

THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM

ESSAYS ON
LOGIC, ETHICS,
and
UNIVERSAL
GRAMMAR

EDITED BY PHILIP SCHOFIELD

 **UCLPRESS**

THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM

General Editor
Philip Schofield

PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION

The present volume includes four major essays, namely 'Essay on Logic', 'Essay on Ethics', 'Didacologia', and 'Universal Grammar', which were written in 1814–16 and are closely related to *Chrestomathia*, Bentham's major work on education. In 'Essay on Logic', Bentham contrasts the *præcognita* of Aristotle with his own 'characteristics' of logic and deals with methodization, ontology, and the relationship between logic and language. In 'Essay on Ethics', he offers a critique of the Aristotelian virtues and outlines his own division of ethics into prudence, probity, and benevolence. In 'Didacologia', he presents an outline of a comprehensive plan for the division of the arts and sciences based on the method of exhaustive bifurcation and a new nomenclature. In 'Universal Grammar', he deals with language as the basis for thought and communication and investigates the nature of the different parts of speech. The volume is completed with an Appendix containing fragmentary material, written in August and September 1813, with a focus on language. All the texts are based on Bentham's original manuscripts and have never before been published in authentic form.

The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham

The new critical edition of the works and correspondence of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) is being prepared by the Bentham Project at University College London. It is filling an enormous gap in the scholarly literature across a wide range of disciplines. Despite Bentham's importance as a jurist, philosopher, social scientist, and leader of the utilitarian reformers, the only previous edition of his works, published within 20 years of his death, was poorly edited and incomplete. The principles and plan for the new edition are set out in the preface to *The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham*, Volume I (London: UCL Press, 2017).

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PREFACE

The Bentham Committee wishes to thank Dr Li Qing, whose generous gift to the Bentham Project made possible the preparation of this volume. The Bentham Committee is also grateful to University College London, the British Academy, and particularly UCL Faculty of Laws, for their continuing support of *The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham*.

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Grateful acknowledgment is also made to the authors, editors, and translators of standard reference works such as the *History of Parliament*, the *Loeb Classical Library*, and the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, without whose scholarship the annotation of a volume such as this would hardly be feasible.

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SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Symbols

	Space left in manuscript.
[to]	Word(s) editorially supplied.
⟨so⟩	Conjectural restoration of a mutilated word.
[?]	Reading doubtful.
[. . .?]	Word(s) proved illegible.
⟨. . .⟩	Torn manuscript.

Abbreviations

BL Add. MS	British Library Additional Manuscript.
Bowring	<i>The Works of Jeremy Bentham</i> , published under the superintendence of . . . John Bowring, 11 vols., Edinburgh, 1843 (initially issued in 22 parts 1838–43).
CW	The present edition of <i>The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham</i> .
MS alt.	Alternative manuscript reading.
MS del.	Word(s) deleted in manuscript.
MS orig.	Original manuscript reading.
UC	Bentham Papers in the Library of University College London. Roman numerals refer to the boxes in which the papers are placed, Arabic to the folios within each box.

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

The essays included in the present volume, namely ‘Essay on Logic’, ‘Essay on Ethics’, ‘Didacologia’, and ‘Universal Grammar’, were written in 1814–16 and are closely related to *Chrestomathia*, Bentham’s major work on education.¹ Bentham was not so much developing new ideas, but rather articulating in much greater detail ideas that he had long held, and indeed had possibly held, in outline at least, since his teenage years. In ‘Essay on Logic’, written in the summer and autumn of 1814, he contrasts the *præcognita* of Aristotle with his own ‘characteristics’ of logic and deals with methodization, ontology, and the relationship between logic and language. From the end of August to the beginning of October 1814, in the midst of composing ‘Essay on Logic’, Bentham composed a series of manuscripts under the heading ‘Logic or Ethics’ or ‘Logic or Deontology’ that constitutes ‘Essay on Ethics’, in which he offers a critique of the Aristotelian virtues and outlines his own division of ethics into prudence, probity, and benevolence. In ‘Didacologia’, written in February 1815, Bentham outlines a comprehensive plan for the division of the arts and sciences based on the method of exhaustive bifurcation and a new nomenclature. In ‘Universal Grammar’, written in late 1815 and early 1816, he deals with language as the basis for thought and communication and investigates the nature of the different parts of speech. The volume is completed with an Appendix containing fragmentary material, written in August and September 1813, with a focus on language that anticipates some of the main themes in the volume as a whole.

¹ The work was first published in two parts, namely *Chrestomathia: being a collection of papers, explanatory of the design of an institution, proposed to be set on foot, under the name of The Chrestomathic Day School, or Chrestomathic School, for the extension of the new system of instruction to the higher branches of learning, for the use of the middling and higher ranks in life*, London, 1816, and *Chrestomathia; Part II. Containing Appendix, No. V. Being an essay on Nomenclature and Classification: including a critical examination of the Encyclopedical Table of Lord Bacon, as Improved by D’Alembert; and the first lines of A New One, grounded on the application of the logical principle of Exhaustively Bifurcate Analysis to the moral principle of General Utility*, London, 1817. Part I, which was printed and privately circulated in 1815, consisted of the main text and first four Appendices. The work was edited for the Bowring edition (viii. 1–191) by Southwood Smith, who discarded the second appendix (though introduced similar content elsewhere in the text) and added five appendices based on manuscript sources. Smith’s edition forms the basis for *Chrestomathia*, ed. M.J. Smith and W.H. Burston, Oxford, 1983 (CW).

(Thomas) Southwood Smith (1788–1861), Unitarian minister, Licentiate of the Royal College of Physicians from 1821, delivered an oration over Bentham’s remains at the Webb Street School of Anatomy on 9 June 1832 and was the creator of Bentham’s auto-icon.

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All the texts presented here are based on Bentham's original manuscripts. Though versions of much of the material that forms 'Essay on Logic', 'Didacologia', and 'Universal Grammar' were published in the Bowring edition of *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*¹ and material from 'Essay on Ethics' has appeared in *Deontology* (CW),² none of it has been previously published in a form that attempts to replicate Bentham's own intentions for its presentation. Since Bentham did not finalize any of the essays included in the present volume and failed to deal with some of the themes that he intended to consider, each may be regarded as incomplete to a greater or lesser degree. Nevertheless, each essay contains substantial portions of text that is coherent and continuous.

Bentham's views on logic, ethics, and universal grammar were a product of his engagement with and response to Aristotle—not with the most authentic versions of the texts attributed to Aristotle (though Bentham was familiar with the works of Aristotle in the ancient Greek), but rather with the Aristotelian tradition as it was received at the University of Oxford and as it had been taught to him. He had commenced his residence at Queen's College, Oxford, at the age of 12, in October 1760 and between February and June 1761 had studied logic by going through Robert Sanderson's *Logicae artis compendium* (i.e. 'Compendium of the art of Logic'), a Latin distillation of Aristotle's 'Organon',³ which had been first published in 1618, and which remained the standard text-book on the subject until the end of the eighteenth century.⁴ Bentham had been a mere 13

¹ Smith's version of 'Universal Grammar', Bowring, viii. 185–91, reproduced in *Chrestomathia* (CW), Appendix IX, pp. 394–407, while based on the original manuscripts, is truncated, confused, and incoherent. The reconstruction of 'Universal Grammar' in the present edition aims to follow Bentham's original intentions for the presentation of the material and has resulted in a longer and more coherent essay than that which Smith prepared. Smith was also responsible for editing the material that appears in the present volume as 'Essay on Logic' for the Bowring edition: see 'A Fragment on Ontology', Bowring, viii. 193–211; 'Essay on Logic', *ibid.* 213–93; 'Essay on Language', *ibid.* 295–338; and 'Fragments on Universal Grammar', *ibid.* 339–57. In addition, the material presented here as 'Essay on Logic', Ch. 18, pp. 183–205 below, appears under the title 'Logical Arrangements, or Instruments of Invention and Discovery employed by Jeremy Bentham' as an Appendix to 'Nomography; or the Art of Inditing Laws', Bowring, iii. 213–95 at 285–95, which was edited by Richard Smith.

² *Deontology together with A Table of the Springs of Action and Article on Utilitarianism*, ed. A. Goldworth, Oxford, 1983 (CW). The manuscripts published in *Deontology* (CW) under the titles 'Deontology: Theoretical' and 'Deontology: Practical', which include those presented here as 'Essay on Ethics', were written at various times between 1814 and 1831 and do not constitute a unified or coherent text.

³ i.e. the works of Aristotle on the subject of logic, namely 'Categories', 'On Interpretation', 'Prior Analytics', 'Posterior Analytics', 'Topica', and 'On Sophistical Refutations'.

⁴ On 15 February 1761 (his thirteenth birthday) Bentham informed his father Jeremiah Bentham (1712–92) that he would 'begin Logic tomorrow' and on 12 June 1761 informed him that 'we are just gone through the Logic Compend': see *The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham*, vol. i, ed. T.L.S. Sprigge, London, 1968 (CW), pp. 34, 47. Bentham studied the

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years old when he had studied Sanderson's compendium of Aristotle's logic, yet so profound had been that encounter that it dictated the structure of his 'Essay on Logic' composed more than fifty years later. His engagement with Aristotle continued beyond logic into ethics, where he again took the standard University of Oxford textbook, the anonymous *Ethices Compendium in usum Juventutis Academicæ*,¹ as his point of departure.

HISTORY OF THE ESSAYS

Essay on Logic

The 1810s were an extraordinary decade in terms of the breadth and scope of Bentham's writings. He began the decade writing on Parliamentary reform, eventually publishing *Plan of Parliamentary Reform*, the first utilitarian defence of democracy, in 1817.² He criticized the Church of England and its educational policies in *Church-of-Englandism and its Catechism Examined*, printed in 1817 and published in 1818.³ He composed the bulk of the work later published as *The Book of Fallacies*,⁴ in which he identified and categorized the misleading arguments adopted by politicians in the Houses of Parliament in order to thwart reform. In 'A Table of the Springs of Action', printed in 1815 and published in 1817,⁵ Bentham explored the connection between

edition of Sanderson published in 1741, i.e. Roberto Sandersono, *Logicæ artis compendium. Editio Unidecima Prioribus Emendatio* ('Compendium of the art of logic. The Eleventh Edition Improved over the Former'), Oxford, 1741. Robert Sanderson (1587–1663) was Regius Professor of Divinity at the University of Oxford 1642–8 and Bishop of Lincoln 1660–3.

¹ *Ethices Compendium in usum Juventutis Academicæ Auctius & emendatius editum. Cui accedit Methodus Argumentandi Aristotelica* ('Ethical Compendium for the use of Academic Youth Edited with additions and corrections. By means of the Aristotelian Method of Argumentation'), Oxford, 1745.

² *Plan of Parliamentary Reform, in the form of a Catechism, with reasons for each article, with an Introduction, shewing The Necessity of Radical, and the inadequacy of moderate Reform*, London, 1817.

³ *Church-of-Englandism and its Catechism Examined*, ed. J.E. Crimmins and C. Fuller, Oxford, 2011 (CW).

⁴ See *The Book of Fallacies*, ed. P. Schofield, Oxford, 2015 (CW). Versions of the work appeared first as 'Traité des sophismes politiques' in *Tactique des assemblées législatives, suivie d'un traité des sophismes politiques*, ed. Etienne Dumont, 2 vols., Geneva and Paris, 1816, ii. 1–267, and second as *The Book of Fallacies: from unfinished papers of Jeremy Bentham. By A Friend*, London, 1824, which was edited by Peregrine Bingham (bap. 1788, d. 1864), legal writer and reformer.

Pierre Etienne Louis Dumont (1759–1829), Bentham's Genevan friend and editor, produced five recensions of Bentham's works: *Traité de législation civile et pénale*, 3 vols., Paris, 1802; *Théorie des peines et des récompenses*, 2 vols., London, 1811; *Tactique des assemblées législatives*; *Traité des preuves judiciaires*, 2 vols., Paris, 1823; and *De l'organisation judiciaire, et de la codification*, Paris, 1828.

⁵ *A Table of The Springs of Action*, London, 1817, reproduced in *Deontology* (CW), pp. 79–115.

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pain and pleasure on the one hand and motivation and ethics on the other. This work formed part of a much broader discussion of ethics generally for which the text has been lost.¹ Again in 1817 he published *Papers relative to Codification and Public Instruction*,² addressed, amongst others, to the Emperor of Russia and to the President and Governors of the United States, putting forward his agenda for the codification of law. He also composed a number of works that he did not print or publish, including his writings on sexual morality³ and the essays included in the present volume, which, as noted above, are closely related to *Chrestomathia*. Bentham had produced a draft plan of instruction for the proposed Chrestomathic School by April 1814⁴ and was still working on the text in May 1816.⁵ When Bentham wrote to his brother Sir Samuel Bentham on 11 August 1814, asking him to send ‘the Geometry papers’, he made an explicit connection between *Chrestomathia* and the writings on logic. Geometry, he explained, was ‘among the subjects which I have need to touch upon not only for Chrestomathia, but now for Logic, which is making Giant’s strides or

¹ See the surviving sequence of 815 marginal contents or marginal summaries for this work reproduced in *ibid.*, pp. 5–73. The corresponding text sheets have not survived, apart from a short ‘Introduction’ (pp. 74–9), which begins: ‘Names of *real* entities—names of *fictitious* entities: in one or other of those two characters will every work, which in any language presents itself in the form of the part of speech called a noun *substantive*, be found to serve.’ The nature of real and fictitious entities is a topic that Bentham addresses in detail in ‘Essay on Logic’, and hence again underlines the close connection between the content of Bentham’s writings on logic, ethics, and education.

For Bentham’s normal working practice, and the relationship between the text, marginal summaries, marginal summary sheets, and rudiments, see pp. lxvi–lxviii below. Many of the marginal summary sheets that appear on the text sheets reproduced in the present volume were not composed by Bentham himself, but in the mid-1810s by his amanuenses, including the brothers Walter Coulson (1795–1860), newspaper editor and barrister, who served Bentham from March 1810 to December 1813 and possibly on an *ad hoc* basis until 1817, and Henry Tonkin Coulson (1796–1840), who served Bentham from around late 1813 until October 1815, when he matriculated at Queens’ College, Cambridge, and in the late 1820s by Bentham’s nephew George Bentham (1800–84), botanist, the son of Sir Samuel Bentham (1757–1831), naval architect, Inspector General of Naval Works 1796–1807, Civil Architect and Engineer of the Navy 1807–12, and Lady Mary Sophia Bentham, née Fordyce (1765–1858). The marginal summary sheets are also in the hands of amanuenses, including James Hume, who served Bentham from around March 1815 and remained with him until mid-November 1816 and who was a nephew of Joseph Hume (1777–1855), radical and politician. The marginal summaries composed by Bentham are noted at the appropriate point below.

² *Papers relative to Codification and Public Instruction: including Correspondence with The Russian Emperor, and divers constituted authorities in the American United States*, London, 1817, reproduced in ‘Legislator of the World’: *Writings on Codification, Law, and Education*, ed. P. Schofield and J. Harris, Oxford, 1998 (CW), 1–185.

³ *Of Sexual Irregularities, and other writings on Sexual Morality*, ed. P. Schofield, C. Pease-Watkin, and M. Quinn, Oxford, 2014 (CW).

⁴ See *Chrestomathia* (CW), Editorial Introduction, p. xiv.

⁵ See Bentham to Dumont, 26 May 1816, *The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham*, vol. viii, ed. S. Conway, Oxford, 1988 (CW), p. 524.

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rather Dragon's, brushing in and gathering up with its tail as it goes on every part of the field of thought and action'.¹ Bentham regarded *Chrestomathia* as a key work, as he later informed his friend and editor Étienne Dumont: 'Since I wrote *Chrestomathia*, I have felt a much stronger mastery of the field of thought and action, including that of legislation than I did before.'² The ideas that he had developed for his writings on logic presumably made a significant contribution to his feeling of 'mastery'.

The more philosophical elements of *Chrestomathia* seem to have grown out of the material that forms 'Essay on Logic', in which Bentham considered the foundational questions of thought and action as a basis for an encyclopedical tree. Inspired by the Porphyrian tree he had encountered while studying logic at Queen's College, he employed the method of exhaustive bifurcation in order to elucidate the relationship between the various arts and sciences, under the general heading of well-being. In Bentham's terminology, every subject-matter or discipline contained both science, which concerned relevant knowledge, and art, which concerned the application of knowledge to practice. The encyclopedical tree was a means of setting out in a coherent relationship the subjects that would be taught in the proposed Chrestomathic School. Logic was one branch of the encyclopedical tree, but its techniques were applicable across the whole range of the disciplines. The instrument of logic was language (or more expansively discourse), which was both the vehicle of thought and the means of communication. Without language, there would be no thought, and hence no arts and sciences. Moreover, arts and sciences were the subjects of teaching, learning, and invention, which were the functions of logic and hence form another link in Bentham's thought between logic and education.

The material that is presented here as 'Essay on Logic' was written by Bentham in the summer and autumn of 1814 while staying at Ford Abbey, his country retreat in Devon, where he took up residence on 17 July 1814 and remained until mid-March 1815.³ Nearly all the relevant manuscripts carry the main heading 'Logic' and, given that Bentham did not provide any title for the work, the title 'Essay on Logic' has been

¹ Ibid. 410–11.

² Bentham to Dumont, 27 November, 10 and 19 December 1820, Letter 2719A, *The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham*, vol. xiv, ed. P. Schofield, T. Causer, and C. Riley, London, 2026 (CW).

³ Bentham had listed the topics of logic, including the faculties of the mind, disciplines (i.e. arts and sciences), discourse, and language, as well as a list of twelve possible chapters, on a sheet headed 'Logic. Rudiments' at UC ci. 12 (16 January 1814), indicating that he had been contemplating writing an essay on the subject several months before he began work in earnest.

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editorially supplied.¹ There is no surviving plan for 'Essay on Logic' drawn up by Bentham himself and his enumeration of the chapters is inconsistent and sometimes contradictory. Hence the ordering of the text in the present edition relies on internal evidence in the form of cross-references (though again these are not always consistent) and the sense. The manuscripts themselves are not catalogued in the order in which Bentham wrote them or ordered them, but generally (though not exactly) in the order in which they were placed by Southwood Smith when preparing the material for the Bowring edition.² The manuscripts had previously been worked on by George Bentham in the late 1820s, who drew on them to produce his own work on logic.³ The text sheets contain interpolations by both George Bentham and Smith. A detailed plan for the work was compiled by George Bentham, which then appears to have been followed by Smith for his version of the text.⁴ In the present

¹ The same title is given to the version of the work that appears in Bowring, viii. 213–93.

² Smith's enumeration of the sheets appears in a tiny script in the bottom right-hand corner of the relevant manuscripts.

³ George Bentham, *Outline of A New System of Logic, with a critical examination of Dr. Whately's 'Elements of Logic'*, London, 1827. Related manuscripts in the hand of George Bentham, the majority of which appear to be a French translation of *Outline of A New System of Logic*, are at UC ci. 499–612. George Bentham also published a French translation of 'Essay on Nomenclature and Classification' as *Essai sur la Nomenclature et la Classification des principales branches D'Art-Et-Science; ouvrage extrait du Chrestomathia de Jérémie Bentham*, Paris, 1823.

⁴ UC ci. 6 (n.d.) The manuscripts incorporated by Smith in his version of 'Essay on Logic' at Bowring, viii. 213–93 are as follows: Introduction: UC ci. 88, 149–51, 88, 153, 152, 89, 91; Ch. I, § I: ci. 92–6; § II: ci. 97–8; § III: ci. 99–104; Ch. II, § I: ci. 105–6; § II: ci. 107–9; § III: ci. 110–13; § IV: ci. 115–36, 422–5; § V: ci. 138–42; § VI: ci. 143–4; § VII: ci. 146; § VIII: ci. 147–8; Ch. III, Title: ci. 149; § I: ci. 154–6; § II: ci. 157; § III: ci. 158–60; § IV: ci. 161; § V: ci. 162–3; Ch. IV, § I: ci. 164–9; § II: ci. 170–2; Ch. V, § I: ci. 173–81; § II: ci. 182–4; § III: ci. 185–7; Ch. VI, § I: ci. 188–91; § II: ci. 192–7; § III: ci. 198; § IV: ci. 199–200; Ch. VII, § I: ci. 201–2; § II: ci. 203–5; § III: ci. 206–7; § IV: ci. 208–10; § V: ci. 211–13; § VI: ci. 214–16; § VII, Bis. 1: ci. 217–18, 220, 219; Bis. 2: ci. 221–4; § VIII: ci. 227, 235, 237, 245–6, 248–9; § IX: ci. 250, 264–74; § X: ci. 275–9, 281–3; Ch. VIII, § I: ci. 284–6; § II: ci. 287–95; § III: ci. 296–7; § IV: ci. 298–306; § V: ci. 307–8; Ch. IX, § I: ci. 309–11; § II: ci. 312–17; § III: ci. 318–21; § IV: ci. 340–2, 322–30; § V: ci. 346, 332–5; § VI: ci. 336–9; § VII: ci. 347–52; § VIII: ci. 353–7; § IX: ci. 358–62; § X: ci. 343–4, 346; § XI: ci. 364–8; § XII: ci. 369–70, 372–3, 371, 374; § XIII: ci. 375–84; Ch. X, § I: ci. 385–7; § II: ci. 388–9, 392, 390–1, 393–8, 400; Appendix A, § I: ci. 406–8; § II: ci. 409–14; § III: ci. 419–20. For Appendix B see p. 1 n. below.

The manuscripts incorporated by Smith in 'A Fragment on Ontology' at Bowring, viii. 193–211, presented here as 'Essay on Logic', Ch. 9. Of Ontology, are as follows: Introduction: cii. 2–3; Ch. I, § I: cii. 7–8; § II: cii. 7, 10–12; § IV: cii. 13–15; § V: cii. 16–17, 19; § VI: cii. 20–6; Ch. II, § I: cii. 27–34; § II: cii. 35–9; § III: cii. 40, 42; § IV: cii. 43–4; § V: cii. 45–50; § VI: cii. 51–4; § VII: cii. 55–6; § VIII: cii. 78–9; § IX: cii. 57–73; § X: cii. 74–7.

The manuscripts incorporated by Smith in 'Essay on Language' at Bowring, viii. 295–338, presented here as 'Essay on Logic', Chs. 10–17, are as follows: Introduction: cii. 282–5; Ch. I, § I: cii. 287–9; § II: cii. 291–3, 296, 294–5, 294, 296–7; § III: cii. 298–302; Ch. II: cii. 303–4, 309; Ch. III: cii. 401–5, 310–11; Ch. IV, § I: cii. 312, 314–18, 320; § II: cii. 321–3; § III: cii. 324–5, 323; § IV: cii. 326; § V: cii. 327–9; § VI: cii. 330–1; § VII: cii. 332–3; § VIII: cii. 334–8; § IX: cii. 341–6, 349–51; § X: cii. 352–6; § XI: cii. 357–9; Ch. V, § I: cii. 360–1; § II: cii. 362; § III: cii. 363; § IV: cii. 364, 368, 367; § V: cii. 370; § VI: cii. 372–83; § VII: cii. 385, 385*, 386–90; § VIII: cii. 391; § IX: cii. 392–4; § X: cii. 396, 399, 397–9; § XI:

edition, all the additions and emendations made by George Bentham and Smith have been ignored.

The work commences with a sheet that carries the marginal subheading 'Preface',¹ where Bentham explains that his own ideas on logic were formed in response to the Aristotelian tradition that he had encountered through the study of Sanderson's *Logicæ artis compendium*. Thereafter, the ordering of the first four chapters of the text is relatively straightforward, although it appears to have taken Bentham more than one attempt to finalize that order. In these first four chapters Bentham contrasts his own approach to the definition and purposes of logic with that of Aristotle as presented by Sanderson. The manuscripts for Chapter 1, of which §§ 1 and 3 were written on 3–5 August 1814 and the interpolated § 2 on 23–4 September 1814, are paginated in order.² The section titles appear on the relevant text sheets, and while the first sheet of the chapter carries the heading 'Ch. 1', Bentham has left a space where he presumably intended to insert the title. In the marginal subheading of this sheet, the chapter title is given as 'Logic, what', as it is on all but the following two text sheets of the section, where it appears as 'Logic defined'. Hence, 'Logic, what', being the more common heading, has been adopted as the title of Chapter 1. Bentham appears to have produced an earlier draft of 'Logic, what', which can now only be partially reconstructed. In a sheet dated 23 July 1814, which formed the second page of this earlier draft, Bentham refers to three definitions of logic, including Sanderson's that logic was not applicable 'beyond the field of science', that is to knowledge, but that in practice the Aristotelians extended it 'over the field of art'.³ In the fourth page of this early draft, Bentham discusses the connection between art and science and recommends the use of the term 'discipline' to designate 'art and science'.⁴

cii. 401–4; Ch. VI, § I: cii. 408–13, 415–23; § II: cii. 426–9, 431–42; § III: cii. 443–4; § IV: cii. 445–55; § V: cii. 456–62, 464, 466–7; § VI: cii. 468–71; § VII: cii. 472–8, 480, 472^v, 481–3; § VIII: cii. 484–5; § IX: cii. 486–90; § X: cii. 491–5; § XI: cii. 496–8.

¹ UC ci. 88 (8 August 1814). The word 'Preface' is in the hand of George Bentham, but he appears to have overwritten the same word in Bentham's hand.

A rudiments sheet, headed 'Logic—Subjects. Operations including Arts & Sciences Encyclopedized according to Happiness', which contains a detailed consideration of the operations of logic and their relationship to happiness, including an analysis of ethics and the terms of ontology, is at UC ci. 15 (28 August 1814).

² UC ci. 92–4 (3 August 1814), 97–8 (23–4 September 1814), 99–104 (4–5 August 1814), with corresponding marginal summary sheets (the marginal summaries having been composed by Bentham) at ci. 79–80 (25 September 1814) and a copy at ci. 55 (15 July 1816).

³ UC ci. 78 (23 July 1814), which originally carried the marginal subheading 'Ch. 1. Logic what. § 1. its three senses', amended to 'Aristotle in general.' At the head of this sheet, Bentham has noted: '☞ Postpone to *Præcognita* as per Aristotelians.'

⁴ UC ci. 91 (23 July 1814), which is sub-headed 'Ch. 1. Logic what.' At the head of this sheet, Bentham has noted: '☞ 3 Aug. 1814. Postpone this to Ch. ||. Of Unstudious Occupations & *Disciplines*.' In the event, no such chapter was written, though Bentham touches

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In Chapters 2–4 Bentham describes his own ‘characteristics of logic’ as distinguished from the *præcognita* of Aristotle. It appears that Bentham did not initially divide the draft of his characteristics into discrete chapters, but rather presented them in a continuous sequence following ‘Logic, what’. In Chapter 2, § 1, he lists Aristotle’s *præcognita* as given by Sanderson and then gives his own list of ‘characteristics’,¹ which he goes on to describe in this and the following two chapters. In Chapter 2, §§ 2 and 3 respectively, he deals with the first two characteristics, namely the end in view and the field of logic.² At some point Bentham intended to insert ‘Subjects’ as a third characteristic but did not in the end compose any text in which he distinguished it from the topic of the field of logic. It is listed as the third characteristic in the title of Chapter 2, and in the text the discussion of ‘*Subject-matter* and *subject*’ is preceded by the title ‘§ 4. Characteristic the 3^d—Subject-matters or Subjects of Logic’, which appears to be a later insertion.³ This characteristic is not, however, in the list that appears in the text of Chapter 2, § 1,⁴ while the discussion that follows the inserted section title simply continues the consideration of the alternative terms to ‘field’ and does not treat ‘Subjects’ as an independent characteristic. The clue to Bentham’s thinking is a rudiment at the head of Chapter 3, where he notes: ‘N.B. This supposes *Subject* to have been antecedently spoken of as a characteristic.’⁵ It is possible, therefore, that Bentham, on reviewing the material, decided to add subject-matters or subjects to his list of characteristics, altered the title of Chapter 2 accordingly and added the relevant section title, but failed to revise the text. In an earlier draft of the characteristic of ‘field’, which is dated 29 August 1814 and carries the alternative titles ‘Field of Logic—its

on the relationship between the occupations of common life and the disciplines in the sequence headed ‘Disciplines’, Appendix, pp. 425–6 below.

¹ UC ci. 105–6 (22 September 1814). The titles of the chapter and sections appear on the relevant text sheets.

² UC ci. 107–9 (25 September 1814) and 110–14 (24–5 September 1814) respectively. A corresponding marginal summary sheet for the whole of Ch. 2 is at ci. 56 (15 July 1816). An earlier draft of the discussion of the end of logic is at UC cii. 202 (23 July 1814) and may have formed part of a longer sequence that would have been equivalent to Ch. 2, but which is now missing. This sheet appears to have been originally followed by UC ci. 95 (25 July 1814), where Bentham discusses the characteristic of ‘field or *subject*’, that is ‘the subject on which [logic] is capable of operating’, and where he states that the subject in question is ‘neither more nor less than the entire field of human thought and action’. At the head of the sheet, Bentham has added a note dated 1 August 1814: ‘Postpone this topic till after *Operations*—perhaps till after *Faculties*.’ In an addition to the text dated 21 September 1814, he repeats the point that logic ‘is the art of applying human reason with the utmost possible advantage to all the subjects to which it is capable of being made to apply itself’, including both ‘artificial action or practice and scientific thought’ and ‘trivial or unscientific thought and trivial and inartificial practice’.

³ UC ci. 113 (24 September 1814).

⁴ See p. 11 below.

⁵ UC ci. 115 (25 July 1814).

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divisions—1. Field of Disciplines—i.e. of Arts and Sciences: 2. Field of undisciplined or common life’ and ‘Relation of Logic to the business of human life in general:—and therein to Arts and Sciences, i.e. to Disciplines:—their *relation* to the well-being of man:—Encyclopedical Division, conceived in an exhaustive method, and having that relation for its source’, Bentham deals with the connection between logic and the disciplines. He makes the point that the distinctions between the disciplines and ‘the remainder of the field of thought and action’ on the one hand, and between the arts and sciences themselves on the other, are indeterminate, but that where the operation requires study, it is regarded as either a science or an art.¹ At the head of the first sheet, Bentham has noted: ‘☞ *Field* is better here than *subject*: viz. for the aggregate or whole: *subjects* may serve for separate articles. So *End* is better than *object*: objects may serve for pluralities, as *subjects* may.’ Hence, Bentham’s addition of ‘subjects’ to the list of characteristics is problematic, and so the original text, in which ‘subjects’ are not treated as a separate characteristic, has been retained.

At the conclusion of Ch. 2, § 3, Bentham notes that the question concerning the relationship between the various arts and sciences is one that ‘here obviously present[s] itself’.² He took up this topic in several fragments. In a fragment written in late July 1814, which carries the title ‘Of the business of human life in general: and herein of Arts, Sciences, and Disciplines’, Bentham explains that the disciplines are distinguished from the occupations of common life by the requirement to study, that the term discipline encompasses both science, that is the acquisition of knowledge, and art, that is the performance of action, and that there is no limit to the number of disciplines.³ In a fragment dated 28 July 1813 and 23 July 1814, which carries the title ‘Relation to well-being, the most instructive bond of connection to all Arts and Sciences’, Bentham states that the relation that the arts and sciences bear to each other will be brought to view by means of their connection to happiness, and hence ‘a new mode of training will be applied to . . . the celebrated Encyclopedical Tree’.⁴

Chapter 3, which contains an extended discussion of Bentham’s third characteristic, namely the operations of logic, was initially

¹ UC ci. 188–91 (29 August 1814), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet at ci. 25 (n.d. 1817).

² See p. 15 below.

³ UC ci. 192 (28 July 1814), 193 (23 July 1814), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet (the marginal summaries having been composed by Bentham) at ci. 24 (n.d. 1814), which indicates that a third page in the sequence is missing.

⁴ UC ci. 198 (23 July 1813, 28 July 1814), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet at ci. 25 (n.d. 1817). At the head of UC ci. 198, Bentham has noted: ‘☞ Postpone to the end of the Chapter.’ Bentham presumably composed the material in July 1813 and reviewed it in July 1814 with a view to incorporating it into ‘Essay on Logic’, but did not definitively do so.

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drafted at the end of July and beginning of August 1814 and then supplemented with five sheets dated 13–14 October 1814, two of which were added to § 1 and three to § 6.¹ The first sheet in the Chapter originally belonged to the earlier draft of Bentham's characteristics, that is before he divided the text into chapters, as evidenced by the fact that it originally commenced with a paragraph numbered '3', which was superseded when Bentham later added the chapter and section titles.² The title for Chapter 3 and its section titles were added before Bentham wrote the material on 13–14 October 1814, since it is on one of the so-dated sheets that he refers to the material that follows as being divided into six sections (i.e. §§ 2–7).³ The six operations that Bentham identified were preceded by a subheading and numbered I–VI. The first of these, headed 'I. Mental Operations Class I',⁴ was superseded by a section title. Bentham did not add section titles in place of the remaining subheadings, which have been adopted as the titles for §§ 3–7. A sheet on teaching and learning, which was originally written for § 7, but which has been cancelled by Bentham, has been reproduced in an editorial footnote.⁵

¹ UC ci. 115 (25 July 1814), ci. 116–17 (13–14 October 1814), ci. 118–27 (25–7 July 1814), ci. 128–30 (14 October 1814), ci. 131–6, 422–4 (26–9 July 1814), ci. 22, cii. 298–302, 160, 203–5 (1–2 August 1814). A corresponding marginal summary sheet for the first six pages is at UC ci. 58 (16 July 1816) and for the final four pages at ci. 59 (16 July 1816). The ordering of Chapter 3 follows the pagination, which appears in an almost continuous sequence through to UC cii. 302. There is some ambiguity in that in one sequence of pagination UC cii. 203 follows cii. 302, and is itself followed by cii. 160 (as adopted in the present edition), while in an alternative sequence of pagination and in the enumeration of the marginal summaries the order of cii. 203 and cii. 160 is reversed.

UC ci. 136 was originally followed by cii. 306 (28 July 1814), on which the text has been cancelled, but which carries the title 'Of Discourse or Language—Purposes to which it is applicable', preceded by a plan headed 'Modes of Communication'. The plan sets out many of the themes that are, in fact, discussed in the subsequent text, while the text itself distinguishes between the intransitive and transitive functions of language and states that the discussion will proceed by bringing to view the mental operations to which the transitive function is applicable.

² See UC ci. 115 (25 July 1814): '3. As to the several *Operations*, by means of it and under the direction of it, the human mind is capable of performing on that subject [MS alt. 'in that field'] and in pursuit of that end or any of its modifications and thence in pursuit of any subordinate ends considered as capable of serving in relation to it in the character of *means*.' It was perhaps the reference here to 'subject' that prompted Bentham's comment that the text 'supposes *subject* to have been antecedently spoken of as a characteristic'.

³ i.e. UC ci. 117: see p. 17 below.

⁴ See UC ci. 118, where the original heading appears as 'I. Mental Operations Class I. Operations in the performance of which the subject is considered as being regarded entirely, i.e. in an *entire* state, and at the same time *singly*, i.e. not in conjunction with others—without regard to past or future time, and without regard to any person other than the person himself by whom the operation is considered as performed.'

⁵ UC cii. 141 (29 July 1814): see p. 30 n. below. This sheet is paginated in sequence with the material for Chapter 3, but its content interrupts the flow of the discussion, while Bentham has noted at the head of the sheet: 'Particulars concerning *teaching* &c. postpone till after tit. *Disciplines*', i.e. the discussion of arts and sciences.

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The remaining four characteristics, namely faculties, instrument, uses, and functions, have been placed in Chapter 4, thereby following the indication in the marginal subheadings on the text sheets, namely ‘Ch. 4. IV. V. VI. VII. Functions &c.’, although no discrete chapter title has been located.¹ The headings which precede each characteristic have, as in Chapter 3, been rendered as section titles, on the grounds that Bentham has inserted section numbers before the relevant Roman numeral.² At some point he reversed the order of the third and fourth sections so that the discussion of uses preceded that of functions, but failed to amend the cross-reference at the end of the section on uses where he states that he has dealt with operations, functions, faculties, and instrument.³ The fifth and final section in Chapter 4 consists of a single sheet, which is paginated in sequence with the remainder of the chapter and carries the appropriate section heading and marginal subheadings⁴ and of which the marginal summaries appear in the appropriate place on the marginal summary sheet. Bentham has, however, noted at the head of this sheet: ‘13 Oct. 1814. This p. of Ch. IV to be rewritten from the subjoined Rudiments.’ It is not clear whether the text on this sheet is the original version that Bentham wished to rewrite or whether it is in fact the rewritten version, since it is preceded by several paragraphs that have been crossed through and it was these paragraphs, therefore, that formed the passage with which Bentham was dissatisfied. The sheet in question, which carries the marginal subheading ‘Ch. 4. Functions &c. Rudiments’, lists a series of twelve topics for consideration and distinguishes the following six properties of logic:

1. Logic is the use of reason.
2. It is the application of it to the several purposes of life.
3. It is the applying it with advantage to the several purposes to which it is applicable.
4. Good logic, the applying reason with advantage to the several purposes to which it is applicable with advantage.
5. In point of fact—such is the original and unalterable constitution of human nature—of all the imaginable applications of which human reason is

¹ UC ci. 138–9 (30 July 1814), ci. 140–1 (1 August 1814), ci. 142–5 (28 July 1814), 147 (27 July 1814), ci. 148 (12 October 1814), ci. 146 (11 October 1814), ci. 96 (22 August 1813). A corresponding marginal summary sheet for the whole chapter is at UC ci. 66 (11–12 November 1816) and for § 1 alone (the marginal summaries having been composed by Bentham) at ci. 137 (n.d. November 1826).

² Bentham misnumbered ‘V. Faculties’ as § 2 instead of § 1, but otherwise numbered the sections in the appropriate order. The ordering of the Roman numerals, both in the text and in the marginal subheadings, is confused and they have been editorially rendered consistent with the numbering of the sections and hence with the list of characteristics that appears in Ch. 2, § 1, p. 11 below.

³ See p. 39 below.

⁴ UC ci. 96 (22 August 1813). This sheet has been extrapolated by Bentham from the material written in August 1813 and integrated into Ch. 3.

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susceptible, there is not one of which it may not with truth be affirmed, that by a process more or less immediate, and by means chosen with more or less wisdom, it is a course taken in pursuit of happiness—in pursuit of happiness in some one or more of the shapes of which it is susceptible.

6. Excepting the several faculties of the body considered by themselves—i.e. abstraction made of their connection with the faculties of the mind—Logic is the application of the several human [faculties]¹ to those same purposes.²

From this point onwards the ordering of the chapters in the present edition is speculative. Chapter 5 on ‘Methodization—its Uses’ is a topic that Bentham lists among the operations of logic in Chapter 3 and which he states is ‘scarce distinguishable’ from logic itself.³ This chapter was a late addition to the essay, being composed on 14–20 October 1814, and consists of three parts, as indicated by three discrete sequences of pagination, of which the first is the introduction,⁴ the second concerns the application of methodization to the mental faculties,⁵ and the third its application to discourse or literary composition and contains a critique of Sanderson’s discussion of method.⁶

The bulk of Chapter 6 on ‘Methodization’ was written on 5–10 August 1814, while the note to the title and the first section were written on 19 October 1814, the second page of the second section on 17 October 1817, and the concluding section on Linnaeus on 5 September 1814.⁷

¹ MS ‘functions’ is a slip.

² UC ci. 77 (16 June 1814). A selection of these rudiments has been copied on the marginal summary sheet at UC ci. 66, where they follow the marginal summaries for ci. 96.

³ See p. 42 below.

⁴ UC ci. 318–21 (14–15 October 1814). The first sheet contains a rudiment that lists six classes of ‘Operations’ which corresponds to the order in which the subject is discussed in Ch. 5 and on which Bentham presumably drew in organizing the following discussion.

⁵ UC ci. 369–74 (17 October 1814). Of the six sections covered by these sheets, two consist only of a section title, while the topics of the other four are cursorily dealt with. These sections, therefore, comprise an outline rather than a detailed discussion. The corresponding marginal summary sheet for the introduction and first five sections is at UC ci. 60 (16 July 1816).

⁶ UC ci. 364–8, 375–84 (17–18, 20 October 1814), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet at ci. 64 (7 and 10 November 1816). A related rudiments sheet, in which Bentham discusses the subjects of methodization, the operations to which it is applicable, and its particular application to discourse, together with the properties desirable in a system of recordation and the uses and purposes of the works of nature and of art, is at UC ci. 21 (21 October 1814).

⁷ UC ci. 309–11 (19 October 1814), ci. 312 (5 August 1814), ci. 313 (17 October 1814), 314–17, 345–6, 331–42, 322–30, 347–54, 356–7 (5–10 August 1814), ci. 358–63 (5 September 1814). The corresponding marginal summary sheet for §§ 1–2 is at UC ci. 60 (16 July 1816), those for § 5 are at ci. 65 (5 November 1816) and ci. 63 (6–7 November 1816), that for § 6 is at ci. 61 (16–17 July 1816), for § 7 at ci. 65 (5 November 1816), for § 8 at ci. 63 (6–7 November 1816), and for § 9 at ci. 62 (17 July 1816).

The titles of the chapter and first section appear on UC ci. 309 and the text on that sheet and ci. 311, while the note to the title appears on ci. 310.

Carl Linnaeus, also known as Carl von Linné (1707–78), Swedish botanist and taxonomist.

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The text sheets contain several series of pagination, but the ordering of §§ 2–8, both in terms of the order of the sections themselves and their internal ordering, is relatively unproblematic in that the dating and pagination of the text sheets and the numbering of the marginal summaries are in the main consistent. The first section, as noted above, was a later addition. The material presented here as § 2 was originally § 1, and the original first page¹ contains not only the section title (where ‘§ 1’ has been amended by Bentham to ‘§ 2’), but also the chapter title ‘Of Methodization or Arrangement’, which has been crossed out by Bentham. While the titles of §§ 3–4 appear at the head of the two relevant text sheets,² no text was written for these sections, though a rudiment at the head of the latter indicates the scope of Bentham’s intended discussion.³ The title for § 5 is taken from the marginal subheading on the text sheets.⁴ The titles for §§ 6–8 appear on the first text sheets of the respective sections.⁵ The addition of the ninth and final section, of which the title is taken from the marginal subheadings on the text sheets,⁶ is based on the fact that these marginal subheadings indicate that the material was written for this chapter and that it continues the theme of the passage that closes § 8, namely Linnaeus’s system of classification.⁷ A related fragment consists of a discussion entitled ‘Rules of Methodization—1. as applied to *objects*’, which contains two such rules, namely ‘*Independentia priora*’ and ‘*Ordo qualis ab incepto*’.⁸ Bentham did not discuss any further category of rules, which presumably would have been rules applied to ideas or psychical entities. A cross-reference to the first rule appears in Ch. 5, § 7, where the relevant text has been inserted in an editorial footnote.⁹

¹ UC ci. 312.

² UC ci. 345 and 346 (5 August 1814) respectively.

³ See p. 59 n. below.

⁴ UC ci. 331–9.

⁵ Bentham at some point seems to have envisaged that the material on ‘Form or Figure’ at UC ci. 328 (see pp. 69–70 below) might have constituted a separate chapter or section, as it carries the title ‘Form—or of Matter and Form—in a physical and psychical sense’, but this title has been crossed through, while according to his emendation to the marginal subheadings on this and the following two sheets on ‘Relation’ at ci. 329–30 (see p. 70 below), he considered employing the material in the chapter on ‘Ontology’ and the section on ‘Fictitious Entities’. The enumeration of the discussions on ‘Form or Figure’ and ‘Relation’ have been editorially numbered IV and V respectively in the present edition. On the marginal summary sheet at UC ci. 61, these three sheets appear in the sequence in which they are placed in the present edition.

The original third sheet in § 8 is at UC ci. 355 (9 August 1814), but the text on this sheet, a single sentence stating that the language of Aristotelian logic had rendered it impracticable to classify adequately the three physical kingdoms, appears to have been abandoned and superseded by ci. 356–7.

⁶ UC ci. 358–63.

⁷ See p. 75 below.

⁸ UC ci. 343 (10 October 1814), 344 (7 October 1814).

⁹ See p. 51 & n. below.

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Logical division is one of the main techniques of methodization discussed by Bentham in Chapter 6 and he takes it up as a discrete topic in Chapter 7.¹ There is some overlap in content between Chapters 6 and 7 and it appears that Bentham had it in mind to integrate both discussions into a single chapter, since he has noted at the head of the first text sheet: 'Write up this in conjunction with title *Methodization*.' He failed to do so and hence the material appears here as discrete chapters. The internal ordering of Chapter 7, for which the text sheets appear in three sequences of consistent pagination,² is straightforward. The introduction to Chapter 7, consisting of two sheets, was written at the beginning of August 1814 and the remainder of the text later in the month. The title of the chapter appears at the head of the first text sheet,³ but neither this nor the second text sheet contain any section title, and so § 1 begins at the third text sheet, with the section title 'Dichotomy—use' being taken from the marginal subheadings on the first five text sheets.⁴ The title for § 2, 'Synthesis and Analysis correspond not', is also taken from the marginal subheadings on the text sheets,⁵ while that for § 3 appears at the head of the first text sheet of the section.⁶

The discussion of paraphrasis, and the related operations of phraseolerosis and archetypation, which forms the subject-matter of Chapter 8, begins with a reference to logical subalternation and so it seems appropriate to place it immediately after the chapters on methodization and division, where the topic is treated in detail. The order of the first two sections of Chapter 8 is unproblematic in that the text sheets are paginated consecutively.⁷ The third section on modes of exposition subsidiary to definition and paraphrasis was originally

¹ UC ci. 285 (3 August 1814), 286 (5 August 1814), ci. 287–9, 296–7, 293–4, 298–308 (19–22 August 1814). At the head of UC ci. 304, Bentham has noted: 'Quere whether this parcel C be employable.' Parcel C appears to consist of UC ci. 304–6, which therefore commences with the paragraph beginning 'An inference that presents itself' at p. 87 below, through to the end of the section at p. 89 below. Bentham may have added this note when he reviewed the material in 1816 (see below).

² i.e. the introduction, § 1, and §§ 2–3 respectively.

³ Bentham added an alternative title at UC ci. 293: 'Of Logical division in general—and of d° on the *bifurcate* principle in particular.' He reviewed the material for this chapter in January 1816 when composing 'Essay on Nomenclature and Classification' and may have made the addition at that time. For his review of the material see his notes at UC ci. 293: '19 Jan^y 1816. Examined these 2 pages [i.e. ci. 285–6] with a view to Chrestom. V. Nomenclature. Supposed not necessary to be employed'; at ci. 287: '19 Jan^y 1816. Examined with a view to Chrestom. V. Nomenclature these three pages [i.e. ci. 287–9]—supposed not necessary to be employed or substance superseded'; and at ci. 296: '19 Jan^y 1816. Examined with a view to Chrestom. V. Nomenclature these two pages [i.e. ci. 296–7]. In substance supposed superseded.'

⁴ UC ci. 287–9, 296–7. The remaining two sheets at UC ci. 293–4 carry the marginal subheading 'Dichotomy—what.'

⁵ UC ci. 298–306.

⁶ UC ci. 307.

⁷ UC ci. 217 (26 August 1814), 218–19, 221–4 (23 August 1814), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet (the marginal summaries having been composed by Bentham) at ci. 71 (23 August 1814).

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written as a discrete chapter, but at the head of the single text sheet Bentham has noted: ‘☞ This being the only leaf on the subject, it may form a section of another Chapter rather than a Chapter of itself.’¹ Given that this sheet was written immediately after the discussion of paraphrasis, and that it assumes that both the operations of definition and paraphrasis have been explained, it seems most appropriately placed as the third and final section in Chapter 8.

The placing of the long Chapter 9 ‘Of Ontology’ is not straightforward. Bentham begins with a discussion of real and fictitious entities, but assumes that these terms have already been explained, which has been done in Ch. 6, § 6.² If the ordering of the previous eight chapters is correct, then the ninth is, of course, the earliest chapter to which the discussion of ontology can be assigned. Bentham goes on to say that various aspects of language will be discussed ‘in a succeeding part of this work’, indicating that the material on ontology should precede the material on language, which appears in Chapters 12–17.³ Moreover, as noted below, the discussion of language appears to follow on from the discussion of learning, teaching, and invention that forms the subject-matter of Chapters 10–11.⁴

The origins of ‘Of Ontology’ can be traced to a sheet dated 23 July 1814, which may have been an early draft of the introduction to the chapter and on which Bentham composed a series of rudiments outlining the scope of his intended discussion:

The most general propositions relative [to] Physics & Psychology taken together are referred to *Ontology*, as d^o relative to *Physics* are to *Mathematics*.

Beings are 1. *perceptible*. 2. *inferential*: viz. 1. God: 2. Human soul, as separate from body.

☞ Refer to tit. *Language* the names of fictitious entities, and thence those entities themselves—the names being all there is of them.

Under Ontology speak of B^p Berkeley’s scheme contrived *to turn the Tables* upon the materialists.⁵

☞ Enumerate the terms of Ontology—and shew that they have all of them first a physical, then a psychical, application.⁶

Bentham then added the title ‘Of Ontology’ and defined ontology as the discipline that was formed from the ‘most general and extensive

¹ UC ci. 227 (24 August 1814).

² See pp. 64–70 below.

³ See pp. 140–82 below.

⁴ See pp. 129–39 below.

⁵ George Berkeley (1685–1753), clergyman and philosopher, Bishop of Cloyne 1734–53, was author of *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Part I. Wherein the chief Causes of Error and Difficulty in the Sciences, with the Grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion, are inquir’d into*, Dublin, 1710.

⁶ A rudiments sheet in which Bentham lists the fictitious entities belonging to ontology is at UC cii. 1 (25 September 1814) and one in which he categorizes the various entities is at ci. 23 (n.d.)

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propositions belonging to Physics, in the largest sense of the word, embracing *Somatology* [i.e. 'the science of what belongs to bodies'] and Psychology taken together'.¹ The text of the chapter, written in late September and early October 1814, consists of sixty-one pages and is divided into two sections, which are separately paginated.² The internal ordering presents no major difficulties.³ While the material is presented here as a chapter divided into two sections, Bentham later conceived of it as forming a discrete 'Part' of a work divided into two chapters. This is evidenced by the first sheet in the sequence, where the original designation of the title as 'Ch.' has been deleted and replaced by 'Part'. The section title that follows has then been designated as 'Ch. 1.' Furthermore, the marginal subheadings on the text sheets are designated as chapter headings. The material appears to have gone through several stages of arrangement, but it is presented here in what appears to be Bentham's final arrangement, while retaining the designation of the material as a chapter and its division into sections.

Bentham composed a number of related fragments, which he did not, in the event, integrate into the chapter. In a fragment dated 22 August 1814, which carries the title 'Of existence as predicated of general or abstract ideas', he noted:

☞ To write this, turn to the deniers of the existence of abstract ideas—viz. Campbel (Philos. Rhetoric). 2. Dugald Stewart. 3. Horne Tookey.⁴

¹ UC cii. 2 (23 July 1814).

² UC cii. 21–5 (23 September 1814), cii. 13–14, 9–11, 15, 35–56, 468–71, 57–68 (25–30 September 1814), cii. 69–77 (2–3 October 1814), cii. 78–9 (25 September 1814). According to the pagination, two pages that should follow UC cii. 470 are missing. The corresponding marginal summary sheets for § 1 are at UC cii. 4–5 (n.d. 1814) and for § 2 through to the discussion of 'aggregation and division' (see p. 114 below) at ci. 26–7, 32–6, 29, 31 (n.d. 1814). The marginal summary sheet at UC cii. 5 interposes a sequence of four marginal summaries following the conclusion of § 1, for which the corresponding text is at UC cii. 18, 6 (22 August 1813), which carries the chapter heading 'Of existence as applied to bodies' and deals with answering the deniers of the existence of bodies and general ideas, of whom Berkeley is named as principal exponent.

³ The only discrepancies are that § 1 begins at p. 2 (UC cii. 21), which contains the titles of both the chapter itself and § 1, and that there are two pages numbered 7 in § 2 (cii. 15 and 35). The first page, which appears to have been abandoned by Bentham, is at UC cii. 3 (25 September 1814). The first section was originally followed by UC ci. 226 (23 September 1814), which carries the marginal subheading '§ 2. Fictitious entities divided', and which begins by stating that all entities, whether real or fictitious, are referable to one of three classes, namely 'I. Names of entities considered separately—II. Entities considered in connection and simultaneously—III. Entities considered in connection but not simultaneously', and continues with a discussion of 'Substance with its synonym Matter'.

⁴ George Campbell (1719–96), Scottish philosopher, Church of Scotland minister, Principal of Marischal College 1759–95, was author of *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, 2 vols., London, 1776; Dugald Stewart (1753–1828), Scottish philosopher, was author of *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, London, 1792 (two further volumes appeared in 1814 and 1827); John Horne Tooke, formerly Horne (1736–1812), radical and philologist,

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Conceditur, if *permanence* be an inseparable or concomitant attribute of existence, general ideas have no existence: but then neither have individual ones.

These cavils suppose *import* to be *naturally* and inseparably attached [to] words: forgetting that they are but the result of convention.¹

Bentham failed, however, to compose any text. In two further fragments, he expounds the distinction between physical and psychical entities,² while in a further two he makes the point that the term ‘substance’ is inclusive of the names of all real entities.³

Chapter 10 on the operations performable in relation to every art, namely learning, employing, teaching, and improving, consists of five sheets dated 11 August 1814, paginated in sequence, and arranged into two sections.⁴ Bentham has not given any explicit indication as to where this material should appear in the essay as a whole, but it seems appropriate to place it so that it forms a general introduction to the following material on invention in the arts and sciences in which Bentham presents and comments on nine mementos, and which is in turn, therefore, presented as Chapter 11. The internal ordering of Chapter 11, which is paginated in one continuous sequence, is unproblematic.⁵ The first page in the sequence is dated 30 July 1814, while the remainder are dated 26–7 August 1814. As in a number of other instances, Bentham composed the initial page of a chapter or section, or perhaps only the chapter or section title itself, and then wrote up the topic at a later date. He returned to this topic on 17 October 1814 when he composed a single sheet and paginated it to follow the commentary on the first two mementos.⁶ This latter passage has been inserted in an editorial footnote.⁷ A further fragment discusses a ‘Mechanical help’ to the rule ‘*Quodlibet cum quolibet*’, namely that to facilitate the comparison of propositions and especially longer pieces of writing, write on one side only of the paper.⁸ Two further fragments suggest that Bentham intended to expand his discussion of invention by taking particular branches of art and science into consideration.

was author of *ΕΠΕΑ ΙΤΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ. Or, the Diversions of Purley. Part I*, London, 1786, and *ΕΠΕΑ ΙΤΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ. Or, the Diversions of Purley. Part II*, London, 1805.

¹ UC cii. 210 (22 August 1814).

² UC cii. 212 (23 September 1814) and 213 (23 September 1814).

³ UC cii. 214 (23 September 1814) and 215 (23 September 1814).

⁴ UC ci. 401–5 (11 August 1811).

⁵ UC ci. 385 (30 July 1814), ci. 386–91, 393–8 (26–7 August 1814), with corresponding marginal summary sheets at ci. 44–6, 28 (n.d. 1814). A fourteenth page in the sequence at UC ci. 399 (28 August 1814) contains only a rudiment (see p. 139 n. below), which indicates how Bentham intended to continue the discussion of mementos 7 and 8.

⁶ UC ci. 392 (17 October 1814).

⁷ See pp. 135–6 n. below.

⁸ UC ci. 400 (1 October 1814). According to the marginal summary sheet at UC ci. 28, this page should follow ci. 398 and thereby conclude the chapter.

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One of these fragments carries the title ‘Of the art of invention as applied to mathematics’. While Bentham did not compose any text, he indicated the intended content in a rudiment:

1. In Mathematics, principal demand for invention is the art of teaching—i.e. *facilitating*, thence *shortening*, the time of learning what has already been invented.

2. Encrease the utility by discarding useless branches.

3. Pugnacious stile of Euclid:¹ the stile of his age & nation: mathematics taught to repugnants, as logic was: pride the spring, not benevolence.²

The second carries the title ‘Of the art of teaching: or of improvement with reference to the operations of teaching and learning’. Bentham begins with the rule that, ‘for instruction and guidance’ in any course of study, take ‘the most recent works which the subject is known to furnish’, on the grounds that they would probably be more correct and complete than earlier works. He indicates that he will go on to discuss exceptions to the rule and then the inconveniences and causes of the contrary practice, which he outlined in a rudiment at the head of the sheet: ‘1. Prejudice in favour of antiquity. 2. Admiration of Geniuses. 3. Poverty.’ His advice to the student was to ‘Guard yourself against blind admiration’ and ‘Encourage yourself in sitting in judgment on your books of instruction—it will give you the consciousness of mental strength, an animating sensation.’³

A related fragment carries the chapter title ‘Of Art in general—Operations performable in relation to it’, to which Bentham has added the following rudiment: ‘Qualities desirable in it: viz. 1. in the language of an individual, i.e. his style. 2. in language in general: i.e. the aggregate of all the language employable by all individuals.’ The material is divided into two sections: ‘§ 1. Operations performable in relation to every art—their natural order in respect of priority’, in which Bentham lists ‘1. Instruction. 2. Use or Employment. 3. Teaching. 4. Improving or ameliorating’, and makes the point that this order represents ‘the order of priority in respect of performance’; and ‘§ 2. Limitations necessary to the proposition indicative of that priority—their practical use and importance’, in which he points out that the same person may be occupied in learning one art, practising a second, teaching a third, and improving a fourth, and the pernicious effects of assuming a clear distinction between, for instance, the person of the master and that of the learner.⁴

¹ Euclid (fl. 300 BC), Greek mathematician, who taught in Alexandria during the reign of Ptolemy I Soter (323–285 BC), was the author of the celebrated *Elements*, which remained a standard textbook on mathematics for 2,000 years.

² UC cii. 201 (30 July 1814).

³ UC cii. 200 (16 October 1814).

⁴ UC ci. 401–5 (11 August 1814).

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Four related fragments, dated 13 October 1814, are concerned with James Harris.¹ The first carries the marginal subheading 'Harris on Art', but barely proceeds beyond a list of Harris's works and an introduction to his definition of the word 'art'.² The second carries the marginal subheading 'Well-being. Harris—Definition.' Bentham notes that 'all the elements of excellence' in 'a literary composition' may be characterized as '[u]tility, verity, and novelty', and states that an example will be brought to view in which a different conception had presented itself.³ The third carries the title 'James Harris—his work on the Predicaments'⁴ and the fourth 'James Harris—his definition of Happiness'. Both of these fragments are concerned with Harris's discussion of the predicaments, which Bentham considers to have been, 'Much ado about nothing:—if not about absolutely nothing, at any rate about little, and that which is done prodigiously laboured, and altogether ill-done.'⁵ It seems that Bentham had it in mind to write a critique of Harris, but in the event only outlined the possible scope of the proposed discussion.

Chapter 12 on the operations performable in relation to 'Discourse or Language in general', namely learning, practising, teaching, and improving,⁶ continues with a more specific example of the general discussion in the preceding two chapters. It begins with a precis of and cross-reference to the discussion in Chapter 10, which, together with the fact that the bulk of Chapter 12 was written immediately after Chapter 10, indicates that it should follow that discussion. The internal organization of Chapter 12 is clear, in that Bentham, at the beginning of § 2, sets out a list of eight qualities desirable in language and then proceeds to discuss each one in turn, and in § 3 discusses them in the order of their importance.⁷ There is one sequence of pagination for the

¹ James Harris (1709–80), philosopher and musical patron, was author of *Hermes: or, A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Language and Universal Grammar*, London, 1751.

² UC ci. 426 (13 October 1814).

³ UC ci. 427 (13 October 1814), which carries the main heading 'Logic or Ethics.'

⁴ UC cii. 217 (13 October 1814).

⁵ UC cii. 218 (13 October 1814).

⁶ UC cii. 310 (11 August 1814), cii. 311 (25 August 1814), cii. 315, 312, 320, 319, 349–50; BL Add. MS 33,549, fos. 13–14; UC cii. 321–3, 332–3, 327–9, 326, 330–1 (11–14 August 1814), cii. 352–6 (16 August 1814). The corresponding marginal summary sheet for § 1 is at UC ci. 17 (25 August 1814).

⁷ Bentham composed several rudiments sheets in which he dealt with the qualities desirable in language. He links the parts of speech to a conjectural history of language at UC cii. 85 (9 February 1814, with additions dated 9 February 1819, 21 September 1831, and 5 November 1831, with a comment that the sheet had been 'Seen' on 29 September 1831), drafted before he began work in earnest on 'Essay on Logic'. He outlines the qualities desirable in language in general and those desirable in the style of an individual, before discussing the operations of the intellectual faculty in relation to language—namely learning, employment, teaching, and improvement—and giving rules for clearness at UC cii. 86 (20 July 1814, with a comment that the sheet had been 'Seen' on 29 September 1831). He develops the theme that nouns and verbs represented clusters of conjugates,

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first section and another for the second and third sections combined. The only discrepancy in the pagination concerns the two pages dealing with ornamentality,¹ which are not included in the subsidiary sequence of page numbers. The topic was a later addition to the discussion, as reflected by the fact that its listing earlier in the section was a later addition² and by the fact that it is not discussed separately in the third and final section (it is mentioned incidentally in the discussion of melodiousness and facility of utterance).³ Furthermore, at the beginning of Chapter 16, dealing with the qualities desirable in the style of an individual, Bentham omits any mention of ornamentality.⁴ The content of Chapter 12, §§ 2–3, takes up the topics outlined in the first part of the rudiment at the head of the first sheet in § 2, which lists the qualities desirable in a language generally and then the qualities desirable in the style of an individual.⁵ It seems that Bentham intended that the detailed discussion of the eight qualities desirable in language should immediately follow the general discussion in Chapter 12, and then to proceed to those desirable in the style of an individual, which appears to be confirmed by the cross-reference in Chapter 16 to ‘the several preceding Chapters on the qualities desirable in every man’s language’ (as opposed to those desirable in the style of an individual).⁶ Hence Bentham’s discussions of improvements in language generally, of copiousness, and of clearness are placed in Chapters 13–15 respectively.

with the former being modified by cases and numbers and the latter by moods, tenses, persons, and numbers, at UC cii. 88 (23 July 1814). Continuing with the theme of conjugates, he produced a list of suffixes and their meanings at UC cii. 89 (n.d. August 1814). He discusses improvements in relation to the qualities desirable in language at UC cii. 113 (2 September 1814), the improvement of philology by means of providing comprehensive lists of words in use in a language at different times and a catalogue of all books published in a particular language at UC ci. 18 (8 September 1814), the improvement of mathematics at ci. 19 (8 September 1814), and improvement by means of methodization as applied to history at ci. 20 (8 September 1814). He argues that language is the expression of the mind of the person whose language it is and goes on to analyse the component elements of a proposition at UC cii. 90 (4 September 1814).

A fragment headed ‘Qualities desirable in language’, in which Bentham lists six such qualities—namely copiousness, clearness, conciseness, impressiveness, melodiousness, and facility of utterance—and goes on to discuss the advantage that less-inflected have over more-inflected languages and the value of the imperative ‘shall’ in English is at UC cii. 351 (1 June 1814).

A fragment that carries the chapter title ‘Of Improvement considered as applicable to Language by a compleat logical instead of an alphabetical arrangement of the words of which, in this or that language, it is composed’, but no text, is at UC cii. 407 (date illegible).

¹ UC cii. 330–1.

³ See p. 153 below.

² See p. 142 below.

⁴ See p. 170 below.

⁵ i.e. in the rudiment at the head of UC cii. 315, where Bentham lists ten qualities desirable in ‘a language at large’, which includes the eight discussed in the text, with the addition of ‘Discibility’ and ‘Dignity’, and then eleven qualities desirable in ‘the style of an individual’, which mirrors the former list, but with the addition of ‘Elegance’.

⁶ See p. 172 below.

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The discussion of improvements in language, which forms the subject of Chapter 13,¹ is concerned with the eight qualities listed in Chapter 12. The first sheet in Chapter 13 carries the date 23 July 1814, but the remainder was written on 16 August 1814, and thus almost immediately after the bulk of Chapter 12.² This order of composition follows the pattern of Chapter 11, with Bentham drafting an initial sheet of text, or possibly only the title, then returning at a later date to fill out the topic. Chapter 13 has, however, been rather mapped out by Bentham than completed, in that the text for both §§ 3 and 4 is incomplete and no text has been written for § 5. Having discussed the qualities desirable in language in general, and then the means of improving language, Bentham presumably intended to compose chapters dealing with improvements in each quality in turn. In the event, it appears that only those dealing with copiousness and clearness were written. Chapter 14, which deals with the former in a short sequence of three sheets,³ and Chapter 15, which deals with the latter,⁴ are both unproblematic in terms of their internal

¹ UC cii. 360 (23 July 1814), cii. 361–6 (16 August 1814).

² The titles of the chapter and § 1 appear on both UC cii. 360 and 361, but have been crossed through on the latter. It is possible that Bentham began the chapter anew on 16 August 1814 and then decided to incorporate the material on the former sheet as the introduction, crossing through the original title, namely '*Improvements—of what improvements language is susceptible: how, when, and by whom they are capable of being made* 1. in the case of language in general: 2. in the case of this or that particular language', and copying the revised title from the latter sheet.

³ UC cii. 392–4 (26 August 1814). In a rudiment at UC cii. 406 (28 August 1814), Bentham contemplated a much more expansive discussion of the topic: 'Sources of Dilation. 1. Addition to the set of Conjugates. 2. When the name [of] one of two Opposites is already in use, adding the name of the other. Ex. gr. Nomen existens, *Well-being*. Nomen addendum, *Ill-being*.

'1. Conjugates—addition to.

'2. Opposites—addition of.

'3. Employing a physical term or proposition in a *psychical* sense.

'4. Composition. See Naturalization.

'5. Naturalization from a foreign language:—N.B. Best from a dead d^o. Reasons. 1. Greek best for composition: 2. This the most usual source: 3. & least invidious.

'6. A dead foreign word when imported is free from ambiguity & indistinctness.'

⁴ UC ci. 201–7, 214–16, 265–74 (16–18 August 1814). An earlier draft, carrying the chapter title 'Of clearness, as opposed to long-windedness—or as constituted by the absence of long-windedness: and thence of *Clarification* by *Resolution*', and an opening paragraph in which Bentham lists one mode of clarification by resolution as 'Conversion of the hypothetical form of statement into the categorical', is at BL Add. MS 33,551, fo. 295 (23 July 1814).

A related fragment on the theme of disambiguation, which carries the title 'Of Distinction considered as a mode of Exposition incidentally preliminary to Definition', is at UC ci. 264 (20 August 1814).

A sheet which Bentham consulted at this time, originally dated 6 August 1804, but with additions dated 1813 and a comment dated August 1814, carrying the title 'Communication (Bacon *Ars traditiva*)', and containing a list headed 'Exposition—its modes' and lists of operations succedaneous and subsidiary to definition, is at UC cii. 206. The allusion is

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ordering. In Chapter 15, having noted that unclearness consists of ambiguity and obscurity, and may be a feature of both single words and propositions, Bentham deals with single words, arguing that the remedy consists in exposition, which in turn consists in definition and its related operations and, in those cases in which definition is inapplicable, in ‘sucedaneous’ operations, that is paraphrasis, archetypation, and phraseoplerosis. He goes on to discuss in detail one operation preparatory to definition, namely disambiguation, with a focus on the multitude of senses attached to the word ‘Church’. The first two sheets in Chapter 16 were written on 13 August 1814,¹ but it was almost two months later that the third and final sheet of § 1 and those for § 2 were added, where Bentham introduces and goes on to discuss the quality of dignity.² The whole chapter is consistently paginated in one sequence.

In Chapter 17 Bentham puts forward a number of rules for the avoidance of ambiguity and obscurity, divided between rules applicable to individual words and rules applicable to collocations or propositions.³ He presumably intended that this material should follow the more general discussion of properties desirable in language, and more particularly the discussion of clearness, or the avoidance of ambiguity and obscurity, which constitutes Chapter 15. The opening sheet in Chapter 17 begins with a long rudiment that lists three rules for ‘Single Terms’ (or rather four, since one rule has been deleted and an alternative added) and six rules for ‘Collocation’, and in effect constitutes a plan for the chapter.⁴ The manuscripts, however, present a number of problems. First, the text is incomplete, with some of the passages being abandoned and some of the rules that are listed on the plan not being discussed at all. Second, the pagination presents an order different to that envisaged on the plan. The plan, as noted above, divides the material into two parts. In the first part, dealing with ‘Single Terms’, material survives for all three of Bentham’s rules as well as for the deleted rule. The text follows the structure outlined in the plan, although the

to ‘the art of transmission’ discussed by Francis Bacon (1561–1626), first Baron Verulam and first Viscount St Alban, philosopher and writer, Lord Chancellor 1618–21, in ‘De augmentis scientiarum’, Bk. 6, in *The Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. J. Spalding, R.L. Ellis, and D.D. Heath, 14 vols., London, 1815–74, ii. 410.

¹ UC cii. 357–8 (13 August 1814).

² UC cii. 359 (11 October 1814) and cii. 334–40 (8 October 1814) respectively. At the head of UC cii. 334, Bentham has noted: ‘N.B. This quality [i.e. dignity] belongs—not to a *language*—but to the *style* of him who uses it.’

³ UC cii. 372–7 (6–7 October 1814), cii. 378 (9 October 1814), cii. 379–80 (7 October 1814), cii. 381, 390 (10 October 1814), cii. 388, 387, 389 (7 October 1814). The manuscripts carry the marginal subheading ‘Ch. ||. Rules’, which indicates that Bentham intended that the material should form a discrete chapter.

⁴ See UC cii. 372 (6 October 1814).

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pagination suggests that the material corresponding to the second and third rules should belong to the second part on collocation and follow the three sheets originally written for that topic.¹ A further problem is that the original first rule under 'Single Terms' on the plan, namely 'Avoid terms of ambiguous applicability where d^o of unambiguous exist', has been deleted,² and replaced by a rule that corresponds to a passage headed 'Change no words but where you mean to change the sense.'³ This additional rule is incorporated in the present edition and so the first part dealing with 'Single Terms' consists of four rules. In other words, the discussion begins with the original first rule, continues with the alternative first rule but renumbered as the second rule, and concludes with the second and third rules but renumbered as the third and fourth rules. In the second part, dealing with 'Collocation', Bentham lists six rules on the plan, for two of which text exists. In the present edition, all six rules have been listed, with the appropriate material inserted under the two rules for which it survives. In addition, Bentham composed text for a further rule that does not appear on the plan, namely that the more important idea be placed at the front of the sentence,⁴ and this material is presented as a seventh rule.

A related fragment that has not been included in the present edition of 'Essay on Logic' consists of four pages dated 24 August 1814 and carries the chapter title 'Of Conjugates, pseudo-conjugates and quasi-conjugates' and the section title 'Of Conjugates'.⁵ Bentham discusses the elements involved in the conjugation of verbs and compares and contrasts them with those involved in the declension of nouns. According to the rudiment at the head of the sequence, the scope of the chapter would have been as follows:

Conjugates—1. Grammatical. 2. Logical.

Faciendum. To class these Logical ones.

Use—to indicate a source of improvement in language: viz. the completion of the several established forms of conjugates.

In a further note at the head of this rudiment, Bentham has stated: '¶ This to come after the Explanation of the several Parts of Speech.' It appears, then, that Bentham had it in mind to expand his discussion of language to include a commentary on the parts of speech. There is no surviving manuscript from this period on the parts of speech, with

¹ i.e. UC cii. 380–1 should follow cii. 387–90. All these sheets have been sub-headed 'II. Collocation', while UC cii. 387–8 have been further sub-headed 'Clearness' and cii. 389–90, 380–1 'Impressiveness'.

² The corresponding discussion is at UC cii. 372–8.

³ UC cii. 379.

⁴ UC cii. 389.

⁵ UC cii. 426–9 (24 August 1814).

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the exception of a fragment on interjections,¹ though he did briefly discuss this topic in ‘Universal Grammar’.²

In the eighteenth and final Chapter in the main body of ‘Essay on Logic’, Bentham assesses the significance of the ‘new ideas’ that he had ‘derived from Logic’. In writing this material, he perhaps wished to avoid the criticism that he levels at Sanderson for his failure to ‘particularize’ the uses of logic.³ The ordering of the chapter as a whole is unproblematic, in that Bentham inserted Roman numerals at the beginning of each item (the only discrepancy being his later insertion of the seventh item on springs of action and his failure to correct the enumeration of the remaining items). The bulk of the material was composed in the second half of October 1814, with some additions made at various dates in the first half of November 1814.⁴ Under the fourth item dealing with the elements or dimensions of pleasure and pain, he incorporated one sheet that he had written in or around 1807 under the main heading of ‘Evid[ence] Prosp[ective] View’, which he re-headed ‘Morals & Legislation’.⁵ In a note dated 15 November 1814, he commented: ‘What more shall be added?’⁶ In the event, he added no more items, either to this discussion or to ‘Essay on Logic’ more generally.

The Appendix to ‘Essay on Logic’ reproduces Bentham’s detailed critique of passages in Sanderson’s *Logicæ artis compendium* and

¹ See UC cii. 596 (22 July 1814), subheaded ‘Ch. ||. Parts of Speech. § ||. Interjections’, where Bentham makes the point that interjections ‘have the import of entire propositions. They may be considered as fragments of the original language. They are to the human animal what the different species of sounds emitted by other animals are to them respectively: ex. gr. the mewling, the chirping, the growling, the spitting of the cat.’

² See p. 377 below.

³ See Appendix, Ch. 1, § 4, p. 211 below.

⁴ BL Add. MS 33,550, fos. 4–47 (15–19, 21–2, 24–7, 30–1 October, 1, 5–6, 8, 11–13, 15 November 1814). For a more detailed analysis see the Table of Manuscripts, p. lxxi below.

⁵ BL Add. MS 33,550, fo. 9 (n.d. 1807 and 31 December 1808). The subheading ‘Logical Arrangements’ is a later addition that has obscured the original subheading. Bentham has added the following note at the head of the sheet: ‘ Headed improperly Evidence prospective view.’ This sheet is a continuation of a passage at BL Add. MS 33,550, fos. 2–3 (31 December 1808), which constitutes the beginning of an essay entitled ‘Logical arrangements Which have served as so many nova organa, instruments of invention or discovery, to Jeremy Bentham in the composition of his several works.’ In a rudiment at the head of fo. 2, Bentham lists fourteen items which correspond, albeit in a different order, with twelve of the fifteen items developed in Ch. 18, with the addition of ‘Ends of justice or judicature’ and ‘Quarters in which a man’s welfare may be affected.’ It is possible that Bentham intended that these two sheets should precede the remainder of the chapter, though it is also possible that he took this decision when he surveyed the material in 1826, rather than at the time of writing ‘Essay on Logic’ in 1814. The material is preceded by a spencer dated 26 September 1826 and headed: ‘1. J.B’s new ideas deduced from Logic. Written in 1814 October &c. 2. Logical and Language Tabular Views.’

⁶ See BL Add. MS 33,550, fo. 37.

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consists of a large proportion of the earliest material that he wrote for the essay. In relation to the organization of this material, Bentham noted:

☞ 31 July 1814. Make Arist.'s *Præcognita* a separate Chapter. It will come best when the whole of J.B.'s *Præcognita* have been displayed.

☞ Say Ch. 1. *Præcognita* or descriptive delineations concerning Logic, according to the present work.

Ch. 2. *Præcognita* concerning Logic, according to the Aristotelians.¹

It seems that at this early stage in the genesis of 'Essay on Logic', Bentham intended that his critique of Sanderson would follow the exposition of his own characteristics of logic, which, as noted above, he originally wrote as a unified sequence, but later distributed the material across three chapters.² It is unclear, however, just where Bentham finally intended this critique to appear.³ Given its distinct theme, and the fact that there seems no obvious place to include it in the body of the essay, it has been presented here in an Appendix. Chapter 1 begins with Bentham's explanation as to why he discusses Sanderson's compendium rather than Aristotle's original works and continues with a critique of Sanderson's presentation of Aristotle's *præcognita*.⁴ The bulk of the text was written on 31 July 1814, but two sheets were added on 25 September 1814⁵ and one on 11 October 1814.⁶ Bentham incorporated a further sheet dated 28 July 1813, but re-dated 23 July 1814, at the conclusion of § 3, indicating in the marginal subheading that it should appear as a note.⁷ There are two drafts of § 2, each consisting of a single sheet. The earlier draft,

¹ UC ci. 157.

² i.e. Chapters 2–4; see p. xxvi above.

³ At one point Bentham states that 'reference will be made' to Sanderson's work (see p. 207 below), which suggests that the material should appear before the body of the essay, but shortly afterwards states that his own list of topics 'is before the reader' (see p. 208 below), which suggests that it should follow the opening chapters of the essay.

⁴ UC ci. 149–51 (31 July 1814), ci. 152 (28 July 1814), ci. 154–5 (31 July 1814), ci. 156 (28 July 1813 and 23 July 1814), ci. 157–8 (31 July 1814), ci. 159–60 (25 September 1814), ci. 161–2 (31 July 1814), ci. 163 (11 October 1814), with corresponding marginal summary sheets at UC ci. 67, 42–3 (13 November 1816).

⁵ UC ci. 159–60. The first of these sheets carries the title '§ 4. II. and III. Uses and End of Logic, according to the Aristotelians.' It is possible that Bentham intended this material to replace the original draft of §§ 4–5 dealing with the uses and end of logic respectively. The pagination, however, indicates that they should form a continuation of § 5, and that is how they have been presented here. They do, however, overlap in content with Appendix, Ch. 4.

⁶ UC ci. 163 (11 October 1814). This sheet contains the original passage from Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 2, that Bentham renders in English translation at UC ci. 162: see pp. 214–15 below.

⁷ UC ci. 156 (28 July 1813 and 23 July 1814), which carries the crossed-out section title 'Aristotelian larger sense of the word *Logic*', and the following rudiment: '☞ Relation to all disciplines. 1. Happiness—the end. 2. Language, the instrument. Hence speak of language, 1st considered in its application to all disciplines: 2. in *dº* to each particular discipline.'

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which carries the marginal subheading ‘Ch. 1. Logic what’,¹ may have been written as part of the original draft of ‘Essay on Logic’.² It has been reproduced in an editorial footnote.³ A related fragment, which carries the marginal subheading ‘Aristotle’s Definition’, was written to follow a discussion of exposition and to show which of Bentham’s ‘modifications’ had been noticed by the Aristotelians and which had not, with a space left in the manuscript for the insertion of the list of those which had been noticed. The text continues with an exposition of definition *per genus et differentiam*, which is described as ‘by far the most important’ of those noticed by Aristotle.⁴

Following the order of the topics in Sanderson, Chapter 2 of the Appendix consists in Bentham’s discussion of Aristotle’s predicaments⁵ and Chapter 3 of Aristotle’s post-predicaments.⁶ The material is paginated in a single sequence. Bentham appears to have intended that the latter discussion should appear as the second section of the chapter on the predicaments, but has not given any title for the first section. In other words, there is a chapter title for the discussion of the predicaments and a section title for that of the post-predicaments. For the sake of consistency, the material has been presented here as two separate chapters. At the head of the first sheet of Chapter 2, Bentham has noted that the discussion should not appear ‘till after *Ontology*’, presumably because it assumes that the distinction between the names of real entities and those of fictitious entities has been explained. Bentham has also noted: ‘Add a view of omitted predicaments: viz. 1. Physical. 2. Politico-Ethical, as power—right &c.’⁷ Though the title of Chapter 4 of the Appendix suggests that the discussion will range over the methods of disputation of both Aristotle and Socrates,⁸ the focus is very much on the former. The bulk of the material was written on 19–21 July, with two pages expanding the discussion of the objectives of the collocutors being added on 29 July 1814.⁹

In the fifth and final Chapter of the Appendix, composed on 16 October 1814, Bentham returns to the theme of disputation with an incomplete sequence consisting of six pages in which he argues that

¹ UC ci. 153 (25 July 1814).

² See p. xxv above.

³ See p. 208 n. below.

⁴ UC ci. 275–6 (2 August 1814).

⁵ UC ci. 164–6 (24 July 1814), ci. 167–9 (26–7 July 1814), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet at ci. 37 (n.d. 1814).

⁶ UC ci. 170 (28 July 1814), 171–2 (30 July 1814), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet at ci. 38 (n.d. 1814).

⁷ UC ci. 164.

⁸ Socrates (c. 470–399 BC), Athenian philosopher.

⁹ UC ci. 173, 176, 174 (19 July 1814), ci. 175, 177 (29 July 1814), ci. 178–81 (20–1 July 1814), with corresponding marginal summary sheets at ci. 39–40 (n.d. 1814). The marginal summary sheets give the order of the material as UC ci. 173–81. This ordering does not follow Bentham’s pagination, in which UC ci. 176 is the second page in the sequence.

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the Aristotelian objective of communicating knowledge had resulted in ‘a compleat failure’, though ‘in the course of the inquiry, particular discoveries of no inconsiderable use and importance were brought to light’, for instance in identifying on which points there was agreement and on which disagreement between two debaters.¹ Bentham claims that the Aristotelian method did not go beyond the explanation of the import of words, that the Aristotelians had mistakenly assumed that each word had ‘an import naturally inherent in it’, and that a corresponding thing existed for every word which in grammatical form purported to be the name of a thing.² He then makes the point that knowledge is the product of experience, observation, and experiment, and of reflection upon the results thereby gained. It is possible that Bentham intended to proceed with a discussion of the experimental method pioneered, in his view, by Francis Bacon, as indicated in the following rudiment which appears at the head of the first sheet in the chapter:

Real art taught by the disputative branch—the art of causing to be distinguish[ed] that which you agree to from that which you disagree to: distinguishing the one from the other.

For 17 centuries the delusion, the imposture, reigned triumphant: it required a Bacon to dethrone it. In Observation &c. behold, he said, the only true road to knowledge. Thus much he did: vast was the difficulty (in those days) as well as vast the use. Thus much Bacon did: more he did not do. He marked out the road but scarcely did he set his foot on it: and small was the success of the few steps he took in it.³

This theme, however, remained undeveloped.

Essay on Ethics

In the midst of writing ‘Essay on Logic’, Bentham composed a series of manuscripts to which he gave the main heading ‘Logic or Ethics’ or, in a few instances, ‘Logic or Deontology’. Bentham provided no title for this material, hence the title ‘Essay on Ethics’ has been editorially supplied. He began writing on the theme of ethics on 30–1 August 1814 and then concentrated exclusively on it from 9 to 20 September 1814, before making some final additions on 3, 5, and 9 October 1814.

¹ UC ci. 182–7 (16 October 1814), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet at ci. 41 (n.d. 1814).

² In a related fragment at UC cii. 216 (5 August 1814), Bentham notes that, ‘One source of error and confusion pervades the whole course of the Aristotelian System: it is the propensity to suppose the existence of a real object for every name that is not a proper one’, and proceeds to list predicables, ante-predicaments, predicaments, and post-predicaments as terms that ‘seem occasionally to be regarded and spoken of upon the footing of real entities’, but has then added in the margin: ‘~~is~~ Quære.’

³ UC ci. 182 (16 October 1814).

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The Oxford Aristotelian tradition was represented, in Bentham's view, by both Sanderson's *Logica artis compendium* and the anonymous *Ethices Compendium in usum Juventutis Academicæ*, dealing with logic and ethics respectively. He seems to have envisaged that his critique of Aristotelian ethics would form part of his critique of Aristotelian logic more generally. How did logic relate to ethics, asked Bentham, since the end in view of both was well-being? Logic, he explained, was the more general art, and ethics the more particular:

If in the pursuit of *well-being* it be the province of Ethics to take the direction of human conduct—in that same pursuit it is the province of Logic to take the command and give direction to the course of Ethics itself. From having his Generals under him, the Commander-in-chief has not the less the command of the army committed to his care.¹

Ethics appears in Bentham's 'Encyclopedical Table, or Art and Science Table' as a sub-field of mind-regarding ontology and is itself divided into expository and censorial branches, with the latter branch termed 'Deontology', a word derived from the ancient Greek and meaning 'Knowledge concerning what is proper to be done'. Deontology is then divided into public and private ethics, and the former into internal government and international politics, and so forth.² In 'Essay on Logic' Bentham states that, in a work of logic, a 'bird's eye view' should be given of the various arts and sciences.³ While the surviving manuscripts do not constitute a complete account, in some respects they go beyond a 'bird's eye view'. It is nevertheless possible that Bentham was intending to give such an outline of the field of ethics as part of 'Essay on Logic', though, apart from a passing reference,⁴ he does not give any indication as to where in the work it might appear. It is, therefore, presented here as a separate essay. There is no plan for 'Essay on Ethics' and very little indication as to the order in which Bentham intended the material to appear. The ordering of the chapters is, therefore, speculative, although the internal ordering of each chapter is generally unproblematic.

In Chapter 1, which is divided into six sections and which was the earliest material to be written,⁵ Bentham deals with the question of the relationship between well-being, happiness, and pleasure on the one hand, and ill-being, misery, and pain on the other, before stating that existence itself is 'a conclusive proof' of well-being and continuing with a discussion of the morality of suicide. Bentham did not write

¹ See p. 12 below.

² See *Chrestomathia* (CW), Table V, between pp. 178 and 179.

³ See p. 5 below.

⁴ See 'Essay on Logic', Ch. 4, § 3, p. 39 n. below, where he instructs himself to insert 'some of the most general matter' from 'Ethics'.

⁵ UC xiv. 35–42 (30 August 1814), xiv. 57–79 (9–11 September 1814).

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any text for § 4, in which he intended to argue that well-being was increasing. The original draft of § 5 consists of a single-page discussion of the *summum bonum*, where Bentham claims that even to ask the question as to the nature of the *summum bonum* was to speak nonsense, since the thing did not exist.¹ On 9–11 September 1814 he went on to compose a much more substantial discussion of the *summum bonum*, divided into two sections, where he deals with the various notions that, according to the author of *Ethices Compendium*, had been advanced in relation to its content.²

Chapter 2 reproduces a sequence of material written on 6–7 September 1814 that carries the marginal subheading ‘Object’.³ In § 1 Bentham notes that well-being is ‘the intrinsic and sole ultimate object of pursuit to every man at all times’ and asks three questions—whether well-being can cease to be the object of pursuit, whether there is any occasion on which it ought not to be so, and what is the point of any discourse on ethics? He gives his answers in the following three sections, albeit he does not address the second point directly, but rather criticizes the *ipse-dixitism* of conventional moralists and their tendency to err on the side of severity. This second point is in effect taken up in § 5, where Bentham presents a series of sixteen ‘aphorisms’ on the subject of pleasure and pain. The sixth and final section consists of a discussion of the notion of purity in relation to pleasure and pain.

The essay continues with seven chapters in which Bentham deals with his own division of ethics into prudence, probity, and beneficence. Following the designation in the majority of titles and marginal subheadings, each of the sequences that make up this material has been presented as a discrete chapter. The titles are taken from the first text sheet in the respective sequences. In Chapter 3, Bentham notes that prudence, probity, and beneficence cover the whole field of ethics and that all other virtues are resolvable into these three. He goes on to list six ‘sources of division’ of the whole field.⁴ In Chapter 4 he takes up the first two of these divisions, namely the division between self-regarding virtue (prudence) and extra-regarding virtue, and the division of the latter into probity and beneficence, depending upon whether the action is respectively either obligatory or non-obligatory.

¹ UC xiv. 43 (30 August 1814), reproduced at p. 235 n. below.

² UC xiv. 57–79 (9–11 September 1814). The original title for this sequence was ‘Summum bonum—one of the doctrines of the Philosophers of antiquity’, but Bentham subsequently crossed out the latter part of the title. The division of the material into two sections appears to have been an afterthought.

³ UC xiv. 44–7, 150–3, 48–56 (6–7 September 1814).

⁴ UC xiv. 81–3 (11–12 September 1814), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet at ci. 7 (n.d.)

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He goes on to discuss the connection between virtue on the one hand and sacrifice and self-denial on the other and to criticize the Aristotelian account of the semi-virtues.¹ In Chapter 5 Bentham takes up the third of his divisions, that is the point that virtues are either intrinsically useful—namely prudence, probity, and beneficence—or ancillary. For Bentham, the utility of the secondary virtues consists in their serving the same ends as the intrinsically useful or primary ones.² In Chapter 6 Bentham discusses beneficence and benevolence and argues that neither is necessarily accompanied with the other and that the good that results from benevolence bears only a small proportion to that which is produced by self-regarding motives.³ In Chapter 7 he explains the difference between vanity and pride.⁴ In the following two Chapters, he deals with the notion of propriety. In Chapter 8 he explains why he prefers to speak about the ‘propriety’ of an action rather than its utility,⁵ while in Chapter 9 he explains the connection between self-regarding and extra-regarding interest in order to show that the notion that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the only true principle of morality is reconcilable with the notion that man’s conduct is governed by his own well-being.⁶

In his discussion of Aristotle’s virtues, Bentham appears to assume that his own division of virtue into prudence, probity, and beneficence has been explained, and hence the material on this latter theme (Chapters 3–9) has been placed before the critique of Aristotle’s virtues. The germ of this critique, and possibly of the whole essay, is found in a fragment written on 30 August 1814 that carries the marginal subheading ‘Virtues & Vices expounded’, gives a definition of prudence, and in a rudiment lists ‘1. Prudence. 2. Justice. 3. Fortitude. 4. Temperance’, presumably representing the topics that Bentham intended to discuss.⁷ In Chapter 10 Bentham commences a general discussion of Aristotle’s virtues, which consist, he notes, in mediocrity or moderation, in contrast to his own account in which the virtue of an act consists in its promotion of well-being.⁸ At the conclusion of Chapter 10, Bentham notes that he will go on to discuss

¹ UC xiv. 84, 86–7, 88a, 88b, 89–93, 85 (10 September 1814).

² UC xiv. 94–6 (13 September 1814).

³ UC xiv. 97–9 (12 September 1814).

⁴ UC xiv. 100–2 (12 September 1814).

⁵ UC xiv. 135–8 (18 September 1814).

⁶ UC xv. 310^v, 303, xiv. 139–41, cii. 211, xv. 278, 276^v, 275^v (18–19 September 1814).

⁷ UC xiv. 80 (30 August 1814).

⁸ UC xiv. 108–10 (13 September 1813). The chapter title is taken from the marginal subheading on the first two text sheets (the third and final sheet carries the variant ‘Aristotelian Virtues’). The first and third sheets carry the additional marginal subheading ‘Virtues in general.’

An alternative draft, which carries the marginal subheading ‘Aristotle’s Virtues’, and which briefly discusses the list of virtues given by ‘the Oxford Compend’, is at UC xiv. 111–12 (13 September 1814).

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the list of virtues identified by Aristotle and modern moralists. Hence the following five chapters deal respectively with fortitude (Chapter 11),¹ temperance (Chapter 12),² justice (Chapter 13),³ veracity (Chapter 14),⁴ and amity (Chapter 15),⁵ thereby imitating the order in which they are set out in *Ethices Compendium*.⁶ Bentham has given contradictory indications as to whether this material should form a single chapter divided into sections, or whether each virtue should be allocated to a separate chapter. Given that the discussions of fortitude and amity were written as discrete chapters and each is divided into two sections, while the remaining discussions are each marked as both a chapter and a section, for the sake of coherence and consistency, the material is presented in discrete chapters.

The Appendix to 'Essay on Ethics' reproduces several sequences of text that have no clear place in the essay as reconstructed here, but which are closely related to it in subject-matter. Chapters 1 and 2 of the Appendix reproduce two versions of a discussion concerning the proper and improper modes of exercising the function of a deontologist or moralist. Chapter 1 reproduces the earlier draft of 31 August 1814, which is divided into two sections, the first dealing with the proper and the second with the improper mode, though this latter section is abandoned.⁷ Chapter 2 reproduces the later draft of 19 September 1814, which is likewise divided into two sections.⁸ Bentham removed four sheets from his discussion of well-being as the universal object of pursuit (i.e. Ch. 2, § 3, pp. 250–3 below) and inserted them in § 2 of the later draft on propriety.⁹ In the present edition, these sheets have been restored to their original location.¹⁰

¹ UC xiv. 113–21 (13–15 September 1814). The titles for this and the following four Chapters each appear on the first text sheet of the respective sequences.

² UC xiv. 123–4 (15 September 1814).

³ UC xiv. 103–5 (14 September 1814).

⁴ UC xiv. 122 (14 September 1814).

⁵ UC xiv. 154–6, xv. 273^v (19–20 September 1814), xiv. 157 (20 September 1814), xiv. 158 (3 October 1814), xiv. 159–65 (5 October 1814), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet at xv. 272^v (5 October 1814). The marginal subheadings indicate that the first four sheets should constitute § 1, but Bentham did not insert a title, though he did do so for § 2.

⁶ No material has been located for liberality, magnificence, and meekness.

⁷ UC xiv. 142–4, 146–7 (31 August 1814).

⁸ UC xiv. 145, 148–9 (19 September 1814).

⁹ i.e. UC xiv. 150–3. On the sheet that originally preceded this material, namely UC xiv. 47, Bentham noted that he had 'Abstracted from this head 4 pages and added to On Deontologist—prop. and improp. modes of exercising this function.'

¹⁰ A fragment entitled 'Of Deontology in general', which deals with the role of the deontologist, is at UC xiv. 174 (7 July 1815), unidentified sheet, xiv. 176, 175 (7 July 1814). It appears that either the first or the latter two of these sheets is mis-dated. The main heading on these three sheets, 'Logic or Ethics or Deontology', indicates that they are linked to the logic material, but it seems unlikely that the correct date is 1814, since they would predate the remainder of the material written for 'Essay on Logic', of which the earliest sheets are dated 19 July 1814 (UC ci. 173–4, 176). Hence, the date 1815 is more plausible. If the latter two sheets are mis-dated, and the correct date is 1815, they belong to a period when Bentham was working on 'A Table of the Springs of Action'.

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Bentham planned to write a chapter on the causes of immorality. A sheet which contains the title of the chapter, but no text, carries a rudiment which lists the following four topics for discussion:

1. Prevalence of self-regarding to social interest—Cause, fault of governments in non-identification [of interests].

2. Preference of lesser present to greater distant [pleasure]—Cause—defects in education, intellectual and moral.

3. False principles in morals: viz. asceticism and sentimentalism. Requiring to be given up pleasures which neither are nor ought to be given up, they disprove the practical utility of books of morality, and confirm men in the notion that bad morals are all that are fit for practice, good ones only for discourse and parade, hence hypocrisy. False morality can never be cultivated but at the expence of true.

4. Misapplication of religion.¹

The only material which survives is a section on the ‘misapplication of religion to morals’,² which is reproduced as Chapter 3 of the Appendix. In a further sequence, however, Bentham deals in effect with an additional cause of immorality, namely the desire to acquire possession of reputation, honour, renown, and so forth, which was particularly mischievous when it influenced the conduct of the sovereign at a national and international level. This discussion is presented here as Chapter 4 of the Appendix.³

Didacologia

The surviving material under the main heading ‘Didacologia’, a term that Bentham coined to mean the study of the art and science of teaching, and under the marginal subheading ‘Art and Science Division’, was written in February 1815 and appears to have been an early draft of § VIII. Specimen of a New Encyclopedical Sketch, with a correspondent Synoptic Table, or Diagram, in ‘Essay on Nomenclature and Classification’, which was first printed and published as Appendix V (later Appendix IV) of *Chrestomathia*.⁴ The surviving material presents a variety of textual problems and the ordering of the essay and its

¹ UC xiv. 125 (16 September 1814).

² UC xiv. 126–34 (16 September 1814). Though it appears as the fourth cause in the rudiment, the section title refers to the discussion as ‘§ 3. Second cause of the prevalence of immorality’ and the text indicates that it follows a joint discussion of asceticism and sentimentalism. Bentham seems to have intended that § 1 would be formed by an introduction.

³ UC xiv. 166–73 (9 October 1814).

⁴ See *Chrestomathia* (CW), pp. 179–206. ‘Essay on Nomenclature and Classification’ appeared as Appendix V in the original edition, but as Appendix IV in Smith’s edition. A version of ‘Didacologia’ appears as ‘Essay on Logic’, Appendix B, in Bowring, viii. 282–93, where it is ordered as follows: UC cii. 347–8, 428–32, 434–6, 490–3, 438–50, 453–4, 451–2, 455–8, 461, 463, 471–84, 494–8.

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division into two chapters is, therefore, speculative. Chapter 1 includes the main sequence of surviving text, which consists of thirty-seven pages numbered from 9 to 44.¹ This part of the essay is concerned with the division of arts and sciences, beginning with the most comprehensive ‘field’, and then dividing and sub-dividing it according to the bifurcatory method, before eventually arriving at deontology and its branches. Two pages contain no text, but only rudiments indicating the points that Bentham intended to discuss, namely the derivation of the ideas of figure and quantity respectively.² The first four pages in the sequence are presumably those paginated 1–4 at UC ci. 428–31 (24 February 1815), which, although written a few days later, carry the same marginal subheading as the main sequence, namely ‘Art & Science Division’, but have the additional subheading ‘Condillac. Iconia.’ Here Bentham takes Condillac’s conceit of bringing a statue to life by gradually endowing it with sensation, in order to show that all ideas are based on sense-perception,³ but introduces elements of his own, including ‘Iconia’ for the name of the statue.⁴ This subject-matter presents a clear connection between these four pages and the main sequence, where Bentham discusses Condillac’s statue and names it ‘Iconia.’⁵ Though he appears to be introducing the subject for the first time in the main sequence (which he would have been in terms of the date order of composition), it is possible that he afterwards decided to write an introduction to the essay as a whole in order to say more about Condillac’s statue. Assuming that these four pages constitute the first four pages of the essay, the following four pages (pp. 5–8) are missing.

In a rudiment at the head of the second page of the introduction,⁶ Bentham has noted: ‘Quere the *use* of teaching her [i.e. Iconia] logic.

¹ UC ci. 432–54, 456–69 (14–15, 17–19, 21 February 1815). The chapter title is taken from the marginal subheadings on the text sheets. A thirty-eighth page, namely UC ci. 470 (21 February 1815), has been added at the conclusion of this sequence, as indicated by a subsidiary sequence of page numbers. Bentham’s indication in the marginal subheading that the material on this page should appear as a note has been followed in the present edition (see pp. 338–9 n. below). A fragment at UC ci. 455 (21 February 1815) which carries the title ‘Connection between Thelematology & Pathematology’ has been reproduced in an editorial footnote at p. 331 n. below, following the discussion of pathematology at ci. 453–4.

² See UC ci. 442 and 443 respectively. The rudiments are reproduced at p. 325 n. below.

³ Étienne Bonnot, Abbé de Condillac (1715–80), French philosopher, was author of *Traité des Sensations, A Madame la Comtesse de Vassé*, 2 vols., London, 1754.

⁴ Bentham describes Condillac’s strategy in a rudiment at UC ci. 430: ‘1. Number. 2. Figure. 3. Place. 4. Body. 5. Vacuity. 6. Motion. 7. Rest. 8. Time. These were the abstractions, the predicaments, which he, by supplying her in a gradual and frugal manner with the five senses, successively gave himself the amusement of giving her a conception of.’ Bentham’s conception of the division of sciences in the body of the essay was itself arranged around six of these ‘abstractions’, namely place, motion, time, number, figure, and quantity (or body): see p. 325 below.

⁵ See pp. 317, 324 below.

⁶ UC ci. 429.

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Answer—saving her from troubling herself with useless science.’ The use of the division of the arts and sciences is the theme of Chapter 2, which is constituted by three discrete sequences. According to the marginal subheadings, this material should form a section entitled ‘Use’ within a chapter entitled ‘Art & Science Division’. The main sequence of material, however, is not designated as a section, but as a chapter. For the sake of consistency, rather than entitling the first part of ‘Didacologia’ as a chapter, and the second part as a section, both parts have been designated as discrete chapters. The organization of the material in Chapter 2 has followed the order of the letters that Bentham has entered at the beginning of the respective sequences.¹ In the first sequence, constituted by passages marked A, B, and B*, Bentham argues that the use of the division and the neology associated with it is to provide a complete and comprehensive view of the whole field of art and science and to give apposite names to, that is names that give rise to correct conceptions of, the various subject-matters. A fragment on Thomas Reid’s criticism of bifurcation has been inserted as a note at the end of this sequence.² In the second sequence, constituted by passages marked C and D, Bentham takes up the point of inapposite nomenclature through a critique of the terms ‘natural history’ and ‘natural philosophy’.³ In the third sequence, constituted by a passage marked E?,⁴ Bentham returns to the topic of bifurcation, its history, and the challenges involved in properly applying it. As the three sequences are discretely paginated, short rules have been inserted in the text in order to demarcate them. A related fragment entitled ‘Generals or Particulars—Abstractions or Concretions—which first’, in which Bentham argues that, ‘from particulars to generals may be stated as the actual order of learning or acquisition. But from generals to particulars, the most convenient and extensively efficient order of teaching or communication’, is presented in an Appendix.⁵

¹ UC ci. 471–8 constitutes passage A; ci. 479–83 constitutes B; ci. 484 constitutes B*; ci. 486–9 constitutes C; ci. 490–3 constitutes D; and ci. 494–8 constitutes E?

² UC ci. 485 (22 February 1815). Bentham has indicated in the marginal subheading that this page should form a note, but does not indicate the place where it should appear. Thomas Reid (1710–96), Scottish philosopher, was author of ‘A Brief Account of Aristotle’s Logic. With Remarks’, which originally appeared in Henry Home, Lord Kames, *Sketches of the History of Man*, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1774, ii. 168–241. The essay is reproduced in Thomas Reid, *On Logic, Rhetoric and the Fine Arts. Papers on the Culture of the Mind*, ed. A. Broadie, Edinburgh, 2004 (*The Edinburgh Edition of Thomas Reid*), pp. 97–149.

³ Bentham has added the comment ‘Note?’ in the marginal subheadings of UC ci. 486 and 487, thereby indicating that these two pages, and presumably the whole sequence, might appear as a note.

⁴ It is unclear whether the question mark indicates Bentham’s uncertainty as to where it should be placed or whether to include it at all.

⁵ UC cii. 347–8 (23 February 1815).

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Hints towards the composition of an elementary treatise on Universal Grammar, on a new principle, on which that branch of Art and Science may, it [is] supposed, be capable of being taught and learnt with advantage and facility, toward the close of a Chrestomathic course

Bentham composed the bulk of ‘Universal Grammar’ between November 1815 and January 1816, during his second residence at Ford Abbey from 6 July 1815 to 31 January 1816, with a view to its appearing as an Appendix to *Chrestomathia*, but did not publish it. A version was eventually prepared by Southwood Smith and appeared as Appendix IX of ‘Chrestomathia’ in the Bowring edition.¹ Smith, moreover, incorporated material that Bentham had composed for ‘Universal Grammar’ in a separate essay, ‘Fragments on Universal Grammar’, for the Bowring edition.² The connection of ‘Universal Grammar’ with *Chrestomathia* is evident in the text itself where Bentham notes that the principles of universal grammar might be taught in the proposed Chrestomathic School with no more difficulty than the principles of mathematics. Universal grammar in its abstract branch, he explains, is concerned with the parts of speech in and by themselves, without regard to particular languages, and in its applied branch with the comparison of the different parts of speech as they feature in different languages. He goes on to note that four topics are of importance: first, the uses of language; second, the properties desirable in language; third, the degrees in which different languages possess these properties; and fourth, the properties desirable in the style of an individual. He concludes that, because of its sparingly-inflected nature, the English language is the most suitable for a treatise on universal grammar. For Bentham, the primary need and use of language was for the communication of thought. All discourse (which includes language and other forms of communication) is the endeavour to communicate the state of the speaker’s mind. His fundamental point is that the basic components of language are not words but propositions. Even a single word, such as the command ‘Go!’ or calling the name ‘John!’, can only be understood when expanded into a proposition. The proposition came first in time, and it was only later

¹ See Bowring, viii. 185–9 (reproduced in *Chrestomathia* (CW), pp. 394–407), where it is ordered as follows: Introduction: UC cii. 499–502; § I: cii. 503–5, 507–10; § II: cii. 515–16, 518, 517, 511–14, 519–21; § III: cii. 522–4.

² See Bowring, viii. 339–57. Introduction: UC cii. 526–37; Ch. I: cii. 538–9; Ch. II: cii. 540–2; Ch. III: cii. 543–5, 88, 101; Ch. IV, § I: cii. 546; § II: cii. 546*, 547–9, 101, 549–50; § III: cii. 551–2; § IV: cii. 553, 183, 553–5; Ch. V: cii. 99, 88, 103, 88, 556, 144; Ch. VI: cii. 144; Ch. VII, § I: cii. 144, 557–8, 144, 558–9; § II: cii. 261, 101; § III: cii. 101, 103; § IV: cii. 261, 562, 560–75, 578; § V: cii. 579, 101, 99, 100; § VI: cii. 580–4, 101, 88; § VII: cii. 101, 587, 103, 101; § VIII: cii. 189; Ch. VIII: cii. 589; Ch. IX, § I: cii. 590–2; § II: cii. 592*; § III: cii. 593; § IV: cii. 594–5; Ch. X: cii. 596, 145.

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that propositions were decomposed into their component words, and thereafter words decomposed into their component letters.

In the course of writing 'Universal Grammar', Bentham composed a number of rudiments sheets that dealt generally with the parts of speech and their exposition. In the earliest of these sheets, dated 11 November 1815, he deals mainly with an analysis of the parts of speech, but also gives a list of the qualities desirable in language.¹ On 3 December 1815 he composed a rudiments sheet in which he gave a more extended list of the properties desirable in language, but also analysed the conjugation and moods of verbs.² The analysis of the modifications of the verb in terms of person, number, mood, and tense, constituted the main theme of several rudiments sheets composed over the next few days.³ He went on to draw up lists of prepositions⁴ and conjunctions.⁵

The organization of the text of 'Universal Grammar' is based on a much-amended plan dated 6 December 1815.⁶ Though material does not survive for all the topics listed, the essay has been reconstructed by attempting to find the best match between the sections listed on this plan and the surviving material. The plan divides the essay into two Parts, giving the title of Part I as 'Generalia', but failing to give a title for Part II. An earlier plan on a marginal summary sheet dated 17 November 1815 gives the title of the first Part as 'Generalia' and that of the second as 'Parts of Speech' and these titles have been

¹ UC cii. 189 (11 November 1815).

² UC cii. 99 (3 December 1815).

³ UC cii. 190 (3 December 1815); cii. 100 (5 December 1815); cii. 101 (5 December 1815); and cii. 103 (9 December 1815).

⁴ See 'Preposition Table' at UC cii. 191 (29 December 1815).

⁵ Bentham drew up a 'Conjunction Table' based on 'Adam's Latin Grammar', i.e. Alexander Adam, *The Principles of Latin and English Grammar*, Edinburgh, 1772, at UC cii. 192 (21 December 1815), and a sheet headed 'Conjunctions—Paraphrasis of' at cii. 193 (2 February 1816). Two sheets entitled 'Etymology of Conjunctions, Prepositions and Adverbs from Horne Tooke', i.e. *Diversions of Purley*, mainly in the hand of James Hume, are at UC cii. 194–5. Bentham has dated the former sheet 7 February 1816 and added the initials 'J.H.', who presumably drew up the table. A further rudiment, mainly in the hand of Hume, headed 'Connective Parts of Speech collected from a Grammar', is at UC cii. 198 (n.d. 1816).

A related rudiments sheet, headed 'Language—Solecism in Pronuntiation', in which Bentham gave such examples as 'Alps: Olps' and 'Palpable: Polpable', is at UC cii. 196 (n.d. 1816), and another, headed 'Mental Phænomena or Affections', partly in the hand of Hume, is at UC ci. 52 (25 January 1816).

A list of 'Propositions' taken from Books II and III of Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, is at UC ci. 48–9 (16 January 1816). The propositions are in the hand of Hume, but the main headings and the enumeration and a partial classification of the propositions are in Bentham's hand. A list of 'Propositions' taken from Watts's *Logic*, i.e. I. Watts, *Logick: Or, The Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry after Truth, With A Variety of Rules to guard against Error, in the Affairs of Religion and Human Life, as well as in the Sciences*, London, 1725, is at UC ci. 50–1 (21 January 1816). The propositions are in the hand of Hume, but the main headings, the enumeration of the propositions, and several notes are in Bentham's hand.

⁶ UC cii. 102 (6 December 1815), headed 'Titles for Sections.'

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adopted in the present edition.¹ It seems likely that the essay emerged from a sequence entitled 'Systematical Sketch of the Parts of Speech'.² Underneath this title, Bentham has, however, noted: 'N.B. 16 Nov^r 1815. *Seem* such a sketch will not be found capable of being with advantage carried far on this ground.' The 'Systematical Sketch' combines the elements that are separated into the two Parts in the essay itself, and it is possible that it was the combination of them in one 'Sketch' that Bentham thought was problematic. The 'Systematical Sketch' is reproduced as Chapter 4 in the Appendix.

Bentham made several attempts to draft an introduction to 'Universal Grammar', with the most coherent and sustained version consisting of a sequence of four pages dated 16 November 1815.³ The first sheet in this sequence carries the main title of the work as well as the title 'Introduction'.⁴ The text sheets for § 1,⁵ for instance,

¹ UC cii. 91 (17 November 1815). This earlier plan divides the whole work into fifteen sections, numbered 1–5, 5*, 6–14, most of which appear on the plan of 6 December 1815. The later plan expands the number of sections dealing with the parts of speech.

² UC cii. 515–18, 511–14 (13–14 November 1815), with corresponding marginal summary sheets (the marginal summaries having been composed by Bentham) at cii. 95 (20 November 1815) and 94 (26 November 1815).

³ UC cii. 499–502 (16 November 1815), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet (the marginal summaries for all but the first sheet having been composed by Bentham) at cii. 91 (17 November 1815), which also contains the earlier plan.

⁴ There are a number of related fragments. In a fragment at UC cii. 134 (12 December 1815), which carries the marginal subheading 'Introd. Ch. 1. Mode as yet pursued' and the title 'Inapposite course as yet pursued—Cause of the inappositeness—Apposite course, what', Bentham lists a series of eleven points for development, in which he notes that 'a blind admiration of the ancients', rather than utility, had been the basis for the study of grammar, and sets out the intended scope of his own essay on the subject. Bentham takes up the point about the prejudice, in his own education, against the English language and in favour of 'the complicated ones of antient Greece and Rome' at UC cii. 135 (17 December 1815).

In a fragment at UC cii. 526–7 (22 December 1815)—the date 1814 which has been overwritten on the first sheet is a slip—which carries the marginal subheading 'Introduction. Objection—impossibility', Bentham answers the objection that an account of universal grammar cannot be given by a person who knows only a 'very small portion . . . of the whole number of existing languages', on the grounds that certain parts of speech are necessary in every language and that the greatest difference between languages is that between the sparingly and copiously inflected ones, 'and for the developing of this difference the limited number of languages which in the best informed parts of the world are included within the ordinary compass of a liberal education will be found to be amply sufficient'.

In a fragment at UC cii. 528 (30 December 1815), which carries the marginal subheading 'Introd.', Bentham justifies the teaching of languages in the Chrestomathic School according to a comparative method. In a rudiment, he notes: 'Nota Joyce's Grammar as comprehending in some sort Univ. Grammar, though not with perfect success, as well as *Logic* in its scheme.' For the possibility of a universal grammar and the advantages of studying logic see William Shepherd, Jeremiah Joyce, and Lant Carpenter, *Systematic Education: or Elementary Instruction in the various departments of Literature and Science; with Practical Rules for studying each branch of useful knowledge*, 2 vols., London, 1815, i. 63 and ii. 393–432 respectively.

In a fragment at UC cii. 537 (1 January 1816), which carries the marginal subheading 'Introd.', Bentham notes that, insofar as any idea is correct and true, its novelty should not be an objection to its being taught to the Chrestomathic scholars.

⁵ UC cii. 538–9, 534–6, 529–32 (14 December 1815), cii. 533 (22 October 1815).

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do not carry any title, while the marginal subheadings give 'Ch. 1. Gram. Part. & Univ.,'¹ and then the division of the material into §§ 1–5, but with no indication of titles for these putative sections. In the present edition the material appears as a single section, with the title taken from the plan of 6 December 1815.² The three sheets that constitute § 2 also carry no title, which has again been taken from the plan of 6 December 1815, but carry the marginal subheading 'Ch. 1. Gram. Univ. & Partic. § 2. Uses'.³ No text has been located for § 3, which consists simply of the title taken from the plan of 6 December 1815, while the titles for §§ 4⁴ and 5⁵ have been taken

¹ i.e. 'Particular and Universal'.

² i.e. UC cii. 102. MS orig. 'Universal Grammar—its Nature and Divisions', has been preferred to MS alt. 'its subject—Relations having place in all languages, and its place in the field of Art and Science', since it more accurately reflects the content of the text, where the latter topic is not addressed.

³ UC cii. 540–2 (21 December 1815). A later draft entitled 'Uses to which, in the character of *ends*, this Essay is directed.—Heads under which the matter of it is accordingly distributed', is at UC cii. 282–6 (22 January 1816), which carry the marginal subheading 'Ch. 2. Uses of this. Ordo.' A corresponding marginal summary sheet (the marginal summaries having been composed by Bentham, although overwritten by George Bentham on the text sheets) is at UC cii. 87 (25 January 1816). Bentham has added a series of rudiments dated 23 September 1831 and noted 'Seen 1831 Sept. 29.' The 'Ordo' elaborated in this sequence does not match that of the surviving material, but may reflect a more mature conception of the essay that Bentham might have pursued had he continued to write on the topic. Having noted that universal grammar, though speculative, was of practical use, he lists the following eight matters for consideration: I. modes or forms of discourse; II. uses of language; III. operations performable in relation to language; IV. occasion on which language should be applied to its uses; V. properties desirable in language; VI. different degrees in which the desirable properties are possessed by the principal languages in use; VII. means by which the desirable properties may be secured by an individual; and VIII. explanation of the several parts of speech.

⁴ UC cii. 303–4 (20 December 1802). A cross-reference suggests that the section on 'Signs employed in discourse' (i.e. § 5) should precede this section, while the original enumeration of the marginal subheadings in both sequences and of the title in § 5 indicate that this was Bentham's earlier ordering. On the plan of 6 December 1815, Bentham has, however, reversed the order of the two sections.

In a related fragment at UC cii. 308 (16 November 1815), Bentham notes that the purpose of language will be either for 'Information purely or information for the purpose of excitation', depending on whether the information is intended to make an impression upon the understanding or upon the will of the person to whom it is conveyed. In a related fragment at UC cii. 309 (2 December 1815), Bentham notes that the philanthropist or lover of mankind should not 'wish to apply any restriction to the powers of language', not even when used in order to excite passion, the enemy of reason and sound judgment, since 'by the same insight from which the mode of encreasing its powers in this line is learnt, the mode of repressing them when and insofar applied to pernicious purposes is learnt along with it'.

In a related but abandoned fragment at UC cii. 297 (20 January 1816), Bentham points out that the topics of shorthand, signals, cyphers, and signs used to govern animals are all capable of throwing light on the field of language, but noted in a rudiment: 'These topics for the present dismissed.'

⁵ UC cii. 291–3 (20 December 1815), where the title corresponds to that on the plan at cii. 102, except that on the text sheet Bentham has altered 'Modes or Forms of discourse' to 'Signs employed in discourse.' An alternative section title, 'Modes of

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from the first text sheets in the respective sequences. The title for § 6¹ is taken from the plan of 6 December 1815 and that for § 7² from the first text sheet in the sequence. The seventh section is incomplete, as Bentham states in a note at its conclusion.³ On the plan of 6 December 1815, the topic is, in fact, divided into two sections, with § 7 dealing with the properties desirable in the style or language of an individual and § 8 entitled 'Degrees in which these properties are possessed by different languages'.⁴

The material that survives for the remainder of Part I presents a complex picture, with a number of overlapping drafts. On the plan of 6 December 1815, a section entitled 'For the arrangement of the matter of language, necessary basis, an arrangement of the matter of thought' is presented here as § 9.⁵ There are three drafts on this theme, all of which carry the marginal subheading 'Thought the basis' and all of which begin with the statement that the use of language is to give expression to or to communicate thought.⁶ The topic is, however,

signification—audible, visible, and their respective substitutes—Correspondent forms of language', but no text, appears at UC cii. 146 (1 December 1814).

¹ UC cii. 522–4 (16 November 1815), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet (the marginal summaries having been composed by Bentham) at cii. 97 (29 November 1815). The title on the first text sheet is 'Properties desirable in language.' Alternative, but abandoned, drafts of the beginning of this section are at UC cii. 313–14 (2 December 1815) and cii. 316 (22 December 1815).

In a related fragment at UC cii. 147 (? November 1815), Bentham notes that the point of the enquiry is to ascertain the properties desirable in all languages and 'in what degrees these properties' are 'respectively possessed by different languages'. This sheet, however, belongs to a longer, unidentified sequence in which Bentham discusses certain 'tests' by which 'the comparative advantageousness of different languages' might be ascertained.

In a further fragment (reminiscent of the rules in 'Essay on Logic', Ch. 17, pp. 175–82 below), headed 'Rule of instruction for clearness and impressiveness', at UC cii. 386 (25 November 1815), Bentham notes that the sign of the principal idea in a sentence should appear 'in the first place, or as near the first place, as the state of the grammatical relations will admitt', though he recommends this procedure only in written, and not in oral, discourse.

² UC cii. 157–9 (4 December 1815).

³ See p. 372 n. below.

⁴ The topic is assigned to a single section on the plan of 17 November 1815.

⁵ It appears as § 6 on the plan of 17 November 1815 (though the seventh listed, due to the interpolation of § 5*), with the title 'Of the arrangement of the matter of *language*, necessary basis of d^o of thought.'

⁶ See respectively UC cii. 507 (24 November 1815), cii. 508 (26 November 1815), cii. 509 (22 November 1815), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet (the marginal summaries having been composed by Bentham) at cii. 93 (26 November 1815); cii. 408–12, 415–16 (27 December 1815); and cii. 155 (19 January 1816), 153–4 (9 December 1815), 417 (15 December 1815), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet (the marginal summaries having been composed by Bentham) at cii. 307 (21 January 1816).

