Arshi Javaid

KASHMIRI NATIONALISM, 1989–2016

Contested Politics of 'Self' and 'Other'

[transcript] PoliticalScience

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

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For Mamma and Abu

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Introduction

This book examines Kashmiri nationalism and its contestations to it. It explores the theoretically different forms of Kashmiri nationalism-ethnic and civic. The classical dichotomy between the civic and the ethnic has been a recurrent feature in Kashmiri nationalism. The nature and interplay of the two forms will be explored in the book by placing them against a set of political and social variables. It looks at Kashmiri nationalism as a political expression, a latent subjectivity defining the connection between the individual and the collective.

The book seeks to understand Kashmiri nationalism as a daily practice through socio-political developments and adjustments. The Kashmir conflict has primarily been understood through a securitised approach that defines the relationship between India and Pakistan. Internal political dynamics and other causalities are given little importance. This, in part, is because they disappear before analytical lenses that are focused on formal institutions, geopolitical security, and the nation-building project. This understanding presents Kashmiri nationalism as a homogenised monolith.

However, there are differences based on social, political, and economic parameters considered in this work. The study focuses on the internal and external factors that have influenced Kashmiri nationalism and further uncovers if Kashmiri nationalism is synonymous with Islamic nationalism or exists as a separate entity. Varshney (1991:999) has influentially demonstrated that Kashmir is a result of three forces: religious nationalism represented by Pakistan, secular nationalism epit-

omised by India, and ethnic nationalism embodied in what Kashmiris called Kashmiriyat (being a Kashmiri).

Kashmiri Nationalism: An Overview

The growth of Kashmiri nationalism can be broken down into a few critical themes: the construction of 'self' versus the 'other', the centrality of religious identity, the desire for political autonomy, and its contested nature. As Kashmiri identity cannot be seen as a homogenised monolith, its transformation into contestation does not happen without the intervention of exogenous factors.

Like in other identities, the constitution of Kashmir's identity is about differences. Identity formation happens through the self-realisation of an individual of how others perceive the individual. Mead (1934:225) argues that "an individual becomes self by taking attitudes of individuals towards himself/herself within a social environment." The collective formation of identity and the sense of self-reflexive action formulate the distinctions between the self and the other. The Kashmiri identity gets negotiated between the 'self' and the 'other' through how it imagines itself and how the identity of the other constructs an identity for the self. This book examines the self and the other through how the self/other binary is reproduced and arranged. The underlying argument remains that the relations of difference are distorted into othering only when certain factors play in. And in essence, those transformative processes form the constitutive basis of the self/other interaction. Often, the interaction between the self and the other could only be for securing one's identity. However, the difference is characterised by other factors like the nature of identity, social distance, etc. This work draws on the understanding that contestations between the self and the other are produced where identities are invoked overtly and made the basis for conflict. The social and political reproduction of conflict transforms the incompatibility of interests into an active battle between the self and the other.

Kashmiri identity in response to the 'other' needs to be understood in the context of the centuries of foreign rule Kashmir has witnessed – Mughals, Afghans, Sikhs, and Dogras. The identity has to be located in the series of dynamic interactions that have taken place over the years. Khan (2012) observes that the anxiety for preserving the Kashmiri identity can be traced to two crucial junctures, 1586 and 1846, when Kashmir came under the control of the Mughals and the Dogras, respectively. The sense of national and religious belonging also changed owing to the different ruling regimes. The establishment of the British Residency and the centralisation of the Dogra state under the British at the turn of the 20th century provided a context for an emphasis on 'community', which later became a reference point for identity.

A vital element of the 19th and 20th centuries political discourse in Kashmir is the repeated regional assertion against anything from the 'outside' (*Nebar*). While the narrative on Kashmiri regional and religious identities was undoubtedly transformed in indirect colonialism's social and political context, the historical discourse, literary forms, religious idioms, and symbols from the pre-colonial period were easily identifiable in the 19th and 20th-century Kashmiri public discourse. For instance, the growth of radical Islam in the valley caused discomfort among the Sufi practitioners of Islam. Similarly, the Kashmiri Pandit community became quite apprehensive of the designs of co-religionists who had migrated to Awadh and had begun attacking the regionally specific religious customs. The contending contentions of 'insider' and 'outsider' are witnessed numerous times.

In this context, the protests of 1931 are an important landmark as it was the first time that Kashmiri Muslims erupted against the Dogra rule. It was in the 1930s that the sense of belonging to a religious collectivity informed the discourse on rights and freedom. In other words, the new Muslim leadership that emerged in the wake of the events of 1931 linked religious affiliation with political demands by claiming rights for Kashmiri Muslims based on the concept of a just Islamic society. Furthermore, since this leadership ultimately sought to replace the autocratic rule of Dogras with Kashmiri self-rule, articulating national ideology was imperative to its project. The energies unleashed by this mo-

bilisation phase resulted in the formation of the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. The period forms the fulcrum of how the emerging sense of political and religious belonging gradually hinged towards two directions –a civic territorial idea of Kashmiri nationalism and an ethnic idea of Kashmiri nationalism. The rechristening of the Muslim Conference into the National Conference indicates how emerging consciousness ranged from exclusivist to inclusive liberal democratic. The sense of belonging was split over the organic historical experience linked through linguistic, religious, and folk traditions versus a unified voluntary nature of the state. Therefore, the focus of the two is different: the idea of how people imagined and envisioned a community and the idea of belonging to the same. By the time of the partition, Kashmiri nationalism was emerging civilly. The emergence of a civil society within a demarcated geographic territory, legal equality to the members, a government that respects the law rather than exists above the law, and respect for liberal democracy were the demands nationalists were espousing. As the partition approached, the question of Kashmiri nationhood came to be tied with the fate of princely states in the eventuality of a British withdrawal. As a Muslim-majority kingdom with a Hindu ruler, Jammu and Kashmir's status was unique in its complexity. The Kashmir War of 1947 led to the Maharaja of Kashmir acceding to India on 26 October 1947. Lord Mountbatten accepted the accession with a clause that a referendum would be conducted in the region as soon as possible. The people would be allowed to either validate or negate the accession.

This provision for referendum or plebiscite became one of the main rallying points and demands by the Kashmiri nationalist movement. The much-promised referendum never happened, and the Pakistanis and nationalist sections in the valley claimed that it was an act of sabotage.

To account for the complexity of Jammu and Kashmir and accommodate nationalist claims in the state, it was given a special status under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Sheikh Abdullah, the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference leader, became the state's first Prime Minister. As Prime Minister, Sheikh Abdullah combined secular, civic nationalism with socialist policies to create a constituency for his rule, which shaped the ideology of the National Conference. Besides ending

the hereditary monarchy, one of his significant achievements was the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act, which ushered in land reforms and abolished the feudal system in Kashmir.

In the post-independence era and particularly under Sheikh Abdullah, a central concern in the Kashmiri nationalist sphere was the desire to maintain the state's autonomy vis-a-vis the Centre. Despite the assurance of Article 370, the central government continued pressuring the state government to accept more provisions of the Indian Constitution. After hard bargaining by both sides, India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah entered into what became known as the Delhi Agreement in July 1952. However, there were contesting narratives to this as well. While the Muslim Conference continued to advocate accession to Pakistan, Jammu's Dogra Hindus formed the Praja Parishad in the early 1950s, demanding the final and irrevocable accession to accession to India. The removal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 proved to be a significant point of rupture between Kashmir and the Indian state. Abdullah created a support base for the National Conference through land reform and debtor relief measures. By winning over their loyalty, he managed to secure their tacit support for their accession to India. His arrest harmed the credibility of the state government. It also decisively turned the balance of power in favour of the Centre. A symbolic manifestation of this was degrading the vocabulary of the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir to the Chief Minister under the state's new constitution adopted in 1957.

The structural breakdown enforced by the state led to the creation of alternate spheres of political mobilisation. Non-state alternatives emerged when the state-dominated participation and representation. The state promoted nationalism, which was fundamentally majoritarian and restricted autonomous political agency. The political process was based on centralisation and hegemonic control, curtailing legitimate representation. Thus, the strategy of hegemony and delegitimation emerged at the doctrinal and political levels. The state's interests were taking priority over all the other commitments made at the time of accession. The state-nationalism espoused a parochial character and made itself a carrier of limited loyalties, ignoring or deliberately wiping

out local or cultural characteristics. This situation led to the crisis of legitimacy and longevity of regional nationalism. The internal crisis of the state and the search for community and identity made way for a confrontation between the forces of Kashmiri nationalism and state nationalism.

Abdullah's arrest in 1953 strengthened the autonomous nationalist forces. The heightened political turmoil led to the formation of the J&K Plebiscite Front in 1955. Its doctrine was "ensuring self-determination through a plebiscite under UN auspices, withdrawal of the armed forces of both nations from Kashmir and restoration of civil liberties and free elections." These demands continue to be a central part of the nationalist outfits' program in Kashmir.

The state's majoritarian character promoted nationalism, restricting collective rights at a doctrinal and political level. The interests of the central state were prioritised over all other promises made at the time of accession. State-led nationalism espoused an exclusionary character and became a carrier of limited loyalties. This situation led to a crisis of legitimacy and provided longevity to local nationalism. It also led to youth-led organisations creating alternate avenues of mobilisation, channelling alternate narratives towards sustained collective action.

The youth-led organisations mainly emerged to launch an indigenous struggle to highlight the Kashmir issue internationally by giving it an indigenous shade without the involvement of Pakistan. These political formations became essential to everyday life in Kashmir and shaped Kashmiri nationalism. Sheikh Abdullah's growth as a figure of Kashmiri resistance was cut short with the Indira-Abdullah Accord of 1975. The years from 1950–1970 were a time of intensive political mobilisation that constantly invoked the shared memories of denial and dispossession. The narratives produced during this period came to configure the political events within a context and created conditions for shaping the collective conscience.

Shiekh passed away in 1982 and was succeeded by his son, Farooq Abdullah. However, the Centre dismissed Farooq Abdullah's government and imposed President's Rule in the state, in a repeat of what had happened in several other states in India under Indira Gandhi. The periodic

dismissal of elected governments and interference by the Centre prevented even pro-accession leaders like Sheikh Abdullah and Farooq Abdullah from building a stable political base. This created a vacuum that was later exploited by separatist outfits. President's rule administered by Governor Jagmohan Malhotra following the sacking of Farooq's government was accompanied by a crackdown on protests and arrest of political leaders.

The events of the 1980s created perfect conditions for the growth of militant nationalism. Non-fulfilment of the political aspirations of the people, undemocratic functioning of different institutions of the state, and maladministration in running the affairs of the state made ground for violent expression and militant assertion of Kashmiri identity. The breaking point was the electoral rigging of 1987, where Congress and Farooq Abdullah's National Conference contested in alliance. It was opposed by a coalition of nonmainstream, anti-establishment groups known as the Muslim United Front (MUF). MUF represented a new face of Kashmir politics. By most accounts, the elections are said to have been rigged, and reports reveal that candidates of the MUF were beaten up. Pakistan, on its part, tried to capitalise on the resentment in the valley and provided patronage to the MUF member's militant groups, reinforcing its irredentist claims over Kashmir through the militant groups. While the JKLF stood for complete independence and reinforced civic nationalism, the Hizbul Mujahideen, which was the militant wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, stood for the merger with Pakistan.

Kashmiri nationalism adopted a variety of structural combinations to pursue its goals. Political nationalism directed an effective mobilisation for nationalism and tried utilising electoral strategy to expand the base of popular struggle. It sought to establish formal access to the state to translate movement aspirations into policy and ultimately created new state institutions. Meanwhile, militant nationalism undermined the state's legitimacy through mass agitation on social, economic, and political issues. It sought to erode the ruling government's claim to authority in the eyes of constituents and also tried to convince the international community of the state's legitimacy. In a way, the militant transition was directed towards securing the political rather than the

military overthrow of the state. Thus, one can say that the military and political struggles were not waged distinctly but in alliance. The outbreak of militant nationalism was not sudden but rather a gradual culmination of demands expressed in political form earlier. The absence of democracy, deep political mobilisation, and the growth of modern education and the press further channelled the grievances into a vocabulary of nationalism.

One can broadly assume that over the years, these central themes pointed out earlier constantly reinforce Kashmiri nationalism — fear of the other, religious identity, and loss of autonomy. The study uses 1989 as an entry point to delineate the nature and emerging aspects of Kashmiri nationalism.

Conceptual Definitions

Nationalism and its Typology

Nationalism is a political belief that people representing a natural community should live under one political system. The underlying question is what classifies a natural community: was the natural community invented, or was there a preexistence of nations? Additionally, today, what is the relation of nations and nationalism to modernity? The position taken by the perennialists and primordialists reflects whether it is natural or not; nations have been there for a long. The features of a nation, whether symbolic or mythical, pre-date the living memory of its members. The second position by modernists is that nations have emerged within a modern context and are created cosmetically. Schleiermacher (2004) and Fichte (1808) are the primary theorists who based their arguments on the primordial/perennial grounds where nations are an ancient and natural phenomenon. As the nation is immemorial, national forms may change, age and particular nations may dissolve, but the identity of a nation remains the same. Fichte (1808) advocated for the earthly fatherland and based his claim on ethnic-genealogical and cultural-linguistic elements.

The second set of understanding is the rational liberal understanding, which was shaped prominently by the ideas of Hans Kohn (1961), Elie Kedourie (1966), and Isiah Berlin (1979). Their main argument rests on the premise that nationalism developed in response to the intellectual and political crisis during the Enlightenment. In this sense, nationalism is a unit bound together, and the group is looking forward to the highest organised activity, forming a sovereign state. As attaining sovereignty might take time, it satisfies itself with some form of autonomy or pre-state organisation but eventually would rest on sovereignty. However, this sovereignty operates on a dual principle of empathy towards fellow members of the nationality. Still, it is marked with indifference and distrust/hate for members and outlook within the nations and by the crystallisation of will. This aspect generated a debate and set a precedent for Benedict Anderson, Anthony Smith, and Ernst Gellner.

Modernists perceived nations as modern social constructs that emerged with increased communication and the growth of contemporary social and political processes such as capitalism, industrialism, state bureaucratisation, secularism, and urbanisation. So, nations became territorial political communities that constituted the chief political bond and overtook other formative allegiances. Gellner (1983) intervened in the debate by understanding nationalism as a peculiarly contemporary phenomenon with dual structural connections between society and the modern capitalist economy. He envisioned nationalism as imposing a high culture on society, replacing local low culture. Anderson (2006) maintains that the nation is an imagined political community because its members will never know of their fellow members, meet them, or hear of them. Yet, they all share a sense of communion and horizontal comradeship. It also has a finite character because beyond a nation are other nations. Hobsbawm (1990) sees nations as a result of the recent historic process. Hobsbawm agrees with Gellner in the invented notion of nations and writes nations are inventions both in their culture and form. A creative method of selection and composition of the past is designed, and then the symbols take a different significance through modern rituals and institutional forms that arise with industrialisation. As a Marxist, Hobsbawm links the political invention of the nation to

the needs of capitalism and the rising bourgeoise seeking hegemony on coming into competition with old established groups and religious beliefs.

Another discourse around the study of nationalism is the marked differences between the rise of nationalism in the Western and the non-Western world. This idea of difference was given by Meinecke (1907), who differentiated between the Staatsnation and Kulturnation. The former was based on cultural similarity, while the latter was based on the unity of common political history and constitution. Kohn (1961) reworked the idea of two types of nationalism – civic and ethnic. He details how nationalism in the West emerged as a predominantly political occurrence. In non-Western societies, it grew as a protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern- primarily to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with the ethnographic demands and found expression in the cultural field. Western nationalism originated with the concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism; in Eastern/central Europe and the Asian contexts, it pitched on the natural fact of the community and sentiments held together not by will but by traditional ties.

There also exists an understanding that the nature of nationalism in developing countries differs from that of Western countries. One approach to studying nationalism can be viewing the concept in the background of colonial rule. Nationalism can be a product of a reaction of colonised people against their colonial masters. Chatterjee (1986) and Nandy (1994) agree that nationalism is essentially a Western construct. However, there is a lot of variation when the concept travels to non-western societies. Chatterjee (1986) explains that nationalism in Africa and Asia emerged to escape European domination yet could not be distant from it. However, anti-colonial nationalism creates its sphere of influence well before it begins its contestation with the other. It divides society into two categories: spiritual. The material involves science, technology, and economy, while spirituality is the inner sanctum of culture. Nandy (1994) argues that colonialism cannot express itself only through economic and political variables. Its impact on the sphere of psychology is more lasting.

The study of ethnic nationalism in South Asia has taken two prominent trajectories – the state-centred nationalist and ethnic-nationalist projects. Brass (1991) explains that one of the shortcomings of the theory of ethnic groups is that it reifies the classes or the ethnic groups. He proposes that the state is an institution where elites are engaged in a conflict to access greater power. The groups compete to establish their rule to control resources and legitimacy. Since the state is a resource and distributor of resources, it can provide a political formula for differing claims. On the other hand, the ethnic-nationalist claim is the outcome of the shortcomings or failure of the state-centred project. Oommen (1997) elucidates that the heightened ethnic consciousness of an ethnic group combined with territorial and language dimensions forms the cornerstone of the separate state formation.

Political Dimensions of Kashmiri Nationalism

Rai (2004) and Zutshi (2004) locate the Kashmiri political and national identity before 1947. Rai's account links colonial history to the present and dissects the role of religion and secularism in the Kashmir conflict. Her primary concern remains to examine how the Dogra Maharajas used the Hindu religion to stake a claim to authority and ensure legitimacy. Adding a new dimension to the study of the Kashmir conflict, her work documents the arbitrary rule of Dogra princes and how the formerly utilised services of Kashmiri Pandits and Punjabi Hindus as their allies. On the other hand, Zutshi notes that Kashmir could have been politically dormant had the Indian and Pakistani states accommodated Kashmir's regional aspirations. Instead, Kashmir became a confrontative emblem between their competing nationalist imaginations.

Bose (2003) argues that the Kashmir crisis might have originated in partition, but other factors combined to continue the conflict. The nonexistence of democracy and the militant movement became factors other than the complex regional, linguistic, and religious causalities. Ganguly (1996) and Behera (2000) explore how existing political institutions have shaped the Kashmir conflict. Ganguly (1996) explains that the 1989 insurgency resulted from the profoundly paradoxical exercise engaged by the

Indian nation-state since 1989. The effort was on one side to entice the Muslims of Kashmir into fuller integration into the Indian Union by providing them with every effort for political education and mobilisation, but on the other hand, perceiving the separatist threats, damping down the institutions that engendered popular political participation in Kashmir. The apparent result was institutional decay that left no other way than political violence to show their discontent. He argues that social mobilisation and consequently increased political participation, unless accompanied by robust political institutions, becomes a reason for political instability. Behera (2000) aptly asserts that the logic of the modern nation-state that recognises a nation's demographically compact form is problematic for pluralistic societies like India. She contends that the self-assertion of a formerly non-dominant identity becomes inherently a site for violence. She reminds us how the balance between competing nationalisms was maintained legally and constitutionally by the Delhi agreement, Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. However, the breakdown of this framework occurred when the Indian state imposed itself on the Kashmiri people through legal integrationist measures by abolishing the legal and political space. Over the years, the claims for autonomy grew into claims for Azadi.

Varshney (1991:999) writes that at the core, the Kashmir problem is the result of three forces – religious nationalism represented by Pakistan, secular nationalism represented by India, and ethnic nationalism (Kashmiriyat) embodied by Kashmiris. He chooses to pit the contesting nationalisms in Kashmir in different phases. Phase one covers 1947–1953, suggesting ambiguity; the second phase marks shrinking religious nationalism favouring secular nationalism during 1953–1983. Phase three characterises diminishing secular nationalism and the resurgence of Islam to Kashmiri nationalism from 1983 to 1991. Aggarwal (2008:227) remarks that nearly all political actors evoke Kashmiriyat. Kashmiriyat is an abstract noun that signifies "origin or affiliation" to Kashmir, referring to the ethos of being Kashmiri. However, little agreement exists over the precision of the term". Kashmiriyat refers to the class of terms known as empty signifiers, which have been prevalent in Indian politics for at least a century.

Militant Dimensions of Kashmiri Nationalism

Sikand (2007) notes that the appearance of radical Islamist groups added a new dimension to the ongoing conflict in the region. It made India, Pakistan, and Kashmiris equal stakeholders in the conflict. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) initiated an uprising against Indian rule in 1989. However, by the 1990s, the JKLF had been pulled off by Pakistan-based Islamist groups.

Puri (1995) argues the initial mishandling of the situation by Indian forces, with their ruthless and tactless repression, led to a mass uprising, including by sections of government employees and the police force. Firing at the funeral procession of a political leader, Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq, can be seen as one such instance. A political leadership, which for some years was waiting for such an opportunity, seized it. The most organised militant outfit was the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), headed by Amanullah Khan in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Yasin Malik was its leader on the Indian side of the Line of Control. Gradually, every separatist political leader formed a separate militant outfit, which could bank on armed support from across the LoC. Finally, Hizbul Mujahideen, an outfit sponsored by Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence, emerged as the strongest. The various separatist organisations formed a loose political alliance under the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC). It became a kind of conglomerate of all secessionist parties. The mass militancy could not be maintained for too long. The expectations raised by it proved illusory. As pro-Azadi (nationalist) militants were replaced and, in some cases, eliminated by pro-Pakistan militants, the Kashmiri nationalists were alienated. Yet, as alienation from India increased, the militancy survived with massive popular support. The militant phase in Kashmir, without the active involvement of the people, continued through various ups and downs till it reached a point where it became no longer dependent on local political backing.

Schofield (2003) writes that by 1989, several militant groups had begun to function in the valley. They were spread around the major towns of Srinagar, Anantnag, Baramulla, and Sopore, and their objectives remained either complete independence or unification with Pakistan.

The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, led within the Valley, was the most prominent, and its aim was fighting for an independent state of Jammu and Kashmir. Some political parties who were part of the Muslim United Front had formed militant wings.

Definition, Rationale, and Scope of the Study

Since most of the literature on Kashmir is security-centric, which understands Kashmir in the context of the rivalry between India and Pakistan or looks at conflict resolution, there is a gap in terms of understanding the changes and continuities in Kashmiri nationalism.

The political elite invokes nationalism in civic or ethnic form as a political assertion of group identity. The political elite uses nationalism to replace some previously dominant cultural groups and create a new one. Theoretically, the route toward nationalism takes two ways: pursuing national identity through the formation of the nation-state or exercising national identity through invoking the shared commonality of religion, language, race, etc. This thesis does not seek to reject these routes to nationalism but instead shows that nationalism does not emerge without the intervention of the other variables. Core elements of both forms are used interchangeably to fulfil the goals of nationalism. For example, civic nationalism shares shared values, myths, and symbols, mainly if there is no principal territorial or population base from which they can establish a political community.

Similarly, ethnic nationalism imagines itself within a state. The idea of a demarcated territory for an ethnic base takes a lot from civic nationalism. Therefore, the categorisations are borrowed from each other. The mobilisation of the ethnicities forges the resurgence of ethnic nationalism. Re-defining and re-educating the ethnic intellectuals politicise culture and are constantly involved in the production of the 'other' and the 'outsider' within. One also needs to understand the possibility of the emergence of multiple narratives from margins. The counter-narratives that emerge from the margins continuously evoke and erase the nation's boundaries and also late the ideological support through which the demand for the country is essentialised.

Kashmir becomes an exciting ground for understanding the juxtaposition of various forces. Since the formation of Kashmiri nationalism precedes the formation of the nation-state or the accession, this study focuses on the changing meanings, interpretations, and perceptions of Kashmiri nationalism. Also, to bridge theoretical and practical perspectives, this study unpacks Kashmiri nationalism and its central dilemma of not being equated with or within any global movement of terrorism.

The study's rationale understands Kashmiri nationalism's essence and the forms it assumes. Moreover, minimal comprehensive studies on Kashmiri nationalism have explored its dimensions, actors, trends, successes, limitations, failures, etc. The research agenda remains exciting as it would inform and expand our knowledge about Kashmiri nationalism's moderate and militant dimensions.

The scope of the study is not only limited to Kashmir, but it also informs and expands the theoretical base to nationalism studies, locating its structural fault lines. The study covers the period from the beginning of militancy in 1989 to 2016. However, the study provides a historical overview as Kashmiri nationalism cannot be studied without examining the creation of Kashmiri identity through centuries. This study ended in 2016 when a unique political formulation between the PDP and BJP alliance government came to power in Jammu and Kashmir after the BJP won an unprecedented 25 seats in the state assembly elections.

The study's main objective is to understand the internal contestations within Kashmiri nationalism. It analyses the changes in form, meaning, and conceptualisation and tries to understand the growth of Hindu nationalism in Jammu and its impact on Kashmiri nationalism.

The significant questions this research looks at are how self does/other contestation play a role in the conception and sustenance of Kashmiri nationalism. How do religious symbols provide a moral vocabulary for Kashmir nationalism, and how is the goal of nationalism recalled, recognised, localised, and reconstructed through commemorative practices? How is collective memory used to foreground a countermemory, and how does the performing of nationalism provide visions of nationhood and possible strategies of cohesion and resistance? How

do symbols and concepts become a powerful source of inspiration and legitimate the struggle for political identity?

Hypotheses and Methodology

The research questions are answered by testing the following hypotheses.

- The first is Kashmiri nationalism, essentially a contestation of 'self' and 'other'.
- The second one is the weakness of democratic institutions, which has created social categories for the distribution of patronage, resulting in chasms based on ethnicity, religion, and region.

This work utilises primary as well as secondary sources to test the hypotheses. Data from existing literature, such as books, research articles, and news articles from different magazines and internet sites, has been collected. Primary sources are also used extensively, including the published material of various Kashmiri political organisations, personal diaries, observer accounts, posters, unpublished documents, and memoirs. The researcher's knowledge of Urdu and Kashmiri languages enabled the use of books and newspapers from these languages.

The thesis was compiled after elaborate fieldwork in Kashmir from April to July 2017, including a field trip to Jammu in December 2017. In addition to using the available material in local libraries, interviews were conducted with various political actors, analysts, journalists, and scholars. The interviews were primarily narrative-based, without a specific questionnaire, allowing the interviewee to speak without inhibitions. The interviewees were chosen through snowball sampling, where they introduced me to their acquaintances, and the circle grew.

Chapterisation

The study is divided into five main chapters. This first chapter develops an analytical framework for examining the form, meaning, and conceptualisation of nationalism. The section explores the development of the concept of nationalism through theoretical debates. It further examines how exclusion and the desire to access later power result in nationalism. It looks at the sources of other nationalisms and what instrumental factors combine to form other nationalisms. It further tries to find out the goals and objectives of other nationalisms.

The second chapter locates the origin of Kashmiri nationalism by examining the historical, political, and social factors that contributed to its development. It sketches out how Kashmir and Kashmiri nationalism is understood in the popular imagination. It also examines whether Kashmiri nationalism is geographically exclusive to a particular territory or extends to the state's length and breadth. Additionally, it traces how the religious and ethnic complexities of the Kashmiri society have interacted with Kashmiri nationalism. The role of different political formulations in defining and promoting Kashmiri nationalism will also be examined. The chapter argues that to garner a better picture of Kashmiri nationalism, one needs to evaluate its interaction with forces of modernity. A deeply rooted sense of regional identity in Kashmir was channelled when education offered access to understanding the nature of Kashmiri nationalism. The development of education, social communications, and the growth of print enabled the masses to think of themselves profoundly.

The third chapter explains the transition of Kashmir nationalism from the political to militant terrain. It traces the assertions and objectives of different political actors. The chapter examines how civic Kashmiri nationalism remains a cornerstone in mainstream and separatist projects and how and where the differences are marked. Further, it examines how the militant transition also brings ethnic Kashmiri nationalism to the fore, which otherwise had been latent. It looks at how the contestations within the militant groups are a contestation of ethnic and civic variants of nationalism. The chapter explains the transition of

political nationalism into militant nationalism through critical political developments from 1950 to 1980 and how these episodes provided a temporal map for the transition. Parallel to the political developments, counter-histories provided newer meanings and forms for political nationalism. The sense of political betrayal and humiliation added to the urgency of the transition. The chapter examines the political groups and organisations beyond the visible political zone and mobilised opinion for civic nationalism. Thus deflating the myth that 1989 was the starting point for Kashmiri nationalism.

The fourth chapter examined how external factors have impacted Kashmiri nationalism. The chapter looks at the external factors that influence Kashmiri nationalism. It tries to investigate the intervention of various political actors through civic and ethnic nationalism, respectively. It tries to determine whether political actors have changed their positions due to the changing geopolitical situations. The chapter looks at the relationship between the Kashmiri diaspora and Kashmiri nationalism. It talks about how Pakistan functions as a factor in Kashmiri Nationalism and how, through deploying centralising tendencies, it has tried to contain Kashmiri nationalism.

The fifth chapter examines contestations to Kashmiri nationalism. It explores how polarising tendencies within the Jammu division emerged as a challenge to Kashmiri nationalism and examines contestations within the nationalist camp. In this context, changes in the form, meaning, and conceptualisation of Kashmiri nationalism are explored.

Chapter 1
Nationalism: A Conceptual Framework

Introduction

Historians undertook the study of nationalism before anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists shifted their attention to the subject. After World War II, a vast body of literature emerged on the subject, but a sense of terminological and historical chaos came alongside it. Calhoun (1997) writes that nationalism is too diverse to be explained by a single theory. Various combinations of cultural traditions and leadership roles determine the orientation of nationalism. Calhoun's scepticism was shared by Hall (1999:1), who believed that the theory of nationalism could not be bound universally. As the historical record is diverse, so must the concepts.

As such, there cannot be any periodic boundaries to understand the exact time frame for the emergence of nationalism. Scholars have tried to mark the critical historical events essential to understanding the emergence of nationalism. Hutchinson and Smith (1994) marked the partition of Poland in 1775 as a crucial date, the installation of the American Declaration of Independence in 1776, the commencement of the second phase of the French Revolution in 1792, and when Johann Gottlieb Fichte addressed the German nation about the higher meaning of the love of Fatherland in 1807. It is essential to point out that imagining a theory of nation and nationalism is not the same thing. The institutional dimension of nations is state-oriented, hence the idea of the nation-state. Meanwhile, nationalism operates as an ideology that

promotes one's superior identity over the other and seeks control of the nation. Therefore, the fundamentals of nationalism are embedded in identity politics.

This chapter tries to map out critical theoretical debates on nationalism. It looks at the scholarship around nationalism and finds out that the idea of exclusion emerges complementarily to the concept of nationalism. The chapter attempts to understand how exclusion converts itself into the derivative discourse of ethnic nationalism in a heterogeneous society. It identifies the basis, strategies, and principles of ethnonationalism and throws light on how ethnonationalism is constructed through sociopolitical grievances.

The Study of Nationalism During the Early Years

The emergence of nationalism is commonly associated with the French Revolution, during which the rights of man were recognised as the rights of the citizen. Hence, the nation emerged as the source of political authority. Junaid (2008) writes that conceptually, the origin of a nation can be traced to the Hebrew Bible, where the connection between land, language, and kinship was established after the deluge and dispersion of Noah's sons.

This section looks at the major influences on the study of nationalism in three phases: from the 18th century to the early 20th century, from 1944 to 1980, and from 1980 to the present. The first intellectual traditions for understanding the nation are primordialism and perennials. Primordialism recognises nations as organic givens and natural divisions of humanity. They regard nations as fixed and permanent entities of the world and trace the nature of national ties to primordial attachments. Smith (1999) recognises the power of such social groups in rooted kinship and genetic bases of human existence. Subsequently, they survived later processes and developments.

Schleiermacher (2004) and Fichte (1808) were the significant theorists who argued on the primordial/perennial grounds where nations are ancient and natural phenomena. As the nation appears timeless, na-

tional forms evolve, and particular nations cease to exist. Fichte (1808), in his 'Address to the German Nation', advocated for the earthly fatherland.

> The natural impulse of a man, which should be abandoned only in the case of absolute necessity, is to find heaven on earth and to endow his daily work on earth with permanence and eternity, to plant and to cultivate the eternal in the temporal-not merely in the incomprehensible fashion or in connection with the infinite that seems to mortal eye an impenetrable gulf, but in a fashion visible to the mortal eye itself.[1] (Jones and Turnbull:1992, 136–138)

Fichte conceived nation as something organic and believed that love for the fatherland can be consolidated only through its eternal character. He simplified it by individualising the context that an individual may imagine having a fatherland in the afterlife but not in this life. He has no fatherland. Jones and Turnbull (1992:143-145) bring out Fichte's translations and describe education as having the capacity to imbibe devotion to the fatherland. Drawing heavily from Herder and Hegel, Fichte regarded the subordination of the state to the nation. While the state was involved in the governance of human life, it was a means to a higher organic purpose. Fichte's nation was based on ethnic-genealogical and cultural linguistic elements, which inspired proto-jingoistic conservatism over the years.

Herder again belongs to the organic tradition of visualising nations as divine and focuses on the education of mankind. Education makes an individual a man; the whole species lives as a chain of individuals. To his understanding, a common language in a familiar territory marks a nation, and inherited myths and traditions nourish its spirit. Herder (1800) sees education as performing the function of imparting social traditions. Following this tradition, he progressed to say that man's natural state is society and that the first forms of government arose from these

1 Fichte advocated that men fundamentally had a tendency to live and perfect their lives, but also to preserve these qualities for the souls of those he leaves behind, so that in turn they may hand it over to their successors. The tendency acquires a national character gradually.

natural social relationships. Mutual assistance and protection are the principal ends of all human associations. For a polity, the natural order ensures that each member becomes what nature wants him to become. Crouter (1988), in his reading of Schleiermacher, points out the defence of the fatherland, whether by the armies already in motion or according to their inclination. A common aim is organised into a noble whole, and personal ambition is not allowed to weaken the actual effectiveness of this courage.

There are three varieties of primordialism: popular, socio-biological, and cultural. Popular primordialism sees nations as close to natural organisms and closer to natural laws. Thus, national identities are seen as an organic part of human beings, and nature predetermined nationality. Hutchinson (1994) recognises that the common claim of popular primordia lists propagates nations as primordial formations that were recognisable through their distinctive way of life, their affiliation to a territorial homeland, and a deep desire for political autonomy. On the other hand, socio-biological primordialism stresses the social and biological intersection of ethnicity and nationhood. Its leading proponent, Van den Berghe, tried using socio-biology principles in animal grouping and cooperation to explain ethnic ties. Socio-biological primordialism suggests that ethnic groups can be traced to the genetic reproductive drives of individuals and the desire to maximise their gene pool. Berghe (1978) explains that socio-biological primordialism is dictated by kin selection, reciprocity, and coercion. The entire process of socio-biological primordialism works on the persistence and strength of social cohesion in ethnic groups or nations by the shared biological heritage of group members.

On the other hand, perennialists do not specify a specific date of birth for nationalism but see modern nations as lineal descendants of their medieval counterparts. For perennialists, the nation is an ethnocultural community politicised. It claims political recognition because of its common ancestry and rootedness in specific geography at a particular time. Smith (1988) identifies two types of perennials: continuous and recurrent. At the same time, constant perennialism advocates that specific nations have existed for centuries and their history is traceable

and continuous. He believes that some nations like Egypt and Greece are immemorial while others in Asia and Africa can be more recent. Recurrent perennialism, on the other hand, believes that nations appear and disappear, emerge and dissolve in different places and times, but nation in general as a human association is perennial and ubiquitous.

However, writing in 1882, Renan challenged the primordial understanding of the nation in subtle yet powerful ways. What makes his contribution worthwhile is that, unlike the importance of the idea of 'remembrance' in nationalist studies, Renan introduces the concept of forgetting the discipline. "Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation", Renan (1882) lectured in his classic statement, "*Quest-ce-qu'une*, what is a Nation"? Renan reminds his readers that the essence of the nation is in the belief that individuals have many things in common and have forgotten many things. Likewise, a nation represents an earlier conquest that would have displaced and massacred individuals to set up a specific realm.[2]

His argument also challenges German scholarship, which assigns undue importance to race in forming nations. While race becomes a primordial right, he holds the rich legacy of memories and present-day consent supreme as the nation's soul. He uses a meticulous metaphor, 'daily plebiscite,' which forms the consent to continue an everyday life.

