


# Ethnicizing Europe

Hate and Violence After Versailles

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Afterword by Tara Zahra



# **Ethnicizing Europe**

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# Ethnicizing Europe

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Hate and Violence After Versailles

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# CONTENTS

*Acknowledgments* *vii*

## INTRODUCTION

Ethnicizing Europe? 1  
ÉVA KOVÁCS, RAUL CÂRSTOCEA, AND GÁBOR EGRY

## PART 1: LAWS AND LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CITIZENSHIP 39

1 Demarcating the National Family: French Nation-Building,  
“Authentic” Alsatians, German Immigrants, and Alsace, 1914–1920 41  
DEVLIN M. SCOFIELD

2 Citizens without a State: “Nationality,” International Law,  
and Jewish Emigration to the United States, 1918–1921 69  
ZACHARY MAZUR

3 “May it be as soon as possible!”: Polish Governments’  
Plans Toward Jewish Mass Emigration 95  
ZOFIA TRĘBACZ

## PART 2: LANGUAGE AS ETHNOPOLITICAL PRACTICE 117

4 Language Fight: Conflicts over Ukrainian/Ruthenian  
Minority Schools in Eastern Galicia in the Second Polish Republic 119  
ELISABETH HAID-LENER

5 Looking for a Viennese Swabian village: Landsmannschaft  
Migrant Activism and Its Limits in Interwar Vienna 139

	PAULI ARO	
6	Controlled Youth Emancipation: Hungarian Germans as Part of the Group Formation Process in the Interwar Period ZSOLT VITÁRI	167
<b>PART 3: RACIALIZATION AND RADICALIZATION OF ETHNICITY</b>		<b>197</b>
7	Living in disturbed times: The Ethnopolitical and Social Consequences of the War and of the New State Order in the Bohemian Lands, 1918–1923 PAVEL KLADIWA AND ANDREA POKLUDOVÁ	199
8	Historical Debate About the Shared Roots and Divergent Causes of the Green, Red, and White Terrors BÉLA BODÓ	229
9	Polish and Ukrainian Propaganda Concerning the War for Eastern Galicia JAGODA WIERZEJSKA	247
<b>AFTERWORD</b>		
	Chutes and Ladders: Racialization in Habsburg Central Europe After 1918 TARA ZAHRA	277
	<i>Index</i>	295
	<i>Contributors</i>	309

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## INTRODUCTION

# ETHNICIZING EUROPE?

ÉVA KOVÁCS, RAUL CÂRSTOCEA, AND GÁBOR EGRY

WHEN WE STARTED PLANNING THE BIENNIAL SIMON WIESENTHAL Conference in Vienna in 2019, one of the main issues we identified was that the Peace Treaties of 1919–1923 can be seen as attempts to establish an international order corresponding to the new realities of nationhood. Because of the pandemic, the conference was not held until the summer of 2021—and even then, in hybrid form. Today, in the fourth year of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, when the end of the war seems far away, World War I and the peace treaties that ended it are being cast in a new light. Moreover, ethnicized tensions are once again commonplace—and not only in the post-Soviet region. Our conference took place before the war, during the pandemic, so our volume does not reflect on these more recent events in a direct way. Indirectly, however, the reader can observe several similarities and analogies that may help them to account for today's political reality.

Irrespective of whether the peace treaties concluded after World War I led to new conflicts, the new regimes of ethnicity entailed the legal creation of minorities and majorities, involving processes of inclusion and exclusion, according to a dichotomy of nations and nationalities. Forging a clear ethnic or national identity allowed no shades of gray. Previously diffuse identities, sentiments, and loyalties had to become unambiguous after 1920. Alongside national legislation, international regulations and institutions were designed to discipline and control this process.<sup>1</sup>

Let us illustrate this phenomenon from the particular perspective of Central European Jewry. Let's travel back in time a hundred years and arrive in Eperjes/Prešov, in the new Czechoslovak Republic, in 1921. That year, a Hungarian Jewish intellectual, Aladár Komlós, published a pamphlet with the title "Jews at a Crossroads":

The truth is that I am a Hungarian, a Jew and an internationalist at the same time! [...] And look at these assimilated Jews: one is more nationalist than the other, but all of them are radical, tend to be socialist. [...] Although we have no reason for not

being loyal to our new states, changing our Hungarian character overnight would be a renegade behavior. If our Hungarianness is a skin only, one does not give up his skin very easily and it is impossible to cast it quickly both for moral and technical reasons. [. . .] If someone doubts our double skin, we may prove it experimentally: beat the Hungarian and it will ache. . . . Beat the Jew and it will ache even more. We can ache twice.<sup>2</sup>

The quote could be taken as a sign of “chronic Jewish ambivalence” or an illustration of society’s refusal of the creativity of Jewish assimilation strategies. Furthermore, it could also be understood as an example of new loyalty conflicts in an ethnicized society. What did Komlós and his Jewish contemporaries, who lived in the new states that were established after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, expect from the future? As the quotation above shows, at that time they were still counting on the continuation of the prewar nationalist assimilation discourse. On the one hand, they assumed that they would have to choose between the former Hungarian and the new Czechoslovak assimilation pressure. On the other hand, Komlós also stressed a general existential fear that the vernacular culture of the Hungarian Jews living in the new nation-states might disappear.

The fear of cultural extinction was not a particular Jewish sentiment. On the contrary, it became a fundamental frame of reference for the national majorities as well. Komlós was not a pragmatic individual in terms of his cultural and political choices, but rather an emblematic protagonist of the ethnicized Central European, post-Versailles landscape.

## STATEHOOD AND ETHNICITY: RUPTURES, VIOLENCE, CONSOLIDATION

Possibly the best-known principle of the Versailles order was and is—at least in rhetoric and on the European continent—its preference for nation-states and democracy. These ideas, interrelated and intertwined in the thinking of the contemporaries, were contrasted to an imperial past embodied by the now defunct Austria-Hungary (“the prison of nations”), Tsarist Russia (the archetype of “Eastern despotism”), and Wilhelmine Germany (associated with Prussian militarism and barbaric war-making). Even though only the Habsburg realm disappeared from the maps entirely, all of the three states once dominating the East of Europe had to relinquish territories to a series of new states whose elites claimed to bring to realization an eternal (but minimum centuries old) dream of their peoples, the oppressed nations of Europe: Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Poles,

Romanians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and Finns. Moreover, even the defeated Austro-Germans, Hungarians, and *Reichsdeutsche* eagerly embraced the principle of the nation-state and the idea of democracy.<sup>3</sup>

What was imagined as a new order was understood as a clear break with the past and a renewal of the continent, a democratic and national revolution—a perception that almost inherently consisted of a West-East dichotomy too, as only the East of Europe was understood as a post-imperial and post-authoritarian space. This new order was thus seen to be morally superior too due to its democratic nature. Democracy was strongly linked with national liberation and the nation-state, but also with a kind of maturity of society—appropriating an allegedly civilized, liberal, and rule-of-law-based way of governing and politics. While the peacemakers generally presumed that Eastern Europeans mostly fulfilled the latter criterion too, unlike the people assorted into mandates according to their alleged (im)maturity,<sup>4</sup> they still felt it safer to conclude a series of separate treaties on the protection of minorities with all these states. These fell short of any recognition of national minorities as political subjects; their aim was to forestall discrimination, and they postulated legal equality and the right to citizenship without respect to national or ethnic belonging. But before establishing a legal framework, Europe needed states, and that was less obvious on the ground than it seemed from the negotiation tables in Paris.

Despite the fact that the Versailles Treaty and the newly established League of Nations had been designed to ensure lasting peace in Europe, ample evidence attests to the continuation of violence in its aftermath, at least until 1923. Factoring in the revolutionary upheavals, civil wars, pogroms, and the more infrastructural violence occurring at the grassroots level, the current scholarly consensus is centered around Robert Gerwarth's notion of the war that "failed to end."<sup>5</sup> Explanations for this varied, from Gerwarth's own focus on "cultures of defeat," through the idea of the "brutalization" of soldiers and civilians as a result of the unprecedented nature of World War I,<sup>6</sup> to emphases on the breakdown of the former imperial order and the ensuing power vacuum<sup>7</sup> resulting in a dynamics of ethnic conflict and (counter-)revolution sweeping particularly across much of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe, the region most affected by imperial collapse.<sup>8</sup> The centenary of the end of World War I prompted a spate of new publications on the topic that further explored these complementing interpretations, while simultaneously broadening the scope of our understanding of "violence" to go beyond armed conflicts and encompass instances of communal violence or sexual violence, for example.<sup>9</sup> As we have written elsewhere and others have also pointed out, minorities, and Jews especially, were often particularly exposed to such violence, whether state-condoned or undertaken by non-state paramilitaries, which was in stark contrast with the intentions of the Paris Peace Conference to offer protection to precisely such groups.<sup>10</sup>

However, the respective literatures on violence in the aftermath of World War I and on the processes of ethnicization discussed above, complete with a new legal regime centered on post-imperial notions of citizenship underpinned by the idea of national self-determination and its corollary in minority rights, have often proceeded in parallel to each other. Studies of violence have repeatedly been dismissive of the more “peaceful” developments occurring at this time, focusing instead on the legacy of the war, just as works on the post-Versailles national and international legal regimes have only pointed at continuing violence as the limit or failure of legal norms.<sup>11</sup> Our volume seeks to bridge these two separate literatures, arguing for the importance of placing a focus on “ethnicization” and on legal concepts of citizenship in dialogue with the violent history of the immediate postwar period. To do so also entails a partial departure from the overwhelming focus on World War I, by tracing the roots of such violence, just as that of ethnicized legal difference further back into the *belle époque*, nuancing arguments that overemphasize “the absence of the horrors of warfare in Europe for more than forty years” prior to it.<sup>12</sup>

Instead, such an interpretation connects with the literatures that have explored broader understandings of violence that go beyond warfare and interstate conflict more generally, while considering “Europe” in a wider, global context. Studies of genocide, for example, have long pushed back the timeline of such mass organized violence against religious or ethnic groups to the late nineteenth century, starting with the Hamidian massacres of Armenians and other Christians in the Ottoman Empire, or by factoring in cases of colonial genocide, such as that of the Herero and Namaqua.<sup>13</sup> Scholars of antisemitism are all too familiar with the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries pogroms in the Russian Empire and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, prompting waves of migration that in turn fueled the rise of antisemitism in Central Europe and beyond.<sup>14</sup> With Eric D. Weitz, we can read the history of the heyday of European liberalism *and* imperialism stretching from the 1815 Treaty of Vienna to Versailles in conjunction with one of escalating violence, indicative of a shift from understandings of sovereignty grounded in territorial considerations to “a politics focused on populations.”<sup>15</sup> Viewed through such a lens, the Paris Peace Treaty is no longer *just* a response to unprecedented warfare, but also the culmination of an interplay between nation and empire as principles of population (and diversity) management that was played out across the long nineteenth century; one where, contrary to prevailing views, the former did not completely supplant the latter.<sup>16</sup> While paramilitaries feature prominently in the history of interwar violence, their origins can also be traced back to the late nineteenth century, which witnessed the emergence of party militias, “shirt movements,” and paramilitary organizations, just as intellectuals and artists of the *belle époque* theorized the positive, or “moral” character of violence.<sup>17</sup>

## “ETHNICIZING EUROPE”—AN EXCURSUS INTO THE CONCEPT OF “ETHNICITY”

In the public and scholarly discourses of the time, the word “ethnicity” was not yet widely used. The words “nation,” “nationalism,” “minorities,” and “race” were more frequently used to describe the phenomenon we explore here. The first recorded use of “ethnicity” dates from 1953, when the sociologist David Riesman referred to “the groups who, by reason of rural or small-town location, ethnicity, or other parochialism, feel threatened by the better educated upper-middle-class people.”<sup>18</sup> “Ethnic Studies” as a curriculum and discipline emerged from social movements only in the 1960s in the United States to offer an anti-racist, multicultural curriculum that reflected the diversity and complexity of the North American societies. From then on, American ethnic studies included the agenda of decolonization and self-determination of minority groups and communities as well. What these now-classic, mainly sociological studies have in common is that almost everyone agrees that the competition for power, privilege, and economic resources in multiethnic societies propels the protagonists to oppose each other as members of an ethnic group with ascriptive loyalties and conflicting interests. Thus, social mobilization is often related to or articulated in ethnic competition.<sup>19</sup>

At the same time, the concept arrived in European ethnology, but with a much more limited sociopolitical agenda and under quite different methodological conditions. In his groundbreaking book, Fredrik Barth defined ethnicity as a fundamental mechanism of boundary making, which “held constant and is implicitly assumed to be context-independent.” Ethnicity as an unconditioned and *anthropological* characteristic of all human beings is therefore a universal social phenomenon, a predisposition in social actions. As Barth wrote: “Categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership in the course of individual life histories.”<sup>20</sup>

Furthermore, Barth stressed that ethnic labels most often endure even when individual members move across boundaries. This is the interdependency of ethnic groups, which are therefore the product of continuous ascriptions and self-ascriptions, accompanying processes of inclusion and exclusion. With this concept, Barth made a radical break with the essentialist view of ethnicity.

Another Scandinavian anthropologist, Thomas Hylland Eriksen, defined ethnicity as an aspect of culturally distinctive social relationships between groups in regular interactions: “Ethnicity refers both to aspects of gain and loss in interaction, and to aspects of meaning in the creation of identity. In this way, it has a political, organizational aspect as well as a symbolic one.”<sup>21</sup>

A new approach to ethnicity studies was the historical one that emerged in the late 1980s, which then fed back into sociological and anthropological research, and by the 2000s had made “ethnicity” an established concept in almost all social science and humanities disciplines. The history of nationalism borrowed the anthropological concept of “tribe” and “ethnic group,” while both are close to the European concept of the culturally homogenous “nation.” Thus, “ethnic group” appeared as a child of nationalism. Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Anthony Smith, and Eric Hobsbawm have had a significant influence in debates on ethnicity, nation, and nationalism.<sup>22</sup> As Gellner claimed: “Men do not in general become nationalists from sentiment or sentimentality, atavistic or not, well based or myth-founded: they become nationalists through genuine, objective, practical necessity, however obscurely recognized.”<sup>23</sup> In his constructivist-functional view in which nationalism produces the nation and not vice versa, Gellner believed that nationalism strives for one ethnicity under one state. For him the worst case could be when the ruler of a state is not a member of the ethnic majority within the boundaries of the state.

In contrast to this, Anthony D. Smith argued that “the core of ethnicity [. . .] resides in the quartet of myths, memories, values and symbols”<sup>24</sup>: “For *ethnie* are viewed as consisting in: (1) symbolic, cognitive and normative elements common to a unit of population; (2) practices and mores that bind them together over generations; and (3) sentiments and attitudes that are held in common and which differentiate them from other populations.”<sup>25</sup>

In this ethnosymbolist perspective, many modern nations base themselves on antecedent ethnic ties, which were selected from several other categories and turned into the ethnic basis for nations or ethnic communities. Without ethnicities we would not have had nations or nationalism.

Benedict Anderson defined the nation as an imagined political community—a kind of “deep, horizontal comradeship.”<sup>26</sup> The word “ethnicizing” appears in his book *Imagined Communities* when he describes the situation in colonial Malaya:

It was precisely because temples, mosques, schools, and courts were topographically anomalous that they were understood [by the rulers] as zones of freedom and—in time—fortresses from which religious, later nationalist, anticolonialists could go forth to battle. At the same time, there were frequent endeavors to force a better alignment of census with religious communities by—so far as was possible—politically and juridically ethnicizing the latter. In the Federated States of colonial Malaya, this task was relatively easy. Those whom the regime regarded as being in the series “Malay” were hustled off to the courts of “their” castrated Sultans, which were in substantial part administered according to Islamic law. “Islamic” was thus treated as really just another name for “Malay.”<sup>27</sup>

Anderson thought about the concept of ethnicizing in a very similar way to how we would like to use it in this volume. His examples of how “ethnic” Christianities were sought to be created by the authorities in the heterogeneous Dutch Indies are only *prima facie* different in their power-technical essence from European post-1920 census topographies. The census, the map (and the museum in his analysis) symbolize the ethnicizing practices of the repressive state, which seek to eradicate the situational character of ethnicity.

When Hobsbawm and Ranger coined the phrase “invented tradition” in the early 1980s, their intention was to criticize contemporary views of the great national traditions of modern Britain, especially the British political and colonial power. They showed how certain cultural patterns form the “nation.”<sup>28</sup> Hobsbawm differentiated between “custom” or “convention” and “invented” tradition. *Custom* is an established practice that can be easily adapted if needed. *Convention* is simply routine without any ritual or symbolic function. Both custom and convention are practices that facilitate day-to-day life, but do not have an ideological basis for nation-building: “The former [custom] were specific and strongly binding social practices, the latter [invented] tended to be quite unspecific and vague as to the nature of the values, rights and obligations of the group membership they inculcate: ‘patriotism,’ ‘loyalty,’ ‘duty,’ ‘playing the game,’ ‘the school spirit’ and the like.”<sup>29</sup>

Hobsbawm’s model, although criticized for its lack of operationalization, and later in postcolonial and aboriginal historiography also for not considering the subversive power of invented traditions in the recognition of subordinated social and ethnic groups, has been used ever since to analyze modern ethnonationalism.

It is not possible here to go into the ways in which the debates around ethnicity have fertilized other disciplines, from minority studies to *microstoria*, but we must briefly mention the new wave of criticism in the 1990s and the 2000s, which came from feminist theory and challenged the concept of ethnicity as such. In her writings, Nira Yuval-Davis analyzed in detail how the national phenomenon relates to racist exclusions. In her view, nationalist ideologies always separate political representation of ethnic collectivities using the myths of “common origins,” the perceptions of “common destiny” or the conception of “common culture”—as types of national exclusions which might be racialized. She stressed that in situations of national, ethnic, and racial conflicts, “the membership in the collectivity becomes the most dominant organizing principle, even if, before this conflict arose, members of the collectivity had only relatively weak bonds with it.”<sup>30</sup>

Yuval-Davis criticized the fact that major theories about nationalism had not taken gender into account; however, nationalisms are always gendered because they depend upon women’s reproductive potential to keep reproducing the chosen identity. This is how women’s bodies became the state’s property and how women’s sexual relations

were strictly policed and controlled in certain historical periods in a bid to maintain the “purity of blood.”<sup>31</sup> Women’s citizenship of the nation is affected by public-private dichotomy, active/passive axes.<sup>32</sup> Ethnicity and other forms of marginalization can also affect women’s citizenships. Gender relations are at the heart of cultural constructions of social identities and collectivities, as well as in most cultural conflicts and contestations.

Narrowly focused on the notion of ethnicity, the critical approach relevant to this volume again came from the field of sociology. In the 2000s, Rogers Brubaker devoted several studies and volumes to the issue. In his view, the paradigm of prioritized ethnocultural descent, previous nationality, place of residence, and so forth was codified by the Treaty of Versailles, legitimizing a more exclusive definition of national belonging, promoting the French ideal citizenry over the inhabitants’ right to choose their optimal state.<sup>33</sup> He suggested analyzing the successor states not simply as national but as nationalizing states. The Yugoslav wars between 1991 and 2001, the violent ethnonational conflicts on the southern periphery of the former Soviet Union, the genocide in Rwanda, and Hindu-Muslim riots in parts of India put the questions of ethnic and nationalist violence—or rather the ethnicization of political violence—back in scholarly debates: “I want to suggest that ethnic conflict—or what might better be called ethnicized or ethnically framed conflict—need not, and should not, be understood as conflict between ethnic groups, just as racial or racially framed conflict need not be understood as conflict between races, or nationally framed conflict as conflict between nations.”<sup>34</sup>

Brubaker introduced a new sociological concept, of “groupism,” to distinguish the ethnic from the ethnicized. Groupism is a political, social, or cultural “tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed.”<sup>35</sup> He further asked: How can we understand ethnic conflict, if not as a conflict between ethnic groups? How can we go beyond “groupism”? Brubaker summarized his proposal for a new research methodology in eight points: (1) rethinking ethnicity; (2) the reality and existence of ethnicity; (3) groupness as event; (4) groups and categories; (5) group-making as project; (6) the relations between groups and organizations; (7) the constitutive character of framing and coding; and (8) ethnicity as cognition.

This concept had an enormous impact on ethnic and minority studies and on history-writing in the 2000s, especially in East Central Europe, mainly because it helped to move away from a substantialist conception of ethnicity. Mostly in the form of a growing historical literature that was informed by Brubaker’s work and that applied the concept of national indifference, it provided powerful methodological tools for a better understanding of situational, hybrid, or simply changing ethnic identities—and not least for exploring the role of ethnopolitics and their entrepreneurs in society. Its

basic assumption was that people in Central and Eastern Europe were not inherently nationalists, and for a long time did not accept nationalist assumptions of social order and issues, generating the very anxiety of national activists that animated their push for eliminating ambiguities of national identification.<sup>36</sup> However, his anti-groupist moral, political, and social theory was widely criticized as a cosmopolitan view and as an underestimation of particular collectivities and the participative character of ethnic belonging.<sup>37</sup> Most of the essays in this volume explore ethnicity, whether explicitly or implicitly, through a research agenda similar to national indifference in its theoretical and methodological assumptions.

As we can see, the history of the idea of ethnicity has undergone many transformations and generated many research debates in recent decades. Nevertheless, in most cases, the original concept of Max Weber has remained inescapable. In the following section, we will therefore briefly look at the original concept and its historical embeddedness in the period of World War I.

## THE WEBERIAN PUZZLE: ETHNICITY AS STRUGGLE FOR A POLITICAL COMMUNITY

At the outbreak of the war, Max Weber, aged fifty, volunteered for service and was appointed as a reserve officer in charge of organizing the army hospitals in Heidelberg. Weber's views on the war and the expansion of the German empire changed during its course. Early on, he supported nationalist rhetoric and the war effort. In time, however, Weber became one of the most prominent critics of German expansionism. He joined the worker and soldier council of Heidelberg in 1918. He then served in the German delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. He opposed both the leftist German Revolution of 1918–1919 and the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. As an advisor to the Confidential Committee for Constitutional Reform, he codrafted the Weimar Constitution. More controversially, he also defended the provisions for emergency presidential powers that became Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. (These provisions were later used by Adolf Hitler to subvert the rest of the constitution and institute rule by decree, allowing his regime to suppress opposition and gain dictatorial powers.)

Frustrated with politics, Weber resumed teaching during this time, first at the University of Vienna, then, after 1919, at the University of Munich. On June 14, 1920, Max Weber contracted the Spanish flu and died of pneumonia in Munich. Among the papers found after Weber's death in 1920 was an untitled draft that has since been published in the *Grundrisses der Sozialökonomik* (*Outline of Socio-Economics*) and given the title "Ethnische Gemeinschaften." Weber started to introduce the concept with the description of social relationship:

The term “social relationship” will be used to denote the behavior of a plurality of actors insofar as, in its meaningful content, the action of each takes account of that of the others and is oriented in these terms. The social relationship thus consists entirely and exclusively in the existence of a probability that there will be a meaningful course of social action—irrespective, for the time being, of the basis for this probability. Thus, as a defining criterion, it is essential that there should be at least a minimum of mutual orientation of the action of each to that of the others. . . . Hence, the definition does not specify whether the relation of the actors is co-operative or the opposite.<sup>38</sup>

Collective identities are thus social linkages that merely create the *possibility* that a national or ethnic community with a sense of group will emerge. Weber discusses the links of ethnic communities in a separate chapter. He refines the concept above in the following manner:

The belief in group affinity, regardless of whether it has any objective foundation, can have important consequences especially for the formation of a political community. We shall call ‘ethnic groups’ those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic membership (*Gemeinsamkeit*) differs from the kinship group precisely by being a presumed identity, not a group with concrete social action, like the latter. In our sense, ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the political sphere. On the other hand, it is primarily the political community, no matter how artificially organized, that inspires the belief in common ethnicity. This belief tends to persist even after the disintegration of the political community, unless drastic differences in the custom, physical type, or above all, language exist among its members. This artificial origin of the belief in common ethnicity follows the previously described pattern of rational association turning into personal relationships.<sup>39</sup>

Weberian terminology questions all essentialist understandings that accept collective identity-formations as given and fixed; at the same time, romantic notions that consider solidarity the main organizational principle of social groups are done away with. Ethnic, national, and other social relationships are only presumed forms of belonging that create the *probability* that certain social acts will take place. Even in the places where he wrote about mixed marriages between African Americans and Native Americans and whites, he emphasized that “the conventional *connubium* is far less impeded by anthropological differences than by status differences, that means, differences due

to socialization and upbringing.”<sup>40</sup> These relationships must be created anew from act to act, while even their intended meaning may change—to the point that they disintegrate and break off.

Social relationships conceal alterity and identity. The equivalent of alterity in Weberian terminology is “struggle” (the singling out and displacement of difference); that of identity is “community” and “association”: “A social relationship will be called ‘communal’ (*Vergemeinschaftung*) if and so far as the orientation of social action—whether in the individual case, on the average, or in the pure type—is based on a subjective feeling of the parties, whether affectual or traditional, that they belong together.”<sup>41</sup>

It is an important condition here that social relationships are “very heterogeneous states of affair,” since every single participant endows them with a different meaning. Thus, for example, there may be those who perceive social relationships aimed at national or ethnic identity as a community, and those who view them as an association. The second group does not take part in them because of feelings of subjective belonging, but based on the equalization or connection of interest. Common characteristics, situations, or forms of behavior are not sufficient to create a community. A uniform answer to possible exclusion is also insufficient for this purpose. Community comes about with a *collective* answer: The orientation of individuals toward each other (not the environment). Common language—one of the cornerstones of identity studies—is only a *tool* of understanding according to the Weberian approach, not a primary content of community. Only the *conscious contrast* that emerges between members of a linguistic group and outsiders creates a community, of which language is one—also conscious—foundation.<sup>42</sup>

Yet, not only the category of ethnicity, but also the Weberian concept of it, contains a number of ambiguities. It is not necessary to decolonize Weberian thought and the oeuvre, which cannot be detailed further here, to see the shackles of prejudices behind the seemingly clear definitions of interpretive sociology. And although Weber is not usually accused of racist language in academic debates, and it is also a fact that he believed in the importance of status stratification through honor, which he saw as underlying both ethnic and racial group formation, it is undeniable that he indeed formulated his sociological views from the political perspective of Western modernism (and rationalism) and especially of the ideology of “Germanism.” His examples of mixed marriages, the Polish nation (*Poľentum*), or even the perceptions of American whites on the “pariah peoples” of African Americans and Native Americans would hardly stand the test of contemporary sociological analysis.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, the early interpretive sociological method, which was not averse to the inclusion of emotions or historical phenomena to ground a sociological argument, the situational character of social groups, the dynamic categories that could be applied, and so forth, all remained relevant for the study of ethnicity.

## THE ROLE OF THE SUPERSTRUCTURE: LAWS AND LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CITIZENSHIP

Weber's work was just as much a reflection of the politics of his time as an abstract analysis of human society. His notion of ethnicity is thus reflected in the process of ethnicizing after World War I, although often in an inverse way—not in the process of community formation but in the practices of the state that aimed to impose a community where there wasn't necessarily one yet. The motivation for the minority treaties was the fact that the nation-state was perceived as the political face of ethnicity-based ideas of community. However, as we will show below, the relationship between ethnicity, nation-state, and democracy was and is more intricate than simply being different aspects of the same phenomenon that provide for discursive interchangeability of the ethnic community and the nation. At the very heart of all three—ethnicity, nation-state, and democracy—lies the same issue: Who is in and who is out. But the groups they delineate are not identical at all, despite their theoretical and practical entanglements. Ethnic difference does not need legal forms to prevail, while nation-states exercise categorization through law, with citizenship or legal nationality. Finally, a democratic polity qualifies its members through political rights and entitlements.<sup>44</sup> It is therefore not a surprise that citizenship, democratic polity, and ethnic categorization continued to vex people, politicians, and state officials after 1919, despite the settling of the new borders and the problems that often came to light in an entangled manner, the different aspects manifesting simultaneously. But was it a new process of ethnicization, and, if yes, what exactly was ethnicized?

In legal parlance, *citizenship* and *nationality* are closely related; both can denote what the German word *Staatsbürgerschaft* entails. In the historical scholarship, however, they are mostly used as separate concepts, *citizenship* referring to the legal links with a state, *nationality* to the national identification of individuals. In his groundbreaking book on citizenship in late nineteenth-century empires, Benno Gammerl used them as complementary concepts, citizenship as the set of rights and obligations an individual holds as regards to the state, and nationality as the legal link between them. He argued convincingly that ethnicization was in the offing well before World War I and not only in nation-states. Imperial citizenship laws and practices just as easily embraced ethnicity as a basic frame of nationalization and citizenship rights as nation-states. First, it was possible for political units within larger imperial formations, like Canada or dualist Hungary, to set their own citizenship laws and to pursue a nation-state approach based on ethnic assimilation as an implicit or explicit condition of citizenship. Second, classic colonial imperialism used ethnicity to delineate groups who were privileged or discriminated against, often linking racist thinking (the idea that human groups hold inherent and unchangeable differences that are reflected in their physical features) with

ethnic ideas too. True, Gammerl identified a third approach to citizenship, the so-called statist one, which positioned state administrators as arbiters of ethnic or national conflicts occupying a neutral position and making citizenship neutral in ethnic terms, like in dualist Austria. However, even in such cases the ethnic principle could have been incorporated into citizenship legislation, at least with regard to what rights citizens enjoyed on what bases. Equal recognition of ethnic groups as political subjects or at least as one legitimate and institutionalized axis of political representation and claim making, a development that happened in the series of provincial compromises in the Austrian half of the Habsburg Monarchy in the early twentieth century, required ethnic categorization of citizens and provided simultaneously limited political rights on this basis even though it was neutral in terms of its effects. But the practice was to stay after Cisleithania did not exist anymore.<sup>45</sup>

Thus, ethnicization of citizenship and nationality was not started, only exacerbated by the war, mostly due to the emergency legislations targeting enemy aliens in various forms or as the emergency measures applied to allegedly disloyal groups of people, who were often defined on the basis of their ethnicity.<sup>46</sup> The persistence of such discriminatory practices was one of the reasons the peace conference implemented the system of minority treaties and included citizenship provisions into the Peace Treaties themselves. They were to provide a generous universal basis for citizenship legislation as they not only stipulated that new states could not simply discriminate against nonethnics when according citizenship to them, but also required equal rights for everyone, setting the stage for a presumably nondiscriminative catalog of rights too.<sup>47</sup> The treaties postulated a right to citizenship on the basis of residence or pertinency (a legal institution linking individuals to communities wherever they lived otherwise), and a right to citizenship options within a period of twelve months, the possibility to take the citizenship of a country in which the majority consisted of coethnics.<sup>48</sup>

While this solution seemingly resolved the problem of the incongruence between boundaries (state territory) and population (the presence of nonethnics who were potential targets of discrimination), it could not help with handling the effects of another important social phenomenon that was crucial for ethnicization already before 1914—mobility and migration. People moving to places where they experienced alterity while the local population was also made to face the immigrants and sense their difference was one potent source of ethnicity. In an era of selective and localized social provisions,<sup>49</sup> it could still cause tensions between groups. Together with the rise of social entitlements—more and more stipulated as social rights<sup>50</sup>—the presence of migrants and aliens was a factor of radical political mobilization. Its first target was the group of wartime refugees who were resettled temporarily within the empires, and later the subsequent wave of refugees from Russia and the Ottoman Empire. As nonresidents and nonpertinents, they were not entitled to accede to citizenship

automatically, and neither could they exercise a right for citizenship option as they were not coethnics in any way.

Finally, there was another group that did not fit neatly into a system of citizenship designed to follow the nation-state approach described by Gammerl, even if it was made milder through nondiscrimination provisions. Jews were almost universally recognized as others—not only in Eastern Europe—but unlike other nationalities, they did not have a kin state to promote their rights in the international arena and bilateral relations. Furthermore, their otherness was often perceived as an unchanging unasimilable essence, making politicians and the wider public reluctant to accept their inclusion to what was seen as an ethnic community. Countries from Romania to Poland and Austria were reluctant to grant them citizenship even if they were residents, and plans of legal discrimination emerged very soon—to be implemented gradually, starting from Hungary’s infamous *numerus clausus* in 1920 to mass retractions of their citizenship in Romania at the end of the 1930s.<sup>51</sup> These developments were entangled with the sense that Jewish citizenship was imposed on the new states from outside, and as such it was a violation of their sovereignty, the right to decide on inclusion and exclusion through the means of nationalization.

Still, the system of minority treaties and citizenship provisions was an abstract legal design based on the idea of mitigating ethnicization of citizenship that threatened mass statelessness within the new boundaries, while restricting the system to the East of Europe. It was accompanied by the acceptance of a limited and voluntary population exchange in Central Europe and an organized one (population exchanges between Turkey and Greece, Bulgaria and Greece) in Southeastern Europe, where the new states were perceived as “less mature.”<sup>52</sup> In principle it was solid and simple, basically following the nation-state approach. But the practice of inclusion and exclusion through citizenship, addressed in the first part of the book, revealed how entangled all three approaches described by Gammerl remained in the practice of individual states, not least because Eastern Europe’s migration and population issues were situated within a global system of migration and citizenship since the nineteenth century.

Thus, it is very important that all three chapters in this section address issues that are geographically linked to or situated in the West. Devlin Scofield’s chapter highlights how the French Republic, with its boldly claimed republicanism, struggled to manage the reintegration of Alsace-Lorraine’s population after almost five decades of demographic change. Throughout this process, the most important aspect was the delimitation of reliable and unreliable individuals and the exclusion and removal of the latter. In this case reliability was ethnicized: The danger was seen in Germanness, associated with origins outside of the province or anti-French and pro-German wartime behavior. In order to support the fiction of French continuity and the idea that Alsace was a natural part of France, French politicians and administrators postulated an authentic

Alsatianness that was supposed to inhabit in people originating from an Alsatian lineage reaching back to 1870. It was probably also a means of dealing with the legal contradictions arising from the idea of Alsace being a redeemed territory and not one annexed to the Republic, thus questioning legal continuity with the period of German sovereignty.

Most importantly, however, French authorities used the interlude between occupation and the peace treaty, a period when citizenship remained in a legal limbo, to apply discriminative practices usually characteristic of the imperial approach to citizenship. The categorization of the population according to A, B, and C identity cards that provided very different rights was nothing more than pure discrimination and led directly to the exclusionary citizenship practices later, the removal of hundreds of thousands from the former *Reichsland*, a process not much different from the parallel semivoluntary and forced population movements in the East of the continent.

Still, for the individuals affected it was a rather chaotic situation where they were confronted with unpredictable and arbitrary decisions, a time of limited rule of law, and unclear criteria of categorization. This aspect of citizenship comes out clearly from Zachary Mazur's chapter too, which brings together the turn in US immigration policies at the beginning of the 1920s with Polish concerns surrounding the country's sovereignty, international standing, and the ethnic structure of Poland's population, most importantly the large number of Jews.

While Mazur argues how much racist ideas crafting Jews as problematic and unasimilable people conditioned US responses to immigration attempts of Jews from Poland and Russia, his story of a Jewish family refused entrance despite traveling with Polish passports shows how asymmetric power relationships diluted the sovereignty of the new nation-states of Eastern Europe. The United States simply refused to accept Poland's claim of nationality on the Jewish family, although international law left only a very narrow space for doing so. Poland, on the contrary, insisted on the legality of citizenship despite all the well-known concerns and reservations about Jews as Polish citizens. Finally, Mazur also highlights how the view of the state from below deviated from the idea of nation-state and ethnicized citizenship, due to the very stringent conditions required with citizenship applications, instead of accepting anyone based on their ethnic belonging.<sup>55</sup> Applicants were to demonstrate first of all that they would not constitute a financial burden on the state, making the unconditional solidarity underlying nationhood questionable. Such attitudes clearly demonstrate the persistence of the statist logic of citizenship, although in an altered form—less as the role of neutral arbiter and more as the guardian of bureaucratic rules that should not be twisted just because of some political issue.

While in the 1920s Polish bureaucrats and politicians felt obliged to fight the inferiority of the Polish state in its relations with great powers, the 1930s was an era

of imperialist plans demonstrating a shift in Polish self-perception. As Zofia Trębacz shows in her chapter, after Poland diluted the provisions of the minority treaty and a society-wide mobilization started against Jews, the government embraced ideas of ethnic engineering, the removal of the Jews, not just to Palestine, but to a colonial space. Some of these plans were linked with Polish demands for colonies (one of the former German ones) or linked with the idea of an alliance with colonial administrations (Angola) or postcolonial states (Colombia, Brazil). None of these ideas came to fruition, mostly because of the racist thinking surrounding Jews that led to prohibition of their immigration, but the story clearly shows how Jews were excluded from the body politic, if not legally, then symbolically. This exclusion was associated with their alleged character, their dubious attitude to productive work, and their occupational structure that was supposed to hinder the modernization of Polish society.<sup>54</sup>

What do these case studies tell us about ethnicity and citizenship after Versailles? First, the process of ethnicization continued and its drivers remained mostly the same Gammerl identified: Democratization, social welfare and its legal anchoring, and the mobilization of populations. The new system of states in Central and Eastern Europe, with their new borders, the resulting (re)assigning of population and migration, and the more asymmetric relations between these new states and the destination countries of their outmigration made these phenomena more contested and as such more visible. Citizenship became a significant security concern after the war and as a result of how it changed policies regarding aliens, and this securitization was extended through racial thinking and hierarchies into the broader field of society as a whole, both within and outside the region.<sup>55</sup> Citizenship started to get emptied of its content as social rights were either not automatically conferred with it or denied discriminatively, just as protection in the face of third states was revoked. Thus, nationality (*Staatsbürgerschaft*) was easy to make nominal and to replace its promise of equality with a layered citizenship of differentiation.

However, as the application of these rules rested with bureaucracies, statist logic persisted and often even trumped ethnic understandings of inclusion. As states are always more than the rules and norms, they are constituted by practices,<sup>56</sup> that puts a question mark behind their solely ethnic nature too. One aspect showing how they often happily deviated from the ethnic principle was class: They wanted to keep out the poor, and simultaneously the immediate post-World War I years saw the start of a process whereby citizenship became a good for sale on the market, easily accessible to the “filthy rich.”<sup>57</sup> Finally, whether rich or poor, the inherent paternalism of citizenship laws (which mostly stipulated that women’s citizenship followed the citizenship of the husband) made women even more exposed to circumstances and arbitrary decisions of petty bureaucrats as male protagonists of this story, regardless of their ethnicity.<sup>58</sup>

## ETHNICIZING FROM BELOW: ACTIVISM, POPULISM, AND THE INTELLIGENTSIA

In reaction to ethnicizing governmental policies after World War I, local elites tried to quickly adapt to the new conditions—with all the dilemmas that Aladár Komlós, quoted at the beginning of our introduction, formulated. As Pieter Judson observed, “a local elite social group often redefined its own traditional social status more consciously in terms of linguistic, religious, and cultural traditions rather than according to the privileged functions it had played within the empire.”<sup>59</sup> The resulting loyalty conflicts created the most diverse situations in the lives of ethnically defined groups. The same ethnic groups could be in minority and majority positions at the same time, while political oppression, knowledge exchange, and informal networks were often channeled into ethnic frameworks. The Versailles Treaties produced diasporas outside and inside of a country. If, as William Safran defined the diaspora, the key elements are the dispersal of an expatriate community to at least two “peripheral destinations”; its maintenance of “memory, vision, or myth” about the homeland; an enduring sense of alienation in the new society; a desire for a return to the homeland at some time in the future; and an ongoing commitment to and relationship with the homeland<sup>60</sup>—there is no doubt that many of the ethnicized groups in Europe easily ended up after 1920 in a kind of diaspora position.

As one can learn from the history of World War II, the fulfillment of belonging—the resettlement or the annexation of the territories—was not a guarantee of the diaspora’s existence, nor of its resolution. The paradox of “we live here and want to be somewhere else” can often be reproduced in the “homeland” as well. Moreover, the host country took its ethnic minorities toward this internal diaspora position with the ethnic prejudices of society, which did not allow minorities to emancipate and be on equal terms with the majority and limited the opportunities of social and career mobility.

Last but not least, in the very case of post-Versailles Europe, not only war refugees or stateless migrants but “native” groups were also placed in a marginal position. Who does not know the old joke: The elderly Kohn is visited by an American journalist in the 1980s. Kohn starts to tell his life story: “I was born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. When I was growing up, I worked in the Czechoslovak Republic, later had my own small business in Hungary, and retired as an employee in the Soviet Union.”—“Wow, how many places have you been in your life!” the journalist wonders. “Me? I never left Mukachevo in my whole life.”

In Central and Eastern Europe, ethnicity was created and moved more in the contacts between “native” peoples living together (as a nationality, a national minority, a language community, etc.). The pattern of these contacts transformed from the local ethnos of the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries into modern nationalisms and

ethnicized or indeed ethnically based formations, which were chiseled in ethnic conflicts. Mirror identities were created in which the other ethnic group often assumed the image of the enemy. Conflict-based ethnic forms flourished within ethnic borders. The closed ethnicities and the nationalist environment often led to the idea of territorial, ethnic, cultural, language, and other autonomy.

As Elisabeth Haid-Lener analyzes in her chapter, the question of the official language already played a formative role in ethnic conflicts within the Habsburg Empire. While minority protection treaties after 1920 granted national minorities the right to mother-tongue education, this approach was often in contradiction to nation-state efforts toward nationalization, assimilation, and unification. She describes the legislation procedure and the local implementation of the law in the former Eastern Galician Ukrainian/Ruthenian schools under the Second Polish Republic. The introduction of a bilingual school system only seems to have achieved equal opportunities between majority and minority groups. Behind the romantic idea of bilingual education, which enables contacts and thus facilitates “friendship” between children of different ethnic origins, creating a sense of cultural unity in them, only former minority schools were converted into bilingual schools due to the specific provisions of the law, while Polish-language schools in the multiethnic regions of eastern Poland were hardly affected. While it was supposed to provide a framework for the use of minority languages, the law reaffirmed the primacy of the Polish language as the state language. Haid-Lener convincingly shows how the school law contained mechanisms that automatically established the dominance of Polish as the state language and made it easy for the local authorities to adapt the Polonizing logic of the center. Since Ukrainian ethnic entrepreneurs (the Greek Catholic clergy, Ruthenian teachers, and political activists) successfully mobilized the locals, the law quickly became a flashpoint for ethnic mobilization—a kind of school “plebiscite” campaign swept the region, with the Polish majority doing its share. In a discourse familiar from ethnicizing state policies, the Ukrainian minority suddenly appeared in the role of “terrorizer.”

The other two essays in this section focus on the activist aspirations of the ethnonationalist German diaspora. Pauli Aro’s case study on the Banat Swabian activism in Vienna is a prime example of transnational ethnic activism. Although *Landmannschaften* became a phenomenon of post-1945 Federal German political culture, they were already acting as “diaspora” lobbies and propaganda networks of German nationalism in the Habsburg and interwar era. However, before 1920 these trends were still firmly embedded in the dense fabric of local language dialects and microcultures, in short, in the context of *Heimat* (home, homeland, home region). Behind this category, which at first sight sounds innocent and apolitical, there was a strong political agenda. Following Celia Applegate, this type of nationalism or ethnocentrism can be understood as the other side of the liberal nation-state that was taking shape during the nineteenth

century.<sup>61</sup> While the liberal nation was characterized by its public spheres and deliberative mechanisms, *Heimat* is situated in “the restricted and secure society of a childhood memory.”<sup>62</sup> Thus, the invented traditions of the *Heimat* could bridge the gap between national aspirations and the provincial reality of the fragmented local groups.

Since 1918, Austria’s *Landsmannschaften* and the German-speaking migrant networks in general were consistent in their beliefs that immigrants from the Banat or the Bačka, from Sylvania or Transylvania, from the Sudetenland or from Hungary, ultimately formed groups that held shared origins and ethnocultural norms and could be mobilized for the sake of the *Volksgruppen* community at large. As Aro convincingly shows, these migrant associations provided self-help, support, and protection to their members. They also organized financial assistance to regional compatriots, provided information on the current state of affairs in the home region, helped people to return there, and organized burials, offered financial support to widows, as well as arranging for the return of the deceased.

The transformations that took place within these communities after World War I are not unique, nor is the development itself. We can observe the same tendencies in Poland, the first Czechoslovak Republic, the Romanian Kingdom, and so forth. The welfare aspects of the *Landsmannschaften* behind the visible ethnocentric scene are also typical for any diaspora association that is a hub for ongoing migratory processes. What would be interesting to see, beyond a better elaboration of this aspect with the help of the sociology of migration, is its place within the several welfare efforts among the provisioning crisis of the first postwar years, and later, how much this role was really capable to attract potential members from a different social milieu.

Postwar Hungary shows an extreme contrast to the other Central European countries because it went from a multiethnic small “empire” to an almost completely homogenous state by 1920. There were no significant differences within the Hungarian-speaking population, either by dialect or by region. The most visible ethnic minority was German, a nationality that, unlike the others, had not had any mature political agenda during World War I and had not left the framework of cultural association before 1920. However, the war brought Germany closer to rural Hungary than ever before, with war propaganda as the most important ally with the direct experiences of serving in the army.<sup>63</sup> In his analysis, Zsolt Vitári recognizes the same tendencies on the anomalies in the new minority education system as Elisabeth Haid-Lener did in her chapter: The need for German schooling was already clearly expressed on behalf of the community and the German-speaking population regularly complained because the mother tongue was not taught. Another vulnerable point was the usage of their mother tongue in religious life. Although there were more than one hundred German-majority villages in Hungary, the use of the German language was steadily pushed into the background. The Hungarian German People’s Education Association

(*Ungarländischer Deutscher Volksbildungsverein*, UDV) was established in 1923 with the aim of promoting long-term economic cooperations and youth organizations—with relative success. At the beginning of the 1930s, after the economic crisis, however, a new, frustrated generation entered the stage. Furthermore, they saw fewer and fewer opportunities to cooperate with the Hungarian government. They proposed the mainstreaming of German identity against Hungarian aspirations and fought a fierce battle for the preservation of their own ethnic group. Institutional and financial help arrived from the already national-socialist Germany. With the radicalisation of the international political scene, the *Volksdeutsche Kameradschaft* and its successor from 1938 onward, the *Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn* (People's Association of Germans in Hungary) wanted to encompass the life of the Hungarian Germans in a complex manner. As Vitári convincingly demonstrates, the national-socialist ethnicizing initiatives in Hungary subordinated all spheres of life to the ethnic point of view and therefore tried to shatter the long-existing hierarchies and milieus. The *Großdeutsche* ambitions, which had already strongly permeated the life of the third generation, resulted after 1938 in a threefold disintegration: The disintegration of the balance in the multiethnic local communities, segregation within the ethnic group, but also among the generations.

## ETHNIC STRUGGLES: QUESTIONING THE STATE MONOPOLY OF VIOLENCE

The interplay of contingent and long-term factors is also on display in the chapter authored by Pavel Kladiwa and Andrea Pokludová, in the different context of the Bohemian Lands. While questions surrounding nationality came to the fore as the borders of the new Czechoslovak state were being defined, the authors make clear that ethnicizing was not a postwar phenomenon, but rather one that had been launched in Cisleithania in the last years of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with evidence of such provided for example by the Moravian Compromise of 1905. This continued and intensified after the war under changed circumstances, still balancing factors pertaining to ethnicity with economic, social, and political aspects that intersected in multiple ways with the former. As such, the postwar violence in the region often had its roots in wartime violence that was not directly related to armed combat, such as riots and revolts prompted by hunger or labor unrest. As in the case of Eastern Galicia, opposing sides in the “ethnicizing game” often vented their frustrations and discontent toward the outsiders who did not belong to either, in the form of local antisemitic excesses.

The balancing act that Habsburg imperial rule over a vast multiethnic and multi-confessional territory had implied meant that Jews were just one among many different ethnic/religious groups, and one that was, if anything, *less* dangerous or problematic

than those with national aspirations of their own. In the dichotomic either/or logic of self-determination rendered normative at Versailles, however, they did not “belong” to any ethnic group with state-building ambitions (although they were duly counted as such when demographic arguments were at stake, as shown in Jagoda Wierzejska’s chapter) and were correspondingly exposed to their ire when such ambitions were or appeared to be thwarted. Moreover, the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the association of Jews with Bolshevism had rendered them “dangerous” in the eyes of the many would-be state-builders who looked with apprehension at the potential spread of revolution to their lands. In an ethnicizing context, Bolshevism (and implicitly the Jews associated with them) and its internationalist impetus appeared as the sworn enemy of *all* attempts at nation-state-building and consolidation. And while the association of Jews with socialism and revolutionary politics more generally had been long-standing, the newly minted myth of “Judeo-Bolshevism” was both more urgent and more fearsome.<sup>64</sup> In the volatile context of the Russian Civil War and its numerous interstate ramifications, “the images of Leon Trotsky standing at the head of the Red Army, and of the Jewish Chekist in leather jacket with a Mauser pistol carrying out mass liquidations, conjured up an existential threat of demonic proportions.”<sup>65</sup> Even as “Judeo-Bolshevism” became a European or even global “specter” following the newfound popularity of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which were translated into numerous languages and became “an extraordinary best-seller” between 1918 and 1920,<sup>66</sup> its salience was understandably more prominent in the region directly exposed to the Russian Civil War.

Next to territorial disputes entangled with the attempts to ascertain the definitive “ethnicity” of certain groups in an area marked by a significant degree of national indifference and fluidity,<sup>67</sup> ideological mobilization and conflict was the second major determining factor of postwar violence. Béla Bodó’s chapter in the present volume addresses this topic in the case of postwar Hungary, comparing the “Red Terror” that followed the establishment of the Hungarian Soviet Republic established in March 1919 with the “White Terror” that followed its collapse, with “the ‘hot phase’ of the counterrevolution,” as the author—the foremost authority on the subject—refers to it, lasting between August 1919 and March 1920. Bodó’s chapter opens with a historiographic synopsis that briefly examines retrospective assessments of the crimes committed under each. This is also interesting considering their constituting “atrocious narratives,” similar in some respects to those covered in Wierzejska’s chapter but structured along ideological rather than ethnic fault lines and stretching out over different regimes of memory, all the way to contemporary scholarship.

Whereas in many other chapters in this volume the story was one of border disputes between competing ethnicizing projects, this is a case where at first glance ethnicity and legal citizenship regimes mattered less than ideology, with perpetrators belonging (mostly) to the same ethnic group. That, however, seems to have rendered the

dynamic more, rather than less, violent—while Wierzejska shows that the rules of engagement were mostly followed in Eastern Galicia even though the conflict was not one between two formally established states/armies, this does not seem to have been the case in 1919–1920 Hungary. Instead, as in many other contexts that pitched “Reds” against “Whites,” from Russia through Germany to the Baltics,<sup>68</sup> Bodó’s chapter reveals the extent of unrestrained violence perpetrated by both sides, but in particular by the better-educated and mostly professional soldiers and officers of the White detachments. This included cases of torture and sexual violence, also covered by the author in previous publications, with the latter especially representing a previously underresearched topic that has recently started to attract more scholarly attention.<sup>69</sup> In turn, this raises further questions about the boundaries of acceptability in instances of violence perpetrated on ideological grounds as compared to those associated with competing, but formally compatible in their aims, projects of nation- and state-building.

The chapter also provides detailed analyses of both the perpetrators and main victim groups in terms of their socioeconomic profiles, education, and wartime experience, as well as of the local dimension of the violence. In a conflict that was primarily ideological, Bodó also pays attention to other forms of violence that were not ideologically driven, such as the one occurring during the “democratic interlude” in postwar Hungary or the one perpetrated by the “green” armed groups of peasants, and which were primarily motivated by deprivation and desire for revenge rather than any “loftier” considerations. This is reminiscent of Kladiwa and Pokludová’s analysis of the importance of relative deprivation and socioeconomic factors in accounting for the dynamic prevailing in the Bohemian Lands and serves as a useful reminder that the violence in postwar Europe was always *situational* and driven by many other factors in addition to ethnicity or ideology.

Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that these two coordinates—roughly corresponding in this context also to Siniša Malešević’s more general considerations about the role of “the rise and fall of organisational capacity and the extent of ideological penetration within a group” in accounting for the social dynamics of violence<sup>70</sup>—are not mutually exclusive. In the volatile setting of postwar Central and Eastern Europe, “questions” related to ethnicity and ideology could mutate into each other. As Dan Diner argues in his interpretation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, “despite all the revolutionary rhetoric [. . .] the revolution was in fact a national rebellion against the imminent territorial dismemberment of Hungary. There was no question of any Bolshevik sentiment among the populace, nor even of any socialist sentiment.”<sup>71</sup> Instead, and reminiscent also of Holly Case’s notion of “question bundling,”<sup>72</sup> we could read the Hungarian case as one where “the national question, made pressing by the looming territorial dismemberment of Hungary, mutated into a social question as the economy spun out of control.”<sup>73</sup> Read against the background of national indifference

and “amphibian” populations who crossed ethnic boundaries, and of the numerous constraints—from international ones to war-weariness, hunger, and generalized deprivation—affecting the range of political decisions available, a more capacious and flexible understanding of the causes of violence might be more productive than one structured by sharper analytical lines.

One “ethnic” element does stand out in Bodó’s chapter, and it is one that recalls many other cases analyzed in this volume: The targeting of Jews, in this context by both the Red and White Terrors. The aggressions committed by Red troops against Jews, also analyzed by Brendan McGeever in the case of the Russian Civil War, serve as a useful reminder that the putatively anti-antisemitic socialist ideology did not preclude anti-Jewish violence.<sup>74</sup> Its more widespread presence among Red revolutionaries in contexts beyond Russia, as in a Hungary that had witnessed the alleged “golden age” of Jewish emancipation from 1867 to 1914, also warns against simplistic interpretations accounting for it by the survival of premodern, religiously inspired forms of prejudice. At the same time, as Bodó makes clear, “the number of Jews who had been killed, tortured, and humiliated [by Red militias] paled in comparison to the number of Jews who fell victim to the White Terror,” where they made up “one-third of the people murdered.” With the myth of “Judeo-Bolshevism” possibly accounting for it, the lines between ideological and ethnic violence appear once again to be blurred in this case, as the White Terror, despite its claims to the contrary, did not enact “revenge” for the crimes committed during the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Instead, Bodó argues, “the Red Terror served as a convenient excuse for ethnic and religious violence, and Jews the perfect scapegoats for national and individual tragedies.”<sup>75</sup>

The different cases analyzed in this volume, read against the background of the wider literature on the topic, present us with a broad spectrum of violence in terms of intensity, typologies, agents, victims, motivations (declared or otherwise), and geographical scope. Despite their differences, they allow a few general conclusions, some of which concur with the recent literature on the subject, while others point beyond them. The presence of “atrocious narratives” as a legitimizing factor appears relatively widespread, irrespective of whether a conflict was territorial or grounded in ideological antagonism, pointing at the increased importance of propaganda in the aftermath of World War I. At the same time, violence appears in all cases to have been highly situational, dependent on local conditions and more mundane factors such as hunger, greed, or opportunities for plunder as much as on nation-making or nation-breaking ideologies. Among such instances of communal rather than state-driven or state-endorsed violence, antisemitic excesses stand out in terms of both frequency and spatial ubiquity across the area of Central and Eastern Europe at least. Anti-Jewish violence points both at the endurance of long-standing antisemitic tropes and at the heightened vulnerability of interstitial groups falling between the cracks of the Versailles-inspired legal regime aimed

at ethnicizing Europe, rendered particularly dangerous for the Jews by the proliferation of the myth of Judeo-Bolshevism. Most importantly, when read in conjunction with the new legal norms centered on citizenship, they recall Eric D. Weitz's sobering remark that "the construction of citizenship necessarily involves boundary-drawing, of territorial borders but also of peoples. The creation of rights for some is, then, inextricably wound up with denying others the access to rights [...] Historically, then, rights and crimes emerged together."<sup>76</sup> If the situational nature of the violence in an uncertain, changing, volatile context raises questions about its contingent importance as a source of *legitimacy* and in-group solidarity, its imbrication with legal norms putatively aimed at preventing violence points instead at tracing its deeper roots before World War I, into the European *fin-de-siècle*.

The long-term lineages of postwar violence allow us to zoom in closer on its complex imbrication with the politics of ethnicity and citizenship, as well as on the civilizational notions underpinning them, persistent legacies of the nineteenth-century imperial "civilizing missions." Jagoda Wierzejska's chapter in this volume illustrates these well when discussing the Polish and Ukrainian propaganda during the war for Eastern Galicia (1918–1919). Wierzejska shows the propaganda deployed on both sides of this conflict to be reliant on two main discursive strategies, one involving competing ethnic claims to the region, the other mutual accusations of having committed war crimes. Both bring to the fore the importance of considering the interplay between immediate conjectural factors and long-term developments in approaching postwar violence and its interpretation. On the one hand, the deployment of propaganda centered on "atrocious narratives" was very much a product of World War I, having taken unprecedented proportions in its course and having eventually been formally institutionalized by the creation of specialized government offices.<sup>77</sup> Originally developed in Western Europe in association with the German "rape of Belgium," according to Maciej Górny these had been imported into Eastern Europe as early as 1915.<sup>78</sup> However, the rise of propaganda during World War I was itself reliant on the importance of public opinion, a long-term process that unfolded over the long nineteenth century.<sup>79</sup>

Moreover, and on the other hand, the *content* of both types of Polish and Ukrainian propaganda that Wierzejska analyzes in her chapter points in the direction of continuities that antedated the war. With regard to the staking of ethnic claims to the disputed region, both sides' narratives relied on academic knowledge production stretching back into the nineteenth century, invoking arguments based on cartography, anthropogeography, and ethnopsychology that were so characteristic of the era.<sup>80</sup> Meanwhile, atrocity narratives invoked even earlier associations of the Ukrainians with the *haidamakas*, eighteenth-century paramilitary units active on the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. These helped portray twentieth-century Ukrainians not just as "savages" or even "animals," an aspect legitimizing the purported Polish "civilizing mission"

in Eastern Galicia, but implicitly as living anachronisms belonging to another, past era that had to be superseded. In turn, the Ukrainians' propaganda also pointed at the abuses of the Polish gentry during the time of the Commonwealth, which had prompted the *haidamakas'* resentment. This had resulted in several eighteenth-century rebellions and eventually came to be associated with the development of the Ukrainian national movement in the 1930s, with its visible anti-Polish component. Contingent as the violence in Eastern Galicia might have been, its long-term history certainly mattered in legitimizing it and in portraying the enemy as a "beast" beyond the pale of civilization, capable of unspeakable horrors. At a time when borders were far from being settled and both belligerent sides looked with hope toward the peacemakers in Versailles, both the academic studies and the atrocity narratives were written with a foreign audience in mind. As such, the need to prove a certain "standard of civilisation" (and deny it to one's enemy) was a pervasive element, one that again shows the importance of considering together short-term factors like wartime propaganda and civilizational narratives stretching over the *longue durée*.<sup>81</sup>

Despite these longer lineages, the end of World War I and the Versailles Peace was certainly a historical "moment" itself, with long-term consequences, some of which reverberate even today, whether in the form of contested borders or in the shape and geographical scope of contemporary minority protection.<sup>82</sup> As the chapters in this volume show, the intersection of new conceptions of "ethnicity," embedded in new legal norms centered on notions of self-determination—that were as inconsistent or irrelevant in some local contexts as they were proclaimed to be "absolute"—could not provide the grid of legibility that was meant to guarantee state sovereignty and peace in Europe. They were, moreover, as Tara Zahra argues in the Afterword, "supported by a global edifice of racial hierarchies and ideologies," whereby "ethnicity" came to straddle "a view of nationality as a biological fact and a view of it as a cultural construct." Read in this light, Eastern Europe, with its much-invoked liminality of the "lands between," appears less exceptional when compared to France, itself engaged in processes of violent classification of the population in Alsace-Lorraine, complete with expulsions of "undesirables."<sup>83</sup> It is therefore a European or even global story, one where if Central and Eastern Europe featured more prominently, it is perhaps at least partly because that is where the architects of the peace were primarily looking.

The fact that this was not just a European story, but a transatlantic one, was rendered even more visible by the presence of American statesmen and experts, as well as the American President Woodrow Wilson at Versailles, who intervened in European affairs more decisively than ever before. Analogies and parallels between Europe and the United States of America, whether along the lines of race, migration, slavery, or emancipation, often missed the very points they were trying to make, and certainly the overarching, racially hierarchical continuum in which such analogies were embedded.

Processes of “ethnicizing” diverse populations might have come up against the limits of national indifference, but, with the weight of nation-states behind them, they increasingly succeeded in creating the majorities and minorities they purported to classify and “manage.” However, the neater, clearer lines of distinction failed to contain violence, as was allegedly intended, but instead ended up exacerbating it, for a host of reasons, many of which were rooted in contingencies that continued to circumvent the rigidity of legal norms and to escape the interpretive grids of states.

## NOTES

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2. Álmos Korall [Aladár Komlós] “Zsidók a választúton” [Jews at a Crossroad], in Aladár Komlós, *Magyar-zsidó szellemtörténet a reformkortól a Holocaustig, I–II* [The Hungarian-Jewish History of Ideas from the Reform Age to the Holocaust, I–II] (Múlt és Jövő, 1997), 11, 22.
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24. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, 15.
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27. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 170.
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29. Hobsbawm-Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*, 10.
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41. Weber, *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, 40.
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72. Holly Case, *The Age of Questions: Or, A First Attempt at an Aggregate History of the Eastern, Social, Woman, American, Jewish, Polish, Bullion, Tuberculosis, and Many Other Questions over the Nineteenth Century, and Beyond* (Princeton University Press, 2018).
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PART 1

LAWS AND LEGAL  
CONCEPTS OF  
CITIZENSHIP



# I

## DEMARCATING THE NATIONAL FAMILY

French Nation-Building, “Authentic” Alsatians,  
German Immigrants, and Alsace, 1914–1920

DEVLIN M. SCOFIELD

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES REFLECTED THE AGGRESSIVE FRENCH nation-building practices in Alsace following World War I. Even before the treaty officially took effect in January 1920, Republican officials commenced an effort to cleanse the former *Reichsland*<sup>1</sup> of the most egregious vestiges of Imperial institutions. An essential component of this endeavor involved an evaluation of the region’s population and the separation of the nationally loyal “authentic” Alsatians from nationally suspect Germans.<sup>2</sup> French authorities delineated this distinction by mobilizing wartime classifications, identity cards, and triage commissions. In the process, they defined the parameters of the nation in the Franco-German borderland. Many Germans, and even Alsatians, whose actions contradicted the narrative of an abiding Francophile Alsace, were identified as potentially disruptive to national reintegration and liable to be expelled. The postwar peace settlement codified a more exclusive definition of national belonging, effectively privileging France’s right to claim its ideal citizenry over the individual’s right to choose their desired homeland. The net result was widespread voluntary and forced migration from Alsace, leaving a legacy of bitterness that returned to haunt the borderland in 1940.

France’s reassertion of sovereignty in Alsace was based on the presupposition of a fundamental incongruity between an Alsatian and a German. Republican authorities were convinced that a German could never be an Alsatian regardless of their birthplace or length of residence in the borderland. Nor could an Alsatian be a German without gross perversion of their nature.<sup>3</sup> Definitions of an Alsatian became progressively exclusive

from 1914 to 1920. This evolution reflected French officials' most pressing contemporary concerns, as well as the context in which they were articulated. The wartime desire to add symbolic credence to France's claim to Alsace through the enlistment of *Reichsländer* in the French military fostered a more inclusive understanding. Postwar designations promulgated after the military victory encouraged a more constrained definition. In contrast to German policies following the Franco-Prussian War, eligibility to be included in the nation after World War I transformed from an agreement to accept the sovereignty of the new government and abide by its laws to a model that prioritized ethnocultural descent, previous nationality, and actions under the Imperial administration. The officially created dichotomy of German/Alsatian left little room for national ambiguity. Interwar French authorities did not recognize a unique Alsatian experience. A Germanophile Alsatian was as unwelcome in French Alsace as any suspect German. Regardless of the supposed expansiveness of French citizenship law for immigrants to France,<sup>4</sup> it proved to be exclusionary and restrictive when French borders moved across people.

The paths to citizenship outlined in the Treaty of Versailles marked a distinct departure from assimilatory notions of *jus soli* codified in the 1889 French nationality law. This change reflected Republican authorities' fears that the undifferentiated naturalization of the thousands of Germans and their descendants who had migrated to the *Reichsland* during the Imperial period would significantly problematize the reintegration of Alsace to France. The treatment of the immigrant population after World War I reveals the limits of French confidence in the acculturating power of Republican institutions. Authorities' certitude of unalterable Germanness was matched by the faith that Alsatians remained time capsules of Francophile sentiment. Contemporary Alsatians could be trusted to be reliable citizens because their fathers had known life in France, not necessarily because they could be taught to be good Frenchmen. These distinctions rested upon the premise that an individual's national loyalties were hereditary and could be predicted with a high degree of certainty through paternal blood kinship. However, descent alone was insufficient to guarantee a place within the French nation. Ultimately, the tension between existing citizenship legislation and the reality of the multicultural frontier led Republican officials to adopt procedures that combined elements of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*, along with considerations independent of both citizenship principles.

Recent First World War historiography has sought to expand the temporal parameters of the conflict and emphasize continuities in belligerents' practices. The revision of traditional periodization challenges the established historical brackets that separate the war years (1914–1918) from a distinct postwar period. This emphasis has been particularly evident in studies of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia.<sup>5</sup> Robert Gerwarth argues that an unambiguous interwar period beginning with the November 1918 armistice and ending in September 1939 only “makes sense” for Great Britain and France.<sup>6</sup>

Historians like Daniela L. Caglioti, Philipp Ther, and Theodora Dragostinova similarly claim that population management policies like expulsion, internment, and nationalization (among others) were not regionally unique to any part of the continent but go further in situating the leading proponents of national homogenization in Western Europe, particularly among the eventual triumphant powers of World War I.<sup>7</sup> The study of Alsace from 1914 to 1920 likewise illustrates the value of challenging established time-frames and notions of regionally and victor/vanquished specific experiences within Europe. It demonstrates the existence of transcontinental continuities that witnessed the victors, in this case France, not just advocating the use of “demographic engineering”<sup>8</sup> or “ethnic cleansing”<sup>9</sup> in the postwar peace settlements in other parts of the world, but also actively mobilizing and implementing them to achieve an imagined, more perfect form, of national homogeneity within France’s newly revised borders.

In the historiography of Alsace, many recent English language works focus on tracing the experiences of particular segments of Alsatian society such as cultural elites, women, workers, and students across successive political regimes.<sup>10</sup> French-language publications also tend to be regional in their orientation but confined to studies under a single government.<sup>11</sup> Alison Carrol’s monograph represents an amalgamation of both historiographies. Carrol focuses on the Franco-German borderland under one administration and purposefully situates Alsations’ experiences within Europe.<sup>12</sup> Many of these works mark the German-to-French sovereignty transfer in 1918. Yet, the transitional period between the signing of the armistice and the Treaty of Versailles going into effect receives scarce attention. Laird Boswell’s article, “From Liberation to Purge Trials in the ‘Mythic Provinces,’” remains the cornerstone study on this understudied era.<sup>13</sup> Boswell adroitly elucidates the French *épuration* of Alsace and even identifies it as a milder precursor to the more violent cleansing of the province after 1945. However, Boswell does not connect the origins of French practice in 1918 and the Alsace-Lorraine citizenship clauses of the Treaty of Versailles to measures established during the conflict, therefore missing the opportunity to reconceptualize the periodization of the Franco-German borderland similarly to those historians of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia.

## DELINEATING THE PARAMETERS OF NATIONAL BELONGING DURING WORLD WAR I

On the evening of Friday, July 31, 1914, Imperial officials announced that a state of war existed in the *Reichsland*. In practice, this meant that the military took executive power. Restrictions on peacetime freedoms for the Alsatian population quickly followed the

transfer from civilian to martial administration. Articles of the Reich's constitution guaranteeing freedom of expression, association, and assembly were suspended, and prospective combat zones were evacuated. During the conflict, authorities took steps to eliminate French influence in Alsace by closing French-language newspapers, forbidding the language in public, and germanizing the names of businesses, natural features, and towns.<sup>14</sup> In the realm of military operations, Alsace provided the backdrop for some of the earliest clashes between Republican and Imperial forces, as French General Joseph Joffre unleashed Plan XVII to reconquer the "lost provinces." The campaign failed, but the French retained a small portion of Upper Alsace against repeated German counterattacks.<sup>15</sup> The Alsatian front marked the only point where the enemy would successfully entrench themselves on Germany's soil for the duration of the war.

World War I was a watershed in the history of Alsace. Wartime exigencies forced Republican officials to rapidly transition from idealist preconflict nationalist rhetoric to a practical and enforceable delineation between desirable and undesirable population elements from the Franco-German borderland. Military authorities and the officially constituted consultative body, the *Conférence d'Alsace-Lorraine*, played a central role in creating the definitions and policies that established the basic parameters of belonging during the conflict. These wartime practices were subsequently implemented in Alsace during the period of transitory sovereignty that lasted from the occupation of the former *Reichsland* by Republican forces in November 1918 until the Treaty of Versailles formally went into effect on January 10, 1920.

The reclamation of Alsace and Lorraine became a centerpiece of French war aims after the outbreak of war in 1914.<sup>16</sup> Republican officials quickly announced that Germany had nullified the post-Franco-Prussian War peace settlements through their declaration of war on August 3. The *Conférence d'Alsace-Lorraine*, which was established in 1915 and charged with making policy recommendations to ease the return of the *Reichsland* to France,<sup>17</sup> formally endorsed and articulated the consequences of this position for the "lost provinces," resolving, "The *Conférence d'Alsace-Lorraine* expresses the unanimous opinion that the Treaty of Frankfurt has been annulled as a result of Germany's declaration of war on France. In consequence, Alsace-Lorraine, which has never ceased to protest the German conquest, is rightfully reinstated to French sovereignty, without retrocession, plebiscite, or any other form of consultation."<sup>18</sup> This resolution framed France's military effort to retake the *Reichsland* as fulfilling the long-held wish of the "genuine" indigenous population and as a matter of honor and international justice.<sup>19</sup> Despite the seeming straightforwardness of this statement of principle, Republican authorities recognized that the redemption of Alsace and Lorraine was not as simple as swapping French for German sovereignty. The presence of 250,000 to 300,000 German migrants and their descendants, who had relocated to the Franco-German borderland since 1871, appeared to pose a lasting obstruction to the reintegration of the borderland into France.

The German population in the *Reichsland* posed a significant conundrum for Republican civilian and military officials. *Conférence* delegates described immigrants as “agents of Germanization”<sup>20</sup> and “unassimilable” because of their extreme “foreignness.”<sup>21</sup> Despite these concerns, members never seriously considered the expulsion of all Germans, viewing such an action as “inhumane and beneath the dignity of France.”<sup>22</sup> An alternative solution to weed out the most disruptive and dangerous sources of German influence would have to be found. This ultimately became the focus of French demographic engineering during the conflict and postwar period. Republican officials oversaw the creation and implementation of a system that distinguished ethnic Alsatians from Germans in a definitory and applied sense, screened and triaged the *Reichsland*'s inhabitants to determine levels of threat to the reassertion of French sovereignty, and employed population policies such as internment or expulsion (among others) to neutralize elements identified as dangerous. Ultimately, in this effort, Republican authorities strategically adopted selected principles of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*, along with independent considerations such as an individual's wartime actions and reputation, to determine the national desirability of the *Reichsland*'s inhabitants and manipulate demographics in a manner perceived as most aligned with France's interests.

Short- and long-term population policy considerations motivated the French dichotomization of Alsace's inhabitants. The appropriate treatment of the estimated 21,700 Alsace-Lorrainers with German citizenship in France or French-occupied territories was of immediate concern at the commencement of hostilities.<sup>23</sup> Republican officials adopted an identification card system for these individuals that reflected their confidence in the bearer's Francophile sentiments.<sup>24</sup> Alsatians present in France at the outbreak of hostilities received white cards. Although this categorization reflected authorities' uncertainty regarding the carrier's national attitude, white-card holders could live in designated locations under minimal surveillance.<sup>25</sup> French officials bestowed the tricolor card upon Alsatians and Lorrainers who voluntarily left the *Reichsland* or traveled to France after August 4, 1914. This most prestigious personal documentation reflected authorities' complete faith in the recipient's national sentiments. The bearer was placed on the same footing as French and Belgian refugees and permitted free movement within France outside military operation zones.<sup>26</sup> Alsace-Lorrainers, suspected of being anti-French and potential threats to military security, were ordered to be detained for the duration of the conflict.<sup>27</sup>

Even in the *Reichsland*, the seeming straightforward distinction between Alsatians and Germans required additional definitive elaboration. After nearly fifty years of Imperial rule, immigration, and marriages, the makeup of the borderland population could not be encompassed by such a bifurcated categorization. For instance, what was the status of German immigrants' children born in Alsace or children born to a mixed marriage? A confidential report plainly articulated the official French position relating that

“Alsace-Lorrainers of French origin are not to be confused with persons born on the territory of Alsace-Lorraine to German parents (children of immigrants). These last are to be classified among the Germans.”<sup>28</sup> The status of “mixed-parentage” offspring was more complicated. In France, the Civil Code delineated that a father’s nationality determined that of his children. The exact application of this policy in the *Reichsland* would mean that only the descendants of an Alsatian male and German female would automatically become French, while leaving unclear the status of children born to a German man and an Alsatian woman. *Conférence d’Alsace-Lorraine* delegate M. Souchon further problematized the procedure by questioning if the father or mother was more influential in determining national sympathies since the latter had more influence in determining the domestic milieu.<sup>29</sup> It followed that perhaps the children of Alsatian women rather than German women would be more likely to have pro-French feelings. Such a scenario raised a troubling issue regarding the viability of categorically ascribed national sympathies in the borderland, an assumption upon which much of the French argument for the return of Alsace and Lorraine was premised. Ultimately, the *Conférence* sidestepped the issue and adopted a proposition that recommended the progenies of “mixed marriages” be given the choice of accepting French nationality when they reached the age of majority.<sup>30</sup> Meanwhile, wartime Republican practice continued to rely on the patriarchal presuppositions regarding Alsatians’ national loyalties.

While the vast majority of *Reichsländer* fought for Germany (380,000) during World War I, thousands also donned the horizon blue and served France (17,650).<sup>31</sup> Despite these disproportionate numbers, the military service of Alsatians in Republican forces provided critical symbolic currency to the claim that Alsace and Lorraine had never ceased to be French and should be so again. Engaging the borderland recruits necessitated delineating eligibility. Lieutenant Colonel Albert Carré, tasked with recruiting willing enlistees from the *Reichsland* for the French army, provides the most precise articulation of the patriarchal and hereditary notion of an authentic Alsace-Lorrainer. Carré wrote, “All individuals are Alsace-Lorrainers of French origin who themselves were French or possess a paternal ascendant who was French on May 20, 1871, and would have continued to be French if not for the intervention of the Treaty of Frankfurt. Every Alsace-Lorrainer of French origin is presumed to have French sentiments.”<sup>32</sup>

Thousands of Imperial soldiers from the Franco-German borderland fell into the hands of the Entente Powers during the conflict. Some had willingly deserted German lines. Others were involuntarily taken in the fighting. In 1915, Republican officials began separating Alsatian and Lorrainer soldiers from their German comrades. The captive borderland combatants were directed to special camps located in St. Rambert-sur-Loire (Loire), Monistrol (Haut-Loire), Lourdes (Hautes-Pyrénées), and Paris.<sup>33</sup> The designation of an Alsace-Lorrainer as being “of French origin” was not applied lightly. All such individuals were triaged upon their arrival at the camps.