In addition to these three sequences, a number of related fragments carry the marginal subheading 'Ch. 9. Thought the basis.' In a fragment at UC cii. 152 (1 December 1815), Bentham complains that the logic of Aristotle was confined to the understanding, but that the will should also have its logic, and classifies the names of various entities in a rudiment. In a fragment at UC cii. 151 (2 January 1816), Bentham notes that an all-comprehensive survey of the field of the modifications found in language may be divided either according to the nature of the subject or on the basis of grammar. In a fragment at UC

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taken up in the section entitled 'Subjects of discourse immediate and ulterior, entities real and fictitious', which appears on the plan of 6 December 1815 as § 10,¹ but is presented here as § 8.² It seems that Bentham regarded 'Thought the basis' and 'Subjects of discourse' as alternative headings for discussions that covered the same or very similar ground. The ninth section in the present edition deals with propositions,³ for which there are again several drafts. The present edition reproduces a draft dated 16 December 1815,⁴ which appears to have been written immediately following, and in continuation of, the material reproduced here as § 8. A passage in which Bentham explains his allusion to the striking of Themistocles by Eurybiades, and its derivation from Bacon, is inserted, as Bentham intended, in a footnote.⁵ In an earlier draft on this topic of 22 November 1815, Bentham distinguishes between simple and complex propositions and

cii. 454–5 (21–2 January 1816), Bentham argues that immaterial ideas are derived from material images, with, for example, the meaning of the preposition 'in' being derived from a material object being found in a particular place. In a sequence which carries the section title 'Modifications of *existence*—thence of *thought*—constitutive of the necessary basis for the correspondent modifications of language' and the marginal subheading 'Ch. 9. Thought the basis. § 2. Existence & Thought', at UC cii. 436–8 (21 January 1816), Bentham distinguishes between portions of matter in a state of rest and in a state of motion and notes that a motion considered independently of volition is termed an event, but where the result of volition is termed an act, action, or operation, and distinguishes between motion as a fictitious entity of the first order and mobility as a fictitious entity of the second order.

¹ The plan of 6 December 1815 gives the title as '§ 10. Subjects of language, entities real and fictitious. Immaterial objects no otherwise expressible than through the medium of Material ones' and that of 17 November 1815 as '§ 7. Entities real & fictitious.'

In a related fragment at UC cii. 161–2 (23 December 1815), Bentham notes that a portion of matter is referred to as a subject and that it is spoken of as being possessed of certain qualities, in addition to those of place, time, and motion. In a related fragment at UC cii. 163 (31 December 1815), which he indicates should form a note 'to the Exposition of *Motion*', Bentham explains that the exposition he gives of the term is an exposition by paraphrasis. The placing of this note is, however, unclear, since the word 'motion' does not appear in the text of the section and there is no exposition of the term elsewhere in the essay. This sheet also contains a rudiment in which Bentham lists several points for development in relation to paraphrasis.

² UC cii. 456–67 (15–16 December 1815). The title is taken from the first sheet in the sequence. An earlier draft of this section, which is entitled '§ 7. Of names of real entities and names of fictitious d^o. Necessity of names of natural objects to the designation of pneumatic or immaterial objects', is at UC cii. 448–53 (2 December 1815), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet at cii. 98 (4 December 1815).

³ On the plan of 6 December 1815 the title is given as '§ 11. Contents of language, simple and complex, integral and fractional—propositions—words—sentences', and on the plan of 17 November 1815 as '§ 9. Terms in a proposition.'

⁴ UC cii. 170, 481–3 (16 December 1815). The title is taken from the first text sheet.

⁵ UC cii. 172 (23 January 1816): see p. 380 n. below.

In a related fragment at UC cii. 164 (21 December 1815), Bentham argues that the incompleteness of a proposition containing a transitive verb is more apparent where 'the quality indicated is *active*' rather than passive, that is in the proposition '*Eurybiades struck*' rather than '*Themistocles was struck*.'

In a related fragment at UC cii. 171 (23 January 1816), Bentham notes that the relation between the subject and the predicate signified by the copula is either a relation of exact

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makes the point that, although different sets of sounds and visible signs are used in different languages, the parts of speech are the same in all. He then distinguishes between universal grammar in the abstract and in the concrete and the grammars of each particular language, before noting that the import of the most simple proposition must contain the name of a subject, an attribute, and a copula.¹ In a later draft of 18 and 20 January 1816, which carries the title 'Contents of Language what', Bentham notes that propositions are either simple or complex and that a simple proposition must contain a subject, an attribute, and a copula, that propositions are either purely real, purely verbal, or mixed, and proceeds with an explanation of the nature of these propositions.² In a further draft written at the same time, which carries the title 'Of the subject of a proposition' and which may have been intended as a continuation of 'Contents of Language what', Bentham distinguishes between names that are singularly designative and plurally designative and explains that while the name of a species 'partakes . . . at once of the nature of the name of a real entity and of that of a name of a fictitious entity', it differs from the name of a quality in that 'a quality is an object altogether fictitious'.³ The final sheet in this sequence carries the title 'Of the attribute, predicate, quality or property designated in and by a proposition', but contains no text. In a rudiment, however, Bentham indicates the scope of the proposed discussion: 'Under this head speak of Motion and rest. Motion, the result of Action—Action intransitive or transitive. Transitive supposes an agent and a patient. It also supposes time: because Motion supposes *time*.'⁴ The final two sections for Part I appear on the plan of 6 December 1815 as '§ 12. Terms of or in a proposition' and '§ 13. Prædication—real and verbal'.⁵ No independent material has

identity or a relation of diversity, and in the former case 'the proposition can be no other than verbally significative'.

¹ See UC cii. 503–6 (22 November 1815), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet (the marginal summaries having been composed by Bentham) at cii. 92 (26 November 1815).

² UC cii. 475–6 (18 January 1816), cii. 480 (20 January 1816), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet (the marginal summaries having been composed by Bentham) at cii. 104 (19 January 1816). A related fragment, which carries the chapter title 'Analytical view of the matter of thought and internal action—Correspondent view of the matter of language, i.e. of the aggregate mass of the signs of thought', and consists of a note in which Bentham states that the methodization of language, that is its division into the parts of speech, required 'a comparatively mature state of the human intellect', is at UC cii. 420 (24 January 1816).

³ UC cii. 484–5, 165 (18 January 1816), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet (the marginal summaries having been composed by Bentham) at cii. 105 (19 January 1816), which also contains an extensive rudiment in which Bentham lists the faculties of the mind and draws up a list of points in relation to the exposition of fictitious entities.

⁴ UC cii. 165.

⁵ They appear on the plan of 17 November 1815 as §§ 9 and 10 respectively.

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been identified for the former topic, while the sole surviving sequence dealing with predication has been presented here as § 10.¹

In Part II of 'Universal Grammar' dealing with the parts of speech, the titles for each of the sections are taken from the first page of the relevant text sheets, with the exception of §§ 2 and 6, where they are taken from the marginal subheadings on the text sheets, and § 8, where it is taken from the plan of 6 December 1815. On the plan of 17 November 1815, Part II consists of §§ 11–14, whereas on the plan of 6 December 1815 the number of sections has increased from four to nine and they are given a separate enumeration as §§ 1–8 (with two sections numbered 8).² The later scheme has been adopted in the present edition on the grounds that it more nearly accords with the surviving material. In § 1 Bentham introduces three propositions of increasing complexity, with the aim of 'bringing to view . . . the classes of objects that require to be designated' and then 'the different contrivances, and as the result of those contrivances the species or classes of words, which in different languages are employed in the designation of them'.³ He does not appear to have carried through his intention, though he did compose material on each of the parts of speech that he listed. A passage on the subject of 'the accessory ideas of which the principal ones expressed by the several parts of speech . . . must be divested' has been marked by Bentham for a note.⁴ This material has, therefore, been inserted as a note to the title of § 1, where the distinction between principal and accessory parts of speech is mentioned.

Bentham then discusses the different parts of speech in material composed between 11 and 26 December 1815. He begins in § 2 with

¹ UC cii. 486–90 (10 December 1815). A related fragment, where Bentham explains the distinction between verbal and real predication, is at UC cii. 169 (1 December 1815). In a rudiment, he has noted, 'Reduce to quality. 1. Time. 2. Place. 3. Quantity—including Number. 4. Relation', which mirrors the scheme adopted in § 10.

² On the plan of 17 November 1815, the title of § 12, namely 'Modifications designated by the effectual parts of speech in so far as modified, and by the adjecititious—Ideas to be designated—Signs employed in the designation of them', suggests that Bentham initially intended to consider the parts of speech within one section, but then decided to divide the material into separate sections, each dealing with a separate part of speech.

³ UC cii. 543–5, 176–8 (7 December 1815). The first sheet carries the title of Part II as well as that of § 1. A fragment at UC cii. 175 (1 December 1815), which carries the marginal subheading '§ 11. Parts of Speech', in which Bentham criticizes previous arrangements, presumably of the parts of speech, for 'obscurity, incorrectness and incompleatness', may have been intended as an introduction to this section.

⁴ UC cii. 519–21 (12 November 1815), which carries the marginal subheading 'IV. Nomenclature. Parts of Speech Tabulated.' On the first sheet the original subheading 'IV. Nomenclature' has been crossed through by Bentham and replaced with 'Universal Grammar'. The corresponding marginal summary sheet (the marginal summaries having been composed by Bentham) is at UC cii. 96 (24 November 1815). It appears that these three sheets were written with a view to being included in Appendix IV of *Chrestomathia*, but were then transferred by Bentham to 'Universal Grammar'.

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noun substantives, sub-dividing the section into discussions of case, gender, and number,¹ proceeds in § 3 to noun adjectives,² and in § 4 to verbs, where he deals with tenses and the role of the ‘auxiliary future-denoting verbal particles’, namely ‘will’ and ‘shall’, in expressing the ‘absolute futurity’ of an event.³ He wrote one draft dealing with adverbs and another with conjunctions on 21 December 1815,⁴ but these drafts were superseded by a sequence dealing with prepositions, adverbs, and conjunctions together, on the grounds that they required ‘in some respects a conjunct consideration’, and this material constitutes § 5 in the present edition.⁵ The combination of the two proposed sections on adverbs and conjunctions into a single section means that the nine sections listed on the plan of 6 December 1815 are reduced to eight in the present edition, with the enumeration of the final three sections altered accordingly. The final two sections on the plan of 6 December 1815 were originally ‘§ 8. Government and Concord’ and ‘§ 9. Collocation—viz. of words in a proposition—of simple propositions in a complex d^o, a clause or a sentence: herein of Inversion’,⁶ but Bentham then inserted ‘§ 8. Conjugates’ before them. Only a short fragment survives for the section on conjugates (i.e. § 6

¹ UC cii. 546^v, 547–9, 551, 553 (11–12 December 1815).

In a fragment on number at UC cii. 555, 554 (10 December 1815), Bentham explains that, ‘Every proposition in which the noun is in the plural number is a complex one’, and that where ‘the plural becomes *indefinite*, *abstraction* is performed, the idea of a class is formed’, though he concludes by noting that the modification of plurality belongs only to the noun substantive and not to the verb and noun adjective, which is a point he makes at the beginning of § 3.

² UC cii. 556 (13 December 1815).

³ UC cii. 557–61 (17 December 1815), cii. 566–70, 572–5, 578 (24–6 December 1815). UC cii. 570 and 572 are cut sheets that originally formed a single sheet. Bentham considered sending the material on ‘will’ and ‘shall’, including the short discussion of ‘would’ and ‘should’, to the *Monthly Magazine*: see the draft covering letter headed ‘To Monthly Mag. on shall and will’ at UC cii. 576–7 (31 December 1815).

In a related fragment at UC cii. 587 (12 December 1815), which carries the marginal subheading ‘Ch. 5. Verb. § ||. Tense’ and the section title ‘Voice’, Bentham distinguishes between the verb in the active and in the passive voice.

In a related fragment at UC cii. 443–4 (16 November 1815), which carries the section title ‘Irregular nouns and verbs are amongst those which are in most frequent use—why’, Bentham notes that ‘these irregular parts of speech will in every language be found among those for the import of which the demand is most frequent in its occurrence’, and that such words were among the earliest in use in the history of language.

⁴ UC cii. 593 (21 December 1815) and cii. 594–5 (21 December 1815) respectively. In the former Bentham criticizes the ancient grammarians and ‘their worshipper Hermes Harris’ for not recognizing the complexity of the adverb, which, according to Bentham, contains the imports of the substantive, the adjective, and the preposition. In the latter he criticizes them for not ‘penetrating into the import of the conjunction’, and although Horne Tooke had ‘discovered that the conjunction was always some element of the complex aggregate part of speech, a Verb’, he had not gone far enough. Bentham then promises to attempt the ‘development’ of adverbs and conjunctions, but fails to do so.

⁵ UC cii. 590–2 (23 December 1815).

⁶ The equivalent sections on the plan of 17 November 1815 are ‘§ 13. On Government and Concord’ and ‘§ 14. On Collocation, viz. in a proposition, a clause, and sentence.’

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in the present edition), though a rudiment at the head of the sheet indicates the points that Bentham intended to discuss.¹ The text for § 7 on government and concord consists of a single sheet.² In relation to § 8 there survive two sheets, both of which carry the section title but no text, though both contain a rudiment which indicates the points that Bentham intended to discuss.³

The Appendix to ‘Universal Grammar’ consists first of a coherent, but unfinished, sequence divided into three chapters, and second of ‘Systematical Sketch of the Parts of Speech’.⁴ The former discussion, for which the chapter titles are taken from the first text sheets in the respective sequences, begins with a discussion of the ‘Phænomena of the human mind’, which was written towards the end of January 1816, and hence is amongst the latest material to be written.⁵ The original marginal subheading on the text sheets is ‘Thought the basis. Mental Phænomena analysed’, though ‘Thought the basis’ has been replaced with ‘Mental Phænomena’ on several sheets. This material may be the final draft for Part I, § 8 as presented here (i.e. § 9 on the plan of 6 December 1815, where it is entitled ‘For the arrangement of the matter of language, necessary basis, an arrangement of the matter of thought’, to which Bentham has added ‘Expression of thought is 1. Voluntary or 2. *Involuntary*.’) Bentham followed this material with a chapter on propositions, which carries the marginal subheading ‘Ch. 2. Signs, viz. Propositions’,⁶ and an

¹ UC cii. 430 (25 December 1815). For the rudiment see pp. 400–1 n. below.

² UC cii. 589 (18 December 1815). A fragment containing the alternative title ‘Of Grammatical government and Concord’ and a rudiment, but no text, is at UC cii. 588 (6 December 1815).

³ UC cii. 188 (6 December 1815), which carries the section title ‘Of Collocation—viz. of words in propositions, clauses and sentences’, and cii. 187 (26 December 1815), which carries the chapter title ‘Of Collocation’. In the present edition, the title is taken from the plan of 6 December 1815. The rudiments on the latter sheet are reproduced at p. 402 n. below, while those on the former read as follows: ‘1. Collocation—its purposes—1. Clearness. 2. Impressiveness. 3. Harmony.

‘2. Its subjects—1. Proposition simple. 2. d^o complex. 3. Clause. 4. Sentence.

‘3. In the above, what order most natural. This depends on the *purpose*.

‘4. Sign of the principal object first: otherwise the hearer will be puzzled and have to grope for it—*Voice* employed must be accordant. Themistocles was stricken by Eurybiades or Eurybiades struck Themistocles. D’Alembert missed the true principle?’

Jean le Rond, alias D’Alembert (1717–83), French mathematician, philosopher, and author.

⁴ See p. lv & n. above.

⁵ UC ci. 406–17 (25, 27, 29–30 January 1816), with corresponding marginal summary sheets (the marginal summaries having been composed by Bentham) at ci. 53 (27 January 1816), ci. 415 (30 January 1816), and ci. 418 (1 February 1816).

⁶ UC cii. 491–8 (30 January 1816), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet for the first three pages at cii. 111 (1 February 1816). At the head of the first text sheet, Bentham has added the following rudiment: ‘ Addend. Propositions why spoken of before terms. Propositions the *integer*: terms but a fraction—result of the decomposition of a proposition. Brutes incapable of this decomposition: their language is all in propositions.’

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unfinished chapter on the names of real and fictitious entities.¹ These two chapters appear to be the equivalent of Part I, §§ 9 and 10 as presented here (i.e. §§ 11 and 12 respectively on the plan of 6 December 1815).

Appendix. Fragments on Logic and Language (August–September 1813)

Bentham composed the material reproduced in this Appendix a year before he began writing in earnest on ‘Essay on Logic’. From mid-August to early September 1813 he wrote a series of manuscripts under the main heading of ‘Logic’, and while the main focus is on various aspects of language, the material does not form a continuous text. His reason for embarking on this topic at this time is obscure. Though fragmentary, the material nevertheless anticipates many of the themes that Bentham went on to develop in more detail in ‘Essay on Logic’ and the other essays appearing in the present volume. He began with a series of rudiments sheets, in the earliest of which, dated 19 June 1813 and headed ‘Logic. Art of Expression’, logic is defined as ‘the art of employing to all purposes and on all occasions the powers of the mind to the best advantage—i.e. with the most and greatest useful effect’. The main theme is the improvement of language. Bentham dismisses the idea of creating a new language in favour of adapting an existing language and states his preference for a less-inflected to a more-inflected language. He then lists ‘Modes of improvement’ and ‘Instruments or means of improvement’, in which he includes new words, the application of suffixes and prefixes, new compounds, and importation from other languages, whether dead or living. He finishes by detailing the properties desirable in language and gives a series of rules for the avoidance of ambiguity.²

Between 5 and 20 August 1813 Bentham composed a rudiments sheet headed ‘Logic. Disciplines’, in which he outlines the relationship between the arts and sciences, existence, well-being, happiness, and pleasure and pain. He discusses the nature of ethics and, under the heading ‘Methodization’, discusses definition *per genus et differentiam*

¹ UC cii. 143, 173–4 (1 February 1816). On the first text sheet, Bentham has noted: ‘~~Next~~ Next after *Propositions—single*.’ On the same sheet, he has outlined the intended scope of the chapter: ‘1. Fictitious entities are but fictions—cannot be spoken of but as if they were realities—their species or orders.’

‘2. Correspondence between the language of real & d^o of fictitious entities.

‘3. Names of fictitious entities—Many unsusceptible of definition—Modes of exposition adapted to them.’

Bentham has also added a rudiment at the end of the chapter indicating how he intended to continue the discussion: see p. 415 n. below.

² UC ci. 8 (19 June 1813).

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and the need for paraphrasis when expounding the name of a fictitious entity.¹ A further rudiments sheet headed 'Logic. Books and Chapters of Saunderson's Compendium: and Ethical d^o', dated 22 August 1813, contains, amongst other matter, a list of Aristotle's predicaments and post-predicaments, Bentham's own list of real and fictitious entities, the titles of the books and chapters in Sanderson's *Logicæ artis compendium* and in *Ethices Compendium*, and a list of 'Laws of Literary Composition' taken from Sanderson's Lib. III, Cap. XXX–XXXI.²

The material presented in this Appendix has been grouped into four broad topics, namely the disciplines or arts and sciences, propositions, the improvement of language, and grammar. The first two sequences deal with the disciplines. In the first sequence dated 14 August 1813, Bentham took up the question of the relationship between science and art. He notes that the former is concerned with what is capable of being known and the latter with what is capable of being done and that the distinction between subjects and non-subjects of science and art depends upon whether study is supposed to be necessary in acquiring the relevant knowledge, but that the boundaries between the disciplines and common occupations on the one hand, and between science and art on the other, are indeterminate. As far as happiness is concerned, he continues, it is desirable that 'the quantity of *discipline* should at all times be as great as possible', though no single person, given the time and effort needed to acquire the relevant discipline, could ever possess 'this maximum of discipline'.³ In the second, incomplete sequence, which carries the title 'Of Disciplines in general—their primary division', Bentham discusses John Locke's division of the disciplines and notes that the instrument of logic is the human mind and that its secondary instrument is language.⁴

¹ UC ci. 9. The first sheet of this bifolium is dated 5 August 1813 and the second 6 August 1813, Wells, Somerset. Additions are dated 9 August 1813 and 20 August 1813, Berry Lodge (Samuel Bentham's residence at Gosport). A final addition is dated 9 August 1814, indicating that Bentham surveyed at least some of the material written in August–September 1813 when preparing 'Essay on Logic'. The bulk of this sheet, therefore, was composed during the 'tour' on which Bentham embarked at the end of July 1813: see Bentham to Samuel Bentham, 15 July 1813 and 24 July 1813, *Correspondence (CW)*, viii. 335 and 342 respectively. Having received compensation money for his expenses in relation to the failed panopticon penitentiary scheme, Bentham visited the south-west of England in order to look for a property to hire as a retreat. He eventually settled on Ford Abbey, Devon, where he first took up residence on 17 July 1814.

² UC ci. 10–11 (22 August 1813). The lists of chapters are in the hand of Henry Tonkin Coulson, but the remainder of the text is in Bentham's hand.

³ UC ci. 194–7 (14 August 1813), with a corresponding marginal summary sheet (the marginal summaries of the final sheet having been composed by Bentham) at ci. 24 (n.d. 1814), which also contains the marginal summaries for ci. 192–3. The text sheets were written at London Inn, Exeter.

⁴ UC cii. 209, unidentified sheet, cii. 289 (22 August 1813). Bentham's reference is to John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* (first published in 1689), ed.

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The second group of material on propositions commences with the earliest sequence, written on 12 August 1813, consisting of two pages that carry the marginal subheading 'Language. Propositions' and containing a series of fifteen points on the nature of the proposition.¹ On 20 August 1813 Bentham composed a sequence of eleven pages entitled 'Of Propositions in general—their component parts and species', in which he began by noting that every proposition expresses a persuasion entertained by the speaker concerning the existence or non-existence of some object or objects and contains an object and a copula, before embarking on an exposition of the names of classes of fictitious entities.² In a further sequence on propositions, entitled 'Propositions what—why brought to view before single words', Bentham notes that the synthetic method of Aristotle and his followers had begun with words and proceeded to propositions, but as a matter of history, propositions had come first, and words were in fact 'the work of abstraction, the produce of a refined analysis'. Bentham states that his method will be to resolve propositions into their smallest component parts, namely words, and then distinguish the different species of words. Through analysis and synthesis, the history of language would be revealed and, by means of history, the principles of universal grammar. Bentham goes on to explain that every statement represents some persuasion in the mind of the speaker and hence an endeavour to produce a similar persuasion in the mind of the hearer, while every persuasion concerns the existence or non-existence of some one or more objects.³

The third group of material on the improvement of language commences with a sequence of which the first three pages are entitled 'Copiousness—Conciseness—Tractability' and the second three pages 'Enrichment—Modes of Enrichment'.⁴ This sequence is followed by a fragment on 'Obstacles to the enrichment of language' which may have been intended as a continuation.⁵ A related fragment, which carries the section title 'Of deterioration by words imported',

P.H. Nidditch, Oxford, 1975 (*The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke*), Bk IV, Ch. XXI, pp. 720–1.

¹ UC cii. 473–4 (12 August 1813). After the date, Bentham has noted 'Ivy Bridge', i.e. Ivybridge, Devon.

² UC cii. 166–8, 27–34 (20 August 1813).

³ UC cii. 413–14, 136–9 (23 August 1813). A related fragment, in which Bentham notes that, since 'all modifications of discourse' contain a persuasion 'in affirmance or negation of the existence of its object . . . the express enunciation of it may henceforward be omitted', is at UC cii. 140 (24 August 1813).

⁴ UC cii. 344–6 and cii. 396–8 (13 August 1813) respectively. After the date on UC cii. 345–6, 396, Bentham has added 'Ivy Bridge.' The former sequence is entitled 'Ch.' and the latter '§', but the exact status is unclear, except that they are paginated in sequence.

⁵ UC cii. 395 (date illegible). This sheet and the six in the preceding sequence carry the marginal subheading 'Copiousness—Conciseness—Tractability.'

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discusses the affected use of ‘to taste’ instead of ‘to relish’.¹ Bentham argues that the usefulness of language is related to its copiousness, which he contrasts with scantiness, and goes on to indicate the sources and modes of enrichment of language or rather the modes of increasing its copiousness. The fourth group of material dealing with grammar commences with a sequence that carries the title ‘Of words *principal* and *accessory*:—and herein of *conjugates*—i.e. clusters of conjugates—grammatical and logical’, in which Bentham explains the distinction between principal and accessory words.² He went on to write a series of sections in which he discusses tenses,³ proper and improper moods,⁴ the imperative future,⁵ and genders.⁶

TEXT

The Manuscripts

The texts of all the writings included in the present volume have been reconstructed from Bentham’s manuscripts and all the material is in Bentham’s hand, with the exception of one passage taken from Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, which is in the hand of a copyist. In general, Bentham drafted his works on single sheets of foolscap, ruled with a wide margin and with a double line at the top, where he inserted the date and main heading. At the top of the margin he added a subheading or series of subheadings. For a significant proportion of his material, Bentham composed marginal contents, which were summaries of the subject-matter of the text. These marginal summaries are not reproduced in the present edition, because they were not intended for publication, but were used by Bentham as a means of organizing his material. Once Bentham had drafted a body of material corresponding to an intended section or other division of the text, the marginal summaries would be transferred by an amanuensis to other sheets of foolscap known as marginal contents or marginal summary sheets. In the case of the vast majority of the manuscripts reproduced in the present edition, the marginal summaries were not composed by Bentham himself but by amanuenses in the mid-1810s and by George Bentham in the late 1820s. The marginal summary sheets are ruled into four columns with a double line at the top for the date and heading. There also survive a significant number of rudiments

¹ UC cii. 405 (24 August 1813).

² UC cii. 431–2 (24 August 1813).

³ UC cii. 562–4 (25 August 1813).

⁴ UC cii. 579 (24 August 1813) and cii. 580–2 (24–5 August 1813) respectively.

⁵ UC cii. 583–6 (25 August 1813). The final two sheets of the sequence were rewritten and superseded by UC cii. 565, 571–2 (2 September 1813). ⁶ UC cii. 552 (date illegible).

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sheets, containing general statements or positions, notes of ideas and themes for possible development, examples for illustration, and plans. These sheets normally consist of single or double sheets of foolscap, each sheet being ruled into four columns with a double line at the top for the date and headings. Many of the text sheets contain rudiments, that is short notes that Bentham wrote as *aide-mémoires*, immediately beneath the main date and heading. Such rudiments, where the text covers their content, have not usually been reproduced in the present edition, but where they contain relevant points not otherwise covered in the text, they have usually been reproduced.

It was Bentham's practice to place sequences of manuscripts in paper wrappers, which he termed 'spencers', and on which he inscribed titles or descriptive headings. These titles or headings are sometimes detailed and specific, where the number of manuscripts is small and they compose one continuous sequence, and at other times more general, where the number of manuscripts is larger and more wide-ranging. Spencers were used by Bentham as an index to the content, and thereby as a convenient means of identifying and organizing his material. However, the spencers in the UCL Bentham Papers were not given folio numbers when the collection was catalogued, and hence many have been misplaced, including most of those for the manuscripts reproduced in the present volume.

It has been editorial policy to reflect as far as possible the manuscript sources on which the relevant texts are based, but without sacrificing clarity or sense. Bentham's spelling and capitalization have been retained in most instances, although editorial discretion has been more liberally exercised with regard to his punctuation, which is often inconsistent and sparse. Punctuation marks have been adjusted and supplied where clearly indicated by the sense, but not in cases where this might involve a dubious interpretation of the meaning. The words and phrases underlined by Bentham for emphasis have been rendered in italics, as have the titles of published works, some of which Bentham underlined and some of which he did not. Straightforward errors made by Bentham in the enumeration of lists have been silently corrected. Where Bentham has used the same type of numerals for both the main series and a sub-series, the sub-series has on occasion been silently altered—for instance from Arabic to lower case Roman numerals—for the sake of clarity.

The manuscripts contain many additions (either interlinear or marginal), deletions, and emendations that represent Bentham's later corrections to the text. The latest variant has usually been preferred, while original readings have not usually been indicated. Square brackets in the text are reserved for editorially inserted words,

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while Bentham's original is, where appropriate, given in an editorial footnote. Bentham's square brackets are replaced by braces. Roman brackets are those supplied by Bentham. Vertical strokes indicate a gap or blank space left in the manuscript. Bentham's own notes are indicated by superscript letters, with a separate sequence for each page of text. Editorial footnotes are indicated by superscript numerals, again with a separate sequence for each page of text. The organization of the relevant texts has been ascertained by paying regard, where applicable, to the plans, the pagination of the text sheets, the numbering of the chapters, sections, and marginal contents, and, of course, the sense. The location of any related fragments has been indicated above. The running headings have been editorially supplied.

For the manuscripts used in the present edition, reference should be made to the Table of Manuscripts below.

Table of Manuscripts

Note. Where the manuscript is undated, or part of the date has never been added, the abbreviation 'n.d.' is employed.

Essay on Logic

<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Section</i>	<i>MSS (UC)¹</i>	<i>Date</i>
Preface		ci. 88	8 August 1814
1	1	ci. 92–4	3 August 1814
	2	ci. 97–8	23–4 September 1814
	3	ci. 99–104	4–5 August 1814
2	1	ci. 105–6	22 September 1814
	2	ci. 107–9	25 September 1814
	3	ci. 110–14	24–5 September 1814
3	1	ci. 115	25 July 1814
		ci. 116–17	13–14 October 1814
	2	ci. 118–20	25 July 1814
	3	ci. 121	25 July 1814
	4	ci. 122–3	26 July 1814
	5	ci. 124–5	26–7 July 1814

¹ Unless noted as BL.

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<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Section</i>	<i>MSS (UC)¹</i>	<i>Date</i>
4	6	ci. 126–7	26–7 July 1814
		ci. 128–30	14 October 1814
	7	ci. 131–6, 422–4	26–9 July 1814
		ci. 22, 16; cii. 298–302, 160, 203–5	1–2 August 1814
	1	ci. 138–9	30 July 1814
		ci. 140–1	1 August 1814
		ci. 142	28 July 1814
	2	ci. 143–5	28 July 1814
	3	ci. 147	27 July 1814
		ci. 148	12 October 1814
5	4	ci. 146	11 October 1814
	5	ci. 96	22 August 1813
		ci. 318–21	14–15 October 1814
		1	ci. 369
	2	ci. 370	17 October 1814
	3	ci. 371	17 October 1814
	4	ci. 372	17 October 1814
	5	ci. 373	17 October 1814
	6	ci. 374	17 October 1814
	7	ci. 364–8, 375–8	17–18 October 1814
ci. 379–84		20 October 1814	
6	1	ci. 309–11	19 October 1814
	2	ci. 312	5 August 1814
		ci. 313	17 October 1814
		ci. 314–17	5 August 1814
	3	ci. 345	5 August 1814
	4	ci. 346	5 August 1814
	5	ci. 331–9	6 August 1814
	6	ci. 340–2, 322–30	7–9 August 1814
	7	ci. 347–52	8–10 August 1814
	8	ci. 353–4, 356–7	9–10 August 1814
7	9	ci. 358–63	5 September 1814
		ci. 285	3 August 1814
		ci. 286	5 August 1814
	1	ci. 287–9, 296–7, 293–4	19–20 August 1814

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<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Section</i>	<i>MSS (UC)¹</i>	<i>Date</i>
8	2	ci. 298	19 August 1814
		ci. 299–303	21–2 August 1814
		ci. 304–6	19 August 1814
	3	ci. 307–8	22 August 1814
	1	ci. 217	26 August 1814
9		ci. 218–19	23 August 1814
	2	ci. 221–4	23 August 1814
	3	ci. 227	24 August 1814
	1	cii. 21–5	23 September 1814
	2	cii. 13–14, 9–11, 15	25–7 September 1814
10		cii. 35–56, 468–70, two unidentified sheets, 471, 57–68	25–30 September 1814
		cii. 69–77	2–3 October 1814
		cii. 78–9	25 September 1814
	1	ci. 401–2	11 August 1814
	2	ci. 403–5	11 August 1814
11	1	ci. 385	30 July 1814
		ci. 386–7	26 August 1814
12	2	ci. 388–91, 393–8	26–7 August 1814
	1	cii. 310	11 August 1814
		cii. 311	25 August 1814
	2	cii. 315, 312, 320, 319, 349–50; BL Add. MS 33,549, fos. 131–4; cii. 321–3, 332–3, 327–9, 326, 330–1	11–14 August 1814
	3	cii. 352–6	16 August 1814
13	1	cii. 360	23 July 1814
		cii. 361	16 August 1814
	2	cii. 362	16 August 1814
	3	cii. 363	16 August 1814
	4	cii. 364–5	16 August 1814
14	5	cii. 366	16 August 1814
	1	cii. 392	26 August 1814
	2	cii. 393	26 August 1814
	3	cii. 394	26 August 1814

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<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Section</i>	<i>MSS (UC)¹</i>	<i>Date</i>
15	1	ci. 201–2	16 August 1814
	2	ci. 203–5	16 August 1814
	3	ci. 206–7	16 August 1814
	4	ci. 214–16	16–17 August 1814
	5	ci. 265–74	18 August 1814
16	1	cii. 357–8 cii. 359	13 August 1814 11 October 1814
	2	cii. 334–40	8 October 1814
17		cii. 372–7 ¹	6–7 October 1814
		cii. 378	9 October 1814
		cii. 379–80	7 October 1814
		cii. 381, 390	10 October 1814
		cii. 388, 387, 389	7 October 1814
18	I.	BL Add. MS 33,550, fo. 4	18 October 1814
		fo. 5	15 October 1815
	II.	fo. 6	15 October 1814
	III.	fo. 7	15 October 1814
	IV.	fo. 8	16 October 1814
		fo. 9	n.d. 1807
	V.	fos. 10–12	16–17 October 1814
		fos. 13–15	5 November 1814
	VI.	fos. 16–21	18–19 October 1814
	VII.	fo. 22	27 October 1814
	VIII.	fo. 23	21 October 1814
		fos. 24–5	1 November 1814
		fos. 26–7	6 November 1814
		fos. 28–30	8 November 1814
		fos. 31–4	11–13 November 1814
	IX.	fos. 35–6	25 October 1814
	X.	fo. 37	27 October 1814
	XI.	fo. 38	22 October 1814
		fo. 39	15 November 1814
	XII.	fo. 40	31 October 1814
	XIII.	fos. 41–2	24 October 1814
		fo. 43	26 October 1814
		fos. 44–5	30 October 1814
	XIV.	fo. 46	22 October 1814
	XV.	fo. 47	21 October 1814

¹ Passages from UC cii. 372 are interpolated at various points in this Chapter.

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<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Section</i>	<i>MSS (UC)¹</i>	<i>Date</i>
Appendix			
1	1	ci. 149–51	31 July 1814
	2	ci. 152	28 July 1814
	3	ci. 154–5	31 July 1814
		ci. 156	28 July 1813 and 23 July 1814
	4	ci. 157	31 July 1814
	5	ci. 158	31 July 1814
		ci. 159–60	25 September 1814
	6	ci. 161	31 July 1814
	7	ci. 162	31 July 1814
		ci. 163	11 October 1814
2		ci. 164–6	24 July 1814
		ci. 167–9	26–7 July 1814
3		ci. 170	28 July 1814
		ci. 171–2	30 July 1814
4		ci. 173, 176, 174	19 July 1814
		ci. 175, 177	29 July 1814
		ci. 178–81	20–1 July 1814
5	1	ci. 182–4	16 October 1814
	2	ci. 185–7	16 October 1814

Essay on Ethics

<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Section</i>	<i>MSS (UC)</i>	<i>Date</i>
1	1	xiv. 35	30 August 1814
	2	xiv. 36–7	30 August 1814
	3	xiv. 38–41	30 August 1814
	4	xiv. 42	30 August 1814
	5	xiv. 57–64	9 September 1814
	6	xiv. 65–79	9–11 September 1814
2	1	xiv. 44	6 September 1814
	2	xiv. 45	n.d.
	3	xiv. 46–7, 150–3	6 September 1814
	4	xiv. 48	6 September 1814

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<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Section</i>	<i>MSS (UC)</i>	<i>Date</i>
	5	xiv. 49–53	6–7 September 1814
	6	xiv. 54–6	7 September 1814
3		xiv. 81–3	11–12 September 1814
4		xiv. 84, 86–7, 88a, 88b, 89–93, 85	10 September 1814
5		xiv. 94–6	13 September 1814
6		xiv. 97–9	12 September 1814
7		xiv. 100–2	12 September 1814
8		xiv. 135–8	18 September 1814
9		xv. 310 ^v , 303; xiv. 139–41; cii. 211; xv. 278, 276 ^v , 275 ^v	18–19 September 1814
10		xiv. 108–10	13 September 1814
11	1	xiv. 113–14	13 September 1814
	2	xiv. 115–21	14–15 September 1814
12		xiv. 123–4	15 September 1814
13		xiv. 103–5	14 September 1814
14		xiv. 122	14 September 1814
15	1	xiv. 154–6; xv. 273 ^v	19–20 September 1814
	2	xiv. 157	20 September 1814
		xiv. 158	3 October 1814
		xiv. 159–65	5 October 1814
Appendix			
1	1	xiv. 142–4	31 August 1814
	2	xiv. 146–7	31 August 1814
2	1	xiv. 145	19 September 1814
	2	xiv. 148–9	19 September 1814
3	3	xiv. 125–34	16 September 1814
4		xiv. 166–73	9 October 1814

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Didacologia

<i>Chapter</i>	<i>MSS (UC)</i>	<i>Date</i>
1	ci. 428–30 ci. 431 ci. 432–7 ci. 438–41, 444–54, 456–8 ci. 459–63 ci. 464 ci. 465–70	24 February 1815 n.d. 14–15 February 1815 17–19 February 1815 21 February 1815 14 February 1814 21 February 1815
2	ci. 471–83 ci. 484–97 ci. 498	19–20 February 1815 22 February 1815 27 February 1815
Appendix	cii. 347–8	23 February 1815

Universal Grammar

<i>Part or Chapter</i>	<i>Section</i>	<i>MSS (UC)</i>	<i>Date</i>
Title		cii. 499	16 November 1815
Introduction		cii. 499–502	16 November 1815
I	1	cii. 538–9, 534–6, 529–32 cii. 533	14 December 1815 22 October 1815
	2	cii. 540–2	21 December 1815
	3	cii. 102 ¹	6 December 1815
	4	cii. 303 cii. 304	20 December 1815 n.d.
	5	cii. 291–3	20 December 1815
	6	cii. 522–4	16 November 1815
	7	cii. 157–9	4 December 1815
	8	cii. 456–67	15–16 December 1815
	9	cii. 170, 481–3 ²	16 December 1815
	10	cii. 486–90	10 December 1815
II	1	cii. 543–5, 176–8 cii. 519–21 ³	7 December 1815 12 November 1815
	2	cii. 546 ^v , 547–9, 551, 553	11–12 December 1815

¹ This section consists only of the title, which is taken from the plan of the essay.

² The footnote to UC cii. 481 at p. 380 below is taken from cii. 172 (23 January 1816).

³ These three sheets constitute the footnote at pp. 384–5 n. below.

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<i>Part or Chapter</i>	<i>Section</i>	<i>MSS (UC)</i>	<i>Date</i>
	3	cii. 556	13 December 1815
	4	cii. 557–61	17 December 1815
		cii. 566–70, 572–5, ¹ 578	24–6 December 1815
	5	cii. 590–2	23 December 1815
	6	cii. 430	25 December 1815
	7	cii. 589	18 December 1815
	8	cii. 187	26 December 1815
Appendix			
1	1	ci. 406–9	25 January 1816
		ci. 410–11	29 January 1816
		ci. 412, 414	25 January 1816
		ci. 413 ²	30 January 1816
	2	ci. 416	27 January 1816
		ci. 417	30 January 1816
2	1	cii. 491–5	30 January 1816
	2	cii. 496–8	30 January 1816
3		cii. 143, 173–4	1 February 1816
Systematical Sketch of the Parts of Speech		cii. 515–18, 511–14	13–14 November 1815

Appendix. Fragments on Logic and Language (August–September 1813)

<i>Heading</i>	<i>MSS (UC)</i>	<i>Date</i>
Disciplines	ci. 194–7	14 August 1813
Of Disciplines in general—their primary division	cii. 209, unidentified sheet, 289	22 August 1813
Language—Propositions	cii. 473–4	12 August 1813
Propositions what—why brought to view before single words	cii. 413–14, 136–9	23 August 1813

¹ UC cii. 570 and 572 are cut sheets that originally formed a single sheet.

² This sheet constitutes the footnote at p. 406 n. below.

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<i>Heading</i>	<i>MSS (UC)</i>	<i>Date</i>
Of Propositions in general— their component parts and species	cii. 166–8, 27–34	20 August 1813
Copiousness— Conciseness—Tractability	cii. 344–6	13 August 1813
Enrichment—Modes of Enrichment	cii. 396–8	13 August 1813
Obstacles to the enrichment of language	cii. 395	[. . . ?]
Of Improvement, considered in relation to language. Of deterioration by words imported	cii. 405	24 August 1813
Of words <i>principal</i> and <i>accessory</i> :—and herein of <i>conjugates</i> —i.e. clusters of conjugates—grammatical and logical	cii. 431–2	24 August 1813
Of Tenses—or designations of <i>time</i>	cii. 562–4	25 August 1813
Of proper moods, or moods properly so-called	cii. 579	24 August 1813
Of improper moods: or moods improperly so-called, viz. the imperative in most languages: the hithpahel in Hebrew	cii. 580–2	24–5 August 1813
Of the imperative future	cii. 583–6 cii. 565, 571–2	25 August 1813 2 September 1813
Of Genders	cii. 552	[. . . ?]

ESSAY

ON

LOGIC

Preface

Of this work the parent hints were drawn from the logic of Aristotle, viz. from Bishop Saunderson's compend of it in the years 1760 or 1761 to 1762 or 1764 when the author was a youth, or rather a child, at College: at Queen's College in the University of Oxford.¹ Of the notions therein delivered, some he found continually applicable, and applicable with advantage to ordinary practice. These treasured themselves up in his mind.²

In this sense the logic of Aristotle may be said to have formed the basis of this work. In that storehouse of instruction he found at any rate a considerable number of the tools or instruments which he has had to work with.

But though such was the assistance derived from the Greek philosopher of old, never at any time, never in any instance, did it occur to him to consider the opinion or discourse of that philosopher, any more than of any one else, as the standard or criterion of truth. The human mind, viz. his own mind, that being the only mind open to any man's immediate observation—was the source from which Aristotle drew the instruction for which we are indebted to his ingenious labours: his own mind was in like manner the source from whence the author of the present work drew those notions which it is the object and the endeavour of this work to communicate to and transfuse into such other minds as may find themselves disposed to receive it.

¹ The works of Aristotle (384–322 BC), the celebrated Athenian philosopher, on the subject of logic, namely 'Categories', 'On Interpretation', 'Prior Analytics', 'Posterior Analytics', 'Topica', and 'On Sophistical Refutations', known collectively as the 'Organon', were studied at the University of Oxford through the *Logicæ artis compendium* of Robert Sanderson (1587–1663), Regius Professor of Divinity at the University of Oxford 1642–8, Bishop of Lincoln 1660–3, which was first published at Oxford in 1618. While at Queen's College, Oxford, where he had taken up residence in October 1760, Bentham had been placed under the tutorship of James, known as Jacob, Jefferson (b. c. 1721, d. 1782), who had taught him logic, using Sanderson's *Logicæ artis compendium* as the textbook. On 16 February 1761 Bentham began his study of logic and on 12 June 1761 informed his father Jeremiah Bentham (1712–92) that 'we are just gone through the Logic Compend': see Bentham to Jeremiah Bentham, 15 February 1761 and 12 June 1761, *The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham*, vol. 1, ed. T.L.S. Sprigge, London, 1968 (CW), pp. 34 and 47. The edition studied by Bentham was Roberto Sandersono, *Logicæ artis compendium. Editio Undecima Prioribus Emendatio*, Oxford, 1741.

² An echo of Matthew 6: 20.

ESSAY ON LOGIC

Chapter 1.

Logic, what

§ 1. *Definition here given of logic—its amplitude justified*

Logic—in the sense, in which the word will, throughout the whole tenor of this work, be employed—may be defined—the art, which has for its object or end in view, the giving to the best advantage direction to the human mind and thence to the whole human frame, in its pursuit of any object or purpose, to the attainment of which it is capable of being applied.

That of all definitions that have been or can be given of this art, this is the most *extensive*, seems to be upon the face of it sufficiently manifest.

That it is the most *useful*, will, it is believed, be no less so: for it is in this modern definition alone, and not in any preceding one, that its relation to practical *use* in any shape has been directly held up to view.

That it is the most proper, will at the same time appear from the account given of it by those who were the first to hold it up to view in the character of an art and that an attainable one:—in a word by the inventors; viz. Aristotle and his followers—not to speak of his at present almost unknown predecessors.¹

For the extent to be given to an art, a more unexceptionable standard of propriety can scarcely be found than that, if any, which has been ascribed to it by its inventors. In the present instance, true it is that in the definition given of it in form, the extent assigned to it falls considerably short (as will be seen) of the extent here assigned to it, as above. But, as will also be seen,² in the course of an observation by which that definition is immediately followed, an extent is assigned to it much more ample, than that which by their definition is given to it, an extent falling little if a(ny thi)ng short of the extent ascribed to it, as above, in the present work.

According to your account of it (it may here naturally enough be objected) an institute of the art of Logic and a compleat

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Note to shew that here is included: 1. Aristotle. 2.—his followers. 3. even his predecessors or co-temporaries, of whom he speaks; viz. in his *Rhetoric* &c.’ Bentham perhaps had in mind *Art of Rhetoric*, 1354a3–4: ‘At this point, previous compilers of “Arts” of rhetoric have worked out only a small portion of this art, for the means of persuasion are the only part that comes within the province of art; everything else is merely an accessory. And yet they say nothing about enthymemes, which are the body of proof, but chiefly devote their attention to matters outside the subject; for the arousing of prejudice, compassion, anger, and similar emotions has no connection with the matter in hand, but is directed only to the dicast.’

² See § 2, pp. 5–6 below.

Encyclopedia—at any rate if the Encyclopedia be a methodical one—are one and the same thing. This work of yours, if it be what it professes to be, is therefore an Encyclopædia and that a compleat as well as a methodical one.

My answer is—to entitle itself to the appellation of a compleat one, true it is that any institute of logic, and therefore this, can not have left altogether unvisited, any portion whatsoever of the field of art and science—no, nor of the whole field of human thought and action. But of every the minutest part of that field an Encyclopædia may, with perfect propriety, give a compleat survey: whereas that which in relation to that same field comes within the province [of logic] consists of no more than a general outline, including its principal divisions, together with here and there a hint, such as may happen to be suggested by a comparative and bird's eye view, and thence in some sort a commanding view, for the more advantageous culture of it.

In relation to some of the principal points, in company with the views here given of the art, will be presented those which have been left to us by the Aristotelians.

In this way mutual light, it is hoped, will be thrown upon each other by the two sketches: and the extent as well as direction of the progress made, should any be found to have been made, by the modern one—will be the more clearly discernible.

§ 2. *Narrower and more common acceptations of the word logic*

Of the field of exercise belonging to this master art, the all-comprehensiveness, on the supposition that the definition above given of it is a proper one, will upon examination, it is believed, be sufficiently manifest. In it will be found comprehended not only every thing that ever went or can go by the name of science and every thing that ever went or can go by the name of art, but every other subject of contemplation or occupation to which it is possible for the human faculties under the guidance of human reason to be applied: every occupation, including the most common and unartificial as well as the most extraordinary of those occupations by which the measure of human life is filled up.

In no such comprehensive, nor indeed in any steady point of view, does it appear to have ever hitherto been considered.

By the Aristotelians it has been in the same breath [taken] as comprehending the field of science alone, and as comprehending that same field with the addition of the field of art.¹

¹ See Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 1: '*Logica*, quæ & Synecdochicè *Dialectica*, est *Ars rationis*: sive, est, *Ars instrumentalis dirigens mentem nostram in cognitionem*

ESSAY ON LOGIC

In the narrowest of all the acceptations in which it has been employed, it is the art of disputing in mood and figure. In a somewhat more enlarged sense it has been employed to denote the art of disputation, in whatsoever manner carried on. When to the whole art this amplitude is assigned, that which has just been mentioned¹ has been considered as a modification of it, and has been stiled the *Logic of the Schools*, or *School-logic*: meaning by Schools, those which in the middle ages were kept for the teaching of this art according to the principles laid down by Aristotle.

In general by those who employ it, a signification considerably more extensive, but still undeterminate, is frequently attributed to it. Arrangement, for example—arrangement and definition appear commonly enough to be considered as belonging to it. In so far as these operations—operations thus extensively useful—have been considered as belonging to it, it could not but have been considered as ministering, or at least capable of being made to minister, to the occasions of science in general, and even of art, not to speak of those of common life. But, forasmuch as by the followers of Aristotle, if not by Aristotle himself, the art of disputing in mood and figure seems to have been considered as the ultimate object of pursuit and study, *arrangement*, *definition*—and in general all other portions of the art, and applications made or capable of being made of it, being considered and represented as no more than accessory and ministerial to that principal and in those days practical use, hence it is that if the amplitude ascribed to it by the above definition be not excessive and unwarrantable, the most extensive conception which as yet it has [been] usual to form of it may be stated as inadequate.

§ 3. *Relation as between Logic and Metaphysics*

Whatever is said of *Logic* would be not simply imperfect [but] perniciously imperfect, if in conjunction with it something were not said of *Metaphysics*.

Between the imports that have been respectively given to these two words, no one to whose cognizance they have ever presented themselves can be unapprized that there exists a very near relation:

omnium intelligibilium’, i.e. ‘Logic, which is also [called] by synecdoche Dialectics, is the Art of Reasoning: or, it is the art which is instrumental in directing our minds towards knowledge of all things which can be known.’

¹ i.e. the art of disputing in mood and figure, as the corresponding marginal summary makes clear: ‘Of all popular acceptations, according to the narrowest it is no more than the art of disputation in mood and figure:—according to another, the art of disputation at large: in this case, in contradistinction to Logic at large, the art of disputation in mood and figure has been called *School Logic*.’

by no one it is believed has any endeavour been employed to exhibit any correct idea, to state by any precise delineation, what that relation is.

Of the word *Metaphysics* the origin is still to be seen in Aristotle. In his works what it was employed to denote was—not the nature of this branch of art or science to which it gave a name, but merely the relation in respect of priority and posteriority which, in the collection of his works, the work in which he treats of this branch of art or science happened to bear to the works in which he treats of physics.¹ According to another meaning, and though recondite, yet rather a more characteristic one—the branch of art or science upon which the mind will not in any natural course have entered until it has touched upon that which is called physics: nor indeed without having [past] over, or at least past *through*, that branch.

When looked at, that treatise² turns out to have for its subject neither more nor less than a few terms of the most general, i.e. most extensive, and at the same time the most frequently exemplified, import of any which language affords: existence, contingency, possibility, necessity, &c. may serve as examples.³

Upon the face of this account, it turns out that in its original import this branch of art or science was neither more nor less than a *sprig*, and that but a small one, of the branch termed Logic: forming but a minute portion of it not only according to the extent ascribed to it, as above, in the present work, but according to the so much narrower extent ascribed to it, as above, by the Aristotelians.

Within this last century or two the word has received an import of which it may, in general terms, be said, that it is much more *extensive*, but which in the highest degree continues vague and indeterminate.

It seems difficult to know what account to give of it, otherwise than from the various reproaches which from divers and various classes of writers have been cast upon it. Religionists, lawyers, politicians, sentimentalists, poets—under the name of *metaphysics* all these different

¹ The word ‘metaphysics’ does not occur in Aristotle, but was later used to refer to those writings which, in the received arrangement of his works, came *after* (μετά) the books on physics.

² i.e. Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*.

³ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Search and insert a catalogue of them: and thus compleat this paragraph. ☞ See Wilkins, Ch. || p. 2[4]3 &c. and J.B. Ms. Excerpts from that Chapter.’ Bentham’s reference is to John Wilkins, *An Essay Towards a Real Character, And a Philosophical Language*, London, 1668, Pt. II, Ch. 9, pp. 243–8, while the ‘Ms. Excerpts’ was presumably the material eventually published as ‘Appendix.—No. VII. Hints towards a system and course of Technology, from Bishop Wilkins’ Logical work, published by the Royal Society, A° 1668, under the title of “An Essay towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language.”—Pp. 243–248’, in *Chrestomathia*, ed. M.J. Smith and W.H. Burston, Oxford, 1983 (*CW*), pp. 323–30.

classes of writers have found something which has appeared to them to thwart their views, their opinions, their interests or their prejudices, and against which they have accordingly used their endeavours to cover with reproach, and bring into disrepute.

Of the art or science of logic, one prime and that the most immediate use is the establishment of clear and determinate ideas: the taking care that, to such discourse as on any subject of importance we employ, the ideas we attach shall be clear and determinate ones^a—and in so far as in the language employed in the course of their converse with us by others, any deficiency in this essential quality¹ becomes observable, to employ our endeavours by apt observations and upon occasion by apt *questions*, to dispell from it whatever marks of ambiguity or obscurity in which it may happen to be enveloped.

The words employed—and the compounds formed of them in the form of propositions—in one or other of these classes of objects may be seen the source of every instance of error or perplexity, every cause of deception, to which discourse can give rise: if it be in the structure of the propositions or in the sort of connection given to them that the malady has or is supposed to have its source, logic (in which Grammar may be considered as included) is the name of the art or science, by which alone the cure, if obtainable, will be obtained: if it be in the import attached to the terms taken singly, sometimes it is to logic, sometimes it is to metaphysics, that any endeavours employed to remedy it are referred.

Voluntary or involuntary—whosoever harbours a favourite error which it would pain him to see exposed, beholds in logic or metaphysics or both an object of antipathy and terror. From the adverse current of these affections, *logic* being, under that its name, defended by the authority not only of the most admired of the philosophers of antiquity, but of those reverend persons from whose lips instruction in its highest and most polished forms is imbibed, *metaphysics* is commonly the but against which the chief force of the hostile affections is directed.²

^a Methodization—Distinction—Definition—Division—Exposition in all its shapes—all these operations have this for their direct object.

¹ i.e. 'clarity'. The words 'and determinate' constitute a later addition, but Bentham has failed to make the appropriate emendation here.

² In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: "☞ Conclude by shewing by what interests or prejudices, indigenuous or interest-begotten, the different classes of the adversaries of truth and thence of right reason and logic are animated against logic the art, and particularly against metaphysics, its appellative. 1. Religionist Beattie's invectives. 2. Politician Burke's "I hate metaphysics". 3. Lawyer.^a 4. Poet. 5. Sentimentalist.'

In the margin, Bentham has then noted: "☞ Quære. May not the question of literary property form an example. From the arguments on that occasion employed it appears that

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no one of the lawyers on either side understood the manner in which *property* is created. Those against whom truth was most troublesome vented their uneasiness against the word metaphysics.'

James Beattie (1753–1803), poet and philosopher, and Edmund Burke (1729/30–97), statesman, orator, and politician, frequently displayed their contempt for metaphysical arguments. See, for instance, Beattie to Sir William Forbes, 30 January 1766, in Sir William Forbes, *An Account of the Life and Writings of James Beattie, LL.D. Late Professor of Moral Philosophy and Logic in the Marischal College and University of Aberdeen. Including Many of his Original Letters*, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1806, i. 79: 'I have of late been much engaged in metaphysics; at least I have been labouring with all my might to overturn that visionary science'; and Burke's 'Speech on American Taxation', originally delivered in the House of Commons on 19 April 1774, in *The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke. Volume II: Party, Parliament, and the American Crisis 1766–1774*, ed. P. Langford, Oxford, 1981, p. 458: 'I do not here enter into those metaphysical distinctions; I hate the very sound of them', and the multiple derogatory references in 'Reflections on the Revolution in France' (first published in 1790), in *The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke. Volume VIII: The French Revolution 1790–1794*, ed. L.G. Mitchell, Oxford, 1998, pp. 72, 109, 111, 112–13, 141, 222, 229, 231, 232, 263, 268, 271, 285, and 288.

The question of literary property had been discussed in Parliament in debates on the Copyright Act of 1814 (54 Geo. III, c. 156), which had been introduced into the House of Commons on 10 May 1814 and had received the Royal Assent on 29 July 1814, but Bentham presumably had in mind the case of *Millar v. Taylor* (1766–9), in which the Court of King's Bench on 20 April 1769 gave judgment to the effect that there was a perpetual Common Law right to literary property: see James Burrow, *Reports of Cases adjudged in the Court of King's Bench Since the Time of Lord Mansfield's Coming to preside in it: With Tables Of the Names of the Cases, and Of the Matter contained in them. Volume the Fourth: Beginning with Michaelmas Term 7 G. 3. 1766, and Ending with Hilary Term 10 G. 3. 1770, (inclusive)*, London, 1776, pp. 2303–408, and *The Question concerning Literary Property, determined by the Court of King's Bench on 20th April, 1769, in the Cause between Andrew Millar and Robert Taylor: with the Separate Opinions of the four Judges; And the Reasons given by Each, in Support of his Opinion*, London, 1773. In February 1774, however, in the case of *Donaldson v. Becket* (1774), the House of Lords, after hearing the opinions of the twelve Common Law judges, reversed the decision in *Millar v. Taylor*, holding that authors had an exclusive Common Law right to the first publication for perpetuity, but that this right was annulled once the work had been published: see Burrow, *Reports of Cases adjudged in the Court of King's Bench, Since the Time of Lord Mansfield's Coming to preside in it: Volume the Fourth*, pp. 2408–17, and *The Cases of the Appellants and Respondents in the Cause of Literary Property, before the House of Lords: wherein The Decree of the Lord Chancellor Apsley was reversed, 26 Feb. 1774. With The genuine Arguments of the Council, the Opinions of the Judges, and the Speeches of the Lords, who distinguished themselves on that Occasion. With Notes, Observations, and References*, London, 1774. This latter work recorded derogatory allusions to metaphysics made by Alexander Wedderburn (1733–1805), first Baron Loughborough and first Earl of Rosslyn, Solicitor General 1771–8, Attorney-General 1778–80, Chief Justice of Common Pleas 1780–93, Lord Chancellor 1793–1801 (p. 26), George Perrot (1710–80), Baron of the Exchequer 1763–75 (p. 41), William de Grey (1719–81), first Baron Walsingham, Solicitor General 1763–6, Attorney General 1766–71, Chief Justice of Common Pleas 1771–80 (p. 47), Charles Pratt (1714–94), first Baron and first Earl Camden, Attorney General 1757–62, Chief Justice of Common Pleas 1762–6, Lord Chancellor 1766–70, Lord President of the Council 1782–3, 1784–94 (p. 48), and Thomas Lyttelton (1744–79), second Baron Lyttelton, Chief Justice in the Eyre North of Trent 1775–9 (p. 55).

Chapter 2.

Logic—its Characteristics—viz. 1. its End. 2. Field of Exercise.¹ 3. Operations. 4. Faculties. 5. Instruments. 6. Functions. 7. Uses²

§ 1. *Lists of these Characteristics—1. Aristotle's—2. the Author's*

After a definition of the word *logic*,³ in the character of an appendage to that definition, the Aristotelians have brought to view a cluster of abstract terms which had presented themselves as in some way or other appertaining to it, and as promising to contribute to the explanation of the nature of the art defined by it.

Præcognita de naturâ Logicæ is the title prefixed to the Chapter in which, in the *Compendium* of Saunderson, the Definition of Logic, with these explanations subjoined to it, is contained.⁴

Though, taken in detail, the mode of execution has appeared, as will be seen, susceptible of considerable amendments, the design has been regarded as highly useful; and of the sketch therein contained, that which here follows, though not a copy, will be seen to be an imitation, or at any rate a sketch executed on a plan, of which the general idea and some of the principal lines were derived from that source.

1. Uses (*Utilitates*). 2. End in view (*Finis*). 3. Functions (*Officia*). 4. Object (*Objectum*). 5. Subjects (*Subjectum* as exhibited in six modifications).⁵ 6. Parts (*Partes*), which, three in number, are brought to view.⁶ Such is the list of the *characteristics* of Logic, as exhibited by Saunderson and other Compendialists; exhibited, though not under that or any other common appellation, unless the word *præcognita* (things foreknown) be taken for that appellation.

¹ MS '3. Subjects.' For Bentham's insertion of 'Subjects' as the third characteristic of logic, but his failure to distinguish it from 'Field of Exercise', see the Editorial Introduction, pp. xxvi–xxvii above. The remaining characteristics have been editorially renumbered.

² In the text, the discussion of 'Uses' precedes that of 'Functions'.

³ See pp. 5–6 n. above.

⁴ See Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, pp. 1–2. For a further discussion of this passage see Appendix, Ch. 1, pp. 206–15 below.

⁵ The six modifications of *Subjectum Logicæ* listed in Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 2, are '*Mens humana*, sive *Ratio*' (the human Mind, or Reason); '*Oratio*' (Speech); '*Thema*, seu *Questio intelligibilis*, πᾶν νοητόν' (Theme, or intelligible Question, everything which can be known); '*Secunda intentio*' (Second intention); '*Syllogismus*' (Syllogism); and '*Demonstratio*' (Demonstration).

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 2–3, where the three parts of logic, corresponding to the three parts of the mind that can be directed by it, are '*Conceptum simplicem*' (simple Conception), '*Compositionem & Divisionem*' (Composition and Division), and '*Discursum*' (Discourse).

CH. 2. LOGIC—ITS CHARACTERISTICS

I. General End in view to which the art called *Logic* keeps or ought to keep in view.¹ II. Field of exercise appertaining to this art.² III. *Operations*, to which it is capable of giving direction and assistance.³ IV. *Faculties* to which it gives direction and assistance.⁴ V. *Instrument*, viz. *Language*, employed in giving direction and assistance to these same Faculties in the performance of these same Operations.⁵ VI. *Uses*, to which it is applicable.⁶ VII. *Functions*, to the exercise of which in relation to other arts and sciences it is capable of giving direction and assistance.⁷—Such is the list of the subjects, which, under that same name of the *characteristics* of the art, will, by means of the explanations respectively given in relation to them, be under these same denominations employed in the explanation of it.

§ 2. I. End in view, or Ultimate Object of Logic

The pursuit of every art being a course of action, and, [in] the instance of man as in that of every other sensitive creature, well-being being in some shape or other the end of every action, it is not in the nature of man, that for its ultimate end the particular art here in question should not have this for its object—it is not in the nature of the case that for its ultimate object it should have any other object.

Well-being, considered as having existence during any given portion of past time, will always have been directly as the magnitude of the aggregate of pleasures of all sorts experienced during that portion of time, and as the magnitude of the aggregate of pains of all sorts experienced during that same portion of time inversely.

Such is the explanation which, how premature soever, it seemed advisable to give, lest though it were but for a moment, any the least cloud should hang over so important an appellative.

Well-being?—but is not this (it may be asked) the end in view, the ultimate as well as direct and immediate object, of another and very different branch of art or science, a branch distinguished by a separate and different name—viz. *Ethics*?

Undoubtedly: but by being the object—the ultimate object—of that other art, it is not the less truly and properly so, of the one in question. As every action whatsoever, so must every art (for *art* is but an aggregate of *actions*) have this for its object—have this common result, viz. *well-being*, for its *ultimate* object.

If *Ethics* has this for its object, so has medicine for example, so has cookery: but this same result, in so far as it can with propriety be said

¹ See § 2, pp. 11–12 below. ² See § 3, pp. 12–15 below. ³ See Ch. 3, pp. 16–34 below.

⁴ See Ch. 4, § 1, pp. 35–7 below.

⁵ See Ch. 4, § 2, pp. 37–9 below.

⁶ See Ch. 4, § 3, pp. 39–40 below.

⁷ See Ch. 4, § 4, p. 40 below.

to be of any use, Logic may with not the less propriety be said to have for its object—meaning for its ultimate object—likewise.

If in the pursuit of *well-being* it be the province of Ethics to take the direction of human conduct—in that same pursuit it is the province of Logic to take the command and give direction to the course of Ethics itself. From having his Generals under him, the Commander-in-chief has not the less the command of the army committed to his care.

Logic, like every other branch of art and science—logic, in a word, like every thing else, is not any otherwise nor any farther deserving of regard, than in so far as it is, or is capable of being, *of use*. But *of use*, in any intelligible sense, can neither this nor any thing else ultimately be, any farther than it has been, is, or is capable of being conducive to the diminution of pain in some shape or other or to the encrease of pleasure.

Be that as it may, assuredly it is not on any other account that it will ever be taken for the subject of consideration, in any part of the present work.

As in this instance, so in every other, the value and usefulness of art and science in every shape depends altogether upon its conduciveness and subservience to this universal end, so in the comprehensive sketch which will farther on be given of the field of art and science, it is in this tendency to a common end that the cementing principle, or common bond of relation by which the several arts and sciences are connected with each other, will be viewed: and from this common bond of connection will be deduced such a plan of Encyclopedical arrangement as should naturally be more interesting than any which has hitherto made its appearance.¹

After a sketch taken upon these principles, if then *dryness* and *uninterestingness* continue to be, as hitherto they seem to have been generally, numbered among the properties of this art, it will at any rate be—not in respect of the *end* to which it is directed, but in respect of the principles and plan observed in treating of it.

§ 3. II. *Field of exercise appertaining to this art*

The definition of this art being given, as above, the field of its exercise has been already given. Within it is contained the field of every other art—the field of every science—the field in a word of every occupation, such alone excepted, if any such there be, to the exercise of which in

¹ The ‘comprehensive sketch’ in question eventually appeared as *Chrestomathia; Part II. Containing Appendix, No. V. Being An Essay on Nomenclature and Classification: including a critical examination of the Encyclopedical Table of Lord Bacon, as Improved by D’Alembert; and the first lines of A New One, grounded on the application of the logical principle of Exhaustively Bifurcate Analysis to the moral principle of General Utility*, London, 1817 (reproduced in *Chrestomathia* (CW), pp. 139–276).

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the most advantageous manner, no exertion of mental power is either necessary or in any way conducive.

The word *field* having to the purposes of logic been found of special and superior use, while other terms there are which have also been employed to these same purposes, a few words to shew the claim it makes to preference may be found perhaps not altogether ill-bestowed.

Sphere—Circle—Subject-matter—Subject—in these four will be found comprehended, it is believed, the compleat list of those its rivals.

I. As to the word *Sphere*, on many occasions it may no doubt be employed without much difference in the article of convenience.

It labours however under considerable disadvantages.

1. Being borrowed from astronomy, it is apt to present to view as often as employed the idea of that abstruse and irrelevant science, and thereby adds difficulty to difficulty. The obscurity which unavoidably and perpetually overhangs the nomenclature of logic is sufficiently thick without needing any additional shade to thicken it.

2. A field is susceptible of corners, and in a word of every variety of shape: and to the number of describable sources of division according to which it is capable of being parcelled out, there is no certain limit. A sphere has no corners: and to the number of sources according to which it is capable of being subjected to division, there are determinate limits.

3. The fields of the several arts and sciences, parcels of the general field of art and science, and of the still more amply universal field of human occupations, are with reference to one another contiguous and mutually coincident, and may upon some if not upon all occasions be considered as situated in the same level. But amongst the objects presented to view by the word sphere there can not be any such mutual coincidence or contiguity: and when spoken of several of them on the same occasion, some are spoken of as higher, others as *lower* or *inferior*.

4. The field of art and science is capable of extension, and is continually receiving it: and the greater the extension it receives, the greater there seems reason to believe—the greater *cæteris paribus*—is the quantity of well-being possessed by the aggregate of mankind. A sphere is not susceptible of extension: extend the body in any one part, a spherical body, it ceases to be spherical.

II. Circle is a word that lies more or less exposed to the same inconveniences: to the last of them in a more practically pernicious degree. The circle of the sciences is a phrase to which in former days much importance was attached, and which continues to be in frequent use.¹

¹ See, for instance, *The Circle of the Sciences*, ed. John Newbery, 10 vols., London 1745–6, which appeared in numerous editions until 1798; *The Circle of the Sciences, consecrated by the Cross. A brief attempt to exhibit the First Elements of Science, and to shew how Every*

Of the emblem thus employed what are the practical inferences? that in the track of science no advance can be made: that by every foot that enters upon the circle, the track taken can be no other than that which was travelled in by his predecessors: that a man may go round and round, but when he has gone as far as it is possible for him to go, he finds himself at the very point from which he set out.

III. and IV. *Subject-matters* and *subjects*.¹—As to these expressions, they are not pregnant with any such delusive allusions as above; but they do not come up to the purpose there in question: and there is another purpose for which they are in demand.

Field is wanted for the designation of the whole of the expanse: fields in the plural are seldom wanted. Subject-matter and subject are wanted for the expression of this or that particular article considered as situated in or within the compass of this or that field: accordingly in the plural number as well as in the singular there is a continual demand for these words.

By the word *subject*, the idea conveyed is that of a moveable solid, capable of being viewed and handled in all imaginable directions: by the word *field*, that of a portion of an immoveable whole, of which the *surface* alone is capable of being thus dealt with.

Real entities and fictitious entities—to one or other of these denominations will be found referable every thing which with reference to this art can be considered as comprized under the denomination of a *subject*.

Name of a real entity—name of a fictitious entity—to one or other of these denominations will accordingly be found referable every word belonging to the class of those which in the language of Grammarians are distinguished by the appellation of noun substantives.

Included in the list of subjects in which the art of Logic is capable of operating are (it will be seen)² the subjects of all the several other arts and sciences.

Field of *disciplines*, field of undisciplined or common life: assigning to the field of logic the extent assigned to it by the abovementioned

Branch of Useful Knowledge may be made subservient to the best purposes, 2nd edn., London, 1805; and William Enfield, *The New Encyclopædia; or, Circle of Knowledge and Science, Digested, in a concise and popular Manner, in Distinct Treatises, Elucidating not only The First Principles of Knowledge, for the instruction of youth, But embracing Every Modern Discovery, That is worthy the Attention of the Philosopher or Man of Science*, 10 vols., London, 1809. Cf. Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, Appendix Posterior Miscella, Cap. II. De Circulo Disciplinarum, pp. 236–42.

¹ In the text, Bentham has added the following title above this paragraph: '§ 4. Characteristic the 3^d—Subject-matters or Subjects of Logic.' For the addition of 'Subjects' to the list of characteristics see the Editorial Introduction, pp. xxvi–xxvii above. The original status of the following material on 'subjects', as an alternative term to 'field', has been retained.

² See Ch. 3, § 1, p. 16 below.

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definition, these may be stated as the primary and most immediate parts or divisions of the field of *logic*: field of *arts*—field of *sciences*—these may be stated as the primary and immediate parts or divisions of the *field of disciplines*.

Between the members of the several divisions—between the elements formed from the several decompositions, what is respectively the relation?—such is the question which here obviously present[s] itself.¹

¹ The text appears to have been abandoned at this point.

Chapter 3.

III. Operations to the performance of which Logic is capable of affording direction and assistance

§ 1. *Relation of this characteristic to those others*¹

Whatsoever be the art in which they are to be performed, or in relation to which action is required, or the products of that art, the above operations² will be found capable of being performed in relation to it: operations—all of them contributing or tending to the attainment of the abovementioned general end,³ in so far as the *art*, the *science*, the practice or act in question, is in its nature in any shape applicable to that end.

When these are considered as so many *species* of operations, to the due and apt and successful performance of which the art called logic is capable of being rendered subservient, this topic—the topic of mental operations—is considered as susceptible of being applied to the several *subjects* of the same art, as abovementioned, and in that respect as considered in what, in opposition to abstracted or *abstract*, has been called a *concrete* or practical point of view.

A different point of view, and which under the name *abstract* is that which has this instant been spoken of, is that in which the *operations* performable are considered as corresponding to so many *faculties* of the human frame by or by means of which they are performable: and on this occasion the same denomination is capable of serving, and accordingly has in great measure been made to serve, for the operation itself, and the *faculty*, the fictitious part or member of the mind, by or by means of which the operation has been considered as being, and said to be, performed.

These operations, being so many modes or species of *action*, which is itself but a mode of *motion*, possess a sort of half-reality, and the names of them belong accordingly to a class of names which, regard being had to names of substances, the only real entities, may, as will be observed in another place,⁴ stand distinguished by the appellation of names of semi-real entities.

¹ For Bentham's list of the characteristics of logic see p. 11 above.

² It is possible that the text to which Bentham is cross-referencing, here and below, is part of an earlier draft: see the Editorial Introduction, p. xxv above.

³ See Ch. 2, § 2, pp. 11–12 above.

⁴ In 'Essay on Logic', Bentham refers only to space as a semi-real entity: see Ch. 9, § 2, p. 107 below.

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But as to the several correspondent faculties, these belong to the class of purely-fictitious entities: feigned in virtue of an irresistible demand, for the purposes of discourse. A motion has a something next to real that corresponds to it, and of which indication is given by the name of it: viz. the path taken by the moving body at the time during which it is said to be *in motion*.

Considered as distinct from the mind itself, a *faculty* is an object manifestly altogether void of real existence: the name of it is the name of a purely nominal and fictitious object framed for the purpose of holding up to view the imaginary cause or productive instrument of some real effect. The word which is the name of it is not indicative of any thing but the *operations* which, when called into exercise, it performs if it be an *active* faculty, or the impressions which, if it be a *passive* faculty, it receives.

Of the several distinguishable operations to which the art of Logic may in one way or other be found capable of affording direction and assistance, so great is the multitude (of the whole number of the operations in which the human mind is capable of bearing a part, there not being one to which from this source direction and assistance is not in one way or other capable of being lent), so ample is the number and so great the variety, that for bringing to view the points in which they agree together with those in which they [disagree]¹—and thus assist the formation [of] a clear and distinct idea of the nature and differential character of each, it will be necessary to distribute them into distinct groupes or classes, which in the course of the six following sections will be brought to view. To place first those which, being most simple, require not for their explanation any thing to be said of the others, and so on.

§ 2. *Class I. Operations in which the subject is taken singly, entire, and without necessity of regard to any other than present time, viz. 1. Perception, Conception or Apprehension. 2. Attention*

1. Perception—Conception—Apprehension.—When perception has place, the source or perceptible object from whence it is derived being an individual portion of matter—a real, corporeal entity—(a being coming under the denomination of *body*—of a *body*—) *impressions* are at the time in question made on *sense*: on some one or more or all of the senses, to the cognizance of which the object stands exposed: of the perception thereupon obtained, these *impressions* are the immediate object and subject: the body itself—i.e. the existence

¹ MS 'agree'.

of it, is but, in a *secondary* and comparatively *remote* way, the object or subject of perception: of this supposed source of the perceptions that are experienced, the existence is, strictly speaking, rather a subject of *inference* than of perception: of inference, judgment, ratiocination, which is liable to be erroneous, and in experience is very frequently found to be so.¹

Scarce does a perception take place, but it is accompanied—accompanied generally—without any *consciousness of*, because without any *reflection on*—without any *attention paid to* it—accompanied with a corresponding *judgment* or *act* of the judicial faculty.

At the time when the perception takes place, the mind may either be more or less *active* or purely *passive* in relation to it: it is only in so far as it is more or less active that any *operation* can with propriety be said to be performed.

If the mind be purely passive, the perception is the work of the simply perceptive—a branch of the intellectual faculty: if in any mode or degree the mind be active, in so far the *will*, the *volitional* faculty, bears a part in the production of it.

Conception is a word which is frequently employed to express the same import that the word *perception* would be employed to express. In common usage the distinction is altogether unsettled. Where any marked distinction is observed, it is to the word *conception* that the largest and most complex sense seems commonly to be assigned: while impressions alone are considered as the objects of perception, conception is considered as having for its object ideas, simple ideas, the copies of those [impressions]²—the things signified by the signs of which discourse is composed—ex. gr. the import of entire propositions—of a discourse composed of such propositions in any multitude—or even that of single words. In this word,³ *intimation* given of a certain degree of *complexity* in the object denoted by it is but the natural effect of the first syllable.

By the word *apprehension*, at least if its etymology be considered, intimation is conveyed not only of action, activity, but of some certain degree of exertion—of effort: *prehendo*—*apprehendo*—to lay hold of.

2. Attention. This operation, as the etymology of the word intimates, has place in so far as by an act, by a more or less continued exertion, of the *will* and the psycholog[ically] active faculty its servant, the mind is as it were fastened upon the object or subject from whence a perception or conception is derived to it: *tendo*, to stretch; *attendo*, to stretch upon.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Give examples.’

² MS ‘expressions’.

³ i.e. ‘conception’.

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§ 3. *Class II. Operations in the performance of which the subject (whether taken entire or not—taken in conjunction with others or not—and whether with or without regard to any person other than he himself by whom the operation is considered as performed) is considered with regard to past time^a*

1. Remembrance. 2. Retention. 3. Recollection. 4. Revocation, viz. to memory.^b 5. Reminiscence.

The sort of fictitious psychological entity called the memory is regarded as a kind of *receptacle*, in which, in any number, perceptions of all sorts that have ever been experienced are lodged, as likewise whatsoever thoughts have by composition or decomposition been framed out of these materials are capable of finding a place. So long as on the occasion of the entrance of the object in question into this receptacle, or of its continuance therein or re-issue out of or re-emanation from, no effort on the part of the will is considered as taking place, no such word as *operation* can with propriety be employed in speaking of it.

§ 4. *Class III. Operations, in the performance of which objects or subjects more than one are considered as being at the same time present to the mind*

1. Judication.
2. Decision.
3. Determination: antecedently to it, and for the purpose of it.
4. Comparison.
5. Examination.

When after examination and comparison made of any two or more of the objects that have presented themselves to it, any *inference* is made or *conclusion* come to in relation to them by the mind, a *judgment* is thereby said to have been formed and passed—an act of the judicial faculty exercised—an operation of the judicial faculty performed.

Decision and *determination* are with no less frequency and propriety applied to operations of the volitional than to those of the judicial faculty.

Decision, from *decido* compounded of *de*—off and *cædo*—to cut, is a word that represents the mind as if cutting off at a certain point the thread of examination, and thereby cutting short the intellectual process.

^a ^{ES} Consideration with regard to future time is the work of the *imagination*, the result of *abstraction*.

^b *Revocation*, a pseudo-conjugate here.

Determination—from *de*—off and *terminus*—a term or boundary—intimates that, with reference to the object in question, whatever chain of examination has been carried on, has been brought to an *end*.

As to *judgment*, when the word is employed to designate an *operation*, considered by itself the operation is not an act of any other than the judicial faculty: it is not an act of the volitional faculty. But the giving *expression* to this as to any other act of the judicial faculty is an act of the volitional faculty: even the applying to the subject or subjects in question the faculty of attention for the purpose of framing a judgment on or in relation to them—this *is* an act of the volitional faculty.

Another object which the word *judgment* is in use to be employed to signify is the discourse, whatsoever it be, which on the occasion in question has been the product of the operations so denominated as performed by the faculty so denominated.¹

As to *examination*, a notion that may be apt to present itself on the subject of this word, is that on the occasion of the operation expressed by it the presence of more than one object in the mind at the same time is not necessary. Applied to entire objects, the observation may be correct. But, an examination of any object can hardly, it should seem, be with propriety spoken of as made, unless the mind has applied itself to the distinguishable parts of the object or some of them: it is only in this way that the import of the word *examination* can be distinguished from that of the word *attention*.

§ 5. *Class IV. Operations, on the performance of which, the subject being such as presents a number of perceptions (viz. impressions or ideas or both together) in conjunction, the mind in the first place decomposes what it finds thus composed, taking for consideration from the groupe any one or more of these component elements, presenting them to itself or not presenting them at any subsequent point of time in an order and mode of conjunction different from that in which, as above, they presented themselves in the first instance*

1. *Abstraction*. In or by this operation, among the impressions or ideas presented in conjunction by an object, whether present to sense, or only present to recollection—and accordingly presenting a groupe of impressions or presenting nothing more than a bundle of ideas corresponding to and derived from and copied as it were from the groupe of impressions presented by it while present, the mind by its

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ In a note for illustration speak of an act of judicature—shew how the intellectual and volitional faculties are jointly employed in framing and divulging it.’

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apprehensive faculty lays hold of some one alone or some other part of the whole number, leaving the rest unnoticed and unheeded.

Take for instance an apple. Applied to the touch alone, the impressions it gives birth to are those of the external shape, the degree of smoothness or roughness and the consistence in respect of hardness and softness: present to the eye, it gives birth to the impressions and ideas of shape as before, with the addition of colour: to the smelling, those of the particular odour of that fruit: to the taste, the particular flavour of that fruit. In so far as any one of these impressions or ideas is rendered present to the mind and becomes a subject or object of perception or thought or attention without being accompanied with the rest, the mental operation called *abstraction* has place.

2. *Imagination*. In so far as a number of these fragmentitious ideas formed by abstraction are put together by the mind and formed into new compounds—into compounds which either do not exist in nature, or have not as yet presented themselves to the mind of the person in question, as it were, in and by the hands of a body already existing in nature, the operation whereby this effect is produced is stiled *imagination*; and in consideration and in respect of it a correspondent faculty is considered as having existence: a faculty termed the *imaginative* faculty—or more shortly by the same name as that given to the operation itself—viz. imagination.

Thus, taking from the fruit of the apple tree its shape and at the same time from any piece of the metal called gold, its weight, colour and consistence, imagination formed the golden apple, the produce of the garden of the Hesperides, the prize or subject of contention on the occasion of the race in which Atalanta was victorious.¹

3. *Invention*. In so far as any product formed as above by the imagination has received or is considered as receiving a fixt description, or as serving as a guide to active talent or practice in such sort as, in the pursuit of some particular end, to produce effects either new or produced in any respect to greater advantage than before, the operation is called *invention*.^a

^a See *postea* Methodization &c.²

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Search and correct the statement here.’ In Greek mythology, Atalanta, a virgin huntress, promised to marry the man who could defeat her in a running race. Hippomenes (or Melanion) won the race by dropping golden apples from the garden of the Hesperides, which Atalanta stopped to pick up. See Servius (Maurus Servius Honoratus), *Commentary on the Aeneid of Virgil*, iii. 113, and Apollodorus, *The Library*, III. ix. 2.

² See Ch. 6, pp. 55–78 below.

§ 6. *Class V. Operations on the occasion of which a number of entire objects, whether masses of matter or assemblages of ideas, are present to the mind at the same time*

1. Designation—simple or individual denomination. For the performance of this operation, the conjunct presence of a number of objects not greater than two suffices: 1. the *object* to which a name is to be attached; and the *name* which is thus to be attached to it: the designand, or object which is considered as requiring to be denominated, and the designation or sign, which, when sufficiently associated and connected with it—when lodged in the mind in contact with it for a sufficient length of time, and thus called up in conjunction with it with a sufficient degree of frequency, is found by experience to contract, as it were, a sort of adhesion to it: in such sort that when, by [the] person in question, the sign, being called up out of the *memory*, is detained by the attention, the idea of the *object signified* is thereby rendered present, and is continued in that state so long as the sign is in that same state.

A sign of this sort by which one individual object and no more is designated is what has been termed by Grammarians a *proper name*.

2. Denomination—or say common, collective, or generic denomination. In so far as the sort of operation thus described and denominated has place, the same sign is made to designate and upon occasion render present to the mind two or any greater number of individual objects: two or any greater number of individual objects, by which so ever of the two faculties, the memory or the imagination, rendered present to it.

Thus while the human species contained but one individual, viz. Adam, individual designation was the only operation of this class which an intelligent and conversing being such as an Angel or a Devil, having occasion to designate him, could have occasion to employ in the designation of him. But no sooner had Eve, when detached from his side,¹ received a separate existence than the occasion for denomination, i.e. collective designation or denomination, came into existence: a name such as should be capable of designating the species which by the addition of this second individual was now formed. One species was there already in actual existence: at the same time, a sort of subordinate species, or rather two species at once, viz. the two species formed together by the difference in respect of *sex*, received already a sort of potential existence. At the birth of Cain,² the species corresponding to the male sex received an actual existence: Adam and Cain, the individuals: on the birth of Cain's eldest sister, the species

¹ For God's creation of the first woman Eve from one of Adam's ribs see Genesis 2: 21–3.

² See Genesis 4: 1.

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corresponding to the female sex received the like existence: Eve and her unnamed daughter, whoever she were, the individuals.¹

3. Methodization or Arrangement.

Of this operation, as will more particularly be seen further on under a separate head thus denominated,² there are two distinguishable modes: for the designation of one of which the word *collective*, of the other the word *lineal*, may be employed: or instead of the lineal mode of methodization, the term methodization by means of precedence may be employed.

To *collective* or cumulative methodization, one of the operations above designated by the term *denomination*, viz. collective denomination, seems to be an altogether indispensable requisite. A general name is the *common*—the necessary—tie, by which a number of general or abstract ideas are fixed and fastened together in the mind.

In what respect, then, is collective methodization distinct from collective denomination? In this only, that where the word *methodization* is employed, a multitude of groupes or collections of general ideas are considered as being at the same time formed or brought together, and at the same time so constituted and disposed of, that two or more, each having its collective name or denomination, are connected together by and comprehended within some common name—some name which, being common to them both and not applied to any other, serves at the same time to distinguish them from all objects to which different names have been applied: the new and larger groupe thus formed being at the same time, in company with some other groupe or groupes formed in the same manner, formed into some still more capacious multitudinous groupe; and so on, through any number of processes of ulterior aggregation.

The course by which *lineal* methodization or arrangement is performed is that of the several subjects, in the present instance the several denominations on which, as on its subjects, it is performed, some *one* shall present itself before any other has presented itself next to that some other, and so on throughout the whole number, and that in this same order one after another they shall all present themselves.

To effect and secure this object, the accomplishment of this design, the words or visible signs by which these several groupes are respectively represented and presented to the mind are so placed as to present themselves to the eye of every reader in the course or order thus appointed as above.

¹ For the unnamed daughters of Adam—and presumably Eve—see Genesis 5: 4. In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Continue this subject under the head of *Language*, to which make reference.'

² See Ch. 6, pp. 55–78 below.

From this master operation all the other operations in some way or other, several of them directly, are wont to receive direction and assistance.

The operation of *communication* of ideas, as performed by its peculiar instrument *discourse* or *language*—will in the next and last place fall to be considered. To this operation, that of methodization will be found capable of rendering the most essential and in some measure indispensable assistance. But antecedently to this so will it, and in an immediate and manifestly visible way will it, be found capable of rendering assistance to the operations of *retention*, *judicial decision*, and *invention*, and the greater the assistance, the larger the scale upon which it happens to them respectively to be performed.^a

§ 7. *Class VI. Operations, by the performance of which, by means of the operation of designation and expression, communication of the ideas formed in one mind is made to, and these ideas are as it were transferred into, another*¹

Discourse or discoursing. In the course of this operation, ideas having been in one mind formed or lodged, and therein associated with and as it were attached and fastened to certain of the *signs*, of which discourse or language is composed, are out of that mind *expressed*, i.e. pressed out, for the purpose of their being *received* into—or say finding *reception* in—another.

1. *Signs* by means of which the operation is performed.—2. Minds to which, and *modes* in which, application is made of these signs,—from these two sources taken together, may the operation be seen to receive whatsoever modifications it admits of.

A difference, in the nature of the *signs* capable of being employed, is produced by a correspondent difference in the nature of the *sense*: of that one of the five *senses* to which the discourse is made to address itself.

The *hearing*—its organ the *ear*—the *sight*—its organ the *eye*—the *touch*—its organ the skin, and more particularly the skin of the hand—to all these *senses* has what is called *discourse* been made to address itself. *Audible*, *visible*, and *tangible*—such accordingly has respectively been the nature of the *signs* of which in these several cases discourse, this organ of the mind, has been composed.

Till a comparatively late point in the time of human existence, of all these sorts of *signs*, those which address themselves to the *ear* were

^a See Ch. ||. Methodization.²

¹ Bentham has noted at this point: ‘⚡ 14 Oct. 1814. Quere whether to leave in this place the doctrine of *Signs*, or to post it off to Methodization?’ ² See Ch. 6, pp. 55–78 below.

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almost the only ones in actual existence: to the infinite multitude and variety of these, the few that as yet in those days addressed themselves *immediately* to the *eye* formed but a feeble supplement, and a still more feeble and inadequate *succedaneum*.

Through the medium of the French word *Langue*—a *tongue*, *Language*—in French *Langage*—the discourse of the *tongue*—is derived from the Latin, *lingua*, a tongue. When addressed *to* the ear, it is *from* the tongue that the discourse addresses itself. For the product of the operation called *discourse*, in the form in which it addresses itself to the eye, as contradistinguished from that in which it addresses itself to the ear, neither the French, nor the Latin, nor the English, affords any proper appellative.

French or English *language*—French or English *tongue*—if applied to the contents of a manuscript or a printed book, a palpable contradiction and inconsistency will, upon consideration, be found involved in any one of these expressions.

Yet for these solecisms, palpable as they are, the demand is frequent, and so urgent, as scarcely to be resisted.

Writing, including its comparatively recent improvements such as printing, engraving, &c., is in every case discourse addressed to the eye. But to this organ, discourse in this form has been found capable of addressing itself in either of two ways: 1. in an unimmediate way, through the medium and intervention of discourse addressed to the *ear*—i.e. of articulate sounds, or 2. in an immediate way, without the intervention of discourse in that form or any other form.

In the first case, sounds—audible signs—are the immediate signs of thought—it is of these audible signs that visible characters are the signs—and it is only in this comparatively remote way that the function of signs of thought is performed by the visible characters.

In the other case, thought is some how or other performed in an immediate way by the visible characters.

Of these two modes the former is the only one familiar to the generality of civilized nations.

The other is exemplified in the vast empire of China—in the empire of Japan, and in some of the states subject to the dominion or ascendancy of the Chinese.

A remarkable circumstance is—that the Japanese—whose audible instrument of discourse is not the same with that of the Chinese—has little or no affinity with that of the Chinese, employ the same visible instrument, the same characters: and so in the case of those other inferior states in that part of the world.¹

¹ See, for instance, Engelbertus Kæmpfer, *The History of Japan, giving An Account of the ancient and present State and Government of that Empire; of Its Temples, Palaces,*

Compared with the footing on which it is in European practice, great must be the incommodiousness of the instruments of discourse as employed in these Eastern Nations; and accordingly the more particularly it is seen into and the nature of it understood, the more manifest are the imperfection[s] which it labours under.

But for the consideration of these imperfections in the instrument of human discourse and the consequent imperfections in the state of human thought, the proper place will be under the head of *Discourse* or *Language*.¹

Mean time, concerning this inaudible and purely visible instrument of discourse, thus much is *certain*, viz. that of the characters of which it is composed, there is not one that can ever be *spoken* of but through the medium of an audible sign. But if, on the occasion of its being spoken of, each visible sign is provided with a correspondent audible one, it has thereby a distinct name: and in this way and thus far, the Chinese instrument of discourse is placed upon a footing with that of Europe.

A name, therefore, in a word an audible name, every such visible character can not but have, in whatsoever nation employed, the Chinese for example or the Japanese. But what is possible is—that in the one nation a given character has one audible name, in another nation, another: and such it should seem is ⟨. . .⟩ reported to be the fact—to be actually the state of the case.²

The *touch* has been mentioned above as one of the three senses through the medium of which the operations of discourse are capable of being performed. This accordingly is a medium through which, in the case of the blind, it is customarily carried on, in many well-known instances.³ But where this one of the three conversible senses is in

Castles and other Buildings; of Its Metals, Minerals, Trees, Plants, Animals, Birds and Fishes; of The Chronology and Succession of the Emperors, Ecclesiastical and Secular; of The Original Descent, Religions, Customs, and Manufactures of the Natives, and of their Trade and Commerce with the Dutch and Chinese. Together with a Description of the Kingdom of Siam, trans. J.G. Scheuchzer, 2 vols., London, 1727, i. 84, pointing out that the Chinese had introduced ‘the learned and significant Character language’ of China into Japan, that it was ‘likewise receiv’d in *Corea, Tunquin*, and other neighbouring Kingdoms’, and that the ‘native of *Japan* doth not understand one word’ of the ‘three different languages’ spoken in China.

¹ See Chs. 12–17, pp. 140–82 below.

² See, for instance, John Barrow, *Travels in China, containing descriptions, observations, and comparisons, made and collected in the course of a short residence at the Imperial Palace of Yuen-Min-Yuen, and on a subsequent journey through the country from Peking to Canton. In which it is attempted to appreciate the rank that this extraordinary empire may be considered to hold in the scale of civilized nations*, London, 1804, p. 256: ‘Just as a piece of music laid before several persons of different nations of Europe would be played by each in the same key, the same measure, and the same air, so would the Chinese characters be equally understood by the natives of Japan, Tunquin, and Cochin-China; yet each would give them different names or sounds, that would be wholly unintelligible to one another.’

³ Bentham may have had in mind the case of Nicholas Saunderson (bap. 1683, d. 1739), Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at the University of Oxford 1711–39, who,

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this way employed, it is never any otherwise than in a remote way, viz. through the intervention of one of the other two, if such they may be called, *conversible* ones.¹

In the case even of a blind person, this medium may be composed not only of the ordinary audible, but of the ordinary visible signs, if so it be that he was once in possession of the sense of sight, and in that time obtained an acquaintance with the use and import of the ordinary visible characters.

Of late years the faculty of discourse has even been communicated to persons who from their birth were deaf, and from that cause or any other at the same time dumb: but in all these cases he has been in possession of the sense of seeing, and thereby has been rendered susceptible of discourse and converse by means of visible characters.²

having lost his sight in infancy owing to smallpox, used ‘palpable arithmetic’, a device consisting of a board with hundreds of small holes into which pins could be set, in order to carry out by touch complex arithmetical and algebraical calculations and to describe geometrical figures: see [John Colson], ‘Dr. Saunderson’s Palpable Arithmetic Decypher’d’, in Nicholas Saunderson, *The Elements of Algebra in Ten Books*, Cambridge, 1740, i. pp. xx–xxvi. The use of relief characters in order to permit the blind to read through the sense of touch had been advocated by Denis Diderot (1713–84) in ‘Lettre sur les Aveugles, a l’usage de ceux qui voient’, London, 1749, a pioneering discussion of the education of the blind, which includes a fictionalized death-bed conversation between Saunderson and his priest Gervaise Holies. Valentin Haüy (1745–1822), the author of *Essai sur l’éducation des aveugles, ou Exposé de différens moyens, vérifiés par l’expérience, pour les mettre en état de lire, à l’aide du tact, d’imprimer des Livres dans lesquels ils puissent prendre des connoissances de Langues, d’Histoire, de Géographie, de Musique, &c., d’exécuter différens travaux relatifs aux Métiers, &c.*, Paris, 1786, had founded the Institution Nationale des Jeunes Aveugles, the first school for the blind, in Paris in 1784 and had printed books in relief. Haüy had gone on to help found schools for the blind in Berlin in 1806 and St Petersburg in 1809.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Exemplify: viz. 1. Finger language. 2. Tangible diagrams. 3. Tangibly marked cards. 4. Tangible musical notes.’

For early accounts of ‘finger language’, that is communication either by the use of a manual alphabet or gestural signs, see, for instance, Juan Pablo Bonet, *Redvction de las letras, y arte para enseñar a ablar los mvdos*, Madrid, 1620, and George Dalgarno, ‘Didascalocophus Or The Deaf and Dumb mans Tutor, To which is added A Discourse of the Nature and number of Double Consonants: Both which Tracts being the first (for what the Author knows) that have been published upon either of the Subjects’, Oxford, 1680. Charles-Michel, Abbé de l’Epée (1712–89), founder of the Institut Nationale des Jeune Sourds-Muets in Paris in the 1780s, taught his pupils by a combined method of a finger alphabet and methodical signs.

As well as Nicholas Saunderson’s invention of ‘palpable arithmetic’, Christian Niesen (1733–84) developed a variety of tangible devices for teaching algebra, trigonometry, geometry, and geography, to the blind Johann Ludwig Weissenbourg or Weissenburg (1752–1800): see his *Rechenkunst für Sehende und Blinde*, Mannheim, 1773 and *Algebra für Sehende und Blinde*, Mannheim, 1777.

The Viennese pianist Maria Theresia von Paradis (1759–1824) used a music board with raised lines and markers for notes and John Stanley (1712–86), London musician, invented an apparatus for teaching music to the blind.

² The first school in Britain to teach deaf and dumb children to read, write, and speak had been Braidwood’s Academy for the Deaf and Dumb established at Edinburgh in 1760 by Thomas Braidwood (1715–1806). In 1783 Braidwood moved his Academy to Hackney,

Should a human being ever be found unfortunate enough to have been from its birth destitute of the sense of sight, as well as of that of hearing, to communicate to him the faculty of converse or discourse in any degree or to any purpose will, it seems evident, be necessarily found altogether impracticable.

In the same deplorable case will any person be, who, being born deaf and dumb or deaf, shall have lost his sight without having as yet received in any competent degree that sort of intellectual and literary instruction of which persons labouring under that complicated imperfection are susceptible.

The different classes called *Parts of Speech* into which in each and every particular language these signs have been distributed or found distributable—the mode and order in respect of priority in which the formation of these signs respectively appears to have taken place—these are topics which will be found in our way in a somewhat more advanced stage.^a

2. *Minds* to which—*modes* in which—application is made of these *signs*.

The mind to which on any occasion application is made of these signs is either the mind of that person alone by whom they are employed, or the mind of some other person: in the latter case, the *use* made of them may be *stiled* the *transitive* use; in the other case, the *intransitive*.^b

Thus it is that, how intimately so ever connected, *designation* (simple designation) and *discoursing* are different operations: without *designation*, *discoursing* could not have taken place: but, without discoursing,

^a See post Ch. ||.¹

^b By some of the grammarians whose works are in present use, *verbs* stand thus distinguished into *transitive* and *intransitive*: *transitive* are those which are more commonly termed active; intransitive those which are more commonly termed *neuter*.² An instance of the *active* or *transitive* verb is *ferio*, I strike: an instance of the neuter or intransitive verb is *curro*, I run. Not but that in the intransitive verb *agency* is expressed: but so is *passion*, or say, to avoid ambiguity, *patiency* likewise: and so it is that in one and the same person, the agent and the patient are comprized: the agent, the volitional part of his mind: the patient or patients, those parts of his bodily frame by the action of which the operation called *running* is performed.

London, where in 1784 his nephew Joseph Watson (1764/5–1829) began working with him and in 1792 became the first Superintendent of the Asylum for the Support and Education of the Deaf and Dumb Children of the Poor, originally in Fort Place, Grange Road, Bermondsey, but from 1809 in purpose-built premises in Old Kent Road.

¹ Bentham does not address these topics in 'Essay on Logic', but does so in 'Universal Grammar', Part II, pp. 384–402 below.

² See, for instance, Robert Lowth, *A short Introduction to English Grammar: with critical notes*, London, 1762, pp. 44–5.

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designation may, and at present, to a great extent, frequently does, take place.

Not that, had it not been for the purpose of *discourse*, *designation*, there seems reason to think, would ever have taken place: it is accordingly, as it should seem, to its transitive use that *discourse* or *language* is indebted for its existence.

So much more conspicuous is the *transitive* use of discourse or language, that, in comparison of it, the *intransitive* seems scarcely to have obtained notice.^a

In importance, however, it is second only to the transitive use. By its transitive use, the collections of these signs are only the vehicle of thought: by its intransitive use, it is an instrument employed in the creation and fixation of thought itself. Uncloathed as yet in words, or stript of them, thoughts are but dreams: as the clouds in the sky, they float in the mind one moment and vanish out of it the next. But for these fixt and fixative signs nothing that ever bore the name of *art* or *science* could ever have come into existence. Whatsoever may have been the more remote and recondite causes, it is to the superior amplitude to which, in respect of the use made of it in his own mind, man has been able to extend the mass of his language that, as much as to any thing else, man, it should seem, stands more immediately indebted for whatsoever superiority in the scale of perfection and intelligence he possesses as compared with the animals who come nearest to him in this scale.

Without language, not only would men have been incapable of communicating each man his own thoughts to other men, but compared with what in the existing state of things he possesses, the stock of his own ideas would in point of number have been as nothing: while each of them taken by itself would have been indeterminate and flitting.

Of the seven or more distinguishable mental operations¹ to the performance of which language, now that it is formed, is instrumental and subservient, viz. 1. perception &c., 2. recollection, 3. attention &c., 4. abstraction, whence imagination and invention, 5. judication, 6. designation, and 7. converse or communication of ideas, this of

^a The transitive was the only original use.²

¹ Bentham has added the following note at this point: '3 Dec^r 1815. Several more now observed—See *Chre.* IV. Nomenclature', i.e. 'Essay on Nomenclature and Classification', *Chrestomathia* (CW), Appendix IV, pp. 163–6 n., where seventeen operations are identified.

² In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'But as to this, consult Locke &c.' For Locke on the forming of 'external sensible Signs' representing 'those invisible *Ideas*, which [man's] thoughts are made up of' for the purpose of communication see *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* (first published in 1689), ed. P.H. Nidditch, Oxford, 1975 (*The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke*), Bk III, esp. Ch. II, § 1, pp. 404–5.

communication of ideas is but one. Look back upon these others, and you will see that there is scarce one of them to which in respect of this its intransitive use, to which in the character of a spring as well as a regulator of thoughts, language is not in an eminent degree subservient.¹

To the communication of ideas by means of discourse two minds at least are necessary; viz. the *communicating* mind and the *recipient* mind.

On the occasion of any such communication thus made, on each side, viz. as well the communicator's as the recipient's, be the matter communicated what it may, there may be partakers, persons occupied, persons bearing a part, in any number.

Where the signs employed in the discourse are of the audible kind—i.e. where it is by word of mouth that the communication is made, true it is that, on the side of the communicator, two persons can not very conveniently or effectually be operating at the same time: where two persons are speaking at once, both may be continually heard, neither can compleatly be understood. But so that by one at a time, and no more, the audible part of the discourse is carried on, to the discourse thus communicated, others on the same side, others in any number, may all along be participating: signs of assent and concurrence being all along given by occasional audible sounds, by gestures, by deportment, or in all three ways at once.

¹ Bentham originally intended the following passage at UC cii. 141 (29 July 1814) to be inserted here, but subsequently cancelled the text:

‘§ ||. *Modes in which mind is operated upon by mind by means of language.*

‘1. Teaching. A man can not in any way apply language to its transitive use, but in some shape or other, to some effect or other, he communicates, or at least seeks to communicate, *information*: he communicates information, and thereby in so far as to communicate information is *to teach*, he teaches. Of all the modes of operation upon mind, *teaching* is therefore the first, and most constantly in use.

‘In common discourse, teaching has, it is true, a narrow sense: conveying information in some shape in which the possession of it is a mark of superiority, the demand for it of inferiority, and in which neither the reception nor the communication of it is altogether unattended with exertion and difficulty.

‘2. Learning. In so far as the operation of *teaching* is attended by its intended consequence, on the other part—on the part of the person to whom the discourse is addressed or rather for whose information it is intended, *learning*, or as in some cases it is called *knowledge*, is the counterpart and result.

‘In many cases, however, the nature of this operation, as characterized by its effect or by its object, is, as will be seen, if not studiously, yet naturally covered and concealed. Concealed it is, in so far as the personality of the teacher, and thence the connection which it has with the subject of the discourse, is kept from being observed by the person to whose mind it is intended that the ideas in question should be conveyed.

‘For example, in all reasonings on the occasion of which the dependence is on the force of the reasoning, independently of the authority of him by whom it is employed. So likewise, where the person by whom the discourse is uttered is manifestly no other than the reporter of a discourse which for its author has had some one else.’

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Where the signs are of the visible kind—for example by written characters, in this case with no other additional labour than that of signature, any number of persons may act on the communicator's side, as easily as any one singly.

Constantly unilateral, or reciprocating. Constantly unilateral the discourse may be said to be where, of the two parties to the discourse, each keeps constantly to the same side: the communicator never taking the part of the recipient, the recipient never taking the part of the communicator; reciprocating where the same person who at one portion of the time employed in the discourse bears the one part, bears at another portion of the time the other part.

And as to the reciprocation, it may be on one side alone, and that on either side, or on both sides.

Of discourse the only immediate *subject* is the state of the communicator's mind: in other words, of some one or more of the faculties belonging to it. Of this proposition, the truth ere long, it is believed, will be made apparent.^{a 1}

The faculty the state of which is thus declared may be either the *active* faculty (to which belongs the *volitional* faculty) or the *passive* faculty.

If it be the *volitional* branch of the active faculty, the discourse, in and by which expression is given to it, will be either a *wish*, a *petition*, a *request*, or a *command*, of which distinctions notice will be taken further on.^b

If it be a branch of the passive faculty, that branch will be either the *perception*, the *retentive* faculty, or the *judgment*.

If it be the perceptive faculty, the object or subject by which the sensation is produced, the object the action of which is the exciting cause, can not but be present and in action at the time of the expression: at the time of the declaration made, for if that object be not present, the faculty the state of which is declared, can not, if the declaration be true, [be] other than the *memory*.

Of the case where the faculty the state of which is declared is the perceptive faculty—or of the case in which it is the retentive faculty, the memory—no separate consideration need be made: for seldom indeed

^a See | |.¹

^b See | |.²

¹ Bentham, in fact, goes on immediately to demonstrate this proposition. For further discussions see 'Universal Grammar', Part I, § 8, pp. 373–9 below, and Appendix, 'Propositions what—why brought to view before single words', pp. 429–31 below.

² Bentham does not, in fact, go on to discuss these distinctions in 'Essay on Logic', though he does so in 'Universal Grammar', Part I, § 8, pp. 373–9 below and Appendix, 'Of improper moods', pp. 444–6 below.

In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ On this account, topic Faculties should be anteposed to this?'

is either the perceptive faculty or the memory in exercise or operated upon, but an act or exercise of the judicial faculty is mixt with it.¹

Remains for consideration the judicial faculty.

When concerning the state of the judicial faculty a declaration is expressed, a persuasion in some shape or other, an opinion, a belief, in relation to some object or other is thereby expressed—the existence of it declared.

The declared subject of this persuasion will be the state either of the communicator's own mind, or of some exterior object or aggregate of exterior objects—exterior, viz. in relation to his own mind.

The portion of time in or with reference to which the state of this exterior object or aggregate of objects is considered and declared, will, with reference to the portion of *time* in which the declaration is made, be either present, past or future: or all three or any two of those portions of relative time.

The exterior objects concerning which such declaration is made will belong either to the class of *persons* or to that of *things*, or to both these classes.

In respect of mobility, the state in which, at any such given point of time, they are thus considered as existing will be either a quiescent state, i.e. a state of rest, or a moving state, i.e. a state of motion.

When considered as the result of motion, any state of things is termed an *event*.

Considered as having had for its cause an exertion of the *volitional* faculty, whether on the part of a person or of a thing, an event is itself termed an *action*, or is considered as having *action*—an *action*—for its cause.

It is only through some *sense* or *senses*, *external* or *internal*—i.e. *physical* or *psychical*—that any thing can be *known* to a man; or (to speak more correctly) that, concerning any object or aggregate of objects, any *persuasion* can be obtained.

In so far as it is from *his own* sense or senses, external or internal, that the persuasion which on the occasion in question is expressed by the communicator is represented by him as obtained, the persuasion is said to be *indigenous*: in so far as it is from a declaration made, or supposed to have been, by any other person that the persuasion so expressed is represented as being derived, it may be stiled an *adoptive* persuasion.

The existence of any expressible state of *things*, or of persons, or of both, whether it be *quiescent* or *motional* or both, at any given point or portion of time, is what is called a *fact*—or a *matter of fact*.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'In a Note, instance the case of *vision*.'

CH. 3. OPERATIONS

In so far as the acts of the perception, the memory or the judgment, the existence of which [are],¹ in and by the discourse held by the communicator in question, represented as being the results of the exercise not of his own faculties but of the faculties of some other person, the declaration so made by the communicator in question is termed *a Report*:—a Report, made concerning the state of things or persons which is therein and thereby averred and declared.

In this case, and thus far, the only matter of fact of which, by such his communication, the Communicator, as such, declares the existence, is the matter of fact [of] which, to the purport in question, at the time in question if mentioned, a declaration was by this other person made.

At the time of the communication made, that which is declared as being present to the mind of the communicator is neither more nor less than a *recollection*, or more correctly, the persuasion of the existence of a recollection, a work of the memory, by which the fact of his having at the time in question, by means of one or more of his senses, received and obtained a perception of the matter of fact so described as above—the fact that at the time in question, by the person in question, a declaration to the purport or effect in question was made.

To the declaration of the existence [of] such recollection—or rather of a *persuasion* of the existence of such recollection—may or may not be added, as it may happen, a persuasion concerning—a persuasion affirmative or disaffirmative of—the truth—the actual existence—of the supposed matter of fact the existence of which was the subject of the report in question, supposing such report to have been made, as, according to the recollection, it was made.

Amusement, i.e. present pleasure, or else information, i.e. if the instruction be of the useful kind, a supposed source of future pleasure or of exemption from future pain or both—the production of one or other of these effects or both is what the discourse in question has for its intermediate and special end or object, in so far as for its more general object it has the well-being of the individual or individuals to whom it is addressed.

Mere amusement—as in case of a song, or other poem, a narrative real or fictitious—abstraction made of all instruction in the way of moral precept or scientific information.²

Except in the comparatively narrow case above described,³ when *information* is professed to be given, *judgment*, viz. the judgment existing or declared to exist concerning the matter in question in the

¹ MS 'is'.

² The sentence appears to have been abandoned at this point.

³ The 'comparatively narrow case' is perhaps the communication of an indigenous persuasion.

mind of the alledged informant, is the utmost that in truth is communicated or ought to be considered as expressed.

Discourse, nothing but a persuasion:—practical inference, moderation: i.e. habitually declared recognition of the above truth.

Fallibility of human persuasion—more or less probable falsity of all declarations, by which the existence of a persuasion to any effect is asserted—falsity, whether accompanied or not with *self-consciousness*, in the former of which cases it is termed *mendacity*—these are among the truth[s] which, whether it be for the exclusion of obstinate error, or for the exclusion of arrogance, overbearingness, obstinacy, and violence, ought never to be out of mind.

Actual or *hypothetical*—to every thing that comes under the denomination of a wish will one or other of these epithets be found to agree: actual the wish may be termed, if in the state of things the existence of which is believed by the individual in question such is actually [h]is wish: *hypothetical*, if it be only on the supposition that things were in this or that state, depicted by his imagination, that the existence [of] the state of things thus wished for would be the object of his desire.

A hypothetical wish as thus described is what is termed a velleity.

From the Latin of the Aristotelian Logicians, *velleitas*, through the medium of the modern French language, *velléité*, the word has introduced itself into the English.

Chapter 4.

IV. Faculties; V. Instrument; VI. Uses; VII. Functions

§ 1. IV. *Faculties, to which Logic gives direction and assistance*

The *faculties* which it may occasionally belong to Logic to call forth into exercise, and give assistance and direction to, are neither more nor fewer than the whole number of distinguishable faculties in the human frame. If there be any to which it will not be seen to apply in so immediate and constant a way as it does to the rest, yet neither can these any more than those fail to fall on this or that occasion, for this or that purpose, within the field of its cognizance.

Of the faculties of the human frame the following may be considered as the proximate division.

Passive and *active*—in one or other of these two divisions may every distinguishable faculty appertaining to the human frame be considered as included.

Physically passive and psychically¹ passive—under the one or the other of these appellations may be included whatsoever faculties belong to the class of sensitively passive ones:—physically passive, the sensitively passive faculties by which man is enabled and made to experience such sensations as present themselves as having their seat in some determinate part of the body: psychologically passive, the sensitively passive faculties by which man is enabled and made to experience the sensations which, not presenting themselves as having their seat in any determinate part of the body, spring up to all appearance immediately and in the first instance in the mind.

Pathematically passive and *apathematically* passive: under the one or the other of these appellations may be included whatsoever faculties belong to the class of physically passive ones: *pathematically* passive, corresponding to those corporeal impressions in the case in which they are accompanied either with pleasure or with pain: *apathematically* passive, corresponding to those impressions in any case in which they are not accompanied either with pleasure or with pain, with feelings of the pleasant or with feelings of the unpleasant class.

While with the appetite of thirst upon him a man drinks, the liquid being for example water—a liquid destitute of all exhilarating as well as of all sapid properties—so long as the appetite is not yet compleatly satisfied, a sensation of the pleasurable kind continues: the appetite compleatly satisfied, the operation may continue some little time

¹ MS orig. 'psychologically'.

without being productive of pain any more than of pleasure: continued for a certain ulterior length of time, it becomes productive of the pain applied to the purpose of extracting confessorial evidence under the Romano-Gallic, Romano-Batavian and other modifications of the Romano-Imperial law.¹

Pathemetically passive and *apathematically passive*—to impressions made *immediately* on the mental part, without passing (otherwise than by the intervention of those signs of which discourse is composed) through the corporeal part of the human frame, may this same distinction be found to apply with no less propriety and use than in the case just-mentioned.

In the hearing of three persons A, B and C, an article in a newspaper reporting the death of a person therein mentioned happens to be read: to A the deceased was altogether unknown, to the second an useful friend, to the third a troublesome enemy: in the mind of the first the intelligence produces no sensation at all, in that of the second an unpleasant, in that of the third a pleasant one.²

Originally active and *derivatively* active—under one or other of these appellations may be comprized every distinguishable modification of the active faculty of the human mind: to the head of the originally active faculty may be referred every exercise or determination of the will, or say the volitional faculty, when considered apart from any operation or act performed in consequence and pursuance of it. An instance of the exercise of the originally active faculty is a mere wish for the gratification of which, whether by reason of consciousness of want of power or at the suggestion of prudence, no act is performed.

Physically active and psychically³ active—under one or other of these appellations may be comprized every modification of the derivatively active faculty: to the head of the physically active branch of

¹ For the use of torture under Roman Law see *The Digest of Justinian*, trans. A. Watson, 4 vols., Philadelphia, 1998, Bk. 48, § 18, iv. 354–9. In France judicial torture (*question*) had been used to obtain either a confession before an individual's guilt had been determined (*question préparatoire*) or to obtain the names of accomplices from an individual whose guilt had been determined and who had been sentenced to death (*question préalable*). Water torture (*question d'eau*), involving the forced ingurgitation of water, was a *question extraordinaire* which could only be inflicted upon men, and generally followed the ineffectual infliction of a *question ordinaire*, usually the *estrapade*. The *question préparatoire* was abolished in 1780 and the *question préalable* in 1788.

In his reference to Romano-Batavian law, Bentham may have had in mind the so-called 'Amboyna Massacre' perpetrated in 1623 at Ambon Island in the Dutch East Indies, of which the capital was Batavia. Following rumours that English merchants, with the support of Japanese mercenaries, planned to await the arrival of an English vessel and then murder the Dutch garrison, the Governor Herman van Speult had the alleged plotters arrested. Twenty-one individuals, who had confessed to their guilt after being subjected to torture, including water torture, were subsequently executed.

² In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Substitute some known facts in history to these feigned cases.'

³ MS orig. 'psychologically'.

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this derivatively active faculty may be referred every human act in so far as any corporeal organ is employed in the exercise of it; to the psychologically active branch every human act in so far as the mind is employed in the exercise of it.

The observation made of and consideration bestowed upon these distinctions are exercises of the psychically active branch of the derivatively active faculty of the mind in the instance of him by whom these pages were composed: the committing to paper the signs of them in the form of a written discourse was an exercise of the physically active branch of the same derivatively active faculty: antecedently to the performance of these several operations, the determination taken to perform them was an exercise of the originally active faculty—the volitional.

Descending lower and lower, with Logic for its guide, into the region of particulars, sooner or later the mind would come to that list of *faculties*, which, as already intimated, agree not only in nature but with little exception even in name with the articles already brought to view under the general name of *Operations*.¹

In *number*,—and, with little exception, even in *name*,—these faculties may be, and for the purpose of correct and compleat instruction will require to be, considered as corresponding with the several *operations* of which a view has just been given:² so many *operations*, so many *faculties*: corresponding to each operation, *a faculty* considered and spoken of as if enabling a man to perform that same operation.^a

§ 2. V. Main Instrument of Logic

Grand Instrument of thought in general, and of thought directed to the purposes of *logic* in particular, the faculty of *discourse*, including the faculty of *speech*.

Under the head of the *operations*, in or to the performance of which logic is capable of being rendered serviceable, mention was made of

^a An *operation*, as there may be hereafter occasion to shew,³ an operation, as being a species of *motion*, has something of *reality* in it: a *faculty* is the name of an *entity*, a sort of *person* or *instrument*, purely fictitious, a sort of Workman by whom the Operation in question is performed. Misrepresentation in this form—*falsehood* in a word, for so, in so far as the falsehood is considered as pure from guilt in every shape, it may with strict truth be stiled—*falsehood*, howsoever pregnant with, and in no slight degree fertile in, deception, is not the less indispensably necessary to the several purposes—the purest not less than to the most impure—of language.

¹ See Ch. 3, pp. 16–34 above.

² See *ibid*.

³ Bentham, in fact, makes this point in Ch. 3, § 1, pp. 16–17 above.

the faculty of *expression*, of *discourse*, of *converse*.¹ Correspondent to this as to any other *operation*, a demand may exist, and at any rate in the present instance does exist, for the mention of a correspondent *faculty*—say the faculty of giving expression to thought—the faculty of carrying on discourse—the faculty of holding converse with other persons—or say more concisely the faculty of discourse, the faculty of converse, of which the faculty of *speech* is but one out of several modifications.

By means of this faculty—by the performance of the correspondent operations, a correspondent product has in every nation—in every tribe or groupe of human beings, howsoever barbarous and uninstructed—been brought into existence. Numberless are the shapes in which this product has among different assemblages and races of men made its appearance: and in whatsoever of these shapes it has made its appearance, one general appellation *language*—a language—is applicable to designate the assemblage of audible signs, of which, with or without a correspondent collection of *visible signs* or *characters*, it is composed: so many different collections of these signs employed by so many different tribes in the designation of the same collections of ideas, so many different languages.

Of the sort of products thus formed—thus every where formed, so great is the importance, so universally extensive the *use*, that for all sorts of purposes there may be a convenience in considering it and speaking of it in the character of an *instrument* in the hand of the *mind*—but more particularly in the hand of *logic*.²

Accordingly, while on the present occasion, for the purpose of being held up to view in the character of an instrument—an instrument of

¹ See Ch. 3, § 7, pp. 24–34 above.

² The following passage, which appears in the text at this point, has been cancelled by Bentham: ‘That language is an instrument of discourse—of communication between one mind and another—that it is the product of the sort [of] operation called *Expression*, *Discourse*, *Converse*—the work of the correspondent faculty—to speak of it in any such way is but tautology. But, as hath been observed already [see p. 29 above], it is an instrument not only of *discourse*, but of *thought* itself: an instrument, by which not only are perceptions and ideas *communicated*, but ideas *formed*: an instrument without the aid of which a man would neither be able to communicate to other minds any part of the thoughts of which the stock of his own mind is constituted, but without which the greatest stock of those possessions, which it would be possible to communicate—with which his mind, his own mind, would be furnished—would be but in an inconsiderable degree more ample, than that with which the mind of the species of animal, be it what it may, which, in the scale of perfection, approaches the nearest to his own, is commonly provided.

‘Out of six distinguishable classes of operations in which the human mind is wont to exercise itself, the formation and employment of this instrument, viz. discourse, is but one. Look back severally to the five others of which mention was made, and you will see that there is not one to which this instrument is not in a high degree subservient.’

For the operations of logic and their division into six classes see Ch. 3, pp. 16–34 above.

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thought as well as converse—it is at the same time taken for the subject of converse, it has, moreover, first in the character of an instrument of thought, then in the character of an instrument of converse, been employed and wrought with.

Accordingly, antecedently to the consideration of any of the work which Logic is competent to the performance of, or in which it is competent to give assistance, it will be necessary to enter into a separate study of the nature of this master instrument, with which it does every thing that it does, and without which the utmost which it would be capable of doing would in comparison be next to nothing.

