Dynamics of Social Change and Perceptions of Threat

Herausgegeben von
Ewald Frie, Thomas Kohl,
and Mischa Meier

Bedrohte Ordnungen

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Ewald Frie, Thomas Kohl
and Mischa Meier

Mohr Siebeck

Ewald Erie, born 1962, is Professor of Modern History at the University of Tübingen.

Thomas Kohl, born 1978, is Acting Professor of Medieval History at the University of Tübingen.

Mischa Meier, born 1971, is Professor of Ancient History at the University of Tübingen.

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Vorwort zur Reihe „Bedrohte Ordnungen“

Was geschieht in Gesellschaften, wenn Handlungsoptionen unsicher werden, Verhaltenserwartungen und Routinen in Frage stehen, wenn Akteure das Gefühl gewinnen, sich jetzt oder in naher Zukunft wahrscheinlich nicht mehr aufeinander verlassen zu können, wenn sie von Bedrohung reden, Gründe dafür suchen und sie meistens auch finden? Zeit ist ein knappes Gut. Emotionen treten stärker in den Vordergrund und verändern sich. Grenzen sozialer Gruppen werden fraglich. „Bedrohte Ordnungen“ tragen ein hohes Potential für schnellen sozialen Wandel in sich, das aber nicht immer wirksam werden muss.

„Bedrohte Ordnungen“ können aus Katastrophen hervorgehen. Sie können die Folge plötzlicher gesellschaftsinterner Konflikte sein. Sie können aus latenten Spannungen hervorbrechen oder die Folge einer Konkurrenz von Ordnungen sein. Verschiedene Forschungstraditionen fließen damit in Untersuchungen ein, die nicht von klassifikatorischen Begriffen wie „Aufruhr“, „Revolution“ oder „Naturkatastrophe“ ausgehen, sondern dynamische gesellschaftliche Prozesse ins Zentrum stellen, die mit der Wahrnehmung und Behauptung von Bedrohung und dem Rekurs auf Ordnung zusammenhängen.

„Bedrohte Ordnungen“ gibt es in allen Epochen der Historie und in allen Kulturen der Welt. Wirken über Zeiten und Räume hinweg ähnliche Mechanismen? Lassen sich Unterschiede typologisieren? Die Reihe „Bedrohte Ordnungen“ lädt Geschichts-, Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaftler ein, zu diesen Fragen Beiträge zu liefern. Sie ist dem DFG-geförderten Sonderforschungsbereich 923 „Bedrohte Ordnungen“ verbunden, möchte aber auch über ihn hinaus Forschungen anstoßen und dokumentieren.

Die Reihenherausgeber

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Dynamics of Social Change and Perceptions of Threat

An Introduction

Ewald Frie, Thomas Kohl and Mischa Meier

This book is about a very simple question: Why do things change at certain times and not at others? The articles assembled here approach this question from the perspective of threat. Self-alerting from within societies and social groups – that is how we define threat – opens up windows of opportunities for change (though not always the changes hoped for by those who raised the alarm in the first place). Once threatened, social orders that were previously taken for granted become visible, debatable, and therefore changeable. 'Threatened orders' thus consist of a cluster of events that have the potential to accelerate, divert, stop or reverse social change; in a nutshell: to influence the trajectory of change or to "change" change. By analyzing 'threatened orders', we hope to revive the debate about social change and offer new perspectives on the nature of classical historical events such as 'revolutions' and 'disasters'. In this very short introduction, we will explore the analytical potential of 'threatened orders' a bit further.

Social Change

Social change, defined as "significant alterations of social structure"[1], is a very broad concept. No single theory of social change exists because this would be tantamount to an all-encompassing theory of society itself.[2] Some impressive approaches to social change as a subject of inquiry were developed in the 1960s and 1970s based on ideas about modernization, development, transformation and evolution.[3] Yet these concepts have been criticized in myriad ways ever since they first appeared. Objections have been raised, for example, against (1) the implicit antagonism between stability and change and sometimes the implicit preference

[1] Wilbert E. Moore 1967, quoted by *Waltraud Schelkle / Wolf-Hagen Krauth*, Introduction. Paradigms Lost and Found, in: Waltraud Schelkle / Wolf-Hagen Krauth / Martin Kohli et al. (Eds.), Paradigms of Social Change. Modernization, Development, Transformation, Evolution, Frankfurt / Main / New York 2000, 11–30, here 14.

[2] Cf. *Günter Endruweit*, Wandel, sozialer, in: Id. / Gisela Trommsdorff (Eds.),Wörterbuch der Soziologie, Vol. 3, Stuttgart 1989, 798–805, here 803.

[3] Cf. *Schelkle / Krauth*, Introduction.

for stability over change; (2) the rather static conceptualization of society as subdivided into sectors (politics, economy, culture, etc.) with stable development trajectories within each of the sectors and desirable connections between them; (3) the implicit antagonism between tradition and modernity, and the lumping together of all sorts of societies under the label 'traditional', whereas modernity is more or less defined by a western paradigm; (4) the preference for pointing to socioeconomic structures as the backbone of societies, effectively relegating factors such as politics and culture to being derivatives thereof.

After decades of criticism, this idea of 'social change' is still very much alive, but it seems to have lost its conceptual framework. Many publications employ 'social change' to indicate an interest in significant alterations in the social sphere, but they do not seem to believe in its explanatory – let alone analytical – power. Social change is everywhere: in Indian cinema[4], in Reform-Era China[5], and in social relations in late Antiquity[6] or early modern England.[7] But it means different things in different fields and to different scholars. Social change, Hans-Peter Müller and Michael Schmid have stated somewhat ironically, "still exists in society, but hardly in sociology".[8]

The ways in which social change is commonly used as a signifier attest to its versatility in space and time. Not only can it indicate shifts in cultural patterns or social structures on a macro-level, but also it can refer to changes in institutions and organizations on a meso-level. Likewise, it can describe micro-variations in biographies, social settings and situation-to-situation sequences. Despite what theories of modernization or evolution would suggest, social change does not necessarily imply an ongoing and stable process; rather, it is marked by accelerations and discontinuities as well as by aberrations and new beginnings. In order to develop a theoretical framework based on such observations, we need to address some key questions: Although change seems to happen all the time, how and why does change accelerate or stop? How is it transported across levels, sectors and spaces? What makes change change? It seems rather unlikely that the ideas about social change developed in the 1960s and 1970s with their notions

[4] *Rukmini Kakot*, Interrogating Social Change – The Cinematic Representation of Hybrid Identity Formations, in: N. William Singh Malsawmdawngliana / Saichampuii Sailo (Eds.), Becoming Something Else. Society and Change in India's North East, Cambridge 2015, 81–94.

[5] *Cao Tianyu* (Ed.), Culture and Social Transformations. Theoretical Framework and Chinese Context, Leiden / Boston 2014.

[6] *Allen E. Jones*, Social Mobility in Late Antique Gaul. Strategies and Opportunities for the Non-Elite, Cambridge 2009; *Alexande Skinner*, Political Mobility in the Later Roman Empire, in: Past & Present 218, 2013, 17–53.

[7] *Steve Hindle / Alexandra Shepard / John Walter* (Eds.), Remaking English Society. Social Relations and Social Change in Early Modern England, Woodbridge 2013.

[8] *Hans-Peter Müller / Michael Schmid*, Paradigm lost? Von der Theorie sozialen Wandels zur Theorie dynamischer Systeme, in: Id. (Eds.), Sozialer Wandel. Modellbildung und theoretische Ansätze, Frankfurt / Main 1995, 9–55, here 26. *Benjamin Steiner*, Nebenfolgen in der Geschichte. Eine historische Soziologie reflexiver Modernisierung, Berlin / Boston 2015.

of modernization, development, transformation and evolution can explain the versatility inherent within social change that is only just hinted at by posing these questions.

Events

Perhaps the best way to get at an answer to these questions is to look at events. Events are compressed happenings. A lot is done, lived through, observed and narrated in a short period of time in a compact space.[9] Events, however, are not fixed and unchangeable phenomena because they are subject to interpretation and can therefore change accordingly. In negotiating the meaning of an event, actors discuss the ordinary and the extraordinary alongside the old and the new. Drawing on their fears and fantasies, they try to make sense of what is happening according to their existing ways of understanding the world, and they evaluate the potential for change. As part of this process of coming to terms with the meaning of events, actors bridge gaps between levels, sectors and spaces. They can then use these interpretations to legitimize or criticize new kinds of change that might have been sparked by a particular event.

Contemporaries and historians alike have singled out some events as having a special capacity for change, such as revolutions, disasters and crises. Interestingly, however, the conceptualization of these terms has suffered a fate similar to that of social change. Revolutions, for example, were a popular research topic in the 1970s thanks to the path-breaking works of Theda Skocpol[10] and Charles Tilly.[11] But what Skocpol once sharply defined as "rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures; […] accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below" has become a more elastic concept. We no longer think about 'state and class structures' as *the* fundamental basis of societies, for example. Likewise, revolts are no longer seen as necessarily 'class-based', nor do we cite rapidity and radicalism as essential features of revolutions.[12]

Just like 'social change', the term 'revolution' has been used in manifold, often metaphorical ways over the last few decades. Several authors have re-conceptualized the idea of revolution in an attempt to regain clarity and consensus. Yet

[9] Cf. *Rudolf Schlögl*, Kommunikation und Vergesellschaftung unter Anwesenden. Formen des Sozialen und ihre Transformation in der Frühen Neuzeit, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 34, 2008, 155–224, at 199.

[10] Cf. *Theda Skocpol*, States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China, Cambridge 1979.

[11] Cf. *Charles Tilly*, From Mobilization to Revolution, Reading 1978; Id., European Revolutions 1492–1992, Oxford 1993.

[12] *Arne Hordt / Thomas Kohl / Beatrice von Lüpke et al.*, Aufruhr! Zur epochenübergreifenden Beschreibung beschleunigten sozialen Wandels in Krisenzeiten, in: Historische Zeitschrift 301, 2015, 31–62.

others like Arne Hordt et al. propose moving away from this term altogether, especially since it is an essentially European concept that is tightly bound up with modernity. They prefer the term 'riot' because it can be used to analyze premodern and modern as well as non-European and European events alike.[13] Not only do they claim that 'riot' is a more encompassing term, but also that it has a more coherent and concrete definition. From a different perspective, Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein have suggested that revolutions should no longer be defined according to certain social, economic, political and cultural processes and features. Revolutions, they say, are better understood as scripts: "Revolutions are produced by, and in turn produce, scripts". They note that "Revolutionary scripts offer frameworks for political action. Whether they serve as models or counterexamples, they provide the outlines on which revolutionary actors can improvise. And revolutionaries, in turn, can transform the scripts they inherit." Scripts are "action frames", Baker and Edelstein contend, "providing a repertory of situations, subject positions, political options, historical narratives, and social logics invoked and enacted, adapted and extended".[14]

The terms 'disaster' and 'crisis' have fared no better. Intensely debated from the 1970s (crises) and the 1990s (disasters), respectively, these terms have also lost their contours and clarity.[15] The proposal voiced by Hordt and his colleagues to replace a modern term with a more encompassing one has also been discussed with respect to 'crisis', but it seems to be more open to redefinition, despite the fact that it has historically been a modern and Western term.[16] This solution, however, leaves us with the daunting task of trying to find alternatives for those concepts that are inherently biased. The Baker/Edelstein notion of 'scripts', for example, can work for 'disasters' and 'crises'. If people label an event a 'crisis' or a 'disaster', some actions, reactions, ideas and statements are more adequate than others. The difference is not (or at least it does not have to be) in the event itself, but rather it depends on the frame in which it is embedded. The events themselves – whether they are called a revolution, crisis or disaster – have some characteristic features in common: time compression and a search for quick remedies; the mobilization of people and resources; emotional reconfiguration;

[13] *Hordt/Kohl/von Lüpke*, Aufruhr, 31–62.

[14] *Keith Michael Baker/Dan Edelstein*, Introduction, in: Id. (Eds.), Scripting Revolution. A Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revolutions, Stanford 2015, 1–24, here 21, 2 and 4.

[15] *Ewald Frie/Mischa Meier*, Bedrohte Ordnungen. Gesellschaften unter Stress im Vergleich, in: Id. (Eds.), Aufruhr – Katastrophe – Konkurrenz – Zerfall. Bedrohte Ordnungen als Thema der Kulturwissenschaften, Tübingen 2014, 1–27, see 7–16; *Ewald Frie*, Bedrohte Ordnungen zwischen Vormoderne und Moderne. Überlegungen zu einem Forschungsprojekt, in: Klaus Ridder/Steffen Patzold (Eds.), Die Aktualität der Vormoderne. Epochenentwürfe zwischen Alterität und Kontinuität, Berlin 2013, 99–109.

[16] *Thomas Mergel*, Einleitung. Krisen als Wahrnehmungsphänomene, in: Id. (Ed.), Krisen verstehen. Historische und kulturwissenschaftliche Annäherungen, Frankfurt/Main 2012, 9–22.

processes of social inclusion and exclusion; and debates about the self, the community and the others. Of course, such framing is not entirely arbitrary, although most 'revolutions' have been called 'disasters' by some counter-revolutionaries, and calling a 'crisis' a 'revolution' forces contemporaries to take sides.[17]

Our approach to 'threatened order and social change' begins with the characteristic features that events have once they develop the potential to change change. By finding this new common ground, we are taking up with what Elizabeth Clemens has recently called "the most striking shift" in historical sociology "from the imagery of systems and crises, which highlighted revolution and state-building, to multidimensional understandings of emergence and destabilization". History is about "a continual process of ordering and reordering, of structuration … This theoretical orientation problematize[s] not only change but also reproduction or durability."[18] The challenge is "to explain how social orders form, change, proliferate, and decline". We try to "identify those categories of cases or classes of episodes that capture the intrinsically historical dimensions of social change and reproduction". We find these episodes in events that have been labeled revolutions, riots, crises, disasters and the like, but our focus is on their common features. And this is why we call them 'threatened orders'.

Threatened Orders

'Threatened orders' appear when actors are no longer certain that they can still rely on existing expectations. Normally, knowledge about structures, behavioral expectations, routines and trust allow participants to predict the way situations should evolve and actions should unfold. Threats change these constellations. Unsettled by self-alerts coming from within these orders, actors begin to expect that their options will become unclear and the applicability of their routines will be called into question; they also begin to doubt the reliability of those with whom they interact. In order to deal with this uncertainty, they establish modes of communication in which more general forms of insecurity are linked to sources of threat that can be identified concretely. This communication is infused with strong emotions, and its messages tend to cast a shadow over other topics because of the pressing urgency of the time factor. Emotional changes, temporal compression and communicative hegemony result in new ways of evaluating and describing situations. In turn, this makes room for new possibilities. 'Threatened orders' are moments in which the historical process becomes more malleable

[17] *Neithard Bulst / Jörg Fisch / Reinhart Koselleck / Christian Meier*, Art. 'Revolution. Rebellion, Aufruhr, Bürgerkrieg', in: Otto Brunner / Werner Conze / Reinhart Koselleck (Eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe Vol. 5, Stuttgart 1984, 653–788, at 749.

[18] *Elisabeth S. Clemens*, Towards a Historicized Sociology. Theorizing Events, Processes, and Emergence, in: Annual Review of Sociology 33, 2007, 527–549, here 529 and 532.

and new actors appear; new ideas gain importance, and it becomes possible to 'write' new scripts.[19]

'Threatened orders' not only spur threat communication, but also specific kinds of threat action. Disquieted by self-alerting within existing orders, people act in new ways in the face of great pressure and emotional changes. Those unsettled by all of this form new "communication communities"[20] as well as communities of action. They rely more heavily on people and concepts that they still trust as opposed to rules and rituals that appear to be breaking down. Feeling threatened, "participants of social situations predominantly attend to one another's position, status, membership, reputation and social capital. In responding to disruptiveness, people coordinate activities and expectations in a largely relational manner. This implies a relative neglect of, and comparative inattention to, cognitive and normative expectations and respective forms of coordination, and therefore to information, competence and cultural capital, as well as a relative neglect of norms, customs and morality".[21] At least initially, it seems that the trust in orders is replaced by a trust in people. On the basis of these personal relationships, specific forms of threat communication and threat action can lead to re-ordering, which then produces orders that can once again be perceived as reliable by the actors involved.

We have developed a model that seeks to describe this re-ordering process that occurs within 'threatened orders'.[22] Re-ordering, we posit, can be understood as the interplay of threat diagnoses, the measures taken to overcome threat, mobilization and reflection. Threat diagnoses open the door for 're-ordering' as actors identify (supposed) threats and ask themselves a fundamental question: Who or what threatens us? The answers to these questions, which are part of an increasingly hegemonic threat communication[23], draw on experiences and lump them together with what is currently experienced as threatening. In turn, this produces scenarios about the near future that then demand action. Usually, several threat diagnoses compete with each other, resulting in conflicts over which one is the 'right' one. These disagreements play out quickly and intensively because all of

[19] See *Ewald Frie / Boris Nieswand*, "Bedrohte Ordnungen" als Thema der Kulturwissenschaften. Zwölf Thesen zur Begründung eines Forschungsbereichs, in: Journal of Modern European History 15, 2017, 5–15.

[20] *Hansjörg Siegenthaler*, Regelvertrauen, Prosperität und Krisen. Konjunkturgeschichte als Gegenstand der Wirtschafts- und Mentalitätsgeschichte, in: Thomas David (Ed.), Krisen. Ursachen, Deutungen und Folgen, (Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte 27), Zürich 2012, 31–44, here 39.

[21] *Hendrik Vollmer*, The Sociology of Disruption, Disaster and Social Change. Punctuated Cooperation, Cambridge 2013, 204.

[22] See *Frie / Nieswand*, Bedrohte Ordnungen.

[23] *Fabian Fechner / Tanja Granzow / Jacek Klimek* et al., 'We are Gambling with our survival.' Bedrohungskommunikation als Indikator für bedrohte Ordnungen, in: Ewald Frie / Mischa Meier (Eds.), Aufruhr – Katastrophe – Konkurrenz – Zerfall. Bedrohte Ordnungen als Thema der Kulturwissenschaften, Tübingen 2014, 141–173.

the actors in 'threatened orders' agree that time is of the essence and immediate action is necessary. Power in its various forms also plays a role, yet the acceptance of a diagnosis is not just about power. Because the matter at hand is an existential one, much consideration is also given to factors such as tradition, knowledge and trust, not to mention the evidence collected through different techniques of observation, description and classification.

Threat diagnoses demand action in the form of some kind of praxis. Actors ask themselves: What should or can we do in order to fight off the threat? Given the lack of time, however, action has to be taken without having collected sufficient information beforehand. This action then takes place within a social space populated by emotionalized people, living beings, machines and things of all kinds that is structured by technologies and knowledge that are not available to all actors. It is therefore not very surprising that the success of a given practice does not usually live up to the expectations of the threat diagnosticians. Such failures then change these diagnoses, which in turn leads to a new, but not necessarily more successful, praxis, which then demands new diagnoses, and the process keeps going. There is a constant interplay of diagnosis and praxis. Normally, however, a threat does not come to an end through the decisive success of a practice that completely overcomes the threat; rather, it is often the case that the intensity of this interplay between diagnosis and practice gradually fades. Indeed, as Siegenthaler has pointed out, it is quite possible that the solution to the problem is a non-intended consequence of individual or collection action undertaken by actors who were not really aware of the situation themselves.[24]

The outcome of this interplay between diagnosis and praxis is heavily dependent on two ancillary processes: the mobilization of people and resources, and the reflection about an order and its actors or participants that are supposed to be protected against a threat or changed by it. People and resources are drawn into a threat situation through mobilization. Actors find themselves facing the question of how to activate the support necessary to defer a threat and where to find the resources to do so. Mobilization, like threat diagnosis, is bound up within questions of power. Sometimes power can rest on physical violence and force. Yet it can also come from other sources of authority – whether it be of a charismatic, traditional or legal nature – that bestow the power to define and encourage abstaining from the use of violence and force.

Reflection, on the other hand, refers to the conscious act of thinking about the order that has been identified as being under threat. People ask themselves: Who or what are we in the face of this threat? In the moment of threat, people can become more conscious of elements of an order that otherwise lurk in the background, behind the backs of actors where they can exert influence but escape reflection. They become more conscious of themselves as embedded within an

[24] *Siegenthaler*, Regelvertrauen, 38.

order, which in turn opens their eyes to possibilities for change that previously went unseen. At the same time, however, some elements continue to remain hidden. Consequently, reflection can lead to changed threat diagnoses and praxes that do not necessarily function better than those that were chosen in the first place.

Threatened Orders and Social Change

Based on what we have outlined so far, the simple question posed in this book – why do things change at certain times and not at others? – needs to be answered by looking at the condensed webs of correlations surrounding events. According to pre-existing scripts, events with the potential to change change are classified as revolutions, disasters, crises and the like, all of which share common features as 'threatened orders'. Actors in these situations, having been alerted from within societies or social groups, engage in re-ordering in an effort to right what seems to be out of joint. By understanding and communicating events, they give meaning to local and situational settings while connecting the micro-, meso- and macro-levels. This is one reason why micro-evidence is of high value to scholars investigating threatened orders and social change.[25] Events compress and condense the ongoing process of change, which entails the ordering and re-ordering of the world around us in social, discursive and material terms.[26] Not only that, but they also have the potential to divert or redirect the trajectory of change.

Given that the experience of threat as well as the clustering of happenings into events is something common to all humans, 'threatened orders' can be detected and analyzed in all human societies. What differs between societies are the conditions under which self-altering and re-ordering unfold. This means that the concept of 'threatened orders' can be used to make comparisons that stretch across the usual temporal borders between the pre-modern and modern world as well as the spatial borders between Western and non-Western societies. Such an analysis also allows for a discourse on the similarities and differences in changing change that crosses the lines that are typically drawn between academic disciplines and historical periods.

This book is divided into five sections that look at this relationship between 'threatened orders' and social change. Each of them has a thematic, spatial and

[25] *Hendrik Vollmer*, The Sociology of Disruption, Disaster and Social Change. Punctuated Cooperation, Cambridge 2013, 236; *Andreas Ziemann*, Soziologische Strukturlogiken der Situation, in: Id. (Ed.), Offene Ordnung? Philosophie und Soziologie der Situation, Wiesbaden 2013, 105–129.

[26] *Stefan Beck/Michi Knecht*, Jenseits des Dualismus von Wandel und Persistenz? Krisenbegriffe der Sozial- und Kulturanthropologie, in: Thomas Mergel (Ed.), Krisen verstehen. Historische und kulturwissenschaftliche Annäherungen, Frankfurt/Main 2012, 59–81, here 72–73.

temporal focus. Although they vary according to the authors, the introductions to each section highlight the correlations between the individual texts. Taken together, these chapters thus allow for a comparison across the times and places that are covered in different sections. Using current events, the first section examines the way in which group mobilization or the formation of groups as a type of threat response is shaped by collective action frames that are specific to a given order and are therefore difficult to transfer across space and time. By looking at riots in medieval European cities, the second section explores the complex nexus between seemingly spontaneous riots, power issues, rivaling interpretations of social order and processes of social change. The third section deals with systems of belief in Ancient Europe that seem to have been permanent and inalterable in that they gave meaning to ever-changing events and circumstances. Yet, as this section shows, this symbolic order was certainly not left untouched by social changes. The fourth section delves deep into European and Australian disasters of the nineteenth and nineteenth centuries to better differentiate forces of continuity and change in the wake of these dramatic events. And, finally, the last section concentrates on the period around 1800 in Europe in order to investigate how changing concepts of the future enabled actors to overcome threats.

The goal of this volume is to foster and stimulate comparisons across the different sections. It seeks to use 'threatened orders' as a key to unlock the door to an interdisciplinary discussion that escapes the confines of historical periodization.

I. Framing Situations of Social Change and Threat in Contemporary Society

Introduction: Taking the Cultural Contexts of Group Mobilization Seriously

Andreas Hasenclever

Collective action presupposes group mobilization. Before people join forces to defend or transform a threatened order, they have to develop a shared understanding both of the threat's nature and the most appropriate coping strategies. Moreover, they need to overcome considerable obstacles to collective action, which usually presupposes robust burden-sharing formulas and strong social bonds. Otherwise, a group will disintegrate and members will look for individual solutions, which are suboptimal if compared to collective responses. In the social sciences in general and in conflict research in particular, however, these cognitive and cultural prerequisites of common threat management tend to be sidelined.[1] The focus is on material opportunity structures and the availability of collective action resources such as movements, armies or whole societies. External as well as internal threats are treated as common knowledge and the selection of coping strategies often follows either a logic of consequences or a logic of appropriateness – or a combination of both.[2] For the sake of parsimonious explanatory models, the way individuals and groups perceive a threat, how these perceptions are processed within specific cultural contexts, how individuals are convinced to cooperate with one another and how they sustain common threat management despite the involved hardships is pushed into the background. Or as Bert Klandermans puts it: "Basic questions remain unanswered, questions such as how consensus is formed, how individuals come to feel, think, and act in concert; why and how some grievances turn into claims, while others do not; why and how some identities politicize while others do not."[3]

As outlined by Jan Sändig in his chapter on non-violent protests in Nigeria, framing analysis as developed in social movement research might provide

[1] *Tanja Granzow/Andreas Hasenclever/Jan Sändig*, Introduction. Framing Political Violence – A Micro-Approach to Civil War Studies, in: Civil War 17, 2, 2015, 113–119; *Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín/Elisabeth J. Wood*, Ideology in Civil War. Instrumental Adoption and Beyond, in: Journal of Peace Research 51, 2, 2014, 13–22; *Anastasia Shesterinina*, Collective Threat Framing and Mobilization in Civil War, in: American Political Science Review 110, 3, 2016, 411–427.

[2] *James March/Johan P. Olsen*, Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics, London/New York 1989.

[3] *Bert Klandermans*, Motivations to Action, in: Donatella Della Porta/Mario Diani (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements, Oxford 2015, 219–230, here 222.

a helpful tool to address these shortcomings.[4] Framing is understood as a form of strategic communication to mobilize a constituency through *persuasive* "collective action frames", which can be defined as "action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization".[5] Such collective action frames comprise the identification of common grievances and the attribution of political responsibility for these grievances (diagnostic frame), the supply of promising solutions to address the identified problems (prognostic frame) and the articulation of strong reasons for individual and collective mobilization (motivational frame). Collective action frames are *persuasive* if they resonate with the target group, which means that they align sufficiently well with the group's predominant political attitudes, social beliefs and cultural orientations, that they are internally consistent and address peoples' main concerns, that the framers are credible and perhaps charismatic and that there is only weak counter-framing by oppositional actors. So understood, group mobilization in threatened orders crucially depends on a convincing "call to arms", which largely shapes the way individuals and groups react to a perceived challenge in a given structural environment. Or to put it differently, framing – and the agency it involves – mediates between structural conditions and actual group behavior. Collective action frames are connected to structural conditions, yet not determined by them. Instead, actors are assumed to possess agency in their strategic communication: based on their values and interests and in line with the perceived material as well as ideational conditions, framers "select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text".[6]

To demonstrate the explanatory power of framing analysis, Jan Sändig focuses on the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). MASSOB was formed in 1999 in Nigeria's Southeast, which must be classified as a high-risk region from the perspective of mainstream conflict research. On the one hand, the mostly Igbo population developed strong grievances against the corrupt and inefficient state apparatus. Absolute poverty has been widespread, unemployment high, economic growth minimal and hardly reaching the poorer strata of the population. Unsurprisingly, as indicated by public opinion polls, a strong majority of Igbos has been feeling abandoned by the central government and perceived independence as a viable solution to improve

[4] *Robert D. Benford / David A. Snow*, Framing Processes and Social Movements. An Overview and Assessment, in: Annual Review of Sociology 26, 3, 2000, 611–639; *Hank Johnston / Eitan Y. Alimi*, A Methodology Analyzing for Frame Dynamics. The Grammar of Keying Battles in Palestinian Nationalism, in: Mobilization. An International Journal 18, 4, 2013, 453–474; *David A. Snow*, Framing and Social Movements, in: Id. / Donatella Della Porta / Bert Klandermans / Doug McAdam (Eds.), The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, Malden, MA 2013, 470–475.

[5] *Benford / Snow*, Framing, 614.

[6] *Robert M. Entman*, Framing. Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, in: Journal of Communication 43, 4, 1993, 51–58, here 52.

their living conditions. On the other hand, armed rebellion would have been clearly feasible. As documented by the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast, the O'odua People's Congress in the Southwest and the Niger Delta militants in the coast region Nigerian state authorities generally lack both the willingness and the ability to prevent the formation of armed groups. Consequently, it would have come as no surprise if MASSOB had turned into just another armed movement that challenges state authorities in conflict-ridden Nigeria. However, it did not.

According to Jan Sändig, the miracle of a strong but unarmed independence movement in Nigeria's Southeast with millions of sympathizers and supporters clearly shows that even highly virulent structures as such do not determine how political conflicts are managed. In fact, the MASSOB leadership consistently opted for non-violent mass protests and was able to prevent its constituency from turning violent even when confronted with harsh state repression. Countering occasional calls for armed rebellion by some Biafran fringe leaders, the MASSOB leadership succeeded in convincing the rank and file that non-violent mass protests were the only appropriate means to realize independence and that patience in the face of state violence would win the movement international recognition and support. As carefully researched by Jan Sändig, the call to non-violent protests strongly resonated with the Igbo population for several reasons: It mobilized the traumata of the Biafra War (1967–70) to strengthen the credibility of non-violent protest strategies; it aligned with a number of successful non-violent protests such as the Indian independence movement, the American civil rights movement or the more recent South African anti-apartheid movement; it successfully communicated the idea that the international community would be alienated by an armed independence movement; and it appealed to the very strong reputation of the movement leader Ralph Uwazuruike as a skillful and ethical political figure.

While the contribution of Jan Sändig elaborates on the agency of frame makers despite countervailing structural conditions, the paper of Holger Stritzel focuses on the irreducible logic of cultural contexts in processes of frame diffusion. For this purpose, he looked at how the concept of "organized crime" was developed in the United States and how the United States promoted this concept internationally with the clear intention to blueprint a global alliance in the so-called "War on Drugs". In this process, the original meaning of the concept was constantly re-interpreted, adapted and transformed to make it work in new locations and according to different political rationalities. To trace and analyze these transformations, Holger Stritzel adopts securitization theory. This analytical perspective was originally developed by the so-called Copenhagen School in International Relations to provide for a de-materialized and discursive understanding of security.[7] In a nutshell, security is not an objective condition but depends on

[7] *Barry Buzan / Ole Wæver / Jaap de Wilde*, Security. A New Framework for Analysis, London 1998; *Lynne Rienner / Thomas Diez / Franziskus von Lucke / Zehra Wellmann*, The Securitisation of

successful securitization moves by authoritative speakers such as governments or parliaments and also recognized civil society actors such as well-known media representatives or religious leaders. Securitization moves are considered successful if they permit the implementation of extraordinary measures in reaction to a perceived and widely shared existential threat. The nature of this threat might vary, e. g. ranging from a pending military attack by a foreign enemy to disastrous environmental changes or serious social threats arising from strong migration flows. In any case, securitization theory focuses on the process of how threats are talked into existence and how perceived threats transform the nature of the political game in particular national or international spaces.

According to Holger Stritzel the term "organized crime" emerged in US discourses at the beginning of the twentieth century and developed a stable operational meaning in the 1950s. The concept further solidified in several emergency acts during the 1960s and was eventually radicalized under Richard Nixon, who was the first to declare a "War on Drugs" in June 1971. Subsequent US administrations maintained the "War on Drugs" and persistently portrayed organized crime as an imminent national security threat. Consequently, anti-drug policies became militarized and the United States promoted international enforcement missions to destroy drug cultivation and production sites in foreign countries – mostly in Latin America. Additionally, the United States turned to international organizations such as the United Nations to coordinate and mainstream repressive national anti-drug policies on a global scale. In this context, however, "organized crime" as a concept developed a life of its own and regained a certain fluidity. As outlined by Holger Stritzel, "the concept was now confronted with several new local discourse traditions and distinct operational logic in these locations which were not always under the full control of the USA." Consequently, he shows how the American "War on Drugs" and the related initiatives to suppress organized crime worked out differently in Latin America and Europe. While the process of securitization of organized crime in Latin America was mostly externally driven by the United States, imposing hard sanctions to bring countries in line with its militarized anti-drug policies, most European countries aligned organized crime with political terrorism and developed corresponding security strategies to counter terrorism as a national security threat. In this process, organized crime as a concept became adapted to the specific bureaucratic standards and routines characteristic of policy-making within the EU.

Together, both papers substantially advance our understanding of group mobilization under conditions of threat and underscore the utility of the framing perspective. Jan Sändig shows that both the onset and the course of mobilization do not automatically follow from structural conditions but are crucially mediated

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Climate Change. Actors, Processes and Consequences, London 2016; *Holger Stritzel*, Security in Translation. Securitization Theory and the Localization of Threat, Basingstoke 2014.

by the way group leaders frame a conflict and how the constituency responds to this particular framing. Holger Stritzel's paper suggests that even powerful actors such as the USA are not in the position to externalize their securitization frames without these frames being reshaped and reconfigured by local contexts. To export a collective action frame means to translate it and translation necessarily comes with shifts in concept understandings and concept related social practices.

The Travelling Concept of Organized Crime as a Threat to Political and Social Orders

Holger Stritzel

Introduction

In the many years of its evolution, the concept of organized crime has shifted its meaning, functions and principal operational logic in political discourse multiple times from being an issue of little concern to being considered a key security threat facing states and societies worldwide. The process started with notions of mafia which first spread and became translated in the USA, where the term "organized crime" itself was created in discourses of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and from there to various other sites, the EU, UN, G7/G8 as well as further domestic settings, prominently in Europe and Latin America. Far from being a process driven by a single actor or a small group in relation to a single-valued referent object, organized crime was in this way continuously constituted and reconfigured through different operational logic, rationalities and senses of the rules of the game in different fields of action. What emerged in the 1990s and temporarily stabilized as an excessively broad and securitized notion of "transnational organized crime" in political discourse had in fact developed through these various previous encounters of pre-existing threat narratives with different operational logic in different locations at national, regional and global levels.

The tale of organized crime as a travelling concept thus illustrates that the evolution of collective interpretations of perceived threats which challenge and potentially transform existing social and political orders often transcends time and space: once established as a relatively stable interpretation in one location, typically, but not necessarily, initially at the national level, their further genesis will extend beyond the geographical locations and time periods of their initial invention. Accepted interpretations of threats thus have the potential to travel between locations, be they national, regional or global, and in this way encounter a great variety of different local discourses and operational logic in these locations on their way. Each encounter may then transform the initial interpretation and adapt it to the particularities of the new location, which may in turn inspire new, or reconfigure existing, operational logic in these locations as a result.

How, precisely, can one capture this process of emergence, spread and local transformation? What happens when the collective interpretation of a perceived

threat created and temporarily established in one location encounters a new one? How does the "foreign" meaning become incorporated and productively appropriated into the new location or not, and with what effects? And what are the driving forces of this process? Specifically, how can one make sense of the emergence, spread and the various localizations of the concept of organized crime in domestic and international settings? What happened when this collective interpretation initially created in the US location encountered the particularities of the new settings? How did it become productively appropriated, incorporated and/or transformed, and with what social and political effects? How has organized crime been securitized by, in particular, the USA? How has the USA then actively exported and/or other countries voluntarily incorporated this securitization? And what factors supported the temporary stabilization of international securitized cooperation with regards to organized crime?

It will be argued in this chapter that securitization theory offers the necessary tools for analytically capturing and understanding the historical process of emergence, spread and local transformations with regards to organized crime. To begin, the chapter will provide a brief introduction to the concept of organized crime and its process of transnational spread, followed by an overview of securitization theory. Next, section 2 will apply securitization theory to the action of the United States with regards to organized crime, demonstrating its construction as a "threat" which placed crime in the realm of national security legitimizing the use of extraordinary means. Section 3 will explore the active US exportation of the concept of organized crime in international cooperation and examine how many partnerships with external actors have taken a securitized form. Section 4 will conclude by asking whether there are indications of a "securitization fatigue" in recent years, which would coincide with the emergence of new norm entrepreneurs replacing the previous securitized approach to organized crime or specifically with regards to narcotics.

Understanding the Subject Matter and Theoretical Toolset

The Concept of Organized Crime

Origins of organized crime narratives are deeply interspersed with earlier notions of Mafia in Italian and US discourse. According to Henner Hess, the term "Mafia" itself first appeared in a document of 1658, a list of heretics, referring to the meanings "boldness", "ambition" and "arrogance", which subsequently turned into distinct social constructions of masculinity in Italian discourse that is today typically referred to in relation to the concept of "Sicilism" in Italy.[1] Both

[1] For this and the following see *Henner Hess*, Mafia and Mafiosi. The Structure of Power, Westmead 1973, 1–4.

references to the Arabic "*mahias*", meaning a bold man or braggart, and origins of the word that refer to the meanings "outstanding", "manly" or "handsome", as well as "*mahud*", meaning "rejected", strongly resonate with the perceived moral codes that are assumed to have evolved in Southern Italy at that time. They are marked by "a proud awareness of one's own personality, of independence in every respect, the ability to look after oneself and to defend one's own dignity at any price".[2] Grounded in these moral codes, according to this narrative, single criminals organized themselves in loosely structured groups and cliques, which cooperated occasionally or fought against other such groups.[3] In the course of the twentieth century these early images were then combined, and became partially replaced, by notions of Mafia as an almighty "parallel society", a quasi-state within the "normal" state that would challenge conventional forms of governance and power and would thus pose an imminent danger to the democratic state in its liberal existence.[4]

These narratives encountered US discourse in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century where they became merged with the invention of the term "organized crime" in the early twentieth century. While the exact phrase "organized crime" was presumably first used in the 1896 annual report of the *New York Society for the Prevention of Crime*, in those days organized crime had no stable meaning and could be understood only in context.[5] Since the 1920s the term then increasingly stabilized in US discourse and enabled a first wave of politicization and partial securitization specifically with the Kefauver Committee hearings onwards since the 1950s which subsequently led, under the proactive leadership of Robert Kennedy, to several emergency acts including the influential Racketeer Influenced and Corrupted Organizations (RICO) statute of

[2] Ibid., 9.

[3] Social anthropologists such as Henner Hess also use the term "*cosche*" or "*cosca*" to describe these loose associations of early Sicilian Mafiosi. This image of the Mafia as, essentially, Sicilism is famously represented in the Italian opera "Cavalleria Rusticana" by Pietro Mascagni in 1890, which was also prominently referred to in "The Godfather – Part III" by Francis Ford Coppola. In the central scene towards the end of the film, a Mafia killer launches an attack on Don Michael Corleone while he is watching his son performing the Turiddu in Cavalleria Rusticana in the Teatro Massimo in Palermo. However, these anthropological interpretations of the origins of Mafia narratives have recently been challenged by Mafia historians such as Salvatore Lupo (2002) or John Dickie (2008), especially in light of the Falcone investigations of the early 1990s (see *Salvatore Lupo,* Die Geschichte der Mafia, Düsseldorf 2002, 7–41; *John Dickie*, Cosa Nostra. Die Geschichte der Mafia, Frankfurt/Main 2008, 86–96). Lupo and Dickie argue, instead, that the concept of Mafia has its origin in popular cultural and political usages of the nineteenth century. In this context, they specifically refer to narratives of the Mafia as a hierarchical criminal organization that has also been related to the emergence of the Camorra in Campania (*Roberto Saviano*, Gomorrha. Reisen in das Reich der Camorra, München 2011).

[4] *Dwight C. Smith*, The Mafia Mystique, London 1975, 40–45.

[5] *Michael Woodiwiss*, Organized Crime and American Power. A History, Toronto 2001.

1970.[6] The process of securitization intensified further and eventually initiated a significant radicalization and militarization of the discourse specifically in the context of Richard Nixon's and subsequent US presidents' "War on Drugs" in which issues in relation to organized crime were portrayed and practiced most clearly as an imminent "national security threat" to the USA, particularly under Ronald Reagan. This had significant domestic and international effects including a process of increasing militarization of US domestic policing as well as international enforcement and crop eradication strategies in several Latin American countries, Bolivia, Colombia and Mexico perhaps most prominently. The increasing militarization of organized crime narratives and political practices coincided with a comprehensive externalization strategy by the USA bilaterally and through international organizations such as the UN.[7] The UN Conventions in this area (1961, 1971, 1988) were here particularly instrumental in exporting the US securitization of organized crime to the global stage, arguably temporarily establishing a "global norm" of repressive law enforcement in relation to drugs. It also paved the way for the influential UN conference on transnational organized crime with the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan signed in 1994 which is today widely seen as a crucial turning point in the cooperative global fight against organized crime.

Yet, to the extent that the concept of organized crime this way left the US location and travelled, through active externalization and local adaptations, to new ones, the concept was now also confronted with several new local discourse traditions and distinct operational logic in these locations which were not always under the full control of the USA. The process of spread and the meaning of organized crime thus significantly diversified and fragmented as a result and therefore increasingly went beyond a straightforward story of simple US exportation. In addition to the initial US dominance in the securitization and spread of organized crime as a concept to the world stage, its subsequent evolution was thus marked by the agency of various local adaptations of organized crime which constitute its genesis overall as a tale of multiple (local) translations.[8]

Securitization Theory

As will be illustrated further, it is proposed in this chapter that this process of travel of the concept of organized crime went through processes of securitization and translation. Securitization theory has evolved from its early articulations

[6] Cf. *Cyrille Fijnaut/Letizia Paoli,* Organised Crime in Europe. Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond, Dordrecht 2004; *Holger Stritzel*, Securitization, Power, Intertextuality. Discourse Theory and the Translations of Organized Crime, in: Security Dialogue, 43, 6, 2012, 549–567.

[7] *Ethan Avram Nadelmann*, Cops Across Borders. The Internationalization of US Criminal Law Enforcement, Pennsylvania 1994.

[8] *Stritzel*, Securitization.

by Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan and the so-called Copenhagen School of security studies in the 1980s/1990s into a rather complex conceptual discourse that is today marked by several internal divisions and specific debates and sub-debates.[9] While some scholars are currently moving the theory into a more explanatory direction, others retain its non-explanatory roots in poststructuralism and radical constructivism.[10]

At its core, securitization aims to conceptually transform the notion of national security into a distinct discursive reading of (radical realist) security practice. In securitization theory, "security" is not seen as an objective condition, but as the outcome of a specific discursive process which brings about new security situations by successfully representing them as such.[11] According to the theory, with the articulation of something as a matter of (national) security, a speaker dramatizes an issue as an existential threat to a valued referent object so that he or she can legitimately claim a need to treat it by extraordinary measures which involve the breaking of normal rules of regular political process.[12] The defining feature of securitization is therefore a specific rhetoric which marks an issue as a threat to survival, requiring priority of action and a sense of extreme urgency so that audiences accept, or at least not oppose, measures that would otherwise not be acquiesced.

This understanding of the logic and effects of "national security" has its origins in the transformation of military and political discourse from defence to national security in an evolving Cold War context under Harry S. Truman where the concept of security emerged as a tool to explain the United States' relationship with the rest of the world and to curtail the traditional US mistrust of standing armies in this context.[13] While defence was usually understood as following

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[9] *Thierry Balzacq*, Enquiries into Methods. A New Framework for Securitization Analysis, in: Id. (Ed.), Securitization Theory. How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, London 2012, 31–53.

[10] *Ulrik Pram Gad/Karen Lund Petersen*, Concepts of Politics in Securitization Studies. Security Dialogue 42, 4–5, 2011, 315–328; *Lise Philipsen*, Our Shared Responsibility: The Conceptualisation of Human Security by the UN, 2013; *Stritzel*, Securization.

[11] In line with the philosophy of language in the tradition of Austin, Wittgenstein and Searle the Copenhagen School argue that by saying something, speakers inevitably create what Searle would call "institutional facts" (*John R. Searle*, Making the Social World. The Structure of Human Civilization, New York 2010, 8–10). From this perspective, the discursive establishment of something as a matter of security constitutes it as an "institutional fact" which differs from "brute facts" such as, for example, the physical existence of a mountain or a tree because it needs human institutions and human agreement and recognition for its existence. Specifically, a securitization gives an object or people a status of "(national) security" and with that status a function that it cannot perform without the discursive establishment and collective recognition of that status.

[12] *Barry Buzan et al.*, Security. A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder 1998, 24–29; *Ole Wæver*, Securitization and Desecuritization, in: Ronnie D. Lipschutz (Ed.), On Security, New York 1995, 46–86, here 35.

[13] *Daniel Yergin*, Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State, Boston 1977, 193 et seq.

geopolitical lines, security was freed from this constraint, as it could be defined according to the needs of "national interests". Therefore, national security, specifically as subsequently outlined in the (in)famous National Security Act of 1947, thus provided a means to retain a form of radical "*ragione di stato*" (state reason) policies of very profound, potentially absolute, state authority and preservation in an era when democratic ethics seemed to be making such a way of thinking increasingly unacceptable.[14] First the national interest, and now national security, were thus ways to address the "democrat's dilemma" in the US context of how to combine democratic values in domestic politics with a perceived amoral and anarchic international system. As such, national security could justify drastic international measures including military interventions, political assassinations and war as well as severe restrictions on individual freedom and citizens' rights in the domestic sphere.[15]

Against this background, the critical political purpose of securitization theory that evolved in the late 1980s context of (second) détente and became more prominent after the end of the Cold War is not only to analytically capture and explore but ultimately also to potentially escape this dangerous logic of security: "More and more trans-national activities should become purely 'economic', 'social' and 'political'"[16] rather than issues of security where states claim the right to use any means necessary to hinder a development which goes against its perceived interests. Furthermore, the Copenhagen School argued that the pitfalls of conventional, previous understandings of security could be avoided by focusing not on what security means, but on what security does, or more precisely what is done by "speaking" or "doing" security, and by studying its social and political effects.

This latter aspect is particularly interesting and relevant in cases of travel as a (securitized) concept or (securitized) political narrative here encounters different contexts and thus potentially generates very different political / cultural dynamics and sociopolitical effects.

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[14] At least this is what Yergin's prominent study on this topic suggests, see *Yergin,* Shattered Spaces. For alternative readings of the various complexities and ambivalences of post-World War II US security discourse, see e. g. *Robert R. Bowie / Richard H. Immerman*, Waging Peace. How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy, New York 1998; *Sacki Dockrill* (Ed.), Controversy and Compromise. Alliance Politics Between Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States of America 1945–1967, Bodenheim 1998; *Michael J. Hogan*, A Cross of Iron. Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954, Cambridge 1998; *John L. Gaddis*, Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, Oxford 2005.

[15] For example, in the USA before the 1940s, "reasons of state" combined with sovereign immunity meant that any state document could be deemed secret. With the passing of the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 US citizens then gained the right to sue the state, yet with the National Security Act of 1947 the state limited its general state secrets privilege to that of security issues so that 'reasons of national security' limited citizens' access.

[16] *Ole Wæver*, Conflicts of Vision – Visions of Conflict, in: Id. et al. (Eds.), European Polyphony. Beyond East-West Confrontation, London 1989, 283–325, here 314.

The Securitization of Organized Crime

As the previous section identified a "security" issue as arising through a discursive process in which a traditionally non-security issue is redefined by a sense of existential threat, extreme urgency and national / state survival, the first essential question to answer is thus whether and how the USA indeed successfully securitized its approach to issues in relation to organized crime, thereby establishing a new norm from its own belief system and initially in its own domestic setting but then increasingly also through exportation to other states.

It will be illustrated that this was indeed the case. Specifically, it will be argued that the US domestic process took two stages while the process of international exportation and spread involved two principal practices of diffusion. The first stage is marked by a process of politicization from the initial Kefauver Committee hearings to the RICO statute which established organized crime as a threat in political discourse and led to the first wave of institutional centralization, domestic emergency laws and a reconfiguration of local dynamics of empowerment and marginalization / victimization in the USA. During the second stage, this process then became significantly radicalized in the War on Drugs which further legitimized violence, control and repression that would otherwise be considered unacceptable. This radicalization coincided with more intensive exportation initiatives by the USA which took a predominantly coercive form with regards to Latin American countries and a predominantly voluntary form with regards to Europe.

Domestic Securitization and Norm Emergence: From Politicization to Securitization

First Stage: Between Politicization and Securitization

When early Italian narratives of Mafia entered the USA in the late nineteenth century, representations of organized crime initially remained diffuse and strongly popular cultural, marked by a complex body of diverse narratives and anecdotes about gang fights, bosses, saloons, prostitution and different forms of "criminal entrepreneurship" of early urban crime in America.[17] According to these narratives, out of the anarchy of the immigrant ghettos gradually more organized forms of criminal activity evolved and the criminal leaders that had been established increasingly sought protection through collaboration with politicians and policemen. These stories of corruption and a growing "political machine system" in early twentieth century USA received a further boost with the Prohibition period, which also entered into mass culture, especially the US

[17] *Charles N. Glaab / Andrew T. Brown*, A History of Urban America, New York 1976.

gangster film. As David Ruth has pointed out in his study "The Gangster in American Culture", the gangster and the industrialist here became increasingly merged in the early twentieth century into the idea of a "gangsterised industry" in which the underworld and the upper world threatened to become one.[18] Typical constructions of masculinity such as power, ambition, bravery, strength and violence that had marked Italian narratives about the Mafia as Sicilism here gained a strong entrepreneurial, business-like notion with most films focussing on single charismatic leaders. The creators of the gangster genre thus adapted traditional constructions of mafia masculinity to US sociopolitical culture and the settings of modern urban society for which cities such as Chicago were perceived to be particularly emblematic at that time.

Political interventions since the 1920s then stabilized and politicized these diffuse popular cultural representations and added an element of specificity and temporary fixity to the concept of organized crime in US discourse. The first of these initiatives were the Kefauver Committee hearings of 1950. They thus constitute a decisive period for the initial political framing of organized crime, created a distinct plot structure for the perceived threat in the US setting and helped to initiate a first wave of intensification in the political discourse, followed by further committee initiatives, including the McClellan and the Katzenbach committees.[19] Crucially, this process eventually forced the influential but initially very sceptical Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), under J. Edgar Hoover, to side with a growing coalition of securitizing actors in order to (re)gain leadership in the initiative, for which Robert Kennedy provided the necessary political backing.[20] In the early 1960s, a strong coalition consisting of the FBI, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) and a proactive Attorney General Robert Kennedy could thus work together to establish organized crime as an existential threat in the USA and introduce several emergency acts, including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupted Organizations (RICO) statue of 1970.[21]

With regards to rhetoric, during this first stage of emergence securitizing actors in the USA clearly applied a language of existential threat and securitization.[22] This is true for all principal securitizing actors at that time including Kennedy, Kefauver, Anslinger, McClellan and J. Edgar Hoover.[23] Yet, it is less

[18] *David Ruth*, Inventing the Public Enemy. The Gangster in American Culture 1918–1934, Chicago 1996, here 37–62.

[19] *Smith*, Mafia; *Michael Woodiwiss*, Organized Crime.

[20] *James Q. Wilson*, Varieties of Police Behavior. The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities, Cambridge 1978, 202 et seq.; *Smith*, Mafia, 187.

[21] *Paoli/Fijnaut*, Organized Crime, 26 et seq.

[22] *Stritzel*, Securization, 561–563; Id., Security in Translation. Securitization Theory and the Localization of Threat, Basingstoke 2014.

[23] *Robert F. Kennedy*, The Enemy Within. The McCellan Commitee`s Crusade against Jimmy Hoffa and Corrupt Labor Unions, New York 1994 [1966], 75, 162, 253; *Estes Kefauver*, Crime in America, New York 1968 [1951], 12–17; *Harry Anslinger*, The Murderers. The Story of the

clear at this stage whether a process of securitization was also fully implemented. While measures constituted a new situation of rather far-reaching repressive law enforcement that went beyond "normal political procedures", they at least did not militarize the actual practice of dealing with issues in relation to organized crime. One could therefore argue that they were not really practiced as national security, at least if narrowly defined.[24]

Second Stage: Between Securitization and Militarization

A process of securitization as militarization was arguably instead only truly initiated and practiced under the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan when the previously established existential threat of organized crime became rearticulated and transformed in the securitized practice of a War on Drugs. This coincided with a change in focus from gambling and racketeering to narcotics which paralleled a growing trend between 1961 and 1988 indicating a general shift in dealing with narcotics towards securitization: an initial drug use paradigm changed from proactively eradicating causes of addiction and abuse towards a reactive focus on criminality, law and order, and punishment, transforming the image of the drug user as a dangerous threat that needed to be contained before he could do harm to society and the state. Furthermore, after reports of American soldiers in Vietnam engaging in the widespread use of heroine reached Washington, attention to the War on Drugs increasingly also shifted globally with a new focus which established not only the drug user as a threat to the state but also drug trafficking. This triggered a perceived need for partnerships with external states, especially those where the production was perceived to be occurring as well as other perceived "drug consumer states" in Europe.

The domestic process of this development began with the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 and US President Richard Nixon's famous declaration of a War on Drugs in 1971, which initiated a change in discourse and practices.[25] Most notably, this included a substantial increase in federal funding, large media cam-

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Narcotic Gangs, New York 1962, 9, 17; *John L. McClellan*, Crime without Punishment, New York 1962, 269–271; for J. Edgar Hoover see *Stritzel*, Securitzation, 91.

[24] This ambiguity is partly due to the vagueness in the concept of national security that the Copenhagen School draws upon. While the National Security Act of 1947 clearly militarized the relationship between the USA and the Soviet Union under Truman, national security can of course be and has been practiced very differently. This is not only true for countries with a distinct "civilian" foreign policy tradition such as Germany, Japan or Sweden but also for the USA itself. As Thomas Freiberg has illustrated, arguably already Truman but certainly Eisenhower and Dulles clearly thought of national security in more comprehensive terms than mere survival, simple self-preservation or excessive militarization: *Thomas Freiberg*, Allianzpolitk in der Suezkrise 1956, Göttingen 2013, 48–94; see also e. g. *Bowie/Immerman*, Waging Peace; *Dockrill*, Controversy; *Hogan*, Cross of Iron).

[25] *David F. Musto/Pamela Korsmeyer*, The Quest for Drug Control. Politics and Federal Policy in a Period of Increasing Substance Abuse 1963–1981, New Haven 2002.

paigns and educational programmes, the emergence of new anti-narcotics lobby groups and organizations, legislative inclusions of no-knock warrants and strict mandatory sentencing, and substantially increased numbers of arrests and incarcerations of drug users and distributors.[26] Furthermore, by declaring drugs to be a national security threat Nixon took a first step of setting the USA down a path of securitization and militarization which provided justification for future presidents to engage in extraordinary response measures including more funding, power and equipment to military forces. The Reagan administration in particular seized on this process, using broad congressional bills to increase expenditures and punitive drug control measures. The National Security Directive 221 in 1986 then formally identified drug trafficking as an existential threat to the US state, a theme which also subsequently found its way into the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.[27]

This led to a substantial empowerment and increase in the size and presence of American federal drug control agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the construction of a joint endeavor of the US military, police and intelligence agencies to combat this new threat to national security. The DEA, originally designed to act in conjunction with local police forces in the War on Drugs, increasingly turned international, opening more than 45 international offices between 1970 and 1989 alone and coordinating combat operations in Latin American countries as part of Special Enforcement Operations to eradicate drug export networks worldwide. Andreas and Price apply the term "crimefare state" for this change to highlight a fusion of military and police in which the latter now defined law enforcement as a security concern and included the direct participation of the former. After the 1980s, this manifested itself in the loosing and relaxing of laws, allowing the US government to eventually designate the Department of Defence as the lead agency in the detection and interception of cross-border drug trafficking.[28]

In returning to the Copenhagen School's definition of securitization, one can see that the US approach to managing narcotics checks all the necessary boxes. The securitization of drugs developed out of a sociopolitical process, facilitated primarily by a political leadership which shifted a relatively limited and non-popularized topic to the forefront of national security concerns. Drug control became the War on Drugs, legitimizing the use of increased enforcement and the militarization of responses by attaching a benign subject to national security and by emphasizing a requirement for an urgent response. The War on Drugs,

[26] *David Bewley-Taylor/Martin Jelsma*, The Internationalization of the War on Drugs. Illicit Drugs as Moral Evil and Useful Enemy, Moreton-in-Marsh 2007.

[27] *Emily Crick*, Drugs as an Existential Threat. An Analysis of the International Securitization of Drugs, in: International Journal of Drug Policy 23, 2012, 407–414.

[28] *Peter Andreas/Richard Price*, From War Fighting to Crime Fighting. Transforming the American National Security State, in: International Studies Review 3,3, 2001, 31–52, here 43.

the related Controlled Substances Act and leadership-driven political and media campaigns supported the securitization transition of existing domestic narcotics approaches. Equally, one can say that the evolving War on Drugs paradigm represents a new standard of appropriateness in the US discourse, challenging conventional and entrenched models of previous action. The new norm, or standard of appropriate behaviour, which emerged in the USA was the securitization of drug enforcement eventually supported by a 64 % approval in September 1989 of increased enforcement measures against what Americans now viewed as the number one threat facing their state and which fuelled the US governments' push for the export of these new domestic standards and ideals abroad.

Internationalizing Domestic Securitization

In our tale of the War on Drugs, the United States emerged in the previous section as a domestic norm entrepreneur, eventually also poised to build off their own internal securitization and extend such a new standard of appropriate behavior into the international sphere. The continuation of this tale involves a process of the USA convincing a critical mass of countries to join its War on Drugs bilaterally and by using international organizations as a platform for the promotion of its own agenda, institutionalizing the securitized War on Drugs as a specific set of new international rules and practices.

As studies by Nadelmann, McAllister, Herschinger and Crick have shown, the last 40 years have indeed been hallmarked by the United States, which has acted as the principal bulwark for an international drug control regime that emphasized criminality, enforcement and a partial militarization of the subject matter.[29] Original treaty negotiations first culminating in the 1914 Hague Convention as well as more contemporary initiatives through the UN, including the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Trafficking of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, were indeed initiated and strongly influenced by the USA. This is particularly true with regards to the latter. The 1988 Convention Against Illicit Trafficking of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances which required all signatory states to make possession a criminal offense, drew heavily on legal approaches, normative values and language already established in US law at the time and was even partially pre-scripted by the National Security Directive 221 of 1986. Similarly, the UN definition of organized crime as a group was adapted and became changed to US standards by focusing on specifically structured groups of people as embodied by narcotics traffickers

[29] Cf. *Nadelmann*, Cops; *Wiliam B. McAllister*, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, Routledge 1999; *Eva Herschinger*, Constructing Global Enemies. Hegemony and Identity in International Discourses on Terrorism and Drug Prohibition, London 2011; *Crick*, Drugs; also: *Peter Reuter*, Why Has American Drug Policy Changed so Little in 30 years, in: Crime and Justice. A Review of Research 42, 2013, 75–140.

and drug cartels.[30] Interestingly, the USA then in turn used the convention as a means of legitimizing their own national certification mechanism in which trade and aid agreements were directly tied to a number of counternarcotics measures and foreign countries were required to deliver a report card to Congress on how they met the international agreement's goals and objectives. The certification programme itself allowed the USA to apply discretionary sanctions in the forms of ending preferential tariff treatment, limiting air traffic and increasing duties on product exports to the USA.

Yet, pressure to follow the US approach was not only exerted directly and bilaterally as through the US certification system but it also involved the agency of various international bodies and global initiatives that were influenced by the USA, mainly at the UN level, such as the UN Economic and Social Council, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the International Narcotics Control Board and the World Health Organization.[31] Some scholars have argued that several of these institutions such as the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control became, in essence, direct tools of the USA with its funding deliberately directed to projects of US allies while organizations such as the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), charged to design and implement programs to prevent the cultivation, production, manufacture, trafficking and use of illicit drugs, became the primary point of compliance advice for states party to the above UN treaties.[32] Therefore, both international organizations, partially derived from American initiative and pressure, and domestic government bodies operating globally presented themselves as agents of change, pushing the world system towards a securitized approach to issues in relation to organized crime and narcotics.

This was not without consequences. Ayling argues that before 1989, 41 states had engineered or were in the process of creating drug policies similar to those found in the USA.[33] The US and international pressure then added another 66 countries between 1989 and 1999. Furthermore, by 2003 the number of states which had signed the 1971 and 1988 conventions rested at 172 and 166 respectively while as of 2013 those numbers had grown to 183 and 188.[34] International initiatives were not limited to the UN but were gradually also adopted by other international bodies and organizations including the TREVI Group, the G7/8 and the Council of Europe.[35]

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[30] *Crick*, Drugs, 411.

[31] Cf. *Julie Ayling*, Conscription in the War on Drugs. Recent Reforms to the U.S. Drug Certification Process, in: International Journal of Drug Policy, 16, 2005, 376–383.

[32] Cf. *Jay Sinha*, The History and Development of the Leading International Drug Control Conventions, Ottawa 2001.

[33] *Ayling*, Conscription, 376.

[34] *David Bewley-Taylor*, Challenging the UN Drug Control Conventions. Problems and Possibilities, in: International Journal of Drug Policy 14,2, 2003, 172.

[35] *Amandine Scherrer*, Good Practices as International Norms? The Modalities of the Global

Exporting and Incorporating Securitization

For the United States the critical countries needed for the adoption of this emergent international normative framework were first producers, for the main underlying assumption of the US international drug control policy was that it was a victim of other nations' inability or unwillingness to control the production and export of illicit narcotics. The USA using various coercive means and inducements thus endeavored to conscript perceived drug-producing and drug-transiting states into their war while they convinced other perceived drug consumer countries through less coercive means to join their endeavor. Specifically, while Latin American countries mainly adapted US practices through coercion and imposition, processes in Europe were marked by more autonomous processes of voluntary incorporation and autonomous localizations.[36]

Exporting Securitization in Latin America

According to Chillier and Freeman, the pressure to cooperate that the USA exerted through its international drug response regime particularly impacted Latin American countries and has been one of the main factors spurring the region's armed forces to heavily intervene in internal security matters. Several examples exist of critical producer states being brought into the new US normative framework on securitized drug enforcement. For Chillier and Freeman, US exportation of securitized norms was most readily seen in Bolivia, where the US military has been directly involved in counternarcotics efforts, and has simultaneously encouraged the Bolivian military to take on a greater role in the local War on Drugs effort. The USA equally offered special forces training to the Bolivian counternarcotics police, the American Embassy in Sucre provided the financial backing to a paramilitary counter-drug unit commanded by Bolivian military officers, and they also provided military equipment and vehicles for related activities.[37]

Similarly, Colombia has been a consistent target of Washington's international drug control campaign as a perceived epicenter of drug production. For example, between 1996 and 1997 the Clinton Administration utilized a decertification process against Colombia as a message that it was unhappy with the state's efforts in battling narcotics. As a result, Colombia became one of several critical producer states to join in the securitized norm of narcotics enforcement as a means of winning back its former supporter: Bogotá launched Plan Colombia

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Fight Against Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism (CEPS Special Report), Brussels 2009. *Amandine Scherrer*, G8 Against Transnational Organized Crime, London 2009.

[36] *Stritzel*, Securization.

[37] *G. Chillier/L. Freeman*, Potential Threat. The New OAS Concept of Hemispheric Aecurity (WOLA Special Report), Washington 2005.

as its principal counternarcotics and coca eradication initiative. In response, the USA substantially increased its foreign aid to Colombia in 2000 to $1.3 billion, most of which was earmarked for security action in the Andean drug production region. The USA equally sent personnel from their Special Forces, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, each of whom helped emphasize the emergence of a new securitized norm of anti-narcotics activities in Colombia.[38]

The situation is similar with regards to Mexico, whose military involvement in the War on Drugs has considerably grown in recent years. Very similar to the policies towards Bolivia and Colombia the USA here exported a securitized campaign against drugs through the provision of equipment and training to the Mexican military as well as rhetorical support for domestic securitization and militarization. As a result, by the end of 2012, the government of Felipe Calderón had deployed nearly 50 thousand military troops to combat drug violence which demonstrates in a dramatic way how Mexico submitted to the USA and appropriated the US model of a securitized War on Drugs.[39]

Incorporating Securitization in Europe

In Europe the process of spread and translation of organized crime was quite different. Here organized crime entered both EU and European national discourses gradually in the 1970s and 1980s through voluntary incorporation and became subsequently part of a large array of policy measures. With the exception of Italy, European states had initially understood organized crime to be an external, foreign issue and thus had not felt the need, up until the 1980s, to adopt legislation or specific instruments in this area.[40] This changed to a situation where organized crime featured with terrorism as the number one threat to Europe's internal security, as the second most important objective of the EU for its Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, as perceived to be profoundly interrelated with migration and terrorism, and as one of the regions with the highest amount of anti-organized crime initiatives just a few decades later.[41] Similar processes of politicization and securitization occurred in parallel at the European national levels.

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[38] *Ian Vásquez*, The New Approach to Foreign Aid. Is the Enthusiasm Warranted?, Washington 2003.

[39] *Aimee Rawlins*, Mexico's War on Drugs, (Council of Foreign Relations), 2013; *David Lier*, Mexico's Sword of Damocles. Institutionalized Securitization and the War on Drugs, 2012.

[40] *Valsamis Mitsilegas*, From National to Global. The Ambivalent Conzept of Transnational Organised Crime, in: Margareth E. Beare (Ed.), Critical Reflections on Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering and Corruption, Toronto 2003, 55–87.

[41] *European Commission*, Communication from the Commission on the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action. Five Steps towards a more secure Europe, COM, 673 final, 22.11.2010; *Fijnaut/Paoli*, Organized Crime, 633–637.

At the international European level, the 1986 Stoffelen Report by the Council of Europe was initially perhaps most instrumental in creating an early threat perception for this issue in Europe.[42] Furthermore, at the domestic level, member states such as Germany and Italy had increasingly adopted a narrative of organized crime as a security concern which rapidly evolved into attempts to upload this narrative to the EC/EU level. As a result, the initial heterogeneity in European understandings of organized crime gradually started to fade. Den Boer argues that this process was eventually marked by a principal change from counter-organized crime efforts at the national level to the European one and a move of the EC/EU from an initial position of securitization importer to a position of securitizing actor, facilitated by the completion of the Single Market and, subsequently, of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.[43]

At the EU level, this process was initially not immediately reflected in EC/EU discourse and practices. It made its way to the EC/EU gradually through a process of initially portraying drug abuse and its related health risks to be threatening to submerge Europe with the perceived need to demonstrate support to international organizations active in this area, prominently the UN and the Council of Europe.[44] Although there was, at the time, no intention of replacing these organizations in the fight against drugs, the EC considered specific action essential "in view of the fact that the efforts of the individual member states to combat illicit drugs have so far failed to produce the desired results".[45] In the mid-1980s one can thus see the beginning of a transition in Europe from a health perspective to a law enforcement one in the context of which "there is every need to improve and intensify international collaboration, particularly as regards the production and traffic of drugs".[46] This transition was significantly accelerated by the willingness to complete the Single Market but also by direct contact between the US government and EC ministers which included the participation of US representatives in EC ministers' meetings as observers and the training of European police officers by the FBI.[47]

Most strikingly and interestingly, apart from a strong international/European "cooperation reflex"[48], the European discourse in the EU setting was marked by a gradual translation of the rather diffuse concept of organized crime into oper-

[42] *Council of Europe*, Report on International Crime, Parliamentary Assembly, Legal Affairs Committee, Rapporteur M. Stoffelen, AS/jur (38) 14 part III, 1986.

[43] *Monica den Boer*, Organised Crime – A Catalyst in the Europeanisation of National Police and Prosecution Agencies?, Maastrich 2002.

[44] *European Commission*, Stoffelen; *European Council*, Council Presidency Conclusions, The Hague, June 1986.

[45] *European Commission*, Stoffelen, 5.

[46] Ibid., 6.

[47] *Cyrille Fijnaut*, Organized Crime. A Comparison between the United States and Western Europe, in: British Journal of Criminology 30, 3, 1990, 321–340.

[48] *Scherrer*, G8.

ationalizable "data" as particularly evident in various organized crime "reports" starting with the "Organized Crime Situation Reports" of 1994 and 1995 up to the more recent "Organized Crime Threat Assessment" reports.[49] The ultimate purpose of these initiatives was to operationalize and technocratically control organized crime through processes of translation from a diffuse political and (pop) cultural concept into a "standardized mechanism" marked by agreed on common guidelines for measurements, methodologies for data collection, questionnaires, statistics and eventually a harmonized, common response to the issue at stake.[50] Organized crime this way became reconfigured through a distinct operational logic and rationality in the specific setting of the EU which locally adapted organized crime for the perceived needs of the new context.

Similar processes of distinct local redefinition and appropriation are visible at the level of European national discourses such as the one in Germany.[51] Here the process of localization and translation of organized crime into a distinctly German narrative of *Organisierte Kriminalität* was initially visible in various expert journals and major institutional initiatives. Similar to the EU level, organized crime here became adapted to the specific operational logics, bureaucratic interests and established professional routines which eventually, since the mid/ the late 1980s, became merged with the process of Europeanizing internal security as described above.

Towards Securitization Fatigue and Resurgence?

In the previous sections, this chapter has reconstructed the emergence of the global organized crime discourse as a securitized practice that evolved through US initiative and pressure as well as processes of local appropriation and translation. To conclude this tale it is necessary to point to scholars who see indications of a securitization fatigue with regards to organized crime and narcotics in recent years marked by developments towards legislative decriminalization and legalization. Indeed, several critical producer-states increasingly seem to be developing new norms towards narcotics activities with the aim of reducing related violence and criminality. For example, Bolivia declared in 2008 their cessation of participating in the War on Drugs citing that the DEA would have facilitated

[49] *Tom vander Beken*, Measuring Organized Crime in Europe, Antwerp 2006.

[50] *Council of the European Union*, The Prevention and Control of Organiced Crime. A European Union Strategy for the Beginning of the New Millenium, Official Journal C 124/ 1–124/ 33, 3. May 2000; *Council of the European Union*, Revision of doc. 6204/2/97 ENFOPOL 35 REV 2, based on doc. 8469/1/99 CRIMORG 55 REV 1, 10415, 3. August 2000.

[51] *Holger Stritzel*, Security, the Translation, in: Security Dialogue 42, 2011, 343–355; Id., Security as Translation. Threats, Discourse and the Politics of Localization, in: Review of International Studies, 37,5, 2011, 2491–2517; Id., Securitization.

conflict and violence particularly in the state's Eastern lowlands.[52] Similarly, the former heads of Brazil, Mexico and Colombia argued in 2009 that prohibitionist policies based on eradication, criminalization and militarization had failed and were responsible for violence facilitated by the narcotics trade.[53] Former Mexican President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) also eventually joined the growing group of these new norm entrepreneurs in 2012 by arguing that consumer states in the West need to accept more responsibility for the drug violence crises affecting Latin America, a region which for him should rather become a testing ground for alternative approaches including market solutions and legalization as means of reducing cash flow to organized crime.[54] Perhaps most prominently in 2011 the Global Commission on Drug Policy, comprised of several presidents from production states, former heads of UN bodies and business leaders published an influential "Report on Drugs" recommending a transformation of the global prohibition regime towards experimental models of legal regulation and decriminalization as a means of undermining the power of organized crime and ending associated violence. By 2013 more actors joined this anti-securitization movement. Uruguay, as an example, became the first state to legalize the cultivation and distribution of marijuana in 2013.[55] And Gil Kerlikowske, Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the official "White House Czar", argued that the USA should shift to treatment over incarceration and securitization[56] and end the previously strongly law enforcement-centric War on Drugs.[57]

If these voices are indeed, as some scholars claim perhaps too optimistically, robust indicators of a principal change in US and global policies then they would reflect a profound replacement of existing norms of appropriateness and the beginning of a new "norm life cycle" of non-securitized domestic and international policies with regards to narcotics.[58] In other words, in the terminology of securitization theory, the securitized organized crime discourse with regards to narcotics would have been successfully desecuritized.

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[52] *Jean Friedmann-Rudovsky*, Why Bolivia Quit the US War on Drugs, in: time World, 4. November 2008.