> Man is a slave neither of his race nor his language nor of his religion nor of course of rivers nor of the direction taken by the mountain chains. A large aggregate of men, healthy in mind and warm of heart creates the kind of moral conscience which we call a nation. So long as this moral consciousness gives proof of its strength by the sacrifices which demand the abdication of the individual to the advantage of the community, it is legitimate and has the right to exist. In case of disputes, the populations would be consulted for decisions. (Rundell, 1992:11)

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2 Renan discusses the idea of forgetting along with the massacre of Saint Bartholomev in which many thousands of Huegonots were killed. This event had momentous repercussions in the history of France.

Clearly, Renan emphasises the radically subjective analysis of nationhood and gives analytical importance to the contemporary against the romanticism of the nations was the order of the day. Nation, for him, is a spiritual principle, and the most crucial aspect emerges from the consensual principle of how nations act and their performativity against the divisive politics of race, language, geography, and religion. This aspect of Renan's thinking made contemporary theorists resurrect him in the 1990s.

Renan's importance also lies in putting forward the subjective identification of the factors that influence nationalism over the objective ones. Weber (1963:172), in his "The Nation", wrote that "it is based on sentiments of prestige, which often extends deep down to the petty-bourgeois masses of political structures rich in the historical attainment of power positions". The fervour of nationalism does not have an economic origin and runs deep down to the prestige principle, making itself indispensable in the sphere of values. And those who zealously shoulder the idea have access to specific cultural capital. He establishes the concept of the vital importance of intellectuals to the nationalist consciousness by demonstrating how the particularistic interest transformed into the national mission.

The Weberian analysis introduced a vital idea later developed by Clifford Geertz, Carleton Hayes, Edward Shills, and Elie Kedourie.

The Study of Nationalism, 1944–1980

During the second phase, from 1944 to 1980, the study of nationalism acquired a contemporary rational liberal outlook. The rational liberal understanding was shaped prominently by the ideas of Hans Kohn (1961), Elie Kedourie (1966), and Isiah Berlin (1979). Their main argument rests on the premise that nationalism developed in response to the intellectual and political crisis during the Enlightenment. In this sense, nationalism is a unit bound together, and the group is looking forward to the highest organised activity, forming a sovereign state. As attaining sovereignty might take time, it satisfies itself with autonomy or a similar arrange-

ment. However, this sovereignty operates on a dual principle of empathy towards fellow members of the nationality. Still, it is marked by indifference and distrust/hate for members and outlook within the nations, as well as by the crystallisation of will.

There are also marked differences between the rise of nationalism in the Western and the non-Western world. Kohn (1961) details how nationalism in the non-Western world emerged to protest existing state patterns, primarily to redraw political boundaries in compliance with ethnographic demands and to find expression in the cultural field. Western nationalism originated with concepts of individual liberty and rationality in Eastern/Central Europe and Asian contexts. It pitched on the natural fact of the community and sentiments held together by traditional ties. The second significant contribution of rational-liberal thought is the historical soundness of the critique of nationalism. This aspect generated a debate and set a precedent for Benedict Anderson, Anthony Smith, and Ernst Gellner.

The liberal rationalists draw their influences from the Whig historiography of modern forms of liberal democracy as having progressed from constitutional monarchy. The supremacy of reason can be gauged from Kedourie's (1974) path-breaking intervention, where he recognises self-determination as the only acceptable way to deal with nationalism. Kedourie (1974) regards "National self-determination as the final culmination in the determination of the will: and nationalism is a method of teaching the right determination of the will".

However, while defining loyalty to a particular institution, for example, an 'A' institution, a nationalist must explain the 'A' institution in terms of language, race, or religion and merge their will with the community's will. The rationalist liberals went to the extent of classifying nationalism as a 'new tribalism', criticising ideological politics capable of espousing hate on grounds of race, tradition, and religion. The destruction of traditional hierarchies deprives people of social and emotional bonds of security, leading to alienation. A new innovative strategy was required to secure cultural, political, or religious bonds from the older order. Majorly, the chasm was filled by traditional bonds of language, memories, and

self-conception as a community. This sentiment was exploited for ulterior purposes and gradually acquired an independent force of its own.

Berlin (1979) pitched the doctrine of nationalism as a revolt against reason and identified Euro-centrism in studying nationalism. The European perceptions were used to analyse Asia and Africa; the inhabitants were seen either as beneficiaries or victims of Europe but seldom as people with histories or cultures. Their nationalisms were perceived solely against European domination, so the nationalisms emerging from the non-Western contexts were seen as an explosion of anti-imperialism.

The Study of Nationalism Since 1980

Nationalism in this period emerged in reaction to primordials and perennials, rejecting the naturalism and immemorial of nations as a myth. For modernists, nations are modern social constructs that emerged with increased communication and the growth of contemporary social and political processes like capitalism, industrialism, state bureaucratisation, secularism, and urbanisation. So, nations became territorial political communities constituting the chief political bond and other formative allegiances. Modernism can be approached in three categories: socio-cultural and political.

Like Berlin (1979), who set the tone for establishing a relationship between primordial ties and modernity within the rational liberal framework, Gellner (1983) meticulously intervened in the debate by understanding nationalism as a peculiarly contemporary phenomenon with dual structural connections between society and the modern capitalist economy. Gellner (1983) envisioned nationalism as imposing a high culture on society, replacing local low culture. He emphasised cultural affinity as the underlying principle for developing politically organised systems and the Weberian State[3]. Gellner (1983) defended that nations are a product of modernity's efforts to impose higher cultures. In his

3 Weberian state is a modern system of administration based on centralization and coercion. It is a symbol of collective action which means whatever the state

work, he saw modernity translating the structure and culture of the state and the nation.

Since society was vertically bound before industrialisation, watertight segregation between communities and classes led to the non-commonality of language, memories, religion, or ancestry. However, in the industrial society, the barriers between communities faded due to mass education, which had a standard character allowing for socio-economic mobility. Additionally, if the scale of industrialisation is uneven, the communities that are at a disadvantage will not be able to assimilate. This gap might increase if the state's ruler is not from the same ethnic majority. In this case, nationalism will erupt because members of the 'nation' would not like to be governed by any other ethnic element. Subsequently, standardised education becomes the connector between culture and the political will of belonging to a nation. This way, the identification between culture and politics is not given but the result of a social process. The industrial society is one in constant growth and accompanied by absolute mobility. Inherited roles disappear as constant movement requires equality for social functioning. As members must be able to communicate with each other, an urgency for a common language emerges. The category of 'cultural' assumes a modern and cultural homogenisation acquires a cultural imperialistic form.

Another essential element of Gellner's work is the strain generated by nationalism around entropy-resistant groups. The groups that resist entropy become problematic for industrial societies. The reasons for the resistance could be genetic or cultural. Gradually, because of being exposed to discrimination, these groups will be openly resistant to entropy generated within industrial societies, leading to nationalism in industrial societies. He thus claims that nations are produced by nationalism created through a series of social processes. For him, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires ethnic boundaries to be congruent with political boundaries.

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performs is always for the community and not particular interests. Territoriality, violence and legitimacy are the essential elements of the weberian state.

Another essential theorisation that emerged in this period is Benedict Anderson's (1983) phenomenal work on nationalism. His primary concern has been understanding nationalism as an occurrence in its own right and not as a shadow of any other variable. Though Anderson's work is considered prophetic in nationalism studies, one can segregate it between his theoretical arguments and the historical account of the rise of nationalism in Europe and elsewhere.

The starting point of Smiths (1983:6) theoretical claim is that a "nation is an imagined community because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of the fellow members, meet them or even hear of them". He contends nations, like religions, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind that emerged towards the end of the 18th century. Discussing the formation and rise of nationalism within Europe against a specific background with the collapse of earlier religious and cultural certainties, Smith (1983:4) visualises nationalism as a "modular form capable of being transplanted with varying degrees of self-consciousness to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and to be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological factors".

Anderson's second theoretical assertion is that the nation is not only imagined but also a limited and sovereign political community. It is limited because the boundaries are demarcated, and it is sovereign because, within the demarcated boundaries, most nations imagine themselves as free. He connects sovereignty to the religious plurality, where the legitimacy of divinely ordained realms is challenged vehemently. Anderson's final theoretical assertion is that a nation, through deep comradeship, becomes imaginable as a community.

Anderson's phenomenal work also explains the historicity behind the rise of nationalism. Talking about the European experience, Anderson discusses the role of religious communities, particularly Christianity, to understand the rise of nationalism. The sacral cultures were imagined mainly through sacred language and written script, which catered to a tiny literate population hierarchically on the apex. However, the importance of religiously imagined communities could not survive beyond the Middle Ages. One of the predominant reasons for this development was the discovery of the non-European world at the beginning of the 13th

century. The second reason was the gradual demotion of the sacred languages. The status of Latin waned, and the traditional communities were fragmented. The form of the dynastic realm also changed from being the only conceivable political unit to one in which the monarchy organised all the essential functions.

The third important idea Anderson floats is that nationalism has to be situated along with the concept of time. He explains that another reality was dawning, equally instrumental in replacing religious communities and dynastic realms. Anderson links the idea of time with the role of print capitalism. This transformation marks a critical juncture in the birth of an imagined community. Book publishing became the earliest form of capitalist enterprise, and in capitalism's restless search for markets, nationalism became a saleable commodity.

By the mid-seventeenth century, the printing press owners faced a shortage of money. As a rescue measure, printing press owners decided to print literature in the vernacular languages. The advent of vernacularisation coincided with reformation. Anderson (1983:40) notes

> The coalition between Protestantism and print capitalism, exploiting cheap popular editions, quickly created large reading publics, not least among merchants who typically knew little or no Latin and simultaneously mobilised for politico-religious purposes. Third was the slow, geographically uneven spread of particular vernaculars as instruments of administrative centralisation by certain well-positioned would-be absolutist monarchs.

With time, print languages influenced the national consciousness by creating unified fields of exchange and communication. He contends nationalism arose in the Americas before arising in Europe. The population shared a common origin and language, which formed Creole states. Creole states shared lingual commonality with the metropole, which led to the transmission of the new doctrines generated in Western Europe. Creoles used their sense of exclusion, along with the opportunities created by print capitalism, as an opportunity to develop Creole identity and, subsequently, Creole nationalism. The pilgrim functionaries and

printmen played an equally decisive role in the spirit of Creole nationalism. However, despite the striking similarity with the metropole, nationalism in Creoles could not convert itself into a Pan-American phenomenon. Anderson makes an interesting observation that by the middle of the 20th century, the educational journey gained a predominant stature gifted by the mobility generated by railways.

The modernist theorisations denote a shift in the analysis framework from culture to capitalism. They contributed to the debate by swapping historical and essentialist notions of culture and power with the forces of modernity. However, structurally heterogeneous imperatives within all modern states give rise to one or the other form of nationalism. This assessment was done by the historicist-lexicographical rebuilding of the nation, imparting importance to the subjective act of imagining vis–a–vis the material conditions.

The educational journey and the role of intellectuals in creating a civil society has an amorphous relation with the nation. Shill (1995) opines that civil society is an essential indicator for sustaining the nation. Civil society is one of the institutional manifestations of the nation and is formed by a sense of mutual awareness. In this way, participating in the collective and not recognising those outside the ambit becomes a political act resulting in the classificatory process of the 'Self' and the 'Other'. Hastings (1997) corroborates the classificatory consciousness and places nationalism as a substantial exposition of a particularistic identity. The nation-state arose from a conviction that one's own ethnic or national tradition is valuable and has to be defended.

On the other hand, economic modernism explained nationalist resurgence through the dynamics of particular stages of capitalism. The economic modernists co-related the roots of nationalism with the world economy and wanted to find an explanatory framework for deriving nationalism. Nairn (1981) notes that the roots of nationalism are to be sought beyond the internal dynamics of societies and, therefore, determined by certain features of the world political economy. The capitalist development process created a vast gap between the core and the periphery. Given the situation, mass mobilisation was only possible regarding national identity outside the forces of domination. This was

followed by nationalism in peripheral countries as a response to uneven development.

In the same period, ethno-symbolism driven by the tireless efforts of such scholars as Anthony Smith (1999), John Armstrong (1982), and John Hutchinson (1987) emerged. Ethno-symbolists asserted that nationalism has stronger roots in pre-modern ethnicity, and their objective is to retain the symbolic legacy of pre-modern ethnic identities. Armstrong (1982) writes that ethnic precursors are essential for properly assessing the emergence of the present nations. The formation of nations should be explored within the more significant phenomenon of ethnicity. In particular, ethno-symbolists are critical of the modernist failure to grasp the recurring nature of ethno-symbolic ties. Smith (1999) expresses that understanding modern nations involves understanding the myths, memories, traditions, and symbols associated with them. He acknowledges that nations cannot be perceived as natural but located in ancient histories and filtered through ethnic consciousness. Ethno-modernists make a difference between nationalism as an ideology and nationalism as a movement. Though nationalism appeared around the later eighteenth century, the ethnic origins of nations are older. Smith writes that artefacts carry forward myths, symbols, memories, and values. As these artefacts and activities change very slowly, the formation of an ethnic group also sustains itself for a long time. Smith (1986) explains that the origins of modern nationalism lie in the successful bureaucratisation of aristocratic ethnic communities with their myths and symbols. Collective memory plays a vital role in forming ethnic and then national identity. Smith (1986:109) notes that in the modern arena, ethnic communities are compelled to become political, and "to survive, *ethnie* must take on some of the attributes of nationhood, and adopt a civic model". On the other hand, nations rooted in ethnicity are long-term processes. According to Smith, modern nations and nationalism have intensified the meaning and scope of older ethnic concepts and structures.

Exclusion and Desire for Power: A Distinctive Characteristic of Nationalism

An important idea that emerges regularly in the theoretical understanding of nationalism is the 'idea of exclusion'. Perennials and primordials believe that the world's natural order ensures the exclusion of those who don't belong to that particular order. At the same time, cultural modernists understand that the change in the mode of economy ensures exclusion. As primordialists point out, if the world's natural order is a division of humanity made by culturally fixed groups, then the groups would tend to exclude others. Such order is bound to create hostility between nations and ethnic groups. At the same time, it is difficult to prove that the genetic pool of smaller social units such as family and clan is extendable to larger groups. It is also pertinent to note that boundaries of ethnic identity are fluid and are continuously redefined and reconstructed via individual choice and according to changing conditions. So, the primordial and perennial claim that ethnic and national ties are ineffable is problematic. The organic nationalism theory also neglects changes affecting nations, such as migration and colonisation, and fails to explain the reasons for the loss and rebirth of nations. Mere knowledge of ethnic ties is not sufficient in predicting the dynamics of ethnic groups, as the use of ethnic attachments for political and nationalist ends can transform their very meanings. In this way, primordial sentiments are ineffable, overpowering, and coercive.

Primordial identities question emotion and affective ties and explain the power of cultural givens of human existence, such as blood, kinship, language, custom, religion, and territory. In this way, cultural primordialists build on the anthropological conception of culture, which defines it as a total way of life having a unique historical group past. However, the imagination of unique peoplehood, distinct culture, and distinct historical experience encoding a set of symbolic patterns remains a fundamentally divisive and exclusivist doctrine. Isaji (1992) situates primordial attachments alongside modern secular civil ties, which impede and dissolve the civil ties of the modern state.

Other than impeding the functions of the modern state, another marked gap in primordialism is its givenness and unquestionable reverence for the fixed social position. An organic understanding of nationalism imposes retrospective nationalism on communities and groups, whereas the identities and consciousness could have been local, regional, or religious.

On the contrary, socio-cultural modernists have historically been grounded in addressing the issue of nation-building. Modernity created cultural homogenisation and the emergence of a new national conscience. Modernist processes like printing and communication helped form the community by imparting a sense of nationhood but fell short of explaining nationhood as an ideology. The centralised, uniform state proposed by the socio-cultural modernists gave members a sense of belonging towards one's identity against the other. Cultural homogenisation was ensured through an education-dependent, high-culture culture protected by the state. Cultural homogenisation was enabled through socio-economic modernisation. Socio-cultural modernism places nationalism as rooted in the past.

However, the homogenised mass culture theory must be revised in varying socio-economic terrains. Deutsch (1953) notes that modernisation enables social mobilisation and social communication. If social communication outraces assimilation, competition among the various groups is inevitable. In a way, the forces of modernisation have a different impact on the consolidation of states where people share lingual or cultural similarities. However, it can be different for states with mixed populations. Secondly, modernisation is also accompanied by the growth of new economic and political orders. Traditional values and authority misplace their meaning in the changing societies. As the old structures fade, societal equations of status and power are reworked, too. This reworking of values and new relationships is reflected through contesting power claims and, thus, the idea of exclusion, which can emerge with modernity. As there is a tussle for control of the economy, objective class differences emerge between formerly classless groups. Competition during modernisation is essentially a competition between

large-scale groups for privilege. It brings different ethnic groups with different values and languages in confrontation.

Thus, a vital accompaniment to the process of modernity has been a multiplication of the claims for greater access to power and resources. However, the success of any such claim depends on the infrastructure of social communications and the comprehensive institutionalisation of values, roles, and expectations. Melson and Wolpe (1970) remarked that the social groups grew faster and reinforced ethnic differences, creating a stark ethnic confrontation. As there is a tussle for controlling the economy, objective class differences emerge between formerly classless groups. Thus, different ethnic groups who held different values -and spoke different languages were pitched against each other. As tribal and kinship networks failed to provide support, individuals sought to create a broader formation, such as an ethnic nation**.** This way, the ethnic boundaries broadened, and loyalty towards the immediate tribe was replaced by loyalty towards an identity. As modernisation also politicises ethnicity to seek greater values in the political process, ethnicity is mobilised through ethnic clientele. The politicisation of ethnicity transmits the message to the masses.

Rogowski (1985) notes that elites believe in ethnic nationalism only when they expect the future autonomous nation to have a favourable supply-demand ratio for their particular skills. For gaining greater economic and political participation, ethnic mobilisation can be carried on cultural lines rather than economic lines. Ethnosymbolism here is used as a smokescreen for underlying demands of economic and political values. So, the demands are carved in terms of invoking pre-modern ethnic identities and contextualisation of ethnic demands through the more significant phenomenon of ethnicity. Reverence for the nation's past is invoked, providing new meanings and functions for myths, memories, symbols, and values.

Modernisation correlates with institutionalism, whereby institutions work as political actors and provide opportunities. They function as recurring patterns of behaviour and are embedded in particular contexts shaped by the forces of modernisation. Institutions are understood as models or scripts for behaviour and include the structure

of governance and the inclusion or exclusion of different actors. As explained, there can be no grand theory of ethnic nationalism; only partial theories concentrate on specific aspects. Various dimensions of modern social, cultural, and political change serve to make both nationhood and ethnicity salient. Ethnicity and nationhood are social problems and political resources often used in various political strategies. Hence, taking cues from differing theories to make sense of our case study is reasonable.

Ethnic Nationalism: A Derivative Discourse of the Contestation Between the Self and the Other

In post-colonial states, nationalism has evolved as a replica of what it once stood against. Chatterjee (1986:42) perceives this problem as a derivative discourse. Postcolonial nationalism adopted a repressive structure shaped by Western capitalism and rationalism. Chatterjee's colonial state model presents an excellent framework for understanding the contestation of self and others in the context of the nation. The West has asserted its superiority through its access to science and technology, while the East pitches its superiority in the spiritual domain, often done by glorifying the golden past. Chatterjee (1986:121) notes that "nationalist thought accepts and adopts the same essentialist conception based on the distinction between 'the East' and 'the West', the same typology created by a transcendent studying subject, and hence the same objectifying procedures of knowledge constructed in the post-Enlightenment age of Western science". Plemenatz (1973) and Greenfeld (1992) also have suggested ways the other gets imitated. Plemenatz (1973:30) distinguished between Western nationalism and the oriental type, where Western domination undermined Western society's structure. He writes that

> Drawn gradually, due to the diffusion among them of Western ideas and practices, into a civilisation alien to them, they have had to re-equip themselves culturally to transform themselves. In their

> efforts to assert themselves as equals in a society not of their own making, they have had to, as it were, to make themselves anew, to create national identities for themselves.

Thus, Plamenatz suggests a conclusive way of thinking about the sub-nationalisms that emerge in response to the control of others, often from the West. This serves the dual purpose of rejecting the power of the other and traditional ways perceived as hindrances towards progress. A key factor emerges here: resentment, resulting in pressed hatred and not having a vent for expressing hatred. Subnationalism thus emerges on multiple levels as a political doctrine and a movement led by elites against social control. This tussle also reflects groups' adaptive processes to raise their prestige. For example, in India, the precolonial contestation between the self and the other occurred through the nationalist stigmatisation and imitation of the British colonialist. The reformists, rather than rejecting the British onslaught on the private sphere, began to diffuse the Western claims by situating them in the ancient global age. In other ways, the 'self' began to interpret itself through the cultural understanding of the other. Foucault (1984) notes that resistance as a phenomenon is situated within the power which provokes it and not outside this power. I believe that resistance is an aspect of this strategic relationship that involves power.

Building a sub-nationalistic ideology thus creates a new mechanism for coping with the threats of the other. Geertz (1973) explains that sub-nationalist retaliation reacts to socio-cultural and psychological strain. In a way, Geertz supports the point made by Plemanatz regarding the pre-requisite of cultural re-alignment through socio-psychological factors. This re-alignment through political, moral, and economic variables determines the growth of sub-nationalism. Thus, sub-nationalism, at one level, imagines a glorious past and transforms its culture vis-à-vis the outsider. Also, much attention is given to constructing ideology through socio-economic and political factors. Civil society often plays a significant role, and social groups carry out the message of transmitting the values of sub-nationalism.

Sources of Ethnic Nationalism

Ethnic nationalism derives from subjective and objective sources to manifest itself as a socio-political value. Cultural attributes and symbolic ethnic markers, such as language, territory, and religion, form the objective dimension, while the subjective dimension includes group loyalty, identity, etc. The objective and subjective values determine the lines of ethnic identity and membership, along with group inclusion and exclusion questions. The objective factors are central to the discourse on ethnic nationalism, but sometimes, the role may be exaggerated. Fenton (2003) places ethnicity as the construction of descent and culture and ethnic nationalism as the social mobilisation. The mobilisation depends on the level of self-consciousness in an ethnic group and awareness of differences with other groups.

De Vos (1995) points out that ethnic nationalism is defined by the subjective application of cultural references or their emblematic use to differentiate themselves from other groups. Thus, cultural references become a marker for group affiliation and identify strangeness and unfamiliarity. The awareness of difference plays a vital role in mobilisation. When a group has no consciousness or the desire to organise in terms of ethnic consciousness, ethnic nationalism does not evolve.

Subjective references thus perform the function of the social organisation of cultural difference and distinction of 'us' and 'them'. Thus, subjective references perform the essential function of generating social labels. A peculiar characteristic of subjective references is that they are formed through mutual contact rather than in isolation. Burgess (1981) explains that symbolic markers explain the quality of the subjective aspects of ethnic nationalism. The subjective element of ethnic nationalism, by and large, plays a more crucial role than objective qualities, as group formation is a subjective experience undertaken by group members themselves. The differences that set the group apart are usually drawn along real or putative shared culture. So, the differences are crucial for the group members and members of other groups.

Smith (1999) and Hutchinson (1996) particularly emphasise the importance of myths, symbols, and memories as primary elements of eth-

nically defined groups. Smith (1999:50), for example, describes it as "a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, and one or more common elements of a common culture, including an association with a homeland and some degree of solidarity, at least among the elites."

Interestingly, the description seeks a compromise between objective attributes, namely common history and culture, and subjective qualities of ethnicity, such as myths and memories. Combining subjective and objective variables makes ethnic nationalism viable and potent in social structures.

Construction of Ethnic nationalism

Ethnic nationalism is a process of construction of an identity negotiated through social practices. Through engaging social processes, actors identify with and commit themselves to a particular vision of nationhood. Smith (1991) identifies fundal elements for constructing ethnic nationalism, a historic homeland, myths and memories, and amassing public culture. Ancestry and historical memories play a crucial role in transmitting the values of nationalism and forming identity. The customs, rituals, and preconceptions shape the content of culture, broadcast it, and formulate behavioural patterns. Popular myths, art, music, and literature provide a bridge with the homeland. A sense of solidarity is manifested through political and popular community institutions or organisations. Yinger (1994) introduces another exciting characteristic of ethnic groups other than segmentality: participation. According to him, ethnic nationalists take part in everyday activities for the valorisation of their culture. So ethnic membership involves not only a possession or a belief in possession of common origin and culture but also requires participating in shared activities, which in turn sustain the belief in common ancestry.

Ethnic nationalism operates in a more extensive social reservoir and ensures interaction with other groups to enhance pseudo-kinship ties. The group then acts or participates in shared cultural activities that not

only symbolise ethnic bondage but also sustain the putative belief. As part of the strategy, compulsory institutions like kinship and religion are promoted to ensure accessible communication. Institutions are given an instrumental nature, responsible for the ideological transformation of cultural values to political and economic ends.

Ethnic nationalism makes it a point to solidify social-psychological ethnic boundaries. These boundaries define lines of ethnic identity and membership and involve group inclusion and exclusion questions. While the contents and membership of ethnic groups change, their boundaries remain. Boundaries can be of two kinds: internal, within the ethnic group, and external, outside the group. In the internal boundaries, self-inclusion in the group occurs, sympathy and loyalty are set towards co-members, and the process of self-identity overlaps. In the external borders, membership exclusion is outlined, and demarcation lines are laid for outsiders.

While assessing ethnic nationalism, Isajiw (1992) suggests distinguishing its external and internal aspects. External aspects of ethnic nationalism refer to social and cultural observable behaviour, such as participating in ethnic institutional organisations and contributing to ethnic associations. The internal elements of ethnic identity comprise visual images, ideas, etc. In this way, ethnic nationalism is constructed as a facade for political aspirations through cognitive, moral, and affective ways.

Resource Competition and Ethnic Nationalism

Ethnic identity is mobilised in multi-ethnic societies as ethnic elites compete for scarce resources and rewards. Such resource competition could lead to ethnic political movements if the acquired resources of a group are threatened or an underprivileged group realises the structural inequalities a group faces. Gurr (1993) writes that an ethnic group may develop a perception of deserving more value than it is getting. Phadnis (1989:39) observes that the process of relative deprivation leading to ethnic political movement may occur in four stages. The first stage is

the stage of recognition, whereby a group recognises deprivation. In the second stage, a group should share the experience and feel that others do not experience similar wretched conditions. In the third stage, the ethnic group has to develop the feeling that the situation of deprivation in which they find themselves is inequitable and unfair. Finally, ethnic groups must recognise that political action could change the situation in their favour, which leads to a stage of mass political revolt. Thus, realising that a group receives less than it deserves becomes the motivating force for ethnic political movements. Two key elements that combine for research competition are elite interaction and the politicisation of ethnicity. Brass (1991) shows that elite competition, resource scarcity, and centralising tendencies of states have combined to produce ethnic competition. However, sometimes resource competition becomes a smokescreen for elites to use the issue for their ends.

Articulation of Interests as Ethnic Nationalism

Given the scenario of resource competition, ethnic nationalism could emerge as a point towards mobilisation. The grievances are expressed over the absence of socioeconomic or political values, but the aim is to redistribute the existing scheme of things. Glazer and Moynihan (1975) realised that modernisation places groups differently, resulting in ethnic groups mobilising towards a group or individual interests. Thus, ethnic grievances become a ready means of demanding group rights or providing defence against other groups. Horowitz (1985) utilises the same perspective to explain how groups symbolically counterfeit hurt sentiments. For example, a group's dignity may be jolted by a lack of respect for its language and could become the cause of violent group conflict.

Goals and Objectives of Ethnic Nationalist Movements

The goals and objectives of ethnic political movements fluctuate according to the sociopolitical conditions. As a group collectively suffers from discrimination in a state and mobilises to promote self-defined interests, historical specificity and the political conditions determine the nature of goals and the change of goals in ethnic nationalist movements. Gurr (1993) uses two terms for politicised groups: national and minority people. National people are the regional groups that retain their cultural and linguistic characteristics during the threats from expansionist states. They desire to maintain some degree of political autonomy. On the other hand, minority people have a definitive position within society and are focused on protecting or improving their status. Therefore, the primary difference between the two lies in goal-seeking behaviour.

National people can be subdivided into two types: ethno-nationalists, regionally concentrated people with a historical precedent of political autonomy, and indigenous movements. Indigenous people, who are primarily peripheral groups and are distinguished from centres of state authority, are concerned mainly about issues of group autonomy. The minority people also have a classification of ethno-classes, militant sects or politically active religious minorities, and linguistic or geographically distinct groups aiming for a more significant share of power. If minority people face or suspect discrimination, they can transform into ethnic-nationalists.

To borrow two terms and ideas from Gurr (1993), inter-group differentials and outright discrimination precisely determine the objectives of the ethno-nationalist movement. He uses differentials as traits that set each group apart in the larger society and are classified as cultural, political, and economic differentials.[4] On the other hand, outright discrimination is measured through systematic exclusion from desirable

4 Cultural differentials determine whether the groups differed from other groups in an important manner through ethnicity, language, religion, customs, urbanness or rural-ness. Political differentials are focused on how communal groups varied in access to positions of power and to political associations. Economic

economic and political goods available to others. Economic inequality is amplified through social and political conditions that are responsible for creating and maintaining these inequalities. Political discrimination could be seen in under-representation in political participation and a prolonged exclusion from political positions. Additionally, demographic and ecological stress also determines the goals of ethno-nationalists.

Strategies of Ethnic Nationalism

For an ethnic nationalism movement to be durable and visible despite the repression by the state, ethno-nationalists adopt several strategies for which several variables need to be taken care of. The first critical variable is to exist as a group and a potent political movement. The movement should have external support in the form of bases, training, finances, weapons, soldiers, intelligence, etc. Additionally, ethno-nationalists should have visibility and solidarity. Modelski (1954) explains that a movement derives visibility and audibility by attracting external politico-diplomatic support and the attention of the international media. Several ways, like international diplomatic activity to gain sympathisers, could be taken to make the movement long-lasting. Diplomatic support can fetch recognition, acknowledgement, territory for exiles, and diaspora activity. It can also fetch material support such as financial and military backing for training and procuring weapons.

Ethnic nationalists must be extremely careful and practical in accepting aid from external actors. This may involve adopting flexibility in its professed ideology and holding to its core constituency. Choosing an ally is also an important step, as the political image of the ally would impact the image of ethno-nationalism. Another important factor is the efficient articulation of their case. This would involve writing booklets, pamphlets, and articles in newspapers and media. This would restrict the allies and the opposition. Phadnis (1989:30) writes that the ability to

differentials are grounded in economic inequalities, access to higher education etc. For more see Gurr (1993:200).

effectively use positive inducements like rewards for services and support, as well as negative sanctions against non-compliance to ethnic nationalist demands, may prove pivotal in attracting support from external parties.

Subsequently, lobbying is conducted at the individual, group, state, and systemic levels. At the individual level, lobbying targets are usually influential personalities, intellectuals, artists, religious figures, etc. The purpose is to legitimise ethnonationalism by using their influence.

At the group level, the lobbying targets are neighbouring nation-states eager to provide military and material support, base facilities, and international publicity. Those states that, in the past, supported ethnic nationalist movements elsewhere are approached for support. Ethnic nationalist movements elsewhere are routinely used for solidarity and support. The ethnic diaspora is also used for lobbying, especially if it is economically and politically powerful.

International bodies comprised of former colonial powers and significant powers are another category of states that could be approached for assistance, recognition, or negotiation of the conflict. International government organisations are other bodies that could be called to mediate the dispute, lend legitimacy to the movement, boost members' morale, and have the broader international opinion in their favour.

The appeal for support to ethnic nationalists opens the possibility of external partisan intervention for affective or instrumental motives. Affective motives include reasons for justice, humanitarian considerations, ethnic and religious affinity, and personal ties between the leadership. In contrast, instrumental motives are rooted in realpolitik and usually include short- or long-term military strategic considerations.

Conclusion

This chapter tried to develop an analytical framework for understanding nationalism and how the derivative discourse of ethnic nationalism comes into existence. Nationalism emerged as a political force against colonial rule, having a solid support base within the political elites. The

genesis of nationalism in post-colonial states differed entirely from its evolution in Europe, where geographical, political, social, and religious unity existed. The European model of nationalism held the cultural boundaries of the nation in unity with the political boundaries. In South Asia, the nationalist imagination emerged mainly to claim an independent nation-state. Nationalism required unity of language, faith, and culture in most cases. In cases where it did not exist, bonds of nationalism were forged.

However, the forged bonds of nationalism were challenged soon after by the underlying divisive tendencies. Some of these tendencies were new, while some were historically entrenched. Consequently, different ethnic groups found little in common with other ethnic groups. Many of these groups had to deal with subordinate treatment from the majoritarian groups because such groups were severely treated and hence saw these cultural groups as new colonisers. The ethnic grievances went hand in hand with the growing assertion by the majority ethnic communities to promote and restore their political, economic, and socio-cultural privileges. This was accompanied by the minority ethnic groups calling for special rights or secession. Social fragmentation, civil and institutional discord, and regime instability became other reasons that bolstered multiple claims of ethnic nationalism.

The absence of a robust nationalist spirit and commitment to common political goals led to a culture of non-accommodation and fundamental discord amongst varied social interests. Given the divergent political and ethnic backgrounds, post-colonial states must develop inclusivity and consociational structures based on accommodation and negotiation. Meanwhile, the states primarily relied on centralist and exclusivist rule patterns, resulting in long-term exclusion and blockage of cross-segmentary ties. This resentment gradually evolved towards ethnopolitical territorial goals when supported by sufficient social support.

In a way, ethno-nationalistic assertion in post-colonial states was determined by varying factors- the most important being the colonial legacy of the ethno-regional policy preferences, state response, and the nature of the social basis for support for ethnic nationalism. The traditional belief system, locally based sources of authority, and kinship

ties reinforced the social basis for support. Some postcolonial states partially redrew their internal boundaries to reduce the perception of exclusion and facilitate a more balanced allocation of benefits to long-ignored regions. However, such examples are limited given the growing ethnic/sub-nationalistic demands. The success of ethnic nationalism also depended on the infrastructure of social communication and the comprehensive institutionalisation of values, roles, and expectations. Modernisation created social mobilisation, leading to greater involvement in mass politics. As social communication outraced assimilation, ethnic competition inevitably results from increased group interaction. Thus, forces of modernisation have a different impact on the consolidation of states with heterogeneous or homogenous populations.

Chapter 2
The Origin and Nature of Kashmiri Nationalism: A Historical Background

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(If the sentiment of love for the
homeland rises from the heart,
it will not prove a burden to the
individual)

Introduction

This chapter tries to locate the origin and nature of Kashmiri nationalism. By delving into politico-historical, sociological, educational, and psychological factors, it attempts to discover how they corresponded to the formation of Kashmiri nationalism. The chapter tries to map the emotional and political nature of nationalism, highlighting the role of prominent political actors. Also, it tries to initiate a theoretical engagement as to how, beneath the actual historical process, other factors intensified the consciousness of identity and the nation-state.

As with other nationalisms, Kashmiri nationalism evolved concretely due to economic, political, and social changes. These changes had a peculiar psychological impact, eventually making the geographical unit more compact and a sense of commonality. A belief in a common

1 A critical edition of Shakristan of Mullah Hamidullah Shahabadi Kashmiri with necessary annotations (1783–1848).

historical past maintained an understanding of difference. Historical memories were gradually interpreted verbally diffusely over the generations. Thus, the imagination of everyday social and genetic descent was consciously developed and propagated through intelligentsia and was diffused throughout the social strata. This mobilisation was supported by social and cultural differentiation. Instead, a distinct, intense, and exclusive culture erupted with its social boundaries. This was followed by continued dichotomisation between the members and the outsiders, making the entire phenomenon continuous.