Shortly after they entered at the separate facilities, the captive soldiers were interviewed. French officials made a concentrated effort to pair the candidate with an Alsatian interrogator from the same region. The questioner's firsthand knowledge of the local community tested the veracity of the enlistee's background. Dominik Richert recalled being questioned in dialect about the mayor of his hometown of St. Ulrich and asked the name of the local bookbinder by a French Alsatian officer following his desertion from the Imperial army.<sup>34</sup> Republican authorities perceived the *patois* interview as the most accurate identity-establishing practice. They were convinced a German immigrant could never perfectly reproduce all the idioms, phrases, and vocabulary like a native Alsatian, even if the individual had grown up speaking the dialect. In contrast, "From his earliest childhood, the young Alsatian will have only spoken dialect, will speak it freely at home and in public, and will not have been influenced by the German instruction that he received. Later in colleges and universities, his way of expressing himself will remain Alsatian pure from all alloys and all German turns of phrases and expressions. If necessary, an instinctive aversion to defend against the tendency to mix the two languages, which for him, are clearly so foreign from one another as the Alsatian and German souls."<sup>35</sup> This extraordinary quote demonstrates the official imagining of a timeless Alsace. In this construction, Alsatians existed in a linguistic and cultural vacuum deliberately kept separate and defended against German influence for over forty years. The overt assumption of the observation was that the Alsatian essence could not be reconciled with, learned by, or transferred to a German. In the unlikely instance that an "Alsatian of bad quality" might pass the interview, French officials were confident that fellow Alsace-Lorrainers in their ranks would quickly denounce such rarities.<sup>36</sup> Both statements' inclusion in a confidential military instruction booklet that established the procedures through which Alsatians were incorporated into the French army demonstrates that military authorities were willing to bet France's national security on these assumptions. The gamble appears to have been sound. As late as October 1918, Republican officials recorded no reported cases of voluntarily enlisted Alsace-Lorrainers spying for Germany.<sup>37</sup>

## THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION: REENTRANCE PROHIBITIONS, IDENTIFICATION CARDS, EXPULSIONS, AND TRIAGE COMMISSIONS, NOVEMBER 1918–JANUARY 1920

The imminent return of the *Reichsland* to France after November 1918 made it imperative that Republican authorities systematically implement their categorization of the Franco-German borderland's population. Time constraints encouraged decisive

action. The military occupation empowered French officials to expel undesirable enemy aliens and nationally suspect individuals in the name of security that would be absent once the region was formally reincorporated into France under a civilian administration. The distinction between Alsatians and Germans was critical in determining the trajectory of an individual's postwar experience in the Franco-German borderland. Republican officials were convinced that a certain sifting of the population was necessary to exclude individuals judged irreconcilable to French rule. Reentry prohibitions, summary, and more deliberately considered expulsions characterized postwar population engineering in Alsace. Factors such as lineage, birthplace, wartime actions, and national attitudes were evaluated to determine whether an inhabitant was eligible for immediate French citizenship, eventual naturalization, or viewed as a potential threat. The peremptory treatment of German immigrants and their descendants sharply contrasted with the more nuanced effort to sift the Alsatian population. Just a hint of overly Germanophile sentiment or alleged wrongs committed against the indigenous populace was often cause enough for internment and probable expulsion of the implicated German. In juxtaposition, Triage Commissions were initially instituted to review accusations of collaboration and national disloyalty among the Alsatian populace.<sup>38</sup>

### Reentrance Prohibitions

Discharged soldiers from Imperial forces began arriving at the new frontier on November 22, 1918. Border guards closely inspected papers, removed Imperial military insignia, searched for hidden weapons, and often temporarily interned the ex-combatants in empty German barracks until their nationality and identities were confirmed. Veterans that Republican authorities considered German faced significant delay or denial of their reentrance effort. A report submitted in December 1918 informed German authorities that the French were interning all soldiers of German heritage returning to the province even if they possessed *Reichsland* citizenship.<sup>39</sup> German officials protested that the delayed homecomings threatened the emotional health and economic livelihood of the affected individuals, writing, "It is also bitter and painful for demobilized soldiers—the majority of whom have been separated from their families for a long time—who now, the war being over for them and yearning to be reunited with their loved ones and resume their civilian jobs, find themselves prevented from doing so and for no discernable reason because the notion that these people could be a danger to the security of the occupational forces in Alsace-Lorraine is impossible."<sup>40</sup> Republican disregard of these protests reflects a seeming disconnect in perceptions of the permanence of the armistice. German authorities appear to have viewed the ceasefire as the definitive conclusion to the war. In contrast, the French seem more cognizant that a

potential renewal of hostilities made the presence of thousands of former Imperial soldiers in Alsace undesirable. The differing Franco-German interpretations of the ceasefire are further evidence of Republican officials' investment in the notion of hereditary national loyalty. As one source explained, "It is indispensable that the distinction [between authentic and false Alsatians] be made because it would be appalling to return genuine Germans (*vrais boches*) under the sole pretext that they were born [in Alsace] and that they claim to have become good Frenchmen."<sup>41</sup> Republican authorities were thus convinced that a successful separation of immigrants from the native population would safeguard Alsace even in a renewal of hostilities.

### Identification Cards

A four-tiered, alphabetically designated identification system marked French officials' first effort to categorize the population living in postwar Alsace. Residents designated as "A" cardholders either possessed French citizenship before May 10, 1871, or were the descendants of such individuals.<sup>42</sup> "B" cards indicated that the bearer had a parent not of "pure" Alsatian stock. Non-German foreigners were "C" cardholders. "D" cards labeled inhabitants who themselves or their forbearers originated from a wartime enemy of France. The vast majority of these recipients were Germans and their descendants who had migrated to Alsace after the Franco-Prussian War.<sup>43</sup>

The diversity of the borderland's population, already recognized as problematic for a straightforward classification by the *Conférence d'Alsace-Lorraine*, rapidly emerged in post-armistice Alsace. The widespread intermarriage of individuals who French officials identified as German and Alsatian meant that household units could not be singularly categorized. Instead, an array of different identity cards were regularly issued within the same family. For instance, the children of an Alsatian ("A" card) and a German woman ("D" card) would receive "B" cards.<sup>44</sup>

The conferral of an identity card did not concurrently award French nationality. However, the particular card a resident of Alsace received revealed their ethnic classification from the official Republican perspective and disclosed their particular avenue to French citizenship after the Treaty of Versailles' ratification. Identity card assignments to the population of the Franco-German borderland broke down as follows: out of a total population of 1,894,950; 59 percent (1,082,650) received A cards, 10 percent (183,500) collected B cards, 3 percent (55,000) got C cards, and 28 percent (573,800) were given D cards.<sup>45</sup> Between the arrival of occupying French forces in November 1918 and October 1919, when the French Chamber ratified the Treaty of Versailles, the cards became a vehicle for identification and discrimination. Individuals' categorization determined their freedom of movement, ability to change money, vote, potential job prospects, and the probability of remaining in French Alsace.

## Expulsions and Voluntary Emigration

The transitional period of sovereignty between November 1918 and January 1920 was marked by widespread voluntary and forced migration from Alsace. The expulsions represented both continuity and rupture with Franco-Prussian War population policies—similar in the sense that French authorities likewise categorically banished foreigners from Strasbourg as threats to security in early August 1870,<sup>46</sup> but also a break from the guarantees of nationality choice and propriety protection in the Treaty of Frankfurt.<sup>47</sup> Expelled individuals were given only twenty-four hours' notice to pack 30–40 kilograms of luggage, a maximum of 2,000 German Marks per adult, and 500 German marks per child before reporting to French authorities at a border crossing.<sup>48</sup> In most cases, French authorities sequestered and eventually liquidated any remaining possessions and property, resulting in significant financial loss for the forced migrants.<sup>49</sup> The traumatic nature of their expulsion amplified the nightmare of expellees' emigration. Republican officials were not content to allow barred individuals to slip over the border quietly. The Committee of Exiled Alsace-Lorrainers accused French authorities of deliberately exposing expellees to an Alsatian mob's physical and oral abuse on the day of their departure by assembling them in Strasbourg's busiest square.<sup>50</sup> German sources further highlighted the supposed callousness of the new administrators by reporting the systematic search of expellees' luggage and their persons to prevent any more than the allotted financial resources from leaving Alsace.<sup>51</sup>

Neither expellees nor their loved ones silently acquiesced to their exclusion from the former *Reichsland*. After having twice failed in previous appeals to the Bas-Rhin Prefecture, a certain Elise Heintz wrote directly to the commissar general of Alsace and Lorraine requesting his benevolent intervention in the case of her son, Josef Fernekess, who had been banished from Alsace “without plausible reasons” in February 1920. Heintz's letter called attention to the fact that she was married to a “category A” Alsatian and that Josef's brother, Frédéric, had voluntarily enlisted in the French army and died fighting in Serbia in May 1917. The case was unique because Elise and Josef were both D card holders. Despite her status as a German in the eyes of French authorities, Heintz related her intention to utilize her husband's privileged classification to apply for naturalization as a French citizen. She employed this imminent status to assert the right to reclaim her son.<sup>52</sup> The note sparked an investigation by the Strasbourg police, which subsequently reported on Heintz's life, morals, and national sentiments.

Elise (Fernekekess) Heintz was born in Bavaria in 1877. She had two children (Frédéric and Josef) before marrying Emile Heintz and moving to Strasbourg in 1909. The couple later had four children of their own. In contrast to their younger half-siblings, both Frédéric and Josef were German in the eyes of French authorities due to their ancestry and birth in Germany. Yet despite his ties to the *Kaiserreich*, Frédéric fled Strasbourg in 1913 following his conscription into the Imperial navy. He subsequently enlisted in the

French army and was killed in the fighting around Monastir, Serbia, in 1917. Neither Josef nor his mother were identified as zealous German nationalists. The investigating officer could not find any specific factor contributing to Josef's expulsion but speculated it was due to his administrative position at the railroad. The report concluded by observing that Josef's return would pose no obvious drawback, save the inconvenience of returning a person already expelled by French authorities.<sup>53</sup> Despite the investigation's findings, Elise Heintz's petition was rejected.

The case of Josef Fernekes reveals the complicated nature of the postwar sorting process and the impenetrability of German and Alsatian categories. Josef's mother's appeal to the commissar general following multiple failed efforts with lower-ranking French officials highlights borderland petitioners' persistence even after initial refusals. Moreover, the factors that Elise drew upon to justify the reevaluation of her son's case—her husband's status as an A card holder, her intention to be naturalized, the critical economic contribution that a returned Josef would make to the family, and most importantly, Frédéric's service and death in the French military, all suggest a knowledge of factors considered important by Republican authorities in their nationality decisions. Elise seemingly had a compelling case for the reversal of the expulsion decision given these reasons and the investigator's conclusion that neither Josef nor his mother posed any real threat to the reassertion of French sovereignty in Alsace. The rejection of Josef's case reflects the larger difficulty the German immigrant population faced in overcoming postwar French ethnic classifications and the associated assumptions. In the circumstances described in Elise's appeal and subsequent investigation, both she and Josef would have been celebrated as quintessential examples of the abiding nature of Francophile sentiment in Alsace had they held A cards. Instead, despite his brother's sacrifice for France and the impending naturalization of his mother, Josef remained a German. As such, Republican authorities would not give him the benefit of the doubt regarding his potential to become a good Frenchman.

Inexact recordkeeping makes an estimation of any attempt to count the number of Germans and Alsatians who were expelled or voluntarily emigrated from the province after World War I. Historians and contemporary sources have generally agreed upon a figure that ranges from 110,000<sup>54</sup> to 150,000.<sup>55</sup> A sampling of German archival records covering the latter half of 1919 details that 96,600 residents had exited Alsace by the time the Treaty of Versailles went into effect on January 10, 1920.<sup>56</sup> Statistics alone insufficiently encapsulate the tremendous personal and societal disruption caused by the expulsions. Many of the expellees had been born in the *Reichsland* and had deeper ties to Alsace than the areas of Germany from which their forebearers had migrated. German authorities observed, "For the majority [of the German expellees], their expulsion would mean more than economic ruin if they are robbed of their *Heimat* and their previous existences if they are torn from cherished relationships and forced to begin a new

life in foreign places where they have no relations to come to their aid.”<sup>57</sup> Beyond the immediate human and financial costs, the expulsions of the German population set a disastrous precedent for the victor in the borderland.

### Triage Commissions

French Premier Georges Clemenceau outlined the form and purpose of the Triage Commissions on November 2, 1918. This first order charged the commissions to examine individual cases of Alsatians accused of acting “contrary to the population’s sentiments.”<sup>58</sup> Thus, the myth of an ever-loyal Alsace continued to shape postwar French policymaking by distinguishing the allegedly exceptional individual from the otherwise collectively held national loyalties of the region’s inhabitants. Director General Paul Valot defined suspect individuals as those,

People, who before November 11, 1918, expressed pro-German sentiment or participated in anti-French demonstrations, those who had denounced others [for pro-French sentiment], those who had lent their aid before or during the war to our enemies in an objectionable manner, those who were deported in 1914 and by reason of the Bern Accord were returned home and used this opportunity to advise the Germans about affairs in France and the enlistment of their fellow [Alsace-Lorrainer] citizens in the French army, and those that accepted rank in the German army under conditions which could make their loyalism suspect.<sup>59</sup>

Thus, Alsatians perceived to have transgressed against the French nation and its aspirant citizenry during the 1914–1918 conflict were prominent targets for the postwar Triage Commissions. Critics pointed out that these alleged offenses were, in reality, patriotic actions supporting the government that held sovereignty over the *Reichsland* at the time. University of Strasbourg professor Robert Redslob argued that, legally, the French government could not distinguish between national and anti-national actions of Alsatians and Lorrainers before the signing of the Treaty of Versailles because the borderland residents were internationally recognized as German subjects.<sup>60</sup>

Historians have since identified additional targets of the Triage Commissions, including German labor leaders, former civil servants and state employees, suspected prostitutes, and cultural mediators, such as teachers, religious leaders, and regionalists.<sup>61</sup> The ambiguity of the nationally suspect category allowed French authorities to target and remove any individual perceived to represent an overt or latent national, moral, or political problem to the new regime.

The Triage Commissions officially began their work on December 20, 1918. The panels themselves were not empowered to initiate investigations. Instead, they were only

to adjudicate cases referred to them by civilian and military authorities, who were responsible for collecting evidence. This instruction meant that members could only rely upon provided materials to pass judgment. In-person testimony from witnesses was described as beneficial but not required. The reluctance of many denouncers to appear before the Triage Commissions meant that defendants were often unable to confront their accusers directly. The suspect was invited to present their defense once all panel members were familiar with the case details. The absence of otherwise mandated judicial procedures created a lasting sense of grievance associated with the triage process.

The Triage Commissions' advisory role extended to judgments. They could only recommend sanctions to the general commandant of the army.<sup>62</sup> This chain of command reflected the preeminence of military authority during the period of sovereignty transition. Martial officials alone were empowered to remove an individual suspected as a potential danger to the security of French military forces.<sup>63</sup> The Triage Commissions' lack of actual autonomy stands in stark contrast to their enduring association with excesses committed against the Alsatian populace by Republican authorities in the immediate postwar period. Historian David Allen Harvey argues that these "sham trials" caused widespread disillusionment among the Alsatian population and contributed to the growing *malaise-alsacien*.<sup>64</sup> Contemporary commentators believed that the French did not anticipate the significant ripple effect of the triage judgments. The trials embittered the accused and alienated their families, relatives, and broader circle of friends, who were direct observers of the injustices.<sup>65</sup> Estimates suggest some 15,000 cases were brought before the Triage Commissions,<sup>66</sup> making it likely that a large percentage of the population had some connection with a defendant. Alsations might have been willing to acquiesce to a moderate "cleansing of the province," but French zealotry trampled on people's rights in a way that echoed the wartime German military dictatorship.<sup>67</sup> The commissions' knowledge of their consultative role may have encouraged panels to err on the side of severity when recommending punitive consequences for a defendant. Members recognized that a web of bureaucracy above them would reevaluate their decisions.

French authorities planned for Triage Commissions' recommendations to undergo an automatic reevaluation by Second Degree Classification Committees (SDCC) located in Strasbourg, Colmar, or Metz. However, these review panels were not yet operational at the beginning of December 1918, necessitating that defendants deemed "dangerous suspects" in the initial reviews be detained for the indefinite future.<sup>68</sup> Once functioning, the SDCC could recommend an array of sentences ranging from acquittal, displacement, evacuation to the interior or a concentration camp in France, or expulsion.<sup>69</sup> Even the harshest sentence recommendation (removal to Germany) was not necessarily intended to be permanent. In some instances, the Interministerial Commission of Alsace-Lorrainers judged the physical removal of the suspect from Alsace over the Rhine to be a sufficient symbol of their transgression, writing, "It is obvious that

some of them [referring to the expelled] will return to France later, but they will have been marked in the eyes of their compatriots, and the sanction will be sufficient.”<sup>70</sup> The decisions of the SDCC were returned to the commandant-general for a final verdict. Only he possessed the authority to evacuate suspects to the interior of France,<sup>71</sup> an authorization underlined for emphasis in the memorandum.<sup>72</sup>

The Triage Commissions functioned until the French Chamber ratified the Treaty of Versailles on October 12, 1919. In a memorandum sent on October 27, Alexandre Millerand related that Alsatians and Lorrainers, now reintegrated as French citizens, were no longer to be subjected to the measures for which the Triage and Classification Commissions had been created. Declaring their mission complete, Millerand wrote, “It is particularly pleasant to me, at this time when the weighty and delicate task entrusted to you is coming to an end to pay homage to the patriotic dedication, to the remarkable quality of method and discernment, to the constant concern for the public interest for whom you and the members of the Commission over which you preside have given so much evidence.”<sup>73</sup> Yet, although the French government may have sought to close the chapter on the Triage Commissions in Alsace formally, the memory and controversial legacy would continue to haunt Franco-Alsatian relations for the next two decades.

## THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES: CODIFYING WARTIME PRACTICES

The Treaty of Versailles codified preestablished wartime classifications and population policies in Alsace. The entirety of the annex following the Alsace-Lorraine Section (V) was devoted to demarcating national categories and outlining various routes to French citizenship for the inhabitants of the former *Reichsland*. Section 1 utilized wartime definitions to identify an authentic Alsatian. Section 2 described a potpourri of different borderland residents who had a right to apply for naturalization within a year of the treaty going into effect on January 10, 1920. Section 3 addressed Germans who had immigrated to Alsace between July 15, 1870, and August 3, 1914.<sup>74</sup> In contrast to the policies utilized by Imperial authorities after the Franco-Prussian War, citizenship in 1918 moved from a primarily performative model to one that emphasized the importance of descent.<sup>75</sup> Ethnocultural considerations, previous citizenship, and location of residence took their place alongside the obligation to accept the sovereignty of the new government and abide by its laws. The combined elements of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* challenged existing French citizenry legislation and conceptions of nationhood. French nationality policies enacted in Alsace after World War I fundamentally contradict the idea of French citizenry being defined “expansively as a territorial community” and not as a “community of descent.”<sup>76</sup> Instead, as has been argued by historians such

as Daniela Caglioti and Geoff Eley, citizenship policies are unstable, evolving, contingent, and contextually dependent.<sup>77</sup>

A critical difference between the Franco-Prussian and First World War peace settlements was the voluntariness of the postwar nationality choice. In 1871, the residents of Alsace and Lorraine were free to choose whether they wished to remain French or to become German. Regardless of their decision, the persons and property of the individual optant were guaranteed.<sup>78</sup> Emigration to and permanent residency in France were the only requirements for borderland residents who chose life under the tricolour. The Treaty of Versailles did not make provisions for nationality options. People whom Republican authorities judged Alsatian automatically became French citizens. There existed no provision to decline their reintegration.<sup>79</sup> This status applied to Alsations wherever they were to be found.<sup>80</sup>

Just as “authentic” residents did not have a say in their nationality transfer on January 10, 1920, in some instances, the state also claimed the exclusive right to approve the release of Alsations from their French citizenship. Article 53 explicitly forbade the German government from asserting their nationality over any resident of the former *Reichsland* claimed by Republican authorities.<sup>81</sup> The demographic primarily affected by this decision were military-aged men, who, per Article 17 of the Civil Code, could only be discharged from their French citizenship after they fulfilled their martial duties or were released by the government.<sup>82</sup> As a result, Alsatian men were not free to take another nationality until they were no longer eligible for any form of military service in France—after their fortieth birthday.<sup>83</sup> Article 53 represented a proactive attempt to remove the legal basis for Germany to contest individual nationality cases. In so doing, Republican officials sought to eliminate contentious ambiguities in citizenship policy they themselves had actively mobilized during the Imperial period. Specifically, French authorities wanted to prevent Germany from becoming a haven for any Alsatian deemed valuable, especially youths eligible for military service.

In one illustrative case, a certain Albert Haenel, despite his German citizenship, reported being arrested and interned for failure to complete French military obligations in 1924 after he returned to Strasbourg to attend his sister’s funeral. He was only released after promising to report to the French consulate in Berlin.<sup>84</sup> Various memoranda discussing the case among Weimar officials concluded that Haenel was a Prussian (and therefore German) citizen but also a citizen of France. The Treaty of Versailles was ultimately responsible for his double nationality. According to the terms of the peace settlement, as an old Alsatian, Haenel had automatically received French citizenship as of November 11, 1918. His subsequent German (re)naturalization did not affect this status because he was still within the military service age demographic and had not been formally released from these duties by the Republican government. Ultimately, Haenel was advised to refrain

from traveling to either the French-occupied portion of Germany or France, lest he be arrested as a deserter.<sup>85</sup>

Individuals possessing the requisite background to be considered Alsatian according to the terms of Section 1 of the Alsace-Lorraine Annex had their French nationality automatically reinstated. Falling into this category were either “Persons who lost their French nationality by the application of the Franco-German Treaty of May 10, 1871, and who have not since that date acquired nationality other than German nationality” or the direct descendant of such a person provided that their paternal line did not include a German who had migrated to the province after July 15, 1870.<sup>86</sup> Both clauses demonstrate the continued investment in the nationalist image of Alsace as an eternally Francophile and anti-German province. Republican officials believed any Alsatian who experienced life within France would unequivocally cling to that loyalty through forty-seven years of German rule. The involuntary bestowal of French citizenship on the descendants of this pre-1870 population is premised upon a similar assumption: even within a “mixed marriage,” French *male* citizens would have inevitably passed love for France to their children and grandchildren, perhaps through blood, but certainly through upbringing. Republican officials saw these two groups as the only undisputed Alsatians with the *right* to be awarded French citizenship. A single German male ascendant was sufficient to taint the entire national pedagogical enterprise and force affected individuals to apply for naturalization.<sup>87</sup> The conception of French citizenship articulated by the Treaty of Versailles marked a distinct departure from Republican, assimilatory notions of *jus soli* codified in the 1889 French citizenship law. Still, it did not yet amount to a “racial” conception of Frenchness as has been suggested by Laird Boswell.<sup>88</sup> Considering the differing nineteenth-century understandings of race, I believe it is more accurate to refer to the pre-1940 citizenship prerequisites enacted in Alsace as relying on ethnocultural rather than racial considerations.

Section 2 of the Treaty of Versailles’ Annex identified an array of borderland residents eligible to apply for naturalization within a year of the treaty going into effect. These groups included (but were not limited to) individuals who possessed at least one ancestor who lost their French citizenship as a result of the Treaty of Frankfurt, Germans domiciled in Alsace before July 15, 1870, Germans born or domiciled in Alsace who fought for France or one of its allies during the war, and the husband or wife of an Alsatian who had automatically reclaimed their French citizenship.<sup>89</sup> Unlike those Alsatians and Lorrainers who automatically received their new nationality via the terms of Section 1, the naturalization claimants were required to declare their desire to become French before their local mayor. This act commenced a month-long waiting period in which any citizen could intervene and oppose the petition. If no objection was forthcoming, the applicant’s demand would be successful.<sup>90</sup>

Section 3 of the annex addressed Germans who had immigrated to Alsace between July 15, 1870, and August 3, 1914, and their descendants. The treaty expressly forbid any German from automatically receiving French citizenship. Such individuals were made eligible for naturalization if they lived in the *Reichsland* before August 3, 1914, and lived for an unbroken period of three years in the provinces after November 11, 1918.<sup>91</sup> The treaty's three-year unbroken residency requirement actually represented an alleviation of the ten-year residency prerequisite stipulated for prospective naturalization candidates by the 1889 French nationality law.<sup>92</sup> In this sense, the treaty provided the Republican government a timeframe in which to observe and evaluate the actions and attitudes of Germans living in the former *Reichsland* while at the same time providing "worthy" elements of that population a quicker route to French citizenship than that available to naturalization-seeking aliens in the rest of the country.

In the end, however, even the detailed citizenship provisions of the Treaty of Versailles proved too inclusive for some French authorities. Senator M. Eccard lamented in a 1922 senate report that the state's interests and security had not been well-served by the peace settlement's population policies. The national loyalties of Germans who obtained French citizenship solely through marriage to an Alsatian and those immigrants eligible to claim French nationality three years after November 11, 1918, were of particular concern.<sup>93</sup> Faced with this potential threat to state security, Eccard advocated the extension of wartime laws passed in April 1915 and renewed in June 1917, which provided for the denaturalization of individuals who, either through rhetoric or actions, demonstrated continued attachment to their country of origin to the detriment of their adopted French homeland. The proposed law distinguished explicitly between the Alsations and German inhabitants of Alsace, and only the latter were subject to its provisions.

## CONCLUSION

The postwar order created by the Treaty of Versailles failed to facilitate the reconciliation of Alsace to France. Instead, mutual disillusionment increasingly came to characterize the relationship between French officials and the local populace throughout the interwar period. Republican narratives had cast Alsations as long-suffering, ardently anti-German Frenchmen and women who spent the Imperial period yearning for their reattachment to the *Patrie*. Officials' postwar experiences in the reattached departments rapidly revealed the complicated nature of regional loyalties and identities in the borderland. For their part, certain segments of the former *Reichsland's* population preserved a nostalgic reverence for a pre-1870 France they

believed would respect individual rights and local particularisms. Postwar reentrance prohibitions, identification cards, expulsions, and Triage Commissions disillusioned many of the province's inhabitants and made them fundamentally question these assumptions.

The distinction between Alsatians and Germans from 1914 to 1920 marked the first official program that screened and judged the national desirability of the province's population based on descent. Individuals' attitudes and actions under German sovereignty, particularly during the war, were also decisive in the official sorting of the nationally desirable from the nationally undesirable. In the end, Republican officials proved themselves willing to sacrifice the purism of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* citizenship principles in favor of selectively adopting practices they perceived to provide the best opportunity to engineer their desired population on the frontier. Thus, it was the French who introduced an exclusionary model of citizenship into the Franco-German borderland.

The study of Alsace and the experiences of its inhabitants during and after World War I also demonstrate the fruitfulness of expanding our understanding of the conflict's temporal parameters. This chapter has shown that many official and unofficial postwar policies adopted by the French government and enshrined in the Treaty of Versailles were born of both prewar nationalist narratives and wartime exigencies. Furthermore, it complicates notions of regionally specific experiences and tendencies by showing that efforts to "un-mix" diverse populations were not unique to Central, Eastern, or Southeastern Europe after 1918. French authorities' population engineering efforts directed at the German immigrant population and the few "nationally confused" Alsatians in their reclaimed eastern borderlands reflect a larger, continental-wide *European* mistrust of ethnic heterogeneity, a common desire to create a more nationally homogeneous population, and a willingness to proactively intervene with aggressive population management procedures to achieve this imagined ideal. Philipp Ther goes so far as to argue that France set a precedent and a negative example for the democratic states in Central Europe in their treatment of minorities in the former *Reichsland* after 1918.<sup>94</sup> Such considerations lie beyond the scope of this chapter, but what is certain is that Republican policies and practices in Alsace after World War I set a standard that returned with a vengeance with the Nazi conquest in 1940. National Socialist administrators transformed the parameters of belonging and introduced a previously unexperienced level of violence to the reordering of the borderland's population. Yet a striking element of the transition between French and German sovereignty in 1940 is the degree to which the Nazis consciously emulated post-1918 French policies and deliberately, even mockingly, invoked Republican models to justify their actions in the Franco-German borderland.

## NOTES

1. Imperial authorities administratively designated Alsace and the annexed portions of Lorraine as the *Reichsland Elsaß-Lothringen* in 1871.
2. For the remainder of the chapter any reference to “Alsations” and “Germans” will be individuals defined as such by French authorities. These officially ascribed categories do not necessarily reflect the identities of the residents of the borderland they were created to label.
3. Theodora Dragostinova notes a similar phenomenon among early twentieth-century Bulgarian nationalist activists who viewed those ethnic Bulgarians “afflicted” with Greek mania as possessing a false consciousness. See Dragostinova, *Between Two Motherlands: Nationality and Emigration among the Greeks of Bulgaria, 1900–1949* (Cornell University Press, 2011), 1–2.
4. Rogers Brubaker emphasizes French citizenship policy’s inclusiveness and willingness to incorporate outsiders. See: Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Harvard University Press, 1992), 108. Gérard Noiriel, however, adds an important caveat that this openness is predicated on the assumption that new immigrants will assimilate to national norms. See: Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity*, trans. Geoffrey de Laforcade (University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
5. For representative examples, see: Peter Holquist, *Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia’s Continuum of Crisis, 1914–1921* (Harvard University Press, 2002); Joshua Sarnoff, *Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics, 1905–1925* (Northern Illinois University Press, 2003); and Annemarie H. Sammartino, *The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914–1922* (Cornell University Press, 2010). Historians, like Timothy Snyder, have demonstrated the fruitfulness of the wider chronological approach used in conjunction with a transnational lens to identify the “bloody” continuities between murderous regimes. See: Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (Basic Books, 2010).
6. Robert Gerwarth, *The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016), 4.
7. See Daniela L. Caglioti, *War and Citizenship: Enemy Aliens and National Belonging from the French Revolution to the First World War* (Cambridge University Press, 2021); Philipp Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation-States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe*, trans. Charlotte Kreutzmüller (Berghahn Books, 2014), and Dragostinova, *Between Two Motherlands*.
8. Caglioti utilizes the term “demographic engineering” to describe belligerent governments’ efforts to homogenize their populations by removing internal and external aliens during World War I. Caglioti, *War and Citizenship*, 7.

9. Ther characterizes ethnic cleansing as an effort to forcibly remove a population group from a given area. Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation-States*, 1.
10. See: Christopher J. Fischer, *Alsace to the Alsatians? Visions and Divisions of Alsatian Regionalism, 1870–1939* (Berghahn Books, 2010); Elizabeth Vlossak, *Marianne or Germania?: Nationalizing Women in Alsace, 1870–1946* (Oxford University Press, 2010); David Allen Harvey, *Constructing Class and Nationality in Alsace, 1830–1945* (Northern Illinois University Press, 2001); Stephen L. Harp, *Learning to Be Loyal: Primary Schooling as Nation Building in Alsace and Lorraine, 1850–1940* (Northern Illinois University Press, 1998).
11. See: Jean-Laurent Vonau, *Le Gauleiter Wagner: Le bourreau de l'Alsace* (La Nuée Bleue, 2011); Jean-Noël Grandhomme, ed., *Boches ou Tricolores: Les Alsaciens-Lorrains dans la Grande Guerre* (La Nuée Bleue, 2008); Jean-Laurent Vonau, *Le procès de Bordeaux: Les Malgré-Nous et le drame d'Oradour* (La Nuée Bleue, 2003).
12. Alison Carrol, *The Return of Alsace to France 1918–1939* (Oxford University Press, 2018).
13. Laird Boswell, "From Liberation to Purge Trials in the 'Mythic Provinces': Recasting French Identities in Alsace and Lorraine, 1918–1920," *French Historical Studies* 23, no. 1 (2000): 129–62.
14. Joseph Rossé et al., *Das Elsass von 1870–1932* (Verlag Alsatia, 1936), 1:339–62.
15. Rossé et al. *Das Elsass von 1870–1932*, 1:222. Some 60,000 German and French troops would die fighting for control of the *Hartmannswillerkopf/Vieil Armand* between 1914 and 1918.
16. Scholars like Jean-Jacques Becker stress that the French government did not actively seek an opportunity for *revanche*. Yet although France would not have gone to war solely to reclaim Alsace and Lorraine, the return of the provinces was adopted as a war goal once the Franco-German conflict was again rekindled. See: Jean-Jacques Becker, "L'Opinion public française et l'Alsace-Lorraine en 1914," in *Boches ou Tricolores: Les Alsaciens-Lorrains dans la Grande Guerre*, ed. Jean-Noël Grandhomme (La Nuée Bleue, 2008), 40.
17. *Procès-verbaux de la Conférence d'Alsace-Lorraine 1915–1919* (Imprimerie Nationale, 1917), 1:1–2. See also: Joseph Schmauch, "Préparer la réintégration des provinces perdues: La Conférence d'Alsace-Lorraine et les Services d'Alsace-Lorraine à Paris," in *Boches ou Tricolores: Les Alsaciens-Lorrains dans la Grande Guerre*, ed. Jean-Noël Grandhomme (La Nuée Bleue, 2008), 285–300.
18. *Procès-Verbaux de la Conférence d'Alsace-Lorraine 1915–1919*, 1:19–20.
19. H. A. Gibbons, "The Question of Alsace-Lorraine in 1918 as Viewed by an American," *The Century Magazine*, March 1918, 12.
20. *Procès-Verbaux de la Conférence d'Alsace-Lorraine 1915–1919*, 1:92–93.
21. *Procès-Verbaux de la Conférence d'Alsace-Lorraine 1915–1919*, 1:231–32.
22. *Procès-verbaux de la Conférence d'Alsace-Lorraine 1915–1919*, 1:231.

23. Chief of the US military mission with the French army, James A. Logan, estimated in December 1914 that there were 8,000 Alsatians interned in various camps in France and another 13,700 who were free but under police surveillance. See letter from James A. Logan, June 18, 1915, 119–20, Box No. 13, James Addison Logan Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Palo Alto, CA.
24. The French government's effort to differently treat and distinguish Alsatians and Lorrainers possessing German citizenship from other enemy-aliens in their territory reflected similar favorable policies adopted by the Entente allies toward other enemy national minorities such as Poles, Czechs, and Czech-Slovaks. See Daniela Caglioti, "Subjects, Citizens, and Aliens in a Time of Upheaval: Naturalizing and Denaturalizing in Europe during the First World War," *The Journal of Modern History* 89 (September 2017): 507. Yet, whereas these other groups were singled out as potential military allies, Republican authorities perceived Alsatians and Lorrainers to be imminent French citizens.
25. "Instructions sur l'admission des Alsaciens-Lorrains dans l'Armée française," 25, May 17, 1916, 16 N 1584, Le Service Historique de la Défense, Vincennes (hereafter cited as SHD Vincennes).
26. Le Directeur du Refuge des Alsaciens d'Ornans, "Maison du refuge alsacien lorrain d'Ornans," M882, Archives départementales du Doubs, Besançon.
27. Commission interministérielle des Alsaciens-Lorrains, "Résumé des Instructions administratives actuellement en vigueur concernant les Alsaciens-Lorrains d'origine français," 2–4, 16 N 1584, SHD Vincennes.
28. Commission interministérielle des Alsaciens-Lorrains, "Résumé des Instructions administratives actuellement en vigueur concernant les Alsaciens-Lorrains d'origine français," 1, 16 N 1584, SHD Vincennes.
29. *Procès-Verbaux de la Conférence d'Alsace-Lorraine 1915–1919*, 1:91.
30. *Procès-Verbaux de la Conférence d'Alsace-Lorraine 1915–1919*, 1:92.
31. The total reported population of the *Reichsland* in 1910 was 1,874,014. The 1921 figure was 1,710,049. Joseph Rossé et al., *Das Elsass von 1870–1932* (Verlag Alsatia, 1938), 4:37.
32. Albert Carré, *Instruction sur l'admission des Alsaciens-Lorrains dans l'Armée française*, 2nd ed., October 15, 1918, 2, AJ30 242, Archives Nationales, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine (hereafter cited as AN).
33. "Instructions sur l'Admission des Alsaciens-Lorrains dans l'Armée française," 5, May 17, 1916, 16 N 1584, SHD Vincennes.
34. Dominik Richert, *Beste Gelegenheit zum Sterben: Meine Erlebnisse im Kriege 1914–1918*, ed. Angelika Tramitz und Bernd Ulrich (Knesebeck & Schuler, 1989), 382.
35. Carré, "Instructions sur l'admission des Alsaciens-Lorrains dans l'Armée française," 17, AJ30 242, AN.
36. Albert Carré, "Instructions sur l'admission des Alsaciens-Lorrains dans l'Armée

- française" May 17, 1916, 16, 16 N 1584, SHD Vincennes.
37. Carré, "Instructions sur l'admission des Alsaciens-Lorrains dans l'Armée française," 21, AJ30 242, AN.
  38. "Triage" was associated with the wartime sorting of the treatable and fatally wounded at French field hospitals. Its use in the postwar *Reichsland* implied a cataloging of the population identifying "those deemed fit to belong to the national community and those who were not." See: Boswell, "From Liberation to Purge Trials in the 'Mythic Provinces,'" 145.
  39. "Bericht des geheimen Regierungsrates Schlössing über Ausweisungen und Verhaftungen in Elsass-Lothringen," December 22, 1918, R904 6, Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde (hereafter cited as BArch).
  40. "Zusammenstellung über Proteste gegen das Vorgehen der französische Besatzungsbehörden in Elsass-Lothringen, namentlich gegen wirtschaftliche Massnahme," R901 80941, BArch.
  41. "Projet de note à faire paraître dans la presse," 121AL 358, Archives départementales du Bas-Rhin, Strasbourg (hereafter cited as ADBR).
  42. A similar effort to identify "pure Greeks" or "pure Bulgarians" occurred between Bulgaria and Greece in the postwar period. Dragostinova, *Between Two Motherlands*, 115.
  43. Rossé et al., *Das Elsass von 1870–1932*, 1:527–29.
  44. Rossé et al., *Das Elsass*, 1:529.
  45. Mémoire de l'Agent du Gouvernement allemand au sujet du droit des "Français par réclamation d'intenter une action devant le Tribunal arbitral mixte," October 15, 1925, R901 35529, BArch.
  46. Caglioti, *War and Citizenship*, 44.
  47. "(Nr. 657) (Übersetzung.) Friedensvertrag zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und Frankreich. Vom 10. Mai 1871," *Reichsgesetzblatt*, no. 26, June 19, 1871, 225, 5AL 93, ADBR.
  48. "Dokument Nr. 38: Ein Ausweisungsbefehl/1919," Rossé et al., *Das Elsass*, 4:407.
  49. Caglioti argues that World War I saw belligerent governments' attitude regarding private property, even the one-time inviolable possessions of enemy-alien, undergo a fundamental shift. Henceforth, enemy civilians might be collectively held responsible for the actions of their governments and liable for asset forfeiture without recompense to compensation. Caglioti, *War and Citizenship*, 299, 301, and 303.
  50. Ausschuss vertriebener Elsass-Lothringer (Freiburg) to the Deutsche Nationalversammlung (Weimar), February 11, 1919, R904 15, BArch. Ther notes that an important element of ethnic cleansing involves public and symbolic violence against members of the targeted group. Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation-States*, 6.
  51. "Schamlos Übergriffe französischer Offiziere gegenüber ausreisenden und ausgewiesenen deutschen Frauen," R1603 2344, BArch.
  52. Elise Heintz to the Commissaire Général in Strasbourg, June 18, 1920, 121AL 677,

- ADBR.
53. Report from the Commissariat de Police, August 4, 1920, 12IAL 677, ADBR.
  54. Boswell, "From Liberation to Purge Trials in the 'Mythic Provinces,'" 141. Rossé's estimation of 114,000 expellees is similar. Rossé et al., *Das Elsass*, 1:523.
  55. Despite providing a number well above those of other sources, Ther states (without citation) that approximately two-thirds of category D Germans were able to stay in France. Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation-States*, 70.
  56. Reports from Reichsministerium des Innern Abteilung für Elsass-Lothringen, June 5–December 29, 1919, R901 35566, BArch.
  57. "Zusammenstellung über Proteste gegen das Vorgehen der französische Besatzungsbehörden in Elsass-Lothringen, namentlich gegen wirtschaftliche Massnahme," R901 80941, BArch.
  58. "Fonctionnement de la Commission de Triage," November 2, 1918, 286D 343, ADBR. Many Germans were also brought before the panels despite official instructions to the contrary. See: Boswell, "From Liberation to Purge Trials in the 'Mythic Provinces,'" 147.
  59. Rosse et al., *Das Elsass*, 1:531.
  60. Mémoire du Comité de l'Association des Victimes de la Commission de Triage—Section des personnes privée to Membres du Gouvernement, les Ministres, les Sous-Secrétaires d'État, les Sénateurs et Députés, le Président du Sénat, le Président de la Chambre, et à la Presse française, January 1934, 286D 343, ADBR.
  61. Fischer, *Alsace to the Alsatians?*, 131–32; Boswell, "From Liberation to Purge Trials in the 'Mythic Provinces,'" 149.
  62. Gerard VIII Armée, Etat-major 2 Bureau, "Instruction au Sujet du Triage de la Population alsacienne-lorraine," November 30, 1918, 12IAL 902, ADBR.
  63. IV Armée, "Instruction relative a l'administration et a l'organisation militaire du territoire occupe en Alsace-Lorraine," December 20, 1918, 286D 343, ADBR.
  64. David Allen Harvey, "Lost Children or Enemy Aliens? Classifying the Population of Alsace after the First World War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 34, no. 4 (1999): 553. The term *malaise-alsacien* was used to describe the phenomenon of the Alsatian population's growing disillusionment with the French administration in the Interwar period.
  65. Rossé et al., *Das Elsass*, 1:534.
  66. Boswell, "From Liberation to Purge Trials in the 'Mythic Provinces,'" 148.
  67. Rossé et al., *Das Elsass*, 1:534.
  68. VII Armée, "Note pour les Commissions de triage," December 9, 1918, 286D 343, ADBR.
  69. J. Kastler, Commission interministérielle des Alsaciens-Lorrains, "Rapport sur les Commissions de triage et sur les Commissions de classement du second degré," 12IAL 902, ADBR.

70. Kastler, Commission interministérielle des Alsaciens-Lorrains, "Rapport sur les Commissions de triage."
71. Two of these destinations were Grenoble and Lyon. See President du Conseil to the Ministre des Finances, August 7, 1936, 286D 343, ADBR.
72. Blanchard, "Note de service au sujet des Commissions de triage," December 15, 1918, 12IAL 902, ADBR.
73. Le Commissaire Général de la République to the Président de la Commission de Classement au 2 degré, Présidents des Commissions de Triage de Molsheim, Schirmeck, Selestat, Barr, Erstein, Saverne, Strasbourg-Campagne, Brumath, Hagenau, Niederbronn, and Wissembourg, October 27, 1919, 12IAL 902, ADBR.
74. "The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany," 47, PH2 357, Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Militärarchiv, Freiburg i.Br (hereafter cited as BAM Freiburg).
75. Daniela Caglioti argues that World War I played a crucial role in pushing European governments to adopt citizenship policies that emphasized the importance of descent in determining national loyalties. See Caglioti, "Subjects, Citizens, and Aliens in a Time of Upheaval," 529.
76. Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, x, 5, 109–10. Both notions are argued by Brubaker.
77. See Caglioti, "Subjects, Citizens, and Aliens in a Time of Upheaval," 527, and Geoff Eley, "Some General Thoughts on Citizenship in Germany," in *Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany*, ed. Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski (Stanford University Press, 2007).
78. Caglioti argues up to the signing of the Treaty of Constantinople in 1913 that options and plebiscites followed changes in sovereignty. Caglioti, *War and Citizenship*, 89. Ther similarly observes that understandings of hereditary nationality began to take precedence over individual declarations in the early twentieth century. Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation-States*, 41.
79. Commissaire Général de la République to the Ministre de la Guerre, October 11, 1921, 12IAL 307, ADBR.
80. Deutsche Delegation für elsass-lothringische Friedensfragen to the Auswärtiges Amt, April 28, 1920, R 901 35527, BArch. In this instance, French policy resembled the 1913 German nationality law that allowed ethnic Germans living outside the Reich to maintain their citizenship unless they were naturalized in their country of residence.
81. "The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany," 39, PH2 357, BAM Freiburg.
82. The principle of "perpetual allegiance" was instituted by Napoleon in 1809. Patrick Weil points out that the 1889 law removed this prerequisite for everyone but French men of military service age. See: Patrick Weil, *How to be French: Nationality in the*

- Making since 1789*, trans. Catherine Porter (Duke University Press, 2008), 31, 239.
83. Deutsche Botschaft, Paris to the Auswärtiges Amt, September 15, 1925, R 901 35529, BArch.
  84. Albert Haenel to Polizeipräsident in Berlin, July 12, 1924, R901 35529, BArch.
  85. Preussische Minister des Innern to the Polizeipräsident Berlin, February 5, 1926, R901 35529, BArch.
  86. "The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany," 47, PH2 357, BAM Freiburg.
  87. "The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany," 47, PH2 357, BAM Freiburg. It is this clause, in addition to French officials' investment in the notion that the "French heart" of Alsace was maintained by the population that lived in the province prior to the German annexation in 1870, that problematizes Brubaker's contention that "Frenchness" was not inherited. See Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 109–110.
  88. Boswell, "From Liberation to Purge Trials in the 'Mythic Provinces,'" 2000, 144, 160. Weil, in contrast, argues that the "racist option" emerged in anti-Algerian and anti-Muslim thought in 1920s French naturalization debates. During the Interwar period, "Racialists" were one of several strands of competing nationality policy that triumphed only under the Vichy regime. See Weil, *How to Be French*, 168–69. Caglioti likewise observes that on the eve of World War I, discussions of race tended to be associated specifically with European Powers' imperial subjects, while Italian, German, and Swiss *jus sanguinis* legislation was "not charged with racial or biological meaning." She argues that the "racialization" of the *jus sanguinis* principle occurred in the interwar period as a result of Nazi and Fascist racial laws. Caglioti, *War and Citizenship*, 100, 101.
  89. "The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany," 47, PH2 357, BAM Freiburg.
  90. Paul Arrivière and H. de Villeneuve, "Project de décret déterminant, en ce qui concerne les habitants ou les personnes originaires de l'Alsace et de la Lorraine, les modalités suivant lesquelles seront constatées, les réintégrations de droit dans la nationalité française et les conditions dans lesquelles il sera statué sur les réclamations de cette nationalité," *Conseil d'État*, no. 2058, August 13, 1919, 4–5, 121AL 590, ADBR.
  91. "The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany," 47–48, PH2 357, BAM Freiburg.
  92. Caglioti, *War and Citizenship*, 102.
  93. M. Eccard, "Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de législation civile et criminelle, chargée d'examiner le projet de loi relatif à la déchéance de la qualité de Français," *Sénat*, no. 734 (1922), 121AL 590, ADBR.
  94. Ther, *The Dark Side of Nation-States*, 11, 233.

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# CITIZENS WITHOUT A STATE

“Nationality,” International Law, and Jewish  
Emigration to the United States, 1918–1921

ZACHARY MAZUR

FROM THE MOMENT OF THEIR ARRIVAL ON ELLIS ISLAND IN MAY 1921, MEER Schunkler and his young family were doomed. After an arduous journey on foot through the multiple war zones of Eastern Europe, they obtained Polish passports and pushed on for England. From Liverpool they arrived in the United States on a small island beguilingly close to the city at the center of the world: New York. American authorities detained Schunkler and his family because, as one State Department official wrote, “this government looks with grave concern upon [the Polish government’s] practice of issuing passports to persons who are not Poles.”<sup>1</sup> Schunkler carried a legitimate Polish passport, but the US government objected to its contents, particularly in the “nationality” section where Schunkler was identified as a “Pole.” The State Department declared, “In view of the other facts in the case, however, this statement of nationality has been discounted by the Department as merely a clerical error.”<sup>2</sup> The “other facts” came down to a single issue: Schunkler and his family were Jews, and therefore they “could not” simultaneously be Poles. Hugh Gibson, then serving as ambassador to Poland, conveyed the disapproval of the State Department to the Polish government who investigated the matter. After an inquest at the office where Schunkler’s passport had been issued, a Polish minister denied that any error had been made; accordingly, he and his family indeed qualified for Polish citizenship *and* nationality.<sup>3</sup> This mattered little to the State Department, which instructed Ellis Island to treat the Schunklers as if they had no identification and expelled them from the United States.

## CONTROLLING MIGRATION

Historians of migration have provided significant evidence to show that the movement of people is not simply a matter of economic forces. John Torpey highlighted how states employed the technology of passports to extend their power and control populations.<sup>4</sup> Tara Zahra's book *The Great Departure* took this a step further, looking more deeply into the places where emigrants came from, to find out why they left. From the perspective of states sending migrants, Zahra wrote, "Emigration policy became an explicit tool of new and more violent forms of nation building and population politics."<sup>5</sup> Nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century nationalist intellectuals living under Imperial rule, without states of their own, could only theorize about their future in a national state. In the interwar period, however, the stakes were considerably higher than before when the dreams of statehood in East Central Europe came to fruition for Poles, Czechs, and others. Interior ministries attempted to hamper the outflow of privileged majority groups, while also facilitating the reduction of "undesirable" minority groups. For Poland this meant limiting the movement of Catholic Poles and encouraging migration for Ukrainians and Jews.

In the new Polish state after 1918, a huge refugee population and a dire economic, social, and political situation motivated thousands to emigrate. From 1918 to 1922 around 1.2 million refugees from the former Russian Empire, including the Schunkler family, entered Poland, and the skeletal Polish administration had to process each request for aid, citizenship, and identification documents.<sup>6</sup> Keely Stauter-Halsted demonstrated that there were cases when Jews with demonstrably strong connections to Poland were denied citizenship because their place of birth was outside the bounds of Polish territory.<sup>7</sup> She argues that this constituted a violent attempt to control the ethnic makeup of the country. However, as we shall see in this chapter, there were also cases when Jews with little connection to Poland, such as the Schunklers, were granted Polish citizenship with the same goal in mind: to reduce their presence in the new Polish republic.

The US federal government spent the prior decades building a system that would differentiate between races allowed to enter and settle, and those that would be turned away. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 inaugurated this approach, and by the 1920s immigration debates no longer centered around whether or not to limit inflows, but rather by how much. Just days after the Schunklers arrived on Ellis Island, the US Congress passed the Emergency Quota Act, establishing annual immigration limitations based on "nationality."<sup>8</sup> This severely constrained the number and types of immigrants who could enter the country.

The start of World War I marked the end of an era of relatively free movement around the world. New policies and an international passport regime controlled migration to a degree never before seen. Due to these legal changes, in order to cross borders

and take up legal residence one required citizenship and a passport. As a result the lives of the Schunkler family, and thousands of others, were to be dictated by the domestic legislation of two countries, the international treaties binding Poland and the United States together, and the ongoing diplomatic relations between the two countries. Modern citizenship is two-tiered; it is an agreement among states, and between a state and its citizens. If one of these agreements falls apart, then it renders citizenship impotent. In the case of the Schunklers, Jews carrying Polish passports in the 1920s were *de facto* stateless because of racial and ethnic assumptions. Officially and legally sanctioned antisemitism from both the Polish and American sides conspired against the ability of Jews to move about the world as they wished. Despite its pretensions, the law is not neutral or blind to the errors of society and its prejudices, but is rather a reflection of those ills.<sup>9</sup> Race and nationality were not legal concepts *per se*, but rather notions that functioned, sometimes unconsciously, in society.<sup>10</sup> With this focus on Jewish migrants, we can view the development of citizenship, both as international law and practice, as deeply intertwined with understandings of nationality and race in the immediate aftermath of World War I.

In order to understand how it became possible for American authorities to deny the Schunkler family their citizenship, we must examine the domestic political and social circumstances that created this legal groundwork. In this one micro-case, which is illustrative of a larger pattern, claims of American and Polish sovereignty come into view in the context of a budding international legal order.<sup>11</sup> Even before Poland had its own laws regarding citizenship, the Minorities Treaty codified the issue.<sup>12</sup> The United States was, of course, a signatory to this agreement. At the same time Poland was the object of derision for its discriminatory policies and lack of protection, the United States was impeding immigration in pursuit of its own racist agenda. Long before European states began to discriminate against minority populations, it was the American government that pushed for national categories on passports, and passed judgment on those categories. Despite the fact that Polish authorities claimed the Schunklers as Poles in nationality and citizenship, US immigration officials decided this was false and stripped them of their status and thus their right to movement as granted by the international system. This chapter aims to understand why, through an exploration of Polish and American domestic policy, both functioning within a newly established international legal context.

## CONSTRUCTING EXCLUSIVE NATIONALITY

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the definition of the Polish nation transformed drastically. To be Polish in the eighteenth century signified belonging to a privileged aristocratic class, including the right to vote and move freely. When Poland

declared independence in 1918, all Roman Catholic Slavs living in historically Polish lands could be counted among the nation. As modern nationalism took shape, Polish intellectuals discussed the position of the non-Catholic and non-Polish-speaking people living among them. In the Polish-language discourse at that time, nationality (*narodowość*) and race (*rasa*) were essentially synonymous; an individual could not change their race or nationality based on self-identification, but belonged to these categories based on “objective” and “scientific” criteria. The only concepts that could be malleable were citizenship (*obywatelstwo*) or subjecthood (*poddaństwo*). To be sure, there was an alternative view that saw Polish nationality in wider terms—the so-called Jagiellonian view—but despite the attention it has been given in the historical literature, it was a minority view of such little significance that it cannot be put on the same level as its exclusivist counterpart.<sup>13</sup> For most, citizenship was flexible and changeable, but “nationality” was immutable, and therefore a Jew could not become a Pole.<sup>14</sup>

The dominant figure forming this debate was Roman Dmowski, who rose to the top of the National Democratic movement. In the 1890s, he began publicizing his concerns for the mixing of “racial-cultural” groups, making a name for himself in the process.<sup>15</sup> While considering the future of Polish “civilization,” Dmowski tried to draw lessons from the past. His social-Darwinistic reading of fallen empires gave him the sense that when “ethnic units” of similar “spiritual strength” occupy the same space, they will ultimately come into conflict, and only one side can be victorious.<sup>16</sup> Nationalists such as Dmowski infected the broader conversation over Jews in Poland with racial thinking, and thus any talk of assimilation or integration was moot. Many contemporary commentators came to the same conclusion: the only solution was emigration of the Jews from the Polish lands.<sup>17</sup>

As it turned out, Dmowski ended up as one of the main representatives of Polish interests during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference to end World War I. Though he started out the war as a Russian loyalist, he headed west in November 1915, setting up the Polish National Committee in Switzerland. At war’s end he was poised to head to Paris where Allied leaders from France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, and Japan gathered to decide the fate of the world.

Once inside the halls of power, Dmowski’s reputation for antisemitism was somewhat problematic for the negotiators. Despite the size of the Jewish population in the Polish lands, Dmowski refused to allow Jewish representatives to join his National Committee representing Polish interests at the peace conference.<sup>18</sup> Stephen Bonsal, a renowned journalist for the *New York Herald* and *New York Times*, served as American President Woodrow Wilson’s personal translator and kept a meticulous diary of the meetings in Paris.<sup>19</sup> From his position, we can access many of the sideline conversations that never made it into the official record. His superiors sent him to Dmowski in an attempt to figure out what kind of man he was. “Dmowski is regarded by many as

in large measure responsible for the anti-Jewish feeling so noticeable among the great majority of the Poles," Bonsal wrote, "and indeed it was upon this subject I was told to 'feel' him out."<sup>20</sup> These conversations took place in the midst of genuine concern for the safety of Jewish people in Poland.

Starting already in 1918, reports of anti-Jewish pogroms appeared in American, British, and German newspapers to be copied and reported elsewhere. Following some larger violent incidents at Lwów, Wilno, and Lida that were exaggerated in the western press, the public became enraged. The issue went by the wayside during the first few months of 1919, until events at Pińsk returned the issue to the public eye. In March 1919, a Polish army group took Pińsk from Bolshevik forces. On April 5, 1919, during a sweep of the city, soldiers broke up a meeting of Jews and slaughtered the men under the pretense that they were holding Bolshevik rally.<sup>21</sup> These reports, and others from Czechoslovakia, threatened to upend the legitimacy of the new states in the region that badly needed international support.<sup>22</sup>

With this black cloud hanging over them, Bonsal openly probed Dmowski's views on Jews in Poland. He wrote in his diary that,

[Dmowski] points out . . . that there are distinctive features in the Jewish problem of Poland which are not met with in other countries. To begin with he asserts that the Ostjuden (Eastern Jews) are a peculiar, a most peculiar, clan and that their activities and characteristics are very trying to those who must live in daily contact with them. "We have in Poland more than one quarter of all the Jews of the world. They form 10 per cent of our population, and in my judgment this is at least 8 per cent too much. When there is only a small group of Jews in our villages, even when they are grasping storekeepers or avaricious money lenders, as they often are, everything moves along smoothly; but when more come, and they generally do come, there is trouble and at times small pogroms. . . . We have too many Jews, and those who will be allowed to remain with us must change their habits; and of course I recognize that this will be difficult and will take time."<sup>23</sup>

Dmowski was more than willing to defend his position that Jews were responsible for their own difficult position because they were too numerous. This only further solidified the view among the Western Allies, especially US officials, that the Poles could not be trusted to guarantee the safety and equality of minorities. As a result, the Allies ultimately forced the Polish delegation to sign a Minorities Treaty, which became one of the bases for establishing who could become a citizen of the new Polish state.

A number of Jewish groups representing varied points of view, from the United States, United Kingdom, and France, arrived in Paris at the beginning of the peace proceedings. Due to the public's attention on the pogroms in Poland, these Jewish

organizations had a basis upon which to argue for the protection of Jewish rights, and through their lobbying, these ideas became more widely accepted among the other delegates.<sup>24</sup> But despite the efforts of Jewish envoys, the Polish government was unable to satisfy their concerns about Jewish safety and legal equality. Ultimately the so-called Pińsk pogrom propelled the Paris commission to demand that Poland submit to a series of concessions securing equality and freedom to its national, religious, and linguistic minorities. The result was the Minorities Treaty signed between Poland and the Allies at Versailles on June 28, 1919.<sup>25</sup> The treaty stipulated that Poland was obliged to grant citizenship to any person who was a legal resident of one of the three partitioning empires before the war, a very broad mandate. And since the treaty was intended to guarantee the rights of minorities, it also required the Polish government do so “without distinction as to race, language or religion.”<sup>26</sup> Poland accepted the treaty and thus made it legally binding within the territory as it expanded over 1919 to 1921. Thus, at the foundational moment of the Polish state, when Dmowski and his acolytes hoped to be able to implement their restrictive policies, the weight of international law limited their ability to do so.

The collapse of four empires in the center of Europe caused millions of people to become stateless, but the rise of nation-states in the area also allowed for the majority of those people to claim belonging based on national characteristics. For Jews, however, their nationality and citizenship were particularly murky. Linguistically, Jews did not fit nicely into one box or another; Eastern European Jews spoke Yiddish, Polish, Russian, or German on a daily basis.<sup>27</sup> And since there would be no Jewish state in the middle of Europe, no one country claimed Jews for their own. Perhaps more to the point, in the immediate months and years after World War I, much of the territory where Jews lived was under the control of no one in particular. This uncertainty is what led to the situation in which Jews became “the only minority whose interests could be defended only by internationally guaranteed protection,” according to Hannah Arendt.<sup>28</sup> New European states cemented their position in the international sphere by signing treaties with the Allied countries—collectively called the Paris Peace Treaties of 1919. At the same time as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and others became recognized by the Great Powers, they were made to sign the aforementioned Minorities Treaties. With the creation of these minority rights regimes, however, well-intentioned structures inadvertently allowed for legal discrimination.<sup>29</sup> In other words, by recognizing “minorities” as legal corporations, they could be parsed out and treated differently from majority populations.<sup>30</sup> The international system which the Versailles Treaty formed left many people in a precarious situation. Vague and fluid terms such as “language of everyday use” and “nationality” began to be used to decide where people belonged and which state could claim them as their citizens.<sup>31</sup>

In Poland, the situation for most people after World War I, Jews and non-Jews alike, was extremely dire. The pressures to feed and house millions of destitute people produced a situation in which emigration from the new Polish state was more desirable than ever, especially in the face of widespread violence.<sup>32</sup> The destruction and displacement of the war produced an impoverished population within Poland, but it also created a mass of refugees. During the course of the Great War, the tsarist government's campaign against "enemy aliens" resulted in the targeting and deportation of nearly a million Jews from eastern Galicia and Ukraine.<sup>33</sup> After 1918, the overlapping conflicts of the Russian Civil War, the Ukrainian Civil War, the Polish-Ukrainian War, and the Polish-Bolshevik War all forced people westward to seek safety. Among the millions of refugees from the former Russian Empire, around 200,000 were Jews.<sup>34</sup>

Famine, typhus, and the Spanish flu threatened the majority of the population regardless of nationality or religion, but this state of affairs heightened tensions between groups. A typhus epidemic broke out in German-occupied Poland in 1916. The reaction of the Prussian interior ministry was to close the borders of the German Reich to the so-called *Ostjuden* because they saw Jews as lazy, dirty people who would only bring disease to German people.<sup>35</sup> Public health police (*poliċja sanitarna*) in Warsaw took infected people from their homes, forced them to undress in congregate settings, and sprayed them with chemicals.<sup>36</sup> Much of this happened in violation of Jewish religious law, and some men said that after having had their heads and beards shaved and forced to eat nonkosher foods, they had ceased to be Jews. A British doctor who studied the outbreak even claimed that 73 percent of all cases in Warsaw were among Jews.<sup>37</sup> This fed into a much older stereotype that Jews were, by definition, carriers of disease. Among the wider population and the Polish government, prejudices continued to affect everyday interactions and policy decisions.

Aid organizations such as the Joint Distribution Commission (JDC), the American Relief Administration, and the American Red Cross fed and provided medical care for millions. The outpouring of aid from American Jews for their coreligionists in Eastern Europe, mostly funneled through the JDC, made Jews the objects of jealousy and violence.<sup>38</sup> Thus, even after the Western public stopped paying attention to the issue of "Polish pogroms," similar situations pressed Jews to emigrate.

However, would-be migrants faced a series of legal and logistical challenges due to what Torpey termed the "monopolization of the legitimate means of movement."<sup>39</sup> The United States was one among many countries that restricted the movement of aliens and its own citizens during the Great War. Despite not joining the war until 1917, the American government adopted policies that required visas and passports for all movement in and out of the country. When the war ended in 1918, these "temporary" measures enacted by executive order became law.<sup>40</sup> In order to leave Europe and move anywhere, first migrants needed to be identified and given a passport. If they wanted to

emigrate to the United States, then they also needed to purchase a ten-dollar visa that required approval from American authorities in Poland.

The American Legation in Warsaw was sieged in its early days with the issues of Jews in Poland. The first US ambassador to Poland, Hugh Gibson, and Secretary to the Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane spent the spring of 1919 shuttling back and forth between Paris and Warsaw. In Paris, they dealt with the problem of the “pogroms” and minority rights, while in Poland their office was filled with people trying to leave. As it turned out, these issues went hand in hand. When Gibson and Lane were attempting to settle back into issues in Poland, they realized that they required a much larger staff to handle their needs. Lane wrote to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris in May 1919 complaining about the lack of funding to hire the necessary workforce.<sup>41</sup> Perhaps unexpectedly for Gibson, rather than communication with the Polish government, the main task of the embassy was the issuance of travel documents to potential migrants. By August, the demand had only increased and funding had not improved. Gibson wrote to Lane,

We are going to have a brand new set of emigration problems and must comb out a huge number of people in order to discard the undesirables, the Bolsheviks, etc. . . . Dr. Bogen [the head of the Joint Distribution Commission in Poland] has a list of over 30,000 people (all Jews) who have taken the precaution of getting their names on paper [to depart from Danzig as soon as possible].<sup>42</sup>

The work became so great at the embassy in Warsaw that two of their most important employees broke under the strain and quit in September 1919. In desperation, Gibson wrote to the State Department to request more support. The issue of passport control was most important. While recognizing that some emigration from Poland to the United States was inevitable, the international situation required that they examine each candidate carefully. At that time, there was only one person in the embassy qualified to fill that position and interview candidates. It became obvious to Gibson that they would need to establish a passport office with at least ten employees to handle the load.<sup>43</sup>

Across the Atlantic, the United States began pursuing legal tools precisely for the purpose of controlling the ethnic and racial makeup of incoming migrants. In May 1921, Congress passed the Emergency Quota Act that set limits on immigration from each country. Quota amounts were to be set at 3 percent of the population of foreign-born people residing in the United States based on the 1910 census. This law did not simply limit immigration, but designed rules that allowed the government to deny entry to populations based on their “nationality.”<sup>44</sup> As the law explains, “For the purposes of this Act nationality shall be determined by country of birth.”<sup>45</sup> By that standard there was

no way to define separate quotas for Jews from Poles, Russians, Germans, or Czechoslovaks. Moreover, the Labor Department had to come up with a formula for assigning “nationality” amounts based on limited census data to countries that did not exist in 1910, or had drastically altered borders, like in the case of Austria, Hungary, or Germany.

Although the letter of the law spoke of “nationality,” it is clear from the context in which the law was designed that the real target was race.<sup>46</sup> There is voluminous evidence to support this supposition. As the academic literature of the day reveals, most influential thinkers were saturated with racial thinking. In 1917, University of Michigan sociologist Warren S. Thompson published a series of articles in *Scientific Monthly* on the issue of “race suicide.” This same trope was repeated before and after, effectively claiming that vastly different birth rates between “native” and foreign-born women would lead to a demographic catastrophe, wherein foreigners would eventually replace the “native” people. Thompson summed up the issue in the question, “Are the people of the older stock—those of Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic descent—gradually dying out and are they being replaced by immigrants from southern and eastern Europe?”<sup>47</sup> His answer was a resounding “yes,” and his solution was to limit immigration. Thompson was certainly not alone, and his ideas found willing ears in the US Congress.<sup>48</sup>

American involvement in World War I created an opportunity for psychological and physical studies on a wide swath of the population that could be used to support racial theories. Data and analyses that arose from these studies, produced mainly by sociologists, psychologists, and medical doctors, reinforced racial thinking and justified some of the worst impulses in American history. The British American psychologist, and professor at Harvard University from 1920, William McDougall, was a prominent proponent of such racist theories.<sup>49</sup> In his 1921 *Is America Safe for Democracy?*, McDougall posited that the country was headed toward disaster due to its continued allowance of “undesirable” races into the country and their proliferation. Based on psychological examinations conducted on recruits to the US Army from 1917 to 1918, he arrived at the conclusion that intellectual capacity, and therefore economic and social success, are predetermined by race. Or in his own words,

that the social stratification which exists in modern industrial communities is positively correlated with a corresponding stratification of innate moral and intellectual quality, or, in less technical language, that the upper social strata, as compared with the lower, contain a larger proportion of persons of superior natural endowments.<sup>50</sup>

The main idea that drives his fearmongering message was that one’s moral compass and intellectual capacity are passed from parent to child the same way as hair color and face shape. McDougall’s disciplinary colleague at Yale University, Irving Fisher, commented on the book, writing, “Research should make our conclusions on this subject

beyond question. A great load of degeneracy is certainly upon us, whether it be true or not that it is increasing in weight. It is incumbent upon us to reduce it.”<sup>51</sup> Both Fisher and McDougall were strong proponents of eugenics, but the more immediate solution was at the border and ports of entry. Fisher wrote, “The obvious safeguard at present is restriction of immigration of a drastic kind.”<sup>52</sup>

From the perspective of immigration opponents, they applied scientific methods to arrive at the 1921 law’s text and content, but it was limited by what could count as a legal category. Another Harvard professor Robert De C. Ward lamented in 1922 that since the law was “being based on nationality, i.e. country of birth, and not on race, it has made possible a disproportionate immigration of Jews to the exclusion of thousands of non-Jewish aliens.”<sup>53</sup> In practice, nationality could not stand in for race in the case of European immigrants. If administrators at ports wanted to limit entry for Jews, they would have to find different methods of disqualifying them.

Congress gave immigration officials only fifteen days to prepare for the implementation of this system, so that by June 3, 1921, quotas started to be counted. The government attempted to place the burden for keeping track on the shipping companies, and a \$200 fine was to be assessed for every person attempting to enter the country above the quota.<sup>54</sup>

The effect was almost immediate. In the fiscal year ending on June 30, 1921, there was a 120,516 net increase in the Jewish population of the United States.<sup>55</sup> By the next year, it was cut by more than half, with 53,437 net immigration.<sup>56</sup> During the same period net migration of “Poles” (Catholics) was actually in negative territory, with more than 34,000 people leaving, presumably to help rebuild Poland, while only around 6,000 Poles arrived in the United States. Thus using the Polish quota number, we can assume that over 75 percent of the migrants from Poland to the US in 1921 to 22 were Jews.<sup>57</sup> This may have been the result of a concerted effort on the part of the Polish administration to facilitate emigration for Jews, and hamper it for Catholic Poles.

The 1921 act was deemed too lenient, and it was revised in the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act, which allowed entry for only 2 percent of nationalities already residing in the United States according to the census of 1890, while explicitly banning Arabs and Asians from entry. In accordance with thirty-four-year-old census data, the new law aimed to severely limit migration from eastern and southern Europe. The explicit intention was to maintain a racial makeup of the country that reflected a time before the mass migration of Jews, Slavs, and Italians because they were seen as unassimilable and thus “dangerous” to the American project.<sup>58</sup> As the Schunkler case shows, the American administrative apparatus tried to differentiate between Christian Poles and Jewish Poles, though there was no legal basis to do so, showing that the power structures changed their practices based on racist ideology even before the laws shifted to match this thinking.

The political environment in the United States certainly encouraged more stringent restrictions on the immigration of poor masses from the east, especially Jews. Through the proliferation of news stories and novels, a “Bolshevik fantasy” pervaded European and American culture. Popular publications and newspaper cartoons often emphasized a supposed stereotypical connection between Bolshevism and Jews, and both became synonymous with destruction, chaos, and violence.<sup>59</sup> The nativist movement in the United States began paying much more attention to Jews after 1917. The Russian Jews’ perceived and real sympathy for the revolution, and excitement surrounding Trotsky’s brief stay in New York City revealed the Jews’ “true” tendencies for insurrectionary behavior. Rumors spread that immigrating Jews were a cover for a secret invading army of the Bolshevik Revolution gathering in New York.<sup>60</sup> Gibson also reported from Warsaw to his superiors in Washington that the Jews of Poland were a dangerous group, filled with “spies” and “provocateurs.”<sup>61</sup> As poor refugees of war and revolution, the Jews were already undesirable from the perspective of many Americans, and the association with Bolshevism only tarnished this image further.

For Poland, on the other hand, determining race was not high on their list of priorities in designing citizenship law. When the Polish state came into being in late 1918, it absorbed laws from the Russian, Austrian, and German empires.<sup>62</sup> The first new guidelines regarding citizenship, and the rights it conferred, came about with the signing of the Minorities Treaty on June 28, 1919. As a result of the unsettled borders of the fledgling Polish state, it was difficult to pin down the exact territorial parameters for citizenship.

Despite the massive need among civil servants and border guards for clear rules, Polish lawmakers published the first guidelines on citizenship only in January 1920.<sup>63</sup> These requirements mirrored the Treaty of Versailles and Minorities Treaty in several ways, and were carefully worded so as not to violate international law.<sup>64</sup> For example, one article outlined a pathway to citizenship that included a ten-year residence in Poland and knowledge of the Polish language, but the next article nullified these requirements if the applicant was previously a resident of the Russian Empire.<sup>65</sup> Expanded instructions on the execution of this law did not mention any national requirements or even guidelines on how to address such issues.<sup>66</sup> Citizenship was supposed to be granted automatically based on residence prior to 1914, when the Great War began. According to the letter of the law, to be counted as a “Pole” was only a matter of declaring one’s loyalty and commitment to the Polish state, regardless of national identity.

In practice, local Polish authorities wielded enormous power to decide citizenship status and produce travel documents. In late 1918, various Polish organizations at home and abroad began issuing “Polish” passports to practically anyone who wanted one. For example, Dmowski’s Polish National Committee in Switzerland issued passports to the diaspora.<sup>67</sup> In the United States and Canada, hastily organized consulates issued

passports to members of the large Polish communities there.<sup>68</sup> As the government in Warsaw became more organized, embassies as far afield as Harbin in China also issued passports without checking birth records in Poland.<sup>69</sup> At home, practically every governmental office was in the business of issuing passports. In the absence of regulation, mayors, police stations, town clerks, and the minister of interior could all produce identification papers.<sup>70</sup> Even after the legislature published clarifications in June 1920, state, provincial, county, and city governments all had the right to decide on matters of citizenship and issue travel documents.

As a result of this decentralized practice, documents varied widely in appearance and content. Of course, this inconsistency made the passports extremely easy to counterfeit. When the Polish embassy in Paris refused to issue passports to Jews, counterfeiters popped up to respond to demand and profit from the situation. Since the Polish passports might appear in practically any form, the only hurdle that remained was to produce a fake ten-dollar visa for travel to the United States.<sup>71</sup>

Despite wide disparities in the appearance of these passports, almost all of these early documents consistently did not mention nationality. American officials pushed for inclusion of the category, placing considerable strain on the relations between Poland and the United States. In order to work around this “oversight,” the American government started to issue “Affidavits of Identity and Nationality” in 1920. To the Polish government this was tantamount to a violation of their sovereignty, and even equated such certifications of national identity with the distribution of new Polish passports without the consent of the Polish state. The Polish ministry of foreign affairs wrote to the State Department that “the issuance of passports to Polish citizens by the Department of state would undoubtedly infringe upon the authority resting exclusively with the agents of the Polish Government duly appointed and recognized by the United States Government.”<sup>72</sup> The State Department did not address these concerns directly, but it appears that they discontinued the practice of requiring or producing supplementary documentation.

In January 1921, Poland issued a new series of passports partly in response to the complaints of the American government. Hugh Gibson in Warsaw saw these new documents come across his desk in applications for visas to the United States. He lamented to the secretary of state, “But the *place* of birth is omitted, and there is no specific indication of nationality, nor does the document contain any clause invoking the aid and protection of other governments on behalf of the bearer.”<sup>73</sup> Even though the Emergency Quota Act had not become law, the US government was deeply concerned with the issue of “nationality,” which it defined through the place of birth. Polish authorities, in response to Gibson’s complaints, declared that any mention of nationality would be superfluous since bearers of Polish passports were by definition “Polish.” But this was deeply unsettling to American authorities who believed that the Poles were willing to

give a passport to anyone looking to travel out of the country, regardless of their residence or origins. Gibson continued,

But if some of these holders of recent Polish passports were to change their minds and decide to remain in Poland instead of going to the United States, it would be interesting to see whether they could convince the local authorities that they were *bona fide* Polish citizens.<sup>74</sup>

The subtext of Gibson's complaint is that the issuance of passports without nationality was a policy directed at facilitating the emigration of Jews. That is what Gibson meant with his snarky challenge for these visa applicants to try and stay in Poland or to claim to a local official that a Jew could also be considered a Pole. This explains the absence of any guarantees of protection abroad on the document, which the State Department took to mean that the Polish passport was nothing more than an exit visa.

These skeptical statements are unsurprising given that the American embassy staff were, overall, not particularly sympathetic to the plight of the Jews in Poland. Historians regard Gibson as especially antisemitic, even among the old boys' club of diplomats.<sup>75</sup> In Warsaw, Gibson befriended another special antisemite, Poland's nuncio Achille Ratti.<sup>76</sup> Gibson and Ratti both saw in Warsaw's religious and "backward" Jewish community all the antisemitic stereotypes they had imagined from their drawing rooms. In their view, the smelly, stubborn, untrustworthy Jew had come out of the war even richer than before and was actively propping up Bolshevism.<sup>77</sup> In 1922, the Holy See selected Ratti as their new patriarch, and he became Pope Pius XI.

Even though they had no hard evidence, American authorities correctly assessed that the Polish administration issued "fictional" passports to Jewish would-be migrants. The Polish government apparently engaged in the practice of handing out so-called emigrant passports, mainly to Jews, which facilitated free movement into and out of Poland, but not the right to settle in the country.<sup>78</sup> Even stronger evidence of this practice is contained in a secret protocol issued by the Ministry of Interior in May 1920. Minister Stanisław Wojciechowski wrote, "It is not in the interests of the Polish State to impede the exit of people [of Jewish faith] . . . on the contrary from the economic perspective it is advisable that we facilitate their emigration."<sup>79</sup> In light of this assessment Wojciechowski ordered his subordinates to "immediately" issue passports to Jews without regard for the laws regulating Polish citizenship and to ignore "national identity or citizenship."<sup>80</sup> A few years later this policy would come back to haunt Polish authorities as they could not sort out who was really a citizen and who had been issued a passport under false pretenses.

These protocols remained private, and outwardly the Polish authorities attempted to project the appearance of generosity in the international arena. Responding to the

angry letters of the American embassy deriding their fast and loose passport policies, the Polish ministry of foreign affairs wrote,

Until now, yielding to simple humanitarian considerations, Poland has not put and does not put any obstacles to the passage into Poland of fugitives from Russia and the Ukraine, but their afflux becomes alarming in view of the sanitary situation of the country, as well as the difficulty of furnishing them with provisions and lodgings in case these refugees are deprived of the possibility of leaving Poland and must prolong their stay therein.<sup>81</sup>

From the perspective of Poland in the early 1920s, the alternative to facilitating exit would be to allow refugees to stay in the country. Following the recommendations of League of Nations experts, Polish authorities created a sanitary corridor on the eastern border, placing newcomers into camps for a three-month quarantine.<sup>82</sup> But what to do with these people after that period was not clear. There was no procedure for asylum, and the Polish government was not keen on allowing nonethnic Poles to remain. Thousands of people wished to leave war-torn Poland, and they did so of their own accord when they could obtain the proper travel documents. Therefore Polish civil servants, with the approbation of the central government, allowed migrants to get what they wanted. But in the case of Jews carrying Polish passports that did not distinguish between “Poles” and “Jews,” nationality and race were at odds, which was problematic from the American perspective.

The State Department warned the Polish government that if they did not end their policy of granting Polish passports to Jews without distinction, then it would adversely affect the ability of “real” Poles to enter the country. This was, however, exactly what the Polish government intended; that the number of Jews would be reduced, while “true” Catholic Slavic Poles would be forced to remain in Poland. The country faced the challenge of forming a nation-state with a multiethnic population. If they were to take the tenants of liberal democracy seriously, then they would have to grant political power to minorities in equal measure to ethnic Poles. In order to guarantee political and economic dominance within the new Polish state, it was paramount that the number of minorities be reduced to an absolute minimum by whatever means necessary.

The Polish government initially refused in writing to change their policy with regard to nationality on passports, but they ultimately relented to American pressure. Before more serious adjustments were made, some local authorities were apparently in the habit of issuing passports that described Jews as being of Polish nationality. Because they could not be processed according to their race, as was the intention of the policy, the US government chose to invalidate the citizenship of such persons. The Schunkler case provides a prominent example among many similar situations.<sup>83</sup>

CITIZENSHIP *AND* NATIONALITY

Meer Schunkler was born and raised in the small city of Gorodok (Polish: Gródek Podolski) in the Podolia region. Throughout the Great War and after, the area changed hands on several occasions. In 1914 the city lay within the bounds of the Russian Empire; from 1917 to 1921 the city passed through successive German, Ukrainian, Polish, and then Bolshevik occupations. Podolia's status was one of the most uncertain in the eastern borderlands.<sup>84</sup> At some point in 1920, Schunkler and his family arrived in L'viv/Lwów, the former capital of the Austro-Hungarian province Galicia, and the third city of interwar Poland. They had little choice but to apply for Polish citizenship. At that point, the Polish-Bolshevik War was ongoing and the status of their hometown uncertain. They were technically stateless, but qualified for Polish citizenship under the Minorities Treaty protection because they had lived in the Russian Empire. After a period of a few months, the five members of the family received Polish passports from the local police office, then purchased and obtained the proper visas from American authorities, and affixed them to their legitimate Polish passports.

After a long and expensive journey, in May 1921, the Schunkler family arrived at Ellis Island. Despite their caution and attention toward legality, American immigration authorities detained them on the island pending further investigation. The Schunklers had the great misfortune to be the last straw in a much larger pattern of immigration practices.

