈ ƍƉ űŶܐ ܐƅſ ܕܬܒƖܐ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ: ܘƕܒƎſű ܐűƌܪźƍſܐ ܓƢƀƊܐ܉ ܗƍƃܐ ̈ ƍــŴܬܐ ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘــŴܬܐ <sup>Ɖ</sup> ƎــƉ ܐűــŶ ƈــƃ ƋــƏܘ̣ Ƌــŷ̇ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܪƃ r59B ̇ــŪ ܘƆ ̈ܗܝ Ŷــű ܨƆــƊܐ ŴܒــƦƃ ܘܢųــƇƄܒ ƎſųƍƉ ƈƤŶܘ : ̇ ܒƐƄźܐ ܕܬܒƗ ųƍƀƃ ܓƢƀƊܐ ܘܬųƀƉܐ ܕƦƕűſܐ ܕųƇƃܘܢ ܗ v2P ̈ ܘſܐ܂

D52v Ƣܒــ Ʀܐܒــſܐܬ :ܬܐܕܘܪܐ ܢŴــŶܐ ܐܘ ƁــƍƉ ƦــƖƊƣ ƎــƀƆܗ Ǝſܕ űƃ 4 ƦƖƣܗ űƊƆܥ܉ ܕܐƍſܐ ܗܘ Ƥƀƌܐ ܕŴƍƙƇƉܬܗ ܕܓܒƢܐ ܗƌܐ: ܘܐſــƍܐ

**1** Ǝſųܒ BCD: ųܒ P | ܐƄƊſܐ P: ܐƄſܐ BCD **3** ƎƉ̣ ] om. C **5** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ C: ƑƀƇŹŴźƏܐܪ D: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ B: ܣŴƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P **<sup>7</sup>** ܐƘ ̈ ŴƐƇƀƘܘ BCD: ܐƘ ̈ ŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **9** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P | ܬܐŴſܘܕܪܕ BCD: ܬܐŴſܘܪܕ P **10** ܗܘ̣ [ om. D **11** ܕܘܗܝŴŷƇܒ CDP: ̈ ܬܐ | B ŴŷƆܕܘܗܝ ŴƍƉ P, corr. D in marg.: ܬܐŴƍ ̈ ܝ **12** BCD ƦƄƉܒ ̈ ܗܘ [om. B | ƎſųƍƉ CDP: Ǝــƀƌܐ B **<sup>13</sup>** ƎــƀƇſܕܐ CDP: ƎƀƇſܐ B **<sup>14</sup>** ܐƐƀƐƌ P: ܐƐƀ ̈ ̈ ƍƀܐ ܘƐƌ ƐŶ BCD **15** ܐźƍſܪ̈űƌܐ P: ̇ **<sup>16</sup>** BCD ܐܕ̈ܪźƍſܐ ųƆܘ BCD: ܐƄƆܘ P | Ǝƃܘ BCD: űƃܘ P **17** ܐźƍſܪűƌܐ P: ܐźƍſܐܕܪ BCD **<sup>18</sup>** ܐűــŶ] + ܐűــŶ BCD | ܬܐŴƍ ̈ Ɖ BCD: ̇ ̈ Ŵƍܬܗ Ɖ P | ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P ̈ ܘſܐ | P .om] ܕƦƕűſܐ **20** ̈ ܘƌܐ ųƇƃܘܢ :BCD ܕųƇƃܘܢ ܗ P ܕܗ

quently and excellently set in them, you asked me where precisely this man had received such a foundation and beginning in education and acquired such riches, i.e., from himself or from someone else among the authors before him.

3 To this, for the sake of the love of learning which is in you, I answered that the beginning, the origin, and the reason of this whole teaching was Aristotle, not only for Galen and for his other fellow doctors, but also for all writers and famous philosophers that came after him. For until the time when nature brought forth this person into the world of men, all parts of philosophy and of the whole of learning were dispersed in the manner of simple drugs and scattered without order and knowledge among various writers. But he alone like a wise doctor collected all parts6 that were scattered, put them together skilfully and intelligently, and prepared out of them one perfect remedy of his teaching which uproots and destroys the frail disease of ignorance in the souls of those who sincerely approach his writings. Just as those who build statues (ἀνδριάς) shape every part of the figure separately and afterwards put them together one after another as the craft demands it, thus creating a perfect statue; in the same way he (i.e. Aristotle) also combined, joined and put together every single part of philosophy in the order demanded by nature, and by means of all his books made of it one perfect and awe-inspiring statue of the knowledge of all beings7.

4 Now, when you had heard this from me, O brother Theodore, you immediately wished to know the goal of the teaching of this man, the order (τάξις) of

**<sup>6</sup>** Thus ms. P, mss. BCD: "writings".

**<sup>7</sup>** Sergius' presentation of Aristotle finds a close parallel in *Praeparatio Evangelica* XI.2.2–4, where Eusebius quotes Atticus, the second century Platonist, who praises in nearly the same words Plato for bringing together various disciplines which before him were scattered and creating from them a perfect body (σῶμά τι) of philosophy.

ƎƉ ƈƀƇƟ ƈƀƇƟ űƃܘ ܗܝ܂̈ ̈ܬܗ ܘŴƙƀƠƌܬܐ ܕŴƇƃŴƏ ܗܘ ƐƄŹܐ ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍ ܬܘܒ :ƎــƀƆܗ ƈƕ ƅƀƉűƟ ƢƉܐƊƆ Ʀſ ̇ ̇ Ʀſ ƐƍƉܐ ܗܘ űƉܡ ܕűſųƕ ܗܘ ̇ ܘ űƉܡ ܕܒƦƇƊܐ ƌƦƉܐ ̈ Ʀܐ ܐƣܒŴܩ ƅƆ: ܗ ܐƁƍƐƀƘ ŴŶܒƅ ܕܒſƦƄܒ ƈــźƉ ܗܕܐ ƎــƉ̣ Ʀــſ ̇ ̇ ſــƦ ƀƉűƟــƅ܂ ܐƌܐ ܕſــƎ ƃــű ƤƉــƦܐܠ ܗܘ ܗܘ ̈ــƦܐ ŴƀƇƖƉܬܗ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܕܨܒŴܬܐ ܐƢƉܬ ܕƕܒűƀ ̣ܗܘ ƁƆ ƉܐƢƉܐ űŶ ܒƠƀƐƙ ̇ C87v ųܒ ƎƀƖܓƘܕ ƎƀƇſܐƆ ơƙƏܘ ܉ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ ܬܗŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ ܐƤƀƌ ƈƕ ܕƋƄŷƌ ܐŴƌܢ ܐƅſ Ɗƃܐ ܕŷƄƤƉܐ ƈƕ ܬܪƦƀƕܗ ܕܓܒƢܐ܂ ܐƦƌ ܕƎſ ܘƆܐ ܗƍƃܐ ܐܬƦƐƀƙŹ܂ ܐƆܐ ƢſƦſܐƦſ ܐƞƆܬ ƎƆ ŴŶܒƍܐƦſ܉ ܕƖƌܒű ̈ƦƇƇܗ ̇ ܘ ܕƈźƉ ƕ ̇ ŴƍƙƇƉܬܗ ܕƊƀƄŶܐ ܗ ųƇƃ ƈƕ ƦſܐƌŴܓ ܐƍƃܗ ŴƆ <sup>10</sup> ƎƉ ܐűŶ ܐűŶ ƈƃ ƈƕ Ʀſܐűƀŷſ ܐƆܐ ܠ܂ųƆ ƎƆ űƀܒƕܕ ƅſܐ :ƈƃ ܐƌܕܗ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕŵŶƦƉܐ ƎƆ܂ ̈Ʀܐ ܗ ƠƀƐƙܒ ƢƉܐƌ ܬܗŴƍ ̈ ƦƄƉܒ

<sup>5</sup> ƈźƉ ܗƈƀƃ ܕƆܐ ܐܬƦſƞƉ ƢƖƊƆܩ ̣ƎƉ ƣܐƆــƦܟ܉ Ɵــűܡ ܕܐܬܐ ŴƆܬ Ŵƣܪſܐ ܕܗƎƀƆ: ܗܕܐ ƑƀƙƉ ܐƌܐ ƅƆ ܘųƇƄƆܘܢ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƘܓƀƖــƎ ܒƦƄƊܒƍــŴܬܐ ܗܕܐ܉ ܕƆــŴ ƉــƎ ſƢƟــƍܐ ܕŶــűܐ ܙܒــƎ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ܕܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƦƉܐƮƉܢ ܬƎƌ: ƢƤƌܟ ܐƥƌ ܒƢ ƦƖƣܗ ŴƆܬ űƕ <sup>15</sup> ̈ƀƆܐ ܘƣƮƉــŴܬܐ ܕƆܐ ܬܘܒ ƦƆܘܬ Ǝſܘܬܪܬ Ǝܙܒ ܐűŶ ܉ƈƃƦƐƉܘ ܐƢƟ űƃ ܪƦƄƌ ܐƆܐ ܂Ǝƀƌ ̈ P3r | B59v ųƉ ܘܐ̈ܪܒــƗ: ܐܢ ܗܘ ܕܗƃــƍܐ ܬܬܒــƗ ܨܒــŴܬܐ܂ ܐܢ ܕſــƎ ܘܐܦ ܗƃــƍܐ ŵŶƦƌܐ űƉܡ ܕŴƊƕܛ: ܘܐܦ Ɔܐ ܗƎſűſ Ɗƌܐܢ ̣ƎƉ ܕƊƆܐܙܠ ŴƆܬ ܐƥƌ ܕŸƄƤƉ ƢƉܬܐ Ɔــų ܘŷƉــŴܐ Ɔــų ܗܘ r88C ̇ Ɖܐ ܕƆܐ ſــűܥ܂ ܗƃــƍܐ ܓƀــƢ ƙƉــƢܩ Ƥƙƌــų ƉــƎ ƣܓƤƀــŴܬܐ ܕܗܘſܐ ܒƦܪƀƕــƦܐ ܕܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƆܐ <sup>20</sup> ̇ Ɖܐ ܕƎſƢƟ: ܘƅƐŶ ܬܘܒ ƎƉ ƉܐƢƠƇƃܨܐ ܘƣƮƉــŴܬܐ ƎƀƇƃƦƐƉ ܗܘ ̇ ܕƦƇƉܐ܂ ܕƆܐ űƖƉ̈ܪܢ ƦƄƊƆܒųƍ

> **<sup>1</sup>** ƈƀƇƟ2] om. B **<sup>3</sup>** ƁƍƐƀƘܐ CDP: ƑƀƘܐ B | ܩŴܒƣܐ BCD: ܘܒƦƃܐ P | ܘ ̇ ̇ ܘ :P ܗ ̣ƎƉ :CD ̣ܗܘ ܗ ̇ ܘ ̈ــƦܐ **<sup>5</sup>** B ܗ ̈ــƦܐ :BCD ܒƠƀƐƙ ƠƐƙܒ P **<sup>6</sup>** ܬܗŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ CDP: ܬܗŴƍ̈ ܒƦƄƉܕ B, add. D in marg. | ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ BC: ƑƀƇŹŴźƏܕܐܪ D: ܣŴƀƇŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ P **7** ƋƄŷƌܕ BCD: ƋƄŷƌ P ܐƊƃ P: ܐƉ BCD **<sup>9</sup>** ܗƦƇƇ̈ ƕ P: ܗƦƇƕ BCD **14** ƎƀƇſܕܐ BCD: ƎƀƇſܐ P **18** ܘܐܦ CDP: ܕܐܦ B **19** ܬܐƢƉ DP: ܬܐƢƉܕ BC | ųƆ1] om. P **20** ܐƦƀƕܪƦܒ CDP: ܗƦƀƕܪƦܒ B **21** ƅƐŶܘ BCD: ƅƐŶ P | ܬܘܒ [+ ųƤƙƌ B: + ܗƦſ CD

his writings, and the sequence in which they should be understood8. And after I had made an attempt to tell in your presence one thing after another of what I could remember about it, your love also persuaded me to send you in written form what I had reported orally before you. When I was asked about it, I said, because of the greatness of this task, that there is one treatise where I had written briefly about the goal of Aristotle's philosophy and that it would explain as far as possible the teaching of this man to those who come across it9. You, nevertheless, were not persuaded by this but even more lovingly urged us that, instead of doing it in the way we had done previously, i.e. (speaking) generally about the whole teaching of this sage concerning the principles of the universe, we should rather briefly describe what seems proper to us regarding each of his writings separately.

5 Thus, since it was not possible for me to avoid your request, there is something that I must urge upon you and upon those who might read this treatise, before I come to the analysis of these things. After having read only one time what is written here, one should not turn immediately to useless accusations and reproaches. Rather one should keep reading and trying to comprehend one time, and another, and a third, and a fourth time, — if this is what the subject requires. But if even then something would look obscure10, in that case he should not be reluctant to go to someone who is able to instruct him and to explain him what he does not understand. Thus he will save himself from the tumult that occurs in the minds of those who do not comprehend what they are reading, and also spare himself accusations and reproaches, of which the author of the book has no use.

**<sup>8</sup>** Sergius formulates Theodore's alleged inquiry in the form of the preliminaries (*prolegomena*, cf. the list of the preliminaries by Ammonius, *In Isag*. 21.6–10) some of which he is going to discuss in the following two books of his commentary (cf. §21). Here, Sergius refers to two points, the goal (ὁ σκοπός) and the sequence of the reading (ἡ τάξις τῆς ἀναγνώσεως). Later on, in §5, he mentions also the problem of obscurity of Aristotle's language, which was considered among the *prolegomena* points as well.

**<sup>9</sup>** As it becomes clear from the next sentence, Sergius refers here to the treatise *On the Principles of the Universe* which is attributed to him and which is in fact a revised version of Alexander of Aphrodisias' *On the Universe*.

**<sup>10</sup>** The obscurity of Aristotle's language was one of the *prolegomena* questions, which Sergius discusses in §§61–64 below.

ƎــſƢܕܒƦƉ ܐŵſ̈ ̈ܒܐ ŵƕ ̈ ܓƀܐܐ ܕܗƍƃܐ ܐƅſ ܕƎƉ ƤƉ Ə Ƣƀܓ Ʀſܐ 6 ̈Ɔــƀܐ űƕ ܐ܉Ʀ ̈ ܒſƦƃܕ ƎſųƍſƢƟ ܪܝŴƣ ƎƉܕ̣ ƅſܐ ܐ܉ƊƐŶ ƎƉ̣ ƦſܐƢƀźƟ ̈ Ƈƃܐ ŴƇƖƌܢ܂ ܒƏűܒƎſƢ ųƆܘܢ ܕܒܓƀƌŴܐ ܕܐƌƮŶܐ ܬƣܒــƦŶŴܐ ŴƏ ƚƇŶ ̣ܗܘ ܕųƤƙƌܘܢ ƐƉܓƎƀ܂ Ɔܐ ܕƎſ ƎƀƊƄŶ ܗƎƀƆ ܕƈƃ ܨܒŴܬܐ ܐűſܐ ̣ܕܗܝ r53D ƎƉ ƇƀŶܐ ̣ܗܘ ܕųƤƙƌ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ƦƉܒƀƠܐ: ܘŴƆ ƎƉ ŴƇƀŷƉܬܐ ܕƦƀƌƮŶܐ܂ ƊŷƘܐ ̇ ــű܂ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ܓƀــƢ ܕƇƀŷƉــŴܬܗ ܕƀŶــƇܐ: ƊƀƇŶــŴܬܗ ܕܐŶــƌƢܐ Ɔܐ ƕܒ ̇ ܘ űƉܡ ܕƋŷƘƦƉ Ɔــų܂ ܒƢſƞܘܬܗ ܕƍƀƃܐ űƉܡ ܪܒŴܬܐ ƇƖƉܐ ƈƕ ܗ ܙܕܩ ܗܘܐ ųƆܘܢ ܓƢƀ ƎƀƆųƆ ܐܢ ܗܘ ܕܒƦܪƞſܘܬܐ ƎſƢƀŶ ܗܘܘ܉ ܕܐƎƀƇſ C88v ƎƀƇſܘܐ ܢ܂ŴƇܒƠƌܘ ܢŴܒƠƖƌ ƥƌܐ ƎƉ̣ ƦſܐƢƀƙƣܘ ƦſܐƙƠƌ ܢƮƉܐƦƉܕ ̈Ǝ ƈƕ ܬƉŴŶܐ ܘܬܘܪܨܐ ̣ܕƎƉ ܐƌƮŶܐ܉ ƌــƦܪܨܘܢ ܕƆܐ ƠƀƍƏܕ Ǝſ̈ <sup>10</sup> ŵŶƦƉܕ ܐƀــƤƌܐ ܐƍƀƄƆ ųƆ ƎƀƠƤƕ ܐƆ űƃ ܂ƁƆűƕ ܐƆܕ Ǝƀ̈ ̇ Ɩƌܒűܘܢ ܐƌ ƋƐŶ ܐܘ ܂ƈƄܒ ŸƆƞƉ ŸƄƤƉ ܐƆܕ ܝ ̇ P3v ųܒ :ܨܐƢƠƇƃܐƉ ܗܝŴƇƕ Ǝſűƣܘܐ

̇ ــƎ Ɖ ƅــſܐ ŴــƆܕ ܐ܂Ƣ ̇ ̇ Ƣ ܐƌܐ ܕƈƃƦƐƌ ܐƍſܐ ̣ܕܗܘ ܕƟ 7 ܗƎƀƆ ܕƎſ ܐƉ ܕܐűƀŶ ܐƌܐ ܒƣƦܒƦŶŴܗ ܕܓܒƢܐ: ܐܘ ܐƦſܝ ܒƢ ܬܪƦƀƕܗ ƑŶ: ܗƣܐ ̈ܬܗ܂ ܐƆܐ źƉــƈ ܕܐܬſƞƕــƦ ƉــƎ ŴƍܒƦƄƉܕ ܐƤƀƌ ƈƕ ܐƌܐ ܒƦƄ ̇ B60r Ɖ ŴŶܒƅ ܐƍƄſܐ ܕܐƢƉܬ ƎƉ ƈƖƆ: ܘƈźƉ ܕƐƉܒƢ ܐƌܐ ܕܕܘܪƣܐ ܪܒܐ ̇ ܘܐ ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ܉ ܘŴƕܬܪܐ ܪܒܐ ŴƆܬ ƕűſــƦܐ ƆܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƄƏــƌƦƆŴܐƦſ ܗ ܒ܂ƦƄƊƆ ƎƆ ƋƀƏܕ ܐƤƀƌ ƈƕ ܗܝŴƇƕ ܢƦƇƊƆ ̇ ųƀƍƙƌ ƎſűƉ ܂Ǝſųܒ ƎſƢƟ

̈ ܓƀܐܐ **1** Ə CDP: ܐܬܐƀܓ ̈ Ə B | ܐŵſ̈ ̈ܒܐ ŵƕ ƤƉ BCD: ܐŵſŵƕ ܒܐƤƌ P **2** ƎƉܕ̣ BCD: ųƍƉܕ P ܪܝŴــƣ BCD: ܪܝŴــƣܕ P **5** ƎــƉ1 CDP: ƎــƉܕ B **7** ܘܬܗƢــſƞܒ P: ܘܬܐƢſƞܒ BCD | ܡűƉ2] om. P ƋŷƘƦƉܕ BCD: ƋŶܬƦƉܕ P **9** ƦſܐƢƀƙƣܘ CDP: ƦſܐƢſƢƣܘ B, add. D in marg. **10** ƎƉܕ̣ BCP: ƎƉ̣ D **11** ƋƐŶ BCD: ܐƊƐŶ P | ܘܢűܒƖƌ BCD: ܘܢƢܒƖƌ P | ܐƀƤƌܐ [om. C **13** ܕܗܘ̣ [ om. P | ŴƆܕ BCD: ŴƆ P **<sup>14</sup>** ܗƦƀƕܬܪ Ƣܒ CP: ܗƦƀƕܪƦܒ BD **<sup>15</sup>** ܬܗ ̈ ŴƍܒƦƄƉܕ BCD: ܬܗŴƍƙƇƉܕ P **16** ƅܒŴŶ P: ܒܐŴــŶ BCD | ܐƣܕܕܘܪ BCD, corr. P in marg.: ܐƣܕܕܪܘ P **17** ܬܪܐŴــƕܘ BP: ܬܕܐŴــƕܘ CD ƦſܐƌƦƆŴــƄƏܕ CDP: ܬܐŴــƌƦƆŴƄƏܕ B **18** ܢƦƇƊƆ CDP: ƎƇſܕ ܐƦƇƊƆ B | ܒƦƄƊƆ] + ƋƇƣ ܐŶܘƢܒــ ơــƙƉ C: + ܐŷܒŴــƣ ܐųــƆܐƆܘ ܐŶܘƢܒــ ơــƙƉ ƋƇƣ B: + űƀܒƕܕ ܐŶܘƢܒ ơƙƉ ƋƇƣ ̇ Ŵƣܒŷܐ ܐƍƀƉܐ ƋƇƖƆ ƎƀƊƇƕ܂ ųƀƆܘ ƑƀܓƢƐƆ D

6 For there are many who are so violently driven by envy as if by mighty blasts of wind that as soon as they start reading a book they turn to reproach instead of understanding, because they believe that by insulting others they will increase their own glory. What they do not comprehend is that everything, whatever it may be, is proven by its own strength and not by the weakness of something else. For comparing one's strength with someone else's weakness does not make one firm. Neither will smallness of some nature bring greatness to something that is compared with it. Instead, it would be proper for them, if they are seeking good judgement, to receive from someone a systematic explanation of what has been written. And if there is something that seems to need clarification and correction by others, they should set it straight without envy and deal with it without reproach. Thus they will not put human nature to shame and bring no slander on it, since it is not possible for it to succeed in everything.

7 I am saying all this, so that anyone who reads this should be aware that I am now writing about the goal of his (i.e. Aristotle's) writings11, not because I am overcome by the glory of (this) man, much less because I have the same opinion as him, but because I was compelled by your love, as I mentioned above, and because I am sure that these things bring much learning and great riches to those who read them with comprehension. Now, let us turn to the account of the subject matter of that about which we are going to write.

**<sup>11</sup>** Ms. P: "teachings".

#### ƉܐƢƉܐ ƀƉűƟܐ

	-

<sup>10</sup> ܘܬܘܒ ܐſƢƉــƎ ܕźƉــƈ ƆــƋ ܕƙƌــƤܐ ƇƀƇƉــƦܐ ܕܐſƦſــų r4P ̇ ܐƉܐ ̈ ܢ ƇƘƦƉــܓܐ: źƉــƈ ܗƌܐ ܐܦ ŴــƍƉ ƎــſܪܬƦƆ ܗܝ̣ ܘܐܦ :ܐƦــƕ̈ C89v űſܕ ̈ ܢ ܐܬƇƘܓƦ܂ ܕƦƆܪƎſ ŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ ̣ܕܗܝ ܗܝ Ʀƕűſܐ ܕƈƃ܉ ƦƆܪܬƎſ ŴƍƉ ̈ ƀــܐܬܐ ̈ ƀƃــƦܐ Əܓ ̇ ܕƙƌــƤܐ܉ ܒűܘ ųــƀƇƀ̈ <sup>Ŷ</sup> ܘܢųــƇƃ ƎــƀܓƇƘƦƉ ܐƀــ̈ ܕƎſ ܙƌ ̈ƕــƌƦܐ ̇ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ űſܘ ųƀƇƀ̈ B60v Ŷܕ ܘܢųƍƉܕ Ƣƀܓ ƎſƢƉܐ ܘܢ܂ųƆ ܐƢƀƉܐ ̈ܬƌܐ ܐƅſ ܗܘƌܐ ܘܬܪƦƀƕܐ ܘƤŷƉܒــƦܐ܂ ܘƍƉــųܘܢ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ ƀŶــŴ ܐƅſ ܪܓƦܐ ܘƦƊŶܐ ܘܨܒƀــƍܐ܂ ܘźƉــƈ ܗƀƃــƈ ܕƀƍƀƃűƉــƦܐ ܕƇƃــų <sup>20</sup> ̇ ̇ ƘŴƐƇƀƘــŴܬܐ܉ ƙƠƌܐſــƦ ܐſƢƉــƎ ܕܐܦ ̣ܗܝ ƦƆܪܬſــƎ ƙƌــƤܐ ܐſƦſــų ̇ ܝ ƀƉűƟــƦܐ ܘűſܘƀƌƦƕــƦܐ܉ ̇ ܗ ̈ ܢ ƇƘƦƉــܓܐ܂ ܒƀــű ܓƀــƢ ƍƉــƦܗ ŴــƍƉ

**1** ܐƀƉűƟ ܐƢƉܐƉ] om. P **3** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƙƆ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƙƆ P **4** ܓܐƆŴƘܕ ܐƦƇƕ BCD: ̈Ƈƀܐ ܕܓŴܐ ƍƟܐ **<sup>6</sup>** P ƆŴƘܓܐ Ŷ BCD: ܐŴܕܓ ܐƇƀ̈ Ŷ ܐƍƟ P **7** ܘܢųƍƉܕ BCD: ƎſųƍƉܕ P **8** ƈƃ P: ƈƄƆ BCD **<sup>10</sup>** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P | ܗܝ P: ̇ ųſƦſܐ BCD | ƎſųſƦſܐ BCD: ̇ ųــſƦſܐ P **11** ܬܐŴƌƦƕܘűſ BCD, corr. P in marg.: ܐƦƀƌƦƕܘűſ P **13** ܐſƢƊƉ P, add. D in marg.: ܐƀƉűƉ BCD **<sup>14</sup>** ƈźƉܕ BCD: ƈźƉܘ P | ܐƤƙƌܕ BDP: ܐƤƙƌ C | ̇ ųſƦſܕܐ CP: ̇ ܐųſƦſ BD **<sup>15</sup>** ܐܦ BCD: ܘܐܦ P **<sup>16</sup>** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P | ƦܓƇƘܐܬ <sup>ܢ</sup> ̈ ŴƍƉ BCD: ̈ــŴܬܐ ƍƉ ƦܓــƇƘܐܬ P | ƎــſܪƦƆܕ BCD: ƎــſܪƦƆ EP **21** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **22** Ƣƀܓ BCD: Ǝſܕ P

#### *BOOK ONE*

#### *[Division of philosophy]*

The ancients divided philosophy12 8 in the most consistent way, as it seems to me, O brother Theodore, into two primary parts, which are theory13 and practice14, and they also gave an explanation as to the reason for this division.

9 They say that God, who is the principle of everything, also possesses two general powers, from which all his actions originate. The first one is that through which He establishes everything and brings it into being; the other is that through which He takes care of the subsistence and preservation of everything created by Him. Therefore, since philosophy is likeness to God, it also has two primary parts, which are theory and practice. By means of the first one, through which it knows everything, it resembles the productive power of the Creator. And by means of the other one, that is by doing what is right, it imitates His marvellous providence15.

10 Further, they say that, since the rational soul which is the mother of knowledge is divided into two parts, so also philosophy which is knowledge of everything is divided into two parts. That all the powers of the soul are divided into two kinds is said in multiple places. Hence, they say that some of its powers are cognitive, e.g. intellect, reasoning, and calculation, and some are animal, e.g. passion, anger, and will. And because philosophy is purification of the whole soul, consequently, they say, it is also divided into two parts. Through its first,

**<sup>12</sup>** The following division is to a large extent found in the *prolegomena* texts which either derive from or are dependent on Ammonius. Thus, it seems proper to quote *in extenso* the corresponding Greek passages from these texts which reflect the Greek source used by Sergius. **13** Syr. *yidaʿta*, "knowledge". Later, Sergius also renders the Greek θεωρία with the loanword *teʾoriya*.

**<sup>14</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.6: διαιρεῖται οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία εἰς τὸ θεωρητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 26.7; David, *Prolegomena* 55.17.

**<sup>15</sup>** Sergius reports the argument found by Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.10–16: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐλέγομεν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὁμοίωσιν θεῷ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ θεὸς διττὰς ἔχει τὰς ἐνεργείας, τὰς μὲν γνωστικὰς πάντων τῶν ὄντων, τὰς δὲ προνοητικὰς ἡμῶν τῶν καταδεεστέρων, εἰκότως ἡ φιλοσοφία διαιρεῖται εἰς τὸ θεωρητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ γινώσκομεν τὰ ὄντα, διὰ δὲ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ προνοούμεθα τῶν καταδεεστέρων, καὶ οὕτως ἐξομοιοῦμεν ἑαυτοὺς τῷ θεῷ. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.9–13; David, *Prolegomena* 55.35–56.7.

̇ܒــűܐ Ɔــųܘܢ ܕƆܐ ƀƄƉــƈ Ɖــűܡ <sup>ƕ</sup> űƃ ܐ܂ƀƃűƉ ܐƤƙƌܕ ܐƕ̈ ̇ űſܘ ųƀƇƀ̈ ŷƆ ̈ܬܐ ƌܐűŶܘܢ܂ Ŵܕܨܒ ƎſܘܬܗƦſƦŷƆܘ ܪܐƢƤƆ ųƆ ܐƆܐ ܢ܉Ŵƕűƌ ܡűƉ ƚƇŶ ̈ܬƌܐ ̇ ܬܘܒ ƀŶــŴ ųــƀƇƀ̈ ̇ ܝ ܐŶــƢܬܐ ƖƏــŴܪܘܬܐ܉ ŷƆ ̇ ܗ ܒƀــű ܕſــƎ ƍƉــƦܗ ̈Ǝƀ܉ ƇƆƞƉܐ: ܘƦƖƉܕܐ ųƆܘܢ ܕƆܐ ųƌܘܐ ܕܘܒƢܗܘܢ ܒܐƎƀƇſ ܕƆܐ ƌųƉ ܐƆܐ ƃܐƌܐƦſ ܘŷƠƘܐƦſ ųƌܘܘܢ ܙܘ <sup>5</sup> ̈ųƀƕܘܢ܂

̇ ܬܘܒ ųƆ ƎƀܓƇƙƉ ܬܐ܉̈ C90r ŴƍƉ ܬܘܒ ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ̣ ܐűŶ ƈƄƆ ܘܐܦ ܐƆܐ <sup>11</sup> ̈Ŵܬܐ܂ ƦƕűƀƆܐ ܓƢƀ ̣ܕܗܝ ܗܝ ̈ܬ ƍƉ ̈ܬܐ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕƎſƢƟƦƉ ŴƍƉ ŴƍƊƆ ̇ ܝ ܕƕــƈ ̇ ƍƙƇƊƆــŴܬܐ ܗ ųــƆ ƎــƀܓƇƙƉ ܬܐ܉ŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ ܐƦƀƉűƟ ̇ P4v ܗƦƍƉ ̈ ſܐ ƎſųƊƤƉ ųƆܘܢ ܘŴƍƙƇƊƆܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܕųƀƇƕܘܢ ̈ƍƀܐ ̈ܪܘƍŶܐ: ܐƎƀƇſ ܕܐųƆ ƃ ̈ƍſܐ: ܐűſܐ ܕܐܦ ŵŶƦƉ ܐƍƀ̈ ܐƦſųƆܐ ƎƀƍƄƉ ųƆ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܂ ܘŴƍƙƇƊƆܬܐ ܕƈƕ ƃ ̈ƍƙƆܐ ̇ ܝ ܬܘܒ ƍƙƇƉــŴܬܐ ܐŶــƢܬܐ ܕܒƀــŴ ̇ ܂ ܘƆــų ųــƆ ƎــſƢƟ ܐƦــƀƍƀƃ ̇ ܂ ųƆ ƎſųƊ̇ ƤƉ ܐƍƙƆ̈ ̇ ܝ ܕűƀŷſܐƦſ Ŵſ ƊƀƟƦƉܐ: ܗ

̇ ܕܗܕܐ ƍƉــƦܐ ̇ ܒƎƀ ܕƎſ ܘܐܦ ƦƇƕܐ ܕƘــƆŴܓܐ ܬƀƆــſƦܐ ܕƇſــų ųſ 12 ̈ ܘſܐ ƀƠſƢƘــƎ ܐƌــŴܢ ̇ ܝ ƀƉűƟــƦܐ ܗƃــƍܐ܂ ܕƍƉــųܘܢ ƆــƋ ܕܗ ܒŴƉűܬ ܗ ܒƊƇƄـــűܡ ܘƉܒſűƖـــƎ ̣ƉـــƎ ܗܘƆܐ ̣ܘƉـــƎ ƕܒƀـــŴܬܐ ܕܓـــŴ <sup>15</sup> ̈ Ɗƣܐ: ܘܒƢܘƍŶــŴܬܐ ƍƀźƟــƦܐ ܘܓƀƊــƢܬܐ ܕƆܐ ܓƤــŴܡ ſƢſűƉــƎ܂ ܘƍƉــųܘܢ r54D ܒŴƠƆűܒŴƀƇܬܐ ܕܗƎƀƆ ƎƀƊƀƏ: ܗƌ r61B ̇Ŵ ܕƎſ ܒųܘƆܐ ܘܒƖܒŴƀܬܐ ܬƦſƦŶܐ: ̇ ųƌܘܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ųƊſŴƟܘܢ܂ ܘųƍƉܘܢ ܬܘܒ ܗ v90C ̇ ܝ ܕƆܐ ſƞƉܐ ܕƆܒƢ ųƍƉ ܒƦƕƞƊܐ ܕܗƎƀƆ ƀƏــƋ ƍƀƃــųܘܢ ܘƆܐ ܗƃــƍܐ ƉܒſƢــƎ ܒƊƇƄــűܡ ̣ƉــƎ ̇ ܐſــƅ ܕܐܦ ̈ƀܐ: ܘŴƆ ܬܘܒ ܗƍƃܐ ŶܒƎƀƄƀ ܒــų ܗܘƆܐ ܐƅſ ܗ <sup>20</sup> ̇ Ŵƌܢ Ƈƕ ̈ــſƦܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒƊــűܡ ̇ ƌــŴܢ ܬŶ ̇ ܒŴƉűܬ ܗ Ɔܐ ܒƦƇƊܐ ŴƣƢƘƦƌܢ ųƍƉ ƎƉ ƎƀƤſƢƘ ܡűƊƇƄܕܒ ܢŴƌ ̇ ̇ ܂ ܐƆܐ ųƆ ̇ ܘܒűƊܡ ŶܒƎƀƄƀ ܒų ųƍƉ ƎƀƤſƢƘ ̈ ƇƀƇܐ ̈ܬܐ ųƇƃܘܢ <sup>Ɖ</sup> ŴƇƀŶܘ :ܘܢųƆ ƎſųƊƤƉ ܐƀ̈ ̈ ſܐ ܘƇƉܐƃ ܗܘƆܐ܉ ܐųƆ

**<sup>2</sup>** ƎــſܘܬܗƦſƦŷƆܘ BDP: ƎــſųſܘܬƦſƦŷƆܘ C **<sup>3</sup>** ̇ ܗƦــƍƉ BCD: ܐƦــƍƉ P **6** ܐűŶ] + ܐűŶ BCD ̈ܬ **<sup>7</sup>** ŴــƍƉ BCD: ܬܐŴــ̈ ƍƉ P **<sup>8</sup>** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P **<sup>10</sup>** ܐƍــſ̈ ŵŶƦƉ CDP: ܐƕűſƦƉ B **<sup>11</sup>** ܐƦƀƍƀƃ P: ܬܐŴƀƍƀƃ BCD **<sup>13</sup>** ܘܐܦ P: ܐܦ BCD | ܓܐƆŴƘܕ ܐƦƇƕ BCD: ƦƇƕ ̇ ųܓƆŴƘ P **<sup>16</sup>** ܬܐƢƀƊܘܓ ܐƦƍƀźƟ] inv. P **<sup>18</sup>** ܝ ̇ ܗ [om. D | ܘܐųƌ ̇ ųƍƉ ƢܒƆܕ P: ƢܒƆ ܘܘܢųƌܕ ̇ ̇ ܘܒų ųƍƉ BCD **<sup>21</sup>** ܐƦƇƊܒ [+ ܐƦƍƊܒ add. D in marg. **<sup>23</sup>** ܬܐ ̈ ̈ ܬܐ :BCD ܘŴƇƀŶ ŴƇƀŶ P

intellectual part, it purifies the cognitive powers of the soul, keeping them from mistaking one thing for another and so grasping the truth and the exact meaning of things. Through its second, practical part, on the other hand, it refines its animal powers, instigating them not to be employed in anything useless, but to make their motions upright and profitable16.

11 But also each one of these parts is further divided into other parts that are called subparts. Thus, they subdivide theory, which is a primary part of philosophy, into the teaching on spiritual natures, which are called divine, so that the teaching on them is also called divine; the teaching on visible natures, which is also called natural; and the teaching consisting of mathematical sciences, which are called sciences in the proper sense17.

12 They also give the following reason for the three-fold division of this part which is similar to the previous one18. Some living beings are completely separate and removed from matter and from the density of bodies, dwelling in the subtle, perfect, and incorporeal spiritual realm. And some of them are placed in opposition to these, i.e. in matter and in the density of the lower world, outside of which their subsistence is impossible. And further, there are some whose nature is placed between these, and thus they are not completely removed from matter like those that are above, but neither are they mixed with it in such a way that they cannot even be separated from it intellectually like those that are below. Instead, they are separate from it in one way and mixed with it in another19. Those beings that are completely separate from matter are called divine and angelic, as well as (encompassing) all rational and intelligible

**<sup>16</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.16–22: πάλιν δὲ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς διτταὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι, αἱ μὲν γνωστικαὶ οἷον νοῦς διάνοια δόξα φαντασία καὶ αἴσθησις, αἱ δὲ ζωτικαὶ καὶ ὀρεκτικαὶ οἷον βούλησις θυμὸς ἐπιθυμία. ὁ οὖν φιλόσοφος πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρη βούλεται κοσμῆσαι καὶ εἰς τελείωσιν ἀγαγεῖν· διὰ οὖν τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τελειοῦται τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν γνωστικόν, διὰ δὲ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ τὸ ζωτικόν. εἰκότως οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία εἰς δύο διαιρεῖται, εἴς τε θεωρητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.14–26; David, *Prolegomena* 56.7–16.

**<sup>17</sup>** I.e. the theoretical part is subdivided into theology, physics, and mathematics. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.22–23: πάλιν τὸ θεωρητικὸν διαιρεῖται εἰς θεολογικὸν μαθηματικὸν καὶ φυσιολογικόν. See also Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.35–36; David, *Prolegomena* 57.23. For Sergius' note on mathematical sciences, cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 12.24–25.

**<sup>18</sup>** I.e. here Sergius again gives an ontological reason for the logical division. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.23–24: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πάντα τὰ ὄντα βούλεται θεωρεῖν ὁ φιλόσοφος, τῶν δὲ ὄντων πάντων τρεῖς εἰσι τάξεις.

**<sup>19</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.25–31: τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων παντάπασίν ἐστι χωριστὰ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει καὶ τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπινοίᾳ, οἷά ἐστι τὰ θεῖα, τὰ δὲ παντάπασιν ἀχώριστα τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει καὶ τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπινοίᾳ, οἷά ἐστι τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ ἔνυλα εἴδη, ξύλον καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ σὰρξ καὶ πάντα ἁπλῶς τὰ σώματα (ταῦτα δὲ φυσικὰ καλοῦμεν ὡς ὑπὸ φύσεως δημιουργούμενα προσεχῶς), τὰ δὲ μέσα τούτων ὄντα κατά τι μέν ἐστι χωριστὰ κατά τι δὲ ἀχώριστα, οἷά ἐστι τὰ μαθηματικά. See also Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.36–28.2; David, *Prolegomena* 57.26–58.12.

̈ ſܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܕܒųܘƆܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ųƊſŴƟܘܢ܉ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕƎſ ܗܘ ųƆ ܐ܂ƍƕ̈ P5r űſƦƉܘ ̇ ــƎ ܕƉــƎ ƀƃــƍܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ <sup>Ɖ</sup> ƅــſܐ :ܘܢųــƆ ƎــſųƊƤƉ ܐƍــƀ̈ ̈ƍƀــƀܐ ܘƃ ƃ ̈ſــƍܐ ܕܐſــƦ ŵŶƦƉ ܐƊƣ ̈ ųƊſŴƟܘܢ܂ ܗƎƀƆ ܕƎſ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ųƇƃܘܢ ܓــŴ ܒųܘܢ ŴƀŶܬܐ ܘܕܓƎſŵƀƇ ̣ƎƉ ܙܘƕܐ܂


15 ܐƎſƢƉ ܓƢƀ ܕܐƌŵƃܐ ƋƆ ܕܐܢ ܐƥƌ ŶƦƌܒƥ ܒܒƦƀܐ ܕŪŹ ŴƊƕܛ ܘƦƤƌܘƢŶ ܒų ܙܒƍܐ Əܓƀܐܐ: ܐܢ ܗܘ ܕƎſ ܕŴƀƠƙƌܗܝ ܐƥƌ ̣ƎƉ ƁƇƣ ܕƆܐ

̈ ſܐ **1** ̈ ƌܐ :BCD ܗܘ ̈ ſܐ + [ܐƌƮŶܐ | P ܗܘ ƦŶܬ add. D in marg. | ܘܗܝƦſܐ BCD: Ʀſܐ P **<sup>2</sup>** ܐƍƀ̈ ܘƃ CDP: ܐƀــــƍƀ̈ ƃܘ B **6** ܬܐŴــــƀƍƉܘ BCD: ܬܐŴــــƀƇƉܘ P: ܬܐŴــــŷƇƉܘ add. P in marg. **7** ܪܘܬܐŴƠƀƏŴƉܘ CP: ܪܘܬܐŴƠƀƐƀƉܘ BD **11** ܘܢųſƦſܐ CDP: ƎſųſƦſܐ B **13** Ƣƀܓ [om. P ܐƦــƇƊܒ [+ Ǝــſűſܘܗ P | ƎــƀƕűſƦƉܘ BCD: ƎــƀƕűſƦƉ P **14** ŴƊƀƏܐܬܬ P: ƋƀƏܐܬܬ BCD **<sup>16</sup>** ƎƀƆܗ [om. B | ܐſƦ̈ Ŷܬ BCD: ܐſƦ̈ ̈ƀƇܐ ܘŶ ƕ P **<sup>18</sup>** ܝ ̇ ܗ [om. P **<sup>19</sup>** ܢŴƌ ̇ ܕܗ ܬܐŴƀƇƖƉ] inv. P ƋƏ CDP: ƋƏܕ B | ƎƆ] om. P | ƋƆ] om. B **<sup>20</sup>** Ƌƕ CDP: ƈƕ B **<sup>21</sup>** ܐƊƀ̈ ܘƆܐ :BCD ܕƆܐ ܓƤ ̈Ɗܐ ƣŴܓ P **22** ƋƆ ܐƌŵƃܕܐ [om. P

powers. And other beings whose subsistence is in matter are called natural and natures, for their subsistence derives from nature. They are all visible bodies, in some of which there is life and some of which are deprived of movement.

13 Those intermediary ones that are called mathematical sciences are truly sciences dealing with things. I am speaking about geometry, arithmetic, astronomy (ἀστρονομία), and music. Since all these crafts and suchlike are sciences which we learn and which derive either from certain books or from other bodies made of bronze, wood or stone, they are not separated from matter for they also come from matter. But since, after we have learned them, they are collected and established in our memory and subsist in our rational thought, they exist without matter. Thus, they may be separated from it intellectually, and it becomes clear that they also have another kind of subsistence which is outside of matter. That is why they are placed between those beings which are above and those which are below20.

14 Now, since we want to ascend from the lower natures to which we belong towards those above in order to be associated with them in knowledge, but it is impossible to ascend immediately from such a lower position to their height, an intermediary nature has been established for us, namely the mathematical sciences, which are to some extent associated with both sides and by means of which we are educated in understanding what is the knowledge of the incorporeals and gradually ascend to them21.

15 They say that this is similar to a man who has been confined to a very dark house and has spent a long time there. If he were to leave it all at once for a

**<sup>20</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.30–12.4: τὰ δὲ μέσα τούτων ὄντα κατά τι μέν ἐστι χωριστὰ κατά τι δὲ ἀχώριστα, οἷά ἐστι τὰ μαθηματικά· κύκλος γὰρ καὶ τρίγωνον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑποστῆναι δίχα ὕλης τινὸς οὐ δύνανται καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀχώριστά ἐστι τῆς ὕλης, ἐπειδὴ δὲ θεασαμένοι κύκλον ξύλινον καὶ χαλκοῦν καὶ λίθινον ἀνεμαξάμεθα αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ ἔχομεν παρ' ἑαυτοῖς δίχα τῆς ὕλης. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.38–28.5; David, *Prolegomena* 58.9–17.

**<sup>21</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 12.20–24: μέσον δέ ἐστι τὸ μαθηματικὸν εἰκότως· ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀμέσως ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα ἀνάγεσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παντάπασιν ἀχωρίστων τῆς ὕλης ἐπὶ τὰ παντάπασι χωριστά, ὁδεύομεν διὰ τῶν μαθημάτων, τῶν κατά τι μὲν χωριστῶν κατά τι δὲ ἀχωρίστων.

̈ܗܝ Ŵƍƀƕ ƎſųƆ ƎܓƮƣ ܗƦƖƣ Ƣܒ ܉Ƣſųƌ ŪŹܕ ܐƦƀܒƆ ܡűƉ ܬܐŴƀƕƞƉ ܘƄƌƦƉܐ Ŵƌܗܪܗ܂ ܐܢ ܕƎſ ƦƀƉűƟ ŴƀƠƙƌܗܝ ƆܒƀــƦܐ ܕƊƕــŴܛ ƀƇƟــƈ ̈ƀƆــƠܐ ŵܒ ƈــƀƇƟ ƈــƀƇƠܒ ܗܝŴــſűƀƖƌ ܬŴــƃܘܗ :ųــƍƉ ƢــſųƌűƆ ƎــƃܪƦܘܒ ܕŴƌܗܪܐ܉ ܗƎſűſ ܕƆܐ ƎƀƄƌ Ƣſűƌ ܘܐܦ ܒŴƍܗܪܐ ܕŪŹ ŵſŵƕ܂ ܗƍƃܐ ƆــƋ ̈ƀــƦܐ ܕܐſųſƦſــƎ ܒــųܘƆܐ: ܘܐܦ ƍŶــƎ܉ ܐƌــųܘ ܕƍƌ <sup>5</sup> ̇ــƐܐ ̣ƉــƎ ܗƀƆــƎ ƍƀƃ Ǝſܪųܓ ܐ܉Ɔܕܗܘ ܐƍƀƃ ƎƉ̣ ƎſųƊſŴƟ ơƀŶܕܪ ƎƀƆܗ ܬŴƆ ƁƇƣ ƎƉ̣ ơƐƊƆ ̇ ܬܪƦƀƕܢ ܒƄƤŷܐ ܕƆܐ Ʀƕűſܐ܂ ̈ƍƕܐ: ܘźƊƕܐ ųƆ űſƦƉ ƎƀƇƀ̈ Ŷ ܘܢųƆ ̈ƀܐ: Ʀƌܕܪܫ ܒƈƀƇƠ ̈ƍƙƆܐ ܗƎƀƆ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ܕܐųſƦſܘܢ ƕƞƉ Ŵſ űƀܒ Ǝſűƌܐ ƦſܐƊŷƆܘ ƦſܐƙƠƌ Ǝſűſܗ ܐ܉ƇƀƇ ̈ <sup>Ɖ</sup> ܐƍƀ̈ C92r ƃܕ ܐƦƕűſ ܬŴƆ ܐƇƕƦƌܘ ƈƀƇƟ ̇ ܘ Ɖــűܡ ܕܒــƦܪܗ ̇ ܕƦƕűſܐ ܘƎƍƀŷƄƤƉ ܐƅſ ܕſƞƉܐ ܗ ܪܕƎƍſ ܒƤܒ <sup>10</sup> ̈ ųƀƇƀ ܪܗƎƍƀŹ܂


**<sup>1</sup>** ܡűƉ P: ܡűƉܕ BCD | Ƣſųƌ BCD: Ƣſųƌܘ P | ƎſųƆ CDP: ųƆ B **<sup>3</sup>** ܐƠƀƆ̈ ̈ܐ :BCP ܒŵ ƠƀƆܙ D **4** Ƣſűƌ BCD: ƢſűƉ P | ܗܪܐŴƍܒ P: ܗܪܐŴƌܕ ܐ̈ ƠƀƆŵܒ BCD **7** ܐƄƤŷܒ P: ܐƃŴƤŷܒ BCD **12** ƈźƉ BCD: ƈźƉܘ P | ܗܕܐ [om. B | ƎƉ̣ ] om. D **<sup>14</sup>** ܕܙܕܩ BCD: ܘܙܕܩ P **<sup>15</sup>** ܐƦ̈ ƄƉ BCD: ܐƦƃܐ ̈ Ɖ P **<sup>16</sup>** ƎƉܘ P: ƎƉ BCD | ƎƀƆܗ BCD: Ǝƀƌܗ P **<sup>17</sup>** ܓܐƆŴƘܕ BCD: ̇ ųܓƆŴƘܕ P **18** ƎſƢƉܐ BC: ƎƍſƢƉܐ D: ƎƌƢƉܐ P **<sup>21</sup>** ̇ ̇ + [ƦƍƉܗ ܘŴƍƙƇƊƆܬܐ **23** P ܕŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܬܐ :BCD ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ | B ܕųƇſ BCD: ܬŴƇƇ ̇ ƊƊƆܘ P | ܐƦƀ̈ ƍƀƃܕ BCD: ܐƦƀ̈ ƍƀƃ P | ƎƀƆܗ BCD: Ǝƀ̈ ƌܗ P

house that is very illuminated without any intermediary, his eyes would at once become dim, being hurt by the light. But if he were to leave it for a less dark house first and later on to the one which is more illuminated, so as to become gradually accustomed to the rays of light, then he would be able to dwell even in very strong light without harm. In the same way, if we make an attempt to ascend all at once from those natural things that are in matter to those ones whose subsistence is far from material nature, our cognitive faculties will become blind and our mind obscured through the darkness of ignorance. If, instead, we are trained little by little in the mathematics which we call intermediary and ascend to the knowledge of rational natures, then we will gradually and properly proceed along the path of knowledge and reach as far as possible what we strive for22.

That is why some of the ancients23 16 called mathematical sciences bridges and ladders, while others said that, since they deal with and teach about the incorporeals as well, these sciences should certainly be taken as something through which we ascend from the inferior to the superior and from natural beings towards those ones that are above nature24.

17 Thus, they say that the cause for the threefold division of the first part of philosophy is the following. Since, as we have said, things are divided into three kinds, i.e. into those which are above nature, those that are in nature, and those intermediary ones which are in mathematical sciences, it is proper that also this part of philosophy, which is knowledge of all existing things, should be subdivided into three parts, namely knowldege of the divine things which are

**<sup>22</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 12.27–13.5: ἐὰν γὰρ βουληθῶμεν εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῶν φυσιολογικῶν ἐπὶ θεολογίαν ἀμέσως αὑτοὺς ἀναγαγεῖν, τυφλώττομεν, καθάπερ οἱ ἐκ σκοτεινοτάτου οἴκου εἰς πεφωτισμένον ἀμέσως εἰσερχόμενοι· δεῖ γὰρ πρότερον ἐν οἴκῳ διατρίβειν σύμμετρον ἔχοντι φῶς, εἶθ' οὕτως ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸν φωτεινότατον. οὕτως οὖν μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ δεῖ διατρίψαντας ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἀνάγεσθαι ἐπὶ θεολογίαν. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 28.14–21; David, *Prolegomena* 58.32–59.3.

**<sup>23</sup>** Ammonius refers to Plotinus in this context, see *In Isag.* 12.25–27.

**<sup>24</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 13.5–7: κλῖμαξ γάρ τις καὶ γέφυρά ἐστι τὰ μαθήματα κοινωνοῦντα μὲν τοῖς φυσικοῖς καθὸ ἀχώριστα τοῖς δὲ θείοις καθὸ χωριστά. See also Elias, *Prolegomena* 28.13–14; David, *Prolegomena* 59.19–23.

̇ ƌــŴܢ ܕܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܒƕƞƊــƦܐ ܕܬܪܬſųſــƎ ̈ƍܐ܉ <sup>ܗ</sup> ܘŴƍƊƇƤƊƆܬܐ ܕƙƆŴſ ܗƎƀƆ܂

 ̇ <sup>18</sup> ܐƆܐ ܘܐܦ Ɔـــų v6P ̇ ܝ ܬܘܒ ƍƉـــƦܐ ƖƏـــŴܪܬܐ ܐܘ ܐŶـــŴܢ܉ ܒـــų ܬܐŴــƌƢܒűƊƆ Ǝــſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ ̇ ܂ ܗƌ ųƆ ƎƀܓƇƙƉ ƎƀƌƮŶܐ <sup>ܢ</sup> ̈ ŴƍƉ ƦƆƦƆ ܬܐŴƉűܒ ܕܓŴܐ ܕųƇƃ Ɗƕܐ: ܘűƊƆܒŴƌƢܬܐ ܕܒƦƀܗ ܕųƇſ ܕܐƥƌ: ܘűƊƆܒŴƌƢܬܐ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ̇ ــƎ ܕƖƏــƢ Ɖــűܡ ܕŹــŪ܉ ܐܘ ܕųƉŴƍƟ ܒŴŷƇܕܘܗܝ܂ ܐƎſƢƉ ܓƢƀ ܕƃــƈ Ɖ ̇ ܒƤƙƍــų܂ Ɖܐ ܗƀƃــƈ ̇ ܒܒƀــƦܗ ܐܘ ܒųƇƄ ųƊƕ ܘƦƍſűƉܗ ƢƖƏ: ܐܘ ܕܒųƇƄ Ɗƕܐ ŴƖƐƌܪ ŹܒƦܐ܉ ܗƌܐ űƉܒƌƢܐ ܕܓŴܐ ųƉƦƤƉ܂ Ɖܐ ܕƎſ ܕܒܒƦƀܗ ܒſƦƀܐ ƟƦƉــƢܐ܂ ܘƉܐ ܬܘܒ ܒƤƙƍــų ƇƘــŶŴܐ ܘƀƕــƢܐ ƍƃƦƉܐ܂ <sup>10</sup>

	- ̇ ــƢ ܗܘܐ܂ ̈ ــƀܐ ƆــŴܬ Ƥƙƌــų ܐƉ ƉűƟ ܐƘ ̈ <sup>20</sup> ŴــƐƇƀƘ ƎƉ ƥƌܐ Ƣƀܓ ܗܐ <sup>20</sup> ܬܐ܂ŴŷſƢƣܘ ܐƦƍƣ ܐƃŵƊƆܘ :ܐƏƢƃ űŶܐƊƆ ƦƀƉűƟܕ ƅƤƙƌ ƋƆ űƀƕܕ ̇ܒű ƕ ܐƦƤƀܕܒ Ǝſܕ ܐƉ ܝ܂űŶ ܐƦܒŹ Ʀƌܐ ƢƖ ̇ ܘܬܘܒ ̣ܐƢƉ ܕƉܐ ƋƆ ܕƏ ̇ ܐܡ Ə ƅſܐ ܐƦƀƉűƟ Ǝ ̇ ̇ ܝ Ɖ ܐƦƌ ƃܐܝ ܒƅƉŴƍƠ܂ ̣ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ ܗƈƀƃ܉ ܗ

**<sup>3</sup>** ܐƦƍƉ BCD: ̇ ܗƦƍƉ P **<sup>4</sup>** ƎƀܓƇƙƉ BCD: ƎƀܓƇƘƦƉ P **<sup>6</sup>** ̇ :BCD ܘƦƍſűƉܗ **7** B ܐܦ :CDP ܐܘ ܗƦƍſűƊܘܒ P **8** ܐƌܗ BCD: Ǝſűſܗ P **9** ܐſƦƀܒ BCP: ܐƦƀܒ D | ܐƢƀƕܘ C: ܐƢƀƉ BD: ܐſűƀƕܘ P **<sup>11</sup>** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƙܒ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƙƀƇƙܒ P **<sup>13</sup>** ƎƀŷƤŶܕ BCD: Ǝŷ̈ ƤŶܕ P **15** ƎƀƖƏܕ P: ƎƀŷƀƤƉܕ BCD **<sup>18</sup>** ̇ ųƆ] om. P **<sup>19</sup>** ܐƦƀƌܬŴƀŶ BCD: ܐƦƀƌܬ̈ ŴŶ P **<sup>22</sup>** űܒ̇ ƕ CDP: ƢƖƏ B **<sup>23</sup>** ܐܡ ̇ Ə P: ƋƀƏ BCD

above nature, the teaching on natural things which are in visible natures, and the tradition of mathematical sciences which are between these two.

18 But the practical part too, O our brother, they similarly subdivide into three parts, i.e. into the general rule over all people, the rule over a man's own house, and the rule over oneself only. For they say that everyone who is doing something good, does it either to all people and the city, or to his house, or to himself. Thus, if someone is doing good to all people he is called a general ruler, if it is to his house he is named a domestic ruler, and if it is to himself then he is called pious and vigilant25.

19 So, they say that in this practical (part of) philosophy a person is sometimes a law-giver and sometimes a judge26. Because for the common good, one promulgates laws that serve for instruction and education as well as for the virtuous conduct of those who are under his rule, and he passes judgement on those who infringe upon them and gives honor and respect to those who observe them. But beyond this, also in his own house the domestic ruler lays down certain laws, and he punishes those who transgress them and shows favor to those who follow them. And also for himself he lays down certain laws and judgements, if he wishes to set his habits in order and to purify the animal part of his soul27.

20 For this is what one of the ancient philosophers said to himself: "Accustom yourself, first of all, to restrain your stomach and to master your sleep and lust."28 Furthermore he said: "If you are doing good things be glad. But when you are doing bad things reprove yourself."29 So, the first of these (sayings) is

**<sup>25</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 15.2–6: διαιρεῖται τοίνυν τὸ πρακτικὸν εἴς τε τὸ ἠθικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ πολιτικόν. ὁ γὰρ πράττων τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ εἰς ἑαυτὸν πράττει κοσμῶν αὑτοῦ τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὸν βίον καὶ λέγεται ἠθικός, ἢ εἰς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον καὶ λέγεται οἰκονομικός, ἢ τὴν ὅλην κοσμεῖ πόλιν καὶ λέγεται πολιτικός.

**<sup>26</sup>** Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 32.26–30; David, *Prolegomena* 75.33–76.16. Both Elias and David ascribe this division to the Platonists. Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 464b.

**<sup>27</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 15.11–17: τούτων δὲ ἕκαστον διαιρεῖται εἴς τε τὸ νομοθετικὸν καὶ δικαστικόν· ὁ γὰρ πολιτικὸς φιλόσοφος ἢ νόμους τίθησι, καθ' οὓς δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἢ δικάζει καὶ τοὺς μὲν γερῶν ἀξιοῖ τοὺς δὲ παρατρέψαντάς τι τῶν κειμένων νόμων κολάζει. εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῷ οἰκονομικῷ θεωρεῖται τὸ νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικάζειν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ νόμους τίθεμεν καὶ δικάζομεν τῶν οἰκετῶν ἢ υἱῶν τοὺς παραβαίνοντας. οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐν τῷ οἰκονομικῷ ταῦτα θεωρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἠθικῷ. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 34.8–25.

**<sup>28</sup>** (Ps.-)Pythagoras, *Golden Verses* (Thom 1994: 94, lines 9–11). Ammonius quotes this passage also without reference to Pythagoras: καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἠθικὸς νόμους τίθησιν ἑαυτῷ, ὅταν λέγῃ κρατεῖν δ' εἰθίζεο τῶνδε γαστρὸς μὲν πρώτιστα καὶ ὕπνου καὶ φιλότητος (Ammonius, *In Isag.* 15.17–20; cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 34.18–21).

**<sup>29</sup>** (Ps.-)Pythagoras, *Golden Verses* (Thom 1994: 96, line 43; Sergius inverts the order of the sentences) as quoted in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 16.3 (cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 34.10–12).

 ̇ ̇ ܉ ܐܘ ̇ ܝ ܕƎſ ܐƢŶܬܐ ܐƅſ ܓŵܪ ܕƍſܐ űƉܡ ܐųſƦſ ̇ ܂ ܗ ƏŴƊƌܐ ܐųſƦſ ܗܝ܂ŴƇƕ ŸƀƤƉ ܐƖ ̇ Ə ̇ ܐܘ ܐƏŴƊƍƆ ųƆ Ƣź̇ ܐƢƠſܐ ܕܐܬܐ ܒƦܪ ܗ v93C ̇ ܘ ܕƌ <sup>21</sup> ܒƦܪ ܗƎƀƆ ܗƀƃــƈ ܙ v55D ̇ܕܩ ƆــƎ ƊƆــܐܬܐ ܘܐܦ ƆــŴܬ ƘــƆŴܓܐ ܕܓــŴܐ

̈ܬܗ ܕܐܪźƐſــƑƀƇŹŴ܂ ܗƃــƍܐ ܓƀــƢ ƌƦƉــųܪܐ ƆــƎ ŴــƍܒƦƄƉ ƎــſųƇƃܕ <sup>5</sup> Ʀــſܐűƀŷſ ƎــſųƍƉ ܐűــŶ ܐűــŶ ƈــƃܕ ܐƤــƀƌ ƈــƕܕ ܐƉ ƅــſܐ ܐƦــƇƉ ƦƄƉܒƎƍƀ܂ ܙܕܩ ܓƢƀ űƊƆܥ ܕܗƎƀƆ ܕƉűƕܐ Ɔــƣųܐ ܐܬܐƉــƢ: ܘܗƀƆــƎ ̈ܐ ̈ŷــƎ ܕܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƇźƉــƦܗܘܢ ܕƀƌــƤ ƤŶ ܐƇƃŴــƐƆ ܉ƎــƍſƢ ̇ ܬܘܒ ܕܗƣܐ ܐƉ ̈ƀــƤܐ ̈ܬܗ ܕܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ ƎƍſűſƦƕ ƊƆܐƢƉ܂ ųƀƇƕܘܢ ܕƎſ ܕƌ ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍ ̈ܬܗ܉ ܒƤــƮܒܐ ŴــƍܒƦƄƉ ƎــƉ̣ ܐűــŶ ܐűــŶ ƈƃܕ ܓܐƆ̈ P7v ŴƘ ƈƕܘ Ʀſܐűƀŷſ <sup>10</sup> ܂ƢƉܐƊƆ ƎƍſűſƦƕ ƎƃܪƦܕܒ

	- ̈ــŴܬܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ̈ƀܐ: ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ƈƕ űŶܐ Ŷــűܐ ƉــƎ ܨܒ ܐƅſ ܗ <sup>15</sup> ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܓƌŴ ̈ſܐ܂ ܗƀƆــƎ ܗƀƃــƈ ܕűƀŷſܐſــƦ ܐſƢƀƉــƎ űــƀŷſ ܢŴــƌ ̇ ܕܐſƢƀƉــƎ ܐſــƅ ܗ ̈ƕــŴܗܝ ŴƊƣ ܬŴƆ ̇ ̈Ǝ ųƆ ŴƆܬ ̈ܪŴƊŶܗܝ ܐܘ ܐܓƮܬܗ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܕƦƄƉܒ ̈ſܐ ̈ ܐ ܕűƉܡ űƉܡ܂ ܗƎƀƆ ܕƎſ ܕܒƦƕƞƊܐ ƎƀƊƀƏ ܕܗƎƀƆ űƀŷſ ƉܐŹܙ ƈƕ ̇ ܝ ̈ Ɗܐ ܘܗ ̇ ܝ ܕƈƕ ܕܘܒƮܐ ܕƊƕ ̇ ܉ ܗ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕܓŴܐ ƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ ܐųſƦſ ܘܕܗ ̈ܬܐ܂ ̈ƍƀܐ ܕŴƀŶ ƃ ƈƕܕ ܐƦƀƖ̈ <sup>20</sup> ƣܕܬ

̈ــƦܒܐ ƕــƈ ܕܘܒــƮܐ ̇ܕܩ ܓƀــƢ ƊƆــűܥ ܕƕܒــű ܐܪźƐſــƑƀƇŹŴ ƃ 23 ܙ ̇ܕܩ Ɔــųܘܢ ܕƦƌܕܒــƢܘܢ ܘƌܐŶــŴܢ ܘƊƖƌــƢܘܢ ̈ ــƊܐ: ƆــŴ ܕܐƄſــƍܐ ܙ ܕƊƕ

**1** ̇ ųſƦſܐ2 [om. P | ̇ ̇ Ɩܐ **2** P ܘܐƢƠſܐ :BCD ܐƢƠſܐ **2**...ܐܘ Ə] om. BCD | ŸƀƤƉ BCD: ŸƤƉ P | ܗܝŴــƇƕ] + tit. ƑƀƇŹŴــźƐſܕܐܪ ܬܐ ̈ ŴــƍܒƦƄƉܕ ܓܐƆŴƘ ƈźƉ BCD **3** ܬŴƆ P: ƈƕ BCD ܐŴܕܓــ [+ ܘܗܝƦــſܕܐ B **4** ƑƀƇŹŴــźƐſܕܐܪ C: ƑƀƇŹŴــźƏܕܐܪ D: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܕܐܪ B: ܣŴـــƀƇƇŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ P **5** ƅـــſܐ [om. BCD **8** ƑƀƇŹŴـــźƐſܕܐܪ BC: ƑƀƇŹŴـــźƏܕܐܪ D: ܣŴƀƇŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ P | Ǝſܕ P: Ƣƀܓ BCD **<sup>15</sup>** ܢŴƌ ̇ ܗ CDP: ƎƀƆܗ B **16** ƎſƢƀƉܕܐ BCD: ܢƮƀƉܐ P Ʀــſܐűƀŷſܕ BCD: Ʀــſܐűƀŷſ P **<sup>17</sup>** ܬܗƮܐܓــ BCD: ܬܐƮܐܓ P **<sup>18</sup>** ܐ ̈ ƉܐŹܙ CDP: ܐƊŹ ̈ B ܙܐ ܡűƉ] om. B **21** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ C: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D: ܣŴƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P

like establishing laws, while the other one is like a judgement, which is either praise that follows the one who observes the law or reproach of the one who breaks it.

#### *[Division of Aristotle's writings]30*

21 So, after this, we ought to turn also to the general division of all Aristotle's writings. This will make comprehensible our account when we write about the goal of each one of them separately. Indeed, it is necessary to know that those things which have been discussed until now and which we are also discussing now are useful for understanding the goals of Aristotle's writings which we are going to discuss. For it is about these goals in particular and about the division of all his writings that we are going to speak in the following sections31.

22 So, the general division of his works is the following. Some of them are particular, being written about each and every kind of matter, others are written universally about nature in general, and still others are in between, since they are neither written about something as a whole like the universal ones nor do they speak about some concrete things only like the particular ones32. Those which are written as particular are his letters which he addressed to his friends or his listeners concerning concrete inquiries (ζητήματα)33. Those which are placed between the particular ones and the universal ones are his writings about the government of the nations and the investigations34 into the natures of animals35.

23 We ought to know, however, that the books which Aristotle composed on the government of the nations are not on how they should be governed, exist

**<sup>30</sup>** This subtitle appears in mss. BCD.

**<sup>31</sup>** Sergius refers here to the same two *prolegomena* issues (Gr. σκοπός and τάξις), to which he has already pointed in the form of the alleged inquiry by Theodore in §4 above.

**<sup>32</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 3.21–23: φέρε δεύτερον καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων ποιησώμεθα. τούτων οὖν τὰ μέν ἐστι μερικὰ τὰ δὲ καθόλου τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τῶν καθόλου καὶ τῶν μερικῶν. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat*. 3.8–11; Simplicius, *In Cat*. 4.10–12; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 6.9–11; Elias, *In Cat*. 113.17–20.

**<sup>33</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 3.23–24: καὶ ἔστι μερικὰ μὲν ὅσα πρός τινας ἰδίᾳ γέγραφεν, ἢ ἐπιστολὰς ἢ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα. See also Philoponus, *In Cat*. 3.22–24; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 6.11–13; Elias, *In Cat*. 113.21–24.

**<sup>34</sup>** Syr. *tašʿita*, "story", here apparently renders the Gr. ἱστορία, "inquiry, investigation".

**<sup>35</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 3.26–28: μεταξὺ δὲ ὁπόσα περὶ ἱστορίας γέγραφεν, ὡς αἱ γεγραμμέναι αὐτῷ Πολιτεῖαι ἀμφὶ τὰς πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίας οὖσαι. See also Philoponus, *In Cat*. 3.26–29; Elias, *In Cat*. 113.29–34.

̈ــƦܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܕܐƄſــƍܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܕܘܒــƢܐ ܘƀƕــűܐ ܕƃــƈ Ŷــű ƉــƎ ܒƍſűƊ ̈Əܐ ܕƎƀƊƀƏ ܒƈƄ űŶ ƎƉ ܐܬ̈ܪܘܬܐ܂ ŴƊƌ ܘܢųſƦſܐ ƎƀƇſܘܐ :ܐƊ ̈ P8r Ɗƕ ܐƃــƦܒ ܕſــƎ ܬܘܒ ƕــƈ ƀŶــŴ v94C ̈ܬܐ: ƆــŴ ܕܐƄſــƍܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƟــƊſŴܐ ̇ ܒƇƀــűܐ ܘܒƢܘܒــƀܐ: ųــƍƀƃ Ŵــ̇ ܘŴƉܙܓܐ ܕƈƃ Ŷــűܐ ſųƍƉــƎ܉ ܐƆܐ ܕƍƉ ̈ܬܐ ܕܕܐſــƅ ܗƀƆــƎ܉ Ɔܐ ܘܒƖ <sup>5</sup> ̈űƀܐ ܕƈƃ ܓƑƍ܂ ܐܕƣܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܕƦƄƉܒƍــŴ ܐƊــƕ űــŶ ųــƇƃ ƈƕܕ ƈźƉ :ܬܐƮܕܐܓ ܘ ̇ űƀŷſܐƦſ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐƅſ ܗ ̈ܬܐ ܐƢƉ܉ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ŴƀŶ ƎƉ ܐűŶܕ ܐƐƍܓ ųƇƃ ƈƕ ̇ ̇ ܐܬܪܐ ܐܘ ܐܘ ܕܓŴܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܗƍƃܐ ܐƅſ ܗƀƆــƎ ƦƄƉܒƍــŴ r56D ̈ܬܐ ܐƀƌƮŶــƦܐ ܕƐƌــŪ ܂ƎſųƀƇƕ ܒƦƄƉܕ ܬܐ̈ B63v Ŵܕܨܒ Ǝſųƍƀƃ ƈƕ ƦſܐƌŴܓ Ǝſųܒ

̈ ܕŴƌܬܐ ųƖƉ ƅſܐ ƎſųƍƉ ܐ܉Ŵܕܓ ƎƀƆܗ Ǝƀƌ ̈ <sup>24</sup> ƦƄƉܒŴƍ <sup>10</sup> ̈ܬܗ ܬܘܒ <sup>ܗ</sup> ̈ ſــƎ: ܘſųƍƉــƎ ܒƤــŴܐƆܐ ܘܒƙــƁƌŴ ƦƘܓــƊܐ ܕܬܪſــƎ ƘــƮܨܘƘܐ ܐųſƦſ ̈ Ʀſܐ ŴــŶƦܒ Ǝــƙƀ̈ ܐƮƀƉܢ: ܘƎſųƍƉ ܬܘܒ ܐſــƅ ̣ܕƉــƎ Ŷــű ƘــƢܨܘƘܐ Ơƌ ̈ ƀــܐܬܐ܂ ƀŶــܒܐ ܓƀــƢ ƊƆــűܥ ܕƃــƈ ܐƉــƦܝ ܕƄƤƉــŸ ̣ܗܘܐ ܗƌܐ Əܓ ̇ ƇƃŴƏܐ ܕųƕܢ ƍƙƇƊƆــŴܬܐ܉ ܪƣــƋ ̣ܗܘܐ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ܪƍƀƕܐ űƉܡ ܐܘ Ɔــų ܐſــƅ ܕƖƆــŴܗܕƌܐ: ܕƌــųܘܐ Ɔــų ƇƉــŴܐܐ ܒűܘƃ <sup>15</sup> ̈ƀــƦܐ ܕƌƦƐƉــơ ̈ܐ ܕܪƀƊƀƣــƎ ܒƦــƃ ƎــƀƆܗ ƈــƀƃܗ ܢŴــƌܗ̣ ܬܗ܂̈ C95r ŴــƍƙƇƉ ƎƉ̣ ܐűŷܒ ܗܝŴƇƕ ̈ܬܐ ܒųܘܢ ̈ܪƍƀƕܐ ܗƎƀƆ ܕܒܐſــűܐ ܒܐſــűܐ ƀŷƃƦƤƉــƎ ̣ܗܘܘ ųƖƉܕƌــŴ ̈ƌܐ ƦƉܪƀƊƣــƎ ̣ܗܘܘ܂ ̣ܘܗƌــŴܢ ܬܘܒ ̇ ܝ ܕźƉــƈ ƕــŴܗܕ ſųƉƦƤƉــƎ܉ ܒــų ƎــƀƇſܐ :ƎــƀܒƦƄƉ ܐƦــſ̈ ̈ــŴܬܐ űƀŷſ ̈ƌܐ܉ ƍƉــųܘܢ ƕــƈ ܨܒ ܗƀƆــƎ ƕــŴܗܕ ܕƊŷƆ <sup>20</sup> ̈ Ǝ ŷƆــűܐ Ŷــűܐ ܨܒــŴܬܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ: ܘƍƉــųܘܢ ܕܓــŴܐ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ܉ ̈ ܓƀܐܐ ŶܒƎƀƤ܂ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕ̈ܪƍƀƕܐ Ə

̈

 Ŵܗܝ ܕƎſ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕܒŴƤܐƆܐ ܘܒƙــƁƌŴ ƦƘܓــƊܐ ܐſƢƀƉــƎ ܗƀƆــƎ 25 Ʀƃܒ ̇ ƦƤƉܐƍƆܐ: ܐŴƌܢ ܕƋƀƏ ܒųܘܢ ƢƘܨܘƘܐ ܐܘ v8P ̇ ƮƘܨܘƘܐ ƤƉܐƍƆܐ ܐܘ

**1** űŶ] + űŶ BCD **2** űŶ] + űŶ BCD **3** ƈƕ] + ƎƉ̣ ܐűŶ ܐűŶ C **4** ܐűŶ] + ܐűŶ BCD **5** ƅſܕܕܐ BCD: ƅſܕܐ P **<sup>6</sup>** Ʀſܐűƀŷſ BCD: ܐſűƀŶܐ P **<sup>7</sup>** ܐܬܪܐ ̇ ܐܘ BCD: ܘܐܬܪܐ P | ƢƉܐ CP: ƢƀƉܐ BD ̈ ܬܗ **10** ŴــƍܒƦƄƉ CDP: ųــƇſܕ ܬܐŴــƍ̈ ܒƦƄƉ B | Ǝــƀƌ ̈ ܗ CDP: Ǝــſܕ B **13** ƈــƃܕ BCP: ƈــƃ D **<sup>14</sup>** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܐƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **<sup>17</sup>** ƎƀƆܗ BCD: ܢŴ̇ ̈ ܬܐ | P ܗƌ ŴƌܕųƖƉ P: ܬܐŴ̈ ƌܕųƕƦƉ BCD ̈Ʀſܐ **<sup>19</sup>** űƀŷſ] + ܕŴŷƇܒ P **<sup>20</sup>** Ǝ ̈ ƊŷƆܕ P: ƎƀƊ ̇ ŷƆܕ BCD **22** ƎƀƇſܐ [+ ųƌܕܐ P | ƎƀƆܗ BCD: ƎƀƆܕܗ P

and dwell in the cities, but on what the governments and customs of each particular nation are and the laws that are established in each land. Also, what he wrote about animals was not on the subsistence and the constitution of each one of them, but on their nature during birth and growth and the habits of the whole genus. Thus, the nature of this kind of writings is not particular (in the same way) as in the letters, since he spoke about one whole nation or country and about one whole genus of animals. But neither is it universal in the same way as the other writings, in which he considered generally the nature of things about which he wrote36.

24 Now, of those writings of his that are universal, some are like notebooks, others are written as questions-and-answers between two persons (πρόσωπα), and still others are as if (they are spoken) by one person but combining multiple arguments37. We ought to know that every time this philosopher found some opinion or idea suitable for teaching, he wrote it down like a reminder in summary fashion which he could make use of in one of his teachings. Thus, those books where he recorded one by one all the ideas that he had found are called notebooks, for they were written in the form of reminders38. Also, some of these notebooks were written about particular things, namely those which deal only with one concrete subject, and some are universal, namely those which encompass multiple concepts39.

25 Now, in those books of his that are composed in the form of questions and answers, either there is one person (πρόσωπον) or there are several persons

**<sup>36</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.6–11; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 3.29–4.6.

**<sup>37</sup>** Ammonius and other commentators divided Aristotle's universal writings first into systematic treatises and into those which were written in the form of notes written for memory: τῶν δὲ καθόλου τὰ μέν ἐστι συνταγματικὰ τὰ δὲ ὑπομνηματικά (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.4–5; cf. Philoponus, *In Cat*. 3.11–12; Elias, *In Cat*. 114.1). The systematic treatises, in turn, were divided into those written in the dialogue form and those written by Aristotle in the first person: καὶ πάλιν τῶν συνταγματικῶν τὰ μέν ἐστι διαλογικά, ὡς ὅσα δραματικῶς διεσκεύασται κατὰ πεῦσιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν πλειόνων προσώπων, τὰ δὲ αὐτοπρόσωπα ὡς ὅσα γέγραφεν ὡς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.14–17; cf. Philoponus, *In Cat*. 4.10–11; Elias, *In Cat*. 114.15–16).

**<sup>38</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 3.28–4.3; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 4.12–13; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 6.25–35.

**<sup>39</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.13–14: τῶν δὲ ὑπομνηματικῶν τὰ μὲν μονοειδῆ, ὡς ὅταν περὶ ἑνός τινος ποιῆται τὴν ζήτησιν, τὰ δὲ ποικίλα, ὅταν περὶ πολλῶν. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat*. 3.12–14; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 7.1–3.

ܘƋƀƏ ܒųܘܢ ܬܘܒ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܐܘ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܕƎƀƠƙƌ ܒƢܘŶܐ ƟŴƆܒƈ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕƦƤƉܐƎƀƆ܂

̈ܬܗ ܬܘܒ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕܐƅſ ̣ܕƎƉ űŶ ƢƘܨܘƘܐ ܐƮƀƉܢ܉ ܘܐܦ ŴƍܒƦƄƉ 26 ̈ ــƎ ܗƃــƍܐ܂ ſųƍƉــƎ ܓƀــƢ ܐſųſƦſــƎ ƕــƈ ܬܐܘܪſܐ ̣ܕܗܝ ܓƇƘƦƉ Ǝــƀƌ ̈ ܗ ̇ ƀƉűƟــƦܐ ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘــŴܬܐ܂ ܘſųƍƉــƎ ƕــƈ ܐſƦſــų <sup>5</sup> ̇ ƕűſــƦܐ ܘƍƉــƦܗ ̇ ܗƦــƍƉ ƈــƖƆ ƎــƉ̣ ƎــƌƢƉܕܐ ƅــſܐ ̇ ŴƖƏܪܘܬܐ ܐƮƀƉܢ: ̣ܕܗܝ ܐſƦſــų ܕܬܪܬƎſ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ܂ ƎſųƍƉ ܕƎſ ܬܘܒ ƈƕ ܐܘ̈ܪܓƍܐ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ r64B ̈ ƀƌܐ ܕƠƀźƠƇſܐ ܘŴƆܓƠƀܐ: ƍƉــƎ ܕſــƎ ܐƮƀƉܢ܂ ܗ v95C ̇ ܝ ܕųƉƦƤƉܐ ƎƉ Ŵſ ŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ ܘܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ƇƀƇƉــƦܐ ƍƃƦƉــƀܐ܂ ܗܕܐ ܓƀــƢ ƆــŴ ƍƉــƦܐ ܐųſƦſ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ̣ƎƉ ŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ: ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ƦƍƉ ƦƍƉܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ ̈ ܓƀܐܬܐ ŴſŴŷƊƆ܂ ̇ ܒŴŷƇܕ ܐƅſ ܕƎƍſűſƦƕ ܒƦܪƎƃ ܒƐ ܕųƇſ


**<sup>2</sup>** ƎـــƀƆܐƦƤƉܕ P: ƎـــƆ ̈ ܐƦƤƉܕ BCD **<sup>3</sup>** ƅـــſܕܐ CDP: ƅـــſܕܕܐ B **<sup>5</sup>** ̇ ųـــſƦſܐ P: ܗܝ BCD P ܕƘŴƐƇƇƀƘـــŴܬܐ :BCD 1ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘـــŴܬܐ **7** P ܕƘŴƐƇƇƀƘـــŴܬܐ :BCD ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘـــŴܬܐ ܬܐŴـــƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ2 BCD: ܬܐŴـــƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P **8** ܐƠـــƀźƠƇſܕ [+ ܬܐŴـــƣܕܪܘ BD add. in marg. ܐƠƀܓŴــƆܘ [+ ܬܐŴــƇƀƇƉܘ BD add. in marg. | ƎــƍƉ CDP: ̇ ųــƍƉ B **9** Ƣــƀܓ CDP: Ǝــſܕ B **10** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **12** ƈــƀƃܗ [om. P **15** ƎــſųƀƇƕܕ [BCD: ܘܢųƀƇƕܕ P **<sup>17</sup>** Ǝƀ̈ ƌܘܕܗ BCD: ƎƀƆܘܕܗ P **18** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P **22** ܒܐƢƤܒ [+ ܐƍܒŵܒ D add. (corr.?) in marg.

who pose questions or answer them, and there are one or more interlocutors who argue against those who are questioned40.

Also, those writings which are spoken as if by one person41 26 are further divided as follows. Some of them are about *teʾoriya* (θεωρία), which means "knowledge" and is the first part of philosophy, and some of them are written about practice, which is the second part of philosophy, as we have said above. And further, some of them are written about instruments (ὄργανα) of philosophy which are called in Greek *dialeqṭiqa* (διαλεκτικά) and *logiqa* (λογικά) and which we designate as "logic" and "logical craft"42. For this is not a part of philosophy, neither is it a subpart, but it is only its instrument (ὄργανον), as we will demonstrate at length later on43.

27 So, of his theoretical writings some are about rational and incorporeal beings, and they are also called "After natures"44, others are about visible natures, their accidents and affections, and their generation and corruption — we will speak about each one of them according to our ability in the appropriate places45, — and still others are written about mathematical sciences which, as we have demonstrated, are between nature and those beings that are above nature46.

28 Of those (writings) which he composed as instruments of philosophy, some concern those things that contribute to the logical craft, some of them he composed about logic (itself), and some of them he wrote about such things that are attached to the logical craft47. We will further explain these subjects in detail in those sections that suit each one of them, quoting from the words of this man (i.e. Aristotle).

**<sup>40</sup>** Ammonius and other commentators thus divide the systematic treatises (τὰ συνταγματικά), cf. the commentary to §24 above.

**<sup>41</sup>** What Ammonius and other commentators refer to with the term τὰ αὐτοπρόσωπα are treatises written by Aristotle in the first person.

**<sup>42</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.18–5.4; Philoponus, *In Cat*. 4.23–35. Sergius modifies Ammonius' division in some aspects.

**<sup>43</sup>** See §§30–48.

**<sup>44</sup>** Gr. μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, "(what comes) after natural things", i.e. the treatise *Metaphysics*.

**<sup>45</sup>** Sergius speaks several times of his intention to compose commentaries on Aristotle's works on natural philosophy, particularly on *Physics*, cf. §256. Additionally, the present commentary contains several sections which are based on the *Physics* and not on the *Categories* (see §§263–284) and it is possible that here he refers to these sections rather than to his future commentaries.

**<sup>46</sup>** Sergius' division is very close to the account of Philoponus in *In Cat*. 4.35–5.6.

**<sup>47</sup>** Ammonius speaks of the writings which either concern principles of the logical method or the method itself or serve as complements to it: τῶν ὀργανικῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τῆς μεθόδου τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς μεθόδου τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ περὶ τῶν ἄλλως εἰς τὴν μέθοδον συντελούντων (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 5.6–8, cf. Philoponus, *In Cat*. 5.8–14; Simplicius, *In Cat*. 4.28–31).


**<sup>4</sup>** ƎــſųƍƉ] om. P **<sup>5</sup>** ܐŹŴــƊƕ BCD: ܐƀŹŴــƊƕ P | Ǝــ ̇ Ɖ] om. D **7** ܐܦ [om. BCD **<sup>10</sup>** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P | ̇ :BCD ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘــŴܬܐ **12** BCD ܘܐܢ :P ܐܘ ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P **13** ܗܐ BCD: ܗܘܐ P **15** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P | ƎƉ̣ BP: ƅſܐ Ǝ ̇ Ɖ CD **16** ŭƇƘܬܬ BCD: ŭƇƘܐܬ P | ܬܐŴƙƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P | ܐƆܐ ̇ــŴ ܕſــƎ ƕűƀƆــƦܐ ܘƖƐƆــŴܪܘܬܐ ܘƇƀƇƊƆــŴܬܐ ̈ ܢ ܗƌ ŴــƍƉ ƦــƆƦƆ] om. D **<sup>17</sup>** <sup>ܢ</sup> ̈ ŴــƍƉ] om. P **18** ŴƠƀźŹܐƙſƮƘ BCD: ŴƠƀźźƘƮƘ P | ܘܗܝƦſܐ [om. P | ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ C: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D: ܣŴƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P **19** ƎƀƆܗ BCD: Ǝƀƌܗ P | ƢƉܕܐܬܐ CDP: ܘƢƉܕܐܬܐ B ƈƖƆ ƎƉ] om. BD | ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P **<sup>20</sup>** ̇ ųƇſܕ [om. B

29 For now, we intend to speak only briefly about the general division of his writings in order to train the hearing of those who learn, but later on we will speak clearly and specifically about each one of them according to our ability. For a general explanation might be very obscure for those who learn. A particular teaching, instead, would be for them more instructive. While something general is similar to an idea, that which is called particular, instead, is like a perfect depiction of this idea. That is why we shall first think about the former and then turn to the latter.

#### *[Logic, an instrument of philosophy]*


**<sup>48</sup>** Ammonius does not mention this question in the introductory part of his commentary on the *Categories*, although Olympiodorus discusses it at length (*Prolegomena* 14.13–18.12). Elias remarks (*Prolegomena* 26.35–27.1) that it belongs to the study of the *Analytics*, and we indeed find extensive discussions of this topic in the commentaries on the *Prior Analytics* by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius, Philoponus, and Elias himself.

**<sup>49</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr*. 8.20–26; Philoponus, *In An. Pr*. 6.21–24; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 14.18–20.


**<sup>1</sup>** ŴƠƀƉű̈ Ɵܐ P: Ŵ ̈ ƠſܐƉűƟܐ BCD | ܐƆ] om. B | Ŵƕűſ BCD: ܐƌܐ ܥűſ P **2** ƅſܐ P: ƅſܕܐ BCD **<sup>3</sup>** Ǝܒŵܒ BDP: Ǝܒŵܘܒ C | ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **<sup>4</sup>** ̇ ųƆ] om. P **5** ܪܘܣűƘ scr.: ܪܘܣŲƘ P: ܐܕܘܪܘܣƘ BCD | ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **7** ƑſűƀƍƉƢƘ P: ܘܣűƀƍƉܘƢƘ BCD: ܘܣűƍƊſƢƘ corr. D in marg. | ƁƤƌܕܐܬ CDP: ƥƌܕܐܬܐ B | ƎƀƆųƆ BP: Ǝƀ̈ ƌųƆ CD **9** ơƙƉ ܘܢųƆ ܘܢƢܒƐƌ ܐƆܕ ܗܕܐ ƈƕ ųƍƉܕ ƎƀƇſܐ ƎſƢƉܐ ܐŶܘƮܒ [om. P **11** ƅſܐ BCD: ƎƀƇſܐ P **12** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ ܬܐŴƇƀƇƉ] inv. BD | ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P **13** ܐƉܘ CDP: ƈƀƃܗ ܐƉ B | ܕܐųܒ P: ܕܐųܕܒ BCD | ƦſܐƠſƢƏܕ BCD: ܬܗܘܢŴƠſƢƏ P **14** Ǝſűſܗ BCD: ܕܐƅſ | P ܕŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܬܐ :BCD ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ **15** P ܕܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ :BCD ܘܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ | P ܗܕܐ ܐƦــƀƕܬܪ [om. P **<sup>16</sup>** ŴــƠƀźźƘƮƘܕ P: ŴــƠƀźŹ ̈ ܐƘƢƘܕ CD: ŴــƠƀźƘƮƘܕ B **17** ܐŴــźƏܐ P: Ŵ ̈ ƠſܐŴźƏܐ BCD **19** ƅſܐ2 [om. P | ܐƌܗ CDP: ܗܐ B

32 Plato, on the other hand, and all the Academics were not sure in which direction they should move, so that they said various things which contradict one another. For sometimes they assumed logic to be part of philosophy, but sometimes clearly proclaimed it to be its instrument. E.g., in the treatise called *Phaedo* and also in the one called *Phaedrus*, Plato stated that logic was part of philosophy, while in another treatise with the title *Parmenides*, as if he had forgot about the earlier ones, he clearly called logic an instrument50.

33 Those who defend (Plato's views) answer to this that what we consider to be erroneous is not in fact what they mean. We will speak about it after we have first considered those arguments which the Stoics elaborate in order to establish by means of them that, as they believe, logic is a part of philosophy and not its instrument51. As soon as we have refuted and disclosed their haughtiness in this issue and demonstrated that they speak vainly, then we will also show that logic is not both a part and an instrument of philosophy but only an instrument in accord with the view of the Peripatetics.

34 Now, those from the Stoa state that, if there is something that is used by a certain craft and is not found in any other craft as its part or subpart, then it is either a part or a subpart of the craft that uses it. Therefore, if philosophy uses

**<sup>50</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr*. 10.20–24; Philoponus, *In An. Pr*. 9.3–20; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 14.20–27.

**<sup>51</sup>** See §§46–47, below.

̇ ŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ ܐųƌܘ ܕŷƤŶƦƉܐ ŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ ܒŴƇƀƇƊܬܐ: ƈźƉ ܕųſƦƀƆ ƦƍƉܐ ܘƆܐ ƍƉــƦ ƍƉــƦܐ ܕܐܘƍƉــŴܬܐ ܐŶــƢܬܐ܉ ſűſــƖܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕܐܘ r10P ̇ ̇ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ܂ ƎƉ ƇƉــƦܐ ܗƀƃــƈ ųſƦſܐ ܐƦƍƉ ƦƍƉ ̇ ƦƍƉܐ ܐܘ ̇ ųــſƦſܐ ܐƦــƍƉ ƦــƍƉ ̇ ̇ ƍƉــƦܐ ܐܘ ܗܕܐ ƏܒſƢــƎ ܕŷƉــƎſŴ: ܕܐܘ ŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ܂ <sup>5</sup>

 ̇ D57v ųƀƇƕ ƎſƢܒƐƉ ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ ܐƦƍƉ ܐƆܐ ܐƦƍƉ ƦƍƉ Ǝſܕ ŴƆܕ <sup>35</sup> ̇ ܉ ƎſŴŷƉ ܬܘܒ ܘܐܦ ܗܕܐ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ܕűƊƇƃܡ ƋƆ ܕƦƍƉܐ ̣ܗܘ ܕܐųſƦſ ųƆ űƃ ܬܘܒ ųƆܘ :ܐƍƟ ܐƆܘųƆ ̇ ųƆ űƃ ̇ ܘƆŴƘܓܐ ̣ܗܘ ܕűƉܡ ܐƎſƢŶ܉ ųƆ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ƦƍƉܗ܂ ƎſűƉ ܐƎſƢƉ܉ ƌܒƖܐ ƦƀƉűƟ ܗ ܐƍ ̇ B65v Ɵܕ ܐƤƀƍƆ ̇ ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘــŴܬܐ: ܘܐſــƍܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ̈ܬܗ ܕܐſــűܐ ܐſƦſــų <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܗܘƆܐ ܕƍƉــŴ ̇ ƀƌــƤܐ ܕƇƣــƋ ƎſųƤƀƌ܂ ܘܐųƌܘ ܕŸƄƤƌ ƋƆ ܕƀƍƟܐ ƇƀƇƉــŴܬܐ ܗܘƆܐ ܐܘ ̇ ųſƦſܕܐ ƢƉܐƌ ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕƊƇƣܐ ųƆ űŷƆܐ ƎſųƍƉ܉ ܗƎſűſ ƦƍƉܗ r98C ̇ ܕƦƍƉܐ ܗ ŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ܂ ܐƎſűƌ ܬŸƃƦƣ ܕƆܐ ܒŴƇƊܐܐ ܘƆܐ ܒƤƀƍܐ ƊƇƣܐ ŷƆــűܐ ̇ ܂ ƎſųƍƉ܉ ܗƎſűſ Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕܐƇƘܐ ƦƍƉܐ ܕűŶܐ ƎſųƍƉ ܐųſƦſ

<sup>36</sup> ܗܘƆܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܕƦƍƉܐ ƀƉűƟــƦܐ ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘــŴܬܐ ܗ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܝ ܕƉƦƤƉــųܐ ̇ ܬܘܒ ųــƤƀƌ ܐ܂Ʀــƀ̈ ̈ Ʀſܐ ܘܐƤƌ ̈ Ŵܬܐ ܐųƆ ̇ ƎſųƇƃ ܨܒ ܬܐܘܪſܐ܉ ܐųſƦſ ̇ ܝ ܐƢŶܬܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ƦƕűſܗƎſ ƢſƢƣܬܐ ܕܗƎƀƆ܂ ܘܗŴƃܬ ܬܘܒ ܕƦƍƉܐ ܗ ̇ ܕܘܒƢܐ ƀƍƊƇƕܐ ܘŴŷƤƊƉܬܐ ܕſƢƟƦƉܐ ŴƖƏܪܘܬܐ܉ ܗܘƆܐ ܐųſƦſ ܐƉ ƎــƉ̣ ƢــſƦſ ŴــƕܬܙƦƊƆ ܢŴــƠܒƦƤƌ ܐƆܕ Ǝــſܕ Ŵــƌ ̇ ̈ــƤܐ: ܗ ܬܘܒ ܕŶ ܕŷƠƘܐ܂ ųƤƀƌ v10P ̇ ܕƎſ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ƊƆܓܒܐ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕűƕ̈ܪܢ ̣ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ: ܘƢƖƊƆܩ ̈ ƎƀƄ܂ ŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܐƎſƢƉ܉ Ɔܐ ŴƤƉܬƘܐ Ƌƕ űŶܐ Ɖܕ ƎƀƇſܐ ƎƉ̣ ̇ ܉ ̣ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ: Ɔܐ ܒųܘƆܐ ܘƆܐ ܒƤƀƍܐ܂ ƈźƉ ܕܗܘƆܐ ܕŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ ܐųſƦſ ̇ ̇ ܕſــƎ űƉܪƍƃــŴܬܐ ܐſƦſــų ̣ܗܘ ƟــƢŹŴܗ ܐܘƍƉــƀܐ ܕƇƊƉــƇܐ܂ Ƥƀƌــų

̇ + [ܕƤŶƦƉــŷܐ **<sup>1</sup>** ųܒــ BCD | ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **<sup>2</sup>** ̇ ̇ :BDP ܕܐܘ C ܐܘ P ܕƘŴƐƇƇƀƘـــŴܬܐ :BCD ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘـــŴܬܐ **5** P ܕƘŴƐƇƇƀƘـــŴܬܐ :BCD ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘـــŴܬܐ **3 6** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P **7** ƎſŴŷƉ CP, corr. D in marg.: ƎſƢƉܐ BD | ܘܐܦ P: ܐܦ BCD **8** ܗܘ̣ [ om. P **9** ܗƦƍƉ CDP: ųƇſܕ ܐƦƍƉ B **10** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ <sup>P</sup>**<sup>11</sup>** ƋƆ] om. P **<sup>12</sup>** ܐűŷƆ C: ܐűŶűƆ BDP | ܐƦƍƉܕ BCD: ܐƦƍƉܘ P **<sup>15</sup>** ܐƦƍƉܕ BCD: ̇ ܕƦƍƉܗ P | ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P **<sup>19</sup>** Ŵƌ ̇ ̇ Ŵƌܢ :BCD ܗ ܗ P | ܢŴƠܒƦƤƌ BCD: ܢŴŷܒƦƤƌ P | ŴƕܬܙƦƊƆ] + Ǝܒ P | ƢſƦſ BCD: ܐƢſƦſ P **21** ƎƀƇſܐ CDP: ƎƀƆܗ B **22** ܐƆ BCP: ܐƆܘ D

logic and if logic is neither a part nor a subpart of any other craft, it is clear that it is either a part or a subpart of philosophy52. So, they believe to have demonstrated by means of this argument that logic is either a part or a subpart of philosophy.

35 However, they suppose it to be not a subpart but rather a part of philosophy, and they demonstrate this as follows53. Everything that is a part and a portion of something else has the same subject matter (ὕλη) and also the same goal as that thing whose part it is54. Thus, they say, we shall first examine what the subject matter of the parts of philosophy is and what their goal is. If we then discover that logic has such a subject matter and such a goal that correspond to either of them (i.e. the parts of philosophy), then we could say that logic is a subpart of that part to which they correspond. But if one finds out that it corresponds neither in material nor in goal to either of them, then it would become apparent that it may not be their subpart.

36 Now, the subject matter of that primary part of philosophy which is called theory are all divine and human things, while its goal is the true knowledge of them. As for the other part which is called practice, its subject matter is government in the world and moderation of the passions, i.e. not allowing them to act in excess of what is appropriate, while its goal is to choose those things which are profitable and to avoid those which are harmful. So, they say that logic is not associated with any of them either in subject matter or in goal, since the subject matter of logic is skilful organisation of speech, while its goal is applica-

**<sup>52</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr*. 9.6–12: ἐάν τις τέχνη κέχρηταί τινι ὃ μηδεμιᾶς ἄλλης τέχνης μέρος ἐστὶν ἢ μόριον, τοῦτο πάντως ταύτης τῆς τέχνης ἢ μέρος ἐστὶν ἢ μόριον. <...> ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία, φασίν, κέχρηται τῇ λογικῇ, ἥτις οὐδεμιᾶς ἄλλης τέχνης \*\*\* τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀλλ' ἢ μέρος ἢ μόριον. See also Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 14.29–15.2.

**<sup>53</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr*. 9.5–6: συλλογίζονται γὰρ οὕτως.

**<sup>54</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In An. Pr*. 6.31–32: τὸ γὰρ μόριόν τινος καὶ τῆς ὕλης κοινωνεῖ καὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ ἐκείνῳ οὗ ἐστι μόριον.

܂Ʀſܐƞſܬܪ ƋƀƏܬƦƉܕ ܐƇƇƊƉ ƢŹŴƟ űƀܒ Ǝſ ̈ ̈ Ʀſܐ ƮſƢƣܬܐ ܕܗܘ ܕܬŴŶ ƎــƉ̣ ƢܒــƆ ܬܐŴــƇƀƇƉܕ ̇ ųــƤƀƌܘ ̇ C98v ܐܗŴــƇƉ ܗܘ̣ ܐƌƢــŶܕܐ ƈźƉ ƋƆ ƎſűƉ ̇Ŵ ܕƎſ ܕܬܐܘܪſܐ ܘܕŴƖƏܪܘܬܐ: ſűſــƖܐ ̣ܗܝ ̇ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ: ܗƌ ̈ܬܗ ŴƍƉ ̇ ƦƍƉܐ ܕűŶܐ ̣ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ: ܕܗŴƃܬ ܬܬŪƤŶ ܗܘܬ ܕƦƍƉ ƦƍƉܐ ܕųſƦƀƆ ܐųſƦſ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ܂

ƦــƍƉ ̇ <sup>37</sup> ܐƎſƢƉ ܗƈƀƃ ܕƈźƉ ܕƦƀƉűƟ ƎƍſŴŶ ܕܐܘ r66B ̇ ƍƉــƦܐ ̣ܗܝ ܐܘ ƦــƍƉ ̇ ƦƍƉܐ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ: ܗƣܐ ܕƎſ ܐܬŶــƦſŴ ܓƀƇܐſــƦ ܕſƦƀƆــų ̇ ųـــſƦſܐ ŸـــƃƦƣܬ ܐƦـــƍƉܕ ܘܣƢـــƘ ƈـــƃ ƎـــƉ̣ ܐƃƢـــƣ ܐ܉ƦـــƍƉ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ܂ ܐƍƄſܐ ܕƆܐ ƀƄƉــƈ ƦƆܪܬſــƎ ƍƉــŴ r58D ̈ <sup>ܢ</sup> ܬܬƇƘــŭ܉ ܐƆܐ ƦƆƦƆ ŴƍƉ <sup>10</sup> ̈ <sup>ܢ</sup> ܐƅſ ܕܐƎſƢƉ܂ ƦƆܐܘܪſܐ ܘŴƖƐƆܪܘܬܐ ܘŴƇƀƇƊƆܬܐ܂

̈ـــŴ ܐſƢƉـــƎ܉ ƃـــű ƐƉܒſƢـــƎ ܕܬ̈ܪſـــƞܢ 38 ܗƀƆـــƎ ܗƀƃـــƈ ܐŴźƏܐƠſ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ̣ܕƎƉ ̈ Ʀſܗܘܢ ܘƆܐ ƦƤƉ̈ܪƎſ ƆܓƢƊ܂ ܕŴƆܬܗܘܢ ܕܗƎƀƆ ܐƎſƢƉ ܗ ܬŴŶ ܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ űƃ ƎƀƐƄƉ ųƆܘܢ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ܕƆــŴ ܬܪƞſܐſــƦ ܐܬܐƉــƢܬ ̇ ܐƏܒـــƢܘ ܕƠƙƌـــƦ ̇ ܝ ƀƉűƟـــƦܐ: ܕƇźƉـــƦܗ ܘܐܬƐƌܒـــƦ ƇƉـــƦܐ ܗ ܬƦſŴŶܗܘܢ ܬܪƞſܐƦſ܂ ܙܕܩ ܗܘܐ ųƆܘܢ ܓƢƀ ܕƚƇŶ ܗ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܝ ܕܐƢƉܘ ܕƃــƈ űƉܡ ܕŷƤŶƦƉܐ ܒų ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ܐƢŶܬܐ: ܐܢ ƦƀƆܘܗܝ ƍƉــƦܐ ܐܘ r99C | r11P ̇ ƦƍƉ ƦƍƉܐ ܕܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ܐƢŶܬܐ܉ ƙƏŴƌــŴܢ ܗܘܘ ܘƌܐƉــƢܘܢ ܕܐܢ ̇ ܐܘܪܓƍــŴܢ ܕܐܘƍƉــŴܬܐ ̇ ƍƉــƦ ƍƉــƦܐ ܐܘ ƀƆــƦܘܗܝ ƍƉــƦܐ ܐܘ ̇ ƦƍƉܐ ̇ ܝ ܕŷƤŶƦƉܐ ܒų ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐܘ ̇ ܕܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ܗ ܐƢŶܬܐ܉ ܕųƇſ ̇ ܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ܂ ܘܗƍƃܐ Ŵŷƌܘܢ ܗܘܘ ƙƠƌܐƦſ ܕƆܐ ܐܘ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ƦƍƉ ƦƍƉܐ ܐܘ ̇ ƇƀƇƉــŴܬܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ƦƍƉܐ ܘƆܐ ƦƍƉ ƦƍƉܐ ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘــŴܬܐ ܐſƦſــų

> **<sup>2</sup>** ƋƆ BCD: ŴƆ P | ̇ ųƤƀƌܘ BCD: ܐƤƀƌܘ P | ܬܐŴƇƀƇƉܕ BCD: ̇ :BCD ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ **3** P ܕŴƇƀƇƉܬܗ .om] 1ƦƍƉܐ **4** D ܬܐܘܪſܐ ܘŴƖƏܪܘܬܐ :BCP ܕܬܐܘܪſܐ ܘܕŴƖƏܪܘܬܐ | P ܕŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܬܐ P | ܬŴــƃܕܗ BCD: Ǝــƃܕܗ P **5** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **7** ܐƦƍƉ] + ܗܝ̣ BCD ̇ **<sup>8</sup>** P ܕƘŴƐƇƇƀƘــŴܬܐ :BCD ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘــŴܬܐ ųſƦſܐ P: ̇ ųſƦſܕܐ BCD **9** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ̈ ܢ **10** P ܕŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܬܐ ŴƍƉ] + ŭƇƘܬܬ B | ƅſܐ <sup>ܢ</sup> ̈ ŴƍƉ] om. P | ƎſƢƉܕܐ BCD: ƎſƢƉܐ P **13** ƑƀƇŹŴــźƐſܐܪ C: ƑƀƇŹŴــźƏܐܪ D: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܐܪ B: ܣŴƀƇƇźźƐſܐܪ P | ܬƢƉܐܬܐ ƦܒــƐƌܘܐܬ BCD: ƦܒƐƌܐܬ P **14** ƦƠƙƌܕ BC, corr. D in marg.: ƦƙƠƌܕ DP **16** ܘܗܝƦƀƆ ܐܢ ̇ ƦƍƉ ƦƍƉܐ ܕܐܘƍƉــŴܬܐ ܐŶــƢܬܐ ܐܘ ܐƦƍƉ] om. hom. C **20** ܐƍƃܘܗ P: ܬŴƃܘܗ BCD P ܕŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܬܐ :BCD ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ **21**

tion of correct arguments that are arranged properly by means of ordered speech. Therefore, since both the subject matter and the goal of logic are different from those of the parts of philosophy, i.e. of theory and practice, it is clear that it is not a part of any of them and it thus may not be considered to be a subpart of philosophy55.

37 Hence, they say, since we have first shown that (logic) should be either a part or a subpart of philosophy, but now it has been clearly demonstrated that it is not a subpart, what remains as the only possible conclusion is that it is a part of philosophy, which is thus divided not into two parts but into three parts, as we have said, i.e. into theory, practice, and logic.

38 This is what the Stoics say, being sure that their arguments are straightforward and they have not missed anything. Against it the followers of Aristotle spoke, refuting them as follows: The first premise from which they believe to straightforwardly develop their argument is not correctly formulated and understood56. For instead of saying, "something that is used by a certain craft and is not found in any other craft as its part or subpart", they should have expanded it and said, "if it is not a part, or a subpart, or an instrument of another craft, it is either a part, or a subpart, or an instrument of the craft that uses it". This way, they would have shown consequently that logic is not a part or a subpart of philosophy but its instrument. However, they omit "an instrument"

**<sup>55</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr*. 9.22–34; Philoponus, *In An. Pr*. 6.31–7.8; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In An. Pr*. 1.13–2.1.

**<sup>56</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr*. 10.2: ἐροῦμεν ὅτι παρελογίσαντο. Cf. also Philoponus, *In An. Pr*. 7.10–11: δυνατὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτὸν ἀντιστῆναί τε καὶ ἐλέγξαι τὴν πρότασιν ὡς κακῶς προβεβλημένην.

ܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ܂ ̣ܗŴƌܢ ܕƎſ ƣܒŴƠ ܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ ܘƦƍƉܐ ܘƦƍƉ ƦƍƉܐ ŴƊƏ ƦــƍƉ ܬܐŴــƇƀƇƉ ̇ ܒƦƇƊܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ: ܘܗƃــŴܬ ܐƏܒــƢܘ ܕſŴŶــŴ ܕſƦƀƆــų ƦƍƉܐ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ ܐƆܐ ƦƍƉܐ܂

̇ ܝ ܕƃــƈ 39 ܒــƦܪ ܗܕܐ ܬܘܒ ƀƖƊƣــƎ ƍƉــųܘܢ ܕƠƀźźƘƮƘــŴ܂ ܘܐܦ ܗ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ <sup>ܐ</sup> v66B ̇ űſܐ ̣ܕܗܝ ܕŷƤŶƦƉܐ ܒƍƊــƦܐ ܕܐܘƍƉــŴܬܐ ܐŶــƢܬܐ: ̇ ܂ ܐſــƅ ̇ ܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ ܕųƇſ ̇ ܘſܐ ƦƍƉܗ ̇ ܝ ܕܗ ܗܕܐ ƢƠƀƉܐ ̣ܗܝ ŪŹ ƎƉ ܗ ܘܬܐƢƆŴــƆ Ƣــƀܓ ƎــƀƆܗ ƎــƉ̣ ܘܬܐ܂ƢــƙƆܐ ƈƕܘ ܘܬܐƢƆŴƆ ƈƕ ƎƍſƢƉܕܐ ̈ܕܐ: ܘſــųܒܐ ƆܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƀŷƤŶƦƉــƎ ܒƃƮــܒܐ ܕ̈ܪƃــƤܐ܂ ŴܓــƘ ܐűܒــƕ ̈ ƙƆܐ ܘųſܒܐ ŴƠƆܒźƌƢــŴܬܐ܂ ܘܒűܓــŴܢ ܘܐƢƙƆܘܬܐ ܬܘܒ ƍƉܓűܐ ܐ ƎــƀŷƤŶƦƉܕ ܐƦــƀƉ̈ C99v űƟ ƎــƀƆܗ ƎــƉ̣ Ǝــſųſܬܪܬ ƎــƀƆܗ Ǝــƀƌܐ ܢƮــƠƀƉ ̈ Ǝƀƌ܉ ƎſűƉ ܐųƌܘ ܕƎƀŷƤŶƦƉ ̈ Ǝſ ܗ ųſƦſܐ Ƣƀܓ ƎƀƆܗ ƈźƉ ܂Ǝſųſű̈ ܒƖܒ ̈Ɖــƍܐ ܬܘܒ ܐŶــƌƮܐ ܒƇƀƇƊــŴܬܐ: ܐƌــųܘ ̈ܬܐ ܘܐܘ ܪܗŹــƮܐ ܘܐƏــŴ ̇ ܪܗƢŹܘܬܐ ̇ ŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ܉ ŷƃƦƤƉܐ ųƆ ܕƦƍƉܐ ܐųſƦſ P11v ƎــƀŷƤŶƦƉܕ ƈــźƉ ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘ ƎــƉ̣ ƢــſƦſ ܢƮــƠƀƉܕ ܬܐŴــƀƏܘܐ ܒƦƍƊܗ v58D ̇ ܐƅſ ܕܒܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ܂ ܐƆܐ ƈźƉ ܕܗܕܐ ƢƀƄƣܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕܬܬƋƀƏ ŴــƆ ܉Ǝــƀ̈ ŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ ܒــƦܪ ܪܗŹــƢܘܬܐ ܘܐƀƏــŴܬܐ ̣ܕܗܝ ܐŷƄƣــƦ ܐƌ ̇ ŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ ܐƆܐ ܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ܂ ƦƍƉܐ ܐųſƦſ


**<sup>3</sup>** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P **<sup>4</sup>** ŴƠƀźźƘƮƘܕ P: ŴƠƀź ̈ ŹܐƘƢƘܕ CD: ŴƠƀźƘƢƘܕ B ŴƠƆܒŴźƌƢܬܐ ܘܒűܓŴܢ | BCD ƍƉܓƢܐ :P ƍƉܓűܐ **9** BCD ܒŪƃƢ ̈ܪƤƃܐ :P ܒƃƮܒܐ ܕ̈ܪƤƃܐ **8** ̈ƀƉــƦܐ űƟ ƎــƀƆܗ ƎــƉ̣ Ǝــſųſܬܪܬ ƎƀƆܗ Ǝƀƌܐ ܢƮƠƀƉ BCD: ƎƀƇſܐƆ P **13** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P **14** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **15** ܢŴƍܕܒܐܘܪܓ CDP: ܢŴƍܐܘܪܓ B | ܕܗܕܐ CP: ܗܕܐ BD **16** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **17** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ̇ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ | P ܕŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܬܐ ̇ ܝ ܕųƍƉ P .hom .om] ܐƆܐ ܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ̣ƎƉ ܗ ̇ **<sup>20</sup>** P ܕŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܬܐ :BCD ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ **<sup>19</sup>** ܗƦƍƉ P: ܐƦƍƉ BCD | ܘܣƢƙƇƃ BCD: ܡűƊƇƃ ܘܣƢƙƇƃܘ P **<sup>22</sup>** ܐƀƍƀƟܘ ܐƢܓƌ] inv. P | űܒ̇ <sup>ƕ</sup> BCD: ܐűܒ̇ ƕ P | ܐƦƘܐܪܙ BCD: ܐƦƘܙܪ P

and put only "a part or a subpart" in their statement and thus believe to have shown that logic is not a subpart of philosophy but its part57.

39 After this, we shall listen further to some of the Peripatetics. Whenever some craft makes use of a part of another craft, it is much greater than the one whose part serves as its instrument, as we may say about bridle-making and navigation. One of them, i.e. bridle-making, produces bridles and provides those who use them in horsemanship with them, while navigation gives course to ships and allows one to steer them. Hence in both cases the latter (crafts) are superior to the former ones which they utilize for their service. Provided that this is true, if we consider that rhetors, doctors, and any other craftsmen use logic, then if logic were a part of philosophy it would turn out that rhetoric and medicine are much greater than philosophy for they use its part as their instrument. But since it would be absurd to place philosophy which is the source of rhetoric and medicine after them: logic is not a part of philosophy but its instrument58.

40 Further, merely from the fact that logic originates from philosophy they cannot demonstrate at all that it is a part of philosophy, because not everything that is generated by some craft is necessarily part of it. For, behold, there are plenty of crafts which produce their own instruments, as in the case of carpenters and blacksmiths. For a carpenter produces a hammer, a rule, and a corner,

**<sup>57</sup>** See this argument in Ammonius, *In An. Pr*. 10.2–7 and a more detailed account in Philoponus, *In An. Pr*. 7.10–23.

**<sup>58</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr*. 10.9–26; Philoponus, *In An. Pr*. 8.1–15; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 15.31–16.10; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In An. Pr*. 2.22–33. Sergius' account finds its closest parallel in Philoponus.

ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ܐܘ̈ܪܓƍܐ ܕܐܘŴƍƉܬܗ ܘŴƆ ƦƍƉܗ r100C ̇ ܂ ܘƍƀƟــƀܐ ܬܘܒ Əــƌűܐ ̈ ܐƌܐ ܕŸƤŶƦƉ ܒųܘܢ ܘŴƆ ƦƍƉܐ Ɖ ܘܢųſƦſܕܐ :ܐƦƘܘܐܪܙ ųƆ ƈƤ̇ B67r Ŷ ƎـــƉ̣ ƎـــƘܐ ܬܐŴـــƇƀƇƉ ܘܐܦ ƎـــſűƉ ܬܗ܂ŴـــƍƉܕܐܘ ܐƦـــƕűſ ƎـــƉ̣ ̈ܬܐ܉ Ŵܕܨܒــ ƎſܗƦſŴــŶܬ ƈــźƉ ƦــƊƀƟܘܐܬ ƦــŷƃƦƣܐ ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘ ̇ ŷƉــſŴܐ ųſƦƀƆ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ƦƍƉܐ ̣ƎƉ ŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ ܐƆܐ ܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ: ܕܒܐűſܗ ̈ƀƐــƎ܂ źƏــƢ ̣ƉــƎ ܗܕܐ ܓƀــƢ Ɔܐ Ɖــſƞܐ ܗܘܬ ̇ Ƈــƀܐ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƃ ܘܓ ܐ܂Ƥƍƀƍ ̈ P12r ܕܒ ܐƢƉŴƖƆ ܐܬܐƊƆ ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘ

	-

̈ܬܐ܉ ƦƉܒźــƈ ŴــƍƉ ƎــſųƇƃ Ǝ̈ 42 ܬܘܒ ܐƎſƢƉ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ܕܐܢ ƐƌƦƉܒ ̈ܬܐ ܕųƇſ܂ ŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ ܕƎſ ܐƅſ ŴƍƉ ƎſųſƦſܕܐ ܐƉ ܘ ̇ B67v ܗ ܘܐܦ ųƆ

**<sup>1</sup>** ƎſųſƦſܕܐ BCD: ܘܢųſƦſܕܐ P **3** ƎƘܐ BCD: ܐܦ P **4** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **5** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **6** ƎــƀƇſܐ BCP: Ǝــƀƌܐ D **7** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **9** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **11** ܗƦــƍƉ P: ܐƦــƍƉ BCD ̇ **<sup>20</sup>** P ܕŴƘŴƐƀƇƇƀƘܬܐ :BCD ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ **<sup>14</sup>** ܗƦƍƉ BCD: ܐƦƍƉ P | ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴــƏŴƙƀƇƇƀƘܕ P **21** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴــƏŴƙƇƇƀƘ P **23** ܘܐܦ P: ܐܦ C: om. BD ̈ ܬܐ ܕųƇſ ŴƍƉ] inv. P | ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P

which are instruments for his craft and not a part of it. And also a blacksmith forges an anvil and a hammer, which are tools that he uses and not a part of his craftsmanship. That is why logic too, even though it is produced and established by philosophy for the sake of demonstrating things, is not a part of philosophy but an instrument, by means of which it shows and makes visible things that are hidden. Without it, in fact, it would be impossible for philosophy to enter the world of men59.

41 Also, from the defining account of the part it becomes evident that logic is clearly an instrument of philosophy. For a part is something that completes the thing whose part it is when it is present in it and makes it deficient when taken away from it60. E.g., we say that, when a leg which is a part of a body is in it, it makes the whole (body) complete, but when it is separated from (the body), it makes it deficient. But logic neither makes the nature of philosophy complete when it is present nor does it make the latter in any way deficient if it is not present. In fact, its essence is in things, for it is knowledge of all existing things in which it exists, regardless of whether we comprehend them or not. For logic reveals to us those things which we do not comprehend61 and it is knowledge whose essence is in things, regardless of whether we know them or not. Thus, we need logic by means of which we come to our knowledge. And consequently, logic is not a part of philosophy but an instrument by means of which philosophy becomes known to us62.

42 Further, they say the following. If all the parts are removed from something whose parts they are this thing will perish too. But as we have just said, philo-

**<sup>59</sup>** Cf. a brief note by Ammonius, *In An. Pr*. 9.36–10.1 and a lengthy account of this argument by Philoponus, *In An. Pr*. 7.23–8.6. See also Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 15.23–30.

**<sup>60</sup>** Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 17.6–7: τὸ μέρος συμπληρωτικόν ἐστι τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πράγματος· ἀμέλει τοι παρὸν μὲν σώζει τὸ ὅλον ἀπὸν δὲ φθείρει.

**<sup>61</sup>** Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 17.10–11: ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄνθρωποι τῆς λογικῆς ἐδεήθημεν πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν, τῆς δὲ ἀποδείξεως εἰς κατάληψιν τῶν κεκρυμμένων. See also Philoponus, *In An. Pr*. 8.24–25.

**<sup>62</sup>** For this argument, see Ammonius, *In An. Pr*. 8.26–33; Philoponus, *In An. Pr*. 8.21–27; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 17.4–17.

̇ ܘ ܕܬܬƐƌــŪ ƇƀƇƉــŴܬܐ źƉــƈ ܕܐƌƢƉــƎ ܗƣܐ܉ Ɔܐ ƦƉܒźــƇܐ ܐܢ ܗ ̇ ƇƀƇƉـــŴܬܐ ̇ ܐſƦſـــų ̇ ܂ ܘܒűܓـــŴܢ ƆـــŴ ƍƉـــƦܗ ܕܐſـــƦܘܗܝ ƍƀƃـــų ̇ ܂ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ ܕųƇſ

<sup>43</sup> ܒƦܪ ܗƎƀƆ ܕƎſ ܙܒƍܐ ̣ܗܘ ܕܐܦ ŴƆܬ <sup>ܗ</sup> v12P ̇ Ŵƌܢ ̣ܕƎƉ ܐƀƊſűƟܐ ܕܐƎſƢƉ ܕŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ ƋƆ ƦƍƉܐ ̣ܗܝ ܐűŷƃ ܘܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ ƊƆܐƢƉ܂ r1L ̇ ƍƉــƦܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘــŴܬܐ ܘƆــŴ ųــƆ ƎــƀƊƀƏܕ Ƣــƀܓ ܢŴــƌ ̇ C101r ܗ ܬŴــƆ ̇ ܒƢ ܐƌܐ ܗܘܬ ŴƍƐƄƉܬܐ ܒűƀ ܗƀƆــƎ ܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ܉ ƠƙƏܐƦſ ܐƅſ ܕƏ ܕܐܬܐƢƉ܂ Ŵƕűƌܢ ܗƈƀƃ ܘܐܦ ܗƎƀƆ܉ ܕŪŹ ƏܓــƁ ƇŷƤƉــƙܐ ƍƉــƦܐ ܡűــƉ ƈــźƉ ŴــƆܘ ̇ ̇ ܐſƦſــų ̣ƉــƎ ܐܘܪܓƍــŴܢ܂ ƍƉــƦܐ ܓƀــƢ ƇźƉــƦܗ ܐƎſƢŶ܂ ܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ ܕƎſ ƈźƉ ƦŷƤŶܐ ܕܐƌƢŶܐ ƐƌƦƉــŪ ܘƆــŴ źƉــƈ <sup>10</sup> ̇ űſܐ ̣ܕܗܝ ƉــƎ ̇ ƦƍƉܐ ܐƢŶܬܐ <sup>ܐ</sup> ̇ ܪܓƇܐ ܐܘ ųƉŴƍƟ܂ ܐűſܐ ܓƢƀ ܐܘ ̇ ƠƉــŶűܐ܉ ̇ ƐƉــƢܐ ܐܘ ̇ ܂ Ƥƕــƙܐ ܕſــƎ ܐܘ ̇ ܐſƦſــų ܗƦſ ƈźƉ ܐƢܓƘ


**<sup>3</sup>** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ [om. P **<sup>4</sup>** ܐƀƊſűƟܐ P: ܐſܐƉűƟܐ B: ܐܐƀƉűƟܐ CD **<sup>5</sup>** ܗܝ̣ BCDL: ̇ ųſƦſܐ P űــŷƃܐ BCD: ܐűــŷƃܐ P | ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P **6** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ̄ :L ܕŴƙƐƇƀƘܬܐ Ŵ̄ ƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P | ŴƆܘ BCDL: ̇ ܐܘ P **<sup>9</sup>** ܡűƉ] om. P **<sup>11</sup>** ܐƇܪܓ ̇ ܘܪܓƇܐ :BCDL ܐܘ <sup>P</sup>**<sup>12</sup>** ̇ ܘܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ ܘܬܘܒ ܗƍƃܐ | P ܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ :BCD ܘܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ **14** P ܘƟــűܝ :BCDL 2ܐܘ ̈ ܬܗ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐſųſƦſــƎ ƍƉــŴ ܗ ųــƇƃ ܐűܒƕ Ūƃܕܬܬܪ ܘųƌܐ ̣ ܐƦƍƉ Ƌƕ ܐƦƍƉ] lac. in L **15** ܐűܒƕ BDP: ܢűܒƕ C **17** ƈƃ] om. CP | ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ BCDL: ܘܢųſƦſܕܐ P **19** űŷƃܐ BCDL: ̄ :BCDL ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘــŴܬܐ **<sup>20</sup>** P ܐŷƃــűܐ ŴــƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P | ŴــƠƀƉ̈ űƟܐ L: ŴــƠſܐƉ̈ űƟܐ BCD: ŴƌܐƉ̈ űƟܐ P | ̇ P ܘƦƍƉܐ :BCDL ƦƍƉܐ **21**...ܐܘ

sophy will not perish if logic is removed from it, since this is what its nature is. Consequently, logic is not a part of philosophy but its instrument63.

43 After this, it is time to speak about those from the Academy who state that logic is both a part and an instrument of philosophy. For I suppose that by means of what was said a sufficient refutation has been provided of those who state that it is only a part of philosophy. Now, we shall also understand that a part differs very much from an instrument. For a part exists in virtue of itself and not in virtue of something else, while an instrument is used for the benefit of something else and not in virtue of itself. For instance, a hand, a leg, or any other part of the body exists in virtue of itself, while an axe, a saw, or a drill exists in order to be used by something else and not in virtue of itself. Therefore, it is clear that a part and an instrument are not same thing64.

44 And further, the following (argument). If one part is attached to another part, together they will bring about the whole whose parts they are. However, if you attach one instrument to another a thousand times, they will never bring about the whole thing whose instruments they are. Hence the instrument and the part differ from one another. That is why logic may not be at the same time both an instrument and a part of philosophy, as Plato and all the Academics state, but it is either only a part, which is not possible as we have shown above

**<sup>63</sup>** Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 17.14–15: ἡ λογικὴ ἀναιρουμένη οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν· ἡ λογικὴ ἄρα ὄργανον τῆς φιλοσοφίας. See also Ammonius, *In An. Pr*. 10.9–11; Philoponus, *In An. Pr*. 8.27–29.

**<sup>64</sup>** Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 16.30–34: ἴδιον μέρους ἐστί, φασί, τὸ δι' αὑτὸ παραλαμβάνεσθαι, ὀργάνου δὲ τὸ δι' ἕτερον παραλαμβάνεσθαι. εἰ δὲ ἡ λογικὴ οὐ δι' ἑαυτὴν παραλαμβάνεται ἀλλὰ δι' ἕτερον, διὰ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, τὸ δὲ δι' ἄλλο παραλαμβανόμενον τοῦ δι' ὃ παραλαμβάνεται ὄργανόν ἐστιν, ἡ λογικὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἔστι μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀλλ' ὄργανον. See also Philoponus, *In An. Pr*. 8.25–27.

̇ ܐܘܪܓƍــŴܢ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ܐſــƅ ܕܬܒــƗ ̈ ƠſŴźــŴ: ܐܘ ܒŴƍƐƄƊܬܐ ܕƆــŴܬ Ə ̇ ƦƍƉܐ ܐűŷƃ ܘܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ܂ Ƣƣܪܐ܂ ܘܕܓƇܐ ̣ܗܝ ƦƇƉܗܘܢ ܕƎƀƊƀƏ ųƆ

űƃ ܗܝ̣ ܐűſܐ ƋƆ ܕܗܐ :ƢƉܐƊƆ ƎſűƖƉ ܕܐܦ <sup>ܝ</sup> ̇ D59v | P13r <sup>ܗ</sup> ܘܢƢƉܐƌ Ǝſűƌܐ <sup>45</sup> ̇ ̇ ܘܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ܉ ƦƉܗƄƘܐ ųƀƇƕܘܢ܂ ܕܐƎƘ ܐųſƦſ ̣ܗܝ ƦƍƉܐ ܐųſƦſ ̇ ܐűſܐ ̣ܗܝ űƃ ̣ܗܝ ƦƍƉܐ ܐűŷƃ ܘܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ܉ ܐƆܐ ŴƆ ܕųƇſ <sup>5</sup> ̇ űƃ ܕƇſــų ̇ ̇ ــƎ ܐſƦſــų ܕŶــűܐ ܨܒــŴܬܐ ܐſƦſــų v1L ̇ ܬܪܬſųſــƎ܂ źƉــƈ ܕƍƉــƦܐ Ɖ ̇ܒــűܐ ƕ ̇ ܕƘܓƢܐ܂ ܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ ܕƎſ ƆــŴ ܕƘܓــƢܐ ܐƆܐ ܕƙƌــƤܐ܂ ܕܒܐſــűܗ ̇ ܘܐ ƍƠƌŴƏܐ ƈƕ ƦŷƤŶܗܘܢ܂ ƎſűƉ ܘƆܐ ܗܕܐ ŴƊƄŶ: ܐƎƀƇſ ̈ƕܐ: ܕܗ ܙܘ ̇ ŴƇƀƇƊƆܬܐ܂ ܕƦƍƉܐ ܘܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ ƎƀƊƀƏ ųƆ

<sup>46</sup> <sup>ܗ</sup> r102C ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕƎſ ̣ܕƎƉ ŴźƇƘܢ܉ ƎƀƠƙƌ ܪܘŶܐ ŴƙƇŶܗܝ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ܕƇƀƇƉــŴܬܐ ƎــƉ ƢــźƏ ̇ ̇ ̣ܗܝ ƍƟــųƉŴ ̇ ܘ ܕܐſƦſــų ̈ــƀܐ ŶƦƉــſŵܐ܂ ܒــų ƌܙ ƎــſܪƦܒ ƋــƆ ̇ ܂ ܕܐſــƅ ܐƄſــƍܐ ̈ܬܐ ŵŶƦƉܐ ƟــųƊſŴ ̇ ܘ ܕܒƎſų ܒƞܒŴ ̈ Ŵܬܐ: ܘܒų ܨܒ ̈ƀܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ܉ ̈ Ŵܬܐ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܒųܘܢ ܒƎƀƆų ܬܪƎſ ܙƌ ܐƎſƢƉ ܕܐܦ ܨܒ ̇ ̇ ܕܬܪܬſــƎ܂ ܗܕܐ ƆــƋ ܘܒــų ܐƅſ ܙƌܐ ܕƤƉــƦŶŴܐ ܕŶــűܐ ܐƉــƦܐ ܐܘ ܒƤƊــƦŶŴܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƟــųƊſŴ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܂ ܘܒܓــƊƣŴܐ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ܐſــƍܐ ̣ܕܗܘ ̇ ̇ ܕƢƊŶܐ ܐܘ ̈ ƀܐ ܐܘ ̇ ܂ ܘƇƀƃܐ ƋƆ ܬܘܒ ܕƉ ̇ ܐ ųƊſŴƟ ̇ ܗܘ ܕŸƤƉƦƉ ܒų ̇ ̈ƎƇƀ܉ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ƆــƋ ̣ܗܘ ƍƟــųƉŴ ̈ܬܐ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕƦƉܬƃ ܕűŶܐ ̣ƎƉ ܨܒŴ ̈ƎƇƀ ܒــų܂ ƐƟــźܐ ƃܬƦƉܕ Ǝƀƌ ̈ ̈ܬܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> Ƈƀƃܐ: ܘܐƦſܘܗܝ ܬܘܒ ܐܦ ܒƞܒŴ ̇ ƤƉــŷܐ ̈ ــƀܐ ܐܘ Ɖ ̇ ܓƀــƢ ƟƦƉــƢܐ ̣ܗܘ ƀƃــƇܐ: ܘƊŶــƢܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܘ ܕƦƉܬƈƀƃ ƦƀƇƉܗ܂ ܗŴƃܬ ܘܐܦ ŴƉܕſܐ ̣ܗܘ Ƈƀƃܐ ƟƦƉــƢܐ ܘŶــź <sup>20</sup> ̈ <sup>ܐ</sup> ܬܘܒ ƦƀƇƉܗ܂

**<sup>1</sup>** ŴــƠſŴź ̈ Ə L: ŴƠſܐŴź ̈ Əܐ BCDP **2** ƎƀƊƀƏܕ BCDL: ƎƀƊƀƏܘ P | űŷƃܐ BCDL: ܐűŷƃܐ P **<sup>4</sup>** ܐƦƍƉ BCDL: ܗƦƍƉܐ P | ̇ ̇ + [1ܐųſƦſ ̇ ܐűſܐ **<sup>5</sup>** (.ditt (P ܐűſܐ ̣ܗܝ űƃ ̣ܗܝ ƦƍƉܗ ܐųſƦſ ̇ ܕŶــűܐ ܨܒــŴܬܐ ܐſƦſــų ųــƇſܕ űــƃ ̇ ̣ܗܝ űƃ ̣ܗܝ ƦƍƉܐ ܐűŷƃ ܘܐܘܪܓƍــŴܢ ܐƆܐ ƆــŴ ܕƇſــų ܐƦــƍƉܕ ƈــźƉ Ǝــſųſܬܪܬ [lac. in L | űــŷƃܐ BCD: ܐűــŷƃܐ P **9** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCDL: ̇ **<sup>11</sup>** P ܕŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܬܐ ųſƦſܕܐ BCDL: ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ P | ܗܝ̣ [ om. BCD **<sup>12</sup>** ̇ ųƊſŴƟ L, corr. D in marg.: ̇ ųƉŴƍƟ BCDP **<sup>13</sup>** ܬܐŴ ̈ ̈ Ŵܬܐ :BCDP ܨܒ ܒƞܒ L **<sup>14</sup>** ƋƆ] + ܐܦ P **<sup>15</sup>** ̇ ųƊſŴƟ LP: ̇ ųƉŴƍƟ BCD **<sup>16</sup>** ŸƤƉƦƉܕ BCDP: ŸƤŶƦƉܕ L | ܐƢƊŶܕ ̇ ̇ | L ܘܕƢƊŶܐ :BCDP ܐܘ ̇ **<sup>19</sup>**...2ܐܘ .lac] 2ܐܘ in L **18** ܐܦ BCD: ܘܐܦ P | ܐźــƐƟ BCP: ܬܐƞــƟ D **19** ܐƢــƟƦƉ P: ܐſƢــƟƦƉ BCD ܗŴƃܬ ܘܐܦ | D ܘܗŴƃܬ :B ܘܗŴƃܬ ܘܐܦ :P ܗŴƃܬ ܘܐܦ | P ܕƈƀƃƦƉ :BCD ܕƦƉܬƈƀƃ **20** ̈ ܐ ܬܘܒ ƦƀƇƉܗ źŶܘ ܐƢƟƦƉ ܐƇƀƃ ܗܘ̣ ܐſܕŴƉ] om. hom. C | ܗܘ̣ BP: ܐܘ D

in our refutation of the Stoics, or only an instrument, as the truth requires. So the statement of those who consider it both part and instrument is false65.

45 And if they say, as they are accustomed to do, "Behold, a hand may at the same time be a part and an instrument!", one should answer them that, even if the same hand might be both a part and an instrument, however it cannot be both of them for one and the same thing. For it is a part of the body, while it is an instrument not of the body but of the soul which uses it in order to make necessary movements. But this is what those who set logic as a part and an instrument of philosophy do not comprehend66.

46 The followers of Plato, however, say in his defence that logic may be considered in two ways. On the one hand it exists by itself apart from things, and on the other it is in things that its subsistence may be observed. Also, of other objects, e.g. of a measure of one or two cubits, we say that they exist in the same two ways. On the one hand it exists in measure, and on the other its subsistence is in some other body that is measured. Thus, some amount of water or wine or other things that can be measured exists by itself as the measure but also in those things that are measured by it. Also a pint is said both of the measure and of wine or water or oil whose amount is measured. Similarly, a peck is said of the measure and also of grain of a certain amount67.

**<sup>65</sup>** A short version of this argument is found in Philoponus, *In An. Pr*. 8.29–31: καὶ πάλιν συντιθέμενα τὰ μέρη ποιεῖ τὸ ὅλον, τὰ δὲ ὄργανα οὐδαμῶς· τὰ ἄρα μέρη οὐκ ὄργανα.

**<sup>66</sup>** Philoponus suggests the same ficticious dialogue, see *In An. Pr*. 8.31–36: εἰ δέ τις εἴποι 'καὶ μὴν ἡ χεὶρ μέρος οὖσά ἐστι καὶ ὄργανον, ὥστε οὐκ ἄτοπον τὴν λογικὴν καὶ ὄργανον οὖσαν εἶναι καὶ μέρος', φαμὲν ὅτι ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ· οὐ γὰρ οὗ ἐστι μέρος ἡ χείρ, τούτου ἐστὶ καὶ ὄργανον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο· μέρος μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος ὡς σώματος, ὄργανον δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς. Olympiodorus also presents this imagined speech which he puts in the mouth not of some anonymous Platonist but of Plato himself: *Prolegomena* 17.18–23.

**<sup>67</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr*. 10.36–38 and 11.15–20; Philoponus, *In An. Pr*. 9.3–5 and 9.13–15; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 15.23–29.


48 ƉܐƉــƢܐ ܗƀƃــƈ ܗƌܐ ƉűƟــƀܐ܉ ƐƌــŪ ƏــƄܐ ܒƆƦــƦܐ ̈ܪƣܐ ̇ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ ܘƆŴƘܓܐ ܕܐܬܬŴƊƀƏ ܒų ܕܐųſƦſܘܢ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ƆŴƘܓų ̈ܬܗ ܕܐܪźƐſـــƑƀƇŹŴ܂ ܘܒƖـــƦܐ ܕƕـــƈ ܕܓـــŴܐ ܕſųƇƃـــƎ ƦƄƉܒƍـــŴ ƇƀƇƉــŴܬܐ: ܕܐܢ ƍƉــƦܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘــŴܬܐ ܘܐܢ ܐܘܪܓƍــŴܢ ܕƇſــų <sup>15</sup> ̇ ̇ ܕŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ ܐƎƍſƢƉ܂ ̇ ܕųƇſ ̇ ܂ ܒƊܐƢƉܐ ܕƎſ ܕܬܪƎſ ƈƕ ųƤƀƌ ܐųſƦſ ܐ܂ƀƉűƟ ܐƢƉܐƉ ƋƇƣ

**<sup>1</sup>** ܘܐܦ LP: ܐܦ BCD **<sup>4</sup>** ܐƉ BCDL: ܐƉܕ P | ܐƇــƇƊƊܕܒ P: ܐƦــƇƊܕܒ BCD: ܐƦƀ ̈ Ɖűܕܒ L **<sup>5</sup>** ƦſܐƍƉܐܘ BCDP: ܬܐŴƍƉܐܘ L **<sup>6</sup>** ܐܡƏ BCLP: ƋƏ D | Ǝ ̇ Ɖ] om. BCD **8** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴــƙƐƇƀƘܕ L: ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P **<sup>9</sup>** ƥــƌܐ [+ ̇ ųܒــ P | ܗƦــƕűƀܒ CDP: ܗƦــƀƕܪƦܒ B **12** ܐƌܗ [om. B **13** ŴƊƀƏܕܐܬܬ CDP: ƋƀƏܕܐܬܬ B | ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P **14** ƑƀƇŹŴــــźƐſܕܐܪ C: ƑƀƆųŹŴــــźƐſܕܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴــــźƏܕܐܪ D: ܣŴــــƀƇźźƐſܕܐܪ P **15** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ ƎƉ P **17** ܐƀƉűƟ] + ƎƀƉܐ ܐƍƀƉܐ ܐŷܒŴƣ ųƀƆܘ B: + ܕƢƏܓƑƀ ܪƀƍƀƖƤſܐ܂ ܨŴƆ ƈƕ ƀźŶܐ ܕƢƏܛ ܘܨŴƆܬܐ ƇƙƆܓܐ ܬźƉܐ ܐܢ ܕŪŹ ܘܐܢ ܕܒƥƀ܂ P

47 In the same way, they say, also logic exists for its own sake and for the sake of something else that uses it. It exists for its own sake when one observes it in his intellect without applying it in speech and in demonstrations. But it exists for the sake of what uses it when it is skilfully applied in speech, in combination of words, and in demonstrations. That is why Plato regarded it both as instrument and part. He took it for an instrument when considered in its application through the combination of words and demonstrations. But he regarded it as a part of philosophy when one contemplates it in pure knowledge in his intellect apart from its application by something else68. Now, whether they are speaking well or they are far from understanding, that is what you will distinguish and comprehend yourself while reading this.

Here ends the first book, wherein three points69 48 have been discussed, namely the division of philosophy, the general division of all the writings of Aristotle, and the question of whether logic is a part of philosophy or its instrument. In the second book, we will speak about the goal of logic.

End of Book One.

**<sup>68</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr*. 11.3–20; Philoponus, *In An. Pr*. 9.5–20; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 15.29–37.

**<sup>69</sup>** Syr. *reše*, corresponding to Gr. τὰ κεφάλαια, "headings", the main points discussed in the introductory part of a treatise.

̇ ܕƉܐƢƉܐ ƀƉűƟܐ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ųƇſܕ ܓܐƆ̈ P14r ŴƘ

B69r | C103r ܐƀƉűƟ ܓܐƆŴƘ ̈ƀܐ ƦƆܐܘܪſܐ ܘŴƖƐƆܪܘܬܐ܂ ƌܙ ƎſܪƦƆ ܬܐŴƙƏŴƇƀƘ ܓܐƇƘƦƉ ̈ƍƙƆܐ ܘƕűƀƆــƦܐ ̈ ſــƦܐ ܘƀƆــŴ ܬܐܘܪſܐ ƇƘƦƉــܓܐ ƕűƀƆــƦܐ ܕܐųƆ ܕƍƀƃ <sup>5</sup> ̈Ʀƀܐ܂

̈ƍƙƆܐ ƇƘƦƉܓƀــƎ ŷƊƆــƢܘܬܐ ܘƀƍƊƆــŴܬܐ ܘƆܐƢźƏܘƌــƀƉŴܐ Ŵــſ ܘŴƠƀƏŴƊƆܪܘܬܐ܂

ŴƖƏܪܘܬܐ ƇƘƦƉܓܐ űƊƆܒŴƌƢܬܐ ܕƇƃــų ƕــƊܐ ܘűƊƆܒƌƢــŴܬܐ ̈ſــƍܐ ̈Əܐ ܘűƆ ܕܒƦƀܗ ܕܐƥƌ ܘűƊƆܒŴƌƢܬܐ ܕųƉŴƍƟ ܕܐƥƌ܂ ƋƀƐƆ ƊƌــŴ ܬ̈ܪƞſܐ܂ <sup>10</sup>

ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕܬܪƎſ

̈ܬܗ ܕܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ ŴƍܒƦƄƉ

ƎſųƍƉ ܐƮƀƉܢ űƀŷſܐƦſ – ܗƎƀƆ ܐܓƮܬܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ܂ ̈ƍƀܐ ƃ ƈƕܘ ܐƊ ̈ Ɗƕܕ ܐƮܕܘܒ ƈƕ ƎƀƆܗ – ƦſܐƕƞƉ ƎſųƍƉܘ ܕŴƀŶ <sup>15</sup> ̈ܬܐ܂ ƎܒــƦ̈ ƄƉ ܐƌܗܕŴــƖƆܕ ƅــſܐ ƎــſųƍƉ – ƦſܐƌŴܓــ ƎــſųƍƉܘ ܘƎſųƍƉ ܒŴƤܐƆܐ ܘܒƁƌŴƙ ƦƘܓƊܐ ܘƎſųƍƉ ܐƅſ ̣ܕƎƉ űŶ ƢƘܨܘƘܐ ܐƮƀƉܢ܂

̈Ɔܓܐ **<sup>1</sup>** ŴƘ CDP: ܓܐƆ̈ ŴƘ ܬܘܒ B | ̇ ųƇſܕ [om. B | ܐƢƉܐƉܕ [+ ܐƌܗ BCD | ܘܢųſƦſܐ CDP: ܘܢųſƦſܕܐ B **<sup>2</sup>** ܐƀƉűƟ] + Ŵƌܗ P **<sup>3</sup>** ܬܐŴƙƏŴƇƀƘ ܓܐƇƘƦƉ] inv. P | ܐƀ̈ ƌܙ ƎſܪƦƆ] om. P **4** ܓܐƇƘƦƉ ܐſܬܐܘܪ [om. BCD **6** ܐƀƉŴƌܘƢźƏܐƆܘ [om. P **8** ܓܐƇƘƦƉ ܪܘܬܐŴƖƏ] om. ̈ ܬܗ ܕܐܪƀƇźźƐſـــŴܣ :BCD ƘـــƆŴܓܐ ܕܬܪſـــƎ **11** BCD ŴـــƍܒƦƄƉ Ŵـــƌܗ ̄ P ƘـــƆŴܓܐ ܕܒ ̈ ܬܗ **12** ŴƍܒƦƄƉ P: ܬܗ ̈ ŴƍܒƦƄƉܕ BCD | ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ C: ̄ ܕܐܪƑƀƆųŹŴźƏ :B ܕܐܪŴźƐſܛ D: ܣŴƀƇźźƐſܕܐܪ P **<sup>13</sup>** ܢƮƀƉܐ [om. P **<sup>18</sup>** ܢƮƀƉܐ [+ ƎſųƍƉܘ Ǝ ̈ ƊƀƏ ܐƦſ ̈ ųƆܐ ƈƕ ƎſųƍƉ ܡűــƟ ƎــſųƍƉ ܬܐ܂ŴــƇƀƇƉ Ǝــſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ ̈Ǝ ܘƎſųƍƉ ܐܘ̈ܪܓƦƀƍܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܗƌ ̈Ʀƀܐ ƦƄƉܒ ƍƀƃ ƈƕ ̈ــƎ ƆــŴܬ ŷƤŶ ƎــſųƍƉܘ ܐƦſ ̈ ̇ ܕܐܘƍƉــŴܬܐ ܕܬŶــŴ ܐܘƍƉــŴܬܐ ܐſųſƦſــƎ ܘſųƍƉــƎ ƀƇƕــų BCD ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ܗܕܐ܂

$$\mathbf{P14r}$$

#### *The divisions of Book One are the following:70*

#### *First division*

Philosophy is divided into two kinds, theory and practice.

Theory is divided into the knowledge of divine things, the mathematical sciences, and the knowledge of natural things.

The mathematical sciences are divided into geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music.

Practice is divided into rule over all people, rule over one's own house, and rule over oneself; into the law-givers and the upright judges.

#### *Second division*

Aristotle's writings:


**<sup>70</sup>** All extant manuscripts containing Sergius' *Commentary* include after each one of the seven books tables which depict the division of the key-terms discussed in these books. Due to the technical limitations of a critical edition, it is impossible to represent these division in the same form. Instead, they are indicated as plain text. See the Appendix, where the divisions are presented in the diagram form.

**<sup>71</sup>** Mss. BCD add: "Some of them are dedicated to divine things, some are written about natural things, and some are instrumental, namely logic. Some of the (latter) are before this craft, some are about this craft of demonstrations, and some are attached to this craft."

#### B69v | Ǝſܕܬܪ ܐƢƉܐƉ


49

̈ܬܐ <sup>50</sup> ſŵŶƦƉܐ ƁƆ ܗƈƀƃ ܐܘ ܐŴŶܢ܉ ̣ܕƎƉ Ƥƀƌܐ ܕƈƕ ܗƎƀƆ ƦƄƉܒŴƍ ܕſųƆــƎ ƣــƢܟ ƘــƆŴܓܐ ܗƌܐ: ܙܕܩ ƖƊƆܒــű Ƈƃــų ƉܐƉــƢܐ ܗƌܐ: ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܕܬܪƎſ ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ ܗܕܐ܂ ܘƢſƦſܐƦſ ̣ƎƉ ܗƀƆــƎ ܕƀƉűƟــų r15P ̇ ̈ ƀــƦܐ܂ ƉűƟ Ǝــſ ̈ ųſƦſܐ Ǝــƀƌ ̈ ܕܗ ƈــźƉ ܂ųــƆ ƎــƀƊƀ ̇ ܕܐܘƍƉــŴܬܐ ܗܕܐ Ə ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ̇ ܕƇƀƇƉــŴܬܐ܂ ܐƆܐ źƉــƈ ܕƌƦƌــųܪ ܗ ųــƀƉűƟ Ǝ ̈ <sup>20</sup> ƊƀƏ ܢŴܓűܘܒ B70r ƈƖƆ ƎƉ̣ ƈƀƇƟ ܐ܉ƌܗ ܒܐƦƄܒ ųܒ ܗܘܘ ƎƀƖܓƘܕ ƎƀƇſܐƆ ܐƌܐ ƢƉܕܐ

̄ + [ܕܬܪſــƎ **<sup>1</sup>** ̄ܚ ܕſــŴ ̄ ܨ P ܕƘŴƐƇƇƀƘــŴܬܐ :BCD ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘــŴܬܐ **5** P ܕƢƏܓƀــƑ ƍƣــƦܐ ܬ **<sup>6</sup>** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **<sup>7</sup>** űــŷƃܐ BCD: ܐűــŷƃܐ P **<sup>8</sup>** ܬܗŴــƍ ̈ :BCD ܕƦƄƉܒ ̈ƍــŴܬܐ ܒƦƄƉܕ P | ƎــſųƇƃ BCD: ƎــƀƆܗ P | ƑƀƇŹŴــźƐſܕܐܪ C: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܕܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܕܐܪ D: ܣŴƀƇźźƐſܕܐܪ P **<sup>9</sup>** ƦſܐƍƉܐܘ BCP: ƦſܐƍƀƉܐ D **<sup>10</sup>** ܐƦſ̈ űƀŷſ BCD: ̈ܬܐ űــƀŷſ P | Ǝــƀƌ ̈ <sup>ܗ</sup> BCP: ƎــƀƆܗ D **<sup>11</sup>** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ̄ ŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P **12** ܘܐܦ [om. B **<sup>15</sup>** ƎƊƀ ̈ Ə] om. B **<sup>18</sup>** ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ [+ ܐƌܗ P **<sup>19</sup>** ܗܕܐ [om. BCD | Ǝ ̈ ̈ Ʀƀܐ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ƊƀƏ ƉűƟ] om. P **20** ܐƉ P: ܡűƉ BCD **21** ܗܘܘ [om. BCD

#### *BOOK TWO*

#### *[Introduction]*

49 In the previous book, which was the first one of the present treatise, O brother Theodore, three points72 were discussed and examined in detail. The first one of them concerned the proper division of all philosophical knowledge. The last one of them was a refutation of those who present the logical craft as a certain part of philosophy or as both a part and an instrument. And in the intermediary point, which was the second one, we provided a precise division of all the writings of Aristotle. This division which properly proceeded and descended from the universal (works) to the particular ones ended with those writings that were composed about the logical craft which we have demonstrated to be an instrument (ὄργανον) of philosophy. These writings, in turn, we correctly divided into three parts and we properly stated that some of them precede the craft of demonstrations, some are written about this craft, and some are composed about those things that are in every respect useful for this craft73.

50 Now, it seems to me, O brother, that it is necessary to dedicate this whole book, which is the second one of the present treatise, to the goal of those writings that closed this division, and particularly to those of them which are set as preceding this craft, for they come first and are therefore set before logic74. However, in order to make this clear for those who encounter the present

**<sup>72</sup>** Syr. *reše*, Gr. κεφάλαια, "headings".

**<sup>73</sup>** Cf. §28, above.

**<sup>74</sup>** What Sergius means are the treatises *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, and *Prior Analytics*, which form the first group of Aristotle's "instrumental" works and which Ammonius characterizes as focusing on the principles of the logical method (τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τῆς μεθόδου), see Ammonius, *In Cat*. 5.6–7.

̇ ܕܗܕܐ ƇƉــƦܐ: ܘܗƃــŴܬ ſƦƉــƕűܐ ܘƦƉܓƇــƀܐ ųſܪŴــƣ ܐƌܐ ŪــƐƌ ƎſųƇƄƆ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕƎſƢƟ܂

űܒƖƊƆ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ ̇ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ƦƇƀƇƉܐ ܗƌ ̇ܕܩ ܗƈƀƃ űƊƆܥ ܕƤƀƌܐ ܕųƇƃ 51 ܙ ̈ Ʀſܐ ܬ̈ܪƞſܬܐ܉ ܒűƀ ƇƇƊƉܐ ƢźƠƉܐ ܘƢſƢƣܐ ܕƈƕ ƈƃ űŶܐ ̣ƎƉ ܬŴŶ ̈ ܢ ŴــƍƉ ƎــſܪܬƦƆ ƎƌƢƉܕܐ ̣ ƅſܕܐ Ƣƀܓ ƈźƉ ܐ܂ƊƇƖܒ Ʀſܕܐ ܬܐ̈ <sup>5</sup> Ŵܨܒ ƇƘƦƉــܓܐ ƘŴƐƇƀƘــŴܬܐ: ƆــƦܐܘܪſܐ ܘƖƐƆــŴܪܘܬܐ܉ ƀŶــܒܐ ƊƆــűܥ ̇ Ǝ ܕŴƖƏܪܘܬܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܓܒƦƀܐ ܕŹܒƦܐ܂ ܕܬܐܘܪſܐ ܕƎſ Ɖ ̇ ܕųƀƇƉŴƣ ̈ ſܐ܂ ܗܘ ܘܢųــƇƃܕ ܐƦــƕűſܘ ܬܐƦــſƦŶ ܬܐŴƍƃܪűƉ ̇ C104v | D61r ųƀƇƉŴƣ ܘܗܝƦſܐ :ƎــƀƆܗ ƎــƉ ܐűــŶ ܐűŶ ƈƄƆ ܐƙƀƠƌܕ ܬܐŴƀƇܒŴƠƏ Ʀſܕܐ ƈƀƃܗ ƈźƉ ̇ ܕƖƏــŴܪܘܬܐ ܘܕܬܐܘܪſܐ܉ ܐܬܒƀƖــƦ ƇƀƇƉــŴܬܐ ųƀƇƉŴــƤƆ Ǝــſܕ Ŵــ̇ <sup>10</sup> ƌܗ ̇ ſƢƣــƢܐ ܒƦƕƞƊܐ܉ ܕܬƢƘܘܫ ƎƆ ̣ܗܝ ܗܕܐ ŴƠƏܒŴƀƇܬܐ ̣ƎƉ ƣــųƀƇƉŴ ̇ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ܂ ̈ܬܗ ŴƍƉ ƎƉ̣ ܐűŶ ƈƃܕ

̇ ܕƖƏــŴܪܘܬܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܓܒƀــƦܐ ܕŹܒــƦܐ 52 ܐųƌܘ ܓƢƀ ܕƣــųƀƇƉŴ ̇ ܂ ƎſűƉ ̇ ܕŹܒƦܐ ܒƦƤƀܐ ܐųſƦſ ܐƅſ ̣ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ: Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕŴƠƏܒųƇ ƎƍƀƠƀƍƏ ƈƕ ŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ ܒƦƍƊܐ ܗܕܐ ŴƖƏܪܬܐ ܕܬƢƘܘܫ ƎƆ ŹܒƦܐ <sup>15</sup>

̣ƎƉ ܒƦƤƀܐ: ܕܕƊƆܐ űƃ ܪܗƎƍƀŹ ܒƦܪ ŹܒƦܐ܉ ŸƃƦƤƌ ƎƆ ܓܒƎƍƀ ܒƇܐ Ʀƕűſܐ ܒƦƤƀܐ ܘƣܒƎƍƀƠ ŹܒƦܐ܂ ܒƞܒųƍƀ ܓƢƀ Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ܉ ܕƆܐ ܐƥƌ v15P ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܓƀــƢ ŶƦƉــŴܐ ܒƀــű ƤƉܒŸ ܘܐűŶ ܒƤƀــƦܐ ܘƣܒــơ ŹܒــƦܐ܂ ܗ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ŹܒƦܐ: ܗܘŴſ ܒƢƤܪܐ ŹܒƦܐ܂ ܕܗ ܬܘܒ ܕŴŶƦƉܐ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܒƤƀــƦܐ܉ ܐƆــƞܐ ̣ܕܗܘ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܒƤƀــƦܐ܂ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܒƦƍƊܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܗܕܐ ŴƖƏܪܬܐ ܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ ܗ v70B | r105C ̇ ܘſܐ ƎƆ ŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ܉ ܕܒų ̇ ܒƢƤܪܐ ܒƦƤƀܐ܂ ųſƦſܕܐ ܐƦƤƀܒ ƎƉ̣ ܐƦƀƍƀƃ ܐƦܒŹ ƎƍƀƣƢƘ

> ܘƢſƢƣܬܐ :BCD ܘƢſƢƣܐ **4** BCD .inv] ƕűſƦƉܐ ܘƦƉܓƀƇܐ | P ܕƦƇƉܐ :BCD ܕܗܕܐ ƦƇƉܐ **1** P | ƈــƕܕ BCD: ƈــƕܘ P | ܐűــŶ] + ܐűــŶ BCD **5** ƅــſܕܐ [om. B **6** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P | ܒܐƀŶ P: ƈƀƃܗ ܒܐƀŶ CD: ƈƀƃܗ ܐűŶ B **7** ܪܘܬܐŴƖƏܕ BCD: ܪܘܬܐŴƖƏ P | Ǝſܕ [om. P **<sup>8</sup>** ̇ ųƀƇƉŴƣ BCD: ܐƀƇƉŴƣ P | ܬܐƦſƦŶ BCD: ܐƦſƦŶ P | ܐƦƕűſܘ BCD: ̈ ſܐ | P ܘƦƕűſܗܘܢ ܗܘ [om. B **9** ܐűŶ ܐűŶ BCD: űŶ űŶ P **10** ܐſܘܕܬܐܘܪ BCP: ܐſܘܬܐܘܪ D ̇ **<sup>13</sup>** P ܕŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܬܐ :BCD ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ **<sup>12</sup>** ųƀƇƉŴƣܕ BCD: ܐƀƇƉŴƣܕ P **21** ܪܬܐŴƖƏ BCD: ܪܘܬܐŴƖƏ P

treatise, I have started to write about this issue a little bit above, so that it might be explained and revealed to the readers.

