

Routledge Studies in Urbanism and the City

HYBRID URBANISMS IN SECONDARY CITIES OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH

INSIGHTS FROM URBAN PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE DELIVERY IN GHANA AND PERU

Christian Rosen and Nina Gribat



Hybrid Urbanisms in Secondary Cities of the Global South

This book presents the concept of 'Hybrid Urbanisms' aiming to deconstruct the still-existing and often critiqued dualism of formalised and informalised practices in urban planning and infrastructure delivery.

Using an innovative perspective, the book addresses this issue by focusing on the complex configurations in which both forms always co-exist and compete as powerful social constructs. It unveils the juxtaposition, simultaneity, dependency and intertwining of in-/formalised practices and highlights the relevance of this perspective to better understand urban development, especially in the global South. At the same time, the book focuses on secondary cities of Ghana and Peru that are often overlooked in the existing literature but play a relevant role in global urbanisation quantitively and qualitatively. In offering a comparative perspective on two very diverse geographical contexts, ten empirical studies are framed by a conceptualisation of 'Hybrid Urbanisms' and a concluding systematisation of perspectives on this central aspect of urban development. Taken together, this volume makes an innovative contribution on how to produce new and more diverse urban theories of cities of the global South.

This book is essential for scholars, students and practitioners in the fields of urban planning, urban studies, infrastructure studies and international cooperation alike. In addition, it will be of interest to those in the fields of urban sociology, public policy, urban geography and development studies.

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1 Introduction

Hybrid urbanisms – Deconstructing the dualism of in/formalised practices in planning and infrastructure delivery

Christian Rosen and Nina Gribat

1.1 Introduction: Understanding hybrid urbanisms in Ghana and Peru

Standing on a public square in the neighbourhoods of Berlin-Top or in Sector 10 of Peregrinos de Chapi might give you the impression of looking at two different worlds. Geographically this is not completely wrong. Peregrinos is located in Arequipa, Peru's second biggest city, which lies in a desert zone in the south of the country. Berlin-Top is a neighbourhood in Sunyani, the capital of Bono region in the very fertile west of Ghana. The climatic conditions are different, the soil has a different colour, the vegetation is different. The socio-economic conditions are also not the same: Berlin-Top is known as the home of the city's upper class, whilst Sector 10 is one of countless *pueblos jovenes*, young neighbourhoods that were created through land invasion. For various reasons, little is invested in the construction of residential buildings here, whilst in Berlin-Top spacious detached houses and villas are protected by high walls and thoughtfully decorated gates.

Despite these differences, Berlin-Top and Sector 10 of Peregrinos de Chapi also share some similarities, particularly when viewed from the perspective of planning and infrastructure delivery. For instance, residents of both neighbourhoods decided to invest in alternatives to the public grid for their water supply. In Sector 10, some of the residents built their own water network served by large tanks on a hill, which are regularly refilled by water trucks. Filling up the big tanks with drinking water costs a lot, but it is less expensive than supplying each of the tiny houses individually. In Berlin-Top, most residents opted for installing individual mechanised boreholes on their plots of land in addition to their connection to the public grid. Having their own borehole gives them the maximum convenience, and guarantees constant supply in a context of heavily rationed public water delivery. Whilst the chosen mode of self-supply is different, residents in both neighbourhoods are inadequately, or not at all, served by the network-based system of the public providers in their cities. In Arequipa, the network has not been extended to Peregrinos yet, and it will most likely take many more years until it reaches this neighbourhood. In Sunyani, Berlin-Top is serviced – at least theoretically – and many households have a connection to the

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public grid, but at the time of our study all the pipes had been disconnected due to road construction and, even before, a strict rationing system meant that water did not flow regularly.

For most actors from the respective public administrations, the described modes of self-supply of water in Peregrinos de Chapi and at Berlin-Top operate outside the 'formal' system, i.e. the centrally organised and/or network-based systems that are run by public providers. Alternative water delivery solutions such as these are often labelled as 'informal', also indicating attributes such as unplanned, unregulated, unlawful, unsafe or unreliable.

Describing the material realities of water delivery in both neighbourhoods based only on direct observations and statistical data has major shortcomings, as it focuses too much on how many people are using what kind of system and how the water delivery works technically. However, approaches like this are still often used for analysis, especially in the context of international cooperation, to evaluate achievements within standardised systems such as the Sustainable Development Goals (Arora-Jonsson, 2023). These approaches do not offer a deeper understanding of the very diverse realities of local populations, their access options to water, their sense-making and perceptions around water, the availability of resources to buy water and the inequalities and other implications resulting from the unequal distribution of water.

Coming back to the examples from Arequipa and Sunyani, such a deeper and contextualised examination is also needed to understand why and how individual water solutions in two very different places, more than 8000 kilometres apart, are so different but share a common starting point: access to a fully functional public grid is not expected to be established any time soon, even if public authorities in both cities continue to pursue their aim to supply all households. To understand why this is the case, it is vital to study the complex interplay of different actors and practices involved, including the structural conditions. Recognising a shortage of public resources on the one hand, and massive urban expansion on the other, is very important to better understand patterns of local development and the limits on the claims made by public providers. But the realities of both cases are far more complex and diverse than this. In Berlin-Top in Sunyani, the high living standards of upper-class households require constant reliable water access, which the public grid with its limited capacities cannot offer. In Arequipa, water supply is a necessary legal precondition for achieving the community's goal of the formalisation of individual land rights in Peregrinos de Chapi. Only after water access has been documented by the state COFOPRI agency[1] can residents apply for official land titles. Once these have been granted, the land increases in value and title holders' likelihood to be eligible for bank loans rises – unless the land is sold for profit. So there is no way around organising alternative solutions given that public providers lack the resources to connect the *pueblos jovenes*. In both cities, self-supply solutions are playing an integral role in water delivery, yet these are not incorporated in local development plans and are only tolerated by the local authorities, even whilst they acknowledge the importance of self-supply for the functioning of their city's infrastructure.

This book comes out of the Hybrid Urbanisms project,[2] which focuses on deconstructing the socially constructed dualism of 'formal' and 'informal' urban development by analysing how both concepts are interwoven in the diverse realities of infrastructure delivery and planning in secondary cities in Ghana and Peru. Whilst following the conceptual framework of the project, this book is broader in scope, exploring different methodological approaches and empirical contexts, and more generally the applicability of the concept of *hybrid urbanisms* in a greater variety of possible research settings. In both, the project and this book, we argue for the importance of a better understanding of the actual meaning and consequences of the terms 'informal' and 'formal' in planning and infrastructure delivery. *Hybrid urbanisms* as a concept analyses the intersections and mutual co-existences of *formalised and informalised urban practices*. We understand the often-formulated divide between 'formal' and 'informal' planning and infrastructure delivery as a powerful social construct, and thus use them with the suffix '-ised' in this volume to emphasise that practices, spaces and subjects are actively rendered 'formal' or 'informal'. The simple binary of 'formal versus informal urbanism' is often a "thin simplification" (Scott, 1998) and closely related to the regulatory and bureaucratic powers of the state. It does not adequately reflect the complexities and nuances of urban realities – neither in the global South nor in the global North.

Upholding this binary is increasingly questioned in academic contexts (Banks et al., 2020; Lawhon et al., 2018; Porter et al., 2011) and in planning practice this dualistic concept leads to implicit and explicit marginalisation of people and spaces. Social and material realities are often forcefully formalised or informalised, causing dramatic effects of delegitimisation of predominantly marginalised groups in contexts such as housing and infrastructure delivery. We use hybrid urbanisms as a concept to deconstruct this existing binary conception by showing the diverse realities of the simultaneity, juxtaposition, dependency and intertwining of widely differing practices and resulting material realities that are often simplistically labelled as 'formal' or 'informal'. Doing so allows us to highlight who decides what becomes formalised or informalised and which resources and practices are used to produce these attributions.

In the following chapters, we show how the critical analysis and subsequent deconstruction of this dualism contribute epistemologically and methodologically both to academic discourses on how to explore the diverse realities of cities of the global South and to formulating new theory of southern urbanisms (Parnell & Oldfield, 2014; Watson, 2012). We argue that comparative approaches have a special role in putting the spotlight on the most relevant aspects of hybrid urbanisms. For instance, the rationing issues of the Ghana Water Company in Sunyani become more meaningful in analyses when contrasting them with the far bigger trust in public supply solutions in Arequipa in Peru. In both urban contexts, public providers deliver good quality drinking water once being connected to their customers, yet residents' perceptions vary in both cities. We argue that seeing particular cases "through elsewhere" (Robinson, 2016) helps us to understand the specific conditions of every individual case more clearly. Focussing on secondary cities in Ghana and Peru allows us to find a common basis for discussion throughout the different

contributions of the book, highlighting urban realities that are still often overlooked but play an increasingly important role in an urbanising world (Rosen, 2020).

The premise of this book is to propose a new perspective that overcomes the understanding of so-called 'formal' and 'informal' urban practices and materialities as binary, operating as polar opposites and alternatives. Conceptualising their relation as hybrid rather suggests that they are often interrelated, coexisting simultaneously, juxtaposed, or in an intertwined manner. Examining the interdependence of formalised and informalised practices and materialities, as well as deconstructing the often apparently clear distinctions between them, allows us to draw attention to the implications and effects of upholding and reproducing this binary. This introductory chapter outlines the concept of *hybrid urbanisms* before exploring the contextual dimensions of secondary cities and the comparative approach employed in this book. It concludes by giving an overview of the different chapters and their contributions to this volume and its overall theme.

1.2 Hybrid urbanisms: Deconstructing the formal/informal dualism

Urban development in cities of the global South is shaped by complex and dynamic processes influenced significantly by the divide between 'formal' and 'informal' practices. Informality as a term is broadly understood as the existence of economic, social, and spatial activities that operate outside the rules and regulations of the state and state-sanctioned bodies. It has been argued to be a characteristic and inherent aspect of urban development in the global South and is increasingly investigated as such. In the conception of "gray spaces" (Yiftachel, 2009) for instance, urban planning is seen to play a central role in producing realities that are labelled 'informal'. Planning can contribute to the intensification of social inequalities as it often responds to informality by either ignoring, neglecting, confining, or "whitening" (i.e., obscuring) it (Avni & Yiftachel, 2014, p. 490). Whilst the often-practiced contrasting of informality with seemingly more 'formal' approaches in many countries of the global North is increasingly critiqued (Harris, 2018; Hodder, 2016), informality is seen to be pervasive in many contexts of people's daily lives, with many engaging in informalised practices in contexts such as housing, work or mobility.

In the context of the informal economy (Chen, 2006), a need for formalising working conditions is often emphasised (International Labour Organisztion [ILO], 2018). It is argued that the prevalence of informality is a reflection of structural and systemic issues on the global, national and local scale that hinder formalisation. In this context, formalisation is seen to be an important step towards better working conditions, whilst informality is considered problematic because of a claimed lack of integration into existing formal, regulated structures and markets (ILO, 2018). Informalised housing is another important feature of most cities in the global South. Rapid urbanisation, often outpacing housing development and state-led infrastructure provision, has led to the emergence of informalised settlements that are not the result of formalised planning and often include practices of land invasion. Northern planning approaches (largely a legacy of colonialism) are

struggling to accommodate the dynamic and spontaneous nature of these informalised urbanisms, and are often promoting their transformation and formalisation to fit within the scope of planning policies or urban development plans (UN-Habitat, 2016). A vast array of failed strategies shows that legalisation of title deeds often only serves to open up land occupied by informalised housing to the real estate market, with dramatic consequences for residents such as price pressure, displacement and dispossession (Marx, 2009). At the same time, new settlements frequently struggle with inadequate access to clean water and sanitation facilities (Mukhija, 2004; Patel et al., 2007). They often experience irregular and unreliable electricity services, hindering residents' daily lives and limiting economic opportunities (Bloom et al., 2018). Inadequate transportation infrastructure also often prevails, exacerbating mobility issues for residents (Rakodi, 2002). All these challenges are often directly linked in official and other elite discourses to informality, and the term consequently becomes synonymous with deficiencies. It is also argued that unplanned urban expansion often takes place in areas of high risk for natural disasters, resulting in additional risks for inhabitants (UN-Habitat, 2016). In Arequipa for example, some of the *pueblos jovenes* are constructed at the foot of still active volcanos, with city officials constantly pointing out the need to relocate inhabitants. Whilst these warnings also serve an important purpose of protecting residents, they often go hand in hand with an informalisation and delegitimisation of their claims to housing and adequate provision of infrastructure.

Recent research underscores the necessity of rethinking planning paradigms to address the realities of the global South (Robinson, 2016; Watson, 2009). The need to recognise informality as an integral part of urban life (AlSayyad, 2004) and a direct product of formality is emphasised, to avoid the exclusion of people being affected by informalisation (Porter et al., 2011). Roy (2019) challenges prevailing assumptions about informality, positing that the term is not inherently describing something problematic that needs to be fixed, but can rather be viewed as a response to systemic failures and exclusionary practices. She argues for the potential of informalised practices to challenge and reshape urban infrastructure, saying that these often fill gaps left by existing public or private systems, providing essential services and amenities to residents. Recognising and incorporating these practices into planning and infrastructure delivery efforts can lead to more effective and sustainable outcomes. Watson (2012), for example, discusses the importance of better connecting planning and development governance to deliver more flexible and context-specific policies. Governance structures should adapt to the unique dynamics of informalised urbanisms to ensure effective planning and infrastructure provision.

This reframing underscores the need for a more nuanced understanding of informalised practices, actors and spaces in shaping urban development in the global South, and especially of the strong interdependence of what is labelled 'formal' and 'informal'. A multiplicity of characteristics are associated with each concept, which often reinforce each other's effects on the stigmatisation of informality. The situations described in Arequipa and Sunyani are again a good example. The public administrations are promoting a networked water system as reliable and

cost-efficient, yet in both cities, residents complain about different forms of accessibility and reliability issues. Self-supply solutions such as boreholes and private networks served by water trucks are largely tolerated by both administrations but are not integrated into the cities' strategic water plans as they do not form part of the formal network. For the administrations, systems of self-supply remain second-class solutions as they are not contributing to the ideal of a fully formalised, planned and networked infrastructure.

In the context of top-down planning approaches' struggles to engage positively with informalised urbanism, the importance of community participation is emphasised (Mahjabeen et al., 2009). 'Adaptive urban development' as an approach points out the need for planners to adopt strategies for urban development that respond to the unique needs of informalised settlements and their populations (Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 2013) emphasising the importance of flexible planning to address the challenges posed by limited resources. Also, cultural sensitivity plays an important role, recognising that informalised communities and their settlements often have distinct local and traditional norms that influence their spatial organisation (Bayat, 1997). However, the potential for collective action is often constrained by external factors such as political and institutional barriers. Governments and formalised institutions play a crucial role in either facilitating or impeding the ability of communities to organise and advocate for their rights and interests (Madzivhandila & Maloka, 2014).

Whilst the divide between 'formal' and 'informal' still prevails in many aspects of planning and infrastructure, these new understandings of urban development highlight the potential of what is being informalised whilst arguing for new ways to think of 'formal' and 'informal' as strongly interconnected, and of informality as always being produced as a consequence and in relation to formality (Porter et al., 2011). The concept of hybrid urbanisms places the relationships between formalised and informalised urban development practices at the centre of the research interest and aims to renegotiate them by highlighting their always individual configurations of simultaneity, juxtaposition, dependency, and intertwined practices and materialities (Rosen & Gribat, 2023). The concept acknowledges that both forms of development exist as powerful social constructs, including sets of rules, customs, and specific local histories. They play important roles in different actors' practices and also contribute to defining which forms of development are formalised and informalised. This becomes particularly important when analysing the often-different perceptions of informality of state and civil society actors and the conflicts about competing definitions concerning development practices.

Lawhon et al. (2018) and Sseviiri et al. (2022) also put the relationship of formalised and informalised practices at the centre of their analysis, developing the concept of 'heterogeneous infrastructure configurations' – socio-technological configurations of which infrastructural artefacts are parts. At the same time, they criticise the term 'hybridity' for its "etymological dualism" (Lawhon et al., 2018, p. 725), which suggests the coexistence of "mixed" informalised and formalised practices of infrastructure production, preferring instead 'heterogeneity' to altogether destabilise the idea that there are two identifiably different kinds of

practices. Whilst acknowledging this critique, hybrid urbanisms understands both forms of development as actually existing social constructs that can only be deconstructed by analysing that existence and at the same time the modes of its production. Only with case-specific knowledge can it be investigated how hybrid realities are socially constructed in negotiations between the involved actors. Following this argumentation, Lemanski (2021) suggests that the examination of "technological bricolage" is productive, understanding hybrid arrangements as specific configurations of networked and non-networked infrastructures, of public and private, as well as planned and grown structures.

Other authors (Banks et al., 2020) also understand informality as a continuum that needs to be explored critically, based on political economy approaches which analyse the consequences for social stratification and marginalisation of whole population groups. Rateau and Jaglin (2022, p. 186) conceptualise hybridisation as "situated combinations of incomplete infrastructuralisation and uneven heterogenisation". They argue for analysing as individual and case-specific the complex realities resulting from the often insufficient provision of infrastructure by formalised networked systems and the consequently emerging co-produced solutions. Hybrid urbanisms also focuses on the relation of both aspects of development realities to better understand how certain configurations come into existence and also acknowledges the range of different possible outcomes of these complex urban realities. At the same time, it highlights the non-existence of a clear divide between so-called 'formal' and 'informal' practices and materialities and invites examination of the constant and conflictful (re)negotiation of what is labelled as one of the two options.

This book underlines the importance of a better understanding of the multifaceted practices of planning and infrastructure delivery, especially in serving vulnerable populations (Mitlin & Bartlett, 2018; Moretto et al., 2018). Residents play a central role in organising their own infrastructural realities (Simone, 2004), for example, by substituting for supply shortages. This gives them a certain amount of power over determining their own living conditions. In this context, the state does not hold the monopoly of rights and duties but residents themselves negotiate new practices and rules that shape life in their environment and also contribute to the social production of their cities (Isin & Nielsen, 2008; Lemanski, 2020). Understanding their realities better and analysing their responses to formalised planning approaches highlights the central hypothesis that urban development is always being shaped by hybrid configurations of actors and practices and their related social and material realities.

1.3 Hybrid urbanisms in context: Comparative research in secondary cities of the global South

Current discourses in urban and planning studies highlight the need for a nuanced understanding of southern cities in terms of urban development and especially planning and infrastructure delivery (Parnell & Oldfield, 2014; Watson, 2012). To address them adequately, scholars and practitioners have been called to embrace

context-specific, collaborative, and adaptive approaches that consider the dynamic nature and diversity of urban development in the global South.

Since the turn of the century, the uncritical transfer of development theories and practices from the global North to the global South, especially to former colonial contexts, has increasingly been criticised in urban studies (Robinson, 2002; Roy, 2011). One of the main arguments in this debate is the demand for a "provincialisation" of purportedly universal Northern models of urban development, which often have little to do with the urban realities in the global South (Sheppard et al., 2013). At the same time, the global South is increasingly recognised to encompass diverse regions with unique histories, grappling with distinct challenges in the realm of urbanisation. In consequence, understanding urban development includes the reconstruction of multifaceted processes involving social, economic, and spatial dimensions of transformations. Planning strategies derived from northern experiences may, for example, not align with the developmental trajectories of northern cities undergoing globalisation (Batra & Udu-gama, 2019).

The empirical focus of this book is on two very different geographical contexts within the global South, Ghana and Peru, and in particular on secondary cities in both countries. Such cities are often overlooked in urban research in favour of the much larger and apparently more significant primary or megacities, but they represent an increasingly important form of urbanisation (Roberts & Hohmann, 2014; Rosen, 2020). Nevertheless, megacities and global cities dominate the academic debate, especially when discussing urban development in the global South (Zeiderman, 2008). Against this background, the relevance of a better knowledge of the urbanisation processes of secondary cities has been emphasised (De Boeck et al., 2009; Owusu, 2008). Secondary cities have been discussed as an independent category of cities, to which a number of hopes are attached in the context of international development, such as decentralisation, economic growth, or poverty reduction (Chen & Kanna, 2010; Marais et al., 2016; Roberts & Hohmann, 2014). Based on analyses of urban systems and normative demands for balanced economic and spatial development, secondary cities are constructed as strategic locations for decentralised development policies (Rondinelli, 1983). At the same time, they are considered as a potential for alternative urban futures beyond global and world cities (De Boeck et al., 2009).

Discussions about a definition for secondary cities can be traced back to the 1980s. They are seen as locations for social and technical infrastructure but also for economic development and other state institutions including the military (Bolay & Rabinovich, 2004; Satterthwaite, 2006). A second early approach to researching secondary cities follows the Chicago School classics of urban research and adds the criteria of population size, spatial extension of the settlement area and location to the existing functional definition (Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1986). In addition, the criterion of a multifunctional economy is identified as an important aspect (Van der Merwe, 1992), thus emphasising the correlation between city size and city complexity (Rondinelli, 1983). Later, the supra-regional or international links to the global economy were increasingly investigated, highlighting the challenges for secondary cities in international competition with the much larger primary cities

and their under-integration in globalised markets (Bolay & Rabinovich, 2004; Rodríguez-Pose & Dahl Fitjar, 2013). In this context, it is also argued that failed decentralisation processes are the main reason for deficits in their urban development, as secondary cities are lacking capacity in terms of qualified experts and institutional knowledge (Marais & Cloete, 2016).

Competing with the major urban centres of their respective states, the problem of urban bias comes into play. National elites have an increased interest in the development of the cities in which they live – often the capital cities. Smaller cities and rural areas, in contrast, are of less interest and therefore at a disadvantage (Armstrong & McGee, 1985; Kaplan et al., 2004). For this reason, little is known about the specifics of secondary cities in terms of their economy, land use, finances, infrastructure and governance (Roberts & Hohmann, 2014). This seems all the more surprising as these cities are often seen as laboratories for more sustainable, environmentally friendly models of urban development. In the course of this, their potential to enable alternative management approaches (Otiso, 2005) on a smaller scale is emphasised in order to improve existing structures and test innovative new approaches (De Boeck et al., 2009; Marzal & Ludeña, 2017; Owusu, 2008). At the same time, secondary cities are often facing limited resources and capacity for governance, making it hard for them to develop innovative approaches and projects on a larger scale (Gribat, 2021). This particular tension between expectations and limitations makes secondary cities in the global South particularly interesting type of cities in which to examine hybrid urbanisms.

The definition of secondary cities in this book follows recent approaches focussing on their role in the urban system of the respective country and beyond, arguing that the diversity of local and national contexts makes it hard to find a standardised quantitative definition. Secondary cities are characterised as important regional centres for economy and services and are to be examined in relation to the respective primary cities in their regional or national context (Rosen, 2020). This also differentiates the concept from other terms like *intermediate cities* (Bolay & Rabinovich, 2004), *ordinary cities* (Robinson, 2006) or *overlooked cities* (Ruszczyk et al., 2020) which each highlight other aspects. At the same time, it goes along with discussions on *second cities* (Hodos, 2011), *second tier cities* (Markusen et al., 1999) and *second rank cities* (Camagni et al., 2015) that argue in a similar direction.

The contributions in this book examine hybrid urbanisms in secondary cities in Ghana and Peru and invite readers to take a comparative perspective. Whilst working with different methods, quantitatively and qualitatively, the authors are responding to the call for more on-site case studies reflecting the local realities in different contexts of the global South (Healey, 2012). In this context, demands for comparative research approaches have developed that take greater account of the particularities and diversity of local contexts and contribute to a more global understanding of urban development or planning (Robinson, 2016; Watson, 2009). Whilst looking at these very diverse realities of secondary cities in Ghana and Peru, this book aims to use this unique perspective to gain a better

understanding of local specifics. Robinson describes these as either "genetic" forms of comparisons, that are "tracing the prolific interconnections and wider processes which produce the urban, and which constitute repeated or related but distinctive, urban outcomes" or as "generative" comparisons that "might emerge across shared features evident amid the rich fullness and complexity of urban life. These provide the invitation to generate conceptual insights across diverse urban outcomes" (Robinson, 2022, p. 11). *Hybrid Urbanisms* contributes to both.

1.4 Hybrid urbanisms in Peru and Ghana: Contributions of the book

Applying the concept of hybrid urbanisms in case studies of little-studied secondary cities in Ghana and Peru, this book contributes to the calls for more diverse urban and planning theories. Focussing on hybrid urbanisms highlights the challenges secondary cities are facing in finding solutions for a lack of resources when they are in competition with other cities (including the larger primary cities) and involved in ongoing decentralisation processes which aim at bringing more responsibilities to the local level. This book juxtaposes case studies of different types of hybrid urbanisms in various secondary cities in Ghana and Peru. In doing so, it invites readers to look at these cities through a comparative lens that is enabled by the structure of the book and by direct links within the chapters to contributions from the other country's context.

Summarising the aims of the book, three central contributions to current scholarly debates can be identified. Firstly, the book contributes to the discussions on urban development, in particular planning and infrastructure delivery, by introducing the concept of *hybrid urbanisms* and applying it in the context of different cities and different specific research interests. Secondly, it answers the calls for conducting more research in *secondary cities*, learning more about their individual specificities and possible commonalities. Thirdly, the book contributes to ongoing debates about the emergence of a theory of cities of the global South, whilst also highlighting the importance of local knowledge production and exchange.

Many of the contributors have been working together for seven years, enabling a constant exchange of ideas that led to the development of this book. This cooperation also generated several research projects, including the Hybrid Urbanisms project. Through this long-standing partnership, comparative moments have always been part of the discussions between the authors involved.

The book is structured into two main parts, with this introduction and a conclusion, summarising and comparing the findings from all chapters, completing the volume. The first part includes the various contributions from the Ghanaian context, and the second those from Peru. Both parts focus on empirically deep studies within the context of hybrid urbanisms, shedding light on the different urban realities and the specificity of certain aspects of urban planning and infrastructure delivery in the secondary cities of both countries. You can read the book by orienting



Figure 1.1 Overview of case study secondary cities in Ghana and Peru

yourself to a country context or by comparing the contributions related to three different themes.

Theme 1: Systems, reforms and legislation. Daniel Kweku Baah Inkoom and George Owusu (Chapter 2) explore how in Ghana, the development of secondary cities in particular is shaped by hybrid urbanisms, taking the example of Sunyani and highlighting policy reforms from the national down to the local level. Millicent Awialie Akaatebaa, Michael Osei Asibey and Florence Abugtane Avogo (Chapter 3) and Jessica Pineda-Zumaran (Chapter 7) explore how planning systems in both countries are challenged by weak institutions, limited resources and conflicting rationalities, leading to hybrid arrangements on all levels.

Theme 2: Actors in urban planning and infrastructure delivery. Whilst Clifford Amoako, Irene-Nora Dinye and Akosua Baah Kwarteng Amaka-Otchere (Chapter 4) explore how unregistered, floating drivers operate on the Ejisu-Kumasi highway, Matteo Stiglich and Jessica Pineda-Zumaran (Chapter 8) compare attempts to formalise public transportation in Lima and Arequipa. Manuel Dammert-Guardia, Diana Torres Obregon and Ricardo Jimenez Palacios (Chapter 9) explore the role of different actors in the application of a social housing program in Tacna.

Theme 3: Everyday practices and activism. Pearl Puwurayire and Christian Rosen (Chapter 5) engage with the topic of transport infrastructure and explore differing

configurations of hybrid urbanims in different places in the secondary city of Sunyani. This relates to Katherin Tiburcio Jaimes's work (Chapter 10), which systematically analyses everyday walking mobility and accessibility of central infrastructure in Huacho. Jonas A. Akudugu, Michael Addaney and Millicent A. Akaateba (Chapter 6) take us to the traders of Bolgatanga and show their resistance to public authorities informalising their livelihoods through displacing them from a regenerated market hall, whilst Maïwenn Raoul (Chapter 11) describes how dwellers on the peripheries of Arequipa struggle with the informalisation of their land rights and a systematic stigmatisation of their lives in a *pueblo joven*.

Notes

1 Organismo de Formalización de la Propiedad Informal (Informal Property Formalisation Agency).
2 The Hybrid Urbanisms project was funded by the German Research Foundation 2021–2024 (funding number 458375534), and included financial support for this edited volume and two authors' workshops in Arequipa, Peru and Sunyani, Ghana.

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2 Urban development and secondary cities in Ghana

The case of Sunyani

Daniel Kweku Baah Inkoom and George Owusu

2.1 Introduction

Ghana has experienced rapid urban growth in recent years (Yankson & Bertrand, 2012), attributed to factors including the combination of high birth rates and net in-migration (Ghana Statistical Service [GSS], 2014). There has consequently been increased financial pressure on governments to provide urban infrastructure and services to enhance the living conditions of residents. Due to constrained financial resources, inadequate institutional capability and conflicting budgetary objectives, many cities find it difficult to obtain sufficient financing for infrastructure projects. Consequently, infrastructure and services are undersupplied in many urban areas due to the inability of local governments to bridge the financing gap (Asibey et al., 2019; Osei-Kyei et al., 2017). Urbanisation without the provision of basic amenities such as energy, transportation, sanitation and water supply to meet the demands of growing populations is detrimental (Pandey et al., 2022), and residents encounter traffic congestion, pollution and service interruptions that hinder day-to-day living and business endeavour. In response to this, there has been the emergence of private and largely informally operating service providers to meet the water, sanitation, health and housing needs of residents (Asibey, Amponsah et al., 2019; Asibey, Dosu et al., 2019). Their services are deemed crucial to complementing the efforts of the formal, public sector agencies in addressing the various needs of the people. Although informal activities tend to be associated with many problems such as inefficiency, pollution of the environment and encroachment on ecologically sensitive areas, the informal sector tends to dominate in many primary and secondary cities.

In Ghana, the literature on urbanisation has largely focused on primary cities such as Accra and Kumasi (Agyemang et al., 2019; Korah et al., 2022). Little attention has been paid to secondary cities, although they constitute the main centres and drivers of the urban transition, and not much is known about the emerging spatial dynamics and drivers that shape their urban development. This gap in the literature not only limits understanding of how secondary cities evolve but, importantly, challenges the capacity of city authorities to plan and sustainably manage secondary cities in the face of rapid urban growth (Roberts & Hohmann, 2014). Addressing this knowledge gap has the potential of equipping city authorities and

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development practitioners with the requisite knowledge and skills to better anticipate and plan for future urban development and basic infrastructure needs of cities.

The main argument underpinning this chapter is that secondary cities contribute significantly to the overall development of Ghana. In particular, actors in both formal and informal sectors, although challenged by a range of factors, greatly influence the growth and expansion of towns and secondary cities by providing social and economic infrastructure, alternative livelihoods and incomes and general improvement in wellbeing. The chapter thus discusses rapid urbanisation and efforts at decentralisation as the main drivers of secondary city growth in Ghana, the urban development challenges in secondary cities, and policy responses which address the challenges and build local capacities and development practice.

2.2 Rapid urbanisation and decentralisation efforts as the main drivers of secondary city growth in Ghana

Ghana's urban population has recorded a more rapid growth than the rural population: it grew by 4.7% per annum between 1960 and 1970, slowing to 3.3% between 1970 and 1984 and increasing to 4.6% between 1984 and 2000. It currently stands at 3.6% (GSS, 2021). The growth rates for the rural population were 1.6%, 2.3% and 1.5%, respectively, for the same periods (GSS, 2014). The urban population is, however, concentrated in a few cities. In 2000, eight out of the 88,656 official localities in Ghana accounted for almost a fifth of Ghana's population (GSS, 2005) and ten years later Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi, Tamale and Tema accounted for over 35 percent of Ghana's urban population. These cities are not only hotspots in terms of their population but also in terms of economic activities and growth (Cobbinah & Niminga-Beka, 2017). Consequently, urbanisation in these cities has been associated with uncontrolled physical development, urban sprawl and growing housing deficits leading to the proliferation of informal settlements.

2.2.1 Planning, decentralisation and the role of hybrid urbanism

Ghana's history of urban development planning dates back to the colonial period. A number of policies, programmes and development plans, from short-term to medium- and long-term, have been put in place with various degrees of implementation and success. Despite all these interventions, governing elites have been unable to achieve a consensus on development strategy, let alone ensure a smooth transition from one strategy to another.

According to international protocols (the New Urban Agenda, the Sustainable Development Goals, the African Union's Agenda 2063, etc.), urban development, in a bid to make cities 'liveable', should cater for sustainable building and development, addressing the need for mixed-income residential areas, density, walkability, public spaces and amenities and modernising urban infrastructure, through a decentralised governance and planning system. Ghana's planning practice has witnessed new approaches that began with the call for decentralisation efforts in 1988. This was to achieve principles of stakeholder participation, coordination, consultation

and citizen participation, embrace the planning ideologies of the 21st century and address socio-economic and spatial challenges, particularly in the bigger cities in the south of the country. Specifically, the Local Government Act 1993 (Act 462), now revised in the Local Governance Act 2016 (Act 936), sought to establish a decentralised system of planning, where the views and interests of people at the grassroots would be identified and incorporated in plans. Additionally, the National Development Planning (System) Act 1994 (Act 480) provides for a decentralised national system of planning and development. It defines planning duties of various local authorities and specifies procedures for the preparation and adoption of local development plans. The planning approach promoted advancements and distribution of services due to the incorporation of interests of local communities in plan design and implementation.

Several other planning laws were subsequently developed to guide and define decentralised planning for the development of Ghanaian towns. Most importantly, to incorporate spatial components into planning practice and embrace new planning thinking, the Land Use and Spatial Planning Act of 2016 (Act 925) was developed "to revise and consolidate the laws on land use and spatial planning [and] provide for sustainable development of land and human settlements through a decentralised planning system" (Republic of Ghana, 2016a, p. 9). Additionally, the National Development Planning (System) Regulations (Republic of Ghana, 2016b) empowered the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) to sanction planning units that default in discharging their constitutional and legal duties. This planning approach was expected to promote sustainable and resilient cities. Fundamental to the development process in Ghana are local government and other actors across the various administrative levels such as the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs), non-governmental and civil society organisations (NGOs and CSOs), international development assistance partners and a range of informal actors. Collaboration among actors with varying interests and the ability to influence the urban development process is essential to its overall success or failure (Abdul Somed et al., 2024; Asibey et al., 2019). Despite the numerous attempts to improve upon planning at the sub-national level, there is evidence of weakness in capacities relating to participatory problem analysis, plan preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation (Inkoom et al., 2019).

2.2.2 The implications of development and decentralisation for secondary cities in Ghana

Urban development planning in Ghana has been described as piecemeal, ad hoc and on-demand, and does not provide continuity in thought, actions and intentions for a planned future (Cobbinah & Darkwah, 2017). Additionally, urban development interventions in Ghana have not affected all urban areas evenly, with most of the population living in areas of urban sprawl and emerging cities. Accra and Kumasi remain Ghana's primary cities, each home to more than two million people (macrotrends, 2024a, 2024b), with vast social contrasts compared to other cities. According to Adarkwa (2012), cities in Ghana are a place of stark contrasts, and

there can be sudden changes in social standing between one district and the next. At the upper end of the social scale, residential enclaves are increasingly turning into gated communities, catering to the demands of the upper-middle classes of Accra and Tema. Sprawling suburbs and the proliferation of secondary cities are another dominant feature of much urban development, with built-up areas of various densities extending over large distances without any real sense of unity or identity.

As a result of the decentralisation efforts of the central government, a new way of city living is being created in the other metropolitan areas of the nation, specifically in secondary cities. Yet, despite numerous decentralisation efforts, urban development interventions have failed to manage urban sprawl, particularly in the south of the country, with the urban centres growing beyond their physical boundaries, with spill-over effects. This has resulted in difficult living conditions with sanitation challenges and uncontrolled settlement layouts, among other problems. Notably, there has been an expansion of informal and unregulated developments.

The National Urban Policy (NUP) was developed in 2012 to address the problems that are associated with Ghana's urban development challenges, although with little emphasis on secondary cities. Most importantly, the NUP recognises the important role of the informal sector (businesses, markets and settlements) in attaining the goals of the policy, where it raises the issue of "changing the official attitude towards informal enterprises from neglect to recognition and policy support" (Government of Ghana, 2012, p. 18). Additionally, Ghana's decentralisation and urban policy, as well as its planning policy, recognise that private and informal sector activities, investments and innovation are also major drivers of urban development. The diversity of the sector, ranging from micro-enterprises to cooperatives to multinationals, along with informal businesses, is thus, acknowledged and promoted.

2.3 Proliferation and growth of secondary cities in Ghana: Sunyani as a case study

According to Owusu (2005, 2008), the process of urbanisation in Ghana is associated with the proliferation and growth of secondary cities. Several reasons have been given for this. First, continuous population growth is argued to have resulted in the proliferation and growth of secondary cities in Ghana. This is because of the processes of rural-urban migration and natural population increase. Although Ghana's population growth rates have declined in recent years, they are still high compared to many parts of the world. According to the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), the last few decades have witnessed the decline of Ghana's population growth, largely due to fertility decline and increasing preference for smaller families by the population (GSS, 2005, 2021). As urban centres expand beyond control, population spills over into peripheral areas. These spill-over effects from large metropolitan centres such as Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi and Tamale, as well as urban sprawl in other large urban centres, especially the regional administrative centres such as Techiman, Sunyani, Koforidua, Wa, Bolgatanga and Ho lead to population concentration in formerly rural areas. These previously low-density

areas, over time, become denser, assume urban form and provide important services to residents; hence, the emergence of secondary cities. This is evident across Ghana where many secondary cities (Takoradi, Cape Coast, Sunyani) have been expanding over time due to population increase and spill-over effects from the major cities. Underlying the massive expansion in many of these centres are the factors of weak urban and land use planning as well as weak development control and land management (Asibey et al., 2019; Asuah et al., 2016). Consequently, urban expansion tends to 'leapfrog', rather than simply progress contiguously with existing areas (Inkoom et al., 2019).

Additionally, improvements in services and infrastructure through projects such as the World Bank-funded Secondary Cities Support Program Project (SCSPP), guided by national policies such as the National Urban Policy Framework and Action Plan 2012, and the decentralisation policy, have led to the growth of secondary cities. Despite the myriad of challenges confronting Ghana's decentralisation and local government reforms introduced at the end of the 1980s, the SCSPP has facilitated the flow of resources (funds and infrastructure) to the lower echelon of the country's urban hierarchy, thus facilitating the growth and proliferation of secondary cities and small towns (Owusu, 2005, 2008). The effects of these urban governance approaches have been continuous expansion of secondary cities with some corresponding services and infrastructure to meet increasing demands. Consequently, today, many secondary cities in Ghana are centres of market and commercial activities, services (secondary and higher education, health, banking, etc.) and some industrial activities.

In Sunyani, for example, local government interventions (land use planning enforcement, provision of urban services, development control, etc.), the establishment of the University of Energy and Natural Resources (UENR), renovation of the airport and other important health, commercial and educational infrastructure have significantly shaped the expansion and development of the city over the years (Adusu et al., 2021). Consequently, the city's growth has attracted organisations and individual operators, often informal in nature, to address service provision gaps, specifically in the areas of transportation, water, energy and waste collection and other sanitation-related services.

Another important factor contributing to the proliferation and growth of secondary cities is the intensifying processes of agricultural commercialisation. Cash cropping in particular has contributed to the development of secondary cities. Related to this is the exploitation of natural resources, especially gold mining, and the emergence of new towns, the creation of new regions and districts, and the establishment of new administrative centres as growth poles or centres. These processes involve having a regional or district seat (town or city) which, by virtue of their new roles, receive investments in the form of infrastructure and service provision, which consequently brings some expansion, as mentioned earlier. Ghana at independence in 1957 had five political administrative regions and therefore five regional administrative capitals or centres. These regions and corresponding regional capitals have increased over time to 10 in 1982, and they have reached 16 in 2018 (Benning, 1999). Similarly, for purposes of effective administration and spatial

development of all administrative regions, districts and their corresponding district capitals have been created over time: 110 in 1988 and 170 in 1998, and then 216 in 2012, reaching 261 in 2021. The regional capitals and many of the district capitals such as Obuasi, Tarkwa, Nkawkaw, Dunkwa-on-Offin, Winneba, Navrongo can be described as secondary cities. Consequently, the political decisions to create new regions and districts have contributed to the proliferation of secondary cities (see Owusu, 2008, 2015).

It has been argued that secondary cities, like large cities and metropolitan centres, are also influenced by the combined effects of local, regional and global factors (Chen & Kanna, 2012; Grant & Nijman, 2002). However, many of these conditions are continuously changing. The impacts of these factors on secondary cities are not uniform, as some global factors may be very important for some secondary cities, whilst for others the influence of local or regional factors may be the key to their growth or decline; which factors are critical requires the study of specific secondary cities (Owusu, 2008).