The chapter also examines how various socio-political processes created the identification of the self and the dichotomisation of the other as a stranger. It broadly tries to understand how the boundaries of Kashmiri nationalism were set.

Politico-Economical Factors

Class formation in Kashmir and the corresponding politico-economic changes are instrumental in understanding the nature of nationalism in Kashmir. The political discourses emerged with the change in economic character for both rural peasantry and urban artisans.

The state became a single geographical entity through the Treaty of Amritsar, signed between Maharaja Gulab Singh and the British on 16 March 1846 for a meagre Rs 75 lakh[2]. Since Gulab Singh sought to earn back the vast amount quickly, he enlarged the existing taxation system from the pre-Dogra period. The trade in the valley was monopolised, and

2 After the Anglo-Sikh War of 1845, the British demanded 1.5 crore from the Lahore Durbar against the cost of war and breaching the friendship treaty with the British. They also realised how controlling the entire Sikh territory would require more significant military and financial costs. More so, a mountainous territory like Kashmir was difficult to defend and closer to the Russian frontier. The inability of Lahore Durbar to pay the war indemnity paved the way for the sale of the territory eastward of the River Indus and westward of the River Ravi to the Dogra rulers. (Zutshi 2004)

there was a tax on every trade and profession. This monopoly also led to pervasive hoarding and black marketing.

Kashmir's rural landscape presented a picture of extreme despondency where the cultivator was at the bottom of the social ladder, and several social groups lived off their labour. In the case of Kashmir, the office holders were primarily Kashmiri Pandits and the Pirs (the preachers from Central Asia settled in Kashmir) who exercised the revenue functions, and these classes were exempted from regular revenue assessment and other taxes the state levied. Zutshi (2003) and Rai (2004) explain how the exploitative revenue system discriminated against the Kashmiri Muslim cultivator. The Kashmiri Muslim cultivator had to feed the Darbar and an entire contingent of intermediaries between himself and the state.

As large tracts of land were concentrated in very few hands, the intermediate class perpetuated all sorts of miseries on the cultivator; the state took away not less than $3/5^{th}$ of the gross produce from the cultivator besides other shares of 3 per cent for Patwari and Qanungo, 2 per cent for village servant and other charges too. Lawrence (1895) records that the state collected one-sixth of its produce from the cultivator in the early Hindu period. During the Sultans, cultivators paid off one-half of their produce. Under the Mughals, taxation intensified, and the cultivating class was asked to dispense grain for three months. Since then, the state's share has been fixed as three-quarters of the land's produce.

The nature of the vast-scale exploitation could also be understood from the fact that land ownership rested with the state. The land was demarcated into two categories Khalsa and the Chakdar, Jagir and Imam grant. In the first category, the land was given directly to the peasants who worked on the land, and the intermediate class collected revenue on the state's behalf. The second category was Chakdars, Jagir land, and Imam grant. This category also did not own the land but held the ownership instead of services provided to the state. During the Sikh period, the rulers were firm on retaining the proprietorship rights, resulting in Jagirdars holding Jagirs but without proprietorship.

The condition of Muslim cultivators could also be gauged by the system of *begaar* or forced labour. Since labour was scarce and a valuable

commodity, the Dogras devised ways to obtain it for free. Here again, Pandits became the intermediaries to collect the human resources. They would exaggerate the number of persons required to make easy money instead of the actual requirement. Those who could grease Pandit intermediaries' palms would be saved from the ordeal of *begaar*. Ahmad (2017) narrates how *begaar* was the worst manifestation of the Dogra regime, with an unspecified number of able-bodied Muslims serving as beasts of burden and being devoured by an inhospitable terrain. The forced labour took a more dangerous turn as the administration herded them to bring supplies for the armies engaged in military expeditions in far-off Gilgit, Leh, Chilas, Askardu, and Hazara. The fellow villagers would tearfully bid goodbye to the male folk who were taken away for *begaars,* as most of them would die en route to these far-flung areas. Doubtlessly, rural Kashmiri peasantry was at the bottom of the economic ladder since the ownership rights rested with the Maharaja. To make ends meet, many of these peasants migrated to Punjab for labour during the winter months and returned to Kashmir in early spring.

There has not been a specific peasant insurgency in Kashmir to identify any ideological variant of peasant consciousness. But certainly, the existing relational opposition of power meant that the dominated possessed particular subjectivity, where they were autonomous and un-dominated. The historical material describes the resistance to practices like '*Begaar*' as a methodological procedure by which one can obtain access to peasant consciousness. Since they were dominated by their power and had no means of recording their knowledge, Ranajit Guha (1985), in his exemplary work, recognised six elementary aspects of insurgent peasant consciousness-negation, modality, solidarity, ambiguity, transmission, and territoriality.

In the case of Kashmir, Lawrence (2005) records the revenue administration as being highest to lowest based on loot and corruption. The loot was based on intelligent calculation, and the administration was vested practically in the hands of the Kashmir Pandits. Lawrence (2005:19) writes,

> It has been pointed out that the revenue administrator keeps three additions of the statement of holding, one for himself, which was supposed to near the truth, one for tehsildars and another for villagers, the two latter being prepared with a view to convincing each side of the excellent bargain he had secured.

This way, peasant consciousness was shaped as an essentially negative, expressing itself solely through opposition to the difference and antagonism towards its dominators. In the case of Kashmir, the dubious official morality and other signs of domination, such as the imposition of taxes or rent or the power to punish, became the targets of resistance. Lawrence (2005:20) writes, "The Kashmiri, despite his abject condition, is very obstinate and determined, and in cases where he considered the assessment too high, he has steadily declined to pay the excess".

The forms of resistance by the peasantry involved a higher degree of ambiguity. There was an assurance of self-definition belonging to a specific collectivity separate from the oppressor. However, the idea of self-definition comes to the fore through solidarity. Solidarity ensured the message was easily transmitted, and the single unifying idea that gave peasant resistance its fundamental character was the notion of community, where respective rights and duties are established and contested.

If forceful taxation and *begaar* exterminated rural peasantry, the urban artists and shawl weavers could not be in a better position. The royal court controlled the shawl trade by reinstating powerful institutions like *Dagh* Shawl, which levied a heavy duty on shawls at various stages of their production and distribution. From purchasing yarn, dyeing threads, and creating motifs to the actual completion, a shawl would go through a series of taxation milestones. There were separate tax brackets for differential embroidery patterns. Then, the shawl would be taken to *Dagh* Shawl, where a 25 per cent tax would be levied. The shawl makers lived in the worst poverty and could not relinquish the trade or choose other vocations.

Ali (2017:35) notes that in 1847, about 4000 shawl *bafs* managed to flee the valley for Punjab to escape the horror of forcible taxation and compulsory weaving. The mass migration by the shawl weavers would mean

an excessive loss to the tax regimes. Maharaja introduced the *Rehdari* System to evade the situation, ordering his troops to plug all the escape routes and passes. The hapless shawl weavers, stranded in a whirlpool of oppression, began chopping off their thumbs to evade weaving.

Despite several delegations sent to the British government to deal with the grievances, things only worsened. Ali (2017) writes about the agitation of 1865 when the shawl workers agitated against the Maharaja's atrocities. It was perhaps one of the first organised demand days in the history of class struggle in the erstwhile subcontinent. Workers from all parts of the city marched towards *Zaldagar* and raised slogans against the Dogra administration. The protestors were dealt with severity, and many lost their lives after getting drowned in a marshy canal nearby. The dead bodies were buried secretly, and punitive fines were put on those who survived.

The international situation also impacted the politico-economic conditions in Kashmir. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 had deteriorated the condition of shawl trade and weavers as France, which had emerged as a significant market for Kashmiri shawls, had ceased to exist as one. It is pertinent to understand that the decline of the shawl merchants had implications for Kashmir's social and political landscape in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Shawl merchants were an influential class in the valley, developed contacts with the outside world, and contributed immensely to the revenue. After losing the principal sources of income to the decline of the shawl trade, many merchants recognised the Muslim community's political and economic condition, paving the way for internal and external contestation.

Sociological Factors

Gellner's concept of social entropy can help us understand the position of Kashmiri Pandits as an entropy-resistant group. Gellner (1983:65) explains his exposition in hypothetical terms, "supposing a society contains a certain number of individuals who are by heredity, pigmentationally blue. After several generations, the blues persist in occupying either

the top or the bottom of society. In other words, the blues tend to capture either too many or too few of the privileges and the services available in the society". This would make blueness a 'social entropy-resistant trait'.

A cursory look at the history of Kashmir reveals that the Pandit community has wielded enormous influence on the affairs of the state. Its members would hold power irrespective of who was ruling. The prime reason was the education within the community and the ability to learn and master the languages of the rulers quickly. However, the education and learning of the rulers' languages are not innate endowments; they flow with state privilege and other social factors. Gellner (1983) puts it down that the traits for social entropy might be invented as natural notions, and the group might reinvent notions whenever it finds itself in a challenging state. The ideological and sometimes punitive mechanisms confirm expectations and internalise them thoroughly. In the case of Kashmir to this day, the legend states that Kashmiri Pandits are naturally intelligent. A prominent Kashmiri Pandit writer Kilam (1955:90) describes the community as a fountain of deep thought, having deep insight into human nature and poetics. He quotes from Ain-i-Akbari (2003:204),

> The most respectable class in this country (Kashmir) is that of Pandits, who, notwithstanding their need for freedom from the bonds of tradition and custom, are the true worshipers of God. They do not loosen their tongue of calumny against those not of their faith, beg, or importune. They employ themselves in planting fruit trees and are generally a benefit to the people.

The recurring attestations of being unique and gifted explain the community's self-perception. Smith (1986) situates myths and symbols as critical dimensions for communication, such as mobilisation. Nurtured by collective experiences, the myths, epics, and ballads form the cognitive maps of the community's history.

The myth-symbol complex functioned impressively in the case of the Kashmiri Pandit community. The segregation worked both on genealogical and ideological grounds, genealogical in terms of the difference in

caste, which led to conversion to Islam, and ideological in terms of the difference in religion. While education inevitably gave Kashmiri Pandits a mobility that their Muslim counterparts could not even dream of. The advent of the Mughals rapidly improved this mobility as community members started trickling out of the valley. Mughals saw allies in Pandits compared to the Muslim majority that had resisted the forceful Mughal takeover of Kashmir[3]. This trust earned them essential positions in the power corridors of Delhi and Agra. To accommodate themselves in the Mughal dispensation, Kashmiri Pandits quickly learned Persian.

Kilam (1955:96) notes the establishment of the Mughal rule in Kashmir opened a new vista for Pandits. After one of his visits to Kashmir, Akbar left along with several Pandits. He distributed rent-free lands to Pandits, and the community enjoyed the fruits. At the same time, the Muslims lived a life of complete political disempowerment as a matter of State policy. In another incident, Akbar participated in the religious festivals of Pandits as a mark of recognising their distinct social existence. The Kashmiri Muslims were ousted from all channels of administration as the Mughals didn't want to repose administrative trust in Kashmiri Muslims. Moreover, their entry into the army was closed. The powerful Muslim families who once ruled over the lands were pulled off from higher positions.

Ahmed (2017) writes that to kill the urge of Kashmiris to regain freedom, Akbar utilised the Kashmiri Pandits as informants of the Mughal court, and they willingly obliged. The royal patronage Pandits enjoyed was restricted to Akbar's reign and continued throughout the Mughal era. To maintain their separate identity, the term Kashmiri Pandits was coined by Emperor Mohammad Shah to distinguish them from the Brahmans from other parts of India.

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3 Kashmir lost its sovereignity to Mughal emperor Akbar on October 6, 1586. The mighty Mughal army was defeated two times by Kashmir Army. Finally, Akbar resorted to treachery and offered friendship to the Kashmiri King Yousuf Shah Chak. Chak visited Delhi to meet Akbar where he was arrested and sent off to a prison in Bihar where the former died (Fauq 1993).

The Mughal decline made way for Afghan rule over Kashmir, which is seen as one of the worst periods of poverty and persecution. During this period, the Pandits were deeply entrenched with the administration and connived at aborting any chances of rebellion against the Afghans. Similarly, during the Sikh and Dogra reigns, Pandits enjoyed power and patronage of the Lahore Durbar while naked economic, political, and religious aggression was meted out on the Muslim subjects.

During the Dogra era, a series of natural calamities took a heavy toll on lives, forcing a considerable portion of the population to move to neighboring Punjab. Against this scenario, Kashmiri Pandits did not feel any pressure to migrate. Lawrence (1895) validates that since Kashmiri Pandits were powerful, they could avail grains during natural calamities. The enormity of the Muslim migration to Punjab can be realised from the Punjab Census Report (1891), which listed around 111 775 Muslims from Kashmir settling in Punjab.

The differential access to the political and economic centre created fissures, rather veritable chasms, in Kashmiri society. Since Muslims had limited to no access to education, the community was likely to remain at the bottom of the social and political hierarchy. Hence, it could not correct and compensate for the disadvantages that had haunted them. The Kashmiri Pandits were comfortably placed and continued to work as an arm of repression.

However, Gellner's (1985) argument also suggests that within the differentiated population, there will be many who are much better and much more fit in terms of whatever performance criteria may currently be relevant and applied. The condition of this section will be painful and fraught with tension. And the sociological obstacles won't be easily removed by goodwill or legislation.

Historical Factors

The year 1931 is critical to understanding the emergence of civil society and its role vis-a-vis the growth of Kashmiri nationalism. The events of 1931 satisfy all the qualifications that a nationalist narrative demands: a

unified movement, a mature civil society, and the arrival of Muslim leadership on the scene. The scope of the uprising was not limited as it made religious collectivity and rights an inseparable discourse. Kanth (2008) narrates how 1931 made *Hakuk* (rights) and *Baidari* (awakening) part of the Muslim self-consciousness. It is in the face of the events that unfolded in 1931 that the rights discourse evolved.

The incidents of 1931 began in Jammu on April 29, when a *maulvi* was asked to stop the Eid *khutba* (sermon). Following this, protest meetings were organised, and the government was requested to punish the offenders. However, in another few days, an incident of a similar nature reoccurred where a Hindu constable allegedly desecrated the Quran. Young Men's Muslim Association of Jammu[4], which had earlier contacted the government over the *khutba* controversy, sprang into action again and issued notices for calling protest meetings throughout the state. The blasphemy was yet again prompted by the discovery of a few torn pages of the Quran in a Srinagar drain.

By this time, in Kashmir Valley, the reading room party formed by the Muslim graduates was emerging as a locus of Muslim civil society.[5] The

4 Muslim civil society in Jammu emerged in response to the network of civil society reform among Hindus and Sikhs of the region. Given the geographical proximity, these reforms were led by mostly Punjab-based organisations and run by one or the other Hindu sects. Hence, the Muslims were excluded. Towards the end of the 19th century, Arya Samaj was firmly established in Jammu. Soon, Shri Ramakrishna Sewa Ashram also followed. The vast influence of Arya prompted the entry of Sikh organisations like Guru Singh Sabha, Khalsa Youngman Association. This social reform based on identity inevitably led to the formation of sociopolitical organisations by Muslims, too. Muslims indigenously formed Anjuman-e-Islamia Jammu for their community's social and educational upliftment. However, in the coming years, the Anujuman-e-Islamia made a political foray under the name of Jammu's Young Men's Muslim Association (YMMA). Given the curbs on political activities, YMMA worked as an underground political organisation for the Muslim Awakening. (Choudhary, 2015)

5 The educated young Muslims from the valley formed an informal party as freedom of association was strictly proscribed. These young men formed a reading room party where the grievances of the Muslim community were expressed and

protest program given by the Young Man's Muslim Association was enthusiastically followed in Kashmir as a protest against the trampling of Muslim rights. Big gatherings were held where the policies of the Dogra government were criticised.

A massive gathering of Muslims assembled for protest in the courtyard of Khanqah-i-Maula shrine of Srinagar on 21 June 1931. A person named Abdul Qadeer, who was in the services of a European visitor, made a speech that was considered seditious and for which he was promptly arrested. His trial date was July 13, 1931, inside the central jail premises. On July 13, restive crowds and police clashed, resulting in the death of 22 unarmed Muslims. Some accounts foreground a picture of communal rioting where Muslim men destroyed the shops and homes of Pandits after the civilian killings.

However, a remarkable difference remains in how the two communities remember the event and how local and official histories narrate the event. The state's narrative contributes to constructing a particular image of the Muslim public. The Srinagar Riot Enquiry Committee report appointed by Maharaja to enquire into the disturbances of 1931 publicised that the movement erupted as Kashmiri masses had been duped by their leadership by blurring the boundaries between their religious and economic grievances, thereby communalising the 1931 movement. The commission read the uprising in Kashmir as primarily inspired by 'outsiders'. Bazaz (1954) notes that as the external influences were cited for provoking Muslim masses that were dumb-driven cattle, it denied any agency to the locals. This assertion also dismissed agitating masses as having no rationality or historical reason for mass eruption.

The commission also attempted to define the agitation as a communal event between the Pandits and Muslims. Conversely, it is more important to understand 1931 as an outcome of years of oppression. Because the demands of Kashmiri Muslims were couched in religious terms, it did not mean that the demands were essentially communal. Zutshi (2003) corroborates that despite the communitarian rhetoric in

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articulated. Subsequently, the room party went on to play an extremely instrumental role in the growth of nationalism in Kashmir.

the aftermath of 1930, the tensions were far from motivated by religion. The tussle between the Muslims and the Pandits in and after 1931 was more about political and economic representation than religious antagonism.

Significantly, the events of 1931 marked the advent of Muslims into the political scene, which coincided with the emergence of Muslim provincial leadership in British India. It also gave a common platform to the Muslims of the Jammu and Kashmir divisions to articulate their rights. Given the geographical and political proximity of Jammu with Punjab, it also meant an intervention from Punjabi Muslim organisations in Kashmir. The All-India Kashmir Committee, Anujuman-I Himayat-i-Islami, and Anjuman-i-Kashmiri Musalman were prominent. The prevailing situation in Kashmir equally appealed to the Ahrar and Ahmediya leadership in Punjab, and both parties plunged into Kashmir to boost their political image.[6] Jalal (2008) writes that Majlis-i-Ahrar decided to send its volunteers to liberate thirty-two lakh Muslims of Kashmir valley. This position of Ahrar was challenged by the creation of the All-India Kashmir Committee by Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad, a prominent Ahmediya.[7] Looking at the situation, the Government of India feared that the uprising in Kashmir would spill to the neighbouring province of Punjab. It advised the Durbar to enquire into the disturbances as a measure of political expediency. Eventually, the Maharaja's government announced the appointment of B.G. Glancy to hold an independent commission to investigate the grievances.

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6 In Punjab, the British patronised landed rural intermediaries who could be counted for becoming allies of the Government. Gradually, oppositional voices in the form of the Ahrar party rose, which was critical of the British and the landowner alliance. The Ahrar party was reformatory and primarily composed of urban lower and middle classes. For more, see (Jalal 2002:342).

7 Ahmediya is an Islamic revival movement founded in Punjab in 1889.The originated with the life and teachings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad who claimed he embodied the metamorphic second coming of Jesus of Nazareth and the divine guide, which was foretold by the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad. The orthodox Muslims consider the message of Ahmad heretical, as they believe Muhamamad was the final prophet of Islam.

Secondly, the events of 1931 transformed the political vocabulary. Muslims employed moral discourses to demand their rights, while Pandits resorted to the past by continuously reiterating their position. For example, in one of the representations by Sanatan Dharma Youngmen's Association Srinagar, the group blames the durbar for step-motherly treatment despite the historical importance of the Kashmiri Pandits, which entitled them to special protection.

These grievances established the biased nature of the state in creating a public sphere, which gave differential patronage to individuals based on their membership in particular religious communities. As the communities became pitted against each other, it led to the newer forms of 'Self' and the 'Other'. The new subjectivity challenged the rationality that Kashmiri Pandits and Kashmiri Muslims had held when they raised the slogan of Kashmir for Kashmiris. The events brought into play the fear of numbers, whereby the Pandits feared losing ground in the state to the Muslim majority. This gave impetus to the idea of a threatened Hindu minority. The events also catapulted several new actors on the political stage of Kashmir, which was different from the older elite leadership.

The new leadership was determined to gain total mileage out of 1931 by drawing attention to the origins of the disturbance. The economic and political disabilities suffered by the people could only be corrected through a widespread reformation of the structures of the state, which implied representation through legislation. Bazaz (1978) writes that the memorials presented a detailed description of the proposed constitution for the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which would guarantee the fundamental rights of religion, press, platform, assembly, and equality of treatment of all state subjects and the formation of executive and legislative bodies to carry out the will of the people. Significantly, the memorial demanded proportionate religious representation for the elected representatives.

As the events of 1931 catapulted the growth of civil society in Kashmir, one of its significant contributions has also been the formation of the Muslim Conference, which later converted into the National Conference. The inaugural session was held in October 1932, during which the constitution was drafted and a party flag was adopted. The unique feature of

this association was that it extended beyond the territorial divisions, and representatives from all parts of the undivided Jammu and Kashmir became a part of it. However, to make the Muslim Conference inclusive, the party was converted into a National Conference in 1939. Abdullah (1986) writes that the policy of admitting non-Muslims was neither tactical nor diplomatic. Therefore, a sincere voice opened the doors for all minorities to join the fight against autocracy. This political strategy of transforming the politics of grievances into a successful nationalistic movement draws an analogy in Gellner (1983), who considers that assimilative functions could be performed either through triumphant nationalism or through education. Prem Nath Bazaz, who was Shiekh's companion in this effort, wrote a letter to Mahatma Gandhi, explaining the direction of Kashmir politics to him. Bazaz (1944) wrote that only nationalism could save his country and community because neither the Hindus nor the Muslims could wipe out one or the other from the government. Since Kashmiri Pandits and Kashmiri Muslims did not live in segregated localities, communalism would endanger their lives. It is only nationalism that would save such families. Consequently, members who aligned with the Punjab-based Muslim politics did not become a part of the rechristened National Conference and relaunched Muslim Conference. This splitting of ranks had many ramifications for the state's politics in the years to come, as their vision was more closely aligned with the idea of Pakistan and pro-Pakistan politics in the coming years.

Educational Factors

In the context of Kashmir, education was intermeshed with the structures and functions of the established hierarchies. The early Dogra state did not intervene in the indigenous educational system, as it was hectic consolidating its dominions. The notion essentially was education was the prerogative of the ruling class, and hence, Kashmiri Muslims would be kept away from education. The Census of India (1911) notes that in 1910, there were only 15 educated Muslim males compared to 453 Hindu

males per thousand of the population; the number grew to 19 for Muslims and 508 for Hindus in the 1921 Census of India.

As the state shirked from providing mass education, the public discourses perpetuated by the absence of schooling shaped the contours of nationalism. Notably, the relegation of the Kashmiri language to the background in all educational and administrative matters became an issue of concern in these discourses. These concerns also became prominent as Punjab-based Muslim organisations had taken to highlight the educational deprivation of Kashmiri Muslims. Some organisations contributed by providing scholarships to talented Kashmiri Muslims who, towards the end of the 1930s, assumed leadership roles to enhance the status of Muslims.

One of the first organisations to be set up for educational and moral reform was *Madrasa Anjuman Nusrat-ul-Islam*, established in 1889. Within a few years of the establishment of this madrasa, institutes of a similar nature started cropping up. The purpose of these institutions was to ensure religious as well as scientific education for Muslims who were educationally deprived and to create a social awakening among the Kashmiri Muslims. This development continuously harked on the glorious Muslim past during the reign of Kashmiri Sultans, and the only way to reclaim the same position was through education.

Bazaz (1954) observes that Muslims had begun to feel their backwardness. They approached the government for intervention in the sphere of education. These requests were not heeded initially, but as the demands grew louder, Kashmir Durbar sought the services of an educational commissioner from British India.

Conversely, the most critical aspect was by the late 1920s, the demands of the Kashmiri Muslim elite had gone beyond the provision of just ensuring educational opportunities for Kashmiri Muslims. The educational platform became a platform for the state to acknowledge the distinct demands of the Kashmiri population. Though educational reforms were introduced in 1926, when primary education was made free and compulsory in the municipal limits of Srinagar, the discourse on education was deeply linked with the more argumentative discourse on political, economic, and social rights.

In retrospect, a significant drawback of these reform organisations working towards education was paying attention to Kashmiri in favour of English and Urdu. The language and education guidelines reflected the biases of the Kashmiri Muslim elite, early looking at segmental interests working in their favour. This predicament takes us to Gellner's (1985) thesis of linking the notion of education to the viable modern high culture. Gellner sees education as an amalgamation of skill sets, which ensures the reformulation of skills. It is a wise skill developed for a non-rigid, adaptable state of mind rather than a single-item list. If a state ensures mass education for all its citizens, it inevitably allows for economic and social mobility and homogeneity. However, in cases where a state has a biased approach towards disseminating education, it may be with the intent of monopolising access to power privilege. This monopolisation debars the filtration of education as it could be a counter-entropic trait.

The advent of education also meant contestations between the high and low definitions of religion. The evolving matrix of social and political realities was spurting the emergence of a politicised religious identity. This led to an intense focus on original definitions of Islam and the perceived advances of the 'other' within the community. It was perhaps the first time the sacrality of religious sites, beliefs, and practices was questioned. The position of shrines came into question, which was otherwise unthinkable in the Kashmiri socio-cultural milieu.[8] Questioning the shrine also meant attacking the position of the Sayeds/Pirs, who had migrated from various parts of central Asia to preach Islam. Shrines were critical sites for rural-urban political and economic exchange and a repository of landed wealth and social capital. The management of

8 Shrines were a central component of Kashmiri society and Kashmiri Islam in particular. It had an extremely important role in spiritual and temporal life of Kashmiris. For more see Gauhar (1998). Hanafism is one of the four Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence. It is named after the scholar Abu Hanifah and has the largest number of followers in Sunni Muslim thought. The sources from where Hanafism derives Islamic law are the Quran and the hadiths of Prophet Muhammad.

shrines would be done by a caretaker, the Pir family, or a couple of families, which would provide these functions for generations together. Contrary to the principles of Islam, the class of Pirs/Syeds emerged as a power group that resorted to social stratification based on one's origin and chance of birth in a particular family. Though the practices of pollution and purity were not observed strictly, there was a visible prejudice towards patronage or matrimonial alliances.

Since their formation, Anjuman-e-Nusratul Islam and the associated madrassas were engrained in Hanafi philosophy; they launched a tirade against the Shrine worship. The shrine supporters accused them of Wahhabism[9]. They would, in turn, call them *Mushriks* (saint–worshipers) who associated partners with Allah. The debates around the sacrality assumed the form of petitions requesting the Darbar to restrict each other's activity. Likewise, Anujuman-e-Ahl-i-Hadith joined the chorus against shrine worship and allied with the local *ulema with* similar ideological leanings. Khan (1999) informs us that Anjuman-e-Ahl-e-Hadis was not liked by the Mullahs and issued fatwas against debarring its members from attending the mosques. Along these lines, education served as a channel for religious modernisation, for holding textual interpretation supreme against Pirs's pronouncements and as a crystalliser of dissent against the Dogra state.

Contact with Punjab and the spread of education encouraged an expansion of the publication market, particularly in Srinagar. Newspaper circulation figures rose noticeably in the 1920s, and the circulation of books in English, Urdu, and Kashmiri also grew. Most of these books and pamphlets were published in Lahore and Amritsar, further cementing the relationship between Punjabi and Kashmiri politics. The progress in the print industry quickly created a reading public and simultaneously mobilised them for socio-political purposes. The role of print became crucial in an age when the production of knowledge and the skill set to

9 Wahabbism is an Islamic movement founded by Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab, advocating veneration of practices like veneration of saints, visiting tombs etc. The movement is considered as ultra-conservative and puritanical.

read was so limited. The growth of publishing made the horizontal circulation of ideas and nationalistic imagination possible.

The boom in publishing also solidified the rival interpretations of history and sharpened the role of the reactionary forces who would try to suppress dissent. Munshi Muhammad Din Fauq attempted to set up a newspaper in 1904, but the Dogra state did not permit him. In 1932, when famous Kashmiri activist Prem Nath Bazaz established the first newspaper, Vitasta, it could not last for more than a year owing to the hostility of Pandits. Earlier, Mulk Raj Saraf had tried to establish a newspaper; however, it became an official mouthpiece of the ruling Dogra regime.

Ahmed (2017) records that owing to the absence of local press in 1931, the newspapers from Punjab were also divided into two camps –Hindu Press and Muslim Press – based on the religion practised by their owners and their policies vis-a-vis Kashmir. Newspapers like *Zamindar, Inqilab, Siyasat, Alfaaz* and Lahore Chronicle formed the Muslim Press and the cause of the Kashmiri masses. On the other hand, newspapers like *Tribune, Prataap, and Guru Ganthaal* comprised the Hindu Press and took the side of the Hindu Maharaja.

Psychological Factors

The history of Kashmir is rife with events which, at the outset, appear to drive the religion, but underneath, it's a mix of forces at work. The contestations essentially conflict between the perception of the 'self' and the 'other'. The presence of 'other' reflects transference of power, a radical break, and assumes the privileged position once acquired by the 'self'. If not destroyed by the transcendental other, the self gets completely subsumed, so much so that it loses its entire agency. The ancient Kashmiri history confirms alliances between the ruling elite and Brahmans, providing ideological support for consolidating their polity. However, the social heterodoxy perpetrated by the Brahmans damages the lower classes, which have risen economically and politically by performing mercantile societal functions. This led to a new alliance between Kshatriyas and other lower classes against the Brahminical

heterodoxy. So, when the Buddhist doctrines reached Kashmir during the Mauryan reign, the society was ready to convert to Buddhism. Bazaz (1954) explains that the Mauryan conquest of Kashmir provided a blessing in disguise for Kashmir. Many inhabitants readily accepted the tenets of Buddhism. Mass conversion to Buddhism produced changes in Kashmir's politico-social and cultural sphere. It awakened a spirit of defiance towards social justice.

However, with the end of Kushan rule, Buddhism received a setback in Kashmir as the corrupt practices had crept in. The Buddhist and the Brahminical forces kept on engaging in a long-drawn struggle. However, what looked like a religious battle was a manifestation of status anxiety. Kashmir came under the Muslim Sultans around 1339 A.C. The conditions under which Muslim rule came to be established were very different from the rest of the subcontinent. In Kashmir, a runaway Buddhist prince from Ladakh, Rinchana, came to exert considerable influence in the politics of Kashmir and acceded to the throne. His wide popularity can be gauged by the fact that

Jonraja (2000) calls him a lion among men. After he acceded to the throne, Rinchana expressed his desire to become a Shaivite, but orthodox Brahmins refused entry into the fold. Around the same time, Islam made inroads across Kashmir through the peaceful proselytisation of Sufis from Central Asia. Stein (1900) notes that Islam made its way into Kashmir, not by gradual conversions or conquest. Though Islam became the court religion, the administration was in the hands of Brahmans. However, the social position of Sayeds was threatening the Brahmans now.

The bitterness between the Sayeds and the Brahmans became a class struggle where two elite groups were involved in the battle for power. In contrast, the common masses remained unaware of the persisting situation. In the twentieth century, there were struggles between the interests of business people who had migrated from the neighbouring provinces of Punjab and Delhi and the Kashmiri commercial classes. The status anxiety arises since the self cannot move outside to embrace the otherness fully; it understands the other as always mediated by its own experiences. The self here tried to identify on religious terms; however, more

than religion, prestige, interests, and status marks characterised the situation. Yet again, otherness comes from a difference that leaves the self and the other forever open to change for good or evil.

Later examples, like Kashmir for Kashmiris and Roti Agitation[10], manifest the same anxiety. However, the 'self' regularly transmutes with the change in the overall situation. In the Kashmir for Kashmiris movement, the threat emanated from the bureaucrats from the neighbouring Punjab as the language of administration was replaced with Persian from Urdu. Bazaz (1954) puts it that armies of outsiders followed the officers from the plains with the intention of exploitation, leaving behind a line of successors to drain resources further.

In this way, the Punjabis and then the Dogra Rajputs began exerting power, which threatened the aboriginal upper classes. For six years, from 1925–1931, educated young Pandits rallied around to demand a due share in the administration of the state at the highest level. During this movement, Kashmiri Pandits worked in unison with Kashmir Muslims, although the stakes were not as high for the Muslims. Yet the bonhomie was short-lived as the Roti Agitation of 1932 was started by the Pandits after Maharaja conceded to opening the door of the Government services for Muslims.

Intellectual Factors

Understanding Kashmir through the bracketed ethos of 'Kashmiryat' has been the fancied methodological paradigm for most of the scholarship. The valley is imagined as a space where differential communities always lived with unity and harmony till militancy erupted in 1989. The fancied imagination not only presents an ahistorical picture but also denies any

10 Glancy Commission recommended series of reforms such as reforms of administrative structure and education, the representation of Muslims in services and minimum freedom for the press and public expression. Maharaja accepted these recommendations, which led to Pandit Yuvak Sabha agitating against these recommendations. (Bose, 2003)

cultural and political specificity to the Kashmiri political space. Subsequently, differential aspects of identity in Kashmir are washed down. Whitehead (2007) notes that the composite and accommodating culture of Kashmir, known as Kashmiryat, is often overstated to evoke a political paradise before a biblical fall and the embroiling of the valley in the rival nationalisms of India and Pakistan.

Kashmiryat has functioned more like a conduit to political actors who try to wade through Kashmir, providing enough space for modification per one's requirements. Given the concept itself is not based on any historical premise, there are few concerns about political correctness or validation. Gandhi symbolically invoked 'Kashmiryat' to create a picture of harmony in the valley that amounted to any spiteful conflict between the various Kashmir communities.[11] The towering leaders of Kashmir, Shiekh Abdullah and Jawaharlal Nehru, became ambassadors of Kashmiryat many times on public platforms. One such moment etched in the public memory and deeply reflective of Kashmiryat in public discourse happened on 2nd November 1947, when Shiekh Abdullah quoted Amir Khusro's Persian Sufi verse to and for Pandit Nehru,

> *Mun Tu Shudam, Tu Mun Shudi, Man Tan Shudam, Tujaan Shudi, Takasnagoyad bod Azeem, Mun Deegram, Tu Deggaree.* (I am You and You are me; I am your body, you are my soul; So, none should hereafter say, I am someone and You someone else).[12]

Agrawal. N (2008) attempts to read Kashmiryat through linguistics and semiotics to arrive at an argument that Kashmiryat belongs to a class

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11 "Only Kashmir is a ray of hope in the time when the subcontinent is in darkness" were the words of MK Gandhi during the partition at the time when communal frenzy had taken all over, but did not touch Kashmir. (Zutshi, 1986)

12 The timing and the usage of couplet are quite fascinating. It had only been a week since Kashmir's conditional accession to India and invoking Amir Khusro, who was an iconic Sufi musician and poet from medieval India who united Persian and Hindivi forms. Perceived as a very important figure in the Ganga-Jamuni tehzeeb, Khusru invocation here refers to Shiekh's adoration of a particular culture and politics.

of terms called 'empty signifiers'. It was a sort of new categorical order that imposed an order on the social collective of Jammu and Kashmir without resolving the legal issues. Kashmiryat indicates understanding Kashmir's changing relations with New Delhi over the years. On the one hand, New Delhi tightened its noose on the various autonomous provisions.

On the other hand, Shiekh Abdullah's favourite slogan, '*Izzat-oo-Aabroo ka maqam*' (position of dignity), was becoming redundant. So, a different vocabulary was needed to rephrase the demands and aspirations. Consequently, the Jammu and Kashmir Academy of Art, Culture, and Languages bolstered the claim of National Conference leadership to debate and define the concept in a specific historical and cultural context.