#### *[The goal of logic]*

51 Now, one should know that the goal of the whole logical craft is to produce true demonstrations by means of correctly aggregated statements75 about each thing that is in the world. But since, as we have said, philosophy is divided into two parts, i.e. into theory and practice, we ought to know that the completion of practice is choosing what is good, while the completion of theory is the true comprehension and knowledge of all existing things. Thus, because a certain contrariety is associated with each of them, i.e. with the completion of both practice and of theory, we require logic as an intermediary in order to distinguish the true completion of each part of philosophy from what is contrary to it76.

52 For if, as we have said, the completion of practice is choosing the good, it is obvious that what is opposite to good is bad. So, we need logic in this practical part in order to distinguish good from bad, so that while seeking the good we might not choose the bad and abandon the good because of our ignorance. It is clear, namely, that no one would by his own will prefer to turn to the bad and abandon the good. But it is what this craft demonstrates to be good that is truly good, and it is also what it demonstrates to be bad that is necessarily bad. Hence logic appears for us in this practical part as an instrument by means of which we distinguish between natural good and the bad that is truly bad77.

**<sup>75</sup>** I.e. syllogisms. Syr. *mamlla mqaṭṭra* literally renders the Gr. συλλογισμός as "aggregation of statements", cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 5.10–12: τὸ τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ὄνομα οὐχ ἁπλοῦν τι δηλοῖ ἀλλὰ σύνθετον (συλλογὴν γάρ τινα λόγων σημαίνει).

**<sup>76</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 4.29–5.3: θεωρητικὰ μὲν ὅσα περὶ τὴν διάκρισιν ἔχει τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς, πρακτικὰ δὲ ὅσα περὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ τὸ θεωρητικὸν ὑποδύεταί τινα ὡς ἀληθῆ μὲν δοκοῦντα μὴ ὄντα δὲ ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὸ πρακτικὸν ὁμοίως τινὰ τῷ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κεχρωσμένα ὀνόματι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθά, δεῖ ἡμῖν ὀργάνου τινὸς τοῦ διακρίνοντος τὰ τοιαῦτα. See also Philoponus, *In Cat*. 4.23–30.

**<sup>77</sup>** Sergius' text is very close to what we find in Philoponus, *In Cat*. 10.10–18: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ὡς ἔφαμεν, τὸ μέν ἐστι θεωρητικὸν τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν, καὶ τοῦ μὲν θεωρητικοῦ τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τεῦξις, ἀμφοτέροις δὲ παρυφίσταται τὰ ἐναντία, τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ τὸ ψεῦδος τῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ τὸ κακόν, ἡ δὲ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ ἅτε δὴ ἀτελὴς οὖσα αἱρεῖται πολλάκις ἀντὶ μὲν ἀληθείας τὸ ψεῦδος οἰομένη αὐτὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ἀντὶ δὲ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ κακὸν οἰομένη αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἐδέησε τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὀργάνου τινὸς διακρίνοντος τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ψεύδους τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 10.15–22; Simplicius, *In Cat*. 14.19–25).

̇ ܝ ܕſــƎ ƍƉــƦܐ ܐŶــƢܬܐ ܕܬܐܘܪſܐ: źƉــƈ ܕƕűſــƦܐ ſƢƣــƢܬܐ 53 ܒــų ̇ܕܩ ƊƆــűܥ ܕܐܦ ܒــųܕܐ ܐſــƦ ̇ ܬܐܘܪſܐ܉ ܙ ̈ ſܐ ܐſƦſــų ܕƇƃــųܘܢ ܗܘ ̇ Ɔܐ Ʀƕűſܐ܂ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ܘܐܦ ܬƎƌ ƎƍƀƠƀƍƏ ŪŹ ŴƠƏܒŴƀƇܬܐ: ܕܐųſƦſ ƎــƍƀƣƢƘ ̇ ƈƕ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ƦƇƀƇƉܐ: ܕܬܗܘܐ ƎƆ ƌŴƍƟܐ ƦſƦŶܐ܉ ܕܒــų Ƣƣܪܐ ̣ƎƉ ܕܓŴƇܬܐ܂ <sup>ܗ</sup> <sup>5</sup> ̇ <sup>ܘ</sup> Ɖܐ ܓƢƀ ܕŴŶƦƌܐ ܒűƀ ŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ Ƣƣܪܐ܉ ųƆ ƌųƆܐ ܐƎƍſűŶ ܒƦܘܕƦſܐ ƊƀƇŶــƦܐ: ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƦƕűſܗſــƎ ̈ Ʀſܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܕܓŴƇܬܐ܉ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܬܘܒ ܕŵŶƦƌܐ ܒűƀ ܬŴŶ ̈ܬܐ܂ ܘܗ ܕܨܒŴ ܕܐųܒ ܘܐܦ ƎſűƉ ܪܐ܂Ƣƣܕ ܐƌܗܕŴƕ ųƇƃ ƎƉ̣ ƢܒƆ ƎƍƀƠܒƣ ܐƌųƆ ųƆ ̇ܒــűܐ ƆــƎ ܕƆܐ ƌܐŶــŴܕ ̇ ܕƕ ƍƉــƦܐ űſܘƀƌƦƕــƦܐ܉ ƇƀƇƉــŴܬܐ ܐſƦſــų ƦƉܘܡ ܕܓŴƇܬܐ ܐƅſ Ƣƣܪܐ: ܘƐƌܒƢ ƈƕ Ƣƣܪܐ ܕܕܓŴƇܬܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ܂ <sup>10</sup>

ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ̣ ܐűŶ ܐƣƢƘƦƉ ܐƆ ܬܐ܉ŴƇƀƇƉ ƎƉ̣ űƖƇܕܒ Ǝſܕ ܗܝ̣ ܐƖſűſ <sup>54</sup> ̇ ــƎ ̈ܬܐ܂ <sup>Ɖ</sup> ŴܒــƞƆ ƎــſųƆ Ǝــƀƍſ ̇ <sup>ܕ</sup> ƦſܐƤƌܕܐ ƎƀƇſܐƆ ܐƕűſƦƉ ̇ P16r | C105v ܐܘ ƦſܐƟܙܕ ̈ ƇƀƇــƦܐ ƀƍƏــƠܐ <sup>Ɖ</sup> ܐƦſ ̈ ŴــŶܬ ƈــƕ ܉ƈƇ ̇ ܓƢƀ ܕܒƢܘŶܐ ܐſųƆܐ Ɔܐ ƊƉ ƦſŴــŶܐܬ ܢŴــƍܕܐܘܪܓ ƈƀƃܗ ƈźƉ ܐ܂ƕ̈ L2r | D61v ŴƊƤƆ ƎƊſܕܬܬܗ ܬܗŴƍƙƇƉ ܕܐųſƦſ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ: ܕƣƢƘܐ ƢſųƌܐƦſ ܒűƖƀܬܐ Ƣƣܪܐ ̣ƎƉ ܕܓŴƇܬܐ: ̇ ܒܐ ƐƇƀƘــƘŴܐ ܘܒŴƖƐܪܘܬܐ ܬܘܒ ƊŶƦƉܐ ŹܒƦܐ ƎƉ ܒƤƀــƦܐ܉ ܨ ƈــƕܕ Ǝــſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ ̈ܬܗ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕƈƕ ܗƎƀƆ ƎſųƇƃ: ܗƌ ܗƌܐ ܕűƟܡ ƦƄƉܒŴƍ ̈ƍƙƆܐ ܘܕƎſųƇƃ ̈ܪܘƦƀƍŶܐ܉ ̈ƍƀܐ ܘܕŴſ ̇ ܘƈƕ ܬܐܘܪſܐ ܕƃ ųƇƃ ܪܘܬܐŴƖƏ B71r ƎــƀƆܗ ƎــƉ̣ ܐűŶ ƈƄܒ ųƆ ܐƀƇƊƉܕ :ܐƦƇƀƇƉ ܗܕܐ ܬܐŴƍƉܐܘ űܒƖƌ ƦŷƤŶܐ ܕܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ܂ <sup>20</sup>

> ̇ ƢſƢƣܬܐ: ܬŶــƦſŴܐ ܕſــƎ <sup>55</sup> ܘƈźƉ ̣ܕܗܝ ŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ ܬƦſŴŶܐ ܐųſƦſ ̈ Ǝ ܬܪƞſܐƦſ ܗܘſܐ: ܘųƆ ܬܘܒ ƢŹŴƠƆ ̈ Ƈܐ ܕƊƀƏ Ɖ ƢŹŴƟ ƎƉ̣ ܬܐƢſƢƣ ̈ ųܐ: ܘƌųƆܐ ̇ ܕܬƦƆܐ Ɗƣ ̈ Ƈܐ ܗƌܐ ƋſűƟ ܪܘƃܒܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܕܬܪƎſ ܐܘ Ɖ ̈źƀܐ܉ ƈźƉ ܗܕܐ ƣــƢܝ ܐܪźƐſــƑƀƇŹŴ ƤƘ ܐƀƌ ̈ Ŵƃ ܢŴƌ ̇ ܬܘܒ ƎƀƊſűƟ ܗ

Ɖܐ ܬܘܒ **7** P ܐƎƍſűƀŶ :BCD ܐƎƍſűŶ **6** BCD ܒƦܐܘܪſܐ + [ܕܓŴƇܬܐ **5** P ܕܐܦ :BCD ܘܐܦ **3** ̇ ܒܐ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ܗƌܐ **<sup>16</sup>** P ܬܘܒ Ɖܐ :BCD ̇ ܒܐ :BCDP ܨ űŶܐ + [űŶܐ **19** L ܗƌܐ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ܨ BCD **<sup>20</sup>** ܢŴƍܕܐܘܪܓ BCDL: ܢŴƍܘܐܘܪܓ P **<sup>22</sup>** Ǝ ̈ ƊƀƏܕ BCDP: ƎƀƊƀƏܕ L **24** ܗܕܐ BLP: ܐƌܗ CD | ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ CL: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ BD: ܣŴƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P

53 Concerning the other part too, i.e. theory, since theory is the true knowledge of all existing things, it is necessary to know that it has a contrary too, namely ignorance. That is why also here we are in great need of the logical craft that serves for us as a precise rule (κανών) by means of which we separate truth from falsehood78. For it is what has been demonstrated by means of logic to be true that we may accept with sound confidence as knowledge of things. And also it is what has been revealed by means of demonstrations to be false that we may cast out from our memory of what is true. So, in this rational part there is logic too which always keeps us from taking falsehood as truth and from considering truth to be falsehood.

54 It is clear, therefore, that without logic nothing that we judge humanly may either be properly distinguished or comprehended. For unless a person speaks through the divine spirit, his teaching requires logical demonstrations to make listeners believe it79. And since, as has been shown, logic is an instrument which in theory clearly separates truth from falsehood, while in practice differentiates good from bad, this Philosopher wished before his other writings about all this — i.e. about all the practice and about the theory of natures, mathematical sciences, and all spiritual beings — to produce this logical craft that would serve as an instrument to each one of them80.

55 Now, because logic is a proper demonstration, while the proper demonstration results from syllogisms that are correctly formed, but what precedes syllogisms is another kind of composition, i.e. by two or three words81, and what in turn precedes it are simple words, because of this Aristotle began in his writ-

**<sup>78</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 10.21–22: ὥσπερ γνώμονί τινι καὶ κανόνι χρώμενοι τὰ μὴ ἐφαρμόζοντα ἀπωθῶνται· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις.

**<sup>79</sup>** Sergius stresses this point again in §450, at the very end of his commentary, where he points out that logic is unnecessary only for those people who "through the exercise in righteousness would gain divine power", but is consequently of paramount value for everyone else.

**<sup>80</sup>** Thus Sergius makes the point that logical treatises form the beginning of the study of philosophy, which is one of the introductory questions discussed in the *prolegomena* texts, cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 8.29–9.13 and 9.31–10.2.

**<sup>81</sup>** I.e. premises (Gr. αἱ προτάσεις), cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 11.1–3: ὁ δὲ συλλογισμός, ὡς ἤδη εἴρηται, οὐχ ἁπλοῦν πρᾶγμα ἀλλὰ συλλογή ἐστι λόγων καὶ συντίθεται ἐξ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων, αἵπερ εἰσὶ προτάσεις. See also Philoponus, *In Cat*. 10.31–11.1.

ƎــƀƆܗ ƈƕܕ ܬܐŴƍƙƇƉ ƎƉ̣ ܐƦƇƀƇƉ ܬܐŴƍƉܐܘ ƈƕܕ ܬܐ̈ C106r ŴƍܒƦƄƊܒ ̇ ܘ ƀƉűƟܐ ܘźƀƤƘܐ܂ ̈źƀܐ܂ ܘܒƦܪ ܗƎƀƆ ܐƚƆ ƈƕ ܪܘƃܒųܘܢ ܗ ƤƘ ܐƀƌ ̈ Ŵƃ ̇ ܘ ܕƍƉــų ܘܗŴƃܬ ܒƦܪ ܗƌܐ ܐƚƆ ƙƀƠƌܐſــƦ ƕــƈ ƟــƢŹŴ ƇƊƉــƇܐ: ܗ ̈ Ʀſܐ܂ ܘƃــƎ ܒــƦܪ ܗƌܐ ܬܘܒ ƕܒــű ƍƙƇƉــŴܬܐ ܕſųƀƇƕــƎ ̈ ܘſــƎ ܬŶــŴ ܗ ƎſųƊſŴــƠƆ Ǝــƀ̈ ƌܙ ƈƄܒ Ǝŷ̈ ܕܬŴŶ <sup>5</sup> ̈ Ʀſܐ܂ ܘܒƦܪ ܗƎƀƆ ܬܘܒ ƈƕ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕƤŶ ̇ : ܘŴƆ ܒƤܓƊܐ ܗƢƖƏ ƦſܐƌƦƕܘűſܘ ƦſܐƍƉܐܘ Ǝſܕ ܗܕܐ ܐ܂Ʀſ ̈ P16v ŴŶܕܬ ̇ ܐſــƅ ܕܐܬſܐ܂ ܘƀƘــƐܐ ܕƕــƈ ܗƀƆــƎ܉ ƉــƎ ܗܪƃܐ ƌــųܘܐ Ɔــƅ ܐܘ ƠƀƙƏܐƦſ܂

̇ űſܐ ̣ܕܗܝ܉ ƊƆŴƣܐ ܕܬܐܘܪſܐ Ŵƣܪſܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ 56 ܒƈƄ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ܐ ̇ــƢܟ ܕܬܐܘܪſܐ܂ ܕŴƖƏܪܘܬܐ܂ ܘƊƆŴƣܐ ܬܘܒ ܕŴƖƏܪܘܬܐ܉ ƤƆــŴܪųſ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ƣ ̇ ƢƉ ܐƌܐ ܕƎſ ܕܐſــƅ ܗƃــƍܐ܂ ܕܐܢ ̣ܗܘ ܕƠƘƦƉــű ܐܪܕƃــƇܐ ܕƌܒــƍܐ ܐ ܐƇــƇźƉ űܒƖƊƆ ƋƆ ƁƆ űƠƘܕܐܬ ƢƉ ̇ ܒƦƀܐ܉ ŪƤŶƦƉ ܒųƍƀƕƢ űƃ ܐ ̈ƀــƍܐ ܕܐſــƅ ܗƀƆــƎ܂ ܕƦƐƉܪ ̣ƎƉ ̈ܪܘŶܐ ̣ܘƎƉ ƢźƉܐ ̣ܘƉــƎ ƣــƃƢܐ ܕƄƌ ܐƆܐ ƇźƉــƇܐ ƆــƋ Ɔܐ ƄƤƉــŸ ܐƌܐ ܕܐƕܒــű܉ ܐƆܐ ܐܢ ƀƉűƟــƦ v2L ̈ Ʀƀƌܗ܂ ƎƀƆųƆ ܕƎſ Ɔܐ ŸƄƤƉ ܐƌܐ ܕܐܒƍܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ŴƖŹ ܐƏ ̈ C106v | B71v ܐ ƦƊƀƟܐ ̈ƦܐƏܐ܂ ƣ ƦƀƉűƟ ܐܡ ̇ ̈ Əܐ܂ ܘܗŴƃܬ Ə ܐƦƣ ƦƖ ̇ Ɵܘܪ Ʀź ̇ Ŷ ƦƀƉűƟ ܐܢ ̇ ܘ ̇ ــܐܡ ƖƆــƈ ſųƍƉــƎ ܬƀƇŹــƇܐ܉ ܗ ̈ ܐ܂ ܘܗƍƃܐ ƢŷƆܬܐ Ə ̇ ƍܐ ܐƏ ܘƎƃ ܒ ̇ــŴ ܕſــƎ ܕܗܘŴſ ųƀƇƉŴƣ ܕܒƍƀƍܐ܂ ܒƎƀƆų ܗƀƃــƈ ƣــŴܪſܐ ܕܬܐܘܪſܐ: ܗƌ ܕƣŴŶܒܐ ܕܒܓــŴ ܪƍƀƕــų܉ ƉــƎ ƇźƉــƇܐ ƣــƢܝ ܘƣــƢܟ ƆــŴܬ ƣــƦܐ r62D ̈ Əܐ܂ ƦƃƢƣܘ ƦſƢƣ ܐƏܐƦ̈ ŴƖƏܪܘܬܐ ܕƎſ ̣ܕܗܝ ܗܝ ƍŷƆŴƘܐ ܕܐ <sup>20</sup> ̈ ſűſܐ܉ ̣ƎƉ <sup>ƣ</sup> ̇ ܐ ƣــŴܪſܐ ŴƆܬ ܬƇƀƇŹܐ܂ ܘܗƍƃܐ ܐƅſ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ƀƇƟــƈ ̣ƉــƎ ƖƆــƈ܉ ܗܘ ܕܬܐܘܪſܐ ƣــƊƆŴܐ ܕƖƏــŴܪܘܬܐ: ܘƣــŴܪſܐ ܕƖƏــŴܪܘܬܐ ƣــƊƆŴܐ ܕܬܐܘܪſܐ܂

> **<sup>1</sup>** ƎƀƆܗ [om. BC **<sup>7</sup>** ̇ ̇ | P .om] ܘƊƆŴƣܐ ܬܘܒ ܕŴƖƏܪܘܬܐ **<sup>10</sup>** L .om] ܐܘ ųſܪŴƤƆ] + ܬܘܒ BCD **<sup>12</sup>** ƁƆ] om. B **<sup>13</sup>** ܪƦƐƉܕ BCDL: ܪܐƦƐƉܕ P **<sup>14</sup>** űܒƕܕܐ BCDL: Ƣܒ̇ ƕܕܐ P **<sup>15</sup>** ܗƦƀƌ ̈ ŴƖŹ BLP: ̈Ʀܗ ƌŴƖŹ CD | ܐƍܕܐܒ BCDL: Ƣܒ̇ ̈ ܐ **17** P ܕܐƕ Əܐ BCDL: ܐƏ ̈ ܘܗŴƃܬ :CDLP ܘܗƍƃܐ | P Ɔܐ B **19** ܒܐƣŴŶܕ BCDL: ܒܐƣŴŶ P | Ŵܕܒܓ BCDL: Ŵܒܓ P

ings on the logical craft with a teaching on these simple words. After that he taught about their first and simple composition82, and after that he consequently taught about syllogistic from which demonstrations result. So, further after that he provided the teaching on demonstrations, and further after that on those things that are in every way useful for the constitution of demonstrations83. He did that not spontaneously or by chance but with skill and knowledge, and this will become quite obvious for you from what follows.

56 In any kind of craft the end of theory is the beginning of practice, and also the end of practice results in the beginning of theory84. What I mean is this. If an architect is ordered to build a house, he will reflect about it in his mind by saying: "I was ordered to construct a roof that will serve for protection against wind, rain and any other kind of damage. But I will not be able to construct the roof unless I first establish bearing walls for it. And I will not be able to build the latter unless I first lay and make firm the foundation." And thus he will first make the foundation, then build the walls, and then finally will put the roof above them which will be the end of the building. In this case the beginning of theory, i.e. of his reflection in mind, started from the roof and ended with the foundation, while the practice, which is the work of his hands, began from the foundation and resulted in the roof. Thus, as we have said a little earlier, the beginning of theory became the end of practice and the beginning of practice became the end of theory85.

**<sup>82</sup>** Sergius' emphasis on premises being "first and simple composition" of words finds parallel in Ammonius' commentary on Aristotle's *On Interpretation* where he states that this treatise discusses "the first composition of simple words" (περὶ τῆς πρώτης συνθέσεως τῶν ἁπλῶν φωνῶν). Further, Ammonius explains that he calls it "first", since syllogisms should be considered as compositions of another kind, namely as "aggregation of statements" (οὐ μέντοι ἡ πρώτη, ἀλλ' ἡ διὰ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῶν κατὰ τὴν πρώτην σύνθεσιν γεγονότων λόγων ἀποτελουμένη). See Ammonius, *In De Int*. 4.5–10.

**<sup>83</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 11.1–8; Philoponus, *In Cat*. 10.24–11.3; Simplicius, *In Cat*. 14.33–15.4; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 8.11–28.

**<sup>84</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat*. 11.5–6: καθόλου γὰρ τῆς μὲν θεωρίας τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως γίνεται, ἔμπαλιν δὲ τῆς πράξεως τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας.

**<sup>85</sup>** The same analogy is found in Philoponus, *In Cat*. 11.5–16 and Simplicius, *In Cat*. 14.5–22. Cf. also Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 2.10–15.

̇ ܒܐܘƍƉــŴܬܐ 57 ƎſűƉ ܘܐܦ ܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ ܒų ܒƌŵܐ ܐܬŸƤŶ ܒــų ̇ ܒܐ ܐƌܐ ƆــƋ ƖƊƆܒــű ƦƇƀƇƉܐ܂ ƦƀƉűƟ ܓƢƀ ܐܬƤŶــŪ ܒƍƀƕƢــų܉ ܕܨ P17r :ܐƦــƤƀܒ ƎــƉ̣ ܐƦܒــŹ ܪܘܬܐŴــƖƐܒ ƁــƆ ƋــŶƦƉܕ :ܐƣܘƢƘ ܢŴƍܐܘܪܓ ̈ܬܐ Ƣƣܪܐ ̣ƎƉ ܕܓŴƇܬܐ܂ ܐƆܐ źƉــƈ ̣ܕܗܘ ܘƢƘܫ ƁƆ ܒƦƕűƀܗƎſ ܕܨܒŴ ܗƌܐ ܐܘܪܓƍــŴܢ: ܐܘƍƉــŴܬܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܕƉــűƆŴܐ ƃــƈ ܬŶــŴ <sup>5</sup> ̈ Ǝſ ܕܒƀــű ̇ܕܩ ̈ Ʀſܐ ܙ ̇ ųƆܕܐ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ܕܬŶــŴ ųƆܕ ܗܝ̣ ܐƖſűſ ܉Ǝ ̈ C107r ƊƀƟƦƉ ܐƦƇƉ ƎــƉ̣ ܐƦſ ̈ ƆــƁ ƀƉűƟــƦ ƖƊƆܒــű܂ ܘźƉــƈ ̣ܕܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܐܘƍƉــŴܬܐ ܕܬŶــŴ ܐƌܗ ƈــƕ ƦــƀƉűƟ ƁــƆ ܕܩ̇ ƢŹŴƟ ƇƇƊƉܐ ܕƀƏــƋ ܐܘƍƉܐſــƦ ܗܘſܐ܉ ܙ ̇ ܐ ̈Ɗــųܐ: ܕƍƉــų ܗܘ ̇ ŴƙƇ܂ ܘƈźƉ ܬܘܒ ܕܐƦſ ܪܘƃܒܐ ƉűƟــƀܐ ܕƣ ƊƆ ̣ܗܘ ܗƌܐ ƢŹŴƟ ƇƇƊƉܐ܉ ƎſűƉ ƋƆ <sup>ܙ</sup> <sup>10</sup> ̇ܕܩ ƁƆ ܕƈƕ ܗƌܐ ܐƦƃܒ ƦƀƉűƟ܂ ƁــƆ ــܒܐƀŶ ܐ܉źــƀ̈ ƤƘ ܐƀƌ ̈ ܘƈźƉ ܬܘܒ ܕܐܦ ƌųƆܐ ƎƀƊſűƟ ̣ܗƌــŴܢ ƃــŴ ܕƈƕ ܗƎƀƆ ܐƚƆ ƦƀƉűƟ܂

	- ̇ ܘ ܕƎſ ܕƈƕ ܪܘƃܒųܘܢ ƀƉűƟܐ ܪƀƣــƋ ܕƘܐܪſܐܪƀƍƉــƑ܂ źƟܐܓŴ̈ܪƑſ܂ ܗ

**1** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ CL: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D: ܣŴƀƇźźƐſܕܐܪ P | ܐƌŵܒ BCDL: ܐƌܙ ܐƌųܒ P **<sup>2</sup>** ƋƆ] om. BCD **<sup>3</sup>** ƁƆ BCDL: ųƆ P **<sup>4</sup>** ƁƆ] om. B | ܬܐ ̈ Ŵܕܨܒ [om. B **<sup>6</sup>** ܐƦſ ̈ ܕܬŴŶ BCDL: ܐƦſ ̈ ŴŶܘܬ P **<sup>7</sup>** űܒƖƊƆ CDLP: ƢܒƖƊƆ B | ܬܐŴƍƉܐܘ [+ ƦƀƉűƟ ƁƆ ܕܩ̇ ̈ Ʀſܐ ܙ ܘܬŴŶ :LP ܬܘܒ ܕܐƦſ **9** B ܗܘ :P ܗܘƌܐ :CDL ܗܘſܐ **8** P ƖƊƆܒű܂ ܘƈźƉ ̣ܕܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ Ʀــſܐ ܕܬܘܒ BCD **<sup>10</sup>** ܗܘ̣ [ om. P **<sup>18</sup>** Ǝــƀ̈ ƌܙ [+ ƎــſųƇƃܘ P **20** ƎــſųƇſܕ LP: ƎــſųƀƇƕܕ BCD **<sup>22</sup>** Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟܕ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓŹܐƟܕ B: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟܕ D: ܣŴſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟܕ P | ܘ ̇ ܗ CDLP: Ŵــƌ ̇ ܗ B | Ǝــſܕ [om. P | Ƌــƀƣܪ P: ܗܘ Ƌــƀƣܪ BCD: Ƌــƣܪ L | ƑــƀƍƉܐܪſܐܪƘܕ L: ƑƀƍƀƉܐܪſƢƘܕ P: ƑƀƍƉܐܪųſܪųƘܕ C: ܐܣƀƍƉܐܪſܪųƘܕ BD

57 So that was the way in which Aristotle approached the logical craft. For first he reflected in his mind: "I wish to create an instrument for distinction that in practice will separate for me good from evil and in the knowledge of things will differentiate for me truth from falsehood. But since this instrument is a craft that brings forth all demonstrations constituted by means of words, it is evident that it is this demonstrative craft that I should create first. But because this demonstrative craft derives from syllogistic which is skilfully applied, I shall first teach about this. But since, further, it is from primary combination of words that syllogistic derives86, I must first write about it. But since this is in turn preceded by simple words, it is necessary for me to teach about them first."87

58 So, in his reflection he started from the demonstrative craft and gradually descended to simple words. That is why he made simple words the beginning of the teaching about all these things88. After them he taught about the first composition of words. Further after that, he wrote about syllogisms which should be formed correctly and properly. And thus he taught about the craft of demonstrations, and after it about all those things that are in every way useful for it89. And he put the end of his practice with those things at the beginning of theory about them, just as he put the end of the theory of them at the beginning of the writings about them.

59 So, the book which he wrote about simple words is called *Qṭʾgwrys* (Κατηγορίαι, "Categories"). The one which is about their first composition has the title *Pʾryʾrmnys* (Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, "On Interpretation"). The one which is about

**<sup>86</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat*. 11.21–22: λόγοι μὲν γάρ τινές εἰσιν αἱ προτάσεις, τῶν δὲ τοιούτων λόγων συλλογή ἐστιν ὁ συλλογισμός.

**<sup>87</sup>** Sergius' account is very similar to what one finds in Philoponus, *In Cat*. 11.16–28.

**<sup>88</sup>** Cf. Simplicius, *In Cat*. 15.12–13: προηγεῖται οὖν ἡ τῶν ἁπλῶν φωνῶν θεωρία, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀρκτέον τῷ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν δημιουργοῦντι.

**<sup>89</sup>** The expression "things that are in every way useful" (for demonstrations) refers to the last part of the *Organon*, cf. §28 above.

̈ ــƀܐ ܘܐŶــſƮܐ܂ ƉűƟ ܐƠƀŹ ̈ ̇ ܘ ܕƈƕ ƢŹŴƟ ƇƇƊƉܐ ܕƉƦƤƉــų ܐƇƌــŴ ܘܗ ̇ ܘ ̈ Ʀſܐ ܐƘــŴܕƠƀźƠſܐ ƃƦƉــƍܐ܂ ܗ ̇ ܕܐܘƍƉــŴܬܐ ܕܬŶــŴ ܘܗ v62D ̇ ܘ ܕƀƇƕــų ̇ ܘ ܕƕـــƈ ̈ ƠƀƘܐ܂ ܘܗ ̇ ܘ ܕƟƦƉـــƢܐ ŹـــŴ ܕƊƕـــų ܕܗƌܐ ܐſـــƦܘܗܝ ܗ ƎــƀƆųܒ ܂ŴــƄƍƆܐ ŴƠƀźƐƘŴƏ ųƆ ųƊƤƉܕ ܐźƐƀƘ ̈ ŴƍƐƄƉܬܐ ܕŴƏ ̇ ܝ ܗƈƀƃ ƇƤƉــƋ Ɔــų ƐƇƀƘــƘŴܐ ܗƌܐ ƇƄƆــų <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܐܘƍƉــŴܬܐ ƇƀƇƉــƦܐ܂ ܗ ̇ ܂ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ܕŴƙƐƇƀƘܬܐ ܘŴƆ ƍƉــƦܐ ƍƉــų ܕܐܘܪܓŴƍܢ ܐųſƦſ ̇ ܝ ܕƕܒƀــűܐ Ɔــų܉ ̈Ǝƀ ܕƎſ ܐƎſƢƉ: ܕܐܦ ܐܘƍƉــŴܬܐ ܕܪܗŹــƢܘܬܐ ܗ ܐƤƌ ̇ ܂ ̇ ܕŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ ܐųſƦſ ̇ ܕųƇſ ܘܐܦ ̣ܗܝ ųƍƉ

ƅــſܐ ƢــƉܐƊƆ ܐƢƤƌܘ ܒܐ܂Ƣƣܕ ܗܝŴƇƕ ƈƀƄƉ ƎƆ ܐƍƙƌ ƎƍŶ ܐƆܐ 60 ƎــƍſƢƤƉ űــƃ ܂ƎــƀƆܗ ܬܐ̈ B72v | C108r ŴــƍܒƦƄƉ ƎــƉ ܐűــŶ ƈــƃܕ ܐƤــƀƌ ƈƕ ƎƍſƞƉܕ ̈ƀــźܐ܂ ƤƘ ܐƀƌ ̈ Ŵــƃ ƈــƕ ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕƈƕ ƀźƟܓŴ̈ܪſــŴܣ܉ ܕܐſƦſــų ܗ ƎƉ̣ ƦſܐƙƠƌ ̇ Ǝƍſű ܒų ܒƌŵܐ܂ ܘƎƃ ܘܗŴƃܬ ܒܐűſܐ ܒܐűſܐ ƈƕ ƈƃ űŶܐ ƎſųƍƉ ƕܒ ̇ ܕŴƖƏܪܘܬܐ ̈ Ŵƍܬܗ ̈ܬܗ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ: ܗƎƀƆ ܕƈƕ <sup>Ɖ</sup> ŴƍܒƦƄƉ ܬŴƆ Ǝƍſܐܬ ̈ ſــƦܐ܂ ̈ƍƙƆܐ: ܘܗƎƀƆ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕſƮƟƦƉــƎ ܐųƆ ̈ƍƀܐ ųƇƃܘܢ ܘŴſ ƃ ƈƕܘ ܘܗŴƃܬ ƐƉܒƎƍſƢ ܕųƀƍƠƙƌܝ ƤƀƍƆܐ ܕƦƄƉܒƍــŴܬܐ ܗܕܐ: ܕƕــƈ ܗƀƆــƎ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܘ ̈ƠƀƐــƦܐ: <sup>ܗ</sup> ƙܒ ƢــƉܐƌ ƎــƀƆܗ ƎــſųƇƃ ƈــƕܕ ܐƉ ܉űܒƖƊƆ ƎƆ ܐƊƀƏ ܂ƈƖƆ ƎƉܕ̣ ƎſܘܕŴƣ ƅſܐ ƎƍſƞƉܕ ܐƉ

61 ƚƏŴƌ ܕƎſ ܒƦܪ ܗƎƀƆ ܐܦ ܗܕܐ܂ ܕƈźƉ ܐſــűܐ ƇƕــƦܐ ܐܬƤŶــŸ Ǝــƀ̈ ƐƇƀƘــƘŴܐ ܒƠƐƖــŴܬ ƇƊƉــƇܐ ܒƐــŴܓܐܗƎſ ܕƦƄƉܒƍــŴ r18P ̈ܬܗ܂ ܐƤƌ ܓƢƀ ܐſƢƉــƎ܉ ̣ܕܗܘ ܐܕƣܐ ܕƇƇƊƉــų ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ ܕܐſــƅ ܗƃــƍܐ: v3L

**<sup>1</sup>** ųƉƦƤƉܕ BCDL, BBahl: ųƉƦƤƉ P | ܐƠƀŹ ̈ ŴƇƌܐ BL: ܐƠƀŹ ̈ ̇ ܘ **2** CDP ܐŴƆŴƌ ̣ܘܗܝ :BCDL ܘܗ P | ܐƠƀźƠſܕŴƘܐ BL: ܐƠƀź̈ ̇ ܘ ܕųƊƕ | P ܐŴƘܕܘƠƀźƟܐ :CD ܐŴƘܕſܐƟ ̇ ܘ ܕųƊƕ :P ܗ ܘܗ BBahl: : ųــƊƕܕ BCDL **4** ܬܐŴƍƐƄƉ] + ƎƀƆܕܗ P, BBahl | ųƆ] om. B | ŴƠƀźƐƘŴƏ LP: ŴــƠƀźƐƀƘŴƏ BD: ŴــƠƀƐƘŴƏ C **5** ܐƘŴــƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƘŴــƐƇƇƀƘ P **6** ܢŴــƍܕܐܘܪܓ CLP: ܢŴƍܕܒܐܘܪܓ BD | ܬܐŴƙƐƇƀƘܕ BCDL: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܕ P **9** ƈƀƄƉ ƎƆ ܐƍƙƌ LP: ܐƍƙƌ ƈƀƄƉ ƎــƆ BCD | ƅــſܐ [+ ܐƉ BCD **10** ܐűــŶ] + ܐűــŶ BCD **11** ƦــſܐƙƠƌ BCDP: ƦــſܐƙƀƠƌ L ܣŴſܪ̈ŴܓƀźƟ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟ D: ܪܣ̈ŴܓŴźƟ B; + ܬܐŴƌƮƉܐƦƉ add. D in marg. **<sup>12</sup>** ܐűŶ] + ܐűŶ BCD **<sup>13</sup>** ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ BCDL: ܐƦſ̈ űƀŷſ P | ܪܘܬܐŴƖƏܕ [+ ƎƙƇ ̈ Ɖ CD: + ƎƙƇ ̈ <sup>Ɖ</sup> Ǝſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ ƌܗ Ǝ̈ ܒƦƄƉ B **<sup>14</sup>** ܘܢųƇƃ ܐƍƀ̈ <sup>ƃ</sup>] inv. BP | ܐƍƙƆ ̈ Ŵſܘ LP: ܐƍ̈ ƙƆŴſ ƈƕܘ BCD ƎƀƆܘܗ L: ƎƀƆܗ ƎſųƇƃܘ P: Ǝƀƌܘܗ BCD **15** ܝųƀƍƠƙƌܕ CDLP: ܝųƀƍƙƠƌܕ B **17** ƎſܘܕŴƣ BCDL: ƎſܕŴƣ P **18** ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ BCD **19** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ L: ܐƙƏŴƇƀƘ P: ܐƌܗ ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD **20** ųƍƀƃܘ ܐƍƃܗ ƅſܕܐ ܬܐŴƠƐƖܒ ųƣܘܕܘܪ ųƇƃ] om. hom. P

syllogisms is called *ʾnlwṭyqʾ* (Ἀναλυτικά, "Analytics"), prior and posterior. The one which is about the craft of demonstrations is designated as *ʾpwdyqṭyqʾ* (Ἀποδεικτικά, "Apodeictics")90. The one which comes together with the latter is called *Ṭwpyqʾ* (Τοπικά, "Topics"). And the one which is about the refutation of the sophists (σοφισταί) has the title *Swpsṭyqw ʾlnkw* (Σοφιστικοὶ Ἔλεγχοι, "Sophistical Refutations"). With it, thus, the Philosopher completed the whole logical craft which is, as we have said, an instrument of philosophy and not its part91. Some people say, though, that the *Craft of Rhetoric* (ῥητορική) written by him also belongs to logic92.

60 But let us now turn to the subject matter and start speaking according to our ability about the goal of each one of these writings. Accordingly, we will start with the *Categories* which is about simple words and then approach each one of them in turn in the same manner. And afterwards, we will proceed to his other writings which pertain to the parts of practice, as well as to all natural and mathematical sciences, and other things that are called divine. In this way, we hope that we have brought out the goal of this treatise (i.e. the *Categories*), for this is what we intend to do when we speak briefly, as far as we are able, about all these matters, in accordance with our promise above.

#### *[Obscurity of Aristotle's language]*

61 After this, we shall additionally discuss the reason why the Philosopher employs obscure language in the greater part of his writings93. Some people state, namely, that this is the sort of language that he has and that his whole

**<sup>90</sup>** Thus Sergius refers twice to the same treatise, first calling it *Posterior Analytics* and then the *Apodeictics*.

**<sup>91</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat*. 11.28–33: πρότερον γὰρ διαλέγεται περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν φωνῶν ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις, εἶθ' οὕτως περὶ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ περὶ προτάσεων ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, εἶτα περὶ τοῦ ἁπλῶς συλλογισμοῦ ἐν τοῖς Προτέροις ἀναλυτικοῖς, εἶθ' οὕτως περὶ ἀποδείξεως ἐν τοῖς Ὑστέροις ἀναλυτικοῖς· ἐνταῦθα οὖν τὸ τέλος τῆς πράξεως, ὅπερ ἦν ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας.

**<sup>92</sup>** Here Sergius shows his familiarity with the idea of the so called expanded *Organon*, which would also include the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric*. The notion of the expanded *Organon* is characteristic of later Arabic scholars (e.g., of the writings of al-Farabi).

**<sup>93</sup>** This is one of the preliminary points (*prolegomena*) which the commentators that followed Ammonius' exegesis discussed before turning to the text of the *Categories*. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 7.7–14 (no. 8); Philoponus, *In Cat*. 6.17–28 (no. 7); Simplicius, *In Cat*. 6.30–7.22 (no.7); Elias, *In Cat*. 124.25–127.2 (no. 9); Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 11.21–29 (no. 9).

ܘƍƀƃــų Ƈƃــų ܘܕܘܪƣــų ܒƠƐƖــŴܬܐ ܕܐſــƅ ܗܕܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ܂ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ƋƆ ܐܦ Ɔܐ ܐܢ ܨ v108C ̇ ܒܐ ܗܘܐ ŸƄƤƉ ܗܘܐ ܕƀƐƌــƋ ƇƊƉــƇܐ ̈ܬܗ܂ űƉܓƀƇــƎ ܕſــƎ ܗƀƆــƎ ܓƀƇܐſــƦ ܒــƆűܐ ƀƊƄŶــƎ źƀƤƘܐ ܒƦƄƊܒŴƍ ̇ ܗܘܬ ܐƅſ ƦƇƉܗܘܢ: ܬܪƦƀƕܗ ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ܂ ܐŴƆ ܓƢƀ ܗƍƃܐ ܐųſƦſ ܐƇƘܐ ƦƇƕܗ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܕܗܕܐ ƀŶܒܐ ܗܘܬ Ɔܐƌــƥ ƊƆܒــƖܐ܂ ܐܢ ܓƀــƢ ƆــŴ ƉــƎ ܨܒųƍƀ: ܐƆܐ ƈźƉ ܕܗƍƃܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ ųƍƀƃ ܐܬŸƤŶ ܒŴƠƐƖܬܐ ̇ ܓܒܐ Ɔــų ܕܐƅſ ܗܕܐ܉ Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕŴƆ ƦƇƕܐ űƉܡ ܐƦſ ܕƦƇźƉܗ ܐܘܪŶܐ ܕܐƅſ ܗܕܐ܂

 ̇ ̇ ܗܘܐ ܗܕܐ܉ ܒƈƄ ܕܘƃܐ ܒų 62 ƎƍŶ ܕƎſ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܕܐŴƆ ܗƍƃܐ ܐųſƦſ ܒŴƠƐƖܬܐ ŶƦƉــŵܐ ܗܘܐ ܕƤŶƦƉــŸ܂ ܐƆܐ źƉــƈ ܕƍſŵŶــƎ ܕſųƍƉــƎ r63D ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍ r73B ̈ܬܗ ܒƇƇƊƊܐ źƀƤƘܐ ܐƮƀƉܢ: ܕƆܐ ܪơƀŶ ƎƉ ܗƌܐ ܕܗƣܐ ̇ ܘ ŸƤŶƦƉ ܐƌܐ ܒų: ܐƅſ ܙƌܐ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ܐܓƮܬܗ ƎſųƇƃ ܘƦƃܒܐ ܗ ̈ƣܐ Ƈƃــųܘܢ ܕƀƊƀƟƦƉــƎ ܒــܐܐܪ܉ ſűſــƖܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƆــŴ űܓ ƈƕ ųƆ űƀܒƕܕ ƈźƉ ܕܗƍƃܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ ųƍƀƃ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒƞܒųƍƀ ܐܬŸƤŶ ܒŴƠƐƖܬ ƇƇƊƉܐ ܒűܘƃܐ ܕܘƃܐ܂ ܐŴƆ ܓƢƀ ųƍƀƃ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ ܘƆــŴ ܨܒƍƀــų <sup>15</sup> ŸــƤŶƦƉ ܬܐŴƉűܒ ̇ C109r ųܕܒ ܐƀƇܓ ƥƌܐ ƈƄƆ ܐ܉ƇƇƊƉ ܬŴƠƐƕܕ ܐƦƇƕ Ǝܒŵܘܒ :ƈƇƊƉ ƦſܐƠƐƕ Ǝܒŵܕܒ ƈƀƃܗ ܝ ̇ ̇ ܒƈƄ ܕܘƃܐ. ƎƉ ܗ ܗܘܐ ܒų ̇ ܒƠƐƖــŴܬܐ܂ ̇ ܕܒƞܒųƍƀ ܐܬŸƤŶ ܒــų ųƆ Ʀƕűſܐܬ ܉ƚƇ ̇ Ɖ ƦſܐźƀƤƘ ̇ ܕܪܫ ƣܒƇƀܐ ܗƌܐ ܕŴƠƐƕܬ ̇ܕܩ ƎƆ ƈƀƄƉ ƊƆܒƖܐ ƦƇƕܐ ܕƦƇźƉܗ ܘܙ ƇƇƊƉܐ܂ <sup>20</sup>

63 ܐƎſƢƉ ܗƈƀƃ ܕܐƍƄſܐ ܕܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƀƇƊƤƉــƎ ܐ̈ܪܙܐ Ɖــűܡ: ƆــŴ Ɵــűܡ ̈ ƌܐ ܘܒƐƄــƀܐ ſƮƖƏــƎ Ɔــųܘܢ: ܐſــƅ ƍƇƃــƥ ܓƀƇــƎ Ɔــųܘܢ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒــƦܘ ̈ƍــƁ ܐ̈ܪܙܐ ƕűſƦƌــŴܢ܂ ܗƃــƍܐ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܕųƆ v18P ̇ ƌــŴܢ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ܕܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܒ

**1** ܗܘܐ [+ Ʀſܐƍƀƃ BCD **2** ܐƆ BCDL: ܗܘ̣ P | ܗܘܐ ŸƄƤƉ] lac. in P | ƋƀƐƌܕ BCDP: ƋƀƐƌ L **<sup>3</sup>** ܐźƀƤƘ] + Ǝſųܒ P **<sup>4</sup>** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BCDL: ܐƙƏŴƇƀƘܕ P **<sup>5</sup>** ̇ ܗƦƇƕ BCLP: ܐƦƇƕ D **7** Ʀſܐ [om. B: + ƅſܐ D **<sup>9</sup>** ̇ ̈ ܬܗ ܒƇƇƊƊܐ **11** P in .lac] ܒƈƄ ܕܘƃܐ ܒų ŴƍܒƦƄƉܕ [inv. L | ܐƆܕ [lac. in P ̇ ܘ :BCDL ܗƌܐ ܗ P **12** ܐƌܐ BCDL: ܗܘܐ P **13** ƎƀƊƀƟƦƉܕ [lac. in P | ܗܝ̣ ܐƖſűſ] lac. in P **15** ܗܘܐ [om. B, add. sup. lin. in D **19** ܬŴƠƐƕܕ BCDP: ܬŴƠƊƕܕ L **21** ƈƀƃܗ [+ ƎƍŶ D, + Ǝƍŷƌܐ C | ƎƀƇſܕܐ [om. B | ƎƀƇƊƤƉܕ CDP: ƎƀƇƊƤƉ L: om. B | ܪܙܐ̈ܐ BCD: ܪܐܙܐ̈ LP **<sup>22</sup>** ܐƌ ̈ ܒƦܘ BCDL: ܐƌ ̈ ܬܘܘ Ŵܒܓ P | ܘܢųƆ2] om. B **23** ܪܙܐ̈ܐ BCDL: ܪܐܙܐ P | ܐܦ BCDL: ܘܐܦ P

disposition and his teaching has this kind of obscurity, so that even if he wanted he would not have been able to apply simple language in his writings. But they are clearly wrong because they do not comprehend the mentality of the Philosopher. For if the latter were like what they say then there would not even be a reason to make this inquiry. Indeed, if it were not deliberately that he employed this kind of obscurity but because that was his disposition, then it is obvious that there is no particular reason he chose this kind of path94.

62 We say instead that if it were like that, he would be seen to employ the same obscurity everywhere. But because we see that some of his writings e.g., all his letters and the treatise that he composed about all phenomena appearing in the air95 — are written in simple language which is not far from what I am using here, it is obvious that it was not that his disposition was like this, but that he deliberately made use of obscure language on some occasions. For it is clear to everyone that, if his disposition were like that and the reason for obscure language were not his will, then he would have equally applied it everywhere. But from the fact that sometimes he speaks obscurely and sometimes he teaches plainly we understand that he deliberately employed obscurity. That is why it is necessary for us to seek for the reason he embarked on the path of obscurity of language.

63 Now, they say that, just as those who are initiated in certain mysteries do not reveal them in front of everyone but perform them secretly in inner chambers in order to make them known only for those who are partakers of mysteries, so also he covered his whole teaching of logic and natures with obscurity

**<sup>94</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat*. 6.21–22; Simplicius, *In Cat*. 7.10–22; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 11.22–24.

**<sup>95</sup>** I.e. the *Meteorology*. Philoponus and Olympiodorus point to the *Meteorology* and the *Topics* as examples of Aristotle's clear style. Elias mentions the *Sophistical Refutations*. Simplicius refers to the *Constitutions* and the *Letters*.

̈ ــųܐ: ܕƆܐ ̈ƍƀܐ ܒƠƐƖــŴܬܐ ܕƊƣ ̇ ܕŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ ܘܕƃ ųƇƃ ܐƦƕűƀƆ ̇ ųƀƙ ̇ Ŷ ̇ ــſŴܐ ̈ــƍܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ƆܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƣ Ƙܘܙܐ ܐſƮــƣ ܐƤــƌ ̈ L4r ܐƆ ܥűــſܬܬ ƈــƀƄƉ ܘܢųƇƀŶ ųƇƃ ƎƉ ܐܐƇƊƆ Ǝƀܒ ̇ ܬܪƦƀƕܗܘܢ ƍƙƆŴƀƆܐ ܕܕܐƅſ ܗƌܐ: ܘܨ ̇űܥ ܗܘܐ ܕܐƎƀƇſ ܕܪƀƘܐ ܬܪƦƀƕܗܘܢ ܘܨƆܐ ܒƮƀƙƤܬܐ܂ ܘܬܘܒ ƈźƉ ܕſ ܨܒųƍƀܘܢ ŴƆܬ ܒƍƇźܐ ܘƀƠƌــƎ ܒƄــƈ Ɖــűܡ ƆــŴܬ ƀƌــŷ <sup>5</sup> ̈ܐ ƘܓƌƮــƀܐ: ƃــű C109v ƎƉ ܘܢųƆ ƎƀƤƀƘܘ ƎƀƇŶŴƉ ܗƦƖƣ Ƣܒ ܗܕܐ܉ ƅſܕܐ ܬܐŴƠƐƕ ܘܢŵŷƌ ̈ Ŵܬܐ܂ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕƎſ ܕƀŷƉــƎ ƍƀƃــųܘܢ ƕűƀƆــƦܐ ܘƀźƉܒƀــƎ ƦƕűſܗƎſ ܕܨܒ ƎƀƇŶŴــƉ ܐƆ ܕŴــŷƇܒ ŴــƆ ܬܐŴــƠƐƕ ܘܢŵــŷƌ űــƃ :Ŵܨܒــ ƈــƃܕ ܐƍƙƆŴƀƆ ̇ ܒƀــƎ Ƥƙƌــųܘܢ ܘƀƤƀƘــƎ܉ ܐƆܐ ƢſƦſܐſــƦ ſƞƀŷƉــƎ ܬܪƀƕــƦܗܘܢ ܘųſ B73v ܢ܂ƮƉܐƦƉܕ ƎƀƆܕܗ ܐƦƕűſ ƎƉ ŴܓƆ ܘܘܢųƌܕ :ܐܐƀܓƏ ܐƇƊƖƆ

̈ƀܐ: ܕƌܒƀƠــŴܗܝ ̇ ƕűƀƆــƦܗ ܒƠƐƖــŴܬܐ ܕƃــƌŴ ųــƀƙŶ ܐƌܗ ƈــźƉ 64 ƎــƀŷƉ ܕܐܢ :ܐƍƙƆŴــſܕ ܘܢųſܪŴــƣ ƎــƉ ųــƍƉ ܐűــƀ ̈ ƍƀƄƆــųܘܢ ܕܬƊƆ ̇ Ŵܐ ƀƊƆƦƆــűܘܬܐ ܘܐܢ Ɔܐ܂ ƃــű ܗܕܐ ܓƀــƢ ƖƏــƢ ܗܘܐ܉ ƦƕűƀƆܐ ܘƣ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕƆܐ ܒƦƖƣƢܗ ƎƀƕűſƦƉ ܗܘܘ ܬűƀƊƆ v63D ̈ܐ ƢſƮƣܐ܉ ܘƎƀƣƢƘƦƉ ƎƉ <sup>ܗ</sup> ƎſŴƣ űƀƊƆƦƆܘܬܐ܂ ƦƇƕܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܕƦŷƤŶܐ ܕƠƐƕــŴܬ ƇƇƊƉــų ܗܕܐ <sup>15</sup> ܗܝ܂

 ̇ 65 ƈƕ ųƤƀƌ ܕƎſ ܕƦƃܒܐ ܗƌܐ ܕƀźƟܓŴܪŴſܣ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ƀƉűƟܐ ܕųƇƃ űŶ űŶ ƈƃ ܐƆܐ ܗܝ܂̈ P19r ŴƍƠƤƙƉ ܘܢųƇƃ ŴƊƇƣ ܐƆ :ܐƦƇƀƇƉ ܬܐŴƍƉܐܘ ܒܐ܉ƦــƄܒ ųܒــ ܢƮــƀƉܐ ƎــƀƇſܐ ƎــƉ ųــƆ ŪــƐƌ ܡűƉ ܐƦƇƕ ܘܢųƍƉ

**3** ƅſܕܕܐ BCDP: ƅſܕܐ L **4** ƎƀƇſܕܐ BCLP: ƎƀƇſܐƆ D **6** ƎƀƇŶŴƉ BCDP: ƎƀƆŴŷƉ L **8** ƎƀƇŶŴƉ BCDP: ƎƀƆŴŷƉ L **<sup>9</sup>** ƎſƞƀŷƉ BCD: ƎſƞƀŶ LP **<sup>12</sup>** ܐűƀ ̈ ƊƆܕܬ [om. B | ܐƍƙƆŴſܕ LP: ܐƍƙƆŴſ ܬŴƆܕ BCD **13** ܗܕܐ [om. B **14** ƎƀƣƢƘƦƉܘ [+ ܗܘܘ D **17** ܣŴſܪŴܓƀźƟܕ L: ŴſƮܐܓźƟܕ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟܕ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟܕ D: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܐܓŹܐƟܕ B **<sup>18</sup>** ܗܝ̈ ŴƍƠƤƙƉ] + ܕܐűŷƆ BCD

of words in order to make it known not for common and frivolous people, but for those whose mind is worthy of this kind of teaching and who strive with all their strength for the good96. Also, since he knew that those people whose mind is unstable, whose will is driven towards laziness, and whose inclination is towards bodily pleasures more than anything else, as soon as they see this kind of obscurity they will immediately shy away and cease their study of these matters. Conversely, when those who have a disposition for knowledge and are prepared for the study of existing things encounter obscurity, not only will they not shy away and cease, but will all the more strengthen their minds and apply themselves to great labour in order to enter the knowledge of those things which are spoken about97.

64 That is why he veiled his doctrine in the obscurity of words, (namely) in order to examine the nature of the disciples right at the beginning of their learning, i.e. whether they are dedicated to knowledge and worthy of discipleship or not. Having done that, he immediately made known the true disciples as distinct from those who were not worthy of discipleship98. So, this was the reason for his use of obscure language.

#### *[The goal of the* Categories*: Various interpretations]99*

65 Those who interpreted the treatise *Categories*, which is the first in the whole logical craft, did not agree on its goal, but each one of them chose for himself a particular reason among those things which are discussed in this treatise and thus believed that he was better at discovering the goal of this

**<sup>96</sup>** Ammonius (*In Cat*. 7.8–10) compares Aristotle's obscurity to a curtain in a temple which prevents persons who are uninitiated in the mysteries from entering it. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat*. 6.26–28.

**<sup>97</sup>** Here, Sergius reproduces Ammonius' argument, see his *In Cat*. 7.10–14, cf. Philoponus, *In Cat*. 6.22–26 and Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 11.26–30.

**<sup>98</sup>** The next preliminary question discussed by Philoponus and Simplicius (their order of the questions differ here from Ammonius and Olympiodorus, who discuss this point a little earlier) is what kind of person a student of Aristotle's writings should be. Ammonius answers it by saying that he should be educated and purified in soul (πεπαιδευμένον τὰ ἤθη εἶναι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κεκαθαρμένον, see *In Cat*. 6.22–23), quoting later on *Phaedo* 67B where Plato points out that the pure should be separated from the impure. Sergius integrates this point into his discussion of Aristotle's obscurity of style. It is worth noting that Sergius quotes the same passage from *Phaedo* on another occasion, namely in his introduction to Galen's commentary on the Hippocratic treatise *On Nutriment*, see Bos & Langermann 2009.

**<sup>99</sup>** Mss. BCD include the subtitle: "On the goal of the treatise *Categories*". The question of the goal of Aristotle's treatise opened the list of the preliminaries related not to all of his philosophy (as was the case with the previous points) but to the *Categories* specifically. Cf. Olympiodorus' list in *Prolegomena* 18.18–21.

ܘܗܝ܂ƮܒــŶ ƎــƉ ƢــſƦſ ܬܐŴƍܒƦƄƉܕ ̇ C110r ųƤƀƌ ŸƄƣܐ ܕܗܘ̣ ƢܒƏܐ ܬŴƃܘܗ ̇ Ƣ ܐƌܐ ƎƉ ܗܐ ƄƉܐ. Ɖܐ ƎſűƉ ƎƀƆܗ ƈƕ ƤƘܕ ƎƀƇſܐ Ǝƀ̈

66 ܬƦƆ ܐƌ

̈Ǝźƀ܂ ܘܐƞƆܐ Ɵــűܡ ƊƇƃــűܡ ƕــƈ ƦƕűſܗſــƎ܂ ̈źƀــƦܐ܂ ܘ̈ܪƀƕــƍܐ ̈ــŴܬܐ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕܐſųſƦſــƎ ܒƇƖــƊܐ ƤƘ ܗƌــŴ ܕſــƎ ܨܒ Ǝſųſ̈ ̈Ʀźƀܐ ܕܒܐűſ ̈Ƈܐ ܬܘܒ ƤƘ <sup>Ɵ</sup> <sup>Ʀ</sup>̈ ƍܘܒ ܂ƎſųƀƇƕ ƎƍƀƍƟܕ ƎƀƇſܐ ܐźƀ̈ <sup>5</sup> ƤƘ ̇ ŴźƇƘܢ ̇ Ƣ ܐƌܐ ܕƎſ ܕܐƅſ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ ܐܘ Ɖܐ ܂ƎſųƆ ƎƍƀƕܕŴƤƉ ̈ــƤܐ܂ ܨܒــŴܬܐ ƦƉܐƉــƢ ̇ ܐƥƌ ܐƌƢŶܐ ƉــƎ ܒƍƀƍ ̇ ܐƀƠƆܒƑſűƀ: ܐܘ ܐܘ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ƦźƀƤƘܐ܂ ܘƃܐƘܐ ܬܘܒ ܒــų v4L ̇ ܒƉűــŴܬܐ ܘƀƟــƐܐ ܘƣــƃƢܐ ̈źƀܐ ܕųƀƇƕܘܢ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ܉ ܕܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ܂ ܗŴƃܬ ܬܘܒ ܘܐܦ ̈ܪƍƀƕܐ ƤƘ ̈ــƇܐ ܬܘܒ Ɵ Ʀــƍ̈ B74r ܘܒ ܂Ǝܒــ ƗــſܬܙƦƉܕ ƎــſųƍƉ ܐűــŶ ƈــƃ ƈــƕܕ ܒܐƣŴــŶ ܐƀƌŴƃܘ ܐƊƣ ܗܘ̣ ƎſųſƦſܐ ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ ܐűŶ ƈƄƆ Ǝƕ̈ ̈Ʀźƀܐ ܕŴƤƉܕ ƤƘ ̇ ܕܬܬűſܥ ųƍƉ܂ ųƆ ƋƀƏܕ

̇ ƌــŴܢ ܕƍƀƍƟــƎ ſųƀƇƕــƎ܉ ̈ــŴܬܐ ſųƍƀƃــƎ ܘ̈ܪƀƕــƍܐ ܗ ܨܒ ƈــƀƃܗ Ǝــƀƌ ̈ C110v ܗ <sup>67</sup> ƍƀƃܐƦſ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ܒƊƇƖܐ܂ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ̣ܗƌــŴܢ ƃــű ̣ܗƌــŴܢ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ Ʀſܐƍƀƃ ŴƆ ܬܐŴ ̈ ܒƞƆ ƎſųƆ ƎƀƕܕŴƤƉܕ ܐƀƌ ̈ ܒűƇƄܘƃܐ܂ ųƊƣ <sup>15</sup> ̈ ܐ ܕƎſ ܘŴƃ ̈ ƍƀƍــƤܐ ܕܐܬƤƍƃــŴ ŷƆــűܐ ܐųſƦſܘܢ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒƊƀƐܐ ܕƎƉ Ŵƍƃ v19P ̈ ƀƣܐ ܕܒ ܐܬܬƊƀƏــŴ: ܘźƉــƈ ܗƌܐ ƆــŴ ̣ܗƌــŴܢ ƃــű ̣ܗƌــŴܢ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܒƄــƈ ̈ ƀƊــƎ܂ ƃــܐƘܐ ܓƀــƢ ܘܒƌƢــƤܐ ܘƀŶــŴܬܐ ܘƞƌܒــƦܐ ܘŷƇƃــűܐ ƉــƎ Ɗƕ ƎــƉ ܐűــŶ ܐűــŶ ƈــƃ ƈــƕ ƎــƍƀƍƟܕ ܬܘܒ ܒܐ̈ ̈ Ŵܬܐ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ: ܘƣŴŶ ܨܒ ܗƀƆــƎ܉ ܒƄــƈ ܐܬ̈ܪܘܢ ܘܒƄــƈ Ɗƕ <sup>20</sup> ̈ ƀƊــƎ ̣ܗƌــŴܢ ƃــű ̣ܗƌــŴܢ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ܂ ̈ ƀƌܐ ܕƎſ ŴƤƉܕƎſųƍƕ ܕܗƎƀƆ܉ ŴƆ ̣ܗŴƌܢ űƃ ̣ܗƌــŴܢ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܒƄــƈ Ŵƃ ̈ ƀƌܐ: ܘܐƀƌƢŶܐſــƦ ̈ــŴܬܐ ܒƀــƦ ſــŴ ܨܒ Ǝƀƍ̈ D64r ƃƦƉ Ƣƀܓ ƦſܐƀƌƢŶܐ ܐ܂ƃܕܘ

**<sup>1</sup>** ƢܒƏܐ LP: ܘƢܒƏܐ BCD | ̇ ųƤƀƌ LP: ܐƤƀƌ BCD | ܬܐŴƍܒƦƄƉܕ [+ ܗܕܐ BCD **2** ƎƀƆܗ CDLP: ܐƤــƀƌ B | ܐƄــƉ] + tit. ̄ ŴܐܓــźƟܕ ܒܐƦــƃܕ ųــƤƀƌ ƈــƕ B in textu: ܒܐƦــƃܕ ųــƤƀƌ ƈــƕ Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓŹܐƟܕ B in marg.: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟܕ ܒܐƦƃܕ ųƤƀƌ ƈƕ C: ̄ ŴܓųźƟܕ ܒܐƦƃܕ ųƤƀƌ ƈƕ D ̈ ܐ :BCDL ܒƊƇƖܐ **4** ƊƇƕ P **<sup>5</sup>** ܐƦźƀ̈ ƤƘ] + ƎƀƇſܐ L **7** ƑſűƀܒƀƠƆܐ CD: ƑſűܒƠƆܐ P: ܣűƀܒƠƆܐ B: ƑſűܒŴƠƆܐ L | ܐƌƢŶܐ CDLP: ƎſƢŶܐ B **<sup>8</sup>** ܐƐƀƟܘ [+ ܬܐŴƉűܒ ̇ ܐܦ :LP ܘܐܦ **9** BCD ܒų BCD **<sup>10</sup>** ܐűŶ] + ܐűŶ BCD **<sup>11</sup>** ܐűŶ] + ܐűŶ BCD **<sup>13</sup>** Ǝƀƌ ̈ ܗƎƀƆ :BCLP] ܘ̈ܪƍƀƕܐ | L ܗƎƀƆ :BCDP ܗ D | ƎſųƀƇƕ BCDL: ܘܢųƀƇƕ P **14** ܘܢųſƦſܐ1 CPL: ƎſųſƦſܐ BD **18** ܐűŷƇƃܘ [+ ܐűŶ BCD **19** ƎƍƀƍƟܕ BCDL: ƎƍƀƍƟ P **21** ܢŴƌܗ̣ űƃ] om. CDLP **22** Ʀƀܒ BCLP: űƀܒ D

book than his colleagues. It is about these things that I am going to speak from now on100.

66 What is simple is three in number, and knowledge about them shall come before everything else. These are simple things that are in the world, simple concepts which we acquire about them, and also simple words by means of which we signify them101. What I mean is this. Socrates, Plato, Alcibiades, or any other human being is said to be a simple thing, and likewise a stone, a piece of wood, and other objects. Subsequently, simple concepts of them are thoughts about each one of them that appear in us. And further, simple words that signify each one of them are names and designations which are imposed on them and by which they are known102.

67 So, things by their nature and concepts which we acquire about them exist naturally in the world, and therefore are the same everywhere. However, names and designations that signify these things do not exist naturally, but are established by communities of people who are gathered together, and because of that they are not the same in all nations103. Thus, stone, man, life, plant and any other thing, and also the ideas of each one of them that we acquire, are the same in all places and in all nations. But the names that signify them are not the same in every place. For things are called in one way by the Greeks, in other

**<sup>100</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 8.20–9.1; Philoponus, *In Cat*. 8.23–27; Simplicius, *In Cat*. 9.5–7; Elias, *In Cat*. 129.7–9; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 18.21–25.

**<sup>101</sup>** Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 18.25: τριττὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἢ πράγματα ἢ νοήματα ἢ φωναί.

**<sup>102</sup>** On the imposition of names, cf. Porphyry, *In Cat*. 57.20–59.2.

**<sup>103</sup>** Cf. Simplicius' note that Aristotle rejected the notion that names are established naturally (κατὰ φύσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀπογινώσκει) in *In Cat*. 13.26.

̈ܬſܐ ̈ܘſܐ ܬܘܒ ܐƀƌƢŶܐſــƦ: ܘܒƀــƦ ƠƏــŴ ܒƀــƦ ƏƮƘــƀܐ: ܘܒƀــƦ ܗƌــű ̈ ــƊܐ܂ ܗƃــƍܐ Ɗƕ ƎــƉ űــŶ űــŶ ƈــƄܒ ƢƉܐƊƆ ƦſܐƤƀƍƃܘ :ƦſܐƀƌƢŶܐ ƎƀƊ ̈ Ɗƕ Ǝſܪ̈Ʀܒ ܐƀƌŴƃ űŶ ŸƃƦƤƌ ƦƉܐƃ ܐƆܕ ƅſܐ ܐƀƌ ̈ Ŵƃ ƎƀƙƇŷƤƉ ̇ ƞƆܒŴܬܐ܂ ųƆ űƃ ̇ C111r ųƆ ܕܥŴƤƉܕ

68 ųƍƉܘܢ ܗƈƀƃ ܕܐƎƀƇſ ܕܨܒŴ ƢƟƦƊƆܒŴ ŴƆܬ ųƇƃŴƏ ܕƦƃܒܐ ܗƌܐ <sup>5</sup> ƎــſųſƦſܕܐ ƎــƌƢƉܕܐ Ǝƀƌ ̈ ̈Ʀźƀܐ ܗ ƤƘ ܬܐŴ ̈ ܕƀźƟܓŴܪŴſܣ: ƎſųƀƇƕ ܕܨܒ ƍƀƃܐƦſ܉ ܐƏܒــƢܘ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ Ƥƀƌــų ܕƃــƦܒܐ܂ ܘƍƉــųܘܢ ƕــƈ ̈ܪƀƕــƍܐ ̈źƀܐ ̣ܐƢƉܘ ܕƦƄƉܒ ųƆ ƘŴƐƇƀƙƆܐ Ʀƃܒܐ ܗƌܐ܂ ܘƍƉــųܘܢ ƕــƈ ƤƘ ƎſܗƦƀƍƕܕŴــƤƉ ƎــƌƢƉܕܐ ƅــſܐ ƎــſųſƦſܕܐ ܐƦــźƀ̈ ̈ــƇܐ ƤƘ <sup>Ɵ</sup> Ʀــ̈ ܒƍ ܕܨܒ <sup>10</sup> ̈ Ŵܬܐ܂

	- ̇ ̈źƀــƦܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ܐſƦſــų ƤƘ ܐƇ̈ Ɵ Ʀƍ ̈ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܬܘܒ ܕܐƏܒƢܘ ܕƈƕ ܒ 70 ܘܗ ŴƍƙƇƉܬܐ ܕܒƀźƠܓŴܪŴſܣ܉ ܘܐܦ ̣ܗŴƌܢ ƎƉ ƦƇƉܐ ܐƢŶܬܐ ܕƊƀƏܐ ܒŴƤܪųſ ܕƦƃܒܐ ŴƍƟ ƐƉܒŴƌƢܬܐ ܕܐƅſ ܗܕܐ܂ ܐƎſƢƉ ܓƢƀ ܕܗܐ ƋƆ <sup>20</sup> Ƣ ̇ Ɖܐ űƃ űܒƕ ܐƇ̈ Ɵ Ʀƍ ̈ ̇ ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ܉ ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕܒ ܒƢ ƦƖƣܗ ܒŴƤܪųſ ܗƃــƍܐ܂ ܕſųƇƃــƎ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƦƉܐƉــƮܢ܉ ſųƍƉــƎ ܒƢܘƃــܒܐ ƦƉܐƉــƮܢ:

̈ ܬſܐ **1** ŴــƠƏ] + ܬܘܒ BCD **<sup>2</sup>** űŶ2] om. D **<sup>3</sup>** ƎƀƊ ̈ Ɗƕ BL: ܐƊ ̈ Ɗƕ CDP **6** ܣŴſܪŴܓƀźƟܕ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟܕ BC: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųŹܐƟܕ D: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟܕ P | Ǝƀƌ ̈ ܗ BCDP: ƎƀƆܗ L **8** ܒƦƄƉܕ BCDL: ƎܒــƦƄ ̈ Ɖܕ P | ܐƘŴــƐƇƀƙƆ BCDL: ܐƘŴــƏŴƇƇƀƙƆ P **9** ƎــƌƢƉܕܐ BCDL: ƎــƍŶ ܢƢــƉܕܐ P **12** ƑƀƇŹŴــźƐſܐܪƆ CL: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܐܪƆ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪƆ D: ܣŴƀƇźźƐſܐܪƆ P **13** ܪƦܒ BCDL: ܪƦܒ ƎƉ P **<sup>14</sup>** Ʀſܐűƀŷſ BCDP: Ʀſܐſűƀŷſ L **<sup>15</sup>** ܐƊƀƟ LP: ܐƊſŴƟ BCD | Ǝ ̈ ƊƀƟƦƉ BCDP: ƎƊƀƟƦƉܕ L | ƎſƢƉܐ BCLP: ƎƍſƢƉܐ D **16** ܐſܪŴƣܕ LP: ųſܪŴƣܕ BCD | ƎſųܓƆŴƘ] + ƎــſųƇſܕ L | ܐƘŴــƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƙƏŴــƇƀƘ P **19** ܣŴــſܪŴܓƀźƠܕܒ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــźƠܕܒ C: ̇ ܝ + [ܐƢŶܬܐ | D ܕƟܐųŹܓŴ̈ܪƑſ :B ܕܒƠܐŴŹܓ :P ܕܒźƠܐܓŴ̈ܪƑſ ܗ P **21** ܗƦƖƣ] + ųܒ BCD

way by the Persians, still in other way by the Indians, and still in other way by the Scythians, i.e., generally speaking, by each one of the nations. So names differ from each other, and you will not find a single name among two nations that signifies one and the same thing.

68 Now, some of those who have sought to reach understanding of the treatise *Categories* considered that it is to the simple things which we say to exist naturally that the goal of the treatise pertains, others stated that it is about simple concepts that the Philosopher had written this treatise, while still others that it is about simple words which, as we said, are signifiers of things104.

69 But those who stated that those were simple things that Aristotle intended to teach about in this treatise led themselves astray by the passage that appears close to the beginning of the book, in which he wrote: "Of things some exist universally and some particularly; and further some have subsistence in themselves and some come to be through these ones."105 So they say: "Behold, it is the division of things that the Philosopher makes at the beginning of the book! Hence it is evident that in this book he teaches about simple things."106

70 Also those who assume that the teaching of the *Categories* is only about simple words derive this kind of assumption from another passage that is found at the beginning of the treatise. So, they say: "Behold, right at the beginning of the book he made a division of words when he said: 'Of all things that are said, some are said in combination and some without combination.'107

**<sup>104</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat*. 8.27–29: τινὲς οὖν περὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν διηνέχθησαν, καὶ οἱ μὲν εἰρήκασι περὶ φωνῶν μόνων εἶναι τὸν σκοπὸν οἱ δὲ περὶ πραγμάτων μόνων οἱ δὲ περὶ νοημάτων μόνων.

**<sup>105</sup>** Sergius' words are a sort of a summary of *Cat*. 1a20–1b9 formulated in accordance with his interpretation of this passage at the beginning of Book III of his *Commentary*.

**<sup>106</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 9.5–7; Philoponus, *In Cat*. 8.33–9.4. In contrast to Ammonius and Philoponus who first speak about simple words and after that about simple things, Sergius reverts this order.

**<sup>107</sup>** *Cat*. 1a16–17: τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς.

̇ ƀƌــƎ ܕƦƉܐƉــƮܢ: ܘƎſųƍƉ ܕƆܐ ܪܘƃܒܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ܂ ƎſűƉ ƋƆ ƈźƉ ܕܗ ܓܐƆŴــƘ ƎــƉܕ ƈźƉ :ܐƇ̈ Ɵ Ʀƍ̈ ŴƆ űƉܡ ܐƎſƢŶ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܐƆܐ ܐܢ ܒ ̈Ʀźƀܐ ƚƇƉ܂ ƤƘ ܐƇ̈ Ɵ Ʀƍ ̈ ܕܗƎƀƆ Ƣƣܝ܉ Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƈƕ ܒ

	- <sup>73</sup> ܐƌŵƃܐ ܓƢƀ ܐſƢƉــƎ ܕƌܓــƢܐ ܐܘ ܐܘƉــƍܐ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ܐſــƍܐ ̣ܕܗܘ: Ŵܒܓــ ųــƍƉ Ǝــſܘ ̈ ̈ܬܐ ܕܗ ̈ــƊܐ ܕܨܒــŴ ƄƏܘܐ ܐƣ̈ <sup>20</sup> ܐܕ ƗܒــŹ ƦــƀƉűƟ ̇ ƚƇ ܘƎƟƦƉ ƎſųƆ܂ ܘƉܐ ܕܐܬܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܒƦܪܗ ܘŵŶܐ ܬܪƦƀƕܗ ܘƎƃ ܓ ̈ــűܐ ܒƖــŴܗܕųƌ ܘܐŶــű ܘƆܒــƅ ܒƕܕ ܘܢųــƍƉ ƎſųƆ Ū ̇ Ɛƌ Ǝſűſܗ ܉Ǝƀƌ ̈ ܐ Ǝــƀƌܗ űــƃ Ǝــƀƌܕܗ Ǝƀ̈ ̈Ǝŷ ܗƎƀƆ ܒƦƆƦܐ ܙƌ ƎſųƆ ܒܓŴ ܬܪƦƀƕܗ܂ ܘƃƦƤƉ

**<sup>2</sup>** ŴƆ] + ƈźƉ D **<sup>5</sup>** ̇ ųƤƀƌ BCDP: ܐƤƀƌ L | ܣŴſܪŴܓƀźƟܕ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟܕ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟܕ D: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟܕ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓŹܐƠܕܒ B in textu, ܬܐŴƌƮƉܐƦƉ B in marg. **6** ŴܒƐƌ BDLP: ŪƐƌ C **<sup>7</sup>** ܐƦƇƉ BDLP: ܢƦƇƉ C **<sup>9</sup>** ƈƕܕ [om. L | ܐƘ ̈ ŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƘŴƏ̈ ŴƇƀƘ P **10** ŴƇƕܐ [+ ܗܘܘ P **11** ܘܢųƇƃܘ [+ ƎƀƇſܐ BCD | ܐƀƉűƟܐ L, Epit.: ܐſܐƉűƟܐ CDP: ܐſܐƀƉűƟܐ B **12** ƎſƢƉܐ Ƣƀܓ [om. BD, D suppl. in marg. **13** ܐܦ [om. L **14** Ʀſܕܐ LP, Epit.: Ʀſܘܐ BCD | ƦƖܒŹܐܬ CDLP: ƦƖܒŹܐܬܬ B **19** ƎſƢƉܐ DLP: ƎſƢƉܕܐ BC **22** ƅܒƆܘ űŶܘܐ LP, Epit.: űŶܘܐ ƅܒƆܘ BCD **23** ƎƀƆܗ LP, Epit.: ƎſųƆ BCD | Ǝƀƌܕܗ BCD, Epit.: ƎſųƆ LP

Consequently, because 'things that are said' are nothing else than words and because it is this division with which he begins, it is evident that he is teaching about simple words."108

71 Now, those who state that the goal of the treatise *Categories* concerns only simple concepts which we acquire about things receive a reason for what they want to say from various arguments109. There is no other way to speak about them than to interrupt our narrative here and to discuss those issues which we have mentioned just above.

#### *[Genera, species, and Platonic forms]110*

72 Philosophers do not agree with each other in their research about genera (γένη) and species (εἴδη), but in their teachings on these issues they have introduced a number of different concepts111. Now, Plato and all those from the Academy hold the following view on genera and species (εἴδη). They state that each thing that exists naturally in the world has a certain form (εἶδος) by itself, but it also possesses a form with its Creator112 which gives subsistence to its essence and according to which it is imprinted and comes into being in the world. Additionally, when someone sees it, then he also receives its form in his memory, and it has subsistence in his mind. Thus, the same form appears in three ways, i.e. with the Creator, in the thing, and in the memory of the person who knows it113.

73 For example, they say that a carpenter or any other kind of craftsman first imprints inside his mind the forms (εἴδη) and shapes (σχήματα) of those things that are produced by him and then carves and furnishes them. And when someone else comes thereafter and sees his works, then he will bring them into his memory and capture and preserve them inside his mind. It will thus

**<sup>108</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 9.3–5; Philoponus, *In Cat*. 8.29–33.

**<sup>109</sup>** Cf. the reference to *Cat*. 11b15 by Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9.8. Sergius discusses this point of view below, in §80.

**<sup>110</sup>** This excursus by Sergius has a parallel in that section of Ammonius' commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* which refers to *Isag*. 1.9–12. In the latter passage, Porphyry addresses the question of whether genera and species exist in reality or in bare thought. In answering this question, Ammonius turns to the Platonic teaching of Ideas, or Concepts, that are contained in the Intellect of the Demiurge, which Sergius associates with one of the interpretations of the *Categories*, namely the one that states that the scope of this treatise pertains to concepts alone.

**<sup>111</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 42.24–26, who specifies that the disagreement is found between Plato and Aristotle.

**<sup>112</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 42.5–6: δῆλον, ὡς ἔστιν ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ τὰ εἴδη. See also 41.20–21: ὁ γὰρ δημιουργὸς πάντα ἔχει παρ' ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντων παραδείγματα.

**<sup>113</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 42.5–13.

ƎƊƀƠƉ: ܗŴƌ ܕƎſ ܒƦܪƦƀƕܗ ܕܐܘƍƉܐ ܘܒųܘܢ ܒƖܒ v112C ̈űܐ ܘܒƖــŴܗܕųƌ ̇ ŵܐ ƎſųƆ܂ ̇ ܘ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܕŶ ܕܗ

74 ܗƃــƍܐ ƆــƋ ܘܐܦ ƕܒــŴܕܗ ܕܗƌܐ ƃــƈ ܐܬܪƕــƁ ܐſƦſܐſــƦ ƕــƈ ̇ Ǝ ܕƎƉ ܐſƦſܐ ƌܒــųܘ: ̈ Ŵܬܐ܂ ܘܗŴƌܢ ̈ܪƍƀƕܐ ܐƅſ Ɖ ̈ܬܗƎſ ܕܨܒ ŴƍƄƉ ƎſųƇƃ ƋƀƟܘܐ ƚƇܘܓ ƗܒŹ ƎƀƆųܒ ܘܢųܘܒ ܗ܂ƦƖƣ Ƣܒ ܗܘܘ ܐƉ̈ <sup>5</sup> ŴƍƟ ̈ܬܐ ܕܬƌــƎ܂ ܘܐܦ ƀƃűƕــƈ ܘܕƆܐ ƣــƋƆŴ܉ ܒــųܘܢ ܒƀƆųــƎ ̈ܪƀƕــƍܐ ܨܒــŴ ܘܬܘܒ ܬܗ܂ŴſܘƢܕܒ ܬܐŴƍƉܒܐܘ ŸƤŶƦƉ űƃ :ƈƃ ƎƀƄƉܘ ܨܐܪ ܐƀƉ̈ P21r űƟ ̈ƀــƦܐ ̈ܬܐ ƍƀƃ ŴܒــƞƆ ƎــſųƆ ƎــƍſŵŶ :Ǝܙܒــ Ǝܒــŵܒ Ǝــƍſܕܗܘ ܐƤــƌܐ Ɓــƍ ̈ B75v ܒ ƎƍŶ ܘƢƟƦƉܒƎƍƀ ŴƆܬ ƦƕűſܗƎſ: ܘƎƍƀƍƟ ܒܓŴ ŴƕܗܕƎƌ ̈ܪƍƀƕܐ ܕųƀƇƕܘܢ܂

	- ƎــƀƇƖ ̇ 76 ܕܬܬųƌܪ ܕƎſ ܬܘܒ ƦƇƉܐ ܓƀƇܐſــƦ ܬŶــƦſŴܐ ܐŶــƢܬܐ ܕƉ Əܐܡ ܐƌܐ ܒƦƖƣƢܗ܂ ܐƎſƢƉ ܓƢƀ ܕܐƌŵƃܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܐſــƦ ƟŵƕــƦܐ r6L ̇ ƍƟŴſܐ ܕܒƤƌƢܐ ܐƍſܐ ̣ܕܗܘ܂ ܬܬŪƐƌ ܕƎſ ܐܦ ƢƟܘܬܐ űƉܡ ܕܪƋƀƣ ܒų ̈ ƀــܐܐ ̈ــƖܐ Əܓ Ɖــűܡ ƊƀŷƣــƦܐ ܘƏܓƀــܐܬܐ: ܘźƌܒــŴܥ ܐƌــƥ Źܒ ̇ ƟــƢܘܬܐ܂ ƌــܐܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ܒƦܪƃــƎ ܘŷƌــŵܐ ܒƟŵƖــƦܐ ܗ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܝ ƇƄƆــų ̇ ̈ Ɩܐ ܕܒƢƠܘܬܐ: ܘƥƍƄƌ ̈ܪܘƊƣܐ ܕųƇƃܘܢ ܘƋƀƐƌ ܒŴƖܗܕųƌ: űƃ ųƆ Źܒ ̇ ŵܐ܂ Ɩſűſܐ ƋƆ ƎſűƉ ܕܬƦƀƆܐƦſ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܪܘƊƣܐ ܬƎƌ: Ŷ ܐƆ ܐƦƟŵƖƆ ܗƌــŴ ܕſــƎ ܒƟŵƖــƦܐ ƀƉűƟــƦ܉ ܘܒƠــƢܘܬܐ ܒƦܪƃــƎ܉ ܘܗƃــŴܬ ܐſƢŶــƦ

**1** ųƌܗܕŴƖܘܒ BCDL, Epit.: ųƌܗܕŴƖܒ ܘܐܦ P **2** ܐƌƢŶܐ BLP, Epit.: ܐſŵŶ C: ܐſŵŶܕ D **3** ܘܐܦ BCDL: ܐܦ P, Epit. **<sup>8</sup>** ƎſųƆ] om. C **<sup>9</sup>** Ŵܒܓ BCDL, Epit.: űƀܒ P **<sup>11</sup>** ƎſųƀƐ̈ ƍܓ BCDP, cf. ƎſųƐƍܓ Epit.: Ǝſųƀ̈ ƍƐƍܓ L | ܐƀ ̈ ƉűƟ BCDP, Epit.: ܐƀƊſű̈ <sup>Ɵ</sup> L **<sup>15</sup>** ܬܐ ̈ ܐƌƮŶܐ .:Epit ,BD ܐſƮŶܐ ܕܨܒŴ ̈ܬܐ ̈ܬܐ ܐŶــƌƮܐ :CP ܕܨܒــŴ Ŵܕܨܒــ L **16** ܐƦــƇƉ LP: ܢƦــƇƉ BCD **17** ܐƌŵــƃܕܐ [om. BCDP Ʀſܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ LP: Ʀſܕܐ ܗܘܐƦƌܕ BCD **18** ܘܬܐƢƟ BCDL: ܐܪܘܬܐƟ P **19** ܐƦƊƀŷƣ BDLP: ƦſܐƊƀŷƣ C **23** ܘܬܐƢƠܘܒ BCDL: ܐܪܘܬܐƠܘܒ P

happen that they subsist in three ways, i.e. in the mind of the craftsman, in his works, and in the memory of another person who sees them.

74 In the same way, also the Creator of the universe (first) has essentially thought about the natural constitution of things114. When these thoughts emanated from the essence, they immediately became substances, and with them he imprinted, engraved, and established all things here. It is also through these primary thoughts that he is still constantly forming and constituting everything, applying his craft of creation. And we, humans, who come into being for a particular time, observe natural things, seek the knowledge of them, and retain concepts of them in our memory.

75 Now, they suppose that these thoughts which are considered to be substantially with the Creator are the primary genera and forms (εἴδη) of things. And those imprintings and engravings that are generated from them here in the matter of natures they designate as natural genera and species of things. And further, those concepts of things that are collected in our memory as knowledge of them they call posterior genera and species of things115.

76 In order to further explain this subject matter more clearly, I will immediately provide another example which they introduce. For instance, let there be a ring, they say, with an engraved image (εἰκών) of a particular person. Then someone takes a large amount of ordinary wax (κηρός) and make with that ring multiple imprints on all that wax. After that, also another person who has not seen the ring will come and see the imprints on the wax, put together the images of all of them, and save them in his memory. So, it is obvious that in this case the image will exist in three ways, namely first on the ring, after that on the wax, and then finally in the memory of the person who came and saw the

**<sup>114</sup>** Thus, the Platonic Forms are associated by Sergius with the Demiurge's thoughts, the notion which apparently belonged to Ammonius, and later on (see §75) he also identifies the thoughts of Demiurge with the primary genera and species, or forms, of the existing things. This identification allows Sergius to further explicate the system of genera and species in the ontological terms, cf. his further excurses in ontology and logic in §§129–133 and 241–242.

**<sup>115</sup>** Ammonius speaks in his commentary on the *Isagoge* of the forms that are in the Demiurge and that are "prior to the many" (πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν), forms that are "in the many" (ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς), and those which are imprinted in our thought and are "after the many and last-generated" (μετὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ ὑστερογενές), see Ammonius, *In Isag.* 42.6–13 (cf. Elias, *In Isag.*  48.15–30). Philoponus discusses this issue in the context of primary and secondary substance, see Philoponus, *In Cat*. 58.13–21.

̇ ܘ ̣ ܕܐܬܐ ̣ܘŶــŵܐ ܒƠــƢܘܬܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ܒƟŵƖــƦܐ Ŷــű ܗܘܐ ܒƖــŴܗܕųƌ ܕܗ ̈ ƀــܐܐ ƍƉــų ̣ܗܘܘ ܪܘƣــƊܐ ܒܐܕƣــų ܘܒƍƀƍƊــų܂ ܒƠــƢܘܬܐ ܕſــƎ Əܓ ̈ܪܘƣـــƊܐ ܕƀƙƇŷƤƉـــƎ ƉـــƎ Ŷـــű v21P ̈ܕܐ܉ ƆـــŴ ܒـــܐܕƣܐ ܐƆܐ ܒƀƍƊـــƍܐ܂ ̇ ܘ ܕŶــŵܐ ܐƌــŴܢ ŷƆــƢܬܐ ܒƠــƢܘܬܐ܉ Ŷــű ܬܘܒ ܘܒƦܪƀƕــƦܗ ܬܘܒ ܕܗ ̈ ƀܐܐ܂ ̇ ܘܐ ܪܘƊƣܐ ܕŪƀƐƌ ƎƉ Əܓ ܘܗ ƥƍ̇ C113v ƃƦƉ

Ǝــſųƀƣ̈ ̈ ſــƎ ܘܐܕ <sup>77</sup> ܗƍƃܐ ƋƆ ܐܦ ŴƆܬ ƕܒŴܕܐ ܕܗ r76B ̈ ܘſܐ ܐƦſ ܓųƀƐƍ ̈ܬܐ܉ ܒŴƉűܬ ܪܘƊƣܐ ܒƦƟŵƖܐ܂ ŹƦƉܒƎƀƖ ܕƎſ ܘƎƀƊƀƟƦƉ ܒűƀ ܕܨܒŴ ̇ ƌــŴܢ ܕܒƠــƢܘܬܐ܂ ̈ܬܐ܉ ܐſــƅ ̈ܪܘƣــƊܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> Ŵܕܨܒــ Ǝــſųƀ̈ ŴƖƏܪܘܬܐ ܒƍƀƄ ̈ƀــƍܐ܉ ܘƍƀƤƍƄƉــƎ ܒܓــŴ ܬܪƀƕــƦܢ ܘܬܘܒ ܐܬƍſــƎ ƆــŴܬ ƕűſــƦܗܘܢ ܕƃ ̈Ʀƀܐ܂ ܘܐƃــƌŵܐ ƆــƋ ƍƀƃ ƎƉ ̇ ̇ űſܐ ܐųſƦſ ̈ƣܐ ܕƈƃ ܨܒŴ <sup>ܐ</sup> ܓƍ <sup>10</sup> ̈Ɛܐ ܘܐܕ ̈ƀƤــźܐ ܕܒƟŵƖــƦܐ Ŷــű ܗܘܐ ܪܘƣــƊܐ܉ ܗƃــƍܐ ܘܐܦ ƆــŴܬ ƕܒــŴܕܐ Ƙ ̈ܬܐ܂ ܘܐſــƅ ܕܒƠــƢܘܬܐ ܬܘܒ Ŵܕܨܒــ Ǝــſųƀƣ̈ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ Ƈƃــųܘܢ ܐܕ ̈ ƍƀƍܐ Ŵſűƀŷſܬܗ ܕܪܘƊƣܐ ܕܒƟŵƖــƦܐ܉ ܗƃــƍܐ ܒــųܘƆܐ ƊƆ ƦܓƇƘܐܬ ̈ــƉŴܐ ƍƠƆ ŭــƇƘƦƉ :ܕܐŴܒƕ ܬŴƆܕ ܐźƀƤ̈ <sup>Ƙ</sup> ܐƣ̈ ܐܕ ƎƉ űŶ ƈƃ ܐƍƀ̈ ܕƃ ܕƆܐ ƎƀƍƉ ܕƎƀƙƇŷƤƉ ƎƉ űŶ <sup>15</sup> ̈ܕܐ ƆــŴ ܒــܐܕƣܐ: źƉــƈ ܕŶــű ̣ܗܘ ܐܕƣܐ ̈ܕܐ܂ ܘܒܓŴ ܬܪƦƀƕܢ ܕųƇƃܘܢ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒƍƀƍƊܐ ܕƥſƢƘ ŴſűŶܬܗܘܢ ƎƉ űŶ ̈ܕܐ: ̈ ܓƀܐܐ ܕƎƀƤſƢƘ ܒƍƀƍƊܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ƎƉ űŶ <sup>Ə</sup> ܐƉ̈ D65v ŴƍƟܕ ܘܢųƍƉ ܬܘܒ܉ ƎــƉ ƎــƀܒƀƐƌܕ ܐſ̈ ̈ܬܐ: ܘܗܘſــƎ ƀŷſــű Ŵܕܨܒــ ƎــſųƇſܕ ܐƣ̈ L6v ܐܕ ƎــƀƤƍƃƦƉ ̈ ܓƀܐܐ܂ Ə

78 ƈƕ ܗƎƀƆ ܗƈƀƃ ܗƍƃܐ ƣܒŴŷ ųƇƃܘܢ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕܗܘܘ ƎƉ ܬܪƀƕــƦܗ <sup>20</sup> P22r | C114r ܘܗܝƦſܐ ܘܢųƍƉܕ :ŴƠƀźźƙſƮƘ ܘܢųƇƃܘ Ǝſܕ ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ ܢ܂ŴźƇƘܕ

> **1** ܘܬܐƢƠܒ BCDL: ܐܪܘܬܐƠܒ P **2** ųƍƀƍƊܘܒ BCDL: ųƍƀƍƊܒ ܐܦ P **3** ŴƆ L: ܗܘܐ ܐƆ BCDP **<sup>4</sup>** ܘܬܐƢــƠܒ BCDL: ــܐܪܘܬܐƠܒ P **<sup>6</sup>** ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ BCD | Ǝــſ ̈ ųƀƐƍܓ BCDL: ƎــſųƐƍܓ P **<sup>8</sup>** ܪܘܬܐŴــƖƏ BCDL: ܬܐŴــſܘƢܒ P: ܐƆܗܘ BD add. in marg. | Ǝــſųƀ̈ ƍƀƄܒ L: ƎــſųƍƀƄܒ BCDP ƅſܐ [om. C **<sup>9</sup>** ƎƍƀƤƍƄƉܘ CDL: ƎƀƤƍ̇ ƄƉܘ P: ƎƀƤƍƃƦƉܘ B **10** ƈƃܕ BCLP: ƈƄܕܒ D | ܐƌŵƃܘܐ BCDL: ܐƍƄſܘܐ P **<sup>11</sup>** ܘܐܦ BCDP: ܐܦ L **<sup>12</sup>** Ǝſųƀƣ̈ ̈ųƀܘܢ :L ܐܕ ƣܐܕ P: Ǝſųƀƣ̈ ̈Ǝſųƀ ܘܐܕ ƍƀƃ BCD | ƅſܘܐ [+ ܐƉ P **13** ܐƊƣܕܪܘ BCD: ܐƊƣܪܘ LP | ܐƆܘųܒ BCDL: ܐƌܘųܒ P **15** ܗܘ̣ ̇ ܘ ܕƃــųƆŴܘܢ :BCDP ܐܕƣܐ ܕƇƃــųܘܢ ̇ ܘ ܕƘــƢܫ :LP ܕſƢƘــƥ **16** L ܗ ܗ BCD | ܬܗܘܢŴــſűŶ LP: ̈ܕܐ | BCD Ŵſűƀŷſܬܗܘܢ űŶ BCDL: ܕܐ̈ űŶܕ P **18** ƎƀܒƀƐƌܕ BCDP: ƎƀܒƐƌܕ L **21** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ CL: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D: ƑƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P | ŴƠƀźźƙſƮƘ BP: ŴƠƀźŹܐƙſƮƘ CD: ŴƠƀźƙſƮƘ L

wax. While the image on the ring is one both in its form (εἶδος) and in number, what derives from it on the wax are multiple images that differ from each other, not in form but in number. And further, in the mind of the person who finally saw them on the wax it will again be united and become one image that is derived from many116.

77 Thus, also the genera and species (εἴδη) of things exist with the Сreator of beings, like the image on the ring. They are imprinted and established in the natures of things through (his) activity117, like the images on the wax. And then we come to the knowledge of natures and collect inside our intellect genera and species (εἴδη) of each thing among natural beings. Just as the image on the ring is singular, so also all the forms (εἴδη) of things with the Creator are simple. And also, just as the singularity of the image which is on the ring is divided into multiplicity on the wax, so also each one of the simple forms (εἴδη) which are with the Creator is divided in the matter of natures into countless individual items118 which differ from one another not in form — for the form of all of them is one — but in number through which they are divided from one another in their unity. And inside our intellect, from multiple individual beings which are divided from one another only in number the species (εἴδη) of things are again summoned, and they appear as singulars which are acquired from the multitude.

78 So this is how all followers of Plato's ideas teach about these things. But Aristotle and all the Peripatetics, to whom also Alexander of Aphrodisias be-

**<sup>116</sup>** The same example is used by Ammonius, see *In Isag.* 41.13–20.

**<sup>117</sup>** Ms. P: "creation". A marginal commentary in mss. BD: "matter".

**<sup>118</sup>** Syr. *qnome*, "individuals, persons".

̈ƀƉܐ ܕŴƆܬ ƕܒŴܕܐ űƟ ܢŴƌ ̇ ̈ƣܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ܘܐܦ ܐűƍƐƄƆܪܘܣ ܐƢƘܘܕƀƐſܐ: ܒܐܕ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕܒܓŴ ܬܪƦƀƕܢ ŹــŪ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕƎſ ܕܒųܘƆܐ ܘܒų ųܒ ܂ƅƏ ƎſܕŴƉ ܐƆ ̇ ܂ ̇ ܓƀــƢ ƍƙƇƉــŴܬܗܘܢ ƀƇƕــųܘܢ ܕܗƀƆــƎ ܐſƦſــų ųــƇƃ ܂ƎــſűƀŶܐ ƁܓــƏ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕƎſ ܕܒƦܪƦƀƕܢ ܘܒŴƖܗܕƎƌ ųƆ ܐ܂ƀ̈ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕܒųܘƆܐ ƍƀƃ ųƆ ƎſųƊƤƉܘ ܬܗܘܢ̈ B76v ŴــƍܒƦƄƉ ƈــƀƃܗ ƎــſųƇƄܒ ܘܢ܂ųــƆ ƎــſųƊƤƉ ܐſƮŶܘܐ ܐƀƍƀƕܪ̈ ̈ƀܐ ƎƀƙƇƉ: ƈźƉ ̣ܕܗŴƌܢ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ƍƀƃ ܢŴƌ ̇ ̈ƣܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ̈ƍƀܐ܉ ƈƕ ܐܕ ƃ ƈƕܕ ƈƕ ܘܢųƆ Ǝſűƀܒƕܕ ܢŴƌ ̇ ̈Ʀܒܐ ܕƎſ <sup>ܗ</sup> ̈ܬܐ܂ ܒƄ Ŵܕܨܒ ƎſųƊſŴƟܘ Ǝſųƀ̈ ƍƀƃ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ̈ƣܐ ƎƀƇƖƉ: <sup>ܗ</sup> ̈Ɛܐ ܘܐܕ ̇ ܕŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ܉ ܓƍ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ųƇƃ ܕƎſųƊƤƉ Ɔــųܘܢ ̈ܪƍƀƕــƀܐ ܘܐŶــſƮܐ: źƉــƈ ܕܗƀƆــƎ ܒܓــŴ ܬܪƀƕــƦܐ ܘܒƦƇƊܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ųƊſŴƟܘܢ܂ <sup>10</sup>

̈ƣܐ ̇ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ƇƀƇƉــƦܐ܉ ܗƀƆــƎ ܐܕ ųƇƃ ƈƕ ƈƀƃܗ ܬܐŴƍƙƇƊܒ 79 ̈ Ɛƍܐ ܒƖــƁ: ܗƀƆــƎ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƟــųƊſŴܘܢ ܒܓــŴ ܬܪƀƕــƦܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ܘܓ C114v ܢŴــƌܕܗ̣ ƈــźƉ :ƎــƀƆܕܗ ܘܢųــƇſܕ Ǝــſܕ ܘܢųƀƍƣܪ̈ŴــƘ ƈƕ ܂ƎƌƢƉܕܐ ƅſܐ ̇ Ƣ ܐƌܐ܂ ̈Ʀܒܐ ųƇƃܘܢ ܕŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ܉ ܒƦܪ ƈƀƇƟ ܐƉ Ƅܒ ƎƀܒƐƌƦƉ

<sup>80</sup> ܗƣܐ ܕƎſ ƍƙƌܐ ƈƕ ܗ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƋƀƏ ܗܘܐ ƎƆ ƊƆܐƢƉ܂ ƋƀƏ ܗܘܐ ̇ ̈ƀــźܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ܐƏܒــƢܘ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ Ƥƀƌــų ƤƘ ܐƍƀƕܪ̈ ƈƕ ƎƀƤ̈ ƎƆ ܕƎſ܉ ܐƌ ܕƦƄƉܒƍــŴܬܐ ܕƀźƟܓŴܪſــŴܣ܂ ܗƀƆــƎ ܗƀƃــƈ ܒــƌŵܐ ܗƌܐ ܨ v22P ̇ ܒƀــƎ ܗܘܘ ̈ــƐܐ ̇ ܕܗܕܐ܂ ܐƉــƢܘ ܓƀــƢ ܕܐܢ ̣ܗܘ ƆــƋ ܕƕــƈ ܓƍ ܕŴƊƀƠƌܢ ܬƦſŴŶܗ ̇ ƌــŴܢ ܕܐܦ ƀźƟܓŴ̈ܪſــŴܣ ƮƐƕܐ ܕŶܒƎƀƤ ƈƃ Ɖܐ ܕܐſــƦ ܒƇƖــƊܐ: ܗ Ǝــſܕ ܐƐــ̈ <sup>20</sup> ƍܓ ܐ܂ƌܗ ܒܐƦــƄܒ ƢــƉܐƊƆ ųــƆ ƋــƀƏ :ܘܢųــƆ ƎــſųƊƤƉ ܕƐƌƦƉܒƀــƎ ܒܐܘƍƉــŴܬܐ ƇƀƇƉــƦܐ ̈ܪƀƕــƍܐ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܕƀƤƍƃƦƉــƎ r7L

̇ ܘ + ;P ܐűƍƐƄƆܪܣ :BCDL ܐƍƐƄƆــűܪܘܣ | P ܐܦ :BCDL ܘܐܦ **1** ܗ L | ܐƀƐſܘܕƢƘܐ L, D in marg.: ܐƀــƐſűƏܘƢƘܐ BCD: ܐƀƐſűƠſܪŴــƘܐ P **<sup>3</sup>** ̇ ųــƇƃ BDLP: ̇ ųƇƃܘ C **4** ƎſųƊƤƉܘ BCDL: Ǝſܕ ƎſųƊƤƉ P | Ǝſܕ [om. D **<sup>5</sup>** ܐſƮŶܘܐ BCDP: ܐƌƮŶܘܐ L | ܘܢųƆ] om. B **<sup>6</sup>** ܐƣ̈ ƈƕ ܐܕ ̈ƀܐ ƍƀƃ ܢŴƌ ̇ ܗ [om. hom. P **<sup>8</sup>** ܬܐŴƇƀƇƉܕ ̇ ųƇƃ LP: ̇ ųƇƃ ܬܐŴƇƀƇƉܕ BCD **9** Ŵܒܓ BCDP: Ŵܕܒܓ L **12** ƎƀƆܗ [om. P | ܐƦƀƕܬܪ Ŵܒܓ ܘܢųƊſŴƟ] om. P **13** ܘܢųƀƍƣܪ̈ŴƘ LP: ܘܢųƍƣܪŴƘ BCD ̇ **<sup>16</sup>** BCDP ܕܗƣܐ :L ܗƣܐ **<sup>15</sup>** ųƤƀƌ LP: ܐƤƀƌ BCD **17** ܬܐŴƍܒƦƄƉܕ [+ ܗܕܐ P | ܣŴſܪŴܓƀźƟܕ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــźƟܕ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــųźƟܕ D: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓــźƟܕ BP **<sup>18</sup>** ̇ BCD ܬŶــƦſŴܐ :LP ܬŶــƦſŴܗ **19** ܣŴſܪ̈ŴܓƀźƟ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟ D: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓŹܐƟ B **20** ƎſųƊƤƉ L: ųƊƤƉ BCDP | ƋƀƏ CDLP: ܐƊƀƏ B

longs, do not acknowledge at all those primary forms (εἴδη) which are with the Creator. However, they completely accept those ones which are in matter and in our intellect, and it is about them that their whole teaching is. They name those (forms) which are in matter natural, and those ones which are in our intellect they call noetic and posterior. Thus, in all their writings about natures they teach about natural forms (εἴδη) because they are the nature and the subsistence of things. On the other hand, in those writings which they have composed on the whole craft of logic, they introduce those genera and species (εἴδη) which, as we have said, are called noetic and posterior, because they have subsistence only in intellect and in speech.

79 Therefore, in the teaching on the whole logical craft you ought to investigate those species (εἴδη) and genera whose subsistence is only in intellect, as we have said. These are the subject of all the books on logic, and it is about their divisions that I will speak shortly afterwards.

#### *[The goal of the* Categories*: Conclusion]*

80 But now we shall return to what we began to speak about. We began to say, namely, that some people consider the goal of the treatise *Categories* to pertain only to simple concepts. And when they intend to bring forth a proof for that, they do it in the following way. They state that, if it is the ten genera which comprise everything that exists in the world and which are also called "categories" that (the author) intended to speak about in this treatise, then, since the genera that are considered in the logical craft are those concepts which are ̈źƀƤܐ ̈ܬܐ ܒܓŴ Ŵƕܗܕƌܐ܂ Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ƋƆ ܕƈƕ ̈ܪƍƀƕܐ <sup>Ƙ</sup> Ŵܕܨܒ ƎſųƍƉ ̇ ƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ܂ ̇ ܕųƇƃ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ųƤƀƌ

̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕܬܪƞſܐƦſ ܐƏܒƢܘ ƈƕ ųƤƀƌ ܕƦƃܒܐ ܗƌܐ: ܕųƍƉܘܢ 81 ܐƆܐ ܗ ̈źƀــƦܐ: ܘƆܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܘܐܦ ƊſܒŴƄƀƇܣ܉ Ɔܐ ƈƕ ܨܒŴ r66D ̈ܬܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ƤƘ ̈źƀܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ̈Ʀźƀܐ: ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ƈƕ ̈ܪƍƀƕܐ ƤƘ ̈Ƈܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ƤƘ Ɵ Ʀƍ̈ B77r ܒ ƈƕ ܐƢƉܘ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ųƤƀƌ r115C ̇ ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ƈƕ ųƇƃܘܢ ܐűŷƃ: ܗŴƌ ̈Ʀźƀܐ ܒűƀ ̈ܪƍƀƕܐ ̈ܬܐ ƤƘ ̈ܕƎƕ ܨܒŴ ̈Ʀźƀܐ ܕŴƤƉ ƤƘ ܐƇ̈ Ɵ Ʀƍ̈ ܕƎſ ƈƕ ܒ ̈Ǝ܂ ̇ ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ ƠƙƏ ųƤƀƌ ƈƕ ƎƀƆܗ ܐ܂źƀ̈ ƤƘ


**<sup>4</sup>** ܘܐܦ CDLP: ܐܦ B | ܣŴƄƀƇܒƊſ BCD: ƑƄƀƇܒƊſ LP **<sup>6</sup>** űŷƃܐ BCDL: ܐűŷƃܐ P **<sup>7</sup>** Ǝƕܕ̈ ܕŴƤƉ ̈Ʀźƀܐ ̈ ܬܐ ƤƘ Ŵܨܒ [om. hom. P **12** ܐƃܗܪ BCDL: ܐƃܪŴܒ P | ܘܗܐ BCDL: ܐƌܘܗ P **13** ܐƍŹ LP: ܐƀــƖŹ BCD | ܐƘ ̈ ŴــƐƇƀƘܕ BCD: ܐƙ ̈ ƏŴــƇƀƘܕ LP **15** ƑƀƇŹŴźƏܐܪ L: ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ C: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D: ܣŴƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P **<sup>16</sup>** ܐƆܕ BCDL: ܐƆ P | ܐƇ̈ Ɵ] + ƎƀƆܗ BCD **<sup>18</sup>** ܬܐŴــƍƙƇƊƆ LP: ܬܗŴــƍƙƇƊƆ B, + ܗ sup. lin. in CD **<sup>20</sup>** ƎــſƢ ̇ Ɵܕ [+ tit. ܐƣ̈ ƈźƉ ܐܕ BCD ܕƦƇƉܐ ܕƊƃܐ ܘܐƎƀƇſ ܐųſƦſܘܢ

collected from things in the memory, it is evident that the goal of the whole treatise concerns simple concepts119.

81 However, those who correctly comprehended the goal of this treatise, among whom was also Iamblichus, stated that it was neither simple things only, nor simple words only, nor simple concepts only that the goal of this treatise concerned, but all of them together, i.e. it concerns simple words which signify simple things by means of simple concepts120. So much for the goal of this treatise.

82 Now, since the teaching here is about simple words which signify simple things by means of simple concepts, does this mean that the Philosopher introduced at this point an endless number of words, things, or concepts? For, behold, there is such a number of them as would be impossible to encompass! However, this is not what the knowledge of philosophers aims at, because they always establish general rules (κανόνες) in order to encompass multiple things for the sake of proper understanding of their activities. Therefore, in his teaching on these things Aristotle too fled from the unlimited number of words, and elevated his teaching to their primary genera that he took as general rules by which he would be able to skilfully and intelligently accomplish his teaching121.

83 At this point, we will conclude what just above was intended to explain briefly for the reader what the general content of this book is.

**<sup>119</sup>** See Philoponus, *In Cat*. 9.4–8: οἱ δὲ περὶ νοημάτων μόνων νομίσαντες διαλέγεσθαι τὸν φιλόσοφον, οἷος ἐγένετο ὁ Πορφύριος, φασὶν ὅτι περὶ τῶν δέκα γενῶν ἐστιν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος· ταῦτα δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς θεωροῦνται καί εἰσιν ὑστερογενῆ, ἅτινά ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διανοίᾳ· περὶ νοημάτων ἄρα ἐν τούτοις τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει ὁ λόγος (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9.7–11). Here, Philoponus applies the same terms which Ammonius used in his commentary on the *Isagoge* when speaking of the third kind of forms according to the Platonists, see §75.

**<sup>120</sup>** Sergius' text corresponds nearly verbatim to Philoponus, *In Cat*. 9.12–15: οἱ δὲ ἀκριβέστερον λέγοντες, ὧν εἷς ἐστιν ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος, φασὶν ὡς οὔτε περὶ νοημάτων μόνων ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος οὔτε περὶ φωνῶν μόνων οὔτε περὶ πραγμάτων μόνων, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν Κατηγοριῶν περὶ φωνῶν σημαινουσῶν πράγματα διὰ μέσων νοημάτων. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9.17–18; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 19.35–20.12.

**<sup>121</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 12.1–4. Ammonius discusses this subject at length in the *prolegomena* part of his commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, see *In Isag.* 17.1–20.15.

̇

	- ̇ ܘ ܕƤƉܐܠ ܒűŷܐ ̇ ܘ ܕƆƞƉܐ܉ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ܗ ̇ űƠ ܘƆܐ ܗ ̇ ܘ ܕƘ 86 Ɔܐ ܓƢƀ ܗ ̇ ƣــƢܪܐ ܐܘ ̇Ɛــơ܉ ܐƆــƞܐ ܕܐܘ ̇ ܘ ܕſــƎ ܕƘ ̇ ܕܓــƈ܂ <sup>ܗ</sup> ܐܘ ƢــſƢƣ ƎــƀƆܗ ƎƉ
	- ܕܓŴƇܬܐ ƌܐƢƉ܂ ܐܢ ܓƀــƢ ƌܐƉــƢ ܕƏــƑƀŹƢƟŴ ƆųƉــƅ܉ ſűſــƖܐ ܗܝ <sup>15</sup> ƅــƆųƉ ܐƆ űــƃ Ǝــſܕ ܐܢ :ƢــſƢƣ ܗܝŴƇƕ ƢƉܐƌ ܗܕܐ ƅƆųƉ űƃ ܕܐܢ ܕܓƈ܂ ܘܬܘܒ ܐܢ ƌܐƢƉ ŴƇƕܗܝ ܕƆܐ ƅƆųƉ܉ ܐܢ ƃــű ƆųƉــƅ ܗܕܐ ܗܘ܂̣ ƢſƢƣ ƅƆųƉ ܐƆ űƃ ܘܐܢ ܗܘ܂ ƈܕܓ ܗܝŴƇƕ ƢƉܐƌ

̇ܒــű ƣــƢܪܐ ܘܕܓƇــŴܬܐ܉ ̣ƉــƎ <sup>87</sup> ̣ܗܘ ܗƀƃــƈ ܗƌܐ ܐܕƣܐ ܕƇƉــƦܐ ܕƕ ̇ ܘ ƀƉűƟܐ: ƎƉ űŶܐ ܕƊƀƏܐ ܐƅſ ̈Ƈܐ ŪƃƢƉ ܪܘƃܒų ܗ Ɵ Ʀƍ ̈ <sup>20</sup> ܒ Ǝſܬܪܬ

̈ƣܐ **<sup>1</sup>** ̇ :BDL ܐܕ ųƀƣ̈ ܐܕ P: om. C | ƥƌܕܐ...**2** ƢƉܐƌ CDLP, Epit.: ƢƉܐƌܕ ƥƌܐ B **2** ƎƇƘ BCDP, Epit.: ƎــƇƘܙ L **<sup>5</sup>** ܙܠ ̇ ̇ ܬܐ .:Epit ,BCDL ܐ ܐ P **<sup>6</sup>** ơ ̇ ƐƘܕ LP, Epit., corr. in marg. in BD: ܐƟŴƐƘ BCDE | ƅſܐ LP: ƅſܕܐ BCD | ƥƌܕܐ BP, Epit.: ƥƌܐ CDL | ƢƉܐƌ BCLP, Epit.: ƢƉܐƌܕ D ƈــƃܕ2 BCDL, Epit.: ƈــƃ P **<sup>8</sup>** ƎــƀܒƠƖƉ] + ƈــƀƃܗ L **<sup>9</sup>** ܐƘ ̈ ŴــƐƇƀƘ BCDL, Epit.: ܐƙ ̈ ƏŴــƇƀƘ P **<sup>10</sup>** ŴــƠƀźƉƮܓƆ LP: ܐƠــƀźƊƉƮܓƆ B: ܐ̈ ƠــƀźƉܐƢܓƆ C: ܐƠــƀźƉƮܓƆ D **12** ܐƣƢــƘƦƉ L: ܫƢــƘƦƉ P: ܫƢــƙƉ BCD | ܬܐƢــſƢƣ BCDL: ܪܐƢــƣ P | ܬܐŴــƇܘܕܓ LP: ܬܐŴــƇܕܓ ܐܘ BCD ܐƕܕŴƉ BCDL: ܐƕܕŴƤƉ P **<sup>13</sup>** ܘ ̇ ̇ ܘ :L ܬܘܒ ܗ ̇ ܘ ܬܘܒ :P ܬܘܒ ųƆ ܗ BCD **15** Ƣƀܓ LP: Ǝſܕ BCD ƅƆųƉ űƃ ܕܐܢ ܗܝ ܐƖſűſ] om. hom. B **16** ܗܕܐ [om. P | ܗܝŴƇƕ] + ܗܕܐ P **17** ܐܢ2 [+ Ǝſܕ P | ܗܝŴƇƕ ƢƉܐƌ ܗܕܐ BCDL: ܗܕܐ ܗܝŴƇƕ ƢƉܐƌ P **20** ŪƃƢƉ LP: ŪƃܪƦƉ BCD

#### *[Kinds of speech]122*


87 Now, this type of speech which expresses truth and falsehood is constructed in its primary composition from two utterances127, namely from the subject

**<sup>122</sup>** Mss. BCD have the subtitle, "On the kinds of speech, i.e. how many and what they are".

**<sup>123</sup>** Ammonius writes about "parts of speech" (μέρη τοῦ λόγου) in his commentary on the *Isagoge* right after his account of the Platonic Forms, and this was probably the reason for Sergius to deal with this topic in the same context. Ammonius mentions five "parts" which correspond to the list found by Sergius but adding also the vocative: τοῦ δὲ λόγου πολλά εἰσι μέρη, ἀποφαντικὸν εὐκτικὸν κλητικὸν προστακτικὸν πυσματικόν (*In Isag.* 43.4–5). Ammonius discusses this topic also in the introductory part of his commentary on Aristotle's *On Interpretation* (*In De Int*. 2.9–25), where he calls them, similarly to Sergius, "kinds of speech" (εἴδη τοῦ λόγου) and gives concrete examples of each one of them.

**<sup>124</sup>** Cf. the examples (deriving mostly from Homer) by Ammonius in *In De Int*. 2.10–20. The last example by Ammonius corresponds to that of Sergius.

**<sup>125</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 43.6–12.

**<sup>126</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 43.12–17.

**<sup>127</sup>** Syr. *bat qale*, "utterances, words", corresponding to Gr. φωναί.

̇ Ƣ ܐƌܐ ܕƎſ ܕܐƅſ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ̇ ܂ ܐƉ ̇ ܝ ܕŴƤƉܕƕܐ ųƀƇƕ ܕŴƤƆܘܕƕܐ܉ ̣ܘƎƉ ܗ ܐܢ ܐƥƌ ƌܐƢƉ ܕƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ ƅƆųƉ܉ ̣ܐƢƉ ƦƇƉܐ ܕƠƐƘܐ ܘƃƢƉܒܐ v116C ̇ ܝ ܕƅƆųƉ܂ ܐƆܐ ̈Ƈܐ܂ ̣ƎƉ Ɗƣܐ ܕƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ ̣ܘƎƉ <sup>ܗ</sup> Ɵ Ʀƍ ̈ ̣ƎƉ ܬ̈ܪܬƎſ ܒ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ ƋƀƏ ܕűſƦƌܥ܂ ܗ r78B ̇ ܝ ܕƎſ ܕƅƆųƉ ƦƉܐƉــƢܐ ܕܬŴƣܕƀƕــŴܗܝ ̈ Ǝ ܒųܘܢ ܒƮܘƃܒܐ܉ ܒŵƇƄܒــƎ ̈Ƈܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܗƎƀƆ ܕƊƀƏ Ɵ Ʀƍ̈ ܕƍƉܐ <sup>ƕ</sup> <sup>5</sup> ̇ܒű܂ <sup>ܒ</sup> ̈ܬܐ܂ ܗƀƌــƎ ܕſــƎ ܐƀƌƮŶــƦܐ Ŵܕܨܒــ ƎــſųƇſܕ ƎــſųſƦſܐ ܐƦƀ̈ P24r ƍƕܕŴــƤƉ ܕƦƉܐƉـــƮܢ ſųƀƇƕـــƎ ܒـــųܘܢ ܒƮܘƃـــܒܐ܉ ܙܒـــƍܐ Ɖـــűܡ ƤƉـــŴܕƎƕ ܬܐ܂̈ des.L7v Ŵܕܨܒ ƎſܬܗŴƌűܒƖƉܘ


**<sup>1</sup>** ܐƕܘܕŴƤƆܕ BCDL: ܐƕܕŴƤƆܕ P **<sup>5</sup>** ƎƀƆܗ LP: Ǝƀƌ ̈ ܗ BCD **6** Ǝƀƌܗ BCDP: ƎƀƆܗ L **7** ܢƮƉܐƦƉܕ BCDL: ܢƮــƉܐƦƉܘ P **9** ƑƀŹƢƟŴــƏܕ BCD: ƑŹƢƟŴــƏܕ P **10** ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏܕ BCD: ƑŹƢƟŴƏܕ P **<sup>12</sup>** ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ BCD: ƑŹƢƟŴƏ P | ƢƉܬܬܐ BCD: ƢƉܬܐ P | ܐܡ ̇ Ɵ CDP: ܐܡƟܕ B **13** ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ BCD: ƑŹƢƟŴƏ P **14** ƅƆųƌܕ [+ ܬܘܒ P | ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ BCD: ƑŹƢƟŴƏ P | ƢƉܬܬܐ ܬܘܒ BC: ܬܘܒ ƢــƉܬܬܐ D: ƢــƉܬܐ P | ܐſŴــŷƉ] + tit. ܐƣ̈ ̈ــƐܐ ܘܐܕ ƍܕܓ ܐƣܪŴــƘ ƈźƉ BC: ƈźƉ ̈ƣܐ ̈Ɛܐ ܘܐܕ ƍܕܓ ܐƍƣܪŴƘ D

that should be signified and from what signifies it128. What I mean is this. When someone says, "Socrates is walking", he makes a statement which is composed of two utterances, the name "Socrates" and the (phrase) "is walking". While "Socrates" is the subject that is characterized, the words "is walking" are pronounced in order to signify what he is doing. Thus, the utterances which are subjects of these compositions are always signified by something, while other ones which are predicated of them in these compositions signify a particular time and some activity129.

88 In the composition which I am here speaking about, "Socrates is walking", the name "Socrates" signifies a certain person, while the (phrase) "is walking" informs us about his activity, i.e. what he is doing, and also about the time it takes place. For if you say, "Socrates is walking", you signify the present time. But if you say, "Socrates walked", you express the past time. And further, if you say, "Socrates will walk", you point to the future time.

#### *[The ten primary genera]130*

89 We ought to know that in these compositions species (εἴδη) are always subjects that are defined and genera are predicated of them131. What I mean is this. Universal human being, i.e. humanity, and also universal horse, universal dog, and other things like that are species of animal, and animal is their genus. For, as we have said above, we observe each one of them and combine them in our mind into one genus that is imprinted in all of them132.

**<sup>128</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 43.17–20: περιέχει δὲ οὗτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ δύο τινά, τό τε κατηγορούμενον καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ἵνα δὲ σαφὴς γένηται ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, εἴπωμεν οὕτως· δεῖ εἰδέναι ὅτι ὑποκείμενον λέγεται περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, κατηγορούμενον δὲ τὸ περὶ ἐκείνου λεγόμενον. Instead of using a Syriac equivalent for "predicate" (τό κατηγορούμενον), Sergius prefers to speak here of what signifies and what is signified, probably having the Gr. terms τι σημαίνει and τὸ σημαινόμενον in mind. In accord with this, Sergius speaks in §88 of grammatical tenses of the verbs. However, he switches again to the logical terminology in §89.

**<sup>129</sup>** The same examples appear in Ammonius, *In De Int*. 2.7–11.

**<sup>130</sup>** Mss. BCD have the subtitle, "On the difference between genera and species". The following section has a parallel in Ammonius, *In Cat*. 13.12–19, where another introductory point is discussed, namely the reason for the title of Aristotle's treatise (cf. further Philoponus, *In Cat*. 12.17–27 and Simplicius, *In Cat*. 15.26–18.6). Sergius' account, however, derives primarily from Ammonius' description of the "ascent to the universal" (ἡ εἰς τὰ καθόλου ἀναδρομή) and the ten primary genera in *In Isag.* 17.1–20.14. The accounts of both Sergius and Ammonius are based on the so-called "Tree of Porphyry" as described in the *Isagoge* 4.1–8.6. Sergius turns again to this subject matter in §§165–172, speaking of universal and particular.

**<sup>131</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 13.12–15: λέγομεν τοίνυν ὅτι πρόκειται αὐτῷ διδάξαι περὶ γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν καὶ ὅτι τὰ μὲν εἴδη τοῖς αὑτῶν γένεσιν ὑπόκειται, τὰ δὲ γένη κατηγορεῖται τῶν εἰδῶν ἑαυτῶν.

**<sup>132</sup>** On the three types of the universals, see §§78 and 80, above. Here Sergius speaks of only the third type, i.e. universals abstracted in human mind "after the many" (μετὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς).

	- ̈ƣܐ ܗƀƆــƎ܂ ̣ܘܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܗƌܐ <sup>91</sup> ŴƀŶܬܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܓƐƍܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕųƇƃܘܢ ܐܕ ܓƐƍܐ ܐܕƣܐ ̣ܗܘ ܕܓƊƣŴܐ ƍƤƙƌܐ܂ ƈźƉ ܕܐſــƦ ܓƍــƐܐ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ̈ ܓƀــܐܐ܉ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܐܕƣــų <sup>Ə</sup> ܐƣ̈ ̇ ܒــƥ ܐܕ ̈ــƦܐ ܕŶ ܗ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܘ ܕƞƌܒ ܕܓƊƣŴܐ ƍƤƙƌܐ܂ ̣ܘܗܘ ܗƌܐ ܬܘܒ ܓƊƣŴܐ ƍƤƙƌܐ܉ ܐܕƣܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ƈźƉ ܕܐƦſ ܓƊƣŴܐ ܕƆܐ ƥƙƌ܉ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܓƐƍܐ ܕųƇƃܘܢ ̇ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ̈ Ɗƣܐ ܕܕƆܐ ƥƙƌ ܐŴƌܢ܉ ܘܐܕƣܐ ܕųƇſ ܓŴ

**1** ƈƃܕ BCD: ƈƃܘ P **4** ƎƀƤſƢƘܕ BCP: ƎƀƣƢƘܕ D **5** ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ BCP: ܘܗܝƦſܐ D **7** ƎƍƀƤƍƄƉ BCD: ƎƍƀƤƍ̇ ƄƉܕ P **9** ܢŴƌܐ [om. D **11** ƥܒŶܕ [lac. in P | ܘܢųƇƄƆ BCD: ܘܢųƇƃ P **16** ܘܗܘ̣ BCP: ܗܘ D **18** ƥƙƌ BCP: ܐܫƙƌ D **20** ƥƙƌ BCP, Epit.: ܐܫƙƌ D **21** ܬܐŴƀŶ1 CP, Epit.: ܬܐŴƀŶܕ BD

90 Further, regarding each one of these species, we observe particulars belonging to certain species and combine them in our memory into their species. What I mean is the following. When we observe this man, and that one, and the rest of them who are numerically distinguished from one another, we combine them in our memory into universal man, which is the nature of humanity, and we establish it as a species of all men. Similarly, also, when we observe all horses, dogs, and bulls, which are numerically distinguished from one another, we in the same way combine them in our intellect into universal horse and universal dog and subsume them under their species. And since such species are numerous and even countless, we further combine them into what someone might call one nature that contains them all, and this is what we call their genus.

91 Thus, animal is the genus for all these species. And this genus is in turn a species of animate body. For there is another genus of plants which comprises many species and which is also a species of animate body. And further, this animate body is a species of substance (οὐσία). For there is inanimate body which is a genus of all bodies that are inanimate and a species of substance.

92 So, substance is a genus which has no other (genus) that is prior to it. Below it, there are other genera, i.e. animate and inanimate body. And also, below the animate one there is a genus of animal. Below animal, then, there are species that are not further divided into genera, but into individual beings which differ from one another only numerically.

	- ̈ܬܐ <sup>96</sup> ƕűſƦƉܐ ܕƎſ ܗܕܐ ƢſƦſܐƦſ ̣ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ ܕܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ܂ ܐƦſ ܨܒŴ ̈ــƎ ̈ Ǝ ܒųܘſܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ƠƀƍƏ ƊƀƟƦƌܕ ƎſųƉŴƍƟ Ǝƀƌܗ̣ Ǝſƞ ̈ ܒƊƇƖܐ ܕƆܐ Ɖ :ƎــſųſƦſܐ Ǝــſܕ ƎــƀƆܗ ƅــſܕܐ ܂Ǝſųƍƀƃ Ƌƀ ̇ ƟƦƌ ųܕܒ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܡűƉ ƈƕ

**1** ƦŶƦƆ P, Epit.: ƦŶƦƆܕ BCD **13** ƈƀƃܗ [om. B | ƁƤſܘܪ BCD, Epit.: ƥſܘܪ P **14** ܬܐŴƍܒƦƄƊܒ P: ܬܐŴƍܒƦƄƉܕ CD: ܗܕܐ ܬܐŴƍܒƦƄƉܕ B **15** Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟܕ CP: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟܕ D: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟܕ B ̈ƀــźܐ **<sup>16</sup>** ƤƘ ܐƍــƀƕܪ̈ űــƀܒ ƎــƀƍƉ ܐƆܕ [om. hom. B **17** ܐƍــƃܗ [+ tit. ܐƀــƏܐܘ ƈــźƉ BCD **<sup>18</sup>** ܐƊſŴƟ] + ܐƀƇܓ BCD **<sup>19</sup>** ƎſƢŶܐ BCD, Epit.: ܐƌƢŶܐ P **<sup>21</sup>** ƎƀƆܗ P: Ǝƀ̈ ƌܗ BCD **22** ƎſųƉŴƍƟ BCP, corr. in marg. D: ƎſųƊſŴƟ D: ƎſųƀƉŴƍƠܒ add. in marg. BD


96 This may be better understood from the contraries: there are things in the world which cannot come into being by themselves but require something else through which their nature would subsist. These are, e.g., whiteness and black-

**<sup>133</sup>** Lit. "species of species". Sergius thus renders the Gr. εἰδικώτατος.

**<sup>134</sup>** Lit. "genus of genera", cf. Gr. γενικώτατος.

**<sup>135</sup>** Cf. Porphyry, *Isag*. 4.14–20.

**<sup>136</sup>** Syr. *bat qala* "utterance, speech", corresponds to Gr. φωνή.

**<sup>137</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.9–10: ὅσα οὖν ἐστιν αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑποστῆναι δυνάμενα καὶ

μὴ δεόμενα πρὸς τὸ ὑποστῆναι ἄλλου τινός, οὐσίαι λέγονται.

ŴŶܪܘܬܐ ܘܐܘƊƃــŴܬܐ: ܘƀƇŶــŴܬܐ ܘſƢƉــƢܘܬܐ: ܘƇƃــųܘܢ ܐƄƏ r119C ̈ــƊܐ ̈ ƌܐ ܐŶــƌƮܐ܂ ܗƀƆــƎ ܓƀــƢ ̣ܗƌــŴܢ ƍƟــųƉŴܘܢ ƍƉــųܘܢ ̈ ܙܓܐ ܘܓــŴ ܘŴƉ ܘƆـــųܘܢ Ɔܐ ſƞƉـــƎ ܕƊƀƟƦƌـــŴܢ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒƊـــűܡ ܐſƢŶـــƎ ܐſـــƦܘܗܝ ̇ ܒܐƃűƀƙƏܐ: ̇ ܒƇŷܒܐ ܐܘ ųƊſŴƟܘܢ܂ ŴŶܪܘܬܐ ܓƢƀ ܒƆƦܓܐ ̣ܗܝ ܐܘ ܐܘ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܒƊــűܡ ܐſƢŶــƎ ܕܐſــƅ ܗƌܐ܂ ܗƃــŴܬ ܬܘܒ ܘܐܦ ܐܘƊƃــŴܬܐ ̇ ܒűܒــƤܐ܂ ̇ ܂ ܘƀƇŶــŴܬܐ ܒــƦܬܐ ܐܘ ܒƊƖــƢܐ ܐܘ r26P ̇ ܒƤƊــƄܐ ܐſƦſــų ̈ــƊܐ ̈ ƌܐ ܘܐƄƏ ̇ ܒܐſƦƍƐƘــƎ܂ ܘƇƃــųܘܢ ܓــŴ ܘſƢƉــƢܘܬܐ ܒƇƖــŴܝ ܐܘ ̇ ܒŴƉűܬܐ ܒܐƀƌƮŶــƦܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƟــųƊſŴܘܢ: ܘŴƉ r68D ̈ ܙܓܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ܉ ܒų ܘƆܐ ƎſƞƉ ܕܗŴƌܢ ųƍƀƃܘܢ ųƌܘܘܢ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ܒŴŷƇܕ܂

ܡűــƊܕܒ Ǝــ̈ E180r ƠƀƍƏ ܐƆܘ ƎــſܗƦſܕ ܐƊــƀƟ ƎــſųƆ Ʀــſܕܐ ƈــƀƃܗ ƎــƀƆܗ <sup>97</sup> ƎــƉ̣ ܐ܉Ɗ̈ ̈ƀــƎ ܘܐܢ Ɔܐ ܓــƣŴ ̈Ɗܐ ܐƌ ̈ ــƎ: ܘܐܢ ܓــƣŴ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ƊƀƟƦƌ ̈ ܢ܂ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕƎſ ܕܐſــƅ ܕܐƌƢƉــƎ: ųƉƦƤƉ Ƒƀ ̈ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܘܐܘƏ Ǝــſųܒ ƎــſųſƦſܕܐ ܐƦــƀƌƮŶܐ ƎــƉ̣ űــƖƇܒ ƎſųƉŴــƍƟ Ǝــƀƌ ̈ ̈Ǝ ܗ ſƞƉ ܐƆ Ǝــſųƀ ̈ ƐƍܓƆ ܕܐܦ :ܐƀــƏܐܘ ƎƉ ƢܒƆ Ǝƀ̈ ƌܐ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ƎƀƆܗ ܉Ǝ ̈ C119v ƊƀƟƦƌܕ ̇ ــܐܡ Ɔــųܘܢ Əܘ ܐƘŴــƐƇƀƘ ŸــƄƤƉ :Ǝــſųƀƣ̈ B80r ܐܕƆܘ ƎــƀƆܕܗ ƎــſųƇſܕ ܬܘܒ ̇ ƦƄܒ ܐܦ ųƀƇƕܘܢ ܓƌŴܐƦſ܂ ܒŴƍƙƇƊܬܐ: ܘƉ

	- ̈ــƊܐ **<sup>1</sup>** ƄƏܐ BDP: ܐƊƀ̈ ƄƏܐ C **2** ܘܢųƉŴƍƟ CDP: ܘܢųƀƉŴƍƟ B **3** ƎſƢŶܐ BCD: ܐƌƢŶܐ P **5** ܐƌܗ [om. D | ܬܐŴــƊƃܐܘ BCP: ܐƦــƊƊƃܐܘ D **6** ܐƢــƊƖܒ [+ ܪܒܐŴــƖܒ in marg. D ̇ + [ܒűܒƤܐ | D .marg in ܒƀƣŴƄܐ :B ܐܘ ܒƖــŴܪܒܐ ܐܘ ܒƄــƀƣŴܐ + [ܒƤƊــƄܐ ųſƦſܐ BCD ̈Ɗܐ **<sup>7</sup>** ƄƏܘܐ BDP: ܐƊƀ̈ ƄƏܘܐ C **9** ܕŴŷƇܒ ܘܢųſƦſܐ ܘܘܢųƌ] om. P **10** ܐƆܘ BEP: ܐƆܕܘ CD ̈Ɗܐ **<sup>11</sup>** ƣŴܓ2 BCD: ܐƊƀ̈ Ƥܓ EP **<sup>12</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܘܐܘ CDP: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ B: ܐƀƏܐܘ E **<sup>15</sup>** Ǝſųƀƣ̈ ܘƆܐܕ BCD: ܘܢųƀƣ̈ ܐܕƆܘ P | ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDE: ܐƙƏŴƇƀƘ P **16** ƦſܐƌŴܓ [+ tit. ܬܐŴƀƊƃ ƈźƉ BCD **19** ƦƆܘܬ P, Epit.: ƦƆܬ ܐܘ BCDE | ܐƮƐƕܕ EP, Epit.: ƎſƢƐƕܕ BCD **20** ƎƀƆųƆ] + ƎſųƇƃ CD: + ܘܢųƇƃ B **21** ƎſųƇƄƆ ƦſܐƌŴܓ BCDE: ƦſܐƌŴܓ ƎſųƇƃ P | ƎſųƇƃ CDEP, Epit.: ܘܢųƇƃ B

ness, sweetness and bitterness, and all other figures (σχήματα), qualities, and colours. They cannot come to be just by themselves, but their subsistence is in something else. For whiteness exists in snow, or in milk, or in white lead, or in anything else like that138. Likewise, also blackness exists in wool or in leather139, sweetness exists in a fig or in honey, and bitterness exists in aloe or in wormwood (ἀψίνθιον). And in the same way, all colours, shapes, and other qualities have subsistence in other things, and their nature cannot subsist only by itself.

97 Thus, such things that have subsistence by themselves and do not require something else through which to subsist — whether they are corporeal or incorporeal — pertain to substance and are called substances. On the other hand, those things that cannot subsist by themselves apart from being in something else, as we have said, differ from substance, and the Philosopher discovered also their genera and species, placed them in the teaching and wrote generally about them too.

98 For he observed and saw that there is something in the world whose subsistence is in substance and which is spoken of by means of measures and numbers. For instance we are accustomed to speak of two cubits or three cubits, and also of one or two palms, of a period of ten months, or ten years, or of any other length. Such words he subsumed under one genus which comprises all of them in common and which he called quantity. For all

**<sup>138</sup>** Sergius' text is very close to what we find in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.3–9: μάθοιμεν δ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· ἔστι τινὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἃ μὴ δύναται αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑποστῆναι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλοις τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, ἃ καὶ συμβεβηκότα καλεῖται, λευκότης μελανία γλυκύτης καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα γὰρ αὐτὰ μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὰ οὐ δύνανται ὑποστῆναι, ἀλλὰ πάντως ἡ λευκότης ἢ ἐν ψιμμυθίῳ ἢ ἐν γάλακτι σώμασιν οὖσιν ὑφέστηκεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα.

**<sup>139</sup>** Mss. B and D add in the margins: "In a raven or in a Cushite (i.e. an Ethiopian)".

̈ƀܐ: ƀƊƃــŴܬܐ Ɖــűܡ ̈ƍܐ ܘܕƍƣ ̈ ƣܒƍܐ ܕܙܒ ̈ ƍƀƍܐ ܘŴŶ ̈ Ʀŷƣܐ ܘƉ ŴƉ Ƣƀܓ ŴƤƉܕƎƀƕ܂

̈ܬܐ Əܓƀــܐܬܐ܂ ̇ ܒƎƀƤ ܨܒŴ ̇ ܐ܉ ܕŶ ̈Ɛܐ ܕܓŴ 99 ܘܐŸƄƣ ܗƎƀƆ ܬܪƎſ ܓƍ Ʀــƍ̈ ܗƌ r120C ̇Ŵ ܕƎſ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܘŴƀƊƃܬܐ܂ ܘܬܘܒ ŵŶܐ ƆܒƢ ̣ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ܉ ܕܐƦſ <sup>ܒ</sup> ̈ــƐܐ܂ ܐſــƅ Ɖܐ ƍܓ Ǝــſܪ̈ܬ ƎــƀƆܗ ƎــƉ̣ Ǝــƀ̈ ƌܐ ƦــƀƆܕ ܐ܉ƦــƀƌƮŶܐ ܐƇــ̈ P26v Ɵ ̈ ƌܐ Ƈƃــųܘܢ ܕܐƎſƢƉ ܗܘƎſ ܗƣܐ ƈƕ ŴƀƇŶܬܐ ܘƢſƢƉܘܬܐ: ܘƕــƈ ܓــŴ ̈Ɗܐ܂ ܗƎƀƆ ܓƢƀ Ɔܐ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ܘƆܐ ƀƊƃــŴܬܐ Ɖــűܡ ܘܐƄƏ ŴƤƉܕƎƀƕ܂ ƈźƉ ܕܐƇƘܐ ܗŴƌܢ ųƉŴƍƟܘܢ ƎƀŷƄƤƉ ܕŴƊƀƟƦƌܢ܉ ܐƆܐ ̈ƍƀܐ ܐŶــƌƮܐ܂ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ƤƉــƦŶŴܐ ܕƀƊƃــŴܬܐ ƀƍƟــƎ܂ Ɔــųܘܢ ܐܢ ܒƄ ܬܘܒ ƎƀƆųƆ ųƇƃܘܢ ܐơƏ ܐŴƌܢ űŷƆ ܓƐƍܐ ܕܓــŴܐ܉ ܗ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܘ ܕƊƣــųܗ ܐƆܕ ƈــźƉ ܂ųƆ ƎƍſƢƟ ܙܓܐŴƉ Ǝܒŵܘܒ ܐƇƀŶ Ǝܒŵܒ Ǝſܕ ƎƍŶ ܣ܂ŴŹܐŴƘ ܐƎƍŷƄƣ Ɖűƕܐ ƣųƆܐ Ɗƣܐ ܒƦƀ ŴƏ̈ܪƀſܐ ܕƋŷƆ ųƆ ܙܕƟܐƦſ܂

ƎƉ̣ űŶ ƦƀŶܬ ƎƇƙƌ ܐƆܕ ܐ܉ƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܐƇ̈ Ɵ Ʀƍ̈ B80v ܒ Ʀſܕܐ ܬܘܒ ŸƄƣܐ <sup>100</sup> ܗƎƀƆ ܬƦƆܐ ܓƍ v68D ̈Ɛܐ ܕܐܬܐƢƉܘ܂ ܕƎƀƍƟ ܗƀƆــƎ ƙƀƠƌــŴܬܐ Ɖــűܡ ƆــŴܬ ̇ ܂ ܗƎƀƆ ܕƎſ űŶ <sup>15</sup> ̈ܕܐ܉ ܘƆܐ ſƞƉܐ űŶܐ ƎſųƍƉ ܕܬܬܪƌܐ ܒűƖƇ ̣ƎƉ ŶܒƢܬܗ ̇ ܘ ܕƍſųƊƤƉــƎ ܒــų ܒــƢܐ ܘܐܒܐ: ƕܒــűܐ ܘƉــƢܐ: ܐƎſųſƦſ ܒــƌŵܐ ܗ ܘܐƙƕܐ ܘƇƘܓܐ܂ Ɔܐ ܓƢƀ ܒƢܐ ƦƉܪƌܐ ܒűƖƇ ̣ƎƉ ܐܒܐ: ܘƆܐ ƕܒűܐ r8L | v120C ̇ ̇ ƢƉܐ ܐܘ ܕƆܐ ƢƉܐ: ܘƆܐ ƇƘܓܐ ܕƆܐ ܐƙƕܐ܂ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܒܐ ܐܘ ܐƙƕܐ ŷƄƤƉܐ ܕƦƌܐƢƉ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ: ܒƖƇــű ܒــƢܐ ܘƕܒــűܐ ܘƇƘــܓܐ܂ ܘܐܦ ƎƀƆųƆ ƎſųƇƃ ܐƏــơ ܐƌ <sup>20</sup> ̈ƀــƎ ܬܘܒ ƐƇƀƘــƘŴܐ ŷƆــűܐ ܓƀƌŴــŴܬܐ ̇ ܂ ܗŴƌ ܕƎſ ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ܂ ƈźƉ ܕܐƅſ ܕܓƎſųƐƍ܉ ܗ r27P ̇ ܝ ܕƢƘܘƁźƏ ųƊƣܗ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƦƉܐƢƉܐ ƈƃ űŶܐ ̣ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ܉ ƎƉ ŴƆܬ űƉܡ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ܉ ̣ܗܘ ܗ

> ̇ ܝ ܕƢſƦſ ƦſƦŶܐ ƈźƉ ܐŴƀƍſܬܐ .tit +] ܘŴƀƊƃܬܐ **4** BCD ƈźƉ ܙƌܐ ܐܘƦƀƃ ŴƉܙܓܐ ܐܘ ܗ **<sup>5</sup>** ܐƉ] om. BCD **<sup>8</sup>** ܢŴƌܗ [om. B **<sup>10</sup>** ܘ ̇ ܗ [om. BCD **11** ܣŴŹܐŴƘ] + ܐƌܙ in marg. D | Ǝܒŵܘܒ BCD, Epit.: Ǝܒŵܕܒ P **<sup>12</sup>** ƎƍŷƄƣܐ BCD: ƎŷƄƣܐ P | ƦſܐƟܙܕ [+ tit. ܡűƉ ܬŴƆܕ ƈźƉ BCD **<sup>16</sup>** ܘ ̇ ܗ ųܒ ƎƍſųƊƤƉܕ [om. P **17** ܐƙƕܘܐ BCD: ܐƘܐƕܘ P **18** ܐƙƕܐ BCDL: ܐƘܐƕ P **19** ܐƙƕܐ BCDL: ܐƘــܐƕ P **<sup>20</sup>** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƙƏŴƇƀƘ ܘ ̇ ܗ P **<sup>21</sup>** ƎſųƐƍܕܓ LP: Ǝſ ̈ ųƀƐƍܕܓ BCD ̇ ܘ ܕƦƉܐƉــƢܐ | BCD Ɖــűܡ :LP Ɖܐ **22** ܗ ܡűƉ ܬŴƆ ƎƉ ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ̣ ܐűŶ ƈƃ] om. hom. P ܬŴƆ CDL: ܬŴƆܕ B

measures, numbers, and calculations of times and years designate a certain quantity140.

99 Thus he discovered two universal genera which encompass multiple things, i.e. substance and quantity. But beyond them, he also saw other words that do not pertain to these two genera. For instance, we have just now spoken about sweetness and bitterness, and about all colours and shapes. They neither pertain to substance nor signify any quantity, because they subsist not by themselves but only in other natures, and they also do not possess any dimension of quantity. All such (words) he (i.e. Aristotle) subsumed under one universal genus141 which he called *pw'ṭws* (ποιότης, "quality")142. As for us, we call it sometimes *ḥayla* ("capacity") and sometimes *muzzaga* ("mixture"), since up to this time we haven't found among Syriac names one which would suit it perfectly143.

100 There are also other words which do not fall under one of those three genera that have been discussed. They have a certain relation to one another144, so that one of them may not be considered without the other. It is in the way of their existence that we call them, e.g. father and son, servant and master, double and half. For neither may a son be considered without a father, nor a servant without a master, nor a half without a double. But also, one may not say that a father, or a master, or a double exists without a son, a servant, or a half. It is all such things that the Philosopher further subsumed under one of the universal genera that he called *prosṭi* (πρός τι) which means "to something"145. Because, as we have said, when any of these things is spoken of, it receives its

**<sup>140</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.13–18.

**<sup>141</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.18–25. Ammonius speaks here of τὸ ποιόν, "the qualified". Sergius does not seem to make a clear distinction in his commentary between quality and things qualified (see particularly Book VI), although in some passages he speaks rather of the latter than of the former.

**<sup>142</sup>** Ms. B adds in the margins the Syriac equivalent *zna*, "quality".

**<sup>143</sup>** Cf. §§354–355 and 365, below. In §355, Sergius writes that he considers the Syriac term *zna* as the most fitting equivalent to the Greek ποιότης, although the two other terms, *ḥayla* and *muzzaga*, also appear in his work (see, e.g., §108), thus corroborating Sergius' statement that all three of them were used synonymously at his time. It is also worthy to note that in ms. E, which contains a selection of passages from Sergius' *Commentary* dating from the 8th century, the term *muzzaga* appears as the only variant in the passage which corresponds to §99.

**<sup>144</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.29: σχέσις ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον.

**<sup>145</sup>** Sergius consistently applies the expression *lwat meddem*, "(in relation) to something", which renders the Greek πρός τι. Though it seems possible sometimes (e.g., here) to translate it literally, in what follows, I will use the terms "relation" and "relatives".

̇ ܘ ̇ ܘ ܕƦƉܐƢƉܐ ܒŴƙƀƠƍܬܗ Ɛƌܒܐ ƃــƀƌŴܐ܂ ܘܒƙƀƠƍــŴܬܐ ܕƆــŴܬ ܗ ܗ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ųƀƌŴƃ܂

	- ܐƤــƊŶ ƎــƀƆܗ ƎــƉ̣ Ǝــƀ̈ ̈Ƈܐ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕƀƆــƦ ܐƌ Ɵ Ʀƍ ̈ 103 ܬܘܒ ܐŸƄƣ ܒ ̈ܕƎƕ ܙܒــƍܐ Ɖــűܡ܂ ܐſــƅ ܕƍſűƖƉــƎ ƊƆܐƉــƢ܉ ŴــƤƉܕ Ǝــƀ̈ ̈ــƐܐ܉ ܗƌ ܓƍ ̈ــƀܐ ƃــƊܐ ̣ܕܗܘ܂ ̇ ܒــƦܪ ƍƣ ̈ƀܐ ſƮƐƕــƎ: ܐܘ ܐܬƁƇƉ ܘƍƉŴſܐ: ܘűƟܡ ƍƣ ̇ ܘ ̈ƀــƎ ܒŷــű ܓƍــƐܐ ܕܓــŴܐ܉ <sup>ܗ</sup> ƌܐ ƥܒــŶ ƎــſųƇƃ ƎــƀƆųƆ ܬܘܒ ƎــſųƆܕ ܕųƊƣܗ ܐƦƉܝ܂ źƉــƈ ܕƃــű ܐƌــƥ ƤƌــƦܐܠ ܗƃــƍܐ: Ŷــűܐ ̣ƉــƎ ܗƀƆــƎ <sup>15</sup> ƍƙƉܐ ƦƘܓƊܐ ܐƅſ ܕŸƃƦƤƌ ̣ܗܘ: ܐƦƉܝ ܓƐƍܐ ܕƎſųƇƃ܂
		- ̈ܕƎƕ űƉܡ ܕܐƦſ Ɔܐƥƌ܂ ̈Ƈܐ܉ ܗƎƀƆ ܕŴƤƉ Ɵ Ʀƍ ̈ 104 ܐƦſ ܕƎſ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܒ ƎــƀƆųƆ ܐ܂ƦƟŵƕ ƋƀƏ ܐܘ :ƎſܐƏ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕƎƍſűƖƉ ƊƆܐƢƉ: ܕƆܒƥƀ ܐܘ ̇ ܘ ܕųſƢƟܝ ܕܐƦſ܂ ̈Ǝƀ ܒűŷ ܓƐƍܐ ܕܓŴܐ܉ <sup>ܗ</sup> ƌܐ ƥܒŶ ƎſųƇƃ ܬܘܒ

**2** ܘܗܝƦſܐ BCDP: ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ L | ųƀƌŴƃ BCDL: ųƍƀƃ P, + B sup. lin., + D in marg.; + tit. ƈźƉ ܐƄſܐ BCD **<sup>5</sup>** ܘܗܝƦſܐ [+ ܗܘܐ BCD **<sup>7</sup>** ƎſųƇƃ ƎƀƆܗ LP, Epit.: ƎƀƆܗ ƎſųƇƃ BCD **<sup>8</sup>** ܐ ̈ Ɛƍܓ LP: Ǝƀ ̈ Ɛƍܓ BCD **<sup>10</sup>** ܐƄſܐ [+ tit. ܝƦƉܐ ƈźƉ BCD **<sup>11</sup>** ܬܘܒ BCDP: ܘܬܘܒ L **<sup>12</sup>** Ǝƀ̈ ƌܗ BCDL: ƎƀƆܗ P | ܐƍܙܒ [om. B **14** ƎƀƆųƆ] om. P **15** ܐܠƦƤƌ ƥƌܐ CDLP: ƥƌܐ ܐܠƦƤƌ B **16** ƎſųƇƃܕ [+ tit. Ʀſܐ ƈźƉ BCD **19** ܐŴܕܓ [om. BCDEP | Ʀſܕܐ [+ tit. ƋƀƏ ƈźƉ BCD **20** ܐƉ BCDEL: ܡűƉ <sup>P</sup>**<sup>21</sup>** ܐܡƟ CDELP: ܐܡƟܕ B | ŪſƦſ BCELP: ܒƦſ D | Ǝƀ̈ ƌܐ [om. P **22** ܐŴܕܓ [om. BCDEP ̇ ܘ ܕųſƢƟܝ ̇ ܘ :BCDL ܗ ųܒ P | ƋƀƏܕ L: ܐƊƀƏܕ P: ƋƀƏ BCD, Epit.; + tit. űܒƕ ƈźƉ BCD

name from its relation to something, which (in turn) has its name146 through its relation to it147.

101 And further, there are other words that are not found under any of these genera, which signify place. For instance, when someone says, "Socrates is in the theatre (θέατρον)", or "Plato is in the market", and everything else like that. He also subsumed them under one universal genus which he called "where", for each one of them appears as an answer to (the question) "where?"148.

102 Now, these are five universal genera that encompass many of those things that exist in the world, i.e. substance, quantity, quality, (in relation) to something, and where.

103 Further, there are other words that do not pertain to the afore-mentioned five genera, which signify certain time. For instance, we are accustomed to say, "yesterday", "today", "ten years ago", or "after so-and-so many years". All of them he also subsumed under one universal genus which he called "when"149. Because if someone is asked this (question), he gives one of the suitable answers which all pertain to the genus of "when".

104 There are other words which signify something that a person possesses. E.g., we are accustomed to say, "he is dressed up", "he has his shoes on", or "he wears a ring". All these too he subsumed under one universal genus which he called "having"150.

105 And further, all other (words) that signify certain position — e.g., when we say, "standing", "sitting", or "lying" — he subsumed under one universal genus which he called "being-in-a-position"151.

**<sup>146</sup>** In ms. P and in the marginal notes of mss. B and D: "its nature". This variant, however, is most likely a scribal mistake.

**<sup>147</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.28–29.

**<sup>148</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.29–20.2: πάλιν δὲ ἔστι τι τὸ ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ εἶναι ἢ ἐν ἀγορᾷ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἅπερ ἀνήγαγον ὑπὸ τὸ ποῦ, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τόπου σημαντικόν. Ammonius, however, does not mention that the name of this category should be understood as an answer to a question.