Sunyani is a good example of an important secondary city and is known as one of the best-planned and cleanest cities in Ghana (Anane, 2013; Asuah et al., 2016). Writing about population and settlement formation of Ghana (then called Gold Coast) in the 18th and early 19th centuries, Dickson (1969) notes that Sunyani originated as a hunters' camp for hunting elephants. The growth and development of Sunyani began in earnest following the expansion of cash crop cultivation (mainly cocoa) and the linking of the area with road transport, particularly the Kumasi-Sunyani Road in the early part of the 1900s. According to Dickson (1969, p. 293), the growth of settlements in general was associated with the cocoa industry, and wherever the crop flourished, towns received an inflow of merchants and others engaged in economic activities peripheral but vital to the continuing success of cocoa cultivation.

Equally important for the growth of Sunyani has been the designation of the town as an administrative centre, a characterisation which began in the colonial times and has persisted to date. In the early 1900s, Sunyani was designated as a district headquarters with jurisdiction over the areas of Sunyani and surrounding areas. Also, with the construction of the road linking Sunyani to Kumasi, the city "became commercially important as a clearinghouse for cocoa, kola nuts, and staple foods" (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013). The designation as district headquarters allowed the town to attract other services, including the establishment of the present Sunyani government hospital in 1929 and the transfer of the Forestry Training School (which developed into the fully-fledged University of Energy and Natural Resources) from Kumasi to Sunyani in 1943.

Sunyani remained a district capital as part of the Ashanti Region until the Brong-Ahafo Region was carved out of the Ashanti Region in 1959. Sunyani was selected as the regional capital for the Brong-Ahafo Region. Following the creation of new political administrative regions in 2018, the Brong-Ahafo Region was split into three regions, namely Bono, Bono East and Ahafo. Sunyani is currently the regional headquarters of the Bono Region. It needs to be stressed that the designation of Sunyani since 1959 as a regional administrative headquarters has facilitated the

Table 2.1 Urban population growth of Sunyani

Year	*Population*	
	Sunyani Municipal	*Sunyani West*
1960	12,160	-
1970	23,780	-
1984	38,834	-
2000	101,145	-
2010	123,224	85,272
2021	193,595	136,022

Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2010, 2021).

growth of the city by attracting both private and public investments. As the regional headquarters for both public and private agencies, Sunyani has attracted a diverse range of people from across Ghana and beyond, contributing to its rapid population growth and spatial expansion (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 shows that the population of Sunyani has grown from as low as 12,160 in 1960 to over 300,000 in 2021, that is, if one includes the population of the Sunyani West Municipality. Indeed, Sunyani West was originally part of the Sunyani Municipality and was created in 2007 as part of the process of fragmentation of the district for administrative and development purposes (see Owusu, 2015). Currently, the two municipalities can be regarded as one continuous built-up area interspersed with a little undeveloped rural land. The process underlies the emergence of a metropolitan region, with Sunyani Municipality at the core, as the built-up area expands and consumes rural centres and agricultural land.

Consequently, several small towns and rural settlements such as Abesim, Baakoniaba/Berlin-Top, New-Dormaa and Fiapre are either part of, or becoming part of, the urban core in the rapidly transforming city. Like many secondary cities in Ghana and the global South in general, uncontrolled urban expansion is stretching the limits of infrastructure and services as city authorities are unable to keep pace with urban expansion. Writing on groundwater quality and access in the Sunyani Municipality, Kusi et al. (2020) note that the supply of piped water does not meet the demand of most communities and as such many urban residents have turned to groundwater as an alternative source of their water needs. Groundwater tends to be acidic with higher levels of coliform and other contaminants than the piped supply, which poses great risks to the health of the population. Anane (2013, pp. 183–184) sums up the urban development challenges of Sunyani as follows: pollution of water bodies, limited drainage systems, poor waste management and inadequate sanitation facilities, traffic congestion and inadequate car parking spaces in the central business district, poor access to roads in some areas and inadequate neighbourhood parks. He adds that the city authorities will have to address these challenges if the city is to develop in a sustainable manner.

Despite the challenges, Sunyani plays key roles as a centre of administration and service provision particularly of secondary and tertiary education as it hosts

several senior secondary schools, colleges for teaching and nursing training and universities. In addition, it hosts the regional hospital and branches of the National Bank of Ghana and virtually all the commercial banks. By providing these important services and others, Sunyani provides livelihood opportunities to its resident population and the hinterlands and also acts as a countermagnet to the large metropolitan centres of Accra, Kumasi, Tamale and Sekondi-Takoradi.

2.4 Urban development challenges in secondary cities

The study of Africa's urban development challenges has been largely focused on megacities; few studies specifically focus on secondary cities. The challenges facing the development of secondary cities, in most cases, are of different scales compared to those experienced in large metropolitan regions (Korah et al., 2022). According to Roberts (2021), secondary cities are not even on the urban policy agenda for most African states. Their challenges range from creating jobs, attracting investment for needed infrastructure, environmental issues and diversifying and revitalising city-wide economies. In contrast to the major cities in Ghana such as Accra, Tema, Kumasi and Takoradi, which have experienced large-scale investment and infrastructure developments such as affordable housing, road interchanges, factories and high-rise buildings, secondary cities witness very limited investment. The infrastructure systems such as road networks, drainage and improvement in services in secondary cities are limited. Much urban development occurs without the needed infrastructure, which has serious implications for the cities' growth and, ultimately, for national development (Yankson et al., 2017). According to Dacosta et al. (2023), Sunyani and other secondary cities in Ghana, for instance, are likely to encounter traffic problems in the next five years if the trend remains unchanged – i.e., the use of low-occupancy vehicles for internal trips (currently around two-thirds of all journeys), the annual growth rate of 12.2 percent in vehicle ownership and the fact that rapid population growth rates are expected to continue. This calls for a major infrastructure investment to address these challenges if the city is to grow sustainably.

The challenge of inadequate infrastructure, including transportation, and little investment in research and development and technology compared to the primary cities, deter businesses from establishing themselves in secondary cities (Agyemang et al., 2019). This lack of investment impedes the growth of industries that drive economic progress and the creation of highly skilled jobs. Given that the primary cities are being industrialised and global investments are focused on those cities, many secondary cities in Ghana face job opportunity challenges (Abdul Somed et al., 2024). Further, policies and regulations impact the ease of doing business in secondary cities. With the bureaucratic hurdles, high tax regime and unfavourable regulatory environment, businesses may be less inclined to establish and/or expand operations in secondary cities. Businesses that experience weak markets, due to the high tax regime, might relocate from the secondary cities to the major cities for better markets, as reported by Amankwaa et al. (2022). Therefore, understanding the specific combination of these factors in a given secondary city is

crucial for developing targeted strategies to address employment issues and stimulate economic growth.

The population growth and the resultant urbanisation and sprawl of Sunyani, for instance, have had significant impacts on the city with built-up areas and farmlands experiencing growth in area whilst uncultivated green spaces are largely negatively impacted. Adusu et al. (2021) reported the drying up of water bodies and reduction in open and closed forest types with major implications for biodiversity and restoration of damaged environments. As noted above, in the case of Sunyani, the city was officially dubbed 'cleanest city in Ghana' in 2007 (Sunyani, cleanest city, 2008). This achievement is, however, threatened by the current urban population growth rate of 3.6% (GSS, 2021). The low crime rate, a relatively clean environment, and the availability of good secondary and tertiary educational institutions have made Sunyani an attractive city. However, the city and its suburbs have experienced pollution of water bodies, lack of drainage systems, poor waste management and inadequate sanitation facilities (Asuah et al., 2016). The African Centre for Cities & Cities Alliance (2013) observed that over 67 percent of city residents do not have access to improved sanitation, and more than 60 percent of these residents reside in informal housing.

2.5 Secondary cities and the policy response

Secondary cities will continue to play the role of engines of growth and economic transformation (Roberts, 2021). The growing sustainability of these cities is, however, threatened by the lack of capacity to generate enough revenue and to enforce urban planning standards and regulations, a lack of coordination and integration of urban activities and emphasis on socio-economic development planning and marginalisation of physical planning (Asuah et al., 2016), as well as the challenge of policy failures. The government response to urbanisation and urban growth in cities in Ghana has been piecemeal and fragmented, and at best been largely pursued within a framework of multiple different development plans. In the absence of a defined policy direction on urban development, previous government interventions in cities have largely been project-based which is not inclusive enough. However, several significant urban policies such as the National Urban Policy and the decentralisation policy, alongside the secondary cities programme and the Rural Development Policy, have been initiated to enhance the competitiveness of secondary cities in Ghana. These are examined in more detail below.

The National Urban Policy (NUP) was developed as a long-term policy framework to intervene widely to facilitate and promote sustainable growth and development of cities and towns in Ghana (Government of Ghana, 2012). A NUP is understood as "a coherent set of decisions through a deliberate government-led process of coordinating and rallying various actors towards a common vision and goal that will promote more transformative, productive, inclusive and resilient urban development for the long-term" (UN-Habitat/Cities Alliance, 2021). The uniqueness of such a policy is in its ability to integrate relevant national sectoral

urban policies and clarify roles and responsibilities horizontally across appropriate ministries as well as vertically, between all levels of government. The premise of the policy is informed by the acknowledgement that towns and cities perform various functions not only for the local economies they serve, but increasingly the importance of some of them extends to the regional and global levels. However, urbanisation poses certain challenges if not properly managed. There is thus the need to put in place the necessary interventions to address the existing and foreseeable challenges: hence, the NUP. The policy adheres to the country's environmental policy by advocating for environmental concerns to be incorporated in all decision-making about urban development. This policy brings together consideration of social, economic, spatial and environmental factors, which serve as a guide in making specific decisions at the national and city-region levels that affect the pattern of urban growth in the cities.

Although there is no evidence-based evaluation of the impact of Ghana's NUP on secondary cities, Inkoom et al. (2019) report what the NUP has generally achieved: improved local governance and revenue base for the Municipal Assemblies; positive impacts, although to different degrees, on the operations of public institutions; improved living and work environments; and enhanced socio-economic development efforts. It has also contributed positively to infrastructure and service delivery, for instance in terms of improving sanitation services for specific beneficiary communities. Lastly, the NUP has impacted employment creation at the local level, ensured a shift in public sector budget allocations, and attracted private sector and donor investments. This policy framework was timely as it stresses a development process which is all-inclusive and takes account of the needs of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups in the Ghanaian cities, and adheres to the country's environmental policy by advocating for all environmental concerns to be incorporated into decision-making about urban development. The Ghana Urbanisation Think Tank (GUTT) (2019, p. 40) elaborated that the NUP was "thorough and sophisticated in its content" because it made a far-reaching proposal, with an action plan for implementation, to resolve inequalities in socio-economic and spatial terms and advance towards sustainable development in all the country's cities. However, the proper enforcement of some of the guidelines has remained a challenge, and the central government is still more focused on the primary cities whilst the secondary cities have remained underfunded.

Decentralisation and devolution of authority to secondary cities are also crucial if they are to become more self-reliant. In tandem with the advancement of national democracy, Ghana adopted a decentralisation policy in 1988 to shift political power from the central government to lower-level governments and advance local participation in development. This provided momentum to shape new planning and development patterns in the cities. Over the past few decades, countries around the world have promoted and established decentralised systems, mostly as a response to the failed centralised bureaucratic system. It is not surprising that Hindriks and Lockwood (2009) describe decentralisation as the policy objective of both developed and developing countries due to its identification with the virtues of accountability and responsiveness. This disposition towards decentralisation

is even more dramatic in those countries that have, recently, adopted democratic political structures as part of their governance system (Kundishora, 2009; Zaharia, 2011). As part of the Government of Ghana's broader urban development and decentralisation effort, funding of US$100 million (in 2018) and US$145 million (in 2022) was approved to support Ghana's SCSPP (World Bank, 2024). The programme assisted regional and national institutions in providing secondary cities with the support needed for effective urban management and service delivery. Under the third phase of the programme, due to be completed in mid-2024, Sunyani has benefitted from a landfill reclamation urban park development, new storm drains and several kilometres of access road linking key economic developments (Ghana News Agency, 2023). However, although the funding was for the development of secondary cities, these cities remain unattractive to the investment communities and industries.

To ensure proper land management and spatial development of cities in Ghana, land use and spatial development planning were initiated as policy options as part of the programme. This component aims to promote the sustainable development of land and human settlements through a decentralised planning system, ensuring judicious use of land and creating an enabling environment for MMDAs within the different cities to better perform the spatial planning and human settlement management functions (Cobbinah et al., 2016). However, the city authorities in Sunyani, as in other Ghanaian cities, have struggled to achieve the planning system's goal of ensuring 'formal' development which meets ideals of sustainability and orderly development: as elsewhere much development is not formally planned or approved by the city authorities, probably inevitably given resource constraints and the intrinsic hybridity of the Ghanaian planning system (see Akaateba et al. in Chapter 3 of this volume).

The various spatial planning processes provided a range of options for optimising land use that align with social, economic, political, cultural and environmental considerations whilst upholding the principles of equity, effectiveness and sustainability (de Deus et al., 2023; La Rosa & Pappalardo, 2020). This policy was to prevent indiscriminate and uncontrolled urban expansion in the cities. Although the informal sector is often tagged as nuisance and a major contributor to slowed development, the policy acknowledges the importance of the informal economy and the limited capacities of formal actors and proposes measures to ensure stronger hybridity and build local capacities and practices. For instance, the policy emphasises initiating regular dialogue and consultations between city/municipal authorities and informal economy operators (Government of Ghana, 2012). Another major activity emphasised in the policy is setting up and resourcing the new Department of Trade and Industry (established under L.I. 1961 of 2009) to promote and service the whole urban economy, including the informal sector, as well as ensuring that urban planning also provides for the activities of the informal economy. These initiatives and activities are deemed important for shifting away from automatically promoting formalisation to, rather, ensuring stronger co-existence and hybridity between formal and informal sectors in meeting the needs of urban residents.

The Rural Development Policy (Government of Ghana, 2018) was another initiative developed to change the country's approach to development and to provide the right perspective, direction and effective coordination for rural development, including urban settlements within such a context (including some of the secondary cities). This policy sought to, among other things, modernise agriculture for rural growth and development and provide quality socio-economic infrastructure and services in a decent and secure environment. It also aimed at maximising the potential of rural areas' rural enterprise development and industrialisation. The policy, of relevance to secondary city development, improved the living conditions of the poor through expansion of income-earning opportunities for economically active poor households. These were pursued to stimulate local economic growth and development geared toward enhancing rural development. For instance, in Sunyani and other secondary cities women, young people and vulnerable sectors of the population have received training on agro-processing, farm-based rabbit and grass cutter (cane rat) rearing, traditional craft making, agro-industries (soaps and cosmetics), occupational safety, health and environmental practices and business managerial services. Investments in health, educational, transport and other social infrastructure led to the growth and expansion of many rural areas and consequently the transition to secondary urban centres. Forkuor and Korah (2023) underscore that rural development has evolved around efforts to improve the standard of living of rural dwellers, which has been a focus of governments and NGOs over the years. The Rural Development Policy addresses key issues including poverty, outmigration, inadequate employment opportunities, low investment in infrastructure and high incidence of illiteracy and non-functioning sub-district structures in many cities (Government of Ghana, 2018).

In all, the different policy approaches have been game-changers for secondary city development and creating the enabling environment to foster strong collaboration between formal and informal sector actors in meeting the needs of residents across Ghana. The approaches, in shaping or influencing secondary cities development, emphasised agriculture, industrialisation, financial inclusion and skills development alongside the provision of basic services, as drivers of change in many towns and the utilisation of the potential for development to tackle issues that would deliver the desired conditions for growth and development. These are reported to have significantly contributed to secondary city development by providing alternative livelihoods and incomes and general improvement in wellbeing.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter on urban development and secondary cities in Ghana, with emphasis on Sunyani, provides insights into the country's urban landscape, including challenges, growth patterns and policies as response mechanisms. It underscores the importance of understanding secondary cities' contribution to sustainable development and economic growth by taking into consideration the historical and

contemporary trends in urban development in Ghana and the associated challenges. Secondary cities play a vital role in maintaining basic services, promoting local economic development and influencing the economic geography of countries as alternative centres to the large cities and metropolitan centres. However, they are sometimes overlooked when it comes to infrastructure, investment in service provision, and other government policies. The difficulties they face, such as inadequate infrastructure, weak institutions, environmental degradation and poor urban planning indicate the need for focused interventions and frameworks for policies to promote their sustainable development.

The case of Sunyani illustrates the complexities and dynamics of urban growth and development in secondary cities in Ghana. The city's growth and economic development over time, along with issues like poor infrastructure, widespread traffic congestion, and destruction of the environment require policy attention. The sustainable growth of the city and its population's quality of life are severely hindered by these challenges. The chapter also reveals how different actors, such as governmental bodies, businesses, non-governmental organisations and international organisations, influence the processes of urban growth. It is imperative that various stakeholders work together and coordinate their efforts to address the complex challenges that secondary cities face and to support their sustainable and inclusive growth.

This chapter shows how critical it is for secondary cities like Sunyani to adopt integrated and holistic approaches to urban development. Currently, urban development approaches are disjointed and incoherent, considering the diverse stakeholders mandated to perform statutory tasks. Ensuring coherence would mean comprehensively clarifying roles, involving all actors (both informal and formal) and examining the activities of these actors with respect to urban development to address overlaps and duplications, where necessary. Specifically, acknowledging the hybrid nature of service delivery (and its contributions to development) in secondary cities is deemed very significant. Policymakers may fully realise secondary cities' potential as catalysts for sustainable development and economic progress by addressing infrastructure deficiencies, encouraging inclusive growth and improving governance processes through hybridity, particularly emphasising the role of private and informal operating sector service providers to meet the water, sanitation, health and housing needs of residents.

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3 Navigating hybrid planning landscapes

Practices in urban land development in Ghana

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3.1 Introduction

Hybrid urban governance, which involves an intricate combination of state and non-state actors in urban development, is characteristic of many African cities. In these cities, informal organisations often serve as de facto authorities and wield considerable influence and power (Baldwin, 2016; Manara & Pani, 2023). As a result, planning authorities have struggled for decades with formalising 'informal' practices in these cities to reflect their ideal visions of the 'modern' city and match global best practices but have had limited success (Finn & Cobbinah, 2023; Watson, 2009). However, in recent times, there has been increasing recognition among African urban scholars of the need to accept informality as a distinguishing feature of African urbanisation and highlight its contribution to tackling the challenges of sustainable urban development (Cobbinah, 2023; Roy, 2009). Similarly, growing attention in African urban scholarship is being paid to relationships between formalised and informalised urban development processes across various sectors (Akaateba, 2018; Banks et al., 2020; Rosen & Gribat, 2023) to end the dominant and colonially biased oppositional binary of 'formal' versus 'informal' urban development. Urban land administration is a critical area where hybridity is most evident in African states due to complex land tenure relations rooted simultaneously in customary and statutory systems (Barry, 2020; Sim et al., 2018). This is because many British colonies in Africa, where indirect rule was introduced, retained a dual system of land administration, in which both customary and state-administered rights in land were recognised. African planning authorities are thus compelled to live and work with both de jure and de facto institutional arrangements to meet the urban land needs of city dwellers.

In Ghana, the processes of urban land delivery (i.e., planning, surveying and registration of a piece of land) are entwined in a complicated interaction of state administrative and customary procedures. The Land Use and Spatial Planning Act, 2016 (Act 925) (henceforth referred to as the LUSPA) and the Land Act, 2020 (Act 1036) are the two overarching laws governing spatial planning and land administration in the country. The LUSPA establishes a tiered planning system based on three layers of spatial plans (spatial development frameworks, structure plans and

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local plans), which mirror the normative concepts of Western planning standards. However, because the state's ability to control land use through zoning of lands it does not own is restricted, implementing these spatial plans is challenging. Act 1036 acknowledges customary land ownership and the right of traditional leaders to administer land parcels using customary land secretariats created within their governance areas. It also allows for land management through statutory administrative procedures established by the Lands Commission. This creates a dualistic legal environment for land delivery, necessitating a hybrid approach to urban land management involving customary and statutory players.

Whereas scholarly research on Ghana's dual legal land system abounds, the focus has been on how such a structure fosters land conflicts (Asafo, 2022; Brobbey, 2019), promotes elite capture and loss of land rights by the poor (Akaateba, 2019; Ubink, 2008) and inhibits sustainable land use planning (Akaateba et al., 2021; Boamah & Amoako, 2020). However, how actors within such a system connect through hybrid land delivery practices in many Ghanaian cities to create *nomotropic urban settlements* (Chiodelli & Moroni, 2014), which are neither 'formal' nor 'informal', has received little attention. Thus, this chapter seeks to develop a relational understanding of the statutory preconditions for planning by showing how actors collaborate to legitimise and enhance land administration practices through hybrid planning. In line with the book's central theme of hybrid urbanism, this chapter reveals that land delivery for urban development in Tamale, Ghana, cannot be fully understood by looking at the actions of either customary ('informal') or statutory ('formal') actors. Instead, a hybrid perspective that elucidates the interplay between traditional authorities and state bureaucrats in the context of institutional bricolage is essential to deepening our understanding of locally adaptive planning practices.

3.2 Hybridity in land governance and hybrid urbanism in Africa

Effective land administration and planning are critical for achieving social justice, economic growth and urban sustainability goals in African cities with dual governance systems (Sim et al., 2018). Accordingly, many African societies are adept at integrating 'traditional' and 'modern' institutions to create hybrid systems (Logan, 2008). Hybrid governance has been defined by Colona and Jaffe (2016, p. 176) to mean "arrangements in which non-state actors take on functions classically attributed to the state and, in the process, become entangled with formal state actors and agencies to the extent that it is difficult to make a clear distinction between state and non-state".

This chapter's use of 'hybridity' aligns with other African critical institutionalist and development governance scholarship, which relates the concept of hybridity to concepts such as *real governance* (De Herdt & Olivier de Sardan, 2015) and *institutional bricolage* (Cleaver, 2012). Cleaver (2012, p. 34), for instance, describes institutional bricolage as "adaptive processes that reinterpret and reconfigure institutions in response to changing circumstances whilst building on existing practices, organisations, and arrangements". Hybridity has been used mainly in two mutually

reinforcing lines of research. On the one hand, it is used to reveal the blending or syncretism of political governance systems which produce an emergent arrangement for providing infrastructure and other public services that are neither state nor non-state (Meagher, 2012). On the other hand, it is used as an analytical concept with the potential to challenge the fixed binaries used to describe development processes and reveal the fluidity of boundaries between state and non-state actors (Akaateba et al., 2018; Barry, 2020). Rosen and Gribat (2023) posit that the binary conception of 'formal' and 'informal' planning practices is a social construct that artificially defines what is 'right' or 'wrong' and fails to reveal the complex and intertwined realities of urban development and ends up marginalising the poor. They, therefore, argue for a shift towards studying hybrid urbanisms that have the potential to highlight hybrid practices in urban development.

Multiple actors, including state and non-state actors, as well as customary and statutory laws and practices, are involved in hybrid land administration systems in African cities. State-based actors play critical roles in protecting the rights of all stakeholders and balancing the interests of various actors. In contrast, non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations and traditional leaders, represent the interests of local communities. Non-state actors can either directly aid in transferring land rights within an official land tenure information system or provide unofficial services outside the system (Akaateba et al., 2018; Barry, 2020; Manara & Pani, 2023). For instance, Barry (2020) shows how in the Western Cape, South Africa, non-state actors such as street committees increase off-register transactions compared with housing projects where they have not been active in land tenure administration. Further, Barry and Roux (2019) claim that community-based organisations are essential for *clean* titles. In Dar es Salaam, Manara and Pani (2023) note that municipalities use meso-level bricolage by involving community chairpersons to validate property relations for residential licences, renewals and transfers. Through these practices, the hybrid governance of formal property is established, transforming the process of residential licences into a hybrid institution that draws authority and knowledge from both formal and informal sources.

Hybrid planning and land administration have considerable drawbacks despite their local adaptability. Akaateba et al. (2018) and Ubink (2008) have demonstrated how hybridity can result in land rights dispossession and urban inequalities in contexts of unequal power relations. Furthermore, the lack of formal tools and political support can undermine the capacity of some actors to perform their duties accurately and with legitimacy, potentially destabilising the existing distribution of power and governance arrangements in a hybrid governance system (Manara & Pani, 2023). Barry (2020) emphasised the importance of three conditions for successful hybrid land administration: institutional coherence, regulatory compliance and monitoring and evaluation. Likewise, Sim et al. (2018) proposed recognising traditional land management systems, knowledge sharing, mutual learning and technical and administrative support for traditional councils as conditions for achieving effective hybrid planning.

Following Rosen and Gribat's call (2023), in this chapter we thus explore the relationship between customary and statutory practices in Tamale, Ghana, using

hybridity as an analytical concept. Our aim is to uncover practical norms and everyday practices that can lead to hybrid planning approaches for urban land development. By analysing the intersection of dual legal and institutional systems with everyday practices, this chapter provides an empirically rich understanding of hybrid urbanism. Moreover, by demonstrating how state and traditional actors use bricolage to enhance the legitimacy and functionality of statutory planning and land administration practices, the chapter contributes to scholarship on identifying innovative southern planning concepts and perspectives to aid in resolving urban problems.

3.3 Study context and methodology

3.3.1 The study area

Tamale, the administrative capital of the Tamale Metropolis and the Northern Region of Ghana, served as the geographical location for the research. With an estimated land area of 647 square kilometres and a population of 374,744 as of 2021, the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly (TMA) area is one of the sixteen districts in the Northern Region (Ghana Statistical Service, 2021). Just over 80% of the population in the metropolitan area is urban, and it is claimed to be Ghana's second fastest-growing metropolis (Fuseini et al., 2017). Tamale is the third largest city in Ghana, serving as a secondary city that provides higher-order health, educational, commercial and administrative services to residents of smaller towns in northern Ghana. It shares functional characteristics similar to those of other secondary cities such as Sekondi-Takoradi and Sunyani.

Tamale was chosen for this study due to the significant influence of traditional chiefs over land issues. It is referred to by Abdul-Hamid et al. (2023) as a "chiefly city" with a highly revered traditional authority system. Up to 90% of the land in Tamale is customarily owned, with chiefs acting as custodians. The overlord of Dagbon (the Ya-Na) has the allodial (i.e., supreme) title to the land. The city has more than 40 chiefs and sub-chiefs, nine of whom are divisional chiefs (Banvim Lana, Nyohin Dana, Gulkpe Naa, Lamashegu Naa, Kalpohin Lana, Tamale Dakpema, Guma Naa, Vittin Lana and Yong Dakpema) who *enskin* (i.e., appoint under customary law) sub-chiefs to assist in the allocation of parcels of land to prospective urban developers in their respective jurisdictions[1]. The city is noted to be a hotspot for hybrid planning and peri-urban land conversions because of this 'chiefly' nature and the relatively high demand for land for urban residential and commercial development (Akaateba et al., 2021). It thus serves as an urban innovation lab to explore hybridity in land administration and makes an ideal case study site. Three types of statutory spatial plans are developed in Tamale, as they are in all local assembly areas in Ghana: namely, spatial development frameworks, structure plans and local plans (see Akaateba, 2018, for an in-depth discussion of these plans). This chapter focuses on the local plans, which are detailed land use plans prepared at the neighbourhood scale.

3.3.2 Research approach

This study employs a qualitative case study research design (Yin, 2018), in order to gain insight into the statutory context and the everyday practices of actors in delivering land for urban development in Tamale, Ghana. Document review of reports, policy and legal frameworks and pertinent journal articles addressing the research issues were also used to obtain secondary data for this study.

Primary data were gathered through semi-structured key informant interviews with 16 respondents, comprising physical planning officers (3) of the Physical Planning Department (PPD), land professionals at the Lands Commission (3), Co-ordinators of Customary Lands Secretariats (2), divisional/sub-chiefs and their secretaries (6) and officials of the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL) (2). These respondents were purposively selected because they play significant roles in land use planning, land registration and ground rent collection in Tamale. The key themes discussed in the interviews included the nature of interactions between traditional authorities and land professionals, customary land tenure and ownership, statutory land use planning systems and practices, land registration processes, ground rent collection and disbursement and collaborative engagements among key players in urban land delivery. After the document reviews and key informant interviews were completed, thematic analysis was used to analyse and present the data gathered from the respondents. Two researchers independently coded the interviews using NVivo (V11) software, using codes constructed both deductively and inductively. These themes were then harmonised and are discussed in the following sections.

3.4 Bridging the formal-informal divide in urban land development in Tamale: The role of hybridity

As noted above, Tamale's urban development involves the collaboration of state and non-state institutions in land use planning, land registration and revenue collection. This is because the 1992 Constitution and a host of laws governing urban land development in Ghana, including the LUSPA, the Land Act and the Local Governance Act 2016 (Act 936), mandate customary and statutory land governance institutions to respect the functions and powers of the other concerning land delivery (see Figure 3.1). Therefore, state authorities combine customary, traditional land administration procedures with Western-derived statutory registration procedures to plan and register skin lands for urban development.

In Tamale, one critical project that spearheaded the integration of customary and state land administration systems was the Land Administration Project (LAP), which was implemented between 2003 and 2018. As part of the LAP, Customary Land Secretariats (CLSs) were created as decentralised administrative units to manage customary land holdings. Through training programmes on land administration and planning, the LAP assisted in developing the capabilities of traditional leaders and coordinators of CLSs (Bugri, 2012). With divisional chiefs supervising



Figure 3.1 Institutional framework for urban land administration in Ghana

their operations, the CLSs effectively serve as a vital interface between the public and customary land sector agencies.

3.4.1 Developing planning schemes for customary lands in Tamale: Planners as bricoleurs

Planners act as bricoleurs when preparing planning schemes for customary land areas as they continuously engage traditional land chiefs to legitimise, co-produce and implement local plans in Tamale. The Tamale Metropolitan Assembly, via its Physical Planning Department, must develop spatial plans to manage the expansion of human settlements within the Metropolis in compliance with the Local Governance Act, 2016. However, due to the Metropolis's dual legal land system, as articulated in Article 267 of Ghana's 1992 Constitution, physical planning officers can only develop spatial plans in customary land areas with the approval of traditional land-owning chiefs. Likewise, land-owning chiefs can only make disposition of customary lands with the endorsement of state land authorities. This constitutional requirement is the genesis of hybridity in land use planning practice in Ghana. A physical planning officer remarked:

> The practice here in Tamale is that before we develop planning schemes for customary lands, we first require the divisional chief of the area to make an official request to the Physical Planning Department. Because the chiefs own the land, we need their approval and support in zoning their lands.
>
> (Physical Planning Officer, Tamale, June 2022)

The remarks by the planning officer indicate that town planners in Tamale acknowledge customary law and leverage existing land tenure arrangements to

legitimise the preparation of planning schemes for skin lands. As a result, the development of planning schemes starts with individual initiatives of traditional chiefs. This is consistent with Cleaver's (2012) assertion that institutional bricolage contains adaptive processes that build upon existing or taken-for-granted ways of doing things to make 'new' institutions socially acceptable and workable in a given local context. In developing planning schemes for customary lands, physical planning officers rely on the assistance of land surveyors in the Survey and Mapping Division of the Lands Commission to create base maps. Subsequently, they are supported by the chiefs and their elders to validate the surveyors' base maps and obtain historical information about the community, including sacred areas and land boundaries. This validation process allows for planners to share the information on base maps with chiefs, who in turn share indigenous knowledge of the community with planners for incorporation into planning schemes. These practices exemplify McFarlane's (2018) point that knowledge sharing is essential to facilitate meaningful engagement and lasting relationships between traditional leaders and state authorities in building hybrid land management systems.

Furthermore, hybridity in producing planning schemes for urban land development is also manifested in the financial support and informal payments that planning officers receive from chiefs to plan customary lands in the Metropolis. Akaateba et al. (2021) report on strategic alliances and informal negotiations involved in developing planning schemes in Tamale. From the planner's perspective

> in preparing the Local Plan, we need materials, and because the Department does not have the material, we request mobilisation [money] from the chiefs to get the materials.
>
> (Planner, Tamale, quoted in Akaateba, 2018, p. 105)

A representative of the customary authority explains,

> My father [the chief] paid a cash amount of GHS2,500.00 [US$656.17] to the surveyors who developed the base map, and for the planners who drew the layout, he paid them GHS1,500.00 [US$393.70]. My father also gave them money any time they came on field visits. After the Local Plan was drawn, we agreed that the surveyors be allocated 10 percent of the total plots of land to be subdivided and installed with boundary pillars in place of cash payments, which my father could not afford. The planners were also given 30 plots of land for developing the Local Plan.
>
> (Secretary to the village chief, Tamale, cited in Akaateba et al., 2021, p. 476)

In addition to paying for planning services, the chiefs must grant preliminary approval for the draft planning schemes developed by the Technical Planning Committee before they are submitted to the Spatial Planning Committee (SPC) of the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly for ultimate endorsement. After receiving approval from the SPC, the chiefs make land allocation decisions based on the approved

schemes. This indicates that the chiefs endorse town planning schemes designed according to Western planning regulations for their traditional lands.

Evidently, in Tamale, planners and chiefs borrow on each other's authority and resources through practices of bricolage to implement national policies on land and make local plans developed for skin lands legitimate. By doing so, they transform land use planning into a hybrid institution whose functionality is anchored within both formal and informal sources of authority and knowledge. The practical norm of demanding informal payments from chiefs for formal planning services rendered by planners of the PPD in Tamale is a context-specific urban reality that constitutes a form of "institutionalised co-production" (Joshi & Moore, 2004, p. 40). Through this practice, land professionals promote the incorporation of technical planning and surveying principles in customary land management and promote the functionality of the planning schemes developed, whilst chiefs, in turn, provide material resources (both cash and plots of land) as informal payments for formal planning schemes. Though it constitutes an extra-legal practice, it has the potential to develop into a hybrid system for urban planning that is locally adaptive and helps address the resource constraints of local government authorities in poor municipalities. This resonates with the arguments by Manara and Pani (2023) that the governance of land in urban areas in Tanzania is constructed by hybrid governance of actors who engage in meso-level bricolage to give legitimacy and functionality to a 'new' property rights system for the urban poor under the Residential License Programme.

It must, however, be emphasised that chiefs and land professionals only work collaboratively in some cases. There are several reported instances in Tamale (see Abdul-Hamid et al., 2023; Akaateba et al., 2021) where chiefs bypass formal planning procedures and alter approved statutory plans, leading to a constrained planning process that, in practice, has both formal and informal elements. Hybrid planning practices in Tamale are also characterised by inequities and land rights dispossession, as revealed by a planning officer:

> The planning scheme is meant to benefit the community. However, when handed over to chiefs for implementation, farmers lose their land rights without compensation as chiefs allocate the land for residential use. The chiefs are revered as traditional landowners.
>
> (Physical Planning Officer, Tamale, June 2022)

As a result, urban land professionals must be wary of the negative consequences of hybrid planning approaches for poor urban dwellers and work towards addressing such consequences.

3.4.2 Hybrid institutions for land acquisition and registration

Besides land use planning, land registration represents a significant area where hybridity is manifested. Acquiring a secured parcel of land for urban development in Tamale requires prospective land seekers to satisfy both customary rules of land acquisition and statutory land registration requirements. As over 90 percent of the

land available for urban development in Tamale is skin land; prospective developers must first search and approach the custodian local chief to express interest in acquiring some portions of his skin land and fulfil all the customary procedures relating to that particular parcel before proceeding to register their interests in customary lands at the Lands Commission.

A land registration officer explained the process for acquiring urban land in Tamale as follows:

> Land seekers must first conduct a search on the land of interest here at the Lands Commission, and if it is not encumbered, they go ahead to approach the land-owning chief to negotiate on the cost of the land and pay the traditional kola money. Following payment, they are issued allocation notes from the divisional chief in charge of the area of interest. Only when they complete the traditional acquisition processes and are given allocation papers signed by the divisional chief as evidence of land transaction can the formal process of preparing an indenture for a deeds registration commence.
>
> (Land Registration Officer, Tamale, June 2022)

Mireku et al. (2016) have explained how the *allocation note,* though not a document that confers legal title on the holder, is a pre-requisite for formally registering customary rights to land with the Lands Commission. Allocation notes are written evidence of land transactions between traditional chiefs (grantors) and prospective land seekers (grantees). In Tamale, they usually contain basic information such as the name and symbols of the chief/skin, information about the land parcel, conditions of the grant and names and signatures/thumbprints of the parties involved and their witnesses. They are admissible in court as evidence for transactions. In some cases, planning authorities also accept allocation notes as evidence of land ownership in building permit applications, and they form the basis for collecting non-lease ground rent in other towns in Ghana (Mireku et al., 2016).

Goodfellow and Lindemann (2013, p. 6) point out that institutional hybridity occurs "when rules and procedures associated with the state merge in some way with those of other organisations", leading to a synthesis or integration of one institution and its structures into the other. The integration of traditional rules of land acquisition into statutory land registration procedures in Ghana reveals how formal and informal practices in urban land administration are interconnected. For instance, the practice whereby possessing an informal and non-legally binding 'allocation note' is a pre-requisite for formally registering a statutory leasehold interest in skin lands, manifests the increasing interdependence between formal and informal land administration practices. Likewise, the need for grantees of skin lands to register such grants with state agencies and the requirement for an allocation note from traditional authorities as evidence of transaction before statutory registration reflects a hybrid land administration system.

Although such practices of hybridity constitute a shift in property recognition from purely customary contracts towards formal law, they do not replace traditional authorities' roles in land administration. Instead, they contribute to

embedding state-designed land registration systems within community relations to make them socially acceptable and functional. It is also important to emphasise that not all grantees of skin land go ahead to statutorily register such land grants with the Lands Commission after receiving their allocation notes. This has created a situation where some grantees of land have only allocation notes from chiefs, whilst others also have deeds registration documents issued by the Lands Commission. This backs up Cleaver's assertion that the products of bricolage are neither completely old nor new but rather "dynamic institutional hybrids" which combine elements of 'formal' and 'informal', 'existing' and 'designed' processes that are socially acceptable (Cleaver, 2012, p. 45).

3.4.3 Hybrid arrangements for ground rent collection and disbursement

Besides planning and land registration, ground rent collection constitutes another area where the interdependence of state and customary actions manifest. The allocation notes from the chiefs and deeds registration documents from the Lands Commission usually contain covenants requiring land grantees in the Tamale Metropolis to pay annual ground rent to the skin. Ground rent refers to the yearly governmental fees payable on leases on customary lands that are formally registered. Although ground rents are to be paid to the grantors (owners of skin lands in Tamale, i.e., the chiefs), Article 267 (2) of the 1992 Constitution and the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands Act 1994 (Act 481) give the OASL the authority to collect skin land revenue and to disburse this to the beneficiaries. The disbursement of revenues collected by the OASL is done according to a formula set out in Article 267(6) of the Constitution which specifies the division of payment between traditional and formal authorities as follows:

> Ten per cent of the revenue accruing from stool lands shall be paid to the office of the Administrator of Stool Lands to cover administrative expenses; and the remaining revenue shall be disbursed in the following proportions –
>
> a twenty-five percent to the stool through the traditional authority for the maintenance of the stool in keeping with its status;
> b twenty percent to the traditional authority; and
> c fifty-five percent to the District Assembly, within the area of authority of which the stool lands are situated.

These sharing arrangements for ground rent show that urban land revenue management in customary land areas in Tamale occurs within a hybrid governance environment where both traditional and statutory agencies play intertwined and interdependent roles. The practice of chiefs issuing allocation notes, which form the basis for formal land registration by the Lands Commission and subsequent revenue collection and disbursement by the OASL to both traditional chiefs and statutory agencies, is widespread in many other cities in Ghana (Akaateba, 2018; Biitir & Kuusaana, 2020; Mireku et al., 2016). Such a land administration and revenue management interface highlights a bricolage of customary norms and statutory

Table 3.1 Summary of hybrid practices in urban land development in Tamale

Hybrid practice	*Actors*	*Institutions and agencies*	*Mechanisms/ instruments*	*Outcomes*
Bricolage in land use planning	Physical planners, traditional chiefs/ representatives, land surveyors	1992 Constitution of Ghana, Act 925 and Act 1036 Physical Planning Department (PPD), Survey and Mapping Division, Customary Lands Secretariat (CLS), Traditional Council and Spatial Planning Committee	Local plan initiation, funding for planning schemes and base maps, knowledge co-production, plan approval and in-kind payments (plots of land)	Local plans for orderly urban development and land disposition
Hybrid institutions for land acquisition and registration	Urban developers, chiefs, land professionals, CLS coordinators	Act 1036, customary laws and procedures for land acquisition Lands Commission, Customary Lands Secretariat, Traditional Council	'Drink/Kola' money, allocation notes, indenture and lease registration documents	Formal registration of customary interests in land
Cooperative ground rent collection	Urban developers, chiefs, OASL officers, CLS coordinators	1992 Constitution of Ghana, Act 481 OASL, Traditional Council, CLS	Allocation notes, lease documents, ground rent revenues	Ground rent collected on registered customary interests and disbursed to the skin

rules, leading to an urban land management system that is neither wholly formal nor informal but hybrid and locally adaptive.