During the initial inquiry, Meer Schunkler spoke truthfully, but his statements reinforced the feeling that he and his family were not candidates for Polish citizenship. Schunkler explained that he was born in Podolia, Russia, a region no longer under Polish control in 1921. When asked how long he had lived in Poland, he first replied three months. The immigration officials were shocked that after such a short residence in Poland one could obtain a passport and citizenship. Since Schunkler was a Jew and a self-professed Zionist, the situation was further complicated. From the perspective of the State Department, Schunkler had gone so far as to deny he could be Polish at all.<sup>85</sup>

Schunkler's brother-in-law, who was already established in the United States, hired a lawyer, and fought the case. The lawyer instructed Schunkler to say that he had misunderstood the questioning from the original inquest. During the second hearing, Schunkler flatly contradicted his earlier statements, claiming that he had actually lived in Poland for five and a half months, and that he was indeed Polish. He produced two identification cards and the passport to attest to this fact. The Bureau of Immigration was not impressed.

Following the instructions of the State Department, Gibson asked the Polish authorities to investigate the matter. The police in Lwów produced Schunkler's passport application and stood by their decision.<sup>86</sup> According to their report, the local police

had followed proper procedure, and using the discretion that the decentralized system afforded them, decided that Schunkler and his family were Poles. Strictly speaking, according to the Minorities Treaty and Polish statutes, Schunkler absolutely qualified for Polish citizenship. He was a subject of the tsar before the war, and regardless whether the town of his birth ended up within the borders of the Polish state, he had the right to self-identify and certify that he wished to become a Polish citizen.

During the hearing regarding the Schunkler family, however, no reference was ever made to international law or Polish law governing citizenship. American authorities entirely sidestepped the question of legality in favor a judgment that as Jews, the Schunklers could not be Poles, and therefore their documents were fraudulent. The international legal structure was not on the side of American officials, and so they bent their authority over immigrants, which was essentially absolute, in order to fit their antisemitic beliefs.

The State Department instructed the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization to treat the Schunklers as if they had arrived on Ellis Island without any travel documents. This decision resulted in their deportation, thwarted their attempt to immigrate to the United States, and nullified their passports. Effectively, the Schunkler family became stateless even though they had legally obtained Polish citizenship and the corresponding documentation. If we are to believe Gibson's cynical analysis—that Jews carrying Polish passports would not be treated as Polish citizens in Poland—then the situation of families like the Schunklers was even more precarious. *De jure* the family possessed citizenship, but *de facto* no one state or international body could guarantee the rights and privileges afforded them by this citizenship. Instead, overlapping claims of sovereignty would have to be respected in order for the passport to mean anything.

## CONCLUSION

The Schunkler case was but one instance among thousands that frustrated American officials' attempts to control Jewish migration. Ultimately, the family fell victim to new modern state forms, the nation-state, and the passport regime that grew out of the Great War. Theoretically, Poland and the United States were bound together by international law, and we commonly perceive law as ethical and equalizing. The foundation of a law-and-order state is precisely that all people are equal before the law. But in the realm of international law, not all states, corporate bodies, or individuals can be equal precisely because there is no supranational force strong enough to enforce it. Poland and the United States were in a severely unequal relationship, and so when the US government requested changes to the ways that Poland identified its own citizens, they followed suit. However, the United States was also able to question the judgment of the Polish government in pursuit of their own racist immigration policies.

From the Polish side, there was no consistent policy on how to categorize the Jews. The power regarding citizenship and nationality questions rested in the hands of lowest-level bureaucrats. On the whim of a single police officer or town clerk, anyone could be classified in any way. By the letter of the law, individuals could declare their identity as Polish or otherwise, but it is difficult to assess whether this actually happened in practice or on what scale. Surviving documentation of passport applications from this period shows a fairly stringent process wherein applicants had to provide ample documentation supporting their right to citizenship and the purposes of their travel.<sup>87</sup>

In our era of closing borders and multiple refugee crises, it is paramount that we understand the international legal mechanisms by which discrimination on the basis of race can work without using the language of race. In the case of Jews leaving Poland, the governments of the United States and Poland were unwilling to accept them, but their defense lay inside the unclear category of nationality, while both administrative apparatuses were more interested in the category of race.

## NOTES

1. Letter from Secretary of State to Hugh Gibson, US Ambassador to Poland, July 6, 1921, no. 1097, Roll 10, US Department of State Records Relating to Internal Affairs of Poland, 1916–1944 Microfilm Edition, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven, CT (hereafter cited as US DSR).
2. Letter from Secretary of State to Hugh Gibson, US Ambassador to Poland, July 6, 1921, no. 1097 Roll 10, US DSR.
3. Letter from Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych to Gibson, October 8, 1921, no. X/IIIa/67427/21, Roll 10, US DSR.
4. John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State* (Cambridge University Press, 1999).
5. Tara Zahra, *The Great Departure: Mass Migration from Eastern Europe and the Making of the Free World* (W. W. Norton, 2016), 17.
6. *Rocznik Statystyki Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej za rok 1922* (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 1923), 28.
7. Keely Stauter-Halsted, “Violence by Other Means: Denunciation and Belonging in Post-Imperial Poland, 1918–1923,” *Contemporary European History* 30, no. 1 (2020): 1–14.
8. “An Act To limit the immigration of aliens into the United States,” May 19, 1921 H.U. 4075. *Sixty-Seventh Congress Sess. I. Ch. 8. 1921.*
9. This is based on a vast law and society literature, see for example: Kitty Calavita, *Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law* (University of Chicago

- Press, 2010).
10. My thinking here is influenced by: Mohammad Shahabuddin, *Ethnicity and International Law: Histories, Politics and Practices* (Cambridge University Press, 2016).
  11. Scholarship has been hard pressed to account for state sovereignty, international law, and the variety of administrative practices in dealing with refugees and migrants. See: Matthew Frank and Jessica Reinisch, "Introduction: Refugees and the Nation-State in Europe, 1919–1959," *Journal of Contemporary History* 49, no. 3 (2014): 477–90.
  12. *Minorities Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (The British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the United States) and Poland, Signed at Versailles, 28 June 1919*, art. 3–6, 8–12.
  13. On this alternative view in early twentieth-century sociology: Joanna Wawrzyniak, "From Durkheim to Czarnowski: Sociological Universalism and Polish Politics in the Interwar Period," *Contemporary European History* 29, no. 2 (2019): 172–87.
  14. This is not an unusual perspective in Europe. In the early nineteenth century, Fichte claimed that even if Jews were baptized they would always remain Jews. See: Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation*, trans. Gregory Moore (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
  15. Grzegorz Krzywiec, *Szowinizm po polsku: Przypadek Romana Dmowskiego (1886–1905)* (Wydawnictwo Neriton–Instytut Historii PAN, 2009), 71.
  16. Krzywiec, *Szowinizm po polsku*, 76–78.
  17. Nikodem Bończa-Tomaszewski, *Demokratyczna geneza nacjonalizmu: Intelektualne korzenie ruchu narodowo-demokratycznego* (S. K. Fronza, 2001), 182–84. This line of thinking continued into the interwar period, see: Zofia Trębacz, *Nie tylko Palestyna: Polskie plany emigracyjne wobec Żydów, 1935–1939* (*Zydowski Instytut Historyczny*, 2018).
  18. Alina Cała, *Żyd—Wróg odwieczny? Antysemityzm w Polsce i jego źródła* (*ŻiH Żydowski Instytut Historyczny*, 2012), 314.
  19. He also wrote a book about this experience called *Unfinished Business* (1944), which won the Pulitzer Prize for History in 1945.
  20. Stephen Bonsal, *Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles* (Prentice-Hall, 1946), 147.
  21. Carole Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878–1938* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 173–82.
  22. For an excellent treatment of the issue of Jewish refugee policy in Slovakia, see: Rebekah Klein-Pejšová, "Beyond the 'Infamous Concentration Camps of the Old Monarchy': Jewish Refugee Policy from Wartime Austria-Hungary to Interwar Czechoslovakia," *Austrian History Yearbook* 45 (April 2014): 150–66.
  23. Bonsal, *Suitors and Suppliants*, 147.
  24. Raul Cârstocea, "Historicising the Normative Boundaries of Diversity: The Minority Treaties of 1919 in a *Longue Durée* Perspective," *Studies on National Movements* 5

- (2020): 20–21.
25. Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others*, 186–208, 237–57.
  26. *Minorities Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers*, art. 7.
  27. Ezra Mendelsohn, *The Jews of East Central Europe between the World Wars* (Indiana University Press, 1983), 139.
  28. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Harcourt Brace & Co., 1976), 289.
  29. Wilson's personal interest and contribution to the language is clear in "Wilson's Third Draft" and "Wilson's Fourth Draft" of the League of Nations Covenant: David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. II (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), 103, 153–54.
  30. Eric D. Weitz, "From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions" *The American Historical Review* 113, no. 5 (December 2008), 1313–43.
  31. The first chaotic census of Poland was performed in 1921 and did not include several regions that would become part of the state. According to its results the population was divided into the following national-linguistic groups: 69.23% Poles, 15.17% Ukrainians, 7.97% Jews, 4.03% Belarusians, and 2.99% Germans. The rest were Lithuanians, Russians, Czechs, "Locals" (*Tutejsi*), and others. *Mały Rocznik Statystyczny: 1930* (Nakład Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego, 1930), 9.
  32. Peter Gatrell, *A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees during World War I* (Indiana University Press, 1999); Michael Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford University Press, 1985).
  33. Eric Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I* (Harvard University Press, 2003).
  34. Eugene Kulischer, *Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917–1947* (Columbia University Press, 1948), 56; Claudena M. Skran, *Refugees in inter-war Europe: the emergence of a regime* (Oxford University Press, 1995), 40.
  35. Piotr Wróbel, "Żydzi polscy w czasie I wojny światowej," *Przegląd Historyczny* 83, no. 4 (1992): 662. German-Jewish officials Haase then serving in Warsaw apparently shared this opinion on the *Ostjuden*.
  36. Wróbel, "Żydzi polscy w czasie I wojny światowej," 659. Sanitary police were a German institution that was added to the tools of government in places under German occupation during World War I.
  37. E. W. Goodall, "Typhus Fever in Poland, 1916 to 1919," *Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine* 13 (1920): 265–66.
  38. Letter from Copenhagen Information office Regarding the Condition of Jews in Poland to JDC in New York City, April 29, 1919, JDC AR1921\_00711, Joint Distribution Committee Archive, New York, NY; "Interpelacja żydowska," *Kurjer Warszawski*, nr 111, April 23, 1919.
  39. Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, 122.

40. Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, 111–16.
41. Letter from Arthur Bliss Lane to Joseph C. Grew, at American Commission to Negotiate Peace, [Warsaw] May 10, 1919, Folder 4, Box 1, Arthur Bliss Lane Papers, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University (SML Yale).
42. Letter from Hugh Gibson in Warsaw to Arthur Bliss Lane in Paris, August 2, 1919, Folder 6a, Box 1, Lane Papers, SML Yale.
43. Letter from Hugh Gibson in Warsaw to Assistant Secretary of State William Phillips, 12 September 1919, Folder 7, Box 1, Lane Papers, SML Yale.
44. Roger Daniels, *Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants since 1882* (Hill and Wang, 2004), 49–58.
45. “An Act To limit the immigration of aliens into the United States,” May 19, 1921 H.U. 4075. *Sixty-Seventh Congress* Sess. I. Ch. 8. 1921.
46. Keith Fitzgerald, *The Face of the Nation: Immigration, the State, and the National Identity* (Stanford University Press, 1996), 137–41.
47. Warren S. Thomson, “Race Suicide in the United States,” *The Scientific Monthly*, July 1917, 22.
48. Erika Lee, “Immigrants and Immigration Law: A State of the Field Assessment” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 18, no. 4 (Summer, 1999), 85–114.
49. McDougall was a controversial figure in his field, though clearly respected by some as his appointment to Harvard indicates. Some of his books also sold well commercially. See: Arthur Berger, *Lives and Letters in American Parapsychology: A Biographical History, 1850–1987* (McFarland, 1988), 118–24.
50. William McDougall, *Is America Safe for Democracy?* (C. Scribner’s Sons, 1921), vii.
51. Irving Fisher, “Impending Problems of Eugenics,” *The Scientific Monthly*, September 1921, 216.
52. Fisher, “Impending Problems of Eugenics,” 229.
53. Robert De C. Ward, “What Next in Immigration Legislation?” *The Scientific Monthly*, December 1922, 566.
54. Approximately \$3000 in present-day dollars. Bureau of Labor Statistics Inflation Calculator: [https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation\\_calculator.htm](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm).
55. *Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Labor for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30 1921* (Washington, DC, 1921), 30.
56. *Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration to the Secretary of Labor for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30 1922* (Washington, DC, 1922), 28.
57. *Annual Report*. . . 1922, 6.
58. Lee, “Immigrants and Immigration Law,” 91.
59. Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, “Bolshevism as Fantasy: Fear of Revolution and Counter-Revolutionary Violence, 1917–1923” in Gerwarth and Horne, *War in Peace: paramilitary violence in Europe after the Great War* (Oxford University Press, 2013).

60. John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925* (Rutgers University Press, 1980), 279.
61. Paul Hanebrink, *A Specter Haunting Europe: The Myth of Judeo-Bolshevism* (Harvard University Press, 2018), 80.
62. David Engel nicely summarizes these: Engel, “Citizenship in the conceptual world of Polish Zionists,” *The Journal of Israeli History* 27, no. 2 (2008): 192.
63. “Ustawa z dnia 20 stycznia 1920 r. o obywatelstwie Państwa Polskiego,” *Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (DURP), January 20, 1920, nr. 7, poz. 44.
64. Articles 3–6 were taken almost verbatim from the Treaty of Versailles and articles 8–11 reference the *Minorities Treaty*. Stanisław Starzyński, *Obywatelstwo Państwa Polskiego* (Krakowskiej Spółki Wydawniczej, 1921), 3–4.
65. DURP, nr. 7, poz. 44, 20 January 1920, art. 8–9.
66. “Rozporządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych w przedmiocie wykonania ustawy z dnia 20 stycznia 1920 r. o obywatelstwie polskim,” DURP, *June 7, 1920*, No. 52, Poz. 320.
67. Syg. 2126, Komitet Narodowy Polski, Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN).
68. *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1918 listopad-grudzień*, ed. Sławomir Dębski (Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2008), nr 190, December 28, 1918.
69. Letter from American Consulate Harbin China to State Department, December 21, 1923, No 1966, Roll 10, USDS.
70. This was done according to instructions for administrators from Warsaw. “Rozporządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych w przedmiocie wykonania ustawy z dnia 20 stycznia 1920 r. o obywatelstwie polskim,” DURP, *June 7, 1920*, No. 52, Poz. 320.
71. 860C.016, Roll 10, USDS, includes many cases and news clippings. Interestingly, the counterfeits were mostly of high quality, but spelling errors in English and French were dead giveaways.
72. Letter from Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to State Department, 55-01/1897, June 10, 1920, Roll 10 USDS.
73. Letter from Hugh Gibson to Secretary of State, January 19, 1921, Roll 10, USDS. Emphasis in original.
74. Letter from Hugh Gibson to Secretary of State, January 19, 1921, Roll 10, USDS. Emphasis in original.
75. Neal Pease, “‘This Troublesome Question’: The United States and the ‘Polish Pogroms’ of 1918–1919” in *Ideology, Politics, and Diplomacy in East Central Europe*, edited by M. B. B. Biskupski (University of Rochester Press, 2003), 67.
76. Perrin C. Galpin, ed., *Hugh Gibson, 1883–1954: Extracts from his Letters and Anecdotes from His Friends* (Belgian American Educational Foundation, 1956), 92.
77. David I. Kertzer, *The Popes Against the Jews: The Vatican’s Role in the Rise of Modern Anti-Semitism* (Vintage Books, 2001), 244.

78. Konrad Zieliński, "Population Displacement and Citizenship in Poland, 1918–1924" in *Homelands: War, Population and Statehood in Eastern Europe and Russia, 1918-1924*, ed. Peter Gatrell and Nick Baron (Anthem, 2004), 107.
79. "W sprawie wydawania paszportów emigrantom do Ameryki (ściśle poufne)," Nr. BB/105, May 10, 1920, syg. 357, Konsulat Generalny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Nowym Jorku (KGRPwNJ), AAN.
80. "Okólnik Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych nr. 45, (Poufny)" K.III.a.2941/23, 27 March 1923, syg. 357, KGRPwNJ, AAN. Wojciechowski was also Poland's second president, elected after the assassination of Gabriel Narutowicz.
81. Letter from Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Gibson (in French), May 18, 1921, Roll 10, USDS.
82. "Note du haut commissaire medical commission du typhus—Societe des Nations" B.38 20/48/57, [late 1920], Syg. 755, Archiwum Ignacego Jana Paderewskiego (zesp. 100), AAN.
83. The State Department described the practice of issuing Jews Polish national passports as frustratingly common. Letter from Secretary of State to Hugh Gibson, US Ambassador to Poland, July 6, 1921, no. 1097, Roll 10, USDS.
84. If Schunkler was in Podolia in 1920, then it was, at that time, under Polish administration. "Raport sytuacyjny Naczelnika okręgu podolskiego," Kamieniec Podolski, June 28, 1920, Roll 26, "Belvedere Archive" Archives of Marshal Piłsudski, Microfilm Edition, SML Yale.
85. Letter from Secretary of State to US Ambassador to Poland Hugh Gibson, July 6, 1921, no. 1097, Roll 10, USDS.
86. Letter from Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych to Gibson, October 8, 1921, no. X/IIIa/67427/21, Roll 10, USDS.
87. For example, the archives in Kraków are full of such applications: Syg. 414, Starostwo Grodzkie Krakowskie, Archiwum Narodowe w Krakowie.

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“MAY IT BE AS SOON  
AS POSSIBLE!”<sup>1</sup>

Polish Governments’ Plans Toward  
Jewish Mass Emigration

ZOFIA TRĘBACZ

THE AIM OF THE PARIS CONFERENCE WAS NOT ONLY TO MAKE PEACE, BUT also to define a new world order ensuring lasting peace. It was important because one of the aftermaths of the conflict turned out to be the formation of many new states, often heterogeneous in terms of nationality. The architects of the peace treaties, understanding the potential challenges posed by this diversity, aimed to establish a system that would ensure that minorities not only had equal status with the majority population, but also guarantee protection against any violation of their rights, ensuring their free national and cultural development. Additional guarantees were added to the provisions of the peace treaty.

On June 28, 1919—together with the Treaty of Versailles—Poland signed under protest the Little Treaty of Versailles, also known as the minority treaty, which was to guarantee respect for the rights of national minorities living in the Second Polish Republic.<sup>2</sup> The Little Treaty of Versailles obliged the Polish state to introduce equality before the law of all citizens (regardless of race, language, or religion), ensure the freedom to perform religious practices, and grant minorities certain language rights in education and the judiciary. It also allowed representatives of national minorities to appeal directly to the League of Nations, bypassing the court procedure in Poland. Inclusion in the March 1921 constitution gave the provisions of the treaty on the rights of minorities the rank of fundamental rights.<sup>3</sup>

It is worth noticing that the Polish government reluctantly agreed to accept the provisions of the minority treaty. Polish delegates tried to question the legitimacy of

some of the regulations, but unsuccessfully. The controversy was raised by the possibility of appealing to the League of Nations, specifically to the Permanent Court of International Justice (Article 12), which was considered an unacceptable interference in Poland's internal affairs.<sup>4</sup> Other provisions of the Little Treaty (Article 1) also caused dissatisfaction—such as allowing national minorities to perform religious practices, ensuring their access to public offices, and performing various professional and economic activities. The guarantees would also concern the freedom to establish a charity, religious, social, educational, and upbringing institutions, ensuring the possibility of using one's own language and religion. The criticism was not directed at the treaty provisions themselves, but rather at how these measures were introduced. They were perceived as external interference in the legislative affairs of a sovereign country. Some of the criticism also stemmed from the fact that the provisions granted numerous freedoms to the Jewish minority, which incited discontent among domestic antisemites.

Furthermore, the conference in Paris caused far-reaching changes in the previous colonial division—above all, it took the colonies away from Germany and thus, eliminated Germany's physical presence in Africa.<sup>5</sup> In this way, the conference initiated the process of decolonization.<sup>6</sup> Of course, the end of the German colonial empire did not mean the end of colonialism in general, especially since the system of French, British, and Italian overseas possessions remained intact; nevertheless, the introduction of the mandate system through peace treaties undermined the existing arrangement, the final collapse of which took place after World War II. The division into three types of seats (A, B, and C) meant that certain territories were promised the chance to gain sovereignty in a specific time perspective.

The weaknesses of the Versailles system, and especially how quickly its rules were challenged and undermined, also affected Poland. Surprisingly, the issue of dividing overseas colonies was connected to plans to encourage mass emigration of Jews. Challenging the idea that colonies “belonged” to specific countries weakened the international system, as did the fact that countries signing the Treaty of Versailles took away basic civil rights from Jews. The way Polish authorities dealt with the “Jewish question” can be seen as an example of how the principles developed at the Paris Peace Conference were disregarded. The world order after 1919 was weakened not only by states seeking to change it, but also by the international institutions meant to support it.

## POLISH DELEGATION AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

The Second Polish Republic was represented at the sessions in Paris by two delegates: Roman Dmowski, president of the Polish National Committee and an

ideologist of the Polish national movement, and world-famous pianist Ignacy Paderewski, at that time prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. For Poland, the most important arrangement of the Treaty of Versailles was the sanctioning of its independence. The participating countries at the conference fully acknowledged the independence and sovereignty of Polish statehood. When shaping the treaty decisions, the Second Polish Republic was a newly established country that had already gained recognition on the international stage. Since most of the crucial decisions were made by Great Britain, France, the United States, Italy, and Japan, the Polish delegation had no real influence on the shape of the treaty. Its project was prepared without the participation of Polish representatives. On June 24, 1919, Paderewski was presented with the final version of the document. The Polish delegation signed the document on June 28, 1919. The crucial provisions of the Paris Peace Conference were supposed to become fundamental laws, which would override any national legal codes or legislation.

Leaders of great powers, including French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, persuaded that building an international system of protection of national minorities would contribute to their gradual assimilation with the dominant ethnic majority in a given country.<sup>7</sup> In addition, they explained that minority treaties were created, among others, to ensure the political unity and territorial integrity of a given state and that minorities do not become a source of separatist activities within it. In turn, the examination by the League of Nations of complaints about noncompliance with minority rights was to avoid the impression that the powers interfere with the internal affairs of other states.<sup>8</sup>

The signing of the treaty between the main Allied and associated powers and Poland started the ratification process in the country. The government was aware of the lack of support in Polish society for solutions imposed by great powers. Therefore, it was emphasized from the very beginning that signing the Little Treaty of Versailles was a condition of signing the Treaty of Versailles. The benefits resulting from it were also pointed out. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Paderewski said at a session of the Legislative Sejm on July 30, 1919:

We felt the rights of the national minority imposed on us vividly, like a Pole should feel them. Was it right to do this with the great, old, and civilized nation such as we are? Was it appropriate for Poland, which for 800 years was a safe refuge for all persecuted in religion and faith, which was a safe refuge for all oppressed peoples and tribes, which always hugged all who suffered to a clean bosom? Indeed, even its own enemies said, that she was constantly a swordsman of tolerance, liberalism, and progress in the history of modern Europe, was it proper to impose internal laws, and orders on some small, primitive and barbaric nation?<sup>9</sup>

## POLISH EDUCATION SYSTEM AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE ILLUSORY CHARACTER OF THE VERSAILLES SYSTEM

The minority treaty faced opposition from the Polish population, leading to many of its provisions being disregarded. For instance, there were challenges in implementing education in minority languages, particularly for the Jewish community. In 1919, Polish legislation made it mandatory for children aged seven to thirteen to attend school, with the decree on compulsory education [*O obowiązku szkolnym*] being issued on February 7, 1919, by the Chief of State Józef Piłsudski. The Legislative Sejm approved it on July 22, 1919. This decree established a seven-year compulsory elementary school system and required local authorities to set up public elementary schools.<sup>10</sup>

National minorities created a private system of primary and secondary education that was separate from the state. They were also considered compliant by the authorities after meeting specified curriculum requirements. In 1922, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education approved the recognition of attending religious schools, including *cheders*, for fulfilling compulsory education. The modernization of the institutions—introducing a minimum of twelve hours a week of secular subjects and maintaining twenty-seven to thirty-seven hours of religious subjects—was the condition.<sup>11</sup> However, even when those orders were not respected, the authorities did not interfere.

The international commitments accepted by Poland ensured minority children a right to education in their mother tongue, but in practice, the situation differed through time and region. There were no public primary schools with the native language for Jewish students. In the early 1920s, the state authorities established a specific type of primary school with Polish as the language of education, but with no classes on Saturdays or Jewish holidays. However, from the beginning of the 1930s, separate schools were gradually liquidated. At parents' request, non-Catholics could be excused from writing and drawing on Saturdays and religious holidays. The extensive network of Jewish schools existing in interwar Poland included exclusively private institutions. They were subsidized only by some municipal governments, but never by the state.

### POLAND IN THE 1930S

The above example shows how difficult it was to implement the provisions of the Little Treaty of Versailles. Furthermore, the situation deteriorated over time. In the 1930s, Poland became a place of open ethnic conflicts between the Polish majority and the minorities, especially Jews. They faced daily violence, both verbal and physical. There

were attempts at universities to limit the number of Jewish students (*numerus clausus*) or even completely exclude them (*numerus nullus*).

It is important to note that as early as the fall of 1922, attempts were made in Poland to introduce a *numerus clausus*. Rallies were held at the universities, and a special memorial was sent to the university authorities. The memorial demanded that the number of Jewish students be limited to 11 percent, which was the percentage of Jews living in Poland at that time. This demand was repeated at all the universities. However, these requests were met with reservations from the League of Nations (resulting from the signed Little Treaty of Versailles), as well as protests from some members of the public, and the idea was ultimately abandoned.<sup>12</sup>

In the 1930s, Polish antisemitism became more and more extreme. At the universities, Polish nationalists won the struggle for the "ghetto benches."<sup>13</sup> In the years from 1935 to 1937, the country was the scene of anti-Jewish pogroms,<sup>14</sup> an economic boycott of Jewish businesses, and the so-called Aryan paragraph, excluding Jews from various professional associations. Also, legislation against Jews had been implemented.<sup>15</sup>

The radicalization mentioned above was possible because after 1935, the Polish government replaced Józef Piłsudski's "state assimilation" (citizens were judged not by their ethnicity, but by their loyalty to the state) with an "ethnic assimilation" policy, which caused the rise of hostility toward Jews and voicing anti-Jewish opinions openly. While many of these elements were present in the Second Polish Republic prior to 1935, what was new was the open support of these actions by the government, its alignment with extreme-right circles, and its increasing drift toward anti-democratic solutions. The new prime minister Felicjan Sławoj Składkowski's *Exposé* from June 1936 was considered a symbol of the upcoming change. While he did condemn pogroms, his words contained an approval for other antisemitic actions: "My government is convinced that nobody should be harmed in Poland. [...] Economic struggle, yes! But no harm."<sup>16</sup> The second half of the 1930s was also the moment when the idea of Jewish emigration entered the mainstream of Polish policy, and plans for Jewish emigration were created in the offices of employees of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

All this related to an aggressive press campaign presenting Jews as a source of misfortune for Poland and Poles. Antisemitic resentments had become a surprisingly powerful tool for political mobilization. None of the major political forces opposed the idea of Jewish emigration from Poland. In the second half of the 1930s, the plan of forced emigration of Jews from Poland became one of the ways considered by the Polish authorities to solve not only ethnic but also economic and social problems. The resettlement of Jews was seen to reduce unemployment and "polonize" Polish cities, as masses of poor peasants would have replaced the Jewish workers as far as trade and craftsmanship were concerned. Emphasis was placed on migration from rural areas and little towns. The global economic crisis meant that the idea began to be taken far more

seriously than it had ever been before and not only in national circles, but also by centrists and even some socialists.<sup>17</sup>

### “WE DEMAND COLONIES FOR POLAND!”<sup>18</sup>

As already mentioned, the Paris Peace Conference established a new world order. It started a slow process of decolonization, but quite quickly, some states called for a revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Firstly, from the very beginning, the former German colonies aroused particular interest:

Let us not forget about those mandate colonies that were once the property of the former German Empire. It is only a matter of time before the distribution of their mandates will be revised. As we know, some countries, especially Italians, are already making efforts to strive for the distribution of these mandates. We must then claim our rightful part of those colonies which the former German Empire took over with our work, blood, and money. Therefore, concerning the blood shed by our citizens when obtaining them and the work, and money at arranging them, they must belong to Poland.<sup>19</sup>

Secondly, in the mid-1920s, Germany openly raised the question of the revision of the Treaty of Versailles, which was described as the “Versailles dictate.” The African continent and its division among European powers became one of the areas of dispute. In the mid-1930s, on the international forum, more and more discussions about colonial issues were held, which was fostered by the growing demographic, social, and economic problems throughout Europe. The Second Polish Republic was one of the countries that expected that sooner or later, they would revise the existing colonial system. Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provided some opportunities in this direction: “The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.”<sup>20</sup>

The ambitions to obtain a Polish colony appeared shortly after regaining independence, which can be also presented as a failure of the peace decisions, as well as a complete misunderstanding of their ideas. While in the 1920s, the pursuit of overseas possessions was seen as an unattainable dream or a beautiful fantasy. However, by the 1930s, the state became involved in attempts to make this idea a reality in order to solve pressing economic, political, and national problems. At that time, it seemed likely that owning overseas territory or establishing national and cultural autonomy on another continent could be achievable. The creation of such an impression was undoubtedly

favored by governmental projects, which were later discussed in the press, just to mention the idea of settling Jews from Poland in Madagascar.<sup>21</sup> The support of Polish authorities was crucial in this regard. However, it is necessary to remember that they also benefited from the atmosphere prevailing in Europe before the war. The possibility of revising the Treaty of Versailles had been discussed repeatedly in the international forum. It was soon to turn out how easily the borders of individual states were changing. Thus, the colonial ideas were probably “rationally calculated opportunities [. . .] with which there were real hopes for political solutions considered to be the most important and urgent.”<sup>22</sup>

At the turn of the 1920s and 1930s, the necessity to implement the colonial demands was more and more clearly emphasized in the public debate. At that time, many publications were created to interest Polish society in this issue.<sup>23</sup> In the second half of the 1930s, the colonial idea became more real. At that time, the main arguments were overpopulation of the country and free access to raw materials, conditioning economic development. It was harder and harder to make a living in the countryside—farms were too low-income, and there was a lack of paid work. Therefore, many farmers left in search of employment, but the great economic crisis also exacerbated the problem of unemployment in cities. That is when the colonial idea gained new supporters. Giving other European countries as an example, it was argued that the possession of overseas territories helps to fight the underdevelopment of the country and the poverty of its citizens. The colonies were not only a place of employment for future settlers—the present landless peasants, unemployed merchants, and artisans—but also constituted a market for their goods and a source of raw materials that were necessary to revive Polish economic life. They also allowed the free import of colonial goods without high customs duties. Furthermore, it was believed that their own overseas territories would help to relieve social, political, and national tensions. In other words, the colonies were an opportunity for the state and its inhabitants.

Imperial tendencies played a minor role. Their goal was to bind all (or almost all) society groups with the state. It was particularly relevant in a multiethnic country like the Second Polish Republic. Poland, remaining under partitions for many years, no longer wanted to stand aside from great European politics. It desired to join the group of colonial powers as soon as possible. From the viewpoint of the ruling, having a colony significantly increased the political prestige of the state and its importance in international relations: “Nimbus of Poland’s superpower was to influence the strength and attractiveness of the Republic of Poland, to maintain Polish identity among emigrants, and to gradually transform a Polish emigrant from a workman, looking for bread, into a conquistador, conquering the world for Poland.”<sup>24</sup>

In addition, access to overseas territories was to bring a solution to the problem of numerous Polish emigrants staying outside the country. Amassing them in one place,

in one part of the world, could have contributed to the reinforcement of the Polish diaspora. The idea of placing foreign elements living in Poland in the colony appeared in the early 1930s. In colonial propaganda, the argument of “strengthening of the Polish element” in the social and economic structure of the state was primarily used. The representatives of the Belarusian, Ukrainian—considered subversive—and, of course, Jewish minorities were considered strangers. This group also included circles radically oriented toward society, mainly communists, promoting “patterns of the social system alien to Poland.”<sup>25</sup>

At that time, as the government started implementing an emigration and colonial program, the main arguments of which were the overpopulation of the country and the “flawed” or “unhealthy” professional structure of Jews because of their concentration in trade and services, the high proportion of Jews among the liberal professions (such as doctors and lawyers), and the underrepresentation of this community among farmers. In one of the official documents of the Polish Foreign Ministry, we can read: “The population situation forces Poland to attach the highest importance to the issue of emigration. Both the problem of rural overpopulation and the Jewish problem in Poland, which has its source mainly in the ‘flawed’ socio-economic structure of the Jewish population, can only be solved if the overseas, unpopulated territories lying fallow and not yet used for the work of civilization will be made available to emigration from Poland.”<sup>26</sup>

In January 1936, an article was published in *Polska Zbrojna* demanding a mandate of Cameroon for Poland. This new tendency of such postulates did not escape the attention of diplomatic missions in Poland. According to Léon Noël, the French ambassador to Poland, such action was an expression of a voice widespread in the society of the Second Polish Republic. The diplomat noted that until then, Polish colonial ambitions had not been articulated openly, and the article from *Polska Zbrojna* was the first to raise the issue of the territorial concession in the form of Cameroon.<sup>27</sup> In contrast, the British ambassador to Warsaw, Howard Kennard, considered an article from *Gazeta Polska* of September 1935 as the beginning of the Polish media and political campaign to obtain a colony.<sup>28</sup>

Certainly, the increased activity of the Polish authorities in this field was related not only to political and economic changes in the country, but also to the international situation, and above all to the increase in revisionist and Imperial tendencies on the part of Germany, Italy, and Japan. At that time, there was an opportunity to put Polish demands on the international forum.<sup>29</sup> On January 29, 1936, at a meeting of the Senate’s Budget Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs Józef Beck said:

I think we are on the edge of maturing a new concept of the colonial problem. The representative of the greatest colonial power, Sir Samuel Hoare, said he foresaw the possibility and the need for an international agreement to share both the sources of

raw materials and the making use of human labor in the world. He believes that this must be sought through a peace agreement. In Geneva, I pointed out in the appropriate form that we reserve ourselves to come back to this matter in the future. If this issue will be discussed internationally, our state will, of course, have an equal right and an equal opportunity to satisfy its interests.<sup>30</sup>

At that time, preparations began, mainly at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to develop Polish colonial demands, and then the entire emigration and colonial program. At the beginning of August 1936, the information about the necessity of increasing Jewish emigration (to at least 100,000 per year) was published in the official organ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—*Polska Informacja Polityczna*. In the article, the priority was admittedly given to Palestine, but it was firmly underlined that its possibilities were very limited, also because of numerous Jewish refugees from Germany, and that is why it was necessary to look for other places: “The road to new areas should be opened for Jewish emigration primarily by those countries that are interested in finding at least a partial solution to the Jewish problem, and which due to their role in world politics and based on their territorial possessions could effectively contribute to working out a practical solution to the issue.”<sup>31</sup> It was then that the efforts aimed at increasing the emigration of national minorities from the country, in particular Ukrainian and Jewish citizens, intensified.<sup>32</sup> In the second half of the 1930s, the emigration policy became a way of shaping changes in the national structure of the state. Furthermore, it was postulated that the areas of possible settlement actions should not be directly within the range of Polish colonization areas. Also, there had been efforts not to create strong minority clusters.<sup>33</sup>

These examples show actions that were a clear violation of the post-Versailles order, proving how unimportant they were from the point of view of Warsaw.

## SHAPING EMIGRATION CONCEPTS IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Jews held a special place in Polish colonial plans. Of course, the idea of forced emigration toward Jews was neither new nor original. Such projects were a component of modern antisemitism in Europe. In the 1930s, we can observe not only an increase in nationalist and anti-Jewish sentiments, but also a growing interest in the problem of emigration. However, its “Polish” version from the end of the interwar period is worth special attention. It directly linked the process of ethnicization with the growing importance of the state in the international area—for example, governmental plans for receiving colonies.

The chances of gaining a colony by Poland were negligible, and Polish colonial policy in the interwar period was a complete failure. However, the combination of colonial ambitions with the prepared program of Jewish emigration from the Second Polish Republic turned out to be skillful propaganda. This idea was born in the second half of the 1930s, and the reduction of the Jewish population in Poland was supposed to be a remedy for almost all the problems of the young state and the beginning of the road to its Imperial future.

The roots of the idea of forced Jewish emigration should be sought, on the one hand, in the intellectual trends of the time in Europe, which often assumed the possibility of displacing entire communities, and, on the other hand, in the antisemitic discourse of that time. Many factors influenced this situation. One of them was the change in the immigration policy of the main destination countries for Jews.<sup>34</sup> It made the previously more self-regulating emigration (responding to economic or social conditions) dependent on government actions. Still, the most crucial factor was undoubtedly a very dynamic situation not only in Europe, but also in the world—the growing colonial revisionism of Germany, Italy's invasion of Abyssinia, or the Imperial policy of Japan. Also, the fascist tendencies coming from Germany and other European countries were not without significance. In this way, external factors strongly influenced the internal situation in Poland and determined the changes. Categorical demands that Jews should leave Poland appeared in the second half of the 1930s. It is true that since the beginning, the National Democrats had ideologically promoted the idea of a Polish-speaking Catholic Poland with no Jewish or any other minority, but the Nazis' rise to power only strengthened their attitude on the matter. The articles in the national press—since 1930 their number had gradually increased—gave a positive evaluation to Hitler's anti-Jewish policies and praised them as a role model for Poland. The growing number of refugees from Germany, who sought shelter in Poland after 1933, also had a great impact on antisemitic attitudes and demands aimed at the deportation of Jews. After 1938, not only German Jews, fired from their jobs, deprived of citizenship, and forced to leave the country, had to look for shelter, but also Austrian, and then Czechoslovak Jews.

It is worth looking closely at the circumstances under which Polish governmental emigration plans for Jews had been created. The first projects for mass Jewish emigration appeared in 1933. However, in the years from 1935 to 1936, they were intensified. At that time, mainly at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they carried out the preparations for the development of Polish colonial demands and then the entire emigration and colonial program. In the second half of the 1930s, the emigration policy started to be treated as one of the most valid factors shaping changes in the national structure of the state. These works were preceded by significant transformations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The head of the Consular Department, responsible for colonial policy and realizing the idea of forced Jewish emigration, was Wiktor Tomir Drymmer, one of the closest and most trusted associates of Józef Beck, Polish minister of foreign affairs. He was even considered *eminence grise* of Polish diplomacy. Drymmer's close associate was Apoloniusz Zarychta, the head of the Emigration Policy Department. The tasks of his department "included establishing the guidelines of Polish emigration policy, dealing with general matters concerning the direction and conditions of emigration and settlement, dealing with legislation, and drawing up conventions in the field of emigration matters."<sup>35</sup> Zarychta's duty was to talk with Jewish leaders and encourage them to accept such an idea. His deputy was Jan Wagner, responsible for research about Polish Jewry. Drymmer was the coordinator of all these activities, responsible for them directly to the minister of foreign affairs—Józef Beck.

The works carried out at the Consular Department were used to create the scientific basis for the governmental plans. There were many special studies, surveys, and other similar publications used during statements on the international area. They were also used in the Polish diplomatic missions abroad. The authors of the publications explained the essence of emigration, described the conditions necessary for its proper implementation, indicated positive results, and above all, the need for such a solution. The arguments they invoked were repetitive: bad economic situation, high unemployment, overpopulation of villages, the inability to absorb farmers' surpluses by underdeveloped Polish industry, and elimination of national conflicts. The developed propaganda machine was to contribute to the dissemination of this concept in society and to convince the public opinion that the chosen path was the right one. What is worth mentioning, all those works presented Poland as an important competitor in the colonial race.

The first such work was *Problem of Jewish Emigration* [*Problem emigracji żydowskiej*], written by Jan Wagner in 1937. The study was published under the pseudonym Jan Ziemiński because of its purpose—information for members of the Foreign Committees of the Sejm and Senate and some diplomatic missions abroad. "We treated this work as a top-secret," recalled Drymmer.<sup>36</sup> Wagner described the first migrations of Jews, their position in Poland in the following centuries, and especially their economic situation, professional structure, and number. The author devoted a separate chapter to the emigration of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, indicating specific settlement directions combined with the transformations that occurred. He emphasized the fundamental importance of Palestine as a Jewish national state, but clearly noted that its immigration possibilities were insufficient: "Then a necessity arises to solve the problem of Jewish emigration not only in Palestine. The need arises to find—with almost all sovereign countries closed to Jews—other territories where Jews could develop without economic or political upheaval either for themselves or other nations.

Zionism cannot—today—solve the problem of Jewish emigration. Thus, it cannot—today—solve the Jewish problem.”<sup>37</sup>

Wagner’s publication was full of antisemitic stereotypes about the harmfulness of the Jews wherever they appeared, including their “unhealthy” social and professional structure, the dangerous competition it created, and above all, their “excessive” numbers and alienation. The author was convinced of the necessity of emigration—if not voluntary, then forced. The emigration rose to the rank of a political problem. “The Polish state, Polish society, and Jewish society are facing the necessity to resolve this issue,” wrote Wagner. Furthermore, the emigration required international cooperation, not only among the Jews themselves, but also among states that owned colonies.<sup>38</sup>

Wagner’s second work was *The Palestinian Problem* [*Problem palestyński*], a booklet from 1938. The author presented the history of the Jewish–Arab conflict. At the end of 1937, he spent two weeks in Palestine. The text, among others, was based on the work of the Peel Commission in Palestine.<sup>39</sup> As the deputy head of the Department of Emigration Policy, Wagner had access to its reports. He also talked to representatives of both sides in this conflict. He pointed out that the most significant feature of this issue is “the irrational, ideological and emotional, and not economic, basis of the struggle for Palestine, which is a struggle for land that is ‘holy’ for both Jews and Arabs, a struggle for ‘a free man in a free land.’” In this situation, Wagner considered the Jewish–Arab conflict to be permanent. In his publication, he strongly emphasized the limited absorption capacity of this area as well as the secondary role played by Polish Jews (constituting 45 percent of this community) to Palestinian Jews.<sup>40</sup>

Later, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also created, for example, *Press Theses on Jewish Emigration* [*Tezy prasowe w sprawie emigracji żydowskiej*]. The authors emphasized the urgency of Jewish emigration and presented the main arguments of the government, indicating the necessity for such a solution—the mentioned overpopulation of the country, economic domination of Jews in cities, limitation of the immigration possibilities of many countries, especially Palestine, the influx of refugees from Germany, and finally the “strong emigration rush” of the Jewish population. Moreover, they argued that other countries should be involved in this issue. Widespread propaganda was supposed to disseminate this idea among the Polish society, so it would be seen as the only logical solution to the so-called Jewish question. In the 1930s, the colonial idea became very popular, which further favored such efforts.<sup>41</sup>

The spectrum of areas that were considered in government circles and in colonial environments was wide. Some projects seemed more likely than others, but their character was still theoretical. Angola and Uganda, Brazil, and Ecuador, Birobidzhan or Australia—all these places where Polish Jews could settle in were connected by illusive-ness. From the outset, these concepts were doomed to failure. The grounds on which they tried to rely were extremely weak—the arguments of nineteenth-century Jewish

emigration in Argentina or the Portuguese government's "substantial consent" to immigration to Angola in the early twentieth century could not convince local opponents. Attempts were made to overcome the reluctance of the authorities of individual African or South American countries toward Jewish emigration through the mediation of other countries, such as England or France, but the involvement of other entities did not increase the chances of the success of the entire undertaking. Moreover, more and more countries (Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia) introduced immigration restrictions, more or less directly aimed at Jewish settlers. In this situation it was difficult to count on the success of Polish plans. Many of them feared that the colonists would be made up of merchants and traders, not to mention the stereotypes linking Jews with communists, which also gave rise to concern (e.g., in Ecuador). Possible consent was granted only to agricultural emigration, which also delayed the prospects of Jewish settlement, although it was often disregarded by the Polish government.

## CONCLUSION

One should notice that in the 1930s, voices supporting Jewish emigration as a solution to economic and social problems of Poland gained support among all Polish parties on the right side of the political scene and at its center. Undoubtedly, these concepts were born in the national camp but relatively quickly met with a favorable reception from other political options. Only the activists of the Polish Socialist Party had not accepted this idea, although the discussion about such a solution occurred within its ranks. The most striking example was the booklet by Jan Maurycy Borski, publicist, and journalist, *Jewish Affair and Socialism: The Polemic with the Bund* [*Sprawa żydowska a socjalizm. Polemika z Bundem*], and the discussion that followed within the party after its publication in 1937. Repeating the arguments popular in national-Catholic circles—alleged support for emigration by Jewish parties, most of the Polish society, and the international opinion—Borski argued that the emigration should not be associated with the "expulsion" of Jews from Poland. It is not a reactionary or antisemitic slogan, he contended. On the contrary, "The immigration movement from over-industrialized to non-populated countries, organized on purpose and planned, has a great future. Besides, the Jewish minority constitutes a separate nation with no spiritual or emotional ties with the country of its settlement."<sup>42</sup> And although it does not have a hostile attitude toward Poland, it will never recognize it as its homeland and will never cease to isolate itself, remaining a separate national group in Polish society, whether for racial, religious, linguistic, or moral reasons—just different. And as such, it should, except for a few people strongly associated with the country of its residence, go to Palestine, or find a new place of colonization. Borski's postulate sparked a stormy discussion within

the party, and although the supporters of national and cultural autonomy certainly still had an advantage, it seems a more important fact that the debate on the forced Jewish emigration took place among socialists. It shows how the ideas of the national camp influenced the Polish political milieu.<sup>43</sup>

As Anna Landau-Czajka notes: “Although emigration seems to be the most drastic and radical solution, it was most accepted and discussed not only at the level of theoretical considerations, as most other projects, because specific actions were initiated in this direction.”<sup>44</sup> All other measures brought against the Jews—such as economic and professional boycotts, restrictions at the universities, social isolation, calls for deprivation of political rights, and even violence—were merely steps leading to their removal from Poland. This widespread support showed the authorities’ success and even more, the success of propaganda once typical only for the far right. Government plans for forced Jewish emigration had become part of the political culture, which reached out beyond the walls of parliament, penetrating social organizations, the church, and universities.

What is more, the change of the attitude of the Polish state toward Jewish citizens was the most visible sign of the failure of the Treaty of Versailles and especially the Little Treaty, which was supposed to build a system of protection of the rights of the minorities in Eastern Europe. Even though the Second Polish Republic was founded also under the condition of treaties signed in 1919, its authorities in the 1930s openly violated the provisions of the Little Treaty, not only discriminating against the Jewish population in many fields but also demanding a colony, which at that time related to the understanding of the so-called Jewish question, and finally, Poland renounced it in 1934.<sup>45</sup> One should emphasize that it was possible due to the weakness of international institutions that were to guard the Paris arrangements. This way eliminated one of the basic foundations of post-Versailles Europe.

It is revealing that the Treaty of Versailles turned out to be the way to ensure minority protection instead of equality. However, also in this regard, it failed. The openly anti-Jewish policies of the Polish authorities led to legislation that deprived national minorities of their democratic rights. However, this received an inadequate response from international public opinion. The provisions of the Little Versailles Treaty were not enough to protect the Jewish minority. Despite the treaty’s guarantees, Jews faced challenges in learning their native language in schools and were denied opportunities for clerical work or military careers. In the 1920s, revisionist views toward the Versailles arrangements were on the outskirts of politics and had minor influence on Polish government policy. However, in the 1930s, with the increasing radicalization of social and political sentiment, these views became part of the mainstream of Polish politics and even part of the government’s political program.

Thus, not only did the international protection of ethnic minorities prove to be a failure, but also an attempt to model the state’s policy toward some of its citizens by

imposing specific solutions on it. Undoubtedly, the combination of revisionist ideas with increasing chauvinism showed how serious threats were not foreseen by the authors of the treaties of 1919. The feeling of emptiness in which European Jews found themselves was further enhanced by the fact that many countries refused to accept any Jewish emigrants, and this issue did not provoke protests in any of them.

## NOTES

1. "Obyź jak najprędzej! Osadnictwo Żydów w koloniach francuskich. Madagaskar, Nowa Kaledonia, Guyana," *Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy*, January 17, 1937, 2.
2. Similar treaties were signed by Romania, Greece, Czechoslovakia, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.
3. *Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland 1920*, no. 110, 728.
4. In 1934, on September 13th, Poland denounced the procedure of appeal to the League of Nations related to the Little Treaty of Versailles because of the withdrawal of Germany and the access of the USSR to the League of Nations, preserving the guarantees of minority rights set out in the treaty. This declaration led to the collapse of the Versailles system of protection of minority rights.
5. Taking their overseas territories from Germany did not mean the independence of the Indigenous peoples of these lands. These lands were distributed among the claimant European colonial empires.
6. See: Raul Cârstocea, "Historicizing the Normative Boundaries of Diversity: The Minority Treaties of 1919 in a *Longue Durée* Perspective," *Studies on National Movements* 5 (2020): 43–79.
7. It is worth noting that at that time the adoption of protection regulations in peace treaties was not a *novum*. Similar agreements on the protection of minorities were included, for example, in the provisions of the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 (then all signatories guaranteed their observance) or the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna of 1815. However, there are significant differences between them. For more about the evolution of how the protection of minorities was understood in the international relations system, see: Jennifer Jackson Preece, "Minority rights in Europe: from Westphalia to Helsinki," *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (1997): 75–92.
8. Piotr Krzysztof Marszałek, "Problem suwerenności II Rzeczypospolitej w świetle postanowień mniejszościowego traktatu wersalskiego z 1919 roku," *Historia i Polityka*, 31 (2020): 19, 21–22.
9. Stenographic report of the 81st session of the Sejm, July 30, 1919, 32.
10. *Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland 1919*, no. 14, 147. Placing the provisions in the March constitution of 1921 raised their importance: "In the field of public school,

- education is compulsory for all state's citizens of the state" (Article 118); "Education in state and municipal schools is free" (Article 119). *Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland 1921*, no. 44, 267.
11. For more about the compulsory education in Poland, and especially in Łódź, where this obligation was introduced at the earliest, see: Stanisław Mauersberg, "Wykonywanie obowiązku szkolnego w niepodległej Polsce (1918–1939)," *Rozprawy z Dziejów Oświaty* 37 (1996): 155–76; Małgorzata Olszewska, "Reprezentanci społeczności żydowskiej a problemy oświaty na forum łódzkiej Rady Miejskiej w latach 1919–1933," *Piotrkowskie Zeszyty Historyczne* 3 (2001): 121–40; Zofia Trębacz, "Czasy, kiedy nauka była przywilejem pewnych kast społecznych, minęły bezpowrotnie. Wokół wprowadzenia obowiązku szkolnego w Łodzi." In *Kultura Literatura, sztuka i nauka w XX wieku* (Żydowski Instytut Historyczny, 2020), 321–40.
  12. See: Szymon Rudnicki, "From 'Numerus Clausus' to 'Numerus Nullus,'" *Polin. A Journal of Polish-Jewish Studies* 2 (1987): 246–68.
  13. See also: Zofia Trębacz, "'Ghetto Benches' at Polish Universities. Ideology and Practice," in *Alma Mater Antisemitica. Akademisches Milieu, Juden und Antisemitismus an den Universitäten Europas zwischen 1918 und 1939*, ed. Regina Fritz, Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, Jana Starek (New Academic Press, 2016), 113–35.
  14. Especially large pogroms occurred in Grodno (June 7, 1935), Sokoły (August 25, 1935), Odrzywół (November 20 and 27, 1935), Rawa Mazowiecka (November 28, 1935), Mińsk Mazowiecki (June 1–4, 1936), Zambrów (October 27, 1936). The excesses in Przytyk, near Radom (March 9, 1936), became their characteristic symbol. See *Pogromy Żydów na ziemiach polskich w XIX i XX wieku*, vols. 2 and 3, ed. Kamil Kijek, Artur Markowski, Konrad Zieliński (Instytut Historii im, 2019).
  15. Such as the *sbechita* limitation of March 27, 1936 (finally, however, the act did not come into force, as the Senate did not manage to consider it before the outbreak of the war); resolution on the production and trade in devotional articles and objects of worship of the Christian, Mosaic, and Muslim religion of March 25, 1938; Act on the deprivation of citizenship of persons staying abroad of March 31, 1938. See also: Ezra Mendelsohn, *The Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars* (Indiana University Press, 1987), 68–81; Joanna Michlic-Coren, "Anti-Jewish Violence in Poland 1918–1939 and 1945–1947," *Polin. A Journal of Polish-Jewish Studies* 13 (2000): 34–61; Szymon Rudnicki, *Równi, ale niezupełnie* (Biblioteka Midrasza, 2008).
  16. Marian Fuks, *Z dziejów wielkiej katastrofy narodu żydowskiego* (Sorus, 1997), 22.
  17. Zofia Trębacz, *Nie tylko Palestyna. Polskie plany emigracyjne wobec Żydów, 1935–1939* (Żydowski Instytut Historyczny, 2018).
  18. Czesław Zagórski, "O sprawiedliwy podział kolonii," *Szkwał* 10 (1936): 2–3.
  19. Woykar, "Nasze zagadnienia morskie," *Prawda Morska* 9 (1934): 1.
  20. Marek Arpad Kowalski, *Dyskurs kolonialny w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Wydawnictwo

- DiG 2010), 101–2, 272; Tadeusz Białas, *Liga Morska i Kolonialna 1930–1939* (Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1983), 166–67, 170.
21. In the circles of Polish government appeared many ideas for possible alternate locations for Jewish emigration—in Africa (Kenya, Rhodesia, Angola) or in South America (Argentina, Columbia, Ecuador). The project of organizing a mass emigration of Polish Jews to Madagascar, an island in the Indian Ocean, and a French colony since 1896, became the target of many years of serious efforts by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was supposed to bring a solution to the problem of overpopulation in rural areas and become a kind of antidote to other difficulties of the country related to the so-called “Jewish question”—demographic, national, and social. In May 1937, a special commission went to Madagascar to investigate the settlement conditions. Its members spent about thirteen weeks there and made several trips to different parts of the island. The results of the team’s activities turned out to be very controversial. No official report was published on the expedition, and members of the commission were divided in their opinions both regarding the possible area of future settlement and the size of possible colonization, and even the attitude of the local population of oases of diseases occurring in this area. Initially, the Polish government tried to interpret the commission’s conclusions only positively, but the official report on the trip to Madagascar was not published. At that time, the French side, although it had officially declared cooperation on the project, began to withdraw its support, so the whole idea lost its foundations. See also: Magnus Brechtken, *Madagaskar für die Juden. Antisemitische Idee und politische Praxis 1885–1945* (Oldenbourg, 1997); Hevesi Eugene, “Hitler’s Plan for Madagascar,” *Contemporary Jewish Record* 4, no. 4 (1941): 381; Adrien Mathieu, *Le Projet “Madagascar”. Une tentative de colonisation juive, les décideurs français (1936–1939)*, *Revue d’histoire diplomatique* (2011): 157–80; Zofia Trębacz, “Jews to Madagascar”—Poland in the face of ethnical problems in the 1930s,” *European Spatial Research and Policy* 28, no. 1 (2021): 9–24; Leni Yahil, “Madagascar—Phantom of a Solution for the Jewish Question,” in *Jews and Non-Jews in Eastern Europe 1918–1945*, ed. Bela Vago, George L. Mosse (J. Wiley, 1974).
  22. Marek Arpad Kowalski, *Dyskurs kolonialny w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warszawa 2010), 274.
  23. Gustaw Załęcki, *Polska polityka kolonialna i kolonizacyjna, zarys teoretyczny, opracowany w świetle problemu zamorskiej ekspansji narodowej* (Instytut Wydawniczy Biblioteka Polska, 1925); *Problem konieczności i możliwości polskiej polityki kolonialnej* (Związek Pionierów Kolonialnych, 1930); *O kolonialno-polityczną kulturę mas polskich*, (Warszawa, 1930); Leon Bulowski, *Kolonie dla Polski* (published by the author, 1932).
  24. Wojciech Wrzesiński, “Polacy za granicą w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej (1918–1939),” in *Problemy dziejów Polonii*, ed. Marian Marek Drozdowski (Państwowe Wydawnictwo

- Naukowe, 1979), 41.
25. See Łukasz Zamecki, "Aspekt surowcowy polskich działań emigracyjno-kolonialnych w latach trzydziestych XX wieku," *Spoleczeństwo i Polityka* 2 (2010): 11.
  26. Archiwum Instytutu Hoovera, Ambasada Polski w Wielkiej Brytanii, 112, Problem populacyjny w polityce międzynarodowej, "Polska Informacja Polityczna," July 30, 1936, 3. Of course, looking for justification in the "unhealthy" professional and social structure of the Jewish population was nothing new. However, it was a convenient tool to justify the antisemitic plans of the Polish government.
  27. Noël also pointed out that the newspaper referred to the nineteenth-century expedition of Szolc-Rogoziński. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Pologne 420, Ambitions coloniales de la Pologne, 2–3; Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, K-Afrique 91, Ambitions coloniales de la Pologne, 1–2; Centre Des Archives diplomatiques de Nantes, Ambitions coloniales de la Pologne.
  28. The National Archives, Foreign Office 19964/6703, Poland's colonial needs, 231–32; The National Archives, Foreign Office 19964/7707, Memorandum on Poland's Colonial Claims, 260. Cf. Sokółów, Florian, "Stara sprawa w nowej fazie," *Gazeta Polska* September 21, 1935, 1.
  29. In October 1936, at the session of the Political Commission of the League of Nations, which dealt with the problem of the mandate, the emigration issue was raised by a permanent delegate of Poland to the League of the Nations Tytus Komarnicki, and undersecretary of state and vice-minister of industry and trade Adam Rose. They both justified it with the overpopulation of the country, its economic structure, and the high number of Jews in Poland. Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 9586, Pismo Naczelnika Wydziału Prasowego z 7 XI 1936, 26–27; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 9904, Oświadczenia przedstawicieli rządu polskiego w sprawie żydowskiej na terenie zagranicznym, 17–19.
  30. Józef Beck, *Przemówienia, deklaracja, wywiady 1931–1939* (Gebethner i Wolff, 1939), 213. See also Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, K-Afrique 91, Pismo Léona Noël'a z 30 I 1936, 3–6.
  31. Archiwum Instytutu Hoovera, Ambasada Polski w Wielkiej Brytanii, 112, Emigracja żydowska, "Polska Informacja Polityczna," August 5, 1936, no. 20, 1–3.
  32. In the early 1920s, the emigration of Jews to the United States was relatively high, and later also to Palestine. In turn, in the years 1925–1930, many Ukrainians left for France or Canada. In the 1930s, this situation changed, and emigration aspirations for national minorities have intensified—also under the influence of internal transformations in Poland. See Halina Janowska, *Emigracja zarobkowa z Polski 1918–1939* (Państwowe Wydawn., 1981), 144.
  33. Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 9585, Notatka dla Pana Ministra. Tezy polityki emigracyjnej państwa, 5–6.

34. In 1919 Great Britain tightened immigration control to their colonies, and later, in 1921, the United States enacted *Dillingham Bill—An Act to limit the immigration of aliens into the United States*. The latter also constituted the major non-European country for all those who left Poland permanently—in the years 1919–1925, it was almost 63 per cent of all overseas emigration. The decisive factor limiting these possibilities was the introduction of the National Quota Acts in 1922. In the spring of 1924, the next law reducing the number of immigrants, the National Origins Act, was passed. See also: Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (Guildford Press, 2003), 63.
35. Piotr Łossowski, *Dyplomacja Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej. Z dziej w polskiej służby zagranicznej* (Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1992), 204.
36. Wiktor Tomir Drymmer, “Zagadnienie żydowskie w Polsce 1935–1939,” *Zeszyty Historyczne* 13 (1968): 65–66.
37. Jan Ziemiński, *Problem emigracji żydowskiej* (Nakładem Związku Pisarzy i Publicystów Emigracyjnych, 1937).
38. Similar theses about the “unhealthy” professional structure of the Jews, the necessity to emigrate, and the need for an international solution can also be found in other works created in the late 1930s. Cf. e.g. Waclaw Łypacewicz, *Rozwiązanie kwestii żydowskiej w Polsce* (Warszawa, 1939).
39. On November 11, 1936, the government of Great Britain established the Palestine Royal Commission, known as the Peel Commission, as it was headed by Lord William Robert Wellesley Peel. Its task was to investigate the situation in Palestine. On July 7, 1937, a report summarizing the activities of the Commission was published. The independence aspirations of the Arabs, colliding with the postulates of the Zionist movement, were considered the main source of the conflict in the study area. On this basis, it was concluded that the only possible way out of this situation was the division of Palestine into two states—small Jewish and large Arab. Jerusalem and the coastal border corridor were to remain under British rule. See: Hillel Cohen, *Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917–1948* (University of California Press, 2008), 95–96, 121–122. Also cf. AMAE, Pologne, 330, Emigration juive en Palestine et à Madagascar, 239–41.
40. Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 10005, Sprawozdanie dr. Jana Wagnera z podróży służbowej do Palestyny odbytej w dniach od 18 XI do 1 XII 1937, 18–26.
41. Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 10005, Tezy prasowe w sprawie emigracji żydowskiej, k. 36–38; Drymmer, Wiktor Tomir, “Zagadnienie żydowskie w Polsce 1935–1939,” *Zeszyty Historyczne* 13 (1968), 65–66.
42. Michał Śliwa, *Polska myśl socjalistyczna (1918–1948)* (Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź 1988), 158–61.

43. Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 9904, Problem emigracji żydowskiej w oświeceniu żydowskim, 44; Jan Maurycy Borski, *Sprawa żydowska a socjalizm. Polemika z Bundem* (Warszawa, 1937); Michał Śliwa, *Polska myśl socjalistyczna (1918–1948)*, (Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1988), 158–61.
44. Anna Landau-Czajka, *W jednym stali domu... Koncepcje rozwiązania kwestii żydowskiej w publicystyce polskiej lat 1933–1939* (Wydawnictwo Neriton–Instytut Historii PAN, 1998), 241.
45. Poland denounced the procedure of appeal to the League of Nations (Article 12) connected to the Little Treaty of Versailles on September 13, 1934. It related to the withdrawal of Germany (October 21, 1933) and the upcoming accession of the USSR to the League of Nations (September 15, 1934).

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PART 2

LANGUAGE AS  
ETHNOPOLITICAL  
PRACTICE



# LANGUAGE FIGHT

## Conflicts over Ukrainian/Ruthenian Minority Schools in Eastern Galicia in the Second Polish Republic

ELISABETH HAID-LENER

*“We are fighting for the full right that the Ukrainian people in all their territories [. . .] can establish mother-tongue schools of all grades and types for their children, that both the teaching and the supervision of these schools and the school administration are in Ukrainian hands, that these schools are sustained from the taxes paid by our people.”*

THESE WERE THE DEMANDS OF A UKRAINIAN PAMPHLET FROM LVIV, THE center of eastern Galicia, in view of a new school law in the Second Polish Republic in 1924. Debates about mother-tongue teaching were not new in eastern Galicia. The school—and in particular the question of the language of instruction—already played an important role in nationality conflicts in Habsburg times. However, the establishment of nation-states after World War I created new conditions.

The new or significantly enlarged nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe were by no means homogeneous but comprised considerable national and religious minorities. The Paris Peace Conference met this fact by imposing minority treaties on the new states to protect national, linguistic, and religious rights of these minorities—including the right to mother-tongue teaching. The minority treaties laid down basic conditions. The implementation of these general regulations, however, varied from country to country and remained mostly controversial. Moreover, states consisting of

heterogeneous territories, such as Poland, Romania, or Yugoslavia, sometimes pursued different policies in different regions or toward different minorities.<sup>2</sup>

This case study on the fight for Ukrainian-language schools in eastern Galicia will shed light on the implementation of nationality or minority rights on the local level. The population group for which the self-designation “Ukrainian” prevailed since the late nineteenth century, but which was referred to with the older term “Ruthenians” in official documents of the Habsburg Monarchy and partly in the Polish Republic,<sup>3</sup> was the largest population group in eastern Galicia and the largest minority in the Polish Republic. Ukrainian activists in eastern Galicia campaigned most intensively for minority schools.

The focus of this article is thus on the question of the extent to which “language fights” in the Polish Republic were a continuation of prewar conflicts, and the extent to which these conflicts took on a new dimension due to the establishment of new nation-states after World War I. Against the background of the Galician school system at the time of the Habsburg Monarchy, this chapter will outline education policies in the Polish Republic, of which eastern Galicia became part in 1919 after the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy and a Polish-Ukrainian war over the region. How have the legal bases of the school system and the language of instruction changed within the framework of the Polish Republic? And how were the legal provisions implemented? What impact did this have on nationality conflicts? Based on documents from the Stanisławów Voivodeship, an administrative district of interwar Poland in southeastern Galicia, a region with a particularly high proportion of Ukrainian-speaking population, this chapter highlights the role of local authorities in the implementation of the school law and the impact on local conflicts.

## EDUCATION POLICY IN HABSBURG GALICIA

In the Habsburg Monarchy, language rights were enshrined in the basic laws of the state of 1867, which guaranteed the equality of all customary languages. In the Austrian half of the empire, therefore, theoretically all children had the right to mother-tongue instruction. However, while Ruthenian was recognized as a customary language, Yiddish was not. Moreover, the implementation of language rights differed from crown land to crown land.<sup>4</sup> In practice, there was a clear imbalance in the education system in some regions. In Galicia, this imbalance was particularly pronounced. A major factor was the demographic structure, as linguistic and religious divisions were largely correlated with social ones. In eastern Galicia, the majority of the population was Ukrainian- or, as it was called at that time Ruthenian-speakers. However, most Ukrainian/Ruthenian-speakers were peasants. The elites and a large part of the urban population, including many Jews, were Polish-speakers.<sup>5</sup> The demographic structure

was also reflected in the school attendance of the respective population groups, especially in secondary schools and universities. In 1910, the Polish-speakers' secondary school enrollment per inhabitants was among the highest of the Habsburg Monarchy, ahead of Germans and Czechs, while the Ukrainian speakers' secondary school enrollment was among the lowest.<sup>6</sup>

In addition to social aspects, however, the political and educational system also contributed to this imbalance. The concessions of the Viennese government in the 1860s, known as "Galician Autonomy," strengthened the position of the Polish elites and their political and cultural dominance. The Polish elites dominated the Galician diet and Polish became the official language in Galicia. The Galician School Board was also in Polish hands and promoted the prevalence of instruction in the Polish language. Ukrainian deputies as well as municipalities repeatedly complained that Ukrainian-language schools were being converted into bilingual (so-called *utraquist*) or Polish-language schools against the will of the municipality. Moreover, almost all Ukrainian-language schools were one- to three-class village schools, which, in contrast to the town schools or citizens' schools, could not adequately prepare the students for attending a secondary school. Although the growth of a Ukrainian educational system made steady progress, it lagged significantly behind the Polish one under these circumstances. Unlike in other crown lands, the Galician diet and Galician School Board were responsible not only for the primary, but also for the secondary schools. The foundation of every single Ukrainian secondary school had to be confirmed by the Galician diet, which was dominated by a Polish majority. The imbalance between Ruthenian- and Polish-language schools was thus particularly pronounced in the field of secondary schools and high schools. On the eve of World War I, out of 135 gymnasia in Galicia, only twelve were Ukrainian-speaking (including seven private ones).<sup>7</sup> A major concern of the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia was thus, in addition to a stronger political voice, the struggle for Ukrainian-language education and, last but not least, for a Ukrainian university. Petitions by Ukrainian deputies to the Viennese government or the Austrian parliament, however, hardly changed Galician school policy. It was not until the Polish-Ukrainian compromise of 1914, negotiated under pressure from the Viennese government, that the Poles agreed to a Ukrainian university and some new Ukrainian secondary schools. Due to the outbreak of World War I, however, these concessions were not implemented.<sup>8</sup>

## EDUCATION POLICY IN THE POLISH REPUBLIC

During the war, Polish-Ukrainian conflicts in Galicia intensified significantly. On the one hand, accusations of treason and ethnicized violence by the armies aggravated

conflicts. On the other hand, the willingness of both sides to compromise declined. Poles and Ukrainians made more far-reaching demands, which eventually culminated in the call for an independent nation-state. When the Habsburg Monarchy collapsed in 1918, both sides claimed eastern Galicia for their nation-state—the Polish Republic or the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic. The conflicts escalated into a war between the two nascent states. The western Ukrainian state-building project failed as none of the claimed territories could be asserted militarily. The Ukrainian army in eastern Galicia finally surrendered in the summer of 1919. Eastern Galicia thus fell to the Polish Republic, but the annexation of the region remained controversial. Relying on the right of peoples to self-determination, Ukrainian politicians tried to continue their fight at the diplomatic level. In the end, however, the Polish Republic was able to assert its claims. In 1923, eastern Galicia’s affiliation with Poland was internationally recognized.

The Polish Republic, which consisted of former Austrian, German, and Russian territories, presented itself as a Polish nation-state. However, the population of the new state was by no means homogeneous. In the eastern provinces of the Polish state, the non-Polish-speaking population, now called *national minorities*, was in many places the majority. This was also the case in eastern Galicia. The understanding as a nation-state justified a privileged position of the Polish language as a state language. However, under pressure from the Allies, the Polish representatives had to sign a Minority Treaty together with the Peace Treaty of Versailles in 1919, which was intended to protect the national, linguistic, and religious minorities in Poland. The latter was particularly relevant for the Jewish population. On the one hand, the treaty guaranteed equal citizenship for minorities, and, on the other hand, it gave them rights, such as the right to mother-tongue education. Article 8 of the Minority Treaty gave minorities the right to establish, manage, and control at their own expense charitable, religious, and social institutions, schools, and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language. Article 9 also obliged the Polish state to provide mother-tongue instruction in public schools in cities and counties with a “considerable” proportion of non-Polish-speaking residents, though this provision did not prevent the Polish government from making the teaching of the Polish language obligatory in the said schools, and the obligation to establish German-language schools was limited to the territories that once belonged to the German Empire.<sup>9</sup> The provisions of the Minority Treaty also applied to Yiddish, the mother tongue of a large number of Jews in eastern Poland, who made up a considerable proportion of the population in many cities of the region. Unlike other minority languages, however, Yiddish was never introduced in public schools in the Polish Republic.<sup>10</sup>

In addition, the Polish government promised a statute of autonomy for the contested region of eastern Galicia, which provided, among other things, for the establishment of a Ukrainian university. While the Minority Treaty was at least partially

incorporated into the Polish constitution, the Statute of Autonomy for Eastern Galicia was never implemented.<sup>11</sup> Only Silesia received an autonomous status in the Polish Republic. Moreover, national rights of Germans in Upper Silesia were additionally protected by the German–Polish Convention regarding Upper Silesia (also known as Geneva Convention) until 1937. The German school system in Upper Silesia was therefore significantly better developed than in other regions of the Polish Republic and even attracted Polish-speakers.<sup>12</sup>

Minority rights remained controversial in Poland. Many Poles regarded the Minority Treaty as being imposed from outside and as violating the sovereignty of the Polish state.<sup>13</sup> Even before the war, nationalist activists had demanded a Polonization of the Galician school system and considered the measures of the Galician School Board to be insufficient.<sup>14</sup> In view of the establishment of a Polish nation-state, Polish nationalists saw their stance strengthened. Right-wing parties became the strongest force in the Polish parliament. This also had an impact on the implementation of the rights guaranteed in the Minority Treaty.

At first, however, little changed in the Galician school system. In general, legal regulations from the prewar period remained provisionally in force until the respective law was replaced by a new one. As a result, different legislation applied in the different regions of Poland for years.<sup>15</sup> In Galicia, the Austrian school system was thus largely preserved. The first changes concerned the curriculum. As early as December 1918, at a time when large parts of eastern Galicia were not yet under Polish rule, the Galician School Council decreed the introduction of Polish-language classes as well as Polish literature and history as compulsory subjects in all schools.<sup>16</sup> Ruthenian-language schools, however, were preserved. Nevertheless, the proportion of the number of Ruthenian- and Polish-language schools changed significantly in eastern Galicia after the *de facto* incorporation of the region into the Polish Republic in 1919. The Polish state started a campaign for education and built additional schools. However, most of the new schools were Polish-language schools.<sup>17</sup> Although Polish politics showed efforts to strengthen the Polish language in the Galician school system, it initially remained largely within the framework of Austrian law. A new phase began in 1924.

## THE SCHOOL ACT OF 1924

In 1924, under the government of the National Democrat Władysław Grabski, a new School Act with special regulations for the eastern provinces, including eastern Galicia, brought further changes to primary schools. The main author of the law was Minister of Education Stanisław Grabski and brother of the prime minister. The School Act hence was also known as “Lex Grabski.” It finally codified the right of minorities to

mother-tongue schools and thus implemented the provisions of the Minority Treaty. However, the regulations were limited to the eastern provinces, where the so-called minorities mostly formed the majority of the population. Other than in the western provinces with their significant German population,<sup>18</sup> some of the provisions, and especially the implementing regulations of 1925, promoted “*utraquist*,” that is, bilingual schools.<sup>19</sup> Grabski later defended the introduction of bilingual schools, both against advocates of an exclusively Polish-language school system and against criticism from minority representatives. On the one hand, he argued that Ruthenians had been accustomed to schools with Ruthenian language of instruction in former Galicia, and if their needs were not met by the state school, it would be satisfied by private schools, or clandestine education in private houses, as it happened formerly among Poles in the Russian and German empires.<sup>20</sup> On the other hand, he argued that while separate minority schools demanded by Ruthenian and Belarusian parties would educate Ruthenian and Belarusian youth to linguistic and cultural distinctiveness that must in time turn into a demand for separate states, the bilingual school enabled contacts and thus facilitated friendship between children of different ethnic origins, creating in them a sense of cultural unity.<sup>21</sup> The latter argument, however, lost credibility by the fact that, due to the specific provisions of the law, minority schools were converted into bilingual schools, while Polish-language schools in the multiethnic regions of eastern Poland were hardly affected. While it was supposed to provide a framework for the use of minority languages, the law reaffirmed the primacy of the Polish language as the state language.

According to the new law, the Polish state undertook to establish Ruthenian-, Belarusian-, or Lithuanian-language public primary schools, however, it did not take into account other minority languages, such as Yiddish or German. Although not legally obliged to do so, in some cases the Polish authorities granted state funding to German-language schools in Galicia, but the majority of the German-language schools in the region were private schools. Yiddish- or Hebrew-speaking schools were entirely confined to the private sector. Moreover, the precondition of minority schools was that at least 25 percent of the population in the respective municipality belonged to the respective minority *and* the parents of at least forty Ruthenian, Belarusian, or Lithuanian children of school age applied for mother-tongue teaching. However, if the parents of at least twenty children applied for Polish-language teaching and the parents of at least forty children for Ruthenian-, Belarusian-, or Lithuanian-language teaching, the schools should be converted into bilingual schools providing that half of the lessons should be held in Ruthenian (or Belarusian). If the number of declarations for a minority language was insufficient, schools should be converted into Polish-language schools.<sup>22</sup> Hence, the law officially gave responsibility for the decision on the language of instruction to the parents, but the specific provisions privileged the Polish language. In addition to the imbalance in the required number of parents' declarations, other

details specified in the implementing regulation by the minister of education in January 1925 made it difficult to establish minority schools. For example, declarations for “native-language” teaching had to be confirmed by a notary or by the head of the municipality. In the case of declarations for the “state language,” that is the Polish language, such formalities were not necessary. In addition, the latter had a later submission deadline.<sup>23</sup> In many larger cities in eastern Galicia, the establishment or rather maintenance of minority schools failed due to the required 25 percent share of the population according to the data from the last census,<sup>24</sup> even if there were enough children for a minority school. After all, the Ukrainian population was a minority in most of the cities of eastern Galicia. Moreover, the Ukrainian call for a boycott of the census in eastern Galicia in 1921, when the region was not yet officially part of the Polish republic, could make it even more difficult to reach the 25 percent-threshold and establish or maintain Ukrainian-language schools. In any case, however, the subjects relevant for the development of a national consciousness should be taught in Polish. Even in monolingual Ukrainian or Belarusian schools, history and civic education classes had to be taught in Polish.<sup>25</sup> Overall, the law contained mechanisms for establishing the dominance of Polish as the state language and made it easy for the local authorities to act in the sense of polonizing the school system.<sup>26</sup> However, they faced very different situations in the individual eastern provinces, which were affected by the new law. Although the population structure in the economically underdeveloped and multiethnic eastern territories was similar, the areas covered by the law had different Imperial backgrounds that also affected the school system. The school system in the former Russian territories in general was poorly developed, and Belarusian in particular was hardly established as language of instruction.<sup>27</sup> In comparison, eastern Galicia had a well-developed Ukrainian-language school system and a dense network of Ukrainian cultural organizations committed to the preservation of Ukrainian-language schools.

Ukrainian activists therefore tried to fight the law legally. Complaints about the incompatibility of the law with the Minority Treaty were finally also sent to the League of Nations, but were ultimately unsuccessful.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, Ukrainian activists tried to mobilize the local population to use the influence of parents granted by the law for Ukrainian national goals. Thus, the law became the starting point for increased national mobilization. While the Polish authorities argued that “*utraquist*” schools would promote peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding between the nationalities, Ukrainian activists feared that in practice the bilingual schools would be Polish-language schools with a minimal proportion of Ukrainian teaching and thus a means of Polonization.<sup>29</sup> Ultimately, the law exacerbated national polarization.

School issues were, of course, also important for other minorities, which were not considered in the new law. Some Jewish activists, for example, campaigned for Yiddish-language or Hebrew schools.<sup>30</sup> However, there was no consensus among

Jewish political leaders on the preferred language of instruction, and most Jewish students in Galicia attended Polish-language schools. While there have been numerous Ukrainian-language public primary schools in eastern Galicia since the time of the Habsburg Monarchy, Yiddish was not recognized as a language despite a considerable number of speakers, but was regarded as jargon. Jewish schools were thus limited to private schools, while the law of both the Habsburg Monarchy and the Polish Republic implied the right to Ruthenian-language instruction.