**<sup>149</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.2–4: πάλιν ἔστι τι χθὲς πέρυσιν αὔριον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἅπερ ἀνήγαγον ὑπὸ τὸ ποτέ, ὅπερ ἐστὶ χρόνου σημαντικόν. As in the previous case, Ammonius does not mention that Aristotle's title for this category derives from an answer to a certain question. **150** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.6–7. Ammonius interprets this category as "placing of one substance around another" (ἔχειν γάρ ἐστιν οὐσίας περὶ οὐσίαν περίθεσις). Sergius omits this interpretation, just as he does in his account of having in §404.

**<sup>151</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.4–6. Ammonius discusses it before having.

	- ̈Ƈܐ ܕܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ܕܗƎƀƆ: ܐƅſ Ɖܐ ܕƌܐƢƉ ܕƦƃƦƉܒ Ɵ Ʀƍ ̈ B81v ܒƆ ܘܬܘܒ <sup>107</sup> ܐƐــƍܓ űــŷƆ ƥــƍƃ ƎــſųƇƃ ܬܘܒ ƎƀƆųƆ ܐܡ܉Ŷ ̇ ̇ Ɵܐܪ ܐܘ ̇ ƗƇ ܐܘ ̇ ܒ ܐܘ ̇ ܘ ܕųſƢƟܝ ܕŶܐܫ܂ ܕܓŴܐ: ܗ
	- ̈Ɖـــƀܐ ܘ̈ܪƤſـــƀܐ: ̈ـــƐܐ űƟ 108 ܗƀƆـــƎ ܗƀƃـــƈ ܐſƦſـــųܘܢ ƐƕـــƮܐ ܓƍ ̈ ܘƎſ ̈ ܘܝ ܘܕܗ ̈ Ŵܬܐ ܕܗ ̇ ܒƎƀƤ ƎſųƇƃ ܨܒ ̈Ɛܐ: ܕŶ ܕƎſųƉƦƤƉ ܐܦ ܓƑƍ ܓƍ ܘܕܐƎſųſƦſ܂ ܘƆܐ ſƞƉܐ ܕŸƃƦƤƌ űƉܡ ƦƉܘܡ ܕƆܐ <sup>ƌ</sup> <sup>10</sup> ̇ƙــƈ ܬƀŶــƦ Ŷــű ̣ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ܕܐųſƦſܘܢ܉ ܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ƀƊƃــŴܬܐ܂ ƉــŴܙܓܐ܂ ܕƆــŴܬ Ɖــűܡ܂ ̇ ܐܫ܂ ܐƄſܐ܂ ܐƦƉܝ܂ ܕܐƦſ܂ ܕƋƀƏ܂ ܕƕ E.des ̇ܒű܂ ܘܐſƢŶܐ ܕųƇƃܘܢ ܕŶ
	- ̈Ʀܐ ܐƅſ ܕƋƀƏ ƠƀƐƙܒ ܘܢųƍƉ űŶ ƈƃܕ ܓܐƆŴƘ ƢƉܐƌܕ Ǝſܕ ܡűƟ 109 ̇ : ܕܐܢ ̣ܗܘ ܕŶƦƌــŵܐ ųƀƇƕ ܐƞƆܐ ŪŹܕ ܝ ̇ C122r ܗ ƢƉܐƌ ܉ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪƆ ųƆ űƉܡ ƦƉܘܡ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ̣ƎƉ ܬ̈ܪſــƎ ܓƍ <sup>15</sup> ̈ــƐܐ܂ Ɔܐ ܬŹــƖܐ ƆــƎ ܬܐܘܪſܐ ƦــƀƆ ܂ƑƀƇŹŴــźƐſܐܪƆ ųــƆ ƈــƖƉ ܐƢſƦſ ܐƐƍܕܓ ƎƆ ƢܒƐƌܘ ܗܝŴƇƕܕ ܓƢƀ ܘƆܐ űŶܐ ܒƢܬ ƇƟܐ ̣ܕܗܝ űƃ ̣ܗܝ ſƞƉܐ ܕܬƈƘ ܬƀŶــƦ ܬܪſــƎ ̣ƉــƎ v28P ̇ ̇ ܐܪܒــƖܐ ܐܘ ̈Ɛܐ܂ ſűſــƖܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕܐܦ Ɔܐ ܬƀŶــƦ ܬƆــƦܐ ܐܘ ܗƎƀƆ ܓƍ Ɗƃܐ ̣ܕܗܘ܂
		- ̇ <sup>110</sup> ܘܐƎƘ ܓƀــƢ ŶƦƉــſŵܐ ƆــƎ ƤƉــƦŶŴܐ ܕܐƉــƦܐ ܐܘ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܕܬܪܬſــƎ ܐܘ ƎــƉ ƎــƀƆܕܗ ƈــźƉ ܐ܉ƘܐƄܒ ̇ ̇ ܒƐƀƠܐ ܐܘ ܕƊƃܐ ̣ܕܗܘ ܕƈƕ ܕܐųſƦſ

**<sup>1</sup>** ƎƀƆܗ BCDP, Epit.: Ǝƀ̈ ƌܗ L **3** ܐŴܕܓ [+ ܘܗܝƦſܐ D | ơƏܐ [+ Ǝƀƌܐ BCD **4** ƅſܐ CDLP: ƅſܕܐ B | ܡűƉܕ BCDL: ܡűƉ P | ƎƀƆܗ [+ tit. ܐܫŶ ƈźƉ BCD **6** ƥƍƃ] + Ǝƀƌܐ BCD **7** ܝųſƢƟܕ BCELP: ܝƢƟܕ D **9** ƎſųƉƦƤƉܕ BCDEP: ƎſųƉƦƤƉܘ L | ƎſųƇƃ BCDEP: ܘܢųƆŴƃ L **11** ܬŴƆܕ LP: ܬŴƆ BCDE **<sup>12</sup>** Ʀſܕܐ LP: Ʀſܐ BCDE | ƋƀƏܕ LP: ƋƀƏ BCDE | űܒ̇ ƕܕ LP: űܒƕ BCDE | ܐſƢŶܘܐ LP: ƦſƢŶܘܐ BC: ƦſƢŶܘܒܐ D | ܘܢųƇƃܕ LP: ܘܢųƇƃ BCD | ܐܫ ̇ Ŷܕ ELP: ܐܫŶ BCD **13** ƈƃܕ [om. BD | űŶ LP: űŶ űŶ C: űŶ űŶܕ BD **14** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪƆ CL: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪƆ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪƆ D: ܣŴƀƇźźƐſܐܪƆ P **<sup>15</sup>** ܐƐ̈ ƍܓ BCDL: ƎƀƐ̈ ƍܓ P | ܐƖŹܬ BCDL: ܐƖŹܬܬ P **16** ܐƢſƦſ CDLP: ƢــſƦſ B | ƑƀƇŹŴــźƐſܐܪƆ CL: ƑــƀƇźźƐſܐܪƆ P: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܐܪƆ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƏܐܪƆ D **<sup>17</sup>** ܐűŶ] + ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ BCD **<sup>21</sup>** ܐƊƃܕ CDL: ܐƊƃ BP | ̇ ųſƦſܕܐ BCDL: Ʀſܕܐ P


**<sup>152</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.7–9: πάλιν ἔστι τι τύπτειν θερμαίνειν ψύχειν· τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνήγαγον ὑπὸ τὸ ποιεῖν· ποιεῖν δέ ἐστι τὸ δρᾶν περί τι.

**<sup>153</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.9–10.

**<sup>154</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.11–12: ἔσχον οὖν δέκα τοιαύτας κοινότητας· οὐσίαν ποσὸν ποιὸν πρός τι ποῦ ποτὲ κεῖσθαι ἔχειν ποιεῖν πάσχειν.

**<sup>155</sup>** Sergius discusses this question in the context of the genus of relatives, see §§391–393, where his account is based on Aristole's text.

ܐܘƀƏܐ ܐųſƦſܘܢ: ܗܐ ܐܦ ̣ܗܝ ƤƉــƦŶŴܐ ̣ƉــƎ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ܐſƦſــų r9L ̇ ܂ ܐƆܐ ŴƆ ܗƍƃܐ ܙܕܩ ܕƐƌܒƢ܂ ƐƀƟܐ ܓƢƀ ܘƃܐƘܐ ܘܐƀƌƮŶــƦܐ ܕܐſــƅ ̇ ܝ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ƐƀƟܐ ܘƃܐƘܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ Ǝſųƍƀƃ ̣ƎƉ ܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ܗƎƀƆ܉ ܒų ̇ ܕܬƦƆ܉ ܒųܕܐ ̣ƎƉ ƀƊƃــŴܬܐ ̈ Ǝƀ ܐܘ Ɖܐ Ǝſܕܬܪܬ ƎſųſƦſܕܐ Ǝſܕ ܝ ̇ B82r ųܒ ܐƎſųſƦſ܂ <sup>5</sup>

	- ̈ ܐ܉ ̈Ǝ ܬƦƀŶ ܬ̈ܪƎſ ܓƐƍ ̈ܬܐ ܕƠƇƏ Ŵܕܨܒ ƎſųƍƉ ƎſŵŶƦƉ ƎƘܐ ƎſűƉ 112 ܙܕܩ űƊƆܥ ܕŴƆ ܒų ƃــű ܒــų ܒــƌŵܐ ܐſųſƦſــƎ ܗƃــƍܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒƊــűܡ ̈ ƀــƎ܂ ܐܢ ܓƀــƢ ܗܕܐ ƆــŴ ̈ــƎ ܒƦ̈ܪſــƎ ܓƐƍ ŷƃƦƤƉ ƎــƌƢƉܕܐ ƅــſܐ ܡűƉ ̈ ܐ ܐŶــƌƮܐ ƦƉܒƀƇźــƎ ܗƃــƍܐ ܬܬƐƌــŪ܉ ܐܦ Ƈƃــųܘܢ ܬƣــƖܐ ܓƍــƐ ųƆܘܢ: ܘűŶ ̣ܗܘ ܒŴŷƇܕ ܓƐƍܐ Ƙܐ r29P ̇ <sup>ܫ</sup>: ܗŴƌ ܕƎſ ܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ƈźƉ ܕųƇƃܘܢ ̇ ƍƟــƀܐ ƟــƊſŴܐ ܗƎƀƆ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܒųܕܐ ƎƀƊƀƟƦƉ: ƈźƉ ̣ܕܗܝ ܒŴŷƇܕųſ ƎƆ ƢƀƉܕܐ ƅſܐ ųܒ ƎƀƃܬƦƌܕ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܡűƉ ƈƕ ơƀƍƏ ܐƆܕ : ̇ ܕųƉŴƍƟ ܂ƈƖƆ ƎƉ

**<sup>1</sup>** ܘܢųſƦſܐ LP: ƎſųſƦſܐ BCD **<sup>9</sup>** Ǝſܪ̈ŴŶܕ LP: Ǝſܪ̈ŴŶ BCD | ܝ ̇ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ƎƉ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܐƆܐ ܒų Ǝſܪ̈ŴــŶ ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕſــƎ ܕƀƇŶــƎ ܐܘ ̈ Ɗƣܐ Ɖــűܡ ܐƌــŴܢ ܒــų Ŵܕܓــ [om. hom. B **11** ƎــƘܐ CDP: ܐܦ BL ̈ ܐ Ɛƍܓ BPL: ƎƀƐ̈ ƍܓ CD **<sup>13</sup>** ܡűƉ BCDP: ܡűƊܘܒ L **<sup>15</sup>** ܫ ̇ ܐƘ BCLP: ƥƘ D **16** ƎƀƆܗ BCDL: ܢŴƌܗ P | ܐƊſŴƟ L: ܐƊƀƟ BCDP **17** ƎƀƃܬƦƌܕ L: Ǝƀƃܕܬܬ BCD: ƎƀƕܬƦƌܕ P **19** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ CL: ƑــƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƏܐܪ D **<sup>20</sup>** ܐ ̈ Ɛــƍܓ ܐƢƐƕ CDLP: ܐƐ̈ ܓƍ ̈ ܐ **21** B ƢƐƕܐ Ɛƍܓ LP: ܐƐ̈ ƍܓ ܐƢƐƕ BCD **23** ܐƉ BCDP: ܐƊƃ L

substance therefore also pertains to substance, this is not how we shall think, for the nature of a piece of wood, or a stone, or anything else like that pertains to substance; because they are wood and stone. That they are of two or three cubit, on the other hand, because of this they pertain to quantity.

111 Also, concerning sweetness or whiteness we may not conclude from the fact that they exist in honey or milk, since honey and milk pertain to substance, that they too pertain to substance. For honey or milk pertain to substance not because they are sweet or white but because they are certain bodies, while because they are sweet or white, they are considered to pertain to quality.

112 Therefore, if some entities appear to be subsumed under two genera, we should know that it is not in one and the same manner that they do this, but, as we have said, they appear in two genera in different ways. For if it were not comprehended like that, then also nine other genera would become idle, and only one genus would remain, namely substance, while all the others would come to be through it, since it alone has subsistence by itself and does not require anything else through what it would be generated, as we have said above.

#### *[Homonyms, synonyms, heteronyms, and polynyms]156*

113 Since Aristotle himself before teaching about the ten genera defined 1a1–15 certain terms that appeared to him useful for the knowledge of these genera157, it is also proper for us, if we are eager to follow the order of his teaching, to discuss them according to our capacity, before the division of the genera. Hence here we also begin with it.

**<sup>156</sup>** The previous paragraph concludes the *prolegomena* part of Sergius' treatise. In what follows, Sergius provides a commentary on Aristotle's text, stating that he is "eager to follow the order of his teaching". Hence the passages from the *Categories* which Sergius apparently comments on are indicated in the outer margins of the text. However, in some cases these references have a conjectural character.

**<sup>157</sup>** Sergius thus refers to the *antepraedicamenta* section of the *Categories*. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 14.4–5: τὰ δὲ πρὸ τῶν κατηγοριῶν συμβαλλόμενα ἡμῖν ἔσται εἰς τὴν τῶν κατηγοριῶν διδασκαλίαν.


	- ̈ــƎ ƕűſƦƉ ܐźــƀƤ̈ <sup>Ƙ</sup> ܐƀƌ ̈ Ŵــƃ űــƀܒ Ǝܒــŵܒ :ƎــƌƢƉܕܐ ƅــſܐ ܐܢ ƎــſűƉ 116 ̈ܬܐ: ܘܒŵܒƎ ܒűƀ ƦƇƉܐ ƦƀƍƊŶƦƉܗƎſ܉ ܙܕܩ ƎƆ űƊƆܥ܂ ܕƎſųƍƉ ܨܒŴ ̈ܕܐ: ܘƤſƮƘــƎ ܒƇƊــƦܐ űــŶ Ƌــƕ Ǝ ̈ ܕܨܒــŴ <sup>20</sup> ̈ܬܐ ܒƤــƊܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ƤƉــŴܬƘ ̈ܬƎƘ ܘƤſƮƘــƎ ŴــƤƉ ƎــſܗƦƀƍƊŶƦƉ ܐƦــƇƊܒ Ǝܒــŵܘܒ ܂ƎــſܗƦƀƍƊŶƦƉ ̈ ܐ ̈ܬƎƘ: ܗƌــŴ ܕſــƎ ܒƊƤــų ̈ ƀƌܐ܂ ܘܒŵܒــƎ ܬܘܒ ܒƦ̈ܪܬſųſــƎ ƤƉــŴ ܒƄــŴ

**1** ƎſųƇƃ BCDEP: ƈƀƃܗ L | űŶ űƀܒ BCLP: űŶűŷܒ DE **2** ƎſܗƦƀƍƊŶƦƉ ܐƦƇƉ ܗܕܐ ܘܗܝ̣ [ om. hom. P **3** Ǝܒــŵܒ BCELP: Ǝܒŵܘܒ D **5** ƎƍƀƕܕŴƤƉܘ LP: ƎƍƀƕܕŴƤƉܕ BCD **13** ܐƀƌŴƄƆ BLP: ŴƆ ܐƀƌŴƃ C, D in marg.: ܐƍƀƃ ŴƆ D **14** Ǝſųƍƀƃ BCDL: Ǝſųƀƍƀƃ P **15** ƎſųƉŴŶܬ BCLP: ƎſųƀƉŴŶܬ D | ƎſƢ ̇ Ɵ LP: ƎƍſƢ ̇ <sup>Ɵ</sup> BCD **<sup>17</sup>** ̇ ܐܘ [+ ƎƉ̣ BCD | ̇ ųƆ] om. B **<sup>19</sup>** Ǝܒŵܘܒ [+ Ǝ ̇ Ɖ CD | űƀܒ [om. B Ǝ | BCDP ܗܘ + [ܒƤــƊܐ **20** ̈ ƘܬŴــƤƉ BDLP: ƎƘܬ̈ ŴــƉܕ C | ܐƦــƇƊܒ CDLP: ܐƦــƇƉ ƎــƉ̣ B ̈ ƀƌܐ **21** ŴƄܒ ƎƤſƮƘܘ [om. P

114 All things that fall under our knowledge become known sometimes through one simple name and sometimes through a certain account that defines them158. And such a definitory account is sometimes derived from what a thing naturally is and sometimes from what is accidentally concomitant to it. What I mean is this. Naturally man is a certain being which we signify by means of a simple name when we call it "man". But when we compose a statement in order to signify it and call it "rational, mortal animal", we define it by means of a statement which derives from what it naturally is. If, instead, we compose a statement in order to signify it from what is accidentally concomitant to it, e.g. when we say that he is capable of speaking and is skilled in crafts, we determine it from what is accidentally concomitant to it. For we call accidental everything what a man acquires but may exist without it159.

115 So, we say of a simple word which signifies a certain subject matter that it is its name. A statement which signifies a thing and is derived from its nature is called a definition. Also, another kind of statement which is composed from what is accidentally present in things we call a characterization from accidents, or a description160.

116 Thus, since, as we have said, things are comprehended sometimes through simple names and sometimes through a definitory account, we ought to know that some things share with one another only name but differ in their definitory accounts; sometimes they have in common their definitory account but differ in name; and further, sometimes they have in common both, i.e. name

**<sup>158</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.4: δηλοῦνται δὲ πάντα καὶ δι' ὀνομάτων καὶ διὰ λόγων (see in general 15.4–16, cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 14.5–6). See also David, *Prolegomena* 11.15–12.18, discussing as one of the introductory questions what a definition (ὁρισμός) is. Like Ammonius, David makes a distinction between a name (ὄνομα) and an account (λόγος) both of which may provide a definition of a subject matter.

**<sup>159</sup>** Cf. the same example in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.10–16; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 14.7–8.

**<sup>160</sup>** Cf. the next main point of David's *Prolegomena* (12.19–13.6) dealing with the distinction between a definition (ὁρισμός), a description (ὑπογραφή), and a descriptive definition (ὑπογραφικὸς ὁρισμός).

܂ƅــƏ ܬܐŴƘܬŴƣ Ǝƀƍ ̇ <sup>Ɵ</sup> ܐƆ űƃ ܉ƎƤſƮƘ Ǝſųſܪܬ̈Ʀܒ Ǝܒŵܘܒ ܐ܂Ɖ̈ B83r ŴŶƦܘܒ Ɔܐ ܒƊƤܐ ܘƆܐ ܒƉŴŶƦܐ܂


̈Ɖܐ **<sup>3</sup>** ŴŶܘܬ BCDL: ܐƉ̈ ŴŶܘܕܬ P **<sup>4</sup>** ƎƌƢƉܕܐ [+ ƈƖƆ ƎƉ̣ BCD **<sup>5</sup>** ܕܐ̈ űŶ Ƌƕ ܬܐ̈ ̈ܬƎƘ ܨܒŴ ŴƤƉ ̇ ܒƊƤܐ ܘܒƉŴŶƦܐ ܐܘ [om. P | Ƌƕ CDL: ƎƉ B **12** ƦƉܐƃ] + ƈƕ P **14** ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ BCD **15** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƙƏŴƇƀƘ P | Ƣſܕܨ CDLP: Ƣſƞܕܒ B **16** ܗܘ1 [om. BCD **22** ܗܘ űŶ BDLP: ܗܘ űŶ C **23** Ǝ ̈ ƙƇŷƤƉ BCDL: ƎƀƙƇŷƤƉ P

and definition; and sometimes they differ in both, having in common nothing at all, i.e. neither name nor definition161.

117 One may also express it as follows. Since, as we have said, things have a name and a descriptive definition, what follows from this is that either they share with one another both name and definition; or they differ from one another both in name and in definition; or they have one of them in common but differ in another, while this in turn may happen in two ways, i.e. either they have name in common but differ in definition, or they share definition but differ in name162.

118 Thus, when things have only a name in common but differ in their descriptive definition, they are called "of similar name" (i.e. homonyms)163, for it is only in the name that the similarity between them shows up. For instance, we use the name "dog" to designate dissimilar natures. For there is a water-dog164 and a land-dog, there is a star called like that, the one which ascends after the Orion165, there is also a philosophical writer who is called like that166, and finally a painted or carved image may be called like that too167. So, it is only the name that makes these things similar to one another while the definitions of each one of them are different.

119 When things have definition in common but differ in name, then they are called "of similar kind"168, for they belong to one and the same kind. E.g., we have the custom to call a stone also "rock" and "flint". While the definition of their nature is one, they differ from one another only in names and they are of the same kind.

**<sup>161</sup>** The taxonomy which Sergius presents here is close to what we find in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 14.11–16 and Simplicius, *In Cat.* 22.15–31, who both attribute each case to homonyms, polynyms, synonyms, and heteronyms.

**<sup>162</sup>** Here, Sergius' account concurs nearly verbatim with what we find in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.16–22: τούτων τοίνυν οὕτως εἰρημένων εἰ λάβοιμεν δύο πράγματα, ταῦτα ἢ κατὰ ἀμφότερα κοινωνοῦσι, λέγω δὴ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον, ἢ κατ' ἄμφω διαφέρουσιν, ἢ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἓν κοινωνοῦσι, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον διαφέρουσι· καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον κοινωνοῦσι κατὰ δὲ τὸ ὄνομα διαφέρουσιν, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὄνομα κοινωνοῦσι κατὰ δὲ τὸν λόγον διαφέρουσιν.

**<sup>163</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.29–16.1: εἰ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὄνομα κοινωνοῖεν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν λόγον διαφέροιεν, ὁμώνυμα λέγεται.

**<sup>164</sup>** Probably, a kind of shark, cf. Chase 2003: 115.

**<sup>165</sup>** I.e. Sirius, Gr. Σείριος, also called the "dog-star".

**<sup>166</sup>** I.e. a Cynic philosopher whose name derives from the term κύων, "dog".

**<sup>167</sup>** Cf. the same example by Simplicius, *In Cat.* 24.9–13.

**<sup>168</sup>** Greek commentators (including Ammonius and Philoponus) designate these cases as polynyms (πολυώνυμοι). Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 16.4–5: εἰ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον κοινωνοῦσι κατὰ δὲ τὸ ὄνομα διαφέρουσιν, ὀνομάζεται πολυώνυμα. The term suggested by Sergius would correspond to Gr. ὁμοειδής.

	- ̈ ܓƀــܐܬܐ Ɵــűܡ ƍƙƇƉــŴܬܐ Ɛܒ ܐƘŴــƐƇƀƘ ƚــƇ ̇ <sup>10</sup> Ɖ ƈƀƃܗ ƎƀƆܗ ƈƕ <sup>121</sup> ̈Ʀܐ ƠƀƐƙܒ Ǝſܕ ƎƍŶ ܂ƈƖƆ ƎƉ̣ ܘƢƉܕܐܬܐ ܢŴƌ ̇ ̈Ɛܐ: <sup>ܗ</sup> ܕƈƕ ƢƐƕܐ ܓƍ ̇ ƦƇƊƆܐ ܕųƀƇƕܘܢ ܒƆŴƙܓܐ ܐܘƀƍƉܐ܂ ܗܕܐ ܓƢƀ ܐƦƣܘܕƎƍſ ųƍƊƏ ̣ƎƉ Ŵƣܪųſ ܕƦƃܒܐ: ̣ܕܗܝ ܬܪƦƀƕܗ ܕܓܒƢܐ ƌܐƢƉ ܒŴƕŵ̈ܪƦſܐ ܐſــƅ ̇ ƊƆŴƣܐ܂ ܕƎƍſƞƉ܂ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ܐܦ ƦƇƊƆܐ ܕƈƕ ܗƎƀƆ ܬƎƌ ƕܒƎƍſű ųƆ ƋƇƣ ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܬ̈ܪƎſ܂ <sup>15</sup>

**1** Ǝƀ̈ ƌܗ BCDP: ƎƀƆܗ L **3** ƅſܐ [+ ܐƌܙ P **7** ƥƌܐ ƢƉܐƌܕ BCDP: ƢƉܐƌ ƥƌܕܐ L | ƑſܐܪƘ DP: ܐƀƏƢƘ BCL **<sup>8</sup>** ƎƀƘܬŴƤƉ LP: ƎƘܬ̈ ŴƤƉ BCD **<sup>10</sup>** ƚƇ ̇ Ɖ] + ƈƇƉ in marg. D | ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƙƏŴƇƀƘ P | ܬܐŴƍƙƇƉ BCDL: ܬܐŴƍܒƦƄƉ P **13** ܒܐƦƃܕ [+ ܐƌܗ BCD **14** ܐܦ BCDP: ̇ Ŵƣܒŷܐ ܐƍƀƉܐ ܘűƆܘſܐ ܕƢƏܛ + ;L ƋƇƣ :BCDP ƇƣــƋ ƉܐƉــƢܐ ܕܬ̈ܪſــƎ **<sup>15</sup>** L ܘܐܦ ܘųƀƆ ̈ ܐ ܒŴƀܡ ܕƍſܐ ܕƇƀŶܐ ܐƎſ ܘܐƎƀƉ ųźŶܕ ܐƍƠܒŴƣ D


End of Book Two.

**<sup>169</sup>** Here, Sergius combines two types, heteronyms and synonyms. The first sentence of this paragraph finds a close parallel in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 16.22–23, where Philoponus explicates the meaning of the term "homonym" that may be applied in multiple ways (ἐν διαφόροις τόποις). **170** I.e. they are heteronyms. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.26: εἰ δὲ κατ' ἄμφω διαφέροιεν, ὀνομά-

ζεται ἑτερώνυμα.

**<sup>171</sup>** I.e. they are synonyms (thus Sergius seems to believe that both designations refer to the same person). Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.22–23: εἰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἄμφω κοινωνοῦσιν, ὀνομάζεται συνώνυμα. Philoponus, Elias, and Simplicius suggest the same example with the name of Alexander, when speaking of homonyms, which would be more appropriate in this case, see Philoponus, *In Cat.* 16.23–24; Elias, *In Cat.* 139.33; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 31.24–25.

Ǝſܪ̈ܕܬ ܐƢƉܐƉܕ ܓܐƆ̈ P31r ŴƘ ƆŴƘܓܐ ƀƉűƟܐ ܬܐŴƇƀƇƉܕ ܬܐŴƍƉܐܘ ƈƕܕ ܬܐ̈ B84r | C125v ŴƍܒƦƄƉ | D71r ƎſųſƦſܐ ܐƦſ ̈ ƎſųƍƉ űƟܡ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ܕƈƕ ܬŴŶ ̈ــƐܐ ̈ƀــźܐ – ƃــƦܒܐ ܕƕــƈ ƐƕــƢܐ ܓƍ ƤƘ ܐƇــ̈ <sup>5</sup> Ɵ ƈƕ ƎſųƍƉ ܕƀźƟܓŴܪŴſܣ ̇ ܘ ܘſųƍƉـــƎ ƕـــƈ ܪܘƃـــܒܐ ƉűƟـــƀܐ ܕܗƀƆـــƎ – ƃـــƦܒܐ ܗ ܕƘܐܪſܐܪŴƀƍƉܣ ̇ ܘ ܘƎſųƍƉ ƈƕ ƢŹŴƟ ƇƇƊƉܐ ܕƍƉــų ܕܪܘƃــܒܐ – ƃــƦܒܐ ܗ ܕܐƠƀŹŴƇƌܐ ƀƉűƟܐ ܘܐſƢŶܐ <sup>10</sup> ̈ Ʀſܐ ̇ ܘ ܕܬŶــŴ ̈ ƊƀــƎ – ƃــƦܒܐ ܗ <sup>Ə</sup> ܐƦſ ̈ ŴــŶܕܬ ƎــſųƀƇƕ ƎــſųƍƉܘ ̇ ܘ ܕƕــƈ ̈ܪſــƤܐ ܕſƢƟƦƉــƎ ܐܬ̈ܪܘܬܐ ܕƟƦƉــƢܐ ܐƘــŴܕƠƀźƠſܐ ܘܗ ŴƠƀƘ ̈ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܕŴŹ ̇ ܘ ̇ ƆܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ƦƄƉܒƎ – Ʀƃܒܐ ܗ ųƆ Ǝ̈ ŷƤŶܕ ƎƀƇſܐ ƈƕ ƎſųƍƉܘ ̇ ܘ ܬܘܒ ܕƈƕ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ܕܪܗƢŹܘܬܐ ܕŴƍƐƄƉܬܐ ܕƘŴƏ <sup>15</sup> ̈źƐܐ ܘܗ C126r | P31v Ǝſܕܬܪ ܓܐƆŴƘ

̈Ǝźƀ ܒƊƇƖܐ ƤƘܕ ƎƀƇſܐ ƎſųƇƃ ƎſųſƦſܐ Ʀſܐƍƀƃ ŴƆ – ƎſųſƦſܐ ܐƇ̈ Ɵ Ʀƍ̈ ̇ ܒ ܐܘ ̇ ̈ܪƍƀƕܐ ܕŴƤƉܕƎƀƕ – ƍƀƃܐƦſ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܐܘ ̈Ʀƀܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ ƍƀƃ – Ǝ ̈ ̈ܬܐ ܕƕűſƦƉ ܐܘ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܨܒŴ

> ̈Ɔܓܐ **<sup>1</sup>** ŴƘ C: ܓܐƆŴƘ LP: ܓܐƆ̈ ŴƘ ܬܘܒ D: ųƇſܕ ܓܐƆ ̈ ܕųƇſ ܕƉܐƢƉܐ + [ƀƉűƟܐ **2** B ܬܘܒ ŴƘ <sup>D</sup>**<sup>3</sup>** ܬܐŴــƇƀƇƉܕ [+ ƎƀƆ ̇ ܗ P **4** ƎſųſƦſܐ [+ ƎƀƆܗ ƎſųſƦſܕܐ P **5** ƎſųƍƉ BCDL: ƎſųƍƉܕ P **6** ܣŴſܪŴܓƀźƟܕ L: ܣŴſƢܓźƟ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟ BC: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟ D **7** ܒܐƃܪܘ L: ܘܢųܒƃܪܘ BCD: Ǝſųܒƃܪܘ P | ƎƀƆܕܗ [+ ܐƀƉűƟ ܒܐƃܪܘ P **8** ܣŴƀƍƉܐܪſܐܪƘܕ L: ƑƀƍƉƢſƢƘܕ BCD: ƑƀƉܐܪſƢƘܕ <sup>P</sup>**<sup>9</sup>** ųƍƉܕ LP: ųƇſܕ BCD **<sup>10</sup>** ܐƠƀŹŴƇƌܕܐ LP: ܐƠƀź̈ ƠƇƌܕܐ BD: ܐƠƀź̈ ƠƆŴƌܕܐ C **<sup>11</sup>** ƎƊƀ ̈ Ə] + ƎƀƆܗ ƎſųſƦſܕܐ P | ܐƦſ ̈ ŴŶܕܬ2 CDLP: ܐƉ̈ ܐܬ̈ܪܘܬܐ | P ƌŴſܐƦſ +] ܕƢƟƦƉܐ **12** B ܕܬŴŶ ̈ ܬܐ :CDLP ܐܬܘ B **<sup>13</sup>** ŴــƠƀƘ ̈ ŴŹܕ L: ܐƠƀƘ ̈ ŴــŹ BCD: ܐƐƘŴــŹ P **14** ƎــƀƇſܐ LP: ƎــƀƆܗ BCD ƎܒƦƄƉ BCDL: ܒܐƦ̈ <sup>ƃ</sup> Ǝſܪ̈ܬ ƎƀƆܗ ƎſųſƦſܕܐ ƎܒƦ̈ ̇ ܘ **15** P ܕƃ ̇ ܘ :BCDP ܘܗ ܗ L | ܬܘܒ [om. BCD ̈ƀــƍܐ :BCDL ̈ܪƀƕــƍܐ **<sup>19</sup>** ̈ ܬܐ **20** P ܕƃ ̈ ܬܐ :BCDL ܨܒــŴ Ŵܕܨܒ P | Ǝ ̈ ƕűſƦƉܕ CDL: ƎƕܕŴƤƉܕ P: ̈Ʀƀܐ ƍƀƃ B

#### *Divisions of Book Two*

#### *First division*

Writings about the craft of logic:

	- some are about simple words: the treatise *Categories* which is about the ten genera;
	- some are about their first composition: the book *On Interpretation*;
	- and some are about syllogisms which derive from this composition: the book *Prior and Posterior Analytics*;

#### *Second division*

Of what is simple in the world:


**<sup>172</sup>** Syr. *reše*, corresponding most likely to Gr. τὰ κεφάλαια, the main points discussed in an argument.

B84v | ܐƦƆܕܬ ܓܐƆŴƘ C126v | D71v ̈ƣܐ ܕƦƇƉܐ ܐܪܒƖܐ ܐųſƦſܘܢ r11L| ܐܕ ŴƠƘܕܐ ƍƀƆƞƉܐ ƤƉܐƍƆܐ ƟŴƐƘܐ

ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ ̈Ɛܐ ܐܕ <sup>5</sup> ̈ƣܐ ܘܓƍ ƎſƢƟƦƉ ܐƀ ̈ ̈źƀܐ ܘƉűƟ ųƍƉܘܢ ŴƆܬ ܒƢܘſܐ ܐŴƌܢ – ƤƘ ƎſųƉƦƤƉ ܐƀƍƀ̈ ̈ ƀƍƆܐ ܘƃ ܘųƍƉܘܢ ܒųܘƆܐ – ܗܘ ܘųƍƉܘܢ ܒƦܪƦƀƕܢ – ܐſƮŶܐ ܘ̈ܪƀƍƀƕܐ ƎƀƍƃƦƉ

ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕƤƊŶܐ

ܐܘƀƏܐ ܓƑƍ ܓƍ <sup>10</sup> ̈ƎƀƐ ܓƊƣŴܐ ܐܕƣܐ ܘܓƐƍܐ ܓƊƣŴܐ ƍƤƙƌܐ ܐܕƣܐ ܘܓƐƍܐ ŴƀŶܬܐ ܐܕƣܐ ܘܓƐƍܐ Ǝƀƣ̈ ܒƤƌƢܐ ܕܓŴܐ ܐܕƣܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ܐܕܫ ܐܕ

**3** ܐƍــƆܐƤƉ BCDP: ܐƌܐƇƤƉ L **6** ܢŴƌܐ LP: ܘܢųſƦſܐ BCD **7** ܘܢųƍƉܘ BCDP: ܘܢųƍƉ L ̈ ƍƆــƀܐ | B ܐſƦſــųܘܢ + [ܒــųܘƆܐ ̈ ƍƆــƀܐ :L ܗܘ ̈ ƀƆܐ :P ܘܗܘ B ܐŴƌܢ + [ܒƦܪƦƀƕܢ **8** BCD ܗܘ [ܕܓŴܐ **14** P ƀƍƤƙƌܐ :BCDL ƍƤƙƌܐ **12** BCD ܓƐƍܐ + [ܐܘƀƏܐ **10** L ܘ̈ܪƍƀƕܐ :BCDP ܘ̈ܪƀƍƀƕܐ om. L

#### *Third division*

There are four kinds of speech:


#### *Fourth division*

Species/forms and genera:


#### *Fifth division*

Substance is a most generic genus.

Body is a species and a genus.

Animate body is a species and a genus.

Animal is a species and a genus.

Universal man is only a species and thus a most specific species.

B85r | C127r ܐƦƣܕ ܓܐƆŴƘ | D72r ܬܐ̈ Ŵܕܨܒ ƎſųƍƉ ̈ ܐ ſƢƟƦƉــƎ – Ƈƃــܒܐ ųــƊƣ ƦــƀƉܕ – Ǝ ̈ ܒƤــƊܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ƤƉــŴܬƘ ̈ ƀܐ ܘƇƃܒܐ ܕܓƍܒƢܐ ܘƇƃܒܐ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ܕſܒƤܐ ܘƇƃܒܐ ܕƉ ܘƎſųƍƉ ܒƉŴŶƦܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ – ܕƦƀƉ ܐܕ <sup>5</sup> ̈ƣܐ ƎſųƉƦƤƉ – ƃܐƘܐ ܘƕŴƣܐ ܘƌƢŹܐ ̈ــƦ Ŷــű ܐܕƣܐ ܐſųſƦſــƎ– ܘſųƍƉــƎ ܒƤــƊܐ ܘܒŶƦــƉŴܐ – ܒƍ ܐűƍƐƄƆܪܘܣ űƠƉܘƀƌܐ ܘܐűƍƐƄƆܪܘܣ ƘܐܪƑſ Ǝــƀ̈ Ǝ – ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܐƌ ̈ ܘƎſųƍƉ Ɔܐ ܒƊƤܐ ܘƆܐ ܒƉŴŶƦܐ ŴƤƉܬƘ ܒƈƄ űƉܡ – ƐƀƟܐ ܘƃܐƘܐ ܘܒƤƌƢܐ <sup>10</sup>

̇ ƦƇƉܗ ųƇƃ ̇ ųſƦſܐ ܘܢųƀƇƕܕ ƎƀƆܗ ƑſܪŴܐܓźƟܕ ܐƐ̈ P32r ƍܓ ܐƢƐƕ ܕܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ܗƎƀƆ – ܐܘƀƏܐ – ŴƀƊƃܬܐ – ƉــŴܙܓܐ ̇ ܐܫ <sup>Ŷ</sup> – űܒ̇ – ŴƆܬ űƉܡ – ܐƄſܐ – ܐƦƉܝ – ܐƦſ – ƋƀƏ – ƕ

**3** ƦــƀƉܕ BCDP: ܬŴــƀƉܕ L | ƎــſƢƟƦƉ BCDP: ƎــſųƉƦƤƉ L **4** ܐƤܒــſܕ CDLP: ܐƤܒــƀܕܒ B ܒܐƇƃܘ1 BCDL: ܒܐƇƃ P | ܒܐƇƃܘ2 BCDL: ܒܐƇƃ P | ܒܐƇƃܘ3 BCDL: ܒܐƇƃ P | ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƙƏŴƇƀƘ P **5** ܕŴŷƇܒ ܐƉŴŶƦܒ CDLP: ܐƉŴŶƦܒ ܕŴŷƇܒ B | ƦƀƉܕ BCDP: ܬŴƀƉܕ L ƎــſųƉƦƤƉ LP: ܢ ̈ ųــƉƦƤƉ BCD **6** ܐƌƢــŹܘ BCDL: ܐƌƢــŹ P **7** ƎــſųƍƉܘ BCLP: ƎــſųƍƉ D ܐƉŴــŶƦܘܒ BCLP: ܐƉŴــŶܘܬ D | ܐƣܐܕ űŶ BCL: ܐƣܐܕ D: ܐƣ̈ :L ܘܐűƍƐƄƆܪܘܣ **8** P ܐܕ ܪܘܣűــƍƐƄƆܐ BCDP | ƑــſܐܪƘ DL: ܐƀــƏƢƘ BCP **<sup>9</sup>** Ǝــƀ̈ ƌܐ [om. L **<sup>11</sup>** ܐƐــ̈ ƐƕــƢܐ ܓƍ ̇ ƦƇƉܗ ܕܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܗƀƆــƎ ųƇƃ ̇ .om] ܕźƟܐܓŴܪƑſ ܗƎƀƆ ܕųƀƇƕܘܢ ܐųſƦſ BCDL **<sup>13</sup>** ܬŴƆ BCDL: ܬŴƆܕ P | ܐܫ ̇ Ŷ] + Ǝſܕܬܪ ܐƢƉܐƉܕ ܓܐƆŴƘ ƋƇƣ P

#### *Sixth division*

Of things:


\* \* \*

The ten genera of the *Categories* with which Aristotle's entire account is concerned are the following: substance, quantity, quality, (in relation) to something, where, when, having, being-in-a-position, acting, being-affected.

#### C127v | L11v ܐƦƆܕܬ ܐƢƉܐƉ

122 ܒƊܐƢƉܐ ܕűƟܡ ܗƌܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܕܬܪſــƎ ܕƦƄƉܒƍــŴܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܐܘ ̇ B85v ųــƤƀƌ ƈــƕܕ ܒܐƟŴــƕ ƎــƉ̣ ܐ܉ſܪŴــƣ ܐƦــƇƉ ƦܒƐƌ ܬܐܕܘܪܐ܉ ܢŴŶܐ ̈Ƈܐ ܕܐƮƀƉܢ ųƆ Ɵ Ʀƍ ̈ ̇ Ǝƀƌ ܒ ̇ ܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ƦƇƀƇƉܐ܂ ܘƦƃƢƣ ŴƆܬ ܗ ܕųƇƃ ̇ ƌــŴܢ ̈Ɖűــƀܐ: ܗ <sup>Ɵ</sup> ܐƐ̈ <sup>5</sup> ƍܓ ܐƮƐƕ ƈƕܕ ܬܐŴƍƙƇƉ ܡűƟ ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪƆ ܕųƊƣܘ ܐŴƌܢ ƀźƟܓŴ̈ܪŴſܣ܂ ܒƌųܐ ܕƎſ ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܕܬƦƆܐ ƎƃܪƦܕܒ Ǝƀƌ ̇ ̇ ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ܉ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܗƣܐ ƈƕ ܗ ̇ ܬܘܒ űƃ ܕųƇſ ܕųƇſ ̈Ɛܐ ܗƀƆــƎ ̇ ܘ ܕƈƕ ƢƐƕܐ ܓƍ ƦƄƉܒƎ ųƆ ƘŴƐƇƀƙƆܐ ܒų ܒƦƄܒܐ ܗ ܕܓŴܐ܂

	- ̇ ܘ ƀƉűƟܐ ܕƦƉܬƋƀƏ ܪܒƖƀܐƦſ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܗƌܐ 124 ƆŴƘܓܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܗ ̇ Ƣ܂ ܕſųƇƃــƎ ƆــƋ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕܐſųſƦſــƎ ܐƄſــƎ ̣ܕܗܘ܉ ſųƍƉــƎ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ܐƉ ܐſųſƦſــƎ ܘſųƍƉــƎ ܓــƣűܐ܂ ܘſųƍƉــƎ ܬܘܒ ܓــƌŴܐƦſ ƦƉܐƉــƮܢ ܘƎſųƍƉ űƀŷſܐƦſ܂ ܐƅſ ܕƎƉ ܗܪƃܐ ŴƊƀƟƦƌܢ ƈƀƄƉ Ʀƣܐ ̈ܪܘƃܒƎƀ܂ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܘ ܕܬƆــƦܐ űŶ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ ܘܕܓƣűܐ܉ ܘܐŶــƌƢܐ ܕܓــŴܐ ܘܕſűƀŷſــƦܐ܂ ܘܗ

̇ ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ ܕźƟܓŴ̈ܪƑſ :LP ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܬƦƆܐ **<sup>1</sup>** ܬܘܒ :CD ܬܘܒ ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܬƦƆܐ ܕųƇſ ̇ **<sup>3</sup>** P ܕƋƀƏ :BCDL ܕűƟܡ **<sup>2</sup>** B ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܬƦƆܐ ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ ųƤƀƌ LP: ܐƤƀƌ BCD **<sup>4</sup>** Ǝƀƌ ̇ ,LP ܗ corr. B: ƎـــƀƆܗ BCD **5** ƑƀƇŹŴـــźƐſܐܪƆ CL: ƑـــƀƇźźƐſܐܪƆ P: ƑƀƆųŹŴـــźƐſܐܪƆ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƏܐܪƆ D | ܐƀــƉű̈ Ɵ BCDLP: ܐƀــ ̈ ƊſűƟ corr. BD **<sup>6</sup>** ܘųــƊƣܕ L: ̇ ųــƊƣܕ BCDP ܣŴſܪ̈ŴܓƀźƟ L: ƑſܪŴܐܓźƟ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓŹܐƟ B: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓųŹܐƟ D **8** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƙƆ BCDL: ܐƙƏŴƇƀƙƆ P **<sup>12</sup>** ƎƀƆܗ CDLP: ܢŴƌܗ B | ܐƀƉ̈ űƟ CDLP: ܐƀ ̈ ƊſűƟ B, corr. D **<sup>13</sup>** ŭƇƙ ̇ ܘƉ CDLP: ƚƇ ̇ Ɖܘ B | Ǝ̈ ƤܒŶܕ L: ƎƀƤܒŶܕ BCDP **<sup>14</sup>** ܘܢųſܬƮƐƕ] + ƎƀƆܗ ܐƐ̈ ƍܓ BCD **<sup>16</sup>** ܐƀƉ̈ űƟ BDLP: ܐƀ ̈ ƊſűƟ C, corr. BD **17** ƦſܐƖƀܪܒ BCDP: ƦſܐƖƀܐܪܒ L **21** ܐƦſűƀŷſܘܕ CLP: Ʀſܐűƀŷſܘܕ D: ܬܐŴſűƀŷſܘܕ B

#### *BOOK THREE*

#### *[The fourfold division]*

122 In the previous book, which was the second one of this treatise, O brother 1a20–1b9 Theodore, the discussion of an inquiry into the goal of the whole logical craft has been set out. At its end, I turned to those terms which Aristotle provided before his teaching on the ten primary genera that are called "categories". In this book, which is the third one of the same treatise, we are about to discuss those things that the Philosopher wrote after that in his treatise on the ten universal genera.

123 Now, those who are eager to chase the true understanding of this man ought to know, O brother, that before the general division of those ten primary categories, this Philosopher established another division of them which is more universal than this one and divided all of them into four parts that encompass the ten. So, ultimately, this fourfold division also includes the other one, for the tenfold one is born out of it, producing a perfect teaching on the nature of each one of the ten primary genera173.

So, this is what he says174 124 about the first division which is set out in a fourfold manner: Of all things that exist in any way some are substances and others accidents, and again, some of them are spoken of universally and some particularly. Thus, six pairings may be generated from this175: the first one is that of substance and accident; another one is that of universal and particular;

**<sup>173</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 24.22–25.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 28.3–9. Both Ammonius and Philoponus speculate on the value of applying numbers from one to ten in this case. Sergius confines himself here to a short remark about the "perfect teaching", but comes to the issues of numbers based on the Pythagorean teachings later on in a separate section (see §§129–134, below).

**<sup>174</sup>** Sergius does not quote Aristotle's text here, but rather presents the following teachings as a correct interpretation of chapter 2 of the *Categories*. While Ammonius stresses (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 25.14–15; cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 29.1) that the terms he uses (substance, accident, universal, particular) are not applied by Aristotle, Sergius does not make such a remark, but uses the same terms as if they actually derive from Aristotle.

**<sup>175</sup>** Sergius' text is very close to the commentary of Ammonius, *In Cat*. 25.5–7: ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαίρεσις αὕτη· τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι καθόλου τὰ δὲ μερικά, καὶ πάλιν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν οὐσίαι τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα· γίνονται τοίνυν συζυγίαι ἕξ (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 28.17–20).

̇ ܘ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ ܕܓƣűܐ ܘܕƦſűƀŷſܐ܂ ܘܗŴƃܬ ܬܘܒ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ ܘܕܓŴܐ܂ ܘܗ ̇ ܘ ܐŶــſƢܐ ܕƣــƦܐ ܕܐܘƏــƀܐ ̇ ܘ ܕƤƊŶܐ ܕܓƣűܐ ܘܕܓــŴܐ܂ ܘܗ ܘܐܦ ܗ ̇ ܘ <sup>ܗ</sup> ܐƊــƣܪܘ ƎــƉ̣ ܉ƦــſܐƢſųƌ ƎــƀƆųƆ Ǝſܕ ƎſųƆ Ʀƌܐ ƚƇ̇ B86r <sup>ſ</sup> ܐ܂Ʀſűƀŷſܘܕ ܕƋƀƏ ƦŶƦƆ܂


̇ ܘ ܕƤƊŶܐ ܕܓــƣűܐ ܘܕܓــŴܐ **1** ̇ ܘ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ ܕܓƣűܐ ܘܕƦſűƀŷſܐ ܘܗŴƃܬ ܬܘܒ ܘܐܦ ܗ [ܘܗ om. hom. P **2** ܐſƢŶܐ BCDL: ܐƌƢŶܐ P | ܐƦƣܕ BCDP: ܐƦƣܕܐ L **5** ܐƦƣ BCDP: ܐƦƣܐ L **6** ܐŷƄƤƉ LP, D in marg.: ܐſƞƉ BCD **8** ܐƦſűƀŷſܘ LP: ܐƦſűƀŷſܘܕ BCD **9** ƎƀƊƀƟƦƉ ܘܘܢųƌ ܒܐƃܪܘ̈ LP: ƎƀƊƀƟƦƉ ܘܘܢųƌ ܒܐƃܪܘ̈ BCD **10** ܬܐŴƤƌܐ BCDP: ܬܐŴƤƌ L **11** ܐƌܐƉ űŷܕܒ BDLP: ܬܐŴܨܒ ܐűŷܕܒ C, B in marg.: + ܬܐŴܕܨܒ ܐܘ D in marg. | ܕŴŷƇܒ [om. B **13** ƎƀƆܗ LP: ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ̣ BCD | ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ L: ܐƙƏŴƇƇƀƘ P: ܐƌܗ ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCD **16** ƢſƦſ] om. B | ܐƠƙƏܕ [ ̈ Ƙܐ **18** P ܐƦſܘܗܝ + [ܕųƌܘܐ **17** BCD ܗܝ + ŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƙƏ̈ ŴƇƀƘ P **19** ܬŴƆ BDLP: ܬܗŴƆ C

the third one is that of substance and universal; the fourth one is that of accident and particular; also the fifth one is that of accident and universal; and the last sixth one is that of substance and particular. You learn them clearly from the table below.

125 However, we ought to know that two pairings from these six, namely the first and the second one, may not come to be, for it is impossible both for the same thing to be a substance and an accident, and for the same thing to be in the same way universal and particular. Hence, only four pairings remain as in every way possible in this division, as we said. These are: universal substance, e.g. humanity as a whole; particular accident, e.g. whiteness in only one dress; particular substance, e.g. Socrates alone; and universal accident, e.g. whiteness as a whole176.

126 Of these four pairings the Philosopher put first that of universal substance, for he considered it more honorable in both of its (elements), i.e. both because of substance and universality, than the other three. For substance is much more honorable than accident, because it is sufficient for its own subsistence, while an accident has no way to exist unless there is substance. And universal is honored much more among philosophers than particular, because they always leave particulars behind and seek after universals that provide a profound knowledge of things177.

**<sup>176</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 25.7–12: ὧν αἱ δύο ἀνυπόστατοι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τέσσαρες, φημὶ δὴ τάς τε ὑπαλλήλους καὶ τὰς διαγωνίους, συνεστᾶσιν. εἰσὶ δὲ αὗται· τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθόλου οὐσίαι τὰ δὲ μερικὰ συμβεβηκότα, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθόλου συμβεβηκότα τὰ δὲ μερικαὶ οὐσίαι, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ τὶ λευκὸν ἢ τὶς ἐπιστήμη καὶ λευκὸν καὶ τὶς ἄνθρωπος (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 28.20–23). This passage in Ammonius (and Philoponus) is followed by a diagram, representing the afore-mentioned six combinations, which is nearly identical to the one found in Sergius. In all extant mss. of Sergius' *Commentary*, it appears after §126.

**<sup>177</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.16–20: καὶ τούτοις τοῖς ὀνόμασι κεχρημένος ἐκτίθεται τὰς τέσσαρας συζυγίας, καὶ πρώτην τὴν καθόλου οὐσίαν, ὡς τιμιωτέραν, ἔπειτα τὸ ἀντικείμενον, λέγω δὴ τὸ μερικὸν συμβεβηκός, εἶτα προετίμησε τὸ καθόλου συμβεβηκὸς τῆς μερικῆς οὐσίας, διότι περὶ τῶν καθόλου τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὁ λόγος (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 31.19–26).

<sup>127</sup> ܒــƦܪ ܗƌܐ ܕſــƎ ܪܘƃــܒܐ܉ ܙܕܩ ܗܘܐ ܕƦƌܬƀƏــƋ ܗ r129C ̇ ܘ ܕܐܘƏــƀܐ Ʀſűƀŷſܐ: ܐܢ ܐƅſ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ƦƀƉܪܐ ̣ܗܝ ܐܘƀƏܐ ƎƉ ܓƣűܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ̈ــƎ: ܐܢ ܓƀــƢ ƕűſƦƉ ƎſųƇܒŴــƠƆܕܕ ƎــƀƆܗ ƎƉ ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕܕ ƎſųƇƃܕ ƈźƉ ܒܐƣŴــŶ ųــƆ ــܐܠƕ ܗƦــƖƣƢܒ ܬܐŴــƀƇŶ ̇ L12v ܐܘ ܪܘܬܐŴــŶ ܥűــƌ ƥــƌܐ ̇ ܘ ܕܐܘƏــƀܐ ܕܐܘŴƊƃܬܐ ܘܕƢſƢƉܘܬܐ܉ źƉــƈ ܗƌܐ ܒــƦܪ ܪܘƃــܒܐ ܗ ܕܓــŴܐ ƏــƋ ܗ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܘ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƠƆــŴܒųƇ ܒƦ̈ܪܬſųſــƎ: ܗƌــŴ ܕſــƎ ܓــƣűܐ ̇ ܝ ܬܘܒ ܕܓــŴܐ ƀŷſــſűܐ܂ ܕܓــƣűܐ ܓƀــƢ ܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ ̣ܗܘ ܕܐܘƏــƀܐ: ܘܗ ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ܕƦſűƀŷſܐ܉ ƈƕ ܗܕܐ Ɔܐ ơƀƍƏ ܐƌܐ ŴſŴŷƊƆ܂

̇ ܘ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ Ʀſűƀŷſܐ: ̇ ܘ ܕܬƦƆܐ܉ ܗ 128 ܒƦܪ ܗƎƀƆ ܬܘܒ ƋƏ ܪܘƃܒܐ ܗ ̇ ܘ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ̇ ̣ƉــƎ <sup>ܗ</sup> ƈźƉ ܕƠƀƉــƢ ܗܘ ܐܦ ܗƌܐ źƉــƈ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ܕܒــų ܕܐ̈ܪܒـــƖܐ܉ ܕܐſـــƦܘܗܝ ܕܓـــƣűܐ ܘܕܓـــŴܐ܂ ܗƀƆـــƎ ܗƀƃـــƈ ܗƃـــƍܐ <sup>15</sup> ̈ ƀܐܐ܂ ƍƙƌܐ ܓƐƆ Ǝ ̈ Ɩſűſ ܐƆ ƎƘܘܐ ܐ܉ƘŴƐƇƀƘ Ǝƀ̈ ƌܐ ƋƏ ƦſܐƐƄźƉ

**<sup>1</sup>** ܐƀƏܐܘ1 P: Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CL: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD | ƎƀƆܗ [om. P **<sup>4</sup>** ܐƦſ̈ űƀŷſ LP: ܐſ̈ űƀŷſܐ BD: ƎƀƆܗ ̈ſܐ űƀŷſܐ C **5** ƋƀƏܬƦƌܕ BCDP: ƋƀƏƦƌܕ L **6** ƎƌƢƉܕܐ LP: ƎſƢƉܕܐ BCD | ܗܝ̣ [ + ŪŹ BCD **7** ƎſųƇܒŴƠƆܕܕ ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ BCDL: ƎſųƇſܕ P | ƎƀƆܗ BCDP: Ǝƀƌܗ L | ƎſųƇܒŴƠƆܕܕ L: ƎſųƇܒŴƠƆܕ BCD **8** ųƆ] + ųƆ L **10** ƋƏ LP: ܐܡƏ BCD | ܐƣűܓ CDLP: ܐƣűܕܓ B **11** ܐƣűܕܓ CDLP: ܐƣűܓ B | ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕ CDLP: ųƇܒŴƠƆܕ B **12** ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕ [+ ܗܝ̣ BCD | ܐƆ] om. P | ܐƌܐ ơƀƍƏ LP: ܐƠƀƍƏ BCD **<sup>13</sup>** ƋƏ LP: ܐܡƏ BCD | ܘ ̇ ܗ1 [om. P **14** ƢƠƀƉܕ BCP: ܘƢƠƀƉܕ DL **15** ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ ܐŴܘܕܓ ܐƣűܕܓ [om. P **16** Ǝ ̈ Ɩſűſ BCDL: Ǝƕűſ P | ܐƍƙƌ] + ƎƆ BCD

B86v | D73r

127 After this pairing, it might be appropriate to place that of particular substance, since, as we have said, substance is more honorable than accident. But because every opposite is comprehended from what it is opposed to — for instance, if a man learns about whiteness or sweetness, he immediately gets the idea of blackness and bitterness — because of this, he placed after the pairing of universal substance the one which is opposite to its both (elements), namely particular accident178. That accident is the opposite of substance and also that universal is the opposite of particular, I have no need to demonstrate.

128 Moreover, after that, he placed the third pairing, i.e. that of particular substance, since it is more valuable — because of the substance which is part of it — than another fourth one, which is that of universal and accident. Thus, it is in this orderly way that the Philosopher arranged them, although not many have comprehended this. So, let us turn to the reason of this fourfold division

**<sup>178</sup>** See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 31.22–24: ἔπειτα δευτέραν τίθησι τὴν ἀντικειμένην ταύτῃ, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μερικὸν συμβεβηκός· ἀντίκειται γὰρ τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τῷ δὲ καθόλου τὸ μερικόν (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.28–31).

<sup>129</sup> ƦƀƘܓــŴܪܘܣ ܗƀƃــƈ ܓܒــƢܐ ܕܐƉƦƣــų ܒƖܒ r87B ̈ــűܐ ܘܒܐƕűſــƦܐ ųƇƃܕ :ųƍƙƆŴſ Ɓƍ̈ ܕŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܬܐ܉ ܐƅſ ܕܒƢܐܙܐ űƉܡ ƋƇƤƉ ܗܘܐ Ɔܒ ̈ ܘƎſ ܘܐƎſųſƦſ ܒƊƇƖܐ ųƇƃ܉ ̣ƎƉ ƍƀƍƉܐ ̈ܬܐ ܕܗ ƇƀŶܐ ܘƕ <sup>5</sup> ̈ƦƇƇܐ ܕܨܒŴ ̇ ƕűſــƦܗ ܘƘŴƐƇƀƘــŴܬܗ ̣ƉــƎ ̈ܬܐ: ܘƇƃــų ŴܒــƞƆ ƎــſųƆ ƋــƀƠƉܘ ܪܕܐ ̈ ƄــƊܐ ܕƀƊƀƟƦƉــƎ ܒƀƍƊــƍܐ ƀƐƌــܒܐ ܗܘܬ ƣــŴܪſܐ ̈ƍܐ ܘܐƏ ŶــƣŴܒ ̈ƦƇƇܐ܂ ܘƕ

	- ̇ ܘ ܗƈƀƃ ƍƀƍƉܐ ܬܪƍſܐ ܐƎſƢƉ ܕܐܪܙܐ ƀƠƣــƈ ܕܗܘƆܐ ܘܐܕƣܐ܉ 131 ܗ ̇ ــܐܡ Ɔــųܘܢ Ə ƈــƃܕ ܐƦــƀ ̈ ƉűƟ ܐƦــƇƇ̈ ܗƀƆــƎ ܕܐƌƢƉــƎ ܕ̈ܪſــƤܐ ܘƕ

**1** Ǝſܕ [om. B | ܐƌܗ ܒܐƃܕܪܘ LP: ܒܐƃܪܘ ܐƌܕܗ BCD **3** ܪܘܣŴܓƦƀƘ L: ܪܘܣŴܓſƦƀƘ BCD: ܘܣƢܬܘܓŴƘ P | ܐű̈ ܒƖܒ BCDL: ܐƮܒƖܒ P **4** ܐܙܐƢܕܒ LP: ܕܒܐܪܙܐ BCD | ųƇƃܕ BCL: ƈƃܕ D: ųƇƃܘ P **<sup>5</sup>** ܐƦƇƇ̈ ƕܘ LP, add. B in marg.: ܐƦƕűſܘ BCD | ƎſųſƦſܘܐ BCDL: ƎſųſƦſܕܐ Ʀƀƃ P **<sup>6</sup>** ƎſųƆ BCLP: ܘܢųƆ D **<sup>7</sup>** ܐƍ ̈ ܒƣŴŶ LP, add. B in marg.: ܐŷƣ ̈ ŴŶ BCD | ܒܐƀƐƌ BCDP: ܒܐƐƌ L ̈ƇƇــƦܐ **<sup>8</sup>** ƕܘ LP: ܐƦــƇƕܘ BCD **<sup>11</sup>** ܗܘ [om. BCD **<sup>13</sup>** ܝ ̇ <sup>ܗ</sup> [om. D **<sup>15</sup>** ܐƤــſܪ̈ LP: ܐƣ̈ BCD ܐܕ **16** ܐƌűܒـــƕƦƉ BCDP: ܐƌűܒـــƕܬƦƉ L **17** ƑƀƇŹŴـــźƐſܐܪ CL: ƑƀƆųŹŴـــźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D: ƑƀŹŴƇźƐſܐܪ P **18** ŴƍƟܐܬܬ BCLP: ƎƟܐܬ D **21** ܕܐܪܙܐ BCDL: ܪܐܙܐ P ܐƣܘܐܕ BCDP: ܐƣܘܕܐܕ L, add. D sup. lin.

and discuss why he has established it as first, before the overall division of the ten genera.

#### *[Pythagoras on numbers]179*

129 Now, Pythagoras, who was a man renowned for the practice and knowledge of philosophy, transmitted like a kind of mystery to his disciples that all powers and causes of everything that came to be and exists in the whole world derive from numbers and constitute things, while every knowledge and philosophy about the latter has its origin and reason in calculations and figures (σχήματα) which come forth by means of numbers.

130 So, he stated that the beginning of all numbers is called the one. It is a copy of the Creator who brings order to everything in that, similar to it, he is also single180 and indivisible. And number two, which is born when the primary number doubles itself, serves also as a model (τύπος) for the universal substance of all bodies, which they call matter (ὕλη), and for the nature that is singularly active in bodies, the one which they also call material (ὑλικός) form (εἶδος). These two principles — i.e. form and matter, one of which is efficacious and the other effected, one is active and the other passive — are primary, according to Aristotle, after the Creator of the universe. From them at first the four customary elements (στοιχεῖα) are formed — i.e. the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry — from which in turn the adornment and constitution of the universe takes place.

131 Thus, they say that the second number contains the mystery of matter and form, which, as we have said, Aristotle sets as primary principles and causes of

**<sup>179</sup>** Cf. §123, above. In the corresponding passage, Ammonius makes a brief note on the application of numbers by Aristotle, without mentioning the name of Pythagoras. The *prolegomena* treatises by David, Elias, and Olympiodorus frequently refer to the Pythagorean arithmology. Cf., e.g., Lectures 16–17 of David's *Introduction to Philosophy* (49.7–54.26), where he describes the following established tradition of Aristotle's commentators: "Since we have earlier on given an arithmetical explanation <...>, the commentators take their starting point from this and proceed to discuss the numbers up to the decad" (Gertz 2018: 133; the Greek text: ἐπειδὴ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν εἰρήκαμεν ἀριθμητικὴν αἰτίαν δεικνύουσαν <...> ἐντεῦθεν λαβόντες οἱ ἐξηγηταὶ ἀφορμὴν ἔρχονται καὶ διαλαμβάνουσι περὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν τῶν ὄντων ἄχρι τῆς δεκάδος).

**<sup>180</sup>** Syr. *iḥidaya*, here probably corresponding to Gr. μοναχός. Sergius applies the same Syriac term in the meaning "particular, individual", cf., e.g., §168.

̇ ܘ ƀŷſــſűܐ ܘƉűƟــƀܐ: ܐܪźƐſــƑƀƇŹŴ܂ źƉــƈ ܕܐƃــƌŵܐ ܕƀƍƉــƍܐ ܗ ܘ ̇ B87v ܗ ܐƍƀƍƊƆ űƆŴƉ ųƤƙƌ ƈƕ ƚƙƕƦƉ űƃ :ܐſܘƢܕܒ ųƊŷƘ ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ P34r ܬܐŴƙƀƙƕ ƦƀƤſƢܒ ƎƉ ŪƐƌ̣ űƃ ܐ܉ſܘƢܒ ܗܘ̣ ܘܐܦ ƋƆ ܐƍƃܗ :ܐƍſܬܪ ̈ ſܐ: ܗܘƆܐ ܘܐܕƣܐ ܐƀƟــƋ űƉܡ ̣ƎƉ ŴƣܬŴƘܬܐ ܕܒƢܘŴſܬܗ ܕŴƆܬ ܗܘ ܐ܂ſ ̈ <sup>5</sup> ܕܗܘ ܘܢųƊſŴƟ ųƇƄƆ ƎƀƠƙƏܕ ƦƀƉűƟ


**1** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ CL: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D: ܣŴƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P **3** ܗܘ̣ ܘܐܦ L: ܗܘ̣ ܐܦ BCDP: ܘܗܝƦــſܐ corr. in P **6** Ŵܒــƃܐܬܪ CDL: Ūــƃܐܬܪ BP | ƦــƀƉűƟ] + ƎــƀƆܗ P ̈Ɛܐ **<sup>7</sup>** ̇ Ŵƌܢ + [ܐƃŴźƏ ܗ BCD | ܘܐܦ LP: ܐܦ BCD **9** Ƣƀܓ [om. D | ƚƙƕƦƌ LP: ƚƙƕƦƉ BCD | ܐƌܗ [+ Ƣƀܓ D **<sup>10</sup>** ܕܐܦ ƈźƉ BCDP: ܐܦ L | ܐƌܗ CDLP: ܐƍƀƍƉ B **<sup>11</sup>** ܘ ̇ ܕܗ [om. B ܐƢƐƕܕ BCDL: ܐƮƐƕ P **<sup>12</sup>** Ǝſܘ ̇ ܗ BCDL: Ǝſű ̇ ܒƕ P **13** ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ BCD | ܐƍƀƍƉ] om. B **14** ƈƄܒ...**176,4** ܐƢƀƊܓ [om. hom. P **18** Ŵſܗܘ CDLP: ܗܘ B **20** ƦſܐƀƇƊƤƉ L: ܐƀƇƊƤƉ BCD ̈ ܘƎſ **21** ܘܗ ųܒ L: Ǝſųſܘųܒ BCD | ܘܡƦƉ BL: ܘܡƦƊƉ CD

everything. For just like the singular and primary number which is similar to the Creator doubled itself and thus gave birth to this second number, in the same way, when the Creator in the beginning181 applied some sort of doubling which derived from the affinity between his creative activity and the creation, he first of all established matter and form that are necessary for the subsistence of all beings.

132 And just as from matter and form, as we said above, the four elements are primarily constituted, which are the secondary principles of beings, so also the number four is born from a doubling of the second number, for when the latter doubles itself it brings forth the subsistence of the former. And since also the number four originates from the primary number and makes the latter fourfold, it is clear that it gives birth to the ten. For one, two, three, and four together make ten.

133 That is why the number ten that is perfect in every respect is also a model (τύπος) for all things and beings of this world, which was made as a whole by the Creator. For just as the fourfold number gives birth to the number ten, which is perfect, as we have said, being the limit of all numbers, because there is no other number higher than it but there are those ones that are infinitely composed from themselves, in the same way from the four elements — i.e. fire, air, earth, and water — also this whole world was composed as an entity, and those things that are delivered into it and come to be remain the same, while not a single thing is ever created in it.

**<sup>181</sup>** Syr. *b-rišit*. The same word appears in the Syriac translation of Gen. 1:1, i.e. opens the creation story.

<sup>134</sup> ܒƦܪ ܗƎƀƆ ܗƈƀƃ ܙܒƍܐ ̣ܗܘ ƢŷƊƆ ƢſųƌܐƦſ ܒƦƇƖܗ ܕƆŴƘܓܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> r88B | r131C ̇ <sup>ܘ</sup> ̇ ــƢ ܐƌܐ ܗƀƃــƈ ܕܐƃــƌŵܐ ܪܒƖƀــƀܐ ܕƟــűܡ ܐܬܬƀƏــƋ ƉــƎ ƖƆــƈ܂ ܐƉ ̇ ܘ ܕƐƕــƢܐ: ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ̇ ܘ ܪܒƀƖƀܐ ܐܘűƆ ƋƆ ƉــƎ ܪܘƃܒــų ܗ ܕƍƀƍƉܐ ܗ ̈Ɛܐ܉ ܓƢƀƊܐ ܒŷƙــƊܐ ܕܐܬܪƃــŪ ܗƌܐ ƃــƈ ƉــƎ ܐܪܒــƖܐ ܐźƏــƃŴ ܗƍƃܐ ܐܦ ܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ űƟܡ Ŷܒƥ ܐŴƌܢ ƢƐƖƆܐ ܓƍ <sup>5</sup> ̈Ɛܐ ܒƆŴƙܓܐ ܘܢųܓƆŴــƘ ƈــƖƉ ƎƃܪƦܘܒ :ܐƐ̈ ܪܒƀƖƀܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܕܘƀƉܐ ܕܐƃŴźƏ ̈Ɛܐ ܗƎƀƆ: ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ųƊŷƘ ܕܗƌܐ ̇ ܘ ܐƌƢŶܐ ſƢƀƐƕܐ ܕܓƍ ܗ ƃــƈ܂ ܐƃــƌŵܐ ܓƀــƢ ܕƀƍƉــƍܐ ܕƐƕــƢܐ ܓƀƊــƢ ܘƀƐƉــƅ ܒــų Ƈƃــųܘܢ ̈ƍƀܐ܉ ܗƍƃܐ ܐܦ ܗƌܐ ƈƃ ܓƢƀƊܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܕŶܒƎƀƤƀ ܒų ųƇƃܘܢ ƍƉ ̈Ɛܐ ܕźƟܓŴ̈ܪƑſ܉ ̇ ܕƎſ ܒŴƉűܬܐ ܐܦ ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕƢƐƕܐ ܓƍ ųܒ ܐ܂ƍƀ̈ <sup>10</sup> <sup>ƃ</sup> ̈ܬܐ ܕܒƇƖــƊܐ܂ ܐƄſــƍܐ ܕƆܐ ܐƌــƥ Ŵܨܒــ ƎــſųƇƃ ƥ ̇ ̇ƋƇ ܘŶܒ ܓƢƀƊ ܘƤƉ ܘܢųــƍƉ űــŶ ƦــƀŶܬ ƥــƀܒŶܘ ơــƇ ̇ Ɖــƞܐ ƉــƦܘܡ ܕƄƤƌــŸ Ɖــűܡ ܕƆܐ Ə ̈Ɛܐ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ܕܓƍ

135 ƈźƉ ܗƈƀƃ ܕܐƄſــƍܐ ܕŶƦƉــſŵܐ ƆــƁ ƢſųƌܐſــƦ ܐܬܐƉــƢ ܗƀƆــƎ܉ ̇ ܒŴƉűܬܐ ܘܐܦ ƈƕ Ƣƌܕܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܦ ŴƆܬ ܗƌ v131C ̈Ǝƀ ܕܒƦܪƎƃ: ܕܐƞƆܐ ܒų ŴƍƙƇƉܬܗƎſ܂ ܕܐƎƀƇſ ܗƈƀƃ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƦƉܐƉــƮܢ ܓــƌŴܐƦſ: ƈــƄƆ ܗܝ ܐƖــſűſ ܗܕܐ ܉Ʀــſܐűƀŷſ ƎſųƊſŴــƟ ܘܗܝƦــſܕܐ Ǝƀ̈ P34v ƌܐ ƎƀƇſܘܐ ̈ Ʀſܐ ܐ̈ܪƄſــƦܐ܂ ŴــŶܬ ƈƕ ̇ ̈ Ɖܐ űƉܡ: ܐܘ ܐƥƌ܂ ܘƆܐ ƠƀƍƏܐ ƈƕ ܬŴŶ ƎſűƉ ܬƉŴŶܐ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ ܘܕܓƣűܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ ܐܪܒƖܐ ̈ܪܘƃــܒܐ ƈــƕܘ :ܪŴــƕŵܒ ܐƆܕ ܒܐ̈ L14r ƟŴƕ ƈƕ ơƀƍƏ :ƈƖƆ ƎƉ ŴƊƀƏܐܬܬ ŴƉűƟܕ ̇ــŴ ܕſــƎ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ̈ ƀƌܐ: ܗƌ Ŵــƃ Ǝــſܪ̈ܬ Ƣــƀܓ ƎƀƆܗ ܂ųƆ Ǝ ̈ ƊƀƠƉܕ ܐƦſ ̈ B88v | D74v ŴŶܬ ܘܓــƣűܐ܉ Ɔܐ ̣ܗܘ ƣــųƉŴܗܘܢ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܕܐſــƅ ܗƃــƍܐ ܒƀƖــűܐ

> **1** ƈــƀƃܗ [om. B **3** ƋــƆ BCD: ƎــƆ L **5** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ C: ƑƀƇźźƐſܐܪ L: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D: ܣŴƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P **7** ܐƌƢŶܐ BCLP: ܐſƢŶܐ D **8** ܘܢųƇƃ BCLP: ƈƃ D **9** ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ BCD **<sup>10</sup>** ܐƍƀ̈ <sup>ƃ</sup> CDLP: ܐƍƀ̈ ƍƉ B | Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟܕ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓŹܐƟܕ B: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟܕ D: ܣŴــſܪ̈ŴܓźƟܕ L: ƑſܪŴܐܓــźƟܕ P **<sup>12</sup>** ܘܡƦــƉ BCLP: ܘܡƦــƊƉ D | ƥــƀܒŶܘ CLP: ƥܒ ̇ Ŷܘ BD ̈ Ʀſܐ | B ܕƆܐ :CDLP ܘƆܐ **18** ŴŶܬ ƈƕ ̇ ܐܘ ܡűƉ] om. hom. P **20** ŴƊƀƏܐܬܬ BCDL: ܒܐƃܪܘ̈ ܘƢƉܐܬܐ ŴƉűƟܕ P | ܪŴƕŵܒ BCLP: ܐƦſܪ̈Ŵƕŵܒ D **21** Ƣƀܓ LP: Ǝſܕ BCD | ܐƀƏܐܘ CDLP: B ܕܐܘƀƏܐ

134 So now, after this, it is time to look clearly at the cause for the fourfold division which we earlier presented above182. Thus, I say that just as the fourfold number gives birth from its composition to the number ten which serves as a perfect model for the universe that is composed from the four elements, so too Aristotle first encompassed the ten genera in a fourfold division which resembles the elements and after that introduced another, tenfold, division of these genera which is in itself a model of the universe. For, just as the number ten is complete, comprising all the numbers, so also the universe is complete, containing all the natures. In the same way, also the division of the ten genera of the categories is complete and perfect, encompassing all things that are in the world, for no one is ever able to find anything that would not fall under and be contained in one of these genera.

#### *[Definition of accident]*

135 Since, as it seems to me, these things have been clearly explained, let us further proceed to those ones that are after them, which is in this way also necessary for teaching them. That there are those things that are said universally and those whose subsistence is particular183, is clear to everyone and there is no need for any definitions or long demonstrations. However, a definition of substance or accident themselves from the four pairings which have been previously set out above requires not a few inquiries as well as demonstrations that support it. Because these two terms, i.e. substance and accident, designate something that is unfamiliar to many from ordinary usage, and also what each

**<sup>182</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 24.22–25.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 28.3–9.

**<sup>183</sup>** Sergius speaks in one case in terms of predication ("said") and in the other in terms of existence ("subsistence"). Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.21–24; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 31.9–15.

̇ ܘ űƉܡ ܕűſƦƉܥ ƎƉ ƈƃ űŶ ƍƉــųܘܢ ܓــƇܐ ̈ ܓƀܐܐ: ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ܗ ƐƆ ̈ƌűŶܐ܂ ܘƗſűſ܉ ܐƆܐ ܐܢ ܒŴŷƇܕ űŷƆ

̇ ܩ ƖƊƆܒــű܉ ƐƉــƦ ܕƆܐ 136 ƕــƟŴܒܐ ܗƀƃــƈ ܕƕــƈ ܗƀƆــƎ ܬ̈ܪſــųܘܢ ܙܕ ŸƃƦƤƌ űƉܡ ܕơƀƍƏ ƈƕ ƠƣŴƘܐ ܕƎƉ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܒƦƄƊܒƍــŴܬܐ ܗܕܐ܂ ̇ ܐƆܐ ƕــƈ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ƕــƟŴܒܐ ܐſــƍܐ ܕƘــܐܐ ƤƆــŴܘܕųƕ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܘŶƦƆــųƉŴ ̇ ܒƦܪƃــƎ ܐƍſƢƉــƎ܉ ܐſــƄܐ ̣ܕܗܝ ܬܪƀƕــƦܗ ܕܐܪźƐſــƑƀƇŹŴ ܕƀƇƕــų ܕܒƦƄܒܐ ܗ r132C ̇ ܘ ܕźƟܓŴ̈ܪƑſ ƎƍƀƊƀƏ ܓƢƀƊܐƦſ܂ ƈƕ ܓƣűܐ ܕƎſ ܗƣܐ ̇ ܘ ܕƏــƋ ƇƕــŴܗܝ ̣ܗܘ ƐƇƀƘــƘŴܐ܂ ܐƎƍſƢƉ܉ űƃ ƎƍſƢƤƉ ƎƉ ܬƉŴŶܐ ܗ ơƀƍƏ ܓƢƀ ƈƕ ܒƍŶŴܐ ܕƆܐ ܒŴƕŵܪ܉ ܐƅſ ܕܐƦſ ƆــƎ ܕŷƌــŴܐ ܒƀƆųــƎ <sup>10</sup> ܂ƎƍƀܒƦƄƉ ƦŶƦƆ ƎƉܕ

	-

̈ــƀܐ ̇ ܝ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ Ɖــűܡ ܒƊــűܡ ܒƐƕűŷــƢ ܙƌ <sup>138</sup> ܐƆܐ ܙܕܩ r35P ̇ ƊƆــűܥ܉ ܕܗ ̇ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕܒܐܬܪܐ܂ ܐܘ ܐܘ ܐ܂ƍܒŵܕܒ ƅſܐ Ǝſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ C132v ƌܗ ܐ܂ƢƉܐƦƉ ܘܢųƇƃ ̈ܬܗ܂ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐſųſƦſــƎ ƍƉــŴ ̈ܬܐ ܒų ŴƍƉ ƅſܐ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕܒƊܐƌܐ܂ ܐܘ

̇ | B ܐƌƢŶܐ :CDLP ܐƍſܐ **<sup>5</sup>** ųƕܘܕŴƤƆ BCDP: ̇ ̈ܕųƕ ܘŴƤƆܘ L **6** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ C: ƑƀƇźźƐſܕܐܪ L: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܕܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƏܕܐܪ D: ܣŴــƇźźƏܕܐܪ P **7** ܒܐƦƄܕܒ DLP: ܒܐƦƃܕ BC Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــźƟܕ CP: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــŹܐƟܕ B: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــųźƟܕ D: ܣŴــſܪŴܓƀźƟܕ L | ƎــƍƀƊƀƏ] + ƎــƍŶ L **8** ƎƍſƢƤƉ BCLP: ƎƍſܪƢƤƉ D | ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƙƏŴƇƇƀƘ P **10** ƎƍƀܒƦƄƉ] + tit. ܐƣűܓ ƈźƉ :B ܐܪźƐſــƑƀƆųŹŴ :CL ܐܪźƐſــƑƀƇŹŴ **11** BCD ܕƍƉــŴ ܘܐſــƍܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܒŶƦــƉŴܐ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܒűƊܡ ܐƎſƢŶ ܐƦſܘܗܝ | P ܐܪŴƀƇźźƐſܣ :D ܐܪƑƀƆųŹŴźƏ ܗ [om. hom. P **12** ŴƆ LP: ŴƆܘ BCD, Epit. | ܐſƞƉ CDLP: ܐƞƉ B **13** ܘܡƦƉ CDLP: ܡűƉ B **14** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ̈ƀܐ ſƞƉܐ ܕųƌܘܐ űƉܡ ܒűƊܡ .tit +] ܒų **<sup>18</sup>** P ƙƏŴƇƀƘܐ ̇ ܝ **19** BCD ܕܒƊƄܐ ܙƌ ܒų +] ܕܗ ̇ ܝ ̇ űƊƆܥ ܕܗ ܓ + [ܕܒܐܬܪܐ | BCD ܒ + [ܕܒŵܒƍܐ | BCD ܐ + [ƦƉܐƢƉܐ **20** P ܐƆܐ ܙܕܩ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕܒƊܐƌܐ | BCD ̈ ܬܗ | BCD ܕ + [ܕܒƊܐƌܐ **21** P .om] ܐܘ ŴƍƉ] + ܗ BCD

one of them signifies is not apparent and comprehensible save for a few alone184.

136 Therefore, an inquiry should be made into both of them, so that nothing will be missing in the interpretation of other things in this treatise. However, concerning substance we will make a proper inquiry into its meaning and definition later on, where it will completely correspond to Aristotle's account of it in the book *Categories*. Of accident, conversely, we will speak now, starting with a definition which the Philosopher gave for it. Thus, we require no small investigation about those things which we are about to discuss below.

137 Now, Aristotle states that accident is "that which is in something else not as a part of it, it being impossible to exist without that thing which it is in"185. This is a defining account of accident given to us by the Philosopher in the treatise on the ten genera. Thus, an accident is what exists in something else, while it is in it not as its part, and its subsistence is never possible by itself, apart from what it is in.

138 Now, it is necessary to know that there are altogether eleven ways of speaking about being-in-something186. These are: as in a time; or as in a place; or as in a container; or as parts in what they are parts of; or as a whole in its parts; or as

**<sup>184</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 31.29–32: ἐπειδὴ ᾔσθετο ἑαυτοῦ ὁ φιλόσοφος φωναῖς τισι χρησαμένου ἀγνώστοις ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας, τῷ τε καθ' ὑποκειμένου καὶ οὐ καθ' ὑποκειμένου καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, βούλεται λοιπὸν διδάξαι ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν. Thus, Philoponus refers to the actual expressions used by Aristotle, while Sergius substitutes them with "substance" and "accident".

**<sup>185</sup>** See *Cat*. 1a24–25: ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν. Aristotle thus defines the expression "in a subject" (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ) which is associated by Sergius with the term "accident".

**<sup>186</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.32–27.2 (cf. 29.5–23) and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.7–26. Both lists contain 11 types that are equivalent to Sergius' list, but differ from one another in their sequence. Also Sergius' sequence does not fully correspond to either of them. These lists ultimately go back to *Phys.* 210a14–24, where Aristotle suggests eight ways of being-insomething.

̇ ܐƅſ ̈ƣܐ ܒܓƐƍܐ܂ ܐܘ ̇ ܐƅſ ܐܕ ̈ܬܗ܂ ܐܘ ŴƍƊܒ ܡűƉ ųƇƃ ƅſܐ ̇ ܐܘ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕܘܒƢܐ ܕܐƎƀƇſ ̈ƣܐ ܒųܘƆܐ܂ ܐܘ ̇ ܐƅſ ܐܕ ܓƐƍܐ ܒܐ v14L ̈ ܕƣܐ܂ ܐܘ ̇ ܐƅſ ̇ Ǝ ܕűƉܒƢ ųƆܘܢ܂ ܐܘ ̇ ܘ Ɖ ܕƦƉܕܒƎſƢ ƎƉ ܬƦƀŶ ܐűſܐ ܕܐƥƌ: ܒų ܕܒƀƇƉŴƤܐ܂ ܐܘ r75D ̇ ܐƅſ ܓƣűܐ ܒܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ƈźƉ ܕƃܒƢ Ɔܐ ƎƀƖſűſ ܓƀƇܐƦſ ܗƎƀƆ ƆܐƎƀƇſ ܕƟ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ƎſƢ܉ ŴƘųƌܟ ܬܘܒ ųƀƇƕܘܢ ܘƌܐƢƉ ܬƦſŴŶܐ ܂ƥƍƇƄƆ Ǝ ̈ Ɩſűſܕ ƎƀƇſܐ ƎƉ̣ ܘܢ܉ųƍƉ űŶ űŶ ƈƃܕ


**<sup>1</sup>** ųƇƃ] om. P | ܬܗ ̈ ̈ ܕƣܐ | BCD ܘ + [ܒŴƍƊ ̇ ܐƅſ ܓƐƍܐ ܒܐ ̈ƣܐ ܒܓƐƍܐ ܐܘ ̇ ܐƅſ ܐܕ [ܐܘ ̈ ܕƣܐ **2** BCD ܙ + [ܒܓƐƍܐ | P .om ܒܐ [+ ܚ BCD | ܐƆܘųܒ [+ ܛ BCD **3** ƎƉ] om. B | ܐűſܐ LP, Epit.: ܗűــſܐ BCD | Ǝــ ̇ Ɖ] om. B | ܘܢųƆ] + ܝ BCD **4** ܐƀƇƉŴƤܕܒ [+ ܐſ BCD **7** ܐ [om. P **8** ܢŴƀƇſܕܐ CDLP, Epit.: ܢŴƇſܕܐ B | ƅſܐ [om. L **9** ܐƦƍƤܕܒ LP, Epit.: ܐƦƖƤܕܒ BCD | ƎƇƘܕܙ BLP, Epit.: ƎƇƘܕ C: ƎƇƘ D | ƎƇƘ DLP, Epit.: ƎƇƘܕ C: ƎƇƘܕܙ B **10** ƅſܕܕܐ BCLP, Epit.: ƅſܕܐ D **12** ܒ [om. P | ܘܒܐܬܪܐ CDL, Epit.: ܒܐܬܪܐ BP **13** ܕܐܐܪ BCDLP: ܕܐܬܪܐ Epit. **16** ܓ [om. BCDP | ܡűƉ BLP, Epit.: ܡűƊܒ CD **17** ƅƏ] om. B **20** ܐſƦƘܘ [om. L, + ܓ BCD | ųƆ Ʀſܐ ̈Ɗƀܐ Ɵ LP: ųƆ Ʀſܐ ܐƊƀ̈ Ɵ BCD, Epit.

species in a genus; or as a genus in species (εἴδη); or as forms (εἴδη) in matter; or as the governing of those who are under someone's rule is in the person who governs them; or as in an end; or as an accident in a substance187. However, since these are probably not clearly comprehensible for the readers, let us further turn to them and suggest examples to each one from what is known by everyone.

139 1. So, we say that something is in a time, e.g. when we state about the War of Ilion188 that it occurred in the time of Alexander Paris, or when we say that any other particular thing was in the year of such-and-such (a ruler) or in the day of so-and-so. Everything like this is said to have happened or to be happening in some time.

140 2. Further, we say that something is in a place, just as each one of us is inside the limits of air that surrounds our bodies from outside, or when we say about water or wine that they are inside the inner limits of an earthen vessel or anything else that contains them.

141 3. Also, we say that something is in a container, as water in a pitcher, or as wine in a wineskin, or as any kind of body that is inside another body. This type differs from the previous one in that place has only two dimensions, namely length and breadth, while a container always has three dimensions, namely length, breadth, and depth. Hence, place is such a limit of a body that encloses in its interior part what is placed into it. A container, on the other hand, is a

**<sup>187</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.32–27.2: λέγεται γὰρ τὸ ἔν τινι ἑνδεκαχῶς, ἐν χρόνῳ ἐν τόπῳ ἐν ἀγγείῳ ὡς μέρος ἐν ὅλῳ ὡς ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν ὡς εἶδος ἐν γένει ὡς γένος ἐν εἴδει ὡς τὰ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἐν τῷ ἄρχοντι ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ ὡς ἐν τέλει ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οἷον τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐσίᾳ.

**<sup>188</sup>** I.e. the Trojan War. The same example appears by Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.5–6 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.17–18.

̈ ــƄܐ: Ŷــű ̇ــƍܐ ܬܪſــƎ Ə Ɖܐƌܐ ܕƎſ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ̣ܗܘ ܓــƊƣŴܐ ƍƟــųƉŴ ܕƟ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐƦſ ܒų: ܘųƉƦƤƉ ܐƅſ ܕܐƌƢƉــƎ ܐܬܪܗ܉ ܓſŴܐ ܕűŶܪ ųƆ ܘŶــű ܒــſƢܐ ܗ r15L ̇ ܘ ܕƉــƎ ƆܒــƢ ܕŶƦƉــŵܐ ƍƇƄƆــƥ܂ ܐܢ ܕſــƎ ܗܕܐ ܗƃــƍܐ ̇ ܘ ܙƌܐ ܕųƌܘܐ űƉܡ ܒܐܬܪܐ ̣ƎƉ ̇ ܉ Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƚƇŷƤƉ ̣ܗܘ ܗ ܐųſƦſ ̇ ܘ ƏــƄܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܓــſŴܐ ܕܓــƊƣŴܐ ̇ ܝ ܕܗ ܗ v133C ̇ ܘ ܕųƌܘܐ ܒƊܐƌܐ: ܒــų ܐƅſ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ܉ ܗƌܐ ܕƎſ ̣ܗܘ ܓƊƣŴܐ ųƉŴƍƟ ܐƦſܘܗܝ܂

	- Ǝſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ <sup>143</sup> <sup>ܗ</sup> ̣ܘܗܘ ܬܘܒ ųƇƃ ƘܓƢܐ ƦƉܐƢƉ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒŴƍƊ <sup>10</sup> ̈ܬܗ܉ ܗƌ ̈ܗܝ ܐŶــƌƮܐ ̈ ſűſܐ ܘܒƮܓــƇܐ܉ ܘܒƇƄــųܘܢ ܗܕƉــŴ ܒƤſƢܐ ܘܒƏƢƄܐ܉ ܘܒܐ ̈ܬܗ܂ ̇ ܘ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ܕƦƉܐƢƉ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ųƇƃ űƉܡ ܒŴƍƊ ܕƃƢƣܐ܉ ܒƌŵܐ ܗ
	- ̇ 146 ܚ ܘܐſــƅ ܐܕƣܐ ܬܘܒ ܒــųܘƆܐ ƦƉܐƉــƢܐ ܨܒــŴܬܐ ܕܐſƦſــų ܒƊــűܡ܉ ܐſــƅ Ɖܐ ܕƌܐƉــƢ ܐƌــƥ ܕܕƉــŴܬܗ ܕܐűƌܪƍſــźܐ ܒŷƍــƤܐ

**<sup>3</sup>** ܐŵŶƦƉܕ BCDP, Epit.: ܐŵŶƦƉ L | ܐƍƃܗ [om. B **<sup>4</sup>** ܘ ̇ ܗ [om. BCD | ƎƉ̣ CDLP, Epit.: űƃ B [ܗ **10** B ܐܘ ܐƅſ ܪܓƇܐ :CD ܐܘ ܪܓƇܐ .:Epit ,LP ܘܪܓƇܐ **8** P .om] ܕ **7** BCD ܕųƇſ +] ܓſŴܐ **5** om. P **13** ܘ [om. P **14** ܪŴŷƌܕ [+ ƥƌܐ BCD **15** ܒܐƇƃܘ ܐƀƏŴƏܕ L, Epit.: ܐƀƏŴƏܘ ܒܐƇƃܕ BCDP [ܙ **18** P ܘܐܪܙܐ ܘܙƦſܐ .:Epit ,BCDL ܘܙƦſܐ ܘܐܪܙܐ | BCDP ܕܐųſƦſܘܢ .:Epit ,L ܕܐƎſųſƦſ **16** om. P **19** ܐƀƏŴƏܘܕ BCLP, Epit.: ܐƀƏŴƏܘ D **21** ܒܐƆܘűܘܒ ELP, Epit.: ܒܐƆܘűܒ ܐܘ BCD **22** ܚ [ om. P **23** ܐźƍſܪűƌܕܐ ELP, Epit.: ܐźƍſܕܐܕܪ BCD | ܐƤŷƍܒ BCDL, Epit.: ܐƤƀƍܒ P

body itself which possesses two limits, the interior one which contains what is in it and, as we said, is called its place, and the exterior one which is seen to everyone from outside. Provided this is so, then it is obvious that the way how something is in a place differs from the way of being in a container in that the former is the inner limit of a body, as we said, while the latter is itself a body189.

142 4. But we also say that things are (in something) as parts in what they are parts of, for example a hand, or a leg, or any other member of human body. For these are in a body as its parts.

143 5. Also, it is said that the whole human body is in its parts, i.e. in the head, in the belly, in the hands and legs, and in all other members of it. In this way, as we said, we state that a whole is in its parts.

144 6. Things are said to be in something as species in a genus, when we see that they derive from one and the same genus and say that they are in their common genus. E.g., we say that a horse, a dog, and a bull are in the genus of animal, while a vine, an olive tree, and a cedar are in the genus of plant.


**<sup>189</sup>** In points 2 and 3, Sergius suggest a different kind of explanation than what we find in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.6–10 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.18–22.

̇ űƉܡ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܕܕܐƅſ ̇ ܐƊƄƏܐ ܕŴƃܪƀƏܐ ܒƐƀƠܐ: ܐܘ ̇ : ܐܘ ܐųſƦſ ܗƍƃܐ܂

	- 148 ܝ ܘܐƅſ ܕܒƀƇƉŴƤܐ ܬܘܒ ܐƎƍſƢƉ܉ ܕܬܨܒƦƀܗ ܕܒƦƀܐ ܒƤــųƊƆŴ ̇ ܂ ܘܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ƎſųƇƃ ܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ̇ ܕܐƙƆܐ ܒųƀƇƉŴƤ ̣ܗܝ: ܘƦŷƤŶܗ
	- 149 ſܐ ܐƅſ ܓƣűܐ ܕƎſ ܒܐܘƀƏܐ܉ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܕܐƦſ ŴŶܪܘܬܐ ܒƇŷܒܐ: ܘܐܘŴƊƃܬܐ ܒƄܐƘܐ: ܘŴƀƇŶܬܐ ܒűܒƤܐ: ܘܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ſųƇƃــƎ ܕܐſــƅ <sup>10</sup> ܗƎƀƆ܂
	- ̈ƀܐ ܐŶــƌƮܐ ƐƕــƢܐ܉ ƍƉــųܘܢ ܐſــƅ ƍƉــƦܐ 151 ܗŴƌܢ ܕƎſ ųƇƃܘܢ ܙƌ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƦƉܐƎſƢƉ ܕܐųſƦſܘܢ ܒų܉ ܘƍƉــųܘܢ ſƞƉــƎ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ܕܗ

**1** ܐƊƄƏܐ CDLP, Epit.: ųƊƄƏܐ B | ܐƌƢŶܐ LP, Epit.: ƎſƢŶܐ BCD **3** ܛ [om. P **4** ܐƊƃ CDLP, Epit.: ܐƊƃűܒ B **<sup>7</sup>** <sup>ܝ</sup> [om. P | ųƊƆŴƤܒ LP: ųƀƇƉŴƤܒ BCD: ܗܝŴƀƇƉ̈ ŴƤܒ Epit. **8** ƅſܕܐ LP: ƅſܕܕܐ BCD, Epit. **9** ܐſ] om. P | Ǝſܕ [om. C | ܐƀƏܒܐܘ [om. P | Ʀſܕܐ CDLP, Epit.: ̇ ųſƦſܕܐ B **<sup>10</sup>** ܐƘܐƄܒ CDL, Epit.: ܐƀƣ ̈ ŴƄܒ B: ܪܒܐŴƖܒ P | ƅſܕܐ LP: ƅſܕܕܐ BCD, Epit. **12** ƑƀƇŹŴــźƐſܐܪ BCL: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƏܐܪ D: ܣŴــƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ P **14** ƅــſܕܐ LP: ƅــſܕܕܐ BCD **16** űƖƇܒ [+ ƎƉ̣ BCD | ųܒ [om. B **19** ܐƆܐ [+ ܐƆ P **21** ܐſƞƉ BCDP: ܐƞƉ L

(σχῆμα) of a chair is in wood, or something else like that190.


150 So, Aristotle writes that accident is "what is in something else not as a part of it" and thus distinguishes accident from all those things that are in something that they are in as parts. He also adds that "it can never have subsistence all by itself without that thing which it is in", in order to distinguish it from all other cases of how a thing is said to be in something. Because all of them, even if they are not said to be in something as a part of it, can however have subsistence without it. An accident, on the contrary, is neither in something as its part, nor can it ever exist without it.

151 As for the other ten types, some of them are said to be in something as part of it, while others can subsist by themselves without it. And since an accident is

**<sup>190</sup>** See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.22: ἢ ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ, ὡς τὸ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος εἶδος ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.15–16: ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ ὡς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ἢ τὸ τρίγωνον ἢ τετράγωνον σχῆμα ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ.

**<sup>191</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.13–15: ὡς τὰ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἐν τῷ ἄρχοντι (λέγομεν γὰρ ὅτι τόδε τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἄρχοντί ἐστιν) (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.22–24).

**<sup>192</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.16–17 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.24–25.

**<sup>193</sup>** Ammonius and Philoponus speak in the last case of being "as in a subject", see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.17: ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὡς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐσίᾳ (= Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.25– 26). Since Sergius completely abstains from using the terms applied by Aristotle himself, he modifies this point accordingly.

̇ܘ

ܐƌــŴܢ ܕƌــųܘܘܢ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ ƍƟــųƉŴܘܢ źƏــƢ ƍƉــų܂ źƉــƈ ܗƀƃــƈ ̈ــƀܐ: ܐܘƏــƚ ܕܓƣűܐ ܒűƊܡ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐƅſ Ƈƃــųܘܢ ܗƀƆــƎ ƐƕــƢܐ ܙƌ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܒــų܉ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ܕƆــŴ ܐſــƅ ƍƉــƦܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܒــų ܕŴƀƣƢƙƌܗܝ ̣ƎƉ <sup>ܗ</sup> r135C ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕܐƅſ ƦƍƉܐ ܐųſƦſܘܢ܂ ܘܐܘƚƏ ܬܘܒ ܘܐܦ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒų܉ ܗ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܝ ܕƆܐ ſƞƉܐ ܕųƌܘܐ ƦƉܘܡ ųƊſŴƟ ܒűƖƇ ܗ ̈ܬܐ ųſƦƀƆܘܢ ŴƍƉ ƅſܐ ƎƘܕܐ :ܐƌƮŶܐ ܢŴƌ ̇ L16r <sup>ܗ</sup> ܘܢųƇƃ ƎƉ̣ ܗܝŴƀƣƢƙƌܕ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐųſƦſܘܢ ܒų܉ ܐƆܐ ſƞƉܐ ܗܝ ܕŴƊƀƟƦƌܢ ƆܒƢ ųƍƉ܂ ܒų


̇ ƞƆܒــŴܬܐ ܗ ̇ ܒŷƇــŴܕųſ ̇ ܘ ܕƆــų ̈ܬܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ܉ <sup>ܗ</sup> Ŵܨܒــ ƎــƉ ܐűــŶ ܐ܂ƦƀƌƮŶܐ ƎſųƇƃ ƎƉ ųƆ ƋŶƦƉܘ ܫƢƘ ܉ ̇ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ŴƤƉܕųƍƕ

**<sup>3</sup>** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƙƏŴƇƀƘ P **<sup>5</sup>** ܝ ̇ ̇ ܝ :BCLP ܗ ųƆ D | ܐƉ] om. LP **6** ƎƘܕܐ BCDP: ƎƘܘܐ L ܘܢųſƦƀƆ LP: ܘܢųſƦſܐ ܐƆ BCD **8** ܘܗܝƦſܘܐ LP: ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ BC: ܕܐܘܬܘܗܝ D **11** ƎƉ] om. L **<sup>12</sup>** ƦƇܒŶܐܬ CDLP: ܐƇܒŶƦƉ B | ܘűƃ + ܗܕܐ BCD **<sup>13</sup>** ܐƉ ̈ ̈ Ɖܐ :CP ܙŹܐ ̈ ƊŹܐ :BD ܙܐŹܐ :L ܙܐ ̈ źܐ ƊƀŹܙ Epit. | ܐƀƆű̈ ƕܘ BCLP: ܐƀƆ̈ űƕ D **<sup>15</sup>** ܗܕܐ [om. BCD **<sup>17</sup>** Ƌ ̇ ŷƆ BCLP: ƋƆ D **<sup>23</sup>** ܘ ̇ :LP 2ܗ ̇ ܝ ܗ BCD **24** ܫƢƘ DLP: ܫƢƘܘ B: ܫƢƘܕ C

in something like the other ten types, the Philosopher added that it is in something not as its part, in order to distinguish it from those things that are (in something) as a part of it. And he further added that it can never have subsistence by itself without that what it is in, in order to distinguish it from all other cases which can exist without that thing which they are in, even if they are not in it as a part194.

152 For example, whiteness is an accident. It has subsistence either in milk, or in white lead, or in any other kind of body. It is in the body that is receptive of it not as its part. Neither can it have subsistence outside the body in which it is, for it will perish at that very moment when it is separated from it.

#### *[Criticism of Aristotle's definition]*

153 Now, it is necessary, as it seems to me, to discuss some enquiries (ζητήματα) and objections which one may hear just after this defining account of accident from those who are judging things without precision. For, since, as we said, any definition of a particular thing ought to suit only this thing which is made known by it, also the defining account of accident must serve for expressing it alone. Thus, there are two ways of making a mistake in a definition: either by enlarging it so that it will comprise not the whole nature of what is defined, or by reducing it and thus including in it other things that are outside of what is defined195. For a balanced and accurate definition of a particular thing is the one which serves for signification of this thing alone, separating and differentiating it from everything else.

**<sup>194</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.2–8 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.26–32.

**<sup>195</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 33.6–10: κακίζουσι δέ τινες τὸν ὁρισμὸν τοῦτον, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζειν οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐλλείπειν· αὕτη γὰρ κακία ὁρισμοῦ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν πρὸς τὸ ὁριστὸν ἀλλ' ἢ πλείονα περιλαμβάνειν ἢ ἐλάττονα. καὶ οἱ μὲν πλεονάζειν λέγοντές φασι μὴ μόνα τὰ συμβεβηκότα περιλαμβάνειν τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα. See also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.9–13. Ammonius characterizes the first kind of criticism (i.e. for being superfluous, cf. ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζειν by Philoponus) as κατὰ τὸ ὑπεραίρειν καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν.

̇ ܘ ̇ ــƢ ܐƌܐ ܕſــƎ ܕܐſــƅ ܗƃــƍܐ܂ ܬŶــųƉŴ ܬܪſــƞܐ ܕܒƌƢــƤܐ: ܗ 154 ܐƉ ܕƀƃــƍܐ ܐƤƌــƀܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕܘܗܝ ŶƦƉــƋ: ܘſƢƘــƥ ̣ƉــƎ ſųƇƃــƎ ܐƀƌƮŶــƦܐ ̇ ــƎ ܓƀــƢ ܕܒƌƢــƤܐ ܗܘ܉ Ŷــƀܐ Ɖ ƈــƃ ܬܐ܂ŴــƀƉ ܐƇــƀƇƉ ܐƀــŶ ܘܗܝ܉Ʀſܐ ƇƀƇƉܐ ŴƀƉܬܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ܂ ܘƈƃ Ɖܐ ܬܘܒ ܕƀŶܐ ƇƀƇƉܐ ŴƀƉܬܐ ܗܘ܉ ܒƤƌƢܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ܂ Ŵƣܘܕųƕܘܢ ܓƢƀ ƦſƦŶܐ ܕܬŴŶ <sup>5</sup> ̈Ɖܐ ܗƌــŴ܉ ܕƌــųܘܘܢ ̈ƉــŴܗܝ܂ ܐܢ ̣ܗܘ ܕſــƎ ܗƀƄƘــƎ ܗƃــƍܐ ƆــŴܬ ܗ v16L ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܬŴŶ ܕƌܒƞܪ ܐƥƌ ųƍƉ ܕܬƉŴŶܐ ܗƌܐ ܘƌܐƢƉ ƀŶܐ ƇƀƇƉܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ܉ Ɩſűſܐ r136C ̇ ܒƇƊــƦܐ ƕــƋ ƍƀƃــų ܕܒƌƢــƤܐ܂ ܗƌــŴ ܕſــƎ ųܒ ƥܒŶ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܐƍƀ̈ P37v ƃܕ ܗܝ ̈ ƇƀƇܐ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ܂ Ɖ ܐƀ̈ ̈ܐ܂ ܘܐܦ ܗƎƀƆ ܓƢƀ ųƇƃܘܢ <sup>Ŷ</sup> ܐܕƤƆܘ ܐƃ ̈ B91v ܐƇƊƆ ܐܢ ܕƎſ ƚƏŴƌ ܬܘܒ ܐƥƌ ŴƇƕܗܝ ܕܬƉŴŶܐ ܘƌܐƢƉ ܕܒƤƌƢܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ <sup>10</sup> ƀŶܐ ƇƀƇƉܐ ŴƀƉܬܐ ܪܗƢŹܐ܉ ܗܪƃܐ ܒƞܪܗ ƀƄƆــƍܐ ܕſƦƉــűܥ ܗܘܐ ̇ ܒƇƊــƦܐ܉ ̇ ܒــƥ ܒــų <sup>Ŷ</sup> ܐƤ̈ ƍƀƍܕܒ ܘܢųƍƀƃ ųƇƃ ŴƆܕ ƈźƉ :ܐƉŴŶܬ ƎƉ ܐƆܐ ƢƆܗƢŹܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ܂

̈ــƀܐ ܕƐƉــƦܪŶܐ ܒــųܘܢ ƍƙƇƉــŴܬܗܘܢ 155 ܒƀƆųــƎ ܗƀƃــƈ ܬܪſــƎ ܙƌ ̇ ܝ ƀƍƊŶƦƉــƦܗ ܕܬŴŶ <sup>15</sup> ̈Ɖܐ܉ ŸƄƤƉ ܐƥƌ ܕƦƀƌܐ ܪƍƀƣܐ ܒƦܪ ƦƇƉܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ̈ƣܐ ܬƊŶــƦ ܘŶܒƤــƦ܉ ܐƆܐ ̇ Ƣ ܕŴƆ ܒŴŷƇܕ ܓű Ɖܐ űƃ ƦƀƉűƟ ܐ܂ƣűܕܓ ̈ƣܐ ̈ܬܐ ܐƀƌƮŶــƦܐ ܐƀƇſــƎ ̣ܕƉــƎ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ܘƆــŴ ̣ƉــƎ ܓــű ܐܦ ܨܒــŴ ̇ ܝ ܐſųſƦſـــƎ܂ ̣ ܐƌـــųܘ ܓƀـــƢ ܕܓـــƣűܐ ܐſـــƦܘܗܝ ܐſـــƅ ƇƉـــƦܐ ܗ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒűƊܡ ܘŴƆ ܐƅſ ƦƍƉܗ: ܗ :ƈƖƆ ƎƉ̣ ƦƊƀƏܕܐܬܬ D77r ƈƃܘ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ ܕܐܦ ƈźƉ ܂ųƍƉ ƢܒƆ ųƊſŴƟ ܘܐųƌܕ ܐſƞƉ ܐƆ űƃ C136v :ܐܬܪܐ ƎƉ̣ ƎſƦſܐ ܐƦƍƉ ŴƆ űƃ ܘܗܝƦſܐ ܡűƉ ܒܐܬܪܐ ƎƍƉ űŶ űŶ ƅــſܐ ƎــſűƉ ܘܐ܉ųــƊƆ ܐܬܪܐ ƎــƉ̣ űــƖƇܒ ܐƞƉ ƎƍƉ űŶ ܬܘܒ ܐƆܘ ̇ ܝ: ܐܦ ܐƎƍŷƌ ܓƣűܐ ܐƎſƦſ܂ ܐƆܐ ƈźƉ ܕƖſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ̇ ܕƦƇƉܐ ܗ ųƇƀŶ

̇ Ǝ ܓƢƀ ܕܒƤƌƢܐ ܗܘ ƀŶܐ ƇƀƇƉܐ ŴƀƉܬܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ **3** Ɖ ƈƃ] om. hom. D | ܗܘ BCL: ܘܗܝƦſܐ P **<sup>4</sup>** ܬܘܒ [om. D **<sup>5</sup>** ܐƉ̈ ŴŶܕܬ BCDL: ܐƉ̈ ŴŶܘܬ P | Ŵƌܗ BCLP: ܢŴƌܗ D **<sup>7</sup>** ܐƍƀ̈ Ɩſűſܐ ܗܝ ܕƃ ̈ƍƀܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ Ɩſűſܐ ܗܝ ܕŶܒƥ :BCD ܐƌƮŶܐ Ŷܒƥ ƃ LP **9** ܘܐܦ LP: ܐܦ BCD **11** ܐƢŹܪܗ BDLP: ܐŹܪܗ C **<sup>13</sup>** ܐƢŹܗƢƆ BDLP: ܐŹܗƢƆ C **<sup>15</sup>** ܐƦƀƌܕ [om. B **<sup>17</sup>** ܬܐ ̈ Ŵܨܒ LP, Epit.: ܐܦ BCD ƎƉ̣ ] om. CD **<sup>21</sup>** űŶ2] om. L **<sup>23</sup>** ̇ ųƇƀŶ CDLP: ܐƇƀŶ Epit.: ̇ ųƤƀƌ B | Ǝƍŷƌܐ CL: ƎƍŶ BDP, Epit.

154 What I mean is this. A correct definition of man that defines only the human nature and separates it from everything else is "rational mortal animal". So everyone who is a man is a rational mortal animal, and also every rational mortal animal is a man. For a correct interpretation of definitions implies that they are convertible with what they define196. If, however, someone reduces this definition and says only "rational animal", it is obvious that together with the nature of man he will encompass with this expression also other natures, namely angels and demons, for all of them are also rational animals. If, on the contrary, one enlarges this definition and says that man is "rational mortal animal rhetor", then he will reduce the nature that is made known by the definition, because this expression will encompass not the whole nature of men, but only the rhetors.

155 So, these are the two ways of corrupting the teaching of definitions which someone may bring forth as accusations after the defining account of accident. First of all, one might say that it defines and encompasses not only accidents, but also other things that pertain to substance and not to accidents. For, if accident matches the description proposed above, i.e. "what is in something not as a part of it, while it cannot have subsistence without it", since also Socrates and each one of us are in a place, while not being part of the place, and while neither of us, further, is able to exist without place, hence, according to the meaning of that description, we too are accidents. But since it is evident that

**<sup>196</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.13–15: οἷον ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον λογικὸν θνητὸν νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν· τοῦτο ἀντιστρέφει· καὶ γὰρ εἴ τι ζῷον λογικὸν θνητὸν νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν, τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος.

̇ ܐܘƀƏܐ ̣ܗܝ űƃ ųƆ ܐŷƃƦƤƉ ܉ƎƍƉ űŶ űŶ ƈƃ ܘܗܝƦſܐ ܐƀƏܐܘ ܕܐܦ ̇ ܝ ܕƆܐ ſƞƉܐ ųƊƆܘܐ܂ ̣ܗܝ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܘܓƣűܐ܂ ܗ

156 ŴƆܬ ܗܕܐ ܕƎſ ܐƎƍſƢƉ܉ ܕƈƃ űŶ űŶ ƎƍƉ ܐƎƘ ܒܐܬܪܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ: űƃ ŴƆ ƦƍƉܐ űƉܡ ܐƎſƦſ ̣ƎƉ ܐܬܪܐ ܕܐƎſƦſ ܒų܉ ܐƆܐ ̣ܗܘ ƍƀƃــƎ <sup>5</sup> Ǝــƍƀƃܕ ųــƍƀƇƊƤƉ ŴــƆܕ ƈــźƉ :ܐܬܪܐ ƎــƉ̣ ƢܒــƆ ܐƌܪƦــƌܕ ܗܝ̣ ܐſƞــƉ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐܬܪܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ƚƠƉ ̣ܗܘ ƚƀƠƌ ƎƆ ܐſــƅ ƇŹــƇܐ ƆܓــƊƣŴܐ܂ ܗ r38P | r30L ̇ ܘ ܕƎſ Ɖܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ƠƉܒųƍƇ ܕܓƣűܐ ƍƀƇƊƤƉܐ ܕųƍƀƃ ܐƦſܘܗܝ܂ B92r ܐܢ ܂ƈƖƆ ƎƉ̣ ƎƌƢƉܕܐ ƅſܐ ܉ƋƀƟƦƌܕ ƅƏ ܐƞƉ ܐƆ Ƣƀܓ ܘܗܝűƖƇܒ ̇ ܘ ̇ ܒƥ ܬųƉŴŶ ܕܓƣűܐ ܗ ܕƎſ ܗƎƀƆ ܗƍƃܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ܉ Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƆܐ Ŷ ̣ܕƎƉ ƈƖƆ ܐܬܬƋƀƏ űƉܡ ܐƎſƢŶ ܐƆܐ ܐܢ ųƆ ܒŴŷƇܕܘܗܝ܂ <sup>10</sup>

	- 158 ܘܐܦ ƆــŴܬ ܗܕܐ ܬܘܒ ܐƍſƢƉــƎ ƀƉűƟــƦ: ܕƆܐ ܐܬܐƉــƢ ܒــų ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܒŶƦــƉŴܐ ܕƆܐ Ɖــſƞܐ ƉــƦܘܡ ܕƌــųܘܐ ܓــƣűܐ ܒƖƇــű ܗ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ ܒų ܒŵܒƎ܉ ܐƆܐ ܕƆܐ ſƞƉܐ ܕųƌܘܐ ܒƖƇــű ܗ

**1** űŶ2] om. BP **3** ƎƘܐ LP: ƎƘܘܐ BCD **7** ܐƍƀƇƊƤƉ BCD, Epit.: ƁƇƊƤƉ L: ųƍƀƇƊƤƉ P **8** ܐƞƉ LP: ܐſƞƉ BCD, Epit. **9** ƎſųſƦſܐ BCLP, Epit.: ܘܢųſƦſܐ D **10** ܐܢ [om. P **11** ųƇƃ LP: ųƇƄƆ BCD **<sup>12</sup>** ܐƦƀƍƊŶƦƉ BCDLP: ܗƦƀƍƊŶƦƉ corr. BC sup. lin. **<sup>13</sup>** ܘ ̇ .om] ܐܦ | BCD Ɖܐ + [ܗ P | ܐŷſܪ BCDP: ܐŶܪ L **14** ܕܗܘ̣ [ om. C **17** ܐŷſܪ̈ L: ܐƍŷſܪ̈ BCDP **19** ܗܝ̣ [ om. BD **21** ܗܕܐ ܬŴƆ BCDL: ܕܐųƆ P | ƢƉܐܬܐ LP: ܬƢƉܐܬܐ BCD **23** ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ BCLP: Ʀſܕܐ D | ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ P .hom .om] ܗܘܐ ܒų ܒŵܒƎ ܐƆܐ ܕƆܐ ſƞƉܐ ܕųƌܘܐ ܒűƖƇ ܗ

each one of us is also a substance, substance appears to be at the same time substance and accident, which is impossible197.

156 To this we reply, then, that, even if each one of us is in a place while not being a part of the place we are in, it is still possible for our nature to be thought of outside place, because place is not completive of our nature but is attached to us as a concomitant, like a shadow to a body. But what is receptive of an accident is completive of its nature, since (an accident) may never subsist without it, as we have said above. Now, if this is how things stand, it is evident that the definition of accident which is given above does not encompass anything else save it alone198.

157 Further, one might say that the defining account of accident does not encompass its nature on the whole but suits only those accidents which cannot be separated at all from what they are in. For, behold, the fragrance of apples or any kind of spices (ἄρωμα), which is an accident, may nevertheless be separated from what it is in, for even when these things are moved far away their fragrance reaches us. So, if an accident is something that cannot subsist without what it is in, while fragrances which are said to be accidents may be separated from what they are in and reach us, it is evident that the account quoted above does not define all accidents199.

158 What we shall first of all say to this is that it is not stated in this definition that it is completely impossible for an accident to exist for some time apart from what it is in, but that it may not exist at the present moment apart from

**<sup>197</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.15–21: φασὶν οὖν οἱ μὲν τὸν ἀποδεδομένον ὁρισμὸν μὴ πᾶσι τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν ἐφαρμόζειν, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἑτέροις τισὶ παρὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα· λέγουσι γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Σωκράτης ἐν τόπῳ ὢν ἔν τινί ἐστι καὶ οὐχ ὡς μέρος ἐν ὅλῳ (οὐ γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ τόπου) καὶ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν (ἀδύνατον γὰρ χωρὶς εἶναι τόπου), ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὁ Σωκράτης συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχει, ὅπερ ἄτοπον (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 33.10–12).

**<sup>198</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.21–30; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 33.12–20.

**<sup>199</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 28.8–12; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 35.10–21.

ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܒــų ܗƣܐ܂ ̈ܪſــŷܐ ܗƀƃــƈ Ƈƃــųܘܢ ܕܗ̈ܪܘƉܐ: ܘܐܦ ܐܢ D77v ܐƀــƏܐܘ ƎــƉ̣ űƖƇܒ ŴƆ ܐƆܐ ܉ƎƟŴƏ ܬŴƆ Ǝſܘܐܬ ܘܢųƍƉ ƎƀƣƢƘƦƉ ̇ ܐܬſــƎ ƆــŴܬܢ܂ ܐܦ ܐܢ ܓƀــƢ ƀƣƢƘƦƉــƎ ܐŶــƢܬܐ ܕܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܒــų ųƍƉܘܢ ܕܗ̈ܪܘƉܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܗܐ ܒܐܐܪ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܐſــƅ ܕܒܓــƊƣŴܐ v137C űƉܡ ƠƉܒųƍƇܘܢ ܘƆܐ ſƞƉܐ ܕŴƊƀƟƦƌܢ ܒűƖƇ ̣ƎƉ ܗƌܐ܂ v38P


**1** ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ BCL: ܗܘܐ Ʀſܕܐ D | ܐŷſܪ̈ L: ܐƍƀŶܪ̈ BCDP | ƈƀƃܗ CDLP: Ǝſܕ B | ܐܢ ܘܐܦ LP: ƎƘܐ BCD **<sup>4</sup>** ܐƉܪܘ̈ܕܗ BCLP: ܐƉܪ̈ܕܗ D **<sup>6</sup>** ܐƍŷſܪ̈ BCDP: ܐƍŶܪ̈ L | ƎƉ̣ ] om. L **<sup>8</sup>** ƅƤ ̇ Ɖ] + ƥƊƃܘ BCD **9** ܐܦ CDLP: ܐܘ B | ܐƀƏܐܘ [om. L **12** ܐƍŷſܪ̈ BCDP: ܐƍŶܪ̈ L **13** ܕܐܦ BCLP: ƅــſܕܐ D **14** ܐƍــŷſܪ̈ BCDP: ܐƍــŶܪ̈ L **16** ųــƍƀƃ BCDL: ܐƍــƀƃ P **17** ܘܐܦ LP: ܐܦ BCD ܣŴـــſܪŴƘƢƘ BCDL, Epit.: ƑſܪŴـــƘƢƘ P | ܘƢـــŶܕ CDP: ƢـــŶܕ BL **18** ƑƀƇŹŴـــźƐſܐܪ CL: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƏܐܪ D: ܣŴــƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P **19** ܐƍــſƢŶܕ BCDP: ܐƍــſƢŶܕܐ L **20** ƎƀƊŶƦƉܕ BCDP: ƎƀƊŶƦƉ L **21** ƈܒŷƉ BCDL, Epit.: ƈܒƠƉ P | ܘܐܦ BCDL: ܐܦ P, Epit.

what it is in200. So, even if every fragrance of spices can be separated from them and reach our nostrils, it still cannot reach us without another substance which they are in. For even if it is separated from the spices, it is nonetheless in the air as in a certain body which is receptive of it and without which it cannot subsist201.

159 Also, from what follows we shall comprehend that fragrances do not reach our nostrils without certain substance. For, behold, if somebody places an apple in a house for many days it will shrivel and shrink, and from this it is clear that together with its fragrance, a certain substance wastes away and disperses from it. Also, when a man puts some vessel over his nostrils, even if there were spices, he will not sense their fragrance because he will breath clear air. This too makes apparent that when fragrances come into contact with a substance that is much denser than air, they are not perceived any more. So, it has become clear now that fragrances may never exist without some substance which they are in. Consequently, they also fit the above-mentioned account that defines universally the whole nature of accident202.

160 Others, among whom was also Porphyry, since they saw in the definition of accident proposed by Aristotle a certain contradiction with his teaching, sought to formulate it clearly and comprehensibly. Thus, they said that accident is "what comes to be in something and is separable from it without destroying it"203. However, there are quite a few contradictions also in this definition proposed by them. For of accidents some may be separated from what they

**<sup>200</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 28.12–13: πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν ᾧ ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν, "first of all, Aristotle did not say 'in which it was', but 'in which it is'." (= Philoponus, *In Cat.* 35.22–23). Thus, Ammonius stresses the present tense in Aristotle's words.

**<sup>201</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 28.11–15; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 35.21–24.

**<sup>202</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 28.16–29.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 35.24–36.13, Simplicius, *In Cat.* 49.10–14.

**<sup>203</sup>** Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.24–25: συμβεβηκὸς δέ ἐστιν ὃ γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς.

ܘƕܐƎƀƆ ܐƌƮŶܐ ųƀƙƇŶܘܢ܉ ܘųƍƉܘܢ Ɔܐ ƎƀƣƢƘƦƉ ƉــƦܘܡ ̣ƉــƎ <sup>ܗ</sup> r39P ̇ <sup>ܘ</sup> Ɖܐ ܕܓƎƀƣű ųƆ܂

	-

<sup>162</sup> ܘܐܦ ƇŶــƚ ܗƀƆــƎ ܕſــƎ Ɖــſƞܐ ̣ܗܝ ܬܘܒ ƙƊƆــơ ܒــƢܘŶܐ ܗƃــƍܐ܂ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܓƀƣűــƎ ܒــų: ܐſــƅ ̇ ƌــŴܢ ܕƆܐ ƀƠŶƢƉــƎ ̣ƉــƎ ܗ ܕܓــű <sup>15</sup> ̈ƣܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ̇ ܝ ܬܘܒ ܕƖƌܒܐ܉ ܘܐƎƘ Ɔܐ ƎƀƠŶƢƉ ܒų ܐܘŴƊƃܬܗ ܕƀƣŴƃܐ ܘܐƅſ ܗ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܒــųܘܢ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒƇƊــƦܐ ̈ Ɗƣܐ ܗ ܒƌƢƕŴƐܐ ̣ƎƉ ܓŴ ܐƇܒــŶ ܘܢųــƆ Ǝــſűܒƕ ܐƆ űــƃ ܘܢ܉ųــƍƉ ܢŴــƌܐ ƎƀƣƢƘƦƉ ܒܐƣŴŷܘܒ űƉܡ܂ ſƞƉܐ ̣ܗܝ ܓƢƀ ܕƦƌܪƌܐ ܘܐܦ ƀƣŴƃܐ ܘƖƌܒܐ ŶــŴ̈ܪܐ܉ ƃــű Ɔܐ ƀƄƌƦƉܐ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܕűŶ ųƍƉܘܢ ܒűƊܡ܂ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ܐܦ ƎƀƆųƆ ŷƆــƊܐ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܝ ƦƀƍƊŶƦƉܐ ܕܐܬܐƢƉܬ ܐܦ ܗƣܐ ̣ƎƉ ƈƖƆ܂ ̣ܗܝ ƦƇƉܐ ܗ

<sup>163</sup> ŷƄƤƉܐ ܕƎſ ܕܐܦ ƟŴƆܒƈ ܗ v39P ̇ ܝ ܕܐƢƀƉܐ ܒų ܒƉŴŶƦܐ: ܕƢƘƦƉܫ ƥƌܐ ƢƉܐƌܕ :ųƆ ƈܒŷ ̇ <sup>Ɖ</sup> ܐƆ űƃ ųܒ ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ ܐƉ <sup>ܘ</sup> ̇ C139r <sup>ܗ</sup> ƎƉ̣ ܐƣűܓ ƋƆ

̇ | P Ɔܐ ܙŴƕܪ .:Epit ,BCDL ܕƆܐ ܒŴƕŵܪ **<sup>4</sup>** ųſƦſܕܐ LP, Epit.: ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ BCD **<sup>5</sup>** ܐƀ ̈ Ɖܕ LP, Epit.: ̈ƍܐ ̈ ƍܐ :CD ܕܒ ܕܙܒ B **8** ƥƌܐ ƈƀƃܗ BCDL: ƈƀƃܗ ƥƌܐ P: ƥƌܐ ƎſűƉ Epit. | ƋƀƏܕܐܬܬ BCLP, D corr. in marg., Epit.: ƋŶܕܐܬܬ D **<sup>10</sup>** ܗܘܐ̣ [ om. L **<sup>11</sup>** ܢŴƌ ̇ ųƆ BCLP, Epit.: ܘܢųƆ D **14** ܬܘܒ [ om. B **<sup>16</sup>** ܬܗŴƊƃܐܘ LP, Epit.: ܬܘܒ ܬܐŴƊƃܐܘ BCD **<sup>17</sup>** ƎƉ̣ ] + ܐƣ̈ űܓ BCD **19** ܗܝ̣ [ om. B, Epit. | Ƣƀܓ [om. D **20** ܐܦ LP, Epit.: ܘܐܦ BCD **21** ܗܝ̣ [ om. P, Epit. **22** ܕܐܦ LP: ܐܦ BCD, Epit. **23** ܐƉ] om. P | ܐƆ…**196,12** ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ [om. P

occur in and destroyed by being replaced by another ones, while others may never be separated from what they occur in.

161 For instance, the blackness which occurs in the body of a man who has remained for a long time in the sun and which becomes his accident may be separated and removed from him after he has spent a considerable time washing himself in water and staying in the shade. But the blackness of an Ethiopian204 or a raven which is also their accident may never be separated and removed from the Ethiopian's skin or from raven's feathers. Thus, one may say that the definition formulated by Porphyry — i.e. that accident is "what comes to be in something and is separable from it without destroying it" — does not encompass all the accidents, but only those which may be separated and removed from what they are in, because the other ones, as we have said, are not separable from whose accidents they are205.

162 However, instead of this we shall rather bring forth the following argument. Even if those accidents which may not be removed from what they occur in, such as the blackness of an Ethiopian and also of a raven, are in actuality not separable from those bodies which they occur in, they nevertheless can be separated from them in speech and in thought without causing any destruction of them. For it is possible to imagine both an Ethiopian and a raven as white without bringing any harm to the substance of any of them206. Hence, they are also encompassed by the descriptive account that has been quoted above just now.

163 It is also possible for someone to say against what is stated in this definition — i.e. that accident is "separable from what it is in without destroying

**<sup>204</sup>** Syr. "the Cushite".

**<sup>205</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 111.7–18.

**<sup>206</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 111.11–15: εἴπομεν δὲ ἤδη ὅτι εἰ καὶ μὴ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀπογίνεται, ἀλλ' οὖν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ὁ κόραξ καὶ ὁ Αἰθίοψ λευκός, τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον οὐδὲ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ χωρίσαι δυνατόν· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ νοῆσαι ἄνθρωπον μὴ εἶναι ζῷον φθείρομεν αὐτόν, ἐπινοήσαντες δὲ τὸν κόρακα μὴ εἶναι μέλανα ἢ τὸν Αἰθίοπα οὐ φθείρομεν αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ὡς κόρακος ἢ ἀνθρώπου.

ܬܘܒ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ܕܐƦƣܐ ܐܦ ̣ܗܝ ܓƣűܐ űƉܡ ܐſƦſــų v93B ̇ : ܘܗܐ ŷƉܒــƇܐ ̇ ܘ ܕܗܘſܐ ܒــų܂ ܘŶƢƟــŴܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܗܘſܐ ܒƖƐــƢܐ: ̣ܗܝ ƆܓــƊƣŴܐ ܗ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܗܘſܐ ܒــų܂ ܕܐܦ ſųƀƇƕــƎ ܕܗƀƆــƎ ܬܘܒ ųــƆ ųــƆ ܐƇܒــŷƉܘ ̈ ــƍܐ ŷƄƤƉܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƌܐƢƉ ܐƌــƥ ܗƃــƍܐ܂ ܕܐƃــƌŵܐ ܕƉܐ ܕŶƦƉƦƉــƎ Ɖ ̇ ƆܐܪƉــƀƌŴܐ ųــƆ ƎــƇ ̈ ܒƦƀƠܪܐ ܐܘ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ƦƉܪƎƀƘ ƢſƦſ ƉــƎ Ɖܐ ܕܙܕܩ: ŷƉܒ ̈ ƇــƎ܉ ܗƃــƍܐ ܐܦ ܒŷƉ ܪܐƦــƀƠƆ ųــƆ ŴــƆ űƃ Ǝſųܕܒ ܐƦſŴƣ ܐƦƍƀƠƆܘ ܐƣـــƦܐ Ɔܐ ܗܘܐ ƙƆܓـــƢܐ ŷƉܒـــƇܐ ܐƆܐ ƆܐܪƉـــƀƌŴܐ ƣـــƦſŴܐ ܕŴƉܙܓų܂ űƃ ܕƎſ ŶƦƌܒƈ ̣ܗܘ ܗƌܐ ŴƉܙܓܐ܉ ܐƞƆܐ ܕܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ƘܓƢܐ v31L ܡűــƉ ܘ ̇ D78v ųــƆ ܐƣűܓــ ƈܒŷƉ ܐƃܗܪ ܐƆ ܐܦ ƎſűƉ ܂ųƊƕ ųƆ ƈܒŶƦƌ ܕܗ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܘܐ ܒــų܂ ܘܐܦ ŶƢƟــŴܬܐ ܕſــƎ Ɔܐ ܗܘܐ ܒƖƐــƢܐ ܕŷƉܒــƇܐ Ɔــų ̇ ܒƦƙƟƢƠܐ ųƍƀƃ ܓƣűܐ܂ ܐƅſ ܕܐܦ ̣ƉــƎ ܗܪƃܐ ̇ ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒų ܐųſƦſ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒų܂ ܬܘܒ ܬܬŵŶܐ܉ ܕƆܐ ŷƉܒƈ ܓƣűܐ ųƆ


**<sup>1</sup>** ܐƇܒــŷƉ ܘܗܐ L, Epit., D in marg.: ܐƇܒŷƉܘ BCD | ܐſܕܗܘ ܘ ̇ ŷƉܒƇܐ ̣ܗܝ ƆܓƊƣŴܐ ܗ ̇ ܗܘſܐ + [ܒــų ̇ ܘ **2** .marg in D ܘܗܐ ̣ܗܝ ŷƉܒــƇܐ ̣ܗܝ ƆܓــƊƣŴܐ ܕܒــų ܗ L, Epit.: ܐƉ BCD ܬܐŴŶƢƟܘ BCL, Epit.: ܬܐŴŷſƢƟܘ D **<sup>3</sup>** ܬܘܒ [om. L **<sup>4</sup>** ܗܝ̣ [ <sup>+</sup>ܬܘܒ L **<sup>5</sup>** ƎƇ ̈ ܒŷƉ BCD, Epit.: ƈܒــŷƉ L | ܐƀƌŴــƉܐܪƆ BCD, Epit.: ܬܐŴــƍƉܐܘƆ L **6** ܐƦــƍƀƠƆܘ BCL, Epit.: ܪܐƦــƀƠƆܘ D ƎــƇ ̈ ܒŷƉ BCD, Epit.: ƈܒŷƉ L | ܐܦ L, Epit.: ܘܐܦ BCD **10** ܐƢƖƐܒ CDL, Epit.: ܐƢƖƏܕ B **<sup>11</sup>** ܐƦƙƟƢƠܒ [+ ܘܗܝƦſܐ L **<sup>15</sup>** ƎƉ̣ ] om. L | ųܒ [om. B | ܐƣ̈ Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƦƀƆ űƉܡ ̣ƎƉ ܓű ̇ ܘܐ ܒų ̇ ܘ űƉܡ ܕܗ ̇ ŷܒƈ ܗ Ɖܕ [om. hom. C **<sup>16</sup>** ܘ ̇ ̇ ܘ .:Epit ,LP ܗ ųƆ BD | ųܒ ܘܐ ̇ ܕܗ LP, Epit.: ܘܐųƌܕ BD **19** ƎƘܘܐ LP: ƎƘܐ BCD **21** ܡűƉ] om. B

it" — the following207. Fever is a sort of accident too, but it certainly destroys the body in which it occurs. Also, baldness happens to hair, and it destroys the substrate in which it occurs. Further, one may say about these things the following. Just as the strings of a lyre (κιθάρα), when they are stretched either more tightly or more loosely than is required, destroy the harmony (ἁρμονία) and the coherence of the melody, without however destroying the lyre, so also fever does not destroy the body but the coherent harmony of its constitution. And only when the constitution itself is destroyed, is the body necessarily destroyed with it too. So, even here the accident does not destroy the substrate in which it occurs. For baldness does not exist in the hair which it destroys but its nature occurs to the skull, so that even from this case it may be seen that an accident does not destroy the substrate in which it occurs.

164 So, speaking concisely, everything that is in the world most of all desires the subsistence of it essence208 and flees always from its destruction. Thus, if none of the accidents can come to be without the substrate in which it occurs, it is obvious that there are no accidents that would destroy the thing to which they occur unless it would bring itself to destruction. What (has been said) about accident is sufficient for hearers.

#### *[Universals and particulars]209*

165 Since the universal and the particular were also included in the fourfold 1b10–24 division above, we shall also speak briefly about them, although they are evident to everyone. We ought to know that in substance, quantity and other genera we have certain genera that are primary and principal, which are the

**<sup>207</sup>** The following arguments and examples illustrating them are found in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 111.18–113.28. Cf. also Elias, *In Isag*. 91.5–93.8.

**<sup>208</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 112.12: ἕκαστον γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι ἐφίεται.

**<sup>209</sup>** For the description of the hierarchical structure of genera, species, and particulars known as the "Tree of Porphyry", see Porphyry, *Isag.* 4.1–8.6; Ammonius, *In Isag.* 70.5–71.11 and 77.15–79.14; Elias, *In Isag.* 63.6–34. The image of a tree appears in the treatise *On Genus, Species, and Individuality* that is ascribed to Sergius in the only manuscript in which it is preserved and in all likelihood indeed goes back to him. In this treatise, the division of the most generic genera into further genera, species, and particulars is presented in the image of a tree that has large boughs divided into branches and further into twigs and shoots, cf. Furlani 1925.

ܕܐųſƦſܘܢ ̣ܗŴƌܢ ܗƎƀƆ ƢƐƕܐ ܕƀźƟܓŴܪſــŴܣ܂ ܘܐſــƦ ܬܘܒ ܐŶــƌƮܐ ܕƎſƦŶƦƉ ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ܉ ܘܐƌƮŶܐ ܬܘܒ ܕŶܒƎƀƤƀ ƦŶƦƆ ųƍƉܘܢ܂ ܘܗŴƃܬ ̈Ɖܐ ƙƉــƣƮܐ ܕŶܒƀƤƀــƎ ̈ܐ ܐŶــſƮܐ: ܘƕــƉűܐ ƍƠƆــŴ ܬܘܒ Ɖűƕܐ Ɔܐܕƣ ŪƐƌܬܬ :ƎſƢ ̇ ̈ſƦܐ܂ ܕܬܬųƌܪ ܕƎſ ܗܕܐ ƆܐƎƀƇſ ܕƟ ̈ƣܐ ܬŶ ܐܕ ƎƉ̣ űŶ ƈƄܒ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܘŴƀƊƃܬܐ ܐƅſ ܕƦſŴŶƦƆܐ܂ <sup>5</sup>

 ƀــܐܬܐ ܓƀــƢ ŶܒــƤܐ ܂ Əܓ 166 ܐܘƀƏܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܓƍــƐܐ Ɖــűܡ ܐſƦſــų ̈Ɖــƀܐ܂ ƆܓــƊƣŴܐ ܘƆــƇܐ űƟ ܐƍƣܪ̈ŴƘ ƎſܪƦƆ ܓܐƇƘƦƉܘ ܂ ̇ C140r ųƍƉ ƦŶƦƆ ܓƊƣŴܐ܂ ̣ܘܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܓƊƣŴܐ ŭƇƘƦƉ ƙƆــŴ̈ܪƍƣܐ ܐŶــƌƮܐ ܕŶƦƆــƦ ̇ ܘ ųــƆܘ ܐƍــƤܓƢƊƆܘ ܂ƥــƙƌ ܐƆűــƆܘ ܐƍــƤƙƌ ܐƊƣŴܓــƆ Ǝــſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ P40r ƌܗ ܂ųƍƉ ܕܓƀƇــŵ ̣ƉــƎ ܪܓƤــƦܐ܂ ܒــų <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܕſــƎ ܒƉűــŴܬܐ܉ ܘܐܦ ܓــƊƣŴܐ Ƥƙƌــƍܐ ̇ ܘ ܕƆܐ ŶــƁ܂ ųــƆܘ ƁــŶܕ ܐƊƣŴܓƆ Ǝſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ L32r ƌܗ :ܐƌƮŶܐ ܐƍƣܪ̈ŴƙƆ ŭƇƘƦƉ ̇ ܘ ܬܘܒ ܕƁŶ ܘƦƉܬܙƗſ܉ ̇ ܘ ܕܓŵƀƇ ̣ƎƉ ܙܘƕܐ܂ ܘܗ ̇ ܘ ܕƦƉܬܙƗſ ܘųƆ ܘųƆ ̇ــŴ ŭƇƘƦƉ ܘܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ŴƙƆ̈ܪƍƣܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܕܐųſƦſܘܢ ƦŶƦƆ ųƍƉ: ܗƌ ܕƎſ ƇƀƇƊƆܐ ܘƇƆܐ ƇƀƇƉܐ܉ ܘƆܒƤƌƢܐ ܘƆܒƢƀƖܐ܂ ܒƤƌƢܐ ܕſــƎ ƇƘƦƉــŭ r79D ̇ــŴ ܕſــƎ źƇƙƆــŴܢ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ƍƠƆــŴ <sup>15</sup> ̈Ɖܐ ƙƉــƣƮܐ ܘŶܒƀƤƀــƎ ܒŷــű ƀƃــƍܐ: ܗƌ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕܒܐűſܐ ܒܐűſܐ܂ ܘƆܐƀƠƆܒƑſűƀ ܘƃƢƤƆܐ ܗ

̈

̇

<sup>167</sup> ܙܕܩ ܗƀƃــƈ ƊƆــűܥ ܕƇƃــųܘܢ ƘــŴ̈ܪƍƣܐ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕܐܬܬƊƀƏــŴ ̣ƉــƎ űــŶ űــŶ ƈــƃܕ ƈــźƉ ܉ƎــſƢƉܐƦƉ ܐŴܕܓــ ܐƀــƏܐܘƆ ܐƉűــƕ ܐƤــƌƢܒ ̇ ̈űܕܐ ܐܘ Ŷ ƎƉ̣ Ǝ ̈ ̇ ܒƥ ܬŴŶܬܘܗܝ ܕƙƇŷƤƉ ̈ ܬܐ Ŷ ̈ܬܐ Əܓƀܐ ųƍƉܘܢ ܨܒŴ ̇ ƌــŴܢ ܕƀƀƇƕــƎ ̈ƣܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ܐܦ ƘــŴ̈ܪƍƣܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ̇ ܒܐܕ ܒŴƙܪƍƣܐ ܕŴƍƟ <sup>20</sup> ̈Ɖܐ ܐܘ űــŶ űــŶ ƈــƃܕ ƈــźƉ ܐ܂Ŵܕܓ ܘܢųſƦſܕܐ ƎſƢƉܐƦƉ ƢſƦſ ܕܐ܉ű̈ B94v | <sup>Ŷ</sup> ƎƉ̣ C140v

̈Ɛܐ + [ƢƐƕܐ **<sup>1</sup>** ƍܓ BCD | ܣŴſܪŴܓƀźƟܕ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟܕ C: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓŹܐƟܕ B: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟܕ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟܐƟܕ D **3** ܐƉűƕ] om. B | ܐſƮŶܐ BCDP: ƎƘܐ L **4** űŶ] + űŶ BCD | ܪųƌܕܬܬ LP: ܪųƌܘܕܬܬ BCD **7** ܓܐƇƘƦƉܘ CDLP, Epit.: ܐƣƢƘƦƉܘ B | ܐƍƣܪ̈ŴƘ LP, Epit.: Ǝƀƍƣܪ̈ŴƘ BCD **8** ܐƊƣŴܓــ1 CDL, Epit.: ܡŴــƤܓ B: ܐƊــƀƤܓ P | ܘܗܘ̣ [ om. B **9** ƥــƙƌ LP, Epit.: ܐܫƙƌ BCD **13** ܘܐܦ LP: ܐܦ BCD, Epit. **15** űŷܒ CDLP, Epit.: űŶ ƦŶܬ B **16** ƑſűƀܒƀƠƆܐƆܘ C: ƑſűܒƀƠƆܐƆܘ D: ƑſűƀܒƠƆܐƆܘ BP: ƑſűƀܒƍƠƆܐƆܘ L **17** ܘܢųƇƃܕ BCLP, Epit.: ܘܢųƇƄܕܒ D | ƎƀƇſܐ BCD: ƎƀƇſܗ L: om. P, Epit. **<sup>18</sup>** ܐƉűƕ CDLP, Epit.: ܐƉűƕܘ B **<sup>20</sup>** ̇ ̈Ɖܐ ܐܘ ŴƍƟܕ ܐƍƣܪŴƙܒ [om. hom. P ܐܦ [om. LP

ten categories. There are also other ones that are subordinated to them, and still other ones that are subsumed below the latter ones, and all the way down until the last species and the separate individuals210 that are encompassed by all lower species. In order to explain this to readers, let us take substance and quantity as examples.

166 Now, substance is a certain genus, for there are multiple things that are subsumed beneath it. It is divided primarily into two differentiae, i.e. into body and incorporeal. Body in turn is further divided into other differentiae that are beneath it, namely into animate and inanimate body and into percipient and deprived of perception. In the same way, also animate body is divided into other differentiae, namely into living body and lifeless body and into moving and deprived of motion. Now, living and moving body is further divided into other differentiae which are below it, namely into rational and non-rational and into man and animal. As for man, it is divided only into individuals that are separate and confined by one nature, namely into Plato, Alcibiades, and any other single person211.

167 Now, we ought to know, since each one of those differentiae that are said to be positioned between man below and universal substance above subsumes under itself multiple things that differ from one another either through the division of individuals or through species, that those differentiae that stand higher than others are also called more universal because each one of them

**<sup>210</sup>** Syr. *qnome*.

**<sup>211</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 77.16–78.4: τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μέν ἐστι σῶμα τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον, καὶ τοῦ σώματος τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἔμψυχον τὸ δὲ ἄψυχον, καὶ τοῦ ἐμψύχου τὸ μὲν ζῷον τὸ δὲ φυτὸν τὸ δὲ ζωόφυτον <...> πάλιν δὲ τοῦ ζῴου τὸ μέν ἐστι λογικὸν τὸ δὲ ἄλογον, καὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ τὸ μὲν θεὸς τὸ δὲ ἄνθρωπος, πάλιν δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ μὲν Σωκράτης τὸ δὲ Πλάτων καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος.

ƎــƉܘ̣ ųــƊƣ ƎــƉ̣ <sup>ܒ</sup> ̇ ̇ ܒــƥ܂ ܘſــų Ŷ ųــƍƉ ƦŶƦƆܕ ܢŴƌ ̇ ųƍƉܘܢ ųƇƃܘܢ ܗ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕƦŶƦƆ ųƍƉ܂ ųƍƀƃ ųƇƄƆܘܢ ܗ

̇

 Ƣ ܐƌܐ ܕƎſ ܕܐƅſ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ܒƤƌƢܐ ƘــŴܪƍƣܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܘܐܕƣܐ 168 ܐƉ ̇ ܘ Ŷــƀܐ܂ ܗƌܐ ܗƀƃــƈ ܒƌƢــƤܐ ܕܓــŴܐ ܐſــƅ ܕܐƌƢƉــƎ ܕܓــƊƣŴܐ ܗ ƎــƉ̣ űــŶ űــŶܕ ܐſ̈ űــƀŷſ ܐƉ̈ ŴــƍƟ ܢŴــƌ ̇ ƢƟƦƉܐ: ƈźƉ ܕŶ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܒƥ Ƈƃــųܘܢ ܗ ܡűــƉ ƦــƀƆܕ ƈــźƉ ܉ƎــſųƉƦƤƉ ܐƉ̈ ̈ſܐ ܕƎſ ̣ܗŴƌܢ ŴƍƟ űƀŷſ ܐ܂Ƥ̈ ܒƍƀƍ ̇ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܕŶܒƥƀ ƦŶƦƆ ųƍƉܘܢ: ܘƆܐ ƇƘƦƉܓƎƀ ŴƙƆ̈ܪƍƣܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܐܘ ̇ ܒــƥ ̈ƣܐ܂ ̣ܘܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܓƊƣŴܐ Ŷــƀܐ ܕܓــŴܐ ƦƉܐƉــƢ܉ źƉــƈ ܕŶ Ɔܐܕ ƆܒƤƌƢܐ ܕܓŴܐ ܘƆܒƢƀƖܐ: ܕƎƀƤſƢƘ ̣ƎƉ űŶ v40P ̈ܕܐ ŴƆ ܒƍƀƍƊܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ܐƆܐ ܘܐܦ ܒܐܕƣܐ: ܘųſ <sup>10</sup> ̇ <sup>ܒ</sup> ųƆܘܢ ܬܘܒ ̣ƎƉ ƣــųƉŴܗ ̣ܘƉــƎ ƍƀƃــų: źƉــƈ ̇ ܘ܂ ܕܐܦ ܒƤƌƢܐ ܘܒƢƀƖܐ ƦƉܐſƢƉــƎ ܕƀƀŶــƎ ܒƀƐƍܒــŴܬܐ ܕƃــųƀƌŴ ܕܗ ̇ ܒــƥ ܓƀــƢ ܘܓــƊƣŴܐ ܬܘܒ Ƥƙƌــƍܐ ƦƉܐƉــƢ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܕܓــŴܐ܂ Ŷ ̇ ܘ ƀŶܐ ܘųƇƄƆܘܢ ŴƘ̈ܪŴƍƣܗܝ܂ ܘƐƌܒƀــƎ ܘܐܦ ̣ܗƌــŴܢ ̣ƉــƎ ܬŴŶܬܘܗܝ ųƆ Ǝــſܕ ̇ C141r | L32v ųܒــ ܬܐ܂ŴــƀŶ ܐܦ ܐƤــƌƢܒ ܐܦ ܐƍــƤƙƌ Ƣــƀܓ ܐƢــƟƦƉ ܂ųƀƌŴــƃ ܒƉűــŴܬܐ ܐܦ ܓــƊƣŴܐ ܐܦ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ܕܓــŴܐ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ܉ źƉــƈ <sup>15</sup> ܘܢ܂ųƀƌŴــƃ ƎــƉ̣ ܘܢųــƆ Ǝــƀܒųſܘ :ƦــŶƦƆܕ ܐƍƣܪ̈ŴــƘ ܘܢųــƇƃ ƎــƀƤܒŶܕ ƢƟƦƉܐ ܓƢƀ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܓƊƣŴܐ ܘܓƊƣŴܐ ƍƤƙƌܐ ܘŴƀŶܬܐ ܘܒƤƌƢܐ: ̈Ɖܐ ̇ ƌــŴܢ ƘــŴ̈ܪƍƣܐ ܐŶــƌƮܐ ܕܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܒܐܘƏــƀܐ: ܘƍƟــŴ ܘƇƃــųܘܢ ܗ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕƦŶƦƆ: ܕƆܐ ƇƘƦƉܓƎƀ űƊƆܡ ܐƎſƢŶ܂ ̈ſܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ܬܘܒ űƀŷſ

̈ــſƦܐ ƐƌܒƀــƎ Ŷܬ ܐƍƣܪ̈ŴــƘ ܘܢųــƇƃ ܉ƢــƉܐƊƆ Ƣــƀܓ ܐƦــ̈ D79v ƠƀƐƙܒ <sup>169</sup> ƎــƀƍƃƦƉ ܐƆ ܐ܉ƀــƇ̈ ƕ Ǝــſܕ ܢŴــƌ ̇ ƣــųƉŴܐ ܕܗ r95B ̇ ƌــŴܢ ܕƖƆــƈ ƍƉــųܘܢ܂ ܗ ̈ſƦܐ܂ ƈƃ ܒƤƌƢܐ ܓƀــƢ Ŷــƀܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܘƤƙƌــƍܐ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܬŶ ܒųƉŴƤܐ ܕܗ ܘܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ŴƆ ܕƎſ ƈƃ ܕƁŶ ܒƤƌƢܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ܉ ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕܒƢƀƖܐ܂ ܘƆܐ ƈƃ ܕƥƙƌ ƁŶ܉ ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕƞƌܒــƦܐ܂ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ƃــƈ ܕܐܘƏــƀܐ ̣ܗܘ ܕƙƌــƥ ̣ܗܘ܉ ̇ Ǝ ܐųſƦſܘܢ܉ ܕƥƙƌ ܕƎſ ̈Ɛƀܐ܂ ܗƎƀƆ ܓƢƀ ܐܘƀƏܐ Ɖ ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕƃܐ <sup>25</sup> ̈ Ƙܐ ܘƟ

**11** ųƀƌŴــƃܕ ܬܐŴܒــƀƐƍܒ BCDL, Epit.: ܬܗŴܒــƀƐƍܒ P **13** ܬܘܗܝŴــŶܬ [+ ܐܦ BC, D in marg. **14** Ǝſܕ [om. L **15** ܐܦ1 LP, Epit.: ܘܐܦ BCD | ܐܦ ܐƊƣŴܓ [om. B | ܐܦ2 LP, Epit.: ܘܐܦ CD **16** ƦŶƦƆܕ [+ ܘܢųƍƉ BCD, Epit. **24** ƈƃ] om. D

contains all those that are lower than it and shares with them both its name and its nature212.

168 What I mean is this. Man is a differentia and a species of living body, as we have said. Thus, this man is called universal, since he encompasses every particular individual from all the human beings. And individuals are called particular213, because there is nothing else that they subsume under themselves and they are not further divided into parts and species. Also, living body is said to be universal, since it encompasses universal man and animal — which differ from one another not only in number but also in species — and shares with them also its name and its nature, for both man and animal are said to be living due to their partaking in its name. Further, also animate body is said to be universal, since it subsumes under itself living being and all its parts, and they partake in its name, for both man and animal are called living. In the same way, body and substance are universals, since they encompass all differentiae below and make them partakers in their name. For body, animate body, animal, and man, as well as other differentiae that are in substance and particular individuals below that are not divided into anything else, are all called substances.

169 To sum this up: All lower differentiae partake in the name of those above them, while the higher ones are not called by the name of the lower ones. So, every man is living, animate, and substance. But not every living being is a man, e.g. animals, neither is every animate being living, e.g. plants. And further, not everything that is substance is animate, e.g. stones and wood, for they are

**<sup>212</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 78.5–15.

**<sup>213</sup>** Syr. *iḥidaya*, "single", here probably reflecting the Gr. ἄτομος (cf. Porphyry, *Isag.* 6.13), since Sergius stresses that particulars may not be further divided into parts.

Ɔܐ ƎſƢƟƦƉ܂ ܗŴƃܬ ܕƎſ ܐܦ ƈƃ ܕƁŶ܉ ƢƟƦƉܐ ƍƤƙƌܐ ܘܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ܘƈƃ r41P C141v ƎƉ̣ ܗܘ̣ ܐƀƏܕܐܘ ܐƉ ƈƃ Ǝſܕ ŴƆ ܐ܂ƀƏܐܘ ųƉƦƤƉ ܬܘܒ ܗܘ̣ ƥƙƌܕ ̇ ܒƤƌƢܐ܂ ̇ ŴƀŶܬܐ ܐܘ ̇ ƍƤƙƌܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐܘ ƈƃ ƢƘܘܣ ܓƊƣŴܐ ̣ܗܘ ܐܘ ̈ــƐܐ ̇ ܝ ܕܐſƢƉــƎ ܗܘſــƎ ƢſųƌܐſــƦ܉ ܕƇƃــųܘܢ ܓƍ ̇ ܗ ųــƆ ƦſŵŶܐܬ ƎſűƉ ܘܢųــƇƄƆ :ܘܢųــƍƀƃ ƎــƉܘ ܗܘܢųƉŴــƣ ƎــƉ Ǝــƀܒųſ ܕܐ̈ <sup>5</sup> űــŶ ƎƉ̣ ƎƀƀƇƕܕ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ̈ſܐ ܕƆܐ ܬܘܒ ƇƘƦƉܓƎƀ܂ <sup>ܗ</sup> űƀŷſ ܐƉŴ̈ ƍƠƆ ܐƉűƕ ܐſƦ̈ ̈ƣܐ ܬŶ ܐܕ ̇ ƌــŴܢ ܕܐſƦſــųܘܢ ƖƆــƈ ƍƉــųܘܢ ܒƖƣƢــƦܗ: ܘƆܐ ̈ــſƦܐ Ɔܐ ųƆ ܕƎſ ܬŶ ƎــƉ̣ ܘܡƦــƉ Ǝــƀܒųſ ܘܢ܉ųــƍƉ ƎــƀƠƀŶܘܪ ƢــſƦſ ƎــƀƇƖƉܕ ܬܘܒ ܢŴــƌ ̇ ųƆ ܘܢ܂ųƍƀƃ ƎƉ̣ ̇ ųƉŴƣܗܘܢ ܐܘ

	- **<sup>3</sup>** ܐƊƣŴܓ [om. B **<sup>5</sup>** ܗܘܢųƉŴƣ BCDP: ܘܢųſųƉŴƣ L, Epit. | ܘܢųƍƀƃ BCDP, Epit.: ܘܢųƀ̈ ƍƀƃ <sup>L</sup>**<sup>8</sup>** Ǝƀܒųſ] + ƎƉ̣ BCD **<sup>9</sup>** ܗܘܢųƉŴƣ BCDL, Epit.: ܘܢųƉŴƣ P | ƎƉ̣ ̇ ܐܘ LP, Epit.: ƎƉܘ BCD **<sup>10</sup>** ܬܘܒ [om. B | ܬܐŴƉűܒ [+ Ǝſܕ B **<sup>11</sup>** <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ ƌܗ ܐƍƣܪ̈ŴƘ ƎſܪƦƆ ƦƀƉűƟ ܗܘ̣ ܘܐܦ Ƣƀܓ [om. B **13** ơƐƙƉ L: ơƐƘƦƉ BCD: ܫƢƙƉ P | ܐŹܪŴƐƆ BCDP: ܐŹƢƐƆ L **14** ܐſƦƙܘܒ LP: ܐſƦƘܘ BCD **<sup>15</sup>** ܐƊƀ̈ <sup>Ɵ</sup> BCDP: ܐƉ̈ ŴƍƟ L **19** ƈƀƃܗ BCDL: ƈƀƄƉ P | ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ BCD | ųܒ [om. P **<sup>20</sup>** ܐܦ L: ܘܐܦ BCDP | űŶ2] om. B **<sup>21</sup>** ̇ ܐܘ2 CDLP: ܐܦ B **23** ƎƤſƮƘܕ BL, D add. sup. lin.: ƎƀƤſƢƘܕ C: ƥſƢƘܕ P

substances but they are not called animate. Similarly, every living being is called animate and substance, and everything animate is also designated as substance. But not everything that is substance is necessarily body, or animate, or living, or man. Hence, what was stated has become clear, i.e. that all genera that are higher than others share their name and their nature with the lower species all the way down to particular individuals which are not further divided, while the lower ones never provide with their name or with their nature either those which are immediately above them or those which are further elevated and remote from them.