(Ahad 2008:8) writes, "to lend an intellectual content and to mean to the much-publicized but vaguely worded idea/slogan: *izzat abroo ka muqam* and make it thus an effective and viable alternative and alimony for the Kashmiri aspirations, the phrase/expression was to our dismay hijacked and eventually used as an elixir for both the lords and their loyal subjects to make them feel much comfortable and more robust in their behaviour and attitude towards Kashmir and Kashmiris.[13]

Recently, Kashmiryat has found two more qualifiers: *Insaniyat* (humanity) and *Jhamooriyat* (democracy). Initially used by Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2003 to break the thaw for initiating talks, this trinity was picked up in 2016 by the Modi government. It pitched to take the growth story of

13 Abdul Ahad claims that Kashmiryat was supposed to be change of attitudes that the people were the real masters of their desires; a panacea for political, social and economic misfortunes to force out inner Kashmiri urges, skills and energies and promote indigenous arts and crafts, agriculture, horticulture and floriculture for marketing a self-sufficient brand, a strategy to protect environmental degradation, urban vandalism and many other things. A former bureaucrat during the National Conference government his claim substantiates how National Conference officially tried to construct a discourse around Kashmiryat which obviously did not exist on ground before. For more see Ahad (2008).

Kashmir ahead. The usage of trinity reflects contradictions and inanity of avoidance.[14]

There have been constant attempts to locate Kashmiryat vis its political usage, earlier as an antidote for invalidating the two-nation theory and setting the tone for the religious and political plurality that the newly created post-colonial state espoused and now as a ploy to sustain rigidity regarding the status-quo.

Subsequently, scholarship has tried to look at Kashmiryat through two approaches. The first is to examine the relationship between religious identities, community definitions and state-building throughout the latter half and the first half of the two decades of the twentieth century. These interventions examine the various forms of belonging and challenge the primordial understanding of the identity in Kashmir. This discourse also clarifies how pre-colonial Kashmir was home to prototypical power struggles among elites to protect themselves from the existing state order. Zutshi (2003) and Rai (2004) argue that Kashmiryat is a series of dynamic identities that have emerged in interaction with and have sometimes been overshadowed by other forms of belonging. A tacit balance of region and religion has always existed that encompasses the Kashmiri sense of 'self'. The public discourse exhibited strong strands of religious universality and regional specificity.

Contrary to what Kashmiryat would like one to believe, the political culture of precolonial Kashmir was laced with various political, economic, and social differences. Though the differences were substantial, as suggested by the literary forms, poetic narratives, and other symbols, they allowed for accommodation and not the erasure of religious differ-

14 In Vajpayee's context the trinity is still somewhat usable. None of the word is explained vis-a vis the present context. Kashmiryat does not specify the inclusions and exclusions and how the differing political demands can be negotiated under the gamut of Kashmiryat. Same holds true about Jamhooriyat as to what are the terms of democracy given the constant erosion of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir and Insaniyat has always become hostage to gross human right violations.

ences. However, parallel to this, one also finds an expression of Kashmir as a homeland and how it had to be saved from 'outsiders'.

It is also important to mention that the narrative of belonging – whether religious or regional – was carved in tandem with various inter and intra-politico-economical interactions and changes happening in Kashmir. Zutshi (2003) explains at length how, in the late pre-colonial era, the changing economic and political relationships created arenas for individuals to lay claims to leadership roles and definitions of community, religious, political or regional.

Since Kashmiryat is corroborated by the presence of syncretic religious cultures that are tolerant, the second approach navigates through its metaphysical understanding and how Kashmiryat cannot be understood without understanding the role of Reshis in promoting Islam against the backdrop of the socio-cultural context of Kashmir and not only the *Tawhidic* (oneness of God) universalism. The tradition was equally antithetical to the Brahminic supremacy prevalent in Kashmiri society.

Explaining Kashmir's transition to Islam and the role of Rishis, Khan (2011) meticulously shows how Rishis became a framework for associational life within a standard social, normative, and ritual order at the time when the Ulama from Central Asia grounded mostly in Sharia were propagating Islam in the valley. Though not an organised tradition, its gradual assimilation and absorption of local ascetic practices in the broader system of Islam gave this movement enormous authority and social importance.

Like other mystic traditions, the Rishi borrowed and innovated from different traditions. The Rishi concept of 'peace with all' was borrowed from Mahayana Buddhism. Secondly, this tradition also imbibed a strong sense of resilience, which later became a strong character of Kashmiri Nationalism. The tradition questioned the caste and class orders that came with established religion. It flourished in the local popular dialects, making it accessible to artisans, peasants, tradespeople, and the oppressed castes. This inclusiveness reflects the popular social character of the tradition. Following Hindu ascetics, it retained essential elements of ancient popular religious culture, such as meditating in

caves, vegetarianism, maintaining celibacy, etc. While accommodating local Hindu-Buddhist practices to the Islamic framework, the Rishis gradually assimilated the people into the Islamic identity. What is, however, unique about this identity is not merely the assimilation of the Kashmiris in Islam over six centuries but also, importantly, their urge to live with their Pandit compatriots in symbolic rather than synergetic relationships. The vitality of the movement that separates and unites a deep metaphysical identity can be reflected in the verses of Shiekh Noorud din Wali, the pioneer of the Rishi tradition.

> Among the brothers of the same parents
> Why did you create a barrier
> Muslims and Hindus are one.
> When will God be kind to His servants?
> (Kulliyat, II, 1981:33-34)

Khan (2011) and Shah (2011) explain that Kashmiryat has been defined to serve the ideological interests of the Indian state. Neither can Kashmiryat be explained as Kashmiri nationalism. The conception of nationalism is foreign to metaphysically oriented civilisations. Any culture's mystical, metaphysical grounding implies that modern political appropriations are prone to suspicion.

The identity crisis is a modern phenomenon, and attempting to graft it onto traditional cultures is not admissible. Kashmir's self or spirit of individuality cannot be located without an in-depth analysis of its religions, mythologies and, most importantly, metaphysics. A comprehensive conception of Kashmiryat requires understanding the metaphysical tradition underlaid by diverse religious and philosophical expressions.

Conclusion

Like elsewhere, they imagined the nation arose when education offered privileged access to understanding centuries of oppression. The development of social communication and the growth of print linked the ideas

of community, power, and time. This also, for the first time, made it possible for people to think about themselves in newer ways.

A deep-rooted sense of regional identity has existed in Kashmiri for long, which only hardened with the subsequent years of oppression. The Mughal and the subsequent ruling realms could not address this regional identity but widened the existing chasms by patronising a particular community. The religious migration impelled mass conversions to Islam, but the migrants got placed above the new converts, giving them access to sacred words and scripts. The new religion made the community imaginable but remained centripetal and hierarchal rather than dispersing horizontally. The majority was doubly discriminated against, and various border guards and symbols functioned to preserve the binary of 'us' and 'them'. There was a visible similarity-dissimilarity pattern, where members shared similarities and dissimilarities with the members. With one section of the population, i.e., the Kashmiri Pandits, the Muslims shared the language and culture, but somehow, the power dynamics were not balanced. With the non-members of the Kashmiri society, the Muslim majority shared the religion but not the culture and language.

The educational reform movements in British India filtered down some welfare payments to Kashmir, and some of the Kashmiri Muslims were able to make educational journeys into British India. These journeys also facilitated the rapid and easy transmission of political ideas rife in British India. Political ideas were transported to various geographies, emerging with multiple political and ideological terrains.

The arrival of education distinctively baptised this differentiated class into a collective where they began to assert their demands through the rights discourse. Since a majority shared this anxiety, it garnered a populist character very soon. These developments led to a re-interpretation of the historical realities, leading to rival histories and, subsequently, dual association and dual recognition with a single territory. By the 1930s, a new Kashmiri leader educated in British India replaced the religious leadership, and the discourse on economic, political, and social rights became an essential part of Kashmir's political

culture. This narrative shaped the articulation of coherent nationalism that accommodated the diverse local, religious and sectarian interests.

After 1947, Kashmir has always been imagined through a Hindu subjectivity that has obstructed any attempt to grant full citizenship rights to Kashmiris while, at the same time, it does not accept its distinct existence. The right to a distinct nationalism was obfuscated under the united nationalism. The new system did not redeem its pledge to conduct a referendum to concede to the demands of the wishes of the Kashmiri people. New Delhi supported unrepresentative governments to safeguard its position and pumped monetary emoluments to strengthen its limited patronage network. In a way, it replicated the structure inherited from the Dogra government. The demand for rights was met with political and economic coercion, which further solidified the assertion of rights in a religious language.

Chapter 3
Political and Militant Dimensions of Kashmiri nationalism

Introduction

The chapter looks at the political and militant dimensions of Kashmiri nationalism. The chapter establishes that Kashmiri nationalism has defied a neat organisational characterisation and reflects the intersection of three distinct forms of political action: firstly, through participation in democratic institutional political process, in terms of Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah's role in the pre-1953 politics; secondly, through involvement in extra-institutional forms of non-violent direct action that may have been illegal and thoroughly reflected in the resistance politics till 1989. And, finally, with the participation in direct violent action. In a way, Kashmiri nationalism has charted its course through violent and non-violent ways of expression and through parliamentary politics, too. The movement of 1989 only served as the immediate catalyst for the transition of politics into a militant.

Employing various strategies of collective action through violence, disruption and convention, Kashmir nationalism has sustained itself through its ability to combine multiple forms of collective action. Most of the prominent inquiries into the outbreak of militant movement have suggested that militant nationalism was a result of a breakdown of centre-state relations as well as a consequence of the alienation of the Kashmir youth from the rest of India. Such analyses, in a way, miss out

on the political aspects of the Kashmiri nationalism, which sustained itself from 1947 to 1989. Cockell (2004) notes that this assertion denies Kashmiris any political agency outside of that state's definitions for militant assertion. This chapter examines how armed militancy was neither sudden nor purely motivated by religion. The events were guided by political continuity arising from the structural weakness of state institutions and the constant development of autonomous nationalistic consciousness.

This chapter tries to explain the transition of Kashmiri nationalism to militant terrain. It examines the assertions of the differing political and militant organisations in terms of ideology and the larger aims they pursue. Further, it explores the strategies and struggles for power within militant groups. The chapter also evaluates the methods, strengths, and limitations of Kashmiri nationalism.

Political Nationalism and the Politics of Plebiscite

The section tries to understand how a collective sense of history, memory, myths and symbols combined and culminated in political nationalism. These trigger points could be understood as events or series of events that created a stronger identity, a sense of being subjected to injustice, and a perception of agency. This marked a shift from widespread sympathy to participation in political nationalism. The other important variables for mobilisation are the changing political, economic, and structural context of the society, including the emerging middle class, changes in social structures of rural and urban geographies and effects of religious movements tapped into a rich vein of potent political nationalism.

Kashmiri political nationalism emerges as part of the complex normative world, which includes myths, a collective sense of agency, and a language of grievance articulation. These variables establish the paradigm of the behaviour of Kashmiri nationalism and also build the relation between the normative and the material universe, between the constraints of reality and demands of an ideal model of political

nationalism. In a way, Kashmiri political nationalism tries to bridge the concept of reality to an imagined alternative, working as a connective between two states of affairs, one prevailing and the other imagined. At the same time, it is essential to understand the diverse and divergent narrative traditions within the national discourse.

Language, memories, and symbols cannot escape their location in a normative political nationalism, nor can the application of coercive legality embodied in a political negotiation escape its consequences. Inevitably, the force of interpretive commitments holds together a political negotiation, and the functionality of these commitments determines the path a particular political nationalism can take. Thus, political negotiation is viewed as a system of overcoming tensions and bridging diverse tendencies, but it can also invoke fissiparous tendencies if the interpretative commitments tail off.

A significant event in terms of failing interpretative commitments was the ousting and detention of Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah in 1953, which accelerated the constitutional integration between the state and the centre. Qasim (1992) remembers that many contributory events had preceded Shiekh Abdullah's arrest in 1953. They included a triangular correspondence between him, Prime Minister Nehru, and the Praja Parishad leader and founder of Jana Sangh, Dr Shyama Prakash Mukherjee. There was also an agitation and a vigorous press campaign against his policies. Abdullah, opposition within the party hierarchy and the erosion of his popularity in Kashmir because of some of his policies. Besieged by these developments, Shiekh Abdullah became more defiant; he suspected his colleagues of plotting against him and openly criticised the central government.

In the backdrop of the Praja Parishad movement, things had taken a volatile turn. Balraj Madhok founded Praja Parishad by building upon the existing organisational network of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and its ideology of Hindu nationalism. The party was rancorous against the 1951 Big Landed Estates Act[1] because it abolished the exten-

1 The land reforms in Kashmir were among the most radical reforms of Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah. It placed a ceiling on land ownership at 186 kanals

sive land holdings without compensation and affected the economic power of the Dogra landlords. Behera (2002) notes that Praja Parishad accused Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah of Islamizing the administration. However, this was only an outward reason. The underlying cause was the slipping of political power and initiative from the hands of Dogras towards Kashmiri Muslims.

In 1952, the Praja Parishad launched an agitation in collaboration with the Hindu Mahasabha, the Ram Rajya Parishad, Punjab Arya Samaj, and a few Akali leaders. The demands of the agitation were full integration of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union; complete application of India's Constitution; doing away with the difference between 'state-subjects' and Indian citizens; bringing the state under the complete jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; removal of customs barriers between the state and India; fresh elections to the state's Constituent Assembly; and setting up an impartial tribunal to probe the cases of alleged corruption in the state.

The famous slogans of Praja Parishad were, "*Ek desh mein do Vidhan, do nishan, do pradhan, nain challenge, nahin challenge*" (In one country, two Constitutions, two flags and two chiefs will not work, will not be tolerated), "*Abdullah Hakumat Khatam Karo*" (end Abdullah's rule) and "*Jammu Alag Karo*" (separate Jammu). Provoked by the developments within the state, Shiekh Abdullah gave a powerful speech at Ranbirsinghpora in Jammu on April 10, 1952

> So long as communalism exists in India, the accession of Kashmir with it will be strictly limited. We want to accede to India without any conditions. But how can we do it unless we are assured and convinced that communalism has been buried in India? We are prepared to apply the

(about 22 acres). The rest of the land of a landlord was redistributed among share-croppers and landless labourers, without any compensation to the landlord. Transferring land without compensation was possible since the provisions of the Indian constitution did not yet apply in the state. The land reforms were so popular in Kashmir that they continued to be pushed for the next quarter-century. The ceiling was gradually decreased until the last of the reform acts in 1975.

> whole constitution of India to Kashmir and will welcome it. But in this regard, we are not fully satisfied. We have acceded to India concerning Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Communication. Other matters are separate from the Agreement. We have done this because we are interested in having some internal autonomy. (The Daily Telegraph, 135 Fleet Street London, E.C 4 March 13, 1957)

This defiance was expressed repeatedly after systematically erasing the state's autonomy. The divergence between the centre's state-sponsored and the Shiekh's political nationalism created visible chasms through the different spheres of representation. Subsequently, the above-quoted speech laid the basis for the sharp difference between Shiekh Abdullah and the central government. Speaking before a massive gathering at Ziarat-e-Naqshband Sahib Srinagar on 13 July, which is a symbolic date in the annals of Kashmir history, Shiekh Abdullah said,

> The essential thing is that we have not made any sacrifices in Kashmir to pawn ourselves either to India or to Pakistan but to achieve freedom for the people of Jammu and Kashmir State. The message that the martyrs have left for us is that they have performed their duty, and now, the Nation (Quom) has to perform its duties. This duty is not to join either Pakistan or India but to secure freedom for all the people of the State. We will adopt the path where we find our freedom, honour, and future safe. (The Daily Telegraph, 135 Fleet Street London, E.C 4 March 15, 1957)

Subsequently, Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah was arrested in 1953, and a local unit of the Congress party replaced the existing National Conference. The Centre's policy led to the shrinking of the avenues for democratic political participation and the weakening of local politics. In response, several youth groups were formed to bring the right to self-determination as the primary objective of the political struggle in Kashmir. Against the backdrop of such developments, the All–Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front or *Mahaazi-Rai-Shumari*, was founded by Mirza Afzal Beg on August 9, 1955. Led by colleagues and sympathisers of Shiekh Abdullah, the group contested the finality of the accession of Kashmir to In-

dia and demanded the right to self-determination. Detailing the events of the 1950s, Shiekh Abdullah later wrote in the weekly Awami Daur,

> I was detained in August 1953 due to my fundamental differences with the Government of India. The differences between the Government of India and me started sometime earlier. The Government of India wanted to back out of all those promises and agreements that she had made and concluded with me and the people of Kashmir.[2]

Strategies Adopted by the Plebiscite Front for Garnering Public Support

The Plebiscite Front managed to penetrate the grassroots levels by operating on the plank of the plebiscite. Gradually, the front launched educative campaigns to magnify its presence. *Mahaaz-e-rai-Shumari*, as popularly known, acquired a mass character as its politics were presented as some service and sacrifice and not as politics of power. The rise and growth of the Plebiscite Front represented an ideological shift as it was asserted that Kashmiri cultural identity was incompatible with the mainstream culture and could only be maintained through the operationalisation of certain autonomous zones. Secondly, the intervening role of the state in the repeated distribution of patronage also created absolute chasms for political nationalism to thrive. The state's weakening of autonomous provisions through legal and constitutional measures was equivalent to sponsoring a formal nationalism.

In the political formation of identity, the state used specific historical references and symbols to promote cultural homogeneity. The state's espousal of Praja Parishad politics and the subsequent incarceration of Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah were working towards creating inaudible spheres of representation. These inaudible spheres were never formally

2 Shiekh Mohammad Abdullah, "*Sarguzasht-i-Nau* August 1953", p.175 October 2, 1978, Weekly Awami Daur, Jammu.

accommodated, and a firm policy of stifling political opposition and pursuit of patronage politics was encouraged. Connor (1994) notes that assertions of the rights of nationhood are problematic, as unwillingness on the part of the national government to give into mini-nationalism often disrupts the political order. Mini-nationalisms attach moral legitimacy to them and can become the source of complexity instead of generating homogeneity and cohesion.

The dilemma for the state arises as to how to satisfy the differing political claims. However, as Connor (1994) points out, the universal tendency of states is a non-compromisable position vis-a-vis the political integrity of the sovereign territory. The underlying premise, of course, remains that the state is given and must not be compromised.

The non-address of grievances for political and cultural autonomy also creates a sense of self-awareness and an awareness of the other group, a referent 'them' vs. 'us'. Levin (1993) suggests that subtle shifts in identity correspond to historical and demonstrable constructs and thus emerge as mental constructs contrary to histographical facts. This works to reinterpret the history of grieved people through a complex interplay of self-awareness and the awareness of the 'other'.

In the case of Kashmir, self-awareness happened through the formation of a vast network of committees at various levels–the essential committee at the mohalla or gram level, the halqa committee at the town or municipal level, followed by the tehsil committee, two provincial committees, the general council and the Central Committee. These committees worked democratically under the supervision and discipline of the central committees bounded by the programs and policies of the *Mahaaz Rai Shumari*. Gradually, other political groupings, such as the Mirwaiz group, Jamaat–e–Islami, and Political Conference, allied with the Plebiscite Front.

The activism of Plebiscite Front was targeted soon after when the state government arrested its founder president, Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg, along with several office bearers and prominent members under the Preventive Detention Act. However, this only strengthened the position of the Plebiscite Front. The rival group made every move to see the Plebiscite Front defeated politically. The defection of Plebiscite

Front workers towards the rival group was celebrated with enthusiasm. Accordingly, the government framed several programs at the administrative level, such as massive subsidies on rations, providing loans to farmers, establishing cooperative societies, and opening up government contracts to divert the people's attention from the policies of the Plebiscite Front. Thus, there were attempts to contain the Plebiscite Front at different levels – local, national, and international. The repression of the legitimate democratic opposition and pursuit of patronage politics was widely used to checkmate the growing popularity of the Plebiscite Front. The situation could find resonance in Sangpam's (1992) characterisation of the third world as an overtly politicised state where the central preoccupation of the state actors is accumulation for survival. Power-holders' strategies to legitimise their rule often fall under political violence and corruption. Kashmir became an over-politicized state without appropriate mediating institutions such as legitimate political parties and ineffective leadership.

A common allegation of the Plebiscite Front against the new government structure was the suppression and torture of its workers. The organisation successfully presented memorandums to confident world leaders for the immediate free, fair, and impartial plebiscite and support of Kashmiri's right to self-determination.[3] Other than this, the organisation managed to do publicity work. It came up with five weeklies, which propagated their party's ideologies. The Urdu weeklies were *Johaar*, *Payam Nau*, *Nawai Muslim*, *Awaam* and *Naya Payaam*. A fortnightly named Free Thinker was also published around the same time.

Tremblay (1996) explains in Kashmir that it was precisely the absence of a competitive party system in the population, combined with the unfortunate decisions of the leadership to pursue patronage politics at the expense of an appropriate economic strategy for development,

3 Memorandums were presented to Earl Atlee-UN Secretary general, Mr. Dag Hammerskgoeld- Chinese Prime Minister, Bulganin-Premier of Soviet Union, Khrushev-Premier of Soviet Union, Mr. Macmilliam-the Prime Minister of England, Dr Sukarno, Queen Elizabeth. The Times of India, January 2, 1957. The *Dawn*, Karachi, July 24, 1958.

generated the crisis of governability in the valley. This crisis quickly degenerated into challenges to the political viability of Kashmir's association with India, revolving around the issue of Kashmir's distinctness and consequent past political claims of self-determination.

Under mounting pressure from various quarters, Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah was released in 1958. The shrines of Kashmir again became powerful spaces for propagating Shiekh's political doctrines.[4] The Hazratbal Shrine, the Khanqah Shrine, and Jenab Sahib Soura allowed Shiekh Abdullah to propagate his political ideas. However, the war of words between Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah and political leaders in New Delhi resulted in a confrontation, again placing Shiekh in jail.

By 1972, the Plebiscite Front leadership concluded that they should settle the issue within the Indian constitutional framework. On the other hand, the Awami Action Committee, the Jamaat-e-Islami, and the Kashmir Political Conferences were emerging as new forces on the old narrative of the plebiscite. These forces allied to mobilise the situation in their favour. Mirwaiz Farooq's Awami Action Committee and the Jamaat-e-Islami constituted a new party called All Jammu and Kashmir Students Liberation League, seeking a solution to Kashmir through a plebiscite.[5]

According to Gochkhami (2011), the movement for Plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir ran into two phases. The first phase can be between 1953 and 1966, and the second from 1966 to 1975. The first phase was a genuine movement for the achievement of the plebiscite. The second phase, from 1966 to 1975, was more related to state autonomy, power politics, and politics of reconciliation. However, two fundamental changes, the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and the formation of Bangladesh in 1971, had a bearing on the people of the state and the Plebiscite Front, which compelled them to rethink the political issues facing the state. Thus, these

4 Shrines in Kashmir were and continue to be far more than simply spiritual retreats. It was in shrines where literature and politics intersected. Shrines provided legitimacy to the rulers and the agents respectively. For more on the role of shrines see *Languages of belonging* by Chitralekha Zutshi and Hindu Rulers Muslims Subjects by Mridu Rai.

5 The *Patriot*, Srinagar, March 17, 1974.

years were a process of rapport building for the Plebiscite leadership, who sought to create alternate avenues for political mobilisation.

The Kashmir Accord, signed in 1975, between Indira Gandhi and Shiekh Abdullah, also added to the resentment. The accord's provisions ensured that Shiekh Abdullah would be released and re-appointed as state chief minister. Additionally, the Plebiscite Front would be disbanded with immediate effect. This was bargained against integrating Kashmir into central constitutional structures and any further devolution of autonomy. This was a turning point in many ways, as the culture of systematic political mobilisation was replaced by sporadic mobilisations led by various youth groups.

Contribution of Plebiscite Front Movement to Kashmiri Nationalism

The Plebiscite Front movement converted Kashmiris into a group possessing common and distinctive cultural elements, where a strong sentiment arose from everyday experiences. This historical point ensured a political awareness of the self and differentiated itself from other political collectivities. The process, which spanned several years, acquainted people with rights and responsibilities, essentially missing from the existing dispensation. A noteworthy aspect of the movement was the unity between the elites and the masses and a sense of owning up to institutions. The breakdown of autonomous provisions for the incarceration of Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah became a symbol of political mobilisation for Kashmiri nationalism.

The Plebiscite Front movement utilised the myths and memories from the past to reconstruct and transform the community into the modern phenomenon of nationalism through re-discovery and re-affirmation. By creating a political and cultural process of legitimacy, the movement ascertained the ownership of resources and infrastructure, launching disruptive actions against the authority. Participation in a movement like *Rai Shumari* was motivated by three key factors: a prevailing sense of injustice and moral acknowledgement that collective

grievances existed and were provoked by the centralising moves of the government. The perceived injustice was at a collective level rather than an individual one. This collective identity was based on shared beliefs and sensibilities, be it cultural or religious. The second important factor contributing to this movement was the presence of an aspect of agency, a belief that one can participate in sustained collective action to alter political conditions.

These conditions indeed emerged in retaliation to the various contextual factors and were cultivated by Kashmiri nationalism.

The door-to-door contact campaigns and reading material circulated by the publicity division of Plebiscite Front ensured the development of a shared perception of injustice, reinforcement of collective identity and the amalgamation of a sense of agency occurring at different levels of society. The activities conducted by the Front dramatically changed the perceptions and persuaded people from other contexts to be a part of the movement. The shared experience of state-enforced coercion influenced the people to come together as the Mahaaz, converting the threshold of sympathy into participation. Political coercion not only formed the core of the collective grievances but also developed a response and led to the maximisation of the goals of political nationalism. This experience also channelled the further adaptation of strategies and tactics for Kashmiri nationalism.

The Plebiscite Front utilised the myth-symbol complex and the mythomoteur by creating similarity in the events of 1931 and 1953 and preserving it for all future events. The political leadership and intelligentsia were thus trying to transform a collectivity into a political nation. This also helped gain recognition for a community's cultural and political claims. The Plebiscite Front reinforced collective identity by persuading those who perceived a sense of injustice being perpetrated on the ethnie and tried to convince them that a national movement was the only way to address this injustice.

The Proliferation of Youth Groups: Al-Fatah and Other Organisations

In response to the restrictions of the local parties and the shrinking of legitimate avenues for democratic political participation, several youth groups emerged to call for self-determination. Other than the Plebiscite Front, several other smaller organisations had also actively advocated for the right to self-determination. Organisations like the Jammu and Kashmir Youth League, formed in 1964, provided the first avenue of political activism for self-determination.

The failure of Operation Gibraltar 24 also led to a change in strategy regarding how the resistance was activated. Jagmohan (2006) writes about eighty underground cells that were active in the Valley of Kashmir between 1965 and 1971, and the ISI did succeed in winning over some of these cells during the late 1960s.

Correspondingly, a network of youth organisations had cropped up across the Cease Fire Line (CFL) in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Jammu and Kashmir Independence Committee was formed in 1963 by Amanullah Khan, Mir Abdul Aziz, G.M Lone, Mir Manan, and Mir Qayoom to channel the resistance movement towards the independence option. Other organisations like Jammu Kashmir Liberation League, Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front, Jammu Kashmir National Liberation Front, and Jammu Kashmir National Students Federation were also formed, espousing the same cause. This proliferation paved the way for the formation of Al-Fatah in 1966, an embryonic Indigenous armed movement that was neutralised in the early stage during the 1970s.

In December 1966, a political project called Al-Fatah was launched. Posters showing a map of India with Jammu and Kashmir depicted as separate entities marked in red ink were sent to government officials, politicians, and influential private individuals. The red ink posters stirred as the general elections to Jammu at the end of the Kashmir assembly were to be held soon after. An article published in *India Today* in 1984 notes that AlFatah was the biggest of all the subversive and

espionage groups in Jammu and Kashmir.[6] It was a guerrilla outfit comprising over 200 people, which began operating around the middle of 1970.

The group was formulated to launch an indigenous armed struggle like Al-Fatah in Palestine. With support from organisations espousing similar politics across the ceasefire line, the movement was ready to launch its guerrilla operations. However, there was clarity that the organisation would run in an autonomous pattern. The group was formed to highlight the Kashmir issue internationally by giving it an indigenous shade without the involvement of Pakistan. To maintain its individuality, it made its preamble and maintained independent finances. By September 1967, Al Fatah had recovered enough confidence to initiate militant operations. Some members crossed the ceasefire line and started recruitment, too. Ali (2012) writes that after 1968, unarmed resistance groups, like Al Fatah of Palestine, were indigenous and emerged under Ghulam Rasool Zehgeer's (GRZ) commandership. Zehgeer operated under several assumed names like Rehman, Maqbool, and Gaznavi. The headquarters were located at Binsoo, Awantipora, in Kashmir.

An excerpt from the preamble of Al-Fatah reads, "The freedom struggle in Jammu and Kashmir is having peculiar character, embedded with religious, cultural, geographical and nationalist maxims to upkeep our prestige and honour as Algerians, Palestinians, and others have done. The preamble draws an analogy between the battle between India and Kashmir, like between an elephant and a mosquito. The minute nature of the mosquito does not deter it from engaging the elephant. In the case of guerrilla warfare, the main objective of the guerrilla is to engage the enemy and secure political motives, which may include political ideology, re-establishment of lost nationhood, or fight against oppression and exploitation. The guerrilla tries to win his political motives by operating and acting on three fronts: political, military, and economic".[7]

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6 http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/al-fatah-is-biggest-espionage-groups-unearthed-in-jammukashmir/1/360540.html [Accessed 10 February 2017].

7 For more see Al-Fatah Constitution 1971.

Al-Fatah imagined the guerilla warfare in Kashmir as a four-staged process. The first stage was conceived as a critical stage where processes like recruitment, training, information collection, and setting up the organisational structure were involved. The complete realisation of this stage could historically realise the triumph or loss of guerilla warfare. This stage would also involve civil disobedience, nonpayment of taxes, and a campaign for economic breakdowns, such as targeting airports, railway lines, and industrial states. Simultaneously, a political party would form to pressure New Delhi-based forces.[8]

The second stage was to create panic among the armed forces in Kashmir in terms of laying light ambushes and throwing hand grenades occasionally but without causing any civilian damage.[9] Swami (2014) writes that Al Fatah urged the cadres to know alternate roadways from an aggressive point of view and said that targeting these could structurally paralyse the enemy at any point in time. In the third stage, the blueprint of raids was to be prepared. In the fourth and final stage, attacks targeted military convoys, depots, and armed garrisons.[10]

The training pattern of Al Fatah was unique; sometimes, the recruits were taken to watch Hindi films like *Aankhein* and *Shaheed*. This was part of the training to inculcate nationalism among Kashmiri youth. The recruits were also asked to read books like *Jehad- e- Islam* written by *Khalil Hamidi*.[11]

As part of the planning infrastructure, recruits were asked to collect or drop material at specific places, which at times was done to check the integrity of the recruits. A specific organisational order was followed, and every recruit was codified. These codes were read in reverse sequence A as Z, B as Y, C as X, D as W, E as V, F as U, G as T, H as S, I as R, J as Q, etc. The recruitment was done only after a thorough check of

8 Interview with Zahid Ghulam Ahmed, senior political columnist, dated 30 June 2017.

9 Ibid.

10 Interview with Bashir Ahmed Bhat, former Kashmir University student's union president (1973–1975) dated 30 April 2017.

11 Interview with Fazal ul Haq Qureshi, former student leader, dated 15 April 2017.

personal background, and preference was given to recruits with other male siblings. This was done to ensure the family's financial stability in case the recruit was arrested. One of the strategies was to write with lemon water so that the words could only be read under the illuminated tube lights.

Some writers, like Jamal (2009), establish that Al Fatah was the first organisation to develop formal links with ISI, but not directly. ISI provided weapons, training, and sanctuaries to the fighters but had no direct control over their militant actions. However, they did not financially back up Fatah. The funds were raised by looting government departments and banks.[12]

However, Al-Fatah was exposed much before it emerged as a full-grown organisation when the members of the latter were identified as committing a bank robbery to generate revenue for the organisation. Sahni (1999) records that the Al-Fatah militants looted around 70,000 rupees from the sub-divisional education office in Pulwama and 100,000 rupees from a local bank. The police arrested a handful of Al-Fatah fighters, which led to a crackdown on its entire membership. It was in 1977 that the cases against Al-Fatah were withdrawn. Thirty members of the organisation were charged with sabotage, subversion, and dacoity.

Besides Al-Fatah, several other organisations espousing the exact cause also cropped up. *Awami Inqelabi Mahaaz and Jammu Kashmir Mahaaz-e-Azaadi* were other votaries of independent Kashmir. Later, a military wing of *Mahaaz-e-Azaadi* called "Operation Balakote" was formed to pursue the same demands aggressively.

Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) was formed around the same agenda in 1977. In one of the official brochures[13], the organisation traces the independent status of Kashmir to 1586, when the Mughals forcefully annexed Kashmir. Contrary to the popular belief that complete independence arose as an option in 1989, JKLF holds a contrary view. JKLF claimed in one of the initial proceedings of the Muslim

12 Interview with Muhammad Ashraf, trade unionist dated 15 April 2017.

13 *Baba-e-Kashmir Aman-u-ullah Khan, Ek Ahd Saaz aur Tareeq Saza Shakisiyat*, Information and Communication Wing Jklf, Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

Conference held on 19 July 1947 that the Muslim Conference ultimately acknowledged the option of independence. However, the very next day, the decision was rolled back[14]. In a way, the autonomous sentiment of Kashmiri nationalism that always existed was manifested in one way or another on both sides of the Line of Control.

In 1962, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto held several talks with Swaran Singh, the Indian foreign minister, where India proposed giving away 1500 sq. miles to Kashmir valley. Unfortunately, the talks failed due to Pakistan's provisional agreement with China. Aman Ullah Khan, who later emerged as one of the prominent faces of Jammu Kashmir Liberation, used his *Voice of Kashmir* journal to generate a consensus around the same. Consequently, a meeting was called at Rawalpindi on 12 May 1963, which was attended by G.M. Lone, Qazi Khurshid Alam, Abdul Khaliq Ansari, Abdul Majeed Malik Mir Abdul Aziz, Majid Ahmad Bhat, Ghulam Nabi Gilkar, Mir Abdul Qayoom, Mir Abdul Farooq, Syed Shah Nazki, Ghulam Ahmad Jarrah, Ali Muhammad Malika and Mir Abdul Rashid to form a committee called Kashmir Independence Committee. The committee resisted the Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks and the dissection plans of the valley.[15]

In his book *Jehd-e-Musalsal*, Aman-ullah Khan (1992) writes that as soon as the organisation was formed, the members boarded buses and travelled to an unguarded India-Pakistan boundary at Suchetgarh, twenty kilometres from the city of Jammu. One crossed the no man's land and bought back soil from across the working boundary. With the soil from the other side of Kashmir in their hands, the members took an oath to work for the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir extensively. Abdul Khaliq Ansari was made the president, Aman-ullah Khan the secretary general, and Maqbool Bhat the publicity secretary.