[53] *Fernando Henrique Cardoso / César Gaviria / Ernesto Zedillo*, The War on Drugs is a Failure, in: The Wall Street Journal, 23.2.2009.

[54] *David Luhnow*, Mexico Drug Violence Shows Decline, in: The Wall Street Journal, 14 June 2013.

[55] *Juan Forero*, Growers Celebrate as Uruguay Prepares to Legalize Marijuana Cultivation, Distribution, in: The Wall Street Journal, 23 October 2013.

[56] *Gary Fields*, White House Czar Calls for an End to 'War on Drugs', in: The Wall Street Journal, 14 May 2009.

[57] *Harold Pollack*, What's the Future of Drug Policy? An Interview with America's 'Drug Czar', in: The Washington Post, 29 August 2013.

[58] *Martha Finnemore / Kathryn Sikkink*, International Organization at Fifty. Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, in: International Norm Dynamics and Political Change 52, 4, 1998, 887–917.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to reconstruct the emergence and spread of organized crime as a securitized narrative and practice and to thereby conceptualize and explore these processes through the lenses of securitization theory. Organized crime as a securitized practice and, eventually, temporarily established global norm evolved gradually through processes of travel and translation. From a diffuse cultural narrative it turned into a political and eventually securitized US national discourse which then spread to other perceived consumer and producer states as well as global institutions and initiatives. Although powerful securitizing speech acts and single political initiatives by political leaders, particularly in the USA, could be clearly identified and are relevant, it would nevertheless be insufficient to focus on this aspect alone. Securitizing moves and their social and political effects differed in substance and effect, and they happened on a continuous, gradually transforming basis. Most importantly, these transforming processes were heavily interspersed with distinct local operational logic and were thus translated differently in different places and at different times. As this chapter hopes to have illustrated, the constitution of organized crime as a securitized global discourse had indeed become established through these crucial encounters with distinct local settings worldwide and the constitutive processes of translation within them.

Framing Non-Violence: MASSOB and the Puzzling Non-Escalation of the Struggle for Biafra in Nigeria

Jan Sändig

Introduction

When societal groups perceive themselves as disadvantaged and threatened by others, they often respond either by peaceful protest or armed rebellion.[1] In spite of much political science research on both non-violent protest and armed conflict[2], the following question has still not yet been sufficiently answered: Why do some identity groups protest peacefully whereas others use violence? Two major theoretical approaches to armed conflict research suggest that opportunities and grievances explain the escalation of conflict into violence.[3] In a nutshell, armed rebellion occurs if it is feasible and profitable for 'greedy' entrepreneurs (Opportunity), and if societal groups are severely discriminated against (Grievances). While these theoretical approaches contribute immensely to an explanation of armed conflict, they are still insufficient and may even make predictions that do not hold up to reality.

As a case in point, I analyze the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). MASSOB strives for the break-away of the Eastern region of Nigeria in the name of Biafra, thus renewing the secessionist attempt of Biafra (1967–1970). The movement emerged in 1999 among the Igbo,

[1] The chapter is based on my research within the project *Threatened Political Orders in African Developing Countries* (2011–2015) at the Collaborative Research Centre 923 *Threatened Order – Societies under Stress*, University of Tübingen (Germany). I would like to express my gratitude to the German Research Foundation (DFG – Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) for supporting the project. Furthermore, I would like to thank all interviewees for sharing their views.

[2] The terms armed conflict / insurgency / rebellion as well as civil war are used interchangeably in this chapter to denote a sustained violent contestation between the government of an internationally recognized state and at least one armed group from within the country that leads to substantial losses of lives on both sides. This draws on the common definition by *UCDP/PRIO*, Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4–2014a, in: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Centre for the Study of Civil Wars (Ed.), International Peace Research Institute, Oslo 2014, 1–3.

[3] *Paul Collier / Anke Hoeffler / Dominic Rohner*, Beyond Greed and Grievance. Feasibility and Civil War, in: Oxford Economic Papers 6, 1, 2009, 1–27; *Frances Stewart* (Ed.), Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict, Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies, Basingstoke et al. 2008; *Christian Davenport / Molly Inman*, The State of State Repression Research Since the 1990s, in: Terrorism and Political Violence 24, 4, 2012, 619–634.

who at a population of around 30 million is Nigeria's third largest ethnic group. MASSOB has pursued its protest by non-violent means, which is puzzling from the perspective of armed conflict research: The movement is driven by severe grievances about inequalities and repressionand it operates in a political and economic context in which an armed struggle would be feasible.

To investigate why MASSOB's protests, nevertheless, have not escalated into violence, I draw on the framing approach from social movement research. Framing refers to strategic communication in which protest movements define grievances, propose solutions, and make emotional appeals to mobilize people for collective action.[4] Framing can be integrated into armed conflict research as a micro-level mechanism that links structural perspectives (e. g. Opportunity, Grievances) with actual protest behavior. Furthermore, framing highlights agency and ideational aspects in the social-construction of protest claims. While framing has become a core approach within social movement research since the mid-1980s, existing studies in this field have focused mostly on peaceful protest movements.[5] In contrast, the determinants of escalation into violence have hardly been examined by the use of framing, neither within social movement nor armed conflict research.[6]

In this chapter, I will show that the framing perspective contributes to the explanation of why protests may remain non-violent despite structural circumstances that make armed rebellion likely.[7] MASSOB's framing has been centered on non-violence and the movement has propagated a legalistic and internationalized approach to achieve the secession of Biafra. I argue that this call for non-violence is based on the cultural context of MASSOB, the movement leaders' perception of international law and of globally emerging norms of non-violent conflict resolution, and the agency of the leaders. Moreover, I will demonstrate that this non-violence frame has resonated with the audience and activists of MASSOB and that this explains their continued non-violent protests.

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[4] *Robert D. Benford/David A. Snow*, Framing Processes and Social Movements. An Overview and Assessment, in: Annual Review of Sociology 26, 2000, 611–639; *David A. Snow/E. Burke Rochford/Steven K. Worden et al.*, Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation, in: American Sociological Review 51, 4, 1986, 464–481.

[5] *Donatella Della Porta*, Research on Social Movements and Political Violence, in: Qualitative Sociology 31, 3, 2008, 221–230.

[6] Notable exceptions include *Mohammed M. Hafez*, From Marginalization to Massacres. A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria, in: Quintan Wiktorowicz (Ed.), Islamic Activism, Bloomington 2004, 37–60; *Stuart J. Kaufman*, Symbols, Frames, and Violence. Studying Ethnic War in the Philippines, in: International Studies Quarterly 55, 4, 2011, 937–958; *David A. Snow/Scott C. Byrd*, Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements, in: Mobilization. An International Quarterly Journal 12, 1, 2007, 119–136.

[7] This chapter is a snapshot of the MASSOB case study from my doctoral thesis. For an extended analysis, see Jan Sändig, Framing Non-Violent Protest and Insurgency. Boko Haram and MASSOB in Nigeria, University of Tübingen, 2018, http://hdl.handle.net/10900/83349 (22 November 2018).

To make this argument, I proceed in three steps: Firstly, relevant background information on Nigeria, the Igbo, and MASSOB is provided. Secondly, I summarize the main theories of armed conflict research and apply them to the case study. Thirdly in the main part, the framing approach is briefly introduced, MASSOB's collective action frames are identified, the processes of frame development are retraced, and the resonance of the frames is assessed. Finally in the conclusion, I summarize how the framing perspective can elucidate the choice of protest behaviors.

Background: Nigeria, the Igbo, and MASSOB

Nigeria is an inherently unstable political order. It was created under British colonialism when about 250 ethnic groups and two major religious camps were 'amalgamated' into one country. The main religious dividing line runs between the mostly Christian South and the largely Muslim North. In terms of ethnic divisions, there are dominant ethnic groups in at least four parts of the country: The Hausa-Fulani (about 29 % of the population) in the North, Yoruba (21 %) in the South-West, Igbo (18 %) in the South-East, and Ijaw (10 %) in the South-South.[8]

Nigeria's political-economic structure is characterized most importantly by federalism, neopatrimonialism[9], and competition for oil revenues.[10] The various identity groups of the country have competed for access to the federal state and the substantial revenues generated through oil exports. Historically, the main contestants in this neopatrimonial game were the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. While these still play an important role, the competition for patronage has become ever more complex in recent decades. Today, a diverse array of ethnic groups (and subgroups), political parties, religious and regional interest groups, and armed militias all seek their share of Nigeria's oil wealth. As a result, the oil revenues are not invested in the development of the country and its people, but almost entirely lost in corruption. Furthermore, the competition has spurred ethnic and religious violence, mostly in the central region of the Middle Belt, that

[8] *The World Factbook*, Nigeria, n.d., https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html (23 November 2018).

[9] Neopatrimonialism can be defined as a system of rule in which power, resources, and loyalty is distributed in patron-client networks that are embedded in the legal-rational bureaucracy of the state, see *Gero Erdmann / Ulf Engel*, Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered. Critical Review and Elaboration of an Elusive Concept, in: Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 45, 1, 2007, 95–119 at 104–106.

[10] This paragraph draws on *Jonathan Hill*, Nigeria Since Independence, Forever Fragile?, New York et al. 2012; *Johannes Harnischfeger*, Democratization and Islamic Law, The Sharia Conflict in Nigeria, 2nd edition, Frankfurt / Main / New York 2008.

led to 10,000–20,000 deaths since 1999.[11] Boko Haram's warfare, in which an additional 30,000 people have been killed since mid-2009, is also partly connected to these neopatrimonial politics.[12]

The Igbo, as major ethnic group and constituency of MASSOB, have their core settlement area in the South-East (the 'Igboland'). In addition, there are large Igbo communities in other parts of the country and abroad. The Igbo came to exist as a unified identity group only under British colonialism during the early twentieth century. After Nigerian independence in 1960, they played an important role alongside the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba in the turbulent competition for access to the federal government and its resources.[13] Confronted with the political dominance of the North, Igbo military officers established an Igbo-led regime in the aftermath of a coup in January 1966. This, however, only made matters worse. Up to 100,000 Easterners were killed in reprisal and the North reclaimed power in another coup in July 1966. In response, the Eastern Region declared its independence in the name of Biafra in May 1967, an act that the Federal Military Government contested by armed means. In the severe Civil War (1967–1970) around one million people died, mostly Igbos. When Biafra surrendered in January 1970, the Federal Military Government declared that there would be 'no victor, no vanquished' but 'rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation.' Yet, to the dismay of Igbos (and other Southerners), the Northern military generals still clung to power for almost three whole decades until the democratic transition of 1998/1999.

The renewed struggle for Biafra took off amid Nigeria's democratization. It was Ralph Uwazuruike, a virtually unknown Igbo lawyer, who revived the idea of Biafran secessionism by founding MASSOB in 1999.[14] As in 1967, Biafra is envisioned as independent country for both the Igbo in the South-East and the various South-Southern ethnic groups. In reality, however, MASSOB is almost entirely based among the Igbo.[15] MASSOB's protests comprise non-violent activities such as, most importantly, public rallies, the hoisting of the Biafran flag, and advocacy at the international level. Since 2004, about once per year the

[11] *Andreas Hasenclever/Jan Sändig*, Nigeria – Gewaltursache Religion?, in: Ines-Jacqueline Werkner/Janet Kursawe/Margret Johannsen et al. (Eds.), Friedensgutachten 2014, Berlin 2014, 180–195.

[12] *Johannes Harnischfeger*, Rivalität unter Eliten, Der Boko-Haram-Aufstand in Nigeria, in: Leviathan 40, 2, 2012, 491–516; *Amnesty International*, Stars on their Shoulders, Blood on their Hands. War Crimes Committed by the Nigerian Military, AFR 44/1360/2015, London 2015, 4–5.

[13] This historical account is based on *Toyin Falola/Matthew M. Heaton*, A History of Nigeria, Cambridge et al. 2008, 164–180.

[14] This paragraph draws on *Godwin Onuoha*, Challenging the State in Africa. MASSOB and the Crisis of Self-Determination in Nigeria, Berlin 2011; *Ike Okonta*, Biafran Ghosts, The MASSOB Ethnic Militia and Nigeria's Democratisation Process (Published as Discussion Paper 73, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet), Uppsala 2012.

[15] Therefore, the role of the South-Southern ethnic groups is not analyzed in this chapter.

movement has also been calling on Easterners to protest by staying indoors on a specific day of the year. This repeatedly brought public life in major cities across South-Eastern Nigeria to a standstill. Besides the many non-violent activities, there have also been a few incidents of violence involving suspected MASSOB members. Information on such events is scarce, but it is evident that these remained isolated events and that MASSOB – unlike Boko Haram and the Niger Delta militants – has never waged an armed insurgency.

MASSOB has won millions of sympathizers and supporters for Biafra among the Igbo within a short period of time. It can be seen as the "most popular political organization in Igboland."[16] The activists consist of mostly the general Igbo population, i. e. low educated and unemployed youths, students, traders, but also the older generations including some who witnessed the civil war first-hand. The common saying 'Every true-born Igbo is a Massobian', though an exaggeration, does contain some truth. The movement's popularity also inspired foundation of other Biafran organizations, both in Nigeria and the diaspora (mostly in the US and the UK). Despite increasing competition, the relationship between MASSOB proper and other Biafran organizations has been friendly rather than hostile during most of the years. Since around 2012, Radio Biafra and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), led by Nnamdi Kanu, have won much influence within the broader Biafra movement. Still, MASSOB proper and the figure of Uwazuruike – who are at the core of the analysis in this chapter – remain key players in the renewed and non-violent demand for Biafra.

Armed Conflict Research: The Puzzling Non-Escalation of MASSOB

Armed conflict research suggests that the strategic behaviors of population groups and political movements are strongly influenced by their political, economic, and social context. In particular, structural opportunities and patterns of group discrimination (grievances) explain why violent insurgency occurs or not.

Opportunity

Opportunity approaches hold that "where a rebellion is feasible it will occur."[17] Common indicators of feasibility are: state weakness, low counter-insurgency capacity, high poverty rates, lack of education, high youth unemployment, moun-

[16] *Johannes Harnischfeger*, Igbo Nationalism and Biafra, 2011, in: http://www.afrikanistik-aegyptologie-online.de/archiv/2011/3042 (23 November 2018).

[17] *Collier et al.*, Feasibility, 2; *James D. Fearon/David D. Laitin*, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, in: The American Political Science Review 97, 1, 2003, 75–90.

tainous terrain, foreign military support, and cross-border sanctuary.[18] Besides this basic model, there are two variants of Opportunity approaches. Firstly, the 'greed'-thesis assumes that armed groups emerge if there are 'lootable' natural resources (such as diamonds and timber) that make violence profitable for 'greedy' entrepreneurs.[19] Secondly, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, political movements have often adopted and refrained from violence depending on their role within neopatrimonial networks. Such "parochial rebels" primarily serve the self-enrichment of elite groups by using violence instrumentally for economic gains.[20]

Investigating the opportunities of MASSOB, evidently armed insurgency would have been highly feasible in the movement's political and economic context: Nigeria is one of the world's poorest countries, ranking 156th out of 179 in the 2011 Human Development Index.[21] Poverty is extremely widespread. In the South-East, about 59 % of the population live from US$ 1 or less per day.[22] Thus, there are several million impoverished and hardly educated Igbo youths who could be recruited for an armed struggle at low costs. Although Nigeria's police and armed forces are strong by regional comparison, they often fail to prevent or involuntarily contribute to the formation of armed movements. The presence of vigilantes and larger armed groups in many parts of the country – including the O'odua People's Congress (OPC), Boko Haram, and Niger Delta militants – is ample evidence. At the same time, the relative flatness of the terrain in South-Eastern Nigeria, the high population density in the region, and the shortage of foreign military support and of cross-border sanctuary provide obstacles to organizing armed insurgency. Igbos are also better educated than most other ethnic groups in the country.[23] Thus, an armed rebellion by MASSOB has been highly probable, but for these geographic and socio-economic indicators MASSOB would have been more likely to operate as an urban-based underground movement than as a rural insurgent group.[24]

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[18] *Jeffrey Dixon*, What Causes Civil Wars? Integrating Quantitative Research Findings, in: International Studies Review 11, 4, 2009, 707–735; *Idean Salehyan*, Rebels without Borders. Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics, Ithaca, et al. 2009; *Nicholas Sambanis*, Conclusion, Using Case Studies to Refine and Expand the Theory of Civil War, in: Paul Collier / Nicholas Sambanis, (Eds.), Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, Washington D. C. 2005, 303–334.

[19] *Paul Collier / Anke Hoeffler*, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, in: Oxford Economic Papers 56, 4, 2004, 563–595.

[20] *William Reno*, Warfare in Independent Africa, Cambridge et al. 2011, 206–241; *Patrick Chabal / Jean-Pascal Daloz*, Africa Works. Disorder as Political Instrument, London 1999.

[21] *UNDP*, Human Development Report 2011, Sustainability and Equity. A Better Future for All, Published by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2011, 129.

[22] *NBS*, Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010, Published by National Bureau of Statistics, Abuja 2012, 23.

[23] As a rough indicator, in 2003 the literacy rate among males in the South-East stood at 71 % whereas it was as low as 32 % in the North-West, see *National Population Commission*, Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 2003, Calverton 2004, 27.

[24] Terrorism research has shown that such armed clandestine tactics are associated with higher levels of education, see *Claude Berrebi*, Evidence about the Link Between Education,

Considering the 'greed'-variant of Opportunity, in absence of 'lootable' natural resources in the South-East[25], pursuing armed rebellion for economic benefit has been improbable in the case of MASSOB. However, as pointed out above, Nigeria is a typical place for neopatrimonial politics and parochial rebels.[26] Some scholars suggested that MASSOB has been playing the neopatrimonial game, much like the OPC and Niger Delta militants.[27] In this logic, the movement could have refrained from armed rebellion because it follows the directives of some elite interest groups. For most of the 2000s, though, there is strikingly little evidence for cooperation between the MASSOB leadership and the Igbo elite. It has been only under the presidency of Goodluck Jonathan (2010–15) that the MASSOB leadership openly supported high-level Igbo leaders and the election bids of Goodluck Jonathan.[28]

Yet, unlike typical parochial rebels, MASSOB has never been deeply integrated into neopatrimonial networks. Ever since foundation, the relationship between MASSOB and the Igbo leaders has been tense. While parochial rebels are typically protected by their patrons, MASSOB has been violently repressed. Its leaders were detained as efforts of 'buying them off' failed. In my interview, the senior Igbo leader Benjamin Nwabueze (Secretary General of Ohanaeze Ndigbo, 1977–2004) recounted that the Igbo leaders proposed to cooperate with MASSOB under the precondition that the treasonable idea of Biafra is abandoned.[29] While profit-seekers would probably have given up Biafra and transformed MASSOB into one of the many opportunistic Igbo youth movements at this point, the MASSOB leadership dismissed the offer. The movement's leaders have remained committed to Biafra and have even gone through great lengths of repression as part of the struggle. This suggests that MASSOB has not merely sought to exploit opportunities in the choice of its strategic behaviors but that ideational motives have mattered.

Grievances

Grievances approaches hold that the more disadvantaged, threatened, and frustrated societal groups and movement activists are, the more likely escalation into

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Poverty and Terrorism among Palestinians, in: Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 13,1, 2007, 1–36, 8–9.

[25] Also, MASSOB hardly has the opportunity to engage in criminal activities related to Nigeria's oil industry (e. g. kidnappings, oil theft), because the oil facilities lie mostly outside of the South-East in the region of South-South, where only few Igbos live.

[26] *Human Rights Watch*, Criminal Politics. Violence, 'Godfathers' and Corruption in Nigeria, 19 16A, 2007; *Isaac Olawale Albert*, Explaining 'Godfatherism' in Nigerian Politics, in: African Sociological Review 9, 2, 2005, 79–105.

[27] *Harnischfeger*, Igbo Nationalism; *Okonta*, Biafran Ghosts.

[28] For example, see *The SUN*, MASSOB shuts down S/East, Lagos 2015, 14 March.

[29] Interview, 1 December 2013, Lagos.

violence becomes. Inequalities in the distribution of power, resources, and rights as well as heightened insecurity are key sources of such grievances.[30]

The Igbo as the main constituency of MASSOB have been discriminated significantly against in major political and economic regards: Since the end of the Civil War, there has never been a Nigerian president from Igbo origin, the Igbo have had limited access to top positions in federal governments and the armed forces (until only recently), and the South-East is Nigeria's only geopolitical zone consisting of five instead of six states. During the long years of military rule (1966–1979, 1983–1999) the North had dominated the federation. The 1999 democratization then improved the political position of the Yoruba, Ijaw, and many other ethnic groups but hardly benefitted the Igbo. Moreover, as probably the most widely dispersed ethnic group in Nigeria, Igbos are most affected by the discrimination against settlers in various states of the federation.[31] As 'settlers' in these states, they are banned from employment in the state administration, their communities receive fewer services, and they are disadvantaged in access to universities. Also, since the early 2000s Igbos who settle in the North are living under Sharia law. Although the Sharia has been rather symbolic than actually enforced, it remains a threat to their security. In fact, one of the main reasons for introducing the Sharia was to threaten Igbos and other Southerners in the North.[32] Since then also hundreds of Igbos (and other Southerners) were killed in the North in repeated rounds of rioting in Plateau and Kaduna states and, more recently, Boko Haram has become a constant source of insecurity.

As a result, Igbos are severely frustrated and aggrieved. This came out clearly in my interviews (see below) and can also be assessed from representative surveys by Afrobarometer[33]: During the mid-2000s, about 72 % of the Igbo respondents – as opposed to 30 % of the non-Igbo respondents – found that their group had less or much less political influence than other ethnic groups; 61 % of the Igbo respondents (non-Igbo respondents: 35 %) stated that their group's economic conditions were worse or much worse than those of others; finally, 64 % of the Igbo respondents (non-Igbo respondents: 32 %) saw their group as often or always treated unfairly by the government. These strong frustrations, many of which are based on factual inequalities and evident security threats, have fueled the rise of MASSOB. Moreover, they have made an armed struggle for Biafran independence probable.

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[30] *Stewart*, Horizontal Inequalities; *Halvard Buhaug/Lars-Erik Cederman/Kristian Skrede Gleditsch*, Square Pegs in Round Holes. Inequalities, Grievances, and Civil War, in: International Studies Quarterly 58, 2, 2014, 418–431.

[31] *Human Rights Watch*, 'They Do Not Own This Place', Government Discrimination Against 'Non-Indigenes' in Nigeria, 18, 3A, 2006, 18–19.

[32] *Harnischfeger*, Sharia, 126–130.

[33] The presented data is from the survey conducted in 2005, but very similar findings can also be found in the 2007 and 2008 surveys, see *Afrobarometer*, Nigeria Data, 6 Rounds (1999–2013), 2015, in: http://afrobarometer.org/data/328 (23 November 2018).

What often drives such discontent into warfare is repression against protest movements. Yet, repression can also deter protest.[34] To elucidate the circumstances under which repression ends or spurs protest, several arguments have been made: Repression escalates protest into violence if the repression is arbitrary rather than selective (e. g. if it addresses grassroots' activists or even uninvolved people instead of leaders and organizers), if it targets a movement that is already highly mobilized and committed to its cause, if the repression transgresses laws (e. g. killing protesters, detention without trial), and if the public sees the repression as unjustified.[35]

MASSOB has been heavily repressed ever since foundation. Reliable numbers are unavailable, but evidently hundreds of MASSOB activists were killed or injured by the Nigerian security forces, thousands (including virtually all of the movement's key leaders) were arrested and held in detention for some time, and MASSOB offices were often raided. From the theoretical standpoint, this repression has been highly escalating. Nigerian security forces have used excessive violence against the movement and in many instances operated inarbitrary manner. Those arrested or even killed had commonly engaged in merely non-violent MASSOB activities. Also, those detained were often held for months without trial and in harsh prison conditions that threatened their bare survival. Thus, the repression against MASSOB transgressed Nigerian laws in thousands of cases. As I found in interviews, many Igbos consider the harassment of MASSOB highly unjustified and evidence of the broader discrimination against Igbos. The repression, unsurprisingly, has radicalized many MASSOB activists and has readied some of them for a violent struggle.[36] Despite these strong grievances, however, the movement has not pursued armed insurgency.

Brief Summary

To sum up briefly, violent rebellion clearly is feasible in the case of MASSOB and there are strong grievances and escalating patterns of repression, which could have driven MASSOB into an armed campaign years ago. Hence, from the perspective of armed conflict research, the non-escalation remains puzzling. I argue that these theories fail to explain MASSOB's non-violent protest behavior

[34] Repression is the actual or threatened use of violent means by the state against its opponents, see *Davenport/Inman*, Repression, 620.

[35] *Audrey Kurth Cronin*, How Terrorism Ends, Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Princeton and Oxford 2009, 31–34, 142–144; *Mohammed M. Hafez/Quintan Wiktorowicz*, Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement, in: Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, 68–71.

[36] This was also reported by *Moses Metumara Duruji*, Resurgent Ethno-Nationalism and the Renewed Demand for Biafra in South-East Nigeria, in: National Identities 14, 4, 2012, 329–350, here 347.

because of their over-emphasis on macro-structural conditions and rationalist assumptions to the neglect of micro-dynamics and ideational aspects.[37] To address these analytical weaknesses, I propose to integrate the framing approach into armed conflict research.[38] Framing helps to understand how protest movements and the agents involved 'translate' structural conditions into mobilizing efforts, which, if convincing, can make people participate in collective action such as non-violent protest or violent insurgency. In this process, framing takes not only strategic considerations seriously, but also the cultural context of protest movements. In the remainder, the framing perspective is introduced and applied to the case of MASSOB to investigate how and why the movement has propagated non-violence.

Framing Analysis of MASSOB

To conduct a framing analysis of MASSOB, it is first of all necessary to give a brief introduction to framing and outline my sources and methodology.

The Framing Approach

Framing, as applied in social movement research, refers to strategic communication by social agents who as framers seek to mobilize people for collective action. For this purpose, framers use frames, which are schemes of interpretation that allow people "to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their livingspace and the world at large."[39] In other words, frames focus attention on particular aspects of the big picture of a complex social reality. The frames that seek to mobilize the audience for collective action (so-called collective action frames) typically encompass three dimensions[40]: The identification of a problem and its source (diagnostic framing), the propagation of a solution to the problem

[37] For similar criticism, see *Richard Jackson/Helen Dexter*, The Social Construction of Organised Political Violence. An Analytical Framework, in: Civil Wars 16, 1, 2014, 1–23.

[38] My colleagues and I discussed the utility of framing for the study of armed conflict more extensively in a special issue of *Civil Wars*, see *Tanja Granzow/Andreas Hasenclever/Jan Sändig*, Introduction. Framing Political Violence – A Micro-Approach to Civil War Studies, in: Civil Wars 17, 2, 2015, 113–119; *Jan Sändig*, Framing Protest and Insurgency. Boko Haram and MASSOB in Nigeria, in: Civil Wars 17, 2, 2015, 141–160; *Alexander De Juan/Andreas Hasenclever*, Framing Political Violence. Success and Failure of Religious Mobilization in the Philippines and Thailand, in: Civil Wars, 17, 2, 2015, 201–221. *Tanja Granzow*, Violent vs. Non-Violent Struggle. Investigating the Impact of Frames on Movement Strategies in Yemen, in: Civil Wars 17, 2, 2015, 161–180; *Anne Theobald*, Successful or Failed Rebellion? The Casamance Conflict from a Framing Perspective, in: Civil Wars 17, 2, 2015, 181–200.

[39] *Snow et al.*, Frame Alignment, 464.

[40] *Benford/Snow*, Framing Processes, 615–618.

and a concrete action plan (prognostic framing), and the (often emotional) call to people to participate in the protest (motivational framing).

Frames are not invented out of nowhere, but are developed in strategic and contested processes.[41] Framers play a major role in generating frames along their perceptions, convictions, and strategic interests. Moreover, their frames are shaped through discursive contestations with other framers (frame disputes). These framing processes involve agency, but they also occur amid structural circumstances, which enable and constrain interpretations of reality and the resonance of ideas among the addressed audience.[42] These circumstances encompass structural opportunities, evident inequalities and security threats, and pre-existing cultural elements (e. g. ideas, myths, narratives, symbols). Framing and the agency involved, thus, mediate between the context and the collective action of protest movements.[43] Therefore, scholars of armed conflict research can use framing as integrative micro-level mechanism that connects macro-structural conditions (such as Opportunity and Grievances) with cultural elements and agency to explain protest action at the micro-level.[44]

Collective action frames may also fail in motivating people to participate in movement activities. The concept of frame resonance allows assessment of whether frames are convincing and emotionally appealing, and thus have the potential to motivate people for taking part in collective action. Frames resonate if they are sufficiently congruent (frame alignment) with the political views, social expectations, and cultural context of the audience.[45] Furthermore, they resonate if they are internally consistent and relevant to the target group, and if the framers are perceived as credible and charismatic.[46] Finally, frames need to be emotionally appealing in order to resonate with the audience.[47] Assessing frame resonance, however, remains methodologically challenging.[48] To identify whether frames and framers are convincing and emotionally appealing toward

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[41] Ibid., 623–627.

[42] Ibid., Framing Processes, 614. *Marc W. Steinberg*, The Talk and Back Talk of Collective Action. A Dialogic Analysis of Repertoires of Discourse among Nineteenth-Century English Cotton Spinners, in: American Journal of Sociology 105, 3, 1999, 736–780.

[43] *Doug McAdam / John D. McCarthy / Mayer N. Zald*, Introduction. Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes – Towards a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements, in: Doug McAdam / John D. McCarthy / Mayer N. Zald (Ed.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, Cambridge et al. 1996, 5–6.

[44] *Marie-Eve Desrosiers*, Tackling Puzzles of Identity-Based Conflict. The Promise of Framing Theory, in: Civil Wars 17, 2, 2015, 120–140.

[45] *Snow et al.*, Frame Alignment, 464; *John A. Noakes / Hank Johnston*, Frames of Protest. A Road Map to a Perspective, in: Hank Johnston / John A. Noakes (Ed.), Frames of Protest. Social Movements and the Framing Perspective, Lanham et al. 2005, 1–29, 12–16.

[46] For limited space, this chapter leaves out examining framing consistency and the framers' credibility and charismatic appeal regarding MASSOB.

[47] *James Jasper*, The Emotions of Protest. Affective and Reactive Emotions In and Around Social Movements, in: Sociological Forum 13, 3, 1998, 397–424.

[48] *Noakes / Johnston*, Frames of Protest, 16.

their audience and whether the frames align with political attitudes and beliefs of those addressed, interviews can be conducted and further sources (e. g. media reporting, surveys, academic literature) used.

Regarding these sources and the methodology, I draw on a sample of 130 documents, which were used for identifying collective action frames. These documents are comprised of public speeches, statements to journalists, press releases, radio transcripts, and other publications mostly by the leadership of MASSOB proper and a few smaller Biafran organizations ranging from 2000 to 2014. To assess frame resonance, I conducted a total of 65 interviews and three focus group discussions with Igbos from all segments of the population, most importantly people from the general population, politicians, academics, journalists, and NGO workers. About one-third of the interviewees are grassroots' activists and leaders of the movement. Interviews with MASSOB leaders also served to retrace the processes of frame development. The interviews were carried out mostly during two field research visits to Abuja, Lagos, Enugu, Onitsha (Anambra State), and Owerri (Imo State) in November/December 2013 and November 2014.[49]

Based on this methodology, in the following I identify the collective action frames of MASSOB with a particular focus on the aspect of non-violence, review the processes of frame development, and assess the frame resonance among the audience.

MASSOB's Collective Action Frames

The movement's framing centers on the concepts of Biafra and non-violence, which span across all three dimensions of MASSOB's collective action frames. In terms of diagnostic framing, MASSOB's leaders define the political and economic discrimination of the Igbo, their insecurity in Nigeria, and the persistent repression against the movement as pressing problems. In this view, the Igbo are oppressed by the Hausa-Fulani/Northerners and their allies, namely the Yoruba and the Igbo political elite. The North is depicted as pursuing 'jihadism' against Igbos (who are Christians) for religious motivation, for punishing Igbos for the past break-away attempt of Biafra, and for maintaining control over the federal government and the oil revenues: "Nigeria (...) is in the interest of only the Northerners, the Hausa/Fulani hegemony."[50] Therefore, Igbos are subjected to 'marginalization' and insecurity: "Since the end of the war in 1970, our people are being killed on a daily basis. We are being marginalized both economically and politically. We have no meaningful infrastructure here

[49] Nine of the interviews were conducted during short research stays in London (August 2013) and Chicago (May 2014).

[50] Statement by the MASSOB founder Uwazuruike in *The News*, I Will Bury Nigeria, Lagos 2000, 10 April.

that equates our region with other parts of Nigeria."[51] Besides the economic and political discrimination, the movement's leaders strongly emphasize the continued security threats against Igbos. Especially the 'Sharia riots' of the early 2000s and more recently Boko Haram's attacks serve as examples to show that Igbos are not safe in Nigeria.

To free Igbos from oppression, in their prognostic framing MASSOB's leaders propagate that "Biafra is the answer".[52] Only independence under the umbrella of Biafra, they argue, will bring an end to the marginalization of the Igbo and will guarantee their security. The movement's leading figures propose that secession can be achieved through a legalistic, internationalized, and non-violent campaign.[53] The international community and the United Nations (UN), thus, are called for holding a referendum or roundtable which could facilitate the peaceful break-away of Biafra from Nigeria and also prevent another mass flight of Easterners as in 1966.

The principle of non-violence has been at the heart of the strategy for Biafra. Three main arguments for non-violencepermeate the reviewed statements by MASSOB's leaders.[54] Firstly, non-violence is framed as a revision of the past warfare for Biafra. Since armed rebellion did not work, the movement's leaders argue, the renewed struggle needs to be pursued by peaceful means. Secondly, non-violence is depicted as a necessary component of the legalistic and internationalized campaign approach to win the support of the international community that is more favorable to non-violent protest. Finally, the movement's leaders align the struggle with that of successful non-violent protest movements and their figureheads, most importantly Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Nelson Mandela. Uwazuruike commonly depicts himself in their footsteps, thereby highlighting his firm commitment to non-violence. These three arguments for non-violence can be found in many public statements by the MASSOB leaders. For instance, Uwazuruike referred to all of them when explaining in a media interview that

"the principle of MASSOB is non-violence (...) This principle was borne out of the fact that in 1967–70, we embarked on the struggle for Biafra through violence and we couldn't make

[51] Mission statement by the Biafra Zionist Movement (an offspring of MASSOB), see *BZM*, The Republic of Biafra, An Ally & Supporter of Israel, 2013, in: http://biafrazionistmovement.org/index.html (1 October 2013).

[52] *Ralph Uwazuruike*, Being the Address Presented by Chief Ralph Uwazuruike on the First Anniversary of the Declaration of the Independence of the New Biafra State. Speech held at Aba, Abia State, 2001, 22 May, in: http://www.biafraland.com/New%20Biafra%20anniversary.htm (23 November 2018).

[53] For example, see *Ralph Uwazuruike*, The Aba Declaration, The Birth of New Biafra, Speech held at Aba, Abia State, 2000, 22 May, in: http://www.kwenu.com/biafra/massob/aba_declaration.htm (13 April 2016).

[54] All of them can be found in Uwazuruike's book dedicated to non-violence, see *Ralph Uwazuruike*, Fundamental Principles of Non-Violence, Enugu, Nigeria 2008.

a headway. I reasoned it was not the proper way of agitating for a sovereign nation as recognized by the world body (UN). Self-determination is defined in the articles of the United Nations. But United Nations as a body is opposed to violence and killing of people. I saw that through mass movement like this, India like other nations obtained independence."[55]

In their motivational framing, MASSOB's leaders depict Biafra as desirable and make emotional appeals to sustain non-violence. In many statements, they frame Biafra not as immediate and urgent but as a long-term project. Biafra is the dream and hope for a safe and prosperous future: "Standing here today we cannot give us any fail-proof roadmap of how we'll reach that better place beyond the horizon, the Land of our dreams, but we know and can assure you that we'll get there."[56] The impression of the struggle as a historical mission is also created by religious appeals. For example, the speakers liken the campaign with that of the Israelites and refer to Igbos as 'chosen people' striving for the 'promised land'. Concomitantly, the movement's leaders highlightthe need for patience, perseverance, and sacrifice. For instance, they teach activists that the hardship of repression is not evidence of failure but of success, because it shows Nigeria's fear of MASSOB.[57] By de-emphasizing urgency, shaping Biafra as a long-term dream, and underlining the importance of patience and perseverance, these motivational frames sustain non-violence.

There have also been occasional threats and calls for waging armed rebellion. Generally, MASSOB's speakers and Uwazuruike himself have not entirely ruled out armed means but always emphasized that their use is legitimate only in the very constrained circumstances of self-defense. In contrast, some less prominent leaders of other Biafran organizations have made belligerent statements, some of which can be read as efforts of mobilizing Igbos for violent struggle. For example, in 2013 the radical youth group Biafra National Youth League (BNYL) threatened:

"The Igbo are good in manufacturing weapons. We already have our own explosive device called 'OGBUNIGWE' meaning 'to kill in mass'. It was produced during the Biafran war. If this killings continue, Our boys will not hesitate to handle the Ogbunigwe."[58]

In another inciting statement, in March 2014 the leader of the Biafra Zionist Movement, Benjamin Onwuka, posed an ultimatum to Nigeria: "Nigeria must vacate Biafra. Failure to do so, there is going to be bloodbath [sic] (...) Biafra has

[55] *The Guardian*, I Advocate The Soviet Example, Not National Conference For Nigeria [Chief Ralph Uwazurike spoke with Charles Ogugbuaja], Lagos 2004, 25 September.

[56] *BILIE*, BILIE Inaugural Speech, 2011, 29 October, in: http://bilie.org/BILIEInauguralSpeech.aspx (13 April 2016).

[57] *Uwazuruike*, Non-Violence, 127–138.

[58] *BNYL*, Biafra Youth Alarmed Over Senseless Killings, 2013, 17 May, in: http://www.modernghana.com/news/464433/1/biafra-youth-alarmed-over-senseless-killings.html (23 November 2018).

risen. I am calling our people to support the quest for Biafra independence."[59] Yet, most of the senior leaders of MASSOB proper and other Biafran organizations have constantly countered such calls by re-emphasizing the need for non-violence. Whenever violent incidents occurred, they swiftly made statements to denounce the use of arms or declare the attackers dissociate from the movement. For example, during the Onitsha crisis in mid-2006 MASSOB speakers made public statements to appease activists: "We appeal to our members in Onitsha in particular and Anambra State in general not to retaliate, no matter the extent of provocation, in the interest of peace."[60] In the following part, I investigate why MASSOB has so strongly propagated non-violence.

Frame Development

To investigate MASSOB's frame development, I focus mostly on the early stage of the struggle and on the key figures, who shaped the core elements of the collective action frames, which then became widely popularized among the Igbo audience. There are three main sources of the non-violence frame: The Igbo's war experience (cultural context), the perception of international law and norms (political opportunities at the international level), and the personal convictions and strategic considerations of the movement leaders. As I show in the following, the framers oriented their claims-making along structural circumstances, but there has also been much agency involved through their perceptions, strategic interest, and convictions.

Firstly, the cultural context and in particular the Igbo's past experience with Biafra played an important role in relying on non-violence. When founding MASSOB, the leaders adopted non-violence to dissociate the movement from the past rebellion for Biafra. At his first major public appearance in May 2000, Uwazuruike expressed that "[t]he memory of the past civil war stares us in the face. (...) We are now faced with the problem of convincing our people that the quest for the new Biafra will not cause another war."[61] One of his co-founders explained similarly that "[t]he events of the war are still fresh in our minds, like when you see the Kwashiokor pictures. You hear stories of people who were driven out of their homes, (...) stories of mass graves and bombs dropped at marketplaces and church buildings."[62] A 1999 survey among Igbos confirms how widely prevailing this collective memory was at the time: About 60 % stated they had personally

[59] *Vanguard*, We seized Enugu Govt House for 4 Hours, says Onwuka, BZM leader, Lagos 2014, 13 March.

[60] *Vanguard*, MASSOB Supports Gov Obi on Plans to Expel Miscreants From Parks, Lagos 2006, 31 July.

[61] *Uwazuruike*, Aba Declaration.

[62] Extract from an interview with Prince Orjiakor (MASSOB's former deputy leader from 1999–2002), as cited by *Okonta*, Biafran Ghosts, 40.

experienced the war and described it as "horrible."[63] This collective experience with warfare made non-violence culturally appropriate as the new strategy for Biafra . In addition, the framers' agency played an important role in producing the non-violence frame. At the time of MASSOB's foundation, there had not been a public debate on what happened during Biafra, why it happened, and how to cope with the past. Thus, the movement's founders were more influenced by their own experience with Biafra than by any public discourse on the issue. Uwazuruike himself experienced the war as a child at the age of nine to twelve and lost a sister due to the war-related illness Kwashiorkor.[64] These experiences made him skeptical of the utility of violence for achieving major political change.

Secondly, MASSOB's framers were also influenced by a broader change towards norms of peaceful conflict resolution in the international system.[65] The movement leaders oriented MASSOB along the preference of the international community, in particular the UN, for non-violent and rights-based approaches. Uwazuruike stated that the "world today is moving in the direction of non violence", that "the International Community views with concern the activities of despots who use iron fists", and that it "views with contempt the use of arms to dismantle a democratically elected Government in any country."[66] Indeed, since the end of the Cold War there has been a broader structural change in the international system toward non-violent conflict resolution, legalism, and human security. These ideas have diffused to many parts of the Global South. Nevertheless, the movement leaders' agencymattered strongly for the frame development. It was their perception of the international arena, which made them emphasize non-violence, legalism, and internationalization. They could as well have been influenced by the persistently high number of armed conflicts in the world or by cases of successful violent campaigns.

Thirdly, personal convictions and strategic considerations by the MASSOB leaders also played a role in their choice of non-violence. When founding MASSOB, Uwazuruike and the co-founders followed the examples of Gandhi and other icons of non-violent protest. Uwazuruike himself had studied law in India and was much inspired by Gandhi. He expressed to have "tried to imitate Mahatma Gandhi himself."[67] In my interview, he explained how Gandhi but also the past war experience shaped his convictions about non-violence:

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[63] *International Committee of the Red Cross*, Country Report Nigeria, ICRC Worldwide Consultation on the Rules of War, Report by Greenberg Research, Inc. 1999, 3–4.

[64] *Ralph Uwazuruike*, The Struggle for Freedom, Vol. 1, 1958–2004, Lagos, Nigeria 2004, 17.

[65] For a detailed analysis of MASSOB's alignment with the UN, the human rights framework, and global norms of non-violent conflict resolution, see *Jan Sändig/Tanja Granzow*, Aligning with the UN. Nonviolent Self-Determination Movements in the Global South, in: Journal of Global Security Studies, 3, 3, 2018, 322–338.

[66] *Uwazuruike*, Freedom, 83–86.

[67] Ibid., 32.

"I studied Mahatma Gandhi in India. (…) I learned that Mahatma Gandhi was a lawyer. Therefore, I studied law after finishing political sciences. I saw that the violence through Ojukwu [Biafra's leader during the Civil War; JS] could not solve it, so I learned in the library that Mahatma Gandhi could achieve independence through non-violence. (…) Having studied Gandhi, I know the potency of non-violence. Because at the end of the day, even when you fight in a battlefield and kill so many, you must still come to the roundtable and discuss. (…) You cannot solve the problems by fighting, you have to sit together and talk, discuss the issues."[68]

Furthermore, the movement's framers pursued strategic calculations by copying the protest strategy of the very successful Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). MOSOP is based among the small ethnic group of the Ogoni in the Niger Delta and was formed in 1990. The movement quickly won huge international attention for the Ogoni who have suffered from the environmental impacts of oil exploration and from repression. MASSOB developed its acronym along the lines of MOSOP and followed MOSOP's protest strategy in main aspects such as internationalization, the choice of a rights-based approach, and the pursuit of non-violence.[69]

To sum up, their past experiences with rebellion for Biafra, their perceptions of the international community as disapproving of warfare, and their personal convictions and strategic considerations explain why the founders and key framers of MASSOB have propagated non-violence. In the following, I examine why these frames have resonated and effectively mobilized Igbos for collective action, whereas calls for armed rebellion have not.

Frame Resonance

The collective action frames have resonated strongly with the general Igbo population (though not with the Igbo elite, as discussed below). Within a short time, MASSOB became a mass movement, in large part for the resonance of the collective action frames.

The diagnostic framing aligns well with the omnipresent belief among Igbos that there is indeed a Northern conspiracy against them and with the outrage about this discrimination. The claim that the Igbo are 'marginalized' finds support by virtually everyone, even by the political elite who dismisses the struggle for Biafra. Igbos tend to perceive Hausa-Fulani and the Muslim North as threatening enemies. Typical statements by the interviewees were: "I am oppressed because I am an Igbo man"; "The Northerners think that they were born to rule"; and "I believe that if this country is divided, there will be peace."[70] he motivation-

[68] Interview with Ralph Uwazuruike, 27 November 2014, Owerri.

[69] *Okonta*, Biafran Ghosts, 36–37.

[70] Such interview statements, which are referred to as 'typical', have been made by so many interviewees that they are quoted without indicating the source.

al framing has also been powerful: There is great longing for Biafra and secession from Nigeria among the general Igbo population. Most interviewees strongly believed in the feasibility and desirability of Biafra's independence. As expressed by one respondent, "Biafra is a model state where the people will rely on themselves to show that Africa, if left alone, can do something. (…) [I]t might even be better than Europe."[71] This utopian vision may appear strange considering the history of Biafra as a short-lived state and place of extreme suffering. Yet, most Igbos have only little knowledge about the Civil War, which allowed Biafra-glorifying narratives to spread.

MASSOB's strategy of a legalistic and internationalized campaign for Biafra has convinced many among its audience. Interview respondents typically expressed that "the mistake in the first war was that we did not have international support" and that "with international support, we get our freedom." The prognostic framing, thus, aligns with the past war experience in which Biafra fought on its own against overwhelming opponents. Already during the Civil War, Biafran leaders strongly pronounced the need for international assistance to sustain independence.[72] The strategy of internationalization, as propagated by MASSOB's leaders, therefore, is congruent to established political beliefs among the Igbo. Moreover, it aligns with the Igbo's cultural and political orientation towards the West. They tend to see the US and Europe as role models with regard to democracy, economic development, and the rule of law. Finally, many interviewees expressed to find it credible that there are legal mechanisms in international law to achieve secession without an armed struggle.

The strategy of non-violence also has strong appeal. Virtually all interviewed proponents of Biafra underlined the need for non-violent means. Typically, they even referred to the very same examples that MASSOB leaders also use (e. g. Gandhi, Mandela) to emphasize that non-violence is powerful and can effect major political change. For example, one interviewee expressed that "[w]hen you are pushed to the wall, violence naturally becomes your response. However, violence is not the best answer. Look at Martin Luther King or Gandhi in India, they achieved their aims without violence."[73] To be sure, many are severely disaffected and some interviewees openly stated their willingness for an armed struggle for Biafra. Yet, it is striking that MASSOB has reached many people and spread the belief about the power of non-violence. Again, the past war experience contributes to the resonance of non-violence. One interviewee put it as follows: "Nobody is ready to go to confrontation and to fight anymore. The main thing that the Igbo are suffering is because of that war [sic]. Whatever way we do it today, we do not

[71] Interview with an academic lecturer, 27 November 2013, Abuja.

[72] *Nicholas Ibeawuchi Omenka*, Blaming the Gods. Christian Religious Propaganda in the Nigeria-Biafra War, in: Journal of African History 51, 3, 2010, 367–389.

[73] Interview, Journalist, 25 November 2014, Onitsha.

want to do it that way again."[74] While this may overstate the Igbo's opposition to violence, still many interviewees cited the past war to express their reluctance in another violent campaign.

Interviews with MASSOB activists showed that the resonance of the collective action frames generally was the key reason for them to join the struggle. Overall, adherents – much like Igbos from the general population – expressed that they are highly frustrated about the continued discrimination against Igbos and MASSOB, that they see the secession of Biafra as the only solution, and that they follow the idea of non-violence. Most interviewed activists were entirely convinced that Biafra can be achieved with international assistance and through non-violence. As one explained, "[i]t's not that we are very weak. But we listen to the voices of our leaders. They say don't fight, don't retaliate."[75] Besides the political goals, other possible motivations appear to play only minor roles for movement participation. The only available survey among MASSOB members (n=100) shows that the political program by far ranked first (89 %; multiple answers allowed) as a reason for joining, followed by expectations of improved security (26 %) and well-being (i. e. employment or cash; only 5–6 %).[76] In general, MASSOB does not distribute money to its adherents and coordinators. On the contrary, these are asked to contribute financially and organizationally to protest activities. Moreover, the movement does not use force to compel people to participate or to prevent them from exiting. In short, frame resonance rather than economic incentives or coercion explain movement participation.

While the propagation of non-violence by the movements' key figures has resonated widely with Igbos and the activists, the occasional calls for a violent struggle made by leaders of Biafran fringe organizations have not resonated. Although some interviewed activists expressed doubts about continuing non-violently, especially in the face of the repression and killings of Igbos by Boko Haram, most still believed in peaceful protest. What underlies much of the resonance of non-violence, however, is not detailed knowledge about what happened during the Civil War and a strong narrative that this must never again happen. Most Igbo youths have only very vague ideas of the war, and even 45 years after the war's end the topic is still not publicly debated. This silencing of Biafra's history in Nigeria allowed war-glorifying narratives to spread in Igboland recently. Therein, the Civil War is portrayed as a success and evidence of the prowess and fighting strength of the Igbo. Two interviewees from the general population expressed that "once Igbos take up arms, the country is over."[77] he

[74] Interview, 4 December 2013, Lagos.

[75] Interview with a mid-level leader, 2 December 2013, Lagos.

[76] *Moses Metumara Duruji*, Ethnic Militias and Sub-Nationalism in Nigeria. A Comparative Study of MASSOB and OPC, Dissertation at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Covenant University, Ota (Nigeria) 2010, 166.

[77] Interview, 20 November 2014, Enugu.

Civil War generally provides a huge cultural stock of songs, symbols, and stories, which could be exploited to rally Igbos for an armed struggle. However, so far Uwazuruike and other senior figures of the struggle have successfully propagated the need for non-violence. They have been highly credible in making this claim and their frames have aligned well with the still widespread war reluctance and Igbos' admiration of the West and the international community, which many of them see as advocates of non-violence.

While popular among the masses, the movement has failed to win the Igbo elite for the new Biafran struggle. High-ranking Igbo politicians and business persons generally share MASSOB's concern about the persisting 'marginalization' of the Igbo and their insecurity in Nigeria. Many of them also find the vision of independence from Nigeria appealing. Still, as found in the interviews, for three reasons most of the Igbo elite have not publicly supported MASSOB: Firstly, secessionism runs contrary to their economic interest. While Nigeria fails the masses, it 'works' for the leaders who profit from the distribution of oil revenues through patronage networks. Furthermore, the elite holds huge business investments throughout the country, which would be threatened by an escalating secessionist campaign. Secondly, MASSOB's struggle may become a threat to their own security since the movement declared leading Igbo politicians part of the problem. Thirdly, the Igbo elite is aware that in the present international system the obstacles for secession are very high. To them, MASSOB's claim that secession could be granted by the international community without waging war is wishful thinking. They are aware of the continued international support for a united Nigeria, which makes them skeptical of secessionism.

To sum up, MASSOB's framing that the Igbo are disadvantaged and threatened, that Biafra is the solution to the problem, and that it can be achieved through a legalistic, internationalized, and non-violent campaign resonates strongly with the general Igbo population. The resonance of these frames explains why so many have joined MASSOB and why the struggle has remained non-violent.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I show that the analysis of framing processes can contribute significantly to explaining why societal groups, who perceive themselves disadvantaged and threatened by others, respond either by violence or non-violence. By the help of framing, meaning-making processes at the micro-level can be examined, agency is brought in, and cultural context is taken into account. Thereby, conflict escalation and non-escalation can be examined with regard to how opportunities are exploited, how grievances and protest strategies are constructed, and how cultural elements become part of mobilization efforts. As the case of MASSOB illustrates, this can elucidate why structural circumstances, which may

make armed rebellion probable, can also be mediated into non-violent protest behaviors. With their focus on structural opportunities and patterns of inequality and insecurity, many scholars of armed conflict research have missed these meaning-making processes, which nevertheless can be crucial for the choice of protest behaviors.

Despite strong grievances and opportunities for violent insurgency, MASSOB has propagated and pursued a non-violent, rights-based, and internationalized struggle for Biafra. These collective action frames were developed based on the cultural context of the Igbo and their historically-founded reluctance in fighting another war for Biafra, the perception of international norms and legal mechanisms as providing an opportunity for peaceful conflict resolution, and the personal convictions of the movement leaders and their strategic considerations. These collective action frames have been hugely compelling to the general Igbo population (though not to the Igbo elite). This resonant framing has mobilized millions of Igbos to sympathize with or actively support the movement and has prevented the escalation of the conflict into armed rebellion. Calls for violence by lesser known movement leaders have not resonated among the Igbo public. This is in large part because the propagation of non-violence by MASSOB's key figures has aligned more neatly with the political attitudes of the Igbo than the calls for an armed struggle. To many Igbos and most grassroots' activists it has been highly convincing that non-violence is the only option after the unsuccessful past war for Biafra, that it is a powerful 'weapon', and that there indeed are legal mechanisms at the international level through which secession can be achieved. In short, the movement has successfully popularized the idea among Igbos that major social change can be achieved without recourse to violent means.

II. Urban Unrest, Power and the Internal Dynamics of Social Change, c. 1050–1550

Introduction

Klaus Ridder

The papers in this section treat social change, not starting from long phases of transition but by focussing on urban riots, concentrated both in space and in time. A special emphasis is placed on factors that allowed actors and institutions to assert specific interpretations of riots and to strengthen their claim to the legitimacy of their social and political actions, by means of which they attempted to enforce long-term structural change. Public debate about the phenomenon of unrest in media of symbolic communication (e. g. in narrative or in theatre) is an important factor in this. Two of the three papers (both by historians) draw attention to the interdependence of spontaneous riots as indicators of threatened orders and social change as long-term process of transformation of institutions and communities. In contrast, the third paper, by a literary historian does not treat specific historical instances of riots, but is concerned with late medieval Shrovetide plays, which were seen as periodically recurring disruptive factors in urban societies.

In his contribution, Thomas Kohl illuminates the (re)appearance of urban populations as political actors in the eleventh and twelfth centuries (*Violence, Power and Social Change: European Cities c. 1050–1120*). Urban unrest and uprisings appear in the context of political uncertainty and instability. Very often, these were accompanied by violence, but at the same time they contributed to the formation of urban identity and emancipation (in the sense of an expansion of the population's rights). The weakness of political actors and the resulting atmosphere of crisis made it the necessity for the urban population to act for themselves. The author shows this using the examples of Augsburg and Le Mans, the difference between the cases lying in the fact that a commune formed in Le Mans, but not in Augsburg. It was craftsmen and traders especially who not only commanded influence through their wealth, but also acted together as a group and were thus able to exert pressure on the authorities. Some rulers quickly took note of the new urban political powers and vied for their support.

Finally, Thomas Kohl asks about the narrative perspectives in the sources. Clerical authors treated the urban population in differentiated ways: words like *cives* (citizens), *urbani*, *burgenses* and *populus* (people) did not have negative connotations. This implies that the authors were not critical per se of collective political actions, but accepted them as part of the political system and sometimes even

identified with these groups. Often these authors distinguish between the lower strata of urban society, *turba* (mass), *plebs* oder *vulgus* (mob), and other citizens, usually placing the blame for unrest on the former. Communes especially are judged negatively, and are seen as threats to social order. Harsh punishments for their deeds support this view.

Hannah Skoda's contribution (*Threats and Violence: Town-gown Conflicts in later Medieval Oxford, Paris and Heidelberg*) treats the conditions of social change drawing on the examples of late medieval universities. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, several new universities were founded and the students' social background as well their career paths underwent a profound transformation. In addition, universities and the political field became more integrated.

Relations between the university and the surrounding population were often tense and accompanied by massive legal and economic conflicts of interest that resulted in periodic outbreaks of violence. Three factors appear to have determined whether violence lead to social change or not: The support of a powerful monarch for one party, clear ideas about the nature of social order on the part of the university and the general effectiveness of the narrative depiction of events. In her comparative study of the three universities of Oxford, Paris and Heidelberg, Skoda focusses on three events: The St Scholastica Day massacre in Oxford in 1355, the fight between students and the nobleman Charles de Savoisy in Paris in 1404 and the Heidelberg 'students' war' of 1406.

Shrovetide and shrovetide-plays were recurrent yearly elements of disorder. Beatrice von Lüpke's contribution (*The Nuremberg Shrovetide Plays and their Perception of Social (Dis-)Order*) drawing on the example of one specific play analyses this phenomenon. This play from Nuremberg titled 'Die Fastnacht vor Gericht' ('Shrovetide on trial') is remarkable because in it, the personification of Shrovetide itself is judged in court. It is accused of disrupting social order by plaintiffs representing the nobility, citizens, craftsmen, peasants and women. In the play, the criticism levelled against Shrovetide is turned on the orders of society. In particular the play's writer accuses the nobility of neglecting its duties and of living at the expense of the lower echelons of society. What begins as a depiction of hierarchical urban structure thus turns into a universal criticism of human behaviour and of status-driven arrogance (shown to be ridiculous with reference to Adam as original father and as a peasant. The play thus formulates a frequently cited motive in early modern peasant uprisings. This latter aspect was possibly a reaction to attempts at regulating or even prohibiting Shrovetide theatre. In any case, it demonstrates that the plays – as collective events in the cities – drew on societal fissures and disharmony, sometimes even pointing them out in the first place, as issues to be implicitly and explicitly discussed and negotiated in times of change.

All three contributions see links between social change and supposedly isolated collective uprisings. What appear as mere collective excesses of violence in the

sources, and thus judged as positive or negative, were possibly (from a historical perspective) also focal points of long-term transformation. These events and their relation to social change may be approached by studying traditional historical sources, but also through literary texts that propagate alternative concepts of social order.

Violence, Power and Social Change: European Cities c. 1050–1120

Thomas Kohl

The eleventh and twelfth centuries saw the emergence of a new type of urbanity in central and western Europe. For the first time since the end of Antiquity, the inhabitants of the rapidly growing towns and cities became relevant political actors within the realms of Europe. Modern historiography has rightly seen the formation of urban communes as an important factor in this development, but this paper argues that a wider perspective, taking into account all documented common actions by urban populations, may provide a more comprehensive picture of the social and political changes of the period. These common actions were always violent, and they usually happened in the context of wider spread unrest and political turmoil. This perspective links the development of an urban identity with the debate on the "invention of the crowd" in the eleventh century.[1]

One very vivid example, which shows the volatility of the situation and the readiness of the urban population to collectively raise arms, is to be found in a text from Augsburg in Southern Germany from the life of Abbot Egino of the local monastery of Saint Ulrich and Afra written in 1121:

The people of Augsburg had gathered to celebrate the day of the dedication of the church of Saint Ulrich and Afra, the main city saints. While the abbot was celebrating mass and preaching, a member of the crowd, who was possessed by demons, began to cry out so loudly that the people gathered in the church no longer paid attention to the preaching abbot. Some bystanders tried to calm down the possessed person, but the devil – speaking through him or her, said: "Why do you attempt to silence me, when you will soon see how useful my warning was?" In that very moment everyone in the church suddenly became aware of a knight running through the crowd, looking and acting as if he had come directly from a battle, crying out that the city was being attacked by enemies. Because the people did not trust the sanctity of churches, the unarmed people fled from the church, procured weapons from the suburban population and rushed to the suspected battle place. When they arrived there, however, there was no enemy to

[1] *Robert I. Moore,* Familiy, Community and Cult on the Eve of the Gregorian Reform, in: Transactions of the Royal Historical Society Ser. 5, 30, 1980, 49–60. Recently, *Shane Bobrycki* has challenged this view and pointed to the importance of earlier medieval crowds (The Flailing Women of Dijon. Crowds in Ninth-Century Europe, in: Past & Present 240, 2018, 1–40).

be found, and they returned to the church to find the mendacious knight, but he was nowhere to be found and had vanished like a transfiguration.[2]

This episode, set in about 1111 – a decade before it was put into writing by the monk Uodalschalk – addresses a number of themes that are central for European urban history in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It also reflects the overarching theme of this volume, the perception of threat and social change. The people rushing from the church obviously felt seriously threatened. Social change, however, is harder to grasp but it is there nevertheless: The fact that here the urban population is presented as a group acting together. This was something new in eleventh and early twelfth century Europe.[3] The first part of this paper will therefore treat the emergence, or perhaps better the reemergence, of urban populations as political and sometimes military actors, drawing on some German and French examples. In almost all cases, the populace of a city is first mentioned as an acting group in the context of violent events: urban unrest, riots, uprisings or military actions. Secondly, the paper will treat the members of these urban groups as far as they can be identified in the sources. Who were the individuals and groups who were able to represent *the* urban population, or at least could be framed in the sources as *the* urban population – from within the city or from the outside?

[2] Uodalscalki de Eginone et Herimanno c. 7, ed. *Philipp Jaffé*, MGH SS 12, Hannover 1856, 432–448, here 435–36: "In huius nostri dedicatione templi praefato patre (sc. Egino) verbum vitae ad populum aliquando faciente, quidam daemonio vexatus magnis coepit perstrepere vocibus, ita ut magis ad eum compescendum quam ad verbum audiendum occuparetur vulgus. Tum subito hostis humani generis: *Quid, inquit, me tantopere sedatis, cum post paululum, quam utili circumferar negotio, videatis?* Haec nobis audientibus cunctosque pro viribus ab eo qui mendax ab initio fuerat avertentibus, ecce cruentatum militem quasi ex acie fugientem per medium populi cernimus discurrentem, atque urbem ab hostibus captam terribili clamore nuntiantem. Flebilis omnium vociferatio, nulla fugientium expectatio, domus Dei asylum posse fieri desperatur, dum et inerme vulgus egreditur; a suburbanis arma rapiuntur, ad locum certaminis properatur, in se quaeque ruunt, nec hostem quem feriant inveniunt. Tandem in se reversi, sathanae insidias cognoscunt, mendosum militem requirunt, sed reperire, ut puta evanescente fantasmatis transfiguratione, nequeunt. Quae illusio quamquam ex cuius acciderit peccato nesciatur a, tamen quotiens ad audiendum verbum divinum congregamur, ne aliorsum intendamus, in commune per hoc factum exhortamur." (I am grateful to Philipp Stahlhut for a discussion of this text).

[3] There is no lack of studies on the urban history of eleventh and twelfth century Europe, classic examples are *Edith Ennen,* The Medieval Town (Europe in the Middle Ages, Selected Studies 15), Amsterdam / New York 1979, originally published in German in 1972 under the title "Die europäische Stadt des Mittelalters". See also her comparative overview: *Edith Ennen,* Bischof und mittelalterliche Stadt. Die Entwicklung in Oberitalien, Frankreich und Deutschland, in: Bernhard Kirchgässner / Wolfram Baer (Eds.), Stadt und Bischof. 24. Arbeitstagung in Augsburg, 15.–17. November 1985, Sigmaringen 1988, 29–42. A more recent overview may be found in *David Nicholas,* The Growth of the Medieval City. From Late Antiquity to the Early Fourteenth Century (A History of Urban Society in Europe), London 1997. For the communal movement, *Albert Vermeesch,* Essai sur les origines et la signification de la commune dans le nord de la France (XIe et XIIe siècles) (Études présentées a la Commission Internationale pour l'Histoire des Assemblées d'États 30), Heule 1966, remains central.

The third section of this paper will briefly treat the sources that tell us about the political actions of the urban groups and their narrative treatment of the political actions. While clerical authors very often saw these deeds as wrong, dangerous and as serious threats to social order, others, such as Uodalschalk, the author of the life of Egino of Saint Ulrich and Afra in Augsburg, were less critical and seem to have taken them for granted.

The Emergence of Urban Groups

The eleventh and twelfth centuries witnessed a rapid growth of cities and towns throughout Europe. This development brought with it the (re)emergence of the urban populace as political actors. From the second half of the eleventh century onward they increasingly appear in the sources, starting in Italy with the *pataria*, a popular movement in Milan directed at clergy seen as unchaste and given to simony[4], but which quickly moved across the Alps to the Rhineland and Northern and Western France. In 1066, the citizens of Trier refused to elect a candidate who had been presented to them as their new archbishop and instead captured and killed him.[5] In 1067, the citizens of Angers, the capital of the county of Anjou in Western France, rose and killed several military leaders and the city's provost, who, fighting for the count's younger brother, had conquered the city and captured Count Geoffrey the Bearded. The count was released and the civil war between the brothers was temporarily halted.[6] In 1069/1070, the citizens of Le Mans united against Geoffroy of Mayenne, who had imposed high taxes on the city, and forced him to drop his claims[7], in 1073/74 the citizens of Worms on the Rhine expelled their bishop and opened the gates for King Henry IV, who was on the verge of losing the civil war against the Saxons, in 1074 the citizens of Cologne drove their bishop out of the city and plundered his possessions after he confiscated a trader's boat to entertain a guest.[8] In 1077, the citizens of Cambrai refused to let the bishop return to his see[9]; in the same year the citizens of Mainz

[4] See on the *pataria: Olaf Zumhagen,* Religiöse Konflikte und kommunale Entwicklung. Mailand, Cremona, Piacenza und Florenz zur Zeit der Pataria (Städteforschung, Reihe A. Darstellungen 58), Köln 2002, 26–128.

[5] Vita et passio Conradi archiepiscopi, ed. *Georg Waitz,* MGH SS 8, Hannover 1848, 212–219.

[6] Annales qui dicuntur Rainaldi archidiaconi Sancti Mauricii Andegavensis, in: Recueil d'annales Angevines et Vendômois, ed. *Louis Halphen*, (Collection des Textes 37), Paris 1903, 80–90, at 87, ad a. 1067, see for this *Winfield Scott Jessee,* Urban Violence and the Coup d'État of Fulk le Réchin in Angers, 1067, in: Haskins Society Journal: Studies in Medieval History 7 1995, 75–82.

[7] Actus pontificum Cenomannis in urbe degentium, ed. *Gustave Busson/Ambroise Ledru* (Archives historiques du Maine 2), Le Mans 1901, at 377–378, see below, p. 70–71.

[8] Lampert of Hersfeld, Annales, ed. *Oswald Holder-Egger* (MGH SS rer. Germ. 38), Hannover 1894, ad a. 1074, 185–187.

[9] Gesta episcoporum Cameracensium Continuatio, ed. *Ludwig C. Bethmann*, in: MGH SS 6, Hannover 1846, 489–511, here c. 2, 498.

rebelled against the coronation of anti-king Rudolf of Swabia and forced him, and the archbishop who crowned him, to leave the city[10], in 1087, the citizens of Augsburg repelled an attack on their city.[11] In 1088, the population of Metz rose against Emperor Henry IV in support of their bishop[12] and in 1092 the citizens of Constance, too, managed to drive out attackers planning to introduce a new bishop in their city.[13] This list could easily be expanded, but the examples presented here already make it clear enough that urban populations appeared on the scene, not merely as crowds but also as political actors throughout northwestern continental Europe, quite suddenly from the 1060s onwards and that their appearance was accompanied by violence.

The expansion of cities throughout Europe in the eleventh century is of course well known and has been called the "urban revolution."[14] It is generally seen as part of the expansion of the European economy during this period, as part of a fortunate cycle involving the growth of the population as a whole, the development of new agricultural techniques, the expansion of long-distance and local trade as well as communication networks, and massive building programs in the cities (mainly churches and monasteries, but also city walls).[15] All these factors, together with improved climatic conditions, supporting and reinforcing each other, contributed to a massive growth of urban populations. This was a necessary precondition for their partial political emancipation.

It has long been recognized that an important feature of the development of political identity and beginning, if limited self-government was the formation of the first communes, a specific form of sworn association. These communes were not unlike guilds in which the participants, perceived as equals, promised to act together and keep peace. In doing this, they followed the example of other *coniurationes*, sworn associations that had been formed mainly during emergencies such as invasions since the ninth century and which were also present in the Peace of God movement since the late tenth century.[16] Associations based

[10] Berthold of Reichenau, Chronicle, ed. *Ian Stuart Robinson*, Die Chroniken Bertholds von Reichenau und Bernolds von Konstanz (MGH Scriptores N. S. 14), Hannover 2003, ad a. 1077, 269. The citizens of nearby Worms did the same when Rudolf and his entourage moved there.

[11] Augsburger Annalen ad a. 1087, 132.

[12] *Bernold of Constance*, Chronicle, ed. *Ian Stuart Robinson*, Die Chroniken Bertholds von Reichenau und Bernolds von Konstanz (MGH Scriptores N. S. 14), Hannover 2003, ad a. 1088, 469.

[13] Casuum sancti Galli Continuatio anonyma, ed. *Heidi Leuppi*, Zürich 1987, c. 33, 170.

[14] *Robert I. Moore,* The First European Revolution, c. 970–1215 (The Making of Europe), Oxford / Malden, 2000.

[15] *Frank G. Hirschmann,* Stadtplanung, Bauprojekte und Großbaustellen im 10. und 11. Jahrhundert. Vergleichende Studien zu den Kathedralstädten westlich des Rheins, (Monographien zur Geschichte des Mittelalters 43), Stuttgart 1998.

[16] For the ninth century see *Otto Gerhard Oexle,* Conjuratio und Gilde im frühen Mittelalter. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der sozialgeschichtlichen Kontinuität zwischen Antike und Mittelalter, in: Id. (Ed.), Die Wirklichkeit und das Wissen. Mittelalterforschung, historische Kulturwissenschaft, Geschichte und Theorie der historischen Erkenntnis, Göttingen 2011, 496–568; for the Peace of God movement see the articles in *Thomas Head / Richard Allen Landes* (Eds.), The

on oaths would become typical for urban settlements throughout Europe in the following centuries. But, especially in the eleventh and twelfth century, they were by no means ubiquitous, and it is quite easy to overestimate their importance. In the short list of earliest common actions by the urban populations given above, only Le Mans and Cambrai are associated with a commune and the communes there were short-lived – in Le Mans it was destroyed by William the Conqueror in 1073 at the latest, in Cambrai it lasted only weeks.[17] On top of this, the accounts mentioning the communes were written long after the events, a few decades in Cambrai; in the case of Le Mans more than 60 years later.[18] The evidence for eleventh-century communes is therefore scanty and – at least in part – questionable. For the eleventh century, it is therefore impossible to study the development of urban populations and identities north of the Alps through the lens of communes. This means that it is necessary to take into account all actions taken by or attributed to the population of a city instead.[19]

To address the question of the contexts of the first appearance of common action by the citizens of a medieval city in the eleventh and twelfth century, two examples will be studied in greater depth: Le Mans, a city for which a short-lived commune is attested for 1069/70 – albeit in much later sources, as mentioned above[20] – and Augsburg where there is no proof of a commune in this period.

Peace of God. Social Violence and Religious Response in France Around the Year 1000, Ithaca / New York 1992 and for the link between the peace of God and communes *Hans-Werner Goetz,* Gottesfriede und Gemeindebildung, in: Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Germanistische Abteilung 105, 1988, 122–144.

[17] The only example of an early commune that potentially lasted longer than this is the commune of Saint-Quentin. According to a charter from 1151 transmitted in French translation, a Count Herbert granted the commune privileges. The last count of Vermandois by that name was Herbert IV (1045–1080/81). If the statements in the translation of the 1151 charter correctly reflect the events (which may be doubted), the commune would have existed in 1081 at the latest (*Vermeesch*, Signification, 98–103).

[18] The part of the Actus of Le Mans containing the description was written in the 1130s, more than 60 years after the events described (*Robert Latouche,* Essai de critique sur les continuations des Actus, in: Le Moyen Age Ser. 2, 11 1907, 225–275). See for the Gesta Gerardi II (ed. *Ludwig Bethmann* (MGH SS 7), Hannover 1840, c.2–4, 498), *Philipp Endmann*, Gerhard II. von Cambrai ein Bischof im Schnittpunkt der Interessen von König, Papst und Stadt, in: Concilium Medium Aevum 5, 2002, 77–118.