170 In the same way we also speak about the genus of quantity. For it too is originally divided into two differentiae, i.e. into the one which is continuous and contains no portions and another one which is discrete and divisible. Also, the one which is continuous and has no portions is further divided into line which is comprehended only through length, into surface whose subsistence is through length and breadth, and also into body whose nature exists in three dimensions, i.e. in length, breadth, and depth. As for the other differentia of quantity which is discrete and divisible, it is further divided into number and time. Each one of them is subdivided into other parts contained in it which are called particulars.

171 Now, all the higher differentiae which the genus of quantity has are also said universally, since they encompass each one of those things that are beneath them, i.e. either their parts that are particulars or other differentiae which differ from each other in species. Particulars, then, are all the lower parts of the species which differ from each other only in number. Universals, on ƎƀƤ ̇ ̈Ɛܐ ܕŶܒ ̈ƣܐ ܘܓƍ ̈ܕܐ܂ ܕܓŴܐ ܕƎſ ƎſƢƟƦƉ ųƇƃܘܢ ܐܕ űŶ ƎƉ̣ ܕŴŷƇܒ ̈Ʀſܐ ܐƆܐ ܐܦ ŴƘ̈ܪƍƣܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ űƀŷſ Ǝƀƌ ̇ ƦŶƦƆ ųƍƉܘܢ܉ ŴƆ ܒŴŷƇܕ ܗ ܂ƎƀƆųƆ ƎſųƆ ƎƀƤܒŶܕ

̈Ǝ ܬƎƌ: ƦƐƉ ܕűƌܥ ܐƥƌ ܕƍƉܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ̣ܗܘ Ɖܐ ƠƙƏ ƈƀƃܗ ƎƀƆܗ 172 ܕƟƦƉــƢܐ ܕܓــŴܐ: ̣ܘܗܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ űƀŷſܐſــƦ܂ źƉــƈ ܗƀƃــƈ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܘ ܕܐܬƐƌܒــŴ ƍƉــų ̈ ܐ ܐܬܬƊƀƏــŴ ܒƢܘƣــƊܐ ܗ ܕܐܪܒــƖܐ Ɗƣــų ̇ ܝ ̇ ܝ ܕܓــŴܐ ܘܗ ܐܪܒــƖܐ ̈ܪܘƃــܒܐ: ܗƌ v142C ̇ــŴ ܕſــƎ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ܘܓــƣűܐ ܘܗ ̇ ܝ ̇ ܝ ܕܓــŴܐ ܘƕــƈ ܗ ܕűƀŷſܐſــƦ܂ ܙܕܩ ƊƆــűܥ ܕƕــƈ ܓــƣűܐ ܘƕــƈ ܗ ܐƉ ƅــſܐ Ǝــſܕ ƢــƉܐƌ ܐ܂ƣųƆ ܐƉűƕ ƎƌƢƉܐ ƦſܐƠƙƏ ܉Ʀſܐűƀŷſܕ ܕƍſƞƉــƎ ̣ƉــƎ ܗܪƃܐ ƕــƈ ܐܘƏــƀܐ܉ <sup>ܗ</sup> <sup>10</sup> ̇ <sup>ܝ</sup> ̣ܕܗܝ ƀƏــƊܐ ܪƣܐ ܕƐƕــƢܐ ̇ ܘ ܕƈƕ ƀźƟܓŴܪŴſܣ܂ ̈Ɛܐ ܒƦƄܒܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ܓƍ

̈ƀܐ ƦƉܐƢƉܐ ܐܘƏــƀܐ܂ 173 ƦƀƉűƟ ܗƈƀƃ ܙܕܩ ƊƆܒƖܐ܉ ܕܒƊƄܐ ܙƌ ̇ ŴƍƙƇƉܬܐ ܕܒƄــƦܒܐ ƈźƉ ܕŴƆ ƈƕ ƈƃ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܐűſܐ ̣ܕܗܝ ܐųſƦſ ̈ Ʀܐ ܘƎſųƍƉ źƀƤƘ ƎſųſƦſܐ ƑƀƏ̈ ܗƌܐ܂ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܗƈƀƃ ܕƎſųƍƉ ܕܐܘ ̇ ̇ ƀƌــƎ ƃƮƉܒــƦܐ ܐܘ ̇ ƀƉــƦ̈ܪܢ ̣ƉــƎ <sup>ܗ</sup> ̈źƀــƦܐ܉ ܐܘ ƤƘ Ǝƀƌ ̇ L33v | B96r ܘܗ ܐ܂ƦܒƃƮƉ Ǝƀƌ ̈ ̈ Ʀܐ ܕƦƀƉ̈ܪܢ ̣ƎƉ ܗ źƀƤƘ Ǝƀƌ ̈ ܗ ƈƀƃܗ Ƒƀ ̈ P42r Əܐܘ ƈƕ ܂ƎſųƍƉ ܢƮſƞܒ Ŵ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕųƉƦƤƉܐ ܬܐܘŴƆܓƀܐ: ܗƌ ̇ ܗ ųƇƃ ܬܐŴƍƙƇƉ ̇ ܕƃƮƉܒƎ܉ ܐųſƦſ ̈ Ʀܐ ܕܐſųſƦſــƎ źƀƤƘ Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ ƎƀƆܗ Ǝƀƌ ̈ ̈ Ʀſܐ܂ ƈźƉ ܕܗ ܕƎſ ܕƈƕ ܐųƆ ̈Ǝƀ ܕ̈ܪƎƠƀŶ ̣ƎƉ ܗܘƆܐ ̣ܘƎƉ ƌܐ ƎƀƆܗ :ܐƦܒƃƮƉ Ǝƀƌ ̈ ܒŴƀƇƖƊܬܐ ŴƆܬ ܗ ŶܒƇܐ: ܘƮſűƉܢ ܒŴźܒŴƌƦܬܐ ܒŵƇƄܒــƎ ܕƆܐ ƕܒــƢܐ܉ ܕſųƀƇƕــƎ ܕܗƀƆــƎ r143C ̈ƀــƍܐ ƃ ܬŴــƆ ƎــƉ̣ ܗƦƕűƀܒ ơƐƊƆ ܒܐ ̇ ̇ ƦƇƉܐ ƈƄƆ ܐƍſܐ ܕܨ ܐųſƦſ ̈ ƀܐܐ܂ ̈ƍſܐ: ܘƖƊƆܒű ŴƍƙƇƉܬܐ ܕƀƇƖƉܐ ̣ƎƉ Əܓ ŵŶƦƉ

> **<sup>4</sup>** ܐƍƉܕ CDL: ܐƍƉ BP | ܐƉ] om. P **<sup>5</sup>** ܐƉ BCDL: Ǝ ̇ Ɖ P **7** ܐƖܐܪܒ BDLP: ܐƖܒܐܪܒ C **<sup>8</sup>** ܙܕܩ [+ ƈƀƃܗ BCD **<sup>9</sup>** ܐƉ DLP: ܐƊƃ BC **<sup>11</sup>** ܘ ̇ ̇ ܝ :BCDL ܗ ܗ P | ܣŴſܪŴܓƀźƟ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟ P: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓųŹܐƟ D: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴŹܐƟ B; + ܐƀƏܐܘ ƈƕ L, + ܐƊƄܕܒ ܐƀƏܐܘ ƈƕ ̈ƀܐ ƦƉܐƢƉܐ ƌܙ BCD **<sup>13</sup>** ƈƃ] om. D | ܬܐŴƍƙƇƉ CDLP: ܥűƊƆ B **<sup>14</sup>** ƑƀƏ̈ ܕܐܘ CLP, Epit.: ̈ ƀܐܣ Əܕܐܘ BD **<sup>16</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CL: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD: ܣŴƀ ̈ Əܐܘ P | Ǝƀƌ ̈ ܗ1 BCDP: ƎƀƆܗ L | Ǝƀƌ ̈ + [2ܗ Ǝƀƌ ̈ <sup>ܗ</sup> ƎƉ̣ ܪܢ̈ƦƀƉܕ B (ditt.) **<sup>18</sup>** ƈƕܕ BCDL: ƈƕ P | Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CL: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD: ܣŴƀ ̈ Əܐܘ P **20** ܢƮſűƉܘ LP: ܢƮſűƉܘ ƎſųſƦſܘܐ BCD | ܐƢܒƕ BCDP: ܐűܒƕ L

the other hand, are called all those species and genera which encompass not only particulars that are beneath them, but also other differentiae that encompass the latter.

172 So, what (has been said) thus far should be sufficient for anyone in order to understand what is called universal and what exists particularly214. We ought to know, however, that although four terms have been applied in the table (above) — namely substance, accident, universal, and particular — from which four combinations derive, up to this point we have sufficiently spoken about accident, about universal, and about particular. Thus, from now on let us speak, according to our ability, about substance which is established as the head of the ten genera in the book *Categories*215.

#### *[On substance]216*

173 First of all, we shall investigate in how many ways substance is spoken of, 2a11–34 for the teaching of this book is not about every kind of substance. So, we say that of substances some are simple and others composite. The simple ones are either superior to the composite ones or inferior to them217. The simple substances which are superior to the composite ones are subjects of the whole science that is called theology (θεολογία), which means "on the divine". It is concerning these simple substances that are exalted above the composite ones and, being remote from matter and corruption, abide always in the beatitude which does not pass away that the word is (directed) to everyone who desires to ascend in his knowledge above the visible natures and to be taught what is exalted above many218.

**<sup>214</sup>** Sergius leaves Chapter 4 of the *Categories* (1b25–2a10) out of his *Commentary*, since he has already suggested an overview of the ten categories in §§95ff. as one of the subject matters among the *prolegomena*.

**<sup>215</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.12–13: πρώτην τάξιν ἔχει ἡ οὐσία ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων αὐτὴν προέταξεν (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.8–9).

**<sup>216</sup>** Ms. L has the subtitle "On substance". Mss. BCD: "On substance and in what ways it is said". Ammonius notes (*In Cat*. 66.14–19) that the version of Aristotle's *Categories* which he used contained two subtitles, "On substance" and "On relatives". It is thus possible that Sergius himself included this rubric in the text of his *Commentary*. On the rubrics, see further Philoponus, *In Cat*. 133.21–23 and Simplicius, *In Cat*. 207.27–208.21.

**<sup>217</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.18–19: τῆς δὲ οὐσίας ἡ μέν ἐστιν ἁπλῆ ἡ δὲ σύνθετος, καὶ τῆς ἁπλῆς ἡ μὲν κρείττων τῆς συνθέτου ἡ δὲ χείρων (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.23–24).

**<sup>218</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.25–29: ἁπλῆ δὲ καὶ κρείττων τῆς συνθέτου ἡ ἀγγελικὴ καὶ ἡ ψυχικὴ καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται <...> διαλέγεται δὲ ἐνταῦθα ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης οὔτε περὶ τῆς ἁπλῆς καὶ κρείττονος τῆς συνθέτου (οὐ γὰρ πρόκειται αὐτῷ θεολογεῖν).


**<sup>1</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CL: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD: ܣŴƀ ̈ Əܐܘ P | Ǝƀ̈ ƌܗ BCDL: ƎƀƆܗ P **<sup>2</sup>** ̇ ųſƦſܐ CLP: ƎſųſƦſܐ BD ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ :LP Ɖܐ ܗ BCD **4** ܐƣܘܕܐܕ BCDL: ܐƣܘܐܕ P **5** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDP: ܬܐŴƙƐƇƀƘ L ܐƦــƀƍƀƃ BDLP: ܐƦــƍƀƃ C | ܘܢųــƇƃ BCDP: ܘܢųــƇƃܘ L | ܬŴــƉűܒ BCDL: ܬܐŴــƉűܒ P **6** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ CL: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ D: ƑƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P **7** ƈƀƃܗ [om. L ̈ ــƎ **8** ƊƀƟƦƉ LP: ƎــƀƊƀƟƦƉ BCD **<sup>9</sup>** ܒܐƟ ̈ Ŵــƕܕ LP: ܒܐƟŴــƕܘ BCD **13** ܬܐŴــƇƀƇƉܕ BCDL: ̈ ــƎ **14** P ܕܒƇƀƇƊــŴܬܐ ƊƀƏܬƦƉ CDP: ƎــƀƊƀƏܬƦƉ BL **<sup>15</sup>** ܐ ̈ Ɛــƍܓ BL: Ǝــƀ ̈ Ɛƍܓ CDP ܣŴــſܪ̈ŴܓƀźƟܕ L: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓــŹܐƟܕ B: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــźƟܕ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــųŹܐƟܕ D: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓــźƟܕ P **<sup>17</sup>** ܐƦźƀƤƘ BCDP: ܐƦźƀƤƘܕ L **<sup>18</sup>** ܐƦſ ̈ ųƆܐ ƈƕ CLP: ܐƦſ ̈ ųƆܐ D: ܐƦſ ̈ ųƆܐƆ B **21** ܐŴŷƉ BDLP: ܐſŴŷƉ C


175 So, the composite substance, which is, as we have said, between the simple divine one that is superior to it and the simple natural one that is inferior to it, forms the subject of discussion for all those who apply the discipline of logic. And since this is how these things are established in all the writings on the rules (κανόνες) of logic, it was this (substance) that was placed in the teaching as primary among the ten genera of the *Categories*.

176 Thus, O brother, it was not the intention of the Philosopher to speak in this book about the simple substance which is superior to the composite one, for it shall be the concern of someone who teaches about the divine. Neither is he writing here about the other simple (substance) which is inferior and lower then the composite one, for he speaks about it, as we have said, in the treatises on natures. Instead, his goal here is to teach about the composite substance

**<sup>219</sup>** For ἔνυλον εἶδος, cf. Dexippus, *In Cat*. 40.30.

**<sup>220</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.21–22: ἁπλῆ δὲ καὶ χείρων τῆς συνθέτου ἡ ὕλη ἡ πρώτη καὶ τὸ εἶδος· ταῦτα γὰρ τῶν συνθέτων ἕνεκα παραλαμβάνονται.

̇ ܕƈƕ ŴƇƀƇƉܬܐ܂ ܘƖſűſܐ ܘܓƇــƀܐ ̇ ܒܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ųƇƃ ܕƎƍƀŷƤŶƦƉ ܒų ̈ƍܐ ܕܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ƙƆŴſܕ ܐƦƇƖƉ ܬŴƆ ƎƀܒƢƟƦƉ ƦſܘܐƢƣܕ ƎƀƇſܐƆ

177 ܙܕܩ ƎſűƉ ܐܦ ܗܕܐ ƠƖƊƆܒŴ܉ ܕƈźƉ ƍƉܐ ƈƕ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܗܘſܐ ܡűƟ ƎƉ̣ Ǝſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ ̈Ɛܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ: ܗƌ ƍܓ ܐƖƣܬ ܢŴƌ ̇ C144r <sup>ܗ</sup> ܡűƟ ƎƉ̣ ܬܐŴƍƙƇƉ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܬƖƣܐ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ܘܙƌܐ ܘܗ <sup>5</sup> ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕƃƢƣܐ܂ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܗƈƀƃ ܕƈźƉ ܕܗ űŶ ƈƕ ܐƠƀƍƏ ܐƆ Ǝſܕ ܗܕܐ :ܢŴƊƀƟƦƌܕ ƎƀƠƀƍƏ ܐƀƏܐܘ ƈƕ ܐƐ̈ ܓƍ ̇ ̇ ܂ źƉــƈ ܗƌܐ ƠƀƉــƢܐ ƇƉــƦܐ ܕƀƇƕــų ƍƉــųܘܢ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܐſƦſــų ܒƊſűƠــŴܬܐ܂ ܘźƉــƈ <sup>ܗ</sup> r81D ̇ <sup>ܝ</sup> ܬܘܒ ܕܐܢ ̣ܗܘ ܕܬܬƐƌــŪ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ƉــƎ ̈Ɛܐ ܐŶــƌƮܐ܂ ܐܢ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܓƍ ̈ ܘܢ ܗ ųſƦƖƣܬ ܘܢųƆ ƎƀƠƇŹƦƉ ܐ܉ƦƕƞƉ ܕƎſ ƦƌܒŴƇźܢ ܗƎƀƆ܉ Ɔܐ ܐܒűܐ ̣ܗܝ ܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ŷƉܒƇܐ ܓƢƀ ųƊƕ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ƈƄƆ ܂ƈƃ ƎƉ ܐƇܒŶƦƉ ܐƆ űƃ

̇ ƀƉűƟــƦܐ <sup>178</sup> ƦƉܬƊƀƏܐ ܗƀƃــƈ ܒƍƙƇƊــŴܬܐ ̣ܗܝ ܐܘƏــƀܐ܉ ƍƉــų ̈Ɖܐ ŴƍƟ ƎƉ̣ űŶ ƈƃ ܐ܉ƀƏܐܘ ܐſƢƟƦƉ Ǝſܕ ܐƦƀƉűƟ ܂Ǝſܕܬܪܬ ̇ ܘųƍƉ ƎــſųƆ ƎــƀƃƢƣܕ :ƈــƖƆ ƎــƉ ƢــƉܕܐܬܐ Ǝــƀƌ ̈ ̈ſــƦܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> űƀŷſ ܬܐ̈ B97r ŴــƍƉܘ ̇ ̈ƣܐ܂ ܐſــƅ ܐƌــƥ ƌܐƉــƢ ƏــƑƀŹƢƟŴ ܒŷƇــŴܕܘܗܝ ܐܘ ܕܐܕ ܘܢųƀܓƆ̈ P43r ŴــƘ ̇ ܕƆܐ ̈ܬܐ ܐƀƌƮŶــƦܐ ܕƙƌــƥ ܐܘ Ŵܨܒــ ƎƉ ܐűŶ ̇ ŴźƇƘܢ ųƍƉ ܘųƆ: ܐܘ ̇ ܂ ſųƇƄƆــƎ ܗƀƃــƈ ܕܕܐſــƅ ܗƀƆــƎ܉ ̇ ܒŴſűƀŷƀܬܐ ܕƍƟــųƉŴ ųſƦſܕܐ :ƥƙƌ ̇ ܘ ܕƈƕ ƢƐƕܐ ̈ Ʀƀܐ ųƊƤƉ ƎſųƆ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ܒƦƄܒܐ ܗ ƉűƟ Ƒƀ ̈ C144v Əܐܘ ̈ſųƀƐــƎ܂ ƍܓƆܘ ƎــƀƆܕܗ Ǝــſųƀƣ̈ ̇ــƢܐ܉ Ɔܐܕ Ɵ Ǝــſܕܬܪܬ Ǝſܕ Ƒƀ ̈ ̈Ɛܐ܂ ܐܘƏ ܓƍ ܗƌ <sup>20</sup> ̇Ŵ ܕƎſ ƆܒƤƌƢܐ ܕܓŴܐ ܘƐƆــƀƏŴܐ ܕܓــŴܐ: ܘƆܓƍــƐܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܗƀƆــƎ܉ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƁŶ ܘܐƦſ ܒų Ƥƙƌܐ܂ ųƆ ƢƉܐƌ ƥƌܐ ƅſܐ

̈ــƐܐ **<sup>6</sup>** BCD ƕــƈ +] ܐܦ **<sup>3</sup>** ƍܓ BCDP: Ǝــƀ ̈ Ɛƍܓ L, + ܐƌƮــŶܐ B **8** ܬܐŴƊſűƠܒ [+ ƢƉܐƌ BCD **<sup>10</sup>** ܢŴƇźܒƦƌ CDLP: ܢŴƠƇŹƦƌ B, add. D in marg. **<sup>11</sup>** ܐƇܒŶƦƉ BCDL: ܐƇܒŷƉ P **<sup>14</sup>** Ǝƀƌ ̈ ܗ BCDL: ƎƀƆܗ P | ƎſųƆ DL, corr. B sup. lin.: ܘܢųƆ BCP, corr. D sup. lin. **<sup>15</sup>** ܘܢųƀܓƆ ̈ ŴƘ CLP: ܘܢųܓƆŴƘ BD | ƅſܐ BCDL: ƅſܕܐ P | ƢƉܐƌ CLP: ƢƉܐƌܕ BD **<sup>18</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CL: ܐܣƀ ̈ ܐܘƏ BD: ܣŴƀ ̈ Əܐܘ P | ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BCDL: ܐƘŴ ̈ ƐƇƇƀƘ P **<sup>19</sup>** ܐƐ̈ ƍܓ BC, corr. D sup. lin.: Ǝƀ ̈ Ɛƍܓ DLP, <sup>+</sup>Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــźƟܕ BCD | Ƒــƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BCL: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ D: ܣŴƀ ̈ Əܐܘ P | ƎſųƀƐ̈ ܘܐܦ :BCDL ܘƆܓƍ ƎſųƀƐ̈ ƍܓƆ P **<sup>20</sup>** ܐƐƍܓƆܘ [om. B **<sup>21</sup>** ܘ ̇ ųƆ BCDP: ܝ ̇ ųƆܘ L

which we make use of in the whole discipline of logic, making it comprehensive and clear for those who have recently approached this kind of sciences221.

177 We also ought to investigate why we teach about substance before the other nine genera, i.e. before quantity, quality and others. We shall say that this is because those nine genera require substance in order to subsist, while the latter does not require any of them in order to exist. Thus, the account of substance is esteemed as prior also because, if it were taken away from the nine other genera, they will disappear as well, but if they vanish, then substance will not cease to exist. So, everything is destroyed together with it, but it is not destroyed by anything222.

178 Now, substance is classified in (Aristotle's) teaching (as follows): some of it are primary and others secondary. He called primary substance each one of the particular individuals and parts which have been discussed above and with which the divisions of species end, e.g., when one speaks of Socrates alone, or separately of Plato, or of any other thing, animate or inanimate, which has individual subsistence223. All things like that the Philosopher designates in his treatise on the ten genera as primary substances. What he calls secondary substances, on the other hand, are their species and genera, namely universal man and universal horse, and also the genus of the latter, e.g. when one says, "what is living and animate".

**<sup>221</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.27–36.2: διαλέξεται δὲ ἐνταῦθα ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης οὐ περὶ τῆς ἁπλῆς καὶ κρείττονος τῆς συνθέτου (τοῦτο γὰρ θεολογίας) οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἁπλῆς καὶ χείρονος τῆς συνθέτου (τοῦτο γὰρ φυσιολογίας), ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς συνθέτου καὶ σχετικῆς (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.27–50.1).

**<sup>222</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.12–18: πρώτην τάξιν ἔχει ἡ οὐσία ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων αὐτὴν προέταξεν· αὕτη γὰρ συνεισφέρεται μὲν ταῖς λοιπαῖς κατηγορίαις, οὐ συνεισφέρει δὲ αὐτάς, καὶ συναιρεῖ μὲν αὐτάς, οὐ συναιρεῖται δὲ ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὅτι αὕτη αὐθυπόστατός ἐστιν, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ αἱ ἄλλαι κατηγορίαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσιν· οὐσίας γὰρ οὔσης οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι κατηγορίας, ταύτης δὲ μὴ οὔσης οὐ δυνατὸν τὰς ἄλλας ὑποστῆναι (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.5–22).

**<sup>223</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 36.2–4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 50.1–3.

	- ̈ƣܐ܉ ܐſــƅ ܕƍſűƖƉــƎ 181 ܗƃــŴܬ ܬܘܒ ܐܦ ܓƍــƐܐ ƇƘƦƉــŭ Ɔــܐܕ ŭƇƙƌ ܐܘƀƏܐ ƆܓƊƣŴܐ ܘƇƆܐ ܓƊƣŴܐ: ܘƆܓƊƣŴܐ ܬܘܒ Ƥƙƌــƍܐ <sup>20</sup> ̈ƣܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ܒƢܬ ƇƟܐ ̈ Ʀܐ ܘųƇƄƆܘܢ ܐܕ ܘŴƀŷƆܬܐ ܘƞƍƆܒ ̈ــƎ ̈Ʀܐ ܕƕűſƦƉ ̈ܬܐ ƙƇŷƤƉ ܕƎſ ƦƊƀŷƣܐ ܘܐܦ ̣ܗܝ ƇƘƦƉܓܐ܉ ƞƆܒŴ

**<sup>1</sup>** ܐƦƇƉ L: ܐƇƉ BCDP | Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CL, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD: ƎƀƆܗ ܣŴƀ ̈ Əܐܘ P **<sup>2</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CL, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD: ܣŴƀ ̈ ̈ ܢ **3** P ܐܘƏ ųƉƦƤƉ LP, Epit.: ƎſųƉƦƤƉ BCD | Ǝſ ̈ ųƀƣܐܕ BCLP, ̈ ܘܢ .:Epit ̇ ܝ **5** D ܐܕųƀƣ ųƆ BCDP, Epit.: ̇ ųƆ L **6** ƋƀƐƌ BCDL, Epit.: ƋƏ P **10** ƅſܐ ܘܐܢ BCDL: ƅſܘܐ P **<sup>11</sup>** Ǝƀƌ ̇ ųƆ BCDL: ƎƀƆųƆ P **<sup>13</sup>** ƅſܕܐ BCDL: ƅſܕܕܐ P | ܓܐƇƘƦƉܕ Ƣƀܓ ܬܐ ̈ ŴƍƉ ̈ ܬܐ ܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ Ŵܨܒ ƎƉ̣ ܐűŶ ƈƃ ƎſųƆ] om. hom. P **<sup>16</sup>** Ǝƀ ̈ Ɖܕ [+ ŭƇƘƦƉ D **17** ܐƢƀƖܘܕܒ ̈ܬܐ **<sup>18</sup>** EP ܐܘ ܕܒƢƀƖܐ :BCDL ̈ ܬܐ :BCDEP ܘŴƍƊƆ ŴƍƊƆ L **19** ܐܦ CDELP: ܘܐܦ B **20** ŭƇƙƌ BCDEP: ŭƇƙƌܕ L | ܐƊƣŴܓ CDL: ܡŴƤܓ B: ܐƊƀƤܓ P **21** ܬܐŴƀŷƆܘ BCDEL: ܬܐŴƀŶ ŴƆܘ P ƅſܕܐ BCDEP: ƅſܕܕܐ L **22** Ǝſܕ [om. D

179 So, in a nutshell, primary substances are all particular things which have self-subsistence, while all their species and genera are called secondary substances. Here arises not a small problem of how substance is divided into primary and secondary. But before we proceed with this question properly, we shall first outline all possible ways in which division of any kind becomes possible.

#### *[Types of division]224*

180 Now, everything that is divided is divided either as (a whole) into its parts, or as a genus into species, or as an ambiguous word into different objects (signified by it)225. Also, when something is divided as (a whole) into its parts, sometimes it is divided into parts that are similar to one another, and sometimes into such ones that are dissimilar. What I mean is this. Bone, wood, bronze, and everything else like that are divided into similar parts, since the parts into which each thing of this kind is divided are in every way similar to each other, save for their large or small size only. Everything that is composed of objects that are not similar is divided into dissimilar parts. E.g., man's and animal's body is divided into head, breast, arms, belly, and legs, i.e. into parts that are dissimilar both to the whole and to one another226.

181 Now, a genus is divided into species, as we usually divide substance into body and incorporeal, and further into animate body, living being, plants, and all other species like that. Also, an ambiguous word may be divided into different objects that are signified by it, just as we said above that the name

**<sup>224</sup>** The same classification appears in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 81.17–82.4; idem, *In Cat.* 38.1–2; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 53.19–22.

**<sup>225</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.1–2: τῶν γὰρ διαιρουμένων τὰ μὲν ὡς γένος εἰς εἴδη διαιρεῖται, τὰ δὲ ὡς ὅλον εἰς μέρη, τὰ δὲ ὡς φωνὴ ὁμώνυμος εἰς διάφορα σημαινόμενα. The Syriac adjective *šḥima*, "dusky", is an uncommon rendering for ὁμώνυμος, "ambiguous (or homonymous)", and Sergius probably applies it here in order to explicate the meaning of the Greek term.

**<sup>226</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 81.17–23: ...ἢ ὡς ὅλον εἰς μέρη, καὶ τοῦτο διττόν, ἢ γὰρ εἰς ὁμοιομερῆ διαιρεῖται ἢ εἰς ἀνομοιομερῆ (καὶ εἰς ὁμοιομερῆ μὲν διαιροῦνται φλέβες, ἀρτηρίαι, ὀστᾶ, ταῦτα γὰρ διαιρούμενα ἔχει τὰ μέρη καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὅμοια καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ, εἰς ἀνομοιομερῆ δέ, ὡς ὅταν εἴπωμεν, ὅτι τοῦ σώματος τὸ μέν ἐστι κεφαλὴ τὸ δὲ χεὶρ τὸ δὲ πούς)...

̇ ܝ ܕƇƃــܒܐ ƇƘƦƉــܓܐ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕܐƢƀƉ ƎƆ ̣ƎƉ ƈƖƆ܂ ܕܒــƢܬ ƟــƇܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ųƍƉ ̇ ܘ ̇ ܘ ܕܨſــƢ ܬܘܒ ܘƆــų ̈ ــƀܐ: ܘƆــų ̇ ܘ ܕƉ ̇ ܘ ܕſܒــƤܐ ܘƆــų ųƆܘ ܒܐƃŴƃܕ ܘ ̇ C145v ųƆ ̈ܕܐ ƃــű ܒــƢܬ űــŶ ƎــƉ̣ ƎſųƍƀƄܒ Ǝ ̈ ̈ܬܐ ܕƙƇŷƤƉ ܕܓƚƀƇ܂ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ܨܒŴ L35r ܗܝ܂̣ ܐűŶ ƎſܗƦƀƍƕܕŴƤƉ ܐƇƟ


̇űܐ ܕƠƉܒــƇܐ ƘــƆŴܓܐ ܘƆܐ Ɖــſƞܐ **<sup>5</sup>** B Ƈƃــܒܐ ƃــƃŴܒܐ :CDELP ܕƃــƃŴܒܐ **<sup>2</sup>** ſܐ Ŵܨܒ ƈƃ ŭƇƘƦƉܕ ܡűƉ ŸƃƦƤƌܕ [om. hom. P | Ŵܨܒ BCDE, Epit.: ܬܐŴܨܒ L **7** ƈƀƄƉ BCDP, Epit.: ƈــƀƃܗ L **<sup>10</sup>** Ǝــƀƌ ̇ ܗ BCDL: ƎــƀƆܗ P, Epit. **11** ƎــƀƆųƆ LP, Epit.: ƎــſųƆ BCD **12** ܬܗܘܐ [om. B **<sup>14</sup>** ܐƦƀƉűƠƆ BCDP, Epit.: ܐƦƀƉűƟ ܝ ̇ ųƆ L | ܘܢųſƦſܕܐ BCLP, Epit.: ܘܢųſƦſܐ D **15** ܐƄſܐ [ om. P **16** ܘܢųƇƃ CDLP, Epit.: ܘܢųƆ B | ܐƆܕ BCDL, Epit.: ܐƆܘ P **17** ܘųƌܐ̣ CLP, Epit.: ܘųƌܘܐ BD **<sup>21</sup>** Ǝſųƍƀƃ BCDEL, Epit.: Ǝſųƀƍƀƃ P | ܐƞƉ BCDEL, Epit.: ƎƉ P **<sup>22</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CLP, Epit.: ̈ ƀܐܣ Əܐܘ BD | ܘܐܦ [+ ܐƆ B **23** Ŵſܗܘ BDLP, Epit.: ܗܘ CE

"dog" is divided into the astral, the terrestrial, and the marine one, and finally into a painted or carved image of it227. These are all things that differ from one another in their nature, while the word signifying them is the same.

182 Thus, since everything that admits of division is divided by means of one of those three types, and it is impossible to find anything divisible that will not fall beneath one of them, it is therefore worth considering which of these types is applied in the division of substance into primary and secondary. Now, I state that (substance) is divided not as (a whole) into parts, neither into those that are similar nor into those that are dissimilar. For otherwise, it would be necessary that there should be another substance that would be divided into them as into its parts, and it would be proper that our teaching about it would be prior to them228.

183 Neither is substance divided here into the primary and secondary one as a genus into species. For among species that derive from the same genus there are no such ones that are prior or posterior, but one may make their division starting from where one wishes, since all species are related (to a certain genus) without any notion of prior and posterior. Therefore, if some substance is primary and another secondary, it is obvious that this division may not be established like that of (a genus into) species229.

184 Neither is it possible to state that the division of substance is like that of an ambiguous word into objects whose natures are not similar to one another. For substances are not only similar to one another in name, but their definition and their nature is also the same in every respect230.

**<sup>227</sup>** See §118. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 81.23–82.1: ἢ ὡς ὁμώνυμος φωνὴ εἰς διάφορα σημαινόμενα, ὡς ὅταν εἴπωμεν, τοῦ κυνὸς ὁ μέν ἐστι χερσαῖος ὁ δὲ θαλάττιος ὁ δὲ ἀστρῷος.

**<sup>228</sup>** Thus, Sergius states that primary and secondary substance may not be considered as parts of other entity which would equally be called substance and be prior to them. Cf. a rather different argument in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.7–10 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 54.9–14.

**<sup>229</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.2–7; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 53.24–54.9. Just as in the previous paragraph, Sergius' argumentation differs considerably from what we find in Ammonius and Philoponus.

**<sup>230</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.15–22; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 54.25–31.

	-

̈ ܬܐ **2** B ܘܐܢ .:Epit ,CDLP ܐܢ **1** Ŵܕܨܒــ [+ ܐƦــƊƀŷƣ P **<sup>4</sup>** ̇ ųܓƆŴــƘ LP, Epit.: ܓܐƆŴƘ BCD ƑƀƇŹŴــźƐſܐܪ CL: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƏܐܪ D: ƑƀƇźźƐſܐܪ P **<sup>5</sup>** ̇ ųƍƉܘ BCLP, Epit.: ̇ ųƍƉ D **6** ܗܘ̣ ܐƌƢŶܘܐ ܐƍƀƍƉܕ ܐƐƄŹ] om. hom. P **9** ܘܐܦ BCDP: ܐܦ L | ƈƕܕ ܐƍƉ BCDP: ܐƍƊƆܕ L **<sup>20</sup>** ܗܝ̣ [ om. LP | ܐƊſűƟܘ [om. P **<sup>22</sup>** ܐƀƏܐܘ [+ ̇ [ܕܐܘƀƏܐ **24** C ܕųƍƉ om. P

185 Thus, since it is neither as (a whole) into parts, nor as a genus into species, nor as an (ambiguous) word into different objects (signified by it) that substance is divided into primary and secondary, it seems that the problem remains to a large extent without solution. Therefore we shall say that it is not a division of substance that Aristotle makes when he says that one of it is primary and another secondary, but only suggests an order (τάξις) of what comes first and what comes second in it231. For numerical order differs from division made of a universal thing that is consequently divided into particulars.

#### *[Primary and secondary substances]*

186 However, after this, it is time to raise the following puzzle: Why, in fact, if 2a34–2b6 universal things are more honored everywhere among the philosophers than the particulars, does the Philosopher place here particular substance first and after that at the second place write about the universal one? One may answer to this that those things that are primary by nature are posterior to us, while those ones that are posterior by nature are primary to us232. Thus, he calls particular substance primary not because this is what it naturally is but because it is primary to our senses. For this is what we see first and thus proceed to inquire into the universal ones which are naturally primary. He also calls particular substance primary because, since his account here is addressed to those who have recently started education, it is obvious that it is primary for those who have not yet learned to comprehend anything beyond their senses233.

187 Now, after he has made the composite substances subject to his talk here and has shown that some of them are primary and particular and some are secondary and universal, he further gives praise (καλῶς) to the primary

**<sup>231</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.21–22: φαμὲν οὖν ὅτι τάξιν παραδίδωσιν αὐτῆς, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ διαίρεσιν (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 55.1).

**<sup>232</sup>** Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* I 1, 184a10–b14 and *An. Post*. I 2, 71b32–72a5. Cf. also §20 of Porphyry's treatise *On Principles and Matter* preserved in Syriac (Arzhanov 2021: 90–91).

**<sup>233</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 36.10–13: ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ ὡς πρὸς εἰσαγομένους, τοῖς δὲ εἰσαγομένοις σαφέστερα τὰ προσεχῆ, εἰκότως τὴν μερικὴν πρώτην εἶπεν ἐν τῷ παρόντι· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν μερικῶν ἀναγόμεθα ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 50.1–14).

̇ ــƢ ̈ܬܐ ܐƀƌƮŶــƦܐ܂ ܐƉ Ŵܨܒــ ƎــſųƇƃ ƎــƉ̣ ƢſƦſ ܪܐƦƀƉ ܕܗܝ̣ <sup>Ǝ</sup> ̇ Ɖ ƅſܐ ̈ƣܐ ̈Ɛܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܕƀźƟܓŴܪŴſܣ: ܘųƇƃܘܢ ܓű ܓƢƀ ܕܗƎƀƆ ƋƆ ܬƖƣܐ ܓƍ ܘܡƦــƉ ܘܢųــƆ ƦــƀƆ ̇ ܐƀƇſــƎ ̣ܕܗܘ ܒــųܕܐ ƀƍƟــƎ ƟــƊſŴܐ: ܘܒſűƖƇــų ųƊƆܘܐ܂ ܘܐܢ ܬܬƐƌــŪ ̣ƉــƎ ƕƞƉــƦܐ܉ ܐܒſűــƎ Ɔــųܘܢ ܐܦ ̣ܗƌــŴܢ ܘƦƉܒƀƇźــƎ܂ ſűƉــƎ źƉــƈ ̣ܕܗܝ ̣ܗܝ ƇƕــƦܐ ܕƟــųƊſŴܘܢ܉ ſűſــƖܐ ̣ܗܝ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܕƀƉــƦܪܐ ƍƉــųܘܢ܂ ܐܢ ̣ܗܘ ܓƀــƢ ܕƆܐ ܐſــƦ ƍƟــƉŴܐ Ɖــűܡ ܐܘ ܓــƊƣŴܐ ܕŶƦƉــŵܐ ܘƆƦƉܒــƅ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ̣ƉــƎ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ƀƉűƟــƦܐ܉ ܐƦŶŴــƤƉ Ǝſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ ̇ ŴƉܙܓܐ: ܗƌ ܐƄſܐ ܬŸƃƦƣ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ܐܘ r99B | r36L ̇ ܙƌܐ ܐܘ ̇ ܓƌŴܐ ̇ ƍƀƍƉܐ ܘƣŴŶܒƍܐ ܐƍſܐ ̣ܕܗܘ܉ ܐܘ ̇ ܕܬܪܬƎſ: ܐܘ ܕܐƦƉܐ ܐܘ ̇ ƅƏ ܓƣűܐ ̇ ƢſƢƟܘܬܐ: ܐܘ ̇ ŴƊƀƊŶܬܐ ܐܘ ŴŶܪܐ ܐܘ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ƠƉŴƏܐ: ܐܘ ̈Ɗܐ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ܐſــƍܐ ̣ܕܗܘ܂ ſųƇƃــƎ ܓƀــƢ ܗƀƆــƎ ܘܕܐſــƅ ܗƀƆــƎ ܒܓــƣŴ ̈ ƀــƦܐ ƀƍƟــƎ ƟــƊſŴܐ܂ ܘܒſűƖƇــųܘܢ ƉűƟ Ƒــƀ ̈ ̈ſܐ ܕܐųſƦſܘܢ ܐܘƏ űƀŷſ ƦƉܘܡ ųƊƆܘܐ Ɔܐ ŷƄƤƉ v147C ̈Ǝ܂ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ƦƀƉܪܐ ̣ܗܝ ܐܘƀƏܐ ƦƀƉűƟܐ ̇ ųܕܒــ ܘܢųــƆ ܐƊــƀƏ ܡűــƉ ܐƍــƀƃ ƅــſܕܐ ƈźƉ :ܐƣ̈ űܓ ܘܢųƇƃ ƎƉ̣ ̇ ــƢ ųƌܘܐ ųƊſŴƟܘܢ܂ ܐƆܐ ܐܦ ̣ƉــƎ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ܬܘܒ <sup>ܗ</sup> <sup>15</sup> ̇ <sup>ܝ</sup> ܕܬܪܬſــƎ ܐƉ ̇ ܗܘܬ ܗܕܐ܉ ܕƦƀƉܪܐ ܐܘƀƏܐ ƦƀƉűƟܐ܂ ƈźƉ ̣ ܕܐųƌܘ ܕƆܐ ܐųſƦſ ̇ ܝ ܕƈƕ ƍƉܐ ܬܬܐƢƉ ܗܘܬ܂ ųƆ ̇ ųƆ ܗܘܐ ƦƀƆ

̈ƣܐ <sup>188</sup> ܐܘƀƏܐ ܓƢƀ <sup>ܗ</sup> r45P ̇ <sup>ܝ</sup> ܕܬܪܬƎſ ܐƅſ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ̣ƎƉ ƈƖƆ܉ ܐܦ ̣ܗܝ Ɔܐܕ ̈ــƐܐ ƕــƈ ̈ ܢ ܕܓƍ ــܐƀܓƏ Ǝــƀƍܙܒ Ǝــſܕ ƎــƆ ܝŴــŷƉ ــܓܐ܂ƇƘƦƉ ܐƐ̈ ܘƆܓƍ ̈ſܐ ܕŶܒƎƀƤƀ ܬƦƀŶ űƀŷſ ܐƉ ̈ ŴƍƟ ƈƕ ܬܘܒ ܐƣ̈ ܐܕ <sup>20</sup> ̈ƣܐ ƦƉܐƎſƢƉ܂ ܘܐܕ :ܗܘ̣ ܐƤــƌƢܒ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏܕ ƢƉܐƊƆ ƎƍſűƖƉܕ ƅſܐ ܘܢ܂ųƍƉ űŶ űŶ ƈƃ ܘŴźƇƘܢ ܬܘܒ ܘƈƃ űŶ űŶ ƎƍƉ: ܘܬܘܒ ܕܒƤƌƢܐ ƀŶܐ ̣ܗܘ: ܘƈƃ Ɖܐ ܕƁŶ ܓƊƣŴܐ ̣ܗܘ Ƥƙƌــƍܐ܂ ƐƌܒƍƀــƎ ܓƀــƢ ƏــƑƀŹƢƟŴ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƍƟــƉŴܐ

**2** Ƣƀܓ [om. C | ܣŴſܪŴܓƀźƟܕ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟܕ C: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟܕ D: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟܕ BP **3** ܕܗܘ̣ BCDL: ܕܗܘܘ P **<sup>7</sup>** ƅܒƆƦƉܘ BCDP: ƅܒƆƦƉܕ L **<sup>8</sup>** ŸƃƦƣܬ [+ Ɓƃ BCD | ܐƌܙ ̇ ܘܙƌܐ :BCDL ܐܘ P | ܙܓܐŴــƉ ̇ ܐܘ BCDL: ܙܓܐŴــƉܘ P | ܐƦŶŴƤƉ LP: ܬܐŴŷƤƉ BCD **<sup>12</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CLP: ̈ ƀܐܣ Əܐܘ BD **<sup>13</sup>** ܘܡƦƉ BLP: ܘܡƦƊƉ CD | Ǝ̈ ŷƄƤƉ BCDP: ƎƀŷƄƤƉ L | ܪܐƦƀƉ BCDL: ܪܐƦƏ P **<sup>15</sup>** ܬܘܒ [om. BD, add. surpa lin. D **<sup>16</sup>** ܐƀƏܐܘ [+ ܝ ̇ ̇ ܝ **17** BCD ܗ ųƆ LP: ܕܐųƆ BCD **<sup>19</sup>** ܝŴŷƉ L: ܐſŴŷƉ BCD: ܝŴƍƏ P | ܢ ̈ ܐƀܓƏ BCDL: Ǝſܐƀܓ ̈ <sup>Ə</sup> P **<sup>20</sup>** ܐƉ̈ ŴƍƟ BCDP: ܐƉŴƀ̈ Ɵ L ƦƀŶܬ ƎƀƤƀܒŶܕ [om. D **21** űŶ2] om. B **22** ܘܬܘܒ [+ Ǝſܕ P **23** ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ BCLP: ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏܕ D

substance as to something that is more honorable than everything else234. For he says that the other nine genera of the categories are all its accidents that acquire subsistence in it and may never come to be apart from it, because if it is taken away from them they will also disappear and perish. Thus, since it is the reason for their subsistence, it is obvious that it is more honorable than they. For if there were no individuals or bodies which may be seen and grasped and which pertain to the primary substance, how would any quantity or qualification and quality235 appear, e.g., the size of one or two cubits, or any kind of number and measure, or white and red colour, or hot and cold, or any other accident at all, since all of them and everything like them acquire their subsistence in particular bodies, which are primary substances, and may never exist without them. That is why the primary substance is more honorable than all accidents, for it is set for them as a certain nature in which they subsist. Moreover, he says that the primary substance is also greater than the secondary one, since if the former did not exist than there would be nothing that might be predicated of it236.

188 Now, secondary substance, as we have said above, is further divided into 2b7–28 species and genera. And he demonstrates to us many times that genera are predicated of species, while species in turn (are predicated) of particular individuals that are subsumed beneath each one of them. E.g., we are accustomed to say that Socrates is a man, just as Plato and each one of us, and also that every man is a living being, while every living being is an animate body. Thus we consider Socrates to be a particular individual and a primary

**<sup>234</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 40.23–25; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 55.26–29. Philoponus states that Aristotle wishes "to sing praise (ἐξυμνῆσαι) to primary substance and to demonstrate that it is properly (καλῶς) said to be substance primarily".

**<sup>235</sup>** Cf. §§91, 354–355, and 365, where Sergius discusses various Syriac terms for quality. Here, he applies both *zna* and *muzzaga* as synonyms.

**<sup>236</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 40.23–41.17; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 55.26–56.12. Ammonius stresses (*In Cat.* 41.16–17) that, while Aristotle makes primary substance more honorable than both universals and accidents, the philosopher makes a distinction between them, applying the expression "to be said of" to universals and "to subsist in" to accidents (καλῶς ἔταξεν ἐν μὲν τοῖς καθόλου τὸ λέγεται, ἐν δὲ τοῖς συμβεβηκόσι τὸ ἔστι). Since in the whole Book III Sergius does not comment on these expressions which appear in the text of the *Categories*, but speaks instead of universals, particulars, accidents etc., he does not focus on the distinction between predication and subsistence.

ſűƀŷſܐ ܘܐܘƀƏܐ ƦƀƉűƟܐ܉ ܘܐƎƍſƢƉ ŴƇƕܗܝ ܐܕƣܐ ܕܓŴܐ: ܗƌ r83D ̇Ŵ ܕƎſ ܕܒƤƌƢܐ ܗܘ܂ ܘܬܘܒ ܐܦ ƈƕ ܐܕƣܐ ܕܓŴܐ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܕܓƐƍܐ ܕܓŴܐ: ̇ ܕܒƤƌƢܐ ƍƤƙƌܐ ̣ܗܘ܂ ̇Ŵ ܕƎſ ܕܒƤƌƢܐ ƀŶܐ ̣ܗܘ ܐܘ ܗƌ

	- :ܡűــƉ ƈــƃ ƎــƉ̣ ƢſƦſ ܐƦƀƉűƟ ܐƀƏܐܘƆ ̇ 190 ƎƉ ܒƦܪ ܗƈƀƃ ܕƣܒųŷ ̇ ܝ ܕܬܪܬſــƎ ܐܦ ̣ܗܝ ƇƘƦƉــܓܐ ܗ ܐƀــƏܕܐܘ ƋــƆ ƈــźƉ Ƣــ ̇ C148v Ɖܐ ƎــƃܪƦܒ ̇ ܝ ̇ ܐܦ ܗ ̈ƣܐ ܐſƦſــų ̇ ܝ ܕܐſــƅ ܐܕ ̇ܕܩ ƊƆــűܥ܉ ܕܗ ̈ƣܐ ܘƆܓƐƍܐ: <sup>ܙ</sup> Ɔܐܕ ̇ ܝ ƦƀƉűƟܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ̈Ɛܐ܂ ܒƢſƞܐ ܕƎſ ̣ƎƉ <sup>ܗ</sup> ƦƀƉܪܐ ̣ܗܝ ̣ƎƉ <sup>ܗ</sup> v45P ̇ <sup>ܝ</sup> ܕܐƅſ ܓƍ ̇ ܝ ܕܪƀŶــƠܐ ƈźƉ ̣ܕܗܝ ſƢƟܒܐ ųƆ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ƢſƦſ܉ Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ̣ܕܗܝ ƦƀƉܪܐ ̣ƎƉ <sup>ܗ</sup> ̇ ܂ ųƍƉ

̇Ŵ ܕƎſ ܕܒƤƌƢܐ ܗܘ ܘܬܘܒ ܐܦ ƈƕ ܐܕƣܐ ܕܓŴܐ ܐƍſƢƉــƎ | P Ƈƕــųܝ :BCDL ƇƕــŴܗܝ **<sup>1</sup>** ܗƌ ܐŴܕܓ ܐƐƍܕܓ [om. hom. P | Ǝſܕ [om. P **2** ܐƤƌƢܕܒ L: ܐƤƌƢܒ BCD | ܐƐƍܕܓ L: ܐƐƍܓ BCD **<sup>3</sup>** ܐƤƌƢܕܒ1 LP: ܐƤƌƢܒ BCD **<sup>6</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CLP: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD **7** ƈƀƄƉܕ BCDL: ƈƀƄƉ P | ܐƆ] om. <sup>P</sup>**<sup>8</sup>** ܗܘܬ [+ ܗܕܐ P | ƦƀƆ BCLP: ܐƆ D | ̇ ųƆ] om. P **9** ƢƉܬܬܐ [om. B | ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ CLP: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƏܐܪ D **<sup>10</sup>** Ƒــƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BDLP: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ C **<sup>12</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CLP: ̈ ƀܐܣ Əܐܘ BD **<sup>13</sup>** ܪܐƦƀƉ BCD: ܪܐ̈ƦƀƉ L: ܪܢ̈ƦƀƉ P | ܝ ̇ ̇ ܝ :BCDL ܒų P ܐܦ + [ܐƆܐ | P ܕܒų ܝ **15** P ܗܕܐ + [ܗܘܬ **14** ̈ ܗܘ2 [om. P | ƎſųƆ] om. D **<sup>19</sup>** ܐƐ̈ ̇ + [ܓƍ ųſƦſܐ BCD **20** ܕܗܝ̣ 2 BCDL: ܗܝ̣ P | ܪܐƦƀƉ] + ƢſƦſ BCD

substance and predicate a general species of him, i.e. that he is a man, and further predicate a general genus of the general species, i.e. that a man is a living being or that a man is animate237.

189 Thus, as we have said, genera are predicated of species, while species (are predicated) of particular individuals which are primary substances. The secondary substances, on the other hand, are genera and species that are predicated of primary substances. This makes it apparent to everyone that, if there were no primary substance, then there would be nothing of which secondary substance might be predicated. That is why Aristotle states that primary substance is greater than all accidents, and also greater than secondary substances, which are genera and species. It is greater than accidents, on the one hand, since they have their subsistence in it, and it is greater than the secondary substances, on the other, since, even though they are universals, they are predicated of the primary (substances), and if the latter did not exist, there would be nothing that they might be predicated of, so that they would remain as if non-existent238.

190 So, after he has praised primary substance as superior to everything, he says that, since secondary substance is divided into species and genera, we ought to know that something that exists as a species is in turn greater than what exists as a genus. Though it is inferior to primary (substance), since it is proximate to it, it is superior to the one which is remote from it239.

**<sup>237</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 41.26–42.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 57.24–25.

**<sup>238</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 58.7–13.

**<sup>239</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 42.10–20; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 59.5–17.


**<sup>3</sup>** ܕܐܦ [om. L **4** ܐƀŶܕ BCDL, Epit.: ܐƀŶܘ P | ܐƍƤƙƌܘ BCDLP: ܬܐŴƀƉ Epit. **6** ܐƌƢŶܐ BCDP, Epit.: ܐſƢŶܐ L **<sup>8</sup>** ƢƉܐ̣ LP: ƎſƢƉܐ CD: om. B | <sup>Ƣ</sup> ̇ Ɖܐ BCLP: ƢƉܘܐ D | ܬܘܒ BCDL: Ǝſܕ P ̇ ܝ + [ܐܦ ̇ ܝ **12** B ܗ ܗ CDLP: Ƣ ̇ Ɖܐ B | ƅƘųƌܕ LP: ƅƘųƊƆ BCD **13** Ƣܒƃܕ BCDP: Ƣܒƃܕܐ L Ƒــƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CLP, Epit.: ــܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD: + ܬܘܒ P **<sup>14</sup>** Ƒــƀ ̈ Əܘܐܘ LP, Epit.: ــܐܣƀ ̈ Əܘܐܘ BCD **<sup>15</sup>** ƎſųƉƦƤƉ] + ܐƆ P | Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ LP, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BCD **17** ܡűƉ] om. B | ƢƀƉܕܐ BCDL: ƢƉܕܐ P **<sup>21</sup>** ƎſűƉ LP: Ǝſܕ BCD, Epit. | ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ BCD **<sup>22</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CLP: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD **23** ̇ ųſƢƣܕ BCDP: ܐſƢƣܕ L

191 That species stands closer to primary substance than genus is evident to everyone. For if someone is asked what is Socrates, he will naturally answer that he is a man. If, in turn, he is asked what is man, then he will give an answer that it is animated and rational living being. Thus, for the first question he will take a species in order to characterize Socrates, who is a primary substance, while for the second one he will make use of a certain genus. This makes apparent that species are closer to primary substance than genera, and because of this he stated that the former are greater than the latter240. Further, he said that (species) are greater than (genera) due to the fact that genera require species of which they are predicated, while species do not require genera, for they are not predicated of the latter but are only encompassed by them.

#### *[Accidents are not tertiary substances]*

192 So after that, one may be inclined to turn back to what (Aristotle) has stated 2b29–3a6 before and perhaps raise the following puzzle: If particular individuals are primary substances, while species and genera are secondary substances, why are accidents not also called tertiary substances? He resolves this puzzle in an indirect and obscure manner241. However, as we have expounded above, we shall not simply repeat without understanding what has been written by him, but shall try to interpret it with the power of our intellect by means of reasonable demonstrations, so that what is written might become clear to everyone.

193 Now, the puzzle which we just mentioned may be solved in two ways which make apparent that it is not proper to call accidents substances. One way of solving this puzzle is the following. Species and genera are naturally predicated

**<sup>240</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 59.21–25.

**<sup>241</sup>** Aristotle does not explicitly mention this puzzle. However, as is explained in the commentaries of Ammonius and Philoponus, its solution may be deduced from the philosopher's words. For the solution's two approaches, the one from the relation of accidents to primary substances and the other from analogy, cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 43.16–44.4 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 61.20–63.9. Sergius' account turns out in some details to be closer to Philoponus rather than to Ammonius.

̈ ƀــƦܐ ̣ܕܗƀƌــƎ ܐſųſƦſــƎ ̈ܪƀƤſــƦܐ ƉűƟ Ǝــƀƌ ̇ ܗ Ƒــƀ ̈ C149v Əܐܘ ƈــƕ Ʀــſܐƍƀƃ ̈ƣܐ ̈ƦſƦܬܐ܉ ܘƉܒƎƀƇź ŴƣܐƆܐ ܕƎſųƀƇƕ ܒűƀ ܕŴƤƉܕƎƀƕ ƎſųƆ܂ ܓű ܘŶ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ ܐ܂ƍƃܗ ƅſܕܐ Ǝſܕ ܐƌܐ Ƣ ̇ B100v Ɖܐ ܗܕܐ܂ Ǝſűܒƕ ܘܡƦƉ ܐƆ Ǝſܕ ̈ſܐ: ̈ Ɖܐ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ ƀŷſــű ܘܐƀƠƆܒƑſű ܘܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕܐſــƅ ܗƀƆــƎ܉ ƍƟــŴ ̈ƀƉــƦܐ܂ ܐܢ ܗƀƃــƈ ƤƌــƦܐܠ ܐƌــƥ ܕƉــƍܐ űƟ ƎــſųƉƦƤƉ Ƒــƀ ̈ <sup>5</sup> Əܘܐܘ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ ܘܐƀƠƆܒƑſű܉ ܒƦƖƣƢܗ ƍƙƉܐ ƦƘܓƊܐ ܕܒƤƌƢܐ ̈ƣܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ŷƇƃــű ƍƉــųܘܢ܂ ܘŶــƀܐ ܬܘܒ ܘƤƙƌــƍܐ܂ ſűƉــƎ ܒƀــű ܐܕ ̈ Ƒƀ ܕܬܪܬſــƎ܉ ܐƀƟــƋ ƣــŴܐƆܐ ܕƕــƈ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܕܐųſƦſܘܢ ܐܘƏ ̈Ɛܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ܘܓƍ ̈Ǝƀ܂ ̈ųſܘܢ Ŵƣܕܥ ܐƌ ̈ Ʀƀܐ ܘܒűƀ ƉűƟ Ƒƀ ̈ ܐܘƏ

Ŵــƍ ̇ ̇ ܕƉ ܐܘ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ Ŵƍ ̇ <sup>194</sup> ܐܢ ܕƎſ ƌܐƢƉ ŴƆܬ ܗ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܘ ܕƤƉܐܠ ųƆ ܕƉ ̇ ܐܪſــƄܐ: ̇ ƟــŶƢܐ ܐܘ ̇ ܐܘƊƃܐ: ܐܘ ܐƀƠƆܒƑſűƀ܉ ܕŴŶܪܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐܘ Ǝ ܘŴƆ ƍƀƃܐſــƦ܉ ſűſــƖܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƆܐ ̈ ƙƀƠƌ Ʀſܐƍƣűܕܓ ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ̣ ܐűŶ ̇ ܐܘ ƤƉــŴܕܥ ܕƉــƍܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ <sup>ܗ</sup> r84D ̇ <sup>ܘ</sup> Ɖܐ ܕܐƣــƦܐܠ ƇƕــŴܗܝ܂ ܐſــƅ ̣ܕƉــƎ ̈Ɖܐ ŴــƍƠƆ ܘܢųƆ ƎƀƕܕŴƤƉ Ʀſܐƍƀƃ ܐƐ̈ ̈ƣܐ ܘܓƍ ܗܪƃܐ ܬܬŵŶܐ܉ ܕܐܕ Ǝſűܒƕ ܘܡƦƉ ܐƆ Ǝſܕ ܐƣ̈ ̈ Ʀƀܐ܂ ܓű ƉűƟ Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ ܘܢųſƦſܕܐ ܐſ̈ des.C űƀŷſ ̈ــƐܐ ̈ƣܐ ܘƆܓƍ ــܐܕƆ ܐƘŴــƐƇƀƘ ܢŴــƌܐ ƋــƏ Ƣــƀƙƣ ƎــſűƉ ܕܐ܂ųــƆ ̇ L37v ųــƆ ܐƆܕ ƈــźƉ :Ƒــƀ ̈ ̈ƣܐ ܕſــƎ Ɔܐ ̣ƟــƢܐ ܐƌــŴܢ ܐܘƏ űܓƆ ܂Ǝſܕܬܪܬ Ƒƀ ̈ ܐܘƏ ܐƀــƏܐܘ ƈــƕ ƎــƆ ƎــƀƆܐƤƉ űــƃ ƎــƆ ܢŴƕܕŴƤƌܕ ƎƍſƢƉܕܐ ƅſܐ ƎƀƍƄƉ ̈Ɛܐ܂ ̈ƣܐ ܘܓƍ ƦƀƉűƟܐ: ܗ v46P ̇ ܝ ܕŷƀƄƣܐ ŴƆܬ ܐܕ

**<sup>1</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ CLP, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD **<sup>2</sup>** ܬܐƦſƦ̈ Ŷܘ BCDL, Epit.: ܬܐƮſƦſܘ P **3** ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ P, Epit.: ܣŴــƀŹƢƟŴƏ L: ƑƀŹƢƟŴــƏܕ BCD **4** ƑــſűܒƀƠƆܘܐ L: ƑــſűƀܒƠƆܘܐ BDP: ܣűــƀܒƀƠƆܘܐ C: ܢŴźƇƘܘ Epit. **<sup>5</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܘܐܘ CLP, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܘܐܘ BD | ܐܢ CDLP, Epit.: ܘܐܢ B | ܐƍƉܕ BCDL: ŴƍƉܕ P **6** ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ BCDP, Epit.: ܣŴƀŹƢƟŴƏ L | ƑſűܒƀƠƆܘܐ L: ƑſűƀܒƠƆܘܐ P: ܐܘ ƑــſűƀܒƀƠƆܐ C: ƑــſűƀܒƠƆܐ ܐܘ D: ܣűƀܒƠƆܐ ܐܘ B **<sup>7</sup>** űŷƇƃ] + űŶ CD **<sup>8</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ LP, Epit.: ̈ ƀܐܣ Əܐܘ BCD **<sup>9</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ LP, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BCD **10** ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ BCDP, Epit.: ܣŴƀŹƢƟŴƏ L | Ŵƍ ̇ ̇ ܕƉ ܐܘ BCDL: ܗܘ ܐƍƉܘܕ P **11** ƑſűƀܒƀƠƆܐ CL: ƑſűƀܒƠƆܐ BD: ƑſűܒƠƆܐ P: ܢŴźƇƘ Epit. **12** ܐűŶ BCDL, Epit.: űŶ P | Ǝ ̈ ƙƀƠƌ BCDP, Epit.: ƎƀƙƠƌ L **14** ܘܢųƆ CDLP, Epit.: ƎſųƆ B **<sup>15</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ LP, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BCD **<sup>16</sup>** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **<sup>17</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ1 LP, Epit.: ̈ ƀܐܣ Əܐܘ BD | Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ2 LP, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ ̇ ܝ **19** BD ܐܘƏ ̇ ܝ .:Epit ,BDP ܗ ųƆ L

of substances, which are primary in the proper and principal sense, and they resolve questions about them by signifying them, but accidents never work like that. What I mean is this. Socrates, Alcibiades, and others like them are particular individuals and they are called primary substances. So, when someone asks what Socrates or Alcibiades is, the immediate answer would be that each one of them is a man, and also living and animate. Thus, it is by means of species and genera, which are secondary substances, that you pose questions about primary substances and by means of them you signify them242.

194 But if to that person who asked what is Socrates or what is Alcibiades an answer were given that he is white, or black, or bald, or tall, or any of those things that are concomitant (for them) accidentally and not by nature, then it will be apparent that it does not signify what the person is about whom the question was raised. So it has become evident by now that species and genera signify by nature particular individuals that are primary substances, while accidents never work like that. That is why the Philosopher has properly established species and genera as secondary substances, but he does not call accidents substances, since, as we have said, they are naturally unable to signify for us what is found in species and genera, when we ask about a primary substance243.

**<sup>242</sup>** See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 61.20–26: νῦν τὴν αἰτίαν λέγει δι' ἣν τὰ μὲν γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη δεύτεραι οὐσίαι λέγονται, οὐκέτι δὲ τρίτας οὐσίας λέγει τὰ συμβεβηκότα. τοῦτο δὲ πάλιν κατασκευάζει διχῶς, ἔκ τε τῆς σχέσεως τῆς πρὸς τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀναλογίας. καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς σχέσεως, ὅτι τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας ἀποδιδόντες οἰκείως ἀποδώσομεν διὰ μόνου τοῦ γένους ἢ τοῦ εἴδους ἀποδιδόντες· τὸν γὰρ Σωκράτην ἄνθρωπον εἰρηκότες ἢ ζῷον οἰκείως ἀποδώσομεν καὶ γνωριμώτερον... (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 43.16–20).

**<sup>243</sup>** See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 61.26–29: ...ἐὰν δὲ ὅτι λευκὸς ἢ τρέχει ἤ τι τοιοῦτον εἴπωμεν, ἀλλοτρίως καὶ ἀγνώστως ἀποδώσομεν. εἰκότως οὖν τὰ μὲν εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη δευτέρας οὐσίας λέγομεν ἅτε μόνα σημαίνοντα τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας, τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα ὅλως οὔ φαμεν οὐσίας ἅτε μὴ δηλοῦντα τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 43.20–22).

	-

**<sup>1</sup>** Ǝſܕ L, Epit.: Ǝ ̇ Ɖ BDP | ܐƌƢŶܐ [om. B | ܬܘܒ [om. BD **<sup>2</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ LP, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD **3** Ƣ ̇ Ɖܕܐ LP, Epit.: ܢƢƉܕܐ BD | ܐƐ̈ ̈ƣܐ ܘƆܓƍ ܐܕƆ BLP, Epit.: ܐƣ̈ ̈Ɛܐ ܘƆܐܕ ƍܓƆ D | ƎƀƙƀƠƌܘ BDP, Epit.: ƎƀƙƀƠƌܕ L **<sup>4</sup>** ƚƀƠƌ BLP, Epit.: ŴƙƀƠƌ D **<sup>6</sup>** ƑƀƍƘŴźƐſܐܪ L: ܐܘܣƍƘŴźƐſܐܪ BD: ̄ Ŵ ̄ ź ̄ Əܐܪ Epit.: ܐܘܣƍƘŴƀźƐƌܐ P **<sup>9</sup>** ܐƐ̈ ƍܘܓ [+ ƎƀƇſܐ P | Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ LP, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD **<sup>10</sup>** ܘܢųܒ [om. P **<sup>13</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ LP, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD **<sup>15</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ1 LP, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ2 LP, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD **<sup>18</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ LP, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD **<sup>19</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ LP, Epit.: ̈ ƀܐܣ Əܐܘ BD **<sup>20</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ LP, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD | ܐܦ L, Epit.: ܕܐܦ P: ܕܐܦ ƈźƉ BD Ƒƀ ̈ Əܕܐܘ LP, Epit.: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD **<sup>21</sup>** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƘŴƏŴƇƇƀƘ P | ̇ ųƐƄŹ LP: ܐƐƄŹ BD


#### *[Definition of substance]*

197 Now, having established the order of substance, having explained which 3a7 kind of it is primary and which one is secondary, and having demonstrated

**<sup>244</sup>** See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 62.3–10: οῦτο τὸ δεύτερον ἐπιχείρημα τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀναλογίας. φησὶ δὲ ὅτι ὃν τρόπον αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι ὑπόκεινται πᾶσι τοῖς παρ' αὐτάς, οὕτως καὶ αἱ δεύτεραι τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ λέγομεν Σωκράτην φιλόσοφον, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπον φιλόσοφον λέγομεν καὶ ζῷον φιλόσοφον. ὥστε καὶ αἱ δεύτεραι οὐσίαι ὑπόκεινται τοῖς συμβεβηκόσι, καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα κατ' αὐτῶν κατηγορεῖται, ἀλλὰ προηγουμένως μὲν τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγορεῖται, ὥς φησι καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος, κατὰ δεύτερον δὲ λόγον καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν γενῶν. τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα οὐδέποτε ταῖς οὐσίας ὑπόκεινται (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 43.24–44.4).

**<sup>245</sup>** Cf. a more elaborated version of the same argument in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 62.10–63.9. See particularly Philoponus' conclusion in 63.6–9: εἰκότως οὖν ἄρα οὐκ ἐκλήθησαν τρίται οὐσίαι τὰ συμβεβηκότα ἅτε μὴ ὑποκείμενά τινι πρὸς ὕπαρξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν οὐσία κατὰ συμβεβηκότος κατηγορῆται, παρὰ φύσιν <φαμὲν> εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην κατηγορίαν.

 : ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕƎſ ܕܬܪܬƎſ ܒƐƄźܐ ܬܪƍſܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƟــųƊſŴ ̇ : ܗ ܪƦƀƤſܐ ܐųſƦſ ̇ ̇ ܒܐ ܒــƦܪ ܗƀƆــƎ ܬŶــųƉŴ ̈ƣܐ ܕƎſ Ɔܐ ƎſƢƟƦƉ ƆܓƢƊ ܐܘƀƏܐ܉ <sup>ܨ</sup> ܓű ̇ ƚƇƉ ܒƦƄܒܐ ܗƌܐ ܕźƟܐܓŴܪŴſܣ ƊƆܐƉــƢ܂ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ ܗܕܐ ܕųƀƇƕ ƈźƉ ܕܐܦ ŴƙƀƠƌܬܐ Ƣƀƙƣܬܐ ܕƍƙƇƉــŴܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܐſƦſــų v101B ̇ ܉ ܕƌܐƉــƢ ̇ ܒܐ ƊƆܐƉــƢ ƇƕــŴܗܝ܉ ܘܗſűſــƎ ̇ ܘ Ɖــűܡ ܕܨ ܐƥƌ ƀƉűƟــƦ ܒƙ <sup>5</sup> ̈ــƆŴܓܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ƎــƀƇſܐ ƎــſųƇƃ ƎƉ̣ ƦſܐƢſܙܗ ųƉŴŶܬ űܒ̇ ƕ űƃ Ʀſܐƞſܬܪ ܗܝŴƀƊŶƦƌ ̈ƆŴܓܐ܂ ܕܐܬŵŶܝ ܕƢſƮƣܢ ܒųܘܢ ܒƙ

<sup>198</sup> ܒų ܗƈƀƃ ܒƄźــƐܐ ܗƌܐ ܐܬƤŶــŸ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ܂ ܐƆــƚ ܓƀــƢ ƆــűƟŴܡ ̇ ƙƠƌܐſــƦ܂ ܒƌŵܐ ƇƙƉܓƍܐ ƈƕ ܐܘƀƏܐ܉ ܘܗƍƃܐ ܒŵƇƄܒƎ ƋŶƦƉ ųƆ ƎƀܒƐƌ ƎܒŵƇƄܒ ܐƐ̈ ܐƆܐ ƈźƉ ܕųƇƃܘܢ ܬŴŶ <sup>10</sup> ̈Ɖܐ ܕܗܘƎſ ܕƆܐ ƁƆűƕ ܓƍ ųƆܘܢ ܪƤſܐ ܘƦƣܐƦƏܐ܉ Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƆܐ Ɖــſƞܐ ƖƊƆܒــű ܬŶــƉŴܐ ̇ ƆــŴ ܓƍــƐܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ܐƆܐ ܓƍــƑ ܬܪƞſܐſــƦ ƕــƈ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ܕܐſƦſــų ̇ ܐƥƌ ܓƍــƐܐ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ܕƀƊƀƐƌــŴܗܝ ܪƣܐ ųƆ ŸƄƤƉ Ƣƀܓ ܐƆ ܂ƎƀƐ̈ ܓƍ ̇ ܂ ܕܬųƉŴŶ

	- 200 Ɖــƍܐ ܗƀƃــƈ܂ źƉــƈ ܕƙƀƠƌــŴܬܐ ܕƍƙƇƉــŴܬܐ ܬܒــƖܐ ܗܘܬ Ɔــų ̇ ܕܐܘƏـــƀܐ ܐܦ ƇƉـــƦܐ ųܓƆŴـــƘ ܪƦܒـــ ƢـــƉܐƌܕ ƑƀƇŹŴـــźƐſܐܪƆ

̇ | L ܕܬ̈ܪſــƎ :BDP ܬܪſــƍܐ **<sup>1</sup>** ųƊſŴــƟ DLP: ̇ ųــƇſܕ ܐƊſŴــƟ B **<sup>2</sup>** ̇ ųƉŴــŶܬ BDP: ̇ ųƉŴــŶܕܬ L **3** ܣŴſܪŴܐܓźƟܕ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟܕ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓŹܐƟܕ B: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųŹܐźƟܕ D **7** ܝŵŶܕܐܬ BDL: ŴſŵŶܕܐܬ P **<sup>9</sup>** ƎܒŵƇƄܒ BL: ƎƃܪƦܒ DP **<sup>15</sup>** ܘܢųƇƃܕ BDL: ƎſųƇƃܕ P **<sup>17</sup>** ̇ ųƐƍܓ BDL: ̇ ųƐƍܓƆ P ̇ :LP ܬƉŴŶܐ ̇ ܝ **18** BD ܬųƉŴŶ ųܒ [+ Ǝſܕ B **19** ܐƞƉ LP: ŸƄƤƉ BD **20** ܘܡƦƉ BDL: ܘܡƦƊƉ P **21** ܗƦƏܐƦƣ BDL: ܐƦƏܐƦƣ P **23** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪƆ B: ƑƀƇźźƐſܐܪƆ L: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪƆ D: ƑƀƆŴŹŴźƐſܐܪƆ P | ܪƦܒ BDP: ܪƦܒ ƎƉ L

clearly that the primary one is principal and the secondary one is second in the order in its subsistence, while accidents may in no way be called substances, after that, the Philosopher wishes to give a definition of the substance about which he teaches in the treatise *Categories*246. For the proper sequence of this teaching requires that one first makes divisions of that issue which he wants to speak about and after that precisely defines it by carefully drawing its limits based on everything that was firmly established in the divisions247.

198 This is also the order in which he proceeds, for he first teaches on substance by way of division and in so doing he always consequently defines it. But since every definition that is correctly made always sets a genus as its principle and foundation, it is obvious that one is not able to provide a proper definition of substance, which is not only a genus but a most generic genus, for it is impossible for a man to find another genus that might be set as a principle of its definition248.

199 For if, as we have said, every definition takes genera of things as its beginning and foundation, it is apparent for everyone that in that case where no genus of a thing may be taken, it becomes impossible to make a definition either. And because there is no other genus above substance which may be predicated of it, since it is a most generic genus, it is obvious that a man is never able to provide its proper definition, as he does not have another genus which he might take and make a foundation of the definition.

200 What then? Since the sequence of teaching required that Aristotle provide after the division of substance also a defining account of it, but we have just

**<sup>246</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 44.6–8: διελὼν τὴν οὐσίαν εἴς τε τὴν πρώτην καὶ τὴν δευτέραν καὶ παραβαλὼν αὐτὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλας, νῦν εὐτάκτως ποιῶν τὸν ὁρισμὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἀποδοῦναι βούλεται (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.12–14).

**<sup>247</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 35.10–13. While commenting on *Isag.* 1.5, Ammonius talks about four methods of reasoning: division, definition, demonstration, and analysis/synthesis.

**<sup>248</sup>** See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.14–17: ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ οὐσία γένος ἐστὶ γενικώτατον, ὁρισμὸν αὐτῆς οὐ δύναται ἀποδοῦναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς ἐκ γενῶν καὶ διαφορῶν λαμβάνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ ἁπλῆς οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστι γένος εὑρεῖν διὰ τό, ὡς εἴρηται, γένος εἶναι αὐτὴν γενικώτατον (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 44.8–10). Sergius does not mention differentiae here, but does below, in §513.

̇ ƎƍſŴ ܗƣܐ ܕƆܐ ſƞƉܐ ƖƊƆܒű ܬƉŴŶܐ ƈƕ Ŷ Ǝſܕ ƎƍŶ : ̇ ƦƀƍƊŶƦƉܗ ųــƆ ƈܒƇܐܬܒ ̇ ̇ ܉ ܐܘ ųƀƇƕܕ ܬܐŴƍƙƇƉ ̇ B102r | D85r ųƆ ƦƤƘܘ ܬƢܓŶܐܬ :ܐƀƏܐܘ ̇ ܘ ܕܬܒƗ ̣ƎƉ ƈƃ ƢƘܘܣ ܒƦܪ ƆŴƘܓܐ ŴƊŶƦƊƆ܉ ܗ :ܐƦƇƉܕ ̇ L38v ųƐƄŹ ̇ ųƆܕܐ ܕƆܐ ſƞƉܐ ܕųƌܘܐ ܬƉŴŶܐ ƈƕ ܐܘƀƏܐ Ɔܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ƈźƉ ܕųƆ ̇ ܘܐ ܐſــƅ ܕܗ ܐƉŴــŶܬ ơܒــƣ ƦــſܐƢƀƙƣ :ƦــſܐƢſƢƣ ̇ ųــƆ ܗܘܐ ƋــƄ ̇ <sup>5</sup> Ŷ ųــƆ ܘܪܗܛ ܉ųƆ Ǝ ̈ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ܒŵƇƄܒƎ ƎƉ ܓƐƍܐ ܘƎƉ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕƙƀƠƌ ̇ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ̣ܕܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܬƇƉܐ ųƆ ܬƎƌ ƦŷƤŶܐ ܕܬƉŴŶܐ܂ ŴƆܬ ܕŴƀƇſܬܗ

<sup>201</sup> ̣ܘܗܝ ܗܕܐ ƖƏـــƢ Ɔܐ ܗܘܐ ܐſـــƅ ܕܐܬſܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ŹـــŪ ƏܓـــƁ ܐܘƍƉܐſــƦ܂ źƉــƈ ܕܕƀƇſــŴܬܐ ſƦſــƢ ̣ƉــƎ ƊƇƃــűܡ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ƉűƉــƀܐ ܒųƍƀƄ ܕܬƉŴŶܐ܂ ܬƉŴŶܐ ܓƢƀ ܐƅſ ܕܐܦ ܐƢƀƉ ƎƆ ̣ƎƉ ƈƖƆ܉ Ɔܐ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܬųƉŴŶ܂ ƈƃ Ɖــűܡ ܐƦſ ܐƦƉܝ ܕƆܐ ܗƅƘ ŴƆܬ ܗ ܓƢƀ ܕܒƤƌƢܐ ̣ܗܘ Ŷــƀܐ ƀƇƉــƇܐ ƀƉــŴܬܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ܂ ܘƃــƈ Ɖܐ ܕŶــƀܐ ƇƀƇƉܐ ŴƀƉܬܐ ܒƤƌƢܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ܂ ܗƍƃܐ ܕƎſ ܒƉűــŴܬ ܬŶــƉŴܐ: ܐܦ ̇ ̇ ܕƀƇſــŴܬܗ܂ ܕƆــų ̇ ܘ Ɖــűܡ ܕܐſƦſــų ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ƄƘųƉܐ ܒŵƇƄܒƎ ƆــŴܬ ܗ ųƆܕܐ ųƍƉܪƎƍſ ųƆ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܒűƀ ܬƦſŴŶܐ ܒƦܪ ƈƀƇƟ܂

202 źƉــƈ ܗƀƃــƈ ܕܐſــƅ ܕܐƌƢƉــƎ: ܕƀƇſــŴܬܐ ܒƄــƈ ƕــűܢ ƉűƉــƀܐ ̇ ̇ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ Əܐܡ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ܒųƇƄ ܒƉŴŶƦܐ܉ ƚƇŶ ܬųƉŴŶ ̇ ܂ ܘƇƤƉــƋ ܐܦ ƆــƎ ƍƟــƌŴܐ ܒƀــű ܗܕܐ܉ ܕƃــƈ ƍƙƇƉــŴܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܕƀƇƕــų ܐƦƉܝ ܕƦƉܐƍſƞƆــƎ ƖƊƆܒــű ܬŶــƉŴܐ ܕƉــűܡ ܘƆܐ ƍƀŷƄƤƉــƎ ܗܕܐ r48P ̇ <sup>20</sup> ܬܗŴــƀƇſܕ ܬŴƆ Ǝƍſܘܐܬ ܐƦƀƍƊŶƦƉ ܐƦƇƉ ƎƍƀƠܒƣ Ǝƍſܗܘ :ƢƖƐƊƆ ̈ܬܐ܉ ܕܬƇƉܐ ƎƆ ܒƮƀƐŷܬܐ ƦŷƤŶܐ ܕƆܐ ƢƀƐŶܘܬܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ƈźƉ ܕܨܒŴ ܉ƋــſűƟ ƎــƉ̣ ̇ B102v ųــƀƇƕ ƢƊܓƆ ƎƆ ƚƇƉ ܐƆܕ ܐűſܐ :Ǝƌܕųƕܐܬ ܬܐŴƀƇſܕܕ ƈܒــƇܒƦƌ ܐƊƆܕ :ƦſܐƊƀܓƣ ̇ ųſƢܒƖƌ ܐƆܕ ƎƆ ƦܒƤŶܐܬ ܬܐƞƆܐ ƎƉ̣ ̇ ܕŴƍƙƇƉܬܐ܂ ųƆ ƐƄŹܐ ܕƢſűƏܘܬܗ

**<sup>4</sup>** ܐƆ] om. BD **<sup>5</sup>** ̇ ųƆ] + ܕܐųƆ L | ƦſܐƢſƢƣ BL, D in marg.: om. P | ƦſܐƢƀƙƣ] om. B **10** ƎƆ] om. L **12** ܐƀŶܕ [+ ܗܘ̣ BDP **13** ܐƇƀƇƉ LP: ܐƇƀƇƉܘ BD **14** ܡűƉ BDL: ܐƉ P **15** ܪƦܒ BDP: ƎƉ ܪƦܒ L **<sup>17</sup>** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƙƏŴƇƇƀƘ P **<sup>20</sup>** Ǝƍſܗܘ BDL: Ǝſܗܘ P | ̇ L ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ :BDP ܕŴƀƇſܬܗ **<sup>22</sup>** ܬܐŴƀƇſܕܕ BDL: ܬܐŴƀƇſܕ P | Ǝƌܕųƕܐܬ BDL: Ǝƌܕųƕ P | ܐűſܐ [om. P | ̇ ųƀƇƕ ƢƊܓƆ LP: ƢƊܓƆ ̇ ųƀƇƕ BD **23** ƦſܐƊƀܓƣ LP: ƦſܐƊƀŷƣ BD

shown that it is impossible to carry out a definition of substance, has his teaching about it become crippled and obstructed, or has the order of his account that requires that one always provide a definition after a division become confused? Not at all. But since he truly grasped that no definition of substance is possible, he reasonably refrained from giving a definition — which is, as we have said, always composed of genus and of other things which are concomitant to it249 — and turned to the property250 of substance which serves here in the function of a definition251.

201 And this is what he did not by chance but with great skill, since property in its nature more than anything else resembles definition. For a definition, as we have already said above252, does not exist unless it is convertible with what it defines. For instance, everything that is a man is a mortal rational animal, and everything that is a mortal rational animal is a man. In the same way as definition a property always converts with that whose property it is253. We will explain this by means of examples shortly afterwards.

202 Thus, since property, as we have said, always resembles a definition, the Philosopher gives the property of substance instead of its definition in his whole teaching on it. In so doing, he provides us with a general rule (κανών), that every time when we are compelled to give a definition of something but are unable to do it, we shall refrain from a defining account and turn to the property of things, which will in case of insufficiency perform sufficient service. But since we mentioned property but have not until now explained at all what it is, it is necessary for us not to pass by hastily but to dwell on it, lest the order (τάξις) of the exposition of the teaching be confused.

**<sup>249</sup>** The last expression by Sergius refers to the constitutive differentia. Cf. the quotation from Philoponus in the previous footnote.

**<sup>250</sup>** Or a distinctive feature, Gr. τὸ ἴδιον, Lat. *proprium*.

**<sup>251</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 44.10–11; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.17–18.

**<sup>252</sup>** See §154.

**<sup>253</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 44.10–15; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.17–24.


**2** ̇ ųƍƣܪŴـــƘ LP: ̇ ųƀƍƣܪŴـــƘ BD | ܐܦ [om. DP **4** ܐƊـــƀƟƦƉ LP: ܐƊـــƀƏܬƦƉ BD ̈ܬܐ **<sup>7</sup>** ̈ ܬܐ :DLP ܘƦƄƉܒŴƍ ŴƍܒƦƄƊܘܒ B | ܐƘŴƐƇƀƙƆ BDL: ܐƘŴƐƇƇƀƙƆ P **<sup>8</sup>** ̇ ܐƥƌ +] ܕƌܐųƀƙƆ BD **9** ƈƄܕܒ BDP: ƈƄܒ ܕܐܦ L **10** ܐƆ űƃ BDL: ܐƆܕ P **11** ƎƙƠƌ LP: Ǝ ̈ ƙƀƠƌ BD | ܐƃܘŴƕ] + tit. ̇ ܝ ̈ــƀܐ ƦƉܐƉــƢܐ܂ ܘܐſــűܐ ̣ܗܝ ſƦŶــƦܬܐ܂ ܘܐſــűܐ ̣ܗܝ <sup>ܗ</sup> ܕƉــƍܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƀƇſــƦܐ ܘܒƄــƊܐ ܙƌ ܐƢــƉܐƦƉ ƦــſܐƇſܐƣܕ BD **13** ƦــſܐƢƀƊܓ BDL: ܘܬܐƢــƀƊܓ P **15** ƎــƀŷƤŶƦƉ L, Epit.: ƎƍƀŷƤŶƦƉ BDP | ܐƌܙ BDL, Epit.: ܐƆܕ P **16** űŶ ųƇƄƆ BDL, Epit.: űŷƇƄƆ P **18** ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƀƘܘܕ BD, Epit.: ܬܐŴƘŴƐƇƇƀƘܘܕ P: ܬܐŴƙƐƇƀƘܘܕ L **20** ųƇƃ] om. BD | ƎƘܘܐ BDL, Epit.: ܘܐܦ P **<sup>21</sup>** ܬŴƆ] + ܘܢųƇƃ B | ܐƍ̈ ƙƆŴƀƆ LP, Epit.: ܐƍ̈ ƙƆŴſ ܬŴƆ BD

#### *[Property]254*

203 So, let us now bring our account of substance to a halt, going briefly beyond it, and turn to the division of the property, also explaining clearly what it is, how many types of it are defined, and when and where it comes to be, so that, after we have explained in general the whole notion of it, then we will apply it without fear, since we will properly understand it. It appears not only in the teaching on substance, but also in all other treatises and writings produced by the Philosopher, as well as by certain other authors. Thus, as soon as we learn what property is in general and of what kind it is, we may obviously make concrete use of it, while nothing will hinder us in understanding it, since general knowledge is easily and without obstacle combined with particular cases.

204 Now, we find in the writings of the ancients that types of property are altogether four255. However, only one of them is fully and precisely property, while the other three are used in a secondary and more common sense everywhere without distinction. So, the first kind of property is what occurs to one species alone as a whole, while it turns out not to exist actually in every particular individual that is encompassed by it. For instance, knowledge of medicine, philosophy, geometry, and any other particular discipline occurs only to the whole species of men, although it does not pertain to every person but only to those who have received particular education. Thus, it is called a

**<sup>254</sup>** After §203, mss. BD have the subtitle: "On what property is and how many types of it exist, which one is called (property) in the strict sense and which one figuratively."

**<sup>255</sup>** See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.13–22 as commented by Ammonius, *In Isag.* 108.22–110.6 and Elias, *In Isag.* 89.4–90.28. Sergius' account follows closely what we find in the commentary on the *Isagoge* ascribed to Ammonius.

 ̇ ܗܕܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܕŴƀƇſܬܗ ܕܐܕƣܐ ܐƀƤƌܐ ſƢƟƦƉܐ܉ ƈźƉ ܕܕųƇſ ܐųſƦſ ܒŴŷƇܕܘܗܝ ܘƆܐ ŷƀƄƣܐ ŴƆܬ ܐܕƣܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ܂

̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕŸƀƄƣ ŴƆܬ ųƇƃܘܢ 205 ܬܘܒ ܙƌܐ ܕܬܪƎſ ܕܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܗ ̇ ܗܕܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܐܦ ̈Ɖܐ ܕܒܐܕƣܐ: űƃ ŴƆ ųƆܘܢ ܒŴŷƇܕųſܘܢ ܐųſƦſ ŴƍƟ Ɔــܐܕ <sup>5</sup> ̈ƣܐ ܐŶــƌƮܐ ܐƀƇſــƎ ̣ܕܗܘ܂ ܐƃــƌŵܐ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܒƌƢــƤܐ ܕܬܪܬſــƎ ̈Ƥܐ ŷƀƄƣܐ܂ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ܕųƇſܘܢ ̈ܪܓŴƇܗܝ܂ ܐܦ ܗܕܐ ܓƢƀ ųƇƄƆܘܢ ܒƍƀƍ ̇ ܝ ܕƇƄƆــųܘܢ ƀƄƣــŷܐ܂ ƃــű ŹــŪ ŶƮƘــƦܐ ųܒــ : ̇ L39v | D86r ųــſƦſܕܐ ܐƢــƉܐƦƉ ̈ ܬܐ ܐƦſ ܕܬܪܬƎſ ̈ܪܓƎſųƀƇ܂ Əܓƀܐ


**<sup>1</sup>** ̇ ųſƦſܐ [om. B **<sup>5</sup>** Ǝſܕܬܪܬ DLP, Epit.: Ǝſܕܬܪ B **<sup>6</sup>** Ƣƀܓ [+ ŴƆ BD **<sup>9</sup>** ܘ ̇ ܗ [+ ܐƉ BD | ųƇƄƆ ܐƣܐܕ BDP, Epit.: ܐƣ̈ ̈Ƥܐ **<sup>12</sup>** L ƇƄƆــųܘܢ ܐܕ ƍƀƍܒ ܘܢųƇƄƆܘ [om. hom. B **14** ܕŴŷƇܒ [om. D ܐƌƮŶܐ [om. BD **17** ܐűŷƃܐ LP, Epit.: űŷƃܐ BD | ܐƍƟ] + ƎſųƆ BD **19** ܐƉŴƍƠƆ] + ܐƌƢŶܐ P **<sup>20</sup>** ܐƆܘܨܗ BDE: ųƆܘܨܗ P: ܬܗŴƆܘܨܗܘ L: ŴƆ ̄ ̄ܗ ܘܨ Epit. **23** ܘܢųƆ DLP, Epit.: ųƆ B | ƎƘܘܐ BDP, Epit.: ܐܦ L

property of the human species, because it belongs to it alone and does not occur to any other species256.

205 Further, the second kind of property is what occurs to all individuals that are in a species, while it pertains not only to them but also to some other species. For instance, man is biped and this is what occurs to all men. Thus, we say that this is proper to them for it belongs to all of them, although there are many birds that are biped as well257.

206 Further, the third kind of property is what occurs to the whole species and also to individuals in it, although it occurs to them not always but at a certain time only, for instance turning grey in old age. For this is what occurs to the species of men alone and to all of them, although not always but during old age, as we have said. Hence, this is also proper to men alone, for it does not occur to any other species save for it258.

207 So, the fourth kind of property, which is truly property in the strict sense, contains all of it at once, i.e. it occurs to the whole species and to all individuals in it, and also not sometimes but always, while it is not attributed to any other species or individual except those ones that it is spoken of. For example, laughing for men, neighing for horses, barking for dogs, and other things like that occur to one species alone and to all individuals in this species, and it occurs to them not sometimes but always. For even if a man is not actually

**<sup>256</sup>** See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.13–14. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 109.13–15: καὶ ἔστιν ἓν μὲν σημαινόμενον καὶ πρῶτον ὃ μόνῳ τινὶ συμβέβηκεν, οὐ παντὶ δέ, ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἰατρεύειν τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν τὸ ἀστρονομεῖν τὸ γεωμετρεῖν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων.

**<sup>257</sup>** See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.14–15. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 109.15–17: δεύτερον δὲ ὃ παντὶ μέν, οὐ μόνῳ δέ, ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι δίποδι· παντὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρχει, οὐ μόνῳ δέ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ πετεινοῖς ὑπάρχει τὸ δίποσιν εἶναι.

**<sup>258</sup>** See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.16–17. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 109.17–19: τρίτον δὲ ὃ καὶ μόνῳ καὶ παντί, οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ ἀλλὰ ποτέ, ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἐν γήρᾳ πολιοῦσθαι· μόνῳ γὰρ καὶ παντί, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀεὶ πεπολίωται, ἀλλ' ἐν γήρᾳ.

̇ ܕܗܕܐ܂ ܘƃــƈ ܐƉــƦܝ ̇ ܝ ܕƟــƍܐ ܒــų ƇƀŶــų ܐƆܐ ܓƃŴŷܐ ƢƟƦƉܐ ܒų ̇ ܐ ƚƇŷƤƉ ųƆ ƇƀŷƆܐ ܗƌܐ ƖƊƆܒŴƌűܬܐ܂ ܕܨܒ

̇ ܘ ܕŸƀƄƣ ŷƆــű 208 ƎſűƉ ܙƌܐ ƀƉűƟܐ ܕܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ܉ ܗ ̇ ܝ ܕƍƙƆŴſܐ ܕƍƀƃܐ ܐƀƤƌܐ ܐܕƣܐ ܐƍſܐ ̣ܕܗܘ: ܘܐƎƘ ŴƆ ųƇƄƆ܂ ܐƅſ ܗ ̇ ܘ ܕƀƄƣــŸ ܐųſƦſ <sup>5</sup> ̇ : ܘܐƎƘ ŴƆ ųƇƃܘܢ ƀƙƇſــƎ Ɔــųܘܢ܂ ܙƌܐ ܕſــƎ ܕܬܪſــƎ ܗ ̇ ܝ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒƤƌƢܐ ܕܬܪܬſــƎ ųƇƄƆ ܐܕƣܐ ܘŴƆ ųƆ ܒŴŷƇܕܘܗܝ܂ ܐƅſ ܗ ̇ ܉ ܐƆܐ ƀƄƣــŷܐ ̈ــƤܐ ܐſƦſــų ̈ܪܓŴƇܗܝ܂ ܗܕܐ ܓƢƀ ܘܐƎƘ ܕųƇƃܘܢ ܒƍƀƍ ܘܐܦ ƦŶƮƙƆܐ܂ ܘܙƌܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܬƦƆܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܗ v39L.des ̇ ܘ ܕƀƄƣــŸ ŷƆــű ܐܕƣܐ ̇ ܝ ܕųƌܘſــƎ ܒŴŷƇܕ ܘųƇƄƆ ܐܕƣܐ܉ ŴƆ ܕƎſ ܒŵƇƄܒƎ ܐƆܐ ܒŵܒــƎ܂ ܐſــƅ ܗ ŶـــŴ̈ܪܬܐ ܒŵܒـــƎ ƀƏܒـــŴܬܐ܂ ܗܕܐ ܓƀـــƢ ܕܐܕƣܐ ܐƤƌـــƀܐ ܐſƦſـــų <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܒŴŷƇܕܘܗܝ: ܘܕųƇƃ ܬܘܒ ܐܕƣܐ܉ ŴƆ ܕƎſ ܒŵƄƇƄܒــƎ ܐſƦſــų v86D ̇ Ɔــų ܐƆܐ Ɖܐ ܕƏܐܒ܂ ܙƌܐ ܕƎſ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ ̣ ܕܗܘŴſ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ſƦŶــƦܬܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƎƍſƢ ̇ ܗ r104B ̇ ܘ ܕŸƀƄƣ űŷƆ ܐܕƣܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ܘųƇƄƆ ܐܕƣܐ ܘܒŵƇƄܒƎ܂ ܐƅſ ܕܐƉ ̇ ܨܗܘŴƆܬܗ ܕƀƏŴƏܐ܂ űŷƇƃܐ ̣ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ ܓƀــƢ ܓŴƃŴŷܬܗ ܕܒƤƌƢܐ ܐܘ ܕűŶ ܐܕƣܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ܘܕųƇƃ ܐܕƣܐ ܐųſƦſ <sup>15</sup> ̇ : ܘܒűƖƇƄܢ ŷƀƄƣܐ ųƆ܂

209 ſűƉــƎ źƉــƈ ܕܘܪƣܐ ܘƌــƠƘŴܐ ܕܒƇƊــƦܐ ƌܐƉــƢ ܬܘܒ ܗƃــƍܐ܉ ̇ ܝ ܕƀƄƣــŷܐ ŷƆــű ܐܕƣܐ: ܘƆــŴ ƇƄƆــų܂ ̇ ܗ ܕܕƀƇſــŴܬܐ ƀƉűƟــƦܐ ܐſƦſــų ̇ ܝ ܕŷƀƄƣܐ ųƇƄƆ ܐܕƣܐ: ܘŴƆ Ɔــų ܒŷƇــŴܕܘܗܝ܂ ܘܕܬƆــƦܐ ܕܬܪܬƎſ ܕƎſ ܗ ̇ ŷƆــű ܐܕƣܐ ܘƇƄƆــų ܘƆــŴ ܒŵƇƄܒــƎ܂ ܕƀƇſــŴܬܐ ܕſــƎ ̇ ܝ ܕܐſƦſــų ܬܘܒ ܗ ̇ــŴ ƌܗ ܐ܂űــŷƃܐ ƎƀƆܗ ƎſųƇƃ Ǝ̈ Ƥƍƃ ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕܐܪܒƗ ܕųƆ ܗ ̇ P49v ųſƦſܐ ܬܐƦſƦŶ ܕƎſ ܕŷƀƄƣܐ ŷƆــű ܐܕƣܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕܘܗܝ ܘƇƄƆــų ܐܕƣܐ: ܘƆــŴ ܒŵܒــƎ ܐƆܐ ̇ ܒƤــƢܪܐ ܒŵƇƄܒــƎ܂ ܗܕܐ ܗƀƃــƈ ܕƀƇſــŴܬܐ ſƦŶــƦܬܐ: ̣ܕܗܝ ܐſƦſــų ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ܂

**1** ̇ ųƇƀŶ L, Epit.: ܐƇƀŶ BDP **2** ܬܐŴƌűܒƖƊƆ BDP, Epit.: ܬܐŴƌűܒƖƉܕ L **3** ƎƍſƢƉܐ BDL: ƎƌƢƉܐ P | űŷƆ] om. P **4** ƎƘܘܐ BDL: ܘܐܦ P **5** ܘܢųƇƃ DLP: ܘܢųƇƄƆ B | Ǝſܕܬܪ BDL, Epit.: Ǝſܪܬ̈ܕܬ P ̇ ܝ **6** <sup>ܗ</sup> [om. P | Ǝſܕܬܪܬ BDL, Epit.: Ǝſųſܪܬ̈ܕܬ P **<sup>7</sup>** ƎƘܘܐ BDP: ܘܐܦ L | ܐƤ̈ ƍƀƍܒ BDP: ܐƤƌܐ L P ܐܕƣܐ ܬܘܒ :BD ܬܘܒ ܐܕƣܐ **11** P ƀƤƌܐ :BD ܐƀƤƌܐ | P ܒƀƐܒŴܬܐ :BD ƀƏܒــŴܬܐ **10** ̇ ܘ + [ܕܐܪܒƖܐ **12** ̇ ܝ + [ܐƅſ **13** P ܗ .:scr ܨܗܘŴƆܬܗ | P ܕܓŴƄŶŴܬܗ :BD ܓŴƃŴŷܬܗ **14** BD ܗ ųƆܨܗ BDP **15** ųƇƃܘܕ DP: ųƇƄƆܘ B **16** ܐƣܕܘܪ P: ܐƣܕܕܘܪ BD **20** ƎƀƆܗ [om. BD

laughing, he is nevertheless called capable of laughter, since he has this ability potentially and any time he wants can make it actual259.

208 Thus, we say that the first kind of property is the one which occurs to one particular species but not to all of it. For instance, sciences belong to the nature of human beings, even if not all of them learn them. The second kind is the one which occurs to all of a species but not only to it, as being a biped belongs to human beings. For although this is characteristic of all human beings, it occurs also to birds. Furthermore, the third kind is the one that occurs to one species alone and to all of it, however not always but at a certain time, as turning grey in old age. For this is characteristic of the species of man alone and also of all of the species, though it occurs to them not always but when they grow old. The fourth kind, which is the property in the strict sense, is the one which occurs to one species only, and to all of it, and always, as when we speak of human beings being capable of laughter or of horses being capable of neighing. For each one of these occurs to one species alone, to all of a species, and always260.

209 So, for the sake of learning and training in words, let us put it also as follows. The first kind of property is what occurs to one species but not to all of it. The second one is what occurs to all of a species but not to it alone. Further, the third one is what belongs to one species and to all of it but not always. And property in the strict sense is the fourth one, in which all these things coincide, namely that it occurs to one species alone, and to all of it, and not at a certain time but always. So, this is the property strictly and truly261.

**<sup>259</sup>** See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.17–20. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 109.19–23: τέταρτον δὲ ἐφ' οὗ συνδεδράμηκε καὶ τὸ μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ καὶ ἀεί, οἷον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ γελαστικὸν καὶ τῷ ἵππῳ τὸ χρεμετιστικὸν καὶ κυνὶ τὸ ὑλακτικόν. τούτων δὲ ἕκαστον λέγεται κατὰ δύναμιν, οὐ κατ' ἐνέργειαν· οὐ γὰρ καθὸ γελᾷ ἢ χρεμετίζει, γελαστικὸν λέγεται ἢ χρεμετιστικόν, ἀλλὰ καθὸ πέφυκε.

**<sup>260</sup>** In this paragraph, Sergius' summary of the four kinds of property is particularly close to Ammonius, *In Isag*. 109.19–23, quoted above.

**<sup>261</sup>** Cf. the schematic division suggested by Ammonius in *In Isag*. 109.9–12.

	- ܗ܂Ʀــſ ܬŴــƆ ƅƘųƉ ܐƀ̈ ƌܙ ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ̣ űŶ ܐƆܘ :ƎƌƢƉܕܐ ƅſܐ ƎſűƉ <sup>212</sup> ̇ ܘ ܕſــƎ ܕܐܪܒــƗ: źƉــƈ ܘܒűܓــŴܢ ƣܐƇſܐſــƦ ƟƦƉــƢܐ ܕƀƇſــŴܬܐ܂ ܗ ܕƅƘųƉ ŴƆܬ ųƤƙƌ ܐƅſ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ܉ ̣ܗܘ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ƢſƢƣܬܐ܂ Ʀــſܐűƀŷſܕ ƈــźƉ :ƎܒــŵƇƄܒ ܐƉűــƉ ܐƉ̈ ܗƌܐ ܗƀƃــƈ ܒƀƄــƍܐ ܕܬŶــŴ

**1** ܐƊƀƄƏܐ P, Epit.: ܐƊƄƏܐ BD **2** ܐƃŴŷܓ BD, Epit.: ܐƄŶŴܓ P **3** ܐƃŴŷܕܓ BD, Epit.: ܐƄŶŴܕܓــ P | ܘܗܝƦــſܐ DP: ܗܘ̣ B, Epit. **4** ܡűــƊƇƃܘ BD: ܐƉ ƈƃܘ P | ܐƆܨܗܘ [+ ܗܘ̣ P ̈Ɗƀܐ **<sup>9</sup>** ƄƏܐ P, Epit.: ܐƊ̈ ƄƏܐ BD **11** ܐƀƉűƟ] om. B | űŶܕ BD, Epit.: űŶ P | ŴƆܘ BD, Epit.: ŴƆ P **13** ܐƉ] om. D **16** ܗܝŴƇܪܓ̈ [+ ܐƆܐ P | ܘܗܝƦſܐ [om. P **17** ųƉƦƤƉ P, Epit.: ܘܗܝƦſܐ BD **22** ܢŴܓűܘܒ [+ ܕŴŷƇܘܒ D in marg.

210 Similar to definition, property always converts in the figure (σχῆμα) of speech with what it relates to262. For every human being is capable of laughter, and all that is capable of laughter is a human being. Similarly, all that is capable of neighing is a horse, and everything that is a horse is capable of neighing. And in all other cases like that properties are in the same way reciprocally related to what they belong263. But (the figures of speech of) three other kinds of property do not reciprocate in themselves like that, and thus they should be called properties not in the true and strict sense like this one, but rather figuratively. And that these figures of speech do not reciprocate will be clear from what follows.

211 So, the first (kind of property) is what belongs to one species but not to all of it, as sciences to human nature, and it does not reciprocate. For everyone who has knowledge of sciences is a human being, but not every human being has knowledge of sciences, since there are many who have not learned them. Likewise, the second (kind) which belongs to all of a species but not to it alone, as when a man is called a biped: all that is man is designated as biped, but not every biped is a man. And similarly also with the third kind which belongs to one species and to all of it at a certain time, for all that turns grey is a man but not every man necessarily turns grey.

212 Hence, as we have said, none of these kinds converts in itself and because of this they are called properties in a loose sense. The fourth one, on the other hand, since it converts in itself, as we have shown, is truly property. It is in every respect similar to the nature of definitions because it pertains exclusively

**<sup>262</sup>** Cf. Ammonius and David on definitions: Ammonius, *In Isag.* 88.22–26; David, *Prolegomena* 15.27. In his commentary on *Isag.* 12.13–22, Ammonius does not go into the question how properties may be applied for definitions. However, Elias dwells on this issue in Elias, *In Isag.* 89.9–11: ὁρισμὸν γὰρ μιμεῖται καὶ ὑπογραφὴν τῷ ἀντιστρέφειν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ὁρισμὸν μιμεῖται, οὐσιῶδες, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑπογραφήν, ἐπεισοδιῶδες· ἡ γὰρ ὑπογραφὴ ἐκ συμβεβηκότων. **263** See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.20–22. Elias in his commentary on this passage again elaborates the question of the application of properties in definitions, since it is both characteristic of definitions and of some of the properties that they reciprocate with what they are related to, see Elias, *In Isag.* 90.14–28.

̈Ɖܐ ܐųſƦſܘܢ܂ ܐƦſܘܗܝ űŷƆ ܐܕƣܐ ܘųƇƄƆ ܒŵƇƄܒƎ܉ ܐƅſ ܕܐܦ ܬŴŶ ܘƅƘųƉ ܬܘܒ ŴƆܬ ܐƊƀƄƏܐ ܕƦƇƉܐ ܒűƖƇƄܢ ܐſــƅ ܕܐܦ ܗƀƆــƎ܂ ̈Ɖܐ ܐƅſ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ƈźƉ ܗƈƀƃ ܕƦƀƆ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܕƎƀŷƉ ųƍƀƄƆܘܢ ܕܬŴŶ ܗܕܐ ƦſƦŶܬܐ܉ ƚƇƉ ܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ ܕƈƃ ܐƄſܐ ܕŵƌܪܘܒ ƎƆ ƍƠƌŴƏܐ ̇ ܕŷƄƣــƦܗܘܢ ܕܬŶــŴ <sup>5</sup> ̈Ɖܐ ܘƆܐ ƉƦƌــƞܐ ƖƊƆܒــű ܐƌــŴܢ: ƤŶƦƌــŸ ܒــų ̇ ̇ Ɔــųܕܐ ƖƏــƢܗ ܒųܕܐ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ƚƇŶ ŴƍƙƇƉܬܐ ƀƍƊŶƦƉــƦܐ܂ ܕƆــų Ū ̇ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ƦƀƉűƟ ܬƎƌ ܒŴƍƙƇƊܬܐ ܕƈƕ ܐܘƀƏܐ: ܘƚƇŶ ܬƉŴŶܐ Ɛƌ ̇ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ųƍƀƕƢƆ ųƆ ƋƀƠƉܘ ƋŶƦƉ ̇ ̇ ƦƇƉܐ ܘܒų ̇ ܒųƇƄ ųƆ

L29r | B105r Ƣــƀܓ ƎــƆ ܗܘܐ ƋــƀƏ ܐ܂ƦــƇƉܕ ܬܐŴƙƀƠƌ ܬŴƆ ƈƀƃܗ ƎƆ ܟŴƘųƌ 213 : ̇ ƊƆܐƢƉ܉ ܕܒŴƀƇſűܬܗ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ ܐܬŸƤŶ ܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ ƚƇŶ ܬųƉŴŶ ƈźƉ ܕܗƃــƍܐ ܐƆــƞܬ ƕــƈ ܗܕܐ܂ Əــܐܡ ܗƀƃــƈ ܕƀƇſــŴܬܐ ƀƉűƟــƦܐ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƦƀƆܘܗܝ ܒűƊܡ ܐƌƢŶܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ̇ ܗ ܗܕܐ܉ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ ƋƆ ܐųſƦſ ̇ : ܘƆܐ ƀƍƏــơ ܬܘܒ ƍƀƃــų ƕــƈ ƟــƊſŴܐ ܕܒܐŶــƌƢܐ܂ ܐƆܐ űƊƇƃܡ ܒų ̈ƣܐ: űܓــ ƢــƉܐƊƆ ƦſܐƌŴܓــ ƎــſųſƦſܕܐ :ܐƦــƀƌƮŶܐ ƎــƀƆܗ ƎــſųƇƃ ̇ űƀŷſܐƦſ ܕƎſ ƊƆܐƢƉ ܬƖƣܐ ܓƍ <sup>15</sup> ̈ــƐܐ ܐŶــƌƮܐ ܕźƟܐܓŴܪſــŴܣ: ܒــų ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƟــƎſųƊſŴ܂ ܒƤــƢܪܐ ܓƀــƢ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ̣ܗܝ ƀƏــƊܐ ƄƆــƈ Ɖــűܡ v87D ̇ ܕƇƃــųܘܢ ̇ : ܘƠƉܒƀƍƇــƦܐ ܐſƦſــų ųــƍƉ ƢܒــƆ ųƍƀƃ ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ ̇ ܂ ̇ Ɔܐ ƋƀƏ űƉܡ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܕųƌܘܐ ܒــų ƟــƊſŴܐ ܕƍƀƃــų ųƆ űƃ ܐ܉ƣ̈ ܓű ̇ ̇ : ܘܒűܓــŴܢ ܐܦ ܨܒــŴܬܐ ܐſƦſــų ܐƆܐ ̣ܗܝ ƙƏــƠܐ ƠƆــƊſŴܐ ܕſــƦܗ ̇ ܂ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ųƊſŴƟ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܒų

> ܡŴــƠƌ ƢــƉܕܐܬܐ ƎــƀƆܗ ƦſܐƌƦܒŴــƠƕ ƎŷܒƉ űƃ ƥƌܐ Ƣܒƃ ܐƆܐ 214 ̇ Ƣ: ܕܗܐ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܕܬܪܬƎſ ܕܐųſƦſܘܢ Ɖܐ űƃ Ʀſܐƣܕܪܘ ܐƦƇƉ ƈܒƟŴƆ ̈Ɖܐ ̈ ƀــƦܐ ܕܐſƦſــųܘܢ ƍƟــŴ ƉűƟ Ǝــƀƌܗ Ƒــƀ ̈ ̈ƣܐ܉ ܒܐܘƏ ̈ــƐܐ ܘܐܕ ܓƍ

ܕƢƐƌܗܒ + [ܕŵƌܪܘܒ | D ܐܪƑƀƆųŹŴźƏ :B ܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ **4** BD ܐƊƄƏܐ .:scr ܐƊƀƄƏܐ **2** BD in marg. **5** ܗܘܢƦŷƄƣܕ [+ ܗܘܢƦŷƤŶܕ BD in marg. **9** Ƣƀܓ [om. B **10** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ BL: ̇ ܕܐܘƏــƀܐ ܀ܐ܀ .tit +] ܗܕܐ **<sup>12</sup>** D ܐܪźƏــƑƀƆųŹŴ ̇ ƀƉűƟܐ ܐܘƦƀƃ ܕŴƀƇſܬܗ ųƉŴŶܬ BD **13** ܐƊſŴــƟ BL: ųƊſŴــƟ D **15** ܣŴــſܪŴܐܓźƟܕ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــŹܐƟܕ B: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــųźƟܕ D **<sup>16</sup>** ƎſųƊſŴــƟ L: ܘܢųƊſŴــƟ BD **<sup>23</sup>** Ƒــƀ ̈ Əܒܐܘ L: ــܐܣƀ ̈ Əܒܐܘ BD | Ǝــƀƌܗ BD: ƎــƀƆܗ L ܘܢųſƦſܕܐ L: ƎſųſƦſܕܐ BD

to one species, to all of it, and always, as it is also the case with definitions, and further, it is always convertible in the figure of speech, as they do too264. Hence, since nothing else appears as akin to the nature of definitions as the property in the strict sense, Aristotle instructs us that every time when we are compelled to give definitions but are unable to do this we ought to apply this kind of property instead of defining method265. For it is what he applies here for the first time, in the teaching on substance, making use of it in the whole account instead of a definition and by means of it defining and establishing the concept of substance.

#### *[Properties of substance]*

213 Now that we have explained why it was necessary that Aristotle made use 3a7–21 of the properties of substance instead of defining it, we shall return to the order of the exposition. So, the first property266 which Aristotle sets out is the following: substance is what is not in something else but everything is in it267. Further, its nature does not need to be subsistent in something else, but all other things, which are generally speaking accidents and speaking particularly are nine other genera of the categories, have subsistence in it. For substance is truly subject for everything else whose nature is beyond it and it is receptive to all accidents, while nothing else is a subject for it (as something) in which its nature might subsist, but it is sufficient for its own subsistence, and hence there are also things that may have subsistence in it.

214 However, someone critically examining what has been said may polemic- 3a21–28 ally suggest a counter-argument by saying268: "Look, the secondary substances, which are genera and species, have subsistence of their nature in the primary

**<sup>264</sup>** See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.17–21: διὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ ἴδιον αὐτῆς ἀποδίδωσιν· ἔοικε γὰρ τοῦτο ὁρισμῷ· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ὁρισμὸς μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ ὑπάρχει, οὗ ἐστιν ὁρισμός, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὁριστὸν ἀντιστρέφει, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἴδιον μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ ὑπάρχει, οὗ ἐστιν ἴδιον, καὶ ἀντιστρέφουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα. διὰ ταύτην οὖν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας ἀποδοῦναι βούλεται (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 44.10–15).

**<sup>265</sup>** Cf. §§200–201, above.

**<sup>266</sup>** Aristotle is speaking of what is "common" (κοινὸν) to all substances, admitting later on (see *Cat*. 3a21) that this characteristic is also shared by differentiae. Ammonius suggests, however, that there is no contradiction here, since what Aristotle meant at this point was "belonging to all substances" (*In Cat.* 44.19–21, cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.24–31). Sergius apparently accepts Ammonius' interpretation of this passage.

**<sup>267</sup>** Sergius paraphrases *Cat*. 3a7–8: κοινὸν δὲ κατὰ πάσης οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι. **268** Aristotle himself anticipates the counter-argument mentioned by Sergius in *Cat*. 2a21–28, suggesting a distinction be made between the substance and the differentia (διαφορά). In so doing, according to Ammonius, Aristotle states that differentiae are not accidents but substances (see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 45.7–46.19; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 64.9–68.9).

̈ſܐ: ܐƦſ ųƆܘܢ ƊſŴƟܐ ܕųƍƀƃܘܢ܂ ܐſــƅ ̣ܕƉــƎ ܗܕܐ ƐƌܒــƢ Ɔــų űƀŷſ : ̇ ̇ ƟــƊſŴܐ ܕƍƀƃــų ̇ ܝ ƀƉűƟــƦܐ ܐſــƦ Ɔــų ܕܐܘƏــƀܐ ܗ r57P ̇ ܝ ܕܬܪܬſــƎ: ܒــų ̇ ܝ ܕܐܬܐƉــƢܬ: ܕܐܘƏــƀܐ ƆــŴ ܒƊــűܡ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ̇ ƇƊƆــƦܐ ܗ ܘƌܒƀƇźــų ̇ ܂ ̇ ƠƙƏܐ ƊſŴƠƆܐ ܕƦſܗ ƊƀƟƦƉܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ̣ܗܝ ųƉŴƍƟ

<sup>215</sup> ƆــŴܬ ܗƌܐ ܕſــƎ ܐƍſƢƉــƎ ܗƃــƍܐ: ܕܐܢ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ܕܬܪܬſــƎ ܒــų <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܝ ̇ ܝ ̈ƣܐ ܬܬƍƉܐ܂ <sup>ܗ</sup> ̇ ܉ ܐƞƆܐ ܕƋƕ ܓű ƦƀƉűƟܐ ƀƍƟܐ ƊſŴƟܐ ܕųƉŴƍƟ Ǝــſܕ ƑــƐƃƦƉ ܗ܂ƦــƇƊܒ ƋƀƠƌܕ ƢƉܐ ƎƀƆܕܗ Ǝ ̇ ̇ ܘ Ɖ ܕܐܦ ܨܒ v105B ̇ <sup>ܐ</sup> ̣ܗܘ <sup>ܗ</sup> ̈ــƐܐ ̈ƣܐ ܘܓƍ ̣ƎƉ ܗܕܐ ܓƀƇܐƦſ܂ ſŵŶƦƉܐ ܓƢƀ ƢſųƌܐƦſ ƥƍƇƄƆ ܕܐܕ ̇ Ɗƕــųܘܢ ųــƆ ƎƀƘܬŴــƤƉ ܐ܉ƦــƀƉűƟ ܐƀــƏܐܘ ƈــƕ ƎــſƢƉܐƦƉ űــƃ ̈ƣܐ ܕſــƎ Ɔܐ ƉــƦܘܡ ſƞƉــƎ ܗܕܐ ̈ ųƀƉܘܢ܂ ܓــű ܒƄــƌŴ <sup>10</sup> ̈ųƀܘܢ ܘܒŶƦــŴ ̇ ƆܐܘƀƏܐ ųƆ ƎƀƘܬŴƤƉ ܘܢųƀ̈ ƖƊƆܒű܉ ܐƆܐ ųƍƉܘܢ ܘܐܦ Ɔܐ ܒƌŴƄ ̇ Ɗƕــųܘܢ ųــƆ ƎƀƘܬŴــƤƉܕ ܘܢųƍƉ Ʀſܐ Ǝſܕ ܐܢ ܂ ̇ L29v ųƀƇƕ ƎſƢƉܐƦƉܕ ̈ ųƀƌܘܢ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒŶƦــƉŴܐ ܕƍƀƃــųܘܢ ƀƆــƦ ܓــƣűܐ ƆܓƊــƢ ܒŵܒــƎ ܒƄــŴ ̇ ܂ ܕƞƉܐ ܕŴƤƌܬܦ ųƊƕ ƆܐܘƀƏܐ ܕƦƉܐƢƉ ųƀƇƕ

<sup>216</sup> ܐƉ <sup>15</sup> ̇ Ƣ ܐƌܐ ܕƎſ ܕܐƅſ ܗƃــƍܐ܂ ܒƌƢــƤܐ ܕܓــŴܐ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܐܕƣܐ: ܘƤƙƌــƍܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܓƐƍــų ܕܐܕƣܐ ܗƌܐ܉ ƦƉܐſƢƉــƎ ƕــƈ P57v ųƆ Ǝƀܒųſܘ ܐ܂Ʀſűƀŷſ ܐƀƏܘܐܘ ܐſűƀŷſ ܐƉŴƍƟ ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ ̣ƎƉ ƃــųƀƌŴܘܢ ̣ܘƉــƎ ܬŶــųƉŴܘܢ܂ ƟƦƉــƢܐ ܓƀــƢ ƏــƑƀŹƢƟŴ ܒƌƢــƤܐ ܘƍƤƙƌܐ܂ ܘܬųƉŴŶ ܬܘܒ ܕܒƤƌƢܐ ܘܕƍƤƙƌܐ ƦƉܐƢƉ ƈƕ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ܂ ̈ƣܐ܉ ܒŵܒــƎ ̇ űƉܡ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ̣ƉــƎ ܓــű ŴŶܪܘܬܐ ܕƎſ ܐܘ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܐܘŴƊƃܬܐ ܐܘ ƎــƉ̣ : ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕƦƉܐſƢƉــƎ ƀƇƕــų ̈ųƀܘܢ ųſܒƎƀ ƆܐܘƀƏܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ƌŴƃ ƎƉ̣ ܐƆ ܐܦ ̇ ܂ ܐܦ ܐܢ ܓƀــƢ ƟƦƌــƢܐ ųــƆ Ǝــƀܒųſ ܘܡƦــƉ ܐƆ Ǝــſܕ ܘܢųƉŴــŶܬ ̇ ܝ ܕܐƦſ ܒų ŴŶܪܘܬܐ űƉܡ ܓƊƣŴܐ űƉܡ ŴŶܪܐ ܐܘ r88D ̇ ܐܘƊƃܐ: ̣ƎƉ <sup>ܗ</sup> ̈ ƌܐ: ̇ ܐܘŴƊƃܬܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܐƎſƢŶ ̣ܗܘ ܬƉŴŶܐ ܕƈƃ űŶ ̣ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ ܓŴ ܐܘ

**3** ܐƌƢــŶܐ BDP: ƎــſƢŶܐ L **5** ܐƍــƃܗ BDL: ƈــƀƃܗ P **6** ܐƍــƉܬܬ BDL: ܬƢــƉܬܬܐ P ̈ųƀƉܘܢ **<sup>10</sup>** ŴŶƦܘܒ BDP: ܘܢųƉŴŶƦܘܒ L | ƎſƞƉ ܘܡƦƉ LP: ܘܡƦƉ ƎſƞƉ BD **11** ܘܐܦ LP: ܐܦ BD | ƎƀƘܬŴƤƉ BDL: ƎƀƘܘܬƦƤƉ P **12** ƎƀƘܬŴƤƉܕ BDL: ƎƀƘܘܬƦƤƉ P **14** ܬܦŴƤƌܕ BDL: ܘܬܦƦƤƌܕ P **15** Ǝſܕ [om. P | ܐŴܕܓ [om. B **18** ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ BD: ܣŴŹƢƟŴƏ P: ܣŴƀŹƢƟŴƏ L ̇ ܐܘŴƊƃܬܐ **<sup>20</sup>** ܐܘ Ǝſܕ BDL: ܬܐŴƊƃܘܐܘ P **21** ܐƆ] om. BD **22** ܘܡƦƉ ܐƆ BDL: ܘܡƦƊƆ P

substances, which are particular individuals. Do not we assume from this that the nature of the secondary substances has subsistence in the primary ones, which brings to nought the statement which has been made that substance does not subsist in anything else but is self-sufficient for its own subsistence?"269

215 In response to this we shall say the following. If secondary substances have their own subsistence in the primary ones, it becomes necessary to take also accidents into account, thus (assuming that Aristotle) intended to say in this passage also how they subsist. But this is clearly wrong, for it is obvious to everyone that, when species and genera are predicated of a primary substance, they share with it their names and definitions. Accidents, however, are never able to have this effect, but some of them do not even share their name with the substance which they are predicated of. And even if there are among them such ones that sometimes provide (a substance) with their name, no accident is ever able to share the definition of its nature with the substance which it is predicated of.

216 What I mean is this. Universal man, which is a species, and also animate, which is the genus of this species, are predicated of Socrates, who is a particular individual and a particular substance, and they provide him with their name and their definition, for Socrates is called man and animate, and also the definitions of man and animate are said of Socrates. Whiteness or blackness, on the other hand, or any other accident sometimes do not even provide the substance of which they are predicated with their names, neither do they ever provide it with their definitions. For even if a body is called white or black due to some whiteness or blackness in it, the definition of each one of these colours

**<sup>269</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 46.21–25; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 68.13–16.

̇ ܉ ܘƆܐ Ɖــſƞܐ ƆܓƊــƢ ̇ ܕܨܒــŴܬܐ ܕƦƉܐſƢƉــƎ ƀƇƕــų ܘܐſƢŶــƎ ܕƇſــų ̇ ܂ ̇ ܝ ܕƦƉܐƉــƢ ƀƇƕــų ̈ƀܐ ŷƇƌــƋ ƆܐܘƏــƀܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ƌܙ ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ̣ űŶܕ ųƉŴŶܕܬ ܘܐܢ ܕƎſ Ɔܐ܉ ̣ܗܝ űƃ ̣ܗܝ ܨܒŴܬܐ ŷƃƦƤƉܐ ܗܘܬ ܕܐųſƦſ r106B ̇ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ̇ ܝ ܕƆܐ ſƞƉܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ܂ ܐűŷƃ ܘܓƣűܐ: ܗ

̇ ܝ ܕܐſــƅ ܕܐƌƢƉــƎ <sup>217</sup> ƙƀƠƌܐ ųƆ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܕƎſ ƆܐܘƀƏܐ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ܐŶــƢܬܐ܉ ܗ ̇ ܂ ̇ ̣ܘƎƉ ܬųƉŴŶ ųƊƣ ƎƉ̣ ܗܝŴƇƕ ܐƢƉܐƦƉܕ ܡűƉ ƈƄƆ ܒܐųſ ܐƣܗ ̈ــƐܐ ܐŶــƌƮܐ ܕƀƠƌــƙܐ Ɔــų ܗܕܐ܉ ̇ Ŵƌܢ ܬƖƣܐ ܓƍ ܗ ƎƉ̣ űŶ Ƣƀܓ ƦƀƆ ̇ ܂ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ܓƀــƢ ܘܙƌܐ ܘƣــƃƢܐ ܕſųƇƃــƎ ܐƆܐ ܐܢ ƆܐܘƀƏܐ ܒŴŷƇܕųſ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ųــƆ Ǝــ ̈ ܒųſ Ǝſųƀ̈ ƌŴــƃ ƎــƉ̣ ܐƆ ܐܦ Ǝܒــŵܒ ܐ܉ƀــƌƮŶܐ ƎــƀƆ ̇ ܗ ̈Ǝſųƀ܂ ƟƦƉــƢܐ ƌŴــƃ ƎƉ̣ ųƆ <sup>Ǝ</sup>̈ P56r ܒųſ ܐܦ Ǝſܕ Ǝܒŵܒ :ܗܝŴƇƕ ܢƮƉܐƦƉܕ ̇ ܕܐſــƦ ܒــų ̣ܗܘ ܓƀــƢ ܓــƊƣŴܐ ܕܐſــƦ ܒــų ŶــŴܪܘܬܐ ŶــŴܪܐ܂ ܐܘ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ųــƆ Ǝــ̈ ܒųſ ܘܡƦــƉ ܐƆ Ǝſųƀ ̈ ŴƀƇŶܬܐ ƇŶــƀܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ƉــƎ ܬŶــƉŴ ̇ ųƉŴــŶܬ Ƌــƕܘ ̇ L17r ųــƊƣ Ƌــƕܘ Ǝــſܕ ܐƀــƏܐܘ ܂ƎــſųƍƇܒƠƉ ܘܗܝƦــſܕܐ ŴƤƉܬƘܐ ųƆ ƄƆــƈ Ɖܐ ܕƦƉܐƉــƢܐ ƇƕــŴܗܝ܂ ܒƌƢــƤܐ ܓƀــƢ ܕܓــŴܐ <sup>15</sup> ܂ųƉŴــŶƦܘܒ ųƀƌŴــƄܒ ųــƆ ܬܦŴــƤƉ ܉ƑƀŹƢƟŴــƏ ƈــƕ ƢــƉܐƦƉܕ ̇ ܕƎſ ųܒ ܐ܂ƤƌƢܕܒ ųƉŴŶܬ ųƆ Ƌ ̇ ƢƟƦƉܐ ܓƢƀ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ ܒƤƌƢܐ܉ ܘŷƆ ܒŴƉűܬܐ ܐܦ ƈƃ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܕƦƉܐƢƉܐ ƈƕ űƉܡ܉ ſــųܒܐ Ɔــų ̣ƉــƎ ̇ųƀƌŴƃ ƎƉܘ̣ ̇

ųƊƣ

̇ ܝ 218 ܗܕܐ ܕƎſ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ Ɔܐ ſŵŶƦƉܐ ܘƙƀƠƌܐ ƈƄƆ ܐܘƀƏܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ųƆ ƎſƢƉܐƦƉܕ ƎƀƆܕܗ ƈźƉ ܐ܂Ɛ̈ ̈ƣܐ ܘƆܓƍ ܕܬܪܬƎſ ܒŴŷƇܕ: ܗƌ <sup>20</sup> ̇Ŵ ܕƎſ Ɔܐܕ ܘܢųƆ ƦƀƆ Ǝſܕ ƎƀƆܗ ܐ܉ſ̈ űƀŷſ ܐƉ̈ ŴƍƟ ̇ ƈƕ ܐܘƀƏܐ ƦƀƉűƟܐ ܕܐųſƦſ űƉܡ ܐƌƢŶܐ ƦŶƦƆ ƍƉــųܘܢ ܕƦƌܐƉــƢܘܢ ƇƕــŴܗܝ܂ ƏــƑƀŹƢƟŴ ܓƀــƢ ܘźƇƘــŴܢ ƕــƈ Ɖــűܡ ܐŶــƌƢܐ Ɔܐ ƦƉܐſƢƉــƎ܂ ܒƌƢــƤܐ ܓƀــƢ ܕܓــŴܐ

܂

**<sup>2</sup>** ųƉŴــŶܕܬ BDL: ܐƉ̈ ŴــŶܕܬ P | ƋــŷƇƌ BDL: ƋــŷƆܕ P | ܝ ̇ ܗ [om. BD | ƢــƉܐƦƉܕ LP: ƎــſƢƉܐƦƉܕ BD **<sup>4</sup>** űــŷƃܐ BDL: ܐűــŷƃܐ P | ܕܬܗܘܐ [+ ܀ܒ܀ BD **<sup>5</sup>** Ǝــſܕ ̇ ųــƆ] om. B **<sup>6</sup>** ܐƢــƉܐƦƉܕ BDL: ƢــƉܐƦƉܕ P **<sup>8</sup>** ܐƀــƏܐܘƆ BLP: ܕܐųــƆ D **<sup>9</sup>** ƎــƀƆ ̇ ܗ BDP: Ǝــƀƌܗ L **<sup>10</sup>** ܢƮــƉܐƦƉܕ BDL: ƢƉܐƦƉܕ P | ܐܦ BDP: ƎƘܐ L **<sup>12</sup>** Ǝſųƀ ̈ ƉŴŶܬ BD: ܘܢųƉŴŶܬ LP **13** ƎſųƍƇܒƠƉ LP, D corr. sup. lin.: ƎſųƇܒƠƉ BD | Ƌƕܘ1 LP: Ƌƕ BD **16** ܐƢƟƦƉ] + ܗܘ̣ BD ųƉŴــŶܬ BLP: ܐƉŴŶܬ D **<sup>18</sup>** ̇ ųƀƌŴƃ] + ̇ ųƉŴŶܬ D al. man. in marg. **20** ƎſƢƉܐƦƉܕ LP: ƎſƢƉܐƦƉ BD **21** ƦƀƆ BDL: ƦƀƆܕ P **22** ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ BDP: ܣŴƀŹƢƟŴƏ L **23** ܐŴܕܓ Ƣƀܓ [om. P

is different from that of the thing which they are predicated of, and it is never possible that the definition of one of these qualities will fit the substance it is predicated of. For otherwise, substance and accident will prove to be one and the same thing, which cannot be.

Thus, another property concomitant of substance is270 217 , as we have just said, 3a33–3b9 that it shares its name and its definition with everything it is predicated of271. This is characteristic, namely, of none of the other nine genera, save for substance alone. For quantity, quality, and the rest of them sometimes do not even provide with their names what they are predicated of, and sometimes, even if they do provide it with their names — for instance, the body containing whiteness is called white or the one containing sweetness is called sweet — still they never share their definitions with what is receptive of them. Substance, on the other hand, makes everything it is predicated of a partaker in both its name and its definition272. Thus, universal man that is predicated of Socrates makes him a partaker in both its name and definition, for Socrates is called a man, and the definition of man fits him. And in the same way every substance that is predicated of something provides it with its name and its definition.

218 However, this property does not seem to pertain to all substances, but only to the secondary ones, namely species and genera, for they are predicated of primary substances, which are particular individuals. The latter, however, have nothing else beneath them of which they might be predicated. For Socrates and Plato are not predicated of anything else, while universal man that is a species,

**<sup>270</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 69.22–23: ἐπὶ δεύτερον παρακολούθημα μεταβαίνει τῆς οὐσίας καταγνοὺς τοῦ προτέρου (see also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 47.19).

**<sup>271</sup>** In the corresponding passage, Aristotle says that it is a characteristic of both substances and differentiae that things predicated of them are called synonymously (συνωνύμως). Sergius neither applies this term in his commentary nor mentions the differentiae, but stresses instead that the property in question is exclusively characteristic of substance. Ammonius and Philoponus are eager to stress that differentiae here should be understood as substances too and not as accidents, so it is natural that Sergius apparently subsumes them under the category of substance and does not mention them explicitly.

**<sup>272</sup>** See *Cat*. 2a20. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 70.27–28: τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὐσιωδῶς κατηγορουμένοις τὸ καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος μεταδιδόναι τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις καὶ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ. See also §120 where Sergius speaks of synonyms as things which share both name and definition.

̈ƣܐ: ܘƉűƕܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐܕƣܐ: ܘƀŶܐ ܘƍƤƙƌܐ ܕܐųſƦſܘܢ ܓƍ v106B ̈Ɛܐ ܘܐܕ ̇ ܓƍــƐܐ ܕܓــŴܐ܉ ƦƉܐſƢƉــƎ ƀƇƕــųܘܢ ܘƕــƈ ųſƦſܕܐ ܐƀƏܐܘƆ ̇ P56v ųƆ ̇ ſــűܐ ̇ܕܩ ƊƆܐƉــƢ ܗƃــƍܐ܂ ܕƀƠƌــƙܐ ƄƆــƈ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ܐ ̈ܕܐ܂ ſűƉــƎ <sup>ܙ</sup> űــŶ ̇ ܂ ̇ ̣ܘƉــƎ ܬŶــųƉŴ ųƀƌŴــƃ ƎــƉ̣ ųــƆ ܕܬܬܠ <sup>ܝ</sup> ̇ D88v <sup>ܗ</sup> ܡ܉űــƉ ƈƕ ܐƢƉܐƦƉܕ ܘܗŴƃܬ ŷƃƦƤƉܐ ƦƇƉܐ ܕƢſƢƣܐ ܘܐųſƦſ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܕܓŴܐ܂


̇ ƆܐܘƀƏܐ **<sup>2</sup>** ̇ ܝ ܐܘƀƏܐ :DLP ųƆ ųƆ B **<sup>4</sup>** ܝ ̇ ̇ ܘ :BDP ܗ <sup>ܗ</sup> L **<sup>6</sup>** Ǝſܕ [+ ܘܐܦ L | ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ LP: ̄ ̄ :B ܐܪŴźƐſܛ ųŹŴźƏܐܪ D | ܐƦƖܒ BDL: ܐƦƇƉ P **7** Ɨſŵƌܕ BDL: ܥűƌܕ P **10** ƎſųſƦſܐ BLP, Epit.: ܘܢųــſƦſܐ D **<sup>11</sup>** ܐܦ [+ ܗܝ̣ BD **<sup>16</sup>** ƎــƘܐ DLP, Epit.: ܐܦ B **<sup>18</sup>** <sup>ܘ</sup> ̇ ܗ [om. L ̈ܬܐ ŴƍƉܕ BDP, Epit.: ܬܐ ̈ ̈ܬܐ ƦƉ̈ܪܓƦƀƍƤܐ **<sup>23</sup>** L ܕŴƀƉ ŴƍƉ ܐƆܐ [om. hom. P **24** ܐƦƤܪܓ BDP: ܢƦƤܪܓ L | ƎſųſƦſܐ DLP: ƎſųſƦſܕܐ B

living being and animate that are genera and species, and on up until substance that is a universal genus are predicated of them and of each other273. That is why we shall put it as follows: it is a characteristic of every substance which is predicated of something that it provides the latter with its name and its definition. In this way, our account will become correct and it will be universal.

After this274 219 , Aristotle solves a certain problem which someone might wish 3a29–32 to raise against him, when he says that we should not be confused by the fact that the parts of substance are in substance. One might state that, since accidents are in substance and also the parts of substance are in substance, the parts of substance are therefore accidents as well. But, although substance is composed of parts, substance would thus become one of the accidents, which is impossible275.

220 Now, let us recall what we have defined above when we stated that one says that a thing can be in something else in eleven ways, and one of them was as parts of something in the whole, while another one was as accidents in substance276. Thus, even though parts of substance are in substance and also accidents have subsistence in substance, nevertheless the mode (of being in something) as parts and the one (of being in something) as accidents differ from one another. For parts are something through what and from what is constituted the nature of substance in which they are. Accidents, on the other hand, are not completive of the substance they are in, but on the contrary, they are completed by the substance and have their subsistence in it277.

221 However, it should be known that some parts of substance are intelligible and some are perceptible278. The perceptible parts of primary substance are what become subject to sense. For instance, the feet, the thighs, the belly, the

**<sup>273</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 47.26–48.11; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 70.3–22.

**<sup>274</sup>** In the transmitted text of the *Categories*, this argument preceeds the characteristic of substance discussed by Sergius in §§217–218. Philoponus, however, notes that "some of the commentators" suggest that this passage of the *Categories* should be placed before 3a21–28, where Aristotle makes a distinction between substance and differentia (Philoponus, *In Cat.* 68.23–29). Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 47.5–13 and Simplicius, *In Cat.* 97.2–23. Both Ammonius and Simplicius reject this suggestion and defend the order of Aristotle's text. However, their notes make it possible that Sergius' remark is based on an alternative commentary tradition.

**<sup>275</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 46.25–47.24 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 68.16–69.19.

**<sup>276</sup>** See §§138–149, above.

**<sup>277</sup>** Cf. Philoponus on substances, differentiae, and accidents: ὅτι δὲ οὐσίαι εἰσὶν ὁμολογουμένως αἱ διαφοραί, δῆλον μὲν ἐκ τοῦ συμπληρωτικὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ οὐσιωδῶς κατ' αὐτῶν κατηγορεῖσθαι· εἰ γὰρ συμπληροῦσι τὰς οὐσίας, καὶ οὐσίαι εἰσὶ δηλονότι· οὐ γὰρ συμπληροῖ τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ συμβεβηκότα (*In Cat.* 66.13–16).

**<sup>278</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 45.17: φαμὲν οὖν ὅτι τῶν οὐσιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι νοηταὶ αἱ δὲ αἰσθηταί.

Ǝــƀ̈ ̈ܬܐ ܐƌ ̈ſܐ ܘܪſــƤܐ ƍƉــŴ ̈ Ʀܐ ܘƏƢƃܐ ܘŶــſűܐ ܘܐſــű ܕ̈ܪܓƇܐ ܘƊźƕ ̈ƀــƦܐ ܕƇſــų ܕܒƌƢــƤܐ ƀŷſــſűܐ ̈ܬܐ ƍƕűſƦƉ ŴــƍƉ Ǝــſܕ Ǝــƀ̈ ܕƘܓــƢܐ܂ ܗƌ ܘܕܓŴܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ܂ ܐƃــƌŵܐ ܕƇƀƇƉــŴܬܐ ܘƀŶــŴܬܐ ܘƍƤƙƌــŴܬܐ܂ ܘܐܦ ̇ ̈ܬܗ ̇ ܘ ܕܓــŴܐ ܘܐſــƍܐ ̣ܕܗܘ܂ ܘƍƉــŴ ̣ƎƉ ܗƀƆــƎ ܓƀــƢ ƃƢƉــŪ ܒƌƢــƤܐ ܗ ܐſųſƦſــƎ ܗƀƆــƎ ܕܗ <sup>5</sup> ̈ ƀƌــƎ ܕƀƇƊƤƉــƎ ƟــƊſŴܐ ܕƍƀƃــų܂ ſųƇƃــƎ ܗƀƃــƈ ̈Ʀƀƍƕܐ܉ ܘܐƎƘ ܐſųſƦſــƎ ܒܐܘƏــƀܐ܉ ̈ܬܐ ƦƉ̈ܪܓƦƀƍƤܐ ܘűſƦƉ ŴƍƉ ̈ƣܐ ܐſųſƦſــƎ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒــƌŵܐ ̇ ܘܐܦ ܓــű ŴƆ ܒــų r89D ̇ ܘ ܙƌܐ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܒــų P52v ܂ƈƖƆ ƎƉ ƈƀƇƟ ƎƌƢƉܕܐ ƅſܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ

<sup>222</sup> ܬܘܒ ƙƀƠƌܐ ƆܐܘƀƏܐ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ܐƢŶܬܐ ܐƅſ ̣ ܕܐƢƉ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ܉ ̇ ܉ ܗ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܝ ܕܬŴƣܕܥ ܗƌܐ űƉܡ܂ ܗܕܐ ܕƎſ ܒــƢܬ ƟــƇܐ ŷƉــƦƀƍſŴܐ ܐſƦſــų ̇ ܘ ܓƢƀ ܕܒƞܒƖܐ ſŴŷƉܐ űƉܡ ܕܐƦſ ųƆ ƊſŴƟܐ űƀŷſܐƦſ܂ ܐƅſ ܗ ̇ƙــƈ ܬƀŶــƦ ܪܓƤــƦܐ ܘſűſــƗ ̇ ܝ ܓƀــƢ ܕܗƌܐ Ɖــűܡ ƕــƈ ƍƟــƉŴܐ ܕƌ ܗ ̈ƣܐ Ɔܐ ƙƀƠƌܐ܂ ƈźƉ ܕܒƦƇƊܐ ̣ܗܘ ܓƀƇܐƦſ ſŴŷƉܐ܂ ܗܕܐ ܕƎſ Ɔܓű ܒŴŷƇܕ ƎƀƕűſƦƉ ܘƎƀƣƢƘƦƉ ̣ƎƉ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܘƆܐ ܒƢܓƦƤܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ܘܐܦ ̇ ܝ ܕܬܪܬſــƎ Ɔܐ ſųƇƄƆــƎ ܐܘƏ <sup>15</sup> ̈ ƀــƑ ܕƉــƀܐ ܕƀƠƌــƙܐ܂ źƉــƈ ܕܐܘƏــƀܐ ܗ ̈Ɛܐ܉ Ɔܐ ܬƦƀŶ ܪܓƦƤܐ Ƈƙƌܐ܂ ܘƆܐ ̈ƣܐ ܘܓƍ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕŴŶܝ ܐܕ ܕܐųſƦſ ̇ ܒƥ ܐܕƣܐ: ܘܬܘܒ ƢſƦſ Ŷ ܬܐ ̈ des.L17v ܐƀܓƏܕ ƈźƉ ܐ܉ƕܕŴƤƉ ܡűƉ űŶ ܬܘܒ ųƍƉ ܐܦ ܓƐƍܐ܂ ƎſűƉ ܐܦ ܗܕܐ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ Ɔܐ ܗܘܐ ƈƄƆ ܐܘƀƏܐ ̈Ɖܐ ŴــƍƟ ̇ ŶƦƉــſŵܐ ܕƀƠƌــƙܐ܉ ܐƆܐ Ɔــų v107B ̇ ܝ ƀƉűƟــƦܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ܕܐſƦſــų ܂ƦſܐƉűƟ ƎƍſŴŶܕ ƅſܐ ܐſ̈ <sup>20</sup> űƀŷſ

> űــƃ ܐƀƏܐܘƆ ̇ ̇ ܐܡ ܕƎſ ܒƦܪ ܗܕܐ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ܐƢŶܬܐ ܕƙƀƠƌܐ ųƆ Ə 223 ̇ Ɖــűܡ ̇ ܝ ܕƀƆــƦ Ɔــų ̇ ƆܐܘƀƏܐ ܐܦ ܗ ̇ Ƣ܉ ܕſŵŶƦƉܐ ƋƆ ܕƙƀƠƌܐ ųƆ ܐƉ ̇ ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ܂ ƍƉܐ ܓƢƀ ſƞƉܐ ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ܂ ܒƢƤܪܐ ܓƢƀ ƆܐܘƀƏܐ ƦƀƆ ųƆ

̈ܬܐ **<sup>1</sup>** ŴƍƉ LP: ܬܐ̈ ŴƍƉܕ BD **5** ƎƀƆܗ BDP: ƎƀƆܕܗ L **6** ƎƘܘܐ BDL: ܘܐܦ P **7** ܘܐܦ L: ܐܦ BDP ƎſųſƦſܐ LP: ܘܢųſƦſܐ BD **8** ƎƌƢƉܕܐ [om. B | ƈƖƆ] + ܀ܓ܀ BD **9** ܬܐŴƀƇſܕ BDL: ܐƦƀƇſܕ P | ܐƘŴــƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƘŴــƐƇƇƀƘ P **<sup>13</sup>** ܐƣ̈ űܓــƆ LP: ܐƤܓــƮƆ BD **14** ܘܐܦ LP: ܐܦ BD **<sup>15</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ LP: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܐܘ BD | ܐƀƏܕܐܘ DLP: ܐƀƏܐܘ B **16** ܝŴŶܕ LP: ƎƍſŴŶܕ BD | ܐƆܘ LP: ܐƇƘܐ BD **<sup>18</sup>** ƈƄƆ BD: ̇ ųƇƄƆ P **<sup>19</sup>** ̇ ųſƦſܕܐ BD: ̇ ųſƦſܐ P **20** ƦſܐƉűƟ] + ܀ܕ܀ BD **21** ܗܕܐ [+ ̇ | P ܐܦ ųƆ] om. P | ܐƀƏܐܘƆ ̇ ųƆ ܐƙƀƠƌܕ ƋƆ ܐſŵŶƦƉܕ Ƣ ̇ Ɖܐ űƃ] om. hom. P **<sup>22</sup>** ܝ ̇ .om] ܗ P **23** ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕ ƥƌܐ ܐƌƢƌܕ ܐſƞƉ Ƣƀܓ ܐƍƉ] om. hom. B

breast, the hands, and the head are such parts of the body. The intelligible parts of both a particular and universal man, on the other hand, are being reasonable, living, and animate. For both a particular and universal man is composed of them and they are his parts which are completive of the subsistence of his nature. Thus, while both intelligible and perceptible parts are in substance, they are not in the same way in it as accidents are, but in a different one, as we have said shortly before279.

222 Further, another property concomitant of substance is, as the Philosopher 3b10–23 says, that it "signifies a particular this"280. It is an expression of pointing out, as if one would point with a finger at something which has individual subsistence281. So, "a particular this" points out an individual which falls under our senses and is clearly perceived282. But this is not characteristic of accidents, since they are comprehended and differentiated from substance by means of intellect only and not by means of senses. But neither does it seem to be a concomitant of every substance, since secondary substance, which is, as has been shown, species and genera, does not fall under sensation, and it does not signify one thing either, since it is multiple things that a species encompass, (to say nothing of) a genus (which encompasses) many more than it. Thus, it turns out that this property too is a concomitant not of every substance, but only of the primary, which is particular individuals, as we have demonstrated earlier283.

223 After this, he sets out another property as a concomitant of substance, 3b24–32 when he says that it seems that "it is also characteristic of substance that there is nothing contrary to it"284. No substance, indeed, has a contrary. For what

**<sup>279</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 45.17–46.10.

**<sup>280</sup>** *Cat*. 3b10: τόδε τι σημαίνειν. The quotation by Sergius does not correspond to the early anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories* (which is generally the case with Sergius' text), but matches exactly with the version that George bishop of the Arabs produced in the early 8th century, which makes possible that George was familiar with Sergius' *Commentary*.

**<sup>281</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 48.15–16: καὶ ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὸ τόδε τῆς δείξεως σημαντικόν, τὸ δὲ τὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐσίας. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 71.18–19.

**<sup>282</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 49.1–2: τὸ γὰρ τόδε τι λέγεται ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐσίας, τοῦτ' ἔστι τῆς ἀτόμου τῆς φαινομένης. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 71.20–21.

**<sup>283</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 49.3–9; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 72.1–4.

**<sup>284</sup>** See *Cat*. 3b24–25: ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι. The quotation by Sergius again does not match fully with the early anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories*, although both versions apply here the term *dalqubla* as an equivalent to the Gr. ἐναντίος, "contrary". In §419, where Sergius makes a distinction between opposition and contrariety, he applies this term as a translation of the Gr. ἀντικεῖσθαι, "being opposite", with the term *saqqublay* for ἐναντίος. However, both here and in what follows (see §304) Sergius makes use of the term *dalqubla* in the sense of contrary, which reflects the same tradition that is found in the anonymous Syriac translation.

 ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƏــƑƀŹƢƟŴ܂ ܐܘ ܕƌــƌƢܐ ܐƌــƥ ܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ ܕƏــƑƀŹƢƟŴ ܒــų ̇ ̇ ܒــųܕܐ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܐܪźƐſــƑƀƇŹŴ܂ ܐܘ ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ܕܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ ܒų ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒƤƌƢܐ܂ ŴƆ ܓƢƀ ܐƅſ ܕܐųſƦſ ƅƏ ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ܕܒƤƌƢܐ ܒų ̇ ƊƀƊŶــŴܬܐ ܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ ܕſƢƟــƢܘܬܐ: ܐܘ r53P ̇ ŶــŴܪܘܬܐ ܕܐܘƊƃــŴܬܐ: ܐܘ ŴƀƇŶܬܐ ܕƢſƢƉܘܬܐ܉ ܗƍƃܐ ܐܦ ܒƤƌƢܐ ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ̣ܗܘ ܕܒƌƢــƤܐ ܒــų <sup>5</sup> ̇ <sup>ܝ</sup> ̇ ܕƉــűܡ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ܐſــƍܐ ̣ܕܗܘ܂ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ Ɖــűܡ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒƌƢــƤܐ: ܐܘ ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܒƌƢــƤܐ܂ źƉــƈ ܕƇƃــų ܐŶــƌƢܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܕƠƆــŴܒųƇ ܒــų ̈ ƌܐ ̇ــŴ ܕſــƎ ܒܓــŴ ̇ : ܗƌ ̈ــƀܐ ܐſƦſــų ܕŴƠƆܒƀƇــŴܬܐ ܘŴƠƏܒƀƇــŴܬܐ ܒƌŵ ̈Ɖܐ ܘܒƤـــƃƢܐ ܕܐƀƌƮŶـــƦܐ ܕܐſـــƅ ܗƀƆـــƎ܂ ܐܘƏـــƀܐ ܕſـــƎ ܘܒƖźـــŴ ̇ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƠƉܒƦƀƍƇܐ ܕܗƎƀƆ ƎſųƇƃ ܐųſƦſ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܂ ܘܒűܓــŴܢ Ɔܐ ܕƠƆــŴܒųƇ űƉܡ ܘƆܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ܕűƉܡ ܐųſƦſ v89D ̇ ܂

	- 225 ܬܘܒ ܕƎſ ܐƉ

̇

**<sup>2</sup>** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ scr.: ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ P: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܕܐܪ D | ܕܐųܒ ̇ ܒų ̇ ܝ :DP ųܒ B | ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ P: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D **6** ܐƍſܐ [om. P **7** ƈźƉ ̇ ܝ :P ųܒ BD **<sup>16</sup>** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BD: ܐƘŴƏŴƇƇƀƘ P | Ǝƀ̈ ƌųܒ BD: ƎƀƆųܒ P **18** ܐƀƍƟ ܡűƉ BD: űƃ ܐƀƍƠƉ P **<sup>21</sup>** ƎƌƢƉܕܐ ̣ [ <sup>+</sup>܀ܗ܀ BD **<sup>22</sup>** ̇ ųſƦſܕܐ [om. P

might someone think of as contrary to Socrates in that he is Socrates, or contrary to Aristotle in that he is Aristotle, or in general contrary to man in that it is man? For it is not as hotness is contrary to coldness, or as whiteness to blackness, or as sweetness to bitterness that a man is contrary to a man in that he is man, or to any other particular thing. Neither is anything else contrary to him in that he is man. For every contrariety and opposition285 exists among qualities, i.e. among colours, tastes, and other things like that, while substance is receptive of all them. Thus, nothing is contrary to it and it is not contrary to anything286.

224 However, this too seems to be characteristic not of substance alone, but of quantity as well, since there is nothing contrary to it either, unless someone says that large is contrary to small, or that the number fifteen is contrary to the number ten because the former is bigger than the latter. For, as the Philosopher demonstrates later on, these things are not contrary to each other but belong to the genus of relatives, since each one of them is said in this way due to their relation to something else, and they do not have any subsistence as contraries. Thus, since they are not contraries either, as we are going to demonstrate in the account of them, it is obvious that, as we have said, not only do contraries not pertain to substance, but neither (do they pertain) to quantity287.

225 Further, he states that it is a concomitant of substance that it is not said to 3b33–4a9 be more and less288. It follows from the previous one, because, if there is nothing contrary to substance, than it is obvious that neither does it admit of a

**<sup>285</sup>** Syriac *dalqublayuta w-saqqublayuta*. Sergius applies these Syriac terms the other way around in §419, while defining contrariety as one of the types of opposition.

**<sup>286</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 74.13–27.

**<sup>287</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 49.13–21; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 74.27–75.10.

**<sup>288</sup>** Cf. *Cat*. 3b33–34: δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία οὐκ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.