3.5 Conclusions and implications

This chapter sheds light on the intriguing arrangements for urban land delivery that occur through hybridity practices in Tamale, Ghana. Traditional chiefs and land professionals within and at the interface of the state work together to implement national policies on land use planning (development of local planning schemes) and land administration (deeds registration and ground rent collection and disbursement) at the local level by blending formal and informal legal/governance arrangements, authority and knowledge systems. Such practices of bricolage generate locally adaptive positive outcomes to enhance the legitimacy and functionality of planning and land

registration processes. For example, they harness much-needed resources for land use planning and facilitate the registration of customary interests in a context where local authorities grapple with technical and financial resource inadequacies. In addition, hybrid practices allow due diligence to be done before planning and registering leasehold interests in skin land, in order to reduce land-related disputes.

However, whilst these practices may generally be advantageous and adaptive at the local level, they have also been found to exacerbate pre-existing urban disparities in land distribution in secondary cities of Ghana, favouring influential traditional chiefs and land bureaucrats. Hence, we propose that the government strengthen the capabilities of state planning and land administration offices by providing sufficient resources to enhance the rigour with which they carry out their statutory public duties. Political and legal backing for hybrid planning and land administration is also crucial. In addition, effective checks and balances should be implemented to ensure that the outcomes of actor engagement do not contribute to the perpetuation of urban inequality.

This chapter provides valuable insights into the complexities of urban land development in Ghana and the practices of hybridity, thereby contributing significantly to scholarly discussions on hybrid land governance and hybrid urbanism. It presents the everyday local realities of how statutory and customary actors engage in practices of bricolage to plan and administer land for urban development and, by doing so, give legitimacy and functionality to planning schemes and registered leasehold interests. The hybrid planning and land development systems in Ghana bear resemblance to the tenure formalisation regulations and municipal housing programs in Tacna, Peru (see Dammert-Guardia et al. in Chapter 9 of this volume). In the self-production of urban space in intermediate cities in Peru, sub-national governments, including regional, provincial and district entities, play a significant role, just like in Ghana. However, the current planning systems in Peru can be counterproductive, often leading to exceptions in planning rather than effective outcomes. Furthermore, the role of funding constraints in plan development and implementation, land speculation, especially in urban areas, and corruption among public officials and politicians is a central aspect in understanding hybridity in urban development practices in both Peru and Ghana.

In conclusion, these chapters thus enhance urban scholarship by highlighting the fallacy of employing the dichotomous terms 'formal' and 'informal' to analyse urban development in Africa, given that hybrid practices have evolved into the reality of land delivery (Ikejiofor, 2006; Kuusaana & Eledi, 2015). It is important to question the usefulness of the binary distinctions of formality/informality and legal/illegal, particularly in the context of African urban governance environments characterised by practical norms such as strategic alliances and non-aggressive relationships between state and non-state actors. We also stress the necessity of identifying southern perspectives and innovative practices that emphasise the synergy-building potential of hybrid urban development processes. African urban development is characterised by locally adaptive hybrid governance practices, which urban professionals must work with to function effectively. Hence, local authorities must oversee and bolster this system with sufficient legal, political, resource and monitoring support.

Note

1 In Ghanaian customary law, *skin* (or *stool* in the south of the country) refers to a customary authority, literally derived from the ceremonial skin or stool on which a chief sits when they take up their position. By extension, *skin/stool lands* are those controlled by chiefs, and the process of appointment is known as *enskinning* or *enstooling* (Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands [OASL], 2023).

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4 Nuances of informal transport operation

Examining 'floating drivers' on the Ejisu-Kumasi highway, Ghana

Clifford Amoako, Irene-Nora Dinye, and Akosua Baah Kwarteng Amaka-Otchere

4.1 Introduction

In urban Ghana, public transport services are provided by a mixture of unionised, registered and regulated transport vehicles, along with a large group of unregistered, so-called 'floating' transport operators. Large transport companies such as the state transport corporation (STC), a state-owned company, operate inter-city services. In contrast, government participation in intra-urban transport service provision has been minimal and informal private transport operators account for over 80 percent of urban transport in major cities like Kumasi and Accra (Amoako et al., 2014; Poku-Boansi & Adarkwa, 2011, 2014). Urban mobility in Ghana is dominated by informal private transport in the form of minibuses, locally called *trotros*, and taxis, which are perceived to be affordable and have the highest service coverage (Dumedah & Eshun, 2020). Trotros are intra-city commercial transport services along varied travel routes, with locally known stops where people can get on and off the vehicle at non-fixed locations. The name comes from 'three pence', as a charge for intra-city public transport in Ghana in the late 1950s and 1960s (Dumedah & Eshun, 2020). Among the private urban transport operators are those who are not registered and properly regulated by city authorities, locally known as *floating drivers*. Knowledge and information about them have long been scanty and largely speculative (Poku-Boansi & Adarkwa, 2011, but see also Puwurayire & Rosen, Chapter 5 in this volume). Their engagements with city authorities are usually chaotic (Yeboah, 2013), and their operations have been associated with indiscriminate charges, especially during rush hours (Agyemang, 2013), and the activities of *shadow men*, also locally known as *loading boys*, who solicit passengers in order to fill waiting trotros and buses (Aggrey et al., 2022).

To contribute to the emerging discussions about floating drivers, this chapter examines the regulatory environment for informal transport services in urban Ghana, and how that shapes the efficiency of the transportation system. The study is situated in Ejisu, a rapidly growing secondary city near Kumasi (see Figure 4.1). Employing hybrid urbanism as a conceptual framing, the chapter has the following objectives: (a) to analyse the existing structures at the local level and challenges for managing transport services along the Kumasi-Ejisu highway; (b) to identify the

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factors determining the readiness of unregistered transport operators to be incorporated into registered public transport and (c) to explore the interventions necessary to improve the management of public transport services in urban Ghana.

The chapter is structured in six sections. This section gives the background of urban informal transport operation in Ghanaian cities and the purpose of the chapter. The next section situates Africa's urban public transport service within the concept of *hybrid urbanism*. Section 4.3 presents the range of stakeholders consulted during the study and how they were engaged, whilst Section 4.4 discusses the typology and characteristics of floating drivers. In Section 4.5, existing institutional and regulatory frameworks for managing informal transport services are discussed. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter with the key findings and policy entry points.

4.2 In/formalised transport services in Africa as hybrid systems

Urban transport service delivery in Africa is made up of dynamic networks of formal and informal operators, transport unions, governmental bodies, policies, regulations and infrastructural facilities (Abraham et al., 2021; Agbiboa, 2020). The conventional public transport systems created by the state and registered private companies are considered as formal but have failed to meet the ever-increasing urban mobility needs (Tembe et al., 2019). This is partly because many African cities lack structured route-based public transportation systems (African Development Bank [AfDB], 2022). As a result, urban transport services in Africa are dominated by private and informal operators (AfDB, 2022; Jennings & Behrens, 2017), who provide flexible services as an alternative to the structured formal sector system offered by the state, operators' unions and private companies.

An important observation about urban informal transport services in Africa is that they are given names that reflect their status as transport for poor urban residents or their unregulated nature, operating on the blind side of metropolitan and municipal authorities. Names like *trotro* in Ghana, *car rapide* (i.e., fast car) in Senegal and *matatu* (literally 'three' from 'three pence') in Kenya reflect the diverse contexts within which similar services are offered. These names are given to reflect their flexible, sometimes cheap and unregulated status. In some cases, these designations are given by urban residents and commuters to project informal transport services as poor, undesirable and chaotic. Informal transport services are also given names by state officials to show that they are weakly regulated, illegal and could even be dangerous. An example is *floating drivers*, which is central to this chapter. In addition, informal transport services are referred to as *Waa Waa* or *Zam Zam* in Ghanaian cities, meaning 'always in a rush, and does not consider safety and regulations'. Other names include *Danfo* in Nigeria; *Combis* in South Africa; *Chapas* in Maputo; *Podapoda* in Freetown, and *Dala Dala* in Dar es Salaam. All these names inherently connote 'fast', 'weakly regulated', 'used by ordinary people' and 'generally affordable'. These designations have influenced research conducted on informal transport services in African cities (Aggrey et al., 2022; Asimeng, 2021; Kumar et al., 2021). Despite their constant harassment by city authorities and sometimes by traffic police, informal urban transport services have

thrived in African cities for many years and expanded to even include motorbikes. Without them, mobility in these cities is almost impossible (Kumar et al., 2021).

In terms of daily operations, both registered and unregistered transport services are provided for urban dwellers in Africa (see Chapter 5 in this volume and Abraham et al., 2021; Plano et al., 2020). Both systems of urban transport run together, characterised by the informal and/or unregistered systems operating alongside the regulated regimes. The complex interactions among these systems create a competitive market that has been difficult to regulate. This study draws on the hybrid urbanism approach (see Rosen & Gribat, Chapter 1 in this volume) to explore the contours of transport service regulation in African cities, using Ghana as the case context.

Ghana's informal and formal urban transport services operate within a hybrid system with complex institutional and regulatory frameworks that render some operators illegitimate and illegal. The operation of an unregistered urban transport service is a breach of Sections 121–127 of Ghana's Road Traffic Regulations (L.I. 2180) (Government of Ghana, 2012). To be recognised by their respective city authorities, informal transport operators must be registered and paid-up members of an operators' union. Every operators' union has its members operating from a designated terminal and along specific routes. Contrary to this provision, floating drivers have no designated terminals or pick-up and drop-off points, which is seen as a breach of the regulation stated above. However, for transport users, these differences do not play a role, as urban residents and commuters use these services without these binary distinctions.

From the foregoing discussion, it emerges that, problematic as the operations of floating drivers may seem, they operate alongside the regulated systems, resulting in a hybrid urban transport industry, in which informal services compensate for the inadequacies of the regulated systems. Understanding the operations of floating drivers and devising strategies to regularise their operations will be useful in meeting the growing urban mobility needs. This requires that floating transport operators are known, accepted, registered and regulated. Ghana's governance system places a considerable amount of authority in the local government and city authorities, including to regulate urban transportation. In the subsequent sections, we explore the management of public transport services, the operational characteristics of floating drivers and the possibility of integrating them into the so-called formal public transport service.

4.3 The research: Engagement with floating drivers and other stakeholders in urban transport

An exploratory design was adopted to study the operations of floating drivers along the Ejisu-Kumasi highway (Figure 4.1) over a period of three months. Ejisu is about 15.6 kilometres east of Kumasi. The Ejisu-Kumasi highway is part of the Accra-Kumasi trunk road (N6), the most heavily used road in Ghana (Cobbinah & Aboagye, 2017). A total of 85 floating drivers were selected at six major bus stops along the study corridor. Sampling and interviews were conducted on all Thursdays



Figure 4.1 Map of the Kumasi-Ejisu highway

within September, October and November 2023. Thursdays are weekly market days for Ejisu, and hence more vehicles ply the study corridor. On these Thursdays, enumerators were positioned at designated bus stops for the data collection.

At these bus stops, floating drivers who stopped, dropped or picked up passengers at peak hours of 6 a.m.–9 a.m. and 5 p.m.–8 p.m. were sampled and interviewed for an average of 10–15 minutes each. This approach was adopted because of a lack of information on the number of unregistered transport operators. Floating drivers were identified after they had stated that they were not members of any operators' association. Simple interview guides were used, and the drivers were questioned about their registration status, regular routes and schedules, operational approaches and challenges. Short interviews with 25 commuters were also conducted to get information on their perceptions of floating drivers.

In addition to the unregistered operators and commuters, 12 officials from the Ministry of Transport (MoT), Department of Urban Roads (DUR), Department of Transport (DoT), Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority (DVLA), Ghana Road Safety Authority (GRSA) and Motor Traffic and Transport Directorate (MTTD) were interviewed. Issues discussed included: structures/mechanisms put in place to

monitor public transport; procedures for formalising and regulating the operations of floating drivers; challenges faced when managing floating drivers and measures to adopt to enhance the smooth management of public transport.

Additionally, six focus group discussions were conducted with selected drivers to obtain a deeper understanding of their operations. Data from the interviews and focus group discussions were triangulated to address inconsistencies. Content and thematic analysis were employed to analyse the data collected, focusing on the perceptions of drivers and agency officials on the operations of floating drivers along the Ejisu-Kumasi highway.

4.4 Understanding floating drivers along the Ejisu-Kumasi highway

The term 'floating drivers' is used to describe operators of public transport services who are not members of any registered local operators' associations or who were members but have refused to pay the required dues and other charges. It also refers to commercial transport operators who are not registered with relevant state and city institutions. The term was coined by members of the operators' associations to expose and ridicule non-members and to prevent them from operating within the associations' jurisdictions.

It is difficult to know the exact numbers of drivers and vehicles involved, since the sector is fluid and always receiving new operators. An official at the Ejisu Municipal Transport Department stated that:

> We know that there are many floating drivers along the main Ejisu-Kumasi highway – it is almost impossible to get the total number of drivers and vehicles operating (…) There are also drivers who are registered for different routes but decide to 'float' at certain times of the day. We also have floating drivers, who are not under the EMA [Ejisu Municipal Assembly], but come into our municipality to work on market days (…) It is just a complex sector to fully understand and manage.

Though difficult to determine, this official suggested that 'over 30 percent' of commercial vehicles in the municipality are operated by floating drivers. It is important to distinguish between *floating drivers* and *floating vehicles*: a driver could be registered with a local association but could be operating a vehicle that is not fully registered and insured. In this case, the vehicle is floating and the driver is registered. The opposite is also possible.

Based on our interaction with the floating drivers along the Ejisu-Kumasi highway, five types of floating drivers can be distinguished:

- The first group can be referred to as *everyday floaters* and includes those not registered with any operators' association under any jurisdiction. These are virtually unknown by any association or city authority. Many of these drivers are unlicensed or have expired driver's licenses. In Ghana, drivers are required to

renew their licenses every six years. In some cases, the vehicles they are using have no insurance or expired registration. This form of floating is considered outrightly illegal. Culprits risk being arrested, prosecuted and convicted. When convicted, a floating driver could be jailed for a period of not less than three months, fined to pay a specific amount, or both.

- The next group of floaters can be referred to as *temporary floaters*: these are drivers/operators who are registered with an association and the municipal assembly but have been sanctioned for one reason or another. In most cases, these operators would have been suspended or barred from working at their designated terminals, sometimes for not adhering to the regulations of their respective associations. Operators in this category are fully registered and paid-up members of one of the associations. When caught, these floaters may be made to pay fines stipulated by their associations and the city authorities.
- The third group of floaters can be referred to as *hiding floaters* and includes operators who float to avoid sanctions, payment of dues and other charges. They are also registered with an association and city authorities but find the processes and charges at the transport terminals frustrating and hence choose to float. When they are caught, they are sanctioned, which makes them part of the second category (*temporary floaters*), with similar sanctions.
- The next group of floating drivers can be called *peak-hour floaters*. These drivers are fully registered and paid-up members of operators' associations and are known by the city authorities, but they float during peak hours in the morning and after work. They are usually driven by the high demand from commuters, which creates additional income opportunities, and the fact that most commuters do not want to join long queues at the terminal during rush hours.
- The last group can be referred to as *convenience floaters*. This category of floating drivers is operating in Ejisu but are fully registered and paid-up members of associations in other local government areas. The motivation of this group of floaters is unclear. However, the high demand created by the large number of commuters along the Ejisu-Kumasi highway could be one of them. Some of these floaters were found to be residents in some of the communities along the study corridor.

In terms of vehicle types, floating transport along the Kumasi-Ejisu highway is dominated by trotro minibuses. In most cases, drivers do not own their vehicle, but pay a fee to the owner who may have just one vehicle or a fleet. The size of the fee drivers have to pay is not regulated, but mostly depends on the condition of the vehicle. Vehicle owners are an important determinant for a floating driver to join an operators' association, particularly when they insist on registration as a requirement for being taken on. As one driver explained:

> The owner of my first vehicle asked me to join the Aprade-Parkoso PROTOA[1] and since I had no option, I operated with the union. However, the owner of my current vehicle only told me 'I just want my daily sales'. Hence, I

> strategize myself to meet the daily minimum sales. This can only be met when I float. You waste no time when you float.

The above statement points to two key issues. Firstly, some vehicle owners encourage their drivers to take undue advantage of the inadequacies in the system. For instance, city authorities are unable to trace the authenticity of a registered vehicle, unless they consult the DVLA, and in most cases, these two institutions do not collaborate. This is typical – almost all the various transport ministries and agencies work in isolation. Secondly, these vehicle owners want to avoid financial obligations and regulatory restrictions for economic benefit. All commercial drivers are expected to pay dues to their respective associations and daily or monthly taxes and tolls to the Transport Department of the Ejisu Municipal Assembly (EMA). By refusing to pay these charges, the floating drivers get to keep all their daily income. Some drivers claim that the financial obligations attached to the unions are too high. The view of one floating driver on this is quoted below:

> I once decided to join a union… but the fee that was required was high for me. They made me aware that the entry fee was 1000 Cedis [approx. US$65]. In addition, they also demanded some specified items including packs of drinks. They also have monthly payments in the form of dues. I don't see the need.

Further, at the various terminals registered members of an association are required to load their passengers in turns. Thus, drivers sometimes have to wait hours to get passengers to destinations along their designated routes. This is seen as a waste of time and prevents drivers from meeting their daily targets. The floating drivers admit that the registered system promotes orderliness and safety, but it is economically not rewarding. As one driver put it,

> How can I spend so much time at the terminal whilst. I can at least get some passengers along the road? Although I may not get a full load, it is better than wasting time at the terminal.

Most of the floating drivers we interviewed were relatively young, between 21 and 40 years, and were all male. Only a few indicated that they were 50 years and above. Most of the floating drivers interviewed had little or no basic education. Their activities start as early as 5 a.m. and end after 9 p.m. In some cases, the vehicle may be handed over to another driver for operation throughout the night. On average, floating drivers work six days per week and work for about 14 hours per day, with breaks only during off-peak periods when demand is very low. Typically they do not stick to specific routes in order to maximise profit and avoid arrest by the city authorities. In some cases, they also break their trips into sections for similar reasons. This occurs at peak periods, when demand is high. During these periods, commuters are taken and dropped off at major bus stops; then new passengers are picked up and fresh charges apply. For instance, instead

of the 14-kilometre trip from Ejisu to Kumasi, a floating vehicle operator may decide to take passengers to Tech Junction, about 7 kilometres into Kumasi, drop off the initial commuters and take new ones, who will be charged more for the rest of the journey. New fares apply to everyone on board at this point, so the initial commuters pay almost twice the fare for their single trip.

4.5 Regulating transport services: No integration of drivers and vehicles

Urban transport and traffic management in Ghana falls under Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs). The MMDAs were established by the Local Government Act 462 of 2003 as the highest planning authority at the local level. Among the functions of the MMDAs is the regulation of public transport services within their jurisdiction (Government of Ghana, 2012). In line with the provisions of the Act, the Department of Transport (DoT) of the EMA has been set up by a legal instrument (L.I. 1961) to regulate transport services within the municipality in liaison with the Motor Traffic and Transport Department (MTTD) of the Ghana Police Service and the DVLA at the local level. The MTTD checks and arrests culprits of traffic offenses and handles accidents, whilst the DVLA is in charge of vehicle registration and driver licensing. The municipal DoT is responsible for the development and adoption of a comprehensive transport plan for the municipal area. Sadly, our study revealed that apart from attending specific municipal assembly meetings, these state institutions hardly work together at the operational level. In particular, there is little coordination between the registration of drivers which is carried out at the local level and the registration of vehicles at the national level.

Section 121 (1–5) of Ghana's Road Traffic Regulations (Government of Ghana, 2012) provides the regulatory framework for the registration of commercial vehicle operators. For instance, Section 121 (1) states that "A person shall not operate as a commercial vehicle driver unless that person is employed by or belongs to a recognised commercial road transport organisation". In the Ejisu municipality, there are three major transport organisations, namely, the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU), Ghana Co-operative Transport Association (Cooperative) and the Progressive Transport Owners' Association (PROTOA). All operators' associations and their members are required to comply with traffic regulations and by-laws of the Assembly. Failure or refusal of any association or driver to comply with the regulations under Section 121 (1–5) of the Road Traffic Regulation is an "offense and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than twenty-five penalty units or to a term of imprisonment of not more than thirty days, or to both". There are also a number of by-laws on urban transport services passed by the EMA and the other adjoining MMDAs, which include the payment of various fees and tolls by public transport operators. The operators' associations are required to have systems of identification for their members. For example, some have issued vehicle stickers to identify their paid-up members. They also offer mandatory training sessions at regular intervals for drivers and operators on traffic regulations and road signs,

for which fees must be paid. Though the drivers interviewed indicated that most of these by-laws are helpful, they complained about the many charges involved and sometimes duplication of efforts from various units of the Municipal Assembly. Thus, a major challenge is that these by-laws are neither harmonised nor coordinated.

There are no restrictions on the entry and exit of vehicles into commercial transport operation in Ghana, which in turn creates two major challenges. Firstly, the DVLA registers and provides permits for the running of commercial transport vehicles without any connection to the local government area of operation. As a result, MMDAs are unable to monitor the number of vehicles that have been registered and which of them are working within their jurisdiction. There are virtually no operational connections between DVLA, the transport departments of MMDAs and operators' associations in checking which vehicles enter and leave the urban transport service industry. Although MMDAs are mandated to regulate transport services within their jurisdictions, without adequate data from DVLA, it is almost impossible to keep an accurate track of the number of vehicles and drivers registered in the respective jurisdictions. Within such an unstructured system, individuals and groups can own and operate fleets of vehicles for commercial purposes without the necessary checks and approval from city authorities. This is largely caused by the lack of coordination between the DVLA which registers all vehicles and issues driver's licenses and the MMDAs within which they operate.

The lack of institutional coordination results in the inability of the local institutions to effectively monitor urban public transport services. This has implications for the law enforcement process. For instance, the local City Guards and Task Force (units of the MTTD) stated that powerful local leaders such as customary chiefs, elected community representatives at the city administration, high-ranking police officers and politicians sometimes interfere and plead on behalf of recalcitrant drivers who were arrested for traffic offenses. This mirrors Goodfellow's (2017) argument, captured by Ndibatya and Booysen (2020, p. 2) that "laxity in regulation enforcement…in the paratransit industry [is] not coincidental: the situation serves the economic and political purposes of the political elites who use the minibus taxi industry for political mobilization".

As in the case of most secondary city authorities in Ghana, the Ejisu Municipal Assembly currently does not provide any efficient public urban transport service for its residents. The existing registered operators' associations are also not able to provide the needed quality and quantity of services along the study corridor. Floating drivers, as well as other informal transport services, can be seen to fill the gap created by the inadequacies in the public urban transport sector.

Without any clear scheduling and regulatory systems in place, floating drivers compete among themselves for passengers, especially for commuters during peak hours. An official of the Department of Transport at EMA described the operations of floating drivers as below:

> … floating drivers overspeed, stop abruptly to pick up passengers and re-enter the road. They stop at unauthorized places, exceed their passenger capacities,

Figure 4.2 Unauthorised parking on the study corridor

> and sometimes cause traffic crashes due to careless driving. Floating drivers only depend on the increasing demand for transport, and exploit passengers.

This statement summarises the perspectives of relevant state institutions on the operations of floating drivers and also draws attention to some of the potential social, economic and public costs of their operations (Cervero & Golub, 2007). These potential costs could be compounded by the poor conditions of the vehicles and roads (Poku-Boansi & Adarkwa, 2014).

Due to excessive competition among floating drivers, they are often accused of being aggressive and careless in their driving. As they are usually in a rush, they often ignore traffic signals. Because they do not start from designated terminals that check on capacities, floating drivers can exceed their capacities and allow more passengers than is legal on a ride. During rush hours, most floating drivers pick up passengers at unauthorised places (Figure 4.2). However, it would be unfair to associate careless driving only with floating drivers, as indiscipline on the study corridor was observed among both registered and unregistered drivers and vehicles.

Despite the negative perception of floating drivers by officials, their services are commended by commuters and other users. Firstly, floating drivers provide convenience for passengers who want to avoid long queues. Secondly, their services are flexible, negotiable, and can be accessed on a door-to-door basis. Some of the

floating drivers have earned the trust of commuters, who are even using them for intra-city parcel and courier services. Whilst there are no official structures for regulating their operations, there seem to be informal systems, built on trust, that shape their activities along the main Ejisu-Kumasi highway. This has also been pointed out by Kumar et al. (2021), who argued that informal public transport systems are dominant and run parallel to local government structures.

4.6 Conclusion

The main aim of this chapter is to understand the operations of the informal transport operators known as floating drivers, and how they can be integrated into the regulated urban public transport system, using insights from the Ejisu-Kumasi highway. This chapter adds to the existing scholarship which highlights the contributions of floating drivers and their implications for transport services in Ghana (see Asimeng & Heinrichs, 2021; Falchetta et al., 2021; Plano et al., 2020; Priye et al., 2021; Sitter & Mitchell, 2020; Yeboah & Asibey, 2019) by delving into their typologies and operational characteristics as a hybrid transport service which mixes informality, formality and sometimes illegality. The chapter shows the thin line between being an unregistered floating driver and a registered driver by exploring the nuances among and continuum connecting the five different types of floating along the Ejisu-Kumasi highway: *everyday, temporary, hiding, convenience and peak-hour floaters*. Often, the services of all the types of floating and non-floating drivers run side-by-side; their differences are unknown to the average commuter and not easy to differentiate, even by city authorities and executives of transport operators' unions. Whereas the study attempts to categorise levels of informality among urban transport service operators, in reality, such distinct categorisation may not be found. The categories overlap, with embedded nuances that are socially and politically constructed and difficult to differentiate. Therefore, a hybrid system persists.

Findings from this study further identified MMDAs and the Department of Transport as the main institutions and the DoT manuals and by-laws as the main policy frameworks that are supposed to regulate the transport system. However, these structures have been found to be weak, fragmented and uncoordinated. Standards and guidelines for transport regulation and management were also fragmented and unharmonised. In the face of these systemic inadequacies, the existing informal transport services ensure smooth mobility along the study corridor. Thus, these operators appear to fill a gap in the public transport service which the formalised system has failed to fill. However, the inherent challenges of registration, unfavourable operational conditions and lack of schedule are major setbacks for the informal transport sector.

It is unquestionable that banning the operations of floating drivers may not be politically feasible or even desirable due to the significant role they play in public transportation in Ghana (Asimeng, 2021). We conclude that the floating transport system is dynamic, fast and constantly evolving, whilst the city authorities' regulatory attempts have largely been reactive and limited. The institutional arrangements, coordination and capacity needed to regulate floating transport vehicles are

still underdeveloped in Ghana. In response to the associated complexities revealed in the study, the chapter recommends the creation of a platform for coordinated and harmonised planning, implementation, regulation and enforcement of public transport regulations at the national, regional and local MMDA levels. The first step towards creating this platform should be not to criminalise floating. Such a platform may take the form of allowing all floating drivers to directly register at a token fee with the DoT and be seen as operators along the corridor, without being members of any particular operators' association. Again, these floaters can be assigned identifiable numbers, and designated bus stops are assigned for their smooth operation.

Another entry point could be the integration of organised unions, which would allow transport operators to operate between unions without illegalising their operations. Drivers would be required to maintain allegiance to the unions they are registered with. We also recommend the integration of floaters into the transport service system within the framing of inclusivity and hybridity. Thus, once floating driving is decriminalised, operators can have a section at the DoT responsible for their organisation and training, checking their vehicles and ensuring that unregistered drivers and vehicles are properly registered and insured. Again, registration points could be mounted at the various bus stops to ease their registration – which could be daily, monthly or annually – and make it affordable and convenient. Whilst supporting the smooth and safe running of floating drivers, there is also the need to sensitise and educate commuters to understand the operations of the various transport options and their associated challenges. As the central stakeholders and primary users, they appear to be the least considered in the management of transport services. Apart from decriminalisation and integration of floating drivers, there is also the need to ensure sufficient financial capacity in the municipal assembly to provide efficient, safe and affordable transport that will expand the options available to commuters. Until these actions are taken, the floating transport sub-system will continue to grow, along with its risks, because of its enormous urban mobility potential.

Note

1 The Progressive Transport Owners' Association (PROTOA): the transport union for the route linking Parkoso to the N6 highway at Aprade.

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5 Exploring hybridity in the delivery configurations of mobility in Sunyani, Ghana

Substitution, competition and complementarity

Pearl Puwurayire and Christian Rosen

5.1 Hybridity of the transportation sector in Sunyani, Ghana

> The Station in Sunyani, bustling with activity, is the heart of the city's transportation system. When I first visited the site for fieldwork, numerous taxis were packed along the streets outside the actual Station premises, with their drivers constantly moving, persuading bystanders to sit in their cars. Some drivers stop abruptly to pick up passengers, causing cars behind them to honk loudly. Overwhelmed by the situation, two city guards keep screaming warnings to these floating drivers to move before they have to face any repercussions. Knowing their activities to be illegal, the drivers immediately moved when they saw the city guards approaching them. One city guard then encourages the 'bystanders' to go inside the Station – the designated space for taxis – to pick one of the official registered taxis. The Station is crowded with taxis, but the drivers navigate seamlessly to their designated spots, following a clear organisation of different zones for all the different destinations within the city. They wait until the taxi is filled with passengers and then depart. Then, the next taxi is filled.
>
> (Observation Protocol, Pearl Puwurayire)

This personal observation contains impressions of different social practices and their varied materialities, which point toward the complex assemblages of human and non-human actors in the context of mobility in Sunyani. The situation is a first insight into how a seemingly unstructured transport system is organised and, at the same time, contested. This chapter examines the hybrid realities of mobility in Sunyani, focusing on the complex interrelation of formalised and informalised actors and practices. The chapter critically analyses how 'formal' and 'informal' forms of mobility are produced as powerful social constructs that oppose each other whilst recognising and showing that this dualism does not fully describe local realities in the urban context, which are often more nuanced and relational (Rosen & Gribat, 2023). Our conceptual–methodological approach focuses on *delivery configurations* of mobility, meaning the actors and institutions, equipment and resources and the different forms of co-production and temporary or permanent arrangements

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(Jaglin, 2014) within and across urban spaces. Our findings suggest that hybridity in mobility expresses itself in substitution, competition and complementation between formalised and informalised actors, vehicles and spaces, which are rarely evident at first sight.

By applying the conceptual framework of delivery configurations, we show the different forms of hybridity in Sunyani's mobility sector using three concrete examples. First, we explore the roles that road users play in the maintenance of roads and in ensuring safety in the neighbourhood of Kotorkrom. The second example presents the central transportation hub, known as "Station", highlighting the different modes of transport in this space and the involved actors' practices, regulations and conflicts. The third example compares two neighbourhoods with different socio-economic status, Kotorkrom and Berlin-Top, and highlights how everyday mobility within and outside these neighbourhoods is organised. This last example also reveals social inequalities in relation to mobility and explores the practices of tricycle drivers in more depth, showing how they suffer from legalisation and subsequent marginalisation in Sunyani. In summary, this chapter presents findings from a qualitative study of the delivery configurations of mobility based on extensive fieldwork, unveiling the different arrangements of formalised and informalised practices and materialities resulting in the hybrid transport realities of Sunyani. It contributes to calls for more diverse theories of cities in the global South, highlighting their individual development paths and potentials for local solutions whilst challenging the direct transferability of development approaches from the global North (Watson, 2012).

Our argument is structured as follows. In the second section, we present an overview of the literature on mobility in Ghana and the conceptual framework of delivery configurations. In the third section, Sunyani and the two case study neighbourhoods, Kotorkrom and Berlin-Top, are presented along with the methods employed to collect and analyse the material. In the fourth section, the delivery configurations of mobility are analysed through the lens of hybridity. Three types of hybrid arrangements are developed, providing insight into the complex realities of mobility in Sunyani. The fifth section concludes this chapter by summarising the findings and comparing the different hybrid arrangements of delivery configurations encountered.

5.2 Theoretical framework: Delivery configurations to explore mobility in Ghana

Historically in Ghana, centralised public transport services have struggled to meet the needs of users due to structural failures and technical inefficiencies (Boansi, 2020). This has played out through successive government interventions with public transport initiatives such as the Omnibus Service Authority, the City Express Service, the State Transport Corporation and the Metro Mass Transit. These projects were expected to facilitate inter- and intra-urban transportation services for urban dwellers in cities such as Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi, Sunyani and Tamale. Metro Mass Transit (MMT) and the state transport corporation (STC) are the

only companies in which the state has invested significant funding and are in full operation. MMT and Intercity STC remain functional in Ghana due to substantial government support and subsidies, their strategic importance in providing essential services, investments in fleet management and operational reforms. Other state ventures in transport systems had major pitfalls due to inadequate funding and investment, poor road conditions and connectivity, regulatory and institutional challenges and a lack of technological integration, that required them to either be sold or liquidated (Spooner et al., 2023). Private operators have seized the opportunity to take over 80 percent of the market by developing services principally using taxis and minibuses. Many of them are labelled 'informal' by public authorities due to a lack of formal registration of their services (Birago et al., 2017; Yeboah & Asibey, 2019).

To regulate the activities of private transport operators, the public sector, led by the central Ministry of Roads and Transport and with the involvement of local governments, created laws, regulations and standards that shape the activities of these transport operators and consequently integrate their services into a centralised and formalised system. For instance, drivers have to register with unions, such as the Ghana Public Road Transport Union (GPTRU), before they can operate (Spooner et al., 2023). The creation of transport unions can be considered an important step toward integrating the highly fragmented transport sector, providing a better overview of existing services and potentially regulating operators (Jedwab & Moradi, 2011). Yet studies show that informalisation was created, especially in cases where private transport operators were unwilling to join the unions (Ahijo, 2022; Alcorn & Karner, 2021), as an unintended side effect of this strategy. In addition, the public sector's involvement in making laws and standards without the participation of all transport providers has contributed to injustice, inequality and exclusion of some transport actors (Birago et al., 2017; Boansi, 2020; Spooner et al., 2023). This is because most of the laws and regulations enacted by public administrations are geared towards standardisation without necessarily improving the livelihood of the transport workers (Alcorn & Karner, 2021). In summary, the Ghanaian state promotes centralised and formalised solutions whilst experiencing inadequate funding and governance capacities to realise these visions fully. It is crucial to understand these processes nationally and throughout the last decades to investigate how the local transport realities of today's Sunyani developed.

The result, we argue, is that hybrid arrangements have evolved. In this study, *hybridity* as a concept helps to explore the social production of a binary between formalised and informalised forms of mobility using examples from Sunyani. 'Formalised', in this context, is understood as practices and material realities that are produced or legitimised by public authorities, whilst 'informalised' represents the very diverse practices of co-production (Mitlin & Bartlett, 2018) or auto-construction (Caldeira, 2017), which exist seemingly outside the regulations of the public sector. We argue that the reality of mobility here and in other cities of the global South is far more complex than this dualistic view (Rosen & Gribat, 2023, and Chapter 1 of this volume). Hybridity as a conceptual lens allows us to critically reconstruct how certain forms of mobility are produced and legitimised

as 'formal', whilst others are informalised and consequently often marginalised (Avni & Yiftachel, 2014). Our analysis focuses on the effects of this dividing logic and explores how actors make sense of it in their everyday mobility routines. Investigating infrastructural delivery configurations allows hybrid arrangements to be made visible very effectively. We investigate infrastructure through a critique of the classical physical, material and technological definition tailored to be uniform across diverse contexts (Graham & Marvin, 2001) and highlight the role of people and social networks (Simone, 2004) and the multiplicity of infrastructure configurations (Lawhon et al., 2018). Following arguments in the context of the infrastructural turn, infrastructure in this study is investigated by focusing on the relation of social and material realities of technical and political knowledge within economic, geographic and cultural spaces (Coutard & Rutherford, 2015;; Simone, 2004). It is understood as a complex representation of social realities that dynamically change over time and by repeated and changing practices of different actors. Practically, we explore the delivery configurations of mobility, including different transport services (such as taxis and motor tricycles), actors (such as drivers, users and regulators) and their different rationalities, institutions such as Sunyani Municipal Assembly and transport unions, as well as the roads and other material entities involved. In this study, delivery configuration does not refer to a 'system', which usually means the functioning of one delimited infrastructure. Instead, it includes the technicalities, capacities, ownerships, politics, risk and power relations in the complex realities of mobility (Rateau & Jaglin, 2022).

In this chapter, the delivery configurations of mobility are analysed to shed light on the diverse aspects that are important in its production. Hybridity as an approach unveils the complex arrangements of informalised and formalised realities in social interactions on different scales, including state regulations and the individual practices of a daily commuter or taxi driver.

5.3 Study setting, case study neighbourhoods and methods

There are 16 regions in Ghana and 261 Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) (Hackman et al., 2021). The regions are the first level of sub-government administration in Ghana and were introduced to enable political decentralisation (Government of Ghana, 1993). Greater Sunyani, the context of our project, comprises the Sunyani Municipal Assembly and Sunyani West Municipal Assembly. Sunyani serves as the administrative capital of the Bono Region, which is located in the west-central part of Ghana (Sunyani Municipal Assembly, 2021). Due to its location, it serves as a transport hub for both the northern and southern parts of Ghana. Over one-third of the land area has yet to be cultivated and is marked as arable land for future investment (Sunyani Municipal Assembly, 2021). Greater Sunyani had a population of about 300,000 in 2021, about a 20 percent increase since the 2010 census, creating economic opportunities and challenges for local housing, job markets and mobility infrastructure. Of this population, some 50 percent are internal migrants (Ghana Statistical Service, 2021). Regarding transport and road infrastructure, the Greater Sunyani area has a mixture of urban

highways and feeder roads. The urban highways are made up of arterial roads, which form two ring roads and connecting spokes. The ring roads serve as bypass routes around the Central Business District (CBD), whereas the spokes connect the suburbs to each other and to the CBD. The feeder roads connect Sunyani to neighbouring towns and villages.

Sunyani West and Sunyani Municipal Assemblies receive annual funds from the central government and also use internally generated funds to maintain these roads and construct new ones. The Assemblies are responsible for infrastructure development under the Local Government Act of 1993, focusing on managing physical and socio-economic growth (Government of Ghana, 1993). The Department of Urban Roads, under the Ministry of Roads and Highways, oversees the construction and supervision of road networks at all scales from arterial roads to local streets, including significant connections from Sunyani to Kumasi, Berekum and Techiman. The Department is also responsible for ensuring proper road markings and signs. As of 2020, Sunyani had 505.71 km of roads, with 41% in good condition, 37.7% in poor condition and 21.05% in fair condition (Sunyani Municipal Assembly, 2021).

The two case study neighbourhoods, Berlin-Top in Sunyani West and Kotorkrom in Sunyani Municipal, were founded 20 years ago. Berlin-Top is popularly regarded as a high-income neighbourhood with a size of 114 hectares. In contrast, Kotorkrom is a significantly more extensive low-income neighbourhood, with a size of 510 hectares. Berlin-Top is located alongside the major ring road, about 2 km from the CBD. In contrast, Kotorkrom is found along an arterial road leading to the northern parts of Ghana, lying about 8 km away from the CBD. This chapter focuses on the two neighbourhoods and the delivery configurations of mobility that we encountered. It contrasts these realities with a central mobility hub in the centre of Sunyani, Station, which plays a vital role for residents of both neighbourhoods.

Fieldwork included participant observation, document analysis, photo documentation, mapping and semi-structured interviewing. At the neighbourhood level, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 25 households each in Berlin-Top and Kotorkrom. Looking at the professionals responsible for mobility-related issues, we conducted interviews with: two urban planners from the Planning Department of the Regional Coordinating Council – responsible for the supervision of Development Plans in the Region; two urban planners from the Development Planning and Physical Planning Department of the Sunyani West Municipal Assembly – responsible for planning and implementing development and physical plans for the Municipal Area; and a civil engineer at the Department of Urban Roads under Ministry of Roads and Highways – responsible for development and maintenance of roads in the municipality.

In addition, we interviewed members of the Traditional Council, the Assemblies of Kotorkrom and Berlin-Top, representatives of the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU), the Taxi Drivers Association and Motor Tricycles Rider Association. We also interviewed taxi and tricycle drivers.

MAXQDA was used for thematic analysis; we compared the materials on different scales, including the different neighbourhoods and perspectives of different actors. Major content codes used in the generation of themes included everyday

practices of residents, professional practices of experts, formalised and non-formalised regulations, local transport conditions, material realities and aspirations of residents and experts.

5.4 Delivery configurations of mobility in Sunyani

The following sections explore how hybridity is present in many aspects of mobility in Sunyani. The first example shows how road maintenance and safety are organised in a hybrid way, whilst the second empirical case describes the competition between formalised and informalised transport providers at the central taxi transport hub. The last example shows how taxi and tricycle services complement each other, once again formalised and informalised, creating additional inequalities for already marginalised providers.