Aman Ullah Khan had already started thinking about guerrilla warfare, which many other party members did not receive well. The younger lot of the party agreed with the principles of guerrilla warfare, while the

14 Ibid.

15 *Maslae Kashmir ka Behtareen Hai*, Jklf, Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

elders categorically rejected the formulation, leading to the ranks split.[16] The younger crowd favouring guerrilla warfare formed the National Liberation Front (NLF) in 1965. Guerilla warfare was considered the only way forward as it was the only way to establish the point of Kashmiris, which otherwise got buried under the ideological structure of India and Pakistan. The single-point program of NLF was to create conditions in which the people of Jammu and Kashmir could determine the future of their motherland. All the members were required to sign an oath in blood that they would not hesitate to sacrifice their lives to achieve the NLF objectives.[17]

National Liberation Front decided to step into Kashmir Valley to introduce guerrilla ideas. This way, two groups, one headed by Maqbool Bhat and another by Major Amanullah, entered the valley to create various hideouts and provide military training. The two groups were successful in setting up in Srinagar, Sopore, Baramulla, Bandipora, and vulnerability, NLF workers pre-emptively kidnapped and subsequently murdered a police inspector. Soon, Bhat was arrested and sentenced to death for the murder of Inspector Amarchand and for inciting the people against the state of India. However, Bhat escaped, and the organisation began looking for ways to escalate its action to draw the world's attention to the Kashmir issue.[18]

Subsequently, Hashim Qureshi and Ashraf Qureshi planned to hijack the Ganga flyer to bring the Kashmir issue to the forefront. The hijackers demanded the release of 36 political prisoners and claimed allegiance to an organisation called the Kashmir National Liberation Front. The high-voltage drama ended with hijackers setting the aircraft on fire after taking out the passengers. In May 1976, Maqbool Bhat re-entered the valley

16 Interview with Ghulam Mustafa Alvi, octgenerian political worker and member of NLF, dated 30 May 2017.

17 Interview with Muhammad Altaf Hussain, a political worker, dated 3 April 2017.

18 In September 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked four jets bound for New York and successfully landed two of them at Dawson Field in Jordan. The operation was successful, attracting international media attention with the detonation of three jets at Dawson's Filed.

to impart military training to recruits. To manage the shortage of funds, Bhat robbed a bank. The employees resisted, and in a shootout that followed,[19] the bank manager was killed. It soon led to Bhat's arrest, and he was subsequently sentenced to death.

From the time of Bhat's arrest in 1976, the National Liberation Front changed its strategy towards advocacy and lobbying as practical techniques for bringing Kashmir to the forefront. This way, JKLF was formed in London, and a journal called *Voice of Kashmir International* was started. The lobbying mechanisms included booking the visitors' gallery of the United Nations General Assembly and raising slogans against the stalemate.

Plebiscite and for endorsing the independent claim to Kashmir. On behalf of JKLF, Amanullah Khan started holding press conferences to discuss the historicity of Kashmir and complete independence as an option. The lobbying continued from 1979 to 1984, and there was a lot of press and media publicity around this time. While the total number of people working for JKLF was not more than a few dozen, the organisation would quickly become the largest and most influential group working for Kashmiri independence. Soon branches were set up in New York, Holland, West Germany, Denmark, France, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Understanding the Impact of Youth Groups on Kashmiri Nationalism

The Plebiscite Front movement and the proliferation of youth groups became part and parcel of everyday life in Kashmir. These everyday experiences and events shaped the Kashmiri nationalist narrative. Faheem (2018) notes that the Azadi movement of the 1990s provided a context through the broken promises connected with other narratives, producing a collective narrative and thereby giving birth to sustained collective action.

19 *Main Kaun Hun*, Muhammad Maqbool Bhat.

The activities of the Plebiscite Front and the corresponding network of indigenous organisations led to what Anderson (2006:8) calls a "spontaneous distillation of complex tossing of historical forces". Once these historical forces surfaced, Janus could acquire newer meanings. As these historical forces were transported through various social terrains, they acquired varying self-consciousness. Thus merging with a correspondingly wider network of more comprehensive political and ideological constellations.

Before 1947, the National Conference headed by Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah was the major political force behind the political mobilisation. His leadership charisma and appeal made it the primary catalyst for political mobilisation. This time, folk songs and stories are full of narratives of Shiekh's popularity. However, by 1953, he was arrested, and a new Prime Minister was installed. This event marks the curtailment and erosion of the autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir. As the National Conference was banned and Shiekh Abdullah was imprisoned, many members, supporters, and sympathisers of the National Conference galvanised themselves into a new party called Plebiscite Front. The massive publicity done through the Plebiscite Front became the primary carrier for Kashmiri political nationalism in these years. This corresponded to a remarkable increase in the number of underground youth-led organisations.

The personality cult of Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah had grown regardless of the institutionally defined position and superseded the established institutional authority. After the Indira-Abdullah accord of 1975, the personality cult diminished, but by then, the historical forces had taken a self-directed trajectory. This corresponded to the e-reading public through educational reforms. Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah made several radical reforms, including access to free, standardised education. Education ensured that people would think about themselves and relate in newer ways. The land-to-tiller reforms successfully created a middle class that prioritised education over everything else. Razdan (1999) informs that in 1941, only 1.6 per cent of the Kashmiri Muslims could read and write. However, two decades later, the literacy rate for the state rose to 11.03 per cent and then 36.29 per cent. From the early 1950s,

Jamaat-e-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir also increased its involvement in education. Sikand (2006) records how Jamaat's growing network of schools made tremendous contributions to the field of education. Jamaat schools were planned as safeguards against the onslaught in the cultural sphere. The self-consciousness brought through education had taken different forms- Islamic, secular, socialistic, etc. and led towards political baptism across the class and sectarian lines. The partition of the sub-continent had already created a political atmosphere charged with newer doctrines, which were further transmitted through the surge in education.

Another major factor that sustained political nationalism was the rapid development of print. To borrow a line from (Anderson 1991:90), "The readership had expanded beyond the tiny literate reefs on the top of the vast illiterate ocean". The readers were connected through print, forming a visible invisibility symbol emblematic of the nationally imagined community. Ganguly (1996) cites that in 1965,46 newspapers were published in Kashmir, while the figure in 1991 was 254. The advent of education, print, power-packed politics of the Plebiscite Front and the subsequent birth of Indigenous organisations on the one hand and the religious revivalist organisations like Ahle Hadith and Jamaat-e-Islami converged for setting the stage for Kashmiri political nationalism.

Before the Indira –Abdullah accord, the demand for plebiscite had been the primary demand of the Plebiscite Front for twenty-two years. These years were essential in forming political nationalism, and this memory laid the foundation for militant nationalism. In public memory, the mobilisation followed a continuity, which started in 1931. In this context, the youth organisations, particularly the JKLF, extensively used influences from past events, forging bonds between past and present events. The underground organisations were, in a way, weaving a parallel narrative from 1953 to 1987, where perceived political betrayals were openly discussed. Underground literature in books, pamphlets, and newsletters was being shared in a realm that was not controlled by the state. Faheem (2018) regards that instead of being a phase of relative calm, this phase was collective effervescence whereby shared narratives, jokes, rumour, and gossip embedded in the larger political reality of the

time were emerging as the powerful vehicles for political mobilisation in Kashmir. The slogans acted as memory snapshots, waiting to be discovered from generation to generation.

The cadre of the newly formed organisations revived and accelerated the political mobilisation through collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction of political events and how these events mediate between political opportunities and action. The youth-led organisations and their intervention created a collective perception of the Indira-Abdullah Accord and developed a new language of political nationalism. Equally, political nationalism, be it Arab or Afghan nationalism, provides motivations and helps the imagination locate oneself in a global matrix.

Run-Up to the Elections of 1987

The closure of legitimate avenues of democratic political participation had made way for many youth protest groups. The 1975 Indira -Abdullah accord eroded the legitimacy of the National Conference as a representative of Kashmiri Nationalism.

Punjabi (1989) characterises the 1980s as the result of the non-fulfilment of urges and aspirations of the people, the result of undemocratic functioning of different institutions of the state, the result of mal-administration in running the affairs of the state and violent expression and militant assertion of a sub-national identity As the process of participation of people in decision making, power sharing and restructuring of the institutions did not take the ordinary course in the state in general and Kashmir valley in particular, the policy of appeasement was used to win over the estranged majority of the population. Appeasement included generous central government aid, gearing up a highly subsidised economy, and arbitrary and discretionary sanctions of permits licenses and permits. The bureaucracy assumed the role of according legitimacy to the successive undemocratic government. Thus, the cumulative effect of all these processes was the emergence of the new middle class in Kash-

miri society. The services and privileges of the state remained confined to this very class.

From 1953 to 1975, the disenchantment and discontentment of the people were drained off through emotional slogans and sharpening the dual identity –religious and region. In other words, Shiekh Abdullah could restrain the Kashmiri identity from being confronted with the national identity. With the exit of Shiekh Abdullah from the socio-political scene, his successors could not maintain a balance between the centripetal and centrifugal tendencies. Puri (1989) states that from 1975 to 1984, the state's politics was divided between two secular and nationalist parties. Those dissatisfied with the police state government's policies supported the Congress (or the Janata for a while). In contrast, those dissatisfied with the policies of the Union Government opted for the National Conference. There was little space for the secessionist forces during this time.

The dismissal of the duly elected Government in 1984 by Governor Jagmohan under central Congress leadership's direction was a significant blow to the centre state-relations. It outraged the sentiments of the local population, who saw Farooq as being wronged by New Delhi. But what outraged the feelings even more was Farooq's accord with Congress and the decision to join hands with the centre. Noorani (1989) argues that the honourable course for Farooq would have been to stay in the opposition, build up his party National Conference and articulate protest through a committed political party. Instead, he discredited himself, and so did the Congress.

Additionally, Farooq Abdullah blamed his father for what he inherited, a "rusted administration" from him, which exhausted him of any goodwill he otherwise enjoyed. During this time, Maqbool Bhat, an influential JKLF leader, was hanged in connection with a case of the killing of an Indian diplomat in the United Kingdom. The hanging marked a significant shift in the landscape of Kashmir and paved the way for the transformation of nationalism from political to militant terrain.

Kashmir observers unanimously assert that the militant nationalism could not rear its head if the March 1987 elections were not rigged. Many political groups formed in the mid-1970s against the Indira-

Abdullah accord came under a Muslim United Front (MUF) coalition to contest elections unitedly. In a way, the politics of the Muslim United Front represented the expression of the non-elites who were contesting against the dominance of the centralised institutional control. MUF was widely expected to emerge as a significant contender after the elections. However, alleged collections were massively rigged in favour of the National Conference-Congress alliance. The election results met with massive outbursts and mass protests against the subversion of the democratic process.

MUF was a manifestation of moderate old-guard leadership ready to work within the confines of the Indian constitution. Political mobilisation was reflected in broader and underground formations, some blanket-banned by the National Conference. The other underground groups devised radical measures to mobilise against the state. Splinter groups regularly spoke in favour of armed struggle as the only logical tool for resolving the conflict.

The last blow to the tower of democracy was rigging in favour of the National Conference. As a veteran leader, Abdul Ghani Lone said in one of his interviews, "The sad part is that moderate leadership is now being finished. Our youth now prefers to listen to the sound of the gun rather than even to my voice."[20] It is also argued that had there not been rigging of elections, the MUF would not have bagged more than 15 seats at most in the House of 76. The National Conference-Congress coalition would have sailed through with ease.[21] The result declared the National Conference the winner of forty seats, Congress of twenty-six, MUF secured only four seats, and the Bharatiya Janta Party and the Independent candidates secured two.

The results were declared after an unprecedented five-day delay, and there was a complete curfew during the counting. Worse, the police threw out MUF counting agents from the counting stations. As soon as the results were declared, MUF candidates were arrested, detained under the Public Security Act, and shifted to various jails. Cash awards

20 The Srinagar Times, dated 29 September 1990.

21 Ibid.

of Rs 25000 were placed on MUF polling agents Abdul Hamid Shiekh, Ashfaq Majid Wani, Muhammad Yasin Malik, and Javed Ahmed Mir.

One particular group, the Islamic Students League,[22] emerged powerfully with a considerable member base. This group had actively campaigned for MUF, and as a result of the rigged elections, a number of its cadres defected towards armed militancy. A senior member of the Islamic Students League, in an interview held in 2017, stated, "Islamic Students League (ISL) had become the street power in the 1980s. Every political actor wanted to utilise this street power for their gains." Muslim United Front, a coalition of various small groups against the elite politics of the National Conference, also sought to utilise the resources of the Islamic Students League for campaigning in the election. However, ISL differed from MUF fundamentally vis-a-vis its approach to electoral politics. Ahmed (2017) remembers that though it agreed to campaign, ISL essentially tried to change the character of the struggle. It was trying to replace political nationalism with more radical options. As time passed, political nationalism was manipulated in favour of electoral gains.

Many of the MUF candidates and ISL members ended up crossing over the line of control to acquire armed training. Another senior activist (2017), preferring anonymity in an interview, recalls, "1989 elections were not an answer to those who had any hopes from the state; it was a reality check for those who were thinking in terms of Indian constitutional framework." This remark asserts that political mobilisation had changed the paradigm with the advent of organised acts of anti-government violence. Armed militancy was initiated formally by the HAJY group, which returned from receiving armed training in Pakistan.

22 On October 13, 1983, the West Indian cricket team was playing against the Indian team at the Polo Ground Srinagar. The spectators involved many Islamic Students League members and they openly cheered for the West Indian team. Some people from the crowd dug the pitch in anger as to how India could host a cricket match in a disputed region. The event became quite a sensation and brought Kashmir into international focus quickly.

Understanding the Drift From Political Nationalism to Militant Nationalism

Militant ethnic nationalism emerged to challenge the state by denying it symbols of authority and legitimacy. The militant form also blocked the monopoly of coercive violence. The political ethnic nationalism operated to undermine the state through mass agitation on social, economic, and political issues. However, militant nationalism, in a way, was perceived as eroding the ruling government's claim to authority. This was done by establishing the legitimacy of numbers. Thus, the militant movement was a strategy of sustained political violence to challenge the state. Guell (1989) notes that the strategy of armed struggle may be viewed from two distinct perspectives. From one perspective, armed struggle represents the first phase in the plan of political violence. It gradually advances from armed struggle to guerilla warfare and then to people's war to general insurrection and weaken the state. From the other perspective, armed struggle represents an autonomous strategy sufficient to achieve the desired goals.

The idea of a transition from political nationalism to militant nationalism can force the state to negotiate the demands made by the militants. However, this could be facilitated only by successfully coordinating two different forms of struggle, reconciling the conflicting demands of the strategy of armed struggle and political outreach and mobilisation.

The Kashmiri nationalist movement adopted a variety of structural combinations. For example, the political wing created and directed an effective mobilisation, setting up small semi-military organisations and directing subordinate wings to disseminate propaganda and mobilise local support for nationalism. It was successfully dispersed through military, political, trade union, and cultural forums. Distinct but allied organisations did not wage the military and political struggles. Kashmiri nationalism also took to an electoral strategy, using elections to expand the famous battle and expose the shortcomings of governments in power. The elected representatives sought to establish formal access to the state to translate movement aspirations into policy and create new institutions. However, many who opposed an electoral strategy regarded

election participation as providing legitimacy to the incumbent regime and the institutions. However, with time, differing ways to seek the goals proved to be a source of disagreement and disintegration rather than of the success of Kashmiri militant nationalism. In particular, the internal debate often resulted in organisational splits and recurrent warfare.

Rise of Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front

Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front was one of many organisations formed as an offshoot of politics of the Plebiscite Front in mid-1960. For more than two decades, JKLF had a negligible presence on the Indian side of the Line of Control as the National Conference and the Plebiscite Front powerfully captured the pro-independence space. Ideologically, it was very close to NC's version of Kashmiri Nationalism, but at the same time, it was disassociated from Shiekh Abdullah's political heritage. Bose (1997) records that in the backdrop of the alleged rigging of the elections of 1987, JKLF resurfaced after remaining dormant for twenty years. The core HAJY group that emerged immediately after the election rigging had its allegiance to JKLF. Essentially, it found spiritual inspiration in the Islamic traditions rooted in the mystical piety of Kashmiri Sufi saints. Kashmiri identity could never merge with a religious identity. Explaining the spiritual aspects of Jameel (2017), a professor at the University of Kashmir said, "Major religions modified when they came to Kashmir. The local texture was retained to uphold the nationalistic identity that existed here. Hinduism did not exist here in the way it existed elsewhere; Buddhism also underwent major changes to accommodate the local practices. So, did Islam emerge in a way that has no parallels elsewhere?" He added, "In Kashmir, there has always been spirituality beneath the realm of politics. For example, Syed Ali Hamdani gifted Kashmiris a beautiful treatise on spirituality-*Aurad-e-Fatiha* because he understood and valued the spiritual mysticism practised here."

The interview reminds me of Renan's (1882) famous essay, "What is a Nation", where he drew a parallel between the nation and the soul. Past

and present are the things that constitute this soul or the spiritual principle. The first is the legacy of memories, and the second is the desire to live together. The vision of Kashmiri nationalism shared by the JKLF rested on the glorified vision of the shared past, but how the idea of consent was emulated remains a matter of debate. Malik (1995) notes that JKLF is mainly based on geo-political and historical grounds, focusing on territorial and geographical identity. The organisation's activists put forward the idea of a supra–religious Kashmir. The term was both an ideological and strategic attempt to not alienate Buddhists of Ladakh and Hindus of Jammu from the predominantly Muslim population of the valley.

JKLF advanced as a frontline group that crossed the border for arms training in 1988. On December 7, 1988, it took the entire state machinery by surprise with a high-profile kidnapping of Rubaiya Sayed, daughter of the then Union Home Minister, Mufti Muhammed Sayed. This marked the arrival of JKLF on the political scene and explained the breakdown of the state apparatus. The kidnapping was surprising for the state machinery, traditional leadership, and the Pakistani stakeholders equally. The helplessness of the state machinery could be evaluated by then Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah's insistence on the act as 'un-Islamic' and then chief secretary Moonis Raza calling out to the kidnappers as "brothers do not hold sisters hostage."[23]

The case of Rubaiaya's kidnapping presents a crisis of weak mediating structures and how the state was held captive by militant nationalists. Constant appeals from the representative organs of the state express a breakdown of trust and a complete takeover of the traditional pro-resistance leadership by the JKLF. The traditional pro-resistance camp essentially espoused political nationalism. The fact that Pakistani leadership also appealed to JKLF to release Rubaiya is indicative that the external actors did not induce the kidnapping, and JKLF was posing a threat to them as well. Prominent Pakistani leaders like Maulana Kausar Niazi and Dr Sher Ali Khan expressed astonishment at this act.[24]

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23 *The Kashmir Times*, December 11, 1989.

24 *The Kashmir Times*, December 12, 1989.

This act of kidnapping also took the traditional leadership by disbelief. Awami Action Committee chairman Mirwaiz Maulana Farooq, requested the JKLF to release the hostage as it was against the principles of religion.[25] Subsequently, there was no other way than to give in to the demands of kidnappers to resolve the crisis, as police and intelligence could not locate the kidnappers. The militants had put a condition that Rubaiya would be freed only if five of their colleagues were released by the government. The militants had also put a condition that Rubaiya's release would come only after 48 hours of the release of the five militants.[26]

As Rubaiya was released in exchange for the arrested militants, the society expressed widespread jubilation. Women often turned out with garlands, traditional sugar candies (*shirini*), and traditional folk songs to welcome the militants. Immediately after the release of the five militants, JKLF flags were hoisted all over Srinagar, and celebratory gunshots were also fired.[27] In the words of a senior journalist, Bukhari (2017), "The Rubaiya kidnapping case was a psychological victory for the Kashmiri nation. It was for the first time that a common Kashmiris had brought the government to its knees."

For some time, JKLF articulated a vision of an independent state and strongly expressed the autonomous political agenda. Earlier, there had been attempts at channelling political consciousness outside of state-defined institutions; however, those attempts could not grab attention like JKLF did. The JKLF politics found a parallel in insurgent peasant consciousness that Guha (1983) explains, occupying autonomous space derived from the historical and social aspect of identity.

There was also a gradual increase in organised violence; an editorial of *Kashmir Times* titled Insidious Tactics[28] discussed how the call for *bandhs* surprisingly evoked total response despite the large-scale pre-

25 *The Kashmir Times*, December 10, 1989.

26 Meraj, Zaffar (1989), "Government vacillation delayed Rubaiya's case by 3 days" *The Kashmir Times*, Jammu and Kashmir, December 15, 1989.

27 *The Kashmir Times*, December 13, 1989.

28 *The Kashmir Times*, January 27, 1989.

emptive arrests having been made to prevent any coercion and intimidation. The futility of all these preventive measures was highlighted. It showed how the ruling parties had lost their influence, and the support drifted towards JKLF. The massive demonstration in the form of protest marches and strikes was churning out a new narrative, which was threatening Pakistan and India. The complete support for strike calls and political marches reflected the solidarity for Kashmiri nationalism.

On 18th June 1990, when the guerrilla movement was at its peak, Amanullah formed the interim independent government, creating a whirlwind in the national and international media. The independent government attempted to cross over the ceasefire line at *Chakoti* in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir on February 11, 1992. Marchers were stopped short at the ceasefire line, and 12 of them were killed and many arrested. This exposed Pakistan's reprehensible position on Kashmir completely.[29]

The act of kidnapping Rubaiya Sayeed and the act of forming the interim independent government constituted an experience where the 'self' and the 'other' encountered and confronted one another. There was considerable strain between the ISI and the JKLF during the latter half of 1989. The ISI even forced the JKLF to change its central plank from sovereignty to self-determination. Jamal (2002) writes the ISI also demanded that its representative be allowed to sit in JKLF central committee meetings as an observer. Amanullah Khan rejected both ideas, saying that he would enable ISI to participate in the central committee meetings if he was allowed to sit for meetings of the Pakistan army. By early 1990, the ISI had cut all funds to the JKLF. Amanullah tried seeking help from Benazir Bhutto, but the communications channels were completely blocked.

JKLF was repeatedly attacked for its secular character by the ISI. As it was the first militant organisation to cross over the border for militant training, its cadres were attacked for fighting for a cause distant from Islam. But beneath the smokescreen of secularism, it was JKLF's vision for independent statehood that was a challenge for the Pakistani state

29 https://kashmirlife.net/the-gilgit-rebel-issue-07-vol-08-104096/ [Online: web] Accessed 3 January 2019.

and the ISI. The Pakistan-supported groups adopted an area domination programme where the geographical territories were marked either as green or red. Green represented areas where pro-Pakistan groups dominated, and red represented areas where JKLF was in control. The JKLF cadre was attacked repeatedly for taking secular positions and pressurised for defection. Those who disagreed were killed mercilessly.

Constitution and Strategy of JKLF

In the proposed constitution, JKLF envisioned a federal, parliamentary political system. This system comprised five federal units: Kashmir Valley, Jammu Province, Ladakh, Azad Kashmir, Gilgit and Baltistan. These units would be autonomous with elected provincial governments and subdivided into districts with their administrative structure. At the centre, it put forward bicameral houses of the legislature with proportional representation. The lower house of the parliament would have proportionate representation vis a vis the population. The upper house would have an equal representation from all units.[30]

The envisioned constitution provided social, economic, and political equality to religious and ethnic minorities and neutrality towards Pakistan and India. The proposed neutrality was such that the proposed republic of Jammu and Kashmir would develop economic cooperation and trade links with India and Pakistan. Regarding the socio-economic program, JKLF, strongly recommended by the Naya Kashmir manifesto adopted by the National Conference in the early 1940s, praised egalitarianism and social justice.[31]

The JKLF constitution promotes the non-homogenization of identity in many ways of autonomous federating units, which can provide greater recognition and establish legitimacy in many ways. Based on the interviews with activists from JKLF and reviewing newspaper articles, the strategies aim at actively disseminating nationalism. JKLF

30 JKLF Constitution (2003).

31 Ibid.

utilised negations, ambiguity, collective experience, solidarity, transmission, and territoriality to solidify expressions of ethnic Kashmiri nationalism. One could understand the strategies through four phases: establishing an organisational base, devising military strategy, pursuing international support, and mobilising popular support.

The most active years of JKLF (1989–1993) were characterised by massive political mobilisation and subsequent mass protests on the streets. Starting with the boycott of the 1989 elections, the famous slogans from this time like *Hai Haqq Humara Aazadi* (Azaadi is our right), *Jab tak na hogi rai shumari jung hamarai aazadi* (we will fight, till the world recognises our right to plebiscite)[32] suggest a meaningful framework for the articulation of ethnic demands. JKLF flags at every nook and corner of the valley and complete strikes on symbolic days suggested a state-seeking behaviour, creating legitimacy for a new power structure.

JKLF ensured that the government installations and offices considered symbols of authority were routinely targeted. Massive rallies were organised with people from different walks of life joining in, even those who were active parts of the state machinery before 1989. Taseer (1990) writes about how the collective oath taken by the JKLF leadership by Charar-e Sharief absolved previous attachments and awakened new impulses. Without alternate channels of collective action and protest, mosques emerged as focal points of mobilisation and resistance. So, it can be said that during the initial stages of protests, JKLF intensified and directed the tension and discontent of people. Garner (2013) explains that JKLF capitalised on the benefits of political Islam. The leadership of JKLF prided itself on the secular understanding of Kashmiri nationalism, but that did not stop them from utilising Islamic themes in the mobilisation and public discourse in response to the violence. Motivational literature uses symbols and metaphors from Islamic history.[33]

JKLF also mobilised international support for Kashmir's right to self-determination by repeatedly focusing on human rights violations.

32 The Srinagar Times, dated 1 March 1990.

33 Jklf pamphlets from 1990–1993 were seen to analyse this trend.

To maintain distance from Pakistan's position on Kashmir and as a total repudiation of the two-nation theory, fundraising was done in the Middle East, the United Kingdom, Europe, and the USA. The Kashmir diaspora in the United Kingdom was particularly active in mobilising international support.

With the intensification of militancy, strategies evolved into a more dissident and subversive model. The works of Mao and Che Guevara were translated into Urdu, and the tanzeem (organisation) frequently taught underground and guerrilla warfare tactics from them. Zahid (2018) informed in a personal interview that a hyper-revolutionary atmosphere was created, and it was strictly urged on the fighters of JKLF (*mujahids*) to show impeccable moral conduct and strict self-control so that the local population would spontaneously become sympathetic to militancy.

A particular impetus to militant nationalism during this phase was the death of Ashfaq Majid Wani, one of the founders of the HAJY group. His death inspired thousands of other young Kashmiri men to take up arms, making it very difficult for the state to control the militancy from this time forward.[34] Defying curfew orders, some 500,000 mourners participated in the funeral of Ashfaq, which easily surpassed other historical gatherings, let alone burials.[35]

To get people together and to create a sense of commonality, JKLF made several symbolic gestures, like visiting the families of militants after their deaths, setting up schools, and urging for the adoption of the children of dead militants. JKLF activists would regularly visit the families of the killed militants, whom they referred to as martyrs, honouring them immediately and also periodically. Martyr cemeteries were laid in every area specifically for militants. The valorisation of fighters was incorporated and manifested at the community level. The organisation tried to project slain militants as 'martyrs'. They explained how wives and children of martyrs need to be supported. These were the performative aspects of the commemoration of the nationhood. The multivalence of martyrdom was enacted through funerals, commemorative murals, and

34 *The Kashmir Times*, 30 March 1990.

35 *The Kashmir Times*, 1 April 1990.

the naming of places after martyrs. Tributes paid to the mothers of martyrs became archetypal events for recalling the goal of nationalism.

As more militants began getting killed, the memorial stones with the name, date of birth, and date of their killing started propping up at every nook and corner of the valley. The day on which the militants were killed was observed as 'martyr days'. Commemorative meetings were held on such days, and these days became events in their way. The goal of nationalism was recalled, recognised, localised, and reconstructed through these meetings. Using Anderson's (1983:9) important argument of how arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism exist in cenotaphs and tombs of unknown soldiers. Whether the tombs/graves are filled with anybody cannot be ascertained, but they become active sites for nationalistic imaginings. Thus, news of any militant's death evoked strong sentiments reminding of reliving and reinforcing the sacrifices made by Kashmiris. These acts foreground a counter-memory and produce strategies of cohesion and resistance. The martyrdom of a militant had a religious underpinning and gave meaning to the larger cultural systems surrounding it.

Faheem (2006) notes that ordinary people organised community dinners during infamous nocturnal crackdowns, and paramilitary search operations fostered solidarity and friction with the adversary. The crack-downs and combing operations incited fear but also made individuals come together and share one another's experiences, unconsciously importing and assimilating into themselves the gestures and attitudes of one another. In her unpublished memoir, Tabassum (1991), a JKLF supporter, writes that Eid in 1990 was entirely different from any other Eid she had ever seen. On Eid that year, early morning, the males from her mohalla were called out for an identification parade but soon were hurdled into buses and taken to some undisclosed location. Soon after, on some other buses, males from a village far away from hers were paraded on the typical community grounds. As it was Eid, she urged the other women to march out with the food they had made and share it with men from the distant village.

Challenges for Nationalism Proposed by JKLF

Faheem (2006) notes that the strategic vision of JKLF was straightforward. It hoped to generate enough popular resistance that it would force India to withdraw from Kashmir, and JKLF would be able to form an independent state. However, the strategy was full of miscalculations, given social resources and institutional capacities. JKLF produced an agitational model of militant nationalism utilising restlessness and impulsive behaviour of the people. However, it could not be transformed into something concrete due to the state action from India and Pakistan.

In the initial stage, JKLF was able to intensify and channel the grievances of common Kashmiris towards collective action. While the initial interest helped recruit members, it had shortcomings in giving a long-term political direction. One reason for this could be the extermination of the central leadership of JKLF in the initial years. In the early years of the militant movement, despite having a limited cadre, the four original organisers of the HAJY group handled the central processes. As the first-tier leadership got arrested or killed, there was no second-tier leadership to take control of the situation. Neither was an institutionalised structure in place to deal with a situation like this.

Secondly, JKLF had considerably weaker social penetration in rural areas than in urban areas. There was a deficient social infrastructure that could mobilise masses for a more extended period. Weak vertical ties meant that the recruitment and expansion of the organisation would be difficult in the long run. Since the organisation had no patronage from a caste, class, or religious network, it meant dangerous consequences. The urban-rural gap visibly worked regarding training and control within the organisation.

Equally, a stringent crackdown was placed by security agencies, which led to JKLF recruiting several individuals and local subgroups with which it did not share its ideological and organisational commitment. This had serious ramifications, creating risks of revolts from below and decapitating the organisational hierarchy. These new fighters often tried to control the resources they got after the armed training. There were also instances when these groups retained important in-

formation for individual good. Moreover, there wasn't a solid policy to deal with the splinter groups, paving the way for chaos. Stanilard (2016) also writes about how JKLF could not build a durable organisation, particularly locally. It could not convert mass mobilisations into resilient institutions that can handle expansion and conflict shocks. In a way, JKLF had an idea, not a base. The problems were equally propounded by the weak horizontal ties between the JKLF on the Indian side and the JKLF on the Pakistani side, which later became evident by multiple splits within the JKLF.

Evans (1999) writes that as the cadre strength of JKLF was decimated by constant killings and arrests from 1992 to 1993 from both Indian security forces and pro-Pakistan gunmen, there was a complete takeover of the movement by Pakistan and its intelligence agencies. Thus, JKLF lost its ascendency to the radical groups, resulting in a unilateral ceasefire by Yasin Malik in 1994.

One can evaluate that JKLF utilised all the elements mentioned above in the section to awaken subaltern consciousness. JKLF catered to the class that was historically on the defensive and helped them achieve self–awareness. JKLF's taking over traditional leadership introduced a new set of class polarities and formed a class of new political actors. These actors had a redefined position of Kashmiri nationalism and also posited a vertical conflict between the latest and the old actors. In a way, the arrival of JKLF on the political scene introduced a new set of individual and group dynamics in Kashmiri society. JKLF mobilised ethnicity in defence of culture and to establish political boundaries.

Rise of Hizbul Mujahideen

The rise of JKLF was becoming an aversion for the Pakistani state, which always deterred any attempts at the creation of a separate state in Kashmir. During the 1980s, the Pakistani state headed by Zia-ul-Haq tried to intervene in Kashmir by using Jamaat-e-Islami as its client. Zia had already set things in motion in a couple of meetings with a founding leader of Jamaat-e-Islami-Maulana Abdul Bari. Jamaat-e-Islami was to

gather international support for the Kashmiri cause from international movements. Subsequently, Bari travelled to Indian-administered Kashmir and met with politicians and activists. However, the Jamaat-e-Islami (Kashmir wing) was not keen on making the Pakistani army their benefactor. Subsequent meetings were Arranged between General Zia and activists of Jamaat-e-Islami in Saudi Arabia.

JKLF was also a threat to small Islamist militant groups as it was a nationalist secular party with no allegiance to Pakistan. Consequently, a new militant organisation was envisioned, and Jamaat-e-Islami would sponsor it. The new origination would replace JKLF and also lead the militancy in Pakistan's interests.

Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) in Jammu and Kashmir was formed in the 1940s, and ever since, it has played a crucial role in the politics of Kashmir. The JI in Jammu and Kashmir shares the common ideological framework with Jamaat elsewhere, based on the writings of Maulana Sayed Ala Maududi. Till the onset of militancy, the core support base for JI was the middle class, propagating adherence to Islamic law (sharia). For JI, Islam functions as a complete code of life covering all the aspects of a collective as well as individual existence of a Muslim's life. And, for the establishment of Islam entirely, according to JI, the creation of a Muslim state guided by Sharia is mandatory. Accordingly, Jamaat sees democracy as going against the sharia, and for the same reason, the separation of religion and politics is condemned. Sikand (2002) notes that JI in Kashmir urged men and women to play an essential role in establishing the status based on din. For this purpose, a solid representative party, JI, was required. The required membership is open to any group, irrespective of the affiliation of class, caste, or tribe, who agrees to follow the guidelines of Jamaat.

Consequently, Jamaat-e-Islami surveyed the political landscape and decided that decisive action was needed to control the situation in their favour. Subsequently, informal relationships with smaller Jehadi groups were strengthened, with many Jamaat-e-Islami leaders taking direct roles in the activities of underground mujahideen. The smaller groups like Zia Tigers and Al Hamza shared their pan-Islamist vision with Jamaat. The most critical group, the largest and the most

effectively organised, was Ansarul Islam. To broaden its appeal and pull the movement out of JKLF's hands, Ansarul Islam was renamed Hizbul Mujahideen- the party of holy warriors- on June 11, 1989.

The ambiguity over two Hizbul Mujahideen was resolved by merging the two with Ahsan Dar as its commander in October 1989. A constitution was finalised on June 10, 1990, after secret meetings between all stakeholders- Jamaat-e-Islami of Jammu Kashmir, Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, and the ISI. The constitution created the offices of the patron, Amir, the chief commander who made up the executive leadership. It also established a central *Majlis-i-Shoura* while the chief commander would be nominated. The power to appoint the patron nearly meant total control over the organisation. However, ISI wanted to run the show, pushing its major client, Jamaat, into the limelight and subordinating minor factions. Senior people were regularly demoted, and smaller organisations like Allah Tigers, Al Badr, and Tehreek-i-Jehd Islami were merged as part of this power struggle. Jamal (2009) records that to combat the influence of JKLF, ISI supported and funded a wide variety of militant organisations. By 1990, the ISI had over 100 militant organisations on its payroll. But with JKLF removed from the scene, the ISI moved to cease its support for more minor factions, becoming more selective in its support of Kashmiri militants. Subsequently, a joint front was envisioned for pro-Pakistani groups, meaning the merger of Hizbul Mujahideen, Muslim Janbaz Force, Tehreek Jehad Islami, Hizbullah, and Al -Umar to form Mutahidda Jihad Council.

However, in 1993, as the United States of America began pressing Pakistan to close its militant operations in Kashmir, the ISI decided to continue funding jihadi organisations only if they could gain sponsorship from a client political party. Thus, the Awami Action Committee became the sponsor of al-Umar Mujahideen, the Muslim Conference was directed to sponsor Jamiatul Mujahideen, the Peoples Conference was to sponsor al Barq, the Peoples League was to sponsor the Muslim Janbaaz Force (MJF), Ittehadul Muslimeen was to sponsor the Karwaan-i-Mujahideen. Hizbul Mujahideen became critical of this move as it would decentralise the entire unified structure that it had bought together, and it would also dilute the chain of hierarchy and the command structure.