̇ ſܐ ܒŵƇƄܒــƎ ſƦſــƢܘܬܐ ܘܒƢſƞܘܬܐ܂ ƈźƉ ܕܒܒƢſƞܘܬܐ ܕܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ ܗܘ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ ̣ܗܘ܂ ܒŵƇƄܒــƎ ܓƀــƢ Ɖܐ ܕƇŶƦƤƉــƚ ܐܘƃــƊܐ ܕܗ ̇ ſܐ ƢſƦſܘܬܐ ̇ ƢſƢƉܐ ƀƇŷƆܐ܉ ܒܒƢſƞܘܬܐ ܕܐܘŴƊƃܬܐ ܗܘ ŴŷƆܪܐ ܐܘ ̇ ſܐ ƢſƦſܘܬܐ ܕŴƀƇŶܬܐ܂ ܕŴŶܪܘܬܐ: ܘܒܒƢſƞܘܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܕƢſƢƉܘܬܐ ܗܘ ܘܬܘܒ ܒܒƢſƞܘܬܐ ܕŴƀƇŶܬܐ ܘܕŴŶܪܘܬܐ Ɛƌܒ <sup>5</sup> ̈Ǝ ܬܪܒƀــƦܐ ܘſƦſــƢܘܬܐ ̇ ܕŴŶܪ܉ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƇŶܐ ܐܘ ƢſƢƉܘܬܐ ܘܐܘŴƊƃܬܐ܂ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܗ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ƠƉܒــƈ ̣ܗܘ ܒƀƆųــƎ ſƦſــƢܘܬܐ ܘܒſƞــƢܘܬܐ: ܐܦ źƏــƢ ̣ƉــƎ ܗ ܕܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ̣ܗܘ܂ ƦƉܐƢƉ ܓƢƀ ܕŴŶܪ ܘܕŴŶܪ ſƦſــƢ ̣ܗܘ ƃــű ̣ܗܘ: ܘܕŶــƇܐ ̈ــƀܐ܂ ܐſــƅ ̣ܕƉــƎ ܗƀƌــƎ ܬܘܒ ܘܕƇŶܐ ƢſƦſ: ܘܗƍƃܐ ܐܦ ƈƕ ųƇƃܘܢ ܙƌ ܬܬŵŶܐ ܕƢſƦſܘܬܐ ܘܒƢſƞܘܬܐ ܐƄſܐ ܕܐƦſ ŴƠƏܒŴƀƇܬܐ ƃƦƤƉ <sup>10</sup> ̈Ǝŷ܂

ƑƀŹƢƟŴــƏ ƢــƉܐƦƉ ܘܡƦــƉ Ƣــƀܓ ܐƆ ܐ܂ƍƃܗ ŴƆ Ǝſܕ ܐƀƏܒܐܘ 226 ̇ ̇ ܒƢſƞ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ܂ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ſƦſــƢ ܐܘ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ƢſƦſ ܐܘ ܒƢſƞ ܒƤƌƢܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ܘܐܦ Ɔܐ ŴźƇƘܢ ƦƉܐƢƉ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒƤƌƢܐ ƢſƦſ v108B ̇ ܝ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ųܒــ :ܢŴــźƇƘ ƎــƉ̣ Ƣــſƞܒ ƑƀŹƢƟŴــƏ ̇ D90r ܐܘ :ƑƀŹƢƟŴــƏ ƎــƉ̣ ܒƤƌƢܐ űŷƇƃ ųƍƉܘܢ܂ ܒƦƀƊܪܘܬܐ ܕſــƎ ܘܒƊƄŷــƦܐ ܘܒƤــƃƢܐ ܕܙƌ <sup>15</sup> ̈ــƀܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ ſƞƉܐ ܗܝ ܕƦƌܐƢƉ ̣ܗܘ űƃ ̣ܗܘ űŶ ܒƤƌƢܐ ܒŵܒƎ ܕƦƀƉܪ ܘܒŵܒƎ ̇ ܒƉűــŴܬܐ ƄƤƉــŷܐ ܗܝ ܕƦƌܐƉــƢ Ɔܐ܂ ܘܐŶــƌƢܐ ƆــŴܬ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ܒــų ̇ ܝ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒƌƢــƤܐ ܘƆܐ ̣ܗܘ ƉــƦܘܡ ܕƦƀƉܪ ųƍƉ ܘܕܒƢſƞ ųƍƉ܂ ܒų ƦƉܐƢƉ ŴƆܬ ųƤƙƌ ƢſƦſܐƦſ ܘܒƢſƞܐſــƦ: ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ƆــŴܬ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ƦƉܐƢƉ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ƎſűƉ Ɩſűſܐ ܗܝ ܕƆܐ ƠƉܒــƇܐ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ſƦſــƢܘܬܐ <sup>20</sup> ܘܒƢſƞܘܬܐ܂

̇ ܝ ųــƆܕ ƈــźƉ ܂Ƣــ ̇ P54r Ɖܐ ܐƀــƏܐܘ ƎــƉ̣ ܐƀــƏܐܘ ܪܐƦــƀƉ ܐƆܕ Ǝſܕ ŴƆ <sup>227</sup> ̇ ܂ ܐƆܐ ܗܕܐ ̇ ܝ ܕܬܪܬſــƎ ƊƏــų ƦƀƉűƟܐ ܕƦƀƉܪܐ ܘܪƀƤſܐ ŪŹ ̣ƉــƎ ܗ

**1** ܘܬܐƢــſƦſ BD: ܘܬܐƢſ P **3** ܬܐŴƊƃܕܐܘ BD: ܬܐŴƊƃܐܘ P **5** ܘܬܘܒ [+ Ǝſܕ D | ܘܬܘܒ ܬܐŴƀƇŶܕ ܘܬܐƢſƞܒܒ [om. hom. B **6** ܐܦ P: ܘܐܦ BD **8** ƢƉܐƦƉ BD: ܐƢƉܐƦƉ P | ƢſƦſ] + ųƍƉ BD | ܗܘ̣ ܕƢſƦſܘܬܐ **10** P ܘܐܦ :BD ܐܦ | D ܘƇŶܐ :B ܘܒƇŶűܐ :P ܘܕƇŶܐ **9** BD ̣ܘܗܘ :P 2 P: ܘܬܐƢſƦſ BD **<sup>11</sup>** ŴƆ P: ŴƆܕ BD **<sup>12</sup>** ̇ ܐܘ ƢſƦſ1 B: ܐƢſƦſ P: ƦſܐƢſƦſ D | Ƣſƞܒ BD: Ƣſƞܘܒ P **<sup>13</sup>** ܘܐܦ P: ܐܦ BD **<sup>14</sup>** Ƣſƞܒ P: ƢſƦſ BD **<sup>16</sup>** űŶ] om. B **<sup>17</sup>** ƢƉܐƦƌܕ BD: ƢƉܐƦƉܕ P **<sup>18</sup>** ܝ ̇ [ܒų + Ǝſܕ BD | ܘܡƦƉ…**19** ƢƉܐƦƉ P: ܘܡƦƉ ƢƉܐƦƉ BD

more and a less. For it is always through the lessening of one of the contraries that another one becomes more289. For instance, every time that black changes into white or bitter into sweet, it is through the lessening of blackness that the increase of whiteness happens, and also it is through the lessening of bitterness that the increase of sweetness happens. And likewise, the lessening of whiteness and sweetness leads to the enlargement and increase of bitterness and blackness. Hence, what is sweet or white admits of more and less even without what is contrary to them. For it is said of one and the same thing that it is white and that it became more white, and also that it is sweet and became more sweet, and in the same way of every quality. It becomes obvious from this that more and less appear where there is opposition290.

226 But this is not the case for substance. For Socrates is never said to be more or less Socrates or to be more or less a man. Neither is Plato said to be more a man than Socrates or that Socrates is less than Plato, since each one of them is a man. However, it is possible to say that one and the same man is sometimes greater in virtue, wisdom and any other qualities and sometimes not. And in the same way, it is possible to say about different things that one of them is more or less than the other. But about being a man, one may never apply a more and a less speaking of himself, neither may this be said of another person. Hence it becomes clear that substance does not admit of a more and a less291.

227 Though, as he says, it is not the case that one substance is not greater than the other — since he established the primary substance as greater and more

**<sup>289</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 50.10–13: ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἡ ἐναντιότης, ἐν τούτοις τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἐναντιότης· ὑφέσει γὰρ τοῦ ἐναντίου τίκτεται τὸ μαχόμενον. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 75.14–17.

**<sup>290</sup>** Philoponus (*In Cat.* 75.17–30) specifies that not all contraries admit of a more and a less, but only "those which are naturally able to be mixed with one another" (ὅσα τῶν ἐναντίων πέφυκε μίγνυσθαι ἀλλήλοις).

**<sup>291</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 50.18–51.3; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 76.2–77.9.

̇ ƉــƦܘܡ ŷƉــſŴܐ܉ ̣ܕܗܝ Ŷــűܐ ܐܘƏــƀܐ Ɔܐ ƦƉܐƉــƢܐ ƆــŴܬ Ƥƙƌــų ƢſƦſܐƦſ ܘܒƢſƞܐƦſ܂ ƐƉܒƢ ܐƌܐ ܕƎſ ܕܐܦ ܗܕܐ ܬܘܒ ŴƆ ƆܐܘƀƏܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ƀƠƌــƙܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܘܐܦ ƀƊƄƆــŴܬܐ܂ źƉــƈ ܕܐܦ Ɔܐ ƀƍƉــƍܐ ̇ ƈ ƢſƦſܘܬܐ ܘܒƢſƞܘܬܐ܂ ̇ ܒųܕܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܕƢƐƕܐ ƠƉܒ ܕƢƐƕܐ ܒų ܐƆܐ ̣ܐųƌܘ ܕƦƌܬܘƏــƚ ƇƕــŴܗܝ ܐܘ <sup>5</sup> ̇ Ʀƌܒــƞܪ ƍƉــų: ƀƍƉــƍܐ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ̇ ƦƉܒƞܪ܂ ̇ ܘ ܕƢƐƕܐ ̣ܕܗܘ űƃ ̣ܗܘ ƦƀƉܪ ܐܘ ̇ ܐ܉ ܘŴƆ ܗ ܗܘ

̇ ܝ ܕƃــű ̇ ܐܡ ܕƀƠƌــƙܐ ƆܐܘƏــƀܐ: ܗ 228 ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ܕƎſ ܐƦſƢŶܐ ܕƎſųƇƃ Ə ̈ Ǝƀƌ ܕܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ܂ ܒƢƤܪܐ ̇ ̣ܗܝ űƃ ̣ܗܝ űŶܐ: ƠƉܒƦƀƍƇܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕܗ ųſƦſܐ ƋƆ Ǝــſܕ ŴــƆ ܐ܂ƇܒŴــƠƆܕܕ Ǝــƀ̈ ̇ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܕƎſųƇƃ ܗƌ ܓƢƀ ƠƉܒƦƀƍƇܐ ܐųſƦſ ܐűŷƃܐ܂ ƈźƉ ܕƆܐ ſƞƉܐ ̣ܕܗܝ űƃ ̣ܗܝ űŶܐ ܐܘƀƏܐ: ܬƟ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܒƈ ŴŶܪܘܬܐ ̇ ܝ ܘܒŵܒƎ ܘܐܘŴƊƃܬܐ ܐܘ r109B ̇ ŴƀƇŶܬܐ ܘƢſƢƉܘܬܐ ܐűŷƃܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒŵܒƎ <sup>ܗ</sup> ̇ ƠƉܒƀƍƇــƦܗܘܢ܂ ̈ــƀܐ ܐſƦſــų ̇ ܝ ܐƢŶܬܐ܂ ܘŴƆ ܒŴƉűܬܐ ܕƇſــųܘܢ ܕܙƌ ܗ ̈ܕܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ƈƃ ŴŶܒųƇ ܕűŶ ųƍƉܘܢ űŷƆ ƎƀƇܒƠƉ ŴƇܒƠƉ ŴƆ Ƣƀܓ ܐƀ̈ ܙƌ ̇ ƉــűƆŴܐ ܕŶܒــƢܗ ܗܘܐ܂ ܐܘƊƃــŴܬܐ ܓƀــƢ ƆــŴ ƠƉܒƀƍƇــƦܐ ܐſƦſــų ̇ ܝ ܗܘſܐ ܗܕܐ܂ ܗƃــŴܬ ܬܘܒ ܘܐܦ ܕŶــŴܪܘܬܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ƃــű ܬܬŶܒ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ــƈ ܗ ̇ ųƆ ƋƀƠƉ ܝ ̇ ̇ ܕܗ ŴƊƀƊŶܬܐ Ɔܐ ̣ܗܘܐ ƢſƢƠƆܘܬܐ ƠƉܒƇܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ųſƢƣ ųƆܕܐ܂

̇ ܕƆܐ ųƉŴــƍƟܘ ̇ D90v ųــƍƀƃ ܘܗܝƦــſܐ űــƃ ܐƆܐ ܐ܂ƍƃܗ ŴƆ Ǝſܕ ܐƀƏܐܘ <sup>229</sup> Ŷܒƈ܉ ƠƉܒƇܐ ܐƅſ ܕܐƌƢƉــƎ ſųƇƃــƎ ܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ܂ ܒــƢܡ ƆــŴ ܐŷƃــűܐ܉ ̇ ܝ܂ űƃ ܓƢƀ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ ̣ܗܘ űƃ ̣ܗܘ űŶ ܐƆܐ ܒŵܒƎ ܗ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܝ ܘܒŵܒƎ ܗ ܒŵƇƄܒــƎ: Ɖــſƞܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕܒŵܒــƎ ŶــŴܪܐ ƌــųܘܐ ܘܒŵܒــƎ ܐܘƃــƊܐ: ܘܒŵܒــƎ ƊƀƊŶܐ ܘܒŵܒƎ ƢſƢƟܐ: ܘܒŵܒƎ ƇƄƏܐ ܘܒŵܒƎ ƊƀƄŶܐ܂ ܗŴƃܬ ܕƎſ ܐܦ ̇ ƎſųƇƃ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ܂ ƎſűƉ ƆܐܘƀƏܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ƀƠƌــƙܐ ܗܕܐ: ܕƃــű ܐſƦſــų ̈Ǝƀ ܕܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ܂ ̇ ƠƉܒƦƀƍƇܐ ܕܗƌ űŶܐ ̣ܘܗܝ űƃ ̣ܗܝ ܬܗܘܐ ܐųſƦſ

**1** ܐſŴŷƉ BD: ܐŴŷƉ P **2** ܐƌܐ ƢܒƐƉ BD: ƦſܐƌƢܒƐƉ P | ܬܘܒ ܗܕܐ DP: ܗܕܐ ܬܘܒ B **3** ܘܐܦ P: ܐܦ BD **5** ܪƞܒƦƌ P: ܪƞܒƦƌܕ BD **6** ܕܗܘ̣ P: ܗܘ̣ BD | ܪƦƀƉ DP: ܪƦſƦƉ B, D corr. sup. lin. | ܪƞܒƦƉ] + ܀ܘ܀ BD **<sup>7</sup>** ܬܐŴƀƇſܕ BD: ܐƦƀƇſܕ P | ƋƆ űƃܕ BD: űƃܕ ƋƆ P **<sup>9</sup>** ̇ ܐųſƦſ BD: ̇ ̇ ܐųſƦſ ųſƦſܐ P **<sup>10</sup>** ܐſƞƉ] + ܗܝ B **<sup>14</sup>** ̇ ųſƦſܐ BD: ܗܝ P **<sup>15</sup>** ܘܐܦ BD: ܐܦ P **<sup>16</sup>** ̇ ųƆ] om. BD **<sup>18</sup>** ̇ ųƉŴƍƟܘ P: ̇ ųƊſŴƟܘ BD **<sup>19</sup>** ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕ DP: ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕܕ B **<sup>24</sup>** Ǝƀ̈ ƌܕܗ DP: ƎƀƆܕܗ B

principle than the secondary one — still it becomes apparent that in relation to itself the same substance is never said to be more and less. However, I suppose that this too is not a property of substance only, but of quantity as well. For number ten too does not admit of a more and a less in that it is number ten. But if one adds to it or subtracts from it, it will become another number and not remain the same number ten which becomes more or less292.

228 The last of all properties which he sets out as an attendant of substance is 4a10–21 the fact that "what is one and the same is receptive of contraries"293. Substance is indeed receptive of all contraries but not simultaneously. For it is not possible that one and the same substance be receptive of whiteness and blackness or sweetness and bitterness simultaneously, but rather (it may be receptive) at some time of one thing and at another time of the other. And it will be receptive of them not in the same way as qualities, for qualities are not receptive of one another, but when one of them perishes the other one comes to be. For instance, blackness is not receptive of whiteness, but when the former perishes the latter comes to be. Similarly, hotness too is not receptive of coldness, but the dissolution of the former results in the appearance of the latter.

229 This, however, is not the case for substance. Rather, while its nature by itself remains without change294, it receives all the contraries, as we have said, though not simultaneously but one at a time. Thus, Socrates, who always remains one and the same, is able to be sometimes white and sometimes black, sometimes warm and sometimes cold, sometimes foolish and sometimes wise, and similarly with everything else. Hence, it is an attendant feature of substance only that, while it is the same and one, it may be receptive of contraries295.

**<sup>292</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 77.10–24.

**<sup>293</sup>** See *Cat*. 4a10–11: τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν. As was previously the case, the quotation does not match with the early anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories*. It has no equivalent for the word ἀριθμῷ, and it is thus likely that the quotation derives from the Greek commentary which Sergius utilized for his work, cf. the omission of ἀριθμῷ by Ammonius in *In Cat.* 52.12.

**<sup>294</sup>** Literally: "without corruption". Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 51.6–7: ταὐτὸν δὲ ἵνα μὴ μεταβάλλῃ καθ' ὑπόστασιν (= Philoponus, *In Cat.* 79.9–10).

**<sup>295</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 51.5–13; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 79.9–80.12.


**1** ܐƆܐ BD: ܐƇƘܐ P | ܘܐܦ BD: ܐܦ P | ƢƉܐƌ BP: ƢƉܐƌ ƢƉܐƌ D **2** ܘܐܦ P: ܐܦ BD **<sup>3</sup>** ܬܘܒ [om. B **<sup>6</sup>** Ǝſųſܬܪܬ BD: ƎſųſƦſ ̈ ŴŶܬ P | ܐűŶ ƈƃ űƃ P: ܐűŶ ƈƃ ܐűŶ űƃ D: ܐűŶ ƈƃ B **7** ̇ ųــſƦſܐ ܐƦƀƍƇܒƠƉ ܐűŶ] om. hom. B | Ǝſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ ƌܗ ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕܕ [om. P **10** ƢƉܕܐܬܐ DP: ƢــƉܐƦƉܕ B **<sup>11</sup>** ̇ ųƉŴــƍƟ P: ̇ ųƊſŴــƟ BD | ƎــƀƆܗ BD: Ǝــƀƌܗ P **12** ܬܐŴــƌƢܒƐƉܘ BD: ܬܐŴƌƢܒƐƉܕ P | ƎſųſƦſܐ BD: ̇ ųſƦſܐ P **14** ƢƊܓƆ] om. B | ܐƇƘܘܐ [om. P **15** ƎſųſƦſܐ BD: Ǝƀƌܐ P **<sup>16</sup>** ܕܐܢ BD: Ǝſܕ P | ̇ ųſƦſܐ BD: ̇ ųſƦſܕܐ P **<sup>18</sup>** ̇ ųƉŴŶܕܬ P: ̇ BD ܕܬƉŴŶܐ ܕųƇſ **<sup>19</sup>** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BD: ܐƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **<sup>21</sup>** ųƆ] + Ǝſܕ P | ܬܐ ̈ ̈ ܐ :P ܕŴƀƇſ ƦƀƇſܕ BD | Ǝſųſ̈ űſܒܐ BD: Ǝſųſ̈ űſܕܒܐ P

230 Here, however, one might object that this is not only attendant on 4a22–27 substance, but also on any statement uttered by means of words and also of a belief296. For when someone states that Socrates is sitting or believes it about him, if the latter happens to be sitting then the statement and the belief about it will be true, but if he happens not to be sitting then both of them will be false. Hence both a statement and a belief, while each one of them remains the same and one, are receptive of contraries, namely of truth and falsity297.

231 However, it is not in the same way that substance is receptive of contraries 4a28–4b19 and that one speaks here of a statement and a belief. For substance remains by itself when it receives contraries298, as we have said, but this does not hold at all for statements and beliefs. A statement, namely, perishes in the same moment when it is uttered, and also a belief has no independent existence at all. That is why they are not receptive of contraries either, but each one of them becomes associated with the truth and falsity of real things, because if the thing really is as a statement or a belief say then they are true, but if it is not then they are false299.

#### *[Conclusion]*

232 Now, with all that has been said thus far, the Philosopher fulfilled the need for a definition of substance, as we have said above. So, since it proves impossible for a person to provide its definition, because it is a primary genus, he ought to turn to the properties attendant on it through which he should

**<sup>296</sup>** Aristotle himself anticipates this objection, so that Sergius' text looks as a paraphrasis of the corresponding passage of the *Cat*. 4a22–23: εἰ μή τις ἐνίσταιτο τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν δόξαν φάσκων τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι.

**<sup>297</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 52.16–53.6; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 80.24–81.9.

**<sup>298</sup>** Sergius again paraphrases Aristotle's text, see *Cat*. 4a29–30: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐτὰ μεταβάλλοντα δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν.

**<sup>299</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 53.20–24; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 81.22–82.23.

ܕƞƉܐ܂ ܐܦ ̣ܗܝ ܓƢƀ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ܐſــƅ ܕŶــƎƍſŴ ܒــų ܒƊܐƉــƢܐ ܗƌܐ: ܒƉŴŶƦܐ ƀƉűƉܐ ƢſƦſ ̣ƎƉ űƊƇƃܡ ܐƌƢŶܐ܂

ƈƃ ƈƕ ŴƆ Ǝƌܬ ܬܐŴƍƙƇƉܕ ܗܕܐ܂ ܐܦ ƎܒŵƇƄܒ Ʀƌܐ űſųƕ Ʀſܗܘ 233 ܐܘƏــــƀܐ ܕܐſــــƦ ܐܬܬƊƀƏــــƦ܉ ܐƆܐ ƕــــƈ ܗܕܐ ƃƢƉܒــــƦܐ ܘƦƀƍſŵŶƦƉܐ: ܕŷƤŶܐ ܘƖſűſܐ ƦƕűƀƆܐ ܕܐƎƀƇſ ܕűŶܬܐƦſ ƢƟƦƉܒƀــƎ <sup>5</sup> ƍƙƆŴƀƆܐ܂

ƋƇƣ ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܬƦƆܐ܂

̈Ɔܓܐ ܕƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܬƦƆܐ܂ ܬܘܒ ŴƘ

ƆŴƘܓܐ ƀƉűƟܐ

B110r :ƢƉܐƦƉܘ ܘܗܝƦſܐ ܡűƊܕܒ ܐƉ ƈƃ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕܒŵܒƍܐ ̣ܗܘ܂ ܐܘ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕܒܐܬܪܐ ̣ܗܘ܂ ܐܘ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕܒƍƊܐ܂ ܐܘ ̈ܬܐ ܒųƇƄ܂ ŴƍƉ ƅſܐ ̇ ܐܘ ̈ܬܗ܂ ܐܘ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܐƅſ Ƈƃܐ ܒŴƍƊ ̈ƣܐ ܒܓƐƍܐ܂ ̇ ܐƅſ ܐܕ ܐܘ ̈ƣܐ܂ ̇ ܐƅſ ܓƐƍܐ ܒܐܕ ܐܘ ̇ ܐƅſ ܐܕƣܐ ܒųܘƆܐ܂ ܐܘ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕܘܒƢܐ ܒűƊܒƌƢܐ܂ ܐܘ ܐܘ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܐƅſ ܕܒƀƇƉŴƤܐ܂ ̈ƣܐ ܒܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ̇ ܐƅſ ܓű ܐܘ

**3** Ʀſܗܘ [+ Ǝſܕ P | Ǝƌܬ P: Ǝƌܕܬ BD **5** ܐƦƀƍſŵŶƦƉܘ P: ܐƀƍſŵŶƦƉܘ BD **7** ܐƦƆܕܬ [+ ܐųƆܐƆܘ ̈ Ɔܓܐ ܕƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܬƦƆܐ **8** D Ŵƣܒŷܐ ŴƘ ܬܘܒ P: ܐƢƉܐƉܕ ųƇſܕ ܓܐƆŴƘ ܬܘܒ B: om. D **<sup>9</sup>** ܐƀƉűƟ ܓܐƆŴƘ] om. P | ܐƀƉűƟ] + ܀ܐ܀ D **<sup>11</sup>** ̇ ܐܘ [om. BD | ܗܘ̣ [ om. BD **<sup>12</sup>** ̇ .om] ܐܘ BD | ܗܘ̣ [ om. BD **<sup>13</sup>** ̇ ܐܘ [om. BD **<sup>14</sup>** ̇ ܐܘ [om. BD | ųƇƄܒ BD: ܐƇƄܒ P **<sup>15</sup>** ̇ ܐܘ [om. BD ܐƇƃ P: ųƇƃ BD | ܬܗ ̈ ̈ ܬܐ :BD ܒŴƍƊ ŴƍƊܒ P **<sup>16</sup>** ̇ ܐܘ [om. BD **<sup>17</sup>** ̇ ܐܘ [om. BD **<sup>18</sup>** ̇ .om] ܐܘ BD | ܐƆܘųܒ BP: ܐƇſųܒ D **19** ̇ ܐܘ [om. BD **20** ̇ ܐܘ [om. BD **21** ̇ ܐܘ [om. BD

teach about it according to his ability. For it is distinctive property, as we have shown in this book300, that is more similar to definition than anything else.

233 Also, you shall always remember that our teaching here pertains not to all substances which exist but to those ones which are composite and visible, and it skilfully contributes to the knowledge of those who have recently started their education301.

End of Book Three.

#### *Further, the divisions of Book Three*

#### *First division*

Everything that is in something else is said:


**<sup>300</sup>** I.e. in Book III of the *Commentary*.

**<sup>301</sup>** See §§173–176, where Sergius explains in detail the types of substances and specifies which ones among them are the subject of the *Categories*. Cf. also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 45.17– 46.10, where Ammonius explains why Aristotle made no mention of differentiae in the *Categories*.

P55r Ǝſܕܬܪ ܓܐƆŴƘ

̈ ƀܐ: Əܕܐܘ ƎſųƍƉ

$$\begin{aligned} \text{maximize} \\ \stackrel{\text{def}}{\sim} & \stackrel{\text{def}}{\sim} \stackrel{\text{def}}{\sim} \stackrel{\text{def}}{\sim} \stackrel{\text{def}}{\sim} \stackrel{\text{def}}{\sim} \stackrel{\text{def}}{\sim} \mathcal{A} \stackrel{\text{def}}{\sim} \mathcal{A} \sim \\ & \stackrel{\text{def}}{\sim} \stackrel{\text{def}}{\sim} \mathcal{L} \stackrel{\text{def}}{\sim} \mathcal{L} \stackrel{\text{def}}{\sim} \mathcal{L} \stackrel{\text{def}}{\sim} \mathcal{L} \end{aligned}$$

ܘƎſųƍƉ ƃƮƉܒƦܐ ̈ſܐ – ŴźƇƘܢ ܘƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ űƀŷſ ܐƉ̈ ŴƍƟ

̈ƣܐ – ܒƤƌƢܐ ܕܓŴܐ ܘƀŶܐ ܘƍƤƙƌܐ ̈Ɛܐ ܘܐܕ ܓƍ

B110v | ܐƦƆܕܬ ܓܐƆŴƘ D91v ŭƇƘƦƉ ܡűƊƇƃ

ــܒܐƇƄƆ – Ǝــƀ ̈ ̈ܬܐ ܕƆܐ ܕƉ ̈ ــƦܐ ƞƆܒــŴ ̈ــƇܐ Ɗƀŷƣ ̇ ܐƅſ ܒƢܬ <sup>Ɵ</sup> ܐܘ ̇ ܘ ܕܨƢſ ̇ ܘ ܕܓƚƀƇ ܘųƆ ̇ ܘ ܕƃŴƃܒܐ ܘųƆ ̈ ƀܐ ܘųƆ ̇ ܘ ܕƉ ܕſܒƤܐ ܘųƆ ̈ܬܐ ŴƀŶ ƎſųƇƄƆܘ ܐƤƌƢܒƆ ܐƀŶ ƅſܐ – ܐƣ̈ ̇ ܐƅſ ܓƐƍܐ Ɔܐܕ ܐܘ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ <sup>15</sup> ̈ܬܐ ŭƇƘƦƉ ̇ ܐƅſ ܕŴƍƊƆ ܐܘ ̈ܕܐ – ܐſــƅ ܓــƉƢܐ ܘƀƟــƐܐ űــŷƆ Ǝــƀ ̈ ̈ܬܐ ܕܕƉ ŴــƍƊƆ ̇ ܐܘ ܘܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ ̈ſܐ ܘܪƤſܐ ܘܕܐƅſ ̈ܕܐ – ܐƅſ ̈ܪܓƇܐ ܘܐűſ űŷƆ Ǝƀ ̈ ̇ ܕƆܐ ܕƉ ܐܘ ܗƎƀƆ <sup>20</sup>

**<sup>1</sup>** ܓܐƆŴƘ BP: ܓܐƆŴƘ ܀ܒ܀ D | Ǝſܕܬܪ [+ ܀ܒ܀ BD **<sup>2</sup>** ܐƀ ̈ Əܕܐܘ P: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܕܐܘ BD **<sup>3</sup>** ܐƦźƀ̈ ƤƘ ƎſųſƦſܐ P: ܐƦźƀ̈ ƤƘ ƎſųſƦſܐ BD **<sup>4</sup>** Ƒƀ ̈ Əܐܘ P: ܐܣƀ ̈ ̇ ܐܕƣܐ :BP ܘܐܕƣܐ **<sup>5</sup>** BD ܐܘƏ D ܐܘ **<sup>8</sup>** ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏܘ B: ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ DP **<sup>9</sup>** ܐƐ̈ ƍܓ P: ܐƐ̈ ƍܘܓ BD **<sup>12</sup>** ܬƢܒ ƅſܐ [om. P **<sup>13</sup>** ܘ ̇ ܘųƆ ƚƀƇܕܓ [om. BD **<sup>17</sup>** ƅſܐ BP: ƅſܘܐ D **<sup>18</sup>** ƅſܕܐ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܘܐ BP: ƅſܘܕܐ D **<sup>19</sup>** ܕܐ̈ űŷƆ] om. BD | ܐſ̈ űſܘܐ [om. B

#### *Second division*

Of substances:

	- either superior to the composite ones, i.e. divine substances,
	- or inferior to them, i.e. matter and form as considered separately by themselves;
	- particular individuals, e.g. Plato and Socrates,
	- genera and species, e.g. universal man, living, animate.

#### *Third division*

Everything is divided:

	- either into parts that are similar to one another, like bone, wood, and other things like this;
	- or such ones that are dissimilar to one another, like feet, hands, head, and so on.

ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ̈ƍܐ ƙƆŴſ ܘܢųƇƃ ƅſܐ – ųƇƄƆ ŴƆܘ ܐŷƀƄƣ ܐƣܐܕ űŷƆ ̇ ܐܘ ̇ ܝ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܕܬܪܬſــƎ ̇ ƇƄƆــų ܘƆــŴ Ɔــų ܒŷƇــŴܕܘܗܝ – ܐſــƅ <sup>ܗ</sup> ܐܘ ̈ܪܓŴƇܗܝ <sup>5</sup> ̈ ܘſــƎ ŶــŴ̈ܪܬܐ ܒŵܒــƎ ųƌܕ ƅــſܐ – ƎܒــŵƇƄܒ ŴــƆܘ ųــƇƄƆܘ űــŷƆ ̇ ܐܘ ƀƏܒŴܬܐ ̇ ŷƆــű ܘƇƄƆــų ܘܒŵƇƄܒــƎ – ܐſــƅ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܒƌƢــƤܐ ܓŷــƃŴܐ ܐܘ ܘƀƏŴƏܐ ܨܗܘƆܐ܂ ܗܕܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ƦſƦŶܬܐ B111r | D92r ܐƤƊŶܕ ܓܐƆŴƘ ƙƀƠƌܐ ƆܐܘƀƏܐ ܐƅſ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ̇ ܂ ̇ ܝ ܕƆܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܒűƊܡ ܐƆܐ ƈƃ űƉܡ ܒų ܗ ̇ ƄƆــƈ Ɖܐ ܕƦƉܐƉــƢܐ ̇ ̣ܘƉــƎ ܬŶــųƉŴ ̇ ܝ ܕܬܬܠ ̣ƉــƎ Ɗƣــų ܘܗ ŴƇƕܗܝ܂ ܘܗ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܝ ܕܬܗܘܐ ŴƤƉܕƕܐ ܗƌܐ űƉܡ ƖſűſܐƦſ ̇ ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ űƉܡ ̇ ܝ ܕƦƀƆ ųƆ ܘܗ ̇ ƢſƦſܘܬܐ ܘܒƢſƞܘܬܐ ̇ ܝ ܕƦƀƆ ܒų ܘܗ ̇ ܝ ܕűƃ űŶܐ ̣ܘܗܝ űƃ ̣ܗܝ ܬܗܘܐ ƠƉܒƦƀƍƇܐ ܕܗƎƀƆ ܕܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ܘܗ

> P .om] ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕƤƊŶܐ **10** D ܕƦƀƇſܐ :P ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ | B .om] ܗܕܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ƦſƦŶܬܐ **9** ̇ ܝ **12** ̇ ܝ :DP ܗ ܘܗ B | ܡűƉ] om. BD

#### *Fourth division*

Property:


#### *Fifth division*

Properties that are attendant on substance are:


234 ܒƊܐƢƉܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܕƟــűܡ ܗƌܐ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܕܬƆــƦܐ ܕƦƄƉܒƍــŴܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܐܘ ܐŴŶܢ ܬܐܘܕܘܪܐ܉ ܪܕܬ ƇƉــƦܐ ܐƄſــƍܐ ܕƄŶــƋ ܐƌــƦ ܒƀــű ̇ ܓƀƇܐſــƦ ̈ Ʀſܐ ܕƀƇƕــų ̇ ܘ ܕƈƕ ܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ܘƦƠƙƌ ܐƀƌــƎ ŶƦƆــŴ Ƣƣܒܐ ܗ ܐƍƄſܐ ܕܐƎƘ ̣ܗܝ ܬܪƦƀƕܐ ܕܐƀƇſــƎ ܕܐܬܐƉــƢ ƀƊƕــƠܐ ܗܘܬ ŹــŪ܉ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܒƢ ܐƌܐ ܕƣܒƦƠ ̣ܗܝ ŴƠƀƤƘܬ ƎƇƇƊƉ Ɔܐƥƌ: ܐܦ Ɔܐ ̣ƉــƎ ܐƆܐ Ɔܐ Ə ܐƎƀƇſ ܕƆܐ ܪܕƎſ ܕơƐƕƦƌ ܒƖƊƤܐ ܕŴƍƙƇƉܬܗƎſ܂ ܗƍƃܐ ܓƢƀ ƎƍƀƘƞſ v111B ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƦƉܪƎƍƀƕ ƊƆܐƢƉ܉ ܒŵƇƄܒƎ ŴƠƤƙƊƆ ܓƀƇܐƦſ ܒűƀ ƦƇƉܐ: ܗ ̈ Ǝƀ܂ ܐƅſ ܕܐܦ Ɔܐ ƤƆܒƮܐ ܙŴƕ̈ܪܐ Ɩźƌܐ ƇƀŶܐ ܕƦƘܓƊ

<sup>235</sup> ܒƊܐƉــƢܐ ܕſــƎ ܗƌܐ ܕܐܪܒــƖܐ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܕƇſــų <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܕƦƄƉܒƍــŴܬܐ ܗܕܐ܉ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܗƣܐ ƈƕ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ܂ ƈźƉ ܕܐܦ ƆܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ ܒűƀ ƍƙƇƉــŴܬܐ ܕƕــƈ ܗܕܐ ƕܒƀــűܐ Ɔــų ܒــƦܪ ƇƉــƦܐ ܕƕــƈ ܐܘƏــƀܐ: v92D ̇ ܘ ܕƕــƈ źƟܐܓŴܪſــŴܣ܂ ܙܕܩ ܓƀــƢ ƊƆــűܥ: ܕƆــŴ ܐſــƅ ܒƊܐƉــƢܐ ܗ ̇ ܝ܂ ųƆ ̇ ܕܐܬſܐ ƊƀƏܐ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ܒƦܪ ܐܘƀƏܐ: ܘƙƀƠƌܐ ƦƇƉܐ ܕųƀƇƕ ܐƆܐ ܐܦ ܒــųܕܐ ܐſــƦ ܪƀƕــƍܐ Ɖــűܡ: ܕƟــƍܐ ƏــƇƃŴܐ ܕƆܐ ܒƕŵــŴܪ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܒƦƇƊܐ: ųܒ ܐƌܐ ܐƢƤƉ ƈƖƆ ƎƉ̣ ƈƀƇƟ ܢŴܓűܘܒ ܂ųܒ ƎſƢƀŶܕ ƎƀƇſܐƆ ̇ ܂ ܕܗƍƃܐ ܬܬűſܥ ܓƀƇܐƦſ ųƀƊŶƮƆ

̇ ܉ ̇ ܝ ܕܗܘƆܐ ƎſųƊƤƉ ųƆ ̈Ɗܐ ܗ 236 ƦƣܐƦƏܐ ܗƈƀƃ ƦƀƉűƟܐ ܕܓƣŴ ̇ ƍƀƃܐƦſ܂ ܗƍƃܐ ƆــƋ ܓƀــƢ ܕƆܐ ܕŴƉ ܘܕƆܐ ܐƋƀƄƏ ܐƎſƢƉ ܕܐųſƦſ ̈ ƎƀƊƄ܂ ܕܬܒƗ ̈ Ŵܢ ܘƈƃ ܐƏ Ɖܕ ƈƃ ŴƇܒƠƊƆ ̇ <sup>20</sup> ųƍƀƃ ܕŴŷƇܒ ܗܘܐ̣ ܐƞƉ

ƉܐƢƉܐ :P ܬܘܒ ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ ܕųƇſ ܕƠƣŴƘܐ ܕźƟܐܓƑſƢ .:scr ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ **1** ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ ܕƦƃܒܐ ܕųƇſ ܕƟܐųŹܓŴ̈ܪſܐܣ :B ܕܐܪܒƖܐ ܕƦƃܒܐ ܕƟܐŹܐܓŴ̈ܪſܐܣ B **3** ܬܐܘܕܘܪܐ P: ܬܐܕܘܪܐ BD **5** ƢƉܕܐܬܐ DP: ܘƢƉܕܐܬܐ B **10** ܐƢƉܐƊܒ BD: ܐƢƉܐƉ P **11** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪƆ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪƆ D: ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ ܐƆ P | űƀܒ [om. P **12** ܗܕܐ ƈƕܕ DP: ̇ ųƀƇƕܕ B **13** ܣŴſܪŴܐܓźƟ P: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓŹܐƟ B: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓųŹܐƟ D | ŴƆܕ BD: ܗܘܐ ܐƆܕ P ̇ ܝ **14** ųƆ DP: ƎſųƆ B **19** ŴƉܕ BDP: ܐƇƀŶ Epit., add. BDP in marg. | Ʀſܐƍƀƃ DP, Epit.: ƦſܐƢſƦſ B | ƋƆ] om. P **<sup>20</sup>** ܢŴ ̈ Ɖܕ DP, Epit.: ܐſܗܘ B

#### *BOOK FOUR*

#### *[Introduction]*

234 In the previous book, which was the third one in this treatise, O brother Theodore, an account has been brought forth of how you should understand (Aristotle's) concept of substance. And it has been clearly demonstrated concerning it that, even if some people hold the opinion that it is extremely difficult, you should not think of refusing to give someone an explanation, especially about those things that prove to be not difficult to understand through listening. Thus we shall always be eager to explain clearly in words what we intend to say, so that even little children might not be confused by our answers.

235 Now, in the fourth book of this treatise we are going to speak about quantity. For this is what Aristotle too does in the *Categories*, turning to the teaching on it after his account of substance. In fact, we ought to know that it is not by chance that quantity is placed after substance and that the account of the latter is followed by the former, but that there is a certain logic in this which is revealed to those who consider it as having no small meaning302. Thus, I will now dwell on this issue for a while in order to make it apparent for those who have interest in it.

#### *[On sequence of the categories]303*

236 The primary foundation of bodies is what they call "matter" (ὕλη) and what they say to be without form304 and shape (σχῆμα) in its nature. It is thus only that its nature might be able to be receptive of all forms and all shapes, for the

**<sup>302</sup>** For various interpretations of the order of the categories, see Simplicius, *In Cat.* 120.27– 122.1.

**<sup>303</sup>** Ammonius gives a short excursus on prime matter at the beginning of that section of his commentary on the *Categories* which deals with quantity (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.3–10, cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 83.14). This excursus follows Ammonius' note that quantity comes second in the order of the categories by Aristotle and apparently aims to provide an explanation for it. Philoponus also includes a lengthy account of prime matter in the section dealing with substance, while explaining the issue of differentiae, see *In Cat.* 65.8–66.25. In the same context, the discussion of prime matter appears in Ammonius' commentary on the *Isagoge*, see *In Isag.* 106.12–107.21. Commenting on *Isag*. 11.12, Ammonius suggests that in that passage "matter means genus, while form means differentiae" (τὸ μὲν γένος ὕλης ἔχει λόγον, αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ εἴδους). Here, Ammonius (and after him, Sergius) applies the same analogy, which in this case justifies the order substance-quantity.

**<sup>304</sup>** In the margins of all three mss. (BDP) in which this passage is extant the variant "without power" is added, and it is the latter variant which appears in the epitome.

ƍƠƌŴƏܐ ܕƕܒŴܕܘܬܐ܉ űƃ Ɔܐ ܬŸƃƦƣ ̣ܗܘܬ ܕƀƍƟܐ ܕŴƉܬܐ ƍƀƃܐƦſ܂ ̇ ܂ ųــƆ ƎــſƢƟ ܐƊ̈ ƣŴܕܓــ ܐƀــƉűƟ ܐƍــƀƃ ܐܦ ܐ܉Ɔܗܘ ܕܐųــƆ ƈƀƃܗ ̇ P51r ųƆ ̇ ܂ ܗܕܐ ̈Ɗܐ ܕƦƉܕܪܟ ܒƦܪƦƀƕܐ ̣ƎƉ ųƀƉűƟ ƣŴܒܓ ܡűƉ ƦƀƆܕ ƈźƉ ܗƈƀƃ ܐƎſƢƉ܉ ܕƉűƟܐƦſ ŶƦƉܐ űƉܡ ƠƉܒƇܐ ܕƆــܐܘܪƃܐ ܘƙƆــſƦܐ ܘƖƆـــƠƉŴܐ ܐſـــƅ ܕܬܐܪܒ܂ źƉـــƈ ܕܐܦ Ɔܐ ܪܒـــŴܬܐ ܕܒźـــŴ̈ܪܐ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܂ Ɖܐ ܕſــƎ ܕܪܕܬ Ɔــܐܘܪƃܐ ܘƙƆــſƦܐ ƀƟƦƉــƊܐ ƀƄƣــŷܐ ܗܘܬ ܒــų ̇ ųــƆ ƎſųƊƤƉܘ ܐ܂Ɗƀ̈ ̇ ܬųſƦƆܘܢ ܗƎƀƆ Ɵ ųܒ Ǝſ ̇ ܘƠƉŴƖƆܐ: ܗƎſűſ ܗܘ ̈Ɗܐ܂ ƣŴܕܓ Ǝſܕܬܪ ܐƍƀƃ ܐƀƉ̈ B112r űƟ Ǝſűſܗ


**1** ŸــƃƦƣܬ BD, Epit.: ŸــƄƣܬ P **6** ܐƃــܐܘܪƆ BP, Epit.: ܐƠƉŴــƖƆ D **7** ܐƠƉŴƖƆܘ BP, Epit.: ̇ | D ܘƆܐܘܪƃܐ ųƆ] om. D **<sup>9</sup>** ܐƀƌܪƦƉܕ ƎſƢƉܐ Ǝſűſܗ ܐŶƦ ̈ Ɖ ܐƦƆܬ ƎƀƆܗ Ǝſܕ ƦܒƐƌܕ [om. P ̇ ܝ **18** ܗ BP: Ǝ ̇ Ɖ D **21** ƦƀƉűƟ DP: ܗƦƀƉűƟ B | ܘƢƉܕܐܬܐ P: ƢƉܕܐܬܐ BD | ܐƉܘ BD: ƎƉܘ P **<sup>23</sup>** ƗܒźƊƆ] om. B | ܐƌ ̈ ܐƉ BD: ܐƆ ̈ ܐƉ P **<sup>24</sup>** ܘܢųƀƊƀ̈ ̈ ܘܢ :P ܒܐƄƏ ųƀƊƄƏܒܐ BD

need for activity demands that it cannot possess form naturally305. They also call this matter the first nature of bodies, since there is nothing in bodies that can be conceived in mind prior to it. Thus, they say that it first receives some extension into length, breadth, and depth in order to gain volume, for otherwise no dimension in space might be possible in it. But when it extends into length, breadth, and depth, then these three dimensions exist in it. That is why the ancients called it the second nature of bodies306.

237 So, once it has received these three dimensions, then, they say, it is considered to be receptive of shapes, qualities, and faculties, and it produces the four primary bodies, which are customarily called elements (στοιχεῖα). From them all bodies here are composed which undergo coming-to-be and passing-away307. For they say that when matter which has gained size receives dryness and hotness it becomes fire; when it receives wetness and coldness water appears; if it acquires dryness and coldness then earth is formed; and if heat and wetness appear in it then it produces air308.

238 However, should one need some visual demonstration of this, we may say the following309. Prime matter may be compared to bronze that has not yet been treated by a craftsman. But when a craftsman takes it, and beats and shapes it, then due to his treatment it becomes large and extended similar to matter which at first acquires the afore-mentioned three dimensions and gains volume. And when bronze is first extended through the treatment of the craftsman, then it receives images which he wants to imprint on it, and there appear vessels from it which differ in their shapes and utility. Just as the

**<sup>305</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 65.10–17: τὴν πρώτην ὕλην φασὶν οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἀσώματον εἶναι τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἀσχημάτιστόν τε καὶ ἀμεγέθη καὶ πάσης ποιότητος κεχωρισμένην· ὅτι γὰρ ἀνείδεός ἐστι, δείκνυται σαφῶς τῷ πάντων τῶν φυσικῶν εἰδῶν αὐτὴν εἶναι δεκτικήν <...> ἡ ὕλη ὑποβάθρα τις οὖσα καὶ δεκτικὴ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι θεωρουμένων, οὐδὲ ἓν ἕξει οἰκεῖον εἶδος. See also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.4–5.

**<sup>306</sup>** See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 65.17–18: αὕτη οὖν ἐξογκωθεῖσα κατὰ τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις ποιεῖ τὸ δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλην (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.5–6). Sergius calls matter the "second nature" (apparently because he has called it "first nature" just above) instead of "second subject" like Ammonius and Philoponus (following Aristotle, *De gen. et cor.* 329a33–34).

**<sup>307</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.4–7: ἡ γὰρ πρώτη ὕλη ἀνείδεος οὖσα καὶ ἀσώματος πρότερον τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις δέχεται καὶ γίνεται τριχῇ διαστατὸν τὸ καλούμενον δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον, εἴθ' οὕτως τὰς ποιότητας καὶ γίνεται σύνθετον ποσόν.

**<sup>308</sup>** See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 65.22–25: τούτῳ οὖν κατά τι μὲν μέρος προσγενομένη ἡ θερμὴ καὶ ξηρὰ ποιότης ἐποίησε τὸ πῦρ, κατά τι δὲ ἡ ψυχρὰ καὶ ὑγρὰ ἐποίησε τὸ ὕδωρ, κατά τι δὲ πάλιν ἡ ξηρὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ ἐποίησε τὴν γῆν, κατά τι δὲ ἡ θερμὴ καὶ ὑγρὰ ἐποίησε τὸν ἀέρα. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.7–9.

**<sup>309</sup>** The same example appears in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 106.19–23.

̈ Ɗƣܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ Ƥŷƌܐ űŶ ̣ܗܘ܉ ܗƍƃܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܘܐܦ ƍƀƃܐ ƀƉűƟܐ ܕܓŴ ̇ ܐſــƅ ŷƌــƤܐ ܕƆܐ ƀƇƘــŸ܂ ̇ ܗܘƆܐ: ܕƆܐ ܐƀƄƏــƋ ܐſƦſــų ܕܐſƦſــų ܘܐƍƄſܐ ܕܐƅſ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ: Ƥŷƌܐ ƦƀƉűƟ Ɖܐ ܕܐܬܐ ƖƆܒűܐ Ŵƣܒźܐ ̈ ƊƄܐ܉ ܗƍƃܐ ܘܐܦ ̈ܬܐ ܘܐƏ ŴƉܕ ųܒ ƎƖ ̈ ܘŴƘܬſܐ ŪƐƌ: ܘƎƃ ŹƦƉܒ ܗܘƆܐ ܪܒŴܬܐ Ɛƌܒܐ ƦƀƉűƟ ܘƆــܐܘܪƃܐ ܘƙƆــſƦܐ ܘƖƆــƠƉŴܐ: ܘƃــƎ v112B ̈ƎƀƇƀ܂ Ŷܘ Ǝƀ̈ ƌܙ ƈƃ ̇ ųܒ ƎƀƖ ̈ ŹƦƉܒ


**<sup>1</sup>** ܘܐܦ P: ܐܦ BD **<sup>4</sup>** ܘܐܦ BD: ܐܦ P **<sup>6</sup>** ƎــƀƇƀ̈ Ŷܘ P: ƎــƀƇƀ̈ Ŷ ƈــƃܘ BD **7** ƎــƀƆܗ BD: ƎƀƆųܒ P Ǝƌܬ ƢƉܐܬܐ BD: ƎſƮƉܐܬܐ P **8** ܗܝ̣ [ om. B | ܬܐŴƍƙƇƊƆ DP: ܬܐŴƍƙƇƉ B | ƈƕܕ2 BD: ƈƕܘ P **11** ܐƆܗܘ ƈƕ ƢƉܐƊƆ P: ƢƉܐƊƆ ܐƆܗܘ ƈƕ BD **16** ƎƆ ƦƐƀƘܕܐ DP: ܐƦƇƉ ƎƆ ƦƠƘܕܐ ̇ ܘ **18** B ܗ [om. P **20** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܕܐܪ D: ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ P **22** ܬŴƆ] om. P ̈ܬܗܘܢ ŴƍܒƦƄƉ BD: ܬܗܘܢ̈ ŴƍܒƦƄƊƆ P **23** ܬŴƆܘ BD: ŴƆܘ P

primary nature of all of them, i.e. bronze, is singular, so also the primary nature of bodies, i.e. matter which is shapeless like untreated bronze. And just as bronze, as we have said, when it first undergoes treatment, becomes thin and extended so that images and shapes might be imprinted on it, in the same way also matter first acquires size and (extends) into length, breadth, and depth so that all qualities and faculties may be imprinted in it.

239 We have discussed these issues here in order to show that the account of quantity is closely related to the teaching on substance and hence should be properly placed after it in the order of exposition310. In the discussion of matter, we are going to explain in the proper way all those demonstrations and notions that the ancients seem to have expressed about matter311, while (now) we are urging the readers always to be prudent and to judge those things which are said, thus discerning between what is true and what is not. But, as you understand, O brother, it is not our goal in this treatise to refute anyone or to distinguish between what is true and what is not like that312.

240 But since you have convinced us to produce this treatise for you, so that you and many with you might be instructed by it, and it also appeared to me that study of these issues would not be useless, I made up my mind to elucidate clearly to you what I recall from the ideas of all the ancients and particularly from Aristotle and as far as I can not to neglect anything from what they have written about the science of logic. But if time allows us, we will also approach their treatises on nature and those which are on the invisible things313. Then we will be able to demonstrate in detail that they do not agree with one another

**<sup>310</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 83.4–5: ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων δευτέραν ἔχει τάξιν τὸ ποσόν. See also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.9–10.

**<sup>311</sup>** As Sergius notes in the following paragraph, after having commented on the logical treatises, he planned to turn to Aristotle's natural philosophy (cf. §256, where he mentions that he aims to write a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*). It is possible that the outcome of Sergius' work in this field became his translation of the Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De Mundo* and his adaptation of Alexander of Aphrodisias' *De Universo*. Both treatises in their Syriac versions bear the name of Aristotle in the title.

**<sup>312</sup>** Here, Sergius points out potential difficulties which Christian students of Aristotle's natural philosophy might have. He further comments on this point in §256.

**<sup>313</sup>** Thus, after commenting on the logical treatises, Sergius intends to write about physics and theology (i.e. metaphysics). Cf. §11, where Sergius suggests a division of philosophy (derived from Ammonius).

ƈــƕ ƎــƆ ܐƍــƙƌ ܐƣܗ ܐƆܐ ܐ܂ƀƆűƕ ƎƉ̣ ܐܬܐƀ ̈ ܕܒŴƠƀŶƢܬܐ ƋƀƏ Əܓ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƋƀƏ ̣ܗܘܐ ƎƆ ƊƆܐƢƉ܂ ܗ

	- ܕƆܐܘܪƃܐ ܘſƦƙƆܐ ܘƠƉŴƖƆܐ܂ ܗƎƀƆ ܕƎſ ̣ƎƉ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ܂ ƈƃ <sup>5</sup> ܬܐ܂ŴƀƊƃ ƎƉ̣ ܐƦƍƉ ̇ ̇ ܐܘ ųſƦſܐ ܡűƉ ܬܐŴƀƊƃ Ƣƀܓ ƎſųƍƉ ܐűŶ ܬܐ܉ŴƀƊƃ ƈƕܕ ܬܐŴƍƙƇƉ ܐƀƏܐܘ ƈƕܕ ܐƦƇƊƆ ܐƙƀƠƌ Ƣƀƙƣ ƎſűƉ ̈ܬܐ Ŵܨܒــ ƎــſųƇƄƆ ̇ ̇ ſƦſــƢ: ܘſűƟــƊܐ ܒــų ̇ ــƎ ̣ܕܗܝ ƀŷƉــƍܐ Ɔــų Ɖ ƅــſܐ ̈ Ɗƣܐ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ܂ ܘƈźƉ ̣ܕƎƉ ܒƦܪ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ƠƉܒƇܐ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܕܓــŴ ̈ــƊܐ: ƀƙƣــƢ ܬܘܒ ܒــƦܪ ƣــƢܒܐ ̈ܬܐ ܘܐƄƏ ̈Ƈƀܐ ܘܕƉــŴ ųƇƃܘܢ ܙƌ <sup>10</sup> ̈ƀܐ ܘŶ ܘܢųــƇƃ ƎــƀƤƀܒŶ ųܕܒــ :ܐƌܙ ƈــƕܕ ܬܐŴƍƙƇƉ ƎƍƀƊƀƏ ܬܐŴƀƊƃ ƈƕܕ ̈ Ɗƣܐ܂ ̈ܬܐ ƎſųƇƃ ܕܒܓŴ ̈ƣܐ ܘܕŴƉ ̈Ɗܐ ܘܐܕ ܐƄƏ
	- ̈ƀܐ ܕܐųſƦſܘܢ űƆŴƉܐ ܬſƦƀƆܐ ܕܗܘƆܐ: ųƍƉ ̣ܘƎƉ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ̣ܘƎƉ ܙƌ ̇ ܐƦſƢŶ܂ ܐƆܐ ƈƕ ŴƙƀƠƌܬܐ ܕƦƇƉܐ ̈ܬܐ ܕƦƉܪƎƀƌ ܒų ̈Ƈƀܐ ܘܕŴƉ ܘŶ ̇ ̈Ǝ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ƌܐܬܐ ƎƆ ܕƎſ ŴƇƕܗܝ ܕƍƙƆŴſܐ ܕƀƊƃــŴܬܐ: ܘƤƌــƢܐ ܒــų ƠƙƏ ̇ ܂ ųƆ ƋŷƆܕ ܓܐƆŴƘ ƎƉ̣ ܬܘܒ

**<sup>6</sup>** ܐűŶ BD: űŶ P **<sup>11</sup>** ƎƀƤƀܒŶ D: ƎƀƤܒŶ B: ƎƀܒƤŶ P **<sup>12</sup>** ܐƣ̈ ̈ ƍƟܐ + [ܘܐܕ Ŵſ B in marg.: + ܐƍƟ ̈ Ŵſܘ D in marg. **13** Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓــźƟ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــŹܐƟ B: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓــųŹܐƟ D **16** ܐƆܕܗܘ [+ ܐƀــƏܐܘ ܐƌܙ ܬܐŴــƀƊƃ BD in marg. | ųــƍƉ] + ܐƊƣŴܕܓــ ܐƐ̈ ƃŴــźƏܐ B in marg.: + ܐƆܗܘ ̈Ɛܐ ܕܓƊƣŴܐ ƃŴźƏܐ D in marg. | ܐƀ̈ ƌܙ DP: ܐƌܙ B **<sup>18</sup>** ܐƍƙƆŴſܕ BD: ̇ ųƍƙƆŴſܕ P | ̇ + [ܒų ƎƉ̣ B **<sup>19</sup>** ܓܐƆŴƘ] + ܐƍƙƆŴſ BD in marg. **<sup>22</sup>** <sup>Ǝ</sup>̈ ƠƀƐƘ BD: ܐƠƀƐƘ P | ܘܐܦ P: ܐܦ BD

and that many of them may be easily rebuked314. But for now, let us turn to what we intend to say.

241 Now, matter is a certain substance, for it is mother of all bodies. As we have said, it is considered first to receive extension into length, breadth, and depth. These, however, pertain to quantity, for each one of them is either some quantity or a part of a quantity315. That is why it is proper that the account of substance is followed by the teaching on quantity, for the latter is closely related to it and thus precedes everything else. And since after quantity, the substance of bodies receives all qualities, faculties, images, and shapes, it is therefore fitting that we place the teaching on quality after the section on quantity, for in it all shapes (σχήματα), forms (εἴδη)316 and images that are in bodies are encompassed.

242 The other seven categories follow these three and are generated from them, similar to how all bodies come to be whose generation takes place in due order from the four elements. Their generation is the third one from matter, i.e. (the first one is) from it, then from quantity, and then from qualities, faculties, and images which are considered in it at the end317. However, what has been said about the order of the exposition should suffice. Next we will turn to the teaching on quantity, and again start with the division that is proper to it.

#### *[Division of quantity]*

243 So, first of all, there are two kinds of quantity. One of them has parts that 4b20–25 are separate and delimited from one another, while the other is a unified whole and is not made up of distinct parts318. But also that whose parts are separate from one another is in turn divided into two types, number and language. And further, that whose parts are not separate, but united and joined to one another,

**<sup>314</sup>** Here Sergius takes up the tradition of Christian apologists who were eager to stress that non-Christian ("pagan" or "outer") philosophers disagree on nearly every question and thus may easily be refuted, cf. for instance Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* II.6.22.

**<sup>315</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 83.21–84.4.

**<sup>316</sup>** A marginal note in mss. BD specifies that this term should be understood as εἰκόνες (Syr. *yuqne*) here.

**<sup>317</sup>** Thus, Sergius draws a parallel between the ontological order and the order of the categories as follows: matter (= substance) generates three-dimensionality (= quantity), which in turn generates forms and shapes (= quality), which finally produce all bodies from the four elements (= other seven categories). Marginal notes in mss. BD aim at making clear these parallels. Ammonius' account differs slightly from what we find in Sergius in that Ammonius makes relatives fourth in the list and after it places the rest of the categories, see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.10-12, more explicitly in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 83.18–20.

**<sup>318</sup>** I.e. continuous and discrete, see *Cat*. 4b20: τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστι διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές.

 ̇ ̇ ŷƀźƣــŴܬܐ: ܘƍƉــų ̇ ƏــŴܪŹܐ ܘƍƉــų ̇ ܓƢƀ ܐųſƦſ ųƍƉ ܓܐ܂ƇƘƦƉ ̇ ܙܒƍܐ܂ ܓƊƣŴܐ ܘܬܘܒ ųƍƉ r94D ̇ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐܬܪܐ: ܘųƍƉ

̇ ܕƀƊƃــŴܬܐ ųــƀ̈ <sup>244</sup> ܐƅſ ܕŴŷƃƦƤƌܢ ̣ƎƉ ƘــƆŴܓܐ ܗƌܐ Ƈƃــųܘܢ ܐܕƣ ̇Ŵ ܕƎſ ƍƀƍƉܐ ܘƦƇƉܐ ܘŴƏܪŹܐ ܘŷƀźƣــŴܬܐ ܘܓــƊƣŴܐ ƣܒƖܐ܂ ܗƌ <sup>5</sup> ܬܐŴــƀƊƃ ŴــŷƄƤƊƆ ܐſƞــƉ ܐƆ Ƣƀܓ ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ̣ ƢܒƆ ܐ܂ƍܘܙܒ ܘܐܬܪܐ ̇


**<sup>3</sup>** ܘܢųƇƃ BD: ƎſųƇƃ P | ܬܐŴƀƊƃܕ ̇ ųƀ̈ ̈ƣܐ ܘŴƀƊƃܬܐ :BD ܐܕƣ ܐܕ P **5** Ƣƀܓ [om. B **7** ųƆ] om. B **<sup>10</sup>** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘܕ BD: ܐƘŴƐƇƀƇƘܕ P **<sup>12</sup>** ܕܐܢ BD: ܘܐܢ P | ̇ ܐܘ BP: ܘܐܢ D **<sup>15</sup>** ƈƕ ̇ :BP ܐܘ ƈƕܘ D | ܘųƌܐ DP: ܘųƌܕܐ B **<sup>18</sup>** ܐƍƖƌܘ DP: ƈƕ B | ܘ ̇ BD ܐƦſܘܗܝ :P ̣ܗܘ | B ܕƤƉܐܠ :DP ܗ **21** ƎƍſƢƉܐ DP: ƎſƢƉܐ B **22** ƢƉܐƌ BP: ƢƉܐƌܕ D **23** ƎƀŷƉܕ BP: űƀŷƉܕ D **24** ܬܐŴſűŶ D, corr. P in marg.: ܘܬܐűƀŶܐ P: ܬܐŴŷƤŶ B

is in turn divided into five types, for one of them is line, another is surface, still another is body, another is place, and the final one is time319.

244 As it becomes apparent from this division, the species of quantity are together seven, which are: number, language, line, surface, body, place, and time. And it is not possible to find any quantity beyond them, but all its species are encompassed and comprehended by them, as it seemed to the one who was the father and discoverer of this science. Now that we have thus properly outlined the species and differentiae320 which embrace all quantities, let us set out each one of its parts separately and make an inquiry about it that is fitting to it according to the teaching of the Philosopher, starting with the first species.

#### *[Number]*

245 Concerning number, it is not necessary to prove whether it is quantity or 4b25–31 not, since it is evident to everyone that it is a quantity321. In fact it is this name that all of us apply when we await an answer from someone on how big or how small some number is; for instance, when it happens that we ask how many people are in the house or how many measures fit in a particular vessel, and we hear that they are ten, or twenty, or thirty, or any other number, depending on circumstances and on what the respondent says. That is why it is not necessary to prove that number is a quantity, but it is proper to investigate whether its parts are separate and delimited from one another, since this is what constitutes this kind of quantity322.

246 Now, we say that this is also obvious to anyone who correctly regards it. And even if it seems that numbers are completely unified when someone says "hundred" or "thousand", since they are pronounced as one word, their parts, however, are separate and not joined to one another. For what kind of unity

**<sup>319</sup>** See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 84.5–9: διαιρεῖ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν εἰς τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ τὸ διωρισμένον. συνεχὲς δέ ἐστι ποσὸν τὸ ἔχον τὰ μόρια ἡνωμένα καὶ συμπεφυκότα πρὸς ἄλληλα, διωρισμένον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχον, λέγω δὴ τὸ ἔχον τὰ μόρια διῃρημένα ἀλλήλων. τοῦ δὲ συνεχοῦς πέντε φησὶν εἴδη, γραμμὴν ἐπιφάνειαν σῶμα τόπον χρόνον, τοῦ δὲ διωρισμένου δύο, ἀριθμὸν καὶ λόγον. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.16–18.

**<sup>320</sup>** Simplicius notes that the outlined seven kinds of quantity should be considered its differentiae (διαφοραί) rather than species, which are magnitude and amount, see Simplicius, *In Cat.* 122.35–123.1. Also Porphyry in his question-and-answer commentary designates the continuous and the discrete as two differentiae of quantity, see Porphyry, *In Cat.* 100.29.

**<sup>321</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 57.3–5; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 89.22–23.

**<sup>322</sup>** I.e. it is proper to prove that number is a discrete quantity, cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 57.3–5 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 89.22–24. According to Aristotle (*Cat*. 4b24–25), numbers share the characteristics of discrete quantities in that they "have no common boundary at which their parts meet" (κοινὸς ὅρος πρὸς ὃν συνάπτει τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ), a point which is not elaborated upon by Sergius.

 ̇ ̇ ƀƤƊŶــƎ ƆــŴܬ ƊŶــƤܐ: ܐܘ ̇ ƐƕــƢܐ ƆــŴܬ ܐܪܒــƖܐ: ܐܘ ƣܒــƖܐ: ܐܘ ƀƍƉــƍܐ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ܐſــƍܐ ̣ܕܗܘ ƆــŴܬ ƀƍƉــƍܐ ŶܒــƢܗ܂ ܐƆܐ ſűſــƖܐ ̣ܗܝ ̇ űŶܐ܂ ܘܒƦܘƦƙƏܐ ̇ ܘܐųſƦſ ̇ ܘųƆ ̈ܬܗ ųƍƉ ŴƍƉ ƎƉ̣ ܐűŷƇƃ ܐƤſƢƘܕ ̇ ܒƞ̈ܪܢ ܘܙƕــƮܢ܂ Ɔܐ ܗƀƃــƈ ̈ ܓƎƀ ܐܘ ̈ܕܐ ܘƏ űŶ ƈƕ Ǝܒƃܪ̈ƦƉ ܕŴŷƇܒ ܗܘ̣ ̈ܬܗ ܒŷــűܕܐ: ܘźƌــƮܢ Ŷــűܐ ƊƇƣــŴܬܐ ܘſűŶــŴܬܐ ܐſــƅ ŴــƍƉ <sup>ܢ</sup>̈ D94v űــƀŶܐ ̇ ܕűŶ ܓƊƣŴܐ ܐƍſܐ ̣ܕܗܘ܂ ̇ ܕűŶ ƐƀƟܐ: ܐܘ ̈ܬܐ ܕűŶ Ɖܐƌܐ ܐܘ ŴƍƉ

	- ̇ܕܩ ̈ ƀƌܐ ܕƦƇƉܐ: ܙ ̈ƣܐ ܓŴ 248 ƈźƉ ܗƈƀƃ ܕܬƦƆܐ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ܗƎƀƆ ܐܕ ̇ ܘ ƕƞƉــƀܐ ƆــŴ ̣ƉــƎ ƀƊƃــŴܬܐ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ܂ űƊƆܥ ܕܗƌܐ ܐſƢŶܐ ܘܗ ƈźƉ ܒƤƙƍܐ Ɔܐ ܓƦƊƀƤܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ƟܒƖܐ ܕƏــŴܬܬܗܘܢ܂ ܗ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܘ ܕſــƎ ̈ Ɗܐ ܕܐܪƎƀƄſ ̈ ܐ ܘܒƦƙܓ ųƊƤܕܒ ƈźƉ :ܐƇƇƊƉ ƎƉ̣ ŪƃƢƉܕ ܐƀƉűƟ

**4** ܢƮƕܘܙ BD: Ǝƕܪ̈ܘܙ P **13** ܐƦƀƍƕűſƦƉ] + ܐƦƀƍƀƕܪƦƉ BDP in marg. **15** ųƍƀƕܪ DP: ܐƍƀƕܪ B **<sup>16</sup>** ŪƐƌܘ BD, Epit., corr. P in marg.: ܒųſܘ P, corr. D in marg. | ܐƀƉܕܘ BD, Epit.: ̇ ųƀƉܕܘ P **<sup>17</sup>** ƢƖ ̇ <sup>Ə</sup> DP, Epit.: ŪƃƢƉ B | ܐƉ ƈƃ DP, Epit.: ܐűſܐ B **<sup>18</sup>** ܐƀƌ ̈ Ŵܓ DP, Epit.: ܐſ ̈ Ŵܓ B **20** Ǝſܕ P, Epit.: Ƣƀܓ BD

does three form with seven, or ten with four, or fifty with five, or any kind of number with another number? But it is obvious that every part of it is separate and exists singularly by itself, and it is only through addition and combination with one another that they increase, or through subtraction that they are reduced. Thus, its parts are not unified with one another, but they maintain one composition and unity like parts of a vessel, or a piece of wood, or any particular body323.

#### *[Language]*

But since we have said that the second kind of quantity is language324 247 , we 4b32–37 shall also inquire into it, by distinguishing first what kind of language pertains to quantity. For if we pass over this without investigation, then synonymous words might bring confusion of no small amount to the reader, as there is not one single kind of language but many. There is, namely, spoken language which is composed of many words and of phrases, and there is rational language that is in the intellect, which arises silently in the mind and because of which we are rational beings and are called like that325. But there is also another, professional language that is collected and imprinted in the mind of a craftsman. By means of it he always contemplates a sort of prototype from which he receives an example for his craftsmanship and in whose image he produces everything that is done by him326.

248 So, while there are these three general species of language, we ought to know that the last and the middle ones do not pertain to quantity, since they are firmly rooted in the incorporeal soul327. The first one, on the other hand, that is composed of utterances is one of the kinds of quantity because its nature

**<sup>323</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 57.8–9; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 89.25–27.

**<sup>324</sup>** Syr. *mellta* corresponding to Gr. λόγος.

**<sup>325</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 57.22–24: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ λόγος πολλαχῶς λέγεται (λέγεται γὰρ καὶ ὁ προφορικὸς λόγος, λέγεται καὶ ὁ ἐνδιάθετος λόγος), νῦν περὶ τοῦ προφορικοῦ λόγου φησίν. See Porphyry's question-and-answer commentary (*In Cat*. 101.26–27), concerning the second kind of language: ὁ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ὃς καὶ σιωπώντων ἡμῶν ἐγγίνεται. Cf. also Simplicius, *In Cat.* 124.8–10. All these commentators distinguish only two kinds of language, the spoken and the internal, and do not mention the third kind discussed by Sergius.

**<sup>326</sup>** This kind of language is not mentioned by other commentators. It is likely that here Sergius is elaborating upon the Platonic teachings on Forms, or prototypes, which he presented in §§72–79. It is also possible that Sergius had in mind Aristotle's theory of language in *De Int*. 16a3–8.

**<sup>327</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 90.2–7. Philoponus speaks of only one kind of language, which is the second in Sergius, i.e. the unspoken one.

̇ ܝ ܓƀــƢ ̇ ܕƀƊƃــŴܬܐ܂ ܒــų ųƀ̈ ƌܙ ƎƉ̣ űŶ Ŵſܗܘ ܉ųƍƀƃ ܘܗܝƦſܐ ƎſƢƃ ̇ ܐܘ ̇ ̇ ƦƇƉܐ ܕܐƅſ ܗܕܐ ŶƦƉܐ ܐƅſ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ܕܐܪŴƄſܬܐ ܐܘ ܕܐƦſ ܒų ̇ ̈ ƀܐƎſ ܐܘ ̈ ܐ ƙƇŷƤƉܐ ܕƏܓ ̈ Ɗܐ ܘųƊƣ ܕŴſƢƃܬܐ: ܘƃƢƉܒܐ ̣ƎƉ ƦƘܓ ܙƕــŴ̈ܪƎſ źƉــƈ ܕܐܪƄſــŴܬܐ ܘſƢƃــŴܬܐ܂ ܘƏܓƀــܐܘܬܐ ܘܙƕــŴܪܘܬܐ ܕŴƀƊƃܬܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ: Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕܐܦ ƇƉــƦܐ ܗܕܐ ܕܒſųــƎ ܐܦ ̣ܗܝ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܂ ܒŴƀƊƄܬܐ ܐųſƦſ

	- Ǝſ ̈ ̇ ܘ ܙƌܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܕŴƀƊƃܬܐ: ܕŴƣ ųƆ ܐܦ ŴܒƢƟƦƊƆ ƎƆ ܙܕܩ ƈƀƄƉܘ 250 ̈ܕܐ ܕƆܐ ƘــŴܪƍƣܐ Ɖــűܡ ܘܕƆܐ ƐƘــƠܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ̈ܢ ܒŷــű ̈ܬܗ ܘܐƀŶــű ŴــƍƉ ̇ ܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ ܐƅſ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ƈźƉ ܕܐܦ ̣ܗܝ ܗܕܐ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ: ƇƘܓų ̇Ŵ ܕƎſ ŴƐƆܪŹܐ ܘŷƀźƤƆــŴܬܐ ܘƆܓــƊƣŴܐ ܘƆــܐܬܪܐ ƥƊŷƆ ܨܒŴ <sup>20</sup> ̈ <sup>ܢ</sup>: ܗƌ ƅــſܐ ܉ƢƉܐƊƆ ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ̣ ܐűŶ ƈƃ ƈƕ ƈƀƄƉ ƎƍƀܒƀŶܬƦƉ ܐ܉ƍܒŵƆܘ ܕƐƙƉܐ ܘƦƀƆܗ ܕƤƀƌܐ ܗƌܐ ܕƋƀƏ ƎƆ ܗƣܐ܂
		- ̇ ܝ ܕƦƉܪƀƌܐ ܒܓŴ ƣŴŶܒܐ: ܘƆܐ ̣ܗܘܐ ܒܓƊƣŴܐ 251 űƟŴƌܬܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܗ ̇ Ɔــųܕܐ ܕƆܐ ̇ ŷƉــƮܐ܂ ܘƆــų ųــƆ ƎــſųƊƤƉ ܢŴƀƊƀƏ ܒܐ܂ƐƌƦƉ ܡűƉ

**<sup>1</sup>** ƎſƢƃ ̇ [ܘƏܓƀܐܘܬܐ ܘܙŴƕܪܘܬܐ **4** P ܘܐܪŴƄſܬܐ :BD ܕܐܪŴƄſܬܐ **2** P ܘܐƎſƮƃ .:Epit ,BD ܐܘ inv. P **<sup>5</sup>** ܕܐܦ DP: ܐƇƘܕܐ B **<sup>7</sup>** Ƣƀܓ [om. P **<sup>8</sup>** ƎſųƆ] + Ǝſܕ P **<sup>9</sup>** ܗܘ̣ [ om. BD **<sup>17</sup>** ܐƌܙ BD: ̇ ųƌܙ P Ǝſ ̈ Ŵƣܕ BD: ƎſŴƣ P **19** ܗܝ̣ ܕܐܦ P: ܕܗܝ̣ BD | ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ BP: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D **22** ܗƦƀƆܘ BD: ųƆ ƦƀƆܘ P **23** ܬܐűƟŴƌ DP: ܬܐűƟŴƌܕ B **24** ܢŴƀƊƀƏ] + ܐƊƀźƍƟ BD add. in marg.

consists in words and phrases which are long and short328. Thus, it includes that kind of language which is measured, as we have said, by length and shortness and which is composed of different phrases and words that are multiple or few and are either long or short. And since being multiple and few is a characteristic of quantity, it is apparent that also this kind of language which includes them pertains to quantity.

249 It is also evident that parts of this language are not unified to one another without separation that would set them apart and distinguish them. For even if the whole treatise is considered to be one utterance329, its words and phrases may be separated and distinguished from one another. Neither the idea nor the sense that is formed from them are completely unified as one line or as one surface, and its parts are not strung together in such a way that no division or separation between them is seen. Hence, it has become apparent that the spoken language pertains to quantity, namely to the first differentia of quantity, the one whose parts do not maintain complete unity and conjunction to one another.

#### *[Line, surface, and body]*

250 Now it is necessary for us to approach also another kind of quantity whose 5a1–6 parts are equal and unified with one another without any division and without separation330. But since Aristotle divides this quantity too into five items, as we have said, namely into line, surface, body, place, and time, we ought to speak about each one of them according to our knowledge and following the goal that is set before us now331.

251 Now, the point may be grasped in thought but is not found in any body. Geometers call it *simeyon* (σημεῖον)332, considering it to be without parts and

**<sup>328</sup>** Aristotle explains how language pertains to quantity by the fact that it is measured by long and short syllables: καταμετρεῖται γὰρ συλλαβῇ μακρᾷ καὶ βραχείᾳ (*Cat*. 4b33–34). The same characteristic appears in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 90.1. Sergius speaks of *šmahe* and *petgame* which both may have the meaning "words", although the second term refers rather to constructions of words, hence "phrases". Cf. Porphyry, the question-and-answer commentary, *In Cat*. 101.30–32: πᾶς λόγος ἐξ ὀνομάτων σύγκειται καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, ἃ λέγεται εἶναι τοῦ λόγου μέρη. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐκ συλλαβῶν συνέστηκεν· αἱ δὲ συλλαβαὶ ἢ μακραί εἰσιν ἢ βραχεῖαι.

**<sup>329</sup>** Syr. *mellta*, Gr. λόγος.

**<sup>330</sup>** I.e. continuous quantity.

**<sup>331</sup>** For the following paragraphs, see Ammonius, *In Isag.* 7.15–24; idem, *In Cat.* 57.26–58.11; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 90.11–91.15.

**<sup>332</sup>** A marginal note in mss. BD suggests a synonym *qenṭima* which is a transliteration of the Gr. κέντημα.

̇ ܂ ܘܐƅſ ܐƥƌ ƌܐƢƉ: ܪƤſܐ űƉܡ Ɔܐ ųƆ ƎƀƊƀƏ ܓܐƆŴƘ ܐƆܘܕ ܐƦƍƉ ܓƀƤــƊܐ ܕƃــƈ ܓƤــŴܡ܂ ƕــƈ ܗܕܐ ܐſƢƉــƎ ܕƃــű ƆــƋ ܬܪܕܐ ܒܓــŴ ƤŷƉܒــƦܐ ܘܬƏــŪ ܐܪƄſــŴܬܐ Ɖــűܡ ܕƆܐ ƘــſƦܐ: ܗ r20L ̇ ܝ ܕſــƎ ƏــŴܪŹܐ ųƉƦƤƉܐ܂ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐܪŴƄſܬܐ ܕƆܐ ſƦƘܐ܂ ܐܢ ܕſــƎ ̣ܗܘ ƏــŴܪŹܐ ܗƌܐ ƐƌـــŪ ܬܘܒ ƉـــŶƦܐ ܐŶـــƌƢܐ ſƦƙƆـــų܉ ܗſűſـــƎ ŷƀźƣـــŴܬܐ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܐܘܪƃܐ ܘſƦƘܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ܂ ܐܢ ܕƎſ ܐܦ ƠƉŴƖƆܐ ƊƀƟƦƉܐ: ܕܐųſƦſ ܬܬƦƉܚ ܗܕܐ ܐƅſ ܕܬܗܘܐ ƦƉܪܓƤܐ܉ ܗƎſűſ ܓƊƣŴܐ ƀƠƉــƊܐ ̈ ŶƦܐ: Ɔܐܘܪƃܐ ܘſƦƙƆܐ ܘƖƆــƠƉŴܐ܂ ܘܒűܓــŴܢ ƄƆــƈ ܕƍƟܐ ܬƦƆܐ Ɖ ̈ܗܝ ƎſųƊƤƉ ųƆ܂ ܓƊƣŴܐ ܐƍſܐ ̣ܕܗܘ܉ ܕܬƦƆܐ ŴƊƀƟ

<sup>252</sup> ̣ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ ܗƈƀƃ ܓƀƇܐ ̣ܗܝ܉ ܕűƟŴƌܬܐ ܪƤſܐ ܐųſƦſ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܕŴƏܪŹܐ܂ ̣ܗܘ ܕƎſ ŴƏܪŹܐ܉ ܪſــƤܐ ܕŷƀźƣــŴܬܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ܂ ܘŷƀźƣــŴܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܪſــƤܐ P59v ܐƊƣŴܓــ ƎــƉ̣ ܐƢــƣܬ űــƃ ܘܢųــƍƉ űــŶ ƈــƃܘ ܡ܂ŴــƤܓ ƈــƃܕ ܐſܪŴƣܘ ܘܬƍƘܐ ƈƖƆ܉ űŶ ŶƦƉܐ ƢƀƐŶ ̣ƉــƎ ŶܒــƢܗ܂ ܘܒűܓــŴܢ ƌــűƟŴܬܐ ܕƆܐ ŶƦƉܐ ŷƃƦƤƉܐ ƆܓƢƊ܂ ܘƈźƉ ܗƌܐ ܐܦ Ɔܐ ƦƍƉܐ űƉܡ ƀƍƟܐ܉ v115B ܐƆܐ ܐųſƦſ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܪƤſܐ űƉܡ ƀƉűƟܐ ܕƆܐ ܓŴƤܡ܂

	- ̇ــŴ ܕſــƎ ƏــŴܪŹܐ ܘŷƀźƣــŴܬܐ ̇ــŴܢ ܕſــƎ ܬƆــƦܐ ܕƍƉــų: ܗƌ 254 ܗƌ ܘܢ܂ųſƦſܐ ܬܐŴƀƊƃ ƎƉ̣ ŴƆܕ ƢƊܓƆ ܐƍſƢŶ ܘܢųƀƇƕ ƦƀƆ ܐ܉ƊƣŴܘܓ

**1** ƅſܘܐ BP, Epit.: ƅſܐ D **2** ƈƃܕ [+ ܐƆܕ corr. D in marg. **4** ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ BDL, Epit.: ܘܗܝƦſܕܐܪ P **<sup>6</sup>** ܐſƦــƘܘ [+ ܡűƉ BD **<sup>10</sup>** ܬܐűƟŴƌܕ BDL, Epit.: ܬܐűƟŴƌܘ P | ̇ ̇ :DLP ܪƤſܐ ܐųſƦſ ܐųſƦſ ܐƤſܪ B | ܗܘ̣ LP, Epit.: Ŵƌܗ BD **<sup>15</sup>** ܐƤſܪ ̇ ųſƦſܐ DLP, Epit.: ̇ ܐƦſ ܒų **16** B ܪƤſܐ ܐųſƦſ ̈ ܐ ƊــƀƟ P: ųܒــ Ʀſܐ ܐ ̈ ƊƀƟ BD: ܐƉ̈ ŴƍƟ ųܒ Ʀſܐ L | ܬܐŴŷƀźƣ] + ܝ ̇ ܗ P **18** űŶ2] om. B **<sup>20</sup>** ܐƆܕܕ DLP, Epit.: ܐƆܕ B **<sup>22</sup>** ܗܕܐ L, Epit.: ܐƌܗ BDP **<sup>23</sup>** ܐƦƆܬ DLP, Epit.: Ŵ̇ ƌܗ B

indivisible, and, as someone might say, a kind of incorporeal principle of all bodies. Though it remains inside their mind333, they say about it that when it receives certain length without breadth, it is called line, which has length but no breadth. And if the line receives another extension into breadth, then surface appears, which has length and breadth only334. And if it is further extended into depth becoming perceptible, then body appears, which has three dimensions, i.e. length, breadth, and depth. That is why any particular body is called three-dimensional.

252 From this, it becomes clear that the point is the origin of the line, while the line is the origin of the surface, and the surface is in turn the origin and the beginning of all bodies. And each one of them, if you start from the body and proceed upwards, will have one fewer dimension than the other. Thus, the point turns out to have no dimension at all, and because of this it does not have parts either, but is a sort of incorporeal first principle335.

253 For, if the body has three dimensions, while the surface which is its origin has only two, and furthermore the line which is the beginning of the surface has one dimension less than it, so that it acquires only one dimension, i.e. length, consequently, since it is necessary for the origin of the line which is the point (σημεῖον) to have one dimension less than it, it is apparent that it is without dimension. And if it is without dimension, then it is clear that it has no size, and because of this it does not pertain to quantity336.

254 However, concerning the three things that derive from it, i.e. the line, the surface, and the body, there is no dispute at all whether they pertain to quant-

**<sup>333</sup>** I.e. it may be considered in theory, but does not actually happen. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 58.1: δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν τὴν διαίρεσιν νῷ καὶ μὴ ἐνεργείᾳ.

**<sup>334</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 90.18–22.

**<sup>335</sup>** Ammonius remarks (*In Cat.* 33.23–34.2) that a point may not be subsumed under one of the ten categories since it is not something that has independent existence, but is "a principle of things in general": τὸ δέ γε σημεῖον αὐτὸ μέν τι πρᾶγμα ὑφεστηκὸς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀρχὴ δέ ἐστιν ὅλως πραγμάτων.

**<sup>336</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 7.17–24: ἐπειδὴ γάρ φησι πᾶν τὸ περατοῦν τοῦ περατουμένου λείπεται μιᾷ διαστάσει· τὸ γὰρ σῶμα τρεῖς ἔχον διαστάσεις περατοῦται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιφανείας, ἥτις ἔχει δύο διαστάσεις, μῆκος καὶ πλάτος (βάθος γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει ᾧ λείπεται τοῦ σώματος), ἡ δὲ ἐπιφάνεια δύο ἔχουσα διαστάσεις περατοῦται ὑπὸ τῆς γραμμῆς, ἥτις μίαν ἔχει διάστασιν τὸ μῆκος μόνον, ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ περατοῦται ὑπὸ τοῦ σημείου, ὃ δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ ἕξει οὐδεμίαν διάστασιν, ἀλλ' ἔσται ἀμερές, εἴ γε, ὡς εἴρηται, πᾶν πέρας τοῦ περατουμένου λείπεται μιᾷ διαστάσει.

̇ ܘ ܬܘܒ ܕƆــܐܘܪƃܐ ŶƦƉܐ ܓƢƀ ܕƆܐܘܪƃܐ ܕܒų ŵŶƦƉܐ ƏــŴܪŹܐ: ܘܗ ̇ ܘ ܕƆــܐܘܪƃܐ ܘƙƆــſƦܐ ܘſƦƙƆܐ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ŷƀźƣــŴܬܐ: ܘƢſƦſܐſــƦ ܗ ̈ Ɗƣܐ܉ ܪܒŴܬܐ űƉܡ ƤƉــŴܕƎƀƕ܂ ܪܒــŴܬܐ ܕſــƎ ܘƠƉŴƖƆܐ ܕűƆŴƉ ܓŴ ƈƃ ܐűſܐ ̣ܕܗܝ ܐܢ ܬܬŪƐƌ ܐƎƘ ܒŷــƣŴܒܐ: ܒــƢ ƖƣــƦܗ ƀƊƃــŴܬܐ ̇ ܂ ųſܪ̈ŴŹ ƎƉ̣ űŶ ƈƃ ŪƐƌƦƉ ̇ ܐųſƦſ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܂ ƈźƉ ܕܒų


̇ ܘ ܕƆܐܘܪƃܐ ܘſƦƙƆܐ **2** B ŶƦƘܐ :DLP ŶƦƉܐ **1** ܗ ƦſܐƢſƦſܘ ܬܐŴŷƀźƣ] om. B **4** ƎƘܐ BLP: ܐܦ D **<sup>8</sup>** ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ̣ ] om. hom. P | ƅſܐ BDP: ܐƆܐ L | Ǝ̈ ƠƀƐƘܕ BDP: ƎƀƠƀƐƘܕ L **10** ܐƠƐƘ BDP: ܐƍƠƏŴــƘ L **11** ܘܐܦ LP: ܐܦ BD | ƈــƃ BDL: ƈــƃܕ P **20** ƢــƀƉܐ DLP: ܐƢــƀƉܐ B **<sup>21</sup>** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪƆ LP: ̄ ŴźƐſܐܪƆ B: ̄ ܛŴźƏܐܪƆ D **<sup>23</sup>** ܐƉ LP: ܐƊƃ BD **<sup>24</sup>** ܐƘ ̈ ŴƐƇƀƘ BDL: ̈ Ƙܐ ŴƐƀƇƇƀƘ P

ity or not. For the dimensions of length in which the line appears, and also those of length and breadth which bring up the surface, and most of all those of length, breadth and depth which generate the body, signify a certain magnitude. And magnitudes of any kind, even if they are considered in theory, are always a quantity, since their size is grasped through the latter.

255 Now, from the fact that the line, the surface, and the body pertain to quantity, it becomes clear to the readers, that parts of each one of them are not divided or separated from one another, like the (parts) of number and language are separate. This is quite evident, since all the parts of a line are unified from one end to its other end without separation, and the same holds for the surface. Also, any particular body is unified in virtue of the unity of its parts and has its subsistence from them, so that there is neither division nor separation between one part and another, as between words and phrases in language or between parts of any particular number. So much for these matters.

#### *[Place]*

256 In order to make our discourse on quantity complete, let us now talk about 5a6–14 place and time, which, as we have said above, belong to the division of quantity. A full account, including all necessary examples, of place and of time, i.e. what and of what kind each one of them is, is given in subtle and excellent fashion by Aristotle in his treatise *Physics*337. If we proceed so far as to speak about his views in this treatise, we will sufficiently explain everything what we have learned not only from this man, but also from other philosophers and from our Christian writers who have diligently searched for truth338. However, lest the

**<sup>337</sup>** See Aristotle's *Physics*, book IV, chapters 1–5 (on place) and 10–14 (on time). The commentaries of both Ammonius and Philoponus contain brief notes on place with a reference to Aristotle's *Physics* as the proper source of information on this subject matter. **338** Philoponus, who belonged to the same Alexandrian group of Christian students of philosophy as Sergius, included the so-called *Corollaries* in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*. However, no commentaries on the latter work written by Christian authors are known prior to Philoponus. It is possible that Sergius meant not only commentaries in the proper sense, but also another Christian works (e.g., the Hexaemeron literature) which dealt with issues of natural philosophy and provided criticism of Arostotle's views.

P60v ܬܗܘܐ ܐƆܕ ƈــźƉ Ǝــſܕ ܐƣܗ ܐܦ ܬܐ܂ƢــſƢƣ ƈƕ ƦſܐƦſƦŶ ŴܒƠƕܕ ŹŴƊƕܐ ܘƀƐƃܐ ƦƇƉܐ ܕųƀƇƕܘܢ܉ ƢƟƦƉܒƎƍƀ ųƆ ƟŴƖƆܒųܘܢ ܐƅſ ƢــƉܐƊƆ ƎــƆ ƋــƀƏ ܘܢųــƍƀƃ ƈƕ Ƣƀܓ ܗܘܐ ܐƆ ܂Ǝƌܕܬ ܐƦƀƆܘ Ɨܕܬܒ ܗƣܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܕŴŷƌܐ ܕܐܦ ̣ܗŴƌܢ ̣ƎƉ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ܐųſƦſܘܢ: ƎƉ ܗܕܐ ̈ܕܐ܂ űŶ ƎƉ̣ ƅƏ <sup>Ǝ</sup>̈ ̇ ܘƆܐ ƠƀƐƘ ܕƆܐ ƎƤſƮƘ ŴƍƉ <sup>5</sup> ̈ܬܗ


**<sup>1</sup>** Ǝſܕ [om. P **<sup>2</sup>** ųƆ] om. BD **<sup>5</sup>** ̇ ̈ ܬܗ ŴƍƉ BDL: ܬܗܘܢ̈ ŴƍƉ P **6** ܐƦƖܒ [+ ƎƆ Ʀſܐ L | Ʀſܐ [om. <sup>L</sup>**<sup>8</sup>** Ǝſܕ [om. P | ܐƊŹ ̈ ̈ Ɖܐ :L ܕܙܐ ̈ ŹܐƉܐ :PD ܕܙŹܐ ܕܙܐ B | ƎƍſƢƄƉ L: ƎƍƀƌܐƊƉ BDP: ƎــƍſƢƤƉ ƎــƍƀƉųƉ corr. BD in marg. **10** ܐƣܗ DLP: ܐƌܗ B | ܬܗŴــƍƀŶܐ BDP: ܬܗŴƍƀŶ L Ƌƕܕ BDL: ƈƕܕ P | ܐƦƀƕܬܪ ܐܦ ܐſܕŴƉ ܕܐܬܪܐ ųƍƀƃ ƈƀƃܗ ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ ܬܐŴƀƊƃ] om. P **14** ܘܐܦ BDL, Epit.: ܐƇƘܘܐ P **17** ܪܐƞܘܒ BDP, Epit.: ܪƞܘܒ L **19** ܗܘܐ2 BDL, Epit.: ܘܗܘܐ P **20** ƎƀƆܗ ųܕܒ BDL, Epit.: ƎƀƆųܕܒ P | ƎƉ̣ BDL, Epit.: ƎƉܕ̣ P

account of them (i.e. place and time) become obscure and mysterious, we shall make an inquiry about them as it is necessary and proper at this moment. For it is not our task now to speak about their nature, but to demonstrate that they also belong to quantity, namely to that type whose parts are not divided and not at all separated from one another.

257 Now, concerning place there are not a few debates among writers, first of all with regard to whether it exists or not, and next to that with regard to what it is and how it exists339. But while these inquiries (ζητήματα) are extensive, we will remain brief and say what is necessary about it, for as we have said, the subject of our discussion now is not its nature but its relation to quantity340.

258 That the nature of place exists is testified already by the common sense that is implanted naturally in everybody341. For all people understand that every thing that is perceptible and intelligible exists in space and in some place. And even their concept of incorporeals is the same, bearing likeness to the visible phenomena, since their mind is not capable of comprehending that everything that is incorporeal is omnipresent.

259 One may also understand that there is place from motion and from the increase and decrease of the bodies. For how would something be able to move from one point to another342 and become bigger or smaller, unless there were the nature of place in which this would happen? But the change that occurs in virtue of motion from one point to another clearly testifies that the change of what is moved happens in place.

**<sup>339</sup>** Cf. the questions formulated by Aristotle in *Phys.* 208a28–29: εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή, καὶ πῶς ἔστι, καὶ τί ἐστιν.

**<sup>340</sup>** In spite of this remark, Sergius provides a much longer account of place than we find in Ammonius and Philoponus and than one might deem necessary in view of Aristotle's very brief notion of space in the *Categories*. The following paragraphs by Sergius are in fact based on Aristotle's *Physics* IV, ch. 1–5, rather then on the *Categories*. According to §261, Sergius was aware of a possible criticism that his excursus might be out of place here but was still eager to include it.

**<sup>341</sup>** Cf. Simplicius, *In Phys*. 521.6–7: τὸ μὲν ἔνδοξον εἶναι δοκεῖ ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ὑπολήψεως εἰλημμένον.

**<sup>342</sup>** I.e. locomotion, Gr. φορά. Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 208b31–32.


**1** ƎƉ̣ 1] om. B **5** ܢŴƠŶƢƌ L, Epit.: ƎƀƠŶƢƉ BDP | ܐƖſűſ ܗܘ űƃ Ŵſܗܘ ųܒ ܗܘܘ ܘܢųſƦſܕܐ ųƊſŴƟ Ʀſܕܐ ܗܝ̣ [ post ƥƍƇƄƆ transp. P **6** ܗܝ̣ 1] om. L | ܗܝ̣ 2] om. P, Epit. **12** Ǝƀƣܘܪ LP: Ǝƀƣܪ BD **15** ƎſƢƟܕ [om. P **18** Ʀƕűſܐܬ BDL: Ʀƕűſܕܐܬ P **19** ܗܕܐ BDL, Epit.: ܐƃܗܪ P **21** ܐƆܘ1 BDL, Epit.: ܐƆ ܘܗܘ̣ P | Ǝܙܒ [om. B **23** ܡűƊƆ] om. L | ܐƇܒŶ BDL, Epit.: ܐƇܒŴŶ P


262 So, I mean that it has become apparent from what has been said that place exists. It has also become obvious from this that place has great power344. For since it does not change together with bodies but exists even if they are corrupted in it, not being corrupted by them, and always encompasses them while not being encompassed by them, it is clear that its nature is greater than theirs, since there is more excellence in encompassing something than in being encompassed, and in remaining unaffected by corruption of those things which are corrupted in it.

**<sup>343</sup>** Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 208b1–11. Aristotle speaks of ἀντιμετάστασις, "mutual replacement" of the bodies.

**<sup>344</sup>** Aristotle stresses that place has a "power", or "potency" (δύναμις), which is prior to everything else: εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτο, θαυμαστή τις ἂν εἴη ἡ τοῦ τόπου δύναμις καὶ προτέρα πάντων (*Phys.* 208b33–35).

	- ̇ ܝ ܕƉــƍܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܐܬܪܐ܂ ̈ ܓƀܐܬܐ ܐܦ ƕــƈ ܗ Ɛܒ Ǝſܕ ƎƀܒƠƖƉ 266 ̇ Ɔܐ ܓƊƀƤܐ܂ ܘܕƆܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܓƊƣŴܐ ܓƀƇܐ ̇Ŵ ܕƎſ ܓƊƣŴܐ ܐܘ ܗƌ

 D ƟܒƇܐ ܕƈƃ űŶܐ ܘƍƟŴſܐ + [ܕƠƉܒƍƇܐ **2** .marg in .add D ܐܕƣܐ ̣ܗܘ ܕƋƕ ܗƇſܐ + [ܐܕƣܐ **1** add. in marg. **<sup>3</sup>** ̇ ܐܘ [om. P | ܐܬܪܐƆ BDL: ܐܬܪܐ P **4** Ǝſܕ [om. BD **8** ܘܗܝƦſܐ DLP: ܗܘ B **11** ƈźƉܕ [LP: ƈźƉ BD **12** ܗܘ̣ 2] om. P **13** ƈźƉܘ BDP: ƈźƉ L **14** ƈźƉܘ BDL: ƈźƉ P **16** ųƆ] om. P | Ǝſܕ [om. BD | ܐƘŴƐƇƀƙƆ BDL: ܐƘŴƏŴƇƇƀƙƆ P **17** ܐƆ] + ܗܘܐ BD **22** Ǝſܕ BDL, Epit.: Ƣƀܓ P | ƈƕ] om. BD **23** ܐƊƣŴܓ1 [+ ܗܘ BD, Epit. | ܐƀƇܓ LP: ܐƊƣŴܓ BD, Epit.

Thus, because Plato saw that place is similar to form (εἶδος)345 263 in that it encompasses but is not encompassed, and also that similar to matter (ὕλη) it is receptive346 of bodies, he considered it to be either matter or form. It is because of this that he openly called matter "place"347. The argument which he constructed about it run like this: Place encompasses but is not encompassed, and form encompasses but is not encompassed, hence place is form. And further in this way: Place is receptive of bodies, and matter is receptive of everything, hence place is matter.

264 But this has not been stated correctly, because if there is something which is characteristic of two objects, it does not follow from this that they are not two any more but one. For if it were not like that, this sage might say: Since man is rational and angel is rational, hence, according to his word, man is angel. And since man is mortal and also ass is mortal, thus man is ass. And since it has been proven already that man is angel, I am ashamed of saying what follows from this.

265 In fact, it would be proper for this philosopher to see that form and matter are changing together with bodies and are parts of them. Place, instead, does not change with them and is no part of them. Thus, it is neither form nor matter. But neither is it a certain body, for its subsistence is apart from bodies which make room for one another in it and are mutually replaced while it remains in its place.

266 They also make a detailed inquiry into what place is, i.e. whether it is a body or incorporeal348. That it is not a body is clear from the fact that it is

**<sup>345</sup>** Ms. D adds in the margin: "That form which is with matter."

**<sup>346</sup>** Ms. D adds in the margin: "It contains every (thing) and image (εἰκών)."

**<sup>347</sup>** Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 209b11.

**<sup>348</sup>** Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 209a2–7. See also Philoponus, *In Phys*. 504.28–506.20.

̈ Ɗƣܐ܂ ܐŴƆ ܓƀــƢ ܓــƊƣŴܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ̇ ܝ ܕƠƉܒƍƇܐ ̣ܗܘ ܕܓŴ ̣ܗܝ ̣ƎƉ ܗ ܗܘܐ ܘƠƉܒƈ ܗܘܐ ܒــų ܓــƊƣŴܐ ܐŶــƌƢܐ܉ ܓــƊƣŴܐ ܒܓــƊƣŴܐ ̇ ܝ ܕƆܐ Ɖــſƞܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ܂ ܐƆــŴ ƄƤƉــŷܐ ܗܘܬ ܓƀــƢ ƃƦƤƉــŸ ܗܘܐ܂ ܗ ܕųƌܘܐ ƦƉܘܡ ܓƊƣŴܐ ܒܓــƊƣŴܐ܉ Ɖــſƞܐ ̣ܗܘܬ ܕܐܦ ܓــƊƣŴܐ ܪܒܐ ܒܓƊƣŴܐ ܙŴƕܪܐ ųƌܘܐ ƃــű Ɔܐ ƦƉܐƆــƞ ܒــų܂ ܐܢ ܓƀــƢ Ɔܐ v62P ̇ űŶ ܒų ܕܘƦƃܐ: Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕܐܦ Ɔܐ ŵƉܕܪܒ ܒų ƅƏ܂ Ɔــųܕܐ ܕſــƎ ܐ ̇ ƀƊƣܐ ܒܓƊƣŴܐ ܙŴƕܪܐ ܬܬŶܒƥ ̣ܗܘܬ܂ ܘƦƟƢƣܐ ƙƀƠƌܐ ܕܐܦ ųƇƃ D97v | B118r ܐ܂Ɗſ ųƇƃ ܗܘܬ ܕŴŶܬܐ ܪܬܐŴƕܙ ܐűŶ


**1** ܗܝ̣ [ om. P **3** ŴƆܐ [+ Ƣƀܓ BDP | Ƣƀܓ [om. BDP **7** ƥܒŶܬܬ DLP: ŪƤŶܬܬ B **9** ܘܐųƌ LP, Epit.: ܘܐųƌܕ BD **12** ܐƍƃܘܗ LP, Epit.: ܐƍƃܕܗ BD **13** ƎƀƆܗ BDL, Epit.: ܗܕܐ P **14** ܡűƊܒ BDL, Epit.: ܡűƉ P **15** ܗܘܢƦŶŴƤƉ DLP, Epit.: ƎſܗƦŶŴƤƉ B | ܐƞƆܐ [+ ܗܘܬ BD **17** ܐƆܕ LP, Epit.: ܐƆ BD **18** ܐܦ BDL, Epit.: ܘܐܦ P | ܐܘܣƀźƀƟ BDP: ܐܘܣƀźƍƟ L: ܐܘܣźƀƟ Epit. | ƎſųƇƄܕܒ BDL: ƎܒŵƇƄܕܒ P **19** ܐƐƍƉ BDP: ܐƐƍƉܕ L | ܐƦƇƊܒ [om. B **21** ܐܬܪܐ Ʀſܐ ƎſűƉ ܘܐܢ ܘܗܝƦſܐ ܡűƉ ƈƃ ƎƉ̣ ܡűƉ ܗܘ̣ ܕܐܦ ƈźƉ] om. hom. P **22** ܗܘ̣ 1] om. L

receptive of bodies. For if it were a body and received in itself another body, then body would be in body, which is impossible349. If, in fact, a body were ever be in a body, then it would be possible for a big body to be inside a small body that cannot contain it. But if something does not have enough room in itself (for something else), then it is obvious that it will not contain it at all. From this would follow that the whole sky might be enclosed in a small body and that one small eggshell might encompass the whole sea.

267 Thus, it is impossible that place should be a body. But one cannot state that it is incorporeal either, since if something is without body then it cannot be expanded, occupy space, and have any extension. Place, however, is expanded and occupies space together with the bodies that are in it, thus containing them. This makes apparent that place is not incorporeal, for we may never believe that bodies are encompassed by something that is without body, for what encompasses them must necessarily be extended and enlarged according to their size350.

268 Now, based on this one may even conclude that there is no place at all. Thus Zeno of Citium351, who always tried to posit in his statements different things which contradicted what is clearly known, acted the same way also in this case. So, he said that there is no place, constructing his argument as follows: Each thing is in a place. So, if place exists, since it is also a thing among other things, it is in a place too. Thus we find a place in a place, and the latter is

**<sup>349</sup>** Sergius slightly modifies the argument of Aristotle as formulated in *Phys.* 209a6–7: "But it is impossible for place to be a body, for then two bodies would be in the same thing" (ἀδύνατον δὲ σῶμα εἶναι τὸν τόπον· ἐν ταὐτῷ γὰρ ἂν εἴη δύο σώματα).

**<sup>350</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Phys*. 505.1–11.

**<sup>351</sup>** I.e. Zeno of Elea. Aristotle mentions Zeno's paradox in *Phys.* 209a23–24.

ܘƃƦƤƉـــŸ Ɔـــų ܐܬܪܐ ܒـــܐܬܪܐ܂ ܘܗ r63P ̇ ܘ ܬܘܒ ܒܐŶـــƌƢܐ܉ ܘܐŶـــƌƢܐ ܒܐƌƢŶܐ ܘܗܕܐ ܕƆܐ ƅƏ܂ ƎſűƉ ƋƆ ƦƀƆ ƆܓƢƊ ܐܬܪܐ܂

̇

̇ــŪ ̇ ܪƃ ܝ ܕƦƀƉűƟ ܕܓŴƇܬܐ ƐƌــŪ: ܘƀƇƕــų ܗ ƎƉ̣ ܗƦƇƉ Ǝſܕ ƦƙƠƌ <sup>269</sup> ܗƎƀƆ ܕƃƢƣܐ܂ ƦƀƉűƟ ܓƢƀ ŴƆ ƈƃ űƉܡ ܒܐܬܪܐ ̣ܗܘ ܐƅſ ̣ܕƋƏ ܙŴƌܢ܂ ƎــſųƆ ƦــƀƆ ܉Ǝــƀ̈ ܐƆܐ Əܓƀــܐ <sup>5</sup> ̈ ܬܐ ܘƢſƦſܐſــƦ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕܕƆܐ ܓƤــŴܡ ܐƌ ̈Ǝƀ ܒűܘƃܐ܂ ܘܗƎƀƌ ܬܘܒ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ܒűܘƃܐ܉ ƆــŴ ܒŷــű ܐܬܪܐ ܘƦƀƆ ܐƌ Ƣƀܓ ƎƆ ƢƀƉܐ ܂Ǝ̈ B118v ŷƃƦƤƌ ܒܐܬܪܐ ƎſųƇƃܕ ƅſܐ :ܐƍƃܗ ƎſųſƦſܐ ܐƌܙ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ̈ــƀܐ ƦƉܐƉــƢ <sup>ܗ</sup> ̣ƎƉ ƖƆــƈ ܒƦƄƊܒƍــŴܬܐ ܗܕܐ: ܕܒƐƕűŷــƢ ܙƌ ܕƉــƦܪƌܐ ܒــűܘƃܐ܂ ̣ܘƉــƎ ܬƉــƎ ŶƦƉــſŵܐ ܓƀƇܐſــƦ܉ ܕƆــŴ ƃــƈ Ɖܐ ܕܒűܘƃܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܒــܐܬܪܐ ̣ܗܘ ܐſــƅ ܕܐƏܒــƢ ܙƌــŴܢ܂ ܐƆܐ ƕــƈ <sup>ܗ</sup> <sup>10</sup> ̇ <sup>ܝ</sup> ̈ــƎ ܗƀƆــƎ܂ ܕƉــƍܐ ܕſــƎ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܐܬܪܐ ܘܕܐƄſــƍܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ܉ ƠƙƏ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ̣ ܘܕƎƉ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ̣ܗܘ ܗƣܐ ܐƎƍſƢƉ܂


̇ ܘ ܬܘܒ ܒܐƌƢŶܐ ܘܐƌƢŶܐ ܒܐƌƢŶܐ **1** ܘܗ [om. hom. P **2** ܘܗܕܐ LP, Epit.: ܐƍƃܘܗ BD **3** ƎƉ̣ BDL, Epit.: ƎƉܘ P **4** ƎƀƆܗ BDL: Ǝƀƌܗ P **5** ƎſųƆ] + Ƣƀܓ B **8** ܐƉ] om. B **9** ܐƃܘűܒ BDL: ܡűƊܒ P, Epit. **<sup>14</sup>** ƥܒــŶܕ BDP, Epit.: ƥܒŶ L | ܝ ̇ ̇ ܘ :LP ܗ ̇ **<sup>15</sup>** BD ܗ ųſƦſܕܐ BDL, Epit.: ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ P **16** ܐűŶ BDL, Epit.: űŶ P **18** ܐűŶ] om. B **21** ܐƌܗ ܐƊƣŴܕܓ BDP: ܐƌܕܗ L **22** ܐܬܪܐ BDP: L ܕܐܬܪܐ

in turn in another (place), which is in another one, and so on without end. Therefore, no place exists at all.

269 However, his argument follows a false assessment which is made at the beginning and on which the rest is built up. So, first of all, not everything is in a place, as Zeno assumes, for there are many things, and most of all those which are incorporeal, that have no place and are not in space, while those that are in space do it not in the same manner, not every one of them being in a place. For, as we have explained earlier in this treatise, there are eleven ways of saying that something is in space352. This makes it apparent that not everything which is in space is also in a place, as Zeno believes. However, on whether place exists and how it exists enough (has been said). Now we will discuss what it is and whether it pertains to quantity.

270 To put it briefly: place is a limit and a surface of every container that surrounds what is contained by it353. Now, any particular body has a limit and a surface which is its outer boundary. However, if it is solid, it has one surface which surrounds it from the outside; but if it is hollow or vaulted, it has two surfaces, i.e. the outer and the inner. And if something is contained in its cavity, then its outer surface is surrounded by air. In this case, the limit of air which adjoins its outer surface will be the place of this body. The inner surface of the same body, on the other hand, which adjoins something that it contains in its cavity will be the place of what is contained in it, since the latter adjoins its limit and is surrounded by it from the outside.

**<sup>352</sup>** In §§138–149, Sergius lists eleven ways of being-in-something (cf. the reading of ms. P and of the epitome, which is probably a later correction of the text), and one of them (no. 2) is "as in a place". In both passages, Sergius uses the Syriac word *ʾatra* for "place" (i.e. a concrete position), while "space" is expressed by the term *dukkta*. Thus, the point which Sergius makes here is that there are eleven ways of saying that something is in something else, i.e. in space, and only one of them means to be in a concrete place. Aristotle lists eight ways of being-insomething in *Phys.* 210a14–24, where being in a place is combined with being in a vessel to yield the eighth way.

**<sup>353</sup>** See Aristotle, *Phys.* 209b1–7 and 212a5–6. Cf. Philoponus, *In Phys*. 519.12–13: εἰ δὲ τὸ προσεχῶς ἕκαστον περιέχον ὁ τόπος ἐστί, πέρας τί ἐστι δηλονότι ὁ τόπος· περατοῖ γὰρ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ. See also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 58.16–17.

	- 273 ܐܢ ܕƎſ ܐƥƌ ƌܐƢƉ ܕƆܐ ƉƦƉــƦܚ ܐܬܪܐ ƙƆــŴܬ Ƈƃــų ƟــƊſŴܐ <sup>25</sup> ̈ Ɗƣܐ ̈ܬܗܘܢ ܕܓŴ ŴƍƉ ƎſųƇƃ ŴƆܕ ܉ƢƉܐƌܕ ƞƆܐƦƉ ܐƌܗ ܐ܉Ɗƣ ̈ ܕܓŴ

**<sup>4</sup>** ܐƃܐܘܪƆܕ BDL, Epit.: ܐƃܐܘܪ ܐƆܕ P **<sup>5</sup>** ܐƍƃܗ DLP, Epit.: ܐƌܗ B **<sup>12</sup>** űŶ] + űŶ BD **<sup>15</sup>** ܘ ̇ ųƆ BDP, Epit.: ܘ ̇ ܗ ܬŴƆ L **18** ܗܘ̣ BDL, Epit.: ܗܘܝ̣ P **24** ܐƃܐܘܪƆ DLP, Epit.: ܐƃܐܘܪƆܕ B

271 So, place is the inner limit of a certain body that adjoins the outer limit of what is contained in it. That is why it turns out that place is not a body but the inner limit of a body. But neither is it incorporeal, since it acquires extension into length and breadth, according to the size of the body which is contained in it. Thus, it is not the cup (κάδος) that is called the place of the water which is in it, since this is a body, but it is the inner limit of the cup which adjoins the water contained in it that is the place of the latter. Moreover, it is not the celestial sphere (σφαῖρα) that we say is the place of the air, but it is its inner surface which adjoins the outer limit of the air that is said to be the place of it. Moreover, it is not the air in which we are that is really the place of natures, even if it is thought of like that, but it is its limits which from outside adjoin each one of the bodies that are the places of each nature which are contained inside them. So, to put briefly what place is: it is the inner limit of that which surrounds something that is contained in it.

272 From what has been said, as it seems to me, it also becomes evident and comprehensible to everyone that place pertains to quantity. For if it surrounds all bodies and there is not a single perceptible nature which might be thought not to be in a place, it is evident that place in some cases will be extended according to the large size of any particular body and in other cases will be contracted according to the small size of bodies that are in it. Thus, if body pertains to quantity, it is apparent that place pertains to it too. And if line which has only one dimension, i.e. that of length, due to its dimension pertains to quantity, place turns out to pertain to quantity much more, since it has two dimensions, i.e. those of length and breadth354.

273 If someone, however, were to say that place does not extend according to the whole constitution of bodies, then he would be compelled to state that not

**<sup>354</sup>** Sergius' conclusion that place is two-dimensional agrees with his notion that it is not a body, but a surface of a container. Since a surface is two-dimensional (cf. §§250–255, above), the same holds for place. In the next paragraph, Sergius raises a puzzle which naturally comes up in this context, without going into detail about it. It seems that this point was not the Sergius' main concern in this section, but a way to show that place pertains to quantity, similar to Ammonius, *In Cat.* 58.16–26.

ܒܐܬܪܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ܂ ܗ v119B ̇ ܝ ܕƆܐ ŷƄƤƉܐ ųƊƆܘܐ܂ ƀƉűƟــƦ ܕܐܢ Ɖــſƞܐ ̈ܬܐ Ɖــűܡ ̣ƉــƎ ܓــƊƣŴܐ ܕƆܐ ܐܬܪܐ܉ ܐܦ Ƈƃــų ŴــƍƉ Ǝſܘ ̈ ܗܘܬ ܕųƌ ŷƄƤƉܐ ܗܘܬ ܕųƌܘܐ ƆܒƢ ̣ƎƉ ܐܬܪܐ܂ ܘܐܢ ܗܕܐ ƢſƢƣܐ ܗܘܬ܉ ܐܦ ̇ ܝ ܬܘܒ ƃــƈ ܓــƊƣŴܐ ܐſــƍܐ ̣ܕܗܘ <sup>ܗ</sup> v64P ̇ ܘܐ ̣ܗܘܐ ܕƆܐ ܐܬܪܐ܂ ƕــƋ <sup>ܗ</sup> ̇ Ƣ܉ ܕܐܦ ŴƠƀƙƏܬܐ űƉܡ Ɩƌــƈ ܕܐƠƍƌܐ ƕܒűܐ ųƆ ųƆ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܘ ܕܗƍƃܐ ܐƉ ̈ Ɗƣܐ ܘƀƆــƦ ܒــų ܒƎſųƍƀƄ ܕܒƦſƮܐ܉ ܘƋƀƐƌ Ɖــűܡ ܕƀƙƏــơ ̣ƉــƎ ܓــŴ ̈ƇƀــƌƦܐ ŷƉــſŴܐ ̈ ƀܐܐ ܘܒــű̈ܪƣܐ Ŷ ̈ Ɵܒܐ Əܓ ̈ƍƀܐ ƅƏ܂ ܗܕܐ ܕƎſ ܒŴƖ ƃ ̈ƀܐ ܕƆܐ ƄƤƉــŷܐ ƊƆــųܘܐ܂ ܐܦ Ɔܐ ܓƀــƢ ƍƀƃ ܐƘ ̈ ŴƐƇƀƘ ܘܢųƇƃ ƎƉ̣ ̇Ŵܢ ܕƎƀƇƖƉ ܐܬܪܐ ƠƀƙƏܐ ܘƎƀƊƀƏ ŴƠƀƙƏܬܐ ܒܒƦſƢܐ ܐƎſƢƉ ܗƌ ܕƍƀƃܐƦſ ܐųſƦſ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܂ ܐƆܐ ܕܗܘſܐ ƦƉܘܡ ƆܒƢ ̣ƎƉ ƍƀƃܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ƈƕ ܗƎƀƆ ܐ܂ƃܪųƆ ܐƉűƕ ơƙ ̇ Ə


̇ ܘܐ + [ܓــƊƣŴܐ **2** <sup>ܗ</sup> ܕܗܘ̣ ܐƍــſܐ P **<sup>6</sup>** ܐƦــſƮܕܒ DLP, corr. B in marg.: ܬܐ ̈ Ŵܕܨܒــ B, Epit. ̈ Ƙܐ **8** ŴــƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƘ ̈ ŴــƏŴƇƀƘ P **10** ܘܡƦــƉ] om. BD, Epit. **12** ــܐܬܐƌܕ BDP: ــܐܬܐƌ L **<sup>17</sup>** ܐƊƣŴܓ BDL: ܐƊƣŴܓƆ P **<sup>23</sup>** ̇ ܕܗųƕ BDP: ̇ ܕܗųƕܐܬ L | ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƘŴƏŴƇƀƘ P

all parts of bodies are in a place355. But this is impossible, first of all, because if it happens that some parts of a body have no place, then all of it might be without place as well; and if this were true, then any particular body might be without place. This, in turn, will necessarily require the one who says this to introduce a certain void into the nature of creatures and to postulate something that is empty of bodies and contains no natures at all356. But that this is something that may not exist has been demonstrated through many investigations and through powerful arguments by all natural philosophers. And even those who introduce empty space and admit that there is void in the creation do not state that it exists naturally, but that it is completely beyond nature. But so much will suffice for it.

#### *[Time]357*

274 Now is the moment we should turn to time and discuss this subject matter in the same concise manner, since this is the last among the seven kinds of quantity left for us to speak about. So, you ought to know that just as place is considered prior to body, so also body is comprehended prior to motion, while motion in turn (is considered) prior to time. For just as a body is a concomitant of the place which always contains it, and just as natural motion is a concomitant of a body, so also time is a concomitant of any particular natural motion358.

275 So, above we have said enough on whether place and body pertain to quantity, while about time we are going to speak now. Concerning motion359, however, one might rightfully raise a puzzle as to why the Philosopher did not mention it in the chapter on quantity. We shall say in response to this that, since

**<sup>355</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Phys*. 505.1–5. Based on the same arguments, Philoponus comes to the conclusion that place is three-dimensional and not two-dimensional, as Sergius states in the previous paragraph. However, in his commentary on the *Categories* which is based on Ammonius' lectures, Philoponus admits that the "limit" of a body, which is actually the place it occupies, must have one dimension less than body itself and thus be two-dimensional (see Philoponus, *In Cat.* 84.24–25).

**<sup>356</sup>** Aristotle discusses void in chapters 6–9 of Book IV of the *Physics*, ultimately rejecting its existence. A number of puzzles that may be raised in this context are discussed by Philoponus in the *Corollaries on Void*, which have been preserved as a part of his commentary on the *Physics*.

**<sup>357</sup>** The following paragraphs are not based on the text of the *Categories*, where Aristotle mentions time only briefly but in contrast to place does not further elaborate on this issue. Instead, Sergius explicates the contents of Book IV of the *Physics* where Aristotle deals with time in chapters 10–14, right after the discussion of place and void.

**<sup>358</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Phys*. 702.13–14: καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τῶν παρακολουθούντων ἐστὶ πᾶσι τοῖς φυσικοῖς πράγμασι.

**<sup>359</sup>** Syr. *zawʿa* corresponding to Gr. κίνησις which might be understood as either "motion" or "change".

̈ Ƙܐ ƕܒűƀ: ܘŴƣܪſܐ ܕƉܐƢƉܐ ܗƌܐ ܕƈƕ ƀźƟܓŴܪܘܣ ܐƅſ ܕŴƆܬ ŴƇſ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܕܕܘܪƣܐ ܕܒƇƀƇƊــŴܬܐ܉ źƉــƈ ܗƌܐ Ɔܐ ܐƕــƈ ܬƌــƎ ƇƉــƦܐ ƎــƉ̣ ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕƇƖƉــƁ ̣ܗܘ ŹــŪ ƣــƢܒܐ ܕƀƇƕــų ܕƕــƈ ƦƉܬܙƍƖſــŴܬܐ܂ ܒــų ƦƖƊƤƉܐ ܕܐƎƀƇſ ܕƈƀƃűƕ Ɔܐ ƦƉܕܪƎƀƣ܂


**1** ܪܘܣŴܓƀźƟ LP: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟ B: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟ D **3** ƎƉ̣ BDL: ƈźƉ P **4** ܐƆ] om. L | ƎƀƣܕܪƦƉ BDL: ƎƀƣܪűƉ P **5** ܐƦƠƀƊƕ L: ܐƦƇƀƊƕ BDP **6** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ LP: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܕܐܪ D | ܐƍƀ ̈ Ɖܐ BDL: ܐƌƮŶܐ P **<sup>7</sup>** ܐܬܐƀ ̈ ܓƏ LP: ܐܐƀ ̈ ܐŴƍƀŶܬܐ **14** BD Əܓ BDP: ܬܐŴƍƀŶ L **15** ƢſƦſ BDP: ŪŹ L

the treatise *Categories* has been written for students and it forms the beginning of the study of logic, for this reason he has not included there a section on motion, for an account of this would not be suitable for the ears of those who have not been previously trained360.

276 There have been many investigations and profound studies of it by the ancients, and also by Aristotle himself, apart from the constant inquiries into it which he carried out in his many writings. There are four whole books which he dedicated to the issue of motion and which others included in his treatise on physics361. But because of the complexity of this subject matter and the confusion in the opinions of the ancients concerning it, let it remain far from the students and let their ears be spared at this moment362 from this kind of hard labour! It is also probable that, since he knew that time is a concomitant of motion and that there is no motion without time so that both of them have great affinity to each other, he mentioned only the one which was easier to explain than the other, namely time, for from its account it becomes apparent that also motion pertains to quantity.

So, let us turn to time and carry out a fitting inquiry into it363 277 . Now, it is possible that someone would say regarding these issues that there is no time at all. For one part of time, the past, has already gone for good and perished, while another, the future, has not yet happened. Thus, it does not exist at all, for how can something exist that has perished and does not exist in one part, and in another part has not yet come to be?364

**<sup>360</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 55.10–13; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 87.21–88.2. In his commentary on the *Isagoge* (*In Isag*. 53.1–2), Ammonius discusses the question why Porphyry does not include motion (or change) in his account of genera and answers that it was not Porphyry's task to speak "naturally" (i.e. as a natural philosopher) about these issues, but rather "in a way appropriate to the issues of logic" (ἀλλ' οὐ πρόκειται τῷ Πορφυρίῳ περὶ τούτων φυσικῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ πρεπόντως τῇ λογικῇ πραγματείᾳ).

**<sup>361</sup>** I.e. Books V–VIII of the *Physics*. According to Simplicius, Porphyry considered these four books as a separate treatise *On motion* (Simplicius, *In Phys*. 802.7–13).

**<sup>362</sup>** An extensive account of motion, or change, appears in the last, seventh, book of Sergius' *Commentary* dedicated to what is called the *postpraedicamenta* (i.e. chapters 10–15 of the *Categories*). Since Aristotle himself considers this issue in the 14th chapter of the *Categories*, Sergius comments on it in the corresponding paragraphs (§§445–448). But additionally, he also turns to the question of change at the beginning of Book VII (§§409–418), thus breaking the order of Aristotle's narrative and including an additional excursus on the six types of change.

**<sup>363</sup>** The following paragraphs are either a literal rendering of chapters 10–11 of the fourth book of the *Physics* (as is the case with §§280, 283, and 284) or a periphrastic account of Aristotle's text.

**<sup>364</sup>** Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 217b32–218a8.

	- ̈ƀــƎ ܕſųſƦƀƆــƎ ƃƢƉــŪ܂ ܘܬܘܒ ƃــƈ Ɖܐ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ܉ <sup>ܗ</sup> <sup>5</sup> ̇ <sup>ܘ</sup> Ɖܐ ̣ܕƉــƎ ܗƌ ̈ܬܗ ̈ܬܐ űƉܡ ƍƟܐ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ܒų: ܐƎƀƇſ ܕƎſųƍƉ ƀƠƉــƋ܂ ƍƉــŴ ŴƍƉ ܝ: ƈźƉ ܕܐܬŶܒƈ ƎſųƆ܂ ܘƆܐ ̈ ̈Ǝƀ ܕܗܘ ܕƎſ ܕܙܒƍܐ ƦƀƆ ܐƎƀƌ ƅƏ܂ Ɔܐ ܗƌ ̈Ǝƀ ܕűſƦƕܢ: ƈźƉ ܕƆܐ ƈƀƃűƕ ܐƎſųſƦſ܂ ܬܘܒ ܗƌ
	-

280 ܐƆܐ ܐܦ ܗƍƃܐ ܙܕܩ ƊƆܒƖܐ ܬܘܒ܉ ܕƈƃ ƙƇŶŴƣܐ ܘܙܘƕܐ ܐƍſܐ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƦƉܬܙƗſ ܒų ܐƦſܘܗܝ܂ ܘܐƅſ ܕƎƄƉ ƦƊƆܬܙƖſــŴ܉ ̣ܕܗܘ ܒų ܗƍƃܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐܦ ܙܘųƕ܂ ܙܒƍܐ ܕƎſ ܒƈƄ ܕܘƃܐ ܗܘŴſ űƃ ̣ܗܘ ܘƈƄƆ

<sup>̈</sup> ܬܗ **6** BDP ܘƈƀƄƉ ܐƄſــƍܐ :L ܘܐƄſــƍܐ ƀƄƉــƈ **4** ŴƍƉ BDP: ܬܐ̈ ŴƍƉ L **7** ܝ ̈ ܕܗܘ [+ ƅƏ B ̣ܗܘ | L ܘŴƍƀŶܬܐ :BDP ܘܐŴƍƀŶܬܐ **13** L ܕƎſűſƦƕ :BDP ܕűſƦƕܢ **8** ̣ܗܘ | BD ܬܘܒ :LP 1 2 LP: Ŵſܗܘ BD **<sup>14</sup>** Ɓƃ BDL: űƃ P **<sup>15</sup>** Ǝſųƀƕ̈ ̈ųƀƕܘܢ :LP ܙܘ ܙܘ BD **16** ܗܘܘ [om. BD **17** Ɓƃ BDL: űƃ P ̈ƍܐ **<sup>19</sup>** ܙܒ [+ Ǝſܕ BD **<sup>20</sup>** ƎƀƀƇܒŴƠƏܕ BDL: ƎƀƇܒ ̈ ŴƠƏܕ P **22** ܬܘܒ [om. BDP **23** ƎƄƉܕ [+ ܬܘܒ BDP P ܙܘƕܐ :BDL ܙܒƍܐ | BD ܘܐܦ :LP ܐܦ **24**


280 But you may also argue as follows: Every change and any particular movement exists in what is moved by it, and its movement occurs in that fashion of which it is naturally capable. Time, on the other hand, is the same at

**<sup>365</sup>** Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 218a9–30.

**<sup>366</sup>** Sergius has the term πλανητός in mind, which he explains as deriving from the verb πλανάω, "to wander", but also "to lead astray, deceive". The same rendering of the Greek τὰ πλανητά appears in the Syriac version of Ps.-Aristotle's *De Mundo*, which is considered to have been prepared by Sergius, see 392a14.

**<sup>367</sup>** Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 218a33–218b9.

̈ܬܐ܂ ſűƉــƎ ܐŶــƌƢܐ Ɖــűܡ: ܘƆــŴ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ܘܐŶــƌƢܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܒƞܒــŴ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܙܒــƍܐ ƆܒــƢ ̣ƉــƎ ܙܘƕܐ܂ ܬܘܒ ܕſــƎ ܐܦ ܒــųܕܐ <sup>ܙ</sup> r100D | r25L ̇ܕܩ ŷƊƆــƢ ̈ ــƎ܂ ̈ƕܐ Ɖــűܡ ܒŵܒــƍܐ ƦƉܬƊŶ ܕƇƀƇƟــŴܬܐ ܘܬܘŶــƢܬܐ ܕܐſųſƦſــƎ ܙܘ ̇ ܓــƁ ƇƀƇƟܐƦſ ܓƢƀ ܐƍſƢƉــƎ ܕƦƉܬܙſــƗ ܗ v66P ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܒŵܒــƍܐ ܙƕــŴܪܐ Ə ƦƉܬܙƗſ: ܘƢŶŴƤƉܐƦſ ܬܘܒ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܕƦƉܬܙƗſ ܗ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܒŵܒــƍܐ Əܓƀــܐܐ ƀƇƟــƈ ƦƉܬܙſــƗ܂ ܙܒــƍܐ ܕſــƎ ܒŵܒــƍܐ Ɔܐ ƦƉܬŶــƋ܂ ſűƉــƎ ܐƌƢŶܐ ̣ܗܘ ܙܘƕܐ ܘܐƌƢŶܐ ܙܒƍܐ܂

ܐƉ :ܡűــƉ ƗــſܬܙƦƉܕ ƎــƍſƢƉܐ ƦſܐƢŶŴــƤƉܘ Ǝــſܕ ƦــſܐƇƀƇƟ 281 Ǝــƀ ̈ ܕƇƉــŴܬƎƍſ ܙܒــƍܐ ƍƀƄƆــų ܘƆــŴ Ɖܐ ܕƐƌܒƍƀــƎ ƆܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƆܐ ܕƉ ̈ܕܐ܂ Ɔܐ ܓƀــƢ ŷƙƉــƋ ܐƌــƥ űــŶ ܬŴــƆ ƎــſųƊŷƘ Ǝــƍſűܒƕܘ :Ǝſųƀƣ̈ <sup>10</sup> ܒܐܕ ܬܪƞſܐƦſ ܪܗŹܐ ܕܪܓƇܐ ƀƏŴƏűƆܐ: ܘܐƎƘ ųƌܘܐ ƢƀƠſ ܒƢܗųŹ܂ ƃــű ̇ ܛ ܘܕƏــƀƏŴܐ ƀƠſــƢ ŪŹ ܐſــƦ ܐƉــƦܝ ܕܐƍſƢƉــƎ܉ ܕܪܓــƇܐ ƏܓــƁ ܪܗ ܪܗųŹ܂ ܘƖſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƈƃ űŶ ųƍƉܘܢ ƙƆــŴܬ ܐܕƣܐ ܕƍƀƃــų ƦƉܬŶــƋ ̇ ƢƀƠſܘܬܐ ܕܐƦſ ̇ ܕƈƀƇƟ܉ ̣ƎƉ ƞƀŶܘܬܐ ܐܘ ܙܘųƕ: ܘƦƉܐƢƉ ܕƢƀƠſ ܐܘ ̇ ܂ ܕƆــŴ ܗƀƃــƈ ܙܘƕܐ ųــƆ Ƌــ̇ ܒƍƀƄــų <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܂ ܕƦƉܬŶــƊܐ ܒŵܒــƍܐ ܐſــƍܐ ܕŷƆ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܙܒƍܐ܉ ̣ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ ܘܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ܂ v121B

282 ܕƍƉܐ ܕƎſ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܗƍƃܐ ſƞƉܐ ܐƥƌ ŵŷƊƆܐ܉ ƎƍſŵŶ ƆܒƢܬ ƇƟܐ ̇ ܕܙܒƍܐ ̣ܕƕܒƢ ̇ ܕƌܐƢƉ ܗƣܐ܉ ƦƀƍƊŶƦƉܐ ܐųſƦſ ܗܕܐ ܕƎƍſűƖƉ ܒų ̇ ܘ ܕűſƦƕ ųƊƆܘܐ܂ ̣ܗܘ ܓƀــƢ ܗƣܐ܉ ƀƆــƦ Ɔــų ƀƟــƊܐ Ɖــűܡ: ƕــű ܘܕܗ ƦƉܐƢƉ ܓƢƀ ƕܒƢ ųƆ ܘƦƀƆܘܗܝ܂ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ܐܦ Ɔܐ ܙܒƍܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ܉ <sup>20</sup> ܐƆܐ Ɖܐ ܕŴŷƌܪ ܒƎƍƀƕƢ ܒűŷ ܗƣܐ ܐƍſܐ ̣ܕܗܘ: ܘƦƊƌܘܚ ܪƎƍƀƕ ųƍƉ r67P ̇ ܘ ųƇƃ ܕܒƦƕƞƊܐ ųƆ Ɖűƕܐ ƣųƆܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܐƍſܐ ̣ܕܗܘ܉ ŴźƆܪܐ ܗ ƍſųƊƤƉــƎ ܙܒــƍܐ܂ ſűƉــƎ ܒƊــűܡ ܕſűƟــƋ ܘܐŶــƢܝ ŶƦƉــŵܐ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ

**<sup>4</sup>** ƦſܐƇƀƇƟ LP: ƈƀƇƟ BD | Ɓܓ ̇ Ə] om. BD **5** ƦſܐƢŶŴƤƉܘ L: ƦſܐƌƢŶܘƦƤƉܘ BDP **8** Ǝſܕ BDL: Ƣƀܓ P | ƦſܐƢŶŴƤƉܘ L: ƦſܐƌƢŶܘƦƤƉܘ BDP **<sup>9</sup>** ƎƀƇſܐƆ L: ƎƀƇſܕܐ BD: ƎƀƇſܐ P **<sup>10</sup>** Ǝſųƀƣ̈ ܒܐܕ LP: Ǝſųƀƣ̈ ܐܕ BD | Ƣƀܓ BDP: Ǝſܕ L **<sup>11</sup>** ܐƇܕܪܓ L: ܐƇܕܓ BDP **<sup>12</sup>** ܐƇܕܪܓ L: ܐƇܕܓ BDP | ܛ ̇ ܪܗ L: ܐŹܪܗ BDP **14** ƎƉ̣ BDL: ƎƉܘ P **15** ܐƊŶܬƦƉܕ BDL: ܐƊŶܬƦƉܘ P **16** ƎƀƆܗ2 [om. P **17** ܐſƞƉ BDL: ܐƞƉ P **18** ܐƣܗ BDP: ܐƣܕܗ L **19** ܐƊƀƟ DLP: ܐƊſŴƟ B **21** ųƍƉ LP: ųܒ BD **<sup>22</sup>** ܐƍſܐ [om. P | ܘ ̇ ܗ [om. L | ųƇƃ BDL: ųƇƃܕ P

every place and to everything and it is not different in different things. Thus, time is something other than motion. And this is furthermore what one should see from the fact that the quickness and slowness characteristic of particular movements are determined by time. For we say that something is moving quickly when it moves a great deal in a short time. And we further say that something moves slowly when it moves a little during a long time. But time is not determined by time. Thus movement is not the same as time368.

281 Indeed, we say that something is moving quickly or slowly when we attach time to its nature and not when we take those things which are not of similar kind and make them equal to one another. For it would be not correct to make equal a person running on foot to the running of a horse, even if (that person) were superior in running. But it would be proper to say that a (man's) foot runs a great deal, while the running of a horse is superior. It is apparent that the movement of each one of these is determined according to the kind of its nature and it is called superior or quick from the firmness or superiority which is in its nature and which is determined by the time which suits it. From these and similar (examples) it becomes apparent that time is not movement.

282 So, in order to see what (time) is, let us consider the statement which we are accustomed to pronounce that the now should be defined by the past and the future. Indeed, the now has no persistence, since when it is spoken it is already gone and does not exist. Thus, it is not a time but what we consider in our intellect as a certain now and what is extended by our intellect to another certain now, and it is this interval in between that we call time. So, it seems that

**<sup>368</sup>** This paragraph appears to be a quotation, with some alterations, of *Phys.* 218b9–20: ἡ μὲν οὖν ἑκάστου μεταβολὴ καὶ κίνησις ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μεταβάλλοντι μόνον ἐστίν, ἢ οὗ ἂν τύχῃ ὂν αὐτὸ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος ὁμοίως καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν. ἔτι δὲ μεταβολὴ μέν ἐστι θάττων καὶ βραδυτέρα, χρόνος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· τὸ γὰρ βραδὺ καὶ ταχὺ χρόνῳ ὥρισται, ταχὺ μὲν τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολὺ κινούμενον, βραδὺ δὲ τὸ ἐν πολλῷ ὀλίγον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐχ ὥρισται χρόνῳ, οὔτε τῷ ποσός τις εἶναι οὔτε τῷ ποιός. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστιν κίνησις, φανερόν.

ܙܒƍܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ƈźƉ ܕŴƊſűƟܬܐ ܘܐŴſƢŶܬܐ ܕƍƀƍƉܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ: ƍƀƍƉܐ űƉܡ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܙܒƍܐ ܘŴƆ ܙܘƕܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ųƍƀƍƉ ܕܙܘƕܐ܂


**1** ܬܐŴƊſűƟܕ BDL: ܬܐŴƀƉűƟܕ P | ƎſųſƦſܐ BDL: ܘܢųſƦſܐ P **2** ųƍƀƍƉ LP: ܐƍƀƍƉ BD **<sup>4</sup>** ƎƍƀƣƢƘ LP: ƎƍƀƣƢƙƉ BD **<sup>7</sup>** ܗܘܐ [om. BD **<sup>8</sup>** ܘ ̇ ܘܐܦ **10** P ܕܙܒƍܐ :BDL ܕܙܘƕܐ | B Ɖܐ + [1ܗ LP: ܐܦ BD | ܐƍܙܒ2 [om. L **<sup>11</sup>** ܗܝ̣ [ om. L **<sup>15</sup>** ƎſųƇƃ DLP: ƎܒŵƇƄܒ B **<sup>16</sup>** ̇ ųƊſŴƟ BDP: ܐƊſŴƟ ̇ ܐܘƌűŶܐ űŶܐ **<sup>17</sup>**<sup>L</sup> ̈ ܬܗ ̇ ܝ ܕƊŶƦƉܐ ܘƣƢƙƉܐ ܘƆܐ Ʈźƌܢ ŴƍƉ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܙܒƍܐ ܘŴƆ ̣ƎƉ ܗ ̈ܕܐ űŶ ܬŴƆ ܐűŷܒ [om. hom. P **18** ܐűŷܒ ܐűŶ ܐƌűŶܐܘ L: ܐƌűŶܐܘ űŶ BD

it is in something before and after that time is. But since the before and after pertain to number, time is some number, i.e. it is not motion but a number of motion369.

283 Now, an indication of this is that we discriminate between many and few by number, but more and less motion we discern by time. Hence, time is a number of motion and not motion itself. But since number is said in two ways — namely of what is numbered and of that by which we number — we ought to know that time is number not in the sense of that with which we count, but in the sense of what is counted370. So, it is the duration of such motion that contains extension and is counted gradually through various parts that we call time. Thus we have also determined what time is, namely that it is the number of the motion.

284 What has been said makes it clear that time belongs to quantity. For since its subsistence is in the extension of motion, while every particular extension is a part of quantity, it is obvious that time is also a quantity. And since there is no division or separation between its parts but all of them are joined to one another, so that the end of what passes by brings into existence what comes after it, it is apparent that time pertains to that type of quantity whose parts are not separate and set apart from one another rather than to that which is definable and divisible and each part of which does not hold the same position with respect to the others371. However, let what has been expained thus far concerning all seven kinds of quantity suffice.

**<sup>369</sup>** This paragraph is a periphrasis of *Phys.* 219a22–219b3, which appears in some parts to be a very literal rendering of Aristotle's text: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν χρόνον γε γνωρίζομεν ὅταν ὁρίσωμεν τὴν κίνησιν, τῷ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ὁρίζοντες· καὶ τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἴσθησιν λάβωμεν. ὁρίζομεν δὲ τῷ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτά, καὶ μεταξύ τι αὐτῶν ἕτερον· ὅταν γὰρ ἕτερα τὰ ἄκρα τοῦ μέσου νοήσωμεν, καὶ δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ νῦν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δ' ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τοῦτό φαμεν εἶναι χρόνον· τὸ γὰρ ὁριζόμενον τῷ νῦν χρόνος εἶναι δοκεῖ· καὶ ὑποκείσθω. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ὡς ἓν τὸ νῦν αἰσθανώμεθα, καὶ μὴ ἤτοι ὡς πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ κινήσει ἢ ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν προτέρου δὲ καὶ ὑστέρου τινός, οὐ δοκεῖ χρόνος γεγονέναι οὐδείς, ὅτι οὐδὲ κίνησις. ὅταν δὲ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, τότε λέγομεν χρόνον· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις ὁ χρόνος ἀλλ' ᾗ ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ κίνησις.

**<sup>370</sup>** The Syriac text follows very closely (with some explicative elements) *Phys.* 219b3–8: σημεῖον δέ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον κρίνομεν ἀριθμῷ, κίνησιν δὲ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω χρόνῳ· ἀριθμὸς ἄρα τις ὁ χρόνος. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀριθμός ἐστι διχῶς (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ τὸ ἀριθμητὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν), ὁ δὴ χρόνος ἐστὶν τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ οὐχ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν. While Aristotle actually suggests three terms for the ways of speaking about number, Sergius subsumes them under two categories, as also does Philoponus in *In Phys*. 723.15–24.

**<sup>371</sup>** I.e. time is a continuous and not a discrete kind of quantity. Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 220a4–26.

	-
	-

̇ ƇƀƆــƘŴܐ ̇ ܐ ܕűƌܪƀƣــų <sup>287</sup> ̣ƎƉ ܒƦܪ ܬܘܒ ܕŭƇƘ ܗƍƃܐ܉ ܐƅſ <sup>Ɖ</sup> <sup>20</sup> ̇ <sup>Ǝ</sup> ܕܨܒ Ɨܒƣ ƎƀƆܕܗ ƎſųƇſܕ űƃ ƎſųƇſܕ ܐܡ ̇ ƏܓƀܐƦſ܂ ܐܦ ƆŴƘܓܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ Ə ̇ ƋƆ ܕŴƀƊƃܬܐ܉ ܐƦſ ƀƏــƊܐ ųƍƉܕ Ƣƀܓ Ƣ ̇ ̇ ܕŴƀƊƃܬܐ܂ ܐƉ ̈ܬܗ ŴƍƉ ̇ ̇ ܂ ܘųƍƉ ̈ܕܐ܂ ܘƖſűſܐ ƈƃ űŶܐ ƎſųƍƉ ܐƄſܐ ܐųſƦſ űŶ ܬŴƆ ̇ ̈ܬܗ ŴƍƊƆ

̈ــŴ **<sup>1</sup>** ƠſܐŴźƏܐ BDP: ŴƠƀźƏܪ̈ܐ L **<sup>2</sup>** ųƉŴƍƟ DLP: ųƉŴƍƠܒ B | ܬܐŴƀƊƃ ̇ ųƇƄƆ] inv. B **3** ܘƢƉܐ̣ BDL: ƎſƢƉܐ P **6** ƎƘܐ BDL: ƎƘܘܐ P **7** ܐƌܗ DLP: ܗܕܐ B **8** Ǝſܕ [om. P **9** ƋƏ BDL: ŴƊƏ P | ܐƆŵƌ DLP: ܐƌƢƌ B **<sup>11</sup>** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ BLP: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D **<sup>13</sup>** ƎſܪƦƆ] + ܐƀ̈ ƌܙ BP **15** űŶ BDP: ܐűŶ L **16** ܬܐŴƀƊƄƆܕ LP: ܬܐŴƀƊƄƆ BD **17** ܐƦƀƍƇƇƉƦƉ BDP: ܐƦƀƍƇƇƊƉ L **<sup>18</sup>** ܬܐŴƀƊƃ LP: ܬܐŴƀƊƄƆܕ BD **<sup>20</sup>** ŭƇƘܕ ܬܘܒ [inv. L | Ǝ ̇ Ɖ BDP: ܐƉ L | ̇ ųƀƣܪűƌܕ L: ųƣܪűƌܕ DP: ܪܫűƌܕ B **<sup>23</sup>** ̇ ųſƦſܐ LP: ̇ ųſƦſܕܐ BD

#### *[Aristotle's other division of quantity]*

285 We shall also not forget to mention that some of the Stoics and even Plato himself divided all of quantity into three kinds, namely into number, magnitude, and weight372. For they said that language is a certain number which is composed of the multitude of words, so that number and language are one kind of quantity. Also, line, surface, and body, although they differ from one another in their subsistence, designate a certain magnitude, and hence they (constitute) one kind of quantity. And because they saw that the inclination towards heaviness and lightness also signifies a certain quantity, they also established this kind which they called weight. And thus, as we have said, they divided all of quantity into number, magnitude, and inclination373.

286 But Aristotle who was diligent in precise divisions of various things, also provided one for quantity. So, as we have said above, he divided it into seven kinds, namely, at first, into two, i.e. into that kind whose parts may be separated through division from one another and into that one whose parts are joined and bound to one another without separation; but also each one of these he further divided as far as it was possible. I mean that the quantity whose parts are separable from one another he sub-divided into number and such language that is spoken, while the quantity whose parts may not be separated from one another he divided into line, surface, body, and also place and time.

287 Then, after having made this division, since he wanted the student to be 5a15–37 instructed in multiple ways, he also provided another division of the same seven parts of quantity. Thus, he said that there are some quantities whose parts have position in relation to one another so that it is obvious where each

**<sup>372</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 55.4–5: τινὲς δὲ τὰ κυρίως εἴδη τοῦ ποσοῦ φασιν εἶναι τρία, ἀριθμὸν ὄγκον δύναμιν, τοῦτ' ἔστι ῥοπήν.

**<sup>373</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 55.4–10.

ܐűــŶ ƈƃ ܢűƇſƦ ̈ ̇ ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒܐűſܐ ܒܐűſܐ Ɖ ̈ܬܗ ŴƍƊƆ ܐƊƀƏ Ʀſܐ ܐƆ ̇ ܂ ܙܒــƍܐ ܓƀــƢ ܘƀƍƉــƍܐ ܘƇƉــƦܐ܉ ƀƆــƦ ƀƏــƊܐ ƎſųƍƉ ܒƦܪ ŶܒــƢܬܗ ƎــſųƇƃ ܢƮــƀƏܐ űƃ : ̇ ̈ ܬܗܘܢ: ܕܬܬŵŶܐ ƈƃ űŶܐ ƎſųƍƉ ܒűܘƦƃܗ ŴƍƊƆ ̈ܬܗ܂ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ŴƍƉ ųܒ Ǝ ̈ ܘƟܒƖƀ

	- ̇ ̈Ɔܓܐ܉ ̣ܨܒܐ ƐƇƀƘــƘŴܐ ܬŶــųƉŴ ŴــƘ Ǝــſܬܪ ƎــƀƆܗ ƈƀƃܗ ܪƦܒ ƎƉ̣ <sup>290</sup> ܕƀƊƃــŴܬܐ ƖƊƆܒــű܂ ܐƀƉــƢ ƆــƎ ܓƀــƢ ܒƤــƮܒܐ ܐŶــƌƮܐ ܘŷƉــŴܝ ƆــƎ ̇ ܝ ƀƍƊŶƦƉــƦܐ܂ ̇ ܝ ƇƙƉܓƦƀƍܐ ſűƟــƊܐ Ɔــų ܓƀƇܐƦſ܉ ܕܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ܗ

̈ űƇſƦܢ | BDP ܐűſܐ :L 1ܒܐűſܐ **1** Ɖ BDL: ܐűƇſƦƉ P **<sup>2</sup>** ܪƦܒ DLP: ̇ ųܒ B **5** ܐƆܐ DLP: ܐƆܕ B ̇ ܘܐ **6** ܗ DLP: ܗܐ B **<sup>7</sup>** ܢƮܒƖƌ DLP: ܢű̈ ܒƖƌ B **8** ܐűſܒܐ1 L: ܐűſܐ BDP **11** ܐűŶ] + ܐűŶ BDP ̇ :BDL ܒűܘƃܐ ܗƦƃܘűܒ P | ƎƉ̣ ] om. B **<sup>12</sup>** ܐűſܒܐ1 DLP: ܐűſܐ B **<sup>13</sup>** ̇ ųܓƆŴƘ BDL: ܓܐƆŴƘ P **14** ܐƌƢŶܐ L: ƎſƢŶܐ BDP **15** ŴܒƐƌܐܬ BDP: ŪƐƌܐܬ L **16** ܐűŷƃܐ1 BDP: űŷƃܐ L **17** Ǝſܕܬܪ [ + ųƊƀƏ ܘܗܝƦſܐ ƎƀƆܗ Ƌƕ P **19** ųƊƀƏ DLP: ųƍƉܘ B **21** ƎƉ̣ DL: ƎƉܘ BP | ƎƀƆܗ [om. P ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƘŴƏŴƇƇƀƘ P **23** ܐƦƀƍܓƇƙƉ BDP: ܐƦƀƍܓƇƘƦƉ L

one of them is situated; and there are some whose parts do not have position but each one of them is generated gradually one after another. So the parts of time, number, and language do not have position, so that each one of them might be seen in its place and they all would be fastened and fixed in that whose parts they are.

288 As for time, it has no parts at all which would have position in it and be seen, but the generation of each one of its parts always comes together with the destruction of the previous one. The same holds for language and number: when their first parts pass away then those after them are generated one after another by way of succession, while the preceding ones do not persist. Line, surface, body, and place, on the other hand, contain parts which have position in relation to one another, each one of them being fixed in its place and comprehended through that whose part it is, and it is not such that after the destruction of the first ones the successive ones are generated one after another374.

289 Now, this division of quantity differs from the first one only by mode and it does not contribute anything more or less to the nature of quantity. So, in the first division, number and language came together, while line, surface and body were combined with place and time. In the second division, on the other hand, time was separated from place, body, surface, and line, and attached to language and number, since according to the principle of the second division its position should be with the latter and not with the former375.

#### *[Quantities in the strict sense and per accidens]*

290 Now, after these two divisions, the Philosopher wished to provide a definition of quantity. It has been told to us and clearly demonstrated in other

**<sup>374</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 59.11–13.

**<sup>375</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 91.28–92.6.

Ǝــſűſܘܗ ܬܐ܉̈ P69r Ŵܕܨܒــ ƎſųܓƆŴــƘ Ƣــƀƙƣ ܘܐųــƌܕ ƦــƀƉűƟ ܕܙܕܩ ƈــźƉ ̈Ɖܐ܂ ܘܒűܓــŴܢ ܒƄــƈ ܕܘƃܐ ŴــŶƦƆ Ǝ ̈ ƊŷƆܕ Ǝƀ̈ ƌܗ ܓܐƆŴƘ ƎƉ̣ <sup>Ǝ</sup>̈ ƐƌƦƌܒ ܐƌŴــƍƟ ųــƍƉ ŴــƇ ̇ ̈ ƍܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܕƟܒ ܐܦ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ Ƌƕ ųƇƃܘܢ ƦƄƉܒ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ųــƆ ųــƆ ƎƀƊŶƦƉ Ǝſűſܘܗ ܉ƎƀŷƤŶƦƉ ƦƀƉűƟ ܓܐƆŴƙܒ ܐ܉ƌܗ ܕܐųſƦſ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ŴƇƕܗܝ ƦƇƉܗܘܢ܂

ƈــƕ ܐܦ űܒــƕܕ ̣ ƅــſܐ ܬܐŴــƀƊƄƆ ƦــƀƉűƟ ̇ ųܓــƇƘ ƎــſűƉ Ƣــƀƙƣ 291 ̈Ɖܐ ܐƄſــƍܐ ̇ ܂ ܐƆܐ źƉــƈ ܕܬŶــŴ ܐܘƏــƀܐ: ܘƃــƎ ܗƣܐ ŶƦƉــƋ Ɔــų ̇ــŴܢ ܕƀƊƀƠƉــƎ ƌܗ ܐƍƣܪ̈ŴــƘ ƎــƉܘ̣ ܐƐــƍܓ ƎــƉ̣ ƈــƖƆ ƎــƉ̣ ƎــƆ ƢƀƉܕܐ ܕܗܝ̣ ƈــźƉ :ܐƐــƍܓ ܣŴــſܪ̈ŴܓƀźƟ ƎــƉ̣ ܐűــŷƆ Ǝſܕ ƦƀƆ :Ǝſ ̈ ̈ƣܐ ܗܘ Ɔܐܕ ̇ ܘ ܕƉƦƤƉــų ܓƍــƑ ܐſƦſــų <sup>10</sup> ̇ ƃــƈ Ŷــűܐ ſųƍƉــƎ ܓƍــƐܐ ƉűƟــƀܐ ܗ ̇ ܕŶــűܐ ̈ƀƐــƎ܉ ſűſــƖܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƆܐ ƀƄƉــƈ ƄƤƉــŷܐ ܕƌــųܘܐ ܬŶــųƉŴ ܓƍ ƎſųƍƉ ƦſƦŶܐƦſ ܬƉŴŶܐ ܓƢƀƊܐ܂ ܘƍƉܐ ƈƀƄƉ ܐƦſ ƊƆــųܘܐ܉ ̈ƀــƎ ܒƉűــŴܬ Ǝ űƀŷſܐſــƦ܉ ܐܦ ܗƌ ̈ ƙƀƠƌܕ Ǝƀ̈ ƌܗ Ǝſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ ̈ƦƀƇſܐ: ܗƌ ƈźƉ ܕܕ ̇ ܝ ܕƘƦƉــƣƢܐ ܒſųــƎ ƃــƈ ܨܒــŴ ̣ƉــƎ ƍƟŴſܐ űƉܡ ܕܬƉŴŶܐ ܨƮſܢ: ܒų ̇ ܘ <sup>ܗ</sup> :ܬܐŴƀƊƃܕ ̇ <sup>15</sup> ųƕܘܕŴƣ űܒƖƊƆ ܐƐƍƉ ƈƀƄƉ ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ̣ ܐ܂ƦƀƌƮŶܐ ̇ Ū ųƆ܂ ܘܐܦ ƆܐܘƀƏܐ ܓƢƀ Ɔܐ ܗܘܐ ܒűƀ ܬƉŴŶܐ Ɛƌ ̇ B123v | L18r ųƉŴŶܬ ƚƇŶܕ ܐƐƍƉ ƦſܐƟܙܕ ƎſűƉ ܂Ʀſܐűƀŷſ ̇ ųƆ Ǝ ̈ ̇ ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒűƀ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕƙƀƠƌ ųƕܕŴƣ ̇ ܂ ųƆ Ǝ ̈ ƙƀƠƌܕ ƎƀƇſܐ ƎƉ̣ :ܐſƞƉܕ ܐƉ ƅſܐ ܬܐŴƀƊƄƆ ̇ P69v ųƀƊŶƦƌܕ

292 ܐƆܐ ƈźƉ ܕƕܒűܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܗƌܐ ܕƌƦƆŴƄƏܐ: ܕƆــŴ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ƕــƈ ܨܒــŴ r102D ̈ܬܐ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕܒƤــƢܪܐ ܐſųſƦſــƎ ƠƖƌــŪ܉ ܐƆܐ ܐܦ ƕــƈ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƦƐƉܒƮܢ űƃ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܐƀƌƢŶܐƦſ ܕܗƍƃܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ Ǝſųƍƀƃ Ŵŷƌܐ܂ ̇ ƀƊƃــŴܬܐ ܒƤــƢܪܐ ƕ ̇ ܝ ܕܐſƦſــų Ɔܐ ̣ܗܘܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ƈƕ ܗ

̇

ܐƆܐ ܐܦ ųƆ

̇ܒــű ƇƉــƦܐ܉

̇ ƍƉܓű ܒƦƇƊܐ

**3** ܐƘŴــƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƘŴــƏŴƇƀƘ P | ܘܢųــƇƃ] om. BP **6** ƎــſűƉ] + Ƣــƀƙƣ D | ܐܦ [om. P **9** ܣŴſܪ̈ŴܓƀźƟ L: ܣŴſƮܐܓźƟ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųŹܐƟ B: ܪ̈ŴܓųŹܐƟ D **11** ܐŷƄƤƉ ƈƀƄƉ] inv. BP | ̇ ųƉŴŶܬ LP: ܐƉŴŶܬ BD **<sup>12</sup>** ƎſųƍƉ BDL: ̇ ųƍƉ P | ܘܐųƊƆ] + ܐƆܐ P, D surpa lin. **<sup>13</sup>** ܐܦ DLP: ƎƘܐ B **<sup>15</sup>** ƎƀƆܗ BDL: ƈƀƃܗ P | ܐƐƍƉ] + ܐƌܐ B **<sup>16</sup>** ̇ ųƉŴŶܬ LP: ܐƉŴŶܬ BD ܘܐܦ LP: ܐܦ BD **17** ƎƀƇſܐ DLP: ƎƀƆܗ B **18** Ǝ ̈ ƙƀƠƌܕ BDP: ƎƀƙƀƠƌܕ L **19** ܐƌܗ [om. L | ƈƕ BLP: ƈƕܕ D **<sup>21</sup>** ܢƮܒƦƐƉܕ DLP: ƎſƢܒƦƐƉܕ B **<sup>23</sup>** ܐܦ BDL: ܘܐܦ P | ܝ ̇ ųƆ BDL: ̇ ųƀƇƕ P

ܝ ܕƦƐƉܒƢܐ ܕŴƀƊƃܬܐ ̣ܗܝ űƃ ųſƦƀƆ

treatises376 that the craft of dividing is prior to that of defining, since it is first necessary to have a proper division of things and then from the division to derive what is suitable for definitions. Hence, the Philosopher and all other authors who have received from him this rule (κανών) always first employed division and after that defined the subject of their discussion.