[19] In Italy, the situation was different. Here, it is possible to distinguish a phase of urban revolts in the early and central eleventh century from the communal movement beginning shortly before 1100, *Chris Wickham,* Sleepwalking into a New World. The Emergence of Italian City Communes in the Twelfth Century (The Lawrence Stone Lectures), Princeton 2015, 9.

[20] There have been extensive discussions on the question whether the sworn association in Le Mans was in reality a peace association as was common in the peace of God movement of the tenth and eleventh centuries. See *Bruno Lemesle,* Le discours de l'Église aux temps grégoriens. Évêques et laïcs dans le Maine aux XIe et XIIe siècles d'après les Actus Pontificum, in: Annales de Bretagne et des Pays de l'Ouest 102 1995, 17–32, 19, n. 7 and *Otto Gerhard Oexle,* Um 1070 – Wie die Kommunen das Königtum herausforderten, in: Bernhard Jussen (Ed.), Die Macht des Königs. Herrschaft in Europa vom Frühmittelalter bis in die Neuzeit, München 2005, 138–149. The discussion about what the commune of Le Mans 'really' was is not particularly helpful, since there is

Let us first turn to Le Mans. There are only two sources that mention the commune (or *coniuratio*) of Le Mans, a description of the deeds (*gesta*) of Bishop Arnold of Le Mans, and the Chronicle of Orderic Vitalis, both written long after the events they describe in the 1120s and 1130s. While they agree that there had been sworn association in Le Mans (probably in 1069), they present different narratives explaining the events. According to the *Gesta*, the commune was formed in resistance to the financial demands placed on the citizens by powerful Lord Geoffroy of Mayenne, the de facto ruler of the county of Maine during this period – the count, Hugh V was a small child and Geoffroy was the confidant and perhaps the lover of the count's mother. The *Gesta* report that Geoffrey was forced to join the association.[21] However, he committed treason and the Normans under William the Conqueror, who also laid claim to the county of Maine, eventually retook the city in 1073.[22] The commune was destroyed, but that did not mean that the citizens no longer mattered. King William had to promise to protect the rights of the citizens (*cives*) before he was allowed to enter the city.

The Norman chronicler Orderic Vitalis, writing in the 1120s, presents a different view of the association that he calls a *coniuratio*. For him, it was directed against the Normans from the start, and Geoffroy is named as an instigator.[23] Since both these texts were written long after the events, it is not possible to place a lot of trust in either version, but it seems certain that there was an uprising in and around Le Mans and that it involved some kind of a sworn association. The end of this sworn conspiracy, however, did not mean that the population of Le Mans remained inactive over the following decades. Between the Norman conquests of Le Mans in 1073 and 1116, we find the population of Le Mans, Maine – or significant parts of it – taking part in rebellions, riots or other fighting no less than twelve times.[24] In addition, it is quite likely that the sparse sources for

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little reason to believe that contemporaries thought there were clear-cut differences between these forms of sworn associations. The decisive point is that they bound themselves together by oath, thus employing a form of association used since the Carolingian era, especialy in times of crisis.

[21] "Facta itaque conspiratione, quam Communionem vocabant, sese omnes pariter sacramentis astringunt, et ipsum Gaufridum et ceteros ejusdem regionis proceres, quamvis invitos, sacramentis sue conspirationis obligari compellunt." (Actus 377 et seq.) See for the history of Maine during this period my chapter on: Maine, Normandie und Anjou – die Integration einer Grafschaft in die Nachbarterritorien, in: Geneviève Bührer-Thierry / Steffen Patzold / Jens Schneider (Eds.), Genèse des espaces politiques. Autour de la question spatiale dans les royaumes francs et post-carolingiens (IXe–XIIe s.). Die Entstehung politischer Räume. Zur Raumgliederung in den fränkischen und postkarolingischen Regna (9.–12. Jh.), (Haut Moyen Age 28), Turnhout 2017, 247–268.

[22] See on the commune *Robert Latouche,* La commune du Mans (1070), in: Mélanges d'histoire du moyen âge, dediés à la mémoire de Louis Halphen, Paris 1951, 377–382; *Goetz,* Gottesfriede 140.

[23] "Goisfredus Meduanensis et aliique optimates Cenomannorum pari conspiratione contra Normannos insurgunt", Ordericus Vitalis, Historia ecclesiastica, Vol. II, books 3 and 4, ed. *Marjorie Chibnall*, Oxford 1969, (Oxford medieval texts 2), lib. 4, 306.

[24] *Lemesle,* Le discours, 19.

Le Mans do not list every episode of urban unrest, so there were probably more than these. At least twice, in 1090 and 1098, the urban population was a decisive factor in actually forcing a count to give up his claim to the city of Le Mans and even the county of Maine.[25] So predictable had the occurrence of riots become that charters were drawn up which contained special provisions about what was to happen to property in case of riots or rebellions.[26] This, once again, reflects the unstable political climate of the area situated between the much more powerful County of Anjou and the Duchy of Normandy whose rulers competed for power in the region and the city throughout most of the eleventh century.

In Augsburg, a Swabian town on the border of Bavaria, the situation was, on the whole, comparable. Here, the urban population is mentioned as an actor only after several years of violence. In the civil war between Henry IV and his enemies, during the so-called "Investiture Controversy" after 1076, Augsburg became one of the main battlegrounds. Apart from the king, the most important political actor in the region was the deposed duke of Bavaria, Welf IV – half-brother of Hugh V of Maine[27] – who owned large amounts of property and rights in the region around Augsburg. In 1081 Welf and anti-king Hermann plundered the suburbs and the surrounding of Augsburg[28], in 1082, Welf captured, killed or blinded several members of the bishop's household; in 1083 the bishop's troops[29] attacked and destroyed some of Welf's nearby property, in 1084 Welf and his troops invaded the city, destroyed many of the buildings and tried to replace the bishop. Several months later, King Henry's troops reconquered Augsburg. In

[25] In 1090 (probably), Hugo V, now grown, sold the county to his cousin Helias and gave up his second and final attempt to become ruler of Maine (Ordericus Vitalis, Historia ecclesiastica, Vol. IV, books 7 and 8, ed. *Marjorie Chibnall*, Oxford 1973, (Oxford medieval texts 2) lib. 8, c. 11, 196; Actus 400); when Helias had been captured in 1098, Count Fulk le Réchin of Anjou took over the city, but left soon, fearing the "treacherousness of the people of Le Mans" (Annales Sancti Albini Andegavensis, in: Recueil d'annales Angevines et Vendômoises, ed. Louis Halphen, (Collection des Textes 37), Paris 1903, 1–45, ad a. 1098, 42).

[26] Cartulaire de l'abbaye de Saint-Vincent du Mans (ordre de saint Benoît): Premier cartulaire: 572–1188 ed. *Robert Charles/Samuel Menjot d'Elbenne*, Le Mans 1886–1913, 44: "(…) convenientia est, ut, si quando in urbe Cenomannem turbatio sue mutatio forte fuerit orta (…)."

[27] They were both sons of the Italian marquis Azzo who had first married Welf's mother Kunigunde. After her death, Azzo married the daughter of Count Herbert "Wake-dog" of Maine, who became the mother of Fulk, later marquis of Este and of Hugh. See for the family *Katrin Baaken,* Welf IV., der "geborene Italiener" als Erbe des Welfenhauses, in: Dieter R. Bauer/Matthias Becher (Eds.), Welf IV. Schlüsselfigur einer Wendezeit. Regionale und europäische Perspektiven, München 2004, 199–225.

[28] All of these events are recorded in most detail in the Annals of Augsburg (Annales Augustani, ed. *Georg Heinrich Pertz* (MGH SS 3), Hannover 1853, 123–136, here 130–135; they are largely confirmed by other sources; see *Wilhelm Volkert,* Die Regesten der Bischöfe und des Domkapitels von Augsburg, Augsburg 1985, 211–220; *Christof Paulus,* Von weißen Raben und einer ungeheuerlichen Zeit. Zu einem Epigramm der "Augsburger Jahrbücher", in: Jahrbuch des Vereins für Augsburger Bistumsgeschichte 44, 2010, 337–354.

[29] Together with the Swabian Duke Frederick of Staufen and the Bavarian Count Palatine Ratpot.

1087 it was the citizens of Augsburg – mentioned here for the first time – who repelled a new attack by Welf's troops; in spring of 1088 the city was taken by a surprise attack and its walls and several buildings were destroyed; in 1093 the attacking forces were easily able to invade the now unwalled city, but they were beaten by an army of citizens in a battle in front of the cathedral.

It was during prolonged periods of insecurity and uncertainty, like the ones described for Augsburg and Le Mans – that is the wars of the investiture controversy and the struggle for supremacy in the county of Maine – that the urban population appeared on the scene. It was not only by opportunity, but also by necessity, that the inhabitants caused this to happen. It is not likely that the people of Augsburg and Le Mans were waiting for an opportunity to be presented to them by political turmoil or moments of weakness of the established political actors to jump forward and force emancipation. The reading of the sources rather suggests that the political weakness of the established political actors, the kings, counts, dukes and bishops, forced them to act for themselves. This is exactly what the crowd that gathered in the church of Saint Ulrich and Afra in Augsburg did when they heard that they were being attacked in the episode mentioned above. It is obvious that the people of Augsburg could not depend on protection by any king, bishop, count or duke. Augsburg and Le Mans are extreme examples, and there are others, in which opportunity rather than necessity in face of serious threats may have played a larger part in the development of a political identity of citizens, but it is clear that the first common actions by the citizens where caused by more than a romantic longing for freedom.

The Urban Population

By the end of the eleventh century, cities and their inhabitants in northwestern Europe had become political and military actors that had to be taken into account by others, such as the kings, popes, bishops and counts. However, the question of who actually makes up the urban population is hard to answer. The sources usually speak of *populus* or *cives*, of *urbani* and *burgenses*, or, with a negative connotation, the *plebs* or *vulgus*. But, who were they? Who was perceived as making up the urban population, or was framed as such? Or, to pose the question the other way around, who was able to convincingly give the impression that they were the urban population or the part of it that mattered? Even for contemporaries it was hard to tell and we find different ways of treating this problem. For instance, for the Le Mans commune, which is mentioned in two sources, we find different opinions as to who formed the commune.[30] The biography of Bishop Arnold, contained in the so-called *Actus* of the bishops of Le Mans, states that the

[30] They also give different reasons for the formation of the commune: Orderic claims that the

cives formed the commune and forced the elite, the *proceres*, the higher-ups, to join. However, the Norman Chronicler Orderic, our second source, writes that it was formed by the *optimates*, which is almost a synonym to *proceres*, that is, the urban elites.[31] In the first case the great and good are separate from the citizens, in the second case they represent them.[32]

Research has focused on different groups in looking for the main actors within an urban setting. Much has been made of the involvement of long-distance traders and market laws in the development of urbanity and self-rule – this line of research goes back at least to Siegfried Rietschel, Henri Pirenne, and Hans Planitz.[33] More recent research has emphasized the importance of local traders (Edith Ennen[34]) and craftsmen (for example Robert Moore[35]), while others, thinking of German cities, have focused on the members of the episcopal household, the so-called *ministeriales* and those unfree that are called *censuales* in the sources, that is, people whose only commitment toward their lord was to pay a small yearly sum and who were therefore able to move around freely and settle in cities (Knut Schulz).[36]

Part of this confusion is due to the fact that it is nearly impossible to find anything about the background or even the names of the people who were called *cives* in the narrative sources. In fact, it seems that calling a group of people *populus* or the *cives* excuses the author from characterizing them in any further way. Still, in some areas and from some monasteries, there is charter evidence that allows us to obtain some information about those people that were – at least supposedly – addressed as *cives* or *burgenses*. In charters from the monasteries in and around Angers and Le Mans, the urban population is well represented, donating property to monasteries, buying, selling or lending, witnessing transactions of others. Because the eleventh century is the period in which surnames became common in France, we can learn quite a lot about the lives of the people to which these names were attributed. They are either sobriquets describing traits, such as

citizens united against Norman rule, the Actus state that it was formed to prevent Geoffrey of Mayenne from continuing to exact money from the *cives*.

[31] "Facta itaque conspiratione, quam Communionem vocabant, sese omnes pariter sacramentis astringunt, et ipsum Gaufridum (sc. de Mayenne) et ceteror eiusdem regionis proceres, quamvis invitos, sacramentis sue conspirationis obligari compellunt." (Actus 377–78). Orderic (lib. IV, 306, cf. note 23) also mentions that Geoffroy joined the commune.

[32] *Latouche,* La commune, argues that Orderic is correct; *Lemesle,* Le discours, rather leans toward the interpretation of the Actus.

[33] *Siegfried Rietschel,* Markt und Stadt in ihrem rechtlichen Verhältnis. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Stadtverfassung, Leipzig 1897; *Henri Pirenne,* Les villes du moyen âge. Essai d'histoire économique et sociale, Bruxelles 1927; *Hans Planitz,* Die deutsche Stadt im Mittelalter. Von der Römerzeit bis zu den Zunftkämpfen, Graz/Köln 1954.

[34] *Ennen,* Medieval Town.

[35] *Moore,* Revolution.

[36] *Knut Schulz*, Die Ministerialität als Problem der Stadtgeschichte und Zensualität und Stadtentwicklung im 11./12. Jahrhundert, in: Matthias Krüger (Ed.), Die Freiheit des Bürgers. Städtische Gesellschaften im Hoch- und Spätmittelalter, Darmstadt 2008, 106–130 and 131–170.

"Robert the Red", or are patronymical, indicating relation, such as "Herbert, son of Robert", or toponymical indicating origin (e. g. "Robert of Chalonnes"), or they refer to the person's function. And if we focus on these functional names, we find a whole string of traders (*mercatores*), smiths, cobblers, butchers, saddlers, skinners, tanners, bakers, millers, carpenters, tailors and even quite specialized trades such as jewelers, crossbow-makers, parchment-makers or glaziers.[37] This is an urban society consisting largely of craftsmen and tradesmen. But how can we tell that these were the people meant when the *cives* or *burgenses* of a city were mentioned? It would be very well possible that these terms were used only for an urban aristocracy, in which these tradesmen did not matter – which is the impression that Orderic wants to give us when he reports that it was the *proceres* who instigated the commune. Explicit mentions of a *civis* in charters are extremely rare[38], people designated as *burgenses* are also rare and the term is ambiguous, since it may refer to a city, a certain quarter of a city or even a rural settlement.

However, it is not likely that tradesmen and craftsmen were excluded from the political actions of the citizens for two reasons: First, tradesmen were not necessarily at the bottom of the urban hierarchy, some of them became extremely rich and obtained important functions such as provost – the leading officer of the count in town – or became members of the count's or bishop's court. Secondly, even if they did not rise to wealth and power, they still mattered. For the first point, two case studies from Angers in Western France illustrate the upward mobility of urban traders. First is the case of the brothers Aimery and Andefred, both tradesmen of probably humble origin. Aimery especially seems to have made an enormous fortune very quickly, since he was known as "Aimery the Rich" and charters mention his "unyielding desire to amass treasure".[39] And eventually, before entering the monastery of Saint-Aubin at a very old age, he owned several houses, vineyards, mills, rents and even an entire suburban quarter, a *burgus*, of Angers. His brother Andebert, also a merchant, and his sons inherited a large part of Aimery's fortune. Andebert's sons rose to the higher ranks of society: they are both attested as "eminent knights", but also as *burgenses*.[40] The

[37] See for example *Latouche,* La commune, and *Thomas Kohl,* Sozialer Wandel und die Zweinamigkeit im 11. Jahrhundert – eine französische Perspektive, in: Namenkundliche Informationen 103/104, 2014, 244–266.

[38] See for example Cartulaire de Saint-Vincent 307 (*civis*); Cartulaire de l'abbaye de Saint-Aubin d'Angers (3 Vols.), ed. Bertrand de Brussilon, Paris 1896–1903 Nos. 58, 76, 572, 797 (*burgensis*).

[39] Cartulaire de Saint Aubin 58: "Haimmericus Mercator (…), indeficientem sibi cupiens thesaurum thesaurizare." See for him and his family *Hironori Miyamatsu,* Les premiers bourgeois d'Angers aux XIe et XIIe siècles, in: Annales de Bretagne et des Pays de l'Ouest 97 1990, 1–14, 5–7; *Bruno Lemesle,* L'intégration politique des bourgeois d'Angers aux XIe et XIIe siècles: entre stratégie et opportunité, in: Annales de Bretagne et des Pays de l'Ouest 116 2009, 7–18, at p. 9.

[40] It goes without saying that the fortune of a family could also be headed in the other direction, see for example the fate of Guinebert's family, who sold the *burgus* to Aimery, cf. *Lemesle,* L'intégration 12.

older brother, Girardus, later obtained the most important lay rank within the city, the office of provost (*prepositus*).[41]

The same was true for members of the family of Bishop Marbod of Rennes, one of the most important Latin poets of the Middle Ages and native of Angers whose family saw a similar, perhaps even more spectacular rise in the same period. Marbod's father, Robert *pellicarius*, either produced or traded pelts, according to his name.[42] Two of his sons, Marbod and a brother, turned to an ecclesiastical career. Marbod found his place in the cathedral chapter, where he quickly became schoolmaster and archdeacon of Angers and was elected bishop of Rennes in 1096. One of his sisters married the provost of Angers, Geoffroy the Rotund, and their son, Hervé the Rotund, would later hold that office as well. In short, these people of bourgeois origin mattered and they rose to the most prestigious ranks in urban society and the church.

But even for those who did not climb up through the ranks of society, they mattered when they acted as a group and were able to exert reasonable pressure on the political powers under certain circumstances. Take for example a case in Le Mans from about 1090, where a conflict had broken out between Count Hugh V and Bishop Hoël, who had refused to accept his office from the hands of the new count and had therefore been forced to leave the city. There were probably some attempts to replace him which failed and the cleric, who had taken control of ecclesiastical affairs – a deacon named Hilgot – was attacked by a crowd and his house destroyed.[43] According to Hoël's friend who wrote the bishop's biography which is our only source for this event, the cathedral of Le Mans remained empty during this time and did not attract the usual pilgrims and other guests, not even for the feasts of Easter and Pentecost. This caused unrest: The stable-owners, innkeepers, butchers and bakers and even the "little women who sold vile goods", as well as all the others who usually profited from the visitors and their money, began to grumble. The count immediately recognized the danger this meant for his position, which was tenuous anyway, and quickly made peace with the bishop.[44] A few days later, he gave up his claim to the county entirely, sold it to his cousin Helias and returned to his father's lands in Italy.[45]

[41] Cartulaire de Saint-Aubin 111.

[42] *Melissa Lurio,* A Proposed Genealogy of Marbode, Angevin Bishop of Rennes, 1096–1123, in: Medieval Prosopography 26, 2005, 51–76.

[43] "His et hujuscemodi questibus vulgaris turba commota, ad domum Hilgoti, que ecclesia malignantium et quasi spelunca latronum facta fuerat, cum festinatione concurrunt, eamque, violento impetu magnoque circumfusi clamore, alli per ostium, alii per tegulas, quidam vero effractis irrupere fenestris. Cumque intra domum, seditiosorum neminem repperissent, diroptis omnibus, quecumque manus eorum invenire potuit, cum plausu maximo ad propria rediere."

[44] Actus 392: "mater ecclesia, propter ipsorum odium, populorum frequentatione deserta, et quasi in solitudinem redacta, perfidia illorum solitis redditibus frustrabatur. Huc accedebat quod ipsi etiam stabularii, caupones, macellarii atque pistores, sed et muliercule que vilioribus mercibus insidebant, aliique quamplurimi, quibus comprovincialium concursus lucrum maximum conferre consueverat, adversus eos intolerabiliter murmurabant, pro eo

This last example is of course quite extreme, but as the examples listed above – the commune of Le Mans 1069/70 and the riot in Angers in 1067 – show, *cives* could cause an enormous amount of trouble for rulers (or people trying to become rulers). And the princes, such as Count Hugh V of Maine, knew this. Hugh's reaction was of course unusual, and he had a number of other reasons to leave Le Mans that do not need to be outlined here, but it is still significant. It is interesting to see how other rulers reacted to the new importance of the urban populations: Count Fulk Réchin of Anjou, whose first attempt to capture and depose his brother Geoffrey the Bearded in 1067 failed because of the resistance of large parts of the urban population, killed several of the leaders of the rebellion.[46] Among them was the provost of Angers. When Fulk finally managed to capture his brother again in the following year, he named a new provost. And it was certainly not by chance that he chose a close collaborator who was nevertheless not a knight or nobleman from somewhere in the county, but rather an important member of the urban society of Angers who had married into one of the cities up and coming families: Geoffrey the Rotund, the brother-in-law of Bishop to be Marbod. There are no further signs of urban unrest for the following decades.

Turning briefly to the Empire, King Henry IV also knew how valuable the support of the urban population was and behaved accordingly. After finding refuge and support in Worms in the winter of 1073/4, when he was on the verge of losing a civil war with the Saxons, the king gave the citizens who had welcomed him and expelled their bishop wide-ranging rights – the first charter of a German king for the citizens of a city.[47] A few years later, the people of Worms again demonstrated their loyalty his support a few years later in 1077 when they refused the newly elected anti-king Rudolf entrance to their city.[48]

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quod ipsorum causa, negociationis sue questu sese conspicerent esse fraudatos. Quos, dum ipse comes adversum se quoque eadem causa fremere cognovisset, cernens sibi periculosum esse si, contra omnium vota, civitatem pateretur diutius pastoris sui presentia desolari, inito cum obtimatibus consilio, episcopum sibi pacificare, eumque quamtotius cum suis omnibus, ad ecclesiam revocare curavit."

[45] Ibid. 393. "Transactis autem paucis diebus, cum prefatus comes, propter inconstantiam suam, bonis omnibus haberetur infestus, omnibus que habere poterat in peccuniam redactis, Helye cognato suo, cujus supra mentionem fecimus, ipsam civitatem totumque comitatum, quantum in ipso erat, vendidit; sicque inhoneste mercationis precio sarcinatus, in patriam suam, cum magno repedavit opprobrio."

[46] *Jessee,* Urban Violence.

[47] Die Urkunden Heinrichs IV., ed. *Dietmar von Gladiß/Alfons Gawlik*, Vol. 1 (MGH DD H IV, 1), repr. Hannover 1978, 341–343, nr. 267. His reception in Worms is described in detail in the chronicle of Lampert of Hersfeld (Lamperti monachi Hersfeldensis Opera, ed. *Oswald Holder-Egger* (MGH SS rer. Germ. 38), Hannover/Leipzig 1894, 169–170).

[48] *Michaela Muylkens,* Reges geminati. Die "Gegenkönige" in der Zeit Heinrichs IV. (Historische Studien 501), Husum 2012, 158.

The Sources

In the final section of this paper, the question of how the urban population was perceived by the authors of the sources is discussed. The first important point to make is, of course, that calling a group of people *the* citizens of a city was a decision on the part of the writer of any given text – unconscious perhaps, but a decision nevertheless – to designate individuals living in the city as representing this urban population.

If we, once again, take into account all the instances of collective action by the urban populations, we find that some authors use words like *cives*, *urbani* or *populus* casually and without any negative connotation, such as the author of the *Actus* of the Bishops of Le Mans and the author of the life of Abbot Egino who just seem to accept tacitly – or even unconsciously – that these people existed and mattered as a group, and who even identified themselves with the citizens.[49] They also added nuances by distinguishing between the *plebs*, members of the lower urban strata, or crowds on the one hand and other inhabitants of the city on the other, placing the blame for evil actions firmly on the former. As Bruno Lemesle has shown, in the Gesta of Bishop Arnold it is the *cives* of Le Mans (or the County of Maine) who form the commune, which he does not denounce out of hand even if he describes negative actions by the commune. On the whole, he seems quite sympathetic to the aims of the people who joined together to resist the exactions placed on the city and county by Geoffrey of Mayenne.[50] In the reign of Bishop Hildebald (1097–1125, archbishop of Tours 1125–1133) however, when the itinerant preacher Henry of Lausanne came to Le Mans and agitated against the established clergy, the writer of his biography denounces Henry's followers as *vulgus*[51] or *plebs*[52], common people, words with clear negative connotations.[53]

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[49] The author of the Gesta of Bishop Arnold, who was a canon in the cathedral of Le Mans, describe the troops of the commune as 'ours' (*nostris*): "Facto ergo mane, adversarii de castro egressi, cum exercitum, ad pugnam provocare cepissent, nostris repentino clamore excitis (…)" (Actus 378).

[50] "Hujus igitur Gaufridus de Meduana tutor et quasi maritus effectus, cum adversum cives quasdam occasiones quereret, et novis quibusdam exactionibus eos moliretur opprimere, consilium inierunt qualiter ejus pravis conatibus obsisterent, nec se ab eo vel quolibet alio injuste opprimi paterentur. Facta itaque conspiratione, quam Communionem vocabant, sese omnes pariter sacramentis astringunt, et ipsum Gaufridum et ceteros ejusdem regionis proceres, quamvis invitos, sacramentis sue conspirationis obligari compellunt" (Actus 377–378), see *Lemesle,* Le discours, 20.

[51] "Quo menia civitatis introgresso, vulgus solito more, ut diximus, applaudebat novitati, et potius personam mirabatur incogniti quam probati" (Actus 409).

[52] "Qua heresi plebs in clerum versa est in furorem, adeo quod famulis eorum minarentur cruciatus, nec eis aliquid vendere vel ab eis emere voluissent" (Actus 409).

[53] *Monique Zerner*, Au temps de l'appel aux armes contre les hérétiques: du "Contra Henricum" du moine Guillaume aux "Contra hereticos", in: Inventer l'hérésie? Discours polémiques et pouvoirs avant l'Inquisition, ed. Ibid. (1998), 119–156; still relevant: *Raoul Manselli*, Il monaco Enrico e la sua eresia. Bullettino dell'Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo 65, 1953,

For Uodalschalk, author of the *Vita* of Abbot Egino, urban society was permanently on the verge of unrest and situations easily escalated into uproar and violence, as he demonstrates vividly in several sections of his text, such as the chapter about the imaginary raid on the city of Augsburg described above – here the gullible people rushing out of the church to confront an imaginary enemy are called *vulgus*[54], just like Henry's followers in Le Mans. In another episode described by Uodalschalk, the crowd (*turba*) gathers to celebrate the miraculous cure of a blind woman and eventually evolves into a spontaneous procession surging through the city, converging with another crowd celebrating the cure of a possessed woman.[55] However, when Bishop Hermann, nemesis of Abbot Egino, disrupts a ceremony of baptism and tries to force the officiating priest to use his chrism, *populus* is used as a description of the people witnessing the scandal.[56] The word *civis* is also used but only once, to designate the woman cured of blindness.[57] *Cives* is also used in the Annals of Augsburg, written by canons of the cathedral church and known for its vivid description of the conflicts of the era, to describe the citizens defending the city in 1087 and again in 1093.[58] For 1093, the annalist reports that Bavarians invaded the city and that they were beaten by the citizens.[59] There exists a parallel source that demonstrates just how malleable the question of who represented a city was, and how closely this was linked to questions of legitimacy. Bernold of Constance, author of the most comprehensive

1–63; *Ernst Werner*, Pauperes Christi. Studien zu sozial-religiösen Bewegungen im Zeitalter des Reformpapsttums Leipzig 1956, 165–176. Zu seinem Aufenthalt in Le Mans *Lemesle*, Le discours, 24–27.

[54] *Uodalschalcus*, De Eginone et Herimanno, c. 8, 435.

[55] "Contigit enim, quadam femina meritis beatae Afrae curata et crucem, sicuti moris est, confluenti turbae per medium urbis praeferente, aliam arrepticiam in ecclesia sanctae Dei genitricis liberatam cum sibi iuncta multitudine occurrisse, sicque unitis duobus semper vincentis Iesu vexillis, duplici exultantem Dei populum triumpho hinc inde cum laudibus in sua redisse" (ibid., c.7, 435).

[56] "A priore loci nomine Marchwardo a baptismatis agitur officium. Dum ad hoc venitur, episcopo iubente, crisma nostrum, ab antistite catholico acceptum, ministro aufertu, suumque baptistae offertur. Tum ille quasi alienum tangere formidat, notum sacramenti vasculum quaeritat. Hoc, inquit portitor execrati liquoris, accipere debetis, aliud non habebitis. Voce publica profitetur baptista, nolle se haeretico inquinari sacramento. Exilit episcopus, vociferatur altius, fit in populo strepitus, discurrit clerus, divina et humana habentur promiscua. Quid ageret praecursoris Christi discipulus, tantum spiculatoris praestolabatur gladius; nisi quod Iohannem Herodes in carcere, istum iuxta altare hostis trucidaret ecclesiae, uterque tamen occumberet pro veritate. Tanto quippe furore praesul debachatur, ut non sibi imperanti, sed populo non obtemperanti sacrilegii dilatio iure asscribatur" (ibid., c. 24, 442).

[57] C. 7: "mulier quedam Augustensis, non ignota civis" (…).

[58] Annales Augustenses a. 1087, 132 and 1093, 134. See for this source *Hans Loewe,* Die Annales Augustani. Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung, München 1903; *Paulus,* Raben.

[59] "Pawarii quidam protervitate contumaci Augustam invadentes, civibus pro copia temporis confluentibus et prope basilicam sanctae Mariae collectis, in ipsa congressione mente consternati, quidam trucidati, quidam sunt vulnerati, quidam turpissimae fugae arripiunt praesidium" (Annales Augustenses a. 1093, 134).

chronicle of the time, provides some background for the invasion, writing that the *Augustenses* – that is the people of Augsburg – repudiated the bishop given to them by King Henry IV (Siegfried II), and elected a legitimate bishop.[60] It is likely that the newly elected bishop was brought into the city by troops of the deposed Bavarian duke Welf IV, who was the principal enemy of Bishop Siegfried II. In any case, it is clear that both the annalist as well as Bernold were capable of framing different groups as *the* people of the city of Augsburg – *Augustenses* for Bernold, *cives* for the annalist.

All this shows that the clerical or monastic authors of the texts informing us about the actions of citizen groups were not necessarily critical of all collective actions on the part of citizens, but were able to differentiate and even identify with the urban populations.

There were, of course, other voices. Communes especially were often criticized as being evil in themselves, as something formed because of bad advice, something that facilitated the evasion of dues, general lawlessness and illicit violence, detrimental to the established social order. This is the view of Guibert of Nogent writing about the commune of Laon formed in 1115. According to him:

> "commune is a new and a bad name of an arrangement for all the poorest classes to pay their usual due of servitude to their lords once only in the year, and to make good any breach of the laws they have committed by the payment fixed by law, and to be entirely free from all other exactions usually imposed on serfs."[61]

For Guibert and other monks and clerics, the urban populations and their activities were a clear threat. They threatened custom, justice, legal dues, the sanctity of the clergy, and even the entire order of society, which was of course the order

[60] "Augustenses episcopum, quem H. illis dedit, expulerunt, ipsique sibi catholicum pastorem elegerunt" (*Bernold of Constance*, Chronicle, a. 1093, 501). Bernold does not mention the battle in front of the cathedral, but a link is very likely, since the see of Augsburg had been a major battleground in the civil wars of the so-called investiture controversy since 1077. Siegfried II, the bishop named by Henry in 1077 was faced with a string of anti-bishops, all supported by the Bavarian duke Welf IV, whom Henry had deposed in 1077, but who held on to his claim to his duchy nevertheless. This explains why the annalist speaks of Bavarian invaders. Since Bernold claimed that the new bishop had been elected by the people of Augsburg, a forced introduction into his see would not have fit into his narrative, much less if the resistance was really led by the citizens.

[61] "Communio autem – novum ac pessimum nomen – sic se habet: ut capite censi omnes solitum servitutis debitum dominis semel in anno solvant et, si quid contra iura deliquerent, pensione legali emendent, caeterae censuum exactiones, quae servis infligi solent, omnimodis vacent" – *Guibert de Nogent*, De vita sua, ed. *Edmond R. Labande*, Autobiographie (Les classiques de l'histoire de France au Moyen Age 34), Paris 1981, English translation by *Charles Cooke Swinton Bland*, The Autobiography of Guibert, Abbot of Nogent-sous-Coucy, London 1925, 153. See for the source and the Laon revolt and commune *Trudy Lemmers*, The Crisis of Episcopal Authority in Guibert of Nogent's *Monodiae*, in: Henk Teunis / Andrew Wareham / Arnoud-Jan Bijsterveld (Eds.), Negotiating Secular and Ecclesiastical Power (International medieval research 6), Turnhout 1999, 37–50.

imposed by God himself. The harsh punishments that often befell citizens acting together, through lords or by acts of God, reflected this.[62]

However, these clerical elites were not the only ones for whom the urban revolution was accompanied by fear, insecurity and threat. If we return to the example given at the beginning of this chapter, in which the people who gathered in the abbey church for a festive mass were immediately ready to take up weapons and gather for battle, and if we keep in mind the amount of violence that had been afflicted on the city of Augsburg in the decades before, it seems quite understandable that the people of Augsburg really believed that their city was being attacked. We have seen that the situation in Le Mans was quite similar. This meant that the people had to take matters into their own hands. In this way, the political threats of the period contributed to the beginning of emancipation for the urban population.

Threats, Social Change and the City

The urban revolution of the eleventh century came to be through a combination of demographic and economic developments that lead to an increase of urban populations. It also happened through the emergence of the urban population as political actors, which can be seen in a string of short-term violent events, riots, uprisings, and rebellions ascribed to "citizens", the "people" or the "crowd". Very often this happened in the context of longer violent phases of political crisis, such as the civil wars of the investiture controversy in Germany (and Italy) or the struggle for political supremacy by competing lords, such as in the county of Maine. Here, urban populations appeared on the scene, forced into action, for example, by the permanent threat of violence in periods of war and the temporary or permanent collapse of established political structures, but also taking advantage of political turmoil in the surrounding regions to obtain certain rights.

The permanent threat of violence by inside and outside groups, visible in the examples of Augsburg and Le Mans, thus contributed to the beginning of urban political emancipation. In a few cases, people returned to an old way of formed associations based on an oath – utilizing a practice established since the Carolingian era – but none of these were long-lived or are in any way linked to later communal government, even if they were sometimes called communes. What matters is that urban populations – or at least significant parts of the populations – felt it necessary to act together in times of crisis and threat, without

[62] In part, criticism of the communes echoed similar points raised against other forms of sworn associations, see e. g. the statements by Bishop Gerard I of Cambrai (1012–1051) directed against attempts by his colleagues to form a peace of God association according to the author of the Gesta episcoporum Cameracensium, lib. 3, c.27, ed. *Georg Heinrich Pertz*, MGH SS 7, Hanover 1846, 474.

the leadership of established political leaders. In this way, threats contributed to and furthered a decisive development in European history, the development of urban self-rule. For France, it is even possible to get a glance of the composition of urban groups that were designated as the citizenship, or the people, of a city – high ranking, upwardly mobile groups were part of it just as the more humble traders and craftsmen.

But there was a second way that the social and political order was seen as being under threat. Some contemporary authors such as Guibert of Nogent felt that urban groups were taking up roles that were reserved for other strata of society. But their criticism was directed specifically at the formation of a commune, an association by oath that was seen as dangerous and subversive.

All contemporary authors, however, realized that the citizens of towns and cities acted as groups and described them as such, as the "people" (*populus*), "citizens" (*cives*) of a city, or, derogatorily, as "crowd" (*turba*) or "mob" (*plebs*, *vulgus*). While misguided actions are associated with the latter terms, most of the authors seem to have accepted political actions on the part of the citizens as legitimate and, on the whole, as a normal part of the political system by the end of the eleventh century.

Threatened Orders in Paris, Oxford and Heidelberg

Hannah Skoda

Why do social orders sometimes change and sometimes not? What kinds of threats lead to a reconfiguration of values? When are old orders simply reaffirmed, despite social upheaval and violence?

Developments in later medieval universities provide a nice lens through which to view these sorts of questions. The late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are often acknowledged as a period of transition for universities[1]: a whole raft of new foundations came into being, particularly across the Holy Roman Empire; the training provided by universities seemed to become more explicitly tied to the needs of state; the social-makeup of universities was changing, as career prospects of graduates altered; and the involvement of universities in politics became increasingly fraught. Universities were, obviously, embedded in town- and city-scapes, and the relationship between the university and the surrounding inhabitants – the notorious town-gown dynamic – defined, and was defined by, these shifts. This essay focuses upon the visions of social order represented by the relationship between town and gown.[2] These were visions in constant negotiation – tense, dynamic, and all-important to the students and townspeople caught up in their collateral. Of what did this friction consist? In a sense, these social orders were embedded in three discursive strands: the jurisdictional rights of the students and townspeople; their respective economic rights; and the violence which erupted on a distressingly regular basis.

In order to place these questions in sharper relief, this study will be comparative.[3] It is based on the universities of Oxford, Paris and Heidelberg in the later

[1] See particularly *James Kittelson/Pamela Transue* (Eds.), Rebirth, Reform and Resilience. Universities in Transition 1300–1700, Columbus1984. See also the accounts in *Hilde Ridder-Symoens* (Ed.), A History of the University in Europe, Vol. 1, Cambridge 2003.

[2] The town-gown relationship is a notorious one, which historians have attempted to explain and typologise. See particularly: *Pierre Gilli/Jacques Verger/Denis le Blévec* (Eds.), Les universités et la ville au Moyen Age. Cohabitation et tension, Leiden 2007; *Jürgen Miethke*, Stadt und Universität im Spätmittelalter, in: Patrik Mähling (Ed.), Orientierung für das Leben, Kirchliche Bildung und Politik in Spätmittelalter, Reformation und Neuzeit, Festschrift für Manfred Schulze zum 65. Geburtstag, Münster 2010, 13–37.

[3] With regard to collective violence, the comments of Samuel Cohn are particularly relevant here. Comparing English university unrest with that on the continent, he observes that town-gown tensions were particularly common in Oxford; that they were more often centred on the assize; that there was less tension between masters and students; and that there were fewer

Middle Ages.[4] Oxford and Paris were universities with centuries-long histories already; Heidelberg had only been founded in 1385/6 by the Elector Palatine. Oxford and Heidelberg were smallish towns, but whereas Oxford was really dominated reputationally by its University, the tugs and tensions between the court and the University characterised late medieval Heidelberg. Paris, on the other hand, was a vast cosmopolitan city, the capital of one of the most powerful polities in Europe, and wracked by dangerous and intensely divisive factionalism in the early fifteenth century. Whereas Oxford and Paris concentrated on the traditional academic disciplines, with students largely destined for the Church, Heidelberg incorporated the four faculties into a single institution and explicitly aimed to produce students who would serve the Elector and his developing polity.

Three specific incidents have been chosen, not necessarily because they stand apart from the many other outbreaks of violence between town and gown in these towns and cities, but because it is methodologically important to narrow the focus. In Oxford, the notorious St Scholastica's Day massacre of 1355 in many ways epitomises the tensions between town and gown. For Paris and Heidelberg, we move into the fifteenth century, with the 1404 battle between some students and the nobleman Charles de Savoisy, and the 1406 so-called 'Studentenkrieg' in Heidelberg. These latter are striking and well-documented incidents, but are interesting precisely because not exceptional.

It is misleading to attempt to essentialise the divisions between town and gown, but a number of questions were at stake. Should the social order marginalise students? Should they be shut away in ivory towers to study? Should students be politically engaged? Should universities enjoy unlimited jurisdictional privileges? What might be the price of those privileges? Should townspeople benefit economically from the presence of a university? A variety of answers presented themselves, and the ways in which they were thrashed out as well as which prevailed, is revealing.

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peaceful strikes. As will be seen, these observations resonate with my own, although the questions I am asking are rather different. *Samuel Cohn,* Popular Protest in Late Medieval English Towns Cambridge, Cambridge 2015, 271.

[4] The most complete histories of the University of Heidelberg remain *August Thorbecke*, Geschichte der Universität Heidelberg, Vol. 1, Heidelberg 1886, 1386–1449; *Johann Friedrich Hautz*, Geschichte der Universität Heidelberg, Vol. 2, Mannheim 1862/64; *Gerhard Ritter*, Die Heidelberger Universität, Vol. 1, 1386–1508, Heidelberg 1936, reprint Heidelberg 1986; *Hermann Weisert*, Die Verfassung der Universität Heidelberg. Überblick 1386–1952, Heidelberg 1974. For Oxford, the best introductions are the essays edited in *Jeremy Catto/Ralph Evans*, The History of the University of Oxford (Late Medieval Oxford 2), Oxford 1992; *Christopher Brooke/Roger Highfield*, Oxford and Cambridge, Cambridge 1988; *Alan Cobban*, The Medieval English Universities. Oxford and Cambridge to c. 1500, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1988. For Paris, see particularly *Jacques Verger/Christophe Charle,* Histoire des universités en France, Paris 1994. A useful overview is *William Courtenay/Jürgen Miethke*, Universities and Schooling in Medieval Society (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, 10), Leiden 2000.

Oxford

Chronologically, and conceptually, we begin in Oxford. The schools of Oxford may have emerged as early as the start of the twelfth century, and by the mid-fourteenth, constituted a flourishing university.[5] There is no doubt but that the University brought enormous economic opportunities to the town. However, two fairly straightforwardly competing visions of social order emerged. Townspeople, quite naturally, wanted their economic rights and opportunities protected; they also demanded a jurisdictional order which would assure equitable treatment across the town-gown divide, and prevent unfettered student violence towards townsmen and women. Students, conversely, wanted protection from economic exploitation by townspeople; and they wanted the jurisdictional privileges which not only assured their superiority, but were a long-standing constituent part of their clerical identity. In some ways, this was about a struggle for dominance, but to characterise town-gown relations in such a way is to miss the interdependency of the two groups[6]: these were two visions of how the two groups might cohabit. The friction between these two visions is readily apparent in the records.[7] For example, in 1327, Edward III renewed Edward II's grant to share the custody and profits of the assize of bread and ale between the town mayor and university chancellor.[8] In the same year Edward III had also tried to mediate between town and gown after a violent riot between university scholars and men of the abbey of Abingdon[9]: he had reaffirmed the university chancellor's jurisdiction over cases involving students of the university (except homicide or violence); he had also requested cooperation between the University, mayor and sheriff in arresting disturbers of the peace.[10] The townsmen continued to feel marginalised by these measures: in November 1327, they prevented the assize of bread and ale from being held[11]; in 1328, they complained to the king that the university chancellor was attempting to control them through legislation which he had no right to enact.[12] The king continued to reaffirm the sharing of the

[5] On the early schools at Oxford, see the collection of essays edited by *Jeremy Catto* (Ed.), The History of the University of Oxford, Vol. 1, The Early Oxford Schools, Oxford 1984.

[6] Although in different context, this interdependency is particularly effectively explored in *Edward de Maesschalck*, The Relationship between the University and the City of Louvain in the Fifteenth Century, History of Universities 9, 1990, 45–71.

[7] For what follows, as well as the primary sources referenced, see *Pearl Kibre*, Scholarly Privileges in the Middle Ages, London 1961, 298–307. All the primary references given here are cited in this text.

[8] *Herbert Salter* (Ed.), Medieval Archives of the University of Oxford (Oxford Historical Society, 1st series, Vol. 74 and Vol. 75, 2.), Oxford, 1920/21, 108.

[9] *Herbert Salter* (Ed.), Munimenta Civitatis Oxoniensis (Oxford Historical Society, 1st series 71.) Oxford 1917, 65, n. 3.

[10] Mun Civ Oxon, 57–0, Aug. 3rd 1327, I, Ed. II.

[11] Mun Civ Oxon, 63–4, Nov. 22nd, 1327.

[12] Mun Civ Oxon, 70–1, June 8th, 1328, 2 Ed. III

assize of bread and ale in 1328, 1330, 1332, 1336 and so on.[13] In many ways, the burghers were right that the king was effectively strengthening the hand of the University: when the scholars threatened a migration to Stamford in the North of England in 1334, the monarch's hand was effectively forced.[14] Jurisdictionally, the privileges of the students, and the reach of the chancellor's power seemed to be repeatedly extended. But royal injunctions were clearly never sufficiently unilateral as to force the issue, and the friction dangerously continued. In 1346, the burghers of the town appealed to the king against what they saw as the imposition of the university's vision of relations, economic, social and jurisdictional, in the town.[15] More appeals from the burghers were made in 1351 and 1352, as they contested the university usurpation of the assize.[16] In 1355, these issues erupted into cataclysmic violence. But this was not the first time. For instance, in 1348, a temporary resolution in a violent quarrel between town and gown had been negotiated by the archbishop of Canterbury and the bishop of Chichester.[17]

The events of 1355 were not merely yet more sparks in the continuous friction between town and gown.[18] Something made this episode different, and that something meant that social change was indeed effected: the university vision of social order was imposed with very little further challenge. Townspeople could no longer appeal to the king or even entertain the possibility of an alternative order. The answer lies partly simply in the sheer extent of the violence. On 10th February 1355, two students named Walter Sprynghouse and Roger de Chesterfield had a drink at a tavern located on Cornmarket Street (at the site of what is now the Lloyds TSB bank). On suspecting that their wine had been watered down, they threw it in the face of the tavern-keeper and followed up the insult with a brutal attack on his person. Other students quickly joined in, and the violence rapidly spread. The bell of the University Church was rung, and the fray

[13] See *Kibre*, Privileges, 299.
[14] Ibid., 300.
[15] Mun Civ Oxon, 106–7.
[16] *Kibre,* Privileges, 303.
[17] Medieval Archives I, 143–146; II, 267.
[18] There exists a wealth of accounts of the riot. For the most complete secondary accounts, see *Kibre,* Privileges, 303ff; *Gordon Leff*, Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, New York 1968, 90ff; *Salter*, Medieval Archives, 97–102; Rashdall Hastings, rev. by *Frederick Mairice Powicke/Alfred B. Emden*, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages. Vol. III, Oxford 1987, 95ff; *Alan Cobban*, The Medieval English Universities. Oxford and Cambridge to c. 1500, Cambridge 1988, 262 et seq. For the primary material of a legal nature, see *James E. Thorold Rogers*, Oxford City Documents 1268–1665 (Oxford Historical Society, 1st series 18), Oxford 1891, 245–68; Medieval Archives, I, 148–60; *William Pantin*, Oxford Life in Oxford Archives, Oxford 1972, 99–104. There are many chronicle accounts including (as used here): Robert of Avesbury, De Gestis Edwardi III, ed. *Edward Maunde Thompson* (new ed.), Cambridge 2012, 421; Thomas Walsingham, Historia Anglicana, ed. *H. T. Riley* (Rolls Series, 2 Vols.), London 1863–1864, 278; Chronica Angliae auctore monacho Albani, ed. *Edward Maunde Thompson* (new ed.), Cambridge 2012, 31. The grievances of the townsmen were reiterated in a document in Mun Civ Oxon, 126–8: this largely corroborates the other accounts.

soon numbered around 200 university men.[19] They beat up townspeople, robbed their homes, and burned their houses. This lasted for two days, at which point the townspeople mustered themselves to retaliate. The townspeople were joined by angry participants from the surrounding countryside. The payback was horrific. Students were murdered, mutilated and scalped – they were hunted down by townspeople with decades of grievances to assuage.

Despite its very real brutality, the ritual nature of the violence serves to indicate what was at stake here, usefully so since the chronicle accounts upon which we usually rely are so intent simply upon demonising the townspeople. The initial focus upon the watered-down wine was polysemous. On the one hand, it evoked the famous episode in Paris in 1200, during which German students had similarly attacked a tavern-keeper after accusing him of watering down the wine, and which, after the ensuing violence, had resulted in the confirmation of the University's privileges by the Pope in 1215.[20] The motif functioned, then, as a totemic indication of the historic privileges and centrality of universities. But the wine also symbolically concentrated attention on the issue of the assize. These competing visions by town and gown had, as we have seen, been centred on questions of who was to monitor and benefit from the customs regulating the quality of wine, and embedded within such questions were issues of economic exploitation of students, and the economic viability of town-gown cohabitation. The students were using their violence to reinforce a vision of the economic prerogatives and protection of the University. More than this, they chose their weapons and forms of violence deliberately, if not with care. They pillaged and plundered, but not to steal. It is a well-known feature of late medieval urban revolts that rioters often failed to steal the contents of houses which they raided: these were symbolic statements about economic privilege.[21] They burned houses, another motif familiar from late medieval revolts more generally: this was about symbolic destruction, purification even. And they wielded the weapons of war, notably swords. Here, their statement was of a more general kind. Whilst defending their privileges, students were keen to reinforce a vision of their role as embedded in society, politically and physically active. They were knights, in the service of learning. Whether or not one decides to take this seriously (it seems eminently likely that some were along for the ride, so to speak), these students were very clearly making the point that they were not to be marginalised. They

[19] On the significance of bells in town revolts, see eg. *Christian Patart*, Les cloches civiles de Namur, Fosses et Tournai, Brussels 1976, 190–194.

[20] *Stephen Ferruolo*, The Origins of the University. The Schools of Paris and their Critics, Stanford 1985, 281.

[21] See, for example, *Hannah Skoda*, Medieval Violence. Physical Brutality in Northern France, c. 1270–c.1330, Oxford 2012, 186; *Patrick Lantschner*, Revolts and the Political Order of Cities in the Late Middle Ages, in: Past and Present 225, 2014, 3–46, here 39.

were not content with the ivory towers of learning, but were demonstrating that they were a force to be reckoned with.

The violence by the townspeople is similarly legible. Despite the demonization of the townspeople in the chronicles, particular motifs stand out. The townspeople apparently maimed students wherever they could lay their hands on them: this was not just about revenge, but about challenging the inviolability of the student body, both individually and collectively. And they apparently scalped students, a horrific, but seemingly odd action, and one which was rare in this period. The jurisdictional privileges of students were visible on student bodies in the form of the clerical tonsure: indeed, it had even become necessary to check how recently a tonsure had been shaved when a clerk came before the chancellor's court, since it appears that criminous townsmen had latched onto the desirability of a tonsure in order to escape trial in a harsher court.[22] And if the jurisdictional privileges of students and the resentment these generated – both for the sense of entitlement which seemed therefore to characterise students, and for the apparent impunity with which students could commit all kinds of misdemeanours – were at stake, scalping was a gruesome way of cancelling out the tonsure and thus the privilege.

The townspeople may have succeeded in making their grievances visible, but the result of the massacre was the unambivalent assertion of the University's vision of order and dominance within the city.[23] From this moment on, the University was utterly dominant in Oxford. It is hard to find examples of town-gown tension after the 1355 massacre[24]: not, one presumes, because the townspeople were any happier about the situation than they had been in the past, but because an alternative social order had won the day quite so clearly. This was real social and structural change. The town was obliged to make extensive reparations to the University, penitential and symbolic, and financial.[25] Those responsible for violence were imprisoned. Two hundred and fifty pounds were to be paid by the town to the chancellor. There were further ecclesiastical penalties. On the anniversary of the massacre, the mayor and 60 burghers were to attend a mass in the

[22] See *Leona C. Gabel*, Benefit of Clergy in England in the Later Middle Ages, 1928/29, repr. New York 1969.

[23] This assessment is challenged by Leff's comment that Rashdall 'magnified the outbreak into an event of unique importance leading to unprecedented privileges; in fact many privileges, such as those of the assizes, already existed' (*Leff*, Paris and Oxford, 90, n. 53). This may be so, but nevertheless a series of unprecendently univocal assertions of these privileges were made; likewise, we may refer to the lack of further violence of this kind, suggesting that these issues were more or less resolved.

[24] Charles Hammer points to the frequency of town-gown collaboration in fifteenth-century Oxford: *Charles Hammer*, The Town-Gown Confraternity of St. Thomas the Martyr in Oxford, in: Mediaeval Studies 39, 1977, 466–476.

[25] For a wider context of reparations paid by towns to universities, see *Antoine Destemberg*, Morts violentes et lieux de mémoire. Les réparations faites à l'université de Paris à la fin du Moyen Age, in: Traverse. Zeitschrift für Geschichte / Revue d'histoire 15, 2008, 37–49.

University Church of St Mary the Virgin, in honour and commemoration of the fallen students.[26] Regarding the bones of particular contention, the University gained an unequivocal victory. The assize of weights and measures was now firmly in the hands of the University chancellor. All the jurisdiction associated with the assize lay now with the University chancellor, along with the necessary rights to punish any infringements. Criminal jurisdiction over all members and associates of the University now lay with the chancellor. As Kibre puts it: "While thus leaving no doubt that in England king and Parliament were supreme over the university [with reference to the Pope], there continued to be evidence of an ever-present desire of the part of both to favour the university scholars."[27]

The sheer extent of the violence helped to wring this social change, but this is, if anything, somewhat counterintuitive, since it was the students who were massacred most effectively. Two further keys must then unlock the puzzle. First, it is clear, and perhaps obvious, that the support of the king was crucial. In a reasonably centralised polity, the support of the monarch, and indeed of Parliament, assured the supremacy of the University's vision: this support was won both by the prestige brought to the realm by the institution, and the monarch's role as protector which was insulted and spurred into motion by the unashamed victimisation of the students. "Rex, si sit per te cleri facies relevata,/ Est tibi tunc certe victoria magna parata […]/ Quisquis ad ista siles, fugiet vigor et decus a te" as one poem put it.[28]

The second key lies in the nature of the way in which the University and its scholars and supporters represented events, and in the silencing of the townspeople who never really had the opportunity to present their side of the story. Why do some violent threats change social orders, and some not? The answer surely lies partly in the narratives constructed around those threats – the ways in which they are represented. As well as the numerous chronicle accounts of the massacre, we have accounts by the University authorities themselves, appealing to the king for swift action.[29] Added to this, we have a marvellous set of poems in the Bodleian Manuscript 859, folios 292b to 294b, and edited by the Reverend H. Furneaux: the manuscript dates from the early fifteenth century, and seems to be a collection of the poems written between 1356 and 1399, about the massacre.[30] We know little of their desired audience, but they resolutely take the side

[26] On these reparations, see particularly *Salter*, Medieval Archives, I, 149; useful summaries are provided in *Cohn,* Medieval English Revolts, 101ff; and *Kibre,* Privileges, 303 et seq.

[27] *Kibre*, Privileges, 310.

[28] "King, if the prestige of the clergy has been increased by you, then certainly a great victory has been achieved for you. […] In whatever role you remain silent on these issues, power and honor will flee from you." Poem III, from *Rev. Henry Furneaux*, 'Poems Relating to the Riot Between Town and Gown on St Scholastica's Day (Feb. 10th 1354/5) and the two following days', in: Collectanea, ed. *Montagu Burrows*, Oxford 1896, 163–87, 180ff, here ll. 13–14 and 20.

[29] See note 18, above.

[30] *Furneaux*, Poems, 163–87.

of the University. The poems provide evidence of reactions by the scholars to the massacre. Three observations with regard to these representations are critical to the argument here.

First, they make it clear that there were just two contrasting, even polarised, visions of social order in Oxford. On the one hand, there was the vision of the townspeople; on the other hand, the vision of the scholars. The clarity of these two visions meant that if one prevailed, there was no need to muddy the waters with other views also. Second, the vision of the scholars aligned itself clearly with that of the University. Although a corporation of scholars, the University was obviously made up of disparate elements: students of various ages, at different stages in their academic careers, focusing upon different disciplines and with varying career prospects and deeply variable levels of commitment to a life of learning and dedication to the Church; masters whose trajectories were equally diverse; University authorities who, then as now, disagreed with each other and debated as to the best course of action. Yet, strikingly, in terms of articulating a vision of the jurisdictional and economic privileges of the corporation, these disparate elements united around a singular vision. Even more importantly, they joined in a unified set of narratives about events *post hoc*.

The nature of those narratives is my third observation. They successfully presented the scholars of the University both as victims, and as a force to be reckoned with. It was clearly important to stress the aggression of the townspeople, in order to sway the king by appealing to his duty of protection. However, the University's vision of social order recoiled from any sense that students should be marginalised as passive victims. They wanted to demonstrate their political centrality and to assure their active role in the well-being of the realm. The sense of victimhood then needed to be tempered with a sense that students were a powerful and engaged group of men. This was a tricky balancing act. The chronicle accounts stressed that students had been brutally massacred by townspeople, but also acknowledged the violence by the scholars themselves. Likewise, the appeal by the University to the Bishop of Lincoln whilst drawing attention to the atrocities committed by the townspeople, avoided a sense that students were innocent victims.[31] This rhetorical tightrope was successfully negotiated by differentiating between the types of violence carried out by students, and those carried out by townspeople. Whilst the students were described with noble weaponry like swords, and behaving in a way which, though brutal, was rational and courageous; the townspeople were characterised as beasts eager for slaughter. Gory accounts of the mutilations and maiming undertaken by the townspeople, combined with adjectives referring to their animality and bestiality, effectively

[31] Here, I refer principally to the account sent by the University to the bishop of Lincoln: Bodleian Twyne MS. V. f. 139. A detailed account of this document is given in *Rashdall*, University, 98.

dehumanised them, and utterly undermined any sense or rationalisation behind their violence.

Poetry, even if not of a terribly sophisticated nature, proved a useful vehicle for working out this tension between victimhood and powerful group of young men. The *Planctus Universitatis Oxoniensis contra laicos tempore magni conflictus* was written probably in 1356 or 1357.[32] It presents a dialogue between a scholar and the University, in which the scholar asks the allegorical figure of the University "Set parce lacrimis et metum dissere:/ Cur sic exanimis sedes in cinere?/ Quis tibi taedia temptat intendere?" (ll. 4–6).[33] The University replies that the mayor, John de Bereford, had renewed his efforts to exploit the scholars economically, to rob and disempower them, and that, as if this was not enough, he had followed this with a planned and vicious attack on the scholars during the St Scholastica's Day massacre. As in the official accounts by the University, the townsmen are blamed for the excesses of violence: "Sub ausu mutuo mane barbarice/ Burgenses denuo armant se publice,/ Inermes clericos invadunt bellice,/ Viros pacificos tractant felonice" (ll. 64–7).[34] The University is the mother, the students her poor sons (ll. 121–5). The townspeople want to create confusion, anarchy and disorder: "In ipso sonitu plebs se conglomerans/ Stridet in strepitu calces dilacerans,/ Vexillo prodito ad domos properans,/ Banno sic edito '*Ha wok*' vociferans" (ll. 83–7).[35] As in the University accounts, the townspeople are dehumanised in the account, and their violence is bestial: Beresford is a "vipera" (l. 44, "snake"), and a "vulpes" (l. 60, "fox"). This denigration of the townsmen's violence is all the more necessary since the students are not simply innocent, pacific victims. The poet shows them fighting back: they are a force to be reckoned with as "Potenter feriunt manus nobelium,/ Laicos reiciunt usque quadrivium. / A luce media ad solicidium/ Abs quavis edia committunt proelium." (ll. 73–6).[36] After a brief digression lamenting the poor behavior of many of students who apparently provoke fights with the townsmen, the scholar convinces the University that unity is essential:

[32] Furneaux, Poems, Poem I, 169 et seq.

[33] "But do not shed tears and do not be afraid: Why are you frightened to death, lying there in ruins? Who is trying to cover you with evil?"

[34] "Together, the burghers barbarously arm themselves in public in the morning, as if in war, they attack the clergy, they approach peaceable men perfidiously."

[35] "In this very commotion the people crowd together, shouting and pressed up against each other, with a raised flag rushing to the houses, and thus, after the proclamation of the ban, crying in a loud voice 'havoc.'"

[36] "The noble fists hit hard, they drive the laity back to the crossroads. Starting at noon they fight battles from midday to sunset."

"Dispensa gracias cum moderamine,/ Redde iusticias aequo libramine./ Ponas in clericis pacis compendium,/ Ne fiat laicis iniquum taedium./ Sic dominaberis in laude gencium,/ Et prosperaberis; nulli sit dubium."[37]

The answer, the scholar assumes, lies in a single social vision, adhered to by all members of the University: and this vision is achieved by getting the story straight about the events during the massacre, and carefully portraying the townspeople as aggressors whilst avoiding a sense that students were passive.

The message is reinforced in another poem (impossible to date with much precision, but predating the reign of Henry IV) with the claim that "Iam regit ancilla, dominatrix suppeditatur" (l. 6).[38] Instead of simply citing the brutality of the townspeople, the poet claims that the world is effectively turned upside-down: a slave overpowers her mistress. The implication is, therefore, that any violence should be exercised only by the University and its scholars. The complaint is not about mistreatment of passive scholars, but about brutality being carried out by the wrong party: "Clericulos contra dum pugnant Oxonienses" (l. 21).[39] Once again, the violence of the townspeople is denigrated through reference to its disorderliness and its chaotic effects: "Vexillum geritur nigrum, '*sle, sle*' recitatur," (l. 17)[40]; the poem is full of the shouts of the angry townsmen: "Havok, havok" (l. 28) and "Smygt faste, gyf good knok" (l. 30).

There were then, several key features which assured the success of the University's vision of life in Oxford. It was a vision to which most (if not all) in the University adhered, and it was clearly expressed in opposition to that of the townspeople: the polarisation of these two visions was articulated through the ritual nature of the violence during the massacre. The University enjoyed the support of the monarch, and crucially assured this through the ways in which it represented events. Instead of portraying its scholars as innocent victims, narratives carefully bestialized the violence of the townspeople, in order to allow a picture of courageous and active students to emerge. If scholars were to be thought of as politically engaged[41], this was essential. And, critically, the narratives constructed by the University were echoed by those found in chronicles and in poems more directly embedded in student life. In many ways, it was these discursive constructions of threatened orders which mobilized change. This combination of factors assured the predominance of the University in town life for centuries to come.

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[37] "Show modest favors, do balanced justice. You shall enter into an arrangement of peace with the clergy, lest unjust evil be done to the laity. In doing so, you will reign with the consent of the peoples and be successful; nobody should doubt this."

[38] *Furneaux*, Poems, poem VII, 183 et seq.

[39] "While the citizens of Oxford are raising their fists against little scholars".

[40] "A black flag is waved, they chant '*slay, slay*'."

[41] The desire for political engagement, even if of an intellectual kind, was articulated particularly forcefully in the foundation statutes for the College of All Souls. See *Jeremy Catto*, Unarmed Soldiery. Studies in the Early History of All Souls College. The Chichele Lectures, 1993–1994, Oxford 1995.

Paris

These observations are thrown into relief when we compare Oxford events with the Savoisy affair in Paris in 1404.[42] This episode has been chosen amongst a multitude of events because it crystallizes the differences particularly effectively. If Oxford was small and dominated, at least in reputation, by its University, Paris was huge and cosmopolitan. Importantly, if Oxford was de-centered from politics, Paris found itself right at the heart of the political life of the realm. In the early fifteenth century, this meant finding itself at the heart of the factional shenanigans and violence which emerged as King Charles VI sunk further and further into mental illness, suffering, most probably from paranoid schizophrenia.[43]

Where in Oxford, two competing visions of social order are discernible, in Paris, the historian finds a whole spectrum of competing visions of the role of the University and of the scholars in the city and in the polity as a whole. Were the members of the University to consider themselves embedded in the political life of the kingdom, or did they stand apart? Different groups within the University offered rather different answers. There were many powerful voices who felt that the University should offer its political advice and opinions. With staggering disregard for the evolving political situation, the University delegation at the Congress of Arras in 1435 famously suggested the partitioning of the kingdom between the English and the French: Jacques Verger has argued that this failure to engage with a rising sense of 'French-ness' proved the downfall of the University in the long-term.[44] Jean Gerson, as chancellor of the University, famously preached "Veniat Pax" ("Peace may come"), that therein lay the future

[42] The accounts by the University can be found in *Heinrich Denifle/Émile Châtelain* (Eds.), Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, 4 Vols., Paris, 1889–1897, iv, no. 1805, 1404, July 14th–19th, 129; see also nos. 1808 and 2275. See also Auctarium Chartularii Universitatis Parisiensis, 6 Vols., ed. *Heinrich Denifle/Émile Châtelain*, Vol. 1, Libre Procuratorum Nationis Anglicanae Alemanniae in Universitate Parisiensi, Paris 1894, 880. Added to this are a wealth of chronicle accounts. Of these, I refer primarily here to: *Jean Juvenal des Ursins*, Histoire de Charles VI, roy de France et des choses mémorables advenues durant quarante-deux années de son règne, 1380–1422, ed. *Josef Francois Michaud*, Paris 1836, 428–36; Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, contenant le règne de Charles VI, de 1380 à 1422, publiée en latin pour la première fois et traduite, ed. *Louis Bellaguet*, 3 Vols., Paris 1839, Vol. III, 187 et seq.; Journal de Nicholas de Baye, greffier du parlement de Paris, ed. *Alexandre Tuetey*, Vol. 1, Paris 1885, 93–111 – this is a highly useful edition which gives references to the relevant criminal documents, also Les Chroniques du Roi Charles VII par Gilles le Bouvier, dit le Héraut Berry, (Eds.) *Henri Courteault/Léonce Celier*, Paris 1979, 14–15; Enguerrand de Monstrelet, ed. *Louis Douët-d'Arcq*, 6 Vols, (Paris, Renouard, 1862), Vol. 1, 13, 73–4.

[43] On the mental ill-health of Charles VI, see *Françoise Autrand*, Charles VI: la folie du roi, Paris 1986.

[44] *Jacques Verger*, The University of Paris at the End of the Hundred Years' War, in: John W. Baldwin/Richard A. Goldthwaite (Eds.), Universities in Politics, Baltimore 1972, 47–78.

and security of the University.[45] But not everyone thought that the University had any role to play at all in politics. The Duke of Orléans declared, according to the monk of St-Denis (now identified as Michel Pintoin) that "Nec in casu fidei ad consilium milites non evocaretis, sic nec in casibus bellicis debetis vos immiscere. Recedentes igitur, studendo ministerium vestrum debite compleatis, quoiniam, et si filia regis Universitas vocetur, tamen de regimine regni ipsam intromittere non decet".[46] Orléans' motivations, though, were partisan: his comments arose from the fact that many in the University seemed to be profoundly supportive of the Duke of Burgundy, Orléans' arch-enemy. There were, then, large numbers of scholars at the University, who believed neither in apolitical ivory towers, nor in negotiations for peace, but who were firmly partisan and deeply belligerent. And not all of them were Burgundian. When the Duke of Burgundy had to surrender control of Paris to the Armagnacs in 1411, it was only the staunch Burgundian supporters who were exiled from the University, and many scholars were clearly supportive of the Armagnacs. Likewise, when Burgundy seized Paris once again, reprisals against many parts of the University in the form of banishments and horrific violence (the Collège de Navarre was notably plundered and its members attacked) spared those of Burgundian loyalty.[47] The University and its members were divided, between factions, and between visions of the degree of political participation appropriate for an institution of higher learning.

In many ways, these competing visions lay behind the outcomes of the fight with Charles de Savoisy. De Savoisy was a nobleman who had apparently performed already extremely bravely in the Hundred Years' War, and had been rewarded for his effort: he was also an unpleasant character, whose squires and valets had attacked the King's procurator in 1403.[48] In many ways, he looked like a great example of chivalry and epitomized a vision of a society dominated by politically engaged knights. The students' engagement with the retinue of such a figure was, in many ways, a clash about the nature of their involvement in the wider military conflict – Savoisy's men demonstrated their belief that students should remain in their centres of learning, and the students contested this by taking on a famous example of chivalry. The dispute with Savoisy's men took

[45] 'Veniat Pax' in: *Jean Gerson*, Oeuvres Complètes, Vol. 2, ed. *Palémon Glorieux*, Paris/Tournai/Rome et al., 1960–71, 1115; cited in: *Laurent Tournier*, L'Université de Paris "Fille de Paix". Le poids des intérêts corporatifs dans les engagements politiques universiaires au XVe siècle', 11. For a detailed account of the University's attempts at mediation, see Tournier's article.

[46] "As you would not call the soldiers for advice in matters of faith, you must not meddle in matters of war. Therefore withdrawing into our studies, you should fulfill your duty, as befits you, since, even if the university is called the daughter of the king, it nevertheless does not befit her to intervene in the governance of the kingdom." Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, iii, 314.

[47] For an account of the violence, see Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, Vol. 6, 39, 7, 232–235. For an account of the attacks on the Collège de Navarre, see *Nathalie Gorochov*, Le Collège de Navarre de sa fondation (1305) au début du XVe siècle (1418). Histoire de l'institution, de sa vie intellectuelle et de son recrutement, Paris 1997, 560–572.

[48] Journal de Nicholas de Baye, Vol. 1, 12–13.

place as the students were walking to the Church of Saint Katherine du Val des Escoliers by the Seine. The dispute seems to have begun as Savoisy's men led their horses to the water to drink. The Church was very close to Savoisy's mansion in the Rue Saint Antoine.

The students struck out at Savoisy's men first of all with stones and rocks, targeting their horses most particularly. As in Oxford, this violence was, to some extent, legible. The students seized what are typically designated the weapons of war – bows and arrows and swords – and claimed, through their gestures, that they too could engage in military activity, and that they too, had something beyond a merely intellectual contribution to make. At a time of international conflict, they claimed that they too could participate in this conflict and had something to offer the wider community. De Savoisy's men returned to re-arm themselves and to fetch reinforcements. Upon their return, a full-blown battle ensued.

Unsurprisingly, de Savoisy was punished for this offense. A vicious attack on a group of students could never be a matter of indifference: it was compounded by the fact that de Savoisy had a record of violence, and had previously been prosecuted. His house was razed to the ground, and he was forced to pay reparations: 200 livres parisis for chapels, 1000 livres parisis for wounded students, and 10, 000 livres parisis to the University itself.[49] He was effectively banished from Paris, and famously set sail from Marseille and captured some Sarrasin slaves. In 1405, he launched an attack against the English coast in an attempt, presumably, to rebuild his reputation.[50] However, this outcome was not as unambivalently advantageous to the University and to the students as the outcome we examined in Oxford. De Savoisy was officially pardoned in 1406, and given permission to reconstruct his house.[51] If this was about competing visions, de Savoisy's sense of his own political centrality was, if anything, reinforced; nothing was done to counteract the marginalization of scholars from political and military life; and over the course of the next century, university privileges were gradually eroded.

Why should violence such as this have left matters as equivocal as beforehand? The answer lies partly in the lack of a clearly articulated pair of competing visions of social order. Within the University, there were many different views on the appropriate degree of involvement in the political situation, and the extent to

[49] As well as the chronicle accounts on which this whole section is based, the sentence against Savoisy is 22nd August 1404, Archives Nationales de France, M 67a, no. 4. See CUP, IV, 807, 291; and 808, 130.

[50] Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, 316, ch. 17; Jean Juvenal des Ursins, 436. See *Maxime Rodinson*, La fascination de l'islam suivi de Le seigneur bourguignon et l'esclave sarrasin, Paris 1993. See also *Antoine Destemberg*, L'honneur des universitaires au Moyen Age, Paris 2015, 177, 254.

[51] Jean Juvenal des Ursins, 175. He was allowed to rebuild his house by letters patent of 15th September 1406, registered in the Paris Parlement on 23rd November 1406: Archives Nationales de France, X1a 8602, fol. 206v.

which it was desirable for students to make their power visible. In this sense, and in contra-distinction to Oxford, the students involved in the 1404 episode, and the University itself, did not align their narratives of what happened. There is a striking disjunction between the way in which the scholar participants actually behaved, and the ways in which they were represented in University accounts. The chronicle accounts make it abundantly clear that these students were not passive victims: whilst it is genuinely impossible to tell who started the fight, all the chronicle accounts concur in describing some extremely vicious and violent behavior on the part of the students, clearly keen to demonstrate their power. Despite this, the University itself insisted on portraying the students as entirely innocent victims.[52] In the official appeal for retribution against de Savoisy, the students were described as "petis innocens" and lambs being led to the slaughter. A sermon by Jean Gerson reiterated this message of peaceful and innocent lambs, never a particularly effective strategy since it was so clearly untrue.[53] These clashing narratives precluded any straightforward change in favor of the University.