Haqqani (2005) writes that the Hizbul Mujahideen carried out a series of campaigns to disarm other militant groups. It also marked a consistent smear campaign against the JKLF. Pamphlets were distributed calling JKLF a secular, atheist party with limited vision. Some pamphlets explained how JKLF worked for a small territory while Hizbul Mujahideen worked for a more significant Islamic cause. The famous slogans of "*Hum Kya Chahtay, Aazadi*" were added with a qualifier- "*Aazadi ka matlab kia-La ilahaha Illallah*" (What does freedom mean? There is no God but Allah), "*Yahaan Kya Chalega, Nizam e Mustafa*" (Which System will be allowed to function here, only the system of Prophet Muhammad) "*Pakistan say rishta kya, La ilaha Illah*" (What is our relationship with Pakistan, there is no God but Allah).

This new campaign was more ruthless as the political rivals, mainly from the JKLF, were eliminated. According to JKLF figures, Hizbul Mujahideen eliminated more members than the state military apparatus. Civil society efforts at negotiation between the two also failed to yield any results. Stanilard (2016) writes that the Hizbul Mujahideen marginalised the JKLF by executing and threatening its members. Street battles in Srinagar, assassinations of JKLF fighters, and public denouncement of militant nationalism were indicators of the fragile social infrastructure Hizbul Mujahideen was building.

Disappointed with the target assassinations and political differences, Hizbul Mujahideen's founding commander, Ahsan Dar, resigned from the organisation. Given his popularity, the resignation caused widespread resentment in the organisation and massive defections towards the new Muslim Mujahideen. Fair (2014) notes that in the entire history of Hizbul Mujahideen, one can observe political differences within the organisation to the level that target assassinations of fellow commanders were also done.

Strategies of Hizbul Mujahideen

Hizbul Mujahideen was intensely owned by Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan. Since the Jamaat-

e-Islami of Kashmir was under tight scrutiny by security agencies, the party could not publically endorse the politics of Hizbul Mujahideen. They ended up playing both sides, disavowing a connection publically but clandestinely supporting it.

The most crucial reason for Hizbul Mujahideen to emerge as a robust organisation was its access to the networks of Jamaat-e-Islami. The central processes were built around the horizontal ties Jamaat had cultivated over the years. Ahsan Dar, the first chief commander of the organisation, pronounced the organisation the "sword arm of the Jamaat".[36] The administrative control was built around Jamaat's shura control, and the preexisting social ties were used to form a militancy grid.

The first strategic goal that Hizbul Mujahideen followed was to cleanse its membership of affiliates who did not subscribe to Jamaat ideology. To accomplish the task, constitutional changes were made. The offices of secretary general and patron were annulled for creating the position of chief patron. A permanent *Majlis-i-Shura* was also established as a twelve-member command council. The command council was to be elected by the *Majlis-i-Numaindgaan* (council of representatives), consisting of two senior commanders from each district in Jammu and Kashmir. At the top of the ladder would be the supreme commander, followed by the deputy supreme commander (one or more than one person could be put at this post), followed by the field operation commander, who would be in control of three officiating chief operation commanders: the first one being field spokesperson, logistics and military advisor and the financial chief. Divisional, district, battalion, company, and section commanders would follow the field operation commanders. This was followed by a strong network of overground workers (OGWs) and underground workers (UGWs). The overground workers were primarily members of the Jamaat and were the primary contact links between the militants.

36 http://www.risingkashmir.com/news/pak-backed-jklf-hm-my-creation [Accessed 5 September 2018]. Interview with Abbas Masoodi, political analyst, dated 10 June 2017.

The organisation's straightforward decision-making process and internal security provided direction and controlled the group, sharply contrasting with JKLF. There was a clear distinction between military and administrative functions, with the administrative wing being the decision-maker.

Likewise, geographically, the valley was divided into units: Budgam, Ganderbal, Kangan was the first one; Baramullah, Kupwara, Bandipore was the second one; Anantnag, Kangan, Shopian, Pulwama was the third one; Poonch, Rajori was the fourth one; Udhampur, Doda, Kishtawar, Bhaderwah was the fifth one.[37]

Hizbul Mujahideen could also mobilise Jamaat-linked social networks in parts of Doda and Bhaderwah. Prominent Jamaatis would identify young men, some having been educated at Jamaat-run Falah ul Aam schools. They would persuade young men to join the ranks using moral and religious authority and established social linkages. This setup also ensured control of finances and weapons. The Jamaat members and the sympathisers were the crucial connections that linked local mobilisation with the organisation's overall structure. Behera (2007) writes that the organisational network of the Hizbul Mujahideen spanned the divisional and district levels in the valley. The Jamaat-e-Islami recruited the Hizbul Mujahideen cadre. In totality, the social resources of Jamaat contributed to the decisive ascendency of Hizbul Mujahideen as a dominant militant group. In addition, the Hizbul Mujahideen cadre was trained initially mostly at the Hizb-e-Islami camps, which had better combat strategies. So, the cadre was better equipped militarily and strategically than JKLF and other fringe organisations. It had access to wireless technology, which was unthinkable for any other militant organisation then.

With the closure of the Afghan war, the Hizbul Mujahideen also started to get fighters who participated in the Afghan war, and this gave a boost to their position. However, with time, the presence of foreign militants led to socio-institutional compromises.[38] The foremost com-

37 Ibid.

38 Interview with Gayoor Dar, columnist, dated 25 December 2016.

promise was with the political intentionality and the politics of control. Often, the foreign militants had wrong notions of the political context and ended up creating a landscape of their own that was beyond any power of control. And so, there was no longer any control over the outcomes. With this argument, political intentionality becomes impossible because it cannot separate the domestic causes from the global ones, disintegrating causality.

The cadre was encouraged to read about Islamic Theology and Islamic history, particularly books written by Abu Ala Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami. The value of martyrdom in Islam was repeatedly espoused. "We had a problem with JKLF's perspective. We were not ready to die in the name of secularism", informed a former recruit.[39]

One of the significant challenges that Mujahideen faced was maintaining effective communication networks. The foremost challenge was finding a reliable way to communicate between the fighters on two sides of the line of control. Usually, couriers were used to communicating, but with the security crackdown, they were arrested before they could speak. In the 1990s, ISI moved to assist the militant cadre in using the communication system. It intended for the trainees to handle a wide range of information, which included sending the trainees to Al-Jehad University of Technology in Peshawar to learn telegraphic and radio communication methods to streamline its operational functions.[40]

In the aftermath of 9/11, the space for militant activities constricted immensely and strategically; there was a significant shift in terms of how the militant organisations functioned. In the new course of action, militants were told to avoid media attention and refrain from making inflammatory statements. Most militant offices were moved from city centres to remote areas. The signboards were removed from the offices, and fighters were strictly asked to abstain from wearing military fatigues and stop adopting Kunyat, the Arabic style of the nickname. Words like *Lashkar, jaish, and sipah* were avoided at all conversation levels. Miller and Gelleny (2010) note that there were also significant changes in militant

39 Anonymous interviewee, dated 10 June 2017.

40 Ibid.

tactics. The fighters were now sent in smaller groups. Militant organisations like *Al –Jehad*, *Al Umer*, and *Lashkar-e-Toiba* were asked to work as one group. Another strategy was to create new fronts like Freedom Fighters for Kashmir and the Kashmir Resistance Force to camouflage Pakistani fighters behind Kashmiri organisations.[41]

Conclusion

Since the consciousness of political and cultural difference from 'others' constantly needs a referent 'them' vs. 'us', 1989 provided significant context to the complex interplay of clashing valuational identities. Firstly, it laid bare the state's role in sponsoring formal nationalism and simultaneously intervening through legal and constitutional structures to suppress the presence of local nationalism. Individual and collective identity formation processes are accelerated by intervention through legal and constitutional institutions. Over time, the historical references and symbols the state used created a divergence between the state-national and ethno-national identities. Despite the state's overarching presence in the larger socio-political environment, the underlying sentiments of independent existence existed on social, political, cultural, and economic lines.

Throughout the political history of Jammu and Kashmir post-1947, an extensive political patronage system has been maintained. The result of this institutionalisation of patronage politics and the constant stifling of democratic opposition was the strengthening of alternate spheres of representation that were not completely invisible in the political domain. The alternate mobilisation was pursued through several political processes. The purpose here is to recognise what Guha (1983) calls statist discourses of nationalism, which include autonomous subjectivity of the collective identity. Nationalist movements are often denied recognition as frequent subjects of history by the statist discourses, while the nationalist movements pursue their political designs.

41 Interview with Tariq Rahman, village level social worker, dated 3 June 2017.

The post-colonial states imposed control through a pronounced focus on centralisation and hegemonic power, and the entire engagement was restricted through official processes. Any alternate mobilisation was confronted with coercion and placed outside the confines of legality. Thus, an institutional-specific definition of nationalism was churned out and implemented using the political elite. Since the demotic affiliations of self-legitimating political agency were underpinned, it led to the complete repudiation of the state-created institutions. In a way, two mutually incompatible vocabularies –institutional and valuational- were operating without a viable dialogue. As the state resorted to coercion as the only way out, the autonomous political agency often established non-state communication channels, making militancy with popular support inevitable. The advent of militant nationalism altered the development of nationalist ideology in many ways, with the strength of a particular militant group enforcing the domination of a specific group ideology.

Chapter 4
External Factors in Kashmiri Nationalism

Introduction

The chapter looks at the external factors that influence Kashmiri nationalism. It examines the intervention of various political actors through the theoretical structure of civic and ethnic nationalism. It tries to determine whether political actors have changed their positions with the changing geopolitical situations. The first section looks at the relationship between the Kashmiri diaspora and Kashmiri nationalism, as well as how, other than maintaining remittances, this group performs the function of imagining Kashmir outside the geographical confines of India and Pakistan. The second section looks at how Pakistan functions as a factor in Kashmiri nationalism and how, through deploying centralising tendencies, it has tried to contain Kashmiri nationalism within Pakistan-controlled Kashmir (Pck). The following section maps how Pakistan uses irredentism as a policy position to counter the narrative of Kashmiri nationalism.

The Diaspora and Kashmiri Nationalism

The section looks at the diaspora as an object of analysis to consider the relationship between global and local in the context of Kashmiri nationalism. The diaspora is the transnational community that contests the state's power and performs essential functions for the continuity of

political movements. Bhaba (1990:11) argues that in a global field dominated by a geopolitical paradigm of the nation-state, the imperfectly assimilated or unassimilated inhabitants of the margins of the nation-state constitute a subversive subjectivity, contesting nation-states' claim to legitimacy. Diasporic populations entail the plurality of polities within, creating a new alignment of self to the other. Alongside the process of de-territorialization, the political subjectivity of an individual gets reconstituted with an imaginary coherence. Hall (1990:53) understand that displaced people cluster around remembered or imagined homelands, places, or communities in a world that seems increasingly to deny firm territorialised anchors in their actuality. In this sense, diasporic subjects simultaneously reflect the bi-focality of engagement with struggles in both the homeland and the new geography.

In the context of Kashmir, the continuing dispute resulted in large-scale displacements of the Kashmiri population — the migration movements from the valley date several centuries with environmental and economic push factors. Consequently, there has been a regular Kashmiri presence outside Kashmir. In the modern historical context, the first migration accompanied the partition and bifurcation of Jammu and Kashmir territory. The political situation of 1947 resulted in a massive migration from Jammu province. Subsequently, during the wars of 1965 and 1971, substantial migration occurred again from the Jammu province. Rollier (2011:85) elaborates that "those displaced in 1947–1949, mainly from the Jammu province, constitute the majority of this population. Mostly, these migrants were allocated property in the main cities of northern Punjab and eastern Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Those displaced in the wars of 1965 and 1971 were also resettled in Punjab, even though many of this generation and their descendants have now moved to Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi". Since the onset of armed militancy in 1989, more Kashmiris, mainly from Srinagar this time, have crossed over to Pakistan-controlled Kashmir (PcK) and Pakistan. While most of them fled as entire families or villages after the state's violent counterinsurgency practices, others crossed the LOC in search of militant training. Most of them were accommodated in refugee camps across PcK.

However, Mirpuris is the largest group that channelled the discontent and displacement towards a diasporic solid formulation. Though culturally and geographically, they are closer to Punjab, allegiance to the erstwhile territory of Jammu and Kashmir and the subsequent displacement by the Pakistani state fostered a sense of unique Kashmiri identity in them. The source of displacement was not direct military intervention but the dam construction in the 1950s and 1960s. The dam project started in the 1950s, aiming at confining waters of rivers Jhelum and Poonch to increase the irrigation of Punjab and generate electricity for the area. Initially, around 13,000 were relocated, but the bulk of the population was relocated over time. Sayyid (2000) notes that the reason for the significant displacement of Kashmiris to the United Kingdom was the dam project, which intended to confine the waters that flowed through parts of PcK.

Given the shortcomings in education and social capital, the dam project mass displaced the inhabitants who joined the labour force in northern Britain. Gradually, this diaspora became vital as it sent back remittances and became repositories of the political act of imagining the homeland outside the confines of India and Pakistan. In this new space, the experience of the shared past and constant displacements mobilised this disenfranchised population around a wide range of identity issues. Subsequently, they resulted in a redefinition of the Kashmiri identity. This memory of this migration was seen as a reminder of many such political migrations at the high-handedness of the two countries vis-a-vis Kashmir.

This diaspora in the United Kingdom gradually emerged as a significant entity. Ballard (1991), through his analysis of emigration from Punjab and Pck, approximated that most of the Pakistanis in the UK are, in fact, from Pak-controlled Kashmir — the reasons for displacement range from militarised to non-militarised. The Mangla dam displacement initially relocated around 13000 inhabitants, but over some time, most of the population was eventually relocated.

The process of displacement, though, came along with misery but started a process of articulation of Kashmiri identity. Ali (1996) writes that Kashmiri identity in Britain engages at the individual and the collec-

tive levels. The identification is not with the current territory but with the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The familial ties across the ceasefire line further augment the emotional value of the homeland. Though there is no linguistic affinity between the Kashmir valley and the parts of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, it does not impede the inhabitants of this territory from identifying with Kashmir. The entire process ensures the preservation and reliving of memories of the homeland through a collaborative effort. The Mirpuri community developed a somewhat idealised account of their place of origin. It disseminated that if allowed to return to their homeland, the community could overcome the sense of subjugation. This strong sense of returning to the motherland is substantiated by the fact that there has not been a nationalistic closure in the case of Kashmir.

Though the Mirpuris are economic migrants, the community sees itself as a 'nation in exile', done by the relative positioning. Of what the diaspora defines itself against, like the assimilationist policies of the nation-states of India and Pakistan. Like other diasporas, the Kashmiri diaspora also shares an inappropriate connection with nationalism. The diaspora requires a strong sense of self as a nation to provide a coherent, unified understanding of collective identity in territorial dispersal. So, evoking shared history and culture through myths and memories becomes all the more important. Several interviewees used the phrase 'Nation in exile' to describe the Kashmiri diaspora in the United Kingdom. On being asked further, they replied, "that Kashmiri diaspora deterritorialises the notion of Kashmir and therefore projected an idea of Kashmir not founded on the bounded territory". Several explanations are provided to justify the presence of the Kashmiri diaspora. The first classifies Kashmiris as national people and a distinct ethnie with the right to self-determination. The second presents the Kashmiri diaspora as victims of political oppression and unified by the experience of being part of the liberation struggle. Evans (2005) writes that after the commencement of militancy, many in the diaspora found it more likeable to identify as Kashmiris as opposed to as Mirpuris. The latter often got stereotyped by urban Pakistanis and Kashmiris.

The Kashmiri diaspora in Britain has tried to articulate Kashmiri identity as being a nation by ethnic identification as Kashmiris and not Pakistanis. Ballard (1991) notes that the change in ethnic self-ascription is also a political move as it enables an articulation of the deep resentment felt by the people in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir towards the treatment given by the Pakistani government. For the 2001 census in the United Kingdom, Kashmiri diasporic organisations came together to ensure that Kashmiris are counted as Kashmiris and not as Pakistanis or Indians. From door-to-door campaigning to bringing out printed pamphlets, it was ensured that the Kashmiri population marked itself as 'other' and wrote 'Kashmiri' in the given box. Ali (2002) writes that Kashmiris in Britain have only recently appeared as a separate ethnic group. Previously, Kashmiris mostly got subsumed under a Pakistan, a generic Asian identity, or a regional category. Consequently, this led to exclusion regarding resources, opportunities, and services compared to other ethnic identities. The fundamental argument that my interviewees shared was, "We were given a rough deal in Pakistan.

However, if we don't assert our separate identity, we will never be able to have our homeland."[1] This de-territorializes the notion of Kashmir beyond the geographical boundaries and re-theorizes the national imaginary. Given the Indian and Pakistani nation-states' hostility towards Kashmiri nationalism, the Kashmiri diaspora became a major theatre for the performance of Kashmiri nationalism. This brings us to the question of how solidarity works towards achieving a homeland and how, through Kashmiri nationalism, the diaspora is decontextualised and spread across the world.

Following the efforts of organisations like the Kashmiri National Identity Campaign (KNIC), local councils in the United Kingdom, such as Bradford Metropolitan Council, Rochdale Metropolitan Council, Kirklees Metropolitan Council, Luton Borough Metropolitan Council, Oldham Metropolitan Council, Pendle Borough Council, and Leeds City Metropolitan Council, have recognised Kashmiris as a distinct ethnic

1 Telephonic interview with Habib Rehman, Kashmiri diaspora activist dated 16 May 2016.

community. A systematic program was launched to acknowledge Pahari as a separate language instead of a Punjabi dialect. The growth of Pahari can be gauged by Pahari television channels being aired on satellite television.

The discourse of Kashmiri nationalism operates in various spaces and levels. It may be expressed through oral narratives at an individual level and in the form of shop names, community organisations and special events at the community level. In cities like Birmingham, Bradford, and Luton, Kashmir is a name for retail outlets, restaurants, convenience stores, travel agents, etc. In common parlance, Birmingham is often called Chota Kashmir or Little Kashmir. To evoke memories of the homeland, it is expected to send Eid cards bearing pictures of Kashmiris who died during militancy, Kashmiri leaders, freedom slogans, and Kashmiri flags. Eid festivals and Muslim holidays are routinely celebrated by waving the Kashmiri flag. The cards often have political messages like 'Freedom Now' and' Day of Independence will be Eid for Kashmiris'. This way, children born and schooled in faraway lands are initiated into the historical past, the reconstruction of which becomes the basis for nationalist aspiration. Ali (1996) writes that human rights violations have become a reason for mobilisation for the younger generation, and emotional location has become significant for the older generation. Close contacts are maintained through a biraderi (rural) based lifestyle.

The displacement of Mirpuris coincided with the relocation of individuals involved with the liberation politics in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir to Britain. The political coercion in Pck had made it necessary for many of them to move to Britain, where political organisations like JKLF were formed. Based in Luton, home to many Mirpuris, the organisation flourished by utilising human capital and remittances. The availability of free media also worked in their favour. The creation of Bangladesh in 1972 made it evident that Pakistan could not be a possible ally against India.

Other than the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, the different political organisations, such as the United Kashmir Liberation Front (UKLF), were leftist and internationalist. It was formed by a small yet committed

circle influenced by the Palestinian resistance and agitations against the Vietnam War. Their activism was largely anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist. Hutnyk (2006) reminds us of the rise of leftist politics in the British South Asians contributed to Kashmiri activism. UKLF cooperated with leftist organisations like the Indian Workers Association and the Pakistani Workers Association. Gradually, it developed robust connections with the trade unions and anti-racism initiatives.

The Kashmiri diaspora based in the United Kingdom tried engaging in local elections to have a political presence and influence on Britain's foreign policy. Earlier, the majority of the voters would consider the Labor Party as their natural political representative. Sokefeld (2016) elucidates how Kashmiris began demanding labour tickets to contest elections. One of the first Kashmiri Councillors, Muhammad Ajeeb, won from Bradford and became the first mayor of Kashmiri origin. Another significant outcome of the political presence was the formation of the All-Party Kashmiri parliamentary group. Four all-party Parliamentary Groups in the UK are interested in Kashmir. Before this, a Kashmir Human Rights Committee was formed in the House of Commons chaired by a Labour Party MP from Bradford.

Political activity among Kashmiris in the United Kingdom was a mixture of reactions to the events in Kashmir, like the Hazratbal Siege AND the burning of the Chrar-i-Sharief shrine. Protests were held at the Indian High Commission, Hyde Park, Trafalgar Square, and other essential places. Utilising the lobby of British MPs, demonstrations and rallies were confined to London and took place in provincial centres like Bradford, Birmingham, Manchester, and Glasgow. Demonstrations were regularly held on symbolic days like International Human Rights Day. Charity Eid dinners were held for Bosnia and Kashmir in Bradford regularly every year. Two satellite channels, channel and Kashmir Broadcasting Cooperation, were set up to voice the feelings of the Kashmiri diaspora. Ali (2002) rightly points out that the Kashmiri ethnicity has succeeded in asserting itself through hegemonic agents such as political parties, welfare organisations, and intellectuals.

In totality, the Kashmiri diaspora in Britain was not simply created by migration. It happened through the discursive creation of a particu-

lar Kashmir vision and political actors' mobilisation towards this imagination. Political activists, academics, and ordinary people have shaped and articulated the idea of community through various factors such as relative freedom, political mobilisation, and frames of imagination. This imagination was enhanced with the growth of satellite television and social media. Ellis and Khan (1998) found universal support for the reunification of Kashmir in all sections of society, but the majority favoured independence for the re-United States. Most believed that this should be decided through a referendum among Kashmiris on both sides of the divide and in the diaspora. The majority assumed that such a vote would favour independence. The diaspora has played a vital role in promoting the debate on Kashmir in the international arena, be it by physical actions or by attending meetings in Britain to advance aspirations for the unification of Kashmir within the near future. Kashmiri diaspora has utilised trauma and the memories (images, myths and practices) associated with Kashmiri nationalism to alter the political imagination. The trauma is remembered repeatedly through symbols, cultural practices, and public memory. Thus, diaspora refigured itself as a social form, a type of consciousness, and a mode of artistic production.

Diasporic Contribution

The diaspora and its contribution to Kashmiri nationalism foster an understanding of self-determination, political legitimacy, and social integration on civil and religious grounds. It has espoused voluntaristic, organic, and universalistic nationalism and denounced illiberal, ascriptive, and particularistic forms of nationalism. The diaspora has constantly used the language of civic nationalism to present their status, especially to an international audience. Organisations representing the Kashmiri diaspora have, in particular, adopted a universalistic and rationalist understanding of nationhood. The nation is always imagined as a voluntary association of culturally differentiated individuals. Kashmiri national membership is prioritised over Pakistani or British membership. An analysis of organisational patterns reflects the im-

portance of individual assent based on shared values and the influence of social interactions. Through the remembrance of the events of 1947 and the subsequent post-dam displacement trauma, a novel sense of community evolved, which maintained a constant yearning for an obtainable homeland. This sense of community transcended the frontiers and promoted the return of a movement. The troubled relationship with both the Pakistanis and the British added to the urgency of return. This sense of attachment and connection to the land where exile was forced operates as a powerful metaphor. It is helpful to abstract the idea of force as motivation and thus in the potential creation of diaspora.

Within the diasporic circles, the discourse on Kashmiri nationalism emerges at diverse levels. The repetitive appeal of the return ensures the presence of Kashmiri nationalism on the global scene. There has been a growing conviction within the diaspora to make their case through civic nationalism, using contextualised and historical details to expand its appeal. Despite the continuous status quo on the ground, the very idea of returning to the homeland is used to concretise the idea of Kashmiri nationalism. This is amplified by requesting that the global civil society build a narrative around the political and deteriorating human record in Kashmir.

Punjabis' disdainful views of Kashmiris as being backward and uneducated have also complicated the issue of Kashmiri identity. The Kashmiri identity was seen as a class identity in Pakistan, and hence, the remittances sent back by the diaspora were a way of accentuating the Kashmiri position. Ali (2002), in her research on Kashmiris living in the United Kingdom, highlights how the Kashmiri identity was expressed on cultural and territorial lines. The residents bring about the historical continuity of their ancestry and the distinctness of their homeland. Though there is religious identification with Pakistan, there is a greater identification with the territorial idea of Kashmir.

The constant geographical movement of the diaspora has enabled a situation where people have moved multiple times. This continuous movement has enabled connections in faraway lands through various frameworks in terms of understanding the politics of Kashmiri nationalism and the evolution of nationalism through the changing economic

character of the diaspora. In particular, remittances contributed to the evolution of communication and technology, creating a virtual Kashmiri identity and enabling the displaced groups to maintain proximity and contact. This way, the diasporic experience sharpened a particular narrative and forged continuity between the Kashmiris who stayed back and those who went away. Sayyid (2000) notes that the terms home and home away become insignificant as the concept of diaspora is no longer just an empirical category but also an increasingly metaphorical one. Diaspora exemplifies a condition of political and social homelessness, more than a physical displacement from an imagined homeland and an eagerness to return.

Over time, the diaspora has maintained institutional practices that nurture Kashmiri nationalism. Political activity is encouraged through the biradari networks. Literature on the Kashmir conflict is shared to keep the settlers informed. Community welfare organisations also contribute to maintaining the social side of Kashmiri nationalism, such as Eid celebrations, Kashmir Day, etc. The goal of returning to the homeland is reified through clothing and the performance of Kashmiri nationalism at sociocultural gatherings.

In totality, the diaspora asserts Kashmiri nationalism through civic variables, articulating how to be Kashmiri outside the historical and geographic idea of Kashmir. The diaspora's identity evolves through its identification with the homeland. While displacement changes the context, Kashmiri nationalism is defined and redefined according to the contexts where settlers find themselves.

In addition, Kashmiri refugees in PcK have played an active part in politicising the space and maintaining a continuity in the narrative of Kashmiri nationalism. (Khan and Ellis). Since 1947, the cross-border flight has been in one direction only, from Indian-administered Kashmir into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Subsequent migrations in 1947, 1965, and 1971 produced a constituency of refugees who were relatively absorbed in society. However, those who fled after the 1990s have yet to be absorbed into the local population, as the groups that arrived before lived

in a series of tented refugee camps. The government in Pakistan Controlled Kashmir has classified them as refugees. There are a series of tented refugee camps in which people have been made to live for many years in some cases. Sneeden (2012) writes that the refugees who have chosen to live in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir over any other Pakistani city make a major political statement. Even while being displaced, many need to remain within Kashmir and not enter Pakistan. The presence of the refugee Kashmiris in Pakis-cn Controlled Kashmir acts as a reminder that their plight is due to the unresolved nature of the Kashmir conflict. The insistence of refugees to stay in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir also brings in the citizenship question. Jammu and Kashmir citizenship, as defined in the Dogra Maharaja's promulgation in 1858, applies to all those living in Kashmir then and up to two generations of those living outside. The ruling stands still as it was never revoked, and Kashmiris who fall in this category are legally entitled to being citizens of Kashmir. This provides a basis for a sense of Kashmiri nationalism for those who have been displaced.

An additional undertaking describes refugees with a Pakistani passport as natives of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir. This is included in the production of the Pushtani Basindha document confirming a person's origin from Kashmir. This reinforces Kashmiriness within the citizenship narrative and through the modern state's controlling mechanisms.

Refugees from 1947, 1965, and 1971 have established themselves at various societal levels. Several senior bureaucrats from refugee families have exerted their position for community gain at multiple levels. The other way that refugees have adopted is active participation in liberation politics, alongside participating in the domestic politics of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. The second way for refugees has been through a refugee-specific structure. The Legislative Assembly in Pakistan Controlled Kashmir has 48 seats in all, out of which 12 have been reserved for Kashmiri refugees. The 12 refugee seats are very influential in determining the composition and nature of civil administration. These 12 refugee seats have primarily served as an ideological benchmark for

Kashmiri nationalism. Thus, Kashmiri refugees impact the boundaries of citizenship and political community.

Pakistan as an External Factor in Kashmiri Nationalism

Pakistan's position on Kashmiri nationalism can be determined through its relation to Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Lamb (1991) records that the first Indo-Pak war over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir culminated in the division of the state into two entities, with the bulk of the valley of Kashmir and Jammu, Ladakh, and a portion of Poonch coming under the Indian administration. The Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) and Paki-tan controlled Kashmir, living under the Pakistani administration.

Though Pakistan Controlled Kashmir has been projected as an independent state, however in effect, the government remains administered mainly by Pakistani officials. Theoretically, this part never joined the country, but the need for recognition internationally, regionally, and within Pakistan subsumed its status. Until 1948, the Azad Kashmir government appealed to international bodies like the United Nations Commission in India and Pakistan for de-facto recognition of Pak as an independent state. However, it could not get recognition regionally or internationally, resulting in the further degradation of the local government to that of the local authority. Korbel (1954) notes that despite Pakistan's insistence that de-facto recognition be given to Azad Kashmir, UNCIP explicitly stated that the government there was like a local authority with responsibility for the area assigned to it under the ceasefire agreement.

The Karachi Agreement of 1949 concluded between the Government of Pakistan and the provisional Muslim Conference of Pakistan Controlled Kashmir and allotted control of the defence, foreign policy, negotiations with UNCIP, and the affairs of Northern Areas to the former, while local administration was handed to the latter. This indicated the broad canvas within which Pakistan-controlled Kashmir could exercise its autonomy in managing affairs. The United Nations also dealt restrictively with the Pakistan government on all Jammu and

Kashmir matters. This allowed Karachi to make binding decisions on Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and have an indefinite authority in regulating Kashmiri nationalism without having to consult the respective government.

Pakistan routinely used its local surrogates and its Ministry of Kashmir Affairs (MKA), its trusted agent, to assert itself. The MKA was also created to help the United Nations in its involvement in the Kashmir dispute, including conducting a plebiscite. Jalal (1990) writes that the first head of the ministry was Mushtaq Ahmed Gurnami, an ardent Muslim League leader, ubiquitous civil servant, and a redoubtable Punjabi. Gurnami's appointment again pitched the Punjabi identity over the regional Kashmiri Pahari identity. The MKA ensured complete instability in the region, aside from appointing seven presidents from 1950 to 1959. Saraf (1 977) records MKA's manipulation, which meant that no President of Pakistan controlled Kashmir and could think of keeping himself in power when the government of Pakistan wanted him to quit. By the end of the 1950s, Pakistan's interference in the political, economic, and administrative affairs of PaK began to be seen as some internal colonialism.

Snedden (2012) notes that veteran Kashmiri leaders like Chowdhary Ghulam Abbas complained to President Liaqat Ali that MKA gave scant regard to region aspirations and often made decisions without consulting the local government. In effect, the joint secretary holding the MKA claimed to be the real head of the Pak government. Though a clear delineation of powers existed, regional aspirations were ignored entirely. At the time of the creation of the state of PaK, there was a tacit understanding that the state would facilitate a pro-Kashmir vision encompassing both parts of Kashmir, ensuring an immediate plebiscite and resolving the Kashmir dispute. Snedden (2011) writes that the dissolution of the local army contingent called the Azad Army and its merger into the Pakistan Army stifled any effort to oppose the benefactor country. Secondly, with no nation to turn to, people were dependent on Pakistan for their survival. It was also combined with the fact that there was no open hostility against Pakistan. In totality, one can say that the Pakistan military is the most important political actor in the politics and administration of PcK, a consequence mainly of its dominance in Pakistani politics.

More so, the region lacked sustained resources to wage the war against Pakistan. It had an excellent workforce, resources, and strategic depth to sustain. Puri (2012) notes that the lent officers from Pakistan controlled the administrative affairs of PCK, which had no legal approval. These officers were mainly Punjabi, leading to anger between the already rancorous Punjabi and local identities. Discouraged by this approach, the veterans of Kashmiri nationalism, like Sardar Abdul Qayoom, chose an independent way in 1951 to resume the war for the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir. Pro-Pakistan political groups like the Muslim Conference equally exploited the situation. The Muslim conference had an irrendialist Pakistani position over Kashmir and refuted Kashmiri nationalism on all grounds. Bazaz (1954) writes immediately after the ceasefire, the Muslim conference maintained its monopolistic control of the Azad Kashmir government and secured exclusivity in the region. It was the only political organisation that Pakistan recognised. While it ensured the party's longevity, Karachi controlled any leftover power.

The Muslim Conference had a dictatorial majority in Pakistan Controlled Kashmir, and the expectation of a plebiscite soon blocked every possibility of establishing a participatory political system. The presence of the Muslim conference fanned divisive factionalism. I. Khan (1990) informs that the two main factions centred on Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas, whose political career gave him power and prestige, and Ibrahim, whose position arose from his liberation credentials in southern Poonch. While Abbas had the support of people from eastern areas of Jammu, Ibrahim had Poonchis and Mirpuris rallying behind him. Apart from these, a third faction comprised ethnic Kashmiris led by Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah and later K.H. Khurshid. Within the Poonchis, the popularity of Sardar Qayum was also growing Saraf (1977) writes that for MKA and Gurmani, this situation was a boon. The factions could be played off, and the entire liberation movement would be divided. Pakistan did not seek to discourage these tendencies as no faction was ideologically opposed to Pakistan or the possibility of merging with Pakistan in case of a plebiscite.

From 1948 to the late 1960s, the Muslim Conference dominated the political landscape of PcK and acted as a facilitator for the Pakistan Muslim League. Asif (2007) notes that the Muslim Conference also played an essential role in bringing Pakistan's man to the president's office. Though other pro-Pakistan parties were present, pro-independence parties were practically barred from political processes.

During the time of General Ayub Khan, poor treatment of Kashmiris slightly improved as K.H. Khurshid reasonably influenced the position of Kashmiris but soon fell out with the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs. Askari (1991), in his book, writes the reason for this disruption is the complex and uncooperative behaviour of K.H. Khurshid. The actual reason was displeasure with Kashmiri's direct contact with General Ayub Khan. By 1965, the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs successfully subordinated Pakistan Controlled Kashmir. The Government Acts of 1964 and 1968 further repudiated the government's position to a municipal committee.

During General Yahya's time, the agitated leadership of Pakistan Controlled Kashmir – Sardar Qayoom, K.H. Khurshid, and Sardar Ibrahim signed a joint declaration for reconstituting the government as a whole sovereign and a successor state to the Government of Maharaja Hari Singh. Thus, a rudimentary Constitution- the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government Act, 1970- was granted, a significant victory for leadership. It provided a presidential system of government, a legislative assembly, and considerable autonomy. However, foreign affairs, defence, and currency remain under Pakistan's purview. The act of 1970 also acknowledged that Pck should not be seen as a part of Pakistan but should be brought into the mainstream of general administration. However, the contradictions did not cease to exist. As the interim constitution shows, all Kashmiris in the territory and all of their political parties have no choice but to be pro-Pakistan. The constitution of Azad Kashmir reads, "No person or political party in Azad Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate against, or take part in the activities prejudicial or detrimental to the state's accession to Pakistan." These legal requirements obstructed the space of leaders who favoured an independent Kashmir and consequently shrunk spaces for Kashmiri nationalism.

Qayoom (1992) records that this deception of independence negated people's sacrifices to unite Azad Kashmir with Pakistan and diminished the concept of a united Muslim community joining Pakistan.

Bhutto introduced a new constitution that gave Pakistan a parliamentary system of government and influenced the leadership in PCK to create a similar system. So, the interim constitution of 1974 was promulgated. This opened up ways for Pakistan's People's Party to operate in Azad Kashmir and could have also paved the way in case the region had to be provincialised. Like its predecessor Act of 1970, this one was legally contradicting with sections related to Pakistan's superior position. In times of war, external aggression, or internal disturbances, the emergency powers rested with Pakistan.

During Zia's time, six amendments were made to the Interim constitution, further lowering Pck's position. Thus, in times of military dictatorships in Pakistan, martial law would be imposed in PCK. In times of civilian governments, Pakistan's elected leaders influenced the PCK politics through their membership of the Azad Kashmir Council. This was done by manipulating Azad Kashmir legislative assembly elections via constituencies for Jammu and Kashmir refugees located in Pakistan. The 1990 elections fully restored the Pck's prime ministerial system, which continued during Musharraf's time.