291 That is why he first properly divided quantity, as he also did with substance, and now defines it. However, since it has been said to us above that definitions derive from a genus and those differentiae which constitute species377, but none among the categories has a genus, since each one of them is a primary genus that is called the most generic genus, it is apparent that for this reason no definition of any of them may be a perfect definition in the strict sense. What remains for us is to draw, as if we paint a certain image, a definition based on their properties, i.e. those things which are individual concomitants of particular entities and through which they may be separated from everything else. So, it is from them that we shall try to produce a description of quantity which we may use instead of a definition. Just as we described substance not by means of a definition, but by means of those things which are its individual concomitants, so is it also proper for us to try to define quantity according to our capacity from those things which are concomitant of it378.

292 However, since it is the job of the scholar to investigate not only those 5a38–5b10 things which exist in reality but also those which are believed and to reveal that their nature is contrary to that379, he (i.e. Aristotle) considered in his account not only what pertains to quantity in reality, but also included in it what is believed to be quantity when it is not and demonstrated where such a

**<sup>376</sup>** It is possible that Sergius means Porphyry's *Isagoge* here, for it is in the commentary on the latter by Ammonius that we find the discussion of the sequence between division and definition, cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 35.10–13. See also §197, above.

**<sup>377</sup>** In §§197–199, where Sergius discusses this issue, he in fact does not mention differentiae. See however, Philoponus, *In Cat.* 19.26: πᾶς γὰρ ὁρισμὸς ἐκ γένους ἐστὶ καὶ συστατικῶν διαφορῶν.

**<sup>378</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 61.7–9; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 93.15–27.

**<sup>379</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 60.14–16: ἔργον ἐπιστήμονος μὴ μόνον τὰ ὑποβεβλημένα αὐτῷ πράγματα σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα μὲν εἶναι, κατὰ ἀλήθειαν δὲ οὐκ ὄντα διεξέρχεσθαι καὶ καὶ διελέγχειν (= Philoponus, *In Cat.* 92.11–13).

̇ ̣ܕƎƉ ܐƄƊſܐ ̣ܗܘܬ܂ ƈźƉ ܗƈƀƃ ܕƃــƈ ܘŴŷƉܐ ƐƉܒŴƌƢܬܐ ܕųƀƇƕ ܓƌŴܐ ܐſــƍܐ ̣ܕܗܘ: ܐƃــƌŵܐ ܕŶــŴܪܘܬܐ Ɖــűܡ ƦƉܐƉــƢ ܕܐſــƦ ܒــų ̇ ƃــƊܐ ̣ܕܗܘ܂ ܘƏــƌƢƕŴܐ ܬܘܒ ƦƉܐƉــƢ ̇ ܐܪܒƗ ܐܘ ̈ Ǝƀ ܬƦƆ ܐܘ ܐƉ ƢــƉܐƌ ƥــƌܐ ƅــſܐ ƅــſܕܐܪ ƢــƉܐƊƆ ƎƍſűƖƉܕ ƅſܐ :ܐƢƃܘ ƅſܕܐܪ ƎــƀƆܗ ƎــƉ̣ ƥƌܐ ƢܒƐƉ ܕܗܘ܂̣ ܐƊƃ ̇ ܐܘ ƢƐƕ űŶܐ Ƣƀܓ ܐƀ̈ <sup>5</sup> ƍƣ ܒܐƢƟ ̈ ƌܐ ܘƏــƌƮƕŴܐ ̣ƉــƎ ƀƊƃــŴܬܐ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ܂ ܐƆܐ ܗƀƆــƎ Ɔܐ ܕܐܦ ܓŴ ̇ــŴܢ ܕܐܬܬƊƀƏــŴ ̣ƉــƎ ̇ ܕƀƊƃــŴܬܐ: ܗƌ ųƀܓƆŴــƘ ƎــƉ̣ űŶ ƦƀŶܬ ƎƀƇƙ̇ ƌ ƈƖƆ܂ ܐƆܐ ̣ƎƉ ܙƌܐ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ܐƅſ Ɖܐ ܕƎƍſűſƦƕ ŴſŴŷƊƆ ܒƢƤܒܐ ܕŴƇƕܗܝ܂

<sup>293</sup> ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܗƈƀƃ܉ ܕƎſųƍƉ ܕܨܒŴ <sup>10</sup> ̈ܬܐ ƦƀƉűƟ ܘƦſƦŶܐƦſ ܐƎſųſƦſ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƦƉܐƮƉܢ: ܘƎſųƍƉ ܬܪƍſܐƦſ ܘܓƍƣűܐƦſ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ſųƆــƎ ܗ ̈ــƀܐ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƦƉܐƢƉ ƎſųƀƇƕ܂ ܒƍƤƇܐ ܕƎſ ƏــŴܪƀſܐ: ƀƆųƆــƎ ܬܪſــƎ ܙƌ ܗ ̇ ܘ ܓƀــƢ Ɖܐ ųــƆ ܢ܂Ŵــƌܐ ųــƊƤƌܕ ƎــƍſűƖƉ ƦــſܐƇſܐƣܘ ƦــſܐƢſƢƣ ƎــƍſűƖƉ ƦــſܐƢſƢƣ ܐ܉ƀــƉ̈ P70r űƟ ųــƆ ƎــſųƊƤƉ ƦــƀƉűƟܘ ƦــſܐƦſƦŶܕ ̇ــŴܢ ܓƍƣűܐſــƦ ƌܗ ܉ųƆ ƎƍƀƍƄƉ ƎƍŶ ƦſܐƇſܐƣܕ ܐƉ ܘ ̇ B124r ųƆܘ ܗܝ܂ŴſƢƠƌܕ ̇ ſƢƣــƢܬܐ ̇ ܐųſƦſ ųƍƉ ܬܐŴƀƊƃ ܐܦ ƎſűƉ ܂ųƆ ƎſƢƉܐ Ʀſܐƍſܘܬܪ ̇ ܘſƦŶــƦܬܐ: ܗܕܐ ܕܐܬƇƘܓــƦ ܘܐܬܐƉــƢܬ ƕــƉűܐ Ɔــƣųܐ܉ ܘƍƉــų ̇ ƣܐƦƇſܐ ܘܓƦƀƍƣűܐ: ܗܕܐ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ܕܒƐƊܒŴƌƢܬܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ܐųſƦſ ܪܐ܂ƢƤܒ ŴƆܘ ܬܐŴƀƊƃ ̇ L18v ųſƦſܐ

̇ ܐſــƍܐ ̣ܕܗܘ ܕƦƌܐƉــƢ <sup>294</sup> ƈƃ ܓƌŴܐ ܓƀــƢ ŶــŴܪܐ ܐܘ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܐܘƃــƊܐ ܐܘ ̇ ƤƉــƦŶŴܐ ܐŶــƢܬܐ ܐſــűܐ ̇ ܐܪܒــƗ ܐܘ ̈ Ǝƀ ܬƆــƦ ܐܘ ܕܐƦſ ܒų ܐƉ ̣ܕܗܝ܉ ŴƆ ƈźƉ ̣ܕܗܘ ܓƌŴܐ ŸƤƉƦƉ ƦƉܐƉــƢ ܗƃــƍܐ܂ ܐƆܐ źƉــƈ ̇ ܘܐ ܒƤƊــƦŶŴܗ܉ ܐſــƅ ̇ ܘ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܒــų ƃƦƤƉــŸ ܕܗ ܕܓــƊƣŴܐ ܗ

**1** ܐŴŷƉܘ DLP: ܐƍƀƍƉܘ B | ܬܐŴƌƢܒƐƉ LP: ܬܐŴƌƢܒƦƐƉ BD | ܐƄƊſܐ BL: ܐƄſܐ DP **2** ܡűƉ] om. L **4** ܐƢƃܘ scr.: ܐƢƃܐܘ BDP: ܐƃܐܘܪ L | ƎƍſűƖƉܕ LP: ƎƍſűƀƖƉܕ BD **5** Ƣƀܓ [om. B **8** ܐƉ] om. BDP | ƎƍſűſƦƕܕ BDL: ƎƍſܕƦƕܕ P **10** ƦƀƉűƟ L: ƦſܐƊſűƟ BDP **12** ܐƀſܪŴƏ L: ܐƀſܪ̈ŴƏܕ BDP **13** ƎƍſűƖƉ] + ܗܝŴſƢƠƌܕ P **14** ƦƀƉűƟܘ L: ƦſܐƊſűƟܘ BDP | ųƆ BLP: ƎſųƆ D ̈ƀƉܐ űƟ] + ƎƍŶ P **18** ܬܐŴƌƢܒƐƊܕܒ [+ ܗܘ̣ BP **20** ̇ ܐܘ2 [om. BD

belief about it comes from. Now, since of any particular colour, e.g. a certain white, it is said that there are three cubits of it, or four, or something else; and furthermore, of some action it is said that it is long or short, e.g. one usually speaks about length when talking about a war that lasted ten years or something like that, — based on this one believes that colours and actions also pertain to quantity. However, they do not fall beneath any of the kinds of quantity which have been established above, but in reality they belong to quality, as we are going to demonstrate in the section on it380.

293 Now, we shall consider that of things that are said, some exist primarily and in the strict sense, and some of those things that are said exist secondarily and accidentally381. In the Syriac language, we are accustomed to call these two kinds "truly" and "seemingly", so that what the ancients named "strictly" and "primarily" we usually call "truly", while what we designate as "seemingly" they referred to as "accidentally" and "secondarily". Thus, there are quantities in the true and strict sense, namely those which have been divided and discussed thus far, and there are those of another kind, seeming and derivative, of which we say that they are quantities only in belief and not in reality.

294 Now, when some colour — e.g., white, or black, or any other — is said to have three or four cubits or any other particular amount, it is said not in respect of the colour which is measured, but since the body in which it is contained happens to have some size, that is how the colour which is in it is

**<sup>380</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 60.16–19; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 92.13–20.

**<sup>381</sup>** Cf. *Cat*. 5a38–39: κυρίως δὲ ποσὰ ταῦτα μόνα λέγεται τὰ εἰρημένα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

Ɗƃܐ ܕƦƉܐƢƉ ܓƌŴܐ ܕܒų ܕܐƦſ ܒų ƦŶŴƤƉܐ܂ ܘŴƖƏܪƌܐ ܬܘܒ v102D ƦƉܐƢƉ ܕܐܪſــƅ ܘƃــƢܐ܉ Ɔܐ ̣ܗܘܐ źƉــƈ ̣ܕܗܘ ƏــƌƢƕŴܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ̇ Ɔܐ܂ ܐܢ ܓƢƀ ܒƈƀƇƠ ̇ ܘܐ ܒų ƌܓƢƀ ܐܘ ܗƍƃܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ƈźƉ ܕܙܒƍܐ ܕܗ ƎƉ̣ ܐ܉Ƣƀܓƌ ܐƍܙܒ űŶ ̇ ܙܒƍܐ ųƌܘܐ ƌƢƕŴƏܐ ܐƍſܐ ܕƦƐƉܒƢ ̣ܗܘܐ ܕܐ ſƢƃــŴܬܗ ܕܙܒــƍܐ ƇƕــŴܗܝ ܕƏــƌƢƕŴܐ ƦƉܐƉــƢ ܕܐܬƃــƢܝ܂ ܘܐܢ ܬܘܒ <sup>5</sup> ƌܐŴŶܕ ܙܒــƍܐ ƌܓƀــƢܐ: ƏــƌƢƕŴܐ ܕƦƐƉܒــƢ ̣ܗܘܐ ܕܒƀƇƠــƈ ƤƉــƦܪܐ܉ ܗſűſــƎ ܬܘܒ ܐܪƄſــŴܬܗ ܕܙܒــƍܐ ƕܒــűܐ Ɔــų ƐƆــƌƢƕŴܐ ܕƌــܐܪܟ ŸــƤƉƦƉ ܐƌ ̈ ƣܐƇſܐſــƦ܂ ܘܒűܓــŴܢ ܓــƊƣŴܐ ƠƉܒƍƇــųܘܢ ܕܓــŴ ̇ ſــƢܟ܉ ܘƆــŴ ̈ ƌܐ܂ ܘܙܒــƍܐ ܬܘܒ ƃــƢܐ ܐܘ ƢſƢƣܐſــƦ ܘƆــŴ ̣ܗƌــŴܢ ܓــŴ ̇ ܕܓƊƣŴܐ ܘܙܒƍܐ ̣ƎƉ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ƌƢƕŴƏܐ ܕܗ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܘܐ ܒų܂ ܘܐܬƦƕűſ ųƆ ̈ ƌܐ ܕſــƎ ܘƏــƌƮƕŴܐ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܐſــƅ ܕܐܬܐƉــƢܬ ̣ƉــƎ ƖƆــƈ܂ ܓــŴ ̇ ųــƀ̈ P70v ƌܙ ƎــƉ̣ űــŷƆܕ ƈــźƉ ܐ܉ƍــƃܗ ƎــſƢƉܐƦƉ Ʀــſܐƍƣűܘܓ ƦــſܐƇſܐƣ ܕŴƀƊƃܬܐ ܓƎƀƣű ܐƅſ ܐƎƌƢƉ܂

B124v ƥƌܐ ƅſܐ ųܒ Ʀſܕܐ :ܪܐŴƕܙ ܐƊƣŴܓ ƈƕ ƥƌܐ ƢƉܐƌ Ƣƀܓ ܐܢ 295 ƌܐƉــƢ ŶــŴܪܘܬܐ ܕſƦſــƢܐ ̣ƉــƎ ŶــŴܪܘܬܐ ܐŶــƢܬܐ ܕܒܓــƊƣŴܐ ܕܪܒ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܐſــƅ ܕܒƤƊــƦŶŴܐ ܘƊƆܐƉــƢ܉ ųܒƐƊƆ ƦſܐƍƀƖźƉ ܐƐƍƌܘ :ųƍƉ ̇ ܘ ܕܪܒ ųƍƉ: ̇ ܝ ܕܒų ܕŴŶܪܘܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܕܒܓƊƣŴܐ ܙŴƕܪܐ ܪܒܐ ̣ܗܝ ̣ƎƉ ܗ ̇ ܘ ̇ ŴŷƆܪܘܬܐ ƋƀƐƌ ܒŴƀƊƄܬܐ ܘŴƆ ƆܓƊƣŴܐ ܗ ܐƅſ ̣ܕƎƉ ܗܕܐ ųƆ ̇ ܂ ܗƌܐ Ɨſűſ ̣ܗܘ܉ ܕƣــƊܐ ̣ܗܘ ܒŷƇــŴܕ Ƈŷƣــƚ ƆܒــƢ ̣ƉــƎ Ɖܐ ųƍƇܒƠƉ ܕܙܕܩ: ̣ܘƉــƎ ܗܪƃܐ ܐƏܒــƢ ܕܐƖŹــƁ܂ ܙܕܩ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܗܘܐ Ɔــų ܓƀــƢ ܕƆــŴ ܕܪܒܐ ̇ ܕƏܓƀܐܐ ܗܕܐ ̣ƎƉ ŴŶܪܘܬܐ ̣ƎƉ ŴŶܪܘܬܐ ƌܐƢƉ܉ ܐƆܐ ܕƢſƦſܐ ܐܘ ̇ ܘ ܕſــƎ ̇ــƋ܂ ܗ ܗ r26L ̇ ܝ܂ ƣــƊܐ ܓƀــƢ ܕܪܒــŴܬܐ ܘܕܙƕــŴܪܘܬܐ܉ ƀƊƄƆــŴܬܐ ŷƆ ̈ــƊܐ܉ ̈ ƌܐ ܘܐƄƏ ܕƢſƦſܘܬܐ ܘܒƢſƞܘܬܐ ƦƉܐƉــƢ ̣ܗܘ ܐܦ ƕــƈ ܓــŴ

**<sup>1</sup>** ܐƊƃ LP: ܐƉ BD | ųܒ Ʀſܕܐ DL: ųܒ Ʀſܐ B: ̇ ųſƦſܐ P **2** ƅſܕܐܪ BDL: ƅſܕܐ P **3** ܐƍܕܙܒ BDP: ܐƍܙܒ L | Ƣƀܓƌ BDP: Ƣܓƌ L **5** ƢƉܐƦƉ LP: ƢƉܐܬܐ BD **9** ŴƆܘ2 [+ ܗܘ̣ B **10** ܐƌƢƕŴƏ] + ̇ ܘ ܗ P | ܘܢųــſƦſܐ ܬܐŴــƀƊƃ ƎــƉ̣ BDP: ܬܐŴــƀƊƃ ƎƉ̣ ܘܢųſƦſܐ L **14** Ƣƀܓ LP: Ǝſܕ BD **16** ųƍƉ BDL: ܐųƍƉ P **17** ܗܝ̣ [ om. L **19** ܗܘ̣ Ɨſűſ BDP: ܥűƌ L | ܐƉ] om. P **20** ܕܪܒܐ DLP: ̇ ܘ | P ܘܙŴƕܪܘܬܐ :BDL ܘܕܙŴƕܪܘܬܐ **22** B ܪܒܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> DLP: Ŵ̇ ƌܗ B

said to have size. Also, if an action is said to be long or short, it is not because the action itself is like that, but because the time over which it took place was either lengthy or not. In fact, if an action which was believed to last long time occurs briefly, then due to the briefness of time taken for it this action will be called brief. But if the action which was believed to be over briefly were to extend over a long time, then again the length of time taken for it would make this action seemingly long. Hence, it is the body receptive of colours that is truly measured and not colours themselves; and it is also the time that is short or long and not the action which happens in it. It is thus obvious that body and time pertain to quantity, as it has been explained above, while colours and actions are called like that seemingly and accidentally, since they occur to one of the kinds of quantity, as we have said382.

295 So, if someone states about a small body that the white in it, as one says, is more white than that of a bigger body and falls into error by trying to measure it by means of measures and saying that the white in the small body is greater than that in a body larger than it, so that such a person will deduce from it that it is whiteness that pertains to quantity and not the body which is receptive of it, then it is obvious that he merely corrupts the proper meaning of the words and is led astray with respect to the rest. In fact, he should not say that one white is greater than the other, but that it is more (white) in one case than in the other383. For the terms "great" and "small" are related to quantity, while the "more" and the "less" are also applied to colours, shapes (σχήματα) and all

**<sup>382</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 60.20–29; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 92.20–93.2.

**<sup>383</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 60.29–61.5; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 93.8–13.

̇ ܐ ƙƊƆܓــƗ ܬƌــƎ ̇ ܘ ܕܨܒ ̈ܗܝ ܕܙƌܐ܂ ſűƉــƎ ܐܦ <sup>ܗ</sup> ܘƈƕ Ƈƃــųܘܢ ܕܐܕƣــŴ ̈ ܐ ̇ ſƦŷƆــƦܘܬܐ ܕƊƣــų ̇ ܥ Ɔــų ܒƦƇƊܐ ܗƍƃܐ ܕܪܘƣܐƦſ: ܐܢ ƃــű ſــű ̇ ܉ ƌܐƆــƚ ̇ ܥ ܕܪܫ űــſ ܐƆ űــƃ Ǝſܕ ܐܢ ܂ƎƌƢƉܕܐ ƅſܐ ƑƐƃƦƌ ܐ܉ƢŶƦƉ ܂ƥƍƇƄƆ ƎƀƇ ̈ ܬܘܒ ܘƆܐ ƞƕƦƌܐ ſƢŶܐƦſ ƟŴƆܒƈ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕܓ

ƎــƉ̣ ܬܐŴƀƊƄƆ ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ ̇ <sup>5</sup> ųƆ ƋŶƦƉ ܉ƈƀƃܗ ƎƀƆܗ ܪƦܒ ƎƉ̣ <sup>296</sup> ƋــƆ ̇ ųــƆ ܐƙــƀƠƌܕ ƦــƀƉűƟ ƢــƉܘܐ ܂Ʀــſܐűƀŷſ ̇ ųــƆ Ǝــ̈ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƙƀƠƌ ̇ űƉܡ ܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ܂ ܒƤــƢܪܐ ܓƀــƢ ŴƀƊƄƆܬܐ܉ ܘܐܦ ܗ r103D ̇ ܝ ܕƆܐ ųƌܘܐ ܒų ̇ ̇ــŴ ܕſــƎ ܒƀƍƊــƍܐ ܘܒƇƊــƦܐ ܘܒŵܒــƍܐ ܐܘ ̇ : ܗƌ ųƀ ̈ P71r ܓƆŴƘ ƎƉ̣ űŷܒ ܐƆܘ ܒŴƐܪŹܐ ܘܒŴŷƀźƤܬܐ ܘܒܓــƊƣŴܐ ܘܒــܐܬܪܐ: ŶƦƉــſŵܐ ƢſƢƣܐſــƦ ܕŴƠƆܒŴƀƇܬܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ܐܢ ܐƥƌ ƌــƞܒܐ ƊƆܐƉــƢ ܕܪܒــŴܬܐ ܘܙƕــŴܪܘܬܐ <sup>10</sup> ̈ܕܐ ܐſųſƦſــƎ: ܗƀƆــƎ ܓƀــƢ ܘƏܓƀــܐܘܬܐ ܘܒſƞــƢܘܬܐ ܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ ܕŶــű ̈ܕܐ܉ Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕܐƦſ ܒŴƀƊƄܬܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ: ܘܐܢ ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ܐƌ r125B ̈Ǝƀ ܕűŶ ̈Ǝƀ ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ: ܐƆܐ ̣ƎƉ ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ܒŴƀƊƄܬܐ܂ ܐܢ ܕƎſ ƎƍſŴŷƉ ܕƦƀƆ ܐƌ ̇ ܘ ܕƆــŴܬ Ɖــűܡ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƟــƎſųƊſŴ܉ ܗſűſــƎ ƃƦƤƉــŷܐ ܓƍــƐܐ ܗ ̇ ܝ ܕƆܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܐƦſ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ܐƅſ ƦƇƉܗ ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ܕƙƀƠƌܐ ųƆ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܉ ܗ ̇ ܕŴƠƆܒŴƀƇܬܐ űƉܡ܂ ܒų

297 ſűƉــƎ źƉــƈ ܕܐܦ ܒƤــƢܒܐ ܕƕــƈ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ܐܬųƕܕƌــƎ: ܪܒــŴܬܐ ܘܙŴƕܪܘܬܐ ܘƏܓƀܐܘܬܐ ܘܒƢſƞܘܬܐ Ɔܐ ƢƀƄƣܐ űƉܡ ܕƈƇƊƌ ƎſųƀƇƕ ܬƎƌ ƈƀƇƟ ̣ƎƉ ƏܓƁ܂ ƐƉــƦ ܕŷƌــŴܐ ܕܐܢ ܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ ܐſųſƦſــƎ܉ ƀƆــƦ ̈ƀــƎ ܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ ܐƌ <sup>20</sup> ̈Ǝƀ ܒŴƀƊƄܬܐ܂ ܘܐܢ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܒƀƊƄــŴܬܐ܉ ƀƆــƦ ܐƌ ̇ ܘ ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ƊſŴƟܐ ̈ܕܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ƢſƦſܐƦſ ̣ƎƉ ܓƐƍܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ܕűŶ ܕƎſųƍƀƃ܂ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܕƎſ Ɩſűſܐ ƦƇƉܐ ܕƈƕ ܗƎƀƆ܉ ƐƌــŪ ܬܘܒ ƣــŴܪſܐ ̈Ʀܐ܂ ƦƇƊƆܢ ܘƌܒƖܐ ƎſųƀƇƕ ܐƅſ ܕܬܒƖܐ ƦŷƤŶܐ ܕƠƀƐƘ

**1** ܐƌܕܙ BDP: ܕܙܒܐ L | ƗܓƙƊƆ DLP: ŭƇƙƊƆ B **3** ƑƐƃƦƌ LP: ƑƐƃƦƉ BD | Ǝſܕ [om. BD **4** ƦſܐſƢŶ LP, corr. D in marg.: ƦſܐƀſƢŶ BD **5** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ LP: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ BD **6** ƋƆ] om. P **<sup>9</sup>** ܐƊƣŴܘܒܓ [om. D **<sup>10</sup>** ܒܐƞƌ LP: ܐ ̇ ܨܒ D: om. B **11** Ƣƀܓ LP: Ǝſܕ BD **13** ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕ1 [+ ܬŴــſ add. D in marg. (sc. ܬܐŴــƀƇܒŴƠƆܕ (**14** ܬŴــƆܕ BDP: ܬŴــƆ L **16** ܬܐŴــƀƇܒŴƠƆܕ LP: ܐܬܐƀƇܒŴƠƆܕ BD **18** ܡűƉ DL: ƎſűƉ BP

kinds of quality. Thus, if someone would like to study this subject but will resist knowing the precise meaning of the terms, he will be rebuked, as we have said. But if being unaware of this, he would study, then he will learn and will not resist in a quarrelsome way those things which are evident to everyone.

#### *[Whether quantity admits of contraries]*

296 So, after this, Aristotle defines quantity by means of its distinctive features. 5b11–16 And he first says that a concomitant of quantity is that there is nothing contrary to it384. For, indeed, none among its kinds — i.e. number, language, time, line, surface, body, and place — seems to truly admit of contraries. Now, someone might wish to say that large and small, plenty and few are contrary to one another, and since they pertain to quantity and are contrary to one another, it is obvious that quantity admits of contraries. However, if we demonstrate that they are not contraries, but in their subsistence they pertain to the genus of relatives, this will prove correct the statement of the Philosopher that a concomitant of quantity is that it has no contrary385.

297 Since we have already discussed large and small and plenty and few in the section on substance386, it would be proper to say now only a few things about them, in order to demonstrate that, if they are contraries they do not belong to quantity, and if they do belong to quantity they are not contrary to one another, but the subsistence of their nature belongs rather to the genus of relatives387. So, in order to make our account of them comprehensive, let us start our inquiry into them, making it as brief as possible.

**<sup>384</sup>** See *Cat*. 5b11: ἔτι τῷ ποσῷ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον. Sergius paraphrases Aristotle's text rather than quoting it.

**<sup>385</sup>** In the second half of this paragraph, Sergius paraphrases *Cat*. 5b14–16: εἰ μὴ τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ φαίη τις εἶναι ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ. τούτων δὲ οὐδέν ἐστι ποσὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρός τι.

**<sup>386</sup>** Sergius probably means §224, where he mentioned that not admitting of contraries is characteristic not only of substance but also of quantity. Philoponus points out that it is Aristotle himself who mentioned large and small briefly in the section of the *Categories* dealing with substance, see Philoponus, *In Cat.* 94.6–7: ἐν γὰρ τῷ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ μνημονεύσας αὐτῶν μόνον παρῆλθε, συγχωρήσας αὐτὰ ἐναντία εἶναι.

**<sup>387</sup>** This is what Aristotle himself implies, as Philoponus stresses in *In Cat.* 94.9–10: καὶ δείκνυσι πάλιν διχῶς, διά τε τῆς ἐνστάσεως ὅτι οὔκ εἰσι ποσά, καὶ τῆς ἀντιπαραστάσεως ὅτι εἰ καὶ ποσὰ συγχωρηθείη εἶναι, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐναντία (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 62.15–18).

	- Ŵ̇ ̇ ܙŴƕܪܐ źƀƤƘܐƦſ: ܗƌ 300 Ɔܐ ܐƦſ űƉܡ ƆܓƢƊ ܕƦƉܐƢƉ ܪܒܐ ܐܘ ܕƎſ ̣ܗܘ ܒųƉŴƍƠ܂ ܐƆܐ ܒƊŷƙܐ ܕŴƆܬ ܐƌƢŶܐ ƍƃƦƉܐ ܗƃــƍܐ܂ Ɔܐ

̇ ܘܓƌŴܐƦſ ƐƌƦƉܒܐ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܕƊŶƦƉܐ ܘƖſűſܐ **<sup>1</sup>** ̇ ܕƆܐ ܬƉŴŶܐ ܐųſƦſ ̇ ܘųƍƉ ųــſƦſܐ [om. hom. B **6** ܐſŵــŶƦƉ] + ܐƊــŶƦƉ add. D in marg. **10** ܐƊــƀƏ BDL: ܐƄƏ P **13** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƘŴƐƀƇƀƘ P **19** ƎſųſƦſܐ BLP: ܘܢųſƦſܐ D **20** ܐſܪŴܓźƟ P: ܪܝŴܓƀźƟ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟ D: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓŹܐƟ B **22** ܐŵŷƊƆ BDL: ƚƆܐƊƆ P **23** ƢƉܐƦƉܕ BDL: ƢƉܐƦƉܘ P **24** ܗܘ̣ [ om. B | ܐƆ scr.: ܗܐ BDLP

298 Now, we say that one kind of quantity is definite and concrete and another is indefinite and may be grasped generally. As for the definite and concrete kind of quantity, it has been set out through the division discussed above. That which is indefinite may be comprehended through another division, when one takes the whole nature of quantity and divides it by saying that one part of it is regarded in terms of large and small and other in terms of many and few. About all bodies, surfaces and lines we say that some of them are larger or smaller than others. About time, language and number, on the other hand, we say that some of them are more or less than others. Thus, large and small apply to that kind of quantity whose parts have position, while many and few apply to that kind of quantity whose parts do not remain in one established position with respect to one another388.

299 That is why the Philosopher used the following examples for the two kinds 5b16–29 of quantity and based his whole discussion of them on these. As examples for body, line and surface he took a mountain and a certain small grain, saying that any particular body is called large and small through comparison to other things of the same genus389. Concerning time, number and language, on the other hand, all things belonging to them are said to be many or few also through comparison to one another. Hence, if these things pertain to quantity, as we have shown, then they are not contrary to one another, but this comes from the category (κατηγορία) of relatives. So, from these and other (examples) one is able to see that they are not contraries390.

300 There is nothing at all that is called large or small simply, i.e. in its own right, but rather it is called thus in relation to something else. Thus, the same

**<sup>388</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 63.2–9; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 95.4–96.20. Ammonius divides quantities into "definite" (ὡρισμένα), which are quantities in the strict sense, and "indefinite" (ἀόριστα), to which large and small belong and which are not quantities in the proper sense. Philoponus provides a more detailed analysis of these two kinds.

**<sup>389</sup>** See *Cat*. 5b16–20: οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μέγα λέγεται ἢ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεται, οἷον ὄρος μὲν μικρὸν λέγεται, κέγχρος δὲ μεγάλη τῷ τὴν μὲν τῶν ὁμογενῶν μεῖζον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον τῶν ὁμογενῶν.

**<sup>390</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 62.2–18, particularly 62.15–18: εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἐναντία εἰσὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν, οὐκ εἰσὶ ποσά, ἀλλὰ τῶν πρός τι· <...> ὕστερον δὲ δείκνυσιν ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐναντία εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεται.

ܓƢƀ ŴŹܪܐ ̣ܗܘ űƃ ̣ܗܘ ƟƦƉــƢܐ ܪܒܐ ܘܙƕــŴܪܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ƆــŴܬ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ܘܐŶــƌƢܐ܂ ܘƘــƢܕܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܦ ̣ܗܝ ƉƦƤƉــųܐ ܪܒــƦܐ ܘܙƕــŴܪܬܐ ܒŷƙــƊܐ ܕƆــŴܬ ܐŶــƢܬܐ ܘܐŶــƢܬܐ܂ ܐƆــŴ ܕſــƎ ̣ܗܘ ƍƟــųƉŴ Ɖــűܡ r72P ̇ ܙƕــŴܪܐ܉ Ɔܐ ܪܒܐ ƉــƦܘܡ ƃƦƉــƍܐ ܗܘܐ ƉƦƤƉــų ̣ܗܘܐ ܪܒܐ ܐܘ ܙŴƕܪܐ: ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ܙŴƕܪܐ ųƉƦƤƉ ܗܘܐ ܪܒܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ƈƃ űŶ ųƍƉܘܢ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܝ ܕܕƆܐ ܒŵƇƄܒــƎ ƄŹــƐܐ ܕƍƀƃــų <sup>ƌ</sup> r27L ̇źــƢ ܗܘܐ܂ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ƘــƢܕܬܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ŷƣŴƉܐ ܙŴƕܪſܐ ̣ƎƉ ŹــŴܪܐ ܐſــƍܐ ̣ܕܗܘ܉ ƉƦƤƉــųܐ ܗܘܬ ܪܒــƦܐ ƉــƦܘܡ: ܘŹــŴܪܐ ƃƦƉــƍܐ ܗܘܐ ܙƕــŴܪܐ܂ ܐƆܐ źƉــƈ ܕƟƦƉــſƢܐ ̇ : ܘŴŹܪܐ ܬܘܒ ųƉƦƤƉ ̇ ܝ ܕܙŴƕܪſܐ ųƍƉ ƢƘܕܬܐ ܪܒƦܐ ܒƊŷƙܐ ܕܗ ܐƊŷƘ ƎƉ̣ ƎƀƆܗ ܐƀƌ ̈ ܙŴƕܪܐ ܒƊŷƙܐ ܕܗ <sup>10</sup> ̇ <sup>ܘ</sup> ܕܪܒ ųƍƉ܉ Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕŴƃ ̈ܬܐ܂ ܒŴŷƇܕ ƀƐƌܒƎƀ ܘƆܐ ̣ܗܘܐ ̣ƎƉ Ǝſųƍƀƃ ܕܨܒŴ

ܐƉŴƍƟ ƦƀƉűƟ Ǝƀƍ̈ ̈ܬܐ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ܉ <sup>Ɵ</sup> 301 ܘܬܘܒ ܨܒŴ ̈Ǝƀ ܕƎſ ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ ƦƉܐƮƉܢ ̈ܕܐ܂ ܗƌ űŶ Ƌƕ Ǝ̈ B126v ƣƦƃƦƉ ܬŴƃܘܗ ƎſܗƦſܕ ̇ Ƣ ܐƌܐ ܕſــƎ ̇ ܐ ƊſŴƟܐ ܕųƉŴƣܗƎſ܂ ܐƉ ܒƊŷƙܐ܉ ܒų ܒƎſųƀƌŴƄ ܗܘ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ܕŴŶܪܘܬܐ ܘܐܘŴƊƃܬܐ ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܕűŶ r104D ̈ܕܐ܉ ܘƈƃ űŶܐ ̇ ܂ ܪܒŴܬܐ ܕƎſ ܘܙŴƕܪܘܬܐ ̇ ܘųƆ ̇ : ̣ ܘƊƀƏܐ ųƍƉ ųƉŴƍƟ ̇ ųſƦſܐ ƎſųƍƉ ̇ ܉ ܐƆܐ ̇ ܘƆــų ųــƍƉ ƎــſųƍƉ ܐűــŶ ̇ ܘƏܓƀــܐܘܬܐ ܘܒſƞــƢܘܬܐ܉ ſƦƀƆــų ̇ ܓƀــƢ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ̇ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܗƌܐ ƀƌŴƃܐ܂ ųƉŴƍƟ ܒƊŷƙܐ ܕŴƆܬ ŶܒƢܬܗ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕűſƦƉܥ ̣ƉــƎ ƣــƊܐ ܗƌܐ܂ ܘܒűܓــŴܢ ƆــŴ ̣ƉــƎ ̣ܗܘ ƆܒƢ ̣ƎƉ ܗ ̇ ܘ ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ܂ ܕܒų ܗƌ <sup>20</sup> ̈Ǝƀ ܕܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܗƎƀƆ܉ ܐƆܐ ̣ƎƉ ܙƌܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ƍſűƖƉــƎ ƐƊƆــŪ ƕܒــűܐ ܘƉــƢܐ: ܘܒــƢܐ ܘܐܒܐ: ܘܐƕــƙܐ ܘƇƘــܓܐ: v72P ̈ܬܐ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ܘܨܒŴ

̣ܗܘ **1** 2] + ųƉŴƍƠܒ P **2** ܐܦ DL: ܘܐܦ BP **3** ųƉŴƍƟ BLP: ųƉŴƍƠܒ D **4** ųƉƦƤƉ BDL: ܐųــƉƦƤƉ P | ܘܡƦــƉ BDL: ܘܡƦــƊƉ P | ܗܘܐ [om. B **5** ܪܐŴــƕܙ ܬܘܒ [inv. BDP **7** ܐŷƣŴƉ BDP: ܐƦŶŴƤƉ L | ܐſܪŴƕܙ DLP: ܪܐŴƕܙ B | ܐƦܪܒ BDL: ܐƦܕܒ P **9** ܐſܪŴƕܕܙ DLP: ܪܬܐŴƕܕܙ B **<sup>10</sup>** ܐƊŷƘ] + ܗܘ̣ BD **<sup>12</sup>** ܐƉŴƍƟ DLP: ܐƉŴŶܬ B **<sup>13</sup>** ܬŴƃܘܗ DLP: Ǝƀ̈ ƌܘܗ B **<sup>17</sup>** ̇ ųſƦƀƆ BDL: ƦƀƆ P **<sup>18</sup>** ܐƀƌŴƃ L: ̇ ųƀƌŴƃ BDP **<sup>21</sup>** ŪƐƊƆ DLP: ̇ ųܒƐƊƆ B | ܐƙƕܘܐ BD: P ܘܐƇƙƌܐ :L ܘƙƕܐ

mountain will be called large with regard to one (mountain) and small with regard to another. And also a grain will be called large as compared to one (grain) and small as compared to another. For if things were called large or small in virtue of themselves, then neither would something large ever be called small, nor would something small ever be called large, but each thing would always maintain the order of its nature. Thus, a grain which is incommensurably smaller than any mountain could never be called large, nor could a mountain be called small391. But since a grain is called large as compared to a smaller (grain), while a mountain is named small as compared to a bigger (mountain), it is apparent that these terms are applied only by way of comparison and do not derive from the nature of things392.

301 Moreover, things that are contraries first have their own existence and only 5b30–33 then fight with one another. But as for relatives, they are said of by way of reference (to one another) and it is in this reference that their names subsist393. What I mean is this. Black and white are contrary to one another, but each one of them has subsistence by itself and exists in its own right. Large and small, on the other hand, and plenty and few do not exist in their own right, but each one of these terms appears by way of reference to the other, while what is signified by them in itself is different from what is grasped from these namings. Hence, they do not belong to contraries, but to the category of relatives, in which we usually include a slave and a master, a son and a father, a half and a double, and other things like that.

**<sup>391</sup>** Cf. *Cat*. 5b20–22: οὐκοῦν πρὸς ἕτερον ἡ ἀναφορά, ἐπεὶ εἴγε καθ' αὑτὸ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἐλέγετο, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τὸ μὲν ὄρος μικρὸν ἐλέγετο, ἡ δὲ κέγχρος μεγάλη.

**<sup>392</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 94.16–25.

**<sup>393</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 63.15–18: δεῖ τὰ ἐναντία πρῶτον εἶναι καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπολελυμένην ἔχοντα τὴν ὑπόστασιν, εἶτα οὕτως συνέρχεσθαι καὶ τὴν μάχην ἀναδέχεσθαι, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀντικεῖσθαι, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πρός τι ἀδύνατον, διὸ οὔτε πολεμεῖ ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον καὶ συνεισάγει (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 97.10–12).

ܐƊــƀƟ ƎſųƍƉ ܐűŶ ƈƃ ܐ܉ƇܒŴƠƆܕܕ Ǝƀ̈ ̈ܬܐ ܗƌ 302 ܘܬܘܒ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ܨܒŴ ƎــƉ̣ ƢــźƏ ̇ ̇ ܂ ܐܘƊƃــŴܬܐ ܓƀــƢ ܐſƦſــų ܗܝ ܐųƌܘ ܕܬܬܒƈź ŶܒــƢܬܗ ŶــŴܪܘܬܐ܂ ܘܬܘܒ ŶــŴܪܘܬܐ Ɔܐ ܐܒــűܐ ܐܢ ܗܘ ܕƆܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܐſــƦ ܐܘƊƃــŴܬܐ܂ ܪܒــŴܬܐ ܕſــƎ ܒƖƇــű ܙƕــŴܪܘܬܐ Ɔܐ ܐſــƦ܂ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ܒƢſƞܘܬܐ ܒűƖƇ ̣ƎƉ Əܓƀܐܘܬܐ܂ ƈźƉ ܕܒŷƙــƊܐ ܕŶــű <sup>5</sup> ̈ܕܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƎſųƊſŴƟ܂ ܗƍƃܐ ܬܘܒ ܘܐƎƘ Ɔܐ ųƌܘܐ ܐƦſ ܐܒܐ܉ ƐƌƦƉــŪ Ɔــų ܐܦ ƀƌŴƃܐ ܕܒƢܘܬܐ܂ ܘܐܢ ̣ƕܒűܐ ܬܘܒ ƈƟƦƤƌ ̣ƎƉ ƦƕƞƉܐ܉ ܒƈź ųƆ ųƊƕ ܐܦ ųƉŴƣܐ ܕƢƉܘܬܐ܂

	-

ܡűƉ űŶ ƦƀƆܕ ܗܕܐ܂ ܐƌܐ <sup>Ƣ</sup> ̇ D104v Ɖܐ ܉ƎſųƇƃ ƎƉ̣ ƢſƦſ Ǝſܕ ܗܝ̣ ܐƖſűſܕ <sup>304</sup> ̇ ̣ܕܗܘ Ɔــų ƌــųܘܐ ƠƏــŴܒƇܐ܂ ƦƉܘܡ ܕųƌܘܐ ܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ ܕƍƟــųƉŴ: ܐܘ ̇ ܘܐ ̣ܗܘ űƃ ̣ܗܘ űƉܡ ܒŵܒƍܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ ̈Ǝƀ ܕܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ܉ <sup>ܗ</sup> ƠƉܒƍƇܐ ܕƎſ ܕܗƌ ̈Ǝƀ ܕܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ ̇ Ƣ ܕܪܒŴܬܐ ܘܙŴƕܪܘܬܐ ̣ƎƉ ܗƌ ̇ ܘ ܕܐƉ ܘܐƌƢŶܐ܂ ƎſűƉ ܗ

̈ܬܐ **<sup>1</sup>** ̈ ܬܐ :BDP ܨܒŴ Ŵܕܨܒ L **2** ƈźܕܬܬܒ DL: ƈźܕܬܒ BP **6** ƎƘܘܐ DLP: ܘܐܦ B **9** ܐܦ BDL: ܘܐܦ P **11** ܐſƞƉ BDL: ܐƞƉ P **12** ܐƉ] om. P **15** ܬܐƮſƞܘܒ DLP: ܘܬܐƮſƞܘܒ B **17** ƢƉܐƌ DLP: ƢƉܐƌܕ B | Ɓܓ ̇ Əܕ BDL: ƁܓƏ P **<sup>18</sup>** ܘ ̇ ̇ ܘ ܕŴƆܬ :DLP ܕŴƆܬ ܗ ܗ B | ܐܐƉܕ DLP: ܐܐƉ B ̇ ܘ + [ܐܦ <sup>ܗ</sup> B | ܐƀــƇܓ...**<sup>19</sup>** ܗܝ̣ BDL: ƦــſܐƀƇܓ P **<sup>21</sup>** ܗܝ̣ [ om. L **<sup>23</sup>** Ǝــƀ̈ ƌܕܗ BDL: ܢŴــƌܕܗ P ̇ ܘܐ | L ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ :BDP ܕܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ܗ [+ Ǝſܕ B | ܗܘ̣ űƃ] om. L

302 In this way, then, each of those things which are contraries persists even after the perishing of its counterpart. E.g., black exists apart from white, and also white does not perish if there is no black. But there is neither large apart from small nor few apart from many, since their subsistence is based on their reference to one another. Thus, if there is no father, then the word "son" may not be applied any more, and if a slave is taken away, the name "master" perishes together with him394.

One may also argue like this395 303 . There is nothing that is able to be receptive 5b33–6a4 of those things that are contraries at the same time. E.g., white and black may not be present in the same body at once. However, what is called large and small may be receptive of both (characteristics) at once, since, as we have said, for a mountain, for a grain and for many other things it is possible at the same time to be both large and small, many and few. Thus, the same mountain turns out to be large in relation to one (mountain) which is smaller than it, and small in relation to another which is bigger than it. Also, e.g., the number fifty is considered many in relation to twenty and few in relation to one hundred. Hence, also from this it becomes obvious that large and small do not belong to things which are contraries but to those that are grasped in relation to something else396.

304 In order to make this completely apparent, I am saying that there is 6a4–11 nothing at all that might be contrary to itself or become its own opposite397. For what is receptive of contrariety remains one and the same at different times. But a person who states that large and small are among contraries, since each

**<sup>394</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 63.20–25.

**<sup>395</sup>** Ammonius notes that this argument of Aristole proceeds by way of *reductio ad impossibile*, see *In Cat.* 63.27: ἕτερον ἐπιχείρημα διὰ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγῆς (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 97.16).

**<sup>396</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 63.28–64.9; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 95.4–96.20.

**<sup>397</sup>** Here, as also above (cf. §223), Sergius applies both the term *dalqubla* and the adjective *saqqubla* synonymously for rendering the Gr. ἐναντίος, "contrary". Porphyry, in his questionand-answer commentary, makes a distinction between opposites and contraries, affirming that some quantities may be opposed to one another but not as contraries, see Porphyry, *In Cat.* 108.5–12.

ܐƢــƉܐƦƉ ܐűــŶ ܗܝ̣ űــƃ ܗܝ̣ ƎــƀƆܗ ƎــƉ̣ ܐűــŶ ƈــƃܕ ƈźƉ :ƎſųſƦſܐ ̇ ــƢ ̇ Ǝƍſ ܕܪܒܐ ܘܙƕــŴܪܐ܉ ܗƌܐ ̣ܗܘ Ŷــű Ɖــűܡ ܐƉ ܒŷƙــƊܐ ܐſــƅ ܕŶــŴ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƆܐ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ ܕƍƟــųƉŴ܂ ܘƐƃƦƉــƑ ܓƀƇܐſــƦ ܕܗ ̇ Ƣ܂ ƞƉܐ ųƊƆܘܐ ܐƉ

	-

̈Ʀſܐ ̈ܬܐ űƀŷſ 307 ƈƖƆ ܕƎſ ܘƦŶƦƆ ܗƣܐ ܙܕܩ ŪƐƊƆ܉ ŴƆ ܐƅſ ܕܒƞܒŴ ƎــſűƉ ܂Ǝƀ̈ ̈Ǝ ܐܦ ܗƌ ܕܬƎƌ܂ ܘܐܢ ܕƎſ Ɔܐ܉ ܒƊŷƙܐ ܕܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ƐƌƦƉܒ ̇ ܝ ܕƦƀƆ ܐܬܪܐ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ܓƌŴܐƦſ ƀŶܒ r105D ̇ <sup>ܐ</sup> ŪƐƊƆ ƈƖƆ܉ ̣ܗܝ ŴƉܙƦƆܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ƀƍƀƃܐ ƈƖƆ ųƍƉ <sup>25</sup> ̇ : ܘƦŶƦƆ ܐܪƕܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƦƀƆ ܐܬܪܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܕŶƦƉــƦܝ

**5** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ L: ܐƘŴƏŴƇƇƀƘ P: ܐƌܗ ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BD **7** ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕ2 BDL: ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕܕ P **9** ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕܕ BDP: ܐƇܒŴــƠƆܕ L **12** ܐƊــŷƙܕܒ BDP: ܐƊــŷƘܕ L **15** ܢƮܒــƦƐƉ] om. B **16** ܐƇܒŴــƠƆܕ [+ P ܐƌƢŶܐ :BDL ܐܬܪܐ | L ܘܗܝ :BDP ̣ܗܝ **24** BD ܐƦſܘܗܝ :LP ܗܘ **20** P ܒŴƀƊƄܬܐ

one of them is applied to the same subject by way of reference, as we have shown, to what is large or small, such a person is saying that the same thing is contrary to itself, thus being obviously wrong in stating what is impossible398.

305 Thus, the Philosopher demonstrates that, if they were contraries then they could not belong to quantity, and if they belonged to quantity then they could not be contraries. The truth is, however, that neither do they belong to quantity nor are they contraries, but rather they are associated with quantity through what is receptive of them399. Just as we have shown earlier that substance is receptive of contraries, so too we state about quantity that it is also receptive of them. Thus, as we have said, the truth is that their nature belongs to that genus which is grasped through relation to something else.

306 Now, if someone is absolutely bent on asserting that there is contrariety in 6a11–18 quantity, he deduces it from the constitution of place400. Indeed, up and down are parts of space, and they are easily grasped as contraries. For a definition of what is contrary goes like this: they are those things that are most distant from one another401. And this most of all applies to up and down, for these are furthest apart from one another. That is why someone might state, that they are contraries and occur in place, and since place belongs to quantity, they too belong to quantity. Thus, it turns out that there is contrariety in the division of quantity.

307 Now, up and down shall not be understood here as particular things in this world402. But even if they were, they should still be grasped through their relation to something else. In fact, people are generally inclined to understand up as the heavenly sphere, above which there is no other physical place, and

**<sup>398</sup>** Ammonius comments that with this argument Aristotle "increases the absurdity": ἐπιτείνων οὖν τὸ ἄτοπόν φησιν ὅτι εἰ ἔστι τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον, συμβήσεται οὐ μόνον τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ μάχεσθαι, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 64.11–13; cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 97.26–29).

**<sup>399</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 64.16–18: πρότερον ὑποθέμενος αὐτὰ ἐναντία εἶναι ἔδειξεν ὅτι ποσὰ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔπειτα ὑπέθετο ποσὰ καὶ ἔδειξεν ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐναντία. τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς οὔτε ποσά ἐστιν οὔτε ἐναντία, τῶν δὲ πρός τι. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 97.31–98.1.

**<sup>400</sup>** Sergius paraphrases *Cat*. 6a12–13: μάλιστα δὲ ἡ ἐναντιότης τοῦ ποσοῦ περὶ τὸν τόπον δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν.

**<sup>401</sup>** See *Cat*. 6a17–18: τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐναντία ὁρίζονται. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 64.25–65.1 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 99.22–23. Sergius omits the expression "in the same genus" in the definition (Ammonius, on the contrary, stresses this point, see 65.5–8).

**<sup>402</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 99.23–24: κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω.

̇Ɛܒܐ ƈƖƆ ܘŶƦƆــƦ܉ ̇ ܂ ܗƍƃܐ ܓƢƀ ƦƐƉܒƢܐ ƦƇƉܐ ܕƍƀƃܐƦſ ƌ ųƍƉ ̈Ɖــƀܐ ܘŴƆ ܒŷƙــƊܐ ܕƉــűܡ ܐŶــƌƢܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ܐܦ Ɔܐ ܗƃــƍܐ ܨܒƀــƎ űƟ ̈ܬܐ܂ Ɔܐ ܓƢƀ ƀƊƤƆܐ ƎƀƊŶƦƉ ƊƆܐƢƉ ܕŴƠƆܒŴƀƇܬܐ ܒƎſųƍƀƄ ܕܨܒŴ ųܒ ƎſƢƉܐ ܐƦƕƞƉܘ ܐƄƏ ܐƆܐ ܂ƦŶƦƆ ƎƀƊƀ ̇ P74r Ə ܐƕܐܪƆ ܐƆܘ ܉ƈƖƆ ܒƇƖــƊܐ ƃــű ƀƊŶƦƉــƎ ƊƆــŴܙƦƆܐ ܕܐſƦſــų <sup>5</sup> ̇ ƏــƄܐ ܘƕܒــƢܐ ܕƃــƈ܂ ̈ ſܐ܂ Ɔܐܪƕܐ ܕƎſ ƎƀƊƀƏ ܒƦƕƞƊܐ ܕųƇƃܘܢ ܗܘ

308 ƎſűƉ ܐܢ ƦƀƆ ƖƆــƈ ܘŶƦƆــƦ ܒƇƖــƊܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ƏــƄܐ ܘƕƞƉــƦܐ܉ Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƦƀƆ ܕŴƠƆܒŴƀƇܬܐ Ɔܐ ܒƇƖــƊܐ ܘƆܐ ܒƀƊƄــŴܬܐ܂ źƉــƈ r128B ܕƦƕƞƉܐ ܘƄƏܐ ܒŷƙــƊܐ ܕƆــŴܬ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ƦƉܐƉــƮܢ܂ ƏــƄܐ ܓƀــƢ ܂ųــƍƉ ŴܓــƆ ƅــƀ ̇ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƐƉ ܕƉــűܡ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƏــƄܐ܂ ܗƌ <sup>10</sup> ̇ــŴ ܕſــƎ ܕܗ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ̇ــŴ ܕſــƎ ܕܗ ̇ ƕƞƉــƦܐ܂ ܗƌ ܘƕƞƉــƦܐ ܬܘܒ ܕƉــűܡ ܐſƦſــų Ǝ̈ ̇ ܝ ܗƈƀƃ ܕƦƀƆ ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ܒŴƀƊƄܬܐ ƠƙƏ ܕܒŴŷܕܪܐ ƅſƢƃ ųƆ܂ ƈƕ ܗ ̇ ųƆ Ǝ ̈ ̇ ܐܡ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ܕƙƀƠƌ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ܘƌܐܬܐ ƎƆ ƈƀƄƉ ŴƆܬ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕƏ űƀŷſܐƦſ܂

̇ ƢſƦſܘܬܐ <sup>309</sup> ŷƀƄƣܐ ܕƎſ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ܐƢŶܬܐ ܒŴƀƊƄܬܐ܉ ܗ v28L ̇ ܝ ܕƦƀƆ ܒų ̇ ܕƦƉܐƢƉܐ ƀƊƃــŴܬܐ ̈ܬܗ ŴƍƉ ƎƉ̣ ܐűŶ ̇ ܘܒƢſƞܘܬܐ܂ ƈźƉ ܕųſƦƀƆ ̇ ܉ ܐƆܐ ƎſųƇƃ ܒűŷܐ ŴſŴƣܬܐ ƀƍƟــƎ ƣــƊܐ ܘƀƃــƍܐ ܬܗƢܒŶ ƎƉ̣ ƢſƦſ ̇ ܐ܂ Ɔܐ ܓƢƀ ƍƀƍƉܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ſƦſــƢ ̣ƉــƎ ƇƉــƦܐ: ܘƆܐ ܕܓŴ ̇ ܕƎſ ܒŴƉűܬܐ܉ ܐܦ Ɔܐ ܒƢſƞ ̣ƎƉ ܬܘܒ ƦƇƉܐ ܒƢſƞ ̣ƎƉ ƍƀƍƉܐ܂ ܒų ̇ ƇƉــƦܐ ƏــŴܪŹܐ ܐܘ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܒſƞــƢ ̣ƉــƎ ܓــƊƣŴܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƀƍƉــƍܐ ܐܘ ̇ ŷƀźƣــŴܬܐ ̇ ܐܬܪܐ ܐܘ ƀƊƃــŴܬܐ܂ ܗƃــƍܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܦ Ɔܐ ܙܒــƍܐ ܐܘ

ܘƦƕƞƉܐ **4** BD ܕܕŴƠƆܒŴƀƇܬܐ :LP ܕŴƠƆܒŴƀƇܬܐ **3** B ܘܐܦ :DLP ܐܦ | D űƉܡ :BLP ܕűƉܡ **2** ̇ ƄƏܐ ųſƦſܕܐ ܐƦƆܙŴƊƆ ƎƀƊŶƦƉ űƃ ܐƊƇƖܒ ųܒ ƎſƢƉܐ [om. hom. L | ųܒ ƎſƢƉܐ ̇ ƏــƄܐ ܘƕܒــƢܐ ܕƃــƈ Ɔــܐܪƕܐ ܕſــƎ ƀƊƀƏــƎ ųــſƦſܕܐ ܐƦƆܙŴــƊƆ ƎــƀƊŶƦƉ űــƃ ܐƊــƇƖܒ ̈ ſܐ ƎſűƉ ܐܢ ƦƀƆ ƈƖƆ ܘƦŶƦƆ ܒƊƇƖܐ ܐƆܐ ƏــƄܐ ܘƕƞƉــƦܐ [ܒƦƕƞƊܐ ܕųƇƃܘܢ ܗܘ om. hom. P **6** ƎƀƊƀƏ Ǝſܕ [inv. B **8** ܬܐŴƀƇܒŴƠƆܕ LP: ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕ BD | ܐƆ] om. D **9** ܢƮƉܐƦƉ L: ƎſƮƉܐƦƉ BDP **<sup>10</sup>** ܘ ̇ ̇ ܘ :DLP ܕܗ BD ܕŴƠƆܒŴƀƇܬܐ :LP ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ | B ̣ܗܘ + [ܕܒŴŷܕܪܐ **12** B ܗ **13** ܐܬܐƌܘ LP: ܐܬܐƌ BD | ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƘŴƏŴƇƇƀƘ P **16** ܬܐŴƀƊƃ] om. P **17** ܐƊƣ DLP, corr. B in marg.: ܐƊſŴƟ B | ܐƍƀƃܘ LP: ܐƀƌŴƃܘ BD **18** ܐƦƇƉ ܬܘܒ ܐƆܘ [ditt. in P ̇ ܕƎſ ܒŴƉűܬܐ ܐܦ Ɔܐ ܒƢſƞ ̣ƎƉ **<sup>19</sup>** ųܒ ܐƍƀƍƉ] om. hom. B | ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ D **<sup>20</sup>** Ƣſƞܒ ̇ ܐܘ BDP: Ƣſƞܘܒ L

down as the earth, below which there is no other place. This is how human reason naturally understands up and down rather then through their relation to something else. But it is not this way that the ancients wished to explain the contrariety in the nature of things. For they did not define up as heaven, nor did they apply down to earth. Instead, they spoke of the outer limits and centre in the world, thus defining heaven as the limit and the boundary of everything, while placing earth in the centre of everything that exists403.

308 Thus, if there is no up and down in the world but (only) outer limits and centre, it is apparent that contrariety is neither in the world nor in quantity, since limits and centre are spoken of in relation to something else. For a limit is a limit of something, namely of what is limited by it; and also a centre is a centre of something, namely of what surrounds it as a sphere404. So, what has been said thus far concerning the fact that no contrariety is in quantity should suffice. Next, we will turn to other concomitants which the Philosopher considered to be peculiar to it.

#### *[Other properties of quantity]*

309 So, there is another property of quantity, namely that it does not admit of 6a19–25 more and less, because none of its parts may be called more quantity than the other, but all of them equally possess its name and general nature. For number is not more quantity than language, neither is language less (quantity) than number. Similarly, number or language are no less quantity than line or body. So also, time, or place, or surface are called quantity to no greater or lesser an

**<sup>403</sup>** Periphrasis of *Cat*. 6a11–12: τὴν πρὸς τὸ μέσον χώραν κάτω λέγοντες, διὰ τὸ πλείστην τῷ μέσῳ διάστασιν πρὸς τὰ πέρατα τοῦ κόσμου εἶναι. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 99.28–100.29. **404** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 65.1–3.

̇ ſƦſــƢ ƍƉــųܘܢ܂ ܐƆܐ Ƈƃــųܘܢ ܐܘ ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ̣ Ƣſƞܒ ܬܐŴƀƊƃ ƎſƢƟƦƉ ̇ ܒŴƉűܬܐ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ƀƊƃــŴܬܐ܂ ܘƆܐ ̇ ƢƉܬ܉ ܒų ̈Ɔܓܐ ܐƍƄſܐ ܕܐ ŴƘ ܗ܂ƢܒŶ ƎƉ̣ Ƣſƞܒ ̇ ̇ ƢſƦſ ܐܘ ܐƦſ űŶ ųƍƉܘܢ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒų

̇ ܂ ܐƎƌƢƉ ܓƢƀ ̣ƎƉ ƈƖƆ܉ ܕƦƀƆ ܕŴƠƆܒŴƀƇܬܐ 310 ܘܗܕܐ ܙܕƟܐƦſ ܐųſƦſ ܐƇܒŴــƠƆܕܕ Ǝــƀ̇ P74v | ƌܕܗ ܐƄܒــŶ ƎــƉ̣ ܘܬܐƢſƞܘܒ Ǝſܕ ܘܬܐƢſƦſ ܬܐ܂ŴƀƊƄܒ űƇſƦƉܐ܂ ܘƈźƉ ܕƀƆــƦ ܒƀƊƄــŴܬܐ ܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ܉ ſűſــƖܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕܐܦ Ɔܐ v105D ̇ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ƙƀƠƌܐ ųƇƄƆ ƎƘܐ ܐƆܐ ܐ܂ƢƉܐƦƉ ƦſܐƢſƞܘܒ ƦſܐƢſƦſ ̇ ܒŴŷƇܕ ŷƀƄƣܐ܂ ŴŷƉܝ ƎƆ ܓƢƀ ܒƢƤܒܐ ܕűƟܡ ܗƌܐ܉ ܕܐܦ ܗܕܐ܉ ŴƆ ܒų ̇ ̈ܬܗ Ɔܐ ܐܘƀƏܐ ƦƉܐƢƉܐ ƢſƦſܐƦſ ܘܒƢſƞܐƦſ܂ ܐƆܐ ƎſųƇƃ ƍƉــŴ ſŴƣܐƦſ ƦƉܐƮƉܢ ܐܘƀƏܐ܂ <sup>10</sup>

<sup>311</sup> ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ܕƎſ ƦſƦŶܬܐ ܕƙƀƠƌܐ ŴƀƊƄƆܬܐ ܒŴŷƇܕųſ v128B ̇ : ܘƆܐ ŷƀƄƣܐ ̇ ܉ ŴſŴƣܬܐ ܘƆܐ ŴſŴƣܬܐ܂ ܗܕܐ ܓƢƀ ̈Ɛܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܐųſƦſ ƍܓ ƎƉ̣ űŷܒ ̇ ܕƀƊƃــŴܬܐ ƀƠƌــƙܐ܉ ܘܒſųــƎ ܒŷƇــŴܕƎſųſ ŶƦƉــſŵܐ܂ ̈ܬܗ ŴƍƉ ƎſųƇƄƆ ƦƉܐƢƉ ܓƢƀ ƍƀƍƉܐ ܕŴƣܐ Ƌƕ ƍƀƍƉܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܘܕƆܐ Ŵƣܐ ųƊƕ܂ ܘܬܘܒ ƇƉــƦܐ ܒŵܒــƎ ܕƣــſŴܐ ƦƉܐƉــƢܐ ƕــƋ ƇƉــƦܐ ܐŶــƢܬܐ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܉ ܘܒŵܒــƎ ܕƆܐ ƣــſŴܐ܂ ܘƏــŴܪŹܐ ܘŷƀźƣــŴܬܐ ܘܓــƊƣŴܐ: ܕܐƃــŴܬܗ ܘܙܒƍܐ ܬܘܒ ܘܐܬܪܐ܉ ƈƃ űŶ ųƍƉܘܢ ƦƉܐƢƉ ܕŴƣܐ Ƌƕ ܒƢ ܐܕųƣ űƃ ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ̣ ܐűŶ ƈƃܕ ܉ƦſܐƀƇܓ ܕܐųܒ ƎƍſűƖƉ Ƣƀܓ ƎƇƃ ܐ܂Ŵƣ ܐƆܘܕ ƎــſűƉ ܐ܂ſŴــƣ ܐƆ ̇ ̇ ܕƣــſŴܐ ܐܘ ųــſƢƉܐƌ ̇ ܬܗƢܒــŶ Ƌــƕ ܐƊــŷƘƦƉ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ſƦŶــƦܬܐ ܕƀƠƌــƙܐ űƀŷſܐſــƦ ƀƊƄƆــŴܬܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕųſ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܉ ܗܕܐ ܐƆܘ ƦſܐſŴƣ ƥƍƇƃ ƎƉ̣ Ǝܙܒ ƈƄܒ ܐƢƉܐƦƉܕ ܂ƎƌƢƉܕܐ ƅſܐ ̇ L40r ųſƦſܐ ſŴƣܐƦſ܂

**5** ܐƇܒŴــƠƆܕܕ BDP: ܐƇܒŴــƠƆܕ L **8** ܕܐܦ BDP: ܐܦ L **11** ܬܐƦــſƦŶ BDL: ܐƦــſܐƦſƦŶ P **13** Ǝــſųܘܒ LP: ƎــſųƍƉܘ BD **14** ܐƍــƀƍƉ1] om. P | ܐƆܘܕ BLP: ܐƆܘ D **18** ƎــƇƃ DLP: ƈــƃ B **<sup>19</sup>** ܐſŴــƣܕ BDL: ƦſܐſŴــƣܕ P | ܐƆ ̇ ܐܘ L: ܐƆܘܕ BDP **20** ܬܐƦــſƦŶ BDL: ܐƦــſƦſƦŶ P Ʀſܐűƀŷſ] om. B **<sup>21</sup>** ƅſܐ [om. P | ƎƌƢƉܕܐ DLP: ƎƍſƢ ̇ Ɖܕܐ B

extent than them. But, as we have said, all its kinds are equally quantity, and none among them is more or less then the others405.

310 And this is plausible, for we have said above that there is no contrariety in quantity, it being from a mixture of contraries that more and less arise406. But since there are no contraries in quantity, it is apparent that more and less are not applied to it. However, although this property is characteristic of all of quantity, it is not found only in it. For it has been shown to us in the previous section that substance does not admit of more and less either407, but all parts of substance are equally said to be substance.

311 Now, the property of quantity in the strict sense which is concomitant for it 6a26–35 alone and does not happen to occur to any other genera is being equal and unequal408. For this is characteristic of all parts of quantity and appears only in them409. A number is said to be equal to another number or unequal to it. Also, an utterance410 is sometimes called equal to another utterance which is like it and sometimes unequal. Line, surface, and body, and also time and place each one of them is called either equal to something of its kind or unequal411. What we obviously mean by this is that, when each one of them is compared to something else, we characterize it either as equal or as unequal. That is why an individual property of quantity in the strict sense which is concomitant for it alone, as we have said, is that it is always and by everyone called equal and unequal.

**<sup>405</sup>** This argument does not appear in Ammonius and Philoponus. Instead, Philoponus stresses that, similar to substance, quantity is receptive of contraries (τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικήν), but does not have the contrariety itself, see *In Cat.* 101.1–19.

**<sup>406</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 65.13–16: καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ὅπου γάρ ἐστιν ἐναντιότης, ἐκεῖ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, ὅπου δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον εὑρίσκεται· τὸ γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἐναντίων μίξεως γίνεται (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 101.23–25).

**<sup>407</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 65.20–21; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 101.25–26.

**<sup>408</sup>** See *Cat*. 6a26: ἴδιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι.

**<sup>409</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 101.29–102.1: τοῦτο κυρίως ἴδιόν ἐστι τοῦ ποσοῦ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ μόνῳ ὑπάρχει καὶ παντί.

**<sup>410</sup>** Syr. *mellta*, Gr. λόγος.

**<sup>411</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 102.1–3.

P75r ܬܐ܂ŴــƀƊƃ ƈــƕ ܐܦ ƦــƊƣܪ ܕܬųƕܕܐܬ ܡűƉ ƅſܐ ƈƀƃܗ ƎƀƆܗ 312 ̇ ű ܐƌܐ ܐܦ ܬƌــƎ ̇ ܕܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ܂ ܘƈƀƄƉ ƕܒ ܐƅſ ܬܪƦƀƕܗ ܕųƀƇƕ ƊƆŴƣܐ ƊƆܐƢƉܐ ܗƌܐ܉ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ ܬܐ܂ŴƇƀƇƊܕܒ ܐƣܕܘܪ ƈźƉ űܒƖƊƆ Ʀƀ ̇ ܗܕܐ: ܕƐƌ

ƋƇƣ ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ܂ <sup>5</sup>

ܐƖܕܐܪܒ ܐƢƉܐƉܕ ܓܐƆ̈ B129r ŴƘ ƆŴƘܓܐ ƀƉűƟܐ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ

̈ܕܐ – ƍƀƍƉܐ ƦƇƉܐ űŶ ƎƉ̣ <sup>Ǝ</sup> ̈ ̇ ܘƊŶƦƉ ̈ܬܗ ŴƍƉ ƎƤſƮƘ ̇ ųƍƉ ̈ܕܐ – ƏــŴܪŹܐ ŷƀźƣــŴܬܐ űــŶ ƎــƉ̣ Ǝــ̈ ̈ܢ ܘƆܐ ƠƀƐƘ ܘƍƉــų <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܐƀŶــű ܓƊƣŴܐ ܐܬܪܐ ܙܒƍܐ

D106r Ǝſܕܬܪ ܓܐƆŴƘ ܘܬܘܒ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ܐŹܪŴــƏ – ƎــſܗƦƀƃ ̈ ̈ ــƎ ܒűܘ ̇ ܘƊƀƟ ̈ܬܗ ŴــƍƊƆ ܐƊــƀƏ Ʀــſܐ ̇ ųــƍƉ Ŵŷƀźƣܬܐ ܓƊƣŴܐ ܐܬܪܐ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܐƆܐ ƦƤƉ̈ܪſــƎ ܒܐſــűܐ ܒܐſــűܐ – ̈ܬܗ ŴــƍƉ ܪܢ̈ƦــƄƉ ܐƆ ̇ ܘųƍƉ ܙܒƍܐ ƦƇƉܐ ƍƀƍƉܐ

**<sup>1</sup>** ƎƀƆܗ LP: ̇ ųſƦſܐ BD | ܡűƉ ƅſܐ LP: ܐƊƃܐ BD **<sup>2</sup>** ܗƦƀƕܬܪ BDP: ܐƦƀƕܬܪ L | ̇ [ܕųƀƇƕ om. D | ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ LP: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܕܐܪ D **5** ƋƇƣ] + ܒƦƄƊƆ P ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ ܕƢƏܓƀــƑ ܐܪƀƃܐŹــƢܘܣ + [ܕܐܪܒــƖܐ | D .om] ƇƣــƋ ƉܐƉــƢܐ ܕܐܪܒــƖܐ ̈ Ɔܓܐ ܕƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ **6** B ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ŴƘ L: ܐƢƉܐƉܕ ųƇſܕ ܓܐƆŴƘ P: om. BD **9** ƎƤſƮƘ BDL: ƎƣƮƙƉ P | Ǝ ̈ ƊŶƦƉܘ BDL: Ǝ ̈ ƊŶƦƉ P **<sup>10</sup>** ̇ ųƍƉܘ LP: ƎſųƍƉܘ BD | ܕܐ̈ űŶ] + ̇ ̈ ܬܗ ŴƍƉ P **<sup>11</sup>** ܐƍܙܒ [om. L; + Ǝ̈ ̈ܕܐ ܘƆܐ ƠƀƐƘ ̈ܢ ܒűŷ ̈ܢ ܘܐűƀŶ űƀŷƉ ƎſųƍƉܘ BD **14** ܐƊƀƏ BDP: ܐƊƀƟ L | Ǝ ̈ ƊƀƟܘ DLP: Ǝ ̈ ƊŶƦƉܘ B **16** ܐűſܒܐ1 DL: ܐűſܐ BP

312 These remarks bring to an end this book, which is the fourth of the treatise that I wrote on the study of logic, where I described quantity according to the teaching of Aristotle based on what I could remember412.

#### End of Book Four.

#### *Divisions of Book Four*

*First division*

Of quantities:


#### *Second division*

Also, of quantities:


**<sup>412</sup>** It is possible that here Sergius refers to his notes (ὑπομνήματα) written on the basis of Ammonius' lectures.

#### B129v ܐƤƊŶܕ ܐƢƉܐƉ

313 ܒƊܐƢƉܐ ܕűƟܡ ܗƌܐ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܕܐܪܒــƖܐ ܕƦƄƉܒƍــŴܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܐƦſ ̈ L40v ŴــŶƦܒ ܬܐŴــƀƊƃ ƈƕܕ ܒܐƢƣ ųƇƃ ƎƍƠƙƌ ܬܐܕܘܪܐ܉ ܢŴŶܐ ܐܘ ̇ ܂ ܘܐܕƎƍŷƌ ܒų ܐƅſ ܕƦƐƉܒƢܐ ƆــƁ ܓƀƇܐſــƦ܉ ųƆ ƎƀƟܕܙܕ ܓܐƆŴ̈ P75v ƙܘܒ ųƇƃ ܪųƍƀƕ ܕƈƕ ƀƊƃــŴܬܐ ܕܐܪźƐſــƑƀƇŹŴ܂ ܒــƌųܐ ܕſــƎ ƉܐƉــƢܐ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܒƙƀƠƍــŴܬܐ ܪܕſܐ ܕܗƣܐ ƋƀƏ ƎƆ ƊƆܐƢƉ: ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܕƊŶــƤܐ܉ ܒــų ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܕƣــƃƢܐ ̣ƉــƎ ƍƙƇƉــŴܬܐ ƇƉــƦܐ ܘŷƉــſŴܐ ƕــƈ ܗ ̇ ܘ ܗܕܐ܉ ܐƅſ ƇƀŶܐ ܕƊƀƏܐ ܕƦƇƉܗ ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ܂ ܒƊܐƢƉܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܗ ܕƈƕ ƀźƟܓŴ̈ܪŴſܣ܉ ̣ƎƉ ܒƦܪ ŴƍƙƇƉܬܐ ܕƈƕ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ: ƈƕ ܓƍــƐܐ ƈƕ ܉ƈƖƆ ƎƉ̣ ƎƌƢƉܕܐ Ǝƀ̈ ƌܕܗ ܐƇƀŶ ƎƉ̣ ŪŹ űƃ ܂Ƣ ̇ ܗ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܘ ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ ܐƉ ̇ ܘ ܕܙƌܐ ƀŶܒܐ ܗܘܬ ųƆ ƦƀƉűƟ ܕƌܐƚƆ܂ ܓƐƍܐ ܗ

̇Ƣܐ ܒƇƊــƦܐ ܕƇƕــŴܗܝ ܕܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ܉ 314 ܘܒűܓŴܢ ܐܦ ƎƍŶ űƟܡ ܕƤƌ ܂ƎſܗƦƕűſ ƈƕ ŪŹ ܐƞƆܘܐ Ǝ̈ ŷƤŶܕ ƎƆ ƎſŵŶƦ ̈ Ɖܕ ƎƀƇſܐ ƢƉܐƊƆ ƎƆ <sup>ܩ</sup> ̇ D106v ܙܕ ̇ ܘ ܕܙƌܐ: ܘƇƉــƚ ̣ƉــƎ ƦƀƉűƟ ̣ܗܝ ܗܕܐ܉ ܕƈźƉ ƍƉܐ ƣܒــơ ܓƍــƐܐ ܗ ܒƦܪ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ƈƕ ܗƌܐ ܕƆــŴܬ Ɖــűܡ܂ ܕܬܪܬſــƎ ܕſــƎ܉ ƇƕــŴܗܝ ܕƍƀƃــų <sup>15</sup> ܕܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ ܕܕܐſــƅ ܐƄſــƍܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ܂ ܘܕܬƆــƦ ܕƍƉــŴ ƄŹــƐܐ ܕŴƍƙƇƉܬܗ ܒƢƤܒų ܕܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ܂ ܘܕܐƢƕܒƗ ܬܘܒ܉ ܕܐŴƍſ ƆŴƘܓܐ r130B ƈــƀƃܗ ƎــƀƆųƆ ܢ܂ƮƉܐƦƉ ܡűƉ ܬŴƆܕ ƎƀƇſܐ ƎſųƇƃ ƎƆ ƥ ̇ ƦſƦŶܐ ܕŶܒ ̇ ܩ܉ Ɔܐ ƐƉܒــƢ ܐƌܐ ܐܪܒƖܐ ̈ܪƣܐ ƃــű ƌܐƉــƢ ܐƌــŴܢ ܐſــƅ Ɖܐ ܕܙܕ ܕƣܒƎƍƀƠ ųƆ r76P ̇ ƦƇƊƆܐ ܕƈƕ ܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ ܕƆــŴܬ Ɖــűܡ: ܐſــƅ ܕܬܗܘܐ ̇ ƎſƢ܂ Ɵܕ ƎƀƇſܐ ƎƉ̣ ƥƌܐƆ ܐƠƐƕ

ܬܘܒ ƉܐƉــƢܐ ܕƊŶــƤܐ :D ƉܐƉــƢܐ ܕƊŶــƤܐ ܕųźƟܓــŴ̈ܪſܐܣ :L ƉܐƉــƢܐ ܕƊŶــƤܐ **1** ̇ ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ ܗܕܐ :P ܕƠƣŴƘܐ ܕźƟܓŴܪŴſܣ ܕܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ ܬܘܒ ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕƤƊŶܐ ܕųƇſ ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƠܕܒ B **2** ܐƢƉܐƊܒ [+ Ǝſܕ BD **5** ųƍƀƕܪ DLP: ųƇſܕ ܐƍƀƕܪ B | ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ P: ƑــƀƇźźƏܕܐܪ L: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܕܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƏܕܐܪ D **7** ܐƦــƇƉ BLP: ܢƦــƇƉ D ƀźƟܓŴ̈ܪŴſܣ **9** P ܕƘŴƏŴƇƀƘܐ :BDL ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ | B ܕƋƀƏ ƦƇƊƆܗ :DLP ܕƊƀƏܐ ܕƦƇƉܗ **8** L: ܣŴſܪŴܐܓźƟ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟ B: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓųŹܐƟ D **<sup>10</sup>** Ǝƀ̈ ƌܕܗ BDP: ƎƀƆܕܗ L **13** ƎſܗƦƕűſ BDL: ƎſųſƦƕűſ P **16** ܐƐƄŹ LP: ܐƐƘŴŹ BD, add. P in marg.

#### *BOOK FIVE*

#### *[Introductory questions]*

313 In the previous book, O brother Theodore, which was the fourth of the present treatise, we devoted our entire discussion to quantity by means of examples and divisions that were proper to it, and in it we have clearly explicated, as it seems to me, the whole concept of quantity in Aristotle. Now, in this book, which we are about to write and which is the fifth one, we will consequently discuss and explain what comes after this teaching according to the meaning which the Philosopher put into his words. Indeed, in his treatise *Categories* (κατηγορίαι), after the teaching on quantity, he speaks about the genus of relation413, though from the contents of what we have said above it might seem appropriate that he should have taught first about the genus of quality414.

314 Because of this, before starting to expound this genus, we ought to talk about those things which appear useful and quite necessary to know. First, why (Aristotle) leaves aside the genus of quality and after quantity teaches on relation. Second, what kind of nature this genus has. Third, what the order (τάξις) of his teaching is in the section on this genus. And fourth, what the correct division is that encompasses all those things that are said in relation to something415. These four points we shall properly consider, and I believe that we cannot leave them out in our discussion of the genus of relatives, for otherwise the latter might be difficult (to understand) for readers.

**<sup>413</sup>** The Syriac expression *lwat meddem*, "(related) to something", is a literal rendering of the Greek πρός τι. In those cases where the plural is implied, I will translate it as "relatives", while in those cases where it appears in the singular as "relation".

**<sup>414</sup>** For various notions of the sequence of the categories and the place of the category of relatives in it, cf. Simplicius, *In Cat.* 155.33–159.8. Sergius' words about the "contents of what we have said above" probably refer to §§129–133 and 241–242, where he discussed the order of the categories as compared to the order of nature. The same argument appears in Simplicius, who states that based on it qualities should be considered prior to relation. Cf. also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 102.17–22.

**<sup>415</sup>** Ammonius suggests discussing five introductory questions: (1) the sequence of the categories, (2) explanation of the title, (3) the independent existence, (4) the order of teaching, (5) division into species. See *In Cat.* 66.5–7: πρὸ τῆς τῶν πρός τι διδασκαλίας πέντε ταῦτα χρὴ ζητεῖν· τὴν τάξιν αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς τὴν ὑπόστασιν τὸν τρόπον τῆς διδασκαλίας τὴν εἰς τὰ εἴδη διαίρεσιν (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 102.13–16, who reverses the order of nos. 4 and 5). Sergius leaves out the second point by Ammonius, since it has apparently turned out to be irrelevant in Syriac.


**<sup>1</sup>** ƎſűƉ] + ƎƍŶ P | <sup>ܩ</sup> ̇ ܙܕ [+ ƎƆ P **2** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ P: ƑƀƇźźƐſܐܪ L: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ BD **3** ܐűŶ LP: ܐűŶܕ BD | ܐܢƀ ̈ ܓƏ BDL: Ǝſ ̈ ܐƀܓƏ P **<sup>5</sup>** ŴƍƉܕ BDP: ŴƍƉ L | ܝ ̇ ܗ [om. P **6** ܐƆ] + Ƣƀܓ P Ƣƀܓ ܗܘܬ [om. P **<sup>7</sup>** ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ BD **<sup>8</sup>** Ɨſűſ LP: ܥűſ BD **<sup>9</sup>** ̇ ܬܗŴƙƀƠƌ L: ̇ ̇ ŴƙƀƠƆܬܗ ųƆ BDP **11** ܡűƉ] om. L **12** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƙƆ BDL: ܐƘŴƏŴƇƀƙƆ P | ܐƦƖƣܕ [+ ƈƕ ܐƕƦƤƌܕ P **18** ̇ .om] 1ܐܘ ̇ ܒƇƊƐܐ **<sup>20</sup>**<sup>L</sup> ܐܘ BDP: ܐƇƊƐܘܒ L **21** ƎƍƀƊŶƦƉ LP: ƎƍŶ ƎƀƊƀƏ BD | ܐƍƃܗ ܢƦƀƕܪƦܒ [ inv. BD

315 So, it is necessary to start with the first point. Then we say that, since in the section on quantity Aristotle mentioned the genus of relation not once but several times, so as not to leave the mind of the hearer to wander about for too long trying to find out what this genus is, he provided the account of it straight away after his teaching on quantity. Indeed, it was not possible that something that has been applied to quantity in order to explain it could itself remain without explanation, so that pupils remain unaware of what it is. Otherwise, he would have brought the previous discussion into confusion and ruined its coherence. But since he referred to the genus of relation in the section on quantity, while explaining that there is no contrariety in quantity, it seemed (proper) for the Philosopher to put off for a moment the genus of quality and to turn to the teaching on this, so that the explanation which has been made about quantity would also become clear to those who learn it in close proximity to what they have just learned416.

316 About the nature of this genus we should know the following. Some writers state that it does not exist by nature at all, but only by a postulation which appears in our mind417. They say that of a particular person who may happen to be standing either on the right side or on the left of someone else we would say that he is on the right or on the left. It is not, however, the nature of this person that makes him to be on the right or on the left, but we define him this way in our mind. Now, they do not comprehend that the genus of relation is also known to nature, as the parts of the body are naturally placed according to it. Thus, e.g., the liver has been naturally created on the right and spleen on the

**<sup>416</sup>** Cf. the same argument by Ammonius, *In Cat.* 66.10–12: φαμὲν οὖν ὅτι ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ποσοῦ διδασκαλίᾳ ἐμνήσθη τῶν πρός τι, ἵνα μὴ ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐάσῃ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἀγνοοῦντα περὶ αὐτῶν, διὰ τοῦτο εὐθέως περὶ αὐτῶν ποιεῖται τὴν διδασκαλίαν (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 102.13–16).

**<sup>417</sup>** Ammonius discusses the problem of ὑπόστασις of relatives, i.e. whether they have independent existence and thus exist naturally (φύσει) or should be considered a construct of the human mind and thus exist only by convention (θέσει). In general, Sergius' account is very close to that of Ammonius.

ܘŷŹــƇܐ ܒƊƐــƇܐ܂ ܘƀƆــƦ ƉــƦܘܡ ܐƉــƦܝ ܕŷŹــƇܐ ܒƀƊƀــƍܐ ܘƃܒــűܐ ̈ܐ ŷƃƦƤƌــŴܢ܂ ܓƇــƀܐ ̣ܗܝ ſűƉــƎ ̇ ܬܪųſܘܢ ܒűŷ ̣ƉــƎ ܓــܒ ܒƇƊƐܐ ܐܘ ܕܐܦ ƍƀƄƆܐ Ɨſűſ ܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ܂

	-

̈ܬܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ 319 ܐƎƀƇſ ܕƎſ ܕܬܪƞſܐƦſ ƎƀƙƇƉ܉ ܐƎſƢƉ ܕƎſųƍƉ ܕܨܒŴ ƢſƢƣܐƦſ ܒƊſŴƠܐ ܕƦſܗƎſ܂ ܘƎſųƍƉ ܒܐŴƍƀŶܬܐ űƉܡ ܕƆــŴܬ Ŷــű <sup>20</sup> ̈ܕܐ ̈ Ǝ: ̣ܕܗƎƀƌ ܗƎƀƆ ̣ƎƉ ܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ ܐƦſܘܗܝ Ǝſųƍƀƃ܂ ƊƀƟƦƉ ̇ ƃܐƘܐ: ̇ ܝ ܕܐųſƦſ ̇ ƃܐƘܐ ܒų ̇ ܝ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒƤƌƢܐ: ܐܘ ܒƤƌƢܐ ܓƢƀ ܒų ܘܐƀƌƮŶــƦܐ ܕܐſــƅ ܗƀƆــƎ܉ ƢſƢƣܐſــƦ ܐſųſƦſــƎ ſųƍƉــƎ ܘſųƆــƎ

**1** ܘܡƦƉ BDL: ܘܡƦƊƉ P | ܐűܒƃܘ BDL: ܐƢܒƄܘܒ P **4** ܪܘܣŴܐܓŹܘƢƘ LP: ܣŴſܪŴܐܓŹܘƢƘ BD **8** ƋƆ] om. BD **11** ƎſűƀŶܘܐ LP: ƎſűŶܘܐ BD **12** ܗܘܐ [om. BD | ܢƮſƢƣܕ [+ ƋƆ BD **13** ƋƆ] om. L **14** ܪܐŴܐܓŹܘƢƘ BDP: ܐſܪŴܐܓŹܘƢƘ L **15** ƈƀƃܗ LP: ܐƍƃܗ BD | ܗܕܐ LP: ܐƌܗ BD **<sup>16</sup>** ƥƌܐ ƢƉܐƌܕ LP: Ʀƌܐ Ƣ ̇ Ɖܕܐ BD **<sup>17</sup>** ƎƍſƢ ̇ Ɖܕܐ DLP: ƎſƢƉܕܐ B | Ʀƌܐ ƢſƢƣ BDP: ƦſܐƢſƢƣ L **20** ƦــſܐƢſƢƣ] + ƦــſܐſƢƣ add. BD in marg. **21** ܐƌܗ om. BD **23** ƅſܕܐ BDL: ƅſܕܕܐ P ƦſܐƢſƢƣ BDL: ƦſܐſƢƣ P

left, and it never comes about that the spleen is on the right or the liver on the left, or that both of them are found on one side418. From this, it is apparent that this genus is also known to nature.

317 Others claimed just the opposite of this, i.e. that everything in this world is constituted by this genus, one of them being Protagoras the sophist. Now, this sophist together with others like him used to say that whatever a person states is true, even if in reality it is the opposite of what he states. So, the one who says that honey is sweet is speaking truly, for it is sweet to those who taste it while being healthy. But also the one who states that honey is bitter is speaking truly too, for it is bitter for those whose sense of taste is unhealthy because they suffer from the illness called jaundice419. And about all other things he was eager to state in the same way that some of them are true in relation to one thing and others in relation to something else.

318 But Plato refuted him, telling him the following: "Protagoras, either you speak truly when you say this or you speak falsely. Now, if you are speaking falsely, then we shall not believe you, since you are lying. And if you are speaking truly, stating that everything what one says is true, then, if we say that what you state is not true, we will be speaking truly and you again will be proven a liar."420

319 Now, those who teach correctly state that some things exist firmly being self-subsistent, while others appear in some relation to one another, and it is the nature of the latter things that belongs to the genus of relation. E.g., a man in that he is a man, or a stone in that it is a stone, and other things like that

**<sup>418</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 66.21–26: περὶ δὲ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτῶν τινὲς μὲν ἔλεγον μηδὲν εἶναι τῶν πρός τι φύσει ἀλλὰ θέσει, οἷον τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερὸν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, οἵτινες οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν· οὕτω γὰρ ἔγνωσται ταῦτα τῇ φύσει, ὡς καὶ τὰ μόρια τοῦ σώματος σχέσει τινὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα θεωρεῖται, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἧπαρ δεξιὸν ὁ δὲ σπλὴν ἀριστερός, καὶ οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο οὔτε τὸ ἧπαρ ἀριστερὸν οὔτε ὁ σπλὴν δεξιός (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 103.20–28).

**<sup>419</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 66.26–67.2: τινὲς δὲ πάντα πρός τι ἔλεγον, ὧν εἷς ἐστι Πρωταγόρας ὁ σοφιστής· οὗτος γὰρ ἔλεγεν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ὁτιοῦν λέγων ἀληθεύει· ὁ γὰρ λέγων ὅτι τὸ μέλι γλυκύ ἐστιν ἀληθεύει (πρός τινας γὰρ γλυκύ ἐστι), καὶ ὁ λέγων αὐτὸ πικρὸν ἀληθεύει· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς ἰκτεριῶντας πικρόν ἐστι (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 103.31–104.13).

**<sup>420</sup>** Sergius' account finds a close parallel in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 67.2–7: τοῦτον οὖν Πλάτων ἐλέγχων φησὶν ὅτι 'ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἀληθεύεις λέγων, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ὁτιοῦν λέγων ἀληθεύει, ἢ ψεύδῃ· εἰ μὲν οὖν ψεύδῃ, εἰκότως διὰ τοῦτό σοι οὐ πιστεύσομεν, εἰ δ' ἀληθεύεις λέγων ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ὁτιοῦν λέγων ἀληθεύει, λέγομεν δὲ περὶ σοῦ ὅτι ψεύδῃ, ἀληθεύομεν ἄρα, ὥστε πάλιν ψεύδῃ, καὶ οὐ πάντα τῶν πρός τί ἐστι.' (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 104.18–25). Plato's words derive from *Theaetetus* 170C. However, Ammonius paraphrases this passage, and it is Ammonius' version that Sergius quotes instead of the text of the *Theaetetus*.

̇ ųƌܘܐ űƉܡ ̇ ƢƉܐ: ܐܘ ܒƎſųƉŴƍƠ܂ <sup>ܗ</sup> | v77P ̇ <sup>ܝ</sup> ܕƎſ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐƥƌ ̣ƕܒűܐ ܐܘ D107v ̈ſــƎ: ܘƆܐ ̣ܗܘܐ ̈ܕܐ ŵŶƦƉ ̇ ܐƙƕܐ܉ ܗƎƀƆ ܒܐƢƏܐ ܕŴƆܬ Ŷــű ƇƘܓܐ ܐܘ ̇ ƈƃ űŶܐ ƎſųƍƉ ƤſƢƘܐ܂ ܘܗƍƃܐ ܐƅſ ܬܪƀƕــƦܐ ܕܗƀƆــƎ܉ ̇ ܘųƆ ųƍƉ ̈ܬܐ ܐſųſƦſــƎ ̣ƉــƎ ܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ ܓƀƇܐ ̣ܗܝ ܘƖſűſܐ ܕƆܐ ƎſųƇƃ ܨܒŴ ̈ܢ ƍƉــų ܐſــƅ ܐƅſ ܕܨܒ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܐ ƢƘܘŹܐܓŴܪŴſܣ܂ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ƆܓƢƊ ܓƀƇــŵ ̇ ܒــųܕܐ ̇ ƌــŴܢ ̣ܕƉــƎ ƉűƟــŴܗܝ܂ ܐƆܐ ܬܬƀƏــƋ ܕܐſƦſــų ųƆ ƦــſŵŶܕܐܬ ̇ ܝ ܕƇƖƉܐ ųƆ ƆܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ űƃ ŴƆ ƢſƢƣܬܐ ܬܪƦƀƕܐ ܕŴƠƀźźƙſƢƘ܂ ܗ ̈ƍƀܐ ƀƐƍƉܐ ŷƊƆܒƥ ܒų܂ ƃ ܘܢųƇƃ

	- ̈ƀܐ ̈ܬܐ ̣ƎƉ ܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ ܒƌŵ Ŵܨܒ Ǝ̈ ̈ƀܐ ܕƎſ ܕƆܐ ܕƎƀƉ ƐƌƦƉܒ 322 ܒƌŴƄ ܡűƉ ƥ ̇ ̇ ܘ ܕŶܒ ̇ Ƣ ܐƌܐ ܕƎſ ܕܐƅſ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ƦƀƉűƟ ܒƌŵܐ ܗ ̈ ƀܐܐ܂ ܐƉ Əܓ ܘŶƦƉܒــƥ: ܐƃــƌŵܐ ܕƇƘــܓܐ ܘܐƕــƙܐ܂ ƇƘــܓܐ ܓƀــƢ ܕܐƕــƙܐ Ɖــűܡ

**1** ƎſųƉŴــƍƠܒ BDL: ƎſųƀƉŴــƍƠܒ P | ܘܐųƌ BDL: ܘųƌܐ̣ P **7** ܐƦƀƕܬܪ LP: ܗƦƀƀƕܬܪ BD ŴƠƀźźƙſƢƘܕ B: ŴƠƀźźƘƢƘܕ L: ŴƠƀźŹܐƙſƢƘܕ D: ܣŴƠƀźźƙſƢƘܕ P | ܝ ̇ ̇ ܝ :BD ܗ ųܒ L: om. P **9** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƘŴƏŴƇƇƀƘ P **10** ܘƢƉܕܐܬܐ BDL: ƢƉܕܐܬܐ P **11** ƎƀƇſܐ1 DL: ƎƀƇſܐƆ BP ƎƀƇſܐ2 BDL: ƎƀƇſܐƆ P **12** ƋƀƏܐܬܬ BDL: ŴƊƀƏܐܬܬ P **14** Ǝſܕ ܓܐƆŴƘ LP: ƎſűƉ BD | ܐܦ ̈ ܐ **15** P ܘܐܦ :BDL ̈ ܐ :BDP ܒųƊƤ ųƊƤƉ L **<sup>16</sup>** ܘ ̇ ̇ ܘ :LP ܗ ܕܗ BD, Epit. **<sup>19</sup>** Ǝ̈ ܒƐƌƦƉ L, Epit.: Ǝ̈ ̈ ܬܐ | BDP ܕƐƌƦƉܒ Ŵܨܒ [om. BDP, Epit. **<sup>21</sup>** ƎƀƉܕ [+ ܕܐ̈ űŷƆ P **23** ܐƙƕܘܐ BD: ܐƙƕܒܐ L, corr. P in marg.: ܐƙƌܒܐ P

have firm existence of their own. But for someone to be a slave or a master, or for something to be a half or a double, such things appear in their being linked to one another, and each of them does not exist separately on its own. Thus, according to their opinion, it is obvious and reasonable that neither all things belong to this genus, as Protagoras believed, nor are they completely deprived of it, as it seemed to those (about whom we spoke) at first. Instead, a true notion about this has been proposed by the Peripatetics, according to which not all of the natures turn out to be encompassed by this genus421.

320 The mode of teaching on this genus which the Philosopher employs is this. First he gives the definition of it that has been suggested by those who were before him, while refuting those statements which seem wrong to him and accepting those which have been made correctly. To this end, he gives his own definition of this genus in all accuracy and consequently reports what relates to the account of it422.

321 The correct division that is appropriate for this genus is this. Some (relatives) are signified by means of similar names, while others by means of dissimilar names423. Those signified by means of similar names are when we say that what is similar is similar to what it is similar to, or what is equal is equal to what it is equal to. And other things like that which belong to the genus of relation are signified by means of those names that are similar to each other.

322 By means of dissimilar names, on the other hand, things pertaining to this genus may be grasped in multiple ways. What I mean is this. First, by way of (relating) a container of something and what is contained, e.g. a half and a

**<sup>421</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 67.7–11; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 104.25–36.

**<sup>422</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 67.11–14: τρόπῳ δὲ διδασκαλίας κέχρηται τοιῷδε· πρότερον ἀποδίδωσι τὸν ὁρισμὸν αὐτῶν, ὃν οἱ παλαιοὶ ἔθεντο, εἶτα δείκνυσιν ἄτοπα πολλὰ τῷ ὁρισμῷ τούτῳ ἑπόμενα, καὶ οὕτως ἕτερον αὐτὸς ἴδιον αὐτῶν ἀποδίδωσιν, ὃ καὶ μόνοις καὶ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 105.12–16).

**<sup>423</sup>** I.e. by means of homonymy and heteronymy. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 67.16–18: ἡ δὲ διαίρεσις τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν αὕτη· τῶν πρός τι τὰ μὲν καθ' ὁμωνυμίαν <...> τὰ δὲ καθ' ἑτερωνυμίαν (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 105.1–2).

ܐƦſܘܗܝ ƇƘܓܐ܂ ܘܐƕــƙܐ ܬܘܒ ܕƇƘــܓܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܐƕــƙܐ܂ ܘܒــƌŵܐ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƖƤƉܒــű: ܐſــƅ ܙƌܐ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕŻƀƇƣ ܘܕܗ ̇ ܘ ܐƌƢŶܐ܉ ܕܗ ܬܘܒ ܗ ܕƢƉܐ ܘƕܒűܐ܂ ƢƉܐ ܓƀــƢ ܕƕܒــűܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƉــƢܐ܂ ܘƕܒــűܐ ܬܘܒ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƘــƢܫ ܘƘƦƉــƢܫ܂ ܐƃــƌŵܐ ܕƢƉܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƕܒــűܐ܂ ܘܐſــƅ ܗ ܕűƊƇƃܡ ƦƉܪܓƍƤܐ ̣ܗܘ ƢƆܓƦƤܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ƦƉܪܓƍƤܐ܂ ܘܐſــƅ <sup>ܗ</sup> <sup>5</sup> ̇ <sup>ܘ</sup> ܬܘܒ Ɖܐ ܕƀŶƦƉــƎ ƀƆــƍƙƆŴܐ Ɖــűܡ܂ ܐƃــƌŵܐ ܕƄƏــƌƦƆŴܐ ܒƐــƇƃŴܐ r108D ̇ ܐ űſܘƌƦƕܐ܂ ̇ űſܘƌƦƕܐ ܒƦƕűƀܐ űƉܡ ܗܘ ̇ ܐ ƌƦƆŴƄƏܐ܂ ܐܘ űƉܡ ܗܘ ̇ ܂ ܐƃــƌŵܐ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƍƉــų ̇ ܘ ܬܘܒ Ɖܐ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƇƕــƦܐ ܘܗ ܘܐſــƅ ܗ ̇ܒű űƉܡ ̇ ܘ ܬܘܒ Ɖܐ ܕƕ ܕܐܒܐ ŴƆܬ ܒƢܐ ܘܒƢܐ ŴƆܬ ܐܒܐ܂ ܘܐƅſ ܗ ƎــƉ̣ ƗƇ ̇ ̇ ܘ ܕܒ ̇ ŷܐ: ܘܗ Ɖ ƗƇ ̇ ̇ ܘ ܕܒ ųƆ ܐŷ ̇ ܘŶܐܫ ųƍƉ܂ ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕܗ v78P ̇ ܘ ܕƉ ̇ ܘ ̇ ƗƇ܂ ܘܐƅſ ƊƀƏܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܒܐܬܪܐ Ɖــűܡ܂ ܐƃــƌŵܐ ܕܗ ̇ ŷܐ ܒ ܗ r132B ̇ ܘ ܕƉ ̇ ܘ ̇ ܘ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ̣ƎƉ ƊƏــƇܐ ŶƦƉــŵܐ: ܘܗ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ̣ƎƉ ƍƀƊſܐ ŴƆܬ ܗ ̇ ܘ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ̣ƎƉ ƍƀƊſܐ űſƦƉܥ܂ ̣ܕƎƉ ƇƊƏܐ ŴƆܬ ܗ

ƎــƉ̣ ܐƀ̈ ̈ــƀܐ ܕܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ܉ ƀƙƇŷƤƉــƎ ܒƄــƌŴ 323 ܗƎƀƆ ܓƢƀ Ƈƃــųܘܢ ܙƌ ̈ܬܐ: űŶ <sup>15</sup> ̈ܕܐ܂ ܘŴƆ ̣ܗܘ űƃ ̣ܗܘ ܐƦſܘܗܝ űŶ Ɗƣܐ ܕŴƤƉܕܥ ܬܪܬƎſųſ ܨܒŴ ̈ƀƉܐ܉ ܒűƀ űƟ ܐƀ̈ ̇Ŵܢ ܕƎſ ܙƌ ̈ܕܐ܂ ܗƌ űŶ ܬŴƆ ܬܐŴƍƀŶܒܐ ƎſųſƦſܕܐ Ǝƀ̈ ܗƌ Ɗƣܐ ܕܕƉܐ ŷƆܒƢܗ ܒƈƄ űƉܡ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ųƊſŴƟܘܢ ܐƅſ ܕܐƌƢƉــƎ܂ ̈Ǝ ŴƙƆܬ ƌűƕܐ űƟܡ ŴƍƙƇƉܬܗ ܕܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ ܕƆــŴܬ ƠƙƏ ƈƀƃܗ ƎƀƆܗ ̇ ܝ űƉܡ܂ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ܐܬƍſــƎ ƆــƎ ܗƣܐ ƀƇƕــų v42L ̇ ܕƇƉــƦܐ ƤƉــŴܕƦƀƍƕܗ܂ ܗ ܕܬƉŴŶܐ ƎƍſűƖƉ ܕųƊƤƌܗ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܂

̇ ܘ ܕܐܬܐƉــƢ ƇƕــŴܗܝ ܕܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ 324 ƀƉűƟــƦ ܗƀƃــƈ ܬŶــƉŴܐ ܗ ̇ ܝ Əܐܡ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ܂ ܘƎƃ ƢŷƆܬܐ ̣ܗܘ ƋŶƦƉ ųƆ ܐƅſ Ɖܐ ܕܙܕܩ: ܒــų ܕƆܐ ŵŶƦƉܐ ̣ ܕƢƙƣ ųƆ ܐƅſ ܕܐƌƢƉــƎ ̣ƉــƎ ƖƆــƈ܂ ܙܕܩ ܓƀــƢ ƊƆــűܥ܉ ܕܐܦ Ɔܐ ܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ ܒűƀ ܬƉŴŶܐ ƦſƦŶܐ ſƦƉــűܥ܂ źƉــƈ ܕܐܦ

**<sup>2</sup>** ŻƀƇƣܕ BDP, Epit.: ƎƀźƀƇƣܕ L | ܘ ̇ ̇ ܘ .:Epit ,LP ܘܕܗ ܘܗ BD **4** ܘܗܝƦſܐ BDL: ܗܘ P | ƅſܘܐ BDP, Epit.: ƅſܐ L **<sup>6</sup>** ܐƉ ܬܘܒ [inv. B **<sup>7</sup>** ܐƌƦƕܘűſ <sup>ܐ</sup> ̇ ̇ ܘ **8** P .hom .om] ܒƦƕűƀܐ űƉܡ ܗܘ ,L ܘܗ ̇ ܘ .:Epit ̇ ܘ **11** BDP ܕܗ ܗ BD: ܐƉ L: ƎƉ P **<sup>12</sup>** ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ1 [+ Ǝ ̇ Ɖ L **14** Ƣƀܓ LP, Epit.: Ǝſܕ BD **<sup>16</sup>** űƀܒ L: űŷܒ BDP, Epit. **<sup>20</sup>** ̇ ̇ :L ܕųƊƤƌܗ ųſųƊƤƌܕ BDP

double. For a half is a half of some double, and also a double is a double of a half. Further, the other way is (to relate) the one who is ruled and the ruler, e.g. a master and a slave. For a master is a master of a slave, and also a slave is a slave of a master. Also, (what relates) the one who discerns and what is discerned, e.g. everything perceptible is perceptible by perception. Further, something that pertains to learning, e.g. an intelligent person becomes intelligent through certain intelligence, or a knowledgeable person becomes knowledgeable through knowing something. Further, (what relates) a cause and what is caused by it, e.g. a father to a son or a son to a father. Further, (what relates) that which affects something and what is affected by it, e.g. the striker strikes a person who is struck, while the one who is struck is struck by the striker. Also, according to a position in certain place, e.g. how one person who is on the right appears related to the person on the left, and the one on the left is understood in relation to the one on the right424.

323 In all such types of this genus, one applies names that differ from one another rather than the same name that designates two things standing in relation to one another, while in the first kind of relatives, as we have explained, one applies to them names which are in every respect similar to one another. So, these things (that should be said) before425 the teaching on the genus of relation are sufficient for the moment. Hence, we may turn now to a descriptive account of it which we are accustomed to call its definition.

#### *[Properties of the genus of relatives]*

324 So, the Philosopher at first provides the definition of this genus which has 6a36–37 been proposed (by others) and later on defines it himself in the proper way by making apparent what is not correct, as we have said above. One should be aware that also this genus may not be grasped through exact definition, since it

**<sup>424</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 67.16–26; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 105.1–11. The types of relatives which are based on heteronymy as listed by Ammonius and Philoponus differ in some aspects from one another and both in turn differ from what we find in Sergius. It is thus probable that no fixed list of these types was known in Ammonius' school.

**<sup>425</sup>** Here Sergius apparently has the Greek term τὰ προλεγόμενα in mind.

̇Ŵܢ ̈ƎƀƐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ܂ ܐƆܐ ܐܦ ܬųƉŴŶ ܕܗƌܐ ܒŴƉűܬ ܗƌ ̣ܗܘ ܓƑƍ ܓƍ ƎــƉ̣ ܗܘܐ̣ Ʀــſܐűƀŷſ ųــƆ Ǝــ̈ ƙƀƠƌܕ ƎــƀƇſܐ ƎــƉ̣ ܐ܉ƌƮــŶܐ ܐƐــ̈ P79r ƍܓ ̈ ƀܐ ƉűƟ ƈƀƃܗ ųƆ ƎƀƊŶƦƉ ܗܝ܂ŴƉűƟ ƎƉܕ̣ ܢŴ̇ ܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ ̣ܘƎƉ ܗƌ ƎƉ̣ ƎſųſƦſܕܐ Ǝƀƌܗ ƋƆ ܬܐ̈ ܐƅſ ܕܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ̣ƋƇƣ ųƆܕܐ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ܕܨܒŴ ܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ ܗƎƀƆ ƦƉܐƮƉܢ܂ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕܗ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ̈ ܢ܂ ̇ ܐƎƄſ ̣ܕܗܘ ŴƆܬ űƉܡ ܐƌƢŶܐ ųƉƦƤƉ ܕܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ƎſƮƟƦƉ: ܐܘ

̈ ƀܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܗƍƃܐ ܐƢƉ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ܉ ܕܬŴƊŶܗܝ ƆܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ ƉűƟ 325 ̇ Ƣ ܕƎſƮƟƦƉ ܘƆܐ ơƐƘ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ܉ ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ: ܘƖſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕܗ | v108D ̇ <sup>ܝ</sup> ܕܐƉ B132v ܉ƢــƉܐƌ ƥــƌܐ ƅــſܐ ܂ ̇ ̇ƋƇ ųƆ ƉŴŶƦƆܐ ܗƌܐ ܐƢƉܗ ƣ ܐƆܕ Ǝ ̇ Ɖ ƅſܐ ̈ ƀܐ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ܐƆܐ Ɔܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܒƤــƢܪܐ ܗƃــƍܐ܂ ƉűƟ ƎƉ̣ <sup>ܢ</sup> ̈ <sup>10</sup> ųƉƦƤƉܕ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ̇ ܝ ܕſــƎ ܕܗ ŷƆــƢܬܐ ܓƀــƢ ̣ܗܘ ŶƦƉــƋ ܐſــƅ ܕܙܕܩ ƊŶƦƊƆــŴ܂ ܗ ̇ ܝ ̇ ܂ ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕܒƤƌƢܐ ŴƆ ܒų ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ܕܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕܐƅſ ܗƍƃܐ ܐųſƦſ ̇ ܝ ܕƟܐܡ ̣ƎƉ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒƤƌƢܐ ƦƉܐƢƉ ܒų ܒܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒų ̇ ̣ƎƉ ƇƊƏܐ ųƉƦƤƉ ܒų܂ ܘܐܢ ̣ƎƉ ƍƀƊſܐ ̣ܗܘ܉ ܕƇƊƏܐ ƍƀƊſܐ ܐܘ ƉƦƤƉــų ƀƊſــƍܐ܂ ܘܐܢ ܬܘܒ ̣ƉــƎ ƊƏــƇܐ ̣ܗܘ܉ ܕƀƊſــƍܐ ƟƦƉــƢܐ <sup>15</sup> ƇƊƏܐ܂

	- ̇ ــƢ ƐƇƀƘــƘŴܐ ܕܐܦ ƆــƋ ŶــƤܐ ܘƀƏــƊܐ ܘƏــƇƃŴܐ 327 ܘܒűܓــŴܢ ܐƉ ̇ــܐܫ ܘܪܓƦƤܐ܉ ƎſųƇƃ ƆــŴܬ Ɖــűܡ ƦƉܐƉــƮܢ܂ ŶــƤܐ ܓƀــƢ ܕƉــűܡ ܕŶ

̈ــƎ **<sup>2</sup>** ƙƀƠƌܕ BDL: űــŷܒ P | ųــƆ] om. P | ƎƉ̣ 2] om. P **3** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ scr.: ƑƀƇźźƏܐܪ L: ƑƀƆŴŹŴźƐſܐܪ P: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D | ܗܝŴƉűƟ ƎƉܕ̣ LP: ܗܝŴƉűƟܕ BD **4** Ǝƀƌܗ L: ƎƀƆܗ P: ƎƀƇſܐ BD **5** ܡűƉ] + ƅſܕܐ BD | ܢƮƉܐƦƉ BDL: ܢƮƉܐƦƉܕ P **7** ƢƉܐ BDP: ܘƢƉܐ L | ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BD: ܐƘŴƏŴƇƀƘ P: ܐƘ ̈ ŴƐƇƀƘ L | ܗܝŴƊŶܕܬ BDL: ܗܝŴƉŴŶܕܬ P **9** ųــƆ] om. BD **13** ܐƌܗ [om. B **15** ܗܘ̣ [ om. BD **18** ܣŴــſܪ̈ŴܓƀźƟ L: ܣŴــſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓŹܐƟ B: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓųŹܐƟ D **20** ܣŴſܪ̈ŴܓƀźƟܕ L: ܣŴſƮܐܓźƟܕ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųŹܐƟܕ B: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓųŹܐƟܕ D **<sup>21</sup>** ܗűƆŴƉ BD: ܐűƆŴƉ P **<sup>23</sup>** ܐܫ ̇ Ŷܕ P: ܐܫŶ BD

is one of the most generic genera. Instead, both Aristotle and those who were before him gave a definition of it in the same way as in case of the other such genera, i.e. deriving it from what is particularly concomitant of it. Thus, the ancients defined it in the following way, as he reports it: "Those things which are said to pertain to the genus of relation are called in what they are from other things or named in any other way as being relative to something else."426

325 This is what the Philosopher says on how the ancients defined the genus of relatives. By saying that they "are called" instead of stating that they "are" he made clear that he is speaking as one who does not support this definition, as if someone said: "This is how they are named by the ancients but this is not how they actually are". Indeed, later on he proposes a definition which is fitting427. And the words "in what they are from other things" mean the following. E.g., it is not as man that a man is said to be in this genus but he is named (as being) in it as the one standing on the right or on the left. So if he is on the right, he is said to be on the right of the left, but if he is on the left, he is said to be on the left of the right428.

326 He (i.e. Aristotle) suggests other examples, lest one assume that this genus 6a37–6b2 comes to be from substance only and not from all the categories. Neither does it originate from quantity only, but also from quality. In reality, this genus is found in all the genera of the categories and is generated from the affinity of their species429.

327 That is why the Philosopher says that also each of the following things is 6b2–10 spoken of as relative: affection, position, knowledge, and perception430. For

**<sup>426</sup>** See *Cat*. 6a36–37: πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον. As in the previous cases, the quotation in Sergius differs from the anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories*.

**<sup>427</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 67.28–30: τῷ λέγεται ἐχρήσατο ὡς μὴ ἀρεσκόμενος τῷ λόγῳ· παρακατιὼν γὰρ δείκνυσιν ἄτοπα πολλὰ τούτῳ τῷ ὁρισμῷ ἑπόμενα, καὶ οὕτως ἄλλον τίθησιν ὁρισμόν (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 106.2–3).

**<sup>428</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 68.2–3; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 106.5–6.

**<sup>429</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 68.5–12; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 106.8–11. While commenting on this passage, Ammonius stresses that the category of relatives is expressed not only by means of the genitive but also by the dative, a point which Sergius apparently found irrelevant for Syriac readers.

**<sup>430</sup>** See *Cat*. 6b2: ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πρός τι οἷον ἕξις, διάθεσις, αἴσθησις, ἐπιστήμη, θέσις. The same list appears in Ammonius and Philoponus. Sergius seems to render, though in different order, the three last terms (αἴσθησις, ἐπιστήμη, θέσις), but to omit the first two, instead using the example of "affection". In the early anonymous Syriac version of the *Categories*, the terms ἕξις and διάθεσις are not translated but transliterated, while the rest of the list is close to the terminology of Sergius.

̇ ܐܫ܂ ܘƇƃŴƏܐ <sup>Ŷ</sup> ܡűƉ ܐƤŶ ƎƉ̣ ܐܫ ̇ ̇ ܘ ܬܘܒ Ɖܐ ܕŶ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ƤŶܐ܂ ܘܗ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƈƃƦƐƉ ܒƇƃŴƐܐ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƈƃƦƐƉ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ƇƃŴƏܐ܂ ܘܗ ܕܗ ̇ ܬܘܒ ƈƃƦƐƉ܂ ܐƆܐ ܐܦ ܪܓƦƤܐ ܬܘܒ ܕƦƉܪܓƤܐ Ɖــűܡ ܐſƦſــų ̇ ܘ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƦƉܪܓƥ ܒƢܓƦƤܐ ƦƉܪܓƥ܂ ܘƊƀƏܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܗ ܪܓƦƤܐ܂ ܘܗ Ɖܐ ܕƀƏــƋ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƀƏــƊܐ܂ ܘܗ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƀƏــƋ ܒƀƐــƊܐ Ɖــűܡ ̇ ܘ ƦƉܐƢƉ ܕƋƀƏ܂ ܗƎƀƆ ܕƎſ܉ ƎſųƍƉ ̣ƎƉ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܐſــƅ ܗ Ɖܐ ܕƦƉܪܓƥ܂ ܘƎſųƍƉ ̣ƎƉ ܙƌܐ ܐƅſ ƇƃŴƏܐ܂ ܘƎſųƍƉ ̣ƎƉ ܓƐƍܐ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƋƀƏ܂ ܕƊƀƏܐ ܐƅſ ܗ


**3** ܐƤܪܓƦƉܕ BD: ܐƍƤܪܓ̈ƦƉܕ P **4** ܐƉ] om. P **7** ܐƉ] om. BD **11** ƎƉ̣ P: ƈźƉ D: om. B **12** Ǝſܕ DP: ܬܘܒ B **13** ܬܘܒ [om. P **17** ܣŴſܪ̈ŴܓƀźƟ scr.: ƑſܪŴܐܓźƟ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųŹܐƟ B: ܐſܪ̈ŴܓŹܐƟ D **<sup>19</sup>** ƎƉ̣ ̇ ܐܘ BD: ƎƉܘ̣ P **20** ܐƆ ܐܦ DP: ܐƆܐ B **22** ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕ BD: ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕܕ P

affection is an affection of something affected, and what is affected is affected by some affection. And knowledge is a knowledge of what is known, while what is known is known through knowledge. But also perception is a perception of something perceived, while what is perceived is perceived through perception. Further, position is a position of something positioned, while what is positioned is said to be positioned in some position. Hence, some (relatives) pertain to substance, such as what is perceived; others pertain to quality, such as knowledge; and still others belong to the genus of position, like what is positioned431.

328 After that, he says that there is a certain contrariety in the genus of 6b15–18 relation, e.g. righteousness and wickedness are contraries of one another432. For wickedness is wickedness of a wicked person, and a wicked person is called wicked because of wickedness. Likewise, righteousness is a righteousness of a righteous person, and a righteous person is called righteous from righteousness.

329 However, among things pertaining to this genus, as the Philosopher stated, some are receptive of contrariety and some are not433. For, as we have said, since the genus of relatives is attached to any category, it is reasonable that among them some may have contraries and some not, thus imitating those categories which they are attached to. So, when something is considered in association with substance or quantity, since there is no contrariety in them as we have said above, then no (contrariety) is found in it either. If, on the other hand, (relatives are) considered in association with quality, since quality fully admits of contrariety, then there will be contraries in them too in the same way as in the genus with which they are associated. Hence, when a half and a double which belong to quantity are relatives, i.e. when they are spoken in relation to one another, they contain no contraries at all. But righteousness and

**<sup>431</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 68.14–19; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 106.14–24.

**<sup>432</sup>** See *Cat*. 6b15–16: ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς πρός τι, οἷον ἀρετὴ κακίᾳ ἐναντίον, ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρός τι ὄν. Here, Sergius renders the Gr. ἐναντιότης as *saqqublayuta* and this term is used alongside *dalqubla*, which in §419 is reserved for the Gr. ἀντικεῖσθαι, "opposite". **433** See *Cat*. 6b17: οὐ πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς πρός τι ὑπάρχει ἐναντίον.

ƦƀƉܪܘܬܐ ܕƎſ ܘܒŴƤƀܬܐ: ƈźƉ ̣ܕƎƉ ܙƌܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܘܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ܐƎƀƌ ̈ܢ ŴƠƏܒŴƀƇܬܐ űƉܡ ܐܦ ܒܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ܂ ̈ܕܐ܉ ƕܒű ܕűŶ

̇

̇

 ܝ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ƀƉــƦܪܘܬܐ ܘܒƤƀــŴܬܐ ܥ܉ ܕŴƆ ܒų űſ ƥƌܐ Ǝſܕ ܘܐųƌ 330 ̈Ǝŷƀ ̣ƎƉ ܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ܂ ܒųܕܐ ܓƢƀ ̣ƎƉ ܙƌܐ ܐƎƀƌ ܐƅſ ܕƍſűſƦƕــƎ Ƅƣ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ſŴŷƊƆــŴ܂ ܐƆܐ ܒــų v80P ̇ ܝ ܕƦƉܐƉــƢܐ ƃــƈ Ŷــűܐ ſųƍƉــƎ ƆــŴܬ ܗ ̇ ŴƆܬ űƉܡ܂ ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕܐƎƍſƢƉ ܕƀƉــƦܪܘܬܐ ܕƉــűܡ ̇ ܐųſƦſ ųƆ ƎƀŷƉܕ ̇ــŴ ܕſــƎ ܕƀƉــƦܪܐ: ܘܒƤƀــŴܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܕƉــűܡ ƌܗ :ܪܘܬܐƦــƀƉ ̇ B133v ųــſƦſܐ ̇Ŵ ܕƎſ ܕܒƤƀܐ܂ ܗƍƃܐ ܓƢƀ ܐƎſųſƦſ ̣ƎƉ ܓƐƍܐ ̇ ܒŴƤƀܬܐ: ܗƌ ܐųſƦſ ̇ ܗƌܐ ܕƆــŴܬ Ɖــűܡ܂ ܒŴƠƐܒƀƇــŴܬܐ ܕſــƎ ܕܙƌܐ܉ ƀƉــƦܪܘܬܐ ܐſƦſــų ܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ ܕܒƤƀــŴܬܐ: ܘƀƉــƦܪܐ ܬܘܒ ܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ ܕܒƀــƤܐ܂ ܘܒűܓــŴܢ <sup>10</sup> ܙܕƟܐƦſ ſŵŶƦƉܐ ܒų ŴƠƏܒŴƀƇܬܐ ܒܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ܂ ƃــű ƆــŴ ܒſųƇƄــƎ ̇ ܂ ƈźƉ ܕƈƃ űŶܐ ſųƍƉــƎ ƆــŴܬ Ɖــűܡ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ̈ܬܐ ܕܒų ܐųſƦſ ܨܒŴ ̇ ܂ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐųſƦſ ƦƉܐƢƉܐ ܗ

331 ܕܥ ܕƎſ ܐܦ ܗܕܐ ܕųƇƃܘܢ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕƐƉܒƎſƢ ƈƕ ŴźƇƘܢ: ܕܒƦƇƊܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ܘƆܐ ̣ܗܘܐ ܒƍƀƄܐ ̣ܐƢƉ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ܉ ƤƖƉــơ ̣ܗܘ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܘ ܗ ܐƢــƉܐƊܒ ųــƆ ܢƮــƀƉܕܐ Ƣــƀܓ ƎــƀƇſܐ ƎــƉ̣ ܐ܂ƢܓܒــƆ ųƆ ƎƀƠƤƕ ܕƢƟƦƉܐ ܓŴܪܓƀܐ܉ ƞƉܐ ܐƌــƥ ƙƊƆــơ ܒــƢܘŶܐ ƙƇŶــŴܗܝ ܕܐܦ ̣ܗܘ v109D ̇ Ƣ ܓƢƀ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ܕܐܢ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ ƤƉܒŸ ܗܘܐ ŴƉܕܐ܂ ܐƉ ̇ــܐܫ܂ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕŶ ̇ܒű܉ ܐƞƆܐ ܕųƌܘܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐܦ <sup>ܗ</sup> ƕܕ ܡűƉ ƋƆ Ʀſܐ ̇ ܕƉƦƤƉــų܂ ܐſــƅ ̣ܕƉــƎ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܗƈƀƃ ܐƉ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ــƢ ܘƆــŴ ܕƦƉܐƉــƢ ܐܘ ܗܕܐ Ɩſűſܐ ̣ܗܝ: ܕŴƆ ܒƦƇƊܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ܉ ܐƆܐ ܐܦ ܒƠــƊſŴܐ ƉــŴܕܐ ̣ܗܘܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ܂

<sup>332</sup> ̣ƎƉ ܒــƦܪ ܗƀƆــƎ ܕſــƎ܉ ܐܦ ƆــŴܬ ܕƀƇſــŴܬܐ ܐŶــƢܬܐ ܕƀƠƌــƙܐ Ɔــų r81P ̇ ــƢ ܕƦƐƉܒــƢ ƆــƋ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܕƠƉܒــƈ ƆܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ ƟƦƉــƢܒ ܘܐƉ

̇ ܥ **3** űــſ ƥــƌܐ [inv. B **7** ܬܘܒ [om. BD **12** ܬŴƆ BD: ŴƆ P **14** ƎƀƇſܐ ܘܢųƇƃܕ BD: ƎſųƇƃܕ P **17** ܐƀܪܓŴܓ P: ܐƀܪܓŴƀܓ D: ܐƀܘܓƢƀܓ B; + ܘܬܐƢƃܐ add. P in marg. | ܐŶܘƢܒ BD: ܐŶܪܘ P **18** ܕܐŴƉ] om. P **19** ܐƉ] om. B **21** ܕŴŷƇܒ DP: ܐƦƇƊܒ B **24** ܐƌܗ [om. B

wickedness which belong to quality and are opposite to one another produce a certain contrariety also in the genus of relatives434.

330 One ought to know, however, that they turn out to belong to this genus not in that they are righteousness and wickedness, for this makes them belong to quality as we are going to demonstrate, but each one of them is a relative in that it is said in relation to something which is associated with it. Thus, we say that righteousness is righteousness of someone, i.e. of a righteous person, and wickedness is also wickedness of someone, i.e. of a wicked person. So, this is how they pertain to the genus of relatives. And it is through the contrariety in quality that righteousness is contrary to wickedness and also righteous is contrary to wicked. That is why it is reasonable that contrariety appears in this genus but not in all things that belong to it435, since each one of them exists in that it is said with reference to something else436.

331 You should also be aware that all those who consider that Plato believed that this genus exists only in what is said and not naturally certainly misinterpret this philosopher. For concerning this one can establish from what he says in the treatise which is called *Gorgias*437 that this genus should be characterized in terms of being. Now, this is what he writes: "If there is something active, there must also be something passive"438. Here he says "is" and not "said of" or "called", which makes apparent that he characterizes it not as what is said but also as actual being439.

332 So, after this, he moves to another property which is distinctive of this 6b19–27 genus and says that it "seems to admit of more and less"440. This (concomitant)

**<sup>434</sup>** Cf. Porphyry, *In Cat.* 114.8–18; Ammonius, *In Cat.* 69.23–70.8; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 108.10–30.

**<sup>435</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 108.29–30: εἰκότως τοίνυν καὶ ἐναντιότης θεωρεῖται ἐν τοῖς πρός τι καὶ οὐ πᾶσι τοῦτο παρακολουθεῖ.

**<sup>436</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 109.25–26: ἐν τούτῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι τῷ ἑτέρου λέγεσθαι.

**<sup>437</sup>** A marginal note in ms. P translates the title of Plato's dialogue as "agriculture".

**<sup>438</sup>** Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 476B: ἆρα εἴ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιοῦντος. It is clear that Sergius quoted Plato not directly, but in that version which was known to him from Ammonius' lectures, see the next footnote.

**<sup>439</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 70.10–14: ἰστέον ὅτι ὅσοι λέγουσι τὸν Πλάτωνα οὕτως ὁρίζεσθαι τὰ πρός τι καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγεσθαι οἴεσθαι αὐτὸν εἶναι τὴν τῶν πρός τι ὑπόστασιν, συκοφαντοῦσι τὸν φιλόσοφον· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐν τῷ Γοργίᾳ ἔστι γνῶναι ὅτι τῷ αὐτὰ εἶναι χαρακτηρίζει· φησὶ γὰρ 'εἰ ἔστι τὸ ποιοῦν, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ τὸ πάσχον'· εἶναι γὰρ εἶπε, καὶ οὐ λέγεσθαι (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 109.26–30).

**<sup>440</sup>** See *Cat*. 6b19–20: δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ πρός τι.

̇ ܝ ܕܗƣܐ ܐƎƌƢƉ܂ ƠƉܒƈ ƢſƦſܘܬܐ ܘܒƢſƞܘܬܐ܂ ܘܗܕܐ ŪŹ ƊŷƆܐ ųƆ ܓƀــƢ ſƦſــƢܘܬܐ ܘܒſƞــƢܘܬܐ܉ Ɔܐ ̣ܗܘܐ Ƈƃــų ܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ ܐƆܐ ̈ــƐܐ ̈ܬܐ ųƍƉ܂ ƈźƉ ܓƢƀ ܕܐƄſــƍܐ ̣ ܕܐƌƢƉــƎ܉ ̣ƉــƎ Ƈƃــųܘܢ ܓƍ ŴƍƉ ̇ ܘܐ ƟــųƊſŴ: ܗƌ r43L ̇Ŵܢ ܐŶــƌƮܐ ƐƌƦƉــŪ܉ ܓƇــƀܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƉܐ ̣ܕƉــƎ ܙƌܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ƈźƉ ܕƠƉܒƈ ̣ܗܘ ƢſƦſܘܬܐ ܘܒƢſƞܘܬܐ ܐƅſ ܕܐƦſ ƎƆ ܕŴŷƌܐ܉ ܐܦ r134B ܬܐŴــƀƊƃ ƎƉ̣ ̇ ̣ܗܘ ƠƉܒƍƇܐ ܗܘܐ ܕܗƎƀƆ܂ Ɖܐ ̣ܕƎƉ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܕƎſ ܐܘ ŪƐƌƦƌ܉ ܗƎſűſ Ɔܐ ƢſƦſܘܬܐ ܘƆܐ ܒƢſƞܘܬܐ ŷƃƦƤƉܐ ܒų܂

333 Əܐܡ ܕƎſ ܐܦ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ܐƢŶܬܐ ܕƙƀƠƌܐ ųƆ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ܕƎſųƇƃ ƆــƋ ̈ܕܐ܂ ܕűƌܥ űŶ ܬŴƆ ܐƇƇƊƊܒ <sup>Ǝ</sup>̈ ̈ܬܐ ܕƦƉܐƮƉܢ ŴƆܬ űƉܡ܉ ƄƘųƉ ܨܒŴ ܕƎſ ܕƍƉܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܙƌܐ ܗƌܐ ܕƅƘųƉ: ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܕŴſŴƣܬܐ ƤƉــŴܕܥ <sup>10</sup> ̈ܕܐ ܘƦƉܐƉــƮܢ ̈ܬܐ ܕƦƉܐƢƉ ƎſųƀƇƕ܉ ܐűſܐ ܕƀƍƟــƎ ƆــŴܬ Ŷــű ܕܨܒŴ ܒų űŶܐ ƈƕ űŶܐ: űƃ Ɔܐ ܐƦſ űƉܡ ܕƖƉــŴܟ܂ ܐƃــƌŵܐ ܕܐƍſƢƉــƎ܉ ܕƉــƢܐ ̣ ܕƕܒــűܗ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƉــƢܐ܂ ܘƍƀƄƘųƉــƎ ܬܘܒ ƣــſŴܐƦſ܉ ܕܐܦ ̣ƕܒűܐ ܕƢƉܗ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ̣ƕܒűܐ܂ ܘܬܘܒ ܕܐܒܐ ܕܒــƢܗ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܐܒܐ܂ ܘܒƢܐ ܕܐܒŴܗܝ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܒــƢܐ܂ ܘܐƀƌƮŶــƦܐ ſųƇƃــƎ ܕܐſųſƦſــƎ ̣ƉــƎ v81P ̈Ǝ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ̇ ܒŴƉűܬܐ ƄƘųƉ ܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ܉ ܒų

334 ܒƦܪƎƃ ܕƎſ ܐܦ ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ܐƢŶܬܐ ƖƉــƈ ܕƀƠƌــƙܐ ƆܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ ̇ Ɔــųܕܐ ܐܢ ̣ܗܘ ̇ ܒƖــƦܐ ܕƆܐ ܒƕŵــŴܪ܂ ܕƆــų ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ: ܕܐƦſ ƀƇƕــų ̇ ܕƆܐ ܬܘƋŶ܉ ܒƆŴܒƇܐ ܕƆܐ ܒƕŵــŴܪ ƖƉــƇܐ ƕــƈ ƍƙƇƉــŴܬܗ ܕƤƌܒųƀƠ ̈ܬܐ ܕƦƉܐƉــƮܢ Ŵܨܒــ ƎſųƇƃܕ ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ ƈƀƃܗ Ƣ ̇ D110r Ɖܐ ܐ܂Ɛƍܓ ܐƌܕܗ ̇ ܂ ŴƆܬ űƉܡ܉ ܐűŷƃܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܘƆܐ ƊſűƟܐ Ŷــűܐ ſųƍƉــƎ ŷƆܒــƢܬܗ ̇ ̇ ــƇܐ Ɔــų ̈ܕܐ܂ ܘܐܢ ܬܬܒƈź űŶܐ ƎſųƍƉ܉ ܒź űŷƆ Ǝ ̈ ƙƀƠƌܕ Ƣ ̇ ܘܬܘܒ ܐƉ ̇ ܝ ܐƢŶܬܐ܂ ̇ ܐܦ ܗ ųƊƕ

**1** ƎƌƢƉܐ ܐƣܕܗ [inv. B **6** ܗܘܐ L: ܗܘ BDP **10** ܕܥŴƤƉ BDL: ܕܥŴƉ P **15** ܘܗܝƦſܐ ܗܝŴܕܐܒ [ inv. BD | ƎƉ̣ BDL: ƎƉܕ P **19** ƋŶܬܘ L, corr. P in marg.: ܡŴŶܬ BDP **20** ܐƐƍܓ ܐƌܕܗ [inv. B ƈƀƃܗ BDL, Epit.: ܐƘŴƏŴƇƀƘ P

is quite similar to the one which has been discussed just now, because it is not the whole genus which is like that but some parts of it441. From what we have said, i.e. that it is considered in association with other genera, it is obvious that, if something gains its subsistence from quality, since the latter admits of more and less as we will demonstrate later, it will admit of them too. If, however, something is considered in association with substance or quantity, then more and less do not occur in it442.

333 Then he sets out another property which is distinctive of (this genus) as 6b28–35 follows: "All things that are spoken of in relation (to something else) reciprocate in speech with their correlatives."443 To learn what it means that something "reciprocates", let us say that it signifies the equality of those things that are spoken of which they maintain towards each other while being said of one another without disadvantage to any of them444. E.g., we say that a master is the master of a slave, but this may equally reciprocate, i.e. that a slave is the slave of a master. And further, that a father is the father of a son and that a son is the son of a father. And all other things which belong to this genus reciprocate in the same way.

#### *[Relatives being simultaneous]445*

334 After that, he also introduces another property which is distinctive of the 7b15–8a12 genus of relation. There is no small puzzle concerning it, and if he had left it without clarification, it might have brought about a confusion of no small measure in the teaching on this genus. Now, the Philosopher says that all things which are said of in relation are simultaneous446, and neither of them is prior to another. Further, he also states that they are associated with one another in such a way that when one of them perishes the other also perishes together with it447.

**<sup>441</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 70.16–18: ἕτερον παρακολούθημα τῶν πρός τί φησι, τὸ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ὅμοιον τῷ πρὸ αὐτοῦ· ὑπάρχει γὰρ τοῖς πρός τι, οὐ πᾶσι δέ (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 110.4–9).

**<sup>442</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 110.20–24.

**<sup>443</sup>** See *Cat*. 6b28: πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται. Sergius' quotation is periphrastic.

**<sup>444</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 70.24–71.1: ἵνα δὲ μάθωμεν τί ἐστι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεσθαι, μάθωμεν πρότερον τί ἐστιν ἀντιστροφή <...> ἀντιστροφὴ δέ ἐστιν ἰσοστροφή. Ammonius stresses thus that ἀντιστροφή should be understood in terms of equality (τὸ ἴσον).

**<sup>445</sup>** Unlike Ammonius and Philoponus, Sergius does not comment on *Cat*. 6b36–7b14.

**<sup>446</sup>** Cf. *Cat*. 7b15: δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρός τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι. Sergius seems not to quote Aristotle's text, but rather to paraphrase it (leaving, e.g., τῇ φύσει untranslated).

**<sup>447</sup>** Cf. *Cat*. 7b19: συναναιρεῖ δὲ ταῦτα ἄλληλα.

	- <sup>337</sup> ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕƄƤŶܐ ܕƤƊƣܐ ܘܕƏــųܪܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ̣ܗܘܐ ܒƇƖــƊܐ ̣ƉــƎ ̈ــƄܐ ܗƀƆــƎ Ɵــűܡ ܕƦƌܒــƢܐ ܬܐƀƆــƑ ƐƇƀƘــƘŴܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ƕűſــƦܗܘܢ ܕƤŶ ܘųƇƃŴƏܘܢ ܘƦŷƄƣܐ ܕƦƇƕܗܘܢ܉ ̣ƎƉ ܓܒƢܐ ܗƌܐ ̣ܗܘܬ ܘܐܬƕűſــƦ <sup>15</sup> ̈ــƤܐ܂ ܘܐƃــƌŵܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܪܘܒــƖܐ ܕŶــŴܕܪܐ: ܐܢ Ɖــſƞܐ ܕƌــųܘܐ ƍƀƍܒƆ ܐƮــŷƉ ƎــƉ̣ Ƣــƀܓ ــܐܐƀ ̈ ܓƏ ܂ƥƌܐ ƎƉ̣ ŸƀƄƣ ܐƆ űƃ ƈƀƃűƕ ܘܗܝƦſܐ ̈ Ƙܐ܉ ƀƐƌــŴ ܕƢƌܒƖــŴܢ ŶــŴܕܪܐ ܘƆܐ ܐŷƄƣــŴ܂ ܒــƢܡ ŴــƐƇƀƘ ƎــƉܘ̣ ܐܪſűƀƊƀƃــƑ ܐſــƅ ܕܐܦ ̣ܗܘܐ ƤƉܒƇــƍܐ ܘŷƄƤƉــƍܐ ܕܐƀƌƮŶــƦܐ Əܓƀܐ <sup>20</sup> ̈ ܬܐ܉ ̣ƈƊƕ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܕƢƌܒųƖ ŴŷƆܕܪܐ: ܘܐŸƄƣ Ɖűƕܐ ƈƀƇƠƆ܂ ſƦŶــƦܘܬܐ ܕſــƎ ܘƣــƢܪܐ ܕܪܘܒƖــų܉ ƉــŴܕܐ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܕƆܐ ܐܬƉــƞܝ ŴŷƄƤƊƆ܂

̇ Ǝ +] ܒܓƐƍܐ **2** Ɖ BD | ܐƆ BDL, Epit.: ܐƆܐ P **3** ƈźܒƌ BDP, Epit.: ƈźܒƦƌ L **4** Ɓƃ BDL, Epit.: űƃ <sup>P</sup>**<sup>6</sup>** ƎƉ̣ ] om. BD **<sup>7</sup>** ܐܦ BDL: ܘܐܦ P **<sup>8</sup>** ܗƦƕűƀܒ L: ܐƦƕűƀܒ BDP **<sup>9</sup>** ܬܘܒ [om. BD | Ǝƀ̇ [ܗƌ om. L **<sup>14</sup>** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BD: ܐƙƐƇƀƘ L: ܐƘŴƐƀƇƀƘ P **<sup>15</sup>** ܗܘܢƦƇƕܕ L: ܗܘܢƦƇƇ̈ ƕܕ P: ܘܢųƀƇƕܕ BD ̈ Ƙܐ **18** ŴـــƐƇƀƘ BD: ܐƙـــ ̈ ƐƇƀƘ L: ܐƘ ̈ ŴـــƐƀƇƀƘ P **19** ƑـــſűƀƊƀƃܐܪ L: ƑـــſܐűƀƊƀƃܐܪ D: ܐܘܣűƀƊƀƃܐܪ B: ƑƀƊƃܐܪ P | ܗܘܐ̣ LP: ܗܘ̣ BD **<sup>20</sup>** ųƖܒƢƌܕ LP: ̇ ųƀܒƢƌܕ BD

To this one might say448 335 : Provided that father and son belong to the genus of relatives, does this mean that a father is not prior to his son, nor is a master to his slave or a slave to his master? And if one of them perishes then the other one must perish as well? But it does not look like that! For it is possible at certain times for one of them to be prior to the other and also to persist after the destruction of its correlative.

336 Further, one may argue as follows: Everything that is known is known by knowledge and hence is spoken of in relation. Also, everything that is understood is understood through understanding it, and because of this it belongs to relatives too. Does this mean that nothing is prior among them? We see, however, that there are many things (that are prior to others); in particular, everything that is known and understood is prior to its knowledge and understanding.

337 For instance, eclipses of the sun and the moon had existed in the world before the philosopher Thales was born. But the knowledge of the eclipses, understanding and the discovery of their cause came about and became known to people through this man449. Or take as a further example the squaring of the circle, if this is possible, since until now it has not been discovered by anyone. So many geometers and philosophers tried to square the circle but failed. Even Archimedes, who became the first one to discover many other things, also made an attempt to square the circle, and discovered anything at all close. Despite the accuracy and soundness of his squaring, even he proved unable to find it out450.

**<sup>448</sup>** Aristotle himself raises this objection in *Cat*. 7b22–23.

**<sup>449</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 118.7–29.

**<sup>450</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 75.11–19.


**<sup>1</sup>** ƈƀƃܗ ƎƀƆܗ ƋƆ BDP: ƎƀƆܗ ƈƀƃܗ L | Ƣ ̇ Ɖܐ DLP: Ƣ ̇ Ɖܕܐ B **2** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ P: ƑƀƇźźƐſܐܪ L: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƏܐܪ D: ƑƀƆŴــŹŴźƐſܐܪ B **4** űــƖƇܒ L: ƢــźƏ BDP **5** ܐŶܪܘ BDL: ܐŶܘƢܒــ P ̈ ƀƐƌܐ **9** ŴــƙƇƘܕ L: ܐƀƐ̈ ƌŴــƘŴƆŴƘܕ P: ܐƀƐƀ̈ ƌŴــƘŴƆŴƘܕ D: ܐƀ̈ ƍƐƀƘŴــƆŴƘܕ B | ܘܣƢܓƦƀƘܘ L: ܪܘܣŴܓƦƀƘܘ BD: ܪܘܣŴܬܓŴƘܘ P | ܗܘ̣ LP: ܗܘܐ BD, Epit. **11** ܐƉ2] om. BDP **13** ܐƉ] om. B | ܐܢ BDL: ƅſܐ P **<sup>15</sup>** ųƆ ƈź ̇ ܕܒ LP, Epit.: ųƇźܕܒ BD **20** Ʀſܐ2 [+ ܐܦ P **21** ܗܝ̣ [ om. L


339 Prior by nature, on the other hand, is that which (when eliminated) eliminates what is said in relation to it along with itself but which is not eliminated along with the other; and that which, when what is spoken in relation to it comes to be, is necessarily introduced along with it but when it comes to be itself its correlate does not necessarily follow it452. I am talking, for instance, about animal and horse. For if animal is eliminated then it is clear that also horse is eliminated along with it. But if horse did not exist, then animal would not disappear along with it, for there are plenty of animals which are not horses. Hence animal is naturally prior to horse, for it is necessary that (first) it exists by itself and then particular animals. Further, if there is man, this brings forth along with it also rationality, but once rationality appears than it is not at all necessary for man to exist, since there are other rational beings, e.g. angels and demons.

340 So, while everything may be said to be prior in these two ways, i.e. either in time or by nature, we are now going to demonstrate that among things that are

**<sup>451</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 74.12–15: τὸ μὲν οὖν πρότερον διττόν, τὸ μὲν χρόνῳ τὸ δὲ φύσει. καὶ πρότερον μὲν χρόνῳ ἐστὶν οὗ πρὸς τὸ νῦν πλείων ἡ ἀπόστασις ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ Μηδικὰ πρότερα τῶν Πελοποννησιακῶν (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 117.20–24).

**<sup>452</sup>** See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 74.19–20: τὸ δὲ φύσει πρότερόν ἐστι τὸ συναναιροῦν μὲν μὴ συναναιρούμενον δὲ καὶ τὸ συνεισφερόμενον μὲν μὴ συνεισφέρον δέ (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 118.2–4).

̈ܕܐ܂ ܐƆܐ űƉܡ: Ɔܐ ܒŵܒƍܐ ܘƆܐ ܒƍƀƄܐ: ܗ v135B ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƦƉܐƮƉܢ ܒų űŷƆ ̈ܕܐ܂ ܐƘــƎ ܓƀــƢ ſűƟــƋ űــŷƆ Ǝــƀ̈ ƌܐ Ǝ ̈ ܐűŷƃܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܒƈƄ ܙܒƎ ܘƙƀƠƌ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƇſƦƉــű ƍƉــų܉ ܐƆܐ Ɔܐ ̣ܗܘܐ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƉــűƆŴ Ɔــų ܒŵܒــƍܐ ܗ ܐƅſ ŴƇſܕܐ: ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ܐƅſ ܐܒܐ ƋſűƟ ƆܒƢܗ ܘűƇƀƆܗ܂ ܐƆܐ ܐƅſ ܒƤƌƢܐ ƊƀŷƣܐƦſ܂ ܒųܕܐ ܕƎſ ܕܐƅſ ܒƌƢــƤܐ܉ ƆــŴ ̣ƉــƎ ܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ <sup>5</sup> ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐƆܐ ̣ƎƉ ܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ܘܬܘܒ ƉــƢܐ ſűƟــƋ ̣ ƖƆܒــűܗ ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƉــƢܐ ̣ ܘƕܒــűܐ ܕܒــų ܐܘ r111D ̇ ̣ƕܒــűܐ ƊƆــƢܗ܉ Ɔܐ ܗܘܐ ܒــų ƦƉܐƎſƢƉ ŴƆܬ űƉܡ܂ ܒــųܕܐ ܓƀــƢ ܐŷƃــűܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƟــųƊſŴܘܢ܂ ̇ ܝ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܒƌƢــƤܐ ܐƆܐ ܐܢ ƋſűƟ ܒŵܒƍܐ űŶ ųƍƉܘܢ ŷƆܒƢܗ܉ ܒــų ƋſűƟ܂ ܕܐųſƦſ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܗܕܐ ̣ƎƉ ܓƐƍܐ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ܂

341 ܗƃــƍܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܦ ƤŶــƄܐ ܕƊƣــƤܐ ܘܕƏــųܪܐ ܘܪܘܒــƖܐ ܕŶــŴܕܪܐ܉ ̈ܬܐ ̈ƀــųܘܢ܂ ܐƆܐ ܐſــƅ ܨܒــŴ ܐƎƘ ƎƀƊſűƟ ܒŵܒــƍܐ ƕűƀƆــƦܐ ܕƍŷƄƤƉ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƗſűſ ܘƈƃƦƐƉ ƎƀƊſűƟ܂ ܐƅſ űƉܡ ƊƀŷƣܐƦſ܉ ܘŴƆ ܐƅſ ܗ ̈ ــƎ ƕűƀƆــƦܗ ܕűſܘſųƕــƎ܂ ܐƆܐ ƊſűƟ ܐƆ ܐ܉Ʀــƀ̈ ƍƕűſƦƉ Ƣــƀܓ ܬܐ̈ L44v Ŵܨܒ ̈Ƈــƍܐ ܐűŷƃܐ ̣ܗܘܘ űſƦƉ <sup>15</sup> ̈ƕــƍܐ ƕــƋ ƕűſــƦܐ ܕƍŷƄƤƉــųܘܢ܂ ܘƃƦƐƉ ̇ ܝ ܕܐſųſƦſــƎ ܐܦ ܗƀƆــƎ ܬܘܒ Ƌƕ ƇƃŴƏܐ ܕųƍƇƃƦƐƉܘܢ܂ ƎſűƉ ܒــų ̇ ܝ ܕſــƎ ̈ܕܐ܂ ܒــų űــŷƆ ƅــƏ Ǝــ ̈ P83v ƊſűƟ ܐƆ :ܡűــƉ ܬŴــƆܕ ܐƌܗ ܐƐــƍܓ ƎــƉ̣ ƎــƉ̣ ŴــƆ ܕܐųܘܒــ ܂ƎſųƇƃŴــƐƆ <sup>Ǝ</sup> ̈ ̈ܬܐ źƀƤƘܐƦſ܉ ƊſűƟ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ܨܒŴ ̇ ܘ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ܂ ܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ܉ ܐƆܐ ̣ƎƉ ܗ

̈ܬܐ ܕƦƉܐƉــƮܢ ƆــŴܬ Ɖــűܡ <sup>342</sup> ܐܦ Ɔܐ ܕſــƎ ܒƀƄــƍܐ ƊſűƟ <sup>20</sup> ̈ ــƎ ܨܒــŴ ̈ــƎ Ŷــűܐ ŷƆــűܐ܂ ܘܐܢ ܬܬܒźــƈ Ŷــűܐ ƙƀƠƌ Ǝــſųſܕܬܪܬ ƈــźƉ ܕܐ܂̈ űــŷƆ ̇ ܂ ܐܢ ƦƀƆ ܓƢƀ ܒƢܐ܉ ܐܦ Ɔܐ ̇ ƦƉܒƇźܐ ܐܦ ŶܒƢܬܗ ųƊƕ ܉ƎſųƍƉ ܐܒܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐܒܐ ܐƎƘ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒƌƢــƤܐ܂ ܘܐܢ ƀƆــƦ ܬܘܒ ܐܒܐ܉ r136B Ǝــƀ̈ ̈ــƎ ܐƌ ܐܦ Ɔܐ ܒƢܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒــƢܐ ܐƘــƎ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܒƌƢــƤܐ܂ ܘƙƀƠƌ

̇ ܘ **1** ̇ ܘ .:Epit ,BDP ܗ ̈ܕܐ | L ܒų űŷƆ L, Epit.: ܕܐ̈ űŶ ܬŴƆ BDP **<sup>3</sup>** ܐƉ1] om. BDP, Epit. **<sup>7</sup>** ̇ ųܕܒ BDP, Epit.: ̇ ųܘܒــ L **<sup>12</sup>** ƎــƀƊſűƟ BDP: ƎــƊſűƟ L | ܐƍܒــŵܒ [+ ܘ ̇ ̈ ــƎ **14** P ܗ ƊſűƟ BD: ƎــƀƊſűƟ LP ̈ųƀܘܢ :L ܕųƍŷƄƤƉܘܢ **<sup>15</sup>** ̈ ܘܢ :L ܕųƍƇƃƦƐƉܘܢ **16** BDP ܕƍŷƄƤƉ ųƀƍƇƃƦƐƉܕ BDP **17** Ǝſܕ [om. <sup>B</sup>**<sup>18</sup>** ƎſųƇƃŴƐƆ LP: ƎſųƀƇ̈ ƃŴƐƆ BD **<sup>22</sup>** ܐƇźܒƦƉ L, Epit.: ƈźܒƦƉ BDP | ̇ ܬܗƢܒŶ L, Epit.: ̇ ܗƢܒŶ BDP | ܐƢܒ BDP, Epit.: ܐƢƉ L **24** ܐƢܒ1 [om. B, Epit. | ܐƢܒ2 [om. L

said in relation to one another none can be said to be prior to its correlate, neither in time nor by nature, but that they are always simultaneous and bound to one another. For even if the one who begets is prior in time to the one who is born from him, this is not because he is the one who gives birth, i.e. it is not being a father that makes him prior to his son and his child but simply being man, and in being man he pertains not to the genus of relatives but to substance. Also, if a master is prior to his slave or a slave to his master, this is not because they are master and slave which are spoken of in relation to one another, since because of it their subsistence is simultaneous, but if one of them is prior in time to the other, he is prior because he is a man, which makes him belong to the genus of substance453.

341 The same holds for eclipses of the sun and the moon and the squaring of the circle. Even if they are prior in time to the knowledge of those persons who discovered them, they are, however, prior merely as particular things and not as something known and perceived. For things that are known are not prior to the knowledge of the one who knows them, but objects of knowledge are simultaneous with the knowledge of the person who discovers them, just as perceived things (are simultaneous) with the perception of the one who perceives them. Hence, when these things are considered as belonging to the genus of relatives they are in no way prior to one another, but when they are considered simply as things then they are prior to the perception of them, since in this case they do not belong to this genus but to that of substance.

342 Now, things that are said of in relation to one another may not be prior by nature either, since they are bound to one another, and if one of them is eliminated the other is eliminated along with it. Thus, if there is no son, then a father is no longer father but just a man. Also, if there is no father, then a son is no longer son but just a man. So, both of them are bound to one another. In the

**<sup>453</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 76.10–17 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 122.24–31. Ammonius notes that Aristotle himself did not provide a solution to the problem which he addressed, so that the suggested argument appears as his own solution of Aristotle's puzzle which Sergius replicates in his treatise without noting that it is not actually found by Aristotle.