If the participants themselves were trying to show their chivalric and political involvement, this attempt was stymied by the University's absolute refusal to achieve the fine balance between victimhood and agency which characterized narratives of the 1355 violence in Oxford.

The distinction could be reinforced with reference to the de Tignonville case of 1406–7. Two students, accused of theft and violence, were hanged by the Parisian provost, Guillaume de Tignonville.[54] The University reacted violently, but without any sense of the tensions which needed to be carefully negotiated. According to the official narrative, the hanged students were innocent victims of a provost intent upon encroaching on university privileges. Whilst this won the day, temporarily as it turned out, student privileges were by no means sacrosanct in Paris and "l'université n'en fut pas contente": the university narrative perhaps was so ineffective because its claims of innocence were so patently untrue.[55]

There is another set of more complex reasons for the ambivalent reaction to the de Savoisy affair. De Savoisy, was at this point, aligned with the Orléanist party.[56] Charles, Duke of Orléans, was the brother of the incapacitated king of France. He was vying for power with the King's uncle, Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy. The University, at least publicly, seems to have been aligned at this stage with the Duke of Burgundy: he seems to have successfully presented himself as the party

[52] CUP, IV, no. 1805, July 14th–19th 1404, p. 129.

[53] 'Veniat Pax' in: *Jean Gerson*, Oeuvres Complètes, ed. P. Glorieux, Vol. 2, Paris/Tournai/Rome et al. 1960/71, 1115.

[54] CUP, IV, no. 1840, November 10th 1407, 146–147. See also, eg. Chronique du religieux de St Denis, III, 724–726, bk. 28; Chroniques du Roi Charles VII, 32–34.

[55] Jean Juvenal des Ursins, 444.

[56] On these factions, see, for example, *Jonathan Sumption*, The Hundred Years' War. Cursed Kings, London 2015, particularly 130–184.

most likely to assure the University's ongoing privileges and autonomy.[57] These factional alignments were perhaps at stake during the clash between the scholars and de Savoisy's men, and they certainly shaped reactions to the episode.[58] Burgundian pressure in 1404 ensured the punitive measures against de Savoisy. The later revival of Orléanist fortunes (even after the assassination of Louis of Orléans in 1407), and particularly during the absence of Burgundy between 1413 and 1418 meant the favoring of figures such as de Savoisy and assured his return to prominence. Similar observations should be made about the de Tignonville episode, superficially simply emblematic of concerns about jurisdictional privileges. De Tignonville was associated with the Orléanists, and, on their ascendancy, his safety and the safety of his office was assured: he had also tried, as an Orléanist, to assure the impunity of Savoisy.[59] The fortunes of the University, and the competing social visions of the greater or lesser political involvement of students, was subject to the vacillations of public political power in this period. In other words, structural factors aside, political context was everything. If, in Oxford, the support of the monarch was critical to the fortunes of the University, the lack of any clear head in Paris was catastrophic for the imposition of a single social order. Relations between the University and the city continued to fluctuate until, ultimately, the University found itself deprived of many of its dearest privileges in the second half of the century.[60]

Heidelberg

If the political context is crucial, then our third example of the University of Heidelberg, underlines this further. The University of Heidelberg was a recent foundation, and attitudes to its privileges were bound to look very different from those at Oxford and Paris since they lacked any long-standing history. Like many German foundations of a similar date, it must be seen as part of a process of territorialization.[61] Combining the models of Paris and of Bologna, its foundation by the Elector Palatine sprung from two principal motivations: it brought prestige to a growing state, and it was to provide the necessary expertise to assure the success

[57] The nature of university allegiances is considered in detail in *Laurent Tournier*, 'Jean sans Peur et l'université de Paris', in: Werner Paravicini / Bertrand Schnerb (Eds.), Paris. Capitale des ducs de Bourgogne, Ostfildern 2007, 299–318.

[58] See also, *Laurent Tournier*, 'Charles de Savoisy', in: Bulletin de la société de l'histoire de Paris et de l'Ile de France, 122/4, 1995–1997, 71–88.

[59] *Tournier*, Jean sans Peur, 303.

[60] See *Verger*, The University, 47–78.

[61] *Reiner Schwinges*, The Medieval German Universities. Transformation and Innovation, in: Paedagogica historica 34, 2, 1998, 375–88.

of statecraft in that area.[62] Its statutes made this clear, stipulating that students should be protected jurisdictionally and economically from exploitation.[63]

As in Paris and Oxford, the early years of the University of Heidelberg were marked by quite frequent occurrences of violence between townspeople, young knights of the court, and the scholars of the University. In 1396, students were accused of persistently hijacking the townspeople's pigeons![64] Further conflicts took place in 1406, 1422, 1426, 1444, 1457 and 1499.[65]

The statutes had made the privileges of these new students very clear.[66] They were to be protected jurisdictionally and economically. The recent nature of these privileges meant that they were much more clearly articulated that in Oxford and Paris: rather than being historical accretions, they were modeled on older examples and enshrined in a single body of legislation. For all that, they still caused tensions. In many ways, Heidelberg looks like Oxford in this respect. Two competing visions seemed to emerge: one in which the students were protected from exploitation and politically engaged and involved; and another in which the townspeople and courtiers protected their prerogatives, and relegated this annoying new group to the ivory towers in which they apparently belonged. There seems to have been little of the fluid complexity and indecision that characterized the University of Paris regarding the appropriate degree of political involvement, but rather a polarity of visions.

As in the cases of Paris and Oxford, most of our evidence for the nature of the 1406 Studentenkrieg comes from a university perspective.[67] The violence began on 11th June 1406, when two students were wounded as they walked to their dinner in the Marktplatz. The burghers involved in the brawl then sent a young man to ring the bell of the town, reminiscent of course of events in Oxford, where conversely it was the students who had rung the bell. As a classic call to revolt,

[62] There is little space here to enter the debate regarding whether this renewed vocation of the universities represented a debasement of their intellectual integrity. I am inclined to think not. See *Heiko Augustinus Oberman*, University and Society on the Threshold of Modern Times. The German Connection, in: Kittelson / Transue, Rebirth, 36–37.

[63] *Gustav Emminghaus,* Corpus iuris Germanici tam publici quam privati academicum, Vol. 1, Frommann 1844–1846, 73.

[64] *Eduard Winkelmann*, Urkundenbuch der Universität Heidelberg, Heidelberg 1886, Vol. 1, 63–64, No. 42.

[65] See *Peter Moraw*, Heidelberg. Universität, Hof und Stadt im ausgehenden Mittelalter, in: Bernd Müller (Ed.), Studien zum städtischen Bildungswesen des späten Mittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit, Göttingen 1993, 298–301; *Winkelmann*, Urkundenbuch Heidelberg, Vol. II, 232, 324, 395 and 569.

[66] *Emminghaus,* Corpus iuris Germanici, Vol. I, 73.

[67] This is available online: *Jürgen Miethke / Heiner Lutzmann* (Eds.), Die Rektorbücher der Universität Heidelberg. 1386–1410 (zugleich das erste Amtsbuch der Juristischen Fakultät), 414–425, nos. 428–436, Heidelberg, 1986–1999. A good secondary account is in *Hautz*, Geschichte, 243–250; see also: *Jürgen Miethke*, Landesherrliche Universitätsreform im 15. Jahrhundert. Das Beispiel Heidelbergs, in: Blanke Zilynská (Ed.), Universitäten, Landesherren und Landeskirchen. Das Kuttenberger Dekret von 1409 im Kontext der Epoche, Prag 2009, 157–168.

an embodiment of a civic identity, this was a clear statement of intent. According to the university account, this was a carefully premeditated attack: "Ecce mala voluntas et intencio et diu preconcepta".[68] At this point, however, the young man was prevented from ringing the bell, the two wounded students were rescued, and a peace agreement was imposed by the Rector of the University. Crucially, however, the peace obligation only referred to the students who had actually been wounded in this brawl. On June 12th, the violence continued: two scholars got into a fight with a squire called Kuno Alheim. Alheim shouted for reinforcements, and more knights and burghers came running. As in Paris, there was significant noble involvement in this outbreak, and this was figured also through the explicit use of weapons of war: bows and arrows, lances, swords.

The focus now was upon the house of Johannes von Frankfurt, the rector of the University. The knights and townspeople were intent upon storming his house, wherein many students had by now taken refuge. Another attempt to ring the bell followed, and the aggressors claimed to be acting on the orders of the sheriff and King. Naturally, these officials later denied this could possibly have been the case, but the claim indicated a planned and rationalized attack. The Bishop of Speyer arrived, and tried and failed to stop the violence. The scene rapidly became one of chaos, as scholars attempted to escape across the roof, whilst being shot at with arrows, and awaited with lances. The aggressors stole books and gowns: reminiscent of the symbolic plundering in Oxford, these items were of little value to those who took them, but the actions constituted an assault on student identity. One student escaped disguised in a bathrobe. As in Oxford, the assaults were accompanied by lots of shouting, and the account is replete with references to noise – "ululatus", "clamor": "Moriantur scolares, interficiantur omnes tonsurati et rasi et longas tunicas deferentes".[69] The focus on the emblematic appearance of the scholars once again makes the violence legible: it would have felt all too real to its victims, but there was also a symbolic element here. But these scholars were, again as in Oxford, not just passive victims. They responded to these cries by defending themselves. Like the Oxford students, they were defined by their clerical status and the associated jurisdictional privileges, visualized in their tonsures; but like the Oxford students also, they were unwilling to be relegated to the status of passive victims.

The outcome of the Studentenkrieg was highly favorable to the University, and this result was further assured by the threat of a strike by the scholars. The Elector, shocked at the levels of violence which had taken place, and angry at the insult to his prestige, compounded by the mendacious claim that he had ordered the violence in the first place, punished the townspeople, and assured the Univer-

[68] "Look! Bad will, bad, long-cherished intention." *Miethke/Lutzmann*, Rektorbücher, 415.

[69] "Death to the scholars, may all the tonsured ones, the shaved, and all who wear long tunics be killed." Ibid., 417.

sity's privileges for the future. The role of University graduates in the administration of the court and the surrounding polity was assured. The University vision of social order had won the day. The scholars were clearly defined as the victims, deserving of retribution, but they were also acknowledged to be active members of the polity. The sermon which followed the ratification of their privileges began with the line: "Det deus, quod rex faciat bonam iusticiam ad dei laudem, regni honorem et incrementum sue filie"[70], and thus reiterated the embeddedness of the University in the political life of this growing territory. Future infractions against, or insults to, the University were dealt with severely: on 2nd July 1406, Johannes von Hirschhorn was punished for "verba iniuriosa universitati".[71]

In this respect, the Studentenkrieg resonates more closely with events in Oxford, than with those in Paris. A single social vision won the day. The context here is crucial. As in Oxford, Heidelberg was part of a more or less unified polity, and one wherein the ruler was in a position to impose his will. There was none of the deeply divisive factionalism which was tearing France and Paris apart, and which both exacerbated town-gown tension and prevented the ruler from imposing any solution. If anything, given that Heidelberg was the seat of the Elector's authority, rather than being decentred like Oxford, the Elector was bound to act more decisively and to feel his prestige to be more directly threatened.

Clues also lie, though, in the ways in which the University represented events. In contrast to Paris, there is no sense of conflicting visions from different parts of the University. The narrative in the Rector's book corresponds with what we can read from the students' behavior. These were young men keen to stress their power, agency and political involvement: the alignment of the narratives in this respect was key. Unlike the descriptions of innocent children which we find in the aftermath of the de Savoisy affair, in Heidelberg, the narrative resonates with Oxford's careful attention to presenting the injustice of the attacks whilst describing powerful students. It is striking that, after the first day of violence, the Rector only placed the peace obligation on those directly implicated: this seems an implicit encouragement to the other scholars to fight back. The university account of events of the second day begins by describing that "duo scolares universitatis supposita de verbis" resists the temptation to exonerate the students entirely: it is clear that they fought back and that this violence was two-sided. The violence of the two sides is, however, carefully distinguished. The townspeople and knights are shown to have started the brawls, and they are said to have been supported in this by the prostitutes of the town, an effective way of degrading their cause.

[70] "God may grant that the king will do good justice for the glory of God, the honour of the kingdom, and the growth of his daughter." *Miethke/Lutzmann*, Rektorbücher, 425.

[71] "Unjust words to the university." Ibid.

Conclusions

Comparison of outbreaks of town-gown violence in these three towns has revealed several pointers which might help us to identify why some violence leads to social change, and some does not. The role of a powerful monarch, able to assure the future of the University, is key. More than this though, it is clear that the articulation of a single clear vision in opposition to that of the townspeople is essential: nebulous spectrums of opinions, as in Paris, preclude University hegemony. If we are to assume that scholars wanted to assure their privileges, but equally to posit themselves as key political actors, the ways in which events were represented and narrativized becomes key. Not only must those narratives align, amongst the various parties involved, but they must carefully balance the victimhood of the students with a sense that these students are powerful historical agents in their own right.

These observations can be reinforced by considering the spatial aspect of the three episodes.[72] In Heidelberg, the students were on their way to eat a meal in the very center of the town, the Marktplatz. The opposition from the burghers was, at least in part, about reclaiming urban space. In this, the comparison with Oxford is striking. The townspeople attempted to ring the city bell, they shut the city gates, and they assaulted the house of the rector. In Oxford, violence began in a tavern on the corner of Carfax, the crossroads at the very heart of city-life and a spot at which the life of the University and the lives of the townspeople intersected. The aggressors then moved down the High Street, one of the most important commercial routes since it lay in the direction of London. The students were responsible for ringing the bell and closing the gates: the townspeople were fighting back against this exclusion from communal spaces. The fighting became increasingly territorialized, as students were obliged to retreat into their Halls and Colleges. In both Oxford and Heidelberg, there were two contrasting visions of dominance within urban spaces. Things were a little more complex in Heidelberg, however, since students were also vying to assure their political centrality given the presence of the Elector's court. It is striking that the majority of the violence focused on the house of Johannes von Frankfurt, a figure explicitly described as living at the end of the road leading up to the castle.

The vying with aristocratic figures was spatially configured in Paris also. The young scholars were on their way to the Church of St Catherine du Val des Escoliers, but must have been well aware that they were crossing space explicitly associated with the chivalric knight, Charles de Savoisy. Violence here was not fo-

[72] I refer the reader to three useful maps of Paris, Oxford and Heidelberg: respectively *Hercule Géraud*, Plan de la Ville de Paris, sous Phillipe le Bel, Paris 1837; *Arthur Crossley/Christopher Robin Elrington,*Oxford c. 1375, in: Id. (Eds.), The City of Oxford *(*A History of the County of Oxford*,* Vol. 4*),* London 1979*;* map of seventeenth-century Heidelberg in: *Gerhard Ritter*, Die Heidelberger Universität, Heidelberg 1936, frontispiece.

cused on the usual student haunts of the city, but on spaces associated with more obviously politically engaged aspects of city life. What exactly the students were doing is subject to such conflicting accounts in the narratives – from walking along peaceably, to actively attempting to provoke a fight – that the significance of the spatial contestation is far less clear-cut than in Oxford and Heidelberg.

Town-gown violence tended indeed to be driven by competing visions of political order, but it was nevertheless highly contingent on particular historical circumstances. Oxford town-gown violence in the fourteenth century was largely driven by different socio-economic visions of urban life, whereas these visions in fifteenth-century Paris and Heidelberg were focused on the degree of political involvement and tended to involve conflict with other political players, notably those of noble extraction. And the ways in which the universities represented these conflicts after these events reveals much about the nature of the visions and closely affected the ways in which they might be implemented. In Oxford and Heidelberg, university authorities portrayed students as victims without minimizing their violent behavior – and the management of this tension seemed to assure that these academic bodies were politically integrated. In Paris, on the other hand, the official university vision of the role of scholars did not tally with that of many of the scholars themselves who wanted to be more politically involved – and, out of this spectrum of visions arose a lack of clarity which prevented true political integration.

The Nuremberg Shrovetide Plays and their Perception of Social (Dis-)Order

Beatrice von Lüpke

Reflecting on the work of Milton Singer, Erika Fischer-Lichte defines theatre as a genuine cultural performance. Through theatre, a culture expresses how it perceives itself and articulates that perception in front of its own members as if they were strangers.[1] Consequently, the theatre could serve as a kind of mirror for understanding society or for getting an idea of a culture's perception of itself in the first place. Because of this, the interpretation of theatre plays can elucidate fields of an urban discourse and might serve as a source for historical studies, in addition to showing how the plays expose the potential of literature and especially urban theatre to reflect and possibly also question social structures. These ideas of theatre as a genuine social performance have mainly been applied to religious plays and their gigantic performances as a kind of urban ritual. The 110 mostly anonymous Nuremberg Shrovetide plays, however, which consist of about 200 verses each and date back to the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, were largely regarded as irrelevant amusement beyond any artistic merit or their obscene character was judged to function as an outlet for oppressed sexual desires.[2] But the private, improvised character of these plays, which were staged in private houses or inns makes their interpretation an especially worthwhile topic: They nearly always treat, in carnivalesque inversion, issues relevant to the social order of the time and, under the pretense of jest, they criticise urban structures in a very direct way.[3]

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[1] Fischer-Lichte pursued this perspective in quite a few publications. For an introduction see *Erika Fischer-Lichte*, Geschichte des Dramas. Epochen der Identität auf dem Theater von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, Tübingen 1999, 1–12.

[2] Early discussions about the very graphic humor of the plays are summed up in *Rüdiger Krohn*, Der unanständige Bürger. Untersuchungen zum Obszönen in den Nürnberger Fastnachtsspielen des 15. Jahrhunderts, Kronberg/Taunus 1974, 16–61. He interprets the obscenity as a deliberate provocation of the craftsmen. Cf. also *Johannes Merkel*, Form und Funktion der Komik im Nürnberger Fastnachtsspiel, Freiburg im Breisgau. 1971. They both assume that the craftsmen abstained from sex before marriage and were therefore sexually frustrated. *Volker Mertens*, Das Fastnachtspiel zwischen Subversion und Affirmation, in: Arthur Groos/Hans-Jochen Schiewer/Markus Stock (Eds.), Topographies of the Early Modern City, Göttingen 2008, 43–60, criticizes this one-sided view.

[3] *Hagen Bastian,* Mummenschanz. Sinneslust und Gefühlsbeherrschung im Fastnachtspiel des 15. Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt/Main 1983, indicates connections between the plays and his-

A very remarkable image of society is, for example, represented in the play *Die Fastnacht vor Gericht* (*Carnival on Trial,* K 51)[4], which I intend to discuss. It was probably written by the famous playwright and poet Hans Folz. In the play, the personification of Carnival appears on stage and is accused of corrupting society. Under its influence crimes are committed and the social order is upset, or so it is alleged. Carnival responds to each accusation, and a judge finally discharges the personified holiday. If the play has been considered worth a detailed analysis and interpretation, it was mainly the personification of Carnival itself and the intended antagonism between Carnival and Lent that was taken into consideration. Ingeborg Glier, for example, compares the play with three others in which a personification of Carnival is taken to court.[5] According to her, interestingly enough, the discussion offered intriguing reflections about human existence between asceticism and indulgence, although the dispute about the primacy of one or the other might seem a waste of time – it has been decided already in the ongoing course of the ecclesiastical year, that both, Carnival and Lent, have their right of existence in a certain period of time. Christa Ortmann and Hedda Ragotzky, however, stress the long iconic tradition of this antagonism. The plays reflected a fascinating change of perspective in so far as the whole ecclesiastical year is to be seen in a carnivalesque point of view, which could be described as total inversion.[6] Bruno Quast specifies this inversion as a threefold one: the inversion of the ecclesiastical year, the inversion of vigil and the holiday itself and the inversion of cause and effect.[7] In contrast to this, Samuel Kinser understands the theatrical representation of Carnival as some kind of evidence that the primor-

torical changes in the 15th century. He emphasizes a strong difference between the two known play writers Hans Rosenplüt and Hans Folz. Analyzing the play *Die karge Bauernhochzeit* (K 104, *The Thrifty Peasant Wedding*), *Klaus Ridder,* Fastnachtstheater. Städtische Ordnung und fastnächtliche Verkehrung, in: Id. (Ed.), Fastnachtstheater. Weltliches Schauspiel in literarischen und kulturellen Kontexten, Tübingen 2009, 65–81, demonstrates some striking overlaps between the plays and the urban discourse. This perspective is again presented in *Klaus Ridder/Beatrice von Lüpke/Rebekka Nöcker,* From Festival to Revolt. Carnival Theatre during the Late Middle Ages and Early Reformation as a Threat to Urban Order, in: Cora Dietl/Christoph Schanze/Glenn Ehrstine (Eds.), From Festival to Revolt, Göttingen 2014, 153–167 cf. *Beatrice von Lüpke*, Nürnberger Fastnachtsspiele und städtische Ordnung, Tübingen 2017, see especially 143–148..

[4] *Adelbert von Keller* (Ed.), Fastnachtspiele aus dem fünfzehnten Jahrhundert, Darmstadt 1965–66 [reprint of the edition Stuttgart 1853–1858 (BLVSt 28–30,46)], Nr. 51, 379–390 (from here on *K* is used as an abbreviation for the Shrovetide play edition).

[5] Cf. *Ingeborg Glier*, Personifikationen im deutschen Fastnachtspiel des Spätmittelalters, in: Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift 39, 1965, 542–587, see especially 557–566.

[6] *Christa Ortmann/Hedda Ragotzky*, Itlicher zeit tut man ir recht. Zu Recht und Funktion der Fastnacht aus der Sicht Nürnberger Spiele des 15. Jahrhunderts, in: Hans-Joachim Ziegeler (Ed.), Ritual und Inszenierung. Geistliches und weltliches Drama des Mittelalters und der Frühen Neuzeit, Tübingen 2004, 207–218.

[7] *Bruno Quast*, Zwischenwelten. Poetologische Überlegungen zu den Nürnberger Fastnachtspielen des 15. Jahrhunderts, in: Wolfgang Harms/C. Stephen Jaeger (Eds.), Fremdes wahrnehmen – fremdes Wahrnehmen. Studien zur Geschichte der Wahrnehmung und zur Begegnung von Kulturen im Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit, Stuttgart/Leipzig 1997, 205–219.

dial Christian meaning of Carnival got lost in the context of the Reformation – a process he described as a "shift of consciousness"– the former "presentation" of Carnival became a mere "representation".[8]

In addition to these interpretations, I will take a closer look at another, perhaps even more remarkable, feature of the play: the accusations of Carnival are put forward by representatives ("anwälte") of the aristocracy, the burghers or citizens, the craftsmen, the peasants, and the women respectively and Carnival responds in turn by denouncing these accusers. Because of the detailed portrayal of different kinds of misbehavior shown by these five social groups, the play could be interpreted as class satire as well. In this regard, the text seems to reflect a slightly modernized, urban version of the common medieval frame of society represented by the triad of nobility, clergy and peasantry.[9] This observation should not, however, hide the fact that the succession of these classes only pretends to be a complete image of the social order, which becomes readily apparent if one considers that differences per class and per gender are combined and that the clerics, who are a very common target of social mockery, are left out completely. But the distinctions presented in the plays and the specific accusations and rebuttals allow, as Hansjürgen Linke puts it, "with all due caution an insight into the cultural history of that time".[10] Interestingly, however, this critique is formulated on an occasion that is characterized by the inversion of the normal social order, and the play itself is an integral part of the carnival activities that it criticizes. To establish this interpretation, I will first discuss the aristocratic figures of this play and those of the so-called political Shrovetide plays in general. Secondly, the presentation of the urban society, burghers and craftsmen will be taken into consideration before I take a closer look at the speech of the peasants and the women, allowing for their role in the Nuremberg Shrovetide plays.

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[8] *Samuel Kinser*, Presentation and Representation. Carnival at Nuremberg, 1450–1550, in: Representations 13, 1986, 1–41.

[9] There are plenty of medieval texts reflecting and legitimizing social inequality. They claim that God intended social inequality. According to them, society as a whole formed a harmonic total entitled as *ordo*. A broad overview of German literary descriptions of *ordo* is offered by *Wolfgang Heinemann*, Zur Ständedidaxe in der Literatur des 13.–15. Jahrhunderts, in: Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur 88, 1966, 1–90; Id., Zur Ständedidaxe in der Literatur des 13.–15. Jahrhunderts (Zweiter Teil), in: Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur 89, 1967, 290–403, and Id., Zur Ständedidaxe in der Literatur des 13.–15. Jahrhunderts (Dritter Teil), in: Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur 92, 1970, 388–437.

[10] "Gewähren sie [i. e.. die Vorwürfe] doch bei aller Vorsicht der Betrachtung Einblick in die kulturhistorische Realität der Zeit", *Hansjürgen Linke,* Aspekte der Wirklichkeits-Wahrnehmung im weltlichen deutschen Schauspiel des Mittelalters, in: *Ridder*, Fastnachtstheater, 11–61, here 31.

Aristocracy

The first one to complain about Carnival is an ambassador of the nobility. According to him, Carnival forces the noblemen to dance and joust, activities that are called in carnivalesque inversion "a big labour".[11] Moreover, noble women have to spruce themselves up with "pearls, gowns, golden crowns".[12] Complaining about expenses, the nobleman himself cites mercantile anxieties on the one hand and could therefore be regarded as speaking "like a merchant".[13] On the other hand, the worries about expenses are a very common urban critique towards the nobility. The nobleman is not presented as a merchant but proves mercantile (pre)judices towards the nobility, as to be said about the last charge: The accusations culminate in the reproach that Carnival is guilty of provoking inbreeding.[14]

Carnival does not only argue that these crimes are self-inflicted, he even adds another accusation: The nobility lives at the expense of the peasants, which leads to the considerable endangerment of the burghers and their trade routes, reflected in the line "By this many merchants / are attacked on the routes. / Many of them have to face losses".[15] Again, this accusation suggests an urban point of view and reflects contemporary problems. History chronicles record that Nuremberg's merchants indeed suffered from robberies and therefore requested a broad intervention from the nearby noblemen.[16] Carnival obliges them to protect the rural population or, more precisely, to guarantee the safety of trade as well. The play alludes to the idea of real, ethical, nobility[17] and mentions a very stereotypical idea of noble merriments, but in fact it exposes the very interests of the city and its anger at the aristocracy. In addition to their incapability to guarantee protection, they borrow money and instead of paying their debts, they start unjustified wars.

The same allegation is put forward in other Shrovetide plays too. *Klerus und Adel* (K 78, *Clerigy and Nobility)*, which is especially regarded as a reflex to the so-called First Markgrafenkrieg (1449–1450), is known for its severe criticism of noblemen and especially of Nurembergs' enemy Markgraf Albrecht Achilles.[18]

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[11] "groß mue", K 51, 380,6.

[12] "perlein, rocken, guldin kronen", ibid., 13.

[13] Cf. *Kinser*, Presentation, 11.

[14] Cf. *Ibid*.: "What a way to prick the nobles' conceit about their superior blood! Rarely is the urban and lower-class point of view of the author so sharply expressed as in this fantasy about noble incest."

[15] "Und werden dardurch nider geworfen / Vil guter kaufleut auf der straßen, / Der mancher muß ein feder laßen", K 51, 380,35–381,1.

[16] Cf. *Gerhard Hirschmann*, Das Zeitalter des Markgrafen Albrecht Achilles, in: Gerhard Pfeiffer (Ed.), Nürnberg. Geschichte einer europäischen Stadt, München 1971, 115–120, here 116.

[17] "recht war adel", K 51, 381,6.

[18] Cf. *Brigitte Stuplich,* Das ist dem adel ain große schant. Zu Rosenplüts politischen Fastnachtspielen, in: Jürgen Jaehrling/Uwe Meves/Erika Timm (Eds.), Röllwagenbüchlein. Festschrift für Walter Röll zum 65. Geburtstag, Tübingen 2002, 165–185, here 172–176.

A knight, who could be identified as the Markgraf himself, justifies the war by claiming:

> If we had nothing but peace
> The peasants would drive out the nobility,
> They would become so overbearing,
> They would buy fortresses and cities.
> Peasants want to comport themselves like burghers,
> Burghers like nobles.
> Therefore we need war,
> So that they remain in their place.[19]

A nobleman himself reveals war as an instrument to keep a social system alive which allows him to live at the expense of the poor. In the "most researched Shrovetide play"[20] *The Turks Carnival* (K 39, *Das Türken Fastnachtspiel*), a burgher formulates the exact same accusation.[21] A group of four plays[22] presents knights and kings, who are constantly suspected of adultery, as cowards. Two plays[23] adopt the literary tradition of the Arthurian court only to show the lack of morals in this king as well.

These so-called political plays[24] mock the nobility in a very direct and pointed manner. Although the upper classes fail in fulfilling their obligation as protectors of the poor, they nevertheless exploit the cities and peasants. Furthermore, their living habits are in no sense coherent with the pretence of honour that they claim for themselves. As Linke states regarding the Shrovetide plays: "The image of the nobility is that of a morally degenerated and socially useless caste, which adheres to a pretense of representation befitting their rank not at all consistent with their merits. […] They keep up an illusion without any social or moral reference to reality."[25] In this regard, the play *Carnival on Trial* seems to be a very political play

[19] "Solt es allweg frid beleiben, / Die paurn würden den adel vertreiben, / Sie würden hinten nach so gail, / Sie machten uns pürg und stet fail. / Der paur wil als der purger gan, / Der purger als der edelman. / Darümb mag uns der krieg gefrumen, / Das sie nit über uns kumen", K 78, 646,11–18. The English translation is taken from *Edelgard E. DuBruck,* Aspects of Fifteenth-Century Society in the German Carnival Comedies. Speculum hominis, Lewiston 1993, 75.

[20] *Stuplich*, adel, 176. Regarding K 39 cf. *Glenn Ehrstine*, Fastnachtsrhetorik. Adelskritik und Alterität in Des Turken Vasnachtspil, in: WerkstattGeschichte 37, 2004, 7–23, and *Christiane Ackermann*, Dimensionen der Medialität. Die Osmanen im Rosenplütschen, Turken Vasnachtspil' sowie in den Dramen des Hans Sachs und Jakob Ayrer, in: *Ridder*, Fastnachtstheater, 189–220.

[21] Cf. K 39, 300,13–301,6.

[22] The plays K 47, 75, 79 and 100.

[23] I.e. the plays K 80 and 81.

[24] *Stuplich*, adel, offers an overview of the political Shrovetide plays.

[25] "Das Bild des Adels ist das einer moralisch verkommenen und ausgehöhlten, sozial funktionslos gewordenen Kaste, die mit der Aufrechterhaltung standesgemäßer Repräsentation einen Anspruch erhebt, dem keine Leistung entspricht […], und so eine Fassade aufrechterhält, hinter der keine Realität – weder sittliche noch gesellschaftliche – mehr steht", *Linke,* Aspekte, 33.

as well. Although the ambassador of the nobility seeks to point out the foul nature of the feast, he is in fact accusing the nobility of its extremely corrupt behavior.

The Urban Society: Burgher and Craftsmen

The second advocate who charges the carnival in K 51 represents the burghers. Again, it is striking that the urban play suggests an economic point of view. Carnival, as it is said, did greater harm to the townspeople than "every trade on earth".[26] According to the prosecutor, the frivolous time provokes the distorted, peasant-like way in which the burghers behave:

> Many of them loose their sanity
> Beating, shovelling and gorging
> They dig in the dung
> With big boots and peasant hoods
> Like hicks, bumpkins and lumps.[27]

Certainly, the Carnival knows how to respond to these accusations. It claims that the father of all mankind, Adam himself, was a peasant and that he ordered this very misbehavior during the Shrovetide days. Consequently, well-educated behavior would be a violation of the command to honor father and mother. Not only do the burghers become peasants, every kind of class conceit or snobbery is ridiculed in some way: "I feel that you are alike him [i. e. Adam as a peasant], / If it wasn't for the wall [i. e. the city wall]."[28]

The reference to Adam is interesting not only because of his existence as a peasant but also because the original state of society is characterized as a paradisiacal state of equality.[29] This idea is even more concisely formulated in the saying: "Als Adam grub und Eva spann, / Wo war denn da der Edelmann?[30]" ("When Adam dug and Eve spun / Who was then a nobleman?"), which can be spotted particularly often in the context of the peasant's war in the sixteenth

[26] "Tust uns burgern vil mer zu lad / Dann all hendel sust auf erden", K 51, 381,18 et seq.

[27] "Etlich ir vernuft so gar an werden / Mit hauen, schaufeln und gabeln, / Do mit sie in dem mist umb krabeln, /Mit großen stifeln, peurischen kappen, / Als trappen, appetappen und lappen", Ibid., 20–24.

[28] "Sust ich euch gleich dem selben [i. e. Adam als Bauer] spür, / Es helf euch dann die maur [i. e. die Stadtmauer]dafür", Ibid., 382,25 et seq.

[29] Cf. *Bernhard Töpfer*, Urzustand und Sündenfall in der mittelalterlichen Gesellschafts- und Staatstheorie, Stuttgart 1999, 529–566.

[30] *Lutz Röhrich* (Ed.), Das große Lexikon der sprichwörtlichen Redensarten, Freiburg 1991, ser. 1, 66 et seq.; *Karl Friedrich Wander* (Ed.), Deutsches Sprichwörterlexikon. Ein Hausschatz für das deutsche Volk, Darmstadt 1964 [reprint of the edition Leipzig 1867], ser. 1, 27; *Kuratorium Singer der Schweizerischen Akademie der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften* (Ed.), Thesaurus Proverbiorum Medii Aevi. Lexikon der Sprichwörter des romanisch-germanischen Mittelalters, Berlin 1995, ser. 1, 32.

century. In the Shrovetide play, however, the motif of Adam and social equality is linked to the burgher and not the nobleman. Hence, it seems to indicate and ridicule their self-esteem and their would-be-noble way of life. During the carnival, their efforts to distinguish themselves from an assumed lower class are meaningless, or, as Quast concludes: "The world upside-down exposes the true identity of the burghers. The one thing that separates them from the peasant is the city wall. The Shrovetide prevents the burghers from constructing their identity by exclusion, by expressing the affinity between the other and the self."[31]

The craftsmen are exposed in a similar way. Their representative tries to convict Carnival as well and points out that they overextend themselves financially, which can be interpreted as an allusion to the growing impoverishment of the urban middle classes in the Late Middle Ages.[32] The fear of impoverishment can also be observed in the various urban sumptuary laws[33], but an even more striking link to the historical context is the presentation of urban society itself. Traditional patterns of society like the triad of clerics-nobles-peasants are not only extended by one urban group, but in the play two different urban classes are differentiated: an upper class and an inferior one. Although they don't present urban society as a whole, and they do not intend to, the play picks up on one crucial distinction. This distinction coincides with urban laws, precisely the graduation of citizenship passed in 1382 and its categories *purgher* and *handwerkerpurgher*, which are linked to income.[34]

Despite the fact that the Shrovetide plays are mainly performed among craftsmen[35], the craftsman himself is rarely a topic of the plays, which is considered as a concession to the tensions between the artisans and the Inner Council.[36] The actors seek to avoid a direct confrontation with the urban authorities by not di-

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[31] *Quast,* Zwischenwelten, 209.

[32] Cf. *Werner Buchholz*, Anfänge der Sozialdisziplinierung im Mittelalter. Die Reichsstadt Nürnberg als Beispiel, in: Zeitschrift für historische Forschung 18, 1991, 129–147, here 144; *Rudolf Endres*, Sozialstruktur Nürnbergs, in: Pfeiffer, Nürnberg, 194–199, here 197 et seq., and *Valentin Groebner*, Ökonomie ohne Haus. Zum Wirtschaften armer Leute in Nürnberg am Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts, Göttingen 1993.

[33] Cf. e. g. *Joseph Baader* (Ed.), Nürnberger Polizeiordnungen aus dem 13. bis 15. Jahrhundert, Amsterdam 1966 [reprint of the edition Stuttgart 1861], 71.

[34] Cf. *Werner Schultheiss*, Das Bürgerrecht der Königs- und Reichsstadt Nürnberg. Beiträge zur Verfassungsgeschichte der deutschen Städte, in: Mitarbeiter des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte (Ed.), Festschrift für Hermann Heimpel zum 70. Geburtstag am 19. September 1971, Göttingen 1972, 159–194, here 180 et seq.

[35] *Eckehard Simon*, Die Anfänge des weltlichen deutschen Schauspiels 1370–1530. Untersuchung und Dokumentation, Tübingen 2003, 303–306, shows that the plays used to be performed by young noble men as well, but that nevertheless most performers were young craftsmen.

[36] *Johannes Janota*, Die Rolle des Handwerks und der Handwerker in den Werken des Nürnberger Handwerkliteraten Hans Folz, in: Rainer S. Elkar (Ed.), Deutsches Handwerk in Spätmittelalter und früher Neuzeit. Sozialgeschichte, Volkskunde, Literaturgeschichte, Göttingen 1983, 265–282, here 280.

rectly addressing the rigid urban structures, for example the total prohibition of any guilds. Undoubtedly though, the main character of the plays is the peasant.

The Peasant and Women

Even before the rural ambassador enters the stage in the play *Carnival on trial*, the peasants are presented as victims of the nobility: "The ones living under a roof of straw pay for it, / The poor peasants in the villages."[37] This image of a most pitiful rural society before the peasants' war in 1524/25[38] is contrasted by a different presentation of the rustic. The representative of the peasantry presents accusations, which differ from the other ones in the play significantly and not only in terms of length. The "anwalt" initiates his long speech, describing children who eat the vomit of their father after not leaving the house and eating large amounts of food for an entire month.[39] He and the subsequent speech of the personified Carnival picture such sexual, obscene and scatological behavior that his speech cannot in any way be interpreted as a "specifically harsh critique of deficits"[40] linked to some kind of rural reality. Moreover, what Carnival depicts as peasant behavior is some kind of perverted guide for the carnivalesque urban behavior. Consequently, Carnival concludes his speech stating:

> You [i. e. the peasants] celebrate this kind of carnival throughout the year,
> That you disobey me completely forsooth,
> That I don't have anything to do with you.[41]

Other than the critics of the nobles, the burghers and the craftsmen, the presentation of the peasants is not meant to mock a social stratum[42] at all. Rather, it is an equalization of all social strata, in that during carnival all human beings behave like the so-called peasants.

It is widely accepted that the figure of the peasant is obligated to a literary tradition, especially to the figure of the so-called "dörper", which is mainly associated with Neithart and presents some sort of counter-concept to the noblemen.[43]

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[37] "Es zalenß die unter den stroen dechen, / Die armen peurlein in den dorfen", K 51, 380,33 et seq.

[38] Cf. *DuBruck,* Aspects, 1–5.

[39] Cf. K 51, 384,19–385,11.

[40] *Glier,* Personifikationen, 574.

[41] "Solch vasnacht habt ir uber jar, / Das ir mein nit vast achtent zwar, / Das ich mich eur nit vast an nim", K 51, 386,37–387,2.

[42] This is the interpretation of *Werner Lenk,* Das Nürnberger Fastnachtspiel des 15. Jahrhunderts. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie und zur Interpretation des Fastnachtspiels als Dichtung, Berlin 1966, 22.

[43] Cf. *Hedda Ragotzky,* Der Bauer in der Narrenrolle. Zur Funktion 'verkehrter Welt' im frühen Nürnberger Fastnachtspiel, in: Horst Wenzel (Ed.), Typus und Individualität im Mittelalter, München 1983, 77–101, here 77: "In der Forschung ist man sich weitgehend darüber

Regarding the Shrovetide Plays, two further considerations come to mind: First, the peasant in the Shrovetide plays is not only marked by his unruly performance and – as in the Neithart poetry – acts like the impolite, obscene idiot, but he is the carnival fool at the same time. As such, he is directly linked to the figure which constantly oscillates between the laughable idiot and the witty outsider uttering an inconvenient truth. The fool is depicted outside every scheme of society. He refuses to be placed within a stratum and therefore questions the medieval concept of society as *ordo*.[44] Second, the peasant is the most popular carnival masquerade of Nurembergs' burghers. In contrast to the poetic Neithart-tradition or in general a mere poetic reflection of the peasant, his appearance on stage points directly at the audience and their most popular carnival disguise. It grants the citizen, as Eckehard Catholy claims, "the intensely longed-for liberation of the severe urban society rules."[45] The shameful behavior on the stage coincides in a way with the carnival behavior of the audience. As Kinser claims, it is even consistent with the report of the carnival excess reported in the urban laws.[46]

The appearance of the next referee seems to be an allusion to a very common carnival masque as well. The next one to make an accusation against Carnival is the representative of women in general, which has been regarded as an incoherency because social differences regarding class and regarding gender are combined. But if one considers that the play, which is a social critique or a class satire in the beginning, ends up presenting the unrealistically obscene behavior of the peasants, the appearance of the second favorite carnival masquerade, a man in women's clothes, seems to be only logical. The presentation of an urban *ordo* and its references to the existing urban law and impending poverty results in a different kind of *ordo*, one that is aware of only one distinction, namely that of the sexes and that, therefore, commands sexuality. Thus, it is not particularly surprising that the women's representative exposes the ubiquity of sexuality during carnival days.[47]

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einig, daß die Beliebtheit der Bauernfigur nicht im Sinne einer Polemik gegen den Bauern als Stand zu verstehen ist, sondern daß sie im Zusammenhang gesehen werden muß mit der Tradition, die der Bauer als literarischer Typus – insbesondere seit Neidharts *dörpern* – hat." ("There is a consensus in research that the popularity of the peasant figure is not to be regarded as a polemic against peasantry, but rather has to be considered in the context of the literary tradition of the type – especially since Neidhart's *dörper*"). Cf. also *Bastian*, Mummenschanz, 95–99.

[44] *Werner Mezger,* Narrenidee und Fastnachtsbrauch. Studien zum Fortleben des Mittelalters in der europäischen Festkultur, Konstanz 1991, 31–51.

[45] "ersehnte Befreiung von der ernsthaften Rollenhaftigkeit des gesellschaftlichen Lebens der Stadt", *Eckehard Catholy,* Fastnachtspiel, Stuttgart 1966, 47.

[46] Cf. *Kinser*, Presentation, 3 et seq.

[47] *Elisabeth Keller*, Die Darstellung der Frau in Fastnachtspiel und Spruchdichtung von Hans Rosenplüt und Hans Folz, Frankfurt/Main 1992, broadly discusses the obvious misogynistic tendencies of the early Shrovetide plays. Cf. also *Bastian*, Mummenschanz, 87–93. It is beyond doubt that the aggressive sexual presentation of women in the plays is a chauvinistic gesture. Nevertheless, one should remain aware that men are the target of sexual mockery in the plays as well.

Reflection of (Dis-)Order

Although the Carnival is summoned to the play *Carnival on Trial*, in the end Carnival accuses different social groups. He states that he does not force anyone to act unruly but rather the social groups themselves are to blame for their deeds. They misbehave in the course of a year anyway. Consequently, the judge doesn't hesitate to acquit the defendant and assert Carnival's right to exist permanently.[48]

This acquittal not only establishes the right of the feast to exist but also confirms the accusations made by the personified Carnival. He doesn't command inversion, but the life of nobles, burghers, and craftsmen is inverted. The succession of these classes presented in the play only pretends to be a satisfying or complete image of the social order. Although Carnival addresses some classes directly (for example when he accuses the nobility of illegitimate warfare or admonishes the craftsmen not to waste their money), in the end, during the carnival festival, all human beings are the same in their misconduct. The presentation of social groups seems to be nothing but a welcome opportunity to portray the obscene transgressions five times in a row. Consequently, the world upside-down is confirmed again in these wild descriptions of misbehavior, which becomes even more obvious if one considers that the play is a part of the carnival amusements itself. The play does not mean to criticize its very surroundings, but instead is an affirmation of the excess and leads directly back to the carnival festivities by presenting the most common costumes.[49] In the course of the festivities and especially under the masque of the peasant and the woman, social borders become less and less distinct because everyone acts in a foolish way and is therefore presented as a fool. Consequently, a hierarchic system of any kind is put into question. For a short period of time, during carnival, the medieval urban order itself is suspended.

It would be very appealing, of course, to show that the inversion of order and the presentation of the total denial of all classes affected reality and furthermore, to show substantial social change by carving out a historic evolution: a status before, theatre in between and some changed status after. Unfortunately, the historical material doesn't indicate direct causal links for most of the themes. It is, however, most striking that plays of the fifteenth century are marked by research as directly dependant on time "before." They are named Shrovetide Plays before the protestant reformation, plays before deep changes regarding the role of women and family. And it does, in fact, seem to be more than just a coincidence that the plays pick up specific fields of discourse that are about to change. These fields are, for example, the legal system and its fundamental changes regarding

[48] "Nach klag und antwort aller tail / Seit fort all vasnacht frisch und geil!", K 51, 389,25 et seq.

[49] *Ulrich Barton*, Was wir do machen, das ist schimpf. Zum Selbstverständnis des Nürnberger Fastnachtspiels, in: *Ridder*, Fastnachtstheater, 167–185, describes the interaction between plays and their surroundings.

the so-called reception of roman law, not to mention the upcoming peasant's rebellions. This specific potential of the plays, namely, the mention of pressing issues, becomes even more evident if one considers the development of the genre: The later Shrovetide Plays tend to be just funny little pieces of moral Christian advice or are used as a polemic instrument in the struggle of faith.[50] The plays of the fifteenth century, however, sometimes reflect an apocalyptical status quo. They plainly picture a world seriously disturbed, a world turned upside down and not only as some theatrical joke, but as a reflection of reality. They mention bribed judges, clerics who do not care at all about faith except for their own well-being, bad currency, highly endangered trade routes, and finally, the total exploitation of the peasant. During Shrovetide, explosive ideas and critiques are not only articulated, they are put on stage. The play *Carnival on Trial* points towards noblemen and urban snobbery and consequently shows that society does not necessarily demand distinction of classes because all human beings are like Adam the peasant.

[50] Cf. *Catholy*, Fastnachtspiel, 50–64, and *Heidy Greco-Kaufmann*, Vor rechten lütten ist guot schimpfen. Der Luzerner Marcolfus und das Schweizer Fastnachtspiel des 16. Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt / Main 1994.

III. Making Sense of Threat – Systems of Belief under Threat, c. 200–800

Introduction

Sebastian Schmidt-Hofner

Historical situations in which contemporaries diagnose accelerating social and cultural change and perceive such change as threatening are often accompanied by an intensification of religious discourses reacting to the perceived insecurity of the social and political order. Such discourses might manifest themselves in intensified religious practice, in heightened awareness for the correct observance of cult, in fear of divine punishment or in eschatological speculations. The relationship between social and cultural change and the intensification of religious threat communication is reciprocal: On the one hand, the latter is a consequence and a symptom of a situation of social change that is perceived as threatening; on the other hand, intensified threat communication itself often contributes to making social orders more fluid, thus inducing or accelerating change in society. The transition between Antiquity and the Middle Ages offers abundant material to study this reciprocity. Matthias Becker's and Philipp Booth's chapters offer two exemplary case studies for the phenomenon.

Becker's study is dedicated to an aspect of the anti-Christian polemic employed by the Neoplatonical philosopher Porphyry (c. 234–c. 305 CE) in his treatise *Against the Christians*. Written at some point after 270, this pamphlet originated during a period in the history of the Roman Empire that contemporaries perceived as a period of accelerated change on all levels. Several decades of civil war between pretenders to the imperial throne had just ended. The quickly developing Sassanian empire in Mesopotamia and warbands in Rome's northern periphery put massive pressure on the empire, as did the loss of territories such as the Agri Decumates in present-day Baden-Württemberg or Dacia in western Romania as well as the temporary secession of Gaul and Syria. Gradual military consolidation and internal peace were only achieved under the emperors Lucius Domitius Aurelianus (270–275) and Marcus Aurelius Probus (276–282). However, it did not lead to lasting stability before the long reign of Valerius Diocletianus (284–305). A consequence of these threats, but at the same time also a precondition for renewed stability were profound social changes such as the replacement or transformation of old elites and a shifting of power relations in society that came about as a result of sweeping military and administrative reforms. And yet this stabilization remained precarious for a long period, and the feeling that the social order was under threat affected the entire period, despite the efforts

of imperial propaganda. Not only did the ghost of civil war flare up repeatedly. Some problems such as the rapid devaluation of coinage remained unsolved, a phenomenon that in itself may attest to the persisting feeling of insecurity.

Rapid change also marked the religious history of the period. The manifold threats to the empire led to a fundamental reordering of its religious landscape: Instead of the traditional religious pluralism of the Roman authorities which tolerated 'foreign' (or outlandish) cults and beliefs, the multiple threats to the empire in the third century led to the articulation of a religious order that was marked by increasing polarization between competing cults and beliefs, by a stricter definition of religious groups – both from outside and from inside – and by oppression. When in 250 CE the emperor Traianus Decius gave the hitherto unheard order that every citizen in the empire should partake in a universal offering to the gods for the security of the state, Roman officials knew no mercy and used force against those who refused to participate in this form of ritual for the salvation of the state. Christians were their main victims. Later persecutions of the rapidly growing religious community of the Christians and other groups that were seen as deviant such as Manicheans under the emperors Publius Licinius Valerianus (in 257–60) and Diocletian (303–313) were motivated at least in part by the same concern for the salvation of the empire.

Porphyry's polemic against the Christians can be placed in this context. On the one hand, it gives vivid testimony of contemporary threat communication in anti-Christian circles who were suspicious of the great attraction of the new religion that belied (or indeed profited from) the official oppression. They also had to cope with the fact that through figures such as Origen (c. 184–254 CE), whom Prophyry knew personally and repeatedly attacked in his anti-Christian polemic, Christianity had gained an intellectual profile that could no longer be ignored. On the other hand, Porphyry's polemic, and the religious threat communication that it represents, was itself one of the factors contributing to this shift from coexistence and toleration to religious polarisation. To be sure, scholars no longer read his work as political propaganda supporting the Diocletianic persecution of Christianity. But it was a part – an important part, too, as its intense reception in the fourth century shows – of the communicative processes that dissolved the old and brought about the new religious order.[1]

Becker's chapter on Porphyry's polemical treatment of the Christians as sophists demonstrates an exemplary aspect of the processes operating here. By applying a metaphorical language well known to his educated audience, Porphyry drew a sharp dividing line between the platonic philosophical tradition and Christianity, a delimitation which would resonate in the intellectual history of

[1] For full discussion of the context and the date of the treatise cf. *Matthias Becker*, Porphyrios, Contra Christianos. Neue Sammlung der Fragmente, Testimonien und Dubia mit Einleitung, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen, Berlin 2016, 22–27.

late antiquity and remain a persistent topic of debate between Christians and non-Christians at the time. In this way, Porphyry's polemic contributed to the emergence of a religious landscape which separated Christians from non-Christians more strictly than ever before. At the same time, Porphyry's polemic against Christian sophistry (as he saw it) must be seen as an attempt on the part of intellectuals adhering to the old cults to close the ranks of non-Christian Platonics in the face of the threat posed by a new, and rapidly growing social and intellectual force. This was achieved by appealing to a venerable myth going back to Plato himself which juxtaposed Platonism and sophistic thought and denied that the latter was the true philosophy at all. By way of 'othering', Porphyry's polemic thus also made a contribution to an important aspect of religious reordering in the decades around 300 AD: the emerging concept of the religious unity of the multifold polytheistic cults in contrast especially to Christianity. The philosophical basis of this new concept was Platonism, its counterpart in religious practice the notion of orthopraxy (the insistence on the correct observance of cultic rituals) that developed as a consequence of the empire-wide offerings ordered by Decius, Valerian and Diocletian.

The case studies provided by Booth show a similar nexus between religious reordering and intensified threat communication caused by social and political insecurity. His examples for historical situations that contemporaries perceived as periods of heightened threat include, first, the troubled second part of Justinian's reign (from c. 540 CE onwards) which was marked by natural disasters, the great plague as well as impassioned dogmatic controversies haunting Christianity, all of which contributed to a strong feeling of insecurity and invited eschatological speculations; second, the reigns of the emperors Maurice (582–602) and Heraclius (610–641) in which the empire struggled for survival against external and internal enemies; and, third, the first escalation of the iconoclastic crisis in the early eighth century. All these moments in the troubled history of the Eastern Roman Empire between the age of Justinian and the eighth century witnessed theological discussions which, as Booth argues, implicitly or explicitly debated the emperor's role within the church, a central feature of the late Roman and early Byzantine social order. At stake were both certain forms of piety and devotion as well as theological positions supported by the emperors: behind theological discussions about the veneration of miracle-working saints and relics, for instance, stood a conflict between the emperor and the Christian clergy about the monopoly on mediation between man and God; the monotheletic controversy was fueled not least by the resistance of anti-Chalcedonian clergymen against Heraclius' priestly self-representation; and the beginnings of iconoclasm were, again, rooted in a priestly opposition to an intensified veneration of saints and relics furthered by the emperors since the sixth century, against which they stressed the importance of the eucharist, a sacrament they themselves offered. In this way, these theological debates reveal a previously neglected chapter of inner-Christian opposition

against the sacralizing tendency in imperial self-promotion of the time that encroached upon ecclesiastical prerogatives. At the same time, we may understand these debates as remnants of threat communication within the ecclesiastical establishment. In their view, the existential threats faced by their societies were to be explained as a divine retribution for deviant religious practices and beliefs. In consequence, churchmen not only called these into question but also the role emperors claimed or acquired vis-à-vis the church when they supported such forms of piety. As the case of the iconoclastic controversy shows, such threat communication could meet with remarkable success and prompt massive social and cultural change.

Both case studies thus present exemplary situations in which threat communication challenged and contributed to reconfigure the social order in the area of cult and beliefs. In both cases, threat communication was not just a consequence of or a reaction to social change; rather, it appears as a motor of change: the delineation and / or new formation of group identities, with which actors attempted to face the threat, contributed to a reordering process and in this way furthered societal change – even if, characteristically, the goal of these measures was never changed but rather followed the conservative agenda (or rhetoric) that the only way to overcome the threats was to adhere to and preserve the established order.

Communication of Threat and the Construction of Meaning

Framing the Christians as Sophists in Porphyry's *Contra Christianos*

Matthias Becker

In the second half of the fifth century B. C., throughout the ancient Greek world and particularly in Athens, several itinerant intellectuals formed what scholars have called the "sophistic movement".[1] Sophists like Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, and others considered themselves to be educational experts in various fields such as rhetoric, grammar, poetry, law, natural sciences, philosophy of religion, and politics. Their professional activity, for which they demanded tuition fees, comprised teaching classes of young men, educating the children of rich families, counseling people, giving lectures, and delivering public speeches. The goals of their teachings were to enable their students to live a good and successful life and to prepare them for participation in the political affairs of their cities.[2] Even though the sophists themselves deemed their work to be an important contribution to the welfare of society, politicians and leading representatives of intellectual communities claimed that the sophistic doctrine posed a threat to political, scientific, religious, and philosophical values.[3] Plato's writings are one significant and very influential example of how the sophists were perceived as a threat. He was the first ancient writer to construe the sophists as some kind of intellectual arch-enemies of true philosophers as he pictured them[4], thereby staging a competition that was to become vital to the identity of Platonic communities throughout Greco-Roman antiquity. By means of the literary device of

* I greatly appreciate the fruitful discussions I had with Dr Beatrice Wyss (Bern, Switzerland) on polemics, on the lexeme "sophist" as a term of disparagement, and on this article. Moreover, I owe my deepest thanks to Kevin Sven McCarthy (Boston) and David DeMarco (Tübingen) for proofreading my English. Unless otherwise indicated, all English translations of Greek texts offered here are my own.

[1] Cf., e. g., *George B. Kerferd*, The Sophistic Movement, Cambridge 1981.

[2] *Kerferd*, Sophistic Movement, 15–58; *Klaus Meister*, 'Aller Dinge Maß ist der Mensch' – Die Lehren der Sophisten, München 2010; *Martin Hose*, Die Erfindung des Experten. Über Sophisten und ihr Auftreten, in: Therese Fuhrer, Almut-Barbara Renger (Eds.), Performanz von Wissen. Strategien der Wissensvermittlung in der Vormoderne, Heidelberg 2012, 29–47.

[3] *Helga Scholten*, Die Sophistik. Eine Bedrohung für die Religion und Politik der Polis?, Berlin 2003, esp. 323–326.

[4] *Beatrice Wyss*, Der gekreuzigte Sophist, in: Early Christianity 5, 2014, 503–528, here 516.

his Socratic dialogues, Plato stigmatized the sophists as greedy instructors with extraordinary language skills who allegedly abused their good rhetorical abilities to deceive their young students and to influence public opinion. He imputed a lack of deeper expertise to the sophists by postulating that their so-called knowledge was superficial and dissembled. Their disinterest in truth, as Plato insinuates, made them appear as serious opponents of the philosophical cause of Socrates and Plato.[5]

Detached from, but surely influenced by this specific historical setting of the sophistic movement in the pre-Christian era, the word "sophist" not only continued to gain a negative connotation[6], but even became a term of disparagement in the following centuries, including the imperial era in which a second sophistic movement flourished between c. 60 A. D. and the 230s A. D. On the one hand, in the Roman period the Greek term "sophist" neutrally denoted the professional "teacher of rhetoric" or "rhetorician" as opposed to the "language teacher" (γραμματικός)[7], "philosopher" (φιλόσοφος), and "lawyer / politician" (ῥήτωρ).[8] Regarding this rhetorical profession[9], there are many positive statements about sophists to be found, e. g. in Philostratus' third-century work entitled *Lives of the Sophists* as well as in inscriptions[10], and it is important to note that the teaching of Hellenic oratory in the cities of the Roman Empire played a significant role in the education of the elites and consequently was widely appreciated.[11] On the other

[5] The key texts for understanding Plato's critique of the sophists are the *Gorgias*, the *Protagoras*, the *Sophist*, and the *Phaedrus*; for further discussion, see, e. g., *Hans Raeder*, Platon und die Sophisten, Kopenhagen 1939; *Marina McKoy*, Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists, Cambridge 2008; *Christopher W. Tindale*, Reason's Dark Champions. Constructive Strategies of Sophistic Argument, Columbia (South Carolina) 2010, 30–43.

[6] *Meister*, Sophisten, 17–19.

[7] On the profession of the "language teacher" (γραμματικός), see *Robert A. Kaster*, Guardians of Language. The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity, Berkeley / Los Angeles / London 1988; *Raffaella Cribiore*, Gymnastics of the Mind. Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, Princeton 2001, 53–56, 185–219.

[8] *Simon Swain*, Hellenism and Empire. Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World AD 50–250, Oxford 1996, 97–100; *Wyss*, Sophist, 504 n. 3.

[9] For details on the professional activity of a Greek sophist in the Roman Empire, see *Cribiore*, Gymnastics, 56–59; *Laurent Pernot*, L'art du sophiste à l'époque romaine: entre savoir et pouvoir, in: Carlos Lévy / Bernard Besnier / Alain Gigandet (Eds.), Ars et ratio. Sciences, art et métier dans la philosophie héllenistique et romaine. Actes du Colloque international organisé à Créteil, Fontenay et Paris du 16 au 18 octobre 1997, Brussels 2003, 126–142.

[10] On Philostratus' collection of biographies, see *Maurizio Civiletti*, Filostrato. Vite dei sofisti. Testo greco a fronte. Introduzione, traduzione e note di Maurizio Civiletti, Milan 2002; for the representation of sophists in inscriptions, see *Bernadette Puech*, Orateurs et sophistes grecs dans les inscriptions d'époque impériale, Paris 2002.

[11] See, e. g., *Glen W. Bowersock*, Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire, Oxford 1969; *Graham Anderson*, The Second Sophistic. A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire, London 1993; *Thomas Schmitz*, Bildung und Macht. Zur sozialen und politischen Funktion der zweiten Sophistik in der griechischen Welt der Kaiserzeit, München 1997; *Tim Whitmarsh*, The Second Sophistic, Oxford 2005. For a prosopographical survey of Greek-speaking sophists in the Im-

hand, however, at that very same time the term "sophist" became increasingly important to authors who engaged in literary feuds and polemics. In the imperial period, as Tim Whitmarsh puts it, there was a "pejorative force […] in the word 'sophist'" that was "particularly" used by philosophers in order "to distance themselves from accusations of flash triviality."[12] It is this negative connotation of the lexeme "sophist" (which, by the way, is limited to literary texts) that I deal with in this article. According to Beatrice Wyss who studied the meaning of the lexeme "sophist" in ancient Greek texts that were composed between the fifth century B. C. and the second century A. D., Greek authors often used the word "sophist" as a polemical device to vilify various opponents in all kinds of intellectual and religious communities. She argues that by the time of the imperial era in the second century, a "pattern of the disparagement of sophists" ("Muster der Sophistenschelte") had developed in pagan and Christian circles alike that served to secure the identity and the truth-claims of one group against its adversaries.[13] Interestingly, among the authors who made explicit use of this pattern we find the first Platonic critic of Christianity, Celsus, who in his work entitled *The True Doctrine* reproached Christians for being bad teachers and Christ for being a "sorcerer" (γόης).[14]

As I will argue in this article, traces of this pattern of the disparagement of sophists can also be found in Porphyry's treatise *Contra Christianos*, which originally comprised 15 books and was written in the last third of the third century A. D.[15] This is indicative of the fact that Celsus' strategy to revile the Christians as sophists was not an isolated case. Rather, we seem to encounter a special char-

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perium Romanum, see *Paweł Janiszewski / Krystyna Stebnicka / Elżbieta Szabat* (Eds.), Prosopography of Greek Rhetors and Sophists of the Roman Empire, Oxford 2015.

[12] *Whitmarsh*, Second Sophistic, 17. One example is Epictetus whose use of the word "sophist" reveals "the connotation of deception and frivolity", see *Whitmarsh*, Second Sophistic, 47, and *Epict.* Diss. 3,2,11; 3,8,1; 3,21 (title). Other authors like Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom and Galen, also expressed strong reservations against this term, see *Swain*, Hellenism, 99 n. 97, and *Tim Whitmarsh*, Greek Literature and the Roman Empire. The Politics of Imitation, Oxford 2001, 158–159, 228–229.

[13] *Wyss*, Sophist, 512 (quote) and passim.

[14] *Wyss*, Sophist, 522–524. For Celsus' critique of Christ as a sorcerer or magician, see *Morton Smith*, Jesus the Magician, London 1978; *Eugene V. Gallagher*, Divine Man or Magician? Celsus and Origen on Jesus, Chico 1982; for a thorough commentary on Celsus' anti-Christian treatise, see *Horacio E. Lona*, Die *Wahre Lehre* des Kelsos. Übersetzt und erklärt von H. E. Lona, Freiburg im Breisgau 2005.

[15] For a date of composition between c. 271 and 303 A. D., see *Sébastien Morlet*, Comment le problème du *Contra Christianos* peut-il se poser aujourd'hui?, in: Sébastien Morlet (Ed.), Le traité de Porphyre contre les Chrétiens. Un siècle de recherches, nouvelles questions. Actes du colloque international organisé les 8 et 9 septembre 2009 à l'Université de Paris IV-Sorbonne, Paris 2011, 11–49, here 20–25. In this article, references to the fragments and testimonia of *Contra Christianos* are given according to the numbering established by both Adolf von Harnack and myself, see *Adolf von Harnack* (Ed.), Porphyrius 'Gegen die Christen', 15 Bücher. Zeugnisse, Fragmente und Referate. Abhandlungen der Königl. Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften / Phil.-Hist. Klasse Nr. 1, Berlin 1916; *Matthias Becker*, Porphyrios: Contra Christianos.

acteristic of Platonic criticism of Christianity in the second and third centuries that is to be interpreted within the broader context of a common polemical phenomenon. In order to detect traces of the pattern in Porphyry's work against the Christians of which only fragments are extant, it is necessary to briefly summarize this "Muster der Sophistenschelte" as presented by Beatrice Wyss[16] in the first part of this article. In the second part, using Beatrice Wyss' pattern as a heuristic device, I will discuss which elements of the pattern can be found in the securely attributable fragments of Porphyry's anti-Christian treatise. In order to shed more light on the significance and the impact of this polemical strategy on Porphyry's readers, I will draw on framing theory in the third part of this article to bring forward the argument that the sophist frame is of great significance in *Contra Christianos* with regard to the communication of the Christian threat and to making sense of it.

Calling Someone a Sophist – A Pattern of Disparagement in Antiquity

According to Beatrice Wyss, there is a set of eight characteristics that constitute what she terms a pattern of reviling intellectual and religious opponents as sophists.[17] (1) In the first place, some Greek sources tend to speak of a "multitude of sophists" instead of naming one single opponent. That kind of subsuming an adversary under a larger group of unspecified "sophists" serves to depersonalize the opponent and negate his individuality.[18] (2) In the second place, bad teachers were called sophists in order to attack both the personality of the teacher and the quality of his education. In some cases, the bad quality of the teaching was even considered to cause damage and harm the students' soul.[19] (3) Thirdly, the financial and material interests of intellectuals were criticized as a central feature of a sophist. In this respect, the semantic field of "selling" (καπηλεύειν) is of special importance. This feature is clearly in line with Plato's accusation against the sophists as being "traders" and "hucksters" who allegedly cared more about the salaries that they received from rich students than about teaching well.[20] (4) A

Neue Sammlung der Fragmente, Testimonien und Dubia mit Einleitung, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen, Berlin / Boston 2016.

[16] *Wyss*, Sophist, 512–519.

[17] In the following, I shall limit myself to presenting only some of the evidence from the Greek texts; for further evidence, see *Wyss*, Sophist, 512–519.

[18] Phrases include, e. g., πλῆθος τῶν σοφιστῶν ("multitude of the sophists", *Plut.* De frat. am. 478b), ὅμιλος τῶν σοφιστῶν ("crowd of the sophists", *Philo Al.* Agr. 136), and ὄχλος πολλῶν σοφιστῶν ("mass of many sophists", *Clem. Al.* Strom. 1,3,24,3); see *Wyss*, Sophist, 512.

[19] *Isocr.* orat. 13,9; *Plat.* Apol. 23d; *Wyss*, Sophist, 512–513.

[20] *Plat.* Soph. 231d (νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής); *Plat.* Prot. 313c (ὁ σοφιστὴς τυγχάνει ὢν ἔμπορός τις ἢ κάπηλος τῶν ἀγωγίμων, ἀφ' ὧν ψυχὴ τρέφεται); cf. *David L. Blank*,

fourth element consists of describing utterances of sophists and sophist-like opponents as showy but useless chatter, as empty trumpery disguised in a stream of words.[21] (5) As far as the argumentation and reasoning of sophists and sophistic intellectuals are concerned, they are held to be crafty and to play subtle tricks on their audience.[22]

(6) The sixth feature of a sophist is his aggressiveness and fondness for polemics which shows that he really is not interested in truth, but in strife and dispute.[23] (7) Another important aspect is that the trustworthiness of what the sophist has to say is reduced to a mere "opinion" (δόξα) as opposed to the safe conclusions that a philosopher draws about reality (τὰ ὄντα). Ever since Plato's negative verdict about his intellectual contemporaries, sophists have had a reputation for coercing and manipulating their listeners, and are said to draw from a so-called expertise that is limited to earthly affairs, the sensory world, and people's everyday lives. In contrast, the philosopher claims access to the realm of eternal and unchanging being.[24] (8) Lastly, beginning with Plato again, sophists are pictured as "sorcerers" (γόητες) who deceive their audiences with evil intentions, using rhetorical strategies to talk people into something instead of persuading them by rational arguments.[25] To sum up, by the second century A. D., the lexeme "sophist" could be used as a derogatory term to label intellectual and religious adversaries as charlatans whose teachings were a threat to truth and secure knowledge. A passage from the *Onomasticon* of the second-century writer Iulius Pollux speaks for itself and provides a good summary in this respect. It proves that the pattern described by Beatrice Wyss is no scholarly construction but that already in Antiquity authors referred to the negative image of sophists in terms of a pattern:

ὅστις δὲ βούλοιτο κακίζειν σοφιστήν, τούτῳ ὑπάρχει λέγειν γόης, ἀπατεών, ἐπίβουλος, ἀπατητικός, ἐξαπατητικός, δολερός, ὕπουλος, ποικίλος, πολύτροπος, παλίμβολος, ἐγκρυφίας, ἐπίσκιος, πολλαπλοῦς τὸ Πλάτωνος, κρυψίνους, γοητευτικός, κακοῦργος, πανοῦργος, ψεύστης, πεπλασμένος, καταπεπλασμένος, καὶ κατὰ Πλάτωνα πολυχρώματος, κάπηλος, καπηλικός, μεταβολεύς, μεταβλητικός, ἔμμισθος θηρευτὴς νέων, θηρευτικός, μίσθαρνος, μισθοφόρος, κόλαξ, κολακευτικός, θώψ, θεραπευτής, θεραπευτικός.

"Whoever wants to abuse a sophist, can call him a sorcerer, a deceiver, treacherous, fallacious, calculated to deceive, deceitful, false, wily, versatile, untrustworthy, a secretive

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Socratics Versus Sophists on Payment for Teaching, in: Classical Antiquity 4, 1985, 1–49, who on pages 25–49 gives an extensive list of references; *Anna Schriefl*, Platons Kritik an Geld und Reichtum, Berlin / Boston 2013, 102–141; *Wyss*, Sophist, 513.

[21] *Clem. Al.* Strom. 1,3,22,5 (ποταμὸς ῥημάτων, νοῦ σταλαγμός); *Wyss*, Sophist, 514.

[22] *Arist.* Metaph. 7,1032a6; *Philo Al.* All. 3,232; *Plut.* Pericl. 36,5; *Wyss*, Sophist, 515.

[23] *Plat.* Soph. 226a; *Philo Al.* Det. 41–42; *Dio Chrys.* orat. 8,9; *Lucian.* Prom. 20; *Wyss*, Sophist, 515–516.

[24] *Plat.* Soph. 234e, 235a, 254a; *Arist.* Metaph. 4,1004b18–26; *Clem. Al.* Strom. 1,8,39,4; *Wyss*, Sophist, 516–517.

[25] *Plat.* Soph. 235a; *Dio Chrys.* orat. 32,11; *Max. Tyr.* diss. 18,4; *Wyss*, Sophist, 517–519.

fellow, a shady character, manifold according to Plato, someone who hides his thoughts, skilled in witchcraft, wicked, ready to do anything, a liar, pretending, artificial, and according to Plato many-coloured, a huckster, someone who is like a trader, someone who barters, subject to change, a paid hunter of young people, fond of hunting, a wage-earner, a flatterer, a fawner, a false friend, an attendant, someone inclined to serve."[26]

Christians as Sophists in Porphyry's *Contra Christianos*

The pattern of the disparagement of sophists clearly shows that by the time of the imperial period you could revile someone as a sophist even without explicitly calling him a "sophist". Judging from the evidence that Beatrice Wyss presents and discusses, it does not seem necessary for an author to refer to all the eight features of the pattern in order to portray an opponent as a sophist. It is sufficient if at least two or three features can be substantiated in a given text or passage. That is also the case with Porphyry's work *Against the Christians*. I deem it highly probable that Porphyry in the 15 books that he wrote against his Christian adversaries explicitly called them "sophists" even though in the securely attributable fragments there are no hints that he did so. In spite of the fragmentary condition of *Contra Christianos* which is, in my opinion, the only reason why there are no explicit references to Christians as being sophists, traces of the just-described pattern of disparagement can be found in the securely attributable fragments. This proves that Porphyry implicitly construed the Christian elites as sophists in such a way that it was obvious to his Platonic, and perhaps even Christian, audience that he did so.[27] In presenting and interpreting the evidence mainly from fragment 39 Harnack = 6F. Becker, I will put Porphyry's statements in *Contra Christianos* in relation to other of his works in order to shed light on Porphyry's general idea of what a sophist is and how he acts.

All of Porphyry's references to the pattern of the disparagement of sophists can be found in the longest extant fragment of *Contra Christianos*, which Eusebius quotes in the sixth book of his *Ecclesiastical History*. In this paragraph, Porphyry criticizes the allegorical interpretation of biblical texts that Christian teachers, and especially Origen, practiced extensively in the third century A. D. He characterizes those exegetes as follows:

[26] *Iul. Poll.* Onom. 4,47–48 Bethe.