In totality, Pakistan has progressively subsumed the region through its Ministry of Kashmir Affairs. Pakistan failed to empower the people of Ajk as it could have stimulated the growth of Kashmiri nationalism, which was antithetical to the 'two-nation' theory. In addition to these formal control mechanisms, Pakistan appoints federal civil servants to top administrative positions in PcK.

The pattern of domination has evolved over the years, and Pck's politics are managed by acquiring and consolidating political space through material assistance.

The local leadership has frequently expressed desperation with the lack of political freedoms and the restrictions on political freedom. However, the vast military and economic dependence constrain possibilities for a different engagement. Moreover, no news about Pakistan-controlled Kashmir could go out as no printing press existed in the

region. A dozen newspapers run by Kashmiris or refugees from Jammu and Kashmir had offices located in the border districts of Punjab, which are within Punjab. This made timely news collection impossible. Bhat (1956) records how strict censorship was enforced on newspapers and how the non-conformists were tactically punished.

Puri (2009) writes that even today, candidates desirous of contesting elections must sign a declaration reaffirming their commitment to Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. A report from Amnesty International records that thirty-two JKLF leaders were barred from contesting the polls for refusing to sign the declaration and were arrested while holding a protest rally. Economic and political underdevelopment, weak political institutions, and legal restrictions on freedom of association have undermined the development of civil society. The sensitive geography of the state is often used to limit the state for democratic reforms of contention. The maintenance of public order ordinance, which prohibits activities prejudicial to public safety, is frequently invoked to deter and suppress opposition.

Asif (2007) argues that Islamabad's relationship with Muzaffarabad is based on control rather than autonomy, with negative consequences for political and economic development. Although the patron-client nature of the relationship has structured political competition and rewards political compliance from local political actors, the relations between Islamabad and Muzaffarabad are far from frictionless.

Pakistan and Kashmiri Nationalism

The Pakistani position on Kashmiri nationalism is exceedingly determined by ethnic nationalism, determined through a rigorous religious commonality and filtered through socio-cultural traditions of the past and the present. The mainstream Pakistani position takes heavily from the group's common origin and connections formed by blood ties and relies heavily on the sense of uniqueness. This is done by valorising particular Islamic cultural attachments to capture the social base of the group, in this case, Kashmiris.

Thus, religion is used to reinforce the unity of commonality of statehood and nation.

In the case of Pakistani nationalism, the national consciousness developed outside the rational, political units of modernity. The resulting national conscience was all-encompassing religious. On the other hand, Kashmiri nationalism was evolving more as a fluid apolitical consciousness, where national consciousness arose first, only to be enclosed in the politico-territorial form later. There is a marked difference in expression, with Pakistani nationalism hugely relying on mutually exclusive forms of cultural homogeneity.

In civic Kashmiri nationalism, cultural standardisation was achieved through a particular level of communication and education. However, the Pakistani state ensured cultural standardisation was not achieved through education-oriented high culture. So, the political elite developed a populist language driven by a seduction of myths and memory, curating a shared memory and a shared destiny. The more the repression against the high culture, the more it compensated with an overzealous insistence on popular culture. Hence, cultural standardisation was achieved through overtly religious ethnie to ensure homogeneity.

The control dynamics are thus manifested and prolonged through cultural values, in this case, religion. Therefore, ethnicity influences nationalism and determines the nature and character of a particular nationalism. The commonality of religion lends a widespread appeal to nationalism, and Appealing to the elements unique to the group gives the entire situation an emotional nature. The Pakistani state was created through a preexisting territory, and nationality was embodied in the territory. However, the provision for creating a new territory doesn't exist. Nationality is wholly embodied in the individuals who cannot move in and out of the preexisting national space.

To legitimise its presence in PcK, the Pakistani position has strategically imposed that the relationship between the two units is bounded by genealogical descent. Thus, national identity is defined as a perennial feature within the theory of Pakistani nationalism and reflects the populist nature of ethnic nationalism. Like other ethnic nationalisms, the Kashmiri population was kept out of the high culture. Only the Punjabi

elite could participate in manipulating the masses for mobilisation. As such, mobilisation could only occur with the tools available or via methods that would compensate for the tools unavailable, such as the necessary economic and political institutions. Using compensatory tools often meant the uniqueness of the people themselves –characteristics they regarded as distinguishing themselves from others. The peripheral elites had no option but to try and satisfy such demands by taking things into their own hands. Elite manipulation then served to crystallise mass discontent.

At every step, the relationship of Pakistani nationalism to Kashmiri nationalism is that of repressed existential envy and negativity. As it is, nationalisms born out of reaction are marked by profound ambiguity and ambivalence. This forced relation also meant that the elite group had to fit their social character in a desired social form to make their involvement natural and legitimate. This required mobilising the masses to meet a narrative, not just their demands. Just as they needed a shortcut toward a high culture, they also needed a shortcut to a history that would legitimise this nationalism. Forcing this process of development and creating a high culture and history due to necessity suggests that the role of the elite in more ethnic-oriented nationalisms was more conscious and manipulative. This further indicates a requirement to rise above the law, which is why ethnic nationalism is seen to sometimes act as a bulwark to liberal democracy and lend itself more readily to authoritarian rule.

Pakistan's Irredential Claim and Kashmiri Nationalism

This section focuses on how Pakistan's Kashmir policy works as an external factor for Kashmiri nationalism. The policy is primarily embedded in the context of negative imagery. The basis of Pakistani nationalism was never territorial; rather, it emerged from community separatism and religiously derived nationality. The proponents of Pakistan neither occupied the land they demanded nor had ever lived together in the past. At the time of the formation of the Pakistani state, the state power was re-

tained by the one dominant ethnic group – Punjabis. Khan (2001) notes that the issue became a source of trouble as the control of the state apparatus and institutions was in the hands of a single ethnic group. This ethnic group used the institutions for their political leverage.

In a way, national identity was imposed from above, and it did not emerge as a horizontal comradeship that could cut across boundaries and social groups and penetrate with varying degrees of consciousness. Thus, national identity is superimposed by religious identity and makes way for Islam to project its relationship to the state. Akhtar (2007) notes that due to the chaos of partition and the more significant need to protect the state's territorial integrity, Islam came to occupy centrality in the Pakistani state. The ideological orientation of the new state was challenged constantly over the accession of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, which had not followed partition logic. The centrality of this contentious relationship is maintained by forging an idea of a nation through a web of emotional, familial, and political ties. Thus, all the political actors, from conservatives to liberals, have placed a claim and strategy to claim Kashmir.

The conservative Islamists have opted for a combative approach to staking their claim to Kashmir, while the liberals have followed a mainly managerial position. Yasmeen (2003) notes that the Pakistani government has balanced various constituencies in Kashmir. They operate in an international environment that identifies terrorism as a significant global threat, which led to a changed policy position in Kashmir. The Pakistani government curbs the activities of Islamists in Kashmir.

The changed Kashmir policy marked a paramount change in Pakistan's position on Kashmir. The state had tried to alter the status quo during the Cold War era. Traditionally, three positions determined Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir: orthodox, the Islamists, and the moderate. The moderate positions have mainly prevailed in the balance of power. They were urging for a change in the foreign policy through a political rather than a military solution. Yasmeen (1995) thinks the Kashmir issue is rooted in a negative context. The military control over the Kashmir policy resulted in the predominance of the efficacy of Jihad and the policy of encouraging and actively using Jihad in anti-India militancy.

These groups had acquired some experience in the Afghan war. This resulted in the triangulation of Jihad policy by making Jehadis stakeholders in the Kashmir policy. Gul (2002) writes that some of the madrassas in Pakistan with close links to the Taliban became the supplier of the Jehadis. As the cross-border movement drew criticism, the Pakistani state constantly denied these accusations by reinforcing that it was only providing political, diplomatic, and moral support to Kashmir. Yasmeen. S (2003) points out that the Pakistan foreign office maintained that it was helping the Kashmiris to make a demand for a referendum by urging the international community to resolve the Kashmir dispute. The democratic leadership was not a mute spectator to the Kashmir policy predominantly formulated by the military and exploited Kashmir for their interests. They also repeatedly used the Kashmir issue to divert away the domestic policy issues.

The support for militancy to alter the status quo came under global scrutiny in the second half of the 1990s. The perception of the Indian state about Pakistan being a weak state also impacted the Kashmir policy. The ousting of Benazir Bhutto as the prime minister of Pakistan and the coming back of Nawaz Sharif opened the space for implementing the moderate agenda. The moderates figured out that the Kashmir policy needed a change, and there should be a reduction in the tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. However, the nuclear tests followed by Kargil derailed the process. Hence, the military administration opted for invariably managing Kashmir in 2000; Pakistan pushed for a unilateral ceasefire, expressing a strong will to engage in Kashmir. The change of positions was evident in government actions and pronouncements on Kashmir. For example, regarding the Kashmir solidarity on 5th February 2002, Musharraf repeated Pakistan's resolve to assist Kashmir in diplomatic and political ways.[2] It was asserted that Pakistan's willingness to negotiate should not be considered a weakness. Farooq (2001) and Malhotra (2001) elucidate that Pakistani foreign policy is a political process that seeks to resolve the freedom struggle by political means. This policy change was visible in the Pakistani approach during the Agra

2 Vajpayee must show courage: Musharraf, The News, 6 February 2001.

summit, where Pakistanis gave up their rigid insistence on the Kashmir dispute.

After 9/11, the context for Pakistan's Kashmir policy. As Islamabad opted to join the United States-led s-r on terror, the garrison is intelligence sharing with America.

The changed political milieu also impacted Pakistan's Kashmir policy. Pakistan's support for Kashmiris could be perceived as a confirmation of its credentials as a state supporting terrorism. This made the Pakistani government more watchful of its Kashmir policy, thus replacing the military solution with a political solution. In an address to the nation in 2002, Musharraf categorically maintained that the support for Kashmir wouldn't be severed. Political and diplomatic support would flow towards it. He made an appeal for involving the international community in the resolution of Kashmir and also announced measures to restrain the Jihadis and banned organisations like Laskhar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. However, groups like Harkat-ul-Ansar, Hizbul Mujahideen and Al-Badr were not disbanded as these groups were indigenous Kashmiri groups. The speech indicated a significant transfer of the Pakistani position in Kashmir. The Pakistani state intelligently modified its strategy but did not directly forsake its claim on Kashmir. Officially, a clear-cut distinction was made between genuine freedom struggle and acts of terrorism. Akhtar (2011) reproduces that in a UN session, Musharraf stated that the struggles of the people for self-determination cannot be banned law in the name of terrorism. The leadership in Pakistan realised that it was essential to bring out some discernible change in its Kashmir policy so that Pakistan's stance on Kashmir remains unchanged and also the international pressures are deflated.

In the context of Kashmir, General Musharraf repeatedly requested the international community to intervene and pressurise India to settle the Kashmir issue. In the aftermath of the parliamentary attacks in 2002, the pressures increased dramatically, and Pakistan had to reduce its involvement in providing diplomatic, political, and moral support. The crackdown after 9/11 had substantially expunged the foreign militants and drastically reduced the finances, too. Pattnaik (2008) notes that

the efforts towards re-approachment with India have saved Pakistan's reputation from further fall.

As a part of the changed strategy, militant organisations were subservient to political organisations. To evade international scrutiny, it was essential to engage through the political medium, and pro-Pakistan militant organisations were effectively utilised for this purpose. As part of the changed strategy, Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizbul Mujahideen went on to support the formation of the political party called the People's Democratic Party. A new political formation would challenge the primary political party, the National Conference. As a political party, NC embodied Kashmiri nationalism, even though it took a volte-face position in 1975.

Nonetheless, it tried to retain some commitment to Kashmiri nationalism. On the other hand, the People's Democratic Party used ethnic religious motifs instead of civic ones. It can be observed that the ethnic-religious lobby within the state, which earlier espoused a pro-Pakistan religious approach, moved strategically towards a political party based on ethnic contours.

The new political formation was carved so that it did not appear distant from the Kashmiri separatist position, at least theoretically. Borrowing heavily from the separatist stance, it blurred the boundaries between the separatist and mainstream discourse. Chaudhry and Rao (2004) write that the formation of the People's Democratic Party has to be located in the larger political context. The political context was to encourage an articulation of political grievances through a non-separatist channel. It was a step towards democratisation and curtailing the relevance of the National Conference.

Another reason for Jamaat-e-Islami's support of the People's Democratic Party was the patronage of the National Conference provided to a pro-government militia called Ikhwan. Ikhwan, in particular, targeted the Jamaat cadre and ground workers of Hizbul Mujahideen. It was paid for and supported by mainstream security agencies. Ikhwan became entirely instrumental in suppressing militancy but also became infamous

for targeting Jamaat-e-Islami ruthlessly.[3] So, forming a political party that could deal with Ikhwan was necessary. The newly formed party was the People's Democratic Party. Wani (2004) opines that there was a viable political gap that Mufti Muhammad Sayed decided to fill up. Hence, he formed the People's Democratic Party. It should also be pointed out that the formation of the PDP coincided with a change in central policy over Kashmir.

The election manifesto of the People's Democratic Party (2001) focused on three main issues, namely, safeguarding the life and property of the people from the Ikhwan, restoring peace by persuading the central government to initiate a dialogue process with Pakistan and the militants, for which opening the roads between two parts of Kashmir would act as a prelude, providing a fillip to the economy and providing a source of assured livelihood to each family. Maqbool (2016) notes that the party aimed to mobilise public opinion to bridge various strains of opinion in the state and the country. It aimed to engage with all stakeholders and resolve the people's grievances through constitutional means, like restoring and protecting human rights. Thus, the formation of the People's Democratic Party made the militant structures subservient and provided an option for opposition in Kashmir.

Another major strategic policy shift in the aftermath of 9/11 is visible in Musharraf's out-of-the-box solution for ending the dispute. The idea involved partial stepping back of all parties-Pakistan, India and Kashmiris to an extent. Musharraf (2008:89) envisaged "identifying the geographic regions of Kashmir that need resolution — second, demilitarising to the identified and curbing all militant aspects of the struggle for freedom and third, introducing self-governance or self-rule in the identified region or regions. Fourth, and most important, having a joint management mechanism with a membership consisting of Pakistanis, Indians, and Kashmiris overseeing self-governance and dealing with resid-

3 Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizbul Mujahideen targeted the cadre of other militant organization brutally during the 1990s over the slightest political difference. Many of the militants were killed through this rivalry. To safeguard ones interest many defected towards Ikhwan after its formation in 1995.

ual subjects common to all identified regions and those subjects that are beyond the scope of self-governance".

However, like other Pakistani policy positions on Kashmir, this position was also subtly targeting Kashmiri civic nationalism. It surrendered the right of self-determination for Kashmiris and divided the state on a regional, linguistic, and racial basis. The people-to-person contact, softening of borders, and easing travel formalities were a diplomatic way of converting the line of control to a permanent border and separating the two parts of Kashmir. Kashmiri nationalists rejected the move. Secondly, Musharraf's proposal was implemented in consultation with stakeholders. The formula envisaged that the area should be de-militarized and there should be movement from one part of Kashmir to another. But at the same time, it also says borders cannot be withdrawn, which is akin to making the line of control into an international border. Secondly, self–government here clashed with self-determination. If the self has the right to govern, how could the notion of self-determination be negated? The joint management system would only give endless powers to the external rulers.

Conclusion

The external factors contribute in both negative and positive ways to the Kashmiri nationalism. As an external factor, the Kashmiri diaspora represents pursuing a culturally diverse political territory. Attainment of a state functions as a starting point for civic nationalism, so the diaspora intervenes in exciting ways to imagine and reinforce the idea of a state. The Kashmiri diaspora promotes the ideals of territoriality, citizenship, civic rights, and legal codes. Through its interaction with modernity, it eliminates cultural cleavages for the formation of a unified culture. It endorses a welfarist culture that emerges and is nourished by factors such as advanced communication and education. In a way, it negates all the primordial affinities and claims commonality on non-genealogical variables.

The intervention of the Pakistani state as an external factor has negative consequences as it bases its claim on irredentism. This irredentism is played through a metaphoric body of an Islamic nation-state and ummah. In this sense, a geographical, spiritual, religious, and emotional continuity is imagined between Pakistan and Kashmir. Kashmir is linked through biological expressions such as *shah-rag* (jugular vein) and varying configurations; Pakistan places itself in a representative position to take up the case of Kashmir. The projection happens through exaggerated news, rumours, and dramatised accounts to reinforce a strict ethnic essence to Kashmiri nationalism.

This claim of common genealogical descent towards attaining a shared national identity is fostered through myths and memories. Common religious ties between Pakistan and Kashmir are used to enforce commonality between different people, eliminating any sense of difference. Pakistani nationalism emerged out of reaction and is marked by vagueness and ambivalence. This necessitated a need for invention to create a history that makes the aspirations for a nation look legitimate and natural. Thus, the ethnic irrendential intervention in Kashmiri nationalism by Pakistan is an essential part of issuing a history.

Chapter 5
Contesting Kashmiri Nationalism

The chapter seeks to analyse the changing dimensions of Kashmiri nationalism in terms of its relationship with the competing nationalistic tendencies within the Jammu division of the state. It tries to locate the position of Jammu in Kashmiri nationalism and how the internal dimensions of the competing nationalisms operate. It is imperative to understand Jammu's pre- and post-partition and its attitude towards Kashmiri nationalism to get a clear picture. Given the fact that religious or national belongings weren't of theatre nature over the whole geographical territory called the erstwhile as the valley of Kashmir and Jammu were separate entities till 1846 when the Dogra king Gulab Singh brought these regions together to form what came to be known as the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The post-partition dynamics and religious resurgence solidified factors of otherness and, subsequently, respective nationalisms.

Historical Background

River Ravi binds the present area of Jammu on one side and the Pir Panchal range on the other. Historically, the boundaries of the current Jammu region have undergone many changes, with its numerous principalities aligning with the neighbouring kingdoms. Sufi (1948) writes that during the time of Shah Jahan, the hill chieftain of Jammu settled down quietly in a feudatory position and carried out the orders

of the Delhi court. However, they could retain their autonomy, and the Mughals did not interfere in their internal affairs. Except for brief periods, Jammu is said to be ruled by external forces. It was ruled by the Mughals from 1733 to 1745, while it was a part of the Sikh empire from 1808–1820. The Mughals, Afghans, and Sikhs could not get a foothold in the Jammu region. At this time, Jammu did not exist as a well-defined region or territory as it exists today. Instead, it was a composition of many small kingdoms by Dogra king Ranjit Dev, who gained control over many lesser kingdoms and principalities. However, his successors soon began fighting against each other, leaving space for many warring Sikh Misls (confederacies) from Punjab to intervene and gain control of the kingdoms.[1] During the later period, however, a resistance movement led by the legendary hero Mian Deedo continued against the Punjabi rule till Gulab Singh was installed as Raja of Jammu by Ranjit Singh in 1820 under his overall lordship, which ended in 1846. Thus, the state of Jammu and Kashmir, as it is understood today, became a single political entity in 1846 after Gulab signed the Treaty of Amritsar with the British. The treaty was concluded on 16 May 1846. It transferred the mountainous country with its dependencies eastward of River Indus and River Ravi westward into the independent possession of Maharaja Gulab Singh and his male heirs. In return for this transfer, Gulab Singh paid the British government the sum of seventy-five Nanak shahi rupees and an annual tribute of one horse, twelve shawl-bearing sheep, and three pairs of Kashmiri shawls. Jammu always displayed a closer affinity to the political culture of Punjab than with that of the Valley

1 The Treaty of Amritsar, signed on 16 March 1846, formalised the arrangements in the Treaty of Lahore between the British East India Company and Gulab Singh Dogra after the First Anglo-Sikh War. By Article 1 of the treaty, Gulab Singh acquired all the hilly or mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the eastward of the river Indus and the westward of the River Ravi including Chamba and excluding Lahul, being part of the territories ceded to the British Government by the Lahore State according to the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty of Lahore, dated 9th March 1846. Under Article 3, Gulab Singh was to pay 75 lakhs (7.5 million) of Nanak Shahi rupees (the ruling currency of the Sikh Empire) to the British Government, along with other annual tributes.

of Kashmir. During the late nineteenth century, though the Jammu province did not have a cohesive political outlook in whatever form politics was pursued, it was greatly influenced by the neighbouring Punjab province. Both Hindus and Muslims of Jammu closely watched the political developments in Punjab. Subsequently, the popular socio-political organisations in the Punjab province also got a strong foothold in the Jammu region. The Hindu reformist movement Arya Samaj, which Dayanand Saraswati founded, was the first movement in the Jammu region in 1875, gaining a massive presence. Within the next few years, Arya Samaj had a substantial following and branches throughout the Jammu region. Sharma (1988) notes two years after it was established in Jammu, Maharaja Ranbir Singh met with Swami Dayanand Saraswati in Delhi. In some years, branches of Arya Samaj came up in different parts of the Jammu region like Mirpur, Kotli, Bhimber, Rajauri, Nowshehra, Reasi, Ramban, Bhaderwah and Kishatawar. The Arya Samaj faced stiff resistance in other parts of British India when challenging the upper-class Brahminical hierarchy. In contrast, Jammu embraced the organisation and was given universal acceptability across all sections of the Hindu society and the rulers alike. The numeric strength of Muslims in the region and the desire of people to identify on religious lines was muscular and reflected in the ever-growing membership of the Arya Samaj. Chaudry (2015) writes that from 70 members in 1890, the group grew by around 23,000 new members every year till it reached 940,000 in 1931. The immense popularity of Arya Samaj and its growing influence alarmed the other religious organisations in Punjab, who started making their forays into Jammu. This proliferation indicated competing tendencies of the socio-reform movement in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. By 1890, a Sikh organisation called Guru Singh Sabha had formally made inroads in Jammu. Sharma (2002) records that by 1906, Guru Singh Sabha had its organisational and infrastructural presence in Mirpur and Muzaffarabad. As communitarian consciousness provided the context for identification regarding religious collectivity, the Muslim responses to these political influences were also rapid. The Anjum-e-Islamia Jammu was established in 1893 and was the first socio-political organisation looking towards Muslim

reform. However, it has not conducted many activities in the coming years.[2] Soon after, efforts were made to set up an organisation on the secular lines. The first socio-political organisation set up on secular grounds was the Dogra Committee in 1904, founded by Lala Hansraj Mahajan and Sahibzada Hazrat Aftab Shah. However, this organisation could not retain its secular character for long. In the coming years, Khalsa Youngman Association and Sri Ramakrishna Sewa Ashram too forayed into Jammu. As petitioning was the dominant mode of representation, both organisations petitioned the Maharajas court to offer special scholarships to students from their religious communities. The demand was conceded immediately, and a specific amount was set in the exchequer for scholarships for students from the Hindu and Sikh communities. Despite these developments, Muslim leaders tried reviving the dormant Anjum-e-Islamia Jammu in 1910. However, unlike the other organisations, Anjum-e-Islamia was an indigenous Jammu-based organisation and was not politically controlled from elsewhere. Among other reform activities, Anujuman-e-Islamia started a couple of schools around Jammu. However, the formation of the organisation called Young Men's Muslim Association (YMMA) in 1928 was pivotal in the development of the politics of Jammu in the coming years. The committee had been formed to work against the discriminatory nature of the Maharajas administration in general and in terms of educational scholarships in particular. Because of the severe curbs on political activities, YMMA mostly worked as an underground political organisation to escape arrests but started taking political stands against the Maharaja's dispensation. It soon started issuing the occasional pamphlet aimed at Muslim awakening, bringing forth the discrepant nature of Maharaja's administration with credible statistical evidence. Young Men's Muslim Association was also the first organisation to make political contact with the Kashmiris and developed a common platform with a statewide appeal during the 1931 crisis. The common platform became known as the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference and had its inaugural

2 Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Political Development File No 312/7-C, List of Sabhas and Societies.

session in October 1932. The incident of 13 July 1931 became a prominent political agenda in Punjab and other parts of British India. However, cracks developed between the Jammu-based leaders and the Kashmir-based leaders of the developing organisation in the coming years. The primary reason for this chasm was Shiekh Abdullah's insistence on making the Muslim Conference more inclusive by exploring possibilities of alliances with the Hindus, which Jammu-based leaders vehemently opposed. This eventually led to the conversion of the Muslim Conference into the National Conference under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah. Over the years, the Muslim Conference aligned itself with the Muslim League. As the Kashmir Committee based in Punjab focused all of its political energies on the developments in Kashmir valley, Majlis-e-Ahrar, a party of conservative Sunni Muslims, rallied in support of Muslims in Jammu. The situation in Kashmir created a proxy warfare situation where the Kashmir Committee and Majlis-e-Ahrar were working to counter each other's influence.[3] The long-term goal of Majlis-e-Ahrar was the creation of Pakistan. Gradually, the Muslim consciousness in the Jammu province was moving towards the idea of Pakistan. The large-scale discontent and its particular political outlook had put Jammu in a precarious situation. Bands of Ahrar volunteers had started arriving in the city, making the security situation volatile. Though the borders were sealed, the clashes transferred even to interior areas like Reasi, Rajauri, Mirpur, and Kotli. In the year 1932, groups of Muslims clashed with Dogra forces at Behrote, leading to the killing of 25 people.[4] Similarly, civil disobedience movements were simmering at Poonch and Mendhar, too. Maini (2012) records that the Raja of Poonch succeeded in putting down the revolt against the Dogra ruler. The post-1931 uprising became such a strong movement in Jammu province that some states had to withdraw their troops — the strategically important fort of Mangla being one of them. Meanwhile, the Maharaja approached the British resident for help. Saraf (1977) discusses at length how the British forces had taken possible measures to stop the infiltration of Ahrar volunteers into the

3 Siasat, 31 October 1931.

4 National Archives of India, Political/Home Department, File 5/54, 1931.

Jammu province, including bombarding the agitating protestors. As intense political activities took place across the state, the members of YMMA of Jammu and the Reading Room Party of Srinagar unified towards creating a common platform with a statewide appeal, resulting in the Jammu Kashmir Muslim Conference.

Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah insisted on building the party on secular lines, but Jammu leaders had a very dint approach vis-a-vis the party's outlook. Gradually, the party was re-christened as the Jammu Kashmir National Conference. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah's close rapport with the Indian National Congress was another obstacle to the functioning of the Kashmir Muslim Conference. Bazaz (1954) informs the growing proximity of the congress and Shiekh Muhammad Abdullah, which ultimately led to the resignation of Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas from the National Conference and the restoration of the Muslim Conference in 1942. Whatever influence the National Conference could have had in Jammu province was pre-empted by the resurrection of the Muslim Conference. The political-ideological battle lines were drawn between the two provinces, with the National Conference working in close coordination – with the Indian National Congress having its primary concentration in the valley but claiming a presence across both regions. The Muslim Conference was primarily concentrated in the Jammu province and allegiance with the All India Muslim League. The autocratic Dogra rule ended in 1948, and Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah took over the reins, first as the emergency administrator and then as Prime Minister. This marked a watershed in the history of Kashmir as the 101-year-long Dogra rule ended, and the seat of power shifted to the Valley.

The Moment of Partition

Partition put Jammu in a precarious position as the region witnessed the worst kind of communal frenzy, where the state administration was equally complicit in the perpetration of the violence. By the time the dust settled, the region had a significant central portion of its territory.

As much as 75.07 per cent of the entire population and 51.29 per cent of the area of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir was drawn from the Jammu province. Conservative estimates record that over a million Muslims of the region were uprooted and 250000–300000 massacred in the Jammu region alone in August-October 1947. With the Muslim leadership of Jammu jailed around this time, the National Conference, too, couldn't deliver to the dismay of Jammu Muslims. Thus, the Jammu factor in Kashmir politics appeared to complicate issues in the times to come.

While Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs were all affected by the violence in 1947, written and oral evidence indicate that Muslims bore the brunt of the violence. Violence against Muslims in Jammu pre-dates the princely state's accession to India. Muslims comprised 61% of the population in the Jammu province of the Dogra state. However, the Hindu majority districts of Jammu, Udhampur, Reasi, and Kathua only made up 38%, becoming increasingly vulnerable in the build-up to Partition. Ian Stephens (1955) notes that the violence in Jammu began in August 1947 and continued for about eleven weeks. Stephens claims that five lakh people were killed and two lakhs went missing, with many women being abducted. The exact death toll varies across sources.

Christopher Snedden's (2012) controversial book Kashmir: The Unwritten History suggests that no less than two lakh Muslim men, women and children were killed, while the number of women abducted is estimated to be 27,000. Choudhary (2015), in his book, uses documents from the International Committee of the Red Cross to narrate how 256 Muslim women were abducted from Ustad Mohalla in Jammu before eventually being sent to their male kin in Pakistan. The number of abductions is said to be much higher, but many cases went unreported because of the conservative social setup. More than a thousand women could not be traced despite many efforts to locate them. Prominent Muslim Conference leader Choudhary Ghulam Abbas's daughter was also allegedly abducted by Hindu right-wingers in 1947. The large-scale displacement of Muslims caused significant demographic changes in the Jammu region. The community went from a majority of 61% to a minority of 30%. The censuses conducted after 1947 reveal the existence of "uninhabited villages" – villages whose residents left or were killed in 1947. The Jammu

violence was also accompanied by the systematic erasure of evidence and denials that followed the violence and the state's alleged conspiracy. Perhaps the main reason for attempts to erase any proof of the Jammu violence is that it questions the narrative.

The accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India was necessitated by the invasion of Pakhtoon tribes in 1947. While it is indisputable that Pakhtoons invaded Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947, it was not how the conflict started. Jawaharlal Nehru's biographer, Sarvepalli Gopal, acknowledges that the Jammu violence was the starting point of trouble in the princely state. The Indian government has consistently claimed that all the violence started on October 22, 1947. However, several press reports, some dated as early as September of 1947, speak about the violence in Jammu. This clearly shows that the Jammu violence preceded the tribal invasion. According to a New York Times report mentioned by Snedden, Jawaharlal Nehru informed the home minister, Sardar Vallabhai Patel, about the events in Jammu and also sent a 19-point report prepared by Nehru's close aide, Dwarkanath Kachru. The essential elements of the report were that the National Conference had decided to accede to the Indian Union and how Sheikh Abdullah deemed the "killings in the state" as "un-Islamic and un-Hindu". Since there was no violence in the Valley till then, it is clear that the

National Conference leader was referring to the massacre in Jammu. The report further stated that Maharaja Hari Singh had lost control over the administrative and governmental machinery. So this means that three weeks before the Pakhtoons arrived in Kashmir, the government of India had reliable information that the Maharaja had little control over his princely domain. The Pakhtoon invasion narrative serves two purposes – legitimising Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India and demolishing the premise for any indigenous mobilisation in the state. It completely ignores the uprising of Muslims in Poonch in September 1947, as well as the violence in Jammu. These events have been glossed over in all accounts of the Kashmir dispute. The Pakhtoon invasion narrative highlights the external threat while completely denying the indigenous revolt against the authority of the Maharaja. Another reason for the erasure of the Jammu massacres from public memory is the

evidence of state complicity in the events. While the arrival of a large number of Sikhs and Hindus from West Punjab led to a communal frenzy in Jammu, the Maharaja's administration played a vital role in the massacres. Various sources refer to the Maharaja's growing proximity to the Hindu right-wing. In an interview with Khalid Bashir Ahmad, who has conducted extensive research on the 1947 Jammu violence, prominent human rights activist Balraj Puri, a witness to the violence, testifies to the close relations between Maharaja Hai Singh and the Hindu Right. MG Golwalkar is said to have been a private guest of the Maharaja. Rajguru Sant Dev, a vital functionary of the Maharaja's regime, is said to have been the main link between the Maharaja and Hindu right-wing outfits. This was also the period when Rajguru had come to occupy enormous influence in the administration, sidelining the secular elements.

Furthermore, Muslim soldiers in Jammu, Mirpur and Poonch were disarmed, something which was not done with their colleagues of other religions. Ian Stephens claims that Maharaja Hari Singh not only encouraged the violence but also opened fire on a group of Gujjar Muslims. However, this also explains the failure of Kashmiri Muslim leadership – both separatist and mainstream – to accommodate survivors of the Jammu violence. Far from accommodating them, the leadership hasn't even acknowledged the events. Sheikh Abdullah understood the state's collaboration but chose to remain silent. No proper inquiry was ordered on the role of Maharaja Hari Singh and his Prime Minister, Mehr Chand Mahajan. Abdullah maintained that the survivors wanted to go to Pakistan, and the only justice that could be done to them was providing safe passage. A leader of Shiekh Abdullah's stature set a precedent, and no civil society or future government took to the cause of survivors of the 1947 massacres. As Ahmad (2014) writes, "The victims of the Jammu carnage still wait, some in body and the rest in soul, for justice which has alluded them all these decades".

Jammu Province and National Conference

The secular fringe movement in Jammu for political democratisation, a responsible government, fundamental rights and land to be tilled predated the birth of the National Conference. Sardar Budh Singh formed the Kissan Party in 1925 for political democratisation. Puri (1981) writes that Singh tried to give the Kissan Party a forceful outlook against the Dogra outlook. During his tenure as the elected president of Dogra Sabha, the first secular organisation of the state, he tried vigorously to politicise the political organisation. It enabled him to extend the movement to all sections of the society in the state, too. Eventually, when the National Conference was formed, Budh Singh was the only person other than Abdullah and the only non-Kashmiri and non-Muslim to be elected the president twice. The accession to India and retreat of Dogra rulers made Shiekh Abdullah's position unassailable. However, the reasons that made the National Conference a formidable force in the valley proved to be a major significant block towards the non-establishment of the National Conference in other parts of the valley, particularly in Jammu. As the National Conference-led Quit Kashmir movement was directed against the Dogra Raj, the Kashmir leaders could not endear themselves and their movement to the Dogras-the central community of the region. Secondly, the conversion of the Muslim Conference into the National Conference inhibited any chances of growth of the National Conference, which was the epitome of Kashmiri nationalism. Many prominent Hindu, Sikh and Muslim leaders and young intellectuals joined the National Conference when it was formed in 1939 but could not acquire emotional, regional and religious appeal in Jammu.