5.4.1 Hybridity in road safety and maintenance: Substituting the state's services

Road networks in Sunyani provide more than just a connection between two or more geographical areas. They create social spaces by manifesting various technical, social, economic and cultural practices and realities. Pedestrian walkways and road curbs serve as a primary or secondary locations for part of the population. Businesses on the roads span from petty trading, including table-top sales of candies and biscuits, to larger grocery shops. Other small businesses such as hair salons, lottery kiosks, food vendors and other small shops (for example, for second-hand clothes) can be found in profusion along the arterial and sub-arterial roads of the city.

Though these business activities are practised across every area in Sunyani, there is an accumulation of different activities along the road to the CBD in the neighbourhood of Kotorkrom. The road is heavily used by *wheelbarrow operators* who assist in carrying heavy goods from the market or assist travellers who have arrived or are departing with heavy luggage. Farming products such as vegetables and fruits, along with household products such as kitchenware, tools and equipment, bedding and furniture, can be found on the road of the CBD, as well as mobile money services and sales of phone recharge cards. During rush hour, traffic congestion on this particular street is intense. Naturally, walking on the roadside is not the easiest activity to do. Ensuring safety for all street users is a particularly challenging task on this street. However, most of the pedestrians know how to navigate through their spaces, and drivers mostly learn to drive more safely. Sometimes, pedestrians on the roadside pitch into direct traffic when the road is congested, but this does not alleviate the heavy traffic congestion. Road markings are either faded or non-existent, and the few existing road signs have also faded, making it difficult for pedestrians and drivers to navigate effectively.

The Department of Urban Roads is responsible for ensuring the safety of all road users, including signage and road markings. Employees are well aware of the situation on this particular road and many other similar cases in the city: "If there

are no road markings or road signs, it means the road is still under construction, or the contractor did not finish the work because of resource constraints from our end" (Officer at the Department of Urban Roads). In this interview, it became clear that many road projects are underway simultaneously but that resources are limited, and the capacities of skilled contractors are inadequate. Therefore, many projects will take longer or stay unfinished for a long time, not providing the level of safety for users the administration aims for.

However, residents also had concerns, for example, stating, "We wish we had more instructions on the road to help us use the road more safely" (Resident 4 of Sunyani Metropolis). Street users told us they were well aware of the dangers for themselves, especially children. They pointed out the need for concrete measures to improve security.

Due to the poor condition of the road's paving, a significant number of sections are regularly being fixed by private individuals. Taxi drivers fill potholes with sand and stones on weekends or holidays. We also observed residents who venture into fixing roads to earn an income. Most of these residents find sections of the road that need to be fixed and use tools such as wheelbarrows filled with sand and stones, and with spades, they fill the potholes. As they fix the road, they request money from drivers who pass by. On questioning one of these workers, he stated: "We don't have work to do, so we decided to find work for ourselves so that we can earn a little money daily" (Resident 5 of Sunyani Metropolis).

Residents who have shops or live close to the dusty road are also worried about the speed of cars and sudden unexpected manoeuvres to escape traffic congestion, both being a risk to the safety of people walking on the street. Consequently, they encourage drivers to reduce their speed by placing car tyres or spreading out a pile of sand, which serves as a speed bump (see Figure 5.1). Residents in this context highlight that the municipality is not helping them provide security on the street, so they have to find other solutions to address this problem.

All these activities on the road are known by the Municipal Department of Urban Roads and are not considered legal. An officer from the Department stated:

> Road construction and everything associated with it is supposed to be done by the government or any government representative. Even though sometimes we stop them, we allow it other times because we also don't have the resources to fix it.
>
> (Officer at the Department of Urban Roads)

This final quote summarises the hybrid arrangement in the context of road security and maintenance. Being considered illegal, the practices of residents and users to maintain the road and provide additional security are considered problematic. The public sector aims, in principle, to have complete control over all activities and to provide regulated services. At the same time, city officials acknowledge inadequate resources and capacity to fulfil this task. The resulting hybrid arrangement is shaped to a high degree by state officials' toleration and acceptance of the

Figure 5.1 Auto-constructed speed bumps

substitution of their own practices with auto-constructed solutions by pedestrians and local residents.

5.4.2 Hybrid organisation of a transport hub: Competing for passengers

In Sunyani, modes of transport besides walking and (limited) cycling include motorcycles, motor tricycles, cars and trucks. Other forms of transport, such as (mini)buses, are rarely seen on the city streets and mostly come from other parts of the country, such as Ghana's second city of Kumasi, some 130 km away. In principle, all vehicular modes of transport are regulated by state institutions: the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority (DVLA) is responsible for ensuring safety on the road by licensing qualified citizens or foreigners with the appropriate license for driving; the Department of Urban Roads is responsible for planning, providing and managing the urban road network and related infrastructure; and the Municipal Assemblies of Greater Sunyani are responsible for the overall planning and implementation of development in the Municipal area. Additional regulations are formulated by the traditional authorities acting as the cultural and historical overlords of the Sunyani area and by the GPRTU, which regulates working conditions, sets standards for public drivers and provides financial assistance to its members. As a minimum requirement, to use a vehicle on the road one is expected to have a driver's license, have the car registered with a number

plate indicating its purpose (private, government, diplomatic or commercial) by the DVLA and obtain insurance from an accredited insurance company (Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority, 2024).

Transport services that serve destinations within Sunyani are mainly taxis, with additional services from motor tricycles outside the city centre. GPRTU, as an authorised union, ensures that all drivers are registered, organised, allocated to a specific destination point and assigned to spaces to park and pick up passengers. This means registered drivers operate between specific pickup and destination points, so working outside these designated points results in a penalty from the union. This gives the union enormous power at the local level as they decide which transport services can be registered, where they operate and how centrally located their pickup points are.

The city's most important transport hub is a 0.4 hectare taxi stand in the CBD, popularly called "Station". There are often more than 50 cars within this space during the daytime. Different sections of the Station are apportioned to taxis going to specific areas in Sunyani (see Figure 5.2). At the allocated section, taxi drivers display placards marked with the name of their destination to attract potential customers, often under a canopy or an umbrella for shade. Drivers depart when all seats of their cars are occupied: these are shared taxis rather than vehicles for individual hire. Passengers can only board the first taxi until it departs, and the next taxi in line drives to the boarding position.

Figure 5.2 Drone picture of Sunyani taxi "Station"

To prevent taxi drivers from skipping the queues, there is always a chalkboard with the license plate numbers of the taxi drivers in order of the time they arrived.

Drawing on Figure 5.2, the destination of taxis at the centre of Station is Berlin-Top, Baakoniaba and Abesim. In the evening, this spot is taken over by taxi drivers going to Dormaa Ahenkro, Berekum and Drobo – major neighbouring towns around Sunyani. Only taxis and drivers which meet all the regulations described above are allowed to enter the Station. At present, there are over 300 registered commercial vehicles in Sunyani. However, there are also over 100 taxis that operate within the city but are not allowed to enter the Station. They are not members of GPRTU or any recognised transport union; some also lack driver's licences or insurance. They are popularly called *floating drivers* (see Amoako et al. in Chapter 4 of this volume). Around the Station area, they can be observed picking up passengers on the road or waiting by the roadside for people. A city guard commented on this situation: "They are stubborn drivers because they always ignore the rules by parking or picking up passengers at undesignated places" (Sunyani City Guard 1 at the Station). However, this also happens because there is no designated space in or around the Station for drivers not registered with GPRTU. It is difficult for the drivers to find places to wait for passengers or to let them enter their cars without the vehicles behind them urging them to move on. The union's price regulations do not bind floating drivers and they do not pay fees for using the Station. They are the preferred option for passengers in a hurry to reach their destination, as they constantly move and pick up individual passengers when they choose. In contrast, taxis within the Station often wait until they are fully loaded, which can take up to half an hour, before departing.

This delivery configuration of registered and non-registered taxis operating in close proximity, serving the same areas of the city, but under very different regulatory conditions is leading to competition and conflict.

> Floating drivers always pick people from the roadside, and they don't allow them to come to the Station. This makes them earn more profit than us. We have complained about them several times, but the authorities do nothing about it.
>
> (Station Driver 1 at the CBD)

Conflicts between the floating and registered drivers, the city authorities and the union are based on different arguments. On the one hand, registered drivers complain about the illegal, non-registered and non-reliable character of the services of floating drivers, and they argue for vigorous law enforcement and legal action against these practices. On the other hand, floating drivers argue that they rely on their income as drivers and do not have the money to meet the union's requirements to become registered. Until now, the practices of the floating drivers are largely tolerated by all authorities, creating a second example of the hybridity of the delivery configurations of mobility. It highlights the competition between formalised and informalised services based on passenger demands and

the resources of taxi drivers to meet or not meet the standards of the union and city administration (see also Chapter 4).

5.4.3 Spatial inequalities and resulting forms of hybridity: Pragyas complementing taxis only in certain neighbourhoods

Getting to the high-income neighbourhood of Berlin-Top is easy due to its proximity to the CBD. Also, all major taxi stations in Sunyani have designated spaces for drivers who want to enter Berlin-Top, and their road is in relatively good condition. In contrast, the situation is different for the less affluent neighbourhood of Kotorkrom. None of the taxi stations has a demarcated space for picking up passengers to get there. Registered drivers we interviewed mentioned that Kotokrom was not a neighbourhood they preferred to serve, due to the poor condition of the roads and the relatively long distance from the Central Business District (CBD). Consequently, the floating drivers are able to offer their services to residents without competition, although there are adverse impacts from the poor road conditions on their often already deteriorating vehicles. This limitation results in longer waiting times for a taxi to Kotorkrom.

Most households in Berlin-Top have at least one car, which the head of the household often uses, making the other family members dependent on taxis. As there is no central taxi station in Berlin-Top, the waiting place for passengers is by the roadside for either registered or floating drivers. A young resident explained: "Over here, I don't have to wait for cars for a long time because people are always coming here with taxis, and sometimes, I use my father's car" (Resident 4 of Berlin-Top). In Kotorkrom, most households do not have a private vehicle: they depend greatly on taxis. There is no taxi station in Kotorkrom, but in contrast to Berlin-Top, the waiting period is significantly longer. An elderly man at the roadside stated: "I have to always stand here for a long time. What makes the waiting period more painful is the dust that you will inhale when you stand. Sometimes, by the time I get to town, I am so dirty" (Resident 5 of Kotorkrom).

For internal neighbourhood commutes, there are motor tricycles (*pragyas*) in Kotorkrom, with an informal but locally recognised space for parking and waiting for their customers, referred to as Pragya Station. This is due to the very few taxis that move along the neighbourhood's arterial road, and that most of them resist driving on the internal roads due to their poor condition. Pragyas are also a cheap option for moving around. At the same time, it is illegal to operate them for commercial purposes. However, they are very popular in many middle-to-low-income neighbourhoods across Sunyani, and in many cases, the tricycles are the only available mode of public transportation. Due to this, the practice of the city administration is to desist from enforcing the laws that prohibit pragyas' activities and to let the tricycles operate within these neighbourhoods, albeit with new (informal) regulations. An officer of the Municipal Assembly opines:

> These motor tricycle riders are operating illegally because, in the Constitution, they are not allowed to use the tricycles for any commercial purposes,

> but we allow it under very stringent rules. For instance, they are supposed to go for a license from the DVLA – their license is equivalent to a motorbike license. They are not supposed to operate within the Central Business District and are expected to abide by all road regulations under the law – they are fined heavily if they flaunt these rules, or we confiscate their tricycle.
>
> (Officer of the Municipal Assembly)

Whilst authorities indicated that they tolerate pragyas, the drivers express their feeling of marginalisation by the city's authorities:

> As it stands now, we are not allowed to get a driver's license, we can't receive any proper training, and we can't form any credible pressure group that will speak for us. We can't even get insured. Even though the authorities know our services are very useful, they don't show us respect.
>
> (Tricycle Driver 5 of Kotorkrom)

This pragya driver explains that he and most of his colleagues drive with a motorbike licence, which does not allow them to legally ride their tricycles commercially. He claims that restrictions are high, so it is very difficult for them to follow the regulations and get benefits like insurance. However, they offer transport services that the registered taxis and floating taxi drivers do not deliver, including in areas that are not accessible to taxis. Their service is informalised by public authorities but tolerated since the transport infrastructure relies on their services predominantly in lower-income neighbourhoods. Still, social inequalities can be observed when comparing public transport in Berlin-Top and Kotorkrom and focusing on the working conditions of the different transport providers. Tricycles deliver a complementary service in the existing hybrid system of formalised and informalised transport. At the same time, they are in themselves a hybrid form of transport, being informalised by the law and only tolerated by city authorities. The authorities know that large parts of the city rely on these services and consequently actively intervene in the informalised sector of pragya drivers, not by attempting to formalise their services but by regulating the 'informal' practices of the already marginalised drivers.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter explores the delivery configurations of mobility in Sunyani and provides insights from examples of our extensive fieldwork. Three examples of delivery configurations show variations of what we conceptualise as hybrid urbanism. The first example highlights how safety and street maintenance are provided when the public sector has inadequate capacities and resources. Residents and users of a street in Kotorkrom found alternative modes to maintain the road and reduce speed to make it a safe place for people to walk and work. Practices of auto-construction replace public sector services, providing a first type of hybrid configuration: *substitution*. The second example examines the diverse

realities of public transport at the Station in downtown Sunyani. It shows how taxi services are organised by competing for space and passengers. The system of registered drivers is formalised by local institutions, providing reliability for drivers and passengers. In contrast, floating drivers are not registered and have no designated spaces. They are trying to make a living in competition with registered drivers by offering their services outside of the Station and often at cheaper rates. This case exemplifies *competition* as a characteristic of hybrid configurations. The last case compares the mobility options in the high-income neighbourhood of Berlin-Top and the low-income neighbourhood of Kotorkrom. It shows how public transport is organised differently in different parts of Sunyani. In Kotorkrom, residents suffer from more complex and less attractive service options. Tricycle drivers supplement the service of taxis in the area, responding to the need of residents to get to their houses, which are not always connected to streets accessible by cars. Residents, thus, have to change vehicles and pay an additional fare. Tricycle drivers are marginalised by the public administration by not being allowed to enter the city centre. This drastically reduces their working options, and they are also excluded from joining powerful unions. They offer a *complementary* form of mobility, representing a third type of hybrid arrangement.

The three examples in this chapter show that analysing delivery configurations is fruitful as it provides contextualised and interconnected insights into the reality of mobility practices. For instance, we show how the public sector plays a central role in promoting certain forms of mobility (such as registered taxis), but also tolerating others (e.g., unregistered taxis and tricycles). Even though certain providers and practices are informalised, they are still tolerated by the state, which becomes a vital actor in the regulation of the informalised transport sector because its services are important, especially for population groups with lower incomes and in areas where no other forms of transport are available. In addition, the examples in this chapter also show that in contexts of limited resources and capacities of the state to either maintain roads or offer public transport in certain areas, other actors jump in, which partly involves a degree of risk-taking. Most importantly, overall mobility in Sunyani relies on complex configurations that are never just ‘formal’ or ‘informal’ but are hybrids which are constantly negotiated and reproduced in response to the conditions of a city like Sunyani.

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6 Shaping urban planning and infrastructural configurations through everyday practices and resistance

The case of the Bolgatanga market reconstruction

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6.1 Introduction

Bolgatanga is the capital of both the Bolgatanga Municipality and the Upper East Region of Ghana. According to the 2021 Population and Housing Census, the Bolgatanga Municipality had a population of 139,864 people (Ghana Statistical Service [GSS], 2021). The municipality has a competitive advantage in handicrafts (Asante et al., 2024; Diabour et al., 2023) with an industry employing a substantial number of residents (GSS, 2021; Wemegah et al., 2020). In addition, Bolgatanga as the regional and municipal capital serves as the level one service centre, providing a wide range of services including education, health, banking, judicial, administrative and commercial among others, making it an important secondary city in the Ghanaian context (Korah et al., 2022).

The phenomenon of increasing urbanisation that is being witnessed in many African cities can also be observed in Bolgatanga (Tengan et al., 2017). The growth of cities in Ghana and in other Sub-Saharan African countries seems to be inevitable and will probably continue until they are highly urbanised (Cobbinah et al., 2015, 2018). Rural dwellers and school leavers from other areas in and around the region migrate to Bolgatanga in search of perceived better opportunities. Also, in recent years, ethnic conflict and tensions in the nearby Bawku municipality have deteriorated and have compelled a large number of residents from the hitherto most populous and commercial city in the region to relocate to other cities, including Bolgatanga (Nikoi et al., 2019). The recent reoccurrence of the conflict and migration of residents of Bawku who are predominantly businessmen and women to Bolgatanga has provided an added boost to commercial life in the city.

The intense increase in commercial activities in Bolgatanga stimulated by rapid urbanisation thus calls for the expansion of market infrastructure in the municipality. Unfortunately, state-led market infrastructure delivery through regeneration projects and new construction has often not been able to keep pace with rising

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demand. As a result, the market infrastructure developed by the government or donors is often inadequate and inappropriate for the largely informal commercial activities across Ghana (Asante, 2020; Asante & Helbrecht, 2019a). Additionally, market infrastructure provided by the state and municipalities is often perceived as an instrument of state control (Asante & Helbrecht, 2019b, 2020). In response, people are exploring alternative modes of market infrastructure delivery in sections of the municipalities they consider strategic for their business operations. This takes the form of either permanent market infrastructure or the erection of wooden kiosks. But these alternative modes of infrastructure have been described as haphazard and illegal developments by municipal authorities (Asante, 2020).

The emerging urban reality in Ghana is that state-led and alternative private modes of infrastructure configurations and delivery will co-exist. Such a co-existence of hybrid forms could be mutually supportive or generate complexities depending on the unfolding nuances of urban realities in the municipality. Relying on the concept of *hybrid urbanism*, this chapter explores the tension arising from the reconstruction of the Bolgatanga Market and how market traders mobilised themselves to resist the use of market infrastructure as an instrument of state control. Using the case narratology approach, the chapter pieces together an account of events before, during and after the reconstruction of the Bolgatanga Market to reveal the strategies employed by the market users to resist being confined to a market facility whose configurations did not meet their business and customers' needs. The chapter therefore explores how non-state actors resist and/or subvert dominant state ideological discourses and infrastructure delivery approaches to forge a blend of stakeholder interests and responsibilities in complex but novel ways. It illustrates how the everyday practices of local market users are setting the agenda for urban planning/upgrading and infrastructural configurations in Bolgatanga. The chapter underscores the effectiveness of positive resistance in shaping market infrastructural configuration and delivery.

6.2 Research approach and method

The study adopts a qualitative research design using the case narratology approach in order to focus on an in-depth study of one single case: the reconstruction of the Bolgatanga Market and the politics of moving traders from one location to another. A narrative gives a subjective account of a sequence of events as they unfold over time (Raven & Elahi, 2015). As noted by Denscombe (2010), the starting point and arguably the defining characteristic of the case study approach is its focus on just one instance of the thing that is to be investigated. The narrative approach allows the respondents to construct their own story and provide an in-depth account about how the whole reconstruction exercise started and ended. Another reason for the use of the case study approach was the intention of the researchers to understand the relationships and processes involved in the reconstruction and the movement of traders in Bolgatanga. A narratology is not just a storyline; it also highlights encounters (Franzidis et al., 2023).

The Bolgatanga Market was chosen from eleven similar cases in Ghana, two of which are also in the Upper East Region. All the cases share a range of similar features: they are all World Bank-sponsored projects, they were all designed and awarded on contract in Accra, and they all suffered from a series of delays. As a result, all eleven of the Municipal Assemblies involved were expected to explore other sources of revenue to complete the reconstruction work. The Bolgatanga case is particularly interesting because of the nature of politics involved in the movement of traders from one location to another. As observed by Flyvbjerg, "there can be no adequate understanding of planning without placing the analysis of planning within the context of power" (Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 293). The resistance of the traders as an effort to protect their livelihoods was also of interest to the researchers.

This chapter is based on semi-structured interviews and field observations to collect primary data from traders and municipal authorities. The interview process was very useful in unearthing the relationships, processes and dynamics of the case investigated. The interviews were transcribed, and the transcripts were analysed using inductive thematic analysis by following the process of data familiarization, coding, category and theme development/revision and writing up.

6.3 Background to the redevelopment of the Bolgatanga market

The Bolgatanga Market is as old as the settlement itself. It was set up by community members as a location for the exchange of goods and services. Oral tradition has it that goods traded in the early years of the market were basically agricultural produce. It was a platform for barter trade before the introduction of money. Accounts by senior citizens explain that the Bolgatanga Market in its early days also performed social functions aside from its primary economic function. The market was a place for social interaction for the young adults in the area. It was a place where many people met their marriage partners, and many young women in the area got married on market days. In recent times, the Bolgatanga Market has grown beyond a community market as it serves as a regional market, attracting people from all over the Upper East Region of Ghana and beyond, including traders from neighbouring Burkina Faso. Another dimension of Bolgatanga as a market centre is its role in the handicraft production and trade (Asante et al., 2024). Bolgatanga is one of the leading centres in the world in the production of straw baskets (popularly known as Bolga Baskets), hats, leather bags, sandals and smock weaving among others (Wemegah et al., 2020). Currently, trading engages about 20 percent of the working population in Bolgatanga (GSS, 2021), with new kiosks being erected nearly every week. Within the market, the erection of stalls is not regulated, and one can virtually see the erection of stalls within the three-day market cycle. Trading in the market is both formalised and informalised. The activities of some traders are formalised through licensing in the form of business operating permits issued by the Municipal Assembly, which they are required to renew annually or have their businesses closed down (Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly, 2020). This licensing that formalises the businesses also assures the Municipal Assembly of

taxable business ventures within its jurisdiction. In contrast, many traders operate informally, setting out their goods in open spaces within the market area.

The provision of infrastructure is critical in facilitating sustainable development (Adarkwa, 2001). The quest for facilities in the Bolgatanga Market gained impetus when the World Bank was implementing multiple initiatives aimed at upgrading infrastructure in secondary cities in Ghana. The upgrading of the Bolgatanga Market was included in the World Bank-funded Local Government Development Project, a successor of the Urban II Project, which also upgraded affordable houses and critical urban infrastructural facilities in a number of cities in Ghana (World Bank, 2003). The objectives of the Local Government Development Project, as captured in the Implementation Completion Report (World Bank, 2003, p. 1), were to:

- improve basic infrastructure and urban services in secondary cities;
- promote the sustainability and expansion of urban services by strengthening the District Assemblies' financial, technical and managerial capacities; and
- support the government's decentralisation programme to promote accountability and efficiency in the provision of infrastructure and services.

The main focus of the project was to improve the living conditions of the population of eleven secondary cities in Ghana, including six regional capitals. The reconstruction of the Bolgatanga Market was part of the first component of the Local Government Development Project: the rehabilitation and upgrading of infrastructure and urban services component. This component included the rehabilitation and upgrading of three types of basic infrastructure and urban services:

- roads and storm water drainage – which consisted of existing key town centre roads and links with the trunk road network, associated storm water drains, and basic traffic management measures;
- markets and lorry parks – which involved the rehabilitation and upgrading of existing markets and lorry parks, including the provision of paving, drainage, water standpipes, sanitation and washing facilities, security lighting and structures; and
- waste management – covering the establishment of environmentally engineered landfills, fencing of refuse collection stations, etc. (World Bank, 2003).

The Bolgatanga Market redevelopment started in 1997 and took more than a decade to complete. The construction of stalls in the market was implemented in three phases. The first phase was carried out with funds from the Local Government Development Project. Whilst this was the main funding source for the reconstruction, the funds that were earmarked for the reconstruction of the market were not sufficient to complete the erection of the stalls (Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly, 2016). As such, the Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly had to explore other avenues of funding to continue with the reconstruction. In the second phase, the Assembly used the Canadian-funded District Wide Assistance Project (Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly, 2016), but this facility was also insufficient to complete the construction

works. Finally, the Assembly resorted to using its share of the central government transfers, the District Assembly Common Fund, for a couple of years to complete the works. The next section discusses this redevelopment of the Bolgatanga Market by analysing the various narratives employed by market traders to resist the government's planned market infrastructure redevelopment.

6.4 Traders resistance narratives and the state's responses

Development projects are platforms that bring together various actors with varied interests (Olivier de Sardan, 2005). As reported in other Ghanaian cities (Asante, 2020; Asante & Helbrecht, 2019b), the reconstruction of the Bolgatanga Market and its associated temporary relocation of traders became an arena of protests and activism, where the municipal authorities and the local residents, particularly the market traders, took turns to defend their interests. The actual reconstruction exercise was to be preceded by the relocation of the traders to a temporary space to enable the contractor to undertake the physical works. But what was seen as a simple exercise of relocating the traders became a source of contestation between the municipal authorities and the traders (Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly, 2016). For the traders, abandoning the place in which they had been trading for many years and moving to a new site carried the risk of losing some of their loyal customers, who were likely to encounter difficulty trying to locate them in the temporary market. Additionally, the possibility of their stalls being allocated to different users after the reconstruction exercise became the grounds for their immediate primary resistance against the initial relocation to a temporary site. As one of the traders put it, "if we move to the temporary place, how can we be sure that we will get our stalls [back] after the reconstruction exercise?" (Teni, market trader). Although the traders may have had genuine concerns regarding the planned relocation, the municipal authorities also believed that they were acting in the interest of the traders.

The municipal authorities, on the other hand, had a strong rationale for the relocation of the traders, as they believed that the reconstruction of the Bolgatanga Market was a necessity and would contribute greatly to the 'beautification' of the city, bring about 'orderliness' in the Market and improve the municipality's revenue generation (Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly, 2016). Accordingly, the authorities started issuing deadlines and warnings to the Market users to move to the temporary market site. The traders remained adamant but were eventually forced out of the market through the deployment of the police, which allowed the reconstruction of the Market to commence and ended the first phase of resistance by the traders.

The completion of the reconstruction, followed by the relocation of the market traders back from the temporary place to the market marked, however, another era of confusion and intense resistance by the traders. Interviews with municipal officials reveal that when the reconstruction of the market was completed after several years of work, the authorities carried out the reallocation of traders' stalls. This was followed by a formal commissioning of the facility. The traders were then expected to move back to the reconstructed market and ply their trade but this did not happen naturally. After some time, the authorities noticed that only a very few people were

using the reconstructed market, whilst the majority kept on using the temporary market. They decided to find reasons for the low patronage and set up a committee to look into the matter. This was the beginning of formal engagement on the part of the Municipal Assembly. The authors further gathered from the interviews that whilst the authorities searched for reasons for the low patronage of the reconstructed market, the traders had already made up their minds to resist any attempt to move them back to the reconstructed market. The traders provided various reasons to justify their resistance to being relocated to the new market.

6.4.1 Spiritual and political agency: The market god and political threats

First, the traders complained about low sales in the reconstructed market and blamed it on the anger of the market god. The authorities quickly responded by contacting the traditional leaders and sacrifices were duly offered, yet the traders would still not move in significant numbers into the reconstructed market. The authorities once again started issuing threats to the vast majority of the traders who were refusing to return, but these traders stood their ground. Elsewhere in Ghana, similar studies have reported how market traders in Cape Coast and Kumasi have adopted various resistance strategies drawing on their political bargaining power (Asante, 2020; Asante & Helbrecht, 2019a, 2019b). Thus, in Bolgatanga, the reconstruction of the market with its attendant relocation of the traders assumed a political character, following a path which went along with the changes in political regimes in the country. Though the reconstruction of the market started during the 1992–2000 National Democratic Congress (NDC) administration, it was completed during the New Patriotic Party (NPP) administration of 2001–2008. This meant that the Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly had become headed by a Chief Executive appointed by the new ruling party. In view of the nature of local politics, the traders, particularly those aligned to the NDC, read political meaning into every action taken by the municipal authorities. Thus, when a committee was set up by the Municipal Assembly to allocate stalls to the traders, it was widely thought that the committee had allocated most of them to people aligned with the governing NPP. It was alleged that traders were compelled to visit the party leaders if they wanted stalls in the reconstructed market. Fuelled by this allegation, the traders became frustrated with the process and rejected the committee's recommendations.

The municipal authorities then believed that it was left with no option than to use force in an attempt to move the traders back to the newly constructed market using security officers. However, they only succeeded in scattering the traders for a day. The traders remained firm and also started issuing threats to the municipal authorities: "if Mr. Ayagle [the Municipal Chief Executive at the time] uses the police and soldiers to force us out of this place, we will not vote for NPP" (Lariba, a trader). The threat from the traders was strong: the Municipal Chief Executive had to take it seriously, as he had been in office for less than a year and was afraid he could lose his position if the local party executives reported to their headquarters in Accra that his actions were detrimental to the success of the party in the upcoming elections.

6.4.2 Market design narrative: Size and appropriateness

Beyond the traders' narrative of low sales being caused by the market god, they further argued that the reconstructed market was very small in size, with a limited number of stalls, which could not contain even half of the traders from the temporary market. With over ten years of delay, it was obvious that the population of the market users would have grown enormously, yet the reconstruction was not projected to expand the number of stalls to accommodate the growing needs of market users.

Another weakness of the reconstructed market that the traders used to justify their refusal to move was the fact that the design did not provide space for seasonal traders. One trader observed, "We have a lot of people who only come here to sell during the harvest season and the reconstructed market did not consider the needs of this category of traders" (Rose, a market trader). This group of traders need space which they cannot find in the newly constructed market, as the formal architectural designs did not incorporate the needs of the informalised users. Ideally, building and site designs must be undertaken in a manner that meets the needs of different users and must also be flexible and adaptable to changing demands over time (Wheeler, 2004). The notion of hybridity in infrastructure design accommodates both formalised regular users and informalised irregular users by providing designated spaces for them. For instance, a trader noted that:

> Everybody in this region knows that Bawku has been the commercial hub of the Upper East Region. However, following the recurrence of an ethnic conflict in the area, a good number of traders from Bawku now come to Bolgatanga on market days to ply their trade. But where can we find space in this small reconstructed market?
>
> (Rukaya, female trader from Bawku)

However, promoting sustainable local economic development requires that social infrastructure is accessible to everyone without any form of exclusion (Guo et al., 2023). When this is not possible, users will explore other means of meeting their socio-economic needs. In line with this, the Bawku traders decided to use the temporary market infrastructure to transact their business. At least, there they could constitute a market by themselves, since, given the experience of the conflict they had gone through, it was perceived by the Bolgatanga traders that those coming from Bawku could cause trouble.

The physical design of the market was also top-down and failed to consider local realities. The design of the newly constructed market with entrances fitted with iron gates was a source of discomfort to the market users and forms part of the reasons for their refusal to return. Though the gates are hardly ever closed, the market users expressed disapproval over their presence. As one put it, "I always have a feeling there is a closing time and I could be locked inside the market" (Abamga, Market Trader).

In addition to this, it was generally the case that traders who buy wholesale foodstuffs in sacks would prefer the big supply trucks to load and offload goods at

their base inside the market. Unlike at the temporary market site, this was not possible in the newly constructed market as its design did not incorporate this need of the traders. The fact that a good portion of the trading public needed an open space rather than stalls defeated the idea of raising only stalls and tiny sheds in the name of upgrading market facilities.

The top-down approach used in the architectural design also failed to make room for certain critical social and ancillary facilities such as restaurants and toilet and urinary units. Some of the market users argued that, unlike the temporary market where drinking bars were dotted all over, the reconstructed market did not make provision for a single drinking bar. As one put it:

> Market days in Bolgatanga are not only for selling and buying alone … they are also days for socialisation. Some people get their partners during market days here. This is possible in the drinking bars; not in the vegetable market.
>
> (Awuni, local resident)

From the above, the users of the market considered drinking bars as important facilities in market squares, and their absence makes the market incomplete. The explanation is that there is a category of market users who usually come out on market days just to drink with friends, but as it stands now these people are excluded by the architectural design of the reconstructed market. According to Addai et al. (2023), social interactions in market centres are critical in enhancing sustainable livelihoods of market users.

In response to the traders' resistance to use the reconstructed market, in April 2007 the then Deputy Upper East Regional Minister inaugurated yet another a 10-member committee to undertake a fresh allocation of stalls to 'deserving' traders. The committee was tasked to ensure fair and equitable allocation of stalls in the reconstructed market and to give special consideration to traders who originally owned stalls in the market before its demolition and reconstruction. The intervention confirms that protests and resistance are potent tools for expressing citizenship and claiming one's right to a property or service from government (Nagle, 2024). The committee made efforts to correct the past mistakes and ensure fairness in the allocation of stalls in the reconstructed market. But this intervention was too late, since, the majority of the traders were no longer interested in moving to the newly developed market. This included traders who had been allocated places in the reconstructed market, thus turning the temporary structure into a place of permanence.

6.5 Reconfiguration of the market to meet local realities: Users' agency in shaping infrastructural decision-making

Relocation has become a common feature of market reconstruction or redevelopment in Ghana and often entails three main stages, namely relocation, construction and allocation (Asante, 2022). In market reconstruction, relocation is often perceived to be a temporary movement of market users to a different location to enable the construction works to proceed without interruption. However, it has become a reality that such relocations can be permanent, a journey of no return for

some of the original market users. This could arise because of the inability of the original users to secure stalls after the reconstruction exercise or a personal decision not to return to the reconstructed market. The discourse on relocation in Ghana often revolves around competing rationales (Stacey et al., 2021). Where there is no convergence of these rationales, a conflict is created. This explains the increasing activism among market users affected by reconstruction exercises who challenge and change the formal infrastructure delivery mode which has become a common feature of urban governance in Ghana (Asante, 2022). Some of these interest groups wield political and economic power which they can exercise to shape political decision-making. This often results in the reconfiguration of existing infrastructure or the emergence of hybrid forms of infrastructure delivery (Asante, 2022).

In the case of the Bolgatanga Market reconstruction, the Municipal Chief Executive suspended the action to compel the traders back into the newly constructed market and further initiated a process of finding a mutually acceptable solution to the impasse. This resulted in a resolution by the Municipal Assembly to recognise and upgrade the temporary market for traders who decided not to move to the reconstructed market. This resolution to allow the 'temporary market' to operate alongside the main market is a recognition of the reality of hybridity in its infrastructural configuration and delivery. It signifies the limitation of formal and technocratic urban planning and infrastructural configurations and the need to embrace the perspectives of local residents, particularly the potential users. This meant that the municipal authorities had to go back to the drawing board to not only recognise the 'temporary market' as a 'new permanent market', but also to reconfigure the infrastructure in the 'temporary market' to meet the needs of the traders.

First, the Municipality realigned the new market to the main lorry station to ensure easy accessibility for users. Guursan et al. (2023) argue that the value of services generated from public infrastructure system appreciate when such services support the realisation of societal needs. From the foregoing, a market design that takes into consideration the hybrid constellations of market users and their practices is highly recommended for meeting the needs of diverse users. In this case, the physical redesign where the new market and the main lorry station are now situated side by side meant that traders and customers can easily access both facilities:

> Now, unlike the old market, when I leave Bawku with my goods and arrive at the main lorry station in Bolgatanga, I walk into the market like moving from my sitting room to the bedroom.
>
> (Habiba, trader from Bawku)

Second, the Bolgatanga Municipal Assembly has been compelled to go into a public-private partnership to construct a two-storey market building along the south and east sides of the formerly 'temporary' market to provide convenient places for trade.

A build-operate-transfer (BOT) arrangement is in place to provide additional market stalls in this new market building. This action introduced another perspective

Figure 6.1 Temporary market recognised as permanent and upgraded to meet traders' access needs

of hybridity in infrastructure delivery in the municipality. Thirdly, the roads directly behind the south and east end stalls have been tarred, whilst the west end of the market has been linked to the main lorry station. Similarly, streetlights have now been installed inside the new market. This facilitates trading into the night, especially on market days when the volume of trade is high. Banking services have also been provided in the market through the setting up of four bank branches. The ongoing reconfiguration is giving permanency to the once-perceived-as-temporary market and also making it more attractive and suited to the needs of market users.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter discussed how resistance by local market users shapes the delivery of market infrastructure in urbanising communities in Ghana. Using the reconstruction of the new market infrastructure in Bolgatanga as a case study, it was shown how a central feature of state-led infrastructure delivery in Ghana has been dominantly top-down, technocratic and centralised and often fails to incorporate local realities in the planning and designing of such infrastructure. This approach to the planning and delivery of critical public infrastructure such as markets has resulted in numerous redevelopment projects causing social conflicts, resistance and disruption for urban dwellers. The poor incorporation of the needs and interests of local

users in the provision of public infrastructure and the perceived inappropriateness of state-led infrastructure delivery is giving rise to alternative modes of infrastructure delivery. Although challenging, hybrid modes of infrastructure delivery are becoming an acceptable model, particularly in politically polarised democracies like Ghana, where public infrastructure delivery has often been subject to partisan politics by politicians and local electorates. Thus, revealing how market traders' activism and resistance to moving to the (re)constructed market forced municipal authorities to recognise and reconfigure a temporary market for use shows how top-down and centralised infrastructure delivery configurations are contested and hybridised in practice to meet local realities.

Furthermore, the chapter expands the hybrid urbanism discourse in the global South by revealing that non-state actor activism is a continuous process that can permeate all phases of a public infrastructure project, calling for a critical look at the potential role of hybrid governance in promoting successful infrastructure delivery in Ghanaian cities and elsewhere. The deployment of various resistance narratives by traders to stand up to city authorities' decisions and to secure and protect their social and economic interests reveals that successful change in urban governance is a function of the complementary and strategic adoption of contention and co-production among state and non-state actors. Thus, city authorities in Ghana can learn from the experiences of market redevelopments to rethink their attitudes and one-directional approach to infrastructure provision and embrace hybridised practices in urban infrastructure configuration and delivery.

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7 Planning frameworks under pressure

The legal hybridity framing Peruvian in/formalised urban development

Jessica Pineda-Zumaran

7.1 Introduction

Since the first half of the 20th century, most, if not all of Peru's cities have experienced rapid urbanisation, resulting in large parts of their built-up areas having incomplete provision of infrastructure and basic services and housing stock in poor structural condition (Espinoza & Fort, 2020). These conditions are more pronounced in the country's secondary cities,[1] where urban growth has accelerated in the last 20 years and showing population growth rates above the country's average (i.e., 1.1% in 2022) (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informatica [INEI], 2021; Observatorio CEPLAN, 2024). For instance, Arequipa, Trujillo, Piura, Cusco and Pucallpa are the cities with the highest population growth rates between 2007 and 2023, increasing between 2.2% and 2.5% per year. Huancayo, on the other hand, shows lower rates of growth over the same period, ranging from 1.1% to 1.7% per year. This growth, nonetheless, is permeated by in/formalised urban development practices. Although all of these cities, except Arequipa, have urban plans in place, the share of housing units without title deeds has increased steadily since 2010 (INEI, 2023). In particular, Arequipa and Trujillo tripled this share between 2010 and 2020, whilst Chiclayo doubled it over the same period.

Under these circumstances, it can be affirmed that in Peru, as in many other Latin American countries, in/formalised[2] urban development practices have become the dominant mode of urbanisation (see UN-Habitat, 2022), in which planning plays a rather marginal role. Over the past two decades, planning research (e.g., Kamete, 2020; Roy, 2009; Watson, 2003) has explained some of the causes of the mismatch between planning intentions and the prevalence of in/formalised modes of urbanisation in the global South, highlighting the limited capacity of planning systems to understand, let alone address, the socio-economic, institutional and political rationalities that underpin the production of self-built settlements. Drawing on scholarship from geography and urban studies, this research strongly challenges the dominant dualism of the governmentality embedded in planning, which places self-built settlements on the negative side of the formal/informal, legal/illegal, planned/unplanned divide (see Rosen & Gribat, Chapter 1 of this volume; Roy, 2005). In line with one key argument of this book, this chapter argues that locating self-built settlements on the informal/illegal/unplanned

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side of this dichotomy leads to the adoption of planning practices that have produced socially questionable outcomes and have consistently proven inadequate for managing urban development in the global South, including in Peru (see also Kamete, 2013).

Analysing the nature of the legal dimension of planning can challenge the dominant dualism mentioned above (Esposito & Chiodelli, 2020; Hughes, 2019; Yiftachel, 2009). This body of research argues that there is no such thing as purely 'formal' urban development resulting from the implementation of planning frameworks (Harris, 2021). Neither does planning fully control formal urban development, nor do self-built settlements emerge outside of planning regulations. Rather, as Chiodelli and Moroni (2014) affirm, these settlements result from the opportunistic and selective application of particular aspects of the multiple laws, regulations and norms that govern urban development processes. What this body of research describes is the legal hybridity that frames urban development, within which planning, building, private urban investment and the production of self-built settlements take place. Drawing on Donlan et al. (2012), this hybrid legal arena can be described as a mix of planning, building, regularisation, formalisation and other substantive and procedural urban-related laws and regulations that frame urban development decision-making, which is permeated by in/formalised practices, *ad hoc* procedures and the opportunistic use of rules and norms.

A key element in the shaping of this arena is the adoption of planning exceptions (Blanc et al., 2022). A planning exception is the temporary suspension of existing planning laws, regulations and procedures that govern the use of land, the exercise of property and building rights, the granting of operating licences and building permits and any other matter within the purview of planning (Schramm & Bize, 2023). Typically, planning exceptions are substantive and procedural regulations that exist in parallel with planning regulations, such as regularisation and formalisation legislation, as well as special provisions introduced to encourage private investment in housing, facilities or infrastructure (Gogishvili & Harris-Brandts, 2020). However, exceptions may also be part of planning regulations themselves (Harris, 2021).