ܬܪܬſųſــƎ Ŷــűܐ ŷƆــűܐ܂ ܗƃــƍܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܦ ܐƆــŴ Ɔܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ ųƇƃŴƏ ܕƄƤŶܐ ܕƤƊƣܐ ܘܕųƏܪܐ܉ ܐܦ Ɔܐ ƍƇƃƦƐƉܐ ܘƕűſƦƉــƍܐ ̇ ܘܐ ̣ܗܘܐ ܒƊƇƖܐ܂ ܘܐŴƆ Ɔܐ ܐƃƦƏــƈ ܬܘܒ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ: ܐƎƘ ܗ ̈Ƥܐ܂ ܘܓƀƇܐ ܘܐܬűſܥ܉ ƦƀƆ ̣ܗܘܐ ųƇƃŴƏ ܐܦ Ɔܐ Ʀƕűſܗ ܒƦƀ ܒƍƀƍ ̣ܗܝ ƈƀƄƉ ܕܗƎƀƆ ƎſųƇƃ ܘܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ: ܕܐſųſƦſــƎ ̣ƉــƎ ܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ <sup>5</sup> ̈ܕܐ܂ űŷƆ ƎܒŵƇƄܒ Ǝ ̈ ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ܉ ܐűŷƃܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒų ƎſųƊſŴƟ: ܘƙƀƠƌ ̈ܕܐ܂ ܘƀƙƣـــƢ ̣ƐƘـــơ ſųƀƇƕـــƎ ܗܕܐ űـــŷƆ ƎـــƇź ̈ ̈ ـــƎ ܬܘܒ ܘƉܒ ܘƊƀƠƉ ܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ܂


**1** ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ BD **3** ܗܘܐ [om. B **5** ܐƌܗ ܐƐƍܓ [inv. B **8** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ P: ƑƀƇźźƐſܐܪ L: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ D: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ B **9** ƎſųƀƇƕ ܐƦƖܒ [inv. BDP **11** ܐſƞƉ LP: ܐƞƉ BD | Ƣ ̇ Ɖܐ [om. B | ƥƌܐ ̇ ųſƢƤƌܕ [inv. B **<sup>12</sup>** ƎƉ̣ BDL: ƎſųƍƉ P | ƑƀƏ̈ ̈ƀƏܐܣ :LP ܐܘ BD ܐܘ **<sup>13</sup>** ܐܦ BDP: ܕܐܦ L | ƎƉܕ̣ BDP: ƎƉ L **<sup>14</sup>** ƎƤ̈ ܒŶƦƉܘ BDL: Ǝ̈ ܗܕܐ + [ܒƦƇƊܐ | P ܘƤŶƦƉܒ BD | ܐƦƀƍƊŶƦƉ L: ̇ ܗƦƀƍƊŶƦƉ BDP **17** ܒܐƇƃܘ [om. L **18** ŪƃƢƉ ƎſųƍƉܕ LP: ŪƃƢƉܕ ƎſųƍƉ BD **<sup>19</sup>** ̇ ųſƦſܐ BLP: ܐܣƀ ̈ Əܕܐܘ D **20** Ǝſܕ ܢƮƉܐƦƉ BDL: ܢƮƉܐƦƉܘ Ǝſܕ ƎſųſƦſܐ B .inv] ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܪƣܐ **22** BD ܘܒƤƌƢܐ ܘܬܘܪܐ :LP ܘܬܘܪܐ ܘܐܦ ܒƤƌƢܐ **21** P

same way, if there were no perception of eclipses of the sun and the moon, they would not be something perceived and understood, even if they exist in the world. For if they were not perceived and also not known, then there would be no perception or knowledge of them among men either. Hence, it is apparent that all these things and similar ones which belong to the genus of relatives are simultaneous in their subsistence and, being always bound to one another, they come to be and perish together. So the way that Aristotle defined them was fitting.

#### *[Controversy concerning parts of substance]*


**<sup>454</sup>** Cf. *Cat*. 8a12: ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν...

**<sup>455</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 77.4–6 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 124.16–21.

**<sup>456</sup>** See *Cat*. 8a28–31: εἰ μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς ὁ τῶν πρός τι ὁρισμὸς ἀποδέδοται, ἢ τῶν πάνυ χαλεπῶν ἢ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τὸ λῦσαι ὡς οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τι λέγεται.

**<sup>457</sup>** This statement contradicts both what Aristotle says in *Cat*. 8a14–15 (τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται κατά τινας τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν) and Ammonius' commentary on it (*In Cat.* 77.6–16). Both of them specify that the aforementioned problem concerns secondary substances, i.e. the universals, and not particulars.

̇ ܝ ̈ Ǝſ ̣ܗƎƀƌ űƃ ̣ܗƎƀƌ ̣ƎƉ ܐܘƀƏܐ ̣ܘƎƉ ܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ܂ ܗ ܕųƌܘ ܕƆܐ ŷƄƤƉܐ ųƊƆܘܐ܂

̈ƀƆܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܗƎƀƆ ܘܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ: ƦƀƉܐ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ܒƦܪ ܬƉŴŶܐ űƕ 345 ̈ ــƀܐ ƤƆــŴܘܕųƕ ܕܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ ܕƆــŴܬ Ɖــűܡ܂ ƉűƟ ƎــƉ̣ ƋƀƏܕܐܬܬ <sup>ܘ</sup> ̇ ܗ ̇ ܩ ƊƆܐƉــƢ ƆــŴܬ ̈ ــƇܐ܉ ܙܕ ƊƆ ƥــƌܐ Ǝــƀ̈ <sup>5</sup> ƌܐ ܘܢűــƌ ƦſܐƢſƢƣܕ ƈźƉ ܐƆܐ ̇ ܝ ̇ ܕܐܘƏــƀܐ ƆــŴܬ Ɖــűܡ: ƆــŴ ܒــų ̈ܬܗ ܗܕܐ ܕܐƘــƎ ƦƉܐƉــƮܢ ƍƉــŴ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ܐܘƀƏܐ ƦƉܐƉــƮܢ ƆــŴܬ ܐƀƌƮŶــƦܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒŴƤܬƘــŴܬܐ v84P űƉܡ ܕƎſųƊƕ܂


 ƎــƀƆܗ2 [om. P | ܐƘŴــƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƘŴــƏŴƇƀƘ P **5** ƦــſܐƢſƢƣܕ ƈــźƉ BDL: ƦــſܐƢſƢƣ P ƎſųƉŴƍƟ BDL: ƎſųƊſŴƟ P | ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ BDP: ܬܐƢŶܐ L | ƦſܐſƢƣܕ BDP: ƦſܐƢſƢƣ L ƎſųƉŴــƍƟ BDL: ƎſųƉŴƍƠܒ P **15** ܣŴƠƐƀƌƢƘŴƏ DL: ܣŴƠƐƀƌܘƢƘŴƏ P: ܣŴƀƠƀƌƢƘŴƏ B ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ BDL: ܘܢųſƦſܕܐ P **23** ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ1 [om. B

someone. It turns thus out that they pertain at the same time to substance and to the genus of relatives, which is impossible.


347 Therefore, we also state that when a horse or a bull are said to be *of* someone, we say this not because they are horse and bull but because they are a kind of property. For a horse in that it is horse and a bull in that it is bull belong to universal substance, while in that they are property, since every

**<sup>458</sup>** Ammonius notes (*In Cat.* 77.6) that Aristotle intends to show "some absurdities" (τινα ἄτοπα) which follow from the definition proposed by the ancients.

**<sup>459</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 77.29–78.2: οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ καὶ μόνον πρὸς ἄλλο σημαίνει ὅτι τῶν πρός τί ἐστι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σχέσιν ἔχειν αὐτὰ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται.

ܕųƀƍƟ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ƍƀƍƟܐ܉ ܒــųܕܐ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ ̣ƉــƎ ܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ ܕƆــŴܬ ̈ܬܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܕܐܘƏــƀܐ ſűƀŷſــƦܐ܂ űƉܡ܂ ܘܬܘܒ ܪƤſܐ ܘܐűſܐ܉ ŴƍƉ ƎــƉ̣ ܗܕܐ ƈــźƉ :ܐƌƢــŶܐ ܡűƉܕ ƎſųƍƉ ܐűŶ ƈƃ ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕܐųſƦſ ܘŴƆ ܒų ܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ ܐƎſųſƦſ܂ ܐƅſ ܪƤſܐ ܓƢƀ ܘܐſــƅ ܐſــűܐ܉ ̈ܬܐ܉ ܒųܕܐ ܐſųſƦſــƎ ̇ ܝ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ŴƍƉ ̣ƎƉ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܐƌ <sup>5</sup> ̈Ǝƀ܂ ܐƆܐ ܒų ̣ƎƉ ܓƐƍܐ ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ܂ ƈźƉ ܕƈƃ ƦƍƉܐ <sup>ܐ</sup> r85P ̇ űſܐ ̣ܕܗܝ܉ ܕƇƃــų Ɖــűܡ ̈ܬܗ ŪƃƢƉ܂ ̈ܬܗ ̣ܘƎƉ ŴƍƉ ̇ ƦƍƉܐ܂ ܘųƇƃ ܬܘܒ űƉܡ ܒŴƍƊ ܐųſƦſ

<sup>348</sup> ƃܒƢ ܕƎſ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ܒــųܕܐ ŶــƢ܂ ܘƆܐ ̣ƐƘــơ ƆܓƊــƢ ܕƆܐ ̇ ܘ ƉűƟــƀܐ܂ ſƞƉܐ ܕܬƦƣܪܐ ܒƖــƦܐ ܐſــƅ ̣ܕƉــƎ ƇƀŶــų ܕܬŶــƉŴܐ ܗ ̇ ̇ ــƢ܉ ܕܐܘ ̇ ܝ ܕƠƐƕܐ܂ ƃــű ܐƉ ܐƆܐ ܐܘƚƏ Ƌƕ ܗ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܝ ܕƆܐ ſƞƉܐ ܐܦ ܗ ̇ ܂ ųſƢƤƆ ܐƠƐƕ ̇ ƋƆ Ɔܐ ſƞƉܐ ܕܬƦƣܪܐ: ܐܘ

	- ̇ ܥ <sup>350</sup> ܐſــƅ ̣ܕƉــƎ ܗܕܐ ƀƄƉــƈ ſűſــƖܐ ̣ܗܝ: ܕܐܢ ܐƌــƥ ƌــųܘܐ ſــű ̇ ƊŶƦƉܐſـــƦ Ŷـــűܐ ̣ƉـــƎ ܨܒـــŴ <sup>20</sup> ̈ܬܐ ܕƆـــŴܬ Ɖـــűܡ܉ ܐܦ ŷƆܒـــƢܬܗ ̇ ܥ ܐƌــƥ ̇ ܂ ܐܢ ܕƎſ ſƢƣܐƦſ ܘźƀƤƘܐƦſ ųƌܘܐ űſ ̇ ܥ ųƆ űſ ƦſܐƊŶƦƉ ̇ ܂ ųــƆ <sup>Ƌ</sup>̇ ̇ ܝ ܬܘܒ ܐƢŶܬܐ ſƢƣܐƦſ ܘźƀƤƘܐƦſ ƄŶ űŶܐ ƎſųƍƉ܉ ܐܦ ųƆ ̇ űſܐ ̣ܕܗܝ: ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕŴƤſűƟܬܐ ܐܢ ܓƢƀ ƑƙƉ ܐƥƌ ܕƦƀƉܪܘܬܐ űŶܐ ܐ ̇ ܥ ƊŶƦƉܐſــƦ ܕܐܦ ̣ƉــƎ Ɖــƍܐ ƀƉــƦܪܐ: űſ ܡ܉űƉ ƎƉ̣ ܗܝ̣ ܪܐƦƀƉ

**<sup>4</sup>** ܐűſܐ [+ ܐƀƏŴƏ ƎƉ̣ B **<sup>8</sup>** Ǝſܕ BDL: Ƣƀܓ P **<sup>10</sup>** ܐſƞƉ ܐƆܕ <sup>ܝ</sup> ̇ ܗ Ƌƕ] transp. post ܐƠƐƕܕ P ̈ƀƆܐ + [ܕܓųƀƍ **<sup>12</sup>** űƕ ƎƉ̣ add. BD in marg. **13** ܐſܪŴܓƀźƠƆ L: ܐſܪŴܓųźƠƆ D: ܐſܪŴܓźƠƆ B: ̇ ܐܡ | P ŴźƠƆܓŴܪſܐ Ə DLP: ƋƏ B **14** ܐƉ BLP: ܐƊƃ D **20** ܐܦ BDL: ܘܐܦ P **21** ܘܐųƌ ̇ ܝ ܬܘܒ ܐŶــƢܬܐ ſƢƣܐſــƦ ̇ ܥ ܐƌــƥ Ŷــűܐ ſųƍƉــƎ ܐܦ Ɔــų űſ] om. hom. P **22** ܐܦ [+ ܗܝ D ܬܘܒ [om. BD **24** ܗܝ̣ [ om. P

property is a property of a proprietor, because of this they pertain to the genus of relation. Also, a head and a hand are parts of a particular substance, but not because each one of them is *of* something else, for because of that they belong to the genus or relation, while being a head and being a hand makes them belong to substance. But as long as they are parts, due to this they pertain to the genus of relation, since any particular part is a part of some whole whose part it is, while its whole is something that exists in its parts and is composed of its parts.

348 It is probably because the Philosopher took heed of this that he has not stated that the problem concerning the definition which has been given earlier may not be solved at all, but added to "impossible" also "difficult", thus saying that it is either impossible to solve it or its solution is difficult460.

#### *[New definition]*

349 Now, having rebuked the definition which has been quoted above and by 8a31–35 means of which the ancients defined this category, he sets out another definition which suits it more than the former one, saying that what is called a relative is everything "for which being lies in being in relation to something"461. So, one might say that it is not how things exist by themselves that makes them belong to this genus, but their relation and connection to one another is what defines their subsistence in the genus of relatives.

350 So, as it becomes clear from this, if someone knows one of the relatives in a 8a35–8b15 definite way, he will also know the other one in a definite way.462 For if a person completely and straightforwardly knows one of them, he will completely and straightforwardly understand the other as well. Thus, if someone is sure that one particular virtue, e.g. chastity, is superior to something, he also knows defi-

**<sup>460</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 129.10–20.

**<sup>461</sup>** See *Cat*. 8a31–32: ἔστι τὰ πρός τι οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν. The quotation by Sergius does not explicitly translate the adverb πως and renders ταὐτόν as "in" (Syr. *b*-) thus reflecting the equivalence between the two modes of being. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 130.6: τούτου καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον λέγεσθαι.

**<sup>462</sup>** Cf. *Cat*. 8a35–37: φανερὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ οἶδέ τις τόδε τι ὅτι τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν. Sergius paraphrases Aristotle's text. Cf. the periphrastic quote found in Ammonius' commentary: φησὶ τοίνυν ὅτι ἐάν τις τῶν πρός τι τὸ ἕτερον εἰδῇ ὡρισμένως, καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὡρισμένως εἴσεται (*In Cat.* 78.29–31).

̇ــƋ ܕƄƀƍƃــŴܬܐ ƀƉــƦܪܐ ̣ƉــƎ ƄŶ ܬܘܒ ܘܐܢ ܬܐ܂ŴــŷſƢƣ ƎƉ̣ Ǝſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ ܗƌ ƎــƉ̣ Ǝــſܕ Ŵــ̇ L46r ƌܗ :ܪܐƦــƀƉ ܐƍــƉ ƎــƉ̣ ܕܐܦ ƦــſܐƊŶƦƉ ƑƙƉ ܡ܉űƉ ̇ ܥ ܕƀƉــƦܪܘܬܐ źƀƤƘܐſــƦ űــſ ƦــſܐƊŶƦƉ ܐƆ Ǝــſܕ ܐܢ ܘܬܐ܂ŵــŷƘ ̇ــƋ: ƄŶ ƦــſܐƊŶƦƉ ܐƆ ܪܐƦــƀƉ ܐƍƉ ƎƉܕ̣ ܐܦ ܡ܉űƉ ƎƉ̣ ܪܐƦƀƉ ܗƌ <sup>5</sup> ̇Ŵ ܕƎſ ̣ƎƉ ܒŴƤƀܬܐ܂ ƎſűƉ ܐƅſ ̣ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ܉ ܐܦ Ʀƕűſܐ ܕƈƃ Ŷــűܐ ̇ ̇ ƊƀƏܐ: ܘܒų ̣ƎƉ ܨܒŴ v85P ̈ܬܐ ܕƦƉܐƮƉܢ ŴƆܬ űƉܡ܉ ܒƇƃŴƐܐ ܕŶܒƢܬܗ ̇ ܂ ųƊſŴƟ ųƇƃ ܐƆܬ

351 ܐܢ ܕƎſ ܐƥƌ ƌܐƢƉ܉ ܕűƃ ܪƉܐ ܐƥƌ ܬƦƀƙŶܐ ƈƕ ܐƥƌ ܐƅſ ܕƈƕ ƦــſܐƊŶƦƉ űــƃ Ǝــſűſܗ :ܐƦــƀƙŶܬ ƎƉ̣ ƢܒƆ ܗűſܐ <sup>ơ</sup> ̇ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ: ܘƣܒ Ɩſűſܐ ܐűſܐ܉ Ɔܐ ܓƀƇܐ ܕŴƍƉ ܐųſƦſ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܂ ܘܐſــƅ ̣ܕƉــƎ ܗܕܐ ƐƉܒــƢ ̇ ƦƇƊƆܐ ܗܕܐ ܕܐܬܐƢƉܬ܉ ƗƊƤƌ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܕŴƆ ܬܪƞſܐƦſ ųƆ ܐƢ̇ ܕƣ ܐƈƃƦƏ܂ ܘܐƎƘ ܓƢƀ Ɔܐ ƙŷƉــƁ ܗܘܐ ƏــƑƀŹƢƟŴ ܐƆܐ ܓــƇܐ ܗܘܐ ƈــƖƆ ƎــƉ̣ ƎــƌƢƉܕܐ ̣ ƅــſܐ ܐűــſܐ ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕܐſƦſــų ܘƗſűſ܉ ܐſــűܗ ƆــŴ ܒــų ܐƦƍƉ ƈƃܕ ƈźƉ ܐ܂ƦƍƉ ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕܐųſƦſ ƐƌƦƉܒܐ ŴƆܬ űƉܡ܉ ܐƆܐ ܒų

ܗܘܐ̣ ƁــƙŷƉ ƎــƘܐ ƎــſűƉ ܐ܂ƦــƍƉ ̇ B138r ųــſƦſܐ ܡűــƉ ųــƇƃܕ ܉Ʀــſܕܐ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ ܘܐƎƘ Ɔܐ ƁƙŷƉ ̣ܗܘܐ܉ ƊŶƦƉܐƦſ ſűſــƖܐ ܗܘܬ ܐſــűܗ ̇Ŵ ܕƎſ ܕƘܓƢܐ ܐƤƌــƀܐ܂ ܘƆܐ ܐƀƃــƦ ܕƦƍƉܐ ܗܘܬ ̣ƎƉ ųƇƃ űƉܡ: ܗƌ ̇ ܝ ܕƙŶƦƌܐ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ܂ ųƆܕܐ ƅƏ ܗ

<sup>352</sup> Ɔܐ ܗܘܐ ܕƎſ ƈƕ ܗƎƀƆ ܐƍƄſܐ ܕܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ̣ܐƢƉ܉ ܐƆܐ ̇ ܩ ܐſــƅ ܕܐܬſܐ ܐƇƘܐ ƈƕ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ Əܓ <sup>20</sup> ̈ ƀܐܬܐ ܕܒŴƘŴƐƇƀƙܬܐ ܙܕ ̈ ܢ ơƐƙƊƆ܂ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ܕƈŶŴƌ ̣ƎƉ ܒƖــƦܐ ܕſųƀƇƕــƎ܂ ̈ܪܒــŴ ܓƀــƢ ܨܒــŴ ̈ــƤܐ܂ ܘſųƍƉــƎ ܐƘــƎ ƍƀƍܒ ƎƉ̣ ŸƃƦƣܐ ƈƀƃűƕ ܐƆ ƎſųƍƉ ܐ܉ƍƙƆ̈ D113r Ŵƀܕܒ ̈ ƀــܐܐ܂ ̈ Ɖܐ Əܓ ܐŸƃƦƣ܉ ܐƆܐ ƈƀƃűƕ ܐſــƦ ſųƀƇƕــƎ ܒƖــƦܐ ܘܙŹــܐ

**<sup>1</sup>** Ǝſܕ [om. D **<sup>2</sup>** ƎƉ̣ ܕܐܦ L: ƎƉܕ̣ BDP **<sup>5</sup>** ܬܐŴƤƀܒ BDL: ܐƦ̈ Ƥƀܒ P | ƎƌƢƉܕܐ ̣ BDP: ƎƍſƢƉܕܐ L **6** ̇ ̇ + [ܕŶܒــƢܬܗ ųــſƦſܐ BD **<sup>8</sup>** ƥــƌܐ2 BDP: ܐƌܐ L **<sup>9</sup>** ơــ ̇ ܒƣܘ [+ ܐƌܐ L | ƎــƉ̣ ƢܒــƆ] inv. L ܐƦƀƙŶܬ BDP: ܐƦƀƙŶƦƆ L **10** ܐƆ DLP: ܐƆ ܐƆܐ B **11** ŴƆܕ BDL: ܬŴƆܕ P **12** ƈƃƦƏܐ DLP: ŴƇƃƦƏܐ B **<sup>14</sup>** ܒܐƐƌƦƉ LP, add. D in marg.: ܐƢƉܐƦƉ BD, add. P in marg. | ܝ ̇ ųܒ [ditt. in B **15** ƎــƘܐ BDL: ܐܦ P **16** ƦــſܐƊŶƦƉ BDL: ܐƊــŶƦƉ P **20** ܬܐŴــƘŴƐƇƀƙܕܒ BDL: ̈ Ɖܐ **23** P ܕܒŴƘŴƏŴƇƀƙܬܐ ̈ ܐ :BP ܘܙŹܐ ̈ ܐƉܐ :D ܘܙܐŹܐƉ Źܕܙ L

nitely what it is superior to, namely to depravity. And further, if he understands that temperance is superior to something, he also knows precisely what it is superior to, namely to debauchery. If, on the contrary, one does not know definitely and straightforwardly that virtue is superior to something, he will also not understand definitely what it is superior to, namely to vice. Thus, as we have said, knowledge of one of the relatives always brings along with itself understanding of its correlate and its whole subsistence hangs on it.

351 Now, one might say that, when a person puts a veil on a man, e.g. on Socra- 8b15–21 tes, but leaves his hand unveiled, then the hand will be known definitely, yet it will be unclear whose hand it is. And he might think that this refutes the argument offered, but let him see that his way of thinking is not correct. For even if Socrates were not covered but unveiled and known, his hand would be considered a relative not because it is a hand but because it is a part. For any part is a part of some whole. That is why both if Socrates were unveiled and if he were covered, it would still be definitely known that his hand is a part of some whole, namely of a human body, and this (knowledge) would in no way suffer from the fact that Socrates is veiled463.

352 Indeed, in these issues, as the Philosopher himself says, as well as in many 8b21–24 others in philosophy, it proves impossible to go into defining them without also spending a lot of effort on raising puzzles about them. For in sciences there are many things which have not yet been found out by people, while some of them, although they have been found out, still contain many puzzles and unsolved

**<sup>463</sup>** Same example appears in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 79.16–23 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 131.12–21.

Ǝ ̈ ̈Ơܐ ܘŴƌܗ̈ܪܐ ܕܒűƀ ܐƌƮŶܐ܉ ܕܗŴƃܬ ƊƄŶƦƌ ƣŴƘ ƈƕ Ǝ̈ ƠƀƍƏ ƎſųƍƉܘ ̇ ܩ ܕƦƌܕܪܫ ܐƥƌ܉ űƃ ƗſŵƉ ƎſųƀƇƕ ܒƖــƦܐ ̈ ƎſųƀƘ܂ ܒƎſųƇƄ ܕƎſ ܙܕ ŴƇƀƆ ̇ ــű ̣ܗܘ ̇ Ǝ ܕƑƙƉ ܕƟŴƕܒܐ ܐƀƉــƍܐ ܕƦƇźƉܗſــƎ܉ ƕܒ ܒŵƇƄܒƎ܂ ܐƅſ Ɖ ̣ƎƉ ƈƃ ƢƘܘܣ ܗƍƀƌܐ űƉܡ ܘŴƣܒƇܐ ŴƆܬ ƦŷƄƣܗƎſ܂

ƋƇƣ ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕƤƊŶܐ܂ <sup>5</sup>

L46v | P86r ܐƤƊŶܕ ܐƢƉܐƉܕ ܓܐƆŴƘ


̈ ƎſųƀƘ **2** P ܘƈƕ Ŵƌܗ̈ܪܐ :BDL ܘŴƌܗ̈ܪܐ **1** ŴƇƀƆ BDL: ƎſųƀƙƆ ̈ ŴƀƆ P | ܕܪܫƦƌܕ LP, add. D in marg.: ܪܕܐƦــƌܕ BD: ƥــƕƦƌܕ add. DP in marg. | ƥــƌܐ [om. P **4** ܐƇܒŴــƣܘ BDP: ܐƇܒŴƣ L **5** ƋƇƣ ̇ ܕܒƦƄƊܒŴƍܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܕܒƠܐųŹܓŴ̈ܪƑſ + :P ܕźƟܐܓŴܪŴſܣ + :D .om] ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕƤƊŶܐ ܕųƇſ ̇ ƣــŴܒŷܐ ܐƀƉــƍܐ ܐƀƉــƎ: ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕƉܐƢƉܐ **6** B ܕƢƏܓƑƀ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ܪܫ ƍƀƕܐ܂ ܘƀƆــų ܬܘܒ ƘــƆŴܓܐ ܕƇſــų ܕƉܐƉــƢܐ ܗƌܐ: ƘــƆŴܓܐ :D ƘــƆŴܓܐ ܕƇſــų ܕƉܐƉــƢܐ :L ܕƊŶــƤܐ ̈ ܐ **8** P ܬܘܒ ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕųƇſ ܕƉܐƢƉܐ ܕƤƊŶܐ ܗƎƀƆ ܐųſƦſܘܢ :B ƀƉűƟܐ ųƊƣ BDP: ܐƊƣ L **12** ƅſܘܐ BDP: ƅſܐ L **15** ŻƀƇƣܕ LP: ŻƇƣܕ BD **16** ܡűƉ BDL: ܡűƊܒ P

problems (ζητήματα), and some of them require explanations and commentaries from the side of others in order to be comprehended by those who learn them. In all these issues, one should always be ready to raise a puzzle about them, for thus he may be sure that doing proper research on them will at any rate bring him some profit and lead to understanding of them464.

End of Book Five.

#### *The Division of Book Five*

Of relatives:

	- as what is similar,
	- as what is equal,
	- as love of a lover,
	- and as other things like that;
	- as a container and what is contained,
	- as the one who rules something,
	- as the one who discerns something,
	- as the one who acquires some learning,
	- as some cause,
	- as what affects something,
	- as what is found in some position.

**<sup>464</sup>** In this paragraph, Sergius suggests a paraphrasis (with an addition in the middle part) of Aristotle's words in *Cat*. 8b21–24: ἴσως δὲ χαλεπὸν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σφοδρῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι μὴ πολλάκις ἐπεσκεμμένον, τὸ μέντοι διηπορηκέναι ἐφ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄχρηστόν ἐστιν. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 79.25–80.13 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 132.23–133.4.

#### P86v ܐƦƣܕ ܐƢƉܐƉ

̇

ܘ ܕƆــŴܬ Ɖــűܡ ƕܒƌűــƎ

	-

ܬܝŴƌƢܒƐƉ ƅſܐ ųƆ ܟƦƆܕ ܐƊƣ űŶ ųƆ ƋŶܕܐܬ ƦſŵŶܐܬ Ǝſܕ ƁƆ 355 ܘܐŴſƢƟܗܝ ܙƌܐ܂ űƃ ƑƀƙƉ ܐƌܐ ƥƍƇƄƆ ܕŴſųƊƤƌܗܝ ܐƅſ ܕܨܒ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܐ: ܘƆܐ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕűſƦƉܥ ƢŶƦƌܐ ƈźƉ ƀƌŴƃܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ܗܘܐ ƞſܦ ƈƕ ܗ ƎſܗƦƕűſ ܐƆ ƎƉܕ̣ ƈźƉ ܂ƦſܐƦſƦŶ ųƆ <sup>ܥ</sup> ̇ űſܘ :ܐƌܗ ܐƀƌŴƃ ƎƉ̣ ųƍƉ ̇ ſܐ ƀƖŹـــŴܬܐ ܘƆܐ ̈ ܐ: ܗܘ ųـــƊƣ ƎـــſƢƉܐƦƉ ƎـــſųƀƇƕܕ ܬܐ̈ ܕܨܒـــŴ ̈ ƀƌܐ܂ źƉــƈ ܕſــƎ ܕƌــųܘܐ Ŵــƃ ƈــƕܕ ܬܐŴƀſƢŶ ƎƉ̣ ŴƆܘ ܬܐ܉ŴƍƇƃƦƐƉ Ɨſűſ ƅƆ Ɗƣܐ ܗƌܐ ܕܙƌܐ: ܘܬܗܘܐ ƋƄŶ ƦſƦŶܐƦſ ܕܕܐƅſ ܐſــƍܐ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ــƢ ܐƌܐ Ɔــƅ ƇƕــŴܗܝ ̇ ܘ űƉܡ ܕűſƦƉܥ ųƍƉ܂ ƦƀƉűƟ ܐƉ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܗ ̇ــƋ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƄŶ ̇ــƢܐ: ܗ Ɵܕ Ǝ ̇ <sup>Ɖ</sup> ƈƄƆ ܥűſƦƌܕ ƅſܐ ܐ܂ƦƠƀƐ̈ ܓƀƇܐƦſ ܒƙ ̇ Ƣ ܐƌܐ ŴƇƕܗܝ܂ ܐƌܐ ܘܐƉ

 P ܬܘܒ ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕƦƣܐ ܕƠƣŴƘܐ ܕźƟܐܓŴܪŴſܣ ܕܐܪƑƀƇŹŴźƐſ :BDL ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕƦƣܐ **1 3** ܬܐܕܘܪܐ BDL: ܬܐܘܕܘܪܐ P **7** ܥűــƊƆ L: ܬܕܥ BDP **9** ƦــſܐƀܓƏ] om. P **13** ܙܓܐŴــƉ ܐƊــƣ űــŶ ųــƆ ƋŶܕܐܬ ƦſŵŶܐܬ Ǝſܕ ƁƆ ܘܗܝųƊƣ] om. hom. P | ܘܗܝųƊƣ B: ܗܝŴƊƏ D **14** ܬܝŴƌƢܒƐƉ P: ƁƇſܕ ܬܐŴƌƢܒƐƉ B: ܬŴƌƢܒƐƉ D **15** ƅſܐ [+ ܐƉ BD **16** ܐƆܐ [om. BD **<sup>21</sup>** ƦƀƉűƟ scr.: ܐƀƉűƟ BD: ܐƌܐ ܡűƟ P **<sup>22</sup>** ܘ ̇ ̇ Ƣܐ ܗ Ɵܕ Ǝ ̇ Ɖ] om. B

#### *BOOK SIX*

#### *[Introduction]*


**<sup>465</sup>** Cf. §99 above and §365 below, where Sergius merely notes that Syriac authors (former and contemporary) mostly make use of two words, *ḥayla* and *muzzaga*, and this is corroborated by his own treatise, since in it we find the same terms as full synonyms. However, in the next §355 he states that he is eager to establish the word *zna* as the correct translation of the Greek ποιότης, and it is this word that appears in this book and which is consequently translated as "quality".

**<sup>466</sup>** In the following paragraphs, Sergius sometimes uses the adj. *znaya* which might reflect ποιός, but in general, it seems, he does not make a distinction between ποιότης and ποιός in his treatise. Neither does he dwell on these two terms in his introduction to Book VI, while Ammonius discusses this point at length, see *In Cat.* 80.15–81.3.

Ŵ̇ 356 ƑƙƉ ܐƦƌ ܓƢƀ ܐܘ ܐŴŶܢ܉ ܕƈƕ ܗܕܐ ܒƈƀź ƁƆ ܒƈƄ ܕܘƃܐ܂ ܗƌ ̇Ƣܩ ܐƌܐ ̇ ܘ űƉܡ ܕƦƉܪƕܐ ܐƌܐ ƊƆܐƢƉ܂ ܘƕ ܕƎſ ܕܐơƤƘ ܓƀƇܐƦſ ܗ ܐƇــƇƊƉ ƎــſƢƏܐ űــƃܕ ܉űܒــƖƊƆ Ǝــƀ̈ ̇ ܝ ܕſűƖƉــƎ ܐƤƌ ܒƄــƈ ܙܒــƎ ̣ƉــƎ ܗ ̈ƀܐ ܐƀƌƢŶܐſـــƦ܂ ܒƀـــű ܗܕܐ ƦƉܪƀƕـــƎ ܕųſܒƀـــƎ ܘƀŷƤŶƦƉـــƎ ܒƄـــƌŴ ƐƉܒŴƌƢܬܐ ƈƕ Ƥƙƌــųܘܢ: ܐſــƅ ܗ r87P ̇ ܘ ܕƃܐƉــƦ Ɖــűܡ ܕܪܒ ܐſƢƉــƎ܂ ŪــŹ ƎƀƃܪŴــƉ űƃܘ ܂ƎƀƙƇƉ ܐƦſܪ̈Ŵƕܙ ܉ƎƀƇƇƊƉ ܬܐ ̈ B139v ܐƀܓƏ űƃܕ ƎƀƇſܐ ̈ ܘܢ܉ ƢſƦſ ܬŴŶܒ ƇƀŶܐ ܕųƇƃŴƏܘܢ܂ ųƀƊܓƦƘ

<sup>357</sup> ܐƌܐ ܕƎſ ܨܒ r114D ̇ <sup>ܐ</sup> ܐƌܐ ŴƙƇƊƆ ƢſƦſ ̣ƉــƎ ܕƇƇƊƊƆــŴ܂ ܘƀƙŶــŻ ܐƌܐ ̇ ــƢ ܐƌܐ܉ ܐܢ ƇƣــƋ Ɔــų ܘܐܢ Ɔܐ ̇ ܘ űƉܡ ܕܐƉ ܕűƌܥ ܐƥƌ ܓƀƇܐƦſ ܗ ̈ܬܐ ܗƎƀƆ ƋƇƣ ųƆ܂ ܐܦ Ɔܐ ܓƢƀ ܐƌܐ ܒƠƐƙܐ ܐƉ <sup>10</sup> ̇ Ƣ ܐƌܐ ƈƕ ܨܒŴ ƎſųƇƃ ܕܙܕܩ ųƆ Ɔܐƥƌ ܕƦƌܕܪܫ ܒſųــƎ܂ ܐƆܐ ܗܕܐ ƐƉــųܕ ܐƌܐ ܒƄــƈ ܕܘƃܐ܉ ܕܐƞƆܐ ŪŹ ƈƕ Ʀƕűſܐ ܕƎſųƇƃ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕܐƮƀƉܢ Ɔܐƍſܐ ̣ܕܗܘ ̇ ܩ܉ ܒܐƎƀƇſ ܕܕܐܢ ̈ƍܐ܂ ܕŸƤŶƦƌ ܕƎſ ܐƥƌ ܐƅſ ܕܒƢſƢƤܬܐ ܙܕ ܒƦƄƉ ƎƉ̣ ̈ Ǝ ƎſųƍƀƄƆ ܕܒƦſƮܐ ܘƐƀƙƆܐ ƎſųƆ ܒܐŴƙƀƃܬܐ Əܓƀܐܬܐ: ܕܐܢ ƊƇƣ ̇ Ƣ ܐƌܐ ƕــƈ ܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ ܕܙƌܐ܉ Ɖܐ ƎſűƉ ܂ƎƍƊſܗƦƌܕ Ǝſ ̈ <sup>15</sup> Ŵƣܕ ƎƀƇſܕܐ ̇ܒű ܐƌܐ Ŵƣܪſܐ ƦƇƊƆܐ ܕŴƇƕܗܝ ̣ƎƉ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƦƉܪƕܐ ܐƌܐ܂ űƃ ƕ ܗ ܗܪƃܐ܂

̈Ɔܓܐ ŴــƘ Ǝſܬܪ ƦƀŶܕܬ ܐƍƟ ̈ 358 ſŵŶƦƉܐ ƁƆ ܗƈƀƃ ƎſųƇƃ ܒƦſƮܐ ܘܬܘ ̈ Ɗƣܐ ̈ ſܐ ܓــŴ ܕܓــŴܐ ƙƌــƈ ƍƀƃــųܘܢ ܓƀƇܐſــƦ܂ ƍƉــųܘܢ ܓƀــƢ ܕܗܘ ųƉŴƍƟܘܢ ܐųſƦſܘܢ܂ ܘųƍƉܘܢ Ɔܐ ܓƤ <sup>20</sup> ̈ƀــƊܐ܂ ܕܐƀƇſــƎ ܕſــƎ ƍƉــųܘܢ ƎƀƍƟ Ŵƣܪſܐ ܕܙܒƍܐ ܘܐƎƀƇſ ųƍƉܘܢ Ɔܐ܂ ܘܐƍƄſܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ Ŵƣܪųſܘܢ ̈ Ɗƣܐ ƈƖƆ ̣ƎƉ ܙܒƍܐ܉ ƈƕ ܗܕܐ Ɔܐ ܪƉܐ ƁƆ ܗƣܐ ƊƆܐƢƉ܂ ܐƆܐ ܓŴ ̈Ɖــƀܐ: ܕƍƉــųܘܢ ŶƦƉــŵܐ űƟ ƎــƉ̣ ƎــƀƤ̈ Ƈƃــųܘܢ ܐſــƅ ܬܪƀƕــƦܐ ܕܐƌ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ŴźƇƘܢ܉ Ƌƕ ܙܒƍܐ ̣ܘƎƉ ܙܒƍܐ ܐƎſƢƉ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ųƊſŴƟܘܢ ܘܒŵܒƍܐ ܬܘܒ ƎƀƠƐƘ ܕƋƀƏ ŴŶܒųƇܘܢ܂ <sup>25</sup>

**1** ƁƆ BD: ƅƆ P **10** ųƆ] om. B **14** ܕܐܢ BD: ܐܢ P **16** ܐƉ] om. P **18** ܐſŵŶƦƉ BD: ƎſŵŶƦƉ P P ܐƍƄſܐ :BD ܘܐƍƄſܐ **21**


#### *[Division of beings]467*

358 Now, it seems to me that the nature of the whole creation and its ranks falls apparently under one of the two general divisions468, i.e. some beings exist as bodies and some are incorporeals, while among the latter some have beginning in time and some do not. It would not be proper for me to speak here about the origin of those that are beyond time. But according to the opinion of some of the ancients, among whom seems to be also Plato, the subsistence of every body is considered to be in time and from a particular time onward and its perishing is also set in time.

**<sup>467</sup>** Like the beginning of Book VI, the following paragraphs (§§358–365) find no parallels in the extant commentary on the *Categories* by Ammonius. In contrast to Ammonius (see also Philoponus and Elias), Sergius does not discuss here the title of the section, the place of this category in the order of discussion, its division, and other *prolegomena* issues. Instead, he suggests an excursus, similar to what we find at the beginning of Book IV, which elucidates the ontological status of the category of quality.

**<sup>468</sup>** Syr. *pulage*, cf. Gr. διαιρέσεις.

359 ܐŶــƌƮܐ ܕſــƎ ܕƍƉــųܘܢ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܐܪźƐſــƑƀƇŹŴ ܘƇƃــųܘܢ ܐƀƇſــƎ ̈ Ɗƣܐ: ܘƀƊƀƏــƎ ܓــƊƣŴܐ Ɖــűܡ Ŵܕܓ ܐƍƀƄƆ ųƆ ƎƀܓƇƙƉ ܗܝ܉ŴƙƠƌܕ ƀƤƘــźܐ ܘƆܐ ƃƢƉــܒܐ܉ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƖƆــƈ ̣ƉــƎ ܗܘſܐ ܘŶــŴܒƇܐ܂ ܕƆــų P87v | B140r ƢܒــƆ ƋƆ ܗܘ̣ ܐƌƢŶܕܐ ƈźƉ ܂ųƆ ƎſųƊƤƉ ܐƍƀƊƣܘ ܐƀƤƀƊŶ ܐ܉ƌųƆ ̇ ƉــŴܙƦƆܐ ̈Ɛܐ ܕƀƕــűܐ܂ ܘƍƉــų ܐſƦſــų ̣ƎƉ ܗƌ <sup>5</sup> ̇Ŵܢ ܐܪܒƖܐ ܐƃŴźƏ ̇ ܂ ܐƆܐ ƈƕ ܗƎƀƆ ܗƣܐ ƕܒŴܪܐƦſ ܐƎƍſƢƉ܂ ƈźƉ ܕƈƕ ܘƮſųƌܐ ܕܒų ̈ Ɵܒܐ ̇ ܕŹــŪ ܪܒܐ܉ ƀƍƏــơ ƣــƢܒܐ ܕſųƀƇƕــƎ܂ ܘƕــŴ ųــƇƃ ܬܐŴــƍܒƦƄƉ ܐ̈ܪƄſܐ ƦƉܒƎƀƖ ƎſųƆ ܕƌܒƎŷ ܐƥƌ ܕܐܢ ſųƇƃــƎ ſƢƣــƮܢ ܐܘ ſųƍƉــƎ: ܘܐƎƀƇſ ƮſƢƣܢ ܘܐƎƀƇſ Ɔܐ: ̣ܘƎƉ ܐƄƊſܐ ܘܒƍƊܐ ܐܬܬܙŴƖſ ƊƆܐƢƉ ƎſųƀƇƕ ܗƍƃܐ ܐܘ v114D ̇ ܗƍƃܐ: ̣ܘƎƉ ܐƄƊſܐ ƞƉܐ ܐƌــƥ ƐƊƆــŪ ܪſــƤܐ ܘŴƣܒƇܐ ܕŴƆܬ Ƣƣܪܐ ܘƐƀƘܐ ܕƎſųƀƇƕ܂


**1** ܘܢųــƍƉܕ BD: ܘܢųــƍƉ P | ƑƀƇŹŴــźƐſܐܪ scr.: ƑƀƆܐŹŴــźƐſܐܪ P: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D **4** ƎſųƊƤƉ BD: ƎſųƤƉ P **9** ŴƖſܐܬܬܙ P: Ɨſܐܬܬܙ BD **10** ƎſųƀƇƕ] om. B; <sup>+</sup>ƢƉܐƊƆ D **<sup>17</sup>** ܐƍſܐƆ BD: ƎƀƇſܐƆ P **<sup>18</sup>** ܐƊƀ̈ Ƥܓ LP: ܐƊƣ ̈ Ŵܓ BD

359 Others, however, among whom was Aristotle and all his followers, when dividing the nature of bodies, stated that there is a certain body which is simple and not complex and which is beyond coming-to-be and perishing. They call it fifth and celestial, since it is other than the four traditional elements (στοιχεῖα), and it is what the heavens and the luminaries in them originate from469. However, we may speak about these things here only in passing, since a discussion of them would require a separate book of great volume, and one should make long inquires into them, in order to prove whether they are all true or whether some of them are true and some not, and because of what and that by means of which one may be motivated to speak about them in one way or another, and whence one may get initial guidance towards true understanding of them.

360 Now, those who are concerned about truth divide entities that are incorporeal as follows. They state that some of them exist by themselves, i.e. they are able to exist apart from the subsistence of other things, for instance angels, souls, and demons, while others do not have subsistence of their essence by themselves, but their nature has subsistence in other things. Further, concerning the latter, it seems to those who do proper research on them that some of them exist in bodies, while others exist in incorporeals.

361 Now, all colours, e.g. black and white, as well as shapes (σχήματα) and forms, e.g. the circle, the sphere (σφαῖρα), and all impressions, and also tastes, e.g. sweetness and bitterness, as well as other innumerable things like these are in bodies. And while they are not bodies themselves, they exist in bodies as one thing in another. Thus, we see that every body of any kind, while it remains one

**<sup>469</sup>** Aristotle speaks of aether (αἰθήρ) in *De Caelo* I 3, 270b20–24, and *Meteorologica* I 3, 339b21–27.

̈ــƊܐ ̈Ɖܐ ܘܐƄƏ ̈ ƌܐ ܘƖŹــŴ ܒƊſŴƠܐ ܕųƉŴƍƟ ̣ܗܘ űƃ ̣ܗܘ܉ ƍƟܐ ܓــŴ ƅــſܐ ųƊƣŴܓــ ܪƦــƄƉ űــƃ ܐƤܕܒــ Ǝــƀ̈ ƍܙܒ ܐƊƃܕ ܐƌŵƃܐ ܐ܂ƙƇŷ̈ B140v ƤƉ ƋــƀƏܬƦƉ űــƃ :ܘܬܐƢــſƢƉ ܐƍــƟܘ ܬܐŴــƀƇŶ ųــƍƉ ܐƠــƙƌ ܘܗܝ܉Ʀſܕܐ ̇ űƃ ܓűܫ ųƆ űƉܡ ܐŶــƌƢܐ܂ ܘƊƕــƢܐ ܬܘܒ ܘܐƀƙƏــƃűܐ ŴƌܓƢܐ ܐܘ ̈ ƌܐ ܘܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ Əܓƀܐ <sup>5</sup> ̈ ܬܐ܉ űƃ ƎſųƉŴƍƟ ƈƕ ܕܘƦƃܗ ̣ܗܘ܉ ƀƍƟــƎ ܓــŴ ̈ƙƇŷܐ܂ ƤƉ


̈Ɖܐ **<sup>1</sup>** ŴƖŹܘ BDL: ܐƊƕ̈ ŴŹܘ P **<sup>12</sup>** Ǝ̈ ŷƄƤƉ BDL: ܐŷƄƤƉ P **<sup>14</sup>** ܗܘ̣ [ om. P | <sup>ܐ</sup> ̇ ܐƦſܘܗܝ :LP ܗܘ BD **15** Ǝſܕ BDL: Ƣƀܓ P **18** ŴƆܘ LP: ܐƆ BD | ܐܦ L: ܘܐܦ BDP **23** ܘƢܒƏܐ BDL: ܘƢܒƦƏܐ P Ŵ ̈ ƠſܐŴźƏܐ BDP, Epit.: Ŵ ̈ ƠſܐŴźƏ L **25** ƎſųſƦſܐ DLP: ƎſųſƦſܕܐ B

and the same in its own subsistence, may acquire different colours, tastes, and shapes. E.g., it may happen that honey, while preserving its substance470 as it exists, should lose sweetness and acquire bitterness because of a long period of storage or because of some other reason. Also, wool, and white lead, and many other things may acquire different colours, while their essence remains the same.

362 So, it becomes apparent from this that such things which occur to bodies differ from them. Neither are they corporeal, for otherwise they could not occur to bodies and be separated from them, since they do not produce increase or decrease of their essence. It is also apparent that they do not possess subsistence apart from the bodies to which they occur, since their separation from bodies means their destruction and, when being removed from the latter, they are not able to exist by themselves. Thus, while they are not embodied as we have said, their subsistence is in bodies.

363 Now, there are also other things of this kind which appear not in bodies, but in those incorporeals which have subsistence essentially by themselves. Examples are virtue and vice, knowledge and ignorance, which have subsistence in souls and not by themselves. They are also something different and separate from the nature of the soul which is receptive of them, since it remains the same in its nature, sometimes possessing virtue and sometimes vice, sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance. They enter it and leave it, depending on whether it is treated with diligence or negligence, while its nature remains the same.

364 When, however, some of the Stoics, who assume that there is nothing incorporeal and to whom also Bardaiṣan the Syrian adheres in his treatise on qualities471, state that such things whose subsistence has been said to be in

**<sup>470</sup>** Literally "its body", cf. the use of *qnoma* at the end of the paragraph in the same context translated as "essence".

**<sup>471</sup>** Bardaiṣan (154–222), "the philosopher of the Syrians" (as Ephrem the Syrian labels him), of whose multiple philosophical and scholarly writings only the *Book of the Laws of the Countries*, which was revised by one of his pupils, has survived. References to Bardaiṣan by later Syrian authors (who considered him mostly as a heretic) demonstrate the influence of his ideas and writings even many centuries after his death.

ƈــƃ ƎƉ̣ ƦſܐƀƇܓ ƎƀƐƐƃƦƉ ܐƆܐ ܉ƎſųƊſŴƟ ܘܗܝƦſܐ ܐƊƣ ̈ ܕܒܓŴ ܨܒŴ ܕܬܬŪƐƌ ŴƍƐƄƊƆܬܗܘܢ܂ ܓƌŴܐ ܓƢƀ ƆــŴ ܓــƊƣŴܐ ̣ܗܘ܂ ܘܐܢ ̈ Ɗƣܐ܂ Ŵܓــ ƎــƉ̣ űŶ ųƍƀƃܕ ܐƌŴܓ ܗܘܐ ƚƇŷƤƉ ܐƆ ܘܡƦƉ ܐ܉Ɔ Ǝſܕ ̇ ܕŴƉܬܐ ܓƊƣŴܐ ̣ܗܘ܂ ܘܐܢ ܕƎſ ܗƍƃܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܦ Ɔܐ ܐƊƄƏܐ ܐܘ Ɔܐ܉ ƦƉܘܡ Ɔܐ ƢƟܘܬܐ ܘƆܐ Ƥŷƌܐ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ űƉܡ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܕܕܐſــƅ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܐ ܐƥƌ ̈ܬܐ ܕƈƃ ܓƑƍ: ܐƅſ ܕܨܒ ̈Ɗܐ ܘܕŴƉ ܗƎƀƆ ƠƉܒƈ ܗܘܐ ܐƄƏ Ǝ ̈ ܕźƌܒŴܥ ܒųܘܢ܂ ܓƀƇܐ ̣ܗܝ ƎſűƉ ƈźƉ ܕƆܐ Ŵƌܪܟ ƈƕ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕƖſűſ :ܘܢųــƍƉ ƎƇ ̈ ̈ Ɗƣܐ: ܘƎƠŶƮƉ ܘŶƦƉܒ Ŵܒܓ Ǝ̈ ƣűܕܓ ƎſųƇƃ ƎƀƆܕܗ ܉ƥƍƇƄƆ ܐƍــƀƃ ƎــƉ̣ ƢܒــƆ ƎــſųſƦſܐ ܐƦــƀƌƮŶܐ ܗܘ܉̣ űــƃ ܗܘ̣ ܘܢųــƍƀƃ Ƌƀ ̇ Ɵ űƃ ܕųƇſܘܢ ܕܓŴ <sup>10</sup> ̈ Ɗƣܐ܂

̈ Ʀܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ƟــƎſųƊſŴ 365 ܗƎƀƌ ܗƈƀƃ ܗƎƀƆ ܐܘ ܐŴŶܢ Ɔܐ ܓƊƀƤ Ǝ̈ ̈ ƇƀƇܐ: ܐƎƀƇſ ܕܓƣű <sup>Ɖ</sup> ܐƍƀ̈ ̇ ܒƄ ̈ Ɗƣܐ ܐܘ Ŵܒܓ Ǝſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ ܒűƊܡ ܐƌƢŶܐ: ܗƌ ̈ ƀƌܐ Ŵــſ ƎــƉ̣ <sup>ܢ</sup> ̈ ųــƉƦƤƉ Ǝــƀƌ ̇ ̈ ƇــƎ܉ ܗ ܒŵܒƎ ܘƎƠŶƮƉ ܬܘܒ ܒŵܒƎ ܘŶƦƉܒ ƎــƍſƢƟ ܐƀــ̈ P89r ƌܙ ܉ƈــƖƆ ƎــƉ̣ ܬƢــƉܕܐ ƅــſܐ Ǝſܕ ƎƍŶ ܣ܂ŴźŹܐŴƘ ܐűƀƖܒ ̈ ܙܓܐ ſųƊƤƉــƎ ſųƆــƎ܂ ŴــƉܘ ܐƇــƀ̈ <sup>15</sup> <sup>Ŷ</sup> ܐ܉ƀſܪ̈ŴــƏ ƎــƉ̣ Ǝſܕ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܂ƎſųƆ ܐ܂ƌܙ ܐƌܐ ųــƊƤƉ ܉ƎــſųƇƃ ƎــƀƆųƆ ƎــſųƆ ƥܒــ ̇ ̇ ܘ ܕŶ ƆܓƍــƐܐ ܗƀƃــƈ ܗ ܕŴƇƕܗܝ ܗƣܐ ƋƀƏ ƁƆ ƊƆܐƢƉ ܐƅſ ܬܪƀƕــƦܗ ܕܐܪźƐſــƑƀƇŹŴ: ܗ v115D ̇ ܝ ̇ ܘ ܕƕــƈ źƟܐܓŴܪſــŴܣ܂ ܐܦ Ɔــų ܓƀــƢ ƆܓƍــƐܐ ܕƏــƋ ܒƊܐƉــƢܐ ܗ ܗƌܐ܉ ܪܒƖƀــƀܐ Əــܐ v141B ̇ ܡ Ɔــų ܬƉــƎ ƐƇƀƘــƘŴܐ ܘƠƀƉــƢ Ɔــų ܒƤــƊܐ ܕƀźƟܓŴܪſܐ܂ ƈźƉ ܕܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܓƑƍ ܓƍ <sup>20</sup> ̈ƎƀƐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ܉ ܐƅſ ܐܘƀƏܐ ̇ ܘ ܓƐƍܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ܂ ܘܐƅſ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ: ܘܐƅſ ܗ

ܐ܂ƍƃܗ ųƆ <sup>Ƌ</sup> ̇ L48r ŷƆܕ ܓܐƆŴƘ ƎƉ̣ ܗܝŴƇƕܕ ܬܐŴƍƙƇƊܒ ƎſűƉ ƎƍſƢƤƉ <sup>366</sup> ̇ ܘ ܕƐƉــƦܬܘܬܐ ųƍƉ ܗƈƀƃ ܕܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ Ŷــű ܐܕƣܐ܉ ܗ ̇ ܫ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܓــű ̇ــƢܐ ܐƌܐ Ɔــų ܘܕƆܐ ƐƉــƦܬܘܬܐ܂ ƐƉــƦܬܘܬܐ ܕſــƎ Ɵ

**1** ܐƆܐ [om. B **3** ƚƇŷƤƉ BDP: ƚƇŷƉ L **5** ƅſܕܕܐ LP, Epit.: ƅſܕܐ BD **7** Ǝ ̈ Ɩſűſܕ BDP, Epit.: Ǝƀƕ̈ űſܕ L **14** ܣŴźŹܐŴƘ L: ܐܣŹܐŹŴƘ P: ܐܣŹܐŹܐܘƘ BD **15** ƎſųƆ1 LP, Epit.: ܘܢųƆ BD **17** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ B: ƑƀƆܐŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ P: ƑƀƇźźƏܕܐܪ DL **18** ܣŴſܪŴܐܓźƟ L: ƑſܪŴܐܓźƟ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓŹܐƟ B: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓųŹܐƟ D **20** ܐſܪŴܓƀźƟܕ L: ܐſܪŴܓźƟܕ P: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓŹܐƟܕ B: BD ܘƆܐ :LP ܘܕƆܐ **24** D ܕųźƟܓŴ̈ܪſܐܣ

bodies are also corporeal, they are clearly refuted by everything that has been taken for their refutation. E.g., colour is not corporeal, for if it were not like that, i.e. if its nature were one of the bodies, no colours could ever be altered. In the same way, shape or form are not corporeal, for if it were not like that, then no wax, or bronze, or any other thing of this kind could receive shapes and forms of any sort which one would like to imprint on them. Thus, since there is no need to talk longer about something that is known to everyone, it is apparent that all those things which appear in bodies and perish when being taken away from them, while the nature of the latter remains the same, are different and separate from the nature of the bodies.

365 So, those incorporeals, O brother, whose subsistence is in something else, 8b25 namely in bodies or in rational natures, where they at one time appear and at another time depart and also perish, are usually called in Greek *pwʾṭṭws* (ποιότητες). As I said above472, we will refer to them as *znaya* ("qualifications"), while some other Syrians call them *ḥayle* ("capacities") and *muzzage* ("mixtures"). The genus that encompasses all these things, I will designate as *zna* ("quality")473. In what follows, I am going to explain it in accordance to Aristotle's notion of it which is established in the treatise *Categories*. The Philosopher sets it there as the fourth and grants it the name "category" (κατηγορία), because it is also a most generic genus, just like substance, quantity, and the other genus of relation.

#### *[First kind of quality]*

366 So, in our teaching on it we will begin with its division, as it is fitting to it. 8b25–9a13 One kind of this genus is that of being stable and unstable474. I call as being

**<sup>472</sup>** See §§99 and 354–355.

**<sup>473</sup>** Cf. *Cat*. 8b25: ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ' ἣν ποιοί τινες λέγονται.

**<sup>474</sup>** Cf. *Cat*. 8b26–27: ἓν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν. In rendering the terms ἕξις, "state", and διάθεσις, "condition", Sergius applies the words which also appear in the anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories*. The latter renders ἕξις as *msattuta*, "being stable", and διάθεσις as *syama*, "being in a position". Later, Jacob of Edessa in his version of the *Categories* transliterated both terms, while George of the Arabs translated ἕξις as *qanyuta* ("possession", from *qna*, "to possess") and transliterated διάθεσις. Sergius' terminology thus turns out to stand close to the early Syriac interpretation of the *Categories* as reflected in the anonymous translation but does not fully match with it.

ܒűƊܡ ܘƈƇƕƦƉ ܒų ƏܓƀܐƦſ ܐƅſ ܕƆܐ ƢƘƦƌܫ ųƍƉ ܬܘܒ ƆܓƢƊ: ܬܘܒ ܬܘܬܐƦــƐƉ ܐƆܘ ܂ųــƍƉ ơــŶƢƌ ƦــſܐƠƐƕ ƁܓــƏ ŪــŹܕ ̇ ܐܘ ̇ ܂ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕűƃ ƌܓűܫ ܒűƊܡ: Ɔܐ ƤƌــƦܪܪ ܒــų ܓƣűــų ųƆ ܐ܉ƌܐ ųƊƤƉ ̇ ܂ ܐܦ ƇƕــƦܐ ܐſــűܐ ̣ܕܗܝ ܐƆܐ ܬܗܘܐ Ɖــſƞܐ ƠŶƢƊƆــŴܬܗ ƍƉــų ܕƠƏــŴܒƀƇܐ Ɔــų܂ ܗƃــƍܐ ܓƀــƢ ƄƆــƈ ܐſــƍܐ ܕƀƇſــƚ ܐܘƍƉــŴܬܐ ܐܘ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ƍƙƆŴſܐ űƉܡ ƢƤƉܪܐƦſ: ܘܬƎƀƟ ܘơƙƍƉ ܒų ܒƈƠƤ ƍƖŹܐ܉ ܕƦƐƉܬ ܒų ܐƎƍſƢƉ ųƆ܂ Ɔܐƍſܐ ܕƎſ ܕܒƖƊƤܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ܘܕƆܐ ܕܘܪƣܐ Əܓƀܐܐ ̇Ƌ ܐƍſƢƉــƎ܂ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƄŶ ̈ƍƙƆܐ܉ ƌųƆܐ ܕƆܐ ƦƐƉܬ ܒų Ŵſ ƎƉ̣ űŶ <sup>ܥ</sup> ̇ űſ ܘŴƊƀƊŶܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܢ ܬܗܘܐ ܒܓƊƣŴܐ űƉܡ ܐƅſ ܕܬܬܒƗƇ ܒų: ܐƍƄſܐ ܕƎƐŷƊƆ ƞƉƦƌܐ ܐƌــƥ ܕƀƠŶƢƌــų v89P ̇ ƍƉــų܉ Ɔــųܕܐ ܕƐƉــƦܬܐ ̇ ܂ ܐܢ ܕſــƎ ܒƌƢܐſــƦ ܬܓــűܫ ܒــų: ųƆ ƎƍſƢ ̇ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܓƣűܐ ܒų ܐƉ ܒų ܐſــƅ ܕܬƃƦƣــŸ ƠŶƢƊƆــŴ ƍƉــų ܒƖܓــƈ܉ ܗſűſــƎ ܕƆܐ ƐƉــƦܬ ܒــų ̇ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ųƆ܂ ܓųƣű

̇ ܐܡ ƦƀƉűƟ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ: ܒƆŴƙܓų ܕܓƍــƐܐ 367 Ɔܐܕƣܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܗƌܐ Ə ̇ ƄƉــƦܪ ܗƌܐ ܕܙƌܐ܂ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐƍƄſܐ ̣ ܕܐƌƢƉــƎ ƘــŴܪųƍƣ܉ ܒــų <sup>15</sup> ̇ <sup>ܝ</sup> ܕܐܘ ̇ Ɔܐ ƄƉــƦܪ ƏܓƀܐƦſ ܒų r142B ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܓűܫ ܐſــƅ ܕƐŷƊƆــƎ ƘƦƌــƢܫ: ܐܘ ̇ ܘ ܕܐƅſ ܗƍƃܐ ŴƌܓƢܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ƦƇƕܐ ܐűſܐ ̣ܕܗܝ ƠŶƢƉܐ ųƆ ̣ƉــƎ ܗ ̈ƍƙƆܐ ܓƢƀ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕƆܐ ƎƀƍƟ ƐƉــƦܬܘܬܐ܉ ̇ ܘܐ ܒų܂ ܘܐܦ ŴƀƆ Ɖܐ ܕܗ D116r :ƢـــƊܓƆܕ ܬܐŴـــƍƀƤƌƦƉ ܘܢųـــƆ ܐƇܒـــŷƉ ܐƍܙܒـــ ƈـــƀƇƟ Ŵܒܓـــ ܘƦƉܪŴƍƠŶܬܐ ܬܘܒ ƈƀƇƟ ܕųƍƉܘܢ܂ ųƆ <sup>20</sup> ̇ Ǝƀƌ ܕƎſ ܕơƙƍƉ ܐƥƌ ܘƤƉــƢܪ ƎــƉ̣ Ǝــƀƌܐ ơŶܕܬܪ ܐƦƇƕ Ʀſܐ ܐƆ ƢƊܓƆ ̇ ܘƦƐƉܬ ܒƎſųƍƙƆŴƀ܉ ܐܘ Ǝــƀ̈ ƌܐ Ɨــſŵƌܕ ŸــƄƤƉ ŪŹ ƎƀƐŶܘ ܕܪܒ ܡűƉ ̇ Ƥƙƌܐ ƠƉܒƦƀƍƇܗƎſ: ܐܘ ̇ ܂ ųƍƉ

**1** ųƍƉ] om. BD **2** ŪŹܕ BDL: ŪŹ P, Epit. | ܬܘܬܐƦƐƉ] + Ǝſܕ P **4** ܬܗܘܐ LP: ܬܘܒ BD, Epit. **<sup>6</sup>** ƦſܪܐƢƤƉ] + ƦſܐƣܪűƉ add. BDP in marg. **<sup>10</sup>** ̇ ųƀƠŶƢƌܕ LP: ̇ ųƠŶƢƌܕ BD **12** ŸƃƦƣܕܬ BDP: ŸƄƣܕܬ L **14** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƘŴƏŴƇƇƀƘ P **17** ܐƠŶƢƉ BDP: ơŶƢƉ L **19** ܐƇܒŷƉ BDL: ܐƇܒƠƉ P | ܬܐŴƍƀƤƌƦƉ DLP: ܬܐŴƍƀƌƦƤƉ B **20** ܪƢƤƉܘ LP: ܪܫűƉܘ BD

stable what occurs to something and enters it so profoundly that it either cannot be separated from it at all any more or may leave it with great difficulty. And I call as being unstable what, when it occurs to something, is not firmly bound to it but may be separated from it by any particular reason which is opposed to it475. E.g., about someone who has learned a particular craft or science thoroughly and remains firm and diligent in it we say that he is stable in it; whereas about someone who knows one of the sciences only from hearing and not from much learning we say that he is unstable in what he comprehends476. Also, when fever is present in a body in such a way that the latter is consumed by it, so that a person is no longer able to fight against its strength and make it leave, then we say that it is stable in what it occurs to. If, on the contrary, it occurs to it outwardly so that (the body) may quickly get rid of it, then we say that it is unstable in it477.

367 So, this is the kind which the Philosopher places first in his division of the genus of quality and which, as we have said, has the differentia in that it is either long-lasting in what it occurs and may be separated from it only with difficulty, or it does not remain in this way for long but any kind of reason makes it depart from that in which it is. Thus, knowledge which has not become stable is entirely destroyed by forgetfulness within a short time and may thus be easily lost. Those things, on the other hand, which one learns gradually, strongly, and firmly, are either not at all separable by any cause from the soul which has received them, or only something great and very mighty can remove them from it.

**<sup>475</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 134.27–135.2: πολυχρόνιοι μὲν οὖν οὖσαι καὶ δυσαπόβλητοι λέγονται ἕξεις <...> ὀλιγοχρόνιοι δὲ οὖσαι καὶ εὐαπόβλητοι λέγονται διαθέσεις (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 81.7–10).

**<sup>476</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 135.4–10.

**<sup>477</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 81.34–35.

	- ̇ ܘ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ܕܒــƦܪܗ܉ ̣ƉــƎ ƍſƞƉƦƉــŴܬܐ ̣ܘƉــƎ Ɔܐ 370 ܐܕƣܐ ܕſــƎ ܗ ̇ ܝ ̇ــŴ ܕſــƎ ̣ƉــƎ <sup>ܗ</sup> ƌܗ ܐ܂ƘŴــƐƇƀƘ ƢــƉܕܐ ̣ ƅــſܐ ŪــƃƢƉ ܬܐŴــƍſƞƉƦƉ ܕƞƉܐ ܐƥƌ ųƊƆܘܐ űƉܡ ܐܘ <sup>20</sup> ̇ Ɔܐ Ɖــƞܐ ƊƆــųܘܐ܂ ƍſƞƉƦƉــŴܬܐ ŴƆܘ ܐƍƀƃ ƎƉ̣ ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕܐųſƦſ ̇ ܩ ŪƐƊƆ܉ ܗ ܕƎſ ܘƆܐ ŴƍſƞƉƦƉܬܐ ܗƣܐ ܙܕ ƎــƀƍƀƤƕܕ ƎــƀƇſܐ ƈــƕ ƢــƉܐƊƆ ƎــƍſűƖƉܕ ƅــſܐ ܡ܂űــƉ ܐƣܕܘܪ ƎــƉ̣ ̈ƣƦܐ: ܘƕــƈ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƀƊƀƏــƎ ƃ ̇ ̈ ܐ ܐܘ ܒƙܓƢܗܘܢ: ܕܗܘƎſ ̣ܗܘܘ ܐܬźƀƆ

̈ ƍƙƆܐ **3** Ŵــſ] + ƎــƀƇſܐ P **4** ܣűــſűƟܬܘ nos: ܣűſܕŴــƟܬ L: ܐܘܣűſܕŴــƟܬܘ BD: ܐܘܣſܕܕŴــƟܬܐ P ̈ƀƐܐ **<sup>5</sup>** ƌŴƘܐƆܐƘ L: ܐƀƐƀ̈ ƌŴƘŴƆŴƘ P: ܐƀƐ̈ ƌŴƘܐܘŴƇƘ BD | Ƣƀܓ LP: Ǝſܕ BD **9** ܘܢųƤƙƌܘ LP: ܗܘܢƦــƤƙƌܘ BD **10** ƎــƉ̣ ] om. L | ܘܢųƌܪܗŴــƃ LP: ܘܢųƀƌܪܗ̈Ŵــƃ BD **11** ܐƊƇƕ Ŵܒܓ LP: ܐƊــƇƖܒ BD **12** ƅſܕܐ BDL: ƅſܕܕܐ P **14** Ǝſܕ LP: Ƣƀܓ BD **17** ܐƌܗ ܐƐƍܕܓ BDL: ܐƌܕܗ ܐƐƍܓ P **18** ܬܐŴƍſƞƉƦƉ ܐƆ ƎƉܘ̣ [ om. BD **19** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƘŴƏŴƇƇƀƘ P **20** ƥƌܐ BDL: ƥƌܕܐ P **23** ܗܘܢƢܓƙܒ BDL: ܘܢųſƮܓƙܒ P

368 I am saying this because some physicians state that there are mighty diseases which cause forgetfulness in those whom they befall, so that they cannot recall anything of what they had learned before they became ill. This is also what the writer Thucydides describes in his account of the plague that happened to the Athenians during the war with the Peloponnesians478. He writes, namely, that most of them died, when during summer time they were exposed to great suffering inside their houses, while those of them who survived, as he says, forgot not only their sciences and crafts, but also their place and city, their house and relatives, and even themselves and their own names, and everything that they had known before their disease, and thought like persons who had just been born and appeared into this world479.

369 So, when hot and cold or anything like that occurs to something briefly on the surface but suddenly some reason brings what is opposite to it, it perishes. But when it goes deep and becomes stable480, then it either cannot be removed at all or remains for a long time and a powerful reason is necessary to oppose it and drive it away. However, enough has been said about the first kind of this genus.

#### *[Second kind of quality]*

370 Another kind which comes after it consists, as the Philosopher says, of 9a14–27 capacity and incapacity, that is from what one is capable to be or not capable to be481. Thus, we shall consider here such capability and incapability that come from nature and not from some training. E.g., we are accustomed to say about those whose body is strong that they are athletes (ἀθληταί) and wrestlers, and

**<sup>478</sup>** I.e. the Peloponnesian war fought between Athens and Sparta in 431–404 BC.

**<sup>479</sup>** Cf. Thucydides, *Historiae* II.49. Sergius paraphrases the account of the Athenian plague by Thucydides and his paraphrasis is obviously second-hand. Neither Ammonius nor other extant commentary from his school recalls this passage in this context. It is possible that this example was known to Sergius not from commentaries on the *Categories* but from the texts of Galen (or commentaries on them), who refers to Thucydides' description of the Athenian plague several times in his works. One of these references appears in Galen's commentary on Book VI of Hippocrates' *Epidemics*, which Sergius himself translated into Syriac (see Galen, *In Epid. VI* 52.3–7, 53.19–54.1).

**<sup>480</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 82.28–29: εἰ δὲ μήτε τελειωτικὴ εἴη μήτε κακωτική, ἢ περὶ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν θεωρεῖται ἢ διὰ βάθους κεχώρηκε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 136.23–27).

**<sup>481</sup>** See *Cat*. 9a14–16: ἕτερον δὲ γένος ποιότητος <...> ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγεται. Sergius' rendering of δύναμις and ἀδυναμία as *metmaṣyanuta* and *la metmaṣyanuta* does not find parallels in any extant Syriac translation of the *Categories* and apparently reflects an attempt at interpretation by Sergius.

ƕƞƉܐƦſ ܘܐ̈ܪƎƄſ ƈƀƇƟ ̈ܪܓųƀƇܘܢ: ܕܗܘƎſ ̣ܗܘܘ ̈ܪܗŹܐ ܘŴƣ̈ܪܐ܂ ܗƎƀƆ | v116D P90v ̈ ܐ܉ ƃــű ــܐƀܓƏ ƈƕ ƎƍſƢ ̇ ̈ ܬܐ ܐƉ ܓƢƀ ܘܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ Əܓƀܐ ̇ـــųܢ ŷƤŷƆـــƦܐ ƍſƢƀŶـــƎ ܒƊـــŴܙܓųܘܢ ܘܒƠܒƖـــųܘܢ ƍƀƃـــƀܐ: ܕƕ ̈ܬܐ ܘܕܕܘܒƮܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܘܐƌƮŶܐ܂ ܙƌܐ ܗƀƃــƈ ܗƌܐ ܕƐƌƦƉــŪ ܕܐܘŴƍƉ ̣ƎƉ ܗܕܐ Ŵƌųƕܬܐ Ʀƀƍƀƃܐ܉ ܐܕƣܐ ܗƌܐ ܬܪƍſܐ Ɵــƍܐ܂ ܕƃــű ƍſƢƀŶــƎ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܘ ųــƆ :Ʀــſܐƍƀƃ ܢųــ̇ ܒų ܐƍƄſܐ ̣ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ܉ ܐƍſƢƉــƎ ƕــƈ <sup>ܗ</sup> r49L ̇ <sup>ܘ</sup> Ɖܐ ܕƕ ̇ܒű ųƆ܂ űƉܡ ܕƎƍƀƠƐƘ ŴƇƕܗܝ ܕƕ

̇ ܝ ̇ ܘ ܕƉűƟــŴܗܝ܉ ܒــų <sup>371</sup> ܐܕƣܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܗƌܐ ŵŶƦƉܐ ܕſƢƘــƥ ̣ܗܘ ̣ƉــƎ ܗ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒų܂ ܗƌܐ ܕƎſ ܒƇƀŷܐ ̇ ܘ ƌƢƕŴƏܐƦſ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒų ܕܗ ܘܒŴƌųƖܬܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܘƆــŴ ܒــų ܒƐــƌƢƕŴܐ܂ ܐܢ ܓƀــƢ ƌــųܘܐ ܐƌــƥ <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܒܐܘŴƍƉܬܐ ̇ ܐܬźƀƆܐ܉ ܐܢ ̣ܗܘ ܕơƙƍƉ ܒų ƌƢƕŴƏܐƦſ ܪܗŹܐ ܐܘ ̇ ŪŹ ƦƐƉܬܐƦſ ƦƉܐƢƉ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ܐܢ ܕƎſ Ɔܐ űƉܪܫ ܒــų ƏܓƀܐƦſ܉ ܒƇܐ ƦƐƉܬܘܬܐ ܕܗܕܐ ƦƉܪƌܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ܂ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ̣ƎƉ ܐܕƣܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> r143B ̇ <sup>ܘ</sup> ܕűƟܡ ܗƌܐ ƎƍƀƊƀƏ ųƆ܉ Ɖܐ ܕƌƢƕŴƏܐƦſ ܐƅſ ̣ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ųƌܘܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ܐܢ ܕſــƎ ƃــű Ɔܐ ܐܬƟــƢܒ Əــƅ ܘƆܐ ܐܬܕܪܫ <sup>15</sup> ̇ųܢ ŴƉܙܓܐ ܘƊƀƏܐ ܕƘܓƢܗ ܕƌــųܘܐ ƕ Ǝſܕ ܘܐųƌ :ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ̣ ܐűŷܒ ̈ܬܐ ̇ ƍܐ ܕųƌܘܐ ̣ܗܘܐ ܒűŷܐ ̣ƉــƎ ܐܘƍƉــŴ ܗܘܐ ܒƎſų܉ ܗƎſűſ ƇƀŶܐ Ɵ ܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ ƍƀƃܐƦſ ܘŴƆ ƌƢƕŴƏܐƦſ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒƎſų܂ ܗƍƃܐ ܕƎſ ܐܦ ̇ ܘ ܕűƟܡ ܗƌܐ ̇ ųſƢƃ ƌƢƕŴƏܐƦſ܉ ܒܐܕƣܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ̇ ܝ ܕųƌܘܐ ܐƥƌ ƋƀƇŶ ܐܘ ܗ ƦƉܐƢƉ ܒűŷܐ ̣ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ: ܐܢ ƦƐƉܬܐſــƦ ܘܐܢ Ɔܐ ƦƐƉܬܐſــƦ܂ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ƍܐ ̣ƎƉ ƉــŴܙܓܐ ܕƘܓــƢܗ ܐƍƀŶــŴܬܐ ܘƌųƕــŴܬܐ ܕųƌܘܐ ܕƎſ ܐƥƌ Ɵ ŴƆܬ ŴƊƀƇŶܬܐ ܐܘ r91P ̇ ŴƆܬ ſƢƃــųܘܬܐ܉ ܗܕܐ ̣ƉــƎ ܐܕƣܐ ܗƌܐ ܬܪſــƍܐ ̇ ܂ ܕŴƍſƞƉƦƉܬܐ ܘܕƆܐ ŴƍſƞƉƦƉܬܐ ܐųſƦſ

**1** ƦſܐƕƞƉ BDP: ƦſܐƕƞƊƉ L **2** Ƣƀܓ BDL: Ǝſܕ P **4** ܐƮܘܕܕܘܒ LP: ܐƮܘܕܘܒ BD **8** ܐŵŶƦƉ DP: ܐŵŶƦƉܕ B: om. L | ƥſƢƘܕ BDP: ƥſƢƘ L **10** ܬܐŴƌųƖܘܒ DP: ܬܐŴƍſųƖܘܒ BL **15** ܐܬܕܪܫ BDL: ܪܪƦƣܐ P **18** ƅſܕܐ L: ƅſܕܕܐ BDP | ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ BD **19** ܘܐųƌܕ [om. P | ܐƣܒܐܕ [+ Ǝſܕ BD **22** ܗܕܐ [+ Ǝſܕ BD | ܐƌܗ [om. BD

about those who are constituted proportionally and have light feet that they are runners and jumpers. These and plenty of other similar things we state about various people when we see in their constitution and natural disposition that they are apt for executing one or the other craft or activity. So, such quality which derives from natural aptness constitutes its second species, for when we observe it, as we have said, we define something that one executes being naturally apt for it.

371 Now, this species seems to differ from the previous one in that the latter exists actually in what it is, while the former exists in potentiality and in aptness and not in actuality482. For if someone actually becomes a runner or an athlete and proves to be good in this craft, we say that he is stable in it, while if he does not practice a lot in it, it is considered to be unstable in him483. Hence, we attribute it to the previous species which exists, as we have said, according to what actually is. But if someone makes no effort at all to learn one of the crafts, while his temperament and the constitution of his body make him apt for it, then he has the potentiality to naturally possess any one of them but is not actually in it. Similarly, one says that a man is actually healthy or sick in one of the two ways of the previous kind (of quality), i.e. that this is either stable or unstable. But whether the constitution of one's body has affinity to and aptness for health or sickness relates to the second kind, i.e. to capability and incapability.

**<sup>482</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 84.23–25: καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἶδος τῆς ποιότητος ἐνεργείᾳ θεωρεῖται ἥ τε ἕξις καὶ ἡ διάθεσις, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον δυνάμει. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 143.20–23.

**<sup>483</sup>** Ammonius writes that in these cases we are speaking about either state (Sergius: "being stable") or condition (Sergius: "being unstable") rather than natural capacity or incapacity. See *In Cat.* 84.25–28: οἱ γὰρ δυνάμει πύκται ἢ δρομικοὶ ἐπιτηδειότητα εἰς τοῦτο ἔχειν λέγονται κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν. ἐὰν δὲ πύκτης ἢ δρομεὺς ἐνεργείᾳ ᾖ, οὐκέτι κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγεται, ἀλλ' ἕξιν καὶ διάθεσιν.


**<sup>3</sup>** ƅſܐ1 [om. P **<sup>4</sup>** ơƀƤƘ BDL: ܐƠƀƤƘ P **<sup>5</sup>** ܐƞƉ BDP: ܐſƞƉ L **<sup>9</sup>** ܘܐųƌ] om. P **<sup>11</sup>** ܐƀ̈ ƌŵܒ DLP, ̇ ܝ **13** B ܒƌŵܐ .:Epit <sup>ܗ</sup> LP, Epit.: ܢŴ̇ ƌܗ BD | Ǝ̈ ƣűܕܓ LP: Ǝƀƣűܕܓ BD, Epit. | Ǝſűܒƕܘ BDL, Epit.: ̈űܢ ̈ƀܐ **<sup>14</sup>** P ܘƕܒ ƌŵƆ] + ܐƙƇŶŴƣ ƎſųƍƉ P | Ǝſܕ BDL, Epit.: Ƣƀܓ P **15** ƎſųƆ BDL, Epit.: ƎƀƆųƆ P **<sup>18</sup>** ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ LP, Epit., add. BD in marg.: ƎƀƇſܐ BD, add. P in marg. | ƎƀƇ̈ Ŷ DL: ƎƀƇ̈ Ŷܕ BP, Epit. **21** ̇ ܐܘ BDL: ܐܬ P **22** ܐƦƤŶ DP, Epit.: ܐƦŷƤŶ BL

372 Now, we are accustomed to say about someone whose natural constitution is weak that he is capable of suffering, or that he suffers easily. About someone, on the other hand, whose constitution is sound we say that he is incapable of suffering by chance, so that one would state that such person does not suffer easily if it were not for a great and mighty reason. Hence, the one who is capable of suffering is incapable of not suffering. And also, the one who is capable not to suffer is incapable of suffering. So, since this kind (of quality which is the one) of capability and incapability has to do with the natural disposition of each particular thing, it manifests itself in that something is either inclined and prone to be affected and perform any kind of activity or is not inclined at all484.

#### *[Third kind of quality]*

373 Another, third species of the genus of quality is also constituted by those 9a28–10a10 qualities485 that are called affections and affective486. They are so named because they appear in bodies and produce certain alterations in our senses. So, when they occur to things and influence them so that they acquire particular properties, these qualities are called affections. When, on the other hand, our senses approach things and, while perceiving them, receive alteration, one calls (such qualities) affective, since they affect the senses in some way producing alteration in them. What I mean is this. Since fire and honey, and all other things that are hot or sweet like them, contain hotness and sweetness in their nature, they are called qualified by possessing affections. But when they approach our body or mouth and cause alteration in our perception of hotness and sweetness, because of that their faculties are called affective qualities, since they produce a certain affection in our perception487.

**<sup>484</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 85.6–9: ἰστέον ὅτι λέγεται δύναμις ἢ τῷ πεφυκέναι ποιεῖν, καθάπερ λέγομεν πύκτην τὸν δυνάμενον πλήττειν, ἢ τῷ πεφυκέναι μὴ πάσχειν, καθάπερ λέγομεν τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα δύναμιν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ πάσχειν καὶ πάλιν τὸν νοσοῦντα λέγομεν δύναμιν ἔχειν τοῦ πάσχειν. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 143.28–144.4.

**<sup>485</sup>** Or "qualifications", Syr. *znaya*, which, however, in this case reflects the Gr. ποιότητες.

**<sup>486</sup>** Cf. *Cat*. 9a28: τρίτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη. Sergius reverses the order of the two terms. Besides, he applies the term *zna* for the name of the whole genus and *znaya* for particular qualities of this kind. But it seems that he does that for stylistic reasons and that in both cases one may speak of quality and not of qualification in the second case.

**<sup>487</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 86.13–19: διχῶς δὲ αἱ παθητικαὶ ποιότητες· ἤτοι γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτὰ πεπονθέναι καὶ διὰ πάθους πεποιῶσθαι παθητικὴν ἔχειν ποιότητα λέγεται ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἡμῶν πάσχειν κατὰ τὴν τούτων ἀντίληψιν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρός· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ πέπονθεν, ἵνα θερμανθῇ, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς τοῦτο πάσχομεν κατὰ τὴν ἀντίληψιν αὐτοῦ θερμαινόμενοι, καὶ τὸ μέλι ὁμοίως. καὶ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ποιότητές εἰσιν ὡς εἶδος καὶ οὐσία ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ,

	- <sup>376</sup> ܒƦܪ ܗƎƀƆ ܕƎſ܉ ܐƦſ ܐܕƣܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ ̣ƉــƎ ܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ ̈ܬܐ܂ ܕܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ơƀƍƏ ƕــƈ ܬŶــƉŴܐ ̈Ɗܐ ܘܕŴƉ ƄƏܐ ƥ ̇ ̇ ܘ ܕŶܒ ܕܙƌܐ܉ ܗ ̇ ܩ ƅƆ ܓƢƀ űƊƆܥ܉ ܕƈƃ Ɖــűܡ űƉܡ ܕƆܐ ܐܬܐƢƉ ̣ƎƉ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ܂ ܙܕ ̇ ƍܐ ܕŴƉܬܐ܉ ܐƦſ ųƆ ܐܦ ܐƊƄƏܐ܂ ŴƆ ܕƎſ ƈƃ űƉܡ ܕŸƀƄƣ ܒų ܕƟ ̈ــƊܐ ܐƊƄƏܐ: ƙƀƠƌܐ ųƆ ܐܦ ܕƉــŴܬܐ܂ ܘܒűܓــŴܢ Əܓ <sup>20</sup> ̈ ƀܐſــƎ ܐƄƏ

̈Ƈƀܐ ܗƎƀƆ **<sup>1</sup>** Ŷܕ [inv. E **3** ܓܐƆƦƆ ܪܘܬܐŴŶܕ BDLP, Epit.: ܓܐƆܕܬ E | ܣŴƍƠƀƠƆܘ EL: ܣŴƍƟŴƠƆܘ BDP, Epit. | ųــƇƄܒ BDLP, Epit.: ųــƇƄƆ E **6** ƎƉ̣ BDLP, Epit.: ƎƉܘ̣ E | ܘܬܐűƀƇſ] + ܡűƉ L ܕܐ̈ܪܘŴƆ :E ܕܐƢſܘƆܐ :L ܕܐܘ̈ܪƀƆܐ :BDP ܕܐŴƇſ̈ܪſܐ | E ܘŴŶܪܘܬܐ .:Epit ,BDLP ܘŴƠƉŴƏܬܐ **7** ̈ܘƀƆܐ + ;.Epit űſܕܐ add. BD in marg. | ܬܐƢŷƆ ųƍƉܘ BDLP, Epit.: ܬܐƢŶܐ ܝ ̇ 2 ̣ܕƎƉ **8** E ܘƎƉ ܗ DELP, Epit.: ƎƉ̣ B **9** ܐƌƮŶܐ [om. E **11** ܐƀƍƣ BDEL, Epit.: ܐƍƣ P **12** ܐƌƢŶܐ EL, Epit.: ƎſƢŶܐ BDP **13** ܐƌŴܓ BDEL, Epit.: ܐƀƍܓŴƣ P | ܐƢܓƙܒ ܬܐƢŷƆ BDLP, Epit.: ܐƢܓƙƆ E **15** ܐƤƙƌ ܬܐƢــŷƆ] inv. B | ܐƦــƀƍƣ BDEL, Epit.: ܬܐŴƀƍƣ P | ܐƙƇŷƤƉܕ BDEP, Epit.: ܐƙƇŶƦƤƉܕ L **16** Ǝſܕ [om. P **18** ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƘŴƐƇƇƀƘ P **19** ŸƀƄƣܕ BDP, Epit.: ŸƄƣܕܬ L


#### *[Fourth kind of quality]*

376 Now, after these, there comes another, fourth species of the genus of 10a11–16 quality, which comprises figures (σχήματα) and shapes490. It also requires a definition, since it is not provided by the Philosopher. So, you ought to know that everything that receives a shape also has a figure, but not everything in which a figure is present also has a shape. Thus, there are more figures than

καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ τὴν αἴσθησιν πάσχειν ὑπὸ τούτων παθητικὰς ποιότητας ἔχειν λέγεται. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 147.24–30.

**<sup>488</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 86.2–12 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 147.9–23. Sergius' classification, although clearly deriving from that of Ammonius, differs from it in some details in the second and third types.

**<sup>489</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 148.8–149.10.

**<sup>490</sup>** See *Cat*. 10a11: τέταρτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος σχῆμά τε καὶ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ὑπάρχουσα μορφή. Sergius' rendering of the first term as *ʾeskema* (i.e. by a loanword) and the second term as *dmuta* is characteristic of all Syriac versions of the *Categories* and thus reflects a wellestablished tradition.

̈Ɗܐ ܕƎſ ܒƈƄ ̇ ܝ ܕܗƎƀƆ ŴƆ ܒƈƄ űƉܡ ܐƎſųſƦſ܂ ܐƄƏ ̈ܬܐ܉ ܒų ŴƉܕ ƎƉ̣ ̈ ܢ ƎƀŷƀƄƣ܂ ܨܒŴ


̈ ܢ **2** Ŵܨܒ L, Epit.: Ŵܨܒ BDP **3** ƥƙƌܕܕ L, Epit.: ƥƙƌܕ BDP **4** ƎƉ̣ ] om. BDP, Epit. **5** Ǝſܕ [om. BD, Epit. | ܐƆܕܕ LP, Epit.: ܐƆܕ BD **6** ƈƕ BDP: Ƌƕ L, Epit. **7** ܕŴŷƇܒ ܐƊƄƏܐ [inv. B | ƎƠƀŶܪ̈ LP: ƎــƀƠƀŶܪ BD, Epit. **8** ܐƊƄƏܘܐ BDL: ܐƊƄƏܕܐ P, Epit. **10** ܬܐŴƇſƦƘܘ LP: ܬܐŴſƦƘܘ BD **<sup>11</sup>** ƎƀƆܗ LP: Ǝƀ̈ ƌܗ BD **13** Ǝſܕ1 [om. P **14** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ P: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ BD: ƑƀƇźźƏܐܪ L ̈ƀܐ **<sup>15</sup>** ƌܕܙ BDL: ܐƌܕܙ P **<sup>16</sup>** ƎƀƆܗ Ǝſ ̈ ܗܘ ܐƊƀƏܕ ܐƐƍܓ ƎƉ̣ Ǝſűſܗ [om. P **18** ܘܬܐűƀܒƇƆ BDP: ܘܬܐűƀܒƆ L **19** ܚƢܒƉܘ BDL: ܚƢƉܘ P

shapes, for the latter are not present in all things, while figures are found in everything491.

377 So, we may briefly put it as follows. Concerning all things which are animate and moved through voluntary motion one says not only that they have figure but that there is a shape in them; while about everything that is inanimate in its subsistence, e.g. a bronze or a stone vessel and the rest of other things, one speaks only about figure, but they are far from being related to a shape. Thus, shape and figure are said of all animate things, while of those things that are inanimate only figure is said492. Also, straightness and curvedness of something belong to this species (of quality, i.e. that) of figure, and they are said of all animate things as well as about those which are inanimate493.

378 Concerning porosity and density, i.e. opacity and transparency, Aristotle 10a16–24 says494 that they belong to the genus of being-in-a-position and not to that of qualifications495. We, however, shall say that if one takes such porosity and density which are caused by something, then they belong to the genus of beingin-a-position, as the Philosopher states. If, on the other hand, (one takes) such opacity and transparency which exist naturally — as we say about earth that it is firm and dense and about air that it is light and transparent — then they turn out to be qualifications and not some states which signify positions496.

379 Now, we say that there is porosity in a body when its parts are spread out at small distances from one another, so that they may admit another body

**<sup>491</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 87.23–88.2: ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς μορφῆς· πᾶσα γὰρ μορφὴ καὶ σχῆμα ἔχει, οὐ πᾶν δὲ σχῆμα καὶ μορφὴν ἔχει. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 151.14–17.

**<sup>492</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 88.3–4: ἡ γὰρ μορφὴ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων μόνον λέγεται, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 151.18–19.

**<sup>493</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 88.6–8; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 152.3–5.

**<sup>494</sup>** See *Cat*. 10a16–19: τὸ δὲ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον δόξειε μὲν ἂν ποιὸν σημαίνειν, ἔοικε δὲ ἀλλότρια τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι τῆς περὶ τὸ ποιὸν διαιρέσεως. **495** Syr. *znaya*.

**<sup>496</sup>** Philoponus points out that this differentiation goes back to Aristotle who treats this issue in a different way in the fourth book of the *Physics* (cf. 216b30–35), see Philoponus, *In Cat.* 153.25–26: ἐν δὲ τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει ποιότητα εἶναι βούλεται τὴν φυσικὴν μάνωσιν ἢ πύκνωσιν τὴν περὶ ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καταγινομένην ὑποκείμενον.

ܐƌƢŶܐ ܕƦƀƆܘܗܝ ܒƢ ܓƎſųƐƍ܂ ܪܨŴƙſܬܐ ܕƎſ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܕܐƦſ ܒƊــűܡ: ̈ܕܐ: ܐſــƅ ܕƆܐ ƖƌــŴܠ ܓــƊƣŴܐ űــŷƆ Ǝــ̈ ̈ܬܗ ܘƙƀƠƌ ̈ܢ ƍƉــŴ Ɖܐ ܕƆܒƀــű ̈ Ǝſ ܒƎſų܉ ̈ܬܐ ܕܗܘ ̈ Ɗƀܐ ܕŴƍƉ Ə ƎſűƉ ܢŴƌ ̇ ܐƌƢŶܐ ƅƏ ܒƦƍƀܗƎſ܂ ܒų ̇ ܘ ̇ ŴŷƀŷƐƆܬܐ ܘƇƆܒűƀܘܬܐ ̣ƎƉ ܓƐƍܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ųƊŶܘܬ ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ ƢŶ ƎƀƆܗ ܕƀƏــƊܐ ܘƆܐ ̣ܗܘܐ ̣ƉــƎ ܗƌܐ ܕܙƌܐ܂ ƍŶــƎ ܕſــƎ ܐƍſƢƉــƎ ܕܒƤــƢܪܐ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ̣ƉــƎ ܐƌــƥ܉ ̇ ſܐ ̣ƎƉ ƤŶܐ űƉܡ ܐܘ ̇ űſܐ ܕܗܘ ƉܒŴŶƢܬܐ ܘܪܨŴƙſܬܐ ܐ ̇ ܘ ܕƀƏــƊܐ: ܘƀƖŹــƎ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƐƉܒſƢــƎ ܗܕܐ ܐſƦſــų r93P ̇ ̣ƉــƎ ܓƍــƐܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ̇ űŶܐ ̇ ܩ ܕƦƌܬƋƀƏ܂ Ɖܐ ܕƍƀƃܐƦſ ܕƎſ ܐųſƦſ ܕܒܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ ܕܙƌܐ ܙܕ ̈ــƀܐ ƎſųƍƉ ܒűƊܡ: ܐƍƄſܐ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ƈƕ ܐܪƕܐ ܘƈƕ ܐܐܪ܉ ܗƎſűſ ܙƌ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ <sup>ܗ</sup> ƎƉ̣ ƎſųƇƀŶ ܫƢƘƦƉ ܐƆܕ ܐ܉ƀ̈ <sup>10</sup> ƍƀƃ ƎƀƆܗ ƎſųſƦſܐ ܒų܂

̈ܗܝ ܕܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ ܕܙƌܐ ƠƙƏܐſــƦ 380 ܗƎƀƆ ܗƈƀƃ ƈƕ ܐܪܒƖܐ ܐܕŴƣ ƢſƦſ ܘܢųƀƇƕܕ ܐƦƇƊƆ ƥƌܐ ̇ B145r ųƀƃܪŴƌ Ƣƀܓ ܐܢ ܐ܂ƌűƕ ܬŴƙƆ ƢƉܐܬܐ ܐƤـــƀƍƆ ųـــƆ ơܒـــ̇ <sup>ƣ</sup> ܐ܉Ƙ ̈ ̣ƉـــƎ Ɖܐ ܕŷƆـــƊܐ ƖƊƤƊƆـــƦܐ ܕƇſـــŴ ܕƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ ܗܕܐ: ܕܐųſƦſ <sup>15</sup> ̇ Ŵƣܪſܐ ܕƠƘŴƌܐ ܘܕܕܘܪƣܐ ܕܒŴƇƀƇƊܬܐ܂ ŸƃƦƤƌ ƋƆ Ƣܒƃܕ ܐ܉ƌܙ ƈƕ ƢƉܐƊƆ ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ ܬܘܒ ƚƏŴƉ ܐƆܐ ƦƉܘܡ ܐܕƣܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܒܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ܂ ܗܕܐ ܕƎſ Ɔܐ ̣ܗܘܐ ƕــƈ ܗƀƆــƎ ̇ ƆــƎ ܒƉűــŴܬ ̇ ܡ ųƆ ̈ ܬܐ ܕܒŴƘŴƐƇƀƙܬܐ Əܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ܉ ܐƆܐ ƈƕ Əܓƀܐ D118v ƈــƕ Ǝــƍƀƕܪ ŸــƀƌܬƦƌܘ ܐƇƤƌܘ ƦƄƤƌܕ ܙܕܩ ܐƆܕ ܗܪŵƉ űƃ :ܡűƉ ܐƌŴƍƟ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕƦƉܐƮƉܢ ܒŴŷƇܕ܉ ܘƦƌܠ ƞŶܐ ƊƆܐŴƍſܬܐ: ܐƅſ ܕƆܐ ƌܒƖܐ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƦƉܐƢƉ ƎƆ܂ ܗ ƎƉ̣ ƢܒƆ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܡűƉ ƎƤƙƌ ƎƉ̣ ŸƄƤƌܘ

381 ܗܐ ܓƢƀ ܐܦ ܐƌܐ ƁƉŴƍƟ: ܐŴƆ ƦƇƉܗ ܕƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ܗƌܐ ܒŴŷƇܕ ̇Ƣź ܗܘƦſ ܒƦƄƊܒŴƍܬܐ ܗܕܐ܉ űŶ ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕŪŹ ܙŴƕܪ ƚƇŶ ܗƀƆــƎ ƌ

**<sup>1</sup>** ܘܗܝƦƀƆܕ BDP: ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ L **<sup>4</sup>** ƎƀƆܗ L: ƎƀƆųܒ BDP | ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƙƏŴƇƀƘ P | ̇ ܘܬųƊŶ LP: ̇ ųƊŷƆܘ BD **<sup>8</sup>** ܐƌܕܙ BDP: ܐƀ̈ ƌܕܙ L | ƋƀƏܬƦƌܕ BDP: Ƌ ̇ ̈ܗܝ **<sup>12</sup>** L ܕܬܬŶ Ŵƣܐܕ BDP: ܗܝŴƣܪ̈ L **<sup>15</sup>** ̇ ųــſƦſܕܐ BDL: ܘܗܝƦــſܕܐ P | ܐƣܘܕܕܘܪ LP: ܐƣܘܕܘܪ BD **16** ƑƀƇŹŴــźƐſܐܪ BLP: ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܐܪ D **<sup>18</sup>** ̇ ųــƆ L: ƎــſųƆ BDP | ƎــƆ] om. P **19** ŸــƀƌܬƦƌܘ BDL: ŸــƌܬƦƌܘ P **20** ܬܐŴƍſܐƊƆ L: ܬܐŴƍſܐƊܒ ƈƙƌܘ BDP

between them which is not of the same kind. Further, we say that there is density in something when its parts are arranged close to one another, so that no other body may enter between them. So, it is the position which the parts have that the Philosopher considered when he stated that porosity and density belong to the genus of being-in-a-position and do not belong to that of quality497. We should say, however, that such permeability and density that are generated by some affection or by men, indeed belong to the genus of being-in-a-position, so that those who assume that they should be situated in the genus of quality err. But when one of them exists naturally in something, just as we said about earth and air, then they are natural qualities, for their capacities498 may not be separated from what they are in.

380 Now, concerning the four kinds of the genus of quality enough has been 10a25–26 said for now. If, however, someone prolongs an account of them more then it is fitting for students to hear, he will obstruct the goal of this treatise, which is the beginning of the exercise and study of logic. But further speaking about quality, Aristotle adds that perhaps some other type of this genus might some time be found499. It is, however, applicable not only to these issues, but rather he establishes it for us as some sort of rule (κανών) for plenty of things in philosophy, admonishing us not to settle down and come to rest making our minds content with what has been said only, indulging in laziness, as if it were not necessary for us to search and to find for ourselves something else than what has been said to us500.

381 Indeed, if I myself had preserved in this treatise only the words of the Philosopher, I would have composed one rather short book instead of all that I

**<sup>497</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 88.10–14: πυκνὸν γάρ ἐστιν οὗ τὰ μόρια σύνεγγυς κεῖται ὡς μὴ δύνασθαι δέξασθαι ἑτερογενὲς σῶμα, μανὸν δὲ τὸ διεστηκότα ἔχον τὰ μόρια ὡς δύνασθαι δέξασθαι ἑτερογενὲς σῶμα. οὐκοῦν θέσιν τινὰ μᾶλλον φαίνεται τὰ μόρια αὐτῶν δηλοῦντα.

**<sup>498</sup>** Syr. *ḥayle* may render the Gr. αἱ δυνάμεις, but, as Sergius himself notes (see §§99 and 354), this term was also applied in his time for translating the term ποιότης.

**<sup>499</sup>** See *Cat*. 10a25: ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλος ἄν τις φανείη τρόπος ποιότητος. Sergius' quotation is periphrastic.

**<sup>500</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 156.8–10: βουλόμενος δὲ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἐπαναπαύεσθαι τοῖς παρ' αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις μηδὲ ἀργοὺς μένειν καὶ ἑτεροκινήτους, ἀλλ' ἔχειν τι αὐτοκίνητον καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ζητεῖν.

̇ܒــƢ ƉــŶƦܐ ƕ ܐƆܕ ƈــźƉ ܣ܂Ŵــſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟ ƈــƕ Ʀــſܘ ̇ <sup>ܗ</sup> űܒــ̇ P93v <sup>ƕ</sup> ܘܢųــƇƃ ܕƦƇƉܗ ܒŴƍƙƇƊܬܐ ܗܕܐ: űŷƆ ̣ƎƉ Ʀƣܐ ƉܐƮƉܐ ܕƕܒűܬ ܐƌܐ ƈƕ ܕܗƣܐ ƈźƉ Ƥƀƌܐ ܗƌܐ܂

	- ̇ Źܐ ܘܐܬƀƆـــźܐ ܘƀƇŶـــƊܐ ܬܘܒ ܘſƢƃـــųܐ܉ ܒƀـــű 384 ܐƆܐ ܐܦ ܪܗ ̇ųܢ ƕܕ :ܘܢųƍƉ űŶ ƈƃ ƢƉܐƦƉ ܗƢܓƘܕ ܐƀƍƀƃ ܙܓܐŴƉܕ ܬܐŴܒƀƐƌ

**1** ܣŴſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓŹܐƟ B: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟ D: ƑſܐܓܐܘܪźƟ P **5** ܐſܐܬ BDP: ܐƦſܐ L **<sup>12</sup>** ųƉŴŶܬ BDP: ܐƉŴŶܬ L **<sup>14</sup>** Ǝſųſ̈ űſܒܐ [om. P | ܐƉ BDL: ܐƊƃ P **15** ƈƀƃܗ DLP: Ƣƀܓ B ̇ :LP ܐƢƉܬ **<sup>17</sup>** ܬܗƢƉܐ BD **<sup>19</sup>** ܬܐŴܒƀƐƌ1 L: ̇ ܬܗŴܒƀƐƌ BDP **21** ܐƍƃܗ [om. L **22** ܐƆܘܕ DLP: ܐƆܘ B **<sup>24</sup>** űŶ] + űŶ P | ŪƀźƉܘ ܢų̇ ƕܕ BDL: ܬܐŴƉܕ ƎƉ̣ ̇ P ܐܘ

have written concerning the categories, since the length of his account in this teaching would not exceed one book instead of six which I have compiled thus far to this end.

#### *[Properties of quality]*

382 After the division of the species of quality that was suitable and that has revealed to us all types (τύποι) in which this genus brings forth its capacity, he (i.e. Aristotle) consequently proceeds in his account to a general definition which differentiates it from all other genera. However, the definitions of genera, as we have said multiple times501, do not match the model (κανών) of definitions but derive from those properties that are particularly concomitant of each one of the genera. As we have also said plenty of times about (the use of) properties in a particular definition, since a property is suitable only to something to which it belongs, it is also applicable as a definitory description of what is to be defined502. Hence, a definition of the genus of quality is constituted by its properties too, which we are now about to turn to, explicating each one of them according to our ability.

Now, it is distinctive of this genus503 383 that almost all things which participate 10a27–10b11 in it are called paronymously504. I say "almost all", since not all things pertaining to it without exception but most of them are said paronymously. Thus, a wicked person is characterised in this way paronymously from wickedness, while a virtuous person is called virtuous paronymously from virtue. Also, an intelligent or a prudent person is designated like that paronymously from intelligence and prudence, while someone is called foolish and ignorant because of the qualities of foolishness or ignorance that are in him.

384 But a runner and an athlete (ἀθλητής), or a healthy and an ill person — all of them are <not>505 called paronymously from the natural disposition of their

**505** This sentence in the form which has been transmitted to us by all extent manuscripts contradicts both what Aristotle writes in *Cat*. 10a34–10b1 and how Aristotle's words are interpreted by Ammonius (see *In Cat.* 89.5–9). It is thus probable that this passage came down to us in a corrupted form and that a negative particle has been omitted in it at a very early phase of the transmission of Sergius' text.

**<sup>501</sup>** See §§198–202, 290–291, and 324.

**<sup>502</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 157.23–24.

**<sup>503</sup>** In *Cat*. 10a27–29, Aristotle makes a distinction between the qualities proper and the things which participate in them and are thus "qualified", which Sergius does not make explicit in his commentary. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 88.25–89.3; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 156.16–23.

**<sup>504</sup>** See *Cat*. 10a29–30: ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πλείστων καὶ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ πάντων παρωνύμως λέγεται. In rendering the term παρωνύμως, Sergius applies the expression *ba-nsibuta* in the sense of "derivatively", which appears also in the anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories* in combination with the noun *šma*, i.e. *ba-nsibut šma*. As in many other cases, we see that Sergius was familiar with the terminology reflected in the latter but does not fully replicate it.

ƎــƉ̣ ̇ ܘŪƀźƉ ܕųƌܘܐ ̣ܗܘܐ ܒűŷܐ ̣ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ̣ƉــƎ ܐƄƏــƊܐ ܕſــƎ ܐܘ ̇ ̣ƉــƎ ƐƉــƦܬܘܬܐ ܘƆܐ ƐƉــƦܬܘܬܐ܉ Ɔܐ ŶƦƉــſŵܐ ܕƉــŴܬܐ: ܐܘ ܕųƉƦƤƉ űƉܡ űƀŷſܐƦſ ܒƀــű ƀƐƌܒــŴܬܗƎſ܂ ܐƆܐ ܐܢ ƌܐƉــƢ ܐƌــƥ ܕܐƌƦƊƄƏܐ ̣ƎƉ ܐƊƄƏܐ ƢƟƦƉܐ: ܐƅſ ƦƀƉܪܐ ̣ƎƉ ƦƀƉܪܘܬܐ: ̣ܕܗܝ ܗܕܐ ƣܐƇſܐſــƦ ܘƆــŴ ƦſƦŶܐſــƦ ƦƉܐƉــƢܐ܉ źƉــƈ ܕܒƤــƮܒܐ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ƦƇƉܢ܉ ̈ƀܐ ܐųſƦſ ƍƀƃ ܐƊƣ ̈ ̇Ŵܢ ܕܒܓŴ ƌܗ ܐƊ̈ L51v ƄƏܐ ƈƕ ƎƀƆܗ ƅſܕܕܐ ܘƆܐ ܗܘܐ ƕــƈ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƣܐƇſܐſــƦ ̣ƉــƎ ܕܘƉــƀܐ Ɖــűܡ ܕܕܘܒــƮܐ ̇ ܝ ƐƌƦƉܒƀــƎ܂ ƀƠƌــƙܐ ſűƉــƎ ܐſــƅ ܕܐƌƢƉــƎ ƆܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ ܕܙƌܐ܉ ܗ ̇ ܐ ܒƎſų: ܘܐƘــƎ ̈ܬܐ ܕܗܘ Ŵܨܒ Ǝ ̇ <sup>Ɖ</sup> ܬܐ ̈ B146r ܐƀܓƏ ܬܗŴܒƀƐƌ ƎƉ̣ ƎſƮƟƦƌܕ <sup>10</sup> ܂ƎſųƇƃ ŴƆ

̇ ܝ ܕųƌܘܐ ̇ Ƣ ܕƎſ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ܉ ܕƙƀƠƌܐ ųƆ ܬܘܒ űƀŷſܐƦſ ܐܦ ܗ 385 ܐƉ ̇ ܉ ̇Ǝƀ ܕܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ܂ ܒƢƤܪܐ ܓƢƀ ܕŴƠƆܒŴƀƇܬܐ ܒƌŵܐ ܐųſƦſ ƌܗ ųܒ Ǝŷƀ̈ Ƅƣ ̇Ŵܢ ܐƌƮŶܐ܂ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܓƢƀ ܐƅſ ܕܐƀƉــƢ ƆــƎ ƌܗ ܐƐ̈ P94v ƍܓ ƎƉ̣ űŷܒ ŴƆܘ ̇ Ǝƀƌ ܕܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ ܘƆــŴ ̇ ܕܗ ̇ ܉ ƠƉܒƦƀƍƇܐ ܐųſƦſ ųƀƇƕܕ ܒܐƢƤܒ ƈƖƆ ƎƉ̣ ųƍƉ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܐƎſųſƦſ܂ ܐƆܐ ܐƅſ ̣ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ܗƣܐ܉ ̣ƉــƎ ܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ ܕܙƌܐ ̇ ܕŴƠƆܒƀƇـــŴܬܐ܂ ŶـــŴܪܘܬܐ ܓƀـــƢ ܘܐܘƊƃـــŴܬܐ: ųـــƇƃ ̇ ܐſƦſـــų ܘŴƊƀƊŶܬܐ ܘƢſƢƟܘܬܐ: ܘܒŴƤƀܬܐ ܘŹܒŴܬܐ: ܘƦƕűſܐ ܘƆܐ Ʀƕűſܐ: ̈ܕܐ܉ ̣ƎƉ ܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ űŶ ܬŴƆ ܬܐŴƀƇܒŴƠƏ Ǝƀ̈ ܘƎſųƇƃ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕƍƟ ̈ƑƀƏ܉ ܐƅſ űƉܡ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ܒܐŶــƌƢܐ܂ ̈Ǝƣ ܕƎſ ܒܐܘ ܕܙƌܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ܂ ܓű ܘܒűܓــŴܢ ſűſــƖܐ ̣ܗܝ܉ ܕſųƍƀƃــƎ ̣ƉــƎ ܙƌܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ܂ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ܕſــƎ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܘŴƆ ܒƢܬ Ǝſųƍƀƃ܂ ųſƦſܐ ƎſܗƦƀƍƇܒƠƉ

386 ŴƆ ܕƎſ ųƇƄƆ ܙƌܐ ƀƠƌــƙܐ ܕŴƠƆܒƀƇــŴܬܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ƐƆــŴܓܐܗ ܐſــƅ ̣ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ܗƣܐ܂ ܘܐܢ ܕƎſ Ɔܐ܉ ŴƠƉŴƐƆܬܐ ܘŵƆܪƟــŴܬܐ: ܘƆܐƄƏــƊܐ ̇ ƢźŹܓƌŴــŴܢ܉ ̇ ſƢŹܓƌŴــŴܢ ܐܘ ܬܘܒ: ܐƃــƌŵܐ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ŶــŴܕܪܐ ܐܘ

**3** ƥƌܐ ƢƉܐƌ] inv. BD **4** ܪܐƦƀƉ BDL: ܪܐƦƀƉܕ P **6** ܢƦƇƉ LP: ܐƦƇƉ BD **11** ܘܐųƌܕ BDP: Ǝــſ ̈ ܘųƌ L **12** ܐƇܒŴــƠƆܕܕ BDP: ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕ L **15** ܐƣܗ [om. P **17** ܬܐŴܒŹܘ ܬܐŴƤƀܘܒ BDP: ܬܐŴܒŹܘܪ ܬܐŴƤƀܒſܘ L **<sup>19</sup>** Ǝſܕ [om. P | ƑƀƏ̈ ̈ƀƏܐܣ :LP ܒܐܘ :BDP ܘŵƆܪŴƟܬܐ **23** BD ܒܐܘ ܬܐŴܪܓŵƆܘ L | ܐƊƄƏܐƆܘ BDP: ܐƊƄƏܐ ܐƆܘ L **24** ܢŴƌŴܓſƢŹ BDP: ܢŴƍܓſƢŹ L

bodies which fits each one of them and determines them as being what they are. Nor does anything seem be characterized by being called paronymously from a figure (σχῆμα) or a shape, or from being stable or unstable. But if one were to state that being figurative is said because of figure, just like being virtuous is because of virtue, this (in fact) is said metaphorically and not literally, since in the discussions of this kind we are speaking about such figures as are in natural bodies and not about those which are considered metaphorically because of some external similarity. Thus, one of the properties characteristic of the genus of quality is that most of the things pertaining to it, although not all of them, are called paronymously.

385 Now, the Philosopher says that another property which is distinctive of it is 10b12–17 that there are contraries in it506. Indeed, there is contrariety in quality but not in any other genera507. Although substance, as we have said above in the discussion of it, is receptive of contraries, this does not come from it but, as we shall say now, every contrariety belongs to the genus of quality. For white and black, cold and hot, vice and virtue, knowledge and ignorance, and all other things which are opposed to one another belong to the genus of quality, while they occur in substances as one thing in another. Hence, it is obvious that their nature belongs to quality, while substance is receptive of them as of something having a different nature508.

386 But contrariety belongs not to every quality but to most of them, as we shall say now. For if it were not like that, what would be contrary to red or blue colour509, or further to a figure (σχῆμα), e.g. the circle, the triangle (τρίγωνον),

**<sup>506</sup>** See *Cat*. 10b12: ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὸ ποιόν.

**<sup>507</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 89.15–16: φησὶν οὖν ἴδιον τῆς ποιότητός ἐστι τὸ ἐπιδέχεσθαι ἐναντιότητα.

**<sup>508</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 157.23–24: καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν ἡ ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὴν ποιότητα ἐθεωρεῖτο· καὶ γὰρ ἡ οὐσία διὰ ταύτην τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστὶ δεκτικὴ καὶ τῶν πρός τι τὰ ἐπιδεχόμενα τὴν ἐναντίωσιν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ποιοῦ ἐλαμβάνοντο κατηγορίας.

**<sup>509</sup>** Sergius paraphrases *Cat*. 10b15–17: οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον· τῷ γὰρ πυῤῥῷ ἢ ὠχρῷ ἢ ταῖς τοιαύταις χροιαῖς οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον ποιοῖς οὖσιν.

ƍƉܐ ܐƦſ ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ܂ ܓƇــƀܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕƆܐ Ɖــűܡ܂ ܕƠƆــŴܒƇܐ ܓƀــƢ ܕŶــű v119D ̈ܕܐ ̇ ܐ ŴŶܒƇܐ ܕƈƃ űŶܐ ̈ܕܐ: ܘܗܘ űŷƆ Ǝ ̈ ̈ܬܐ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕƙƇŶƦƤƉ ܐƎſųſƦſ ܨܒŴ ̇ ܂ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕܐſųſƦſــƎ ܐܦ ܒŷــű ſųƍƉــƎ ƉــűƆŴܐ ܘƟــƊſŴܐ ܕŶܒــƢܬܗ Ǝƀ̇ ƌܗ ƎſųƇƃ ƎƉ̣ ƢſƦſ ܐ܉Ɛƍܒܓ ųܒ űƃ ųܒ ܕܐ̈ ܓƐƍܐ ܘ̈ܪƎƠƀŶ ̣ƎƉ űŶ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕܒƦƕƞƊܐ܂ <sup>5</sup>

P95r Ǝــƀƌܗ ƎــſųſƦſܐ ܐƐــƍܓ űــŷܕܒ ܗܝ܉̣ ܐƖــſűſ ƈــƀƃܗ ƎــƀƆܗ ƎــƉ̣ <sup>387</sup> ܕܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ܂ ܘܒƈƄ ܐܕƣܐ ųƍƉ ܕܬŸƃƦƣ űŶܐ ƎſųƍƉ܉ ܒــų ƃــű ܒــų ̇ ŴŶܪܘܬܐ܉ ŷƃƦƤƉܐ ܐܦ ܗ v146B ̇ ܝ ܐƢŶܬܐ܂ ܐܢ ܓƢƀ ܓƌŴܐ űƉܡ ܐųſƦſ ̇ ܐܦ ̣ܗܝ܂ ܐƞƆܐ ܕܐܦ ܐܘŴƊƃܬܐ ܕܕŴƠƆܒųƇ r52L ̇ : ܓƌŴܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܐųſƦſ ܘܐܢ ŴƊƀƊŶܬܐ ƇƀŶܐ Ɖــűܡ ܐſƦſــų <sup>10</sup> ̇ ܉ ܐƍƌــƠܐ ̣ܗܝ ܕܐܦ ſƢƟــƢܘܬܐ ̇ ܂ ܘܗƎƀƆ ܬܘܒ ƎſųƇƃ ܐƀƌƮŶــƦܐ ܕܕܐſــƅ ܗƀƆــƎ܉ ƇƀŶܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܐųſƦſ Ǝŷ̈ ̇ ܘ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ܗƎƀƌ ܕܕŴƠƆܒƎſųƇ: ƃƦƤƉ ̇ ܒŴƉűܬܐ ̣ƎƉ ܐܕƣܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ܒų ̣ƎƉ ƈƃ ƢƘܘܣ ܐܦ ܗƎƀƌ܂ ̇

388 ܐƉ

 Ƣ ܕƎſ ܬܘܒ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ܉ ܕƙƀƠƌܐ Ɔــų űƀŷſܐſــƦ ƆܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ ܕܙƌܐ܉ ܐܦ ܗ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܝ ܕƌــųܘܐ ƦƉܐƉــƢ ƢſƦſܐſــƦ ܘܒƢſƞܐſــƦ܂ ܐƃــƌŵܐ ̇ ܒƢſƞܐ ̣ܗܝ ̣ƎƉ ܗܕܐ܂ ̇ ܝ: ܐܘ ܕŴŶܪܘܬܐ ƦƉܐƢƉܐ ܕƢſƦſܐ ܗܕܐ ̣ƎƉ ܗ ̇ ̇ ܐܘ ̇ ܒŴƉűܬܐ܉ ܕƢſƦſܐ ̣ƎƉ ŶܒƢܬܗ ܘܙܕŴƠſܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܘƦƀƉܪܘܬܐ ܒų ܕܒƢſƞܐ ƦƉܐƢƉܐ܂ ƠƀƍƏܐ ܕƎſ ƦƇƉܐ ƈƕ ܬƉŴŶܐ܂ ƈźƉ ܕŴƆ ̣ܗܝ ̇ ܘ ̇ űŶܐ ̣ƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ ƦƉܐƢƉܐ ƢſƦſܐſــƦ ܘܒƢſƞܐſــƦ܉ ܐƆܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ųƉŴƍƟ ųƍƉ Ƣſƞܕܒ ̇ ܐܘ ܐƌƢŶܐ ƎƉ̣ ƢſƦſܕ ƢƉܐƦƉ ƎſųƍƇܒƠƉ ܘܐ ̇ P95v ܕܗ ܐƉ

̇ ܗƌــŴܢ + [ܕܒŷــű **<sup>6</sup>** BD .om ] ̣ܗܝ **<sup>1</sup>** ̈ ƀƇܐ܂ ܐܘ ̇ ܒܓƐƍܐ ƠƏــŴܒ ̇ ܒų űƃ ܒų ܒܓƐƍܐ܂ ܐܘ ܐܘ ̈ ܒƎƀƀƇ ŴƠƏ ܐƐ̈ ƍܓ add. D in marg. | Ǝƀƌܗ BDL: ƎƀƆܗ P **7** ŸƃƦƣܕܬ BDP: ŸƃƦƣܬ L | ƎſųƍƉ] ̈Ɛܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ<sup>+</sup> ̇ ܗŴƌܢ ܓƍ ̈ ƀƇܐ ܐܘ ̈Ɛܐ ŴƠƏܒ ̇ ܒų űƃ ܒų ܒܓƐƍܐ ܘܒܓƍ ̇ ܘܐܢ **<sup>10</sup>** P ܐܘ ųſƦſܐ ܡűƉ ܐƇƀŶ ܬܐŴƊƀƊŶ] om. P | ܗܝ̣ [ om. BD **11** ƎſųƇƃ] om. L **12** Ǝƀƌܗ BDL: ƎƀƆܗ P **14** ܐƘŴــƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƘŴــƐƇƇƀƘ P | ųــƆ] + ܬܘܒ Ǝــſܕ P | ܐƌܗ [om. P **16** ܐƢــſƦſܕ BDL: ƦſܐƢſƦſܕ P **20** Ƣſƞܕܒ BDP: ܐƢſƞܒ L

or the square (τετράγωνον)? Apparently, nothing. For things that are contrary to one another change into one another so that the destruction of each one of them means the generation and subsistence of its counterpart, and they also belong to same genus and are more distant from one another in the same genus then all other things which are between them510.

387 So, it becomes apparent from this that the contraries belong to the same 10b17–25 genus511 and that if one of them is subsumed under some species (εἶδος) then the other is subsumed under it too. Thus, e.g., if white is a colour, it is necessary that black which is contrary to it should be a colour as well. And if hot is a faculty, then cold shall necessarily be a faculty as well. Similarly, also all other things like that are subsumed under the same species together with what is contrary to them512.

388 Further, the Philosopher states that another concomitant which is distinct- 10b26–11a14 ive of the genus of quality is that it may be said to be more and less513. For instance, the whiteness of one thing is said to be greater than that of another, or less than it. Similarly, also the righteousness and virtue of someone may be said to be more or less than those of another person. However, a definition of this subject matter should be given514. In fact, it is not one of these things by itself that admits of a more and a less, but what is receptive of it is said to be more or

**<sup>510</sup>** Thus contrariety is present only in those qualities which are opposed to one another but not to something that lies between the opposites. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 157.30–158.3: οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ τῇ ποιότητί ἐστιν ἐναντιότης· ταῖς γὰρ μεταξὺ τῶν ἐναντίων ποιοτήτων ποιότησιν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, οἷον τῷ πυρρῷ ἢ τῷ ὠχρῷ ἢ τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῖς σχήμασιν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, τῷ τριγώνῳ λέγω καὶ τῷ κύκλῳ καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις.

**<sup>511</sup>** Ms. D here adds a scholion which is inserted in a slightly different form in the main text in ms. P and which turns out to be a quotation from *Cat*. 14a19–20: (ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία) ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι, "(all contraries must) either be in the same genus or in contrary genera or be genera themselves" (ms. D differs in the last part of the sentence: "or be contrary genera themselves", while ms. P is closer to the Greek text). The quotation is based on the Syriac version of the *Categories* produced by Jacob of Edessa (d. 708) and is thus a product of an unknown (probably West Syriac) commentator of Sergius' work who must have lived after the 7th century.

**<sup>512</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 89.18–21: δῆλον δέ ἐστι, φησίν, ὅτι ὑφ' ἣν κατηγορίαν ἀνάγεται ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων, ὑπὸ ταύτην ἀνάγεται καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ ἄλλην κατηγορίαν αὐτὸ ἀναφέρειν. See also Porphyry, *In Cat*. 137.5–14.

**<sup>513</sup>** See *Cat*. 10b26: ἐπιδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὰ ποιά. Sergius paraphrases the text of Aristotle similarly to what we find in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 89.23–24 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 158.14–15, but refers to "the genus of quality (*zna*)", while Aristotle himself and both Ammonius and Philoponus use the term τὰ ποιά, "qualified things".

**<sup>514</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 158.25–26: ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης οὐ διήρθρωσεν ἡμῖν τὸν περὶ τούτων λόγον. ἡμεῖς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτά φαμεν ("but Aristotle has not given us a detailled account of these matters, so that we shall say the following").

̇ ܙܕƠſــŴܬܐ ̣ƉــƎ ܒƀƐƍܒŴܬܗƎſ܂ ƦƀƉܪܘܬܐ ܓƀــƢ ̣ƉــƎ ƀƉــƦܪܘܬܐ: ܐܘ ƎſܬܗŴܒƀƐƍܕܒ Ǝ ̇ ̇ ܘ Ɖ ̇ ܒƢſƞܐ ƅƏ܂ ܐƆܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ܙܕŴƠſܬܐ܉ Ɔܐ ƦƀƉܪܐ ܐܘ ƎــƉ̣ Ƣــſƞܒ ̇ ̇ ܘ ƦƉܐƉــƢ ܕſƦſــƢ ܐܘ ̇ ܙܕſــƠܐ܉ <sup>ܗ</sup> ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƀƉــƦܪܐ ܐܘ ŶܒƢܗ ŴƙƆܬ ƦŶŴƤƉܐ ܕƀƐƌܒŴܬܐ ܕƈƃ űŶܐ ƎſųƍƉ܂

389 ܘŴŶܪܘܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܘܐܘŴƊƃܬܐ ܘܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ܉ ŴƆ ܗƎƀƌ <sup>5</sup> ̇ ̇ ܝ ܕܐųſƦſ ̈ܕܐ܂ ŴŶܪܘܬܐ ܓƢƀ ܒų űŶ ƎƉ̣ ܢƮſƞܒ ̇ ƦƉܐƮƉܢ ܕƮſƦſܢ ܐܘ ŴŶܪܘܬܐ܉ Ɔܐ ƢſƦſܐ ̣ƉــƎ ŶــŴܪܘܬܐ ܐŶــƢܬܐ <sup>ܐ</sup> r120D ̇ ſــűܐ ̣ܕܗܝ܂ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ̇ ܐܘƊƃــŴܬܐ܉ ܒſƞــƢܐ ̣ƉــƎ ܐܘƊƃــŴܬܐ ̇ ܝ ܕܐſƦſــų ܐܘŴƊƃܬܐ ܒــų ܐƢŶܬܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ܓƊƣŴܐ ƠƉܒƎſųƍƇ܉ ̣ܗܘ ƦƉܐƢƉ ܕŶــŴܪ ſƦſــƢ ̣ƉــƎ ̇ ܒſƞــƢ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܐܘ r147B ̇ ܒƢſƞ ųƍƉ: ܘܕܐܘƋƃ ܬܘܒ ƢſƦſ ̣ƉــƎ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ܐܘ ųƍƉ܂ ܘܗƍƃܐ ܐܦ ƈƕ ƎſųƇƃ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕܐƦſ ܒų ܒܓƍــƐܐ ܗƌܐ܉ ̇ ܩ ƎƆ ܕƐƌܒــƢ ܕƦƉܐƉــƮܢ ƢſƦſܐſــƦ ܘܒƢſƞܐſــƦ܉ ܐƆܐ ܙܕ ƎſųƀƇƕ ŴƆ ̈Ǝ ܒų܂ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܓƣű ƈƕ ܗ

̇

 ܝ ܕƆــų Ɔــƌųܐ ܓƍــƐܐ ܕܙƌܐ ƀƠƌــƙܐ 390 ܕŴƀƇſܬܐ ſűƉــƎ ſƦŶــƦܬܐ ܗ ̇ ܝ ܕƦƌܐƢƉ ܒƄــƈ ܙܒــƎ ܕƀƉܐſــƦ ܘƆܐ ܕƀƉܐſــƦ܂ ܗ ܉ ̇ L52v ųſƦſܐ Ʀſܐűƀŷſ ̈ܗܝ ƊŷƆܐ: ܘƙƀƠƌܐ ųƆܘܢ ܒűƖƇƄܢ܂ ܗƃــƍܐ ܗܕܐ ܓƢƀ ųƇƄƆܘܢ ܐܕŴƣ ̇ ܂ ܘܐܘŴƊƃܬܐ ̇ Ǝ ܕƌܐƢƉ܉ ܕŴŶܪܘܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܕƀƉܐ ųƆ Ɖ ƈƕ űƀƖƉ Ƣƀܓ ̇ ܝ Ɔܐ ̇ ܘ ܕƉܐ܂ ܕŴƉܬܐ ܕƎſ ܗ ̇ ܘ ųƆ ܗ r96P ̇ ܝ Ɔܐ ܕƀƉܐ ųƆܕܐ܂ ܘܐƊƄƏܐ ܗ ܕƀƉܐ ųƆܕܐ܂ ܘƈƕ ŴƊƀƊŶܬܐ ܘƢſƢƟܘܬܐ: ܘܪƀŹܒــŴܬܐ ܘſܒƤƀــŴܬܐ: ܘƀƉــƦܪܘܬܐ ܘܒƤƀــŴܬܐ: ܘƏــƄܐ ƕــƈ ſųƇƃــƎ ܨܒــŴ <sup>20</sup> ̈ܬܐ ܐƀƌƮŶــƦܐ ƎƍſűƖƉ Ǝƀ ̈ ̈ܕܐ ܘܕƆܐ ܕƉ űŷƆ Ǝƀ ̈ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ̣ƎƉ ܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ ܕܙƌܐ܉ ܕܕƉ ƢſƦſ ܉Ʀſܐűƀŷſ ܐƌܗ ܐƐƍܓƆ ųƆ ܐƙƀƠƌ ܗܕܐ ƎſűƉ ܂Ǝƀ̈ ƌܐ ƢƉܐƊƆ ųƉŴــŶܬ ƈــƕ ܐܦ ƎــƀƆܗ ƈƀƄƉ ƎƠ̈ ̈Ǝƀ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ܂ ܘƙƏ ƌܗ ƎſųƇƃ ƎƉ̣ ܂ųƆ Ǝ ̈ ̣ܕƎƉ ܗƎƀƆ ܕƙƀƠƌ

̇ ܒſƞــƢܐ **<sup>2</sup>** ܐܘ BDL: ܐƢſƞܘܒ P **<sup>5</sup>** ܪܘܬܐŴŶܘ BDL: ܪܘܬܐŴŶ P | ܬܘܒ BDL: Ƣƀܓ P **<sup>8</sup>** ܝ ̇ ܒų ̇ ܐܘƊƃــŴܬܐ ܒſƞــƢܐ ̣ƉــƎ ܐܘƊƃــŴܬܐ ųــſƦſܕܐ [om. hom. P **12** ŴــƆ BDL: ܗܘܐ ܐƆ P **14** ܬܐƦſƦŶ BDL: ܐƦſܐƦſƦŶ P | ܐƐƍܓ ܐƌųƆ BDL: ܐƌܗ ܐƐƍܓƆ P **22** ųƆ] om. P

less than another thing which partakes of it515. Indeed, virtue is by no means more or less than virtue, neither is justice more or less than justice, but rather it is someone who partakes of them by being virtuous or just who is said to be more or less in the degree of partaking of each one of them.

389 Also, of such things as white, black, and suchlike, one also does not say that one of them is more or less then the other. For white in that it is white is not more than any other white. Nor is black in that it is black any less than something else that is black. Rather it is the body which is receptive of them that is said to be more or less white than another one, and also more or less black than another. Likewise, in regard to everything else pertaining to this genus, we shall not assume that they themselves admit of a more and a less, but those things in which they occur516.

390 Now, a property in the strict sense which is particularly characteristic of 11a14–19 the genus of quality is that it may always be called similar or dissimilar517. It applies to all its species and is always concomitant of them. Thus, we are accustomed to say that this white is similar to that one, or that this black is dissimilar to that one, that this figure (σχῆμα) is similar to that one, while this shape is dissimilar to that one. Also, about hot and cold, wet and dry, virtue and vice, and about all other things without exception which belong to the genus of quality we are accustomed to say that they are similar or dissimilar to one another. Hence, this is particularly characteristic of this genus much more than of all other ones. Now, what has been said thus far is sufficient for a definition (of quality) which derives from its concomitants.

**<sup>515</sup>** Syr. *ba-nsibuta*. Sergius applies here the same expression for rendering the Gr. μετέχω, which he used while speaking about paronyms above, see §§383–384. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 90.3–5: δικαιοσύνην γὰρ δικαιοσύνης οὐ πάνυ φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεσθαι, ἧττον μέντοι καὶ μᾶλλον μετέχειν τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ὑγείας λέγεται.

**<sup>516</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 90.10–12; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 159.1–17.

**<sup>517</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 90.28–91.2: μεταβαίνει δὲ εἰς τὸ κυρίως ἴδιον καί φησιν ὅμοια δὲ καὶ ἀνόμοια· ἐπ' οὐδεμιᾶς γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν ἁρμόζει τοῦτο τὸ ἴδιον.

̈ ܬܐ ̣ƉــƎ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕܐܬܐƉــƢ ܒــų 391 Ɔܐ ܕƎſ ܐƥƌ ƦƤƌܓƥ ܐܢ Əܓƀــܐ ̇ ܘ ܕܐܬܐƉــƢ ̈Ǝŷ ܕܐƎſųſƦſ ܐܦ ̣ƎƉ ܓƐƍܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ܒܓƐƍܐ ܗƌܐ: ƃƦƤƉ ̇ ܝ ƉűƟــŴܗܝ: ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƆــŴܬ Ɖــűܡ܂ ܘƆܐ ƐƌܒــƢ Ɔــų ܕܐܬƍƀƤƌــƎ ƆــƎ ܗ ̈ ܢ ̣ƉــƎ ƖƆــƈ: ܕƆܐ ܐſــƦ ܨܒــŴܬܐ Ŷــűܐ ــܐƀܓƏ Ǝــƀ̈ ܕܐƀƉــƢܐ ܙܒƍ ܒܐƟŴــƕ Ƌــƕ ܪŴــŷƌ ܐ܉Ƣ ̇ ܕŷƃƦƤƉܐ ̣ƎƉ ܬܪƎſ ܓƍ <sup>5</sup> ̈Ɛܐ܂ ܐƆܐ ƥƍƇƃ ܕƟ ̈ــƐܐ Ɔܐ ̇ ܩ ܓƢƀ ƊƆــűܥ܉ ̣ܕƉــƎ ܬܪſــƎ ܓƍ ܕܙܕܩ ܒܐƎƀƇſ ܕƦƉܐƮƉܢ܂ ܙܕ ̇ ܘ ̇ــŴ ܕſــƎ ܒــų ̇ ܒų űƃ ܒų ܒƌŵܐ: ܗƌ ŷƃƦƤƉܐ űŶܐ ܨܒŴܬܐ ܕܐųſƦſ Ɖܐ ܕƦƉܐƢƉܐ ܒų ܕܐųſƦſ v147B ̇ ̣ƎƉ ܓƐƍܐ ܐŶــƌƢܐ܂ ܒźــƐƘŴܐ ܕſــƎ D120v ܐűــŶ ŸــƃƦƣܕܬ ܐſƞــƉ ܐƐــƍܓ űــŶ ƎــƉ̣ ܕŴŷƇܒ ŴƆ ܐƌƢŶܘܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܨܒŴܬܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ̣ƎƉ Əܓƀܐ <sup>10</sup> ̈ ܐ܂

̇ Ƣ ܐƌܐ ܕƎſ ܕܐƅſ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ܕƐƀƟܐ űƃ űŶ ̣ܗܘ űƉܡ܉ ƦƉܐƢƉ 392 ܐƉ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ̣ƎƉ ܐܘƀƏܐ ̣ܘƎƉ ƀƊƃــŴܬܐ: ̣ܘƉــƎ ƆــŴܬ Ɖــűܡ ̣ܘƉــƎ ܙƌܐ܂ ƎƉ̣ ܘܢ܂ųƇƃ ƎƉ̣ ܘܗܝƦſܕܐ ƢƉܐƦƉ ܐƐƘŴźܒ ųܒ űƃ ųܒ ŴƆ ܐƆܐ ܐܘƀƏܐ ܓƢƀ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܒــų v96P ̇ ܝ ܕƟــƍܐ ƟــƊſŴܐ ܕƍƟــųƉŴ܉ ܘƆــŴ ܒƊــűܡ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ: ܐƅſ ŴƊƀƊŶܬܐ ܒܓƊƣŴܐ܂ ̣ܘƎƉ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ܬܘܒ <sup>15</sup> ̇ űſܐ ̣ܕܗܝ܂ ̇ ܐƦſ ܒų ƦŶŴƤƉܐ <sup>ܐ</sup> ̇ Ƣƃܐ: ܐܘ ܐƦſܘܗܝ܉ ܒų r)Lg(L ̇ ܝ ܕܐܪƅſ ܐܘ ܗƍƃܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܦ ̣ƎƉ ŴƆܬ űƉܡ ƦƉܐƢƉ܉ ܐƅſ ƍƀƍƟܐ űƉܡ ܕƢƉܗ: ̇ ܕſűƟŴƌــŴܗܝ܂ ̣ܘƉــƎ ܙƌܐ ̇ ܘ ܕܐƦſ ųƆ ŴƇƕܗܝ ƍźƆŴƣܐ ܕŵƌܒƀƍــŴܗܝ ܐܘ ܗ ̇ ܐܘƋƃ: ̇ ŴŶܪ ܐܘ ̇ ܪŪƀŹ: ܐܘ ̇ ܝ ܕſܒƥƀ ܐܘ ܬܘܒ ƦƉܐƢƉ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ܉ ܒų ̇ ƢƀƠſ܂ ܗƎƀƆ ܓƢƀ ƎſųƇƃ ܘܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ܉ ̣ƎƉ ܓƐƍܐ ܕܙƌܐ ܐܘ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ƈƀƇƟ ܐܘ ̇ ƎƍſƢ ܒƈƄ ܙܒƎ܉ ܕƀƆــƦ Ŷــűܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ܂ ƎſűƉ ƦſŴŶ ƦƇƉܐ ܕܗܕܐ ܐƉ ̈ــƐܐ: ƍܓ Ǝــſܬܪ ƎــƉ̣ ܐƐƘŴــźܒ ųܒ űƃ ųܒ ̇ ܨܒŴܬܐ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ųƍƀƃ ̈ƍƀܐ ܒƐƘŴźܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܘܐƌƢŶܐ ŸƃƦƤƉ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƃ ƎƉ̣ űŷƇƃ ܐƆܐ ̈ ܐ܂ ̈Ɛܐ Əܓƀܐ ƍܓ ƎƉ̣

̈ ܢ ̣ƎƉ ƈƖƆ ܕƆܐ ܐƦſ ܨܒŴܬܐ űŶܐ ܕŷƃƦƤƉܐ **4** ܐƀܓƏ Ǝƀ̈ ƍܙܒ ܐƢƀƉܕܐ [om. P **<sup>6</sup>** ܐƐ̈ ܓƍ BDL: Ǝƀ ̈ Ɛƍܓ P **17** ܬܘܒ [om. BDP | ƎƉ̣ ] om. P **18** ܗܝŴſűƟŴƌܕ LP: ܗܝŴſűƟŴƌ BD

#### *[Puzzle concerning relatives]*

391 One should not be disturbed if many of those things which have been 11a20–38 discussed in this genus turn out to belong also to the genus that has been discussed before, namely to that of relation518. Nor should one believe that we have forgotten what has been stated plenty of times above, i.e. that same thing may not pertain to two genera519. But every reader should examine what is said with due consideration. Thus, we ought to know that one thing may not be found in two genera in the same way, i.e. what is said of it would come from various genera. However, in modes (τύποι) which differ from one another a particular thing may belong not to one genus only but to many.

392 What I mean is this. The same piece of wood may be said to belong to substance and to quantity, to relation and to quality, but it is not in the same mode (τύπος) that it is said to pertain to all of them. For it belongs to substance in that it has subsistence in virtue of itself and does not exist in something else, like hot in a body. But it also pertains to quantity in that it is long or short, or has any particular size. Similarly, it is also said as relative when it belongs to someone who has the power to sell or to burn it. And further, it is referred to quality in that it is either dry or wet, either white or black, either small or big, for all these and suchlike pertain to the genus of quality. So the statement has been made clear which we make all the time that the nature of one thing may not pertain in the same mode to two genera, but every nature turns out to belong to different genera in different ways.

**<sup>518</sup>** Sergius paraphrases *Cat*. 11a20–22: οὐ δεῖ δὲ ταράττεσθαι μή τις ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὑπὲρ ποιότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένους πολλὰ τῶν πρός τι συγκαταριθμεῖσθαι. Ammonius makes clear that it is Aristotle himself who articulates this puzzle and consequently suggests a solution to it, see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 91.4–8 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 161.31–162.4.

**<sup>519</sup>** See §§109–112, above. Porphyry refers in his question-and-answer commentary to Aristotle's own statement in *Cat*. 1b15–16 that the differentiae of genera that are different and not subordinate one to the other are different in species, see Porphyry, *In Cat*. 139.26–27.

	- ̇ــŴܢ ̈Ɖــƀܐ: ܗƌ <sup>394</sup> ܕƐƕــƢܐ ܗƀƃــƈ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ Ƈƃــųܘܢ ܓƍ r121D ̈ــƐܐ űƟ ƈــƕ ܐ܂ƀــƉ̈ ̇ــŴܢ űƟ ܕƀźƟܓŴܪŴſܣ ſųƉƦƤƉــƎ܉ ܐƀƉــƢ ƆــƎ ܒƤــƮܒܐ ܗƌ ܐܪܒƖܐ ܕƎſ ųƍƉܘܢ ܐƎƀƇſ ̣ܕܗŴƌܢ ̈ܪƎƀƀƣ܉ ܐƎƍƙƆ Ɖűƕܐ ƣųƆܐ܂ ƈƕ ܗƌ <sup>15</sup> ̇Ŵܢ ܕƎſ Ʀƣܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ܉ Ɔܐ ƇƊƕܐ ƦƇƉܐ ŴſŴŷƊƆ܂ ܐƇƘܐ ܓƢƀ ̣ܗܘ ƘŴƐƇƀƘܐ ųƍŷƄƤƉܘܢ ܐƚƆ ųƀƇƕܘܢ Ɖــűܡ܂ ܐƆܐ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ܐܬƕــųܕ ̇ Ǝ ܕſűſــƖܐ ̣ܗܝ Ɖ ƅſܐ ܘܢ܉ųƀƇƕܕ ܐƦƇƊƆ ̇ L(Lg)v ųƠܒƣܘ :ƦſܐƊƀŷƣ ܢŴƌܐ ̇Ŵܢ ܕܐܬܐƢƉ܂ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܗƈƀƃ ƎƍŶ ܐܦ ܬƎƌ ƀƇƕــųܘܢ ܘܓƀƇܐ ̣ƎƉ ܗƌ ̈Ɖــƀܐ: ܕܐſƦſــųܘܢ ̇ــŴܢ ̈ܪƣــƀܐ ܘűƟ ̈ــƐܐ ܗƌ ̈ــƦܐ ܗƃــƍܐ܂ ܕܓƍ ܒƠƀƐƙ ̇ــŴܢ ƣــƦܐ ܐŶــƌƮܐ܉ ܗƀƆــƎ ܒƉűــŴܬ ܐźƏــƃŴ v97P ̈Ɛܐ ܘƦƣܐƏــƦܐ ܕܗƌ ̇Ŵ ܕƎſ ܐܘƏــƀܐ ܘƀƊƃــŴܬܐ: ܐܪܒƖܐ ܕܐƎƍƙƆ ųƀƇƕܘܢ ܐųſƦſܘܢ܂ ܗƌ ̇Ŵܢ ܕƎſ ܐƌƮŶܐ Ʀƣܐ܉ ̣ƎƉ ܪܘƃܒܐ ܕܐܘƀƏܐ ܕƋƕ ܘŴƆܬ űƉܡ ܘܙƌܐ܂ ܗƌ ̇Ŵܢ ܬƦƆܐ ƎſűƇſƦƉ ܘƎƀƊƀƟƦƉ܂ ܗƌ

**<sup>1</sup>** Ǝــƀ̈ ƌܗ BDL: ƎــƀƆܗ P **11** ƈــƀƄƉ] + ܐܦ P **13** ܣŴــſܪŴܓƀźƟܕ L: ܣŴــſܪ̈ŴܐܓźƟܕ P: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓــųŹܐƟܕ BD **14** Ǝــƀƀƣܪ̈ BDP: Ǝــſܐƣܪ̈ L | ܐƣųــƆ LP, corr. D in marg.: ܐƃܪųƆ BD **16** ܐƘŴــƐƇƀƘ BDL: ܐƘŴــƏŴƇƇƀƘ P **17** ܗܝ̣ [ om. BD **18** ܐƀــƇܘܓ [+ ܗܝ̣ BDP | ƎــƍŶ] om. B **22** ܐƦƣ ܐƌƮŶܐ [inv. P

393 Thus, even though one may consider many things which have been discussed in the genus of quality to belong also to the genus of relation, it is however not in one and same mode that they pertain to the former and to the latter. For even if both figure, since a figure is in something, and understanding, since also understanding is in someone who understands, pertain to the genus of relation, still essentially520 each one of them belongs to the genus of quality. Thus, one says that they are species of quality which have affinity to and participation in the former genus, but each one of them seems to essentially521 belong to quality apart from participating in something to what it is said to be related522. And since enough has been said about it, we shall now turn to the teaching about the remaining (categories).

#### *[Division of the categories]*

394 As it has been explained in the previous books, there are all together ten primary genera that are designated as "categories" (κατηγορίαι). About the four principle ones among them523 we have taught until now. About the remaining six, on the other hand, there is no need to give an account, since even the Philosopher who invented them taught nothing about them, but confined himself to merely mentioning them and spared (the reader) an account of them, as if it were obvious and apparent from what has been said524. So, let us also here briefly discuss this subject. The principle and primary genera, which appear as elements (στοιχεῖα) and the foundation of the other six, are the four about which we have taught, namely substance, quantity, relation, and quality. The remaining six, on the contrary, are generated and arise from the combination of substance with the (other) three525.

**<sup>520</sup>** Syr. *quyyameh*, "what concerns their subsistence". Cf. the use of *qnoma* in the next sentence.

**<sup>521</sup>** Syr. *qnoma*.

**<sup>522</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 91.10–92.2; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 162.7–28. Sergius' *Commentary* differs here from what we find in Ammonius and Philoponus.

**<sup>523</sup>** Ammonius calls them αἱ κυρίως καὶ πρῶται κατηγορίαι, see *In Cat.* 92.6. The following account by Sergius finds a close parallel in Ammonius and clearly derives from the latter.

**<sup>524</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 92.12–16: ἀποδοὺς δὲ τῶν τεσσάρων κατηγοριῶν τούς τε ὅρους καὶ τὰ παρακολουθήματα τῶν λοιπῶν ἓξ οὔτε τὰ ἴδια εἶπεν οὔτε τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς ἀπέδωκεν οὔτε τὴν εἰς τὰ εἴδη διαίρεσιν ὡς δυναμένων ἡμῶν ἐκ τῶν ῥηθέντων καὶ ταύταις ἐπιστῆσαι.

**<sup>525</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 92.6–8: δεῖ εἰδέναι ὅτι αἱ κυρίως καὶ πρῶται κατηγορίαι τέσσαρές εἰσιν αἱ εἰρημέναι, οὐσία ποσὸν ποιὸν πρός τι, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ἓξ γίνονται ἐκ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς τὰς λοιπὰς τρεῖς. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 163.4–10.


̈Ɛܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ + [ܗƎƀƆ **<sup>4</sup>** ƍܓ P | ܐƊſŴƟ2 BDP: ܐƉŴƍƟ L **<sup>8</sup>** ƎƀŷſƦƉ P: Ǝ̈ ŷſƦƉ BD: ƎƀƍƕƦƉ L **<sup>11</sup>** ƎــƀƆųƆ BDL: ƎــſųƆ P | ܐƐــ̈ ƍܓ1 BDL: ƎƀƐ̈ ƍܓ P **13** ܐܬܪܐ ƈƕܘ ܐƦƃܕܘ ƈƕ BDL: ƈƕ ܐƦــƃܕܘ ƈــƕܘ ܐܬܪܐ P **<sup>14</sup>** ܡűــƉ] om. B **<sup>15</sup>** ܐƌƮŶܐ BDL: ƎſƮŶܐ P **<sup>16</sup>** ܘ ̇ ̇ ܘ :BDL ܗ P ܘܗ **<sup>17</sup>** ƎƕܕŴƤƉ LP: ƎƀƕܕŴƤƉ BD **<sup>18</sup>** Ƌƕ] om. P | ܘ ̇ ̇ ܘܐ | P ܘܕŴƆܬ :BDL ܕŴƆܬ | BDP .om] ܗ ܗ ̇ ܘܐ :BDL ̇ــŴ ܕſــƎ | P ܘܕƣــƃƢܐ :BD ܕƣــƃƢܐ **<sup>19</sup>** P ܕܗ ƌܗ [om. BDP **21** ܘܢųــſܬƮƐƕܕ P: BD ܕƦƐƕ̈ܪųſܘܢ


397 But as I have said, the teaching about each one of them has become apparent — so that we are in no need of further definitions which we should learn about them — from the explanation given to us in the discussion just above, when we spoke about the meaning of the ten genera, and particularly from

**<sup>526</sup>** The same classification is found in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 163.10–15: τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑφέστηκεν, ὡς ἡ οὐσία, τὰ δὲ ἐν ἑτέροις ἔχει τὸ εἶναι. τῶν δὲ ἐν ἑτέροις ἐχόντων τὸ εἶναι τὰ μὲν ἐν σχέσει θεωρεῖται, οἷον τὰ πρός τι, τὰ δὲ ἄσχετά εἰσι. καὶ τῶν μὴ ἐχόντων σχέσιν τὰ μέν ἐστι μεριστά, οἷον τὰ ποσά (τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον ἐλέγομεν τοῦ ποσοῦ εἶναι, τὸ μεριστόν), τὰ δὲ ἀμέριστα, οἷον αἱ ποιότητες.

**<sup>527</sup>** Sergius' division reflects what we find in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 92.7–12: αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ἓξ γίνονται ἐκ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς τὰς λοιπὰς τρεῖς· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ ἐγένοντο δύο κατηγορίαι ἥ τε ποῦ καὶ ἡ ποτέ, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τῆς μίξεως τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ γίνονται ἕτεραι δύο τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῶν πρός τι γίνονται αἱ λοιπαὶ δύο κατηγορίαι τὸ κεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἔχειν. Cf. an extended version in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 163.16–164.5.

̈ ܬܐ܉ ̈ــƐܐ ܕܐƍƙƆــƎ ƀƇƕــųܘܢ ܒƐܓƀــܐ ̣ƎƉ ܪܘƃܒܐ ܕܗƎƀƆ ܐܪܒƖܐ ܓƍ ̈ƀــƎ ܬ̈ܪƀƕــƦܐ ܕƀƇƕــųܘܢ ƌܐ ƎــƤƀ ̈ ̇ــŴܢ ƣــƦ ܕƣــƃƢܐ܂ ܘŶܒ ƌܗ ƎــſűƇſƦƉ ̇ ܕܐܬܬƦƊƀƏ ƈƕ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ܒŴƍƙƇƊܬܐ ܗܕܐ ųƇƃ

	- ̇ ܝ ܕƖƌܒű űƉܡ ܘƖƐƌــŴܪ Ɖܐ ̇ ű ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܗ ̇ ܘ ܕƕܒ 399 ܓƐƍܐ ܗƈƀƃ ܗ ̇ ̈ƣܐ܂ ƃــƈ Ɖــűܡ ܓƀــƢ ܕƖƉܒــű܉ ܐܘ ̣ܕܗܘ܂ ƇƘƦƉــŭ ܕſــƎ ƦƆܪſــƎ ܐܕ : ̇ ̇ ܘƊƄŶܐ Ʀſܗ ܒųƉŴƍƠ ƖƉܒű ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕƤƙƌܐ Ɖܐ ܕƀƍƘƦƉܐ ŴƆܬܗ ̇ ܒܐŶــƌƢܐ ƖƉܒــű ܐƃــƌŵܐ ܕƌــŴܪܐ ŷƉــƊܐ ƆܓــƊƣŴܐ ܐŶــƌƢܐ: ܐܘ ܘܬƆܓܐ ܬܘܒ ƢƠƉ ƆܓƊƣŴܐ ܐƍſܐ ̣ܕܗܘ܂ <sup>15</sup>
	- ̇ ܘ ܕƊƀƏܐ܉ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܓƣűܐ űƉܡ 401 ܘܐܦ ܓƐƍܐ ܬܘܒ ܗ ̇ ܓƢƀ ųƇƃ ܓƊƣŴܐ ̈ƣܐ܂ ܐܘ ܕƚƀƠƌ ƆܓƊƣŴܐ܂ ܘŭƇƘƦƉ ƦƆƦƆܐ ܐܕ ̇ ܘܐ ܙƀƟــƚ ̇ Ƈƃــų <sup>ܗ</sup> ̇ ܐ ܘƦƉܐƉــƢ ƊƀƏــų ƉܓــƐܐ: ܐܘ ̇ ܘܐ ܪƉ ܗ

**<sup>6</sup>** ܐƉ P: ܡűƉ BD **<sup>7</sup>** űŶ] + űŶ P | Ƣƀܓ P: Ǝſܕ BD **<sup>10</sup>** ̇ ܗűſܒܐ [+ tit. ű ̇ ܒƕ ƈźƉ BD **15** ܕܗܘ̣ [ + tit. ̇ ܐܫ Ŷ ƈźƉ BD **<sup>19</sup>** ܡűƉ] om. BD | ܘ ̇ ܐƅſ Ɖܐ ܕܐƎƍſƢƉ ܕƤŶܐ ŵŶܬܐ ܘƙƇŶƦƤƉܐ ̣ƎƉ ܗ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ + [Ɖܐ ܕŶــſŵܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> ƎƉ̣ ܐƌƢƕŴƏܕ ųƀƇƉŴƤƆ ܐƙƇŶƦƤƉ Ǝſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ ̇ ܝ ܕƤŶܐ ŵŶܬܐ ܗƌ ƈƕ ܗ ܐ܂ſŵــŶܕ add. BD in marg. **<sup>20</sup>** ܐƙــƇŶƦƤƉܘ BD: ܐƌƢƕŴƏܕ ųƀƇƉŴƤƆ ܐƙƇŶƦƤƉ Ǝſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ ƌܗ P ܐſŵŶܕ [+ tit. ƋƀƏ ƈźƉ BD

what we said on how the six genera are generated from the combination between the four genera about which we had taught at greater length, so that the concept of the former is encompassed by the whole teaching that has been established about the latter528.

398 But since, as I have said above, we always ought to seek more than anything else in our teaching to clearly explain what we intend to say, also now we will briefly give the definition and the division of each one of them separately. For as you know very well, I am always concerned about the composition of my account, trying to make it straightforward (ἰδιώτης) in its structure and to manifest clearly to everyone in what way something is explained.

#### *[Definition of the remaining six categories]529*


401 Further, the genus of being-in-a-position is an accident that occurs to a body. It is divided into three species. For either the whole body is reclining and

**<sup>528</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 92.12–17; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 164.6–10.

**<sup>529</sup>** See also §§95–108, above.

**<sup>530</sup>** This paragraph, as also the following ones, reflects what we find in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 92.17–19: ἔστιν οὖν ποιεῖν μὲν τὸ εἴς τι ἐνεργεῖν. τούτου δὲ εἴδη δύο· τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν ἢ εἰς ἑαυτὸ ποιεῖ ὥσπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἑαυτὴν γινώσκουσα ἢ εἰς ἕτερον ὡς τὸ θερμαίνειν (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 164.10–12).