§ 3. VI. *Uses of Logic—or, Uses to which Logic is applicable*

In this case as in any other—in the instance of this art as in regard to every other, an use is either a modification of the universal *end*, i.e. *well-being*, or a subordinate and subservient end, i.e. a *means*, capable of being employed to contribute towards the attainment of that same universal end.

Be the thing, be the object, what it may, if it neither performs nor contributes to the performance of service in either of these shapes, it is of no use—use, real use, it has none.¹

If it has any thing belonging to it that can with propriety and intelligibility be termed use, it must be either by giving encrease to the aggregate mass of pleasure or applying defalcation to the aggregate mass of pain: or else by contributing or tending to contribute in some way or other to the production of one or other or both of those ever desirable and ultimately only desirable effects.

Of the field of exercise of this art a sketch has been already given above:² the aggregate of its uses is coextensive with that field.

Operations, functions, faculties, main instrument—the relation borne by logic to all these articles has already been brought to view.³ By the art of logic, direction and assistance is given to the mind, in the carrying on of all these its various *operations*—in the performance of these its functions, in the exercise of these its faculties, in the giving employment to that main instrument: thus extensive and diversified are its uses: always remembered, that on each occasion it is only in

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Refer here to tit. *Ethics*, or take from thence some of the most general matter and insert it here.’ Bentham presumably had in mind the material reproduced as ‘Essay on Ethics’, pp. 229–314 below.

² See Ch. 2, § 3, pp. 12–15 above.

³ See Ch. 3, and Ch. 4, §§ 1–2, pp. 16–39 above, for the discussion of the operations, faculties, and the main instrument of logic. The topic of functions is discussed in § 4, p. 40 below. At some stage Bentham appears to have reversed the order of uses and functions.

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so far as, by any direction and assistance so given by it, encrease is in some shape or other given to the balance on the side of happiness, that any use that can be made of this or any other instrument can be of any real *value*.

§ 4. VII. *Functions of Logic—or, Functions, to the performance or exercise of which, in relation to other arts and sciences, Logic gives direction and assistance*

By the word *functions*, if it be not considered an exact synonym to the word *operations*, the mind will naturally be led to the idea of the sort of person expressed by its conjugate *functionary*—a *functionary*, considered in the character of a person, by whom, in virtue of some special engagement taken or task undertaken by him, these several operations will, in the prosecution of some special design or other, in relation to this or that subject or subject-matter, have come to be performed.

1. Learning—2. Using, practising, employing or applying—3. Teaching—4. Improving—viz. the *acquirement* in question—the *art*—the *science*—to one or other of these heads may be referred whatsoever courses of operations, considered as having for their ideal subject-matter any branch of art or science, have been in use to be designated by the name of *functions*, any or all of them capable of being at the same or different times exercised by the same hand, but all of them capable of being considered as the work of so many different hands at different points of time.

Of the courses or modes of action for the designation of which the word *operation* was employed, some there may be that may be found preeminently or even exclusively applicable to this or that branch of art or science, inapplicable to this or that other.

Of the more extensive courses of action for the designation of which the word *function* is here employed, there is not one that is not alike applicable without exception or distinction to every branch of *art* and *science*.

§ 5. *Distinctive character of this art¹ as compared with other arts and sciences*

What distinguishes this art from every other branch of art and science is—that in its field of action are contained the several fields of action of all those other branches of science and art: in the field of action of

¹ i.e. logic.

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this *discipline* are included the several fields of action of all those other disciplines.

By what mark then does it stand distinguished from the aggregate of those disciplines?—By its generality—its amplitude—and nothing else. Of the observations which respectively apply to the subjects of those several disciplines, those which are most general may be referred to the head of logic. In no quarter, therefore, are those boundaries fixt, by which the field of logic is separated from the respective fields of those several other and subject disciplines.

Thus in government, the territorial field of the dominion of the sovereign is composed of the territorial fields of the dominion of the several individual and particular land-owners.

For its subject or ground to work *upon*, logic—this all-embracing and all-commanding discipline—has the *mind*—the human mind—composed as it is of, and distinguishable into, the several faculties: viz. 1. perception. 2. retention. 3. re-exhibition or revocation. 4. attention. 5. abstraction. 6. judgment or internal persuasion. 7. imagination. 8. invention. 9. symbolization or denomination. 10. methodization or arrangement. 11. communication, viz. purposed or voluntary communication.¹

¹ Cf. Ch. 3, pp. 16–34 above.

Chapter 5.

Mental Operations and Faculties—Methodization—its Uses—Purposes and Subjects to which it is applicable. Advantageous effects producible by means of it

In the whole field of the art of logic, so vast is the portion occupied by the art of Methodization—so vast and at the same time so difficult to confine within any determinate [limits]—that the task of shewing what it is that the art of method can do is scarce distinguishable from the task of shewing what the art of Logic can in all its totality itself do.

Of the several distinguishable mental operations to which it belongs to the art of Logic to give direction and assistance, a list, supposed to be a compleat one, has already been brought to view. In this list, Methodization is but one article in a multitude.¹ But, in comparison of all those its associates, such is its importance, that they are all of them but, as it were, so many instruments in its hands.

No one is there to which the art of Logic is not in some way or other capable of affording direction and assistance. But neither is there any one of them to which the art of conducting this same operation termed *arrangement* or *methodization* is not in like manner capable of affording direction and assistance.

If, in the stile of Poetry and Rhetoric, Logic were to be termed a Queen, Methodization, Method, might be termed her *Prime Minister*.

Method is not the same thing as *Invention*. For from Method, Invention, it will be seen,² as well as the other operations and their correspondent faculties, is capable of receiving assistance: and a thing can not be said to be an assistant to itself.

But Method is itself the product of Invention: one of the most difficult works that it was ever employed in the execution of.

In the investigation of the uses capable of being made of this operation—or figuratively speaking of this instrument, for clearness of conception it will be proper to be careful not to confound this operation with the aggregate of the operations of which logic is capable of taking the direction, nor, as some appear to have done, with the art of *literary composition* to whatsoever subject applied.^a Co-acervation and successive exhibition—these and these alone are

^a v. infra Saunderson's Rules of Method.³

¹ See Ch. 3, pp. 16–34, esp. pp. 23–4, above.

² See § 4, p. 45 below, and Ch. 11, pp. 132–9 below.

³ See § 7, pp. 48–54 below.

strictly and properly speaking the functions of methodization—the two branches of the art.¹

Whatsoever assistance a different and distinguishable operation may be capable of receiving from methodization, it is not to methodization alone that the work performed by means of that other operation can with propriety be referred.

Great, for example, is the assistance which from this source invention has already drawn: still greater perhaps the assistance which it may yet be capable of deriving. Yet it is not by methodization alone that what has been performed in the way of invention has been performed. To chance and to analogy, great also have been its debts: to this or that single and insulated analogy presented in some happy moment by the hand of Chance.

Functions applicable to any other branch of art and science. In relation to art and science without distinction, *teaching* and *learning*, and *teaching* and *improving*: in relation to art, *practising*.²

For the exercise of these functions, method will in every branch of art and science be found capable of affording useful direction and eminent assistance.

Correctness and *compleatness*—in these intimately connected though still distinguishable qualities will be found so many properties desirable in relation to the conception formed and retained of the matter of any branch, whatsoever it be, of science.

Towards conferring on the conception these kindred qualities, be the science what it may, methodization taken, as above, in the strictest and narrowest sense of which the word is susceptible, will be found rendering indisputably serviceable assistance.

In relation to every other branch of art, Methodization, considered in respect of its *successive-location* branch, indicates as the object which, on the occasion of whatsoever is done or contrived in the practice of it, should always occupy the first place, the characteristic End in view.

An object correspondent to the end in view is composed of the *Properties* desirable on the part of the sort of *work*, whatsoever it be, which the art in question has for its *fruit*.

¹ See Ch. 6, § 2, pp. 56–9 below. In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘But may it not be considered as applicable to two sorts of subjects, viz. 1. Entities real or fictitious considered in and by themselves; 2. any portion of literary discourse considered in respect of the matter or parts of which it is composed.’ For this distinction see Ch. 6, § 1, pp. 55–6 below.

² See Ch. 10, pp. 129–31 below.

§ 1. *Methodization—its application to the assistance of the perceptive and conceptive faculties*

Examples.¹

1. Numbers in general, as disposed in the Numeration Table, in which numbers as many as can ever be wanted for any purpose, follow one another in an endless succession, having all along at every step *unit*, or number *one*, for their common difference. The order in which they follow one another is an example of the *Regula Antecessionis* or *Antecedentiæ et Consequutionis*.²

To form an idea of the use of the order thus given to them, suppose any series of numbers, though it were no more than an hundred, instead of following one another in the order exhibited in the Numeration Table, following one another in an order determined by lot:—how incomprehensible a labyrinth would be the mass composed of those numbers! how impracticable a task the obtaining any tolerable acquaintance with an art now so simple as that of common arithmetic!

Every case of systematical arrangement, performed by Division and Subdivision of aggregates or fictitious masses formed by abstraction, is an exemplification of Methodization performed in the *aggregative* or *co-acervative* mode.

§ 2. *Methodization—its application to the assistance of the memory*

The applying of this master operation in the special view and design of affording assistance to the memory by expedients directed expressly to that object has been taken for the end in view of an appropriate branch of art, termed from the Greek *Mnemonics*, or the *Mnemonic* art.

But language itself—language the indispensable instrument of all the arts and all the sciences, [is]³ itself an exemplification of the application of the power of method to the assistance of the memory: it is by means of the several signs of which language is composed—i.e. of words, taken singly or in conjunction or combination—that the ideas of objects respectively signified by them are lodged in and upon occasion called up from that fictitious receptacle, the memory.

§ 3. *Methodization, as applied to the assistance of the judgment or judicial faculty*⁴

¹ Bentham goes on to give only a single example.

² See Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 164, for ‘Lex Generalitatis, sive Antecessionis & Consequutionis’, i.e. ‘the Law of Generality, or of Antecedence and Succession’.

³ MS ‘it’.

⁴ Bentham does not appear to have written any text for this section.

§ 4. *Methodization, as applied to the inventive faculty*¹

Invention is an operation which has for its results every art and every science which at the point of time in question is in existence.

But in some instances the accession thus made to the existing fund of art and knowledge has been the result of design steadily directed to the acquisition of it: in others it has been the work of accident—design, attention and labour either not having had any part at all in the production of it, or having taken no other part than what consisted in the endeavour to turn to account and as it were ripen the fruit which accident had been the first to bring to view.

For facilitating the assistance capable of being rendered by methodization to the task of invention—viz. of invention by design—of purposed invention—such rules as have presented themselves will be found in the Chapter on Invention.^a

§ 5. *Methodization as applied to the productions of the imagination or imaginative faculty*

That without impropriety every instance of abstraction and every instance of invention are capable of being referred to the imaginative faculty has been seen already.²

But when the subject of discourse is a work stiled a *work of the imagination*, what is usually meant is a state of things or assemblage of events purely fictitious, put together and commonly sent abroad for the purpose of affording what is called amusement: amusement, viz. an assemblage of pleasures of a particular sort, commonly termed *pleasures* of the imagination.

The art in the practice of which the powers of the imaginative faculty are employed and directed to that end is termed *poetry*—or *the art of poetry*.

That, in the production of the choicest fruits of this art, accident has been thought to have borne no inconsiderable part, is testified by the common adage—*Poeta nascitur non fit*.³ But that the part borne by design is not an inconsiderable one, and that from the art of method

^a v. infra Ch. ||.⁴

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘See the Chapter on Invention [i.e. Ch. 11, pp. 132–9 below]. ☞ Should what follows be under this head or under that of Invention?’

² See Ch. 3, § 5, pp. 20–1 above.

³ i.e. ‘the poet is born, not made’. This proverbial phrase probably originated with the commentary of the scholiast Pseudo-Acro, probably Helenius Acro (*fl.* 2nd Century BC), on Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus), *Ars poetica*, 408. See *Psevdacronis scholia in Horatium vetustiora*, ed. O. Keller, 2 vols, Leipzig, 1902–4, ii. 372: ‘Multi quaerunt, utrum nascatur poeta an fiat.’

⁴ See Ch. 11, pp. 132–9 below.

in particular it is [in] use to receive very considerable assistance, is an opinion that seems not much exposed to dispute.

To attempt the rendering any assistance to the cultivators of this art is a task that will scarcely be deemed to come under the province of logic.

But for illustration sake, in the chapter allotted to the topic of invention, an example will be brought to view of an operation whereby assistance might at the time at least have been lent to the labours of the poet: viz. by the collection and exhibition of a groupe of fictions, from which, by the help of Analogy, other fictions might be deduced.^a

§ 6. *Methodization, as applied to the purpose of operating on the affections and passions*¹

§ 7. *Of Methodization, as applied to the materials or parts of a discourse or literary composition*

In any literary composition or protracted mass of discourse, such as is the whole, such must of course be the parts.

That which all discourses have in common is the different species of words called *parts of speech*, and the sentences in different forms composed of those parts of speech, and the paragraphs composed of those sentences.

If, besides these parts, there were any others that belonged to all discourses in common with one another, *methodization* would be an operation susceptible of application to the parts of a discourse, as well as to the entities which are the parts or elements of an aggregate considered as such. But, to discourses taken in the lump, there belong not such common parts.

But a set of incidents to which discourses of all kinds stands exposed are certain vices or *imperfections*, vices to which discourse in every shape is liable to labour under.—

1. Superfluity by *Irrelevancy*.—2. Superfluity by Repetition *in terminis*.—3. Superfluity by virtual Repetition.—4. Verbosity.—5. *Scantiness*.—6. *Inconsistency*, including self-contradiction.—7. *Ambiguity*.—8. *Obscurity*.—9. Confusedness.—10. Desultoriness:²

^a viz. the fictitious augmentation or diminution of human faculties, psychical & physical powers.³

¹ Bentham does not appear to have written any text for this section.

² In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Confer Ch. Properties desirable in language: and d° in style’, i.e. Chs. 12 and 16, pp. 140–53 and 170–4 below respectively.

³ Bentham discusses analogy in Ch. 11, pp. 133–4 below, but does not present any such illustration.

by these appellations are designated so many imperfections by which every discourse is liable to be stained.

Many are the cases in which a suggestion which, in the character of a precept, would be generally deemed nugatory, may yet, in the character of a memento, not only be, but be generally acknowledged to be, of use.

In one single sentence might be contained a memento, adequate to the purpose of putting the reader upon his guard—in so far as by mementos inserted in a book men can be put sufficiently upon their guard—against the falling into any of these vices.

If for separate paragraphs, in number equal to that of the vices, there can be any adequate demand, the purpose will be the subjoining in each instance something by way of explanation or example.

Repetition in *terms* as well as import, or say *literal* repetition, and repetition in import alone and not in terms—or say virtual repetition—the distinction thus expressed may, it is believed, be found to have its use.

Repetition in terms is a vice into the practice of which a writer, especially at this time of day, is not, it may naturally be imagined, in any great danger of falling.

An example of this vice—and that carried to a very extraordinary degree of enormity—may be seen in a publication of comparatively recent date; viz. the work of the late Dr Brown on the subject of | | and Admiralty Law.¹

Till this performance came out, the most extraordinary example perhaps that ever was in print, or even in manuscript, is that which is exhibited in the Koran. In the compass of a moderate sized 8^{vo}, the same proposition—and that a nonsensical one—repeated several hundreds of times.²

Repetition in import is a vice that may be practiced by a man to any extent and without his being aware of it: and great according[ly] is the extent to which the practice of it may be seen carried.

Scantiness is an imputation which, even in a case that affords just ground for it, does not very easily find its seat.

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: 'See State the number of Chapters and pages twice printed.' Bentham perhaps had in mind the fact that Arthur Browne (1756?–1805), Irish lawyer and classical scholar, Regius Professor of Civil and Canon Law 1785–6 and Regius Professor of Greek 1792–5, 1797–9, 1801–5 at the University of Dublin, discusses the same point of Roman Law on two occasions in *A Compendious View of the Civil Law, and of the Law of Admiralty, being the substance of a course of lectures read in the University of Dublin*, 2 vols., London, 1802, i. 478, ii. 421, a slip to which Bentham also refers in *The Rationale of Judicial Evidence, specially applied to English Practice*, 5 vols., London, 1827, Bk. III, Ch. XVI, ii. 376 (Bowring, vi. 491), rather than to the double printing of the same pages.

² Bentham may have had in mind the phrase 'In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful', repeated at the beginning of each of the 114 *surahs* in the Qu'ran.

ESSAY ON LOGIC

It is only in so far as a writer fails in the performance of what he has actually undertaken to perform, that any deficiency in the quantity of the matter delivered by him can be charged upon his discourse in any such character as an imperfection or a vice.

But if, having expressly or impliedly undertaken to cover by his discourse the whole of the field which he has taken in hand, he leaves untreated any part of it that is known to have been already touched upon by any other writer, he must not expect to be holden altogether guiltless by any person by whom the deficiency has been perceived.

In any list of articles—that list being expressly or impliedly given as a compleat one, in proportion as any article or articles that have a title to be considered as belonging to it be omitted, the reproach of scantiness will naturally be more readily and clearly seen to have been incurred, than where the spots omitted are such as correspond to so many larger members or portions of the discourse.^{a 1}

In the work of Saunderson, of any such distinction as that between method considered as applicable to aggregates of detached entities and method considered as applicable to the parts or members of a literary discourse, no intimation is to be found.

But taking together in hand without distinction two topics thus disparate, he exhibits under the appellative of the *laws of Method*, a string of rules.

^a Of a deficiency to which the reproach of scantiness can scarcely be regarded as inapplicable, remarkable is the example afforded in the late D^r Campbel's work intituled 'The Philosophy of Rhetoric'.¹

According to him, B. II. Ch. 5. Vol. II. p. 4—'besides *purity*, which' (he says) 'is a quality entirely grammatical, the five' (and by the article *the* he thus undertakes for the compleatness of his list) 'the five simple and original qualities of style' (what he doubtless means but does not say is qualities *desirable* in style, for assuredly they are not found in every man's style) 'of style, considered as an object to the understanding, the imagination, the passions, and the ear, are *perspicuity*, *vivacity*, *elegance*, *animation*, and *music*': meaning by '*music*', *musicalness*.

To the subject of *perspicuity*, the remainder of that same Book (Book the 2^d) is allotted:² to that of *vivacity*, the whole of his third Book;³ and with this third Book, the work ends. Elegance, animation, and musicalness—of no one of these three qualities is so much as a syllable to be found, or so much as a hint to serve as an apology for so incongruous a silence.

Yet several times in the lifetime of the Author was this work republished:⁴ always under the same all-comprehensive and not altogether unassuming title *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*.

¹ George Campbell (1719–96), Scottish philosopher, Church of Scotland minister, Principal of Marischal College, Aberdeen 1759–95, was author of *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, 2 vols., London, 1776.

² Ibid., Bk. II, Chs. VI–IX, ii. 5–155.

³ Ibid., Bk. III, ii. 157–445.

⁴ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Enquire how many Editions?' The work had been reissued in editions of 1801 and 1808.

CH. 5. METHODIZATION—ITS USES

In so many different Chapters, two sets of propositions are thus by him delivered under the name of Laws: in Ch. 30th one set, containing five under the name of Laws of Method considered in the genus: in Chapter 31st, two sets under the name of Laws of Method considered *in specie*:¹ in each set two of these laws, one pair being exhibited as extensively applicable to works of science, the other pair as extensively applicable to works on art.

I. Of his laws of method considered *in genere*, the first is stiled *Lex Brevitatis*. Though by this its title it professes not to bring to view any other virtue than this of *brevity*—to put men consequently upon their guard against any other vice than the vice or vices opposite to that virtue, viz. redundance or superfluity, yet by the explanation immediately after subjoined, the design of it appears to have included the virtue which has for its opposite the vice of scantiness: and it is with this unnamed virtue and vice that the explanation commences—‘*Nihil in disciplina desit, aut redundet*.’²

Of any such distinction as that between repetition in terms and repetition in import and not in terms, no intimation: under the one name of Tautology, both confounded. Instead of irrelevancy and repetition, to both of which ideas belong that are altogether determinate, the word *redundance* employed, by which nothing more determinate is expressed than the sentiment of disapprobation attached by the person in question to the discourse in question in consideration of its quantity, no determinate ground for that disapprobation being brought to view.

To these two vices thus denominated, viz. Redundance and Tautology, a note of reprobation is applied: the effect of them, he says, is to give birth to nausea. After this, would any one have expected to find a case in which he is seen recommending the practice of the vices thus denominated? Yet two such cases there are. One is that which has place in so far as it is of examples, another that which has place in so far as it is of commentaries, that the discourse in question is composed. In both those cases, such is the awkwardness of his expression, though assuredly such was not his meaning, what he gives us to understand is that the more redundancy and tautology there is, the better.³

¹ See Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, Lib. III, Cap. XXX. *De Ordine & Methodo in Genere*, and Cap. XXXI. *De Methodis in Specie*, pp. 162–5 and 165–7 respectively.

² Ibid., p. 163, i.e. ‘Let nothing be lacking, or redundant, in the discipline.’

³ Ibid., pp. 163–4: ‘Redundantia vero & Tautologia in præceptis nauseam pariunt: in præceptis dico, non in exemplis, aut commentariis; *exempla* enim si sint frequentiora, & *commentarii* si pleniores, ita non damnamus, at probemus magis’, i.e. ‘Indeed redundancy and tautology in the precepts give rise to nausea: I say in precepts, not in examples or commentaries; for if examples are more frequent, and commentaries more extensive, we do not condemn them, but rather we approve of them.’

II. Next comes a proposition stiled the Law of Harmony—*Lex Harmoniæ*: by which, when explained, it appears that what is meant to be conveyed is neither more nor less than a warning against the vice of inconsistency: a vice at the thought [of] which an expression of ill-humour is ejaculated. '*Doctrinæ singulæ partes inter se consentiant*'. Pessimè docet, qui quod hic ponit, alibi per incogitantiam evertit';^a better had it been opposite. For, for its justice, the reproach of inconsistency depends not upon success—not upon the comparative propriety of the two mutually contradictory propositions.

III. In the third place comes his *Lex Unitatis, sive Homogeneæ*: in its import and effect another warning, though a little more particular than before, against irrelevancy.

Thereupon comes the explanation, and in it a premature distinction between the two impliedly supposed incompatible cases, viz. that in which the discourse has a subject, and that in which it has an end: for that to any one discourse there should be at the same time a subject and an end is a case the impossibility of which is virtually assumed. But more of this a little farther on.¹

'*Nihil in doctrina præcipiatur, quod non sit subjecto aut fini homogeneum*. Dico *Subjecto*, propter scientias; *Fini* propter artes & prudentias. Damnat *Aristoteles* merito transitum à genere ad genus.'²

IV. In the fourth place comes his *Lex Generalitatis, sive Antecessionis & Consequutionis*: Law of Generality, or of Precedence and Subsequence.

Follows an explanation: of which, after this double title, there surely is no small need. In teaching let that one of two things stand first, without which the other can not be understood, while without this last mentioned, the first mentioned may be understood. '*Præcedat in docendo id, sine quo alterum intelligi nequit, sed ipsum sine altero*.'

Thereupon, in guise of a reason, comes an observation which, under that guise, is in fact nothing better than a *petitio principii*—a begging of the question. For it is necessary (continues he) that those things which follow should receive light and strength from these things which go before:—not these from those.³

^a p. 164.⁴

¹ See p. 53 below, though Bentham appears to have abandoned the passage.

² Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 164, i.e. 'Nothing should be taught in the doctrine which is not homogeneous either to the subject or to the end. I say to the subject for the sake of the sciences; to the end for the sake of the arts and prudences. Aristotle justly condemns the transition from genus to genus.' Sanderson may have had in mind Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, x. iii. 1054b–1055a.

³ Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 164: 'Lumen enim accipiant oportet, & robur, sequentia à præcedentibus; non hæc ab illis.'

⁴ i.e. 'The separate parts of a doctrine should all harmonize among themselves. He

In substance and import, of the law here in question, the meaning, it must already have been observed, is neither more nor less than the rule herein brought to view, having the short title of *Independentia priora*.¹ By the *antecessionis et consequutionis*, intimation of this import is plainly enough given. But over this apposite enough and expressive title, precedence is given to the title *Lex Generalitatis*—Law of Generality, than which a more inapposite one could scarcely have been found.

V. Fifth and last of the rules, or laws as they are stiled, delivered in this Chapter comes that which is called *Lex Connexionis*,² under which head are meant to be given, as the explanation shews, not one rule merely, but two rules, or rather three, which, though in no wise inconsistent, are altogether different.

'*Singulæ partes doctrinæ* (says the rule) *aptis transitionibus connectantur*.' Let all the several parts of the instruction be connected with one another by apt transitions.

Thereupon comes the explanation: in and by which, though in a manner somewhat indirect and inexplicit, no fewer, as just observed, than three distinguishable rules. The first is—to avoid desultoriness: the second, to employ the requisite means for pointing out such connections as have place among the parts of the discourse: the third is to give Synoptic Tables.

By frequent interruptions (says he, and very truly) the conceptive and retentive faculties are disturbed:—in this is implied the memento to avoid desultoriness:—but by apt colligation (continues he), i.e. by apt ligaments, both (i.e. both conception and memory) will be assisted, and the reason of the method will be made manifest.³

teaches very badly who asserts something in one place, and overturns it through carelessness elsewhere.'

¹ Bentham discusses the rule *Independentia priora* in a fragment at UC ci. 343 (10 October 1814): 'When two words present themselves together for exposition, examine and observe whether there be not between them such a relation that one of them, and that one alone, is capable of being explained while the other remains unexplained and not understood: if so, be careful that the explanation given of that one shall precede the explanation given of the other.'

'Reason 1. Brought to view before the explanation, the as yet unexplained article is brought to view without explanation: but if without explanation it can be understood, the explanation is of no use.'

'Reason 2. If of one article in the explanation of which the mention of the other is requisite, the explanation given is put first, here will be an object more or less unknown and obscure perpetually standing in the way: the unexplained object will, in the character of an opaque body, be floating about in the mind and intercepting whatsoever light may from any other quarter have been thrown upon the object placed for explanation: and, between the two, the attention will be distracted, and no clear view will be taken of either of them.'

² Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 164.

³ Ibid.: 'Crebris enim interruptionibus turbantur intellectus & memoria: apta vero colligatione & utrumque juvabitur, & methodi ratio manifesta fiet.'

In what follows in the last place, there seems to have been either some misprint or some defect in grammar. 'Operæ facturus præcium' (it should have been *pretium*) 'qui docet Methodi connexionem & rationem universam *tabula* aliqua; sive *diagraphe* compendiaria discipulis repræsentabit.'

To give to this proposition what seems to have been its intended import, indeed to give to it any import at all, two words, viz. *est* and *si*. With these two words inserted in what seem to be the requisite places the sentence will stand thus—*Operæ facturus pretium {est} qui docet, {si} Methodi connexionem et rationem universam tabulâ aliquâ, sive diagraphe compendiariâ, discipulis representabit.* 'A teacher will find his labour well repaid, if in some table or compendious draught he will exhibit to his pupils the connection and universal reason of his method.'—Though, by reason of the necessarily extreme generality of the ideas belonging to the subject and the rather more than necessary vagueness and indeterminateness of the words here employed for the giving expression to them, the information thus given is not altogether so instructive and satisfactory as could be wished, it may be, however, if attended to, not altogether without its use.

Here ends his thirtieth Chapter intituled Concerning Order and Method in general: *De Ordine et Methodo in genere*: follows his 31st intituled Concerning Method *in Specie*. Of the proficiency made by the Instructor in the Art which he is thus employed in teaching, the specimen here exhibited must be confessed to be rather an unhappy one.

Four propositions delivered all of them, lest the name of *Rules* should not be assuming enough, by the name of *Laws*: and of these laws, one is a repetition of the other, and both of them denominated by the same name, *Lex Generalitatis*,¹ which in the last preceding Chapter we have seen prefixed to another Rule or Law which has not so much as a word in common with them.² The two other self-styled Laws, not Laws or Rules but observations having something of the aspect of a definition, but nothing of that of a rule.

Wherefore this repetition? Meantime this repetition, what was the cause of it? it was this. Of Method, he says, there are two species: extensively applicable the one to science, the other to art.

Thereupon in the same terms, the *Lex Generalitatis* of this Chapter (so different from the *Lex Generalitatis* of the former Chapter—which same last mentioned *Lex Generalitatis* was there given as applicable

¹ See *ibid.*, pp. 165, 166, where the four laws, of which the first pair are said to belong to the synthetic method and the second pair to the analytic, are as follows: 'Lex Unitatis. *Unitas scientiæ pendet a subjecti unitate.* . . . Lex Generalitatis. *Magis universalia præcedunt minus universalia.* . . . Lex Unitatis. *Unitas disciplinæ operatricis pendet ab unitate finis.* . . . Lex Generalitatis. *Magis universalia præcedunt minus universalia.*' ² See p. 51 above.

to every kind of Method)—is applied in the first place to Method considered as applied to contemplative disciplines, i.e. to *science*, in the next place to Method considered as applied to *operative* disciplines:—i.e. to prudences (*prudentiæ*) and arts.

Let things more universal precede (says he) *those which are less universal.*—‘*Magis universalia præcedunt minus universalia.*’¹

Remain the two quasi-definitions so improperly self-styled laws. 1. The unity of a science (says he) depends on the unity of its subject:—the unity of an operative discipline depends on the unity of its end. ‘*Unitas scientiæ pendet a subjecti unitate: Unitas disciplinæ operatricis pendet ab unitate finis.*’²

Another imperfection, no less than an absolute self-contradiction, figures in this unhappy Chapter. To the species of Method which he says applies to sciences, and not to practical disciplines, he gives the two synonymous appellatives, the one Greek, the other Latin, synthetic and compositive.³ To the other species of Method which (he says) applies to practical disciplines and not to sciences, he gives the two other names, Greek and Latin, analytic and resolute.⁴

Now to that word compositive on the one hand—to this word resolute on the other—what were the ideas annexed in his mind?—Answer—none at all: *signs* they were, but what was wanting to them was—the things designated. For, of this compositive species of Method, what is the second of its two rules? It is this—Let such things as are most universal come before such things as are less universal. Resolution, not composition, if either of the two, is surely what is recommended by this rule.

Had he but had condescension and patience enough to subjoin to each of his rules an example—though it had been no more than [one]—he

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Add a Note on the oracularity, the ambiguity, of this law. *Aio te, Aeacida, Romanos vincere posse.*’ According to Quintus Ennius (239–169 BC), quoted in Cicero (Marcus Tullius Cicero), *De Divinatione*, II. lvi. 116, ‘O son of Aeacus, my prediction is That you the Roman army will defeat’, was the purported response from the oracle of Apollo to Pyrrhus of Epirus (319–272 BC), Molossian King. The grammatical construction of the Latin sentence does not indicate which is the subject and which the object. Likewise in the ‘Lex Generalitatis. *Magis universalia præcedant minus universalia*’, the grammatical construction makes it possible to translate the phrase in two ways: either as it is given in the text above or as its opposite, i.e. ‘let things less universal precede those which are more universal’.

² Bentham appears to have abandoned the passage at this point.

³ Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 165: ‘Methodum *Syntheticam*, sive *Compositivam*, Scientiarum, quæ contemplativæ sunt, propriam diximus’ i.e. ‘We have called the synthetic, or compositional, method proper to the sciences which are contemplative.’

⁴ Ibid., p. 166: ‘Methodi *Analyticæ*, sive *Resolutivæ*, quæ Prudentiis & Artibus inservit, partes sunt tres, *Finis*, *Subjectum*, & *Media*: Finis enim introducendus est in subjectum per Media quædam’, i.e. ‘The analytical or resolute method, which serves prudence and art, has three parts, the end, the subject, and the means: for the end must be introduced into the subject by some means.’

in whose declared opinion examples can not be too numerous,¹ he would probably have escaped falling into this scrape. But here may be seen a failing into which logicians, the gravest of all writers, as well as the most flowery, are but too apt to give into:—their species have no individuals contained in them: their nuts have no kernels.

Unfortunate, indeed, have been from the earliest times known to us these two magnificent species of method, the analytic and the synthetic: a decomposing method which decomposes, and a compounding method which, instead of compounding, decomposes likewise.

Frequent, indeed, is it to see these two terms, especially the word *analytic* and its conjugates *analysis* and *analyse*, brought to view: never, it is believed, from the supposed distinction, from the supposed contrast, has any light been diffused. To the word *analysis* when standing by itself, its proper meaning seems not unfrequently to be annexed: but where, as significative of the opposite meaning, the word *synthesis* is introduced, such is the effect, between the one and the other, the meaning of the one and of the other are wrapped in clouds.

In Algebra, quantity is considered without regard to figure: in Geometry, not but with regard to figure. The algebraical is termed the analytic method: the geometrical, the synthetic. But in either of them what is there either of analysis or of synthesis—of decomposition or of composition—more than in the other.

In both instances, the ideas belonging to them are abstract—general—extensive—in the extreme: in the instance of algebra, still more so than in the other, the idea of figure being laid out of the case, and nothing left but that of quantity. But still in either, what is there of analysis more than of synthesis? The parts of a geometrical proposition are put together, and so are those of an algebraical investigation, and here we have synthesis. The parts of which they are respectively composed may be considered one after another in the one case, and so may they in the other: and here we have analysis.²

¹ See p. 49 & n. above.

² For a further discussion of analysis and synthesis see Ch. 7, § 2, pp. 84–9 below.

Chapter 6.

Of Methodization, or arrangement^a

§ 1. *Subjects to which it is applicable*—1. *Unconnected subjects or objects*: 2. *the connected body of a discourse*

At the very first mention of the mental operation thus denominated, a distinction requires to be brought to view, a distinction respecting the nature of the subjects or objects to which it is applicable: for according as it is considered in its application to the one or the other of the two very different subjects or classes of subjects to which it is applicable, different for the most part and disparate will be found to be any rules from which the application of it may be capable of receiving direction and assistance.

On the one hand, a groupe of subjects or objects of any kind, considered as distinct, separate and detached from one another: on the other hand, the fictitious body intituled a discourse, a discourse of any kind, a literary composition included, considered in respect of the mutual relations of which its several distinguishable parts are susceptible.

Of the operation termed methodization or arrangement, the fictitious receptacle termed *method*, is the fictitious result or produce: when a number of objects are considered as methodized, they are said to be put *into a method*.

^a Considered as names of action, Methodization and arrangement may on most occasions be considered and employed as interconvertible terms. But if there be any difference, methodization is that one of the two of which the field of applicability is most extensive. Compared with the word *arrangement*, the word *methodization* seems to have acquired more of an eulogistic sense, and accordingly, in company with the idea of arrangement, to carry the intimation that in the instance in question the operation has been well conducted, and that the approbative adjunct *good* may with propriety be applied to the result of it: and in so far as this is the meaning, the consequence is that in any instance in which this sentiment of approbation is not intended to be annexed to the disposition which is considered as having been or being about to be made, the eulogistic term methodization would not be so suitable to the design as the more neutral term *arrangement* or the word disposition, where the nature of the case admits of the employing a word the import of which is so much more ample and thence so much more lax.

Considered as names expressive of the result of this action or operation, the words order, method, and taken in this additional sense the word *arrangement*, seem to want but little, if any thing, of being interconvertible. Order, however, seems as well as the word *method* to have imbibed somewhat of an eulogistic tinge: a tinge from which, in this sense as well as the former, the word arrangement appears to be, if not altogether free, much more so than either of those two.

Method as applied to insulated *objects*—method as applied to discourse—by these two denominations may the distinction between the two branches of method resulting from the consideration of the two great fields to which it is applicable be, it is hoped, commodiously brought to view.

Of the field of method, the division thus brought to view may be compared with, and observed to bear some analogy to, the principle of the fundamental division applied of old to the field of *quantity*: viz. that which corresponds to the distinction for the expression of which the terms discrete and continuous were employed: by *discrete* quantity, number, or rather numbers, being designated; by continuous quantity, that which, by the juxtaposition of its ultimate parts, presents the idea expressed by the words form, figure, conformation or configuration, shape.¹

For illustration and explanation, take a discourse having for its field any portion of the field of *Natural History*. In this particular field will be contained a portion more or less considerable of the whole number of distinct and distinguishable subjects belonging to that general field: to the aggregate of these subjects the species, and that the only species, of method or methodization applicable will be that to the designation of which, as above, the compound denomination method as applied to insulated objects—or more shortly to objects, has been appropriated. But, of any discourse which has taken for its field any portion of the field thus brought to view, any part in and by which the art of method is applied to those same objects will have constituted but one [part], how comparatively large so ever in comparison of the whole: and while, to the guidance of the mind in the disposition to be made of those same objects, one set of rules and observations will be adapted, another and very different set of rules and observations will be found requisite for its guidance in the task of putting together the ideal fabric termed a *discourse*.

§ 2. *Methodization as applied to objects, its two principles or modes—principle of successive exhibition—principle of connected aggregation*

Applied to subjects or objects, *Methodization* is an operation which, in so far as any determinate and useful import is attached to this its name, bears an indispensable, though not a very prominent nor in general sufficiently apparent, relation to the particular *end* or *purpose* to which it is or ought to be regarded as subservient. Methodization

¹ See Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, pp. 23–4, for the division of quantity into continuous and discrete, with the former consisting of line, surface, body, time, and place, and the latter of number and speech.

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supposes a multitude of articles on which, in the quality of subjects, it has to operate: and in so far as it is apt and useful, it is effected by making such a disposition of them as promises to render them, as far as depends upon itself, subservient to such its purpose.

Physical, and *psychical*—as in the instance of so many others, so in the instance of the present subject, this presents itself as the first distinction which the nature of the subject requires to be brought to view: physical in so far as the articles to which this operation is applied are so many portions of matter: psychical in so far as they are so many ideas, creatures of the mind, of the immaterial part of the human frame.¹

Psychical entities, i.e. ideas, not being capable of being communicated, or so much as fixt and rendered determinate, otherwise than by the means of the words employed to serve as signs of them, hence in so far as psychical methodization is in question, words will be the instruments by which whatsoever is done will be all along considered and spoken of as done.

In so far as, in any number whatsoever, any objects whatsoever are put together in a particular manner, by design directed to a particular end, the operation termed *methodization* or *arrangement* may be considered as performed, and the objects so dealt with are said to be *arranged* or *methodized*.

Disposition *by means of* succession—disposition *without regard* to succession—under one or other or both of these denominations will every possible mode of methodization be found comprehensible.

And with equal propriety it will be found applicable to arrangement in the physical sense and to arrangement in the psychical sense.

Succession is a term by which the relation between priority and posteriority is designated.

Priority and posteriority are relations that apply alike to *place* and *time*, to portions of *place* and to portions of *time*.

On this occasion, of the two predicaments, *place* is capable of being exhibited in the simplest mode. Why? *Answer*. Because where it is in respect of *place* that a number of objects are to be arranged, they may be all of them designated at the same time, in such sort as to be present to the view of the individual in question at the same time: whereas if they are to be arranged with reference to time without being arranged with reference to place, they can not be brought to the view of the same individual at the same time.

Audible signs are the only signs by means of which objects are capable of being arranged according to priority and posteriority in

¹ For a further discussion of this theme see Ch. 7, pp. 79–91 below.

respect of *time* otherwise than by means of reference to priority and posteriority in respect of *place*. By *visible* signs, priority and posteriority in respect of time is no otherwise designated than by d^o in respect of place. By tangible signs, they may be designated in either of those ways, by either of those means. To *tangible* signs, the organs may be applied successively or all at once: but if all at once, the number to be distinguished must not be large.

Methodized by means of priority and posteriority, objects will have been disposed in such manner as to exhibit all together some conspicuous and familiar figure.

Of all figures, the one most familiar is a right line: disposed in such manner as to exhibit a right line, they are said to be disposed in a *row*.

In that case, if the position of the row be vertical, the article to which priority is ascribed will be that one which stands highest: if horizontal, that one which is [nearest to]¹ the position from which it is designed to be viewed.

Methodized otherwise than by means of priority and posteriority, methodized without regard to priority and posteriority, objects may be said to be methodized by aggregation—by simple and promiscuous aggregation—or say inclusion: by being shut up, all together, in a box, or as it were in a box.

To *physical* and to *psychical* methodization, this distinction is alike applicable.

Guineas, say fifty in number, exhibited in a row are methodized by means of *succession*: inclosed all together in a *rouleau*—a sort of *ex tempore* paper box—they are methodized by aggregation and inclosure or inclusion.

Where the number is thus great, the superior convenience of the principle of aggregation and inclosure, as compared with the principle of *succession*, has been experienced by the gamesters whose invention it was, and of this convenience the existence is evidenced by their practice. Displayed in a row, such a number would have required *time* and labour for the counting of it, and more for the recollection and redisplay of it: disposed in a *rouleau*, an aggregate in the instance of which the number of its elementary parts is known, no counting, no collection, no redisplay is necessary.

In the psychical mode of methodization, arrangement of the names of the objects in a determinate figure—such as line, horizontal or vertical, is arrangement on the principle of *lineal succession*: arrangement of them under a common *denomination* is arrangement on the principle of *aggregation* and *inclosure*: the name, the common denomination,

¹ MS 'farthest from' appears to be a slip.

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is as it were the box, the *rouleau*, in which they are inclosed and by which they are kept together.

§ 3. *Good and bad arrangement, on the principle of lineal succession*¹

§ 4. *Good and bad arrangement on the principle of co-acervation and inclosure*²

§ 5. *Subalternation*

From methodization on the principle of co-acervation³ follows the sort of relation that has place between genus and species: the relation by means of which aggregates of different dimensions are, with reference to one another, lodged in the order called *subalternate*, or the order of *subalternation*—or *intus-susception*.

It is from this order—that is from the practice made of ranging ideas in this order by means of correspondent denominations—that the operations called *Logical Division* and *Logical Definition* took their rise.

The order in which, by the Aristotelians, the component elements of a system of subalternation are exhibited is the reverse of the historical order in which they made their appearance. By these logicians, an immense aggregate is held up to view, the most extensive of which they were capable of conveying or framing a conception, that aggregate is represented as divided or divisible into other aggregates, these again, each of them, into others, and so on till at last comes the last link in this sort of chain—a link consisting of an aggregate which, not having within it any other aggregates, is composed wholly of individuals:⁴ which individuals, if those spiritual substances are excepted which on this occasion are commonly introduced, will of course consist of portions of matter, being natural bodies or parts or portions of such bodies.

This order, according to which (the principle of methodization being in this respect the principle of priority and posteriority) the object of largest dimension is that which presents itself in the first instance, is called analytic order or the order of *analysis*: analysis from a Greek

¹ Bentham did not write any text for this section.

² Bentham did not write any text for this section, though he added the following rudiment to the text sheet: 'Those objects alone should be enclosed in the same receptacle which are designed to receive the same destination—shillings and half-pence should not be put up into a rouleau of guineas.'

³ MS orig. 'aggregation'.

⁴ See Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, Lib. I, Cap. III. *De Genere, Specie, & Individuo*, pp. 6–9, which deals with the division of genera into species, and that of species into individuals.

word which signifies to melt or break down into a number of parts an object considered in the character of *a whole*.¹

The reverse of this is the line of priority as chalked out by the hand of Nature. *Sense* is the fountain from which all ideas take their rise. To *sense*, no objects but individual ones ever present themselves. The names first in use must accordingly have all of them been of the sort of names called *proper* names, names invented and employed for the designation of individual objects.

From the invention of proper names to the invention of common names must have been a very wide and ample step: long may the race have continued before any instance of its being taken actually occurred.

As often as any separation to the eye had happened to take place, the first man desiring the presence of the first woman would have need to lift up his voice to give intimation to her of such his desire: the sound thus uttered by him would, if to any degree of constancy the same sound were repeated, become her name. In the same manner, from the first woman would the first man receive his name. In the same manner would the dog—the first dog between whom and any part of the human species any intercourse established itself—receive and at the same time learn his name.

Had Adam and Eve remained childless, the human species would never have received, at least from human lips, a common name. On that supposition, himself and Eve would have been all the human beings whom Adam could have had need to speak of: herself and Adam all that Eve could have had need to speak of: for [no]² common name including those two, still less for a common name including other human beings in an indefinite number, could either of these our first parents have had any use.

In the language of the modern Hebrews, and even in the language of the Hebrew Scriptures, the same word which is employed to designate the earliest individual of the human species, man, is employed to designate the species likewise.³ A name employed constantly by Adam for designating himself to the exclusion of Eve could never have been employed or pitched upon for designating both of them together.

It was taking a wide step the forming in this way an aggregate in which the component individuals were determinate. It was another and still wider, the forming such a denomination of this sort in which the component individuals were all or any of them indeterminate.

Whether for an aggregate denomination, the component individuals of which were determinate, any effectual demand presented itself

¹ i.e. ἀνάλυσις, 'a loosening'.

² MS 'any'.

³ The Hebrew word אָדָם designates both the individual Adam and the species man.

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antecedently to a like demand for an aggregate denomination of which the component individuals were indeterminate, would naturally depend in good measure upon the number of alike denominable individuals that happened to come at the same time within the cognizance of the interlocutors. So long as the number of his sheep was small, Abel would have no need of finding for them an *aggregate*, a specific, denomination:¹ the larger and larger it became, the more and more urgent would be the demand for an all-comprehensive name.

Of an aggregate composed of determinate individuals the idea and denomination being once formed, it would not be long before the same denomination would have been found capable of serving for the designation of an aggregate composed of individuals some or all of which were indeterminate: between individual and individual the less wide to any practical purpose were the difference, the sooner would the transition be made from the employment of an aggregate denomination of the more obvious nature to an aggregate denomination of the less obvious nature.

Under the direction of an attentive observer, Geography serves in some sort for supplying the deficiencies left by History. The description of nations exhibiting themselves in different levels in the scale of improvement, or to speak more precisely having before them fields of observation of different extent, serve when put together to exhibit a simultaneous view of no inconsiderable portion of the history of mankind.

In this view the most curious, and to the purpose of instruction the most valuable, chapter in this sort of contemporary history would be composed of the vocabulary, if a complete one could be obtained, of a tribe the seat of which were, supposing it to have all along been there, in the narrowest field as yet known: in a small and thinly inhabited island or cluster of islands, destitute of communication with any other inhabited portion of the globe.

At Otaheite, at the time of the discovery of that groupe of Islands, dogs and hogs being, unless rats were an exception, the only quadrupeds with which the human part of its inhabitants were acquainted, they had, we may be well assured, no denomination answering in point of extent to our word *quadruped*, still less to our word *animal*. When to their astonished eyes a horse first presented itself, it was classed by them with *dogs*: it was designated among them by the same common and aggregating name. The hog species was as familiar to them as the dog: but from its being the name of dog and not that of hog that by

¹ See Genesis 4: 2 for Abel's occupation as 'a keeper of sheep'.

them was bestowed upon the first-seen horse, it appears that in their eyes it was to the dog and not to the hog species that the horse bore the closest resemblance.¹

The process or course by which, setting out from *individuals* and those *determinate*, men arrived at the seat of [the] most extensive aggregates has received the name of *generalization*: it has *division*—logical or psychical *division*—for its *converse*.

At this stage of the enquiry, the justly celebrated logical instrument called the Porphyrian Tree presents its claim to notice. It took this name from its inventor Porphyrius, a Greek who not long after the days of Aristotle enlisted himself under his banner.²

In the track of generalization, such, among that ingenious people, even before—no one knows how long before—the days of Aristotle, had been the progress of generalization, he found rising one above another in that scale words in the Greek language employed as the names of the following aggregates, 1. Man. 2. animal. 3. living thing. 4. body. 5. substance.

¹ Bentham may have misremembered the following passage from James Cook and James King, *A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean. Undertaken, by the Command of His Majesty, for making Discoveries in the Northern Hemisphere. To determine The Position and Extent of the West Side of North America; its Distance from Asia; and the Practicability of a Northern Passage to Europe. Performed under the Direction of Captains Cook, Clerke, and Gore, In his Majesty's Ships the Resolution and Discovery. In the Years 1776, 1777, 1778, 1779, and 1780*, 3 vols., London, 1784, i. 182–3, in relation to the inhabitants of Otaheite (Tahiti): 'They were afraid to come near the cows and horses; nor did they form the least conception of their nature. But the sheep and goats did not surpass the limits of their ideas; for they gave us to understand, that they knew them to be birds. It will appear rather incredible, that human ignorance could ever make so strange a mistake; there not being the most distant similitude between a sheep or goat, and any winged animal. But these people seemed to know nothing of the existence of any other land-animals, besides hogs, dogs, and birds. Our sheep and goats, they could see, were very different creatures from the two first, and therefore they inferred, that they must belong to the latter class, in which they knew there is a considerable variety of species.' Several other sources mention that the Otaheitans viewed the horse as a kind of large hog: see, for instance, 'Genuine Account of Omiah, a Native of Otaheite, a new discovered Island in the South-Seas, lately brought over to England by Capt. Fourneaux', in *The London Magazine: Or, Gentleman's Monthly Intelligencer*. Vol. XLIII. For the Year 1774, London, 1774, p. 364; and *Select Reviews, and Spirit of the Foreign Magazines*. By E. Bronson, and others. Vol. I., Philadelphia, 1809, p. 340.

² For Bentham's rendition of the Porphyrian Tree, a genealogical table demonstrating a definition of man which had been derived from the *Isagoge* of Porphyry (234–c. 305), scholar and philosopher, in 'its original form' and in 'a supposed amended form' see 'Table IV. Arbor Porphyriana, seu potius Ramea' in *Chrestomathia* (CW), facing p. 159, where the source is given as the Frankfurt edition of 1597, i.e. *Ivl. Pacii A. Beriga* [i.e. Giulio Pace de Beriga (1550–1635), jurist, philologist, and philosopher] in *Porphyrii Isagogen, et Aristotelis Organvm, Commentarius Analyticus, ad illustrem et generosum Dominum, Dominum Ladislavm VVelenvm, L.B. A Zerotin, Dominum Lundenburgi, Tribouiae Morauorum, Hohnstadij, &c.*, Frankfurt, 1597. Bentham points out in *Chrestomathia* (CW), pp. 240–1 n., that there is no tree as such in Porphyry's *Isagoge*, and that its inventor was probably Pierre de La Ramée, also known as Petrus Ramus (1515–72), French humanist, logician, and educational reformer.

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In addition to those objects the existence of which is made [known] to sense, for designating other objects, the idea of which is presented to us only by abstraction, the work of imagination, while their existence is pointed out to us by inference, he found already in use a word corresponding to our word *substance*.

For exhibiting to the senses the relation between the objects standing on different levels of the scale thus composed, he employed as an *emblem* the figure of a *tree*.

At the bottom, in the place of and as serving to constitute the *trunk*, with its continuation the *root*, he stationed the most capacious of all these aggregates, the half-corporeal, half-ideal name *substance*. Within the compass of this most capacious aggregate, he beheld two lesser aggregates, constituting the nearest and lowest branches of the tree: one the aggregate composed of such substances as are of a corporeal, the other of such as are of an incorporeal nature. Those of a corporeal, i.e. bodily, nature were in one word bodies: those of an incorporeal nature were in one [word] *spirits*. At that point and without the labour of any farther ramification or division, he left the world of Spirits.

Taking in hand the aggregate composed of bodies, he observed that some had *life* in them, others not: by which word life he designated as well the sort of life ascribed to *plants*, viz. *vegetable* life, as the sort of life ascribed to animals, viz. animal life. In these, then, for the corporeal branch of his ideal trunk and root, he found so many ulterior branches: one branch served for containing such bodies as had life in them; the other such as had no life in them.

Leaving the vegetable world as before he had left the incorporeal world undivided, he performed the operation of division in the same way with the animal world as he had proceeded with the corporeal: included in this aggregate he observed two ulterior aggregates, one in which were included all animals endowed with reason, viz. human creatures, in the other all animals not endowed with that transcendent gift: which last, without farther division or distinction, he drove together in one flock under the name of *brutes*; and with these rational beings he peopled the one, as with the irrational ones the other, of the two extreme branches of this emblematic and instructive tree.

The branch to which he saw the brutes adhering he left, as he had left the incorporeal and within it the vegetable world, unnoticed as well as undivided. Brutes being but brutes were not worth distinguishing from each other: in a word, on no account had they any farther claim to notice.

As to rational creatures, they were human beings, and in the largest sense of the word *man*, they were *men*. These were worth

distinguishing: accordingly from this extreme branch arose a twig representing the aggregate composed of individuals: and upon this, distinguished by their several denominations, which, they being individuals, were the sort of names called *proper* names, sat perched, as the representatives of their fellow beings, some of the most distinguished of these individuals, viz. the Socrates and the Platos,¹ their cotemporaries and their ancestors or predecessors.²

One defect but too discernible in this emblematic vegetable.

1. The order of succession which, in respect of priority and posteriority, it assigns to the parts of which it is composed is not the real order in which they came into existence, but the reverse of it.

2. For those parts of the system which possess in the largest measure the nature of substance—viz. body in the only shape in which it comes within the cognizance of our senses—the station should be on *terra firma*. But in the tree of Porphyrius, their place is aloft in the air, the high and thin air. There it is that the illustrious persons taken for examples of individuals—there it is that the Socrates, the Platos and the Aristotles—are seen tottering upon the extremest twigs. The part[s] from which by abstraction the properties of matter have one after another been drawn off till nothing but a bubble remains, to these is appropriated the name of substance; those in the altitude of the system occupy that place which in a real tree is in or in immediate contiguity with the earth.

Take a small tree as it grows in a garden pot, continue it in its natural position, it represents not the tree of Porphyrius, but the reverse of it: turn it topsy-turvy, the bottom of the trunk then occupies the highest station, the remotest and slenderest branches the lowest, and then it is, if at all, that the tree of Porphyrius finds in it a correct emblem and a faithful portraiture.

§ 6. *Subjects of methodization by denomination—real entities—fictitious entities*

Of methodization in so far as performed by denomination, the subjects—the immediate subjects—are *names* and nothing more: things?—yes:—but no otherwise than through the medium of their names.

It is only by means of *names*, viz. *simple* or *compound*, that things are susceptible of arrangement: understand of arrangement in the

¹ An allusion to Socrates (c. 470–399 BC) and Plato (c. 429–347 BC), the celebrated Athenian philosophers.

² In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘For the individuals, viz. down to the age of Porphyrius, consult Priestley’s *Chart of Biography*.’ See Joseph Priestley, *A Description of a Chart of Biography*, Warrington, 1764, which gives a chronological arrangement of famous persons from 1200 BC onwards.

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psychical sense; in which sense, strictly speaking, it is only the ideas of the things in question that are the subjects of the arrangement, not the things themselves. Of *physical* arrangement, the subjects are the things themselves: the animals, (suppose)—the plants—the minerals, viz. as disposed in a museum: of *psychical*, the *names*, and, through the names, the *ideas* of those several objects: viz. as disposed in a systematic work on the subject of the correspondent branch of Natural Philosophy—on the subject of Zoology, Botany or Mineralogy.

If, of this operation (viz. methodization by denomination), things were the only subjects, after names of *persons*, names there would be none, other than names of *things*. But of names that are *not* names of *things*, there are abundantly more than of names that *are*.

By *things* are here meant bodies: inanimate masses of corporeal substance.

By this denomination we are led to the distinction—the comprehensive and instructive distinction—between *real* entities and *fictitious* entities: or rather between their respective *names*. Names of *real* entities are, if proper names, names of so many individual masses of matter: if *common* names, names respectively of all such individual masses of matter as are of such or such a particular description, which by these names are indicated or endeavoured to be indicated.

Words, viz. words employed to serve as names, being the only instruments by which, in the absence of the *things*, viz. the *substances*, themselves, the ideas of them can be presented to the mind, hence, wheresoever a word is seen which to appearance is employed in the character of a *name*, a natural and abundantly extensive consequence is—a disposition and propensity to suppose the existence, the real existence, of a correspondent object—of a correspondent thing—of a thing to which it ministers in the character of a name.

Yielded to without a sufficiently attentive caution, this disposition is a frequent source of confusion: of temporary confusion and perplexity: and not only so, but even of persisting error.

Names of fictitious entities require to be distinguished from names of *fabulous entities*.

For shortness say *fictitious entities* require to be distinguished from *fabulous* entities. To render whatsoever is said of them correctly and literally true, the idea of a *name* requires all along to be inserted, and the grammatical sentence composed and constructed in consequence.¹

Fabulous entities are either fabulous persons or fabulous things.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: '¶ Quære whether for distinctness and to avoid confusion it may not be necessary *from* the first, or at any rate *at* the first, to insert the mention of the *name*.'

ESSAY ON LOGIC

Fabulous entities, whether persons or things, are supposed material objects of which the separate existence is capable of becoming a subject of belief: and of which accordingly the same sort of picture is capable of being drawn in and preserved in the mind as of any really existent object.

Gods of different dynasties: Kings, such as Brute and Fergus:¹ Animals, such as Dragons and Chimæras: Countries, such as El Dorado: Seas, such as the Straights of Anian: Fountains, such as the fountain of Jouvence.²

Of a *fabulous* object, whether person or thing, the idea, i.e. the *image*, delimited in the mind by the name and accompanying description may be just the same whether a corresponding object had or had not been in existence; whether the object were a historical or a fabulous one.

Fictitious entities, viz. the objects for the designation of which throughout the whole course of the present work this appellative is meant to be employed, are such of which, in a very ample proportion, the mention and consequent fiction requires to be introduced for the common purposes of every discourse. Their names being employed in the same manner as names of substances are employed, hence the character in which they present themselves is that of so many names of substances. But these names of fictitious entities do not, as do the abovementioned names of fabulous entities, raise up in the mind any correspondent images.

Follows a sort of commenced catalogue of these names of fictitious entities: from which the common nature in which, as above, they all participate will presently become perceptible. Like the names of real and those of fabulous entities, all these words, it will be seen, are, in the language of Grammarians, *noun substantives*. All these fictitious entities are accordingly so many fictitious substances. The properties which for the purposes of discourse are attributed to them are so many properties of substances—so many properties of all substances.

That the properties belonging to substances—to bodies in general—are attributed to them—that they are spoken of as if possessed of such properties—appears from the *prepositions* by which the import of their respective names is put in connection with the import of the

¹ Brut or Brutus of Troy, reputed first King and founder of Britain, of allegedly Trojan descent, and Fergus, Irish chieftain and reputed first King of Scotland, who went there to assist the Scots to defeat the Picts and Britons and drowned at Carrickfergus on his return to Ireland c. 330 BC.

² El Dorado was a legendary city or country in the Amazon Basin ruled by a priest-king whose body was covered in gold powder, the Strait of Anian was a legendary sea-passage that connected the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and the waters of the legendary Fontaine de Jouvence or Fountain of Youth were reputed to have rejuvenating powers.

other words of which the sentence—the grammatical sentence—is composed.

Physical and *psychical*—under one or other of these two denominations may all fictitious entities be comprized.

Let us commence with *physical*.

I. Motion—motions.

In the physical world, in the order of approach to real existence, next to *matter* stands *motion*. But motion itself is spoken of as if it were *matter*:—and in truth, because in no other way, such is the nature of things and such is the nature of language—in no other way can it—could it have been—spoken of. A *ball*—the ball called the *earth*—is said to be *in* motion. By this word *in*, what is it that is signified? Answer—that *motion* is a *receptacle*, i.e. a hollow substance: and that in this hollow substance the ball called the earth is lodged.

A motion or the motion, we say, *of* a body. The body is one portion of matter: the motion is another which proceeds *of*, that is *from*, that substance.

Of names of motions—i.e. of names of species or modifications of motions—vast, not to say infinite, is the number and variety.

Genus generalissimum is a term employed by the Logicians of old to indicate the name of any one of those aggregates which is not contained in any other aggregate that hath as yet received a name.¹

The idea of *motion* necessarily supposes that of a moving body: a body which is *in* the motion or *in* which the motion is: necessarily supposes, i.e. without the one idea, at any rate without the one image, the other can not be entertained.

The idea of motion does not necessarily suppose that of another body, or the idea of the motion of another body, or the idea of another body from which, or from the motion of which, the motion in question proceeds or did proceed. The planets, that they are in motion is matter of observation: whence the motion took its rise is matter of inference or rather of vague conjecture. On the earth's surface we see various bodies in the act of deriving motion from various *primum mobiles*. But the *primum mobile*, if any, from which the earth itself derived the motion *in* which it is at present, what can we so much as conjecture in relation to it?

Where a motion of any kind is considered as having place, it is considered either with reference to some *person* who is regarded as the author of it, or without such reference. In the latter of these cases, motion and nothing else is the word employed: in the other case,

¹ See, for instance, Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 7: 'Genera generalissima, sive *summa*, sunt quibus non datur superius genus', i.e. 'The most general, or highest, genera are those to which no higher genus is given.'

action or *operation*: and in respect of it, the author is termed *agent* or *operator*.^a

II. Quantity.

Next to motion come[s] quantity.

Quantity is applicable in the first place to *matter*, in the next place to *motion*.

Of and *in* are the prepositions in the company of which it is employed.

A quantity *of* ink is in the ink-glass, which stands before me. Here *ink*, the real substance, is *one* substance: *quantity*, the *fictitious* substance, is another which is proceeding or has proceeded from *ink*, the real one.

The ink which is in this ink-glass exists there *in* a certain quantity. Here *quantity* is a fictitious substance—a fictitious receptacle: and in this receptacle the ink—the real substance—is spoken of as if it were lodged.

In this word *quantity* may be seen the name of another [*genus generalissimum*]:¹ another aggregate than which there is no other more capacious in the same *nest* of aggregates.

Where *quantity* is considered, it may be considered either with or without regard to the relation between part and whole: and if considered, in one or other of those ways it can not but be considered: the division is, therefore, an exhaustive one.

Where quantity is considered, or at least attempted to be considered, without regard to the relation between part and whole, it is considered with reference to *figure*. But if without regard to the relation between part and whole, the idea of figure, if indeed it be capable of being entertained, is indeterminate and confused.

Quantity, according to the Logicians of old, is either continuous or discrete.² By *continuous* quantity, they mean quantity considered with regard to figure, and without regard to the relation between part and whole. By *discrete* quantity, they mean quantity considered with regard to the relation between part and whole and without regard to figure.

If the three branches of mathematical discipline be separately considered, continuous quantity is the subject of *geometry*, discrete quantity the subject of *arithmetic* and *algebra*.

But it is only by *arithmetic*, that any clear conception, either in relation to any proposition appertaining to geometry, or in relation to any proposition in algebra, can be obtained. Divide a circle into a number of parts, for instance those called degrees, clear and distinct ideas are obtainable respecting the whole and those or any other parts

^a See tit. *Operations*.³

¹ MS '*generalissimum genus*'.

² See p. 56 n. below.

³ See Ch. 9, pp. 119–21 below.

into which it is capable of being divided or conceived to be divided. Refuse all such division, the best idea you can obtain of a circle will have neither determinate form nor use.

III. Quality.

Quality is applicable to matter—to motion—and to quantity.

Of and *in* are the prepositions in company of which it is employed.

Qualities of *bodies*, or say portions of matter, are good and bad, viz. with reference to man's use.

Qualities of motion, i.e. of motions, are quick and slow—high and low—viz. with reference to any object taken as a standard: uninterrupted and interrupted.

Qualities of quantities are—1. great and little—2. determinate and indeterminate, i.e. with reference to man's knowledge of them or conception concerning them.

Qualities of quantities are qualities either of bodies, i.e. portions of matter, or of portions of space, considered with reference to quantity to the exclusion of every other quality.

Property is in one of the senses of the word synonymous or nearly so to quality.

As we speak of the *quality* of a *quantity*, so do we of the quantity of a quality.

When men speak of the quantity of a quality, instead of saying quantity of a quality, they commonly say a degree: in a high degree, in a low degree: instead of high, we say sometimes in a great degree, instead of low, a small degree.

Degree, in French *degré*, is from the Latin *Gradus*, a *step*, or *stair*: that which is said to be in a *high* degree is considered as situated upon one of the upper steps of a staircase. *Scale*, in French *Echelle*, is from the Latin *Scala*, a *ladder*. Whether the word be staircase or ladder, the image is to the purpose here in question much the same.

IV. Form or Figure.^{1 a}

No mass of *matter* is without *form*, to which as a synonym [may] be added *figure*. No individual mass of matter but has its boundary lines, and by the magnitude of those lines and their position with reference

^a *Figura* from *figere*, by contraction for *figura*.

Fingere, to fashion, as a potter does his clay. It has for its conjugates, besides *figura*, *figulus*,² and quære the English word *finger*, fingers being the parts of the human frame principally employed in fashioning, in giving to masses of matter—to each its intended figure.

¹ The insertion at this point of the following passage dealing with form or figure is conjectural, but it follows the order of the discussion in Ch. 9, p. 107 below. It originally carried the following title, which has been cancelled by Bentham: 'Ch. or § ||. Of Form—or of Matter and Form—in a physical and psychical sense.'

² i.e. 'potter'.

to one another, the *form*—*the figure*—of the mass is constituted and determined.

But neither is any portion of *space* without its form. Form or figure, or say to possess form or figure, is therefore a property or quality of space as well as of matter. It is a property common to matter and to space.

A mass of matter may have throughout for its bounds or limits either another mass or other masses of matter, or a portion of space, or in some parts *matter*, in others *space*.

A portion of space can not in any part have for its bounds any thing but matter.

A mass of matter is said to exist *in* a certain form: to be *of* a certain form or figure; to be changed *from* one form *into* or *to* another.

V. Relation.

In so far as any two objects are regarded at the same time, the mind for a greater or less length of time passing from the one to the other, by this transition a fictitious entity termed *relation*—a relation—is considered as produced.

The one of these objects—*either* of these objects—is said to *bear* a relation to the other.

Between the two objects a relation is said to exist, or to have place.

The time during which the two related objects are regarded or kept under consideration is, as above, for shortness, spoken of as the same time. It should seem, however, that, with exactly the same degree of attention, objects more than one can not be regarded, considered, examined, surveyed at exactly the same instant or smallest measurable portion of time: but that on the occasion and for the purpose of comparison, the mind is continually passing and repassing from the one to the other and back again, i.e. vibrating: viz. after the manner of the pendulum of a clock.

This motion, viz. *vibration*, being the motion acquired by an elastic *cylinder*, or *prism*, in which the length is the prevalent dimension, on its being suddenly impelled or drawn and let go in a direction other than that of its length is the sort of motion best suited, or rather is the only sort of motion in any degree at all suited, to the purpose of *comparison*.

Hence it seems to be that, in speaking of *a relation*, any number of objects greater than two are not brought to view: for, on this occasion, the preposition employed is always *between*: never *among*. By the preposition *between*, the number of the objects in question is restricted to two: restricted invariably and uncontrollably.

Hence it is that, in methodical division, the *bifurcate* mode is the only one that is completely satisfactory.

§ 7. *Of Scales of or in Logical subalternation*

In the whole field of human thought and action, so many aggregates as we have occasion to form and to distinguish in the character of *genera generalissima*, so many are the different scales of logical subalternation.

In the aggregate which has *entity* for its name, all other imaginable aggregates are comprehended.

Entities are either physical or psychical.

Physical are either real or fictitious.

Psychical again are either real or fictitious: real psychical are either present to perception, i.e. impressions, or present to memory, i.e. ideas: ideas are either *single*, or say concrete, simple or particular, formed without abstraction; or *general*, or say aggregate, formed by abstraction.

Psychical fictitious entities may be *distinguished*—i.e. the aggregate composed of the entities termed *psychical fictitious entities* may be *divided*—according to the faculties to which they respectively bear relation. See tit. Faculty and faculties.¹

Aggregates—any two aggregates—which are completely included either of them within the other stand with reference to each other in the relation of *logical subalternation*, and with reference to each other may be said to be *commensurable*. Divide the *larger* of the two, you may sooner or later divide it into *parts*, one of which will be the smaller aggregate.

Aggregates, no one of which is in any part included within the other may in like manner be said to be *incommensurable*.

Any number of aggregates which are thus commensurable may be considered as belonging to and may be said to constitute one *scale*:—and to *belong* to one and the same scale. And thus we have *scales* of aggregates, and scales of logical subalternation.

Instead of *scales of aggregates*, we may also, in so far as the convenience of discourse may be found to require it, say *nests* of aggregates:^a

^a ☞ Chemists and Apothecaries have their nests of *boxes*.

¹ See Ch. 4, pp. 35–7 above.

In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Ethical will be those belonging to the aesthetically or pathically passive faculty. The Ethical fictitious entities will be obligation, right, power, &c.: distinguishable according to the *sanction* from which the good and evil is considered as flowing, viz. 1. physical, 2. popular, 3. legal, 4. religious. *Sanction*—a source of good and evil.

‘All these are or will be considered under their several heads.’

Bentham began such a discussion in Ch. 9, p. 128 below, but does not appear to have completed it.

For the four sanctions see *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (CW), ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, London, 1970, Ch. III, pp. 34–7.

and speak of two or more aggregates as belonging to the same *nest* or belonging to different nests.

Aggregates belonging to the same scale of logical subalternation are, moreover, said to be arranged, with reference to one another, in *systematic* order.

Of two aggregates belonging to the same scale, the larger may with reference to the smaller be termed *superordinate*: the smaller, with reference to the larger, *subordinate*.

In this way the two only modes or principles of methodization are employed together: the one which proceeds on the principle of succession or priority and posteriority being in the character of a type or emblem employed to represent that which proceeds on the principle of *aggregation*.

In all scales of logical subalternation there are two fixed points or levels: viz. that on which individuals stand, i.e. the level of individuality or lowest level, and that on which the *genus generalissimum*, including the most extensive and all-comprehensive aggregate, stands—i.e. the highest level.

Between these two fixed points or degrees, other degrees, in any number, are wont to be interposed, according to the exigency of the case, as determined by the nature of the scale, and the use made of the aggregates or aggregate terms of which it is composed.

For the purpose of scientific arrangement, the aggregate composed of physical entities is commonly considered as composed of three aggregates which, in their respective *fields*, are commonly spoken of by the appellation of *kingdoms*; viz. the mineral and the vegetable and the animal: the individuals belonging to the mineral kingdom being neither sensitive nor so much as vital; those belonging to the vegetable kingdom vital but not sensitive; those belonging to the animal kingdom *vivacious* and *sensitive*.

In each of these kingdoms, between the two points, viz. the highest and the lowest, degrees are placed in any number according to the demand constituted by the state and condition of the science, in respect of cultivation and advancement.

For the formation and designation of these *degrees*, the name of the kingdom giving name always to the highest aggregate, the course taken has usually been to begin with the highest, i.e. the most capacious receptacle.

From this, in order to obtain lesser and inferior aggregates, stationed in so many lower levels, it became necessary to have recourse to division: division, say psychical or logical division, was the operation necessarily recurred [to].

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In every branch of art and science, the use of *definition* is universally felt and acknowledged. But, to *definition*, at any rate in the usual sense of the word, division—psychical or logical division—is a necessary preliminary or accompaniment. In that sense, by definition is meant the indication of a larger aggregate, in which the aggregate in question (the aggregate for the name of which definition is required) is comprized; together with the indication of some property or properties by which the aggregate in question stands distinguished from whatsoever other aggregates are likewise comprized under that same larger aggregate: distinguished, to wit in this manner: viz. that the property so indicated does appertain to the lesser aggregate in question, but does not appertain to those other lesser aggregates from which it is required to be distinguished.

Take, for example, this definition of the species *man*. Man is a rational *animal*. By the word *animal* indication is given of the larger aggregate within which the aggregate in question, the aggregate indicated by the word *man*, is comprehended. By the word *rational* is indicated a quality or property which is considered as appertaining, at birth at least, and abstraction made of particular accidents, to all individuals comprehended within the name of that lesser aggregate in question, viz. man, and not appertaining to any other individuals comprized within the name of the greater aggregate *animal*.

But, for this purpose, and on this occasion, and—if not antecedently—by this means, here is a larger aggregate psychically or logically divided: divided into two lesser and component aggregates: to the one of these two aggregates application is made of a name: viz. the name *man* is given: to the remaining aggregate, no name is, in and by this same operation, given—it is left without a name.^a

Thus intimately connected are the three logical operations subservient to instructive intercourse—viz. *aggregative arrangement*, *division*, and *definition*. Without previous aggregate arrangement, there would be nothing to divide. Without division, there could be no definition: at least no definition in which the *genus*, or aggregate, referred to and

^a ¶ Thus by every definition *per genus et differentiam* a bifurcate division is made: the greater aggregate is divided into two *forks* or *arms*. But of that one of the *arms* to which a name is given, a property, and that a characteristic one, is brought to view: it is thereby placed in the light: whereas of that which constitutes the other *arm*, no such property is brought to view: it is left in the dark.

In a bifurcate division, expressed in the only form in which it is at the same time shewn to be *exhaustive*, viz. in the *contradictorial* form, both arms are placed, at least as nearly as may be, in an equally strong light: though of the two arms, that which is expressed *positively* and that which is expressed *negatively*, the light in which the former is thereby expressed will naturally be in general the clearer, and thence the stronger.

employed for the purpose of explanation or instruction were any other than—of any less dimensions than—the *genus generalissimum*—the box in which all the other boxes belonging to that nest were included.

§ 8. *Of subalternation and psychical division and definition, considered as applied or applicable to the three Physical Kingdoms: viz. 1. Animal. 2. Vegetable. 3. Mineral*

Since the revival of letters—i.e. of intellectual culture—the greater the length of time that has elapsed, the greater the quantity of time and thence the greater the number of the persons that have been employed in the observation and examination of the subjects of these three portions of the intellectual world.

In each part the number of these objects—of these sorts of objects—all different and distinguishable from each other, has received prodigious encrease: to reduce them to masses of a comprehensible bulk, means have necessarily been looked out for, of breaking down each of these all-comprehensive aggregates into aggregates of less extent, those again into others, and so on downwards until, under the name of species, a range of aggregates were established all situate upon the same level—no one of them containing any other aggregates—every one of them having for its contents individuals, and those not in any number greater than what might without confusion, and with sufficient observation of their several points of agreement and difference, be contemplated by a scrutinizing eye.

The labour, whatsoever it be, that was or is capable of being bestowed in this direction (viz. in the way of methodization) upon the field of physical science had and has for its sole immediate object the solution of this one problem—viz. in the instance of every individual object belonging to every one of the three kingdoms—of every such object, in the state in which it is presented to man's view by the hands of nature, to set upon it, by verbal description only, and without seeing it, a mark whereby it may be effectually distinguished from every other individual object, except such as are possessed of exactly the same properties, or at least of properties so nearly the same as to be capable of being employed instead of it without practical inconvenience.

The accomplishment of this problem was far indeed from being a work of mere barren speculation: practice in every line of art, and above all in the medical, the most useful of all arts, has ever been in no small degree dependent upon it. On such or such an occasion an individual object—say an individual plant—has been found possessed of certain serviceable properties—has afforded to a man relief under

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disease. The plant employed, the disease appears to be cured. But ere long the disease returns: the health-restoring plant is all consumed: another plant presenting the same outward appearance might be expected to operate with the same inward efficacy—to be productive of the same happy effect—discovery is accordingly made of another presenting, to a first view, the same appearance: employed in the same manner as the first, instead of banishing the disease, it exasperates it. Upon a sufficiently close observation, the two plants might have been seen to present, even in their outward configuration, very material differences: differences from which correspondent differences in respect of their effects on the human body would have been inferred, or at least the supposition of their absolute identity disproved and banished. But supposing even these outward differences spied out, and the salutary inference deduced—how minute and momentary would be the benefit! The one individual person is, for the moment at least, sufficiently put upon his guard against the mischief, but even himself perhaps on another occasion, all others upon all occasions, remain exposed to it.

In a degree more or less serious, the like danger may be seen extending itself over the whole field of the three kingdoms. For the obviating this danger, the nature of the case affords no other means than the giving to the solution of the abovementioned problem an equal and coincident extent.

In these latter days, so far as regards the physical world, this grand problem, comparatively speaking, wants not much of being accomplished. But to the accomplishment of it, the stock of methodical terms possessed by the Aristotelians wanted much of being sufficient. *Species* and *genus*, with the addition of a term floating in the clouds at an infinite and indeterminable distance above the other two,¹ composed the whole of it.

1. System of nature the name of the all-comprehensive physical aggregate—*that* divided into the three *kingdoms*. 2. Each kingdom divided into *Classes*; 3. these into *orders*.—4. Orders divided into *divisions*; 5. and perhaps these into *sub-divisions*—by the list of these terms is shewn the addition made by Linnæus.²

¹ For Sanderson's distinction into *species*, *genus*, and *genus generalissimum* see p. 59 n. above.

² Carl Linnaeus, also known as Carl von Linné (1707–78), Swedish botanist and taxonomist. In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Consult his *Philosoph. Botanica* &c.' See Caroli Linnæi, *Philosophia Botanica in qua explicantur Fundamenta Botanica cum definitionibus partium, exemplis terminorum, observationibus rariorum, adjectis figuris æneis*, Stockholm, 1751, p. 98, where the division is made into class, order, genus, species, and variety.

§ 9. *Division of Aggregates—Linnaeus*¹

In relation to the names employed for the designation of the aggregates of different dimensions which are respectively the results of the successive divisions performed in a system of logical subalternation, what is to be wished is—that in the instance of [each]² intimation should be given 1. in the first place of the number of nests or *ranks of aggregates* contained in the system, 2. of the rank occupied by the aggregate of which the word in question is the name.

In such a system, the most capacious of all the aggregates, viz. that in which all the others are contained, will occupy the *first* rank; those which constitute the result of the first act of division to which it is subjected, the *second* rank; those which are the result of the division to which the results of the first division are subjected, the 3^d rank.

The number of *nests* or *ranks* will be *one* more than the number of the *acts of division* to which the aggregate, which occupies the most capacious, highest, and first rank, has been subjected.

In the system of *Linnæus*, if the contents of the whole Earth be taken for the first, highest and all-comprehensive aggregate, the number of nests or ranks of subordinate aggregates constituting the result of the successive divisions to which it has been subjected will, when added to that first aggregate—the original dividend, be found to be *seven*; the number of those successive acts of division being *six*: viz. 1. Kingdoms. 2. Classes. 3. Orders. 4. Genera or Genus's. 5. Species. 6. Varieties.

For farther explanation, taking the Class for the *prime* dividend, to this prime dividend he subjoins as synonymous to it and explanatory of it, the compound term *Genus summum* (Highest Genus); to *Ordo*

¹ The insertion of this passage and its presentation as a separate section is conjectural.

In a rudiment at the head of the passage, Bentham has noted: '*Linnæi Systema Naturæ*. Ed. 3. Vindobonæ. 1767. p. 13. Successive divisions.

'Class has for its conjugate to *classify*: *genus*, to *generalize*, but in a different sense: species again to *specify*, but in a sense different from both.'

Bentham's reference to the third edition is perhaps a slip for the thirteenth edition, since the table illustrating the 'correct' system of fivefold division appears in Caroli a Linné, *Systema Naturæ, per Regna Tria Naturæ, secundum Classes, Ordines, Genera, Species, cum Characteribus, Differentiis, Synonymis, Locis*, 13th edn., 3 vols., Vienna, 1767–70, i. 13:

<i>Classis,</i>	<i>Ordo,</i>	<i>Genus,</i>	<i>Species,</i>	<i>Varietas.</i>
<i>Genus summ,</i>	<i>G. intermedium,</i>	<i>G. proximum,</i>	<i>Species,</i>	<i>Individuum.</i>
<i>Provinciæ,</i>	<i>Territoria,</i>	<i>Paræciæ,</i>	<i>Pagi,</i>	<i>Domicilium.</i>
<i>Legiones,</i>	<i>Cohortes,</i>	<i>Manipuli,</i>	<i>Contubernia,</i>	<i>Miles.</i>

² MS 'which'.

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(Order), the compound term *Genus intermedium*; to *Genus* (Kind), the compound term *Genus [proximum]*:¹ to *Species* (Species), nothing but that same appellative; to *Varietas* (Variety), the term *Individuum*.

1. Unfortunately in this illustration the prime dividend or the all-comprehensive aggregate is omitted: so also the results of the first act of division, the three physical Kingdoms. What is done for the purpose of illustration consists, therefore, in taking the term *Genus*, and with two different epithets or adjuncts successively employed for distinction sake,² applying it as synonymous in the first place to *Class*, and then again to *Ordo*.

2. What is still more unfortunate, in this additional tree, designed for the illustration of the other, he places *Individuum* on the same level with *Varietas*, as if the two appellatives were, with relation to one another, *synonymous*, and interconvertibly employable: whereas *varietas*, variety, is the name of an aggregate, and in that character employed even by himself.

3. For further illustration he gives two other nests of aggregates: the one constituted by the divisions to which the territory of a political state has been found subjected; the other by the divisions to which the Military Establishment has been found subjected.

Unfortunately in both these instances, the number of these successive acts of division and subdivision, being altogether arbitrary, has, in different political states, and in the same political state at different times, been different, and, moreover, as to the denominations which for the designation of them are employed by him, the language in which this work of his is written being the Latin language, it is from that language that they were, all of them, necessarily deduced. But in neither of those instances does the Latin language afford an adequate number of names of aggregates, the relations of which to each other in respect of capacity and amplitude were or are found by him determinate.

The Geographical or Topographical aggregates which he employs, and which are constituted by portions of the Earth's surface, with their divisions and subdivisions, are: 1. *Provinciae*, put as correspondent to *Classis* and *Genus summum*; 2. *Territoria*, put as correspondent to *Ordo*, and *Genus intermedium*; 3. *Paræciæ*, put as correspondent to *Genus* and *Genus proximum*; 4. *Pagi*, put as correspondent to *Species*; 5. *Domicilium*, put as correspondent to *Varietas* and to *Individuum*.

The Political or Politico-Official names of aggregates which he employs are: 1. *Legiones*, employed as correspondent to *Classis* and to *Genus summum*, and to *Provinciae*; 2. *Cohortes*, employed as correspondent to

¹ MS '*intermedium*' is a slip.

² i.e. '*summum*' and '*intermedium*'.

Ordo and to *Genus intermedium*, and to *Territoria*; 3. *Manipuli*, to *Genus* and *Genus proximum*, and to *Paræciæ*; 4. *Contubernia*, to *Species*, and to *Pagi*; 5. *Miles*, to *Varietas*, to *Individuum*, and to *Domicilium*.

4. Another imperfection—*Varietas* may without impropriety be employed as the name of an aggregate: and in that character is accordingly in this work of his¹ employed by himself: so possibly, with the help of explanation, might *domicilium*, for example, if considered as an aggregate having individual chambers for its constituent parts. But by no explanation can *individuum* be rendered a fit denomination for an *aggregate*: by no explanation can it be rendered a fit denomination for any thing but an individual: and so in the case of *Miles*.^{a 2}

In so far as concerns the aggregate composed of the universality [of] bodies considered in their natural state, the classification and correspondent nomenclature invented and established by that illustrious Swede will, it is believed, be found tolerably well fit for use.

The distinction and correspondent relation between *Species* and *Varietas* is of extensive practical, and thereby is entitled to be esteemed of cardinal, importance. Among the marks by which individual objects (*plants* for example) are distinguished from each other, some are supposed to remain always the same, not only in each individual, but in the whole race to which that individual belongs—in the whole of the beginningless and endless chain (so to speak with reference to our own opportunities of observation) of which that individual forms a link.³

^a In more points of view than one are the characters of original genius exhibited in the work of this illustrious Swede. Not less peculiar to him than his system was his style. Compressed and elliptical in the extreme, the picture which it exhibits is rather that of an immense bundle of loose hints than that of a continued discourse. Great indeed is the excellence which it accordingly displays in the articles of compressedness and impressiveness: but far indeed are these excellences from being so much clear gain, being paid for, and that at no low rate, by imperfections not only in respect of facility of intellection, but in respect of *clearness*, and thence, as hath been seen, even in respect of *correctness*.

He may be stiled, the *Tacitus*⁴ of Physics.

¹ Bentham has added a question mark following the phrase 'in this work of his'.

² Bentham has added the following rudiment at this point: 'These denominations serve for physics—not for psychics perhaps: certainly not in so far as bifurcation may be found applicable.'

He has then noted in the text: 'Quære.—In each of the three Kingdoms is the number of divisions, and thence of ranks of sub-aggregates, the same?'

³ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Go on.'

⁴ Tacitus (Publius Cornelius Tacitus) (56–120), Roman historian, orator, and politician, was noted for his compressed style: see, for instance, [James Burnett, Lord Monboddo], *Of the Origin and Progress of Language*, 6 vols., Edinburgh and London, 1773–92, iii. 223.

Chapter 7.

Of Division

Physical and *Psychical*—to one or other of these two epithets may every possible mode of division be referred: *physical*, where the subject-matter to be divided—say the *dividend*—is a *physical* body or aggregate: *psychical*, where it is a *psychical* or say an ideal aggregate: viz. any aggregate of objects, individually assignable or unassignable, for the designation of which a common name, or say appellation, has been provided.

Of these modes, the former, the physical, is the only original and proper mode. It is the *archetype* of the other. The *ideal* aggregate is feigned to be—is considered as being—a body—a mass of matter: any number of lesser aggregates into which, they being contained in it, it is considered as being capable of being resolved, are considered as so many parts into which it is considered as capable of being divided.

Of these two modes, the *psychical* is the only one that belongs to the present design: the only one employed in the exercise of the art of Logic. In an institute of that art, the other, the physical, would not have had any title to a place, had it not been for the light which it may serve to throw upon—the explanation which it may serve to give—of the *psychical* which has been deduced from it.

Division and Definition go hand in hand: for the definition, you take the dividend last preceding.

As between two receptacles, the one with its contents contained in the other—for description sake let the more capacious be considered as standing foremost, i.e. occupying the higher ground: at every fresh division two receptacles, the result of such division, are conceived as placed above or underneath it: in these two receptacles, if the division be the exhaustive one, the contents of the greater receptacle are emptied out and lodged.

The several possible modes of methodization, and in particular the mode by aggregation, has been already brought to view. On that occasion, in speaking of aggregation, arrangement in a series or line of subalternate receptacles—arrangement in a line of subalternation—was also brought to view.¹ It is in such a mode and no other that²

¹ See Ch. 6, § 7, pp. 71–4 above.

² Bentham has crossed through in pencil the preceding part of this and the previous two paragraphs, and altered the text here to read: 'It is by arrangement in a line of subalternation—in this mode and no other—that'.

This alteration may reflect a change of mind as to where this material should be placed in relation to Methodization. For further details see the Editorial Introduction, p. xxxii above.

the operation of division—understand of psychical division—can be performed. In the character of a *dividend*, a name constituting a receptacle of a comparatively larger content is assumed. Its contents are lodged in two or more other receptacles so constituted in respect of extent as to contain all of them together the exact amount of the above contents of the *dividend* or greater receptacle: the aggregate contained in this greater receptacle is considered as divided, the component articles or units of the aggregate mass are considered as distributed, among the compartments which by such division have been created.

§ 1. *Dichotomy—use*

Correctness and *compleatness*—be the *subject* of discourse what it may, and the *purpose* for which the subject is taken in hand, and the discourse delivered, being determined, *correctness*, and with reference to the end *compleatness*—these are two qualities which, by every man in proportion as it is his desire that the expression given to his thoughts by his discourse should be at once true and as useful as the nature of it will admitt of its being, should be found to appertain to it.

☞ *Nequid falsi dicere audeat, ne quid viri non audeat*¹—are the words employed in a case where the moral endowment of courage was requisite to a man's bestowing upon his discourse these desirable qualities, by a writer of antient times, in a language which enables a man to express in a small number of words, and in a correspondently pointed manner, whatsoever is required.²

For *correctness* at large not much instruction can be given, without special reference all along made to the particular nature of the purpose in view, and the subject, i.e. the portion of the field of thought and action operated upon. But be the purpose and the subject what they may, correctness will in a considerable degree depend upon clearness: correctness of conception on the one part, upon clearness of expression on the other: and in so far some instruction on the subject of *correctness* has already been endeavoured to be administered.³

But a case may be found, nor that a narrow one, in which correctness depends upon compleatness: insomuch that if the discourse be incompleat, it is certain, to the exact amount of the degree of incompleatness to be likewise incorrect. Such it is evident is the case in so far as it has

¹ See Cicero, *De oratore*, II. xv. 62: *Nam quis nescit, primam esse historiae legem, ne quid falsi dicere audeat? Deinde ne quid veri non audeat?*, i.e. 'For who does not know history's first law to be that an author must not dare to tell anything but the truth? And its second that he must make bold to tell the whole truth?'

² In the text, Bentham has noted in relation to this and the previous paragraph: '☞ Abridge both paragraphs.'

³ See Ch. 5, § 7, pp. 46–54 above, but also Ch. 15, pp. 159–69 below.

happened to a man to undertake, whether to himself or to others—for his own sake or for the sake of others—that the view which he will take of the subject, and accordingly the expression which he [will give]¹ as the result of that view, shall prove *complete*.

Towards the accomplishment of so desirable an object, Logic will be seen to afford assistance.

Towards the accomplishment of an object at once so desirable and at the same time to a first view so much above the reach of human grasp, logic may perhaps be seen to afford a sort of instrument or engine of greater power than might readily have been imagined. The mode of division called *exhaustive* is this engine.

1. What the *nature* is of this engine—2. what by its means *can* be *done*—3. and what *can not* be done—4. what are the *subjects* to which with advantage it is *applicable*—5. what those to which it is *not* applicable; whether as being absolutely incapable of being applied to them, or as not being capable of being applied to them with advantage—these are the topics of the matter of this chapter.

By the Aristotelians, no division was recognized as legitimate or at any rate as perfect, no division was regarded as worthy of the name of division, unless it were exhaustive.²

The object to be divided being termed the *dividendum*, the parts into which it is divided and which constitute the result of the operation, the dividing or condivident members, follow, according to Sanderson, under the name of Canons of perfect division, the following rules.—

1. Be the parts such as that, by their union, the whole shall be recomposed. *Membra absorbeant totum divisum.*^a

2. The dividend is greater in extent than any one of its members: it can not but be equal to all of them when put together. *Divisum esto* (say rather *est*) *latius singulis suis membris; adequatum universis.*

3. Let the condivident members be, in their imports, distinct from and opposite to each other: in such sort, adds an explanation, that they be not liable either to [be] in any part coincident, or to be confounded.

4. The members produced by each division, let them be the nearest and immediate members, and be the number of them as small as

^a ¶ N.B. The original is not correctly worded—its imperfections are here endeavoured to be corrected.

¹ MS 'has given'.

² See Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 47, '*Divisio rei Perfecta est totius alicujus propriè dicti in partes propriè dictas distributio*', i.e. 'The perfect division of a thing is the distribution of what is properly said to be the whole of something into what is properly said to be parts.'

may be. *Divisio fiat in membra proxima et immediata, et (quam fieri commodè potest) paucissima.*¹

From the nearest results thus formed (continues the text in the way of explanation) descend by subdivision to such as are most immediate. *A proximis per rō ad remotiora et minutiora descendendum per subdivisiones.*

The dichotomous mode of division (it goes on to say) is that which has been most approved of, where it can conveniently be employed. *Dichotomiæ* (dichotomies) *sunt laudatissimæ, ubi commodè haberi possunt.*

Nor yet (continues this explanation) ought it to be every where hunted after (pursued)—hunted after too superstitiously and anxiously pursued:—as it is by the Ramæans.²

An example, unfortunately not a very unfrequent one, of the conjunction of self-sufficiency and emptiness may be seen in the account of Dichotomy as above delivered.

Of the existence of a state of things in which dichotomy can be employed commodiously, intimation is given: and in that state of things, says the instructor, dichotomies are most praiseworthy things. That state of things, what is it? to any such question, not so much as any the smallest endeavour is made to find an answer.

What renders the deficiency the more to be regretted is, the danger which it seems there is of their being too superstitiously and anxiously hunted after: too superstitiously; for where [there] is not too much of it, superstition is, it seems, of the number of the abovementioned most praiseworthy things—a danger which, in the practice of the sort of persons here called Ramæans (meaning, it should seem, the followers of a certain *Peter Ramus*), had actually been realized.

Upon the whole, however, of two propositions relative to the matter in question—viz. the dichotomical or bifurcate mode of division—intimation is hereby given: viz. 1. that there are cases in which this mode of division has its use; 2. that there are cases in which, forasmuch as in those cases it either has no use at all, or none but what is outweighed by inconvenience, the practice of employing it may be considered as matter of *abuse*. Let us see whether some criterion may

¹ See *ibid.*: '1. *Membra absorbeant totum divisum.*

'2. *Divisum esto latius singulis suis membris; adæquatum universis.*

'3. *Membra dividenda sint contradistincta & opposita; ita ut confundi nequeant, vel coincidere.*

'4. *Divisio fiat in membra proxima & immediata, & (quam fieri commodè potest) paucissima.*

² See *ibid.*, p. 48: 'non tamen nimium superstitiosè & anxie ubique venandæ; quod faciunt *Ramæi*.' For Peter Ramus and his diagrammatic classification see p. 62 n. above.

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not be discoverable, whereby the one of these classes of cases may be distinguished from the other.¹

In the case of [an]² aggregate of the physical kind, it may have been seen,³ the greatest number of integral parts into which it is capable of being divided is always a determinate number: in a bushel of apples containing 400 apples, 400 is that number: in a bushel of wheat containing 400,000 grains of wheat, 400,000 is that number: in a warehouse-full of plants 40,000 in number, each of those of a different species, 40,000 is that number.⁴

The 40,000 plants, each of them of a species distinguishable from every other species, suppose it required so to divide into subordinate and lesser aggregates the universal or all-comprehensive aggregate of which, by the supposition, the word plant is the name—to divide it in such sort by a series of successive divisions that, from the description given of the products of these several divisions, should be made to appear in what points each coincided with, and in what points it disagreed with, the description given of every other? In this case, the following is the only mode of proceeding by which the object can be accomplished. Divide the whole aggregate into two equal parts or say divisions: divide each of those divisions into others, which call divisions of the 2^d order, calling the two first mentioned divisions, divisions of the 1st order: each of these divisions, dividing always by two, divide into divisions of the 3^d order: total number of divisions, eight; and so on, dividing always by two until the whole number of the component aggregates thus formed comes to be the 40,000,⁵ the assumed number of different species of plant. This mode of division is termed from the Greek *dichotomous*; from the Latin, bifurcate, two-forked.

On this plan of division, viz. the dichotomous—between the number of operations performed and the number of included aggregates to which the original all-embracing aggregate is reduced by those operations, there exists, whatsoever be the number of those operations, an established ratio:—the number of the results being as above 40,000, the number of the operations will have been ⁶

¹ Bentham does not go on to provide such a criterion. Above the following paragraph, Bentham has added the following title in pencil: 'Ch. or § ||. Of Logical Division in general—and of d° on the *bifurcate* principle in particular.'

² MS orig. 'a physical'.

³ Bentham, in fact, makes this point in Ch. 9, § 2, p. 105 below.

⁴ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: '✍ Amend the numbers from arithmetical calculation.'

⁵ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: '✍ Put instead some *power* of 2.' The relevant number is 32,768.

⁶ The number 40,000 needs to be divided by 2 on fifteen occasions in order to reach near to the number 1.

§ 2. *Synthesis and Analysis correspond not*

Psychical, viz. logical, division supposes the antecedent existence of psychical, or say logical, *aggregation*. *Psychical* division has no subject but the ideas commonly called *general* ideas. These general ideas are aggregate ideas, or say abstract ideas, formed by *abstraction* and *aggregation* out of simple ones.

Of the aggregate thus formed, the extent is determined and measured by that of the import of the *term*—the *appellative*—employed for the expression of it.

If, of this extent, the amplitude be in a certain degree considerable, the aggregate idea, of which that appellative is the sign, will hardly have been formed, but that, antecedently to its formation, some other aggregate idea or ideas less ample in extent, and in their whole extent contained within the one in question, will also have been formed; formed, and by their respective appellatives, designated and fixed.

Thus in a country in which human society has, in the scale of civilization, attained the *pastoral* state, an appellative correspondent to the word *animal* will scarcely have been formed, till after the two appellatives, corresponding respectively to the words *man* and *sheep*, have been formed and brought into use. By the observation of the properties which are possessed by all men, and not possessed by any sheep, the aggregate idea expressed by the word *man* will have been formed: by the observation of those properties which are possessed by all sheep and not possessed by any men, the aggregate idea expressed by the word *sheep* will have been formed.

In the instance of *man*, the properties, which are common to all men, can never have been presented to the senses of any man, but the properties, by which the several different men that have come under observation have differed from each other, have also and at the same times respectively been presented to sense. The respective aggregates composed of the several simple ideas presented by each of these men respectively may be termed *individual* aggregates: the aggregate composed of the several simple ideas drawn alike from the contemplation of all these several men, and fixed and designated by the classical term *man*, may be termed *classical aggregates*.^a

In the formation of the aggregate idea designated [by] the term *man*—in the formation of the classical psychical aggregate termed *man*, the attention has turned itself aside from all the several simple ideas that have alike been presented by the abovementioned individual aggregates, turning itself at the same time, and therefore confining

^a To this purpose *classical* is preferred to *general*: *class* being in no such determinate ratio as *genus* is in to *species*.

itself, to such of those simple ideas as have been presented by every individual belonging to that class, comprehended under that appellation; and those to which it has thus exclusively turned itself and confined itself, it may be said by so doing to have *abstracted*, i.e. drawn off, from the rest. It is thus that, to the *operation* or *process* by which in this way *classical aggregates* are formed, the term *abstraction* has been applied, and to the classical aggregates themselves, the term *abstract ideas*, in opposition to and in co-ordination with that of *general ideas*.

These explanations premised, the time may have come for observing, that where, of the name of a classical aggregate, the extent is to a certain degree considerable, it will scarcely have been formed but by repeated exercises of the process of abstraction, a certain cluster of ideas having been first abstracted, or as it were distilled, from the cluster contained in the several individual, i.e. physical, aggregates—from the product of this first distillation others drawn off to compose what may be termed a classical aggregate of the 2^d stage from the bottom, from this product of the 2^d distillation others again drawn off to compose an aggregate of the 3^d stage from the bottom, and so on.

By certain terms, which, in the description of this process, have sometimes been employed (viz. *synthesis* and *analysis*) it looks as if it had been taken for granted that the two operations thus denominated were each of them the exact counterpart and converse of the other: that the stages passed over in the one process and in the other would every where and on all occasions be exactly the same, and consequently the number of those stages likewise: and that whatsoever had by *synthesis* been put together, the putting of that asunder—of all that, as far as they both went, and no more than that—was the operation performed by analysis.

Wide indeed from the truth of the case would any such conception, however, be found. Small has probably been the number of the successive operations of the kind in question, viz. abstraction—correspondently small that of the stages in passing through which the idea of the most amply extensive classical aggregate of which the mind is capable of forming to itself an idea has in this way been formed. Of this most extensive aggregate, termed by the logicians of antiquity the *genus generalissimum*, being, or existence, or entity is the name. *Five* or at the utmost *six* is the number of successive distillations by which this most sublimated and refined of all abstract ideas has, as far as appears, been formed.¹ *Five* or at the utmost *six* has accordingly been the number of steps successively taken by the mind in its ascent towards this most exalted pinnacle: five or at the utmost six the

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Give here in text or Note the Porphyrian Tree.’ For the Porphyrian tree see Ch. 6, § 5, pp. 62–4 above.

number of *stages* at which it has stopped. Of these *abstractions*, these *steps*, these *stages*, the number corresponds to and is indicated by the number of the ramifications exhibited by the famous Porphyrian Tree:¹ and of these operations indication has been given, and at the same time *recording* made, by the names respectively employed for the designation of the classical aggregates of different amplitudes which have been their respective products.²

Far indeed from being thus limited is the number of aggregates of different orders capable of being formed by the decomposition of that all-embracing aggregate.

Division the 1st. Divide the all-comprehensive aggregate of universal amplitude *being* or *substance* into the two aggregates immediately issuing from it, you have *corporeal* beings and *incorporeal*. For corporeal beings say in one word *bodies*; as on the other hand, for incorporeal beings, in one word *spirits*.

Division the 2^d. Divide the aggregate corporeal beings into its proximate component aggregates, *living* and *not-living*, you have those endowed with life and those not endowed with life, to which latter description belong mineral bodies.

Division the 3^d. Divide the aggregate corporeal beings endowed with life into its proximate component aggregates, you have such as are endowed with sensation as well as life—say in one word *animals*, and such as are *not* endowed with sensation—say in one word *vegetables*.

It was from the observation and contemplation of individual animals, and from the observation made of a quality which such of them as were most exposed to observation had in common with one another, and which was not observed or observable in vegetables, viz. the habitual act of respiration, that the common name expressive of the faculty corresponding to that act, viz. *animal*, was first formed.³ Here, then, are four stages which have place alike in the ascending and the descending line.

But, in the descending line, between the psychical aggregate designated by the word *animal* and the individuals from the observation of which the existence of that faculty from which the classical appellation of that aggregate was deduced as above, there has been framed a whole nest of physical aggregates one within another in a long chain or series of *intus-susceptions* or *enclosures*: and so in the case of vegetables another such series, and so in the case of minerals another such: each such box, with its companions at the same distance from

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'N.B. This is dichotomous and exhaustive.'

² The aggregates were man, animal, living thing, body, and substance.

³ The word 'animal' is derived from the Latin *animalis*, 'having the breath of life', in turn derived from *anima*, 'air, breath, life'.

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the all-enclosing box, being the result of a division which at that level had been made of the contents of that larger box within the limits of which they had all been contained.

Thus far, though at a few of the highest stages coincident, are the steps taken in the ascending line and the steps taken in the line of descent from agreeing with one another in number. In the line of ascent the steps were taken with the seven-leagued boots of fairyland,¹ assisted by the wings of the genius: in the line of descent, they were taken by Observation, retarded at every step by Reflection and Discernment, and in several tracks by experiment.

Taken in their original acceptations, *Synthesis* and *Analysis*—the *Synthetic method* and the *Analytic*—are *packing* and *unpacking*: the latter operation being the exact converse or reverse and counterpart of the former: the road the same, the stages or stopping places the same: the direction alone different, and *that* opposite.

But very different, it has been seen, from a course thus simple in description is the course taken by the mind when occupied in the field of logical method.

An inference that presents itself as an obvious one, is—that in the instance of every such aggregate the number of integrant parts contained in it is a *limited*—is in a word a *given*—a *determinate*—or at any rate a *determinable*—number.

Such accordingly it would be, were it not for the powers, the unlimited powers, of decomposition, whereto belongs abstraction, and recomposition possessed by the human mind; of these powers, one effect is to exclude as fruitless every possible attempt at circumscribing within any limited extent the number of such parts into which a logical whole is capable of being divided.

In the case of physical aggregates, yes: but not so in the case of logical ones. Take a bushel of apples, the number of integrant parts of that aggregate, each apple constituting one of those integrant parts, will be the number of apples that were put into the bushel, neither more nor less. Some years ago the aggregate number of all the species of plants then known was estimated at 40,000.² Suppose a warehouse or garden, and in it a specimen of every one of these 40,000 species: 40,000, neither more nor less, is in this case the exact number of integrant parts into which the aggregate here in question is capable

¹ The seven-leagued boots, which allowed their wearer to stride seven leagues with each step, were popularized by the story of 'Le Petit Poucet' by Charles Perrault (1628–1703), first published in *Histoires ou Contes du temps passé. Avec des Moralitez*, Paris, 1697, pp. 183–228, in which the titular character steals the boots from a sleeping giant.

² Bentham's source has not been traced, but this figure was commonly given as the total number of known species of plant: see, for instance, Sutton Thomas Wood, *A Treatise on the analysis and effect of Manures*, Chipping-Norton, 1813, p. 48.

of being divided. But upon this supposition, 40,000 is not so great a number as that of integrant parts called *species* into which the logical aggregate designated by the names of *plant* and *vegetable* is capable of being divided.

In this supposed case, by the supposition, for every species there is one individual and no more: for every individual one species and no more.

But as within the extent of one species, individuals in an unlimited number may be and habitually are contained, so from any one individual, much more from a greater number of individuals, an unlimited number of species may be deduced.

No new species, it is true, can be formed, except so far as in description it is capable of being rendered different from every species which had been described before it had ever been described. But, in regard to any of the observable species of natural bodies, taken as they come out of the hands of nature, this is a condition of the failure of which no reasonable probability seems to present itself. Take, for instance, the 40,000 different species of plants that having some years ago been said to be the number of those species already known to be in existence. Of these, there exists not any one which has not some property or aggregate of properties which is not to be found in any of the others; and which constitute[s] that *difference*, or say differential mark or character, whereby it stands distinguished from every other. Of these differences, the ideas were respectively formed in the mind by the process of abstraction. They were formed from the observations made of some individual plant or plants which, at the time of observation, were considered as belonging respectively to those same species. On this occasion, in the formation of any such species, what was done was—not to take for the character or essence of the species every *mark* whereby the individual in question, the individual or individuals then and there observed, was seen to differ from all individuals that had ever been observed before, but only some *one*, or other small number, of those marks. For in all the different species of plants that have thus been framed, take any one whatsoever: answerable to the description how ample and particular so ever of that one species will be found individuals in a multitude absolutely inexhaustible, no two of them so perfectly similar, but that upon a simultaneous comparison, differences—perceptible and describable differences—between them might be found.

Hence it is that the denomination given to the operation by which the fictitious aggregates created by the joint powers of perception and imagination, or else by the imagination alone, is termed *abstraction*: out of an indefinite number of peculiar marks by which the several

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really-existing entities lying open to observation are distinguishable, the mind fixes upon some one or other comparatively small number, and leaving the others unnoticed, and in this way separating them from those others, makes its own use of them, applies to the purpose in question the property or properties thus abstracted, establishing them in the character of so many marks, whereby the thus new-formed species, and as many individuals as will ever come to be included under it, i.e. be found to exhibit marks of the same description, are made to stand distinguished (as supposed) from all others, species and individuals, that *are*, ever *have been*, or ever *will be*, in existence.

Among Natural Philosophers, and more particularly among Botanists, the word species has a particular and narrow import, whereby it stands distinguished from that of *variety*; for the composition of a *species*, those marks or combinations of marks alone are on this occasion taken and employed of which it is supposed that, on the part of all individuals descended in the way of botanical descent from an individual thus described, they will for ever continue to have existence: those which are regarded as being in the contrary case being for distinction sake termed varieties: in such sort that by the term *variety* is expressed an aggregate subordinate to and contained within some one species *of* which it is a *variety*. But for these attributions of everlasting immutability in the one case, and mutability in the other, there can never be any ground stronger than conjecture: a conjecture which though by experience found to be so far true as that the acting in conformity to the indication afforded by it is found to be productive of practical benefit, yet is every now and then found to be erroneous. Accordingly it is with suitable diffidence that the existence of the sort of distinction in question is commonly announced: that such a collection of marks is indicative of a *species* and not of a mere *variety*: that such another of a mere *variety*, and not of a *species*. Thus it is that species in the botanical, or say phytological, sense differs from a species in the logical sense.

§ 3. *Misapplication of the terms synthesis and analysis to Geometry and Algebra*¹

Expressing the difference between Geometry and Algebra is another of the purposes to which the opposite terms synthesis and analysis,

¹ Bentham has added the following rudiments at this point: '1. In Locke, no mention of Analytic & Synthetic.

'2. In Saunderson, the account given of the difference is obscure—unintelligible.'

Locke does not discuss synthesis and analysis in *Essay concerning Human Understanding*. For Sanderson's explanation of the synthetic and analytic methods see p. 53 & n. above.

with the methods respectively denominated from them, viz. the *synthetic method* and the *analytic method*—have been employed.¹

But between these two branches of science, no such difference or distinction will be found as that of which intimation is given by that pair of correspondent and opposite appellatives.

In Geometry, *quantity* is never considered but with relation to figure: in Algebra, it never is considered with relation to figure: of the difference between these two branches of mathematics, this account is at once true, short and clear: and no other account that is in equal, if in any degree, endowed with those three qualities, will, it is believed, be found.^a

In Algebra as well as in Geometry, in Geometry as well as in Algebra, that which is unknown or supposed to be unknown is inferred from its relation to that which is known or supposed to be known: in Algebra, unknown quantities are made known by means of the relation they bear to known ones: in Geometry, unknown quantities as expressed by figure, and supposed to exist as between figure and figure or parts of the same figure, are made known by means of the relations they bear to known quantities as expressed by figure.

In Geometry, true it is, that objects are put together: quantities known and unknown are put together: whereupon, of such as are unknown, a description is given and a conception conveyed by means of the relation they bear to certain known ones.

Of Geometry this is true: nor is it less so when applied to Algebra.

A quantity is mentioned to me, of which I wish to know the amount, it being as yet unknown to me. By the amount is always in this case meant the amount in numbers: for in truth the subject of algebra is numbers and nothing else. Suppose the number in question six. In

^a In Algebra, *quantity* alone, mere quantity without regard to figure, is throughout the subject: in Geometry, the subject of *figure* is superadded: in Fluxions, the idea of *motion* is introduced, in addition to those of quantity and figure.²

In Fluxions the misfortune is that the *motion*—the motion supposed to have place on the occasion in question, is a mere fictitious circumstance, not having, on that occasion, any place in the particular—the individual—cases, to which it is applied, whereas in all cases in which algebra is applied, *quantity* has place: and in all cases in which geometry is applied, figure (unless where, as in Fluxious *motion*, it is introduced fictitiously) has place.

¹ There appears to have been a degree of confusion regarding the application of the terms synthesis and analysis to the different branches of mathematics, but for an instance that is consistent with Bentham's statement see William Enfield, *Principles of Mental and Moral Philosophy. To which is prefixed, Elements of Logic*, London, 1809, p. lx: 'The science of Geometry exhibits the most perfect specimen of the synthetic method, and experimental philosophy and algebra of the Analytic.'

² In relation to the following paragraph, Bentham has noted: 'Employ this further on.'

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answer to my question, what is the number, the number six is not mentioned by that name. But I am told it is the number which is as great again as number three: or half as great exactly as number 12. Simple as they are, either of these answers is already algebra.

Chapter 8.

Of Exposition by Paraphrasis with its subsidiary operations, viz. Phraseoplerosis and Archetypation

§ 1. *Explanation of these modes of exposition, and of the case in which they are necessary*

Paraphrasis is that mode of exposition which is the only instructive mode where the *exponend*, being the name of a fictitious entity, has not any superior in the scale of logical subalternation.

Connected, and *that* necessarily, with Paraphrasis is an operation for the designation of which the word Phraseoplerosis (i.e. a filling up the phrase) may be employed.

By the word paraphrasis may be designated that sort of exposition which may be afforded by transmuting into a proposition having for its subject some real entity, a proposition which has not for its subject any other than a fictitious entity.

Nothing has no properties. A fictitious entity, being as this its name imports—being, by the very supposition, a mere nothing, can not of itself have any properties: no proposition by which any property is ascribed to it can, therefore, be in itself and of itself a true one, nor therefore an instructive one: whatsoever of truth is capable of belonging to it can not belong to it in any other character than that of the representative of—the intended and supposed equivalent and adequate succedaneum of—some proposition having for its subject some real entity.

Of any such fictitious entity or fictitious entities, the real entity with which the import of their respective appellatives is connected, and on which their import depends, may be termed the *real source, efficient cause, or connecting principle*.

In every *proposition* by which a property or affection of any kind is ascribed to an entity of any kind, real or fictitious, three parts or members are necessarily, either expressly or virtually, included—viz. 1. a *subject*, being the name of the *fictitious entity* in question; 2. a *prædicate*, by which is designated the property or affection attributed or ascribed to that subject; and 3. the *copula* or sign of the act of the mind by which the attribution or ascription is performed.

By the sort of proposition here in question—viz. a proposition which has for its subject some fictitious entity and for its prædicate the name of an attribute attributed to that fictitious entity, some sort

of image—the image of some real action or state of things—is in every instance presented to the mind. This image may be termed the archetype,¹ or archetypal² image, appertaining to the fictitious proposition of which the name of the characteristic fictitious entity makes a part.

In so far as, of this emblematic image, indication is given, the act or operation by which such indication is given may be termed *archetypation*.

Of the subject of the fictitious proposition, which is employed as the representative of some real one, and which, for the exposition of it, requires a paraphrasis having for its subject a real entity, which paraphrasis, when exhibited, performs, in relation to the name of the fictitious subject, the same sort of office which, for the name of a real entity, is performed by a definition of the ordinary stamp—viz. a definition *per genus et differentiam*—the name forms but a part of the fictitious proposition for the explanation of which the sort of proposition having for its subject a real entity is, in the character of a paraphrastically-expository proposition, required. To compose and constitute such a proposition as shall be ripe and qualified for the receiving for itself, and thereby for its subject, the exposition by *paraphrasis*, the addition of other matter is required: viz. besides the name of the subject, the name of the predicate together with some sign performing the office of the copula—the operation by which this completion of the phrase is performed may be termed Phraseoplerosis.

Phraseoplerosis is thus another of the operations connected with and subservient to the main or principal operation—*paraphrasis*.

§ 2. *Exemplification in the case of the fictitious entity* Obligation

For exposition and explanation of Paraphrasis, and of the other modes of exposition connected with it and subsidiary to it, that which presents itself as the most instructive of all examples which the nature of the case affords is that which is afforded by the groupe of Ethical fictitious entities, viz. *Obligations, rights*, and other *advantages* dependent on obligation.

The fictitious entities which compose this groupe have all of them for their *real source* one and the same sort of real entity, viz. *sensation*: the word being taken in that sense in which it is significative not merely of perception, but of perception considered as productive either of pain, of pleasure, or of both.

¹ MS orig. 'emblem'.

² MS orig. 'emblematic'.

Pain (it is here to be observed) may have for its equivalent, loss of pleasure: pleasure again may have for its equivalent, exemption from pain.¹

An obligation (viz. the obligation of conducting himself in a certain manner) is incumbent on a man (i.e. is spoken of as incumbent on a man), in so far as, in the event of his failing to conduct himself in that same manner, pain or loss of pleasure is considered as about to be experienced by him.^a

In this example:

1. The *exponend*, or say word to be expounded, is *an obligation*.

2. It being the name not of a real but only of a fictitious entity, and that fictitious entity not having any superior genus, it is considered as not susceptible of a definition in the ordinary shape *per genus et differentiam*, but only of an exposition in the way of paraphrasis.

3. To fit it for receiving exposition in this shape, it is, in the character of the subject of a proposition, by the help of the requisite complements, made up into a fictitious proposition. These complements are: 1. the *predicate*, incumbent on a man; 2. the *copula*, is: by and of these, when thus added to the name of the *subject*, viz. obligation, the fictitious proposition which requires to be expounded by paraphrasis, viz. the proposition *An obligation is incumbent on a man*, is composed.

4. Taking the name of the subject for the *basis*, by the addition of this predicate *incumbent on a man*, and the copula *is*, the phrase is completed, the operation called *phraseoplerosis*, i.e. completion of the phrase, performed.

5. The source of the explanation thus given by paraphrasis is the idea of eventual sensation, as expressed by the names of the different and opposite modes of sensation, viz. pain and pleasure with their respective equivalents, and the designation of the event on the happening of which such sensation is considered as being about to take place.

6. For the formation of the variety of fictitious propositions, of which the fictitious entity in question, viz. obligation or an obligation, is in use to constitute the subject, the emblematic or archetypal image is

^a It being at the same time understood that it is only in so far as he is aware of the probability that, in the event in question, the unpleasant consequence in question will befall him, that the obligation can possess the probability of proving an effective one.

¹ Above the following paragraph, Bentham has noted: ‘Note this exposition is peculiar to the case where the obligation is of that sort that applies itself or is capable of applying itself to the *will* or active faculty: antecedently, therefore, it may be requisite to distinguish it from d° applying to and not going beyond the passive faculty.’

that of a man lying down, with a heavy body pressing upon him, to wit in such sort as either to prevent him from acting at all, or so ordering matters that if so it be that he does act, it can not be in any other direction or manner than the direction or manner in question—the direction or manner requisite.

The several distinguishable sources from any or all of which the pain and pleasure constitutive of the obligation in question may be expected to be received—viz. the several sanctions distinguished by the names of the physical sanction, the popular or moral sanction, the political (including the legal) sanction, and the religious sanction—these particulars belong to another part of the field, and have received explanation in another place.¹

To that other place² it also belongs to bring to view the causes by which the attention and perception of mankind have to so great an extent been kept averted from the only true and intelligible source of obligation—from the only true and intelligible explanation of its nature, as thus indicated.

On the exposition thus given of the term obligation, may be built those other expositions of which it will form the basis, viz. of *rights*, and their respective modifications, as well as of the several modifications of which the fictitious entity *obligation* is itself susceptible.

§ 3. *Of the modes of Exposition subsidiary to Definition and Paraphrasis*

1. Etymologisation—indication of the etymology or say derivation of the word.

2. Synonymation—indication of some other word or words the import of which [agree]³ with it more or less correctly in their import.

3. Antithesis—indication of some other word or words the import of which is opposite to that of the word in question.

4. Exemplification—indication of some individual or of some lesser aggregate as being included in the name of the aggregate in question.

5. Illustration—bringing to view some word or words by which, in any one or more of the above ways, or in any other way or ways, *light* may be thrown upon the import of the word in question—i.e. the import of it may, in some way or other, be rendered clearer—i.e. more surely clear as well of obscurity as of ambiguity.

¹ See *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (CW), Ch. III, pp. 34–7, and Ch. 18, VIII, pp. 193–9 below.

² Bentham perhaps had in mind the discussion ‘Of Principles adverse to that of Utility’ in *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (CW), Ch. II, pp. 17–33.

³ MS ‘agreeing’.

ESSAY ON LOGIC

Without any difference—or at any rate without any difference worth remarking—all these subsidiary modes of exposition seem capable of being applied with equal propriety and utility, whether the main mode of exposition be in the form of a Definition, or in the form of a *Paraphrasis*.¹

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘At present, 24 Aug. 1814, no sufficient reason presents itself for adding any further observations under any one of these heads.’

Chapter 9.

Of Ontology:
under which head are brought to view such objects
as are designated by the most capacious and
comprehensive appellations which the stock of
Language affords

§ 1. *Entities real and fictitious—fictitious, the mysterious products and instruments of language—distinction between a fictitious entity and a non-entity, and a fabulous entity*

Real entities—fictitious entities—under one or other of these denominations may be comprehended every object that ever was or ever can be present to any faculty of the human frame—to perception, memory, or imagination.

An objection immediately presents itself—Fictitious entity? (says some one). Of such a locution where can be the sense? By the word *entity* can not but be represented something that *has* existence: applied to the same subject, of the adjunct *fictitious* the effect is to give intimation that it has not any existence. Here then is a contradiction in terms: a species of locution of which, in proportion as it has any, confusion, and that alone, can not but be the effect.

Entities are either real or fictitious—what can that mean? What? but that of entities there are two species or sorts: viz. one which is itself, and another which is neither itself, nor anything else? Instead of fictitious entity—or as synonymous with fictitious entity, why not here say—non-entity?

Answer. Altogether inevitable will this seeming contradiction, it is believed, be found. The root of it is in the nature of language: that instrument without which, though of itself it is nothing, nothing can be said, and scarce any thing can be done.