## “SCHOOL PLEBISCITES” AND NATIONAL MOBILIZATION IN EASTERN GALICIA

The School Act of 1924 caused a lot of uproar, especially in eastern Galicia, where the Ukrainian national movement had its greatest popularity. Although the law provided for Ukrainian- or, as it was officially called, Ruthenian-language schools, it was obviously aimed at replacing them largely with “*utraquist*” or Polish schools. Ukrainian activists therefore launched a broad-based campaign for the preservation of the Ukrainian school and also tried to reach the politically less active rural population. Local Polish authorities criticized the agitation of Ukrainian activists who told the population that all parents must sign the declarations and that Poles wanted to abolish the Ruthenian language in all schools.<sup>31</sup> The county authorities in Kolomyja, for example, argued that the agitation was not objectively justified, since according to the law the previous language of instruction remained. Even the chairman of the Ukrainian school association “Native School” in Kolomyja did not consider declarations in purely Ruthenian municipalities to be necessary. But the head office of the association in Lviv had ordered the dissemination of declarations for the Ruthenian language of instruction in all schools. Hence, the agitation included almost all municipalities in the county. The county authorities concluded that the Ukrainian agitation, mostly carried out by Greek Catholic clergy, Ruthenian teachers, and political activists, mainly served to sow discontent and distrust of state power among the rural population: As the agitators knew that the majority of the Ruthenian population already trusted the Polish state power and wanted to live in peace, Ukrainian nationalists used the School Act for their own ends in order to bring the politically uneducated rural masses back under their influence, to the disadvantage of the Polish state.<sup>32</sup> Indeed, if there was no sufficient number of declarations submitted (neither for the state language nor for a minority language), the previous language of instruction remained, according to the law.<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, in many cases Ukrainian activists tried to mobilize the local population for the submission of Ukrainian declarations. They drew attention to the risk that a Ukrainian-speaking school could be converted into a purely Polish-speaking one, if twenty declarations were

submitted for the Polish language, but no (or too few) declarations for the Ukrainian language.<sup>34</sup> Ukrainian activists called this decision on the language of instruction “school plebiscite,” expressing an obligation on parents to participate. The term was taken up by the Polish side and sometimes even by the authorities. Actually, the mobilization for the so-called school plebiscites did not come solely from the Ukrainian side. Both Ukrainian and Polish activists, the latter often with the support of the Polish authorities, tried to persuade the local population to make declarations on the language of instruction. Even the Polish county authorities in Kolomyja admitted that the extremely intensive agitation for the language of instruction was partly a reaction to the agitation of Polish nationalists. In particular, statements by Polish members of parliament who wanted to force a Polonization of the Ruthenian territories with the help of the School Act had raised doubts in the Ukrainian nationalist camp about the honest intentions of the Polish government.<sup>35</sup> Nevertheless, Polish authorities primarily blamed Ukrainian “agitators,” including local academics, clergy, teachers, and students of the higher classes, for unrest caused by the “school plebiscites.”<sup>36</sup>

The “school plebiscites” often brought national conflicts into the village communities. However, the extent of the unrest varied from county to county and from municipality to municipality, and depended heavily on the activity and influence of the local intelligentsia. While in many municipalities an intensive agitation began immediately after the introduction of the School Act, in others there were neither Ukrainian nor Polish activists who mobilized for “school plebiscites,” and the first declarations on the language of instruction were submitted only years later. Sometimes nearby cities, the centers of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, had considerable influence on rural communities.<sup>37</sup> While some county authorities reported that the intense Ukrainian agitation aroused great interest among the Ruthenian population,<sup>38</sup> others argued that the majority of the Ruthenian peasant population did not have much interest in the question.<sup>39</sup> The extent of the mobilization is also reflected in the statistics. The number of declarations submitted in Kolomyja county, for example, was usually about 5–10 percent of the total population of the respective municipality, while one declaration often referred to several children.<sup>40</sup> In Zhydachiv county, the number of declarations was even higher, with an average of 13 percent of the total population of the municipality. Often the proportion was particularly high in small villages. Only in 7 percent of the municipalities of the county no declarations or an insufficient number of declarations were submitted.<sup>41</sup> Overall, local authorities emphasized that bilingual schools would meet with broad acceptance and that the majority of the local population agreed with Polish lessons as long as compulsory Ruthenian lessons were guaranteed. The desire for exclusively Ruthenian schools allegedly came only from a small minority of political agitators who “terrorized” the entire population and collected declarations for the Ruthenian school against the will of the parents. However, as the county authorities

in Pechenizhyn argued, Polish society was already preparing declarations for the state language to paralyze this action.<sup>42</sup>

Consequently, Polish authorities or Polish activists and Ukrainian activists accused each other of pressuring parents to sign declarations on the language of instruction against their will. For example, the Polish National Organization in Kolomyja complained about the “terror” of the Ukrainian agitators, who put pressure on the population to sign declarations for the Ukrainian language of instruction and resorted to illegal means to collect signatures.<sup>43</sup> On the other hand, Ukrainian members of parliament brought a complaint about illegal actions by the Polish authorities. Local leaders had refused in several cases to confirm the authenticity of signatures; furthermore, contrary to the government’s regulation, several authorities had levied stamp duties on the declarations or illegally confiscated declarations.<sup>44</sup> Moreover, a Ukrainian member of parliament lodged a complaint with the minister of the interior about “police terror” against the Ukrainian population in eastern Galicia, referring to the actions of police officers who threatened Ukrainian activists as well as parents who signed declarations for the Ukrainian language of instruction with arrest, or prohibited community leaders from confirming signatures. Thus, with one hand, the Polish authorities would give rights to the Ukrainian population, and with the other hand, deprive them of the opportunity to use them. This would cause dissatisfaction in large circles of the Ukrainian population.<sup>45</sup> Police investigations could not confirm both the Ukrainian allegations against Polish police officers and the Polish allegations against Ukrainian activists in many cases.<sup>46</sup> Nevertheless, some authorities applied different standards regarding the allegations. For example, the board of the Lviv School District classified the numerous Ukrainian complaints largely as slander and exaggeration of misunderstandings, and at the same time lamented the Ukrainian “terror” against the peaceful Polish village population.<sup>47</sup> In any case, the Polish authorities had the whip hand.

The outcome of the “school plebiscites” depended not only on the intensity of national mobilization, but also on the approach of the local authorities, not least the county authorities, who assisted the school authorities in assessing the validity of the declarations. Some county authorities, for example, did not recognize declarations that applied for “Ukrainian” instead of the official “Ruthenian” language of instruction. Moreover, they often argued that the declarations were signed under pressure from Ukrainian activists and did not correspond to the will of the parents. Hence, parents who had signed declarations for Ukrainian schools were often summoned for oral interrogation, which, as Ukrainian activists argued, in turn exposed them to pressure from the Polish authorities. Often, parents who had signed a declaration for Ukrainian education were willing to accept Polish or bilingual instruction when questioned by the authorities, but later supported Ukrainian teaching again. Polish authorities and Ukrainian activists interpreted these wavering attitudes of the parents differently and

accused each other of putting pressure on them, while claiming to represent the true interests of the population.<sup>48</sup>

The statistics of the county authorities on the “school plebiscites” give an insight into different practices. In the county of Zhydachiv, for example, where before 1924 more than two-thirds of the schools had been Ruthenian-language schools, the reduction of them was particularly radical. The results of the “plebiscite” in this county were largely based on Ruthenian votes being declared invalid. The county police commander explained the high number of invalid declarations by the fact that the Ruthenian agitators had not informed the population how the declarations had to be filled in properly, while Polish actors had properly informed Polish society about the provisions of the new law. Although in many other cases the authorities argued that the declarations were collected against the will of the parents, this report does not question the desire of the signatories for Ruthenian schools, but merely points to formal errors. Due to these formal errors, in a county where there had previously been a large number of Ruthenian schools, only Polish and bilingual schools should exist in the future, namely 40 percent of schools in the county should be Polish-language schools and around 60 percent bilingual—while 55.4 percent of the declarations were in favor of Ruthenian schools and 44.6 percent in favor of Polish schools.<sup>49</sup> The decision on the language of instruction in the Zhydachiv county was subsequently changed in individual cases—probably due to Ukrainian complaints. Nevertheless, the number of Ukrainian-language schools in the county was marginal.<sup>50</sup>

The reports from the Kolomyja county testify to a pragmatic approach by the authorities. According to the statistics, 80 percent of parents in the county voted for bilingual schools. Only in some places did parents decide for a Ruthenian school, and only very occasionally, apparently in predominantly Polish-speaking municipalities, for a Polish one. In most municipalities, a clear majority of declarations, sometimes even 100 percent, were in favor of a bilingual school. While in most municipalities at least a minority spoke out in favor of a Ruthenian school, there were usually no declarations for Polish schools at all. Only in one case did declarations for a Polish school (25 percent) compete with declarations for a Ruthenian school (75 percent), without votes for a bilingual school. In a few municipalities no “plebiscite” took place—either because not enough declarations were submitted or because the population share of the Ruthenian population was less than 25 percent.<sup>51</sup> The results of the “plebiscites” in Kolomyja county are in line with the assessment of the authorities, not only in Kolomyja but also in other counties, that the majority of the population would agree with bilingual schools. The statistics are striking, however, in that the law only provided for declarations for the Ruthenian or Polish language, not for bilingual schools.

The county authorities in Kolomyja deviated from the law also in another point. In the city of Kolomyja, the proportion of the Ruthenian population was less than 25

percent, according to the census. Thus, all schools would have had to be converted into Polish-language ones. Nevertheless, the county authorities as well as the local school district authorities were in favor of preserving the two Ruthenian-language schools or at least the girl's school, which served as a training school for the local private Ruthenian teachers' college. They argued that Ukrainian activists would otherwise set up private schools over which the Polish authorities would have less influence.<sup>52</sup> In the end, both Ruthenian-language schools in Kolomyja remained.<sup>53</sup> Thus, while some local Polish authorities used all possible means to encourage the spread of Polish-language schools and promote polonization in the eastern provinces, others apparently tried to avoid open national conflicts.

Regardless of the different practices in the individual counties, most Ukrainian-language schools were replaced by bilingual schools as a result of the "school plebiscites," while Polish-language schools were rarely affected. In 1926, about 44 percent of primary schools in Stanisławów Voivodeship were bilingual schools, 30 percent Ruthenian-language schools, and 26 percent Polish-language schools. This meant that 90 percent of the Polish-language schools existing before the "plebiscites" were preserved, but only 42 percent of the Ruthenian-language schools. In some counties, the number of Polish-language schools even slightly increased.<sup>54</sup> In other regions of eastern Galicia, this development was even more pronounced, and the trend intensified over the years. In 1912, eastern Galicia had 2,400 Ukrainian primary schools. In 1927 the figure had dropped to 352, and in 1939 it was a mere 144, while the number of bilingual schools increased at the same rate.<sup>55</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The fight for minority schools in eastern Galicia reveals some continuities to Polish-Ukrainian conflicts of the prewar period. While Polish nationalists demanded a strengthening of the Polish language in the education system, Ukrainian nationalists complained of discrimination by the Polish-dominated school authorities. However, the integration of the region into the newly formed Polish Republic after World War I further strengthened the Polish position. While the Austrian constitution stipulated equality of all customary languages, Poles could invoke a primacy as a "state nation" in the Polish Republic. Nevertheless, the Minority Treaty signed by the Polish government together with the Peace Treaty of Versailles in 1919 guaranteed minority schools. Hence, the main problem continued to be not so much the legal basis, but its implementation.

The School Act of 1924, which finally codified the right of minorities to mother-tongue schools, favored in fact the introduction of bilingual schools. While the initiators of the law praised bilingual schools as an instrument to combat national

polarization, the concrete provisions ultimately had the opposite effect and evoked conflicts in many municipalities. On the one hand, Ukrainian activists doubted that bilingualism in schools was actually guaranteed, arguing that bilingual schools were de facto Polish-language schools. On the other hand, the fact that mainly Ukrainian-language schools, but not Polish-language schools, were affected by the conversion into bilingual schools strengthened the feeling of discrimination against minorities and did not promote integration into the Polish state. Discriminatory provisions laid the foundation for the conflicts that followed. However, the actions of the local authorities, which partly forced a polonization of the school system and partly considered the local situation, exacerbated or reduced these conflicts.

The high level of national mobilization (for example in comparison to the former Russian territories of Poland) also goes back to the prewar period. Galician Ukrainian activists had experience in political struggles to enforce language rights and were willing to fight for their rights by any means the law offered. They argued that the Ukrainian people must use the new School Act for their own interests and secure as many Ukrainian-language schools as possible by issuing declarations.<sup>56</sup> Even before the war, educational issues, such as the fight for a Ukrainian university, sometimes received enormous public attention. However, while the scene of these conflicts had been mainly the urban centers, the fight for primary schools brought the conflicts to the village communities. Although cities continued to be important centers of national agitation, “school plebiscites” were a predominantly rural phenomenon, since many cities did not meet the legal requirement of a Ukrainian population share of 25 percent. The great response to campaigns for Ukrainian schools in eastern Galicia was based not least on the high level of organization of the Ukrainian national movement in the region, which had been active in rural areas for decades, for example through reading clubs. But political developments after World War I, as well as the provisions of the School Act of 1924, which officially gave responsibility for the decision on the language of instruction to the parents, increased national mobilization. In this respect, conflicts significantly intensified after the war. Even though large parts of the rural population were apparently willing to accept bilingual schools, it was important to them that mother-tongue instruction was ensured, as local authorities noted. The argument of Ukrainian activists, which was not entirely unfounded in view of the discriminatory provisions of the School Act, that only declarations for Ruthenian education could prevent a purely Polish-language school and secure mother-tongue instruction, apparently motivated many parents to participate in the “school plebiscites.” This was all the truer in those cases where Polish activists or authorities were working toward the greatest possible polonization of schools.

The School Act contained mechanisms for establishing the dominance of Polish as state language and made it easy for the local authorities to act in the sense of polonizing

the school system. Thus, local authorities played an essential role in school affairs, and their actions could intensify or calm national conflicts. In Habsburg times, the Viennese government was still regarded to a certain extent as a mediation authority. The Warsaw government could hardly fulfill this role. The hopes of minority representatives rested more on the League of Nations. However, even in the Habsburg Monarchy, interventions from Vienna did not always have practical effects on Galician school policy. This was all the truer for the League of Nations. The incorporation of eastern Galicia into the Polish Republic was part of a radicalization process—both on the part of Polish politics and on the part of minorities. A loss of confidence in the rule of law, which dated back to the war, can be seen as an important factor. Discriminatory legal provisions, which were sometimes exacerbated by the actions of local authorities, contributed to this. Discrimination against minorities took place in various fields, for example regarding admission to the civil service. School issues were only one of them, but an important one, as it affected broad sections of the population. In the course of this radicalization process, nationalist activities did not always remain within the scope of the law, and nationalists were increasingly willing to resort to means such as terror.

In addition, Ukrainian organizations, but also other minorities, especially Jews, increasingly relied on private schools in order to achieve greater independence from the Polish authorities. Even before the war, the establishment of private schools was a way to strengthen Ukrainian-language education. At the same time, the expansion of state Ukrainian-language schools gradually made progress despite many obstacles. On the other hand, when the number of Ukrainian-language state schools fell significantly within the framework of the Polish Republic, the importance of private schools increased. While Minister Grabski argued that a complete polonization of the school system in eastern Galicia would have led to the establishment of private schools or secret teaching,<sup>57</sup> the school law, which significantly reduced the importance of the Ukrainian language, had to some extent just this effect.

## NOTES

1. Volodymyr Tselevych, *Pronovipol skishkil' nizakony. Zivstupomposla Serbiia Kozyt's koho. Praktychnyi poradnyk vraz z tekstom zakony i vykonmoho rozporiadku* (Nakladom avtora, 1925), 3.
2. For a comparison of school policy in the different countries, see Ingo Eser, “Volk, Staat, Gott!” *Die deutsche Minderheit in Polen und ihr Schulwesen 1918–1939* (Harrassowitz, 2010), 659–66.
3. In the Polish Republic, the use of the terms “Ukrainian” and “Ruthenian” was sometimes inconsistent. See Katarzyna Hibiel, “Aspekty lingwistyczne polityki językowej II RP w

stosunku do mniejszości ukraińskiej 1918–1939 w Galicji Wschodniej (etnonimy i glotonimy).” *Studia Slavica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 56, no. 2 (2011). In part, the terminology implemented a political program: for some Polish activists, the term “Ukrainian” stood for a separatist, anti-Polish political movement, while the majority of the population, which was assumed to be loyal to Poland, was to be referred to as “Ruthenians.” In part, the terms were used interchangeably without any difference in meaning. Polish laws used both the term “Ruthenian” (for example, in the School Act of 1924 discussed here) and the term “Ukrainian.” Ukrainian activists strongly criticized the use of the term “Ruthenian,” which was no longer used as a self-designation. In the following, the terms “Ukrainian” and “Ruthenian” are used according to their use in the sources.

4. Hannelore Burger, “Sprache und Gerechtigkeit im Unterrichtswesen,” in *Místo národních jazyků ve výchově, školství a vědě v habsburské monarchii 1867–1918: sborník z konference (Praha, 18.–19. listopadu 2002) = Position of national languages in education, educational system and science of the Habsburg monarchy, 1867–1918*, ed. Harald Binder, Barbora Křivohlavá, and Luboš Velek (Výzkumné Centrum pro Dějiny Vědy, 2003).
5. John-Paul Himka, “Dimensions of a Triangle: Polish-Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Austrian Galicia,” in *Focusing on Galicia: Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians 1772–1918*, ed. Israel Bartal and Antony Polonsky (Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1999).
6. Gary B. Cohen, *Education and Middle-Class Society in Imperial Austria: 1848–1918* (Purdue University Press, 1996), 141.
7. Józef Świeboda, “Szkolnictwo Ukraińskie w Galicji (1772–1918). Stan badań i potrzeby,” in *Mysł edukacyjna w Galicji 1772–1918: ciągłość i zmiana*, ed. Czesław Majorek and Andrzej Meissner (Wyższej Szkoły Pedagog., 1996), 290; cf. Ann Sirka, *The Nationality Question in Austrian Education: the Case of Ukrainians in Galicia 1867–1914* (Lang, 1980), 134–35.
8. Jarosław Moklak, *Halyczyna contra Galicja: ukraińskie szkolnictwo średnie i wyższe w debatach Sejmu Krajowego galicyjskiego 1907–1914* (Towar. Wydawn. “Historia Iagellonica,” 2013); Sirka, *The Nationality Question in Austrian Education*.
9. “Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, signed at Versailles, 28 June 1919,” *Dziennik Ustaw* 1920 nr 110 poz. 728, <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU19201100728>.
10. Miriam Eisenstein, *Jewish Schools in Poland, 1919–39: Their Philosophy and Development* (Columbia University Press, 1950), 2–5.
11. Torsten Wehrhahn, *Die Westukrainische Volksrepublik. Zu den polnisch-ukrainischen Beziehungen und dem Problem der ukrainischen Staatlichkeit in den Jahren 1918 bis 1923* (Weißensee-Verl., 2004), 347–52.
12. Stanisław Mauersberg, “Das deutsche Schulwesen im unabhängigen Polen 1918–1939.” *Nordost-Archiv* 1, no. 2 (1992).

13. Wiktor Marzec, "One of the Oldest States in Europe Has Never Suppressed Any Nation.' The Minority Treaty, Nationalist Indignation and the Foundations of Interwar Ethnic Democracy in Poland," *Nations and Nationalism* 27 (2021).
14. Maciej Janowski, "Polnische Sprache, österreichischer Geist? Der Streit um nationale Erziehung in Galizien (1891–1941)," in *Místo národních jazyků ve výchově, školství a vědě v habsburské monarchii 1867–1918: sborník z konference (Praha, 18.–19. listopadu 2002) = Position of national languages in education, educational system and science of the Habsburg monarchy, 1867–1918*, ed. Harald Binder, Barbora Křivohlavá, and Luboš Velek (Výzkumné Centrum pro Dějiny Vědy, 2003).
15. Helmut Slapnicka, *Österreichs Recht ausserhalb Österreichs. Der Untergang des österreichischen Rechtsraums* (Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1973), 11–21.
16. "Rozporządzenie Rady szkolnej krajowej dotyczące kilku zmian w planach naukowych, oraz podjęcia nauki w szkołach lwowskich i innych. L. 431 pr.," *Dziennik Urzędowy Rady szkolnej krajowej w Galicyi*. Rok XXII, Nr. 11, December 15, 1918: 213–16.
17. Seweryn Lehnert, *Spis nauczycieli publicznych szkół powszechnych i państwowych seminarjów nauczycielskich oraz Spis szkół w okręgu szkolnym lwowskim obejmującym województwa lwowskie, stanisławowskie i tarnopolskie* (Wydawnictwa Książek Szkolnych w Kuratorjum Okręgu Szkolnego Lwowskiego, 1924), II:145.
18. In the case of Germans in the western provinces, the Polish authorities preferred separate minority schools or parallel classes. See Eser, "Volk, Staat, Gott!," 283. Eser argues that while the Polish authorities in the eastern provinces hoped for an assimilation of the Ukrainian, Belarusian, or Lithuanian populations, in the western provinces they feared the influence of German education on Polish children.
19. Christhardt Henschel and Stephan Stach, "Nationalisierung und Pragmatismus. Staatliche Institutionen und Minderheiten in Polen 1918–1939," *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 62, no. 2 (2013): 174–75.
20. Stanisław Grabski, *Szkola na ziemiach wschodnich. W obronie ustawy szkolnej z 31 lipca 1924 r.* (Warszawa, 1927), 7.
21. Grabski, *Szkola na ziemiach wschodnich*, 4.
22. "Ustawa z dnia 31 lipca 1924 r., zawierająca niektóre postanowienia o organizacji szkolnictwa," *Dziennik Ustaw* 1924, no. 79, poz. 766, Art. 1–3, <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU19240790766>.
23. "Rozporządzenie Ministra Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego z dnia 7 stycznia 1925 r. wydane w porozumieniu z Ministrem Spraw Wewnętrznych i Ministrem Rolnictwa i Dóbr Państwowych, w sprawie wykonania ustawy z dnia 31 lipca 1924 r., zawierającej niektóre postanowienia o organizacji szkolnictwa," *Dziennik Ustaw* 1925, no. 3, poz. 33, § 8–10, <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU19250030033>.
24. "Rozporządzenie Ministra Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego z dnia 7

- stycznia 1925 r.” § 5.
25. Stephanie Zloch, *Polnischer Nationalismus: Politik und Gesellschaft zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen* (Böhlau, 2010), 247.
  26. Henschel and Stach, “Nationalisierung und Pragmatismus,” 174–75.
  27. For the situation in the former Russian territories and for the specific problems and effects of the law in this region see Werner Benecke, *Die Ostgebiete der Zweiten Polnischen Republik* (Böhlau, 1999), 255–65.
  28. See Martin Scheuermann, *Minderheitenschutz contra Konfliktverhütung? Die Minderheitenpolitik des Völkerbundes in den zwanziger Jahren* (Verlag Herder-Institut, 2000), 131–34.
  29. See the argumentation of the Ukrainian petitions to the League of Nations. Scheuermann, *Minderheitenschutz*, 131–34.
  30. Eisenstein, *Jewish Schools in Poland, 1919–39*.
  31. County authorities in Horodenka, March 25, 1925, Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Ivano-Frankivs'koi oblasti (DAIFO) [State Archives of Ivano-Frankivsk region], f[ond] 2, o[pys] 1, sp[rava] 309, a[rkush] 69.
  32. County authorities in Kolomyja, March 16, 1925, DAIFO, f. 2, o.1, sp. 309, a. 109.
  33. “Rozporządzenie Ministra Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego z dnia 7 stycznia 1925 r.” § 13.
  34. Tselevych, *Pro novi pol'ski sbkil ni zakony*, 21–23.
  35. County authorities in Kolomyja, March 16, 1925, DAIFO, f. 2, o.1, sp. 309, a. 109.
  36. See for example County authorities in Pechenizhyn, February 26, 1925, DAIFO, f. 2, o.1, sp. 309, a. 25.
  37. Olga Linkiewicz, *Lokalność i nacjonalizm: społeczności wiejskie w Galicji Wschodniej w dwudziestoleciu międzywojennym* (Universitas, 2018), 157–62.
  38. County authorities in Kolomyja, March 16, 1925, DAIFO, f. 2, o.1, sp. 309, a. 109.
  39. County authorities in Pechenizhyn, February 26, 1925, DAIFO, f. 2, o.1, sp. 309, a. 25.
  40. Superintendent of schools in Kolomyja, September 11, 1925, Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrainy m. L'viv (TsDIAL) [Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Lviv], f. 179, o. 2a, sp. 219, a. 21–24.
  41. Police commander in Zhydachiv, August 15, 1925, DAIFO, f. 68, o. 2, sp. 70, a. 2–3.
  42. County authorities in Pechenizhyn, February 26, 1925, DAIFO, f. 2, o.1, sp. 309, a. 25; County authorities in Kosiv, March 25, 1925, DAIFO, f. 2, o.1, sp. 309, a. 68.
  43. Polish National Organization in Kolomyja, March 22, 1925, DAIFO, f. 2, o.1, sp. 309, a. 131.
  44. Interpellation of MP Serg. Kozicki, March 6, 1925, DAIFO, f. 2, o.1, sp. 309, a. 160.
  45. Interpellation of MP Serg. Kozicki, March 24, 1925, DAIFO, f. 2, o.1, sp. 309, a. 206.
  46. Police headquarters in Kolomyja, April/May, 1925, DAIFO, f. 2, o.1, sp. 309, a. 137, 176, 208–215.

47. Board of the Lviv School District, March 18, 1925, DAIFO, f. 2, o.1, sp. 309, a. 128.
48. Linkiewicz, *Lokalność*, 164–171.
49. Police commander in Zhydachiv, August 14, 1925, DAIFO, f. 68, o. 2, sp. 70, a.1.
50. Cf. Statistics on the School Plebiscite in Stanisławów voivodeship, May 18, 1926, DAIFO, f. 68, o. 2, sp. 70, a. 123.
51. Police headquarters in Kolomyja, September 4, 1925, DAIFO, f. 68, o. 2, sp. 70, a. 44–48.
52. District school council in Kolomyja, March 20, 1925, TsDIAL, f. 179, o. 2a, sp. 919, a. 1–2.
53. Statistics on primary schools and language of instruction 1928/29–1930/31, TsDIAL, f. 179, o. 2a, sp. 942, a. 9.
54. Statistics on the School Plebiscite in Stanisławów voivodeship, May 18, 1926, DAIFO, f. 68, o. 2, sp. 70, a. 123.
55. Christoph Mick, “Colonialism in the Polish Eastern Borderlands 1919–1939,” in *The Shadow of Colonialism on Europe’s Modern Past*, ed. Róisín Healy and Enrico Dal Lago (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
56. Tselevych, *Pro novi pol’ski shkil’ni zakony*, 7.
57. Grabski, *Szkola na ziemiach wschodnich*, 7.

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# LOOKING FOR A VIENNESE SWABIAN VILLAGE

## Landsmannschaft Migrant Activism and Its Limits in Interwar Vienna

PAULI ARO

**I**N 1927, A BANAT SWABIAN STUDENT ACTIVIST WHO HAD FRESHLY GRADUATED in medicine at the University of Vienna was about to leave the city and to return to his native Großjetscha/Iceca Mare/Nagyjécsa. Before leaving Vienna, the young doctor was honored by the authors of *Unsere Heimat*, the official journal of the *Verein der Banater Schwaben in Wien*, the association of Banat Swabian immigrants in Vienna, with a dialect poem. The narrative features two fellow Banat Swabians living in Vienna, chatting about the accomplishments of the recent graduate. Beginning with the first line, there were allusions to a specific picture of Banat Swabianness in Vienna.

In our Viennese Swabian Village / something has happened on Monday! / The news had from one street to the next / awoken our countrymen. / Thereby the thick Swabian heads / got shaken up and hot: / “Hey, neighbour, have you heard / A doctor will make a journey!”<sup>1</sup>

One core element of the poem is to ironically portray Banat Swabian migrants in Vienna as living in a close-knit community that mirrored romantic ideas of an unspoiled rural life. However, the Verein der Banater Schwaben was quite serious in its efforts to nourish feelings of belonging to an intimate network among its members. Flipping through the association’s journal, *Unsere Heimat*, one frequently encounters notifications about not just the Verein’s monthly meetings, but also about various activities such as regular excursions as well as news regarding the *Vereinigung schwäbischer*

*Hochschüler*—the Association of Swabian University Students, the student association closely related to the Verein. Festive occasions and ceremonies were claimed to express the closeness of Vienna's Schwaben and their deep connection to the original *Heimat*. Up to this day, the activists of the Verein's successor organization honor the legacy of the pre-1945 organization's social activities.<sup>2</sup>

This chapter discusses associational activities that—unironically—aimed at creating close-knit migrant communities that were based upon a shared ethnoregional origin.<sup>3</sup> It highlights the uncertainties that affected these activities in interwar Vienna. And most importantly, it emphasizes that a not-unimportant element of late-Habsburg and interwar German nationalism in Vienna was migrant activism. The institutional framework for such community-building efforts was a type of organization that was referred to as *landsmannschaftlicher Verein* (countrymen association) or simply *Landsmannschaften*. The latter often being rendered as “homeland association” in English. The bulk of existing literature on Landsmannschaften focuses on the post-1945 expellee associations in Germany, their memory culture, and their fight for a *Recht auf Heimat*.<sup>4</sup> This chapter does not only follow a different timeframe and spatial setting by looking at Landsmannschaften as nationalist associations that had originally been founded by inner-Imperial migrants in the Habsburg and post-Habsburg world, but it also looks at these associations' activities differently. While their ethnoregionalism gave their German nationalism a narrow focus, these organizations differed not much from other *Schutzvereine* (language defense associations) active in the Habsburg Empire. But as migrant association, these associations had to pursue fairly conventional group-making activities such as organizing social gatherings or providing private welfare. The leaders of the Verein der Banater Schwaben hoped to turn their association into a focal point of countrymen activities. Their rhetoric could be full of allusions to the intense closeness of Banat Swabians living in Vienna. Their activities, however, also reveal the difficulties of realizing this community and shed light on the many frustrations that these activists experienced on the way.

## WHERE TO LOOK FOR AN URBAN VILLAGE

Even for historians of Central Europe, Landsmannschaften primarily are phenomena of post-1945 Federal German political culture and products of the preceding phase of successive efforts to ethnically unmix the people of East Central and Southeastern Europe. But Habsburg and interwar-era Landsmannschaften, too, were acting as lobbies and propaganda networks, broadly embedded in the German nationalist culture of their time with an emphasis on a strong ethnoregionalism. Appearing relatively late on the scene, in 1907, the Verein der Banater Schwaben was promised an annual donation of

100 *Kronen* by the “Südmark.”<sup>5</sup> Even closer was the Verein’s entanglement with German Hungarian associations. The Verein closely monitored the activities of Edmund Steinacker who initiated the foundation of the Hungarian German People’s Party (UDVP) in 1906. The party, which was ultimately unsuccessful among voters, promoted a German Hungarian identity that combined loyalty to the Hungarian crown with a distinct German nationalism.<sup>6</sup> Like the UDVP, the Verein cultivated national initiatives in the Banat and in the Kingdom of Hungary at large. At the occasion of the 1910 census in Hungary, the association’s board had decided “to send proclamations to all Germans of Hungary, that prompt them, to truthfully indicate German as their mother tongue at all costs.”<sup>7</sup> Equally, the Verein would buy copies of nationalist publications, such as books by Adam Müller-Guttenbrunn, and send them to German-speaking localities in the Banat and the Bačka.<sup>8</sup>

The nationalism of such associations was not predominantly concerned with the nation at large but with the more compact world of the Heimat. While only insufficiently translated as home/homeland/home region, *Heimat* is here understood, following Celia Applegate, as the other side of the liberal nation-state that was taking shape during the nineteenth century. Where the nation was ideally marked by a public sphere and deliberations, Heimat could be situated within “the restricted and secure society of a childhood memory.” In Applegate’s treatment of the Palatinate within the German Reich, “the invented traditions of the Heimat bridged the gap between national aspiration and provincial reality.”<sup>9</sup> Within the provincial spaces of the former Habsburg Empire, nationalists conceived of Germanness as in regional terms and demanded loyalty to a provincial community of co-ethnics. This notion of Germanness was characterized by local histories and by the relations between the linguistic groups of the respective regions. This plea toward regional ethnic unity stemmed from the desire to consolidate a German community whose supposed members were, until at least 1920, still firmly embedded in the dense fabric of local dialects, partial multilingualism, and microcultures.<sup>10</sup> Over time, nationalist activists and population scientists lobbied for the adoption of specific group names, such as *Sudetendeutsche* for the self-professed Germans of the historic lands of the Bohemian Crown, or *Donauschwaben* for the German-speaking inhabitants of parts of the Pannonian Basin, especially from the regions of the Banat, the Bačka, and Syrmia, commonly understood as the descendants of settlers sent by the Habsburg rulers to territories that had formerly been ruled by the Ottoman Empire.<sup>11</sup>

One of the goals of the Heimat nationalism of Landsmannschaften in Habsburg and interwar-era Vienna was to influence the political elite to support activities that they deemed favorable for the national future of their respective Heimat. But there were certain impediments for overt nationalist lobbying and propaganda. In the context of late-Imperial Austria, where openly political associations were liable to specific

regulations, Landsmannschaften—like other bourgeois associations—often emphasized their supposed unpolitical nature. The articles of associations of the Verein der Banater Schwaben, for example, deliberately stated that political manifestations were entirely excluded.<sup>12</sup>

Many Landsmannschaften seemingly complied with the self-defined limitation on nonpolitical activities by organizing events and gatherings that on the surface were primarily cultural and folkloristic in nature. German Silesian, Moravian, and Bohemian associations were organizing theater performances, slide presentations of German art in Bohemia, or lectures on the history of the German-speaking inhabitants of the Sudetenlands.<sup>13</sup> Self-professed Sudeten German businesspeople would try to animate countrymen to come to them. On the pages of one association's journal, an innkeeper invited countrymen from northern Bohemia and Silesia to "casual gatherings" that included lectures and dances on every Sun- and holiday.<sup>14</sup>

But the social character of Landsmannschaften was not solely the result of compliance with the lawmaker. It also stemmed from a desire to meet the needs of co-ethnics who shared migratory biographies that had led them away from the romanticized Heimat region. German Landsmannschaften were migrant associations after all. And in the late-nineteenth century, Vienna was full of them. Many registered migrant associations were formed around the idea of promoting coherent national narratives. There were associations representing Czechs or Germans from Bohemia, Slovaks from Upper Hungary, Slovenes from Carniola, or Ruthenes from Galicia.<sup>15</sup> German landsmannschaftliche Vereine often adopted the rhetoric of national ownership and borderland to create a distinct national profile.<sup>16</sup> And these Landsmannschaften were a fixture of Vienna's cultural landscape since the 1870s. There was a *Verein der Siebenbürger Sachsen* (founded in 1871), a *Verein der Deutschen aus Böhmen* (1872), an *Egerländerverein* (1881), a *Verein der Iglauer* (1885), a *Gablonzer Bierstübel* (1887), a *Verein der deutschen Böhmerwälder* (1890), and a *Verein der Deutschen aus Gottschee* (1891).<sup>17</sup> In the Habsburg Empire, these and other migrant associations largely figured among so-called *Geselligkeitsvereine* (social clubs), especially when they were formed by inner-Imperial migrants<sup>18</sup> who had come to the Habsburg core lands and to Vienna in order to pursue educational possibilities, get training, find a career, to settle there, or who had been forced to move there. Migrant networks—both loose and organized—played an important role in helping newcomers to integrate in their new surroundings. The future state-chancellor of the Austrian Republic, Karl Renner, for example, arrived in Vienna in 1889. Born in Dolní Dunajovice/Unter-Tannowitz in Moravia, Renner in his autobiography mentioned the importance of such networks for his own orientation.<sup>19</sup>

Historians know that social activities and self-help were among the staple strategies pursued by migrant associations. Industrialization, pre-world war globalization, and various other social pressures globally saw a broad proliferation of locally oriented

migrant associations in late nineteenth century. These migrant associations provided self-help, support, and protection to their members. They would organize financial assistance to regional countrymen, provide information on the current state of affairs in the home region, help people to return there, and organized burials, financial support for widows, as well as the return of the deceased. In many cases, such organizations were formed with the desire to maintain or cultivate a conservative attachment to the community, customs, and religiosity of the region of origin. Frequently, the more affluent members of such communities would reinvest in the home regions—thereby reshaping them according to certain religious or nationalist ideas about what a home should really look like. Often these associations distinguished themselves not only according to regional origin, but they also represented the interests of countrymen who pursued the same professions or had comparable economic interests.<sup>20</sup>

The ethno-regionalism of *Landsmannschaften* made them, quite paradoxically, justify their social activism by claiming that the regional German loyalties of their fellow countrymen living in Vienna, a predominantly German-speaking city, had to be protected. Especially after 1918, simple social activities were quickly framed as existential for the larger cause of the *Heimat*. In quite a telling example, the Viennese weekly *Das interessante Blatt* published an article on a performance by the *Schlesische Bauerntheater in Wien* on September 21, 1921. The play that was performed was called *Die Wunderkur* (The Miraculous Cure), the story of the spiritual recovery of a selfish and philandering farmer, written by the Silesian dialect poet Viktor Heeger. It was a folksy show that was especially noted for the short dance sequences in between scenes. But the author of the article in *Das interessante Blatt* explained the deeper necessity of such performances and initiatives. Vienna's Silesian community counted 70,000 individuals: "Separated from the *Heimat* which has fallen under foreign yoke they face the danger of forgetting their rootedness, their dialect and their mores and to be alienated from their *Schlesiertum*." The *Verein der Schlesier* that had organized the performance tried to tackle these developments. Its "initiatives aim at creating a spiritual center that shall give new impulses to their sense of belonging to the *Heimat*, their particularity and their *Volksbewußtsein* [ethnic/national consciousness] and that shall account for the conditions of the time which threaten to uproot them."<sup>21</sup>

During the Habsburg reign, consolidating Germanness on the provincial level had been important for nationalists because they sought to create an unambiguous ethnic identity that dominated the regional space. In the world of Habsburg successor states, consolidating ethno-regional Germanness was deemed to be of existential importance to protect the German presence in regions whose inhabitants to various degrees experienced new politics of national homogenization. The desire to consolidate a German population in order to use it as a justification for German nationalist claims over specific provincial spaces made the question of who participated in *Landsmannschaft* activities

and who didn't, of who could be reached by Landsmannschaft propaganda and who remained unfaced by it, fundamentally relevant for these associations.

## ALMOST A SWABIAN VILLAGE IN VIENNA

Migration from the Banat to Vienna mostly seems to have been professional in nature. While by the early twentieth century, the unfavorable economic situation was fueling emigration from the Banat even more, the majority of people left for North America and did not seem to have been drawn to the traditional centers of the Habsburg Monarchy. A 1903 newspaper article reported that 900 people had left the communities of Billed, Großjetscha/Iecsa Mare/Nagyjécsa and Warjasch/Variaş/Varjas.<sup>23</sup> In 1911 alone, almost one percent of the inhabitants of the Banat and Bačka had left the region—more than 15,000 people.<sup>24</sup> Well into the late 1920s, there were exaggerated press reports of entire villages in the Romanian Banat being completely deserted.<sup>24</sup> Vienna primarily became a center of gravity for artisans, students, and merchants. However, the largest professional group of Banaters were hairdressers and those training as such. German-speaking hairdressers from the Banat were just the last ethnically defined group of migrants to push into this segment of the Imperial capital's market. They supplanted Hungarian, Serbian, and Croatian hairdressers—and if job ads in Vienna's hairdresser journals can tell us anything, they were in high demand.<sup>25</sup> It was thus a group of enterprising hairdressers from the Hungarian half of the Monarchy who became the founding generation of the Verein der Banater Schwaben in Wien. Since at least 1882, various Banaters had been organizing a weekly roundtable, encouraging broader interactions between countrymen living in the Imperial capital. On January 27, 1907, this previously loose assembly founded their new Verein during a meeting at the restaurant *Zum Grundstein* in Vienna's bourgeois *Josefstädter Straße*.<sup>26</sup> Throughout the forty years of its existence, the associations bridged the gap between Landsmannschaft and a professional interest group. An illustrative example of this is the figure of Martin Endres, who between 1923 and his premature death in 1944 had been the head of the Verein, while also fulfilling some leading functions in Vienna's hairdresser cooperative, such as the role of the vice-chairman of the professional division of women's hairdressers.<sup>27</sup>

Since the day of the association's foundation, a too-pronounced fixation on professional issues was seen as an impediment for the nationalist goals that the association strove to achieve. These goals were defined as, for example, the creation of a meeting point for the cultivation of a German–Swabian national sentiment, of the Banat Swabian dialect, and of a feeling of almost being back at home. Of course, a minority of the founders had been determined to create an organization that would have a “purely professional foundation—since all the initiators and proponents are hairdressers,” and that

it would strive “to acquire the influence in commercial and cooperative matters, that with regard to their percentage in the trade of hairdressing should be the Banat Swabians’ due.” At least, these entrepreneurs had hoped that the association would pursue “the chief task of materially aiding the colleagues.”<sup>28</sup> And indeed, the Verein was heavily invested in the trade. Within a year after the Verein’s foundation, activities that the association organized prominently included public presentations of specific types of historical haircuts. Soon, these forms of *Schaufrisieren*—show styling—would serve to demonstrate the skills of the participants both in applying the styles of the past as well as in inventing new forms.<sup>29</sup> The association furthermore used such occasions to invite countrymen to participate in training classes for hairdressers.<sup>30</sup>

Yet, the majority of the founders of 1907 regarded such a limitation on purely commercial matters as contrary to their nationalist goals. According to the founding protocol, one of the master hairdressers stated his belief that it was important to unite all Banat Swabians in Vienna regardless of their trade and profession, and that the sole focus on the professional concerns of hairdressers would quickly make their association “uninteresting, dull, and boring.”<sup>31</sup>

And while activists might not have seen their associations as “uninteresting, dull, and boring,” they quickly and genuinely feared that it would remain confined to a small circle of already connected Banaters in Vienna. Short notes that appeared from time to time in Vienna’s hairdresser periodicals indicate that the Verein was continually eager to reach out to all those countrymen who had not yet joined its ranks and invited them to participate in the near future. In February 1912, both the *Neue Wiener Friseur-Zeitung* and the *Fachblatt für Friseure, Raseure und Perückenmacher* reported on a dinner that had been organized by the Verein in mid-January. People were served free beer and a variety of dishes. Not only the hairdressers attended, but also students from the Banat and the Bačka. Then-chairman Johann Braun expressed his joy about the fact that some 150 to 180 members were in attendance, but encouraged those present to recruit even more members. The anonymous writer of the *Fachblatt* showed himself sympathetic to the Verein’s cause and emphasized this invitation: “It’s a pity that the countrymen hardly stick together. Give it a try and come every second Sunday of the month to the Verein.”<sup>32</sup>

At another gathering in 1914, Chairman Braun appeared dressed in traditional garb and addressed the guests in their native dialect. Youngsters were demonstrating traditional clothes that they would wear on the occasion of a German spring celebration that would take place two days later. “In short,” the article went on, “one feels like at home. But it would honestly be preferable that all our countrymen, especially our professional colleagues, would join the Swabian association.” The article continued to praise the services that the Verein offered to hairdressers, most noteworthy being free training. But more importantly, the article stressed the importance of congeniality and the

absence of any snobbery. During their meetings, members sat side by side: “[T]hey do so as countrymen, who feel at ease among countrymen, far from home, and who find the unifying ties of the Swabian association.”<sup>33</sup>

Verein activists saw their community as a work in progress and pushed for unity and coherence. This push was an incentive to find and organize activities that would make the Verein more relevant for the ideal migrant community it claimed to represent. For many *Landsmannschaften*, World War I and its aftermath marked a moment of crisis that forced them to come up with new ideas for how to be more representative. In the light of the national remodeling of Europe, when the spaces that they had defined as language borders became actual state borders, many of them saw Germanness as even more endangered. Against this backdrop, *Landsmannschaft* activists were partially concerned that the closeness of the migrant communities they claimed to represent might be lost over time, or that their ranks had never been really closed in the first place. As the *Landsmannschaft* community was seen as an asset of the *Heimat*, its weakening contributed to no less than the weakening of the German character of the *Heimat* itself. Accordingly, *Landsmannschaft* activists believed they had to mobilize their communities, just as their nationalist counterparts in the Banat, in Transylvania, or in the *Böhmerwald* were working hard to create *Volksgruppen* communities that stood united against the perceived threat of denationalization.<sup>34</sup>

But if *Landsmannschaft* activists wanted to offer their potential members an organization that was meaningful for them in their everyday struggles, they had to go beyond social activities and nationalist rhetoric. If the promise of a Banat Swabian *Volksgruppe* in Vienna really was to mean something, then the association had to offer people more than the representation of the professional interests of one (however important) group within the larger migrant network.

The Verein der Banater Schwaben accordingly tried to position itself as an association that helped countrymen migrating to Vienna, through Vienna, and moving between Vienna and their Banat communities in Hungary (and subsequently Romania and Yugoslavia). Records for the year 1910–1911 note that in June 1910, a traveling countryman was given ten crowns to cover his expenses, and a high school student was given a stipend of 300 crowns; in September 1910, a number of female members agreed to accommodate young German women from Hungary on the lookout for a place to stay in Vienna; and in August 1911, the Verein covered the travel expenses of fifty men from the Banat coming to Vienna to work in public transportation.<sup>35</sup> Such efforts were duly chronicled because they were understood to highlight the Verein’s merits. In one case in March 1924, the members of the Verein’s board came to help 256 countrymen from the Banat. The families that had been on their way to the United States, had run out of money, and had subsequently been stranded in the Austrian capital. The Verein set out to help them with money and food.<sup>36</sup>

## OF POOR VILLAGERS AND CHILDREN

World War I and its outcome did not only prove to be a moment of ideological crisis for many German nationalists across all areas of the former Habsburg Empire. In the everyday lives of people, the supply and health crisis resulting from the war was much more existential. Especially a large urban area like Vienna was hard hit by the shortages. By 1917, starvation had become omnipresent in the Habsburg Empire. In the final phase of the war, the malnutrition, especially of poor Viennese children, was considered to be alarming. The examination of children's health proved again and again that around two-thirds or even more of the city's young population had not received enough to eat and that, compared with children from England, Germany, Belgium, or Russia, both their body and weight growth was lagging. The mortality of children between seven and fourteen rose annually. In 1918, the Spanish flu hit Vienna with force, killing altogether 4,544 people—probably twice as much if one includes the victims of unspecified pneumonia. Before the influenza epidemic, tuberculosis was the single largest killer in the city. In 1917, more than 46,000 people passed away in Vienna at a time when the overall population were 2.225 million people. More than 11,000 of these deaths were due to various types of tuberculosis, and 9,650 were due to lung tuberculosis.<sup>37</sup>

The authorities in Cisleithania tried to counter these developments—and ideally stifle any revolutionary tendencies—by creating a new welfare ministry that cooperated heavily with private welfare and charity organizations. Child relocation and holidays were one of the principle services. One carrier of such a program, the *Kaiser-Karl-Wohlfahrtswerk* (Emperor Charles Welfare Works), sent 20,000 poor Hungarian children to the Adriatic coast and, in May and July 1918, some 72,000 children from Bohemia and Lower Austria to farmers in Western Hungary, in the Baranya County, or in the Bačka.<sup>38</sup> After the war, the new Viennese Youth Aid Works (*Wijug*) continued to cooperate with private welfare providers offering comparable programs. Besides long-term, long-distance child relocation to countries such as Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland,<sup>39</sup> a number of actors either linked to the *Wijug* or operating independently within the same field of welfare activism offered short-term holidays for children. This seemingly universal language of welfare activism was motivated by a multitude of vastly differing ideologies. There were Socialist and Catholic associations, Zionists, and purely German nationalist associations among the involved actors. In practice, this also meant that instead of being universal, such welfare efforts primarily were services provided exclusively to members. Landsmannschaften like the Verein sought to alleviate the suffering of fellow countrymen from their home region.

Overall, World War I and its aftermath incentivized the Verein to be even more engaged in welfare efforts for its own community. Verein activists raised funds for welfare

purposes, such as financial aid to the wives of mobilized countrymen, while also supporting them in finding jobs and providing means for countrymen returning from the war.<sup>40</sup> The association organized food from the Banat that was distributed at a low price among 402 impoverished families.<sup>41</sup>

While such activities evidently addressed existential needs of a migrant community and, in extension, friends, relatives, and countrymen in the home region, the Verein's activists none the less organized them in the hopes of mobilizing the community in Vienna, strengthening its loyalty to the Heimat, and potentially recruiting new members. This expectation was relatively clearly stated with regard to the most prominent welfare initiative that the Verein had set in motion. In 1920, the Verein created its own welfare section to provide aid "for impoverished children and countrymen of the Banat Swabians in Vienna."<sup>42</sup> Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Verein would organize vacation journeys for children to the Banat. This initiative, which proved to be quite popular, had begun as an effort to "awaken a sense of togetherness" among Banat Swabians throughout the post-Habsburg world by reconnecting the Austrian children of Verein members—often referred to as *Schwabenkinder*<sup>43</sup>—with their parents' relatives, friends, and countrymen in the Banat, a region now partitioned between Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia.<sup>44</sup>

This expectation is not limited to the Verein. Other Landsmannschaften, too, hoped to connect their children with what they saw as their ancestral homelands or fellow countrymen elsewhere in order to instill them with a sense of belonging to a Volksgruppen community. In 1922, for example, the newly founded *Fürsorgestelle der Sudetendeutschen* (Welfare Office for Sudeten Germans), one of the satellite organizations of the larger *Sudetendeutscher Heimatbund* (Sudeten German Homeland Federation), actively strove to send Sudeten German children to the ancestral Heimat.<sup>45</sup>

In an article from August 1921, the Verein der Banater Schwaben defined and justified its vacation journey program as something mandated by the purity of blood and language in the *Schwabenland*, the Banat. Admonishing the countrymen in the Heimat to never renege on their national consciousness, the text continues: "For decades we have fought in Vienna. We are simple craftsmen and we have had the courage to express our German sentiment, because the time for the seed to ripen is here." Again, "German sentiment" in this context specifically refers to an attachment to Heimat community. For the Verein and its representatives, the situation demanded the cooperation of all Swabians—which they also saw as a direct command to the community in Vienna: "We only know countrymen; everybody must cooperate with determination. [...] All Swabians, leave your hiding places, stick together like a bur and our motto shall be: Countryman, hail!"<sup>46</sup>

If the Verein's own accounts are to be believed, the first vacation transports to the Romanian Banat were considerable in size. Between the beginning of July and mid-August

1921, three trains arrived in Timișoara's *Josefstädter* station, bringing more than 1,200 children to the Banat.<sup>47</sup>

The Verein, it seems, had real hopes that this activism would directly translate into increased participation of hitherto uninvolved countrymen in Vienna. During the association's monthly meeting in April 1921, which coincided with the ten-year anniversary of the chairmanship of then-leader Johann Braun, the original founders of the Verein together with vice-chairman Martin Endres would applaud the jubilarian for his accomplishments. During the first journeys to Yugoslavia in 1920, 260 member children had been sent on vacation to the Banat. It was assumed during the meeting that this number would be even higher in 1921, as the number of members had supposedly quadrupled within a year.<sup>48</sup> In practice, the number of Verein members had potentially risen somewhat in the immediate period after World War I, but from around the beginning of the welfare program onward into the mid-1930s there were no dramatic changes, and the Verein had a constant number of around 800 declared members.<sup>49</sup>

## A MIDDLE-CLASS VILLAGE IN VIENNA

While welfare activities certainly must have had some degree of positive effect on the Verein community, a quick side glance at other *Landsmannschaften* suggests that any growth in members in the immediate post-World War I period was likely due to external pressures rather than a sudden attractiveness of these organizations. The already mentioned Verein der Siebenbürger Sachsen in Wien, one of the oldest *Landsmannschaften* in Vienna, experienced a considerable rise in the number of members. Having not had more than 100 members for years, in 1920 the association suddenly counted 663. Even *Landsmannschaften* founded as a result of World War I grew rapidly. The irredentist *Sudetendeutscher Heimatbund* (originally founded as *Hilfsverein für Deutschböhmen und die Sudetenländer* in 1919) quickly counted 15,000 members in Austria alone.<sup>50</sup> That reason that people suddenly applied for membership in these organizations during the first two or three years after World War I can most likely be found in the necessity for people born elsewhere in the former Habsburg Empire to prove their Germanness in order to apply for citizenship of the newly founded Republic of German-Austria. Throughout the young state, German nationalist associations such as *Schutzvereine* or *Landsmannschaften* were providing their members with statements that identified them as Germans. The Austrian authorities recognized such documents as proofs of Germanness during naturalization procedures.<sup>51</sup> The *Verein der Banater Schwaben*, for example, subsequently boasted to have helped four hundred countrymen to become naturalized Austrian citizens this way.<sup>52</sup>

Such momentary developments made Landsmannschaft activists hope that they could recruit even more members in the long run, hence the strong turn towards welfare activism after 1918. The main obstacle to their efforts proved to be questions of social class. The language of welfare activism was informed by the middle-class backgrounds of many leading figures in these organizations. In the case of the Verein, as has already been shown, the circle of activists mostly comprised artisans, university students, and to a lesser degree graduated academics. Despite a temporary rise in the number of members, all these associations struggled to get working-class people to participate. The January 1929 edition of the journal of Vienna's Böhmerwald German community greeted its readers with strikingly admonitory words right on its first page: "It's a sad fact that the majority of our countrymen are still avoiding the *Böhmerwaldgau*, the meeting point of all *Böhmerwäldler* in Vienna." Where were these unfaithful countrymen? The biggest fault, the article continues, lay with those who, while seeing the necessity of Sudeten German activism in Austria, would not do anything for their countrymen associations. The Böhmerwaldgau's leaders seemed to be especially concerned with the disruptive force that class distinctions might have on the community they wanted to build and maintain: "In view of the high importance of our goals, class distinctions shall not motivate anybody to stay away, regardless of his education, regardless of his poor or his splendid financial situation."<sup>53</sup>

Vienna's Banat Swabian activists equally saw the necessity to bridge class distinctions. Appealing to a sense of Christian humility, one article in the Verein der Banater Schwaben's journal *Unsere Heimat* would point to the figure of Christ himself—hadn't he decided to live among the "workers," and hadn't he disdained all rich and powerful people?<sup>54</sup> Bourgeois expectations about social norms and behaviors to a degree interfered with the nationalist ideals of these associations. When the Verein initially organized vacation journeys to the Romanian Banat, for example, it co-organized the transport and the acquisition of visas together with a Christian conservative railway union from Vienna. One hundred children who had signed up with the vacation program of the Verein and 800 children from railway worker families went to Romania together in 1921.<sup>55</sup> Any tensions that might have arisen between Banat host families and Viennese children were subsequently attributed to the working-class upbringing of these railway worker children.<sup>56</sup> In the following years, the Verein overemphasized the bourgeois characters of its activities and marketed new vacation journeys as aid for Vienna's German middle-class families. Fighting in the name of the middle-class was not only beneficial because it insulated the Verein from critique from other like-minded associations, but also from internal dissenters once the immediate necessity to alleviate the effects of the post-1918 crisis had subsided. By 1927, members of the Verein had begun questioning the usefulness of continuing to invest time, energy, and resources in the organization of these journeys. Verein activists voiced the counterargument that for the sake

of the positive mental development of Vienna's children and for the future of the German family, it was important to continue to send middle-class children to the Banat.<sup>57</sup>

According to a list of past activities submitted to the new Nazi authorities in 1939, the Verein's organizers claimed that between 1920 and 1937, their program had enabled 10,000 children to travel to the Banat.<sup>58</sup> This included both the children of Verein members as well as the children of nonmembers, as the emphasis on aiding the middle-class increasingly forced the association to market its program as a service to all *Wiener Kinder*. Especially Austria's Christian Socials perceived the Verein's effort for the German middle-class to be something laudable. In 1928, when the association had sent more than 6,000 children abroad, the governing coalition of Christian Socials, German Nationalists, and Agrarians under the leadership of the reelected Ignaz Seipel awarded the Verein's chairman Martin Endres the Grand Decoration of Honor in Silver for Services to the Republic of Austria.<sup>59</sup> The National Socialist movement equally sympathized with the Verein. After the Anschluss, it was one of the *Landsmannschaften* that were left intact by Vienna's new Nazi rulers.<sup>60</sup>

In the long run, however, whatever base the claim that the Verein would represent some kind of Viennese Swabian village might have, its sources were slowly withering away. Throughout the interwar years, immigration to Vienna from Romania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia remained insignificant.<sup>61</sup> Eventually, a critical number of members who had reached an advanced age had passed away. A post-1945 chronicler of the Verein claimed that by 1934, the overall number of members began to decline for good.<sup>62</sup> By 1947, there seemed to be no chance of reactivating the Verein, which had almost no members anymore. The last representatives decided to disband their association.<sup>63</sup> That the Verein would be recreated as *Schwabenverein* within a year of the original organization's dissolution was the tragical consequence of the massive influx of refugees, evacuees, and expellees.<sup>64</sup> Now the old veterans of the Verein could find a new audience and a foundation for a potentially more diverse Swabian village in Vienna. The parallel renaissance of the Verein der Siebenbürger Sachsen in Wien after World War II illustrates this quite well. One post-1945 activist asserted that its original membership base of "established citizens, academics, students" quickly became a minority with regards to "the lower-middle class and the rural element," refugees and expellees from rural Romania.<sup>65</sup>

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

In 1945, a new chapter of *Landsmannschaft* activism began in Austria. Unlike Western Germany, Austrian *Landsmannschaften* struggled to reach some degree of political importance. After the war, the centrality of Vienna for *Landsmannschaft* activism in Austria was also broken. Due to Allied resettlement policies and the different

occupation regimes in the various zones of occupation, cities like Linz or Salzburg became central nodes of local *Volksgruppen* activism equal or, depending on the community, even more important than Vienna. At the same time, activists of interwar *Landsmannschaften* participated in the formation of the postwar expellee associations. In a number of cases, there were personal continuities between interwar and postwar Banat Swabian, Sudeten German, and Transylvania Saxon networks in Austria.<sup>66</sup> And the destitute situation that many of the stateless expellees faced in postwar Austria also incentivized renewed forms of welfare activism within the various expellee networks.

Since 1918, Austria's *Landsmannschaften* and the migrant networks they were embedded within saw phases of rising and declining commitment with equally fluctuating numbers of official members. While it is quite likely that these fluctuations were rather a product of political and social developments outside of the immediate sphere of influence of the various *Landsmannschaften*, these organizations were consistent in their belief that German speakers from the Banat or the Bačka, from Syrmia or Transylvania, from the Sudetenland or from Hungary, all of them living in Austria, ultimately formed groups that were held together by shared origin and ethnocultural norms, and that each group could be mobilized for the sake of the *Volksgruppen* communities at large. This view even seeped into Austria's political elite, especially where *Landsmannschaft* activists became members of this elite themselves. As a negative stereotype, it fueled popular resentment against expellees who could now be decried as collective agents and as crypto-Nazis.

This chapter offered a case study of Vienna's *Landsmannschaft* culture as it came out of the Habsburg era and as it was adapted to the new realities of the interwar world. It outlined notions of *Landsmannschaft* ethno-regionalism, the wish for an active, committed *Landsmannschaft* community on the one hand, and aspects of the migrant welfare activism that these associations also tried to fulfil, and that their activists consistently hoped would in turn energize the community on the other. Many aspects of interwar *Landsmannschaft* culture could not be treated here, mostly for the sake of keeping the text within a format that was digestible. Specific festive occasions were not treated, as were the more chauvinistic aspects of this culture, best exemplified by the anti-Czech militancy of Vienna's Sudeten German organizations. Also, the place that the interwar era's *Verein der Banater Schwaben* held within the self-narratives of its successor associations in the postwar years could not be treated.

German *Landsmannschaft* culture must not be seen as confined to post-1945 Western Germany, but can be found in various places, Austria among them. Resettlement, evacuation, flight, and expulsion certainly were dramatic events of collective uprooting that decisively shaped *Landsmannschaft* culture. But it is once again well worth a look beyond the zero hour to get glimpses of continuities that help locate these organizations within a deeper history of German nationalism and its many regional emanations

in the (post-)Habsburg world and Central Europe at large. Finally, Landsmannschaft culture cannot be reduced to repeated reflections of what Heimat is or what it should be. An equally if not much more important object of focus for these associations was the figure of the *Landsmann* (countryman). To reach these people, Landsmannschaften had to resort to welfare activism, underlining their sometimes-neglected role as migrant associations.

## NOTES

1. "In unserm Wien'r Schwowador / is Montag was g'passiert! / Die Nachricht hat vun Gass' zu Gass' / die Landsleut rewelliert. / Do sein die dicki Schwowaköpp / ganz schepprich gin un haß: / 'He, Nochbr, hädd'r schun vernumm? / A Doktr geht uff d'Raas!" - "Zum Abschied von Wien!" *Unsere Heimat* (December 1927).
2. See, for example, Hans Dama, "An Der Schwelle Zum 100-jährigen Jubiläum Des Verbandes Der Banater Schwaben Österreich," in *Österreich Und Die Banater Schwaben. Festschrift. An Der Schwelle Zum 100-jährigen Jubiläum Des Verbandes Der Banater Schwaben Österreichs*, ed. Hans Dama (Pollischanksy, 2005).
3. "Ethnoregional" being understood here as pertaining to ideas of regional autonomy—or outright secession—based on ethnical self-determination. See Michael Hechter and Margaret Levi, "The Comparative Analysis of Ethnoregional Movements\*," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2, no. 3 (1979): 260–74, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.1979.993268>.
4. A good discussion of the post-1945 German phenomenon can be found in Andrew Demshuk, *The Lost German East. Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory, 1945–1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); for German discussions, see furthermore Matthias Stickler, "Landsmannschaften," in *Online-Lexikon zur Kultur und Geschichte der Deutschen im östlichen Europa*, May 9, 2012, <https://ome-lexikon.uni-oldenburg.de/begriffe/landsmannschaften>; Samuel Salzborn, *Grenzenlose Heimat: Geschichte, Gegenwart Und Zukunft Der Vertriebenenverbände* (Elefanten Press, 2000); an older, yet still interesting study on the phenomenon is Manfred M. Wambach, *Verbändestaat und Parteienoligopol: Macht und Ohnmacht der Vertriebenenverbände*, Bonner Beiträge zur Soziologie 10 (Enke, 1971).
5. "Am 31. Mai 1907 überraschte uns ein Brief des durch seine weitausgreifende Schutztätigkeit in aller Welt bekannten Vereines 'Südmark,' in welchem Schreiben uns die verehrliche Hauptleitung mitteilt, daß sie beschlossen habe, unserem 'Verein der Banater Schwaben in Wien.' einen jährlichen Unterstützungsbeitrag von 100 K / Kronen / zu widmen." Nikolaus Wehner, "3. Tätigkeitsbericht Über Das Erste Vereinsjahr" (January 31, 1908), 2, Folder 14 - Vereinschronik, 2400 (B) - Verein der Banater

- Schwaben, Nachlässe, Kriegsarchiv, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Vienna; on “Südmark,” see Sigrid Kiyem, “Der deutsche Schulverein ‘Südmark’ 1918–1938” (Diploma thesis, Universität Wien, 1995); Eduard G. Staudinger, “Die Südmark,” in *Geschichte Der Deutschen Im Bereich Des Heutigen Slowenien 1848–1941*, ed. Helmut Rumpler and Arnold Suppan, Schriftenreihe Des Österreichischen Ost- Und Südosteuropa-Instituts 13 (Verlag für Geschichte und Politik; R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988), 130–54; Pieter M. Judson, “Reisebeschreibungen in Der ‘Südmark’ Und Die Idee Der Deutschen Diaspora Nach 1918,” in *Zwischen Exotik Und Vertrautem. Zum Tourismus in Der Habsburgermonarchie Und Ihren Nachfolgestaaten*, ed. Peter Stachel and Martina Thomsen (Transcript, 2014), 59–76.
6. See “Steinacker, Edmund,” in *Kulturportal West Ost*, accessed March 8, 2020, <https://kulturportal-west-ost.eu/biographien/steinacker-edmund-2>.
  7. “Es wird beschlossen, anlässlich der am Ende des Jahres bevorstehenden Volkszählung in Ungarn an alle Deutschen Ungarns Aufrufe zu versenden, in denen sie aufgefordert werden, unter allen Umständen die Wahrheit gemäß als Muttersprache Deutsch anzugeben.” “Die Wichtigsten Vorfälle in Der Sitzung Im Vierten Vereinsjahr 1910–11” (1911), Folder 14 - Vereinschronik, 2400 (B) - Verein der Banater Schwaben, Nachlässe, Kriegsarchiv, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Vienna.
  8. See Franz Klein, “Geschichtlicher Abriss Des Vereins Der Banater Schwaben in Wien” (1997), Folder 4 - 40 Jahre Verein der Banater Schwaben, 2400 (B) - Verein der Banater Schwaben, Militärische Nachlässe, Kriegsarchiv, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Vienna.
  9. Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials. The German Idea of Heimat* (University of California Press, 1990), 13. And yet while it served as a justifying foundation for a larger nation, the example of the Habsburg Empire also showed that specific regional Heimat loyalties could stand in opposition to each other. The strongly Catholic and regional Heimat nationalism in Tyrol that was at odds with the centralizing state apparatus in Vienna struggled to find common ground with the anticlerical stance of German nationalists in Styria or those in Bohemia that affirmed the central authority as an ally in their conflict with Czech nationalists. See Pieter M. Judson, “When Is a Diaspora Not a Diaspora? Rethinking Nation-Centered Narratives about Germans in Habsburg East Central Europe,” in *The Heimat Abroad: The Boundaries of Germanness*, ed. Krista O’Donnell, 1. Social History, Popular Culture and Politics in Germany (University of Michigan Press, 2005), 226.
  10. See also Ulrich Prehn, “‘Volksgruppen Rights’ versus ‘Minorities Protections.’ The Evolution of German and Austrian Political Order Paradigms from the 1920s to 1945,” in *A New Nationalist Europe under Hitler: Concepts of Europe and Transnational Networks in the National Socialist Sphere of Influence, 1933–1945*, ed. Johannes Dalfinger and Dieter Pohl, Routledge Studies in Second World War History (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019), 28.

11. The Sudeten Germans famously got their name from the Sudety / Sudeten, a mountain range between Bohemia and Silesia. One of the first authors to use this expression to designate the Germans in the historical lands of the Bohemian crown was the nationalist journalist and teacher Franz Jesser in 1902. He used it to distinguish them from the so-called *Alpendeutsche* (Alpine Germans) of the Austrian core lands. With the establishment of First Czechoslovak Republic, nationalists were increasingly pushing to apply the designation to all German citizens of the new state in order to replace the plethora of even more local German identities. A thorough discussion can be found in Tobias Weger, "*Völkstumskampf*" *Ohne Ende? Sudetendeutsche Organisationen, 1945–1955* (Lang, 2008), 30–51.
12. See "Satzungen Und Statuten Des Vereines Der Banater Schwaben in Wien" (1916), R 57/6178 Verein der Banater Schwaben in Wien, R 57 Deutsches Ausland-Institut, Deutsches Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde, Berlin; on the association culture that had developed in the German-speaking world, see David Blackbourn, "The Discrete Charm of the Bourgeoisie. Reappraising German History in the Nineteenth Century," in *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany*, ed. David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley (Oxford University Press, 1984), 195–98.
13. See "Lichtbildvorträge," *Zeitschrift Des Hilfsvereins Für Deutschböhmen Und Die Sudetenländer* (April 1921): 8; "Urania-Vorträge in Wien," *Zeitschrift Des Hilfsvereins Für Deutschböhmen Und Die Sudetenländer* (April 1921): 8.
14. See "Zwanglose Zusammenkünfte," *Zeitschrift Des Hilfsvereins Für Deutschböhmen Und Die Sudetenländer* (April 1921): 9.
15. See Hans-Peter Hye, "Vereinswesen Und Bürgerliche Gesellschaft in Österreich," *Beiträge Zur Historischen Sozialkunde* 19 (1988): 86–90.
16. See Hans-Peter Hye, "Vereine Und Politische Mobilisierung in Niederösterreich," in *Politische Öffentlichkeit Und Zivilgesellschaft. Teilband 1: Vereine, Parteien Und Interessenverbände Als Träger Der Politischen Partizipation*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Helmut Rumpler, *Das Habsburgerreich 1848–1918* (Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2006), 8:208–10.
17. See Bureau der k. k. statistischen Central-Comission, ed., *Handbuch Der Vereine Für Die Im Reichsrathe Vertretenen Königreiche Und Länder Nach Dem Stand Am Schlusse Des Jahres 1890* (Manz'sche K.u.K. Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1892), 11–13, 567, [https://usearch.uaccess.univie.ac.at/primo-explore/fulldisplay?vid=UWI&id=990075997560203332&inst=43ACC\\_UBW&context=L&lang=de\\_DE](https://usearch.uaccess.univie.ac.at/primo-explore/fulldisplay?vid=UWI&id=990075997560203332&inst=43ACC_UBW&context=L&lang=de_DE).
18. In the case of migrant associations of Germans from Hungary, it was of course trans-national migration within a common Imperial framework.
19. See Karl Renner, *An Der Wende Zweier Zeiten* (Danubia-Verlag, 1946), 187; see also Michael John, "Vielfalt und Heterogenität. Zur Migration nach Wien um 1900," in

*Migration und Innovation um 1900: Perspektiven auf das Wien der Jahrhundertwende*, ed. Elisabeth Röhrlich (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016), 27–28.