[27] Unfortunately, we know nothing about the historical readers or addressees of *Contra Christianos*. However, from the contacts he entertained to Plotinus' school in Rome and from the dedications in some of his books it can be deduced that Porphyry addressed a small circle of educated adherents of (Platonic) philosophy; see *Andrew Smith*, Porphyry and his School, in: Lloyd P. Gerson (Ed.), The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity Vol. 1, Cambridge 2010, 325–357, here 355. Besides pagan readers, Christians also read *Contra Christianos* which can be deduced from the severe Christian reactions against this work.

τῆς δὴ μοχθηρίας τῶν Ἰουδαϊκῶν γραφῶν οὐκ ἀπόστασιν, λύσιν δέ τινες εὑρεῖν προθυμηθέντες, ἐπ᾽ ἐξηγήσεις ἐτράποντο ἀσυγκλώστους καὶ ἀναρμόστους τοῖς γεγραμμένοις, οὐκ ἀπολογίαν μᾶλλον ὑπὲρ τῶν ὀθνείων, παραδοχὴν δὲ καὶ ἔπαινον τοῖς οἰκείοις φερούσας. αἰνίγματα γὰρ τὰ φανερῶς παρὰ Μωυσεῖ λεγόμενα εἶναι κομπάσαντες καὶ ἐπιθειάσαντες ὡς θεσπίσματα πλήρη κρυφίων μυστηρίων διά τε τοῦ τύφου τὸ κριτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς καταγοητεύσαντες, ἐπάγουσιν ἐξηγήσεις.

"Some, desiring to find a solution to the depravity of the Jewish Scriptures rather than abandon them, have turned to exegetical explanations which were inconsistent and incongruous with the written texts and which, instead of supplying a defense of the foreign [writings][28], contain rather approval and praise of their own. For they bring on their exegetical explanations by boasting that what is said openly by Moses are riddles, by revering [sc. these texts] as if they were oracles full of hidden mysteries, and by enchanting the critical faculty of the soul through their arrogance."[29]

Even though a lot of scholarly industry has been dedicated to Porphyry's portrayal of Christian exegetes and their allegorical approach as presented in this fragment[30], it seems that scholars have not noticed that Porphyry, in this portion of *Contra Christianos*, seriously reviles his intellectual opponents as sophists.[31] In using the verb καταγοητεύειν, which reminds us of the eighth feature in Beatrice Wyss' pattern, Porphyry refers to the "bewitching" and rhetorical "enchantment" that Plato had already accused the sophists of.[32] Thus, Christian teachers are implied to be sorcerers who deceive their audience with their allegedly wrong textual interpretations.[33] As Plato had done, Porphyry stages a competition between the (Christian) sophists and pagan philosophers like himself when he claims that Christian exegetes "bewitch" or "enchant" the "critical faculty of the soul" (τὸ κριτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς). Within the context of Platonic psychology, the "critical faculty of the soul" clearly refers to reason, and thereby Porphyry stigmatizes

[28] In adding these square brackets, I follow *Aaron P. Johnson*, Philosophy, Hellenicity, Law. Porphyry on Origen, Again, in: Journal of Hellenic Studies 132, 2012, 55–69, here 56.

[29] *Porph.* Chr. fr. 39 Harnack = 6F. Becker = *Eus.* HE 6,19,4.

[30] Recent studies on *Porph.* Chr. fr. 39 Harnack = 6F. Becker include *John G. Cook*, Porphyry's Attempted Demolition of Christian Allegory, in: The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2, 2008, 1–27; *Jeremy M. Schott*, 'Living Like a Christian, but Playing the Greek'. Accounts of Apostasy and Conversion in Porphyry and Eusebius, in: Journal of Late Antiquity 1, 2008, 258–277; *Johnson*, Porphyry on Origen.

[31] In previous publications, I hinted at the possibility that Porphyry in this fragment portrays Christian teachers as sophists, see *Matthias Becker*, Bedeutungszuschreibung in konkurrierenden Textgemeinschaften. Überlegungen zu einem Porphyrios-Zitat bei Eusebios (*Hist. eccl.* 6,19,1–11), in: Christian D. Hass / Eva M. Noller (Eds.), Was bedeutet Ordnung – was ordnet Bedeutung? Bedeutungskonstituierende Ordnungsleistungen in Geschriebenem, Berlin / Boston 2015, 25–50, here 36, and *Becker*, *Contra Christianos*, 80–81.

[32] For the "sophist" as γόης ("sorcerer, wizard, juggler"), see *Plat.* Polit. 291c; *Plat.* Symp. 203d; *Iul. Poll.* Onom. 4,47; 4,49; 4,50 Bethe; *Max. Tyr.* diss. 18,4; *Dio Chrys.* orat. 32,11; cf. also *Jacqueline de Romilly*, Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece, Cambridge (Mass.) 1975, 3–43.

[33] For the connection between γοητεύειν and "cheating / deceiving" (ἀπατᾶν) in Porphyry's thought, see *Porph.* Antr. 35: γοητεύοντα καὶ ἀπατῶντα.

Christian allegorical exegesis as an unphilosophical and unscientific undertaking. In his work *De Abstinentia*, he creates a sharp opposition between "sorcerers" (γόητες) and philosophers that is illuminating for Porphyry's argument in *Contra Christianos*. In contrast to "sorcerers" or "enchanters" who cannot be free of impurity, "divine men and such as are wise in the things of God" (θείων καὶ θεοσόφων ἀνδρῶν), i. e. philosophers, strive for purity by liberating their soul of its passions and by feeding it "knowledge of things divine" (θεοσοφίαν), assimilating themselves to God by having "the right conceptions about the divine" (ταῖς περὶ τοῦ θείου ὀρθαῖς διανοίαις).[34] What is indeed interesting about this passage is that Porphyry denies that sorcerers, as opposed to philosophers, have any expertise in things divine. The fact that, according to Porphyry's *De Abstinentia*, evil demons are responsible for every kind of sorcery shows how harsh the accusation of sorcery against Christian teachers actually is. In fact, whoever practices evil by means of using enchantments ultimately venerates evil demons.[35]

In order to further explore Porphyry's notion of a "sophist" as someone who stands in opposition to philosophy and who does not possess a trustworthy knowledge in religious and theological matters, we may draw on one of Porphyry's remarks in his letter *Ad Marcellam*. In chapter 17, he answers the question of how a man can become "acceptable to God" (εὐάρεστος θεῷ). On the one hand, Porphyry's answer propagates a spirituality of deeds in the sense of a virtuous lifestyle, and he does not want this kind of spirituality to be confused with traditional cultic activities like praying or the offering of sacrifices. On the other hand, becoming well-pleasing to God presupposes, according to Porphyry, the "assimilation to God" through which man is divinized. Thus, only the philosopher can reach the Platonic goal of divinization.[36] In this context, Porphyry also explains that one "cannot become acceptable to God through the opinions of men nor through the empty talk of sophists".[37] At the end of the chapter, Porphyry claims that impiety basically consists in adopting the theological ideas of non-philosophers, in "applying the opinions of the masses to God".[38] Consequently, Porphyry makes a connection between the realm of opinion, sophists, ignorance of God, and impiety on the one hand, and between the realm of being, philosophers, knowledge of God, and true spirituality on the other. Considering

[34] *Porph.* Abst. 2,45.

[35] *Porph.* Abst. 2,41.

[36] On the Platonic concept of "assimilation to God", see *Irmgard Männlein-Robert*, Tugend, Flucht und Ekstase. Zur ὁμοίωσις θεῷ in Kaiserzeit und Spätantike, in: Christian Pietsch (Ed.), Ethik des antiken Platonismus. Der platonische Weg zum Glück in Systematik, Entstehung und historischem Kontext. Akten der 12. Tagung der Karl und Gertrud Abel-Stiftung vom 15. bis 18. Oktober 2009 in Münster, Stuttgart 2013, 99–111, here 99–105.

[37] *Porph.* Marc. 17: θεῷ γὰρ εὐάρεστος οὔτε δόξαις ἀνθρώπων οὔτε σοφιστῶν κεναῖς φωναῖς γένοιτ' ἄν τις.

[38] *Porph.* Marc. 17: ἀσεβὴς […] ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας τῷ θεῷ προσάπτων.

the anti-Christian tendency of *Ad Marcellam*[39], we may well suppose that Porphyry, by referring to anonymous sophists, really means to implicitly address Christian theological teachers. And as for the "masses", while being a Platonic phrase that generally denotes the uneducated people outside of philosophic circles[40], οἱ πολλοί ("the masses") could refer to the Christians in general who, by the time *Ad Marcellam* was composed, were no longer a minority in society.

In addition to the verb καταγοητεύειν, there is a second piece of evidence, which proves that it is Porphyry's intention in *Contra Christianos* to portray Christian scholars as sophists, and that is the word τῦφος ("arrogance, vanity"). Similarly to the fragment of *Contra Christianos* under discussion (διά τε τοῦ τύφου […] καταγοητεύσαντες)[41], the noun τῦφος is semantically and syntactically linked with γοητεία ("sorcery") in *De Abstinentia*.[42] This shows that in Porphyry's thought there was a clear connection between these negative characteristics that found its verbal expression in his different works. What is more, in his biography of Plotinus (*Vita Plotini*), Porphyry explicitly links τῦφος with the phrase σοφιστικὴ σκηνή which could be translated as "stage of sophists" or the "theatrical deception typical of sophists". In the context of that paragraph, Porphyry makes the point that his teacher Plotinus was free of all arrogance and pretense and that in his teaching he avoided all forms of rhetorical pomp and sophistic ostentation.[43] What we learn is that for Porphyry, sophists were pretentious, and so in *Contra Christianos* τῦφος is to be considered a signal word that introduces Christian teachers as sophists. Besides the Porphyrian corpus, there are literary references by other authors as well that indicate that τῦφος was generally held to be a character trait of sophists. Plutarch's *De genio Socratis* is an illuminating example. In one passage, the sophists' arrogance is contrasted with Socrates' own simplicity and his love of truth.[44] Iulius Pollux says that one attribute of a philosopher is that he "diminishes τῦφος" (τῦφον συστεῖλαι), thereby indicating that τῦφος is representative of unphilosophical behavior.[45]

[39] *Helene Whittaker*, The Purpose of Porphyry's *Letter to Marcella*, in: Symbolae Osloenses 76, 2001, 150–168.

[40] Cf. *Hanns-Dieter Voigtländer*, Der Philosoph und die Vielen. Die Bedeutung des Gegensatzes der unphilosophischen Menge zu den Philosophen (und das Problem des *argumentum e consensu omnium*) im philosophischen Denken der Griechen bis auf Aristoteles, Wiesbaden 1980.

[41] *Porph.* Chr. fr. 39 Harnack = 6F. Becker = *Eus.* HE 6,19,4.

[42] *Porph*. Abst. 4,16.

[43] *Porph*. Vit. Plot. 18,1–8, esp. 5–6. This characteristic of Plotinus' style of writing and speaking is confirmed by another passage of the *Vita Plotini* where Porphyry states that Plotinus' writing was "concise, dense with thought, terse, more lavish of ideas than of words" (*Porph*. Vit. Plot. 14,1–2, transl. by *Stephen MacKenna*, Plotinus: The Enneads, London 1956, 10). By enumerating these features, Porphyry makes very clear that his teacher was not dedicated to the tricks and ornaments of sophistic oratory.

[44] *Plut.* De gen. Socr. 580b; further examples include *Dio Chrys.* orat. 6,21, and *Alciphr.* Epist. 2,36,2 Schepers (τετυφωμένου σοφιστοῦ).

[45] *Iul. Poll.* Onom. 4,39 Bethe.

There is a third signal word in the fragment of *Contra Christianos* under discussion that is reminiscent of the third element of the pattern of disparagement that was described above. When attacking Origen for his alleged apostasy from Hellenic philosophy, Porphyry writes that after Origen's conversion to Christianity,

[…] αὐτόν τε καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἕξιν ἐκαπήλευσεν [sc. Origen], κατὰ μὲν τὸν βίον Χριστιανῶς ζῶν καὶ παρανόμως, κατὰ δὲ τὰς περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ θείου δόξας ἑλληνίζων τε καὶ τὰ Ἑλλήνων τοῖς ὀθνείοις ὑποβαλλόμενος μύθοις.

"[…] he [sc. Origen] sold himself and his learning, living like a Christian and unlawfully as his lifestyle is concerned, but arguing like a Greek in his doctrines about [material][46] reality and the divine and foisting the intellectual property of the Greeks on foreign myths."[47]

The word καπηλεύειν reminds the educated reader of Plato's description of a sophist as a "trader" or "huckster" of intellectual goods "that nourish the soul" (ἔμπορός τις ἢ κάπηλος τῶν ἀγωγίμων, ἀφ' ὧν ψυχὴ τρέφεται).[48] It may well be that Porphyry wants to imply Origen demanded tuition fees for his lessons. He possibly knew of a tradition that we find in Eusebius' biography of Origen according to which Origen as a young lad earned his keep by teaching Greek literature and "the word of God" in Alexandria.[49] As for the Christian school that Origen led in Caesarea later on in his life and that Porphyry most probably visited in his youth[50], there are no records that allow us to draw a conclusion about whether it was funded by Ambrose, Origen's patron, or whether students had to pay fees.[51] Beyond this question of historical reference, Porphyry, by using the verb καπηλεύειν, shows the polemical intention of insinuating that Origen's Christian teaching was grounded in material interests and that he behaved like a sophist.

There is another piece of evidence that might suggest that in Porphyry's view there exists a connection between sophistry, money and sorcery. According to a securely attributable fragment of *Contra Christianos* that is preserved in Jerome's

[46] In adding these square brackets, I again follow *Johnson*, Porphyry on Origin, 56.

[47] *Porph.* Chr. fr. 39 Harnack = 6F. Becker = *Eus.* HE 6,19,7.

[48] *Plat.* Prot. 313c; cf. *Iul. Poll.* Onom. 4,48; 4,49; 4,50 Bethe; *Schriefl*, Kritik, 102–141.

[49] *Eus.* HE 6,2,15–6,3,1; cf. *Christoph Markschies*, Kaiserzeitliche christliche Theologie und ihre Institutionen. Prolegomena zu einer Geschichte der antiken christlichen Theologie, Tübingen 2007, 93 et seq.

[50] This can be inferred from *Porph.* Chr. fr. 39 Harnack = 6F. Becker = *Eus.* HE 6,19,5 where Porphyry says that he met Origen in his early youth; cf., e. g., *Wolfram Kinzig*, War der Neuplatoniker Porphyrios ursprünglich Christ?, in: Manuel Baumbach / Helga Köhler / Adolf Martin Ritter (Eds.), Mousopolos Stephanos. Festschrift für Herwig Görgemanns, Heidelberg 1998, 320–332, here 328–331. On Origen's school, see *Markschies*, Theologie, 93–109, and *Tobias Georges*, '… herrlichste Früchte echtester Philosophie …' – Schulen bei Justin und Origenes, im frühen Christentum sowie bei den zeitgenössischen Philosophen, in: Millennium 11, 2014, 23–38.

[51] *Markschies*, Theologie, 105.

comment on *Psalm* 81, Porphyry claimed that apostles like Peter and Paul[52] practiced magic (*magicis artibus signa fecerunt*) in order to receive money from rich women (*ut divitias acciperent a divitibus mulierculis*).[53] The mentions of material interests on the one hand and "magic" or "sorcery" on the other remind the modern interpreter of two important elements of the pattern of the disparagement of sophists. Therefore, it may be that Porphyry not only intended to construe the philosophically educated members of the Christian educational elite as sophists, but that he also reviled the less-educated apostles of the early Christian period as such.[54] Thus, the Christian religion would appear as a dubious sophistic movement right from its beginnings, and all the missionary efforts of the early Christian Church as the work of itinerant Christian sophists whose missionary strategy was perfidious and whose motives were base and selfish. However, the obvious lack of education that Porphyry underscores in the same fragment by calling the apostles "men from the countryside" (*homines rusticani*) casts some doubt on whether he really meant to portray non-educated apostles like Peter as sophists.[55] Moreover, the accusation of magic against Christians was quite common in the second and third centuries A. D.[56], and that is why Porphyry's critique can be understood within this context as well.[57] In summary, it can be said with certainty that Porphyry viewed contemporary Christian intellectuals like Origen as sophists, but the evidence is inconclusive regarding the apostles of the early Christian Church.

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[52] We know that Peter and Paul were meant from the context of that fragment, see *Hier*. In psalm. 81, lines 206–224 (CChr.SL 78A, p. 89 Morin).

[53] *Porph.* Chr. fr. 4 Harnack = 70F. Becker: *Homines rusticani et pauperes, quoniam nihil habebant, magicis artibus operati sunt quaedam signa. […] Concedo tibi, Porphyri, magicis artibus signa fecerunt, ut divitias acciperent a divitibus mulierculis, quas induxerant: hoc enim tu dicis* (*Hier*. In psalm. 81, lines 226–232 (CChr.SL 78A, p. 89 Morin).

[54] It might well be that this characteristic of Paul as a sorcerer and deceiver reverberates in one paragraph of Macarius Magnes' *Apocriticus* in which the anonymous Hellene attacks Paul for "hypocrisy" (ὑποκρινόμενος), deceiving (προσωπεῖον ἀπάτης περιβαλών), "stealing the truth" (κλέπτει τὴν ἀλήθειαν), "besieging the soul's understanding" (πολιορκῶν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ φρόνημα), "enslaving the light-minded by means of magic or sorcery" (τέχνῃ γοητείας τοὺς εὐχερεῖς δουλούμενος), "flattery" (θωπείαις), and lying (ψεύστης, τοῦ ψεύδους ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ σύντροφος) (*Macar. Magn.* Apocr. 3,31,2; 3,31,4–5 Volp = *Porph.* [?] Chr. fr. 28 Harnack). In another passage, the Anonymous accuses Paul of "vanity/conceit" (κενοδοξία), "greediness" (πλεονεξία), "insatiate desire" (ἀπληστία), and of being an "impostor" (φέναξ) (*Macar. Magn.* Apocr. 3,32,1; 3,32,3 Volp = *Porph.* [?] Chr. fr. 29 Harnack). In *Macar. Magn.* Apocr. 4,1 Volp = *Porph.* [?] Chr. fr. 35 Harnack), Paul's remarks about the resurrection and Christ's Second Coming in 1 Thess 4,15–17 are called a σόφισμα ("sly/sophistic trick").

[55] Peter's lack of education is already evident in the *New Testament*: In *Acts* 4,13, Peter and John are portrayed as "uneducated" and "common men" (ἄνθρωποι ἀγράμματοί εἰσιν καὶ ἰδιῶται).

[56] *Werner Schäfke*, Frühchristlicher Widerstand, in: Wolfgang Haase (Ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II,23,1, Berlin/New York 1979, 460–723, here 599–602.

[57] Cf. *Xavier Levieils*, Contra Christianos. La critique sociale et religieuse du christianisme des origines au concile de Nicée (45–325), Berlin/New York 2007, 284–285.

Communication of Threat, Framing and the Construction of Meaning

From the evidence that I presented in section two, it is obvious that Porphyry's picture of the Christians was 'taken' from a very specific and intended viewpoint. It reveals a particular perspective that can be interpreted as a sophist frame. While it is true that Porphyry uses the pattern of the disparagement of sophists to attack Christians, understanding this pattern as a frame enables the scholar to also focus on the internal communication between Porphyry, who establishes the frame, and his audience. In this way, the aspect of an external attack against the Christian opponents outside of Porphyry's intellectual community can be viewed in the broader perspective of internally and strategically communicating a threat, and of making sense of it within his pagan group of addresses.[58] Framing theory today is mainly used in the social, political, and communication sciences as well as in psychology in order to understand and analyze how individuals or collectives interpret the world around them.[59] In a general sense, frames are "schemata of interpretation" that enable individuals or groups to take a certain perspective on what they experience and thereby "locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms."[60] Framing, therefore, plays an important role in the structuring of reality and in the construction of meaning because it creates a coherent view of otherwise possibly disparate elements.[61] A special type of frame is the so-called collective action frame which is constructed to attract, persuade and mobilize political or religious sympathizers. The plurality of frames within a group or society can often result in frame competition. Thus, in the social and political sciences it is of particular interest to investigate how individuals or groups, for political or other reasons[62], make use of certain "schemata of interpretation" with the intention of inducing other people to conform to their interpretation of certain events, issues,

[58] For a thorough analysis of Porphyry's communication of threat in *Contra Christianos*, see *Matthias Becker*, Bedrohungskommunikation und der Faktor Zeit. Überlegungen zu den christenfeindlichen Äusserungen des Porphyrios, in: Museum Helveticum 72, 2015, 55–75, and *Becker*, Contra Christianos, 32–85.

[59] For the history of framing theory, see *John A. Noakes/Hank Johnston*, Frames of Protest. A Road Map to a Perspective, in: Ibid. (Eds.), Frames of Protest. Social Movements and the Framing Perspective, Lanham 2005, 1–29, here 3–5; *Jörg Matthes*, Framing, Baden-Baden 2014, 24–35.

[60] *Erving Goffman*, Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of Experience, New York et al. 1974, 21.

[61] Cf. *Robert D. Benford*, *David A. Snow*, Framing Processes and Social Movements. An Overview and Assessment, in: Annual Review of Sociology 26, 2000, 611–639, here 614; *Matthes*, Framing, 21.

[62] One example is how the media frame their coverage on politics and how public opinion is influenced thereby, see *Dennis Chong/James N. Druckman*, Identifying Frames in Political News, in: Erik P. Bucy/R. Lance Holbert (Eds.), The Sourcebook for Political Communication Research. Methods, Measures, and Analytical Techniques, New York/London 2011, 238–267.

or socio-political problems, and to take some sort of action. Polemical literature like *Contra Christianos* is an ideal medium to establish a frame that others are supposed to adopt because it serves the purpose of persuading audiences that certain individuals or groups should be viewed as opponents or even enemies.[63] Since Porphyry did not invent the sophist frame, 'establishing' a frame in this respect can also mean to make use of an already existing frame with the intention of implying that a problem is either still urgent or recurring and that it should therefore be tackled without changing familiar patterns of interpretation or coping.

According to the more specific definition of the so-called collective action frames, framing encompasses three key tasks: First of all, it offers a specific interpretation or diagnosis of events, issues, or problematic situations by attributing an occurrence to various causes or by blaming certain agents who are culpable (diagnostic framing); secondly, it proposes a solution to the problem that is diagnosed (prognostic framing); and thirdly it strives to convince people to take action against the problem in order to bring about change (motivational framing).[64] As Fabian Fechner et al. in a recent article have shown, this kind of framing is especially relevant for scholars who analyze past or present situations of threat and social change because it functions both as a theory and an analytical technique. By studying the modes of communication, the framing approach enables scholars to explore how agents communicate a threat and which means they use to call people to action.[65] In order for a threat to be communicated, an event or an issue has to be first of all perceived, i. e. constructed, as threatening. Regarding the constructive nature of perception, it has become the *communis opinio* in the humanities that the processes of human perception as well as the verbal or literary communication of perceived phenomena, occurrences, and historical events are influenced by a number of aspects, such as the personal experiences, presuppositions, and cultural conditioning of an individual. Thus, literary treatments of so-called historical 'facts' or cultural phenomena are an important means of the construction of reality because they are determined by an authors' worldview, belief system, and (pre-)conceptions.[66]

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[63] The image of the enemy that Porphyry creates in *Contra Christianos* has been thoroughly analyzed in a recent study by *Irmgard Männlein-Robert*, Ordnungskonkurrenz. Polemik und Feindbild in konkurrierenden Ordnungen. Der platonische Philosoph Porphyrios und sein Kampf gegen die Christen, in: Ewald Frie / Mischa Meier (Eds.), Aufruhr – Katastrophe – Konkurrenz – Zerfall. Bedrohte Ordnungen als Thema der Kulturwissenschaften, Tübingen 2014, 117–138.

[64] *Benford / Snow*, Framing Processes, 615–618; *Noakes / Johnston*, Frames, 5–11.

[65] *Fabian Fechner / Tanja Granzow / Jacek Klimek et al.,* 'We are Gambling with our Survival.' Bedrohungskommunikation als Indikator für bedrohte Ordnungen, in: Ewald Frie / Mischa Meier (Eds.), Aufruhr – Katastrophe – Konkurrenz – Zerfall. Bedrohte Ordnungen als Thema der Kulturwissenschaften, Tübingen 2014, 141–173, here 153–155.

[66] Cf., e. g., *Hans-Werner Goetz*, Wahrnehmungs- und Deutungsmuster als methodisches Problem der Geschichtswissenschaft, in: Das Mittelalter. Perspektiven mediävistischer Forschung, 8, 2003, 23–33.

Without referring to framing theory, the sociologist Werner Schirmer stresses a similar interdependence between what he calls observing a threat and communicating a threat, and it is important to underscore this interdependence. Schirmer's concept of "Bedrohungskommunikation" ("communication of threat") is influenced primarily by systems theory. He basically takes a constructivist approach by claiming that social or political threats only rarely exist *per se*. In his opinion, almost all situations of threat become threats only because certain people, be they individuals or social groups, observe and communicate them as such. In this act of communication, social or political agents express their perception of a threat by explaining to their social group or society who ("Sozialdimension") and what ("Sachdimension") is actually threatened. In their explanation, they often juxtapose the past and the present in order to prove to their audience that a threatening social change is going on ("Zeitdimension"). Furthermore, they suggest coping strategies so that action can be taken against the threat.[67] Now, it might well be that within a group or society there are several frames of one and the same situation and that the threat frame is perhaps not the only perspective one could take. In such a case of frame competition, a good deal of strategic communication is needed and a lot of persuading has to be done so that a consensus in interpretation and a unity of perspective can be achieved.[68] As a result, the threat in the sense that I refer to, is a construction whose verification is not so much dependent on its objective reality but rather on whether or not a group, a community or a society accepts the communicated threat frame as persuasive and true.[69]

With regard to Porphyry, we may suggest that the sophist frame was uncontested within the context of the Platonic community that he wrote for. Due to the fragmentary condition of his work, the only thing that can be said with certainty is that the sophist frame has considerable diagnostic importance for Porphyry. In what follows, I will, therefore, elaborate on the exact nature of the Christian threat and then venture a guess regarding prognostic and motivational framing. By framing the Christians as sophists, Porphyry, as a Platonic philosopher, envisions them as enemies[70] of the true philosophy[71], and as some kind

[67] *Werner Schirmer*, Bedrohungskommunikation. Eine gesellschaftstheoretische Studie zu Sicherheit und Unsicherheit, Wiesbaden 2008, 83–122, here 101–107.

[68] Cf. *Fechner/Granzow/Klimek*, Bedrohungskommunikation, 155.

[69] Ibid., 141, 163.

[70] For the general importance and the various aspects of the image of the enemy in Porphyry's anti-Christian argument, see *Männlein-Robert*, Ordnungskonkurrenz, esp. 124–132.

[71] Repeatedly in his work, Porphyry claims absoluteness for his (Platonic) philosophy, stressing that in his eyes it is the only true way of interpreting reality and of leading a virtuous and spiritual life; see, e. g., *Porph.* Chr. fr. 39 Harnack = 6F. Becker = *Eus.* HE 6,19,6 (τὴν ὀρθὴν τοῦ βίου προαίρεσιν); *Porph.* Marc. 1; 3; 8 (ἡ ὀρθὴ φιλοσοφία); *Porph.* Marc. 5 (φιλοσοφίας τοῦ μόνου ἀσφαλοῦς πείσματος); *Porph.* Marc. 16: Only (μόνος) the philosopher (ὁ σοφός) is a priest, only (μόνος) the philosopher loves God / is loved by God (θεοφιλής), and only (μόνος) the philosopher knows how to pray.

of pseudo-philosophers. Even though Celsus in the second century A. D. had already attacked the Christians as sophists[72], the pseudo-philosophers imagined by Porphyry a hundred years later are completely different. While Celsus perceived and addressed the Christians as a socially inferior group and criticized them for refusing education, being uncultivated, and for taking an unscientific approach to teaching[73], by the time Porphyry wrote *Contra Christianos*, the Christian elite was intellectually on the same level as their pagan colleagues. This makes them comparable to the highly educated sophists of the pre-Christian era whose activity Plato and his contemporaries took great pains to portray as a threat to the polis and its traditional values.[74] A particularly revealing case in point is Origen: as a Christian Platonic philosopher, he can be considered a paradigmatic example that illustrates how Christian influences dramatically changed the intellectual landscape in Porphyry's time. The philosophical and educated type of Christianity for which Origen stands is exactly what is most alarming to Porphyry because in so many aspects it had become similar to Greek, and especially Platonic, philosophy.[75] In Porphyry's view, Origen undercuts the authenticity of the Greek philosophical heritage by intentionally blurring the boundary lines between the "Hellenes" and the "Christians" whom Porphyry presents as barbarians.[76] By "living like a Christian" (Χριστιανῶς ζῶν) and "behaving like a Greek" (ἑλληνίζων), as Porphyry puts it[77], Origen, due to his popularity[78], threatened the intellectual identity of pagan philosophers like Porphyry and the pre-eminence of the Platonic belief system in the intellectual landscape of the late third century A. D.[79]

The blurring of boundary lines is especially obvious for Porphyry in the way Christians interpret their Bible. In criticizing the allegorical method of biblical interpretation[80], he does not disapprove of allegory altogether because he himself allegorized texts like Homer's account of the cave of the nymphs in the *Odyssey*.[81]

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[72] *Wyss*, Sophist, 522–524.

[73] *Orig.* Cels. 1,9; 3,44; 3,49–50; 3,55; 3,65; 3,73–78; *Katrin Pietzner*, Bildung, Elite und Konkurrenz. Heiden und Christen vor der Zeit Constantins, Tübingen 2013, 216–228.

[74] *Scholten*, Sophistik, 275–330.

[75] *Jeremy M. Schott*, Porphyry on Christians and Others. 'Barbarian Wisdom', Identity Politics, and Anti-Christian Polemics on the Eve of the Great Persecution, in: Journal of Early Christian Studies 13, 2005, 277–314, here 280–281; *Schott*, Living Like a Christian, 258–259, 261–262.

[76] *Porph.* Chr. fr. 39 Harnack = 6F. Becker = *Eus.* HE 6,19,7; *Schott*, Living Like a Christian, 262–271; on Porphyry's depiction of Christianity as "barbarian daring (βάρβαρον τόλμημα)" (*Porph.* Chr. fr. 39 Harnack = 6F. Becker = *Eus.* HE 6,19,7), see *Männlein-Robert*, Ordnungskonkurrenz, 128–130.

[77] *Porph.* Chr. fr. 39 Harnack = 6F. Becker = *Eus.* HE 6,19,7.

[78] Cf. *Porph.* Chr. fr. 39 Harnack = 6F. Becker = *Eus.* HE 6,19,5.

[79] *Jeremy M. Schott*, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion in Late Antiquity, Philadelphia 2008, 54–55; *Becker*, Contra Christianos, 62–70.

[80] For further details of this critique, see *Cook*, Demolition, passim.

[81] *Karin Alt*, Homers Nymphengrotte in der Deutung des Porphyrios, in: Hermes 126, 1998, 466–487; *Becker*, Bedeutungszuschreibung, 36–40.

What he reproaches is that Christian exegetes like Origen use the allegorical method to read all kinds of philosophical, or rather Platonic, interpretations into the Jewish Scriptures and thereby imply that these 'unphilosophical' texts are to be considered a source of philosophical and divine wisdom. In Porphyry's opinion, however, the biblical accounts of the *Septuagint* are "alien" to Greek learning and philosophy.[82] Considering the relationship of other Platonists to the Bible, Porphyry could not defend this notion of alienness on objective grounds, because Middle Platonists like Numenius seem to have allegorized the Bible themselves.[83] Rather, labelling the Jewish Scriptures as "alien" to Greek intellectuality is a polemical and strategic device intended to question the justification of Christian allegorical exegesis and negate the philosophical meaning Origen ascribes to texts of scripture.[84] While in his *De philosophia ex oraculis haurienda* Porphyry honours the Hebrews for their barbarian wisdom and their religious traditions[85], in *Contra Christianos* he claims that their scriptures are "depraved" and full of "myths"[86], the reason being that Christian scholars like Origen abuse them as a repository of hidden truth expressed in philosophical terms. It is necessary that this ascription of philosophical meaning be negated because, as Porphyry himself remarks, it mirrors the non-Christian philosophy of all those philosophers that Origen read.[87] It goes without saying that Porphyry perceived this kind of exegesis as an adaption and even usurpation of ideas[88] and therefore as a serious threat, not least because Porphyry admits that Origen was a very popular, famous and influential teacher during his lifetime and that he was valued highly even after his death.[89]

Framing Origen as a sophist, therefore, helps Porphyry to portray his teaching activity as a pseudo-philosophy and an abuse of scholarly expertise that threatens the genuineness and authenticity of pagan Platonic philosophy. This is what can be said in behalf of diagnostic framing. As for prognostic and motivational framing, it can be reasonably assumed that Porphyry, by framing the Christians as

[82] *Porph.* Chr. fr. 39 Harnack = 6F. Becker = *Eus.* HE 6,19,4; 6,19,7 (ὀθνεῖοι).

[83] According to *Orig.* Cels. 4,51.

[84] *Becker*, Bedeutungszuschreibung, 31–36.

[85] *Porph.* Phil. orac. fr. 323F.–324F. Smith.

[86] *Porph.* Chr. fr. 39 Harnack = 6F. Becker = *Eus.* HE 6,19,4; 6,19,7.

[87] Porphyry names the following: Plato, Numenius, Cronius, Apollophanes, Longinus, Moderatus, Nichomachus, Chaeremon the Stoic, and Cornutus (*Porph.* Chr. fr. 39 Harnack = 6F. Becker = *Eus.* HE 6,19,8). As Gregory Thaumaturgus states, the curriculum at Origen's school in Caesarea included philosophical education; see *Greg. Thaum.* Or. pan. 7,93–15,183 Crouzel; *Markschies*, Theologie, 72–74.

[88] Cf. *Heinrich Otto Schröder*, Celsus und Porphyrius als Christengegner, in: Die Welt als Geschichte. Eine Zeitschrift für Universalgeschichte 17, 1957, 190–202, here 200; *Becker*, Contra Christianos, 65.

[89] *Porph.* Chr. fr. 39 Harnack = 6F. Becker = *Eus.* HE 6,19,5: […] ἀνδρὸς […] σφόδρα εὐδοκιμήσαντος καὶ ἔτι δι' ὧν καταλέλοιπεν συγγραμμάτων εὐδοκιμοῦντος, παρειλήφθω, Ὠριγένους, οὗ κλέος παρὰ τοῖς διδασκάλοις τούτων τῶν λόγων μέγα διαδέδοται (emphasis mine).

sophists, wants to encourage his audience to act as Platonists from Plato onwards have always acted when faced with a sophistic threat. In other words, he motivates and mobilizes his audience to join him in the intellectual resistance against the Christians for which his *Contra Christianos* lays the groundwork. Although many scholars argue that Porphyry was also involved in political propaganda and with his anti-Christian writings meant to justify Diocletian's persecution of Christians (303–311 A. D.)[90], the securely attributable fragments of *Contra Christianos* only allow one to assume that Porphyry makes the case for an intellectual resistance. While accusing the Christians of acting against the law and therefore of breaking with Roman society, there are no reliable indications that he propagated violence against them. The only fragment in which the punishment of Christians is vaguely alluded to and justified cannot be attributed to Porphyry with certainty and should therefore not be used as a basis to secure the claim that Porphyry endorsed persecution and physical violence against Christians.[91]

In addition to the call for intellectual resistance, the sophist frame functions as a resource of meaning for Porphyry's Platonic audience because it serves to make sense of the Christian threat by using an explanatory pattern that assigns Christian intellectuals a place within the context of a specifically Platonic tradition and worldview. Two aspects have to be mentioned in this respect: (1) First of all, by framing the Christians as sophists, Porphyry tells his audience that the opponents they face are really very old and familiar adversaries and that the challenge they pose is not entirely new. Thus, Porphyry thwarts the Christians' claims of being an innovative religious movement.[92] By replicating and confirming the Platonic position on sophists, Porphyry shows that for him "sophists" are some kind of timeless enemies of the Platonic community, "new foes with an old face" or "old foes with new faces", to quote the subtitles of Charles Kingley's nineteenth-century novel *Hypatia* (1853) and of Elizabeth Bowers' play, *The Black Agate* (1859). Plato had to attack the sophists in the fifth and fourth century B. C., and in Porphyry's time they were still the same type of enemies, even though they had changed their looks and even though they were even more similar to Platonic philosophers than in Plato's time. In this way, Porphyry can diffuse the

[90] Cf., e. g., *Schott*, Christianity, 177–185, and *Elizabeth DePalma Digeser*, A Threat to Public Piety. Christians, Platonists, and the Great Persecution, Ithaca / London 2012, esp. 164–191.

[91] The authenticity of Harnack's fragment 1 = 88D. Becker = *Eus*. PE 1,1,13–1,2,5 has been convincingly questioned by *Sébastien Morlet*, La *Démonstration évangélique* d'Eusèbe de Césarée. Étude sur l'apologétique chrétienne à l'époque de Constantin, Paris 2009, 41–48, and *Aaron P. Johnson*, Rethinking the Authenticity of Porphyry, Contra Christianos, fr. 1, in: Jane Baun / Averil Cameron / Mark Edwards / Markus et al. (Eds.), Studia Patristica Vol. XLVI. Papers presented at the Fifteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 2007. Tertullian to Tyconius, Egypt before Nicaea, Athanasius and his Opponents, Leuven 2010, 53–58.

[92] Origen was one of those theologians who underscored the Christian self-conception of being a new religion, cf., e. g., *Orig.* Cels. 1,29; 1,31; 1,46; 1,59; see also *Becker*, Bedrohungskommunikation, 58–65, 73–75.

Christian threat to a certain degree, although the 'Christian sophists' posed a much more existential threat to the Platonic community than the sophists of the pre-Christian era. (2) Secondly, by framing the Christians as sophists, Porphyry strengthens the group identity of the intellectual community he addresses. The sophist frame marks a "differential positioning" that enables Porphyry to stigmatize the Christians as the "'other'" that has to be "excluded" from the Platonic community.[93] The category of alterity that the sophist frame provides within a Platonic context ensures his audience that, despite all Christian efforts to the contrary[94], the Christians are not real philosophers and that the truth claims they make are based on texts whose literary and theological depravity[95] is obvious to educated Hellenic intellectuals like Porphyry and his audience.[96]

[93] The quotes are taken from *Whitmarsh*, Greek Literature, 228–229, who neither talks about Platonists and Christians nor about the sophist frame, but about philosophers and sophists as juxtaposed by Dio Chrysostom.

[94] From the second century A. D. onwards, apologists and Church Fathers alike propagated the Christian religion as a philosophy; see *Winrich Löhr*, Christianity as Philosophy. Problems and Perspectives of an Ancient Intellectual Project, in: Vigiliae Christianae 64, 2010, 160–188.

[95] Cf. *Porph.* Chr. fr. 39 Harnack = 6F. Becker = *Eus.* HE 6,19,4 (μοχθηρία – "depravity").

[96] Before this article went to print, a revised and substantially abbreviated version was submitted for publication in *Vigiliae Christianae*.

"Liturgification" and Dissent in the Crisis of the East Roman Empire (6th–8th Centuries)

Phil Booth

Introduction

In 1979 Averil Cameron published in *Past and Present* a brilliant and seminal article under the title 'Images of Authority: Elites and Icons in Late Sixth-Century Byzantium'. Cameron argued that during and, in particular, after the reign of the emperor Justinian (527–565), and in a context of growing economic and geopolitical crisis within the eastern Roman empire, the political culture of Constantinople underwent a profound, but vital, transformation. In this transformation, the traditional classical trappings of imperial power were de-emphasised, and emperors instead shrouded themselves in the veil of holiness, Christianising imperial rituals and rhetoric, and lending their active patronage to a range of religious phenomena then occurring across the eastern empire: in particular, the expansion of church building, of Marian devotion, and of the cult of icons. For Cameron, these phenomena then served as a focus for the emergence of new civic identities, to a process of 'cultural integration' to which emperors made a decisive contribution. Although this process was in itself unable to prevent the subsequent Islamic conquest of the Roman Near East, it nevertheless lent the subsequent state centered on Constantinople the 'strength and will' to weather the storm of subsequent centuries.[1]

Although Cameron herself would now, almost four decades later, temper this picture from various directions, the general lines of her vision have been fundamental to a range of more recent publications, of which I shall here highlight two of the most important. In 2003 Mischa Meier published his magisterial *Das andere Zeitalter Justinians* (2003), a monograph devoted to the complex relation of eschatological expectation, natural and geopolitical disaster, and cultural change in the age of Justinian.[2] In this, and in a wide range of subsequent publications on the same themes, he accepted and expanded Cameron's argument, but modified it in two important aspects. Like Cameron, Meier sees the heightened

[1] *Averil Cameron,* Images of Authority. Elites and Icons in Late Sixth-Century Byzantium, in: Past and Present 84, 1979, 3–35.

[2] *Mischa Meier*, Das andere Zeitalter Justinians. Kontingenzerfahrung und Kontingenzbewältigung im 6. Jahrhundert n. Chr., Göttingen 2003.

sacralisation of imperial culture in this period, the abandonment of classical themes in literature, and the concomitant increase in Marian and iconophile devotion – which he includes under the broader label of 'Liturgisierung' –, as a response to contemporaneous crisis, as the product of a universal need to invest in new, more secure forms of divine protection and intercession. In contrast to Cameron, however, Meier both extends this process earlier and places it in a more complex context, associating its full realization with the series of disasters which beset Justinian's reign from 541/2, in particular the plague. For Meier, therefore, Justinian and his successors presided over, and encouraged, a profound shift in *mentalité* which left behind the vestiges of late Roman classicism, but which also, as for Cameron, secured the survival of the east Roman state against the onslaught soon to follow.[3]

A similar perspective has been cultivated in Peter Bell's impressive *Social Conflict in the Age of Justinian* (2013). Here Bell models the Justinianic elite in terms of two competing socio-cultural groups: the reformist, Christian, *novi homines* of the imperial court; and the conservative, 'Pagan', optimates of the landed aristocracy. These groups, in turn, sustained two polarised ideologies – the first totalising and Christian; the second pluralistic and classical – and the Justinianic period is marked, for Bell, in the gradual triumph of the former, as the parvenu emperor and his entourage attempted to legitimise their (faltering, much-criticised) regime through a process of sacralisation. The result of this process was, in Bell's vision, nothing short of a triumphant, 'totalizing Christian discourse' or 'a single hegemonic Christian ideology.'[4] In all these publications, therefore, the reign of Justinian emerges as a crucial moment in the transition from the (classical, pluralistic) culture of the ancient world to the (Christian, exclusive) culture of its medieval successor.[5]

In this paper I want not to contradict this narrative – which, of course, is far more detailed and nuanced than our brief précis allows – so much as to offer a brief addendum to it. Both for Meier and for Bell, a crucial prompt for the process of 'liturgification', that is, the process through which the emperor Justinian and his successors harnessed pre-existent religious phenomena, and in turn encouraged their dissemination, was the attempt to elevate the emperor above

[3] For further refinements of the argument of the monograph see esp. *Mischa Meier*, Sind wir nicht alle heilig? Zum Konzept des 'Heiligen' (sacrum) in spätjustinianischer Zeit, in: Millennium 1, 2004, 133–164; Id., Ostrom-Byzanz, Spätantike-Mittelalter. Überlegungen zum 'Ende' der Antike im Osten des Römischen Reiches, in: Millennium 9, 2012, 187–253, esp. 222–236; Id., The 'Justinianic Plague'. The Economic Consequences of the Pandemic in the Eastern Roman Empire and its Cultural and Religious Effects, in: Early Medieval Europe 24, 2016, 267–292.

[4] *Peter Bell*, Social Conflict in the Age of Justinian. Its Nature, Management, and Mediation, Oxford 2013; cf. *Averil Cameron*, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire. The Development of Christian Discourse, Berkeley 1991.

[5] For an extreme expression of the same view: *Polymnia Athanassiadi*, Vers la pensée unique. La montée de l'intolérance dans l'Antiquité tardive, Paris 2010, see 114–132.

a chorus of dissent, in particular that aimed at him through disenfranchised or disillusioned aristocrats. The sometimes explicit suggestion, therefore, is that as the process of 'liturgification' advanced, so too were the possibilities for dissent constrained, and hence also was 'cultural integration' realized. Here, however, I want to add to this recent scholarship three further points: first, that intellectual dissent did of course continue long after Justinian; second, that it was not limited to the circles of dissident classicists; and third, that it was organised around those same Christian phenomena which emperors of this period had attempted to appropriate.

This addendum is important, I think, for three reasons, all of them important to the wider theme of 'threatened orders'. First of all, it reminds us that the imperial order in the eastern Roman empire was, despite its rhetoric, never static, but was caught in a continuous process of remaking, reordering, itself in response to new contexts and challenges. Second, it helps us to resist the temptation to regard the process of heightened Christianisation in this period as one of simplification, or to suppose that responses to contemporaneous crises were ever uniform or unidirectional. And, third, it also underlines that dissent in this period was not the preserve of pseudo- or non-Christians; that Christian discourse could embrace a range of (often inconsistent) intellectual positions; and that 'Christian' does not have to mean 'apolitical'. A range of excellent recent scholarship on the medieval east Roman empire has done much to denude it of its conservative, sterile ('byzantine') reputation; but those scholars who have attempted to uncover its pluralism, its dissenting traditions, have often done so through reference to latent strands of pre-Christian thought[6], and sometimes cast this thought in explicit contrast to a static, monolithic, 'Orthodox Church' (capitalised) and its 'doctrine'.[7] It is crucial that we complicate this view of Christian culture.[8] Indeed

[6] Most important are the various contributions of *Anthony Kaldellis* e. g. Procopius of Caesarea. Tyranny, History, and Philosophy at the End of Antiquity, Philadelphia 2004; Id., Hellenism in Byzantium. The Transformations of Greek Identity and the Reception of the Classical Tradition, Cambridge 2007.

[7] For some important reflections see *Paul Magdalino*, Orthodoxy and Byzantine Cultural Identity, in: Antonio Rigo / Pavel Ermilov (Eds.), Orthodoxy and Heresy in Byzantium, Rome 2010, 21–40; *Paul Magdalino*, Orthodoxy and History in Tenth-century Byzantine 'Encyclopedism', in: Peter Van Deun / Caroline Macé (Eds.), Encyclopedic Trends in Byzantium, Leuven 2011, 143–159; *Anthony Kaldellis*, Byzantine Philosophy Inside and Out. Orthodoxy and Dissidence in Counterpoint, in: Katerina Lerodiakonou / Börje Bydén (Eds.), The Many Faces of Byzantine Philosophy, Athens 2012, 129–151; but cf. also *Anthony Kaldellis*, The Hagiography of Doubt and Scepticism, in: Stephanos Efthymiadis (Ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Byzantine Hagiography, Vol. II, Genres and Contexts, Farnham 2014, 453–477, for a differentiated view of popular Christian culture.

[8] See the reflections of *Averil Cameron*, Byzantium and the Limits of Orthodoxy, in: Proceedings of the British Academy 154, 2008, 129–152; Id., The Cost of Orthodoxy, in: Dutch Annual Lectures in Patristics 2, 2012, esp. 22–24. Also *Dimiter Angelov*, Power and Subversion in Byzantium. Approaches and Frameworks, in: Dimiter Angelov / Michael Saxby (Eds.), Power and Subversion in Byzantium, Abingdon 2013, 1–18, esp. 14–18.

I will argue here that if the crises of the age of Justinian and his successors indeed encouraged an intensified 'liturgification' of Roman culture, as recent scholars suggest, then so too did it witness an intensification of dissenting voices, and that the more overt and more threatening of such voices came not from classicising or pagan intellectuals, but from Christians.

Emperor and Saint

A central component of the narrative of 'liturgification' as set out above is a rising popular resort, in a context of crisis, to the divine intercession offered through the cult of saints, and a concomitant imperial attempt to harness that same phenomenon. At the popular level, this same phenomenon – which is well-attested in both written and material culture – has sometimes been placed in the context of a 'depersonalisation' of the sacred, as individual ascetics in the Brownian mode, in their conspicuous failure to assuage disaster, faced a rising tide of scepticism, and as Christians sought out new, less human, intercessors to petition for relief.[9] The burgeoning promotion of the shrines of dead saints might indeed have attempted to circumvent this skepticism, since it shifted (or tried to shift) the expectation of holiness from the performer of the miracle to his or her supplicant. But it is now clear that such shrines were also mired in dissenting voices, and that such voices intensified in response to the imperial appropriation of cult.

As the cult of saints had expanded in the fifth and (in particular) the sixth centuries, so too had a new Christian genre emerged within the eastern Mediterranean: collections of miracles, focused on particular saints and their shrines. A notable feature of these collections is the appearance of skeptics, or the authors' anticipation of their audience's doubts about the narrative described. Thus these collections point to a cultic clientele which might be far less credulous and more discerning than we might often presume. This is not to claim that most late antique persons did not believe in saints or in miracles; it is rather to point out that, in a context of intense competition between different modes of supernatural intervention (e. g. magic), and indeed between different saints, supplicants must have developed complex mechanisms of discriminating true from false.[10] In this perspective, the saint as much the ascetic ever risked a reputation as a charlatan.

[9] See e. g. *Meier*, Sind wir nicht alle heilig?, 140–148; now also *Lucy Parker*, Paradigmatic Piety. Liturgy in the *Life of Martha*, Mother of Symeon Stylites the Younger, in: Journal of Early Christian Studies 24, 2016, 99–125.

[10] See *Phil Booth / Matthew J. Dal Santo*, Conclusion. An Age of Saints? Power, Conflict and Dissent in Early Medieval Christianity, in: Peter Sarris / Matthew J. Dal Santo / Phil Booth (Eds.), An Age of Saints? Power, Conflict and Dissent in Early Medieval Christianity, Leiden 2011, 205–214.

In the reign of the emperor Maurice (582–602), however, these doubts around the saints appear to have assumed a more formal basis. In one perspective, Maurice is the classic representative of imperial 'liturgification'. He spent much of his reign, which culminated in his violent usurpation, battling a succession of geopolitical and economic crises; and in this context, he continued the established trend towards the sacralization of the imperial office. Like his predecessors Justinian and Justin II, Maurice is a noted promoter of the Constantinopolitan cult of the Virgin[11]; and it seems also that he cultivated various, prominent ascetics.[12] But during his reign we also witness a remarkable, concerted effort to concentrate at the capital saints' relics from across Christendom. Thus the *Letters* of Pope Gregory the Great refuse a request of the emperor's wife Constantina for the head of St Paul[13]; the *Miracles of Demetrius* reports the emperor's attempt to appropriate the relics of Demetrius from Thessalonica[14]; and the later *History* of Ps.-Sebēos states that Maurice even tried to obtain the relics of the prophet Daniel from Susa.[15] Here we have a clear attempt, then, to fashion Constantinople as a veritable *hagiopolis*, a city of the saints with the emperor as its center.

It is now evident, however, that this same attempt encouraged significant dissent. In his recent *Debating the Saints' Cult in the Age of Gregory the Great* (2012), and in several articles, Matthew Dal Santo has drawn attention to a text composed at Constantinople under Maurice (*c.*590), *On the State of Souls after Death* of Eustratius Presbyter, an adherent of the Constantinopolitan patriarch Eutychius.[16] In this treatise Eustratius counters the position of some contemporaneous Christian theologians who contradicted the basic metaphysics of the cult of saints through positing the inactivity of their posthumous souls, and claiming that such miracles as received at saints' shrines represented God's or an angel's assumption of the saint's form. For Eustratius, this represented a clear challenge both to the saints' power to perform miracles for their supplicant's post-mortem; and to the claims of the church to intercede for the souls of the dead through the eucharist. At stake, therefore, was nothing less than the claims of cultic and ecclesial impresarios to effective intercession.[17]

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[11] *Nicephorus Callistus*, Ecclesiastical History 17.28.

[12] E. g. Theodore of Sykeon (Life of Theodore 82); Golinduch (*Eustratius Presbyter*, Life of Golinduch 23); Sabrisho (Chronicle of Seert 67).

[13] *Gregory the Great*, Letters 4.30.

[14] *John of Thessalonica*, Miracles of Demetrius 5.

[15] *Ps.-Sebēos*, History 14.

[16] See *Nicholas Constas*, An Apology for the Cult of the Saints in Late Antiquity. Eustratius Presbyter of Constantinople, *On the State of Souls after Death* (CPG 7522), in: Journal of Early Christian Studies 10, 2002, 267–85.

[17] *Matthew J. Dal Santo*, Gregory the Great and Eustratius of Constantinople. The Dialogues on the 'Miracles of the Italian Fathers' as an Apology for the Cult of the Saints, in: Journal of Early Christian Studies 17, 2009, 421–57; Id., Debating the Saints' Cult in the Age of Gregory the Great, Oxford 2012, 21–83.

It cannot be a coincidence that these intellectual doubts concerning the theological basis of the cult of saints, which are also countered in a range of contemporaneous hagiographies, manifest at the same moment that imperial promotion lent the institution a new-found prominence and importance. Because of the increasing implication of the cult within imperial discourse, theological inquiries into the fundamental mechanics of the saints' intercession after death – inquiries which suggested that devotion to the saints might be idolatrous – also served to problematize a now fundamental component of imperial ideology. Indeed, Dal Santo associates this theological skepticism with political opposition to Maurice, and with the inevitable doubts around his rule raised in the successes of the Persians, Slavs, and Avars, and in the emperor's attempts to offset the depletion of the fisc.[18] If the problems experienced in the east Roman empire encouraged 'liturgification', therefore, the same problems also encouraged, to quote Dal Santo, 'a dissenting current in the face of the broader stream of imperial ideology and public political culture.'[19]

The relation between Christian culture and the contemporaneous crisis was, therefore, more multifaceted and more complex than has sometimes been allowed. The heightened sacralization of the imperial office was not devoid of tension, nor did it constrain or marginalize dissent. If we accept that emperors were attempting to realise a so-called 'hegemonic' Christian culture in this period, and the appropriation of the cult of saints formed a crucial component of that process, then we must also accept that there existed significant currents of counter-hegemonic dissent generated in Christian circles, and that this dissent was oriented around the same institution through which emperors had attempted to realise their new societal consensus. This is indeed, as we shall see, a defining dynamic in the Christian debates of the subsequent period.

Emperor and Priest

Written and material evidence suggests that alongside the growing prominence of the cult of saints, the sixth-century empire witnessed a significant expansion of liturgical life, and a concomitant sanctification of both space and time: the numbers of churches and shrines expanded; new feasts were created; and new

[18] Ibid., 321–335; also *Matthew J. Dal Santo,* The God-protected Empire? Scepticism Towards the Cult of Saints in Early Byzantium, in: Sarris / Dal Santo / Booth (Eds.), An Age of Saints? 129–149. Note that *Mischa Meier*, Liturgisierung und Hypersakralisierung. Zum Bedeutungsverlust kaiserlicher Frömmigkeit in Konstantinopel zwischen dem 6. und 7. Jahrhundert n. Chr., in: Angelika Neuwirth / Nora K. Schmid (Eds.), Denkraum Spätantike. Reflexionen von Antiken im Umfeld des Koran, Wiesbaden 2016, 75–106, also sees in Maurice's violent end (and that of Phocas) the failure, and indeed subversion, of imperial self-sacralisation.

[19] *Dal Santo*, The God-Protected Empire?, 133.

rituals devised.[20] In the 'liturgification' narrative described above, this expansion has two explanations: first, a rising tide of piousness; and, second, imperial patronage, as emperors began further to sacralize their role through Christianising existing rituals, and expanding their place within ecclesial liturgies. Both developments, according to the same narrative, occurred in a context of geopolitical and socioeconomic crisis, which encouraged the performance of liturgies as a means of propitiating God and, in the capital, accelerated the imperial appropriation of Christian rituals as a means of sacralising, and thus legitimising, the emperors' faltering temporal power.[21]

These developments are both clear in a range of contemporaneous sources. But it is difficult, nevertheless, to go further and to accept that this expansion of liturgical life realized some form of unambiguous social or cultural 'integration'. The phenomenon, as I hope to show, was more multi-faceted. In parts of the Near East, for example, this new commitment to liturgical life was now practised in a quite different context, for it coincided with the formation of new, anti-Chalcedonian congregations opposed to the doctrinal policies of Constantinople, and with the subsequent, radical, bifurcation of the Christian episcopate following the consecrations carried out through Severan bishops from 553.[22] In the diverse texts produced within these communities, we indeed encounter an ever-growing emphasis on the sacraments and on liturgies. But the immediate impetus for this emphasis, it seems, is not so much contemporaneous crisis as it is the desire to emphasize the ritual unity and integrity of the new church(es), in the face of Chalcedonian pollution.[23] In the discourse of these communities, moreover, the contemporaneous emperor is often considered as a heretic and persecutor, and new ideas are beginning to be explored, in which Roman and Christian identities are again held separate.[24] Here, then, the heightened investment in, and reflection upon, ecclesial rituals served not to 'integrate' such communities within a hegemonic Christian culture, but rather to provide a focus for the construction of new religious identities, to which emperor and empire might be irrelevant.

Even in Constantinople – the main stage for imperial ritual, and for the emperor's participation in ecclesial rituals – the sanctification of the imperial

[20] See e. g. *Derek Krueger*, Christian Piety and Practice in the Sixth Century, in: Michael Maas (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Justinian, Cambridge 2005, 291–315.

[21] See esp. *Meier*, Das andere Zeitalter, esp. 481–641; Id., Sind wir nicht alle heilig?, 156–160.

[22] For this process see e. g. *Albert Van Roey*, Les débuts de l'Église jacobite, in: Aloys Grillmeier / Heinrich Bacht (Eds.), Das Konzil von Chalkedon (Geschichte und Gegenwart 2) Würzburg 1951, 339–360; *Phil Booth*, Towards the Coptic Church. The Making of the Severan Episcopate, in: Millennium 17, 2017 (forthcoming).

[23] See *Volker Menze*, Justinian and the Making of the Syrian Orthodox Church, Oxford 2008, esp. 145–193.

[24] *Philip Wood*, 'We Have no King but Christ'. Political Thought in Greater Syria on the Eve of the Arab Conquest, Oxford 2010.

office was fraught with conflict. As Gilbert Dagron long ago demonstrated in a masterful monograph, the sanctification of the imperial office had long served to present the emperor as 'quasi-bishop', and this status was enacted in the unique status afforded to him in ecclesiastical rituals, in particular the celebration of the eucharist. The quasi-sacerdotal status of the emperor was, however, at once exposed to challenge, since for all his proclaimed status as God's vicegerent on earth, the emperor was not and could not be a priest, and in his reception of the sacraments was subordinate to the hierarchs of the church. For the most part, this problem of the emperor's precise religious status remained implicit, its tensions enacted in a continuous complex of rhetoric and ritual which pushed at the boundaries of imperial religious power, in particular in Constantinople. But for those Christians alienated from the emperor – whether through temporal or through spiritual failings – it was a simple step to refute his claim to special status in the church, and even, perhaps, to proclaim the independence of the latter from the empire.[25]

This tension manifests with particular force during the reign of the emperor Heraclius (610–641). Heraclius is, in one perspective, a classic representative of the 'liturgification' narrative described above. During his earliest reign, he confronted an unprecedented crisis, as the Persians extended their conquests across the Near East, sacked Jerusalem, and threatened Constantinople.[26] Indeed, it is remarkable that Heraclius – an usurper who had suffered a personal defeat on the field of battle in 613, presided over the loss of Jerusalem in 614, and failed to prevent the fall of Egypt (the empire's most important province) in 619–620 – was not himself usurped. But the imperial court responded to this unprecedented crisis with an intensified emphasis on the emperor's sacred role: Heraclian court culture shrouded him in the guise of an Old Testament warrior king[27]; his subsequent campaigns against the Persians were presented as a battle on a cosmological, even eschatological, scale[28]; and Heraclius himself emphasised a new, Christian, imperial title: *pistos in Christōi basileus*.[29] This conception of the emperor culminated in two particular events: first, the restoration to Jerusalem,

[25] See *Gilbert Dagron*, Empereur et prêtre. Étude sur le "ésaropapisme" byzantine, Paris 1996, esp. 106–138.

[26] For the narrative see *Bernard Flusin*, Saint Anastase le Perse et l'histoire de la Palestine au début du VIIe siècle, Vol. 2, Paris 1992, 67–83.

[27] See e. g. *Suzanne Spain Alexander*, Heraclius, Byzantine Imperial Ideology and the David Plates, in: Speculum 52, 1977, 217–37; *Steven Wander*, The Joshua Roll, Wiesbaden 2012, 133–138; *Mary Whtiby*, A New Image for a New Age. George of Pisidia on the Emperor Heraclius, in: Edward Dąbrowa (Ed.), The Roman and Byzantine Army in the East, Krakow 1994, 197–225.

[28] See *Yuri Stoyanov*, Defenders and Enemies of the True Cross. The Sasanian Conquest of Jerusalem in 614 and Byzantine Ideology of Anti-Persian Warfare, Vienna 2011, 45–75.

[29] See *Evangelos K. Chrysos*, The title βασιλεύς in early Byzantine international relations, in: Dumbarton Oaks Papers 32, 1978, 29–75.

in 630, of the True Cross, removed to Ctesiphon after the Persian assault of 614[30]; and, second, his forced baptism of Jews in 632.[31]

There can be little doubt that the emperor's success against the Persians was greeted with enthusiasm across the empire. But it is also evident that some provincial Christians hesitated to accept the grand rhetoric of imperial renewal. Elsewhere I have pointed to the muted response to Heraclius's success contained within the output of a prominent group of Palestinian, Chalcedonian, ascetics: John Moschus, Sophronius, and Maximus the Confessor.[32] In the face of the Persian advance into the Roman Near East, this group had, with other ascetics, retreated westwards, and in the end settled in North Africa. Across this same period, the output of the group manifests an ever-deepening emphasis on the sacraments and rituals of the orthodox church, and the shared ascetical and liturgical commitments of all Christians, as an evident demonstration of that church's continued mission, floating above the treacherous reefs of the secular.[33] In one perspective, then, this might well be seen an example of cultural and social 'integration': of the advanced attempt to systematise disparate aspects of Christian thought – in particular, competing narratives of the ascetic and liturgical lives –, to emphasise the shared religious devotion of all orthodox Christians, and to differentiate such Christians from those who did not share the same commitments.

When this same 'integrative' narrative intersected with the perception that the emperor had erred from the path of correct doctrine, however, it could also assume a quite different emphasis. From 629 to 633, following his dramatic triumph over the Persians, the emperor Heraclius had presided over a series of spectacular doctrinal unions with various anti-Chalcedonian churches, and even received communion from the hands of some of their prelates.[34] The basis for such unions was in part the doctrine of Christ's single operation (monenergism), which was promoted as a bridge between Chalcedonian and anti-Chalcedonian theologies.[35] From the summer of 633, however, Sophronius and Maximus had launched a public opposition to the doctrine, and in turn to its successor, the doctrine of Christ's single will (monotheletism).[36] It is no accident that this op-

[30] See esp. *Jan W. Drijvers*, Heraclius and the *Restitutio Crucis*. Notes on Symbolism and Ideology, in: Gerrit J. Reinink/Bernard H. Stolte (Eds.), The Reign of Heraclius (610–641). Crisis and Confrontation, Leuven 2002, 175–90.

[31] See *Gilbert Dagron/Vincent Déroche*, Juifs et Chrétiens dans l'Orient de VIIe Siècle, in: Travaux et Mémoires 11, 1991, 17–274, here 28–32; *Stoyanov*, Defenders and Enemies, 68–70.

[32] See *Phil Booth*, Crisis of Empire. Doctrine and Dissent at the End of Late Antiquity, Berkeley 2013, 160–163, 170–171.

[33] Ibid., 76–185.

[34] Ibid., 200–208.

[35] See *Christian Lange*, Mia Energeia. Untersuchungen zur Einigungspolitik des Kaisers Heraclius und des Patriarchen Sergius von Constantinopel, Tübingen 2012.

[36] On the development of Maximus's opposition see *Marek Jankowiak/Phil Booth*, A New Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, in: Pauline Allen/Bronwen Neil (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor, Oxford 2015, 19–83.

position coincided with the first inroads of the Muslims into Roman territories, which invited the association between imperial doctrine and temporal disaster. Indeed, in certain of Sophronius's sermons – delivered during his tenure as the patriarch of Jerusalem (634–*c.*639), when the Muslims surrounded the city – we find a clear association between the doctrinal, liturgical, and moral restoration of the Christian community and the renewal of temporal peace. But the implication is that the emperor is not so much the solution to the crisis of the *oikoumenē*, as its cause.[37]

The monenergist and monotheletistic controversies would continue to rage across the next decades, culminating at the Lateran Council of 649 – at which Palestinian ascetics and western bishops combined to condemn imperial doctrine – and the subsequent trials of Pope Martin (653) and Maximus (655) in the capital. After the latter, Maximus's circle produced a text which purports to be a record of the trial, and which offers us a remarkable insight into its conception of Maximus's dissent. Therein Maximus is asked whether he considers the emperor also to be a priest which, as we have seen above, was a implicit if a fraught component of imperial self-conception. Maximus replies that the emperor cannot be a priest, for he fulfills none of the ritual functions of the priesthood, and is subordinate to its sacramental mediation like all others Christians. His interventions to enforce monenergism and monotheletistic are therefore unwarranted transgressions upon the prerogatives of priests, to whom alone belongs the right to decide the faith.[38] Thus 'Maximus' sought to expose the paradox of the emperor as quasi-priest, and to unveil the burgeoning gulf between imperial sacralization and the realities of Roman reversals.[39] Here, then, 'liturgification' – understood as a dual, interdependent, process through which communities and emperors, in a context of crisis, became more Christianised and more ritualized – resulted not so much in integration as in *dis*integration, in disruption, and in dissent.

Emperor and Icon

I would like to conclude with some brief reflections on the origins of iconoclasm, that is, the belief that the worship of icons (and relics) was idolatrous, adopted in some form in the later reign of Leo III (717–741) and his successor Constantine V (741–775). The emergence of anxieties over images has long been associated with perceptions of crisis – with continued Roman reversals at the hands of the

[37] *Booth*, Crisis of Empire, 241–250.

[38] See Record of the Trial Ed. *Pauline Allen/Bronwen Neil*, Scripta saeculi VII vitam Maximi Confessoris illustrantia, CCSG 39, Turnhout 1999, 14–51.

[39] Cf. the comments of *Dagron*, Empereur et prêtre 182; *Wolfram Brandes*, 'Juristische' Krisenbewältigung im 7. Jahrhundert? Die Prozesse gegen Martin I. und Maximos Homologetes, in: Fontes Minores 10, 1998, 141–212, here 194–196.

caliphate, with natural disasters – and a subsequent perception that God was punishing the Christians for sin.[40] The recent work of John Haldon and Leslie Brubaker has offered a far more nuanced and differentiated exploration of that connection, placing iconoclasm within the context of a series of structural and cultural changes beginning from the reign of Justinian.[41]

In terms of the intellectual roots of iconoclasm, however, that work has focused on its more immediate context, seeking its inspiration in the period after 680, and pointing to a then more urgent perception of the need for purification, for the observance of Old Testament prescriptions, and for the propitiation of a God who had abandoned his chosen people.[42] In part this chronological focus rests upon the notion that the icon *devotion* of which iconoclasts disapproved, if not the spread of icons themselves, is also a product of this period, as embattled Christians sought out new forms of access to an ever-distant God; and earlier witnesses to such devotion have been interpolated within iconophile manuscripts.[43] This issue, let us note, is far from decided.[44] But irrespective of this important debate, I would like here to connect iconoclasm to a series of pre-existent intellectual debates, and to place it within the narrative of 'liturgification' described above, that is, the integration of icons within both imperial and wider Christian practice, on the one hand, and of the dissenting Christian voices which were the inevitable handmaiden of that integration, on the other. This is not to discount that iconoclasm must be situated within a series of more immediate contexts; it is rather to point that out that we can connect it to far more protracted intellectual anxieties within Christian communities, evident long before the 680s. In this same perspective, the entire discussion might be seen both to draw from and to mirror those introspective Christian debates around praxis, politics, and crisis which we have examined above.

It seems quite clear that during the sixth and seventh centuries, the expansion of the cult of saints was also accompanied by a proliferation of the saints' images,

[40] E. g. *Peter Brown*, A Dark-age Crisis. Aspects of the Iconoclastic Controversy, in: English Historical Review 88, 1973, 1–34, esp. 23–27.

[41] *Leslie Brubaker / John Haldon*, Byzantium in the Iconoclast Era c.650–850. A History, Cambridge 2011, esp. 9–68, 772–799.

[42] *Brubaker / Haldon*, Byzantium in the Iconoclast Era, 50–68.

[43] See (amongst various studies of the same author) *Paul Speck*, Wunderheilige und Bilder. Zur Frage des Beginns der Bilderverehrung, in: Varia III, Poikila Byzantina 11, Bonn 1991, 163–247; taken up in *Leslie Brubaker*, Icons before Iconoclasm? in: Guglielmo Cavallo et al. (Eds.), Morfologie sociali e culturali in Europa fra tarda antichità e alto medioevo di studio, Spoleto 1998, 1215–54. The latter accepts Speck's arguments, but his position is far from comprehensive and in various cases has been challenged; see e. g. *Vincent Déroche*, L'authenticité de l'*Apologie contre les Juifs* de Léontios de Néapolis, in: Bulletin de correspondance hellénique 110, 1986, 655–669.

[44] For critique see e. g. *Averil Cameron*, The Anxiety of Images. Meanings and Material Objects, in: Angeliki Lymberopoulou (Ed.), Images of the Byzantine World. Visions, Messages and Meanings. Studies Presented to Leslie Brubaker, Farnham 2011, 47–56; *Richard Price*, The Acts of the Seventh Ecumenical Council, Liverpool (forthcoming).

if not on wooden panels then at least on *eulogiai* and other pilgrim tokens; and that such images were, moreover, crucial both to the aspiration of supplicants to experience visions of the saints at their shrines, and to the validation of theological claims as to the saints' posthumous existence.[45] At the same time, it is in the post-Justinianic period that one first reads of the so-called *acheiropoietai*, that is, contact relics bearing images of Christ, and attributed with miraculous, apotropaic powers.[46] Under Justin II one of these, the image of Camuliana, was transferred to Constantinople[47], and it was perhaps this *acheiropoieta* that the emperor Maurice then exhibited before his armies.[48] Soon after, Heraclius also displayed an *acheiropoieta* to his troops[49], while the same emperor, as well as his subordinates, also paraded images of the Virgin and of Christ in battle.[50] In short, within decades of their emergence into public discourse, images of Christ and the Virgin were appropriated within imperial culture, and used further to sacralize both emperor and empire.

We have seen that the heightened prominence lent to saints and ascetics in the period after Justinian, in particular in imperial culture, also intersected with a more intense interrogation of those same figures, not least because of their inevitable failure to fulfill their posited role. Were sacred images also implicated thus? A lack of evidence means that it is difficult to assess the role of such images within imperial practice in the period before iconoclasm proper. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the anxieties around images of Christ, which manifest amongst certain of Leo III's churchmen in the 720s, might in part reflect their heightened appropriation within the propaganda of Justinian II (685–695, 705–711) – in particular, the famous, innovative solidus bearing Christ's image – and the patent disconnect between this façade of imperial holiness and the realities of temporal defeat.[51]

Since the reign of Justinian, contemporaneous crisis had accelerated a process of Christian introspection, an attempt to theologize, and thus to legitimize, those less formal elements of Christian praxis which existed on the edges of the church, and which might seem suspect, or even sacrilegious. In the face of criticism, at

[45] See *Dal Santo*, Text, Image.