Understood in this way, formalisation legislation in the Peruvian context becomes a form of planning exception. This is the case because formalisation is a legally sanctioned procedure that grants property titles to individuals who occupy land that is not considered developable by urban plans or who dwell in housing built without complying with planning regulations or building codes (Calderón Cockburn, 2019). Formalisation is thus a planning exception that allows individuals to enter the formal urban land and property markets. Although the World Bank and other international organisations continue to promote formalisation as a core strategy to deal with the constant emergence of self-built settlements (for example, see SDG target 1.4 and SDG 11 of the United Nations' Agenda 2030), the results of its application in Peru are far from what was expected. Not only has it failed to reduce the pace of in/formalised urbanisation, but as Torres and Ruiz-Tagle (2019) argue, formalisation has become a means

by which the state itself promotes informal/illegal urban development practices, deepening the power imbalances and inequalities already present in the country's urbanisation process.

Reflecting the fragility of planning in Peru (Fernández-Maldonado, 2019), it can be affirmed that the implementation of formalisation legislation has not encountered resistance in the practice of this discipline. On the contrary, in Peru, formalisation legislation and its procedures do not appear to operate in parallel with planning, but are intrinsic to it (Anane & Cobbinah, 2022; Chiodelli & Mazzolini, 2019). In other words, the successful implementation of formalisation legislation depends on the characteristics of planning itself, in particular on the exceptions embedded in its regulations. In this sense, both planning regulations and formalisation legislation can be seen as key building blocks of the legal hybridity that frames in/formalised urban development in the country.

This chapter, therefore, examines how the conceptual, operational and implementation inconsistencies and contradictions of Peruvian planning regulations facilitate the implementation of formalisation legislation. Specifically, it explains how the synergistic interplay of the two regulatory systems, underpinned by the logic of exception, contributes to shaping the legal hybridity of Peruvian urban development. The study employed a qualitative methodology that included the analysis of 24 policy documents, regulations and guidelines available online, as well as eight publicly available video interviews, presentations and discussion forums with former high-level officials, experts and other professionals from the Housing, Building and Sanitation Ministry, the Peruvian Chamber of Builders and the Professional Association of Architects. The following three sections develop the main arguments of the chapter. Section 7.2 describes the main features of planning regulations and formalisation legislation, key building blocks of the legal hybridity of urban development. Section 7.3 analyses how formalisation legislation exploits the inconsistencies and incoherencies of planning regulations. Finally, Section 7.4 presents the chapter's conclusions.

7.2 The orientation of planning regulations and formalisation legislation in Peru

Although several regulatory bodies contribute to shaping the legal hybridity of Peruvian urban development, this section discusses two regulatory frameworks that are considered to be the most influential: (i) planning regulations and (ii) formalisation legislation. In the case of planning regulations, their orientation (which has changed little since their inception) can be described as physical and administrative in nature. They have been conceived only to guide 'formal' urban development. The maintenance of the physical orientation to date can be explained by the lasting influence of architectural and technical thinking in the country's urban legislation (Pineda-Zumaran, 2018). It started with the first urban regulations in the country that guided subdivision development and individual building by setting minimum physical and technical standards in the 1922 *Reglamento de Urbanizaciones*. Successive legislation passed from the 1930s to the 1970s maintained

this spirit. The control of compliance with these standards was conceived as an administrative task, initially in the hands of the Subdivision Technical Inspection Offices, which reported to the then Ministry of Public Works and Development (Castro Pozo, 2007).

Although planning was formally institutionalised in 1946, with functional zoning as the core planning mechanism (Fernández-Maldonado, 2019), the regulations that guided urban development still focused on establishing and controlling compliance with minimum physical and technical standards at the subdivision and building scale. In other words, planning guided urban development solely through building codes, effectively embracing a technocratic approach (Pineda-Zumaran, 2018). After nearly 40 years of guiding urban development in this way, the country's first planning regulations, D.S. 007-85-VC, were approved in 1985, working in tandem with the 1970 National Building Code (Ludeña Urquizo, 2004; Ministerio de Vivienda, Construcción y Saneamiento, 2022). However, these planning regulations retained the physical approach of previous periods. Far from being a policy framework, these regulations only detailed the planning process to be followed in the development of land use plans at the provincial level and functional zoning plans at the city level (Instituto Boliviano de Urbanismo, 2022). Around the same time, planning became in theory the responsibility of local governments, but, in practice, municipalities concentrated on land administration since plans continued to be developed by the national government (Dorich, 1996).

Although all planning activities were virtually abandoned in the 1990s, planning made a comeback in the 2000s, following the directions of the structural adjustment guidelines imposed by the World Bank (Pineda-Zumaran, 2018). Successive planning regulations were adopted in 2003, 2004, 2011 and 2016, each of which expanded the procedural aspects of planning and increased the number of products to be delivered in the form of plans (Instituto Boliviano de Urbanismo, 2022). Nevertheless, these planning regulations still focused only on 'formal' urban development, as their main purpose was to promote private urban investment. However, a more interesting feature of this latest wave of planning regulations was the inclusion of exceptions. Arguing for the need to make planning more responsive to the pace of urban development in the country, these exceptions are mainly procedural provisions on how to rezone. As Peruvian planning is a regulatory activity, these exceptions can be seen as self-defeating.

The logic of exception in Peruvian planning was consolidated in 2021 with the adoption of the first National Policy for Housing and Urbanism (D.S. No. 012-2021-Vivienda, from here on referred to by its Spanish acronym, PNVU) (Government of Peru, 2021b), together with the first Law for Sustainable Urban Development (Law No. 31313) (Government of Peru, 2021c) and the modified planning regulations of 2022 (D.S. No. 012-2022-Vivienda, from here on referred to as the 2022 Decree) (Government of Peru, 2022). These current regulations retain functional zoning as the central planning mechanism and are, therefore, still essentially regulatory in nature and rich in procedural directives. The regulations include guidelines for the development of land use plans at the provincial

level and metropolitan and urban development plans at the metropolitan, city and district levels, ideally by local governments. They also include a number of economic mechanisms to encourage private investment in housing and certain other developments, but, interestingly, do not include any mechanism to protect collective rights such as those related to the protection of the environment and cultural heritage, to name two.

There are three significant features of the physical and administrative orientation of planning regulations that contribute significantly to shaping the legal hybridity that frames in/formalised development in the country. The first, arguably the most influential feature in undermining planning practice in the country, relates to the inclusion of various forms of planning exceptions as specific planning procedures. These exceptions are easier to apply than planning restrictions as they more-or-less depend on politically-oriented decision-making processes. The second significant feature is the strong belief that the enactment of planning regulations through plans would be sufficient to stop the production of self-built settlements, which has not been the case. The PNVU sees self-built settlements as a planning failure and their low physical quality as the main problem to be addressed by planning. According to its physical and administrative orientation, as well as in practice, the self-built settlement issue is placed outside the remit of the planning system because: (i) such settlements do not follow the mandatory administrative procedures for obtaining building permits and other authorisations and (ii) their material expression does not meet the architectural design and technical standards established by law. In this way, planning regulations open the door to the implementation of other, *ad hoc*, legislation to deal with the matter, such as that of formalisation.

A final feature relates to the administrative orientation of planning in the context of clientelism, patronage and corruption in local governments (see Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 2018). Planning regulations do not show awareness of the link between the administrative nature of planning and local government corruption. Naïvely, the PNVU firmly states that this situation can be successfully overcome by sanctioning public officials who grant land use changes and subdivision or building permits outside of planning regulations (Grupo de Estudios de Derecho Inmobiliario, 2022). However, it has been shown time and again that the existence of sanctions is not enough to stop non-transparent practices in public administration worldwide (e.g., Zhu, 2012). This is particularly challenging in contexts where the judicial system itself is weak and corrupt, such as in Peru.

The physical and administrative orientation of Peruvian planning regulations, imbued with the logic of exception, has facilitated the implementation of formalisation legislation, itself a planning exception. Following the ideas of the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, which have been much questioned since the beginning of the 21st century (see Gilbert, 2002; Otto, 2009), formalisation began in 1996 with the creation of the Agency for the Formalisation of Informal Property (COFOPRI),[3] a dedicated public agency that is still responsible for granting title deeds to housing and facilities that are built without complying with planning and other regulations.

COFOPRI is currently under the jurisdiction of the Housing, Building and Sanitation Ministry, which legitimises formalisation as a public policy. The official discourse used to maintain formalisation as the main exception to deal with self-built settlements is that, by formalising property tenure, thousands of poor families can gain access to formal tenure systems and bank loans to improve their living conditions on their own. However, the results have not been what was expected, as the promised social and economic benefits have yet to materialise (Torres & Ruiz-Tagle, 2019). Moreover, the spatial dimension of formalisation has been completely ignored in the application of this exception, making it self-defeating for planning practice and its purpose of guiding urban development.

Since the 1990s, the legislative branch, represented by the Peruvian Congress, with the approval of the executive branch of government, has seen an opportunity to increase their political revenues and strengthen their patronage practices by reinforcing formalisation rather than planning in the management of in/formalised urban development. Law No. 28687 (2006) contributes significantly to this practice by transforming formalisation into an administrative procedure. Subsequent laws, including no. 29320 (2009), no. 29802 (2011), no. 30513 (2016), no. 30711 (2017), no. 31056 (2020) and no. 31145 (2021)[4] have not set a deadline for formalisation, although the introductory section of these regulations deems formalisation as a temporary regime applied in exceptional circumstances. Moreover, this legislation has further simplified the process by eliminating some procedural steps and the requirement for some legal documents as well as waiving all fees (see the PNVU). In other words, under the current legislation, formalisation is now an ex officio administrative procedure, which means that it can be initiated by COFOPRI itself and not necessarily at the request of the potential beneficiaries.

The current formalisation procedures adopted by COFOPRI are rather simplified (see the PNVU itself, and COFOPRI, 2023a; 2023b). The process is administrative, involving the submission of a few affidavits from those living on the land to be formalised, and focuses on verifying the physical characteristics of self-built settlements. In this sense, formalisation has a similar orientation to planning regulations: a physical and administrative process. It consists of three stages: (i) qualification, (ii) technical–legal diagnosis and (iii) physical–legal clearance. The qualification stage involves the submission of a petition by the representatives of the housing association requesting formalisation. If this petition meets the requirements, it is approved. The technical–legal diagnosis stage consists of identifying the physical conditions of the land to be formalised (known as the parent estate), including the presence of cultural heritage or exposure to natural hazards, as well as its legal background. This stage identifies the rights and restrictions that may exist over the land. The physical–legal clearance stage is carried out if the final technical–legal report is favourable. It is based solely on the verification of documents that could prove some form of land ownership and that no other person claims a similar right. Key in this stage is the presentation of *posesion* (i.e., possession) certificates, which are documents that prove that an individual or a family have lived on a certain piece of land for a sustained period (see Raoul, Chapter 11 in this volume). Formalisation ends with the granting of

the title deed and the individual registration of property rights with the Public Registry Agency.

Considering the procedures described above, it can be affirmed that formalisation legislation does not work in complementarity with planning regulations, but in opposition to them, or at least to their official purpose. Although this legislation initially emerged as a parallel mechanism to address the legal dimension of the production of self-built settlements (Fernández-Maldonado, 2015), nowadays formalisation legislation is aligned with the logic of exception embedded in planning regulations, not only exploiting their inconsistencies but also working in tandem with their procedures. As a result, formalisation has virtually replaced planning as the main legal framework guiding in/formalised urban development in the country. In this sense, both systems shape the legal hybridity that frames Peruvian urban development, as explained below.

7.3 The legal hybridity framing Peruvian in/formalised urban development

The physical and administrative orientation of planning regulations and formalisation legislation, both imbued with the logic of exception, are essential features that underpin the legal hybridity of in/formalised urban development in Peru. This hybridity is expressed through the mutually reinforcing conceptual, operational and implementation inconsistencies of these two bodies of law, as explained below.

7.3.1 Conceptual inconsistencies

These inconsistencies concern the central place of individual property rights in the conceptual basis of planning regulations and formalisation legislation, despite both claiming that they were created to protect collective interests. On the side of planning, the PNVU, the sustainable urban development law (Law No. 31313) and the 2022 Decree maintain the protection of individual property rights as a conceptual cornerstone, although the first two state the intention to balance this through the concretisation of the right to the city. However, the sustainable urban development law defines the latter as a bundle of rights that includes the right to housing, the right to participation and information, the right to access facilities and services, the right to private property and the right to file complaints to demand the fulfilment of urban law mandates (see Article 17). All of these are individual freedoms and none is a collective right. The right to the city as such is not mentioned in any Peruvian urban legislation, including the Political Constitution, and therefore, lacks legal and political strength. As a result, it would be very difficult for planning regulations to move beyond the discursive level as a tool for trying to implement collective rights.

The centrality of individual property rights is evident in the planning mechanisms set out in the 2016 regulations for sustainable urban development (D.S. No. 022-2016-Vivienda) (Government of Peru, 2016), the second policy objective in the PNVU (to "guarantee the sustainability of land occupation processes",

Government of Peru, 2021b, p. 36) and the 2022 Decree. These mechanisms seek to crystallise planning's strong commitment to providing legal predictability for private investment. They aim to promote the creation of developable land and include financial incentives to increase the economic benefits of urban development, thus maximising the benefits of private property (see Titles V–VII and Chapters III and V of the 2022 Decree). Specifically, Articles 92 and 93 define this as the *derecho a edificar* (the right to build) and the *derecho de superficie urbanística* (the right to engage in urban development on others' – undeveloped – land). In this sense, these mechanisms can be seen as the basis for the creation and consolidation of a market in individual property rights, which often has indirect negative social impacts and tends to favour private interests (see Needham, 2006).

This conceptual inconsistency is closely related to the rationality that underpins formalisation legislation. On the one hand, there is the declaration of formalisation as an activity of national interest, a public necessity and a political priority for the national government, thus attempting to give formalisation an aura of collective interest. Each law that has extended the deadline for formalisation cites these justifications in its introductory section (see Article 2 of Laws Nos. 28687 and 29320 from 2006 and 2009), insisting on the positive impact of legal security of tenure on overcoming poverty. On the other hand, there is COFOPRI's motto, "*país de propietarios*" (a country of individual owners), with its commitment to the universalisation of individual property rights (see COFOPRI's official website at https://www.gob.pe/institucion/cofopri/institucional). These rights are the pillars of the country's neoliberal economic policy, as proclaimed in Peru's Political Constitution. In this sense, both planning regulations and formalisation legislation create a legal arena that prioritises private property rights over collective interests.

7.3.2 Operational inconsistencies

These inconsistencies refer to the inclusion of exceptions within planning procedures, which are aligned with the exceptional nature of the formalisation legislation. This alignment is expressed in specific procedures that take advantage of the administrative orientation of both legal systems. As introduced above, Peruvian planning is essentially regulatory, with functional zoning as its core mechanism, although urban governance in the country does not meet the ideal conditions for the successful implementation of this type of planning (Watson, 2003). Therefore, planning by zoning is effectively thwarted by exceptions, which are essentially specific administrative procedures within broad planning procedures. Justifying planning exceptions on the basis of the need to make plans more flexible to adapt them to the rapid changes in urban conditions (Grupo de Estudios de Derecho Inmobiliario, 2022), the 2022 Decree introduces two administrative mechanisms that allow for the periodic modification of zoning. One is the mandate to 'update', that is, modify, at least once a year, any of the provisions of provincial land use plans and of metropolitan and urban development plans (see Articles 32, 41 and 48), at the request of the municipality itself or private investors, among other powerful actors.

The other mechanism is the zoning modification or rezoning procedures (see Articles 122, 123, 124 and 125 of the 2022 Decree). This involves the alteration of zoning maps, urban parameters and permitted activities, and can be requested by private developers, among others. Although this procedure requires the submission of a technical report demonstrating the low impact of the proposed adjustment on existing urban conditions, as well as the development of a participatory process for the approval of such changes, neither requirement is rigorous. Whilst the former only includes a review of the physical characteristics of buildings and land adjacent to the proposed zoning change as the area to be considered for impact assessment, the latter does not specify the type of participatory process to be conducted, who will be involved in it, its timeframe or its funding sources. Under these conditions, and given the high level of corruption in Peruvian municipalities, it is quite possible to manipulate the outcome of these reports and processes and obtain the final approval.

These exceptions are quite useful in the early stages of formalisation processes and seem to encourage in/formalised urban development practices. According to Diez Hurtado (2023) and Lambert (2021a), these practices generally begin with outright land invasions, the allocation of state land for agricultural activities, or the purchase of peri-urban land by a housing cooperative or association from either a private owner or a peasant community. Irrespective of how the land is acquired, in all these modes the purchasers or encroachers use the zoning map to decide which land to occupy, usually choosing that which is outside the planned area or without zoning designation. According to Article 117.5 of the 2022 Decree, "land reserved for [long-term] development" is without zoning designations and can be promptly rezoned as "immediately" developable land through the administrative process of plan updating.

The amount of land designated as 'reserved for development' is not small. The selection of the area to be planned is based on the administrative boundaries of provinces and districts. Considering that the extension of each of these administrative units covers tens or even hundreds of square kilometres, the planned area usually represents only a fraction of the province or district territory. Moreover, the planning guidelines recommended by the Housing, Building and Sanitation Ministry do not provide clear directions on how to determine the planning area, nor do they recommend ways to protect peri-urban land from encroachment. As a result, land outside the plan area has an unclear status and can easily be converted into developable land through the administrative procedures included in the planning exceptions described above. If these changes are made to the plan, the process would facilitate compliance with the verification procedures required as part of formalisation processes.

7.3.3 Implementation inconsistencies

This inconsistency concerns the type of norms and standards that are sanctioned by planning regulations, which, in turn, are exploited by formalisation legislation. These are rules on the physical characteristics of the built environment and fit in

with the land administration procedures carried out by municipalities. These norms and standards are deeply rooted in the architectural and engineering origins of Peruvian urban legislation, which have resulted in a pervasive view of cities as static built environments. Even today, the PNVU conceives of the main policy problem to be addressed in physical terms, i.e., the existence of poor physical living conditions in cities. In this way, the policy directs planning regulations and their mechanisms towards solving some of the infrastructural and physical aspects of in/formalised urban development.

This understanding has generated ambiguity about what constitutes a 'city'. When referring to a city (*ciudad*), the PNVU means the immediate urban area surrounding the dwelling unit or plot, which can be loosely defined as belonging to the neighbourhood scale (see the fourth policy objective in the PNVU). As a result of this understanding, planning regulations only apply to the building and plot scale (Article 121 of the 2022 Decree), controlling some physical characteristics that delineate the building envelope and thus define the footprint and massing of the built environment. Regulations for spatial units above the plot and building scale are set out in the National Building Code (Government of Peru, 2021a), the lowest hierarchical level of Peruvian urban legislation. However, this Code only establishes design and technical standards for subdivision development. Spatial scales above the subdivision level are left without a regulatory framework. Subdivision regulations outline the shape and physical characteristics of the urban fabric, but when applied in isolation to the layout of major infrastructure (such as main roads), they end up shaping a fragmented and disconnected urban fabric that makes overall urban planning rather difficult.

Although formalisation procedures do not require compliance with planning regulations or building codes, in/formalised urban development implicitly complies with the subdivision regulations of the National Building Code. Lambert (2021b) explains that settlers tend to comply with these regulations as much as possible because they facilitate the provision of water, sewerage and energy networks. In turn, the provision of such services constitutes proof of ownership that can be presented to COFOPRI during the formalisation process. Interestingly, this situation is supported by regularisation legislation (Law No. 29090) and even by the General Subdivision Law (Law No. 26878), which gives COFOPRI full responsibility for verifying compliance with the physical and technical standards when assessing self-built subdivisions. In this way, formalisation legislation takes advantage of the physical orientation of planning regulations and gives more credibility to technical codes than to planning directions, even though the former is at the lowest hierarchical level of Peruvian urban legislation.

7.4 Conclusions

The physical and administrative orientation of Peruvian planning regulations has not changed much in the last one hundred years. It has been reinforced by the recent (2021) adoption of the PNVU and sustainable urban development law (Law No. 31313). This situation is due to two circumstances. The first is that, instead of

providing a framework to guide the different modes of in/formalised urban development, planning regulations reduce the management of this process to the fulfilment of administrative requirements that focus on verifying the physical quality of buildings and infrastructure. This orientation, in turn, corresponds to the logic embedded in the formalisation legislation, since it essentially consists of an ex officio administrative procedure that grants title deeds based on the verification of the physical characteristics of the land and property to be formalised. The other is that the physical and administrative orientation has consolidated the logic of exception embedded in both bodies of legislation. In their current form, planning regulations seek to respond to market demands by including exceptions that are applied at the plot level and increase the 'flexibility' of the procedures used to change land use and zoning designations. These exceptions are exploited by formalisation legislation when promoters of in/formalised urban development request the conversion of land not zoned for development into developable land. This is a valuable step towards the formalisation of settlements. In this sense, both sets of legislation become key building blocks of the legal hybridity that frames in/urban development in the country.

Although the implications of this situation are many, the most worrying is the replacement of the logic of planning with that of formalisation, with the latter becoming the de facto framework for dealing with self-built settlements (see also Akaateba et al., this book, Chapter 3). However, contrary to what is usually concluded by planning scholars, formalisation is not a separate regulatory framework, operating in parallel to planning. Formalisation in Peru depends largely on the application of existing planning regulations. This legislation successfully exploits the internal conceptual, operational and implementation inconsistencies and contradictions of planning regulations in three ways. First, it focuses on granting individual property rights without addressing how these rights relate to collective interests that, in turn, are not specified anywhere. Second, it relies on the use of planning exceptions to bring unplanned land into urban plans, thus fulfilling an important requirement for formalisation. Third, it uses the physical and technical standards of planning as a framework to guide the development of subdivisions, the fulfilment of which facilitates the production of the *posesion* certificates required for the formalisation procedures. In a decision-making environment riddled with corruption, patronage and clientelism, it is improbable that further action will be taken to correct this situation. In all likelihood, this hybrid legal arena will not only be stabilised but strengthened, as powerful economic and political actors will continue to increase their gains under these circumstances.

Notes

1 This chapter considers as secondary cities those defined as Regional Metropolises in the Peruvian Cities and Populated Centres System (*Sistema de Ciudades y Centros Poblados*, SICCEP, in Spanish), proposed by the Housing, Building and Sanitation Ministry in 2021, which includes the cities of Arequipa, Trujillo, Chiclayo, Chimbote, Cusco, Huancayo, Iquitos, Piura and Pucallpa.
2 This term is defined by Rosen and Gribat in Chapter1, this volume.

3 *Organismo de Formalización de la Propiedad Informal* in Spanish.
4 Peruvian laws are accessible from the *Archivo Digital de la Legislación del Perú* at https://www.leyes.congreso.gob.pe/.

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8 Urban transportation reform and the consolidation of a hybrid transport service in Peruvian cities

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8.1 Introduction

Most city authorities in the global South are unable to provide efficient urban transport services. As a result, these services are usually covered by paratransit. Whilst the term was coined in the global North[1] to refer to government-provided transport services for people unable to access the main network, it has been translated in the global South to describe transport services outside the traditional centrally planned networks (Cabrera & De Marchi Moyano, 2022; Lesteven & Boutueil, 2018). There, paratransit has gradually developed as a demand-responsive service that provides the majority of urban transport services in these cities. It is a flexible, demand-driven service, often without fixed timetables and routes. Private companies, cooperatives or even individual operators identify transport needs and provide the service with or without government authorisation, thus not constituting a transport network – or at least not an integrated one (Lave & Mathias, 2000).

On the one hand, policymakers and planners tend to perceive paratransit as inefficient, risky and polluting (Cabrera & De Marchi Moyano, 2022). On the other hand, however, paratransit is recognised by others as an important contributor to urban transport provision due to its flexibility, adaptability, relevance and affordability (Behrens et al., 2016). Despite these advantages, over the last two decades, several cities in the South have sought to replace paratransit with planned transport services. Some well-known examples come from Latin America (Pardo, 2009), where the bus rapid transit (BRT) model has proved popular (Rodriguez & Vergel-Tovar, 2013). Not surprisingly, these attempts at reform have been fraught with difficulties (Jirón Martínez, 2014). Conceptually, urban transport reforms often fail to grapple with the complexities of paratransit, envisioning a formalised, complete network to replace it. However, this goal is rarely achieved, revealing a conflict of rationalities between planners and service users (Watson, 2003). The chapter by Amoako et al. in this volume (Chapter 4) addresses this issue in the city of Kumasi, Ghana. Operationally, the changes in road infrastructure and delivery configurations required by the reform are often not sufficient to meet most of the demand, resulting in the continuation of paratransit alongside the 'reformed' service (Nguyen et al., 2019).

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Nevertheless, one of the main outcomes of these reform experiences in the global South is the reassessment of paratransit (Boutueil et al., 2020). At least in academic circles, approaches to urban transport have therefore shifted from *displace and replace* to *embrace, engage and upgrade* (Klopp & Cavoli, 2019). This shift is probably the result of a better understanding of the configurations of paratransit service provision, including characteristics such as routes, frequencies, availability, accessibility and operators (Falchetta et al., 2021). In some regions, policymakers and planners have recognised this, and some have followed this shift by adapting transport policies to existing paratransit service delivery configurations (Behrens et al., 2016). However, policymakers in Peru and other Latin American countries have not always done so. There, urban transport reforms are still dominated by the displace and replace paradigm (VREF, UITP and BRT+ COE, 2019), possibly due to a limited understanding of the nature of paratransit, marginal knowledge of mobility planning and institutional barriers such as corruption, clientelism and patronage in local governments (Yañez-Pagans et al., 2018). As a result, the implementation of urban transport reforms in this region leads to hybrid forms of service provision, i.e., transport services that combine centrally planned routes with the atomised routes of paratransit. In this context, *hybridity* refers not only to the modes of service provision, but also to the way in which the service is used on a day-to-day basis. This means that the planned network depends on the availability of paratransit for its functioning, as the former's limited coverage forces users to use paratransit to reach their destination. In some cases, policymakers themselves end up promoting the hybridity of the service.

A key feature of the hybrid service offered by urban transport reform proposals is the configuration of service provision (Poku-Boansi, 2020). This configuration often includes operational features such as time to and from the home (i.e., the 'first and last mile'), access and exit time, waiting time, fare (set by estimating costs and revenues) and coverage (Basu et al., 2017). These features are usually seen as technical, which isolates the reform orientation from the behaviour of other transport modes (Das & Pandit, 2016). However, the definition of these features is closely linked to the overall mobility policy and planning of the city in question, which in turn defines the implementation priorities that urban transport reform will follow (Sietchiping et al., 2012).

Understood in this way, the analysis of the hybridity of transport service provision should include three components of transport reform: (i) policy and planning orientation, (ii) service configuration and (iii) implementation priorities. This chapter examines these three aspects in the context of urban transport reforms in Lima and Arequipa. In particular, it examines how the interrelationship between these aspects contributes to the service hybridity of the reform, regardless of the size, hierarchy, available economic resources, political will or access to expertise of the two cities. Eleven million people live in the Lima-Callao metropolitan area, Peru's capital and largest city. Arequipa, on the other hand, is home to 1.1 million people. Both cities have embarked on a major transport reform in the last fifteen years, but it has not made a profound difference to the way these services are provided and is still incomplete. In Lima, less than 10 percent of trips are made using the services

provided as part of the reform. In Arequipa, almost 60 percent of trips are made using these services, although little has changed compared to how the services were provided pre-reform.

The methodology is qualitative. Documents and news sources documenting the process of urban transport reform in Lima and Arequipa were reviewed. These include laws, studies, plans, censuses and surveys, which were used to reconstruct the process and analyse its shortcomings.

8.2 Urban transport and paratransit in Peruvian cities

Peru has faced severe urban transport problems since the mid-20th century. However, following the neoliberal turn in the 1990s and the withdrawal of the state from transport provision, paratransit became virtually the sole provider of urban transport services (Poole Fuller, 2021). The Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (1997) shows that in the mid-1990s, nationwide, 84 percent of passengers used some form of paratransit, be it *microbus* (minibus), *combi* (minibus smaller than the *microbus)* or three-wheeled *mototaxi*. In Lima and Arequipa, the cities studied, the situation has not changed much. In Lima, in 2023, 60 percent of trips to work and 68 percent of trips to educational centres were mainly made by paratransit (Lima Cómo Vamos, 2024), whilst in Arequipa, in 2022, 39 percent of the vehicles providing urban transport services are those commonly used by paratransit (EGIS-Rupprecht, 2022).

Paratransit as the main provider of urban transport services in Peru is one of the outcomes of the new transport legislation of the early 1990s, which completely deregulated and liberalised these services (Poole Fuller, 2021). The policy framework shifted from the state as planner and provider to the state as facilitator of transport services (Jara Risco & Vásquez Córdova, 2012). In practice, urban transport was no longer conceived as a service *per se*, but as a set of micro-enterprises subject to market forces of supply and demand (Glave, 2016).

The business model that followed this policy is known as the route-concession model. It consists of service operators that form single-vehicle urban transport companies or run fleets of small, low-capacity vehicles, in some cases with as few as six passenger seats (Poole Fuller, 2021). Routes are defined by the operators themselves, based on their assessment of demand and subsequent government approval. Often these companies sell the right to operate the route to individual drivers who then hire a vehicle from another company. It is rare for the driver to be an employee of one of the two companies. Drivers work long hours under stressful conditions, including competition for passengers on the road, as their income depends on the number of tickets sold. This model leads to a large supply of low-capacity transport services, with routes designed to suit the operators' revenue expectations (Bielich Salazar, 2009). It has also exacerbated corrupt practices within municipalities (Shack et al., 2021), as provincial municipal transport offices have discretionary powers to grant transport authorisations (Glave, 2016).

Since the early 2000s, however, this *laissez-faire* approach has been challenged by local governments. Lima and Arequipa began their transport reforms with these

ideas, but were influenced by the wave of BRT implementation in Latin America (Montero, 2020). By the end of the 2010s, urban transport issues were back on the national political agenda. Following the prescriptions of the World Bank and European consultancies, urban transport was once again considered a public responsibility, adopting the environmental discourse embedded in the notion of sustainable mobility (MTC & GIZ, 2015). The National Policy for Urban Transport (Government of Peru, 2019a), approved in 2019, aims to "provide cities with safe, reliable, inclusive and accessible transport systems, with high quality standards, institutionally coordinated, [and] financially, economically and environmentally sustainable…" (p. 23; authors' translation). Despite this development, the national policy framework continues to consider paratransit as a problem. The National Programme for Sustainable Urban Transport (known as PROMOVILIDAD) (Government of Peru, 2019b), also created in 2019, embodies this understanding. Its main objective is to support the implementation of integrated transport networks in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. This task requires an institutional architecture with clear functions and competences – conditions that are hardly met in Peru. Another problem is the overlapping of responsibilities between the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the Ministry of Housing, Building and Sanitation and local municipalities. The current urban transport policy is unclear about who is responsible for mobility planning. On the one hand, according to the National Policy for Housing and Urbanism and the Sustainable Urban Development Law (Government of Peru, 2021a; 2021b) urban mobility plans should be drawn up as part of metropolitan and urban development plans, but PROMOVILIDAD, under the Ministry of Transport and Communications, is also assigned this role.

These national policy contradictions are reflected in the planning, implementation and operation of urban transport reforms in Lima and Arequipa, which play a significant role in shaping the hybridity of these services. This is explained in the next section.

8.3 Urban transport reforms and hybrid service provision: Peruvian-style

8.3.1 Policy and planning approaches

In Lima and Arequipa, transport reforms were implemented with a limited understanding of what mobility planning entails. Policy objectives were largely formulated in terms of providing road infrastructure and reorganising transit routes, rather than mobility objectives. The implementation of integrated transport systems (*sistemas integrados de transporte* or SIT) became the preferred strategy for reorganising urban transport services. With regard to paratransit, the policy approach was to displace and replace. This infrastructural and technocratic view has recently embraced notions of sustainable urban transport, in line with the national government's policy agenda. In the cities studied, this emphasis can be seen in the preference given to non-motorised transport over more appropriate

strategies for managing paratransit. However, there are specificities in each city, as explained below.

Since 1990, Lima has developed two metropolitan plans and three transport-specific plans. In the 1990 plan, the approach was almost exclusively infrastructural. Following this approach, in the early 2000s, the city government created Protransporte, an agency in charge of transport reform and the planning of segregated bus corridors. Protransporte existed alongside the Urban Transport Agency (GTU) (*Gerencia de Transporte Urbano*), which was responsible for issuing authorisations for regular transit services. In 2018, the Urban Transport Authority (ATU) was created to oversee all transport services, including the BRT, the complementary corridors and authorised routes. In 2005, Protransporte commissioned Spanish consultants Advanced Logistics Group (ALG) and Inocsa to carry out a transport-specific study to add "complementary [transit] corridors", which was the first significant step towards creating a planned transit network beyond isolated BRT lines. Unlike the 1990 plan, the focus was on route design rather than infrastructure alone. However, the plan did not provide enough information on how the existing system worked, so the transition from one system to the other was rather unsophisticated.

The lack of clarity over roles between different levels of government with respect to local planning and transport studies was evident when the Ministry of Transport and Communications commissioned the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to prepare another transport plan in 2005. The plan recommended BRT and metro lines. In contrast to the ALG-Inocsa plan, this plan described the conditions of paratransit, but did not provide much insight into how to deal with it. The proposals and strategies focused on the removal of small vehicles, which according to the plan were a major contributor to road congestion and were therefore seen as a problem to be solved.

In 2011, the government began implementing a SIT. The municipality approved a network of four complementary corridors, based on the study carried out by ALG-Inocsa a few years earlier. It seemed that the SIT would be built mainly on the 'complementary' mixed traffic routes. However, in order to provide a technical basis for the transport reform, the municipal government commissioned another study from the Spanish consulting firm Taryet (2013). The aim was for the study to become a blueprint for future corridor-specific demand studies, which would financially justify the operation of the service without subsidies. The overlap between levels of government also revealed a clash of perspectives: whilst the national government focused on large infrastructure investments, the municipal government prioritised small investments and route reorganisation.

In Arequipa, reform was addressed in two urban plans, the Metropolitan Directive Plan and an urban mobility plan, drawn up in 2002, 2016 and 2023. These policy documents considered transport and mobility as two different issues, but all were informed by notions of sustainability and aimed to eliminate paratransit services. During the initial phase of the reform, urban transport became a core policy concern in two planning instruments developed by local consultants under Juan Manuel Guillen's mayoral administration: the 2002 Strategic

Urban Plan and the 2002 Metropolitan Directive Plan. In both plans, transport policy was defined in terms of environmental concerns and traffic congestion, with the aim of eliminating paratransit by reorganising the transport network and rationalising the number of routes. In order to achieve this objective, the plan focused on the provision of road infrastructure and proposed the upgrading and completion of the existing north-south trunk road corridor. Interestingly, neither document recognised that tackling the urban transport problem in this way meant embarking on transport reform. The SIT was seen as a project within these plans, inherently ignoring the need to specifically address Arequipa's overall urban mobility.

The 2016 plan maintained the policy approach to urban transport of the 2002 plans, but transport was no longer a central policy concern. This plan also did not examine in detail the characteristics of paratransit and considered it a problem that should disappear once the SIT was implemented. There was no specific urban mobility component. At the time, the deterioration in the quality of urban transport services was continuing, as the level of motorisation in Arequipa increased significantly, from 87.01 cars per 1,000 inhabitants in 2010 to 151.91 in 2019 (EGIS-Rupprecht, 2022). Attention therefore continued to focus on congestion, along with environmental concerns and infrastructure improvements. Recently, at the initiative of the European Union, the Arequipa Sustainable Urban Mobility Plan 2022–2042 (*Plan de Movilidad Urbana Sostenible,* PMUS) was developed by the French Development Agency and Colombian consultants (EGIS-Rupprecht, 2022). This plan pays attention to non-motorised transport, making it a political priority in line with sustainability requirements. However, the intended role of paratransit in Arequipa's mobility patterns is still unclear. The PMUS insists on supporting the implementation of the SIT and hopes to formalise all paratransit services in time, but it is unclear what mechanisms will be proposed to realise these political aspirations.

8.3.2 Operational features of service provision

Operational features are the most significant in revealing the hybrid nature of urban transport provision after the reforms in Lima and Arequipa. However, as both cities have given paratransit a different role in the reform, they have manifested the hybridity of transport services in different ways. In the case of Lima, the reform focused on eliminating paratransit and replacing it, at least initially, with BRT lines. To achieve this, the first step was to create Protransporte. Protransporte sets the criteria for the bidding process: to win a concession, companies had to demonstrate that their bus fleets met certain characteristics, such as size and environmental standards. They also had to recognise drivers as formal, salaried employees. These changes mark a clear contrast to the previous configuration of transport provision, where drivers earned their income based on the number of passengers they carried and worked under informal conditions.

The second step was to define the planned routes, including trunk lines with dedicated bus lanes and complementary corridors with mixed traffic. However,

after the national government announced in 2012 that a metro line would be built along the same corridor as the second BRT line, all plans for new dedicated bus lanes were scrapped. As a result, the corridors originally planned as complementary to the main lines became the core of the new system. These corridors would follow a grid pattern with nodes in central areas of the city. This was another major change from the existing transport system, of which most of the routes ran through the city centre and connected this to the outskirts and were longer than the complementary corridors.

Another area in which the SIT falls short is the integration of fares and routes. Unlike paratransit, SIT services mostly run along a single linear corridor. The system assumes the need for transfers. Since 2019, the BRT card can be used on the complementary corridors. However, apart from a few cases along single corridors, transfers are penalised: passengers have to pay a separate fare each time they use a service. Without fare integration, this means higher fare costs. In addition, very little has been done in terms of infrastructure and urban design changes to facilitate transfers. For example, to transfer from the BRT to the complementary Red Corridor, which shares a junction, a passenger would have to walk about 500 metres. These frictions have contributed to the SIT's inability to increase ridership. Overall, in practice the reformed service is limited, serving only 7% of home-to-work trips compared to 53% made on approved routes served by authorised private operators (Lima Cómo Vamos, 2024).

In Arequipa, the reform was also managed by a recently created agency within the municipal organisational structure, called the 'SIT Office'. This took a technocratic approach to transport planning but separated route planning from mobility planning. According to this logic, the 2010 Regulatory Route Plan was developed. Its proposed routes partially followed the trunk road infrastructure proposed in the 2002 plan but maintained the spatial logic of paratransit services of that time. The proposed spatial distribution of routes showed a trunk-feeder model with the BRT trunk, an exclusive corridor running from north to south, at its centre, but not covering the full extent of the city. This model includes several feeder lines to the north, south, east and north-east of Arequipa that neither reach the outskirts of the city nor fully take into account the difficult topographical conditions of the city's periphery. In addition, there is no provision for high-capacity buses, nor are there any exclusive corridors, as the medium-capacity buses provided are mixed on the roads with other modes.

The reform has maintained the service delivery logic of the route-concession model, but there have been some changes in the way the concessions are managed. Whilst the operation of the SIT is still in the hands of private operators, the provincial government, through its Transport Management Office, monitors compliance with defined quality criteria. Potential service providers must meet certain fleet requirements in order to obtain the appropriate municipal authorisation. The selection of service providers is made through public tenders for the concession to operate urban transport services, which were issued in 2010, 2011 and 2017, all based on the 2010 route plan. However, according to Granda Acosta (2018), Calderón Romero et al. (2020) and some internal informants, non-transparent practices

prevail. In some cases, providers with valid authorisations operate additional vehicles that are not registered within their companies, allowing these to use routes for which they hold concessions. Furthermore, as the authorisation process tends to be rather lengthy, concessionaires can start operating as soon as they have submitted the paperwork to apply for authorisation. Finally, as the operation of the SIT is entirely in the hands of private operators, the municipality does not know with certainty the full costs and revenues of the system. This lack of knowledge makes it impossible to set realistic tariffs. These features have consolidated the hybrid service that existed before the reform whilst widening the inequality gap in access to urban transport.

In summary, in both cities the reforms were intended to bring about two major operational changes. Firstly, the state would determine the main transport routes. This meant that competition would be between companies for the right to operate routes, rather than between drivers for passengers on the road. Secondly, higher bus quality and labour standards were set for the operating companies. None of these changes have yet been implemented fully, with the result being the consolidation of hybridity in service provision.