Of the nature of that instrument—of the various forms under which it has been seen to present itself among different tribes of men—of the indispensable *parts* which may be seen to belong to it under every one of these forms actual or possible—of the qualities desirable on the part of the collection of signs of which, under all these several forms, it is composed—of the manner in which in the character of an instrument altogether indispensable it serves not only for the communication but in great measure also to the formation of ideas—under

all these several heads, sketches will be endeavoured to be given in a succeeding part of this work.¹

All this while, antecedently to the stage at which these topics present themselves, use is herein making, as it could not but be made, of this same instrument. At that future stage, it will be not only the *instrument*, but also the *subject* of inquiry: at present, and till then, employing it in the character of an instrument, in that same character we must be content to take it in hand and make use of it in the state in which we find it.

In like manner, the several operations which, under the direction of logic and by the help of language, are by human minds performed upon language, and therewith upon minds—such as distinction, division, definition, and the several other modes of exposition, including those of methodization, these [too]² must be performed—performed at and from the very outset of a work on logic, antecedently to the stage at which the task of examining into their nature and origination will be entered upon and come to be performed.

To language then—to language alone—it is that fictitious entities owe their existence—their impossible, yet indispensable existence.

In language, the words which present themselves and are employed in the character of *names* are some of them names of real entities, others names of fictitious entities: and to one or the other of these classes may all words which are employed in the character of *names* be referred.

What will moreover be seen is, that the fiction—the mode of representation by which the fictitious entities thus created, in so far as fictitious entities can be created, are dressed up in the garb, and placed upon the level, of real ones—is a contrivance but for which language—or at any rate language in any form superior to that of the language of the brute creation—could not have existence.

And now perhaps may be seen the difference between a fictitious entity and a *non-entity*: or to speak more strictly the difference between the import of the two words: a difference such that where with propriety and use the one is, the other can not be, employed.

In the house designated by such a number (naming it), in such a street, in such a town, lives a being called the Devil, having a head, body and limbs like a man's, horns like a goat's, wings like a bat's, and a tail like a monkey's. Suppose this assertion made, an observation naturally might be—that the Devil, as thus described, is a non-entity: the averment made of it is that an object of that description really exists: and of such averment, if seriously made, the object or end in

¹ For Bentham's discussion of language see Chs. 12–17, pp. 140–82 below. ² MS 'two'.

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view can not but be, to produce in the minds to which communication is thus made, a serious persuasion of the existence of an object, conformable to the description thus expressed.

Thus much concerning a non-entity.

Very different is the notion here meant to be presented by the term fictitious entity.

By this term is here meant to be designated one of those sorts of objects which, in every language, must for the purposes of discourse be spoken of as existing—be spoken of in the same manner as those objects which really have existence, and to which existence is seriously meant to be ascribed, are spoken of—objects of the existence of which a persuasion is seriously intended to be produced—but without any such design as that of producing any such persuasion as that of their possessing each for itself any separate, or strictly speaking any real, existence.

Take, for instance, the words Relation, Situation, Faculty, Power, and the like.

Real entities being the objects for the designation of which, in the first place, at the earliest stage of human intercourse, and in virtue of the most urgent necessity, words in the character of names were employed—between the idea of a name and that of the reality of the object to which it was applied, an association being thus formed, from a connection thus intimate sprung a very natural propensity, viz. that of ascribing reality to every object thus designated: in a word, of ascribing reality to the objects designated by words which, upon due examination, would be found to be nothing but so many names of so many fictitious entities.

To distinguish them from those fictitious entities which, so long as language is in use among human beings, never can be spared, *fabulous* may be the name employed for the designation of the other class of *unreal entities*.¹

Of fictitious entities, whatsoever is predicated is not, consistently with strict truth, predicated (it thus appears) of any thing but their respective names.

But forasmuch as by reason of its length and compoundedness, the use of the compound denomination *name of a fictitious entity* would frequently be found attended with inconvenience, for the avoidance of this inconvenience, instead of this long denomination, the less long, though unhappily still compound denomination, fictitious entity, will commonly, after the above warning, be employed.

¹ For a discussion of unreal or fabulous entities see Ch. 6, § 6, pp. 65–6 above.

§ 2. *Classification of entities—real and fictitious*

Real entities, viz. 1. Perceptions. 2. Perceptible Bodies. 3. Inferential, i. human soul in a separate state: ii. God and other incorporeal beings.

Perceptible and inferential: under one or other of these denominations may be reduced all *real* entities: *perceptible* those of the existence of which the persuasion is produced by sense without reasoning, i.e. without reflection: *inferential* those of the existence of which the persuasion, in as far as it has place, is produced by reason, by reflection.

1. Under the head of perceptible *real* entities may be placed without difficulty individual perceptions of all sorts: the impressions produced in groupes by the application of sensible objects to the organs of sense: the ideas brought to view by the recollection of those same objects: the new ideas produced by the action of the imagination, by the decomposition and recomposition of those groupes—to none of these—not to mention at present any articles in the same list—can the character, the denomination, of *real* entities be refused.

Faculties—powers of mind—dispositions: all these are *unreal*—all these are but so many fictitious entities. When a view of them comes to be given,¹ it will be seen how perfectly distinguishable among psychical entities are those which are recognized in the character [of] real, from all those which are here referred to the class of fictitious entities.

Pathematic, apathematic—to one or other of these denominations may be referred all the aggregate imaginable multitudes of perceptions: pathematic, viz. such as either themselves consist purely of or are accompanied by pain or pleasure: apathematic, such as have not any such accompaniment in either shape.

2. Sole remaining perceptible entities, *bodies* of all sorts.

To some it may seem matter of doubt, whether to a perception of any kind, the appellation of a *real entity* can with propriety be applied.

Certain it is that it can not, if either *solidity* or *permanence* be regarded as a quality belonging to the essence of *reality*.

But in neither of these instances can, it is believed, [there] be any sufficient or just reason assigned, why the field of reality should be regarded as confined within the limits which on that supposition would be assigned to it.

Whatsoever claim an object belonging to the class of bodies may be considered as possessing to the attribute of reality, i.e. of existence,

¹ Bentham discusses the faculties of the mind, but does not give a list of them, in Ch. 4, § 1, pp. 35–7 above. He does, however, list the various operations of the mind, to each of which belongs the name of a corresponding faculty, in Ch. 3, pp. 16–34 above.

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every object belonging to the class of *perceptions* will be found to possess a still better title—a title established by still more immediate evidence. Of the reality of perceptions, they are themselves their own evidence: it is only by the evidence afforded by perceptions that the reality of a body of any kind can be established.

3. By the common appellation of *inferential* real entities may be designated beings of two widely distant descriptions: viz. in the first place, the human soul considered as existing in a state of separation from the body; in the next place, *God*, the almighty being, creator and preserver of all other real entities.

Howsoever widely different in other respects, the title of these two sorts of real beings to the common appellation of *inferential* will, it is believed, be found sufficiently clear.

Of a human soul existing in a state of separation from the body, no man living will, it is believed, be found ready to aver himself to have had perception of any individual example: or, at any rate, no man who, upon due and apposite interrogation, would be able to obtain credence.

Considered as existing and visiting any part of our earth in a state of separation from the body, a human soul is a ghost: and, at this time of day, *custom* scarcely does, *fashion* certainly does not, command us to believe in ghosts.

Of this description of beings, the reality, not being in any instance attested by *perception*, can not, therefore, be considered any otherwise than as matter of *inference*.

As to God—sanctioned by divine revelation, according to the freshest and most approved edition of that sublime and mysterious discourse—sanctioned by the religion of Jesus, as delivered to us by the Apostle Paul, is the proposition that by no person was God ever seen at any time:^a for at that time men had not yet learnt so much as to *see*, much less to eat, their God.¹

Of Moses, in a prior edition of that same sublime and mysterious discourse, it is indeed said, whether by that same Moses himself, or by some other person, that, on one particular occasion, the existence of that almighty person was certified to him by the sense of sight.² But by any person whom the averment of the Apostle finds persuaded of its correctness, that of the Jewish lawgiver and historian can not without self-contradiction be received as possessed of that same property; and forasmuch as no parts of that infinite being but the

^a In the Greek original: τον θεον ουδεις εώρακε πώποτε.³

¹ An allusion to the doctrine of transubstantiation, which had been endorsed by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215.

² Exodus 33: 23.

³ The passage appears in the Gospel of John (see John 1: 18), though Paul makes a similar statement at I Timothy 6: 16.

hinder parts were supposed by Moses to have been presented to his view, the only conclusion consistent with the persuasion of the correctness of the averment delivered by the Apostle will be that on the particular occasion in question either the Jewish sage laboured under a misconception, or that in the copies which have reached us of that history and of the translations made of it, one of those errors has crept in, the probability of which there is such frequent occasion to lament.

If the above observations be correct, God, not being, consistently with the imperfections of the human senses, capable of being referred to the class of perceptible entities, can not, in consequence of the imperfections under which human reason labours—can not, any more than the soul of man, [be] considered as existing in a separate state—be referred by it to any other class than that of *inferential* real entities, as above described.

Should there be any person to whose view the souls of men considered in a state of separation from the body should present itself as not capable of being, with propriety, aggregated to the class of real entities, to every such person, the class to which it belongs would naturally be that of fictitious entities: in which case it would probably be considered as being that whole, of which so many other psychical entities, none of which have ever been considered any otherwise than as fictitious, such as the understanding and the will—the *perceptive faculty*, the *memory* and the *imagination*—are so many parts.

Should there be any person who, incapable of drawing those inferences by which the creator and preserver of all other entities is referred to the class of real ones, should refuse to him a place in that class, the class to which such person would find himself in a manner compelled to refer that invisible and mysterious and tremendous being would be—not as the soul of man that of fictitious entities, but that of non-entities.

To any such property as that of *exhaustiveness*, this division of *inferential* real entities into the *souls of men* in a state of separation on the one hand, and the creator and preserver of all entities on the other hand, presents not any pretension.

Angels and Devils: Devils being a party of *Angels* in disgrace: *Angels* living under a sort of subordinate *Aristocracy* of *Archangels: Devils* under a *Monarchy* filled by a *Prince: Cherubims* a sort of *Angels* in an infant and as yet unformed state in which nothing but head and wings are as yet visible. . . .

All these are so many *inferential* beings, of the existence of which the persuasion is fortified at least by, if not principally derived from, their portraits as exhibited in such rich profusion by artists of various

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classes. *Thrones, dominations, principedoms, virtues, powers*—in this one verse are exhibited by the illustrious Angelographer of modern times,¹ the several orders of Angels: and this same classification seems alike applicable to Angelic beings in either state, as well in a state of disgrace as in a state of favour.

By the learner as well as by the teacher of useful *logic*, all these subjects of *ontology*, may, without much detriment (it is believed), either to any other useful *art*, or any other useful Science, be left in the places in which they are found.

Of *ideas* our perception is still more direct and immediate than that which we have of corporeal substances—of their existence our persuasion more intense and irresistible than that which we have of the existence of corporeal substances.

Speaking of entities, ideas might perhaps be accordingly considered as the sole *perceptible* ones; substances, those of the corporeal class, being with reference and in contradistinction to them no other than *inferential* ones.

But if substances themselves be the subject of the division, and for the designation of the two branches of the division the words perceptible and inferential are employed, it is to corporeal substances that the characteristic and differential attributive *perceptible* can not but be applied, the term inferential being thereupon employed for the designation of incorporeal ones.

The more correct and compleat the consideration bestowed, the more clearly will it be perceived, that from the existence of perceptions, viz. of sensible ones, the inference whereby the existence of corporeal entities, viz. the bodies from whence these ideas are respectively deduced, [is inferred] is much stronger and more irresistible than the inference whereby the existence of incorporeal entities, alias souls inseparable from bodies, and God or Gods, alias Persons of the Godhead,² is inferred from the existence of perceptible entities, *alias* corporeal substances, *alias* bodies. Suppose the non-existence of corporeal substances—of any hard corporeal substance that stands opposite to you—make this supposition and as soon as you have made it, act upon it, pain, the perception of pain, will at once bear witness against you, and be your punishment, your condign punishment. Suppose the non-existence of the above-mentioned inferential incorporeal substances, of any of

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Search out and quote the passage in the New Testament in which these are distinguished.' See Colossians 1: 16: 'For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him, and for him.'

² An allusion to the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, whereby God is conceived as being three persons in one, namely God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost.

them, or of all of them, and the supposition made, act upon it accordingly—be the supposition conformable or not conformable to the truth of the case, at any rate no such immediate counter-evidence, no such immediate punishment, will follow.

I. Fictitious entities—Class the first.

1. Matter. 2. Form. 3. Quantity. 4. Space.

No substance can exist but it must be itself matter—be of a certain determinate *form*—be or exist in a certain determinate quantity: and were there but one substance in existence, all these three attributes would belong to it.

Matter. At first view the word matter may naturally enough be considered as exactly synonymous to the word *substance*.

It may undoubtedly be employed with propriety instead of *substance* on many of the occasions on which the word substance may, with equal propriety, be employed.

But there are occasions on which, while substance may, matter can not, with propriety be employed.

By the word *substance*, substances incorporeal as well as corporeal are wont to be designated: the word matter is wont to be employed to designate corporeal, to the exclusion of incorporeal substances.

On the other hand, neither are occasions wanting in which, while the word *matter* may, the word substance can *not*, with propriety be employed.

Matter is wont to be employed in contradistinction to *form*: and that on occasions on which the word *substance* can not with propriety be employed. Thus, in considering substance, any individual substance, consideration may be had of its matter without any consideration had of its *form*: and so *vice versa*, of its *form* without its *matter*.

Thus it is, that, taken in that sense which is peculiar to it, the idea attached to the word *matter* can not, by means of that word, be brought to view without bringing to view along with it the idea of another *entity* called form: and this is the reason why, along with form, it has been considered as composing a groupe of entities distinct from the sort of entity for the designation of which the word substance has been employed.

The word *substance* is the name of a class of real entities, of the only class which has in it any corporeal entities.

The word *matter* is but the name of a class of fictitious entities, springing out of the sort of real entity designated by the word *substance*.

And so it is in regard to the word Form.

The ideas respectively designated by these corresponding words are fractional results, produced from the decomposition of the idea belonging to the word *substance*.

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Every physical real entity, every corporeal substance, every sort of body, has its matter and its form: and this its matter and this its form are entities totally different from each other.

These names of entities possess both of them the characteristic properties of fictitious entities. It is by means of propositions designative of place, and by that means of a fictitious material image, that the names of them are connected with the name of the real entity substance. *In* that substance exists such and such matter: behold the matter *of* that substance: behold all this matter from that substance. Here substance is a receptacle: matter a fictitious entity spoken of on one of these occasions as if it were a real entity contained *within* that receptacle; on the other as if one that had proceeded *from* it.

Behold the form *in* which that substance presents itself: behold the form *of* that substance.

Figure, Configuration, Shape—in these several words may be seen so many synonyms, or almost synonyms, to the word *form*.

Quantity: Quantity has been distinguished into 1st. *continuous*, and 2^{dly}. *discrete*.¹

Discrete quantity (it is commonly said) is *number*: it should rather be said is *composed of numbers*: viz. of numbers more than one of separate entities.

It is only by means of discrete quantity, i.e. number, that continuous quantity can be measured by the mind.

To form an idea of any continuous quantity, i.e. of a body as existing in a certain quantity,^a one of two courses must be taken or conceived to be taken in relation to it. It must be divided or conceived to be divided into parts, i.e. into a determinate number of parts, or together with other similar bodies made up into a new and artificial and compounded whole.

To divide a body or conceive a body to be divided into parts, it suffices not to divide it or conceive it divided into its constituent bodies, into any such smaller bodies as are contained in it. Either the entire body itself, or its parts respectively, must, by the mind, be conceived to be divided into its several *dimensions*.

Be the body what it may, not being boundless, it can not but have some *bound* or *bounds*: this bound, if one, is a surface: these *bounds*, if there are more than one, are surfaces. These surfaces, again not being boundless, have their bounds—these bounds are lines.

^a So of space.

¹ See p. 56 n. above.

The only bodies that have each of them but one uniform surface are spheres.¹

Bodies are real entities. Surfaces and lines are but fictitious entities. A surface without depth—a line without thickness, was never seen by any man. No: nor can any conception be seriously formed of its existence.

Space is the negation or absence of body.

Of any determinate individual portion of space, as clear an idea is capable of being formed as of any body or of any portion of any body: and besides being equally determinate as that of body, the idea of space is much more simple.

To *space* it is difficult either to ascribe or to refuse *existence* without a contradiction in terms: to consider it as nothing or as distinct from nothing.

Of body, that is [of] all bodies whatsoever, the annihilation is conceivable without difficulty. Why? because in whatsoever place, that is within whatsoever portion of space, within whatsoever receptacle composed of mere space, any body is at any given time conceived to be, it may thenceforward be conceived to be removed from that place, and so successively from any and every other portion of space.

Of space—that is of all portions of space whatever—indeed of so much as any one portion of space—the annihilation can not be conceived. Why? because in *mere* space there is nothing to remove: nothing that can be conceived capable of being removed. In so far as matter is annihilated, there is less matter than there was before. But suppose space to be annihilated? is there less space than there was before?

Accordingly, taken in the *aggregate*, no bounds, no limits, can be assigned to space, so neither can any *form*, or any *quantity*. It can not be removed: it can not be moved: for there is nothing of it or in it to remove: there is no place to which it can be removed.

So much for *space* taken in the *aggregate*. But take this or that individual portion of Space, the properties of it are very different. Conceive it, as in innumerable instances really it is, enclosed in bodies, immediately it is, and unavoidably you conceive it to be, endowed with many of the properties of bodies. Of limits it is susceptible as body is: in point of fact it has limits: and having those limits it thereby has not only form but quantity. It not only has limits as clearly as body has limits, but it has the *same* limits.

Having limits, it thereby has form, quantity, and even motion: along with the terraqueous globe, i.e. with the whole matter of it, all the

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Quære as to Spheroids.' In the margin, he has also noted at this point: 'Quære portions of space.'

portions of space inclosed in that matter describe round the Sun, and along with the Sun their continually repeated yet ever varied round.

Substances being real physical entities, perceptions real psychical entities, matter, form, quantity, and so on, so many fictitious entities, both descriptions being in part applicable to space, neither of them applicable entirely, space may be regarded and spoken of as a semi-real entity.

II. Fictitious Entities—Class II.

Matter—Form—Quantity—all these are susceptible of *Quality*. Matter—every portion of it—is capable of having its *qualities* independently of those of its form and those of its quantity.¹

A body is said to be of such a *quality*—such or such a quality is said to be *in* it—*resident*, *inherent* in it. The matter, the form, the quantity of this body—in any one of these fictitious entities may this secondary fictitious entity be said to be *resident*, to be *inherent*.

Between quantity and quality, a sort of reciprocation, a sort of reciprocal intercourse, may be observed to have place. As *a quantity* has its qualities, for instance vastness, minuteness, etc.,—so has a quality its quantities.

The quantity of a quality is termed a degree.

The term *modification* is nearly synonymous to the term *quality*.

Of modification, it seems scarcely proper to speak of it as constituting or being a fictitious entity different and distinct from *quality*: the difference between them is rather of a grammatical than of a logical nature. Yet among the cases in which the word *quality* may be employed, there are some in which the word *modification* can scarcely without impropriety be employed. We may speak of a modification of, or of the matter, form, or quantity [of], this or that body, as well as of a quality of that same body: but we can scarcely without impropriety speak of a modification as being *resident* or *inherent* in that same body.

By the word *quality* it is that are expressed all particulars whereby the condition of the body or other object in question is rendered similar or dissimilar, in the first place to that of itself at different times, in the next place to that of other bodies, whether at different times, or at the same time.

Goodness and *badness* of all qualities, experienced or imaginable, these are the very first that would present themselves to notice—these are the very first that would obtain names. Desire of pleasure and of exemption from pain, in one word *interest*, being in some

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Exhibit here from a Book of Nat. History—especially Chemistry—the modifications of which matter is susceptible, independently of those of its form and those of its quantity.’

shape or other the source of every thought as well as the cause of every action, and, in particular, of every action by which names are employed in the designation of persons and of things, names plainly and immediately expressive of the two opposite modes of relation in which those objects would be continually bearing relation to each man's *interest* as above explained, would be among the very earliest to which the faculty of discourse would give existence.

Synonyms or quasi-synonyms to Quality. In this character may be mentioned: 1. *Nature*. 2. *Sort*. 3. *Kind*. 4. *Mode*. 5. *Complexion*. 6. *Description*. 7. *Character*. 8. *Shape*—viz. in a sense somewhat less extensive than that in which it is as above synonymous to Form.

Relation.

No two entities of any kind can present themselves to the mind at the same time—no, nor can so much as the same object present itself at different times, without presenting the idea of *relation*. For relation is a fictitious entity which is produced and takes place as often as the mind, having perception of any one entity, obtains at the same or at any immediately succeeding instant perception of any other entity, or even of that same object if the perception be accompanied with the perception of its being the same. Diversity is in the one case the name of the relation, [*identity*]¹ in the other case. But, as identity is but the negation of diversity, thence, if on no occasion diversity had ever been, neither on any occasion would any such idea as that of [*identity*]² come into existence.

Whatsoever two entities, real or fictitious, come to receive names, and thus to receive their nominal existence, *relation* would be the third: for between the two, they being by the supposition *different*, and both of them actual objects of perception, the relation of difference or diversity would also become an object of perception, and in the character of a fictitious entity, a production of the arts of abstraction and denomination, acquire its nominal existence.

Next after *matter* and *form*, the fictitious entity relation, or the class of fictitious entities called relations, might therefore have been brought to view. But not only between matter and form, but also between the one and the other respectively and the fictitious entities designated by the words quantity, space, and quality, so close seemed the connection, as not to be, without sensible inconvenience, broken by the interposition of any other.

Once introduced into the field, the fictitious entity called *Relation*, swells [to] an extent such as to swallow up all the others. Every other fictitious entity becomes but a mode of this one.

¹ MS '*diversity*'.

² MS '*diversity*'.

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The most extensive and in its conception simple of all relations, i.e. of all modes or modifications of the fictitious entity denominated *relation*, is that of *Place*, with its submodifications.

Next to that in the order of simplicity comes the modification of *time* with its submodifications.¹

Next to them come successively the Relations designated by the several words Motion—Rest—Action—Passion—Subalternation, viz. logical subalternation—Opposition—and Causation, or the relation between cause and effect.

Existence, with its several modifications or correspondent fictitious entities—non-existence, futurity, actuality, potentiality, necessity, possibility and impossibility—will with most convenience close the rear. Though still more extensive than even relation, being applicable to all other relations, to relations of all sorts, and in a word to entities, fictitious as well as real, of all sorts,—no compleat or so much as correct view of their nature and character could be given, till those less extensive ones had been brought to view.

Place. Of the species of relation designated by the word *place*, the most perfect conception may easily be formed, without taking into the account the species of relation designated by the word *time*.

Necessary altogether is the relation which the species of fictitious entity called *place* has on the one hand to the species of fictitious entity called *body*, on the other hand to the fictitious entity called *Space*.

Space has already been distinguished into *absolute* and *relative*.² To absolute space there are no conceivable bounds. To relative space, i.e. to portions of space separated from one [another]³ by bodies, there are in every instance bounds, and those determinate ones.

As to the word *place*, whether it be considered as the name of a real entity or as the name of a fictitious entity, would be a question of words, barely worth being explained, and not at all worth debate.

Considered as a modification of Space, it would, like *that*, stand upon the footing of the name of a real entity. Considered as a species of relation, it would stand upon the footing of a fictitious entity. But in this latter case comes an objection, viz. that the relations which on that occasion are in question, [are]⁴—not place itself or places themselves, but such *relations* as *belong* to place.

Be this as it may, place is a relative portion of space, considered either as actually occupied or as capable of being occupied by some real entity of the class of bodies.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Quere whether *Motion* must not come before *Time*?'

² In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Examine if so.' See pp. 106–7 above.

³ MS 'or other'.

⁴ MS 'is'.

Portions of the earth's surface are considered and denominated each of them *a place*. But in this case the term *place* is used in its *physical* and *geographical* sense, not in an ontological sense.

Whether in a *physical* sense place be or be not a fictitious entity, that in every *psychical* sense it is so, seems manifest beyond dispute. Take, for example, the *place* occupied by such or such an idea in the mind: the place occupied by such or such a subject in a work: by such or such a transaction in a narrative.

Time. Be it as it may in regard to *Place*, that the entity designated by the word *Time* is but a fictitious entity, will it is believed be sufficiently manifest.

Different altogether from each other are the perceptions or ideas respectively presented by the word *place* and the word *time*. Yet as often as *time* is spoken of, it is spoken of as if it were a modification of, or the same thing as, *place*.

Like place, time, or at least any given portion of time, is spoken of in the character of a receptacle. As in such or such a place, things are done in such or such a time—as at such or such a place, things are done *at* such a time. As portions of *space* or *place* are long or short, great or small, so are portions of *time*. In the same sense as quantity of time, we even say *space* of time. As bodies are spoken of as going *from* and *to* such or such a *place*, so operations are spoken of as going on from and to such or such a portion of *time*.

Of every receptacle, all the several parts are co-existent: of any portion of *time*, no two parts how small soever are co-existent. Of any given portion of time, no two of the parts are co-existent, all with relation to each are *successive*. In the very import of the term *co-existence*, the idea of identity in respect of the portion of time supposed to be occupied, as by the word successive that of diversity, is of necessity implied.

Motion. That the entity designated by the word *Motion* is a fictitious entity seems at least equally beyond dispute.

A body, the body in question, is *in motion*: here, unless *in motion* be considered as an abbreviated expression substituted for *in a state of motion*, motion is a receptacle, in which the body is considered as stationed. *The motion of this body is slow or is retrograde*. Here the body is a stationary object—a station or starting post, of or from [which] the motion is considered as proceeding.

Necessarily included in the idea of *motion* is the idea of place and time. A body has been in motion when? in what case? when having at or in one point of time been in any one place, at another time it has been in any other.

Of any and every corporeal real entity, a similitude is capable of being exhibited as well in the form of a body, for instance a model, as

in the form of a surface, as in painting, drawing or engraving: which in every case is, like the object represented, a stationary, permanent and, unless by internal decay or external force, an unchanging and unmoving object.

But by no such graphical similitude—by no picture, by no image, by no stationary object—can any motion be represented. A representation of the body, as it appeared in the place occupied by it at a point of time anterior to that at which the motion commenced—a representation of the same body, as it appeared in the place occupied by it at a point of time posterior to that at which the motion commenced—in these two representations, either or both, may be seen all that can be done towards the representation of motion by any permanent imitative work.

Even on the table of the mind, in no other way can any motion be held up to view. There not being any real entity to represent, the entity represented can not be any other than fictitious: the name employed for the purpose of representation can not therefore be any thing else than the name of a fictitious entity.

Action. In the *idea* of action, the idea of motion is an essential ingredient. But to actual action, actual motion can scarcely be regarded as necessary. Under the term *action*, besides motion, a tendency, though it be without actual motion, seems to be included. Held back by strings, a magnet and a bar of iron suspended at a certain distance from each other; they remain both of them motionless: cut the strings of either of them, it moves till it comes in contact with the other: but for the state of mutual action which preceded the cutting of the strings, no such motion would have taken place.

Passion—Reaction.

Among all the bodies, large and small, cosmical and terrestrial, with which we have any the slightest acquaintance, no instance, it is believed, can be found of action without passion, nor of passion without reaction. But without either of these accompaniments, a conception of action may be entertained, or at any rate attention may be applied upon it: but if on either of any two objects attention is capable of being bestowed without being bestowed on the other, the separate lot of attention thus bestowed affords sufficient foundation for a separate name.

Here then are two more fictitious entities most nearly related and intimately connected with the fictitious entities action and motion, having all of them for their common archetype the same image or set of images, viz. a nutshell, a nut, a starting-post and a goal; the representation of which is performed by the prepositions in, of, from, etc., employed in connection with their respective names.

III. Object—Subject. Groupe of entities considered and denominated in respect of their concomitancy.

In the idea of an object, the idea of some *action*, or at any rate some *motion*, seems to be constantly and essentially involved. Where the object is a corporeal entity, it is a body towards which the body in motion moves: the body, whether permanently or momentarily, which stands *objected*, i.e. *cast before* that other object which moves.

Even in the case of vision, in the instance of an object of sight, the relation is materially the same: the only difference is that, in the case of vision, the moving bodies being the rays of light, the *object* instead of being the body towards which, is the body *from* which, the motion takes place.

In the picture the tracing of which is the effect of the names here in question, the *object* is either on the same level with the source of the motion, or *above* it: the *subject*, as in its literal sense the word *subject* imports, is below and under it.

In the case of a human action—a motion, real or fictitious, considered as being produced by an exercise of the faculty of the will on the part of a sensitive being, this action has in every instance for its cause, the desire and expectation of some good, i.e. of some pleasure or of exemption from some pain, and the entity, the good by the contemplation of which this desire has been produced, is in this case, if not the only object, an object, and indeed the ultimate object, the attainment of which is, in the exercise of the action, aimed at.

Of entities thus intimately connected, it is not to be wondered at, if the conceptions formed, and the names bestowed in consequence, should frequently be indistinct.

In the designation of the same *entity*, in the designation of which the word *subject* is employed, the word *object* is at other times employed: and so also in the designation of the same entity in the designation of which the words *end in view* are employed, the word *object* is frequently also employed.

If, in a case by which a demand is presented for the mention of an object and a subject, so it happens that for the designation of the subject you employ the word *object*, then so it [is]¹ that for the designation of that which may with propriety be termed the object, but cannot with propriety be termed the subject, finding the only proper word preoccupied, you will naturally feel yourself at a loss.

In a case where the faculty of the *will* is not considered as having any part, the designation of *the end in view* is a task on which any occasion for the employment of the word *object* can not have place:

¹ MS 'has'.

in this case, therefore, neither has the uncertainty which as above is liable to be produced by the use of that word.

In a case where the will is supposed to be employed, and which accordingly affords an end in view, one single end [to] the attainment of which by the power of the will the action is directed, in any such case what may very well happen is—that there shall be other entities to which, in the course of the action, though not in the character of *ends in view*, it may happen to the attention to be directed. Here, then, besides an object which may be, will be other objects no one of which can be, commodiously designated by the compound appellative end in view.

In regard to the word *subject*, one convenience is—that it may be used in the plural number. The word to the exclusion of which this convenience belongs to it is the word *field*.¹ For a groupe of numerous and comparatively small entities, the word *field* will not, either in the singular or in the plural, conveniently serve: but to this same purpose the word *subject*, if employed in the plural, is perfectly well adapted.

If beneath the imagined line of action, you have need to bring to view not merely one extensive fictitious motionless body, but a multitude of smaller moveable bodies lying on it, here comes an occasion for the use of both these terms—viz. *field* and *subject*, or *subjects*: the *field* the extensive immoveable entity, the *subjects* the comparatively numerous and less extensive [bodies],² fixt or lying loose upon the surface of it.

In the place of the word *field*, as well as in place of the word *subject*, the words *subject-matter* may be employed: so also in the plural *subject-matters*. But if, in addition to an extensive surface, you have to bring to view a multitude of smaller bodies stationed on it, and if in that case instead of the word *field* you employ the word *subject-matter*, you will find that you can not commodiously, after laying down your *subject-matter*, have *subjects* stationed on it.

In the case where the action in question is a physical—a corporeal one, a question might perhaps arise whether the entities respectively designated by the words *subject* and *object* belonged to the class of fictitious or real entities: a platform on which you stand to shoot an arrow—a butt[t] at which you shoot your arrow—to these could not be refused the appellation of real entities. But in so far as upon the platform you superinduce the character designated by the word *subject*, and upon the butt the character designated by the word *object*—of this *subject* and this *object*, it might be insisted that they are but so many names of fictitious entities.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Confer *suprà* verbo *Field*.’ See Ch. 2, § 3, pp. 12–15 above.

² MS ‘subjects’.

Not that for any practical purpose a question thus turning upon mere words would be in any considerable degree worthy of regard.

Be this as it may, in the case in which the action in question is an incorporeal—a psychical action—having no other field than the mind, or than what is in the mind, in this case the title of the words subject and object, as well as of the word field, to the appellation of fictitious entities will be seen to be clear of doubt.

IV. Groupe of concomitant fictitious entities resulting from the process of logical aggregation and division and subalternation.

It will be seen more at large¹ how it is that, when contemplating the qualities exhibited by individual objects, by abstracting the attention successively from them, quality after quality, let the groupes of individuals, present, past and future contingent included, be ever so vast and multitudinous, there will at last be left some quality or assemblage of qualities which, being found all of them existing in a certain assemblage of individuals, and not in any other, may serve for the foundation of a name by which that whole assemblage may be designated, without including in the designation any individual not included in that assemblage. The words mineral—vegetable—animal—may serve here for examples.

Wherever any such number of individuals can be found so connected with one another, so distinguished from all others, and for the designation of the *aggregate*, the *fictitious unit* composed of that multitude, [a] name or appellation has been found employed and appropriated by use, the fictitious unit thus formed will be found divisible by the imagination into lesser component aggregates or units, these again each of them into others, and in this way the largest, the first divided and all-comprehensive aggregate will be found capable of being divided and sub-divided into any number of aggregates not greater than the whole number of individuals, actual and conceivable, contained in the original factitious and fictitious whole: the name of each one of these component aggregates constituting as it were a *box*, for the containing and keeping together the several aggregates comprized in it, the entire aggregate contained in each such box being characterized by some quality or qualities in respect of which they agreed with one another, at the same time disagreeing with and being thereby distinguished from all others.

Kingdom—Class—Order—Genus—Species—Variety—have been the names given to these boxes, to these fictitious receptacles.

That it is to the class of fictitious and not to the class of real entities that these imaginary, howsoever useful, receptacles appertain, is at this time of day sufficiently clear.

¹ The point is, in fact, discussed in Ch. 6, § 8, pp. 74–5 above.

But the time has been when they have been mistaken for realities.^a

V. Relation as between Archetype and Type—with their respective synonyms and modifications.

When any two psychical real entities, any two ideas—whether perceptions, remembrances, or factitious mental images—have, either at the same instant or at two contiguous or near to contiguous instants, been present to the mind, each of them—such is the effect of this conjunction, howsoever transient—acquires in the event of its reappearance a tendency to draw forth and introduce the other: and the more frequently the conjunct appearance is repeated, the more apt, *cæteris paribus*, is this *tendency* or *probability* to ripen into *actuality*.

This tendency is equal and mutual: and forasmuch as, when considered in this most simple point of view, the two objects thus associated present not any points of difference by which either can be distinguished from the other, they are not, while considered in this point of view and no other, susceptible of different names.

Where in respect of the order of time any difference between the two has place, in this difference may be found (it might be supposed) matter sufficient to serve as a ground for the formation of a difference in respect of name. But innumerable are the instances in which no difference in point of *time* can be found to have place; and even where a difference of this sort might perhaps be observable, to such a degree is it fugitive and questionable, as to be altogether incapable of affording any permanent and sufficient practical ground for a permanent difference in respect of *name*.

At the same time so it is, that for the two ideas in a pair of ideas thus associated, two different names, and those employed throughout no inconsiderable portion of the field of thought, have actually been provided.

To the possibility of putting to any kind of use this difference in name, some difference of nature was an indispensable requisite. Of this necessary difference, a source was found in the order of *importance*.¹ For designating the object regarded as sole or superior in the scale of importance, the words thing *signified* or *archetype* were employed: for the other, the words *sign* and *type*.

In so far as importance is considered as belonging to both, and if to both, in so far [as] any difference is considered as having place in their

^a V. post.²

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'For an exposition of *importance* make *reference* or insert it here.' No such exposition has been located.

² For a discussion of Linnaeus's system of classification see Ch. 6, § 9, pp. 76–8 above, though Bentham does not there make the point about the 'receptacles' being 'mistaken for realities'.

respective degrees of relative importance, that to which the highest degree is ascribed will be considered and spoken of as the archetype or thing signified: that to which no more than an inferior degree of importance—or, what is perhaps more common, no importance at all—is regarded as belonging, will be spoken of as the type or sign.

If, while importance is considered as belonging to both, no difference of level is considered as having place between their respective situations in the scale of importance, either may be considered as possessing the character of archetype or object signified in relation to the other, which in that case will be considered as operating in the character of *type* or *sign*.

In so far as no degree of importance is regarded as belonging to either of them, no source of denomination can in that case be found for either of them—neither of them presenting any pretension to the character of *archetype*, neither of them is capable of being designated by any such denomination as that of *type*.

The conditions requisite to the establishment of this conjunction being so extremely simple, and such as in the nature of things can not but be of continually repeated occurrence, design, human design, can not have been necessary to the exemplification of it.

But if even without *design*, i.e. an exertion of the will applying itself to that purpose, it is capable of taking place, much more is it with and by design.

Of the production of this effect by design, language, in all its various forms, is the most extensive exemplification. Within the field of its operation, almost all other exemplifications are included.

In the case of language taken in the aggregate, the aggregate composed of ideas or other psychical entities capable of being expressed by language being considered as constituting the aggregate archetype or thing signified, the aggregate of the *sounds* applied to that purpose composes with reference to it the aggregate type or sign: this aggregate type or sign being considered as the archetype, the aggregate of the images which, by the name of *letters*, are employed for the designation of those sounds, constitutes with reference to the aggregate of those same sounds, the aggregate type or sign.¹

Symbol—index—indication—token—badge—the ideas attached respectively to those names are so many modifications of the idea attached to the word *sign*.

Though in the nature of the case, as above, no object of perception is incapable of being in the character of type or sign made to serve for

¹ According to Bentham's pagination, two pages of text are missing at this point.

bringing to the mind's view any other, yet, by reason of their natural permanence or capacity for permanence, the signs most naturally and frequently applied to this purpose are of the visible class.

So extensive, and considered in its totality so adequate, to the purpose of *designation* is the collection of signs of which language is composed, that any other sign or lesser aggregate of signs to which on any occasion it happens to be applied to any part of the same purpose is considered in no other light than that of a substitute to that instrument.

Symbol—token—badge—in these words may be seen so many names of signs of a particular description employed on some particular occasion, with or without advantage, in the character of substitutes to that universally and constantly fit and useful instrument.

Of the above three words, *symbol* and *token* are not incapable of being employed for the designation of any class of objects considered as employed in the character of *signs*. Of the word *badge*, the applicability seems confined to such signs as consist of visible images.

VI. Relation as between Cause and Effect—Entities appertaining to it.

In the idea of causation—in the idea of the relation as between cause and effect—in the idea of the operation or state of things by which that relation is produced, in which that relation takes its rise, the idea of motion is inseparably involved: take away motion, no causation can have place—no result—no effect—no *any* thing—be produced.

In the idea of *motion*, the idea of a *moving body* is with equal necessity implied.

Of the cases in which the existence of motion—relative motion—is reported to us by our senses, there are some in which the commencement of the motion is, others in which it is not, manifest to our senses.

Endless and terminating—under one or other of these denominations may all motions, observed and observable, be included.

Endless motions are those which have place among the bodies (each of them considered in its totality) of which the visible universe is composed.

To the class of terminating or terminative motions belong all those which have place in our planet, and to judge from analogy all those which have place in any other of the celestial bodies.

So far as the motions in question belong to the endless class, so far no such distinction, and therefore no such relation, as that between cause and effect seems to have place. Each body attracts towards it all the rest: and were it to have place singly, the attraction thus exercised might be considered as if it operated in the character of a

cause. But each body is attracted by every other: and were it to have place singly, the attraction thus suffered might be considered in the character of an effect. But in fact the two words are but two different names for one and the same object—for one and the same motion or tendency to motion. In the case of motions that have place among the distinct bodies with which the surface of our earth is covered, action and reaction are phenomena exhibited [by] different bodies in the character of agents and patients. In the case of the celestial bodies considered each in its totality, no such distinction has place. No such character as that of agent—no such character as that of patient—belongs separately to any one: each one is agent and patient at the same time: no one exhibits more of agency, no one more of patiency, than any other.

Suppose that, all these several bodies having been created out of nothing at one and the same instant, each with the same quantity of matter and thence with the same attractive power that appears to belong to it at present, an impulse in a certain rectilinear direction were to be given to each of them at the same time: on this hypothesis it has been rendered, it is said, matter of demonstration that the sort of intermediate motions which would be the result would be exactly those which these same bodies are found by observation to exemplify.¹

Here, then, we should have a beginning: but even here we should not have an end. In the beginning, at a determinate point of time, we should have a motion operating in the character of a cause: but at no determinate point of time to the exclusion of any other should we have either a motion or a new order of things resulting from it in the character of an effect.

Thelematic and *athelematic*—to one or other of these denominations will all motions of the terminative class be found referable: *thelematic*, those in the production of which *volition*, the inward act of a sentient and self-moving being, is seen to be concerned: *athelematic*, those in the production of which *volition* is not seen to have place.

In the case of a motion of the thelematic class, you have for the *cause* of the motion, meaning the *prime* cause, of whatsoever motion happens in consequence to take place, the psychical act—the act of the will of the person by whose will the motion is produced—you have that same person for the agent.

Ergastic and *unergastic*—or fruitful and unfruitful—under one or other of these denominations will all motions of the thelematic

¹ According to the laws of motion and the law of gravitation advanced by Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727), natural philosopher and mathematician, in *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica*, London, 1687, pp. 12–13, the path of a planet launched initially in a straight line will become an elliptical orbit.

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class be found referable: *ergastic* or fruitful, all those which have for their termination and result the production of *a work*: *unergastic* or unfruitful, all those which are not attended by any such result.

Between these two classes, the line of separation, it will be manifest enough, can not in the nature of the case be determinate.

A work has reference to human interests and exigencies. When, in consequence of a motion or set of motions of the thelematic kind, in the body or among the bodies in which the motion has terminated, or those to which, in the whole or in any part, it has been communicated, any such change of condition, by which for any considerable portion of time they are or are not regarded as being rendered in any fresh shape subservient to human use, [has taken place], a *work* is spoken of as having thereby been produced.

In so far as a work is considered as having been produced, some person—any agent who in respect of his active talent is regarded as having borne the principal part in the production of the work, is wont to be spoken of under the appellation of *the author* or *an author*.

In this same case, any body which is regarded as having, in consequence of the motion communicated upon it, been rendered contributory to the production of the work, is wont to be spoken of in the character and by the name of an instrument: any *body*, viz. if inanimate, [or] considered as inanimate, an *instrument* in the *physical* sense; if animated, or considered as animated, and in particular if regarded as *rational*, an instrument in the *psychical* sense:—if regarded as *simple*, a tool or implement—if regarded as *complex*, an engine, a machine—a system of machinery.

To the case, and to that alone, in which the motion or motions, being of the *thelematic* and therein moreover of the *ergastic* kind, have had for their prime mover or principal agent concerned, a rational, or at least a sensitive being, belong the words end, operation, means, design.

Operation is a name given to any action in so far as it is considered as having been performed with a view to the production of a work.

Of the word *end*, and its synonym—the compound term *end-in-view*, the exposition has been already given:¹ the idea of good (i.e. pleasure or exemption from pain in this or that shape or shapes) as about eventually to result to the agent in question from the proposed act in question.

The word *means* is a term applicable with equal propriety to the designation of any body considered in the character of an *instrument*, or any *action* or *motion* considered in the character of an *operation*,

¹ See Ch. 2, § 2, pp. 11–12 above and pp. 112–14 above..

tending to the production of *a work*, or any good looked to in the character of *an end*.

Productive and *unproductive*—under one or other of these denominations, as the case is, may be referred the action in question, in so far as, being of the *thelematic* and moreover of the *ergastic* kind, it has for its *end in view* the bringing into existence any intended result in the character of a *work*.

Productive and *unproductive*—whether in actual *result* or only in *tendency*—to one or other of these denominations may also be referred every motion or set of motions of the *athelematic* kind—every motion or set of motions produced in, by and upon such agents as are of the purely physical kind.

This distinction is applicable to all the three physical kingdoms: but on the mention of it, the two living kingdoms—the vegetable and the animal—will be most apt to present themselves.

In the use frequently made of the word *cause* may be seen an ambiguity, of which, in respect of its incompatibility with any correct and clear view of the relation between cause and effect, there may be a practical use in endeavouring to remove.

On the one hand, a *motion*, an *action*, an *operation*—on the other hand, an *agent*, an *operator*, an *author*: to the designation of both these in themselves perfectly distinct objects the word is in use to be indiscriminately applied.

Take, for example, the questions that used to be agitated in the logical schools. Is the moon, says one of them, the cause or a cause of the flux and reflux of the sea?¹ Here the moon. Here the word cause is employed to designate a corporeal being considered in the character of an agent.

The cause (says a position of which frequent use was made in the same theatres of disputation) *the cause is always proportioned to its effect*.² But between the moon itself and the tide, i.e. the flux and reflux of the sea, there can not be any proportion: they are *disparate* entities: the one, the *moon*, a real entity; the other, the flux and reflux, i.e. the motions of the sea, are but fictitious entities. Between the moon itself and the water moved by it—i.e. between the quantity of both, proportion may have place: between the motion and thence the action of the moon and the motion of the water, a proportion may have place. But between the moon, a body, and the flux and reflux of the sea, no

¹ Cf. Pseudo-Aristotle, *On the Cosmos*, 396a. 25–7: ‘There are many tides and tidal waves too, which are said to occur in concert with the moon at certain definite times.’

² Cf. Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, 275a. 7–10: ‘But we may assume that in the same time equal forces will cause the same amount of alteration, a lesser force less, and a greater more, and more in proportion as the greater force exceeds the less.’

proportion can have place; neither can be either larger or smaller than the other.

In speaking of God, it has been common to speak of that inferential being by such names as *the cause of all things*—*the great, the universal cause*. In this instance, the same sort of confusion—the same sort of indistinctness in the expression—the same consequent confusion in men's conceptions—as in the case mentioned is apt to have place.

The *will* of God—the *act* of God—these are the entities to the designation of which, and of which alone, the term *cause* can in the case in question with propriety, consistently with analogy, be employed—these on the one hand—the word *cause* on the other—are alike names of fictitious entities.

Author and Creator: these alone, and not the word *cause*, can with propriety be employed in speaking of God. These, as well as God, are names of real entities, not names of fictitious entities: author, a name applicable to man, or in a word to any being considered as susceptible of design: Creator, a term exclusively appropriated to the designation of *God* considered with reference to his *works*.

In the use commonly made of the terms *work, cause, effect, instrument*—and in the habit of prefixing to them respectively the definitive article *the*—seems to be implied a notion, of which the more closely it is examined, the more plainly will the incorrectness be made apparent. This is that where the effect is considered as one, there exists some one object, and no more than one, which with propriety can be considered as its cause.

Of the exemplification and verification of this supposition, there exists not, it is believed, perhaps so much as a single instance.

Take in the first place an effect—any effect—of the physical kind.

No effect of this class can, it is believed, be assigned that is not the result of a multitude of influencing circumstances: circumstances, some always in different ways contributing to the production of it, others frequently operating in opposition to it: contributing to it, viz. in the character of promoting and co-operating *causes*; others operating in the opposite character of *obstacles*.

In relation to the result in question, considered in the character of an *effect*, suppose at pleasure any one body to be the prime or *principal* agent or mover, and the motion, the action, or the operation of it to be the *prime* or principal *cause*.

In no instance can any such cause be in operation but it will happen to it to be on all sides encompassed and surrounded by *circumstances*.

These circumstances will consist of the state of the contiguous and surrounding bodies in respect of form, colour, quantity, motion or rest.

Among these, some will appear to be exercising on the result a material influence—others not to be exercising any such influence: influential and influencing circumstances—uninfluencing or uninfluential circumstances—in one or other of [these]¹ two classes of circumstances taken together will every circumstance, by which it can happen to the principal agent or agents to be encompassed, be referred.

Obstructive or *promotive*—under the one or the other of these denominations may the whole assemblage of influential circumstances be comprized.

Any circumstances that act, that are considered as operating, in the character of *obstructive* circumstances are termed in one word *obstacles*.

The internal constitution of the moving body—the internal constitution of the immoveable or no-moving bodies with which it comes in contact—and the configuration of these same bodies—upon all these several circumstances, or rather groupings of circumstances, must the nature of the ultimate effect produced by the motion be dependent—whether that effect be a purely physical result, or a human work.

In so far then as by the term *cause* nothing more is meant to be designated than one alone of all those sets of co-operating circumstances, be the effect what it may, the cause can never of itself be adequate to the production of it: nor between the quantum of the effect and the quantum of the cause can any determinate proportion have place.

But of the case in which, in the extent given to the import attributed to the word *cause*, the whole assemblage of these influencing circumstances [is]² taken into the account and comprized, it seems questionable whether so much as a single example would be to be found.

In the notions commonly attached to the word *cause*, much deficiency in respect of clearness and correctness as well as completeness can not [but] have place: and that in the inferences made from either the one to the other—whether it be the cause that is deduced or supposed to be determined from the effect, or the effect that is deduced and supposed to be determined from the cause—much uncertainty and inconclusiveness can not but be a frequent, not to say an almost constant and continual result.

Seldom indeed does it happen that, of the co-influencing circumstances, the collection made for this purpose is complete: nor is it always that in such collection so much as the principally influencing circumstance or circumstances are included.

¹ MS 'this'.

² MS 'are'.

CH. 9. OF ONTOLOGY

In those cases in which the several influencing circumstances are all of them subject not only to the observation but at the disposal of human agency, any such miscalculations and errors as from time to time happen to be made may, when perceived, from time to time be corrected.

Thus it is, for example, in the case of the observations that have for their field the anatomy and physiology of plants and animals.

Thus it is, moreover, with little exception in the instance of the practical applications made of the respective theories of Chemistry and Mechanics: the influencing circumstances being for the most part, or even altogether, and that at all times, subject not only to our observation, but at our disposal as well as subject to our command.

The cases in which our inferences from supposed causes to supposed effects, and from supposed effects to supposed [causes],¹ seem most precarious and exposed to error are on the one hand cases belonging to the field of medicine, on the other hand cases belonging to the field of naval architecture.

In cases belonging to the field of *medicine*, the influencing circumstances belonging principally to the class of chemical phenomena—to those phenomena by which particular sorts of bodies are distinguished from each other, lie in a great degree out of the reach of our observation.

In cases belonging to the field of naval architecture, the influencing circumstances, belonging principally to the class of mechanical phenomena—to those phenomena which belong in common to bodies in general, may perhaps in *specie* be without much difficulty comprehended in their totality by observation, but in respect of their *quantity* lie in great measure beyond even the reach of *observation*, and in a still greater degree are out of the reach of *command*.

Prone as is the human mind to the making of hasty and imperfectly-grounded inductions on the field of physical science, it can not but be much more so in the field of ethics, in which is included the field of politics: commonly not only the collection made of influencing circumstances incomplete, but uninfluencing *circumstances* and even *obstacles* held up to view in the character of principally or even exclusively operating causes.

Thus superior is the density of the clouds which overhang the relation between cause and effect in the field of morals as compared with the field of physics. Two concurring considerations may help us to account for this difference: 1. the elements of the calculation being in so large a proportion of the psychical class—such as intentions, affections and motives—are in a proportional degree situated out of

¹ MS 'effects'.

the reach of direct observation: 2. in the making of the calculation, the judgment is in a peculiar degree liable to be disturbed and led astray by the several sources of illusion:—by original intellectual weakness—by sinister interest—by interest-begotten prejudice—by adoptive prejudice.

Material, formal, efficient, final—by these in the language of the Aristotelian Schools¹—by these even in the higher forms of common language—so many different species of causes are considered as designated.

Neither incapable of being applied to practice—nor of being ever applied with advantage, these distinctions present in this place a just claim to notice. The relation they bear to the foregoing exposition will now be brought to view.

Matter and *form*—both these, it has been seen,² are necessary to existence, meaning to real and physical existence, to the existence of a physical body.

1. By *material cause* is indicated the matter of the body in question—considered in so far as it is regarded as contributory to the production of the effect in question.

2. By *formal cause*, the form of the same body.

3. By *efficient cause* must be understood, in so far as any clear and distinct idea is attached to the term, the motion of some body or bodies: what is meant to be designated by it may in general be supposed to be the motion of that body or assemblage of bodies which is regarded as the principal motion—the motion which has the principal share in the production of the effect.

But to the production of the effect—meaning a physical effect—whatsoever it be, a correspondent and suitable disposition of the circumjacent non-moving bodies is not (it has been seen)³ less necessary than a correspondent and suitable motion or aggregate of motions on the part of the moving bodies.

To the designation of the matter and of the *form* that concurs in the production of the effect, the language here in question is, therefore, we see, adequate.

But to the designation of the other influencing circumstances, we see how far it is from being adequate.

4. By *final cause* is meant the *end* which the agent had in view, meaning, as hath been seen,⁴ by the *end*, if any thing at all be meant by it, the good to the attainment of which the act was directed: the good,

¹ See Aristotle, *Physics*, II. 3, and Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 126: 'Causarum autem genera sunt quatuor . . . *Materialis* . . . *Formalis* . . . *Efficiens* . . . *Finalis*', i.e. 'There are four kinds of causes . . . the Material . . . the Formal . . . the Efficient . . . the Final'.

² See pp. 104–7 above.

³ See pp. 121–2 above.

⁴ See Ch. 2, § 2, pp. 11–12 above.

i.e. the pleasure or pleasures, the exemption or security from such or such pain or pains.

It is, therefore, only in so far as the effect is the result of design on the part of a sensitive being, a being susceptible of pains and pleasures—of those sensations which by us are experienced and known by the names of pleasures and pains—that the species of cause here called *final* can have place.

The doctrine of final causes supposes, therefore, on the part of the agent in question, the experience of pleasure and pain—of pleasures and pains the same as those of which we have experience: for to us there are no others: employed in any such attempt as that of designating and bringing to view the idea of any others, they would be employed in designating and bringing to view so many non-entities.

VII. Existence, and the classes of fictitious entities related to it.

Existence is a quality the most extensively applicable, and at the same time the most simple of all qualities, actual or imaginable. Take away all other qualities, this remains: to speak more strictly, take any entity whatsoever, real or fictitious, abstract the attention from whatsoever other qualities may have been found belonging to it, this will still be left. *Existence* is predicable of naked *substance*.

Opposite to the idea of existence is that of non-existence. Non-existence is the negation of existence. Of every other entity, real or fictitious, either *existence* or *non-existence* is at all times predicable. Whether such other entity be real or fictitious, its existence is of course a fictitious entity: i.e. the word existence is in all cases the name of a fictitious entity.

The idea of *non-existence* is the idea of *absence* extended. Take any *place*, and therewith any real entity—any body—existing in that place: suppose it no longer existing in that place, you suppose its *absence*, its *relative* non-existence: expell it in like manner from every place, you suppose its *absolute* non-existence.

It is through the medium of absence—the familiar and continually recurring idea of absence—that the idea of non-existence—the transcendent and awful idea of non-existence—is attained.

Being as above a species of quality, *existence* itself is a fictitious entity: it is *in* every real entity: every real entity is *in* it.

In it, the man the object of whose appetite is the sublime, and he the object of whose appetite is the ridiculous, may here find matter for their respective banquets. *Nothing* has been laughed at to satiety:¹

¹ For jokes that play on the word 'nothing' see *Joe Miller's Jests: or, the Wits Vade-Mecum. Being A Collection of the most Brilliant Jests, the most excellent Bons Mots, and most pleasant short Stories in the English Language; many of them transcribed from the Mouth of the Facetious Gentleman whose Name they bear. To which are added, Choice Collections of Moral*

the punster who has played with *nothing* till he is tired may renew the game with existence and non-existence.

At any point of *time*, take any entity—any real entity—whatsoever, between its existence in that place and its non-existence in that same place, there is not any *alternative*—there is not any *medium*—whatsoever.

Necessity, impossibility; certainty, uncertainty; probability, improbability; actuality, potentiality;—whatsoever there is of reality correspondent to any of these names is neither more nor less than a disposition, a persuasion of the mind, on the part of him by whom these words are employed, in relation to the state of things or the event or events to which these *qualities* are ascribed.

Down to this present time—whatsoever be this present time—whether the time of writing it or the time of any one's reading it—whatsoever has existed has had existence; whatsoever has not existed has not had existence: at this present time, whatsoever does exist has existence; whatsoever does not exist has not existence: and so at any and every future point of time. Throughout the whole expanse of time—past, present and future put together—where will room be found for any thing real to answer to any one of these names?

Quality itself is but a fictitious entity: but these are all of them so many fictitious qualities: they do not, as real qualities do—they do not like gravity, solidity, roundness, hardness—belong to the objects themselves to which they are ascribed: in the character of attributes of the objects to which they are ascribed, they are mere chimæras, mere creatures of the imagination—mere non-entities.

Yet non-entities as they are, but too real is the mischief of which some of them—and in particular the word *necessity*—has been productive: antipathy, strife, persecution, murder, upon a national, upon an international scale.¹

The persuasion expressed by the word *certainty* has for its [object]² the event itself simply: the persuasion indicated by the word *necessity* has for its object not only that event but an infinity of other events

Sentences, And of the most pointed and truly valuable Epigrams in the British Tongue; With the Names of the Authors to such as are known, 14th edn., London, [c. 1771], pp. 8, 44–5, 63, 65, 79, 96, 110.

¹ The notion that war was justified by necessity had been famously stated in Hvgonis Grotii [Hugo Grotius], *De Iure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres. In quibus ius naturæ & Gentium: item iuris publici præcipua explicantur*, 3 vols., Paris, 1625, Lib. II, Cap. XXII, §§ 5–6, ii. 468–9. In the message of George III (1738–1820), King of Great Britain and Ireland from 1760, to the House of Commons on 12 February 1793, and reiterated by William Pitt the Younger (1759–1806), leader of the administration as First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer 1783–1801, 1804–6, in his speech in the subsequent debate, the war against Revolutionary France had been said to be 'just and necessary': see *Parliamentary History* (1792–4), xxx. 344–5.

² MS 'persuasion'.

and states of things out of number from the beginning of time in the character of its *causes*.

Certainty, necessity, impossibility—exhibited seriously in any other character than that of expressions of the degree of the persuasion entertained in relation to the subject in question by him whose words they are, in the use of these words is virtually involved the assumption of omniscience.—All things that are possible are within my knowledge: this is not upon the list. Such being interpreted is the phrase—*this thing is impossible*.

The sort of occasion on which, without any such assumption, these terms can be applied is that of a contradiction in terms—a self-contradictory proposition, or two mutually contradictory propositions, issuing at the same time from the same mouth or the same pen. But here the objects to which these attributes are with propriety applicable are—not the objects for the designation of which the propositions are applied, but the propositions themselves. Propositions thus contradictory and incompatible can not with propriety be applied to the same object: that they should is impossible: i.e. inconsistent with the notions entertained by the person in question in relation to what is proper and what improper in language.

It is impossible that among a multitude of bodies all equal to one another, four taken together should not be greater than two taken together:—why?—because by the word *four* has by every person been designated a number greater than by the word *two*.

Yet in affirmance of the truth of a proposition thus impossible, persuasion rising to the highest pitch of intensity has been entertained.¹ Why? Because the human mind having it in its power to apply [itself]² to any object or to forbear to apply [itself]³ at pleasure, the person in question has exercised this power in relation to the import of the words in question as above: i.e. to the import which, according to his experience, all persons by whom they have been employed have been constantly in the habit of annexing to them. But against an object which the mind has contrived to exclude out of the field of its attention, no objection can in that same field be seen to bear: whatsoever, therefore, were the considerations by which he was engaged to endeavour to persuade himself of the truth of the self-contradictory and therefore impossible proposition, remain without any thing to counteract their force.⁴

¹ Bentham perhaps had in mind the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, whereby the one God is said to be constituted by three persons: see p. 103 n. above.

² MS 'its mind'.

³ MS 'it'.

⁴ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Add an exposition, i.e. by paraphrasis, of the words certainty and necessity?'

Class VIII. Political and Quasi-Political fictitious entities.¹

1. Obligation. 2. Right. 3. Exemption. 4. Power. 5. Privilege. 6. Prerogative. 7. Possession (physical).² 8. Possession legal. 9. Property. 10. Naked [right] of passive political advantage.³

All these have for their efficient causes Pleasure and Pain, but principally pain, in whatsoever shape, and from which soever of the five sanctions or sources of pleasure and pain, derived or expected: viz.—1. The physical sanction. 2. The sympathetic sanction or sanction of sympathy.⁴ 3. The popular or moral sanction. 4. The political including the legal sanction. 5. The religious sanction.

Obligation is the root out of which all these other fictitious entities spring.

Of all the sanctions or sources of pain and pleasure above brought to view, the political sanction being susceptible of being the strongest and surest in its operation, and accordingly the obligation derived from it the strongest and most effective, perfect and efficient, this is the sanction which it seems advisable to take for consideration in the first instance: the correspondent obligations of the same name which may be considered as emanating from these other fictitious entities being, in the instance of some of these sanctions, of too weak a nature to act with a force capable of giving to any of those other productions any practical value.

An obligation—understand here that sort of obligation which through the medium of the will operates on the active faculty—takes its nature from some act—from the act to which it applies itself: it is an obligation to perform or to abstain from performing a certain *act*.

A legal obligation to perform the act in question is said to attach upon a man, to be incumbent upon him, in so far as in the event of his performing the act at the time and place in question, he will not suffer any pain, but in the event of his not so performing it, he will suffer a certain pain—viz. the pain that corresponds to it, and by the virtue of which, applying itself eventually as above, the obligation is created.⁵

¹ Bentham has added the pencil heading 'Effects' above this sub-heading.

² Bentham has marked the word 'physical' for possible deletion.

³ In the text, Bentham has inserted the following list, under the pencil heading 'Causes', at this point: '1. Order. 2. Prohibition, Inhibition, &c. 3. Punishment. 4. Pardon. 5. Licence. 6. Warrant. 7. Judgment. 8. Decision.'

⁴ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Quere whether to insert the sympathetic?'

⁵ The text appears to have been abandoned at this point.

Chapter 10.

Of Art in general—Operations performable in relation to it

§ 1. *Operations performable in relation to every art—their natural order in respect of priority*

1. Instruction. 2. Use or employment. 3. Teaching. 4. Improving or ameliorating¹—these are so many operations capable of being performed—and, the three first at least, actually and continually performed in relation to every thing that bears the name of *art*:² these accordingly are capable of being performed, and unless the fourth and last be an exception, are actually and constantly performed in relation to that *art* of which discourse or language is at once the product and the instrument.

The order in which these several operations are brought to view, i.e. in which their names are made to precede each other, is (it will readily be observed) the order of priority in respect of performance: whatsoever be the operation in question, a man must have learnt to perform it, to practice it, before he can employ it—he must have performed it himself³ before he can teach it and thereby enable and cause another person to perform it—and, unless it be by some extraordinary and extraordinarily felicitous accident, he must not only have learnt it, and been in use to practice it—to practice it in the state in which he finds it, before he will be able to make improvements in it—i.e. raise it up to a better and higher state than that in which it had happened to him to find it.

§ 2. *Limitations necessary to the proposition indicative of that priority—their practical use and importance*

To a first glance, as applied to all these several operations, the observation seems to present the aspect of correctness. But to a closer view, to confine it in every part within the pale of truth, it will be found to require several limitations, but for which it would be liable to give birth to errors of such a nature, as to exercise on practice a pernicious influence.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Try whether this division is exhaustive?’

² Bentham has marked the remainder of the sentence for possible deletion.

³ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Note the time taken and exceptions to this.’

The truth of it is throughout confined to those the several operations taken singly of which the vast aggregate called by the name of the art in question is composed. Of these particular operations, it will in almost every instance happen that a number more or less considerable may be found, of which one and the same person may, on one and the same day or even hour, while he is occupied in learning one, be occupied in practising with advantage a second, teaching a third, and making improvement in a fourth.

1. From a too extensive and unlimited adoption given to it as applied to *learning* and *practicing* has arisen that most pernicious and foolishly devised clog to productive industry—the English Statute concerning Apprenticeships.¹ Be the art what it may, how (it was asked) can a man practice it well unless he has learnt to practice it? therefore be the art what it may, seven years shall he have been employed in learning it, before he is allowed to practice it.

2. Applied to the art of *teaching*, considered in its relation to the operation of *learning*, and at the same time applied to language considered as the particular subject of these general operations, it has ever been pressing and continues to press as a dead weight upon the intellectual branch of education. Learning, it has been said, is the duty of the ignorant: teaching, that is the privilege of the knowing, the learned, the skilful, the advanced in age: assign to those who are destitute of instruction the function of administering it—unite in the same individual the opposite and incompatible functions of *Scholar* and *Master*—the consequence is too obvious to require mention, and almost too ridiculous to admitt of it.

At length, by bold experience, acting in despite of superficial wisdom, the discovery has been made that for the function of master, he who at the same time and in the same seat of instruction is acting in the character of learner is not merely in as high a degree adapted, but in a much superior degree.^a

3. Applied to the operation of making improvements considered in its relation to that of learning, to that of practicing, and even to that of teaching, this same effusion of superficial wisdom is an instrument which, in the hand of envy, the offspring of imbecillity and indolence,

^a See Ch. ||. Improvement as applied to the art of teaching in general.²

¹ The Statute of Artificers of 1563 (5 Eliz. I, c. 4) had required a person entering a trade to undergo an apprenticeship of seven years, though this provision had recently been repealed, with the exception of the City of London and other places with ancient customs on the matter, by the Apprentices Act of 1814 (54 Geo. III, c. 96).

² In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Pursue it there to full development.’ No such Chapter, however, appears to have been written, though the theme is developed at length in *Chrestomathia*.

CH. 10. OF ART IN GENERAL

is neverfailingly employed in the endeavour to nip in the bud the blossoms of active genius.¹ It is the same instrument which in the hand of the ruling few, self-clothed in the robe of superior wisdom, is employed in treating with contempt the claims and exertions of the subject many. Be the art what it may, not merely to teach it but even to practice it in the perfection to which it has in these times been brought forward (not to speak of merely learning it) requires all the ability that a man of consummate talent can hope to possess. Who are you who pretend to improve it? Who are you who, not content to equal, pretend to have risen above those whom the whole world beholds seated on the highest pinnacle of eminence?^{2a}

^a It is by the ideal decomposition performed by the separate consideration of the several distinguishable operations which respectively constitute the component parts of various mechanical arts—and thence by the division of labour, that the great improvements made within the last half-century in manufactures have been effected.²

¹ In relation to the following sentence, Bentham has noted: ‘Rudiment.’

² In relation to this note, Bentham has commented: ‘~~to~~ To be enlarged on and inserted under another head?’

Chapter 11.

Of the art of Invention

§ 1. *Of Invention in general*

To *teach*, to *learn*, and to *invent*—these are so many processes or operations applicable alike to every branch of art or science.

To *practice* is a sort of operation exclusively applicable to arts: not applicable to any branch of discipline, otherwise than in so far as some portion of art is contained in it.

Between *teaching* and invention, a sort of reciprocity is observable: among the subjects of the art of *teaching* may be [the] art of *invention*: among the subjects of the art of *invention* may be the art of teaching.

As between these two, first in the order of existence must have come the art of *invention*: since whatsoever comes to be taught must first have been invented before it could have been taught.

Of this Chapter, the object is to afford such helps as by the powers of an individual mind—of the individual mind in question, are capable of being given to invention—understand of course to invention in so far as it is useful—to invention, to every quarter of the field of thought and action to which it can be applied.¹

A chapter which takes this for its subject may be compared to the work of the handicraft who, having to make an utensil or instrument of new construction, finds occasion in the first place to contrive and fabricate one or more of the tools or other instruments which he has to employ in making it.

Invention supposes *art*. The inventor of any branch of an art is the first individual by whom it is practiced: or if between conception and actual practice there be a difference, in so much that of the art which a man was the first to practice not he himself but some other individual had been the first to conceive, the first individual by whom it had been conceived.

A *new art* or a *new mode* of practicing an art already invented:—either of these may the invention have had for its *subjects*. Of this distinction, the indication may for clearness sake be in this or that instance not altogether without its use: but in many instances to draw the line between the two cases may be found a matter of such difficulty that in those instances the distinction may be seen to be rather a nominal or verbal than a real one: the words not finding an individual case to which they can be applied with truth.

¹ Bentham has marked the following paragraph for possible deletion.

CH. 11. OF THE ART OF INVENTION

Among the *helps* capable of being given to invention, some will be seen alike applicable to all arts: others to no other than this or that particular species of art.

Inventions applicable to all *arts* are thereby applicable to all *sciences*. Of this proposition, the truth depends upon and follows from that of a proposition already brought to view,¹ viz. that between art and science there exists throughout the whole field of thought and action a constant conjunction—for every science a correspondent art, and for every art a correspondent science.

§ 2. *Helps applicable to arts in general without exception or distinction*

In this view a few rules present themselves as capable of being formed, to some minds in the way of original instruction, to any minds in the way of memento or reminiscence, not altogether without their use. In some sort by affording positive helps: in others by the indication of obstacles: of certain obstacles which, in any track of the field of invention, the labourer will find standing in his way, and opposing his progress: obstacles of the existence and force of which it concerns him to be well apprized, lest, when the time comes, they find him unprepared.

Memento 1. Whatsoever be the art, which, or in which, you think to invent, keep steadily in view the particular end at which it aims: the effect the production of which it has for its object. Keep your eyes fixt upon the end. In two Latin words, *Finem suspicito*.

Memento 2. Beware of *intellectual servility*. In other words, take Reason, not Custom, for your Guide: the Reason of the thing including the *nature* of the *effect* meant to be produced, not confining yourself to the pursuing of the *practice*, to the performance of those operations and those only by which alone the effect is as yet wont to be produced. *Non Mos sed Ratio dux esto*.

Memento 3. Be on your guard against the confederated adversaries of all good, and thereby of all new good, viz. 1. Indigenous Intellectual Weakness. 2. Sinister Interest. 3. Interest-begotten prejudice. 4. Adoptive prejudice.^a

Memento 4. In relation to every part of your subject, and every object connected with it, render your ideas as clear as possible. *Lux undique fiat*.

Memento 5. For means and instruments, look out for analogies. *Analogias undique indagato*.

^a ¶ Where they can not by force, these will oppose by discouraging opinion and advice.

¹ Bentham has not hitherto made the following point.

Memento 6. In your look-out for analogies, for surveying that quarter of the field of thought and action to which the art in question belongs, employ the logical ladders—the ladders made of nest[s] of aggregates placed in logical subalternation. *In Analogiarum indagatione scalis logicis utere.*

Memento 7. Enquire and learn whatsoever for the production of the effect in question has been already practiced or attempted. *Iam acta et tentata discite.*

Memento 8. In such your survey of existing inventions, look out in preference for the latest of all, not looking backwards but for some special reason.—*Postrema exquirito.*

Memento 9. Instruction—*Quodlibet cum quolibet.* To every thing, forget not to apply any thing. Suppose an indefinite multitude of objects, which in consideration of certain properties or qualities in respect of which they are found or supposed to agree, and certain others in respect of which they have been found or supposed to disagree—having been all of them placed in one or other of two classes, some article belonging to the one class has with success, i.e. with some new effect which either has been found to be or affords a prospect of being found to be advantageous, been applied—no matter in what manner nor to what purpose in particular, to some article belonging to the other class: in like manner, frame a general resolution, not to be departed from in any instance but for some particular cause, to apply to each article belonging to the one class every article belonging to the other.

The sort of special cause here in question will be one of these two, viz. 1. Apparently preponderant probability of [not] producing any new result at all. 2. Apparently preponderant probability that the new result, if any, will instead of proving preponderantly advantageous prove preponderantly disadvantageous.

N.B. Among physical arts and sciences, the branch of art and science to which this rule or memento is in a peculiar degree applicable is the chemical including, in so far as they belong to it, the several practical and subordinate branches of art and science which come under its department: ex. gr. cookery, pharmacy, agriculture, architecture in so far as concerns *materials*.

On the subject of each of these mementos, one [observation presents itself] as capable of having [its] use.¹ In the course of them it will, it is believed, be seen, that of all of them, howsoever at first view the contrary might in some instances be supposed, there is not one that is not, in a manner more or less pointed, applicable to every track which

¹ MS orig. 'a few observations present themselves as capable of having their use'. Having altered 'a few' to 'one', Bentham neglected to amend the remainder of the sentence.

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in the field of thought and action it is in the power of art, and invention, ever to take—art and invention, and not excepting science.¹

The two first mementos demand a joint consideration.

The end?—it may be asked—and exists there any man who, be the art what it may, in the practice of it, ever omits so much as for a moment either to keep his eyes fixt upon the end, or to keep them on the look-out for the fittest and most promising means?

Oh, yes, with the exception of the inventive few—who are few indeed—every man. The end—yes—of the end he is not altogether unregardful: but as to *means*, the *means* which he sees pursued by others—by all those from whose discourse and practice his notions on the subject have been derived—these are the means which from first to last he has been in the habit of regarding not only as conducive to the end, but if not the only ones that are so in any degree, at any rate those which are so in a higher degree than any others which the nature of the case admits of.

Let Reason be fruitful, Custom barren—such indeed is the advice which, on this subject, has been delivered. Delivered?—but by whom? by the Chancellor Bacon:² by the man whose mind was of almost all minds the most unlike to others. In regard to fruitfulness, how stands the matter as between Reason and Custom, in the world at large? Reason breeds like a free martin, Custom like a doe-rabbit.³

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Examine whether this predication of universality be correct.'

² Francis Bacon (1561–1626), first Baron Verulam and first Viscount St Alban, philosopher and writer, Lord Chancellor 1618–21. See 'De augmentis scientiarum', Bk. 8, Aphorism XI, in *The Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. J. Spalding, R.L. Ellis, and D.D. Heath, 14 vols., London, 1815–74, iii. 139: 'Ratio prolifica, Consuetudo sterilis esto.'

³ Bentham considered inserting the following passage at UC ci. 392 (17 October 1814) at this point: 'Rule. In taking a survey of practice, distinguish in it as many distinguishable points as the nature of the case appears to afford, and on each of those points, try its utility and propriety by its relation to the end.'

'Example. The field of medical practice is a field in which many examples indicative of the utility of this rule might be collected. In the comparatively antient system of pharmacy may be found medicines in the composition of which drugs to the amount of twenty or thirty different sorts, of which, by comparatively recent observation, experience and experiment, all but two or three have been found either wholly inoperative or uncondusive to the end.

'In every part of the field, in which the practice has not yet been thus dissected, and its several distinguishable parts or points confronted with the proper end, uninfluencing circumstances and even obstructive circumstances, i.e. obstacles, may be seen confounded with promotive causes, and the result, be it what it may, ascribed without distinction to their conjunct agency: and in this way the character of promotive causes ascribed to uninfluencing and even to obstructive causes.

'Of this mode of confusion, examples will naturally be to be found in abundance in the system of government established in every country, and in particular in that branch which regards constitutional law. Of whatsoever measure of prosperity the state may be supposed to be in the enjoyment of, as many abuses and imperfections as by the theory or practice

Memento 3. Principles in human nature hostile to invention.
N.B. Invention is the offspring of Genius.

1. Indigenous intellectual weakness.

The more *stupid* a man is—especially if in his mind *stupidity*, as it is not unapt to be, is accompanied by *self-conceit*, the more improbable it will appear to him that to the invention in question, be it what it may, any such characters as those of *useful* and *meritorious* would be found to belong.¹ So difficult as the art is in its *present* state—so great the expence which in the articles of genius and industry as it did cost, or must have cost, to the inhabitants of former times (in whose minds those talents (it is assumed) were of a much brighter and stronger texture than in the minds of the present degenerate race) to bring the art up to its present mark in the scale of perfection—so great the multitudes that for so many ages must have been occupied in the endeavour to give to it every degree of perfection of which it is susceptible, is it in any degree—is it preponderantly—probable, that by the man in question ([who] in his exterior² has probably nothing to distinguish him to his advantage to raise him above the common level, and whose weaknesses, whatever they may be, being indicated by Envy and Jealousy, are laid open to general observation) so important an addition to the art should really have been made?³

Memento 4. Clarification of ideas.⁴

If the subject be of the physical class, render the images which you form of it in your mind as correct and compleat as possible.

If the subject be of the psychical class, in so far as the words employed in discoursing of it are names of fictitious entities, take the only course by which it is possible for a man to give perfect clearness to the ideas of which they serve to constitute the signs, viz. by searching out the real entities in which the fictitious entities have their source.

of it have place, will, by all those who profit by them, be of course placed more or less confidently and explicitly upon the list of *promotive causes*.'

Ancient medicinal preparations such as mithridate and Venice treacle were composed of many ingredients and thus supposed to render antidotes against a whole variety of poisons or venoms.

Bentham has added the following note to this passage: 'See the work on Fallacies.' See the discussion of the cause-and-obstacle-confounder's device in *The Book of Fallacies*, ed. P. Schofield, Oxford, 2015 (CW), pp. 361–80.

¹ Bentham goes on to comment from the perspective of the stupid man.

² MS orig. 'whose exterior'.

³ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Go on with the three remaining natural enemies of Genius', i.e. sinister interest, interest-begotten prejudice, and adoptive prejudice.

⁴ At the head of this passage, Bentham has noted: 'Clearness of ideas is more necessary abundantly for communication of ideas than for invention. Mechanics frequently bad explainers of their own inventions. Newton a great inventor, not a very clear explainer.'

On some subjects, in some instances, without the use of words a man may exercise invention, drawing his materials and instruments from the stock of ideas already laid up in his own mind.

But unless by the actual survey of sensible works, the results and fruits of invention already executed, it is only through the medium of words that, for his assistance in the exercise of invention, he can make any use of the inventions, practices or works of others. Here, then, are so many collections of signs of ideas, from which, according to the degree of attention bestowed on the consideration of them, and the degree of discernment with which that attention is accompanied, the ideas which he obtains from those words will be more or less clear, ambiguous or obscure. In so far as the words are such as to be themselves direct representatives of clear ideas, so much the better: but even where this is in but a small degree or not in any degree the case, still it will frequently happen that by the reflections and comparisons of which in his mind they are productive, they may render to him more or less assistance towards the formation of other ideas; such as shall in a greater or less degree be clearer than those by which they were themselves suggested.

Memento 5 and 6. Search after analogies.—Use on this occasion to be made of all existing and accessible scales of logical subalternation.

Follows the mode and use of applying these *subalternation scales*, viz.

I. Application of it in the *descending line*.

With exception of such words as are names of individual objects, take any one of the material words that present themselves as belonging to the subject. Not being the name of an individual alone, this word will be the name of a *sort* of objects—the name (say) of an aggregate. If the aggregate denomination be the name of a *genus*, think of the several species which by their respective names present themselves as being contained under it. Whatsoever is predicated of the *genus*, will, in so far as it is truly predicated, be with equal truth predicable of all those several species.

II. Application of it in the *ascending line*.

In like manner look out for the name of the next superior genus, with reference to which the genus in question is but a species, and try or conjecture whether that which beyond doubt has been found predicable with truth of the whole of this species be or promise to be with like truth predicable of the whole or any other part of that genus—the aggregate designated by the name of that genus.¹

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: 'For Rudiments of examples see N° 4 at the top of this page: and see the paper in which several of J.B.'s ideas on legislation are traced up to their source.' The fourth point in Bentham's note at the top of the page is as

Of the utility derivable from the search after analogies, whether in the same scale or in different scales—and thence whether on different levels or on the same level, three Latin words, viz. *Quodlibet cum quolibet*, may form another memento.

It is in the instance of the physical department of the field of thought and action, and more particularly to the chemical district of that department, that the applicability of this memento is most conspicuous. Upon every subject try, or at least think of trying, every operation: to every subject, apply every subject in the character of a solvent:—and so on.

It is to the extent to which application has been made of this memento that chemical science is indebted for the prodigious strides which, within the compass of the present generation, [have]¹ been made in it.

Memento 7 and 8. Search after inventions already in use—Preferable regard due to the latest.

Inventions of the physical stamp are those in regard to which the importance of these mementos is, generally speaking, at its highest pitch.

Discovery, practice, publication—by these words are designated so many periods which, in the career of invention, may to the purpose here in question be usefully distinguished.

1. To the purpose of the discovery, that, generally speaking, it can not but be of advantage to a person of an inventive turn to be apprized of and acquainted with whatsoever has been already invented or thought of in the same line is obvious enough.

But so far as mere *discovery* is concerned, any inconvenience which it can happen to a man to incur from a want of acquaintance with any thing that has already been discovered by others is in this case but inconsiderable, in comparison of what is liable to have place. In the first place, so far indeed as for want of being preacquainted with this or that discovery which has already been made by this or that other person, he fails of making this or that discovery which, had it happened to him to have been acquainted with the existing discovery

follows: '4. Fixt vegetable Alkali from observation of properties common to Salt of Tartar & d^o of Wormwood. Fixt Alkali from d^o of Potash & Soda. Alkali from d^o of Potash, Soda & Ammonia.' The paper on legislation has not been located. The preceding points in the list, which is headed 'Tables useful for this purpose', are as follows: '1. Tables of Contents of Books written on it. 2. Give Synoptic Table to Blackstone's Analysis with J.B.'s Emendations. 3. Tables of the names of subjects belonging to it. 4. Tables of Rudiments of the inventions one notices on the subject.'

For the synoptic table of Sir William Blackstone (1723–80), first Vinerian Professor of English Law at the University of Oxford 1758–66, Justice of Common Pleas 1770, 1770–80, Justice of King's Bench 1770, see the table entitled 'Contents of this Analysis' in *Analysis of the Laws of England*, Oxford, 1756, pp. [xi–xiv].

¹ MS 'has'.

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in question, he would have made, so far here is so much lost to the individual in question and to the world at large.

2. In the next place, in so far as after the discovery has been made by himself, it happens to him to learn that this same discovery has already been made by some one else, in this case what is but natural enough is—that in proportion to what appears to be the degree of importance of the discovery, uneasiness in the shape of a pain of disappointment should be experienced by him.

But in such a track as that of invention, no step that has ever been taken, no step, be the ulterior result of it what it may, is ever lost. Of every step, present pleasure is the accompaniment: from every step, it derives encrease of vigour: of that which is an instrument of future security and future pleasure.¹

¹ The text appears to have been abandoned at this point, though a note at UC ci. 399 (28 August 1814) may indicate how Bentham intended to continue: 'Advantages of Posteriority. 1. Experience encreased. 2. Attention closer and closer: thence views of things more & more correct & compleat. Ex. Anatomy—Subjects of attention. 1. Quiescent states of things—these being constant, encrease of knowledge is *pro tanto* sure. 2. Changes, the results of motion. In so far as these are causal, so *pro tanto* is encrease of knowledge.'

Chapter 12.

Of Discourse or Language in general—*Operations* which, in its character of an art, are performable in relation to it

§ 1. *Operations performable in relation to Discourse or Language considered in its character of an art—learning—practising—teaching—improving*

In speaking of *art* in general, mention has been already made of the several operations performable in relation to it—viz. teaching, learning, employing, and improving—and of the order of priority which seems to have been planted, as it were by the hand of Nature, as between those several operations: warning has at the same time been given of the *limitations* necessary to be applied to all propositions enuntiative of that order and of the practical ill-consequences that have never ceased to result from the want of due attention to the propriety of those limitations—to the considerations which call for the observance of those limitations—to the practical mischiefs which have been the result of the non-application of those limitations.¹

Applying to art in general, these same instructions would be found applicable with indisputable propriety to that master art, the *art of discoursing*, of which the product [is] *discourse* itself or *language*. The art itself—the fruit or produce of it—the instrument of it—of this as of every other art, of every thing that bears the name of art—in all these distinguishable howsoever intimately connected senses are both these words—discourse and language—wont to be applied.²

Teaching, learning, practising—on the occasion of the use made of the names by which these several operations are designated, the state in which language is tacitly and impliedly considered as being taken in hand and made the subject of the operation, is the exact state in which it happens to be at the time: by *improvement*, in so far as it is considered as taking place, the language is considered as being brought out of *that* state into a *better*.

A language, like any other work or subject, a language is *good* in proportion as the several *qualities*, which, on any account, are *desirable* in it, are found to be in it.

¹ See Ch. 10, pp. 129–31 above.

² In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Quære whether to pursue the enquiry farther under this head. Refer to Ch. ||. *Of Art in general*’, i.e. Ch. 10, pp. 129–31 above.

In the instance of *language*, what those *qualities* are, it will be the business of the next Section to endeavour to shew.

As to *improvement*, it has two distinguishable *subjects*: 1. the work itself, language: 2. the several other operations, viz. *teaching*, *learning*, and *employing*, performable in relation to that work.

Of these operations, *teaching* and *learning* are correlative: and for the reception of any improvement of which the mode of performing them is susceptible, they must wait hand in hand. But in both these instances, improvement considered as applied to the instrument itself, and improvement considered as applied to the mode of teaching and learning it, are perfectly distinguishable.

In regard to the mode of *employing* the work, improvement considered as made in the *work* itself, and improvements considered as made in relation to the mode of employing it in the character of an instrument of discourse, will be apt to coincide, and become difficultly, if at all, distinguishable.

§ 2. *Qualities desirable in a language*

Qualities or Properties desirable in language—this topic has two aspects—a speculative and a practical one.

1. Qualities desirable in a language—i.e. in every language—in all languages—in this we behold a purely speculative topic—why? because every where the state of the language is what it is, and it lies not in the power of any individual, by any act of his own, to render it in any degree worth mentioning either materially better or worse.

2. Qualities desirable in the discourse or language of every individual—be he who he may—and be the discourse in which, on the occasion in question, he expresses himself what it may—here the *aspect* under which the topic presents itself may be set down as a practical one. Qualities desirable in the stile of every individual—or more concisely qualities desirable in style—either of these two locutions may without much error be set down, it should seem, as synonymous to the first one.

Qualities (then) desirable in every man's language—thus expressed the topic may be considered as a practical one—why? because to a certain sense every man has power over his own style: at any rate, whatsoever be the language which he employs, his style is such as he has made it.

What use (it may be asked) this topic? Languages and Language—each particular Language and the aggregate mass of signs composed of all Languages put together—are every where what they are. No man but must take them as he finds them: by no man, be his own language

in particular—be all languages in general—ever so ill-adapted to the ends of language—say in one word, ever so bad—can any of them be made better than it is?

To a considerable extent—these observations will be found no less just than they are obvious. Not but that some points, however, will, it is supposed, be seen in relation to which observations may be brought to view such as may be found not altogether barren of practical use.—

1. Occasions are not altogether unexampled, in which a man has the choice of the language he will make use of.

2. Be the language in the use of which he has been principally bred—be, in a word, his native language—what it may, it may be of use to him to be apprized in what degree the qualities desirable in language are possessed by it—why? that in respect of them he may make the most of it—he may employ it to most advantage.

3. Wild as at first mention the notion may appear, upon the list of these qualities articles may be brought to view, in relation [to] which improvement is a result the contributing to which in one way or other may be seen to be a function not altogether out of the reach of individual hands.

Considered as applied to language *in general*—that is to every language without distinction—every one of these qualities [is] liable to have place in different *degrees*. Not perhaps in the instance of any one existing language is every one of these qualities possessed in a degree equal to the highest in which it could be *conceived* to be possessed of them respectively: at the same time, not perhaps in the instance of any one of them can it be said with truth that there is any one of these qualities which is not in the lowest degree applicable to it.¹

1. Copiousness—2. Simplicity, i.e. exemption from useless *terms* and *inflections*—3. Compressedness or Conciseness—4. Clearness, i.e. exemption from obscurity and ambiguity—5. Impressiveness or force—6. Melodiousness or Harmoniousness—7. Facility in respect of utterance—8. Ornamentality, or Decoratedness:—under one or another of these appellations will (it is supposed) be found referable every quality desirable in language: every quality which can contribute to render it well-adapted to every useful purpose to which discourse is applicable.²

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘~~Go on.~~’

² Bentham has marked for deletion the following passage which appears in the text at this point: ‘1. Scantiness—2. Abundance in useless terms and inflections—3. Diffuseness—4. Proneness to obscurity and ambiguity—5. Feebleness—6. Unharmoniousness—7. Difficulty in respect of utterance—8. Baldness:—under one or another of these appellations will (it is supposed) be found comprehensible every quality by which, in proportion to the degree in which it has place, language is capable of being ill-adapted to its purposes.’

Under all these several heads, more or less of explanation may have its use.

1. As to *copiousness*. This quality is of a positive aspect, and of the whole list it presents itself as the principal one. The main use and purpose of language is to express *thought*: by the amount of all useful thought for which it is incapable of affording an adequate expression, a language, therefore—any language—can not but be imperfect and inadequate.

This observation appears so extremely obvious, that all mention of it may be apt to appear superfluous.

A prejudice, however, is to be found established—and that in no small force—the adoption of which is irreconcilable with the acknowledgement of this quality in the character of a desirable one. The word in and by which this prejudice is wont to find utterance is *purity*.¹

2. Simplicity. In this quality may be seen, as it were, the antagonist of *copiousness*: a language is *copious*, in so far as it is replete with useful matter; it is *simple*, in so far as it is unencumbered with matter which, being *useless*, is at best *superfluous*.

To this purpose the words of which language is composed may be considered either 1. *singly*, but entire—2. *aggregately*, as put together in the composition of a sentence—3. *fractionally*, i.e. each of them in respect of its component parts. By useless combinations—by words altogether useless—or lastly by useless modifications of words—as where to the same radical meaning, beginnings and endings²

But allowing to the quality opposite to the one here in question the character of an imperfection, in what way, it may be asked, is it attended with any practical inconvenience—in a word with positive uneasiness or with loss of positive enjoyment?

I answer—in this way. Whether it be his own native language, or a language which with reference to him is a foreign [one],³ of no part of any language can the use be obtained without labour: and in so far as it is consumed either in the learning or in the employing of words or phrases that are without use, in so far is a man's labour devoid of use.⁴

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Refer to Ch. ||. Style. § ||. False perfections 1. *Purity*: and Ch. ||. Improvement as applied to Language.' See Chs. 17 and 13, pp. 170–4 and 154–6 below respectively, though the topic of purity is discussed in neither.

² The sentence is incomplete.

³ MS 'man'.

⁴ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Add examples. 1. Terms without use, in many instances technical terms of professions or even pastimes: for the act of parturition, different terms one for each species of animal: so, for the act of sexual impregnation: so, for the male and female sex in the instance of various animals.

'2. Superfluous inflections: 1. example in Greek nouns and verbs, cases, moods and tenses expressed by different terminations, in different dialects: 2. the dual a useless number. 3. Quere as to useless combinations of words.'

3. *Compressedness*. Opposite to this quality stands that of unnecessary *diffuseness*. In so far as diffuseness is a positive quantity, that of compressedness will be a *negative* one.

Communication of ideas is on every occasion the benefit which, on both sides, or at the least on one side, is, unless by mere accident, always sought for in discourse: the labour—i.e. the time and the exertion expended in the performance of the operation, is the price paid for this advantage. In proportion as the import expressed by any given quantity of discourse is ample, being at the same time neither incorrect nor redundant, the purchase is advantageous in respect of the magnitude of the benefit obtained by it: in proportion as the quantity of discourse expended is small, the purchase is advantageous in respect of the smallness [of the] price paid.

To a hasty glance, this quality may present itself as being of little moment: especially if it be considered how small, in respect of the quantity of discourse expended in a given length of time, the difference will be apt to be between the most diffuse and the most comprehensive and concise form of words in which a given import, it being in both cases [of] exactly the same import, is capable of being expressed.

But on whatsoever occasions and on each occasion in so far as time is pretious, the difference between the utmost degree of diffuseness not accompanied with redundancy, and the utmost degree of comprehensiveness not accompanied with obscurity or ambiguity, may be no light matter: and occasions of this sort, being infinitely various, may relatively speaking be not unfrequent.

Of this observation examples need not be wanting in the case of oral discourse—in [the]¹ case of that mode of discourse which has for its instruments a succession of *audible* signs.^a

^a Of the occasional importance of compressedness, in the case where the instruments employed for designation are of the audible kind, a practical exemplification may be afforded by English legislation in the instance of the Riot Act.² The existence of a disturbance of any kind in which a number of persons are concerned, and a danger of physical mischief produced, being taken into contemplation, the object of the law is to put an end to it. For this purpose, death, the panacea of the English lawyer's pharmacopoeia, is administered as a matter of course. Nevertheless, such is the tenderness displayed, a warning is provided: and unless the warning proves fruitless, the punishment is not to be administered.

This warning, what does it consist of? A symbol, or rather a collection of signs, addressed to both senses at once, and in virtue of some pre-established association expressing in an instant the important import intended, or at least professed to be intended, to be expressed?—a flag or banner, for example, bearing

¹ MS 'that'.

² The Riot Act of 1715 (1 Geo. I, Stat. 2, c. 5).

Audible signs are the signs in the instance of which the amount of the advantage is perceptible with greatest facility, and measurable with greatest exactness.

In the European languages, written discourse is no otherwise the sign of thought, than by being the sign of audible discourse. In so far as this state of things has place, whatsoever of unnecessary diffuseness has place in the mass of discourse in question, may have for its seat either the audible signs, or visible signs, or both.

In so far as concerns the audible signs, an exemplification of the quality opposite to the desirable quality here in question has been already given.

As between language and language, of the differences of which in this respect different languages are susceptible, some sort of physical measure may be seen in books in which discourse which, in every language, is intended to be of the same import is in different languages, two or more, exhibited on the same page; for instance column-wise. Latin, French, English, German. In the scale of [compressedness],¹ such, it is believed, will be found the order of precedence.

Considering the quality of *compressedness* in its application to the visible signs, taken by themselves, the audible ones being the same, the practice of scribes before the commencement of the printing press and that of printers for some time afterwards will afford an exemplification of the importance attached to this quality. For no inconsiderable portion of the contents of every written work, for saving the labour of the penman, and the expence of paying him, a sort of short-hand was

the ensign of government and the emblematical figure of *Justice* with her sword, expressing in large letter-press, and at the same time by some symbolical painting, the eventual punishment, which, to answer any useful purpose, would have no need to extend a hair's breadth beyond the ordinary measure. Oh, no!—this is what plain sense, looking at the *end* in view, and looking over the field of *experience* for suitable *means*, would have prescribed. Instead of it comes a long-winded discourse, in which the small number [of] words capable of contributing any thing to the design are drowned in a vast ocean of surplusage. If the disturbance be any thing considerable, it may go on for any length of time—nothing is more natural than that the object of it, be it what it may, shall have been effected, before any thing of the warning provided by the men of law has been either seen or heard: and whenever any thing is seen, it is a man, tall, middle-sized or short as it may happen, with a paper in his hand, the words of which he is required to read, under a moral certainty that not a syllable of it will be heard, a mass of lawyers' grimgribber which, if it were heard, would be unintelligible. If so it be that it is really heard and understood, there can not be a plainer proof that there was no such inflammation as was capable of affording so much as a plausible pretence for the employment of this sedative. But to exhibit in any thing like its due proportion the mixture of absurdity and barbarity contained in this instrument of despotism would require much more space than, consistently with the present design, can be spared.

¹ MS 'comprehensiveness' is a slip.

in use: for this or that single letter, in particular for *n* and *m*, a more simple character: and so for several of the most frequently occurring combinations of letters: for example for *us*, when at the end of a word: for *per*, *pen* and *pro* in every part.

Thus much concerning the quality of *compressedness* considered with a view to such advantages as are derived from it immediately, and without the intervention of any other advantageous qualities. But when we come to the quality of *clearness*, it may perhaps be seen that in some measure it is upon this quality of *compressedness* that it depends: and so, in the instance of *impressiveness*.

4. Clearness.

With equal right, two distinguishable, though nearly related, qualities may claim to be represented by this word: viz. exclusion of ambiguity, and exemption from obscurity:—both of them negative ones.

1. The case in which *Ambiguity* has place is where, when the discourse [has] presented [itself]¹ to and been received by *sense*, distinguishable acceptations present themselves to the mind—two distinguishable and accordingly distinguished imports, between which the judgment hesitates, unable to determine which of the two it was that was intended should be received.

By the strict and original import of the word ambiguity, the number of those imports is confined to two: but in its application this explanation may be extended to any greater number of imports, so as they be determinate ones. In practice, it is seldom between more than two that the mind will have to hesitate.

11. *Obscurity* is where, after the discourse has been received by sense, the mind for a greater or [less] length of time finds itself unable to fix upon any determinate import as having been intended to be conveyed: and if, after continuing for a greater or less length of time, the endeavour is given up as hopeless, the obscurity of the discourse is, with relation to the individual in question—viz. the individual by whom it is thus taken in hand, converted for a time at least into *unintelligibility*.

Obscurity, so long as it lasts, may be considered as the superlative or highest point of ambiguity—ambiguity having place to the widest extent: it is not, as in the case of ambiguity, between two or some other small number of imports and those determinate ones that the mind hesitates, but between *all*, or rather *among*,^a all imaginable ones.

^a See tit. Bifurcate division.²

¹ MS orig. 'word or words have presented themselves'.

² Bentham perhaps had in mind the discussion of 'between' and 'among' in Ch. 6, § 6, p. 70 above.

The greater the number is of the words that are employed in the expression of a given import, the less *clear* is the discourse which they compose. Take an entire paragraph, take any one of the sentences of which it is composed: to whatsoever purpose the mass of discourse in question is considered as a *whole*, till the last word has been heard or read and understood, obscurity of a shade more or less deep covers every part of it. Such being the case, the sooner the mind has gone [through] the whole, the sooner this whole has been traversed, the sooner this obscurity is dispelled; and the less there is of it, the sooner it is gone through with.

That compressedness is of use not only immediately and [in] its own character, but mediately and in the character of an instrument of *clearness*, has been already intimated:¹ in what way it is so may now have been observed.

5. *Impressiveness* or *Force*.

By the word *impressiveness* is meant to be brought to view the degree in which, so far as depends upon the general structure of it, and not upon any particular talent of the individual by whom, on the occasion in question, it happens to it to be employed, nor yet upon the particular *purpose* for which, on that occasion, it is employed, the nature of the language, the language in question, affords, on the occasion in question, be it what it may, and, with relation to the purpose in question, be it what it may, the means and probability of accomplishing that purpose.

The *time* at which the purpose is designed to be accomplished, what is it with reference to the time at which the discourse is uttered? is it *present* or *future*? if *future*, more or less *near* or *remote*? The faculty proposed to be operated upon, what is it? the *intellectual* alone, or the *volitional* also? and if the *volitional*, by what *means*? by the affections operating in a *temperate* state, or by the affections operating in a warm or in an inflamed state?—in a word, by the *passions*?—On the modes brought to view by these questions will depend in some measure not only the degree, but the sort of impressiveness best adapted to the nature of the purpose.

In so far as time *future* is the time at which the purpose is to be accomplished, and the portion in question of that time is remote, the memory is the subject on which the impression requires to be made: and thus far, as applied to a mass of discourse, *impressiveness* coincides with fitness for being holden in remembrance.

If it be on the passions that the impression is proposed to be made, the *present* will be the portion of *time* more particularly looked

¹ See p. 146 n. above.

to—the *present* will in a more particular manner be the *time* for making it.

Be the purpose of which of these sorts it may, how it is that the strength and thence the depth of the impression is influenced by the structure of the language is an enquiry that will be laying its claim to consideration as we advance.^a

At present, all that seems suited to this place, is—that in one sort of case impressiveness depends upon or is promoted by *clearness*—in so far as *clearness* stands opposed to ambiguity, and likewise in all cases by compressedness.

6. *Melodiousness*, or say *Harmoniousness*.^b

By each of these terms is meant the property of producing, through the medium of the ear, a sensation of the agreeable cast in the mind.

Applied to different species of discourse, i.e. to discourse considered as employed for different purposes, *melodiousness* or *harmoniousness*, which so ever be the term, presents two ideas somewhat different, though differing rather in *degree* than in any other particular. In this point of view, the opposite ends of the scale may be designated by the terms *positive* and *negative*: a sort of medium being assumed—any point being taken at pleasure as and for the middle point, *positive* melodiousness has place where the degree of that quality is considered

^a See post Ch. ||. *Impressiveness how produced*.¹

^b In the word *harmoniousness* may be seen a source of ambiguity from which the word *melodiousness* is free: applied to aggregates of *musical* sounds, harmony has, in contradistinction to melody, been in these modern times, since the invention of music in parts, applied to the case in which sounds, more than one, are purposely produced *simultaneously*—at the same instant: and in this, for the express purpose of distinguishing the case from that of *melody*, in which the like sounds are not considered otherwise than as exhibiting themselves in *succession*.

On the other hand, the word *melodiousness*, if employed on the occasion here in question—viz. *sounds* considered as the vehicles of *thought* and as the instruments of *converse*—seems exposed to an objection from whence the word *harmoniousness*, when applied to the same subject, is free: by the word *melody*, the case [is suggested] where the sounds employed are of the musical kind, standing with reference to each other in the relation that belongs to the sounds called *musical*: a sort of relation in which, with reference to each other, except in the particular case of their being, as the phrase is, *set to music*, the sounds employed as instruments of discourse, do not stand to each other.

Moreover, in this case, in farther justification of the use of the word *harmony*, a farther observation is—that in its original acceptance αρμονία—the Greek word of which the English word *harmony* is a copy—means neither more nor less than *adaptation*, and whether on the occasion of the pleasure derived from a number of sounds, the pleasure derived from simultaneity be or be not added to the pleasure produced by succession, it is upon *adaptation* that the production of the agreeable effect depends.

¹ Bentham does not appear to have written any material for this proposed Chapter.

as being *above* that middle point; negative melodiousness, where the situation of the degree in question is considered as being *below* that point.

In the discourse in question, what degree of this quality is required depends upon the *nature* of the discourse: i.e. upon the *purpose* to which and the *occasion* on which it is employed.

I. In the case of *poetry*, in so far as *rythm*, i.e. the succession of measured sounds, is considered as entering into the composition of it, melodiousness at the positive side of the scale is universally understood as essential and indispensable: in this case, of the art and labour of the composer, one great object is the securing the undiscontinued existence of it.

II. In the case of that sort of poetry in which rythm is not employed, and of which the agreeableness is understood to depend on the intercourse between the imagination of the author and the imagination of the reader, melodiousness in the positive degree is not of the essence of the discourse: but the quantum of the pleasure produced can not but be more or less dependent on the degree in which this quality has been conferred upon it: and at any rate by any positive degree of the opposite quality, unmelodiousness or unharmoniousness, the design can not but be proportionably counteracted.

III. In the case of *public speaking*—of a *speech* delivered to or before a *public assembly*, though the melody or harmony is of a different cast from what it is in the case of vocal music, or even in that of metrical poetry, and though extra harmoniousness enters not here, as there, into the very essence of the purpose, yet to that purpose, as universally acknowledged, of this quality, in so far as obtainable, an extraordinary share is, in proportion to the degree of it, conducive: and at any rate, by any such deficiency as leaves the degree below the middle point, the design can not but be in a considerable degree counteracted.

IV. In a word, there is not perhaps that imaginable occasion on which, by the degree of harmoniousness or unharmoniousness appertaining to the discourse, its efficiency with relation to the design of it, be that design what it may, may not in some degree be influenced.

This connection, viz. between the efficiency of a discourse and the harmoniousness of it, howsoever, when once indicated, clear and above dispute, is in no small degree apt to be unobserved.

Speaking of the intensity and universality [of the] admiration bestowed upon Shakespeare,¹ it is to the harmony of his numbers as much as, if not more than, to any other feature of excellence in the works of that author

¹ William Shakespeare (1564–1616), dramatist and poet.

that Mrs Montague¹ attributes the effect.^a When this observation first made its appearance, the character of originality was, it is believed, very generally attributed to it. At any rate, the quality in question presented itself to the author of these pages in that same character, and the observation as one which, though when once presented the justice was felt, had not till then presented itself to his mind.

7. Facility of utterance.

Though in the field of causality intimately connected with melodiousness, this quality is in its nature, and thence in idea, sufficiently distinguishable from it. In proportion as to produce it requires effort on the part of the speaker, and on that occasion effort is accordingly employed, the fact of its being employed naturally becomes perceptible and the existence of it is actually perceived: and in proportion as in the bosom of the speaker uneasiness [has place],² or by the hearer is supposed to have place, by the force of sympathy the like effect is in his own bosom apt to take place.

That in the formation of language in general, melodiousness and facility of utterance taken together have actually, in the character of ends, been generally aimed at is a matter of fact that may be stated as perceptible in the history of some languages, and it is supposed in a degree more or less considerable in the history of every language.

In every known language, in so far as it is known, changes in their structure are observable: and in every instance these changes appear to have had for their cause, a general endeavour towards the giving to the instrument of discourse these agreeable qualities in a continually increasing degree.

8. Ornamentality.

Whatsoever be the import intended to be conveyed, by the mere conveyance of that import alone, nothing which can with propriety be termed *ornament*, unless it be in so far as harmoniousness and those other intrinsic qualities are considered in that light, can be given to the discourse by which that import is endeavoured to be conveyed.

Saving the above exceptions, whatsoever, therefore, of ornament can be given to a discourse will be given by the conveyance of some ideas which are *not* essential to the main or direct purpose, in addition to

^a *Essay on Shakespeare*.³

¹ Elizabeth Montagu, *née* Robinson (1718–1800), author and literary hostess.

² MS 'is'.

³ For a passage extolling Shakespeare's use of blank verse see [Elizabeth Montagu], *An Essay on the Writings and Genius of Shakespear, compared with the Greek and French Dramatic Poets. With some remarks Upon the Misrepresentations of Mons. de Voltaire*, London, 1769, pp. 210–11.

those which *are* essential to it. Of some ideas not essential to the main purpose will *the matter of ornament* be composed.

Of that matter of ornament, the exhibition and conveyance may be performed either by and with, or even without, addition to the number of the words, which, if nothing in the way of ornament were conveyed or intended to be conveyed, would have been employed.

In what manner matter of ornament, as expressed by additional words designed for that purpose, may be added to discourse, is a topic that belongs not to the design of this work. According to the general nature of the end proposed by the discourse, it belongs to the head of Rhetoric or Poetry.

The case which alone belongs in any way to the present design, is that in which, in and for the conveyance of the ornament, no greater number of words is employed, than would or might have been employed, had no such effect been produced, nor any such desire entertained.

Under the present head, one very general observation may have its use.—

This is, that so long as no addition is made to the number of the words that would otherwise have been employed, the addition of any ideas the effect of which is not in some particular and assignable way of a positively displeasing nature, the effect of which is not to produce uneasiness in some positive and assignable shape, will operate as ornament, and have the effect of producing, or at any rate a tendency to produce, pleasure.

Of this pleasure, the cause has been already brought to view. Among the qualities desirable in language, that of *compressedness* has in its place been brought to view.¹ On the one hand communication of ideas being the benefit which it is the nature and design of discourse to confer, and on the other hand the time and labour employed on the one hand in the *utterance*, on the other hand in the *hearing* or *reading*, and in both cases *considering*, the discourse, the consequence is that the *price* remaining the same, whatsoever ideas can, without any addition to that price, be imparted and received are, in the mind of the receiver, so much clear gain.

The mind is thus led to the subject of *association*—of the associations that have place among ideas.

1. What are the sorts of ideas which, in the character of main or principal ideas, are wont to have others associated with them in the character of accessory ones?

2. What are the ideas which, in the character of accessory ones, are respectively wont to be associated with these principal ones?

¹ See pp. 144–6 above.

3. In what cases the effect of the association is wont to be productive of an immediately pleasant or otherwise beneficial effect?

4. In what cases, if any, of a pernicious effect?

5. By what means any unpleasant or in any other way pernicious effect produced or producible by such association may be put an end to, or prevented?

For all these questions, answers will, at some ulterior stage, be endeavored to be provided.¹

§ 3. *Comparative Importance of these several Desirable qualities*

Such as above is that which, in the character of a compleat as well as correct one, has presented itself as a list of the several qualities desirable in language.

Good—it may be said—desirable:—but in what degree as compared with one another?—all in equal degree, or different ones in different degrees?

Answer. Different and widely distant in the scale of importance will these several qualities, it is believed, upon comparison with each other, be found.

Copiousness, and *clearness*, viz. clearness from ambiguity and obscurity—compared with all the several others, these two qualities present themselves as seated upon a lofty eminence.

1. On the highest point stands *copiousness*.

It is only in proportion as it is *copious* that in a direct way language contributes any thing to its *end*: to any of the modifications of which the *universal end*, *well-being*, is susceptible. Reduce its copiousness, and in proportion as you reduce it, the height of the place occupied by man on the scale of being is reduced from that of a member of the best governed and mannered community down to that of a barbarian, of a savage, of a beast.

2. Next in the order of importance—and at no great distance—comes *clearness*, clearness from the two kindred imperfections—*ambiguity* and *obscurity*.

This however is but as it were a sort of *negative* quality, composed of the absence of two positive vices, each of them reducing as far as it extends the benefits attached to *copiousness*.

3. Upon a level still inferior presents itself the quality of *impresiveness*, at any rate, if considered by itself, viz. as having place no otherwise than in a case in which, in the article of *clearness*, no deficiency has place.

¹ Bentham does not appear to have written any further material in answer to these questions.

A circumstance from which, in so far as importance agrees with utility, the importance of this quality, viz. impressiveness, may, it should seem, be found to experience no inconsiderable reduction is its liableness to be rendered subservient to mischievous, in a degree but too superior to that in which it is likely to be rendered subservient to beneficial purposes—to purposes of the beneficial cast: the greater the intensity of a passion, the greater its aptitude to be productive of pernicious consequences: and, in the case of a discourse the object or tendency of which is to operate upon the passions, the greater the degree of its impressiveness, the greater the degree of efficiency with which it is likely to operate upon the passions—the greater the degree of intensity of the passion which it is the nature and tendency of it to excite.

4. and 5. *Simplicity, Compressedness*—lower still is the level on which these two qualities present themselves.

Of their utility, that part which is original and intrinsic, and which consists of the saving in time and labour, is comparatively inconsiderable.

The principal part is composed of that secondary and *derivative* utility, which is composed of and measured by their subserviency to the two qualities of primary and *intrinsic* utility, viz. *clearness* and *impressiveness*.

6. and 7. Lowest of all stand the two kindred qualities so nearly allied to purely physical ones, viz. *melodiousness* and *facility of utterance*.

Melodiousness—still more decidedly the absence of the opposite quality—may in some measure be considered as subservient to impressiveness. *But* for this connection, it might be perhaps to be regarded in no higher a character than that of a foreign and accidental *ornament*, not connected with any of the important ends and uses of language, and not having application to it, but on two portions of its field, viz. oratory and poetry.

Even as between these two, viz. melodiousness and facility of utterance, facility of utterance presents itself as standing on one account, in so far as it has place uncombined with, manifestly and considerably below *melodiousness*. By excellence in respect of melodiousness, other persons besides the speaker or writer—other persons, to the number of which in the case of the writer there are not any limits, and in the case of the speaker none but such as are not narrow ones—are gratified—by deficiency in that same respect, more or less displeased: from facility of utterance, in so far as it is separable and exists separate from melodiousness, one individual alone, viz. the writer, is affected, and he only in so far as the discourse, being composed of signs of the audible kind, comes accordingly to be made *audible*.

Chapter 13.

Of Improvement, considered as applicable to *Language*

§ 1. *Questions applicable to improvements in language*

To make an improvement or improvements in a language is to cause it to possess in a higher degree than it does at the time in question, some one or more of the qualities desirable in a language. Of these has already been given a list as compleat as it could be made.^a

An imaginable ulterior species of improvement would be the putting language in general, or this or that language in particular, in possession of some quality, of which till the time in question no language was ever possessed. But, if the list above referred to be, what it was intended to be, a compleat one, on this supposition this imaginary species can not be exemplified and realized.

1. What alterations have a just claim to the title of *improvements*—2. in what way and in what manner they have actually been brought about without design—3. whether any and what improvements are capable of being brought about by design—in other words, in what shape or shapes the nature of language admitts of improvement—and 4. by what hands and in what manner improvement in those several shapes may be effected or promoted—such are the questions to which, in relation to this subject, an answer may be expected.¹

§ 2. 1. *What alterations may be deemed improvements?*

Short is the answer which for this question may suffice.

Of the qualities desirable in language, a list has been endeavoured to be given: viz. 1. Copiousness. 2. Simplicity. 3. Compressedness. 4. Clearness, i.e. exemption from Ambiguity and Obscurity. 5. Impressiveness. 6. Melodiousness. 7. Facility of Utterance. 8. Ornamentality. In so far as that list is correct and compleat, an answer to this question has been already given.²

If the list above given be a compleat one, then so it is that in the qualities contained in it, including their respective opposites, we have all the qualities, good and bad, of which a language is susceptible:—and

^a See Ch. ||.³

¹ Bentham goes on to consider these topics in the following four sections, though he reverses the order of the third and fourth points.

² See Ch. 12, pp. 140–53 above.

³ See *ibid.*

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if so, then will every alteration to which the name of *improvement* can with propriety be applied consist in bestowing upon the language, i.e. to the aggregate of the words of which the language is composed, one or more of these qualities in a higher degree than that in which it was respectively in possession of them before. After, and in consequence and in virtue of, the improvement, the language will *pro tanto* and to the extent of the improvement be more *copious*, more *simple*, more compressed, more clear, i.e. freer from ambiguity and obscurity—more impressive, more melodious, more easy of utterance, more ornamental, than before.

§ 3. 2. *What improvements take place without design*

Improvements made without design? No certainly: in all the several shapes in which improvements have ever been made, in none of them has it ever been made any otherwise than with the design of doing what was done. In what sense, then, without design? In this sense—viz. without any *general* view—without survey taken—of the language—without any such thought as that of doing on the individual occasion in question that which on that individual occasion was done.

1. Copiousness.—For the purpose which the individual has in hand, a new word is thought wanting—he accordingly makes one.

2. Simplicity.—On the occasion in hand, a phrase, a word, a part of a word, which by others had been employed, presents itself to him, but presents itself to him in the character of a superfluous one—he in consequence, according to the nature of the case, forbears to employ it or excludes it.

And so in the instance of the several other desirable qualities—¹

§ 4. 3. *By what hands, and in what way, improvements in language are capable of being effected or promoted*

Individual and simple practice—individual instruction—free association—government authority—by these several expressions, so many different hands by which, or so many means by which, improvement in this field is capable of being effected or promoted may be brought to view.

1. In so far as in the nature of the case, improvement in language is capable of being introduced into language by simple practice—by mere individual practice, any individual may, with a more or less reasonable prospect of success, take his chance for introducing it.

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Go on, bringing them to view successively in the same manner.’

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Of all the several desirable qualities of which the thing called *language* presented itself as susceptible, a view has already been given.¹ Not one of them, it is supposed, will be found in respect of which improvement is not susceptible of being, if not effected, at any [rate] promoted by mere individual practice.

In all these several cases, so long as the only instrument employed is simple practice, whether, to any extent beyond the individual occasion, design has or has not place, is, with regard to the effect, a matter of indifference.

2. In so far as in the nature of the case, in addition to those qualities in respect of which [improvement] may be effected or promoted by simple individual practice, improvement is capable of being effected or promoted by mere *instruction*—here also any individual (it is equally manifest) may, with a more or less reasonable prospect of success—with a prospect of success proportioned to the justness of his observations, and the apparent solidity and conclusiveness of the *reasons* by which it may have happened to them to be supported, take his chance for introducing it.²

§ 5. 4. *What improvements are capable of being brought about by design*³

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Repeat them here?’ See Ch. 12, pp. 140–53 above.

² Bentham does not go on to consider improvement effected by ‘free association’ and by ‘government authority’.

³ Bentham does not appear to have written any text for this section.

Chapter 14.

Of the Improvement of Language in respect of Copiousness

§ 1. *General Rule—The more copious a language, the better—Reference to Exceptions*

New words, and new combinations—to one or other of these may every improvement of which language is susceptible in respect of copiousness be referred.

In which soever mode any addition is made to the pre-existing stock of instruments of discourse, the addition is *primâ facie*, and saving particular exceptions, entitled to be set down to the account of improvement.

Particular exceptions apart, for the same reason that the first word that was ever invented was an addition to the stock of instruments of enjoyment and security, in a word to the instruments of well-being, so *has every other been*, and so *will every other be*.

On this head therefore the general rule is—*The more copious a language is, the better*:—the better adapted to the purposes of language.

But, to this general rule, particular exceptions are not wanting. As to the grounds of these exceptions, and thence as to the rules or cases of exception that have place under this general rule, their place will be found under the head of the next mentioned article upon the list of qualities desirable in language, viz. *Simplicity*.¹

§ 2. *General tendency of every language to become more and more copious*

Generally speaking, there exists in language a [natural]² tendency to improve itself, or to speak strictly, to become improved—in respect of this desirable quality. The same causes, by the operation of which the earliest and scantiest stock of the instruments of conversation and even of thought were produced, continue in action and will continue in action, without end. Observation, experiment, experience, reflection, discovery, invention—all these are so many seeds of language, seeds from which new additions to the stock of words and combinations in every language are continually springing up.

¹ See Ch. 12, § 2, p. 143 above.

² MS 'naturally'.

§ 3. *Psychical opponents and obstacles to improvement in respect of Copiousness*

As there exist cases in which the alterations made in language, by encrease given to the number of words and combinations of words of which it is composed, can *not* with propriety be set down to the account of advantage, so are there cases in which, though the addition, if made, would be of an advantageous nature, yet the addition finds the introduction of it opposed, finds opposition raised and kept up against it, by various springs of human action, by various principles of human nature.

Indigenous weakness, viz. in the intellectual faculty, sinister interest, interest-sown prejudice, adoptive prejudice—in this part of the field of action, as in every other, will human felicity find these its enemies set in array against it, and opposing its progress at every step.

Chapter 15.

Of Clearness in discourse—where the seat of the unclearness, actual or apprehended, is considered as being in the words taken singly:—and hence, of exposition

§ 1. *Seats of unclearness, the words or their connection—Exposition what*

A *sentence*, in the grammatical sense of the word sentence, consists either of a single *proposition* in the logical sense of the word proposition, or a number of such propositions: if one only, it may be termed a simple sentence; if more than one, a compound sentence.

A proposition is *clear*, in proportion as it [is] *clear*, that is *free*, at the same time from *obscurity* and *ambiguity*, imperfections the nature of which has been already explained.¹

All clearness is on every occasion relative: relation being had to the person considered in the character of hearer or reader.

There exists not, nor ever will, any proposition that is perfectly clear to every hearer and reader. There exist but too many that neither will be nor ever have been to any one: not so much as by those by whom they were respectively framed.

Instances, however, are not uncommon where ideas which, in the mind of him by whom the discourse meant for the communication of them was uttered, were perfectly clear, are expressed in such a manner as not to be clear to any one else: clear in the conception—clear in the expression: clear in neither: clear in the conception alone, not in the expression: if in the conception a set of ideas were not clear, it is not natural that they should be clear in the expression: yet by accident it may happen to them to be so.

Where *unclearness* (why not unclearness as well as unclean[n]ness?)² has place in a discourse, the seat of it will be either in the *terms* or in the *syntax*: in some one word, or number of words each taken singly, i.e. without regard to the mode of their connection, or in that mode itself, or in the *manner* in which they are connected with each other,

¹ See Ch. 12, § 2, pp. 146–7 above.