[46] Image of Edessa: *Evagrius Scholasticus*, Ecclesiastical History 4.27. Image of Camuliana: *Ps.-Zachariah Rhetor*, Chronicle 12a. Image of Memphis: *Piacenza Pilgrim*, Itinerary 44 (cf. also *John of Nikiu*, Chronicle 91).

[47] *Cedrenus*, History (Bekker 684); with *Mischa Meier*, Die Translatio des Christusbildes von Kamulianai und der Kreuzreliquie von Apameia nach Konstantinopel unter Justin II. Ein übersehenes Datierungsproblem, in: Zeitschrift für antikes Christentum 7, 2004, 237–25.

[48] *Theophylact Simocatta*, History 2.3, 3.1.

[49] *George of Pisidia*, Persian Expedition 2.86 (and *Theophanes*, Chronographia AM 6113).

[50] *George of Pisidia*, Heraclias 2.12–18 (cf. *Theophanes*, Chronographia AM 6102); Persian Expedition 1.139–153, 2.86–87 (and *Theophanes*, Chronographia AM 6113); *Theodore Syncellus*, On the Siege of Constantinople 15.

[51] *Michael Humphreys*, Images of Authority? Imperial Patronage of Icons from Justinian II to Leo III, in: Sarris / Dal Santo / Booth (Eds.), *An Age of Saints?,* 150–168.

various levels, from within their own communities, some Christian intellectuals, such as Eustratius, had posited a defence of the saints' posthumous activities, and in so doing had also galvanised the church's claim to offer, through the eucharist, intercession for the dead; while others, such as Maximus, attempted a radical redefinition of the Christian ascetic, removed from the margins of the church and now set anew at its navel. In both authors, then, one encounters a common impulse, that is, to consider how these different, unconsecrated, forms of Christian devotion related to the rite of the eucharist, and to the sacramental mediation of the church.

Indeed across this period, as I and others have argued elsewhere, Christian authors demonstrated an ever-deepening concern with, and devotion to, the eucharist, the sacrament of sacraments, which united all Christians in shared devotion, and in a ritual impervious to crisis.[52] At the same time, on the eve of iconoclasm, there is a clear, more intense, interest in other, material manifestations of the sacred – in the Cross, the church, and in the sacred image[53] – and from here it was but a short leap to the attempt to comprehend how (if at all) these other elements of Christian devotion related to the central Christian act.[54] Indeed, a crucial component of iconoclast polemic will be that icons (and relics), unlike the eucharist, the church, and the Cross, have not received the blessing of priests, and cannot therefore be worshipped.[55] Out of this threatened order, then, and the intense introspection which accompanied it, we can trace an an ongoing attempt at the social and intellectual integration of Christian practices, and the orientation of such practices around the church's sacramental and hierarchical heart. Seen in this light, the emergence of iconoclasm and its intellectual rebuttal – in which all of the anxieties around asceticism and sainthood, familiar from the late sixth and seventh centuries, will reappear[56], and in which eucha-

[52] *Vincent Déroche*, Représentations de l'Eucharistie dans la haute époque Byzantine, in: Travaux et Memoires 14, 2002, 167–80; *Booth*, Crisis of Empire.

[53] See, for example, the preoccupation with eucharist, cross, and image in the canons of Trullo: e. g. Canons 73, 82, 83, 100, 101. The same triad is a notable and frequent feature, often as apotropaia against demons and others, in the second collection of Tales of Anastasius of Sinai: see e. g. Tales 2.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 28. I cite the numbering of *André Binggeli* (Ed.), Anastase le Sinaïte. Récits sur le Sinaï et Récits utiles à l'âme. Èdition, traduction, commentaire, unpublished Diss., Paris IV, 2001.

[54] On the status of material signs within contemporaneous debates see *Averil Cameron*, The Language of Images. The Rise of Icons and Christian Representation, in: Diana Wood (Ed.), The Church and the Arts, Studies in Church History 28, Oxford 1992, 1–42. For the importance of the cross in iconoclasm, see *John Moorhead*, Iconoclasm, the Cross, and the Imperial Image, in: Byzantion 55, 1985, 165–179.

[55] See *Brown*, Dark-age Crisis 5–6, 26–28; *Marie-France Auzépy*, Les Isauriens et l'espace sacré. L'église et les réliques, in: Michel Kaplan (Ed.), Le sacré et son inscription dans l'espace à Byzance et en Occident. Ètudes comparées, Paris 2001, 13–24.

[56] See e. g. *Peter Hatlie*, Spiritual Authority and Monasticism in Constantinople during the Dark Ages (650–800), in: Jan W. Drijvers / John W. Watt (Eds.), Portraits of Spiritual Authority. Religious Power in Early Christianity, Byzantium and the Christian Orient, Leiden 1999,

ristic doctrine will again assume a central position[57] – can be seen as a further manifestation of those debates which had, since the reign of Justinian, accrued around disparate aspects of Christian devotion.

The most obvious danger for the emperors was that such debates might cast a central component of imperial culture as idolatrous. Indeed, although Leo III and Constantine V acquiesced to some extent in contemporaries' criticism of saints' relics and sacred images, it is clear (despite the attempts of later polemicists) that both were nevertheless careful to curtail the more extreme expressions of such criticism: thus imperial leipsanoclasm focused on the presence of saints' bodies at the altar, and never extended to contact relics, like those of the Passion (of which the capital was an effective museum); while imperial iconoclasm never extended to a denial of the saints' traditional intercession (and thus to the shrines which all emperors patronised).[58]

At the same time, however, a more fundamental threat to the imperial office loitered in the burgeoning sacramental sensibilities – and the emergent, more ecclesiocentric, Christian culture – through which contemporaries attempted to frame the worship of images. Thus as the Christian empire faltered and Christians looked inwards for explanations as to God's apparent anger, some intellectuals legitimized otherwise contentious Christian practices through locating them within a sacramental framework, thus also anchoring them to an institution which transcended the vicissitudes of empire. But as the example of such persons as Maximus, John of Damascus, and Theodore the Studite demonstrate, this heightened integration, and sacramentalisation, of Christian thought could also be used to exclude the emperor from religious narratives, when that emperor was perceived, for one reason or another, as a failure.

The anxieties around images, then, although generated in particular contexts, also represented a conspicuous continuation of the dissenting voices which had swirled around various elements of Christian devotion since the eastern empire's Justinianic apex. The various crises which beset the emperors from that time encouraged, on the one hand, a process of 'liturgification', of the heightened sacralisation of public (and, in particular, imperial) culture, which much recent research has so well exposed. However, the heightened prominence given to, for example, ascetics, saints, and sacred images, and the obvious failure of such things to assuage divine anger, also led to their heightened interrogation, and to the emergence of new narratives which threatened either to undermine, or to

195–222; *Vladimir Baranov*, 'Angels in the Guise of Saints'. A Syrian Tradition in Constantinople, in: Scrinium 12, 2016, 5–19.

[57] See e. g. *Stephen Gero*, The Eucharistic Doctrine of the Byzantine Iconoclasts and Its Sources, in: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 68, 1975, 4–22; *Vladimir Baranov*, The Doctrine of the Icon-Eucharist for the Byzantine Iconoclasts, in: Studia Patristica 44, 2010, 41–48.

[58] See *Auzépy*, Les Isauriens et l'espace sacré; also *John Wortley*, Iconoclasm and Leipsanoclasm. Leo III, Constantine V and the Relics, in: Byzantinische Forschungen 8, 1982, 253–279.

exclude, the emperors. Concepts of 'cultural integration' or of 'hegemonic discourse' – or, we might add, the reductive separation of 'political' and 'theological' motivations in appreciating the conflicts – do not encapsulate the complexities of this process, of this response to a 'threatened order'. But more than this, such concepts also risk perpetuating old clichés about the monolithic nature of Christian ('Orthodox') culture, and thus encouraging the notion that dissidence in the medieval, eastern Roman empire must be sought in non-Christian traditions, even in non-Christian circles. I hope here to have shown, however, that the crises of empire in the sixth to eighth centuries encouraged something more than 'liturgification'; those crises also encouraged an intense, wide-ranging, and protracted debate as to what constituted the sacred, and as to how those elements of Christian devotion which emperors appropriated, and thus problematized, could be reconciled to the incomparable power of the central Christian rite.

IV. Disasters and Social Change, 19th–20th c.

Introduction

Klaus Gestwa

For a long time, revolution has been the dominant epitome of rapid and radical social change. Yet as the "third wave of democratization"[1] during the last third of the twentieth century ended military dictatorships, the apartheid regime in South Africa and state socialism in Eastern Europe, those intensively working on revolutionary theory wholeheartedly declared, "the ballot box has been the coffin of revolutionaries".[2] Timothy Garton Ash, enthusiastic observer and prudent commentator of the turn of eras in Eastern Europe, even confidently called the upheaval against the Serbian president Slobodan Milošević in 2000 "the last revolution".[3] "History's end", optimistically proclaimed by the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama in 1989, seemed to evoke simultaneously the farewell to revolution.

But the condemned live longer. Even in the twenty-first century the revolution still has not disappeared from the arena of public attention and unwaveringly captures key elements of political imagination and agency, as the 'Arabellion' and the Ukrainian Euromaidan, celebrated as "revolution 2.0" or "3.0", vividly demonstrated.[4] However, since the latest uprisings once more have given rise to disappointment and disillusions, the melodramas of revolution are, seemingly, no longer understood as the major drivers of social change and have been superseded by the tropes of 'catastrophe' and 'disaster'.[5]

Whereas revolutions as heroic acts of liberation have always pledged new beginnings and a better social order, the mere term 'catastrophe' as an abrupt turn for the worse and as a harbinger of a routinely disastrous future epitomizes disorder and social breakdown. The focus is no longer on the rail line that Marx'

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[1] *Samuel P. Huntington*, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, London 1991.

[2] *Jeff Goodwin*, The Renewal of Socialism and the Decline of the Revolution, in: John Foran (Ed.), The Future of Revolution. Rethinking Radical Change in the Age of Globalization, London / New York 2003, 59–72, here 67.

[3] *Timothy Garton Ash,* The Last Revolution, in: New York Review of Books, 16. November 2000, 8–14.

[4] *Wael Ghonim,* Revolution 2.0. Wie wir mit der ägyptischen Revolution die Welt verändern, Berlin 2012; *Simon Geissbühler* (Ed.), Kiew – Revolution 3.0. Der Euromaidan 2013/14 und die Zukunftsperspektiven der Ukraine, Stuttgart 2014.

[5] *Jessica Greenberg,* After the Revolution. Youth, Democracy, and the Politics of Disappointment in Serbia, Stanford 2014.

"locomotive of history" supposedly follows and on the driving force of its engine but on the train derailing with all its consequences. Tapped into timeless myths and inspiring magical possibilities, 'revolution' addresses progress, promise and hopes. On the contrary, with the collapse of security and its violation of taken-for-granted-expectations, catastrophe reveals a trend pointing downward, evoking decay, calamity and fear. The shift from revolution to catastrophe insistently proves that an apocalyptic shadow has fallen over the *zeitgeist*. Modernity is no longer a narrative of the continuing mastery of nature, science and technology. Its notion of ascension – the idea that the management of peoples, resources and economies can be made even better – has lost much of its persuasiveness. In fact, mankind's conception of the future has been placed in great jeopardy. The continuous causation of cataclysmic accidents from Bhopal and Chernobyl to Fukushima and climate change with its stubbornly enigmatic occurrences of weather extremes have resulted in a situation in which risk is no longer quantifiable or statistically predictable. By "playing roulette with nature"[6] the risk society has been transformed into a community of fate. Thus, the rise of catastrophe to a dominant trope in social thought exposes the fragility and teleological vacuity of contemporary social orders. The dominant academic response has not been another grand theory, but rather cautionary notes to rethink how the complex relationship between structural determination and individual agency could be analyzed with the intention to make suggestions for a progressive response to catastrophic modernity that is less dramatic than the revolutionary ethos, though more expedient and sustainable for that.[7]

Despite the fundamental difference between an optimistic and a pessimistic mindset, catastrophes have much more in common with revolutions than it seems at first glance.[8] Both have great revelatory capacities: They unmask the nature of power and the fabric of order, thus open up new perspectives for an illuminating "social autopsy".[9] With their sudden interruption of normalcy and the

[6] *Christof Mauch*, Phönix und Mnemosyne. Katastrophenoptimismus und Katastrophenerinnerung in den USA. Von der Johnstown Flood bis Hurricane Katrina, in: Patrick Masius / Jana Sprenger / Eva Mackowiak (Eds.), Katastrophen machen Geschichte. Umweltgeschichtliche Prozesse im Spannungsfeld von Ressourcennutzung und Extremereignis, Göttingen 2010, 133–151, here 144–145.

[7] *Paul Virilio,* The Original Accident, London 2007; *Eva Horn*, Zukunft als Katastrophe, Frankfurt 2014; *Ralph Cintron*, What Next. Modernity, Revolution, and the 'Turn' to Catastrophe, in: Ralph Cintron / Robert Hariman (Eds.), Culture, Catastrophe, and Rhetoric. The Texture of Political Action, New York 2015, 231–255.

[8] Writings on revolution have long made extensive use of natural metaphors. Revolutionary actions, described as earth-shattering and ground shaking, are compared to floods and tsunamis, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, tornados and wildfires, even as the natural events themselves are largely deemed apolitical. See e. g. *Mary Ashburn Miller*, A Natural History of Revolution. Violence and Nature in the French Revolutionary Imagination, 1789–1794, Ithaca 2011.

[9] *Eric Klinenberg,* Heat Wave. A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago (Illinois), Chicago 2002.

suspension of routines, both revolutions and catastrophes lay open the contradictions, inadequacies and inequities, the alliances and hierarchies, the infrastructures and organizations of a certain community or state in a more focused way.[10]

Like revolutions, catastrophes should not be understood as isolated outliers; they always exist in the virtual space of history. Their analysis demands a processual concept which embeds the disaster as a "focusing event"[11] in long-term historical developments. Catastrophes do not happen out of the blue; they are man-made by the onward accumulation of social vulnerabilities, for example due to the process of urban expansion into flatland prone to flooding and the agricultural exploitation of semiarid areas regularly afflicted by extremely low rainfall, as the two following chapters demonstrate.[12] Moreover, catastrophes are both the result of previous developments and emergent conditions brought about by the disaster and its hardly predictable aftermath. Thus, next to placing cataclysmic occurrences in their historical context, it is at once necessary to trace how catastrophes themselves produce new contexts and ipso facto become of particular interest to those who seek to transform embedded institutions, mentalities and practices.[13]

For this reason, catastrophe's message "that anything could happen is not so far away from revolution's exhortation that anything is possible."[14] Catastrophes often create a critical juncture when political possibility expands and new options for drastic action occur. Disaster politics open space for the renegotiation of values and structures of society, and focus attention on "the moments of transition that can act as tipping points towards concentration or contestation of political power."[15] Implemented coping practices and adaptive strategies frequently allow rearranged forms of social organizations as well as new knowledge to emerge.[16] Hence, 'catastrophe' occupies a powerful place in political imaginaries not only due to its signification of a worst-case scenario, but due to its potential to spark

[10] In this regard see *Giorgio Agamben*, The Man Without Content, Stanford 1999, 115: "It is only in the burning house that the fundamental architectural problem becomes visible for the first time".

[11] *Thomas A. Birkland*, Natural Disasters as Focusing Events. Policy Communities and Political Response, in: International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 14, 1996, 221–243.

[12] *Greg Bankoff*, Comparing Vulnerabilities. Toward Charting an Historical Trajectory of Disasters, in: Historical Social Research 32, 2007, 103–114.

[13] *Brigitte Refslund Sørensen/Kristoffer Albris,* The Social Life of Disasters. An Anthropological Approach, in: Rasmus Dahlberg/Olivier Rubin/Morten Thanning Vendelø (Eds.), Disaster Research. Multidisciplinary and International Perspectives, New York 2016, 66–81, here 75.

[14] *Rebecca Solnit,* A Paradise Built in Hell. The Extraordinary Communities that Arise in Disaster, New York 2010, 172.

[15] *Mark Pelling/Kathleen Dill*, Disaster Politics. Tipping Points for Change in the Adaption of Socio-political Regimes, in: Progress in Human Geography 34, 2010, 27.

[16] *Robert Proctor/Londa Schiebinger*, Agnotology. The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance, Stanford 2008; *Matthias Gross*, Ignorance and Surprise. Science, Society, and Ecological Design, Cambridge, Mass. 2010; *Claudia Aradau/Rens von Munster*, Politics of Catastrophe. Genealogies of the Unknown, Oxford 2011.

productive processes of re-ordering.[17] Closely related to Joseph Schumpeter's perennial gale of "creative destruction"[18], a certain kind of catastrophic optimism can convey a vision of progress by cycling through rhythms of destruction and reconstruction, ruin and renewal. Phoenix-from-the-ashes-narratives are commonly used to reframe tragic experiences of devastation, loss and sorrow and to reroute the catastrophe toward confident ends by declaring that recovery will blaze the trail for a better social order providing more protection and security.[19] Since catastrophes like other irruptive phenomena (wars, epidemics, uprisings, acts of terror) occasionally usher in experimentation with spatial, scientific and social technologies, it prompts new forms of regulation and control by integrating the disaster potentials of modernity into planning and policy-making processes.[20]

The revelatory function, the diagnostic relevance and the transformative capacity of catastrophes constitute the historian's argument for studying them. In addition, analogous to revolutions catastrophes affect collective ways of remembering and social memory and develop their own iconography, rituals, and distinctive sets for representation and reflection. This is why some even argue that history is – to a certain degree – shaped by catastrophes. Disasters with a huge formative impact should be seen as "signposts" and "switch plates of history".[21] And confronted with the catastrophic potentials of the present, scholars nowadays feel an obligation to historicize the development of these potentials, to engage themselves in the discussion of the narratives and myths surrounding disasters as well as to identify the resources for facing up to the catastrophes.[22] With this in mind Rebecca Jones explains in her chapter on *Understanding the conundrum of drought in Australia* that "cultural narratives of past droughts helped farmers cope with droughts in the present". The interpretation of 'catastrophe' has both a retrospective and a prospective meaning and thus bridges the gaps between past, present and future.

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[17] *Alyssa Battistoni / Kata Streiphen*, Climate Change and the Politics of Catastrophe, in: Nitzan Lebovic / Andreas Killen (Eds.), Catastrophes. A History and Theory of an Operative Concept, Berlin / Boston 2014, 156–180.

[18] *Thomas K. McCraw*, Prophet of Innovation. Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruction, Cambridge, Mass. 2007; *Esben Sloth Andersen*, Schumpeter's Evolutionary Economics. A theoretical, historical and statistical Analysis of the Engine of Capitalism, London 2009.

[19] *Kevin Rozaria*, The Culture of Calamity. Disaster and the Making of Modern America, Chicago 2007; *Sasha Lilley* (Ed.), Catastrophism. The Apocalyptic Politics of Collapse and Rebirth, Oakland 2010; *Andrew Lakoff*, Disaster and the Politics of Intervention, New York 2010; *Uwe Lübken*, Natur – Katastrophe – Politik. Zum historischen Umgang mit Naturgefahren in den USA, in: Michael Reder / Verena Risse / Maria-Daria Cojocaru (Eds.), Katastrophen – Perspektiven, Stuttgart 2016, 79–99.

[20] *Nitzan Lebovic / Andreas Killen*, Introduction, in: Lebovic / Killen (Eds.), Catastrophes, 1–14, here 8–9.

[21] *Cintron*, What Next, 242.

[22] *Lebovic / Killen*, Introduction, 13.

Analyzing how catastrophes happen within existing social orders and change them has been central to modern disaster research since its beginnings. The field of disaster research developed in the aftermath of the shocking calamity that struck the Canadian harbor town of Halifax in 1917, when two ships loaded with massive amounts of ammunition and fuel collided and exploded. The heat and shock waves of the blast killed 2,000 people. The Halifax explosion was the most powerful man-made release of energy in history, prior to the detonation of the first atomic bombs in 1945. Based on his own experiences, the priest Samuel Henry Prince wrote his dissertation on "Catastrophe and Social Change". This book, published in 1920, became the first scientific piece of work to focus on the social effects of disaster.[23]

In the wake of this old established research tradition, resilience has become an immensely popular concept in the social sciences in recent years. At first, this concept referred only to a system's or material's ability to recover from shock and retain its core functions with little or no external assistance. It was soon also applied to individuals and communities. Criticized for advocating stability instead of promoting change and for providing a neoliberal script of the entrepreneurial citizen who does not need intervention by the state, resilience since then has gradually taken on a more dynamic meaning. It now implies not only a "bounce-back" effect, but also positive adaptive capacities of disaster-affected communities and societies which results in a better preparedness and strengthens the re-ordering vigor, urgently needed to withstand future, potentially even more disruptive shocks and cataclysmic events.[24] In her article Rebecca Jones identifies a reactive and a more proactive, preparatory or preventive mode of resilience, since the Australian farmers either simply stoically endured the calamity of dryness or purposefully changed their land use in response to drought. This useful differentiation can be refined in order to mark a clear, long overdue distinction between the mere inertia of social orders and resilience as a vibrant way of coping with disaster.

Analyzing catastrophe as an urgent appeal for swift action and consequently as a source of social change has turned out to be an intellectual challenge of its own. Of course, there are some historical cases in which catastrophes played a role in

[23] *Samuel Henry Prince*, Catastrophe and Social Change, New York 1920; *T. Joseph Scanlon*, Disaster's Little Known Pioneer. Canada's Samuel Henry Prince, in: International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 6, 1988, 213–232; *Janet Kitz,* Shattered City. The Halifax Explosion and the Road to Recovery, Halifax 2008.

[24] *Kirsten Hastrup* (Ed.), The Question of Resilience. Social Responses to Climate Change, Copenhagen 2009; *Louise Comfort/Arjen Boin/Chris Demchak* (Eds.), Designing Resilience. Preparing for Extreme Events, Pittsburgh 2010; *Rasmus Dahlberg et al*., Resilience in Disaster Research. Three Versions, in: Civil Engineering and Environmental Systems 32, 2015, Nr. 1–2, 44–54; *Judith Rodin,* The Resilience Dividend. Being Strong in a World Where Things Go Wrong, New York 2014; *Chris Zebrowski*, The Value of Resilience. Securing Life in the Twenty-first Century, London 2016.

overthrowing political leaders and regimes.[25] In their chapter on the *Hungarian flood disaster of 1838*, Anna Ananieva and Rolf Haaser explain that a cluster of disastrous events during the 1830s and 1840s was harmful to the social order and preceded the Hungary revolution in 1848 by provoking political discontent. But the empirical evidence predominantly points to social orders being quite resilient to disasters. By no means should 'catastrophe' become the new master trope for historical discontinuity, because it mostly proves to be a prolonged process that entails both formative continuities and changes. In accordance with this argument, both chapters of this book section provide good case studies for understanding the aftermath of a catastrophe as a "parallel run of discontinuity and continuity".[26] The impact of disasters on political and social developments is obviously more subtle, since catastrophes usually act as a catalyst for preexisting dynamics either accelerating or detailing already ongoing processes. But disastrous occurrences are not sufficiently strong to directly create these processes and therefore do not serve as initials of social change. They might be best considered as revealers, triggers and fuses.[27]

Due to the great variability of disasters, social orders and transformations, the relationship between catastrophes and social change is likewise multifaceted. In strong economies, catastrophes often function as economic stimulus programs by creating new fields of activity for investment capital and by promoting the modernization of infrastructures. By contrast, in weak economies with corrupt political regimes recovery might be slow or never happen at all, due to the lack of capital, administrative inefficiency and insufficient infrastructures. Together with already ongoing processes of crises and decline, disasters frequently turn into a "convergent catastrophe" with cumulative tolls and extreme devastating consequences in these cases. For example: Droughts are, as Rebecca Jones states, "a distinct form of slow disaster which meanders for months and years rather than days and weeks". This long duration increases the probability of temporal overlaps with dust storms, fires and heatwaves. Similarly, floods can lead to the spreading of hunger, epidemics and diseases.[28] For Hungary, Anna Ananieva

[25] See e. g. the 1972 Nicaragua earthquake, the 1978 Iran earthquake and for the collapse of the Soviet Union the nuclear catastrophe in Chernobyl in 1986 and the 1988 Armenia earthquake.

[26] *Niklas Luhmann*, Das Problem der Epochenbildung und die Evolutionstheorie, in: Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht / Ursula Link-Heer (Eds.), Epochenschwellen und Epochenstrukturen im Diskurs der Literatur- und Sprachhistorie, Frankfurt / Main 1984, 11–33, here 20.

[27] *Virginia García-Acosta*, Historical Disaster Research, in: Susanna Hoffman / Anthony Oliver-Smith (Eds.), Catastrophe and Culture. The Anthropology of Disaster, Santa Fe / Oxford 2002, 49–66; *Mary Pelling / Kathleen Dill*, Disaster Politics. Tipping Points for Change in the Adaption of Sociopolitical Regimes, in: Progress in Human Geography 34, 2010, 21–37; *Mariya Y. Omelicheva*, Natural Disasters. Triggers of Political Instability?, in: International Interactions 37, 2011, 441–465.

[28] *Cintron*, What Next, 248; *Michael E. Moseley*, Modeling Protracted Drought, Collateral Natural Disaster, and Human Responses in the Andes, in: Hoffman / Oliver-Smith (Eds.), Catastrophe and Culture, 187–212, here 191–192.

and Rolf Haaser explain that the flood disaster of 1838 was followed by "a severe financial and economic crisis" which resulted in the postponement of important infrastructure projects, in the bankruptcy of the "popular, highly traditional German theatre in Pesth", and in a troublesome period for enterprises and businesses. Depending on its specific socioeconomic conditions Hungary experienced neither a ruin nor a splendid ascent after 1838.

Catastrophes may result in minor or major, in temporary or long-lasting social change. The spectrum ranges from insignificant shifts in existing patterns to fundamental breaks with former social practices.[29] Some changes are sudden and spectacular; others proceed more inconspicuously and gradually and hence do not attract greater attention. Besides the coping capability of the social order, the type of catastrophe is crucial for determining its transformative power, since different types of disaster possess unequal heft and impact, politically and emotionally. It is useful to distinguish between swift, particularly salient occurrences on the one hand which like flooding could change the lives of persons and the status of communities in a very short time, and attenuated disasters on the other hand which develop slowly and can be maintained indefinitely. Both kinds of disaster – swift and slow – inflict great loss, but when the loss is slow and does not immediately leap to the eye, its cumulative impact is difficult to comprehend, and the causal agencies are often unrecognized.[30]

In his widely discussed book "Slow Violence", Rob Nixon addresses the creeping catastrophes of modernity and environmental problems that remain outside of our area of attention. He shows how the invisible, destructive impacts of neoliberalism stretch across vast spatial and temporal scales. In an age that venerates the instant and the spectacular, Nixon argues, the pernicious repercussions of slow violence pose formidable imaginative difficulties. Gradual toxic buildup, massing greenhouse gases and desertification, that are low in instant spectacle but high in long-term effects, often lack visceral, page-turning potency and thus do not evoke the necessary political apprehension. Due to the gap between catastrophic acts and their delayed effects, attritional calamities can hardly be turned into stories dramatic enough to arouse public sentiment. However, insidious workings of slow violence are no less real. In long term, they are at least as lethal and costly as sudden disastrous events, and all the more challenging because they have eluded effective policy-making.[31]

By demonstrating that some Australian farmers diversified their production away from cereal into livestock and horticulture Rebecca Jones presents some optimistic evidence that even a slow disaster such as drought can be a catalyst for a long term change by paving the way for new (or renewed) economic and social

[29] *Sørensen/Albris*, The Social Life of Disasters, 74–75.

[30] *Moseley*, Modeling Protracted Drought, 192.

[31] *Rob Nixon*, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, Cambridge 2013. See also *Marla Cone*, Silent Snow. The Slow Poisoning of the Arctic, New York 2005.

practices. Jones makes her point briefly and succinctly by concluding that "the way people have responded to drought reflects the conundrum of drought – slow, uncertain and variable".

Thinking through the concepts of visibility, time and spectacle, Nixon's book indicates that the anatomy of catastrophe is heavily influenced by the way in which the disaster is socially communicated and negotiated in the practice of everyday life. Entirely in this sense, the two following chapters clearly demonstrate that catastrophes must be interpreted in order to be governed or otherwise politicized. It is the explanation of the disaster together with its forward-looking diagnosis of threat that opens the space for processes of re-ordering and thus facilitates social change.[32] Using the example of six farmers, Rebecca Jones shows that from the 1890s to the present "two parallel and conflicting understandings of Australian climates" have been dominating "drought commentary" and beyond that have been even defining whether the farmers adapted or not. If they viewed drought as part of the normal functioning of the ecosystem they often came to the conclusion that the diversification of their agricultural production and new practices of dam building were the best ways of mitigating against the effects of future droughts. Next to the experiences made in former droughts the media coverage textured the action that was taken to cope with conditions of climate and economic instability.

Drought vulnerability is a very illuminating case for the blurring of the always-murky boundaries between human action and natural occurrences. By emphasizing farmers' place-making practices and by illustrating how they embody their environment through the consumption of agricultural products, Rebecca Jones elucidates that the environment is not merely a provider of resources, but part of people's identity and being. Thus, the loss of house, land, assets and personal belongings in a disaster is not only an economic loss, but also a loss of social status and identity.[33] This embeddedness of individuals and communities in their surrounding natural world which humans can never completely control requires new integrative concepts in order to overcome the old established human-nature-dichotomy. Also, it requires to describe that social change results from the emergent development of specific assemblages of humans, nature and artifacts. Their constantly varying, not easily grasped interplay is decisive for the relationship between structure and agency and hence for the state and dynamic of the social order.[34]

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[32] *Ewald Frie/Boris Nieswand*, 'Bedrohte Ordnungen' als Thema der Kulturwissenschaften. 12 Thesen, in: Journal of Modern European History 15, 2017, 5–15, here 9.

[33] *Ann-Margaret Esnard/Alka Sapat*, Displaced by Disaster. Recovery and Resilience in a Globalizing World, New York 2014.

[34] *Manuel De Landa*, A New Philosophy of Society. Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity, London 2006; *Tanya Richardson*, The Politics of Multiplication in a Failed Soviet Irrigation Project, Or, How Sasyk Has Been Kept from the Sea, in: Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology 79, 2014, 1–27; *Martin Schmid*, Bedrohung matters – Nature matters. Kommentar eines Umwelthistorikers, in: Journal of Modern European History 15, 2017, 19–24.

Catastrophes reveal not only a society's adaptive capability, but also uncover its mediascape, its public and its communication strategies. Using the example of the flooding which hit Budapest in 1838 Anna Ananieva and Rolf Haaser outline how the catastrophic torrent of water prompted rousing text streams.[35] These located local scenes of the urban disaster in the transnational community of the "elegant world" that had emerged within European elites since the late eighteenth century. The contemporary concept of elegance primarily understood as a mode of performance encouraged beneficiary activities like donation campaigns and fund-raising events and verified an ordinarily unmet yearning for community, purposefulness, and meaningful work that the disaster relief efforts provided. As Ananieva and Haaser conclude, recovery aid characterized by the humanitarian ethos of 'doing good' and fueled mostly by cosmopolitical patriotism constituted new experiences of enhanced solidarity, morality and identity. The attention-grabbing expressions of altruism, resourcefulness and generosity that arose amid grief and disruption helped to prevent that issues of causality and responsibility as well as blaming strategies could come to the fore.

In 1838 appeals for donations and the subsequent charitable social practices "were the first to take place on such a large scale" by successfully entangling the local setting with national traditions and transnational culture, as Anna Ananieva and Rolf Haaser note. The concept "sympathy from a distance" established a pattern that today still determines the aftermath of the catastrophe with all its contradictions emerging from the moral pull of charity and the emotional rewards of volunteer labor on the one hand and the opportunities for self-promotion and money-making which the "market of sorrow" produces over and over again on the other hand.[36] With their mapping of the imaginary community of the 'elegant world' in the flows of disaster communication, Anna Ananieva and Rolf Haaser show how catastrophes leave traces in the social order and identity. Their article proves that community is not a static entity, but its development results from processes of social self-fashioning and shift of borders occasionally influenced by the mastery of catastrophes as an intensifier of social change.[37]

Both chapters in this book section make the social and political life of catastrophes a subject of discussion by focusing on adaptive and communication strategies taken in order to approach and remedy disasters. The two well-researched contributions show that whereas some historical actors saw just loss and destruc-

[35] See also their article Wasserströme und Textfluten. Die Überschwemmungskatastrophen 1824 in St. Petersburg und 1838 in Ofen und Pesth als Medienereignisse in der deutschsprachigen Prager Presse, in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 62, 2014, 180–214.

[36] See e. g. *Solnit*, A Paradise Built in Hell; *Vincanne Adams*, Markets of Sorrow, Labors of Faith. New Orleans in the Wake of Katrina, Durham 2013*; Michele R. Gamburd*, The Golden Wave. Culture and Politics after Sri Lanka's Tsunami Disaster, Bloomington 2014.

[37] See also *Susann Ullberg,* Watermarks. Urban Flooding and Memoryscape in Argentina, Stockholm 2013; *Uwe Lübken,* Die Natur der Gefahr. Überschwemmungen am Ohio River im neunzehnten und zwanzigsten Jahrhundert, Göttingen 2014.

tion, others recognized the unique chances of recovery and insistently attempt to use the process of re-ordering for their interests and visions. Therefore, catastrophes are often understood as the "salt of modernization"[38] and as "transformative agents in the longer term".[39] But Rebecca Jones as well as Anna Ananieva and Rolf Haaser emphasize that forces of continuity which arise from the inertia of social orders should not be neglected. With their differences in time and space and their focus on drought and flood as interesting forms of slow and swift disasters, the two chapters instructively highlight some important facets of the wide field of social change in the wake of catastrophes and elaborate causalities. The understanding of the disaster, the economic flexibility and the social capital obviously play critical roles for the ability of individuals and communities to withstand cataclysmic occurrences and to renew the infrastructure, the ties and the meanings that are at the foundation of any social order. It is the merit of this book section to underline that through the prism of catastrophe, the dynamics of social change can be insightfully explored in order to provide urgently needed orientation not only in the past, but also in the present and future.

[38] *Christian Pfister*, Am Tag danach. Zur Bewältigung von Naturkatastrophen in der Schweiz, 1500–2000, Bern 2002, 16.

[39] *Bankoff*, Comparing Vulnerabilities, 110.

Coping with Floods

The Imaginary Community of the "Elegant World" and the Hungarian Flood Disaster of 1838

Anna Ananieva and Rolf Haaser

Introduction: Catastrophes and Social Dynamics

The economic, social, and political development of Habsburgian Hungary in the period between 1830 and 1848 can be referred to as a history of catastrophes and crises.[1] The first station on this path of passion and suffering is marked by the cholera epidemic of 1830–1831. This pandemic disease forced numerous industries to temporarily suspend production due to the danger of contagion. Various areas throughout the Habsburg Empire were temporarily quarantined depending on where the current outbreaks were located. The quarantines brought with them substantial restrictions on traffic and trade. Deliveries of goods ceased or were confiscated. During the stagnation of commerce in Hungary many businesses were driven nearly to the point of bankruptcy. At the same time there were also cholera uprisings in the cities and countryside which were suppressed by military intervention. The economy of Hungary had scarcely recovered from the epidemic and the measures to restrain it when a new blow struck the land: the catastrophic Danube flood of 1838 which will be dealt with as the main subject of this paper.

Subsequently, in 1841, a severe financial and economic crisis affected Hungarian banks and businesses[2] – particularly projects that were connected with reconstruction and economic development in the region of Ofen (Buda), Altofen (Óbuda) and Pesth (Pest) after the flood. This financial collapse was harmful and even damaging to infrastructure projects funded by loans or investments based upon stocks and shares. Substantial setbacks and delays affected the development of the railroad, for example, or the construction of the Chain Bridge between Ofen and Pesth. Some aspiring Pesth enterprises, in particular an important, modern sugar factory, went bankrupt. Insolvency also struck the popular, highly

[1] Cf. the analysis of the economic development of Hungary in *Amelie Lanier*, Das Kreditwesen Ungarns im Vormärz, Frankfurt / Main 1995.

[2] For the financial crisis cf. *Szabolcs Somorjai*, Credit Crises in Hungary Before The Age of Banks?, in: Working Papers in Crisis History 3, 2014, http://valsagtortenet.elte.hu/upload/new_folder/WP_3.pdf (01 July 2015).

traditional German theatre in Pesth, which did not manage to recover financially from the losses originally caused by the 1838 flood. After three years of hard striving, its director was eventually unable to prevent financial ruin.[3]

Moreover, in 1846 and 1847, long rainy periods led to harvest failures and famines on a scale never before experienced in Hungary. Thousands fled to the cities in hopes of escaping starvation. In Pesth particularly the demographics underwent a shift, with the Magyar population increasing significantly.[4] The German-speaking inhabitants, making up the majority of the urban population, began to see that their cultural dominance up until that time started to become increasingly challenged.[5] The rather cosmopolitan and supra-national approach of the German-speaking press was oppressed and largely subdued by the strengthening process of Magyarization (Hungarization), destabilizing the complex and fragile balance of the ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity of pre-1848 Hungary.[6]

A new financial crisis made itself felt in the Austrian crown land. Following the harvest failures, bills of exchange or promissory notes on the expected crop income became invalid. In 1847 the Austrian bankers and merchants demanded their Hungarian business partners to pay back their debts and refused to offer them any further credit.

The political uprising of 1848 in Hungary was struck with revolutionary violence and finally even obtained features of a civil war.[7] It does not seem unreasonable to claim that the outlined history of crises and catastrophes contributed significantly to this crucial development.

As already mentioned, our paper focuses on just one of these particular catastrophes: the Danube flood in March 1838, a disaster which destroyed a large part of the prosperous merchant city of Pesth, the suburbs of the residence of the

[3] *Wolfgang Binal,* Deutschsprachiges Theater in Budapest, Wien 1972.

[4] *Tamás Faragó*, Die Budapester Bevölkerungsentwicklung und die Zuwanderung 1840 bis 1941, in: Gerhard Melinz / Susan Zimmermann (Eds.), Wien – Prag – Budapest. Blütezeit der Habsburgermetropolen. Urbanisierung, Kommunalpolitik, gesellschaftliche Konflikte (1867–1918), Wien 1996, 58–72.

[5] For examples of aggression against the German speaking population cf. *Robert Nemes,* The Once and Future Budapest, DeKalb 2005, 124–125.

[6] For the cultural topography of the city-triangle Buda, Óbuda and Pest in Habsburg Hungary cf. Julia Richers, Jüdisches Budapest. Kulturelle Topographien einer Stadtgemeinde im 19. Jahrhundert, Köln / Weimar / Wien 2009.

[7] *Jiří Kořalka*, Revolutionen in der Habsburgermonarchie, in: Hubert Lengauer / Primus Heinz Kucher (Eds.), Bewegung im Reich der Immobilität. Revolutionen in der Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1849. Literarisch-publizistische Auseinandersetzungen, Wien / Köln / Weimar 2001, 34–66; *Harm-Hinrich Brandt*, Ungarn 1848 im europäischen Kontext. Reform – Revolution – Rebellion. Ein Koreferat, in: Karlheinz Mack (Ed.), Revolutionen in Ostmitteleuropa 1789–1989. Schwerpunkt Ungarn. Wien / Köln / Graz 1989; *István Deák,* The Lawful Revolution. Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians 1848–1849, New York 1979.

Hungarian Palatine in Ofen, and the neighboring royal market town Altofen.[8] It was one of the most significant inundations of urban space in the first half of the nineteenth century.

The flooding of large cities during the early industrial age is typically only mentioned as a side note in studies of urban history. Such studies focus primarily on historical hydrology, vulnerability, and resilience[9] but rarely consider the floods in their cultural and historical context. However, we would argue that it is worthwhile to investigate individual 'natural disasters'[10] and their effects on urban areas precisely because they can offer insight into cultural processes and social changes.

The paper examines the question of how the handling of catastrophic natural phenomena in the first half of the nineteenth century influenced the self-fashioning of an imagined community of urban elites in Europe.[11] By focusing on the perception of the Hungarian flood catastrophe of 1838 in the European German-speaking press, the reactions of a more general public is taken into consideration.[12] Here the study applies the model of "dispersed public" which has

[8] From the extensive literature on the 1838 Danube flood the following publications may be pointed out: *Imre Kaján* (Ed.), Jégszakadás és Duna' kiáradása. Pest-Buda 1838. (Budapesti Történeti Múzeum, 1988. március 11 – 1988. október 30.: Kiállítási katalógus), [Ice-jam and Danube Flood: Pest-Buda 1838. Budapest Historical Museum March 11 1988–October 30 1988: exhibition catalog], Budapest 1988; *Tamás Faragó* (Ed.), Pest-budai árvíz 1838. Fejezetek Budapest múltjából (The Inundation of Pest-Buda in 1838. Chapters From the Past of Budapest 5), Budapest 1988; *Imre Kaján* (Ed.), Dokumentumok az 1838-as pest-budai árvíz történetéből. Pest-Buda 1838, (Documents on the History of the Pest-Buda Flood in 1838). Budapest 1988.

[9] On the definition of these central terms for historic disaster research cf. *Gerrit Jasper Schenk* (Ed.), Katastrophen. Vom Untergang Pompejis bis zum Klimawandel. Ostfildern 2009, 260 (historic hydrology), 261 (resilience), 262 (vulnerability).

[10] Cf. *Anthony Oliver-Smith*, Theorizing Disasters. Nature, Power, and Culture, in: Susanna M. Hoffman / Id. (Eds.), Catastrophe & Culture. The Anthropology of Disaster, Santa Fe 2002, 23–48.

[11] In recent years communication and media studies have devoted increasing attention to aspects of the public sphere beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Cf. *Michael Brüggemann et al.* Transnationale Öffentlichkeit in Europa. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven, in: Publizistik 54, 2009, 391–414. – Our recently published study about two city floods in the first half of the nineteenth century demonstrates that these flood disasters were constructed as media events within transnational communication: *Anna Ananieva / Rolf Haaser,* Wasserströme und Textfluten. Die Überschwemmungskatastrophen 1824 in St. Petersburg und 1838 in Ofen und Pesth als Medienereignisse in der deutschsprachigen Prager Presse, in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 62, 2014, 180–214. – Besides the royal seats of the Russian Empire and the Habsburgian Kingdom of Hungary, the study includes Prague as a third capital into its realm of observation. In the case of the Bohemian residence, the study does not explore yet another flooding, as an additional, third event of catastrophe, but focuses on the perception of these two geographically distant flood catastrophes in the Prague press and the reactions in the general public.

[12] This study is based on the qualitative evaluation and empirical analysis of the 1838 issues of the *Prager Zeitung* and the entertainment magazine *Bohemia*, which was loosely connected with it. In order to establish a reference point for the Prague newspaper articles and notices, we have also scrutinized the *Vereinigte Ofner-Pesther Zeitung*, the *Der Spiegel für Kunst, Eleganz und Mode*, the *Preßburger Zeitung*, the *Wiener Zeitung*, the *Österreichischer Beobachter*, the *Der*

become common in the past years within communication and media studies.[13] The method of analysis has definite similarities with recent approaches in anthropology and the sociology of culture that look at social dynamics connected with globalization, migration, and mobility. Twentieth and twenty-first century mass media have made clear the effectiveness of collective imaginings, conceptualized variously as "ethnoscapes" or "social imaginaries." The circulation of media and cultural practices played an equally substantial role in the creation of these imagined communities in the nineteenth century.[14]

The political daily press as well as cultural, conversational, and entertainment magazines not only reported about catastrophes, they also had the potential to bring about social integration and generate empathy and altruism. By looking at donation campaigns and fund-raisers, the study focuses on cultural practices of charity which are practical actions caused by a current catastrophe. As such, they mark the contribution of non-governing but elitist social classes in public events.

The Ice-Jam and Danube Flooding in Ofen, Altofen, and Pesth

In 1838, Budapest, located on the mid-Danube, was still separated into three neighboring cities, Ofen, Altofen, and Pesth. A pontoon bridge connected the opposite banks of the river; it was removed during winter season because of the danger of drifting ice. The Danube profoundly influenced the characteristics of the landscape and the development of the city triangle. The flat left bank of the

Adler, the *Allgemeine Theaterzeitung*, the *Zeitung für die elegante Welt*, and the [Augsburger] *Allgemeine Zeitung*. – By focusing on the German-speaking axis of communication between the cities Pesth (Buda-Pest) and Prague the study pursues the major objectives of the research project "Circulation of News and Goods. The Transfer of Modern Urban Forms of Living in the German Speaking Cultural Press in Bohemia and Hungary, 1815–1848" at the Tübingen University funded by the Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media upon a Decision of the German Bundestag in 2013–2015.

[13] Cf. *Jürgen Fohrmann/Arno Orzessek* (Eds.), Zerstreute Öffentlichkeiten. Zur Programmierung des Gemeinsinns, München 2002.

[14] In the context of the nineteenth century, historical forms of media contributed to the formation of a transnational public sphere. Analogies to this can be found today – as described in a recent introduction to the topic of "migration, globalization and transnationalization" – in the circulation of "quotations from daily newspapers, excerpts of news reports from other countries, transnational appearances by journalists, transnational blogs, etc." *Andreas Langenohl*, Einführung, in: Id./Ralph Poole/Manfred Weinberger (Eds.), Transkulturalität. Klassische Texte, Bielefeld 2015, 107. – Specifically on the topic of the formation of both national and transnational communities in the context of dealing with catastrophes, see *Günter Pfister*, Von Goldau nach Gondo. Naturkatastrophen als identitätsstiftende Ereignisse in der Schweiz des 19. Jahrhunderts, in: Günter Pfister/Stephanie Summermatter (Eds.), Katastrophen und ihre Bewältigung. Perspektiven und Positionen, Bern et al. 2004; *René John*, Die Modernität der Gemeinschaft. Soziologische Beobachtungen zur Oderflut 1997, Bielefeld 2008. This sociological study looks at community features which were articulated in response to the flooding of the Oder in the summer of 1997 in large areas of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Germany.

Danube, the Pesth side, consisted in part of sandy ground that was once part of the river bed.[15] Some five meters above the flatland was a raised late diluvial terrace on which the original city of Pesth was built; it offered a rather limited amount of natural protection from the annual spring floods. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the city grew rapidly and expanded into the surrounding flatland. Protection from floods depended more and more on the construction of new dams.

In contrast, the right bank of the Danube, the Ofen and Altofen side, was hillier. Gellért Hill and Castle Hill were remnants of another late diluvial terrace that rose some 80 meters above the valley floor. The city of Ofen consisted of a narrow shoreline, which was highly flood-prone, and the city center with the residence of the Palatine, located in the elevated hill region.[16] The three cities were not only different geologically and geographically, but demographically as well. Ofen was the administrative and military center of the Habsburg Kingdom of Hungary, whereas Altofen, situated on the low river bank, possessed an important harbor with docks and a production site for steamboats. The smallest of the three sister cities housed a large Jewish community.[17] Pesth, on the other hand, developed into a trade and merchant center, and its population grew particularly rapidly.

From Margaret Island, located between Ofen and Pesth, to the point where Gellért Hill[18] dropped steeply down to the shore, the river bed of the Danube became gradually narrower, reaching a width of only 300 meters. Further downstream the river widened again to three times this width, becoming significantly shallower at the same time. Here, where the flow of the water was slower, sandbanks formed. The profile of the river created a substantial flood risk along the shoreline of both cities. Records indicate 23 floods in the course of the eighteenth century alone.[19] Seven times the high water levels resulted from melting ice in the spring: sheets of ice freed themselves and floated downstream until they encountered hindrances such as narrowings of the river, sandbanks, or islands. Here they transformed into water barriers. Such an ice jam formed in March

[15] Häufler described the geographical qualities of the area around Pesth as follows: "Das Pester Gebiet trägt den Charakter eines urweltlichen Seebodens an sich. Die Sohle bildet ein versteinerungsreicher tertiärer Grobkalk, der mit einem derselben Periode angehörigen Lehme abwechselt; beides wird vom Alluvial-Sande bedeckt." ("The Pest region has the character of a primeval sea floor. The [valley] floor is made of stony deposits of coarse tertiary limestone mixed with clay from the same period; both are covered with alluvial sand.") – *Joseph Vincenz Häufler*, Buda-Pest. Historisch-topographische Skizzen. Vol. 3, Pest 1854, 8.

[16] *Zoltán Kovács/Tamás Egedy*, Budapest. 'Königin der Donau', in: Harald Hitz/Helmut Wohlschlägl (Eds.), Das östliche Österreich und benachbarte Regionen: ein geographischer Exkursionsführer, Wien 2009, 573–601.

[17] Cf. *Richers*, Jüdisches Budapest, 119–130.

[18] Gellért-hegy/Blocksberg.

[19] *Peter Csendes/Andras Sipos* (Eds.), Budapest und Wien. Technischer Fortschritt und urbaner Aufschwung im 19. Jahrhundert, Wien 2003, 80.

1838 at the narrows near Gellért Hill, causing the largest recorded flood in the Ofen-Pesth urban area.[20]

Way before the flood, the winter of 1837–1838 had already been noted as one of the hardest and most menacing in recent decades. To start with, the daily news and feature articles in the German-language press devoted a remarkable amount of attention to large fires. Three fires in particular dominated the reports: the fire in the Winter Palace in Saint Petersburg, the Stock Exchange in London, and the Théâtre-Italien in Paris. At the same time, the papers also reported on the dangers of the extremely low temperatures and exceptionally heavy snowfall. Mainly, the newspapers discussed the problems caused by frozen rivers impeding inland ship traffic, the presence of hungry wolves in the vicinity of inhabited areas, and discoveries of people who had frozen to death.[21]

In the region of Ofen, Altofen, and Pesth the Danube had frozen solid in various places, including the area around Csepel Island. With the onset of warming temperatures and rainfall in the spring, the heavy ice sheet began to melt, but only very slowly. The waters of the Danube, carrying ice flows from upstream, began to back up behind this barrier. By March 6 1838, Margaret Island had disappeared entirely beneath the waters.[22] On March 13, the water level of the Danube reached the highest point in history. Around 9 p.m., the dam at Theatre Place[23] burst, flooding large parts of the city. The flood waters did not begin to subside until March 16, when for the first time it became possible to assess the extent of the devastation.

Although Prague, as Bohemia in general, was not affected by the flooding, the editors and publishers of Prague newspapers and magazines felt it necessary to depict the current landscape of flood disaster. A geographically wide-scattered net of correspondents, which was used for the news coverage of the German-speaking newspapers, made it possible for a broad readership to really internalize the threat through regular reading of the news and to create a mental

[20] On the hydrological characteristics of floods and their socio-economic consequences, see *Arni Snorasson* (Ed.), The Extremes of the Extremes. Extraordinary Floods. Wallingford 2002; *Dénes Lóczy,* The Danube. Morphology, Evolution, and Environmental Issues, in: Avijit Grupta (Ed.), Large Rivers. Geomorphology and Management, Wiley 2008, 235–260. On the environmental history of Hungary see *Lajos Rácz*, Magyarország környezettörténete az újkorig. [Modern Hungarian Environmental History], Budapest 2008; *Andrea Kiss*, A brief overview on the roots and current status of environmental history in Hungary, in: Environment and History 19, 2013, 391–394.

[21] On the extreme winter in central Europe, see the assessment Der Winter 1837/38, in: *Moravia*, an entertainment magazine started in Brünn in 1838 and modeled on the Prague-based *Bohemia*: Moravia, Nr. 11. (April 5, 1838), 44. – On January 25, the *Prager Zeitung* included a feature article reprinted from the *Brünner Zeitung* about the killing of a wolf that had crossed over the Carpathians from Hungary into Moravia. A snow slide that buried two people in Ofen was reported in the *Prager Zeitung* on February 1, 1838.

[22] Cf. *Häufler*, Buda-Pest, 44.

[23] Theátrom piatcza / Theater Platz, known today as Vörösmarty tér.

map of an imaginary community shaped by the current catastrophe. Entertainment journalism had a considerable stake in the emergence of this mental map during the threat communication and was able to provide a set of coping strategies. (Ill. 1)

Figure 1: Count István Forray "Rescue scene", watercolor, 19th century. Budapesti Történeti Múzeum [Historisches Museum Budapest]. Némethy Károly (Ed.), A Pest-Budai árvíz 1838-ban, [The Inundation of Pest-Buda in 1838], Budapest 1938, ill. 3.

Coping Strategies: Media and Practices of the "Elegant World"

The *Prager Zeitung* presented the first reference to the flood of the Hungarian Danube on March 18, 1838. The major Bohemian political newspaper reprinted an article from the *Vereinigte Ofner-Pesther Zeitung* dated March 9, describing the evacuation of houses in the immediate vicinity of the river in Ofen and the royal market town of Altofen. The article ended on an optimistic note, reporting that the ice sheet had moved a significant distance downstream and that the water level of the Danube had begun to sink again.[24] The next edition of the paper, however, had to admit that these hopes had been dashed: The water level had

[24] Prager Zeitung 44 (18 March 1838), front page (reprinted from "Vereinigte Ofner-Pesther Zeitung").

risen again and several districts of Ofen, Altofen, and Pest were already under water. The municipality of Gran, a larger provincial city located further upriver, had already suffered from major flooding. Six hundred houses were reported to have been destroyed: the result of both the Danube flooding and a putative earthquake connected to it.[25] The same edition of the paper included a more recent and detailed report from Vienna, which included a hydrographic explanation for the way that this particular natural disaster had developed. It also presented a provisional overview of the building damages. The city of Pesth had been mostly destroyed and would require many years to recover from this terrible piece of misfortune, the article reported. The number of known deaths in Pesth at the time was given as 150.[26] All residents who had been spared or who could afford to contribute funds were asked to offer their collective aid. One could read that His Majesty the Archduke Stephan had hurried forth at once, "disregarding the danger" across the "raging river" to the other shore "in order to console the beleaguered residents with his presence and inspire the rescue and aid organizations with new energy."[27] The article ended with a call for solidarity among the residents of the Habsburg Empire, asking them to heal and relieve the "misfortune of their brothers in distress" in one of the "most blossoming cities of Hungary."[28] The subsequent edition of the *Prager Zeitung* opened with an official call for donations by the Bohemian national government and repeated vivid descriptions of the disaster from journals in Vienna and Pesth.[29]

In the March 25 edition, the reader found information for the first time about emergency financial aid provided by the governments in Vienna and Ofen. In addition, it reported that the emperor himself was coordinating the disaster management activities. The newspaper reprinted in full the imperial order to begin collecting relief funds immediately in all parts of the monarchy.[30] After March

[25] Prager Zeitung 46 (22 March 1838), front page (reprinted from "Vereinigte Ofner-Pesther Zeitung").

[26] The number of fatalities, listed even in the standard modern publications as 151, should be viewed critically, for the flood as a cause of death can be defined in various ways. A number of deaths that occurred long after the flood due to collapsing buildings were easily omitted from the official statistics. In addition, they do not include the deaths in Ofen and Altofen, much less the surrounding villages. Furthermore, due to a trade fair planned for March 19, which was commonly visited by some 20,000 merchants, there were countless non-residents in the city and its surroundings. These fatalities are unlikely to have been considered in reports, particularly if the bodies were washed downstream by the Danube.

[27] "[…] die Gefahr nicht scheuend, über den reißenden Strom an das jenseitige Ufer [geeilt], um den bedrängten Bewohnern der Nachbarstadt durch Ihre Erscheinung Trost zu bringen und die Rettungs- und Hilfeleistungsanstalten zu beleben.", in: Prager Zeitung 46 (22 March 1838), front page (reprinted from *Oesterreichischer Beobachter*).

[28] "[…] das Mißgeschick der nothleidenden Brüder [in einer der] durch Handel und Industrie blühendsten Städte Ungarns [heilen und lindern zu helfen]" op.cit.

[29] Prager Zeitung 47 (23 March 1838), front page.

[30] Prager Zeitung 48 (25 March 1838), front page.

Bohemia,

ein

Unterhaltungsblatt.

Den 23. März Nro. 35. 1838.

Aufforderung.

Der letzte Eisgang der Donau hat in Ungarn und namentlich in Ofen, Pesth und Gran schreckliche Verheerungen verursacht. Die Uiberschwemmung hat den höchsten bisher bekannten Wasserstand weit überschritten, und ist an die Stellen hingedrungen, die noch nie von der austretenden Fluth erreicht worden waren. Das Unglück ist unermeßlich groß, viele Menschen haben dabei ihr Leben verloren, zahlreiche Waisen jammern um ihre ihnen entrissenen Eltern. Viele Familien sind ihres Eigenthums beraubt, oder verhindert, ihren bisherigen Erwerb fortzusetzen, und irren trostlos ohne Obdach umher. Seine Majestät unser allergnädigster Kaiser haben auf die erste Nachricht von den schweren Unglücksfällen, welche die Stadt Pesth durch die Uiberschwemmung betroffen, die Summe von Zwanzigtausend Gulden Conv. Münze zur augenblicklichen Aushilfe für die Nothleidendsten aus Allerhöchst Ihrer Privatkasse anzuweisen geruhet.

In der sicheren Uiberzeugung, daß der bei einer jeden Gelegenheit, wo es sich um Rettung seines Nächsten handelte, bewährte Wohlthätigkeitssinn der edlen Bewohner Böhmens sich auch aus diesem Anlasse beeifern werde, den verunglückten Bewohnern Ungarns bei diesem so außerordentlichen grenzenlosen Elend für unzählige Menschen herbeiführenden Unglück um so mehr beizustehen, als die gütige Vorsehung die Einwohner der Hauptstadt und der Provinz in diesem Jahre vor einem solchen Unglücke gnädigst verschont hat, werden die zahlreichen Menschenfreunde dieser Provinz aufgefordert, ihre milden Beiträge hier in Prag an die k. k. Stadthauptmannschaft gegen Empfangsbestätigung und auf dem Lande an die Kreiskassen gegen Quittung übergeben zu wollen. Das k. k. böhmische Landespräsidium wird die einzelnen Geber durch den Druck bekannt machen lassen, und die eingegangenen Gelder zur zweckmäßigsten Verwendung leiten.

Vom k. k. böhmischen Landespräsidium.

Tizian's Tochter.

Nach dem Englischen des R. Shelton Mackenzie (New-York Mirror.)

»Du bewunderst dies Gemälde?« fragte der große Tiziano Vecelli seinen Zögling seinen Liebling Antonio Leira.

»»Ja in tiefster Seele. Doch wessen Portrait ist es? wann wurde es gemalt? und wo war es bis jetzt?««

»Und Du fragst nicht, wer es malte? Hast Du so gar wenig Neugierde?«

»»Wer wollte diese Frage thun! Es ist nur einer, der so malen kann: nur ein Pinsel kann die kühnste und doch correkteste Zeichnung in einem solchen Farbenschmelze verklären. Signor Maestro, willst Du in Deinen Gemälden unerkannt bleiben, so mußt Du sie umgekehrt an die Wand hängen.««

»Auch Du willst mir schmeicheln, Antonio? Doch ich glaube an die Wahrheit Deiner Empfindungen. Was dies Portrait betrifft —«

»»O Signor, wessen ist es?««

»Weil Du so begierig bist, es zu erfahren, und weil Du Deinem Lehrer so oft schlimme Streiche spielst, will ich Dir es nicht sagen. Blicke, so ernsthaft Du willst, jetzt sage ich Dir es nicht. Rufe meine Gondolieri: der Tag ist lieblich, sie sollen mich zum Lido hinüber rudern. Addio, Addio!«

Der große Maler flog über die Laguna, und lächelte wie einer, dem ein lange gewünschtes glückliches Ereigniß nun in sicherster Nähe steht. Wie er so behaglich ausgestreckt auf dem Ruhebette der Gondel sich schaukelte, spielten die freundlichsten Gedanken um seine Seele, und mit zufriedenem Lächeln murmelte er: »Er ist ein wackerer Junge, und hegt eine glühende Liebe für die Kunst; er ist fleißig, edlen Gemüthes und hat das treueste wärmste Herz. Meine zarte Taube Beatrice findet an seiner Brust den sichersten Schutz. Wie starrte er ihr Bildniß an! Seine ganze Seele wohnte in den Augen. Bewundert er das Urbild nur halb so sehr, so muß er bald in innerer Gluth entbrennen. Der wackere Junge!«

Mittlerweile betrachtete sein Schüler das Bildniß mehr im Einzelnen als zuvor. Er bewunderte es nicht nur als

Figure 2: "Bohemia. Ein Unterhaltungsblatt" 23th March 1838: Official call for donations by the national government. Austrian National Library Vienna (Austrian Newspapers Online – ANNO).

27, even minor cultural news items became front page headlines if they involved charity events for the victims of the flood.[31]

Readers of the Prague cultural magazine *Bohemia*[32] were confronted with the news of the flooding for the first time on March 23, 1838; here, too, on the occasion of the official call for donations by the national government.[33] (Ill. 2) It briefly described the hardships suffered by the residents of Pesth, Ofen, and Gran, and pointed out the example set by the Emperor, who had donated twenty thousand guilders from his private funds in order to ease their suffering.[34] This narrative was followed by the actual call for donations.[35]

The appeal printed in *Bohemia* and the *Prager Zeitung* did not remain unheard. On March 27, the pyrotechnician Paul Schwarzenberg, known as the "Russian Fire King," announced a charity performance in the "Konviktsaal"[36] that evening. On the same day, the royal municipal government and head of the police department issued, in the name of the "local theatre management", an invitation to a performance of the opera "Der Zweikampf" by Ferdinand Hérold and Karl August Ludwig von Lichtenstein on March 31. The invitation included an urgent plea to the public "to support this undertaking not just by grasping the theatre boxes and by buying tickets, but also by offering optional small contributions as a sign of sympathy and concern."[37] Issue no. 38 of *Bohemia* on March 30 likewise promoted a largely charitable lottery being held in Vienna to benefit the victims of the flood. In the same issue, the menagerie owner Karl Thiry, a Hungarian, announced that on April 2 the entrance fees for visiting his establishment would be donated to "ease the misfortune that had

[31] Prager Zeitung 49 (27 March 1838), front page.

[32] Bohemia, created in 1828 as an entertainment supplement to the *Prager Zeitung*, appeared independently starting in 1832 under the title *Bohemia, ein Unterhaltungsblatt*. The magazine, which in 1838 was published three times a week, was edited by the brothers Ludwig, Andreas, Gottlieb, and Rudolph Haase. In addition to literary texts and essays on various topics, the magazine included reports on theatre productions and concerts, announcements on Prague sociable events, national and international correspondences, and, particularly during the summer season, sociable news from the Bohemian health resorts. On the history of the magazine especially after 1848 see *Petronilla Ehrenpreis*, Die deutschsprachige Reichspresse Böhmens und Ungarns, in: Helmut Rumpler / Peter Urbanitsch (Eds.), Die Presse als Faktor der politischen Mobilisierung (Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918), Wien 2006, 1791–1808.

[33] "Aufforderung", in: Bohemia 35 (23 March 1838).

[34] In general, *Bohemia* avoided explicit descriptions of the disaster and its aftermath. It seems that the editors deliberately left this for the political daily papers to cover. Instead, the magazine devoted its attention to the numerous charity events for the victims, in particular when they took place in Prague.

[35] Bohemia 35 (23 March 1838).

[36] Bohemia 37 (27 March 1838). – The "Konviktsaal" was a former refectory of the Jesuit convent in the historic town center of Prague. It was converted into a hall where various events were held.

[37] "[…] diesem Unternehmen nicht allein durch die Abnahme der Logen und Eintrittskarten, sondern auch durch beliebige milde Beiträge wohlwollende Theilnahme schenken zu wollen". Bohemia 37 (27 March 1838).

hit his countrymen so severely."[38] On April 3, *Bohemia* circulated a report from Vienna: the editor of the *Wiener Zeitschrift*, Friedrich Witthauer, had announced the publication of an elegantly bound charity album to benefit those who had suffered flood damage.[39] On April 8, the Austrian painter Johann Michael Sattler made it known that he had put his panorama of Salzburg (which had been on tour in Europe for several years) on display in Frankfurt am Main and dedicated its opening on April 2 "to the victims of the water emergency in Hungary."[40] In the same issue, the magazine announced that the band of Palombini's infantry regiment would hold a music academy on Easter Monday on the Dyers' Island in Prague, a Moldau island and one of the most frequented leisure areas of the city. This event, too, would benefit the flood victims.[41] The theatre news discussed a performance of a musical-dramatic quodlibet on April 7. The reviewer noted that "although the collection initiated by monarchic authority was still in progress, and had already reached a sum of 21,327 guilders[42] […] all the seats and boxes of the house were filled with audience". In addition, beyond the price of the tickets, the "well-known generosity" of Prague residents had been once more demonstrated.[43] The program of the evening was intended for a mixed audience; selections from operas were sung in German as well as Czech and Italian. Furthermore, a dramatic quodlibet, organized by an amateur society and performed on April 22, 1838 at the "Kren'sche Anlagen", a green area with a theatre location mostly visited by the Prague Jewish population[44], brought in donations amounting to 19 guilders and 30 kreuzer.[45]

[38] "[…] Linderung des Unglücks, das seine Landsleute so hart getroffen". Bohemia 38 (30 March 1838).

[39] Bohemia 40 (3 April 1838).

[40] "[…] zum Besten der bei der Wassernoth in Ungarn Verunglückten", Bohemia 42 (8 April 1838). – Issue No. 45 on April 14 includes the addendum that the proceeds of 254 fl. 58 kr. Rh. had been given by Prof. Sattler to the Austrian embassy in Frankfurt/Main. – The Sattler Panorama, which today is located in the Panorama Museum in the Neue Residenz in Salzburg, shows the city and the surrounding region as seen from Festung Hohensalzburg. The cyclorama, almost 5 m high and 25 m wide, was created by the landscape painter Johann Michael Sattler from 1825 to 1829. Cf. http://www.salzburgmuseum.at/199.html (06 January 2014).

[41] Bohemia 42 (8 April 1838).

[42] fl. C. M. = Gulden Conventions-Münze (guilders conventional coin).

[43] "[…] wiewohl die hohen Orts eingeleitete und noch nicht geschlossene Sammlung bereits die Summe von 21,327 fl. C. M. ausweist, […] am 7. das Haus dennoch in allen seinen Räumen besetzt". Bohemia 43 (10 April 1838). – In issue No. 47 on April 20, the author of the theatre review from April 18 uses the occasion of the birthday of the emperor to provide an update on the status of the charity drive in Bohemia: "Die noch nicht geschlossene Sammlung für die verunglückten Bewohner Pesth's hat bis zum 19. April, als dem Geburtstage Seiner Majestät, die Summe von 29,160 fl. C. M. und vier Dukaten in Gold ausgewiesen." ("The still ongoing collection for the suffering residents of Pests had reached a sum of 29,160 fl. C. M. and four ducats in gold by the birthday of His Majesty on April 19.").

[44] Near the Neutor in Prague.

[45] Bohemia 50 (27 April 1838).



Erstes Verzeichniß
über die in Prag eingegangenen Beiträge, welche nachstehende Menschenfreunde zur Unterstützung der durch Ueberschwemmung der Donau verunglückten Bewohner mehrerer Ortschaften in Ungarn gewidmet haben:

Geldbetrag in Conv. Münze.

Se. Excellenz der Herr Oberstburggraf Graf von Chotek 150 fl. — Ihre Excellenz die Frau Oberstburggräfin Gräfin Chotek 100 fl. — Aus dem Hause Sr. Durchlaucht des Herrn Fürsten Rohan 400 fl. — N. N. 100 fl. — Se. Durchlaucht der Herr F. M. L. Fürst v. Windischgrätz 400 fl. — N. N. 400 fl. — N. N. 200 fl. — N. N. 50 fl. — Se. Excellenz der Herr Graf Joseph Nostitz 100 fl. — Se. Durchlaucht der Herr Fürst Oettingen-Wallerstein 100 fl. — Ihre Durchlaucht die Frau Fürstin v. Oettingen-Wallerstein 40 fl. — N. N. 100 fl. — N. N. 40 fl. — Se. Excellenz der Herr Prokop Graf Hartmann, Oberstl. Kämmerer 50 fl. — N. N. 100 fl. — N. N. 50 fl. — Ihre Excellenz die Frau Gräfin Wratislaw 50 fl. — N. N. 100 fl. — N. N. 50 fl. — N. N. 100 fl. — Hr. Graf Buquoy 100 fl. — N. N. 100 fl. — N. N. 50 fl. — Hr. Freiherr v. Senftenberg 100 fl. — N. N. 50 fl. — Herr Karl Freiherr v. Puteani 10 fl. — Herr August Kursa, Fischhändler 5 fl. — Herr Kaufmann Ratzenbeck 5 fl. — Herr Niklas Römisch, Hausbesitzer 15 fl. — Herr Mathias Ritter von Kallina, Gutsbesitzer 5 fl. — Herr Jarosch, Gemeindwirth 1 fl. — Herr J. U. D. Hämpel 4 fl. — Herr Junghans, Besitzer der Musikalien-Leihanstalt 1 fl. — Herr Adam Bittner, k. k. Astronom 20 fl. — Herr Fritz, k. k. Professor 5 fl. — Fräulein Josephine Friedrich 2 fl. — Herr Baron v. Enis 5 fl. — Herr Ellenberger, Ziegelhüttenbesitzer 10 fl. — Herr J. M. H. 50 fl. — Herr Scharf, Stadtrath aus Breslau 10 fl. — Herr F. L. List 10 fl. — Herr J. B. 5 fl. — Herr Samuel Mark 1 fl. — Herr J. U. D. Walter 2 fl. — Herr Hampl, k. k. quiesc. Staatsgüter - Oberbeamte 50 fl. — Herr Ritter v. Schönfeld 20 fl. — Durch Herren Brüder Porges gesammelt in ihrer priv. Kottonfabrik zu Prag am Smichow 73 fl. 5 kr. — Die Chefs dieser Kottonfabrik 200 fl. — Herr Wenzel Nossal, k. k. prager Postmeister 20 fl. — Herr Peter Boulogne et Compagnie 5 fl. — Herr G. Haberkorn 1 fl. 40 kr. — Herr R. Schattinger 1 fl. 40 kr. — Herr F. Bonnet 1 fl. 40 kr. — Herr Johann Gerzabek, Hausbesitzer 2 fl. — Herr Wirthschaftsrath Seidel 2 fl. — Herr Ramstein, Professor der französischen Sprache 5 fl. — Herr Joseph Tittel 5 fl. — Herr Joseph Vogel, Handelsmann 3 fl. — Herr Friedrich Lehmann, Haushofmeister 2 fl. — Herr Nowotny, Realitätenbesitzer 100 fl. — Herr Peter v. Schlosser, J. U. D. 20 fl. — Herr Johann Kanka, J. U. D. 2 fl. — Herr Franz Puch 40 kr. — Herr Maschka, Hausbesitzer 4 fl. — Herr Hutzelmann, Schneidermeister 4 fl. — Frau Josepha Hutzelmann, dessen Gattin 1 fl. — Herr Karl Maschka 1 fl. — Herr Anton Hawle 30 kr. — Herr Ernest Kotzurek 10 kr. — Wenzel Kumml junior 1 fl. — Frau Franziska Kumml 30 kr. — Herren Sellier et Bellot 20 fl. — N. N. 1 fl. — Herren G. Wehle et Lippmann 200 fl. — Herr Bernard Baer, Buchhalter 5 fl. — Herr W. F. Sammer 5 fl. — Herr Anton Kresling 2 fl. — Herr Adalbert Krumml 2 fl. — 147 Arbeiter der Fabrik Wehle et Lippmann 38 fl. 2 kr. — Herr Ewald 5 fl. — Herr A. B. Przibram 250 fl. — Herr Salomon Przibram 50 fl. — Herr Salomon M. Jerusalem 50 fl. — A. B. Przibramsches Fabriks- und Handlungspersonale 92 fl. 17 kr. — Herr Kutschera Winz., fürstl. J. Lobkowitzischer Hausverwalter 2 fl. — Frau Ottilie Gröschl 5 fl. — Herr J. L. Lieben 10 fl.