8.3.3 Implementation priorities

The priorities for implementation of the reforms reveal the persistence of the idea that urban transport problems would be solved by providing road infrastructure and reorganising transport through the implementation of planned, technically selected routes. On the one hand, this suggests that the reform was seen as a physical project. On the other hand, it shows the importance attached to technical solutions to social problems. The cities studied, however, show certain peculiarities. In Lima, at the initial stage of implementation, the new network consisted of a main BRT line with several feeders linking to the stations at each end of the line. There were no plans to integrate the new corridor with paratransit. Instead, the two systems were seen as competitors. Most paratransit services were rerouted or eliminated to reduce competition with the BRT line, and no efforts were made to facilitate transfers between paratransit and the BRT line. Although three more corridors have been implemented to date, they are all on mixed traffic roads and insufficient to meet demand. Partly as a result of the SIT's inability to meet all demand, another form of paratransit has emerged along the corridors themselves: *colectivos*. These are small, unlicensed vehicles that provide transit services along a corridor. The cost is usually slightly higher than a bus fare, but they are faster because they have to make fewer stops. Some efforts have been made to prevent the *colectivos* from clogging up the corridor. However, in the absence of infrastructure to separate the lanes, enforcement depends on municipal inspectors. So far, these strategies have not worked.

The above situation shows that the priority of reform implementation in Lima has focused on eliminating competitors, including unauthorised services (i.e., *colectivos*) and authorised services (i.e., existing paratransit services). The

exclusion of paratransit has two consequences. One is intended: the demand for travel on the corridors has increased in the absence of alternatives. The other is unintended: people have lost services that are convenient for them. The most worrying result, however, is the deepening of the hybridity already present in the previous transport service. Twelve years after the start of the reform, it accounts for around 1.5 million daily trips compared to 11 million in authorised non-SIT routes (see Table 8.1). Rather, paratransit services, such as the *colectivos*, have increased and are now present in corridors where previously only authorised services existed. These corridors include precisely those served by the SIT. Their presence has a negative impact on the efficiency of the formal routes, as they congest the roads through which they pass.

The case of Arequipa is similar to that of Lima. In this city, there was very limited local expertise to plan and implement the transport reform. Initially, the priority for implementation was to develop specialised studies on urban transport. Between 2001 and 2008, three specialised studies were commissioned from international private consultancies. The first study was commissioned in 2002 from the Japanese consultancy PADECO. The second study, called *Efficient Mass Urban Transport* (TUME), was commissioned in 2005 from the Spanish consultancy ALG-Andina. Finally, the third study, called the *Integral Transport System* (SIT), is the basis of the system currently in use and was commissioned in 2008 from the American consultancy EMBARQ-WRI. These studies identified the city's monocentrism as the main cause of congestion and proposed the consolidation of a north-south trunk route, an exclusive corridor. Although these specialised studies differed in the design and location of this corridor, none was in line with the road system envisaged in the 2002 plan. Therefore, the reform prioritised infrastructure implementation and focused on conditioning some existing trunk road infrastructure to implement the exclusive corridor. However, not all of this road infrastructure was built, nor was other essential infrastructure such as bus stops, bus terminals, interchanges and bridges.

Since the mid-2010s, the focus of reform has shifted to the operation of the SIT. However, as noted above, the operation is riddled with contradictions and suspicions of corruption, as reported in the local media, demonstrating the extent of administrative weakness and lack of local expertise in the implementation of the SIT. In 2023, an evaluation study by PROMOVILIDAD recommended several administrative and institutional adjustments, including the development of organisational management tools, the allocation of adequate financial resources and the recruitment of expert civil servants (Fernández, 2023). However, whilst the SIT Office was closed at the end of 2023, apparently due to the beginning of the restructuring process, there is no evidence that this process has actually begun. These back-and-forth movements in the implementation of the SIT have resulted in a lack of service coverage in peripheral neighbourhoods. The prevalence of paratransit as the main transport provider in Arequipa is striking. As a result, the total number of buses in the city is 90 percent higher than planned for the SIT (EGIS-Rupprecht, 2022, see Table 8.1).

Table 8.1 The situation of urban transport services in Lima and Arequipa

CITY			
LIMA		*Situation in 2012*	*Situation in 2024*
	Number of routes	1 Metro line 1 BRT line with feeders 480 authorised routes (approximately)	1 Metro line 1 BRT line with feeders 13 trunk routes 507 authorised routes
	Number of buses	300 in trunk BRT 220 in feeders to BRT 17,712 vans on authorised routes 23,667 minibuses on authorised routes 8,400 buses on authorised routes	305 in trunk BRT 244 in feeders to BRT 797 in complementary corridors 22,000 on authorised non-SIT routes
	Type of road	Most services run in mixed traffic. One BRT line with exclusive lanes	Most services run in mixed traffic. One BRT line with exclusive lanes
	Number of passengers per day	9,700,000	550,000 on Metro 700,000 on BRT 235,000 on trunk routes 11 million on authorised non-SIT routes (estimated)
AREQUIPA		*Situation before 2010*	*Situation in 2021*
	Number of routes	243 authorised routes Unknown number of paratransit routes	119 approved routes
	Number of buses	Over 4,000 small-capacity vehicles	2,029 vehicles
	Type of road	These vehicles used all available road and street infrastructure, sometimes including pedestrian paths	A combination of dedicated and unauthorised roads and streets
	Number of passengers per day	Over 500,000 passengers per day	Unknown

Source: The authors, based on Aguirre Abuhadba (2010); Corredor Azul (2024); Corredor Morado (2024); Corredor Rojo (2024); EGIS-Rupprecht (2022); Government of Peru (2024); MPA (2010); MTC & JICA (2013); Taryet (2013).

8.4 Conclusions: Divergences and convergences of the urban transport reform and the shaping of hybridity

Lima and Arequipa show two different forms of hybridity in transport service delivery configurations, revealing both divergences and convergences in their reforms. Further research may be needed to find detailed explanations for the divergences, but it is possible to outline a few points. In Lima, the transport reform has not taken over the entire transport system, as the route plan and the SIT had intended. To date, most journeys are still made by paratransit rather than the planned routes.

Arequipa, on the other hand, has managed to bring almost all services under the umbrella of its SIT, but it is not working as planned. Some features of paratransit are still present in the planned system, despite efforts to eliminate them. The size of the cities may have played a role in this situation. Lima is ten times the size of Arequipa and overhauling its entire transport system in a few years was undoubtedly a more difficult task than in Arequipa.

There may be another reason for the divergence. In Lima, whilst the reform started with an infrastructure project, the BRT line, the priority quickly shifted to transforming service delivery configurations. The aim was to replace the atomised service model with a centralised one. Operators had to meet strict criteria set by the government, including physical standards for buses. Centralising route operations in a single company or consortium was a key priority. At the same time, changing the road infrastructure to allow buses to bypass congestion was not seen as important. As a result, the companies operate under strict conditions set by the municipal government (and later the ATU) but provide a slow and inefficient service that has driven passengers to use unauthorised services and made it difficult to expand the planned system. In Lima, hybridity is manifested in the prevalence of paratransit along the integrated system. In Arequipa, on the other hand, improving road infrastructure was one of the main priorities. However, by prioritising infrastructure transformation, the reform was somewhat contradictory, as it was not clear whether improving infrastructure would benefit private cars more than the reform. The reconfiguration of service provision was secondary. Therefore, companies were allowed to enter the system under looser conditions. This allowed the system to cover most services in the city, but under conditions not envisaged by the planners. In Arequipa, hybridity manifests itself within the SIT.

In terms of convergences, these are evident in the expertise and evidence that underpinned both reforms. In Lima and Arequipa, the reforms were informed only by evidence of travel demand, but the analysis of how urban transport was actually provided and what was needed to reform it was rather superficial. Thus, both showed an alarmingly limited knowledge of how paratransit works. In terms of expertise, both reformed transport systems focused on route planning rather than mobility planning and seemed to view transport problems as purely technical. In Lima, there were inconsistencies in route design, with mass transit corridors being replaced by much lower-capacity corridors. In Arequipa, failure to take topographical conditions into account limited the reach of the planned service. Finally, both reforms maintained the delivery configurations of the route-concession model introduced in the early 1990s. In Lima, the delivery configuration aims to centralise operations in consortia to improve the quality of the buses providing the service, but in Arequipa, the maintenance of the model is based on the recognition that the SIT would be very difficult to implement without the involvement of the former paratransit operators.

Paratransit is a key component of urban transport services in Peruvian cities. However, not all policymakers have been able to recognise this. As a result, transport reforms are often caught up in the need to eradicate this form of transport and replace it entirely with a new one. This process often reveals a conflict of

rationalities. Policymakers are then unable to fully transform existing services and instead contribute to deepening their hybridity, sometimes in new forms, as shown by the cities of Lima and Arequipa studied here. Therefore, if national and local governments want to provide better urban transport services, they need to radically change their view of paratransit and start seeing it as an ally rather than an enemy to be defeated. However, this would require a better understanding of the nature of in/formal urban transport services, and only time will tell whether this expectation can be met by policymakers, planners, experts and communities.

Note

1 *Paratransit* is principally a (North) American term. Elsewhere, for instance in South Asia and anglophone Africa, *Intermediate (Public) Transport* (IPT) is more usual.

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9 Municipal housing programmes as hybrid urbanism

The case of Tacna, Peru*

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9.1 Introduction

"It's a white elephant out there in the pampa", says Pedro, referring to the zone where municipal housing programmes are located in the district of Gregorio Albarracín Lanchipa in Tacna, Peru. He continues: "I'm a realist: they don't live there, but there are some people who have built houses, others have also done business, many people". Pedro refers to an under-researched form of housing programme in Perú: *Programas Municipales de Vivienda* (Municipal Housing Programmes), known as PROMUVI. Despite previous experiences in public programmes of lot delivery, with and without essential services and infrastructure, during the second half of the 20th century, PROMUVI has rarely been implemented in Peru in the 21st century, with notable exceptions such as in the secondary city of Tacna, where the predominant urbanisation policy has been to formalise tenure after land occupation.

This chapter analyses PROMUVI to highlight the configuration of institutional hybridity and the flexible and porous nature of legality, marked by the logic of speculation and land trafficking by multiple actors. Theoretically, we use the conceptual framework of the production of urban space (Lefebvre, 1974/1998) to explain this type of urbanisation. This is because, in the case of Tacna, the capacity to monopolise and use urban land is a disputed good that requires political and economic arrangements but is not a dynamic external to the wider relations between state and market agents. In other words, a political view of the urbanisation process is necessary, and the question therefore arises of how PROMUVIs have been implemented as hybrid processes for producing urban space in the Coronel Gregorio Albarracin Lanchipa (CGAL) district in Tacna.

In the Peruvian context, urbanisation in the margins of the city is a spiral process with many stages: the creation of 'urban' land, upgrading of material conditions, legal recognition of possession and densification. Each stage has its own dynamics

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in terms of time, space and social organisation, which increase the complexity of the production of urban space.

Elsewhere (Dammert-Guardia et al., 2025), we explained that the creation of urban space is the process by which uninhabited space is spatially and legally transformed for urban use, mainly for residential use. We described six new urban land production modes that show synergistic work between actors and a discretionary use of legislation with the aim of land speculation. From housing programmes and the actions of civil associations (or at least their leaders) to the creation of new neighbourhoods by land traffickers,[1] new land is created to obtain the greatest economic benefit from vacant land and not to directly benefit the most vulnerable populations. These processes produce a highly speculative land market that generates greater socio-spatial inequality but is socially legitimised.

In the following, we focus on explaining the first stage of urbanisation: the creation of urban land in Tacna. Based on qualitative fieldwork and secondary information sources, we describe the multiple arrangements between actors, the use of regulations, the porous nature of legality, and the speculative interests at play. In other words, we shed light on the nature of policy implementation, its use to enable urban land and property formalisation and the actions undertaken for corrupt gain.

Since the mid-20th century, as many scholars have pointed out (Arnillas, 1987; Calderón, 2005; Collier, 1978; Matos Mar, 1986; Riofrío, 1986, 1991), in the context of land occupation by a population in need of housing, urban policies in Peru have aimed only at regularising and providing services and infrastructure for clientelist purposes. However, urban scholars in Peru have paid little attention to the role of local governments and other types of public policy-making in land and social housing provision. The case of PROMUVI in Tacna helps to make visible the role of sub-national governments in the production of urban space, but also shows how the implementation of these policies and the practices of municipal actors include speculative interests, corruption and clientelist political networks.

The research methods used for this study included semi-structured interviews with residents (14), urban association[2] leaders (8) and officials (4). To ensure a systematic approach, the interviews were transcribed and analysed using Atlas.ti software to create a matrix of codes and quotes. In addition, we reviewed secondary information, including censuses, socio-spatial and institutional indicators, regulations and urban plans. For this chapter, we limited the analysis of the categories linked to the modalities of PROMUVI, leaving aside other cases of new urban land production, such as private land trafficking and invasions, among others (see Dammert-Guardia et al., 2025).

In the following sections, we first present central arguments of the theoretical debate on the formal/informal dichotomy, which we argue is inadequate to understand the processes of production of urban space in secondary cities of Peru where land scarcity is not the main problem. Secondly, we describe the modes of production of new urban land by PROMUVI to argue that (i) the generation of a speculative urban regime is based on the capacity of actors to influence the outcomes of legislation in different ways and (ii) the synergy between the state apparatus and

other actors leads to forms of planning that articulate and mobilise hybrid arrangements in different configurations, which in turn result in the reproduction of conditions of precariousness and socio-spatial inequality.

9.2 Theoretical approaches to urbanisation in the Peruvian context

The production of urban space in Peru during the second half of the 20th century was characterised by the logic of necessity. It allowed communities and families access to land by occupation, leading to self-building, self-management and gradual access to services and titling (Calderón, 2005; Gyger, 2019; Matos Mar, 2012). The state's role during this period was discussed in four theoretical ways. Firstly, the absence of the state in addressing urban sprawl was noted, which led to the dichotomy of 'formal' and 'informal' as concepts of separate and unconnected spheres. Secondly, migration and popular urbanisation (*urbanización popular*,[3] i.e., neither state nor formalised market) were considered to exemplify a state crisis and its inability to establish integration mechanisms (Matos Mar, 1986). Thirdly, the state's actions were understood to benefit dominant and elite groups through various forms of exploitation and dependency (Quijano, 1968). Fourth, land grabbing and self-building were seen as the result of the high standards set by the state to achieve formalisation (De Soto, 1986).

In the late 20th century, between 1990 and 2000, the authoritarian regime of Alberto Fujimori addressed the issue of urban growth in expansion areas by focusing on the lack of land titles, following the proposals of De Soto (1986). This led to a massive nationwide titling programme that failed to ensure access to housing and essential services or improve living conditions for socially disadvantaged groups. Instead, it fuelled informal land sub-markets (Calderón, 2015; Caria, 2008; Fernández Maldonado, 2015; Torres, 2018). Furthermore, *traficantes de tierra* emerged as a new group of urban actors seeking to benefit from land-grabbing and land commodification strategies. It is essential to clarify that the commodification of housing necessity is a logic of urban land production because the institutional conditions of urban governance have changed (Calderón et al., 2023).

This chapter aims to make two theoretical and methodological contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, we challenge prevailing views on the state and informality and argue for the importance of hybrid arrangements for urbanisation processes and infrastructure delivery. On the one hand, clientelist networks consist of local authorities, community leaders and parts of the population, for whom land is one of the leading resources that can be made available, negotiated and capitalised. On the other hand, corruption is a generalised logic of how the Peruvian state works. Secondly, to understand how a municipal housing programme can be understood as a hybrid configuration, we highlight the importance of contextual characteristics. Urban studies in Peru have privileged the study of large metropolitan areas (Calderón & Vega Centeno, 2016). This situation obscures and limits the understanding of the heterogeneity of urbanisation and the importance of contextual characteristics in other urban contexts (Vergara & Salazar, 2021).

In the case of the city of Tacna, we can identify two similar arguments. It has been argued on several occasions that the characteristics of urbanisation in the capital city of Lima – how it grows, where it grows towards and what types of disputes between actors there are – are related to the lack of land in zones safe for urbanisation (Riofrío, 1991). This argument is relevant to Lima but not for secondary cities such as Tacna, where the problem is not exclusively land scarcity, as we will discuss based on the example of the growth of Gregorio Albarracín district. Another way this situation becomes evident – even more alarmingly – is how studies on Lima dismiss the sub-national level of government. For secondary cities, such as Tacna, the importance of sub-national governments at regional, provincial and district levels in producing urban space is substantial. These reasons justify the analysis of a city like Tacna, located on the border with Chile in southern Peru, with a population of fewer than 300,000 inhabitants. According to the national official categorisation, Tacna is a city of third hierarchy rank and is of the *Ciudad Mayor* (i.e., 'major city') type (Government of Peru, 2022). In the context of territorial planning, a *Ciudad Mayor* holds between 100 and 500 thousand inhabitants, supplies the region with social and economic integration functions and organises the structuring of the local and regional territory.

9.3 Case study: Opportunity structure, budget and regulations

As a result of decentralisation, the land in the city of Tacna is owned and administered by regional and local governments.[4] Thus, public land becomes a resource that can be mobilised to attract votes or as a source of revenue through legally ambiguous practices or corrupt schemes. Since 2001, the area of intensive urban growth in Tacna has been the district Coronel Gregorio Albarracín Lanchipa (CGAL). The new parts of the CGAL district shown in Figure 9.1 are associated with three mutually reinforcing processes: the 2001 earthquake and the district's creation, the financial resources available at the sub-national level, and implementing PROMUVIs in Tacna.

Firstly, in February 2001, following constant requests from social organisations, President Valentín Paniagua promulgated the law that created the district of Coronel Gregorio Albarracín Lachipa. Months later, after the earthquake that hit Tacna in June 2001, the Provincial Municipality of Tacna (Municipalidad Provincial de Tacna or MPT) proposed relocating those affected to the new CGAL district. This decision led to an accelerated urbanisation of the southern part of the district (see Figure 9.1). Despite being a process led by the local municipalities, new speculative urban configurations were generated within the permissive environment created by the public authorities and officials in charge of urban planning. This situation is described by all those interviewed in Tacna, like Luis, 52 years old, who lives in one of the currently consolidated areas of CGAL. For Luis, the earthquake offered a structure of opportunities:

> When the 2001 earthquake happened, the government started to look at Viñani to get access to new land for the people to protect those who lived



Figure 9.1 Urban Growth of Coronel Gregorio Albarracin Lanchipa District (2000–2020)
Source: INEI (2017), MINAM (2007) and MUNTACNA (2013).

> in [other parts of the city]. Unfortunately, the relocation plan did not work because the people stayed, and only strangers came to do business with the new plots, which is why the plots have been abandoned for a long time in Viñani. This is where all the problems of land trafficking occur, perhaps due to poor organisation by the municipal government that did not know how to manage the process of giving land to the people who needed it.
>
> (Luis, interview, December 2022)

The earthquake provided opportunities to become a private plot owner and was one of the justifications for implementing PROMUVI in the following years as a mechanism to provide housing. The earthquake also promoted speculative practices and land trafficking. After the earthquake, people who had been unsuccessfully trying to invade land in this area could obtain a plot legally. Juan, 54, who was a *dirigente* at that time in one of the first associations formed after the earthquake,

indicates that for several months they tried to invade but were evicted at every attempt. After the earthquake, the registration of the plots was facilitated, albeit under economic arrangements with the association leaders.

Second, local governments are facing significant budget challenges. Current income (from taxes, property income and others) only represents 23.7% of the total budgets of local governments in 2019 (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informatica [INEI], 2020), with many variations depending on the socioeconomic characteristics of residents and levels of tax income. This, however, is different for the CGAL municipality, which receives mining canon resources from the extractive mining activities in the department of Tacna.[5] This income varied from 95% of the municipality´s revenue in 2009, decreasing to 54% in 2020 and then increasing again to 81.3% in 2021. In Peru, it is unusual that new municipalities have enough money for public infrastructure, but the municipality of Gregorio Albarracín had resources to allocate to projects for water and sewage access networks, electrification, roads and pavements, generating added value in the land market.

Third, it is crucial to understand the main characteristics of PROMUVI. The Peruvian state apparatus has constantly participated in popular urbanisation through lax regulation, direct technical assistance, political promotion and deregulation to allow the commercialisation and subdivision of areas previously used for agricultural purposes, among other things (Calderón, 2015). However, regional and local governments can implement PROMUVI to address the population's demand for housing, although it is a rather exceptional type of state intervention.

The implementation of PROMUVI must be contextualised within other significant changes in the functioning of the state. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the Peruvian Government decentralised several functions to the regional governments (Law No. 27867-2002),[6] including the administration and adjudication of urban and unused land owned by the state. Consequently, local municipalities and regional governments started managing their land and implementing housing programmes. The Provincial Municipality of Tacna enacted a regulation that allowed the implementation of PROMUVIs, outlining the process's characteristics, requirements, access criteria, urban reclassification processes and property titling processes. In general terms, this regulation and its subsequent modifications indicated that this type of programme is to be carried out on land owned by the provincial municipality and within its jurisdiction.

For individuals, winning a particular lottery established by the municipality is the starting point for being granted access to buying one of the plots. Applicants must meet a set of requirements: presenting identity documents, not owning other property and providing a sworn income statement. On the other hand, a *precio social* (social price) for the land plots is defined through a property valuation.[7] Then, a certificate of adjudication and delivery of the lot is issued. Finally, the property title is granted to those who maintain continuous occupation of the plot until the adjudication and have made all the corresponding payments. (See Raoul, Chapter 11, for more details of these processes.)

The analytical categories used to interpret current urban land occupation differ from those forged during the second half of the 20th century. The new regulatory

structures (Law No. 27867-2002; Law No. 27972-2003; Law No. 27506-2001) allow a new scenario where land is obtained through diverse occupation strategies. Moreover, the formal–informal dichotomy does not help explain the current practices of land occupation, which are increasingly influenced by the relationship between institutional and regulatory arrangements. In the next section, we describe how PROMUVI was implemented.

9.4 PROMUVI as a speculative and hybrid programme

The implementation of PROMUVIs in Tacna and CGAL responds to national political conditions, changes in regulations and political decisions at the local level that are combined with clientelist and corrupt practices. These allow the creation of urban land for speculative purposes. The PROMUVIs have become a method for land-grabbing by actors with economic and political power. During the fieldwork, we identified three ways PROMUVIs are developed. Firstly, as a mechanism to regularise land in an already occupied area. Secondly, as a path to buy a plot from the local municipality through the relevant lottery; and thirdly, as a form of real estate investment led by a civil association representing people who need housing.

According to Tacna's Urban Development Plan (2015-2025) (Municipalidad Provincial de Tacna, 2015), 42 percent of the total 'formalised territory' for residential purposes corresponds to PROMUVIs. However, this does not correspond to a single way of acting and intervening on the territory. On the contrary, as we will show in this section, local solutions were case-specific and flexible, promoted by different actors and conditions for speculation and land-grabbing were established. This shows the hybrid character of the negotiation between the state and society and the state's action in the context of regulation.

In the first type of PROMUVI, the local municipality regularises the previous occupation of public land. It establishes a way to promote titling processes at the municipal level linked to national public policy regarding the formalisation of informal settlements since 1961. The second type of PROMUVI was proposed to face a housing shortage after the 2001 earthquake. Local government was made responsible for implementing PROMUVIs. The process began with identifying available land. An open call was made to the population, with specific requirements based on the need for social housing. This involved managing information, technical and legal documents for viability and organising the lottery to select the future owners. The administrative processes were regulated through municipal ordinances.

The case of Maria and her husband illustrates how this process was conducted. They had spent more than four years of effort and a significant amount of money building their own house on a plot of land given to them by her mother-in-law. However, she decided it was time "to have something of her own". They found out about the programme through a local radio station advertisement. It offered plots through a lottery organised by the Provincial Municipality of Tacna. A great deal of documentation and evidence was required during this process. The principal requirements were that applicants should have lived in

Tacna for some time and have no other property. Also, this time, the main requirement was having a family and not being single: "Single people never got a plot", says María. "My land cost me about 368 soles", i.e., under one US dollar per square metre.

Once the payment was made and the lottery was won, there was still uncertainty about which plot would be allocated to them. "We were left uncertain", recalls Maria. Participation in the lottery and the processes of PROMUVI were not always clear or transparent for the new owners. The process was also influenced by political and clientelist interests – association leaders and municipal officers intervened with unclear rules to benefit people who pay *coimas* (bribes) to them, not only to win the lottery but also to get a specific plot. Some cases have been brought to judicial court, reflecting conflicting interests between public, political and private actors. For example, in the case of some specific PROMUVIs that were part of a public prosecutor's investigation, a series of legal proceedings were led against civil servants, politicians and community leaders. This situation occurred through the definition of a social price for the land, around 16 soles (around US$5) per square metre, which it was claimed had done economic damage to the municipality.

In the third type of PROMUVI, an association's president worked as a real estate developer who speculated and sold the plots to the highest bidders, not to families in real need of housing. In our research, this was the case of an association funded by workers, family members and acquaintances linked to formal and informal transport services. Cesar, one of the founding leaders of the association, indicated that they prepared a list of *socios* (applicants to be members). "Well, we gave each manager a paper sheet so they could bring their people, right?", Cesar remembered. The association had 2,000 members, each of whom had to pay the provincial municipality 360 soles (approximately US$100),for plots of more than 160 square metres each. "It's a gift", says Cesar. The process of organising the programme and implementing it began in 2004 or 2005, but the municipal government only handed over the plots in 2008. The planning of plots and urban conditions was made later, after payment.

The people who won the lottery did not necessarily start living in the area immediately. Some re-sold the plots, whilst others left them unused (see Figure 9.2). Speculative conditions resulted in a low number of permanent residents during the initial stage, creating problems in different dimensions, such as their collective negotiation capacity with local authorities and with political intermediaries like *dirigentes*.

The gradual process of urban space production was observed in the case of one PROMUVI called Señor de los Milagros (see Figure 9.2), where three types of occupation were combined: the construction of a minimal area (usually around 2 metres square) as a signal of presence in the territory, but almost always without people residing; the construction of a perimeter fence around the plot, which fulfils security functions, reduces the possibility of invasions, but also does not signal continuous living in the territory; and finally, the processes of self-building that are more linked to living in the territory. This is not exclusive to Tacna or PROMUVI.



Figure 9.2 History of occupation in PROMUVI Señor de los Milagros

Source: MINAM (2007); INEI (2017); MUNTACNA (2013); MUNIALBARRACIN (2018) and Google Earth Pro (2023).

What is a particularity in the case of CGAL is the percentage of plots that are not occupied, which reveals a land speculation logic.

These speculative logics were not limited to operating in isolation or as a single sphere of action but collectively became the dominant logic of interest and action in these spaces. For example, in some cases, community leaders can mobilise strategies like those of *traficantes de tierras*, taking advantage of their knowledge of empty plots and promoting the sale of plots. Rosa's story illustrates this situation.

> The *dirigentes* have also benefited from the land, transferring and exploiting it at their will. It seems to me that they are somewhat opportunistic; once they've made the most of a place, they move on to something larger, leaving it behind for sale. They have a record of all the residents, knowing who has legal documentation and who doesn't. They then sell the land, advising the buyer to take minor actions to claim it, and if no one objects within a few months, the buyer can proceed with development.
>
> (Rosa, interview, December 2022)

But speculative practices were not exclusive to the *dirigentes*. The people who have access to plots are also involved in attempts at accumulation processes based on selling their plots. The conditions under which plots were given to the winners of the PROMUVI lottery promoted speculative dynamics of commodification and hoarding. During fieldwork, we found recurrent stories of people who sold their plots or bought them from someone who benefitted from a PROMUVI. Pedro exemplifies these situations.

> Of course, I bought the plot. I think it was a programme that they had put out for those who didn't have houses. I bought the lot from a friend. He got it by lottery. But he already had his plots.
>
> (Pedro, interview, December 2022)

9.5 Conclusion: Hybridity, speculation and corruption

The analysis of the implementation of PROMUVIs in the CGAL district shows hybrid arrangements immersed in the production of urban space in secondary cities. In CGAL and Tacna, the scarcity of developable land is not the central problem, which instead is speculation based on the legislation itself and on the relationships of the actors involved. The case of PROMUVIs can be extrapolated to other places with similar institutional contexts in Peru.

The conditions under which PROMUVIs are implemented reflect the institutional conditions and the capacity of actors to perform flexibility in different ways concerning existing norms. This flexibility allows for the coexistence of various modalities for creating new urban land and developing submarkets for land plots (Dammert-Guardia & Rivera Segura, 2024). Similarly to what has been pointed out by other authors regarding massive land titling programmes in Peru (Calderón, 2019; Torres, 2018), PROMUVI's innovations reproduce speculative logics and should be understood as institutionally hybrid forms of urban space production that include relaxations of norms, collusion of interests and corruption. The analysis highlights how speculative conditions are reproduced, characterised by socio-spatial inequalities and the capacity of actors linked to the trafficking of plots.

Furthermore, it becomes evident that urban development in the CGAL district is based on complex synergistic relationships between the state apparatus and politicians, civil organisations and land agents. The corruption of public officials and politicians is a central dimension for understanding the reproduction and

emergence of informal submarkets of plots of land (Clichevsky, 2006; Fernandes, 2003; Jaramillo, 2008; Lambert 2021). In the case of secondary cities, the corruption that is linked to municipal administration has exceeded the technical capacity for the planning, management and control of land transformation and use, thus allowing agents such as land traffickers or community leaders to promote invasions of municipal land, which is subsequently awarded under the PROMUVI process.

The production of urban space in the CGAL district exemplifies the complex interrelations of social structures, processes and practices that transcend the informal–formal dichotomy. Local social practices do not transgress the law per se, but strategies are implemented through normative flexibility and corruption. These strategies, which combine political power, economic resources and social legitimisation, allow the norm to be bent to make the most of it, whether in monetary terms by land agents, land traffickers and community leaders, or in political terms by officials, politicians and other political actors. Although PROMUVI can be a viable alternative for vulnerable families to gain access to land and subsequently to housing, the case of CGAL demonstrates that vulnerable families are unable to access a programme created for them because actors with greater political and economic power monopolise the plots for their commercial purposes and expand the city without ensuring minimum conditions of habitability.

Notes

1 *Traficantes de tierra.* Also known as *loteadores piratas* (pirate developers), they profit from buying and selling land, usually public property.
2 In Peru, creating a civil association (*asociación*) of residents in new urban areas facilitates the process of titling (i.e., the formalisation of land rights for owners), access to services and other legal processes. (See also Raoul, Chapter 11 of this volume.) The *dirigente* (leader) of each association operates as an intermediate agent with the local municipality, the state and political parties; he or she is responsible for collective action in the association and maintains a hierarchical power relationship with residents. Associations vary significantly in size and number of participants. In many cases, the *dirigentes* promote land trafficking and speculative strategies.
3 *Popular* in Spanish is difficult to translate. It roughly refers to marginalised sectors/areas/groups, overlapping with but not synonymous with 'poor', 'working class' etc., as a set of characteristics, but extends beyond these, and has political connotations. Increasingly, Anglophone scholarship is simply using the English word 'popular' in this Spanish sense. See the discussion in Lombard, M., & Horn, P. (2024). *Urban informality: an introduction*. De Gruyter. (M. Lombard, personal communication, 30 July 2024.)
4 Under Law N° 27783 (2002), Peru has implemented a decentralisation process in which the National Government has progressively transferred functions to 26 regional governments across the national territory. As part of this process, housing, health and education responsibilities have been delegated. Since then, regional governments have taken on the challenge of managing land and social housing programmes with greater autonomy.
5 The income of local governments is divided into several items: transfers (from the central government), financing, current income and capital income. Within the transfers category is the mining canon, based on a proportion of the income tax paid by the mining companies active in a locality.
6 Peruvian laws are accessible from the *Archivo Digital de la Legislación del Perú* at https://www.leyes.congreso.gob.pe.

7 The *precio social* is an amount established by local municipalities for the auction of vacant land or housing programmes. Its value is established by property appraisal by municipal experts, and it is below the market price.

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10 Huacho and the unequal production of pedestrian commuting to essential social services

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10.1 Introduction

The capitalist production of cities has configured geographies with multiple inequalities (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Theodore et al., 2009), one of them being present in everyday mobility (Cass et al., 2005; Manderscheid, 2009; Ohnmacht et al., 2009; Urry, 2007). In the Latin American context, particular urban conditions – such as the hybridity of residential urbanisation (see Chapter 9), the market-driven choice of development location and the weak culture of urban planning (see Chapter 7) – are combined with challenging socio-economic conditions that exacerbate the unequal distribution of commuting[1] which is required for citizens to participate in urban life. This is not only due to the uneven conditions of proximity between residential areas and the location of activities of economic production (such as workplaces) and social reproduction (such as social infrastructure like schools and hospitals) (Avellaneda & Lazo, 2011; Blanco & Apaolaza, 2018; Di Virgilio et al., 2022; Figueroa Martínez et al., 2018; Hernandez, 2018; Hernandez & Rossel, 2015; Jirón & Mansilla, 2013; Mayorga Henao, 2023; Robert et al., 2022), but also to the uneven distribution of capabilities for movement within the population (Avellaneda, 2008; Oviedo Hernandez & Titheridge, 2016). This inequality takes on greater importance when it manifests itself in the different forms of commuting necessary to guarantee a minimum quality of life, such as that required for everyday access to essential social services (hereinafter ESS) considered as human rights, such as basic education and primary health care.

This chapter addresses the unequal production of commuting based on the relationship between pedestrian mobility and the socio-spatial particularities of urbanisation, especially those linked to the provision of ESS and the hybrid urbanisation of residential areas. It highlights the complex arrangements of formalised and informalised practices present in Latin American urban development. To this end, it is argued that pedestrian commutes to the essential services of early childhood education and primary health care are the most basic and necessary dimension of everyday mobility, and an analysis is made of the socio-spatial configuration of the distribution of these commutes in a Peruvian secondary city, considering the particularities of its urbanisation.

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The case study of Huacho, capital of the Lima[2] Region and an urban area little explored by Peruvian urban studies, focuses on the particular nuances that secondary cities present in terms of everyday pedestrian mobility. Although the geographies of these cities are still unequal and influenced by the presence/absence of the state and the interests of the market, the nature and scale of these urban scenarios favour innovative configurations for the relatively fluid development of urban life, compared to the configurations of the primary cities (see Chapter 1). Whilst these advantages do not prevent the production of territorial inequalities, they do confine them sufficiently to observe new and narrower dimensions of the unequal production of space and movement.

Huacho is a city that has historically been a strategic location for the development of the *Norte Chico* (i.e., the coastal region north of the national capital). However, since its designation as capital of the Lima Region in 2002, Huacho's position as a secondary city was revalidated and strengthened as it sought to become a hub for the decentralised functioning of state institutions and an attractor for private investment, although not necessarily with the best results. These conditions initiated an accelerated urbanisation process through which the conurbation of five districts (Huacho, Hualmay, Huaura, Caleta de Carquín and Santa María) was formed and the population increased to an estimated 185,200 inhabitants by 2023 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática [INEI], 2023).

As in most Peruvian cities, Huacho's urban space is produced by the coexisting interventions of different actors and by hybrid practices. On the one hand, residential urbanisation generally relies on market agents (formalised, informalised and often illegal) and the low-income population, who through complex arrangements of formalised and informalised practices, have taken advantage of the availability of waste and agricultural land in peripheral and peri-urban areas to generate housing supply. On the other hand, the provision of education and health ESS relies on both the state and the market. Although this could be interpreted as an absolute dichotomy between public and private provision of these services, in fact, part of the supply of services by both sectors is oriented towards a single target public: the population with lower incomes, who can choose to use the free service for economic reasons, and the low-cost private service, which is the preferred option (Balarín, 2016; Durand et al., 2020).

Within this framework, this chapter seeks to answer how the distribution of pedestrian commuting to ESS in the city of Huacho is configured socio-spatially. For this purpose, a quantitative approach is adopted, focusing on spatial analysis and developed in two phases. Firstly, the spatial distribution of pedestrian commuting to ESS is evaluated based on a pedestrian proximity analysis, and the *level of functionality for everyday access to essential services* of the urban space is determined. On this basis, the most and least functional residential areas for daily life are identified, socio-economically qualified through observations on the particularities of their urbanisation, and the variation in effort required (in time and economic resources) for the population to make their regular commute to the ESS is determined.

The chapter is organised into five sections. In the next, a theoretical argument is constructed to argue that pedestrian commuting to ESS is the most basic and necessary dimension of everyday mobility, especially in contexts such as Peru. The third section explains the quantitative methodology adopted for the analysis of the case study. The fourth section presents the results of the case study analysis, and the fifth section discusses the findings in the light of the theoretical debate and outlines the main conclusions.

10.2 Everyday mobility, essential pedestrian commuting and the Latin American urban context

Among the various types of human movements, commuting has the greatest impact on the full development of urban life, as it involves the spatial connection between residence and the places where economic production and social reproduction activities take place. This implies that everyday mobility is fundamental for access to the essential needs and opportunities provided by the city, so that the unequal production of everyday commuting contributes to increasing the conditions of social exclusion (Cass et al., 2005; Manderscheid, 2009; Ohnmacht et al., 2009) and intensifying socio-spatial segregation (Di Virgilio et al., 2022; Lulle & Di Virgilio, 2021; Mayorga Henao, 2023).

In Latin America, research on everyday mobility has been conducted using two approaches. Most studies focus on everyday mobility to places of 'opportunity', focusing on commuting to places that host economic production activities, such as work and university education (Blanco & Apaolaza, 2018; Hernandez, 2018; Prieto & Brain, 2018; Robert et al., 2022). However, studies have also emerged that focus on everyday mobility to places that host social reproduction activities, such as health and basic education – a type of mobility associated with care and which predominantly involves women (Comas d'Argemir, 2017; Hernandez & Rossel, 2015; Sánchez de Madariaga, 2009). This new approach highlights the importance of the provision of ESS to ensure an adequate quality of urban life and the need to guarantee access to it, taking into account the diversity of people and their varying abilities to move within the city.

From this approach, pedestrian commuting to ESS is considered to be the most basic and necessary dimension of everyday mobility, since pedestrian mobility is the most democratic form of commuting – it does not require people to invest money, but only time and physical effort. This democratic approach to mobility is appropriate if it is considered that even the ability to move is unequally distributed (Barthon & Monfroy, 2011; Kaufmann et al., 2004; Lévy, 1994): for advantaged groups, walking is one of several options available to them for their everyday commutes, whilst for less advantaged groups, this type of mobility is generally the only alternative that does not compromise their finances.[3] In addition, eventually, in situations that require actions without the use of private cars, walking may become the only alternative, either for public health reasons (as in the COVID-19 scenario) or for macroeconomic reasons such as widespread fuel shortages.

From this dimension of everyday mobility, proximity becomes more salient as one of the characteristics that structures the space and conditions pedestrian commuting. Proximity has generally been approached from a health and sustainability perspective, especially in the studies carried out in the context of COVID-19. With the rise of the '15-minute city' debate, numerous efforts were made to quantitatively analyse everyday pedestrian commuting (Moreno et al., 2021; Rhoads et al., 2023; Weng et al., 2019). Although these studies constitute important methodological inputs, they tend to focus only on the duration of trips, overlooking the local urban particularities that condition them and the characteristics of the people involved. For this reason, it is considered crucial to delve deeper into the relationship between everyday mobility and the socio-spatial particularities of urbanisation because in this way it is possible to understand the production of unequal geographies as both consequence and cause of the unequal production of movement.

In the case of Latin American cities, the hybridity of the urbanisation of residential areas and the uneven spatial distribution of ESS provision condition proximities and commutes. On the one hand, the coexistence of conventional, formalised urbanisation and (often informalised) popular urbanisation[4] has come to entwine their housing development practices to the point of hybridity. The intensification of urbanisation, the generalisation of informality and the strength of land trafficking have made it increasingly difficult to distinguish between formalised, informalised and consequently often illegal, practices that produce residential space. This is why many of the new neighbourhoods cannot be categorised as *popular* or *conventional* with complete certainty, as their emergence may be the result of genuine needs, illegal market interests, informalised practices or a mixture of all of these.

The emergence of this hybridity in residential urbanisation also has a spatial correlate that has reconfigured the urban space. For a long time, conventionally produced homes were located in the well-provided centres of the city, whilst popular housing was located in marginal areas or neglected peripheries. This distribution of residential areas configured situations of *polarised segregation*, marking a clear distinction between centre-rich and periphery-poor. However, in recent years it has been shown that the structure of large Latin American cities is showing a tendency to change from polarised segregation to *fragmented segregation* (Borsdorf, 2003; Janoschka, 2002), as the emergence of new neighbourhoods of complicated categorisation is coupled with the emergence of gated (relatively wealthy) communities in the peripheries (Borsdorf, 2002; Caldeira, 2000; Janoschka & Borsdorf, 2006), the consolidation of old popular neighbourhoods (Abramo, 2012; Barreda & Ramírez Corzo, 2004) and the emergence of *hyperperipheries* with their overlapping social, economic and spatial vulnerabilities (Alves et al., 2010; Torres da Gama & Marques, 2001). What is striking about this spatial reconfiguration is that the new peripheries are no longer inhabited exclusively by the less advantaged population groups, but have become a residential option for more advantaged groups. In their search for 'exclusivity', the middle and upper classes have sometimes opted to reside in locations previously stigmatised as being associated with poverty and the lack of urban service provision. They thus appropriate the peripheral territory, but disassociate themselves from its stigmatising associations.