² Bentham's point is to justify the coining of the noun 'unclearness', though the word had been previously used.

or *put together*—in the state of their mutual relations with reference to each other's import.¹

In so far as the seat of the unclearness is in the words taken singly, *clearness* has for its *instrument*, *exposition*: i.e. *exposition* is a name which may with propriety be applied to the designation of every operation which has for its object, or end in view, the exclusion or expulsion of unclearness in any shape: to the *operation*—and thereby—for such on the present occasion is the poverty and thence the ambiguity of language—to the portion of discourse by which the end is endeavoured to be accomplished, and by which the operation of accomplishing it is considered as performed.

§ 2. *Subject of Exposition—subjects to which it is applicable*

Be the exposition itself what it may, *a subject* it can not but have—a subject to which it is applicable.

This subject—what may it be? what are the diversifications of which it is susceptible?—a question to which in the first place an answer must be provided. Why? because on the nature of the subject will depend the nature of the mode of exposition of which it is susceptible.

In relation to the subject of this instrument of clearness, two observations require to be brought to view in the first place.

1. The subject of exposition—viz. the immediate and only immediate subject—is in every case *a word*. 2. That word is in every case *a name*: at any rate, a word considered in the character of a name.

Exposition supposes *thought*. A *word* is a *sign of thought*. How imperfectly so ever—in a manner how deficient so ever in respect of *clearness*—*thought*, it is true, may be expressed by *signs other* than words—by inarticulate *sounds*, by gestures, by deportment. But, as often as any object has been considered in the character of a *subject* of or for exposition, that object has been *a word*:^a the immediate subject

^a On this subject, for the purpose of exposition, i.e. for the purpose of ensuring clearness, the Aristotelians have given us a distinction which may be seen to be itself a source of unclearness, viz. of that sort which is termed obscurity. For the purpose of exposition, one of the instruments or operations they employ is definition, to which again they apply another instrument, viz. *division*. A definition (say they) is either a definition of the *name*, or a definition of the *thing*:² meaning evidently of the thing—of the object, of which the word is employed as a name. Now, in the account thus given of the matter, a proposition is implied

¹ Bentham has indicated that a footnote should be added at this point: 'Note in this respect the difference, if any, between Syntagmatical relations, and relations at large.'

² See Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 43: 'Definitio est Definiti (*sive nominis, sive rei*) explicatio', i.e. 'Definition is the explanation of either the defined name or the defined thing.'

of the exposition has been *a word*: whatsoever else may have been brought to view, the signification of *a word*—of the word in question—has been brought to view: the word is not only a subject, but the only physically sensible subject, in relation to which and upon which the *operation*, called *exposition*, has been performed.

Case where the exposition takes for its subject an object proposed to be expounded, as well as the word with the help of which, in the character of its sign, the object is proposed to be expounded.—Case where, without reference to any particular object or class of objects, the exposition takes for its subject a word, considered in the character of a sign, which for the designation of some object or class of objects is in use to be employed. Of these two cases, the firstmentioned is that to which, for the purpose of this enquiry, convenience seems to require that the first place should be allotted.

§ 3. *Mode of Exposition where the thing which is the subject is an individual—Individualization, individual and generic*

Thus much being premised.—

The word in question is either the name of an *individual* object, or the name of a *species* or sort of objects.

If it be the name of an individual object, *individualization* is the general name of the only mode of *exposition* of which (regard being had at the same time to the subject) the name of an individual object is susceptible.

*Individual individualization—generic or specific individualization—*by these two denominations may be distinguished two modes of individualization which, for practical purposes, may require to be distinguished.

Individual individualization is where, in relation [to] an individual object, an indication is endeavoured to be given, an indication whereby or by the help of which an individual object may be distinguished from all or any other individual objects wherewith it is regarded as being liable to be confounded. Take, for instance, on the surface of the earth, the designation of the several distinguishable portions which it contains: and into which, physically or psychically speaking, it is capable of being divided. In so far as the portion in question is considered as relatively large, Geography is

which is not true: viz. that where the definition is a definition of a thing, it never is a definition of the name: whereas in truth it always is.

Of the distinction which they had in view, the form which they should have employed seems to be this.—A definition is a definition either of the word alone, or by means of the word, a definition of the thing meant to be expressed by it.

the portion of art and science to which, with the help of Astronomy, the individualization of the object is considered as appertaining: Topography, in so far as it is regarded as relatively small. From Geography will be sought, on the surface of the terraqueous globe, the portion distinguished by the name of Europe: from Geography again, in Europe, England; in England, London and Westminster: in London and Westminster, Queen's Square, Westminster and Queen's Square Place.¹

Generic or *specific individualization*—by this appellation may be distinguished the operation which has place in the case where, regard being had to a genus of objects, as designated by a generic name, instructions are given having for their object the causing men to be agreed in determining within what limits or bounds an individual, when designated by and under that name, shall be considered as limited, so as to be distinguished from all objects which are regarded as liable to be confounded with it: or in relation to any individual likely to be considered as designated by that name, of what elements that aggregate shall be considered as composed.

The field of *law* is the field in which the demand for this mode of individualization—for this mode of exposition—is most copious and most urgent—and the use of it most conspicuous and the utility of it most obvious and incontestable.²

§ 4. *Modes of Exposition where the subject is a class*

1. Definition—meaning the sort of operation and correspondent work ordinar[il]y understood by that name.—2. Operations incidentally employed as preliminary and preparatory to that of definition—say Preparatory Operations. 3. Operations incidentally employed as subsequential and supplementary to that of definition—say supplementary operations. 4. Operations which, in certain cases, in which the purpose can not be effected by definition—understand by definition in that same form, require to be performed in lieu of it: say succedaneous operations—under one or other of these appellations may every modification of which the operation of Exposition is susceptible be (it is believed) comprized.

To *define* a word is to indicate some aggregate, in which the object of which it is the sign is comprehended, together with an indication

¹ Bentham's home was, of course, 2 Queen (or Queen's) Square Place.

² In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Give Examples.' He has then further noted: '☞ Add in text, Instruments of individualization for movable physical objects, conjunct portions of space and time. Axiom. No two portions of matter can exist at the same portion of time in the same portion of space.'

of some quality which, being possessed by that same object, is not possessed by any other object included in that same aggregate.

Elliptically but more familiarly—to *define* is to *expound*, by indication of the genus and the difference: *per genus et differentiam*, say the Aristotelians.¹

In this account of the matter, two things, it may be observed, are, howsoever inexplicitly, assumed, viz. 1. that the object in question belongs to some *nest of aggregates*:^a 2. that it is not itself the highest—the most capacious aggregate—the all-comprehending aggregate of the nest: in other terms, that the word is not of the number of those the import of which is not included in the import of any other of the words employed in giving names to aggregates—that it belongs to some nest of aggregates: and that it is not itself the most comprehensive and all-comprehensive aggregate of the nest.

The genus represented by a word which is the name of that aggregate in which all the other aggregates of the nest to which it belongs are contained and included has no genus which is superior to it: it is, therefore, in its nature incapable of receiving a definition: meaning always that mode of exposition which in modern practice seems to be universally understood by that name.

Meantime, the class of words which are in this sense of the word incapable of receiving exposition in that shape are among those in the instance of which the demand for exposition is the most imperious. For these, then, that mode of exposition is necessary to which, by the description of *succedaneous* modes of exposition, reference has just been made, and of which an account will presently be endeavoured to be rendered.²

Yet of these words, which are all of them incapable of receiving a definition in effect, definitions are very generally, not to say universally, given with a degree of unconcern and confidence not inferior to that with which the operation is attended where the subject upon which it is performed is with the strictest propriety susceptible of

^a See supra Ch. ||.³

¹ See Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 44: '*Definitio rei* (perfecta & essentialis, quæ absolutè definitio dicitur,) est *oratio explicans quid sit res*; sive est Definitio per terminos essentielles explicatio: ut *homo est animal rationale*. Est autem Definitum perpetuo *species*: Termini vero essentialès *Genus & Differentia*; secundario etiam & *Proprium*, velut immediatè fluens ab essentia', i.e. 'The definition of a thing (perfect and essential, which is called absolute definition) is a speech explaining what a thing is; or it is an explanation of the thing defined using essential terms: as man is a rational animal. However the thing defined is constantly a species: the essential terms, indeed, are genus and difference; secondly furthermore also a characteristic, as if flowing immediately from the essence.'

² i.e. phraseoplerosis, paraphrasis, and archetypation, which are, in fact, discussed in Ch. 8, pp. 92–6 above.

³ See Ch. 6, § 7, pp. 71–4 above.

exposition in that mode. Of the sort of shape in which these abortive attempts make their appearance, an account will be given presently.¹

§ 5. *Disambiguation—what—in what cases employed*

Be the word what it may, if it is the case that it is wont to be employed in divers senses, between or among which no coincidence either total or partial is perceptible, at the same time that while by one person it is received in one sense, by another person it is received in another sense, an operation necessarily preliminary to that of definition is distinction or disambiguation: in other words, when so it happens that the word in question has been employed in the character of a *sign* for the designation of several objects, in so much that, without farther explanation, it may happen to it to be taken as indicative of one object, when by the author of the discourse it was meant to be indicative not of that but of a different one, what may every now and then be necessary for the excluding of such misconception is—an intimation, making it known which of all these several objects the word is, in the case in question, meant to designate, and what other or others it is not meant to designate.

Take, for example, the English word—*Church*. This word is uniformly considered and employed as the correct and compleat representative of the Latin (which in other letters somewhat different in appearance serves for the designation of the same sound as the correspondent Greek) word *Ecclesia*, in French *Église*.

1. Among the Greeks, in its original acceptance, *Ecclesia* was employed to signify an assembly of any kind: it was manifestly derived from the union of two words $\epsilon\kappa$ and $\kappa\alpha\lambda\epsilon\omega$ which signified to call out, viz. for the purpose of a joint meeting: and more particularly of a joint meeting for a public—for a political—purpose.

2. Thence, among such of the first Christians whose language was Greek, it came to signify in particular such assemblies as were held by those religionists as such, whether for the purpose of devotion, or conjunct economical management.

3. In an association of this kind, there was commonly at least one member whose occupation consisted in taking the lead in their common exercises of divine worship, and, by the exposition of that book or collection of books which by all of them was recognized as constituting the standard of their faith and action, to administer instruction to the rest. The operations thus performed being regarded as *serviceable* with reference to the persons at whose desire they were

¹ Bentham does not go on to discuss ‘these abortive attempts’ at definition.

performed, the persons by whom they were performed were accordingly designated sometimes in consideration of such their services *Ministers*—the Latin word for Servants, sometimes in consideration of their age *Presbyters*, from πρεσβυτερος, which was the Greek word for *Elders*, i.e. for men of any description when advanced in age, from which word *Presbyter* comes the French word *Prestre*, and the English word *Priest*: sometimes in consideration of their acting as Overseers or Overlookers, overseeing and overlooking in relation to the deportment of their disciples, the members of the association at large, Επισκοποι, *Episcopi*: from whence the English word *Bishop*.

In process of time, those members of the association whose occupation originally consisted on the occasion in question in acting, with or without pay, as servants to the members at large, came to act as rulers over the rest, at first on this or that particular occasion, at length upon all occasions.

At this time, besides the other senses of which mention will require to be made presently, the word *Church* came to be employed to designate, according to the purpose which, by those who were employing it, it was designed to serve—employed to designate three very different assemblages of persons: viz. 1. the whole body of the persons thus governed; 2. the whole body of the persons thus employed in the government of the rest; and 3. the all-comprehensive body or Grand Total, composed of *governed* and *governors* taken together.

When the persons in question were to be spoken of in the character of persons bound to pay obedience, then by the word *Church* was meant to be designated these subordinate members of the association: in a word the *subject many*: when they were to be spoken of in the character of persons to whom the others were bound to pay obedience, then by the same word were designated the *ruling few*: when for the purpose of securing in favour of both parties, and especially of the ruling few, the affections of respect and fear, then would the import of the word open itself, and to such an extent, as to include under one denomination the two parties whose situations and interests were thus opposite.

4. From designating first¹ the assembly composed of all persons, and no other than all persons actually assembled together at one and the same *time* in a particular place, and then all the several persons who were regarded as entitled so to assemble at that place, it came also to be employed to designate the place itself at or in which such assembly was wont to be held: the *place*, consisting of the *soil*—the portion of the earth's surface—on which, for containing and protecting from the

¹ At this point, Bentham noted the following correction to his account: 'First the act of calling together an assembly.'

occasional injuries of the weather, a *building* was erected, and such building itself when erected.

Such as above being the purpose, for which the class of building in question was erected, viz. the paying homage to God, God, although present at all times in all places, was regarded as being in a more particular manner present at and in all places of this sort: sufficiently attentive to whatsoever was passing at all other places, but still more attentive to whatsoever was passing in these places.

Being thus, as it were, the dwelling places of God, these places became, to the members of this association, objects of particular awe and reverence, of a mixture of respect and terror; they became, in one word, holy—whereupon, by an easy and insensible transition, this mixture of respect and terror came to extend itself to, upon and to the benefit of, the class of persons in whose hands was reposed the management of whatsoever was done in those holy places: holy functions made holy places; holy functions and holy places together, holy persons.

On the score of beauty, admiration; on the score of kindness and tenderness, love; on the score of fitness for domestic management and rule, respect;—these affections are in use to find their joint object in the character or relation designated by the word Mother. On the one part, admiration, love and respect—all these are, on the other part, so many instruments of governance. The servants of the subject many, being converted into rulers of the same subject many, had their assemblies for the operating in such their capacity, and securing to themselves the faculty of continuing so to do. Of these assemblies the Members were a few young, some middle-aged, some elderly, some old men. Upon their contemplating themselves all together in the mirror of Genius with the eye of Faith, it was found that of all these Males put together was composed one beautiful female, the worthy object of the associated affections of admiration, love, and respect—the Holy Mother Church.

Besides, this holy female was seen to possess a still greater quantity of holiness [than]¹ could have entered into the composition of the aggregate mass of holiness composed of the separate holinesses of the several holy males of which she was composed, had they not in the abovementioned holy place been thus assembled and met together. By ordinances issued by this holy female a greater and surer measure of admiration, love, respect and consequent obedience was obtained than would have been obtained by the assembly in its plain and original character of one assembly of males, notwithstanding all their holiness.

¹ MS 'that'.

CH. 15. OF CLEARNESS IN DISCOURSE

By the combination thus happily accomplished, an effect no less felicitous and convenient than it was holy was produced: in the holy compound, while all the perfections of which both sexes are susceptible were found united in it, all imperfections, as if by chemical precipitation, were found to have been excluded. The holy men might, notwithstanding their holiness, have remained fallible: the Holy Mother was found to be infallible. Her title to implicit confidence, and its inseparable consequence implicit obedience, became at once placed upon the firmest ground, and raised to the highest pitch.

Great is the scandal—great to all well-disposed eyes the offence, if, to her own children or any of them, a mother has been an object of contempt: proportioned to the magnitude, to the enormity, of the offence is the indignation of all well-disposed spectators, the magnitude of the punishment which they are content to see inflicted on the score of it, and the alacrity with which they are ready to concur in promoting the infliction of such punishment.

How much more intense that indignation should any such indignity be offered to that holy character as that of beholding her person, her servants, or though it were but her ordinances, violated! Flowing from the maternity of this *holy*, this *sanctified*, this *sacred* character—to all these epithets appertains the same venerated import—thus convenient and useful was the result.

When an edifice of the holy class has been erected and duly consecrated, proportioned to the holiness, the sanctity, the sacredness bestowed upon it in and by its consecration is the enormity of any offence by which it has been profaned, and its sanctity violated.

When again an edifice of the holy class has been erected and duly consecrated, the more sumptuous, the more magnificent, the more elevated, the more admirable, the more venerable its structure—the greater the calamity, the wider the ruin, the more intense the shock—supposing the possibility of its being *subverted*: the more intense and implacable the indignation excited towards and pointed against all persons regarded or considered as capable of being regarded as authors or promoters of so shocking a catastrophe.

Already has been seen the advantage derivable and derived by and to the rulers of the Church, themselves being that Church, by the creation of a Church capable of being violated.

Here may now be seen the advantage producible and produced by and to the same rulers of the Church from the creation of a Church, themselves being that Church, capable of being subverted.

By any unholy person, is this holy will in any particular opposed or threatened to be opposed, that same sacrilegious, unholy, profane, unbelieving, infidel, miscreant, reprobate person is already a violater,

and in intention a violater, of the Church: worthy of all indignation, all horror, all punishment, all vengeance which it is in the power of a dutiful and worthy son of the Church to pour down or contribute to pour down upon his devoted head.

In the above example may be seen an instance of that impracticability which is liable to have place—the impracticability of exhibiting a definition of the term in question where the import of the term is such, that antecedently to any such operation, a division of the mass [of] its import requires to be made: where its import is in such a sort a compound of diverse and multifarious imports, that no one exposition, which shall at the same time be compleat and correct, can be given of it.

In this particular instance here in question, although before any correct definition could be given it was necessary that an apt division should be made, yet when once such division has been made, the need of any ulterior exposition in the shape of a definition may perhaps be seen or supposed to be effectually superseded. Other instances might perhaps be found in which such ulterior exposition might still be requisite.

Beard—mean you the beard of a *man*?—Beard—do you mean the beard of a plant?—for example barley or wheat?—By these questions, *division* is already made: and then, for the instruction of any one to whom (he being acquainted with other sorts of wheat) it has not happened to have heard of the sort called *bearded wheat*—some sort of an *exposition* in the shape of a *definition* might be necessary.

In the above instance, the imports, how widely and importantly so ever different, might, however, be seen to be, by a principle or chain of association, interconnected: and the more important, especially in respect of practical purposes, the difference is—as also the more the several senses are liable to be mistaken for each other—that which in one sense is not true, howsoever in another sense it may be true, being understood in a sense in which it is not true, the more material it is that whatsoever distinction has place between them should be brought and held up to view.

In all transactions relative to the Church, in so far as concerns the interests of the members of the Church, the good of the Church ought to be the object pursued in preference to every other. By each of two persons, this proposition may with perfect sincerity have been subscribed: but according as to the word *Church* the one or the other of two very different and, in respect of practical consequences, opposite imports has been annexed to it, their conduct may on every occasion have [been] with perfect consistency exactly opposite: one meaning by the word *Church* the *subject many*, the other by the same word the *ruling few*.

At the same time, the number of pronounceable changes of which the letters of an alphabet are susceptible being, how so ever ample, not altogether unlimited, other instances can not but have place in which, to one and the same word, divers imports altogether uninterconnected by any such bond of association may have happened to be attached.¹

Many, however, are the instances, in which, of two or more in appearance widely different imports, the connection, though real, will not be generally perceptible.

In French, by one and the same word, *worms* and *verses* are designated.² Between two objects so widely dissimilar, in any mind could there have existed any principle of connection? Possibly not. In this instance, possibly, no such connection has had place. But neither is the contrary impossible. The French *vers* is from the Latin *versus*, a verse—but in Latin the name of a worm is *vermes*; in the same language *verto* is to turn: and who can say but that of *versus* and *vermes*, this verb *verto* may have been the common root. Tread upon a worm and it will turn, says an English proverb: and in the construction of verses, how much of turning the stock of words of which the language is composed requires is no secret to any person by whom a copy of verses has ever been either made or read.

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘ Give here an example or two.’

² i.e. ‘les vers’ and ‘le vers’ respectively.

Chapter 16.

Of the Qualities desirable in style: i.e. in language considered as employed by this or that individual

§ 1. *What qualities depend on the language—as well as on the individual—what, on the individual alone*

1. Simplicity—2. Compressedness—3. Clearness—4. Impressiveness—and 5. Harmoniousness—of the seven distinguishable qualities which presented themselves as desirable in language in general, in the whole structure of the instrument, by whatsoever hands employed, these presented themselves as five:¹ to the case of this or that individual considered as taking in hand this or that language in particular, and applying it to his own purpose, whatsoever be that purpose, these same five qualities will, it is believed, be found alike applicable, and with like propriety and advantage.

Of the seven qualities above mentioned as desirable ones in the case of an entire language in general, considered without reference to an individual employer of this instrument, there remain two others, viz. *copiousness* and *facility of utterance*.

1. Of these, *copiousness* seems scarcely to be at all applicable to the case of an individual speaker or writer. In his case, copiousness bears reference to the occasion and the subject. *Occasions* are not wanting with reference to which a sufficient degree of copiousness may be exhibited by the compass of a single word: the word *away*, for instance. In so far as the language which he employs fails of being adapted—adequately adapted—to the subject, the most consummate writer or speaker will not be able to give to his style the quality of copiousness. In the native language of New South Wales, the most consummate master of the language of that country would not be able to deliver an intelligible argument in the English Court of Common Pleas, on an action of Replevin, or on what is called a point of practice.

2. Pronuntiability.² In this we have another quality the applicability of which will be found to be confined to the case of a whole language, in contradistinction to that of an individual considered as making use of it.

In so far as the language in which he expresses himself affords a choice, it will naturally, especially in this experienced and polished

¹ See Ch. 12, p. 142 above. Bentham here omits ornamentality, which appears to have been a later addition to the list of qualities desirable in style: see the Editorial Introduction, p. xxxviii above.

² i.e. facility of utterance.

age, be among the cares of every well-educated man, especially of the Poet and the Public Speaker, to put aside rather than look out for any of those difficultly pronouncable sounds which the usage of early times happens to have introduced into the language, and that of intervening times to have left in it.

But if, throughout its whole texture, the language abounds in difficultly utterable sounds, the utmost possible skill on the part of him by whom it is employed may be insufficient to give utterance to a discourse of considerable length without suffering uneasiness, and in his pronuntiation, intonation and deportment exhibiting perceptible marks of such his sufferance.

Without much toil to himself, a Statesman of the Hottentot country might perhaps for a considerable time continue in the display [of] his eloquence. But to an European hearer, the idea of continual difficulty and consequent uneasiness would all the while present itself.^a

One quality there is which will be seen to depend on the individual alone:—on the use made by him of the language, whatsoever it may be.

For the designation of this quality, no appellative more apt has been found than the word *dignity*.

By the word *dignity*, no such meaning is here intended to be expressed, as that which is conveyed by the word *pomposity*.

With or without *dignity*, *pomposity* is a quality that may be given to a man's style by an apposite choice of words taken singly: by words selected for the purpose of impressing on the imagination the ideas of grandeur, sublimity and importance.

The quality for the expression of which the word *dignity* is here employed to express will be found to depend—not upon the choice of terms taken singly, but upon *collocation*: and that not so much upon the collocation of words taken singly, but upon the collocation of whole sentences, and their component clauses or members.

§ 2. Of Dignity²

By dignity is here to be understood that quality or character in a man's style which is the result of its being such as to convey to the

^a The language of that country is said to contain in it sounds unexemplified in any European language and, without course of labour such as hath never yet been submitted to, not utterable by any European organs.¹

¹ The language spoken by the Hottentots, the inhabitants of south-west Africa, and now known as the Khoisan language, makes use of an extensive range of sounds, including clicks.

² In a rudiment, Bentham has noted at the head of this section: 'Burke & Johnson their clearness from laxity and fumbling.' Edmund Burke was celebrated for his oratory and

hearer or reader the idea of *self-possession* on the part of the speaker or writer: the idea of his having acquired a mastery over the subject which he has taken in hand, whatsoever it be—or at the least of his having arranged and settled his thoughts concerning it.

This quality may be termed a secondary one, as a quality which is, as it were, a collateral result, produced without any additional and separate causes by virtue of some of those which are requisite for securing to the style the qualities of *clearness* and *impressiveness*.

Of *strength of mind* on the part of the speaker or writer, dignity of style is a natural fruit and by that means a sign.

The signs of strength of mind are exhibited in a man's style in greater or less perfection in proportion as it is clear of certain marks which may be considered as symptoms of weakness.

Laxity and *fumbling*—under one or other of these two denominations the principal symptoms of weakness may, it is believed, be found comprized.

1. *Laxity*. In what improprieties in the choice and arrangement of words ambiguity and obscurity take their rise has been shewn in the several preceding Chapters on the qualities desirable in every man's language.¹ But, as it [is] with the several other imperfections which stand opposed to the several qualities desirable in language, so is it with these:—no man who with equal facility could exclude them from his discourse, would leave the marks of them to appear in it and deface it.

Proportioned, therefore, to the degree in which it is seen to be defaced by these imperfections is the degree of weakness under which his mind appears to labour.

In the constitution of the mind, *ambiguity* and *obscurity* of style are symptoms of *laxity* and *weakness*: *clearness* and *impressiveness* are signs of *strength*.

2. *Fumbling*.

Fumbling is the natural result, and by that means a symptom, of *want of preparation*.

When the field which a man has to travel over is new to him, he finds himself under the necessity of his picking up as he goes the *opinions* which he sees reason to deliver, and the *expressions* which, in the delivering of them, he makes use of. The consequence is that no sooner has he pitched upon one opinion and clothed it in such expressions

Samuel Johnson (1709–84), author and lexicographer, with whom Bentham had been acquainted, for his conversation.

¹ See Ch. 12, pp. 140–53 above. The discussion is restricted to one Chapter, though improvements to language in respect of copiousness and clearness are considered in Chs. 14 and 15, pp. 157–8 and 159–69 above respectively.

CH. 16. OF THE QUALITIES DESIRABLE IN STYLE

as at the moment have presented themselves, than he finds that in some way or other they are, in respect of correctness or completeness, deficient and inadequate. Hence come clause after clause, having for their objects the producing the effect of ampliation, restriction, modification, by words indicative of *addition*, *subtraction*, *substitution*—in one word *amendment*.

Besides—and *again*—and *this too*—and *moreover*—it is by words of this sort that the symptom of weakness here called *fumbling* is betrayed.

In some cases the seat of this disease may be seen in *single terms*: in other cases the whole proposition or the whole paragraph, or in a word the whole argument, must be examined before the nature of the disease becomes apparent, and thence before the proper mode of cure can be ascertained.

Instance of symptom of fumbling as perceptible in the character of single terms: species of things picked up on the spot and brought to view, one after another in the order in which they have happened to present themselves. If a correct and comprehensive view of the subject had been taken, some generic term, in the import of which the import of all these several specific terms—or at least of such of them as belonged properly to the occasion—would have been employed. By this means a number of repetitions, equal to the whole number of these specific terms *minus* one, might have been spared: and if, for greater clearness, it had been deemed advisable to present separately to view the ideas designated by these specific terms or any of them, for producing that effect so many single words, with the requisite small assortment of connectives for stringing them together, might have sufficed: and instead of being weakened by correction after correction, the first impression would, by many exemplifications, illustrations and corroborations, have been rendered stronger and stronger.

Proportioned to the difficulty of adequate preparation is the degree in which want of preparation is apt to be unavoidable, and thence where it betrays itself, the degree in which it appears excusable. And conversely, proportioned to the facility of adequate preparation is the degree in which evident want of preparation, as evidenced by its symptoms, viz. *laxity* and *fumbling*, is apt to render itself offensive and discreditable.

In every spoken discourse in general, want of adequate preparation is much more apt to be unavoidable than in any written discourse. In a spoken discourse, *laxity* and *fumbling* are accordingly much more excusable and less offensive than in a written discourse.¹

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘*et* Add in both *spoken* and *written*, the imperfection is flagrant in proportion to the facility of preparation: and *é conversò*.’

Preventive Remedies.

1. Preventive remedy against *laxity*—the *period*: i.e. the particular mode of arrangement by which that grammatical or rhetorical denomination is given to the sentence.¹

2. Preventive Remedy against *fumbling*.

When, whether in the character of subjects or of predicates, several terms one after another are presenting themselves, consider whether the nature of the case afford not some more ample term, such as, in the character of a generic term, may serve to bring to view the respective imports of these several specific terms, together with such others as are proper for the occasion, without bringing to view with the like effect any others that are not proper for it.

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘§ Here give a description of the period: consulting the Rhetoricians of antiquity, and Campbel &c.’ See, for instance, Aristotle’s discussion of the period in *Art of Rhetoric*, III. ix, and Campbell, *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, Bk. III, Ch. III, § III, Part II. Observations on periods, and on the use of antithesis in the composition of sentences, ii. 347–69.

Chapter 17.

Rules for the avoidance of the imperfections opposite to the qualities of Clearness (Non-Ambiguity and Non-Obscurity) and Impressiveness¹

Part I. Rules for the avoidance of ambiguity, obscurity and debility so far as depends upon words taken singly.

[Rule the first].² Where the language affords a word appropriated exclusively to the expression of the import which alone it is your intention to express, avoid employing any word which is alike applicable to the expressing of that import, and a different one which may require to be distinguished from it.

Substantives—Adjectives—Adverbs—in the instance of all these three parts of speech, instances of the frequent breach of this rule may be found.

1. Substantives.

1. The word *taste* employed instead of the word *relish*. *To relish* a thing is to taste it with pleasure. Do you relish this peach? In this question there is no ambiguity—not even for a moment. But instead of this, oftentimes we find, do you taste this peach?—and so in the case of almost any other source of pleasure—for example, a poem, a sonata, a building, a landscape.

In the French language, there exists no appropriate word by which *pleasure* is represented as an accompaniment of the perception indicated. *Gouter* is *to taste*: and for *to relish* it has again this word and no other. In French, therefore, this imperfection, this ambiguity and inadequacy, this incompleteness and consequent incorrectness, of expression is the result of necessity. In the word *taste*, when employed instead of the word [*relish*], this imperfection is needlessly and inelegantly copied. Why? Answer—from affectation. To give the hearer or reader to understand that the speaker or writer is so well acquainted with that foreign language that it is more readily present to his memory than his own language is.

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘^{MS} N.B. A particular course of reading, viz. from approved authors, may be necessary for collecting farther examples: whereupon matter may probably be collected for additional rules.—Try upon these the exhaustive process.’

The present Chapter has been arranged according to a plan at UC cii. 372, the first text sheet in the sequence, where Bentham organizes the material into two parts, the first dealing with ‘Single Terms’ and the second with ‘Collocation’. For further details see the Editorial Introduction, pp. xl–xli above.

² MS ‘I.’

II. Adjectives.

2. Either employed instead of *each*.

To the word *either* belongs an exclusive signification, which belongs not to the word *each*. Where the idea of exclusion is not intended to be conveyed, how slovenly and absurd is it not to employ a word by which the exclusion is expressed? Yet of negligence in this shape examples are, however, continually occurring.

Poetry is the species of composition in which it is most frequent. It has there its excuse. 1. In cases where the monosyllable *each* would *not*, so it may be that the dissyllable *either* will, suit the measure. 2. In poetry, distinctness is less requisite than in prose: a uniform distinctness would even be incompatible with the nature of the discourse and fatal to the design of it. Of poetry, when administered to the eye or to the ear, as of wine, tea, opium, tobacco, and other narcotics, administered through the *prima via*, to produce and keep up in the mind confusion, so it be accompanied with pleasure, is an object not of aversion, but of endeavour and study.

To affectation may the sin be imputed in this case as well as in the last preceding one.

In saying *taste* where he means *relish*, a man pleases himself with the thought of shewing how familiarly acquainted he is with the language of *France*.

In saying *either* where he means *each*, a man pleases himself with the thought of shewing how familiarly he is acquainted with the language of *poetry*.

Affectation the genus, pedantry the species. Formerly the dress most frequently worn by pedantry was *Greek* and *Latin*: latterly it is *French* and *Poetry*.

To the ambiguity attached to this impropriety, one circumstance alone operates in some measure as a palliative. If so it be that, for predicating what you meant to predicate alike of two things, A and B, the word you have employed is a word by which one of them is excluded, conceive the term repeated, then, one after the other, they are both of them comprized. First introduce A without B, then introduce B without A, both of them are introduced. But how much better would it not be if, without any such unintended exclusion, both were introduced at once?

All—every—each—either—these collective adjectives are none of them absolutely incapable of being employed for and instead of any of the rest, but they have each of them its appropriate and most proper sense.

Thus it is throughout in regard to words which, with reference to one another, in common acceptation and discourse pass for synonyms.

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Take any two of them. By neither perhaps is exactly the same idea expressed as is expressed by the other. In many instances, however, so it is that without inconvenience and without impropriety one of them, perhaps either or even each, may be employed instead of the other. Why? because in¹

3. The word *future* employed instead of the word *subsequent*.

Future and *subsequent* are both of them names of relations—terms of reference. By each of them two portions of time, an *antecedent* and a *consequent*, are brought to view. By the term *subsequent*, the point of time brought to view in the character of an antecedent is that which, with reference to the state of things or transaction *spoken of*, was present: this alone and not the *time at which* that same state of things or transaction is spoken of. Thus stands the matter so far as concerns the word *subsequent*. In the use of it nothing of ambiguity is to be found.

Now as to the term *future*. But for the context, from which, upon reflection, it may be concluded that the time from which the futurity is reckoned was the time where the state of things or transaction spoken of was present, that time would always be the time in which the discourse, if oral, was spoken, if in writing, written.

From the promiscuous use thus made of two words suited to very different purposes confusion and absurdity are continually arising. In one and the same sentence, an event meant to be represented as past is spoken of as future.²

4. Restrictives—such as *alone* and *only*.

By these words, what is constantly understood is—that the purpose for which they are employed is—the narrowing the import of some word or other to which they are respectively annex: that which in many cases can not be collected but from the context, nor from the context without some difficulty, is to which of all the words in the sentence the restriction is meant to be applied.

1. Substantive in the nominative case (i.e. name of the agent)—2. adjective agreeing with d^o (i.e. quality ascribed to the agent)—3. verb (name of the action)—4. substantive in the accusative case (name of the patient)—5. adjective in d^o (quality of the patient)—6. adverb, in the character of the name of a quality—of a quality annex to one or other of the adjectives or to the verb—frequently to any one of these, with more or less propriety, may the restriction be found capable of being considered as applicable.

In English, what thickens the confusion is the indeterminate character of the restrictives *alone* and *only*. Each of them is employed

¹ The passage has been abandoned at this point.

² In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Here add examples.'

sometimes in the character of an adjective, sometimes in the character of an *adverb*: to exhibit the different occasions on which each, in contradistinction to the other, is most proper would of itself be a task of no inconsiderable length.

Required to exhibit so many forms, by means of which, in the several cases, the restriction is meant to be applied exclusively to the objects respectively signified by several parts of speech, it may be applied to those several subjects in such sort that no misapplication whatsoever, how so ever transient and momentary, can take place.

To solve this problem would be a task of no inconsiderable length and labour—but at the same time of no inconsiderable use.¹

If, of the words *alone* and *only*, the one were always an adjective, the other always an adverb, the difficulty of the task would be much less than it is: but unfortunately, as it has been just observed, no such constant distinction has place.

5. Ordinals: more especially the word *first*.

Of the aptitude to involve in ambiguity the import of the sentence in which it is employed, the causes are of the same nature in this instance as in that of the restrictives *alone* and *only*, viz.

1. Uncertainty of the part of speech, and thence of the subject, to which the attributive is meant to be applied.

2. Uncertainty in regard to the part of speech to which it is meant to be considered as belonging, viz. whether an adjective or an adverb.

Example of the mode in which the ambiguity may be avoided.

1. Ambiguous expression—Columbus first saw Hispaniola.

2. Correspondent pair of sentences by which the existence of the ambiguity is indicated, and at the same time the mode of avoiding it.

1. Columbus was the first person who ever saw Hispaniola.

2. Of the Islands now called the West India Islands, Hispaniola was the first that Columbus discovered.²

The plural number is, in a particular degree, liable to be productive of perplexity and mis-statement.

For remedy, substitute the singular, where substitutable without impropriety, as, by one means or other, it may generally be.³

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Subjoin examples.’

² In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Look out for examples as in the case of *Restrictives*.’

On 6 December 1492 Christopher Columbus (1451–1506), Italian explorer and navigator, took possession, in the name of the King of Spain, of the island that he named La Isla Española, later anglicized as Hispaniola, but consisting of Haiti and the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo at the time Bentham was writing. Columbus had, however, previously arrived at the Bahamas in October 1492.

³ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Give examples.’

The passage appears to have been abandoned at this point.

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Rule the second. Change no word, but where you mean to change the sense.

Whenever the same nature
The same nomenclature.

Eadem natura, eadem nomenclatura.

1. Unless for special reason, by whatsoever name an object has once been designated, by that same name and no other, continue to designate it: or, if on any account, you find it matter of necessity or convenience to employ for that purpose this or that other name, take care to give notice of the change.

Converse of the above Rule.

2. Whatsoever be the object for the designation of which a given word has been employed, employ not that same word for the designation of any other object: unless so it be that the word being a generic one, on the first occasion it was employed for the designation of the whole genus or of one species, on the other occasion for the designation of another species of the same genus.

Rule the third. Prefer verbal substantives to verbs—*make application* to *apply*.

Numerous are the instances in which, for the giving expression to the import in question, a single word in the form of a verb may in some sort suffice, and is frequently made to serve, a verbal noun from the same root, with the addition of some verb of extensive sign and proportionally frequent use, may also serve: as where, for example, instead of *to apply*, the phrase *to make application*.

By this substitution, considerable convenience is frequently made to result.

The noun from the same root is commonly a *verbal noun*: a *verbal noun* of that sort which serves to designate in the first place the species of action for the designation of which the verb, including the several modifications^a belonging to that complex part of speech, [is employed]—this in the first place, and thence by an almost imperceptible transition, the state of things or *result* produced by that same act.

This verbal noun, when thus obtained in a state of separation from those adjuncts which form so many constant parts in the composition of the very complex part of speech called *a verb*, and which in this its separate state becomes the name of a sort of fictitious entity, of a sort of fictitious body or substance, is in this state rendered, as it

^a viz. the adjuncts designative of the time of the action, the number of the person or persons concerned in it and the point of view in which, in respect of *certainty*, the act in question was contemplated.

were, more prehensible. Being thus prehensible, it is more easily and more directly brought to view:—and, being thus brought to view, it is capable of being employed as a common subject to any number whatsoever of propositions that may be requisite for predicating whatsoever the nature of the case requires to be predicated of that sort of act in question or of its result.¹

By means of a few verbs of extensive import, such as the above word *make*, capable of serving, as it were, in an *auxiliary* character, introduction may in most cases be given, given by each of them, to a large number of names of fictitious entities, and the advantage in question compassed to its utmost extent.

Where a characteristic verb thus capable of being resolved into a correspondently characteristic verbal noun substantive and an uncharacteristic auxiliary verb has been employed, a practice not unfrequent is, to follow it by some relative which has for its antecedent the verbal noun the import of which is implied in that of the characteristic verb: subjoining, or not subjoining to it, the antecedent noun thus implied.

Example.²

1. The implied antecedent brought to view as if repeated—

If you would gain the populace, upon every favourable occasion apply yourself to their senses. *This application* will do more for you than the closest strain of reasoning.

2. The implied antecedent not brought to view, but only tacitly and implicitly referred to—

If you would gain the populace, apply yourself upon every favourable occasion to their senses. *This* will do more for you than the closest strain of reasoning.

If the verbal noun, the name of the fictitious entity, has in a preceding sentence been expressly brought to view, the repetition of it in the succeeding sentence will have the good effect of renewing and strengthening the first impression. On the other hand, insert the verbal noun in the succeeding sentence without having inserted it in the first, the consequence is that, in this way of speaking, a sort of false intimation is conveyed: an intimation that the verbal noun employed in the succeeding sentence had already been employed in the preceding one.

Leave the verbal noun altogether [un]inserted, the result is still worse. *This will do* so and so—? what is it that will do so and so?—to

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Proceed to shew that the verb will not serve for this.’

² In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Substitute to this some other example taken from some published work. This was devised upon the spur of the occasion.’

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this question, no answer being given by the writer, the reader is left to hunt for one.

Rule the fourth. For impressiveness, put not the names of two leading objects in one sentence unless where they are under the same regime. One thing at a time.

Place not in a strong light—place not in an impressive point of view—two propositions—two clauses—in the same sentence.

For example, a principal proposition, and a modificative clause—a clause which is employed to modify it.

Reason. Where, upon the same level in the scale of importance two objects are thus placed at the same time, the consequence is that, between the one and the other, the attention is distracted: it takes not a sufficient hold of either of them. Present them to the mind one after another, the mind grasps hold of each of them with its undivided force.

Part II. Collocation.

Rule the [first]. Avoid interposition of any possible antecedent between the *intended* antecedent and its relation.

Between an antecedent substantive and its article relative be careful not to interpose any word capable of being, though it be but for a moment, understood as meant to be taken for the antecedent of that same relative.

Rule the second. A list of topics given, treat them in the same order—*change not* the order.

Rule the third. Avoid compound Genitive case: where you employ it, put the terminating *s*.

Rule the [fourth]. To avoid misapplication of a modificative clause, insert it in the middle of the modificand: or at the beginning of the sentence if the modificand comes next.

When, in relation to the clause in question, having the effect of a limitative, ampliative or in any other way modificative clause, your intention is that the import of it shall be understood as applying exclusively to some one to the exclusion of one or more other clauses, the nature of the case affords two expedients either of which will suffice for ensuring the production of the desired effect.

1. It is only in one case that the first of them applies: and that is where the clause to which it is intended that the modification should be considered as applied is that which it is intended should stand before any of the others to which it would be capable of being applied. In this case put the modificative clause before the clause intended to be modified: and in this way modificative clauses in any number may be made to precede and by that means exclusively attach upon one and the same modificand.

2. The other expedient is applicable to all sorts of cases. It consists in stowing the modificative clause in the belly of the modificand. By this means, it is to this modifiable clause, to the exclusion of all other modifiable clauses, that it will be found applicable.

In the wording of Acts of Parliament, and indeed law discourses in general, this expedient is pretty generally employed: and that with manifest good effect.

Rule the fifth. Use antecedent modificatives—1. they prevent instead of correcting misconception: 2. they excite the collateral idea of self-command on the part of the speaker or writer. This *the* or *a* reason why I find it not pleasant to begin the sentence with a nominative case.

Rule the sixth. Where contrast is meant to be exhibited, keep to the same words throughout till you come to those by which the contrast is meant to be expressed.

Rule [the seventh]. Where, of two or more ideas brought to view in the course of the same proposition, same sentence, or clause, there is some one to which, whether to the exclusion of or in preference to the rest, it is your wish that, for the purpose of its being impressed into his mind with a preeminent degree of force, the attention of the hearer or reader should be pointed to it, to the end that he may take particular cognizance of it, contrive so to turn the phrase as that the word or words designative of [that idea]¹ shall occupy the front of the sentence.

Example. Say *Where it is by word of mouth that the communication is made*—rather than *where the communication is to be made by word of mouth*.

In the last mentioned form, the attention is divided between the consideration of the general fact of the making of the communication in question, and that of the particular mode in which that operation is proposed to be performed; and by this division the impression made by the words indicative of the particular mode is more or less weakened: in the first-mentioned instance, the attention is without division fastened at once upon the only one of the two objects to which, on the particular occasion in question, it was meant to attach it.

¹ MS 'those ideas'.

Chapter 18.

J.B.'s new ideas derived from Logic

I. Division of entities into real and fictitious: or say, Division of nouns substantive into names of real entities and names of fictitious entities.

By the division and distinction thus brought to view, signal is the light thrown upon the whole field of logic, and thereby over the whole field of art and science: more especially the psychical, and thence the ethical or moral branch of science.

It is for want of a clear conception of this distinction that many an empty name is considered as the representative of a correspondent reality: in a word, that mere fictions are in abundance regarded as realities.

D'Alembert is the author in whose works^a the notion of this distinction was observed by me: *être fictif* is the expression employed by him for the designation of the sort of object for the designation of which the appellative *fictitious entity* has ever since been employed.

In speaking of the faculties of the mind, the same distinction will also be found occasionally brought to view in the philosophical works of Voltaire.¹

By attention to this distinction, I was enabled to discover and bring to view, in the case of a numerous class of words, their incapacity of being expounded by a definition in the ordinary form—viz. the form *per genus et differentiam*—in which form a definition it has, with how little success and benefit so ever, hitherto perhaps universally been the practice to bestow upon them: and at the same time to bring to view the only instructive and useful exposition of which the words of this class

^a *Mélanges de Littérature et de Philosophie*.²

¹ François Marie Arouet de Voltaire (1694–1778), French writer and wit, was the author of *Dictionnaire Philosophique, Portatif*, London, 1764, p. 5, where, under the heading 'Ame', he noted: 'Mais de grace, qu'entends-tu par ces mots, Cette fleur végète? mais y a-t-il un être réel qui s'appelle *végétation*? ce corps en pousse un autre, mais possède-t-il en soi un être distinct qui s'appelle *force*?' Voltaire does not, however, appear to have used the term 'être fictif'.

² Jean le Rond, alias D'Alembert (1717–83), French mathematician and philosopher, was the author of *Mélanges de Littérature, D'Histoire, et De Philosophie*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1753, i. 1–242, which reproduced his 'Discours préliminaire Des Éditeurs de l'Encyclopédie' to *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire Raisonné Des Sciences, des arts et des métiers, par une société de gens de lettres*, 17 vols., Paris, 1751–65, compiled by him and Denis Diderot, in which the term 'être réel', but not the term 'être fictif', appears. The latter term does, however, occur in the entry for 'Fictif ou Fictice' in *Encyclopédie*, vi. 679: 'se dit, en *Philosophie*, des choses qu'on suppose sans fondement; un *être fictif*, une *hypothèse fictive*'.

are susceptible, viz. the exposition by *paraphrasis*: the only form of exposition by which the import attached to them is capable of being fixt and at the same [time] placed in a clear and determinate point of view.

See under title *Ontology*, see in particular the class of political including legal fictitious entities:^a wherein, by indication of the relation which the import of the words in question bears in common to the fundamental ideas of pain and pleasure, a distinct and fixt meaning is thus given to a numerous tribe of words of which till that time the meaning had been floating in the clouds, and 'blown about by every blast of doctrine':¹ words to which, in the mind of many a writer, no fixt, no real, import—had been annexed.

II. Division of entities, real and fictitious together, into physical and psychical.

By means of this arrangement considerable has been the light thrown upon the field of psychical entities and the origin and formation of language: the connection between the nomenclature of psychical and that of physical entities clearly pointed out, no name of a psychical entity, that is not also the name of a physical entity—in which capacity alone it must have continued to be employed long before it was transferred to the field of psychics, and made to serve in the character of a name of a psychical, and that most commonly a fictitious, entity.

III. Relations between the import of the word *happiness* and that of the words *pleasure* and *pain*.²

Sole *positive* elements of happiness, alias *felicity*, alias *well-being*—pleasures and those determinate ones: negative happiness &c., exemption from pains and those equally determinate ones.

Determinate import thereby given to the word *utility*—a word necessarily employed for conciseness sake, in lieu of a phrase more or less protracted, in which the presence of pleasures and the absence of pains would be to be brought to view.

An action may be considered and spoken of as *useful*—as conducive to general utility, in proportion to the *value* of any pleasures which it

^a Obligation—right—power—privilege, &c.³

¹ See the Collect for St Mark's Day in *The Book of Common Prayer*: 'Give us grace, that, being not like children carried away with every blast of vain doctrine, we may be established in the truth of thy holy Gospel.'

² In a rudiment, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Add here the contrary doctrines intimated in Oxford Eth. Compend. and Cicero's works &c.' *Ethices Compendium in usum Juventutis Academicæ Auctiùs & emendatiùs editum. Cui accedit Methodus Argumentandi Aristotelica*, Oxford, 1745, was the textbook on ethics that Bentham studied at the University of Oxford. He perhaps had in mind the discussion of the summum bonum that he criticizes in 'Essay on Ethics', Ch. 1, §§ 5–6, pp. 235–48 below, and the discussion of the philosophy of Epicurus in the *Tusculan Disputations*, III. xv–xxvi of Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC), Roman orator, politician, and philosopher.

³ See Ch. 9, § 2, p. 128 above, but also Ch. 8, § 2, pp. 93–5 above.

is its tendency to produce—to give birth to, or of any pains which it is its tendency to avert.

Whether there ever was a time at which the word happiness failed of presenting itself to my mind in the character of an aggregate or compound, of which pleasures and the exemptions corresponding to pains are the sole elements, is more than at present I can recollect. The satisfaction I remember to have experienced at the observation of this interpretation as given to it in the first place by Helvétius,^a and afterwards by D^r Hartley,^b affords some presumption of its being at the first of those times new to me. But perhaps the cause of that satisfaction was not the novelty of the notion in relation to my own conceptions, but the circumstance of seeing the confirmation given to them in these works.

IV. *Elements* or *dimensions* of value in regard to pleasures and pains.

It was from Beccaria's little treatise on crimes and punishments that I drew, as I well remember, the first hints of a principle by which the precision, clearness and incontestableness of mathematical calculation is introduced for the first time into the field of morals¹—a field to which, in its own nature, it is applicable with a propriety no less incontestable, and when once brought to view manifest, than

^a In his book *De L'Esprit*.²

^b In his treatise on Man: or rather the abridgment of it as given by | .³

¹ Cesare Bonesana, Marchese di Beccaria (1738–94), criminologist and economist, was author of the famous and influential *Dei delitti e delle pene*, Livorno, 1764, which appeared in French translation as *Traité des Délits et des Peines, traduit de l'Italien, D'après la troisième Edition revue, corrigée & augmentée par l'Auteur. Avec des Additions de l'Auteur qui n'ont pas encore paru en Italien. Nouvelle Édition plus correcte que les précédentes*, [Paris], 1766, and in English translation as *An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, Translated from the Italian; With a Commentary, Attributed to Mons. De Voltaire, Translated from the French*, London, 1767. Bentham perhaps had in mind *Essay on Crimes and Punishments*, Ch. XXVII. Of the Mildness of Punishments, pp. 98–102, esp. 99–100: 'That a punishment may produce the effect required, it is sufficient that the *evil* it occasions should exceed the *good* expected from the crime; including in the calculation the certainty of the punishment, and the privation of the expected advantage. All severity beyond this is superfluous, and therefore tyrannical.'

² Claude Adrien Helvétius, *De l'Esprit*, Paris, 1758, does not seem to contain an explicit statement to this effect, though Bentham may have inferred it from such passages as the following at p. 335 n.: 'Toutes les fois qu'on voudra se donner la peine de décomposer le sentiment vague de l'amour du bonheur, on trouvera toujours le plaisir physique au fond du creuset. Il en est de l'ambitieux comme de l'avare, qui ne seroit point avide d'argent, si l'argent n'étoit pas ou l'échange des plaisirs ou le moyen d'échapper à douleur physique.'

³ See, for instance, David Hartley, *Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations*, 2 vols., London, 1749, i. p. iii: 'The *Affections* have the Pleasures and Pains for their Objects; as the *Understanding* has the mere Sensations and Ideas. By the Affections we are excited to pursue Happiness, and all its Means, fly from Misery, and all its apparent Causes.' The work was reissued in abridged form by Joseph Priestley as *Hartley's theory of the Human Mind, on the Principle of the Association of Ideas; with Essays relating to the subject of it*, London, 1775, where the quotation appears at p. iii.

to that of physics, including its most elevated quarter, the field of mathematics.

For bringing to view in a concise form these elements, seven in number, the following memoriter verses, awkward as verses of that class naturally are, may for the present purpose serve.^a

For a full explanation of these elements or dimensions see *Introduction*, &c. Ch. {Value}.¹

Less awkward [verses] I can not but suppose may one day be found, and one day substituted to them with advantage, by some person who is more in use to dress up language in the garb of poetry.²

Elements or dimensions of the value of a pain or pleasure: viz. 1. Intensity, 2. Duration: these belong to it whether considered as past or as future: and of these taken together its *magnitude* is composed. To these come to be added, but in the case only in which it is considered as not past—3. the certainty or probability of its arrival: 4th its proximity, propinquity or remoteness.

Thus far when it is considered as confined to the breast of a single individual: if considered as seated or capable of being seated in a number of different breasts, it is then considered as existing under a 5th dimension, viz. *extent*: which extent has for its measure the number of the individuals who are considered as being thus affected: the greater that number, the more extensive it is; the less, the less extensive.

Two other conceivable elements of value remain still to be ascribed to it: viz. 6th. fecundity: 7. purity. Of these elements, neither, it is true, can be considered as belonging to the value of a pain or pleasure, when considered by itself: in both instances, it is considered in as much as it is capable of being followed or accompanied by sensations of the same or a different kind: if by sensation of the same kind, i.e. if being a pain, by a pain, or being a pleasure, by a pleasure, it be considered as

^a Intense, long, sure, not distant, fruitful, pure, &c.³

¹ See *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (CW), Ch. IV, pp. 38–41.

² The following three paragraphs are taken from a folio composed in 1807 under the heading 'Evidence', but subsequently incorporated into the present Chapter. The folio has been re-headed 'Logical Arrangements' and Bentham has noted: '§ Headed improperly *Evidence*, prospective view.' For further details see the Editorial Introduction, p. xlii above.

³ See *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (CW), Ch. IV, para. 2, p. 38 n.:

*'Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure—
'Such marks in pleasures and in pains endure.
'Such pleasures seek, if private be thy end:
'If it be public, wide let them extend.
'Such pains avoid, whichever be thy view:
'If pains must come, let them extend to few.'*

accompanied or followed, it may in proportion to the number of such concomitant or consequent sensations be termed *fruitful* or prolific or unprolific: if by sensations of the opposite kind, it may in proportion to the number of such concomitant or consequent sensations be termed impure; in proportion to the number of those which it escapes or fails being accompanied with, *pure*.

V. Extension of the use made of the word *matter* from the field of *physics* to the whole field of *psychics* or *psychology*, including *ethics* and *politics*: viz. In the higher or more general quarter of ethics, *matter of good*, *matter of evil*: in the department of *law* in general, and of *penal law* in particular, *matter of punishment*, *matter of reward*, *matter of compensation*: matter of *punishment* being neither more nor less than the matter of *evil* applied to a particular purpose; matter of *reward*, the matter of *good* applied to *one* particular purpose; matter of *satisfaction*, the matter of *good* applied to *another* particular purpose. In political economy, matter of *wealth*, and its modifications, viz. the matter of *subsistence*, the matter of *opulence* or *abundance*, and the matter of *security*:¹ each of these three being neither more nor less than so many modifications of the matter of *wealth*: and in so far, through the medium of exchange, interconvertibility as between one and another of these modifications has place, with no other difference than correspondence to the difference in the purposes to which that common matter comes to be applied.

Correctness, compleatness, and consistency of the views taken of this large portion of thought and action, conciseness in the sketches made or to be made of them—such are the desirable qualities and effects which this fictitious entity presented itself as capable of contributing in large proportion to the production of.

By this means, for the first time were brought to view several analogies that have been found susceptible of important practical applications, a clearer as well as more comprehensive view of all these objects having thereby been given, than in the nature of the case could or can have been given by any other means.

The matter of *good*, as to one half of it—one of the two modifications of which it is composed, viz. the negative modification—being the same thing as the matter of *evil*: of one and the same object, viz. pain, having by its presence the effect of evil, by its absence or removal, that of good: the matter of good being in its positive form composed of pleasures and their respective causes; in its negative modification or form, of exemptions, i.e. exemptions from pain, and their respective causes.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Quere whether to employ *matter of security*.’

In like manner, the matter of *evil* being, as to one of the two portions, viz. the negative, of which it is composed, the same thing as the matter of good: one and the same object, viz. pleasure, having, by its presence, the effect of good, by its *absence*, when considered as the result of loss, the effect of *evil*: the matter of evil being in its *positive* form composed of pains and their respective causes: in its negative form of losses, corresponding to the different species of pleasures capable of being acquired and possessed or lost, and their respective causes.

From this correspondency and interconvertibility, a practical result in the hands of whoever is able and willing to turn the observation to advantage is the prevention of excess and waste in the application of both these portions. A position which by this means is placed in the clearest and strongest point of view is that whatsoever is done in any shape in and by the exercise of the powers of government is so much certain evil done that good may come.

Though the matter of reward and the matter of satisfaction (viz. for injuries sustained) are in themselves so much of the matter of good, yet it is only by coercion, and in a quantity proportioned to the extent to which that coercion is applied, that the matter of good thus applied can be extracted.

That when, on the score of and in compensation for injury sustained, the matter of good is in the character of matter of satisfaction extracted from the author of the injury, it operates, and by the whole amount of it, [in] the character of punishment on the person from whom it is extracted: and whatsoever may be the quantity of punishment inflicted in this shape, in that same proportion is the demand for punishment satisfied, and whatsoever may be the amount of it in this shape, by so much less is the demand of any that remains for it in any other.¹

Operating in any such way as to produce on the part of the party operated upon an act or course of conduct adverse in any way upon the whole to the interest of the community in question—ex. gr. a particular class or district or other division of the political state—the whole of the political state in question—or mankind at large, the matter of good and evil becomes the matter of corruption.

It may be either the matter of *good* or the matter of *evil*: but it is the matter of good that most frequently presents itself in that character.

The breast in which the matter of corruption is thus operating may be that of any individual at large.

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Add conversely the more satisfaction is adminster[ed] in the shape of punishment, i.e. vindictive, so much the less is needed in any lucrative shape.' In the margin, he has further noted: '☞ Quere whether compleated?' and '☞ Add matter of corruption.' The remainder of item V, dealing with corruption, was written several days later than the bulk of the Chapter.

But the case which affords the most frequent occasion for speaking of the matter of good as operating in this character is that in which the person thus operated upon is regarded as occupying the situation of a trustee: of a trustee, whatsoever be the party regarded as the correspondent principal, or as the English lawyers say, using the remnant of an obsolete jargon borrowed from France, the *Cestuy que trust*—whether another individual or assemblage of determinate individuals—a subordinate community composed of an assemblage of individuals individually indeterminate, or the whole of the political state.

To operate in the character of matter of corruption, the matter of good and evil requires not to be applied—to be actually applied by this or that hand in the character of a *corrupting hand*. Of itself, and without any such application, the matter of *good* and *evil*, especially in the form of the matter of *good*, keeps operating in so far as it happens to it to be at the disposal of any person, in so far as the interest of that individual or assemblage or division of individuals is adverse to the interest of a greater number of individuals.

In every political state, in the shape of the matter of wealth, a quantity more or less considerable of the matter of good and evil lies—and a still greater quantity is expected to lie—at the disposal of the several persons in whose hands the business of the administrative department is lodged. In every state, in so far as in those same hands the disposal of it is left free, it is in the power of these trustees of the public so to dispose of it in favour of other trustees of the public in the other departments of government, viz. the legislative and the judicial, as well as to those belonging to that same department, the administrative, as to cause them to be subservient [to] the particular, thus rendered the sinister, interest of these depositories of the public stock, at the expence of the public at large.

Accordingly, in the joint proportion of the quantity of this matter being or expected to be at the disposal of these hands, and of the facility with which it is capable of being applied to this sinister purpose, will be the force with which, in the character of matter of corruption, the matter of good and evil will be operating—operating upon all persons according to the degree in which, partly by situation, partly by disposition, they stand exposed to its sinister influence.¹

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Either continue the subject here, or for ulterior matter relative to the nature, effects, operation and application of the matter of corruption, make reference to the work on *Influence*.’ For material written under the heading of ‘Influence’ as part of Bentham’s general consideration of the topic of Parliamentary reform see UC cxxv. 1–72, cxxvi. 105–449.

VI. *Good* and *evil* of the 1st, 2^d and 3^d orders:¹ i.e. Ulterior effects, similar or opposite, producible in society by the operation of one and the same act at different stages. Effects, in some cases homogeneous with reference to each other, in other cases heterogeneous, produced, in the way of good and evil, by the power of one and the same act in the course of its progress in and through society.

1. In the case of delinquency—effects in the way of good and evil producible by the offence.

1. At the first stage comes a portion of the matter of good: viz. the advantage, whether in the shape of pleasure or of exemption from pain, the prospect of which was, in the character of a motive or inducement, the cause of the pernicious act.

2. At the next stage comes in some cases an effect of an opposite nature, a portion of the matter of evil: viz. if the pernicious act be of the number of those by which a determinate suffering is produced in the breast of an assignable [individual] or individuals, here we have one portion of the matter of evil—call this portion the evil of the 1st order.

3. An ulterior and in every respect distinct lot of evil produced in some cases from the same cause has been termed the evil of the 2^d order.² It consists partly of the alarm produced in other breasts by the apprehension of finding themselves among the sufferers of other transgressions with which they find themselves threatened from the same source.

4. Of the mass of evil capable of being produced by an act of delinquency, or at any rate by a multitude of acts of delinquency of the same nature, that portion which comes in at the third and last stage of its progress is of a sort which, under any tolerably well-established government, is rarely to any considerable extent exemplified. It is that which has place in so far as, such being the effects of the alarm produced by the apprehension of continually occurring repetitions of the species of injury in question, the mischief has, from the passive and sensitive faculties of the persons thus threatened, extended itself to their active faculties: compelling them as it were

¹ In a rudiment, Bentham has noted at this point: 'On the existence of the evil of the 2^d order depends the greater part of the demand for punishment.

'Taken from Harris, attributives of the 1st and 2^d order.'

James Harris (1709–80), philosopher and musical patron, was author of *Hermes: or, a Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Language and Universal Grammar*, London, 1751, where at pp. 191–3 he explains that 'VERBS, PARTICIPLES, and ADJECTIVES, may be called ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER' and that as these attributives 'denote the *Attributes of Substances*, so there is an inferior Class of them, which denote the *Attributes only of Attributes*' and therefore 'we call them ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND ORDER'.

² See *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (CW), Ch. XII, para. 3, p. 143.

to render themselves, by their own inactivity, instruments of their own ruin.

In that modification of delinquency and injury which is composed of acts of the prædatory class may be seen the clearest and strongest exemplification of this case.

In Asia and Africa, many are the instances in which, in spots which, though situated within the demesne of regular governments, and at one time kept accordingly under a state of regular cultivation, have successively found themselves become to such a degree infested by the prædatory incursions of neighbouring tribes, as to have at length been abandoned by their inhabitants and left in a state of perfect desolation.¹

Under any European government, instances are scarcely at present to be met with where, in its progress over the community, the evil produced by private delinquency has made so great an advance as to have arrived at this third stage.

Unfortunately, of evil which, having been the result [of] the misconduct of the rulers themselves, has extended itself so far as to make its appearance in the character of an evil of this 3^d order, examples are by no means rare.²

¹ Philip Beaver, *African Memoranda: relative to an attempt to establish A British Settlement on The Island of Bulama, On the Western Coast of Africa, in the year 1792. With a brief notice of the Neighbouring Tribes, Soil, Productions, &c. and some observations on The facility of Colonizing that part of Africa, with a View to Cultivation; and the Introduction of Letters and Religion to its Inhabitants: but more particularly as the means of gradually abolishing African Slavery*, London, 1805, pp. 336–7, relates, for instance, how the Biafaras, having been ‘tired and worn out with the continued attacks of their martial neighbours’ the Bijugas, had ‘evacuated the island, and retired to Ghinala, up the Rio Grande’. Bentham possessed a copy of Beaver’s book (see Bentham to Samuel Bentham, 24 July 1813, *The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham*, vol. viii, ed. S. Conway, Oxford, 1988 (CW), p. 341), and so it may not be coincidence that Bentham adopts the phrase ‘predatory incursions’ which Beaver goes on to use to describe the attacks of the Bijugas.

² In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Add for examples 1. James. Ireland. 2. Bonaparte. [3.] Irish & English Tythes.’

Following the invitation issued in 1610 by James VI (1566–1625), King of Scotland from 1567, and as James I King of England and Ireland from 1603, to Scottish and English settlers to colonize lands seized from fleeing Irish landowners in Ulster, the lands were cleared of native inhabitants, who were permitted to live only in certain areas. By the early 1620s, the Anglo-Scottish population of Ulster was over 20,000.

When French forces under Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821), First Consul 1799–1804, Emperor of the French 1804–14, invaded Russia in June 1812, the Russian army devastated the land as it retreated and, upon abandoning Moscow in September 1812, left an empty burning city, from where the French army eventually began a disastrous retreat home in October 1812.

Tithes were often condemned as being a hindrance to the cultivation and improvement of agricultural land: see, for instance, Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (first published in 1776), ed. R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner, and W.B. Todd, 2 vols., Oxford, 1976, ii. 837–8, and Arthur Young, *A Tour in Ireland; with General Observations on the Present State of that Kingdom: made in The Years 1776, 1777, and 1778. And brought down to the End of 1779*, London, 1780, pp. 76, 132, 179.

II. In the case of public punishment—i.e. of evil purposely produced by the powers of government, to the end that it may operate in the way of punishment, in the first place comes a portion of the matter of evil. But as, among the last effects of an act of delinquency, was the operating upon the active faculty of the persons in question, in such sort as to restrain and prevent them from doing that good to themselves and others which otherwise they would have done, so of a lot of evil produced for the purpose of punishment, the earliest effect is of the nature of good, consisting in this, viz. that they who otherwise would in the shape in question [have] done evil to others are by the experience or fear of the like evil to themselves restrained and so prevented from doing it.

III. In the case of public reward, i.e. a portion of the matter of good administered at the expence of government, and thence at that of the community, to the end that in the character of matter of reward it may have the effect of giving birth to public service which in some shape or other is regarded as more than equivalent to the expence, in the first place comes the evil necessarily attendant on the coercive measures necessary to the extraction of this pretious matter. But in the next place comes the good, i.e. the pleasure, which, whether the application made of [the] matter be well- or ill-contrived, is necessarily produced on the receipt of this pretious matter; in which good we see the good which is of the first order, and applies itself to the passive, and to no other than the passive, faculties of the persons to which it applies itself.

Effects of the first order, evil, as above: effects of the 2^d order, good, and that of the first order, as above: pleasure of acquisition, enjoyed by the individual by whom the matter of reward in question has actually been received, as above: effect of the 3^d order and good of the 2^d order, pleasure of expectation with the proportionable consequent alacrity in the breasts of all those to whom, from observation made of the cause for which, and manner in which, the matter of reward has been bestowed in the present instance, it may happen to ground the expectation of obtaining for themselves, from the like source, similar reward in return for similar service. Effect of the 4th order, and that good of the 3^d order—active service performed accordingly: and here in the last stage we see the application of the pretious matter, invigorating and exciting the active faculty, as in the case of delinquency at the same stage we see the active faculty debilitated and perhaps paralyzed and struck motionless.

Extensive and important are the practical inferences that present themselves as following from this theory. In the case of evil, the evil of the 1st order next to nothing in comparison of the evil of the 2^d order—not to speak of a stage of evil so unfrequently seen to be exemplified as the evil of the 3^d order.

Of the four classes into which the whole mass of delinquencies may be divided—viz. Offences against other persons individually assignable—Offences against a man's own welfare—Offences prejudicial to a particular class of persons—Offences prejudicial to the whole community at large¹—in the second of these classes, viz. Offences against a man's self, the principal element of the evil of the 2^d order, viz. the *alarm*, altogether wanting.

VII. Springs of action—Appetites—desires—motives—interests.

Explanation of these psychical fictitious entities of the pathematic class by their common connection with pleasures and pains in the several shapes of which they are susceptible.²

VIII. Sanctions—or sources of obligation and inducement—five in number, viz.

1. The physical sanction.
2. The moral or popular sanction.
3. The political including the legal sanction.
4. The religious sanction.
5. The sanction of Sympathy—limited in its application to a particular class of cases.

In so far as the word *sanction* is employed, what is thereby brought to view is—not the species of pleasure or pain by the prospect of which the influence on human will is exercised and the effect produced, but only the *source* from whence the pleasure and pain in question is expected to flow.

1. In the case of the physical sanction, the source or root of the pleasure or pain is in the pre-established nature of things, and not in human agency.

Thus in the case of intoxicating liquors. In respect of the fear of the pains resulting from the drinking of fermented liquors when pursued to excess, the power of the physical sanction tends in a certain degree to restrain a man from giving into such excess.^a

^a N.B. In respect of the pleasure produced by the drinking of the liquors in question where not carried to any such degree as to be productive of sensible ill effects, may it not be said, and without impropriety, that in the case of a person to whom such potations are productive of agreeable sensations, it is by the force of the physical sanction that he is invited or excited so to act?³

¹ For an exposition of the division of offences see *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (CW), Ch. XVI, pp. 187–280. See also no. XIII, pp. 203–4 below.

² In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'See Spring of Action Table', i.e. 'A Table of the Springs of Action' (first printed in 1815 and published in 1817), reproduced in *Deontology together with A Table of the Springs of Action and Article on Utilitarianism*, ed. A. Goldworth, Oxford, 1983 (CW), pp. 79–115.

³ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Go on.' The material for the remainder of this item was composed several days later than the preceding part.

2. In the case of the popular or moral sanction, the source or root of the pleasure or pain regarded as eventually about to have place is in the good or ill offices of mankind at large, that is of such of its members to whom the information of the act or transaction in question may happen to arrive: viz. in the degree of estimation in which, on the occasion of the act in question, the agent is regarded as likely to be held, or in other words in the opinion, good or bad—favourable or unfavourable—likely to be entertained in relation to him: thence in the mental sensation, pleasant or unpleasant, amicable or hostile, of which the idea of the act is likely to be productive in his mind: thence in the good or ill *offices* (in the case of *good* offices commonly expressed likewise by the word *services*).

Popular—for the employing of the word *popular* in the designation of the sort of sanction here in question, what (it may be asked) is the ground or warrant?

Answer.—In this consideration—viz. that the people at large without distinction of persons are the persons at whose hands the good and evil in question are respectively expected: the good and evil, viz. of the *good*, whatsoever may be the result of the good offices which the people at large, freely and without coercion, may on the consideration in question respectively feel themselves efficiently disposed to render: of the *evil*, whatsoever may be the result of such *evil offices* as the same persons are, under and by this and by the several other sanctions, left free to render, to the person on whom and whose conduct the force of the sanction here in question is considered as applying itself.

Moral—for the employing of the word *moral* on this same occasion and to this same purpose, what is the ground or warrant?

Answer.—In this consideration—viz. that for the performance of such acts, positive and negative together, as though not sanctioned by the political sanction, nor on the occasion in [question] by all persons considered as sanctioned by the political sanction, and yet at the same time considered as obligatory, the moral sanction or the sanction of morality is the term by which the source of the obligation seems commonly to have been designated.¹

3. In the case of the political including the legal sanction, the source or root of the pleasure or pain regarded as eventually about to have

¹ See, for instance, [William Warburton], *A View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy, compleat, In Four Letters to a Friend. In which his whole System Of Infidelity and Naturalism is Exposed and Confuted. With the Apology prefixed*, 3rd edn., London, 1756, p. 240, referring to 'that moral sanction which arises from *God's making the practice of virtue our interest as well as duty*', and James Ramsay, *An Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of African Slaves in the British Sugar Colonies*, London, 1784, p. 277: 'As religion must be built on the foundation of law; so, in respect of practice, it may be called the perfection of society: it brings futurity into the aid of law, and gives a moral sanction to the edicts of authority.'

place is in the good or ill offices of that portion of mankind in whose hands, in the political state in question, the powers of government are lodged, and who in consequence have at their disposal an unlimited proportion of the matter of good and of the matter of evil, capable of being employed and applied at pleasure in the character of matter of reward and matter of punishment.^a

The case and only case in which the term *legal* is applicable to the sort of sanction here in question is that in which, under the authority of the legislative department of government, the matter of good and evil is disposed of and applied in the express and declared view of its operating in the character of matter of reward or matter of punishment, thereby giving or endeavouring to give direction to those to whom application is made of the matter itself or the prospect and expectation of it. In this department, it is principally to the avowed purpose of giving to men's conduct in the character of subjects that direction by which they are made to abstain from such acts, principally positive acts, as are treated on the footing of offences, principally in consideration of the mischief of which they are regarded as productive or threatening to be productive, that the matter of good and evil is applied, and that accordingly principally in the shape of matter of punishment. But in so far as in the shape of the matter of wealth or in any other shape, although it be not declaredly in the character of reward or in that of punishment, application is made of it by persons invested with the powers belonging to the administrative department of government, not less in this than in the other case the matter of good and evil is capable of being made to operate in the character of a sanction in such sort as to give to men's conduct in the character of subjects such direction as, whether in pursuit of those public ends in that department of government which are avowedly the objects of pursuit, or in pursuit of the personal or other private ends of those in whose hands the public powers in question are reposed¹

In this case, in so far as the ends in pursuit of which the matter of good and evil is thus administered are of the personal or other private and therefore sinister [kind]² just mentioned, it is in the character of matter of corruption that it operates: but how ill so ever the degree and effect is with which it is thus made to operate towards the giving to men's conduct the direction so endeavoured to be given, the effect of which it is productive is not the less the same as where, being in the character and under the name of a sanction it is avowedly employed, it

^a §. V. *Matter*.³

¹ Bentham appears to have left the sentence incomplete.

³ See pp. 187–9 above.

² MS 'ends'.

is avowedly applied to the giving to men's conduct the sort of direction above mentioned as endeavoured to be given to it where employed in the name and character of matter of punishment or matter of reward.

By the Treasury Board under the direction of the first Commissioner, suppose an office given or promised to be given to a Member of Parliament for the known purpose of engaging him on all occasions to give his vote according to the direction prescribed by that member of the administrative department. The sanction by the force of which the direction in question is thus given to the functionary in question can not with propriety be termed the legal sanction: but to its being termed the political sanction, no objection seems capable of being made.

4. In the case of the religious sanction, the source or root of the pleasure or pain regarded as eventually about to accrue is in the good or ill offices of an almighty, but to man invisible, being: in whichever state of existence, whether the present or a future, considered as about to be rendered.

5. Lastly, in the case of the sanction of Sympathy, or sympathetic sanction, the occasion on which any pleasure or pain appertaining to this sanction is capable of being experienced is where, of some act which the person in question has it in contemplation to exercise, a consequence regarded as about to result is pleasure or pain in any shape, as the case may be, in the breast of some other person in whose well-being the person in question experiences an interest produced by the force of sympathetic affection: in this case, in the joint proportion of the force with which this affection operates in his breast, added to the magnitude of the pleasure or pain which is regarded by him as about to result to the object of this his affection in the event of his exercising the act in question, is the force with which, by this sanction, he is urged to exercise or forbear to exercise such act: to exercise it, in so far as it appears likely to be productive of pleasure or an equivalent good; to forbear exercising it, in so far as it appears likely to be productive of pain—in so far as pain or an equivalent evil appears likely to be the result of it.

In this case the pleasure or pain, by the idea and contemplation of which man's conduct is operated upon and liable to be determined, being the immediate result of the conduct of the person in question about to be eventually produced and regarded as about to be eventually produced without the intervention of any will exterior to his own, it follows that, when considered in this point of view, this sanction comes within the description of the physical sanction. But between these two cases, the difference seemed considerable enough to indicate the propriety of representing the conduct in question as

being in the two cases the result of two different sanctions: so great is the difference between self-regarding and sympathetic affection—between the case where the pleasure or pain by the consideration of which man's conduct is determined is his own purely and immediately, and the case where it is his own no otherwise than in consequence of a correspondent pleasure or pain being regarded as experienced or about to be experienced by another person: between the case where the pleasure or the pain is his own purely and directly, and the case in which it comes to him no otherwise than as it were by reflection, and through the medium of a portion of pleasure or pain of a different nature regarded as having place in another breast.

Taken in the aggregate, the four preceding sanctions may with reference and in contradistinction to this sanction—to the sympathetic sanction—be termed purely self-regarding ones.

The influence of this sympathetic sanction, i.e. of the pleasures and pains belonging to this sanction, corresponds to and is coextensive with that of all the purely self-regarding ones. A person presents himself to my conception as suffering or eventually about to suffer pain: by the love I bear to him, I am impelled to do what may be in my power towards relieving or exempting him from it. That pain may be a pain inflicted by the power of any one of those four sanctions: or it [may] be an evil composed of so many distinguishable pains inflicted by the powers of every one of them.

Take, for example, the habit of drunkenness. By that weakness, 1. it may happen to the same man to be subjected to bodily suffering in a great variety of forms all comprized under the general denomination of ill-health: here we have the pain of the physical sanction. 2. It may happen to him to be exposed to public shame, and by that means to sink in the esteem of his friends and acquaintances: here we have the pain of the popular or moral sanction: 3. it may happen to him to lose some office more or less lucrative or honourable of which he is in possession or expectation of: here we have the pain of the political sanction: either for the scandal of the exposure, or for some injuries done to individuals or other excesses committed in some paroxysm produced by the stimulus, it may happen to him to be subjected to punishment at the hands of the law: here we have the pain of the legal branch of the political sanction: 4. it may happen to him to be tormented with apprehension of punishment about to be administered to him by the hand of the almighty in a life to come: here we have the pain of the religious sanction.

That in comparison of the several other moral forces to which the name of sanction has here been given, the force here termed the sympathetic sanction is in general very weak, is not to be denied. But,

for the omitting it out of the list of sanctions, this weakness, were it greater than it is, would not afford any sufficient warrant. Of itself, i.e. without assistance from any of the other sanctions, it is every now and then seen productive of very considerable effects. It is to the force of this sanction that the principle of utility, understand of general utility, stands indebted for whatsoever reception it meets with, other than what it may happen to any other articles in the list of sanctions to be instrumental in procuring for it. Under the guidance of the principle of utility, it operates in alliance with the several other sanctions. Under the same guidance it may not unfrequently be seen operating in opposition to them, and checking them in those sinister courses of maleficence in which, in opposition to the dictates of general utility, they are, all of them, so apt to be led by the political sanction, whether under its own guidance, or under the guidance of the religious. Equally steady and efficient in its action with any of those self-regarding sanctions it can not be said to be: but a force howsoever weak and unsteady is still a force; and were it not for the operation of this sanction, no small portion of the good, physical and moral, which has place in human affairs would be an effect without a cause.

In exact proportion to the efficiency of this principle would be the error committed by him who, on the occasion of any calculation made of the result of the moral forces on the sum or balance of which an effect the production or prevention of which had become the object of human policy, should leave out of his calculation the operation of this cause.

Origin of the set of ideas in question—origin of the theory of the five sanctions.

In speaking of law—viz. the internal laws of any political state (internal, I say, in contradistinction to international)—Blackstone (by whom, by an appellative not very appropriate, it is termed *municipal*)¹ divides [it] into | | parts (after Puffendorf² and others), one of which he terms the sanction or sanctionative part.³ The sanction or sanctions

¹ See William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, 4 vols., Oxford, 1765–9, i. 44, noting that he calls ‘the rule by which particular districts, communities, or nations are governed . . . *municipal law*, in compliance with common speech; for, tho’ strictly that expression denotes the particular customs of one single *municipium* or free town, yet it may with sufficient propriety be applied to any one state or nation, which is governed by the same laws and customs’.

² Samuel, Baron von Pufendorf (1623–94), German jurist and historian, divided the law into two parts, the definitive and the vindicative: see Samuelis Pufendorffii, *De Jure Naturae et Gentium libri octo*, Lund, 1672, Bk. I, Ch. VI, § xiv.

³ Bentham has added ‘?’ above the word ‘sanctionative’. Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, i. 53–4, states that ‘every law may be said to consist of several parts’, which he terms declaratory, directory, and remedial, ‘to which may be added a fourth, usually termed the *sanction*, or *vindictory* branch of the law’.

of law is accordingly an expression of not unfrequent occurrences. So likewise the sanction or sanctions of religion: and accordingly this or that practice is spoken of as having received or being enforced by the sanction of law or the sanction of religion. But that which, as above, is here termed the popular or moral sanction I have no recollection, general or particular, of ever having seen it employed.¹ To the sanction here termed *political* and employed in contradistinction to the legal sanction, viz. in so far as the whole of any thing stands distinguished from a part of it, the same observation may also be extended.²

In fine, so may it to the physical and the sympathetic. For in relation to all these several sources of action, two things have, as above, been, and it is hoped not unsatisfactorily, shewn—viz. that they are each of them distinct from all the rest, and that they are all what they are here termed, sources of action: viz: motives or sets of motives derived in each one of these five instances from so many different sources: to which may be added—that each of them is according to circumstances susceptible of such a degree of force as may prove sufficient, perhaps even the weakest of them, to enable it to overpower any one or more of the rest—i.e. to give determination to human conduct even while all those others are operating in opposition to it.

IX. Conditions to the accomplishment of any object, in so far as depends upon human means.—

Qualifications both of them necessary and together sufficient on the part of the agent or agents in question for the due accomplishment of any object whatsoever, and in particular for the due discharge of every political obligation, and thence for the due execution of every public trust—appropriate *will* and appropriate *power*. Power is either power *ab extrà*, or power *ab intrà*. Power *ab extrà* is correspondent to, and its efficiency proportionate to, the extent and degree of compliance on the part of those over whom it is considered as being exercised. Power *ab intrà* will be in the joint proportion of the degree of relative or appropriate knowledge, and the degree of appropriate *active talent*, on the part of him by whom the exercise of it comes to be made.

¹ Bentham may be correct in saying that the phrase ‘moral or popular sanction’ had not appeared in print before he made use of it, though, as he notes at p. 194 above, the phrase ‘moral sanction’ had been used, as had the phrase ‘popular sanction’: see *Britons strike home. The Absolute Necessity of Impeaching Somebody. In a Letter to Tom. Burnet, Esquire*, London, 1715, p. 25, where it is claimed that the attempt to garrison French towns with Dutch troops had ‘got [the King of France] a new popular Sanction to what we call here his Arbitrary Government’.

² In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Add sympathetic sanction a comparatively recent discovery.’ For Bentham’s addition of the sympathetic as well as the retributive and antipathetic sanctions to the physical, political including the legal and administrative, moral or popular, and religious sanctions see Bentham to Dumont, 24 October 1821, *The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham*, vol. x, ed. S. Conway, Oxford, 1994 (CW), p. 414.

In so far as operation or co-operation toward the accomplishment of the object is considered as matter of duty or moral obligation, to possess the appropriate will or inclination is to possess the virtue of *probity*—relative probity: and when put in contrast and contradistinction with this requisite state of the will, appropriate knowledge has been termed *intelligence*.

Wisdom, probity and power, of these three—on attending Blackstone's Lectures, and afterwards reading them when in print under the name of *Commentaries on the Laws of England*—I observed the concurrent existence laid down by him as a condition necessary and at the same [time] sufficient to ensure, in any given political community, the existence of good government.¹

With reference to government in the highest stations, and in those alone, are these conditions and qualifications brought to view by *Blackstone*. Neither by him is any thing done to shew the relation borne to each other, as above, by these associated fictitious entities, or towards satisfying the reader that the division thus exhibited is exhaustive.

With the help of such amendments as seemed requisite, the enumeration and division appeared to me capable of being with equal propriety and utility applied in the political line to all subordinate stations—in the next place, in the ascending or more comprehensive line, to the accomplishment of any object whatsoever.

X. Obligation and Right.—Explanation of these moral including political fictitious entities, and of their relation to one another, by shewing how they are constituted by the expectation of eventual good and evil, i.e. of pleasure or pain or both as the case may be, to be administered by the force of one or more of the five sanctions, as above: viz. the physical, the popular or moral, the political including the legal, the religious, and the sanctionative force of sympathy.

Of either the word obligation or the word right, if regarded as flowing from any other source, the sound is mere sound without import, and the notion by which real existence in any shape is attributed to the things thus signified, is no better than an effusion of ipsedixitism.

When they have not this meaning, they have no meaning at all: either they have this meaning, or they have none.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'add—and so as to qualification.' He has also noted at this point: 'Search for Blackstone's expressions.' See Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, i. 48, where 'the three grand requisites . . . of wisdom, of goodness, and of power' are said to be 'the requisites that ought to be found in every well constituted frame of government'. Bentham had begun to attend Blackstone's lectures in December 1763 and his lecture notes are at Queen's College Library, Queen's College, Oxford, MS 401.

Simple as is this exposition, or rather because it is so simple, many there are to whom it is an unwelcome one. By it the existence [of] a sort of choice is in every case shewn to have place: a choice between the good or evil that will have place in the case where conformity to the obligation has place, and the good or evil which has place in the case where non-conformity has place. In a peculiar degree is this idea of choice repugnant to their feelings in so far as the obligation is regarded as having the religious sanction, i.e. the real or supposed will of God, for its efficient cause. For the efficient cause, what they look out for is something by which choice shall be altogether excluded.¹

XI. Proper and main ends of the distributive branch of law—ends or purposes which this branch of law ought to have for its principal objects—*security, subsistence, abundance and equality*.

Security—in the mention made of security, a tacit but necessary reference is made to the several classes of injuries, i.e. offences against individuals other than the man himself, to which every individual stands exposed: security is security against mischief—against evil from whatever quarter it may happen to it to come, and against whatsoever of a man's possessions or vulnerable part of the human frame it may happen to it to be directed or to strike.

On this occasion the quarter in which the great difficulty lies is in the tracing the lines of distinction by which these several fictitious entities are separated from each other. Subsistence and abundance have one and the same matter: the matter of wealth: and of security, that same matter is itself a main instrument, and a means whereby all other instruments of security may be obtained. In the case both of subsistence and abundance, the relation they bear to security labours under some obscurity. Security has several branches—as many branches as there are distinguishable objects exposed to mischief, to danger, to destruction, to deterioration: and in the list of these objects are comprized that matter, the matter of wealth, which is common to subsistence and abundance. Security against mischief to human life, person, reputation, property, i.e. the matter of wealth considered as lodged in the hands of the individual or assemblage of individuals in question, and condition in life. In another direction, security is again divisible into as many branches as there are different sorts of offences or mischievous acts by which *pro tanto* security is destroyed or endangered.

All these objects are at the same time with relation to each other so many antagonizing forces: in some instances, by the measure by which one is attained, so are one or more of the others: in other

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Go on.'

instances, one can not be attained or endeavoured to be attained, but by the relinquishment or even *pro tanto* the sacrifice of one or more of the others.

Equality in particular finds in all the other three an antagonist and rival, and in security and subsistence a rival, an antagonist, of which the claims are of a superior order, and to which, on pain of universal destruction in which itself will be involved, it must be obliged to yield. In a word, it is not equality itself, but only a tendency towards equality, after all the others are provided for, that, on the part of the ruling and other members of the community, is the proper object of endeavour.

At the same time, in proportion as the subject is enquired into, it will be found that in all good systems of law, and even in all systems the very worst not excepted, more or less regard is paid to equality: that in the aggregate of the body of laws in every state all these others, security, subsistence and abundance, are constantly aimed at, are the objects of constant care and solicitude and active operation, and that in fact the laws have no other objects or ends in view but what, short as it is, are comprehended in this list—and that in all bodies of laws the great and constant difficulty is on each occasion, in so far as the competition has place, to which of them the greatest portion of favour is due: for which, in preference to the rest, provision is to be made.

These things considered, of the ends or objects of the distributive branch of the law, how with propriety could any list differently composed, more or less compleat, have been given?

XII. Formation of an uniform and mutually correspondent set of terms for the several modifications of which the creation, extinction and transfer of subjects of possession, whether considered as sources of benefit or as sources of burthen, are susceptible: and thence of a mutually connected and correspondent cluster of offences consisting in the several possible modes of dealing, as above, with such subjects of possession in the case in which they are considered as wrongful, and as such prohibited by statute law, or considered and treated as prohibited by judiciary, alias judge-made, law. 1. Collation: 2. ablation. In the case where, and at the point of time at which, the subject-matter is for the first time brought into existence, collation has place without ablation: if it be already in existence, then collation and ablation have place together, and of their union translation is the result: in so far as ablation has place without collation, then not transfer, but extinction is the result.

Performed in favour of the Collator himself, collation is self-collation: if regarded as wrongful, it is wrongful self-collation: usurpation is the name by which it has been and at any time may be designated.

Performed by the ablator himself, ablation is *abdication*: if by the laws treated or regarded as wrongful, wrongful abdication is accordingly the name by which it may be designated.¹

XIII. Division of *Offences*—by which is meant all such acts as, on the score of their reputed mischievousness, are fit or have been or are likely to be regarded as fit, viz. by the application of punishment, to be converted into offences—from the consideration of the person or persons with reference to whom in the first instance they are regarded as being or likely to be mischievous—into Offences against others, i.e. regarded as prejudicial to others, and Offences against a man's self, i.e. regarded as prejudicial to a man's self.

More concisely thus—Division of offences into heteroblaptic and autoblaptic.

Division of offences regarded as prejudicial to others into offences against assignable individuals, alias private offences—offences against the unassignable individuals belonging to this or that class or this or that local district—say semi-public offences—and offences against the unassignable individuals of whom is composed the population of the whole political state.

From the distinction thus brought to view have been deduced divers conclusions of no inconsiderable importance with reference to practice: Offences, so far as the mischief, if any, which they have for their result is confined to the author of the offences, are no fit objects of controul by punishments and penal laws.

Of the offence which in this case is regarded as mischievous, the mischief, if any, being by the supposition confined to the Offender himself, the consequence is—that no sooner is it felt, viz. by him, than, by the whole amount of it, it operates upon him in the character of so much punishment.

Division of offences into *positive* and *negative*. The case of a positive offence, that where the mischief of the offence, as above (§ |),² has for its cause a positive act—an act of *commission*: the case of a negative offence, that in which the mischief has for its cause a negative act—an act of *omission*: an act which consists in a man's omitting to do that which it was in his power to do, for the prevention of a mischief which, for want of such positive and preventive act on his part, either actually did [take] place, or at any rate would have taken place but for some preventive obstacle, in the application of which he had not any share.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Go on.'

² Bentham does not make the distinction between positive and negative acts and hence offences in the present essay but does so in *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (CW), Ch. VII, paras. 8–10, pp. 75–6.

The principle of division here brought to view extends itself over the whole field of delinquency: be the positive act what it may, the opposite negative act is alike conceivable—is alike capable of being exemplified. If, from the positive act, any mischief is seen to flow, the correspondent negative act can never be altogether unproductive of the like consequence.

As to the difference between the mischief of the one and the mischief of the other, it consists altogether of the mischief of the 2^d order:¹ for as to the mischief of the first order, suppose it to have place in both cases, it is exactly the same in both cases. But in the case of the negative offence, the mischief of the second order—the danger and the alarm—shrinks to nothing. On his part, all endeavours to prevent the mischief, which in the instance in question was actually produced, were wanting:—true: but it follows not that he will at any time employ any exertions in the endeavour to produce a similar mischief.

In respect of punishment, cases there are in which, under the laws perhaps of all civilized nations, the negative act is put upon exactly the same footing as the positive act. In these cases—homicide for example, viz. where one person having another in his power, keeps him without sustenance till he dies: by a mother or nurse, a new-born child: a jailor, one or more of his prisoners—in respect of punishment, the negative course of conduct of which loss of life is the result is commonly put upon a footing little if any thing different from that which has place where the mischief has for its cause a positive act. So in case of a design hostile to the person or authority of the sovereign or this or that member of the sovereignty in a state, the negative offence, which, in the case of a person by whom the existence of the design is known, is committed by omission to give information of it to the competent authorities, is commonly punished not perhaps with exactly the same punishment as that which is appointed for those by whom an active part is taken in that same design, but yet with some other punishment that does not much fall short of it.

Wheresoever the obligation considered as imposed by the law is of a positive nature, the only sort of offence which the nature of the case renders possible is of the *negative* kind:—and in this whole class of cases the concomitancy of the two forms of delinquency fails. The sort of offence commissible by non-payment of taxes may serve by way of an example. But in every other case, little as hath been the notice as yet taken of it, it has had place.

XIV. Ends of political economy. These are the same as those of the distributive branch of law.

¹ For good and evil of the several orders see item VI, pp. 190–3 above.

Wherein then lies the difference? Answer. In so far as political economy is the object, so it is that to two of these objects, viz. subsistence and abundance, a more particular and direct attention is paid than either to security (general security) or to equality. By distributive law is declared what, on as many occasions as shall happen to have been taken into view, shall be each man's own. By political economy is endeavoured to be ascertained how far and for what particular purposes, chiefly for the general purposes of abundance and subsistence (i.e. security for subsistence), the use which otherwise under distributive law each man might make of his own, shall, for the more effectual fulfilment of those several ends, be limited, directed and restricted.¹

XV. Limits applied to the quantity and productiveness of productive industry by the quantity of the necessary instruments of production which at the place in question, at the time in question, are in existence.

These instruments are:

1. The aggregate mass of existing capital.
2. The aggregate mass of capacity for labour.

That no *end* can be pursued with success to any point beyond the productive power of the aggregate mass of *means* of all sorts necessary to the pursuit and attainment of it is a self-evident, not to say an identical, proposition—any proposition denying the truth [of] it would be a contradiction in terms.

Yet from this theoretical aphorism follow divers practical inferences, which, though they will scarcely be found to admitt of direct contestation, will find it very difficult to obtain assent.

These are—²

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Go on.'

² In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Go on.'

APPENDIX

Chapter 1.

Præcognita, or preliminary and general indications, concerning Logic, according to the Aristotelians

§ 1. *Saunderson's Compendium why throughout referred to; Aristotle's original, no where*

Aristotle, the works of his predecessors in the same line being lost, is with reference to us the father of the art called Logic:¹ the sole fountain of every thing that has ever been presented or ever can be presented to our minds under that imposing name.

In such accounts as will here be given of this art considered in the state in which this work has found it, it may naturally enough be expected, that the text of Aristotle should from first to last be the object of reference.

But, with a view to use, in relation to this as in relation to any other art, the material and only material question is—what is that which is written, not who is he that wrote it. Two thousand years and more have already elapsed since the works of Aristotle,² and in particular those which for their subject have taken the field of Logic, were made public. In all that length, unless the last century or century-and-a-half be regarded as constituting an exception, the making the most and best of this art, and of the labour of the ingenious founder of it, has afforded the occupation of some of the acutest minds that England or Europe has produced. By several of them, if not much has been added to the quantity of matter elaborated by Aristotle, not a little has been done towards the rendering it plainer and more easily comprehensible.

For use, in the instance of this as of any other branch of art it is to the most instructive work which the field happens to afford—to the most instructive and not to the most antient, that a man whose wish it

¹ For Aristotle's works on logic see p. 3 n. above.

² In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Consult Priestly's *Chart of Biography*.' Priestley, *Chart of Biography*, showed the lifespans of approximately 2,000 historical figures, including Aristotle, from 1200 BC to AD 1800. In the accompanying work, namely Joseph Priestley, 'A Catalogue of all the Names inserted in the Chart', in *A Description of a Chart of Biography; With a Catalogue Of all the Names inserted in it, And the Dates annexed to them*, Warrington, 1765, p. 9, Aristotle is listed as 'd. 322 B C 63 H P', i.e. died in 322 BC, aged 63, Heathen Philosopher.

is to make himself more or less acquainted with it, will, if his mind be not absolutely enslaved by prejudice, always betake himself: it is in the works of Davy or Dalton or Thomson¹ that a man will betake himself for instruction in Chemistry, not to Van Helmont or Paracelsus.²

In the British Isles, not a few are the works which at different times have been published, with the professed design of serving for compendiums of instruction in this art. In the University of Oxford, Queen's College used to be, and for aught the author of these pages has heard to the contrary continues to be, regarded as the College in which it has been cultivated with greatest success: in this College, the compendium written in Latin by Saunderson, who in the days of Charles the second was Bishop of Lincoln,³ used to be, and it is supposed continues to be, the *classical* work, the work which was taken for the text by the Tutor on the occasion of his lectures to his pupils.⁴ Considered as a methodical abridgment of what Aristotle and his earliest Commentators, the Greek Logicians, have left us on this subject, it is at any rate the most copious: it is supposed to be the most correct, the most copious, the most precise, and upon the whole the most instructive. In relation to this or that point, suppose the account given by Saunderson is not a perfectly correct copy of that delivered by Aristotle—what matters it? if it be not exactly the same, the presumption is—that it is better. At the end of so many centuries employed in the endeavour to render the account given of this art better than the account left by Aristotle, the expectation, is it in regard to any point a natural one, that, instead of being better, it will be found worse?

Saunderson's *Compendium* is accordingly the work to which, as often as the question may happen to present itself, what on this point has been said by the School of Aristotle, reference will be made. Saunderson's *Compendium* is accordingly the work in which, should any supposed imperfections be found in that system, the proof and exemplification of such imperfections will be deduced.

¹ Sir Humphry Davy (1778–1829), chemist and inventor of the Davy safety lamp; John Dalton (1766–1844), chemist and natural philosopher; and Thomas Thomson (1773–1852), Scottish chemist.

² Jan or Joannes Baptista van Helmont (1579–1644), Flemish physician, philosopher, and mystic, was a follower of Phillipus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim, known as Paracelsus (1493–1541), German-Swiss physician and alchemist.

³ Sanderson was Bishop of Lincoln 1660–3 during the reign of Charles II (1630–85), King of England, Scotland, and Ireland from 1660.

⁴ For Bentham's study of Sanderson's *Logicæ artis compendium* while at Queen's College, Oxford see p. 3 n. above. By the end of the eighteenth century, the work had been replaced in the Oxford curriculum by new logics written in English, with an emphasis on understanding and discovery, rather than disputation: see J. Yolton, 'Schoolmen, Logic and Philosophy', in *The History of the University of Oxford: Volume V: The Eighteenth Century*, ed. L.S. Sutherland and L.G. Mitchell, Oxford, 1986, pp. 565–91, esp. 575, 591.

Meantime what is far from impossible is—that in this or that instance an imperfection which in this way, through the medium of this his English disciple, comes to be imputed to the Master, would, if justly chargeable, be found chargeable not on the Master, but only on this disciple. But should it turn out that in here and there an instance this sort of injustice, such as it is, [should] chance to be committed, not that this is any other than a mere supposition for the purpose of the argument,—what would it matter? where would be the real, the practical mischief? For one who for instruction resorts all along or even to any considerable extent to the original, some dozen or some score will never look farther than to this or some other, most probably to this the most instructive, compend. Taking the original for its subject, the strictures would be a comment—not on the *art*, but on the language.

If, on the occasion of any such imperfections, reference were made now to the Greek original, now to this or that Greek or Latin Commentator or abridger, Volumes and Volumes might thus be written and none of them of any use.

§ 2. *Account given of Logic by the Aristotelians, its imperfections*¹

The account which, in this work, is given of logic considered in regard to its nature and business, is before the reader: if the extent given to it in that account is not in a considerable part improper and irrelevant, the extent given to it by the Aristotelians will be seen to be incomplete.

Of the topics that presented themselves as appertaining to this art—appertaining to it in such sort that, supposing any one omitted,

¹ In a rudiment at the head of this section, Bentham has noted: ‘Metaphysics stated after Aristotle as a separate Discipline. Aristotle knew nothing of it, only that it came into his head after physics. Confer other barbarous uncharacteristic appellatives. Ex. gr. Legal—viz. Hanaper—Pells—Green wax—Petty Bag—Equity.’

The following draft of this section, entitled ‘Imperfections of the Aristotelian system on the subject of logic’, is at UC ci. 153 (25 July 1814): ‘Truth is never capable of being so clearly or strongly impressed when considered by itself as it is capable of being when illustrated by a view of any opposite error or errors, which have been wont to occupy the place of it.

‘The system of Aristotle is the system by and according to which whatsoever has been taught under the name of logic has now for upwards of two thousand years been taught: and through by far the greater part of that time it has been considered as being in a state of absolute perfection, little if at all capable of receiving improvement, and not in any degree susceptible of amendment: of amendment in any of its three modes, viz. omission, addition, and substitution.

‘By whomsoever the present sketch is looked into and considered, if Aristotle’s system of logic, in so far as it is delivered in the first Chapter of Bishop Saunderson’s *Compendium* of that art and science, be looked into at the same time and compared with it, very different to a very considerable degree will the two schemes be seen to be, at the very first glance.

‘In the following pages the principal differences will be held up to view.’

the account would *pro tanto* have been incomplete, the list is before the reader:¹ if this list be a correct one, that given by the Aristotelians will be seen to be an incongruous one: on the one hand deficient, on the other hand redundant.

§ 3. I. Definition of *Logic*, according to the Aristotelians

An instrumental art, directing our mind into the cognition (the knowledge) of all things that are intelligible. Such, according to Sanderson, is the definition of logic as given by the School of Aristotle.

Before the above, in the semblance of a definition, comes this short locution: Logic is *the art of reason*.² For recollection, this short phrase may not impossibly have its use: for instruction—for original instruction—it is not in the nature of it to serve.

By this art—such according to the account thus given of it is its nature—the human mind is directed. Good:—for so it is said to be by any other art, by every one of those fictitious entities that bears the name of art. Directed?—but into and in what? into knowledge—knowledge of all things intelligible—the only things capable of being known—subjectible to the dominion of knowledge—into knowledge—but into nothing else.

Meantime, unfortunately, of the field which Nature has thrown open to the dominion of this art, over no more than one part out of two, nor that the most useful, did the Grecian Philosopher—in so far as this account of what he did is the true one—cast forth his shoe.³ In point of use, of real utility, and thence in point of real worth and true dignity, in so far as they are separate or separable, knowledge is inferior to art: so much so, that separated from art, all the knowledge which the human mind is capable of containing is of no use. According to their own shewing, the logic of the Aristotelians is but an useless, which is as much as to say a worthless, art, and so in respect of no small part, though not the whole of it, it will be found.⁴

Even before that definition—before the first presented—the vague and uninformative definition—is completed, comes a parenthesis by which, of the narrowness of the extent attributed to the art by these its cultivators, intimation is already given—Logic, says the Bishop,

¹ See Ch. 2, § 1, pp. 10–11 above.

² See Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 1: 'Logica, quæ & Synecdochicè *Dialectica*, est *Ars rationis*: sive, est, *Ars instrumentalis dirigens mentem nostram in cognitionem omnium intelligibilium*.' See also pp. 5–6 n. above.

³ Psalm 60: 8; 108: 9.

⁴ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Confer with what has been already written under the head of *use*.' See Ch. 4, § 3, pp. 39–40 above.

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which, according to the figure of Synecdoche, is also called *Dialectica*: the figure of Synecdoche, it is that figure of the Rhetorician by which the part is put instead of the whole.

A very inauspicious commencement this, for a treatise on an art which, in one of its most useful branches, is the art of correct expression, true representation.

The art called Logic is the same art, say they, as the art called *Dialectics*, which being interpreted is the art of disputation, viz. in mood and figure. What is true is that, of the art of logic, this art of disputation forms a part. But is it thence also true that Logic and the art of disputation are one and the same object? names for one and the same thing? If so, then so a tree and a branch of that same tree.^{1 a}

^{a 2} Happiness—composed as it is of pleasures and exemptions^a—Happiness including every thing that for its own sake is worth having—every thing that in itself is of any value—logic, to be of any value, must in some way or other be in every part conducive to happiness—and it is only in so far as it is so conducive that it is worth knowing—that an acquaintance with it is of any value.

Logic, according to the definition given of it by Aristotle and his followers,³ is an art the effect or at least aim of which is to lead a man to the knowledge of all things intelligible. By Aristotle and the Greek philosophers in general, knowledge taken in the aggregate was an object, on which, [to] judge from the comparative degree of attention paid to it, and from the comparative quantity of discourse bestowed upon it, a greater store was set than upon happiness itself:⁴ and as to its connection with happiness, either it was regarded as something more valuable than happiness, or as something from the possession of which, in whatever part or shape, an at least equal quantity of happiness would follow as of course.

Knowledge, or something that with them passed for knowledge, was the prerogative possession of those teachers and their disciples: for happiness,—at least in so far as it was composed of pleasures and exemptions—a capacity at least was shared with them by the vulgar herd: hence the transcendent and independent value ascribed [by]⁵ them to every thing that went by the name of knowledge, or afforded any thing like a promise, prospect or hope of leading to it.

^a See Table of Springs of Action.⁶

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Quere whether quite finished. 31 July 1814.’

² Bentham has indicated that this passage, which, although written a year earlier, has been interpolated into the present sequence of material, might form a note, and his suggestion has been followed accordingly. The following section title at the head of the passage has been crossed through by Bentham: ‘Aristotelian larger sense of the word *Logic*.’

³ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Search and quote Aristotle.’ For Sanderson’s definition of logic see p. 209 n. above.

⁴ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Note about the *summum bonum*—its nonsensicalness.’ For a discussion of the nonsensicalness of the *summum bonum* see ‘Essay on Ethics’, Ch. 1, §§ 5–6, pp. 235–48 below.

⁶ For ‘A Table of the Springs of Action’ see p. 193 n. above.

⁵ MS ‘to’.

§ 4. II. *Uses of Logic*—*Utilitates*—*according to the Aristotelians*¹

As to the *uses* of *Logic*—viz. of their *Logic*—none, though this topic is brought to view by them, have the Aristotelians been able to find: practice, they say, will bring them to view.² But if practice will, as they find it convenient to suppose, bring them to the view of the learner, why not to that of the teacher: and if so it be that to his view it has brought them, why not particularize them here at once, as he has done in the case of all the other topics?

Indistinct, indeed, must have been the notions attached by these logicians to the word *utilitas*. Else, instead of referring under the name of practice to the casual observation of each Scholar, how could they have avoided referring to the indication which they themselves had but that instant been giving? Necessary is this art, say they, to the acquisition of every discipline:³ i.e. of every thing that is or can be the subject of instruction, by which, if they mean any thing, every thing that is or can be the subject of any thing that ever did go or ever can go by any such name as either that of *art* or that of *science*. So many disciplines, so many uses⁴—for each discipline a distinct, intelligible and undeniable use: subsequently to which, in relation to each such discipline, might have come the enquiry into the particular mode in which it administers to well-being. How much more instructive and satisfactory would this indication have been—how much more commensurate with the truth—how much more honourable to the art would have been such an indication of the uses, than the vague and self-humiliating put off—Go look for them—What they are we can not tell you: if you have good luck, some time or other you may find them or some of them of yourselves.

§ 5. III. *End of Logic*—*Finis*—*according to the Aristotelians*

After the topic of the *uses* of *Logic*—the *utilitates* and not before, comes in their list the topic of *finis*, *finis ejus*, *scilicet Logicæ*,⁵ i.e. the general end. But of logic as of any thing else, what are the *uses* but so many modifications of the general, the universal end, or so many

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Use (most general) corresponds to End. Uses particular may come at the end of the *Præcognita*.'

² See Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 1: '*Utilitates ejus sunt plurimæ, quas docebit usus: Finis vero unicus, Cognitio scil. rerum*', i.e. 'The *uses* of [logic] are many, and practice will make them clear: *the end* in truth is single, namely the knowledge of things.'

³ See *ibid.*: 'Ideoque debet esse omnium disciplinarum prima, utpote ad reliquas acquirendas necessaria'.

⁴ A variation on the phrase *Quot homines tot sententiae*, from Terence (Publius Terentius Afer), *Phormio*, 454.

⁵ i.e. 'the end of it, namely of logic'.

means tending to the attainment of it? If so, first should have come the *end*, after that the uses: first the *genus*, then and not till then the *species*.

This end of Logic—this end when it does come—what is it? Is it the universal, the sole universal end—actually as well as fitly and properly the universal end—well-being, i.e. the maximum of pleasures alloyed by the minimum of pains? Not it indeed: no such amplitude does it extend to. It is confined in the first place to mere knowledge. But except in so far as in some shape or other it leads to and is productive of well-being—a balance on the side of happiness—what is the value of all the knowledge in the world?—Just nothing.

In the next place, though the whole of knowledge it might be, and still be worth nothing, it is not so much as the whole of knowledge. Persons and things—under one or other of these heads may be comprized the subjects of knowledge: of the two, persons, a man would be apt [to] think the most interesting: but to persons—to what belongs to persons—it does not so much as profess to extend: it confines itself and most pointedly to things—‘*Finis vero unicus, Cognitio scilicet rerum.*’

Knowledge of things—viz. either scientific knowledge alone, or at the utmost this with the addition of unscientific—knowledge of *things*, *cognitio rerum*, beyond this even the pretensions of the Aristotelians—at any rate any distinct and explicit pretension—did not extend.

Far indeed, however, were their actual *attainments*—far even their actual *researches*—from coming up to these pretensions.

Words—viz. the import of words, this was the utmost point—within this field was contained the sum total of their researches.

To exhibit a demonstration, so they termed it—was with them the great work—the object and, if attained, the fruit of all their ingenuity and of all their labours.

This demonstration, what did it amount to? an indication of a certain mode and degree of coincidence between the import of two words? this and nothing more.

But this exploit, what did it require? It required that, to all the several words employed, the same import be annexed by the disputing parties. Suppose this identity to have place, then, if the demonstration was correct, the opponent could not deny it without falling into a contradiction in terms. But this necessary condition, suppose it in any part wanting: in this case, no demonstration could take place: not so much as this faint semblance of, and spurious substitute for, real knowledge.

Observation, experiment, experience: these were the only processes by which real knowledge could be attained: and by the boasted art of

logical demonstration, to what extent so ever employed, not a particle of knowledge was obtained through all or any one of these sources.

Of this assuming science, thus worthless was the end.

In truth, it was not simply worthless—it was positively pernicious. It was pernicious by drawing aside and keeping mankind for so many ages out of the only really instructive track of study as abovementioned and in this uninformative one.

But out of an ill-directed pursuit it will sometimes happen that useful results may collaterally—and as it were by a side wind—be brought to light.

Though of all the propositions thus demonstrated or demonstrable the value was, is and ever will be equal to 0—though logical demonstration, the fruit of all this labour, was and is mere delusion, yet of the operations which had no other object than the formation and maturation of this fruit, many there are which have been and will ever continue to be found applicable to and continually applied to real and most important uses.

The demonstration of the Aristotelians may in this respect be compared to the philosopher's stone of the Heraclitic philosophers.¹ The *stone* was a *non-entity*: but in digging for this non-entity, real entities pregnant with real and important uses were discovered in no inconsiderable numbers.²

§ 6. IV. *Functions of Logic—Officia—according to the Aristotelians*

Of these, no unapt description is given: it is by these functions, as by so many means, that Logic labours towards the attainment of that end.³

According to this account these *Officia*—these functions—seem to coincide with sufficient exactness, at least as far as they extend, with the articles herein above brought to view by the name of Operations:⁴—operations of the human mind or rather of the whole human frame, mind and body together, to all which, in some way or other, logic is or

¹ Heraclitus (fl. c. 500 BC), Greek philosopher, whose writings are lost, though a summary of a work entitled 'On Nature' appears in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, ix. i. 6–11. It is unclear, however, why Bentham associates the philosopher's stone with Heraclitus and his followers.

² In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Substances applicable to the purposes of medicine, dying.' The note appears to have been left incomplete by Bentham.

The theme of the failure of Aristotelian disputation is taken up in Appendix, Ch. 5, pp. 225–7 below.

³ See Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 1: '*Officia*, quibus, velut mediis [Logica] finem suum consequitur'.

⁴ See Ch. 3, pp. 16–34 above, and for the 'Præcognita de Natura Logicæ' given by Sanderson see Ch. 2, § 1, p. 10 above.

is capable of being rendered subservient: all of them by some course or other directed to and leading to the universal end, to which, by the guidance it is capable of affording to them, Logic itself may be and ought to be made to lead.

Thus much for the general nature of these functions—these means—these operations. But the list, the particular list, any particular list—any thing approaching, or so much as pretending itself to be, or to lead to the finding or formation of any thing approaching, a compleat list—where shall it be found?—Not assuredly in the custody or power of these philosophers. Of these functions some there are—what or so much as how many, they can not tell? Three however, but no more than three, are what they know of: viz. *Definition*, *Division* and *ratiocination*.¹

Concerning these several functions of Logic or mental operations, how indistinct and inadequate were the notions of these logicians will be seen in another place.²

§ 7. V. VI. VII. *Object, Matter and Subjects, according to the Aristotelians*

Of this first Chapter, the remainder consists of a string of words, to which no intelligible meaning has ever been attached and of which no use—no intelligible, no sensible use—has ever been made or been attempted to be made, [and] which, without any the smallest loss, and with no small advantage, if saving of time and labour be an advantage, the reader may well spare to himself the study of. Primary object, the *mind*: secondary object, *language*, *speech*: Subject, *Matter*, viz. *being* and *non-being*: formal reason, *the second intention*: Logical *instruments*, so many *second notions*: all these so many other *subjects*.

Words more and more; confusion thicker and thicker: a wood in which the farther a man proceeds or attempts to proceed, the more inextricably he will be bewildered. Greek as usual called in; and why?—that a meaning which is not to be found in the Latin, may be supposed to be in the Greek.

The subject of logic, a subject either of *information*, of *operation*, of *tractation*: the subject of *information*, primarily the human *mind*, secondarily *discourse* or *language*. The subject of *operation*, the *material* subject; alias *a theme* or *the theme*, alias *an intelligible question*, alias παν νοητον. A warming pan, a dripping pan or a patty

¹ The three functions of logic listed in Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 2, are *Definitio*, *Divisio*, and *Ratiocinatio*.

² Bentham does not specifically discuss Sanderson's account of the three functions, but for his own account of the operations of logic see Ch. 3, pp. 16–34 above.

pan¹ would have been equally instructive. The subject of *tractation*, the *formal* subject: which, if total and adequate, is *a* or *the* second intention; if principal, a *syllogism*, or more specially a *demonstration*. In all this heap of words, will any thing useful or so much as intelligible ever be found? Sooner will any useful or intelligible matter, that is not stale, be found in *Kant*²—sooner will a knot be found in a bull-rush.^{3 a}

^a *Saunderson*, p. 2.⁴

Objectum Logicæ *primario* est, *Mens humana*; unde & Logicæ nomen, velut ἀπὸ τῷ λόγῳ, id est ratione: *secundario* etiam & *Oratio*, quæ & ipsa λόγος dicta est, quâ sc. sensa mentis nostræ loquendo exprimimus.

Materia, circa quam versatur, est omne illud, sive Ens, sive non Ens, quod vel *Mente* complecti, vel *Oratione* eloqui possumus. Ratio autem *formalis* considerandi est *secunda intentio*. *Logicus* enim considerat omnia themata, non secundum proprias ipsorum naturas, sed in quantum *Logica instrumenta* (quæ sunt *secundæ notiones*) sunt eis applicabilia. Hinc Logicæ pro diversa ratione multiplex assignari potest *subjectum*.

Subjectum Logicæ	Informationis (sive <i>objectum</i>) est λόγος id est	{ Primario, <i>Mens humana</i> , sive <i>Ratio</i> . Secundario, <i>Oratio</i> .
	Operationis (sive <i>subjectum materiale</i>) est <i>Thema</i> , seu <i>Questio intelligibilis</i> , πᾶν νοητὸν.	
	<i>Tractationis</i> (sive <i>subjectum formale</i> .)	{ Totale & Adæquatum, est <i>Secunda intentio</i> . Principale, est <i>Syllogismus</i> ; vel etiam magis specialiter, <i>Demonstratio</i>

¹ A pun on the word 'παν', i.e. 'pan'.

² Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), German philosopher.

³ See Plautus (Titus Maccius Plautus), *The Two Menaechmuses*, 247: *in scirpo nodum quaeris*.

⁴ The following passage has been reproduced from Sanderson, rather than from the MS copy.

Chapter 2.

Of Aristotle's ten predicaments

Aristotle's ten predicaments are all of them either names of real entities or names of fictitious entities.¹

Substance, the first upon the list, is the name of a real entity—of a species of real entity: the only species of real entity, as hath already been observed,² that belongs to the class of perceptible ones.

The nine names of fictitious entities are distinguishable into two groupes.

Groupe the first, *quantity* and *quality*. Both these are affections of *substance*, i.e. of substances of bodies—of the bodies the existence of which is made [known] to us by our senses. According to the sort of fiction which in these instances is necessary to the purpose of discourse, quantity is, as it were, a smaller body which is *in* some substance in question, or a larger body in which the substance in question is. Quality is also, as it were, a small body *in* which the substance in question is: or it is a sort of object *of*, i.e. from which the substance of which it is the affection is considered as issuing.³

In neither of these two cases does any object necessarily come in question, excepting the substance, real or fictitious, of which they are respectively the affections.

In the instance of all the remaining predicaments, seven in number, the predicament is the name of a relation: in the fourth instance *relation* is itself the name of the predicament: and this name is the generic name with reference to which all the remaining predicaments are specific ones: they are, all of them, so many species of *relation*.

Of a relation, it is the essential character to suppose the existence of two objects *between* which the relation is spoken of as subsisting. Of this sort is the sort of image—the sort of fictitious picture—which the mind presents to itself. Two objects—two bodies of any sort—A and B: between them an interval of space: in that interval the fictitious body, the relation, is conceived as placed: for such is the picture exhibited to the mind by the word *between* as often as it is applied to two bodies—to two substances of any kind.

5. and 6. By the words *Actio* and *Passio* are brought to view two of these fictitious bodies between which the particular species of relation

¹ See Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 19: '*Substantia, Quantitas, Qualitas, Relatio, Actio, Passio, Ubi, Quando, Situs, Habitus*', i.e. 'Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Action, Passion, Where, When, Situation, Clothing.'

² See Ch. 9, § 2, pp. 103–5 above.

³ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'a man is said to be *of* a quality'.

or relations respectively denominated by them are considered and represented as subsisting or *having place*.

Passio, Passion, can not be conceived without *Actio, action*. Concerning *Actio*—action, the truth of that proposition, if true it be, seems not quite so clear. Suppose a body moving along in space: true it is that it has no other body *on* which it acts—but it seems too much to say that it *does not act*: to move, is it not to act? every motion, is it not a species of action?

7. By the word *Ubi* is designated *place* with the several modifications and relations of which it is susceptible.

9. By the word *situs, site*, position, is on other occasions designated the same object *place*—or [at] any rate the mode of being of the body or mass of matter in question, with reference to *place*, i.e. with reference to its distance from other bodies.

In Sanderson's *Compendium*, a distich is inserted in and by which exemplifications of all these several predicaments are exhibited.¹ In the explanation thus given, *stabo, I [will] stand*, is given as exemplification of the word *situs*. *Standing*, at any rate upon the face of the exemplification as it stands in the two verses in question, is a posture of the body—of the human body. But a posture, that of standing in particular, what is it? It is the result of the position or *situation*, of the *situs*, of the several parts of the body in question with reference to each other.

Here, then, is a predicament, *situs*, which is but a modification of—and has accordingly already been brought to view by and under—a former predicament, *Ubi*.

Two other incongruities are moreover here observable.

I. In the first place, in company and on a level with the eight other names of predicaments—which names are all of them, as it were fit they should [be], so many *nomina*, names of objects—nouns substantive, come a pair of adverbs, viz. *ubi*, where, and *quando*, when.

II. In the next place comes an instance of disorder—between the two words, viz. *ubi* and *situs*, here employed to designate *place*, comes the word *quando*, employed to designate *time*.

10. *Habitus*—Vesture—human Clothing: for such is the intimation given by the corresponding portion of the illustrative distich: viz. *nec tunicatus ero*.

But clothing—human clothing—is it not *a substance*? Here, then, we have given in the character of a predicament distinct from all the rest—an article included under one of them, viz. the first.

¹ Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 20:

'Arbor Sex Servos Fervore Refrigerat Ustos.

'Ruri Cras Stabo, nec Tunicatus ero',

i.e. 'A tree cooled six slaves burnt by the heat.

'Tomorrow I will stand in the country, nor will I wear a tunic.'

Clothing, a predicament distinct from substance? On equal ground might additional predicaments in any number be stated as possessing a title to a place upon the list: many of them, perhaps most, a better title.

A curious predicament—a predicament the exemplification of which is contingent: a predicament which at one *time* had no existence; which in one place *has*, in another place *has not*, existence at this present time.