Moreover, Jammu lacked a homogenised regional personality like the Kashmir valley, symbolically united culturally and emotionally. Jammu's various communities, castes and cultural sub-groups could not emerge unanimously in the face of the common danger. Given the situation, the reaction against

Kashmir-oriented character of the National Conference was expressed in a communal vocabulary, further dividing its people. The absence of a secular party to voice angst over the Kashmir-centric vision

of the National Conference always worked in the right's favour. At the time of the partition, this sentiment was captured by the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha, respectively. Post-partition, this sentiment was entirely subsumed by the right wing. The base of the communal movement initially was the urban middle-class intelligentsia, the traditional aristocracy, landlords, and jagirdars because they were the ones who suffered most from the transfer of power. The National Conference was better situated in other areas of Jammu Province than Jammu city. However, the geographical divisions at the time of the partition didn't work well for the National Conference. The amalgamation of Poonch Jagir with the state had considerably hurt the local sentiments and attracted its people to the state-wide movement against the autocratic regime of the Maharaja. In Chenaini Jagir, the National Conference aligned itself with the revolt against the excesses of the local Raja, protected by the state's ruler. In the Mirpur region of the state, the National Conference again made inroads, aligning with the local struggle in the area.[5]

A group of Dogra patriots formed the All-Jammu National Youth Conference in 1948, asserting that the institution of monarchy was the biggest stumbling block to satisfying the popular aspirations of the Jammu region. The organisation specifically proclaimed that political power had to be transferred from the autocratic ruler to the people of Jammu. It also alleged that a section of Kashmiri leadership did not allow the people of Jammu to stand on their own and had imposed reactionary elements and government puppets in the Jammu National Conference.[6]

The *mohalla* committees operating under the All-Jammu National Youth Conference attacked the National Conference on the pretext of attacking the ruler's personality rather than the institution of monarchy. A convention of Jammu District National Conference workers was held

5 Interview with Mustafa Kemal, senior politician National Confrence. Interviewed In June 2017.

6 Poster published by Ram Nath Mengi, General Secretary, All Jammu and Kashmir National Youth Conference.

at Parmandal in March 1949, which not only demanded the abdication of the Mutharaja by amendment of the party manifesto Naya Kashmir to delete provision for a constitutional ruler of the state.[7] However, no constitutional, institutional or political arrangements were devised to uphold inter-regional and inter-communal harmony. The impact of a political vacuum in Jammu was precipitated again by the inexplicable expulsion of senior leaders like Om Nath Saraf and Amarnath from the primary membership of the National Conference by the party president Shiekh Abdullah, a day before they had proposed to celebrate Maharajas proposed abdication as a deliverance day under the auspices of Jammu district National Conference committee. Instead of allowing this leadership to flourish, the Kashmir leadership of the National Conference preferred to project Karan Singh, the new regent of the state, to get the support of the people of Jammu. The Jammu leadership felt betrayed that the National Conference negotiated with the Dogra royal house to retain power. Bhasin (2016) notes that the power transfer from the Jammu-based ruler to the Kashmir-based National Conference had reversed Jammu's regional power and psychological vacuum. After removing the sponsors of the abdication moves from the leadership of the Jammu National Conference, no other regional leadership could stabilise itself owing to repeated and arbitrary changes in the local functionaries of the party. The debate on the future of the Maharaja and the institution of the monarchy could not thus be confined to what could be called the radical and conservative wings of Jammu politics. It inevitably became a Kashmir versus Jammu issue, aggravating the tensions. The abdication of Maharaja was followed by an irregular share of Jammu in the state's political power. With numerical confusion over the numbers, the Jammu leadership always felt a lopsided power-sharing arrangement was at work. To raise the level of Jammu leadership and harmonise it with Kashmir, Balraj Puri made the following suggestion in 1950:

> If Shiekh Abdullah is unwilling to permit the evolution of local leadership in Jammu democratically as he does not trust his people, let him

7 Interview with historian Om Prakash Saraf, dated January 2017.

> nominate a leader from Jammu. This leader should be consulted for all Jammu affairs and have as high a status as any other Kashmiri leader. We should try to rally around such a leader. This might not be a democratic way. But in the present undemocratic system, if Shiekh Abdullah's leadership is indispensable and the integrity of the State is to be maintained, this is the most feasible way to defend the self-respect and honour of Jammu.[8]

Jammu and the Pandit Migration

In the late 1980 and early 1990, the Kashmiri Hindus, known as Kashmiri, fled from the valley towards the southern part of the state and the rest of the cities in India. The Pandit migration coincided with the resurgence of Hindu rights in India. Thus, the Kashmiri migrant Hindu community emerged as an important factor in the 1990s as the Bharatiya Janta Party and its affiliate members increasingly used the issue of Kashmiri Pandits as a political mobilisation tool and quickly associated it with the Hindu nationalist project. After the Pandit migration, Hindu-right wing leadership constantly raised the issues of Kashmiri Pandits in their speeches. The then BJP president L K Advani, in response to the Pandit migration, said, "None raised the voice when 40 odd temples were desecrated in Kashmir. Why these double standards"? According to Nandudar (2006), the BJP's Hindutva politics worked on the perception of a 'Muslim threat' to the Hindu majority, which, given the departure of Pandits from a Muslim majority state, served their ideology. In one of their publications, the Hindu right-wing political group RSS, documenting the 'genocide' of Kashmiri Pandits, claimed that 600 Pandits were murdered and 36 temples desecrated."[9] The Sangh Parivar situated itself in hostility against the secular nationalist position as it said it ensured minority appeasement at the cost of the majority. Thus, Hindu nationalism was becoming a reservoir for middle-class

8 Desh Sewak, Jammu, 23 March 1950.

9 Speeches by senior Bjp leadership as recorded in Anand Patwardan's documentary Final Solution made in 2012.

anxieties. As in the case of Kashmir, the fleeing minority became the plank for communalism and xenophobia. The Kashmiri Pandit issue was invoked in political manifestos, speeches and slogans, repeatedly arguing that congress leaders had implemented minority appeasement policies for decades but could not provide adequate protection for the Pandit community, which was a minority in Kashmir. Duschinski (2008) writes that "Hindu nationalist rhetoric presented the anxieties of the Kashmiri Hindu migrant community as a mirror of anxieties of the Indian middle class themselves, who felt vulnerable to increasing mobilisation among minority and impoverished classes. This position also enabled Hindi nationalist political parties to strengthen their claim as defenders of national boundaries and national interests in India." Thus, the Hindu right positioned themselves within this framework vis a vis the Kashmiri Pandit discourse. With the eruption of militancy in 1989, Kashmiri Pandits felt vulnerable, and the targeted killings of important members of the community of the community aggravated the feeling of insecurity. The state narrative believes that the target killings were mainly responsible for the departure, but the killings were not entirely based on religion but more so on political affiliations. The argument is supported by Madan (1993) and Bose (2003), who argue that targeting was not based on religion; in fact, the number of targeted Muslims surpassed the number of targeted Hindus. Allegedly, some local newspapers also carried direct threats ordering the Pandit minority to leave the valley or be prepared to be killed. The Hizbul Mujahideen issued the threats issued. Evans (2002 makes a claim by the valley using census data that not more than 155,000-170,000 Pandits left the valley at the onset of 1989 violence. Most of the Kashmiri Pandits moved towards Jammu. However, the state outrageously had no adequate requirements for the relief and rehabilitation of the migrants. As the state stumbled to offer assistance, socio-cultural organisations, many of which had loose affiliations with Hindu rights, came forward to help. Duschinki (2008) notes that the community found support for Kashmiri Hindu families who had moved to Delhi over the years. The other source of support was the political parties, which had their vested interests. Panun Kashmir, a prominent Kashmiri Pandit organisation, claims that the Pandits were

thrown out of their homeland after a sustained campaign of intimidation and harassment by the secessionists. It was done to create a Hind-free Kashmir where the goal of 'Islamisation' could be easily achieved". Behera (2000) records that the Kashmiri Muslims and Pandits shared an ethno-nationalist identity. With the increasing momentum of the self-determination movement, the community began feeling vulnerable and insecure. The other narrative sharply blames Governor Jagmohan for hatching a conspiracy to comb out militancy, but after shifting Kashmiri Pandits outside the valley for an interim period. Akbar (1991) reinforces that Jagmohan encouraged the scared Kashmiri Pandits to create legitimacy for his harsh tactics. Some prominent citizens did make efforts to stop the Pandits from fleeing. However, it did not yield any results. Traditionally, Kashmiri Pandits sided with the National Conference on a local level and the Congress Party at the national level. Even the Praja Parishad, the vanguard party of the Jana Sangh, was not popular among the Pandits. However, the situation began changing in 1990 as the relationship between Kashmiri Muslims and the Kashmiri Hindus came under a double threat. One was from fundamentalist militant groups like Hizbul and another from the Hindu nationalistic organisations like Sangh Parivar. The Hindu nationalist organisations offered support to the Kashmiri Pandit cause for reinforcing other causes like full integration of Kashmir into India.

Panun Kashmir was formed in 1991 to articulate a vision for Kashmiri Pandits and work towards the cultural revival of the community. They demanded a homeland for Kashmiri Pandits for the formation of a separate homeland, which would comprise the eastern and northern basin of the river Jhelum. The demarcated territory would have the status of union territory and governed by the constitution of India. The homeland would provide resettlement to all those Hindus who left the valley. Some community organisations responded harshly to such demands and saw the demands as part of political manoeuvring. In 2007, Kashmiri Pandits formed their political party. The formation was due to non-dependence on mainstream parties like the Bharatiya Janta Party and the Indian National Congress.

Jammu and the Amarnath Land Agitation

Amarnath pilgrimage is conducted for about 40 days between July and August in the southern part of Kashmir to pay reverence to the naturally forming ice stalagmite, which is perceived as the incarnation of Lord Shiva. The cave is located at an elevation of 13,500 feet and can be reached from the traditional route from Pahalgam and the shorter non-traditional route from Baltal. In the earlier years, yatra was undertaken over 15 days primarily by *Sadhu*s and a few civilian ans. The number of pilgrims would not exceed a few thousand people. With the advent of the 1990s, the demographics of yatra changed, and lakhs of yatris began participating from many regions of India. In the year 1996, a freak-weather natural disaster resulted in a large number of fatalities, creating momentum for the creation of a Shrine board for the effective and smooth running of the yatra. Jagmohan, the former governor, had conceived the idea of forming a shrine board for Amarnath, similar to what was achieved for the Vaishno Devi shrine in the Jammu region. The report, Amarnath- A Militarized Pilgrimage (2017), highlights how the move was conceived during the President's rule. The blueprint envisaged the formation of a statutory body called SASB Shri Amarnathji Shrine Board (SASB). It was mentioned in the blueprint that the Governor would chair the board. However, the shrine board could not be formed in 1986 as the governor's rule terminated before it could be established. In the coming years, the state government organised the yatra with local people's assistance for logistics. The Shri Amarnathji Shrine Board (SASB) was established in 1996 by an act passed by the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly. According to the Act (2000)[10], "the governor of the state of Jammu and Kashmir would be the e-officio chairman of the board if the governor was a Hindu. If he is not a Hindu, he could nominate a person who is a Hindu. The Army and Central Reserve Police Force controlled the security functions. Between 2005 and 2008, several attempts were made to construct the Yatra's infrastructure. In 2008, the state cabinet approved land transfer for infrastructure construction. This resulted in widespread protests

10 The Jammu and Kashmir Amarnath Ji Shrine Act 2000.

in Kashmir from June 2008 to August 2008. This land transfer in the fragile ecological belt was seen as a long-term conspiracy to engineer change in the demography of the Kashmir valley.[11] The chief executive of the SASB, Arun Kumar, responded to the raging agitation as a disinformation campaign provoked by certain sections of media and communal propaganda launched by separatist groups. SASB insisted they had every legal right to raise the prefabricated structures and that the land transfer was permanent.[12] The problem with the Amarnath Land controversy was not only the rigid and chauvinistic attitude of the outgoing Governor but also the sinister designs to communalise the situation and hamper the ecological balance of the place. There were also concerns about the involvement of locals and their right to traditional jobs during the pilgrimage and the threat to ecological balance created by the extension of the yatra. The controversy triggered massive polarisation, with the political mainstream and separatists echoing the same narrative. Barring the Congress, all other mainstream parties and groups, including the National Conference, Peoples Democratic Party and the Left, came out against the land transfer deal. Given the volatile attitude of the administration, the state got actively involved in a religious affair. The land agitation eventually caused the fall of the coalition government, where PDP took a tough stance when its patron demanded the cancellation of the land diversion order. On the other hand, appeasing the PDP was not an option for Congress as it could have proved counterproductive with its Hindu vote bank in Jammu.[13] Kashmiris saw the land transfer and establishment of permanent structures as a cultural and political threat to the region, intended to dispossess residents of their land and natural resources. A sustained movement took up against the land transfer. Massive violent protests erupted across the valley against the land transfer, resulting in the complete collapse of authority. The order about land transfer was eventually revoked on 30 June 2008, and the Action Committee against Land Transfer (ACALT) announced the end of the

11 *The Kashmir Times*, dated June 10, 2008.

12 *The Kashmir Times*, June 17, 2008.

13 *The Kashmir Times*, June 22, 2008.

strike in Kashmir Valley. The right-wing organisations equally resisted the cancellation of the land transfer order. The resistance was clubbed in the Shri Amarnath Yatra Sangharsh Samiti (SAYSS) formation. The Hindu right-wing organisations, Kashmiri Pandit groupings and other social and cultural groups deemed the cancellation of the transfer order as unconstitutional.[14] The condition went out of hand, and the curfew had to be clamped down in the province, and the army had to be called out. As a form of protest, bandhs, suspension of traffic movement and an economic blockade were enforced in Jammu to suffocate Kashmir. As a result, the Chief Minister had to resign, and the Governor's rule was imposed in the state. Bidwai (2008) writes the fall of the Congress-PDP coalition government, the first of its kind in J&K, was a setback to the cause of moderation and political reconciliation in the long-troubled and restive state. This is one of the many casualties extracted by the transfer of forest land to SASB and the subsequent violent process. The crisis has taken an even greater toll in the form of the collapse of the political normalisation process, the revival of intolerance, and the assertion of regional or communal-based identity. The first economic blockade, which clogged up the National Highway, was started on June 23rd. The second blockade was started on July 22nd. Angry protestors burnt vehicles and, in a couple of instances, attacked Kashmiri drivers. One of them was brutally burnt alive. Horticulture, too, was adversely affected as the agitation came at the time of fruit harvest, thus resulting in heavy losses for Kashmiri traders. Furious over the blockade of the Srinagar-Jammu highway in the peak fruit season, the apex body of the Kashmir Fruit Growers Association decided to cross the Line of Control through the Srinagar – Muzzafarabad road with their trucks carrying the fruit.88 In retaliation, the 'BJP gave Quit Jammu' call and its cohorts against Kashmiri Muslims who resided in Jammu. On August 11, traders in the valley protested against the blockade and called for a March to Muzaffarabad, the first town across the Line of Control. During the march, a senior Hurriyat leader, Shiekh Abdul Aziz, was shot as he tried to lead the march. On

14 https://www.hindustantimes.com/topic/shri-amarnath-yatra-sangharsh-samiti. Accessed Februray 2018.

his funeral, more than 300,000 joined and the procession was again met with state violence. However, the yatra continued in full swing, and not even a single yatra was attacked by Kashmiris. The agitation greatly impacted the assembly elections in the state, with the Bharatiya Janta Party using the agitation as a plank to widen its base in Jammu. The polarisation could be gauged by the national leadership of the Bhartiya Janta Party jumping into the fray. The then BJP president Rajnath Singh announced that the agitation over Amarnath shrine would be extended to the entire country, and the party's senior leader, Lal Kishan Advani, said that the issue would also figure in the Lok Sabha election. Eventually, an agreement was reached between SAYSS and the government. The aftermath of the controversy left irreversible consequences on the relations between Jammu and Kashmir and implanted a sense of vulnerability in the Kashmir valley.

After the traditional routes that worked along the river Jhelum had been closed in the aftermath of 1947, the only road access the valley had to the rest of the world went through Jammu. The difficulty of accessing the markets abroad became more prominent for a Kashmiri trader. The Jammu traders also realised the shortcomings of doing business at the cost of politics. Jammu traders alone suffered a loss of 500 crore rupees. An interview with a senior Jammu Traders' Association member revealed they were invited to be part of the SAYSS. "We did not know initially how politically motivated the movement was, but as soon as we realised it, we did not want our business to be at stake. We tried convincing the SAYSS that a blockade like this would result in the closure of our only market, which is Kashmir. SAYSS did not yield, so we withdrew our participation. The polarisation also shook the Muslims based in Jammu as how the Hindu right-wing organisations like VHP, RSS, and Bajrang Dal had prepared the ground in the Jammu province. The educated class found space for asserting themselves in rallies where the trishuls were carried openly. The symbols of protest at the SAYSS's rallies were reminiscent of militant Hindu symbolism, making the Muslim population insecure. The fissures created by the blockade could not be filled even after almost ten years. It is not simply a question of economics but also the state's

social fabric, which has been severely damaged by the protests taking a communal form[15].

Interestingly, Kashmiri Pandit bodies like Kashmiri Pandit Sabha argue the issue was different from how the constructions at Baltal could have eased the yatris. Instead, it was about making the outsiders stakeholders. The insecurity of service providers who saw the complete takeover of the services industry by outsiders could have been resolved if Kashmiri Pandits were dealing with these issues, said K.K Khosa, a member of Kashmiri Pandit Sabha. The Amarnath Land transfer revealed sinister designs with graver implications. The problem was not only the rigid and chauvinistic attitude of the Governor, Lt General Sinha, who polarised the situation on communal and religious grounds.

Additionally, the administration locked horns by straying into the political domain with the sweeping generalisation of seeing any criticism of the move as communal. This was indicative of the unabashed sectarian behaviour coupled with an irrepressible tendency to usurp the administrative authority of the political executive. Moreover, there have been constant attempts by the Hindu socioreligious originations to prolong the duration of the Amarnath yatra, which goes against the recommendations of the Sengupta report[16]. In 1996, a Public Interest Litigation was filed by Swami Sachidanand against the state government of Jammu and Kashmir, demanding the Baltal route be kept open throughout the lines of the Vaishno Devi Yatra. However, it is not logically achievable given the weather and the specific time of the pilgrimage. Increasing the duration of the yatra would mean tampering with the region's fragile ecology. However, SASB has always been more accessible to the Hindu socio-religious organisations who have constantly demanded an

15 Interview with Shakeel Qalandar, President of Kashmir Chamber for Commerce and Industry, dated 3 June 2017.

16 Enquiry Report on Amar nath Yatra Tragedy (1996), Department of Jammu and Kashmir Affairs, Government of India by Nitish Sengupta called for regulating the number of pilgrims and the period of the yatra. He also elucidated that the carrying capacity of the pathways leading to the holy cave shrines is minimal, so the influx of yatris has to be controlled.

increase in the duration of yatra and rejected any attempt at putting a restrictive cap on the number of pilgrims visiting each year.

BJP/PDP Coalition and its Impact on Jammu

In a dramatic turn, the Bharatiya Janta Party secured 25 seats in the Jammu Kashmir Legislative Assembly elections (2014), claiming contesting nationalism visible to any observer. It is pertinent to mention that all 25 seats were secured in the Jammu division alone. This also brings into focus the debates around Article 370 and the plan of trifurcation of the state. It is also essential to understand that the Dalit assertion in an otherwise upper-caste Hindu-dominated area of Jammu is minimal because the caste concerns have been relegated to the background because of the threat from the Muslim other. Chowdary (2014) writes that the assembly elections of Jammu and Kashmir surprised everybody with the massive participation and the performance of the BJP. The election changed the dynamics of the state's internal politics.

The political baggage of the BJP ran counter to the ideological soft-separatism of the PDP. In the BJP's nationalist cosmology, removing Article 370 of the constitution is fundamental. On the other hand, the political imagination of a party like the People's Democratic Party (PDP) is entirely enshrined in the principles of soft separatism. PDP couched its agenda in quasi-separatist language, advocating change in New Delhi's relationship with Kashmir. Even self-rule was first coined in 2005 by the then-President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf. The PDP adopted it in January 2006 in a different form and context. The party aimed towards constitutional restructuring, rescinding central laws that curtailed Jammu and Kashmir's autonomy and reclaiming the titles of Prime Minister and President, respectively. These proposals are nothing less than an aversion to the BJP. Chaudhary. R (2015) explains that "the PDP is a product of a political situation developed in Kashmir in the last two decades, and it reflects an inappropriateness that persists in the region between the need for democratic governance and separatist sentiments."

On the one hand, the PDP was close to separatist organisations regarding its agenda of self-rule, demilitarisation, softening of borders, and free movement across the Line of control. Through the support of Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizbul Mujahideen, the party managed to build a strong constituency for itself. The party also got unconditional support from others who were critical of the politics of the National Conference.

Thus, the Jammu & Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party was launched on a soft separatist plank in 1999. It styled itself self-consciously on the memory of the Muslim United Front borrowing its flag and also drew for its ideological content. Even the PDP symbol- a pen and inkpot- was the same logo used by the Hizbul Mujahideen's supreme commander, Muhammad Yousuf (now known as Syed Salahudeen), when he contested the 1987 Assembly elections. A significant feature of the formation of the PDP was the unspoken tactical alliance between the elements of Jamaat-e-Islami, Hizbul Mujahideen and the PDP. After the elections in April 2002, Mehbooba displayed her party's Islamic colours by waving a green handkerchief to the audience at a rally. In the recently published memoir, Kashmir: The Vajpayee Years, former chief of the Research and Analysis Wing, A S Dulat, describes Mehbooba Mufti as having links with the Jamaat-e-Islami, the ideological edge of armed militancy in Kashmir. Dulat recounts how Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee suspected Mehbooba of having links with militants. Narrating an episode from Vajpayee's visit to Srinagar in 2003, he writes, "When Vajpayee went to Srinagar in April 2003 and famously extended his hand towards Pakistan, a stage was erected high up for the public meeting — Vajpayee and Mufti (Mohammad Sayeed sat up on the stage). Mehbooba wanted to join them, but she was politely told there was no place for her on that stage". He adds, "Vajpayee did not want her up there…There were grave doubts about Mehbooba in Delhi, about her links with the Hizbul Mujahideen and the help it provided her party during the 2002 elections".

Wallace and Ramashray (2009) write that the party (PDP) used religious motifs to appeal to the voters. In 2008, this kind of propaganda was used by the PDP to get support from the Jamaat-e-Islami cadre. With multi-cornered contests in many constituencies, the 2014 assembly

elections led to a fractured mandate. The outgoing National Conference managed to capture 15 seats, and its coalition partner, the Indian National Conference, got along with 12 seats. The Peoples Conference managed two seats and independents, and all other parties walked away with five seats. PDP had come out of elections as the largest party of the state in terms of its share of seats, the BJP in terms of its share of votes. After hectic negotiations, the two parties entered a Governance Alliance based on a contract for seeking national reconciliation in Jammu and Kashmir. PDP's patron, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, who became the chief minister of the new government, mentioned that the "alliance as coming together of the North Pole and the South Pole-hoping the alliance would cover the gap between the two. "The alliance was to form a coalition government that would help in settlement and confidence building within and across the Line of Control, alongside providing a stable and representative government. Given the wide-ranging difference between the socio-political aspirations and complaints of the different people in the state, economic amelioration cannot lead to peace and prosperity. It was envisaged that a purely political process without visible material and economic goals could not ensure peace. Due to the different positions and perceptions of the two parties regarding the constitutional status of Jammu and Kashmir, the alliance said it would maintain the status quo on all constitutional provisions, including the special status Jammu and Kashmir enjoy constitutionally.

Conclusion

After 1947, the leadership vacuum in Jammu proved to be too big, and the efforts of the National Conference were too small to bridge it up. The National Conference failed to extend its base to Jammu because of its Kashmir-centric vision and lack of coordination and contact with its workers in Jammu. Further, an uneasy coalition between a democratic leader like Shiekh Abdullah and a constitutional leader who was the erstwhile Maharaja turned out to be untenable on many grounds. The constitutional leader could not give public expression to the aspirations of Jammu.

As a repository of feudal interests, he could furthermore not provide any justice to the democratic aspirations of Jammu's population. The reluctance of national parties to extend their activities in the state, particularly the secular parties, enlarged the sense of the prevailing vacuum. No other secular party could counter Sheikh Abdullah's charisma as a secular leader. For instance, the All-India Congress Committee disbanded its Jammu unit after the National Conference took over the administration. Praja Parishad articulated Jammu's discontent in the expressive vocabulary of complete accession of the state and abrogation of Article 370, which guarantees a special status to Jammu to the state. Gradually, with time, Jammu's regional discontent branched into a demand for local autonomy. This was portrayed repeatedly through statistics of lopsided developmental outlays. The Hindu rightist parties appropriated much of the regional identity politics and asserted through the demands made in the elite interests, with marginal interests relocated to the peripheries.

Most of the agitations spearheaded in the name of regional discrimination of Jammu focused on the interests of the educated middle class and did not represent the backward areas and sections of the society. As Hindu right-wing organisations raised the issues of regional discrimination, the discourse inevitably became the dominant Hindu perspective. A copious amount of the communal discourse also evolved during the 1952 agitation led by the Praja Parishad. Gradually, with time, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Jana Singh, and other variants of Hindu right-wing like VHP, Shiv Sena, Bajrang Dal, etc., also made inroads. However, the hold of these parties and organisations remains limited to the Hindu belt of Jammu, and the internal contradictions between the two regions have only deepened. The failure of democratic institutions to take root in Kashmir by overt intervention of the central government prevented the development of healthy competition among the state's political parties.

Over the years, the polarising tendencies in different divisions were never checked, and institutional structures became weaker and vulnerable. When, in a dramatic turn of events, the Bharatiya Janta Party, which did not have a significant electoral presence in the state, managed to secure 25 seats in the 2014 state legislative assembly elections, it claimed

to contest nationalisms visible to any observer. It is pertinent to mention that all 25 seats were secured in the Jammu division alone. This also brings into focus the debates around Article 370 and the plan of trifurcation of the state. It is also essential to understand that the Dalit assertion in otherwise an upper-caste Hindu-dominated area of Jammu is minimal because the caste concerns have been relegated to the background because of the conflict-centered political discourse. The upward graph of religious tourism in the last thirty years also corroborated the solidification of Jammu's religion-based identity.

The Pandit migration from the valley turned out to be a bonus for the Hindu right-wing organisations as they could make inroads within the Pandit community and communalise the society on religious lines. The eruption of land agitation in the state also led to long-term implications that changed the region's nature and politics. The most significant fallout from the land row was the fracturing of the relationship between the two major areas of the state. The discordant politics went beyond the grievances of regional discrimination towards the idea of trifurcating the state into three parts.

The BJP's electoral triumph in 2014 put the PDP into a more passive mode toward a junior partner in the coalition, almost equivalent to disrespecting the popular mandate. The demands of self-rule, an end to human rights violations, and revocation of the AFSPA could not get any response beyond the PDP's election manifesto. The standard minimum programme, too, did not gain any traction. The only takeaway from the coalition was polarisation on communal grounds and greater demands for trifurcation of the state.

Final Conclusion

Kashmiri nationalism has acted as a definitive mode of political participation and existed before the violent militancy. Before the partition, it acted as a kind of political mobilisation in response to centuries of foreign domination. After the partition, the same mobilisation began to challenge the structural stagnation of the post-colonial state. It was also a way to address the majoritarian bias of state-enforced nationalism.

The majoritarian character of state nationalism was coming out at a doctrinal and political level, restricting collective rights. The interests of centralised nationalism were given priority over all other commitments made at the time of accession, reflecting a clash of interests. The conditions created were fragmentary and particularist, creating a form of 'particularist politicisation[1] in the words of (Mary Kaldor 1999:22). The state-nationalism espoused a parochial character and made itself a carrier of limited loyalties, ignoring or deliberately wiping out any local and cultural characteristics. This situation led to a crisis of legitimacy and longevity for local nationalism. The internal crisis of the state and the search for community and identity made way for a confrontation between the forces of Kashmiri nationalism and state nationalism. Delanty and O'Mahony (2002:146) classify that situations like this generate "a strong presence of fundamental assumptions about group membership and hence a high degree of exclusion; the identity of the self — 'the people' — is predicated on the negation of the other; and there is

1 Mary Kaldor, see "Cosmopolitanism vs. Nationalism: The New Divide?" also Old and New Wars (1999) Cambridge: Polity Press.

an absolute subordination of the individual to the collectivity." Thus, the thesis tries to understand how Kashmiri nationalism exercises itself through self-defined social, political and cultural processes.

The growth of education and print from the 1940s to the 1970s created conducive conditions for developing Kashmiri nationalism. This was happening parallel with a growing sense of discrimination and the consciousness of political differences with others.

This study tried to look at Kashmiri nationalism in terms of its origin and growth, bringing out contestations around it. It also assessed the strategies and objectives of Kashmiri nationalism about competing nationalistic tendencies within the Jammu division of the state. In Kashmir, various political processes led to the nationalist mobilisation, which lasted for a considerable time. These processes preceded militant nationalism. The presence of alternate political processes, which were widely popular, indicates that Kashmiri nationalism enacted itself in the political form before it took a militant form. The transition can be interpreted as a change of strategy in the Kashmiri nationalism.

A cursory look at the last seven decades of Kashmir's political history shows underlying tensions between the state-nationalism propounded by the state and the political elite versus the valuational Kashmiri identity. The purpose here is to recognise that beyond state nationalism exists a realm of nationalistic assertions that challenge the former. As Guha (1983) remarks, the mainstream narrative of national identity does not recognise the subdued nationalist movements as they hinder their political projects. Recognising the underlying valuational identity gives communities a sense of affective and collective satisfaction. In the case of Kashmir, a sense of historical wrongdoings and sociological imperative augmented the nationalistic imagination. The development of education and the press also contributed to the nationalist imagination. Symbols and myths of the past were regularly used as strategies to appeal to mass sentiment and marked a socio-cultural particularism and historical discontinuity with the state.

Hypotheses One

The weakness of democratic institutions resulted in the creation of social categories for the distribution of patronage.

The patronage was disbursed according to the convenience of the state on ethnic, religious and regional lines. The constant tensions between centralised nationalism and indigenous nationalism resulted in the imposition of formal nationalism through juridical and legal structures. The officially constituted legitimate sphere of politics was the only channel to express grievances, and only groups ready to engage with the official political processes were given leverage. The other assertions were confronted with violence and coercion to impose a nomological definition of nationalism. The refusal to acknowledge such claims is based on a specific understanding of non-legitimacy to any opposition to formal nationalism and non-acknowledgement of value-specific identity. This led to a situation where indigenous nationalism did not recognise the controlling institutions. The outcome of the clash between the two forces of nationalism was that no mutually acceptable framework emerged for a dialogue. In short, the state nationalism and the Kashmiri nationalism reflected irreconcilable political discourse, one having institutional characteristics and the other based on values of autonomy. The absence of a reconciliation between the two leads to a status where coercion became the only way for the ruling elite. The adoption of coercion accelerated the Kashmiri nationalistic mobilisation. The autonomous nationalist agency also became a reserve for local trust, given its political positioning and subjectivity. As the Kashmiri nationalist agency was confronted with state coercion, the possibility for violent militancy grew with support. The mode of political mobilisation also altered, introducing differing agendas of the various groups who took up militancy. The dominant militant began to enforce the ascendancy of their respective political agendas within the nationalist movement.

Among other things, what comes out is that the roots of Kashmiri nationalism are more complex than the simple thesis of institutional decay and lack of economic structures. Kashmiri nationalism exerted itself

through subaltern processes, creating autonomous ways of political participation and opposing the mainstream ways of involvement. The alternative forms of political participation and mobilisation can be observed in the politics of the All–Jammu and Kashmir National Conference from the 1930s to 1953, the Plebiscite Front and the 1987 Muslim United Front.

One could also understand that the support for Kashmiri nationalism majorly evolved through the collective awareness of the community and a deep urge to exercise their political agency. The repetitive failure of non-violent political mobilisation paved the way for the eventual rise of militancy. In other words, the militant nationalism introduced new ideas which were not always sharing their objectives with Kashmiri nationalism and undermined Kashmiri nationalism over time. This thesis tried to understand how the structural inconsistencies within state nationalism paved the way for further augmentation of Kashmiri nationalism. It thus justified the hypotheses that the weakness of democratic institutions has created social categories for the distribution of patronage, resulting in chasms based on ethnicity, religion, and region.

Hypotheses Two

Kashmiri nationalism is essentially a contestation of self and the other.

The second hypothesis of the tie study stated that Kashmiri nationalism is essentially a contestation of self and the other. 'Self' and 'Other' denote identity and differences about specific political actors. Rumaelili (2007:22) notes that simultaneously, the self and the other emerged as perspectival and interchangeable concepts, where the self and the other changed constantly. The collective identities were constituted about the differences; hence, the formation of collective identity entailed differences with those outside of the collectivity. This resulted in the relative difference between the collective self and others.

Nationalism forms identities when socialisation enables individuals to see themselves and how others perceive them. Thus, individuals become self by encompassing other individuals' attitudes, as Mead

(1934:88) calls them 'generalised others. Similarly, individuals refer to nationalism from the perspective of a generalised other. In this way, Kashmiri nationalism sees itself and its relation to the other through oppositional structuring, construing a meaningful identity in opposition to other nationalisms. Therefore, the discourse revolves around morally superior nationalism juxtaposed with less superior nationalism. The performance of nationalism entails a representative character, and the politicisation of differences furthers the sense of self and otherness.

The contestation of self and others in Kashmiri nationalism, if analysed carefully, is a contestation between civic forces of nationalism and the ethnic forces of nationalism. It is a recurring tussle between a set of contradictory values of inclusive liberal universality versus the illiberal, ascriptive, exclusive particularism. In its current form, Kashmiri nationalism emerged against the highhandedness of the ruling Dogra house in the 1930s. The fundamental idea that emerged from this was a territorial idea of an inclusive Kashmiri homeland with a common citizenship. A cursory glance at the critical pre-colonial junctures reveals the civic dynamics of Kashmiri nationalism. For instance, the movement against Begaar (bonded labour) was t for exclusive citizenship rights, the right to work, and equal opportunity. Even the tirade against the Dogras was directed against the exclusion of ordinary Kashmiris, oppression, lack of opportunity, etc. The resistance of Kashmiris to share administrative positions with non-Kashmiri officers led to the enactment of state subject law in 1927. This movement saw the coming together of Kashmiris, irrespective of religion, against opening jobs for non-Kashmiris. However, in another instance, the Roti agitation was launched in 1932 by Kashmiri Pandits after the Maharaja's government opened the gates for Kashmiri Muslims. The incident hints towards the shortcomings in the construction of the narrative of Kashmiri nationalism. The formation of the Muslim Conference in 1931 and its conversion to the National Conference in 1938 is determinative that Kashmiri nationalism was constantly evolving with visible tensions between ethnic and civic nationalism.

Without getting into the micro-political details of the politics of the accession signed in 1947, which the National Conference ensured, it was, in many ways, a vote against the ethnic irredentist nationalism

espoused by the Pakistani state. In the 1940s, the organisation's popularity declined after it moved away from Islamic principles and towards vague ideas of secularism and nationalism. Kashmiri nationalism had taken a bold position against the illiberal premise of religious commonality. However, Jalal (1998) notes that Indian nationalism represented by the Indian National Congress excluded those seeking to accommodate religious differences within the framework of the Indian constitution. The resultant creation of the binary opposition between the secular nationalities and the religious communalism denigrated the affinities to religion and not with the nation. Like Indian nationalism, Kashmiri nationalism was also becoming resistant to any other alternate vision of Kashmiri nationalism.

Kashmiri nationalism repeatedly expressed itself against the exclusionary nature of religious nationalism. It debunked Islamic revivalism in its inception and distanced itself from the Muslim League, which stood for the ideals of the Muslim Conference, which was in favour of the ultimate accession of Kashmir to Pakistan. The political outlook throughout the 1940s was far more ambiguous, with the presence of multiple actors who displayed a diversity of interests. However, the pertinent theme is the dialogue between religious and communitarian identities and the deep longing for rational democratic governing structures. Though, in practice, the central appendage of Kashmiri nationalism, the National Conference faltered in successfully incorporating dissent and difference.

Nonetheless, the shortcoming should be ascribed to the National Conference, not Kashmiri Nationalism. In some ways, one can assert that the disjunction between the politics of the National Conference and Kashmiri nationalism placed a precedent for the importance of state nationalism over other valuational variables. The thesis tries to question and transcend the polemical and teleological interpretations of Kashmiri nationalism. The process reveals that Kashmiri nationalism could not be delinked from the ideas of significant nationalisms and their shortcomings elsewhere in South Asia. Civic and ethnic nationalism are not set against one another but are affiliated with modern nationalism.

After 1947, the contestations within Kashmiri nationalism did not cease to exist. Differences were enhanced with the rising political consciousness and education development of the press and media. A vibrant civil society developed in Kashmir, and Kashmiri nationalism based on civic lines gained further momentum. Kashmiri nationalism formed a narrative where people and territory were to belong together and possess a singular political will. A sense of belonging to the same community and an urge for self-governance was fostered. Civic nationalism developed more like a social movement with democratic characteristics. Ethnic nationalism was propounded by the political actors who imagined a commonality of Kashmiri nationalism with Pakistani nationalism. The binary articulated itself in the political and militant forms of Kashmiri nationalism and exhibited constitutive differences. However, the relationship between the self and the other is constituted along multiple dimensions, which allow for a broader range of possible interactions and contradictions. The interactions and contradictions emerge around the nature of difference, the social difference between the self and other and the response of the other.

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