20. Anthropologists have given them many names. They are referred to as regional associations, migrant village associations, hometown associations (HTA), or simply migrant associations. Sometimes one even finds the expression *Landsmannschaft* applied to this general type of associations. Some examples include: Since the mid-19th century migrants from rural China—among others, Hakka or Cantonese people—began founding regional associations, called *huiguan*, in urban centers of migration such as Hong Kong or Singapore. On the other side of the Pacific, Catholic priests in the 1940s urged migrants from the region of Arandas in Mexico who had moved to Mexico City, Guadalajara, León, or even the United States to form so-called “*Colonia Arandese*.” These colonias had a considerable impact on the modernization and Industrialization of their members’ home region and served as liaisons between their home region and the various authorities in urban centers of Mexico. Up north, the city of New York had been home to at least 2,060 so-called *landsmanshaften*, Jewish immigrant associations between 1848 and the outbreak of World War I. See Wing Chung Ng, “Urban Chinese Social Organization: Some Unexplored Aspects in *Huiguan* Development in Singapore, 1900–1941,” *Modern Asian Studies* 26, no. 3 (1992): 469–94; Elizabeth Sinn, “Xin Xi Guxiang: A Study of Regional Associations as a Bonding Mechanism in the Chinese Diaspora. The Hong Kong Experience,” *Modern Asian Studies* 31, no. 2 (1997): 375–97; David Fitzgerald, “Colonies of the Little Motherland: Membership, Space, and Time in Mexican Migrant Hometown Associations,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50, no. 1 (2008): 145–69; Nathan M. Kaganoff, “The Jewish *Landsmanshaftn* in New York City in the Period Preceding World War I,” *American Jewish History* 76, no. 1 (1986): 56–66; Daniel Soyer, “Between Two Worlds: The Jewish *Landsmanshaftn* and Questions of Immigrant Identity,” *American Jewish History* 76, no. 1 (1986): 5–24; and Anat Helman, “Hues of Adjustment: *Landsmanshaftn* in Inter-War New York and Tel-Aviv,” *Jewish History* 20 (2006): 41–67.
21. “Getrennt von der Heimat, die heute der Fremdherrschaft verfallen ist, stehen sie in Gefahr, ihre Bodenständigkeit, ihre Mundart und Volkssitten zu vergessen und sich dem Schlesiertum zu entfremden. Dieser nicht unbedeutenden Gefahr will der Verein der Schlesier in Wien entgegenwirken, dessen Arbeiten die Schaffung eines geistigen Mittelpunktes bezwecken, der dem Heimatgefühl, der Eigenart und dem Volksbewußtsein neue Impulse geben und den traurigen Zeitverhältnissen, die das Stammesgefühl zu enturzeln drohen, Rechnung tragen soll.” “Das Schlesische Bauerntheater in Wien,” *Das Interessante Blatt*, April 21, 1921, 9.
22. See “Die Auswanderung Der Schwaben Aus Ungarn,” *Mährisch-Schlesische Presse*, May 27, 1903, 2.
23. See “Die Deutsche Auswanderung in Ungarn,” *Deutsches Nordmährerblatt*, October 18,

- 1913, 2; at the last census in 1910, the Banat had 1,582,133 inhabitants. See G. W. Prothero, *Transylvania and the Banat* (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1920), 6, <https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/gdc/gdclccn/a2/20/00/86/8/a22000868/a22000868.pdf>.
24. See "Vom Deutschen Tabakbau Im Rumänischen Banat," *Vorarlberger Tagblatt*, March 3, 1927, 4; "Wohin Kann Mann Noch Auswandern?" *Freiheit!*, May 21, 1928, 6.
  25. See Gertrude Adam, "Banater Friseure in Wien. Eine Erfolgreiche Berufsgruppe, Die in Der Hauptstadt Der Monarchie Hohe Anerkennung Fand," in *Banater Kalender 2017*, ed. Aneta Konschitzky and Walther Konschitzky (Banat-Verlag, 2017), 245–57.
  26. See Klein, "Geschichtlicher Abriss Des Vereines Der Banater Schwaben in Wien."
  27. See "Gründungs- Und Tätigkeitsbericht Des Vereines Der Banater Schwaben in Wien," *Unsere Heimat*, December 1925; he was elected vice-chairman in 1921. See "Mitteilungen Der Fachsektion Der Damenfriseure," *Frisierkunst Der Mode*, October 1921, 28; and in 1934, he was elected the temporary head of the Viennese Coiffeur Federation. See "Vom Bund Der Wiener Friseure," *Fachblatt Für Friseure, Raseure Und Perückenmacher* (September 1934): 25; See "Eine Kurze Lebensbeschreibung," *Unsere Heimat* (October 1928): 6.
  28. See "Protokoll von Der Am 27. Jänner 1907 Um 7 h Abends Im Restaurant 'Zum Grundstein' Wien VIII., Josefstädterstr. 28, Stattgehabten Konstituierenden Versammlung Des Vereines Der Banater Schwaben in Wien (Copy)" (27 January 1907), 2, Folder 4 - 40 Jahre Verein der Banater Schwaben, 2400 (B) - Verein der Banater Schwaben, Militärische Nachlässe, Kriegsarchiv, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Vienna.
  29. See "Fachsektion Der Damenfriseure Aus Dem Verein Der Banater Schwaben," *Neue Wiener Friseur-Zeitung*, February 1, 1908, 5; the *Schaufrisieren* is mentioned several times in Nikolaus Britz, "Fünfzig Jahre Schwabenverein Wien," in *Die Donauschwaben zwischen gestern und heute. Festschrift zur Fünfzig-Jahr-Feier des Schwabenvereines Wien*, ed. Nikolaus Britz (Hauptverein der Donauschwäbischen Landsmannschaft in Wien, Niederösterreich und Burgenland, 1957), 121–43.
  30. See "Der Verein Der Banater Schwaben," *Neue Wiener Friseur-Zeitung*, January 15, 1909, 5.
  31. "auf die Dauer alles Interesse verliert, abstumpft und langweilig wird." See "Protokoll von Der Am 27. Jänner 1907 Um 7 h Abends Im Restaurant 'Zum Grundstein' Wien VIII., Josefstädterstr. 28, Stattgehabten Konstituierenden Versammlung Des Vereines Der Banater Schwaben in Wien (Copy)."
  32. "Schade, daß die Landsleute so wenig zusammenhalten. Versuchen Sie es einmal und kommen Sie jeden zweiten Sonntag im Monat in den Verein." - "Verein Der Banater Schwaben in Wien," *Fachblatt Für Friseure, Raseure Und Perückenmacher* (February 1912): 10.
  33. See "Verein Der Banater Schwaben in Wien," *Neue Wiener Friseur-Zeitung*, May 15,

- 1914, 10.
34. On the Volksgruppen narrative see the brilliant summary in the introduction of Winsong Chu, *The German Minority in Interwar Poland* (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
  35. See Klein, "Geschichtlicher Abriss Des Vereins Der Banater Schwaben in Wien"; "30. August 1911" (1911), Folder 14 - Vereinschronik, 2400 (B) - Verein der Banater Schwaben, Nachlässe, Kriegsarchiv, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Vienna.
  36. See Britz, "Fünfzig Jahre Schwabenverein Wien," 135–36.
  37. See Andreas Weigl, *Mangel – Hunger – Tod. Die Wiener Bevölkerung Und Die Folgen Des Ersten Weltkriegs*, Wiener Geschichtsblätter 1/2014 - Beiheft (Veröffentlichungen des Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchivs, 2014); Friedrich Reischl, *Wiens Kinder Und Amerika. Die Amerikanische Kinderhilfsaktion 1919*, ed. Deutschösterreichisches Jugendhilfswerk in Wien (Gerlach & Wiedling, 1919), esp. 47.
  38. In 1918, altogether 71,855 children were registered for a vacation journey to the countryside. See Reischl, *Wiens Kinder Und Amerika*, 44; Friederike Kind-Kovács, "The 'Other' Child Transports: World War I and the Temporary Displacement of Needy Children from Central Europe," *Revue d'histoire de l'enfance 'irrégulière'. Le Temps de l'histoire*, no. 15 (October 30, 2013): 7–9, <https://doi.org/10.4000/rhei.3474>; see also newspaper articles of the time, such as "Kaiser=Karl=Wohlfahrtswerk, Hainburger Kinder in Ungarn," *Niederösterreichischer Grenzboten*, 8 April 1918, 2; or "Neustift-Innermanzing," *Wienerwald-Bote*, August 31, 1918, 5.
  39. See Weigl, *Mangel – Hunger – Tod*, 20–21; see also Isabella Matauschek, "Kinder Ins Ausland. Die Verschickung Österreichischer Kinder Nach Dänemark Und In Die Niederlande Im Anschluss An Den Ersten Weltkrieg" (PhD thesis, European University Institute, 2002); Susanne H. Knudsen, *Wiener Kinder. Kindheit Im Schatten Des Krieges* (Historia, 2014).
  40. See "Verein Der Banater Schwaben in Wien," *Die Neue Zeitung*, March 24, 1916; "Der Verein Der 'Banater Schwaben,'" *Neue Wiener Friseur-Zeitung*, April 15, 1916; Nikolaus Britz, ed., *Die Donauschwaben zwischen gestern und heute. Festschrift zur Fünfzig-Jahr-Feier des Schwabenvereines Wien* (Hauptverein der Donauschwäbischen Landsmannschaft in Wien, Niederösterreich und Burgenland, 1957), 129–30.
  41. See "Gründungs- Und Tätigkeitsbericht Des Vereines Der Banater Schwaben in Wien," 5; see also "Verein Der Banater Schwaben" (October 17, 1939), XII-37-3819, 13-A 2/8, Box 239, Stiko Wien, Zivilakten der NS-Zeit, Archiv der Republik, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Vienna.
  42. The whole quote reads: "Wenige Wochen später, am 11. Jänner 1920, schlug sein Vetter Othmar vor, ein Komitee zu wählen, 'welches das ganze Jahr hindurch alle Angelegenheiten hinsichtlich des Kinderhilfsfonds zu bearbeiten hat' (Vereinsprotokoll), worauf am 28. Jänner 'für verarmte Kinder und Landsleute der Banater Schwaben in

- Wien' eine eigene Fürsorgesektion erstand (ebenda)." Britz, "Fünfzig Jahre Schwabenerverein Wien," 130.
43. This was of course oddly reminiscent of the other *Schwabenkinder*—children from poor rural families in Alpine Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein who had been sent as seasonal workers to farmers up north, mostly in *Oberschwaben* (Upper Swabia). This practice had emerged in the Early Modern Age and continued well into the early 20th century. See Friedrich Stepanek, "Schwabenkinder. Tiroler und Vorarlberger Kinder als Saisonhilfskräfte im Schwabenland," *historia.scribere* 1 (March 31, 2009): 407–22, <https://doi.org/10.15203/historia.scribere.1.20>.
  44. "Sie wollten ihre Kinder aus zwei Gründen in die Heimat schicken, 1. damit sie an Unterernährung nicht zugrunde gehen, 2. um in ihnen das Gefühl der Zusammengehörigkeit zu erwecken." Michael Kausch, *Schicksalswende Im Leben Des Banater Deutschen Volkes. I. Wegbereitung Und Aufbauarbeit* (H. Anwender & Sohn, 1939), 316.
  45. An effort that was almost rendered impossible by the unfavorable exchange rates between Austria and Czechoslovakia. The Viennese Sudeten German community did in fact have to fall back on sending their children to fellow countrymen living in Tyrol, where another larger Sudeten German community could be found, and to the Silesian town Głucholazy / Hlucholazy / Bad Ziegenhals in Poland. See "Wiener Sudetendeutsche Kinder in Der Heimat," *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, July 31, 1922, 5; "Aufruf!" *Allgemeiner Tiroler Anzeiger*, April 27, 1922, 7.
  46. "Kein Schwabe darf in Zukunft seine Muttersprache verleugnen und muß frei aus der Brust sagen, ich bin ein Schwabe. Seit Jahrzehnten kämpfen wir in Wien. Wir sind meist schlichte Werkleute und haben den Mut gehabt, unser deutsches Gefühl zum Ausdruck zu bringen, denn die Zeit ist da, wo der Samen zur Reife kommt. . . . Es gibt nur einen Landsmann, zielbewußt muß jedermann mitarbeiten. . . . Alle Schwaben heraus aus dem Versteck und zusammenhalten wie eine Klette und unsere Devise soll und muß sein: Landsmann, Heil!" "Wiener Schwabenkinder Aufs Land!" *Die Frau*, May 28, 1921, 6.
  47. See Klein, "Geschichtlicher Abriss Des Vereins Der Banater Schwaben in Wien."
  48. See "Wien," *Neue Wiener Friseur-Zeitung*, May 15, 1921, 3.
  49. See Klein, "Geschichtlicher Abriss Des Vereins Der Banater Schwaben in Wien."
  50. See Verein der Siebenbürger Sachsen in Niederösterreich und dem Burgenland, *Festschrift: Herausgegeben anlässlich des 100jährigen Bestandes des Vereins der Siebenbürger Sachsen in Wien* (Verein der Siebenbürger Sachsen in Wien, Niederösterreich und dem Burgenland, 1971).
  51. See Bernhard Mussak, 'Staatsbürgerrecht und Optionsfrage in der Republik (Deutsch-) Österreich zwischen 1918 und 1925' (Dissertation, Vienna, Universität Wien, 1995), 365–366.
  52. See 'Verein der Banater Schwaben' (17 October 1939), XII-37-3819, 13-A 2/8, Box 239,

- Stiko Wien, Zivilakten der NS-Zeit, Archiv der Republik, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Vienna.
53. "Bei der hohen Bedeutung unseres Zieles sollen die Standesunterschiede bei niemandem, sei er welchen Bildungsgrades immer, befunde er sich in ärmlichen oder in glänzenden Vermögensverhältnissen, ein Beweggrund zum Fernbleiben sein." E. O., "Unser Mitgliederstand," *Die Säumerglocke. Nachrichtenblatt Der Böhmerwäldler*, January 1929, 1–2.
  54. See Hans Haupt, "Nur Ein Arbeiter!" *Unsere Heimat* (September 1926): 6–7.
  55. See "Wiener Eisenbahnerkinder Nach Rumänien," *Arbeiter Zeitung*, August 11, 1921, 3; "Wiener Eisenbahnerkinder Nach Rumänien," *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, August 11, 1921, 6; "Wiener Kinder Im Banat," *Neues Wiener Journal*, July 8, 1922, 7; See "Wiener Kinder Im Banat," *Reichspost*, October 10, 1923, 4.
  56. See "Minorenne Atheisten Und Achtjährige Sozialpolitiker," *Österreichische Wehrzeitung*, October 27, 1922, 3; Hildrun Glass, "Minderheiten Im Rumänischen Banat. Das Minderheitenpolitische Konzept Der 'Arader Zeitung' Und Ihr Verhältnis Zu Ungarn Und Juden (1921-1941)," *Ungarn-Jahrbuch* 8 (1991): 121.
  57. See "Die Kinderfürsorge," *Unsere Heimat* (May 1927): 5–6.
  58. See "Verein Der Banater Schwaben."
  59. See "Verdiente Männer," *Unsere Heimat* (October 1928): 4–6; "Eine Kurze Lebensbeschreibung," 6.
  60. See "Verein Der Banater Schwaben."
  61. In 1923, 10,414 Romanian citizens lived in Vienna, of which 8,390 were counted among those foreigners whose primary language was German, that is roughly 80 percent of all Romanians. Over a decade later, in 1934, there were only 3,867 Romanian citizens living in Vienna, although their primary language is not known. Accordingly, the number of Romanian citizens in Vienna was shrinking. If a larger portion of German speakers from Romania had opted for and was granted Austrian citizenship, this must have happened between 1920 and 1926. Real data exists again for the years 1927 and 1928 as well as 1930 until 1935, indicating, however, that throughout those years only 304 Romanian citizens become naturalized. The German census of 1939 counted 572 German speakers among 1,516 Romanian citizens. For data on language use and nationality in Vienna in 1923 as well as naturalizations in 1927 and 1928, see Magistratsabteilung für Statistik, *Statistisches Jahrbuch Der Stadt Wien 1929*, Neue Folge (Vienna: Magistrat der Stadt Wien, Magistratsabteilung für Statistik, 1929), 1:6, 39; for data concerning foreigners in Vienna in 1923 and 1934 as well as naturalization in the years 1930 until 1935, see Magistratsabteilung für Statistik, *Statistisches Jahrbuch Der Stadt Wien 1930–1935*, Neue Folge (Vienna: Magistrat der Stadt Wien, Magistratsabteilung für Statistik, 1930), 3:12, 52; the data from the 1939 census can be found in Magistratsabteilung für Statistik, *Statistisches Jahrbuch Der Stadt Wien 1939–1942*, Neue Folge (Vienna:

- Magistrat der Stadt Wien, Magistratsabteilung für Statistik, 1946), 6:32.
62. See Klein, "Geschichtlicher Abriss Des Vereins Der Banater Schwaben in Wien."
63. See "Neugründung Des Vereines," *Schwabenpost*, May 1949, 17.
64. See "Erster Anlauf Zur Wiedergeburt Des 'Verein Der Banater Schwaben in Wien'" (n.d.), Folder 4 - 40 Jahre Verein der Banater Schwaben, 2400 (B) - Verein der Banater Schwaben, Militärische Nachlässe, Kriegsarchiv, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Vienna.
65. See Verein der Siebenbürger Sachsen in Niederösterreich und dem Burgenland, *Festschrift*.
66. In some instances, the interwar associations had also left their mark on the expelled who were arriving in Austria as well. Fritz Klingler, for example, the Banat Swabian graduate in medicine, for whom the poem quoted at the beginning of this article had been written, became an important figure of Danube Swabian expelled activism in postwar Upper Austria. See Hans Wolfram Hockl, "Ein Leben Für Die Gemeinschaft," *Banater Post*, August 15, 1974, 2; Hans Wolfram Hockl, "Dr. Fritz Klingler Zum Achtzigsten," *Banater Post*, July 15, 1979.

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# CONTROLLED YOUTH EMANCIPATION

## Hungarian Germans as Part of the Group Formation Process in the Interwar Period

ZSOLT VITÁRI

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE DANUBE MONARCHY AFTER WORLD WAR I made Hungary one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in Central Europe. Compared to the approximately 90 percent of the majority population of Hungarians, the numerically largest minority was German, with a share of 6.9 percent. Since ethnic homogenization was still on the agenda given the recent experiences of the peace accords, the largest minority was at the same time to pose the greatest threat to the realization of this aspiration.

In contrast to other nationalities that cultivated thoughts of secession at the end of the war, the Germans in Hungary kept very quiet. Nevertheless, at the end of the war, changes began to take place among them as well. With his article that appeared in the newspaper *Budapesti Szemle* [Budapest Review] in 1917, German professor Jakob Bleyer laid out the program for the following period.<sup>1</sup> Drawing on earlier experiences, he broke his lance not only for unbroken loyalty to his homeland, but also for the preservation of the German ethnic group, whose atrophy must be stopped at all costs. Bleyer, who came from a wealthy German peasant family and attended Hungarian grammar schools after German elementary school, followed by studies in German and Hungarian philology at the University of Budapest, embodied the typical figure of an intellectual of non-Hungarian descent. Through his career, he rose into the Hungarian elite, whose Hungarian character he accepted, but as a teacher and later professor of German studies, he showed responsibility for the preservation of the German language and culture in Hungary. His political profiling, however, was more due to the realization that he had

to spare the Germans in Hungary from a similarly grueling national struggle as was to be seen among the other peoples of the country, to maintain loyalty to the Hungarian state, not to form an extreme front against its assimilation tendencies and ultimately not to get into the rut of Reich German interests and thereby be instrumentalized.<sup>2</sup>

Bleyer therefore proclaimed a moderate program that focused on the agrarian population and also took their religious attitudes into account. It seemed suitable precisely because less friction could be expected with Hungarian ethnopolitical aspirations, from which he expected acceptance of his plans as an appropriate compromise. After all, he did not want to reverse those assimilation processes—which were already underway or completed.<sup>3</sup>

Moreover, the world war brought Germany closer to rural Hungary than ever before. On the one hand, this happened in an indirect way, since the war propaganda gave the most important war ally a prominent role in the Hungarian press products. Since the local reading circles and reading itself were extraordinarily popular among the Germans, these messages achieved their effect. On the other hand, the presence of Germany and the Austrian part of the monarchy were also directly experienced through the armies—as a result of the troop movements, as the population in the countryside also had such experiences.<sup>4</sup>

All things considered, a rather favorable constellation formed for Bleyer. A spokesman had come to the fore who presented a program that seemed more suitable than earlier ones. Moreover, the strengthening of moderate intentions in Hungarian ethnopolitics showed some hope for at least partial realization of this program. Meanwhile, Germany, Cisleithania, and the Germans, respectively, and thus their similarities to the Germans in Hungary, became tangible in a wider circle than ever before.

With the lost war defeat, however, the starting point for implementation changed significantly. Although in the period between 1918 and 1920 the treatment of the nationalities, especially the Germans, had fundamentally changed in a positive direction, the practice in minority policy—which began at the end of 1919 but came to the fore decisively from 1920 onward—meant a major contrast and a return to the old ethnopolitical traditions of the prewar period.<sup>5</sup>

In the realization of the Bleyer program, the youth became a priority at the latest in the second half of the 1920s. In the following it is worth analyzing this generational change, its relevance, and its foundations. While always maintaining loyalty to the Hungarian state, the efforts of Bleyer and his companions to prevent the linguistic and cultural decline of the rural German population soon encountered the problem that the adult generations only half-heartedly accepted this mobilization. Thus, Bleyer and his associates came to the realization that it could only be based on the younger generation. Considering the background of the ethnopolitical context and the framework conditions of a minority existence, the main question is the extent to which

the conditions for mobilization existed, whether youth emancipation provided the basis for it, to what extent was it possible to realize this in both a social and ethnic sense, and which endogenous and exogenous factors played a role in it. Finally, it becomes clear that external guidance established a new form of generational socialization, which realized the dynamization, mobilization, and politicization of German youth and thus Germans much more strongly than before. In the process, a generational history of change emerges: the beginning is represented by the Bleyer generation with the establishment of the group formation process and its modest results, which, however, already target the involvement of the younger generations. The partly mobilized second generation around Franz Basch realized the turnaround already sketched out by Bleyer, then dynamized this process and devoted themselves to bringing in the third generation, which was seen as the basis of effective group formation.

## GERMAN MINORITY EXISTENCE IN HUNGARY AFTER 1920

After the Trianon Peace Treaty, the accusation that ethnic minorities were to be held fundamentally responsible for the immense territorial and other losses became the doctrine of authoritative public opinion. To avoid a similar national trauma, the view at the time was that no further concessions could be made to the minorities. Rather, it was felt that their complete assimilation should be encouraged more than before. After the peace treaty, the sharp decline in the minority population, the almost complete disappearance of the former large, closed settlement areas of the nationalities, and the homogenization effect that could thus be expected, which was now much easier to achieve, provided further inspiration to the process. Consequently, a separate identity or characteristics deviating from the Hungarian one was not tolerated—at least not when the closed world of the village was left behind and the minority entered into interaction with the majority population and its institutions. However, all this also reflected the majority view of the time, according to which a dual bond was not possible. Therefore, the abandonment of German ethnic characteristics, or at least their banishment to the private sphere, became an indispensable demand in order to remain in the Hungarian nation.<sup>6</sup>

This expectation on the part of the public speaking also shaped minority policy and was increasingly felt by the municipal administration, the schools as well as the church superiors, among others, also in the individual municipalities. It became clear that it was primarily the majority population that had problems with the minority.<sup>7</sup>

The Germans, as the largest minority, experienced this attitude and the resulting practice most strongly through minority policy. The concessions of the revolutionary

period and the results of the Ministry of Nationalities, led by Bleyer—a German—who only acted in the short term, possibly triggered more resonance among the majority of the German population of Hungary, who accepted the integrity of the country, which strengthened the sense of contrast even more. It followed that this minority could understandably articulate its protest against the negative effects of the aforementioned policy most loudly and thus most unpleasantly for the state.

Being a minority or belonging to a different ethnic group is generally perceived as constricting when the majority tries to restrict the existing space of the minority and manipulate the ethnic identity of the minority.<sup>8</sup> The minority sees this state of affairs as a violation. If it has sufficient power, then there is the possibility that it will pursue a grievance policy with which it sets in motion a vicious circle that further antagonizes the majority population and thus generates further defiance and demands from the minority.<sup>9</sup> This kind of violated relationship gradually integrates itself into the identity of the respective minority in such a way that the given negative situation is projected both into the past and into the future, while one tries to change it in one's own favor in the present.<sup>10</sup> Similar processes can be observed in the case of the majority society. By making this situation conscious and transforming it into a mobilization energy, it can play a crucial role for protecting the characteristics of minorities.

The further decline of the minorities' position was not a slogan plucked out of thin air. Nevertheless, the treatment of the school question sprang from general discontent to such an extent that it lent itself as a pillar of mobilization. The aim was not only to provide the rising generations with a better school education, but also to close the gaps in the social structure of the German minority. An intellectual layer was to be created that could cultivate the German identity, thus representing the ethnic interests of the Germans against the intolerant Hungarian ethnopolitics.

Despite Hungarian-language teaching, the closed, majority German communities were not yet particularly affected by this homogenization effort. The language change only began after the war in those settlements.<sup>11</sup> The voices that emphasized the heavy burden of the German school question wanted means to justify the ends. As a kind of *ultima ratio*, they prophesied the loss of the language as a harbinger of the loss of the entire nation. Such statements as "In Paks, for example, even now the Swabians can speak neither German nor Hungarian"<sup>12</sup> or "In Somogy county the 40-year-olds can no longer speak German and if you give them a German prayer book or a German newspaper, they stand in front of it like a cow in front of a new gate" were obviously among the statements used to stir up sentiment, but they pointed out that these exemplary phenomena could be instrumentalized in this way.<sup>13</sup>

However, it was not difficult to make the schools a primary part of the public discourse, since new problems had already been raised in this context immediately after the revolutionary period. The pushing back of minority schools—a phenomenon

that had been almost universal during the period of dualism—came back on the agenda. This effort was made even more conspicuous by the fact that in the immediate postwar period, especially under the long-lasting foreign domination, it had been possible in several places to convert schools into German schools. Now—after it had been decided that the municipalities would remain under Hungarian sovereignty—these were to be turned into Hungarian teaching institutions almost immediately. This is what happened, for example, in case of the village Elek,<sup>14</sup> where the school remained German under Romanian occupation, and in numerous municipalities in Baranya County during the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian occupation. Thus, by the school year 1921/1922, out of the 92 minority schools with a pupil population of 11,610, only 58 remained, and provided education in their mother tongue for only 7,506 pupils. This number declined steadily in the following years (53 schools with 825 pupils in 1922/23, 9 schools with 239 pupils in 1923/24). Therefore, within a very short time, the proportion of minority schools fell by 85 percent, while the number of pupils fell by 97 percent. The loss could be compensated to some extent by the fact that the government had already established mixed schools by this time. These were to accommodate the majority of pupils (5,380 pupils) attending mother-tongue classes.<sup>15</sup>

The well-known Decree No. 4800/1923, which introduced three types of schools, eased the situation to some extent.<sup>16</sup> After 1927, the government then showed a greater willingness to convert a considerable proportion of the type-C schools into mixed-language type-B schools by the end of the decade.<sup>17</sup> However, the implementation of this intention was only rudimentary—although this time Bleyer was personally very confident, progress was noticeable until 1928, but was then followed by stagnation.<sup>18</sup>

It would be wrong, however, to think that the lack of type-A schools would have brought mobilizing energies; for the increase in type-C schools, however, this was true. However, it says much more that even in 1932 less than 10 percent (6,109 persons) of school-age children of German nationality attended a type-A school, and about a quarter of them (15,200 persons) were educated in a type-B school.<sup>19</sup> It is obvious that, despite economic awareness and the intention to master the Hungarian language, these numbers bore no relation to the needs of the German minority. At the beginning of the 1920s, the government commissioner of German speakers in Hungary already counted at least a dozen cases where the population complained because the mother tongue was not taught. This shows that this need was already clearly expressed on behalf of the minority community. Thus, they asked for the problem to be solved or for the number of lessons to be increased. While it was possible to ensure the teaching of the Hungarian language in German communities, it did not happen even once in the opposite case.<sup>20</sup>

The situation was no better in the kindergarten: in 1929/1930, 13 out of the 12,500 kindergartens were German-speaking.<sup>21</sup> The same was true for the middle and high

schools, which were practically nonexistent in regard of minority language education: a total of 1.2 percent of the high school graduates, and only 0.3 percent of the students were of German nationality.<sup>22</sup> “The intention of the leaders of the Germans to keep the intellectual leadership in the hands of the Germans will not succeed with the strength of the assimilation process, because the overwhelming part of German youth who attend high school will become so Hungarian in language and feeling by the end of their schooling, that they will not want to know anything about Germanness as a nationality”—was how the demographer Alajos Kovács, head of the Central Statistical Office, who praised this process, summed up the situation in 1936.<sup>23</sup> There were just as many difficulties with textbooks and teachers.<sup>24</sup>

Another vulnerable point was the mother tongue in religious life. In the case of the church schools, it was up to the decision—often supported from below—of the highest dignitaries, the bishops and archbishops, to what extent they were prepared to go beyond ecclesiastical autonomy and guarantee mother-tongue teaching for the Germans in the elementary schools (mostly they were not prepared to do so). However, the language in which services were held was usually decided locally. Although there were more than one hundred German-majority villages, the use of the German language was steadily pushed into the background in this context as well.<sup>25</sup>

## CREATING A UNIFIED GROUP OF GERMANS

All in all, Bleyer correctly recognized that the time of an ethnicity without a group<sup>26</sup> was over and that the Germans in Hungary could only avoid further erosion if they united as a group. Bleyer only saw a chance for preserving German identity, if it was possible to rise above individual orientation, and let the Swabians of the regions of Bakony, the surroundings of Budapest, Baranya, and other areas become Germans. However, the German population had to be formed into a group that until then had no consciousness of cohesion nationwide, but only had a regional identity. In addition to territorial delimitation, the Germans were characterized by different origins, different cultural backgrounds, and different customs and dialects. Since the national “awakening” among the Germans in Hungary began relatively late, from the middle of the nineteenth century, and the process of group formation only got underway at the turn of the century,<sup>27</sup> the political, linguistic, and cultural unification at the beginning of the twentieth century did not show any significant results.

At the same time, Bleyer had a vision of a more modern identity management in which the group could be equated with the help of a common press product. Here he referred to the *Sonntagsblatt*, first published in 1921, as the first component of group formation, in which German traditions, everyday life, reading habits, and religious

sentiments were expressed. Furthermore, Bleyer's vision built on a nationwide group organization, the Hungarian German People's Education Association (Ungarländischer Deutscher Volksbildungsverein, UDV), supraregional events such as the annual Schwabenball (Swabian Ball) from 1925, long-term economic cooperatives, and youth organizations.

After much hesitation the organization that extended beyond the German settlement areas as the most important institutional framework was then finally founded in 1923. However, the cultural UDV, which operated under the influence and supervision of the government from 1924 onward, could by no means be regarded as an autonomous organization of the Germans. The association itself was unable to equip the representation of the interests of the Germans in Hungary with the appropriate effectiveness. At the local level, this situation was compensated by the minority associations to a certain extent. Reading circles, singing societies, and groups where people met for handicrafts and spinning still existed in many German communities.<sup>28</sup>

Nevertheless, in all this, the actors and organizations that had set themselves the goal of preserving German ethnicity only ever came to the conclusion that of the three pillars of their program, only the nationwide press organ, the *Sonntagsblatt*, functioned relatively undisturbed, while the school question continued to remain unresolved and the *Volksbildungsverein* also was unable to operate effectively. Bleyer and his circle gradually came to realize that their activities could not be successful without the commitment of the youth, so that within the group organization one of the subgroup formations at the same time had outstanding importance in regard of the growing generations, who were to be preserved for Germanness.

In the memorandum compiled in 1930 at the request of the general secretary of the European Nationalities Congress, Ewald Ammende, Bleyer already names several points that clearly signaled the priority of youth: beyond the school question, among others, the obstacles to religious instruction, the language of worship, and the activities of the UDV, as well as the long, drawn out approval of the Suevia student organization,<sup>29</sup> the Hungarian state youth *Levente*,<sup>30</sup> and the obstruction of relations with the German Reich are mentioned as the most urgent problems.<sup>31</sup>

## PRECONDITIONS FOR THE EMANCIPATION, MOBILIZATION, AND POLITICIZATION OF YOUTH

Until the second half of the twentieth century, it was by no means a widespread view that the independence, personal responsibility, and participation of children and young

people in public affairs was desirable, that is, that their role as actors should be recognized.<sup>32</sup> Although this was not the case in Hungary between the wars, it was at that time that the need to deal with children and young people as a separate social subculture arose for the first time. After the peace treaty of Trianon, the intention was to integrate the youth—adapted to their age group—into the national strategy. They were expected to act as carriers of the newly formulated national interests. Hungary's authoritarian system was marked by the Trianon trauma inherited from the period of dualism and the minority policy burdened by the peace treaty. Now those in the system wanted to maintain the prioritization of state, national politics, and national interests, which were above all, as well as the omnipotence and validity of the conservative, national, Christian political side representing this, through the complete appropriation of the youth. Therefore, the political elite showed no interest in independent youth emancipation, which could have escaped their supervision if necessary.

However, the realization of the strategy was quite immature. In the already existing youth organizations, above all in the Hungarian Scout Association, a kind of elitist youth education continued to be conducted for the most part, although the organization of petty bourgeois and peasant youth was already underway.<sup>33</sup> The newly founded Levente movement could have provided a balance, but by the end of the 1920s, it was still far from being in a position to take the more significant part of the youth under its wing.<sup>34</sup> There were hardly any experts available who understood the youth, as evidenced by the recruitment of teachers for the Levente organization or their further training, which was still in a very initial stage.

The extracurricular activities of pupils in associations were practically always viewed with suspicion by the Hungarian state. For example, they could under no circumstances be members of organizations that also included adults, and the foundation and work of youth organizations were strictly supervised by the Ministry of Culture and Education.<sup>35</sup> Accordingly, there were not many signs of youth emancipation in Hungary. Of course, the government showed no interest in it either, nor did the social and political elite behind it. Apart from the scouts and church youth organizations, which bundled the elite,<sup>36</sup> and the Levente movement, which gradually absorbed the masses, did not tolerate any other competing youth organizations. These concerned youth organizations that organized themselves on an ethnic basis also possibly undermined the abovementioned intentions in the first place. This was already indicated by the fact that the Suevia was consistently forced to carry out German youth work without approved statutes, tolerated illegality, and pushed to the periphery.

In the mirror of this, the question arises as to whether there was at all an inclination toward emancipation among Hungarian German youth that could have served as a foundation for these ethnic mobilization attempts, to what extent the German youth in Hungary during this time perceived the aspirations of Hungarian minority politics

themselves at all, whether they criticized them, considered them an instance that restricted their own lives, and whether they intended to counter this with some kind of alternative. This inner youth emancipation should immediately have a double character: Emancipate themselves within the ethnic group, that is, break new ground against the passive Bleyer generation, and on the other hand, emancipate themselves from the majority nation and the Hungarian ethnopolitics of its youth organizations (Levente, Scouts). It was therefore a question of social emancipation on the one hand and ethnic emancipation on the other. However, it was unclear to what extent the conditions for this existed. Another explanation is that it was an activism, again, that was only due to the minority elite, which became increasingly aware of this problem from the end of the nineteenth century.

It was unfavorable that the youth came into focus at a time when the group formation of the Germans was still developing, results were only partially apparent, and, above all, their permanence was uncertain. Thus two processes overlapped. This was a disadvantage, especially regarding foundations and stability, since political mobilization and group formation among the Germans in Hungary could not be successfully realized without the youth.

In the broader social framework, there was little sensitivity to such a complex emancipation. For a long time, there was no organizationally effective intelligentsia, or where it existed—in the cities—it was assimilated. In the countryside, the very modest village intelligentsia tended to be limited to preserving long-standing conditions. That is the reason why there was no social and political movement worth mentioning. There was therefore no inner urge, no inner energy to be mobilized. The old order and traditional spaces preserved old structures, old hierarchies. The dividing lines determined by wealth, age, and gender were complemented by ethnic hierarchies in multiethnic villages.

Everyone had their anchored position in the community. Children created their own worlds for themselves because games and social connections were present, but they only established themselves on the fringes of village life and the adult world, not in their independence. Thus, from the symbiosis of the world of labor and the world of children raised a village youth culture that remained characteristic in Hungary until the interwar period, and only slowly began to crumble due to the phenomena of modernity. In the disciplined social hierarchy, the children and youths occupied a fixed place. It was a world that was predictable in advance, but at the same time offered prospects.

The local civil organizations did not function in this rural environment in the sense of an emancipatory tradition, but as a force that maintained order and discipline. In addition, church or religious organizations were in the majority, especially in the communities around Budapest where numerous youth organizations of this kind existed.<sup>37</sup> Only in the capital could a certain interest be observed, which was expressed in the

Suevia. However, this was also limited to the age group over eighteen. A supraregional, especially nationwide organization of any kind was alien. An organized youth would have transgressed these traditions and, with its regularity, would have burst through these bounds.

Thus, there was no alienation in the rural milieus that would have triggered the process of emancipation. It is no coincidence that this applies more to the cities. Not differently in Hungary, where the idea of youth emancipation and the adoption of the Wandervogel ethos<sup>38</sup> appeared primarily in the urban Saxon area, as well as in some towns in the Spiš and Banat regions, that is, in areas that no longer belonged to Hungary after 1920. It follows that in the area of the so-called Trianon-Hungary, where the remaining Germans now wanted to organize themselves into a group and wanted to establish a common collective identity, there were—apart from an extremely narrow layer of university youth—no youth emancipatory traditions whatsoever.

So an endogenous process of youth emancipation could not be expected. It is therefore no coincidence that an artificial influence was needed in the area of German youth; the idea of emancipation had to be brought to them from outside. This alone gave rise to doubts that this was really emancipation. At times there may have been a willingness to do so, but this really only became apparent at the beginning of the 1930s. This means that other factors—to be described in a moment—were necessary to raise this readiness. All things considered, it can be said that possibly germs of youth emancipation began to appear, so that an exogenous acceleration of this process became necessary and ultimately a guided youth emancipation began, which precisely pushed the normally existing, inner, sovereign character gradually into the background. The model came—for lack of one of its own—from Germany, of course, but in this way, it was also not possible to avoid the mindset flowing in from there.

All in all, neither the mobilization of the Germans nor that of the youth was in good shape. Nevertheless, the ongoing crisis narrative—supplemented by the expansion of communication possibilities, the loosening of village communities, the expansion of mobility, and the development of infrastructure, which brought people closer together—did not remain without effect. However, all this could not provide the re-sounding force that would have led to a real and lasting success of German group formation. In any case, it was beneficial that the fruits of the UDV's work as well as Hungarian minority policies, which also affected individuals, made the minority existence more tangible. With the prime ministers Gyula Gömbös (1932–36), Béla Imrédy (1938–39) and Pál Teleki (1939–41)—to mention only the top level—the upper class, the aristocrats and notables dependent on the state, who experienced the dawn of the new era much more intensively, and had already warned against pan-Germanism in the 1920s, increasingly came to the fore.<sup>39</sup> This phenomenon, coupled with the social problems resulting from the world economic crisis, caused faith in the old system to waver and

led to a certain receptivity to organization; yet the development of agriculture and its industrialization had already indicated this. Although the economic crisis affected the Germans less overall (since the price of more specialized products had fallen less than that of grain<sup>40</sup>), the lower strata of the German population suffered more; after 1920 they already clearly made up the bulk of the German agricultural population.<sup>41</sup> The economic restructuring, the industrialization and its absorption power, the concentration of property that had been visible for decades and the multiplication of small livelihoods, the increased mobility as a result of the latter phenomena dissolved the economic system, solidarity, and slowly the village communities in their old form, which had functioned so excellently in the past.<sup>42</sup>

However, a more advantageous constellation could not have presented itself in order for the ethnic explanation for the crisis to be accepted by much broader circles than before. Germans could be made to believe that the economic slump was not only a consequence of the crisis, but also a result of ethnic differences. And if one articulated alongside this the other—often long existing—problems such as the behavior of the authorities, the rigidity of the churches, the problems of the school question, the Magyarization of names, and others, in this way a credible explanation was given that one could only compensate for all this with ethnic self-organization. The centrally directed mobilization that this entailed now required a decision: Should one go down the path of ethnicization or stay on the former path?

Mobilization also required politicization, an awareness of the political effects that affected the ethnic group. The period before World War I showed that a receptivity to the world of politics presented itself primarily when the economic positions of the Germans were shaken. Due to the Great Depression, the economic situation was more severe than ever before. However, a sustained political receptivity would have required a generational learning process, a sustained process of politicization. But this was not the case; on the contrary, there was a strong headwind. A perceptible receptivity to politics was only evident among the Germans who lived in the vicinity of Budapest and cultivated lively relations with the only true urban milieu in Hungary, the capital. Here, both social democracy and the extreme right-wing Arrow Cross movement had a nonnegligible base in the minority circle. At the national level, this process only began from the beginning of the 1930s.

As is well known, political socialization begins at a very young age, with childhood and adolescence being definitive. During these periods of life, the political personality of the individual develops at the same time as general socialization.<sup>43</sup> In this case, too, the family is of central importance. A German child, however, received hardly any impulses from this direction, which is why politicization had to come from outside. It is questionable, however, to what extent this could be effective with an apolitical family heritage. Already in the nineteenth century, political socialization was promoted

beyond the given bourgeois development by the fact that social explanations were increasingly less sought in religion. At the same time, however, a strong faith—as was characteristic of the Germans in Hungary—inhibited modern political socialization. In this apolitical attitude, the Germans also did not accept political Catholicism as an offer, whereby this possibility was also out of the question for group formation because of the confessional division.

In Hungary, German youth also found themselves in a difficult situation because the institutions involved in political socialization did not reinforce each other, as they rather exerted a precisely opposite effect, or caused the influences to cancel each other out, which further intensified the youths' orientation disorders and sometimes caused radicalization.<sup>44</sup>

The modernization that was taking place in the socioeconomic sphere and the change in the framework conditions led to a review of the norms, the way of life, and the value systems, which in the case of the Germans in Hungary was expressed for the first time in the final phase of the Bleyer era (until his death in 1933) and then followed in the *Volksdeutsche Kameradschaft* (VK) established within the UDV, and lastly in the *Volksbund*. These two organizations wanted to spark not an ethnic but also a political consciousness among the members of the German minority—especially among young people. The young comrades and the *Volksbund* had to pass on completely new norms, knowledge, values, and political behavior patterns that were clearly different from the apolitical attitude of the previous era.<sup>45</sup>

## SUBGROUP FORMATION

Within the group formation, which was supposed to guarantee and promote the preservation of German identity, the preservation of the identity of German youth had thus become a central issue for Jakob Bleyer. Only the development of an ethnic German intelligentsia could guarantee the long-term future of the Germans in Hungary.<sup>46</sup> There were two fundamental keys to this: a German school and a movement that also integrated the youth. It is quite understandable that the aspirations of the minorities and the ideas of the majority society collided most strongly in these two areas.

A memorandum from the beginning of 1928 demanded the temporary organization of the oldest age groups of young people: "Official permission is requested that the youth belonging to the German minority of Hungary may unite at colleges and universities in associations with approved statutes."<sup>47</sup> This sought the legalization of the *Suevia*, which had been operating for years without approved statutes. Although this demand did not challenge the right of the *Levente* organization to educate youth between the ages of twelve and twenty-one, it also expected a concession there in the area of language use.

The organization of the younger generation still seemed like a pipe dream at that time, but nobody thought that this would change until 1941. However, the *Volksbildungsverein* could only have achieved modest success even if it had reached the larger part of the youth on the basis of its statutes (the age of membership was twenty-four). This was because the Hungarian administration prevented the UDV from addressing the entire German minority on a territorial level, which made its work within the legal framework more difficult.<sup>48</sup> In view of the Hungarian minority policy, which was more lenient upward but severely restrictive downward, it is not surprising that the UDV was able to achieve the greatest weight in the areas east of the Danube. However, in the strongholds where most Germans lived, such as in Budapest and the surrounding area, and in southern Transdanubia (Swabian Turkey<sup>49</sup>), the result was disappointing from the UDV's perspective.<sup>50</sup>

The UDV tried to compensate for this unfavorable situation by reviving its relations with Germany. Thus, students usually completed two semesters at a German university, but young people who did not attend a college or university were also sent to Germany for training. These relations probably remained at the usual level throughout the twenties, until 1929. With the death of Foreign Minister Stresemann, Germany's more energetic foreign policy and the Great Depression seemed to indicate that Germany was indeed becoming a more important factor in the region than in the previous decade. This also promised advantages for Hungary from an economic and revisionist point of view, as long as it was not accompanied by the revival of relations between the Germans in Hungary and the Reich Germans. Presumably, from this point on, the view of everything German sharpened. The deputy state secretary of the Ministry of the Interior was already indignant in this regard in 1929:

If the German cultural associations had no ulterior motives with these economic study trips, then they could also carry out these study trips within the country, in the national territory, because no doubt they would also find plenty of material here at home that could be studied. But the young people sent to Germany can, within the framework of a well-organized study trip and attentive guest management, have the Greater German ideas hammered into them in such a way that when they return home they will become the champions of the increasingly more transparent aspirations of the cultural associations, which are probably no less dangerous than the national aspirations of the Wallachians in the peace years.<sup>51</sup>

The former Prime Minister István Bethlen (from 1921 to 1931) also dealt with this question, and Miklós Gömbös, later an important figure in the Loyalty Movement, devoted an extensive article to this phenomenon in 1930.<sup>52</sup> In it, he drew attention to the fact that the intention here was to "kindle a separate German patriotism and a bond and

love for the Greater German homeland." In Bleyer's "manipulations" there was a danger "that a nationality would develop out of the German-speaking Hungarians, just as the Wallachians and the Saxons in Transylvania, the Pan-Slavs in Upper Hungary and in the Batschka, a nationality that would join with every thought, with every feeling, with every nerve fibre, the spiritual community of a huge foreign people, of a foreign state, and would also make its territorial aspirations its own. It was further stated that "one almost shudders at how far the hairy hands of the native wandering boys reach!"<sup>53</sup> Moreover, Gömbös also became aware of the fact that "influenced by these native wandering boys," young farmers traveled to Germany to study German agriculture, while there were world-famous model farms in Tolna County: "What poisonous seeds these young men bring home in their satchels, everyone can imagine!"<sup>54</sup> Through relations with Germany and participation in the European Congress of Nationalities, the idea of ties to Germany, and the German national community certainly took on ever greater space in the UDV in the late 1920s and early 1930s.<sup>55</sup>

Before the beginning of the 1930s, the German minority sought a peaceful agreement with the Hungarian government with every move it made, but in most cases the government did not honor this solidarity. If it did, it was not completely and with conviction, because it did not consider minority politics as an area that required interaction between the two parties. Instead, it maintained a monopoly over this policy field and related decisions.<sup>56</sup> At the same time, the German movement expected nothing from the government in this period other than the preservation of its language and culture, that is, it did not doubt the supremacy of the Hungarians.

The government saw it the same way. In a memorandum of November 1930, the government itself admitted that the predominantly German agrarian population had no ambitions because it considered their political representation guaranteed by the existing parties, which were not organized on an ethnic basis and were mainly supraregional.<sup>57</sup> The government also saw no real "danger" in the UDV. Despite this insight, the decision makers did not feel it necessary to actively counter the phobia of pan-Germanism that sprang from wounded national self-confidence and burst to the surface much more strongly than before 1918. Rather, it played this card, if necessary, in the interest of its own political ends.<sup>58</sup> Another memorandum analyzing Weimar foreign policy, written at the same time, came to the disturbing conclusion that while there was no official foreign policy intervention to fear, the activities of the German Schutzvereine, which spoke of and supported the idea of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, were already having negative effects in neighboring countries. The scholarships, excursion groups, above all the *Wandervögel*, the book and magazine programs, all harbored a "danger." In the case of the Germans in Hungary, however, one spoke only of "a kind of sympathy" in this regard, which one thought could be balanced out in cooperation with Berlin.<sup>59</sup>

Then, a year later, when Bleyer drew the conclusions from his experiences and resigned from the leadership of the UDV, he wanted to make it clear in several statements to everyone concerned that the Germans in Hungary would have to choose between complete assimilation and a more confrontational, more radical policy—the latter possibly even more strongly supported by Germany. The questions relating to German youth, however, arose again in an unchanged form. These topics concerned the use of the German language in the Levente movement while retaining Hungarian as the language of command, the authorization of the Suevia, and the legitimate granting of German scholarships to students from Hungary.<sup>60</sup>

Bleyer was also already taking steps toward more effective identity management, which led to a rapprochement with Germany in view of Hungary's inability to compromise. In his search for the right path, he created certain pillars, such as the stimulation of scientific research regarding the Hungarian Germans—both in Hungary and in the German Reich. To this end, he established, among other things, the journal *Deutsch-ungarische Heimatblätter*, founded an economic office within the UDV for the economic activity of the Germans in Hungary, and at the same time for the deepening of their economic relations with the Reich. Moreover, he also supported the targeted use of German tourism to promote the Hungarian-German movement.<sup>61</sup> The institutionalization of the new direction took shape in the official founding of the German Working Group around the *Sonntagsblatt*, which had hitherto been considered an informal forum, in August 1931. Under Bleyer's chairmanship, the new work program of the UDV, its strategy and tactics vis-à-vis the Hungarian government were worked out here in regular meetings.<sup>62</sup> The dynamization of the youth played an eminent role in this program.

This process of change was initiated at the beginning of the 1930s by the younger generation that had grown up in the 1920s, who held membership in the Suevia, took advantage of support opportunities from the Reich, and then set the tone within the *Volksbildungsverein*. The new generation, led by Franz Basch after Bleyer's death, no longer saw any possibility of reaching a compromise with the Hungarian government due to the failures of the previous decade and took the position that further erosion of the German identity could only be avoided by strengthening an identity completely detached from the Hungarian one. For this young generation, therefore, only an open struggle against the Hungarian assimilation efforts, securing their own ethnic preservation, was legitimate, for which they expected support without hesitation from the German Reich, which in the meantime had become National Socialist.

With this incipient change of course, club life was actually revitalized. Following the example of the Reich German *Wandervögel* (and later *Hitlerjungen* in such disguise), the young potentates flooded the German areas of Hungary. With regular youth courses, they wanted to exhibit the cadre of a future youth organization, the

quasi-third generation. The liveliness and real presence of the German movement with large demonstrations, increased visits from the German Reich, and diverse events were the consequences.

In the summer of 1934, the members of Suevia visited the German settlements in five groups of three to six members in order to make an analysis of the situation of the German population and the possibilities for its dynamization. Based on this information, they sent an extensive report to Berlin describing the desperate situation: lack of language skills, attitude of the local authorities, deterioration of the financial situation, indifference, changing acceptance of the UDV, and “madjarising” influence of the schools and churches.<sup>63</sup>

The situation assessment also provided valuable insights for youth work. Since the UDV was not suitable for organizing young people due to the age limit set in its statutes and the authorities would have prevented this anyway, the main key to success was seen in influencing the existing Hungarian youth organizations in the sense of German interests. They saw the activities of Ludwig Leber in Törökbálint as an example worthy of imitation, who had succeeded in developing the Journeymen’s Association, which had several hundred members, the main venue for looking after the German population. Youth work based on a solid German institutional framework was not yet considered possible due to the conditions in the countryside, but the development of informal singing and playing groups was all the more so. They were then able to pass on the mission locally by teaching the young people songs and dances, having fun with them, and encouraging them to use the German language.<sup>64</sup>

The aim was to make the ambitions of the new movement clear to everyone. Among the tasks and goals, the program to create a “new type of youth” had become an absolute priority during these months. The women and young girls welcomed the initiative and showed a willingness to work together that seemed to justify the need for change. The first youth course took place in Kéty from December 4 to December 7, 1934,<sup>65</sup> and proved to be a model for the methodology of subsequent events of this kind. The increased self-confidence was reflected in the otherwise correct statement by Basch, who personally opened the event, that the statutes—despite earlier prohibitions—allowed such courses to be held and that he envisaged many more such occasions in the future. He also addressed the youth, exhorting them to prepare “with loyalty and honour, like true Germans, for the great tasks that await them in their struggles.”<sup>66</sup>

The organization was relatively “unstable,” with constant mood swings, and remained so throughout. The upswing was characterized by more consistent use of the German language, activism, a more defiant attitude among the younger members, and in some places the use of external elements borrowed from National Socialist Germany; in the downswing, the opposite became dominant in the settlements. In the struggle between the two competing currents of the UDV, however, the new current increasingly

prevailed. However, it was precisely at the time when Basch and his *Volksdeutsche Kameradschaft* (*Volksdeutsche Comradeship*) were being pushed into illegality that the seventeen-point program (*The Wishes of the German Movement in Hungary*) crystallized, eleven points of which were clearly related to the youth.<sup>67</sup>

In the years 1936 to 1937, the *Volksdeutsche Kameradschaft* exposed itself only cautiously, and its members organized themselves and corresponded in secret. They visited local leaders in person and spent only a short time in one place. The youth organization, however, set out on the road to institutionalization. Treating the age group as a separate unit within the comradeship under the name “*Jungkameradschaft*” (*Young Comradeship*) was the first organizational initiative.

Like the comrades, the young comrades were more active than ever in organizing, which was shown, among other things, by the fact that they increasingly moved to the countryside, to nine different regions of the country, which shows a more conscious territorial distribution in the organization of work: Hans Christ in Baranya County, Josef Michl in Kakasd, Anton Tafferner in Komárom, Josef Rath in Mosonszentpéter, Stefan Mann in Bácsalmás, Philipp Böss in Mohács and Versend, Anton Gintner in Rátka (*Zemplén County*), Matthias Huber in Siklós, and Stefan Müller in Isztimér.<sup>68</sup> By 1937, the courses had increased in size. The organizers took every opportunity to hold them, be it an agricultural exhibition or a half-price travel offer. With the help of the rotation principle, they were able to train dozens of young people within a few weeks.<sup>69</sup>

Even before the founding of the *Volksbund* (in November 1938), the young comrades were constantly developing and expanding their regionalized and localized activities. This led to the strengthening of the dynamic centers on the territory of Swabian Turkey (*Mágocs, Mekényes, Bikal, Egyházaskozár, Nagyhajmás, Bonyhád-Hidas, Némethbóly, and Palotabozsok*). Starting from these centers, a kind of networking began. Comradeship was most successful in the southern territories during these years. Due to the modest sources available, one can only guess that a similar process took place in the other German regions but on an obviously more modest scale.<sup>70</sup>

After the *Volksdeutsche Kameradschaft* was legalized as the *Volksbund* of the Germans in Hungary against the background of the first revision success (the return of southern Slovakia)—realized with Reich-German help—and as the local groups were founded one after the other, the Young Comrades were now publicly treated as a separate unit. Their local leadership was elected almost everywhere, but without constituting a vertically independent organization within the *Volksbund*. More and more young people joined. The new format brought with it a new community event that had not been possible in previous years.<sup>71</sup>

As the possibility of establishing an independent youth organization seemed to be getting closer, the *Volksbund* planned to organize younger children (under eighteen) to provide new blood for the Young Comradeship.<sup>72</sup> These efforts to organize the youngest

were a sign that the Volksbund was indeed on its way to becoming an inclusive German organization. Without these steps, it was unthinkable that the entire youth organization could be organized later.

In the absence of permission to found a youth organization, youth work during this period concentrated mainly on cultivating German consciousness and further mobilizing youth to exhibit the cadre necessary for the hoped-for founding of a separate youth organization. From the beginning of 1939, the organizational courses, which had been sporadic until then, became a regular feature. Mass events with a high propaganda value also played an important role in the youth organization.<sup>73</sup>

The number of members of the Young Comrades was already considerable by the time the German Youth (DJ) was founded, as the expansion of the Volksbund had apparently increased their numbers to several thousand by 1941.<sup>74</sup> This age group later formed the oldest age group of the DJ, which, after further preparatory measures, was made possible by the so-called Vienna Ethnic Groups Agreement and then took place in June 1941.

## CONCLUSION

The old generation around Jakob Bleyer realized in the second half of the 1920s at the latest that the group formation they were aiming for could not be successful without engaging the youth. However, while the older youth generation (over eighteen years of age) had an organizational framework in the Suevia, drawing on older traditions and developing their own subgroup consciousness, the younger generation completely lacked the foundations for emancipatory segregation.

However, with the economic stagnation and crisis, as well as through the situation in the schools, the use of language in the masses and church services, the practice in the Levente, and other factors, a feeling of social unease arose. At first, this gripped especially the poorer, more economically threatened part of the Germans, as well as the young people who had been disappointed by the once stable perspective. They in particular were receptive to seeking appeasing explanations and solutions outside the strict rules of the previous order. This was the point at which Bleyer and his followers cleverly gave an ethnic coloring to the multitude of problems affecting Germans. They promised a significant section of the Germans that a united stand would lead to success. They succeeded in eliminating the view that the unchanged state represented a value in itself. Later, a part of the upper classes also showed themselves open to the idea that traditional socioeconomic status should no longer take precedence over ethnicity.

This situation contributed to an increasing sensitivity among young people to reflect on their own situation and perspectives, to develop an alternative to the behavior of the

mostly passive parental generation, and thus the seeds of youth emancipation appeared. However, these were not strong enough, so they had to be strengthened and steered from the outside. Since the negative census results of 1930 (a 15 percent decline in the number of Germans) made it clear that the previous way of preserving the minority was not enough, there was no time left for youth emancipation to mature. After Bleyer took stock at this time and addressed the insufficient results of the decade, he set the course for a new era in which group formation was to be advanced by more effective means.

At the beginning of the 1930s, the age group of twenty- to forty-year-olds, that is, the second (Suevia) generation, entered the stage. This group was formed around Franz Basch. The younger generation saw fewer and fewer opportunities to cooperate with the Hungarian government because of the failure of the German movement in the past. In addition, they were of the opinion that further erosion of German identity could only be stopped by bonding with the German national community. This meant that for the younger age group, the only legitimate identity was one that was openly professed, one that opposed Hungarian aspirations and fought a fierce battle for the preservation of their own ethnic group. Help was clearly expected from Germany, which in the meantime had become National Socialist and—beyond helping to build up its own identity—had further plans with regard to the German minority in Hungary.

By wanting to dynamize, mobilize, and politicize the whole minority, this second generation was already appealing to the third generation, which was indispensable for the sustainability of group formation. With this change of direction came an upsurge in associational life, as the members of the Suevia and later the *Volksdeutsche Kameradschaft* flooded the regions of the country inhabited by Germans, following the example of the earlier German *Wandervögel*. Together with the young people who came from the Reich, they conveyed the feeling of permanent presence and radiated an inexhaustible energy. The intention was to bring the burgeoning emancipation of the youth to fruition by artificially directing it from the outside, which sometimes meant strong interference. This went so far that the exogenous effect increasingly overran the process and destroyed the endogenous emancipatory initiatives in order to centrally control youth emancipation and carry out generational socialization. In this way, youth were once again pushed into the role of object.

The *Volksdeutsche Kameradschaft* and its successor from 1938 onward, the *Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn* (People's Association of Germans in Hungary), chose a completely different, energetic, and radical tactic, aiming at a claim to leadership that would encompass the life of the Hungarian Germans in a complex manner because only in this way was it considered possible to realize the ethnic and political program aimed at dissimulation and group formation, and at the establishment of a new folk identity. They wanted to embody and replace as an integrating organization the former peasant, rifle, and fire brigade associations of the men, the rosary associations of the

women, and the various church organizations themselves. The Volksbund wanted to be a comprehensive, general organization that was practically synonymous with Germanness.

Organizing activity also sought to reshape rigid, local social conventions, as the Volksdeutsche Kameradschaft and the Volksbund organized local communities on an ethnic basis and by segregating youth into new subcommunities. Thus they—though not everywhere and with varying degrees of effectiveness and contrary to the aspirations of the state and the churches—drew all three instances of socialization into its sphere of power, such as the educational institutions, the village communities/families, and its own youth organization. This was an epoch-making change in the life of Hungarian Germans, eliminating the anomaly of mutually negating institutions of socialization.

The subordination of all spheres of life to the ethnic point of view undoubtedly had to shatter the long-existing hierarchies, milieus, and spheres of life. Despite the purposes of uniformity, this led to a threefold disintegration: The disintegration of the balance in the multiethnic local communities, segregation within the ethnic group, but also among the generations.

On the whole, this new direction was confirmed by the results that, despite the division of Germanness into two parts, one part—among them the second and third generations—became more active, acted more self-confidently, became clearer about its own interests, used the German language more intensively, lived its culture more sovereignly, even if this was done in a very politicized way, in the hope that in time the other part would also join in. All in all, it was achieved that the Germans confessed their ethnic otherness as a manifested ethnicity, their “we-group” not only formed as a reaction to the aspirations and practice of Hungarian ethnopolitics, but also constructed itself from within.

Parallel to this, the Volksbund also made progress on the school issue. Although this remained slow in the original national territory, where only two new elementary schools could be opened by 1942, and twenty-eight were in preparation for the school year 1942–1943, of which only six were approved, in the territories regained through the revision successes (in the Batschka and in northern Transylvania) the organization was able to take over an intact German school network. The development of the secondary schools was more impressive (grammar schools in Budapest and Pécs, citizen schools in Hidas, Baja, Bóly, Nagykároly, two grammar schools and two citizen schools in Transylvania and in the Batschka, as well as an agricultural school in Futak).

This actually brought about a dynamization, mobilization, and politicization of the Hungarian-German youth, now also of the third generation, which then also received its own long-awaited organization in 1941. The German movement established a much more conspicuous activity and thus also increasingly led to collisions with the Hungarian state and administrative apparatus, which was decisive for the ethnic revival, the results of which, however, were also largely destroyed again by the total subordination to the needs of the Reich in the 1940s.

## NOTES

1. Jakab Bleyer, "A hazai németiség," *Budapesti Szemle* 169, no. 483 (1917): 428–41.
2. Márta Fata, "Bleyer Jakab nemzetiségi koncepciója és politikája (1917–1933)," *Regio* 5, no. 1 (1994): 175–90; Hedwig Schwind, *Jakob Bleyer: Ein Vorkämpfer und Erwecker des ungarländischen Deutschtums* (Südostdeutsches Kulturwerk, 1960), 12–45; Márta Fata, *Jakob Bleyer, politischer Vertreter der deutschen Minderheit in Ungarn (1917–1933)* (self-published, 1992); Jakob Bleyer, "Die deutsch-ungarische Frage vor dem Parlament," *Sonntagsblatt*, April 1, 1928, p. 1.
3. See Gerhard Seewann, *Geschichte der Deutschen in Ungarn. Band 2: 1860–2006* (Herder Institut, 2012), 173–77.
4. Tamara Scheer, "Language Diversity and Loyalty in the Habsburg Army, 1868–1918" Habilitationsschrift (Wien 2020), 221–63.
5. See more detailed: Zsolt Vitári, "Újkisebbségpolitikaellenérzésekkel. Kisebbségpolitikai irányváltások Magyarországon 1918 és 1920 között," in *Sed intelligere. Tanulmányok a hatvanöt éves Gyarmati György tiszteletére*, ed. Gábor Bánkúti, Krisztina Slachta, and József Vonyó (Kronosz, 2016).
6. Rudolf Weinhold, "Überlegungen zum Problem der Identität am Beispiel der Ungarn-deutschen," in *Nemzetiség—identitás. A IV. Nemzetközi Néprajzi Nemzetiségkutató konferencia előadásai*, ed. Ernő Eperjessy, András Krupa, and Zoltán Ujváry (Ethnica, 1991), 458.
7. Gerhard Seewann, *Ungarndeutsche und Ethnopolitik. Ausgewählte Aufsätze* (Osiris, 2000), 7–10. In the case of Véménd, the presence of a quite significant village intelligentsia also exerted a strong effect, which Bleyer confirmed. Györgyi Bindorffer, "A kettős identitás összehasonlító vizsgálata két magyarországi német településen—Csolnok—Véménd," in *Változatok kettős identitásra. Kisebbségi léthelyzetek és identitásalakzatok a magyarországi horvátok, németek, szerbek, szlovákok, szlovének körében*, ed. Györgyi Bindorffer (Gondolat 2007), 150–52; Loránt Tilkovszky, "A nemzetiségi identitás vállalásának problémái hazánkban a 20. században," in *Nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségek Magyarországon a 20. század végén*, ed. Gábor Sisák (Osiris 2001), 145.
8. András A. Gergely, *Identitás és etnoregionalitás. A kisebbségi identitás történeti és regionális összefüggései Nyugaton és Kelet-Közép-Európában* (MTA PTI, 1996), 11.
9. István Bibó, *Válogatott tanulmányok* (Magvető, 1986).
10. Bibó, *Válogatott tanulmányok*; György Csepeli, *Nemzettudat és érzésvilág* (Múzsák Kiadó 1984); Gergely, *Identitás és etnoregionalitás*, 11.
11. See the example of Véménd. Bindorffer, *A kettős identitás összehasonlító vizsgálata*, 149–150.
12. Franz Basch's speech at the founding meeting of the Tékés local group of the Hungarian

- German People's Education Association on October 7, 1934. See Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Baranya Megyei Levéltára (MNL BaML), IV 401a, Baranya vármegye főispánjának bizalmas iratai, 244/1934.
13. Basch's speech in Véménd. The Chief Magistrate of Pécsvárad District to the Chief Magistrate of Baranya County, Pécsvárad, 10 December 1934. See MNL BaML, IV 401a, Baranya vármegye főispánjának bizalmas iratai, 285/1934.
  14. Thomas Spira, *German-Hungarian Relations and the Swabian Problem. From Károlyi to Gömbös, 1919–1936* (East European Quarterly, 1977), 74.
  15. Spira, *German-Hungarian Relations*, 96–98.
  16. In June 1923, Decree 4800/1923 M. E. No. on the implementation of the obligations undertaken in the Peace Treaty of Trianon for the protection of minorities was adopted, which reaffirmed the equal rights of citizens of different ethnic groups and created the possibility of mother-tongue teaching in state and municipal schools at the request of those concerned. The implementing regulations were issued by the Ministry of Culture (110.478/1923 VKM), which provided for three types of nationality folk schools (A, B, and C) to be chosen from at parents' meetings. In type A, instruction was given in the minority language, with Hungarian taught as a compulsory subject. Type B meant mixed-language teaching. Here, the teaching of science, physics, chemistry, economics, drawing, and needlework was given in the mother tongue. In contrast, the teaching of geography, history, civics, physical education, and the Hungarian language was in Hungarian. At the same time, language and speech lessons, as well as writing, reading, arithmetic, and singing were taught in both languages (Hungarian and mother tongue). In the Type C schools, classes were not held in the mother tongue but in Hungarian, and the minority language was taught as a foreign language. Although reading and writing lessons were held in both languages, the nationality language was degraded to a purely compulsory subject. Béla Bellér, "A nemzetiségi iskolapolitika története Magyarországon a legújabb korban," *Baranyai Művelődés* 17, no. 4 (1973): 11–24.
  17. Spira, *German-Hungarian Relations*, 176.
  18. In 1928 there were forty-nine minority schools of type A (instruction in the minority language), ninety-eight of mixed type B and 316 of Hungarian-language type C (i.e. a total of 436 elementary schools). In comparison, the two following years showed little improvement (1929: 49, 119, 292 = a total of 460 schools; 1930: 47, 134, 273 = a total of 454 schools). The government's promise, on which Bleyer's confidence was based, according to which forty to fifty type C schools were to be transformed into type B schools, was thus not realized; some type A schools even disappeared, and the decline of type C schools was not only based on the transformation into type B, but also on the complete extinction of minority status and the transformation into a Hungarian school. Spira, *German-Hungarian Relations*, 184, 288; Béla Bellér, "Az ellenforradalmi rendszer nemzetiségi politikája a válság küszöbén (1930–1931)," *Századok* 111, no. 2 (1977): 289.

19. G. C. Paikert, *The Danube Swabians. German Populations in Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia and Hitler's Impact on their Patterns* (Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), 52; Ágnes Tóth, "Nationality Education in Hungary 1920–1980," in *National and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary, 1920–2001*, ed. Ágnes Tóth (Social Science Monographs, 2005), 360.
20. Government commissioner of the German Speakers in Hungary. Overview of the proposals arising from the government commissioner's area of responsibility submitted to the Hungarian royal prime minister and of the proposals submitted by the prime minister to the ministers, their implementation and non-implementation, from July 3, 1922 to May 11, 1924. See Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (MOL), K 28, 93 cs., K 28-193-M.E.-1925-C-89.
21. Schwind, *Jakob Bleyer*, 122.
22. Paikert, *The Danube Swabians*, 52–53.
23. Alajos Kovács, *A németek helyzete Csonka-Magyarországon a statisztika megvilágításában* (Hornvánszky Viktor Rt-M. Kir. Udvari Könyvnyomda, 1936), 20.
24. See Spira for more details: *German-Hungarian Relations and the Swabian Problem*, 192–208.
25. Norbert Spannenberger, *Die Katholische Kirche in Ungarn 1918–1939. Positionierung im politischen System und "Katholische Renaissance"* (Franz Steiner Verlag, 2006), 146–47, 151–55.
26. Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without groups* (Harvard University Press, 2004).
27. Gerhard Seewann, "Ungarndeutschtum' als Identitätskonzept und politische Ressource," in *Staat, Loyalität und Minderheiten in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa 1918–1941*, ed. Peter Haslinger and Joachim von Puttkamer (Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007), 99.
28. See Bindorffer, *A kettős identitás összehasonlító vizsgálata*, 135; Seewann, "Ungarndeutschtum' als Identitätskonzept," 104–7.
29. The Association of Swabian/German University Students, founded in 1899, continued its activities after 1918 in the successor states of Austria-Hungary under the name Suevia, in Budapest as Suevia Budapestina. The young intellectuals active in Budapest stood for the preservation of nationality and the emancipation of the older age group of German youth on the new territory. However, this phenomenon remained rather marginal because the German students who went through the Hungarian school system had taken the path of Magyarisation and for the most part stayed away from an organization of a distinctly Hungarian-German character. Officially, the Suevia was founded in Budapest at the end of 1924; the Hungarian government permanently refused to approve its statutes, but it still did not prevent its work. However, many later members of the UDV and the Volksbund came from the Suevia. See Anton Taffnerer, "Ungarndeutsche Studentenvereinigungen unter Jakob Bleyer. Teil I," *Suevia Pannonica. Archiv der Deutschen aus Ungarn* no. 3 (1966): 40–41; Norbert Spannenberger, "Ungarndeutsche akademische Jugend in der Zwischenkriegszeit," *Suevia Pannonica. Archiv der*

- Deutschen aus Ungarn* 15, no. 25 (1997): 41–48; Stefan Steyer, “Treue Bewahrung, tapfere Bewahrung. Erinnerungen,” *Suevia Pannonica. Archiv der Deutschen aus Ungarn* 6, no. 16 (1988): 5–9; Béla Bellér, *A Volksbildungsverein-tól a Volksbundig. A magyarországi németek története 1933–1938* (Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó, 2002), 28.
30. Even before World War I, thought was given to how physical education and the training of young people in arms could be promoted. After isolated and insufficient successes, a means was finally found to create the appropriate foundations with the founding of the National Council for Physical Education (Országos Testnevelési Tanács, OTT). It was here that the system for the military training of youth was worked out, which was finally put into practice from 1921 in the form of the Levente movement (the fact that the Peace Treaty prohibited universal conscription accelerated its realization). School-leaved male youths between the ages of twelve and twenty-one were obliged to take part in regular exercises. Of course, the organization served not only to prepare them for military service, but also to impart a Christian-national value system and at the same time to Magyarize them. In the 1930s, the organization developed into a kind of state youth organization with five hundred to six hundred thousand members. After the introduction of compulsory service in 1939, membership increased to 1,300,000 young people by 1943. In 1943, a Levente section for girls was also established. See Ferenc Gergely and György Kiss, *Horthy leventéi. A Leventeintézmény története* (Kosuth Könyvkiadó, 1976); *Az IHNETOV munkanaplója. Vitéz Bély Alajos vezérezre-des Hadtörténelmi Levéltárban őrzött irataiból*, ed. Róbert Blasszauer (Hadtörténelmi Levéltár—Petit Real Kiadó, 2002), 3–24.
  31. Loránt Tilkovszky, “A magyarországi német mozgalom válságának kibontakozása (1930–1932),” *Somogy megye múltjából* no. 10 (1979): 414.
  32. Ervin Csizmadia, “Mozog-e az ifjúság? Tézisek egy lehetséges ifjúságtérlemezéshez. *Napjaink, Észak-magyarországi irodalmi és kulturális lap* 27, no. 7 (1988), 16; Sándor Karikó, “Az ‘ifjúság’ elvétele és trónra emelése?” *Iskolakultúra* 9, no. 5 (1999), 10.
  33. Ferenc Gergely, *A magyar cserkészlet története* (Göncöl Kiadó, 1989); Gábor Tabajdi and László Szigeti, *Magyar cserkészélet (1910–1948)* (MCSSZ, 2020).
  34. Gergely and Kiss, *Horthy leventéi*, 83–89.
  35. Tamás P. Miklós, “Ifjúsági szerveződések évszázadai’ —gyermek- és ifjúsági szervezetek a XIX–XX. századi Magyarországon,” *Új Pedagógiai Szemle* 47, no. 11 (1997): 35–43.
  36. The scouts and church youth organizations, which tend to attract middle school students, could have offered little opportunity for the German youths—if their cultural characteristics were taken into account—because they were underrepresented among them.
  37. See Jenő Bonomi, *Az egyházi év Budaörs német község nyelvi és szokásanyagában* (Dunántúl Pécsi Egyetemi Könyvkiadó, 1933), 23.
  38. The Wandervogel groups established from the end of the nineteenth century mainly

comprised schoolchildren and students of middle-class origin who wanted to break away from the rigid social order, the hierarchical world of Wilhelmine Germany by creating their own living environment, by separating themselves from adults and establishing a new youth lifestyle with romantic forms such as tent camps, campfires, hiking, singing, and open-air activities.

39. Norbert Spannenberger, *Der Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn 1938–1944 unter Horthy und Hitler* (Oldenbourg, 2002), 51.
40. Gábor Kopasz, “Az 1929–32. évi világgazdasági válság hatása Dél-Dunántúlon,” *Baranyai Helytörténetírás* 7 (1974–75): 353–78; *Magyarország története. Vol. 8: 1918–1945*, ed. Tibor Hajdu and Loránt Tilkovszky (Akadémiai Kiadó, 1976), 735; *Magyarország gazdaságtörténete a honfoglalástól a 20. század közepéig*, ed. János Honvári (Aula, 2000), 372. The negative effects of the Great Depression were further exacerbated by the immense crop failure of 1934 and 1936 due to drought (up to 20 percent), see *Magyarország története* ed. Hajdu and Tilkovszky, 731. Agriculture did not reach its pre-crisis level until the second half of the 1930s.
41. Béla Bellér, *A magyarországi németek rövid története* (Magvető, 1981), 146.
42. Seewann, *Geschichte der Deutschen in Ungarn*, 171–72.
43. David Easton and Robert D. Hess, “The Child’s Political World,” *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 6, no. 3 (1962): 229–46; Herbert H. Hyman, *Political Socialization. A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior* (The Free Press, 1959); David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children in the Political System. Origins of Political Legitimacy* (McGraw-Hill, 1969); Ildikó Szabó, *Nemzet és szocializáció* (L’Harmattan, 2009), 21. There is a so-called pre-political socialization process; it has been proven that the foundations for Swiss democracy are laid between the ages of eight and ten. See Anna Melich, *Comment devient-on Suisse? Enfants et apprentissage politique* (Institut de science politique, 1979).
44. Richard G. Niemi and Mary A. Hepburn, “The Rebirth of Political Socialization,” *Perspectives on Political Science* 24, no. 1 (1995), 7–10.
45. On political socialization in general, see Szabó, *Nemzet és szocializáció*.
46. Tilkovszky, “A nemzetiségi identitás vállalásának problémái hazánkban,” 146.
47. Memorandum on the wishes of the German minority of Hungary concerning their linguistic preservation and cultural development as well as the methods and means to satisfy these wishes—MOL, K 28, 109 cs, K 28-210-1929–C–1989; Die Wünsche der ungarländischen Deutschbewegung. Abschrift ohne Datum—Bundesarchiv Berlin (BArch), NS 43/44, 40–44.
48. Paul Flach, *Ortsgruppengründungen des Ungarländischen Deutschen Volksbildungsvereins (1924–1940) und des Volksbundes der Deutschen in Ungarn* (Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Ungarn in Bayern, 1968), 4; *Nemzetiségi ügyek dokumentumai Baranyában 1923–1938*, ed. Miklós Füzes (BML, 2001), Document no. 51.

49. In the southern part of Transdanubia reconquered by the Ottomans at the end of the seventeenth century, i.e. in the counties of Tolna, Baranya, and Somogy, one of the largest settlement areas of Germans in Hungary came into being as a result of the settlement from the southern imperial territories, which was called Swabian Turkey in the memory of this period.
50. Michael George Hillinger, *The German National Movement in Interwar Hungary* (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1973), 123–25; Béla Bellér, *Az ellenforradalmi rendszer nemzetiségi politikájának kialakulása* (Akadémiai Kiadó, 1975), 279–80; Spira, *German-Hungarian Relations*, 161–63.
51. The deputy state secretary instructed by the Hungarian royal minister of the interior to the Hungarian royal prime minister, Budapest, June 5, 1929.—MOL, K 28, 109 cs., K 28-1929-210-1311.
52. Miklós Gömbös, “Hazai vándorlegények,” *Pesti Hírlap*, August 2, 1930, 5. Quoted in *Válogatott dokumentumok a Hűséggel a hazához mozgalom történetéhez*, ed. László Kolta and Imre Solymár (Vörösmarty Mihály Ifjúsági és Művelődési Központ, 1994), 14–20.
53. *Válogatott dokumentumok*, ed. Kolta and Solymár, 14.
54. *Válogatott dokumentumok*, ed. Kolta and Solymár, 15–16.
55. Ferenc Eiler, *Kisebbségvédelem és revízió. Magyar részvétel az Európai Nemzetiségi Kongresszuson 1925–1939* (Gondolat, 2007); Ferenc Eiler, “Németország Duna-völgyi politikája 1920–1938,” in *Társadalmi önismeret és nemzeti önazonosság Közép-Európában*, ed. Csilla Fedinec (Teleki László Alapítvány, 2002), 37–63; Ferenc Eiler, “Német és magyar nemzetpolitikák a két világháború között 1920–1938,” in *Integrációs stratégiák a magyar kisebbségek történetében*, ed. Nándor Bárdi and Attila Simon (Fórum Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2006), 89–99.
56. See Spannenberger, *Der Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn*, 50–51.
57. The Situation of Linguistic Minorities in Rump Hungary. Memorial—MOL, K 28, 13 cs. 57. t. Quoted by Norbert Spannenberger, “A Volksbund. Egy népcsoport nemzetiszocialista szervezete vagy emancipációs kisebbségi egyesület?” *Aetas* 15, no. 4 (2000): 51.
58. Seewann, *Geschichte der Deutschen in Ungarn*, 144.
59. Report of November 18, 1930—MOL, K 28, 13. cs., 57. Quoted by Spannenberger, “A Volksbund. Egy népcsoport nemzetiszocialista szervezete vagy emancipációs kisebbségi egyesület?” 51–52.
60. Tilkovszky, “A magyarországi német mozgalom válságának kibontakozása,” 420.
61. On the latter in more detail later. On the other points see Tilkovszky, “A magyarországi német,” 406–7.
62. The founding declaration was signed by thirty-five people, the number of members of the body was forty-two. Everybody who intensively participated in the revival of the UDV and later in the foundation of the Volksbund was a member in the following

- period. Among others: Jakob Bleyer (Budapest), Franz Kussbach (Budapest), Karl Steiner (Pécs), Ludwig Leber (Törökbálint), Ägidius Faulstich (Németbóly), Johann Teppert (Villány), Heinrich Derner (Hidas), Max Albert (Budapest), Franz Basch (Budapest), Franz Rothen (Budapest), Johann Faul-Farkas (Zsámbék), Anton König (Budapest), Heinrich Mühl (Bonyhád). Tilkovszky, "A magyarországi német," 430–431.
63. Loránt Tilkovszky, "A budapesti Suevia vándorcsoportjainak jelentései a magyarországi németiség helyzetéről 1934 nyarán," in *Somogy megye múltjából. Levéltári évkönyv 31*, ed. Sándor Bösze (Somogy Megyei Levéltár, 2000), 91–92.
64. Tilkovszky, "A budapesti Suevia," 93, 97, 99, 106–107.
65. MNL OL K 28 210-M.E.-1935-C-15090.
66. MNL OL K 28 210-M.E.-1935-C-15090.
67. Wishes of the German Movement in Hungary, 1935: 1. schools, 2. kindergartens, 3. repetition schools, 4. secondary schools and agricultural schools, 5. teacher and kindergarten teacher training, 6. establishment of a supervisory authority for minority schools, 7. religious instruction and German-language religious services, 8. German-language instruction in Levente youth while retaining the Hungarian as command language, 9. Youth organizations, 10. approval of UDV local groups, 11. use of the German language in offices, 12. guarantee of linguistic and cultural rights, 13. scientific research into the German language, 14. cessation of propaganda lies, 15. cessation of political judgements, 16. teacher and student exchange programs in higher education, 17. training courses in the Reich. Herrn Dr. Leibbrand, APA der NSDAP. Abschrift, 29.12.1935—BArch, Außenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP (NS 43/44): 40–44.
68. MNL OL K 28 198-M.E.-1937-C-16200; MNL BaML IV. 410. a. 268/1936; 20/1937.
69. MNL BaML, IV. 410. a. 53. Karton, 1937–1938.; MNL BaML IV 410. a. 49/1937, 88/1937.
70. MNL BaML IV. 401. a. 119/1938.
71. MNL BaML IV. 401. a. 33/1939.
72. MNL BaML IV. 401. a. 503/1940.
73. MNL OL K 28 208–1939–17405, 198–1939–15164.; MNL BaML IV. 401. a. 139/1939.
74. Youth work of the Volksbund of the Germans in Hungary, Berlin, June 10, 1940. BArch NS 22/108.

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PART 3

RACIALIZATION AND  
RADICALIZATION OF  
ETHNICITY



# LIVING IN DISTURBED TIMES

## The Ethnopolitical and Social Consequences of the War and of the New State Order in the Bohemian Lands, 1918–1923<sup>1</sup>

PAVEL KLADIWA AND ANDREA POKLUDOVÁ

**T**HE LIVING STANDARD OF THE POPULATION IN THE BOHEMIAN LANDS reached an unprecedented level before World War I. The middle strata, whose living standard could be described as decent, strengthened. Even the working class reached the stage of consumption growth, as their wages in heavy industry sufficed to afford decent clothing, ample food, and even a few extras.<sup>2</sup> Wages for labourers in other sectors, such as light industry and agriculture, were much lower, especially for women. Nevertheless, the lower strata had essentially developed a fatalistic habit of poverty over generations. Even their social situation slowly improved.

Approximately in the last three prewar decades, the principles of civil society expanded from the middle strata to the working classes. The latter became increasingly active, and their participation in association life increased, both in towns and, with some delay, in the country. The extension of suffrage (1897, 1907) led to the emergence of mass political parties, which incorporated the interests of the new groups of voters into their election programmes. A politics of direct contact between a voter and “their” party emerged, facilitated through party press and preelection as well as other public meetings. Prewar Austria, as emphasized by Gary Cohen, was not only highly progressive in terms of asserting civil society, but this “society developed a significant active engagement—indeed, an investment—in the workings of the transnational imperial state”<sup>3</sup>

The growing civic discourse was closely linked to a national discourse. National identification significantly intensified due to this connection—the leading figures of the national movement were simultaneously civic “modernizers” in the local milieu—as well as due to psychomental factors, which should not be underestimated (national identity and the national program provided the emancipating working class with a sense of self-confidence, importance, and transcendence). This was also true for the social-democratic working-class milieu.<sup>4</sup> National and civic slogans demonstrated considerable mobilization potential several times before the war, both in the German-speaking and Czech-speaking communities of the Bohemian Lands.

Neither Czech nor German political representatives from the Bohemian Lands were entirely satisfied with the policies directed from Vienna. It is not surprising; governing over nations and parties necessitated a constant search for compromises, taking into account the political power of competing groupings. However, although the Czech political representation found itself for this reason at a disadvantage in most disputes, the Cisleithanian milieu nonetheless provided conditions for a relatively rapid economic, social, and cultural development even in the Czech part of the society of the Bohemian Lands. The relatively widespread contentment with the gradual affluence growth was not conducive to social turbulence. In this regard, the situation rapidly changed after the outbreak of the war, especially in its second half.

Czechs did not enter World War I with enthusiasm comparable to Germans, yet they were not inclined toward anti-Austrian sentiments, and almost none of them could imagine the disintegration of the state. However, the situation began to deteriorate economically, socially, as well as politically. The Austrian military clique was outraged by the lack of war enthusiasm among Czechs (albeit desertion was by no means a common phenomenon). From 1915, the Bohemian Lands experienced an atmosphere of snooping, denunciations, opening of letters, internments, and persecution of nationally engaged Czech teachers and academic intelligentsia, members of Sokol (a Czech national sports organization), and pan-Slavism. Czechs were replaced by Germans in leading positions in public offices, courts, and the police; national organizations and associations were dissolved. Particularly intense pressure was exerted on the education system. Curricula, textbooks, and teaching aids were revised. From September 1, 1915 to the end of 1917, a total of 422 Moravian teachers were confined to various internment camps.<sup>5</sup> The Austrian state thus antagonized significant segments of the Czech intelligentsia, even though they were crucial for influencing public attitudes.