Figure 3: "Prager Zeitung" 29th March 1838: "First List of the Contributions Collected in Prague which the philanthropists listed herein have donated to supporting the residents of several localities in Hungary who suffered from the Danube flood" (Photo private).

A list titled "First List of the Contributions Collected in Prague Which the Philanthropists Listed Herein Have Donated to Supporting the Residents of Several Localities in Hungary Who Suffered From the Danube Flood"[46] was published in the March 29 edition of the *Prager Zeitung* (*Figure 3*). This list was headed by the superior Prague imperial official, the supreme burggrave (Oberstburggraf) Count Chotek, joined by his wife. It included the names of around a hundred donors, a note of the amount given, and typically their occupation as well. One of the first donors listed was the editor of the *Prager Zeitung* himself.

From that point on the newspaper published additional lists of donations at irregular intervals. By the end of the year a hundred or so lists had been published, often as multi-page supplements to the regular editions of the paper. The donors represented people from nearly all social groups of Prague and the crown land of Bohemia, from the highest nobility to the humblest servant.[47] The Prague supreme burgrave was able to present the Palatine in Ofen donations amounting to a total of more than 50,000 guilders.

Mapping of Imaginary Community in the Flows of Communication

The beginnings of donation drives for victims of catastrophes in the modern historical period have scarcely been researched. In the Habsburg Empire, one of the earliest examples of the cultural practice of donation drives for victims of catastrophes launched by press media appeared in the aftermath of flooding in the Vienna suburbs in February and March 1830. The appeals for donations in 1838, which were directed to an urban and transnational public, were the first to take place on such a large scale, and they established a pattern that can still be observed today.

The media coverage that we have presented on the Danube flood of 1838 offers concrete evidence of the concept of "sympathy from a distance" formulated most recently by Tobias Scholz.[48] Our examples from the German-language press in Prague correspond closely with the patterns described by Scholz, in which transnational media in particular not only provide information about catastrophic

[46] "Erstes Verzeichniß über die in Prag eingegangenen Beiträge, welche nachstehende Menschenfreunde zur Unterstützung der durch Ueberschwemmung der Donau verunglückten Bewohner mehrerer Ortschaften in Ungarn gewidmet haben." Prager Zeitung 50 (29 March 1838).

[47] Similar lists of donors had appeared in the *Wiener Zeitung* after a Danube flood in Vienna in March 1830. At that time, the *Prager Zeitung* had summarized these lists, but did not itself print any complete lists.

[48] *Tobias Scholz*, Distanzierte Öffentlichkeit. Mediale Bilder, Emotionen und Solidarität angesichts von Katastrophen, Frankfurt/Main 2012.

events but also stimulate efforts to overcome the crises that result from these catastrophes.[49]

What enabled these modern patterns to develop as early as 1838 in the Bohemian public[50] and media? One decisive factor is the way that the forms of convivial sociability and cultural practices of entertainment were harnessed to serve a charitable purpose during the flood disaster. The participation in philanthropic activities such as benefits and donation campaigns offered the "dispersed public" of the European urban elite to create an imagined community through this gesture of sympathy. The devastating flood in Ofen, Altofen, and Pesth in 1838 illustrates the way that regional cultural behavior patterns can potentially connect with trans-regional events.[51] Interestingly, in the various charity events for the flood victims, the nineteenth-century nationalist tendencies that discouraged solidarity among different European communities did not play a significant role in the motivations of the so-called 'elegant world', the refined cultural circles of the big cities. The donors' motives were based less on nationalism than on a concept of broader, more cosmopolitical patriotism, as it had been valued, for example, in the philanthropic and morally universalist activities of the Free Masons of the late eighteenth century.[52]

Thanks to the efforts of modern journalism during the nineteenth century, and due to newly developed urban patterns of communication, places of entertainment and sociability, such as theatres, concert houses, public gardens, coffee houses, clubs, salons, and public reading rooms, constituted the imaginary community of a new 'elegant world'. This elegant community created and valorized

[49] According to Scholz, when the media pick up events and make them into media events, they "moderate a measure of disaster management, a restoration of the ability to act to which the (unaffected) distant recipient is not uninvolved; that is, he participates in the completion of this process emotionally and the distance between him and the location of the events breaks down. […] When this community-building effect and the creation of a global, episodic solidarity is successful, intersubjectivity is produced – people participate in overcoming a distant catastrophe through donations, for example." *Scholz*, Distanzierte Öffentlichkeit, 70.

[50] For the formation of the Bohemia public in the first half of the nineteenth century cf. *Rita Krueger*, Czech, German, and Noble. Status and National Identity in Habsburg Bohemia, Oxford 2009.

[51] In the southern Hungarian town of Szeged, the interplay between local events and supraregional or transnational participation in handling disasters is still visible today. The town was inundated and largely destroyed during floods of the rivers Maros and Tisza in 1879. Just as in the case of the Danube flood of 1838, practically all of Europe provided financial aid for rebuilding the town. This is still attested by the names of the ring roads (which were created after the model of Vienna during the reconstruction of the city) based on the capitals of the states which provided donations: Berlini Körut, Brüsszeli k., Londoni k., Moszkvai etc. We thank Detlef Haberland for this information.

[52] A notable representative of this type of transnational patriotism was Christian Carl André (1763–1831), the director of the Evangelical Lutheran school and secretary of the Imperial Moravian Society for the Advancement of Agriculture ("Kaiserlich Mährische Gesellschaft zur Förderung des Ackerbaues") in Brünn. He was the editor of the encyclopedic newspaper *Hesperus* (published first in Brünn, later in Stuttgart) and the *Patriotisches Tageblatt* in Brünn.

its concept of elegance as a mode of performance, which could be easily put on scene in the beneficiary activities supporting the flood victims of Buda, Óbuda, and Pest in 1838. At the same time, participation in disaster relief efforts through charitable social practices contributed to the development and sharpening of political identity. The cosmopolitan patterns of elegance arose at the very time when nationalism gained currency in many European countries. It thus articulated the ambivalent identity of European elites, who saw themselves as belonging at once to national traditions and to an emerging transnational urban culture.

By focusing on how the Danube flood of 1838 was coped with, as in the reports printed in the German-language media in Prague, we have described an observer perspective that is spatially distant and rather politically uninvolved. We were interested in seeing what forms of social practice resulted from the mediated perception of catastrophes by people on the periphery of events or, vice versa, how this perception was integrated into their social practices. In other words, we investigated the question of how natural catastrophes were constructed as events in translocal and transnational communication, and how these events influenced public perceptions or entered into the collective memory and everyday forms of communication. In this model, processes of national identity creation are largely absent.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the rapidly developing traffic and information channels provided an important stimulus for the sphere of the dispersed public in Central and Eastern Europe, allowing the participants of the modern urban patterns of communication to regard the European world as a European space of communication. Paradoxically, this mode of transnational perception emerged at the same time as the various efforts to establish and consolidate national identities.

Understanding the Conundrum of Drought in Australia

Rebecca Jones

Introduction

Droughts are a distinct form of slow disaster which meanders for months and years rather than days and weeks. Droughts are defined by an absence. While tangible events such as dust storms, fires and heatwaves may be contained within them, the drought itself – the absence of rain – is intangible, neither a presence nor an event. Droughts cast a long shadow, their effects often felt many months after they commence and continue long after the drought itself has ended. When does a drought start? When does it end? Only in retrospect can we pinpoint the beginning of a drought, when the cumulative effect of the absence reaches a certain point. The definition of drought in Australia was inconsistent until the mid-twentieth century when it gradually became accepted that a drought was to be defined against historical averages with at least three months of rainfall below 30 % of the expected median.[1] And yet this defines drought against a shifting normality. Rainfall averages are misleading, concealing the extreme highs and lows. The more arid the climate, the more variable is the norm. Drought therefore is relative; a severe drought along the east coast of Australia (for example Sydney where average annual rainfall is about 1100 mm) is an abundance of rain in northwestern Victoria where the mean rainfall is about 300 mm.

In the last one hundred and fifty years of European colonization of Australia there have been at least ten serious droughts in south-eastern Australia, three of these of at least seven years duration.[2] In a global context, southeastern Australia has an exceptionally variable climate influenced by its latitude, large continental mass and fluctuations in temperature in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans and is, therefore, particularly drought prone.[3] Although droughts are not disasters, their effects can be disastrous and constitute a severe threat to individuals, communities and regions. The impact of drought on Australian society and environ-

[1] *James Charles Foley*, Droughts in Australia, in: Bureau of Meteorology Bulletin 43, 1957, 1–13; *W. J. Gibbs/John Vincent Maher*, Rainfall Deciles as Drought Indicators, in: Bureau of Meteorology 48, 1967.

[2] *Australian Bureau of Statistics*, Drought in Australia, Year Book of Australia 1988, 1989, 623–624.

[3] *Paul N. Holper*, Climate Change Science Information Paper. Australian Rainfall – Past, Present and Future, in: CSIRO and Bureau of Meteorology, 2011, 4.

ment has been profound, bringing destruction to vegetation, soil and animals, alienation of agricultural land, economic hardship and destitution. In semi-arid areas, settlers are particularly vulnerable to drought, not because drought is necessarily more frequent (as drought is relative) but because being semi-arid, even a relatively small reduction in annual or seasonal rainfall can propel a marginal farming area into an impossible farming area. For example, during the long 'Federation Drought' which lasted from 1895 to 1903, it is estimated that as many as half of the settlers in northwestern Victoria left the area.[4] During this drought the State of Queensland lost two-thirds of its sheep, New South Wales more than half, South Australia more than one third and Victoria just under a quarter.[5] A State Government inquiry in 1915 into settlement in northwestern Victoria found that of 2000 agricultural leases commenced in the previous twenty years, 450 had failed and another 400 were in imminent danger of failing, at least partly as a result of the Federation drought.[6] Separate government inquiries into the occupation of western New South Wales and inland South Australia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also describe horrendous experiences of failed farms, humiliated farmers, mounting stock carcasses, destitution and deserted farms.[7] During dry years between 1880 and 1940, agriculture retreated from large areas of inland South Australia and soil erosion in the interwar decades created a 'dust bowl' similar to that of the United States midwest as formerly productive agricultural areas were rendered almost uninhabitable. Vast quantities of sand buried fences, roads, rail lines and fields and scattered upon towns and cities.

The impact of drought can be profound, and yet people have, over time, found ways to respond, adapt and survive. Despite the frequency of drought, southeastern Australia is very agriculturally productive with a diverse range of agricultural and pastoral activities including sheep and cattle grazing, broad acre cereal farming, horticulture and dairying. The way people have responded to drought reflects the conundrum of drought – slow, uncertain and variable, like the droughts themselves. In this paper I argue that the way people respond to drought, whether they adapt or not, and whether short-term adaptations result

[4] *Charles Fahey*, A Splendid Place for a Home. A Long History of the Australian Family Farm 1830–2000, in: Alan James / Christian Mayne / Stephen Atkinson (Eds.), Outside Country. A history of inland Australia, Wakefield 2010, 242.

[5] *Ted Henzell*, Australian Agriculture. Its History and Challenges, Melbourne 2007, 70.

[6] *Victoria. Royal Commission on Closer Settlement*, Progress Report of the Royal Commission on Closer Settlement as Relating to the Working of the Closer Settlement Acts in the Non-Irrigable Districts. Together with Appendices, Melbourne 1915.

[7] For example *New South Wales. Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of the Crown Tenants*, Western Division of New South Wales Royal Commission to Inquire Into the Condition of the Crown Tenants. Government Printer, Sydney 1901. Also a Commonwealth Royal Commission examining the Wheat Industry was established in 1934, a South Australian Agricultural Settlement Committee in 1931 and a Marginal Lands Committee was appointed in February 1939 to investigate the viability of agriculture in arid areas.

in change rests on how people understand drought. As Anthony Oliver Smith notes, climatic events such as drought should not be called a *natural* disaster because their impact is as a much cultural as it is natural; the threat drought poses on society is as much influenced by society as it is by rainfall. Response, and ultimately adaptation to drought was influenced by the way people perceive drought: an unusual deviation from the norm or a recurrent and inherent part of the climate. This perception influenced whether they simply *endured* or *changed* in response to drought.

Resilience to stressors such as drought, as discussed by psychologists, sociologists and socio-ecologists, is a process rather than an inherent trait. People absorb and resist stress and disturbance and then change and adapt in response to that disturbance. This process occurs at many different levels including the individual, the group or community, the institution and even the nation.[8] In this paper, in order to interrogate people's understanding of drought, I have focused on individual farmers who represent informal groupings or styles of farming. I have chosen to focus on farmers as they are amongst the people whose well-being and livelihood depend most directly and intimately on the climate and therefore are most directly affected by drought. Research at the micro level, using personal sources from farmers such as diaries and oral history interviews, can I believe provide a window to the lived experience and response to drought. Personal sources (or ego documents) offer a breadth of detail of everyday life and reveal the unexceptional as well as the exceptional. I have looked at fourteen diaries, five series of correspondence, fourteen memoirs and conducted fourteen oral history interviews which provide a rich picture of the day to day activities of farming before, during and after drought. Sources such as diaries and correspondence series build up day by day, month by month, year by year and decade by decade, through which the researcher can trace change and continuity and glean the rhythms and patterns of lives. Memoirs and oral histories give the reader an insight into the experience, understandings and perceptions of farmers. How people respond to drought is how they lived their lives. Farmers' responses to drought are about actions such as farming practices but they are also about beliefs and understandings of the world.

[8] *Neil Adger*, Social and Ecological Resilience. Are they Related?, in: Progress in Human Geography, 2000, 347–364; *Suniya S. Luthar*, Resilience in Development. A Synthesis of Research Across Five Decades, in: Dante Cicchetti / Donald J. Cohen (Eds.), Developmental Psychopathology. Risk, Disorder and Adaptation, New York 2006, 740–795; *Michael Rutter*, Psychosocial resilience and protective mechanisms, in: American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 57, 1987, 316–331.

Drought Commentary

The historical and sociological research and commentary on drought have argued that the impact of drought in Australia has been particularly profound because Australian settlers have consistently failed to see drought as a recurrent phenomenon and therefore failed to learn lessons from drought. This is what environmental historian Don Garden describes as the 'long-standing myth about colonists and their successors'.[9] Beginning with T. M. Perry in 1966 and reinforced by R. L. Heathcote's influential articles from the late 1960s until the 1990s, social commentators on drought have lamented Australians lack of acceptance of drought as a regular and frequent visitor.[10] Australians, they claim, are surprised by drought and see it as a freak event rather than an occupational hazard. This argument has also been taken up by many historians of water management.[11] Commentators of drought policy have reiterated this narrative in their description of drought policy in the years leading up to the 1990s. Government drought policy prior to the 1990s, they argue, characterized drought as an anomalous disaster punctuating the climatic landscape.[12] The implication of this denial is that governments, farmers and water agencies have been reactive rather than proactive, have not sufficiently prepared for the inevitable return of drought, did not factor drought into everyday operation and continued to expand agriculture into unsustainable areas.

Media has played an important role in reinforcing and reproducing the idea that drought is an unprecedented disaster. Brad West and Phillip Smith have observed that for at least 150 years, newspapers, and more recently electronic media have reported on each drought as if it was an unexpected oddity, each one worse

[9] *Don Garden*, Extreme Weather and ENSO. Their social and cultural ramifications in New Zealand and Australia in the 1890s, in: James Beattie / Emily O'Gorman / Matthew Henry (Eds.), Climate, Science and Colonisation. Histories from Australia and New Zealand, New York 2014, 61–80, at 74.

[10] *Thomas M. Perry*, Climate and Settlement in Australia 1700–1930, in: John Andrews (Ed.), Frontiers and Men, Melbourne 1966, 138–154. *Ronald Leslie Heathcote*, Drought in Australia. A Problem of Perception, in: The Geographical Review 59, 1969, 175–194; *Ronald Leslie Heathcote*, Drought in Australia. Still a Problem of Perception, in: GeoJournal 16, 1988; *Ronald Leslie Heathcote / Roger C. Stone*, Braving the Bull of Heaven. Drought Management Strategies, Past Present and Future, Milton 2002.

[11] *Michael Cathcart*, The Water Dreamers. The Remarkable History of our Dry Continent, Melbourne, 2009; *Jenny Keating*, The Drought Walked Through. A History of Water Shortage in Victoria (Department of Water Resources, State of Victoria), Melbourne 1992; *Kirsty Douglas*, 'For the Sake of a Little Grass'. A Comparative History of Settler Science and Environmental Limits in South Australia, in: James Beattie / Emily O'Gorman / Matthew Henry (Eds.), Climate, Science and Colonisation. Histories from Australia and New Zealand, New York 2014, 99–117.

[12] *Linda Courtenay Botterill*, Uncertain Climate. The Recent History of Drought Policy in Australia, in: Australian Journal of Politics and History 49, 2003, 61–74.

than anything which has come before.[13] The images they chose to reiterate in pictures and words are those of dust storms, creviced earth and humiliated farmers deserting the land. These images have been reawakened with each drought.

Such a view of drought response in Australia provides an incomplete picture. I argue that while a perception of drought as an aberration is *part* of the story of drought in Australia, if drought response is viewed from a historical perspective (over at least one hundred years) and from the ground, focusing on farmers' responses to drought, other narratives emerge. In this paper I will suggest that two parallel, and at times conflicting, understandings of drought in Australia have been prevalent in the last 150 years. The first mirrors the dominant commentary on drought; that drought is an aberration and that 'normal' climate is predictable and consistent in its rainfall. The second is that drought has long been accepted as an inherent part of the Australian climate and has been accommodated into everyday life. Those who accepted that drought was a recurrent part of the climate were better prepared to respond, while those who experienced droughts as unusual events had less capacity to change and adapt. I will give three examples, from my research, of farmers who see drought as a peculiar event and then three who accepted drought as a recurrent event and incorporated drought into their normal farming practices. These farmers represent different farming styles in Australia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which demonstrate different understandings of drought.

Drought as an Aberration

The three farmers discussed below all approached the climate as if drought was an anomaly and reliable rainfall was the norm. This was not stubborn ignorance but a result of social and cultural phenomena which colluded to encourage settlers to expect rain. The first example narrates the story of the Brewer family who based their expectations of a climate on the appearance of the land in a period of abundance fuelled by a contemporary culture of optimistic expansion. The second example is of the McCann family who settled in an area characterized, sometimes erroneously, as wet and based their expectations on this reputation. The third example is Jeff and his contemporaries in southern Victoria in the mid-twentieth century who, for a period, had very little experience of drought.

New settlers, whether they are from lands far away or regions closer to home, arrived bearing particular expectations about the environment. As many historians have noted, British, Irish and other European settlers understandably brought with them sensibilities and skills developed in the cool temperate north-

[13] *Brad West / Philip Smith*, Drought, Discourse and Durkheim. A Research Note, in: Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology 32, 1996, 93–102.



Figure 1: Location of case study farms i south eastern Australia (Sharon Harrup Design).

ern hemisphere.[14] As historian Paul Carter explained, European settlers glided over the surface of the land, neutralizing its uniqueness rather than engaging with the particularities of the environments they encountered.[15] This was also, at times true of colonial-born settlers. Without long-term experience or knowledge of a new locality, settlers based their expectations of climate on what they saw, and what they wanted to believe.

John Brewer settled on Merri Merrigal, a 280 000 acre property on the Lachlan River in central western New South Wales in the early 1870s in a period of abundant rainfall. His companion and future wife, Minnie, recalled their first sight of the property: "[It] looked so cool and lovely, the big gum trees so fresh and green along both sides of [the river] and great big Billy Bongs [flowers] ev-

[14] *Geoffrey Blainey*, A Land Half Won, Melbourne 1983; *Chris O'Brien*, Imported Understandings. Calendars, Weather and Climate in Tropical Australia, 1870s–1940s, in: James Beattie / Emily O'Gorman / Mathew Henry (Eds.), Climate, Science and Colonisation. Histories from Australia and New Zealand, New York 2014, 195–211.

[15] *Paul Carter*, Lie of the Land, London / Boston 1996.

erywhere as far as we could see … You could always hear the ripple of the water from the house."[16] Rain fell the day they arrived and "tumbled down in torrents" from a rocky outcrop.[17] This appeared to be a land of plenty: long and lush grass, flourishing vegetation, abundant water and plentiful animals.

However, by the mid-1870s rain was falling infrequently and lightly and Minnie's impressions of the Lachlan had changed. Most of the water sources away from the river had dried and grass and ground vegetation died, burnt by the sun, heat and lack of water: "the paddocks looked like a swept backyard"[18] she recalled. Brewer let the sheep and cattle roam to the furthest reaches of the station to find water. As the animals ate out the feed close to the river they had to travel as much as twenty kilometers between feed and water. "As time went on, those that were left traveled backward and forwards to the little feed out back and the water at the frontage, till they ended by falling into the river to be dragged out by horses, mostly to die on the banks and be eaten by goannas."[19] Selling these sheep and cattle was a gamble. The stock had to be walked over 250 km to the nearest railhead. The longer the drought, the more animals were taken along these routes and the less feed was available. Many animals died on the road or were in such bad condition when they arrived that sellers received a very low price. Minnie recalled that Brewer suffered "fearful" financial losses from selling sheep and cattle in the midst of drought.[20]

John Brewer's assumptions about the normal weather in the Lachlan district differed markedly from the weather they experienced. Their expectations for a co-operative climate were raised by their initial sighting of abundant pasture. The Brewers arrived infused with the contemporary culture of optimism. The early 1870s was a time of rapid expansion of pastoralism in New South Wales. Since the 1850s, pastoralism had been spreading west facilitated by over five years of relatively benign weather. Sheep numbers exploded, from 42 million in the early 1870s to 106 million thirty years later and wool prices rose in response to civil war disturbances in North America.[21] This optimism replicated throughout newly settled parts of Australia. For example, in South Australia in the 1870s in a time of ample rain and population expansion, both government and settlers alike drove expansion of cereal growing into inland areas despite the recommendations of colonial surveyor George Goyder who had defined the limit of rainfall reliable enough for agriculture as a narrow band in the southeastern part of the colony.

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[16] *John Brewer*, Memoirs, Unpublished manuscript, State Library of Victoria, MS 13262, c.1915–1928, 77.
[17] Ibid., 74.
[18] Ibid., 12–13.
[19] Ibid., 7–8.
[20] Ibid., 8–9.
[21] *Samuel Wadham*, Australian Farming 1788–1965, Melbourne 1967, 17 et seq.

There was an expectation in establishing inland pastoral districts of New South Wales that land settlement was dynamic and that there was a high turnover of owners.[22] Brewer saw the tall swaying grasses of the plains as an opportunity to make money and move on. Minnie stated more than once that, like many pastoralists moving into inland areas, John Brewer had no expectation of staying for the long term. The Brewers' milieu was restless and mobile with little desire to put down roots. A culture of optimism, expansion and impermanence meant there was little need to study the intricacies of the local climate. Long-term meteorological records did not yet exist for this area and the family knew few other established settlers in the district to inform them about the local climate. They had extensive contact with Aboriginal pastoral workers but an incident recounted by Minnie suggests that the collective knowledge which Aborigines shared about the local climate could not be seriously heard by Brewer. Late in 1876, after years of dry weather, Minnie recalled two Aboriginal men attempting to tell Brewer of the impending arrival of a flood: "A change coming Boss, rain soon be here". The second man confirms: "black fellow know, three more days and flood be here, big one flood … water everywhere." John's response was polite but dismissive "I hope so but we can't believe it till we see it."[23] This story indicated that European ideas of superiority in comparison with Aboriginal people may have prevented settlers such as Brewer learning from indigenous knowledge.

The second example is the McCann family, who settled in southeastern Victoria in the early 1890s farming sheep and dairy cows. The McCanns' story demonstrates that particular regions generated particular hopes and a region's reputation influenced expectations of the climate. The McCanns' story is told through the diary of Margaret McCann written from 1893 to 1910.[24] Brothers Arthur and John (Margaret's husband) had worked for about a decade in arid central Australia. Their selection of farmland in southern Victoria was driven by a desire to live in a well-watered environment and coastal Victoria represented moisture, rain, water and reliability to the brothers. Southeastern Victoria was settled in the mid-nineteenth century by pastoralists from New South Wales who, in the midst of a drought, were searching for more productive pastures.[25] The region's reputation for reliable rainfall and a refuge from drought was continually reinforced by the media. For example, an advertisement in the 1870s claimed that the climate in the area was 'beautiful in the extreme' and rarely subject to drought.[26] While coastal Victoria is considerably wetter than central Australia (with nearly

[22] *Keith Hancock*, Discovering Monaro. A study of man's impact on his environment, Cambridge 1972, 127.

[23] *Brewer*, Memoirs, 17 et seq.

[24] *Margaret McCann*, Diary of Margaret McCann 1893–1910, unpublished manuscript, State Library of Victoria, MS 9632.

[25] *Don Watson*, Caladonia Australis. Scottish Highlanders on the Frontier of Australia, Sydney 1984, 107, 136.

[26] *Barry Collett*, Wednesdays Closest to the Full Moon, Victoria 1994, 120.

double its average annual rainfall) it could not boast a *reliably* damp climate. In 82 years of meteorological records, an average of one in ten years was severely dry and an average of one in three or four was significantly below average. While the median rainfall is about 600 mm annually, annual rainfall ranges from 975 mm at its highest to 330 at its lowest (the latter comparable to a semi-arid inland area). Therefore, the climate experienced by the McCanns, like that experienced by the Brewers, differed markedly from their expectations.

The McCann's style of farming showed an expectation that rain would fall, and fall regularly. This belief was reflected in the lack of water storage on the property. In 1891 the one hundred and ten cleared acres had only one dam as well as a stream. By 1901, despite five years of intermittently dry weather this had not changed. Every summer and autumn water tanks ran dry, even during seasons which were not notably short of rain. In February 1902, Margaret described the farm as "in a bad way for want of rain".[27] John ordered a windmill to pump water from a spring, however when it rained soon after they took the windmill away: "we do not want it now the rain has come" Margaret wrote, assuming dry weather would not return.[28] Despite little justification for their belief in the area as a place of reliable rainfall in the first ten years of residence, these ideas persisted and shaped their farming. The McCanns, spurred on by settlement stories and media propaganda believed in a regional climate which did not exist.

The third example takes us to the mid-twentieth century, a period of abundant rainfall and rapid agricultural expansion. Just as John Brewer held expectations of reliable rainfall based upon his first sighting as well as a culture of rapid agricultural expansion, farmers with minimal experience of drought, who farmed during unusually wet periods, also understood drought to be an unusual event. This generated a precarious certainty of reliable rainfall. The decades from the late 1940s until the late 1960s are remembered as a Golden Age in Australian farming which established a new normal and against which all subsequent periods have been measured. High prices for agricultural products such as wool and dairy following the Second World War encouraged agricultural expansion. Many people entered the industry and agricultural communities boomed.

Agricultural production at this time was nurtured by abnormally clement weather. The two decades following the end of the Second World War were years of unusually abundant rainfall in the history of meteorological records for southeastern Australia.[29] While there were localized and short dry periods, for approximately twenty years, temperate regions of south-eastern Australia experienced no widespread or severe dry periods. No severe droughts and only a small handful of dry years were recorded in southeastern Victoria in the twenty years

[27] *McCann,* Diary, 22/2/1902.
[28] Ibid., 26/3/1902.
[29] *Holper,* Climate Change Science, 4.

between 1946 and 1966. By contrast, the same meteorological station recorded six severe droughts for the twenty years between 1920 and 1940. As a result, by the late 1960s, farmers with as much as twenty years' experience may have had no direct experience of farming through drought and had few incentives to prepare for an absence of rain. For this generation of farmers, an absence of drought was normal. A serious drought in 1967–1968 was, therefore, a shock to many settlers and is remembered as a time of severe water shortage. Long-term southern Victorian farmer, Jeff, recounted his experience of the 1967–1968 drought in an interview in 2013:

"The first [drought] I was really affected by was in 1968. It came on drier and drier. We had family and no money and lots of debt and we could see that it wasn't going to be really good … Now at that stage we hadn't had any major droughts for many many years. We were milking 95 cows (that was a big herd then) on our 99 acres so we were pushing the limits there a bit […]. Everybody had little small dams that most years got them through with no trouble at all. […]. We all had dams on top of the hill or on the side of the hill. That was the done thing."[30]

Sitting high on the hill (where construction was easier) with small catchments meant a significant amount of rain was needed to fill these dams. In wet years these dams supplied enough water for the farm but in dry years they were insufficient. With little rain throughout 1967 and 1968, dams emptied and remained dry. Farmers became desperate: "get me some water, we are out of water'. 'I've had it. If I haven't got water by tomorrow night I've got to sell all me cattle because I can't keep them going any longer".[31]

Farmers' experience of their local environment in the post-war decades shaped their concept of normal and showed them that drought was abnormal and they constructed water storage accordingly. However when the climate reverted to the usual pattern of variability, this water infrastructure was inadequate. The 1967–1968 drought followed by droughts in the early 1970s and early 1980s encouraged farmers to acknowledge that drought was an ongoing threat and there was a change in the practice of dam building in the region.

Drought as part of the climate

In contrast to the examples of farming styles characterized by an assumption of the absence of drought above, all of whom saw drought as an aberration, I have found that many farmers *did* understand the climate as inherently variable and many accepted or came to accept that drought was an inevitable part of their climate. I will briefly outline this response amongst three farmers. The first example

[30] *Jeff*, Interview by Rebecca Jones, June 2013.
[31] Ibid.

is Charles Coote who commenced farming in northwestern Victoria at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries just prior to the Federation Drought. The second example is Charlie Grossman who farmed from 1914 until the 1960s through recurrent drought in north-eastern Victoria. The third example is that of Bill Maher and Ethel Prange who both farmed in the Mallee from the 1950s to the 2000s. Charles Coote, Charlie Grossman, Bill Maher and Ethel Prange formed their understanding of drought through direct experience of severely dry weather early in their farming career and through repeated experience of drought reinforced by the reputation and identity of their region as drought prone.

Charles Coote was part of a large migration of new settlers into the Mallee in the 1880s and early 1890s.[32] Increasing demand for land following population expansion, reasonable commodity prices, and an ideology of development encouraged many new farmers to move north into newly opened agricultural areas. Three years after taking up his farm, the long Federation drought of 1895–1903 descended on the Mallee. In these seven years the Mallee had only two years which recorded average rainfall. Three of Coote's horses died, harvests failed completely and Coote spent at least half his time carting water from public tanks. Early 1903 was a particularly hard time for Charles Coote as he had no harvest, no seed wheat, no horse feed and little water. Without any income from farming Coote hawked firewood around the city and took government contracts clearing roads, a task which he described contemptuously as "shovelling muck" and "slinging mud".[33]

Charles Coote's experience, forged during the 1890s and early 1900s taught him that periods of abundant rainfall were short lived. Despite some good harvests in the years after 1903 Charles Coote remained cautious about the ability of the sky to produce rain. Even during short dry periods he feared the worst: "'total failure imminent' 'everything on the way to being buggered'" he wrote in his diary.[34] There was general caution in the Mallee at that time: stock became unsaleable at the first sign of dry weather and farmers were unwilling to make financial commitments such as fencing and property purchase. This drought cast a long shadow and was a seminal time against which Charles compared all subsequent dry periods for the rest of his farming life. In his experience, rainfall meandered unpredictably between sufficiency and insufficiency and he developed a style of farming which accommodated this variability. He closely observed the soil and weather and made meticulous notes in his diaries. He waited for rain before sowing (rather than sowing by the calendar) and sowed differently in different parts of his farm depending on the water holding capacity of the soil. After the desperate early months of 1903 Coote's strategy was always to keep ex-

[32] *Charles William Coote*, Records of Charles William Coote 1896–1955, unpublished manuscripts, University of Melbourne Archives, 1964.0005.

[33] *Charles Coote,* Diaries, 6, 11/5/1903.

[34] Ibid., 8/10/1905.

cess as a buffer against years without harvest and water. Coote greatly increased his water storage capacity and government land records showed that by 1906 his property had significantly more storage capacity than any of his five immediate neighbors.[35] Coote was also cautious about keeping a reserve of seed and fodder for use during dry years. After 1902 he always stored enough to provide for excess beyond the next sowing. As southeastern Australia entered the next major drought in 1914/5 (which in Coote's area had the lowest rainfall on record) Coote had stockpiled enough fodder and seed to see him through the next 18 months. Many local farmers sent their animals away on agistment but Coote was able to feed them through the drought.

Coote's formative years of farming during drought encouraged him to develop a style and practice of farming which incorporated the probability of drought and therefore the possibility of harvesting little or no crop and collecting no water. Coote's experience of living through the Federation drought in the semi-arid Mallee was so profound that it caused him to shape their future farming practice to incorporate the probability of its return. Unlike the Brewers and McCanns, he expected irregularity in the weather. He developed enough confidence in the weather to continue to farm but made no assumptions about its kindness and leniency.

Australian environmental historian Tom Griffiths argued that the Federation drought was a watershed in thinking about the land, when settlers began to see that environment had agency.[36] The destructive impact of this drought on soil, vegetation and animals was so profound that settlers' confidence in their mastery over nature was shaken and they were required to acknowledge that climate shaped their endeavor. As the longest, most widespread and destructive drought since European settlement, this revelation reverberated around settled Australia. Contrary to much academic commentary, many Australian settlers, such as Charles Coote, did not forget about drought as soon as it was over. At a governmental level, the Federation drought was also the catalyst for fundamental organizational changes such as the establishment of government auspices irrigation, it fostered popular and scientific examination of meteorology and may have encouraged the colonies to co-operate towards Federation.[37]

While the realization acquired during the extreme crisis of the Federation drought was vital, the reinforcement of subsequent droughts for farmers such as Coote was just as important. The intensity of the First World War drought, the insidiousness of dry years in the 1920s and 1930s (combined with economic

[35] Public Records of Victoria, VPRS 5357 Land Files, Unit 1798, Serial 413, Charles William Coote; VPRS 5357, Unit 1827, Serial 1352, Angus Bremmer; VPRS 5357, Unit 1827, Serial 1354, David Williamson; VPRS 5357, Unit 1846, Serial 1639, Thomas Ritchie.

[36] *Thomas Griffiths*, One Hundred Years of Environmental Crisis, in: Rangelands Journal 23, 2001, 5–14.

[37] *Garden*, Extreme Weather, 74 et seq.

depression), the long endurance of the Second World War droughts all combined to continually reinforce awareness of drought amongst farmers and agricultural communities. Long-term settlers who lived through the machinations of irregular rainfall put down roots, closely observed the land and climate and learned to accept the fundamental variability of the climate in which they lived. The experience of recurrent drought was an impetus to adapt. Recurrent drought reinforced these experiences and taught settlers that drought was a normal part of the climate. Farmers such as Charles Coote continued to adapt their farming practices in response to dry years.

My second example is that of Charlie Grossman of Wangaratta in northeastern Victoria who, like Coote, experienced drought in his early years of farming and then experienced recurrent severe drought throughout his fifty years of farming.[38] Grossman, aged only sixteen years, took over the family's 180-acre cereal farm in 1914 soon after the death of his father. 1914 was a treacherous year to begin a career in farming. April 1914–May 1915 was to become one of the worst droughts in the history of south-east Australia, with Wangaratta receiving less than 60 % of its usual rainfall which was the lowest annual rainfall since records began at Wangaratta in 1879.[39] The year was dire for Charlie, his mother and younger siblings. They lost almost all of their year's wheat harvest and most of the following years hay, a prime working horse died and cash flow was meager, consisting of the sale of a small amount of stored hay and wheat and one pound five shillings earned working for a neighbor. Charlie's daughter recalled, in an interview I conducted with her in 2013 that the 1914 drought, experienced at such a young age and so early in his farming career left an indelible mark on her father. Like Charles Coote, Charlie Grossman's experience of drought guided his style of farming for the rest of his farming career.

Soon after the worst impact of the 1914–1915 drought had receded, Grossman began to make changes which would have a direct and enduring impact on the viability of this small farm. He significantly broadened his production away from a sole focus on cereal. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the farm had grown a variety of products and Grossman had the example of his forebears in choosing to diversify away from cereal into livestock and horticulture. Although most of the Grossmans' neighbors were also growing wheat and oats, north-east Victoria lies outside of what is now considered to be the ideal wheat growing region. The availability of a reasonably reliable water source from the well for supplementary watering as well as the close proximity of the farm to a railway station enabled the family to consider horticultural products. Returns from most farm products increased during the post-war reconstruction period

[38] *Charlie Grossman*, Diaries 1914–1979, unpublished manuscript, State Library of Victoria, MS 12589.

[39] *Bureau of Meteorology*, Rainfall Records, Wangaratta, station number 082053.

making diversification an attractive prospect for drought burnt Grossman. By 1918, Grossman had introduced pigs, figs, plums, almonds, walnuts, quinces, loquats and tomatoes into his farm production. The family continued to diversify their production away from cereal and by 1925 Grossman was running a diverse mixed farm with cows, sheep, 3.5 acres of vines, 2.5 acres of fruit trees as well as 88 acres of wheat, 15 acres of oats. By the mid-1920s non-cereal production amounted to about 40 % of the family income.

The Wangaratta region experienced recurrent dry years during Grossman's farming life: 1914–1915, 1919, 1922, 1927, 1929 with a particularly long and severe drought from 1937–1945, now known as the Second World War drought.[40] The duration of the Second World War drought meant that each dry year compounded problems and further depleted reserves of water and fodder. Every autumn during this period Grossman lamented that the "grass has gone to pot".[41] Dry soil prevented the plow from doing more than scratch the surface and in July 1943 Grossman wrote that harrowing was particularly slow because the horses were weak from lack of food.[42] During this period Grossman lost one horse, a number of sheep and cattle and wheat yields were negligible. However, between 1938 and 1945 Grossman sowed only 30 acres of wheat compared to 90 acres in the 1920s. Therefore when his wheat crops failed in 1938, 1941, 1943 and 1944 it had less impact than it would have with greater investment. Although diversifying farm production of course meant that the Grossmans failed to get huge boom time profits in grain when seasons were good it also buffered losses when wheat seasons were poor. Despite the severity of the drought, the Grossmans' diversity in farming, allowed the family to emerge from the 1940s drought not unscathed but buoyant, their farm and livelihood intact. They purchased a second-hand car for £200 in 1939 and in the late 1940s, soon after the end of the drought, bought their first tractor. The more frequent the droughts the more farmers such as Grossman were encouraged to accept climate variability. Settlers in areas where drought was a frequent and persistent visitor were forced to confront droughts' reality – that it will come and come again – and enabled them to prepare for further drought.

My third example is, again, from the Mallee region of north-western Victoria. Bill Maher and Ethel Prange were both long-term wheat farmers who I interviewed in 2013. Bill Maher farmed wheat and sheep in the Mallee for forty years until his retirement in 2012. Bill was perplexed by my questions about drought as I was, for him, questioning the obvious; drought was just part of the farming scenery and not an event or a disaster. He explained this understanding to me:

[40] *Bureau of Meteorology*, Wangaratta.
[41] *Grossman*, Diaries, May 1941, blotter.
[42] Ibid., 26/10/1943 & 18/7/1947.

"Dry years don't worry me because I'm born and bred to it so it is pretty hard for me to pick the bad years. It's just something that I've always got in the back of my mind – this year's dry, next year might be wet; the average will catch up. The worst drought I've ever been through was the '82 drought, but the harvest in the next year, was my best financial year ever. As far as the droughts and the dry weather and the variable seasons we just take it for granted really. Part of the living – course it is."[43]

Most of the Mallee farmers I interviewed treated drought in this way. Eighty-six year old Ethel Prange had lived in the Mallee all her life and had farmed wheat with her husband since 1952. Asking Ethel about her experience of drought was similar to asking about her experience of rain. It just happened. Drought was not a word Ethel used, because, for her, drought meant the complete absence of rain, not simply significantly low rainfall. In her adult life she had experienced at least six years considered by the Bureau of Meteorology to be severe droughts however, because they did not result in complete failure of the farm, Ethel regarded these to be just part of the fluctuation of the weather: "[Those years] might have been branded drought but we weren't destitute. There was always something growing. Yes, here we've never had a season that we didn't strip [some wheat]".[44]

The expectation of rain played as important a role in accepting rainfall variability as it did in expecting rainfall consistency. Just as the reputation of south-eastern Victoria as a land of eternal moisture encouraged settlers to expect consistent rainfall, so the notoriety of the Mallee as dry and barren prepared settlers for variable rainfall. The Victorian Mallee became notorious in the mid-nineteenth century as drought ridden, and was a source of scorn by Governments and settlers as beyond the reaches of a viable settlement. It had a reputation as a semi-desert wasteland of dubious agricultural worth. In the 1880s a vermin proof netting fence was constructed which separated the Mallee from the rest of settled Victoria. The Victorian Minister for Lands, Charles Gavan Duffy described the country beyond the fence as an "abomination of desolation."[45] Stories of pastoral failure, lack of water, distorted stunted trees and sandhills compounded the inhospitable image of the region. Minnie Brewer, who regularly traveled through the region, recalled the Mallee as a place devoid of life: "all white sand just a few wretched trees here and there … a miserable bit of country and everyone hated going through it – you never saw a live thing in it, not even a bird".[46] The consensus at the time (encouraged by resident pastoralists keen to discourage further settlement) was that the Mallee had a dead heart, worthless for settlement or agriculture. This reputation must have deterred some potential settlers, but for others, such as Charles Coote, it may have assisted in destroying unrealistic expectations of abundant rainfall and prepared them to accept dry weather.

[43] *Bill Maher,* Interview by Rebecca Jones, June 2013.
[44] *Ethel Prange,* Interview by Rebecca Jones, June 2013.
[45] *Alfred S. Kenyon*, The Story of the Mallee, Rainbow 1912, 73.
[46] *Minnie Brewer,* Memoirs, 118.

By the late nineteenth century, the semi-arid interior dominated Australian cultural images of rural. Unlike the rolling hills and thick forests of temperate and tropical coastal areas, the inland plains had entered popular mythology as the land of struggle. Settlers were pitied but also revered and the endemic hardship romanticised. Historian Kate Darien-Smith and colleagues have argued that 'rural' in Australian history and social science is *defined* by stoicism and the association of rurality and endurance of hardship is an idea continually reproduced in literature about inland Australia.[47] Whether inland Australians were ever any more stoic than urban Australians is certainly debatable but this myth may have assisted them to endure adversity. Drought became part of the Mallee identity thereby normalizing it and cultural narratives of past droughts helped farmers cope with droughts in the present.[48]

Conclusion

The six examples discussed above, ranging in date from the 1890s to the present, are indicative of two parallel and conflicting understandings of Australian climates, understandings which influenced farmers' abilities to adapt to recurrent climatic phenomena such as drought. The expectations and experiences of farmers influence their conception of climate. The reputation of a particular area as either dry or wet, the appearance of an area at settlement, a culture of optimistic impermanence and experience of drought in the early years of farming all underpin the capacity of farmers to adapt to drought. To return to the bigger question of this series; under what conditions and in what way are threats a catalyst for longer-term social change? The examples of drought I have presented above suggest that a slow disaster such as drought *can* be a catalyst for change. The process of resilience to events such as drought involves people firstly resisting and withstanding drought, secondly, recovering and regaining some semblance of normality, thirdly adapting, learning and changing in response to drought and finally, acknowledging that drought is part of the normal cycle of the climate and will likely return and so prepare for future droughts. The examples discussed in this paper suggest that when farmers see drought as an aberration then there was an emphasis on resistance and recovery, buffering the threat of drought. When they see drought as a recurrent threat then their emphasis was proactive adjustment and change to incorporate drought into their ongoing practices. Given that in almost all climates in southeastern Australia droughts constitute a repeated threat, resilience to drought must involve preparing for future droughts and

[47] *Andrew Gorman-Murray/Kate Darian-Smith/Chris Gibson*, Scaling the Rural. Reflections in Rural Cultural Studies, in: Australian Humanities Review 45, 2008, 37–52.

[48] *Deb Anderson*, Endurance. Australian Stories of Drought, Melbourne 2014.

mitigate against their effects in the future. Closely observing the environment, creating a buffer against scarcity, diversifying production and working within the limitations of the climate rather than relying on hopes, reputations, first impressions and assumptions about rain allowed farmers to better withstand drought. These examples suggest that it *is* possible and feasible to farm through drought, if drought is accepted as part of the normal cycle of the climate. As global climate change is likely to increase the frequency and severity of drought in Australia, accepting this norm, responding and preparing accordingly will become increasingly important.

V. The End of Threat: Diverging perspectives on Social Change during the 'Sattelzeit' (c. 1750–1850)

Introduction

Renate Dürr

After having discussed different dynamics of change in the period of threat, this section of the book deals with the 'end of threat'. Therein, two perspectives are to be distinguished. On the one hand, the perspective of the actors themselves who at some point cease to talk about threat and begin to look ahead to what could happen next. As a result, the idea of future becomes relevant after that of threat. On the other hand, these contemporary discourses about the future lead the authors of this section to a discussion of Reinhart Koselleck's 'Sattelzeit' ('saddle period') thesis. The 'Sattelzeit', i. e. the decades between 1750 and 1850, is described by Koselleck and his followers as a time of acceleration, political and social change, and new philosophical ideas, which altogether lead to modernity. Therefore, the 'Sattelzeit' seems to mark a considerable, if not the decisive, break between premodern and modern times. One especially significant change is the emergence of the concept of an open future in contrast to a future in the hands of God as in previous epochs.

The following two chapters enquire into the concept of future, albeit in different ways. Whereas Dennis Schmidt explores the (re-)actions of contemporary actors with regard to the end of threat, Fernando Esposito analyses Hegel's conception of the "end of time", because this idea has often been seen as paradigmatic for the new optimistic notion of the future in the 'Sattelzeit'. Both chapters challenge the implicit modernization theory that goes with the 'Sattelzeit' concept by taking into account three different perspectives: firstly, that of the actors themselves, whose new ideas of future resulted from 'premodern' and not 'modern' attitudes (Dennis Schmidt); secondly, that of post-modern interpretations of Hegel, which have discussed him from a historicist perspective (Fernando Esposito). Thus, both chapters challenge the purported opposition between the premodern and the modern period and the 'Sattelzeit' as the great watershed.

Dennis Schmidt's study on the Josephinian reforms in the 1780s argues within the categories of the CRC 'Threatened Orders'. He analyses the agitation against these reforms by members of the estates, the clergy and the local population. The threatened order in his study therefore has three dimensions: it is the political order of the Habsburg Monarchy with the balance between Emperor and estates, the Catholic Church with all its institutions, and baroque Catholicism in its broader sense. In three case studies, he gives an example of the communica-

tion of threat within these areas. One of the main questions concerns the end of the threat in each case. The communication of threat reflected deep fears about the future, for instance when inhabitants of villages in the Jaun Valley fought in opposition to the prohibition of ringing bells against bad weather. In the end, the villages that rose up were insofar successful as they could return to former religious practices – at least for a while. This does not confirm the idea that a new philosophy was emerging, but certainly their perception of the world was changed all the same. So, the reputation of the (enlightened) priests had declined and parishes began to organize themselves. Even women were able to adopt an active role in this fight. The fight for their traditional religion can't be described in terms of modernization. Nevertheless, it had a lasting impact these villages.

Fernando Esposito gives a refreshing new interpretation of Hegel. Whereas Hegel had mostly been read as the prophet of modernity and modernization until the 1960s and 1970s, this changed in the 1980s. By characterizing Hegel as a philosopher who can be read in various ways, Esposito also questions the 'Sattelzeit' theory and the notion of the decades around 1800 as the starting point for imagining an open future and optimistic worldviews. After general remarks on the notion of time and temporalization, Esposito shows that Hegel's use of the concept of the "end of history" has long been interpreted as paradigmatic for the rise of the collective singulars 'history' and 'progress'. This was the leading interpretation of Hegel in Europe until the 1980s or the period deemed 'post-modernity'. Since then, the perception of Hegel has changed. Instead of the 'old' Hegel, a 'historicist' Hegel arose whose dialectical method implies a description of history as a never-ending process without the idea of one (European) "end of history". Here, as in the previous chapter, the "end of history" notion is connected to the experience of disaster and Hegel's persisting fear. It is therefore no wonder that of all people it is Hegel to whom growing numbers of postmodernists refer.

‘Daß alles beym Alten bleibet’

Josephinism and Religious Orders in Inner Austria

Dennis Schmidt

This paper focuses on a phase of reform in the Habsburg Monarchy in the second half of the eighteenth century, known as Josephinism.[1] The name derives from Emperor Joseph II[2], who ruled alone, between 1780 and 1790, after the death of his mother, Maria Theresia. He continued, or rather intensified, the politics of his mother. She had executed reforms in many different areas, as when assisted by her State Chancellors Friedrich Wilhelm von Haugwitz and Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz.[3] The historical research about Josephinism is closely connected with the concepts of Enlightened Absolutism and Catholic Enlightenment.[4]

The chapter is based mainly on Inner Austrian examples and is part of a project about the reactions of the Catholic clergy in Inner Austria to the threat of Josephinism, if it really can be seen as one. Inner Austria was that part of the Habsburg Monarchy that Charles II inherited after the death of his father, Emperor Ferdinand I, in 1564.[5] In that so-called *Zweite Erbteilung* (second distribution of the estate), the Monarchy was divided into three parts: The firstborn son, Emperor Maximilian II, received Hungary, Bohemia and the archduchies

[1] See for a brief account: *Harm Klueting*, Einleitung, in: Id. (Ed.), Der Josephinismus. Ausgewählte Quellen zur Geschichte der theresianisch-josephinischen Reformen, Darmstadt 1995, 1–17.

[2] The best current biography about Joseph II is *Derek Beales*, Joseph II. Vol. 1: In the Shadow of Maria Theresia 1741–1780, Cambridge 1987, Vol. 2: Against the World. 1780–1790, Cambridge 2009. The most detailed study in German is *Karl Gutkas*, Kaiser Joseph II. Eine Biographie, Wien / Darmstadt 1989.

[3] To Kaunitz cf. *Grete Klingenstein*, Der Aufstieg des Hauses Kaunitz. Studien zur Herkunft und Bildung des Stastskanzlers Wenzel Anton, Göttingen 1975; *Franz A. J. Szabo*, Kaunitz and enlightened absolutism. 1753–1780, Cambridge 1994; *Grete Klingenstein / Franz A. J. Szabo* (Eds.), Staatskanzler Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz-Rietberg 1711–1794. Neue Perspektiven zu Politik und Kultur der europäischen Aufklärung, Graz 1996.

[4] *Helmut Reinalter* (Ed.), Josephinismus als Aufgeklärter Absolutismus, Wien / Köln / Weimar 2008; *Elisabeth Kovács* (Ed.), Katholische Aufklärung und Josephinismus, München 1979; *Rainer Bendel / Norbert Spannenberger* (Eds.), Katholische Aufklärung und Josephinismus. Rezeptionsformen in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa, Köln / Weimar / Wien 2015.

[5] *Alfred Kohler*, Ferdinand I. 1503–1564. Fürst, König und Kaiser, München 2003; *Karl Amon*, Innerösterreich, in: Anton Schindling / Walter Ziegler (Eds.), Die Territorien des Reichs im Zeitalter der Reformation und Konfessionalisierung. Land und Konfession 1500–1650, Vol. 1: Der Südosten, 2nd ed. Münster 1992, 102–116.

of Austria; the second son Ferdinand Tyrol and Further Austria; the third son Charles received Inner Austria, which mainly consisted of the three duchies of Styria, Carinthia and Carniola. Inner Austria was ruled from its capital Graz until Charles' son, Ferdinand II, unified most of the Habsburg Monarchy and moved to Vienna.[6] Inner Austria remained an administrative unit. Joseph II, for example, formed the Inner Austrian *Gubernium*, an administrative unit between central state and provinces, which resided in Graz.[7]

Three different social or religious orders, threatened by Josephinism in one way or another, are treated in this chapter. These orders differ in coverage, dimension and prominence. They range from macro- to micro-perspective, from the order of the Habsburg Monarchy as a whole, via the religious order in a small region in Carinthia, to the order of a single monastery in the western part of Styria. Each case is analyzed in four steps. Firstly, a characterization of the old order is offered. Secondly, the nature of the threat of Josephinism to the social order in question is discussed. In a third step, the situation during the stage of threat is described and, finally, the end of the threat is presented. But first of all, a discussion of some words concerning the methodological approach to threatened orders: communication of threat.

Communication of Threat

The communication of threat is a central concept for the research of threatened orders because the main attribute of such orders is actors communicating an existential threat and thus creating the very threat. This constructivist concept was mainly developed by Werner Schirmer in 2008[8] and was advanced further by a group of researchers from Tübingen in 2014.[9] Schirmer's model is embedded in the social systems theory, whereas the Tübingen concept is more interested in the actors. One of Schirmer's axiomatic theoretical postulates, that "communication can produce security as well as insecurity,"[10] is absolutely correct. It is, in general,

[6] *Dieter Albrecht*, Ferdinand II., in: Anton Schindling/Walter Ziegler (Eds.), Die Kaiser der Neuzeit. 1519–1918. Heiliges Römisches Reich, Österreich, Deutschland, München 1990, 125–141.

[7] *Anton Mell*, Grundriß der Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsgeschichte des Landes Steiermark, Graz 1929; *Gernot Peter Obersteiner*, Theresianische Verwaltungsreformen im Herzogtum Steiermark. Die Repräsentation und Kammer (1749–1763) als neue Landesbehörde des aufgeklärten Absolutismus, Graz 1993.

[8] *Werner Schirmer*, Bedrohungskommunikation. Eine gesellschaftstheoretische Studie zu Sicherheit und Unsicherheit, Wiesbaden 2008.

[9] *Fabian Fechner/Tanja Granzow/Jacek Klimek et al.*, 'We are Gambling With our Survival.' Bedrohungskommunikation als Indikator für bedrohte Ordnungen, in: Ewald Frie/Mischa Meier (Eds.), Aufruhr – Katastrophe – Konkurrenz – Zerfall. Bedrohte Ordnungen als Thema der Kulturwissenschaften, Tübingen 2014, 141–173.

[10] *Schirmer*, Bedrohungskommunikation, 85.

the successful communication of threat that generates a situation of insecurity for an order, whereas the threat in some earlier cases was only observed by a small group of so-called experts, who afterward establish communication in a bigger group.

Threat can be understood as the "(contingent) relationship between an object that is seen as threatened and an object that is interpreted as the source of threat."[11] The factor of time is a mentionable attribute, too: "Communication of threat takes place in the present but is directed towards an unknown future."[12] It is a combination of an agreement about the status quo and prospective threat scenarios.[13] Another important indicator of communication of threat is that the speaker is involved. He labels a threatened object that is crucial for a construed collective to which the speaker and the receiver belong. The relationship between speaker and receiver distinguishes communications of threat from warnings.[14] From the speaker's point of view, the receiver acts as an active or passive intensifier of threat, maybe because of unnoticed threatsupporting behavior or merely a result of faineance.

The speaker communicates his observation to the receiver and sketches threat scenarios directed to the future.[15] This act of communication is linked to the speaker's expectations of how the receiver(s) should react to the threat. In this way, the speaker often provides recommendations for action.[16] Of course this does not remain a one-way communication process. In the next step, the receiver may reproduce this construction, whereupon he modifies it and communicates his own threat scenarios and recommendations for action.

The Habsburg Monarchy

The first order under threat is the Habsburg Monarchy as a whole. In this case, the threat was first perceived and communicated by conservative clergymen, who resisted reforms in politics, church and state. For them, the reforms threatened the *Pietas Austriaca*, the most important virtue of the Habsburg dynasty and thereby their composite monarchy. That term describes the loyal catholic orientation of the Habsburg dynasty, their personal devoutness and the promotion of religious practices like pilgrimages or the adoration of the Virgin Mary.[17]

[11] Ibid., 103.
[12] Ibid., 105.
[13] *Fechner/Granzow/Klimek*, 'We are Gambling', 161–168.
[14] *Schirmer*, Bedrohungskommunikation, 109.
[15] *Fechner/Granzow/Klimek*, 'We are Gambling', 165–168.
[16] Ibid., 168–171.
[17] *Anna Coreth*, Pietas Austriaca. Österreichische Frömmigkeit im Barock, München 1982. A good inner Austrian example of the early counter reformatory *Pietas Austriaca* of Ferdinand II is the painting of the high altar in the capuchin church of Saint Anthony in Graz. Cf. *Helmut*

Connected to this decidedly catholic attitude was the support of the orders of Counter-Reformation and baroque, especially the Jesuits but also the Capuchins and Ursulines. With the threat for the *Pietas Austriaca*, the status of Catholicism as the official religious denomination of the Habsburg Monarchy was in danger. The principle of monoconfessionality was a cornerstone of this composite monarchy, at least in its central countries. Hungary was a particular case as the Emperors had often tried to enforce Catholicism there as well.[18] Religious unity was seen as a basic need: *religio fundamentum rei publicae* or *religio vinculum societatis*[19], in the France of Louis XIV the slogan: *un roi – une loi – une foi.*[20] With the Patent of Toleration in 1781, Joseph II granted non-Catholic Christians (Lutherans, Calvinists and Orthodox), and later even the Jews, the right of – restricted – practice of religion as well as civil equality.[21]

The conservative clergymen tried to convince all Catholics, or at least the clergy in the Habsburg Monarchy, of the dangers that lay in the reforms. They suggested and expected resistance to the imperial policy. This meant trying to influence the powerful circles in Vienna or even the Emperor himself. One of the threat scenarios they described was a destructive victory of Freethought. They appealed to an assumed collective that can be understood as (Catholic) Christianity. The previous role of the receivers was interpreted as an intensifier. That role was active for those who assisted in the execution of the imperial instructions and passive for those who stayed silent. With that silence, in the opinion of the speakers, they intensified the threat.

But let us turn to the four steps described above, starting with the old order. The Habsburg Monarchy was characterized – at least on the religious field – by the *Pietas Austriaca* mentioned above.

J. Mezler-Andelberg, Zur Verehrung der Heiligen während des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts in der Steiermark, in: Id., Kirche in der Steiermark. Gesammelte Aufsätze, Wien / Köln / Weimar 1994, 243–278, 266 et seq. [first published in 1968]; *Kerstin Schmal*, Die Pietas Maria Theresias im Spannungsfeld von Barock und Aufklärung. Religiöse Praxis und Sendungsbewußtsein gegenüber Familie, Untertanen und Dynastie, Frankfurt / Main 2001.

[18] Or at least to unify the different denominations in Hungary. Cf. for example *András Forgó*, Kirchliche Einigungsversuche in Ungarn. Die Unionsverhandlungen Christophorus Rojas y Spinolas in der zweiten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts, Mainz 2007.

[19] This phrase was formulated by 16th century humanists. They refer to Cicero's *de re publica* and *de legibus* as well as to Plato's *Nomoi.* Cf. *Folkert Postma*, Prefigurations of the Future? The Views on the Boundaries of Church and State of William of Orange and Vigilius van Aytta (1565–1566), in: Alasdair A. MacDonald / Arend H. Huussen (Eds.), Scholarly Environments. Centres of Learning and Institutional Contexts. 1560–1960, Leuven 2004, 15–32, 26 et seq.; *Ernst Feil*, Religio, Vol. 2: Die Geschichte eines neuzeitlichen Grundbegriffs zwischen Reformation und Rationalismus (ca. 1540–1620), Göttingen 1997, 206 et seq.

[20] *Christoph Link*, Toleranz im deutschen Staatsrecht der Neuzeit, in: Peter F. Barton (Ed.), Im Zeichen der Toleranz. Aufsätze zur Toleranzgesetzgebung des 18. Jahrhunderts im Reiche Josephs II., Wien 1981, 17–38, 19.

[21] *Joseph Karniel*, Die Toleranzpolitik Kaiser Josephs II., Gerlingen 1986.

That practice changed during the reign of Maria Theresia. Threatened by the rise of Prussia and the crushing defeat in the War of the Austrian Succession[22], while also impressed by how much more money Prussia had managed to squeeze out of Silesia, the monarch started with *der großen Remedur*, or "the grand renovation", as it was called.[23] One of its features was the limitation of the clergy's privileges and influence. This state reform was associated with the reform movement in the Catholic Church. Reform Catholicism was strongly influenced by Jansenism in Austria[24] and the developing Catholic Enlightenment.[25] Leading representatives of the Church, including the Inner Austrian Bishops, supported this endeavor.[26]

After the death of his mother in 1780, Joseph II increased the speed of reform markedly. Every day, so it seemed to the people, new decrees were produced in Vienna.[27] The Patent of Toleration in 1781, the beginning of the abolition of monasteries in 1782, the first steps to the adjustment of political and ecclesiastical borders in 1783, etc., caused the lives of the people to change fast. Institutions that seemed indestructible before were simply disposed of. Many people from inside and outside the Habsburg Monarchy started to communicate about Joseph II and his ambitious agenda. The proponents of the Enlightenment applauded the emperor, but many others did not. One famous example of the enthusiastic reception of Joseph II is the "Ode an den Kaiser" by the famous poet Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock from 1781, in which he acclaimed the emperor as liberator of the peasants, Jews and the German nation.[28] There were lyrical reactions by the conservatives, in which they attack Klopstock for his ode to the emperor

[22] In English cf. *Reed Browning*, The War of Austrian Succession, New York 1993.

[23] That is a phrase used by Maria Theresia in a memorandum from 1750, the so-called "first political testament". It is edited by *Friedrich Walter* (Ed.), Maria Theresia. Briefe und Aktenstücke in Auswahl, Darmstadt 1968, 63–97, 72.

[24] *Peter Hersche*, Der Spätjansenismus in Österreich, Wien 1977.

[25] *Kovács*, Katholische Aufklärung und Josephinismus; *Jeffrey D. Burson / Ulrich L. Lehner* (Eds.), Enlightenment and Catholicism in Europe. A Transnational History, Notre Dame 2014; *Bendel / Spannenberger,* Katholische Aufklärung und Josephinismus.

[26] The most famous was the bishop of Laibach, Johann Karl Herberstein, who published a pastoral letter in 1782 in which he among other things defended tolerance: *Johann Karl Graf Herberstein*, Hirtenbrief an die Geistlichkeit, und das Volk der Laybachischen Diöces. Von dem Bischofe zu Laybach, in: Der aufgeklärte Reformkatholizismus in Österreich, ed. by *Peter Hersche*, Bern 1976, 17–43 cf. on the bishops: *Dennis Schmidt*, Die österreichisch-böhmischen Bischöfe der theresianisch-josephinischen Zeit. Versuch einer synoptischen Visualisierung, in: Thomas Wallnig / Elisabeth Lobenwein / Franz-Stephan Seitschek (Eds.), Maria Theresia? Neue Perspektiven der Forschung (Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert und Österreich 32), Bochum 2017, 87–112.

[27] In the first four years of his regency Joseph enacted more decrees about religious topics than were issued in the fourteen years before (1767–1780) and eleven years after his (1790–1800) regency combined. That count is based on the data of *Herbert Rieser*, Der Geist des Josephinismus und sein Fortleben. Der Kampf der Kirche um ihre Freiheit, Wien 1963, 49 et seq.

[28] Nr. 111: Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock: Ode "an den Kaiser", in: *Klueting*, Josephinismus, 268 et seq.

and insulted him as a "Judenfreund", a friend of the Jews.[29] A communication of threat had developed, in written articles of the social elite as well as in taverns and churches in rural areas.[30] The social as the well political order of the monarchy was threatened.

Joseph's power reached its peak in the middle of the decade. However, he had overplayed his hand.[31] Even bishops who had supported him before, started to see things more critically. They remained reform orientated, but increasing governmental interventions in ecclesiastical affairs and the ever more radical Josephinian publications threatened them. A good example of that change is the Bishop of Seckau Joseph Adam von Arco. He was an eager supporter of Joseph II in the first years, but in the second half of the century their relation declined. One reason was the training of priests in the general seminary ("Generalseminar") that was not under control of the bishop but of the secular state.[32] Another example were the books written by radical proponents of the (Catholic) Enlightenment which went much too far in their demands for reform; at least from the perspective of this Styrian bishop.[33] It seemed to Joseph's moderate supporters that it was not a question of reform anymore, but of devilish change. Especially in Hungary, Tyrol and Belgium, Joseph was confronted with organized resistance. In Belgium the so-called Brabant Revolution of 1789 was a result of this hasty and heedless policy.[34]

How did the threat to the political order of the monarchy come to an end? The United States of Belgium were militarily defeated in December 1790. However, that is just the Belgian case. In 1789, the situation was declining in the other parts of the Monarchy, too. It was the death of Joseph II in February 1790, and

[29] Vier Oden in der Affaire wegen der Ode Klopstocks an den Kaiser, von dem Verfasser der Antiphone herausgegeben, 1782, in: Neueste Sammlung jener Schriften, die von einigen Jahren her über verschiedene wichtigste Gegenstände zur Steuer der Wahrheit im Drucke erschienen sind 37 (1788).

[30] An impressive evidence for growing scepticism within the rural population is the printed sermon of the Capuchin Basilian Gottsberger in Knittelfeld (Styria). In this sermon, he tried to convince the locals that the reforms of Joseph II are not an adoption of Lutheranism. *Basilian Gotssberger*, Frage: Werden wir bald alle lutherisch werden? Beantwortet in einer sittlichen Rede am Ostermontag zu Knittelfeld, Graz 1784.

[31] The most famous example is the "Klappsarg", a re-usable coffin that Joseph ordered to use for burials in September 1784. He had to withdraw that order only four months later because of strong popular resistance. The decree is published in *Joseph Kropatschek* (Ed.), Handbuch aller unter der Regierung des Kaisers Joseph des II. für die K. K. Erbländer ergangenen Verordnungen und Gesetze in einer Sistematischen Verbindung, Vol. VI, Wien 1786, 565–568. The withdrawal: Ibid., Vol. VIII, Wien 1787, 675 et seq.

[32] That is to see in Arco's remonstrance from 1790 in which he inter alia demanded the control over the seminary. Cf. Diözesanarchiv Graz, Konsistorialprotokoll, 1790, Ausgang, 181–192.

[33] *Karl Amon*, Vom Jesuitenkolleg zum Priesterseminar, in: 400 Jahre Grazer Priesterseminar, Graz 1973, 3–11.

[34] *Janet Polasky*, The Brabant Revolution, "a Revolution in Historiographical Perception", in: Journal of Belgian History 4, 2005, 435–455.

the more pragmatic policy of his successor and brother Leopold II, which finally ended the threat in the field of religion. Leopold withdrew some of the decrees of his late brother and acted more accommodatingly toward the demands of the bishops and estates.[35] In the following period, the conflict with the French Republic marginalized other problems. The inner conflicts froze for a time, but some of them would return in the nineteenth century.[36]

The Jaun Valley

On a smaller level, a similar conflict can be examined in the Jaun Valley in Lower Carinthia.[37] This valley is located in the south-east of the former duchy, now the state of Carinthia. It was, and still is, populated by German and Slovenian speakers. The religious order – and as a consequence the social order – of this area came under heavy stress in the second half of the 1780s. Some reforms were seen as existential threats by the local communities. Especially the prohibition of bell ringing against bad weather, the disrobement of the statues of the Virgin Mary and the prohibition of processions were catalysts for opposition to the local, regional and national authorities.[38] As in the case before, the character of the old order is outlined first.

The order in question was the religious order of the baroque, established in the Counter-Reformation during the seventeenth century.[39] Religious practices were a dominant factor in the life of individuals and whole communities, they structured days, weeks and years.[40] They were the fundamental basics of the small cities and villages in the valleys of the Alps. These religious practices were closely connected with two other important basic factors of life: rural work routines and natural cycles. As a whole, the baroque order can be characterized as public, collective, theatrical, semi-magical and splendorous. In the words of the Swiss historian Peter Hersche, it represented "a culture of leisure and prodigality."[41]

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[35] *Adam Wandruszka*, Leopold II. Erzherzog von Österreich, Großherzog von Toskana, König von Ungarn und Böhmen, Römischer Kaiser, 2 vols., Wien 1963/65.

[36] *Christian Ehalt / Jean Mondot* (Eds.), Was blieb vom Josephinismus? Zum 65. Geburtstag von Helmut Reinalter. Internationales Kolloquium der Universität Innsbruck am 8. und 9. Mai 2009 in der 'Claudiana', Innsbruck 2010.

[37] *Stephan Singer*, Kultur- und Kirchengeschichte des Jauntales. Dekanat Eberndorf, Kappel 1938.

[38] *Hans Hollerweger*, Die Reform des Gottesdienstes zur Zeit des Josephinismus in Österreich, Regensburg 1976, for Inner Austria cf. 199–231.

[39] A classic study about baroque Austria is: *Oswald Redlich*, Weltmacht des Barock. Österreich in der Zeit Kaiser Leopolds I., Wien 1961.

[40] *Andreas Holzem*, Religion und Lebensformen. Katholische Konfessionalisierung im Sendgericht des Fürstbistums Münster 1570–1800, Paderborn / München / Wien et al. 2000.

[41] *Peter Hersche*, Muße und Verschwendung. Europäische Kultur und Gesellschaft im Barockzeitalter, 2 vols., Freiburg / Basel / Wien 2006.

The priests, as administers of the sacraments, played an important role in their communities.[42] This is especially true for parish priests in the communities without abbeys or friaries. In the small parishes, there wasn't even a chaplain; the priest was the only one who could administer the sacraments. The priests were also leading interpreters of natural phenomena in their villages, for example after hail or a poor harvest. But it is important to say that the baroque devoutness was not only a result of actions on the part of the church, but also based on the traditions and beliefs of the common people.[43] As a result of the abolition of monasteries, the position of the parish priests was strengthened to a certain degree. The nature of the priests' office also changed, since – according to the ideals of Catholic Enlightenment – they were expected not to rule, but to be teachers of the people and were urged to follow the ideal of the good shepherd.[44]

With this, we have already reached the second step of analysis: the threat. Joseph and his advisers tried to establish a new, more enlightened order. This can be seen in the new role of the parish priests, but also in reforms of religious practices. Processions and bell ringing against bad weather, especially important in rural communities with a high vulnerability to extreme climatic influences, were forbidden.[45] It was also ordered that all statues of the Virgin Mary should be disrobed.[46] Taking care of the clothes for the statues was an important practice for the women in the villages and the statues were often nothing more than a staff with a head on it. Only the clothes made them look like a person. The conflict flared up after local authorities attempted to disrobe the statue of the Virgin Mary in the small city Kappel.[47] Resistance against the authorities spread in a few weeks to almost ten other communities in the Jaun Valley.[48] From the beginning,

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[42] Cf. for the role of the baroque priest *Hersche*, Muße und Verschwendung, 247–318.

[43] Cf. on "Volksfrömmigkeit" (popular piety) *Hansgeorg Molitor/Heribert Smolinsky* (Eds.), Volksfrömmigkeit in der Frühen Neuzeit, Münster 1994; *Wolfgang Brückner*, Mentalitätsgeschichtliche Probleme moderner Wallfahrtsforschung. Eine diskursanalytische Besinnung, in: Daniel Doležal/Hartmut Kühne (Eds.), Wallfahrten in der europäischen Kultur. Pilgrimage in European Culture, Frankfurt/Main 2006, 15–23.

[44] To the changing role of the parish priests cf. *Christine Schneider*, Der niedere Klerus im josephinischen Wien. Zwischen staatlicher Funktion und seelsorgerischer Aufgabe, Wien 1999; *Peter G. Tropper*, 'Hirt, Lehrer, Führer, Arzt und Vater'. Der Josephinismus und die neue Rolle des niederen Klerus, in: Harald Krahwinkler (Ed.), Staat – Land – Nation – Region. Gesellschaftliches Bewußtsein in den österreichischen Ländern Kärnten, Krain, Steiermark und Küstenland 1740 bis 1918, Klagenfurt 2002, 67–102.

[45] The bell ringing against bad weather can be seen as an apotropaic practice. Some interesting thoughts and examples: *Katrin Pfeifer*, Stürme über Europa. Eine Auswahl aus den Niederlanden und Österreich in der Frühen Neuzeit. Eine Kulturgeschichte, Wien 2014, 171–181.