Before the swallowing of the fatal apple, neither Adam nor Eve his spouse had any cloathing, had possession or so much as an idea of any such predicament: in fact, it had not any exemplification—any existence. At the very instant of its being placed, the first fig-leaf that was ever placed¹ gave birth [to] this predicament, gave birth to the first individual from which the species such as it is, pregnant with all the individuals that ever belonged to it, took its rise.²

¹ See Genesis 3: 1–7.

² In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘New Zealand.’ Perhaps Bentham intended to illustrate his earlier statement on the subject of clothing ‘which in one place *has*, in another place *has not*, existence at this present time’ with a reference to New Zealand, though James Cook (1728–79), explorer, did not state that indigenous peoples there were generally naked, but gave a description of their clothing. He did, however, note that the inhabitants of Lagone Island and New Holland appeared naked. See [James Cook], *A Journal of a Voyage round the World, In His Majesty’s Ship Endeavour, In the Years 1768, 1769, 1770, and 1771; Undertaken in Pursuit of Natural Knowledge, at the Desire of the Royal Society: containing All the various Occurrences of the Voyage, with Descriptions of several new discovered Countries in the Southern Hemisphere; and Accounts of their Soil and Productions; and of many Singularities in the Structure, Apparel, Customs, Manners, Policy, Manufactures, &c. of their Inhabitants. To which is added, A Concise Vocabulary of the Language of Otahitee*, London, 1771, pp. 34, 107, 111, 122.

Chapter 3.

Of Aristotle's Post-predicaments

Taken together, Aristotle's ten predicaments were to include every thing whatsoever. Yet after this list of predicaments comes presently a list of five other articles by the name of *post-predicaments*.¹

These five, how came they to be thus separated from the ten? for the designation of them, how happened it that a separate and different plan has been employed?

A look at them and you will see out of the five, one, viz. the last, being employed to signify a mixture altogether incongruous, the other four supernumerary present as good a title as any of the original ten to admittance into the learned language.

1. *Oppositio*—Opposition. This is manifestly a species of Relation.

Of Opposition, the Aristotelians distinguish four different modes,² of which in their place.³

2. *Prioritas*—Priority. This again is another sort of Relation.

3. *Simultas*: another Relation: viz. that which takes place between two objects which with relation to each other are co-temporary: i.e. exist in or during or at the same point or length of time.

Note that *Priority* can not have place without *posteriority*: no object can go before another which is going likewise, but this other must come after. Yet of posteriority, nothing is here said.

4. *Motus*—Motion. In the field of thought and action, this is an object of the most important and most extensive use.

Of all the ten predicaments, there is not one, *Substantia* excepted, whose title to a place upon the list seems so incontrovertible, as that of this article. As to its [. . ?]—it is, as well as *substance*, matter, body, among the objects of which *quantity* and *quality* are predicable: like substance, it ought to have preceded both those predicaments.

Action—*actio*, the 5th of the predicaments, is related to *Motio* as a species to its superordinate.

Like *substantia*, substance, and on as correct a ground, motion is itself *substantial* enough (so to speak) to be susceptible of quantity and quality.

For its non-admittance into the list of predicaments, what possible reason can have presented itself?

¹ i.e. See Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 38, where the post-predicaments are given as '*Oppositio, Prioritas, Simultas, Situs, Habere*'.

² See *ibid.*, p. 38, where the four modes of opposition are given as *Relativa, Contraria, Privativa*, and *Contradictoria*, i.e. Relative, Contrary, Privative (or Negative), and Contradictory.

³ Bentham does not go on to discuss the four modes of opposition.

5. Fifth and last of these Post-predicaments, *Habere*, in English *to have*.

The discourse has at this step fallen off into nonsense, or something very near of kin to it. In the instance of the ten predicaments, and in the instance of the four first of these [post-]predicaments, determinate ideas and not mere words were brought to view. A word is now introduced in the character of the name of a post-predicament, and to the word no determinate idea is attached: in the way of specification, what is given under this head is not the modification of an idea but a multitude of significations or senses in which it has happened to this same word to have been employed. Eight in number are these specifications: eight according to [a] succeeding chapter is the number of these its different significations.¹ Two and no more it has been seen were the different significations included in the predicament termed *habitus*, *habit*.² These two form two out of the eight significations ascribed to this last of the post-predicaments, viz. *habere*, to have.³

¹ Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 42: '*Habere* dicimur octo ferè modis: 1º, ut *habitus* & *affectum*: 2º, ut *quantitatem*: 3º, ut *ea quæ sunt circa corpus*: 4º, ut *quæ sunt in parte*: 5º, ut *partem*: 6º, ut *in vase aut loco*: 7º, ut *possessionem*: 8º, & omnium improprissimè, ut *uxorem*', i.e. 'To have is said to have about eight modes: first, as an attitude and affection: second, as a quantity: third, as those things which are about the body: fourth, as those things which are in a part: fifth, as a part: sixth, as in a vessel or place: seventh, as a possession: eighth, and most inappropriate of all, as a wife.'

² Ibid., p. 37, where *Habitus* is divided into '*Vestimentorum genera*' and '*Possessionum*', i.e. all kinds of clothing and possessions.

³ Bentham appears to be equating '*Vestimentorum*' with '*ea quæ sunt circa corpus*'.

Chapter 4.

Modes of discussion—Aristotelian and Socratic

To inform, to be informed—to persuade—to expose to aversion or contempt—under one or other of these heads may be comprized, it is supposed, the advantage, whatever it be, which, in the character of an object or end in view, a man can have, on the occasion of his spontaneously joining in discourse.

In so far as to inform or be informed is the whole of the object in view, the seat of what passes is in the understanding: so far as persuasion or exposure are in view, it is in the affections—the affections which, when excited to a considerable degree of intensity, are termed *the passions*.^a

Of the forms employed by the Aristotelians in their disputations, the function or immediate object is to designate the several propositions which it is proposed to exhibit to the *other interlocutor*—say the *adversary*—for the purpose of his attaching to them successively and respectively the sign of his assent or dissent—of his concession or negation.¹

The denomination given to the proposition for the purpose of the argument is one by which the sort of relation which it bears or it is designed to bear to the other propositions with which it is accompanied and connected is indicated or intended to be indicated.²

Great are the elogiums that have been passed upon the mode of disputation that bears the name of Socrates.³ Compared with that of Aristotle, what is the real merit—i.e. the real use—of it?

^a See Springs of action.⁴

¹ In a rudiment preceding this paragraph, Bentham has noted: 'Socrates does the same thing—but in such manner as to attach the fear of the imputation of absurdity to palpably erroneous affirmation or negation: it applies therefore more directly to the affections than the Aristotelian.'

'Major and Minor—terms—their inexpressiveness.'

² In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞' Compare this nomenclature with the nomenclature of *Rhetoric* and with that of the modern classification as performed 1. upon natural physical objects; 2. upon artificial physical objects.

'Give an exposition.'

For Sanderson's description of the method of disputation at the University of Oxford see *Logicæ artis compendium*, Appendix Prima, Chs. I–III, pp. 181–213. The disputation began with the *suppositio* of the respondent, affirming or denying the question under consideration, to which the opponent answered with the *oppositio*, whereupon the disputation proceeded with arguments and counter-arguments.

³ See, for instance, I. Watts, *The Improvement of the Mind: or, a Supplement to the Art of Logic: Containing a Variety of Remarks and Rules for the Attainment and Communication of useful Knowledge, in Religion, in the Sciences, and in common Life*, London, 1741, pp. 170–1, on the advantages of a Socratic method in education.

⁴ Bentham did not, in the event, discuss the passions under that name in the printed version of 'A Table of the Springs of Action'.

Thus much all possible modes of investigation, consequently these among the rest, have in common—viz. from some proposition to which assent is given on both sides, an endeavour on the part of the comparatively active collocutor to draw from the comparatively passive collocutor an assent to a proposition to which the assent of the active collocutor has already been attached, and to which the assent of the passive collocutor has not been, or at least is not by the active collocutor supposed to be as yet, attached: whether it be that the mind of the passive collocutor has not as yet taken its side, or that having taken its side, the side it has taken is the opposite side: attaching its dissent to the side to which the active collocutor has attached its assent, its assent to that to which the active collocutor has attached its dissent.

In any form of argumentation, this sort of opposition is—if not in actuality, at least in probability—an essential feature: from first to last, the existence of it is in contemplation: from first to last, on the part of the active collocutor, the object and design of the discourse is, to exclude it: if not to drive it out, to prevent it from taking place.

For the production of this effect, what are the means employed? what are the means which the nature of the case furnishes? This will presently be visible.

On the part of the *passive* collocutor, the state of his mind with reference to that of the *active* collocutor, is, as far as can be collected from his discourse, either *negative* or *neutral*:—for simplicity sake suppose it, according to the customary supposition, *negative*:—in this case, the discourse, the discussion, is termed a controversy, a debate.

The debate is carried on either with or without the privity of a 3^d person or 3^d persons: according to the customary supposition, it is carried on not only with the privity but in the presence of 3^d persons in an indefinite number.

When, of two collocutors engaged in debate, the one passes over to the opinion of the other, a sort of superiority is by such transition ascribed to the one with reference to and at the charge of the other: ascribed to the one whose declared opinion remains fixt, at the charge of him in the state of whose opinion a change has been produced: a sort of superiority, viz. in the scale of wisdom—knowledge—intelligence: on the part of the superior, the existence of *power*—a source of enjoyment—is testified to exist: on the part of the inferior, weakness—a source of suffering.

In regard to *power*, not only is *power* itself a source of enjoyment, but so likewise is the *reputation* of it—i.e. the state and condition of him who is reputed to possess it: so, on the other hand, in regard to *weakness*, not only is weakness itself a source of suffering, but so likewise is the reputation of it.

APPENDIX CH. 4. MODES OF DISCUSSION

When *reputation* is mentioned simply, i.e. without addition, it is understood to be reputation of something desirable, of something the tendency of which is to produce enjoyment to him who possesses it.

When a debate takes place, a contest for superiority—for the reputation of superiority—a contest whether avowed or not, not the less real—has place: the side on which the superiority is understood to take place, is the side of that one of the collocutors—the co-debaters—the contending parties—to whose side the other passes: the side on which the inferiority is understood to take place is the side of him who, from his own side, passes over to the opposite one.

From this source any more than from any other, a man will not subject or expose himself to sufferance in any shape, but for the avoidance of some apparently greater suffering, or for the obtainment of some apparently more than equivalent enjoyment.

Rather than, as above, acknowledge inferiority, he would continue in the utterance of discourse to any effect, or if it would serve the purpose, have recourse to *silence*.

But by silence no such purpose on such an occasion can be served: on the contrary, the opposite effect is produced. It is only by action that superiority can be displayed or exercised: by inaction, whether in the shape of silence or in any other, on any occasion on which action is necessary to the display of superiority, nothing but weakness and inferiority is displayed.

Remains as and for the sole refuge, discourse.—But what discourse? Discourse by which in the debate in question the reputation of superiority is capable of being obtained—discourse by which the reputation—the imputation—of inferiority is capable of being avoided—is, by the supposition, not to be found. But all discourse not conducive to that desirable end is either *irrelevant*, i.e. *impertinent*, or *erroneous*.¹ Now it is only by such discourse as is at the same time *pertinent* and correct, that, on the occasion of a debate, the imputation of weakness can be avoided.

In proportion as in case of irrelevancy, the irrelevancy—in case of erroneousness, the erroneousness—is manifest and glaring, *absurdity* is the quality universally ascribed to the discourse: absurdity is the character ascribed to the mind of him by whom it is uttered.

Of debate in whatsoever form carried on, what, then, is the object of the course taken by him by whom an active part is taken in it?—Answer. So to shape his discourse, that, in return to it the adversary shall, for the avoidance of a still more afflictive humiliation, submit to the humiliation of coming over to his side. But such will be the effect,

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Shew that this division is exhaustive?’

if, in return to the discourse, whatever it be, which is uttered by the more active of the two debaters, the discourse uttered by the other is of such a nature as to be, in the eyes of all competent judges, either palpably irrelevant or palpably erroneous.

N.B. A case in which irrelevancy is carried to as high a pitch as possible is that of nonsensicalness: for discourse which has not any meaning at all can not, with reference to any discourse that has a meaning, be relevant.¹

What does the Socratic?

The Socratic method employs not any such determinate mode and figure as that which is employed by the Aristotelian—nor, in a word, any mode or figure, except in so far as the use of a modification of what the Grammarians call the imperative mode may be stiled, as by the Rhetoricians it is, a figure.^{a 2}

Now then for the difference between the Aristotelian mode of disputation or debate and the Socratic?

What does the Aristotelian?

Answer. In bringing up his arguments, the object and endeavour of the active collocutor is—previously so to frame and marshal them that, at the issue, the adversary shall not be able to express his dissent from the proposition or string of propositions advanced by him without advancing a proposition palpably erroneous or irrelevant.

In this view, all the propositions which, for the reduction of the adversary to this dilemma, can be necessary are so framed, that while without error as supposed dissent can not in relation to the last link in the chain be expressed, without absurdity the expression either of dissent or assent (in which last case the proselytism is acknowledged) can not be refused.³

^a viz. Erotesis.

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Shew in its proper place the connection between *irrelevancy* &c. in *argument*, and d° in *evidence*.'

² Above the following paragraph, Bentham has noted: 'N.B. In modern Scholastic disputation, the active collocutor is generally considered as being in the wrong. The side regarded as the wrong side is generally allotted to the *active* collocutor.'

³ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Go on displaying the mechanism.'

Chapter 5.

Of discussion—disputation—argumentation—or debate:
viz. of that branch of the Aristotelian logic which takes
that operation for its subject

§ 1. *The disputative branch of Aristotle's logic—in what respects it failed*

In respect of miscarriage and success, the character and lot of the art of logic as taught by Aristotle may be considered as a sort of prototype of the art of alchemy as taught by the searchers after the universal medicine, the universal solvent and the philosopher's stone. In both instances, in respect of the ultimate object, a compleat failure was the result: but in both instances, in consequence and in the course of the inquiry, particular discoveries of no inconsiderable use and importance were brought to light.

Of the art of logic, according to the declaration made by the Aristotelians, the professed object was, the communication, in which was necessarily implied the attainment, of knowledge, correct and compleat knowledge, a perfect acquaintance with relation to every thing which by human faculties is capable of being known.¹ Knowledge—and that not slight, superficial and imperfect, but correct and compleat, viz. such as it was in the nature of the instrument called *demonstration* to produce.

So much for profession: now for the result.

For about two thousand years little more or less, the precepts of this art have been before us: and the result is that, of the whole universe of things knowable, there is not a single one concerning which the smallest particle of knowledge has been found obtainable by the means of it. On the contrary, the nature of it is now, or may now be seen to be, such that, by means of it, of no one thing can any sort or degree of knowledge at any time by any possibility be obtained.

¹ See Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 1: 'Logica . . . est *Ars instrumentalis dirigens mentem nostram in cognitionem omnium intelligibilium*', i.e. 'Logic . . . is . . . the Art which is instrumental in directing our minds towards knowledge of all that can be known'; and *ibid.* p. 2: *Objectum* Logicae *primario* est, *Mens humana*; unde & Logicae nomen, velut ἀπὸ τῷ λόγῳ, id est, ratione: *secundario* etiam & Oratio, quæ & ipsa λόγος, dicta est, quâ sc. sensa mentis nostræ loquendo exprimimus', i.e. 'The object of Logic is firstly, the human mind; whence comes the name Logic, as if from λόγος, that is from reasoning: and secondly, Speech, which is also itself said to be λόγος, by which, that is, we express the sensations of our mind through speaking.'

Experience—Observation—Experiment—Reflection on the results of each and of all together: these are the means, these are the instruments, by which knowledge, such as is within the power of man, is collected, put together and treasured up: and of no one of these in the whole mass of the Aristotelian logic is so much as a syllable to be found.

The *import of words*—in this short expression will in truth be found the subject—the only subject of it: in such or such a manner the import of this or that word agrees or disagrees with the import of this or that other.

On this occasion, a notion, and that an erroneous one—a proposition, and that a false one—was all along involved. This is—that to each word was an import naturally inherent in it: that the connection between the sign and the object signified was altogether the work of nature.

What is now pretty generally, and at the same time pretty clearly, understood is—that the connection between a word and its import is altogether arbitrary, the result of tacit convention and long-continued usage: and of the truth of this proposition, the short proof is the infinite diversity of languages: the infinite multitude of signs by which, in the different languages, the same object has been found represented.

The case is—that so firmly cemented by habit was the connection between these signs and the things which they had respectively been employed to signify and present to the mind, that in Aristotle's time men had not learnt sufficiently to distinguish them from one another: and of this inability, one consequence and thereby one proof was their aptitude, as often as they observed a word which in its grammatical form purported to be the name of a thing, to infer the existence of a particular sort of real thing corresponding to that word: the observation not having as yet been made that the purposes of human converse could not in any instance have been attained, unless to such words as are names of real entities a mixture, and that a large one, had not been added of words which are but so many names of so many purely fictitious entities.

§ 2. *Of useful instruction, how much and what has been obtained and is obtainable from it*

Thus compleatly (it has been seen) has the disputative branch of this art—that which was regarded as the main and crowning branch—failed in the accomplishment of its promise.

But, besides that, as hath already been observed,¹ in and by the precedent and supposed subservient branches of the same system of

¹ See § 1, p. 225 above.

instruction many and very useful helps to instruction—helps to the human mind in its labours in the field of art and science and even in that of ordinary discourse and converse—were afforded,—so it is that neither has this part of the system, notwithstanding the compleatness of its failure so far as concerns its principal object, been altogether without its use.

Of this use, the following description may perhaps serve to convey a general, though antecedently to explanation, not perhaps a very determinate idea—furnishing to discourse a certain form whereby, if any two persons agree in the employing of it, it will, in relation to any topic of discourse at pleasure, all along be seen in what, if in any, particulars they agree, and in what, if in any, they disagree.

It operates (this form), to borrow an image from Chemistry, as a sort of menstruum whereby the portion of discourse placed in it is decomposed, and that part, if any, in which they agree lodged in one place, that part, if any, in which they disagree, in another place.

Such as above, and in so far as the instrument has been employed, has been found to be the effect.

But the means—the means by which this effect has been produced, what, it will naturally be asked, have they been?

Answer.

1. This form being a received and acknowledged test of truth, shame keeps men of seminaries[?] from refusing to subject their discourse to it.

2. It can not serve but in proportion as the same ideas have been generally annexed to the same signs: but in so far as this is notorious, shame keeps men from denying or questioning it.

ESSAY
ON
ETHICS

Chapter 1.

Of Well-being and Ill-being in general—Happiness and Unhappiness

§ 1. *Well-being what—Happiness not exactly synonymous to it*

For clearness of discourse and conception it is absolutely necessary to have some word by which the *difference* in *value* between the sum of the pleasures of all sorts and the sum of the pains of all sorts which down to the point of time (suppose the end of his life) a man has experienced may be designated.

This difference may, if it be on the pleasure side of the account, be termed the neat amount of his *well-being*—or more shortly his *clear well-being*—or simply his well-being:—if on the side of pain, the neat amount of his ill-being—or his neat ill-being—or simply his ill-being.

Instead of well-being, the word happiness will not be equally suitable to the purpose. It seems not only to lay pain in all its shapes altogether out of the account, but to give it to be understood that whatsoever have been the pleasures that have been experienced, it is in a high and as it were superlative degree that they have been experienced.

Comparatively speaking few men, it is believed, would be to be found who, down to any given period, the whole length of their lives taken together, have not been in the enjoyment of a measure more or less considerable of well-being. Much fewer, or rather none at all, who during an equal period have been in the possession and enjoyment of *happiness*, as above described.

§ 2. *Well-being—its dependence on particular Sensibility*

In regard to well-being, quality as well as quantity requires to be taken into account.

Quantity depends upon *general* sensibility—sensibility to pleasure and pain in general; quality upon *particular* sensibility: upon a man's being more sensible to pleasure or pain from this or that source, than to d^o from this or that other.

To every man, by competent attention and observation, the quality of *his own* sensibility may be made known; it may be known by the most impressive and infallible of all direct evidence—the evidence of a man's own sense.

To no man, can the quality of sensibility in the breast of any other man be made known by any thing like equally probative and unfalacious evidence; countenance, gesture, deportment, cotemporary conduct at the time, subsequent conduct at other subsequent times—from each of these articles of circumstant[ial evidence] separately or collectively taken, indications much surer and [more] unambiguous may be deduced than from any such direct evidence as is or can be constituted and delivered by any verbal account given by him of his own feelings.¹

Proportioned to the differences between the particular sensibilities of the several persons in question will be the absurdity of him who, in a case in which the agent himself were the only person whose well-being were in question, should in the character of a Moralist, or say a Deontologist, prescribe exactly the same line of conduct to be observed by every man.

With a benefit of a certain degree of experience, it may be delivered in the character of a general proposition, every man is a better judge of what is most conducive to his own well-being than any other man can be.

§ 3. *Quantity of well-being in human life—its preponderance over that of Ill-being*

Taking the whole of mankind together, on which side of the account does the ballance lie? on the well-being, or on the ill-being side?

If religion were out of the question, the answer would require scarce a moment's thought:—on the side of *well-being* beyond dispute: of well-being, existence is of itself a conclusive proof. So small is the quantity of pain necessarily accompanying the termination of existence.

But men have made to themselves an almighty being, whose delight is in human misery: and who, to prevent a man's escaping from whatsoever misery he may be threatened with in the present life, has without having denounced it formed[?] a determination, in the event of any such escape, to plunge him into infinitely greater misery in a life to come.

Even taking the Christian religion for true, this notion is a most vain and groundless conceit. For the Christian Scripture lies open to every eye: and in no one part of it is any intimation given of any such doom.

By no precept has Jesus been represented as forbidding suicide.

By his own example he is represented as approving of it. Possessed even of superhuman power, having power, though it were for ever,

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Go on.'

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to exempt himself from death, Jesus purposely and spontaneously subjected himself to it.¹ What he then did, it was for all men, i.e. to promote the well-being of all men, that he did it. Will this be said? What he thought right that by one person it should be done [for]² all men,³ how could he think it otherwise than right, that by each person it should, upon occasion, be done for himself?

A manufacturer of human misery is every man who joins in the declamation against suicide. In what proportion?—in the exact proportion of the extent of his influence.

If Maupertuis is to be believed, it is to a great amount clearly on the side of ill-being that the balance lies.⁴

The precise tenor or even purport of his argument I do not now remember. The book is not at hand, nor is it worth looking for. Horace's *Qui fit Mæcenas*, if I misrecollect not, is something in that strain.⁵ To better his condition: to acquire for the future some means of enjoyment more than at present he is in possession of—is the aim of every man. Not perhaps in the character of an universal proposition, true: but for argument sake, be it so. What then does it prove?—that in other particulars be the balance on the side of well-being or of ill-being, an element of well-being is in the possession of every man—a pleasure of expectation—a pleasure of hope.

No (will it be said)—it is not for the encrease of a balance on the side of pleasure that a man looks forward and labours for a change in his condition, but for the diminution of a balance on the side of pain? Among any of those whom Horace could have had in view, this, at any rate, could not have been the case. Why? Because among them, so far from being an object of horror, suicide was an object of praise and admiration. 'Dum moritur', (asks Martial) 'numquid majus Othone fuit?'⁶

To be consistent, the admirers of Jesus should likewise be admirers of this Otho. Otho was Jesus though upon an inferior scale. What

¹ i.e. by his death on the Cross.

² MS 'by'.

³ An echo of Hebrews 2: 9.

⁴ Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698–1759), mathematician, astronomer, biologist, and philosopher, was the anonymous author of *Essai de Philosophie Morale*, Berlin, 1749, of which the second Chapter at pp. 15–21 is entitled '*Que dans la vie ordinaire la somme des maux surpasse celle des biens*'.

⁵ See Horace, *Satires*, I. i. 1–3: *Qui fit, Mæcenas, ut nemo, quam sibi sortem seu ratio dederit seu fors obiecerit, illa contentus vivat, laudet diversa sequentis?*, i.e. 'How comes it, Mæcenas, that no man living is content with the lot which either his choice has given him, or chance has thrown in his way, but each has praise for those who follow other paths?'

⁶ See Martial (Marcus Valerius Martialis), *Epigrams*, VI. xxxii. 6: *dum moritur, numquid maior Othone fuit?*, i.e. 'in his death was he greater than Otho?' Marcus Salvius Otho (32–69), Governor of Lusitania 58–68, Roman Emperor 69.

Jesus did to save men from misery after death, Otho did to save men from the miseries of civil war—from misery and death.¹

As to his motives, in the case of Otho, it is true, what we believe concerning them, if we believe them to be as above, it is from his own account that we must take them. But so must we, in the case of Jesus; his account—that is the account given by others of that account of his.²

By an ill-considered expression, Locke, a man worth a hundred Maupertuis's, has given countenance to a notion at once so false, so uncomfortable, and so pernicious. According to him *uneasiness* is what every action has for its source.³ If this be true, a proposition not easily found deniable is that uneasiness is the state in which every man is who acts: viz. as often as he acts and for as long as he acts.

But, in so far as it exists, this uneasiness, what is it? Incidentally, it will indeed be this or that according to the situation, in which on each occasion the man in question is. Necessarily however it is no more than this: viz. a sense of a capacity of enjoying at some future time a pleasure not enjoyed at the time in question—at the time at which the uneasiness is considered as being felt.

What by Locke was not sufficiently considered—and what by the expression in question, taking it as it stands, seems to be negatived, is—that for as much as pleasure as well as pain may be issuing at the same time from a thousand sources, thence it is that from any number of sources he may at a given point of time be in the receipt of present pleasure, while at that same point of time he is looking forward to, and acting in pursuit of, future pleasure: reaping at the same time, from the prospect of that pleasure, the pleasure of hope.

If Johnson⁴ be to be believed, that which in the thoughts of every man occupies, till dinner comes, the highest place in his thoughts is—his

¹ Following the death of Nero Claudius Caesar (37–68), Roman Emperor from 54, Otho supported the accession of (Servius Sulpicius) Galba (3 BC–69 AD), Governor of Hispania Tarraconensis, Roman Emperor from 68, in the hope of being named his successor. When Galba instead named his adopted son Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi Licinianus (38–69) as his successor, Otho instigated a revolt among the Praetorian Guard, who murdered Galba and Piso on 15 January 69 and proclaimed Otho as Emperor. The legions of the Rhine, however, had declared the province's governor Aulus Vitellius (15–69) as Emperor, and his forces decisively defeated those of Otho at Bedriacum on 14 April 69. Rather than continue fighting, Otho killed himself on 16 April 69. Otho is represented as killing himself in order to save Rome from civil war in Plutarch, *Lives. Otho*, xv and Suetonius (Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus), *Lives of the Caesars*, vii. ii. 10–11.

² i.e. in the Gospels and by St Paul.

³ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Search the passage.' See, for instance, Locke, *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, Ch. XXI, § 29, p. 249: 'What moves the mind, in every particular instance, to determine its general power of directing, to this or that particular Motion or Rest? And to this I answer, The motive, for continuing in the same State or Action, is only the present satisfaction in it; The motive to change, is always some *uneasiness*: nothing setting us upon the change of State, or upon any new Action, but some *uneasiness*.'

⁴ Samuel Johnson.

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dinner. According to the improper¹ phraseology of Locke—this is as much as to say, every man who is not at dinner is uneasy for want of his dinner: or simply and absolutely, at every point of time, other than those which are occupied by the act of eating his dinner, [every man] is in a state of uneasiness. No, not even of Johnson himself was this true. Beyond every thing else, what Johnson loved was his dinner:² perhaps so. But thinking thus amorously of his dinner, what should have hindered him from sitting with his *Tetsey*³ on his knee, with a nosegay under his nose, another Tetsey at the Harpsichord entertaining him with a Song, and with the work of a favourite author in his hand?

§ 4. *Well-being—its preponderance perpetually on the encrease*⁴

§ 5. *Summum bonum*⁵

What *well-being* is has been seen:⁶ in the instance of the individual in question, for and during the portion of time in question, what balance there has been, if any, on the side of pleasure.

¹ The word 'improper' has been marked by Bentham for possible deletion.

² Cf. James Boswell, *The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D.*, 2 vols., London, 1791, i. p. 255: 'At supper this night he talked of good eating with uncommon satisfaction. "Some people (said he,) have a foolish way of not minding, or pretending not to mind, what they eat. For my part, I mind my belly very studiously, and very carefully; for I look upon it, that he who does not mind his belly will hardly mind any thing else."'

³ Elizabeth Johnson, née Jervis (1689–1752), the widow of Harry Porter, had married Johnson on 9 July 1735. Johnson referred to her as Tetty or Tetsey.

⁴ Bentham did not write any text for this section, but the following rudiments indicate the proposed topics: '1. As intelligence encreases, so does virtue: as virtue, genuine well-being.

'2. As in civilized nations population encreases, in uncivilized it declines.'

⁵ In a rudiment, Bentham has noted: 'Anti-Epicureans quarrellers with their bread & butter.'

The present section and § 6 appear to supersede the following earlier draft, entitled '§ 5. Summum bonum—the notion of its existence absurd and mischievous', at UC xiv. 43 (30 August 1814): 'The summum bonum, wherein does it consist? Such was the question debated by multitudes—debated from generation to generation by men calling themselves lovers of wisdom, and by others wise.

'The summum bonum, wherein does it consist? In this nonsensical question is implied an assertion of the existence of a some thing correspondent to and designated by this name.

'The summum bonum—the sovereign good—wherein does it consist? The philosopher's stone—the thing that turns all metals into gold—the thing that cures disease in all its shapes—in what quarry is it to be found? Upon the same level in the scale of rationality stand both these questions.

'It consists in virtue—it consists in this and that and t'other: it consists in any thing rather than in pleasure. It is the Irishman's apple pie which was to be made of nothing but quinces.

'This bonum, what would it be if it were any thing? What would it be if it had any thing in it of or belonging to pleasure? Would it be pleasure in the character of an *effect* or [would it] be a something, an unknown something, considered as its cause?

'This supreme or sovereign good, one supposition is that, whatever the degree in which it is, that is the highest degree: whatever it is, it is to be in the instance of every man who is in possession of it, one and the same thing at all times and in all places. This non-telligible thing, in what individual man, in what individual place, in what individual atom of time, was

What happiness is has also been seen:¹ any pleasure or combination of cotemporary pleasures, considered as existing at an elevated point, though without the possibility of marking it,² in the scale of intensity.

From observations such as these, nothing that comes under the name of information can be derived—nothing that comes under that name is pretended to be given: no human being so ignorant as not to be informed of it: informed of it by the best master, his own experience.

In³ almost every walk of discipline, error is a labyrinth through which man stands condemned to keep groping before he can arrive [at] truth.

While Xenophon was writing History,⁴ and Euclid teaching Geometry,⁵ Socrates and Plato were talking nonsense, on pretence of teaching morality and wisdom. This morality of theirs consisted in words: this wisdom of theirs, in so far as it had a meaning, consisted in denying the existence of matters made known to every body by experience—in asserting the existence of a variety of matters the non-existence of which was made known to every body by experience. Exactly in proportion as they and their notions thus differed from the general mass of mankind, exactly in that same proportion were they below the level of it.

The people who took no pleasure in the talking of any such nonsense—of the people who were content with reaping common pleasures under the guidance of Common sense⁶ and who on that account were considered as ignorant, and as composing the vulgar herd, were beheld by them enjoying each of them, throughout the compass of their lives, a portion more or less considerable of well-being—most of them, every now and then, a portion of happiness. Well-being for their ordinary fare, happiness, now and then a slight taste of it, as if at a feast. Good enough this for the ignorant vulgar: not so for those learned sages: men who by whatsoever name they called themselves or were called—wisest of men (σοφισταί), wise men (σοφοί) or lovers of

it ever to be found? What fool ever has there been so foolish as not to know that by no man, at no place, at no time, has it ever been found?

For the Irishman's apple pie see *Joe Miller's Jests*, 14th edn., p. 5: 'A very harmless *Irishman* eating an Apple-pye with some Quinces in it? *Arrah now, dear Honey*, said he, *if a few of these Quinces give such a Flavour, how would an Apple-pye taste made all of Quinces?*'

⁶ See § 1, p. 231 above.

¹ See *ibid.*

² The phrase 'though . . . marking it' has been marked by Bentham for possible deletion.

³ Perhaps on account of a discrepancy in the pagination of the text sheets, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Is there a sheet missing between this & the preceding?'

⁴ Xenophon (c. 430–c. 353 BC), Athenian historian, perhaps best known for the *Hellenica*.

⁵ Euclid (fl. 300 BC), Greek mathematician, who taught in Alexandria during the reign of Ptolemy I Soter (323–285 BC), Macedonian King of Egypt from 305 BC, was the author of the celebrated *Elements*, which remained a standard textbook for mathematics for 2,000 years.

⁶ The phrase 'of the people . . . sense' has been marked by Bentham for possible deletion.

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wisdom (φιλοσοφοί)—held their heads equally high, carrying on with the same rapidity and pretension the manufactory of nonsense.

To the vulgar they left the enjoyment of pleasure in this or that shape—in whatsoever shape it might fall in the way of each man to lay hold of. For their own disciples they reserved a thing called the summum bonum. This summum bonum, what was it?¹ was it pleasure? O no: pleasure was not good enough for them: their summum bonum was something that was better than pleasure: and better it could not be without being different from it.

Had their practice been of a piece with their doctrine, it would have been that of the dog, who, to hunt the shadow of a beef stake, let drop the stake.² But theirs was no such folly. Pleasure was good for one use, summum bonum for another: pleasure to be enjoyed; summum bonum to be talked of. While they were all of them chattering about the summum bonum, each was amusing himself with their respective παιδικας.³ Socrates had his Alcibiades, Plato his Aster,⁴ Aristotle his | |,⁵ each of them his favourites of either sex without number, whom no history has canonized.^a

Two things there were about which the Alchemists, a set of physical philosophers of later times, were agreed: that there is a universal medicine somewhere, and that it is somewhere to be found. About one thing their agreement was not quite so perfect: that was, whereabouts it was to be found.

^a Dependent on public opinion for that reputation which, to the head of a party or a sect, is always money's worth, and upon occasion money, they knew better than to suffer themselves to be governed by their minions, as James the first of England was by his.⁶ Socrates, the most prudent of them all, Socrates, such as he himself declared was the heat of his constitution and such the turn of his desires, upon his coming in company with a person of his own sex, durst not, if the person were young and handsome, accost him with the sort of salutation which was customary, for fear of forfeiting his independence.⁷

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'το ψιζου αγαδον?'

² See 'The Dog, the Meat, and the Reflection', in *Aesop's Fables*, ed. L. Gibbs, Oxford, 2002, Fable 263, p. 128, in which a dog steals meat from a butcher's shop and runs away. Upon reaching a river, the dog sees the reflection of the meat in the water, which appears much larger than the piece he is carrying and so drops the meat in order to seize that in the river. In the meantime, a raven swoops down and carries off the meat.

³ i.e. youthful lovers.

⁴ For the relationship of Socrates with the youthful Alcibiades (451/0–404/3 BC), Athenian general and politician, see Plutarch, *Lives. Alcibiades*, iv. and for that of Plato with Aster see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, iii. 29.

⁵ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'See Diogenes Laertius.' Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, v. i. 1, refers to Aristotle's concubine Herpyllis, but makes no mention of any male lover.

⁶ Bentham perhaps had in mind George Villiers (1592–1628), first Duke of Buckingham, Master of the Horse 1616–28, Lord High Admiral 1619–28, favourite of James I.

⁷ See Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, i. iii. 8–14.

Two things in like manner the moral philosophers in question were agreed about: that a summum bonum is somewhere existing: and that it is somewhere findable: but as to the *where*, in this case too, there was the source of difference.

I. '*The idea of good*'—this, according to one set, was the summum bonum:¹ or what comes to much the same thing, that is to much the same nonsense, in this idea it was that the summum bonum was to be found. This being true, You then, whoever you are, no sooner have you got the idea of good than you have the summum bonum: and having it You are happier—happier by—it is not easy to say how much than the happiest of all men who has not got it: but what you are to do with it, *that* it is time enough for you to know, when you have got it.

In this view of the matter, two sets of Philosophers were agreed, viz. the Platonists and the Academics: the Platonists, including of course the Master Manufacturer of Nonsense, from whom they took their nonsense and their name.

Nonsense in general—or at least this nonsense in particular—is like an eel: when You think you have it fast, it slips through Your fingers and in comes another lot of nonsense in the stead of it.

After giving you for the summum bonum of these philosophers, the idea of good, as if this were not unintelligible enough, in the same breath, in the same sentence and in the very next words, in comes the Instructor with a *sive*—'*sive visione et fruitione Dei*': understand in the vision and fruition—the seeing and enjoying of God.

Here, if there were any thing, there would be two things: vision or seeing of God, one thing, enjoying of God, another thing: and this same idea of good, what has either of them to do with it?²

Enjoying a person of the same species and the opposite sex—this is sufficiently intelligible: but this is of the number of those things in which, as every body who ever talked about the summum bonum is altogether clear[?], the summum bonum is not to be found: and so as to a mess of turtle or a pine-apple. But God? enjoyment of God? what sort of an enjoyment is that? by whom was it ever experienced? As to the God—the God here spoken of—though here we are given to understand there is but one God, he is neither the God of the Jews,

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Eth. Compend. Oxon. p. 9.' See *Ethices Compendium*, p. 9: 'Neque in *Idea Boni*, sive *Visione & fruitione Dei*, ut *Platonici & Academici*', i.e. 'Nor [does the summum bonum consist] in the idea of good, or the seeing and enjoyment of God, as with the Platonists and Academicians.'

² In a rudiment, Bentham has noted: 'The God of the Christians, Paul assures us, no body ever saw. Eaten he is, but with what degree of enjoyment?

'Of the God of the Jews, no man but Moses ever saw any part, and he but the hinder part and if here was sight, where was the enjoyment?'

For Paul's claim that no one had ever seen God and for Moses seeing the back of God see pp. 101–2 above. The eating of God is an allusion to the doctrine of transubstantiation.

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nor the God of the Christians—who each of them had but one—and he, as they say, as the Christians at least say, the same—but the God of the Platonists and the Academics—heathens all of them, having Gods by thousands.

II. The habit of Virtue:—according to another set, this was the summum bonum or in this was the summum bonum to be found:¹ in this we have either the jewel itself, or the casket in which it will be to be found. Lie all your life-long in your bed with a rheumatism in your bones, the stone in your bladder and the gout in both your feet, so long as you are in the habit of virtue, so long the summum bonum, be it what it may, is in your hands, and much good may it do you. As to this condition, in so far at least as negative virtue is virtue, in the fulfilment of it, no great difficulty presents itself: in any such situation, to engage in the practice of vice—of vice in any shape—in that rather than in its opposite, there seems the greater difficulty. Of a summum bonum of this sort, the seat, if it be any where, it is in the head surely that it must be. But to have summum bonums in his head, be they what they may, and were the number of them ever so great, exists there any man in his senses who would be content to have his head, his bladder and his bones so occupied.

Lest the sense of this nonsense should be mistaken, in comes the compiler with a remark of kindred sagacity at his finger's end: 'for (says he) Reason shews, that a naked habit is not of any the least value, unless it be referred to *Operation*, and brought forward into act and exercise.'² A habit without an act! a habit in existence, and not so much as a single act in it! a habit formed, and of the acts of which that habit is composed, not so much as a single act ever done! and so, lest you should fall into any such error, and in consequence into any such misconduct, as that of persevering in the habit of virtue, without ever having performed so much as a single act of virtue, it is for this cause that the information and warning thus given to you is bestowed.

III. Of little indeed would be the use of knowing where this summum bonum, if it meant any thing and were good for any thing—little indeed would be the use of a man's knowing where it *is not*, unless he knew where it *is* to be found. This accordingly is what, inspired by all these Oracles, the Academical instructor, with his philosophers in his head, has been generous enough to inform us of.

Virtue—virtue itself—there it is that the summum bonum—the true and only true summum bonum—is to be found. 'Ponendum est

¹ See *Ethices Compendium*, p. 9: 'Nec denique in solo Virtutis habitu, ut Stoici', i.e. 'Nor [does the summum bonum consist] finally in the habit of virtue alone, as with the Stoics.'

² See *ibid.*, pp. 9–10: 'monstrat enim Ratio, nudum habitum *minimi* æstimandum esse, nisi ad *Operationem* reseratur, & in *actum & exercitationem* producat'.²

igitur summum hominis bonum in ipsâ Virtute.^a What? *in the habit of virtue*? Oh no: not in any such thing: a supposition to any such effect is the very error against which you have just been cautioned. Have virtue, and you have the *summum bonum*: have virtue, you need not trouble yourself about the habit of it: as to the habit of virtue, this too you may have if you please, but no summum bonum will You get by it.

Nothing can be more positive, nothing more decided; whereupon, immediately upon the back of this concise nonsense, comes a torrent of diffuse nonsense, by which every thing that was decided is washed away.

And therefore, continues the Instructor—and therefore in acting according to the best and most perfect virtue consists the essence of human felicity.^b Yet to the entirety and perfection of felicity are required, in moderate quantity at least, good things of the body and of fortune; and moreover is added that more sincere pleasure of the mind, which of its own accord is produced (though it should seem in a sort of sly way) *subnascitur* from the conscience of things well done.

‘This felicity’, he goes on to assure us, is a steady kind of good, and not easily can it be lost. Are you in any doubt? look once more, and at the back of the assurance you may see the ground and reason of it. For, says he, Virtue in which its foundation is laid—virtue in which this summum bonum which is itself virtue is laid—neither can be snatched out of the hands that are unwilling to part with it, nor when the good things of fortune and the body are gone does it immediately take itself off. In a word, by the loss of external good things, the essence of felicity is not taken away: all that happens to it is to be diminished and to have its integrity mutilated.

Haec felicitas &c. to integritatem.¹

§ 6. *Physical pleasure—not the summum bonum—Variorum objections to it*

IV. Not to speak of the Platonics and the Academics, with their visions, their fruitions and their divinity or divinities²—if the Stoics with their habits of Virtue were still short of the mark, and being so

^a p. 10.³

^b p. 10.

¹ Ibid., p. 10: ‘Hæc felicitas est *bonum stabile*, & quod non facile *amitti* potest. Nam *Virtus*, in qua ponitur ejus *fundamentum*, nec *eripi* potest invitis, nec cum *fortunæ* & *corporis bonis* statim aufertur. Proinde, *bonorum externorum* amissio non tollit felicitatis *essentiam*, sed minuit solummodo & mutilat ejus *integritatem*.’

² The phrase ‘Not to speak . . . divinities’ has been marked by Bentham for possible deletion.

³ See *Ethics Compendium*, p. 10: ‘Ponendum est igitur summum hominis Bonum in *ipsa Virtute*’, i.e. ‘Therefore the highest good of man must be placed in virtue itself.’

short of the mark were still wrong, how must it have been with those sensualists—with those hogs—the Epicureans? The summum bonum being the thing sought, could any body have thought of any such thing, hogs as they were, it was actually in pleasure that they looked for it: where to look for it they could not imagine, unless it were in pleasure. Such is the account here given of them, that they, as well as those others, joined in the hunt for the summum bonum, and that it was in pleasure—yea and that too though it were bodily pleasure—that they looked for it. Upon the face of it, this account presents itself as not altogether a correct one. That to those men, as well as others, *pleasure was pleasure*, in that there seems nothing improbable: another thing that seems likewise altogether not improbable is, that if they had been obliged to look for this summum bonum, it is in pleasure they would have looked for it. On the other hand, three things seem not alike probable: that they should have expected to have found it any where, that among these people the existence of it should have found believers, and that in their account of pleasure, pleasure in every shape but bodily should have been omitted.

In some of its shapes, it is in the body that pleasure has its seat, in others it is in the mind: where is the man to whom either part of this is unknown? where is the man to whom experience of any part of it has been wanting?¹ That which is known to every man, can it have been unknown to these philosophers?

Too reasonable to look for any such moonshine any where, they could no more have looked for it in pleasure, whether of the body or of the mind, than any where else.

Be this as it may, having thus started the subject of bodily pleasure, he, the Instructor, takes this occasion to assure us that no such thing as the Summum bonum is to be found in it. Why not to be found there? because it exists not any where? Oh no: but for quite different reasons.

1. In the first place, the part of the human frame to which they are subservient—one should rather have said which are subservient to them—is the less noble, literally the more ignoble.

2. In the next place they are short.

3. In the third place, here and there, when they are over, the recollection of them is (it seems) unsavoury, and thereupon come or ought to come certain blushes.

Harum præterea sensus est brevis, præteritarumque insuavis sæpe recordatio, et erubescenda.^a

^a p. 9.²

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Alter.'

² *Ethics Compendium*, p. 9.

1. The life of A is filled up with pleasures, all of them ignoble, all of them in the highest degree intense, none of them alloyed by any thing in the shape of pain. In the life of B, what pleasures there are, are all of them of the noble kind, whatever they are that are of the noble kind, but all of them alloyed with and outweighed by pains. Whose lot, A or B, would a man choose, he being in his senses?

The part *ignoble*—well, and if so it be, what follows? Ignoble as it is, is it less necessary than any other part? Ignoble as it is, the Compend-writer, not to speak of his Master, would he have liked to have been without it?

Not that, as thus applied, *ignoble* &c. means any thing but *ignoble*: the sound of the word—ignoble—the sound of the word is all there is in it.

But let it mean what the modern philosopher pleases. Take two men Felix and Miser. The life of Felix is filled up with pleasures, all of them altogether ignoble, but on the other hand all of them intense, and all of them unalloyed by pain, and, in that only intelligible sense, all of them pure. In the life of Miser, what pleasures there are, are all of them of the noble kind, whatsoever is the noble kind, but every one of them faint in itself, every one of them alloyed and outweighed by pains. Felix or Miser, philosopher as you are, which would you rather be?

Alas! alas! this is all a mistake. Not the particular organ, but body and all to which it belongs is the ignoble thing here meant: and if the pleasure be the thing to which the organ is subservient, the body is the thing to which the pleasure is subservient. Well, but suppose ignoble, though it means nothing, mean any thing, and let the body be as ignoble as the purpose can require: what follows? The seat of the pleasures, be the pleasure what it will, is it not all this while in the mind? Did any body ever see a body that felt pleasure, when the mind was out of it?

2. Duration short. Well, and what if it be? Each taken by itself, there is but little of it. Well and what of that?¹ Taken by itself, not to speak of shillings or farthings, even a guinea is but a small thing. Take out of your pocket a guinea, and get the change for it:—which is worth most, the guinea or the change? Which of the two is the heavier, a pound of gold or a pound of feathers? When an answer has been given to these questions, then and then it is that the observation about shortness will be found to have any thing in it besides words.

3. Recollection unsavoury, and a blush, or the demand for a blush, the consequence.

¹ The following sentence has been marked by Bentham for possible deletion.

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When enjoyed in an improper manner, whatever be an improper manner, let the recollection of them be ever so unsavoury, those which are enjoyed in a proper manner, how much are they the worse for it?—So, in regard to blushes, if any thing be meant by blushes.

But besides all these sets of summum bonumists who have each of them their *proper* names, others the Compendialist has found who have no names but common ones. All in the wrong, if he is in the right, the *denominated* ones, and so are the *undenominated* ones.

True: in the wrong they are if, having what they prize, they pretend or fancy themselves to have a summum bonum: but not at all in the wrong, hard as he labours to have them thought so, if, having what they prize, they value it at what it is worth.

I. First come the vulgar—Anglicé the mob. These place the summum bonum in riches or to speak more precisely¹ in the matter of wealth; meaning, we can not but suppose, what is regarded as a large quantity of it.²

All in the wrong too, notwithstanding there are so many of them. Good reason why: this matter of wealth, which the vulgar are so fond of, small is the value of it, let there be ever so much of it.

In the first place, the thing is slippery and unsteady; in the next place, it is not on its own account, but on account of other things, that these vulgar people are so fond of it; in the third place who does it belong to? Not to the owner, but to Fortune.^a

Objection the first—slipperiness and unsteadiness: or in plain English, when the rhetorical varnish is stript off, it is³ liable to be lost.⁴ But the question is what it is worth, not to him who has it not, but to him who has it? And, as is well-observed by Adam Smith, in England at least, being the country in which this Tutor wrote, and in the 18th Century, being the Century in the middle of which this Compend was

^a p. 8. | | εἰμι δ' ὅλως οὐδενος ἀλλὰ Τυχῆς.⁵

¹ The phrase 'or to . . . precisely' has been marked by Bentham for possible deletion.

² See *Ethices Compendium*, p. 8: 'Non collocandum est summum hoc Bonum in *Divitiis*, ut *vulgus* hominum fere existimat: tum quia *hæ* sunt *fluxæ*, & *instabiles*; tum quia non propter *se*, sed *aliorum* gratia expetuntur: tum denique quia non in *nostra potestate*, sed in *fortunæ* temeritate, ponuntur', i.e. 'The summum bonum most not be placed in riches, as the common people think: because these are changeable and unsteady; and also because they are not sought for their own sake, but for the sake of other things: and finally because they are placed not in our power, but in the rash hands of fortune.'

³ The phrase 'when . . . it is' has been marked by Bentham for possible deletion.

⁴ In a rudiment, Bentham has noted: 'ἔσθ' Put at the commencement. One use of this exposure, to give a sample of the spirit of false and weak reasoning with which the Oxford youth continue to be drenched.'

⁵ The epigram appears in *The Greek Anthology*, x. lxxiv. 4: 'I belong to no man, only to Fortune.'

published, for one man who has lost what he had, you have a good thousand who has not only kept it, but added to it.¹

Travelling on with closed eyes in the track of common place, whatsoever on the subject in question was the language of the earliest times, men continue to employ it, heedless of the changes that have taken place in the state of things which it was then employed to represent. In the heart of Greece, in Athens, when Aristotle wrote, land was at two Years' purchase:^a in England, it is now at thirty Years'.

In Judea, at the time when the biographers of Jesus wrote, moth and rust were, in the character of corruptors general, mentioned as causes of impoverishment, and assuredly not without reason:² not without reason then, no, nor yet at present. But neither moth nor rust corrupt gold, no, nor yet the paper which represents it. From the moth, no one at this time of day has any serious loss to fear, unless it be a woollen draper; nor from rust, unless it be a hardware man whose goods lie upon his hands.

Objection the 2^d. Not for its own sake does a man want it, but to get this and that and t'other in exchange for it.—Well, but if he gets for it what he wants, whatsoever it is that he happens to want—if he gets for it what he wants, in what respect is it the less valuable? Suppose a man to have what he wants, what more would he have? And if he has not the summum bonum itself, has he not a something else, which is as good as ever that can be?

Objection 3. The person it belongs to is not the owner, but Fortune.

Literally the thing is placed not in our power but in the temerity of Fortune. Non in nostrâ potestate, sed in Fortuna temeritate. In the union of rhetoric with poetry, in Dame Fortune and the two *tates*, lies the great strength of this argument; decanted out of Latin into English, no small part of it flies off. In truth, what is it that remains? that the matter of wealth is a slippery sort of thing—that it is liable to slip out of a man's hands was the matter of the first of these objections: and for such news, surely once might have been sufficient.

^a Hume from Xenophon.³

¹ See Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, i. 342: 'After all our complaints of the frequency of bankruptcies, the unhappy men who fall into this misfortune make but a very small part of the whole number engaged in trade, and all other sorts of business; not much more perhaps than one in a thousand.'

² Matthew 6: 19–20.

³ David Hume (1711–76), philosopher and historian, did not quote Xenophon to this effect and there does not appear to be any such statement in Xenophon. Bentham may, however, have had in mind a comment in Hume's essay 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations', in *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, ed. T.L. Beauchamp and M.A. Box, 2 vols., Oxford, 2021 (*The Clarendon Edition of The Works of David Hume*), i. 303, discussing the high rates of interest and profits on trade, that 'ANTIDORUS, says DEMOSTHENES, paid three talents and a half for a house, which he let at a talent a year.'

If in this place that be not all, what more is there in it? That Fortune is a woman, and that that woman is a rash one?—Good perhaps in rhetoric—but this is a book on Ethics. Good in rhetoric?—No: not even there. For where design is not, neither can rashness be.

II. Next come, in one set, the class of Politicians and Votaries of Ambition.

In Honour and in Power—in the one or the other or in both—do these men place their summum bonum.

Reason, or what is meant for reason, meaning, as far as any such thing can be found, much the same in this case as in the foregoing one. Of language, that something new might appear to be done—of the sort of rayment thus made for nothingness, a new change. Riches were slippery and unstable. Honour and Power are uncertain and deciduous: depending for the most part on popular breath or pretended favour: *admodum incerta et caduca* . . . ; *utpote quæ ex arbitrio popularis auræ*,—here Horace speaks, ask Horace else—*aut simulato hominem favore, plerumque pendent*.¹

Riches—when it was of these that our Moralist had to speak—it was not for their own sake, but for the sake of other things that, according to him, they were sought after. Neither in Honour, no, nor yet in Power—whatsoever the man of politics or the man of ambition may think, is there any intrinsic dignity: or if any of this intrinsic dignity there be, none is there in either of them of any such sort of intrinsic dignity, as can cause them or either of them to be either desired, or praised.²

As to the objection about caducity, in so far as it means any thing, it has received an answer in the answer about unsteadiness.

But as to meaning, has it any? and if any, what? If from any person this latter question is capable of receiving an answer, it must be from some person, other than him by whom the objection thus worded was brought to view.

Honore? what means Honore? Honour or Honours? Natural good reputation, or political and factitious dignity: for in English thus wide is the distinction between the singular and the plural.

¹ See *Ethices Compendium*, pp. 8–9: ‘Neque in *Honore*, aut *Potentia*, ut *Politici* & *Ambitiosi*: Hæc enim *admodum incerta & caduca* sunt; utpote quæ ex arbitrio *popularis auræ*, aut *simulato* hominum favore, plerumque pendent’, i.e. ‘Nor [does the summum bonum consist] in Honour or Power, as with Politicians and the Ambitious: for these are very uncertain and transitory; since things generally depend on the popular whim, or on the feigned favour of men.’

Bentham’s allusion is to Horace, *Odes*, III. ii. 20: *arbitrio popularis auræ*, i.e. ‘the people’s whim’. Bentham has translated *caduca* as ‘deciduous’, and has noted in a rudiment: ‘The Compendialist forgets he is writing in England where Honours are not deciduous.’

² See *Ethices Compendium*, p. 9: ‘Nullam porro *intrinsicam* habent dignitatem, ob quam expeti, aut laudari possint’, i.e. ‘They have no intrinsic dignity for which they can be desired or praised.’

Good repute—reputation—is it that? By accident no doubt may good repute attach upon ill-behaviour, ill-repute upon good. But this ill-constituted state of things, if it be a possible one, and now and then a visible one, happily, for any length of time at least, it is not an ordinary one. Were there even more truth in it than there is, in the mouth of a Moralist at any rate, it seems not a very consistent one: to under-rate the power of the moral sanction has no more of consistency than it has of truth in the mouth of a professed moralist, whatsoever it may have in other mouths. Three sanctions, in some sort, on some occasions, rivals—the popular, the political, and the religious:¹ by the politician and by the religionist, more particularly by the religionist,² the power and in particular the tutelary power [of the moral sanction] is but too apt to be undervalued. But the professed Moralist, is it for him to undervalue it? to undervalue it is to undervalue his own occupation; it is as if a tradesman were to undervalue the very ware he deals in.

Is it factitious reputation? is it Honours in the plural? Here, as in the case of riches, the worse it is to cease having them, the better it is to continue having them:³ and it is in the keeping them, and not in the losing them, that the Politician and the Ambitious man would, if he dreamt of having a summum bonum in his hand, be disposed to place it: and so, in regard to *power*.

But be it honours—be it power—what means *pretended*—what means *simulato*? In so far as it is by *favour* that a man has been placed either in honours or in dignity, what room is there for a denial of the sincerity of it?⁴

III. Lastly come a set of people, who, supposing them to exist, are here called *Theoretics*. In contemplation and that alone, do these men look for their summum bonum, such as it is.

Contemplation? To attain the summit of felicity, has a man nothing to do but contemplate? If this were the case, if the summum bonum were any thing like what has been said of it, who is there that would not be a Theoretic? Crede quod habes et habes⁵—if there be really a case in which the truth of this maxim is exemplified, surely it must be this: for between being in any given degree happy, and in that same degree fancying one's self happy, where, so long as the fancy lasts—where (let any body say) is the difference?

¹ Cf. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (CW), Ch III, pp. 34–7, where Bentham adds the physical as a fourth sanction.

² The phrase 'more . . . religionist' has been marked by Bentham for possible deletion.

³ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Keeping them when got, and even increasing them, is the ordinary course, losing them only the accidental one.'

⁴ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Wants a little to be finished.'

⁵ i.e. 'Believe that you have it, and you have it.'

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Of these men surely may be said, and with no less propriety what by Cicero was said of another set of men: *Istos viros sine contumeliâ dimittamus: sunt enim boni viri, et quandoquidem ita sibi ipsis videtur, beati.*¹ Those are a good set of men, and forasmuch as such they are in their own opinion, a blessed one.

Not so this our modern philosopher. Let them fancy themselves ever so happy, he proves to them that it is no such thing.

We are born, he says, for action: and to prove it, he calls The Fabrick of our Nature: whereupon he goes on to observe that therefore, if in such acting, no action, no action of *Offices* (or for *Offices*, say *Duties*), whatsoever he meant to say by action of offices or action of duties, takes place, the highest knowledge in arts or sciences is in a certain sort defective, and such as will be of little service to mankind. *Testatur enim &c.*^a

Thus far this our Compendialist. All this while, how conclusive so ever that evidence of his may appear to him, a still nearer proof of our being born to act is that which he himself was giving, if there be any truth in the adage *Scribere est agere*,² all the while he was thus scribbling.

In good truth, to all this there are but two objections, one of them that it means nothing, the other that it is nothing to the purpose.

For, once more, one of these Theoreticks, who ever they are, suppose him wrapt up in contemplation, thinking about any thing else or nothing else, but fancying himself happy and so happy as to be in possession of the summum bonum: which is it that he will believe: his own feelings which tell him that he has got the summum bonum, or this Fabric of our Nature which, if the Compendialist is to be believed, is telling him that he has not got it?³

To plain sense, it should seem that whatever it is that a man does, that it is that he was born to do, for how else happens it that he does it? These good people, by the supposition, contrive to occupy themselves

^a p. 9.⁴

¹ i.e. 'Let us dismiss these men without reproach: for they are good men, and since it seems to themselves, they are blessed.' Bentham has adapted Cicero, *De Oratore*, III. xvii. 64: *Quare istos sine ulla contumelia dimittamus, sunt enim et boni viri et, quoniam sibi ita videntur, beati*, i.e. 'Consequently let us dismiss the masters in question, without any derogatory comment, as they are excellent fellows and happy in their belief in their own happiness.'

² i.e. 'To write is to act', a legal maxim.

³ In relation to the following paragraph, Bentham has noted: 'Omitt?'

⁴ See *Ethices Compendium*, p. 9: 'Neque in *Contemplatione* sola, ut *Theoretici*: testatur enim nostræ naturæ fabrica, nos ad *agendum* esse natos; ideoque *summa* in artibus aut scientiis *cognitio manca* quodammodo est, & humano generi *parum profutura*, si nulla *Officiorum actio* consequatur', i.e. 'Nor [does the summum bonum consist] in contemplation alone, as with the Theoreticians: for the fabric of our nature testifies that we were born to act; and therefore the highest knowledge in the arts or sciences is in a sense lacking, and of little use to the human race, if no action of Offices results.'

some how or other in contemplation: they are therefore as clearly born to contemplate as they or any body can be to act—and if so, what becomes of the compendialist and this his argument?

As for the manufacturers of nonsense, call them Platonists, call them Academics, call them Stoics, they shall be as much in the wrong as he pleases. But of the others who, according to him, are all in the wrong, let any one now judge, whether there be a single one amongst them that is so compleatly in the wrong as he is.

By no one of them, taking his account of them, is the sovereign good found but where there is some good: while not an atom of good is there to be seen where he has found it.

Be they, all of them, ever so much in the wrong, no one of them is in such a degree in the wrong as to contradict himself. But he, no sooner has he come out with one sentence, than he comes out with another that runs counter to it.

Nothing, after all, does this summum bonum of his amount to, without a dose of those other things which he has been turning up his nose at, and dragging through the kennel. A dose and what dose? This is more than he so much as pretends to know: a moderate one it must be, and this is all the description he can give of it.

Have the least valuable of all the other summum bonums, you have always something. Have his summum bonum, you have nothing but moonshine, and that, according to him, you can not have, unless at the same time you have more or less of those others.

But whatsoever may have been their logic, their ethics, it may be said, were good: whatsoever they were in speculation, they were good in practice: the effect was good, howsoever it may have been with the cause: and so long as the effect is good, no matter what the cause. Suppose two men, one who always reasons well with you, all the while doing ill by you; another who always reasons ill with you, but always does well by you: for a friend or for a companion, which of them would you choose?

To a set of questions thus put, about the answer there can not be a difference.

But the truth is—of these antique sages, all that we can have any sufficient assurance of is their logic: delivering this sort of logic, a man's moral conduct might have been good or bad, just as it happened: in morals, as in religion, nothing is more common: one thing for shew, another thing for use. Of these men all that we know for certain is their logic: and especially when morals is the field in which it exercises itself, all bad logic is mischievous. By no man can any such moral doctrine have been embraced but at the expence of his understanding: deep indeed must have been its prostration of strength, ere trash such as this can have been swallowed by it.

Chapter 2.

Sole and constant End of Action, or object of man's pursuit, well-being

§ 1. *Topics belonging to this head*

Well-being, composed, as hath been seen,¹ of the maximum of pleasure minus the minimum of pain—the pleasure, it will be seen, a man's own pleasure—the pain, a man's own pain—will, upon a strict and close enquiry, be seen to be actually the intrinsic and sole ultimate object of pursuit to every man at all times.

1. Can it ever cease or fail so to be?

2. Exists there that occasion on which it ought to fail or cease so to be?

3. If to no man this can ever cease or fail to be the ultimate object of his pursuit, then what, it may be asked, can ever be the use or effect of this or any other discourse on the subject of Ethics?

For all these several questions, answers will be endeavoured to be found.

§ 2. *Well-being can never cease or fail to be man's object*

In the instance of any man, well-being—his own well-being—can it ever cease or fail to be his object—and in one shape or other the sole ultimate object of his pursuit?

Nay, cries an Objector—but if this be so, then where is benevolence? where is sympathy?² Whereupon comes a volley of sentimentalist | | decked out by the hands of rhetoric in all its gayest and most tender colours.

Answer: exactly where they were.

To deny the existence of this social affection would be to talk in the teeth of all experience. Scarce in the most brutal Savage would they be found altogether wanting.

But the pleasure I feel at the prospect of bestowing pleasure on my friend, whose pleasure is it but mine? The pain which I feel at the sight or under the apprehension of seeing my friend oppressed with pain, whose pain is it but mine?

If from that external source neither any such pleasure nor any such pain were felt by me, beneficence indeed I might have—since there

¹ See Ch. 1, § 1, p. 231 above.

² The following sentence has been marked by Bentham for possible deletion.

is not a self-regarding motive by which a course of action followed by that effect is not capable of being produced: but should I have any sympathy?¹

§ 3. *His own well-being—ought it ever to cease to be the object of any man's pursuit? Ought & ought not, what*

Ought it ever to cease so to be? the answer will be liable to be different, according to [whether] the party whose interest, i.e. whose well-being, is considered as the preferable object of regard is the individual alone, or the society of which he is considered as a Member.

But in the first place, this word *ought*—what on this occasion is meant by it?

Answer. What by myself is meant by it is altogether clear to me. If to the preceding question my answer is—his own well-being ought on every occasion to be the sole object of pursuit to every man—what I mean by it is that the conduct of him who on every occasion takes his own well-being for the sole object of his pursuit is approved by me: approved by me, in so much that, if it depended upon me, his pursuit should not on any occasion have any other object.

As often as, speaking of any man, I say he ought to do so and so—or he ought not to do so and so, what I know and acknowledge myself to be doing is accordingly neither more nor less than endeavour[ing] to bring to view the state of my own mind—of my own *opinion*—of my own *affections*—in relation to the line of conduct which on the occasion in question is stated as pursued by him: thus much and nothing more.

That which I am very sure I do not mean—forms no part of my meaning—no part of my intention—is that, on this or any other occasion, that or any other opinion of mine should, independently of any particular power with which it may happen to me to be invested, be considered as having the force of law—should, in the character of a law or otherwise, be regarded by him as constituting of itself a *reason* why the line of conduct, to which my approbation as above is declared to be attached, should, by him or any one, be pursued by him or any one: or that, on the ground of such my opinion, he should believe or be disposed to believe that a law to any such effect is any where in existence.²

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Go on.'

² In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: '20 Sept. [1814.] Abstracted from this head 4 pages, and added to Ch. Deonto[lo]gist—prop. & improp. modes of exercising this function.' The pages in question, at UC xiv. 150–3, have been reinstated and constitute the remainder of the present section. For further details see the Editorial Introduction, p. xlix above.

The following paragraph has been cancelled by Bentham.

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Unfortunately a disposition and practice thus simple and unassuming does not in general accord with the convenience of moralists—of those by whom the conduct of man or men considered in a moral point of view is—whether in the way of speech or writing—taken for the subject of discourse: and not according with their convenience, it accords not with their practice.

With few, if any, exceptions, open any book that takes for its subject any part of the field of morals, the following, you will find, is the state of mind in which he enters upon the subject. He begins with investing himself with the character, if not of legislator, of preceptor of mankind: in conformity to this character, he places himself in a commanding station—he expresses himself in a commanding tone. Whatsoever it would be his pleasure they should do, he tells men that they *ought* to do it: whatsoever it would be his pleasure to see them forbear doing, he tells them that they *ought not* to do it. I *ought* to do so (should any one say), but *why* ought I—I ought not to do so, but *why* ought I not? to any such question, no answer does he consider it as incumbent on him to give. Whatever it be, for the enforcement of which this language is employed, to say it *ought not* to be done is easy in the extreme: easy to every man in proportion to the facility with which the component letters of this word *ought* can be made to flow from his pen: to say *why* it ought will in every case be matter of comparative difficulty, and in many cases, as for instance where that which is thus recommended is what it too frequently is—*folly* or *improbability*, not possible.

Whatever it would be his pleasure to see done or forborne to be done—no: not exactly so: the mode of prescription here in question is frequently, if not constantly, in a degree more or less considerable, the produce of a still more deeply seated cause. This cause is the advantage by the prospect of which, in whatever shape or shapes, the author was engaged to give utterance to such his discourse. In the composition of this inducement, the part played as above by the love of ease can not, in the nature of the case, be other than a secondary one: this love of ease, were it a primary object, to attain it, the way would be not to write this thus glibly and concisely, but not to write at all.

On this occasion, as on every other, [his object] is the deriving from his labours *advantage*—advantage to himself—in whatsoever shape or shapes the situation he occupies in life affords him a prospect of being able to reap it: money, reputation, office. By prospects such as these is the cast and character and tenor of his discourse determined.

Severe he thus stands engaged to be: at any rate, on the side of severity he beholds his safe side and the only one that is so.

Reputation he must make sure of at any rate, at any price: reputation has its value not only on its own account, but on account of the

proportionate profit—profit by the sale of the work—of which it is pregnant: this in certainty, not to speak of situation in contingency.

For the hope of reputation, one thing he must be sure to do—viz. to keep fair with public opinion, with public opinion taken as it is, e.g. to no current prejudice, to no generally prevalent bias, on any occasion, may his discourse in any part of it stand opposed.

1. Throughout the whole field, with very little exception, the bias of public opinion is on the side of severity. Why?—because in every restraint or constraint imposed on his neighbour, every man beholds an encrease of his power and a gratification to his pride and his vanity, provided always that by his own self-esteem, joined to his own self-love, some pretence, how slight soever, can be found for exempting himself from the general imputation, the consequence of the general law.

2. In the next place, be the practice in question what it may, the greater the severity manifested by him in speaking of it, the more generally obvious and natural the conclusion that he himself has ever been pure of it: for what so unnatural and improbable as that a man should be forward in passing condemnation on himself?

Thus it is that, by all these motives, in which man's actions are most in use to find their cause—the moralist stands engaged to lean, and by constantly leaning, constantly to err, on the side of *severity*. From laxity he has more or less to fear—nothing to hope: from severity he has every thing to expect, nothing to fear. Thus it is that without reserve and almost without thought—taking for his instruments these craven words *ought* and *ought not*—he goes on laying on commands and prohibitions, imposing on mankind in both shapes those fictitious and metaphorical, but not the less heavy and afflictive, chains and burthens.

By the exercise of tyranny in this shape, thus it is that, in so many agreeable and useful shapes, profit is to be made. Scarce in any other way is any thing like equal profit to be made at so small an expence—of any thing like equal profit, is the expence in the way of thought so inconsiderable. Applied to the description of the line of conduct which a man proposes to himself to recommend, the word *ought*, or applied to the description of the opposite line of conduct the words *ought not*, are altogether sufficient for the purpose. Observation—enquiry—reflection—these and all other mental operations are altogether as superfluous as they are laborious. Wheresoever a man's *ipse dixit* passes for argument, he has no need of any other.

Exercising themselves in this field, folly and arrogance—the blindest folly and the most assuming arrogance—find themselves altogether at their ease. By these physicians of souls, pleasures are ordered off the

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table—pains ordered on instead of them, with as much ease as, by the wand of the miserable physician Rezio, the meats were ordered off the table of the famished Sancho.¹

§ 4. *If it can not ever cease to be, then what can ever be the use of this or that or any other discourse on any part of the field of Ethics?*

Answer. Use the 1st. To shew him, that, howsoever conducive to his well-being, according to his then present view of it, the conduct which otherwise he might be disposed to pursue might present itself to him as being, it will not, on a cool and comprehensive view, be seen to be so at the upshot, inasmuch as the present or other nearer *good*, by the prospect of which he would be determined so to do, would be outweighed by a mass of evil preponderant in value.

Answer the 2^d. If so it be that, of the line of conduct in question, the effect is more or less likely to prove prejudicial to the interests of [the] whole or of this or that portion of the society in which he lives—that while they sustain evil in this shape, the source from whence, and the person from whom, it comes will be visible to their eyes, and that accordingly, were it only by the principle of self-preservation, they will stand engaged in some shape or other to satisfy their vengeance upon the author for the injury which they regard themselves as having thus sustained.

Answer the 3^d. If so it be that, with or without reason, the species of conduct in question is in the breasts of a portion more or less considerable of the community productive of displeasure, and thence of damage in some shape or other, determinate or indeterminate, to the man himself, to bring before his view, by way of warning, the tendency of the practice to become productive of this effect.²

§ 5. *Pleasure and Pain—their relation to Good and Evil. Aphorisms*

1. *Primâ facie*, and *pro tanto*, consequences apart, every species of pleasure—every individual pleasure, to whatsoever species it belongs, is good, and fit to be pursued.

2. After experience had of it by the person in question, the very fact of his pursuing it is, subject to the limitations abovementioned,³

¹ See *The Life and Exploits Of the ingenious gentleman Don Quixote de la Mancha. Translated from the Original Spanish of Miguel Cervantes de Saavedra. By Charles Jarvis, Esq.*, 2 vols., London, 1742 (first published in Spanish as *El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quixote de la Mancha* in two volumes in 1605 and 1615), Bk. III, Ch. XV, ii. 240–2.

² In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘^u Add Dependence of each man’s well-being on the Moral Sanction.’

³ See § 4 above.

conclusive proof of its goodness:—of its relative goodness, relation being had to the person himself and his particular well-being.

3. *Primâ facie* and *pro tanto*, all consequences apart, over and above the pleasure reaped by it, every act whereby pleasure in any shape is reaped is good: and fit or proper to be exercised: and the converse is true in regard to pain.

4. Every act by which pleasure is reaped is good, if either no pain at all is the result of it, or if pain being among its consequences, the magnitude of the sum of pain is less than that of the sum of pleasure: and the converse is true in regard to pain.

5. Every person is not merely the most proper judge, but the only proper judge of what, with reference to himself, is *pleasure*: and so in regard to *pain*.

6. To say of any act—from this act, no pleasure or no preponderant mass of pleasure, were the act exercised by me, or by this or that other person or number of persons, would be reaped by me or by them respectively, therefore from the like act, if exercised by you, no pleasure would be reaped by you, is folly.

7. To say of any act—from this, no pleasure, or no preponderant mass of pleasure, were the act exercised by me or by this or that other person or number of persons, would be reaped by me or by them respectively, therefore, although from the like act, if exercised by you, *pure* or preponderant pleasure would be reaped by you, the act is not fit or not proper to be exercised by you, is folly: and, if followed up by acts having for their object the applying evil in any shape to you, injustice and, in so far as public power or influence is employed to that end, tyranny.

8. Abstraction made of future contingent consequences, viz. of consequences which, with reference to the point of time in question, are as yet but contingent, the bare fact of a person's having down to that time continued in the *free* as well as habitual exercise of any act (*free*, viz. without or independently of any disposition thereunto produced by the influence either of pain or pleasure in the shape of punishment or reward expected from any foreign sources) is of itself conclusive proof, that the act is, with relation to him, productive either of pure or of preponderant good, and as such fit and proper to be exercised by him.

9. In relation to any act which, abstraction made of future contingent consequences, is thus (as per par. 8.) fit and proper to be exercised by a person, to warrant any other person in pronouncing it to be in any way an evil one, it is incumbent on such censor to shew and render it preponderantly probable—not only that in this or that determinate shape, evil will be the result of it, but that the sum of that evil will,

at the end of the account, be preponderant over the sum of the good produced by the same cause.

10. On every man who, whether by misrepresentation of the natural consequences, or by erroneous argumentation in any other shape, much more if by fear of punishment at the hands of any one or more of the tutelary sanctions, viz. physical, popular or moral, political or religious, is dissuaded from the reaping of any pleasure, an injury is inflicted—an injury as great as would be done to him by the causing him to suffer pain in any shape to an equivalent amount.

11. Such injury will be susceptible of all those degrees of delinquency which, being dependent on the state of the delinquent's mind with reference to the consequences of the act, are constituted and expressed by the concomitants *bona fides* or absence of evil consciousness, *bona fides* accompanied with temerity, and *mala fides*, or presence of evil consciousness. At any rate it is not of its nature to be productive of evil of the second order in any shape.¹ But still it is not the less an injury: an injury, the mischievousness of which, an injury, the gravity of which, in so far as depends upon its mischievousness, is exactly equal [to] the magnitude of the pleasure from which, by the means in question, the person in question has been debarred.

12. Whatsoever be the means employed, and the material circumstances in which they are employed being in both cases the same, the injury done to a person by the causing him to fail of reaping this or that pleasure which he would otherwise have reaped is exactly equal to the injury that would be done to him by the causing him to suffer this or that *pain*, which he would otherwise not have suffered.

13. The matter of wealth is not of any value, nor can the subtraction of it from any person be productive of injury, nor for the punishing of him who without right obtains it for himself can there be any sufficient reason, any otherwise than in so far as the general effect of it is to serve for the attainment of pleasure or for the avoidance of pain.

14. In respect of any erroneous reasoning, having for its effect or tendency the causing a person to debar himself from innoxious pleasure, as above, to any amount, or in any shape and to any amount, there can not be any sufficient reason for annexing punishment to the act of giving utterance to such erroneous reason:—because if any reasoning be erroneous, it is only by correct reasoning, and not by punishment—or fear of punishment, that the erroneousness of it can be proved and exposed. It is only in proportion as an opinion is erroneous, that he by whom it is espoused or pretended to be espoused

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Add, why.' For the evil of the second order see *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (CW), Ch. 12, § i, pp. 143–52, and 'Essay on Logic', Ch. 18, pp. 190–3 above.

can have any need of employing punishment for the support of it. Nor, for proving that the opinion in question not only is erroneous, but by the person in question is believed to be so, can there be any more conclusive presumption, than the act of his employing or contributing or seeking to employ punishment in support of it.

15. For the purpose of obtaining money, reputation, or the matter of good in any shape, giving, without due consideration, utterance to discourses having for their object or their tendency the causing men to debar themselves from the enjoyment of pleasure in a shape not preponderantly noxious, is a species of act analogous to the act of him who, for the saving of an equal quantity of the matter of wealth or of the matter of good in any other shape, instead of causing such filth as in any shape has been produced in his house to be conveyed away by some unnoisome mode of conveyance such as is supplied by the established practice of the place, should cast it out of the window upon the heads of passengers, and in the instance of each respective sufferer, the magnitude of the injury thus inflicted will be as the magnitude of the *uneasiness* sustained in the one case, compared with the magnitude of the loss of pleasure sustained in the other case.

16. He who, in a discourse having for its subject any part of the field of morals, deals out at random, and without any specific grounds produced or referred to, his *ought* and his *ought not*—his injunction or declared approbation attached to this or that act—his prohibition or declared disapprobation to that other, may be compared to a careless housemaid, who, without regard to the heads upon which it might chance to fall, should cast the contents of her receiving pail into a crowded street, out of an upper window.

§ 6. *Of purity, considered in relation to pain and pleasure*

Arithmetical or *mathematical* on the one part—*rhetorical* on another—physical on a third¹—between these [three]² senses in which the word *purity* has been employed, in the highest degree it is necessary to bring the distinction to view, and place it upon the clearest ground. Throughout the whole field of morals, the solidity of the foundation built upon the difference between sense and nonsense—between utilitarianism and asceticism—between wisdom, in a word, and folly, is in a preeminent degree dependent upon it.

In the arithmetical or mathematical sense alone is it employed in this work, unless it be with warning of the departure, or in any other of its author.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘~~or~~ Add *economical* & *chemical*?’

² MS ‘two’. Bentham added the physical sense to the list, but failed to change the total.

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In this sense a pleasure is *impure* exactly in so far as it is accompanied, pure, in so far as it is unaccompanied, with feelings of the opposite quality, viz. with pains.

In this same sense, in regard to pains what is equally manifest is that to them the attributives *impurity* and *purity* apply with exactly the same propriety as to pleasures.

In this sense, in the account of well-being, by help of the two words *impurity* and *purity* may be and are designated ideas no less clear than, in the account of money, those designated by the terms *profit* and *loss*. *Purity* is profit: *impurity*, loss. The case of a pleasure preponderantly impure corresponds to the case of a money account of profit and loss, in which the balance is on the side of loss. The case of a pain preponderantly impure is the case of a money account in which the balance is on the side of profit.

In so far as by the *medical* practitioner, by the *domestic* ruler, or by the *political* ruler, whether in the character of a punishment inflicted in any other than a vindictive and tyrannic view, or in the character of a burthen in any shape imposed for the purpose of producing a correspondent and preponderant benefit, pain is produced, it is produced in the design and with the endeavour that it shall be as *impure* as possible.^a

Of all the several distinguishable conceptions that have ever been annexed to the attributive *pure*, the most original and most extensively annexed seems to be that in which it is employed to designate the absence of every substance which, being liable to be found mixt with the substance in question—with the substance to which this attribute is stated as belonging—is different from it and foreign to the purpose, whatsoever it be, for which it is proposed to be employed.

When employed for drink or in the preparation of food, water is liable to be in a state of mixture or combination with a variety of substances many of which would render it less fit, none more fit, for the purpose for which it is employed. In proportion as it is free from

^a For a grammatical purpose, if not with equal profit, nor yet with equal expressiveness, at any rate with equal innocence, the words *purity* and *impurity* have been employed, in this discourse and others of the same author.

In the Westminster grammar, if preceded by a vowel, a letter, be it vowel or consonant, is termed *pure*: if by a consonant, *impure*.¹

The analogy, from the observation or imagination of which a connection was considered as subsisting between the original and archetypal, viz. the physical sense of the terms and the tralatitious import thus assigned to them, has not been found perceptible.

¹ See *Rudimentum Grammaticæ Latinæ Metricum, in usum Scholæ Regiæ Westmonasteriensis*, London, 1751, p. 3: 'Litera, si præeat vocalis, pura vocatur; Ceu {reus}: impura est, præeat si consona, ceu {rus}.'

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all such foreign admixture, it is accordingly termed *pure*: in proportion as any such foreign substance is regarded as being mixt or combined with it, impure.

Flower would be rendered impure by an admixture of Coal Dust: Coals themselves, when in a scuttle, would be rendered impure by a sprinkling of flour or hair-powder.

Where the foreign part is regarded as unwholesome or offensive to sense, proportioned to the supposed degree of unwholesomeness, or the degree of offensiveness, whether to sense or to imagination, is the degree of intensity ascribed to the impurity.

Chapter 3.

Field of Ethics—its Divisions

Prudence—probity—beneficence—under one or other of these denominations are comprized, it may be seen, every quality conducive to human happiness—every thing that bears—or at least every thing which, taking for the touchstone of genuine virtue conduciveness to well-being, ought to bear—the name of *virtue*.

On this view of the matter, by these three virtues taken together, the whole field of Ethics is covered: and whatsoever is capable of being to any use observed on the subject of Ethics will consist in instructions concerning the application to be made of these virtues.

Meantime not inconsiderable is the number of those other qualities, which, under the same generic appellation, are wont to be placed on a level with these three.

This being the case, if by these three virtues in the character of all-comprehensive ones the whole field of morals is completely covered—what follows is—that to one or more of these three those others are, all of them, in some way or other resolvable.

Such accordingly, it is believed, will be found to be the case.

From any number of sources of division, the whole or aggregate in question, be it what it may, may, according to the various exigencies of which human affairs are susceptible, need to be divided: divided, and at the same time, on such a plan of division as shall in each instance be found exhaustive.

I. First source of division—situation of person whose interest is to be pursued—1. the proposed agent himself. 2. another person or set of persons more or less numerous and extensive.

From this source of division, the whole field of virtue is divided into two portions—1. the field of self-regarding, 2. the field of extra-regarding, Virtue.

II. Second source of division applying exclusively to the *extra-regarding* branch of virtue—presence or absence of obligation to pursue the path of conduct by the pursuit of which the virtue is exercised.

From this source of division, the field of extra-regarding Virtue is again divided into two portions, viz. the field of *probity*, and the field of *beneficence*.

III. Third source of division applicable respectively to the fields of those three most extensive and all-embracing Virtues, Natures of the several subordinate Virtues which are respectively subservient or

reducible to one or more of those three. From this source, the field of Morals is divisible into as many ulterior portions, as there are of these secondary virtues.

IV. [Fourth]¹ source of division—Nature of the Pleasures positive and negative (exemptions from pain) on the choice or rejection of which the presence or absence of the Virtue in question depends.

From this source, the field of Virtue is divisible into as many portions as there are Pains and Pleasures.

V. [Fifth]² source of division—Permanence or *transitoriness* and thence accidentality of the *situation* or state of things by which the occasion for the exercise or non-exercise of the Virtue in question depends.

VI. More particularly, *amplitude* of the situation by which the occasion for the exercise or non-exercise of the Virtue in question is afforded.

From this source, the field of extra-regarding virtue is divisible into the Private and the Public compartment: Private into the Domestic and the Miscellaneous: Public into the International and the National: the National into the field of legislation and the field of Executive Management: the field of Executive management into the field of Administration and the field of Judicature.

¹ MS 'Third'.

² MS 'Fourth'.

Chapter 4.

Virtue, what—Virtue self-regarding & extra-regarding— Prudence, its relation to self-regarding—Probity, Benevolence and Beneficence, their relation to Extra-regarding—Virtue and Vice unmeaning but for Pain & Pleasure

Of Virtue, the effects, such effects as it is productive of, may be considered either in respect of their influence on the well-being of other persons, or in respect of their influence on the well-being of the man himself. In the first case it may be to be considered in an extra-regarding point of view—and to be of the extra-regarding kind—in the other case to be considered in a self-regarding point of view, and to be of the self-regarding kind.

Considered in an extra-regarding point of view, the maintenance of the conduct which it is considered as requiring at a man's hands, and which, in so far as he is properly termed virtuous, he is considered either as being, or as not being, under any *obligation*^a of maintaining—in the former of these two cases *probity* is the appellation by which the virtue is wont to be designated: in the other case, beneficence.¹

In so far as the virtue is of the self-regarding kind, it consists of a relinquishment [of] a present or nearer good for the sake of, i.e. in the view of attaining, one which at the time in question is more remote, but upon the whole more valuable: the relinquishing a present or nearer good: i.e. either his abstinence from a present or nearer pleasure, or his subjecting himself to a present or nearer pain.

Extra-regarding or self-regarding virtue is considered as having place in so far as, against the current of the party's own individual inclination, or at least against the general inclination of mankind, a preference is given to a greater good on its coming in competition with a less: viz. in the case of extra-regarding virtue, in so far as, for the sake of producing a more extensive and thence upon the whole a greater mass of good receivable by another person or assemblage of

^a viz. placed under obligation by the power of one or other of the four sanctions, viz. physical, popular or moral, political including legal, and religious.²

¹ The following paragraph has been crossed through by Bentham.

² For the sanctions see *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (CW), Ch. III, pp. 34–7.

persons, a man forbears possession of, or does what depends upon him for sacrificing, a lesser mass of good receivable by himself.

As to the good thus forborn, it may be either of the positive or of the negative stamp. In so far as it is of the positive stamp, the virtue consists in the forbearance to possess or enjoy some lot or lots of positive pleasure: in so far as it is of the negative stamp, the virtue consists in a man's subjecting himself to some lot or lots of positive pain.

On any occasion of the above description, *sacrifice* and *self-denial* are wont to present themselves as proper to be employed. In so far as the good in question is of the positive kind, viz. of the nature of pleasure and it is by abstinence that the exercise of virtue is performed, the use made of them is strictly and obviously proper. In so far as the good sacrificed is of the negative kind consisting in exemption from positive pain, and it is accordingly by self-subjection to positive pain that the sacrifice of the good is made, the use thus made of the terms *sacrifice* and self-denial is less obvious and seems less natural and less strictly proper.

If to the import of these words this extension be given, in this case, but in this alone, can it be said with propriety, that in the idea of virtue is included that of *sacrifice* and that of *self-denial*: and by this means, and by this means only, the exposition given of it may be reduced to the comparatively concise expression above exhibited.

That, in the more ordinary and less extensive application of the words *sacrifice* and *self-denial*, the ideas respectively expressed by those words are not either of them necessarily included in the idea of virtue, will be sufficiently apparent. To the appellation of virtue, in cases to a large extent at least, the title of courage or courageousness is indisputable. But in so far as it consists in a man's exposing himself to pain—to bodily pain for example—and suppose it to be unaccompanied with danger to life, in this case no sacrifice is made, there being no object to sacrifice—the operation thus designated not having any assignable object: and so again in regard to *self-denial*; no self-denial has place, the case not affording any thing the possession of which being capable of being obtained by a man for himself is accordingly capable of being denied by a man to himself.

In regard to *inclination*, in addition to the particular inclination of the individual in question, it became necessary to subjoin the mention of the general inclination of mankind; otherwise, in and by the account given of *virtue*, virtue in the most perfect degree of perfection might have appeared to have stood excluded.

In proportion as over the desire in question a man has acquired a command, the resistance to its impulse becomes less and less difficult,

till at length in some constitutions things may have come to such a pass that all difficulty is at an end. At an early part of his life, for instance, a man had a taste for wine in general or for a particular species of food. Finding it disagree with his constitution, little by little the uneasinesses attendant on the gratification of the desire have become so frequent in experience and so continually present in idea, that the idea of the future but near and certain pain has gained such strength as to overpower the impression of the present pleasure, or what comes to the same thing, the idea of it at the moment preceding that at which, but for the idea of the attendant pain, it would have been reaped. In fine, the idea of the consequent and greater though more distant pain has operated as an extinguisher upon the idea of the lesser though immediate pleasure. In this way it is, that, by the power of association, things which originally had been objects of desire, have at length been rendered objects of aversion, and on the other hand things which originally had been objects of aversion, such as medicines for instance, have been rendered objects of desire. In this state of things, the good, viz. the pleasure, which had been, being no longer in existence, there is no good in the case—no pleasure capable of being sacrificed: and in like manner in regard to self-denial, the *desire* which originally had been *calling for its gratification* being no longer in existence, there remains no *call* to which any denial can be opposed.

When things are arrived at this pitch, the virtue, so far from being extinguished, has reached the pinnacle of perfection: and defective indeed would be that definition of virtue the effect of which would be to exclude from its pale the very perfection of virtue.

What is curious enough is—that by the exclusion thus put upon virtue in this its most perfect degree, the whole would be comprized of that to which, and to which alone, the Aristotelians will allow the appellation of virtue: for where, for the exercise of the virtue, any thing of present inclination remains and requires to be subdued, there, be the subjugation ever so perfect, the title of virtue is still refused and to this superior title, the inferior title of *semivirtus* or half-virtue is substituted.

Semivirtutes says the Oxford Compend,^a sunt virtutum quasi rudimenta et bonæ dispositiones ad virtutis habitum, sed tamen integram virtutis formam nondum habent

^a Eth. Compend. p. 69.¹

¹ See *Ethics Compendium*, p. 69: 'Hæ autem ab Aristotele appellantur *Semivirtutes*, quia sunt virtutum quasi *rudimenta* & bonæ *dispositiones* ad virtutis habitum, sed tamen *integram* virtutis formam *nondum* habent', i.e. 'And these are called by Aristotle the Semivirtues, because they are as it were the rudiments of the virtues, and good dispositions for the habit of virtue, but yet they do not have the complete form of virtue.'

Semivirtus igitur est (continues the author) quis¹ *mediocritatem*^a servat, sed cum aliquâ difficultate, affectibus Rationis imperio reluctantibus et ægrè parentibus.

Atque in hoc a virtute perfectâ distinguitur; quam tunc se sciat aliquis assecutum² esse, cum et Ratio præscribit quod rectum est, et Affectus sine ullâ reluctantiâ Rationis dictamina sequuntur.³

According to this account, forasmuch as virtue consists in doing, without any expence in the articles of self-sacrifice or self-denial, whatsoever requires to be done, the consequence is that for every whole virtue, there should be a half-virtue. Accordingly, though with a limitation for which it seems not very easy to find any assignable ground, intimation is actually given of this correspondency: 'Harum tot *ferè* genera statui possunt, quot sunt virtutes perfectæ.'^b Ferè? why ferè—why not *penitus*?⁴ But to no such question is any answer to be found.

Be this as it may, continuing to speak of these half-virtues, they may be commodiously reduced (he says) to two denominations *Continentia* et *Tolerantia*: continence and tolerance. Of this division, he goes on to observe that it corresponds with that of appetite into the concupiscible and the irascible: continence being the virtue by which the concupiscible, tolerance that by which the irascible, is taken in hand and governed.⁵

But forasmuch as between whole virtue and half-virtue there exists not, according to him, any other difference than that which consists in the difference between the absence and the presence of reluctance, this same division into continence and tolerance, thus brought forward for the purpose of being applied to half-virtues and not before, should have been with equal propriety applicable, and should accordingly have been applied, to the whole virtues: but neither to his whole-virtues all together, nor to any one of them by itself, is any such application made.

^a The allusion here is to another tenet of the Aristotelians, viz. that in every case virtue consists—in other words every species of virtue consists—in *mediocrity*.

^b p. 69.⁶

¹ *Ethices Compendium*: 'quæ'.

² *Ethices Compendium*: 'assecutum'.

³ i.e. 'Therefore it is semi-virtue that preserves mediocrity, but with some difficulty, the affections being reluctant and vexed parents to the rule of Reason.'

'And in this one is bound by perfect virtue; which one should know that one has attained, since Reason prescribes what is right, and the Affections follow the dictates of Reason without any reluctance.'

⁴ i.e. 'For the most part? why for the most part?—why not *completely*?'

⁵ See *Ethices Compendium*, p. 69: 'Commodè, tamen reducuntur ad *Continentiam* & *Tolerantiam*; quarum altera appetitum *concupiscendi*, altera verò appetitum *irascendi* moderatur.'

⁶ *Ibid.*, i.e. 'Almost as many kinds of these can be established as there are perfect virtues.'

Unfortunately, the further he travels, the thicker is the dust in which, by his footsteps, the subject has been involved. Given for exhaustive, his division of appetite into *concupiscible* and *irascible*—as the phrase is—(*concupiscitive* and *irative* it should rather have been) is no such thing: and at this stage the imperfection of it stares a reader in the face. Subjection [of] one's self to pain—to bodily pain for example—is not that what he means or among those things which he means by *tolerentia*, by tolerance? Yes: if he himself is to be believed, *that* it is. 'Semivirtutes versantur primo, circâ voluptates, ut Continentia: secundo, circâ Dolores, ut Tolerantia.'^a

'Tolerantia (thereupon continues he a little further on) est virtus imperfecta, quâ res adversas et laboriosas cum quodam dolore conjunctas honestatis gratiâ magno animo preferre conamur.

'Objectum ejus sunt Res adversæ sive Dolores, non vero quivis, sed ii præsertim, quibus plerique succumbunt ex imbecillitate Animî.'¹

The irascible appetite is that appetite which, in consequence of anger or ill-will in any other shape, takes for its object the suffering of some person who in another sense is the object of it: insomuch that if in the breast of that person evil is produced, at any rate in so far as, to the production of it in that same breast, the person in question, the angry person in question, is instrumental, the appetite receives its gratification.

But in the case here in question, the breast which is the seat of the pain in question is not the breast of any person with whom he, the man of tolerance, is angry, but his own breast: and in short, as for anger, it forms not any part of the case.

In a practical point of view, if this Oxford Academical teacher of morality is to be believed, no light matter is the subject which has thus been left involved, and to this hour continues to be involved, in such thick confusion. On it depends, if any thing depends, the difference between salvation and damnation. These very qualities, this Continence and this Tolerance which, in Aristotle's account and language, are but half-virtues, in Theology, if the Compend writer is to be believed, are reckoned not only among the most perfect, but

^a p. 70.²

¹ Ibid., pp. 70–1, i.e. 'Tolerance is an imperfect virtue, by which we try to endure adverse and laborious things, combined with some pain, with the grace of honesty and a great heart.

'Its object is adverse events or pains, not just any one, but especially those to which most people succumb from weakness of mind.'

² Ibid., p. 70, i.e. 'The semi-virtues are concerned firstly with pleasures, such as continence: secondly, with pains, such as tolerance.'

among the most arduous, virtues.^a According to Aristotle's morality, half is but no more than half—half-virtue but half-virtue. According to the Oxford Theology, half is at least equal to, if not greater than, the whole. For in the Oxford theology, mystery is on every occasion made out of any thing or nothing.

At Oxford, to the two Aristotelian appetites, the concupiscible and the irascible, should have been added at least one other, the appetite for mystery: which, being interpreted, is that appetite which, on the field of religion, keeps itself in the hunt for absurdity and nonsense: devouring such its aliment with a relish directly proportioned to its grossness.

From what is above, if to the word virtue any intelligible meaning be annexed, the following corollaries may be deduced.

The existence of virtue depends upon the existence of pain and pleasure. Virtue, for its very existence, depends upon pain and pleasure.

It is only in proportion as it is preventive of pain or productive of pleasure that it is promotive of well-being, possessed of any positive value, or entitled to any regard.

That its dependence on pleasure is altogether as close and necessary as any dependence it has on pain.

That, in respect of whatever tendency it has to promote pleasure in any shape and to any amount, it is of exactly the same value and entitled to the same regard as in respect of an equally strong and efficient tendency it has to avert pain in any shape to an amount corresponding and equal in value to such pleasure.¹

That, whatsoever may as above be predicated of Virtue, the reverse of it may with equal truth be predicated of vice.

That as to vice, this too is and in the same proportion as Virtue dependent for its very existence upon pain and pleasure.

That it is only in proportion as it is productive of pain or preventive of pleasure that it is promotive of ill-being, or a fit object of aversion.

That of vice too the dependance on pleasure is altogether as necessary as any dependence it has on pain.

^a Observandum esse velim, Continentiam et Tolerantiam, quæ hic ab Aristotele Semivirtutes dicuntur, in Theologiâ annumerari inter perfectas et maximè arduas virtutes. Nec immeritò.^a

^a p. 71.²

¹ The following paragraph has been marked by Bentham for possible deletion and, in the margin, he has noted at this point: 'Quære? Consider.'

² *Ethices Compendium*, p. 71, i.e. 'I would like it to be observed that continence and tolerance, which are here called semivirtues by Aristotle, are numbered in Theology among the perfect and most difficult virtues. Nor is it unmerited.'

CH. 4. VIRTUE, WHAT

That, in respect of whatever tendency it may have to prevent pleasure, it is of exactly the same value and is entitled to exactly the same regard as it is in respect of whatsoever equally strong and efficient tendency it has to promote pain in any shape to an amount corresponding and equal in value to such pleasure.

That, if the effect of *virtue* were to prevent more pleasure in any shape than it produced and at the same time promote more pain than it prevented, the practice of it would, according to the persons affected by it, be either wickedness or folly: wickedness in so far as others were so affected, folly in so far as the man himself were so affected.

That, if the effect of vice were to promote more pleasure than it prevented¹

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Complete this.'

Chapter 5.

Virtue—its modifications

Intrinsically useful virtues, subservient or ancillary virtues—under one or other of these heads will every thing which is entitled to the appellation of virtue, and with few, if any, exceptions ever[y] thing that has ever worn the name of *virtue*, be found comprized: every act which, being possessed of those other properties which have been above spoken of as essential to virtue, as essential ingredients in the composition of an act of virtue,¹ can, upon the principle of utility, be regarded as capable of being with propriety designated by that appellation: every thing which, taking for the standard and test of virtue, subservience to well-being, can with propriety and consistency be regarded as entitled to the name of virtue.

Prudence, probity and beneficence—to one or other of these appellatives will all virtues that are intrinsically useful be, it is believed, found comprizable:—to prudence, in so far as the party to whose well-being the virtue, and accordingly the act which is regarded as being virtuous, is regarded as conducive is that [of the] person himself: in which respect the virtue may be said to be of the self-regarding kind: *probity* and *beneficence*, in so far as the party or parties, to whose well-being it is regarded as conducive, are any party or parties other than the person himself whose act is in question: probity, in so far as the act regarded as an act of probity is of the number of those acts which are considered as obligatory, i.e. as being rendered so by the force of one or more of the abovementioned four sanctions:² free beneficence, say for shortness beneficence, in so far as it is considered as not comprized within the field of any of those obligations.

Subservient, and in certain respects reducible to one or more of the above three, with few or no exceptions, will, it is believed, be found every other moral quality the name of which has ever been considered as the name of a species included under the genus designated by the terms virtuous and *Virtue*.

Primary virtues—Principal virtues—virtues of the first rank—virtues of the first order—by all these several denominations may the virtues here designated by the name of *intrinsically useful* virtues be occasionally designated.

¹ Bentham perhaps had in mind his discussion of the relationship between virtue on the one hand and the properties of pleasure and pain on the other in Ch. 4, pp. 261–2 above.

² See p. 261 n. above.

CH. 5. VIRTUE—ITS MODIFICATIONS

Secondary virtues or virtues of the second order or ancillary virtues—by these several denominations may the whole tribe of virtues the value of which depends upon their subserviency to those primarily and intrinsically useful virtues be designated.

Of this class of secondary virtues, deduced from the relation they bear in common to those of the primary class,¹ the following may be stated as the characters.

1. If those of the primary class were not useful, neither would those of the secondary class be so.

2. Their utility consists in their subserviency to the same ends as those of the primary class.

3. With reference to some person or other, whether useful or not to human society upon the whole, the tendency of the virtues of the primary class is in all cases of a useful tendency.

4. Of those of the secondary class, in so far as the tendency is useful, it is so no otherwise than in so far as it is their tendency to be productive of some one or more of the effects of which it is the tendency of those of the first class to be productive.

5. Their utility has for its measure the degree in which they contribute or tend to contribute to the advancement of one or more of those ends which are the ends of the primary virtues.²

¹ The phrase 'deduced . . . class' has been marked by Bentham for possible deletion.

² In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: '⚡' After examining the several secondary virtues in detail, look back to this statement, to see whether it does not require correction.'

Chapter 6.

Of Beneficence and Benevolence

Positive and *negative*—into these two branches the field of beneficence requires, it will be seen, to be divided.

Positive beneficence is the quality which a man is considered as endowed with in a degree proportioned to the importance of the beneficial effects produced or acts of a positively serviceable nature exercised by him in relation to the persons towards whom the virtue is considered as exercising itself.

Negative beneficence is the quality which a man is considered as possessing in respect of all or any such acts as, without being repugnant to the virtue of *probity*, i.e. modifications of the *vice* of improbity, would be productive of annoyance, i.e. of pain or uneasiness to other men.

By the word *benevolence* seems to be designated the disposition to exercise all those same acts in the actual exercise of which beneficence consists.

Of this virtue the field coincides therefore exactly with the field of beneficence.

Neither of them however is necessarily accompanied by the other.

That benevolence may have place without beneficence is but too certain, and sufficiently obvious. Be the action, if performed, beneficial or pernicious, the endeavour is liable to fail of becoming productive of the intended effect, much more the bare desire or wish.

On the other hand, so may beneficence without benevolence. In truth, in the whole mass of human affairs, the good which has for its spring the benevolent—the sympathetic—affection would upon examination be found to bear a very small proportion to that which has its source in the influence exercised by the self-regarding class of motives. Even if the donations made in favour of children by their parents be reckoned into the account, the quantity of the matter of wealth—of subsistence and abundance, which is transferred without equivalent bears but a small proportion to that which is not obtained but for an equivalent, viz. in the way of trade. The quantity voluntarily offered up to government to be employed for the benefit of the public at large bears but a small proportion to the quantity paid in in obedience to compulsory requisitions.

As between benevolence and beneficence, benevolence, whether accompanied or not by beneficence, is apt to experience the larger

CH. 6. OF BENEFICENCE AND BENEVOLENCE

portion of popular favour. Only however in proportion as it is accompanied or followed by beneficence is benevolence of use.¹

¹ In a rudiment, Bentham has indicated the proposed development of the discussion: 'Go on to shew that the favour shewn to benevolence is not altogether without reasonable cause.'

'The will better regarded than the deed. Why—because the will is regarded as a permanent source of beneficence.'

Chapter 7.

Of Vanity and Pride¹

Notwithstanding the ordinary dissimilarity and even the opposite character of the external effects of which they are respectively wont to be productive, so intimate is the relation between these two moral qualities thus denominated, that unless they be considered in conjunction, much of that light will be wanting, which, in the way of contrast, they will be found each of them capable of reflecting upon and receiving from the other.

The relation betwixt this part of the field of Ethics and the rest—the relation betwixt the moral qualities thus denominated on the one part and Virtue and Vice at large on the other—by these two so intimately connected relations, an odd corner is occupied which, in the whole field of morals, seems to have hitherto been the most obscure, and which, although so continually trodden, seems not to have ever as yet been visited by any totally accurate instrument of mensuration.

In the popular or moral Sanction will, it is believed, be found the clue, and the only clue, applicable to this labyrinth.

By this clue indication will be given of the relation that has place between the two so intimately connected and yet in general so plainly distinguishable ideas thus designated. By this clue will be indicated the relation by which they are respectively connected with so many other fictitious entities which compose the population of the field of Ethics.

The quality of *Vanity* is attributed to a man in the joint proportion of the value at which he appears to set upon the pleasures of the popular or moral sanction, in so far as they are considered as flowing from the esteem of other men, and of the manifestness of the exertions employed by him in the pursuit of them.

The quality of *Pride* is attributed to a man in the direct ratio of the quantity of the esteem and respect which he considers himself as about to receive at the hands of other men, the degree of assurance with which he expects to experience the effects of it, in the inverse ratio of the demand which he regards himself as having of it, and in the inverse ratio of the esteem which he feels for them, and the degree of his esteem which he entertains for them, and of the respect which he is himself disposed to testify in relation to them.

¹ In a rudiment, Bentham has noted: 'In which track a man may most *properly* in respect of teleclectic *prudence* look for his pleasure of the pop. or mor. Sanction, will depend on idiosyncrasy. See Introd. Ch. Circumstances influenc^g Sensibility.' The reference is to *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (CW), Ch. VI, pp. 51–73.

CH. 7. OF VANITY AND PRIDE

Activity and Loquacity are accordingly the natural and almost inseparable accompaniment of Vanity: immobility and taciturnity and sullenness of *Pride*.

Vanity, though it, in so far as they are regarded as being within its reach, is disposed to aim at drawing esteem from the highest situated and most copious sources, is frequently seen stooping to draw it, if possible, from any source from which the smallest drop of it is considered as obtainable, howsoever narrow, scanty and low-situated.

Between esteem and sympathy, the connection is natural and intimate. Vanity is accordingly not only not incapable of having sympathy for its companion, but has even a tendency to enter into that alliance. Pride, with a force proportioned to its intensity, repels and tends to exclude sympathy.

Correspondent and in strength of tendency proportioned to its connection with sympathy is the connection which Vanity has with Beneficence. Pride, though in an inferior degree it is not incompatible with sympathy, nor therefore with that beneficence which has sympathy for its source, yet in proportion to its intensity, is averse to, and operates towards the exclusion of, sympathy, and in so far as beneficence is the fruit of sympathy, of beneficence.

Chapter 8.

Of Propriety, and its connection with Utility

Even under the dominion of the *principle of Utility* taken in the sense so often explained, the word *Utility*, with its conjugates *Useful* and *Usefulness*, *Useless* and *Uselessness* and *Inutility*, has not been found conveniently adapted to every one of the occasions on which application of the *principle of utility* to practice may come to be made.

I. In some instances the expression will be apt to appear too weak: not sufficiently expressive of the force of the obligation which in those cases appears to have place.

It is useless to commit murder, or it would be useful to prevent it: and so in regard to rape, incendiarism and other acts which, in respect of the magnitude of the mischief to which they are apt to give birth, are wont to be denominated and dealt with on the footing of heinous crimes.—To any such applications of the word *utility* or its conjugates, the mind of most readers would be apt to recalcitrate.

II. Another obstacle to the all-comprehensive employment of the word *utility* is, the decision which it will be seen to involve in relation to the question concerning the different sources of morality. Upon the two rival principles to that of utility, viz. asceticism and sentimentalism, a plain negative being on every occasion on which it is employed being manifestly put, a consequence is—that to any person by whom in any instance the dominion of either of those principles is recognized, every proposition in which it is employed will be apt to present itself as inadmissible.

Such are the observations, of which the effect was the suggesting the expediency—not to say the necessity—of looking out for some other word which, being capable of expressing on other occasions the ideas for the expression of which, but for the above objections, the word *utility* would have been employed, should at the same time be free from those same objections. In the word *propriety*, with its several conjugates proper, improper and impropriety, this desirable quality seemed to be found.

I. In respect of *intensity of import*—no crime, how heinous so ever, but will readily be admitted to be improper. In relation to no crime, how heinous so ever, will it be denied, that the prevention of it, understand in so far as it can be effected without the introduction of preponderant evil in some other shape, is a proper object to be aimed at. True it is that, to the rhetorician, an expression thus cool may, in respect of its coolness, be apt to present itself as not well suited to the

occasion—or in a word as being itself *improper*. His object being to put others into a passion, his practice is to be so or to appear to be so in his own instance: and, by so cool a term, not passion, but the absence of passion, is expressed.

But to the eye of the logician, an objection of this sort will not present a very formidable aspect: and it is in a logical and not in a rhetorical point of view that the field of morals is throughout meant to be presented in this work.

II. In respect of *impartiality*, the *usefulness* of this term presented itself as not less manifest. Of itself, it decides not between any two or more of the three systems: with equal propriety it may be employed in the exposition, development and application of any one of them. Unless it be in respect of the coolness of it, a property which has just been spoken to, neither the ascetic nor the sentimental ipse-dixitist, it is supposed, will be apt to regard [it] as inapplicable to his purpose. Of whatsoever he disapproves of, he will be ready enough to recognize the *impropriety*: of whatsoever he approves of, the propriety. By these words, the simple and absolute fact, viz. that the sort[s] of act[s] to which they are applied are respectively the objects of his approbation, may, in a manner not likely to be unsatisfactory, stand expressed: and this done, whatsoever degree of intensity he may feel himself disposed to give to the expression of his affections, the language is not wanting in words usually employed in the expression of it.

On all these occasions, the judgment to which expression is meant to be given is accordingly expressed: expressed, and that [simply]¹ and purely, without intimation given of either of two collateral matters: viz. the affection with which that judgment is accompanied, or the *ground* on which it has been formed.

III. Another consideration by which no inconsiderable addition to the convenience and propriety of the use made of the set of words in question will, it is believed, be seen, is that under the dominion of the principle of utility, taken as the general and all-comprehensive rule of action, it will with equal convenience serve for giving expression to any judgment of approbation or disapprobation meant to be brought to view, on which soever of the two grounds in the field of *interest*, viz. self-regarding or extra-regarding interest, and on which soever of the three grounds in the field of virtues, viz. of the three more particular, though still very general grounds, corresponding to the three primary virtue, it may happen to that judgment to be built: by three primary virtues, understand here as elsewhere the virtues here respectively designated by the names of Prudence, Probity and Beneficence.

¹ MS 'simple'.

Chapter 9.

Of propriety, as between self-regarding or teleclectic Prudence on the one hand, and Probity and Beneficence taken together, on the other

At the outset an objection presents itself: and *that* an objection applying to every thing that follows or can follow. It shall present itself in its full force.

According to you, the principle which, in the case of every action, establishes as the ground and measure of its *propriety* its conduciveness or repugnance to the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the one and only true principle.

But on the other hand, according to you, it is by a regard for his well-being, and by that alone, that on each occasion a man's conduct will actually be governed.

In like manner, according to you, each man, being of ripe Years and an ordinarily sound constitution of mind, at all times is, on the question what pleasures they are the enjoyment of which, and what pains they are the exemption of which, will, at any rate at the moment in question, be most conducive to his well being, [the best judge].

This being the case, of what use, according to you, can this work of yours, or any other work that can be written on the subject, ever come to be?

1. Be he who he may, according to you, it is by his own particular interest—his own self-regarding interest, that on every occasion, be it what it may, a man's conduct will be governed:—this being the case, to what use speak to him of his extra-regarding interest?—of interest constituted by the pleasures or exemptions or pains of others?

2. Again in the field of self-regarding interest, as to the competition and conflict between the present and the contingent future, each man being, according to you, the sole competent judge as to what is most conducive to his ultimate interest, to what use speak to him on the subject of the preference to be given, on any occasion, to the one in comparison of the other?

Answer.

1. In respect to the competition as referred to between self-regarding and extra-regarding interest, true it is that between the two interests thus denominated, a strong and almost continual competition does really exist.

But on the other hand what is no less true, is that into the composition of a man's self-regarding interest enters on every occasion a quantity of extra-regarding interest, and that [in] a variety of shapes. In other words, on most not to say on all occasions, a man has an interest—a self-regarding interest—in promoting and accommodating his conduct to the interest—the self-regarding interest of others: and in so far as a self-regarding interest of this description has place, it acts in alliance with his extra-regarding interest, and as a check upon the force of that self-regarding interest which operates in other shapes.¹

What then is the business of the Deontologist? In every instance to bring out of the neglect in which they have hitherto in so large a proportion been buried, the points of coincidence to the extent of which extra-regarding interest has by the hands of Nature been identified with self-regarding interest: and this, in such sort and with such effect, that by this conjunct kind of interest—by the alliance thus formed—the force of self-regarding interest in those shapes in which it is purely self-regarding is commonly already in use, and by apt means may be rendered more and more in use, to be outweighed and overpowered.

In this way it will, it is believed, be found that, for this species of artist, there is no want of work. Nature has provided no inconsiderable quantity of useful work which as yet remains unattempted: and that it will be his own fault, if his office be a sinecure.

1. In the first place comes the interest corresponding to and produced by the affection of *sympathy* or *benevolence*.^a This, it is true, is an *extra-regarding* interest, but it is not the less a self-regarding one. *Egenus* is in distress: this distress is observed by *Liberalis*. By the force of sympathy, the pain felt by *Egenus* becomes, by means of the evidences made of it, productive of correspondent pain in the bosom of *Liberalis*. To relieve himself from this pain, and to obtain at the same time, by means of the same act, a portion of pleasure—of the opposite and correspondent pleasure, he applies relief to this distress. If, for the purpose of applying to *Egenus* this relief, or this exemption from pain, the correspondent relief, heightened by the correspondent pleasure, *Liberalis* puts himself to any expence, in this case, as in other cases of expenditure, a competition has place between the interest *served* by the expenditure, and the interest (in this case the pecuniary interest) *disserved* by it. But, by the supposition, the relief is applied: therefore

^a See Spring Table, N^o ||.²

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: '¶ Here or lower down shew that what the Deontologist has to do is to shew how extra-regarding becomes self-regarding interest. ¶ Shall the following order be employed, or the reverse?'

Bentham has then inserted a pencil rule across the page.

² See 'A Table of the Springs of Action', Table No. X, in *Deontology* (CW), p. 84.

the interest served by the expenditure, the interest of sympathy, has been the preponderant one.¹

II. In the next place comes the interest correspondent to and produced by the love of reputation: in other words, the interest created by the power of the popular or moral sanction. Proportioned in general to the regard which, by his deportment, a man appears to have for the well-being of other men, is the regard which, by the like tokens, they are apt to manifest for his.

Here again is another extra-regarding interest, but it is not the less a self-regarding one.

III. In the third and last place comes the interest corresponding to and produced by the desire of amity: the desire of becoming or continuing to be, with relation to this or that particular individual, or small assortment of individuals, an object of sympathetic affection, or a recipient of any such good things as by that affection a man is prompted to bestow upon a person who is the object of it.

Of these three interests, the two former are universally and constantly operative: capable of operating and wont to operate upon all sorts of men, upon all sorts of occasions, and in all sorts of situations.

Of the third, the operation in the instance of each man is confined to particular and comparatively casual situations. It may be termed the interest of the popular or moral sanction in miniature. Between the two, although they are capable of operating in opposition and competition with relation to each other, there is evidently no precise boundary line. In proportion as the field of a man's particular connections enlarges itself, it approaches to a coincidence with that of the public at large.²

By his own interest—and even by his own self-regarding interest³—i.e. by that which in that character presents itself to his view, will on every occasion the conduct of every man be determined. But by what branch of his own interest? It has been just seen that in every man's self-regarding interest there are two branches;—one, indeed, in a state of competition with and opposition to the body of his extra-regarding interest, but another in alliance with and acting in support of it.

Proportioned to the degree in which extra-regarding interest, i.e. that part of his self-regarding which acts in alliance with extra-regarding,

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point, '☞ Add a stricture on the absurdity and injustice of the Sentimentalist', and in a rudiment, '☞ Subjoin to this sheet a stricture on Sentimentalism, which ascribes to the Utilitarian the opinion that *selfishness* is the cause of every thing that is done—Selfishness being dyslogistic.'

² In relation to the following three paragraphs, Bentham has noted: '☞ Quere if not superseded by p. 3 of this?', i.e. by the text beginning with the word 'Answer' and the following four paragraphs, pp. 276–7 above.

³ The phrase 'and even . . . interest' has been marked by Bentham for possible deletion.

predominates in his breast will he be inclined to preserve his conduct in a state of subserviency to the well-being of those to whose lot it happens to be within the range of his activity.

But it is only in so far as it is present to his mind, that, by the action of any interest whatsoever, a man's conduct is determined: and by a variety of circumstances, the elementary interests of which that branch of a man's self-regarding interests which are in alliance with interests of other men, and thence with his extra-regarding interest, are kept from being so manifest, and in general from being so efficient, as those of which the *purely* self-regarding branch of his self-regarding interest is composed.

To bring to view these comparatively latent ties—this, in so far as concerns the competition between purely self-regarding and social or say extra-regarding interest—this, in so far as concerns the competition between probity and the self-regarding branch of prudence—this is what belongs to the field of Deontology, and in this part of that field the labour of the human mind seems capable of being expended not altogether without fruit.

2. Remains within the field of self-regarding interest, teleclectic prudence.

Of the value of the matter of present good in both its shapes—viz. pleasure and exemption from pain, every man is in his own instance the best at least, not to say the only tolerably competent judge.

But when, in either of those its shapes, the portion in question of that pretious matter becomes more or less remote, the more remote it is, the less *cæteris paribus* is the advantage which in this respect the man, being a man, has in comparison of another man who, with the same natural talent and appropriate mental acquirements, has taken the connection between causes and effects in that portion of the field of action for the subject of a more attentive scrutiny. Of the value of each particle of good—of the value of each pleasure and each pain when once it becomes present to the feelings of the individual in question—by no other individual can any equally correct or compleat conception be formed. But, not infrequently, to a pleasure or pain which, to the mind of another person, shall be present in all its value,¹ and its value with relation to the individual by whom it is about to be experienced, as correctly and compleatly comprehended as any feelings which are not a man's own are capable of being, shall to the mind of that individual be altogether out of sight: and that which at any point of time is not so much as thought of, is not capable of being, at that point of time, appreciated.

¹ The phrase 'in all its value' has been marked by Bentham for possible deletion.

Chapter 10.

Aristotle's Virtues—Virtues in general

According to the view here taken of the subject, the essence of virtue consists in its being in its general nature conducive in some shape or other to well-being: to the well-being, viz. to the very man in question himself, or to some other person or persons.

According to Aristotle or his Oxford disciple, it consists in *mediocrity*:¹—so in Latin at least: but of the Latin *mediocritas*, moderation would perhaps be thought the more congruous interpretation. If at Oxford morality had been regarded as a thing for use, a living language and not a dead one would have been the language in which it would have been taught: the language of the many, not the language of the few.

Of any exposition which, in the shape of an ordinary definition or in any other shape, is given of a thing—be it a real entity, be it a fictitious entity, what is the use? what is the end in view?—that to what purpose so ever such knowledge may be necessary or useful, we may know it when we meet with [it]—on each occasion, in relation to any individual object that can come to be proposed, we may know whether it does or does not come under that name.

To so desirable an end, how it is and in what way it is in the nature of the reference thus made—the reference to mediocrity—to be conducive seems not altogether easy to resolve.

By name, the virtue itself—by name or description, the quality, which, in respect of that virtue, is deficient—by name or description the quality which in respect of that same virtue is excessive—this is what you have throughout—this is the sort of explanation which is carried on through the whole list of virtues.

But of this quality—to know the exact quantity of it, to know on each occasion, whether the quantity which has been, or if that which is proposed were done would be, exhibited would be the proper one, lest by exhibiting none of it or too little of it, vice or weakness in one shape, nor by exhibiting too much of it, vice or weakness in other shape, should be exhibited—this on every occasion is the one thing

¹ See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103b. See also *Ethics Compendium*, p. 39: 'Vera virtutis *Forma* est *conformitas* actionum nostrarum ad *legem divinam* sive ad *rectam rationem*: & quoniam ista *conformitas* in *Medio* quodam consistit, ipsa *Virtus* in *Mediocritate* consistere dicitur', i.e. 'The true form of virtue is the conformity of our actions to the divine law or to right reason: and since this conformity consists in a certain Mean, Virtue itself is said to consist in Mediocrity.'

needful¹—this is the purpose to which the words which are bestowed upon it will, if they be good for any thing, be conducive.

In the instance of the words here in question, difficult indeed it should be to shew how to this useful—to this exclusively useful—purpose in any the slightest degree it is in the nature of them to be conducive.