**<sup>531</sup>** See the same account in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 92.19–22: πάσχειν δέ ἐστι τὸ ὑπό τινος ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τούτου εἴδη δύο· ἢ γὰρ ὡς εἰς φθορὰν ἀγόμενον πάσχει ὡς τὸ καίεσθαι ἢ ὡς εἰς τελειότητα ἀναγόμενον, ὡς ὅταν εἴπωμεν πάσχειν τὴν ὅρασιν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 164.13–17).

̇ ܒƦƕƞƊܐ ܕܗƎƀƆ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܘųƉƦƤƉ ųƊƀƏ ܘƦƉܐƢƉ ܕƟܐ v149B ̇ ܡ: ܐܘ ŴƉܬܒܐ܂

	- ̇ ܘ ܕܐƄſܐ܉ ƍſŴŷƉܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܕܐܬܪܐ܂ 403 ܗƍƃܐ ܕƎſ ܐܦ ܓƐƍܐ ܗ ƢــƉܐƦƉ ƈــƖƆ Ƣــƀܓ ųــƍƉ ܐ܂Ʀــƣ ܐƣ̈ ܘƇƘƦƉــŭ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ Ɔــܐܕ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ: ܘųƍƉ ŶƦƆــƦ: ܘƍƉــų ƀƊƀƆــƍܐ: ܘƍƉــų ƊƐƆــƇܐ: ܘƍƉــų ŴƠƆܕƉܐ: ܘųƍƉ ƆܒƦƐܪܐ܂

**1** ̇ ̇ ܐ :BD ܐܘ ܘ P **2** ܬܒܐŴƉ] + tit. ܝƦƉܐ ƈźƉ BD **5** ܕܥŴƤƉ] + tit. ܐƄſܐ ƈźƉ BD **7** ܗܘ̣ [ om. BD | ܐƦــƣ DP: ܐƦــƣ Ǝſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ ƌܗ ܐƦƆܘܬ ܐƦƆܬ B **9** ܪܐƦƐܒƆ] + tit. Ʀſܐ ƈźƉ BD ̈ــƐܐ **<sup>14</sup>** BD .om] ܐŶــƌƢܐ **<sup>13</sup>** ƄŹ] + ܐƐ̈ ƘŴــŹ add. (corr.?) BD in marg. **15** ܐܦ BD: ܘܐܦ **16** ܬܘܒ [om. B

its position is called lying, or the whole of it is elevated and it is called standing, or its position is between these two and is called sitting532.

402 Now, the genus of when is indicative of time, and it also has three species. For sometimes it refers to the past, sometimes to the future, and sometimes it signifies what is present533.

403 Similarly, the genus of where is indicative of place, and it is also divided into six species. For of things some may be said to be up, some down, some on the right, some on the left, some in front, and some behind534.

404 And finally, there is another genus called having, which designates something being in something535. There is no need to repeat the account of its division and to prolong uselessly our discussion. We have provided you with the division of it in that section where we showed in how many ways something is said to be in something else. There, we clearly demonstrated that everything may be called being in something in eleven modes (τάξεις). So, I will refrain from talking about it here, and thus conclude our introduction into those things which we are about to discuss.

End of Book Six.

**<sup>532</sup>** See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 164.18–22: κεῖσθαι δέ ἐστι τὸ θέσιν τινὰ ἔχειν. τούτου δὲ εἴδη τρία, τὸ ἀνακεκλίσθαι τὸ καθῆσθαι τὸ ἑστάναι· ἢ γάρ, ὡς πολλάκις εἴρηται, τὸ ὅλον σῶμα κέκλιται καὶ λέγεται ἀνακεκλίσθαι, ἢ τὸ μέν τι κέκλιται τὸ δὲ ὀρθόν ἐστι καὶ λέγεται καθῆσθαι, ἢ ὅλον ὀρθόν ἐστι καὶ λέγεται ἵστασθαι (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 93.1–2). Sergius is closer to the account preserved by Philoponus, although he deviates from it in some details.

**<sup>533</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 93.2–3: ποτὲ δέ ἐστι χρόνου δηλωτικόν, καὶ τούτου εἴδη τρία, ἐνεστὼς παρεληλυθὼς μέλλων (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 164.22–23).

**<sup>534</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 93.3–4: ποῦ δέ ἐστι τόπου δηλωτικόν, καὶ τούτου εἴδη ἕξ, ἄνω κάτω δεξιὰ ἀριστερὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὄπισθεν (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 164.23–25).

**<sup>535</sup>** Sergius' description of the last remaining category differs from what we find in Ammonius, who defines it as "placing one substance around another substance", cf. *In Cat.* 93.5–6: ἔχειν δέ ἐστιν οὐσίας περὶ οὐσίαν περίθεσις· σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ ὑποδεδέσθαι τὸ ὡπλίσθαι καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 165.17–19). Thus, Ammonius shifts the focus from being-in-something, i.e. what is contained, to being-around-something, i.e. to the container, and does not refer to the eleven modes of being-in-something found also in his commentary.

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} & & & \text{a}\mathbb{I}\_{\mathsf{L}} \mathsf{L} \mathsf{m} \ \mathsf{x} \mathsf{w} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{w} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{w} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{x} & & & \text{a}\mathbb{Z}\mathsf{x} \\\\ & & & & \text{a}\mathbb{Z}\mathsf{L} \mathsf{w} \mathsf{w} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{w} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{x} & & & \text{a}\mathbb{Z}\mathsf{L} \\\\ \mathsf{L} \mathsf{m} \mathsf{x} \mathsf{w} \mathsf{x} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{d} \mathsf{L} \mathsf{L} & & & \text{a}\mathbb{Z}\mathsf{L} \\\\ \mathsf{L} \mathsf{x} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{d} \mathsf{L} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{d} \mathsf{L} \mathsf{w} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{d} \mathsf{L} & & \text{a}\mathbb{Z}\mathsf{L} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{d} \mathsf{L} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{w} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{d} \mathsf{L} \mathsf{w} \\\\ & & & \text{a}\mathbb{Z}\mathsf{c} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{L} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{d} \mathsf{L} \mathsf{w} \mathsf{} \mathsf{L} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{d} \mathsf{L} \mathsf{w} \\\\ & & & \text{a}\mathbb{Z}\mathsf{c} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{L} \mathsf{c} \mathsf{$$

̈ܬܐ ̈Ɗܐ ܘŴƉűƆ ƄƏܐƆ ̈ƍܐ ƇƘƦƉܓƎƀ ܗƍƃܐ ̈ ƣܐ ܘƤŷƉ ŴƤŶ Ǝſܕ ܐƀ̈ ܙƌ ̇ ܒųƇƄ Ŷــű ܓƍــƐܐ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ ܐſــƅ ŶــŴܪܘܬܐ ƇƄƆــųܘܢ ܐܘ ŴƍƟ ̈ <sup>10</sup> ŴƟ ̇ ŴƆ ܒųƇƄ ܓƐƍܐ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ܐƅſ ŴŶܪܘܬܐ ܒܒƤƌƢܐ ܐܘ ܐƀƣŴƄƆ ܬܐŴƊƃܐܘ ƅſܐ ƎƀƙƀƠƌ ܐűƆŴƉ ƎƉ̣ ̇ ܐܘ ̇ ƢŷƆܬܐ ܓƎƀƣű ܐƅſ ƁƌŴƣ ܓƌŴܐ ̣ܕƎƉ Ŵƃܪܗƌܐ ܐܘ

̈ƍܐ

̈

ŴƤŶ ܐƀ̈

ƌŵƆ

ƣܐ ܘƤŷƉ

̈ Ɔܓܐ **1** ŴƘ DP: ܓܐƆ ̈ ŴƘ ܬܘܒ B | ųƇſܕ P: ųƇſܕ űƃ ųƇſܕ BD | ܐƦƣܕ P: ܐƌܗ D: ܓܐƆŴƘ ܐƌܗ ܐƀƉűƟ B **<sup>3</sup>** ܐƌܕܙ DP: Ǝſܕ B **<sup>4</sup>** ܐƇƆܘ DP: ܐƆܘ B **<sup>5</sup>** ܐƇƆܘ DP: ܐƆܘ B **<sup>9</sup>** ܘܢųſƦſܐ [+ ̇ BD ܐܘ **11** ŴƆ DP: ƅſܐ B **12** ƎƀƙƀƠƌ P: Ǝ ̈ ƙƀƠƌ BD **<sup>13</sup>** Ǝƀƣűܓ P: Ǝ̈ ƣűܓ BD

#### *Divisions of Book Six*

#### *First division*

The genus of quality is divided:


#### *(Second division)*

The affections and affective qualities are divided as follows:


ƀܐ: ܕܐųſƦſܘܢ ܪƣܐ ܘŴƣܪſܐ ܕűƉܪŴƣܬܐ

	- ܘ ܕƊŶــƤܐ ܘ ܕܐܪܒƗ ܘܒų ܘ ܕܬƦƆܐ ܘܒų ̣ƎƉ ƈƖƆ܂ ܒƊܐƢƉܐ ܕƎſ ܗ ̇ ܝ ܕܬܪܬſــƎ ܕƉܐƉــƢܐ ܕܐܪźƐſــƑƀƇŹŴ ̇ ܘ ܕƣــƦܐ܉ ƕــƈ ƍƉــƦܗ ܗ ܘܒų ܐ܂ƦƇƉ Ǝƌűܒƕ
	- ̇ ܝ 407 ܒƊܐƢƉܐ ܕſــƎ ܗƌܐ ܕƣܒــƖܐ ܕܗƣܐ ƀƏــƋ ƆــƎ܉ ƕــƈ ƍƉــƦܐ ܗ ̇ܕܩ܂ ܬƦſƦƀƆܐ ܕƉܐƢƉܐ ܗ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܘ ܕƈƕ ƀźƟܓŴ̈ܪŴſܣ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܐƅſ Ɖܐ ܕܙ ̈Ƈܐ űƉܡ Ɵ Ʀƍ ̈ <sup>ܒ</sup> ƈƕ ܉ƎƆ ƢƀƉܐ ƈƖƆ ƎƉ̣ ܕܐܦ ƅſܐ ̇ ܗܕܐ ܕƎſ ܐųſƦſ

ƉܐƉــƢܐ ܕƣܒــƖܐ ܕƇſــų ܕƘــƠƣŴܐ :B ܬܘܒ ƉܐƉــƢܐ ܕƣܒــƖܐ :L ƉܐƉــƢܐ ܕƣܒــƖܐ **1** :LP ܒƊܐƢƉܐ **2** D ƉܐƉــƢܐ ܕƣܒــƖܐ ܕƃــƦܒܐ ܕƇſــų ܕųźƟܓــŴ̈ܪſܐܣ :P ܕųźƟܓــŴܪƑſ ܐƢƉܐƉ BD **<sup>3</sup>** ܬܐܕܘܪܐ BDL: ܬܐܘܕܘܪܐ P | ܐƄƏ] om. BD | ܢŴ̇ ƌܗ [om. P **4** ƎſųƇƄܒ BDP: ƎſųƇƄܕܒ L **5** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ LP: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ B: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƏܐܪ D **6** ܐƢƐƕܕ LP: ƈƕܕ ܐƢــƐƕ BD **9** ܐƢــƉܐƉ] om. P | ܣŴــſܪŴܓƀźƟ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓــźƟ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــųźƟ D: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųŹܐƟ B **10** Ǝſܕ [om. P | ƎŷƤŶܕ LP: ƎƀŷƤŶܕ BD **15** űſųƕܕ BDL: ܕųƕܕ P | ƎƀƇſܐ BDL: ƎــƀƇſܐƆ P **17** ܐƢــƉܐƉܕ L: ܗƢــƉܐƊܕܒ BDP | ƑƀƇŹŴــźƐſܕܐܪ BP: ƑــƀƇźźƐſܕܐܪ L: ̇ ܘ **20** D ܕܐܪźƏــƑƀƆųŹŴ ܗ [om. L | ܣŴــſܪ̈ŴܓƀźƟ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܐܓــźƟ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓــŹܐƟ B: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟ D

ܕƢƐƕܐ ܓƍ

#### *BOOK SEVEN*

#### *[Introduction]*

405 The previous, sixth, book which has just been completed, O brother Theodore, was dedicated to the teaching on quality and on the remaining six genera. I have finished in it the systematic account of all doctrines which have been taught to us by Aristotle and by all other philosophers relating to the teaching on the ten highest genera, which are principle and primary for the study of and training in logic536.

406 But as we learn from the books of the ancients, the Philosopher divided his treatise *Categories* into three sections, i.e. the first one that is about particular words used for the instruction about these genera, the next, second one that includes the discussion of each one of the ten categories, and also the third one that deals with those words which (Aristotle) mentioned in the teaching of these genera but which he left without definition537. If you recall what has been discussed above, you should know that we taught about the first section of this treatise in the second book538, while in books three, four, five, and six we gave an account of the second section of Aristotle's treatise.

407 Now, in the present, seventh, book we are going to explain what is necessary about the third section of the treatise *Categories*, which is, as we

**<sup>536</sup>** I.e. the previous book concluded the part on the *praedicamenta*, and the last, seventh book focuses on the so-called *postpraedicamenta*. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 168.21–22: πεπλήρωται ὁ τῶν κατηγοριῶν λόγος καὶ ἄρχεται τοῦ μετὰ τὰς κατηγορίας τμήματος ("the account of the categories has been completed and now begins the section of what comes after the categories").

**<sup>537</sup>** See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 167.22–168.2: εἰς τρία μέρη διῄρηται τοῦτο τὸ βιβλίον, εἴς τε τὸ πρὸ τῶν κατηγοριῶν καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν κατηγοριῶν καὶ τὸ μετὰ τὰς κατηγορίας, καὶ ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῷ πρὸ τῶν κατηγοριῶν περὶ φωνῶν διαλέγεται, αἷς μέλλει χρήσασθαι ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ τῶν κατηγοριῶν, ἀγνώστων ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας οὐσῶν, ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ τμήματι περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν κατηγοριῶν, ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ, τοῦτ' ἔστι τῷ προκειμένῳ, περί τινων φωνῶν ὧν παρέλαβεν ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ τῶν κατηγοριῶν, ὧν ἔννοιαν μέν τινα ἔχομεν οὐ μὴν διηρθρωμένην. Ammonius (and Philoponus) discusses this issue in the *prolegomen*a part, see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 14.2–5 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 13.6–18; cf. also Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 25.5–9. However, similar to Sergius, Philoponus finds it necessary to recall this division at the beginning of the *postpraedicamenta* part.

**<sup>538</sup>** The *antepraedicamenta* discussed briefly in §§113–121.

̈Ɛܐ܂ ܐƎſųſƦſ ̇ ܝ ܕųƀƇƕܘܢ ܕܓƍ ܐƎƀƇſ ܕܐܬųƕܕܢ ܐƎƀƌ ܒŴƍƙƇƊܬܐ ܗ ܕƎſ ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕƣــŴܓƀƍܐ ܘܕŴƠƆܒƀƇــŴܬܐ ܘƦƉܬܙƍƖſــŴܬܐ: ܘܐƀƌƮŶــƦܐ r151B ƈــƕ Ǝــſܕ Ŵــ̇ P100r ƌܗ :ƎƀƆܗ ƈƕ ƢƉܐƊƆ ܐƣܗ ƈƀƃܗ ƎƆ ƋƀƏ ܂ƎƀƆܗ ƅſܕܐ Ǝــƀ ̈ Ɖܕܕ Ǝــƀ̈ ܕŴƠƆܒŴƀƇܬܐ ܘƈƕ Ŵƣܓƀƍܐ ܘƈƕ ƦƉܬܙŴƍƖſܬܐ ܘƈƕ ܗƌ ƎſųƆ: ܕƍƉܐ ŴƤƉܕƕܐ ƈƃ űŶܐ ƎſųƍƉ܉ ܘƊƄƆܐ ܙƌ <sup>5</sup> ̈ƀܐ ƇƘƦƉܓܐ܂


**<sup>1</sup>** ܕܢųƕܕܐܬ BDL: ܕųƕܕܐܬ P **<sup>3</sup>** ƅſܕܐ LP: ƅſܕܕܐ BD **<sup>4</sup>** Ǝƀ̈ ƌܗ BDP: ƎƀƆܗ L **7** Ǝƍſܕųƕܘ LP: ƎƍŶ Ǝſűſųƕܘ BD **8** ܐƉ] om. L **12** ܐƍſܐ L: ܬܐŴƘŴƏŴƇƀƘ BD: ܬܐŴƙƐƀƇƀƘ P **14** Ǝſܘܕܬܪ BDL, Epit.: Ǝſܘܕܬܪܬ P **<sup>15</sup>** Ǝſųƀ̈ ƙƙƕ BDP, Epit.: Ǝſųƙƙƕ L **<sup>16</sup>** ܘ ̇ ̇ܒű ƙƇŶŴƣܐ ܘܕƦƣܐ <sup>ܗ</sup> [ܕƕ om. hom. B | ܐƦƣܘܕ DL: ܐƦƣܕ P, Epit. **19** ƎſųƆ1 BDL: ƎƀƆųƆ P | ƎſųƆ2 BDL: ƎƀƆųƆ P

have already said above, about particular terms that have been mentioned in the teaching on genera, for instance change, contrariety, movement, and suchlike. Thus, it is our task now to discuss them, i.e. contrariety, change, movement, as well as those things that are similar to them, what each one of them signifies, and into how many species they are divided.

408 So, let us say briefly about them what we have learned in many places and what we recall about them. If someone would be able to find out something else that would exceed or prove more useful than what I am writing, then you shall listen to it, O brother, rather then to us. But let us now turn to an inquiry into the remaining subject matters, beginning with change539.

#### *[Change]*

We learn from nature and from philosophy540 409 that there are six kinds of 15a13–15b16 change in this world which encompass every particular change that ever takes place in any object541. The first one of them is seen in generation and destruction. The second one takes place through growth and diminution. These two pairs arise from the doubling of something that occurs in things and thus bringing forth the four (kinds). The fifth is that one which produces alteration, and the sixth appears through movement from one place to another542.

410 However, in order to make clear the account of what we discuss, we shall further explain each one of them by itself, making in our speech the following distinction543. As we have said above, substance is in multiple things that have individual subsistence, e.g. Socrates, or a particular stone, or a piece of wood, or anything else like that. When something that did not exist comes to be in the

**<sup>539</sup>** Sergius deals with the remaining questions not in that order in which they appear in the *Categories* or in the commentaries by Ammonius and Philoponus. In contrast to them, he first considers the issue of change, or motion, which appears at the very end of the *Categories* and to which he turns once again at the end of Book VII, thus following Aristotle's text. In the first case (in §§409–418), he renders the Gr. κίνησις as *šugnaya*, "change", while in the second case (§§445–448) as *zawʿa* and *mettziʿanuta*, "motion, movement". Thus he aims to differentiate these two terms and to treat them separatly.

**<sup>540</sup>** Philoponus points out that the issue of change, or motion, is fitting for a natural scientist, or physiologist: ὁ περὶ κινήσεως λόγος πρέπων μέν ἐστιν ἀνδρὶ φυσιολόγῳ· πάντα γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ πράγματα ἐν κινήσει ἔχει τὸ εἶναι (*In Cat*. 197.12–13).

**<sup>541</sup>** In §§275–276, Sergius raises a puzzle as to why motion (Syr. *zawʿa*) is not mentioned by Aristotle among the species of quantity and solves it by pointing out that this issue is not suitable for those who are beginning the study of logic (i.e. for the readers of the *Categories*).

**<sup>542</sup>** See *Cat*. 15a13–14: κινήσεως δέ ἐστιν εἴδη ἕξ· γένεσις, φθορά, αὔξησις, μείωσις, ἀλλοίωσις, κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή.

**<sup>543</sup>** For the following account, see Ammonius, *In Cat*. 105.10–16 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 197.12–199.24. Ammonius divides the kinds of change first into substantial and accidental: ἡ οὖν κίνησις μεταβολή ἐστι, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν μεταβάλλει ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (105.10–11).

̇ ܂ ܘźƉــƈ ܕƆܐ ̇ ܗܘܬ ܗܘſܐ ƉƦƤƉــų ƉــűƆŴܗ ܗ v151B ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕƆܐ ܐſƦſــų ̇ ܉ ſűſــƖܐ ̣ܗܝ ̇ ܝ ̣ܕƎƉ ܙܒƍܐ űƉܡ Ƣƣܝ ƟــųƊſŴ ſƞƉܐ ܕܬƦƃܪ ƋƇƖƆ: ܒų ̇ ŶܒƇܐ ƢƟƦƉܐ܂ ܕƦƤƉܪſܐ ܘܒƇźܐ܂ ̣ܘܗܘ ܗƌܐ ųſƢƣ


̇ ܘ Ɖܐ **1** ̇ ܝ :BDP ܗ ̇ **<sup>13</sup>** BDP ܘűſƦƉܥ :L ܕűſƦƉܥ **<sup>12</sup>** L ܗ ųƍƀƄܒ BDL: ܐƍƀƄܒ P **14** ƢƉܐƦƉ LP: ܐƢƉܐƦƉ BD **15** ܡűƉ ƎƉܕ̣ BDL: ܡűƉܕ P **16** Ǝſűſܗ [+ ܡűƉ P **17** ܬܘܒ [om. L | ܐƇܓ BD: ܐƀƇܓ P: Ɨſűſ L **<sup>21</sup>** ̇ ųܕܒ [om. B

world, its birth is called generation. And since it cannot persist forever, for the subsistence of everything after some time comes to an end, it is clear that it is also dissolved and perishes, and this dissolution is called destruction.

411 Consequently, they say, generation takes place when an unworthy thing perishes and brings forth subsistence of something else which is much more manifest and worthy than it. They call destruction, on the other hand, what happens to something apparent and worthy when it is dissolved into what is despised and unseen. Thus, we say that from a worthless and despised seed, which is a kind of moisture, appears a human body that has much greater appearance and dignity than it. In turn, the destruction of the latter produces the former, for we also state that the human body which is worthy and apparent becomes soil that is despised and unseen, and we say that the destruction (of the body) resulted in it.

412 So, the first kind of change is the one which appears in generation and destruction and whose subsistence is in the nature of substance544. For when some substance changes completely into another substance, this is called generation and destruction, as we have said. When, on the one hand, something unseen is destroyed and produces something apparent, then people call this sort of change generation. When, on the other hand, something apparent is changed into something unseen, then we usually call this sort of change destruction. While these two kinds of change occur in the nature of a substance, as we have said, the other two which are revealed in growth and diminution do not take place in the nature of a substance but in the quantity which is in it545.

413 So, we call growth such an increase as occurs to a certain body by means of numerical addition, either in the dimensions of length, breadth, and depth (all at once), or in any of them particularly. For if a small number is multiplied by any other number, e.g. ten by twenty, then we say that growth happens in that

**544** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 105.11–13: καὶ εἰ μὲν κατ' οὐσίαν, γίνεται γένεσις καὶ φθορά (εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὄν, ἔσται γένεσις, εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, γίνεται φθορά).

**<sup>545</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 105.13–14: εἰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἡ μεταβολὴ ἢ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἢ περὶ αὐτό. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ, καλεῖται αὔξησις καὶ μείωσις.

̇ : ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܕܗܘܬ ܬܪܒƦƀܐ܂ ܐܢ ܕƎſ ƈƕ ܓــƊƣŴܐ ̈ܬܗ ŴƍƉ Ǝ ̈ ܕƊŶƦƉ ̈ Ǝƀ ܐܘ ܕƥƊŶ: ̇ ܕܐܪܒƗ ܐƉ ̈ Ǝƀ ܬܗܘܐ ܬܘƦƙƏܐ ųƍƉ űƉܡ ܕܬƦƆ ܐƉ ̇ ųſƦƆƦƆܘܢ ܐűŷƃܐ܉ ܗſűſــƎ ̇ ƠƉŴƖƆܐ: ܐܘ ̇ ſƦƙƆܐ ܐܘ Ɔܐܘܪƃܐ ܐܘ ̇ ܘܐ ܒƀƆųــƎ ܬܪܒƀــƦܐ ƉƦƤƉــų܂ ƀƟƦƉــƋ ܕſــƎ ܐſــƅ ƣــŴܓƀƍܐ ܕܗ ܕܐƌƢƉـــƎ ܐܕƣܐ ܗƌܐ: Ɔܐ ̣ܗܘܐ ܒـــų ܒƍƀƄـــų <sup>5</sup> ̇ ܕܐܘƏـــƀܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܪܒܐ ƦƤƉܓــƍܐ ̇ ܗ ̇ ܂ ƈźƉ ܕŴƆ ̣ܗܘ ƍƟــųƉŴ ܒŴƀƊƄܬܐ ܕܒų ƅــſܐ ųــƍƀƃ Ūــ ̇ ܘܗ v101P ̇ ܘܐ Ɖــűܡ ܐŶــƌƢܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܬܘƙƏــƦܐ Ɖــűܡ Ɛƌ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ̣ܗܘ űƃ ̣ܗܘ܂


**<sup>1</sup>** Ǝſܕ LP: Ƣƀܓ BD **<sup>3</sup>** ܐſƦƙƆ ̇ ܐܘ LP: ܐſƦƙƆܘ BD **<sup>4</sup>** ƋƀƟƦƉ BDL: ƋƀƟƦƉܘ P **<sup>5</sup>** ̇ ųƍƀƄܒ L: ܐƍــƀƄܒ BDP **<sup>6</sup>** ܐƍܓــƦƤƉ L: ܐƍܓــƦƤƉܘ BDP **<sup>10</sup>** ƢــƐŶ BDP: ƢــƀƐŶ L **<sup>11</sup>** ̇ ܐܘ2 [om. L **<sup>13</sup>** ܐƀƏܕܒܐܘ BDL: ܐƀƏܕܐܘ P **<sup>15</sup>** ƅſܕܕܐ DL: ƅſܕܐ BP **<sup>16</sup>** ̇ ̇ :BDL ܒܒŴſƢܬܗ P ܒܒƢſƢܘܬܗ **17** ܪŴŷƌ ܕܐܢ BDP: ܪŴŷƌܕ L | ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ BDP: ܣŴƀŹƢƟŴƏ L | ܐܢ BDP: ܐܘ L **18** ܐƍŷƀƍƉ BDP: ܐŷƀƍƉ L | Ƌƃܐƌ DLP: ƋƄƌ B **19** ̇ ܐܘ L: ܐܦ BD: ܐܢ ܐܦ P | Ƌŷƌ L: Ƌƃܐƌ P: om. BD **<sup>20</sup>** ܗܘܐ1 [+ Ƌŷƌ BD | ̇ ̇ **<sup>21</sup>** L ܐܢ + [ܐܘ ̇ :BDL ܕܒܒŴſƢܬܗ P ܕܒܒƢſƢܘܬܗ

quantity whose parts are separate546. So, if a particular body of three cubits is increased by four or five cubits in its length, breadth, or depth, or in all three (dimensions) at once, then the change that happens in them is called growth. When this species (of change) takes place, then, as we have said, it occurs not to the nature of a substance, but to the quantity which is in it, for what grows does not itself change and become something else, but its nature receives a certain increase while it remains one and the same.

414 Similarly with diminution, which is contrary to growth. For we say that diminution occurs to something which apparently becomes less than the original number or to a particular body which has certain decrease either in length, or in breadth, or in depth, or in all three (dimensions) at once. This change too takes place in the quantity which is in a substance and not in the substance itself, since the latter remains one and the same, while a diminution or a decrease of any kind occurs to it.

415 The fifth kind of change is the one which occurs to the outer parts of a substance and not to all of it547. E.g., if Socrates who was previously black becomes white because of a quiet way of life or becomes black from any particular reason, while being white before that, or becomes warm, having been cold (previously), or cold, while he was warm before, then the change that happens to him is called alteration. Thus, we properly say that this change occurs to the outer part of a substance, while the latter itself persists and remains the same.

**<sup>546</sup>** Cf. §243, above.

**<sup>547</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 105.15: εἰ δὲ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, (*sc*. καλεῖται) ἀλλοίωσις.


**1** ƥſƢƘ BDP: ܫƢƘ L | ܗܘ̣ Ǝſܕ L: ܗܘ̣ Ǝſܕ ܗܘ̣ P: Ǝſܕ ܗܘ̣ BD **2** ƎƀƆܕܗ BDP: ƎƀƆųܕܒ L | ܡűƉ] + ܡűƉ P **3** ܐƌܗ [om. L **5** ܐƆܐ [+ űƃ B **10** ܘܢųſƦſܕܐ L: ܘܗܝƦſܘܐ BDP **12** Ǝſܕ DLP: Ƣƀܓ B **16** ܗܕܐ [om. L **18** Ƣƀܓ [om. BD **19** ܘܢųſܬƦƣ BDL: ܘܢųſƦſƦƣ P **20** ܘܢųƍƉܘ BDP: ܘܢųƍƉ L **21** ܐƦƀܬܪܒ BDP: ܐƦƀܪܒƦܒ L | ܘܬܐƢſƞܘܒ BDP: ܘܬܐƢſƞܘܒܒ L

416 Now, this kind, i.e. that of alteration, differs from the previous one, which is seen in growth and diminution, in that the latter cause some increase or decrease in the quantity to which they occur, while alteration neither changes the substance itself nor causes in it any increase or decrease but is spread out in it while it is preserved in its subsistence and size. Thus, it pertains neither to substance nor to quantity, but to the genus of quality, and it is found especially in the following species (of it): figures, shapes, colours, and affections. For all changes of these kinds produce certain outward alterations of a substance without extension or reduction from any side. Hence they are called alterations, as we have said, that belong to the genus of quality.

417 Now, another kind of change which shows itself in the movement from one place to another548, is further subdivided into species, about which we will say a little later when we will give an account of motion, as we have said above549. And since it is not proper for us to tell the same things twice, we will therefore omit here the account of this kind of change, for (what has been said) is sufficient for listeners.

418 This is how you can clearly explain and make apparent to the students the teaching on the six kinds (of change) which have been discussed thus far. Two of them take place in substance, namely generation and destruction. Another two occur to quantity which is in substance, namely growth and diminution. And the other two of them which remain have their birth in the genus of quality, namely alteration and movement from one place to another550. Now I am going to tell you also about opposition.

**<sup>548</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 105.15–16: εἰ δὲ περὶ αὐτό, καλεῖται ἡ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή.

**<sup>549</sup>** Thus Sergius differentiates between motion (Syr. *mettziʿanuta*) and change (Syr. *šugnaya*), and this turns out to be the reason to treat these two issues at different places of his commentary.

**<sup>550</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 105.16–19: ὥστε γίνεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν ἐν τέτρασι κατηγορίαις, ἐν μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποσῷ αὔξησιν καὶ μείωσιν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιῷ ἀλλοίωσιν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ποῦ τὴν κατὰ τόπον μεταβολήν. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 199.5–7. Thus, Ammonius differentiates the two last species in that he attributes one of them to quality and another to the category of where. Sergius himself sets aside locomotion in §417 just above as a separate kind of change.

̈ ƀܐܐ ƦƐƉܒƢܐ܉ ܕܕŴƠƆܒŴƀƇܬܐ ܗܝ ̣ܗܝ űƃ ̣ܗܝ ŴƠƏܒŴƀƇܬܐ܂ 419 ƐƆܓ ̈ܕܐ܂ ܗܕܐ ܕſــƎ Ɔܐ ܗܘܬ ſƢƣــƢܐ܂ űــŶ ܬŴــƆ ܡűــƉ ܐƍƣܪŴƘ ƎƀƍƟ ܐƆ űƃ Ƣــƀܓ ܡűــƉ ƈــƃ ܬܐ܂ŴــƀƇܒŴƠƏ ƎــƉ̣ ܬܐŴــƀƇܒŴƠƆܕ ــܐܐƀܓƏܕ ƈــźƉ ܕܒŴƠƐܒŴƀƇܬܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ܉ ܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ƦƉܐƢƉ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ܂ ŴƆ ܕſــƎ ƃــƈ Ɖܐ ܕܒŴƠƆűܒƀƇــŴܬܐ ŶƦƉــŵܐ܉ ƠƏــŴܒƇܐ ܗܘ ܕƉــűܡ܂ ŴƠƏܒƀƇــŴܬܐ r125D ̇ ܂ ſűƉــƎ ƌܐƉــƢ ܐƌــŴܢ ̇ ܕܕŴƠƆܒƀƇــŴܬܐ ܐſƦſــų ųــƀ̈ ƣܐܕ ƎƉ̣ űŶ ƈƀƃܗ ̇ ܕܕŴƠƆܒŴƀƇܬܐ܉ ܕܗƃــƍܐ ܬܬŶــŵܐ ƆــƎ ƢſųƌܐſــƦ ܕƉــƍܐ ųƀ̈ ųƇƄƆܘܢ ܙƌ ̇ ̇ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ƃƦƤƉــŷܐ ܕܐſƦſــų ųƀܓƆ̈ ŴــƘ ƎــƉ̣ űــŶ ܐƍــƄſܘܐ : ̇ ܐſƦſــų ̇ ܐſــƅ ƀŶــƇܐ ܘܓƀƇــŵܘܬܐ ŴƠƏܒƀƇــŴܬܐ܂ ܕŴƠƆܒƀƇــŴܬܐ ܗƀƃــƈ܉ ܐܘ ̇ ܐſــƅ ̈Ǝƀ ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ ƦƉܐƉــƮܢ: ܐܘ ̈ܬܐ ܗƌ ̇ ܐƅſ ܨܒŴ ܐܘ : ̇ P103r ųſƦſܐ ƎــſųſƦſܕܐ Ǝــƀ̈ ̇ ܐƅſ ܗƌ ̇ Ɔܐ: ܐܘ ̈ܪܘƃܒܐ ܕƦƇƉܐ ܕŴƤƉܕƎƀƕ ܐƎſ ܐܘ ̇ ųــƀƣ̈ ̈ܕܐ܂ ܘܒűܓــŴܢ ܐܪܒــƖܐ ܐſƦſــųܘܢ Ƈƃــųܘܢ ܐܕ ƠƏــŴܒƇܐ ܕŶــű ܕܕŴƠƆܒŴƀƇܬܐ܂

420 ƈźƉ ܕƎſ ܕܬܬűſܥ ƇƉــƦܐ ܕƀƇƕــųܘܢ ܓƀƇܐſــƦ܉ ƌܐƉــƢ ܗƃــƍܐ܂ ̈ ــƇܐ ƃƦƤƉــŷܐ܂ ܐƃــƌŵܐ ܕƌܐƉــƢ ܐƌــƥ ܕƍƉــų <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܕܕŴƠƆܒƀƇــŴܬܐ ܒƊ ̇ ܛ܂ ܘܐƀƌƮŶــƦܐ ſųƇƃــƎ ܕܕܐſــƅ ̇ ܛ: ƏــƑƀŹƢƟŴ Ɔܐ ܪܗ ܕƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ ܪܗ ̇ ܒƎſų ܗƎƀƆ܂ ܘŸƃƦƤƉ ܐܕƣܐ ܗ v153B ̇ ܘ ܕƋƀƟƦƉ ܒƢܘƃܒܐ ܕƦƇƉܐ. ܘųƍƉ ̈ܬܐ܉ ̈ܬܐ ƀƟƦƉــƊܐ܂ ̣ܘܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܕŴƠƆܒƀƇــŴܬܐ ܕܓــƣűܐ ܒƞܒــŴ ܒƞܒــŴ ųƍƉ r56L ̇ ܒŴƤܬŴƘܬܐ űƉܡ ƕűſƦƉܐ܂ ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕƍƀƊſܐ ܘƇƊƏܐ: ܘƖƆــƈ ̇ ̇ ܘ ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ܂ ܘƍƉــų ܘƦŶƦƆ: ܘƃƢƣܐ ܕܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ܘܗ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܘܐ ܐܕƣܐ ܗ ̇ ܂ ܕܐܦ ̣ܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܬܘܒ ܕƆܐ ܕƆܐ ܐŴƍƀŶܬܐ ܕƋƕ űƉܡ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܐųſƦſ ̇ ܒſųــƎ ̈ܬܐ ܕܐųſƦſ ŴܒƞƆ ƎſųƆ ܐƙƇŷƤƉ ̇ ŴƤƉܬƘܐ Ƌƕ ܐƌƮŶܐ: ܐܘ ̈ܕܐ܉ ܐƃــƌŵܐ ܕŶــŴܪܘܬܐ ܘܐܘƊƃــŴܬܐ: ܘſƢƟــƢܘܬܐ ܘƊƀƊŶــŴܬܐ: űŷƆ

**3** ܐܐƀܓƏܕ [+ ܗܝ L **5** ܬܐŴƀƇܒŴƠƆűܕܒ BDP: ܬܐŴƀƇܒŴƠƇܕܒ L | ܐƇܒŴƠƏ BDP: ܐƀƇܒŴƠƏ L ̇ **<sup>6</sup>** P ܐƦſܘܗܝ :BDL ܗܘ ųſƦſܐ LP: ܘܗܝƦſܐ BD **7** ܐŵŶܬܬ LP: ܐŴŶܬܬ D, add. B in marg. ƦــſܐƢſųƌ LP: ƦــſܐƢſƢƣ BD: ƦــſܐƢſƦſ add. D in marg. **<sup>10</sup>** ܐƦــƇƉܕ ــܒܐƃܪܘ̈ ƅــſܐ ̇ ܐܘ Ǝƀ̈ ̇ ܐƅſ ܗƌ ̇ Ɔܐ ܐܘ ܐܘ Ǝſܐ ƎƀƕܕŴƤƉܕ [om. P **<sup>11</sup>** ܐƆ ̇ ܐܘ L: ܐƆܘ BD, Epit. **14** ܐƍƃܗ ƢƉܐƌ] inv. L **16** ƑƀŹƢƟŴــƏܕ BDL, Epit.: ƑƀŹƢƟŴــƏ P | ƑƀŹƢƟŴــƏ LP, Epit.: ƑƀŹƢƟŴــƏܕ BD **20** ƅſܕܕܐ BDP, Epit.: ƅſܕܐ L

#### *[Opposition]*


**<sup>551</sup>** In the following paragraphs, Sergius systematically applies the noun *dalqublayuta* as an aquivalent to Gr. ἀντικεῖσθαι, "being opposite", and *saqqublayuta* as a translation of the Gr. ἐναντιότης, "contrariety", although in the earlier parts of his commentary these two terms appear as synonyms. The same differentiation is characteristic of the 7th century Syriac versions of the *Categories* produced by Jacob of Edessa and George of the Arabs, but is not found in the early anonymous translation which uses *dalqubla* with both meanings.

**<sup>552</sup>** Cf. *Cat*. 11b17–19: λέγεται δὲ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἀντικεῖσθαι τετραχῶς, ἢ ὡς τὰ πρός τι, ἢ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις, ἢ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις. Sergius alters the order of Aristotle's text and seems to have paraphrased it rather than translating it directly. That this alteration of the order was deliberate is shown by Sergius' note in §421 below that capacity and privation appear first in the list.

 ̇ ̇ ܘ ܕŴƠƏܒƀƇــŴܬܐ: ܐܘ ̇ ܐܕƣܐ ܗ ̇ ܘܐ ųƍƉ ܘܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ: ܘܗ ̈ܕܐ܉ ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕŵŶܬܐ ܘŴƀƊƏܬܐ: ܕűŶܐ ƎſųƍƉ űŷƆ ƎſųƆ ܐƙƇŷƤƉ ܐƆ ̇ ܘ ̇ ܝ ܕƎſ ܐƢŶܬܐ Ɔܐ ܗƄƘܐ: ܘƕܒűܐ ܐܕƣܐ ܗ ̇ ܉ ܗ ƙƇŶƦƤƉܐ ŷƆܒƢܬܗ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܕƇƀŶܐ ܘܕܓŵƀƇܘܬܐ܂ v103P


**1** ܐƦƀƌƮŶܘܐ BDL: ܐƃƢƣܘ P: ܐƦƀƌƮŶܕܐ ܐƃƢƣܘ Epit. | ƅſܕܐ L, Epit.: ƅſܕܕܐ BDP | ܐƣܐܕ ̇ ܘ ̇ ܘ .:Epit ,BDL ܗ ̇ Ɔܐ | P ܘܗ ܐܘ BDL, Epit.: ܐƆܐ P **3** ܐƙــƇŶƦƤƉ BDL, Epit.: ܐƙــƇŷƤƉ P **<sup>4</sup>** ܐƇƀŶܕ [om. B **<sup>5</sup>** ̇ ųƀ̈ ƣܐܕ BDL, Epit.: ܐƣ̈ ܐܕ P **8** Ǝܒ DLP, Epit.: ƎƉ B **9** ųƇܒŴƠƆܕ BDL, Epit.: ųƇܒŴƠƆܕܕ P | ܬܐŴƀƊƏܘ BD, Epit.: ܬܐŴƉŴƀƏܘ P **10** ܬܐŴƀƊƏ BDL, Epit.: ܬܐŴƉŴƀƏ P **11** Ǝſųſܘܬܪܬ BD: ƎſųſƦſܪܬ̈ܘܬ P | Ǝƀƌܗ L: ƎƀƆܗ BDP **12** ƎܒŵƇƄܒ ŪƐƊƆ] inv. BD **13** ܣŴƇƘܗ BDP: ܣŴƇƘܐ L, Epit. **<sup>16</sup>** ųƇܒƠƌܕ L, Epit.: ųƆ ųƇܒƠƌܕ BD: ̇ ųƀƇܒƠƌܕ P

and other things like that, thus constituting the species of contrariety; and some do not change into one another, e.g. sight and blindness — of which one may change into its counterpart, while the other does not reciprocate, — and produce another species, namely that of capacity and privation553.

421 Now let us suggest a characteristic for each species of the opposition 12a26–34 separately and thus clearly distinguish them from each other. So, capacity554 and privation, which are called first among those things that are opposed to one another555, refer to some activity that is present in us or to its opposite, e.g. sight and blindness. For sight is some natural capacity that operates in us, while blindness is a privation and destruction of this capacity, and both of them are spoken of in opposition to one another.

422 Now, one should always consider privation not as something occasional, when a person is simply (ἁπλῶς) deprived of something, but when he is deprived of what he ought to possess at that time and to such an extent that is necessary for him. Hence, there are three things concerning privation that one should inquire into, namely whether someone is of a nature to receive that capacity which is opposed to something, at what time someone may naturally receive what he is deprived of, and also in which part of his body it is natural to receive the capacity that is missing556.

**<sup>553</sup>** Sergius' division has a close parallel in Ammonius, *In Cat*. 93.18–94.3: τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἢ ἐν λόγοις ἀντίκειται ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, οἷον Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ—Σωκράτης οὐ περιπατεῖ, ἢ ἐν πράγμασι, καὶ τούτοις ἢ σχέσιν ἔχουσιν ἢ ὡς καθ' αὑτὰ θεωρουμένοις· καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ σχέσιν λέγονται ἀντικεῖσθαι ὡς τὰ πρός τι οἷον δεξιὸν ἀριστερόν, τὰ δὲ οὐ κατὰ σχέσιν ἀλλὰ καθ' αὑτὰ ἀντίκειται, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα ἢ οὐ μεταβάλλει, καὶ εἰ μὲν μεταβάλλει, ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ ἐναντία οἷον τὸ μέλαν τῷ λευκῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ μεταβάλλει, ἀντίκειται κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν οἷον ὡς ὄψις καὶ τυφλότης. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 168.18–27.

**<sup>554</sup>** Syr. *ḥayla*, Sergius translates thus the Gr. ἕξις, "possession", which the anonymous Syriac translation renders as *ʾituta* that derives from *ʾit l-*, "to have". Jacob and Georg both translate ἕξις as *qanayuta* which derives from another verb meaning "to possess", *qna*. Sergius' interpretation thus appears quite unique, although his note that *ḥayla* refers to "something present in us" (*ma d-ʾit leh ban*) makes apparent that he was familiar with that terminology which we find in the anonymous translation.

**<sup>555</sup>** This statement is supported neither by the transmitted Greek text of the *Categories* nor by the commentary tradition. Ammonius corroborates the order which we find in Aristotle by stating that the division starts with a milder kind of opposition (in relatives) and ends with the most strong kind (in affirmation and negation), see Ammonius, *In Cat*. 94.4–17, cf. a much more detailled account by Philoponus, *In Cat.* 169.3–170.16.

**<sup>556</sup>** The same three points are described by Ammonius and Philoponus: τρία δὲ δεῖ παρατηρεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς στερήσεως, τό τε πεφυκὸς δέχεσθαι καὶ ὅτε πέφυκε δέχεσθαι, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε, καὶ ἐν ᾧ μέρει πέφυκε (Philoponus, *In Cat.* 175.3–5, cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 96.11–14). Sergius' version turns out to be closer to that of Philoponus, and the same holds for the following paragraphs.

<sup>423</sup> ܐƉ r104P ̇ ــƢ ܐƌܐ ܕſــƎ ܕܐſــƅ ܗƃــƍܐ܂ Ɔܐ ܐƍſƢƉــƎ ܕܐſــƦ ܓƀƇــŵܘܬܐ ܐƇƀŶ ƈܒƟܕܬ ܐƍƄƉ ܐƆܕ ƈźƉ ܐ܂ƘܐƄܒ ܬܐŴƀƊƏ Ǝſܕ <sup>Ŵ</sup>̇ des.BD ƌܗ ܬܐŵŶܕ ̇ ܓƀƇــŵܘܬܐ ܗܕܐ܂ ܘƆــŴ ܕŶــŵܬܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ܐƍſƢƉــƎ ܕܒܒƌƢــƤܐ ܐſƦſــų ̇ ܗܕܐ܂ źƉــƈ ܕƆــŴ ܗƀƆــƎ ̇ ܒƮܓƇــŴܗܝ ܐƍſƢƉــƎ ܕܐſƦſــų ܒܐűſܘ v56L ̈ܗܝ ܐܘ ̈ƀــƍܐ܂ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ƖƆــƆŴܐ ̈ ƌܐ ܕŶــŵܬܐ܉ ܐƆܐ ƕ ܗܕ <sup>5</sup> ̈Ɖܐ ܐųſƦſܘܢ Ɖܐ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ܕܓŵƀƇ ̣ƉــƎ Ŷــŵܬܐ܉ źƉــƈ ܕƆܐ ƀƃűƕــƈ ܐܬܐ ܙܒــƍܐ ܕƄƉــƎ ̇ ܂ ܗƍƃܐ ܓƢƀ ܐܦ Ɔܐ Ƈƃܒܐ ܕƇſƦƉــű ƦƉܐƉــƢ ̇ ܒų ܕųƌܘܐ ƍƟܐ ųƆ ̇ ܕܓƀƇــŵ ̣ƉــƎ Ŷــŵܬܐ܉ źƉــƈ ܕƆܐ ƀƃűƕــƈ ܙܒــƍܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ܕƊƏܐ ܐܘ ̈ــƍܐ ̇ ܂ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ƤƆܒــƢܐ ܐƍſƢƉــƎ ܕܓƀƇــŵ ̣ƉــƎ ƣ ̇ ܒــų ܕųƌܘܐ ƍƟܐ ųƆ ܂ųƆ Ǝſ ̈ <sup>10</sup> ܘųƌܕ ƎƄƉܕ ܐƍܙܒ Ƣܒƕ̣ ƈƀƃűƕ ܐƆܕ ƈźƉ ܉ƎƀŶƮſ ܐƦƤƆ ܐƉűƕ ̈Ʀܐ ܗƈƀƃ ƊƆܐƢƉ܉ ܗƎſűſ ƦƉܐƢƉܐ ܓŵƀƇܘܬܐ: Ɖܐ ܕܙܒƍܐ ܒƠƀƐƙ ̇ ܘ ܕƎƄƉ űƉܡ ƠƊƆܒŴƇ ƇƀŶܐ ƀƍƀƃܐ ܐƍſܐ ̣ܕܗܘ ŸƃƦƤƌ ܕܓŵƀƇ ųƍƉ܂ ܗ ̇ ܘ ܕƎƄƉ ųƊƆܘܐ ܒų܉ Ɔܐ ųƌܘܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ܂ ܘƉܐ ܕܒų ܕƉܐ ܗ ̇

 ܘ ܕܒƢܘƃــܒܐ 424 ܬܘܒ ܐܕƣܐ ܐŶــƌƢܐ ܕܕŴƠƆܒƀƇــŴܬܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ܉ ܗ ܕƇƇƊƉܐ ŵŶƦƉܐ܂ Ɖܐ ܓƢƀ ܕŪƐƌ ܬܪܬƎſ ܨܒŴ <sup>15</sup> ̈ܬܐ ܘƌܐƢƉ űŶܐ ƈƕ ̈ܕܐ ̈ Ƈܐ ܕܕŴƠƆܒƇܐ ܕűŶ ̇ ܉ ܗƎſűſ Ɖ ųƆ ̇ ̇ ܕųſƦƀƆ ̇ ܐܘ ųƆ ̇ ̇ ܕܐųſƦſ ŶܒƢܬܗ ̇ ܐƥƌ ܐƌƢŶܐ ̇ ܐƀƠƆܒƑſűƀ ܐܘ ܐƎƍſƢƉ܂ ܐܢ ܓƢƀ ŪƐƌƦƌ ŴźƇƘܢ ܐܘ ̇ Ƣܐ: ̇ ܕƟ ̇ ܕƅƆųƉ ܐܘ ܐƍſܐ ̣ܕܗܘ: ܘƦƌܐƢƉ ƈƕ űŶ ųƍƉܘܢ ܕܪܗ v104P ̇ <sup>ܛ</sup> ܐܘ ̇ ̇ ܛ ܐܘ ̇ űƉܡ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܐƍſܐ ̣ܕܗܘ: ܘܬܘܒ ƦƌܐƢƉ ƇƕــŴܗܝ ܕƆܐ ܪܗ ܐܘ ƎــƀƆܗ ƎــƉ̣ Ǝܒƃܪ̈ƦƉ ܐƇܒŴƠƆܕ ܐƇ ̈ Ɖ Ǝſűſܗ ܐ܉Ƣ ̇ <sup>Ɵ</sup> ܐƆ ̇ <sup>20</sup> ܐܘ ƅƆųƉ ܐƆ ܕųƀƇƕܘܢ ܕ̈ܪܘƃܒܐ ܗƎƀƆ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ƏܓƀܐƦſ ܘܙܕƟܐƦſ܉ Ɖܐ ܕƍƖſŵƉــƎ ̈źƀــƦܐ܂ ̈ــƇܐ ƤƘ Ɵ Ʀــƍ̈ ̇ ܝ ܕƕــƈ ܪܘƃــܒܐ ƉűƟــƀܐ ܕܒ ŴƆܬ ƦƄƉܒŴƍܬܐ ܗ ̇ ̈ــƐܐ: ܕܒƊܐƉــƢܗ ̇ ܒــƦܪ ܗܕܐ ܕƕــƈ ƐƕــƢܐ ܓƍ ܕܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƐƄŹــų ܐſƢŶܐ ܪܕƎƍſ ܗƣܐ܂

̇ ܕܓŵƀƇ **<sup>8</sup>** ܐܘ L: ŵƀƇܘܕܓ P **<sup>10</sup>** ƎƄƉܕ P: ƎƍƄƉܕ L | ųƆ P: ųܒ L **<sup>16</sup>** ̇ ųſƦƀƆܕ L, Epit.: ƦƀƆܕ P ̇ Ɔܐ **<sup>19</sup>** P ܐƎƍſƢƉ +] ܐƌƢŶܐ **<sup>17</sup>** ̇ Ɔܐ **<sup>20</sup>** P ܘƆܐ :L ܐܘ ܐܘ L: ܐƆܘ P, Epit. **21** ƎƍƖſŵƉܕ L: ƎƀŷƉܕ P

423 What I mean is this. We do not say that a stone is deprived of sight, i.e. is blind, since it is not in its nature to admit of the faculty of sight557, but we speak of privation of it concerning men. And we do not say that this occurs to their hands or feet, since these members are not instruments for sight558, but to their eyes. Further, we do not say about a baby that it is deprived of sight, for the time has not come yet for it to be naturally capable of having it. Similarly, a newborn puppy is not said to be blind or deprived of sight, because the time has not arrived yet for it to receive it559. Further, we do not say about a baby which is less than six months old that it is deprived of teeth, since time has not arrived yet for it to have the natural capacity for them560. So, to sum up, one speaks of privation when there is a proper time for something to receive a particular natural capacity which turns out to be missing and by which point one does not have what he is naturally capable of.

424 Another species of opposition is that which is manifested in the construc- 12b5–16 tion of speech. When we take two things and say of one of them that it either has or does not have the other, then we make statements that are opposed to one another. So, if one takes Plato, Alcibiades, or any other particular person and states about one of them that he is running, walking, reading, or anything else like that, and further states that he is not running, not walking, or not reading, then one will construct opposite statements. About this kind of compositions we will extensively and properly speak, when we move to the treatise on the first compositions of simple words, which in order comes just after the one on the ten categories in whose last section we are now561.

**<sup>557</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 175.6–7: οὐ γὰρ λέγομεν τὸν λίθον ἐστερῆσθαι ὄψεως, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲ ὅλως πέφυκεν ἔχειν ὄψιν (see also Ammonius, *In Cat*. 96.15–16).

**<sup>558</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 175.7–9: οὔτε τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατὰ τοὺς πόδας λέγομεν ἐστερῆσθαι ὄψεως, ἐπειδὴ μὴ κατ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος πέφυκεν ἔχειν τὴν ὄψιν (see also Ammonius, *In Cat*. 96.19–21).

**<sup>559</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 175.9–10: ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ σκυλάκιον ἐστερῆσθαι ὄψεως λέγομεν, ἐπειδὴ μὴ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ καιρῷ πέφυκεν ἔχειν (see also Ammonius, *In Cat*. 96.21–25).

**<sup>560</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 175.12–14: ὁμοίως καὶ νωδὸν λέγομεν οὐχ ἁπλῶς τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα ὀδόντας (οὐ γὰρ δήπου καὶ τὸν ἄρτι τεχθέντα· οὐ γὰρ τηνικαῦτα πέφυκεν ἔχειν).

**<sup>561</sup>** I.e. *De Interpretatione*. No commentary by Sergius on this treatise has come down to us.

	- ̈ܕܐ: ܕܐƦſ ܒƦƕƞƊܗƎſ űŷƆ ƎƀƇܒ ̈ ̈ܬܐ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕŴƠƏ Ŵܨܒ Ǝſܕ Ǝƀ̇ 427 ܗƌ ܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܐƎſųſƦſ܉ ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕŴŶܪܘܬܐ ܘܐܘŴƊƃܬܐ܂ ƦƕƞƉ ܗƀƆــƎ ̈ ƀܐܐ܂ ܓƢƀ܉ ܐƦſ ܓƌŴܐ ܗ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܘ ܒųܪܐ ܘƠƉŴƏܐ ܘŴſܪƟܐ ܘܐƌƮŶܐ Əܓ ܘƦƕƞƉ ƦƀƉܪܘܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܘܒŴƤƀܬܐ: ܘƕűſــƦܐ ܘƆܐ ƕűſــƦܐ܉ ܐſــƦ űŷƆ ƈƀƇƟ ƎƀܒſƢƟ ̇ ̈Ɛܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ ܕƎƀƊƀƏ ܒƦƕƞƊܐ ƦſƦŶܐƦſ ܐܘ ƄŹ ̈ ܐ ̈ ܒܐ ƢſƦſ ̣ƎƉ ŶܒƢܗ܂ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ܐƦſ ܐƦƉܝ ܕƎƍƀŷƄƤƉ ųƊƣ ̣ƎƉ ܓ ̇ ųƆܕܐ ŴƀƕƞƉܬܐ ܕܒŴƠƐܒŴƀƇܬܐ܉ ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ƈƕ ųƆ ƎƀƊƀƏܕ

**3** ƎــƀƆųƆܕ L: ƎــſųƆܕ P | ܐܦ L: ܘܐܦ P **5** ܘܗܝƦــſܐ L, Epit.: ܘܗܝƦــſܕܐ ܢƮــƉܐƦƉ P **<sup>7</sup>** ƎƀƙƇŶƦƤƉܕ L, Epit.: ƎƀƙƇŷƤƉܕ P **<sup>8</sup>** ƎſųƆ Ʀſܐ ܐƆ ̇ ̈ܕܐ ܐܘ űŶ ܬŴƆ Ǝƀ̈ ƍƟ ܡűƉ ܬܐŴƀƕƞƉ] ditt. in P **<sup>13</sup>** ܘܐܦ L: ܐܦ P | Ƣƀܓ [om. P **<sup>16</sup>** ųƆ L: ܐƆ P **<sup>18</sup>** Ǝƀ̇ ƌܗ P, Epit.: ƎƀƆܗ L | ܕܐ̈ űŷƆ] om. P, Epit. **<sup>20</sup>** ܐƌŴܓ Ʀſܐ L, Epit.: ܐƌŴܕܓ P | ܐܐƀ ̈ ܓƏ] + Ʀſܐ P **22** ƦſܐƦſƦŶ L, Epit.: ܬܐƦſƦŶ P **24** ƎƌƢƉܕܐ [+ ƎƉ P

425 Further, another species of opposition is the one based the genus of 12b16–25 relatives, for instance right and left, above and below, half and double, and all other things similar to them. For all these things and suchlike whose subsistence is in the genus of relation are also spoken of in opposition to one another.

426 Also, another species of opposition called contrariety has its subsistence in 12b26–32 all faculties and colours which transform into one another. Those things that are contrary to one another either have something intermediate between them, or there is nothing else which is somehow known to be intermediate between them. Those contraries which have nothing intermediate between them are for instance even and odd numbers, for there are no other numbers between them which are neither even nor odd. Similarly, also about light and darkness and about many other things we say that there is nothing else between them what would be neither light nor darkness. Although there are many people who believe that the light coming from the shining of the rays of the sun which breaks out at dawn before the rise of the sun occupies an intermediate position between light and darkness.

427 There are also other things that are contrary to one another and have something intermediate between them, for instance white and black. For there are grey, reddish, pale, and many other colours between them. Also, between virtue and vice, knowledge and ignorance there are other ranks (τάξεις) which are set either precisely in the middle or a little bit closer to one side than to the other. Therefore, in some cases we are able to find names for the things which are between the contraries, as we have said about colours that are intermedi-

̈ ƀƌܐ܉ ܐƆܐ Ŵــƃ ̇ ̇Ŵܢ ܕܒƦƕƞƊܐ: ܘܐƦſ ܐƦƉܝ ܕƀƆــƦ ƀƇƕــų ̈ ƌܐ ܗƌ ܓŴ ܒƦƇƊܐ ܗܘ ܒŴŷƇܕ ƣƢƘƦƉܐ܂ ܐƅſ ܕܐƎƌƢƉ ܗƣܐ ƈƕ ܕ̈ܪܓܐ ܗƌ v105P ̇Ŵܢ ܕƦƕƞƉ ƦƀƉܪܘܬܐ ƆܒŴƤƀܬܐ: ܘƦƕƞƉ Ʀƕűſܐ ƇƆܐ Ʀƕűſܐ܂


**<sup>3</sup>** ƦƕƞƉܕ L: ƦƕƞƊܕܒ P: ܐƦƕƞƊܕܒ Epit. **<sup>6</sup>** ̇ ųſűܒƖƌ L: ̇ ųſƢܒƖƌ P **9** ܬܐŴƀƊƏܕ L, Epit.: ܬܐŴƉŴƀƏܕ P | ܬܐŴƀƊƏ L, Epit.: ܬܐŴƉŴƀƏ P | Ǝƀ̇ ƌܗ L: Ǝƀƌܕܗ P: ƎƀƆܗ Epit. **11** ܐƍƀƊſܘ L: ܐƍƀƊſ ̇ ̈ ܢ ܘܒűŷ ܗܕƉܐ | P ܕܓŵƀƇܘܬܐ .:Epit ,L ܘܓŵƀƇܘܬܐ **12** P ܐܘ ųƉƦƤƉ ܕŴŷƇܒ [om. hom. P, Epit. **<sup>13</sup>** Ǝſܕ [om. L **<sup>17</sup>** Ǝƀ̇ ƌܕܗ L: ƎƀƆܕܗ P, Epit. **19** ܬܘܒ ܘܬܐƢſƢƟܘ [inv. P | Ǝſܕ [om. P **22** ܐƄƘܗ [om. P

ate, and in some cases there are no names for them, but they may be distinguished only intellectually, as we have just said about the degrees that lie between virtue and vice or between knowledge and ignorance.

428 Let what (has been said) concerning the subsistence of the four types of opposition suffice for the ears of those who study logic. Next we will explain the differences between them.

#### *[Differences between the types of opposition]562*

429 So, the type of capacity and privation differs from that of relation in that 13a3–13 capacity and privation are never said of one another. For sight is not called (the sight) of blindness, neither is blindness (the blindness) of sight563. Most of the relatives, on the other hand, are said of one another, for instance the right of the left and the left of the right, and also the half of a double and the double of a half. Further, capacity and privation are attributed to a particular member of the body, for only one member is naturally capable of them, while things that are said as relatives may neither both be in one and the same thing nor do they usually occur to the same part564.

430 The opposition of capacity and privation differs from things that are 13a13–36 contrary to one another in that one of the contraries may always change into the other, for instance white into black and black into white, cold into hot and also hot into cold. But this is not what we see in the capacity and privation, for a capacity sometimes changes into privation, for instance sight into blindness, but privation never changes into capacity565. Thus, blindness never turns back into sight as long as we are speaking about natural understanding of it. For we

**<sup>562</sup>** As references to the *Categories* in the margins make clear, in this section of his commentary, Sergius does not follow strictly Aristotle's text, but prefers to deal with various topics in the order which he considered more appropriate. This order does not find parallels in the commentaries by Ammonius and Philoponus that are based on the sequence of the *Categories*. **563** Here, Sergius turns to *Cat*. 12b16–19, partly quoting partly paraphrasing Aristotle's text: ὅτι δὲ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἕξις οὐκ ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ πρός τι, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου· ἡ γὰρ ὄψις οὐκ ἔστι τυφλότητος ὄψις, οὐδ' ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγεται.

**<sup>564</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 99.5–100.2; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 182.13–183.15. Sergius differs from what we find in Ammonius and Philoponus in that he distinguishes here what is opposed as state and privation to relatives, while Ammonius, following Aristotle's text, compares state and privation with those opposites that have something intermediate between them.

**<sup>565</sup>** The first part of the paragraph is very close to what we find in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 183.20–24: τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα (τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν εἰς ψυχρὸν μεταβάλλει καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν εἰς θερμὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν εἰς λευκὸν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἰς μέλαν), τὰ δὲ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν οὐ μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὄψις εἰς τύφλωσιν μεταβάλλει, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ τύφλωσις εἰς τὴν ὄψιν.

̇Ǝƀ ܓƢƀ ܕƮƕƦƐƉܢ ܐųƆܐſــƦ܉ ̇ ܗƣܐ ƎƍƀƇƇƊƉ܂ ƈƕ ܗƌ Ʀƀƍƀƃܐ ܕܒų Ɔܐ ܪƉܐ ƊƆܐƉــƢ ƆܐƀƇſــƎ ܕƕــƈ ܕܘܪƣܐ ܕܒƇƀƇƊــŴܬܐ ƀƏــƋ ƀƌــƤܐ ܕƦƇƉܗܘܢ܂


**<sup>10</sup>** ƎƀƆܗ1 L, Epit.: Ǝƀ̇ ƌܗ P **<sup>17</sup>** ܐƞƆܐ L, Epit.: ƦſܐƞƆܐ P | ܐܦ [om. L **<sup>18</sup>** ܝ ̇ ųƆ P, Epit.: ܝ ̇ L ܗ **<sup>19</sup>** Ʀſܐ [om. L | ܗܝ̣ [ om. P **<sup>21</sup>** ܗܕܐ [om. P **<sup>22</sup>** ̇ ܬܗƢܒŷƆ L: ̇ ܬܗƢܒŶ BDP, Epit. **<sup>23</sup>** ̇ ܕŴƠƆܒųƇ BDL, Epit.: ̇ ųƇܒŴƠƆܕܕ P

will refrain from speaking about those things that may happen by the will of God, since our discourse aims at the study of logic566.

431 But the opposition of the contraries differs from that of capacity and 12b33–13a3 privation also in the following. Most of the contraries have other things that are intermediate between them, as we have said above, for instance there are plenty of colours which are between black and white, and there are not a few grades between virtue and vice. Between capacity and privation, on the other hand, there is nothing at all which comes in between.

432 One (type of opposition) differs from the other also in the following. It is necessary for most of the contraries that one of them is found in that thing to which it occurs and that it perishes in that moment when it departs from it, e.g. hot in fire and cold in snow. But privation and capacity are not like that, for as we have said they always occur to one and the same thing.

433 Now, things that are contraries differ from those which are opposed as 14a6–14 relatives in the following567. When one of the relatives exists then it is necessary for the other to be present too, and when one of them perishes then the other one perishes together with it. For if there is a father, it is necessary for a son to exist, but if there is no son, there is no more father together with him. And the same applies to all other relatives. But it is not like that with things that are contraries. For if one of them exists, this does not necessarily bring forth the other. Neither, if it perishes, does what is contrary to it always perish along with it. For if there is white in something, there should not be black. Neither is it

**<sup>566</sup>** A similar note, which reflects the Christian interpretation of this passage is found in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 169.18–19 and 184.17–18, in Elias, *In Cat.* 242.11, and in a number of marginal scholia to *Cat*. 13a35, see the additional critical apparatus *ad loc*. in Bodéüs 2002: 241. **567** Here, Sergius provides a commentary on some portions of Chapter 11 of the *Categories* focused on contraries, which Ammonius and Philoponus treat in separate sections of their commentaries. Sergius prefers to deal with this subject matter in the context of opposition.

 $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$   $\sim$ 


**1** ƈــźܬܒ LP: ƈــźܬܬܒ BD, Epit. **3** ܐƍܒــŵܒ BDP, Epit.: ܐƌŵܒــ L **13** ܘܢųــſƦſܐ DLP, Epit.: ƎſųſƦſܐ B | ܒƦ̇ <sup>ƃ</sup>] + ̇ ܘܐܘ P **<sup>14</sup>** ܐƦƇƊܒ BDL, Epit.: ܐƦƇƉܘ P | ܬܐŴƀƊƏ ̇ ܐܘ L, Epit.: ̇ ƢſƢƟܘܬܐ :BDL ܘƢſƢƟܘܬܐ **<sup>15</sup>** P ܘŴƉŴƀƏܬܐ :BD ܘŴƀƊƏܬܐ ܐܘ P, Epit. **16** ƎſųƉŴƍƟ DLP, Epit.: Ǝſ ̈ ųƀƉŴƍƟ B **20** ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ P, Epit.: ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏܕ L

necessary, if cold disappears, that hot will disappear together with it; instead, it will probably come to be.

434 They also differ from each other in the following. Things (that are contrar- 14a15–19 ies) occur naturally to the same thing at different times, while those which are said in relation do not have their subsistence in the same thing, but in two objects, as we have said multiple times.

435 Now, this is how the three species of opposition, i.e. that of capacity and 13a37–13b35 privation, that of relation, and that of contrariety, differ from each other. As for the other, fourth, species of opposition which is constituted, as we have said, by combination of words, it differs from the other three, to put it briefly, in that it appears only in words, while those three are not in words but in things. Thus, if one says, "Socrates is writing" — "Socrates is not writing", this opposition is said to exist in words. If, on the other hand, one speaks of sight and blindness, or hot and cold, or right and left, he is speaking of things themselves and not combining words. Thus, as we have said, this species of opposition differs from the other ones in that it exists in words, while those (exist) in objects themselves.

436 If, however, someone would suggest that what we learn from a combination of words, e.g. "Socrates is writing", is also a thing and not only a sound which signifies nothing, then we shall respond as follows. Not all combinations of words signify something. In fact, statements can often be made about things that do not exist. For instance, when we say, "Socrates is flying" or "Every man is writing", neither the former nor the latter is something which is happening. ̇Ʀܒ܂ ܗܕܐ܂ ƈźƉ ܕƆܐ ܐƦſ ƅƏ ƈƃ ܒƥƌƢ܉ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܢ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ƃ ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕܐܦ Ɔܐ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ ܐƦſܘܗܝ: ƈźƉ ܕƢƀźƘ ̣ƎƉ ŴƌܓƢܐ܂ ܘƆܐ ̇Ƣܚ ܗܘܐ܂ ܬܘܒ ܐܢ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ Ƙ

<sup>437</sup> ƥſƢƘ ܕƎſ ̣ܗܘ ܗƌܐ ܐܕƣܐ ܕܕŴƠƆܒŴƀƇܬܐ ܕܒƢܘƃܒܐ ܕƇƉــƦܐ ̣ƉــƎ ̇ ̇ ƣــƢܪܐ ܐܘ ܗƌ <sup>5</sup> ̇ــŴܢ ܬƆــƦܐ ̣ ܕܐƌƢƉــƎ ܐܦ ܒــųܕܐ܉ ܕܗƌܐ ܒŵƇƄܒــƎ ܐܘ ƎــƉ̣ ܐűŶ ƈƕ ܕܥŴƉ ܘܢųƍƉ űŶ ܐƆܘ Ǝſܕ ܢŴ̇ ܕܓŴƇܬܐ ŴƤƉܕܥ܂ ܗƌ ܐƆ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ :ƋƀƇŶ ̇ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ܐܢ ܓƢƀ ܐƥƌ ƌܐƢƉ ܕƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ ܪܗ | r155B ̇ ܛ ܐܘ ̇ űƉܓــƈ܂ ܐܢ ܓƀــƢ ܬܓــűܫ v126D ̇ ſƢƣــƢ ܐܘ ̇ Ɔܐ ƋƀƇŶ܉ ܗƎſűſ ܐܘ ̇ ܛ ܐܘ ܪܗ ܂ƢſƢƣ ŸƃƦƤƉ ܗܝ܉ŴƇƕ Ƣ ̇ ̇ ܘ Ɖܐ ܕܐƉ ܘųƌܘܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ ܒų ܐܢ ܕƎſ Ɔܐ ųƌܘܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐƅſ Ɖܐ ܕܐƉ <sup>10</sup> ̇ Ƣ ųƆ܉ ŸƃƦƤƉ űƉܓƈ܂ ̇ ̇ ƊƀƊŶــŴܬܐ ܐܘ ̇ ƀƊƏــŴܬܐ: ܐܘ Ŷــſŵܐ ܕſــƎ ܐܢ ƌܐƉــƢ ܐƌــƥ ܐܘ ̈Ǝƀ ܒűƖƇ ̣ƎƉ ܪܘƃܒܐ ܕƋƕ űƉܡ ܐƌƢŶܐ܉ ܗƎſűſ Ɔܐ ƢſƢƟܘܬܐ ܪܒŴ ܙܒƍ Ƣƣܪܐ ܘƆܐ ܕܓŴƇܬܐ ŴƤƉܕܥ܂ ܘܒűܓŴܢ ܐܦ ܒųܕܐ ƥſƢƘ ̣ܗܘ ܐܕƣܐ v155B ̇ ųــƀƣ̈ ̈ƠــƎ ܗƀƆــƎ ܐܦ ƕــƈ ƘــŴܪƍƣܐ ܕܐܕ ƙƏ ƎــſűƉ ܢ܂Ŵــ̇ ܗƌܐ ̣ƉــƎ ܗƌ ܕܕŴƠƆܒŴƀƇܬܐ܂ <sup>15</sup>

P108r ܐƢــƉܐƊܒ ܐƘŴƐƇƀƘ ܕųƕܐܬ ƋſűƟܕ ܡűƉ ƈƕ ܕܐܦ Ǝſܕ ƈźƉ 438 ̈Ʀܐ ܕƍƉܐ ƤƉــŴܕƕܐ ƠƀƐƙܒ ƎƍŶ ܐܦ ƢƉܐƌ ܣ܉ŴſܪŴܓƀźƟ ƈƕܕ ܘ ̇ L59r ܗ ܒƢܬ ƇƟܐ ܗܕܐ ܕŴƊſűƟܬܐ܂ ŴƊſűƟܬܐ ܗƈƀƃ ƦƉܐƉــƢܐ ܒƊŷــƤܐ r127D ̇ ܘ ̇Ŵ ܕƎſ ܒŵܒƍܐ ܘܒƍƀƄܐ: ܘܒűƐܪܐ ܘܒƐƄźܐ ܕܪܒــŴܬܐ: ܘܒــų ̈ƀܐ܂ ܗƌ ܙƌ <sup>20</sup> űــŶ ƈƃ ܕܐܦ Ǝſܕ ƈźƉ ܂ųƊſŴƟ ųƆ ƚƀƠƌ ܡűƉ Ƌƕ ܐŴƣ̣ űƃܕ ܐƉ ̈ƣܐ ܗƎƀƆ űſƦƌܥ ܓƀƇܐƦſ ܒƦƇƊܐ܉ ܐƎƍſƢƉ ųƀƇƕܘܢ ܗƍƃܐ܂ ̣ƎƉ ܐܕ ̇ ܘ ƀƉűƟܐ ܕܒŵܒƍܐ ſŵŶƦƉܐ ŴƊſűƟܬܗ܂ ܗ ƎƉ̣ ƎƍſƢƤƉ űƃ

**2** ƈźƉ P, Epit.: ܐƉ L **3** ܐܢ L: ŴƆܐ P, Epit. **6** ƈƕ] om. P **7** ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏܕ BDL: ƑƀŹƢƟŴƏ P ̇ ܘ **9** ̇ ܘ :BDL ܒų ܗ P | ŸƃƦƤƉ] + ܗܝŴƇƕ B **<sup>10</sup>** ܘܐųƌ] + ƢſƢƣ B | ƅſܐ BDL: ܘ ̇ [ܕƎſ ܐܢ **11** P ܗ inv. B **<sup>13</sup>** ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ BD | ܕܐųܒ LP: ܗܕܐ BD **<sup>14</sup>** ܢŴ̇ ̇ ܘ :LP ܗƌ <sup>ܗ</sup> BD | ƎƠ̈ ƙƏ BDP, Epit.: ƎــƀƠƙƏ L **15** ܬܐŴƀƇܒŴƠƆܕܕ [+ tit. ܬܐŴƊſűƟ ƈźƉ BD **17** ܣŴſܪŴܓƀźƟ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟ P: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓŹܐƟ B: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟ D **18** ܬƢܒ BDL, Epit.: Ƣܒ P **20** ܐƉ] om. B | űŶ BDL, Epit.: ܐűŶ <sup>P</sup>**<sup>21</sup>** ܐƣ̈ ܐܕ BDL, Epit.: ̇ ųƀ̈ ƣܐܕ P | ܐƍƃܗ [om. B **<sup>22</sup>** ܘ ̇ P Ɖܐ + [ܗ

For all men cannot be present at once, and even if they could, they would not be writing. Similarly, neither does Socrates exist, since he has died long ago, and even if he were present, he would not fly.

437 Thus, this species of opposition which is in the combination of words differs from the three which we have discussed also in that it always indicates truth or falsehood, while none among the other ones signifies them. For if one says, "Socrates is running" or "He is sleeping" — "Socrates is not running" or "He is not sleeping", then this is either true or false. So, if Socrates happens to be doing what is said about him then it turns out to be true, but if he is not doing what is said about him then it proves false. But if someone says a thousand times "sight" and "blindness" or "hot" and "cold" without combination with something else, he will indicate no truth or falsehood. So, this is also how this species differs from the other ones. So much for the distinction between the species of opposition.

#### *[Priority]568*

438 Since the Philosopher mentioned what is prior too in his treatise on the 14a26–14b23 categories, we shall also briefly discuss what the term priority signifies569. Now, priority is said of in five ways570, namely in time, in nature, in sequence, in order (τάξις) of greatness571, and in the way that one thing (is prior) to another which is equal to it and follows it in its subsistence572. In order to explain each one of these kinds through a clear account, let us discuss them, starting with the first one where priority is manifested in time.

**<sup>568</sup>** Mss. BD contain a subtitle: "On priority".

**<sup>569</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 103.3–4: ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ τῶν κατηγοριῶν διδασκαλίᾳ ἐμνημόνευσε τοῦ προτέρου, εἰκότως τούτου ἀπαριθμεῖται τὰ σημαινόμενα. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 191.17–18.

**<sup>570</sup>** Aristotle speaks in *Cat*. 14a26 of four ways, but later, in 14b10–13, adds the fifth one, cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 103.4–5.

**<sup>571</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 191.20–22: ...πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τῷ χρόνῳ πρότερον δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τῇ φύσει τρίτον τὸ τῇ τάξει τέταρτον τὸ τῇ ἀξίᾳ. It is worth noting that Sergius applies the loanword *ṭaksa* (τάξις) not for the third but for the fourth kind, and the same holds for the paragraphs below.

**<sup>572</sup>** Sergius thus interprets Aristotle's words in *Cat*. 14b11–13: τῶν γὰρ ἀντιστρεφόντων κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν τὸ αἴτιον ὁπωσοῦν θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι πρότερον εἰκότως φύσει λέγοιτ' ἄν ("for of things which reciprocate as to implication of existence, that which is in some way the cause of the other's existence might reasonably be called prior by nature", trans. in Ackrill 1963: 39).

	- 441 ܒƐــűܪܐ ܬܘܒ ƦƉܐƉــƢ Ɖــűܡ ܕſűƟــƋ ƊƆــűܡ܉ Ɖܐ ܕƦƌܬƀƏــƋ <sup>15</sup> ƦƀƉűƟ ܘܒƦܪܗ ܕƦƐƌܕܪ űƉܡ ܐƌƢŶܐ ܒų ƃــű ܒــų ܒŵܒــƍܐ܂ ܐƃــƌŵܐ ̇ ̇ ܡ ܒƤſƢܐ ܕܓŴܐ űƉܡ: ܘܐƅſ ƢƘܐܘƀƉــŴܢ ܕƉܐƉــƢܐ ܐܘ ̇ ܘ ܕƟܐ ܕܗ ̇ űſܐ ̣ܕܗܝ܉ ܗƎƀƆ ܓƢƀ ܘܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ ܒƐــűܪܐ ƦƉܐƉــƮܢ ܕܬƦƀƖƣܐ ܐ ̈ ــƎ܉ ܐƀƇſــƎ ܕ̈ܪƀƤſــƎ ܘƠƀƉــƮܢ܂ ̈ ــƎ܂ ܒƄźــƐܐ ܕſــƎ ܘܒƢܒــŴܬܐ ƊſűƟ ܕƊſűƟ ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕƄƇƉܐ ܘܐܪƌŴƃܐ: ܘܐƦƀƌƮŶܐ ܕܐƅſ ܗƎƀƆ܂ v59L

**1** ơــſƦƕܘ BDP, Epit.: ơــſƦƉ L **3** ƥــƙƌܕܕ DLP, Epit.: ƥƙƌ ܐƆܕܕ B | ܬܐŴƊſűƟ BDL, Epit.: ܬܐŴƊſűƟܕ P **4** ƎſųſƦſܐ DLP, Epit.: ܘܢųſƦſܐ B | ܡűƉܕ BDL, Epit.: ƋſűƟܕ P **6** ܐƍܒŵܒ BDL, Epit.: ܐƌŵܒــ P **7** ƢــƉܐƦƉ Ǝــſܕ [inv. P **13** ܬܐŴــƀŶ] om. L **17** ܢŴƀƉܐܘƢƘ L, Epit.: ܢŴــƀƉܘܐƢƘ P | ܐƢــƉܐƉܕ P, Epit.: ܐƢــƉܐƦƉܕ L **18** ܐƦــƀƖƣܕܬ P, Epit.: ܐƦƀƖƣܬ L **<sup>19</sup>** Ǝ ̈ ƊſűƟ L, Epit.: Ǝ ̈ ƊſűƟܕ ܢƮƉܐƦƉ P **20** ƅſܕܐ L, Epit.: ƅſܕܕܐ P **21** ܐűƀƖƆ LP, Epit.: ܐƍƀƄƆ BD **<sup>22</sup>** ܬܐŴƀƇſܕ ƦſܐƦſƦŶ ̇ ̇ űſܐ ̣ܕܗܝ ܕܐųſƦſ ܐ [om. hom. P


442 Now, the fifth kind of priority is in a way unknown to us in customary usage. It encompasses all kinds of properties which are properties in the strict sense. For even if a property is equal to the subject in which it is found, it

**<sup>573</sup>** Cf. *Cat*. 14a26–28: πρῶτον μὲν καὶ κυριώτατα κατὰ χρόνον, καθ' ὃ πρεσβύτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου καὶ παλαιότερον λέγεται.

**<sup>574</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 103.7–8: εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρεσβύτερον ἐπὶ ἐμψύχων τὸ δὲ παλαιότερον ἐπὶ ἀψύχων λέγεται. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 191.26–192.2.

**<sup>575</sup>** See *Cat*. 14a29–30: δεύτερον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν ("secondly, what does not reciprocate as to implication of existence", trans. in Ackrill 1963: 39). Sergius follows the interpretation of Ammonius, see *In Cat*. 103.9–10: ἤγουν τὸ συνεισφερόμενον μὴ συνεισφέρον δέ. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 192.5–9.

**<sup>576</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 103.13–18; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 192.14–17. Ammonius suggests animal and human being as an example.

**<sup>577</sup>** Cf. *Cat*. 14a35–37: τρίτον δὲ κατά τινα τάξιν πρότερον λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῶν λόγων. As noted above, Sergius does not apply the term τάξις (Syr. *ṭaksa*) here, reserving it for the fourth kind of priority. All Syriac translations of the *Categories*, on the contrary, render τάξις as *ṭaksa*. In this case, we again see Sergius' primary concern to interpret Aristotle's text in particular way rather than to literally translate it or use any extant translation.

**<sup>578</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 103.18–19: τρίτον δὲ τῇ τάξει ἐστίν, ὡς τὸ προοίμιον πρότερον τῆς διηγήσεως.

̇ ܂ ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕܓŴƃŴŷܬܐ ܘܒƤƌƢܐ܂ ƈƃ Ɖܐ ܘܒƦܪܗ ƦƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܐųſƦſ ܓƢƀ ܕܒƤƌƢܐ ̣ܗܘ ܓƃŴŷܐ ܐƦſܘܗܝ܂ ܘƈƃ Ɖܐ ܕܓƃŴŷܐ ̣ܗܘ ܒƌƢــƤܐ űــŶ ƁܓــƏ ܐƆܕ ƈــźƉ ܕܐ܉̈ űــŶ Ƌƕ ƎƀƍƟ ܬܐŴſŴƣ ܢŴܓűܘܒ ܘܗܝ܂Ʀſܐ ̇ ܩ ųƍƉܘܢ ƢſƦſ ̣ƎƉ ŶܒƢܗ܂ ܐƆܐ ܓŴƃŴŷܬܐ ƙƀƠƌܐ ƆܒƤƌƢܐ܉ ܒų r109P ̇ <sup>ܝ</sup> ܕܙܕ ƉűƟــƀܐ ܕƌــųܘܐ ܐſــƦܘܗܝ ƍƟــųƉŴ ̣ܗܘ ܒƌƢــƤܐ: ܘܗſűſــƎ ƌــƦܪƌܐ <sup>5</sup> ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܐܦ ܓƃŴŷܐ܂ ܘƈźƉ ܗƌܐ ܐܦ ܕƋſűƟ ųƆ ƦƉܐƢƉ܂


 BDL ̣ܗܘ :P ܐƦſܘܗܝ | L ܒƤƌƢܐ :P ܓــƄŶŴܐ :BD ܓŷــƃŴܐ | L ܕܓŷــƃŴܐ :BDP ܕܒƌƢــƤܐ **2** BP ܗܘ :DL ܐƦſܘܗܝ **3** L ܓƃŴŷܐ :BDP ܒƤƌƢܐ | L ܕܒƢ ܐƤƌܐ :P ܕܓƄŶŴܐ :BD ܕܓŷــƃŴܐ **5** ųƉŴــƍƟ] + ܐƄŶŴܓــ P **6** ܐƃŴــŷܓ BDL: ܐƄŶŴܓــ P **7** ŴــſŵŶܐܬ LP: ŴſŴŶܐܬ BD, Epit. ̇ ܩ | BD ܕƀƊſűƟــŴܬܐ :L ܕƀƉűƟــŴܬܐ .:Epit ,P ܕƊſűƟــŴܬܐ ܙܕ [+ ƎــƆ BD **9** ܬܐŴــƊſűƟܕ P: ܬܐŴƀƉűƟܕ L, Epit.: ܬܐŴƀƊſűƟܕ BD | ܐƣܐܕ BDL, Epit.: ̇ ųƀƣ̈ ܐܕ P **10** ܬܐŴſƢŶܕܐ BDP, Epit.: ̇ ܝ ܕܐűŷƃܐ .tit +] ܕܕŴƀƇſܬܐ **12** L ܐŴƀƌƢŶܬܐ .:Epit ,BDP ܐŴſƢŶܬܐ | L ܕܐŴƀƌƢŶܬܐ ƈźƉ ܗ BD **13** ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ scr.: ƑƀƇźźƏܐܪ L: ƑƀƇŹܐźƐſܐܪ P: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ BD **14** ܐƍƉܕ BDP: ܐƍƉ L **17** ƎſųƊſŴƟܘ ƎſܗűƆŴƉ] inv. L **20** ƢƉܐƌ ƥƌܐ [inv. L **22** ƈƃ L: ƈƄƆ P

follows the latter and is said to be after it. Take capable of laughing and human being as an example. Every human being is capable of laughter, and all that is capable of laughter is a human being. Thus, they are equal to one another, for none of them is greater than the other579. But it is capable of laughing that follows a human being, since it is necessary for a human being to exist first in virtue of itself that his ability to laugh may also be considered, and because of that he is also said to be prior.

443 Now that we have seen that there are five kinds of priority, we shall understand that the kinds of posteriority are also five. For it is apparent that each type of priority is opposed by a type of posteriority580. Hence, one kind of posteriority is said to be in time, another by nature, still another in sequence, next one in order and greatness, and the last one in virtue of a property which follows something.

#### *[Simultaneity]581*

444 Since Aristotle mentioned also the term "simultaneous", let us further 14b24–15a12 explain what it means582. Again583, one speaks of it in two ways, i.e. in time and by nature. Those two things are said to be simultaneous in time whose generation and subsistence occur in one and the same time. For instance, when the sun rises over the earth the light shines if there is nothing that hinders it. Those two things are said to be simultaneous by nature, on the other hand, which are mutually conjoined in such a way that one may not become the cause of existence for the other584. For instance when one speaks of the aquatic, terrestrial, and aerial animals, they are simultaneous with respect to nature. If, however, one divides each one of them into species then a genus is not said to

**<sup>579</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag*. 88.24–26: τὰ δ' ἐξισάζοντα καὶ ἀντικατηγορεῖται· ὡς γὰρ λέγομεν, πᾶς ἄνθρωπος γελαστικόν, οὕτως καὶ πᾶν γελαστικὸν ἄνθρωπος.

**<sup>580</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 104.8–12; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 194.28–195.4. Ammonius argues that priority and posteriority are relatives and thus the account of one of them is understood from the account of the other.

**<sup>581</sup>** Mss. BD have the subtitle: "On the simultaneous".

**<sup>582</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 104.16–17: ἐπειδὴ καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἅμα ἐμνημόνευσεν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατηγοριῶν διδασκαλίᾳ, διδάσκει καὶ περὶ τούτου.

**<sup>583</sup>** I.e. similar to the term "priority" whose first two meanings were in respect to time and nature, cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 104.17–19.

**<sup>584</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 104.21–105.1: οὐκ ἔστιν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἕτερον αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι.

̈ܗܝ܉ ܐƆܐ ܕƋſűƟ Ɔــųܘܢ ƍƀƃܐſــƦ܂ ܘܐܦ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ܓƐƍܐ Ƌƕ ܐܕŴƣ ̈ ƀܐ܉ ̇Ŵ ܕƎſ ܐܐܪ ܘŴƌܪܐ ܘܐܪƕܐ ܘƉ ̈ Ɛƃܐ ܕƎſ ܐ̈ܪܒųſƦƖܘܢ: ܗƌ ܐŴźƏ ܐűŷƃܐ ƦƉܐſƢƉــƎ ܕܐſƦſــųܘܢ ƀƄƆــƍܐ܂ źƉــƈ ܕƇƃــųܘܢ ƣــŴܐ ܗܘ ƌƢƕŴƏܐ ܕƖƉܒŴƌűܬܗܘܢ ŴƆܬ ƊſŴƟܐ ܕܓŴܐ ܕܗƌܐ ƈƃ܂ v109P


ܩ܉ ŴƇƕܗܝ ܕܗƌܐ ƌܐƢƉ ܗƣܐ: űƃ ƇƙƉܓƎƍƀ ųƆ ܗƍƃܐ܂

̇ ܐ܉ ƍƉــų ܒŷــŴܕܪܐ ƃƦƉــƢܟ: <sup>447</sup> ƃــƈ ܙܘƕܐ ̣ܕƉــƎ ܕܘƃܐ Ɔــűܘƃܐ ܗܘ ̇ ܘܐ ܒŷــŴܕܪܐ܉ ƍƉــų ܘųƍƉ ܬܪƞſܐſــƦ ƦƉܬܙſــƗ܂ ܐƆܐ ܐܦ ܗ <sup>20</sup> ̇ ܘ ܕܗ ̇ ܘܐ ܒــų ſŵƉــƗ ̣ƉــƎ ܐܬܪܐ Ɔــܐܬܪܐ: ܐƃــƌŵܐ ƇƄƆــų ܓــƊƣŴܐ ܕܗ ܕܓƀܓƇܐ ܕƕܓƦƇܐ ܕűƃ ƦƉܬܙƖſܐ ܒŴŷܕܪܐ ƙƇŷƉܐ ܕܘƦƃܐ: ܘųƍƉ ̈ܬܗ ܒŷƇــŴܕ ̇ ܘܐ ܒــų܉ ƃــű ƍƉــŴ ܕܗ ܐƊƣŴܓــƆ ųƆ ƗſŵƉ ܗƦƃܕܘ ƈƕ ̇ܒű ܕƎƀƍƤƌ ̣ƎƉ ܕܘƃܐ űƆܘƃܐ܂ ܐƌŵƃܐ ܕܓƊƣŴܐ ܕŴƉܙƦƆܐ ܕűƃ ųƇƃ ƕ

ܐƅſ Ɖܐ ܕܙܕ

**3** ܗܘ ܐŴƣ] om. P **4** ܐƊſŴƟ P: ųƊſŴƟ L **6** ܣŴſƮܓƀźƟܕ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓźƟܕ P **7** ܬܐƢƀƊܓ L: ܘܬܐƢƀƊܓ P **11** ƈƕ] om. P **13** ܐƌŵܒ BDP: ܐƍܒŵܒ L, Epit. **21** ƗſŵƉ] + ųƆ P | ܐƌŵƃܐ BDL, Epit.: ܐƌŵƃܕܐ P **22** űƃܕ LP: űƃ BD, Epit. | ܐƦƃܕܘ DLP, Epit.: ܐƃܕܘ B **23** ܗƦƃܕܘ DLP, Epit.: ųƃܕܘ B | ųܒ [om. BD **24** űƃܕ LP: űƃ BD, Epit.

be simultaneous with its species but to be naturally prior to them585. Also, about the four elements (στοιχεῖα), i.e. air, fire, earth, and water, one says that they are simultaneous with respect to nature because their activity produces equal effect on the general existence of the universe.

#### *[Motion]*

445 Since we have said above that motion too had been mentioned in the 15a13–15b1 teaching on the ten genera of the *Categories*, we shall also discuss it now briefly586. A full account of it will be given by us in a commentary on the *Physics*587. For now, however, it will be sufficient for us to learn about it the following.

Any kind of change is movement and is called motion588 446 . Thus, as we have said above589 concerning change that sometimes it happens in substance and is called generation and destruction, sometimes it occurs to quantity and is called growth and diminution, and sometimes it takes place in quality and is called alteration and movement from one place to another, we ought to consider with regard to motion the very same things which we have said with regard to change. But since about all these kinds of change we have spoken sufficiently above and only about one of them, which is movement from one place to another, we have not taught properly, it is about the latter that we shall speak now, dividing it as follows.

447 Every movement that goes from one place to another sometimes goes round in a circle and sometimes proceeds straightforwardly. Further, when the movement goes in a circle, then sometimes the whole body which is subject to it moves from one place to the other, as the wheel of a wagon which changes its place while moving in a circle, and sometimes the body which is its subject remains in the same place while its parts only are affected and move from one position to the other. E.g., while the whole heavenly sphere remains in its place and does not shift to another position, only its parts change their location in a

**<sup>585</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 105.1–6; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 196.28–197.8.

**<sup>586</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 105.9–10: πάλιν περὶ κινήσεώς φησιν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτης ἐμνημόνευσεν ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν.

**<sup>587</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 197.12–15. Aristotle discusses motion and change (κίνησις καὶ μεταβολή) in chapters 1–3 of the third book of the *Physics*, where he defines change as the entelechy, and in books V–VIII where he speaks of three kinds of change instead of six as in the *Categories* (cf. §276 where Sergius speaks of the latter as Aristotle's separate treatise on motion).

**<sup>588</sup>** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat*. 105.10: ἡ οὖν κίνησις μεταβολή ἐστι.

**<sup>589</sup>** See §§409–418.

Ǝ ̈ ܒܐܬܪܗ ܐƦſܘܗܝ ܘƆܐ ƍƤƉܐ űƆܘƃܐ ܐƌƢŶܐ: ŴƍƉ | v128D ̈ܬܗ ܒŴŷƇܕ ƙƇŷƉ L60v ܂ƎܒــƮƕ űــƃܘ ƎــƤſܪ ƎــƉ̣ ƈــƖƆ Ǝſ ̈ ̈Ǝŷ ܘűƃ ܗܘ ܐܬܪܐ ܒų ܒŴŷܕܪܐ űƃ ܕƌ ƎــƉ̣ ܐƀــƍƤƉ ܐƆܘ ܐ܉ƀــźƟ ܐƌƢƏ űŶ ƈƕ ܬܐŴƉűܒ ̇ ܘܪƀŶܐ ܬܘܒ ܒų ̈ܢ ܕܘƦƃܐ ܐƢŶܬܐ ܘܐƢŶܬܐ ̇ ܒŵƇƄܒƎ ܐűŶ ̈ܬܗ ŴƍƉ űƃ :ܐܬܪܐƆ ܐܬܪܐ des.P ܕܪܐ܂Ŵŷܒ ųܒ

	- 449 ܗƎƀƆ ܗƈƀƃ ܐܘ ܐŴŶܢ܉ ܐƅſ ܕܐܬƦſƞƉ ųƖƊƆܕ ܪƦƊƣ ƅƆ ƈƕ ̈ ܢ ܒƍƤƇܐ ̈Ʀźƀܐ: ܐƎƀƇſ ܕųƉƦƤƉ ƤƘ ܐƇ̈ Ɵ Ʀ̈ ̈Ɛܐ ܕƎſųƇƃ ܒƍ ƢƐƕܐ ܓƍ űــŶ ܐƢــƉܐƉ ƑƀƇŹŴــźƐſܐܪ űܒــƕ̣ ƎــſųƀƇƕܕ ܣ܂ŴــſܪŴܓƀźƟ ܐƀƌŴــſ ̇ــƋ ܙŴƕܪܐ: ܗ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܘ ܕܐƦſܘܗܝ ƦƇƖƉܐ ܘŴƣܪſܐ ܕܕܘܪƣܐ ܕܒŴƇƀƇƊܬܐ܂ ƄŶ ̇ ܘ ƀƄƣــŸ ̇ ܕ ƆــƁ ܐܦ ƣــƢܪܐ܉ ܕܐƘــƇܐ ̣ܗܘ ƉܐƉــƢܐ ܗ ܐƦƌ ܓƢƀ ܘƏــų ̇ ܨƦŶ ܗƎƀƆ܂ ܘƑƀƙƉ ܐƌܐ ƅƆ ƈƀƄƉ ܕܬܗܘܐ ƦƉܗܓܐ ̣ܗܘܐ ƁƆ űƃ ܐ ̇ ųƇƃ ܬŴƆ ܐܐŴƇƉ ƅƆ Ǝſ ̈ ܒƎſų: ܐƅſ ܕܬƈƃƦƏ ܘܬܬųƕܕ ܐƎƀƌ܉ ܕųƌܘ ̈ƌƦƕܐ ̈ƍƙƆܐ ܐƌƮŶܐ: ܐƎƀƇſ ܕƎƀŷƤŶ űƀƆܘ Ŵſ ƈƕܘ ܐƍƀ̈ ƃ ƈƕܕ ܬܐŴƍƙƇƉ ܕƎſƦƣŴƠƆ܂ <sup>20</sup>
		- ̈ܬܐ ܒܐűſܐ ܒܐűſܐ ŴƍܒƦƄƉ ƎſųƇƃ űܒƖƌܘ ܐƍܙܒ ƎƆ Ƒƙƌ Ǝſܕ ܐܢ 450 ܐƇــƀŶ ܐƆ ƎƀƆܗ ƎƉ̣ űƖƇܕܒ Ʀƌܐ ƈƃƦƐƉ :ܬܐŴƇƀƇƊܕܒ ܐƠƘŴƌ ƈƕܕ ̈ Ƙܐ ̈ܬܐ ܕܐƀƏــŴܬܐ ƉــƦܕܪܟ܉ ܘƆܐ ܬܪƀƕــƦܐ ܕƐƇƀƘــŴ ܕƦƄƉܒƍــŴ ̈ ſܐ: ܕܒــųܘܢ ̈ــƦܒܐ ܐƆــų ſƦƉــƕűܐ܉ ܘƆܐ ܬܘܒ ܪƀƕــƍܐ ſƢƣــƢܐ ܕƃ

**<sup>1</sup>** ܐƌƢŶܐ BDP, Epit.: ܐƀƌƢŶܐ L **<sup>3</sup>** ܐƀŶܘܪ BDL, Epit.: ܐƀŶܘܕ P **<sup>4</sup>** <sup>ܢ</sup>̈ ̈ܢ :BDL ܐűŶ űƀŶܐ P, Epit. ܐƦƃܕܘ LP, Epit.: ܐƃܕܘ BD **<sup>12</sup>** ܕųƖƊƆ BD: ܕųƕܕܐܬ L **<sup>13</sup>** ܢ ̈ ųƉƦƤƉܕ BD: ƎſųƉƦƤƉܕ L **14** ܣŴــſܪŴܓƀźƟ L: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓــųźƟ D: ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓــųŹܐƟ B | ƎــſųƀƇƕܕ BD: ܘܢųــƀƇƕܕ L ƑƀƇŹŴźƐſܐܪ L: ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܐܪ BD **16** ܗܘܐ̣ ŸƀƄƣ BD: ŸƃƦƣܐ L **17** ܗܓܐƦƉ] + Ʀƌܐ BD **<sup>18</sup>** Ǝſ ̈ ܘųƌܕ L: Ǝſ ̈ ܘųƌ BD **<sup>21</sup>** űܒƖƌܘ L: űܒƖƌܕ BD | ܬܐ ̈ ŴƍܒƦƄƉ L: ܬܗ ̈ ŴƍܒƦƄƉ BD

circular way, sometimes rising up and appearing above our heads and sometimes going down. Similarly, a mill also turns around an axle and does not change its place for another, while its parts constantly move from one spot to the other in circular way.

448 Now, the movement which proceeds straightforwardly is also further divided into six kinds590. For what is moved either goes up as fire, or goes down as water, or (goes) into one of the two directions, i.e. right or left, as something that was cast away with much force, or moves forward or backwards as the one who is walking or as something driven back591.

#### *[Conclusion]*

449 Thus, O brother, I have described to you everything I was able to recall about the ten genera of all simple words592 which in the Greek language are called "categories" (κατηγορίαι) and about which Aristotle has written a short treatise that is an introduction into and a beginning of the study of logic593. However, what you understand and what also truth testifies to me is that, even if I had not this treatise at my disposal while I was writing down these things, I would still have urged you to meditate about them in order to comprehend and remember them, so that they would become profitable for you in the whole teaching on natures and in other sciences that are useful for those who seek the truth.

450 So, if time permits us and we compose all the treatises, one after another, about the discipline of logic, it will become clear to you that without them neither will one be capable of studying the books on medicine nor will the arguments of the philosophers be comprehensible. Nor will one have the correct understanding of the divine books in which the hope of life has been

**<sup>590</sup>** Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 204.12–15.

**<sup>591</sup>** Similar to the commentary attributed to Ammonius (but contrary to that of Philoponus), Sergius does not comment on the last, 15th, chapter of the *Categories* focused on the category of having.

**<sup>592</sup>** Syr. *bat qale*, "utterances", corresponding to Gr. φωναί.

**<sup>593</sup>** Cf. Simplicius, *In Cat*. 1.3–6: τὸ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους βιβλίον <...> προοίμιόν ἐστι τῆς ὅλης φιλοσοφίας εἴπερ αὐτὸ μὲν τῆς λογικῆς ἐστιν ἀρχὴ πραγματείας, ἡ δὲ λογικὴ τῆς ὅλης προλαμβάνεται δικαίως φιλοσοφίας.

 $\text{Ashora, } \omega \text{-ring } \sigma \Delta \omega \text{, } \Delta \omega \text{ -- we } \omega \text{-endado}$  $\text{7-but, } \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{ -- we } \omega \text{-endado}$  $\text{8-but, } \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-} \Delta \omega \text{-$ 

ųƍƉ ܓűܫ ܒܐܘƀƏܐ – ܗܘſܐ ܘŴŶܒƇܐ ƢƟƦƉܐ ųƍƉ ܒŴƀƊƄܬܐ – ܬܪܒƦƀܐ ܘܒƢſƞܘܬܐ ųƉƦƤƉ ܘųƍƉ ܒƌŵܐ – ƙƇŶŴƣܐ ܘƦƉܬܙŴƍƖſܬܐ ƍƃƦƉܐ <sup>10</sup>

ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕܬܪƎſ

ܕŴƠƆܒŴƀƇܬܐ ̇ ̈Ǝƀ ܕŴƆܬ űƉܡ ܐųſƦſ ̇ ܐƅſ ܗƌ ܐܘ ƎƀƇ ̈ ̈Ǝƀ ܕŴƠƏܒ ̇ ܐƅſ ܗƌ ܐܘ ܐܘ <sup>15</sup> ̇ ܐƅſ ƇƀŶܐ ܘܓŵƀƇܘܬܐ ̇ ܐƅſ ܪܘƃܒܐ ܕܐƎſ ܘƆܐ ܕܒƦƇƊܐ ܐܘ

B158v ܐƦƆܕܬ ܓܐƆŴƘ

ŴƊſűƟܬܐ ųƍƉ ܒŵܒƍܐ – ܐƅſ ܐܬƁƇƉ ƍƉŴƀƆܐ ܘųƍƉ ܒƍƀƄܐ – ܐƅſ ŴƀŶܬܐ ƀƏŴƐƆܐ <sup>20</sup> ܘųƍƉ ܒűƐܪܐ – ܐƅſ ܪƣܐ ܕܓŴܕܐ

̈Ʀƕܐ **<sup>3</sup>** űſ BD: ܐƦƖſ̈ űſ L **5** ܐƖܒƣܕ ܐƢƉܐƉ ƋƇƣ L: Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟܕ ܒܐƦƃ ܒƦƄƊƆ ƋƇƣ ܕƕܒűƀ ƆܐܪźƐſــƑƀƇŹŴ ƐƇƀƘــƘŴܐ ܘƤƙƉــơ ƢƐƆܓƀــƑ ܐܪƀƃܐŹــƢܘܣ ܪƀƖƣــƍܐ܂ ܘƆܐƆــųܐ ̈ ܐ ܒƀــŴܡ ܕſــƍܐ ܕƀŶــƇܐ ܐſــƎ Ŵƣܒŷܐ ܘƀźŷƆܐ ƍƤƊƤƉܐ ŴƖƊƣܢ ܕƢƏܛ ŴƣܒƍƠܐ ܕźŶــų ܂ƎــƀƉܘܐ B: ܐƘŴــƐƇƀƘ ƑƀƆųŹŴــźƐſܐܪƆ űــƀܒƕܕ ܐܣſܪ̈ŴܓــųźƟܕ ܒܐƦــƃ ܒƦــƄƊƆ ƋــƇƣ ܘơƤƙƉ ƢƐƆܓƑƀ ܐܪƀƃܐŹــƢܘܣ ܪƀƖƣــƍܐ܂ ܘƆܐƆــųܐ ƣــŴܒŷܐ ܐƀƉــƍܐ ܘźŷƆــƀܐ ܕƏــƢܛ ̈ ܐ ܒŴƀܡ ܕƍſܐ ܕƇƀŶܐ ܐƎƀƉ܂ ųźŶܕ ܐƍƠܒŴƣ D **<sup>13</sup>** ܡűƉ D: ܕܐűŶ B | ̇ ųſƦſܐ D: ƎſųſƦſܐ B **<sup>14</sup>** ƎƀƇ ̈ ܒŴƠƏܕ D: ƎƀƀƇ ̈ B ܕŴƠƏܒ

revealed, unless through the exalted character of his way of life he would gain divine power, so that he would have no need in human knowledge. But through human abilities no progress or guidance to any knowledge is possible without training in logic.

End of Book Seven.

#### *First division*

Change:


#### *Second division*

Opposition is:


#### *Third division*

Priority is:


$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{where } \stackrel{\text{def}}{\text{max}} \text{ denotes } \stackrel{\text{def}}{\text{sum}} \text{times} \text{s}\_{\text{sum}} \\\\ \text{where } \stackrel{\text{def}}{\text{sum}} \text{ is any } \stackrel{\text{def}}{\text{sum}} \\\\ \text{where } \stackrel{\text{def}}{\text{sum}} \\\\ \text{and } \stackrel{\text{def}}{\text{sum}} \\\\ \text{and } \stackrel{\text{def}}{\text{sum}} \\\\ \text{and } \stackrel{\text{def}}{\text{sum}} \\\\ \text{for each } \sigma \text{ is } \sigma\_{\text{sum}} \\\\ \text{for each } \sigma \text{ is } \sigma\_{\text{sum}} \\\\ \text{for each } \sigma \text{ is } \sigma\_{\text{sum}} \\\\ \text{for each } \sigma \text{ is } \sigma\_{\text{sum}} \\\\ \text{for each } \sigma\_{\text{sum}} - \text{int}\_{\text{sum}} \text{ and } \sigma\_{\text{sum}} \\\\ \text{for each } \sigma\_{\text{sum}} - \text{int}\_{\text{sum}} \text{ and } \sigma\_{\text{sum}} \\\\ \text{for each } \sigma\_{\text{sum}} - \text{int}\_{\text{sum}} \text{ and } \sigma\_{\text{sum}} - \text{int}\_{\text{sum}} \\\\ \text{for each } \sigma\_{\text{sum}} - \text{int}\_{\text{sum}} \text{ and } \sigma\_{\text{sum}} - \text{int}\_{\text{sum}} \\\\ \text{for each } \sigma\_{\text{sum}} - \text{int}\_{\text{sum}} \text{ and } \sigma\_{\text{sum}} \\\\ \text{for each } \sigma\_{\text{sum}} - \text{int}\_{\text{sum}} \text{ and } \sigma\_{\text{sum}} \end{array}$$

ܐŴſűŷƃܬܐ Ÿــƌűƌ ܐƕܐܪ ƎــƉ̣ ƈــƖƆ ܐƤƊƣ ܘܐųƌ űƃܕ ƅſܐ – ܐƍܒŵܒ ̇ ųƍƉ ܐܦ Ŵƌܗܪܐ <sup>15</sup> ̈ ــƀܐ ܘƀŶــŴܬܐ ܕſܒــƤܐ ̇ ܒƀƄــƍܐ – ܐƃــƌŵܐ ܕƀŶــŴܬܐ ܕƉ ܘƍƉــų ܘƦŶƢƘܐ ܘܕƃƢƣܐ

̇ **<sup>4</sup>** BD ܘƍƉــų ܒــƌŵܐ ܕܕƀƇſــŴܬܐ ̣ ܘܕܗܘ ܕܕƇſــų ̣ܗܝ + [ƆܓƃŴŷــŴܬܐ **<sup>2</sup>** ųــƍƉ B: ̇ ųــƍƉܘ D **<sup>10</sup>** ƎƀƇ ̈ ܒŴــƠƏܕ D: ƎƀƀƇ ̈ ƋƇƣ ƦƄƊƆܒ ŴƀƆŴƄƏܢ űƉܡ ܐܘƦƀƃ Ƥƀƌܐ + [ܘܕƃƢƣܐ **17** B ܕŴƠƏܒ ܐźƐƀƘŴــƏ ܐƍــƀƖƣܪ ƑــƀܓƢƐƆ űƀܒƕܕ ŴƠƀźŹܐƘƢƘ ƑƀƆųŹŴźƐſܕܐܪ Ƒſܪ̈ŴܓųźƟ ƈƕܕ ̇ Ŵƣܒŷܐ ܐƍƀƉܐ ܐƎƀƉ ܘܐƎƀƉ܂ D ܘܪƀƃܐƢŹܘܣ܂ ܘųƀƆ


Also, opposition is:

	- either in association with another thing or by itself;
	- they either change into one another, e.g. the contraries, or do not change, e.g. relatives, capacity and privation.

#### *Fourth division*

Simultaneity is:


**<sup>594</sup>** Explicit in ms. D: "Finished is the composition of a certain commentary (σχόλιον) concerning the goal of the *Categories* of Aristotle the Peripatetic composed by Sergius of Reshayna, the sophist and archiater. Let the true glory be (to God)! Amen and amen!"

**Appendix Divisions Presented in the Diagram Form** 

 ̇ ܕƉܐƢƉܐ ƀƉűƟܐ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ܗƎƀƆ ųƇſܕ ܓܐƆ̈ ŴƘ

ƆŴƘܓܐ ƀƉűƟܐ

ƢŷƊƆܘܬܐ ܘŴƀƍƊƆܬܐ ܘƆܐƢźƏܘƀƉŴƌܐ ܘŴƠƀƏŴƊƆܪܘܬܐ

ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕܬܪƎſ

#### **The divisions of Book One are the following:**

̈Ɔܓܐ ܕƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܬ̈ܪƎſ ŴƘ

ƆŴƘܓܐ ƀƉűƟܐ

#### **Divisions of Book Two**

*First division* 

ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕܬƦƆܐ

ܐܕ ܕƦƇƉܐ ܐܪܒƖܐ ܐųſƦſܘܢ ̈ƣܐ ŴƠƘܕܐ ƍƀƆƞƉܐ ƤƉܐƍƆܐ ƟŴƐƘܐ

ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ

ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕƦƣܐ

#### *Third division*

#### *Fourth division*

philosopher-dog

̇

ܐܘ

ܒܐܘƀƏܐ

ŴƘ ܕƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܬƦƆܐ ̈Ɔܓܐ

ƆŴƘܓܐ ƀƉűƟܐ

#### **Divisions of Book Three**

*First division* 

ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕܬƦƆܐ

ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ

ŴƘ ܕƉܐƢƉܐ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ ̈Ɔܓܐ

ƆŴƘܓܐ ƀƉűƟܐ

ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ܐűƀŶ ܘƆܐ ̈ ܘųƍƉ <sup>ܢ</sup> ̇ <sup>Ǝ</sup>̈ ܕܐ ƎƉ̣ ƠƀƐƘ ̈ űŶ ̇ ƎƤſƮƘ ųƍƉ ̇ ŴƍƉ ̈ܬܗ <sup>Ǝ</sup> ̈ ܕܐ ƎƉ̣ ƊŶƦƉܘ ̈ űŶ ŴƏܪŹܐ Ŵŷƀźƣܬܐ ܓƊƣŴܐ ܐܬܪܐ ܙܒƍܐ ƍƀƍƉܐ ƦƇƉܐ

ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕܬܪƎſ

ܘܬܘܒ ŴƀƊƃܬܐ ̇ ܘųƍƉ Ɔܐ ƦƄƉ̈ܪܢ ̇ ŴƍƉ ̈ܬܗ ܐƆܐ ƦƤƉ̈ܪƎſ ܒܐűſܐ ܒܐűſܐ ̇ ܐƊƀƏ Ʀſܐ ųƍƉ ̇ ŴƍƊƆ ̈ܬܗ <sup>Ǝ</sup> ̈ ƎſܗƦƀƃ ƊƀƟܘ ̈ ܒűܘ ŴƏܪŹܐ Ŵŷƀźƣܬܐ ܙܒƍܐ ƦƇƉܐ ƍƀƍƉܐ

ܓƊƣŴܐ ܐܬܪܐ

ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕƉܐƢƉܐ ܕƤƊŶܐ

#### **The division of Book Five**

*First division* 

The genus of quality is divided

into being stable and unstable

 into capacity and incapacity

 into affections and affective qualities into figures and shapes

The affections and affective qualities are divided as follows : either they are present in one whole species, as whiteness in all swans or they are found not in the whole species, as whiteness in men or they are present from birth, as blackness of an Ethiopian or they occur by chance, as pallor resulting from sickness

ƉܐƢƉܐ ܕƣܒƖܐ

ƆŴƘܓܐ ܕܐܪܒƖܐ

## **Bibliography**

## **Primary sources quoted in the abbreviated form**


Thucydides, *Hist.* Jones, Henry Stuart, and John E. Powell (eds.), *Thucydidis Historiae* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942).

#### **Secondary Literature**


Bodéüs 2002 — Bodéüs, Richard (ed. and transl.), *Aristote, Catégories* (Paris: Les belles lettres, 2002).


Daiber 1985 — Daiber, Hans, "Ein vergessener syrischer Text: Bar Zoʿbī über die Teile der Philosophie", *Oriens Christianus* 69 (1985), 73–80.


Hugonnard-Roche 1997c — Hugonnard-Roche, Henri, "Comme la cigogne au désert: Un prologue de Sergius de Reshʿainā à l'étude de la philosophie aristotélicienne en syriaque", in Alain de Libera et al. (eds.), *Langages et philosophie: Hommage à J. Jolivet* (Études de philosophie médiévale, 77; Paris, 1997), 79–97 [reprinted in Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 165–186].

Hugonnard-Roche 1997d — Hugonnard-Roche, Henri, "Sergius de Rešʿaynā: Commentaire sur les *Catégories* (à Théodore), Livre premier", *Oriens-Occidens: Cahiers du Centre d'histoire des sciences et des philosophies arabes et médiévales* 1 (1997), 123–135 [reprinted in Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 187–231].

Hugonnard-Roche 2000 — Hugonnard-Roche, Henri, "Le traité de logique de Paul le Perse: Une interprétation tardo-antique de la logique aristotélicienne en syriaque", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 11 (2000), 59–82 [reprinted in Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 275–291].

Hugonnard-Roche 2004 — Hugonnard-Roche, Henri, *La logique d'Aristote du grec au syriaque: Études sur la transmission des textes de l'Organon et leur interprétation philosophique* (Textes et traditions, 9; Paris, 2004).

Hugonnard-Roche 2007 — Hugonnard-Roche, Henri, "Le corpus philosophique syriaque aux VIe–VIIe siècles", in Cristina D'Ancona (ed.), *The Libraries of the Neoplatonists* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 279–291.

Hugonnard-Roche 2011 — Hugonnard-Roche, Henri, "Du commentaire à la reconstruction: Paul le Perse interprète d'Aristote (sur une lecture du *Peri Hermeneias*, à propos des modes et des adverbes selon Paul, Ammonius et Boèce)", in J. Lössl & J. W. Watt (eds.), in Josef Lössl and John W. Watt (eds.), *Interpreting the Bible and Aristotle in Late Antiquity* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 207–224.

Hugonnard-Roche 2012a — Hugonnard-Roche, Henri, "Probus (Proba)", in Richard Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, vol. V.2 (Paris, 2012), 1539–1542.

Hugonnard-Roche 2012b — Hugonnard-Roche, Henri, "Le commentaire syriaque de Probus sur l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre: Une étude préliminaire", *Studia Graeco-Arabica* 2 (2012), 227–244.

Hugonnard-Roche 2012c — Hugonnard-Roche, Henri, "Porphyre de Tyr, Isagogè: Traduction syriaque", in Richard Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, vol. V.2 (Paris, 2012), 1450–1453.


Kiraz 2015 — Kiraz, George A., *The Syriac Dot: A Short History* (Piscataway: Gorgias, 2015).



Wright 1901 — Wright, William, with an introduction by Stanley A. Cook, *A Catalogue of the Syriac Manuscripts Preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1901).

## **Indices**

### **General Index**

ʿAbdishoʿ bar Brikha 12, 19 accident, accidental 10, 18, 22, 48, 49, 85, 155, 167–171, 177–197, 205, 217–227, 239–247, 257, 309, 311, 401, 409, 453 – are not tertiary substances 221–225 – Aristotle's definition of 177–187 – do not share their name and definition 241 – not separable 191–195 – particular 169 – Porphyry's definition of 193–195 – separable 191–195 – subsist in substance 225, 245–247 – universal 169 account 69, 97, 155, 159, 187–195, 209, 245, 267, 279, 293, 295, 335, 337, 387, 403, 415, 431, 437 – definitory 97, 155, 179, 187–191, 227, 229, 337, 353 – universal 193, 245 acting (category) 151, 165, 399, 401 action 72, 137, 307–311, 399 – whether it pertains to quantity 307–311 activity 131, 135, 139, 151, 175, 265, 377, 379, 419, 437 actual, actuality 195, 231, 235, 343, 377 aether 367 affection 85, 337, 339, 341, 361, 379, 381, 385, 399, 401, 405, 415, 459, 461 – affective qualities 379, 381, 405, 461 – being-affected (category) 151, 165, 399, 401 air 119, 175, 181, 193, 265, 283, 289, 291, 383, 385, 437 Alexander of Aphrodisias 12, 26, 47, 67, 87, 131, 267 – commentary on the *Prior Analytics* 87 – *On the Universe* 26, 67, 267 Alexander Paris 159, 165, 181, 451 Alexander the Macedonian 159, 165, 451 Alexandria, Alexandrian 3–24 – Church authorities (patriarch) 6 – exegesis of Aristotle 9, 11, 16, 20, 22, 23 – pedagogical model 3–8 – philosophical tradition 3–8, 13, 16 al-Farabi 3, 117 Alqosh 15, 32, 33, 41

Ammonius Hermeiou 3–9, 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 23, 28, 57, 71, 77, 79, 83, 85, 87, 107, 113, 117, 121, 127, 129, 135, 137, 149, 157, 167, 173, 205, 217, 221, 227, 231, 237, 239, 243, 245, 257, 263, 269, 279, 281, 291, 293, 305, 317, 319, 325, 329, 331, 333, 337, 339, 363, 365, 377, 381, 397, 403, 409, 415, 419, 425, 435, 439 – commentary on the *Categories* 8, 9, 23, 87, 365 – commentary on the *Isagoge* 127, 135, 231, 305 – commentary on the *Prior Analytics* 8, 87 – educational system 5–6, 18 – (pseudepigraphical) *Lives of Aristotle* 34 – school of 4–8, 15, 18, 57, 337 analysis and synthesis 227 ancients, the 18, 63, 71, 77, 231, 265, 267, 295, 309, 323, 339, 353, 355, 357, 365, 407 angels, angelic 73, 189, 285, 349, 367 *antepraedicamenta* 9, 153, 407 Antony of Tagrit 8 Apodeictics 117, 161, 449 apology, apologetic 7, 8, 14, 269 Arabic 3, 7, 14, 20, 25, 57, 117 Archimedes 347 Aristotle 3–30, 34, 37, 45, 47, 48, 50–52, 56, 59, 63–69, 81–87, 93, 103, 105, 107, 111, 115–121, 125, 127, 131, 135, 147, 151, 153, 165, 167, 173, 177, 179, 185, 187, 193, 207, 209, 215–221, 227, 239, 243, 245, 249, 255, 257, 263, 267, 273, 275, 279–289, 293, 295, 301, 311, 313, 325, 329, 331, 339, 345, 347, 351, 353, 367, 371, 383– 387, 391, 395, 407, 409, 435–439 – as collector of all sciences 10, 16, 65 – *Constitutions* 105, 119, 447 – criticism of 187–197 – *De Mundo* 26, 267, 297 – division of his writings 7, 10, 81–87, 103, 105, 107, 447 – goal of his philosophy 67–69 – letters 81, 83, 105, 119, 447 – logical terminology 17, 23–24 – *Metaphysics* 10, 85 – *Meteorology* 119 – natural philosophy 7, 13, 267

– obscurity of his language 10, 67, 117–121

– *On Interpretation* 14, 20, 34, 107 – on place 279–293 – on time 293–305 – *Physics* 13, 279–301 – *Prior Analytics* 20, 34, 107, 161, 449 – *Rhetoric* 117, 161, 449 – *Sophistical Refutations* 119, 161, 449 – Syriac reception of 8, 16–24, 34 – *Topics* 117, 119, 161, 449 – translations into Arabic 3 arithmetic 75, 105, 173, 447 ascent 75, 77, 139, 205 astronomy 3, 10, 75, 105, 447 Athanasius of Balad 8 Athens 5, 17, 349, 375 – Academy 17 – plague 375 Atticus (Platonist) 17, 65 Baghdad 3, 15, 32–34 Bardaiṣan 16, 369 Barḥadbshabba 14 Barhebraeus 4, 8 Basil of Caesarea 6 being-in-something 22, 179–187, 289, 403 – eleven ways of 179–187 beings 65, 73–79, 85, 131, 175, 365–371 – above nature 77, 79, 85 – corporeal 73, 131, 365 – divine 73, 77, 91, 105, 111, 117, 447 – division of 73–79, 365–371 – incorporeal 73–77, 85, 145, 365–371 – individual 131, 141 – rational 85, 273 belief 255, 309 Berlin 15, 34, 50, 51 body 141, 143, 163, 181, 183, 187, 193, 199–203, 211, 271, 275–279, 285–293, 303, 305, 309–315, 323, 325, 327, 365, 367, 369, 383, 385, 401, 411, 437, 457 – animate 141, 143, 163, 199–203, 209, 211, 217, 247, 383, 433, 453 – as a continuous quantity 269–271 – having three dimensions 181, 203, 277 – inanimate 141, 199, 209, 383, 433 – living and lifeless 199 – transformation of 283

capacity 19, 147, 363, 375–379, 405, 407, 419, 421, 425, 429, 441, 443, 461 – difference to contraries 425–427 – difference to relatives 425 categories (ten primary genera) 9–10, 30, 49, 52, 133, 165, 167, 177, 199, 205, 207, 239, 277, 301, 305, 339, 341, 387, 397–403, 407, 421, 437, 439 – and ontological order 73, 129, 267, 269, 365 – division of 10, 167, 217, 397–401 – four primary 9, 401 – sequence of 10, 52, 263–269, 329 – six categories that are generated from the combination of substance with other three 397–403 – three main categories 263–269 – whether one thing may not belong to two categories 151–153, 395–397 *Categories* (treatise) 5–13, 17, 20–24, 34, 37, 45, 48, 50, 63, 85, 107, 115, 117, 121, 125, 127, 133, 143, 161, 167, 179, 205, 207, 217, 227, 245, 257, 263, 281, 293, 295, 313, 329, 371, 407, 409, 419, 425, 427, 431, 437, 439, 449 – Syriac translations of 20–24, 26, 45, 247, 253, 339, 371, 381, 387, 391, 417, 433 – chapter two 22, 167 – commentaries on 5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 29, 87, 375 – division into three parts 9, 153, 407 – goal of 10, 22, 37, 121–127, 133–135, 443 – reason for the title 139 cause 337, 347, 361, 435, 459 Chalcedon, Chalcedonian 17, 18 – anti-Chaledonian 4, 8, 18 – Council of 17 Chaldean Antonian Order of St. Hormizd 32–33, 61 Chaldean Oracles 5 change 10, 11, 251, 253, 281, 283, 293, 295, 297, 381, 391, 401, 409–419, 425, 437, 439, 441, 443, 463 – six kinds of 11, 409–415 chronicle 4, 5 – of 846 4 – of Michael the Great 4 – of Ps.-Zacharias of Mytilene 4, 5 circle, squaring of 347, 351 colour 18, 145, 147, 217, 241, 249, 309, 311, 367, 369, 371, 389, 391, 415, 423, 427 commentary 3–24, 29, 34, 37, 38, 44, 45, 61, 85 – Greek 11–12, 16, 20, 22, 23, 57

– Syriac 18–20, 29–31, 34, 35, 37, 46 completive 97, 191, 245, 247 concept 83, 123–135, 143, 161, 263, 281, 329, 401, 449 – simple 123–127, 133–135, 143, 449 concomitant 155, 191, 223, 229, 243, 247, 249, 293, 295, 307, 313, 323, 325, 339, 343, 387, 391, 393 Constantinople 5 container 179–183, 257, 289, 291, 335, 361, 403, 453 – being in 179–183 contraries, contrariety 45, 109, 111, 143, 247–255, 261, 297, 313–325, 331, 341, 343, 389, 391, 409, 417–429, 441, 443, 463 – as one of the species of opposition 417–425, 441, 463 – having and not having something intermediate between them 423–427 – vs. capacity and privation 425–427 – vs. relatives 427–429 convert, reciprocate 189, 229, 237, 239, 345, 419, 431, 433 craft, art 65, 75, 89–95, 105, 107, 113, 129, 155, 373, 375, 377 – craftsman 127, 129, 265, 273 – professional language 273–275 creation 129, 131, 175, 293, 365 – story of 175 – nature of 365 Creator 71, 127–133, 163, 173–175, 451 – similar to number one 175 curriculum 5–7, 34 Cynic 157 Cyril of Alexandria 47 Damascius 5, 6 David (philosopher) 5, 63 Dayr al-Suryan 25 definition 10, 11, 12, 14, 22, 34, 48, 49, 63, 155–159, 165, 177, 179, 187–195, 213, 225–245, 255–257, 261, 305, 307, 321, 335–339, 353–357, 381, 387, 391, 393, 399, 401, 407, 451 – based on properties 10, 229, 237–239, 255, 257, 387, 393 – being convertible 189, 229, 239 – derives from a genus and differentiae 227, 229, 307 – descriptive 155, 157, 195, 307, 337 – relation to division 229, 307, 401

– types of 155 – two ways of making a mistake in 187–189 Demiurge 127, 129 demonstration 63, 103, 105, 107, 109–117, 161, 177, 221, 227, 265, 267, 449 differentia 199–205, 227, 239, 243, 245, 257, 263, 271, 275, 307, 373, 395 – constitutive 229, 307 dimension 147, 181, 203, 265, 277, 279, 291, 411, 413 – length, breadth, and depth 181, 203, 411 – three-dimensional 181, 203, 265, 277, 293, 413 – two-dimensional 181, 293 Dionysius Bar Ṣalibi 30 division 10, 11, 14, 49, 63, 71, 73, 79, 81, 85, 87, 103–109, 125–133, 151, 153, 159–165, 167–177, 197, 199, 209, 211–215, 227–231, 235, 257–261, 267, 269, 271, 275, 279, 301, 303–307, 315, 321, 327, 329, 335, 361, 365, 371, 373, 387, 397– 405, 419, 441–465 – as a genus into species 211–215, 259, 455 – as a whole into parts 211–215, 259, 455 – as homonyms 211–215, 259, 455 – fourfold 48, 167–177, 197 – graphic 27–31, 34–35, 42, 54, 56, 105, 161–165, 257–261, 327, 361, 405, 441–465 – is prior to definition 227, 307 – types of 10, 211–215, 259, 455 drugs, simple 11, 17, 65 earth 175, 265, 323, 383, 385, 435, 437, 443, 465 education 3–18, 26, 32, 33, 35, 47, 65, 79, 215, 231 – beginners in 10, 65, 215, 257 – Christian 7, 16, 32, 33 – higher 26 – medical 4, 5, 7, 16 – philosophical 5, 6, 18 elements, four 173–177, 265, 269, 367, 397, 437 Elias (philosopher) 5, 7, 79, 87, 119, 159, 173, 237, 365 Enaton (monastery) 5, 6 Ephrem the Syrian 16, 369 epitome 9, 15, 16, 24, 31, 32, 50–55, 61, 63, 289 Erbil 15, 28, 31–46, 56, 61 essence 97, 127, 129, 369 Estrangela 25 eternity of the world 5 excerpts 12, 17, 46–50, 53, 55 exegesis, exegetical 8, 16, 19, 20, 31, 52, 117

faculty 77, 265, 267, 269, 379, 381, 391, 421, 423 figure 12, 145, 173, 237, 239, 381, 383, 389, 393, 397, 405, 415, 461 – of speech 237, 239 florilegium 17, 49 form 127–133, 137, 163, 173, 175, 181, 183, 207, 257, 259, 263, 265, 269, 285, 367, 371, 451, 453 – being as forms in matter 181, 183, 257, 453 – existing with the Creator 127, 163 – material 133, 163 – natural 133, 163, 207 – noetic 133, 163 – Platonic 127–133, 137, 273 – posterior 133, 163 – primary 133, 163 Gabriel Qatraya 14 Galen 3, 5, 10, 11, 16, 17, 63, 65, 121, 375 generation 85, 265, 269, 305, 367, 391, 409, 411, 415, 433, 435, 437, 441, 463 – and corruption 85, 265, 367, 409, 411, 415, 437, 441, 463 genus, genera 10, 18, 19, 45, 83, 127–135, 139–153, 159–167, 173, 177–183, 197–227, 239–249, 255–259, 295, 313, 315, 321, 325, 329–357, 363, 365, 371–409, 415, 423, 435–439, 449– 455 – being a principle of a definition 227–229, 307 – being as a genus in species 181, 183, 257, 453 – being divided as a genus into species 211–215, 259, 455 – most generic 143, 307, 339, 371 – primary 133–153, 167, 255, 307, 397 – ten (i.e. the categories) 133, 139–153, 159, 161, 165, 173, 177, 179, 205–209, 399, 437, 439, 449 – universal 18, 147–151, 163, 167, 245 geometry 75, 105, 231, 447 George, bishop of the Arabs 37, 247, 371, 417 Gessius 7 God 48, 53, 63, 71, 427, 443 – likeness to 71 – possessing two powers 48, 71 grammar 26, 137 Greek 3–9, 11–13, 16, 18–25, 28, 32, 37, 47, 50, 56, 57, 63, 71, 85, 123, 147, 157, 253, 371, 419, 439 – philosophy 8, 12, 16, 18 – Syriac translations from 3, 8, 18–24, 63 Gregory of Nazianzus 6, 47

Ḥarran 3 Ḥasan Bar Bahlul 15 having (category) 149, 151, 165, 399, 403, 439 heteronyms 9, 10, 153, 157, 159, 335, 337 Hippocrates 5, 121, 375 Homer 137 homonyms 9, 10, 153, 157, 159, 211, 335 Ḥunayn ibn Isḥaq 3, 10, 63 hypostasis 17 Iamblichus 135 iatrosophists 5, 7 Ibas of Edessa 19 image 129, 131, 157, 183, 213, 265, 267, 269, 285, 307 incorporeal 73, 75, 77, 85, 145, 199, 211, 273, 277, 281, 285–291, 365–371 individual (particular) 131, 141, 173, 199–203, 209, 217–225, 231, 233, 241, 243, 247, 259, 409, 453 intellect 63, 72–75, 103, 127, 131, 133, 141, 221, 247, 273, 299, 425, 427, 447 intermediary 75, 77, 105, 109, 423 Iraq 32 Islamic 16 Jacob of Edessa 8, 34, 37, 45, 51, 53, 371, 391, 417, 419 John bar Zoʿbi 34 John Philoponus 5, 9, 20–23, 87, 101, 119, 121, 125, 129, 135, 157, 159, 167, 169, 179, 185, 217, 221, 243, 245, 263, 273, 279, 281, 293, 315, 325, 337, 345, 365, 383, 403, 407, 409, 419, 425, 427 – commentary on the *Categories* 9 – commentary on the *Physics* 279 – commentary on the *Prior Analytics* 87 – *Corollaries* 279 kind 10, 71, 77, 83, 87, 105, 137, 157, 159, 165, 205, 211, 231–239, 269, 279, 293, 297–303, 309–315, 325, 337, 355, 371–387, 409–415, 431–439, 447, 451 – of similar 157–159, 165, 299 language 10, 18, 19, 56, 63, 67, 117–121, 269–275, 279, 303, 305, 309, 313, 315, 323, 327, 363, 457 – as a discrete quantity 269–275 – obscure 10, 67, 117–121 – three kinds of 273–275

line 10, 203, 271, 275–279 – as a continuous quantity 275–279 – having length without breadth 277 loanword 25, 47, 57, 71, 381, 431 logic, logical 3, 5, 7, 10–24, 26, 34, 35, 37, 47, 48, 63, 73, 85–103, 107–121, 133, 161, 167, 207, 209, 267, 295, 327, 385, 407, 409, 425, 427, 439, 441, 449 – Aristotle's 3, 17–19, 23, 34, 37, 48 – being not a part but an instrument of philosophy 7, 10, 48, 87–103 – goal of 10, 91, 109–117 – study of 5, 10, 18, 23, 34, 35, 295, 385, 407, 409, 425, 427, 439 – terminology 17, 23, 24, 139 – what precedes it, what is about it, and what is attached to it 85, 107, 161, 449 margin, marginal 25, 29, 30, 35, 38–45, 53–55, 61, 131, 145, 147, 149, 153, 263, 269, 275, 285, 343, 425, 427 Mattai bar Pawlos 15, 41 matter 52, 73–77, 131, 133, 163, 173, 175, 181, 183, 205, 207, 257, 259, 263–269, 285, 451, 453 – prime 52, 263–269, 285 medicine, medical 3–7, 10, 16, 18, 95, 231, 439 Michael Badoqa 15 Miskawayh 14, 20 model 173, 175, 177, 387, moon, eclipses of 347, 351, 353 more and less, admitting of 249–253, 261, 301, 323, 325, 343, 345, 391, 393 Mosul 32, 34 motion, movement 10, 73, 75, 101, 199, 281, 293– 301, 383, 409, 415, 437–439 – its relation to time 293–301 – locomotion 415, 437 music 75, 105, 447 mystery 63, 119, 121, 173, 281 name 123, 125, 139, 149, 155–159, 165, 201, 203, 211, 213, 241–245, 261, 271, 317, 319, 323, 335, 337, 361, 363, 371, 423, 425, 451, 459 – different by different nations 123, 125


nature 17, 65, 69, 73–85, 111, 119, 121, 123, 129– 133, 141–149, 153–157, 161, 167, 173, 177, 187– 193, 197–207, 213–217, 223, 229, 235–247, 253, 263–267, 273, 281, 283, 291, 293, 297, 299, 307, 313–323, 329–335, 349, 351, 355, 365– 371, 375, 379, 389, 395, 399, 409–413, 419, 421, 431–439, 443, 447, 449, 465 – being above 77, 79, 85 – being prior by 349–351, 431–435, 443 – of Christ 17 – treatises on 81, 207, 267 – visible 73, 79, 85, 205 Neoplatonism, Neoplatonic 6, 16, 17 Nisibis 14 Notre Dame des Semences (monastery) 32, 33 number 10, 123, 131, 135, 145, 147, 167, 173–177, 201, 203, 217, 249, 253, 269–273, 279, 301, 303, 305, 313, 315, 319, 323, 325, 327, 411, 413, 423, 457 – and time 301 – as a discrete quantity 203, 269–273, 279, 303, 305, 327 – differ in 131, 201, 203 – Pythagoras on 173–177 Olympiodorus 5, 12, 87, 101, 119, 121, 173 *On Genus, Species, and Individuality* 12, 197 ontology, ontological 73, 129, 269, 365 opposition, opposite 10, 30, 73, 109, 151, 171, 247, 249, 251, 319, 333, 341, 343, 375, 391, 415–431, 441, 443, 463, 465 – differences between its kinds 425–431 – is larger than contrariety 247, 249, 417 – its kinds: as capacity and privation, as relatives, as affirmation and negation, as contraries 417–425, 441, 463 order 65, 93, 153, 171, 173, 215, 225, 227, 229, 239, 263, 267, 269, 317, 329, 421, 431–435, 443, 463 *Organon* 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 37, 63, 115, 117 Orphic 5 pagan 5–8, 269 paratextual 25, 46, 55 part 65, 71–81, 85–111, 117, 137, 179, 183–191, 203, 209, 211, 245, 247, 269, 271–281, 285, 293–297, 301–305, 321–325, 331, 345, 353–359, 381, 383, 385, 399, 413, 419, 437, 439


– divided as a whole in its parts 211, 213, 259, 455 – having position 303–305, 315, 327, 457 – not fixed 303–305, 315, 327, 457 – separate from one another 269–275, 279, 303, 327, 413, 457 – similar and dissimilar 211, 259, 455 – unified with one another 269–271, 275, 279, 281, 301, 303, 327, 457 particular 81, 83, 105, 107, 125, 129, 139, 167–173, 177, 187, 197–205, 209, 215–225, 231, 241, 243, 249, 259, 261, 277, 279, 289–293, 307, 309, 321, 331, 349, 351, 357, 379, 395, 401, 409, 413, 421, 447, 453 Paul of Alexandria 26 Paul the Persian 14, 19, 20, 34 Peloponnesian war 375 perception, perceptible 193, 199, 207, 245, 247, 277, 281, 291, 337–341, 351, 353, 379 Peripatetics 87, 89, 95, 131, 335, 443 periphrasis, periphrastic 13, 14, 21, 23, 24, 46, 48– 50, 53, 239, 255, 295, 301, 313, 321, 333, 345, 357, 361, 375, 385, 389, 391, 395, 417, 425 person 47, 83, 85, 105, 131, 199, 331, 447 *philoponoi* 4–8, 18 philosophy, philosophical 3–20, 26, 33–35, 48, 50–52, 57, 63–67, 71–111, 117, 121, 173, 207, 231, 267, 279, 359, 409 – as likeness to God 63 – Christian students of 5–7, 18, 267, 279, 365 – division of 10, 34, 35, 71–111, 267, 447 – introduction to 10–14, 19, 35 – parts of 48, 65, 71–111, 117, 207 physician 4, 12, 47, 51, 63, 375 *Physics* (treatise) 10, 13, 85, 267, 279, 281–305, 383, 437 – book IV 279, 281, 293, 383 – books V–VIII as *On Motion* 295 physics (natural philosophy) 7, 13, 26, 73, 85, 207, 267, 279, 293, 295 place 10, 52, 149, 181–183, 189, 191, 271, 275, 279– 293, 303–305, 313, 321–327, 337, 399, 403, 415, 437, 453, 457 – as a continuous quantity 271, 275, 279–293, 327, 457 – being in 179, 181–183, 189, 191, 257, 453 – constitution of 321 – has power 283 – is an inner limit of a container 289–291 – is neither body nor incorporeal 287

– is two-dimensional 291, 293 – Plato's notion of 285 – up and down 321–323 – whether it exists 281–283, 287–288 Plato, Platonic 6, 16, 26, 48, 51, 56, 65, 89, 99, 101, 103, 121, 123, 127–133, 149, 199, 209, 217, 225, 243, 251, 259, 273, 303, 333, 343, 349, 365, 421, 453 – *Advice to his disciple* 26 – *Definitions* 26 – dialogues 16 – Forms (Ideas) 51, 127–133, 137, 273 – *Gorgias* 343 – on logic 89, 99–103 – on place 285 – on relatives 333, 343 – on the division of quantity 303 – *Parmenides* 89 – *Phaedo* 89, 121 – *Phaedrus* 89 – pseudepigrapha 26 Platonism, Platonists 16, 17, 65, 79, 89, 99, 101, 127–133, 135 Plotinus 77 point 275–279, 281 – as incorporeal principle of bodies 277 – does not pertain to quantity 277–279 – has no dimension 277 – has no size 277 polemic, polemical 17, 18, 47, 49, 239 polynyms 10, 153, 157 Porphyry 6, 8, 9, 13, 20, 26, 34, 37, 56, 139, 193– 197, 271–275, 295, 307, 319, 395 – *Isagoge* 6, 8, 9, 13, 20, 26, 34, 37, 127, 307 – *On Principles and Matter* 215 – question-and-answer commentary on the *Categories* 271, 273, 275, 319, 395 – Tree of 13, 139, 197 position 149, 283, 289, 301, 303, 305, 315, 327, 337, 339, 341, 361, 371, 385, 437, 457, 459 – being-in-a-position (category) 149, 151, 165, 341, 383–385, 399, 401–403 posteriority 10, 20, 117, 129, 133, 163, 213, 215, 435, 451 – by nature and to us 215 – types of 435 *postpraedicamenta* 30, 295, 407 potentiality 235, 377 power 48, 71–73, 111, 173, 221, 283

– divine 71, 111, 441 – of the soul 48, 71–73 – rational 73, 221 practice 48, 72, 73, 79, 85, 87, 91, 93, 105, 109–117, 173, 447 – as a part of philosophy 48, 72, 73, 79, 87, 91, 93, 105, 109–117, 447 – end of 113 *praedicamenta* 10, 407 predication, predicate 22, 139, 177, 217–227, 241– 245, 261 premise 93, 111, 113 principle 67, 71, 173, 175, 227, 277, 449 priority, prior 10, 129, 141, 143, 209, 213, 283, 345– 353, 431–435, 437, 441–443, 463 – and posteriority 10, 213 – by nature 349–351, 433, 437 – five kinds of 431–435, 441–443, 463 – in time 349, 431–433 privation 417–429, 441, 443, 463, 465 Proba 12, 19, 20, 34 Proclus 5, 7 *prolegomena* 7, 9, 11, 22, 26, 35, 47, 67, 71, 81, 111, 117, 135, 153, 173, 205, 365, 407 property 10, 49, 229–257, 307, 323, 325, 337, 343, 345, 355, 357, 379, 387–393, 433, 435, 443, 455, 463 – division of 261, 455 – in the function of a definition 229, 237, 239, 307, 387 – in the strict and secondary sense 233–239, 261, 393, 433 – is convertible 237–239 – types of 10, 49, 231–239, 261 Protagoras 333, 335 prototype 273 pseudepigrapha 26, 34 psychology 26 Pythagoras, Pythagorean 14, 79, 167, 173–177 – *Golden Verses* 79 – philosophy of numbers 173–177 Qenneshre 8, 34 quality (category) 9, 10, 18–20, 23, 145–153, 165, 209, 217, 243, 249–253, 265–269, 309, 313, 329, 331, 339–345, 363–399, 407, 415, 437, 441, 461, 463 – are said paronymously 387–389 – division of 371, 405, 461

– its kinds: being stable and unstable, capacity and incapacity, affections and affective qualities, figures and shapes 371–387, 405, 461 – place among the categories 263–269, 329, 365– 371, 397–401 – properties of 387–393 – Syriac words for 18–20, 51, 147, 363–365 – things qualified 147, 217, 387, 391 – things subsumed under this genus may belong to the genus of relation 395–397 quantity (category) 9, 10, 18, 52, 145–153, 165, 197, 199, 203, 217, 243, 249, 253, 263–331, 339– 345, 341, 371, 395–399, 411–415, 437, 441, 457 – being equal and unequal 325 – composed of parts having position vs. not having position 303–305, 327 – continuous and discrete 269–301, 327 – definite and indefinite 315 – definition based on its properties 313 – differentiae of 203–205, 275 – division of 269–271, 303–305, 457 – not admitting of more and less 323–325 – not having a contrary 313–323 – in the strict sense and per accident 18, 305– 313, 325 – its position among the categories 52, 209, 263– 269, 397–401 – kinds of 269–313 Rabban Hormizd (monastery) 32, 33 relatives, relation (category) 9, 10, 28, 147–151, 165, 205, 249, 269, 313–323, 329–363, 371, 395–399, 417, 423–431, 441, 443, 463, 465 – admit of more and less 343–345 – being simultaneous 345–353, 359 – contrariety in 341–343 – definition by the ancients and Aristotle's criticism of it 337–357 – definition of 357–361 – difference to capacity and privation 425–431 – division of 335–337, 459 – homonymy and heteronymy in 335–337, 361 – nature of 329–333 – opposition based on relatives 417, 423, 441, 463 – order of teaching on 329, 335 – parts of substance as relatives 353–357 – Plato's notion of 333, 343


Reshaina 4 Rome 5 scholion, scholia 12, 29, 36, 37–39, 43, 45, 46, 49, 53–55, 61, 391, 427 sciences 10, 11, 16, 73–79, 85, 105, 111, 117, 205, 209, 235, 237, 261, 261, 271, 359, 373, 375, 439, 447, 455 – mathematical 73–79, 85, 105, 111, 117, 447 scribe, scribal 7, 15, 25, 28–46, 50–56, 61, 149 script 25, 28, 32, 33, 50 secondary 10, 16, 18, 49, 129, 175, 209–227, 231, 239–243, 247, 253, 309 Seert 28 senses 215, 247, 379 Severus of Antioch 4–8, 18 Severus Sebokht 34 shape 127, 145, 147, 183, 263, 265, 311, 367–371, 381, 383, 389, 393, 405, 415, 461 – shapeless 267 signification 52, 123, 125, 135–155, 161, 179, 187, 211–215, 223, 247, 261, 279, 303, 317, 335, 345, 383, 403, 409, 417, 429, 431, 449 Simplicius 5, 20, 119, 121, 159, 245, 271, 295, 329 simultaneous 10, 30, 253, 345–353, 435–437, 443, 465 Sirius 157 size 151, 211, 217, 265, 267, 277, 279, 287, 291, 309, 311, 395, 415 Socrates 16, 123, 137, 139, 149, 169, 189, 209, 217, 221, 223, 241, 243, 249–255, 259, 355, 359, 409, 413, 417, 429, 431, 443, 453, 465 sophists 117, 161, 333, 443, 449 soul 48, 71–73, 79, 101, 121, 137, 273, 367, 369, 373, 381, 401 – parts of 71 – powers of 48, 73 – rational 71, 137 space 52, 265, 281, 287, 289, 293, 321, 399 Sparta 375 species 10, 51, 127–133, 139–145, 163, 181, 183, 197–205, 209–225, 231–247, 257–261, 271, 273, 307, 329, 339, 377–405, 409, 413–423, 429– 437, 451, 453, 455 – being as species in a genus 181, 183, 257 – division as a genus into species 211–213, 259, 455 – lower 199, 203

– most specific 143, 163

speech 10, 49, 91, 103, 133, 137, 139, 143, 163, 195, 237, 239, 345, 365, 417, 421, 441, 451, 463 – kinds of 10, 49, 137–139, 163, 451 – ordered 91, 93, 103, 417 sphere, heavenly 291, 297, 321 star 157 statement 109, 113, 139, 155, 163, 255, 299, 417, 421, 429, 451 – aggregated 109, 113 Stoic, the Stoics 87–93, 101, 303, 369 – division of philosophy 87 – division of quantity 303 – notion of logic 87–93 – on qualities 369 substance 9, 10, 14, 17, 22, 28, 49, 52, 129, 141–153, 163–185, 189, 197–267, 307, 313, 321, 325, 339–345, 351–357, 371, 389, 395–401, 409– 415, 437, 441, 453, 463 – definition of 10, 225–229, 255, 307 – division of 199, 211–215, 227, 307, 453 – does not admit of more and less 249–253, 261, 325 – has no contrary 247–249, 261 – is a most generic genus 141, 143, 163, 227 – is receptive of contraries 253–255, 261, 321, 389 – is sufficient for its own subsistence 143, 239, 261 – its relation to nine other categories 209, 267– 269, 397–401 – parts of 245–247, 325, 353–357, 413 – primary and secondary 10, 209, 211–225, 239– 247 – properties of 229, 239–255 – shares its name and definition 243–245, 261 – signifies a particular this 247, 261 – simple and composite 205–209, 215, 259 – universal and particular 169–173, 215 subtitle (rubric) 17, 28, 31, 35–37, 54, 61, 81, 121, 137, 139, 205, 231, 431, 435 surface 10, 203, 271, 275–279, 289, 291, 303–305, 313, 315, 323–327, 375, 457 – as a continuous quantity 271, 275–279, 289, 291, 303, 305, 327, 457 – having length and breadth 203, 277, 279, 291 – inner and outer 289, 291 – of a container 289, 291 syllogism, syllogistic 109–117, 161, 449 synonymy 9, 10, 147, 153, 157, 159, 165, 243, 273, 335, 361, 451, 459

Syriac 3–25, 28–30, 37, 45, 50, 51, 56–57, 63, 139, 147, 211, 215, 247, 249, 253, 267, 289, 297, 309, 329, 339, 363, 371, 375, 381, 387, 391, 417, 433 – Aristotelianism 7, 8, 16–24, 34, 37, 45 – attitudes towards Greek culture 16 – East Syriac 12, 14, 28, 32, 33, 50 – logical lexicon 18–24, 51, 52, 249, 309, 329, 363 – philosophical tradition 3, 7, 8, 13, 15–24, 52 – schools 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 34, 50 – West Syriac 8, 18, 25, 46, 391 Thales 347 Theodore of Mopsuestia 19 theology 14, 17, 18, 48, 73, 205, 267 theory (part of philosophy) 48, 71–81, 85–93, 105– 117, 447 – Aristotle's writings on 85 – division of 73–81, 447 Thucydides 375 time 139, 147, 149, 179, 181, 195, 203, 257, 271, 275, 279, 281, 293–305, 311–315, 323–327, 349– 353, 365, 375, 399, 403, 431–437, 441, 443, 453, 457, 463, 465 – Aristotle's notion of 279, 293, 295 – as a continuous quantity 203, 271, 275, 293– 305, 457 – as movement of the heavenly sphere 297 – being in 179, 181, 257, 365, 453 – its relation to motion 295–301 – past, present, and future 139, 295–299, 403


– whether it exists 295–297 Timothy I 12 translation 3, 8, 16, 18–24, 37, 45, 63, 175, 215, 247, 249, 253, 267, 339, 371, 375, 387, 391, 417, 433 – Greek into Arabic 3 – Greek into Syriac 3, 16, 19–24, 63, 375 Trinity 17 Trojan War 181 universal 10, 22, 81, 83, 105, 107, 125, 139–153, 163, 167–173, 177, 193, 197–205, 209, 215, 219, 241–247, 353, 355, 447 universe 67, 129, 173, 177, 437 virtue 251, 357, 359, 369, 387–393, 423–427 void 293 weight 303 when (category) 149, 151, 165, 399, 403 where (category) 149, 151, 165, 399, 403 word 103, 111–127, 135–161, 211–215, 255, 259, 271, 273, 275, 279, 363, 365, 421, 429, 431, 443, 449, 455, 465 – ambiguous 211–215, 259, 455 – combination of 103, 115, 429, 431 – division of 125 – obscure 119–121 – simple 111–117, 123–127, 135, 143, 161, 421, 439, 449

Zacharias of Mytilene (Rhetor) 4–7, 52 Zeno of Elea 287, 289

#### **Index of Greek Words**

ἀθλητής 375, 387 αἴσθησις 23, 339 Ἀναλυτικά 117 ἀνδριάς 65, 183 ἀντικεῖσθαι 247, 341, 417 Ἀποδεικτικά 117 ἄρα 297 ἁρμονία 197 ἀρχίατρος 4 ἄρχων 433 ἄρωμα 191 ἀστρονομία 75 ἄτομος 201 αὐτοπρόσωπα 85 ἀψίνθιον 145 γενικώτατος 143 γένος 127 διάθεσις 23, 339, 371 διαίρεσις 365 διαλεκτικά 85 δύναμις 283, 375 εἰδικώτατος 143 εἶδος 51, 127–133, 137, 139, 173, 181, 183, 207, 269, 285, 391 εἰκών 129, 269, 285 ἐναντίος 247, 319, 341, 417 ἔνυλος 207 ἕξις 23, 339, 371, 419 ζήτημα 81, 187, 281, 361 θεολογία 205 θέσις 23, 339 θεωρία 71, 85, 151 ἴδιον 229 ἰδιώτης 401 πλανητός 297 Ἰλλυριοί 47 κάδος 291 καλῶς 215, 217 κανών 111, 135, 207, 229, 307, 385, 387 κατηγορία 315, 329, 371, 397, 439 κέντημα 275 κεφάλαιον 47, 48, 87, 103, 107, 161 κηρός 129

κιθάρα 197 κίνησις 293, 409, 437 κύκνος 47, 381 κυρίως 18 λογικός 85 λόγος 155, 273, 275, 325 μετὰ τὰ φυσικά 85 μοναχός 173 μορφή 23 ὁμοειδής 157 ὁμώνυμος 211 ὄργανον 85, 87, 107 οὐσία 141 παρωνύμως 24, 387 Περὶ ἑρμηνείας 115 ποιότης 18, 20, 147, 363, 371, 379, 385 προλεγόμενα 7, 337 προοίμιον 433 πρός τι 147, 329 πρόσωπον 47, 83 ῥητορικός 117 σημεῖον 275, 277 σκοπός 67 Σοφιστικοὶ Ἔλεγχοι 117 στοιχεῖον 173, 265, 365, 397, 437 συλλογισμός 109 συμβεβηκός 18 συνταγματικός 85 σφαῖρα 291, 367 σχῆμα 23, 127, 145, 173, 185, 237, 263, 269, 311, 367, 381, 389, 393 σχόλιον 443 τάξις 47, 65, 67, 81, 215, 225, 229, 329, 431, 433 τετράγωνος 391 Τοπικά 117 τρίγωνος 389 τύπος 173, 175, 387, 395 ὕλη 173, 183, 285 ὑλικός 173 ὑπόμνημα 327 φορά 281 φωνή 143

#### **References**







17.14–15 99





#### **Syriac Manuscripts**

Baghdad, Chaldean Patriarchate, Syr. 223 34–35 Berlin, Petermann I. 9 (Sachau 88) 15, 34, 50–53, 61

Birmingham, Mingana, Syr. 606 15, 33, 40–41 Cambridge, Gg 2. 14 30

Erbil-Ankawa, O.A.O.C., Syr. 169 32–46, 54–55, 61

Erbil-Ankawa, O.A.O.C., Syr. 170 32–46, 54–55, 61

Erbil-Ankawa, O.A.O.C., Syr. 171 32–46, 54–55, 61

London, BL Add. 12155 12, 14, 17, 27, 46–50, 53– 55, 61 London, BL Add. 14658 12–15, 20, 21, 25–28, 35, 46, 53–55, 61 London, BL Add. 14660 12 Paris, BnF, Syr. 354 28–31, 44, 52–56, 61

Vatican, Syr. 158 34