On the other hand, public and private provisions of ESS present a heterogeneous spatial distribution due to the varied choices for service location and the weak urban planning culture. To begin with, the locations chosen by the private sector generally aim to benefit from agglomeration economies (Bateman Serrano & Nieto, 2020) rather than prioritising equality of access across the whole urban area, as the public sector intends. Thus, despite the considerable increase in private provision of these services over the last thirty years, their distribution has remained uneven. This is because the private sector relies on user preferences, as the widespread neoliberal discourse of private efficiency and public inefficiency has encouraged the choice of private over public, even in lower-income sections of the population (Balarín, 2016; Durand & Salcedo, 2020). These have found an alternative in low-cost private services (Balarín, 2016; Durand et al., 2020), even though this choice generally implies investing greater efforts to commute (Hernandez & Rossel, 2015). In addition, and in parallel with related neoliberal discourses, zoning as an urban planning instrument is limited to identifying the places destined to offer this type of services without necessarily limiting the market-driven choice of locations.

Understanding the socio-spatial particularities of Latin American urbanisation that condition proximities and commutes makes it possible to approach everyday mobility as a contextualised spatial practice. In addition, the relationship between the production of urban space and the most basic and necessary dimensions of everyday mobility, such as pedestrian commuting to ESS, makes it possible to map a kind of *geography of essentialities*.[5] This mapping not only highlights the uneven distribution of everyday and essential pedestrian commuting, but also reveals more narrow dimensions of urban inequality and the consequences of hybrid urban development in the field of service accessibility.

10.3 Methodology

The study examines the case of the city of Huacho using a quantitative design approach that focuses on spatial analysis and takes advantage of the nature of secondary cities to reveal little explored dimensions of mobility and spatial production. To this end, Geographic Information Systems are used to apply an analysis developed in two phases.

The first phase assesses the spatial distribution of pedestrian commuting to ESS and identifies the *level of functionality for everyday life* of residential areas. This phase begins by characterising the distribution of locations of publicly and privately provided ESS facilities. Then, a network analysis is applied that assesses the spatio-temporal implications of proximity and shows the spatial distribution of pedestrian commutes from residential areas to ESS facilities provided by the state and by the market. For this analysis, a walking speed of 72 m/min is considered (Silva et al., 2014), as this is the average speed of women, who usually assume the responsibility for essential everyday commuting.

Based on this, an indicator called *level of functionality for everyday access to essential services* is constructed, which characterises the urbanised area according to the advantages of proximity in terms of essential everyday commuting. This

Table 10.1 Level of functionality of residential areas by walking time to essential social services

Level of functionality	*Walking time to essential social services*	
	Early childhood education	*Primary health care*
High	≤ 5 minutes (*)	≤ 15 minutes (*)
Medium	5–10 minutes	15–20 minutes
Low	> 10 minutes	> 20 minutes

(*) = walking times identified in Weng et al. (2019).

indicator is applied by differentiating between public and private provision, and is categorised into three levels based on the walking time required to access these services (Table 10.1). The results are visualised through thematic maps.

The second phase identifies the residential areas that are most and least functional for everyday life, qualifies them socio-economically through observations on the particularities of their urbanisation and determines the disparity of effort required for the population to make their daily commute to the ESS. The thematic maps serve as input to identify the residential areas with higher and lower functionality for everyday life. The areas with higher functionality are those with pedestrian accessibility to public and private services in adequate spatial-temporal conditions, whilst the areas with lower functionality are those that do not have adequate public or private pedestrian accessibility. The former are identified from the superposition of the zones of high functionality for each type of provision, whilst the latter are determined by the superposition of the zones of low functionality.

These areas are then qualified by observing urban data such as the characteristics of the land (occupation and zoning), the neighbourhood (typology and location) and its socio-economic composition (socio-economic strata). Finally, the walking times required for residents of the least functional areas to make their commutes to the ESS are identified, as well as the economic resources that would be necessary to cover the disadvantages of (lack of) proximity by substituting pedestrian trips with motorised ones.

For both phases of analysis, different sources of official data were used, verified, georeferenced, supplemented and updated as required.

- Location of ESS: data from official sources (CENEPRED, 2023; MINEDU, 2023; SUSALUD, 2024), georeferenced with the free software QGis Desktop 3.22.8 and contrasted with Google Satellite.
- Street network: based on the 2017 census urban plan (INEI, 2017), verified and updated to 2023 through Google Satellite images.
- Characterisation of functional areas for everyday life: data from official statistical databases (INEI, 2007, 2020), the current urban plan (Municipalidad Provincial de Huaura, 2013) and the mapping of urbanisation characteristics made from Google Earth Pro satellite imagery.

- Commuting efforts: data from the network analysis applied in the first phase, field collection of the cost of motorised travel and the household income report[6] (IPSOS, 2022).

10.4 Huacho: Essential social services, functionality for everyday life and distribution of pedestrian commuting

10.4.1 Provision of ESS and level of functionality by proximity

Public and private provision of early childhood education and primary health care services varies in quantity and location, which is reflected in the distribution of their facilities (Figure 10.1). The state provides these ESS in the five districts of the conurbation roughly in proportion to the urban area it needs to serve. In contrast, the private sector has greater provision (almost double the supply of state education and almost four times the state health supply), but less proportionately distributed with respect to the areas it needs to supply. This is evidenced by the concentration of private education provision in central or better-connected areas and the under-supply of private health provision in the districts of Carquín and Santa María.

The distribution of ESS determines the levels of functionality for urban life in the area. The analysis of these levels, calculated on the basis of pedestrian proximity, reveals a configuration of zones differentiated according to the type of service provision and conditioned by location choices.



Figure 10.1 Distribution of essential services facilities

Source: Own design based on data from CENEPRED (2023); INEI (2017); MINEDU (2023); SUSALUD (2024) and Google Satellite.

The results of the analysis of early childhood education reveal better functional conditions in the central areas and worse conditions in the peripheral areas, although with different nuances in their distribution (Figure 10.2). The distribution of zones according to their functionality for pedestrian access to public provision evidences the state's intention to achieve a certain homogeneity and equidistance in the distribution of its supply. Despite this, facilities are not located close enough to homes to guarantee a high level of functionality throughout the territory, not even in all central and well-connected urban areas. On the other hand, the areas of high functionality in relation to the private offer are concentrated in the central and better-connected areas of the conurbation, neglecting the new peripheral areas of the district and the sector of Manzanares, a former area of popular urbanisation on the periphery which is currently in the process of consolidation.

In the case of primary health care, the results of the analysis show that most of the territory is made up of areas with high functionality, but, due to the spatial distribution of the service, there are still sectors neglected by both the state and the market that do not necessarily correspond to new urban areas (Figure 10.3). In the case of public services, the analysis of the spatial distribution of these zones shows that those with high functionality are concentrated around the oldest and most consolidated areas of all the conurbation districts, except in the most important central area of the city: the centre of Huacho. This



Figure 10.2 Provision of early childhood education: Level of functionality by proximity

Source: Own design based on data from INEI (2017); MINEDU (2023) and Google Satellite.



Figure 10.3 Provision of primary health care: level of functionality by proximity

Source: Own design based on data from CENEPRED (2023); SUSALUD (2024); INEI (2017) and Google Satellite.

is explained by the presence of the Huacho Regional Hospital, a second-level health centre which, in the absence of primary health care facilities provides this service and covers the apparently deprived area. Therefore, although the spatial analysis identifies this area as having low functionality, it is not really that it lacks this service, but rather that this is provided by a higher level of health care. However, it is possible that this situation generates an overload of demand on the hospital and, to a certain extent, limits the adequate provision of the public service.

From the analysis of private provision, it is observed that the areas with the highest functionality are predominantly concentrated in the large central area of the conurbation and the district of Huaura, whilst the areas with the lowest functionality are mainly located in the peripheries. The notable exception is the lack of private service provision in the district of Carquín, despite this being a consolidated area with a local urban centre. Unlike public provision, private provision does not seek to develop a homogeneous distribution pattern that facilitates pedestrian access to the service throughout the territory, but rather chooses to ensure its locations in sectors with greater economic dynamics, even if this implies overlapping coverage areas.

The distribution of zones according to their level of functionality reveals the unequal nature of pedestrian commuting and makes it possible to visualise the urban areas best and worst served by the public and private provision. This serves as an



Figure 10.4 Functional and non-functional residential areas for everyday access to essential services

Source: Own design based on data from CENEPRED (2023); INEI (2017); MINEDU (2023); MPH (2013); SUSALUD (2024) and Google Satellite.

input to identify the most and least functional residential areas for everyday access to the ESS (Figure 10.4).

10.4.2 Most functional residential areas for everyday life

Figure 10.4 shows the grouping of the most functional residential areas for everyday access to education (E-MF1, E-MF2, E-MF3, E-MF4 and E-MF5) and health (H-MF1, H-MF2, H-MF3 and H-MF4). Among the main socio-economic characteristics of these areas (Table 10.2), the following stand out:

- The areas with increased functionality include not only traditional urban centres and relatively new *centralidades*,[7] but also neighbourhoods in the newly urbanised periphery. These new areas have been developed in areas zoned for residential use as well as in the 'compatible' and 'non-compatible for residential use' zones.
- The neighbourhoods that comprise these areas are mostly conventional or arose through popular urbanisation, and have been consolidated or are in the process of consolidation. However, other types of neighbourhoods also show this increased functionality, such as developed lots driven by real estate developments,[8] lot-by-lot development[9] and new emerging neighbourhoods.[10]

Table 10.2 Most functional residential areas for everyday life: Socio-economic characteristics of neighbourhoods

Characteristics	*Education*					*Healthcare*			
	E-MF1	*E-MF2*	*E-MF3*	*E-MF4*	*E-MF5*	*H-MF1*	*H-MF2*	*H-MF3*	*H-MF4*
AREA (Ha)	60,55	6,84	3,28	147,14	8,37	179,54	504,30	32,77	158,20
DISTRICT	Huaura	Santa María	Carquín	Hualmay (*); Santa María; Huacho	Huacho	Huaura	Hualmay(*); Santa María; Huacho	Huacho	Huacho
PERIOD OF LAND OCCUPATION	Before 2002	2002–2023	Before 2002	Before 2002	2002–2023	Before 2002 (*); 2002–2023	Before 2002 (*); 2002–2023	Before 2002 (*); 2002–2023	Before 2002 (*); 2002–2023
ZONING (i)	RDM(*); CZ(*); ZRE; ZRP	PU	RDM(*); CZ; ZRE;	RDM(*); CZ(*); CE; ZRP; ZAR	RDM(*); ZRP	RDM(*); CZ; CE; ZRE; ZRP; ZAR; ZPE; E1; I2; OU; PU	RDM(*); CZ; CE; PU; ZRP;	RDM(*); ZRP	RDM(*); ZRE; ZRP; ZPE; CE
TYPE OF NEIGHBOURHOOD	Consolidated neighbourhood	Consolidated neighbourhood	Consolidated neighbourhood	Consolidated neighbourhood (*); Popular neighbourhood	Emerging neighbourhood	Consolidated neighbourhood (*); Neighbourhood in process of consolidation; Real state development – developed lots; Lot-by-lot development	Consolidated neighbourhood (*); Lot-by-lot development; Popular neighbourhood in process of consolidation	Consolidated neighbourhood (*); Emerging neighbourhood	Popular neighbourhood in process of consolidation (*); Emerging neighbourhood; Consolidated neighbourhood
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATA (ii)	Medium (*); Medium Low	Medium	Medium	Medium high (*); Medium; Medium low	Medium low (*); No data	Medium (*); Medium low; Low; No data	Medium (*); Medium low; Medium high; Low	Medium high (*); Medium; Medium low	Medium low (*); Medium; Medium high; Low; No data

(i) Codes follow the Zoning Plan of the Urban Development Plan 2013–2022 (MPH, 2013):

- Residential zoning – RDM
- Zoning compatible with residential use – CE, CZ, PU, ZRP, ZRT, ZRE, ZA, El, I2, OU
- Zoning not compatible with residential use – ZAR, ZPE

(ii) According to data from INEI's income-stratified map (INEI, 2020).

(*) Predominant category

- The socio-economic composition of the residential areas most benefiting from proximity to ESS supply is diverse, including higher-middle, middle, lower-middle and, in some cases, lower class, as defined by INEI, the relevant state body (INEI, 2020).[11]

10.4.3 Least functional residential areas for everyday life

Figure 10.4 also shows the grouping of residential areas that are least functional for everyday access to education (E-LF1, E-LF2, E-LF3 and E-LF4) and health (H-LF1, H-LF2 and L-MF3). Among the main socio-economic characteristics of their urbanisation (Table 10.3), the following stand out:

- Urban areas with lower functionality are mainly located in the newly urbanised periphery. These areas have been developed in all three types of zones: residential, 'compatible' and, in some cases, 'not compatible' with residential use.
- The neighbourhoods that make up these urban areas are mostly emerging neighbourhoods, lot-by-lot developed neighbourhoods or neighbourhoods driven by real estate developments, including developed lots and gated communities.
- The socio-economic composition of the residential areas most affected by the lack of proximity to ESS supply is diverse. Although it affects the lower, lower-middle and middle class to a greater extent, it also impacts the higher-middle class.

10.4.4 Distribution of commuting efforts

The most functional areas for everyday life require the least effort to access public or private provision of ESS. This is because their optimal proximity conditions (less than 360 metres from the facilities) allow access to services in less than a 5-minute walk. On the other hand, in the least functional areas, people need to invest more effort. This is not only because the inadequate proximity conditions (more than 3,600 metres from the facilities) imply walks of more than 50 minutes, but also because overcoming these distances by motorised transport requires a considerable monetary investment that affects each socio-economic stratum differently (Table 10.4).

If it is considered that an average Peruvian family needs access at least 20 days per month to the early childhood education service and at least one day per month to the primary health care service, and that each trip by motorised transport costs at least S/3.00 (approximately US$0.79), then a family from Huacho that resides in the least functional areas for everyday life needs to spend at least S/126.00 per month to be able to travel to the ESS. This amount is equivalent to 13.55% of the minimum wage.[12] When looking at this monthly expenditure in relation to the average household income of each socio-economic sector (Table 10.4), it becomes clear that the sectors with the lowest incomes are the most affected. For them, the cost of motorised transport to the ESS can represent up to around 10% of household income, in contrast to 2% for the higher middle-income groups.

Table 10.3 Least functional residential areas for everyday life – Socio-economic characteristics of urbanisation

Characteristics	*Education*				*Healthcare*		
	E-LF1	*E-LF2*	*E-LF3*	*E-LF4*	*H-LF1*	*H-LF2*	*H-LF3*
AREA (Ha)	114.51	92.66	13.59	150.39	92.07	21.52	154.82
DISTRICT	Hualmay (*); Carquín	Santa María	Santa María (*); Huacho	Huacho	Santa María (*); Hualmay; Carquín	Santa María	Huacho
PERIOD OF LAND OCUPATION	2002–2023	2002–2023	2002–2023	2002–2023	2002–2023 (*); Before 2002	2002–2023	2002–2023
ZONING (i)	RDM(*); PU; ZA; ZAR; ZRP; ZPE	PU(*); ZA; ZAR; ZRP; RDM	ZAR(*); RDM; ZRP	RDM(*); ZRP; ZPE; ZRT	PU (*); CE; RDM; ZAR	ZAR	RDM (*); CZ; ZRP; ZPE; ZRT
TYPE OF NEIGHBOURHOOD	Lot by lot development (*); Real state development - Developed lots; Emerging neighbourhood	Lot by lot development (*); Emerging neighbourhood; Real state development - Developed lots; Real state development - Gated community	Emerging neighbourhood (*); Popular neighbourhood in process of consolidation; Lot by lot development	Emerging neighbourhood	Lot by lot development (*); Real state development - Developed lots; Real state development - Gated community; Emerging neighbourhood	Emerging neighbourhood	Emerging neighbourhood
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATA (ii)	Medium Low (*); Medium; Low; No data	Medium (*); Medium Low; Low; No data	Low (*); Medium Low; Medium; No data	Medium High; Medium; Low; Medium Low; No data (*)	Medium (*); Low; Medium Low	Low (*); No data	Medium Low (*); Medium High; Medium; Low; No data

(i) Codes follow the Zoning Plan of the Urban Development Plan 2013–2022 (MPH, 2013):

- Residential zoning – RDM
- Zoning compatible with residential use – CE, CZ, PU, ZRP, ZRT, ZRE, ZA
- Zoning not compatible with residential use – ZAR, ZPE

(ii) According to data from INEI's income-stratified map (INEI, 2020).

(*) Predominant category

Table 10.4 Monthly expenditure on everyday commuting to ESS by strata

Strata	*Average household income*		*Monthly expenditure on everyday commuting to ESS*	
	In soles (i)	*% of minimum wage (ii)*	*In soles (iii)*	*% of family income*
Medium high	S/6.135,00	660%	S/126,00	2%
Medium	S/3.184,00	342%	S/126,00	4%
Medium low	S/2.038,00	219%	S/126,00	6%
Low	S/1.242,00	134%	S/126,00	10%

(i) According to Ipsos (2022), which used data from 2021.

(ii) Minimum wage in 2021 (Government of Peru, 2018): S/930.00 (approximately US$244.74).

(iii) Calculated by considering: Minimum number of monthly trips to early childhood education facilities (20); minimum number of monthly trips to primary health care facilities (1) and average cost per round trip (s/6.00 = US$1.58).

Source: Designed by the author using data from fieldwork, IPSOS (2022) and Government of Peru (2018).

10.5 Discussion and conclusion: Uneven geographies, uneven mobilities

This research addressed the unequal production of everyday commuting based on the relationship between pedestrian mobility and the socio-spatial particularities of urbanisation. To do so, the socio-spatial configuration of the distribution of these commutes in the city of Huacho was analysed, considering the varying characteristics of neighbourhoods across the city. Based on the evidence presented, three findings highlight the fact that the production of unequal geographies has a correlate in the production of unequal mobilities.

First, the locational choices of ESS providers have a direct impact on the configuration of the urban space and the unequal production of commuting. Whilst the state unsuccessfully seeks a more proportional and decentralised distribution, the market opts for a distribution that benefits from the economies of agglomeration, locating its supply in the central and better-connected areas of the city. This is enabled by the turning of the provision of health and education in Peru from a right to a commodity (Balarín, 2016; Verger et al., 2016) and the market's ability to ignore their essential nature and choose their location with relative freedom (only limited by municipal zoning). Together, the locational preferences of both providers shape unequal patterns of ESS distribution, which contributes to reinforce the locational advantages of urban centres and to produce under-provisioned peripheries. In particular, the locational decisions of the private providers contribute greatly to the unequal production of the geographies of essential service provision and commuting – confirming that there is no mobility produced outside power.

Second, the most and least functional areas for everyday life are not socially homogeneous, nor are they exclusively associated with wealth or poverty, nor with

formalised or informalised practices of urban development. The evidence shows that higher-income residents of central areas do not necessarily have the best conditions of proximity to the ESS, just as the low-income residents of the periphery do not necessarily have the worst. In the same way, areas located in the periphery, regardless of their level of functionality, are no longer areas developed exclusively from popular urbanisation or through informalised practices. The surge of emerging neighbourhoods, lot-by-lot developments and new real estate developments (such as developed lots and gated communities) has diversified the composition of the peripheral urban structure, although often bypassing municipal planning. This evidences that Huacho is showing the first signs of moving from polarised to fragmented segregation (Borsdorf, 2003; Janoschka, 2002), a change that has not otherwise been recorded in moderate-sized Peruvian secondary cities and is correlated with hybrid urban development. Observing these signs from the analysis of pedestrian commuting reinforces the understanding of mobility and space as intertwined and interdependent social products (Cresswell, 2001, 2006; Kaufmann, 2002; Urry, 2000, 2007).

Third, the effort required for everyday commuting to the ESS affects each socio-economic stratum differently. People living in the least functional areas may need to walk more than 50 minutes to access ESS. The challenge of travelling these distances with an infant (when going to school) or with an ill family member (when going to the health service) generally requires finding alternative ways to make these journeys happen. This leads to the use of vehicular transport, which involves a cost which becomes considerable due to the everyday nature of the commuting. In this scenario, the population with fewer economic resources can end up compromising their family economy to make these everyday commutes feasible, whilst the more privileged sectors can compensate for their locational disadvantages without much effort. Considering that the ability to move is also unequally distributed (Barthon & Monfroy, 2011; Kaufmann et al., 2004; Lévy, 1994), the economic capacity of families residing in low-functioning areas can accentuate or mitigate the unequal distribution of commuting and can lead to or reduce social exclusion.

The evidence and analysis of the production of essential everyday commuting in a secondary city like Huacho help to understand mobility as a contextualised and socially produced spatial practice. It highlights that inequalities in mobility are manifested as another dimension of socio-spatial inequalities generated by the capitalist production of space and by the hybrid urban development that characterises contexts such as Peru. For a better understanding of the phenomenon, it is necessary to delve not only into the conditions of proximity, but also into other aspects of the accessibility of the urban space and the varied capabilities of the population to actually access it (which we might think of as their ability to 'appropriate' it). These issues will allow the observation of new dimensions of inequality which, together with those presented in this chapter, can contribute to highlighting the importance of commuting to access essential social services in order to guarantee a minimum quality of urban life.

Notes

1 Note that the chapter uses 'commuting' in a general sense of regular or routine travelling from home to services, not in the narrower sense of '(daily) travel to/from work' which dominates (economic) transport studies.
2 Note that the Lima Region (of which Huacho is the capital) is *not* the administrative region for the country's capital, Lima, which has its own, separate province.
3 Another option would be cycling mobility, but this requires at least an initial investment in the acquisition of the bicycle.
4 *Popular* in Spanish is difficult to translate. It roughly refers to marginalised sectors/areas/groups, overlapping with but not synonymous with 'poor', 'working class', etc., as a set of characteristics, but extends beyond these.
5 As an extrapolation of *geographies of opportunity* (Briggs, 2003, 2005), but linked to access to ESS.
6 The stratified household income report for the year 2021 (IPSOS, 2022) is used in the research because it is the latest one available at the time of writing. As comparisons are being made with the minimum wage, the statutory minimum wage figure for the same year is also used, rather than the current, higher, figure.
7 In Latin America, *centro* (literally 'centre') is a historic, symbolic city core, whilst *centralidad* (literally 'centrality') is used to refer to dynamic, multiple activity hubs across urban areas, often shaped by inequality resulting from formalised and informalised urban growth.
8 This modality, driven by the real estate market, is oriented to sell urban developments without built housing. Only the lots are sold, provided with basic services and roads.
9 This modality, driven by landowners (usually owners of large lots or plots of agricultural land), is aimed at subdividing the land to build their own homes or sell it to third parties.
10 This modality is simply categorised as 'emerging' because it is uncertain which actors and motivations are behind its emergence, as it may be the result of genuine needs, illegal market interests, informalised practices or a mixture of all of these.
11 These are all the socio-economic categories registered in Huacho by the competent state entity (INEI, 2020). Note the absence of the upper class, who are not recorded by INEI.
12 Minimum wage in 2021 was S/930.00 per month (approximately EUR 232.50).

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11 "We are not *invasores*, we are an *asociación*"

Legal hybridity on the peripheries of Arequipa

Maïwenn Raoul

11.1 Introduction: "Is the *libro de acta* legal?" When the peripheries question legality

On a Sunday in December 2022 on the slopes of one of the hills surrounding Peru's second-largest city, Arequipa, a discussion was particularly animated at the assembly of the *asociación* Virgen de las Rosas.[1] This is an *asociación de vivienda*, in other words, an *asociación* of people who own one or more so-called 'informal' plots of land. Sitting on a low stone wall, in the shade of a stretched canvas, the members, the *socias* (women) and *socios* (men), ask themselves: "Is the *libro de actas* for Zone 1 'valid'?" The *libros de actas* are the minutes of the meetings of the *asociación*. They must be drawn up for each meeting and the decisions taken during these collective moments must be documented in this register. Writing them down gives them recognition, builds up their value and thereby gives them validity. According to some members of the assembly, the *libro de actas* is not valid because it has not been 'legalised' – that is, validated by a notary. For others, it is perfectly in order. Other questions are related to this comment: "Can the zone coordinators sign the *libro de actas*? Once again, is this legal? Do zone coordinators have to have their own *persona jurídica* [legal identity]?" Speeches were made both in favour and against. Such legal discussions are commonplace at meetings of these *asociaciones*.

Yet these lands, and the *asociaciones*, often embody the idea of the 'margins', and for a section of Peruvian society, mainly the upper classes and part of the middle classes, they represent illegality and illegitimacy in social terms. The points discussed at the assembly of the *asociación* Virgen de las Rosas run counter to these perspectives of 'outside the law'. Indeed, respect for legality has a place within these spaces. Therefore, how can we understand, from a legal point of view, both these plots of land (*lotes*) as individually owned and these *asociaciones* as collectives? To understand and analyse the structure of these *lotes* and *asociaciones*, is it enlightening to think in terms of a clear dividing line between legality and illegality, between the formal and the informal?

Based on long-term ethnographic work,[2] the aim of this chapter is to propose a discussion of the notions of 'formal'/'informal' and 'legal'/'illegal' – sometimes regarded as dichotomies – through an analysis of the urban peripheries of the city

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of Arequipa. The aim is to show how these ideas are intertwined and how hybridity arises. Considering the margins as a mirror of the centre, the chapter finally invites us to question the dimensions of law, the state and how citizenships are "manufactured" (Neveu, 2004, 2016) on the peripheries. With this in mind, in order to understand the current situation on the peripheries of Arequipa, we will first focus on changes in land use. We will then focus on the categories of *invasión* and *invasor*, the processes that underlie them, their circulation within society and the moral considerations they reveal. This will lead us, in the third and final stage, to take a close look at the hybridity of these peripheries, analysing the expression "we are not *invasión*, we are *asociación*" to understand how it is the expression of a hybrid legality.

11.2 From land to live on to land to invest in: The formal transforms the informal

> We've been there for eight years now. You go in, you get your land… you have to look after it day and night. 24 hours a day. You can't leave, otherwise… others come in. That's how it is, police grabs you, hits you… It hits you. They hit you. It is by hitting you that they throw you out [of here]. They wanted to throw us all out. But nobody has left, no one. We've… they've said, we have to go back in. We've gone back in.[3]
>
> (Rosa, Arequipa, 2015)

In 2008, by taking part in what some in Peruvian society are calling an *invasión*, Rosa acquired a plot of land on the outskirts of Arequipa. Rosa's experience is not unique.

Since the 16th century, Peru has been a fragmented society. The frontiers are social and spatial (Matos Mar, 1969, 2005; Nugent, 2012). On one side, there is the *costa* (the coastal region), the symbol of power, the urban world and the *criollo* (people associated with Spanish descent): what anthropologist Jose Matos Mar calls *Official Peru*. On the other side, the *sierra* (the mountainous regions, the Andes) and the *selva* (the regions of the Amazon rainforest), and the formerly colonised populations: the *Other Peru* (Matos Mar, 2005). Nowadays, these categories have transformed, but the divisions remain. From the 1940s onwards, as in other countries, Peruvian cities underwent a metamorphosis (Abugattas, 1979; Altamirano, 1983). As a consequence and a reflection of the major inequalities between rural areas and urban centres, many people living in rural areas have moved to the cities. (Carpio Muñoz et al., 1990; Guerrero de Los Ríos & Sánchez León, 1977; Matos Mar, 2005; Meza & Condori, 2018). The city of Arequipa has grown from around a hundred thousand inhabitants in the 1940s to just over a million today (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, 2022). The 20th century was the century of Arequipa's industrialisation and also the century of great changes. Although the first population movements began in the 1940s, it was not until the early 1960s that the city became a significant magnet for migrants.

As a result of these population movements, new phenomena have emerged, known in particular and collectively as *informality*. A term to be questioned (Fassin, 1996; Lautier et al., 1991; Quijano, 2000). This notion of informality encompasses a range of heterogeneous practices and situations, particularly in relation to self-built housing and neighbourhoods. Many parts of different cities in Peru, like those in other countries on the continent, were born and took shape through informality practices (Abarca Begazo et al., 1986; Adams & Golte, 1990; Chagnollaud, 2016; Degregori et al., 1986). For a significant proportion of the population, often in vulnerable situations, the acquisition of an informal plot of land, a *lote*, has been one of the few resources for advancing in a society where the state has never been a *social* state (Castel, 1995, Castel & Haroche, 2001). In a context where the state is weak, and social protection and social rights are virtually non-existent for a significant proportion of society, the *lote* can be seen as a form of resource for developing individual strategies. That said, following a shift in public policy on land in the 1990s, the use of land has undergone a metamorphosis (Raoul, 2024). Nowadays, it is more a question of investing in land as an asset than investing in land to live on. It is land in which most of the investors are from the popular sectors[4] of the population (Beunardeau & Merklen, 2018). In other words, these days the vast majority of people who own a *lote* do not live on it. Along the main routes into and out of the city of Arequipa, plots of land, mostly of identical shape, structure the urban landscape of the outskirts. Rectangular in shape, physically demarcated by small stone walls and topped by a simple breeze block and sheet-metal shelter, the plots line up one after the other. For some, these spaces are "*invasiones*", for others "*asociaciones*".

Figure 11.1 Aerial photo of the outskirts of Arequipa

According to Peruvian sociologist Nekson Pimentel Sánchez, these plots of land have become "*lotes* for sale" (Pimentel Sánchez, 2020). This perspective needs to be qualified. It is not just a question of selling, but also of investing to build a bit of security. Undoubtedly, some people acquire land for the benefit of a future sale, when its value has risen. But many people buy one or more plots of land to build up a resource against life's risks. They are investing to put their few savings in a secure place; also, because they don't trust the banking system, they are investing to build a little security for retirement, investing to have something to fall back on if a health problem arises, particularly when social protection is non-existent (Raoul, 2024). At present, the outskirts of Arequipa are the site of a growing market for informal land. People have plots without having land titles for them: they have what is known in Peru as the *posesión* (literally, 'possession', though with a context-specific meaning) (Mejorada Chauca, 2013; Ortiz Sánchez, 2017). The right to *posesión* exists and is built through action. One must show that they occupy and use the land in order to preserve their right, and therefore their land, their property. Therefore, the land can be lost very easily, because if activity on the property in question is not perceptible, the right is no longer sustained. Moreover, in these areas, rules specific to the *asociaciones*, a form of internal 'law', prevail. Generally speaking, to keep one's plot of land, one must be 'an active *socia*' or 'an active *socio'* – that is, be present at collective events of the *asociación* and have 'taken *posesión*'. It must be visual – occupation, frequent use of the land, must be seen. The precarious nature of the *posesión* right stems from the fact that it is subject to little or no formal legal framework. As a result, an illegal land economy has developed within this informal market, an economy commonly called 'land trafficking'. At the heart of this hybridity, numerous sales and resales are carried out in an unscrupulous manner, sometimes without respecting the right of *posesión*. These are the source of many conflicts, sometimes involving violence (Raoul, 2023). This so-called 'traffic' needs to be examined in the light of the ambiguities of the law and of the moral issues raised by these informal investments.

To understand this transformation from a *place to live* to a *place to invest*, we need to look back at the evolution of public policy. In the second half of the twentieth century, it was a question of inhabiting and then formalising, i.e., obtaining title deeds (Calderón Cockburn, 2014, 2016). At the end of the century, *formalización* policies were introduced, based on the idea that property rights would "reduce poverty" (De Soto, 1986). Many studies have shown that these policies did not achieve their objectives, but that they were at the root of the changes in people's use of the land (Calderón Cockburn, 2005, 2013; Caria, 2008; Castro & Riofrío, 1996; Ramírez Corzo & Riofrío, 2006). Title deeds have been distributed extensively (Calderón Cockburn, 2005, 2014, 2016) without there being any inhabitation or activity on the land. As a result of these policies, the value of the land itself has increased, whereas previously it was the housing and the land that had value. This neoliberal shift in public policy in the 1990s therefore contributed to changes in practices. Guidelines from the 'top' helped to transform practices from the 'bottom'. Nevertheless, the social representation of informal areas, namely the terms *invasión* and *invasores*, has endured.

11.3 *Invasión*: To name, to marginalise

The second half of the 20th century was a period of profound change. In addition to the demographic consequences, these upheavals reconTabd the divisions in Peruvian society. On the one hand, borders shifted and margins were transformed, and on the other, new social categories were structured. The notions of *invasor* and *invasiones* have become central to the discourse about population displacements. Stigmatising and symbolically explicit, they remain social categories associated with margins and illegality. Let's take a moment to look at these terms and what they highlight. Examining social categories sheds light on the processes at play in the social space in which they circulate. Ways of naming reflect power relations, and not all social groups have the same 'power of identification'. In other words, names and designations are the expression of social divisions: "the power of identification depends on the position one occupies in the system of relations that binds groups together. Not all groups have the same authority to name and to name themselves" (Cuche, 2001, p. 88). From this perspective, what do the terms *invasión* and *invasores* reveal? What power relationships do these moral considerations reveal? The speech of the local press is a good place to build an analysis of the subject. As we can read in the daily *El Pueblo* in the 1970s, and also in the weekly *El Búho* in 2018, the category of *invasión* has been present in journalistic speech for several decades.

> The *invasión* continues unabated, the daily exodus of families arriving from various parts of the Sierra Sur (Puno, Cuzco, Apurimac, etc.) […] The urgency of studying this mass migration, which accentuates the problems of the White City, has been highlighted.
>
> (*El Pueblo* [a regional daily newspaper], 25 February 1970, p. 1)

Editorial: land *invasiones*:

> Land *invasiones* are occurring unexpectedly in Arequipa. […] Although they occupy *eriazos*[5] land which are owned by the State, […] the group of *invasores* will have to be evicted. [A senior official] has rightly pointed out the firm determination of the government to keep this process orderly and within the law. Illegal occupations of land will not be allowed, he said, because this is absolutely negative for the community.
>
> (*El Pueblo,* 8 June 1971, p. 1)

> *Invasiones* in Arequipa. The urban explosion of recent years generated a number of conflicts over land tenure, especially in the province of Arequipa. Due to the pressing need for housing, numerous groups began to illegally occupy the state's unoccupied land.
>
> (*El Búho*, November 2018, nº 61, p. 17)

In these three press extracts, so-called *invasiones* and what they encompass are synonymous with problems. Let's take a step back from the 'problem'

perspective and look at the idea of *invasión* to analyse and understand what it crystallises. The literal translation of the term is 'invasion'. With its warlike connotations, the verb 'to invade' evokes the idea of the taking over, often by force, of a territory by foreigners. Particularly explicit in the June 1971 editorial of *El Pueblo* quoted above, the notion of *invasión* makes sense in this perspective of illegitimate occupation, which one can imagine taking place by force. But how is this term to be understood? What are the processes underlying this far-from-trivial social category? The contributions of sociologists Norbert Elias and Erving Goffman are enlightening in understanding certain aspects of what lies behind this term. In his work on the "logics of exclusion" in England in the mid-1960s, Elias explained the foundations of a system of hierarchies between different groups living in different parts of the same city, with no racial differences. He showed how, through interaction and the "socio-dynamics of stigmatisation", residents who had been living in an area for a long time, the "established", placed groups who had arrived more recently on the margins, as the "outsiders" (Elias, 1965). The process of stigmatisation, analysed and theorised in a pioneering way by Goffman, consists of attributing one or more traits, stigmas, with the intent of differentiating and inferiorising (Goffman, 1963/1975). In other words, the established build a position of superiority and maintain their power in and over a territory by attributing 'bad' characteristics to an incoming group. Finally, this dynamic can be seen in the speech about the transformation of the city of Arequipa. By associating the adjective *invasión*, already stigmatising in itself, with the characteristics of disorder and the detrimental nature of these actions for the collective ("absolutely negative for the community") the distancing becomes all the more pronounced. The mechanics of differentiation and discrediting are made explicit in these remarks.

In his work, Elias insists on the fact that different groups are constructed through and by interaction. Outsiders exist because established people assert themselves as such. And conversely, the 'established' group structures itself by relegating the outsiders to a minority position. ('Minority' in the sense of a person's place in the hierarchy, in power relationships, and not in the sense of numerical inferiority (Guillaumin, 2002).) The analyses developed by Goffman point in the same direction. He states that a trait becomes a stigma only through "the negative value conferred on it in interaction" (Rea & Tripier, 2008, p. 60). It is because one outsider group is stigmatised by another established group that there is, in itself, a group. Power relations "are not based on the properties of the groups involved, but on the oppositional relationship between these two groups" (Rea & Tripier, 2008, p. 60). Neither group exists independently. In the light of the contributions of Elias and Goffman, we can understand that by describing these arrivals as *invasiones*, the established people of Arequipa (that is, the longest-standing residents), like similar groups across Peru position the new arrivals from the Andean regions as outsiders. The established group in Arequipa structures itself and at the same time builds up an outsider group, the so-called *invasores*, and makes it inferior.

It should be pointed out that there is a shift between the categories of *invasión* and *invasor*. This shift can be seen in the journalistic speech presented, as well as

in vernacular speech. There is an unremarked shift from actions to actors and from actions to spaces. Actors and urban spaces are thus marginalised, as well as actions. The term *invasión* is therefore an expression of the link between the process of categorisation and marginalisation. Through the *invasión* category, and in particular, through the stigmatising representations and meanings associated with it, the group of newcomers is marginalised.

11.4 *Invasor*: The social construction of illegality

As well as marginalising the actions and the people involved in them, the categories of *invasión* and *invasor* are an expression of moral considerations. Indeed, it is possible to grasp the non-legitimacy of certain populations in integrating a space, in this case, the so-called 'White City' of Arequipa.[6] This non-legitimacy reflects the social position of these groups in social relations (Kergoat, 2011) and in power relations (Rea & Tripier, 2008). As the sociologist Hélène Bertheleu explains:

> The dominant group, which categorises, does much more than simply acknowledge the existence of the Other. At the same time, it situates, classifies and hierarchises, imposing its perceptions on other groups who are forced to be or become what the dominant group has 'decided' to see in them […] Through the process of categorisation, the majority group ultimately establishes its power over the other groups.
>
> (Bertheleu, 1997, p. 129)

By categorising the people who arrive as *invasores*, and some of their practices as *invasiones*, the established residents decide to see these new populations as breaking the law, illegitimately occupying spaces, or even usurping them. Following on from the perspectives of Elias and Goffman, the contributions of the anthropologist Fredrick Barth offer keys to understanding the processes underlying the categories of *invasión* and *invasores*. According to Barth, groups do not exist so much by virtue of their own membership criteria, which would make them unified, but rather by virtue of the boundary that separates them from other groups, a boundary that constructs an 'Us' and a 'Them' (Barth, 1995). In the case of *invasores*, there is a claimed legitimate Us, those to whom the city belongs, as expressed in the phrase "our city" in the 1971 editorial, and a Them, to whom the city does not belong, illegitimate, the perpetrators of illegal actions, the "*invasores"*. Even though the notions of *invasión* and *invasor* were forged in the second half of the 20th century, they continue to structure speech and representations. The extract from *El Búho* newspaper in 2018 is an illustration of this. Nowadays these social categories circulate within certain sections of Peruvian society: this is the case in some journalistic speech, but the categories are also invoked by members of public institutions and by members of the upper and upper middle classes.

As well as reflecting the social relationships and power relations at work within a society, social categories have a normative dimension: they are not just words.

In fact, as the French sociologist Jocelyne Streiff-Fénart explains on the basis of research into the dynamics of racism and social categories in France, "while they define people's identities, social categories define the rights and duties attached to the members of these categories" (Streiff-Fénart, 1998, p. 24). Therefore, to question the categories of *invasión* and *invasores* is to raise the question of the rights of the individuals who are confined within them. The Peruvian sociologists Raul Guerrero de los Ríos and Albelardo Sánchez León, in their work on changes in the capital, Lima, propose an analysis along similar lines. They argue that in Peru there is "a conception of the [internal] migrant as an '*invasor*', i.e., one who has no rights and therefore usurps and appropriates" (Guerrero de Los Ríos & Sánchez León, 1977, p. 81). As a result, by categorising certain spaces as *invasiones* and certain groups as *invasores*, marginal urban figures are constructed, associated with usurpation, characterised by their distance from laws and the moral order and often deprived of rights.

Ultimately, this speech about *invasiones* and *invasores* reveals a marginalisation, a making of social and political inferiority. However, for their part, the so-called *invasores* – in other words, people who own land, or plan to own land – distance themselves from this marginalising categorisation. For example, during a discussion with a long-standing interlocutor, she shared her desire to buy a plot of land. It was an informal plot of land. However, she insisted: "It wasn't an *invasión*, it was already an *asociación*". This is a common expression that sounds like an argument. So how do we understand it? What does it highlight? Why such a strong claim to associative status? Do these *invasores* have no rights at all?