German political representatives in Austria sought to take advantage of the situation and escalated their demands. For instance, the program published by German radicals at Easter 1916 (“The Demands of Austrian Germans for the New Arrangement after the War”) demanded the constitutional entrenchment of an alliance and a customs

union with Germany, separation of Galicia, Bukovina, and Dalmatia from Cisleithania, and establishment of “Western Austria as an unequivocally German state with a leading state and cultural position of Germans.” German was to be enacted as the only official language, with other languages countenanced for external communication with the population in non-German areas. Ethnic regions and nationally separate provincial administration were to be established in Bohemia, resulting in the country being divided into a German part and a bilingual part.<sup>6</sup>

In May 1918, German nationalist parties presented an ultimatum regarding the regional system in Bohemia and the establishment of the province of *Deutschböhmen*. Prime Minister Ernst Seidler von Feuchtenegg was willing to accommodate them, and a number of ordinances were issued in order to gradually meet the nationalist demands. In mid-May 1918, the government imposed an ordinance on the establishment of regional governments in Bohemia (seven Czech regions, four German regions, and one mixed region) despite the dissent of Czech politicians. This naturally raised resistance of Czech politicians, and the emperor eventually dismissed Seidler on July 22, 1918, thereby canceling the ordinance.

## HATE AND VIOLENCE IN WAR TIMES: HUNGER AND LABOR REVOLTS

The economy of no European state could bear the strain of a prolonged war. This was doubly true in the case of moderately developed Austria-Hungary. The population began to feel the social and economic impacts of the militarization of the state and the economy as early as in 1915 (adoption of rationing), and from 1917, a severe crisis could be discerned. There were only 31 hunger demonstrations in Bohemia in 1915, but by 1917, the number had risen to 252, and in the first ten months of 1918, there were 235. In 1918, 93 demonstrations ended in violence.<sup>7</sup>

Hunger demonstrations often ended with looting of shops and food warehouses:

In July 1917, poor supply and military harassment in manufacturing enterprises in the Ostrava area led to mass demonstrations and a general strike. As often before, the impetus was a spontaneous action by women. Having been denied their food rations, they prevented their husbands from reporting for the shift at the Vitkovice Ironworks on the evening of 2 July 1917. Since negotiations at the town hall regarding potato rations ended in failure, this strike escalated into street demonstrations and the looting of shops. Five people were killed and 17 were wounded during the military intervention and gunfire. The strike and unrest spread throughout the entire Ostrava area in the following days.<sup>8</sup> In Muglinov, three shops were completely looted, seven

shopkeepers were forced to surrender food or spirits in order to prevent looting, one shop had its windows smashed, and another had its equipment broken. In Heřmanice, the municipal flour warehouse, a granary, and 15 shops or taverns were looted, often twice, as two looting mobs arose independently.<sup>9</sup> A funeral rally on 6 July 1917 was attended by 30,000 people. Clashes with military units and gunfire ensued, resulting in the death of nine people and 15 severe injuries. The declaration of martial law on 8 July 1917 prevented further disturbances.<sup>10</sup>

Demonstrators often accused shopkeepers of concealing goods and thereby exacerbating the situation. They were evidently partly correct. In late November 1917, the Police Headquarters in Moravská Ostrava reported to the State Prosecutor's Office in Těšín that "in most cases, the accusations against shopkeepers of stockpiling and denying sales tallied the reality." Thus, part of the responsibility for the unrest lay with the shopkeepers. People looted goods from them that they claimed not to have.<sup>11</sup>

The aggressiveness of the intervening units was significantly escalated also by the fact that the units deployed against the demonstrators were predominantly composed of nonnationals,<sup>12</sup> who, without knowledge of the local language and in an unfamiliar environment, sometimes acted impulsively and inadequately harshly. The riots in Prostějov had the bloodiest consequences, when on April 26, 1917, two called assistance companies, consisting of four hundred men along with twenty-five mounted dragoons, used firearms, resulting in twenty-three fatalities, including ten women and one child, and thirty-eight others injured.<sup>13</sup> A memorial for the victims has remained until today.

The revolutionary days of autumn 1918 unfolded in the midst of food shortages. The civil service as well as local governments continued to grapple with the challenge of ensuring the distribution of basic foodstuffs among the population. The situation was exacerbated by persistent Czech-German animosities, when, for instance, German farmers in the Znojmo area were urged by their compatriots to refrain from supplying their produce to the Czech state and instead exclusively supply the German-Austrian republic.<sup>14</sup>

Perhaps the saddest fact is that the war spoiled even children and youth. There was a tremendous increase in the proportion of young people under the age of twenty involved in violent offences—from 20.7 percent before the war to 41 percent at the end of the war.<sup>15</sup>

The new state, Czechoslovakia, formed in the final days of the war, was not the outcome of a long-term struggle for independence but the result of historical circumstances—the defeat of Germany in the war and the total political, social, and economic collapse of Austria.

## LIMITED OPEN CONFLICTS IN THE FIRST POSTWAR MONTHS

On October 28, 1918, the independent Czechoslovak state was declared in Prague. Especially the German population and their political representation disagreed with incorporation into a state where they would be a national minority. Therefore, Czech Germans responded by declaring four separate provinces (Deutschböhmen, Sudetenland, Deutschsüdmähren and Böhmerwaldgau), whose territory was predominantly or entirely populated by Germans. These provinces were supposed to become part of new German Austria, but the two most important ones (Deutschböhmen and Sudetenland) did not share a border with Austria. In fact, their representatives hoped to join Germany, but hesitated to admit it openly, realizing that the victorious powers would not countenance any territorial gains by Germany.

In late November, following unavailing negotiations with representatives of these provinces, the Czechoslovak government enjoined their military occupation. The Austrian government refused military assistance, leaving the Sudeten-German provincial government to fend for themselves. They had only reserve troops at their disposal. However, German soldiers were already weary of war. The majority of units were concentrated in Litoměřice. Since they were not exclusively comprised of Germans, the commander suggested disarming and sending home the non-German soldiers and forming protective troops from the German troops. However, when the German soldiers saw the others leaving, they were not to be detained. The takeover of the Litoměřice military headquarters was thus of no avail. *Volkswehr* was incapable of action—due to military pay, mainly the homeless and unemployed applied for service, and as soon as they found a job, they simply left the militia. Moreover, *Volkswehr* lacked sufficient weaponry. The units returning from the front scattered home upon arrival.<sup>16</sup>

The occupation of the provinces by Czechoslovak units thus proceeded quite placidly; the population, impoverished by prolonged wartime suffering, primarily desired peace, the restoration of regular supply, and resumption of life in respectable conditions. According to the report from the Tachov district government to the Deutschböhmen provincial government dated November 8, the population held the opinion that there was no other choice but to join Czechoslovakia. Most of them even desired it, hoping for a better life in Czechoslovakia. German industrialists from Bohemia were also in favor of joining Czechoslovakia as they would face more formidable competition in Germany.<sup>17</sup>

The occupation of border towns by the Czechoslovak military units continued until the end of 1918. One of these towns was Opava, the provincial capital of Austrian

Silesia. In autumn 1918, the town hall of Opava primarily dealt with the supply to the population.<sup>18</sup> At the session of the municipal council on October 30, 1918, Mayor Walter Kudlich first reported on a receding influenza epidemic and only then said that the National Assembly in Vienna and the National Council for German Austria had been established on October 21, 1918, following a manifesto of Germans in Austria.<sup>19</sup> He convened an extraordinary session of the municipal government for the next day and welcomed the participants with the words: "I have convened this session at a time of great changes, at a time of the formation of the German-Austrian state, to which Opava belongs. We have been the most faithful members of the state and the dynasty." Then he gave the floor to the leading representative of the German Social Democratic Party in the city, Johann Proske, whom he invited to the session and who told the participants: "We have been invited to this hall for the first time,<sup>20</sup> and hopefully not for the last time, in order to collaborate for the good of the German state."<sup>21</sup>

The municipal government, expanded by representatives of the Social Democratic Party, German nationalist workers, the Zionist movement, and women, convened on December 20, that is, two days after the occupation of the city by the Czechoslovak military units.<sup>22</sup> Although the minutes of the session suggest that life in the city proceeded relatively calmly, the reality did not correspond to this. Czech papers reported the formation of an armed militia in the city.<sup>23</sup> German papers did not deny it. The occupation of the city by the army was anticipated in the press. *Teplitzer-Schonauer Anzeiger*, on December 14, 1918, fallaciously informed readers that the city had already been occupied.<sup>24</sup> *Neue Freie Presse*, a Viennese paper, on December 18, 1918, provided a brief report on the last page that Opava expected the occupation by the Czechoslovak army around 2 p.m. The Czechoslovak troops marched into the city around 4 p.m., followed by Josef Šrámek, who had been a loyal Cisleithanian civil servant until the coup and who took over the provincial government from Robert Freissler.<sup>25</sup> The latter handed it over with the words that the German people had formed the Sudetenland province in "a closed territory" in compliance with the right to self-determination.<sup>26</sup> In the end, there was no military resistance. The occupation of the provincial government office and then the town hall was perceived by the German public as an unauthorized act of power. Sudetenland representatives Freissler and Jokl left for negotiations in Vienna. Mayor Kudlich filed a protest against the occupation of the city by the Czechoslovak army. The last session of the autonomous municipal government took place on January 18, 1919.<sup>27</sup> During the session, Mayor Kudlich read to the participants the Provincial President J. Šrámek's decree dissolving the municipal government on the basis of Section 20 of the statute. According to the legal interpretation of the provincial government, the expansion of the municipal government had violated the law.

The German resistance was so weak that Czechs did not even need the units returning from Italy when occupying Deutschböhmen. The resentment toward the

Czechoslovak state order was manifested only belatedly. The sentiments of the population seem to have changed after the occupation, particularly due to the demeanor of the Czechoslovak soldiers and also canvassing activities of the local press. The newly elected Parliament of Austria convened on March 4, 1919. The Czechoslovak authorities banned the elections to take place in the German areas of the Bohemian Lands (the postwar borders between the states had not been set yet). As a protest, the German population organized large demonstrations on March 4, resulting in fifty-six casualties (including two Czechoslovak soldiers). Thus, the formation of the Sudeten-German identity took place between October 1918 and March 1919.<sup>28</sup>

A radical wing of demonstrators attempted to violently break into the town hall in the Czech town of Kadaň and assailed soldiers on March 4, 1919. An accidental gunshot triggered a reaction—fire from three prepositioned machine guns. The result was twenty-five dead and over a hundred injured. A conflict in the Moravian town of Šternberk also began with an attack on soldiers; one soldier was shot dead, followed by gunfire from both sides, resulting in the deaths of two soldiers and fifteen civilians.<sup>29</sup> Similar disturbances against the background of persisting social crises and frictions were also observed in Opava.<sup>30</sup> The German Social Democratic Party called a demonstration against costliness for March 4, 1919.<sup>31</sup> The army intervened against the demonstrators. The German press reported the following day that the Czech army did not intervene against the radicalized youth during the demonstration of the unemployed but rather against peacefully passing women and the elderly. Even the provincial president did not disclaim the harshness of the intervention, stating in a report on the events: “The participants intend to file a protest against the disbandment and beating of people with gunstocks.” However, his last words in the report raise a certain unease: “After all, yesterday elapsed without any unusual stories.”<sup>32</sup> It is as if the suppression of demonstrators in the streets by the army was a common occurrence.

A struggle for public space continued in the postwar months and years. Political power always utilized town squares and main streets in the Bohemian Lands to present its ideology; they bore the names of significant figures of “national” history, science, art, and culture. A change of the political system was evident in the public space, from which distinguishable symbols of the previous power were removed, first spontaneously and then systematically. A well-known case is the Marian column in the Old Town Square in Prague. Moravian and Silesian towns and cities were primarily concerned with the Czechization of street names. As soon as at the second session of the administrative commission of Olomouc, a proposal was made to return old Czech names to the streets instead of the newer names given by the Cisleithanian town hall in honor of personalities of German cultural and political life.<sup>33</sup> The proposal was approved and implemented during 1919. The administrative commission in Opava acted in a similar way a few months later.<sup>34</sup>

In October and November 1920, statues of Emperor Joseph II became a symbol of the Czech-German national conflict in the famous case of political iconoclasm during the First Republic, in the so-called war for statues. From the 1880s, Joseph II was praised by German liberals and nationalists as a symbol of a centralized German state with the predominance of the German language and German culture. This transformation of Joseph II's legacy into a national symbol of the German-speaking population became fatal to the statues of the enlightened ruler at the moment of the establishment of Czechoslovakia as a nation-state of Czechs and Slovaks. Many statues were torn down in northern and western Bohemia in autumn 1920. For instance, legionaries exacted the removal of a statue of Joseph II in Ústí nad Labem on October 23, 1920, and approximately two hundred armed Czech soldiers brought down a statue of Joseph II in a square in Cheb on November 13, 1920. Legionaries removed a bronze statue of Joseph II in Aš on November 18, 1920. German residents attempted to return the statue to its pedestal in front of a school building. In the subsequent confrontation with German civilians, Czech soldiers applied firearms, resulting in three killed Germans and over twenty injured (both Germans and Czechs). Some statues of Joseph II had already been removed a year earlier, as was the case in Teplice or Brno. The demolition of the statue of Joseph II in Brno by Czech legionaries was preceded in spring 1919 by numerous events of anti-German activities, including the destruction of German-language signs on houses and signboards. Germans in Brno held meetings at the German House on August 23 and 24, 1919, expressing their protest against the school policy and the Czech rule by force.

Czech politicians in Opava demanded the removal of a monument to Emperor Joseph II from public space during 1919. German political representatives intended to prevent its demolition and sent expert reports to relevant official places, emphasizing the cultural-historical value of the monument. The monument was to be removed by the decree of the Silesian provincial government dated September 17, 1920, but instead of tearing it down, the municipal government surrounded it with wooden boarding. In the eyes of Czech politicians, it remained a symbol of irredentism, as they reported literally in one of their numerous letters to Prague: "it is a place of anti-state and anti-Czech intrigues and encourages committing various criminal offences, such as laying wreaths with ribbons in German colours by German conscripts on 22 March 1922."<sup>35</sup> Under the Protection of the Republic Act, it was then removed from its pedestal in 1923 and replaced by an older monument to the German poet Friedrich Schiller in 1925, which was acceptable even to the local Czech community. Its fate was sealed in 1945, when it was torn down and, twenty years later, replaced by the sculpture *New Opava*. Similarly, monuments to Emperor Franz Joseph were removed from public space in Moravian and Silesian towns and cities, including a monument in a square in Olomouc. The proposal for its removal was approved at a session of the administrative commission on January 13, 1919. It was torn down during the spring.<sup>36</sup>

The situation was also very complex in Těšín/Cieszyn/Teschen Silesia, predominantly inhabited by a Polish-speaking population, whose political representatives mainly claimed allegiance to the project of a restored Polish state. On November 2, 1918, the emerging authorities of the Czechoslovak and Polish states, the Czech Provincial National Committee and the Polish National Council of the Duchy of Těšín, signed an interim agreement on the administration of Těšín Silesia, pending the decision of the peace conference on the definitive borders of the new states. According to this agreement, the Frýdek political district and six municipalities with Czech administration in the Frýštát area were to be administered by the Provincial National Committee, while the rest of Těšín Silesia with a Polish majority was to be administered by the National Council of the Duchy of Těšín.

In late January 1919, the situation in Těšín Silesia escalated into an open military conflict. The Polish government called elections to the parliament, the Sejm, not only for the Těšín territory administered by its authorities, but also for the territory under the Czech administration. The act of calling the elections in a territory whose affiliation was yet to be decided by the peace conference was a violation of the interim agreement. The Czechoslovak government responded by deploying military units to the areas of Těšín Silesia occupied by Poland, leading to a brief war. Czechoslovak troops crossed the demarcation line on January 23, 1919, seized control of the key Bohumín—Těšín—Jablunkov railway line, and occupied most of Těšín Silesia. The last battles around Skočov ended on January 30. Western powers did not desire an escalation of the conflict, especially as the Polish-Soviet War was just beginning. Therefore, they pushed representatives of both states to sign an armistice. The border was supposed to be defined by a plebiscite, which did not take place in the end, and the border, still in force today, was defined by the diplomatic conference on July 31, 1920. Těšín Silesia was divided into two parts of a roughly equal size, with the southwestern one devolving upon Czechoslovakia and the northeastern one upon Poland.

While the Czechoslovak Republic had to respect the agreement on the protection of the rights of national minorities, preserving Polish schools and associations, and bilingual public administration in areas with a significant Polish population, it also seized every opportunity to strengthen the positions of the Czech (or, in the contemporary concept, Czechoslovak) nationality. It was able to capitalize on the efforts of thousands of people from the Těšín and Ostrava areas to acquire Czechoslovak citizenship. After the establishment of Czechoslovakia, anyone lacking the domicile right in any Czechoslovak municipality became a foreigner. This applied to more than 37,000 people in the Czechoslovak part of Těšín Silesia, primarily Galicians. The most important directive regarding Czechoslovak citizenship was issued by the Ministry of the Interior in Prague on December 8, 1921. It demanded an investigation of “whether and how the applicant has demonstrated an understanding

of the vital interests of the state and whether, if acting passively towards state institutions and needs, it might suggest hidden hostile attitudes towards the Czechoslovak Republic, which would become apparent upon acquiring citizenship. . . . When granting Czechoslovak citizenship, the state interest must be prioritized, as only the state interest, and not perhaps the personal interest of the applicants, must be the first and foremost decisive factor.”<sup>37</sup>

Most applicants obviously knew what was expected of them—many of them declared Czechoslovak nationality in a census and began sending their children to Czech schools. The chances of acquiring citizenship dramatically decreased, even for an applicant living in “orderly circumstances” and having a job, if they were an active member of the Polish national movement and/or Polish associations and sent their children to Polish schools. The authorities were the strictest toward applicants with communist leanings. In such cases, even sending children to Czech schools, tolerance, and good work performance were not enough.

## THE SOCIAL SITUATION AND ANTISEMITIC LOCAL EXCESSES AFTER THE GREAT WAR

In the last months of the war, the state and its structures disintegrated. Municipal governments were collapsing, as seen in the Liberec area in September 1918: “The situation regarding the sustenance of the population can be characterized by the stance of municipal representatives who, referring to mass diseases due to starvation and to incredibly high child mortality, declared in Teplice on 10 September that they were no longer able to perform their duties as they had neither the desire nor reason to carry further responsibility for the incapacity or lack of will of the government and decision-making authorities.”<sup>38</sup> The deficiency concerned not only food but all basic commodities. It was impossible to buy coal for heating preschool and school facilities on the free market even in the Ostrava-Karviná mining district. There was a shortage of cloth in textile regions, such as Mistek and its surroundings. Cattle breeding was decimated by forced requisitions, having far-reaching consequences for agriculture as a whole, involving not only the loss of meat and dairy production, but also of manure as valuable fertilizer. The countryside also suffered from food shortages, although fake news circulating in urban milieus claimed the opposite.

In the first postwar months, the authorities of the emerging state primarily needed to stabilize the situation. The National Committee of Moravská Ostrava (an interim administrative body) had 1,000 posters addressed to “the Ostrava labour” posted around the city on November 17, 1918. They appealed for calm and work discipline, emphasizing that the first draft bill to be debated in the parliament would be a bill for the eight-hour

working day. They announced the establishment of a transitional economy commission, comprised of half workers and half employers.<sup>39</sup>

The dismal social conditions provided a fertile ground for the spread of antisemitic sentiments in society. The Moravian Vicegerency urged district authorities, through a circular dated December 11, 1918, to monitor the situation and prevent open manifestations of antisemitism by all available means. Even the right to peaceful assembly was allowed to be curtailed under the decree of February 5, 1918. In case of disturbances, taverns, pubs, and distilleries were to be immediately closed and guarded.<sup>40</sup> On December 14, 1918, municipal governments were instructed to post notices in public space warning the population against assaults upon fellow residents of the Jewish faith. The civil service acted on the impetus of the Ministry of the Interior, which was addressed in this matter by a deputation of the Jewish council. In early 1919, Moravian periodicals such as *Pozor* and *Našinec* were urged to abandon their antisemitic rhetoric. The concerns were justified in many respects, as illustrated by the events in Moravská Ostrava.

The wave of plundering triggered by the wartime poverty and high prices struck the Bohemian Lands particularly hard in January 1919. Demonstrations against high prices and black marketeers (*Kettenhändler*) took place in many Czech towns in May 1919. Participants carried little wooden gallows, and shopkeepers and farmers had to place their heads in nooses and vow to sell at fair prices.<sup>41</sup> However, it did not end with May. On June 8, 1919, a social-democratic manifestation against usury and costliness, attended by 15,000 people, took place in Moravská Ostrava. Jews were forced to carry the symbolic gallows.<sup>42</sup> There was a big quantity of Jewish shopkeepers and sole traders in Moravská Ostrava. The number of Jews increased even more during the war due to the arrival of refugees from Galicia and Bukovina. There are reported to be approximately 50,000 of them in Moravia in 1915.<sup>43</sup> In late 1918, antisemitic riots linked with social unrest broke out in some towns. They recurred in early 1919. On January 14 and 15, 1919, demonstrations against the high cost of living erupted in Moravská Ostrava and Vítkovice. Six Jewish shops were looted in Vítkovice, and one police officer was shot during the intervention. Twenty people were arrested for plundering. In Moravská Ostrava, three shops were partially looted, and the police and army intervened. Authorities subsequently imposed a ban on assembly and a curfew after 9 p.m.<sup>44</sup>

Early in the morning of September 4, 1919, posters against Jewish refugees in Ostrava were posted by unknown perpetrators in several municipalities of Ostrava: "Fellow residents! We are betrayed! Authorities are bribed, favouring Jews. They allow Polish Jews, who have been eating us out of house and home for five years, to stay here. Protest meetings are to no purpose; Jews just laugh. We must expel them ourselves. Prepare everything for 6 September; not a single Polish Jew must be here on that day. Whoever stays here or hides will be expelled with axes. Do not worry; nobody will or may intervene against us. We will neither steal nor rob; we will only beat thieves so that they will not

rob us.” Local authorities subsequently issued the following statement: “The implementation of the ordinance regarding the eviction of refugees has been in full swing for several days. 42 refugee families have already left individually in recent days; around 20 families are leaving by a special train on 5 September, and another transport is leaving on 7 September. The residents are being warned to refrain from any action that might result in a breach of the peace. Technical difficulties have prevented all refugees who had applied for departure from leaving on time.”<sup>45</sup>

*Rudé právo*, a communist newspaper, wrote in autumn 1920: “If pogroms take place, all right. They should be carried out in a way that Jewish capitalists . . . would have all their property confiscated. We shall certainly regard it as the beginning of the general dispossession of the rich. . . . However, in order to make the issue appear more palatable, it is possible to begin with the wealthy Jews.”<sup>46</sup> In mid-November 1920, a mob attacked the Jewish town hall in Prague and looted the Jewish archive. There were antisemitic and anti-German rallies in the streets of the inner town for three days. Franz Kafka wrote to Milena Jesenská at that time:

I am now in the streets all afternoon, bathing in hatred of Jews. I have just heard Jews are being called a lousy race. Is it not natural that one leaves a place where one is so hated (Zionism or national sentiments are not necessary for that)? The heroism of staying after all is equal to the heroism of cockroaches, which also cannot be eradicated from the bathroom. I have just looked out of a window: police on horses, police officers with bayonets on alert, a screaming, dispersing crowd, and up here at the window, the sickening shame of constant living under protection.<sup>47</sup>

A specific case is documented in a report from the District Office in Olomouc to the Moravian Vicegerency in Brno dated May 29, 1919. A demonstration against usury was scheduled to take place in Hodolany, a village near Olomouc; it was not explicitly stated as an antisemitic event. Both the Czech and German Social Democratic Parties disassociated themselves from the event, cancelled it, and forbade the organized labor from participating in such events. After security measures eased during night hours, a window of a butcher’s was smashed and an anti-usury gallows was erected, which was removed by the authorities by dawn. The perpetrators were identified and arrested for the crimes of dangerous menacing and damaging private property. Police patrolling was intensified even in neighbouring villages.<sup>48</sup>

One of the stimuli for the adoption of the government’s bill on the benefit to recompense for damages caused by riots<sup>49</sup> was the disturbances and looting that broke out during a rally organized by the Social Democratic Party in Olomouc on March 3, 1920.<sup>50</sup> According to a police report, Dr. Kraus, the deputy mayor, said in his impassionate speech: “Down with the bourgeoisie, today or never.” Afterward, the crowd

was reported to have shouted “to Komárek.” The radicalized and overexcited crowd got carried away and looted not only the abovementioned shop but two others as well. Sixty police officers were unable to quell the riots, prompting the deployment of the army. Five individuals were arrested and transported to the regional court. Reports of the Provincial Political Office (*Zemská správa politická*) in Brno and the Ministry of the Interior suggest an appeal to Social Democratic politicians to realize that in the socially tense times, it was only a matter of time before the crowd would get carried away to similar actions. The property damage was significant, estimated by the shopkeepers at 2,000,000 crowns for the Ministry of the Interior, while the district office estimated it at 400,000 to 460,000 crowns.<sup>51</sup>

Life in the first postwar weeks and months was both materially and mentally very demanding, particularly for the German and Jewish populations. In the case of Czech society, a positive element was the confidence in the republican future; the delight at the national rise and “war victory” eased surmounting the tense social and political divergences.<sup>52</sup> The German population also suffered greater material losses due to their significantly higher involvement in underwriting Austrian war loans (eight, in total, were issued during the war). The Czechoslovak state recompensed, under the law of September 30, 1924, only those Austrian state loans owners whose net worth did not exceed 25,000 crowns. Another condition for the recompense was that they did not own state loans worth more than 125,000 crowns. They received 3 percent lottery bonds for the war loans, namely 75 crowns of the compensation bonds’ nominal value for every 100 crowns of the war loans’ nominal value. Individuals liable to the levy on property over 25,000 crowns had the only option to reduce their losses from the purchase of the Austrian war loans, namely to apply the act of June 24, 1920, on the fourth state loan of the Czechoslovak Republic and on the participation of the Austrian and Hungarian war loans owners in its underwriting. Individuals deposited the war loan bonds and paid additional 75 crowns in cash for every 100 crowns of their nominal value, receiving 150 crowns in bonds.

## THE NATIONAL MOTIVATION FOR CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES, ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

As mentioned earlier, the Cisleithanian civil service increasingly took into account the ethnic situation in the last decades of its existence. This was evident in the personnel composition of public offices. In Bohemia in the early twentieth century, it was a

common practice that civil servants of German nationality served only in German districts, while Czech civil servants in Czech districts, and there was contention over a few mixed districts. The Moravian vicegerent, without hesitation, referred to most civil servants as Czechs and Germans. Leaving aside the districts in Bohemia without a definitively appointed district governor, the ratio between Czech and German senior civil servants at the end of the monarchy was 59:43. In contrast, the ratio was 16:89 in 1925 (Czechs occupied important, predominantly German border districts such as Děčín, Liberec, Jablonec nad Nisou, and Cheb).<sup>53</sup>

At the end of the war in 1918, Moravian districts were more occupied by German district governors (nineteen) than Czech ones (seventeen). After October 28, 1918, an imperial and royal (*kaiserlich und königlich, k. k.*) civil servant, as a loyal state employee, was caught in a problematic position. In the eyes of Czech national activists, those civil servants who had not held office impartially in the years before and during the war but had favored German fellow nationals should be dismissed. However, the situation at the time of the emerged political coup was immensely complex and unfolded against the background of a deep social crisis, when without an effective functioning of state political administration, social unrest loomed. Immediately after the events of October 28, 1918, Moravian vicegerent Dr. Heinold resigned. He was succeeded by the future Minister of the Interior Dr. Černý, who, on October 30, 1918, sent binding instructions to the district governors regarding the functioning of state political administration, based on the principle that the organization and scope of authority of the district political offices would remain unchanged. He wrote in the so-called principles: "In order to ensure continuity of administration, everything will remain essentially the same as before, including personnel." He encouraged civil servants in further work by saying: "Civil servants have managed to fulfil tasks that often seemed impossible with admirable skill, energy, and dedication for more than four years. Therefore, I believe that now, when new peace conditions need to be prepared, I can rely on them to do their utmost to manage office in the new conditions without disputes and upheavals and to ensure peace and order."<sup>54</sup> However, changes in administration became immediately evident. As early as on October 31, the District Governor's Office in Olomouc received an order from the National Committee in Prague to introduce the Czech language in internal administration, despite the fact that it might cause difficulties for some civil servants.

The continuous execution of political state administration by district offices was questioned in public discourse. A commission of the National Committee in Prague had to address the emerged situation, issuing a statement on November 5, 1918, that the entire political administration in Moravia was under the rule of the Czechoslovak state, and that district governments had no executive power, and any interference in the activities of the civil service was deemed detrimental. After November 7, any interference

by national committees in the activities of district offices was considered a transgression and a danger to public peace and order.<sup>55</sup>

The situation in Moravia stabilized within the following months. District governors whose loyalty to the republic was questioned due to their previous activities in office retired.<sup>56</sup> After the personnel changes, political administration suffered from a shortage of young trainee lawyers. Although applicants for the public service were promised relatively good pay, it was not the case. The public service practices of 1914 remained in effect, and a change in the wage rate came only with Act No. 541/1919 Coll. of October 7, 1919. The principle that a civil servant of political administration could be called to another position as necessary was also retained from the times of the monarchy. If it was a call, for example, to Brno or Prague, it could be perceived as a promotion, whereas a call to Slovakia or even Carpathian Ruthenia was considered a “punishment” by the civil servants, and therefore they sought to avoid it by going on sick leave, which was negatively perceived by superiors.<sup>57</sup> After the changes, the governor’s positions were occupied by seven Germans and nineteen Czechs.

A *k. k.* civil servant was supposed to be apolitical before the Great War, whereas there is evident politicization of the civil service after the war. Loyalty to the republic was required. Unless German civil servants retired, they were preferably appointed to districts with a majority German population. The number of German civil servants in the civil service declined, and later steps of German activist politics were intended to redress this situation. Czech national campaigners kept records of the demeanor and attitudes of civil servants, forwarded them through their networks to relevant places, and sought to influence the actions of district offices. Before the 1921 census, several district governors found themselves in the political maelstrom, and it was not the impartiality but the interests of Czech political parties and national organizations that influenced, for example, the appointments of census commissioners. Political offices primarily dealt with state-political tasks, such as monitoring the sentiments of the local German population, observing activities of the emerging Communist movement, and so forth. Sources document a wide range of activities, when an unpopular *k. k.* civil servant became a similarly unpopular republic servant.

Despite the 1920 law on counties, counties were not established, mainly for national reasons. Nine counties were supposed to be created in Bohemia and five in Moravia and Silesia. However, it was not possible to form the counties in Bohemia without at least two of them having a significant German minority, whose political representatives the Czechoslovak state was unwilling to delegate important powers to. On December 1, 1928, Silesia and Moravia were united into one administrative unit, namely the Moravian-Silesian Province, with Brno as the capital. The left-wing political spectrum rejected the law, which legal historian Karel Schelle considers the most significant unification act with antidemocratic features in the field of electoral

law for local authorities.<sup>58</sup> The loss of Silesia's independence became a rather marginal issue in parliamentary debate.<sup>59</sup> The Szlonzakian movement, Těšín autonomists, vehemently opposed the merger.<sup>60</sup> Several German newspapers were published with mourning framing on December 1, 1928. The Czech political representation advocated the merger of the two provinces in the media as a necessary administrative step and denied its ethnic background, as stated in *Obrana Slezska* in early December 1928: "It was approved with judicious calm, appreciating the great sacrifice that the Silesian people are laying on the altar of the common good."<sup>61</sup> The author captured the opposite stance of the German political representation a few lines below: "Nonetheless, the regional patriotic feeling remains alive in the hearts of the people, which is not to be underestimated, as Germans endeavour to emotionally make political capital for their political profit." However, in the internal discourse of Czech activists, there were critical opinions and stances on the reform verging on disenchantment with the current developments.<sup>62</sup>

Opava lost not only its position as the provincial capital but also as a statutory city. The measure was perceived as "retaliation" for the events associated with the visit of Czechoslovak President T. G. Masaryk on June 23–25, 1924. The then mayor of Opava, Ernst Franz (Deutsche Nationalpartei), welcomed the president in Opava as if it were the German capital and only had municipal flags, not national flags, hung at the town hall.

Before World War I, there were elected district self-government bodies, namely district governments (a broader body) and district councils (a narrower body), in Bohemia. They had relatively significant powers and became an important instrument in the rise of Czech political influence. The self-government at the level of districts was constituted neither in Moravia nor in Silesia, mainly due to the apprehension of German liberal, and later also nationalist, circles that Czechs, and in Silesia also Poles, would exploit it for their national-political goals. Instead, there were only district road committees responsible for the road network.

Before 1918, the Czech political representation wanted to enforce the establishment of the district self-government also in Moravia and Silesia. However, once in power after the war, the district self-government became an undesirable element. Therefore, the old system (district road committees) was retained in Moravia and Silesia and, in Bohemia, the district governments were dissolved and replaced by district administrative commissions (based on proportional representation of political parties). In 1928, the existing bodies were abolished, and self-government corporations called districts were established. However these were under the control of the civil service. The district governor, heading the district civil service, as well as one-third of the members of the self-government corporation were recruited from the ranks of the civil service. Only the remaining two-thirds were elected.

In some ethnically mixed towns, municipal governments controlled by Germans were dissolved soon after the establishment of the republic and replaced by administrative commissions with a significant Czech predominance. German parties in Moravská Ostrava were given seven out of thirty seats in the administrative commission. In neighboring Vítkovice, German parties gained ten seats in the twenty-four-member administrative commission. In Olomouc, the German side obtained eight out of twenty-four seats in the commission.<sup>65</sup> The first postwar municipal elections were not held everywhere on the state-wide “regular” date, that is, June 15, 1919. In Opava, it was in January 1920, and in Moravská Ostrava, it was not until in autumn 1924.

## CHANGES IN THE SCHOOL SYSTEM

The new postwar conditions also affected education. Before the war, German primary schools (*Volksschule*) were preferred in linguistically mixed municipalities in Moravia and Austrian Silesia. The State Basic Law on the General Rights of Cisleithanian Nationals of December 21, 1867, declared parity of all the customary (*landesüblich*) languages in the country at school and, in 1884, the ruling of the Administrative Court of Justice (*Verwaltungsgerichtshof*) set a precedent stating that a primary school of another language of instruction had to be established in linguistically mixed school districts provided a sufficient number of schoolchildren’s parents requested it. However, this did not always happen, as Czech parents did not recognize the need for education in the mother tongue and/or were under pressure from their German employers or German municipal authorities. Municipalities were the founders of primary schools, and most Moravian cities and all Silesian cities were politically controlled by Germans. Czech schools were eventually established there, albeit with a delay caused by the resistance of the municipal governments (Brno, Olomouc, Moravská Ostrava, Vítkovice, and Jihlava), but the town halls were much more generous to the German schools. The Czech primary education was undersized as hundreds of children of Czech ethnic origin attended German schools. The so-called Lex Perek, adopted within the Moravian Compromise of 1905, did not change this. Although it advocated the principle that a child should know the language of instruction of the school they attend, its interpretation was ambiguous.

The circumstances changed rapidly after October 28, 1918. The situation when the state did not directly oppress the non-German nationalities but de facto tolerated the preference for German education by municipal authorities (both for political reasons, that is, pressure from German political parties, and for economic reasons—the stance of municipal governments had to be taken into account when delegating the financing of education to them) ceased. Czech administrative authorities sought to transfer

Czech children from German to Czech schools. Immediately after the coup, 867 pupils moved from German schools in Vítkovice to Czech schools and 26 to Polish schools.<sup>64</sup> Such transfers apparently took place elsewhere as well. Part of these transfers (the extent is debatable) likely occurred under direct or indirect pressure exerted on both the parents and the German school boards. In November 1919, the Administrative Commission of Vítkovice together with the local school board claimed children from German schools whose parents had declared Czech nationality (probably during interrogations based on enrollments). On December 13, 1919, the Administrative Commission of Moravská Ostrava requested the Czech district school board to expel Czech children from German primary and secondary schools in Moravská Ostrava for the sake of the proper education of the children.<sup>65</sup> The commission did not refer to any law enjoining it. Nor could it, as no law had been passed yet unequivocally ordaining that the language of instruction had to coincide with the child's nationality. The practice of excluding children from German schools was based solely on the pressure from the administrative authorities, to which the parents (voluntarily or involuntarily) and German schools (involuntarily) conformed.

The *Lex Perek* was in force in Moravia also in the interwar period.<sup>66</sup> Without a new law being passed, it became a binding practice in Moravia after a few years that a child had to attend a school of their nationality. Surprisingly, this practice was not codified by a law but by the Supreme Administrative Court, which in its ruling of June 7, 1922, provided for the interpretation of the *Lex Perek* that a child had to attend a school whose language of instruction corresponded to their nationality (as long as such a school was available in the particular school district).

During the first postwar months and years, the number of pupils and schools in Moravian cities fundamentally changed. Whereas in the school year 1909/10, the ratio of the pupils of Czech and German primary and secondary schools was 2,232:3,547 in Moravská Ostrava, 698:1,294 in Přívoz, and even 519:3,517 in Vítkovice,<sup>67</sup> in the school year 1920/21, Czech schools in Moravská Ostrava were attended by 3,141 pupils and German schools by 1,958 pupils.<sup>68</sup> In the school year 1926/27, Czech schools in Vítkovice had 1,710 pupils and German schools 849 pupils, and the ratio in Přívoz was 1,649:469.<sup>69</sup> Correspondingly, the proportion of Czech and German schools also changed. This reorganization was very painful for German officials in the Ostrava area as it substantiated the new power dynamics and the loss of the privileged position. Whereas there were seven Czech and nine German primary schools and two Czech and four German secondary schools in Moravská Ostrava in the school year 1918/19, in the school year 1926/27, there were nine Czech primary schools and four secondary schools, and only four German primary schools and three secondary schools.<sup>70</sup> As a result of the decline in the number of pupils, German schools thus suffered not only a reduction in the number of classes but also the closure of some schools, which were then

utilized for Czech education. The handover of the schools was a grievous experience for the German community. In Moravská Ostrava, Germans lost, among other things, the building of the primary school on Nádražní třída. When the school was to be handed over on September 23, 1920, two to four thousand people of both nationalities gathered in front of the building, leading to verbal conflicts. The district governor managed to calm the situation but, as a precaution, enjoined the school to be closed for a few days.<sup>71</sup>

In the case of the city of Olomouc, the Czech district school board requested the Ministry of Education and National Enlightenment in a letter dated August 18, 1919, that the beginning of the school year in the city be moved to September 16, 1919, due to an increase in the number of children enrolled in Czech schools by 300 while a simultaneous decrease enrolled in German schools by about 130 pupils. It became necessary to establish two new Czech schools and to reduce the number of German schools: "It will be necessary to reduce and relocate German schools, as it is not permissible for one German class to have 21 pupils according to the register just made, and three times as many to a Czech class."<sup>72</sup> This process of school transfer took place in all cities. However, nuances in the speed and forcefulness of the process are discernible between cities where Czech politicians won a majority in the municipality (Olomouc) and those with a persistent German majority in the city management, such as in Jihlava.

Whereas the increase in the number of Czech schools and the decrease in the number of German schools was objectively justifiable, albeit painful for the German national representation, the establishment of Czech minority schools<sup>73</sup> in predominantly German-speaking areas (hence, occurring more in Bohemia and western Silesia than in Moravia) was a purely political step. In 1919 to 1920 alone, 475 Czech minority schools and only four German ones were established.<sup>74</sup> Czech minority schools were primarily established in the municipalities where the proportion of the Czech population barely reached a few percent, and sometimes even less. According to available data, Czech minority schools absorbed 1–2 percent of German pupils of primary schools.<sup>75</sup> From 1922, minority schools were removed from the scope of authority of municipalities or districts and subordinated directly to the Ministry of Education and National Enlightenment. The costs of these schools were now borne by the state.<sup>76</sup> There were 1,400 Czech and only 23 German minority schools in 1930.<sup>77</sup>

## NATIONALITY AS A CENSUS CATEGORY

Czechoslovakia, like other successor states of Austria-Hungary, sought to prove that it was a nation-state, that is, a state with a significantly predominant "state nation." Therefore, it was in its interest to ensure that even censuses showed the most favorable results in this regard.<sup>78</sup>

A comparison of the last prewar and the first postwar censuses reveals that, as a consequence of the population losses during and shortly after World War I (the Spanish flu epidemic), the population declined by 243,258 (for nationals) or 143,034 (for all present residents, that is, including foreigners). The increase in the number of foreigners (by 100,224) is attributed to legislative changes (a successor state of the Habsburg Monarchy automatically had to acknowledge citizenship only for individuals who had their domicile rights in a municipality within its territory).<sup>79</sup> Interestingly, despite the events of World War I and the first postwar years, there is a slight population increase in Moravia, and an overall decline at the expense of Bohemia and Silesia (however, the data for Silesia, is distorted due to the secession of a part of Těšín Silesia and its incorporation into Poland).

TABLE 1. LANGUAGE OF DAILY USE/NATIONALITY  
IN BOHEMIAN LANDS 1910 AND 1921.

Province, year	Language of daily use/nationality				Nationals in total	Foreigners in total
	Czech/ Czechs	German/ Germans	Polish/ Poles	Jewish		
Bohemia, 1910	4 241 918	2 467 724	1 541	unknown	6 712 944	56 604
Bohemia, 1921	4 382 788	2 173 239	973	11 251	6 576 825	93 757
Moravia, 1910	1 868 971	719 435	14 924	unknown	2 604 857	17 414
Moravia, 1921	2 048 426	547 604	2 080	15 335	2 616 436	46 448
Silesia, 1910	180 348	325 523	235 224	unknown	741 456	15 493
Silesia, 1921	296 194	252 365	69 967	3 681	622 738	49 530
In total, 1910	6 291 237	3 512 682	251 689	unknown	10 059 257	89 511
In total, 1921	6 727 408	2 973 208	73 020	30 267	9 815 999	189 735

Sources: *Oesterreichische Statistik. Neue Folge. Band I: Die Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 31. Dezember 1910, Heft 1: Die summarischen Ergebnisse der Volkszählung*. Wien 1912, pp. 59\*, 73 and 79; *Československá statistika. Svazek 9, Řada VI. (Sčítání lidu, sešit 1). Sčítání lidu v Republice československé ze dne 15. února 1921. I. díl*. Praha 1924, pp. 54\* and 60\*.

Nationality aspects of the censuses are intriguing. The postwar census counted 436,171 more Czechs (6.9 percent) than individuals with Czech as their language of daily use in 1910, whereas 539,474 (18.1 percent) fewer Germans and 178,669 (34.5 percent) fewer Poles than speakers of these languages in 1910. The decline of Germans was much more pronounced in Moravia (by 31.4 percent in comparison to the 1910 census of the language of daily use) and Silesia (by 29 percent) than in Bohemia (by 13.5 percent). Poles lived almost exclusively in Silesia and adjacent Moravian parts of the coal

mining district. Czech nationality showed an increase in the 1921 statistics compared to the Czech language of daily use in 1910 in all three Czech provinces.

It is indubitable that the significant competences held by municipal governments during censuses in Cisleithania were reflected in the pressure in ethnically mixed areas, where the “German” town halls sought the best possible outcome for “their” language of daily use. This factor had a greater effect in Moravia and eastern Silesia (where many ethnically majority Polish or Czech towns were governed by a “German” town hall), while in Bohemia, it was mainly confined to the industrial areas of western and north-western Bohemia, experiencing a substantial influx of migrant workers from the inland (otherwise, the language border separating Czech-speaking and German-speaking areas was clearly demarcated, unlike in Moravia and eastern Silesia). This is the main reason why the decline in German nationality in 1921 compared to the German language of daily use in 1910 was much more pronounced in Moravia and Silesia than in Bohemia (by 13,5 percent).

Although Czechoslovak censuses obviated the pressure from nationalized municipal governments, they replaced it with a pressure from the state, albeit not as pronounced but similarly consistent. This pressure manifested itself by imposing obstacles to registering a nationality other than Czech (officially “Czechoslovak”) for anybody with Czech-speaking ancestors, even if ancestors of a different language were traceable. The Czechoslovak state thus allowed a citizen to register their nationality without oppression unless one wanted to register a nationality other than the one that met the state criteria. Freedom of registration thus had its limits residing in the verification of “the correctness of the registered nationality.”

The acknowledgment of Jewish nationality was not an important factor on the scale of the entire Bohemian Lands from the 1921 census (Cisleithania acknowledged Judaism only as a religion). In 1921, Jewish nationality was declared by 11,251 people in Bohemia, 15,335 in Moravia, and 3,681 in Silesia,<sup>80</sup> while the Jewish faith was declared by 75,239 individuals in Bohemia and 38,939 in Moravia and Silesia. In Bohemia, 49.5 percent of the adherents of the Jewish faith declared Czechoslovak nationality, 34.6 percent German, 14.6 percent Jewish, and 1.3 percent another nationality. In Moravia and Silesia, 15.7 percent of the adherents of the Jewish faith declared Czechoslovak nationality, 34.85 percent German, 47.8 percent Jewish, and 1.6 percent another nationality.<sup>81</sup> In 1910, out of 85,798 Jews in Bohemia, 47.4 percent declared German as their language of daily use and 50.3 percent Czech, whereas out of 41,174 Jews in Moravia, 77.65 percent declared German and 16.6 percent Czech, and out of 13,431 Jews in Austrian Silesia, 84.3 percent declared German, 6.6 percent Polish, and 2.8 percent Czech as their language of daily use.<sup>82</sup>

Comparing the results of the 1910 and 1921 censuses, an extreme decline in the proportion of German nationality at the expense of Czech nationality occurred mainly

in Moravian cities that were ethnically mixed and had “German” town halls until the end of World War I: Brno (65.9→36.2), Olomouc (60.5→35), Jihlava (79.7→51.5), Moravská Ostrava (48.4→27), Vítkovice (72→28.5). Significant statistical decreases are also recorded among Poles in Silesia, namely in districts Fryštát (71.34→40) and Polská Ostrava (23.7→1.9), and municipalities Polská Ostrava (19.7→2), Doubrava (62.8→16.3), Fryštát (59.5→32.2), Karviná (82.5→56.3), Orlová (34.2→14.4), and Třinec (68.95→44.2). What were these shifts caused by? Several factors had some effect; we will name the three most important ones:

1. A change in the census category and a change of state power. It was no longer the language of daily use that was recorded but rather nationality, which was much more closely tied to the ethnic origin and mother tongue. The change of state power demonstrably contributed to a greater inclination of bilingual individuals to register Czechoslovak nationality. Moreover, state power did not impede the registration of Czechoslovak nationality for individuals coming from completely or predominantly Polish or German ethnic backgrounds. In the opposite case, a strict bond between nationality and the mother tongue applied.
2. A significant increase in the proportion of foreigners, who were not recorded in the nationality statistics, in some districts, when comparing the 1910 and 1921 censuses (e.g., Moravská Ostrava 2.5 percent→10.9 percent, Fryštát 1.9 percent→14.3 percent, Polská Ostrava 1.7 percent→16.1 percent). The inclusion of several tens of thousands of former Cisleithanian citizens in the category of foreigners reduced particularly the proportion of Polish and German nationalities. This is proved by statistical data, as the Czechoslovak statistics recorded (albeit separately) even the nationality of foreigners.<sup>83</sup>
3. The factor of territorial reorganization in several towns before the 1921 census. In February 1919, the revolutionary National Assembly (the Czechoslovak parliament, still composed only of representatives nominated by Czech political parties) granted the government the power, without an approval of the affected municipal governments, to merge or dissolve municipalities and alter municipal boundaries: “It is true that a large part of the cases of municipality mergers in the early days of the Czechoslovak Republic bore signs of an effort to solve the national problems that had been accumulating in the local communities for years. The questions of the rationalization of the administration of the merged municipalities had more of a ‘secondary’ effect, which could be used to justify the merging of the municipalities.”<sup>84</sup> The municipal governments of the merged municipalities were completely defenseless, as they were dissolved and replaced with administrative commissions before the merger (unless it had already been done for other reasons).

## CONCLUSION

Until 1914, the Czech population was not fundamentally discontented with life in the Austrian state and considered the state symbolized by the Habsburg dynasty to be their own. The living standard of the majority of the population in the early twentieth century was higher than that of their ancestors. Hardly anybody could imagine the disintegration of the centuries-old monarchy. The Great War, especially its second half, brought about a fundamental change. The deterioration of the economic and social situation resulted in a crisis of the legitimacy of power, which, due to the collapse in 1918, escalated into an existential crisis.

It is by no means possible to claim that the Austrian state persecuted the Czech nationality as a whole during the war, but it did considerably curtail Czech national life, monitoring and sometimes even persecuting many representatives of Czech politics and the intelligentsia, that is, strata significantly influencing collective identity and stances. The last months and years of the war, which were full of misery and hardship previously unknown for generations among the civilian population, were reflected in the Czech divergence from the Habsburg Monarchy. The new state order was meant to symbolize change and hope. The tense social situation did not end with the declaration of the state and the signing of the armistice. Life in the first postwar weeks and months was both materially and mentally very demanding. Social issues became central in everyday life and politics. In the case of Czech society, a positive element was the confidence in the republican future; the delight at the national rise and “war victory” eased surmounting the tense social and political divergences much better than was the case for the German, Polish, and Jewish populations in the new state.

German political and intellectual elites, accustomed to key positions, found it difficult to reconcile themselves to the changes in the composition of the civil service as well as local authorities in connection with the consolidation of Czechoslovak state power.

## NOTES

1. This article has been produced with the financial support of the European Union under the REFRESH – Research Excellence For Region Sustainability and High-tech Industries project number CZ.10.03.01/00/22\_003/0000048 via the Operational Programme Just Transition.
2. Jana Machačová and Jiří Matějček, *Nástin sociálního vývoje českých zemí 1781–1914* (Slezské zemské muzeum, 2002), 426–29.
3. Gary B. Cohen, “Our Laws, Our Taxes, Our Administration: Citizenship in Imperial Austria,” in *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg,*

- Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands*, ed. Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz (Indiana University Press, 2013), 105.
4. Jakub S. Beneš, *Workers & Nationalism: Czech and German Social Democracy in Habsburg Austria, 1890–1918* (Oxford University Press, 2017).
  5. Jiří Malíř and Milan Řepa, *Dějiny Moravy. Morava na cestě k občanské společnosti* (Muzejní a vlastivědná společnost and Historický ústav Akademie věd České republiky, 2018), 268.
  6. Jan Křen, *Konfliktní společenství Češi a Němci 1780–1918* (Academia, 1990), 404. Translated from Czech.
  7. Peter Heumos, “‘Kartoffeln her oder es gibt eine Revolution’: Hungerkrawalle, Streiks und Massenproteste in den böhmischen Ländern 1914–1918,” in *Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Beziehungen zwischen Tschechen, Slowaken und Deutschen*, ed. Hanns Mommsen, Dušan Kováč, Jiří Malíř, and Michaela Marek (Klartext, 2001), 256, 261.
  8. Malíř and Řepa, *Dějiny Moravy*, 279. Translated from Czech.
  9. Zemský archiv Opava (ZAO) [Provincial Archives in Opava], Policejní ředitelství Moravská Ostrava (PŘMO), prezidiální spisy, cart. 188, call no. 1131.
  10. Malíř and Řepa, *Dějiny Moravy*, 279–80. Translated from Czech.
  11. ZAO, PŘMO, prezidiální spisy, cart. 188, call no. 1131, Pr. 1542/192. Translated from German.
  12. Especially at the end of the war, predominantly German, Hungarian, or Bosnian assistance units were deployed in the Czech-speaking territory. Milan Šedivý, *Češi, české země a Velká válka 1914–1918* (NLN, 2001), 324.
  13. Malíř and Řepa, *Dějiny Moravy*, 278.
  14. Státní okresní archiv (SOkA) [State District Archives] Olomouc, Okresní úřad Olomouc, M-3, inv. no. 289.
  15. Ota Konrád and Rudolf Kučera, *Cesta z apokalypsy. Fyzické násilí v pádu a obnově střední Evropy 1914–1922* (Academia, 2018), 180.
  16. Paul Molisch, *Die sudetendeutsche Freiheitsbewegung in den Jahren 1918–1919* (Braumüller, 1932).
  17. Susanne Maurer-Horn, “Die Landesregierung für Deutschböhmen und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht 1918–1919,” *Bohemia. Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur der böhmischen Länder. A Journal of History and Civilisation in East Central Europe* 38, no. 1 (1997): 41, 42.
  18. *Verhandlungsschriften des Troppauer Gemeinderates*, Troppau 1918, no. 20, 04. 09. 1918.
  19. *Verhandlungsschriften des Troppauer Gemeinderates*, Troppau 1918, no. 24, 30. 10. 1918.
  20. The Social Democrats had never been elected to the municipal government before due to limited suffrage.
  21. *Verhandlungsschriften des Troppauer Gemeinderates*, Troppau 1918, no. 25, 31. 10. 1918. Translated from German.

22. *Verhandlungsschriften des Troppauer Gemeinderates*, Troppau 1918, no. 28, 20. 12. 1918.
23. "Ze Slezska," *Národní politika*, December 8, 1918: "There are machine guns as well as artillery placed around Opava."
24. *Teplitz-Schönauer Anzeiger*, December 14, 1918, 3.
25. *Neue Freie Presse*, December 19, 1918, 1.
26. "Der tschechoslowakische Eroberungskrieg," *Voralberger Wacht*, December 22, 1918, 3; "Die Besetzung der Troppau durch tschechoslowakischen Truppen," *Deutsche Post für Sudetenland*, December 19, 1918; "Eine Protestversammlung in Troppau," *Deutsche Post*, December 29, 1918.
27. "Auslösung der Troppauer Gemeindevertretung," *Deutsche Post*, January 18, 1919.
28. Maurer-Horn, "Die Landesregierung," 40–42, 52–54.
29. Karl Braun, "Der 4. März 1919. Zur Herausbildung sudetendeutscher Identität," *Bohemia. Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur der böhmischen Länder. A Journal of History and Civilisation in East Central Europe* 37, no. 2 (1996): 367–68.
30. Andrea Pokludová, "Änderung in der Stadtverwaltung nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg in Troppau und Olmütz," in *Stadt und Krieg im 20. Jahrhundert: neue Perspektiven auf Deutschland und Ostmitteleuropa*, ed. Christoph Cornelisse, Václav Petrbok, and Martin Pekár (Klartext, 2019), 110.
31. "Die Ereignisse vom 4. März," *Deutsche Post*, March 5, 1919, 2.
32. ZAO, Slezská zemská vláda, inv. no. 982, cart. 50.
33. *Amtsblatt der Königlichen Hauptstadt Olmütz*. Olmütz 1917–1920, 2.
34. "Die Umbenennung der Strassen und Plätze in Troppau," *Deutsche Post*, March 15, 1919, 3.
35. ZAO, Národní rada československá - slezský odbor Opava, cart. 2, a letter by the Silesian division of the Czechoslovak National Council to the board of the Provincial Political Administration Office in Opava dated April 27, 1922.
36. Accessible on <http://palackhi.blogspot.cz/2015/05/pomnik-cisare-frantiska-josefa-i-v.html>.
37. ZAO, PŘMO, prezidiální spisy, call no. 422, cart. 216.
38. Konrád and Kučera, *Cesta z apokalypsy*, 220.
39. Archiv Města Ostrava (AMO) [Ostrava City Archives], ONV Moravská Ostrava, inv. no. 23, cart. 1.
40. SOkA Olomouc, Okresní úřad Olomouc, M-3, inv. no. 289.
41. Konrád and Kučera, *Cesta z apokalypsy*, 271.
42. ZAO, PŘMO, prezidiální spisy, cart. 199, inv. no. 110.
43. Malíř and Řepa, *Dějiny Moravy*, 277.
44. ZAO, PŘMO, státně policejní spisy, cart. 622, call no. 476.
45. ZAO, PŘMO, prezidiální spisy, cart. 622, call no. 561. Translated from Czech.
46. Christoph Stözl, *Kafkovy zlé Čechy. K sociální historii pražského žida* (Nakladatelství

- Franze Kafka, 1997), 101. Translated from Czech.
47. Stözl, *Kafkovy zlé Čechy*, 102, 103. Translated from Czech.
  48. SOkA Olomouc, Okresní úřad Olomouc, M-3, inv. no. 289.
  49. See <http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1918ns/ps/stenprot/130schuz/s130002.htm>. Accessed January 1, 2016.
  50. Pokludová, "Änderung in der Stadtverwaltung," 110.
  51. SOkA Olomouc, Okresní úřad Olomouc—venkov, cart. 3, inv. no. 291.
  52. Konrád and Kučera, *Cesta z apokalypsy*, 276.
  53. Martin Klečáček, *Poslušný vládce okresu: okresní hejtman a proměny státní moci v Čechách v letech 1868–1938* (NLN, 2021), 84–87.
  54. SOkA Olomouc, Okresní úřad Olomouc—venkov, cart 2, inv. no. 117. Translated from Czech.
  55. SOkA Olomouc, Okresní úřad Olomouc—venkov, cart 2, inv. no. 117.
  56. Seven German governors vowed obedience to the declared German provinces Sudetenland and Deutschsüdmähren in early November 1918, making them automatically unacceptable for the Czechoslovak state. Twenty out of thirty-six Moravian district governors were replaced at the beginning of Czechoslovakia (sixteen Germans and four Czechs).
  57. SOkA Olomouc, Okresní úřad Olomouc—venkov, cart 4, inv. no. 291.
  58. Karel Schelle, *Vývoj veřejné správy v letech 1848–1990* (Eurolex Bohemia, 2005), 293–309.
  59. The reason was not only the officially stated small area of the Silesian province, but also the endeavor to curtail the political influence of the local Sudeten-Germans and Poles.
  60. Marie Gawrecká, *Československé Slezsko mezi světovými válkami 1918–1938* (Slezská univerzita, 2004), 96.
  61. "Sloučení Slezska s Moravou," *Obrana Slezska*, December 12, 1928, 4. Translated from Czech.
  62. Andrea Pokludová, "Národnostní poměry Slezska a Ostravska," in *Slezsko a Ostravsko 1918–1938*, ed. Ondřej Kolář (Slezské zemské muzeum, 2018), 24–36. Translated from German.
  63. AMO, ONV Moravská Ostrava, cart. 1, inv. no. 23; "Letzte Sitzung der Stadtverordneten-Kollegium," *Mährisches Tagblatt*, November 12, 1918, 4.
  64. AMO, Archiv města Moravská Ostrava, nová registratura, cart. 414. The Administrative Commission of Vítkovice informs the administrator of the district governor's office as the chairman of the district school board on August 22, 1919.
  65. AMO, Městský školní výbor Ostrava, uninventoried, 03. 11. 1919, the minutes of the session of the District School Board in Moravská Ostrava.
  66. It was affirmed by Ruling No. 11297 of the Supreme Administrative Court dated June 27, 1923.

67. Otakar Skýpala and Ladislav Rozehnal, *Ostravský sborník a adresář II. ročník. Rok 1909–1910* (Moravská Ostrava, 1910), 209–12, 214–16, 224–27.
68. Lukáš Lisník, “Transformace školství v Moravské Ostravě po roce 1918 ve vybraných aspektech. Na příkladu mateřského, obecného a občanského školství,” *Ostrava: příspěvky k dějinám a současnosti Ostravy a Ostravska* 33 (2019): 212.
69. *Almanach města Moravské Ostravy* (Moravská Ostrava, 1929), 233, 236.
70. Blažena Przybylová et al., *Ostrava* (NLN, 2013), 426.
71. ZAO, PŘMO, prezidiální spisy, cart. 627, call no. 850.
72. SOkA Olomouc, M5–1, Okresní školní výbor. Translated from Czech.
73. Due to the ambiguity in terminology, the term “minority school” has been used in both practice and journalism since the times of Austria-Hungary to describe schools established in areas where the majority population spoke a language different from the language of instruction at the particular school.
74. Miloš Trapl, “České menšinové školství v letech 1918–1938,” in *České národní aktivity v pohraničních oblastech první Československé republiky*, ed. Olga Šrajeroová (Filozofická fakulta Univerzity Palackého, 2003), 115.
75. Václav Kural, *Konflikt místo společenství? Češi a Němci v československém státě (1918–1938)* (ÚMV, 1993), 101.
76. Michal Šimáně, *České menšinové školství v Československé republice. Ke každodennosti obecných škol v politickém okresu Ústí nad Labem* (Masarykova univerzita, 2019), 73.
77. Kural, *Konflikt místo společenství?*, 101.
78. For details, see Petr Kadlec, Pavel Kladiwa, Dan Gawrecki, Andrea Pokludová, and Petr Popelka, *Národnostní statistika v českých zemích 1880–1930. Vol. II* (Ostravská univerzita and NLN, 2016), 272–81.
79. For details, see Michal Sojčák, “Nabývání československého státního občanství v letech 1918–1935 (Na příkladu politického okresu Moravská Ostrava),” *Ostrava. Příspěvky k dějinám a současnosti Ostravy a Ostravska* 24 (2009): 157–58.
80. *Československá statistika. Svazek 9, Řada VI. (Sčítání lidu, sešit 1). Sčítání lidu v Republice československé ze dne 15. února 1921. I. díl* (Státní úřad statistický, 1924), 54\*.
81. *Československá statistika* (Státní úřad statistický, 1924), 90\*.
82. *Oesterreichische Statistik. Neue Folge. Band I: Die Ergebnisse der der Volkszählung vom 31. Dezember 1910, Heft 2: Die Bevölkerung nach der Gebürtigkeit, Religion und Umgangssprache in Verbindung mit dem Geschlechte, nach dem Bildungsgrade und Familienstande; die körperlichen Gebrechen; die soziale Gliederung der Haushaltungen* (K. K. Statistische Zentralkommission, 1914) 54–55.
83. *Československá statistika. Svazek 9, řada VI, Sčítání lidu v RČS ze dne 15. února 1921, I. díl* (Státní úřad statistický, 1924), 67\*. Out of 93,757 foreigners in Bohemia, 60.8 percent registered German nationality. Out of 46,448 foreigners in Moravia, 42 percent registered German, 19.1 percent Polish, and 6.7 percent

- Jewish nationality. Out of 49,530 foreigners in Silesia, 42.6 percent registered Polish, 23.55 percent German, and 2 percent Jewish nationality.
84. Petr, Popelka, "Revolution in the Town Halls: The Formation of Czechoslovakia, the Battle for the Town Halls and Power Transition in the Municipal Authorities of Moravian Towns after 1918," *The City and History* 10, no. 2 (2021): 61. The establishment of Greater Brno was reflected in an increase in the proportion of Czechoslovak nationality by 11.1 percent and a decrease in the proportion of German nationality by 10.25 percent; the establishment of Greater Olomouc (similarly to Brno, achieved by incorporating predominantly Czech-speaking suburban municipalities) brought about an increase in Czechs by 8.1 percent and a decrease in Germans by 6.8 percent. In the case of Znojmo, the cancellation of its status and its incorporation directly into the district caused an increase in Czechoslovak nationality by 4.5 percent and a decrease in German nationality by 5.4 percent.

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# HISTORICAL DEBATE ABOUT THE SHARED ROOTS AND DIVERGENT CAUSES OF THE GREEN, RED, AND WHITE TERRORS

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THE DISSOLUTION OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE IN THE FALL OF 1918 inaugurated a period of rapid change in East-Central Europe. Independent Hungary, which emerged as one of the “successor states” to the Dual Monarchy, experienced two revolutions in ten months. Political violence, which, in the forms of bread riots, strikes, and pogroms, had been on rise since the end of 1917, reached a new height during the Hungarian Soviet Republic in the spring and summer of 1919. The Red Terror (as the systematic use of violence by the radical leftist regime to destroy resistance to its rule and intimidate political opponents became known) provoked a backlash after the collapse of the Soviet Republic at the end of July 1919. During the “hot phase” of the counterrevolution, between August 1919 and March 1920, the right-wing paramilitary groups, the police, and the antisemitic mobs targeted for arrest and execution not only the enforcers of the defunct Soviet Republic, but also labor activists and socialist sympathizers, especially among workers and poor peasants and Jews. The high majority of conservatives and right-radical contemporaries identified Jews as the source of, and indeed the main force behind, the two revolutions.<sup>1</sup> While attacks on Jews had been common during the democratic and Communist interludes, antisemitic violence acquired a new dimension during the counterrevolution. After the Ukrainian part of Soviet Russia, the pogroms and armed robberies seem to have claimed the most casualties and caused the most material damage in Hungary in the late 1910s and early

1920s.<sup>2</sup> The police and the paramilitary groups arrested, imprisoned, or threw into hastily constructed internment camps about 40,000 individuals, which included labor leaders, political activists, the functionaries of the Soviet Republic, and innocent bystanders denounced by their jealous neighbors and colleagues. About the same number of people, including some of Hungary's best minds, were forced into exile or left in desperation over their country's fate. By the end of 1921, the political and military elite had been able to reign in the militias; however, isolated attacks on Jews, as well as socialist, democratic organizations, and politicians, continued well into the mid-1920s.

The idea that the White Terror represented a mild reaction to Communist brutality first emerged in the writing of conservative and right-radical journalists and political commentators in the late summer and early fall of 1919. In colorful reports and fiery editorials, the journalists described their experiences and the rumors that they may have heard about Red crimes and enforcers. The same commentators kept quiet about, denied the existence of, or trivialized the nature of the atrocities perpetrated by the right-wing militias and the police during the counterrevolution, however.<sup>3</sup> The political pamphlets published in Hungary between 1919 and 1921 compared the impact of the Soviet Republic and the Red Terror to the greatest tragedies in Hungarian history, such as the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century and the Ottoman occupation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. On the other hand, the same authors attributed no such significance to the White Terror, which they believed was only a knee-jerk reaction to the Communist crimes: A regrettable event, which had no deep roots in Hungarian history or political culture and no long-term consequences.<sup>4</sup> The Miklós Horthy biographies published in the interwar period repeated the same argument. Their authors tried to distinguish the supreme commander of the National Army from his unruly officers' detachments. They argued that the officers' detachments and the civic militias operated largely independently of Admiral Horthy; many of the units were, in fact, armed gangs dressed in stolen army uniforms, and their members were Communists, who sought to destroy the reputation of the National Army. Horthy neither ordered nor participated in any of the atrocities; when he learned about the illegal arrests, the admiral moved quickly to save the victims and severely punish the culprits.<sup>5</sup>

The Hungarian interpretation of the Red and White terrors closely mirrored the contemporary Italian and German narratives about their own civil wars: In both fascist Italy and interwar Germany, bourgeois commentators and the veterans of the militia movements habitually portrayed extra-legal violence attributed to the *Arditi* and the German *Freikorps* as an understandable reaction to Socialist and Communist crimes.<sup>6</sup> The idea of right-wing political violence as a reaction to Communist atrocities did not die with the end of World War II, but found its way into the conservative liberal interpretation of fascism in the 1960s.<sup>7</sup> The conviction that the Red atrocities foreshadowed, and indeed somehow provoked, the Nazi crimes informed the argument of many of the

conservative participants in the *Historikerstreit* (in the historians' debate on the rise of Hitler, the place of Nazism in history, and the behavior of German troops in the final phase of World War II) in West Germany in the mid-1980s.<sup>8</sup>

The collapse of the one-party state in 1989 witnessed a revival of the Horthy cult in Hungary. With the image of Horthy as the savior of the country from the Bolshevik threat, and the restorer of law and order, the narrative about the Hungarian Soviet Republic as the product of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy also resurfaced; however, it has attracted relatively few followers, especially among professional historians.<sup>9</sup> The latest book on the history of the Hungarian Soviet Republic emphasizes the ideological fanaticism, unscrupulousness, occasional cruelty, and inexperience of the radical politicians who grabbed power in March 1919, as well as the bureaucratic chicaneries and heavy-handedness that characterized political practices during the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Pál Hatos's study questions the much-touted achievements of the proletarian dictatorship in the social and cultural realms, and sheds doubt on the claim of Marxist historians that the new regime drastically increased social mobility. Neither the peasants nor the majority of workers, he argues, fully identified with the proletarian dictatorship, and even tried to sabotage those plans and policies of the political class, which harmed their interests. In Hatos's reading, state violence, including the Red Terror, was a logical, albeit disproportional, response to the population's resistance to, and rejection of, the totalitarian pretention of the Communist dictatorship.<sup>10</sup> Like some of the liberal and conservative commentators in the interwar period, contemporary historians after 1990 have attributed the Red and White terrors to the psychological consequences of the war and the social and political chaos in its aftermath. While most scholars admit that the White Terror was a response to, and revenge for, the Red crimes, they also maintain that the two events ran parallel with each other: Both had their origins in the war; the Red and the White paramilitaries attracted the same types of people as perpetrators; and the violence that they perpetrated claimed about the same number of victims. Whereas interwar commentators described the Red Terror as one of the worst tragedies in Hungarian and European history, and Marxist scholars after 1945 identified the White Terror as the founding moment of the "fascist" state and a prelude to World War II, Jewish genocide, and the "counterrevolution" of 1956.<sup>11</sup> Contemporary historians, on the other hand, portray left- and right-wing paramilitary and mob violence after 1918 as a sterile force—as the swan song of the Great War—rather than as a prelude to a world revolution or the founding moment of the interwar regime.<sup>12</sup>

This new/old interpretation of postwar violence in Hungary coincides with, and in part has drawn inspiration from, international scholarship on the history of the post-1918 period. In the last ten years, the immediate postwar period and paramilitary violence have emerged as an independent field of inquiry, connected with, but not subordinated to, the study of fascism. The three dominant explanations of both left- and

right-wing paramilitary violence between 1917 and 1924 have revolved around the “retreat of the state,” the “brutalization” of soldiers and civilians, and the “culture of defeat,” emphasizing the importance of humiliation in the lost war, the loss of the monopoly of the state on the means of violence, political chaos, economic collapse, and desensitization of soldiers and civilians to violence.<sup>13</sup>

## PEASANT REBELLION AND VIOLENCE

Besides the Red and White terrors, recent studies have drawn attention to the existence of new types of political violence and perpetrators, who do not fit neatly into the Red-White paradigm. Peasant soldiers and their family members, the so-called Greens, played a major role in the civil war in Soviet Russia (particularly in its Ukrainian part) between 1918 and 1921. There is a debate among historians about the nature and goals of this movement. While earlier studies described the Greens, particularly Nestor Machno’s troops, as anarchists, recent works have denied that the rebels drew their inspiration from the ideas of Proudhon, Bakunin, and Sorel. The Greens in Soviet Russia possessed neither a comprehensive ideology nor a vision of the future. The Greens seem to have been motivated by atavistic ideas and raw emotions: The vociferous hatred of the state and its local representatives; the dislike of the cities and their culture and inhabitants; the love of their villages and regions, and the determination to defend their autonomy at any price; xenophobia—the dislike of ethnic and religious outsiders, such as Germans, Greeks, and Jews; and, last not least, the lowly desire to loot, pillage, torture, and kill. Unlike true anarchists, peasant rebels were backward-looking. They were inspired by the ideas and political practices of “stone-age Communism,” rather than by science or modern political theories.<sup>14</sup> Jakub Beneš and Paul Newman, too, have detected the same atavistic features in the ideology of Czech, Croat, and Serbian peasant rebels in the aftermath of the Great War.<sup>15</sup>

Recent studies in Hungary, too, have also emphasized the role of deprivation, social grievances, the decline in the power of state, and its loss of monopoly on violence in the *jacqueries* committed in 1918 and early 1919. Peasant violence in Hungary has been described as a product of the war—as a response to material deprivation, class injustice, and discrimination.<sup>16</sup> Since anarchism in Hungary (unlike in Spain and Italy) was an urban and middle-class phenomenon, historians have sought the roots of the peasant revolt in the ideas and political practices associated with agrarian socialist movement at the turn of the century.<sup>17</sup> Like in Soviet Russia, the Greens in historical Hungary often vented their aggression on the ethnic minorities or in regions where the ethnic minorities made up the majority of the local population, on Hungarian-speaking administrator, landowners, merchants, and professionals. What had been a class conflict thus

took on the characteristics of a struggle for liberation and national independence.<sup>18</sup> The Greens in Hungary also shared their Ukrainian counterparts' dislike of Jews, even if the number of the victims of antisemitic violence in Hungary in 1918 was dwarfed by the number of Jews murdered by soldiers and pillaging peasants in the western parts of Soviet Russia during the civil war.

Recent studies have focused their attention on the action (and inactions) of the new democratic governments to end the peasant uprisings, restore law and order, and defend the country's territorial integrity. These studies have rejected the traditional argument that the democratic governments, led by naive and politically inexperienced intellectuals, deliberately sabotaged the efforts of seasoned officers and civil servants to create a new army and police force. They have shown that reorganization of the Hungarian Army in the fall and winter of 1918 had more to do with war weariness and the refusal of peasants to serve than with the pacifist conviction of some of the ministers and high-ranking administrators of the new democratic government. The reorganization of the armed forces had switched into a higher gear at the end of the year. It remains true, however, that the local successes of the reorganized army came too late to prevent the full occupation of the ethnically mixed provinces.<sup>19</sup>

Newer studies also reject the argument that the democratic governments were too indecisive to restore law and order, and that Hungarian society had lost its healthy instinct to put up a strong defense. The new studies show that the reorganization of the police, in contrast to the reorganization of the army, was seen as a priority from the start, and the government's determination to restore its strength also enjoyed strong public support. The socialist trade unions backed the formation of civic guards not only to restore law and order, but also to prevent a radical Right or a Communist coup.<sup>20</sup> Both the trade unions under the influence of moderate social democrats and National Association of Manufacturers (*Gyáripárosok Országos Szövetsége*), the main professional organization of factory owners, helped the government to set up the People's Guard (*Népőrség*), an umbrella organization of the paramilitary groups, in early November 1919. Simultaneously housing blocks, sport associations, and even banks also formed their separate paramilitary units. With the explicit approval of the democratic government, professional soldiers, and reserve officers (established as the Defense Guard of Budapest, *Budapesti Védőrség*) in the final months of the year.<sup>21</sup> In the countryside, provincial administrators, noble and bourgeois landowners, and wealthy peasants set up similar groups. Jewish reserve officers and war veterans, both in the towns and in the countryside, created their own paramilitary organizations to put an end to looting and prevent violent assaults.<sup>22</sup> These local militias attracted people from all walks of life—soldiers, gendarmes and policemen, students, and even ex-priests and criminals found their way into the new organization. The organization of the militias proved to be a mixed blessing in the ethnically mixed regions. While they helped to restore law

and order, the most non-Hungarian militia men acted as a fifth column by paving the way to Czech, Romanian, and Serbian occupation and playing a key role in the smooth transfer of power (*imperiumváltás*).<sup>23</sup>

The democratic governments did not hesitate to take strong measures to restore law and order in the fall and winter of 1918. With their permission, in dozens of places, the police and the militias fired into the crowds or used more palatable means to disband the groups of rioters. No exact statistics exist as to the number of people shot, beat to death, or summarily executed by the police and the various militias in the fall and winter of 1918, but their numbers must have run into the hundreds.<sup>24</sup> The two democratic governments thus not only set up the militias, whose internal structure, social composition, and the mindset and motives of their members bore an uncanny resemblance to the Red and White paramilitary groups in 1919, but their actions also contributed to the spiral of violence during the democratic interlude.

Marxist historians in the 1960s and 1970s recognized the revolutionary potential inherent in peasant uprising and blamed the democratic governments and the social democratic party for failing to exploit this potential by forming an alliance with the rebelling peasants to uproot the old social and political order completely. More recent studies, on the other hand, argue that the peasant rebels lacked both class consciousness and the clear goals (not to mention the inclination to form political alliances with urban groups) of true revolutionaries.<sup>25</sup> Peasant violence shared some features with, but also differed from, its Red and White counterparts in one important aspect. In all three cases, besides greed and cruelty, the agents of violence pursued political goals: They all sought to terrorize their opponents and convince them either to cease to resist or leave their communities. Alone among the three groups, the Greens lacked state support. While the Red Terror was, for a while, state policy, and the White militias either carried out the orders, or at least enjoyed the support (in the fall and winter of 1919) of the military and political elite, the Greens' actions alienated every social and political group and provoked a violent response from the state. The term "Green terror" in the title of this essay refers to the cruelty and private intentions of the perpetrators of violence only. It does not imply, however, that the state or the political elite supported the uprisings in any way. The peasant rebels may have drawn inspiration from the egalitarianism of the agrarian socialist movement, which had been popular at the turn of the century. However, they possessed neither the agrarian socialists' democratic credentials, pacifist convictions, and humanism nor their ethnic and religious tolerance and peasant internationalism. The frequent reference in the recent publications to "peasant revolutions" and "revolutionary violence" thus does not justice to the true nature of the movement and the actions of the rioters. The rebels were no revolutionaries. Like their Ukrainian counterparts, they lacked a comprehensive ideology, the utopia of a new and better world, and the vision of a more perfect man. The uprisings did not

create myths, heroes, martyrs, rituals, and songs, that is, it did not give birth to a new political culture. Its only positive impact seems to have been to convince the political and social elite about the necessity of land reform.

## THE ACTION-REACTION FORCE PAIR PARADIGM

The most important debate about the postwar era revolves around the action-reaction force pair paradigm as it refers to the Red and White terrors. This debate is neither new, nor is it confined to Hungary. The notion that the White Terror was only a response to Communist violence has been with us since the French Revolution. Because the first part of the essay has already covered historiography, in the second half of the essay, I will focus on the basis of my recent research and publications, on the benefits and the disadvantages associated with the application of a scientific concept (the action-reaction force pair paradigm) to a historical event—in this case, to political violence in Hungary after World War I.<sup>26</sup>

The action-reaction force pair paradigm is best stated by the famous American historian, Arno J. Mayer, in his book on the French and the Russian revolutions: “It takes two to make revolution, and counter-revolution is revolution’s other half. Revolution and counter-revolution are bound to each other as reaction is bound to action, and making for a historical motion, which . . . is at once dialectical and driven by necessity.”<sup>27</sup>

The action-reaction force pair paradigm, which has been borrowed from the field of physics, implied that every action provokes an equally strong reaction. A close look at the Red and White terrors in Hungary, however, reveals that the two types of violence did not fully overlap with each other. The White Terror, for example, lasted longer and claimed far more lives than its Red counterpart.<sup>28</sup> The victims came from different social milieus: The Red militias targeted mainly the elite and the middle classes, and left the poor (especially blue-collar workers but also estate servants and agricultural laborers) alone. On the other hand, the White militias attacked, first, the poor—agricultural laborers, poor farmers, and blue-collar workers, then the middle and the lower middle classes. The elite, on the other hand (unless they were of Jewish descent), had no reason to fear the White paramilitary groups. Within the middle and lower middle classes, the Reds were more likely to kill farmers than merchants, whereas the Whites singled out teachers, doctors, advocates, journalists, artists, and other, mainly Jewish, professionals, rather than rural administrators, officers, and policemen for violent attacks. Yet the most important difference between the two groups was their attitude towards Jews. Jews, because of their wealth and high social status, remained over-represented among the victims of the Red Terror. The Red militias did not target Jews

because of their ethnicity or religion. The number of Jews who had been physically abused, tortured, and killed during the Communist interlude, too, paled in comparison to the number of Jews victims of the White Terror.<sup>29</sup>

The spatial dimension and intensity of the Red and White terrors did not completely overlap either. The Red Terror devastated mainly the countryside; less than ten percent of its victims came from the capital. The majority—perhaps as many as three-quarters—of the victims of the Red Terror were farmers or part-time farmers (gendarmes, who also owned some land, for example), landowners, and estate managers, that is, people who drew their livelihood from the land. The Red Terror was not only about the conflict between the rich (the bourgeoisie and elite) and the poor (the workers and agricultural laborers, on the other hand), but also about the fight between the city and the countryside—between urban consumers and rural producers.