In one or more words—for the quality which in each instance is in question, in the several doses in which it is considered as capable of existing, viz. the proper dose, the deficient dose and the excessive dose, this is what you may look for long enough ere you will find it.²

In every instance—in the instance of every word which has been commonly regarded as being the name of a virtue—what you have is a certain species of action which, according to the circumstances in which it is performed or abstained from, is conducive to the well-being or to the ill-being of the party in question upon the whole—is an act of prudence or imprudence—of probity or improbity—of beneficence or maleficence.

What in each instance are those circumstances? In each instance, what is that line of conduct which, if maintained, will be in the highest degree subservient to the welfare of society—of the individual or community in question—upon the whole? Of that which in each instance is the proper object of enquiry, this it should seem may be given as the description.

Follows the application carried through the whole list of names which by Aristotle, and through him by the moralists of modern times, have been considered and employed in the character of virtues.

¹ Luke 10: 42.

² In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘ Compare this mode of exposition with that of the Nosologist who, without giving the symptoms of the diseases or any of them, should content himself with giving their names.’

Chapter 11.

Fortitude

§ 1. *Its relation to the primary virtues*

On the occasion of action, in what case is a man considered as entitling himself to the praise of fortitude—to the denomination of a man of courage? Answer. On the occasion of his placing himself voluntarily in a situation in which he would stand exposed to suffer evil in some shape or other, and in particular to death, to considerable bodily pain, or to both in one.¹

In so far as he voluntarily and knowingly places himself in any such situation, in proportion to the magnitude of the danger, i.e. what to him appears the magnitude of the pain or the probability of the death—in that same proportion is the quality of fortitude considered as belonging to him.

This exposure, for the ultimate good of human society, is it desirable that it should be made?—on these circumstances will the answer, it is believed, be found to depend. By such exposure will his own well-being—his own ultimate interest—will that of such other persons whose interests are in any respect at stake upon it be upon the whole more likely to be served than disserved? Suppose these two interests to be incompatible? of which of them is it desirable that it should give way? to which of them is it desirable that the preference should be given, the other being to the amount necessary for the purpose sacrificed?

Difficult—in many instances but too difficult—to know—but at any rate here is something to be known, and that something not ill-worth knowing.

The benefit, whether to a man's self or to some other man or set of men, is the article to be purchased: by exposing him to the danger to which it is proposed that he should expose himself, he would pay the price necessary to be paid for the chance of obtaining that benefit. Whether the article is worth the price that must be paid, this is the question and the only question worth considering; whether in case of his exposing himself to the danger, the act which he exercises in so exposing himself be entitled to the appellation of an act of *fortitude*, this is a question not worth the words necessary to be expended in the proposing of it.

A question of this sort is not merely useless. By throwing a man's ideas into confusion, and thus eventually leading him to pursue a line

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Add—to actual pain or danger.'

of conduct adverse to that of his interest or that of his duty—adverse to the interest in question, the tendency of it is positively pernicious.

The act least conducive to that interest, suppose it understood to merit the appellation of an act of fortitude. What is the practical consequence? that fortitude being a virtue, the pernicious line of conduct in question is that which ought to be pursued.

The line of conduct most conducive, suppose it not to merit that appellation of fortitude. What is the practical consequence? That not being conformable to the idea of virtue, it belongs to the category of Folly or of vice.

§ 2. *Account given of it by the Aristotelians*

Of absurdity, of blindness, of self-contradiction, would you wish for a curious pattern? Turn to title Fortitude in this Oxford Compend.^a The title of an act to the denomination of an act of fortitude: what, according to that institute, does it depend upon? Upon the magnitude of the suffering which a man continues voluntarily to endure? No such thing. Upon the magnitude or in other respects upon the value of the danger—i.e. the eventual suffering to which he voluntarily exposes himself? No, nor that neither. Upon what then? Upon the nature of the occasion, on which the suffering is endured or the danger of it incurred: upon the nature of the occasion, and the circumstance of its suiting or not suiting the convenience [of] the instructor to rank it as among the number of the occasions on which the exposure in question is approved of.

In battle or on any other occasion—a man runs the risk of being deprived of life, or makes an actual sacrifice of it? The act thus exercised by him, is it an act of fortitude? Ask the Compendialist: Oh, says he, before I give you an answer, you must tell me the occasion: if it have my approbation, then it is an act of fortitude: but if not, not.

Self-slayers, for example, duellists, robbers, and men who subject or expose themselves to death, or instant danger of death, in defence of their personal liberty. Four different sets of people, for example,

^a p. 47.¹

¹ i.e. *Ethices Compendium*, Cap. XVI. De Fortitudine, pp. 46–8 at 47: ‘*Objectum fortitudinis est duplex. Vel Internum, ut Metus, seu potius Meticulositas, & præceps audacia, quas fortitudo reprimit.*

‘*Vel Externum, quod est in genere, quicquid timorem potest incutere, modo malum non sit inhonestum, sed triste; & præsertim mors bellica, cum causa belli est justa*’, i.e. ‘The opposite of fortitude is twofold. Either internal, such as fear, or rather terror, and impetuous boldness, which fortitude represses.

‘Or external, which is in general, whatever can instil fear, so long as the evil is not dishonourable, but sad; and especially death in war, when the cause of war is just.’

who endure or expose themselves to what they will, never can they by any such sufferance or any such exposure give to their doings the character and praise of acts of fortitude.¹

To account for these absurdities, it is necessary to advert to the hands through which, in its way to the eyes and ears of Oxford Students, the doctrines of Aristotle had to pass.

The morality of the heathen being taken for the Main text, to fit it for all such orthodox eyes, an embroidery of amendments—nor that a scanty one—required to be applied to it.

The word *virtue*, notwithstanding the sparing mention made of it in the Christians' Scriptures,² still maintained itself in the possession of general, not to say universal, homage. Be the act what it might, supposing it generally understood that the quality of *virtue* could without impropriety be applied to it, neither judgment, nor therefore language, of a condemnatory nature, could consistently, nor therefore would willingly, be applied to it.

What was to be done? The dilemma was a distressing one. Two Masters, Aristotle and Jesus, were here at variance. To serve two Masters, and those Masters issuing opposite commands, was not in human power.^a One was to be cloven to, the other to be . . .d. The choice was not difficult. Aristotle was indeed a hero: but Jesus was a God. Aristotle had founded neither Bishopricks nor so much as fellowships. Jesus, little, as for aught appears, he thought of such a thing, had become a founder of both, clothing his Bishops in the robes of Dives, and seating them on thrones.

To the points here in question, the judgment of Aristotle was to be superseded. At the same time, as far as possible, his credit was to be saved. Here was a knot to be untied. To untie it was not possible: to cut it was found necessary, and this was the course taken for cutting it. Self-contradictory propositions were necessary: self-contradictory propositions were accordingly employed: employed and given to the Academic youth to swallow. For this operation every Academic

^a Luke 16. 13.

¹ See *ibid.*, p. 47: '*Fortes* ideo non sunt *Suicidæ*, sive *qui violentas sibi manus injiciunt*, quod planè *illicitum* est. Neque *Monomachi*, qui *Duello* congregiuntur, cum provocans & provocatus se ultro in *loco conducta* sistunt. Neque

'*Quicunque malo affectu concitati sese in periculum temerè conjiciunt; aut præcipuè ob spem prædæ vel metum servitutis militant*', i.e. 'Therefore the strong [those with fortitude] are not suicidal, or those who lay violent hands on themselves, which is clearly unlawful. Nor monomachists, who engage in a duel, when challenging and being challenged they stand opposite each other in the appointed place. Nor

'Whoever, excited by an evil feeling, throws himself into danger at random; or fights chiefly for the hope of booty, or the fear of slavery.'

² The word 'virtue' appears at Luke 6: 19, 8: 46, Mark 5: 30, II Peter 1: 3, 5; and Philipians 4: 8.

pharinx was, or at least was not without reason supposed to be, sufficiently prepared. To those in whose arithmetic three persons are but one,¹ what should hinder self-defence against slavery from being an act of cowardice?

All this while, it was not the religion of Jesus—it was what is a very different thing—the religion of modern orthodoxy—that was to be saved. Between Aristotle and modern orthodoxy, not between Aristotle and Jesus, was the real difference. Jesus had said nothing against Suicide. He had said as little against Duelling. In favour of suicide, what could be done by example, he had done:² and as to any distinctions, whatsoever may have been made by any other persons, by himself none, or at least none that have been handed down to us.

Neither in favour of Duelling had he said any thing: neither by name nor by any discriminating description, nor in short by any description that could comprehend it, had he said any thing that could be applied to it.

Suppose death to be on both sides the intended consequence, duelling, compleat consent on both sides being supposed, would be but the combination of two acts of suicide. Smitten on one cheek, says Jesus, turn the other to be smitten by the same hand.³ In a duel—always understand in a compleatly and reciprocally voluntary duel, each combatant turns not his cheek merely, but his vitals, to be smitten by the other. To the letter, no man, not even among the people called Quakers, ever professed to receive and practice the sermon from which the precepts here alluded to were taken.⁴ Practicing it to the letter, every Christian would be a slave, having for his Master every other man who were not of the same faith.

Where reason has not only been sacrificed, but sacrificed upon principle, the absurdity of a position, so far from a disproof, operates as a recommendation of it.

The man who puts an end to his own life can never have been a man of fortitude. Would you know why? It is because suicide is unlawful.

According to these Oxford Ethics, in case of a war, before you can know whether any of the combatants fought bravely or no—or rather—since on this occasion words are every thing—whether he acted or did not act the part of a man of fortitude, it will be necessary for you in the first place to know on which side it was that he fought, and in the next place whether Justice was on that side.

Not inconsiderable are the difficulties, which, if in orthodox or fashionable ethics consistency were ever looked for, would be found

¹ An allusion to the doctrine of the Holy Trinity: see p. 127 n. above.

² i.e. by Jesus' death on the Cross: see Ch. 1, § 3, pp. 232–3 above.

³ Matthew 5: 39; Luke 6: 29. ⁴ i.e. the Sermon on the Mount, recorded in Matthew 5–7.

to attend the application of this principle to practice. Look over the whole tribe of Conquerors, scarce would you find a single man of fortitude. Your Alexanders, Your Cæsars, Your Gengis Khans, Your Bonapartes¹—what were they all? any thing but men of fortitude.

When the protection afforded to an absurdity is such that no mouth dares open against it, the more flagrant and manifest it is, the greater the triumph with which it is uttered. Grant or deny to those who in battle expose themselves to no more than a chance of death—grant or deny, as you will, the praise of fortitude, to those who plunge into death itself, no such praise can be allowed. A self-murderer, a man of fortitude? Call him rather the prince of cowards.

How often has not this discovery been made: made with the most perfect good faith, without any the least spice of self-conscious piracy. How happy the thought! the chorus of wit embellishing the substantial ground of orthodoxy.

Continue in misery, or you will be ranked not only among unbelievers, but among cowards. How often has not this comfort been delivered to the diseased and destitute—to the incurably diseased, and hopelessly destitute, from the seat of rosy and well-fed orthodoxy.

Confusion—controversy—self-contradiction—cover every inch of the field of Ethics.

Such must every where be the case where the principle of utility fails of being recognized.

At this same time, men are to be found to whom it is ‘quite certain’ and ‘altogether clear’,² that every thing that relates to ethics has been settled for these two thousand Years and that every man is either a quack or a visionary who, on this ground, can fancy or pretend himself to have produced any thing that is new.

¹ i.e. Alexander the Great (356–323 BC), King of Macedonia 336–323 BC, Julius Caesar (100–44 BC), Roman Dictator and Triumvir, Genghis Khan (1162–1227), Khan of Mongolia from 1206, and Napoleon Bonaparte respectively, all famed for their successful military careers.

² Bentham perhaps had in mind the phrase ‘quod planè illicitum est’: see p. 284 n. above.

Chapter 12.

Temperance

Temperance has for its objects the pleasures of sense. Of these there is not one the abstinence from which may not, as well as the abstinence from any, be without impropriety referred to this head. But forasmuch as, subject to the restriction abovementioned,^a self-denial, i.e. sacrifice of pleasure, is of the essence of virtue, hence it is that in the instance of some of the pleasures of sense, abstinence would scarcely be deemed to afford matter enough for so magnificent a name.

Opposite to the *virtue*, such as it is, of *temperance* is the *vice intemperance*. Productive of a preponderance on the side of mischief to a man himself, intemperance is a breach of prudence: productive of mischief to others, it is a breach of probity.

Productive of mischief in neither of these shapes, how can it to any person be a mischief?

But if it be not, then—if the principle of utility—if the greatest happiness of the greatest number—be the true and only standard and conduciveness or opposition to that end the only test of right and wrong—then in any other case, except where in one or other or both together of those two shapes enjoyment is productive of preponderant mischief, neither can *abstinence* have any claim to the name and praise of virtue, nor enjoyment be with justice considered as subject to the reproach of vice.

Difficult as it may be found to object to this, impossible with consistency, few, it is believed, are those who, at the existing stage in the career of civilization, in the existing state of the public mind, will bring themselves to accede to it. Few perhaps will be found sturdy enough to maintain that all physical good is moral, or not to admit that pleasure is of itself a good thing, or at least is capable of being made so, or to take upon themselves to find for happiness any other materials than such as are without impropriety susceptible of the name of pleasure.

But on this occasion a condition that generally speaking most men insist upon is that of choosing for every other man what shall be his pleasure, or at any rate that no man shall have the choosing of his own pleasures, but shall leave that task to other people. The object of his desire is not a pleasure: being a pleasure, it is an unlawful, an

^a | .¹

¹ See Ch. 4, pp. 262–7 above.

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improper one: either of these phrases bestowed by any man upon what any other man regards and would wish to enjoy in the character of a pleasure, is considered as sufficient to cover the supposed pleasure with merited odium and operate as conclusive evidence of depravity in the breast of any one to whom, under the notion of its being a pleasure, it is the object of desire.

Chapter 13.

Of Justice—its coincidence with probity

Virtues intrinsically useful, three: viz. Prudence, Probity and Beneficence.

The other virtues, no other than subservient: their utility being derived from and dependent on that of the three intrinsically useful ones. Such, it will here be observed, was the division made of the aggregate mass of virtues.¹

Of Justice, then (it may naturally be asked) what shall be said? Is this too but a subordinate virtue? if so, to what one or more of the above three intrinsically useful ones is it thus subordinate?

Answer. Before the art of Logic came into the world, and in particular before the art of arrangement was brought into a state approaching to that of correctness and compleatness, ideas respecting virtue, and names designative of those ideas, were made up. The relations then between Virtue and Virtue were vague and obscure: the descriptions of them complex: the points of coincidence and difference indeterminate. Logically speaking, they are disparate; mathematically speaking, they are incommensurable.

To the Aristotelians it is that we are indebted for such definitions or expositions as have been given of the several virtues. Of those virtues, several there are that have been divided into species. Examine them, and in several instances you will find that under one and the same generic name species are exhibited which have no assignable relation to one another—species in some of which the character of the Genus is not to be found—[and that] the modifications ranked under the name of one virtue agree not with the definition given of that virtue but with the definition given of some other.

The Linnæus of Natural History the world has had for some time past: the Linnæus of Ethics is yet to come.

As to Probity and Justice, scarcely perhaps will it be altogether correct to speak of probity as subservient to justice. What at the same time may without impropriety be said, is that where there is no want of probity, there can not, so far as depends on intention, be any want of justice: while on the other hand it can not be said that there can not be any want of probity, so long as there is no want of justice.

The truth is, that, in the field of morals, the place occupied by probity, and the place occupied by Justice, viz. in so far as Justice is considered as a species of virtue, are nearly, if not entirely, the same.

¹ See Ch. 5, pp. 268–9 above.

Between the import of the one of these words and that of the other, the difference is not logical or ethical, but grammatical. The occasions on which they are capable of being employed—the actions of which they are capable of being predicated, are the same; but for the being respectively made up into sentences, the sets of concomitant and concordant words required by them are every here and there different.

Every body says, I will [do]¹ to you justice: nobody says, I will do you probity.

But every act of injustice—at any rate, if by the agent himself understood to be such, is an act of improbity, and conversely—every act of improbity, is an act of injustice, if, by the agent, understood to be so.

For giving expression to the primary virtue, with its opposite vice, the term probity will, it is supposed, be found much more apt and convenient than the terms Justice and Injustice.

Why? because the word Justice is clogged with other significations which bear no relation—no such relation as that here in question—to the import of the word probity. The word *justice*, for example, may be employed as a substitute for the word *judicature*. Not that even in this sense it can be said to be synonymous to the word *judicature*, but that, provided the proper complement of adjectitious words be made up, the same import may be expressed in a sentence in which the one, as in a sentence in which the other, is the leading term.

He by whom judicature, i.e. the power of judicature, is exercised is thereby said to administer justice.

But on this occasion it is not ever said that probity is administered, scarcely that it is exercised.

Of him by whom judicature is exercised, it is commonly said that he administers justice.

In the exercise of his office, let the conduct maintained by him be ever so truly and manifestly chargeable with improbity, not only by himself and those who speak well of him will it be said that he administers justice—that that which he administers is justice, but even those who speak worst of him will not, without some difficulty and perplexity, be able to bring themselves to deny it.

But by no one will he in any case be said to administer probity, scarcely by any one to exercise probity. To exercise an act of probity: this phrase may perhaps be found endurable. But this and the preceding one are not the same.

¹ MS 'due'.

Chapter 14.

Veracity—how reducible to prudence, probity and beneficence

Upon the first hint given, veracity, it is believed, will be recognized to be but a subordinate and subservient virtue.

Suppose no breach either of prudence or of probity or of beneficence, no mischief from a breach of veracity will be to be found.

In the making [the] supposition there [is] not any¹ difficulty: but to find cases in which it is verified, that will, it is believed, be found much less easy than might at first sight be imagined.

Of the whole stock of information, upon the correctness of which life and whatsoever contributes to make life valuable depends, small in comparison is the part which a man's own experience or personal observation is able to supply him with: for all the rest, he is dependent upon the veracity of those from whom it is derived.

¹ MS 'there not be any'.

Chapter 15.

Of propriety, with reference to the pleasures and pains
of amity

§ 1.¹

The desire of amity is the species of desire that corresponds to the pleasures and pains derivable from this source.

The pleasures and pains of amity have already [been] stated as being the pleasures and pains of the popular or moral sanction in miniature:² the person whose goodwill is the source of the present pleasure being, in the case of the pleasures and pains of amity, a determinate individual, in the case of the pleasures and pains of the popular or moral sanction, an indeterminate multitude.

To proceed in this case as in the case of all the several antecedently mentioned modifications of pleasures and pains.

On what occasions is it proper and desirable that the pleasures of this description should be reaped?—On all such occasions on which they may be reaped without preponderant evil in any shape—without violation of the laws of self-regarding prudence.

To what length may the pursuit of them be carried? To exactly such length at which that pursuit will be consistent with the laws of the above mentioned three cardinal virtues, self-regarding prudence, probity (including veracity) and beneficence.³

In regard to the primary virtues, the occasions are comparatively rare, in which, for the direction to be given to this pursuit, there exists between them any considerable competition.

Be the person who he may, in order to gain his favour—his amity, what is the natural, the obvious course? Within the sphere of your

¹ Bentham has failed to supply a section title.

² See Ch. 9, p. 278 above.

³ In a rudiment, Bentham has noted: ‘Note: may not abstinence from offensive *tastes* be ranged under this head. Pain, the pain of disgust: disgust by what causes produced:—generally imagination. Consult for disgusts, *The Miseries of Human Life*.

‘Sensibility how encreased by lofty education & habits.

‘No. Flattery a just object of aversion or contempt, except what is rendered at the expence of probity. Prudence only suggests the propriety of not being known to render to the Patron services, by the rendering of which when known renders the renderer an object of hatred and contempt. How by the fear of the imputation of Flattery men are led into imprudent demonstrations of Pride, injurious to beneficence as well as to prudence.’

[James Beresford], *The Miseries of Human Life; or the Groans of Timothy Testy, and Samuel Sensitive. With a few supplementary sighs from Mrs. Testy. In Twelve Dialogues*, London, 1806, mentions ‘disgust’ on several occasions but does not provide the kind of list of the causes of disgust that Bentham seems to have had in mind.

power, to continue in the habit of rendering to him all sorts of services. To the value of the services thus to be rendered, what are the considerations that set the limit? Answer—those suggested by probity and those suggested by prudence.

The limits applied by probity to the pursuit of the object of this desire are the same as those applied by that same primary virtue to the pursuit of the matter of wealth. If, as to a considerable extent is apt to be the case, the value of the good expected at the hands of the person whose amity is courted (say for shortness the person courted), consists in the tendency they have to confer on the person courting portions more or less considerable of the matter of wealth—if the amity sought for is regarded as a source of enrichment, the pursuit of amity is in reality the pursuit of the matter of wealth: whereupon just in so far as the pursuit of the matter of wealth, with the pleasures and exemptions deducible from it, is repugnant to probity, so is the pursuit of amity.

Pleasures derivable from this source have this peculiar property belonging to them:—in so far as the pursuit of them is recommended by teleclectic prudence, so is it by beneficence.

The desire by which the pursuit is produced, let it be purely of the self-regarding kind, without the least tincture of the social: let it be purely selfish, without the least tincture of benevolence. Still the effects of it are not the less purely beneficial to all the parties concerned. In the ultimate result, the interest of the person *courting* may be served or not served, as it may happen: but in the mean time, with a degree of certainty scarcely inferior to that with which they could have been served by the pursuit of the well-being of the person-courted himself, carried on by his own labours, his interest is served—his well-being is promoted.

By the supposition, it is not by sympathy—it is not by the purely social principle—it is not by *benevolence* that the services have been produced, the well-being of the party in question, in so far as those services have been effectual, promoted. But setting aside effects of the 2^d order,¹ the good produced is just the same—is just as valuable, as if it had had for its final and efficient cause, the purely social principle. Benevolence, to what does it owe its value? to this and this alone, viz. its tendency and aptitude, to produce the effects of beneficence.

This, it may be seen, is of the number of the cases in which, so it be not carried to any such length as to act in opposition to self-regarding

¹ The primary effects of an act were those that related to an assignable individual or individuals, while the secondary effects were those that related to the whole community or some other class of unassignable individuals. Cf. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (CW), Ch. XII, para. 3, p. 143.

interest, to the rules of probity, no care need be attached to preventing the affection from running into excess.

§ 2. *Opposition made by an error of the popular or moral sanction to the pursuit of the pleasures of amity*

Proportioned to the value of the services in all shapes which a man is regarded as qualified by ability and inclination to render to all such as happen to come within the field of his activity, will naturally be the number of those who, each of them having in any shape a demand for those his services, will enter into a sort of competition with one another for the benefit of those services. In this case as in every other case of competition, each known competitor without exception will to every other be an object of jealousy: each competitor in proportion as the share he is thought to have obtained is regarded as greater than the share which another has obtained will to that other be an object of envy. Sufferance, uneasiness, pain in every shape having for its natural concomitant an affection more or less intense of ill-will towards every person who is regarded as instrumental in the production of it, especially if he be knowingly and willingly instrumental, and ill-will having for its natural accompaniment¹ the desire of inflicting or seeing inflicted—producing or seeing produced—pain in some shape or other upon every one who is the object of it, and one mode of inflicting pain on any person being the lowering him in the estimation of those with whom it may happen to him to have dealings—to diminish the quantity of respect paid to him, hence it is that upon the whole tenor of his general deportment, and in particular that part which bears relation to the person whose expected good offices are the object contended for.

Meantime there exists a benefit for which this man as well as every other is a competitor—this benefit is *general esteem* or *good repute*: there exists at the same time a tribunal—a judicatory—before which the contention for this benefit is perpetually carried on. This judicatory is the tribunal of the popular or moral sanction: the judicatory of which every man who chooses to take a part in the business is a member. Under this judicatory every one whose endeavour it is by alledged facts, or inferences from those facts, to detract from the quantity of public esteem bestowed upon the obnoxious person, acts as informer: by him the deportment and character of every person whom he takes for the object of his hostility is represented in an unfavourable light: in particular the motives to the operation of which his conduct is

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘ Abridge this.’ The sentence is, in fact, incomplete.

attributed, are the least reputable, the least honourable, the least popular of all, of those by which such his deportment is regarded as capable of having been produced: and if in the motive considered in itself there be nothing disreputable, nothing objectionable, the name by which it is mentioned and brought to view is one of those dyslogistic appellatives which, for every sort of motive, the authors of language have, in the language of every nation, provided in such abundance.

Servility—in this single term, though no inconsiderable number of synonyms and quasi-synonyms,¹ might be found for it, may be comprized the substance of the accusations which on this occasion are in use to be preferred.

To the imputation which this word is employed to convey, no precise idea being attached, it is therefore but so much the more impressive: and great and constant are the privations and inconveniences to which, by the fear of it, many a man has been made to subject himself.

When examined into, it will be found to mean neither more nor less than the habit of rendering to the superior in question this or that service which, to a person in his situation, according to the received notions of *propriety*, *ought not*, by a person in the situation in which the inferior stands, to be rendered.

To form an apt ground for the decision called for by the question—what are the services which, in the case in question, may be rendered, what are those which in that same case ought not to be rendered, the same course of enquiry which has been applied to the pleasures and pains derived from the several preceding sources will with equal effect serve for this.

In the instance of every person without exception, to render to him whatsoever services it may be in a man's power to render without violation of the dictates of probity or those of prudence is the obvious and indisputable dictate of that virtue of beneficence in which benevolence is comprized.

For constituting in this case not merely a sufficient warrant but a sort of morally obligatory mandate, the force of benevolence is even by itself sufficient: even supposing no weight to be added, can it be that any should be defalcated by the concurrent force of the virtue of prudence?

On this occasion, as on so many others, may be seen two opposite sets of antagonizing forces: the one set, that of the impelling, the other, that of the restraining motives or considerations.

To the proper field of the impelling forces there can be no other limits than those which are set by the cohibitive forces.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Consult.'

[If]¹ the field which, by its actual exercise, the virtue of beneficence is capable of occupying and filling with efficient services rendered to the whole of humankind taken together, even when taken at its amplest, is extremely narrow: much more narrow must be that part of it which can apply and confine itself to the demands of any single individual or particular assemblage of individuals.

It has been already shewn,^a that if it were possible that every man should, on all occasions, or even with very few exceptions on any occasion, sacrifice to the interest of all mankind in general, or any portion large or small of mankind, his own personal interest; far from being benefited by any such disposition, the whole community, were it possible such a disposition should be carried into act, would speedily be destroyed by it.

Self-regarding prudence suffices of itself, within the field of its dominion, to set limits, and those comparatively very narrow ones, to the exercise of the virtue of beneficence.

But in the case here in question, by the very supposition in favour of the particular individual in question, viz. the supposed superior, to a very considerable extent self-regarding prudence, so far from prohibiting, prescribes and enjoins the profiting of every proper occasion to render him service.

To render him service?—but in what quantity? Answer—to the amount of the utmost quantity that can be rendered under a sufficient assurance that the value of the service received in return will not be less than the value of the suffering which, in the shape of self-denial and self-sacrifice, is incurred in the course of the exertions necessary to [be] made in the endeavour to render those same services.

In the case of this inexplicit, as in the case of the most explicit, commerce, the rule of prudence that applies to the quantum of expenditure is the same.—No expence is detrimental that brings with it or draws after it an equivalent: no expence fails of being beneficial, i.e. of being productive of neat profit, that draws after it an equivalent with a ballance.

Here then, as in every part of the field of commerce, prudence, self-regarding prudence, according to circumstances, acts in opposite directions: prescribing expenditure in so far as it promises to be attended with more than equivalent profit: inhibiting on all occasions its advance beyond that line.

^a | |.²

¹ MS 'Of'.

² Bentham has not hitherto made this precise point in the present essay, but for a similar argument see, for instance, *First Principles preparatory to Constitutional Code*, ed. P. Schofield, Oxford, 1989 (CW), pp. 233–4.

That, in this case as in every other, propriety inhibits the exercise of an act of beneficence as of self-regarding prudence, wherever that exercise can not be performed without a breach in the virtue of probity, has in every instance been observed, and the bare remembrance of it is sufficient in the present instance.

Of the restraining forces capable of applying to this case, remains that of self-regarding prudence.

But on this as on every other occasion the dictates of self-regarding prudence—where are they? by what are they determined?—by the balance of an account which has in it as many separate heads as there are species of pleasures and species of pains. With few or no exceptions, prudence supposes and requires the sacrifice of pleasures and exemptions on the one hand to pleasures and exemptions on the other. On every occasion, pleasure and security in one shape are liable to find their rivals in pleasure and security in some other shape or shapes.

In the present instance, the pleasures of amity find a constant rival in the pains of the popular or moral sanction.

Rendered in certain forms, service is disreputable—exposes to general contempt the individual by whom it is rendered. Render those which would be warranted by virtue—by probity—by beneficence—by self-regarding prudence at large in other shapes, Fashion applies to the pursuit of pleasure and security—*advantage*, in a word—from this source, a variety of exceptions: exceptions in no small degree multitudinous and various.

In different stages of civilization, the description of these has experienced corresponding variations. In general, the longer the scale of rank, i.e. the greater the distance between the highest and the lowest station—the less extensive has been the mass of restraint opposed by Fashion to the pursuit of advantage from this source—in other words, the greater the latitude that has been left to this pursuit: the less the distance between the highest and the lowest of those stations, the less extensive is the latitude allowed to this same pursuit, the more numerous and extensive the restrictions.

Go back in the field of *time*. In the reign of Elizabeth,¹ in conduct—in deportment—and particularly in language, among the manifestations of obsequiousness, many would universally be placed to the account of propriety, of prudence and even of good breeding which now would be placed to the account of undue obsequiousness—of servility—of meanness—of baseness—and in consequence draw upon the individual in question a full measure of general contempt.

¹ Elizabeth I (1533–1603), Queen of England and Ireland from 1558.

Go back in the field of *place*. Turn to any of the Mahometan—to any of those called Oriental nations. In those countries—under those governments—between the highest and the lowest station, the distance is infinite. Degrees not numerous; but the distance between degree and degree enormous. There, unless in so far as inhibited by probity, no obsequiousness is *undue*. To how low soever a pitch carried, self-abasement is self-preservation. Carried to whatsoever excess, servility is but conformity to the law of prudence.

[Bending]¹—or as the phrase is, cringing or fawning to his superiors, the same man is stiff and even insolent to his inferiors. Nothing is more frequently observed; nothing more natural: for the sufferings to which he subjects himself in the one case, he makes amends by the enjoyments of the same kind which he gives himself in the other.

At the same time, by and [in] proportion to the gratification he thus affords to the sentiment of pride, he provokes enmity and through enmity ill-offices, and through ill-offices the sufferings of which, in all imaginable shapes, they are capable of being the cause.

By self-indulgence in this shape, is he upon the whole of the account a loser or a gainer? On which side the balance is will depend partly upon taste, partly upon accident.

¹ MS 'Unbending' contradicts the evident sense of the passage.

APPENDIX

Chapter 1.

Modes of exercising the function of practical moralist

§ 1. *Proper mode*¹

During the length of time in question—be it the whole of the man's life or this or that part of it, a man's well-being will be at a higher pitch, at the higher degree of the scale, the greater the quantity of pleasure and the less the quantity of pain which, for and during that length of time, he has experienced.

But, to encrease the amount of his own well-being is actually the object of every man's wish—of every man's endeavour, from the beginning of his life to the end of it, that part alone which is passed in sleep excepted.

But to each man, what is pleasure? to every man, what is the greatest pleasure? To every man, what is pain? to every man, what is the greatest pain? That which in his own judgment, assisted by his own memory, and through that printed upon his own feelings, is so. Reader, whoever thou art, ask of yourself and answer to yourself this question—Is there—can there be—that man who knows or who can know as well as yourself, what it is that has given you pleasure or what it is that has given you most pleasure?

Of these observations, what is the obvious practical conclusion?—That, being the best judge for himself what line of conduct on each occasion *will* be most conducive to his own well-being, every man, being of ripe age and sound mind, ought on this subject to be left to judge and act for himself: and that every thing which by any other man can be said or done in the view of giving direction to the conduct of the first, is no better than folly and impertinence.

Even upon a nearer—even upon the closest view—such in truth it will be found to be.

¹ In a rudiment, Bentham has noted: '1. Each man best judge of what has been most conducive to his own well-being. Yes if accustomed to correct and compleat reflection—& permitted by his passions to employ it.

'2. But in a book of practical Ethics—it is the *future* always that is in question and here right judgment depends upon ulterior reflection, and upon inference as to the most probable means.

'3. In regard to the future—inquirendum, how far the pursuit of a man's own well-being requires for his own sake to be limited by a regard to the well-being of others.'

But, specious as it is throughout, as well as in no inconsiderable part solid, it is not with exceptions and those to no inconsiderable extent, that the proposition—each man is the best judge of what is most conducive to his own well-being, will be found correctly true.

Of the practical moralist, what then is the proper function? For the use of each man, to lay before his eyes a sketch of the probable future more correct and compleat than, without the benefit of such suggestion, inflamed by the view of present[?] or speedy pleasure or pain, men's appetites and passions will be apt in general to suffer them to draw for their own use:—to assist them in making reflections and drawing comparisons—in taking a correct and compleat account of the past—and from thence in drawing inferences and forming eventual calculations and eventual conjectures in relation to the future: thereby to each man to administer assistance—in the first place, in the choice of subordinate, i.e. particular, *ends*: in the next place, of the *means* through which the obtainment of those pleasures respectively shall be endeavoured at: of particular *ends*, i.e. in regard to pleasure, in the choice of the species of pleasures to be sought after and of the situations in which, and occasions on which, each pleasure shall be reaped: in regard to *pain*, of the choice of the species of pains most studiously to be avoided.

§ 2. *Usual but improper mode of exercising this function*¹

Of exercising the function of practical moralist, such then as above is the proper mode: is it then the usual one?

Not so indeed, but widely different: and in the difference may be seen the cause of the inutility of the greater part of the mass of labour expended in this field.

Of his own authority, to set up in the field of moral action a throne: to seat himself on this throne, and from this throne to address himself in the character of an absolute and infallible monarch to the crowd below—dealing out with much gravity, but with very little reflection, his commands and his prohibitions—such is the course which, in

¹ In rudiments, Bentham has noted: 'Between individual and individual, moral advice more frequently proceeds from self-interest than sympathy; has for its end the exercise of power, or promotion of interest in some other shape.

'1. How moralist writers gain reputation by severity: a man would not (it is supposed) condemn himself.

'2. How in consequence they bid against one another in severity.

'3. To themselves this severity costs nothing: to his followers every thing.

'4. Mischiefs of groundless restraint—restrains from innoxious actions, casts none upon noxious.

'Shalt and shalt not the language of the ruler. Ought & Ought not d^o of the Moralist.'

APPENDIX CH. 1. PRACTICAL MORALIST

the assumed character of practical moralist, has hitherto been seen generally pursued.

In the character of political ruler, invested with political power, the wantonness of man has been the subject of well-grounded and not unfrequent observation. In the character of self-created ruler, wielding, like the Madman in his Cell, an imaginary sceptre, the wantonness [of the practical moralist] would be found still more egregious. In the sense of responsibility, by the fear of reaction, the despotism of the acknowledged ruler feels at all times a check more or less efficacious: the despotism of the practical moralist finds no such check.

Chapter 2.

Deontologist or Writing Moralist—proper and improper Modes of exercising this Function

§ 1. *Proper Mode*

Of that which has presented itself as the proper office of the Deontologist, an indication has been already given:¹ in itself it is neither more nor less than that of *a Scout*: a man who, having put himself upon the hunt for consequences—for such consequences as have been found apt to result from a particular species of cause, collects them as he can, and, for the use of those who feel themselves disposed to accept of his services, spreads them out in their view.

In this mode of executing the office, how much there is of labour, how little of self-assumed importance, let any one judge.

§ 2. *Improper mode*

Very different is the mode in which this office has, with few if any exceptions, been hitherto exercised.

The tone of the Schoolmaster, or of the Magistrate—at any rate the tone of authority—is the tone in which he delivers himself. He alone is strong and wise and knowing and virtuous: his readers are weak and foolish and ignorant and vitious. His voice is the voice of power: and it is in the superiority of his wisdom that his title to that power is composed.

In what has thus been described, no real mischief has yet been brought to view. If, without prejudice to any one else, the pride of the individual enjoys a gratification, so much the better: it constitutes the matter of a reward—of a sort [of] reward which, if productive of real service, would not be improperly employed.

The misfortune is—that in the case of this assumed moral authority, as in the case of political power, arrogance has for its natural attendants indolence and ignorance. Even where the laws or precepts, or by whatsoever other name the emanations of authority are called, are of a nature to afford good reasons, to give to those reasons due expression and arrangement is commonly a work of no inconsiderable difficulty: a task for which few indeed have hitherto been found competent. But in giving the laws or precepts themselves, no difficulty at all is

¹ See Ch. 2, § 4, p. 253 above.

commonly attendant: it is an operation to the performance of which every man who has power is competent: the most foolish not less than the most wise. Ignorance has not a more convenient cloak than Arrogance.

Of the combination thus formed of arrogance, indolence and ignorance, exemplification and sufficient evidence will be found contained in the compass of a single word. This word is the word *ought*: to which will be to be added, according to the nature of the act to which it is applied, the opposite negative expression *ought not*.

You *ought* to act this way—You *ought not* to act that other way. To execute in this way the office of moralist requires nothing but the repetition of these two expressions, coupled with the description of the species of actions which it is or is pretended to be the will of the writer to see exercised or not exercised.

These words—if for this one purpose the use of them may be allowed—*ought* to be banished from the vocabulary of Ethics.

Chapter 3.

Of the causes of immorality¹

§ 3. *Second cause of the prevalence of immorality—misapplication of religion to morals*

Next to the use and application of the false principles of morality, viz. asceticism and sentimentalism, comes the misapplication of religious principles.

Religion is misapplied (how can it be otherwise?) in proportion as it is applied to any part of the field of morals.

Applied in conformity to the principle of utility, it is needless and useless: applied in opposition to that sole guardian of temporal felicity, it is pernicious.²

Take any religion—meaning by any religion the notion or notions of any human person or persons on the subject of religion—if in any of its precepts it be irreconcilable to the principle of utility, what is the consequence?—that the religion is false. For of the falsity of any religion there can not be a more conclusive or a plainer evidence than the fact, supposing it proved, that in any point it is repugnant to that principle which, for the test of propriety in every act, takes its conduciveness or repugnancy to the greatest known happiness of the greatest number of mankind.

To understand religion is to understand the will of God. God is a being, one of whose attributes is benevolence: and that not ordinary, such as human, but infinite benevolence. But, be he God or man, how can any person be benevolent but in proportion to the quantity of *happiness* which it is his wish to see enjoyed by those who are subject to his power? And if it be any other than an empty name, of what is it that happiness can be composed, but of pleasures? Be the pleasure what it may, to speak of any being as desirous that it should be given up for any other cause than that of its not being receivable without being accompanied or followed by a more than equivalent pain—thus to speak and at the same time to speak of such being in the character of a benevolent one is a contradiction in terms. By a mere change of terms, can actions or can agents be made to change their nature? By

¹ According to the rudiment preceding the title, Bentham planned to write on four topics in this section, but material survives for one only. For further details see the Editorial Introduction, p. 1 above.

² In a rudiment, Bentham has noted: 'What is conducive to happiness is more certain than that miracles are true. Conduciveness to happiness is conformable to any man's experience—miracles, unconformable.'

calling it a kiss, can that which used to be termed a stab be rendered an act of kindness?

To take, on this occasion, a distinction between the attributes of God, and the attributes of man, and in particular to say that God's benevolence, though different from man's benevolence, is not the less benevolence, is mere mockery. Unless in its application to humankind on the one hand, on the other to human feelings, whence did the word *benevolence* acquire its meaning? Be it what it may, an effect is still the same—it is still itself whatsoever be its author or its cause. If he who asserts this is a trifler, what shall we say of him who denies it?

Under the name of benevolence, to ascribe to one being that which, if ascribed to another being, would not be benevolence, is on the part of every one, whom terror or prejudice has not blinded to the impropriety, a mere act of fraud: under the name of a *fish*, it is to sell a *serpent*.¹ By being called a tomtit, would a tarantula be made harmless?

True of any one attribute, this can not be otherwise than true of any other. Any otherwise than as man is just, how can any other being be just? and so of powerfulness and knowledge and veracity. From what but from the observation of the effect of human conduct on human feelings can the idea of justice—the idea, for the designation of which the word *justice*, and those others which in different languages correspond to it, have been made use of—employed among human beings—have been derived?

O yes (say some) happiness, even as you say—and that human happiness—it is *that*, that affords the true and only true standard of moral conduct—that which is in the highest degree conducive to human happiness—that is to the greatest happiness of the greatest number—that is the course of conduct which on every occasion is the most fit to be pursued.

But on each particular occasion for knowing what course of conduct will be most conducive to human happiness, there is but one way and that is, to consult the will of God: meaning the will of God as declared in the sacred scriptures by Jesus and his followers.

Yes, if in those books the happiness of the present life were all along the declared object—if for men's guidance in the pursuit of it the principle of utility, as so often explained, were all along appealed to, and the application of it to the details of human life made all along with that correctness and compleatness which the nature of the case admits of.

¹ An echo of Matthew 7: 10; Luke 11: 11.

But in those books the happiness of the present life is not all along the declared object—in those books the principle of utility, as above, is not any where appealed to, nor even of such principles and rules as are there laid down is the application made all along with that correctness and compleatness which the nature of the case admits of.

1. In the language therein ascribed to Jesus and his followers, the happiness—the utmost attainable happiness—of the present life, in comparison of the happiness or misery about to be experienced in a future life—is there, comparatively taken or even absolutely, over and over again spoken of as being of no value.¹

2. The utmost happiness attainable in the present life being represented as of no value, strange indeed would it have been and, with reference to all such representations, inconsistent, if that principle by which the influence of an act on the happiness, i.e. the pleasures as well as the pains, capable of being experienced in the present life is pointed to as the standard of its propriety and impropriety, were in these same writings on any occasion referred to in any such character as that of the all-governing principle.

3. On the occasion of any proposed act, to make application of the principle of utility, is to take an *account* of the feelings of the two opposite kinds—of the pleasures of all sorts on one side, of the pains of all sorts on the other side—which in all breasts that seem likely to be in any way affected by it, seem liable and likely, in the two opposite cases of an act's being done and of its being left undone, to take place.

But in no part of the works in question is any such account to be found, or so much as any the slightest trace of one.

In the nature of things—in the nature of language itself—so in the nature of the particular language in use at the times and in the places in which the discourses in question are represented to have been delivered, exists there any bar—or so much as any impediment—to the taking of such account?

No, verily. Where is the language, in particular the written language, which is incapable of serving for the designation of any of the pleasures or any of the pains of which those who speak it are susceptible, or of any of the acts from which those pleasures and those pains may respectively be seen to flow?

¹ See, for instance, John Tillotson, 'Sermon VIII. Of the happiness of a heavenly conversation', in *The Works Of the Most Reverend Dr John Tillotson, Late Lord Archbishop of Canterbury*, 10 vols., Edinburgh, 1772, i. 144–62 at 146: 'The scriptures have revealed so much in general concerning the reality and unspeakable felicities of this state [i.e. of good men in another life], as may satisfy us for the present, and serve to inflame our desires after it, and to quicken our endeavours for the obtaining of it: as, namely, that it is incomparably beyond any happiness of this world; that it is very great; and that it is eternal; in a word, that it is far above any thing that we can now conceive or imagine.'

APPENDIX CH. 3. CAUSES OF IMMORALITY

But, it has been said, so clear and conclusive is the evidence by which it is proved that, concerning whatsoever relates to human happiness in this life, whatsoever will is expressed in the Christian Scriptures is the will of God—so clear and conclusive is this evidence, that in order to know on each occasion what, on that occasion, is most conducive to human happiness even in this life, the only safe and proper course to take is to study those sacred writings, and on each occasion, observe and if necessary discover what, in respect of command, prohibition or allowance, is the will of God.

Unfortunately, by no examination made into those sacred writings can the correctness of that proposition be established.

Pleasures and pains are all of them matters of experience. The evils, understand the human acts, by which they are respectively produced, are all of them alike matters of experience. The connection between those acts in the character of causes and those pleasures and pains respectively in the character of effects, is on the part of every man that breathes¹ matter of continual experience.

In no sense, at any rate with reference to the inhabitants of present times, can the verity of those discourses which on this occasion are referred to, as expressive of the declared will of God, be stated, with so much as the colour of truth, as being matter of experience. The conclusion from which the authenticity and verity of those discourses is affirmed, has been drawn from a prodigious mass of probative and disprobative evidence: and this where as yet no tolerably correct, compleat or consistent system of rules in relation to evidence considered in its application even to the events of present time, much less if considered in its application to times so long since past, and states of things so widely dissimilar to the present, hath ever as yet made its appearance.

Instead of an account such as the above, of what sort, considered in the character of a discourse having for its object the causing the production of the greatest happiness of the greatest number in the present life, are the discourses contained in that sacred volume?

Discourses couched always in the most general terms, most commonly in very obscure or ambiguous terms, and which, to be saved from the reproach of having taken for their object, instead of the beatification, the destruction and in the mean time the torment of all who took them for the standard of right and wrong and for the model of human conduct, require, unless restrained in their import by words of limitation no where to be found, in a great measure either to be explained away and so reduced to nothing or to be explained in a

¹ The phrase 'on the part ... breathes' has been marked by Bentham for possible deletion.

sense quite different from, if not opposite to, the obvious import of the terms and phrases.

How long could any society continue to subsist if, among the members of it, no such thing as property had place—against injury in any shape no security in any shape: if in any shape, instead of being repelled, injury were, and by the injured party himself, courted and encouraged?¹

Oh, but discourses of this sort ought not to be understood according to the letter.

Well, then, if they were not fit to be understood according to the letter, wherefore is it that they are pronounced? Why not, on every occasion, employ such discourses, and such discourses alone, as without danger of error, of being productive of misconception, and thence productive of misconduct, might on every occasion have been employed?

But whether they could or could not have been otherwise such as they are, such unfortunately they are:² such in the character of a rule of moral action are they in comparison with those rules which, according to the principle of utility, and an account taken in conformity and pursuance to it, might now at length be established.

But if, to the purpose here in question, viz. that of ascertaining what manner of conduct is most conducive to the happiness of the present life, religion, i.e. the rules of conduct as laid down in the sacred volumes, is in its very nature incapable of being applied with propriety and advantage, what other applications, it may be asked, are they susceptible of?

Answer. To provide an answer to this question belongs not to the present purpose. Ethics, not Religion, is the subject of the present work. The field of Ethics, not the field of religion, is the field here undertaken to be surveyed.

To any such question an answer, if given in this work, would, with reference to the proper object and professed design and plan of this work, be irrelevant.

Irrelevancy apart, and even reference had to the satisfaction of the enquirer, it would be superfluous, and therefore needless, at least to a large proportion of the aggregate mass of those who call themselves Christians.

Not the happiness of the present, but that of a future life is the happiness which the religion of Jesus has for its object. Compared

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Quote the Mount Sermon.' Bentham was critical of Jesus' injunctions in Matthew 5: 38–42 on the grounds that they would undermine property and society more generally.

² In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: '(which is here the thing in question)'.

APPENDIX CH. 3. CAUSES OF IMMORALITY

with the happiness which by means of that religion is attainable in a future life, the utmost conceivable happiness capable of being enjoyed in the present life is nothing worth.—The multitude of the accessible discourses in which this position has been insisted upon, urged, repeated and enforced, who shall take upon him to enumerate? On the head here in question, whoso requires satisfaction, let him look to any of those books.

Chapter 4.

Fictitious entities deriving their import from the pleasures and pains of the popular or moral sanction—their import—their pernicious influence

Of the names of fictitious entities the essence of which is derived from the pleasures and pains of the popular or moral sanction, the following may serve for a list:

1. Reputation.
2. Honour.
3. Renown.
4. Fame.
5. Glory.
6. Dignity.¹

They have all of them one thing in common. viz. that they are all of them so many fictitious objects of *possession*: or, (as it is said for shortness) so many *possessions*.

One particular circumstance there is by which, while they agree with one another, they are distinguished from most, if not all, other possessions or objects of possession: viz. that the love and desire of them is scarcely capable of being carried to excess. On this ground, as far as words and sentimentality can go, the value of them, or at any rate the propriety of the attachment of which they are the object, is placed even above that of *money*. The attachment to *money* is universally acknowledged to be capable of being carried to excess; the attachment to *these* is commonly regarded, or at least spoken of, as *not* being capable of being carried to excess.

In the opinion which, by means of the eulogistic character acquired by the names of these several possessions, is expressed and disseminated as often as these names are employed, may be seen one of the most fruitful sources of improbity and consequent mischief that are any where to be found.

Whatsoever means a man has in his power, these means it is *proper*—it is much more than *proper*—he should employ in the endeavour not only to preserve at any rate whatsoever stock it may happen to him to

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Examine whether this list be compleat: if not, compleat it. See *Spring Table*.’ See ‘A Table of the Springs of Action’, in *Deontology* (CW), p. 83, where ten eulogistic and sixteen dyslogistic terms are listed under ‘No. VIII. PLEASURES AND PAINS,—of the MORAL or POPULAR Sanction: viz. PLEASURES of REPUTATION, or *Good-repute*: PAINS of BAD REPUTATION, or *Ill-repute*’, but not renown, fame, or dignity.

be already in possession of, but to be perpetually making to that stock the most copious additions possible.

Hence the mischief of which they are apt to be productive is great in proportion to the magnitude of the field of action over which the influence of the person by whom those notions are imbibed extends, and to the magnitude of that influence.

Confined to the field of action belonging to an individual—to a private person, the mischief is at its *minimum*: operating upon a national or international scale, it is at its *maximum*.

Confined to *private* concerns, the only mischief of which the use of these appellatives is liable to be productive is the danger to life by the practice called *duelling*: and, in this instance, though the good (viz. the repression of offensive deportments) is no more than what is capable of being produced by other and less expensive means, yet some good there is to set in the balance against the mischief.

Applied to *national* and *international* concerns, they operate as incentives to misrule in the shape of usurpation of power, or to war—i.e. to murder, to rape, rapine, depredation and destruction upon the largest scale.

One element upon which the magnitude of the mischief depends is consequently the quantity of power belonging to the situation of him by whom the notions thus disseminated are imbibed: for *abuse of power*, or to speak still more largely abuse of *influence*, is the immediate source of the mischief which it is their tendency to produce.

1. First,¹ suppose the situation that of the Sovereign. His field will be either *national* or *international*. In so far as his own subjects are the persons in his dealings with whom, and at whose expence, these possessions—this *honour, glory, fame, renown*, encrease of *dignity*—are to be acquired, the mischief to the production of which the language in question leads is—invasion of popular rights, and, in case of non-resistance, oppression and misrule, in case of resistance, *civil war*.

In so far as the rulers and subjects of any foreign state are the persons in his dealings with whom, and at the expence of whom, these same possessions are to be acquired, the mischief is that of war at large, alias foreign war: which being interpreted is murder, rape, depredation and destruction carried on upon the largest scale, at the expence as well of his own subjects as of the ruler and subjects of the foreign state.

Of this all-comprehensive mass of wickedness and profligacy, it is only the sovereign that can be the actual and principal perpetrator. But the function of instigator, of would-be accessory before the fact, is

¹ Bentham does not go on to add a second point.

a part which, in the situation of subject, it is open to any man to operate in the situation, for example, of Official Counsellor—of Member of a Popular Assembly—Member of a free and unofficial association—or to speak of that which, though last mentioned, is not least—viz. that of conductor of a public newspaper.

That the quantity of these ideal possessions which, in the situation of sovereign, it will be in a man's power to possess is in proportion to the quantity of power, in the *national* and in the *international* sense, which he possesses—the power which he and his subjects possess with reference to the rulers and subjects of other nations—and the power which he possesses with reference to, and at the expence of, his own subjects is manifest enough. But according to the notions respectively attached to these names, the desire of national honour, national glory, national fame, national renown, national dignity, can not be carried to excess: therefore neither can the desire of the sole and necessary means by which a man can acquire these same invaluable possessions be carried to excess: the desire and pursuit [of] the respective means, viz. foreign conquest, usurpation foreign and domestic, murder, rape, depredation and destruction committed abroad, committed at home, committed every where—the desire and endeavour to committ or cause to be committed all those acts which, when committed by unofficial hands, are spoken of and punished in the character of *crimes*—therefore neither can criminality in any shape be carried to excess.

That instances may be found, in which, by exertions other than those which, as above, consist in abuse of power, the class of possessions here in question are now and then spoken of as having been obtained is not to be denied: for instance, by the enactment of wise laws, by the manifestation of the virtue of justice in transactions with foreign nations.

But it is only by a long-continued series of operations carried on in those directions respectively, or by some one operation carried on upon a scale of extraordinary magnitude, that by any such innoxious means any the least particle of these brilliant possessions is commonly spoken of as having been acquired: and when any portion of them is spoken of as having by any such means been acquired, the magnitude ascribed to it is so small, that, in comparison of that which is continually spoken of as acquirable and acquired by those pernicious and flagitious means, it shrinks into insignificance.

If these observations are well-grounded, the consequence seems to be that in so far as, without confining the recommendation to those particular cases in which, of these same brilliant possessions, some small stock is considered as acquirable by innoxious means, a man

speaks of them in terms of which the tendency is to engage men in the indiscriminate endeavour to acquire them by any means, and thence by these same flagitious means, the part he acts is that of a species of malefactor, in comparison of whom a common incendiary is as much inferior in the scale of mischievousness as the greatest quantity of mischief in all shapes capable of being perpetrated by a single act of incendiarism is inferior to the greatest quantity of mischief capable of being perpetrated by a foreign or domestic war.

One supposition there is—and but one—in which, taken as above according to the import commonly attached to them, these stimuli might be innoxious. This is if, instead of covering in its application a whole nation or its rulers, it is even not only confined to the class of military men, but in its application to them, confined to the time of actual warfare.¹

The mischief would be no worse, nor any other than that of an inapposite and incongruous expression, if, by the acquisition of these tinsel possessions, nothing else were either meant or supposed to be meant than the advancement of the public and general *interest* of mankind or even of the political state to the use of which all this stock of honour, glory, fame, renown, and dignity was to be purchased.

But no: when these radiant possessions are in view, of no such sordid object as that which is designated by the term *interest* is any account to be taken—any provision made. To them, or though it be but to the hope of them, on every occasion is that coarse and vulgar possession to be sacrificed: to *that* on no occasion is the sacrifice of any the least particle of any of them ever to be made.²

After exception made of the comparatively narrow field of action above indicated, power being the net by the employment [of] which the brilliant possessions here in question are fished for, the pursuit of the pleasures of the popular or moral [sanction]³ by this track coincides with the pursuit of the pleasures of power: and, as above, it is not by the use of that instrument, but by the abuse of it, that in this case these pleasures are endeavoured to be attained.

Striking is the contrast here exhibited by the composure with which the application of these stimuli, with the effect, if not for the purpose of, engaging men in the pursuing of these most pernicious of all pleasures to excess, is commonly contemplated, and the jealousy with

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Go on to say, that it is not thus confined. The poison conveyed by it is inhaled by the whole people, as well as by its rulers.'

² In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Add yet national interest may be more undeviatingly and unexceptionably pursued—pursued without danger to probity or prudence—than private interest. By acquisition of territory, private interest may be advanced: not so public. Neither by conquest nor by colonization: the interest of the *ruling few*, yes; but not that of the subject many.'

³ MS 'portion' appears to be a slip.

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which the pursuit of the pleasures of sense, and in particular those of the sexual appetite, is regarded. Yet how vast the superiority of the least mischief produced by the excessive pursuit of the pleasures of the moral or popular sanction derived from this source—of the pleasures derivable from power so employed and the greatest mischief producible by the pursuit of any of the pleasures of sense!¹

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘~~Go~~ Go on to state the immediate certain good of pl. of sense alloyed only by uncertain evil, and per contrà the absence of all good derivable from the pursuit of power *so* pursued.’

DIDACOLOGIA

Chapter 1.

Art and Science Division

Condillac¹ was a French Abbé.^a When young he had served an apprenticeship to the Greek Statuary, so well known to the Dilettanti by the name of Pygmalion.² In his workshop he had learnt that secret which to Statuaries is what the philosopher's stone is to Chemists, the art of giving life to clay or marble. Pygmalion's practical object in the animating of his statue was, as every body knows, the pleasure [of] teaching it, or to speak more properly, of teaching *her*, the art of love. Condillac, being by this time an Abbé, and in that quality finding sufficient ready-made flesh and blood at his command for any such didactic experiment, and being moreover a man of an independent mind and an original cast of character, determined, instead of making himself the servile copyist in the trade of his master, to teach logic to his Iconia,³ instead of love.

In this view, instead of cramming her all at once with the five senses—not to speak of the sixth sense,⁴ which how necessary so ever to the purpose of the Greek⁵ would have been quite foreign to the new purpose of this Frenchman, he found it necessary to proceed upon a more economical plan, and to *begin* at least with furnishing them to her one by one.

For matter for one of her first exercises, he took Aristotle's logic in hand, and proposed to himself to teach her the ten Predicaments,

^a Like so many other histories of modern date, the present is a history, partly of what in the way in question the hero actually did, partly what he might have done. What he actually did may be seen in a little work in one or two small 12^{mo} volumes intituled *Traité des Sensations*.⁶ It is not known to have ever been translated into English—though on the subject of Logic it contains a quantity of information not derivable from any other source.

¹ Étienne Bonnot, Abbé de Condillac (1715–80), French philosopher.

² In Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, x. 248–96, Pygmalion, King of Cyprus, carved an ivory statue of a woman with which he fell in love and which, in answer to his prayer, was brought to life by the goddess Aphrodite.

³ Bentham has supplied this name for Condillac's statue.

⁴ The 'sixth sense' is the sexual appetite: see 'A Table of the Springs of Action' in *Deontology* (CW), pp. 79–115 at 80.

⁵ i.e. Pygmalion.
⁶ Condillac was author of *Traité des Sensations, a Madame la Comtesse de Vassé*, 2 vols., London, 1754. Condillac explained in the 'Dedication' that he had imagined a statue constructed internally like a human being, but without any ideas in its mind. The marble exterior of the statue prevented the use of any of its senses, which were then gradually opened up, beginning with the smell, in order to receive the appropriate sensations and to ascertain the knowledge that the statue would thereby possess.

and by means of the ten Predicaments proposed to himself to teach her the nature of those fictitious entities called Abstractions.¹ When it came to the point, he found that Aristotle's list was not quite so well made up as it might have been, and doubtless would have been had the ingenious Greek had the advantage of consulting with Locke and a few others.

In teaching her those predicaments his plan was to begin with those, if any such there were, the nature [of] which could be taught without taking into consideration any others.

In all new courses of experiment there is commonly a good deal of fumbling: of the crude conceptions that occurred to him, and the unsuccessful trials that took place in consequence, mention need not be made: of a few of those by which it appeared that more or less light was thrown upon the subject, a short and plain account will suffice for the present purpose.

1. & 2. With the smell and the taste little or nothing (he found) was to be done: no predicament learnt nor any thing like a predicament.

1. Giving her the sense of smelling, he presented her with a rose. The smell of the rose excepted, in the way of logic nothing was taught by the experiment: she liked the smell very well but she knew not what it came from: whether from a rose-tree, from Otto of roses, or from the *esprit de Rose*.²

2. Equally limited was the science she made herself mistress of when endowed with the sense of taste.³ A slice of pine apple was no less agreeable to her than the rose had been: but all she learnt from it was the taste of pine apples.⁴

3. He gave her the sense of sight: and now for the first time began her schooling: smelling and tasting were no better than child's play.

The first thing he presented to her view was a round spot:—nothing was to be learnt from the round spot. With a little alteration, the round spot was converted into a triangle:⁵ and now commenced her logic—by this triangle was furnished the first lesson she learnt in the art of logic. The triangle happened to [be] an equilateral one: not but that any other might have done nearly as well. Being a triangle it had three points or corners. Look there, says he, at those points: on the left,

¹ No attempt is made by Condillac to teach Aristotle's predicaments to his statue.

² See Condillac, *Traité des Sensations*, i. 17–21, where the statue is exposed to the smell of a rose, amongst other flowers, whereupon it also begins to enjoy, when the smell is pleasant, or to suffer, when it is unpleasant.

³ See *ibid.*, i. 150–6.

⁴ The reference to the tasting of pineapples is Bentham's invention.

⁵ In Condillac, *Traité des Sensations*, i. 157–99, when the statue is given the sense of sight, it is able to discriminate between varying colours, but does not at that point recognize specific shapes. It is only when the statue combines the senses of sight and touch that it is able to distinguish shapes, namely a globe from a cube in Condillac's example, rather than a round spot and a triangle (see *ibid.*, ii. 39–42).

one: on the right, a second: above them both, a third: here you have numbers one, two, three.¹

But when the predicament of number was thus made sensible to her, the predicament of figure was made sensible to her at the same time: for in these three points the triangle had its bounds, and by these bounds its figure was determined.

To make the matter the clearer, he presented to her, by the side of this triangular spot, the round one. From that round one, viewed by itself, nothing had been to be learnt. A figure it had: but being so perfectly uniform and presenting to view but one number, it had [not] presented her with any such idea as that of figure—no more than the smell of the rose, or the taste of the pine apple, had done. But now being placed by the side of the triangle, and her eye passing continually from the one to the other, the difference between the one and the other was as often presented to her, and by the contrast her ideas of figure became every moment more and more distinct as well as from the first moment more extensive.

By knowing what number is, she already had some notion of what arithmetic is: and by knowing what figure is she had moreover some notion of what geometry is. He would have been glad to have given her a correspondent notion of what Algebra is: but this he found impossible, till she had become more or less acquainted with the use of language. Arithmetic has for its subject, number, directly and independently expressed: viz. the several modifications of it all of them expressed by so many determinate, absolute and appropriate names. Algebra has for its subject number and numbers: but these expressed in every instance not by any determinate and absolute names, but by names indicative in each instance of some relation borne by the object in question to some determinate number or numbers which sooner or later may be presented to view by their respective names, but which as yet are not presented to view.²

Entering upon the field of mesology,³ we shall find Science occupying a compartment over a portion of which only, and that comparatively a small one, it belongs to art to follow her; always excepted that species and quantity of Art, the exercise of which being necessarily employed in the acquisition of the science, is therefore inseparably attached to it.

¹ In *ibid.*, i. 90–6, the statue, when given the sense of smell alone, gains ideas of number, but is probably unable to count beyond 3. The statue, however, further extends its ideas of number when given the sense of touch (see *ibid.* 280–2).

Hereafter, Bentham appears to be devising his own account of the education of the statue, rather than following that of Condillac.

² According to the pagination, and assuming the present ordering is correct, four pages are missing at this point.

³ MS orig. 'mesognosy'.

Contributory to well-being, human well-being, and its opposite are or may be, for they have been supposed to be, all beings of which we have any notion as well as all with which we have any acquaintance. If so it be, then so it is that with that portion of the field of eudæmonics which is occupied by mesognosy, the whole field of *ontology*, a word more in use in former days than at present, and employed to signify the science of *being* in general, is coincident.

Perceptible and *inferential*—[under]¹ one or other of these names will every imaginable being be comprized: perceptible all those portions of matter, combined or uncombined with mind, endowed with life or not endowed with life, endowed with animal life as well as vegetable, the existence of which is certified to us by the direct evidence of our senses: inferential, those of the existence of which our persuasion is derived, as the word expresses, from inference, inference deduced from that same direct evidence: among inferential, one supreme—one being by which all others were made and are ruled:² subordinate, the soul of man in a state of separation from the body, together with such other spirits more or less good or bad, more or less powerful, as, under the name of Angels, Devils or any other names, might, if a copy were in our possession, be found contained in the catalogue of existence.

To some the notion of the existence of mind, at least in any other character than that of an attribute of certain portions of matter, to others the notion of the existence of matter, has appeared erroneous. To the design of a work such as the present it would not be apposite to take a part on any side of any such question: on the wrong side it would be wrong, on the right side it would be irrelevant.

The principle of the division expressed by the adjuncts perceptible and inferential was taken from S^t Paul, who says clearly and decidedly that God was never seen by any man. *τον Θεον ουδεις εωρακε πωποτε.*³

To those to whom the notion of the existence of *light* and *heat* respectively in the character of separate bodies or portions of matter has appeared erroneous, the notion that these names are aptly expressive of so many attributes or affections of other portions of matter has not appeared erroneous.

To those to whom the notion [of] existence of mind in a state of separation from matter has appeared erroneous, the notion that this name is aptly expressive of a certain attribute or affection of which in certain circumstances particular portions of matter are susceptible will hardly appear erroneous. In this case as well as in the opposite one, the practice of speaking of mind in the character of a subject of

¹ MS 'to'.

² Bentham perhaps had in mind Colossians 1: 16–17.

³ I Timothy 6: 16: 'no man hath seen, nor can see God'.

science distinct from matter can not, it is supposed, present itself, as having any thing of impropriety in it.

For the designation of the general term science, considered as applying to this or that particular portion of the field of science, on some occasions or by some persons the termination *logy*, on [or]¹ by others the termination *gnosy*, is preferred: on other occasions, or by some persons, to give compactness to the appellative, both are discarded, and the termination *-cs*, a termination derived from the Greek and employed as designative of an adjective of which the substantive is subintellected, is preferred:^a—all taken from the Greek, the language without which scarce any new names could, by our barbarism-sprung language, be framed, and consequently scarce any new views of things expressed or taken, nor in so far as former ones are either incorrect or incomplete, any true ones be so much as formed.

Somatology, *somatognosy*, or *somatics*:^b *psychology*, *psychognosy* or *psychics*^c—to one or other of these denominations will every branch of science which has for its subject the field of (to us) perceptible existence—the class of (to us) perceptible beings—be found referable.

Physioplactic, anthropoplactic—by one or other of these appellatives will the condition of all beings by which any part of the field of somatics is seen to be occupied be found referable: *physioplactic*, the state in which, being found in the bosom, they are supposed to have been formed by the hands, of *Nature*: anthropoplactic, the state into which, after having been torn from the bosom of nature, they have been brought by human labour.

In the labour or course of the operations by which, under the hands of man, forms are given to bodies different in any respect from those into which they are cast by nature, they may be considered at two different portions of time or stages: viz. 1. the stage during which, with a view to the advancement whether of art or science or of both in one, trials are made of the different forms into which they may be cast, of the different properties immediately or eventually conducive to man's well-being they may be discovered or made to possess, and of the different points of view in which, for that purpose, they may be contemplated and subjected to examination: 2. the stage at which, by the light of a more or less considerable mass of knowledge derived

^a Examples: *mathematics*, *dynamics*, *therapeutics*, *æsthetics*, *tactics*.

^b From the Greek word for body, viz. σωμα.

^c From the Greek word for soul, viz. ψυχη.

¹ MS 'and'. Bentham has emended 'and' to 'or' on the two other occasions on which he refers to 'some occasions or some persons'.

from such trials, means having been found of casting them into such and such useful forms, and thereby enduing them with such and such useful properties, the casting them into those forms and enduing them with those properties has become the regular and extensive result of an established course of practice.

In their *physioplasic* state—in the state in which they are fashioned by the hands of nature, bodies form the contents and subject of that portion of the field of Somatics which is so generally but so inexpressively designated by the appellation of Natural History, and which, the term *physiology* having by a narrower application been unfitted for this use, may more expressively and aptly, it should seem, be designated by the term *Physiognosy*.

In so far as they are considered as forming the subject of those preliminary trials and examinations which, as above, serve as the foundations for those ulterior operations by which they are rendered subservient to general use, they form the contents of that portion of the field of Somatics which also very generally, but not the less inappositely, has been termed sometimes *Natural Philosophy*,^a sometimes Experimental^b Philosophy, but which neither unaptly nor unexpressively may, it is supposed, be termed Empiric Somatology.

In so far as they are cast into those forms into which, being cast, and endued with those properties with which, being endued, they are considered as having, on an established course of practice, [been] fitted for man's use and in some shape or other, immediate or unimmediate, rendered or qualified for being rendered subservient to the universal end, human well-being, they form the contents of that portion of the field of Somatics which, from a Greek word signifying art,¹ may not unappositely[?], nor even uncustomarily, be distinguished by the appellation of the field of *Technology*, or of the *arts*—of the portions of science belonging to the several arts—understand

^a {Philosophy.} In the original Greek compounded of two words by one of which love is designated, and by the other wisdom,² Philosophy, in its original sense at least, meant neither more nor less than *the love of wisdom*: the love of wisdom, with whatsoever subject conversant, from whatsoever source derived. But wisdom, is this the only source from which it is derivable or derived? and by the active exertions of the Empiric Somatologist is nothing more effected than the manifestation of the passive affection termed *love*?

^b {Experimental Philosophy.} The properties of bodies taken in their physioplasic state, are they the only subjects of *experiment*? Every political constitution at the time of its being new—every act of legislation or even administration, in so far as it has any thing new in it, is it not among the subjects of Experimental practice?

¹ i.e. τέχνη.

² i.e. φίλος and σοφία.

the generally useful, and nothing is so surely useful as that which is actually agreeable,—of the generally useful, *arts*.

In the attention which it applies to its subjects, somatology may either apply indiscriminately to all the properties observable in them, or confine itself to any one or more of them to the exclusion of the rest: in the first case, ageledoidioscopic, or for shortness ageledoscopic, in the other case, choristodioscopic, or for shortness choristoscopic, are the names by which it may respectively be distinguished.

Vacuity, rest, time, figure, quantity—all these form so many distinguishable subjects of choristodioscopic somatics.

Of *vacuity* it may seem that it belongs not to the properties of body. But, be the body what it may, and be the place which at the time in question it occupies what it may, it may as easily be conceived to be absent from as present at and in that place. To be either in or out of any given place is therefore among the properties of body: for if there were no such being as a body, there would be no such distinction as that between place and place.

It is only by abstraction that the idea of rest can be formed any more than that of body: it has for its ground the idea of place. It is the absence of motion, and of motion itself no idea can be formed but what has for its ground the idea of place.

Take at any time into consideration any body, considering it with reference to the place which at that same time it occupies: but of that same place conceive it removed, and into that same place suppose no other body or portion of matter introduced. In this way and no other is formed the idea of a vacuum or portion of unoccupied space.

In so far as human observation has been able to apply itself to the subject, absolute motion is at all times among the inherent, inseparable properties of every distinct body, and in so far of every particle of matter. But of *relative* motion, motion as between any two bodies or particles of matter considered in relation to one another, examples, real or apparent, may upon the surface of this our globe be found in abundance.

Of relative motion or its negation relative rest, no idea can, it should seem, be formed, otherwise than by the help of the idea of time. Two distinct bodies, in so far as in the course of a given length of time the distance that intervenes between them is observed to be or appears to be different, are observed to have been one or both in motion with reference to each other—to have been, one or other or both of them, in a state of relative motion: in so far as no difference in the amount of the distance between them has been observed or is supposed to be observable, they are regarded as having been in a state of rest.

The idea of time is derived, says the common phrase, from the succession of ideas:¹ of this definition the misfortune is that in the explanation given of the object, the object undertaken to be explained is itself introduced under a disguise.

It may perhaps be said to be derived from the diversity between ideas: to a mind to which one idea and no more—one smell for example, or one taste, or one sound—was present, no such idea could, it should seem, present itself as the idea of time.

Condillac, in his *Traité des Sensations*, took a Statue and, having taken a leaf out of the book of *Pygmalion*, endowed it successively with the several senses, at first one by one, afterwards in such groupes as it occurred to him to collect them into for that purpose.² Neither from any one smell, nor from any one taste, nor from any one sound, nor from any one feeling supposing it diffused all over its body, could this statue of his form, it should seem, any such idea as that of time. From a single *view*, yes perhaps—yes: viz. supposing the object of sight spacious enough to present different parts: to subtend, though it were ever so small, an angle. Coloured or not coloured, the surface would present distinguishable parts: and during one portion of time supposing the attention of his *Statua* applied to one part, during another portion of time to another, here it should seem would be ground sufficient for her building on it an idea of time.³

Number. To our *Iconia* thus borrowed from the ingenious Abbé, neither through the smell by one smell, nor through the taste by one taste, nor through the hearing by one sound, nor through the feeling by one feel, whether universal or local, could the idea of *number* be suggested: and as to feeling, whether it were universal or confined to one spot, provided no other spot had any other feeling, would it in this respect make any difference. But correspondent to any one of those senses, suppose two sensations, then it is that the idea of number presents itself, or at least is capable of presenting itself, to her mind. What if at all times she had one sensation of each kind and no more? still, it should seem, no idea of number: coalescing, the whole assemblage of sensations would form all together no more than one.

¹ See, for instance, Locke, *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, Ch. XIV, §§ 16–17, pp. 186–7, and David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (first published in 1739–40), 2 vols., ed. D.F. Norton and M.J. Norton, Oxford, 2007 (*The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume*), Bk. 1, Part 2, § 3, paras. 6–8, i. 28–9.

² In his *Traité des Sensations*, Condillac endowed his statue with one sense at a time, with various combinations of senses, and finally with all five senses: see pp. 317–19 above.

³ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Continue this or not, shewing how the idea of time is continually presented to each individual by motion in abundance of bodies in abundance, and in the mind of each individual corrected and confirmed by the observations made and repeated by other individuals.’

In regard to the sense of sight, whether it presented her or not with the idea of number, would depend, it should seem, on the figure of the surface by which the angle formed by the pencil of rays on entrance was subtended: suppose it circular, no difference any where, no number: suppose it triangular, here would be three points, by each of which a different idea might be produced, and thence the number three.¹

Of these eight abstractions, six, viz. 1. Place. 2. Motion (viz. relative Motion). 3. Time. 4. Number. 5. Figure. 6. Quantity—in a word all but *Vacuity* or *Void Space* and *Rest*—have furnished so many distinguishable branches of science—branches, let us say, of Choristodioscopic Somatology, each of them already furnished with a separate name, how far so ever from being uniformly apposite and expressive.

I. Sciences having for their subject the predicament of *Place*.

Topography, a term confined in its customary appellation to small portions of the surface of our Earth, though with equal original propriety applicable to any portion or portions of the whole universe—*Chorography*, a term not much in use, but when in use applied to portions larger than Topography is commonly applied to—Geography, a term exclusively and necessarily, as its etymology shews,² confined to this our earth, and, subject to that limitation, applicable to any portions so they be not so small as that the propriety of the application shall find on the part of Topography a ground or pretence for disputing it.

By Uranography, or still better Uranognosy, rather than Astronomy, may that branch of Topography taken in its largest sense which remains after the subtraction of Geography be designated. Uranognosy rather than Uranography: because while on our Earth the situations of its several parts with relation to each other when measured upon a large scale are never observed to undergo any considerable change, those of the bodies of which the whole universe is composed are, as far as observation or induction may be depended upon, all with relation to each other in a state of constant relative motion, and accordingly their relative situations undergoing incessant change. Uranognosy or even Uranography in preference to Astronomy, because by the word Astronomy a needless separation is made of the bodies which, while some perceptibly, others

¹ Bentham intended to discuss figure and quantity at this point, composing the following rudiments, but no corresponding text: 'Figure—the idea of it not derivable but through that of Number. Idea of figure derivable 1. from *sight*. 2. from *feeling*—witness the blind.

'Idea of Quantity may be derived 1. from number without figure. 2. from figure without *consideration* of number: but the idea of figure can not be derived without that of number.'

² From the Greek γῆ, 'earth'.

imperceptibly, are continually moving in the boundless field, from the field in which they move.

II. Sciences having for their subject the predicament of *Motion*.

Had it happened to this predicament to have been customarily taken for the subject of contemplation in its whole extent—i.e. under all the applications capable of being made of it to particulars, *Kinesiology* or some such word might have been the name allotted to it.

Taken in its whole extent, however, it presented not any such identity or unity of interest as to give birth to a portion of science having exactly those same dimensions.

In the case, however, in which the motion is considered as receiving its direction from the hand of man, whether its origin be or not derived from that source, it has received, principally from French pens, a name of its own, viz. *la dynamique*, with an English termination, dynamics. *Dynamic*, δυναμικ, is the Greek word for *power*, and it is by direction given to motion, that is to *matter* in a state of *relative motion*, that mechanical power is produced and employed.

Of the field of *dynamics*, the greater, a great, but scarcely a determinate portion, is occupied by *mechanics* taken in the narrowest sense in which it is commonly employed.¹

When motion considered in the case in which it has its origin in volition, in animal volition, is excepted, motion in every other case has for its cause or shape that to which the name of *attraction*, since the time of Newton, has been applied, or its antagonist and opposite *repulsion*.²

It is to the balance between the several modifications of attraction on the one hand,^a and of repulsion on the other,^b that the relative situation of the particles of the several bodies, one amongst another, and thence the weight and texture of those bodies respectively, are determined.

III. Sciences having for their subject the predicament of *Time*.

By Chronology, *events*, in so far as a persuasion more or less intense or decided in affirmation of their existence has been suggested by appropriate evidence, are presented to our view: events considered,

^a Attraction of gravity, attraction of cohesion, magnetic attraction and chemical attraction, electrical and galvanical included.

^b Repulsion exhibited in the clashing of bodies whether in a solid, liquid or gaseous state: d^o produced in all these several cases by the addition of caloric.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Examine: and consult *Proposal*.' The reference is obscure.

² Cf. Isaac Newton, *The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy: A New Translation*, ed. I.B. Cohen and A. Whitman, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1999, pp. 382–3: 'For many things lead me to have a suspicion that all phenomena may depend on certain forces by which the particles of bodies, by causes not yet known, either are impelled toward one another and cohere in regular figures, or are repelled from one another and recede.'

as the word itself imports, with reference to time,¹ with which is also commonly connected a reference to *place*.

In so far as, in addition to the events themselves nakedly considered, intimation is given of the accompanying circumstances in so far as they have appeared material, and therein and therewith of the real or supposed causes and anti-causes, agents and counter-agents, principal and accessory, Chronology takes the name of History.

According as it takes for its subject the transactions of entire political states or other aggregate bodies of men, History is either aggregate, commonly termed *general*, or individual, i.e. if taking for its subject what has been supposed to have been done and experienced by this or that individual. For the designation of individual History as thus defined, the appellation commonly employed is the Greek word Biography:—literally, the delineation of life.²

IV. Sciences having for their subjects the predicaments of Number, Figure, and Quantity.

Among the three predicaments respectively designated by these three names, the nature and closeness of the relation that has place has already been brought to view.³ Of figure, the modifications scarcely distinguishable, nor accordingly clearly expressible, otherwise than by means of number; quantity, a predicament including both, and therefore still more abstract than either.

By the Greek-sprung word *posology*,⁴ science of quantity—science in so far as it has quantity for its subject—may not inappositely, and if so, now it is believed for the first time, be designated.

Melomorphic⁵ and amelomorphic—having regard to figure and not having regard to figure—by the one or other of these denominations will the whole contents of the field of posology be found expressible.

Of posology, the melomorphic or morphoscopic branch has found in the word *Geometry*, measurement of the earth, a denomination altogether familiar, but far from being coextensively expressive. In the practice of measuring the earth may be found the origin of this branch of art and science, as well as one of its great uses. But besides the earth it is moreover employed in the measurement of the rest of the visible universe. Not unfrequently in the measurement of imaginary and unexemplified extension: i.e. in the measuring of nothing at all: and it is when thus employed that those by whom it is cultivated seem most proud of it.

Oristic and aoristic, or more expressively Oristicosemeiotic and Aoristicosemeiotic, determinately expressed and indeterminately

¹ From the Greek χρόνος, 'time'.

² From the Greek βίος, 'life', and γράφω, 'write'.

³ See p. 325 n. above.

⁴ From the Greek πόσον, 'how much'.

⁵ MS alt. 'Morphoscopic'.

expressed—by one or other of these denominations will the whole contents of the field of amelomorphic posology be found expressible.

Of amelomorphic posology, the oristicosemeiotic branch has always had an appellative no less apposite and expressive than familiar in the word *arithmetic*—i.e. the art and science which has numbers for its subject—the art of applying numbers to use, including the science of the properties of numbers: the aorist[ic]osemeiotic in the Arabic-sprung word *Algebra*,¹ an appellative not much less familiar, but altogether inapposite and unexpressive.

For the branch of art and science for the designation of which the word posology has been as above proposed, the word familiarly employed, is, as every one knows, the word mathematics—a word not altogether inapposite, but in an enormous degree uncommensurably expressive. For in its original language, of what is it that the word is expressive? Of every thing that is ever learnt, neither more nor less.²

But for this abuse, in the designation of the class of intellectual exercises by which a lesson is got, the adjunct *mathematic* would in consideration of its familiarity have been employed. But, in the constantly erroneous conception of which, in consequence of the abusive extension thus given to it, it could not have failed of being productive, an exclusive negative was found opposed to the use of it.

Applied and unapplied—or if for uniformity a corresponding pair of Greek-sprung words be preferred, | |³ according to another principle or source of division—a division made in a different direction from the former—may the field of posology taken in its whole extent, as above sketched, be divided.

Instead of *applied*, *mixt*, instead of *unapplied*, *pure*, are the terms in familiar use.

In so far as by *pure* neither more nor less is expressed or suggested than with reference to some correspondent object unapplied to, and thence unmixt with [it], it is simply and co-extensively synonymous to unapplied and in so far not pregnant with error and delusion.

But here steps in imagination: and forasmuch as in their physioplastic state most objects are found in a state of combination with others, and all objects have a tendency to combination with others, while at the same time, for many useful purposes, it is necessary to leave them in a state as free from combination as possible, whether to the end that they may be applied to use in that state, or that for the purpose of being applied to use they may be made to enter into new combinations, and whereas the bringing them into or keeping

¹ From the Arabic *al-jabr*, 'the reunion of broken parts'.

² 'Mathematics' is derived from the Greek μάθημα, 'that which is learnt'.

³ Bentham does not appear to have coined any such terms.

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them in that state is very commonly a work of more or less difficulty as well as labour and expence, thence it is that to this fundamental idea of the absence of combination, imagination—by means of the association of ideas, has attached the accessary sentiment of approbation, which, being indiscriminating, has given to its application an extent more or less outstretching that which by the principle of utility would have been marked out for it; insomuch that, through no inconsiderable part of the extent given to the application of it, *pure* is synonymous to *useless*.

Of these prædicaments—of these supremely abstract and comprehensive appellatives, two have been mentioned, viz. Void Space or *Vacuity* and *Rest* (i.e. relative rest—absolute, there being none of which in any instance the existence is either known or probable), which are not of the number of those which have become the subjects of so many correspondent branches of art and science.

Of the exceptions thus constituted the cause will, it is believed, seem not unobvious. Of itself, space, mere void space presenting no variety, no change, is neither a source of use, nor on any other account an object of curiosity.

Psychology—pathematic—apathematic

Simple perception, simple remembrance, enjoyment, i.e. sensation of pleasure, sufferance, i.e. sensation of pain, judgment or opinion or judicial determination, volition, volitional determination, internal action, external action—all these on one and the same occasion—indeed on most occasions—all these several incidents are taking place at the same time: but for the purpose of science, in the way of abstraction, any one of them, every one of them, may be and has been detached from the rest, and held up to view and subjected to examination by itself. So many of these incidents as are capable of being distinguished from each other, so many compartments or separate fields included within the all-comprehensive field of psychology.

Psychology—Thelematology—Noology—Æsthetics

In the production of the events of which it is the scene, the state of the mind is either purely passive or active: purely passive, in so far as the will bears no part in the production of them: active, in so far as in the production of them the will has had a perceptible and efficient share.

When in the production of the result the will has had a perceptible and efficient share, the field in which that result has taken place has

either been confined within the precincts of the mind itself or has extended beyond those precincts: in the first case the act to which the will has given birth, and in the production of which its efficiency has consisted, may be, and actually has been, termed an *intransitive* act: in the other case, a *transitive* one.¹

In so far as the will is concerned in the production of any result, the field of the corresponding branch of science which takes cognizance of such result may be termed the field of *thelematology*.

In so far as in the production of the result in question either the will has borne no part, or the place of its operation has been confined within the precincts of the mind, the field of the corresponding branch of science may be termed the field of Noology—passive or purely passive Noology, where in the production of the result the will has had no share; active, in so far as in the production of the impression made and correspondent change produced in the mind, the will has borne a share.

Pathematology—by this name may be designated the science of psychology in so far as pleasure or pain are taken for the subjects of it. Applied to pleasure it will receive the specific name of hedonology:² applied to pain, that of odynology.³

But for pre-established associations, *pathology*, an equally apposite, would in respect of brevity have furnished a preferable name. But this appellative has been occupied by the art and science of Medicine, and after being shorn of a great part of its import confined to a corner of the field occupied by that science.

Pleasure and pain being the only objects possessed of intrinsic and independent value, simple perceptions, perceptions if any such there were altogether unconnected with either pleasure or pain, would have no claim to attention—would not in fact engage attention—would not be comprehended within any part of the field of art and science.

In general pathematic feelings, i.e. pleasures or pains, and apathematic feelings, i.e. simple perceptions considered in so far as separable from pleasures and pains, are experienced together—are simultaneously concomitant. But neither are instances wanting in which as on the one hand perceptions might be found unaccompanied with pleasure or pain, so also on the other hand, if not pleasures, pains at any rate unaccompanied with any perception distinguishable from itself.

But abundant are the instances in which a simple perception which has neither pleasure nor pain for its contemporary adjunct may,

¹ See *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (CW), Ch. VII, para. 13, pp. 76–7.

² From the Greek ἡδονή, 'pleasure', plus '-logy'.

³ From the Greek ὀδύνη, 'pain', plus '-logy'.

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through the medium of attention, reflection, volition and transitive action, reckon feelings of both sort in abundance among its consequences: and hence it is that, except for clearness of intellection, the distinction between pathematic and apathematic perception becomes void of practical use.¹

From somatology and psychology taken together, eudæmonics—or the art of applying life to the maximization of well-being—derives its knowledge of the phænomena belonging to human existence: in the signification of one word, *deontology*, may be designated the knowledge, in so far as by art it is attainable, of the course by which on each occasion those means may with most advantage be rendered conducive to that common end.

In the field of deontology, as thus explained, will be found included the several fields of Ethics, meaning Private Ethics or Morals, Internal Government, and International Law.

If on ground so thorny and so slippery enquiry could be warranted in expressing itself with that intensity of persuasion, that fulness of assurance, which is designated in the import of the word *knowledge*, the field of deontognosy would be the more expressive denomination for the designation of the field of this branch of art and science. In that case, Deontognosy would be the knowledge of what on every occasion is by the person in question *proper*^a to be done.

Were it not for the extent thus given to Deontology, upon a great part, not to say the greatest part, of what has been advanced and written on the subject of Ethics, of Government, and of International Law taken together, an exclusion would be put.

^a Of this word *proper*, with its conjugate *propriety*, and its *quasi-conjugate ought*, the use made has for its causes, efficient as well as rational, the desire of including whatsoever has been advanced on the subject, without as well as with regard to the effect producible in respect of well-being by the course of conduct which on the several occasions has, under the notion of its propriety, been prescribed or recommended.

¹ Bentham has indicated an intention to insert a note at this point: 'Give instances of the separate and the conjunct existence.'

The following related passage, headed 'Connection between Thelematology and Pathe-matology', is at UC ci. 455 (21 February 1815): 'Thelematology or Thelematognosy has for its basis pathematology. It is by the idea of pleasure, or of exemption from pain, considered as about to result from the proposed act that the volition in pursuance of which the act is performed, and consequently the act itself, is produced.

'In the character of *ends* and in the character of *means*, in that double character it is that pleasures, pains, or their respective negations are continually presenting themselves. Not pain itself but its negative—i.e. exemption from pain—is the end: but in the character of a means pain itself operates, as well as its negation, pain itself as well as *pleasure*.

'What *dynamics* is to somatology, the practical branch of thelematology, or the art of giving direction to volition and thereby to action, is to psychognosy: it may be termed psychological dynamics.'

But in the present sketch, Deontology is considered as neither more nor less than a branch of the all-comprehensive art with its attached science—the art of Eudæmonics: and thus limited and expounded, it means neither more nor less than the consideration, not to say the knowledge, of what on each occasion is most conducive to well-being: i.e. in what manner the means furnished by the several other branches of the art of Eudæmonics, with these attached branches of science, may to most advantage be employed for the attainment of well-being.

Well-being, good: but whose well-being? the well-being of what person or persons?

In the answer given to this question will necessarily be included the determination of the different sub-branches into which this branch of Science is sub-divisible and accordingly, as above, is wont to be divided.

Between the several branches in question the limits most unhappily are essentially and unavoidably indeterminate. To give warning of this inconvenience is all that can be done: to remedy it is impossible: by the very nature of the case, all remedy is excluded.

Of deontology, in the case in question, the field is either private or public: for the division of the science itself, these adjuncts may accordingly be made to serve.

Intransitive and transitive—to one or other of these denominations will the whole contents of the field of private deontology be found referable: intransitive, in so far as that individual and no other whose agency is on the occasion in question the object of consideration—the person for whose guidance the enquiry is made—is the party whose well-being is taken into consideration and included in the account: transitive, in so far as in the account in question the well-being of any other individual or individuals.

National and international—to one or other of these denominations will whatsoever belongs to the subject of public deontology be found referable: national, in so far as in the consideration of the effects of the act or course of conduct which is in contemplation, in the list of the persons whose well-being is taken into account, all the members, rulers and subjects taken together, of the political state in question—of all these but of no others—are taken into the account: international or universal in so far as the well-being of the members of all other political states taken together, or of this or that political state in particular, or of this or that individual member of such foreign political state, is taken into the account.

With reference to all these several fields, all differing in extent, a man's interest will of course be altogether different according to

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the situation or situations which it happens to him to occupy in the whole of society, in the universal field: according as he is a member of no other society than that of the subject many, or is in lieu of or in addition to that character a member of the society of the ruling few.

From every extension given to the field in which he acts, the field in which on the occasion in question his conduct is capable of exercising an influence, a man receives a fresh interest which is capable of coming into competition with and operating in opposition to his purely personal interest—that species and the only species of interest which no man can fail of possessing and being operated upon by. His interest as the member of a family¹—his interest as the member of this or that particular public society included in the general society composed of all the members of the political state to which he belongs—and to the number of these so included societies of which it may happen to the same individual to be a member, there are no determinate limits—his interest as a member of that society—his interest as a citizen of the world—corresponding to all these several conditions in life may be seen so [many] distinguishable interests each of which is capable of coming into competition with, and operating in opposition to, all the others.

On all these occasions the interest which, according to the nature of man, will generally be predominant is the narrowest of all interests—purely personal interest. For any regard that is capable of being had for them, all those other interests can not have any thing to trust to but the forces of the several sanctions, viz. political including the legal, popular or moral, religious, and the force of sympathy—for sympathy is capable of having for its object not only this or that individual, but this or that portion or any number of portions howsoever extensive of the whole species, or even the whole. In addition to this sympathy which, from cultivation, is happily capable of continuing to receive, as it has received, continual encrease, what the narrowest personal interest has to depend upon for any corrective of which it may be susceptible is composed of the man's own opinion concerning what, in relation to the matter in question, is the free opinion and will of the public at large, i.e. of that portion of it, greater or less, on whose opinion and will he regards himself as more or less dependent—concerning what will eventually [be] the opinion, will and practice of the members of the government to which he is subject—their practice, viz. in respect of the application expected to be made by them of the matter of punishment or reward or both—concerning what will be [the] eventual will and conduct of the almighty being.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'N.B. Family interest is divisible into as many conflicting[?] interests as the family is capable of having members.'

When the person in question is considered as occupying the situation of a member of the ruling few, the art and science of deontology will coincide with the art and science of government: within the field of which art and science is included the art and science of legislation, together with what remains of the field of government after abstraction made of the field of legislation, which remainder may be designated, as it commonly appears to be, by the appellation of the field of administration.

Wheresoever every interest capable of acting in opposition to the interest in question is absent, any the slightest interest, according to the conception formed of it, may have power enough to determine action: and it is on this account and this account only that the question what course of action will on the occasion in question be most conducive to the general well-fare of mankind can be worth writing about. Upon the sensibilities of the individual in question, the consideration of the general welfare of mankind may operate in either or both of two different ways: 1. immediately, by means of any sympathy on his part to which, in his breast, it may happen to that general interest to be the object. 2. less immediately, by means of the religious or the popular or moral sanction: for independently of any such sympathy as above, a man may be engaged to act in favour of what he regards as the general interest of mankind, being thereto determined either by the consideration of the eventual treatment expected by him at the hands of the almighty or by the consideration of the eventual treatment expected by him at the hands of the tribunal of public opinion.

Thus in the case of the Slave trade. On the part of many of those who have neither possessed nor conceive themselves to possess any personal interest in the continuance of that pernicious traffic, sympathy for the species in general, and thereby for the interest [of] that particular portion of the species who are the subjects of that trade, may to a very considerable extent, there can be no reason to doubt, have sufficed to engage them to take a part more or less active in favour of the abolition.

But to these instances, there can be as little doubt that others might with truth be added composed of those who, though in the shape of personal interest they found their breasts with more or less force operated upon by views of interest against the proposed abolition and in favour of the continuance of that trade, yet to the personal interest corresponding [to] the interest of the purse found an opponent or opponents, and in the force of those opponents an overmatch, in the interest of the trumpet and in the interest of the altar acting in conjunction: in corresponding eventual pleasure and pain respectively

expected at the hands of the tribunal of public opinion, and the tribunal of Almighty God.

As for its end, to pathematology, so it is to *thelematology* and thence to psychical dynamics that Deontology looks for its means.

In relation to these means for the promotion of any ends which it may be his endeavour to promote, all that in a direct way the Deontologist as such is capable of doing consists in indication—[giving]¹ indication: viz. indication of the course of conduct which on each occasion presents itself as most conducive to the well-being of the person or persons whose well-being is by the deontologist on that occasion taken into consideration, among whose it is not natural that those of mankind at large should be altogether unthought of or unmentioned.

But though in a direct way the word indication is expressive of all the means by which, and all the force with which, the deontologist as such can expect to operate, yet indirectly, acting in the situation thus assumed by him, and that by means of the very indication thus given, nothing is more natural than that he should at the same time [operate]² in a more efficient character: viz. in the character of a member of the tribunal of public opinion, whose motions, in proportion to the strength of the grounds and reasons which they have for their support, these grounds and reasons being composed of those indications in so far as they are regarded as correct, will, viz. on the part of all those whose sympathy for the general interest—supported by such natural supports as that sympathy as above is provided with—is not overpowered by interests of a natural and, because more concentrated, a more powerful complexion, be likely to find approvers and supporters in a number proportioned to the skill and felicity with which those indications have been brought to view.

And with this sort and degree of influence, in so far as he is reasonable, he will find no difficulty in contenting himself.

It is only in so far as it is considered as bearing relation to pleasures and pains, that any clear and determinate idea can be annex to the word interest. Correspondent to well-being as above defined is interest taken in its most general sense. Every man has an interest in the possession of the maximum of well-being. To possess the maximum of well-being is the interest of every man. But the maximum of well-being is the maximum of pleasure in all shapes taken together, accompanied through life with the minimum of pain in all shapes taken together.

So many different shapes as taken together pleasure and pain are capable of assuming, so many shapes is interest capable of assuming.—So many species of pleasures and pains, so many species of interest.

¹ MS 'give'.

² MS 'operating'.

Original or independent personal interest—personal interest created by sympathy—personal interest created by public opinion—personal interest created by religion—to these four heads will all the modifications of interest be found in every case reducible—and in this way the modifications of the sympathetic interest, all capable of operating in opposition to one another, may be as numerous as the divisions which the aggregate number of the whole species of mankind, not to speak of inferior sensitive beings, will admit of. Yet by the operation of the above four heads of interest, the number of the actual contending parties to such a competition will in practice be found reduced to that moderate and easily observable number: for by the interest created by religion or the interest created by public opinion or both together, the claims of sympathy as excited by all these contending extra-regarding interests, be they ever so numerous, will commonly without difficulty be decided upon them and with little difficulty the respective force of them overborne.

Deontology—i.e. the mode of treating this branch of art and science—the mode of giving instruction in it—is of two kinds.

In the teaching of deontology, i.e. in the shewing in what manner, on each occasion in the situation in which a man is placed, it is proper for a man to conduct himself, the teacher either confines himself to the consideration of what is the manner in which, on that same occasion in that same situation, it is the interest of persons in general (due allowance not being forgotten to be made in every instance to idiosyncrasy and idiopathy) to conduct themselves, or takes upon himself to a greater or less extent to determine what, on such occasion, in such situation, it is proper for them to do without regard to their respective interests.

Considered in respect of the principle pursued as above in treating of it, deontology may accordingly be distinguished into the deontology of utilitarianism or the deontology of ipse-dixitism.

Being coextensive with and exactly commensurate to the field of pleasure and pain, the field of interest, viz. of interest in respect of pleasure and pain, outstretches by far the utmost extent that was ever endeavoured to be given to the field of duty.

Yet to the word interest, throughout the whole course of his enquiry into what is proper to be done, the ipse-dixital deontologist, the ipse-dixital moralist—or in one word the ipse-dixitist (and to this class have belonged almost every man who has ever written or spoken on the subject)—substitutes commonly the word *duty*: and for the determination of what is a man's duty, throughout the enquiry, to the consideration of what is the interest of the person in question, the supposed agent substitutes the consideration of what on the occasion

is his own will and pleasure. On no occasion does he take up the pen but to lay down the law. In the stile in which the legislator within the field of his actually existing authority expresses himself in the issuing of his laws, the ipsedixital moralist expresses himself in the issuing of his aphorisms. Not so the utilitarian.

The mood in which the utilitarian expresses himself is never other than the indicative: disguised or undisguised, the mood in which the ipsedixitist expresses himself is never other than the imperative.

Clothed and backed by pleasure and pain in inexhaustible abundance, the expression given by the legislator [to his] will, within the field of his power, [will] present at all times the most perfect of all titles to regard. Destitute of that support, the expression [given] by the ipsedixital moralist to his will is generally speaking compleatly devoid of all title to regard. The character in which he holds himself up to view is the fancied and assumed character of legislator of the human race. The human race has never had more than one Orator, and that was Anacharsis Cloots.¹ Legislators it has had almost as many as it has moralists.

Duties of Man—Duties of Woman—Whole Duty of Man.² Anacharsis was a man deserving of general respect compared with the men who, jogging on from first to last in the track of ipsedixitism, of ipsedixital didactics, deliver to the world their will and pleasure in the form of books published with such titles.

Anacharsis pretended not to any thing beyond persuasion: these men set the law. The sin of Anacharsis went not beyond vanity: the sin of these men is the proudest of all pride.

Destitute of all just ground, is this arrogance without effect? By the whole amount of whatsoever that be, it has more than for the good

¹ Jean-Baptiste du Val-de-Grâce, Baron de Cloots, known as Anacharsis Cloots (1755–94), Prussian nobleman, having settled in France in 1789, aimed to establish a universal federation of all peoples and came to be known during the French Revolution as ‘the orator of the human race’. On 26 August 1792, on the same occasion as Bentham, he was given the title of French Citizen by the Legislative Assembly, but was guillotined during the Terror.

² *The Whole Duty of Man*, attributed to Richard Allestree (1621/2–81), Church of England clergyman, Regius Professor of Divinity at the University of Oxford 1663–79, Provost of Eton College 1665–81, was first published as *The Practice of Christian Graces. Or The Whole Duty of Man Laid Down In a Plaine and Familiar Way for the Use of All, but especially the Meanest Reader. Divided into XVII. Chapters, One whereof being read every Lords Day the Whole may be read over Thrice in the Year*, London, 1658, and then as *The Whole Duty of Man laid down In A Plain Way for the use of the meanest reader. Divided into XVII Chapters One whereof being read every Lords Day the Whole may be Read over thrice in the Year*, London, 1659, with which title it went through numerous subsequent editions. A companion work, authored by ‘a Lady’, appeared as *The Whole Duty of a Woman: Or a Guide to the Female Sex. From the Age of Sixteen to Sixty, &c. Being Directions, How Women of all Qualities and Conditions, ought to Behave themselves in the Various Circumstances of this Life, for their Obtaining not only Present, but Future Happiness*, 2nd edn., London, 1696.

of mankind were to be wished. But by a man unprovided with every thing that goes by the name of power, and not vouchsafing so much as to profess to bestow a thought on what may be the interest of those to whom he is addressing himself, in what way is it, it may be asked, that any such influence can thus successfully be exerted?—In this way. The power of the popular or moral sanction, the power of the tribunal, as it is called, of public opinion (though of opinion the power would be nothing without will, nor will itself without action), is one of the four or five distinguishable forces by the joint operation [of] which will on every [occasion]¹ is determined—by which man, in a word, is governed. The tribunal of public opinion is a Standing Committee in which all who write or speak to the public have voices. In this Committee the ipsedixitist makes his motions correspondent in extent and number to the proposed laws of which his book is composed: and though these powerless and spurious laws are commonly no less bare of reasons than are the genuine ones—yet such, in the mouth or pen of him who has boldness enough to assume the exercise of it, is the force of intellectual authority, that a motion of this sort can scarcely be so absurd or mischievous, as not to find men in considerable numbers to vote for it.

Severity, the grand engine and trust of the vulgar among legislators, is also that of the vulgar among moralists. No reason does he employ or find himself to stand in need of when he is calling upon men to give up their dearest pleasures—as little when he is calling upon them to embrace pains. Severe to others, the conclusion is that he could not take upon him to be so, unless he were at least equally so to himself: severe in doctrine, the conclusion is that he can never be less so in his practice. Thus, without any the smallest expence to himself, at any rate without need of it, he purchases, at the expence of those listen[ing] to him, the reputation of wisdom and virtue: and in proportion to the extent to which he acts the part of an enemy (for what is it but the part of an enemy to engage men without any equivalent to sacrifice pleasure or embrace pain?), find those who are weak and misguided enough to cherish and respect him as a friend.^a

^a In so far as it is from religion that he draws his motives, the deontologist acts in the character of an utilitarian. For by what means does religion operate or seek to operate on the will of men, but by the pains of hell and the pleasures of heaven?

But while drawing upon heaven and hell for motives, it is upon his own will, under the guise of his own opinion, [that] the ipsedixital moralist and religionist draws for precepts: upon his own personal will, determined like other wills by considerations of personal interest, real or imagined. There lie the sacred books: but they are but for shew: for use he is full fraught with an ample stock of substitutes: substitutes more commodious and in every respect preferable: a Liturgy,

¹ MS 'action'.

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a set of creeds, and a whole swarm of Articles. As much fitter for use as his Liturgy, his creeds and his Articles are than the sacred books, so upon occasion, under the name of interpretations, are his own conceits, or what is better the conceits, real or pretended, of those who turn the cock of the fountain of preferment: and thus upon exposition mounted upon exposition, as it were upon pillow mounted upon pillow, ipsedixitism, in its travels over the field of theology, supports itself and slumbers at its ease.

The substitutes all the while are of no value but in virtue of their conformity to the originals, but by oaths and solemn engagements, the violation of which would have among the number of [its] effects exclusion from all hope of preferment, and ill-will on the part of all who look for it, this indispensable conformity is effectually secured.

Chapter 2.

Uses¹

*Aristophon.*² To what purpose all this ramification—all these divisions, sub-divisions, and sub-sub-divisions—to what purpose all this neology? The words which to every body are so familiar, of which the application is so easy—why seek to disturb the possession they have so long had of the field of art and science?

Aristotle. To enable men, whosoever should happen to be those whom it may concern, to take at any time not only a compleat and all-comprehensive view of the whole field of art and science, but also an observation of the mutual relation and connection of its several compartments and their respective contents: at the same time shewing in what way those contents are respectively of a nature to be regarded as interesting, and as such as enabling the whole system to make an adequate return for any such labour as any person may feel himself disposed to employ in the perusal of it.

This view, this observation, the assemblage of names in use, will not, so long as they [are employed] to the exclusion of a connected and consistent system of nomenclature, such as [that above]³ has endeavoured to render itself, suffer to be [taken].⁴

In the first place as to the principle or source of division. The point of view in which the whole field is placed by it is not merely the most interesting in which it is capable of being placed, but the only one to which in itself the appellation of interesting can with propriety be applied. Unless in so far as it means conducive to well-being—to the maximization of the aggregate mass [of] pleasure—to the minimization of the aggregate mass of pain, the word *interesting* is devoid of meaning.

In the next place as to the denominations, divisions and sub-divisions and the names given to the results.

It is only by a correspondent set of apposite names that the relations that have place between different objects can be instructively and conveniently expressed, and thereby, as far as by general words can be done, the nature, the true and distinctive nature, of those several objects made known.

By the most and all-comprehensive term of every system those properties are expressed which are common to all the individual

¹ For the material that constitutes this Chapter see the Editorial Introduction, p. lii above.

² Aristophon (c. 435–c. 335 BC), Athenian politician.

³ MS 'the following', The cross-reference is presumably to the division of arts and sciences in Ch. 1, pp. 319–39 above.

⁴ MS 'done'.

objects which are understood to be designated by and comprehended in the import of that universal appellative. Divide that aggregate into two parts, taking care at the same time that in one or other of those parts every individual comprehended in the whole shall be comprehended, by the names respectively given to those two parts, whatsoever properties as are peculiar to the contents of each in contradistinction to the contents of the other are designated. But in so far as in addition [to] all those properties which it has in common with other objects, those which are peculiar to itself are known and understood, the nature of the object, be it what it may, is understood. In addition to that vast assemblage of common properties which is designated by the universal name, the greater the number of the divisions and sub-divisions which are thus made, while, to the two lesser compartments forming the result of each act of division, apposite denominations, expressive of a property by which the contents of each of the two compartments are distinguished from those of the other, are attached, the greater the number of these successive acts of division, the more clearly each one of the individual objects contained under them is rendered distinguishable from every other, with which, but for the distinctions thus brought to view, it might have been in danger of being confounded.

Such is the use of apposite names. Now observe the inconvenience produced by inapposite ones.

Of their inappositeness, the consequence is—that in conjunction with the ideas which they are employed and intended to present to view, they are continually presenting to view others which are quite different and which, in so far as on the occasion in question they are annexed to the words in question, are productive of constant confusion and frequent error.

True it is that originally, i.e. antecedently to established associations, neither appositeness nor consequently inappositeness are among the properties of language—for giving expression to any idea, any and every combination of sounds or figures is as apposite as any other. But in so far as between ideas on the one part and sounds or visible signs on the other associations have already been formed, then in so far it is that inappositeness as well as appositeness has place: with relation to an idea which for the first time it is employed or about to be employed to designate, a term is *apposite* when, in virtue of the family connections with which it is already provided, it has a tendency upon the first mention to dispose the mind to ascribe to it properties, whatsoever they may be, by which that object is distinguished from other objects: it is *inapposite* in so far as, in virtue and by means of such its connections, its tendency is to dispose the mind to ascribe to

it, instead of the properties which are thus peculiar to it, others which it is not possessed of, or at any rate which are not peculiar to it. Thus of appositeness on the part of the appellative, on the part of the mind to which it presents itself, correct at least, if not compleat, conception is at first sight the natural result: of inappositeness, conception always more or less incomplete, and frequently altogether incorrect and erroneous.

In the above analysis, the *dichotomous, bifurcate, two-pronged* plan of division is that which, it may have been observed, has all along been endeavoured to be employed. The grounds and reasons of this choice are as follows.

Of the *polytomous, multifurcate, many-pronged* plan of division (such is every plan of division that is not bifurcate), the following are the imperfections—

1. Whatsoever be the number of the parts into which the whole or aggregate in question is thus divided, so it is that in and by the exhibition made of them no means is afforded for judging whether the enumeration so made be compleat. But if it be incomplete, then in so far as it is so, in so far will every account given of those parts, and thereby of the whole, be imperfect and [un]satisfactory.

2. In the case of the bifurcate plan of division, the nature of the case happily affords a sort of test of compleatness: a test which, where the number of *prongs* is greater than two, does not apply.

This test has place in so far as distribution has been so managed, that of the two lesser compartments between which the whole contents of the greater are distributed, there is one so circumstanced that by all the individuals contained in it some one property at least is possessed which is *not* possessed by any one of the individuals contained in the other.

Wheresoever this is true the assurance is entire, that of the whole number of objects contained in the greater, every one will be contained in one or other of the two lesser: and that of those which are contained in one of them, there is not one that will be found contained in the other.

The whole aggregate, for example, which it is proposed to analyse, for the individuals of which it is composed, let it have all bodies whatsoever—all portions of matter in so far as they are observed to be separated from each other. Of these it will very early have been observed that in some [has place] the property or assemblage of properties designated by the word *life*: in others, not. Of this vast and all-comprehensive receptacle, distribute the whole contents into two heaps: for the designating and as it were containing one of these heaps, in addition to the denominative which is common to the whole mass,

provide the epithet or adjunct *animated*, for the other *unanimated*. This done, that which in this or that instance will present some difficulty, will be the determining in the instance of this or that individual body whether the property in question which, as above, was taken for the characteristic and differential property of all of the individuals that should be placed in one of the two heaps is to be found in it, and accordingly which of the two compound appellatives thus formed, as above, is the one by which it may with propriety be designated. But a proposition which cannot present either difficulty or danger of error is, that the individual in question, be it what it may, if so it be that in it the property in question [has place], does belong to the heap of which that property is the characteristic, and does not belong to the other: and that of the two appellatives in question, the one may, the other can not, be employed with propriety and truth for the designation of it.

3. In so far as the bifurcate plan of division proceeds, the properties respectively belonging to the several individuals contained in the aggregate whole are, by the names given to the several compartments, indicated, and in so far as the several allotments thus made are properly made, are truly indicated and made known to all those by whom the import of the several words employed as appellatives is understood. In so far, by the several denominations under which it is ranked, one for each division that has been performed, the properties which it does possess and those which it does not possess are brought to view. In each such operation a heap is taken in hand in the character of a dividend, and by the operation this dividend is divided into two condivident portions. By its being ranked under the name given to the dividend, intimation is given that the individual in question is possessed of all the properties designated by that name, and that in so far it agrees with all the individuals to which that name may with propriety be applied: by its being ranked under the name given to one of the two condivident portions, intimation is given that it is possessed of all those ulterior properties designated by that name, and at the same time that it is not possessed of any of those ulterior properties which the name allotted to the other condivident portion is employed [to designate].

The farther down the process of division is carried upon this plan of division, the more compleat, the more extensive, and at the same time particular, is the knowledge afforded of all the several particulars or individuals included in the grasp of the universal appellative by which the whole system is designated: for at each division information is given of some farther property or properties by which all the individuals contained in one of the condivident portions are distinguished from all the individuals contained in the other.

Thus in the instance already mentioned. On the occasion of the first divisional operation, the dividend taken in hand was the aggregate composed of all bodies whatsoever. By the first operation performed on it as above, it was divided into two condivident portions, to one [of] which all bodies in which the property of life is to be found were referred, to the other all bodies in which that property is not to be found. Take then any individual body for example. It being referred to the aggregate designated by the adjunct *animated*, if that adjunct be with truth and propriety applied to it, what we learn thereby is—that it is possessed of all those properties the aggregate of which is designated by the term *life*.

Proceed now and perform an ulterior, viz. the next ulterior, divisional operation. Take for the dividend that one of the two condivident portions for the designation of which, on the occasion of the first divisional operation, the word *animated* was employed. For the principle or source of division take on this occasion the property designated by the word *sensation*. On this as on the former occasion, dividing the aggregate into two portions or heaps, throw onto the first heap all such individuals in which this ulterior property is to be found, leaving for the second heap all those in which it is not to be found.

In this way to the information which, concerning the object, the individual or species in question, is conveyed by the referring it to the several appellatives, *body* and *animated body*, may be added this farther information conveyed by the referring it to the additional appellative *sensitive animated body*, or to omitt the intermediate adjunct as unnecessary, (since if the divisional process has been rightly carried on, i.e. upon the *exhaustive* plan as here described, then if the object in question be sensitive it can not but be animated) to the shorter appellative *sensitive body*.

Thus much for theory. But the sort of information thus conveyed, does it end in theory? is it inextendible to practice? If so it were, it would be useless: if so it had been deemed, no such labour as [has]¹ here been bestowed upon the endeavour to render it intelligible would have been expended upon it. But far indeed is it from being devoid of use. Correspondent to, and in every considerate mind determined by, the properties which [it is] found to possess, is the manner in which the object, be it what it may, requires to be, and will be, dealt with.

In one of his newly visited and at the same time conquered countries, Alexander was one day taking a walk in a wood: Aristotle was in his company.² Pointing to something on the ground which had caught

¹ MS 'have'.

² This story appears to be Bentham's own invention. Aristotle was the tutor of Alexander the Great.

his attention—what is this, said the Monarch? A leaf, answered the Philosopher. A leaf, say you? why, you see, it moves? Indeed, and so it does; it is not a leaf, it is an animal—an insect: the leaf-caterpillar—and a curious one it is. I will pick it up in my habit. I must deal with it accordingly, if it be the pleasure of your Majesty to have it kept. A little farther on, There is another odd thing, cried the Conqueror, that stick, it seems to be, that is just by you: do so much as pick it up. Gladly, replied the Naturalist, had I durst. That stick, as it seemed to you, was a serpent, and one of the most deadly sort. I have crushed it and killed it: or by this time it would have killed me.

Take any object at pleasure: and at the same time, take any property at pleasure. This property does belong to that object: this property does not belong to that object. The two propositions are with reference to each other termed contradictory ones. To whatsoever object applied, both of them can not be true, one or other of them is sure to be so.

This being the case, the consequence is—that in so far as the observations in pursuance of which the property in question has been ascribed to the object in question are correct, truth will be the property of every proposition by which an object is referred to any one of the heaps and correspondent compartments thus formed: at every step, be the individual or other particular object what it may, so it does but belong to the all-comprehensive aggregate which stands at the top of the system, to one or other of the heaps and compartments thus formed it can not but belong, and at the same time it can not belong to both: and thus it is that so long as the divisional process proceeds upon this plan, so long is it sure that, of the whole contents of the universal aggregate, no one item is omitted, which in other words is as much as to say that the plan of division is all-comprehensive and exhaustive: that the whole stock of matter contained under the appellative by which the universal aggregate is designated, is all along exhausted to furnish the matter on which the operations are successively performed.

Instead of bifurcate, two-pronged, suppose the plan of division, for example, trifurcate, three-pronged. So long as it remains in this state, the test of all-comprehensiveness, as above, not being applied to it, so long it is that whether it be or be not all-comprehensive, whether the whole stock of the matter contained in the dividend be or be not lodged in these three condivident portions, and in that way the dividend compartment drained and exhausted of its matter, remains unindicated. If the conditions necessary, as above, to the rendering the division all along exhaustive have been fulfilled, then so it is that, in itself and in truth, exhaustive it will be: but in this case, though by the supposition it is exhaustive, yet this is more than it will be shewn to be, and, in so far as seeing depends upon shewing, seen to be.

Minerals, vegetables, animals. Here of the all-comprehensive aggregate designated by the word bodies, we have the three condident portions which are the result of a division of the three-pronged kind: minerals, vegetables, and animals, subjects of so many kingdoms framed by some logician when in a poetic mood for the containing of them. No, so it does happen that by these several appellatives taken together all individual bodies whatsoever are designated, and thereby in the allotment thus made of subjects to and for the three kingdoms, the population of the whole empire out of which portions were taken to form the dominions of these same three kingdoms was and is exhausted: for of this exhaustiveness the proof may be afforded and has been afforded by the application of the test of exhaustiveness as above described and exemplified. But this is more than either is announced by the names thus given to them, or would be announced in and by any tabular view, in which, without any intimation given of the two dichotomous divisional operations of which these three compartments are the results, they were exhibitiv of the all-comprehensive aggregate—exhibited in the character of so many portions into which, by one and the same operation, that aggregate had been divided.

So again with regard to indication given of properties distinctive as well as properties aggregative, points of separation in addition to points of co-union. That minerals, while agreeing with vegetables in being bodies, disagree with them in not being endued with life—that vegetables, [while]¹ agreeing with animals in being endued with life, disagree with them in not being endued with sensation, all this from one source or other we all know, or upon a moment's intimation may be made to know—such of us as are acquainted with the application made of these general names to individuals. But this is that of which, by the names themselves, no intimation is conveyed. By the term vegetable what is indicated is—that vegetables possess a species of life, viz. the vegetable species of life: but that, in addition to this faculty, the other faculty of sensation is not possessed by them—of this property, though equally belonging, no indication, instructive and useful as it would be, viz. by serving to distinguish them from animals, to prevent their being regarded as possessed of a property of which they are in truth [not] possessed, is afforded.

This example, though, of any that could have been formed, it is, by reason of its familiarity, the fittest for conveying, in relation to the mode of examination and arrangement in question, a clear conception, is by that very reason, the least fit for conveying, at least to a cursory

¹ MS 'with'.

view, an adequate sense of the utility of it: that which when applied to other subjects, it is so exclusively qualified for making known, being in this instance universally known without it.

The farther the operation is continued, in other words the number of steps taken in and by the performance of it, the longer and more complex would be the names thus given to the continually lesser and lesser aggregates which by this division are obtained. In a synoptic Table—an instrument designed for the eye rather than for the ear—this inconvenience may, under favour of a well-adapted language, remain for some time scarce perceptible. But in a running discourse—in a discourse designed for the ear as well as the eye—it would presently become intolerable. In ordinary discourse, therefore, at the second if not at the very first operation, the necessity will be felt of substituting in the instance [of] each aggregate, in place of the two-worded appellative exhibited by the Table, a single-worded one. Thus in English, to the two-worded appellative *material substance*, on the occasion of the first division made of the import of the universal appellative *substance*, will be to be substituted the single-worded appellative *body*: *a fortiori* to the three-worded appellative *living material substance*, another single-worded appellative, so it were that the English language, as do the Greek^a and Latin^b languages, afforded one: *a fortiori* again, on the occasion of a second division to the three-worded appellative *insensitive living body*, or the four-worded appellative *insensitive living corporeal substance*, will require to be substituted another single-worded appellative such as *plant* or *vegetable*: and so in the case of the opposite result of this same second division, viz. *animal*.

On this occasion the logician finds himself under the obligation of employing the same sort of expedient as on a similar occasion is wont to be employed by the algebraist, who to a heap of as, bs and cs, mixt up with a heap of xs, ys and zs, forms to himself in the shape of a single s a concise and most commodious substitute.^c

^a Ζωον.

^b Vivens.

^c By Dr Reed, and through him by Lord Kames,¹ the bifurcate system of arrangement has been taken for a subject of ridicule. Its practical uses and convenience have here been brought to view. By the ridicule in question it is manifest that by those writers these uses were unperceived.

To the term designative of the differential character of the aggregate in question, which character is, under the exhaustive system, always wanting in the

¹ Henry Home (1696–1782), Lord Kames, Scottish judge, was author of *Sketches of the History of Man*, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1774, which contained ‘A Brief Account of Aristotle’s Logic. With Remarks’ (ii. 168–241), which Kames revealed was the work of Thomas Reid (1710–96), Scottish philosopher. The essay is reproduced in *Thomas Reid on Logic, Rhetoric and the Fine Arts*, ed. A. Broadie, Edinburgh, 2004 (*The Edinburgh Edition of Thomas Reid*), pp. 97–149.