[46] With decree from February 1784: Archiv der Republik Slowenien 14, Gubernij V Ljubljani, Reg. I., ODD VII. f.32 im f. 34, 1784–1786, Kt. 30, 4692/1784: Hofdekret an das I. Ö. Gub. vom 9. Februar 1784.

[47] That was first in 1788. Diözesanarchiv Klagenfurt, APA Eisenkappel, I, Schreiben des Kappeler Pfarrers an das Archidiakonat Eberndorf [undatiert, Vermerk darauf: 16. Februar 1788].

[48] To the history of events see *Siegfried Kristöffl*, Katholischer Pöbel und plattes Land. Zur

the greatest fear of the local authorities was exactly this expansion of resistance, which was likened to spreading fire.[49] Even though it stayed regional, it was seen as an existential threat. The resistance against imperial decrees, violent as well as non-violent, was seen as an illegal assault on the authority of the Emperor, a delegitimization of the existing order.

But from the view of the people in the uprising communities, the authorities were to blame for violating the common rules. Through the extensive regulation of religious practices, the sense of their whole life and the world around them was challenged – challenged by the very authorities whose duty it was to defend the existing social order. One strategy of dealing with and overcoming that challenge was to excuse Joseph II from any criticism.[50] The exalted head and defender of the political order could not be their enemy. He was not seen as the initiator of the new instructions, rather blame was placed on the local and regional authorities; the *Gubernium of Inner Austria,* the *Kreisamt of Klagenfurt* (Inner Austria was grouped in ten local administrative units, called *Kreisämter*) or just the parish priests.[51] Thus the sense of the whole social, political and religious order remained. However, the local orders changed in the period of threat. Two results were particularly striking: (1) The reputation of the priests declined. They were often victims of violence, verbal as well as physical. (2) Women became active participants in local decision-making and they publicly acted as an integral part of the community. Often they seemed to be the driving force of resistance. In one case in Saint Margarethen, for example, a compromise between the *Kreisamt* and some (male) delegates was prevented by the women of the village.[52]

How was this conflict between two contradicting demands – one for change and the other for perpetuation – solved in the end? How did the threat end? The authorities had one course of action that was, to a certain extent, effective.

Durchführung josephinischer Reformen in der Diözese Gurk. 1780–1790, Dipl. Salzburg 1989, 146–157.

[49] KLA, Gubernium Graz, Sch. 369, Mat. 51, 300, Protokoll der Sitzung der geistl. Komm. vom 14.02.1788.

[50] It was not uncommon that rebellious peasants saw themselves as the actual allies of a badly counselled monarch. See for example *Lorenz Mikoletzky*, Der Versuch einer Steuer- und Urbarialregulierung unter Kaiser Joseph II., in: Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 24, 1971, 310–346, 310; *Wolfgang Reinhard*, Theorie und Empirie bei der Erforschung frühneuzeitlicher Volksaufstände, in: Winfried Schulze (Ed.), Europäische Bauernrevolten der frühen Neuzeit, Frankfurt/Main 1982, 66–99, 77; *Jirko Krauß*, Ländlicher Alltag und Konflikt in der späten Frühen Neuzeit. Lebenswelt erzgebirgischer Rittergutsdörfer im Spiegel der kursächsischen Bauernunruhen 1790, Frankfurt/Main 2012, 367–369.

[51] In Kappel for example the legend that the responsible person was not the emperor but a local officer is still told today. Homepage der Gemeinde Bad Eisenkappel: http://www.bad-eisenkappel.info/tourismus/themen/erleben-natur-brauchtum-und-kultur/wallfahrtskirche-maria-dorn.html. (18 February 2015).

[52] Kärntner Landesarchiv, Gubernium Graz, Sch. 369, Mat. 51, 300, Protokoll der geistl. Komm. vom 19. Juni 1788/1.

Priests who were threatened with physical abuse by their flock were ordered to leave their parishes.[53] To be without any clerical attendance was a threat to the people in the parishes, which was almost as big as the fear of new religious practices. But this strategy worked only in a few cases and, of course, the people could not be convinced of the values of the reforms conducted in this way. Indeed, the threat to the religious order ended in and by indifference. Many communities returned to their old religious practices, which were officially forbidden, yet the authorities did not have the power to enforce the new order. A condition of ambiguity soon developed as a result. From the perspective of the unruly local communities, the threat was averted. In *Kappel* for example, where the unrest started, the people received written assurance from the archpriest, "*daß alles beym Alten bleibt*,"[54] "that everything remains as it was before." Of course, the archpriest did not have the right to assure such a thing, but the people in Kappel received a slip of paper with this assurance, so they ended their open resistance to reforms. It was the end in indifference. On both sides – people and authority – the communication about threat dropped out, and both adapted to this situation of ambiguity.[55] That is interesting, especially for the side of the reformers, because one of their aims was to end ambiguity and establish unambiguousness instead. In the words of that time: the fight against "Mißbräuche", against misuse. In this case, however, they had to accept their lack of power to enforce their order.[56]

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[53] KLA, Gubernium Graz, Sch. 369, Mat. 51, 300, Schreiben der geistl. Komm. an das Kreisamt vom 4. Juli 1788.

[54] Kärntner Landesarchiv, Gubernium Graz, Sch. 369, Mat. 51, 300, Schreiben des Eberndorfer Erzpriesters an das Klagenfurter Kreisamt vom 2. Mai 1788 [attached to the Hofdekret from May 26,1788].

[55] This thought follows the concept of a "culture of ambiguity" which was developed by Thomas Bauer in his fascinating history of Islam. *Thomas Bauer*, Die Kultur der Ambiguität. Eine andere Geschichte des Islams, Berlin 2011. In the German historical science, some authors are trying to operate with that concept. See for example *Gerd Althof*, Spielregeln symbolischer Kommunikation und das Problem der Ambiguität, in: Christina Brauner / Tim Neu / Barbara Stollberg-Rillinger (Eds.), Alles nur symbolisch? Bilanz und Perspektiven der Erforschung symbolischer Kommunikation, Köln / Weimar / Wien 2013, 35–51; *Frank Rexroth*, Transformationen des Rituellen. Überlegungen zur 'Disambiguierung' symbolischer Kommunikation während des langen 12. Jahrhunderts, in: Ibid., 69–92; *Andreas Pietsch / Barbara Stollberg-Rillinger* (Eds.), Konfessionelle Ambiguität. Uneindeutigkeit und Verstellung als religiöse Praxis in der Frühen Neuzeit, Gütersloh 2013.

[56] In a brutally honest letter to his bishop, the archpriest of Eberndorf described the situation in his district and beyond in 1791. He complained about the priests' declining reputation as a consequence of the reform and the unclear situation in matters of the religious order. Cf. Diözesanarchiv Klagenfurt, APA Eisenkappel, I, Schreiben des Eberndorfer Erzpriesters an das (Lavanter?) Ordinariat vom 27. Juli 1791.

Stainz

The third and last discussed threatened order is the monastery of the *Augustiner-Chorherren,* a religious community of secular priests who followed the rule of Saint Augustin in Stainz.[57] The monastery in Stainz was founded in 1229. The written rule of Saint Augustin[58] – demanding chastity, poverty, obedience and community – plus ecclesiastical law marked the order's frames. Furthermore, the principle of seniority was of great importance. It is important to keep in mind that the Augustinian canons in Stainz were not only clerical, but also manorial lords. In their scattered manor[59] they exerted both clerical and secular authority.

The reform-oriented forces in state and church tried to modify this situation. The state administration started to inspect the relationship between the landlords and their subjects constantly; that was a main duty of the *Kreisamt*.[60] Thereby the jurisdiction of the landlords was limited. The exemption of the monasteries – that is the release from episcopal jurisdiction – was eliminated. They were under attendance of the secular as well the clerical authorities. But it seems that the canons in Stainz did not really recognize the consequences of this new situation.[61]

With the beginning of the abolitions of monasteries in 1782[62], fear spread through many monasteries in the monarchy, including Stainz. But the reaction of the canons in Stainz differed from that in other communities: not every monastery of the Augustinian order was abolished, instead it was decided on a case-by-case basis. This status of dubiety and insecurity was the dynamic factor in the

[57] There are some treatises about the history of the monastery in Stainz: *Anton Selak*, Stainz. Ein Beitrag zur Ortsgeschichte, Stainz 1930; *Franz Weissofner*, Die letzten Chorherren des im Jahre 1785 aufgehobenen Stiftes Stainz. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer nachmaligen Verwendung in der Seelsorge. Diss. Phil. Graz 1978; *Herta Wlasak*, Die Aufhebung des Chorherrenstiftes Stainz unter Kaiser Joseph II. aus besitzgeschichtlicher Sicht. Diss. Phil. Graz 1979; *Hannes P. Naschenweng*, Stainz. Um 1229–1785, in: Floridus Röhrig (Ed.), Die ehemaligen Stifte der Augustiner-Chorherren in Österreich und Südtirol, Klosterneuburg 2005, 565–608.

[58] Of course, there is not just one authentic rule of Saint Augustin. Important are the *Praeceptum* and the *Ordo monasterii*, cf. *Tarsicius J. van Bavel*, Art. Augustinusregel, in: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche 1, Freiburg im Breisgau 2009, 1250 et seq.

[59] The monastery did not only possess the village Stainz, but also other manors in the Styrian south-west. The major styrian historiographer in the 18th century, *Aquilinus Julius Cäsar* listed them in his book Staat= und Kirchengeschichte des Herzogthum Steyermarks, Vol. IV, Graz 1786, 142–144.

[60] *Corinna von Bredow*, Die niederösterreichischen Kreisämter als Scharnier zwischen Landesregierung und Untertanen – Kommunikationsprozesse und Herrschaftspraxis, in: Stefan Brakensiek (Ed.), Herrschaft und Verwaltung in der Frühen Neuzeit, Berlin 2014, 25–36.

[61] This is not unusual because societies and social systems often are not able to 'understand' themselves – especially in times of accelerated social change. Cf. *Rudolf Schlögl*, Alter Glaube und moderne Welt. Europäisches Christentum im Umbruch. 1750–1850, Frankfurt / Main 2013, 17.

[62] The best study of the abolition of monasteries in Inner Austria is from the nineteenth century: *Adam Wolf*, Die Aufhebung der Klöster in Innerösterreich. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Kaiser Josephs II., Wien 1871.

time of threat. The canons did not openly protest against the looming abolition of their monastery, neither did they focus on spiritual life, as it is observed in other cases. The Ursulines in Vienna, for example, withdrew more or less from the public sphere, trying to avoid attracting any attention.[63] Instead, the canons in Stainz did not obey the rules or follow the routines of their order any longer. There had already been problems with discipline in *Stainz*, but after the seemingly inexorable abolition, a group of younger canons refused to integrate any longer. The committee that was formed to investigate the irregularities in Stainz concluded:

"(…) daß während dessen dem Todt des Prälaten nachgefolgten Administration die schon vorhin sehr wankende Kloster Zucht noch mehr verschüttet worden, welche endlich durch den erschallenen Ruf der gänzlichen Aufhebung aller Stifter in den dermahligen gänzlichen Verfall gekommen."[64]

"(…) that during the administration following the prelate's death, monastic discipline, which had been faltering before, declined further, collapsing into full decay when calls for the abolition of all monasteries rang out."

The main accusations concerned forbidden contact to women from the village Stainz. Some canons went sledding, celebrated Shrovetide and danced with women. Some actually had breakfast with the women in their private rooms in the enclosure. Prelate Johann Anton died in 1782 and the dean Müller, who officiated as administrator, was not able to call the deviant canons to order. The canon Seidler, who protested against the behavior of his confreres, drew the attention of the insubordinate group. They called him a denigrator and managed to isolate him within the monastery. In several letters, he bitterly complained about his situation:

"(…) wer weis, was meine Feinde wieder mich schmieden, das Herz schlägt in mir, meine Hand zitteret, helfen Sie mir, Ich bithe, als ein von allen Verlassener, gehaster, unglücklicher Geistlicher, könnte ich nur von Stift hinweg und an einer guten Pfarr in Obersteyer, als lezter mindester Kaplan dienen."[65]

Seidler wrote that he did not know what his enemies, the other canons, were planning against him. He wrote of fear, of his beating heart and shivering hand, and described himself as abandoned, hated and distressed. According to his letter, he would even have preferred to be a marginal chaplain in a parish in Upper Styria than to live in the *Stift* any longer.

[63] *Christine Schneider*, Kloster als Lebensform. Der Wiener Ursulinenkonvent in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts (1740–1790), Wien 2005.

[64] Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv Wien, Alter Kultus, Kt. 641, F. 67, Stift Stainz, Schreiben des Grazer Kreishauptmannes Wolf von Stubenberg an das innerösterreichische Gubernium vom 22. August 1784.

[65] Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv Wien, Alter Kultus, Kt. 641, F. 67, Stift Stainz, Schreiben Joseph Seidlers an Joseph Karl Kindermann, o. D.

But things were changing quickly, not only within the monastical community. The relations between the canons and their subjects were also reconfigured. Supported by a new inhabitant of the village, the former world traveller Joseph Karl Kindermann[66], the villagers complained about their landlord to the *Gubernium* and the bishop in the capital Graz. Although the canons showed documents concerning their unquestionable manner from the nearby landlords[67], they were found guilty. That shows how the power structure had changed – the statements of aristocratic landlords were no longer more important than the incriminations of the subjects. The new claim was expressed by Joseph Karl Kindermann. In a letter to one of the canons he proudly refused the demand for submission with the words: "Wir sind beyde Josephs Untertanen"[68] – "we both are Joseph's subjects". That meant: 'we are on the same level'. Joseph's policy of degradation of the *pouvoir intermédiaire*[69] – the powers between monarch and people – is expressed imposingly in that quotation. On the basis of this case it can be seen clearly that a threatened order can be a reaction to change and at the same time a catalyst of change.

Finally, let us examine the end of the threat. The monastery was abolished in 1785. With it, the canons' order was gone. Interestingly, the monastery was not abolished because of the bad behavior, but because of *Unnützlichkeit*, "uselessness" (Joseph II's utilitarian thinking is evident here). The offenders were punished anyway.[70] So, the monastery was gone and the canons afterward lived 'in the world,' as life outside the monastery is called in the sources. The manor was taken over by the state and that often meant a totally different situation for the inhabitants, with their landlord no longer being their neighbor but rather living far away. They henceforward had to deal with officers, not with their landlord himself.

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[66] Kindermann led an interesting life: born in Hungary in 1744, he studied in Vienna, fell into conflict with his father, took up positions with the Dutch East Indian Company with stations in Cape Town and Ceylon. Because of disease, he was forced to return to Europe and returned to his parents who now lived in Styria. There, Kindermann acted as publicist and especially as cartographer. He died in Vienna in 1801. Cf. *Anton Schlossar*, Art. Kindermann, Joseph Karl, in: Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie Vol. 15, München/Leipzig 1882, 763 et seq.; *Johannes Dörflinger*, Art. Kindermann, Joseph Karl, in: Neue Deutsche Biographie Vol. 11, Berlin 1977, 618 et seq.

[67] Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv Wien, Alter Kultus, Kt. 641, F. 67, Stift Stainz, Beilagen zum Schreiben Joseph Johann Millers an die Kommission vom 13. August 1784.

[68] Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv Wien, Alter Kultus, Kt. 641, F. 67, Stift Stainz, Schreiben Joseph Karl Kindermanns an den Chorherren Aloysius Dinzl von Angerburg vom 25. August 1783.

[69] Clearly articulated by *Werner Ogris*, Joseph II. Staats- und Rechtsreformen, in: Peter F. Barton (Ed.), Im Zeichen der Toleranz. Aufsätze zur Toleranzgesetzgebung des 18. Jahrhunderts im Reiche Josephs II., Wien 1981, 109–151, 119.

[70] Diözesanarchiv Graz, Klöster und Stifte, Stift Stainz, 54-d-1/2, Schreiben des Guberniums an Bischof Adam Arco vom 28. Oktober 1784.

Conclusion

In the 1780s different orders in the Habsburg Monarchy came under heavy stress, triggered by the reforms which emanated from the court in Vienna. On an abstract level, Josephinism may be examined as a conflict between competing social orders. Three cases were presented in this paper: on a macro-level, the conflict between enlightened and traditional concepts of order, on a meso-level, a conflict between baroque religious practices and the demand for modesty, and on a micro-level, within one single monastery some of the consequences of its prospective abolition were studied. In all examples, the status of a threatened order ended, but in different ways. Utilizing the model of communication of threat, one can see that a threat can end with the (assumed) disappearance of its source (Joseph II in the case of the Habsburg Monarchy), the disappearance of the threatened object (the monastery of Stainz), or when the actors become convinced that the source of threat does not seem threatening anymore (as happened regarding religious practices in the Jauntal).

Finally, I would like to connect these results with the concept of the *Sattelzeit*.[71] There is an additional way, previously only hinted at, in which a threat may end: When actors come to the conclusion that there is another bigger, more dangerous, more important threat. And that is what happened at the end of Joseph's reign and above all in the following decade. A new threat arose in the west – revolution. It was not a traditional revolution as undertaken by the Estates in Belgium, but a revolution of commoners, a revolution that promised radical change. Especially after the death of King Louis XVI in January 1793, the French Republic was seen as an absolute devilish threat. Alleged followers in Austria were rigorously persecuted.[72] An atmosphere of fear arose. There was no potential for ongoing reforms.

It may be asked if Josephinism, with the conflict between its enlightened advocates and its conservative enemies, was a foreshadowing for the clash of political ideologies after the French Revolution. In central Europe, and possibly beyond, the era of Josephinism and similar enlightened projects in other states were the

[71] That very influential concept was developed by the German historian *Reinhart Koselleck*, Einleitung, in: Otto Brunner / Werner Conze / Reinhart Koselleck (Eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, Vol. 1, Stuttgart 1972, XIII–XXVII. An interesting adaptation for Josephinism was undertaken by *Sebastian Hansen*, Verzeitlichungstendenz des Josephinismus, in: Achim Landwehr (Ed.), Frühe Neue Zeiten. Zeitwissen zwischen Reformation und Revolution, Bielefeld 2012, 357–372. Cf. also Fernando Esposito's chapter in this volume.

[72] *Ernst Wangermann*, From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials. Government Policy and Public Opinion in the Habsburg Dominions in the Period of the French Revolution, Oxford 1959; *Lucian Maximilian Röthlisberger*, Die Jakobiner in Österreich. Verfassungsdiskussionen in der Habsburgermonarchie zur Zeit der Französischen Revolution, Frankfurt / Main 2013.

genesis of the political spectra.[73] The French Revolution was not the starting point, but an important promoter. The change of language and time concepts, both central arguments to Reinhart Koselleck's *Sattelzeit* model, were of course not the results of the French Revolution either but of the time before. In the period of Josephinism, it can be observed that both sides used the same terms, but with a totally different meaning.

In the *Sattelzeit* apparently new threats arose that overlaid older threats. One central characteristic of the early modern period, confessional conflict, became less important. For the catholic clergy, after the experiment of Catholic Enlightenment and the experiences of French Revolution, Protestantism was not the one big threat anymore. Instead, it was replaced by the Freethinkers and the proponents of the Enlightenment, in one word, modernity.[74]

[73] The classic treatment for that question is *Fritz Valjavec*, Die Entstehung der politischen Strömungen in Deutschland 1770–1815, München 1951.

[74] A good example of that development was the College of the Ex-Jesuits in Augsburg. They fought Protestantism until the early 1780s, when they suddenly changed their target: Now, the fight no longer concerned competing denomination, but the seemingly more dangerous enlightenment. Cf. *Michael Schaich*, 'Religionis defensor acerrimus'. Joseph Anton Weissenbach und der Kreis der Augsburger Exjesuiten, in: Wolfgang Albrecht / Christoph Weiß (Eds.), Von 'Obscuranten' und 'Eudämonisten'. Gegenaufklärerische und antirevolutionäre Publizisten im späten 18. Jahrhundert, St. Ingbert 1999, 77–123; *Dennis Schmidt*, Augsburg als Zentrum der Gegenaufklärung. Die publizistische Reaktion der Augsburger Ex-Jesuiten in St. Salvator auf die Bedrohung durch die josephinische Kirchenpolitik, Mag. Tübingen 2011.

The Two Ends of History and Historical Temporality as a Threatened Order

Fernando Esposito

Introduction: The Sattelzeit and Time as an Object of Order and Historiography – a Programmatic Outline for Further Inquiry

As is well known, the historian and doyen of German conceptual history Reinhart Koselleck understood the *Sattelzeit*, i. e. the age roughly between 1750 and 1850, as the era in which modernity, and with it a new understanding of temporality as well as a new concept of history, emerged.[1] One could argue that historical consciousness itself arose. In his Introduction to the lexicon *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe,* whose first volume was published in 1972, Koselleck declared that "a profound process of transformation of classical topoi took place" during the *Sattelzeit* "and old words acquired new meanings that are no longer in need of translation the closer they get to our present."[2] Furthermore, new concepts were coined. I believe that Koselleck's claim that the classical topoi are in no need of translation has become outdated. I will try to substantiate this assumption by taking a closer look at the change in the semantics of the topos of the "end of history" from Hegel at the beginning of the nineteenth century to the 1980s. Yet, before we get to the "end of history", or rather its two ends – the ambiguity is intended – some further groundwork has to be laid.

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[1] On the close nexus between 'modernity' as an era and a specific understanding of temporality and historicity see i.a.: *Peter Osborne*, The Politics of Time. Modernity and Avant-Garde, London 1995, xii: "Modernity is a form of historical time which valorizes the new as the product of a constantly self-negating temporal dynamic." Cf. also: *Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht*, Modern. Modernität, Moderne, in: Otto Brunner / Werner Conze / Reinhart Koselleck (Eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Vol. 4, Mi-Pre, Stuttgart 1978, 93–131 and *Peter Fritzsche*, Stranded in the Present. Modern Time and the Melancholy of History, Cambridge, MA 2004, 53 et seq.: "One of the distinguishing characteristics of the nineteenth-century sense of time […] is the dramatization of change as the restless iteration of the new, and also the insistence that the experience of this change is unique and foundational to the idea of modernity. It may well be the greatest conceit of modernity to claim for itself the special consciousness of transition and indeterminacy. In one stroke it deadened and immobilized history prior to 1789 […]. And, of course, the immobility which distorted the premodern period worked to accentuate the mobility that supposedly defined the modern sequences that followed it. The conceit served as its own best testimony."

[2] *Reinhart Koselleck*, Einleitung, in: Otto Brunner / Werner Conze / Reinhart Koselleck (Eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Vol. 1, A–D, Stuttgart 1972, XIII–XXVII, XV.

Koselleck tracked down the new, modern 'historicist' temporality in the semantic transformations that were taking place. Basic characteristics of this 'historicist temporality' are the valorization of the new, the vision of an open future, a belief in man's agency in regard to time, an understanding of time as an object of order, and most importantly a (potentially) all-encompassing historicism.[3] Koselleck sought out 'historicist temporality' in the meaning that amongst others the concept of a "neue Zeit", "new time", or the according composite concept "Neuzeit" had acquired. As Koselleck has shown, the latter implied that the era of modernity was temporally determined:

"Since the second half of the eighteenth century on, there has been a growing frequency of indices denoting the concept *neue Zeit* in a full sense. Time is no longer simply the medium in which all histories take place; it gains a historical quality. Consequently, history no longer occurs in, but through time. Time becomes a dynamic and historical force in its own right. Presupposed by this formulation of experience is a concept of history which is likewise new: the collective singular form of *Geschichte*, which since around 1780 can be conceived as history in and for itself in the absence of an associated subject or object."[4]

In recent years reservations have grown in regard to Koselleck's outline of a monolithic modern temporality and its dawn during the *Sattelzeit*. The boundaries between the pre-modern and modern age have become more permeable and diffuse. On the one hand, it has been argued that time became an object of intensive debate and new practices well before 1750 and that the "birth of the present," and thus the widening of the horizon of the future, should be located in the seventeenth rather than the eighteenth century, as Achim Landwehr has convincingly shown.[5] Revisiting Arno Seifert's criticism of the early 1980s, Stefanie Stockhorst and Jan Marco Sawilla have claimed that the process of "Verzeitlichung", or "temporalization", as well as the development of the collective singular 'history,' should be antedated. Koselleck's findings, the above authors

[3] In accordance with Otto Gerhard Oexle and Ernst Troeltsch I understand 'historicism' not as the German school of historiography – this is a secondary meaning of the term – but rather as the "process of the 'fundamental historicization of our knowledge and thought' […], the insight that anything and everything has historically come into being and is historically conveyed." See *Otto Gerhard Oexle*, Geschichtswissenschaft im Zeichen des Historismus. Bemerkungen zum Standort der Geschichtsforschung, in: Id. (Ed.), Geschichtswissenschaft im Zeichen des Historismus, Göttingen 1996, 17–40, here 17.

[4] *Reinhart Koselleck*, 'Neuzeit': Remarks on the Semantics of Modern Concepts of Movement, in: Id., Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time, New York 2004, 221–254, here 236. Cf. also 241 et seq.: "Two specific temporal determinants characterize the new experience of transition: the expected otherness of the future and, associated with it, the alteration in the rhythm of temporal experience: acceleration, by means of which one's own time is distinguished from what went before. […] The abbreviation of the periods which allow for a homogeneity of experience – stated differently, the acceleration of a change which consumes experience – has since then belonged to the topoi characteristic of the prevailing *neueste Geschichte*."

[5] Cf. *Achim Landwehr*, Geburt der Gegenwart. Eine Geschichte der Zeit im 17. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt/Main 2014.

have argued, deserve closer scrutinizing as his interest in the *Sattelzeit* was motivated by modernization theory[6] and can be understood as a self-referential attempt of 'a modern' to describe and come to grips with modernity itself.[7] On the other hand, relevant doubts have been expressed in regard to the monolithic character of the modern "regime of historicity" that has been extrapolated from Koselleck's works amongst others by François Hartog and Aleida Assmann.[8] Achim Landwehr has plausibly asserted that we should think of societies as pluritemporal, i. e.:

"[…] social groups, objects, events etc. are at least potentially capable of bringing forth their own forms of time that can vary considerably from others. The concept of pluritemporality expresses a methodical doubt in regard to the idea that societies deal with solely one form of time that coincides with the time of watches and calendars. Societies aren't situated in a cocoon-like monolithic time regime, they do not know only one form of synchrony. Rather, they cultivate numerous, parallel forms of time, i. e. they exist in a world of many synchronies."[9]

Not only do various social groups live in different, and at times contradictory, social times and have different visions of their past, present, and future, there are also multiple time spheres or perspectives with their own rhythms and tempos, as well as time layers within one and the same social time aggregate individuals partake in. As Hartmut Rosa has pointed out, in accordance with Peter Ahlheit and Anthony Giddens, "actors always simultaneously develop three distinct temporal perspectives whose relations with each other they must repeatedly reconsider and work out in their temporal practices", i. e. synchronize them. Actors experience everyday time as well as a "perspective on life as a whole"

[6] The following might be a chance finding and further research will have to show if there is any substance to the assumption that Koselleck may have adapted the term "horizon of expectation" – one of Koselleck's most substantial concepts that complemented his "space of experience" – from Walt Whitman Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth*, the canonical text of modernization theory. In the latter's chapter concerning the pre-conditions for take-off we read: "And more generally – in rural as in urban areas – the horizon of expectation must lift; and men must become prepared for a life of change and specialized function." See *Walt Whitman Rostow*, The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge 1990 [or. 1960], 26.

[7] See *Arno Seifert*, 'Verzeitlichung'. Zur Kritik einer neueren Frühneuzeitkategorie, in: Zeitschrift für historische Forschung 10, 1983, 447–477; *Stefanie Stockhorst*, Novus ordo temporum. Reinhart Kosellecks These von der Verzeitlichung des Geschichtsbewusstseins durch die Aufklärungshistoriographie in methodenkritischer Perspektive, in: Hans Joas / Peter Vogt (Eds.), Begriffene Geschichte. Beiträge zum Werk Reinhart Kosellecks, Berlin 2011, 359–386; *Jan Marco Sawilla*, Geschichte und Geschichten zwischen Providenz und Machbarkeit. Überlegungen zu Reinhart Kosellecks Semantik historischer Zeiten, in: Ibid., 387–422.

[8] See *Aleida Assmann*, Ist die Zeit aus den Fugen? Aufstieg und Fall des Zeitregimes der Moderne, München 2013 and *François Hartog*, Regimes of Historicity. Presentism and Experiences of Time, New York 2015 [French or. 2003].

[9] *Achim Landwehr*, Alte Zeiten, Neue Zeiten. Aussichten auf die Zeit-Geschichte, in: Id. (Ed.), Frühe Neue Zeiten. Zeitwissen zwischen Reformation und Revolution, Bielefeld 2012, 9–40, here 25.

or "lifetime". Furthermore, everyday time and lifetime are embedded in "the encompassing time of their epoch, their generation, and their age" which Rosa calls "historical time".[10] These three-time tiers are themselves in turn embedded in a further, fourth time tier that may be referred to as "sacred time".[11] The latter "overarches the linear time of life and history, establishes its beginning and its end, and sublates life history and world history in a common, higher, and, so to speak, timeless time."[12]

This plurality of time tiers and social times needs further differentiation. Moreover, apart from synchronization of social groups and individuals via (technical) objects such as the watch and the calendar[13], we do not yet know very much about the process of synchronization via institutions, regulations, and discourses. This is a task historiography will have to take up in the following years. For the time being, it is essential to assert that while it seems rather obvious to us that individuals and social groups live in a plurality of social times and understandings of temporality, time tiers and dimensions, we obviously needed to be reminded of pluritemporality. The pluritemporality claim is, in a way, a performative contradiction.

In the following, I will take a cursory look at what I believe to be plausible starting or endpoints for further inquiry, namely the growing talk of the "end of history" in Hegel's writings on one hand and by a number of intellectuals roughly in the last third of the twentieth century on the other hand. I will first scrutinize Hegel's "end of history"-thesis against the backdrop of the dynamic social change taking place during the revolutionary era. I will be focusing on Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of History,* which he held in Berlin between 1822 and 1830. Along with his *Phenomenology of Spirit* from 1806 and his *Philosophy of Right,* which was published in the winter of 1820/21, his lectures are the *locus classicus* of this modern day chronotopos.[14] I will then contrast the semantics and

[10] *Hartmut Rosa*, Social Acceleration. A New Theory of Modernity, New York 2013, 8 et seq.

[11] On "sacred time" see *Mircea Eliade*, The Sacred and the Profane. The Nature of Religion, Orlando 1987 [repr.].

[12] *Rosa*, Social Acceleration, 11.

[13] Cf. for example: *Vanessa Ogle*, The Global Transformation of Time, 1870–1950, Cambridge, MA 2015.

[14] I will use Bachtin's term, which implies a kind of timescape, differently here in the sense of a specific temporal commonplace. On chronotopes or chronotypes see *Michail M. Bachtin*, Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel, in: Id., The Dialogic Imagination. Four Essays, ed. by Michael Holquist, Austin, TX 1981, 84–258 and *John Bender*/*David E. Wellbery*, Introduction, in: Id. (Eds.), Chronotypes. The Construction of Time, Stanford, CA 1991, 1–15. Bender and Wellbery's definition of chronotype (p. 4) is more suitable to my undertaking: "Chronotypes are models or patterns through which time assumes practical or conceptual significance. Time is not given but […] fabricated in an ongoing process. Chronotypes are themselves temporal and plural, constantly being made and remade at multiple individual, social, and cultural levels. They interact with one another, sometimes cooperatively, sometimes conflictually. They change over time and therefore have a history or histories, the construal of which itself is an act of temporal construction."

function of his "end of history" with the posthistorical mindset that established itself roughly in the 1970s and 1980s. This latter period, which we in Tübingen have subsumed under the header "after the boom", saw a downright inflation of posthistorical concepts. Therefore, I will only be able to give a cursory overview of context.[15]

One of my underlying aims is to reconcile the vision of a supposedly monolithic 'modern' "regime of historicity" – or as I prefer to call it 'historicist temporality' – deduced amongst others from Koselleck's writings, with Achim Landwehr's pluritemporality thesis. I will argue that both in the first third of the nineteenth and in the last third of the twentieth centuries intellectuals made use of the chronotopos of the "end of history" to make sense of the dynamic social change that was occurring in their midst. Furthermore, the "end of history" served to order time, i. e. to make sense of the disruption between past, present and future that contemporaries were experiencing by virtue of dynamic social change. And it possibly also helped synchronize everyday-time, lifetime, historical time and sacred time. During both of these phases of threat to the prevailing social, political, economic but also temporal order, i. e. the revolutionary era and the period after the boom, the chronotopos of the "end of history" acquired a specific meaning. My thesis is that Hegel's use of the "end of history" is exemplary for the temporally homogenizing tendencies that became prevalent during the *Sattelzeit* and that is apparent in the rise of the collective singulars 'history' and 'progress'. This merging of a plurality of histories and social times into one 'historicist temporality' would reach its peak along with the rise of the modern nation-state, or the "Leviathan 2.0".[16] Meanwhile, during the period 'after the boom', various intellectuals made use of the "end of history" to threaten or destabilize 'historicist temporality'. This hegemonic temporal order, which they deemed way too constringent, had to be historicized, pluralized, reframed or, to quote Lyotard, "rewritten".[17] In his essay *Nous n'avons jamais été modernes,* first published in 1991, Bruno Latour stated:

"Fortunately, nothing obliges us to maintain modern temporality with its succession of radical revolutions, its antimoderns who return to what they think is past, and its double concert of praise and complaint, for or against continual progress, for or against continual degeneration. We are not attached forever to this temporality that allows us to understand neither our past nor our future, and that forces us to shelve the totality of the human and

[15] See *Anselm Doering-Manteuffel / Lutz Raphael*, Nach dem Boom. Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970, Göttingen 2010². For a more detailed overview see my article "Von *no future* bis Posthistoire. Der Wandel des temporalen Imaginariums nach dem Boom" in: *Anselm Doering-Manteuffel / Lutz Raphael / Thomas Schlemmer* (Eds.), Vorgeschichte der Gegenwart. Dimensionen des Strukturbruchs nach dem Boom, Göttingen 2016, 393–423.

[16] *Charles S. Maier*, Leviathan 2.0. Die Erfindung moderner Staatlichkeit, in: *Emily S. Rosenberg* (Ed.), Geschichte der Welt, 1870–1945. Weltmärkte und Weltkriege, München 2012, 33–286.

[17] Cf. *Jean-François Lyotard*, Re-Writing Modernity, in: SubStance 16, 1987, 3–9.

nonhuman third worlds. It would be better to say that modern temporality has stopped passing. Let us not bemoan the fact, for our real history had only the vaguest of relations with the Procrustean bed that the modernizers and their enemies imposed on it. Time is not a general framework but a provisional result of the connection among entities. Modern discipline has reassembled, hooked together, systematized the cohort of contemporary elements to hold it together and thus to eliminate those that do not belong to the system. This attempt has failed; it has always failed."[18]

Hegel, the French Revolution and Discontent in History

To understand Hegel's chronotopos of the "end of history" and the function that I assume it has, it is essential to clarify his viewpoint in regard to the era of dynamic social change in which he was living. Yet, prior to this it is necessary to remind readers of the often enigmatic and abstruse character of his writings. To make sense of Hegel's philosophy I have had to seek out the help of translators and interpreters. In the course of this reading I have become aware of the possibly trivial fact that general knowledge on Hegel is frequently reliant not on an actual reading of Hegel himself but informed both by the legends surrounding him as well as the many interpretations that his work has experienced. These interpretations seem to have shifted so that the Hegel that has recently come to the fore is in many ways quite different from the Hegel of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[19] This interpretational shift is relevant here, as I believe that it is both an indicator and a factor of transformation of our temporal and semantical order, which will become apparent in the second usage of the "end of history" that I examine at the end of this paper. Let me try to clarify this by rephrasing it: I believe that something in the way history and time is understood was indeed transformed after the boom. That is why one of the founding fathers of modern historical thought and historiography has, in a way, become incomprehensible and indefensible and another Hegel has appeared on the scene. This applies likewise to his "end of history"-thesis or at least to the Hegelian "end of history myth", as Eric Michael Dale recently dubbed it.[20] It seems as if the teleological Hegel of yore has been displaced by a radically historicist Hegel who was there all along but has only recently grown predominant. This shows, I believe, that the attempt to come to grips with Hegel's "end of history" is not some esoteric historiographical gimmick, but strikes at the heart of our understanding of history

[18] *Bruno Latour*, We Have Never Been Modern, Cambridge, MA 1993, 74 et seq.

[19] Cf. *Paul Redding*, Hegel's Hermeneutics, Ithaca, NY 1996, 246: "the resurgence of interest in Hegelian thought characteristic of the last few decades has been largely concerned with working a way out of the labyrinth of those traditional interpretations which have dominated the reception of Hegel but which are now being increasingly recognized as inadequate to his thought."

[20] See *Eric Michael Dale,* Hegel, the End of History, and the Future, Cambridge 2014.

and of our dealings with time. Yet, how is Hegel's philosophy intertwined with the Revolution, the concept of freedom and of history?

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel – born in 1770 and died in 1831 – was a member of the "revolutionary generation". As Joachim Ritter asserted in his impressive and influential essay *Hegel and the French Revolution*:

> "For Hegel, the French Revolution is that event around which all the determinations of philosophy in relation to its time are clustered, with philosophy marking out the problem through attacks on and defences of the Revolution. Conversely there is no other philosophy that is a philosophy of revolution to such a degree and so profoundly, in its innermost drive, as that of Hegel. […] The Revolution has posed the problem which the epoch has to work out. This problem, posed and at the same time left unsolved by the Revolution, is that of the political realization of freedom."[21]

As a philosophy of the Revolution and of freedom, Hegel's philosophy is accordingly also a philosophy of dynamic social change and of the threat to the socioeconomic and political order of the *ancien regime*. This is the meaning of Hegel's often quoted "so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts" and why Hegel is relevant well beyond philosophy itself.[22] Yet, Hegel's philosophy can also be understood as a reflection of the "new time", the emergence of which Koselleck described.[23] I believe it mirrors the new sense of temporality characterized by "the restless iteration of the new", by the rupture between past, present and future and by the historical consciousness that helped come to terms with the "open future" that was realized in the Revolution.[24] His "end of history" is, I believe, a concept that allowed his contemporaries to cope with and master the contingency that the open future implied.

At any rate, Hegel's stance towards the French Revolution was differentiated. He criticized the terror that emanated from Robespierre's attempt to "set up the principle of Virtue as supreme".[25] In his eyes, this led solely into "negative action" and to the "fury of destruction":

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[21] See *Joachim Ritter*, Hegel and the French Revolution, in: Id., Hegel and the French Revolution. Essays on the Philosophy of Right, Cambridge, MA, 35–89, here 43, 47. On the following see Ibid, 43–49.

[22] *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel*, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Auf der Grundlage der Edition des Textes in den Gesammelten Werken Vol. 14, ed. Horst D. Brandt, Hamburg 2013, 18. English version: Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Translated and with notes by Thomas M. Know, Oxford 1967, 11. Henceforth quoted as PR, § no.

[23] Cf. *Koselleck*, "Neuzeit".

[24] *Peter Fritzsche*, Stranded in the Present. Modern Time and the Melancholy of History, Cambridge, MA 2004, 5. On the open future see e. g.: *Reinhart Koselleck / Christian Meier*, Fortschritt, in: Otto Brunner / Werner Conze / Reinhart Koselleck (Eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Vol. 2, E–G, Stuttgart 1979, 351–423, here 371 and *Lucian Hölscher*, Die Entdeckung der Zukunft, Frankfurt / Main 1999.

[25] *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel*, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte. Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Vol. 12, Frankfurt / Main 1970, 533. English translation by *John Sibree*,

"The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore death, a death too which has no inner significance or filling […]. It is the coldest and meanest of deaths, with no more significance than cutting off a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water."[26]

Yet Hegel remained enthusiastic towards the spirit that the Revolution had inaugurated, or rather towards the realization of Spirit with a capital S that it represented. Legend has it that Hegel always "drank a toast to the storming of the Bastille on July 14th."[27] In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* from 1830, he states:

"Never since the sun had stood in the firmament and the planets revolved around him had it been perceived that man's existence centers in his head, i. e. in Thought, inspired by which he builds up the world of reality. […] This was accordingly a glorious mental dawn. All thinking beings shared in the jubilation of this epoch. Emotions of a lofty character stirred men's minds at that time; a spiritual enthusiasm thrilled through the world, as if the reconciliation between the Divine and the Secular was now first accomplished."[28]

The French Revolution appeared as this "glorious dawn" because it did away with

"a confused mass of privileges altogether contravening Thought and Reason – an utterly irrational state of things, and one with which the greatest corruption of morals, of Spirit was associated – an empire characterized by the Destitution of Right […]."[29]

In Hegel's eyes the Revolution replaced the socioeconomic and political order, which was based on injustice, with a new order founded on the concept of right and freedom:

"An intellectual principle was thus discovered to serve as a basis for the state – one which does not, like previous principles belong to the sphere of opinion […] nor owe its origin to the religious sentiment […] but the principle of Certainty, which is identity with my self-consciousness, stopping short however of that of Truth, which needs to be distinguished from it. This is a vast discovery in regard to the profoundest depths of being and Freedom."[30]

By doing so, the Revolution finalized "the history of the world" as "none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom."[31] In fact, as Hegel states further on in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*:

"The history of the world travels from east to west, for Europe is absolutely the end of history, Asia the beginning. […] Here rises the outward physical sun, and in the west it sinks down: here consentaneously rises the sun of self-consciousness, which diffuses a

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Lectures on the Philosophy of History, London 1861, 470. Henceforth quoted as PhG, German pagination / English pagination.

[26] *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel*, Phänomenologie des Geistes. Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Vol. 3, Frankfurt / Main 1986, 436. English translation: Phenomenology of Spirit, New York 1977, 359 et seq.

[27] Cf. *Terry Pinkard*, Hegel. A Biography, Cambridge 2000, 451.

[28] PhG, 534 et seq./466.

[29] PhG, 528/465 et seq.

[30] PhG, 527/465.

[31] PhG, 32/19 et seq.

nobler brilliance. The history of the world is the discipline of the uncontrolled natural will, bringing it into obedience to a universal principle and conferring subjective freedom. The east knew and to the present day knows only that one is free; the Greek and the Roman world, that some are free; the German world knows that all are free."[32]

It is not possible here to further clarify the complex role freedom plays in Hegel's philosophy in general[33] or particularly in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, his first major work, which he was completing as the famous "world soul" on horseback, i. e. Napoleon, defeated the Prussian troops at Jena and Auerstedt.[34] Suffice it to note that Susan Buck-Morss has plausibly argued that, aside from the French Revolution, it may well have been the Haitian Revolution – and thus the self-liberation of the slaves in France's most lucrative colony – that inspired Hegel's famous dialectic of lordship and bondage, or rather master and slave.[35] As a result of the Revolution, freedom became the principle underlying the state. Now "a man counts as a man in virtue of his manhood alone, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc."[36] The realization of freedom is the actualization, or becoming real, of that which history potentially was from its very beginning. Consequently, history has come to an end (τέλος) with the Revolution; its aim has been reached.

More or less, these are the components of Hegel's "end of history"-thesis – or rather Hegel's "end of history"-myth –, which were handed down through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. If we follow Karl Löwith, nothing about this "end of history" ought to disturb us:

"This occidental conception of history, implying an irreversible direction toward a future goal […] is essentially a Hebrew and Christian assumption that history is directed toward an ultimate purpose and governed by the providence of a supreme insight and will – in Hegel's terms, by spirit or reason as 'the absolutely powerful essence'. […] Fifteen hundred

[32] PhG, 134/109 et seq.

[33] Cf. PhG, 30/18: "Now this is freedom, exactly. For if I am dependent, my being is referred to something else which I am not; I cannot exist independently of something external. I am free, on the contrary, when my existence depends upon myself. This self-contained existence of Spirit is none other than self-consciousness – consciousness of one's own being. Two things must be distinguished in consciousness; first, the fact *that I know*; secondly, *what I know*. In *self* consciousness these are merged in one; for spirit *knows itself*. It involves and appreciation of its own nature, as also an energy enabling it to realise itself; to make itself *actually* that which it is *potentially*. According to this abstract definition it may be said of universal history, that it is the exhibition of spirit in the process of working out the knowledge of that which it is potentially. And as the germ bears in itself the whole nature of the tree, and the taste and form of its fruit, so do the first traces of spirit virtually contain the whole of that history."

[34] Letter from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels to Immanuel Niethammer from October 13th 1806, in: *Johannes Hoffmeister* (Ed.), Briefe von und an Hegel, Vol. 1, 1785–1812, 3rd ed. Hamburg 1969, 120.

[35] *Susan Buck-Morss*, Hegel and Haiti, in: Critical Inquiry 26, 2000, 821–865. For an overview on the Haitian Revolution see *Jürgen Osterhammel*, Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, München 2009, 757 et seq.

[36] PR, § 209.

years of Western thought were required before Hegel could venture to translate the eyes of faith into the eyes of reason and the theology of history as established by Augustine into a philosophy of history which is neither sacred nor profane. It is a curious mixture of both, degrading sacred history to the level of secular history and exalting the latter to the level of the first […]."[37]

If we follow the secularization and temporalization (*Verzeitlichung*) thesis presented by Koselleck, who was one of Löwith's disciples, we could simply locate Hegel at a kind of watershed between "the spiritual *profectus*" and "a worldly *progressus*". Hegel materializes the "objective of possible completeness", which was "previously attainable only in the Hereafter," in the secular world. He is stuck somewhere in between "the doctrine of the Final Days" and "the hazards of an open future," as Koselleck writes.[38] Hegel's "end of history"-thesis would thus be nothing more than a revisited adaptation of an age-old eschatological topos, ranging from the Revelation to Augustine's *finis saeculi* to the myriad of chiliastic visions that periodically sprang up like mushrooms in the Middle Ages and the early modern period.[39]

If the secularization thesis were not a close relative of modernization theory, and, most of all, if Hegel were not at the same time a truly historicist philosopher, we could leave it at.[40] His historicism, his thinking in the categories of change, of process, of development, and of *Zeitgeist* was revolutionary in philosophical and historiographical thought. His dialectical method *per definitionem* implies a never-ending process. Gadamer stated in his inaugural lecture at Leipzig in 1939 – a fact that in the face of the prevailing antihistoricism of the National Socialists would be worthy of analysis in its own right – that as a result of Hegel's contributions, "the spirit knows of itself that it is historical, that is prejudiced by and trapped in its own time, anchorless and obsolete."[41] Let me clarify this with the help of a further lengthy quote from Friedrich Engels' *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy* from 1886/88:

[37] *Karl Löwith*, Meaning in History. The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History, Chicago, IL 1950, 54, 59. Cf. *Reinhart Koselleck*, Zeitverkürzung und Beschleunigung. Eine Studie zur Säkularisation, in: Id., Zeitschichten. Studien zur Historik, Frankfurt/Main 2003, 177–202, here 192 et seq.

[38] *Reinhart Koselleck*, "Space of Experience" and "Horizon of Expectation". Two Historical Categories, in: Id., Futures Past, 255–275, here 265.

[39] Cf. *Christian Meier*, Vom 'fin die siècle' zum 'end of history'? Zur Lage der Geschichte; in: Merkur 10, 1990, 809–823.

[40] On Hegel's Historicism see *Frederick C. Beiser*, Hegel's Historicism, in: Id. (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, Cambridge 1993, 270–300. Beiser asserts (270): "One of the most striking and characteristic features of Hegel's thought is that it *historicizes* philosophy, explaining its purpose, principles and problems in historical terms. Rather than seeing philosophy as a timeless *a priori* reflection upon eternal forms, Hegel regards it as the self-consciousness of a specific culture, the articulation, defense, and criticism of its essential values and beliefs."

[41] *Hans-Georg Gadamer*, Hegel und der geschichtliche Geist, in: Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft/Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 100, 1940, 25–37 [GA IV, 384–394], here 25 et seq.

"[…] the true significance and revolutionary character of Hegelian philosophy […] [was] that it once and for all dealt the deathblow to the finality of all products of human thought and action. […] Just as knowledge is unable to reach a perfected termination in a perfect, ideal condition of humanity, so history is unable to do so; […] Just as the bourgeoisie by large-scale industry, competition and the world market dissolves in practice all stable, time-honored institutions, so this dialectical philosophy dissolves in practice all conceptions of final absolute truth and of a final absolute state of humanity corresponding to it. For it, nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher."[42]

What do we make of this paradox? Is Hegel a historicist or is he a theologian and teleological metaphysicist? Does history end with the worldwide realization of freedom and with Hegel's philosophy or is this just one end, the perfection of a specific development of humankind? It would probably take a couple years of close reading of Hegel's works, and of the seemingly endless interpretations he has received, to arrive at a decision. As far as I have an overview of the Hegel exegesis, I believe it could go either way, or rather, I believe that hoping for a solution to this impasse is analogous to believing in an end to history. There will never be an *adequate* reading of Hegel. That is, we will never know what Hegel really meant – "what actually happened" – because that is not what history is about, or is it?[43]

I want to make an alternative suggestion that brings together Hegel's usage of the chronotopos of the "end of history" with the dynamics of social change and the perception of threat to existing orders. Hegel began his last lecture on the philosophy of history on November 8, 1830. In July, the House of Bourbon had been overthrown in France and a further wave of revolutionary turmoil swept through southern Netherlands, Italy, Poland and some territories of the German Confederation.[44] Hegel commented on this in his lecture:

"Another breach, therefore, took place, and the Government was overturned. At length, after forty years of war and confusion indescribable, a weary heart might fain congratulate itself on seeing a termination and tranquillization of these disturbances. Thus agitation and unrest is perpetuated. This collision, this nodus, this problem, is that with which history is now occupied, and whose solution it has to work out in the future."[45]

Approximately a decade earlier, on the 30th of October 1819, about a year after he had taken up Fichte's chair for philosophy at the recently founded Berlin University (1810), Hegel wrote to the philologist Friedrich Creuzer:

[42] *Friedrich Engels*, Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie, in: *Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels*, Werke, Vol. 21, 5th ed. Berlin 1975, 259–307, here 267 et seq. Cf. Dale, Hegel, 56–79.

[43] Cf. *Leopold von Ranke*, Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494 bis 1535, Leipzig/Berlin 1824, VI.

[44] *Osterhammel*, Verwandlung, 769.

[45] PhG, 534/471 et seq.

"I will soon be fifty years old and have spent thirty of them in these eternally troubled times of fear and hope, hoping that the fearing and hoping would come to an end. Now I have to see that it continues perpetually, indeed, in dreary hours, it seems as if it's getting ever worse."[46]

These "eternally troubled times", this "indescribable confusion", perpetual "agitation and unrest" is what I would like to call Hegel's 'discontent in history'. On the one hand, historicist temporality (i. e. "new time" with its "open future") was invigorating and man had now become the agent of history and existing orders were perceived as changeable. Yet, on the other hand, the advent of historicist temporality and the exact same openness of the future were frightening and disorientating. One fundamental problem arising of historicism was finding a stable base for knowledge. In fact, Hegel's work is dedicated to this essential challenge pervading idealistic philosophy.[47] Already in his lectures from 1804–1805, published as *The characteristics of the present age* in 1806, Hegel's predecessor at Berlin's lectern, Fichte, wondered if he had succeeded in understanding the "phenomena of the Present" by bringing "them forth as necessary of the Past, and to predict their immediate consequences in the Future". Yet, even if the historicist seed of insecurity, self-doubt and self-analysis had not yet grown and brought forth fruit, it had already been sown:

"Should our view of the Present Age prove to have been a view taken from the standing-point of this Age itself, and should the eye which has taken this view have been itself a product of the Age which it has surveyed, then has the Age borne witness to itself, and such testimony must be cast aside; […] Whether this has been our position or not, let us now determine by a retrospect of our previous inquiry; and this we can only do by placing it before us, as itself a phenomenon of Time, and indeed of that Age in which it has occurred, namely, – the Present."[48]

In the future, a confidence in the possibility of knowing comparable to Fichte's and Hegel's would become more and more difficult. The insight into the fact that "*anything* and *everything* [my emphasis] has historically come into being and is historically conveyed", and was thus relative to its age and to the standpoint of its 'creator', grew. Yet, the "new time" bore a further fundamental problem. Not only the present and one's own standpoint but also the future had become contingent. As Peter Fritzsche writes in his book *Stranded in the Present*:

"Woven in among nineteenth-century narratives of progress, whether in liberal or Marxist versions, a more melancholy rendition traced out the scars of history. Part of the modern

[46] Letter from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel to Friedrich Creuzer from October 30th 1819, in: *Johannes Hoffmeister* (Ed.), Briefe von und an Hegel. Vol. 2, 1813–1822, 3rd ed. Hamburg 1969, 217–220, here 219.

[47] Cf. *Albrecht Koschorke*, Hegel und wir, Berlin 2015, 126 et seq.

[48] *Johann Gottlieb Fichte*, Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, Hamburg 1978, 248. English translation: The Characteristics of the Present Age. Translated by William Smith, London 1847, 254.

experience was a deepening sense of loss, a feeling of disconnection with the past, and a growing dread of the future."[49]

The desirable openness of the future also implied its unpredictability. Not knowing its "end" meant uncertainty and contingency. Now the only inevitability in regard to the future was that it would be different from the past and the present. The fact that everything seemed possible was at times exhilarating. The fact that anything could happen could, at the same time, be horribly alarming.[50] As the future was unknowable, it became the projection screen for secularized, immanent utopias. A whole plethora of 'isms' was aimed at closing the very same future that had just opened up. Hegel's philosophy of history, his chronotopos of the "end of history", is thus a hermeneutical tool, a pattern of interpretation aimed at minimizing contingency. As Hegel states in his *Lectures*, "the philosophical contemplation [of history] has no other aim than to eliminate the contingent [*das Zufällige*]. […] We have to find in history a universal aim, the final aim of the world […]".[51]

Hegel's philosophy of history thus serves to "give meaning to the meaningless", as Theodor Lessing observed in 1919.[52] Freedom as the aim and end of history structured the disorienting, dynamic transformation process that Hegel himself was living through. By giving history an end (τέλος), both time and the dynamic social change were ordered and made comprehensible. The "forty years of war and confusion indescribable" were located within a long-term and rational development, i. e. the development of the Spirit and the actualization of freedom. The period of transition Hegel and his contemporaries were experiencing was

[49] *Fritzsche*, Stranded in the Present, 49.

[50] This paradox seems to be a signature of modernity and was expressed beautifully by Klaus Mann in 1927: "We are in the peculiar position of regarding everything as possible […] Will we have the monarchy and a Kaiser in the country next week? We wouldn't be astonished in the least. Will we have the communist Soviet-state with its terror and red flag the day after tomorrow? We are prepared for anything." Cf. *Michael Makropoulos*, Krise und Kontingenz. Zwei Kategorien im Modernitätsdiskurs der Klassischen Moderne, in: Moritz Föllmer / Rüdiger Graf (Eds.), Die Krise der Weimarer Republik, Frankfurt / Main 2005, 45–76.

[51] *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel*, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte. Erste Hälfte, Vol. I, Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister, Hamburg 1955, 29. Cf. *Dale,* Hegel, 7 et seq.: "History is always the realm of the contingent for Hegel, and his philosophy of history is his attempt to overcome the contingency of history within his larger category of spirit. But because spirit proceeds and develops dialectically, it requires the contradictions of history in order to be what it is. Therefore, against Hegel's best insights, those contradictions cannot be dialectically overcome; they are crucial to the dialectic of history as Hegel (rightly) understands it. Since the dialectic is ongoing, necessarily, history cannot be brought to an end, and Hegel's attempt to offer his philosophy of history as a theodicy explanation of historical contingency founders upon the very dialectical necessity which gives rise to the problem in the first place. Hegel cannot end history, and therefore no theodicy explanation is possible. Hegel's heroic effort to 'eliminate contingency' […] is doomed to failure."

[52] *Theodor Lessing*, Geschichte als Sinngebung des Sinnlosen oder die Geburt der Geschichte aus dem Mythos, München 1983 [or. 1919].

thus anchored in a past and given a trajectory in the future. With his "end of history" Hegel helped to soothe the unease that was characteristic of the age and that Chateaubriand described as "sailing along an unknown coast, in the midst of darkness and the storm." His philosophy of history can be understood as Chateaubriand's

"chart which must be studied while in danger, that the sagacious pilot may ascertain the point we have left, the place in which we are, and the one to which we are steering; so that in case of wreck we may save ourselves on some island where the tempest cannot assail us."[53]

Posthistoire or the Other End of History after the Boom

The person most commonly associated with the renaissance of the "end of history" chronotopos at the end of the twentieth century is the neoconservative political scientist Francis Fukuyama. Even before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Fukuyama argued:

"What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."

Fukuyama's end is in no need of translation as it is paradigmatic for an understanding of Hegel that prevailed throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[54] Yet, this triumphant "end of history"-thesis is untypical of the post-historical mindset that reappeared in the 1970s as it is unabashedly ahistoricist. In fact, a radically historicist, more 'defeatist' brand of the "end of history" was considerably more emblematic for the end of the post-war economic boom and the new phase of dynamic social change that had now begun.

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[53] *François René Chateaubriand*, An Historical, Political and Moral Essay on Revolutions, Ancient and Modern, London 1815, 5. Cf. *Fritzsche*, Stranded in the Present, 58.

[54] Fukuyama himself relied heavily on Hegel, albeit a Hegel that he had read through the lense of the very influential Franco-Russian, Heideggerian, Marxist intellectual Alexandre Kojève. Fukuyama can be seen to represent the enduring legacy of the Hegelian "end of history"-myth. Indeed, as Eric Michael Dale recently pointed out in *Hegel, the End of History, and the Future*, "the end of history myth as modern scholarship knows it is the product of Kojève's work on Hegel." On Kojève see *Knut Ebeling*, Alexandre Kojève. Ein Snobismus *sans reserve*, in: Ulrich Johannes Schneider (Ed.), Der französische Hegel (Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Sonderband 12), Berlin 2007, 49–64. It was Kojèves seminars on Hegel at the *Ecole Practique des Hautes Eutdes* in the 1930s that made him so profoundly influential. A whole generation of on their part influential intellectuals heard his lectures: Maurice Merleau-Ponty, André Breton, Jacques Lacan, Jean-Paul Sartre, Georges Bataille. See *Alexandre Kojève*, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Arranged by Raymond Queneau, New York 1969. For the quote see *Dale*, Hegel, 80.

The crisis of Keynesian consensus-capitalism, the end of the Bretton Woods-system and the deregulation of the international finance market, the oil price shock and the dislocation of heavy and textile industries, the "second cold war" and the onset of "second globalization", the beginning of the digital revolution, the consciousness of the *Limits to Growth* and the ecologization of politics, but also new gender roles and education policies are characteristic of this era.[55] A new sense of uncertainty arose in the face of the threat to, and transformation of, the existing economic, social, political and semantic orders. The chronotopos of the "end of history" was an indicator and factor of this uncertainty. The anxiety was amplified by the downright inflation of apocalyptic visions that were circulating in the 1970s and 1980s. In this case, the "end of history" was an articulation of the omnipresent fears of imminent nuclear Armageddon or ecological catastrophes, i. e. an end of history in the sense of the termination of human life on earth and of an "immanent eschatology".[56] Yet, interconnected with this dystopian angst – that was by far not only German – a different sense of an ending was spreading throughout Western thought.

Most notably, the "end of history" voiced the loss and impossibility of those (ideological) charts that Hegel's history of philosophy had helped to bring forth and that were currently forfeiting their capacity to guide the seafarers in the new uncharted territory. Now that the prevailing guises of the belief in progress were being shattered, be it modernization theory or the last hopes of an implementation of a Marxist utopia, and the teleological ends were being called into question, contemporaries again felt like Chateaubriand. Once more they were "sailing along an unknown coast, in the midst of darkness and the storm". As Eric Hobsbawm stated in 1978:

"Once upon a time, say from the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth, the movements of the left […] like everybody else who believed in progress, knew just where they wanted to go and just what, with the help of history, strategy, and effort, they ought or needed to do to get there. Now they no longer do. In this respect they do not, of course, stand alone. Capitalists are just as much at a loss as socialists to understand their future, and just as puzzled by the failure of their theorists and prophets."[57]

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[55] For further examples see *Doering-Manteuffel/Raphael*, Nach dem Boom. Cf. also the recently published book by *Andreas Rödder*, 21.0. Eine kurze Geschichte der Gegenwart, München 2015, that essentially confirms the findings of the "Nach dem Boom"-project.

[56] See *Silke Mende*, Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn. Eine Geschichte der Gründungsgrünen, München 2011, 289–321 and 365–406 as well as *Landwehr*, Geburt der Gegenwart, 26 et seq. On "immanent eschatology" see *Alexandre Escudier*, Das Gefühl der Beschleunigung der modernen Geschichte. Bausteine für eine Geschichte, in: Trivium 9, 2011, http://trivium.revues.org/4034. Cf. also *Bernd Greiner/Christian Th. Müller/Dierk Walter* (Eds.) Angst im Kalten Krieg, Hamburg 2009 and *Andreas Wirsching*, Abschied vom Provisorium. Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1982–1990, München 2006, 429 et seq.

[57] *Eric J. Hobsbawm*, Should the Poor Organize?, in: The New York Review of Books 25, 1978, 44–49, here 44.

In 1983 in *links*, the journal of the *Sozialistisches Büro*, another historian, Dan Diner wrote:

"It is patently obvious that the visions of linear progress which were valid at least since the Enlightenment have become frail. Paradoxically, the end of the future has itself become a theme with which to explain our time. Without a future or a vision of the future, without forward facing – whatever that means – plans, it is not possible to devise a life *rationally*. The perception of the end of time, of linear time corresponds to a feeling of a confined life – a feeling of *no future* – that becomes tangible in the expectation of the end of our civilization. There is little or no time remaining to prevent this end, this thought reflects the seismographic perception of the end of an epochal vision of progress."[58]

The ubiquitous "post-isms" that emerged in the 1970s – postmodernism, post-fordism, postmaterialism, and the adjectives postindustrial, poststructuralist, postmarxist, and postcolonial to name the most important ones – reflected this "end of an epochal vision of progress". They hint at the widespread sense of navigating without a chart or specific destination that was typical of the period "after the boom" or, as Daniel Rodgers has aptly named this period, the "age of fracture".[59] As Ulrich Beck stated in 1986 in his preface to his book *Risk Society*:

"It [the prefix 'post'] is the key word of our times. Everything is 'post'. […] It hints at a 'beyond' which it cannot name, and in the substantive elements that it names *and* negates it remains tied to the familiar. *Past plus post* – that is the basic recipe with which we confront a reality that is out of joint."[60]

In 1989, under the heading "After History", Peter Sloterdijk similarly argued:

"The career of the prefix 'post' suggests that – even though hair raising things are occurring – we have no vision of history that would help us date the present. Since the impression has spread that history has no road map, we are feeling our way in a progressional no man's land."[61]

The chronotopos of the "end of history" or 'posthistoire' was the most generic "post-ism". It was grounded not only on doubts in regard to the whereabouts of the present and on what the future had in store. Rather, it mirrored an overall scepticism towards teleology. Posthistoire epitomized the questioning of 'the' Hegelian vision of 'History' in the singular altogether and of its various derivatives. The "end of history" which a number of German intellectuals such as Sloterdjik, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht and Jacob Taubes were sympathizing with and others, like Lutz Niethammer, were noticing with a growing degree of irritation, can, I believe, be seen as the result of applying historicism on historicism

[58] *Dan Diner*, Hier stimmt was nicht. Mutmaßungen über die Angst in der Friedensbewegung; in: links 162, 1983, 21–22.

[59] *Daniel T. Rodgers*, Age of Fracture, Cambridge, MA 2011.

[60] *Ulrich Beck*, Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity, London 1992 [or. 1986], 9.

[61] *Peter Sloterdijk*, Eurotaoismus. Zur Kritik der politischen Kinetik, Frankfurt / Main 1989, 266 et seq.

itself.[62] Questioning the ends in the sense of aims went hand in hand with calling the concept of History into question altogether.

While I cannot elucidate this any further, it is not by chance that Reinhart Koselleck (and Michel Foucault) started historicizing historicism in the late 1960s and 1970s or that Koselleck's work is currently experiencing such a notable renaissance. His *Sattelzeit* and temporalization theses reflect the dramatic semantic and social change that was underway in those very same years. What Charles Maier claimed in regard to *territoriality* applies just as well to *temporality*: "The contemporary dissolution of a structural order allows researchers to glimpse trends formerly so ubiquitous they had not been perceived as issues for historical investigation."[63] Accordingly the historicist paradigm was being reviewed and challenged.

Yet, in contrast to the interwar period this challenging of historicist temporality didn't occur from outside the historicist mindset, but rather by means of a radicalized historicism. The historicizing of historicism, the self-reflective history that came underway in those years, was aimed at "thinking history *differently*, without ceasing to think historically altogether", as Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht stated in compliance with Jacob Taubes. The basic elements of this new history were, according to Gumbrecht, "the substitution of the *one telos* for the *many short-term objectives*, the substitution of the concept of *perfectibility* for a concept of *preservation of mankind*."[64] The underlying question was how to think of history at the end of teleology or how to think like the historicist Hegel while dialectically transcending, in the Hegelian sense of *aufheben*, the "end of history"-Hegel.[65]

Achim Landwehr's remarks in regard to the pluritemporal configuration and structure of societies can, I believe, be located in this tradition of posthistorical thought. While it has its roots in the 1950s and can be traced back to the first critics of historicism in the wake of Nietzsche's second *Untimely Meditation*, it only started to catch on in the wake of the significant social change that was taking place in the 1970s. The growing awareness of societal pluritemporality, of the "many short-term objectives", of the diversity and multidimensionality of social times points to the abatement of a drive once prevalent in modern societies

[62] See *Lutz Niethammer*, Posthistoire. Ist die Geschichte zu Ende?, Reinbek 1989 or his english summary: *Lutz Niethammer*, Afterthoughts on Posthistoire, in: History and Method 1, 1989, 27–53.

[63] *Charles S. Maier*, Consigning the Twentieth Century to History. Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era, in: AHR 105, 2000, 807–831, here 809.

[64] *Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht*, Posthistoire Now, in: Id.: Präsenz, Berlin 2012, 9–25, here 24. The original anthology's blurb stated that the colloquium in Dubrovnik on which the anthology was based was devoted to discussing the opportunities for innovation that "resulted for historiography from its becoming self-reflexive". See *Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht / Ursula Link-Heer* (Eds.), Epochenschwellen und Epochenstrukturen im Diskurs der Literatur- und Sprachhistorie, Frankfurt / Main 1985.

[65] Cf. *Jürgen Klein,* Nachwort, in: *Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht*, Präsenz, Berlin 2012, 352–358, here 352.

or rather in modern nation-states to homogenize.[66] The waning of the project of synchronization and unification of the divergent and at times contradictory temporalities and ends of the varying social groups had many sources. Yet, the new trend towards pluralisation and multiplication of history and its subjects, of modernities[67] and temporalities and thus the "end of history" in the singular is rooted in an ongoing historicization of historicism. The questioning of Western chronocentrism and of the power structures it enabled, the contextualization and revision of 'modernity's' totalizing grand narratives and of its belief in the collective singular progress has enabled us to think of "multiple temporalities" without conceiving them as "diachronic dissonances", as "survivals" or earlier stages along time's progressive arrow that need be overcome.[68] The radicalization of historicist thought, its self-reflexivity has resulted in the loss of credibility of "several ideas central to the modern conception of history".[69] The historian of historiography Georg G. Iggers continues:

[66] On the centrality of simultaneity or contemporaneity for the modern nation cf.: *Benedict Anderson*, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London 1991, 24 et seq. On page 26 we read: "The idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history". My thesis that I will not be able to elaborate any further here is that pluritemporality was a thorn in the flesh of the modern nation state or rather its elites. The latter endeavoured to mould a temporally unified society with one history out of divergent social groups with their many temporalities and historys. Temporal homogenization or synchronization can be seen as part of the quest for order that – according to Zygmunt Bauman – characterized modernity. While this 'totalitarian' – in the sense of aiming at the whole of society – aspiration towards temporal homogeneity was never achieved in full, it should be taken seriously primarily as an ambition of the modern nation states. It appears as if between approximately the 1860s and the 1970s 'historicist temporality' gained a certain hegemonic status in the West and along with "homogenous, empty [clock]time" became the underlying temporal code that permeated a great variety of diverging social times, time spheres and perspectives. The pluritemporally configured societies were hereby temporally simplified and made 'legible', enabling the state to administer them efficiently, to envision their future and most of all to bring the latter about via planning and social engineering. On the quest for order cf. *Zygmunt Bauman*, Modernity and Ambivalence, Ithaca 1991. On "homogeneous, empty time" see *Walter Benjamin*, Illuminations. Ed. and with an introd. by Hannah Arendt, New York 1968, 261 et seq. For the legibility of societies and the nexus to social engineering cf. *James C. Scott*, Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, New Haven 1998.

[67] Shmuel Eisenstadt's "multiple modernities" are probably the most prominent example. See *Shmuel Eisenstadt*, Multiple Modernities, in: Daedalus 129, 2000, 1–29.

[68] On the "diachronic dissonance" see *Achim Landwehr*, Von der 'Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen', in: Historische Zeitschrift 295, 2012, 1–34, here 20. On chronocentrism see *Johannes Fabian*, Time and the Other. How Anthropology Makes its Object, New York, 2002 [or. 1983] and *Dipesh Chakrabarty*, Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton 2008 [repr.] On "grand narratives" see *Jean-François Lyotard*, The Postmodern Condition. A Report on Knowledge, Minneapolis 1984.

[69] *Georg G. Iggers*, Historiography in the Twentieth Century. From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge, Middletown 2005, 142 et seq.

"One was the notion that there was one history, *die Geschichte*, that permitted a continuous narrative of historical development. […] Another idea was that there existed certain key institutions, primarily the state, that occupied the central role in the narrative. […] Finally, […] there was the firm belief expressed by Hegel, Ranke, Comte, Marx, and many others that there was only one truly historical society, that of the Occident. All three notions succumbed to the criticism of the twentieth century. […] in the place of one meaningful process there is now a pluralism of narratives touching on the existential life experiences of many groups."

If it were not for the fact that it would call all the above into question, I would be tempted to call that progress.

Notes on contributors

Anna Ananieva is Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow in the Department of Eastern European History at the University of Tübingen.

Matthias Becker is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the CRC 1136 'Education and Religion' funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft at the University of Göttingen.

Phil Booth is A. G. Leventis Lecturer in Eastern Christianity at the University of Oxford.

Renate Dürr is Professor of Early Modern History at the University of Tübingen.

Fernando Esposito is a Postdoctoral Researcher in the Department of Contemporary History at the University of Tübingen.

Ewald Frie is Professor of Modern History at the University of Tübingen.

Klaus Gestwa is Professor of Eastern European History at the University of Tübingen.

Rolf Haaser is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the BKM-Project 'Circulation of news and products' funded by the federal government at the University of Tübingen.

Andreas Hasenclever is Professor of Peace Research and International Relations at the University of Tübingen.

Rebekka Jones is a Senior Research Fellow at Monash University in Melbourne.

Thomas Kohl is Acting Professor of Medieval History at the University of Tübingen.

Mischa Meier is Professor of Ancient History at the University of Tübingen.

Beatrice von Lüpke is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the research training group 'Religious knowledge in premodern Europe (800–1800)' at the University of Tübingen.

Klaus Ridder is Professor of Medieval German Literature at the University of Tübingen.

Jan Sändig is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the CRC 923 "Bedrohte Ordnungen" at the University of Tübingen.

Dennis Schmidt is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the CRC 923 "Bedrohte Ordnungen" at the University of Tübingen.

Sebastian Schmidt-Hofner is Professor of Late Antique History at the University of Tübingen.

Hannah Skoda is Professor and Tutorial Fellow in History at St John's College, Oxford.

Holger Stritzel is Lecturer in German Foreign Policy at King's College London.

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