The Red Terror did not impact every region and county equally. Militia and state violence ravaged mainly the western (Transdanubia) and the central parts of the country (Duna-Tisza Watershed). Peasant farmers in these regions tended to work larger estates; they were better educated and more market-oriented than their counterparts in other parts of the country. Within Central Hungary, Bács-Kiskun County experienced more atrocities than the neighboring three counties combined. On the Great and Lesser Plains, the Red militias singled out small or mid-sized agrarian towns (Kecskemét, Szolnok); religious centers (Kalocsa); and market-oriented villages and small towns in the outskirts of Budapest with often ethnic German populations (Soltvadaskert, Harta) for reprisals. In Transdanubia, they targeted old urban settlements in close or relative proximity to the Austrian border, such as Sopron and Győr.<sup>30</sup>

The White Terror, too, devastated mainly the central and the western parts of the country. Many of the same agrarian towns (Szolnok, Kalocsa, Kecskemét, etc.), which had functioned as the centers of the Red Terror, also stood high on the Whites' priority list. However, the overlap was far from complete: Many towns and villages, which attracted attention as the center of antisemitic violence during the White Terror, had been quiet during the Soviet interlude. While the Red militias were active in only a few counties and towns during the Council Republic, the White Terror, in the form of antisemitic excesses, left no region and count untouched. The Red Terror took three-quarters of its victims from Central Hungary; on the other hand, the majority of attacks on Jews during the White Terror occurred in Transdanubia. The two counties (Bács-Kiskun and Pest), which functioned as the center of the Red Terror in Central Hungary also witnessed dozens of atrocities during the counterrevolution. On the other hand, Somogy, Veszprém, and Tolna Counties in the western part of the country, which served as the centers of antisemitic violence after August 1919, had been relatively quiet during the radical leftist experiment. The White Terror took its victims from market-oriented regions, small towns, and villages, where there was a strong Jewish bourgeoisie and middle

class, and where the White militias temporarily took over the reins of municipal and county governments after August 1919.<sup>31</sup>

## AGENCY AND TARGET SELECTION

There were also significant differences between the Red and White terrors in regard to the social background and motivation of the agents of violence. Nobles were overrepresented in the most important officers' companies in the fall and winter of 1919. The leaders of the less prestigious local militias came from the local elite and middle class, while their rank-and-file were recruited from the lower middle and the lower classes. With a few exceptions, the members of the officers' detachments had graduated from high school (this was, of course, also true for the two student battalions in Budapest). The majority of the officers and noncommissioned officers in the elite units spoke at least one foreign language, more than fifty percent knew two or more. With the exception of cadets, all the members of the Prónay and Ostenburg Officers' Companies served in the war. All but the professional soldiers were promoted to officer ranks and progressed in rank during the war. The majority received more than one decoration for bravery, and a handful even earned a reputation as war heroes.<sup>32</sup>

The Red militias, as one might expect, recruited their leaders and rank-and-file from the lower classes. Both the leaders and the rank-and-file of the most infamous Red militias, the Lenin Boys and the Bertók Detachment, hailed almost entirely from the working class. The Lenin Boys and the Bertók Detachment attracted mainly unskilled workers; on the other hand, about half of all members of the Red Guard (*Vörös Őrség*) were skilled laborers. The members of the two elite Red units were in their early twenties in 1919 (regarding their age, they were indistinguishable from the officers' detachments). The Red Guards, on the other hand, appealed to a somewhat older group of workers. Only a small minority (8 percent) was under twenty-five, whereas almost half (46 percent) were middle-aged (over thirty-one years old). About two-thirds of the members of the Lenin Boys came from Budapest; the rest hailed from small and mid-sized provincial towns, rather than villages or isolated farmsteads. There were no peasants in the Cserny and Bertók detachments, and only a couple among the members of the Red Guards were put on trial at the end of 1919. The leaders and the rank-and-file of the Red militias were less educated than the members of the officers' detachments or the right-wing civic militias. Only one person among the Lenin Boys on trial had a high school diploma; the rest attended school only for four years. On the other hand, none of their members were illiterate, which suggests that the members of Red paramilitary groups were somewhat better educated than the general population, and that their level of education matched that of the working-class youth in the cities. Unlike

the leaders and the rank-and-file of the White officers' detachments and many commanders of the civic militias, none of them were promoted to officer rank or became national heroes. Every member of the Red militias put on trial in December 1919 had been enlisted in the army during the war; however, they served as lowly infantry men or sailors, rather than hussars, pilots, or rangers.<sup>33</sup>

There were a handful of convicted criminals in the White civic militias, especially in the Héjjas Detachment; however, they represented at best a few percentages of the rank-and-file and did not have much power in their units. On the other hand, contemporaries were convinced that many of the Lenin Boys had come from the criminal underworld. Even though no evidence so far has surfaced to support their contention, the trial documents do suggest that ex-convicts and petty thieves played a more important role in the Red militias than in their White counterparts. The Whites employed women only as informers; the Red militias, on the other hand, enlisted a small number of women as regular soldiers. Two, Anna Tóth and Mancsi Fallós, became notorious robbers and torturers.<sup>34</sup>

Many middle-class commentators attributed the cruelty of the Red troops to the presence of Jewish soldiers and officers. Jews were, indeed, overrepresented (Jews made up about five percent of the population in 1914) in the most infamous Red units, the Lenin Boys—about 20 percent of the rank-and-file of the units had Jewish ancestors. Since the Jewish share in the capital's population was about 23 percent on the eve of the war, the Lenin Boys did not represent an exception. There were, moreover, very few Jews in the rank-and-file of the Bertók Detachment and in the Red Guards. With a few exceptions, the leaders of the Red militias seem to have been non-Jews; the most important of all, József Cserny, was an agnostic Roman Catholic. The high majority of the active participants in the Red Terror, in other words, were Christians.<sup>35</sup>

The Red and White units vented their aggression on different groups. Less than one-third of the victims of the Red Terror were enforcers (officers, noncommissioned officers, and common soldiers and policemen). Four-fifths of the victims had participated in the armed uprising or were believed to have conspired against the radical leftist regime. About five percent of the victims of the Red Terrors had been deserters and common criminals, who would have been prosecuted and killed by any regime. Only five percent of the victims of the Red Terror were murdered because of their social background (as aristocrats or members of the bourgeoisie, for example), rather than for their actions. These numbers contrast sharply with the result of ethnic and religious persecution during the White Terror. As mentioned above, at least one-third of the people killed by the militias after August 1919 were Jews, the majority of who had been murdered not for having resisted the regime but merely because they were Jewish.

Finally, the Red units seem to have been somewhat less cruel and less accomplished as torturers and killers than their White counterparts. About ninety percent of the

victims of the Red Terror were shot. The White militias, on the other hand, routinely tortured their victims, and chose more cruel methods to execute their captives. The court of the counterrevolutionary regime sentenced the commander of the Lenin Boys, József Cserny, to death for ordering and participating in the execution of seven people. The authorities tried Iván Héjjas, the head of the infamous Héjjas militia, in absentia for the death of ninety-three individuals. In the end, the court found Héjjas guilty of murder on seventy-two counts. Even Prónay's right-hand man, Lieutenant Dénes Bibó, was charged with killing of sixty-four people in 1946.<sup>36</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The paramilitary and mob violence after World War I can be divided into three (Green, Red, and White) phases. All three phases had their roots in the war and in the economic collapse and social dislocation in its aftermath. Each phase was connected to grievances and political culture of a social group: Green violence was the work of peasants; the agents of the Red Terror were mainly workers, underemployed intellectuals, the urban underclass, and agricultural laborers; the White Terror expressed the interests of, and gave form to, the paranoia of the middle class and the elite. The Greens had nothing to do with the state, whom they regarded as their enemy. On the other hand, the Reds and the Whites sought the capture state; both groups carried out the orders, or believed to have acted according to wishes of, the military and political elite.

While the action-reaction force pair paradigm does not fully explain the relationship between the Red and White terrors, it does help to shed light on the differences between the two phases of violence. The Red Terror was about common crimes, political (class) violence, and, finally, the fight between poor urban consumers (workers) and rural producers (farmers). The White Terror, on the other hand, went beyond common crimes and political violence: It could also be perceived as a conflict between Jews and non-Jews and, more importantly, between the Jewish and non-Jewish segments of the middle class. The White units were often walking in the steps of the Red soldiers. While some of the atrocities could be taken for revenge for Red violence, many of the crimes (especially armed robberies) had nothing to do with the excesses committed by the Lenin Boys and other groups. Similarly, the majority of the victims of the White Terror had not committed any crimes and had not played any role in the Soviet Republic. The Red Terror served as a convenient excuse for ethnic and religious violence, and Jews the perfect scapegoats for national and individual tragedies.

Peasant (Green) violence and the Red and the White terrors, in brief, had different origins and expressed different interests and phobias. The peasant revolution had its roots in rural violence, and in the anarchistic impulses (but not in anarchism

as a modern political ideology) of peasant culture. The Red Terror could be traced back to labor and political demonstrations, strikes, agrarian rebellions, and common crimes perpetrated by urban gangs. The White Terror, on the other hand, was rooted in middle-class culture and state violence: In the suppression of labor unrest both in the cities and the countryside, as well as in antisemitic violence before 1918. The agents of violence came from different segments of the population, subscribed to different ideologies, pursued different goals, and served different regimes. Both the Red and White militias made use of torture and unlimited violence. Yet, the Whites showed far less restraint, dispatching their victims in a crueler fashion. The White troops proved to be far more sophisticated in their use of torture and painful techniques of execution than their Red counterparts.

The actions-reaction force pair paradigm should not be fully discarded as an explanation of the White Terror. Yet the main trend was convergence rather than reaction—the convergence of different kinds of violence in the heat of the civil war. The White Terror—in the form of disciplining the lower orders, punishing their leaders, and scapegoating and robbing Jews—would have occurred without the Red Terror (and to a lesser extent without peasant violence in the fall of 1918). However, paramilitary and mob violence during the counterrevolution owed, in part, its intensity and its scope to the failed democratic and Communist experiments and the extralegal violence committed by the Lenin Boys and other left-wing paramilitary groups in the spring and summer of 1919.

## NOTES

1. Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, “Bolshevism as Fantasy: Fear of Revolution and Counterrevolutionary Violence, 1917–1923,” in *War in Peace*, ed. Robert Gerwarth and John Horne (Oxford University Press, 2012); Paul A. Hanebrink, *A Specter Haunting Europe. The Myth of Judeo-Bolshevism* (Belknap Press, 2018).
2. Historians estimate the number of Jews killed during the Civil War in the Soviet Union between fifty thousand and two hundred thousand. See Normann Stone and Michael Glenny, *The Other Russia* (Viking, 1990), 64–70; Salo W. Baron, *The Russian Jew Under Tsars and Soviets*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Schocken Books, 1987), 168–86.
3. Béla Bodó, “White Terror, Newspapers and the Evolution of Hungarian Anti-Semitism after WWI,” *Yad Vashem Studies* 34 (Spring 2006): 45–85.
4. Péter Csunderlik, *A 'Vörös Farsangtól' a 'Vörös Tatárjárásig.' A Tanácsköztársaság a Korai Horthy-Korszak Pamflet—És Visszaemlékezés Irodalmában* (Napvilág Kiadó, 2019), 27.
5. Jenő Pilch, *Horthy Miklós* (Athenaeum, 1928), 170–72, 206, 385, 390; Baroness Lily Doblhoff, *Horthy Miklós* (Athenaeum, 1938), 235–49; Owen Rutter, *Regent of Hungary: The Authorized Life of Admiral Nicholas Horthy* (London: Rich & Cowan Ltd.,

- 1939), 224–42.
6. Edgar von Schmidt-Pauli, *Geschichte der Freikorps, 1918–1924* (Robert Lutz Nachfolger, Otto Schramm, 1936).
  7. Ernst Nolte, *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche: die Action française der italienische Faschismus, der Nationalsozialismus* (R. Piper, 1963).
  8. Richard Evans, *In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape the Nazi Past* (Pantheon, 1989).
  9. On the re-emergence of the Horthy cult after 1990, see Dávid Turburz, “Antal József miniszterelnök Horthy-képe,” in *Búvópatakok. Széttétekintés. Évkönyv XIX* (Aquifers. Outlook. Yearbook XIX), ed. János M. Rainer (Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár–1956-os Alapítvány, 2013), 177–99.
  10. Pál Hatos, *Roszfűik Világforradalma. Az 1919-es Magyarországi Tanácsköztársaság Története* (Jaffa Kiadó, 2021), 196–200.
  11. Dezső Nemes, *Az ellenforradalom története Magyarországon, 1919–1921* (Akadémiai Kiadó, 1962); Ervin Hollós, *Kik voltak, mit akartak?* (Kossuth, 1967); Ervin Hollós and Vera Lajtai, *Horthy Miklós: A fehérek vezére* (Kossuth, 1985).
  12. Konrád Salamon, “Vörösteror-fehériteror. Okok és Következmények,” in *Megtorlások évszázada: Politikai terror és Erőszak a huszadik századi Magyarországon*, ed. Cecília Szederjesi (Nógrád Megyei Levéltár, 1956-os Intézet, 2008), 11–24. Szabolcs Nagy, “A ‘klerikális reakció’ fészke a Kommün alatt; A Tanácsköztársaság Veszprémben,” in *Vörös És Fehér. A Vörös És A Fehér Uralom Hátszaga 1919 Vidéken*, ed. Szabolcs Nagy (Veszprém: A Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Veszprém Megyei Levéltára, 2013), 9–19.
  13. Robert Gerwarth, *The Vanquished. Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917–1923* (Penguin, 2016); Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, eds., *War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War* (Oxford University Press, 2012).
  14. Felix Schnell, *Räume des Schreckens. Gewaltträume und Gruppenmilitanz in der Ukraine 1905–1933* (Hamburger Edition, 2012).
  15. Jakub S. Beneš, “The Green Cadres and the Collapse of Austria-Hungary in 1918,” *Past & Present* 236, no. 1 (August 2017): 207–41.
  16. Tamás Révész, *Nem akartak katonát látni? A magyar állam és hadserege 1918–1919-ben* (Bölcsész tudományi Kutatóközpont Történettudományi Intézet, 2019); Pál Hatos, *Az Elátkozott Köztársaság. Az 1918-as Összeomlás és Forradalom Története* (Jaffa Kiadó, 2018).
  17. Tamás Csiki, “A parasztság forradalma 1918-ban,” in *Háborúból békébe: A magyar társadalom 1918 után. Konfliktusok, kihívások, változások a háború és összeomlás nyomán*, ed. Zsombor Bódy (MTA Bölcsész tudományi Kutatóközpont Történettudományi Intézet, 2018), 129–49.
  18. See Zoltán Dévavári, “Örségválás és birtokbavétel. Lázadás, zendülés, forradalom és nyílt erőszak a Délvidéken (1918 október—1918 december),” in *Forradalmi Erőszak*

- Magyarországon 1918-ban*, ed. Ádám Gellért and Ákos Fóris (Erőszakkutató Intézet, 2024), 33–62; Gyula Kosztyó, “Előáll az irigység, a bosszú érzete és mindenki akar ütni valakin,” in *Forradalmi Erőszak Magyarországon 1918-ban*, 63–88; Hatos, *Az Elátkozott Köztársaság*, 172–81
19. Révész, *Nem akartak katonát látni*, 151–60; Ignác Romsics, *Erdély elvesztése, 1918–1947* (Helikon, 2019), 140–54.
  20. Hatos, *Az Elátkozott Köztársaság*, 52–54; Karl-Heinz Gräfe, “Mythos und historische Wirklichkeit eines Weltereignisses. Bürgerlich demokratische Volksrevolution und sozialistische Räterevolution in Ungarn 1918–1919,” in *Die Ungarische Räterepublik 1919. Innenansichten –Aussenperspektiven—Folgewirkungen*, ed. Christian Koller/Matthias Marschik (Promedia, 2018), 17–44, 35.
  21. Hatos, *Az Elátkozott Köztársaság*, 165–72.
  22. Levente Olosz, “Zsidóellenes erőszak és zsidóönvédelem az őszirózsás forradalomban,” in *Forradalmi Erőszak Magyarországon 1918-ban*, 135–208.
  23. Hatos, *Az Elátkozott Köztársaság*, 213–14.
  24. Hatos, *Az Elátkozott Köztársaság*, 204–6; Csiki, “A parasztság forradalma 1918-ban,” 135.
  25. Ignác Romsics, “A parasztság és a forradalmak kora,” *Valóság* 6 (1989): 14–27; Péter Csunderlik, “Magyarország ‘utolsó parasztlázadása.’ Historiográfiai és emlékeztörténeti áttekintés,” in *Forradalmi Erőszak Magyarországon 1918-ban*, 63–88; Hatos, *Az Elátkozott Köztársaság*, 11–32.
  26. For the more detailed discussion of the action-reaction force pair paradigm, see Béla Bodó, *The White Terror. Antisemitic and Political Violence in Hungary, 1919–1921* (Routledge, 2019), 93–94. Béla Bodó, “Actio und Reactio. Roter und Weißer Terror in Ungarn, 1919–1923,” in *Die Ungarische Räterepublik 1919*, ed. Christian Koller and Mathias Marschik (Promedia, 2018), 69–82.
  27. Arno J. Mayer, *The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions* (Princeton University Press, 2000), 6.
  28. The Council Republic lasted only for four months and claimed the lives of 362 people. The White Terror spanned August 1919 to November 1920 and cost the lives of seven hundred and three thousand people. See Ignác Romsics, *Hungary in the Twentieth Century* (Osiris, 1999), 109–110; Gergely Bödök, “Politikai erőszak az első világháború után: forradalmak és ellenforradalmak Magyarországon és Közép Európában,” in *Az első világháború következményei Magyarországon*, ed. Béla Tomka (Országgyűlés Hivatala, 2015), 85–108. In a recent and painstaking study, Máté Kóródi was able to identify 650 victims, and estimates the number of people killed around 1500. See Máté Kóródi, *Adattár a Magyar Nemzeti Hadsereg tiszti különítményes csoportjai és más fegyveres szervek által elkövetett gyilkosságokról, 1919. augusztus 3 – 1921. október 23* (Clio Kötetek, 2020), 10. In a previous work, I have estimated the number of the victims of the White Terror about three thousand. This number includes those who died in prison

- or died because of their injuries shortly after their release from prison. See Bodó, *The White Terror*, 93–94.
29. *Encyclopedia Judaica* reckons that three thousand out of the five thousand or six thousand people murdered in Hungary between 1919 and 1923 were Jews. See *Encyclopedia Judaica*, vol. 8 (Keter Publishing, 1973), 1095. Recently, János Gyurgyák has argued that the number of Jews killed during the counterrevolution ran into the hundreds, rather than the thousands. See János Gyurgyák, *Azsidókérdés Magyarországon* (Osiris Kiadó, 2002), 112–13. Bodó, *The White Terror*, 95–96.
  30. Bodó, *The White Terror*, 95–96; Hatos, *Roszfűük Világforradalma*, 373.
  31. Bodó, *The White Terror*, 96–97.
  32. Béla Bodó, “The White Terror in Hungary, 1919–1921. The Social World of Paramilitary Groups,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 42 (2011): 133–63.
  33. Bodó, *The White Terror*, 96–97.
  34. See Aurél Biró, *A Tanácsköztársaság fővárosi karhatalmai* (Hegyvidéki Helytörténeti Gyűjt. és Galéria, 2014), 20–30, 35.
  35. Bodó, *The White Terror*, 97–99.
  36. Bodó, *The White Terror*, 100–102.

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# POLISH AND UKRAINIAN PROPAGANDA CONCERNING THE WAR FOR EASTERN GALICIA<sup>1</sup>

JAGODA WIERZEJSKA

THE POLISH-UKRAINIAN WAR FOR EASTERN GALICIA WAS A CONFLICT BETWEEN two antagonized state-building and national projects rather than that between two states. In autumn of 1918, Poles designed the former Habsburg province with its main city, Lviv, as a part of renascent Poland, and they planned to join it to Western Galicia, already under Polish control. At the same time, Ukrainians claimed Lviv as the capital of the emergent Western Ukrainian state or even a regional center of united Ukraine of the future. Simultaneously with the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, which Galicia had been a part of between 1772 and 1918, the Polish-Ukrainian War broke out on November 1, 1918. The most fateful fight of the war was the battle of Lviv with its best known and, in fact, decisive stage in November 1918, which took place in the very heart of the city. The war ended up with Polish victory and withdrawal of Ukrainian forces behind the Zbruch River in mid-July 1919. However, on November 21, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers granted Poland only the right of mandate country and put the contested province under its administration for a period of twenty-five years. Meanwhile, on the Eastern front, the Polish-Soviet war raged. The Riga Treaty of March 1921, which ended the war, confirmed that Eastern Galicia belonged to Poland, albeit only as a trilateral agreement between Poland, Soviet Russia, and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Ultimately, it was the decision of the Council of Ambassadors, announced on March 15, 1923, which acknowledged the Southeastern Polish border and affirmed Polish sovereignty in the region.

Jochen Böhrer includes the Polish-Ukrainian War into the broader phenomenon, which he calls “the civil war in Central Europe.”<sup>2</sup> According to him, the civil war in the macro-region had two features that distinguished it from a conventional war, as he views World War I. The civil war in Central Europe was uncontrollably violent toward the fighters and civilians alike. Additionally, divisions between its participants were blurred, especially national ones.<sup>3</sup> However, several conflicts, which directly followed the Great War, shared some characteristics with conventional wars and resembled previous battles on the Western front. It applied, among others, to the Polish-Ukrainian War for Eastern Galicia. Polish and Ukrainian ranks in the province fought along fortified fronts, using such military strategies as artillery shelling or air forces reconnaissance. Moreover, both sides conducted propaganda activities, which brings to mind the French, British, and German propaganda from the period of World War I. During the Great War, both Polish and Ukrainian intellectual-propagandists with a Galician identity background regarded as the enemy first and foremost Russia, then Soviet Russia (whose propaganda remained a negative reference point for them). In 1918, however, they turned forcefully against each other, using narrative patterns developed in the West, which they had already assimilated through their knowledge of German and translations of some Western propaganda pamphlets.

The chapter discusses the latter—propagandist—aspect of the Polish-Ukrainian War. It is dedicated to analysis of propagandist textual acts undertaken by both national groups. What is important to me in the chapter are the methods of critical discourse analysis, which allows an interpreter to look at disparate discourse manifestations—political and historical documents, journalism, memoirs, and fiction—as testimonies to the state of consciousness of a community and power relationships in it at a particular time.<sup>4</sup> Other helpful insights for me come from anthropologically oriented literary studies, inspired by Eric Gans<sup>5</sup> and Wolfgang Iser.<sup>6</sup> Such studies treat the sense of reality and texts about it as nonobvious, even if it imposes itself as natural. They recommend suspicion of what at first glance appears tame and normal, encourage tracing hidden meanings of statements and stress that the norm not only constitutes but also excludes. Given my main methodological inspirations, I therefore assume that the analysis of texts in the chapter represents a meeting point between critical discourse analysis and anthropologically oriented literary studies, as well as contextual analysis and comparative studies.

The first Polish and Ukrainian acts of propaganda preceded the war for Eastern Galicia. They increased in number and intensified in tone while the fighting in the province was going on. The main propagandist campaigns, however, were run promptly after the war, during the Paris Peace Conference. Initially, I will focus on those propagandist texts, which sought to justify Polish or Ukrainian rights to Eastern Galicia on the basis of arguments derived from the juxtaposition of history and geography

with ethnography and statistics. Then, I will pay special attention to the Polish and Ukrainian propaganda of violence, which was involved directly in the military conflict for Eastern Galicia and accused the enemy side of atrocious war crimes, even more brutal than those committed in reality. The analysis of Polish and Ukrainian propagandist texts will let me point out their main ideological trends. It will also lead me to consider whether they manifested the ethnicization and nationalization process, which had tormented the Habsburg Monarchy, including Galicia, since the first half of the nineteenth century, causing ever deeper divisions between the religious, linguistic, cultural, and national groups of the empire. Or they were rather new tendencies typical for the “epoch of nation-states”<sup>7</sup> in East Central Europe.

## ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGE AND PROPAGANDA IN THE SERVICE OF BOUNDARY-SETTING

Mass propaganda as an instrument of politics is a relatively modern phenomenon, reaching back to the beginning of World War I. While before 1914 the field of propaganda had been limited, between 1914 and 1918 the fighting sides quickly realized that “psychological war must accompany economic war and military war,”<sup>8</sup> as Harold Dwight Lasswell put it. Shortly after George G. Bruntz, for whose book Lasswell had written an introduction, the topic was undertaken by Edward Hallett Carr. That international relations theorist argued that the victory of the Allies of World War I in 1918 had constituted a “skilful combination of military power, economic power, and power over opinion,” the latter being the “third form of power” in general.<sup>9</sup>

Polish historians Włodzimierz Borodziej and Maciej Górny claim that the propaganda development was imported from the Western front to East Central Europe already in 1915.<sup>10</sup> An important field of its use was created by an issue that far predated the Great War and concerned the rights of a particular national group to a particular land. Texts pertaining to that issue were often delivered by intellectuals and scholars who decided to subordinate their academic knowledge and writing skills to political interests of their nations and (imagined) homelands. During World War I they adopted new propagandist measures of a manipulative nature to deliberately shape the views of individuals and communities on a topic of interest.

Interesting texts of that kind, concerning the Polish or Ukrainian right to take over Eastern Galicia and incorporate it into the future Polish or Ukrainian state, started to appear already before the outbreak of the war on November 1, 1918. They presented the national composition of the province to prove the numerical superiority or at least strength of a given nation and, thus, its right to self-determination in the province based on the ethnic principle. Inasmuch as the real national composition of Eastern

Galicia was unfavorable for the Poles,<sup>11</sup> they put special effort into manifesting and giving proofs of their significant number in comparison with the Ukrainians. In 1917, Leon Wasilewski, an activist of the Polish Socialist Party, coworker of Józef Piłsudski, and historian specializing in linguistic, ethnography, and history of literature, reported that Eastern Galicia had had 5,336 million inhabitants with 58.9 percent of “Ruthenians” and 39.8 percent of Poles.<sup>12</sup> Such estimation clearly overestimated the number of the Galician Poles. It was possible because Wasilewski based on the Austrian census of 1910 and included into the group of Poles—the Jews who indicated Polish as their everyday language. The Galician Jew commonly did it, however, due to the criteria of the census: It did not take into account the nationality criterion, only the language and religion, while Yiddish as a language did not appear in it and could not be chosen. On the opposite pole to such Polish calculations were estimates of some Ukrainian scholars. The pamphlet *Eastern Galicia an Independent Commonwealth*, published in English, claimed that the Ukrainians constituted 4.58 million, that is, 75 percent of inhabitants of Eastern Galicia. The number of Roman Catholics reached 25.3 percent of the population but, according to the brochure, half of them were of Ukrainian nationality, so the Poles constituted only 12.2 percent of the region’s population.<sup>13</sup> The text was officially brought out by the National Council of Eastern Galicia (what allows to assume the date of its publication—the last quarter of 1918). The author mainly responsible for its content was, however, a particular scholar: Stepan Tomashivskyi, a Ukrainian historian and politician, a member of the Scientific Society of Shevchenko, and a lecturer at the University of Lviv and the Jagiellonian University. Just like Wasilewski, he used his background in the humanities and social sciences, and manipulated statistics to convince national and, first and foremost, international public opinion of his peoples’ right to poses and rule the province.

The World War I period created a boom in works explaining and clarifying ethnic boundaries and cultural divisions, especially works concerning East Central and Southeastern Europe, where those boundaries and divisions were considered particularly blurred. It is no wonder then, that propaganda texts justifying Polish or Ukrainian territorial claims to Eastern Galicia began to use (and misuse) not only findings of social history and statistics, but also cartography combined with anthropogeography and ethnopsychology.<sup>14</sup>

When the Polish and Ukrainian armies were still fighting to settle the issue of Eastern Galicia on the ground, politicians supported by experts in different fields gathered at the Paris Peace Conference to consider the future of Europe, including the contested province. In May 1919, the Polish Commission for Preparatory Work for the Peace Conference issued the *Mémoire sur la Galicie*, which claimed: “The Poles demand that all of Galicia, detached from the Austrian Empire, be attributed as a whole to the new Polish state. They support their revindication on historic, ethnographic,

economic, and territorial reasons.”<sup>15</sup> Emphasizing the importance of the 1772 border of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the necessity of revindication of Galicia was understandable given that the main author of the document was Eugeniusz Romer, a leading geographer from the University of Lviv. Already in 1916, he published *Geograficzno-statystyczny atlas Polski*,<sup>16</sup> adopting the 1772 border as a starting point for cartographic and statistical work. In *Mémoire sur la Galicie*, Romer presented ethnographic argumentation and combined it with historical and geographical ones. Not only did he insist that the province was 59 percent Polish and 40 percent “Ruthenian,”<sup>17</sup> what must have involved counting all Galician Jews as Poles, but he also pointed out that Poles and “Ruthenians” were “so reciprocally penetrated” that they constituted an “ethnographic mélange,” produced by numerous mixed marriages.<sup>18</sup> Thus, according to the author, Galicia could never be divided into the Polish and Ukrainian parts. Instead, it should be entirely incorporated into Poland, especially that Poles were “autochthonous” throughout the province and allegedly surpassed Ukrainians in terms of economy, civilization, and culture.<sup>19</sup> Romer developed this already known, statistical, and sociohistorical type of reasoning in a new geographical direction; namely, he reinforced it with arguments particularly close to him, concerning Galicia’s “natural” affiliation, based on “general geography.” The geographer insisted that the hydrographic and physiographic structure of the province clearly bounded it to Poland, moreover, thanks to the province’s resting on the Carpathians it gave Poland a “natural frontier,”<sup>20</sup> an idea as much undermined, as vital in Paris in 1919–1920.

In the same month, May 1919, the Polish Commission supported the memorandum with another pamphlet, also prepared mainly by Romer and this time directed to the English-speaking public, perhaps with President Woodrow Wilson on the first place. Unlike the title of the pamphlet suggested, *Statistics of Galicia* did not have much in common with statistical precision. It repeated the figures of *Mémoire sur la Galicie* and advocated the concept of “ethnographic limit” crossing “every third family” in Eastern Galicia.<sup>21</sup> The latter concept, according to which the national boundary in the province ran through marriage beds, had its roots in the nineteenth century, and in that century signified the mixing of nationalities in what Timothy Snyder called “a local reality unto itself.”<sup>22</sup> In a situation of acute military and diplomatic dispute between Poles and Ukrainians, the concept in question was used manipulatively to create the impression that the delimitation of Eastern Galicia in line with the distribution of these two national groups was as impossible in 1919 as it had been in the mid-nineteenth century. Additionally, the pamphlet *Statistics of Galicia* developed the idea of a Polish civilizing mission in the province. The author investigated the civilizational differences between Poles and Ukrainians and pointed at manifold superiority of the former group, as well as the “primitive social structure” allegedly corresponding to backwardness of the latter group.<sup>23</sup> The second concept of early nineteenth-century provenance<sup>24</sup> was

therefore used to complete the argumentation on the ongoing conflict. According to the author's clear implication, if Poles and Ukrainians could not be separated, then the province had to be awarded in its entirety to Poles because of their superiority, from cultural to economic and political.

The next Polish memorandum, for the content of which Romer was also responsible, appeared in June 1919. It did not mention Eastern Galicia; instead, it dealt with the issue of the "South Eastern Frontiers of Restored Poland"<sup>25</sup> and used the term "Red Ruthenia" to describe the land between the San and Zbruch Rivers. The memorandum maintained that Poles, together with "Ruthenians," had formed the autochthonous ethnographic element of the region, but they had been solely responsible for civilizing the province. However, the text went a step further and denied both the existence of Ukraine as a separate nation and the legitimacy of Ukraine's establishment on the disputed territory. "Red Ruthenia" is not Ukraine, claimed the document, and "the Ruthenian people are not yet a nation in the political sense of the world."<sup>26</sup> Therefore, they were not ripe for independence, especially in Eastern Galicia, which, being under the Polish civilizational influence, should rightly belong to Poland.

The aforementioned arguments were put together and presented broadly in the Polish-language book *W obronie Galicji Wschodniej* of 1919, signed by Romer, his assistant Stanisław Pawłowski, and the historian Stanisław Zakrzewski. According to the thesis, belonging of Eastern Galicia (alternatively called "Red Ruthenia") to Poland was justified by the great past, as well as the social and material structure of Polish society in the region. It was also supported by the territory's natural conditions, including flora. Romer skilfully used the already elaborated argumentation of Albrecht Penck, a German geographer and geologist, on the botanical basis of political boundary delineation, but he was particularly interested in a certain botanical phenomenon—beech trees. In his opinion, the extent of beech forests, together with physiographic relations, proved that the province was the most Western part of Ruthenia, naturally connected with Poland.<sup>27</sup>

The argumentation of the Ukrainian side on Eastern Galicia's state belonging, predictably opposite toward the Polish one, referred to cartographical, anthropogeographical, and ethnopsychological knowledge, and also had propagandist purposes related to the future of European borders. Its intellectual base constituted works of Stepan Rudnytskyi, a Ukrainian geographer, Penck's talented student, and Romer's great opponent.<sup>28</sup> Rudnytskyi did not refer primarily to Eastern Galicia, rather, he sought to disseminate information about his (imagined) homeland among his compatriots and foreigners. He subordinated his expertise to proving that Ukraine, including the contested province, was a territorial and social entity separate from Russia and Poland in every respect. Many of Rudnytskyi's geographical works, first and foremost *Ukraina. Land und Volk*<sup>29</sup> issued in German in 1916, used a wide range of

arguments concerning almost every aspect of animate and inanimate nature. The geographer dedicated extensive sections of his writings to such factors as morphological types, hydrological and climatic boundaries, pedological relations, and plant geography, all of which were intended to confirm that Ukraine unquestionably stood out as a whole in terms of temperature, humidity, and even plant smell. A particularly important point of Rudnytskyi's reasoning was persuasion that in terms of anthropology Ukrainians constituted a separate "race" and distinctively differed from Poles, Belarusians, and Russians, the last three groups being, according to the scholar, "very similar and closely related."<sup>30</sup> His theories, reaching back to the prewar period, were popularized in various languages, thanks to efforts of the geographer himself and the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine. They were also used directly for propaganda by Ukrainian publicists and their German and Austrian allies. Among others, the union's proclamation of 1915<sup>31</sup> constituted a simplified paraphrase of Rudnytskyi's dissertations.

Apart from these dissertations, there were texts that dealt principally with Eastern Galicia and were intended to convince the international public opinion to grant the province to Ukraine and Ukrainians. At the same time when *Mémoire sur la Galicie* was brought out, in May 1919, Myroslav Sichyn's'kyy published the article in the *New York Times* titled "The War in Eastern Galicia: Disputed Claims of Poles and Ukrainians Now Before the Conference."<sup>32</sup> He proved that, in fact, the Ukrainians predominated in Eastern Galicia and exposed that the Poles manipulated statistics and inflated the number of their compatriots in the region, including the Jews in the Polish national group. He also accused the Poles of imperialistic inclinations and warned that the Polish authority in Eastern Galicia would increase, not decrease, as the Poles argued, the revolutionary threat from Soviet Russia west of the Zbruch River. Sichyn's'kyy was not a scholar, so he used fewer academic arguments than Romer and Rudnytskyi, while lobbying for the Ukrainian side's right to the province. However, he was a popular, though controversial Ukrainian activist, before World War I, known especially for the assassination of Andrzej Potocki, a Polish politician and Austrian governor of Galicia, in 1908. After World War I, when the assassination case lost its political relevance, he was recognizable primarily as an adherent of the Ukrainian case, supporting it from the United States of America. That gave his voice a substantial propagandist power not only in the perspective of Ukrainians, but also in the optics of most opponents of Polish power throughout Eastern Galicia.

After the Supreme Council had granted Poland the right of mandate country to administrate Eastern Galicia for a period of twenty-five years, there was an abundance of Ukrainian protests against that decision. They were similar in a political and emotional tone, categorically demanding the removal of the Polish military forces and the withdrawal of the Polish authorities from the province and, simultaneously, sincerely asking

for humanitarian aid to the civilian population.<sup>33</sup> Among these publications, *Protest of the Ukrainian Republic to the United States Against the Delivery of Eastern Galicia to Polish Domination* deserves special attention. The publication was officially issued by the Friends of Ukraine organization but, in fact, it was elaborated by Julian Bachynskiy, a Ukrainian politician, journalist, and graduate from the Lviv University Law School. Apart from protesting against giving the mandate over Eastern Galicia to Poland, the author once again used statistical, anthropogeographic, and historical information to demonstrate the Ukrainians' predominance in the province and the territory's connection with other ethnographically Ukrainian lands. In doing so, Bachynskiy cited a number of professional publications, including works by Arnold J. Toynbee, Herbert Adams Gibbons, and Alexander Bruce Boswell. He summarized the history of the region as seen from the Ukrainian point of view and exposed Poles' fears of the national sentiment of the regional Ukrainians, which in his opinion was well developed. According to him, Poles rejected a plebiscite under the Allied supervision in the province precisely because they were aware of the fact that there was no Ukrainian circle, "from the Conservative Catholics to the Social Democrats, which advocates or would agree to a union of Eastern Galicia with Poland as against a union with Ukraine."<sup>34</sup> Bachynskiy's claim was justified, but only to a certain extent. The Polish side, interested in Upper Silesia plebiscite and East Prussian plebiscite, was indeed concerned about the outcome of a potential plebiscite in Eastern Galicia. However, the decision not to carry it out was made by higher political forces at the Paris Peace Conference. During the Polish-Soviet War, on March 10, 1920, the Supreme Council sent a note to the Polish delegation emphasising that, according to the article number 87 of the Treaty of Versailles, Poland's Eastern borders were to be determined by the Allied Powers so no plebiscite could have taken place, especially during the military operation. The Polish side did not undertake an official discussion on the issue, hiding behind the argument that the Polish government did not intend to hold a plebiscite in the near future.<sup>35</sup> In fact, such a plebiscite never took place.

One other text that sought to reverse the decision of the Supreme Council and induce it to withdraw the mandate over Eastern Galicia from Poland was the address *To the Civilized Nations of the World*. It was created by Mykhaylo Hrushevs'kyy on behalf of the Committee of the Independent Ukraine and published in 1920 in Geneva, where the League of Nation was just about to establish its headquarters. Hrushevs'kyy was a politician and statesman who had played an important role in the declaration of Ukrainian independence in January 1918 and in the Act of Union promulgating the unified Ukraine in January 1919. Simultaneously, however, he was a historian, so he used his knowledge of the past to lobby for changing the center of official administrative and unofficial—but actual—political power over the province. While the Polish claims to revindication of Eastern Galicia referred back to the first (1772) and the third

(1795) partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ukrainian claims, as presented by Hrushevs'kyi, reached back the medieval or "immemorial" times of existence of the "Ukrainian State of Kiev" (Kievan Rus) and the "Galician-Volhynian State" (Kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia).<sup>36</sup> In the scholar's long historical view, the decay of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1918 logically and indisputably should have entailed the return of the region to independent Ukraine. Thus, Hrushevs'kyi exploited the revindication discourse in much the same way as the Habsburg authorities did during the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth<sup>37</sup> and the Polish elite did from the partition period up to and including the Polish-Ukrainian War.<sup>38</sup> He only chose different historical arguments, those that rooted Eastern Galicia in the Ukrainian past of both real and imagined character.<sup>39</sup>

In 1920, when the address by Hrushevs'kyi saw the light of day, the Polish-Soviet War was raging, and representatives of the Entente Powers were increasingly eager to support Poland in the Polish-Ukrainian rivalry for Eastern Galicia. They believed that the Poles would prevent the Soviet invasion of the West and, last but not least, secure the Allies' oil interests in Eastern Galicia more effectively than the Ukrainians. It was all the more that the Polish economic delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, already in 1919, insisted that only Polish control over the region could ensure normal development of the oil industry, especially in the Boryslav-Drohobych Oil Basin where large British, French, and Belgian capitals were located.<sup>40</sup> Notwithstanding those unfavorable circumstances, Hrushevs'kyi one more time used his expertise in the field of humanities and social science and subordinated it to propaganda, in order to that what in those days meant—*de iure*—redrawing the demarcation line of Eastern Galicia and—*de facto*—resetting the state belonging of the province.

## PROPAGANDA OF VIOLENCE

Texts that took advantage of academic findings to affect the shape of the Polish or Ukrainian state border in Eastern Galicia were not the only ones that gravitated toward propaganda discourse, usually with the awareness of their authors, who did not hesitate to use academic works for the needs of their nations and emerging or future homelands. Already the beginning of the Polish-Ukrainian War brought texts directly related to the armed clashes in the province, which also had propaganda objectives. These texts sought to specifically exaggerate and interpret in a specific manner mutual acts of violence committed by each national group. Analysis of these texts requires consideration of a tripartite antinomy of institutional rules, according to which the war developed, acts of brutal violence committed by some participants of the war, and ideological use that the Polish and Ukrainian propaganda made of war violence.

As for the institutional dimension of the war, it is striking that it was run with respect for international war laws and customs. More precisely, some of the war laws and customs; at least officially and at least in the initial stage. During the battle of Lviv in November 1918, warfare in the city area seriously disturbed—but did not entirely stop—the activities of main municipal institutions.<sup>41</sup> Binational committees oversaw the waterworks and power station and ensured that supplies reached the city. From time to time ceasefires were agreed to enable inhabitants to get out of houses and replenish food and fuel stocks.<sup>42</sup> Negotiations between the warring sides continued almost until the end of the November battle. After the battle, when Lviv was under Ukrainian siege for six months, the Ukrainians no longer allowed supplies to reach the city and attempted to disrupt the water supply of Lviv inhabitants. Their fierce artillery fire killed many civilians, including women and children.<sup>43</sup> All that time, the Poles did not recognize the sovereignty of the West Ukrainian People's Republic/Western Oblast of the Ukrainian People's Republic<sup>44</sup> and treated the Galician Ukrainians as rebelled citizens of Poland. Despite such circumstances, both Poland and Western Oblast of the Ukrainian People's Republic made an agreement on February 1, 1919, to respect the Hague and Geneva conventions<sup>45</sup> and committed themselves to remind their soldiers.<sup>46</sup>

All the attempts to regulate the conflict institutionally did not change the fact that the Polish-Ukrainian War was brutal and violent. According to historians' estimations, during the nine months of fights, 10,000 Polish soldiers and 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers lost their lives.<sup>47</sup> However, the total number of casualties on both sides remains unknown. The Poles and Ukrainians applied arrests, including mass arrests of captured enemy fighters and civilians. Until the end of July 1919, 25,000 Poles were sent to Ukrainian prisons and camps, and 100,000 Ukrainians were interned in camps of the victorious Polish army. Many of these people died of infectious diseases.<sup>48</sup> Both sides accused each other of violating the war laws, especially of shooting at medical staff—including the Red Cross patrols—mistreating and shooting prisoners, and murdering hostages. Apart from letters about these issues exchanged by the Polish and Ukrainian high commands,<sup>49</sup> as well as testimonies of victims and witnesses of Polish and Ukrainian offenses,<sup>50</sup> such accusations appeared also in many reports and recollections delivered by combat participants<sup>51</sup>; not to mention press articles, which constituted a less reliable source, as they often served propagandist goals.

Both Poles and Ukrainians sides gathered in (para)military formations, often operating away from the decision-making center, cut off from regular supplies, therefore taking advantage of plunder. Victims of their violence were mainly civilians who represented various groups, primarily regarded as representatives of hostile nationalities. The scale of these tragic phenomena can be glimpsed from documents of military jurisdictions and reports of local commanders to the Polish and Ukrainian high commands.<sup>52</sup> There are no doubts that the most rigid form of aggression against civilians

in the borderlands between Russia and Germany, also in the Polish-Ukrainian borderland, from 1917 to 1921, was anti-Jewish violence. During the Polish-Ukrainian War in Eastern Galicia, the perpetrators of those riots included both Polish and Ukrainians soldiers, but also Polish and Ukrainian civilians. Comprehensive studies on this topic show that murdering, raping, plundering, and devastating houses created everyday life of the Jewish community in the province. Pogroms with many afflicted, also killed, were organized in great numbers on both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian front. The most atrocious slaughter was the three-day-long pogrom in Lviv (from November 22 to 24, 1918), perpetrated by the victorious Polish fighters and dwellers of Lviv immediately after the withdrawal of the Ukrainian soldiers from the city.<sup>53</sup>

The tension between the institutionalized and bottom-up war practices during the Polish-Ukrainian military conflict for Eastern Galicia was further complicated by the conflict's propagandist aspect. Shortly after the beginning of the battle of Lviv, already in early November 1918, the Poles and Ukrainians initiated the propaganda of violence, accusing the enemy side of atrocious deeds and describing them in terms of barbarity and savagery. They deprecated and ridiculed the opponent and, simultaneously, merged earlier-epoch depreciating metaphors with what was considered modern science at that time. This way, the Poles and Ukrainians joined the war of spirits known under its German name *Krieg der Geister*,<sup>54</sup> that is, a rivalry of antagonized reflections on the meaning and goal of a military conflict, but also a role one's own nation played in it. Participants of the Polish-Ukrainian war of spirits included intellectuals spontaneously reflecting on the fights for Eastern Galicia and—more often—miscellaneous people of letters, who overtly or covertly served the state propaganda machine. Although there often stood serious, authoritative institutions behind these people, they usually spread a specific information mix in which realistic accusations merged with outrageous exaggerations.

The initiative in the Polish-Ukrainian war of spirits belonged to both national groups' daily presses, which commented on the warfare in the province. The Polish wartime Lviv daily *Pobudka* even managed to publish a few articles dedicated to this topic in a single issue. *Pobudka* on November 10 highlighted the cruel behavior of Ukrainian soldiers, allegedly always drunk, toward Polish civilians, and found the following parallel to the ongoing battle of Lviv: "History repeats itself. The bloody times return when drunken haidamakas' bands carouse in the Ukrainian steppes."<sup>55</sup> In the same issue, the editorial board of *Pobudka* released two more texts that described the "carousing savages"<sup>56</sup> and their "animal deeds"<sup>57</sup> in Lviv. *Pobudka* was promptly joined by other Polish newspapers—principally from Lviv—which together imputed barbarously disgraceful conduct to the Ukrainians during and after the November battle. Christoph Mick is right that the Ukrainians were less confident in imputing barbarism to the Poles.<sup>58</sup> Nevertheless, the Ukrainian press like *Dilo* also informed its readers

about the dreadful behavior of Polish soldiers toward Ukrainian civilians, captives, and, principally, medical staff. Reports of *Dilo* were increasingly daring and dramatic. The article published in the newspaper on November 13, 1918, reported on three deliberate attacks on Ukrainian patrols with a Red Cross sign, while an article two days later detailed a further six assaults that resulted in killing or serious injuring of doctors and wounded in transport.<sup>59</sup> “Obviously, such an ‘enemy,’” summarized the author of the article from November 13, “does not obey the most elementary rules accepted between militant cultural sides.”<sup>60</sup> While the same author regarded the Polish ranks as “gangs” (*vatahy*), the author of the text from November 15 used much stronger words. The latter called Poles “bandits” and openly blamed them for “barbarism”: “the Polish side in Lviv does not respect any international war law and barbarically shoots at our medical services.”<sup>61</sup> *Dilo*’s authors sarcastically quoted Polish accusations of “savagery and barbarism of Ruthenians”—the phrase iterated in original Polish to emphasise the Ukrainians’ distance toward such allegations—and enumerated offenses of their Polish foes, ironically attributed with epithets of “gentlemanly” and “honest,”<sup>62</sup> as examples of allegedly high Polish culture (*kulturnost*).<sup>63</sup>

The Polish and Ukrainian press had a relatively high potential for arousing anti-Ukrainian and anti-Polish moods, but they acted ad hoc. Brochures or books had far more long-term impact, which incited longer public discussions. On the Polish side, such power held the parliamentary speech by Jan Zamorski, published as a booklet in 1919. Zamorski was a politician of a right-wing Polish party, the National Democracy, and deputy for the parliament of the Second Polish Republic. During World War I, Zamorski conducted propagandist activities on the Italian front and—since late 1918—he did the same on the Polish-Ukrainian front in Eastern Galicia. To achieve his propagandist goals, Zamorski had an effective tool at his disposal: The Parliamentary Investigation Committee established in 1919 to inquire into “haidamakas’<sup>64</sup> crimes,” as they were called in official documents of this institution. Despite the fact that the committee primarily investigated cases that were to take place in the more provincial parts of Eastern Galicia, it met and acted in Lviv, itself a propagandist move. Designation of Lviv for the headquarters of the committee enhanced Polish national and state symbolism of the city and, simultaneously, confirmed Polish power in Eastern Galicia as a whole; all the more important for Poles, as Ukrainians never came to terms with their defeat in the province.<sup>65</sup> The reports prepared by the committee on the basis of inquiries in towns and villages of the region were discussed in Lviv and then summarized in the speech given by Zamorski during the 66th session of the parliament in Warsaw. The politician claimed that Ukrainian *haidamakas* had committed the most outrageous offenses toward the Polish civilians in Eastern Galicia, including unlikely sexual crimes. According to Zamorski, not only did the Ukrainians torture people, burn them alive in their houses, and bury them alive or half-alive, but they also captured Polish girls for

public houses for soldiers, collectively raped them, and then murdered in an extremely perverse way: "While capturing people for forced labour, the Ukrainians paid special attention to girls. After the work, these girls were given for soldiers' use. [...] having satisfied their lust in sequence, soldiers usually murdered their victims. [...] We know about women who had their breasts cut off, who had pepper or grenades put into their shameful places of bodies, then grenades were fired with a fuse to blow up poor nuns or female legionnaires. These were frequent cases."<sup>66</sup>

Zamorski summarized such revelations by particularly accusing Ukrainian nationalists of the most perverse crimes. This way, he divided Ukrainians into a group of aggressive nationalists and the rest of the "folk"—"Ruthenians"—ethnically related and reportedly loyal to Poles. It was a distinct tendency in the Polish discourse rooted in the ideology of Polish superiority in Galicia and Poles' denial of Ukrainians' existence as a separate nation. Strikingly, Zamorski associated Ukrainians with *haidamakas* and, consequently, with the territory of Right-bank Ukraine. While ignoring that the majority of Eastern Galicians were Ukrainians, he only noticed their presence in the rural area of the province and claimed the region as a Polish territory with its Polishness visible especially in towns and cities, with Lviv as the key example.

At that time, Zamorski's parliamentary speech was one of the most influential Polish publications about the Polish-Ukrainian War with such a strong anti-Ukrainian meaning. The meaning of his speech was additionally strengthened by alleged Ukrainian offenses' photographic documentation that supplemented the text but was at least partly fabricated.<sup>67</sup> However, a similar character appeared in other publications that claim to be fully reliable documents. One of them was Władysław Orobkiewicz's small book with an explicit subtitle: *Ukrainian Rapes and Barbarity Committed Towards the Polish Soldiers and the Population of the Eastern Part of the Former Austrian Partition and Their Sources*. The vice president of the Casino and Literary-Artistic Circle in Lviv, Orobkiewicz enumerated several "facts" from the time of the battle of Lviv and the following Polish-Ukrainian struggle. These included many sensations, like the following one: In November 1918 on Żółkiewska street in Lviv, Ukrainian soldiers undressed a young boy, forced him to dance naked, and ultimately scalped him.<sup>68</sup> From the repetition of fabricated information of that kind did not refrain even Czesław Mączyński, the commander in chief of the Polish forces during the battle of Lviv. Although his memories should belong to historiography, he repeated unreliable images of bestial murders committed by the Ukrainians and "hundreds [of victims] completely, completely innocent, regardless of age and sex, from babies to old women."<sup>69</sup>

The Ukrainian reaction to such insinuations appeared in a few publications, often originally written in or translated into foreign languages for better publicity and propaganda effect. One of the most significant was *Krvavá kniha*, an extensive book published in Czech language in Prague in 1920. Undoubtedly, Czech was not a language

that prompted the spread of information as much as French, English, or even German, the language of the defeated empire, especially during the Paris Peace Conference. However, in the East Central European powder keg Ukrainians could count on the support of the Czech public opinion for their national case more than on the understanding of other nations' elites. After the defeat in the Polish-Ukrainian War in 1919, Prague, Poděbrady, and the Czechoslovakian region called (since February 1920) Podkarpatská Rus were also the emigration destinations often chosen by Ukrainian people, including intellectuals and politicians. According to the subtitle, *Krvavá kniha* was dedicated to the meticulous documentation of the "Polish Occupation of the Ukrainian Territory of Galicia, from 1918 till December 1919."<sup>70</sup> The book consisted of seven chapters on murder, imprisonment, plunder, persecution for religious reasons, economic and cultural oppression, enforcement to the oath of allegiance, and spread of anti-Ukrainian lies perpetrated by the Poles against the Ukrainians, especially civilians, in Eastern Galicia. Descriptions of Polish offenses were combined with general reasoning on the Ukrainian national character of the region. The most extensive part of the book was about the murder of Ukrainian civilians. This part enumerated eighty-six separate sites in Eastern Galicia where atrocious crimes were to have occurred. For example, in the village of Klichytsi near Sambor, the Polish soldiers badly hurt three Ukrainian women with sabers and then buried them still alive.<sup>71</sup> In another village, Nahuievychi near Drohobych, the "Polish legionnaires gathered children from the whole area and closed them in a wooden campanile, which they covered with straw and set on fire"; then they shot with machine guns to those who managed to escape.<sup>72</sup> *Krvavá kniha* included also information on several scandalous murders believed to have been committed by the Poles in the Galician capital of Lviv. Except for the brutal torture-like killing of wounded soldiers, the Polish fighters for Lviv were said to have killed the juvenile Ukrainian civilians in the city. Simultaneously with the victims' young age, the book underlined their social status, which suggested that the Poles sought to destroy the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

Another publication that pointed at Polish atrocities in Eastern Galicia and had an overtly propagandist goal—the publication less known than *Krvavá kniha* but also significant—was the Ukrainian memorandum from 1919, written by Volodymyr Temnyts'kyi and Osyp Burachyn's'kyi, addressed to Georges Clemenceau, the president of the Paris Peace Conference. The document protested against the authorization of Poland's temporary administration in Eastern Galicia, officially to safeguard the lives and property of Eastern Galician population against various threats. The Ukrainian politicians and authors of the memorandum sought to show that the main source of threats were the Poles, especially the undisciplined and demoralized Polish military units and bands of a different kind. Temnyts'kyi and Burachyn's'kyi complained about the "Polish policy of annihilation," which ostensibly had begun "with the first invasion of the Polish army in East Galicia on November 1918."<sup>73</sup> They accused the Polish soldiers of "the most diabolical cruelties";<sup>74</sup>

among others, notorious rapes of Ukrainian women and girls—even twelve-year-olds—and the barbarian torment of Ukrainian peasants, including gouging out their eyes, beating, and starving them to death. The authors claimed that atrocities like the above were equal with or even worse than the “barbarous cruelties perpetrated in the Balkans and Armenia,”<sup>75</sup> especially the mistreatment of adolescents. *Temnyts’kyy* and *Burachyn’skyy* described many atrocities of the latter kind to their readers and even detail situations in which Polish soldiers grabbed Ukrainian children and hurl them alive into flames. These crimes were to occur frequently, in numerous spots in Eastern Galicia.

Mutual Polish-Ukrainian war accusations, especially when referring to such historical phenomena as the *haidamaka* movement or serfdom oppression of Ukrainian peasants by Polish lords, revealed layers of deep-rooted, long-lasting grudges that both nationalities held against each other. As for Poles, the cluster of demonic stereotypes of *haidamakas*, “wild” Cossacks, and Ukrainian peasants dripping with Polish blood was strongly inscribed into common Polish imagination and enhanced since the second half of the nineteenth century in the works of popular writers, like Franciszek Rawita Gawroński and Henryk Sienkiewicz.<sup>76</sup> As for Ukrainians, the socioeconomic issue of abusing the Ukrainian peasantry by Polish landowners was closely connected with the development of the Ukrainian national movement since its dawn in the 1830s and determined its anti-Polish orientation.<sup>77</sup> If one takes such circumstances into account, the accusations in question appear as peak manifestations of the ethnicization process, which was weakening the Habsburg Monarchy since the first half of the nineteenth century. In Galicia, the ethnicization revealed itself in the form of a conflict of the three main national groups—Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish—in the province. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Polish-Ukrainian dimension of that conflict resembled—in discursive terms—the preliminary stage of the war of spirits that both nationalities conducted later, in the wake of the military clash for Eastern Galicia. The rivalry of Poles and Ukrainians at that time showed that fronts of the initial—larval—stadium of the “paper war” (as the war of spirits was also called) did not always run along borders of different countries. Sometimes, these fronts arose within the borders of a single state, in this case, the Habsburg Monarchy.

After 1918, the Polish and Ukrainian intellectuals not only maintained but also significantly increased their anti-Ukrainian and anti-Polish mobilizations. Thus, the decay of the Habsburg Monarchy released proper violence of the Polish-Ukrainian paper war. Moreover, during and immediately after the war for Eastern Galicia, the Polish-Ukrainian war of spirits revealed new threads, which merged with the anti-Ukrainian and anti-Polish stereotypes and metaphors from the past. These threads ensued from new ideas considered to have been scientific at that time. They found their discursive patterns on Western fronts of World War I and made the Eastern Galician war of spirits into a truly modern phenomenon.

According to a convincing argument of the Polish historian, Maciej Górny, descriptions of outrageous crimes that the Poles and Ukrainians really or—more often—allegedly committed toward representatives of the antagonistic nation constituted a testimony to the Eastern reception of the Western propaganda developed in the course of World War I.<sup>78</sup> This was particularly evident in accounts of sexually motivated atrocities against females and adolescents. In 1914, the French, British, and Belgian propaganda found perpetrators of the same, usually faked cruelties in the Germans. Especially the British and the French press described the Germans as bloodthirsty barbarians, dehumanized them, and presented them as beasts.<sup>79</sup> Simultaneously, the Entente propagandists started to give a deeper, essentialized meaning to their words of indignation, that is, to analyze the Germans' horrendous crimes in ethnopsychological terms. The latter phenomenon consisted of hyperbolizing immoral deeds of the enemy in order to make general statements— aspiring to the rank of objectivity and science—about an enemy's worst possible national character. The precursor of such an optic was Henri Bergson. The French sociologist and philosopher was the first one who gave the uncoordinated expressions of indignation and horror a deeper meaning and described the war as a clash between the civilization represented by France, England, and Belgium, and barbarism embodied by Germany. He presented real, or more often fictitious, news about the debauched cruelty of the Germans as a symptom of the whole nation's mental condition, ensuing inherently from the German culture.<sup>80</sup> Such enunciations were shortly followed by pronouncements of the Germans intellectuals, who sought to oppose Bergson's and other Entente propagandists' calumny. Already in the autumn 1914, in response to Bergson's criticism, the German academics priced "Prussian militarism" as a beautiful, spiritualized phenomenon, which the French and British people simply could not understand. In 1915, the outstanding sociologist Werner Sombart developed such reasoning. He claimed that it was "true" (i.e., German) idealism—so different from the materialism and mercantilism of the French and British—that made his compatriots to fight and perish for higher goods—the nation, the state, and the German spirit.<sup>81</sup>

In East Central Europe, there were soon many people of letters who learned from the Western intellectuals working for the state propaganda machine. The Polish and Ukrainian authors ran their variant of war of spirits first—since 1915—against Russia.<sup>82</sup> However, during the later Polish-Ukrainian War and after, when tensions between the Poles and Ukrainians remained, clashes between the two national groups from 1918 to 1919 constituted one of the best fields for generalizations of their mutual national characters for both. Such authors as Zamorski and Orobkiewicz on the Polish side or Tymnyts'kyy and Burachyn'skyy on the Ukrainian side accused their military antagonists of barbarian deeds, including dubious sexual crimes, but they also emulated Bergson and Sombart on a local scale. Not only did they charge the enemy soldiers with "thievish"

reaching for not their city and land, wildness, barbarity, and evil, but they also presented the opposite community as a bunch of thieves, savages, barbarians, scum, and villains. The Polish authors went so far as to call all Ukrainians *an masse* “Antichrist”<sup>83</sup> or—emulating the metaphor used by the Entente press against the Germans—“Hunns of the twentieth century.”<sup>84</sup> Thus, the aforementioned authors shifted the accent from specific—even if fabricated—crimes of their foes to general reasoning about the presumed mental and moral conditions of their foes as a nation. In other words, they essentialized these deeds, presenting them as manifestations of allegedly inherent barbarism of the antagonistic national group. In this way, all of them sought to show their enemies not only as perpetrators of savage acts but, first and foremost, as savage people, outcasts from the circle of civilized nations, and, consequently, those who could have no right to take control over Eastern Galicia and look after its population. The stake of such essentializing propaganda representations of the opponent side was very high. During the Paris Peace Conference both Poles and Ukrainians tried to present themselves internationally as a democratic nation, able to create a secure homeland for all their fellow citizens regardless of nationality or religion. Simultaneously, however, the diplomatic battle over Eastern Galicia reached its climax, with Poles and Ukrainians literally flinging back and forth with reports and memoranda designed to justify the province’s belonging to the territory of one nation or the other. Additionally, the imposition of the Little Treaty of Versailles on the newly created states in South and East Central Europe revealed that the leaders of the Allied Powers did not perceive them as civilized enough to guarantee democracy and social security on their own, without international oversight. In such a situation, imposing the anathema of barbarism on the opponent constituted a convenient propagandist way to present one’s own nation as the single proper ruler of the disputed province. This aspect of the Polish-Ukrainian War of spirits meant that it became a phenomenon, which belonged to the new epoch of nation-states in East Central Europe.

## CONCLUSION

Specific academic-propagandist writing, as well as texts engaging in the propaganda of violence constituted two different but equally important manifestations of propagandist aspect of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict and, finally, war for Eastern Galicia. In the academic-propagandist books, brochures, and memoranda findings of history, ethnography, and anthropology, together with achievements of geography and cartography, underwent politicization and supported propaganda aimed at shaping the border of Eastern Galicia in a way that was most beneficial to the Polish or Ukrainian national group. In Polish and Ukrainian propaganda on violence, realistic accusations against

the opposing side were often interwoven with exaggerations and slander, making it difficult to distinguish credible claims from unfounded ones, sometimes approaching a probabilistic assessment of blame. Nevertheless, both types of propagandist textual acts were not a theoretical and detached or sensational addition to the conflict for the former Habsburg province. Quite the opposite, they constituted the conflict's important and complicated dimension. The academic-propagandist writing was an integral part of the political and later diplomatic rivalry of the Poles and Ukrainians for the contested land. The Polish and Ukrainian propaganda of violence, in turn, functioned in-between the institutional frameworks of the Polish-Ukrainian War and the brutal deeds of its participants, often without the control of their commanders.

Generally speaking, both fighting sides' propagandist activities were supported by influential institutions like the Polish Commission of Preparatory Work to the Conference of Peace, Polish Office of Political Publications, Friends of Ukraine, Committee of the Independent Ukraine, and finally, Investigation Committee of the Second Polish Republic's Parliament or the Ukrainian National Committee of the United States, which all had—at least officially—peaceful purposes. Moreover, all these activities overtly or tacitly aimed to influence the decisions of the greatest institution of the immediately post-World War I period, the Paris Peace Conference. This applied not only to the documents analyzed in the first part of the article, but also to the reports of Zamorski's Committee or the 1919 Ukrainian memorandum, which were secondly or even firstly intended for Entente politicians. However, the analyzed documents did not always serve to clarify the Polish-Ukrainian conflict for Eastern Galicia, and often even exacerbated it. While the Polish and Ukrainian texts mixing academic knowledge with propagandist discourse had some (though not equal and certainly not key) influence on demarcation of new borders in the region, they served the political interests of their authors' homelands. The borders they proposed, thus, satisfied one national group but harmed another. The Polish and Ukrainian propaganda of violence texts, in turn, accused the opponents of war crimes and clearly suggested that the more barbarian deeds—real or imagined—the opponents did, the more barbarian they were and the less they deserved power over the contentious territory. Their goal was not just to highlight who suffered more in the fight for the province. First of all, they sought to show the antagonistic national group as Eastern Galicia's barbarian invader/occupant, who perpetrated monstrosities, while their own group was Eastern Galicia's true host, whose national territory should have embraced the region for the benefit of all its inhabitants. So, even if those texts accused the opponents of fabricated offenses, they had a real power to incite revenge and, consequently, escalate the struggle. Good evidence of this regularity is the fact that the propaganda activities of Poles and Ukrainians from the time of the military and diplomatic struggle for the province cast a shadow over relations between the two national groups throughout the entire interwar period.

They were particularly updated at the very beginning of the 1930s, when Poles carried out the pacification of Ukrainian villages in Eastern Galicia, and Ukrainians turned to the League of Nations on that issue and publicized the matter internationally. Perhaps the best and most frightening proof of power, including the violent-causing power of the analyzed propagandist texts, was that the incredible cruelties described on paper, during and shortly after the Polish-Ukrainian War, which were committed in reality after two decades of ongoing conflict of the two nations, during the World War II tragedy in East Central Europe.

## NOTES

1. The article is a result of the grant no 2018/31/D/HS2/00356 funded by the National Center of Science (Poland).
2. Jochen Böhler, *Civil War in Central Europe, 1918–1921: The Reconstruction of Poland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
3. Böhler, *Civil War in Central Europe*, 62–63.
4. The main inspiration for this methodological approach comes from the works of Michel Foucault, especially his classic *Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (Tavistock Publications Limited, 1972). According to the philosopher, the reality is an emanation of supra-subjective forces of a linguistic nature and can be treated as a discursive formation, i.e., a constellation of various intertwined social languages subject to common rules.
5. See especially Eric Gans, *End of Culture: Towards a Generative Anthropology* (University of California Press, 1985).
6. See especially Wolfgang Iser, *How to Do Theory* (Blackwell, London 2006).
7. Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 131.
8. Harold Dwight Lasswell, “Foreword,” in George G. Bruntz, *Allied propaganda and the collapse of the German empire in 1918* (Stanford University Press, 1938), vii.
9. Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (Macmillan and Co., 1941), 174, 168.
10. Włodzimierz Borodziej and Maciej Górny, *Nasza wojna: vol. II Narody 1917–1923* (Wydawnictwo WAB, 2018), 451.
11. While in Western Galicia, in 1910, the Polish population reached 90 percent percent, in Eastern Galicia 62 percent percent of the population were Ukrainians, 25.3 percent percent were Poles, and Jews—8.2 percent percent. See Paul R. Magocsi, “Galicia: A European Land,” in *Galicia: A Multicultural Land*, ed. Christopher Hann and Paul R. Magocsi (Toronto University Press, 2005), 7–8; Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of*

- Ukraine: The Land and its Peoples* (Toronto University Press, 1996), 423–24; Magosci, *Galicia: A Historical Survey and Bibliographical Guide* (Toronto University Press, 1983), 225. It should be borne in mind that contemporary estimates of the national composition of the whole of Galicia and its individual parts are based on a cross-interpretation of data on the denomination declared as one's own religion and *Umgangssprache*, the language declared as spoken in everyday life. The reason for this is that the censuses, which took place in the Habsburg Empire from 1857 onward approximately every decade, did not fully reflect its nationality complication. The censuses did not take into account the criterion of nationality, only religion and language, with Yiddish as a possible language of choice not appearing in it. On the criteria of the census and their interpretation see Wolfgang Göderle, *Zensus und Ethnizität. Zur Herstellung von Wissen über soziale Wirklichkeiten im Habsburgerreich zwischen 1848 und 1910* (Wallstein Verlag, 2016); Ioan Bolovan, Crinela Elena Holom, and Marius Eppel, "Ethnicity and Politics: Censuses in the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Case Study: Transylvania, 1869–1910)," *Romanian Journal of Population Studies* 10, no. 2 (2016): 137–52.
12. Leon Wasilewski, *Kresy Wschodnie: Litwa i Białoruś – Podlasie i Chełmszczyzna – Galicya Wschodnia – Ukraina* (Towarzystwo Wydawnicze w Warszawie, 1917), 42–43. Wasilewski used the term "Ruthenians," instead of "Ukrainians," for Ukrainian inhabitants of Eastern Galicia, rejecting their national unity with Ukrainians from the Russian Empire.
  13. *Eastern Galicia an independent commonwealth* (National Council of Eastern Galicia, n.d.), 28–30.
  14. On cartography as an element and instrument of political projects, as well as on a collective biography of prominent geographers between 1870 and 1950, see especially Steven Seegel, *Map Men: Transnational Lives and Deaths of Geographers in the Making of East Central Europe* (University of Chicago Press, 2018); Maciej Górny, *Kreślarze ojczyzn. Geografowie i granice międzywojennej Europy* (Instytut Historii PAN, 2017).
  15. *Mémoire sur la Galicie* ([Commission Polonaise des Travaux Préparatoires au Congrès de la Paix], 1919), 3.
  16. Eugeniusz Romer, *Geograficzno-statystyczny atlas Polski* (Gebethner i Wolff, 1916).
  17. *Mémoire sur la Galicie*, 4. Romer used the term "Ruthenians" for the same reason as Wasilewski.
  18. *Mémoire sur la Galicie*, 5–6.
  19. *Mémoire sur la Galicie*, 10–14.
  20. *Mémoire sur la Galicie*, 15.
  21. *Statistics of Galicia* (Polish Commission of Preparatory Work to the Conference of Peace, 1919), 2.
  22. Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (Yale University Press, 2003), 153.

23. *Statistics of Galicia*, 5.
24. See Burkhard Wöller, "Misja 'cywilizacyjna' czy 'okupacyjna'? Aneksja Rusi Czerwonej w czasach Kazimierza III w kolonialistycznym dyskursie polskich i rusińskich historyków w habsburskiej Galicji," *Historyka. Studia metodologiczne* 42 (2012): 133–45.
25. *Memorandum on the North and South Eastern Frontiers of Restored Poland* (Polish Office of Political Publications, 1919).
26. *Memorandum on the North and South Eastern Frontiers*, 7–8.
27. Eugeniusz Romer, Stanisław Zakrzewski, and Stanisław Pawłowski, *W obronie Galicji Wschodniej* (Książnica Polska Towarzystwo Naucz. Szkół Wyższ. – Gebethner i Wolff – M. Niemierkiewicz, 1919), 10–11.
28. For discussion between Rudnytskyi and Romer see Górny, *Kreślarze ojczyzn*, 63–76, 187–92.
29. Stepan Rudnyckyj, *Ukraina: Land und Volk eine gemeinfassliche Landeskunde* (Verlag des Bundes zur Befreiung der Ukraine, 1916). Both Ukrainian and Polish scholars wrote and published in foreign languages to increase the readership of their texts. During World War I, the German language was among their most frequent choices. This was favored by the offensive of the Central Powers and the fact that the scholars of my interest were usually fluent in German; sometimes they were also the graduates of German-language universities. Rudnytskyi himself graduated from the University in Lviv and in Berlin.
30. Rudnyckyj, *Ukraina*, 182.
31. *Die Ukraine und der Krieg. Denkschrift des Bundes zur Befreiung der Ukraine* (J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1915).
32. Miroslav Sichinsky [Myroslav Sichyns'kyy], "War in Eastern Galicia: Disputed Claims of Poles and Ukrainians Now Before the Conference," *The New York Times*, May 25, 1919, section E, 36. <https://www.nytimes.com/1919/05/25/archives/war-in-east-galicia-disputed-claims-of-poles-and-ukrainians-now.html>
33. See, for example, Delegation of the Ukrainian Socialistic Revolutionary Party, *For Galicia! Appeal to the world democracy* (Imprimerie J. Skalák a spol., 1920), 7.
34. *Protest of the Ukrainian Republic to the United States Against the Delivery of Eastern Galicia to Polish Domination* (Friends of Ukraine, 1919), 8.
35. For further investigation of the issue, see still instructive, based on archival sources article by Zofia Zaks, "Problem Galicji Wschodniej w czasie wojny polsko-radzieckiej," *Studia z dziejów ZSRR i Europy Środkowej* 8 (1972): especially 80.
36. Mykhailo Hrushevsky [Mykhaylo Hrushevs'kyy], *To the Civilized Nations of the World* (Committee of the Independent Ukraine, 1920), 1.
37. See Larry Wolff, *The idea of Galicia. History and fantasy in Habsburg political culture* (Stanford University Press, 2010), 13–62.
38. See Jagoda Wierzejska, "Cultural and Ideological Aspects of Spatial Adaptation After

- the Change of Political Boundaries. The Case of Galicia,” *Przegląd Humanistyczny* 59, no. 4 (2015): 59–76.
39. On recreation of the past representations so that they suited a political interest of a particular community, see David Lowenthal, *The Past is a Foreign Country* (Cambridge University Press, 1985).
40. See Délégation polonaise à la Conférence de la Paix, Délégation Économique, *L'Industrie du pétrole en Galicie* (Imp. Levé, 1919), 4. For further investigation of the issue, see Alison Fleig Frank, *Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia* (Harvard University Press, 2007), 205–36.
41. Ludwik Mroczka, *Spór o Galicję Wschodnią 1914–1923* (Wydawnictwo Naukowe WSP, 1998), 114–18; Michał Klimecki, *Polsko-ukraińska wojna o Lwów i Galicję Wschodnią 1918–1919* (Oficyna Wydawnicza Volumen, 2000), 83–85.
42. Christoph Mick, *Lemberg, Lwów, L'viv, 1914–1947: Violence and Ethnicity in a Contested City* (Purdue University Press, 2016), 151.
43. Mick, *Lemberg, Lwów, L'viv*, 175.
44. After the unification of Western Ukraine with the rest of Ukraine in January 1919, the former changed its official name to Western Oblast of the Ukrainian People's Republic.
45. “Umowa polsko-ukraińska z 1 II 1919,” Biblioteka Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich we Wrocławiu (Oss), Dział Rękopisów, 13500/III, część III, strony (ss.) 183–200; the Ukrainian version of the document, Oss, Dział Rękopisów, 14351/II, cz. VI, ss. 329–336.
46. Grzegorz Skrukwa, *Formacje wojskowe ukraińskiej “rewolucji narodowej” 1914–1921* (Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2008), 34.
47. Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (University of Toronto Press, 2000), 370; Bogdan Musiał, “Die Ukrainepolitik Polens von 1918–1922,” in *Die Ukraine. Zwischen Selbstbestimmung und Fremdherrschaft 1917–1922*, ed. Wolfram Dornik, Georgiy Kasianov, and Hannes Leidinger (Leykam, 2011), 449–64.
48. Piotr Wróbel, “The Seeds of Violence. The Brutalization of an East European Region, 1917–1921,” *Journal of Modern European History* 1, no. 1 (2003): 125–49.
49. For example, E.g., letters of the Polish and the Ukrainian high command to each other, November 1918, Derzhavnyy arkhiv L'viv'skoy oblasti, (DALO), fond (f.) 257, opys (op.) 2, sprava (spr.) 1497, arkush (ark.) 62, 63, 64. See also letters of the Polish and the Ukrainian high command to each other, November 1918, Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe w Warszawie, Wojskowe Biuro Historyczne, I.341.1.74, karty 29–30.
50. For example, E.g., testimonies of witnesses of Ukrainian offenses against the Polish population, in 1918–1919, drawn up by the Department of Justice of the High Command of the Polish Army for Eastern Galicia in Lviv, Oss, Dział Rękopisów, 13497/III and II, tom 3, ss. 1–222; Reports of testimonies given at the Archive Office of the Governing Commission in Lviv, Oss, Dział Rękopisów, 13504/II, ss. 65–199.