11.5 *Asociación:* The legal existence of the socially illegal

"We're not *invasores*, we're an *asociación*" or "We're not an *invasión*, we're an *asociación*": during my fieldwork, I regularly heard these remarks, both when people were addressing public institutions and during interviews. The reason why asserting the status of an *asociación* is so important, today as much as it was fifty years ago, is that this status allows one, in part, to create distance from the figure of the *invasor*, and therefore to distance oneself from the margins and from illegality.

María: "So, but there… it wasn't an *invasión*. It was an *asociación* of Ciudad de los Arboles. So, I spoke to the leader, how much was the income? So, he told me, he told me so much."

Maïwenn: "And why wasn't it an *invasión* in Ciudad de los Arboles? What's the difference?"

María: "Because, because it has already been invaded already…. It was already an *asociación*." (María, Arequipa, 2018)

María explicitly points out the difference between *invasión* and *asociación*. In her view, the *asociación* represents a stage, a step forward. Whilst it started out as an *invasión*, from her point of view, by the time she arrived, it was no longer an *invasión*. This concept of 'progress' is commonly put forward, as is the difference

between the two statuses. Beyond the idea of a step forward, the status of *asociación* enables the construction of the difference between the formal and the informal, the legal and the illegal, and by extension, the expression of a distancing. Highlighting the legal status of the collective allows us to distance ourselves from the figure of *invasor* and obscure the legal situation of the land. Born of the illegal action of *invasión*, the occupation acquired a certain legality through its associational status. By forming an *asociación*, the collective of *posesionarias* and *posesionarios*[7] can begin the process of obtaining title to the land they occupy and own. The legal status of the collective is valued more than the legal situation of the land, because in both cases, *invasión* or *asociación*, the land has no title and is therefore legally unregulated. (In the case of Arequipa, most of the land is owned by the regional government.) This way of talking also highlights the ambiguities and contradictions in Peruvian law, as well as the legal and formal dimensions of what is associated with the illegal and the informal. These *invasiones* are not completely outside the law. As mentioned above, it is legal to have the *posesión* of a plot of land and it is legal to form an *asociación de vivienda* and to exist as such.

Another argumentative form of distancing the *invasor* figure is put forward: "I'm not an *invasor*, I bought it". The buying represents a formal and legal act, unlike the *invasión*, which represents the opposite. Once again, the legal situation of the land, although similar, is not considered. In this expression, the way in which the land is acquired, i.e., the purchase, helps to build acceptance of the ownership of the land, its legitimacy and to distance the speaker from the figure of the *invasor*. Generally speaking, people investing in a *lote* say that they are buying the 'right of *posesión*', the right to occupy the space, and not the land itself. It is an offence to sell land without being the *dueño* (owner), in other words, without having title to it. However, it is not illegal to buy a 'right of *posesión*'. Asserting the legal existence of the purchase, and not of the land itself, is a way of moving from the illegal to the legal, of constructing rights in spaces on the fringes of legality. These changes in terminology may seem like a play on words. However, this game subtly allows us to remain, in a sense, within the formal framework, within the legal framework. In the end, whether it is a question of associative status or the act of buying, legality is invoked to legitimise practices.

In addition to words, legality is also achieved through actions. Let's go back to the discussions at the *asociación* Virgen de las Rosas assembly: "Is the *libro de actas* for Zone 1 'valid'?"; "Can the zone coordinators sign the *libro de actas*? Is this legal? Is it necessary for zone coordinators to have their own *persona jurídica*?" The reason why these discussions are so lively is that, as we have just seen from the ways in which the figure of the *invasores* is distanced, the status of the *asociación* is central. It is important to act within a legal framework. As well as legal recognition, existence as an *asociación* opens the door to claims.

> A *personeria jurídica* [legal identity] is when you have a registration, it's like you exist. It's like the birth certificate of an *asociación*…[…] For something to be born, it has to have a birth certificate […] Now the *asociación* has to have its birth certificate. It is a *personeria jurídica*. It is recognised the

> state as an *asociación*. […] So these *asociaciones* have value. Why? Because they could go and take over the state.
>
> (Julio, Arequipa, 2018)

> Our *asociación* was left without a founding charter, without a DNI [National Identity Document] […] In other words, there was no *personeria jurídica*. And so, we couldn't apply for anything, to any authority.
>
> (Luz, Arequipa, 2019)

Julio and Luz present their associative status as an opportunity to gain political standing: recognition as an *asociación* offers the possibility of expressing oneself and making oneself heard from a political point of view. Being an *asociación* embodies the legitimacy to express oneself before the State. Being an *asociación* opens the way to acquiring rights. In short, being an *asociación* allows you to exist as a citizen. French anthropologist Catherine Neveu has taken an anthropological interest in the ways in which, through practices, demands and redefinitions, people build access to rights when they see themselves excluded from them. Neveu calls these processes "manufacturing citizenship" (Neveu, 2016, 2004). The transition from *invasión* to *asociación* is such a process, highlighting citizenships that have to be manufactured when registration in the legal system, in the formal system, is only partial. Generally speaking, once the title deeds have been acquired, the *asociación* ceases to exist. Once they have entered fully into the legal framework, the rights are acquired and no longer to be manufactured.

In the final analysis, at the heart of the interstices of the particularly ambiguous Peruvian legal framework, *invasores* gain access to rights, in part, by structuring themselves into an *asociación*, by becoming members of such a collective. However, it is important to clarify that existence under the status of *asociación*, within the structure of a collective, does not imply in any way unity among all the members. Indeed, through my empirical work, I have been able to observe conflict and mistrust being structural features of these groups. Considering the precarious nature of the right of *posesión* and the unlawful nature of the land economy is necessary to understand these two characteristics. In these marginal spaces, there is always a potentially conflictive interplay between individual interests and the need for a collective, a necessary interplay in the manufacturing of these citizenships.

11.6 Conclusion: Informality, a game of boundaries

Invasión as a social category reflects the pervasive and structuring processes of constructing multiple boundaries within Peruvian society. However, not taking these boundaries for granted, and in particular not considering the informal as separate from the formal, makes it possible to grasp what is at stake in the outskirts of Arequipa. Indeed, questioning these divisions widens the range of analytical perspectives for understanding what is at work within these margins. The interplay between *invasión* and *asociación* is a case in point. On the one hand,

invasión is symbolises the margins, being 'outside the law', informality; on the other hand, *asociación* is the symbol of social and legal legitimacy, of formality. All in all, the status of *asociación* tells us something about the formal and informal nature of these social and physical spaces, and therefore throws light on their hybridity, and on the porosity, or even non-existence, of the frontier between 'formal' and 'informal'. Practices are not legal or illegal, formal or informal, they are both. The discussions at the heart of the *asociación* Virgen de la Rosas illustrate this. Respect for the law is essential because it is a means of preserving the status of an *asociación*, and therefore a way of keeping one's distance from the spectre of *invasión*. In other words, even if certain urban practices are stigmatised and classed as informal, this does not mean that they are banned in their entirety. In fact, the term 'formal' is part of the recognition and existence of the informal. Metaphorically speaking, the status of an association allows a bridge to be built between the margins and the centre, formalising the informal. To say "we are not *invasión*, we are *asociación*" reveals the hybridity of so-called formal and informal practices. So, rather than a question of boundaries between the formal and the informal, it is more a question of permeability, coexistence, juxtaposition and intertwining. The formal and the informal are co-constructed: they exist in and through their interdependence. Finally, based on the case of land tenure in Arequipa, it is enlightening to consider informality as a legal in-between in which legality and illegality are articulated rather than opposed, as a hybridity in which the city is produced. Ultimately, "we are not *invasión*, we are *asociación*" is the expression of a hybridity within which citizenships can be manufactured.

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Notes

1 In order to preserve the anonymity of the people, *asociaciones* and places (with the exception of the city of Arequipa), all the names are pseudonyms. The term is kept in Spanish to distance ourselves from the idea of 'association', with connotations of volunteering and commitment.
2 The chapter is based on nineteen months of ethnographic work (just over seven months during the master's and eighteen months during the doctorate). The empirical approach is based on observations and participation in collective moments of these *asociaciones* (assemblies, collective tasks, *aniversarios* [anniversaries], walks in these spaces), on accompanying people who have land, on interviews at home with the various actors involved in these spaces (people who have, or have had, land; presidents and other members of the *juntas directivas* (board of directors) of the *asociaciones*; representatives of public institutions), and to a lesser extent, on the exploration of local media (archives and online press).
3 The translations are all by the author.

4 The notion of 'popular sector' is the literal translation of a Latin American sociological concept, *sectores populares*. This refers to a range of positions within the social relations of class and race (including workers, peasants, '*Indios*', informal dwellers, poor...) that cannot be encompassed by any single class-based term (Beunardeau & Merklen 2018, p. 331).
5 Land that is not administratively in an urban area and that is not occupied, cultivated or worked.
6 The nickname 'White City' has a double meaning. In a widespread speech, it refers to the colour of the many buildings in the centre, built in *sillar* (a white volcanic stone) during the colonial era. And in another sense, it evokes the colour of skin and, in turn, the mechanisms of exclusion and discrimination in Arequipa, which was called 'white' during the changes of the twentieth century (Bedregal la Vera, 2006). The Arequipeños and Arequipeãs were not very open to the arrival of newcomers (Bedregal la Vera, 2001; Cotler, 2009).
7 The terms *posesionarias* and *posesionarios* derive from the idea of *posesión*. These are the people who hold *posesión*.

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12 Conclusion

Seeing hybridity through a comparative lens – perspectives on urban development in secondary cities of Ghana and Peru

Christian Rosen and Nina Gribat

12.1 Introduction

The contributions to this book examine examples of hybrid urban planning and infrastructure development, highlighting diverse forms but also common dynamics in very different urban contexts in secondary cities in Ghana and Peru. The specifics manifest geographically, in scale and intheir structural social conditions, including political decision making, planning laws and traditions concerning actors and networks and their practices. In the first chapter of this book, we develop the overall conceptual framework of *hybrid urbanisms* as the complex interplay of various formalised and informalised practices and materialities in urban development, which are consciously made and remade as opposed to naturally occurring. We argue that the informalisation involved can lead to an increase in urban inequalities. Especially in contexts of the global South, 'informality' is often seen as a negative and deficient counterpart of 'formality', meaning well-planned, integrated approaches to housing, infrastructure, governance and so on. Arguing against this powerful binary and the resulting marginalising characterisations of 'informality' we apply the concept of hybridity. It aims to understand both 'formal' and 'informal' as socially produced categories that do not appropriately reflect the complexities of urban realities. In doing so we contribute to discussions in urban and planning studies that highlight the importance of examining the social and material configurations of urban development in relation to structural issues, whilst acknowledging the potential of local resources, knowledges and capacities of local actors (Lawhon et al., 2018; Lemanski, 2021; McFarlane & Waibel, 2016). This also addresses discourses that call for more research on the diverse urban realities of cities in the global South and more generally for southern urbanisms, critically engaging with colonial histories and the sustained dominance of approaches from the global North (Hodder, 2016; Parnell and Oldfield, 2016; Robinson, 2016). Studying urban processes as hybrid is based on a relational approach, with a focus on the dynamics between (1) the regulatory and bureaucratic practices of the state and other institutions, (2) the related actors in these processes and (3) ordinary people's practices of living. This final chapter brings together the various contributions

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of this volume in a comparative effort in order to highlight links across distance as well as demonstrating the diversity of studies of hybrid urbanisms.

Apart from the thematic diversity of the contributions, an initial overview quickly shows that very different research designs and sets of methods are used productively to explore different types of hybrid urbanisms. Some contributions deal exclusively or predominantly with analysing documents such as legal texts, development plans, newspaper articles and maps (Chapters 2, 3, 7 and 8). Other chapters work with observations and interviews (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 9). Furthermore, ethnographic approaches are used (Chapter 11) as well as quantitative designs (Chapter 10), including methods of mapping (Chapters 9 and 10). Hybrid arrangements can be made visible and analysable through all these research designs and corresponding methods. The great diversity of methodological approaches and topics covered in this book reveals the multifaceted and multidisciplinary nature of hybridity in urban development and highlights the relational nature of structural conditions, actors and practices. Specific aspects of urban realities such as planning policies, housing or infrastructure development become visible in their embeddedness in complex and context-specific configurations that are all characterised by hybridity.

In addition to this diversity of methods and the research data and materials, the contributions in this book also cover a wide range of urban development issues. In terms of content, they examine two different areas of urban development: planning and infrastructure. The chapters on urban planning focus on planning systems, including their policies, land use issues and questions concerning the formalisation of land rights. The contributions dealing with infrastructure provision are interested in various forms of mobility and water supply as well as social infrastructure for healthcare, education and commerce. As secondary cities of the study countries Ghana and Peru, the cases are characterised by rapidly growing urban populations with limited public infrastructure services and investments (Marais et al., 2016; Roberts & Hohmann, 2014; Satterthwaite, 2006). At the same time, decentralisation policies are demanding more engagement of local administrations, especially in the fields of urban planning and infrastructure provision (Camagni et al., 2015). The hybrid configuration of urban services between formalised and informalised practices and actors becomes especially important here, where decentralisation and a lack of resources are particularly pressing but, at the same time, new innovative solutions emerge out of necessity to cater for the growing populations (Rosen, 2020). The contributions also examine hybrid urbanisms on very different scales, from national policy to urban reform processes, from small-scale neighbourhoods to the individual practices of residents. This makes it possible to investigate hybrid realities and their production in different contexts and settings and to highlight the relation between the different forms and scales of social interaction in this book.

The discussion of hybridity in urban development builds on the findings of the Hybrid Urbanisms research project, which analysed the delivery configurations of water and mobility in the secondary cities of Arequipa, Peru and Sunyani, Ghana.[1] The multi-scalar comparative approach developed in that context (Rosen & Gribat, 2023) is continued in this book and significantly expanded by the large number of

very different contributions, with the aim of demonstrating the versatile applicability of the hybrid urbanisms concept. In line with this aim, this chapter summarises the new insights that the consideration of hybridity means for the three thematic strands that are distributed through the two geographically organised parts of the book: (1) systems, reforms and legislation (2) actors in urban planning and infrastructure delivery and (3) everyday practices and activism. Further, we explore how new knowledge can be gained through the comparative consideration of the different perspectives of actors on hybridity in the individual contributions, offering a systematisation of different rationalities for hybrid urbanisms at play. We conclude this chapter and the book by summarising the contributions we believe the hybrid urbanisms approach can make to ongoing discussions in urban and planning studies.

12.2 Comparative, thematically structured findings from the chapters

12.2.1 Systems, reforms and legislation

The first thematic strand, addressed by chapters at the start of each geographical section on hybrid urbanisms in secondary cities in Ghana (Chapters 2–6) and in Peru (Chapters 7–11), provides a meta-framework that introduces the institutional contexts in which to situate the findings developed within the other two themes. Its three chapters examine the national planning systems and related legislation, as well as recent reforms in Ghana and Peru, and include a reflection on the ongoing debate on secondary cities in both countries. In doing so, they show how the perpetuation of outdated, inherited colonial and inappropriate ideas from the global North about the purpose, scope and practice of urban planning has hindered efforts to reform the Ghanaian and Peruvian planning systems. Furthermore, the persistence of these ideas has contributed to the development of legal frameworks for planning and urban land development which are sustained by hybridity in their structural conditions and practices, especially in secondary cities.

Pineda-Zumaran (Chapter 7) analyses the conceptual, operational and implementational inconsistencies and contradictions of the Peruvian planning reforms enacted since 2021. In particular, she shows how the features of the 'reformed' planning system allow for the consolidation of the logic of exception over that of planning. This is being facilitated by the widespread use of land and property formalisation policies to address informalised urban development. The chapter reveals the shaping of the legal hybridity that guides urban development in Peru, which is characterised by three specific contradictions: (1) privileging individual property rights over collective interests, thus aligning the purpose of planning with that of land formalisation policies; (2) relying on the use of planning exceptions, allowed for within the planning system itself, to bring unplanned land into the scope of urban plans, thus enabling new land invasions and urbanisation; (3) using physical and technical standards of planning as a framework to guide the development of informalised built settlements, the achievement of which facilitates the production

of the *posesion* certificates required to initiate formalisation procedures. Pineda-Zumaran concludes by questioning the political will to revise the current planning reform, despite the growing pace of informalised urban development in the main cities of the country, given the existence of a decision-making environment riddled with corruption, patronage and clientelism.

Akaateba, Asibey and Avogo (Chapter 3) examine practices of institutional bricolage in planning and urban land development in Tamale, Ghana. By analysing everyday urban land delivery practices using the lens of *institutional hybridity*, they highlight the interconnected and interdependent nature of customary and statutory practices, emphasising the intricate complexity of urban land delivery. In the context of a constitutionally recognised hybrid legal land administration and planning system, reinforced by the limited financial resources of local planning authorities, the authors show how state planners and traditional chiefs combine their authority and resources through practices of bricolage to implement national policies. This results in the creation of 'nomotropic urban settlements' (Chiodelli & Moroni, 2014) in numerous Ghanaian cities, which do not conform to traditional categorisations of 'formal' or 'informal'. Furthermore, through customary actors' support for state-enacted legislation on the acquisition, registration and management of customary lands, land revenues in the form of ground rents are collected and disbursed to both customary actors and state bodies according to a constitutionally stipulated formula. The authors reveal that these hybrid practices lend legitimacy and functionality to planning schemes and registered leasehold interests and conclude that institutional hybridity is the norm in urban land development in Ghanaian and many other African cities. Strategic alliances and symbiotic relationships between 'formal' and 'informal' actors appear to be essential in the practice of hybrid urbanism in Southern cities. The authors further underscore the need to acknowledge the potential impact of such hybrid practices on urban inequalities. Their findings indicate that whilst they lead to adaptive approaches to land delivery for land use planning and registration, these practices predominantly favour land use professionals and influential chiefs.

Inkoom and Owusu (Chapter 2) give an overview of the relevance of secondary cities for the Ghanaian urban system, highlighting the role of decentralisation processes for urban policy. They describe these processes in the context of planning policies and responsibilities over the last few decades. They also point out that secondary cities in Ghana have seen a fast growth of population, leading both to rapid urbanisation and also to cities changing their functions to become centres for infrastructure and local administration and politics. Sunyani, serving as an example, first became commercially important and was then designated as district headquarters, allowing the town to attract other state services including the establishment of a government hospital and a university. Following the creation of new political–administrative regions in 1959, Sunyani also became the regional capital of the Brong-Ahafo Region and in 2018 of the newly created Bono Region, underlining its political importance and also exemplifying the unique development conditions of secondary cities. Lastly, the authors examine the National Urban Policy and the recent Rural Development Policy as the main policies which address the

challenges mentioned above at the local level, and for the first time acknowledge the informalised sector and, consequently, hybridity in urban development.

All three chapters highlight the very different realities of the systems and regulations in planning and infrastructure provision in secondary cities in Ghana and Peru, providing an indication of the diversity of approaches across the global South. Showing the cities' distinctness from the planning contexts of the global North, but also their differences from one another, the chapters are arguing for the specificity of development paths in every urban setting. Still, what can be argued is that in both countries, governments and administrations pushed forward programmes to formalise urban development to secure more control over diverse processes and to prevent unplanned growth of the secondary cities, as it is described by Inkoom and Owusu. However, the contributions highlight challenges in these formalisation processes and also critique its results in general. Hybridity in Peru is accompanied by different forms of clientelism and corruption, which still enable informalised practices to prevail. In Ghana, the complexity of different but coexisting planning systems, which are controlled by elected politicians on the one hand and by traditional leaders on the other, leads to an institutional bricolage that leaves many blind spots in the regulatory framework resulting in hybrid forms of urban planning involving a multitude of actors, regulations, norms and traditions. In summary, hybridity is an inherent part of planning systems and legislation in Ghana and Peru, yet it affects the realities of urban development in secondary cities in different ways.

12.2.2 Actors in urban planning and infrastructure delivery

The second thematic focus of the book is on the various actors and their networks in urban planning and infrastructure delivery. In all of the book's contributions, the practices of specific actors and (in most cases) conflicts between them are part of the analyses. The contributions of this thematic strand deal in particular with the different perspectives and rationalities of state actors on the one hand, and civil society actors and inhabitants on the other. The effectiveness of the implementation of regulatory frameworks, the related political rationalities at the national and local level, as well as the resulting hybrid urban realities are analysed here, following the focus of the first thematic strand of the book.

In their chapter, Stiglich and Pineda-Zumaran (Chapter 8) show how efforts to reform public transport in the capital, Lima, and the secondary city of Arequipa are inspired by the ideal of fully integrating existing private services into a single, state-controlled bus system. This preference for formalisation is linked to the pursuit of better service and greater efficiency. It follows a 'displace and replace' approach, disabling existing transport modes through new regulations, whilst newly introduced measures themselves follow the model of integrated Western transport systems. Against the backdrop of academic debates, which have been calling for an approach described as 'embrace, engage and upgrade' instead, the authors make it clear that those responsible in public administrations are actively contributing to the emergence of new hybrid forms of mobility through formalising particular

strands of urban transport, whilst at the same time failing to utilise the potential of informalised systems which are already in place. Not only are competing – or in some cases complementary – private and state-controlled services emerging, but other informalised transport services are also being strengthened, despite the prevention of these being one of the aims of the reforms. One example here is shared taxis or *colectivos*, which are gaining in importance wherever the switch to integrated and formalised bus transport means poorer accessibility for passengers than the previously existing private solutions could guarantee. For the authors, hybridity therefore means that formalised systems are themselves dependent on the existence of additional informalised services in order to provide an adequate service, and that formalised actors in urban mobility planning sometimes even actively refer to these in their policies.

Amoako, Dinye and Kwarteng Amaka-Otchere (Chapter 4) use an explorative approach to investigate the practices of informalised 'floating drivers' in relation to the policies and actions of local political and transport authorities. Focusing on the major transit road between the primary city of Kumasi and the smaller secondary city of Ejisu in Ghana, they analyse the existing local-level hybrid structures in the provision of public transport services. They discuss the challenges encountered by local authorities in attempting to regulate 'informal' transport service providers as well as the consequent marginalisation of the floating drivers. By highlighting the complex arrangements surrounding the legality of transport operations, they identify different types of floating drivers and show how these face major restrictions whilst at the same time providing an integral part of the urban transport system through meeting the demands of passengers. They highlight the challenges of formalising based on a lack of transparency and coordination between national registration of vehicles and local registration of drivers. Emphasising the significance and potential of floating drivers, the authors advocate for their recognition, acceptance and inclusion within the urban transport sector. They also propose adaptations of the 'formal' sector to accommodate the hybrid realities of public transport service provision in secondary cities.

In the Peruvian secondary city of Tacna, Dammert-Guardia, Torres Obregon and Jimenez Palacios examine the role of state actors in urban development through planning policy, by analysing the implementation of municipal housing programmes (Chapter 9). These programmes were created to provide low-income residents with legal opportunities to buy land for housing purposes, but also to curb informalised practices of land invasion. Used to facilitate resettlement following an earthquake, the programme discussed in the chapter has particular importance in Tacna, whilst the need for new housing in all secondary cities of Peru is growing. In contrast, however, the authors show that both state and private actors exploit the programme to make profit through land speculation. To this end, they use their influence on the design of regulations as well as their private networks to buy and sell land. The authors see corruption and mismanagement as a further consequence, also favoured by the state's lack of resources for effective regulation and prevention. Hybrid arrangements arise between the legal regulations for implementing the programme and the actual practice of the various

actors with their different particular interests, which are often not congruent with the objectives of the programme. This ultimately favours the exacerbation of socio-spatial inequalities instead of contributing to the goal of providing housing for all.

The chapters in this thematic strand emphasise the importance of analysing relevant actors, their networks and practices in order to better understand the various forms of hybrid urbanisms. In particular, the chapters demonstrate how state actors attempt to drive the formalisation of previously informalised arrangements of urban planning and infrastructure provision, whilst the resulting urban realities are hybrid in nature, never fully conforming to the ideal of a 'formal' system. Furthermore, the chapters show that a conceptual starting point of hybridity makes the often conflictual negotiation processes between actors around urban development particularly visible and emphasises their divergent rationalities of 'good' urban development. Specific interests, especially those of resource-rich actors, directly influence planning and infrastructure provision – in particular as a few, powerful actors attempt to maximise private profit whilst reinforcing the marginalisation of large sections of the urban population.

12.2.3 Everyday practices and activism

The third thematic focus of the book centres on the everyday practices of residents and examines how planning and infrastructure provision have a direct influence on people living in secondary cities. The examples from the individual chapters show how strongly these realities are shaped by hybridity, and what influence the reform and formalisation efforts of state actors examined in the previous chapters have on this.

In Sunyani, Puwurayire and Rosen (Chapter 5) examine the everyday mobility-related practices of residents in the city centre and two selected neighbourhoods. Using various examples, their aim is to make different forms of hybrid urbanisms visible and to make an initial contribution to differentiating types of hybrid arrangements. They show how residents themselves ensure the maintenance and safety of a shopping street in the neighbourhood of Kotorkrom and thus substitute for the work of the public administration, which is inadequate due to a lack of resources. Using the inner-city transport hub known as Station as an example, they explain how registered and unregistered drivers compete for customers. As a final example, they compare how various services provide mobility for residents in the high-income neighbourhood of Berlin-Top and in the low-income neighbourhood of Kotorkrom. The *pragyas* (motorised tricycles) operating in Kotorkrom represent a complementary form of transport which, unlike the formalised taxis, are not regulated and are often marginalised by state and institutionalised transport actors. The ban on pragya drivers operating routes and taking passengers into the city centre is an important example of this. The authors illustrate the diversity of forms of hybridity and show a way to make this wide range visible; their categorisation of *substitution*, *competition* and *complementing* can support future comparative studies, particularly in the field of infrastructure studies.

Akudugu, Addaney, Akaateba and Wireko-Gyebi (Chapter 6) investigate the actors and conflicting rationalities involved in the upgrading project of market infrastructure in the secondary city of Bolgatanga. Here, a prolonged delay in the completion of a regenerated market hall led to multiple relocations of local market traders, mostly women, and of foreign traders coming from neighbouring West African countries. They show how the state-driven project affected traders' sales negatively and, in addition, led to confusion among the traders about their future in the new building. Consequently, resistance arose against the interim solutions and the projected final market hall. It is highlighted that the market traders were constantly reorganising and adapting their practices to keep their businesses going, often in direct opposition to the official plans. The contribution also shows how the newly created 'formal' space of the market hall failed to meet the demands of the vendors in crucial areas, leading to new hybrid practices, including formalising what was intended to be the market's temporary home. In conclusion, this chapter shows how local practices and structures were not integrated sufficiently into formalised urban development and consequently led to various forms of conflict and different forms of hybridity over time and in different spaces.

In the secondary city of Huacho in Peru, Tiburcio analyses walking distances to the essential social service infrastructure of primary schools and health care (Chapter 10). Using a quantitative approach and detailed mapping, she compares private and public services and argues that whilst the state tries to promote an equal spatial distribution, private market actors opt for central locations. With Peru's social infrastructure being highly privatised, this is leading to a concentration of services in certain central areas, producing under-provisioned peripheries and thus creating socio-spatial inequalities. At the same time, the chapter shows that individual wealth and proximity to essential services are not necessarily connected, as some high-income neighbourhoods are not close to health and primary school provision – a 'problem' overcome by the wealthy by their use of private cars. The author argues that this is pointing in the direction of a fragmented urban development in Huacho with a mosaic of wealth and poverty all over the city. The distribution and availability of basic services are organised in a hybrid way with different actors providing for the local populations, following different rationalities that vary from the state's claim to supply everyone equally to a market logic aiming to maximise profit.

In her chapter (Chapter 11), Raoul examines the tensions between legality and illegality in the peripheral neighbourhoods of Arequipa, approaching the hybrid practices and realities of the residents on three successive levels. Whilst she shows how regulatory laxness makes the process of land invasion possible and how land 'invaders' can emerge as a specific group of people in the first place, it also draws attention to the constant marginalisation of people in the informalised settlements and of the neighbourhoods themselves. The inhabitants try to stand up for their rights and demand, in particular, the formalisation of their land titles, consciously identifying themselves as organised occupiers of land and distancing themselves from the stigmatising connotations of 'invasion'. The author thus identifies the neighbourhood association as a decisive moment in which community

commitment to the formalisation of individual land rights becomes visible. The associations serve as a community of purpose of actors who individually have less chance of successfully going through the complex administrative procedures. This formalisation process is another important example of hybridity, in this case of legality and ownership, by which informalised realities are tolerated by the state and discursively repositioned by land occupiers, who actively integrate their actions into 'formal' contexts in ongoing and complex processes of negotiating with different state and institutional actors and agencies.

All contributions in this part of the book show that the everyday lives of inhabitants of secondary cities in Ghana and Peru are greatly characterised by hybridity. Whilst there is still strong pressure to formalise planning and infrastructure, urban realities are shaped by hybridity reflecting the needs and capacities of the people. These solutions are often the result of the desire of state institutions to promote the formalisation of fundamental aspects of urban development, be it public transport, the local market or land rights. At the same time, the examples show how, as a consequence, new forms of hybrid realities are constantly emerging that in some cases adapt to the needs and resources of their users. Hybridity may thus also become an expression of resistance or the search for alternatives when the provision of social infrastructure, for example, is inadequate and long journeys to the nearest school have to be accepted. However, in the negotiations between formalised and informalised solutions, outcomes are very context-dependent, sometimes working to the benefit of 'the people' and in other cases further enriching and empowering elite actors.

In sum, hybrid urbanisms can include very different practices and materialities as well as diverse groups of actors, depending on the case and its specific conditions, as shown throughout the contributions of this book and in this concluding comparative overview of the findings. At the same time, from this comparative reading, it becomes clear that various groups of actors engage in hybrid practices for different reasons and with different implications. The costs of, and benefits from, hybrid urbanisms are unequally distributed, which is our starting point for a conceptual systematisation in the next section.

12.3 A comparative attempt at systematising actors' perspectives of hybrid urbanisms

Taken together, comparison of the findings from all chapters of this volume leads to the conclusion that conditions of urban hybridity can mean different things for different (groups of) people, even if one examines the same planning or infrastructure project: since hybrid urbanisms, at least to a certain degree, perpetuate social inequalities, how one judges them largely depends on whose perspective one is focusing on. Based on the Hybrid Urbanisms research project and the contributions of this book, we have developed six perspectives on hybridity. To us, these appear particularly relevant for a critical analysis that is not only interested in offering hybrid urbanisms as a description of urban complexity and diversity, but also in showing that different groups of actors, different sets of practices and materialities

Table 12.1 A systematisation of actors' perspectives on hybrid urbanisms

Individuals' perspectives	Need	Convenience	Profit
Institutional perspectives	Integration	Co-existence	Conflict

as well as related spaces are affected differently by it, even if they readily engage in its re/production. Our conceptual systematisation is based on two sets, individual and institutional, each comprising three distinct perspectives (see Table 12.1).

These perspectives help us to understand actors' logics of why and how to engage in/with hybrid urbanisms and what kinds of different rationalities are enabling the diverse forms of hybrid arrangements that were unveiled in the course of this volume. The first set of three perspectives comprises:

- *Perspective of need.* Actors that were investigated in many of the chapters produce hybrid forms of urban development out of need, mostly due to a lack of financial resources and limited formalised and public supply of essential infrastructure. They have no other options and often do not see their solutions as the best possible outcome but as the only one they can afford. Pragya drivers (Chapter 5) often lack the resources to register with a union or to obtain the needed license. They take more risks than the registered drivers and can in some cases be prosecuted. The residents of the new neighbourhoods in Arequipa and Tacna are relying on the opportunity to own a piece of land. The need for 'formal' land titles is unquestioned by them, as it is directly connected to their hopes for a secure and stable future (Chapters 9 and 11). In the absence of a public supply of water, residents in Peregrinos de Chapi (Chapter 1) have established their own alternative water system. All these examples of the *perspective of need* also highlight the marginalisation of particular groups of actors and resulting social inequalities. They show how hybrid configurations offer coping mechanisms for low-income households in the light of limited supply.
- *Perspective of convenience.* Even though only a few contributions in this book are highlighting this, hybridity is not only related to a lack of resources or to low-income urban populations. Exploring alternative supply options to the public grid can also contribute to a higher level of convenience, especially for high-income population groups. The construction of individual boreholes in an affluent neighbourhood of Sunyani shows how residents that do not have a high trust in the networked public system organise alternative supply options for their convenience (Chapter 1). Also in Sunyani, residents of a high-income community use different transport options depending on how convenient they are (Chapter 5). Hybrid delivery configurations, thus, also offer options for high-income residents to overcome limited supply and establish a reliable alternative at their own cost. Actors who can adopt this *perspective of convenience* on hybrid urbanisms are typically those with more power and resources than those operating from a perspective of need.

Both the perspective of need and of convenience are situated in contexts of limited state capacities and limited supply. They describe individual actors' rationalities and practices relating to their supply of infrastructure and services. The third perspective denotes how individuals (also in larger groups) can exploit hybrid urbanisms for profit.

- *Perspective of profit*. This perspective focuses on how actors actively use hybrid arrangements for individual monetary gain. In Arequipa and Tacna, land formalisation is closely linked to speculation and corruption. In both cases, powerful actors are using hybrid arrangements for land trafficking, making money by reselling formalised land (Chapters 9 and 11). In Huacho, private social infrastructure providers are locating their facilities at very central locations in the city to have more paying customers. This practice is going against plans of the public authorities to organise equal access all over the city, a goal that is not made obligatory by legislation (Chapter 10). Hybrid configurations are often approached by powerful actors from this *perspective of profit*, which contributes to deepening inequalities, but it is shared by some resource-poor actors, such as the taxi drivers on the Kumasi-Ejisu highway who use peak hour floating to maximise their profits (Chapter 4).

Actors working with the three individual perspectives by and large do not actively seek to change the hybrid configurations but are engaging with and reproducing them in their everyday practices. The next set of perspectives is different. It is that of state institutions and other organised bodies – groups of actors who actively seek to shape hybrid configurations, mostly by redefining what is constituted as 'formal' or 'informal'. This may imply a perspective of integration that seeks to eventually overcome hybrid urbanisms altogether, as well as a perspective that recognises hybrid urbanisms as a permanent feature of the urban, and lastly, a perspective that sees it as a site for constant struggle and open conflict.

- *Perspective of integration.* Hybrid urbanisms are often the result of attempts to integrate informalised practices or materialities into the formalised sector. Planning systems in Ghana and Peru are largely aiming for this goal (Chapters 2, 3 and 7). Throughout the chapters, it is shown that the state almost always plays an important role, for example, through deciding on the legality of land rights for residents in the new settlements in Arequipa (Chapter 11) or on the displacement and replacement of public transport in Peru (Chapter 8). Both examples also highlight the role of the ideal of integrating existing systems or already-built realities into the logics of a centralised state system. From the *perspective of integration*, hybrid urbanisms are in many cases considered a temporary phenomenon, which will eventually be overcome, whilst realities that cannot be integrated (or that the state does not want to integrate) are informalised by planning policies.
- *Perspective of co-existence.* Institutional actors such as the state often tolerate, ignore or accept the existence of hybridity, approaching it from a *perspective of*

co-existence. Around Kumasi and in Sunyani floating drivers are taking over a large share of commuter traffic and other forms of mobility. Whilst not being a part of the plans to organise a centralised transport system, public authorities still let them operate, knowing that large parts of local populations rely on their services (Chapters 4 and 5). Recognising this perspective invites us to look at configurations in which the state and other institutions turn a blind eye for various reasons, which include limited capacities to control or to provide alternatives, as well as the formalised institutions' ignorance of hybrid realities.

- *Perspective of conflict.* Actors look at hybridity as a conflict between differing kinds of urban development practices, often including formalised solutions on the one side and informalised solutions on the other side. The public authorities in Bolgatanga, for example, are fighting with the local market traders on having a say in the process of organising the space in the new market hall (Chapter 6). In Arequipa, the practices of the state agency COFOPRI lead to conflicts with the *associaciones* of neighbours in the informalised *pueblos jovenes.* The latter are fighting for their land titles and against stigmatisation, especially through the process of formalisation (Chapter 11). Examining this perspective of conflict reveals actors engaging in power struggles over shaping current and future urban realities, often including the fight over resources, access and competences.

These sets of perspectives are not confined to the corresponding types of actor – individual or group. Conflict, for instance, can also be a central point for individual actors; profit can also be a political aim for state institutions. What we can see throughout the chapters, though, is that individual actors do focus on the direct consequences of hybridity for their quality of life (which, depending on their position in society, may contribute to widening social inequalities), whilst institutional actors mostly concentrate on the systemic effects of hybridity. This can lead to very different perceptions of the qualities and effects of specific hybrid configurations in urban development and of an actor's appropriate response in terms of engagement with that configuration. The presented systematisation therefore aims to support more nuanced and critical analyses of different actors' perspectives, to better understand how and why hybridity is re/produced, at whose cost and to which effects.

12.4 Conclusion

The individual contributions in this book show how complex and multi-layered the case-specific arrangements of hybrid urbanisms are in secondary cities. This becomes clear in a comparative reading of the various contributions, for example, on the processes of hybrid land use planning in Peru (Chapters 7, 9, 11), but also in the contributions on mobility in Ghana (Chapters 4 and 5). Hybridity is evident here at all the levels analysed, in very particular configurations, but at the same time in relation to one another – hybridity operates across scales of place and governance. In order to better understand the practices of the residents in the new neighbourhoods in Arequipa created by land invasion, for example, an examination of their everyday practices is central. At the same time, however, studies on

the legal planning conditions and the other public and private actors involved in the processes of formalising neighbourhoods also provide important insights for a better understanding of hybridity in this context. On the one hand, the contributions in the book show the advantages of focusing on individual aspects of hybrid urban development. On the other hand, they also highlight the fact that the omnipresence of hybrid urbanisms requires classification and contextualisation, also considering the specific temporalities and socio-spatial settings.

The findings from the three different thematic strands show that hybrid urbanisms are of great relevance to planning and infrastructure provision. They are not hard to discover when looking at the diverse realities of urban development in Ghana and Peru. Legislation, regulations and norms are as closely related to hybridity as the negotiation processes between different groups of actors on the state, private sector and civil society level, as well as the everyday practices of local people. Examining hybrid urbanisms suggests a relational approach as it focusses attention on all these different levels as well as the underlying discourses, agency and resources of actors whilst also highlighting the interconnectedness between social and material realities.

By highlighting and systematising the perspectives of different actors, this concluding chapter also contributes to a more nuanced understanding of what shapes hybridity in different contexts. Conceptualising two sets of perspectives, the individual (need, convenience, profit) and the institutional (integration, conflict, coexistence), we underline the great diversity of actor positions towards hybridity but also add an important aspect to the development of a conceptual framework to critically analyse hybrid configurations and their effects in very diverse urban settings. To our surprise, we could not identify a perspective of innovation in this context, which would highlight institutional actors' hopes that hybridity could contribute to creating novel, more efficient and socially just urban planning and infrastructure realities. Whilst secondary cities literature tends to assume that decentralisation will lead to innovative governance approaches on the local level, it also highlights the limited capacities of public authorities to organise larger urban planning or infrastructure programmes (Roberts, 2019; Rondinelli, 1983). The chapters of this volume show that individual actors engaging in hybrid arrangements out of need often develop new ways of practicing urban development and delivering infrastructure, in many cases in the absence of an active and viable public service or provision. Institutional actors, on the other hand, show very little interest in the hybrid solutions from below. As a consequence, institutional actors often view hybrid urbanisms as temporary coping mechanisms or merely pragmatic solutions to problems. There is a lack of imaginative work by formalised actors in engaging positively with informalised actors' adaptive ideas and ways of urban life that match the case-specific needs of diverse urban contexts. Such a more imaginative approach could also contribute to balancing the negative effects of hybridity, such as widening social inequality.

Whilst hybrid urbanisms are probably ubiquitous, the evidence from the chapters, and the preceding argument for a nuanced and critical analysis of its drivers and forms, reinforces our case for focusing on secondary cities. In this context,

we showed that such cities are confronted with various challenges, which are discussed in the individual chapters. These include the creation, through decentralisation, of new tasks in urban planning and infrastructure provision for city administrations, often in the context of increasing pressures from migration, and the almost inevitable general lack of resources. Examples of this are deficiencies in competence and institutionalisation of knowledge for the administration and government of the cities, in financial resources for the expansion of social and technical infrastructure, and in capacity to challenge corruption. Last, but not least, is the exclusion and segregation of poorer population groups, particularly in these often rapidly growing cities. Hybrid configurations in planning and infrastructure delivery are responding to these challenges. The chapters of this book show strongly that hybridity can be an innovative response to the challenges that these cities are facing, albeit one with a clear danger of reinforcing social inequalities. However, these reflect the individual development paths of secondary cities that often do not simply replicate the realities of the far more visible primary cities of Ghana and Peru. Looking at the individual cases and realities presented, at the interconnectedness of the different thematic strands and at the diverse perspectives of actors of various forms of hybrid urbanisms, this book offers a new perspective on urban development in secondary cities and elsewhere.

Note

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