51. For example, E.g., the document on the situation in the field hospital on the Polish side of the front "Raport Komendy Szpitala WP na Technice, Lwów – Technika, 17 XI 1918," DALO, f. 257, op. 2, spr. 1128, ark. 35–6; the Polish-Ukrainian agreement on hospitals, power stations, etc. and the document on Ukrainians' behavior toward the Polish Sanitary Service, DALO, f. 257, op. 2, spr. 1131. See also Czesław Mączyński, *Boje lwowskie. Część I. Oswobodzenie Lwowa (1–24 listopada 1918 roku)* ("Rzeczpospolita," 1921), vol. 1, 243; Dmytro Krenżałowski, *Lwów w ukraińskich rękach 1–21.XI.1918* (wydania "Strilicia," 1919), DALO f. 257, op. 2, spr. 1507.
52. See, for example, e.g., Leszek Kania, *W cieniu Orłąt Lwowskich. Polskie sądy wojskowe, kontrwywiad i służby policyjne w bitwie o Lwów 1918–1919* (Uniwersytet Zielonogórski, 2008); *Raporty i komunikaty naczelných władz wojskowych o sytuacji wewnętrznej Polski: 1919–1920*, ed. Marek Jabłonowski, Piotr Stawecki, and Tadeusz Wawrzyński (Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych Uniwersytet Warszawski – Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna, 2000).
53. See especially Jeffrey Veidlinger, *In the Midst of Civilized Europe: The Pogroms of 1918–1921 and the Onset of the Holocaust* (Metropolitan Books, 2021), 83–88, 180, 187, 236–37, 358; William W. Hagen, *Anti-Jewish Violence in Poland, 1914–1920* (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 87–212; William W. Hagen, "The Moral Economy of Popular Violence: The Pogrom in Lwów, November 1918," in *Antisemitism and its Opponents in Modern Poland*, ed. Robert Blobaum (Cornell University Press, 2005), 124–47; Alexander V. Prusin, *Nationalizing a Borderland: War, Ethnicity, and Anti-Jewish Violence in East Galicia, 1914–1920* (University of Alabama Press, 2005), 65–113. See also Wierzejska, "The Pogrom of Jews During and After World War I: The Destruction of the Jewish Idea of Galicia," in *Personal Narratives, Peripheral Theatres: Essays on the Great War (1914–18)*, ed. Anthony Barker, Maria Eugénia Pereira, Maria Teresa Cortez, Paulo Alexandre Pereira, and Otilia Martins (Springer, 2018), 169–84; Jagoda Wierzejska, "Polski feniks z popiołu pogromów. Przemoc antyżydowska w Galicji w czasie wojny polsko-ukraińskiej 1918–1919," in *Mniejszość i większość. Relacje kulturowe na pograniczach*, vol. 2, ed. Joanna Szydłowska, Magdalena Ochmańska, Aleksandra Bączek, and Lech Kościelak (Instytut Historii i Stosunków Międzynarodowych Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego, 2016), 209–27. For recently published work on the topic, see Grzegorz Gauden, *Lwów – kres iluzji. Opowieść o pogromie listopadowym 1918* (Universitas, 2019).
54. The precursory analysis of the *Krieg der Geister* phenomenon in Eastern Europe, in the period between the Balkan wars and the conflicts directly following World War I, was made by Maciej Górny. See Górny, "Der 'Krieg der Geister' im Osten? Eine Fußnote zum vergangenen Paradigma," in *Frontwechsel*, ed. Wolfram Dornik, Julia Walleczek-Fritz, and Stefan Wedrac (Böhlau, 2014), 191–210.
55. "Kto sieje krew," *Pobudka*, November 10, 1918, 1.

56. "Dzicz hula," *Pobudka*, November 10, 1918, 4.
57. "Zwierzęcy czyn Ukraińców," *Pobudka*, November 10, 1918, 4.
58. Mick, *Lemberg, Lwów, L'viv, 1914–1947*, 153.
59. O.K., "Z kym voyuyemo?," *Dilo*, November 13, 1918, 3–4; "Otzhe z kym voyuyemo?," *Dilo*, November 15, 1918, 3.
60. O.K., "Z kym voyuyemo?," 4.
61. "Otzhe z kym voyuyemo?," 3.
62. *Ibid.*, 4.
63. For the further investigation of the press discourse on the battle of Lviv, see Wierzejska, "The Idea of Galicia in the Interwar Polish Discourse, 1918–1939," in *Continuities and Discontinuities of the Habsburg Legacy in East-Central European Discourses since 1918*, ed. Magdalena Baran-Szoltys and Jagoda Wierzejska (V&R unipress, 2020), 51–76; Wierzejska, "Toward the Idea of Polishness: Implications of 1918 for the Former Eastern Galicia, 1918–1939," *Przegląd Humanistyczny* 62, no 4 (2018): 71–94; Mick, *Lemberg, Lwów, L'viv, 1914–1947*, 152–54.
64. Haidamakas constituted paramilitary outfits composed of Ruthenian peasants, craftsmen, impoverished noblemen, and Zaporozhian Cossacks on the territory of Right-bank Ukraine within the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Their activeness was a rebellious reaction against the Commonwealth's attempts to reconstitute its orders on the territory of Right-bank Ukraine and against the exploitation of Ruthenian peasants by Polish lords. Their opposition toward the Polish gentry and the Roman Catholics led to the haidamaka rebellions, three major of which took place in 1734, 1750, and the largest—usually referred to as Koliyivschyna—in 1768. The Haidamaks entered literature through Taras Shevchenko's poem *Haydamaky* [*The Haidamaks*] (1841), among others. In the Polish tradition they were identified with rebels shedding Polish blood, mainly due to the Polish romantic literature, Henryk Sienkiewicz's *Trylogia* [*Trilogy*] (1884–1888) and Franciszek Rawity-Gawronski's books with the famous *Historia ruchów hajdamackich* [*History of the Haidamakas Movements*] (1899).
65. For further investigation of the issue, see Wierzejska, "Ideologiczne przejęcia narracji o 'obronie' Lwowa po 1918 roku," in *Rok 1918 w polskiej pamięci kulturowej. Spiwiła i pęknięcia*, ed. Karol Hryniewicz, Tomasz Wójcik, and Andrzej Zieniewicz (Elipsa, 2019), 195–225.
66. Jan Zamorski, *Mowy Sejmowe nr 7. O okrucieństwach hajdamackich. Mowa posła tarnopolskiego, prezesa Związku L.-N. w Małopolsce, Jana Zamorskiego, na posiedzeniu 66. Sejmu dnia 9 lipca 1919 r.* (N.p.: Sejmowy Związek Ludowo-Narodowy, 1919), 5.
67. For an example of using photos taken from a different front in the Polish anti-Ukrainian propaganda concerning Eastern Galicia, see Górny, "Identity under Scrutiny: First World War in Local Communities," in *Imaginations and Configurations of Polish Society. From the Middle Ages through the Twentieth Century*, ed. Yvonne Kleinmann,

- Jürgen Heyde, Dietlind Hüchtker, Dobrochna Kałwa, Joanna Nalewajko-Kulikow, Katrin Steffen, and Tomasz Wiślicz (Wallstein, 2017), 261–80.
68. Władysław Orobkiewicz, *Dlaczego? Rzecz o gwałtach i barbarzyństwach ukraińskich popełnianych na żołnierzach i ludności polskiej we wschodniej części byłego zaboru austriackiego i o ich przyczynach* (Redakcja Kurjera Lwowskiego, 1919), 5.
  69. Mączyński, *Boje lwowskie*, vol. 2, 74. See also Orobkiewicz, *Dlaczego?*, vol. 1, 230, 244, 268.
  70. *Krvavá kniha, čI: Dokumenty k polské okupaci v ukrajinském území haličském. Rok 1918 až do prosince 1919* (Administration of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, 1920).
  71. *Krvavá kniha*, 10.
  72. *Krvavá kniha*, 12.
  73. Vladimir Temnitsky [Volodymyr Temnyts'kyi], Joseph Burachinsky [Osyp Burachyn'skyi], *Polish Atrocities in Ukrainian Galicia. A Telegraphic Note to M. George Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference* (The Ukrainian National Committee of the United States, 1919), 9.
  74. Temnitsky [Temnyts'kyi] and Burachinsky [Burachyn'skyi], *Polish Atrocities in Ukrainian Galicia*, 13
  75. Temnitsky [Temnyts'kyi] and Burachinsky [Burachyn'skyi], *Polish Atrocities in Ukrainian Galicia*, 13
  76. See, for example, e.g., Adam Kudła, “Swawolni Kozacy i dzicy Hajdamacy w twórczości Franciszka Rawity Gawrońskiego,” in *Galicyjskie dylematy*, ed. Kazimierz Karolczak and Henryk W. Żaliński (Wydawnictwo Naukowe WSP, 1994), 93–105.
  77. See, for example, e.g., John-Paul Himka, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1988).
  78. See Borodziej and Górny, *Nasza wojna: vol. II Narody 1917–1923*, 457.
  79. For further investigation of the issue see Martin Schramm, *Das Deutschlandbild in der britischen Presse 1912–1919* (Akademie Verlag, 2007); Juliette Courmont, *L'odeur de l'ennemi. L'imaginaire olfactif en 1914–1918* (Armand Colin, 2010).
  80. See Henri Bergson, *The Meaning of the War: Life and Matter in Conflict* (T. F. Unwin, 1915).
  81. See Werner Sombart, *Händler und Helden. Patriotische Besinnungen* (Duncker und Humboldt, 1915).
  82. See, for example, e.g., Dmytro Donzow [Dmytro Dontsov], *Die ukrainische Staatsidee und der Krieg gegen Russland* (C. Kroll, 1915); Tadeusz Stanisław Grabowski, *Rosya jako “opiekunka” Słowian. Dwa odczyty wypowiedziane w Piotrkowie dn. 16. I 17. maja 1916* (Towarzystwo Słowiańskie, 1916).
  83. See, for example, e.g., Franciszek Kruczkowski, *Duma o Lwowie* (nakładem Polskiego Towarzystwa Pedagogicznego, 1919), 30; Wisława [Wilhelmina Adamówna], *Gdy zagrzmiął*

- złoty róg... Powieść dla młodzieży z walk listopadowych 1918 r.* (nakładem Księgarni Naukowej, Polskie Towarzystwo Pedagogiczne, 1921), 139. See also Umberto Eco, "Inventing the Enemy," in Eco, *Inventing the Enemy: Essays* (Mariner Books, 2012), 1–21.
84. See Mączyński, *Boje lwowskie*, vol. 2, 74, 126. See also Schramm, *Das Deutschlandbild in der britischen Presse 1912–1919*, 378–80, 419; Cynthia Wachtell, "Encountering the Enemy. Representations of German Soldiers in American World War I Literature," in "Hunns" vs. "Corned Beef." *Representations of the Other in American and German Literature and Film on World War I* (V&R unipress, 2007), 65–74.

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# AFTERWORD

## CHUTES AND LADDERS

### Racialization in Habsburg Central Europe After 1918

TARA ZAHRA

**N**OT TOO LONG AGO, 1918 WAS CELEBRATED IN NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY in terms of the triumph of progress, national self-determination, and democracy. As Thomas Masaryk, the first president of the Czechoslovak Republic, famously declared, “great multinational Empires are an institution of the past, of a time when material force was held high and the principle of nationality had not yet been recognized, because democracy had not been recognized.”<sup>1</sup>

In the past several decades, scholars have collectively challenged the simplistic identification of progress and modernity with the nation-state, creating a new paradigm for thinking about 1918 in East Central Europe and globally. We now have a far darker view of the legacy of Versailles, certainly in the East European context. The rhetoric of anticolonial nationalism was mobilized for many political purposes in 1918. It served individuals and groups striving for liberation from oppressive and exploitative empires, but it also served those seeking to disenfranchise and expel minority populations and other individuals deemed “foreign” or threatening to the nation. The essays in this volume productively contribute to this reassessment, focusing on topics ranging from citizenship and migration to schooling and violence, from Ellis Island to Alsace and the Bukovina, from the practices of diplomats to the dynamics of local conflict.

Several essays cross the chronological divide of 1918. There is always something artificial about turning points. We know that the social conflict and violence that led to World War I began well before 1914, and continued well after 1918, as work on the “Greater War” has emphasized.<sup>2</sup> In the Central European context, both the positive achievements and the troubling legacies of the interwar successor states built on Habsburg institutions and precedents. The successor states inherited a functioning

bureaucracy and legal system; an ideal of the rule of law (which had however been severely compromised during the war); a largely literate population that was informed of its political and civic rights; a fledgling welfare state; and creative ways of managing national conflicts. But these new states also inherited a severe social crisis; a radicalized population; nationalist tensions; a view of Roma and Jews as racial “others”; and stark economic inequalities between different regions.<sup>3</sup>

Robert Gerwarth has argued that the “vanquished” powers of the Great War inflicted the greatest havoc on Europe in the twentieth century. It was in the East, including the former Habsburg lands, where bitterness and anger festered about the terms of the Versailles treaty; where bloody revolutions were followed by even bloodier counter-revolutions; and where the most extreme and violent ideologies and practices of the twentieth century took root.<sup>4</sup>

Scholars have also questioned what 1918 was about. Certainly, 1918 was a moment in which the nation-state was consecrated as the privileged state form in Europe, but imperialists didn’t simply pack up and go home. This was despite the ways in which anticolonial nationalists around the world also tried to use the language of self-determination to win their own independence.<sup>5</sup> Some former Habsburg citizens longed for the continuation of the empire, as Dominique Reill has shown in her study of Fiume. The people of Fiume were less motivated by the nationalist poetry of their leader than by an active desire for imperial continuity. The Habsburg Empire had provided a great deal of local autonomy, respected the city’s multinational character, and enabled the port to develop an important economic role linking the hinterland to the Adriatic and global economy. In the aftermath of World War I, many citizens of Fiume imagined that their best chance of retaining these imperial advantages lay with Italy rather than Yugoslavia.<sup>6</sup> And even when citizens did use the rhetoric of nationhood or national interest locally, there was no consensus about what that meant in practice, as Gábor Egry has shown.<sup>7</sup>

When it came to what we might call democratization, it is important to recognize that the successor states made some tangible gains, including the extension of suffrage to women, new forms of economic development, the expansion of welfare states, and new rights for workers. But within a framework of nationalist democracy, in which rights generally accrued to members of a privileged national majority, these gains often came at the expense of those excluded from the national community.

Literature on national indifference has also called into question what 1918 was about. Was it even primarily a product of nationalization or nationalism? If so, who was nationalized and why? More than 60 percent of the Slovene-speaking population of Southern Carinthia voted to join Austria, rather than Yugoslavia, in a 1920 plebiscite. In Silesia, to the north, meanwhile, many Polish speakers preferred to remain in Germany rather than join Poland. Their votes, like the resistance of the people of Fiume, reflected uncertainty about the future of the new states, as well as a desire to maintain accustomed

economic and social networks that would have been disrupted by annexation.<sup>8</sup> Clearly the space for national indifference narrowed after 1918, in part because states forced people to choose sides, or forcibly classified them. But whether indifference to the nation was widespread or not, we have increasingly come to see nationalist violence as a consequence of nationalization, rather than as a preordained or inevitable consequence of national, linguistic or confessional diversity.<sup>9</sup>

This reevaluation of 1918 in central Europe is predicated in part on a different understanding of how and why the Habsburg Empire collapsed at the end of World War I in the first place. Maureen Healy and Claire Morelon have demonstrated the extent to which the fall of the Habsburg Empire itself was not necessarily a product of nationalist conflict at all, but rather of social conflicts exacerbated by World War I.<sup>10</sup> And as Mark Cornwall, Iris Rachamimov, John Deak, and Jonathan Gumz have suggested, the dissolution of Imperial loyalties were partly the result of the Habsburg state's own militarization, its abandonment of national impartiality, and the rule of law during the war.<sup>11</sup>

Finally, a lot of recent scholarship has located the origins of both violent conflict and “hatred” in very local contexts.<sup>12</sup> Sometimes, nationalist violence was a product of boredom. Local violence—such as drunk kids throwing stones at school windows—was often sensationalized by what Rogers Brubaker has called “ethnic entrepreneurs,” which in turn radicalized people further. Mass politics and the emerging sensational press were key. Nationalists gained followers by presenting themselves as more radical than the next person.<sup>13</sup>

Local rumors and conspiracy theories were instrumental in fomenting violence: in the Galician context, this included rumors that the emperor himself had sanctioned violence against Jews, as Daniel Unowsky has shown. At the same time, violence in the name of a nation was often a way of resolving other kinds of local conflicts—grievances against a neighbor or a competing business. Yet, it also mattered a lot how states responded. When states intervened decisively, fewer people died. This can be seen by comparing the relatively low death tolls of the 1898 antisemitic violence in Galicia with the much higher death toll of anti-Jewish violence in 1918–1919.<sup>14</sup>

If local contexts are essential for understanding the events of 1918, so is the global context. That is where I would like to turn to consider the next steps in studying “ethnicization, violence and hatred” after 1918. The post-Versailles legacy included more than the dissolution of an empire or the “ethnicization” of populations locally, but also the racialization of populations in a global framework.

Writing in 1921, Robert Musil remarked on the extent to which the terms “nation” and “race” had become coterminous since 1918. “There cannot be many people who, if directly asked, would equate nation with race—everyone knows that nations are racial mixtures—but strangely enough, the concept of race is nonetheless constantly

substituted, quite unabashedly, for the concept of nation, and people make use of “race” as if it were as straightforward as the concept of the cube.”<sup>15</sup>

In critiquing the association of race and nation, Musil reinforced what he took to be the commonsensical notion that distinctive “races” really existed, and that nations were somehow composed of them. But he also pointed out the extent to which the racialization of society had gone to ludicrous extremes.

“If ordinary tables were, at a given moment, to begin multiplying by propagation rather than by being ordered from a manufacturer, we would immediately see arising from the now-living tables (and on the same evidence by which we recognize a Frisian as a Frisian) races of four-legged square tables, one-legged oval tables, and more.”<sup>16</sup>

Musil’s remarks remind us that people were thinking about race when they spoke of nations after World War I. Historians, however, have arguably obscured the racialization of nationalism through our own use of the terms ethnicization and “ethnic nationalism,” terms we should use critically. It is equally important, as Zachary Mazur argues in his contribution to this book, to recognize that racialization often takes place beneath the cover of other concepts and words, such as *nation* or *culture*. With respect to transatlantic Jewish migrants, he argues, “The governments of the United States and Poland were unwilling to accept them, but their defense lay inside the unclear category of nationality, while both administrative apparatuses were more interested in the category of race.”

Clearly, the history of racialization is a transatlantic story. Beginning in the nineteenth century, United States immigration authorities drew upon a concept of race defined by blood quantum that had been used to define African Americans domestically, and applied it to migrants coming from Europe. They assumed that a person with one German and three English grandparents was somehow one-fourth German and three-fourths English.<sup>17</sup> By 1900, immigration officials classified immigrants from the Habsburg Empire as members of several distinctive “races,” including “Bohemian and Moravian,” “Croatian and Slovenian,” “Dalmatian, Bosnian, and Hercegovinian,” “Pole,” “Slovak,” and “Hebrew.” Nicole Phelps has shown that Habsburg authorities contested these forms of classification. Austrian officials wanted emigrants to simply be recorded as “Austrians.” But US officials rejected this demand because Austrian “was not a race name. [...] It has no significance as to the physical race or language.”<sup>18</sup>

This changed after World War I, however, in both the United States and Europe. As Mae Ngai has shown, as US immigration authorities sought to create a barrier against the immigration of foreigners deemed “non-white,” they started to refer to migrants from Eastern and Southern Europe as members of “ethnic” groups, and migrants from outside of Europe as members of “racial” groups. White people supposedly had ethnicities, non-white people had races (and lacked “national origins”). However, and this is key, both concepts—national origins or ethnicity and race—were still presumed to be

“immutable and transhistorical, passed down through generations without change.” Both terms were racialized. But by continuing to talk about Eastern Europeans in terms of ethnicity and non-Europeans in terms of race, we perpetuate an imagined distinction between Europeans and non-Europeans that was invented in the service of racial exclusion.<sup>19</sup>

There are other problematic consequences of the use of the term “ethnicity.” Jeremy King argued two decades ago that the term “ethnicity” has been used by social scientists since the early twentieth century to soft-pedal primordialism. Talking about “ethnicity” was a convenient way of carving a middle-ground between a view of nationality as a biological fact and a view of it as a cultural construct. This echoed the early twentieth-century use of “ethnicity” to refer to European migrants. “Ethnicity” is a racialized concept that was invented to locate groups—such as Jews or Poles—on the borderlands of whiteness. And like race, ethnicity is generally considered immutable. We don’t use the phrase “cultural ethnicity” because it is a contradiction in terms; nor do we use the term “racial ethnicity” because it would be redundant.

We do talk about “ethnic nationalism.” But this implicitly presupposes that there is another form of nationalism that is cultural, and more benign. This distinction runs deep in nationalism scholarship, back to theorists like Hans Kohn, who distinguished between the “ethnic” nationalisms of Central Europe and the “civic” nationalisms of places like the United States and France. That distinction has been criticized from many angles, theoretical and empirical, in the past several decades.<sup>20</sup> I do not think anyone could seriously argue today that nationalism in the United States after 1918 (a period that included the rise of the Ku Klux Klan, immigration restriction, Jim Crow, and antisemitic exclusion) was “civic” or that nationalism in Central Europe was ever entirely “ethnic.” In France, the criteria for proving one’s “Frenchness” were arguably more descent-based than in Czechoslovakia in 1918, where national malleability was an accepted (if lamented) social fact.<sup>21</sup> So, what do we gain with the term “ethnic nationalism?” Why not just call it “nationalism,” and acknowledge that all forms of nationalism beginning in the late nineteenth century contained both racial and cultural elements?

Another problem with terms such as “ethnicization” and “ethnic nationalism” is that they serve to distance the nationalisms of East Central Europe from later Nazi formulations in misleading ways. We insist that Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia experienced “ethnicization,” while Germany had a “racial state.” When Poles or Romanians engaged in antisemitic violence or passed antisemitic legislation, it has often been described as “ethnic conflict.” When Germans did the same thing, we call it racial persecution. While the Nazi state took racial antisemitism to the point of genocide, the rise of racial antisemitism between the two world wars was a feature of every interwar state discussed in this book. Likewise, eugenic policies based on biological conceptions of race were widespread around the world in the 1920s and

1930s.<sup>23</sup> Instead of talking about ethnicization and ethnic nationalism, terms that localize, orientalize, and to some extent obscure East European racism, I suggest that we should talk more about racialization and about the place of Central Europe in global racial hierarchies.

In 1918, Eastern Europe occupied an important place in the imagined borderlands of whiteness and in the formation of anticolonial political rhetoric.<sup>23</sup> This liminality had institutional, social, and political consequences. The fate of Habsburg Central Europe was defined in part in 1918 by the perception that its inhabitants were almost, but not quite, white and European; almost, but not quite, worthy of sovereignty; almost, but not quite, racially acceptable as immigrants in Western Europe and North America.

One of the first clues that people were thinking about race in a global context in 1918 is that the language of slavery was so ubiquitous. In Graz, German nationalists addressed a telegram to Wilson in which they expressed their outrage at the terms of the peace treaty, which “will make us a nation of slaves, deprive us of every possible means of making a living and strike a blow to the face to the most basic human rights.”<sup>24</sup> A petition sent by a gathering of members of the Austrian Christian Social Party and German Freedom Party in May 1919 proclaimed its opposition to the “enservment” of the German Austrian people. They warned, “We will not allow ourselves with our wives and children to be sentenced to death or eternal economic slavery, but demand fairness, humanity, and justice. If the Entente wants to prepare a grave for us, all of Europe will be destroyed with us.”<sup>25</sup>

Why all these references to slavery? In part this was the language Wilson himself used, as Larry Wolff has shown. In spite, or perhaps because of being a southern segregationist, Wilson liked to fashion himself as the Abraham Lincoln of Eastern Europe, emancipating “slaves” from the rule of autocratic empires.<sup>26</sup> By invoking the language of slavery in their protests, Eastern Europeans both appealed to Wilson’s sensibilities and positioned themselves firmly on the white side of a global racial divide.

They did not succeed. On the one hand, unlike African Americans in the US South, unlike British and French colonial subjects in Asia and Africa, and unlike most former Ottoman subjects, Eastern Europeans were considered worthy of national self-determination. On the other hand, that self-determination and sovereignty was compromised institutionally in multiple ways that reflected a perception that the former subjects of the Habsburg Empire were not quite “mature” enough for complete self-government. They enjoyed what Adom Getachew has called “burdened membership” in the club of European powers.<sup>27</sup>

The Great Powers that controlled the league were all empires, and the Habsburg successor states all aspired to be empires in one way or another. Interwar nationalists may have insisted rhetorically that they had been liberated from the yoke of the Habsburg Empire, but they behaved as though they were governing miniature empires—empires

even more centralizing and hierarchical and certainly racialized than deposed Habsburg rulers had been, as Pieter Judson has argued.<sup>28</sup>

In borderland territories that were stigmatized as “backward” and/or nationally or politically unreliable, several of the successor states undertook mini civilizing missions of their own. In interwar Poland, Kathryn Ciancia has shown how border guards, settlers, teachers, local officials, and even boy scouts streamed into Volhynia, recently annexed from the USSR, in order to “modernize” and “civilize” the region. They debated whether the Ukrainians and Jews who inhabited the region were mature enough to handle democratic participation, for example. Armies of bureaucrats and teachers were also dispatched from Prague to rural Slovakia and to the Subcarpathian Rus, where they were often greeted as colonial invaders.<sup>29</sup>

Natasha Wheatley has called Central Europe in 1918 a “ground zero” for the articulation of a new international order.<sup>30</sup> Yet this international order was simultaneously a reformulation of an older Imperial order.<sup>31</sup> Beyond the league’s authority over the new “mandates” created from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, the league often functioned as a replacement for the former Habsburg Empire and as a semicolonial power in East Central Europe.<sup>32</sup>

For example, the league’s financial reconstruction of Austria required the Austrian government to open its books to a league commissioner, as loans for reconstruction were contingent on implementing austerity measures that were deemed necessary by outside auditors. This kind of external financial control of a sovereign state’s budget had previously only been attempted in colonial contexts. This was not lost on league officials or Austrians, as Jamie Martin has shown. Austrians protested being subject to what they called “Tunisianization” or “Ottomanization,” or reduced to a “Madagascar.” League officials meanwhile debated how to make this unprecedented intervention into the financial affairs of a sovereign state appear less like a form of colonial or imperial domination.<sup>33</sup>

The semicolonial status of the successor states was also reinforced by swarms of international humanitarian workers who flooded the region after the war. In the face of famine conditions, Herbert Hoover’s American Relief Administration (ARA) and the International Save the Children Fund, both founded in 1919, emerged among the most important efforts to combat hunger in Central Europe. The ARA penetrated the tiniest villages of Central and Eastern Europe through a network of committees and soup kitchens. While theoretically focused solely on feeding starving children, Hoover’s mission embraced a civilizing mission from the outset. Its representatives sought to deliver “American” values of self-help, efficiency, and cross-class solidarity along with surplus wheat and corn.<sup>34</sup> Hoover believed that his soup kitchens could heal the festering wounds of class division in Europe, and thereby prevent the Russian revolution from spreading west. “A princess stirring broth in a soup kitchen is the best argument

for democracy that could possibly be found. . . . It was through this kind of service that we were able to stave off anarchy,” he explained to the *Saturday Evening Post*.<sup>35</sup>

Along with American values and anti-Communism, humanitarian workers brought their prejudices to Eastern and Central Europe, depicting the region and its people as inherently backward, violent, and corrupt—in opposition to American modernity and efficiency.<sup>36</sup> These prejudices undercut their stated goals of facilitating self-help, but reinforced the status of the Habsburg successor states as semicolonial protectorates. Encounters between relief workers and locals sometimes left humanitarian activists questioning whether Eastern Europeans were even human. One Save the Children Fund field worker reported that in the Sub-Carpathian Rus in Czechoslovakia in 1920, “The squalor is almost beyond belief. Six or seven people—if one can call them people—in one stuffy room, and a half-dozen hens or rabbits besides. [. . .] Idiots and cretins abound.”<sup>37</sup>

Finally, the semi-independent status of the successor states was concretely embedded in the Minorities Treaties that the successor states were required to sign in exchange for their independence or territorial aggrandizement. These treaties obliged signatories to protect national minorities within their borders and to submit to external scrutiny by a League of Nations Committee. But only the new states created at the end of the war were required to sign these treaties.

The hypocrisy of the Great Powers was not lost on the citizens of the new Central and Eastern European nation-states. Before the war ended, a Viennese newspaper speculated that the Allies would be as eager as the Central Powers for peace, given their own “minority problems,” writing, “The Irish and Indian questions plague the British global empire no less than the Czech and South Slav questions plague us.”<sup>38</sup> But when in 1922 Lithuania proposed that all member states of the League of Nations adopt universal standards of minority protection for all members, a French delegate responded, “France has no minorities.” Armed with an ethnographic map, a Romanian delegate contested this claim, only to receive the reply: “Minorities only exist where there is a Treaty.”<sup>39</sup>

According to contemporary logic, members of minority groups in Western Europe or in the United States did not need protection because those societies were fully civilized and fully democratized. Eastern Europeans, by contrast, could not be fully trusted with self-government. One of the most influential players at Versailles, Jan Smuts, prime minister of South Africa, argued that a mandate system applied to Europe could function to train Eastern Europeans for full sovereignty. “The peoples left behind by the decomposition of Russia, Austria, and Turkey are mostly untrained politically; many of them are either incapable or deficient in the power of self-government,” he insisted.<sup>40</sup>

Of course, we should not oversimplify the relationship between the league and other international organizations and Eastern Europeans. There are examples of local experts and officials using international organizations, including the league, to

build national institutions and infrastructure or even strengthen national sovereignty. One example of this kind of partnership between international institutions and local state-builders was the League's Health Organization, run by Ludwig Rajchmann, a Polish Jew. As Sara Silverstein has shown, he and his colleagues used the league's resources along with those of the Rockefeller Foundation to strengthen the public health infrastructure of the new Polish state, building new hospitals, sanitary stations, and child welfare clinics.<sup>41</sup> This is not only a story of imperial meddling and domination. But even here, race was a factor: Western organizations were willing to invest so much in public health in the Habsburg successor states to stop the transmission of epidemic diseases, which they associated with "dirty" and "backward" Jews migrating from Russia and Eastern Europe.<sup>42</sup>

Racialization was not simply imposed on Eastern Europe by international authorities or the Allies; it also reshaped legal definitions of nationality and citizenship domestically in central Europe after 1918. For example, take Article 80 of the 1918 Treaty of St. Germain, the so-called Option Clause. It was intended to address situations in which an individual's citizenship and nationality were not aligned. It enabled citizens of the former Habsburg Empire who differed "by race and language" from the majority population to "opt" for citizenship in another successor state, so long as that state was populated by "persons speaking the same language and having the same race." In practice, self-identified Germans were most likely to take advantage of the clause. Approximately 180,000 German families (totaling 540,000 people) from the former Austrian crownlands opted to become citizens of the First Austrian Republic.

Race was not the only basis for citizenship, however. In their recent exploration of welfare and citizenship in post-Habsburg Central Europe, Dominique Kirchner Reill, Ivan Jeličić, and Francesca Rolandi have shown that the Habsburg institution of *Heimatrecht* was often used after World War I to exclude "undesirables" from the benefits of national citizenship (including welfare rights). States readily accepted wealthy applicants as well as men of military age, but they were reluctant to naturalize the poor or individuals considered politically troublesome. The result was that hundreds of thousands of former Habsburg citizens became stateless after 1918.<sup>43</sup>

Yet it is far from coincidental that so many of these stateless people were former Jewish refugees. In this case, exclusion was justified on explicit racial grounds. In 1921, the Austrian Supreme Court defined "race" as an "inborn, inherent, physically and psychically determined quality," that "cannot be removed at will or changed according to preference."<sup>44</sup> On the basis of this definition, the Austrian Interior Ministry proceeded to reject almost all Jews from the Austrian successor states who had attempted to opt for Austrian citizenship—around 75,000 people—on the grounds that they did not belong to the German race. The League of Nations Minority Council ultimately supported Austria's decision, ruling that "Austria is fully justified, based on local and international

law, to exclude Eastern Jews. This should however take place with consideration of humanitarian principles.”<sup>45</sup>

Another reason that Europe faced such a severe crisis of statelessness in the 1920s and 1930s was that the United States, which had welcomed millions of immigrants before World War I, instituted new racialized immigration restrictions. In the United States, the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act created a quota system that discriminated heavily against migrants from Eastern and Southern Europe on racial grounds. The number of people leaving East Central Europe declined dramatically. The Polish quota in 1924 was only 25,800, even as more than 100,000 Poles per year requested emigration visas to the United States in the early 1920s, many hoping to join family members who were already overseas.<sup>46</sup>

Migration politics after World War I were shaped by a desire to create more racially homogenous states on both sides of the Atlantic.<sup>47</sup> Through the emigration of national and linguistic minorities and the return of nationally “reliable” and “productive” citizens from abroad, Central European officials hoped to transform multinational states into more homogenous nation-states. In Poland, new passport restrictions in 1920 hindered the emigration of Poles. But the Polish Interior Ministry simultaneously decreed that Jews should be encouraged to emigrate “in the interest of the Polish Republic.”<sup>48</sup> In the early 1920s, Józef Okołowicz, a founder of the Polish Emigration Society and former consul in Montréal, advised the Polish government to assist Ukrainian emigration to Canada as a strategy for “getting rid of elements that are enemies of or indisposed toward the Polish state.”<sup>49</sup> The Polish government also expressed its support for the Zionist cause throughout the interwar period, declaring its “special interest in the emigration of the Jews from Poland” as early as 1919. Zachary Mazur’s article in this volume shows that US authorities objected to the Polish state’s liberal distribution of passports to Polish Jews on the grounds that these Jews were not racially “Polish,” creating a tug-of-war between two states, which both saw Jews as undesirable citizens.

These policies easily facilitated a shift in the 1930s toward actively encouraging or forcing the mass emigration of Jews from Eastern Europe, a project that Zionists, western leaders, humanitarian organizations, and government officials in East Central Europe all agreed was necessary. Theodore Achilles of the US Department of State insisted in 1938, “the problem of refugees from Germany, great as it is, is merely a small part of the problem presented by the existence of seven million unwanted Jews between the Rhine and the Russian frontier. . . . A basic solution of the larger problem would unquestionably be a major contribution to European stability and world peace, worth using heroic measures to achieve.”<sup>50</sup>

My purpose here is not to suggest that 1918 was the trailhead of a special path to the Holocaust. But to understand the events of the 1930s and 1940s in Eastern Europe, we must come to terms with the extent to which 1918 represented more than a localized

“ethnicization” of nationalism within Eastern Europe. Violence was indeed rooted in local, regional, and national conflict and contexts, but it was also supported by a global edifice of racial hierarchies and ideologies.

East Central Europe has often been referred to as a “borderland.” It has also been known as the “Other Europe,” the “Shatterzone of Empire,” the “Lands In-Between,” or the “Bloodlands.” These formulations all refer to the region’s geographic liminality, or its precarious position between Germany and Russia. I suggest that we need to pay equal attention to another kind of “liminality” or “in-betweenness” that has profoundly shaped Central and East European history. The Habsburg successor states in this period were trapped in the imaginary borderlands of whiteness; someplace between colonizer and colonized, civilization and backwardness, Europe and not-Europe.<sup>51</sup> In 1918, this liminal status was institutionalized and anchored in the international order. In the process, Eastern Europeans became both racialized and racializers. For the remainder of the twentieth century, and arguably into the twenty-first, Eastern Europeans would continue to claw their way up and slide back down the chutes and ladders of this global racial order.

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# INDEX

*Page numbers in italics indicate tables.*

- Achilles, Theodore, 286  
action-reaction force pair paradigm, 235–37  
activism, 17–20  
Act No. 541/1919, in Moravia, 213  
Administrative Court of Justice (*Verwaltungsgerichtshof*), 215  
Affidavits of Identity and Nationality, in United States, 80  
African Americans, 282; mixed marriages of, 10–11; racial identity of, 280  
Albert, Max, 192n62  
Algeria, France and, 65n88  
Alsace-Lorraine: citizenship in, 41–58, 61n24; expulsions and voluntary emigration from, 50–52; France and, 14–15, 25, 41–58, 60n16; Franco-Prussian War and, 42, 44, 50; Germans in, 41–58, 61n24; identification cards in, 49, 50, 51; language in, 44; *malaise-alsacien* in, 53, 62n49; mixed marriages in, 45–46, 56; Nazi Germany and, 58; reentrance prohibitions in, 48–49; SDCC in, 53–54; transition period in, 47–54; Treaty of Versailles and, 4, 51, 52, 54–57; Tri-age Commissions in, 48, 52–54; in World War I, 44, 46, 58  
alterity, 11, 13  
American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 76  
American Red Cross, 75  
American Relief Association (ARA), 75, 283  
Ammende, Ewald, 173  
Anderson, Benedict, 6–7  
Angola, 106, 107, 111n21  
antisemitism: in Bohemian Lands, 208–11; in Czechoslovakia, 208–11; of Dmowski, 72–73; in Eastern Galicia, 20; in Galicia, 279; of Gibson, 81; in Hungary, 229–30; in Moravia, 209–10; in Nazi Germany, 281; in Poland, 72–73, 99–100; in Russia, 4, 23; Treaty of Versailles and, 23–24; of Wagner, 106  
Applegate, Celia, 18–19, 141  
ARA. *See* American Relief Association  
*Arditi*, 230  
Argentina, 107, 111n21  
Armenians, genocide of, 4, 261  
Aro, Pauli, 18  
Aryan paragraph, 99  
Association of Swabian University Students (*Vereinigung schwäbischer Hochschüler*), 139–40, 189n29  
Australia, 106  
Austria (Vienna): Batat Swabians in, 139–53; Bohemian Lands and, 199–201, 202; Catholics in, 137, 154n9; civil society in, 199; Czechoslovakia and, 159n45, 203–4, 221; Eastern Galicia and, 121, 123; Germanness in, 149; Germany and, 19, 140–41, 142, 148, 150, 152, 155n11; in Habsburg Empire, 140, 142, 143–44, 154n9;

- Austria (*continued*)  
 hairdressers in, 144–45; *Heimat* of, 140–42, 148, 153, 154n9; Hungary and, 19, 141, 144, 146, 147, 151; Jews in, 286; *Landsmannschaft* in, 19, 139–53; League of Nations and, 283; middle-class village in, 149–51; Moravia and, 200; nationalism in, 18, 19, 139–53; Nazi Germany and, 151; Poland and, 122; propaganda in, 144; race in, 285–86; refugees in, 151; Romania and, 148–49, 151, 160n61; Spanish flu in, 147; Sudeten Germans in, 19, 142, 148, 150, 152, 155n11
- Austria-Hungary, 2; Bohemian Lands and, 201–2; citizenship in, 14; refugees in, 17; schools in, 225n73
- Austro-Hungarian Empire: dissolution of, 229; Moravian Compromise of 1905 and, 20
- Bachynskyi, Julian, 254
- Barth, Fredrik, 5
- Basch, Franz, 169, 181, 182, 192n62
- Bas-Rhin Prefecture, 50
- Bat Swabians, in Austria, 139–53
- Beck, Józef, 102–3, 105
- Becker, Jean-Jacques, 60n16
- Belarus, 253; Poland and, 102; School Act of 1924 and, 124, 125
- Belgium: Germany and, 24; propaganda of, 262; rape of, 24
- Beneš, Jakub, 232
- Bergson, Henri, 262
- Bertók Detachment, 237, 238
- Bethlen, István, 179
- Bibó, Dénes, 239
- bilingual education: in Czechoslovakia, 207; in Poland, 18, 121, 124
- Birobidzhan, 106
- black marketeers (*Kettenhändler*), 209
- Bleyer, Jakob, 167–69, 170, 172–73, 175, 180, 181, 184, 192n62
- Bodó, Bela, 21–22, 23
- Bohemian Lands: administrative reforms in, 211–15; antisemitism in, 208–11; Austria and, 154n9, 199–201, 202; Austria-Hungary and, 201–2; black marketeers in, 209; civil society in, 199; conflicts after World War I in, 203–8; Czechoslovakia and, 20, 142, 200; Czechs in, 200–202, 212, 214, 215, 218; Germans in, 142, 200–203, 205, 212, 214, 215, 218; Hungary and, 22; hunger and labor revolts in, 201–2; Jews in, 219; language in, 218; nationality in, 217–20, 218; pan-Slavism in, 200; Poland and, 208–9; schools in, 215–17; World War I and, 199–221
- Böhler, Jochen, 248
- Böhmerwald, 146
- Böhmerwaldgau*, 150
- Böhmerwäldler*, 150
- Bolshevism: in Hungary, 231; Jews and, 21, 23, 24, 79, 81, 231; Poland and, 73
- Bonsal, Stephen, 72–73
- Borodziej, Włodzimierz, 249
- Borski, Jan Maurycy, 107–8
- Böss, Philipp, 183
- Boswell, Alexander Bruce, 254
- Boswell, Laird, 43, 45
- Braun, Johann, 145–46, 149
- Brazil, 16, 106, 107
- Brubaker, Rogers, 8–9, 59n4, 279
- Bruntz, George G., 249
- Budapesti Szemle* (Budapest Review), 167
- Budapesti Védőrség* (Defense Guard of Budapest), 233
- Bukovina, 201
- Bulgaria: Greece and, 59n3, 62n42; nationalism in, 59n3
- Burachyn'skyi, Joseph, 260–61, 262
- burdened membership, 282
- Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, in United States, 84
- Caglioti, Daniela L., 43, 59n8, 62n49, 64n75, 64n78, 65n88
- Cameroon, 102
- Canada: Poland and, 79–80; Ukraine and

- Carr, Edward Hallert, 249  
 Carré, Albert, 46  
 Carrol, Alison, 43  
 Case, Holly, 22  
 Catholics: in Austria, 137, 154n9; in Eastern Galicia, 250; in Poland, 70, 72, 78, 82, 104  
 Černý, Dr., 212  
 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 70  
 Christ, Hans, 183  
 Christians: in Hungary, 190n30, 238; in Ottoman Empire, 4; in Red Terror, 238. *See also* Catholics  
 Ciancia, Kathryn, 283  
 Cisleithania, 201, 204, 205, 211, 215, 219  
 citizenship: in Alsace-Lorraine, 41–58, 61n24; in Czechoslovakia, 207–8; ethnicity and, 12–16, 24; in France, 14–15, 41–58, 59n4, 61n24; in Germany, 64n80; of Jews, 14, 69–85; legalities of, 39–109; nationality and, 12–16, 83–84; in Poland, 69–85; race and, 285; rights of, 24; rule-of-law and, 15; stateless, 15, 17, 69–85; in Treaty of Versailles, 42; of women, 7–8, 16; World War I and, 64n75  
 civil society, 199  
 class, 16  
 Clemenceau, Georges, 52, 97, 260–61  
 Cohen, Gary, 199  
 Colombia, 16, 111n21  
 colonization: by Germany, 104; by Great Britain, 113n34; by Italy, 96, 104; by Japan, 104; by Poland, 100–103, 111n21. *See also* decolonization  
 Committee of Exiled Alsace-Lorrainers, 50  
 common culture, 7  
 Communism: in Czechoslovakia, 213. *See also* Bolshevism; Soviet Union  
*Conférence d'Alsace-Lorraine*, 4, 44–45, 46  
 Confidential Committee for Constitutional Reform, 9  
 Congress of Vienna, 109n7  
 convention, 7  
 Cornwall, Mark, 279  
 Council Republic, in Hungary, 236, 242n28  
 Covenant of the League of Nations, 100  
 Croatia, 144, 171, 232  
 Cserny, József, 238, 239  
 custom, 7  
 Czechoslovakia/Czechoslovak Republic/  
 Czechs: administrative reforms in, 211–15; antisemitism in, 208–11; Austria and, 159n45, 203–4, 221; bilingual education in, 207; Bohemian Lands and, 20, 142, 200–202, 212, 214, 215, 218; citizenship in, 207–8; Communism in, 213; conflicts after World War I in, 203–8; formation of, 202; Germans in, 155n11, 203–6, 211, 213–20; Habsburg Empire and, 221; Jews in, 1–2, 219; *Landsmannschaften* in, 19; language in, 212; militias in, 203, 204; Ministry of Education and National Enlightenment in, 217; Minorities Treaty with, 74; nationality in, 217–20, 226n84; peasant revolt in, 232; Poland and, 73, 207, 208; Polish-Ukrainian War and, 259–60; Protection of the Republic Act in, 206; Provincial National Committee in, 207; refugees in, 17; schools in, 215–17; self-determination in, 204; Spanish flu in, 204, 218; Zionism in, 204  
 Dalmatia, 201  
 Deak, John, 279  
 decolonization: in ethnic studies, 5; of Germany, 96; Paris Peace Conference and, 100; in United States, 5  
 Decree No. 4800/1923, in Hungary, 171, 188n16  
 Defense Guard of Budapest (*Budapesti Védőrség*), 233  
 “The Demands of Austrian Germans for the New Arrangement after the War,” 200–201  
 democracy: in Hungary, 234; rule-of-law in, 3; Treaty of Versailles and, 2–3; women and, 278  
 demographic engineering, by France, 43, 59n8  
 Derner, Heinrich, 192n62  
*Deutsch-ungarische Heimatblätter*, 181

- diasporas: of Poland, 102; from Treaty of Versailles, 17
- Dilo*, 257–58
- Diner, Dan, 22
- DJ. *See* German Youth
- Dmowski, Roman, 72–74, 79, 96–97
- Donauschwaben*, 141
- Dragostinova, Theodora, 43, 59n3
- Drymmer, Wiktor Tomir, 105
- Eastern Galicia, 20, 22; Austria and, 121, 123; Catholics in, 250; Habsburg Empire and, 120–21, 126; Jews in, 120–21, 250, 251; nationality in, 250; Paris Peace Conference and, 248–51; Poland and, 24–25, 119–32, 247–65; propaganda of, 24–25; Ruthenians in, 142, 250, 251, 252, 258; School Act of 1924 and, 124–32; school plebiscites in, 126–30; self-determination in, 249; Ukraine and, 24–25, 119–32, 247–65. *See also* Polish-Ukrainian War
- Eastern Galicia an Independent Commonwealth*, 250
- Eccard, M., 57
- Ecuador, 106, 107, 111n21
- Egerländerverein*, 142
- Emergency Quota Act, 70, 76–77
- Emperor Charles Welfare Works (*Kaiser-Karl-Wohlfahrtswerk*), 147
- Endres, Martin, 144, 149, 151
- Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, 5
- ethnic cleansing, by France, 43, 60n9
- ethnic entrepreneurs, 279
- ethnicity: activism and, 17–20; citizenship and, 12–16, 24; defined, 5; diaspora and, 17; intelligentsia and, 17–20; myths of, 7; nationalism and, 5–9, 18–19, 281; populism and, 17–20; race and, 197–265, 280–81; racialization and radicalization of, 197–265; self-determination and, 25; statehood and, 2–4; symbolism in, 6; Weber on, 9–11. *See also specific topics*
- ethnic studies, 5
- “Ethnische Gemeinschaften” (Weber), 9–10
- ethnographic limit, 251
- eugenics, 78, 281–82
- Exposé* (Składkowski), 99
- Fachblatt für Friseur, Raseure und Perückenmacher*, 145
- Fallós, Mancí, 238
- fascism, in Hungary, 230, 231
- Faul-Farkas, Johann, 192n62
- Fernekeß, Frédéric, 50–51
- Fernekeß, Josef, 50–51
- Feuchtenegg, Ernest Seidler von, 201
- Final Act, of Congress of Vienna, 109n7
- Fisher, Irving, 77–78
- Foucault, Michel, 265n4
- France: Algeria and, 65n88; Alsace-Lorraine and, 14–15, 25, 41–58, 60n16; citizenship in, 14–15, 41–58, 59n4, 61n24; colonization by, 96; demographic engineering by, 43, 59n8; ethnic cleansing by, 43, 60n9; nationalism in, 281; perpetual allegiance in, 64n82; Poland and, 80; Polish Jew emigration and, 107; propaganda of, 262; Ukraine and. *See also* Paris Peace Conference
- Franco-Germany Treaty of 1871, 56
- Franco-Prussian War, 42, 44, 50
- Franz Joseph (Emperor), 206
- Fraulstich, Ägidius, 192n62
- Freikorps*, 230
- Freissler, Robert, 204
- French Guyana, 30n54
- “From Liberation to Purge Trials in the ‘Mythic Provinces’” (Boswell), 43
- Fürsorgestelle der Sudetendeutschen* (Welfare Office for Sudeten Germans), 148
- Gablonzer Bierstübel*, 142
- Galicia, 201, 207; antisemitism in, 279; Habsburg Empire and, 247, 261, 265n11; language in, 265n11. *See also* Eastern Galicia
- Galician Statute of Autonomy, 121, 123
- Gammerl, Benno, 12–14, 16

- Gans, Eric, 248
- Gawroński, Rawita, 261
- Gazeta Polska*, 102
- Gellner, Ernest, 6
- gender: in Alsace-Lorraine, 46; in nationalism, 7–8. *See also* women
- genocide: of Armenians, 4, 261; of Jews, 231; in Rwanda, 8
- Geograficzno-statystyczny atlas Polski* (Romer), 251
- Germanness: in Austria, 149; in France, 14–15; in Habsburg Empire, 141, 143–44; *Landsmannschaft* and, 146
- German-Polish Convention, 123
- German Working Group, 181
- Germany/Germans: in Alsace-Lorraine, 41–58, 61n24; Austria and, 19, 140–41, 142, 148, 150, 152, 155n11; Belgium and, 24; in Bohemian Lands, 142, 212, 214, 215, 218; citizenship in, 64n80; colonization by, 104; in Czechoslovakia, 155n11, 203–6, 211, 213–20; decolonization of, 96; in Hungary, 19–20, 146, 167–86, 232; language in, 267n29; in Moravia, 142, 212, 220; nationalism in, 18, 19, 139–53, 201; Poland and, 75, 122; propaganda against, 262; refugees from, 104, 286; in Silesia, 142; Treaty of Versailles and, 100, 109n4, 114n45; in Upper Silesia, 123; White Terror and, 230. *See also* Nazi Germany
- German Youth (DJ), 184
- Gerwarth, Robert, 3, 42, 278
- Getachew, Adom, 282
- Gibbons, Herbert Adams, 254
- Gibson, Hugh, 69, 76, 79, 81, 83–84
- Gintner, Anton, 183
- Gombos, Gyula, 176
- Gömbös, Miklós, 179–80
- Górny, Maciej, 24, 249, 262, 269n54
- Grabski, Stanisław, 123–24
- Grabski, Władysław, 123
- Great Britain: colonization by, 96, 113n34; at Paris Peace Conference, 97; Polish Jew emigration and, 107; propaganda of, 262
- The Great Departure* (Zahra), 70
- Great Depression, in Hungary, 177, 179, 191n40
- Greece/Greeks, 59n3, 62n42, 232
- Green Terror, in Hungary, 232–40
- Großdeutsche*, 20
- group affinity, 10
- groupism, 8–9
- Grundrisse der Sozialökonomik* (*Outline of Socio-Economics*), 9–10
- Gumz, Jonathan, 279
- Gyáriparosok Országos Szövetsége* (National Association of Manufacturers), 233
- Habsburg Empire/Monarchy, 2; Austria in, 140, 142, 143–44, 152, 154n9; citizenship in, 13; collapse of, 279; Czechoslovakia and, 221; Eastern Galicia and, 120–21, 126; Galicia and, 247, 261, 265n11; Germanness in, 141, 143–44; Jews in, 20–21, 279; language in, 18, 119; League of Nations and, 283; Ottoman Empire and, 141; racism and, 277–87; Ruthenians in, 120–21; self-determination in, 282; Treaty of Versailles and, 278; Ukraine in, 120, 255; United States and, 283–84; World War I and, 147
- haidamakas*, 24, 25, 261, 270n64
- Haid-Lener, Elisabeth, 18, 19
- hairdressers, in Austria, 144–45
- Hartmannswillkerkopf/Vieil Armand*, 60n15
- Harvey, David Allen, 53
- Hatos, Pál, 231
- Healy, Maureen, 279
- Heeger, Viktor, 142
- Heimat* (homeland), 18–19; of Alsace-Lorraine, 51–52; of Austria, 140–43, 148, 153, 154n9
- Heimatrecht*, 285
- Heinold, Dr., 212
- Heintz, Elise, 50–51
- Heintz, Emile, 50
- Héjjas, Iván, 239
- Héjjas Detachment, 238, 239

- Hilfsverein für Deutschböhmen und die Sudetenländer*, 149
- Historikerstreit*, 231
- Hitler, Adolf, 9, 231
- Hitlerjungen, 181
- Hoare, Samuel, 102–3
- Hobsbawm, Eric, 6, 7
- homeland. *See Heimat*
- hometown associations (HTA), 145n20
- Hoover, Herbert, 283–84
- Horthy, Miklos, 230, 231
- Hrushevs'kyi, Mykhailo, 254–55
- HTA. *See* hometown associations
- Hungarian German People's Education Association. *See Ungarländischer Deutscher Volksbildungsverein*
- Hungarian German People's Party (UDVP), 141
- Hungary: antisemitism in, 229–30; Austria and, 19, 141, 144, 146, 147, 151; Bohemian Lands and, 22; Bolshevism in, 231; Christians in, 190n30, 238; Council Republic in, 236, 242n28; Decree No. 4800/1923 in, 171, 188n16; democracy in, 234; fascism in, 230, 231; Germans in, 19–20, 146, 167–86, 232; Great Depression in, 177, 179, 191n40; Greeks in, 232; Green Terror in, 232–40; Jews in, 1–2, 23, 232, 238, 240, 243n29; language in, 170–72, 181, 186, 193n67; Loyalty Movement in, 179–80; militias in, 23, 230, 233–34, 236, 237–38; Ministry of Nationalities in, 170; National Association of Manufacturers in, 233; national indifference in, 22–23; *numerus clausus* in, 14; OTT in, 190n30; pan-Slavism in, 180; paramilitaries in, 230, 231–32; People's Guard in, 233; politicization preconditions in, 173–78; Red Terror in, 21, 22, 23, 229–40; refugees in, 17; schools in, 170–72, 186, 188n18; Slovakia and, 142; Soviet Union and, 229–40; subgroup formation in, 178–84; Suevia in, 173–76, 178, 181–85, 189n29; unified Germans in, 172–73; White Terror in, 21, 22, 23, 229–40, 242n28. *See also* Austria-Hungary; Austro-Hungarian Empire
- identification cards: in Alsace-Lorraine, 49, 50, 51. *See also* passports
- Imagined Communities* (Anderson), 6
- Imrédy, Béla, 176
- India, 8
- Das interessante Blatt*, 142
- International Save the Children Fund, 283, 284
- invented tradition, 7
- Is America Safe for Democracy?* (McDougall), 77
- Iser, Wolfgang, 248
- Italy/Italians: colonization by, 96, 104; propaganda in, 258; in United States, 78; White Terror and, 230. *See also* Paris Peace Conference
- Jagiellonian view, 72
- Japan: colonization by, 104. *See also* Paris Peace Conference
- JDC. *See* Joint Distribution Commission
- Jeličić, Ivan, 285
- Jesenská, Milena, 210
- Jewish Affair and Socialism (Sprawa żydowska a socjalizm)* (Borski), 107–8
- Jews: in Austria, 286; baptism of, 86n14; in Bohemian Lands, 219; Bolshevism and, 21, 23, 24, 79, 81, 231; in Cisleithania, 219; citizenship of, 14, 69–85; in Czechoslovakia, 1–2, 219; in Eastern Galicia, 120–21, 250, 251; in French Guyana, 30n54; genocide of, 231; in Habsburg Empire, 20–21, 279; in Hungary, 1–2, 23, 232, 238, 240, 243n29; language of, 74; mass emigration from Poland, 95–109; in Moravia, 219; nationality of, 219; Palestine and, 105, 106, 112n32, 113n39; paramilitaries and, 3; passports for, 80–83, 90n83; in Poland, 15–16, 69–85, 95–109, 111n21, 125–26, 208–9, 283, 285; in Red Terror, 238; as refugees, 75; in Russia, 21, 23, 75, 79; School

- Act of 1924 and, 125–26; schools of, 98; in Silesia, 219; in Soviet Union, 233, 240n2; United States and, 15, 69–85; White Terror and, 240. *See also* antisemitism; Zionism
- Jim Crow, 281
- Joffre, Joseph, 44
- Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, 78, 286
- Joint Distribution Commission (JDC), 75
- Josefstädter Straße*, 144
- Joseph II (Emperor), 206
- Judson, Pieter, 17, 283
- Jungkameradschaft (Young Comradeship), 183–84
- jus sanguinis*, 42, 45, 54, 58
- jus soli*, 42, 45, 54, 56, 58
- Kafka, Franz, 210
- Kaiser-Karl-Wohlfahrtswerk* (Emperor Charles Welfare Works), 147
- Kennard, Howard, 102
- Kenya, 111n21
- Kettenhändler* (black marketeers), 209
- King, Jeremy, 281
- Kladiwa, Pavel, 20, 22
- Klingler, Fritz, 161n66
- Kohn, Hans, 281
- Komarnicki, Tytus, 112n29
- Komlós, Aladar, 1–2, 17
- König, Anton, 192n62
- Kóródi, Máté, 242n28
- Kovács, Alajos, 172
- Kraus, Dr., 210–11
- Krieg der Geister*, 257, 269n54
- Krvavá kniha*, 259–60
- Kudlich, Walter, 204
- Ku Klux Klan, 281
- Kussbach, Franz, 192n62
- Landau-Czajka, Anna, 108
- Landsmannschaft*: in Austria, 18, 19, 139–53; Germanness and, 146; World War I and, 146
- Lane, Arthur Bliss, 76
- language, 117–86; in Alsace-Lorraine, 44; in Bohemian Lands, 218; in Czechoslovakia, 212; in Galicia, 265n11; in Germany, 267n29; in Habsburg Empire, 18, 119; in Hungary, 170–72, 181, 186, 193n67; of Jews, 74; in Moravia, 218; Paris Peace Conference and, 119; in Poland, 79, 98, 119–32; in Silesia, 218; in social relationships, 11; of Ukraine, 119–32. *See also* bilingual education; schools
- language defense associations (*Schutzvereine*), 140
- Lasswell, Harold Dwight, 249
- League of Nations, 3; Austria and, 283; on colonization, 100; Habsburg Empire and, 283; Health Organization of, 285; Lithuania and, 284; Minorities Treaties and, 97, 284; Minority Council of, 285–86; Poland and, 82, 95, 96, 112n29, 114n45, 125; Political Commission of, 112n29; School Act of 1924 and, 125; Soviet Union in, 109n4, 114n45
- Leber, Ludwig, 182, 192n62
- Lenin Boys, 237, 238, 239
- Levente movement, 174
- Lex Perek, in Moravian Compromise of 1905, 215, 216
- Lincoln, Abraham, 282
- Lithuania: League of Nations and, 284; School Act of 1924 and, 124. *See also* Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
- Little Versailles Treaty. *See* Minorities Treaties
- Logan, James A., 61n23
- Loyalty Movement, in Hungary, 179–80
- Machno, Nestor, 232
- Mączyński, Czesław, 259
- Madagascar, 101, 111n21
- malaise-alsacien*, 53, 62n49
- Malešević, Siniša, 22
- Mann, Stefan, 183
- Martin, Jamie, 283
- Marxism, 231, 234
- Masaryk, Thomas G., 214, 277

- Mayer, Arno J., 235
- Mazur, Zachary, 15–16, 280, 286
- McDougall, William, 77–78, 88n49
- McGeever, Brendan, 23
- Mémoire sur la Galicie*, 250–51, 253
- Michl, Josef, 183
- Mick, Christoph, 257
- militias, 4; in Czechoslovakia, 203, 204; in Hungary, 23, 230, 233–34, 236, 237–38. *See also* paramilitaries
- Millerand, Alexandre, 54
- Ministry of Education and National Enlightenment, in Czechoslovakia, 217
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Polska Informacja Polityczna*), 103–7
- Ministry of Nationalities, in Hungary, 170
- Minorities Treaties: with Czechoslovakia, 74; League of Nations and, 97, 284; with Poland, 73–74, 79, 83–84, 95–96, 108, 122–23, 125; School Act of 1924 and, 125
- The Miraculous Cure (*Die Wunderkur*) (Heeger), 142
- mixed marriages: with African Americans and Native Americans, 10–11; in Alsace-Lorraine, 45–46, 56
- Moravia: Act No. 541/1919 in, 213; administrative reforms in, 212, 213–14; antisemitism in, 209–10; Austria and, 200; conflict in, 205; Germans in, 142, 212, 220; Jews in, 219; language in, 218; nationality in, 217–20, 218; schools in, 215–17
- Moravian Compromise of 1905, 20, 215, 216
- Morelon, Claire, 279
- Mühl, Heinrich, 192n62
- Müller, Stefan, 183
- Muller-Guttenbrunn, Adam, 141
- Musil, Robert, 279–80
- Napoleon, 64n82
- Našinec*, 209
- National Association of Manufacturers (*Gyáripárosok Országos Szövetsége*), in Hungary, 233
- National Council for Physical Education (Orszagos Testnevelési Tanacs, OTT), 190n30
- National Council of Eastern Galicia, 250
- national indifference, 8–9, 26, 278–79; in Hungary, 22–23
- nationalism: in Austria, 18, 19, 139–53; in Bulgaria, 59n3; ethnicity and, 5–9, 18–19, 281; in France, 281; gender in, 7–8; in Germany, 18, 19, 139–53, 201; in Poland, 71–83; race and, 279–80; Treaty of Versailles and, 277; in United States, 71–83, 281
- nationality: in Bohemian Lands, 217–20, 218; in Cisleithania, 219; citizenship and, 12–16, 83–84; in Czechoslovakia, 217–20, 226n84; in Eastern Galicia, 250; of Jews, 219; in Moravia, 217–20, 218; in Poland, 71–84; in Silesia, 217–20, 218; in United States, 80
- National Origins Act, in Great Britain, 113n34
- National Quota Acts, in Great Britain, 113n34
- Native Americans, mixed marriages of, 10–11
- Nazi Germany: Alsace-Lorraine and, 58; antisemitism in, 281; Austria and, 151; Poland and, 104; Red Terror and, 230–31
- Népőrség (People's Guard)*, 233
- Neue Freie Presse*, 204
- Neue Wiener Friseur-Zeitung*, 145
- Newman, Paul, 232
- Ngai, Mae, 280–81
- Noël, Léon, 102, 112n27
- Noiriel, Gérard, 59n4
- numerus clausus*, 14, 99
- Obrana Slezska*, 214
- Okolowicz, Józef, 286
- Option Clause, in Treaty of St. Germain, 285
- Orobkiewicz, Władysław, 259, 262
- Orszagos Testnevelési Tanacs (OTT, National Council for Physical Education), 190n30
- Ostjuden*, 75
- Ottoman Empire, 4, 13–14, 141

- Outline of Socio-Economics (Grundrisse der Sozialökonomik)*, 9–10
- Paderewski, Ignacy, 97
- Palestine, 16, 103, 105, 106, 112n32, 113n39
- The Palestinian Problem (Problem palestynski)* (Wagner), 106
- pan-Slavism: in Bohemian Lands, 200; in Hungary, 180
- paramilitaries, 4; in Hungary, 230, 231–32; Jews and, 3; in Polish-Ukrainian War, 256–57, 259, 270n64; in Ukraine, 24
- Paris Peace Conference, 3; aims of, 95; decolonization and, 100; Eastern Galicia and, 248–51; Jews and, 73–74; language and, 119; Poland and, 72, 96–97; Polish-Ukrainian War at, 248–55, 263; propaganda at, 248–55, 263; Weber at, 9
- passports: counterfeiting of, 80; for Jews, 80–83, 90n83; in Poland, 15, 69–71, 75–76, 79–81, 83, 90n83, 286; in United States, 76
- Peace of Westphalia, 109n7
- Peel, William Robert Wellesley, 113n39
- Peel Commission, 106, 113n39
- Penck, Albrecht, 252
- People's Association of Germans in Hungary (*Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn*), 20, 185–86
- People's Guard (*Népbőrség*), 233
- Peres, Shimon, 30n54
- Permanent Court of International Justice, 96
- perpetual allegiance, 64n82
- Phelps, Nicole, 280
- Piłsudski, Józef, 98, 99, 250
- Pius XI (Pope), 81
- Plan XVII, 44
- Pobudka*, 257
- Pokludová, Andrea, 20, 22
- Poland, 18, 95, 96–97, 101, 108; antisemitism in, 72–73, 99–100; bilingual education in, 18, 121, 124; Bohemian Lands and, 208–9; Bolshevism and, 73; Cameroon and, 102; Canada and, 79–80; Catholics in, 70, 72, 78, 82, 104; census in, 87n31; citizenship in, 14, 69–85; colonization by, 100–103, 111n21; Czechoslovakia and, 207, 208; diasporas of, 102; Eastern Galicia and, 24–25, 119–32, 247–65; education policy in, 121–23; education system of, 98; France and, 80; Germany and, 75; Jews in, 15–16, 69–85, 95–109, 111n21, 125–26, 208–9, 283, 285; *Landsmannschaften* in, 19; language in, 79, 98, 119–32; League of Nations and, 82, 95, 96, 112n29, 114n45, 125; Madagascar and, 101; mass emigration of Jews from, 95–109; Ministry of Foreign Affairs in, 103–7, 111n2; Minorities Treaties with, 73–74, 79, 83–84, 95–96, 108, 122–23, 125; nationalism in, 71–83; nationality in, 71–84; national minorities in, 122; Nazi Germany and, 104; in 1930s, 98–100; *numerus clausus* in, 99; Paris Peace Conference and, 72, 96–97; passports in, 15, 69–71, 80–81, 83, 90n83, 286; race in, 72; refugees in, 75; School Act of 1924 in, 123–32; Silesia and, 207, 214, 278; Slavs in, 72, 82; Soviet Union and, 283; Spanish flu in, 75; state assimilation in, 99; Treaty of Versailles and, 79, 95, 96, 97, 98, 101, 108, 109n4, 122; typhus in, 75; Ukraine and, 18, 24–25, 70, 119–32, 132n3, 247–65; United States and, 69–85, 286; Upper Silesia and, 123; Western Galicia and, 247, 265n11; Zionism in, 286
- policja sanitarna* (public health police), 75
- Polish-Bolshevik War, 75, 83–84
- Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 24–25, 251, 255, 270n64
- Polish National Committee, 72, 79, 96–97
- Polish National Organization, 128
- Polish-Soviet War, 207, 255
- Polish-Ukrainian War, 75, 247–65; paramilitaries in, 256–57, 259, 270n64; at Paris Peace Conference, 248–55, 263; violence of, 255–63
- Political Commission, of League of Nations, 112n29

- Polska Informacja Polityczna* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 103–7
- Polska Zbrojna*, 102
- populism, 17–20
- Potocki, Andrzej, 253
- Pozor*, 209
- Press Theses on Jewish Emigration (Tezy prasowe w sprawie emigracji żydowskiej)*, 106
- private property, in World War I, 62n49
- Problem of Jewish Emigration (Problem emigracji żydowskiej)* (Wagner), 105–6
- Problem palestyński (The Palestinian Problem)* (Wagner), 106
- propaganda: in Austria, 144; for boundary setting, 249–55; on Eastern Galicia, 24–25; in Italy, 258; at Paris Peace Conference, 248–55, 263; of violence, 255–63; in World War I, 23, 24, 248, 249, 258
- Proske, Johann, 204
- Protection of the Republic Act, in Czechoslovakia, 206
- Protest of the Ukrainian Republic to the United States Against the Delivery of Eastern Galicia to Polish Domination*, 254
- Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, 21
- Provincial National Committee, in Czechoslovakia, 207
- public health police (*policja sanitarna*), 75
- race/racism: African Americans identity with, 280; in Austria, 285–86; citizenship and, 285; ethnicity and, 197–265, 280–81; Habsburg Empire and, 277–87; nationalism and, 279–80; in Poland, 72; in United States, 70, 76–77, 280, 281; World War I and, 65n88. *See also* Jews
- Rachamimov, Iris, 279
- Rajchmann, Ludwig, 285
- Ranger, Terence, 7
- Rath, Josef, 183
- Ratti, Achille, 81
- Recht auf Heimat*, 140
- Red Guard (*Vörös Örség*), 237
- Red Ruthenia, 252
- Redslob, Robert, 52
- Red Terror: in Hungary, 21, 22, 23, 229–40; Jews in, 238; Nazi Germany and, 230–31; White Terror and, 231, 235–39
- refugees, 17; in Austria, 151; in France, 45; from Germany, 104, 286; Jews as, 75; from Ottoman Empire, 13–14; in Poland, 75; from Russia, 13–14
- Reichsdeutsche*, 3
- Reichsland*. *See* Alsace-Lorraine
- Reill, Dominique Kirchner, 278, 285
- Renner, Karl, 142
- Rhodes, 111n21
- Richert, Dominik, 47
- Riesman, David, 5
- Riga Treaty, 247
- Rockefeller Foundation, 285
- Rolandi, Francesca, 285
- Romania, 14, 19, 120; Austria and, 148–49, 151, 160n61; Hungary and, 171
- Romer, Eugeniusz, 251–52, 253
- Rose, Adam, 112n29
- Rothen, Franz, 192n62
- Rudé právo*, 210
- Rudnytskyi, Stepan, 252–53
- rule-of-law, 3, 15
- Russia: antisemitism in, 4, 23; Jews in, 21, 23, 75, 79; Poland and, 122; refugees from, 13–14; Ukraine and, 1. *See also* Soviet Union
- Russian Revolution of 1917, 21
- Ruthenians: in Eastern Galicia, 142, 250, 251, 252, 258; in Habsburg Empire, 120–21; Moravia and, 213; School Act of 1924 and, 124, 127–30; Ukraine and, 132n3, 265n12
- Rwanda, 8
- Safran, William, 17
- Schaufrisieren*, 145
- Schelle, Karel, 213–14
- Schlesische Bauerntheater in Wien*, 142
- School Act of 1924: Belarus and, 124; Eastern Galicia and, 124–32; Jews and, 125–26; League of Nations and, 125; Lithuania

- and, 124; in Poland, 123–32; Ukraine and, 124–32
- schools: in Austria-Hungary, 225n73; in Bohemian Lands, 215–17; in Cisleithania, 215; in Czechoslovakia, 215–17; in Eastern Galicia, 126–30; in Hungary, 170–72, 186, 188n18; of Jews, 98; in Moravia, 215–17; in Silesia, 215, 217
- Schunkler, Meer, 69, 70–71, 82, 83–84, 90n84
- Schutzvereine* (language defense associations), 140
- Schwabenkinder*, 148, 159n43
- Schwabenland*, 148
- Schwabenverein*, 151
- Scofield, Devlin, 14–15
- Second Degree Classification Committees (SDCC), 53–54, 99
- self-determination: in Czechoslovakia, 204; in Eastern Galicia, 249; ethnicity and, 25; in ethnic studies, 5; in Habsburg Empire, 282; of nations, 4; Treaty of Versailles and, 21; in United States, 5
- Serbia, 50–51, 144, 171, 232
- shirt movements, 4
- Sichynskyi, Myroslav, 253
- Sienkiewicz, Henryk, 261
- Silesia, 205; administrative reforms in, 213–14; Germans in, 142; Jews in, 219; language in, 218; nationality in, 217–20, 218; Poland and, 207, 214, 278; schools in, 215, 217
- Silverstein, Sara, 285
- Składkowski, Felicjan Sławoj, 99
- Slavs: in Poland, 72, 82; in United States, 78.  
*See also* pan-Slavism
- Slovakia, 142, 213, 283. *See also* Czechoslovakia
- Slovenia, 142, 171, 278
- Smith, Anthony D., 6
- Smuts, Jan, 284
- Snyder, Timothy, 59n5, 251
- social-Darwinism, 72
- Social Democratic Party, 204, 205, 210–11
- social relationships, 9–11
- Sombart, Werner, 262
- Souchon, M., 46
- Soviet Union: Hungary and, 229–40; Jews in, 233, 240n2; in League of Nations, 109n4, 114n45; Poland and, 283; refugees in, 17; Ukraine and, 229, 247
- Spanish flu: in Austria, 147; in Czechoslovakia, 204, 218; in Poland, 75; Weber and, 9
- Sprawa żydowska a socjalizm (Jewish Affair and Socialism)* (Borski), 107–8
- Šrámek, Josef, 204
- state assimilation, in Poland, 99
- stateless citizenship, 15, 17, 69–85
- Statistics of Galicia*, 251–52
- Stauter-Halsted, Keely, 70
- Steiner, Karl, 192n62
- Stresemann (Foreign Minister), 179
- Sudetendeutsche*, 141
- Sudetendeutscher Heimatbund* (Sudeten German Homeland Federation), 148, 149
- Sudetenland, 19, 204–5
- Suevia, 173–76, 178, 181–83, 184, 185, 189n29
- Swabian Turkey (Transdanubia), 179, 183, 192n49
- Syrmia, 19
- Tafferner, Anton, 183
- Teleki, Pál, 176
- Temnyts'kyi, Vladimir, 260–61, 262
- Teplitzer-Schonauer Anzeiger*, 204
- Teppert, Johann, 192n62
- Tezy prasowe w sprawie emigracji żydowskiej (Press Theses on Jewish Emigration)*, 106
- Ther, Philipp, 43, 58
- Thompson, Warren S., 77
- Tomashivskyi, Stepan, 250
- Torpey, John, 70
- Tóth, Anna, 238
- To the Civilized Nations of the World* (Hrushevs'kyi), 254–55
- Toynbee, Arnold J., 254
- Transdanubia (Swabian Turkey), 179, 183, 192n49

- Transylvania, 19, 146, 152
- Treaty of Constantinople, 64n78
- Treaty of Frankfurt, 44, 45, 46, 50
- Treaty of St. Germain, 285
- Treaty of Versailles: Alsace-Lorraine and, 4, 43, 51, 52, 54–57; antisemitism and, 23–24; citizenship in, 42; democracy and, 2–3; diasporas from, 17; Germany and, 100, 109n4, 114n45; Habsburg Empire and, 278; nationalism and, 277; Poland and, 79, 95, 96, 97, 98, 101, 108, 109n4, 122; self-determination and, 21; weaknesses of, 96; Weber on, 9
- Treaty of Vienna, 4
- Trębacz, Zofia, 16
- Triage Commissions, in Alsace-Lorraine, 48, 52–54
- Trianon Peace Treaty, 169, 174
- Trotsky, Leon, 21
- typhus, 75
- UDV. *See Ungarländischer Deutscher Volksbildungsverein*
- UDVP. *See* Hungarian German People's Party
- Uganda, 106
- Ukraina. Land und Volk* (Rudnytskyi), 252–53
- Ukraine: Canada and, 112–32; Eastern Galicia and, 24–25, 119–32, 247–65; France and, 112–32; in Habsburg Empire, 120, 255; language of, 119–32; paramilitaries in, 24; Poland and, 18, 24–25, 70, 119–32, 132n3, 247–65; Russia and, 1; Ruthenians and, 132n3, 265n12; School Act of 1924 and, 124–32; Soviet Union and, 229, 247. *See also* Polish-Ukrainian War
- Ungarländischer Deutscher Volksbildungsverein* (UDV, Hungarian German People's Education Association), 19–20, 173, 175, 179–82; *Deutsch-ungarische Heimatblätter* in, 181; revival of, 192n62; VK in, 20, 178, 183, 185–86
- United States, 25; Affidavits of Identity and Nationality in, 80; Austria and, 146; Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization in, 84; Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 in, 70; decolonization in, 5; Emergency Quota Act in, 70, 76–77; Habsburg Empire and, 283–84; immigration control in, 70–72; Jews and, 15, 69–85; Johnson-Reed Act of, 78, 286; nationalism in, 71–83, 281; nationality in, 80; passports in, 76; Poland and, 69–85, 286; race/racism in, 70, 76–77, 280, 281; self-determination in, 5; in World War I, 75–76. *See also* Paris Peace Conference
- Unowsky, Daniel, 279
- Unsere Heimat*, 139, 150
- Upper Silesia, 123
- Valot, Paul, 52
- Verein der Banater Schwaben in Wien*, 139, 144, 146–51
- Verein der Deutschen aus Böhmen*, 142
- Verein der Deutschen aus Gottschee*, 142
- Verein der deutschen Böhmerwäldler*, 142
- Verein der Iglauer*, 142
- Verein der Schlesier*, 143
- Verein der Siebenbürger Sachsen*, 142
- Vereinigung schwäbischer Hochschüler* (Association of Swabian University Students), 139–40, 189n29
- Verwaltungsgerichtshof* (Administrative Court of Justice), 215
- Vienna. *See* Austria
- Vienna Ethnic Groups Agreement, 184
- Viennese Youth Aid Works (*Wijug*), 147
- Vitar, Zsolt, 19
- VK. *See* *Volksdeutsche Kameradschaft*
- Volksbildungsverein, 173, 181
- Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn* (People's Association of Germans in Hungary), 20, 185–86
- Volksdeutsche Kameradschaft (VK, Volksdeutsche Comradeship), 20, 178, 183, 185–86
- Volksgruppen*, 19, 146, 152
- Volkschule*, 215
- Volkswehr*, 203

- Vörös Órség* (Red Guard), 237
- Wagner, Jan, 105–6
- Wandervögel, 180, 181, 185
- Ward, Robert De C., 78
- Wasilewski, Leon, 250
- Weber, Max, 9–11
- Weil, Patrick, 64n82, 65n88
- Weimar Constitution, 9
- Weitz, Eric D., 4, 25
- Welfare Office for Sudeten Germans (*Fürsorgestelle der Sudetendeutschen*), 148
- Western Galicia, 247, 265n11
- Wheatley, Natasha, 283
- White Terror: Germany and, 230; in Hungary, 21, 22, 23, 229–40, 242n28; Italy and, 230; Jews and, 240; Red Terror and, 231, 235–39; victims of, 242n28
- Wierzejska, Jagoda, 21–22, 24
- Wijug* (Viennese Youth Aid Works), 147
- Wilson, Woodrow, 25, 72, 87n29, 251, 282
- W obronie Galicyi Wschodniej*, 252
- Wolff, Larry, 282
- women: citizenship of, 7–8, 16; in Czechoslovakia, 204; democracy and, 278; in Polish-Ukrainian War, 258–61; suffrage for, 278
- World War I: Alsace-Lorraine in, 44, 46, 58; ambiguous periodization of, 42–43; Bohemian Lands and, 199–221; boundary setting from, 250; citizenship and, 64n75; Habsburg Empire and, 147; *Landsmannschaft* and, 146; peace treaties of, 1, 13; power vacuum after, 3; private property in, 62n49; propaganda in, 23, 24, 248, 249, 258; racism and, 65n88; United States in, 75–76. *See also specific topics*
- Die Wunderkur* (The Miraculous Cure) (Heeger), 142
- Yiddish, 120, 122, 124, 125–26, 250
- Young Comradeship (Jungkameradschaft), 183–84
- Yugoslavia, 8, 120, 149, 151, 278
- Yuval-Davis, Nira, 7–8
- Zahra, Tara, 25, 70
- Zakrzewski, Stanislaw, 252
- Zamorski, Jan, 258–59, 262
- Zarychta, Apoloniusz, 105
- Zionism, 106, 113n39; in Austria, 137; in Czechoslovakia, 204; in Poland, 286



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— **Holly Case,** professor of history, Brown University

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