To the word *natural*, so far as it goes, no objection presents itself: but no sooner is the word *history* added than the inappositeness of the appellative formed by the union of the two words, stares us in the face. By this appellative, History being brought to view in the character of the stem, the science in question (physioplasmic somatics) is presented as one branch of it. But of the science of *history* one essential character and the sole essential character is a difference in the order of time between the several events and states of things brought to view by it: and in the case of physioplasmic somatics, this essential character has not, unless by accident, any place. For any one point of time, to the exclusion of all others, a system of physioplasmic somatics might be given, and be not the less a complete one.

Of itself, i.e. considered independently of preestablished associations, the single appellative *history* was as well-adapted to the designation of that branch of science which has for its subject bodies considered in that state in which, having been formed by the hands of Nature, they are found in the bosom of Nature, as the compound appellative physioplasmic somatics: and, in respect of conciseness, even better adapted. But, before it was thus taken and applied to the purpose of helping to designate the physioplasmic branch of Somatics, the word *history* had

aggregate which stands immediately opposed to it, occupying the other prong of the [fork],¹ you may, instead of the contradictory particle *not*, substitute, say they, an &c.² This is very true, but what is also true is that by the figure &c. no such intimation is conveyed as is conveyed by the particle *not*: viz. that of those articles which are contained in one prong of this fork, there is not one that is also contained in the other.

Notwithstanding his industry and his acuteness—so unfortunately have those estimable qualities been applied—not many persons, it is believed, can be named by whom so little good and so much mischief have been [done] to the branches of art and science to which they have respectively applied themselves as by Dr Reed. The false and the trivial, of which the false is no small proportion—take these from his works—and small indeed it is believed would what remains be found. With this small exception, what is new in them is not true—what is [true]³ in them is not [new].⁴

¹ MS 'work'.

² See 'A Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic', § 2. On the Ten Categories, and on Divisions in general, in *Sketches of the History of Man*, ii. 179–83 at 183: 'When you meet with a division of any subject imperfectly comprehended, add to the last member an *et cætera*. That this *et cætera* makes the division complete, is undeniable; and therefore it ought to hold its place as a member, and to be always understood, whether expressed or not, until clear and positive proof be brought, that the division is complete without it. And this *et cætera* shall be the repository of all members that shall in any future time shew a good and valid right to a property in the subject.'

³ MS 'new'.

⁴ MS 'true'.

from every mouth, as well as every pen, been established in the habit of being employed in designating the science by which events as well as states of things of all sorts are exhibited in succession—i.e. in the order of time—and thereby in bringing to view no other branch of science than one which [was] altogether different from the one which on the occasion in question it was thus for the first time employed to designate.

Of this misrepresentation, what has been the consequence? When for the first time presented to a mind to which the branch of science in question, not in its totality at least, had never ever been presented, the conception presented by it can not have failed to have been an erroneous one—and thus far of the communication thus expressed of the instruction, if meant for instruction, not encrease of knowledge, but error, an acquisition worse than ignorance, must have been the fruit: and by the opinion thus imbibed, instead of being in so far advanced in his ascent towards the summit of knowledge, he whose assent to it should thus have been obtained would have been so much farther from it than he was before: after which, before he could in relation to this subject learn the truth, he would have to unlearn this falshood which he had been made to learn instead of it.

True it is that in process of time what in this case may very well happen, for it does happen, is—that by the habit of observing particulars of all sorts continually referred to the branch of science to which this name, inapposite as it is, is in use to be applied, this misconception will at length have been worn away: in so much that at the same time that, when employed without this adjunct, it will all along have served to present to his view the science of which, in preference or to the exclusion of purely physical events and states of things, human actings and sufferings form the subject, and that subject considered with a constant regard to time, at that same time this same word, when the adjunct natural has been tacked to it, will come to have served to present to the view of the same person this branch of science in which human actings and sufferings are altogether out of the question, and of which *time*, if any, forms but a secondary or accidental object of regard.

This accordingly is what constantly has place. But from hence does it follow that an inapposite appellative as here explained and exemplified is as commodious and as well-adapted to the purpose of instruction as an apposite one?—By no means. For of such inappositeness, observe the consequence.—First, i.e. before [the foundation] of the habit from which by degrees the error receives its corrective has been so much as laid,¹ comes error, pure error: then while, with

¹ MS 'before that of the habit . . . its corrective, foundation has been so much as laid'.

the misconception resisting it and striving to keep it out, the true habit of right conception is forming itself, confused and indistinct perception: nor, in the mind in question, can any one on good ground take upon him to say, when if ever this sort of *blurr* in the conception will have compleatly disappeared.

On this occasion as on any other occasion, to say that an inapposite appellative is as good as an apposite one—that an apposite appellative is not preferable to an inapposite one—would be as much as to say that a disease is no disease if it be capable of being cured. In three distinguishable particulars the apposite appellative will have the advantage of the inapposite one: mischiefs prevented will be 1. the period of pure and certain error at the beginning: 2. then the period of confusion: 3. then the chance which remains that after all and to the last the erroneous conception will fail of being replaced by the correct one.

The farther we advance, the more clearly do the convenience of an apposite nomenclature and systematic arrangement, and the inconvenience of inapposite nomenclature and unsystematic arrangement, become perceptible.

Somatics being the name given to the stem, by the two adjuncts physioplastic and anthropoplastic, a designation which is correct, and to every one to whom the import attached to those words in the original language is familiar an intelligible one, is presented. By a person whose ignorance of all particulars contained in the respective fields of science should be as great as that of any person can be, the import of the two names and accordingly the nature of the two branches of science would nevertheless be conceived and understood—so he were but apprized of the import of the Greek words correspondent to the word nature and the word man.

So much for the apposite and systematic nomenclature and arrangement: now as to the inapposite and unsystematic. Of the two words composing the inapposite appellative employed to designate physioplastic somatics, the word *natural*, in so far as it went, was apposite and expressive. But when applied to designate the anthropoplastic branch of somatics, instead of being apposite and leading to truth, it leads of itself to error: what it gives you to understand is—that under the branch of science to which it thus gives name, in the observations made on the bodies which are the subjects of it, a state to which the consideration is confined is that into which they have been brought by the hands of Nature, whereas the truth is that the state in which alone they constitute in a direct way the subjects of anthropoplastic somatology is the state into which they have been brought, or are capable of being brought, by the hand of man.

CH. 2. USES

True it is that in anthropoplastic somatics, without more or less regard paid to physioplastic somatics, that is to the bodies which are its subjects—and that too in the state in which they are its subjects, nothing could be done: for it is to physioplastic somatology that anthropoplastic somatology is indebted for all its subjects, for all the materials which it can have to work upon. But from this no such consequence follows as that in any part anthropoplastics and physioplastics are the same. By architecture, stone and wood are employed: but architecture is not on this account one and the same branch of art and science either with mineralogy or with botany.

When upon taking a farther step we come to the word philosophy, the misrepresentation, instead of receiving any correction, is rendered still more flagrant. Instead of a state of, or acquisition made by, the understanding, that and that alone which the term philosophy was originally employed to designate—and which even now it ceases not to convey to those who are more or less acquainted with the language from which it has been borrowed—is a state of the *affections*: a sentiment or affection of *love* and *good-liking*.¹ Of good-liking? as to what? not to this branch of somatics in contradistinction [to] the other, nor yet to *somatics* in contradistinction to any other branch of science: no, nor so much as to science in contradistinction to any thing else: to what then?—why, e'en to *wisdom*? And what is wisdom? a term of wide and imperfectly determined import, employed not so much to designate science, as to designate an habitually correct state of the judgment or judicial faculty, to whatsoever subjects considered as applied, but more particularly to such as are regarded as standing distinguished in respect of their importance.

As in its original import this term Natural Philosophy is scarcely expressive of any idea which it is employed to express, thence it is that from the first to the last in relation to this or that less extensive branch of science a question may be, does it belong to Natural History, or does it belong to Natural Philosophy?: whereas under the terms physioplastic somatology and anthropoplastic somatology, a clear line of demarcation between the two sciences thus distinguished is drawn at one stroke, and all such questions are nipt in the bud.

Instead of physioplastic and anthropoplastic, had the words *pushpin* and *trap-ball*, to the same extent and for the same length of time, been employed for the designation of the two branches of art and science for the designation of which the terms Natural History and Natural Philosophy still continue to be employed, the change, instead of being for the worse, would have been rather for the better: by

¹ See Ch. 1, p. 322 n. above.

the word trap-ball, no person would have been tempted to regard as belonging to physioplastics what belongs to anthropoplastics: whereas of the term natural philosophy, when thus applied, the tendency to produce this sort of misconception, is, as hath just been seen, not inconsiderable. A word is not the more inconvenient, but the less inconvenient, the less liable it is to lead men to confound with any object those objects from which it is most material that it should be distinguished.

At every step taken in the track of exhaustive division,¹ when added to the divided aggregate exhibited by the stem, the two condivident aggregates exhibited by the two prongs exhibit a definition and that of the *regular* kind, a definition *per genus et differentiam* of the two aggregates thus designated. Animal est vivens sensitivum. Vegetabile est vivens insensitivum.²

This animal including in its import the import of the two terms *living* and *sensitive*, in these two terms, in any language which as the Greek and the Latin affords to the | | a single-worded appellative, we have for a definition of the aggregate designated by the word animal, and thence of the word by which that aggregate is designated, the following words—an animal is a sensitive living body or a living body endowed with sensation.

In the Greek and Latin languages, but more particularly in the Greek, a word which of itself is in the form of the part of speech called an *adjective*, is employed moreover in addition to its own import to exhibit the import of a word which, in the form of the part of speech called a substantive, is wont to be allied to it. In general this substantive will be the universal denominative answering to the word *thing*: and in this way the *genus* and the *differentia*, the greater aggregate and one of the two lesser aggregates into which it is divided, may be and are designated by one and the same word.

Though it is by Porphyry, one of Aristotle's Grecian Commentators, that the first exemplification of the bifurcate and exhaustive-indicating plan of arrangement has been grown, yet it is to a comparatively modern disciple of the same School, viz. *Peter Ramus*³ and his disciples, that

¹ In a rudiment at the head of this paragraph, Bentham has noted: 'For denomination add the need of substituting all along to a two-worded appellative of the distinction, a single-worded d^o.'

² i.e. 'An animal is a sensitive living being. A vegetable is an insensitive living being.'

³ A diagrammatic classification of dialectic appears in Ramus's *Dialecticae institutiones*, Paris, 1543, p. 57, and a more complex table in the enlarged edition, *Institutionum dialecticarum*, Paris, 1547, p. 168.

the practice of pushing it to the greatest known length has all along been ascribed. Bishop Saunderson, to whom we are indebted for the most masterly and instructive view of the Aristotelian logic that is any where to be found—even to Saunderson, the usefulness and matchless excellence of this plan of arrangement seems not to have ever presented itself in an adequately clear point of view. In that work of his, no mention is made of any of these utilities, and by the name of the *Ramæans* the persons by whom the most extensive application of it is stated by him as having been made are on that account pointed out as objects of censure.¹

True it is that in relation to this instrument of instruction thus much must be confessed: viz. 1. that it is an instrument for the due handling of which no small quantity of mental labour, coupled with no slight portion of knowledge and no small degree of correctness on the part of the judgment, are necessary:

2. that in respect of the stock which it requires of these qualities of which, they being when separately taken so rare, the union is consequently so much more so, the number of the divisional operations employed, and consequently the number of aggregates one within another which are the result, must perforce receive a pretty early limitation:

3. that in so far as error creeps in, in so far [instead of]² the true and clear instruction which it is able to convey, false instruction and confusion will be conveyed by it.

4. That such error will be liable and apt to be the result, if any where previously to the fixation of the two condident appellatives, the test of exhaustiveness as above described is omitted to be applied to the result of the division which has been pursued.

5. That though, if it were possible for every race of individuals, or even for every individual object comprehended in the aggregate in question, to be included in the view given of the contents, an acquaintance [with] the contents would be by so much the more perfect and the Table thereby so much the more useful, yet it is to a comparatively very small number of divisions, and thence to a correspondently small number of articles constituting the results of those divisions, that the practical application of this useful instrument will unavoidably be found confined.

6. That accordingly the faculty of making use of it with advantage will be found confined in its application to the largest aggregates which the nature of things affords, as well as to a small number of the steps which, in the course of the divisional plan, might by possibility

¹ For Sanderson's critical assessment of Ramus and the Rameans see *Logicæ artis compendium*, pp. 250–2.

² MS 'to'.

be made; the greater the labour, the complexity and nicety of the operation, the fewer the occasions on which, with an effect advantageous upon the whole, it can be employed.

But of these observations, what in regard [to] this instrument is the result? much the same as with regard to gold: not that [it] is of no use: not that it is of no value: but that the getting it for use is an affair of no small difficulty, and that accordingly of the whole number of occasions on which a man would be the better for employing it and would accordingly be glad to employ it if he could, it is but in a small part that he is able to employ it.^a

7. Though to maximize the instructiveness of the partition it is necessary to render it demonstratively and manifestly bifurcate, in which case at each operation the number of parts into which the whole aggregate is divided will be no more than two, yet to the number of the directions in which, or sources of division from which, the whole may thus be successively divided, there is no limit. In the direction of the partitions,¹ at right angles to that direction, at any angle other than a right angle—in any one or more of these ways may an *orange*, for instance, be divided, in each instance into two and but two parts, and those equal ones, not to speak of the infinity of modes into which it may be divided into two unequal ones.

Of this diversified plan of bifurcate and exhaustive division—this division from several sources—the use is to reach such general terms as the usage of language has established, and therewith exhibit the several relations which the objects respectively designated by them bear to each other: viz. in so far as [the] aggregates which they respectively serve to designate have been so made up that, if the course of the division were confined to one direction, the nature of the case would not admitt of any such course carried on upon the bifurcate and exhaustive plan as would take them in.

^a The number of different races of plants that are known, as well as the number of races of plants that are in existence, is continually upon the change: the first is continually upon the encrease—the other, there is but too much reason to think, is continually upon the decrease. The number of [. . . ?] is susceptible of encrease *ad libitum*: not so the number of different races of mushrooms.

Be this as it may, forty thousand was the number of different races of plants that at one time were more or less known to botanists. Apply to the comprehension of these 40,000 races or species, instead of the comparatively loose systematic method employed at present, the exhaustive bifurcate analysis, it is for the arithmetician to exhibit to us the number of successive divisions necessary to the accomplishment of such a wish.²

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Add the Botanical term.'

² See p. 83 n. above.

APPENDIX

Generals or Particulars—Abstractions or Concretions which first

In the field of Eudæmonics and Pantognosy, the field of abstractions or the field of concretions—to which of these two compartments shall the surveying eye first apply itself?

In the whole human race considered at all periods of its history the knowledge of particulars preceded that of generals. Abstraction, a branch of Logic, show are the degrees by which it has been learnt.

In that sense, taking the whole species together, the knowledge of particulars has in every part of the field of science preceded that of generals.

But, when general conceptions have once been attained, the communication of them is performed with much more despatch, even to the most unpracticed and uninformed minds, than that of particulars: i.e. in a given time much more knowledge may be communicated by the use of more general terms in company with less general terms, than by the use of less general terms alone.

True it is, without the use of particular terms and even according to the nature of the subject, i.e. as it belongs to somatics or psychology, no clear knowledge can be conveyed by general ones: but by a single individual or species exhibited in the character of a specimen or sample for the explanation and illustration of a generic term, the exhibition of all the other individuals or particulars contained in the genus of which it is the name may be saved.

With these explanations, from particulars to generals may be stated as the actual order of learning or acquisition. But from generals to particulars, the most convenient and extensively efficient order of teaching or communication.

HINTS TOWARDS THE COMPOSITION
OF AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON
UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR,
ON A NEW PRINCIPLE,
ON WHICH THAT BRANCH OF ART AND SCIENCE MAY,
IT [IS] SUPPOSED, BE CAPABLE OF BEING TAUGHT
AND LEARNT WITH ADVANTAGE AND FACILITY,
TOWARD THE CLOSE OF A CHRESTOMATHIC COURSE

Introduction

The purposes for which grammar as applied to languages other than the vernacular one is proposed to be included in the Chrestomathic course have already been brought to view.^a

With a view to these same purposes, it is supposed that now, in the present state of the field of art and science, to the leading principles of what is called Universal Grammar, admission might, in this same seminary, be given, and that with sufficient facility and adequate practical advantage.

Of a plan of the kind in question, the general principles of mathematics will, it is taken for granted, be universally recognized as forming a proper part. But an expectation confidently entertained is—that with the rules of particular grammars, to afford explanation to them, the general principles of universal grammar will not, on the part of the student, require either a greater degree of exertion or a greater maturity of intellect than the general principles of mathematics: while on the other hand, by the more extensive command which will thus be given to him over the powers of his mind, the use derived from a given quantity of labour will in this case be at least equal to any that can reasonably be expected to have place in that other case.

A consideration from which this expectation has received additional strength is—that upon the plan in question, to the exposition of the leading principles of Universal Grammar, the exposition of a correspondent part of the principles of logic would be necessary: considerations of the logical cast forming all along the basis of such considerations of the grammatical cast as would be brought to view. If, by this connection, the access to an acquaintance with so much of the connected matter as belongs to the head of grammar would be clogged with difficulty and the progress retarded, here would *pro tanto* be an objection. But the notion is that, upon the two branches of art and science in question, mutual light would by each other be reflected: and that, by means of the conjunction, a given degree of acquaintance with both would be attained with less labour than, supposing separation

^a See | |.¹

¹ See *Chrestomathia* (CW), p. 74, where the 'objects aimed at in and by' grammatical exercises are listed. The present essay was written with a view to its appearing as an Appendix to *Chrestomathia*: for further details see the Editorial Introduction, pp. liii above.

practicable, would be necessary to the attainment of an equal share of acquaintance with no more than one.

The circumstance by which, at the present time in particular, the prospect of being able, in relation to this at present abstruse branch of art and science, to administer instruction on terms of hitherto unprecedented advantage, is the discovery made by Horne Tooke: that discovery by which the import of certain till then incomprehensible parts of speech was made known by shewing their identity with other parts of speech, the import of which was not thus abstruse.¹

The explanation of this discovery of his having been left by him in an unfinished state,² this imperfection may perhaps be referred to as having in some measure been the cause why no new system of Universal Grammar, constructed with the help of the lights thrown on the subject by that discovery, hath as yet been given to the world. But to the purposes here in question, to any one who will be at the pains of availing himself of them, the lights afforded by that discovery will, it is believed, be found quite sufficient.

Should the expectations here spoken of be sanctioned by the event, two results, one theoretical, the other practical—both of them in a more particular degree gratifying to an English heart—will, it is believed, [be] found deducible from the branch of instruction here proposed.

The theoretical one is that, to all the purposes of discourse taken together—Latin and Greek not excepted—the English language is better adapted than any other language.

The practical result is—that in the seminary, which, so much to the honour of this country, is already at work for the qualifying of young persons to be sent abroad in the character of Missionaries,³ in the hope of that glory which is to be reaped by the propagation of Christian civilization among barbarian nations, by whom, when taken in the aggregate, a prodigiously diversified multitude of languages afford respectively the only medium they have through which instruction can be transmitted to them by the generosity of their intended benefactors, an institutional treatise, on the principles of universal grammar, would, if grounded on the foundation here in

¹ John Horne Tooke, formerly Horne (1736–1812), radical and philologist, was author of *ENNEA PITEPOENTA. Or, the Diversions of Purley. Part I*, London, 1786, and *ENNEA PITEPOENTA. Or, the Diversions of Purley. Part II*, London, 1805, in which he argued that nouns and verbs were the basic parts of speech and that all other words were derived from them.

² Shortly before he died, Horne Tooke destroyed the manuscript for a projected third volume of *Diversions of Purley*.

³ Bentham may have had in mind the Missionary Seminary which the London Missionary Society, founded in 1795, had in 1800 attached to the Gosport Academy, founded in 1795 for the theological education and training of dissenting ministers.

INTRODUCTION

question, be found a useful assistant, substracting at the same time from the quantity of the correspondent part of their literary labour, and at the same time, in respect of strength of mind and mastery of the subject, make addition to the strength of it.

PART I. GENERALIA

§ 1. *Universal Grammar—its Nature and Divisions*

Grammar is that branch of Art and Science, in and by which the words of which language or discourse is composed are considered without any regard to the subject of the discourse, and only with respect to the relations which the imports of the different classes of words of which it is composed bear to each other, these classes of words being the same whatsoever be the subject of discourse.

These classes of words are termed *The Parts of Speech*.

In the providing of words for the course taken for giving expression or designation to these several imports, considerable differences are exhibited by different languages. But as to those differences which have place in the mutually-related imports themselves, the demand is the same in all language.

The course taken by the particular language in question for satisfying this demand forms the subject of that branch of the art and science which may be called Particular Grammar.

In so far as the modifications of which it takes cognizance are those which have place in all the several particular languages, the art and science of Grammar is designated by the name of Universal Grammar: viz. the different correlative imports which are essential ingredients in discourse whatsoever be the subject and which stand respectively designated by the different classes of words called, as above, Parts of Speech.

In so far as the imports are considered in themselves alone, and without regard to the different provision made in and by different languages for the designation of them, they constitute the subject of a branch of the art and science of Universal Grammar which may be distinguished by the appellation of the *abstract* or *unapplied* branch.

In so far as they are considered with regard to the differences that have place in the provision made for the designation of them in different languages, the branch may be termed the practical or applied branch.

For the purpose of conveying as early as possible a conception of the design and principal results of this essay, a distinction that has been observed as between language and language in relation to these parts of speech must in this place be brought to view.

Essentially diversified and *not essentially diversified*—to one or other of these two heads they will every one of them be found capable of being arranged.

PART I. § 1. NATURE AND DIVISIONS

Those which are essentially diversified are those which are at the same time expressive of some one principal idea or import and of some one or more accessory ideas of which, according to the nature of the discourse, one or more are constantly and inseparably annexed to that principal one.

These will be seen to be: 1. the noun *Substantive*. 2. the *Verb* called by grammarians the *Verb substantive*—and no others—the pure and simple sign of relative existence.

Necessarily attached to the principal idea in the instance of the noun *substantive* there is but one accessory idea, and *that* is that of *number*. The objects meant to be brought to view by the word in question are meant to be represented either as one only or as more than one: and in one of those two cases they can not but be presented to view.

Necessarily attached to the principal idea in the instance of the sign of relative existence are the diversifications of which *time* is susceptible, and the ideas of absoluteness and conditionality, one or other of which is the inseparable accompaniment of every conception that can be formed on the subject of *existence* considered as the attribute of the matter of fact the idea of which is, by the portion of discourse in question, presented to the mind.

Considered with reference to time as applied to the sign of existence in the case in question, the verb is said to present itself to view in different *tenses*.

Considered with reference to *absoluteness* and *conditionality*, it is said to present itself to view in different *moods*.

The imports of all the other parts of speech are resolvable into the import of these two—viz. the Noun Substantive and the Verb substantive: viz. as well those which in certain languages, though not of necessity, are in fact diversified, as those of which no diversifications are to be found in any language.

The noun adjective contains not necessarily any distinct diversifications: its only diversifications being those of the noun substantive to which it makes reference.

In addition to those pastmentioned, the verb *substantive* requires not any diversification.

The import of any other verb than the [verb]¹ substantive admits not of any diversifications other than those which belong to the [verb]² substantive: insomuch as the import [of] every verb other than a verb substantive is resolvable into the import of the verb substantive added to the import of a noun adjective.³

¹ MS 'noun' here and below is a slip.

² MS 'noun'.

³ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Add here or farther on, or say that farther on will be explained, the mode in which the import of the preposition, conjunction

For giving expression to the abovementioned diversifications, the authors of language have had the choice of two modes. One is by addition of so many separate words allotted to that purpose: the other is by some change in the letters of which the sign of the principal idea or import is composed. Say in the first case by detached signs, or more shortly, though less clearly, by distinct addition: say in the other case by modification, or, to employ the word already in common use, inflection.

The language in which for that purpose no use whatever is made of inflection—in which, for the giving expression to all these several diversifications of import, no other instrument than that of distinct addition is employed—would not (it is believed) be found.

But some languages there are in which, in comparison of others, the use made of *inflection* is extremely small. These may be termed—sparingly-inflected languages: the others—copiously-inflected languages.

Between *sparingness* and *copiousness*, taken according to the common acceptation of the terms, no naturally determinate line of separation would be to be found. But in their application to the several known languages, so wide and conspicuous in every instance will the difference be found that, in the particular case here in question, no ambiguity will be found to be produced by that want of determinateness by which it might in some cases be produced.

On this distinction between the sparingly-inflected and copiously-inflected as applied to language, a variety of results have been found deducible: most if not all of them such, that in a practical point of view the importance of them, supposing them correct, will, it is believed, be generally and readily recognized.

In the character of propositions to be proved they will now immediately be presented to view: what has presented itself as necessary in the shape of explanation and proof, will successively come to view as we advance.

In the field of universal grammar, four objects or topics present a principal claim to notice—viz.

1. The uses or *purposes* to which language has been or is capable of being rendered subservient.

2. The properties which, in the character of properties conducive to these purposes, are desirable on the part of a language—in a word in the instance of every language.

3. The degrees in which, by the several known languages, in so far as they are known, these properties may be seen to be possessed.

and adverb is resolvable into that of the noun substantive, noun adjective and verb—one, two or all of them.'

4. The properties which, according to the occasion on which the language, whatsoever it be which is in question, is employed, are desirable on the part of the stile, i.e. the language of an individual by whom on that occasion it is employed.

1. The properties which, for all *purposes* taken together, are desirable on the part of language at large—i.e. as far as may be in every language—will, it is believed, be found to be as follows: viz. 1. Clearness or Perspicuity. 2. Correctness. 3. Copiousness or Comprehensive-ness. 4. Conciseness or Compressedness. 5. Impressiveness. 6. Melodiousness. 7. Pronuntiability, i.e. facility of pronuntiation. 8. Discibility—i.e. facility of being learnt. 9. Ornability—i.e. facility of being made subservient to the purpose of ornament.

2. Of the abovementioned nine properties, the five first—regard being had to the difference in the degrees of which different languages are respectively susceptible of them—are beyond comparison the most important.

3. In respect of all these five properties, the sparingly-inflected languages have in a prodigious degree the advantage over the copiously-inflected languages.

4. By means of the sparingly-inflected languages alone—and not by any copiously-inflected language—can the fundamental principles of universal grammar, including the relation and correspondency between the nature of the thoughts requiring to be expressed and the nature of the signs capable of being employed for the expression of them, have been developed with that clearness of which they are susceptible.

5. To the class of copiously-inflected languages, and at the head of that class, may be seen the antient Greek, the antient Latin, and the modern languages of the continent of Europe of which from those two, but most immediately from the Latin, the structure has been derived.

6. Of all known languages, the English is that which is most sparingly-inflected.

7. Of all known languages, the English is accordingly that in which in the highest degree, taken in the aggregate, the most important of the properties desirable in every language are to be found.

8. In particular, in a higher degree than any other, is the English language adapted to the purpose of a treatise on Universal Grammar, in which the essential character of all language and the fundamental principles of all grammar is intended to be brought to view.

9. In so inferior a degree are the copiously-inflected languages, and in particular the Greek and Latin, adapted to the purpose of being employed as instruments for the explanation of the principles of universal grammar, that it may be doubted whether, by any person unacquainted with any other language than those languages

respectively belonging to that class, a clear conception of the nature of language in general and of the principles of Universal grammar could have been conveyed or formed.

10. By means of the lights afforded [principally by]¹ this distinction between the sparingly-inflected and the copiously-inflect[ed] languages—and in particular by that enumeration by which it has been suggested or at least accompanied, viz. the list of the properties desirable in language, observations may be suggested by which not only the attainment of the maximum of perfection in the stile of each individual on each occasion may be facilitated, but the improvement of the whole body of the particular languages which they respectively employ placed in some degree within the reach of individuals.

§ 2. *Its uses—good and particular: viz. to Chrestomathia*

Of an acquaintance with this branch of art and science, should it be asked, what is the use—an answer is at hand.

1. Giving facility to the study of any particular language whatsoever.

2. Giving to the comparative study of a number of languages conjunctly a degree of facility not obtainable by any other means.

3. In the case where a man is so circumstanced that, for the purpose in question, it may be a question of doubt with him which of several languages to employ—affording grounds for the solution of it.

4. By developing the nature of the connection between the different sorts of signs and the thoughts of which they are the signs, rendering a man the better acquainted with the nature of his own thoughts, whatsoever may on any occasion be the subject to which they apply themselves.

To give a clear, correct, comprehensive and instructive view of the field of universal grammar, it is not enough for a man to look into the books that are extant on the subject of grammar, whether particular or universal. He must look into his own mind.

For want of being confronted and compared with the purposes the demand for which gave birth to the distinctions of which they are expressive—for want of being brought to view in company with the thoughts or parts of thought of which they are the signs—the parts of speech have formed altogether a dark and mysterious cloud. To the view of the awestruck tyro they present themselves as if in their present state brought down from heaven by the hand of Revelation.

The only medium through which grammar, whether particular or universal, has ever yet been presented, is that of the shape in which it

¹ MS 'by principally'.

is presented by the languages of antient Greece and Rome. But in both those languages properties will be shewn by which they are rendered, it will be seen,¹ in a high degree incompetent and ill-adapted to this purpose.

If by a clear insight—if, in a word, by a clearer insight than has been as yet obtained of the general principles of language and of that art and science of which it is the subject, the acquisition of any and of every particular language may be made to receive a facility hitherto unexampled—if at the same time, in the obtaining of this insight, no greater difficulty will in the case of non-adults be experienced than in the obtaining that acquaintance which so many do actually form, and which by the new method it is supposed that all may be made to form, with the particular elements of the grammars of several particular languages,—if all these several suppositions shall be found verified, it will follow that the claim presented by the art and science of Universal Grammar to be admitted upon the list of branches of learning taught in a Chrestomathic School will not be exposed to dispute.

The mode of teaching by interrogation is a mode the utility of which has never been contested, and which is every day more and more extensively recognized as well in practice as in discourse: nor is there a branch of art or science better adapted than this.

§ 3. *Why now teachable to non-adults, though not before*²

§ 4. *Uses of language—primary and secondary—native and adventitious—social and solitary.—Social are: 1. simply informative—2. excitative*

When, in the state at which in a civilized nation, as far back as history reaches, the art has displayed itself, the subject of language is contemplated, two perfectly distinct, howsoever intimately connected, uses of it will be found observable. One is the communication of thought: the other may be termed the *improvement* of thought: that which consists in communication may be termed the *social* use: the other, for distinction sake, though not less than the former capable of being ultimately subservient to social purposes, yet not being immediately so, the *solitary* use.

The social was for a long time not only the only use actually made, but the only one which was even in contemplation. Of the solitary use, even to this day, no instance is recollected in which, in the character

¹ Bentham has, in fact, made this point in § 1, pp. 365–6 above.

² No text survives for this section.

of a separate use, compleatly distinct in its nature [from]¹ the former, any notice has in print been taken of it.

As to the social use, it is in its nature already as familiar as it is in the power of words to make it.

In regard [to]² the solitary, in the character of a distinct use, it having hitherto passed nearly if not altogether unnoticed, a few observations, for the purpose of bringing to mind the particular modifications of this species of use, will naturally be expected.

In regard to these two uses, the first observation that occurs is—that of the two different instruments capable of being employed to the social purpose, viz. audible signs and visible signs, the visible are those which are in a preeminent degree better adapted and more subservient to the solitary purpose than the audible.

Hence arises at the outset a practical suggestion, viz. that it is not till after the distinction between these different species of instruments has been brought fully under view, that any observations relative to the solitary use of discourse can be presented with due advantage.

§ 5. *Signs employed in discourse—audible, visible, and their respective substitutes*

At a stage to a certain degree advanced in the career of civilization, two perfectly distinct and different modes or instruments for the fixation of thought and the conveyance of it from mind to mind are made use of. The one, that in which, on the part of him whose design it is to make the communication, the instruments employed are measured, or as they are termed *articulate*, sounds, produced by organs which in men are in a peculiar degree adapted to that purpose: on the part of him by whose senses it is the intention of [the] utterer of those sounds that the communication so made of them should be received, and in his mind the requisite impression should be made, the corresponding organs of hearing: these accordingly may be termed *audible* signs: the other, that in which, on the part of the author of the intended communication, the instruments employed are perceptible characters presented to sense, and, on the part of the intended receiver (with the exception of the particular case in which the appropriate organ is deficient), the instruments put in exercise are the organs of sight: these accordingly are termed *visible signs*.

That the signs which address themselves to the ear were in use before the others came into use, several considerations concur in rendering manifest.

¹ MS 'for'.

² MS 'of'.

PART I. § 5. SIGNS EMPLOYED IN DISCOURSE

One is, that the audible form is alike natural to mankind and to the inferior animals: the visible, though as experience testifies not altogether incapable of being employed by man in his intercourse with some of the most intelligent species of those animals, is not, as far as appears, at any rate in a degree approaching to that in which the audible is, natural to any of them.

The other proof is—that of all the denominations by which, in any of the civilized languages, this mode of communication is designated, the organs of speech are the only ones by which it is ever in any direct way designated. Witness this very word language, derived as it is from the Latin name for a tongue, *lingua*. Witness also the other word *speech*, by which, from what root so ever derived,¹ the audible form, and that to the exclusion of the visible form, never fails to be presented.

True it is that for the designation of both alike, there exists in the English the word *discourse*: which word is moreover imported from the Latin *discursus*, having for its logical conjugate the verb *discurro*. But of the verb *discurro*, the original import is by far more extensive and at the same time less appropriate. By it is meant to run over or run on: and accordingly so far is it from being in any sufficient degree on all occasions appropriate, that on many occasions, notwithstanding the seeming contradiction, even in speaking of discourse in its visible form, it has been found necessary to put aside that appellative, and instead of it to employ the word *speech* or the word language.^a

For two purposes it was necessary that at this early period the distinction between these two forms should be brought to view.

1. One is—that of making out and rendering compleat the list—that list so important in a practical point of view—the list of the *properties* desirable in language. Among these some will be seen—or at any rate one—the application of which is confined to the audible signs of language.²

2. Another is, that of being necessary to the purpose of forming and conveying a distinct conception of the solitary use of language: this being, as to a considerable portion of it, confined (as already intimated)³ to the visible signs of language.

^a For example, in speaking of the instrument of communication in the forms in which it exhibits itself in different nations.—You can not say, the English discourse, the French discourse. You find yourself under the obligation of saying, the English language—the French language.

¹ The word 'speech' was Old English derived from the Germanic.

² i.e. 'pronuntiability'.

³ See § 4, pp. 367–8 above.

§ 6. *Properties desirable in language at large*

The properties desirable in the case of any particular language will be correspondent to and dependent on the properties desirable on the part of all language or discourse at large.

Different properties are in different degrees desirable in a human discourse on different occasions: the properties desirable in a mass of discourse will in some degree as to some of them depend on the nature of the discourse: that is on the sort of end which it has in view and the occasion on which—the state of things—the conjuncture—in which—it is uttered.

The properties desirable in language in general will, then, be the sum of all the properties which can be desirable in it on the sum of all the different occasions that are capable of having place.

One all-comprehensive property may, therefore, be stated as desirable in any particular language, viz. the capacity of being, according to the nature of each occasion, endowed with all the several properties which on that particular occasion are desirable in language—would be desired by—would be serviceable to—any and every person who on that occasion should have need to employ the faculty of discourse.¹

Properties of the first order or primary properties—properties of the second order or secondary properties—under these different classes may be ranked all the several properties desirable in language or discourse taken at large.

By properties of the first order, understand all such properties as in a direct way are respectively conducive to one or other of all the several sorts of ends to the accomplishment of which language is in any part of it on any occasion capable of being employed and directed: and which, supposing them possessed, need not for that purpose the intervention or addition of any other properties.

These last will be found to be properties not belonging to language at large, but properties belonging in greater or less degree to this or that particular language.

By properties of the second order, understand such properties as are indeed conducive to the same ends, but no farther nor any

¹ There is no text corresponding to the following marginal summaries which Bentham has added at this point to the marginal summary sheet at UC cii. 97 (29 November 1815): 'Occasions are: 1. Didactic. 2. Hedonistic. 3. Pathocinetic.

'Subjects or Objects of consideration in relation to language are: 1. Properties desirable in language. ⚡ Might not Prop^s desirable in the stile of an individual come before d^o d^o in a language? 2. Degrees in which they are exclusively possessed in different languages. 3. Means of giving encrease to the degrees in which they are possessed.

'Add. Clearness and Impressiveness and Melodiousness depend on 1. Choice. 2. Collocation.'

otherwise than as being respectively contributory to the endowing of the language with one or more of the properties above designated and distinguished by the appellation of properties of the first order.¹

The several properties of the first order which, with reference to all ends, and on all occasions taken together, are desirable in language may, therefore, be thus enumerated.

1. Clearness.
2. Correctness.
3. Copiousness.
4. Conciseness.
5. Impressiveness.
6. Melodiousness.

The several properties of the second order, which in respect of their conduciveness to the same ends [operate] but through the medium each of them of one or more of the particular [properties] standing in the above list of primary properties, may be thus enumerated.²

1. The relations expressed by it expressed as much as may be by distinct words in contradistinction to modifications of other words.

In proportion as it is endowed with this property, a language may be termed a sparingly-inflected language.³

A word being assumed as the basis or root of these several modifications, they will consist either of additions to, subtractions from or changes of some one or more of the letters of the fundamental or radical word.⁴

All such modifications may be termed *inflections*.⁵

§ 7. *Properties desirable in the style of every individual—and thence in every language—Degrees in which they are possessed in different classes of languages*

Of the two distinguishable uses or purposes to which language, now that it has been invented and established, is found applicable and is accordingly applied, a general view has already been given, viz.

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Find out here and enumerate the several different sorts of *ends* or *purposes* with a view to which so many distinguishable properties may be desirable on the part of language, taking note of the different *occasions* on which the same end may be in view.’

² In the text, Bentham goes on to enumerate just one such property of the second order, though he adds a second in a note to himself.

³ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Contrà, a *copiously*-inflected language.’

⁴ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘thence 1. at the beginning. 2. at the end. 3. at any intermediate part.’

⁵ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Add for another secondary property, Affording facility to the construction of composite words.—State the use of composite words.’

the social and the solitary: and of these two the solitary, howsoever important in itself, has in comparison of the other been seen to be secondary and incidental.¹

For the accomplishment of the first of these purposes, different systems of signs—different *languages* as they are called—have, from the earliest accounts, been found to be employed on different parts of the earth's surface by different races among mankind: and in the instance of many of these languages—probably in by far the greater number of them—the social purpose is the only one to which the language has ever been employed. For on the answer to the question whether, in the nation in question, to the audible and universal form of discourse, any visible form has or has not been added, may be considered as depending the question whether, in addition to the social purpose, the language has been employed with a view to the solitary purpose.

Of the differences thus manifested between language and language, the cause seems altogether out of the reach of human investigation.

But be they ever so numerous, one feature, in whatsoever different degrees of perfection, would be found to be, for it can not but be, possessed by all of them in common: and that is, capacity of exhibiting those modifications of the matter of language of which, the art and science of grammar taking cognizance, are accordingly termed grammatical, and of which the distinctive character, as above explained,² is—their being necessary to the purpose of exhibiting a full and adequate development and form to the matter of language on every imaginable occasion, whatsoever may be the *subject* of it.

Such being the uses and purposes to which language considered in all its diversifications is seen to have been and continues to be applied, on an occasion and under a proposed institution in which it is proposed that, to every pupil, instruction in languages in considerable number should be administered, it can not but present itself as desirable, if not in the instance of every language actually to observe—at any rate in the instance of every language to be put in a way to observe, in what degree in the scale of perfection those purposes have been accomplished.

The degree in which, in any given language, those *purposes* are accomplished will depend upon the degree in which the several *properties*, the possession of which is necessary to that end, are possessed.³

¹ See § 4, pp. 367–8 above.

² See § 1, pp. 362–6 above.

³ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: '¶ Then go on to say 1. that each language is the aggregate of the discourses of all the individuals that speak it.

'2. that therefore properties desirable in a language depend on d° d° in the stile of an individual: *individuals* manifesting actuality, the language furnishing correspondent capacity and facility.'

§ 8. *Subjects of discourse immediate and ulterior, entities real and fictitious*

Language is the sign of thought—an instrument for the communication of thought from one mind to another. Language is the sign of thought: of some thought which is in the mind of him by whom the discourse is uttered.

It may be the sign of other things and other objects in infinite variety, but of this object it is always a sign, and it is only through this that it becomes the sign of any other object.

On this occasion and for this purpose, the whole of the mind of man may be considered as distinguishable into two parts—the purely *passive* and the *active*. In the passive is included the intellectual: the active may also be stiled the concupiscible. The passive, the seat of *perception*, memory, even judgment in so far as it is, as in *seeing*, capable of being exercised without any consciousness of the intervention of the *will*: the active, the seat of desire, and thence of volition, and thence of external action.

The object for the designation of which a class of words termed by grammarians a verb in the imperative mood is employed is one modification of the state of the concupiscible part of the mind—one modification out of several of which it is susceptible.

A certain event, presented by my imagination as being not yet realized but capable of being realized, becomes the object of my desire—if the event be regarded as capable of being brought into reality by my own agency alone, and my desire of seeing it realized is strong enough, my will, my volitional faculty, and at the same time the appropriate branch of my externally active faculty, are exercised in the production of it.

If it be regarded as capable of being brought into reality by the action of some other individual and not otherwise, at the same time that it appears to me probable that, by the knowledge of the desire entertained in my mind, a correspondent desire followed by corresponding action will be produced in his, I address myself to him—I employ the faculty of language in making communication to him of such my desire accordingly.

In respect of power, what is his situation in life—regard being had to the particular occasion and purpose in question—what is his situation in life in relation and comparison to mine? Is it that in my view of the matter I have it in my power to exercise a greater influence on his well-being than he has on mine?—I am his superior. Is it that, on the one hand the power which I have of exercising influence on his well-being, on the other hand the power which he has of exercising

influence on my well-being, are equal to one another? He is my equal. Is it that the power which he has of exercising influence on my well-being is greater than that which I have of exercising influence on his well-being? I am his inferior.

In the first case, if the mode in which I make communication of such my desire is such as to convey to him an intimation of the opinion I entertain of the position of such my own station in life with relation to his, the expression thus given to my desire is termed a command.

In Latin *impero* means I command: imperative, commanding. Of the including cluster of words designated by grammarians by the name of verb, one included cluster is termed a verb in the *imperative mood*. By this name, the intimation expressed is that wherever a word of this form is employed, intimation of superiority is given, as above: that by this sort [of word] commands are signified: and that commands are not signified by any other sort of word. But that neither of these propositions is correct will in due course be manifested.¹

Thus far, then, are we advanced. The immediate subject of a communication made by language is always the state of the speaker's mind: the state of the *passive* or *receptive* part of it, or the state of the *active* or *concupiscible* part.

Now, then, in the case where it is the state of the receptive part, what is or may be the *ulterior* subject of the communication thus made?

Answer. It will be in some respect or other the state (*viz.* always meaning the supposed or alledged state) either of the corporeal part of the speaker's frame, or the state of some object other than and exterior to the speaker.

Of the corporeal part of the speaker's own frame. Example—I am weary. I am hungry. I am dry.

Of the state of some object other than and exterior to the speaker. Example—That apple is ripe. Apples are sweet. Apples are good.

In both these cases an object other than the state of my own mind is the subject of the discourse held by me—but in neither of them is it the immediate subject.

In both of them the immediate subject is no other than the state of my own mind—an opinion entertained by me in relation to the ulterior object or subject.

In the one case, it is an opinion of which the subject is the state of my own body.

¹ Cf. 'Of improper moods', Appendix, pp. 444–6 below.

PART I. § 8. SUBJECTS OF DISCOURSE

In the other case, it is an opinion concerning the state of a body exterior to my own body.

In the first case, the opinion, though it be but an opinion, is not, as the case is here put, much in danger of being erroneous. In respect of the actual state of my sensations, meaning the sensations themselves, I am scarcely liable to be deceived or in error. But beyond that point, no sooner do I advance but a single step, if in relation to any one of those sensations I undertake to pronounce an opinion relative to the cause of any of those sensations, from that moment I am liable to fall. I here launch into the ocean of art and science: I here commence physician: and in the field of the physician, the dominion of error is but too severely felt.

Speaking of the state of my own body, am I thus exposed to error? much more am I in speaking of the state of any other.^a

The sort of infirmity just noticed being common to all discourse in the composition of which an assertion of the state of the speaker's mind precedes, introduces and weakens the ulterior assertion which lies beyond it, the consideration of the intervening assertion may in every case but the present, in which, for the purpose of explanation, it has been necessary thus for once to bring it to view, be dropped, and the subject of the discourse may be stated as being, except in the particular case where it is the state of the speaker's body, the state of some exterior *entity* or assemblage of entities.

But now already comes the stage at which, by an irresistible voice, and on pain of leaving every thing unexplained and misconceived, the land of fiction calls upon us to visit it.

That apple is ripe. Apples are sweet. Apples are good. An apple is a real entity. In saying, That apple exists, the existence of which I express my opinion is that of a real entity. But, *That apple* is ripe. Of what is it that, in addition to that of the apple, I express my opinion of the existence? It is of the existence of the quality of ripeness in the apple.

But the quality of ripeness, is it a real entity? Different from apples, and every thing else that is susceptible of it, has this quality or any quality any separate existence? If there were no other apple in the world than that which I have in my hand, that apple would not the

^a From these speculative observations, practical inferences of no small importance might be deduced.

1. Avoid dogmaticalness.

2. Still more, avoid intolerance. In both cases never cease to bear in mind how slippery and hollow the ground on which your opinion, and consequently the utmost value of any expression which you can give to it, rests.

less be possessed of existence. But if there were nothing in the world that were susceptible of being ripe, where would be the quality of ripeness?—No where.

In saying this apple is ripe, what is it that I affirm? It is that *in* this apple is the quality of ripeness. The two expressions are equivalent. But, in this apple is the quality of ripeness. In the assertion thus made, what is the image that I bring to view? It is—that the apple is a receptacle; and that, in this receptacle, the quality of ripeness—the imaginary, the fictitious entity called a *quality*—is lodged. For, of the preposition *in*, this is the import. Witness the apple which I am supposing myself to have in my hand: witness the pen which at this moment I actually have in hand.

Thus it is that, in the use made of language, fiction at the very first step that can be taken in the field of language, fiction in the simplest, or almost the simplest, case in which language can be employed, becomes a necessary resource.

Coæval with the very first steps that can be taken in the endeavour to give a clear explanation of the true nature of language must be the intimation given of the distinction between real and fictitious entities, and the correspondent distinction between names of real and names of fictitious entities.

Apple is the name of a real entity. Sweetness is the name of a *quality*. Every *quality* is a fictitious entity.

Of no quality can any conception be formed, without its being conceived as existing in some *subject*. But in the very signification of the word, an assertion, and therein a sort of conception, is included that the object to which it is applied is a receptacle—a material receptacle. The course of thought and language considered, to material receptacles there can be no doubt of its being applied in the first instance, as among nations in a rude state^a it can not but have been applied in the greatest number of instances.

In a word, a material image is the only instrument by which, the only medium through which, conceptions can be conveyed from mind to mind. In every instance, by what is called the *strict* or *literal*—that is by the original—import of the words, the existence of such an image is asserted. In every instance, that assertion is a false one. Pure from all moral turpitude, deception, though so frequently in some shape or other the effect, not being, unless by accident, the object of it, this falshood, such as it is—this falshood, notwithstanding all of those inconveniences of which, in respect of clearness of conception, it is so apt to be productive, is interwoven

^a So among [...] even now.

with the very essence of language. Without it, language could not have had existence: and in proportion as it shall have been fully developed and clearly brought to view, all inconveniences incident to the use of it will cease.

Even in the very explanation thus endeavoured to be given of it—in this very explanation, and throughout the whole of it, an exemplification and thereby a proof of the existence of this system of necessary and unreprehensible falshood may be observed.

Though, to the development and thus the explanation of the import of the word *ripe*, the word ripeness may thus be rendered subservient, it follows not that of the two the word ripeness was first in use. From the use which, in and for the developing the texture of the import of the verb, [of] the word quality in the character of a generic name, and the names of the several sorts of qualities distinguishable in the several sorts of substances in the character of so many specific names, may now be made, it follows not that words of this description were in use before the verb—before that complex species of verb in every individual of which the import of some species of quality may be found contained. On the contrary, the contrary course seems even by much the most natural and probable to have taken place.

The earlier the stage of society, the more indistinct have been all conceptions, and thence all expressions: it is only by long continued courses of attention that distinctness in conception and expression have been produced.

It seems probable that the shape of entire propositions was the first shape in which the sounds of which audible language was composed first presented themselves: witness those words, which, under the name of *interjections*, are by grammarians numbered among the parts of speech, and which may be considered as so many fragments of language as it shewed itself in its earliest state.

As it was with the audible, so it appears to have been with the visible signs of speech: and as words were formed by the decomposition of propositions, so were letters by the decomposition of words.¹

This distinction,² is it a trifling one? Is it an unimportant one? Alas—no. To what a prodigious extent have fictitious entities been taken, been mistaken, for real ones?

Throughout the whole of the Aristotelian Logic, scarce are any symptoms of a clear perception of this distinction to be found.

¹ Bentham has marked the following three paragraphs for possible deletion.

² i.e. between real and fictitious entities.

To the several fictitious entities which, for the purpose of giving an explanation of some of the operations of the human mind, were in that system invented and by so many correspondent names presented to view, frequently if not continually it looks as if no less reality was imputed than to the individual real entities in which they had their several sources.¹

If all language be thus figurative, how then (it may be asked) how then is it that the character, and in so important a class of instances the reproach, of figurativeness is cast upon it in particular instances?

To this it may be answered—the discourse that is *not* in this particular sense figurative is the discourse in which, for the conveyance of the immaterial part of the stock of ideas conveyed, no other fictions—no other figures—are employed than what are absolutely necessary to, and which consequently are universally employed in, the conveyance of the import intended to be conveyed.

The discourse that *is* figurative is the discourse in which, in lieu of these, or in addition to these, other images not necessary to, and thence not universally employed in, the conveyance of the import in question are employed.

In some instances, by the figures—by the images—thus without necessity employed, it happens that, in the mind of the hearer or speaker, a sense of pleasure is produced: in this case, according to the nature of the subject, and according as the use of them is or is not conjoined with the use of *metre*, they constitute the matter of *poetry* or *rhetoric*, and are regarded as ornamental.^a

In other instances, the sensation of which they are productive is that of disgust. The cases in which this happens is where, between the material image employed as a sign and the immaterial object meant to be signified, the resemblance is too faint, the distance too wide, or where, in such a proportion as to be fatiguing, for the designation of one and the same object, a multitude of images one upon the back of another are heaped up.²

Not unfrequently, when, having for the designation of the immaterial idea meant to be designated, a man has chosen and employed a material image not very closely analogous to it, that

^a In poetry, the dose of them by which pleasure is produced is much larger than in oratory.

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Examine how far this is true.’ Bentham may have had in mind Sanderson’s discussion of definition, division, and identity and diversity in *Logicæ artis compendium*, Lib. I, Cap. XVII–XIX, pp. 43–51.

² In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘N.B. Disgust or pleasure depends [more] upon the individual than upon the nation—the state of society in the nation.’

image brings to view and gives expression to a second, that second to a third, and so on, no one of them perhaps very closely analogous to the one by which it was immediately suggested. What adds to the confusion, a quality which belongs only to one of those images considered in the character of a subject is inadvertently ascribed to another. In this way, perhaps, before the discourse is come to a close, the immaterial object or state of things originally meant to be designated has been forgotten, and is dropt out of sight: and thus the whole becomes a tissue of nonsense.

Of imperfection in this shape, the most conspicuous examples may be found generally, not to say universally, in the works of Oriental writers.

§ 9. *Of Propositions*

Propositions are simple or compound.

Simple propositions are the component elements or integral portions of complex ones.

Every complex proposition is resolvable into one or more simple ones.

A simple proposition is that which has but one subject, to which is added a prædicate, and the copula by which the connection between the subject and the prædicate stands expressed.

The subject may be the name of any entity, real or fictitious.

The prædicate is always the name—may at least in every case be considered as the name—of a quality.

By the help of the copula, what the proposition does is to express, on the part of the speaker, an opinion affirming or denying the existence of the quality designated by the prædicate in the entity which, or the name of which, constitutes the subject.

Example.

Simple proposition, affirmative.

Snow is white. Gold is yellow.

Simple proposition, negative or disaffirmative.

Snow is *not* yellow. Gold is *not* white.

A complex proposition is that which has at least two subjects, with a predicate and copula to each of them: two subjects and as many predicates.

The general effect of it is to bring to view two entities each of them real or fictitious, accompanied with an intimation, that by one of them a change is produced in the state or condition of the other.

Examples.

1. Eurybiades struck Themistocles.^a

2. Themistocles was stricken by Eurybiades.

In both these instances, the result expressed is one and the same. But in the first instance the verb employed (a verb of the complex kind, of which farther on)¹ is in what is called the active voice: in the other, in the passive.

In both instances, in the state of a certain entity, a change is represented as produced, and a *motion* is presented as the cause of that change.

But, in the first instance, the entity brought to view in the first place is the entity in which the motion is represented as having had its commencement: the entity which is represented as having been first in motion, and, with that same entity, the motion so produced by it: in the other instance, it is the entity in which the motion is represented as having had its termination: Themistocles was struck, viz. by Eurybiades.

This motion may be considered [as] the manifestation of a correspondent quality in the subject—viz. an active quality, an active quality which is represented as having on the occasion in question, at the moment in question, been resident in one of the two subjects in question, viz. *Eurybiades*.

In the other instance, the being struck may be considered as the manifestation of a correspondent quality of the passive cast, which is represented as having been on that same occasion, at that same

^a On the invasion of Greece by the Persians, at a council of war composed of the Commanders of the troops of the Grecian confederacy, Eurybiades, the Spartan Commander, was so far transported with passion, as to offer personal violence to the Athenian Commander Themistocles. 'Strike—but hear me,' said Themistocles: and to the insult that had been offered him, this was the only return he made.

Speaking of the opposition he expected to the innovation which he was bringing to view, my answer to any opponents (says Bacon) shall be that of Themistocles to [Eurybiades]:² and thereupon he quotes it as above.³

¹ See Part II, § 4, pp. 391–9 below.

² MS 'Alcibiades' is a slip.

³ See *The Two Bookes of Francis Bacon. Of the proficience and aduancement of Learning, diuine and humane*, London, 1605, p. 109 (reproduced in *The Oxford Francis Bacon IV: The Advancement of Learning*, ed. M. Kiernan, Oxford, 2000, p. 181): 'As for my labors, if any man shall please himselfe, or others in the representation of them; they shall make that ancient and patient request, *verbera sed audi*.' The original source was Plutarch, *Life of Themistocles*, xi. 3: 'And when Eurybiades lifted up his staff as though to smite him, Themistocles said: "Smite, but hear me." Then Eurybiades was struck with admiration at his calmness, and bade him speak, and Themistocles tried to bring him back to his own position.'

Themistocles (c. 524–459 BC), Athenian politician and military commander. Eurybiades, commander of the naval fleet of the Hellenic League at the Battles of Artemisium and Salamis 480 BC.

moment, resident in the other of the two subjects in question, viz. Themistocles.

And here may be seen the origin and explanation of two species of Verb—the Verb active and the verb passive, or (to speak in the language [of] the past and present race of grammarians by whom an ample cluster of words are spoken of as if they were all together but one word, to which real aggregate and imaginary unit they give the name of *a verb*, i.e. one verb) the active *voice* and the passive *voice of the verb*.

A verb active is a verb, i.e. an aggregate of words, in and by which, to the import of the copula or verb substantive, is added that of an active quality as having been manifested by the subject in question. In this case, the subject in question is the subject in which the motion in question is considered as having had its commencement.

A verb passive is a verb in which, to the import of the same copula or verb substantive, is added that of the correspondent passive quality as having been manifested by the subject in question. In this case the subject in question is the subject in which the motion in question is considered as having received its termination.

§ 10. *Prædication—real and verbal*

In the character of a *subject*, an entity, real or fictitious, being brought to view, if by any phrase intimation is given that in that subject a certain *quality* thereby designated has place, *prædication* is performed: the quality, in respect of its being so asserted to have place in the subject, is stiled the predicate: and the sign, by which the act of assertion to the effect in question is expressed, is termed the *copula*.

In this explanation a proposition implied is—that Prædication may, in every case be expressed by this one expression—an attribution of a *quality* to a subject—to the entity which is the subject of the proposition of which the prædicate in question is the prædicate: the import of the word quality being, [as] already explained,¹ understood not to be confined to the case in which the existence of it is considered as *permanent*.

Property—relation—time—place—manners—[within]² the one word *quality* can the import of all these terms be with propriety said to be included?—Answer. Yes.

1. *Property*. This may be considered as being perfectly synonymous to the word *quality*: and, therefore, in any case in which the use of the

¹ Bentham makes the distinction between the 'momentary or transitory' and the 'permanent or habitual' existence of a quality in a related fragment at UC cii. 169 (1 December 1815).

² MS 'by'.

word quality might on any account be less convenient, may, without any difference of import, be employed as a substitute for it.

2. *Relation*. For explaining the import of divers parts of speech, this word will of necessity come to be employed. But the bearing this or that relation to this or that other object may without impropriety be numbered among the qualities or properties of any object.

3. Of the modifications of which *place*, i.e. *space* considered in a relative point of view, is susceptible, frequent occasion for making mention will present itself. But the having its existence *in* the *place* in question may, for so long as it continues, with as much propriety in this instance as in any other, be numbered among the *properties* or *qualities* of the object, whatsoever it may be.

4. So in regard to *time*. Amongst the *qualities* attributed to the subject in question may be the having its existence in a certain portion of the field of *time*.

Every object that exists, exists in some portion or other of the field of place or space.

Every object that exists, exists in some portion or other of the field of time.

In so far as it exists in the field of *space*, an object bears a certain *relation* to every other object considered as having its existence in that same field.

In so far as it exists in the field of *time*, an object bears in like manner a certain relation to every other object, considered as having its existence in that same field—the field of time.

And thus we have the *relations* of *place* and *time*, which, with the addition of *quality* in that less extended sense of the word (viz. that in which it is put for qualities other than those which consist in existence in certain portions of the fields of place and time), constitute some of the principal classes of the objects for the designation of which different classes of words called *parts of speech* are employed.

As it requires an entire proposition, to give compleat expression—expression at length—to an intimation that to the subject in question a certain property or quality belongs, so does it to give the like expression to an intimation that, of the subject in question, the existence is confined to a certain portion of the field of space, or to a certain portion of the field of *time*.

In this way it will appear that not only in an adverb such as *here*, *there*, *now*, *then*, the import of an entire proposition is contained, but even that in a mere preposition such as *of*, *under*, the import of an entire proposition is contained: and that accordingly wherever, over and above the preposition *in*, the import of which is included in every *proposition*—(in every form of words by which a quality is asserted to

be *in* a subject)—any other preposition is included in the proposition, that proposition is a complex one containing, in addition to whatsoever other simple propositions it may contain, one of which the preposition in question is the abridged equivalent and substitute.

Prædication is either real or verbal: real, when the design of the proposition is to convey information concerning the nature of the object signified: verbal, when the design is merely to give intimation of the import of a word—the word which, on the occasion in question, is employed in the character of a sign.

Different as they are in themselves—that is, in the design in pursuance of which they are employed—these two modes of prædication are very liable to be confounded.

When the prædication is *real*, the purpose of it—the purpose of the proposition in which it has place—is always, as above, to convey an intimation that in the entity in question, which, or the name of which, is the *subject* of the proposition in question, a certain quality, to which expression is given in and by the predicate, has existence.

Where the prædication is *verbal*—purely verbal—the design is not to give intimation of any quality as having existence in any subject, but merely to convey an intimation of a certain relation between the import of one word, and the import of another, no such object as the nature of the quality designated by either being on that occasion meant to be brought into view.

The reason for holding up to view this distinction is that sometimes, when the effect or design of the proposition is of one sort, it is liable to be misconceived, by being conceived to be of the other sort.¹

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Follows an exemplification.’ No such exemplification has been located.

PART II. OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH

§ 1. *Parts of Speech—essential or principal, and accessory*^a

By the name of the parts of speech are designated certain classes of words, which being either indispensably necessary or universally and

^a The following are the accessory ideas of which the principal ones expressed by the several parts of speech in question must be divested.—Why? Answer. Because of these several accessory ideas, the import conveyed will be found to be equivalent to the import of so many entire propositions.

I. Noun Substantive—Accessory ideas attached to it in some languages—

1. The ideas respectively designated by the words—I. Gender. II. Number. III. Case.

In the copiously inflected languages (ex. gr. Greek, Latin, Sclavonian and their derivatives) these accessory ideas are, all three of them, designated by terminations: letters or combinations of letters added or substituted to those expressive of the principal object. In the sparingly inflected languages, for example, Gender: no. Number: yes. Case: the genitive, and no other.

In the Russian, a dialect of the Sclavonian, instances are not wanting in which not only the noun, but the verb is encumbered with variations of termination indicative of sex.

II. Noun adjective—the same.

III. Verb—Accessory ideas attached to it, as above, in some languages—

1. Person (relation had to the speaker and the being spoken to).

2. Number.

3. Mood or Mode, which is either 1. Absolute or 2. Conditional.

4. *Tense*—i.e. sign of *Time*.

1. Gender. The proposition involved in the import of the termination by which Gender, i.e. Sex, is designated.

1. The person in question, viz. the person in the designation of whom the Noun Substantive to which the termination is attached is employed, is of the sex thus designated: viz. either male or female. Applied to human and most other animated beings, the proposition thus expressed may always be true.

2. The thing in question is of the sex so designated. Applied to unorganized beings, this is never true: and so among organized beings with few exceptions if applied to vegetables.

By this absurd falshood, useless complication to a vast amount, conception not only erroneous, but pernicious to a considerable amount, are infused into the composition of the languages in which this execrescence is contained: and in particular the Latin, the Greek and the modern languages of which those antient languages form respectively the main roots.

II. Number—Proposition the import of which is indicated.

Objects of the same kind more than one are meant to be indicated by the noun substantive to which the termination in question is attached.

In the same way may be brought to view the propositions respectively indicated by the terminations or other modifications expressive of Tense and Mood or Mode.

Two *cases* there are in and by the import of which no such adjectitious and accessory idea is necessarily involved. These are: 1. The Nominative. 2. The

highly convenient to the purpose of discourse are to be found in all known languages.

The characters by which these several classes of words stand distinguished, and from which they [are] denominated, are taken solely from the consideration of the parts which they respectively bear in the composition of the mass of discourse termed a grammatical sentence: and thence from the relation which the classes of objects respectively

Accusative. In these cases there is not any proposition of the import of which the designation is added to that of the import of the Noun to which the termination or other modification is attached.

Those in the instances of which there is always some proposition, the import of which the designation is always involved in that of the termination in question, are: 1. the genitive. 2. the dative. 3. the ablative.

In certain sparingly inflected languages the import of the genitive is indeed expressed by a termination. But in those same languages it is in every instance expressed also by a preposition.

In every language in which it has place, the substitution made of terminations or other inseparable modifications to separate words, for example prepositions, is on several accounts a great blemish. 1. It is a source of prodigious complication, the whole of it useless. 2. It is a most copious source of ambiguity. One such modification being in these copiously inflected languages applied of necessity to convey indiscriminately [a] multitude of different imports, which being essentially different present a correspondently urgent demand for those instruments of distinction of which so correct and compleat a stock is afforded by the sparingly inflected languages. 3. In the multitude of these separate adjuncts which, in the sparingly inflected languages, are capable of being conjoined with the same principal part of speech, and the multitude of the changes capable of being rung upon [them] by arranging them in different orders, may be seen a copious source of energy, variety, and thence of beauty, of which the copiously inflected languages are not susceptible.^a

^a Of these beauties the conception was remembered to have been derived some twenty years [ago] from some printed work for which the searches that of late have been made have been without effect. *Analogous* (it is remembered) is the term by which either the languages here designated by the term sparingly-inflected, or those here designated by the term copiously-inflected, was there designated. Which it was (the designation not appearing in any degree characteristic) can not now be recollected: what the term is that it there employed in contradistinction to *analogous* is not remembered. The indication was accompanied by a copious and most satisfactory stock of examples.¹

¹ The publication in question is possibly the entry on 'Language' in *Encyclopædia Britannica; or, a Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and Miscellaneous Literature*, 18 vols., Edinburgh, 3rd edn., 1797, ix. 863–80, at 864–5, where languages are divided into analogous and transpositive, with the former, such as English and French, expressing their ideas 'in the natural order in which they occur to the mind', and the latter, such as Latin and Greek, in 'no other order . . . than what the taste or fancy of the composer may suggest', but where 'The confusion which this might occasion is avoided by the particular manner of *inflecting* their words, by which they are made to refer to the others with which they ought to be connected, in whichever part of the sentence they occur, the mind being left at liberty to connect the several parts with one another after the whole sentence is concluded.'

designated by them may be seen [to] bear to one another when considered in that point of view.

They are the same to whatsoever part of the field of thought and action the subject and adjuncts of the discourse belong.

Of these parts the names in general use are | |

The words¹ respectively designated by these names are some of them *single*, some of them *aggregated*, consisting each of them of a cluster of words or signs.

Single are 1. Preposition. 2. Conjunction. 3. Adverb.

Aggregated are 1. Noun Substantive. 2. Noun Adjective. 3. Verb.

In those parts of speech which are aggregated may be distinguished so many sub-parts as there are different objects included under the same name.

For giving an explanation of the several parts of speech and their respective *sub-parts*, that language will be the fittest to be employed which, being furnished with signs for all the necessary parts and sub-parts, is encumbered with the fewest superfluous ones. This language will, it is believed, be found to be the English.

In giving an explanation of the several classes of words called Parts of Speech, the most instructive, not to say the only essentially instructive, course will, it is believed, be found to be—the bringing to view in the first place the classes of objects that require to be designated, and thereafter and thereupon the different contrivances, and as the result of those contrivances the species or classes of words, which in different languages are employed in the designation of them.

This being the track proceeded in, for the laying a foundation for grammar, the art of Logic, or as some would say *Metaphysics*, is called in and employed.

Case I. The proposition simple. The quality designated internal with relation to the subject: the state of things quiescent.

1. I thirst or am thirsty. 2. You are good. 3. Napoleon² is wicked.

Subjects of the proposition.

In the first instance, I: in the 2^d instance, you: in the 3^d instance, Bonaparte.

2. Qualities prædicated.—In the first proposition, thirstiness: in the 2^d, goodness; in the third case, *wickedness*.

In the prædication, i.e. in the expression by which the quality in question is attributed to, i.e. is asserted to exist in, the subject, are employed and expressed the sign of the quality attributed, or say

¹ MS orig. 'objects'.

² Napoleon Bonaparte, whose forces had recently been defeated at the Battle of Waterloo of 18 June 1815.

the attribute, and the copula, i.e. the sign expressive of the speaker's opinion that, in the subject in question, the quality in question has existence.

In the first instance, the sign of the quality is the word *thirsty*; in the second instance, the word *good*; in the third case, the word *wicked*.

In the first instance, the copula or sign of assertion of the opinion of existence is *am*; in the 2^d instance, *are*; in the 3^d instance, *is*.

In all these several cases, the quality, the immaterial object, is a fictitious entity spoken of as being *in*, i.e. within, the substance of the real entity, which thereby is spoken of as being the receptacle of it, as a peach stone is of the kernel contained in it.

Case II. The proposition complex in the first or lowest degree, a transitive act designated, two entities introduced in the character of subjects of the proposition: one the agent of the act: the other the subject of it. The quality exterior with relation to the first subject:—the state of things or act, transitive.

Eurybiades strikes Themistocles.

Here Eurybiades is the name of one subject spoken of in the character of an agent.

Themistocles is the name of another subject spoken of in the character of a patient.

What is predicated of Eurybiades is the striking of Themistocles.

To Eurybiades, a quality is thus attributed, though of its existence the duration is not spoken of as being more than momentary: for notwithstanding the shortness of the duration thus attributed to it, the existence of a quality in the subject in question is asserted, viz. the quality of being a striker: a quality which, supposing its existence to be possessed of a certain degree of permanence, would denominate the subject possessed of it, a *pugilist*.

The quality in question is the quality constituted by the performance of a certain act, viz. the act of striking.

And in this instance, in this species of proposition, it being a transitive one, to the designation of the agent and the act is added the designation of the object on which the act was exercised and in which it terminated: viz. *the patient*.

Case III. The proposition complex, two entities introduced. The voice of the verb, *passive*.

Themistocles is stricken [by Eurybiades].

Here, of the logical proposition, Themistocles is the subject, say the first-mentioned subject: is stricken by Eurybiades, the logical prædicate.

§ 2. *Noun Substantives*

1. Case.

An entity, be it what it may, is susceptible of a multitude of relations as towards other entities. Where it is viewed in the character of the subject or the predicate of a proposition, occasion for giving expression to those relations is continually taking place. In so far as, for the giving expression to any such relation, a particular modification is given to the word by which the entity in question is designated, that word is thereby said to be put into a certain *case*.^a


For the production of this effect, two courses have been employed. One of them consists in the inserting into the texture of the proposition a separate word appointed for this purpose. This may be termed the *exterior* course or method. The other consists in some change made in the letters of which the word itself, of which the relation to be expressed, is composed. This may be termed the *interior* method.

The exterior course seems the most natural. It seems to be that which would be the first to occur and to be employed. For giving expression to the principal subject, a separate term has been employed. By the same reason and the same habit by which this mode of designation was suggested in the one instance, it seems but natural that this same mode of designation should be suggested in the other instance.

After having for some time been employed in company, though not in union, with the sign of the subject, it was natural enough that

^a The word *case*—in Latin *casus*, a fall—is a literal translation of the Greek πτωσις. From the Greek Grammarians, Harris, in his *Hermes*, has given what may be called the *archetyption* of the word: i.e. he has brought to view the material image that has been employed for serving as a sign of the immaterial idea.¹ The analogy is an extremely faint one.

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Give the diagram from *Hermes*.’ See Harris, *Hermes: Or, a Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Language and Universal Grammar*, Bk. II, Ch. IV, p. 277: ‘The *Peripatetics* held it [the nominative] to be no *Case*, and likened the Noun, in this its *primary and original Form*, to a perpendicular Line, such for example, as the line A B.



The Variations from the Nominative, they considered as if A B were to fall from its perpendicular, as for example to A C, or A D.’

insensibly the sign of the relation should come to be considered as an inseparable part of it, and thus be put in union with it.

In the case of some of the most obvious relations—those which there is most frequent occasion to bring to view—this expedient might serve. But as the field of language came to enlarge itself, the complication and embarrassment that would be produced by the giving such a multitude of modifications to the same word, were the expedient applied to every relation which there could be occasion to bring to view, set limits to the practice.

In the instance of some of these relations, the *interior* method or course continued thus to be employed. But in the instance of other relations, the *exterior* method was preserved; and for every such relation that had been distinguished from the rest, a separate sign, under the name of a preposition, continued to be employed. In the order in which the words of the sentence were arranged, being most commonly put immediately before one of the two words employed as the names of the entities between which the relation was represented as having place, it thus acquired the name of a *preposition*.

This course—could the effects of it have been generally foreseen—this union would never have been generally adopted. In the course of pronuntiation some how or other it happened that the termination which was regarded as suiting this or that principal word was not found suitable to this or that other principal word. To one class of words, one set of terminations came thus to be attached: to another class of words, another set of terminations: for the giving expression to one and the same idea, a great variety of signs. To these different sets of terminations were given the name of *declensions*.

From all these inconveniences the English language is almost, if not altogether, free. For giving expression to these relations, with only one exception, it employs no other than the exterior mode. No declensions are to be found in it. From that source—that abundant source—of useless and troublesome complication, it stands wholly free.

Of the existence of one exception intimation has just been given. This exception is that which is constituted by the mode in which expression is given to the relation of possession: in the language of grammarians, to the *possessive*, or, as it was first stiled, the *genitive*, case. But, of the sign employed for this purpose, a single letter s, and that on all occasions the same, such is the simplicity, that—not being applied in the instance of more *cases* or *relations* than this one—the *interior* mode is not productive of any sensible inconvenience. Applying itself to all nouns substantive without distinction, no particle of that useless system of complication expressed by the word *declension* is produced by it.

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2. Gender.

Gender is the sign either of sex or the absence of it: masculine and feminine, of the two sexes: neuter, of the absence of sex.

When the form given to a noun is that which causes it to be said to be of the masculine gender, an assertion which it expresses is that the object of which the noun is the sign is of the male sex: and so in the case of the feminine gender. When it is that which causes it to be said to be of the neuter gender, the assertion which it conveys is that the object of which the noun is the sign is not of either sex.

Applied as it is to common names, this modification, wherever it is employed, is altogether an useless one—and not merely useless, but replete with absurdity, and pregnant with inconvenience.

The English language is, in relation to this point, a perfect model. It attributes not on this occasion sex to any object that is not endowed with sex. By the entire name, and not by any particular modification of the name, it attributes sex to such objects as are really endowed with that quality.

The Greek and Latin languages are in this respect so constructed as to attribute sex to objects of all sorts which are not susceptible of sex. In so doing, they fill themselves with a most absurd system of continual misrepresentation. This is sometimes productive of confusion and pernicious error, and loads the language with a mass of complication forming a burthen enormously grievous to all who have the language to learn in the character of a foreign one.

3. Number.

A sign for the distinction of numbers—of more than one from one alone—is, it has already been observed,¹ indispensably necessary. In every instance, so as the purpose be but answered, the shorter the sign employed, the better: and here, so perpetually recurring is the demand for the distinction, brevity is of very particular importance. A single letter attached to the word by which the object is designated when no more than one of the sort is meant to be brought to view is the shortest sign that can be employed: shorter than a whole word employed on purpose, the instances excepted, of which the number must necessarily be small, confined to the number of the vowels, in which a word consisting of no more letters than one, can for such a purpose be spared.

Here, then, is another point in respect of which the English language presents a model of perfection. To this purpose it allots a single letter:

¹ See Part I, § 1, p. 363 above.

PART II. § 3. OF NOUN ADJECTIVES

and, with the exception of a very few words, remains of the language in its earliest state,^a this one letter serves for all words of this class. On this head, as on the former, none of those declensions, by which the Greek and the Latin are infested.

§ 3. *Of Noun Adjectives*

Case, Gender, Number—of none of these *affections* of the Noun Substantive has the noun adjective any need. In all these particulars, its import is determined—determined with perfect clearness—by the relation it has with the Noun Substantive: by the connection which the sign of a *quality* has with the sign of the *subject in* which it is meant to be represented as being the quality: *in* which it is meant to be represented as inhering.

In this particular again, the English may be seen presenting a model of perfection. In the English, the adjective is every where altogether undeclinable.

The substantive has but two *declensions*—two signs of modification—the sign of the genitive case in the singular number and the sign of the plural number in all cases. In the adjective, even these modifications are unnecessary: accordingly in the English, they have not, either of them, any place.

§ 4. *Of Verbs*

A Verb is either simple or complex.

There is but one simple Verb, and that is the verb substantive: the word of which the function is to designate existence, to whatsoever subject attributed.

By the addition of a word expressive of absence or negation, it is rendered significative of non-existence.

In comparison of this, every other verb may be termed *complex*. For with the import of it is involved the signification of some *adjective*: in which, as abovementioned,¹ is already involved the import of some quality coupled with the intimation of the existence of some entity in the character of a subject, in which that quality is to be found.

As well simple as complex, a verb is either unmodified or modified. Or rather—

^a Man, men: Woman, women: Child, children: Brother, Brethren: Sisters not: the demand for the frequent mention of *Sisters* coming later than that for the frequent mention of *Brothers*.

¹ See Part I, § 10, p. 381 above.

A verb, whether simple or complex, may be considered either in an unmodified state or in a modified state.

For the explanation of these modifications, let us, were it only in consideration of its simplicity, begin with the simple verb—the verb substantive.

A Verb is the sign of existence. The modifications essential to a verb are those which are essential to existence, considered in that limited point of view in which alone the human faculties enable us to consider it. Of these modifications, there are two sources: 1. difference in respect of time—and 2. the difference between absolute and conditional existence. Say rather between the case in which existence as applied to any subject is regarded by the speaker as absolute, i.e. certain, and that in which it is regarded by him as conditional, i.e. as uncertain, depending upon this or that event or state of things, the existence of which is regarded as a condition to its existence.^a

A verb is equally capable of existing and being considered in an unmodified as in a modified state.

1. As to those modifications of which *time* is the source.

No event or state of things can have existed but it must have existed in some portion or other of the field of time.

But in speaking of it as having existed, it is not necessary that, of the portion of time in which it is regarded as having existed, any intimation shall be made.

2. Next as to those modifications of which the difference between certainty and uncertainty, absoluteness and conditionality, is the source. By the speaker in question, of the event or state of things in question, though in itself either existent or non-existent, the existence may have been regarded as certain or it may have been regarded as conditional. But it is not necessary that, of the point of view in which in this respect it has been contemplated by him, any intimation shall in his discourse have been conveyed.

^a [To]¹ the word uncertain, though according to our forms of speech spoken of as a quality belonging to the event or state of things which is the object or subject of consideration, no really existing object corresponds other than the state of the mind by which that event or state of things is contemplated. Take any conceivable state of things at pleasure: either it exists or it does not exist—between existence and non-existence there is no medium. Suppose it to exist, all uncertainty is out of the question: suppose it not to exist, all uncertainty is equally out of the question.

¹ MS 'By'.

Of Time and Tenses

A distinction of which every thinking mind is at all times sensible is that between the modifications of time termed the present, the past, and the future. Here, then, are three modifications of time.

But whatsoever portion of time is now past was at one time present: and that time, it had its past and its future.

Moreover, whatsoever portion of time is now future will, should it ever have place, be present: and then, like a portion of past time, it will have its past, and also its future.

As time flows on, the absolute portions of time of which these names are designative are continually upon the change: at every instant different from what they are at every other.

Of one of these portions of time, all language is essentially and necessarily designative: and that is the *present*: the portion of time which has place while the discourse is going on.—Why necessarily?—Answer. Because, as above observed,¹ a thing, and the only thing, immediately and necessarily expressed by language is the state of mind that has place in the instance of him who is thus using it.

Will and Shall

For expressing an opinion in affirming the futurity of the event spoken of, understand in this case the absolute futurity, the English language has two auxiliary words—viz. will and shall.

1. In one thing they both agree: viz. in that, *an* event being, by other words in the sentence, brought to view, they both of them are expressive of an opinion on the part of the speaker that that event will take place: and that absolutely: no other event or state of things having place, on the existence of which, in the character of a condition, the event in question is dependent.

2. Another point in which they agree is that, over and above the futurity of the event as above, each of them, to the expression of an opinion to that effect, [adds]² the expression of an opinion that, where it does take effect, it will have the will of the speaker for its cause.

The particular point in which they differ is this: viz. the intimation given of the dependency of the event in question upon the will of him who speaks does not in the two cases apply to the same persons.

Where the purpose is that this dependency shall be considered as having place, if the event in question be an act to be performed by

¹ See Part I, § 7, pp. 373–4 above.

² MS 'address'.

the speaker, in which case the verb employed by him is in the first person, *will* is the futurity-asserting auxiliary verb to be employed: as I *will* read.

For this same purpose, if the event be either a mere event, or the act of a person or persons other than the speaker, the futurity-asserting verb employed must be the verb *shall*.

When employed in conjunction with the sign of the first person plural, viz. we, no such intimation is given.

Of the six *descriptions* of persons in conjunction with the signs of which this verb, as well as every other verb, is capable of being employed, viz. the first, second and third person in the singular number and the same in the plural number,^a one there is, viz. that indicated by the first person plural, concerning which it is not possible that the assurance expressed should be equal in strength to the assurance conveyed by the first person [singular]. Say, for example, we *will* read. For expressing my assurance in affirmance of the futurity of the act, in so far as it is an act of my own that is in question, the first person *I will read* serves correctly and compleatly. But if, in conjunction with its application to an act of my own, I apply the same sign of futurity to the respective acts of a set of persons with whom I consider myself as associated, it is not possible that it should convey the same import as that which it conveys when applied to the first person singular—viz. my own person alone. Let it be supposed, that in the instance of those other persons, so far as concerns their acts, their external conduct, and that at a future time, I may be as well assured as I can be of my own: still, in regard to the state of their will—of their internal and secret inclinations, and that at the very moment of uttering the discourse in question—no such equal assurance is possible within the nature of the case. In this case, therefore, the import of the word is attended with a sort of ambiguity and indeterminateness with which it is not attended in any other of the six cases.

With respect to any set of persons whatsoever, an intimation which, by the use of one of these words, it is in my power to express is that, in so far as concerns the act which the principal verb is employed to designate, viz. the act of reading—their conduct is dependent upon my will. But in this case, the class of persons in which, by my mode

^a 1. The person, if but one, who is speaking: 2. the person, if but one, who is spoken to: 3. the person or thing, if but one, who is spoken of: 4. the speaker, with the addition of the persons with whom he represents himself as associated: 5. the persons whom, in a number greater than one, he considers himself as speaking [to]:¹ 6. the persons or the things, or the persons and things, whom he considers himself as [speaking]² of.

¹ MS 'of'.

² MS 'spoken'.

of speaking of them, I place them must be that which in grammatical language is termed the third person plural, as above: that is, in speaking of them, I must say, they shall read.

Here occurs another question—supposing my design to be to represent the act or other event in question as depending upon their joint wills, for an import to this effect, by means of either of the two auxiliary verbs in question—shall and will—or by any other words, does the language afford any and what phrase? The answer is in the negative. By the phrase *they will read*, the import will not be conveyed: by that phrase, an import that is not conveyed is that their reading is regarded by me as dependent on my will: but neither is any such import conveyed by it as that it will be dependent on the will of all of them together or any one of them:¹ the event spoken of may, according to the description thus given of it, have alike for its cause either an act produced by a concurrent determination of their own respective wills, or a state of things in the production of which no part has been borne by the will of any one of them.

The imports for the expressing of which these two auxiliary futurity-denoting verbal particles afford the means are simply two.

1. That the result which is meant to be represented as about to have place, and for the designation of which the principal verb is employed, is meant to be represented as dependent upon the will of him who speaks.

2. That that same result is not meant to be represented as thus dependent.

In both these cases, to carry into effect the intention in question, viz. in so far as in the nature of the case it is capable of being carried into effect through all six persons—to carry it through in its application to the six descriptions of persons for the designation of which language in general has furnished expressions, both these auxiliary and futurity-denoting verbs are necessary.

But for the giving expression to these two opposite imports respectively, a course that will not serve is the course which in general is the only course which for such purposes can be made to serve—viz. the employing in one of the two cases throughout all six persons, one of these two words, and in the other case, the other.

No: but for the giving expression to those two opposite meanings, in the instance of each of them, both these words require to be employed: viz. as applied to some of the six descriptions of persons, the one of them; as applied to others of these same six descriptions of persons, the other.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘☞ Change the word *read* for an event not dependent on will.’

For placing all this matter in what, it is believed, will be found a clear light, the two following suites of phrases, by one of which one of the two imports is meant to be expressed, and by the other of them the other, will, it is hoped, be found to serve.

I. Case 1. Case in which the event is meant to be represented by me (the speaker) as dependent upon my will:

1. First person singular—I *will* perish.
2. Second person singular—Thou *shalt* perish.
3. Third person singular—He, she or it *shall* perish.
4. First person plural—We *will* perish.^a
5. Second person plural—Ye *shall* perish.
6. Third person plural—They *shall* perish.^b

II. Case 2. Case in which the event is not meant to be represented by me (the speaker) as dependent upon my will:

Singular Number

1. First person singular—I *shall* perish.
2. Second person singular—Thou *wilt* perish.
3. Third person singular—He, she or it *will* perish.

Plural Number

4. First person plural—We *shall* perish.
5. Second person plural—Ye *will* perish.
6. Third person plural—They *will* perish.

What remains is—employing successively through all six descriptions of persons the same one of the two futurity-denoting words in question, to subjoin to it, on the occasion of its application to these several descriptions of persons respectively, an intimation of that one of the two imports in question of which it is expressive. In this case the explanation given is the same as that given in the other: the only difference is that which regards the order in which the particulars are brought to view.

I. Case 1. Case in which *will* is the word employed.

First person singular—I will perish. Intimation that the event in question is dependent on the will of the speaker is in this case given.

Second person singular—Thou [wilt]¹ perish.

Third person singular—He, she or it [will]² perish.

In neither of these cases is any such intimation as that in question given.

^a N.B. In this voice, the assurance expressed not capable of being so determinate in this number as in the singular.

^b viz. these male persons, these female persons or these things—one, two or all of these classes together.

¹ MS 'shalt'.

² MS 'shall'.

First person plural—We will perish. In this case a decided intimation is given that, in so far as regards the fate or condition of the speaker, the event is dependent on his will. But in so far as regards the fate or condition of his alledged associates, the intimation given is that it depends in some way or other upon their wills and his taken together, but as to what part their several wills will respectively bear in the production of the event, no peremptory determination is expressed, because in the nature of the case no such compleat assurance can be entertained.

Second person plural—Ye will perish.

Third person plural—They will perish.

In neither of these cases is the intimation in question—the intimation of the dependency of the event on the will of the speaker—conveyed.

Of the above six cases, in one, viz. in that of the first person singular, the intimation is given, and that clearly and determinately. In one other it is moreover given, but in a manner unavoidably somewhat ambiguous and indeterminate.

In the four remaining cases, viz. those of the second and third person singular and those of the second and third persons plural, it is not given.

II. Case 2. Case in which *shall* is the word employed.

1. First person singular—I shall perish. Intimation *not* given.

2. Second person singular—Thou shalt perish. Intimation *given*.

3. Third person singular—He, she, or it shall perish. Intimation *given*.

4. First person plural—We shall perish. Intimation *not* given.

5. Second person plural—Ye shall perish. Intimation *given*.

6. Third person plural—They shall perish. Intimation *given*.

Of the six cases, in two, viz. in the case of the first person singular and the first person plural, the intimation is *not* given.

In the case of the four remaining ones, viz. the second and third persons singular and the second and third persons plural, the intimation *is* given.

In a jest-book story, the way in which a foreigner is apt to make a mistake in the application of these two words is represented in a half-disastrous, half-ludicrous point of view. A Frenchman is fallen into the water; a bystander takes measures for saving him. Cries the Frenchman all the time, ‘I will, I will, be drowned.’¹

¹ Cf. *The Eclectic Review*, vol. i, part ii (July–December 1805), 677: ‘there is nothing very improbable in the story of the poor Frenchman, who lost his life in the Thames, by crying out, “*I will* be drowned, *nobody* shall help me!”’

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If my meaning is to represent the result in question as dependent upon my own will, in going through the persons and numbers, the manner in which I apply the words will and shall is as follows:

Singular Number	Plural Number
1. I will / would advance in that case.	1. We will / would advance in that case.
2. Thou shalt / shouldest advance in that case.	2. Ye shall / should advance in that case.
3. He, she or it shall / should advance in that case.	3. They shall / should advance in that case.

If I have no such meaning, the manner in which I apply them is as follows:

1. I shall / should fall or sink / advance.	1. We shall fall / advance.
2. Thou wilt / wouldest / fall / advance.	2. Ye will fall / advance.
3. He, she or it will / would / fall / advance.	3. They will fall / advance.

N.B. The person, on whose will, by the simple use of the portions of auxiliary verbs *shall* and *will*, as above, it is in the power of him who speaks or writes to represent the event or state of things in question as being dependent, is only himself. He can not in this way represent it as being dependent upon the will either of a person spoken *to*, or of a person spoken *of*.

At first, should and would appear as derived from, and corresponding to, shall and will respectively: and thence to one another. But this correspondence is far from being so perfect, as at first sight might be expected.

1. Should has two perfectly distinct senses, viz. the conditional, and what may be termed the moral.

1. *The Conditional*:—as, if I should move, I should fall.

2. *The moral*.¹ You should take heed, lest you should fall.

Here, in the first clause, the word *should* is moral: importing that, in the opinion of the speaker, the performance of the act designated by the principal verb, is the object of moral duty or obligation—at any rate, if prudence, considered as choosing and employing means to the attainment of ends, be included under that notion.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Deontological: if Deontology has been already mentioned.’

PART II. § 5. OF PREPOSITIONS, ADVERBS, AND CONJUNCTIONS

1. Preceptive¹ in respect of probity—i.e. designative of what is conducive to general welfare.

In whatever you do for the fartherance of your own interest, you should never be regardless of the effect it may have on the interest of others.

2. Moral in respect of prudence, abstracted from the consideration of the end aimed at, consists in the choice of means considered with reference to the probability they present of contributing to the attainment of the end.

In whichever course you take for the fartherance of your own interest, you should never appear to be regardless of the effect it may have upon the interest of others.

So in matters where morality is out of the question, if you wish to hit a mark, you should be sure to take good aim.

§ 5. *Of Prepositions, Adverbs and Conjunctions*

The three parts of speech here in question, viz. prepositions, adverbs and conjunctions, require in some respects a conjunct consideration.

In many instances, the different functions designated by these three several names are performed by one and the same word.

Of the imports respectively belonging to them, that of the *preposition* is the most simple. By the addition of some farther import or imports belonging to some one or more other parts of speech, the import of the preposition constitutes [and] becomes identical with that of the adverb: and in some instances at least, by the addition of a still ulterior body of import, the import, once already augmented as above, constitutes and becomes identical with that of the conjunction.

Of these three parts of speech, the *explanation*—the exposition—constitutes the *obscure*, the *transcendental*, the *mysterious* part of the Art and Science of Universal Grammar. The relation they bear to the other parts of speech, viz. the substantive, the adjective and the verb, resembles that which by the signs employed in Algebraic is borne towards the signs employed in Common arithmetic. When the signs employed in algebraic arithmetic are all of them translated into the signs employed in common arithmetic, those employed in common arithmetic being at the same time reduced to one simple uninterrupted line of numeral figures, the import of the algebraic signs is compleatly understood and the problem for the solution of which they have been employed is solved. In like manner, when, of a sentence of which a preposition, an adverb or a conjunction

¹ MS orig. 'Moral'.

makes a part, the equivalent is given in a sentence in which no part of speech other than a substantive, a verb and an adjective or some other substantive is employed, then and then only is the import respectively attached to these mysterious parts of speech at once clear, correct and compleat.

For the bestowing upon the imports respectively attached to these several mysterious parts of speech the abovementioned desirable properties of clearness, correctness and compleatness, the following are the logical operations which have presented themselves as requisite to be performed in relation to them.

1. Denomination: i.e. giving to them respectively and to each separately, or to each aggregate composed of several together, an appropriate name or denomination.

2. Systematization—i.e. placing the several denominations when so constructed, as above, in systematic order: i.e. by a division made of the respective universal *trunks*, being the names of the several *genera generalissima*—*preposition, adverb, conjunction*—performed in each instance, as far as it can be pursued with advantage, in the exhaustive bifurcate [mode], whereby their several relations of agreement and disagreement to and with each other will be brought under the eye at one view.

3. Exemplification: i.e. exhibiting a proposition or sentence, of the sort of those in common use, in the texture of which the several words belonging respectively to the abovementioned *genera generalissima* shall respectively be employed.

4. Paraphrasis: i.e. for the explanation or exposition of each such proposition or sentence, exhibiting another which shall present exactly the same import, but without containing in it a word belonging to the part of speech thus undertaken to be expounded.

As in every instance in the paraphrasis or paraphractical proposition or sentence thus brought to view a more or less considerable number of words will be contained, while the word thus requiring to be expounded is but one (except in a few instances in which two are so put together to form as it were but one), on this consideration, the *paraphrasis* may be termed the *development*.

§ 6. *Conjugates*

The *radical* part of the cluster of conjugates is that by which expression is given to the *principal* idea, as distinguished from the *accessory* ideas above brought to view.¹

¹ See § 1, pp. 384–5 n. above. The section appears to have been abandoned at this

§ 7. *Of Government and Concord*

With the ideas that belong properly to the subject—with the purely grammatical ideas, a ludicrous mixture of moral and political ideas has happened in this part of the field of grammar to have been associated. In these latter times, Darwin has sung the loves of the plants: but ages before Darwin, Lilly and others had sung the loves, not altogether pure from the tyranny, of the parts of speech.¹

Here opens to view an additional mass of useless complication: mere evil unalloyed with any particle of good. Anarchy would every where be an advantageous substitute to such government: discord, to such concord.

Of the herbage of this jungle, a suspicion arises that the seeds were sown by the Muses. But of this afterwards.

Once more, in the structure of the English language, scarce a trace is to be found of the tissue of useless and dull fictions designated by these two names.²

point. The following rudiments at the head of the text indicate the potential scope of the discussion: 'In the verb, the import of a substantive is involved.

'1. *Mode* and Tense are adjuncts or accessories to the *copula* contained in it. By *Person* an idea expressed by *another* substantive is brought to view.

'2. Number is an accessory to the *substantive* when separate from the verb.

'3. By Case and Gender ulterior qualities are expressed by the import of so many ulterior propositions.'

¹ Robert Waring Darwin (1766–1848), botanist, author of *Principia Botanica: or, a concise and Easy Introduction to the Sexual Botany of Linnæus. With the genera; their mode of growth, (as tree, shrub, or herb;) the number of species to each genus; where principally native; and the number indigenous to the British Isles: arranged in columns under each class and order; and digested alphabetically under Several Generic Distinctions. By which Means most Plants may be thus far ascertained. Together with Three Indexes. I. Of the Linnæan Genera accented, with the British Names. II. Of such Trivial Names as were the Genera of Old Authors. III. Of the British Names, with the Linnæan Genera; to which are added many of the Specific Names. Also, A Table of several Vegetable Drugs not in the Indexes*, Newark, 1787, and William Lily (1468?–1522/3), grammarian and schoolmaster, whose grammars formed the basis for 'Lily's grammar' or *The Royal Grammar*, first published in 1540.

² Bentham does not appear to have written any further text for this section, though the following rudiments at the head of the text indicate the potential scope of the discussion: '1. Definitions and divisions.

'2. Mischiefs corresponding to the Properties desirable.

'3. Add. The tissue of fictions a means of transgression—like the Mosaic law, and the English system of nullification.

'4. Observers of instances of grammatical conformity, how they assume the part of legislators and Judges.'

§ 8. *Of Collocation—viz. of words in a proposition—of simple propositions in a complex d^o, a clause or a sentence; herein of Inversion*¹

¹ Bentham does not appear to have written any text for this section, though the following rudiments at UC cii. 187 (26 December 1815) indicate the potential scope of the discussion: ‘Objects in collocation: 1. Clearness. 2. Impressiveness.

‘1. Words in a sentence.

‘2. Clauses in a sentence.

‘3. Propositions in a clause.

‘Ambiguities producible by miscollocation with remedies. 1. Words with ambiguous reference: 1. Restrictives. 2. Ordinals.

‘Interposition of a false antecedent between *antecedent* and *relative*.

‘Cause of those miscollocations. Associated with clear ideas, false conclusion that the ideas excited will be clear.

‘Choice of words belongs *principally* to the subject, purpose and occasion, thence to Logic. Collocation entirely to Grammar.’

APPENDIX

Chapter 1.

Phænomena of the human mind—viz. 1. Experiences and 2. Operations—Correspondent faculties—perceptive and appetitive

§ 1. *Analytical view of the phænomena of the human mind*

I. Experiences—States of the perceptive faculty

Considered as the instrument of communication between mind and mind, that which language or any discourse has for its immediate object—and in so far as it has any effect, its immediate effect—in every case is the giving expression to, and causing to be known to some other person or persons, the state and condition of the discursive mind, viz. either in respect of inward *experiences*, or inward *operations* and their results.

The whole structure of the mind may be considered as included in two faculties: viz. the perceptive and the appetitive.

To the perceptive belong all mental experiences: to the appetitive, all mental operations and their results.

In the perceptive faculty, the judicial may in a certain point of view be considered as included.

To the head of *experiences* may be referred the following phænomena:

1. Apathematic perceptions—viz. perceptions as they have place in the case in which they do not consist of, nor are attended with, any distinguishable pain or pleasure.

2. Pathematic perceptions: perceptions as they have place in the case where they consist of, or are attended with, sensations or feelings [of] either pain or pleasure: i.e. are, or are attended with, pains or painful perceptions, or pleasures or pleasurable perceptions.

Pathematic or apathematic perceptions may be distinguished into judgment-not-involving and judgment-involving.

A judgment-involving perception is the perception of a relation: i.e. of the existence of a relation between some two objects.

One of the relations most frequently exemplified in this way is the relation of cause and effect.

Between a judgment-involving and a judgment-not-involving perception the differential character is this.—In so far as an experience

or act of the judicial faculty is not involved in the perception in question, it is not susceptible of error: in so far as any such experience or act is involved, it is susceptible of error.

The case of a judgment-involving perception is exemplified in and by every one of the five senses.

1. I open my eyes. I see something before me. It seems to me that it is a distant hill. But in fact it is a cloud. Here is a misjudgment. Here is error. But that I see something—i.e. that on the retina of my eyes an image is depicted, in this there is no error.

2. I hear a sound. To me it seems the voice of a man at a distance. But in fact it is the note of an owl.

3. I am sitting in the dark—a piece of drapery is presented to me. I am asked what it is. I pronounce it silk velvet. But in fact it is cotton velvet.

4. Still in the dark, a plate of boiled vegetables is placed before me. I am asked what it is. It seems to be spinage. But in fact it is beet-leaves.

5. Still in the dark, a flower is presented to me to smell. I am asked what it is. It seems to me to be a pink. But in fact it is a carnation.

In the production of that state of mind in which a perception, whether judgment-involving or judgment-not-involving, has place, objects exterior to the body have or have not borne a part. In the first case the perception may be termed a perception *ab extrà*, or say *derivative*: in the other case, a perception purely *ab intrà*, or say *indigenous*.

Of derivative perceptions, the above five are each of them an exemplification.

Of indigenous perceptions, examples are: a sense of dilatation in the stomach: a sense of encreased or diminished heat: in either of which cases the perception may be apathematic or pathematic: and if pathematic, accompanied either with pain or pleasure.¹

In the case where the perception is *ab extrà*, so long as the organ of sense is acted upon by the external object, the result belongs to the original or primitive faculty of perception, and has been distinguished by the appellation of an *impression*.

Where the organ of sense is no longer thus acted upon, if any effect remains in the mind, it belongs to the faculty of *derivative* perception—i.e. the *memory*: and has been distinguished by the appellation of an *idea*.²

¹ The following two paragraphs have been cancelled by Bentham.

² Cf. Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. 1, Part 1, Sect. 1, i. 7.

II. Operations—results of the exercise of the
appetitive faculty

Every operation of the mind, and thence every operation of the body, is the result of an exercise of the will or volitional faculty.—The volitional faculty is a branch of the appetitive faculty: i.e. that faculty in which *desire*, in all its several modifications, has place.

Desire has for its object either pleasure or pain, or, what is commonly the case, a mixture of both in ever-varying and unascertainable proportions.

The desire which has pleasure for its object is the desire of the presence of such pleasure: desire which has pain for its object is the desire of the absence of such pain.

I see an apple. I conceive a desire to eat, and thence to possess that apple. If, not being either hungry or thirsty, my desire is notwithstanding excited by the supposed agreeable flavour of the apple, pleasure and pleasure alone, viz. the presence of that pleasure, such as it is, is the object of my desire. If, being either hungry or thirsty or both, and *that* to a degree of uneasiness, *pain*, viz. the absence of that same uneasiness, is, moreover, the object of my desire.

A desire, then, has in every case an internal object, viz. the corresponding pleasure, and, in so far as that object has for its expected *source* an object exterior to the body, an external object.

A desire having pleasure alone, i.e. presence of pleasure, for its internal object has place, in so far as from the presence or productiveness of the supposed source, pleasure is regarded as about to be eventually experienced.

A desire having pain alone, i.e. absence of pain, for its internal object has place in so far as from the presence or productiveness of the supposed source, pain is regarded as being eventually about to be experienced.

A desire having pleasure and pain together for its internal object has place, in so far as, while from the presence or productiveness of the supposed source pleasure is regarded as being eventually about to be experienced, pain is at the same time experienced from the reflection of the actual absence of that same source.

If the desire, being a desire having pleasure for its object, is to a certain degree intense, in this case, so long as it remains unsatisfied, it has a certain degree of pain for its inseparable accompaniment: viz. the pain of non-possession, or say privation, produced by the absence of the source, and the consequent non-satisfaction of the desire.

If the desire be a desire having for its object pain, i.e. the absence of pain from this or that particular source, in this case, if the desire be to a certain degree intense, it has for its inseparable accompaniment, a persuasion more or less intense of the probability of a state of things in which that pain will be experienced.

Considered as having produced, or as [operating], with more or less probability of success,¹ towards the production of the result, (viz. presence of pleasure, or absence of pain) which is the object of it, a desire is termed *a motive*.

In so far as the taking place of the state of things which is the immediate object of the desire is considered as following immediately and certainly upon the existence of the desire, an act of the *will* is said to take place, the faculty by which this effect is considered as produced being termed the *volitional* or *volitive* faculty.

The *volitional* faculty is therefore a branch of the *appetitive*.

But no act of the will can take place but in consequence of a correspondent desire: in consequence of the action of a *desire* in the character of a *motive*.

Also, no desire can have place unless the idea of pleasure or pain, in some shape or degree, has place. Minute, it is true, minute in the extreme is the quantity of pleasure or pain requisite and sufficient to the formation of a desire. But still it is not the less true, take away all pleasure and all pain, you have no desire.^a

Pleasure and Pain, considered in themselves, belong to the perceptive faculty; i.e. to the pathematic branch of it.

But Pleasure and Pain considered as above as operating in the production of *desires*, operating as above in character of motives and thus producing *volition*, and through volition, action—action internal or external, corporeal or purely mental, belong to the *appetitive* faculty.

Pleasure and Pain compose, therefore, as it were, the bond of union and channel of communication between the two faculties.

Attention is the result of an act of the *will*: of an exercise of the volitional branch of the appetitive faculty.

^a In the production of volition, a desire operating in the character of a motive is either not effective or effective: if effective, an act of the will is the consequence. The cause of my own act is always my own desire: and in this sense my will is *free*. But, the cause of that desire, what is it? In some cases, I know what it is; in others, not. When I know not what it is, how is my will free? The action of it is in so far dependent upon an unknown cause, external to myself.

When I make my choice amongst a multitude of antagonizing desires, of that choice, what is the cause?

¹ MS 'as being, with more . . . success, operating'.

APPENDIX CH. 1. PHÆNOMENA OF THE HUMAN MIND

In so far as attention has place—in so far as attention is applied either to the *direction* or to the *observation* of an *experience*, the experience is converted into an *operation*, or, at any rate, in the field of thought—in the mental field—that place, which would otherwise have been the field of an experience and nothing more, becomes now the field of an experience and of a correspondent operation at the same time—an operation having for its subject the object which was the source or seat of the experience.

In some instances language affords not as yet any word or words, by which the difference between the presence or absence of *attention* in relation to the effect in question is denoted.

Thus the word *judgment*—act of the judgment—is the locution employed as well in the case of those instantaneous and involuntary judgments which, as above, are commonly confounded with simple perception, and those attentive and elaborate judgments which are pronounced in the senate, on the Bench, in the Laboratory of the chemist, or on the library table of the Logician.

Without attention, the *memory* is but the seat of a mere passive experience, which is termed *remembrance*. Consequence of an exertion or exercise of the will importing *attention*, and applied to the purpose of searching out and bringing from the storehouse of the mind the impression in question, it becomes the seat and subject of an *operation*, termed recollection.

§ 2. *Perception* ab extra—its objects or sources: viz. states of things, which are either positions, i.e. situations, or events, the results of motions

Of the aggregate mass of matter in existence, whatsoever that be, the least distinguishable particle in existence, whatsoever that be, is termed *an atom*.^a

Considered, with reference to any determinate portion of time, and at the same time with reference to any other atom, the position of atom 1 with relation to atom 2 either has, during the whole of that time, been the same, or, during the whole or a part of that time, it has been more or less different.

In the first case, both atoms, considered with reference to one another, have been, during that whole time, *at rest*: in the other case, one has been or both of them have been, during the whole or a greater or less part of that portion of time, *in motion*.

^a From a Greek word which signifies *indivisible*.¹

¹ i.e. ἄτομος.

Thus there are two *states*, of which every portion of the aggregate mass of matter may truly be considered as susceptible: a state of *rest* and a state of *motion*.^a

And with relation to one another, at every two contiguous atoms of time, in one or other of these states have been every two atoms whatsoever. For rest is the negation of motion.

An assemblage of atoms considered as adhering together by the attraction of cohesion in such sort as not to be separated any of them from any other by the attraction of gravitation is termed *a body*.

Events are either corporeal or psychical:¹ corporeal, alias material: psychical, alias immaterial.

A psychical event can no otherwise be *spoken* of, than by speaking of it as if it were a corporeal one: v. *infra*.²

Every corporeal event is the result of motion on the part of certain bodies or certain atoms, coupled or not coupled with rest on the part of certain others.

Considered with reference to the portions of space respectively occupied by them, any two atoms, they being [both]³ of them considered as being in a state of rest, are said to be *in a position* with reference to each other.

^a State is a conjugate of the Latin verb *sto*, to stand. Without self-contradiction, it, therefore, can not be employed to denote *motion*. But this contradiction is inevitable. By language, motion can not be designated otherwise than by means of a fiction, and by that fiction it is spoken of as if it were stationary. A thing is said to be *in motion*: v. *infra*.⁴

¹ MS alt. 'pneumatic'.

² Bentham intended to make this point in Ch. 3, as he indicates at p. 415 n. below.

³ MS 'all'.

⁴ See Ch. 2, § 1, p. 410 below.

Chapter 2.

Signs employed for the designation of these
phænomena, viz. Propositions:—their modifications or
species—their constituent parts or contents

§ 1. *Collections of signs, i.e. Propositions, expressive of some state of the perceptive faculty, considered as having for the source of the perception, a corporeal object or objects*

Correspondent to the *objects* to be designated must be the *signs* by which they are designated.

Correspondent to the states and modifications of which corporeal objects are susceptible, such must be the modifications of the signs which, under the name of *language* or *discourse*, are employed in the designation of them.

Every proposition by which any portion of matter is brought to view—is presented to the mind—has for its *subject* either some material body, some portion of a body, or some collection of bodies, or of portions of bodies, or of bodies and portions of bodies.

The sign or portion of language, by which any such modification or modifications of matter are presented to the mind, is termed a *name*, a *denomination*, an *appellation*, an *appellative*.

By any such name, what is designated is either a single body, a part of a single body, or an aggregate of bodies or of parts of single bodies.

If a part of a body is spoken of by itself, it is in so far considered as a whole.

If it be a single body, the mode in which that body is spoken of is either *determinate* or *indeterminate*: if determinate, the name is stiled a *proper* name: if it be an aggregate of bodies, it is stiled a *common name*.

If the individuals designated by such common name be all determinate, it is or may be stiled a collective name: in so far as any of them are indeterminate, a generic or specific name.

If being a single body, it be indeterminate, it has for its denomination a *common* name, whether *collective* or *generic*, being the name of the aggregate of which it is considered as an *unit*, coupled with a species of sign denominated a pronoun adjective, of which by and by.¹

¹ Bentham does not go on to discuss the pronoun adjective in the present sequence of material, though he does mention it in 'Systematical Sketch of the Parts of Speech', p. 417 below.

During any given length of time, every material object capable of being taken for the *subject* of a *proposition* has in fact been either in motion or at rest. But when it is in motion, it may be considered as capable of being at rest—and when at rest, as capable of being in motion.

Every proposition has either one subject alone or more than one: it being understood that under the description of one subject is here comprehended that which has for its sign a common name, whether collective or generic (i.e. logically comprehensive), or a proper name.

A proposition, if but one subject be designated in it, may be termed a single proposition: if two, double; if more than two, complex.

As every thing that can happen to a corporeal subject is resolvable into this: viz. the having been, during the length of time in question, either in a state of motion or in a state of rest, so every thing that can be said, if said to have happened to that same corporeal subject, is resolvable either into this: viz. that, during the length of time in question, it has been, or has been capable of being, in a state of *motion*—or into this, viz. that it has been, or has been capable of being, in a state of *rest*.^a

In either case, by what is said of the corporeal subject in question, a quality may be said to be ascribed to it, to be attributed to it, to be said to belong to it: it may be said to be possessed of, endued, endowed with that same quality: the quality is spoken of as being *in* that same subject: belonging to, appertaining to, inherent in that same subject.

If, in speaking of the quality as being in the subject, no more than a single point of time is brought to view, the quality thus attributed may be stiled *actual* or *momentary* or *transient*: if it is considered as either being or capable of being in the subject for an indeterminate length of time, the quality may be stiled potential, habitual, or permanent.

When a *quality* is spoken of as appertaining to this or that subject, that which on this occasion is most frequently meant to be designated, and is, therefore, most apt to be brought to view, is an habitual or permanent quality.

In consideration of its being *attributed* to a subject, a quality is also frequently stiled an *attribute*—an attribute of that same subject: and in consideration of its belonging to a subject, it is also frequently termed

^a Sight, hearing, smell, present no exceptions. In case of sight, the object said to be seen may be at rest: but the light, but for which it would not have been seen, has been in motion: and so in the instances of *hearing* and *smell*: in hearing, the air; in smell, the odoriferous particles.

a *property*: a property of, or belonging or appertaining to, or inherent in that same subject.

Suppose, then, a portion of the matter of language so constructed as to present to view a quality, whether actual or habitual, as appertaining to this or that given corporeal subject, let it be considered what are the objects of which this portion of the matter of language must have contained the signs?

These are 1. the subject. 2. the quality.

But to say that the quality in question is *in* the subject in question, is to affirm the existence of a certain relation between that subject and that quality: viz. the sort of relation of which the word *in* is the sign.

Thus, then, to the sign of the subject and the sign of the quality must be added the sign of the *relation*.

But what is thus said, what is thus affirmed, is—that, in the subject in question, the quality in question *is*: in other words, that *between* the subject and the quality there *exists* the relation in question.

Thus, then, to compleat the texture of the proposition, to the sign of the subject, the sign of the *quality* and the sign of the *relation* must be added the sign of existence: the sign by which existence is brought to view: the sign by which existence is asserted to have or to have had place, viz. the existence of the relation between the subject and the attribute.

Of a proposition taken, as above, in its least dimensions, examples in great variety will presently be given: the stores of Saunderson and Watts¹ will both of them be ransacked and exhausted for this purpose.

For the present, viz. to aid conception, and to afford a mark of distinction whereby this minimum proposition and a proposition of larger dimensions and a greater number of parts may be distinguished, let the following examples serve.

Apples, say, are sweet, or, to keep clear of certain causes of complication, say rather, sugar is sweet.

The number of words employed is here no greater than *three*. But in the form of expression, an abbreviation may be discovered.

Sweetness (the quality of sweetness) is in sugar. Sugar, the name of the subject, a corporeal subject, sweetness the name of the quality: the quality consisting in the aptitude, in consequence of the necessary actions, to produce in the sensoria of men the perception termed by the same name.

¹ Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, and I. Watts, *Logick: Or, The Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry after Truth, With A Variety of Rules to guard against Error, in the Affairs of Religion and Human Life, as well as in the Sciences*, London, 1725.

§ 2. *Aristotelian logicians—imperfection of their conceptions in relation to propositions*

For the formation of a *proposition*, it has been seen that no fewer than four objects require to be brought to view:¹ objects all of them distinct, and for the designation of each of them, a distinct sign capable of being, and in use to be, employed.

What has moreover been seen is—that for the formation of a compleat proposition, though it be but a single proposition, the number of objects brought to view can not be smaller than as above.

True it is that, for the bringing to view this number of distinct and altogether different objects, a smaller number of words—and in truth even a single word—may be, and often has been, made to serve and to suffice. But how? only because, in virtue of certain established associations, by this one word, the whole number of the abovementioned distinct and different objects has been brought to view.

Not so the Aristotelians.

Constituent parts of a proposition, according to Aristotle himself, no more than two:² viz. the subject, and the predicate. Name of the subject, a noun: name of the predicate, a verb.

Seeing that out of two and no more than two distinguishable parts no proposition could be formed, no attribute spoken of as belonging to any subject, the followers of Aristotle, one and all, added a third: viz. the sign of existence, to which they gave the name of a copula: though in this, according to Saunderson, they departed from the truth of the case. Why? because they departed from the conception expressed—from the language used—by Aristotle.²

^a Saunderson, L. II. Cap. 2. p. 55.³

¹ See § 1, p. 411 above.

² See Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 55: 'Nomen & Verbum sunt partes propositionis *Verbales*; signant tamen *Reales*: unde *partes signantes* dicuntur, sicut *Reales* (qui & termini) *partes Signatæ*. *Terminus* est, quo constituitur, & in quem resolvitur propositio. Sunt autem Termini tres; *Subjectum*, *Prædicatum*, *Copula*: quorum *Subjectum* & *Prædicatum* à Nomine signantur; *Copula* à Verbo. Ita serè institui solent tyrones in scholis de numero & natura Terminorum: Sed secundum doctrinam *Aristotelis* atque ipsam rei veritatem, statuendi potius essent *duo* tantum Termini, *Subjectum* & *Prædicatum*. Quorum *Subjectum* perpetuo est *Nomen*: *Prædicatum Verbum*, aut per se positum, aut Nomini conjunctum. *Copula* autem *verbalis* non est proprie *pars* aut *terminus* totius propositionis: sed *Syncategorema* pertinens ad *prædicatum*, ut ejus pars', i.e. 'The noun and the verb are verbal parts of the proposition: however, they signify real things: thence they are said to be signifying parts, just as the real things (which include the terms) [are said to be] signified parts. A term is that by which a proposition is constituted, and into which it is broken down. So there are three terms; subject, predicate, copula: of which the subject and predicate are signified by a noun, the copula by a verb. Thus recently were pupils in schools accustomed to be taught about the number and nature of terms: but according to the teaching of Aristotle and the truth itself of the matter, rather should only two terms,

But the relation between the subject and its attribute, the relation of which the existence between the subject and the attribute was to be affirmed, even after the above addition, what name had they found for it? what observation had they made of it?—Answer—None.

As in *anatomy*, so in logic, by a continued and varied course of attention bestowed by a succession of observers, new organs have from time to time been discovered.

For the formation of a proposition, taken too in its least dimensions, according to Aristotle no more than *two*, according to his observers no more than *three*, parts necessary, whereas the minimum number, it has been seen, is no less than *four*. And in their view of the matter, this number sufficient for another sort of proposition which remains to be brought to view and which, when analyzed, will be found to contain twice the number of parts contained in the only sort of proposition as yet brought to view.¹

Term, it must be acknowledged, is the Rome-sprung word² corresponding to the word employed by Aristotle:³ *terms* no more than two: and so by his followers, *terms* no more than *three*. But by terms, he and they must have meant constituent parts. For that was the thing which required to be brought to view. If by the name of terms there were any such parts that were not designated, then by some name or other, such other parts should have been brought to view.

According to Saunderson, the copula, says Aristotle, is neither a term nor so much as a part of a proposition: it is no more than a syncategorema: and what, according to him, is a syncategorema? it is a part of the predicate, which, according to him, is itself a part of a proposition, the subject being the other. A part of that which is a part of the whole—and yet not a part of the whole! what self-contradiction! what confusion! what trifling! what torment to the student who, by the law of authority, stands bound to find it all true and unimpeachable!

subject and predicate, be established. Of which the subject is always a noun: the predicate a verb, either placed by itself or attached to a noun. The verbal copula however is not strictly a part or a term of the whole proposition: but is a syncategorem belonging to the predicate, and a part of it.'

³ See *ibid.*, Lib. II, Cap. 1, p. 54 [rather than p. 55]: 'Ad efficiendam *Propositionem* complexio Nominis & Verbi & absolutè est *necessaria*, & omnino *sufficit*, ita ut nec sine istis duobus confici possit ulla *Propositio*, nec præterea quidquam aliud requiratur', i.e. 'For the making of a proposition, the combination of a noun and a verb is both absolutely necessary, and utterly sufficient, as neither can any proposition be made without those two, nor is anything else required.'

¹ Bentham does not go on to discuss this other sort of proposition, but presumably intended to do so in Ch. 3, pp. 414–15 below, where he proposes to discuss propositions in which the subject is the name of a fictitious entity.

² i.e. derived from the Latin *terminus*, 'limit, boundary'.

³ i.e. ὅρος: see, for instance, *Prior Analytics*, 24a and 68b–69a.

Chapter 3.

Division of entities into real and fictitious, more properly of names into names of real and names of fictitious entities—the distinction, its necessity to the conception of the mechanics of language

Of more frequent occurrence by much than single propositions are double propositions, and of still more frequent, complex propositions. Upon the face of this statement, next to single, double and complex present a demand for explanation. But of the nature of double and complex propositions, the conception will be more easy after the distinction, the capital and fundamental and, as it is believed, it will be found the eminently elucidative and instructive distinction, between real and fictitious entities—more properly, it will be seen, between names of real and names of fictitious entities—has been brought to view. And for this explanation matters, it is believed, will be found already ripe.

Of fictitious entities, no less than of real ones—of each by means of their respective names—has mention been made in the course of the preceding pages in indiscriminate abundance.

Of the different sorts of propositions, the simple or minimum proposition has already been brought to view—and examples given of it. *Four* has at the same time been brought to view as the least number of the members or components necessary to the formation of it. For each of these members a name, and that a name comprized in the compass of a single word, has been found.¹

But of these four names, one and one only is the name of a real entity: to one and one alone belongs any correspondent real entity of which it is the sign. This is the name of the *subject*: the word *sugar*. The three others are all of them fictitious entities: sweetness the name of a quality: *in* the name of a relation having place between the subject and the quality, or say attribute: *is*, the sign of existence, by which the assertion is conveyed that, between the quality and the subject, the relation designated by the preposition *in* has place.

Now, in relation to these several names and the objects respectively designated by them, of what follows the truth will, it is believed, be recognized at the first word. The object of which *sugar* is the name is a class of real beings—a class of substances. The object of which *sweetness* is the name is not a class of real beings, at any rate not a

¹ See Ch. 2, § 1, pp. 409–11 above.

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class of substances: if, for a moment, any just claim to the character of real existence should appear to be presented by the word sweetness, upon a second glance, that claim will be seen to evaporate.

In at any rate will not, for the moment, be supposed to be the name of a real being. It is but the name of a *relation*: yet the sort of entity stiled a relation could make as good a title to the attribute of reality as the sort of entity stiled a quality.

Even existence itself is not the name of any real being, of any really existing being: it is but the name of a quality: a quality appertaining in common to all beings. Take away this and this and so every other sort of beings but two, beings still remain—but take away all beings, you take away all qualities, all relations, all existence. Qualities, relations, existence itself, all these are but so many sorts of fictitious beings, feigned as if, spoken of as if, belonging to real ones.¹

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘§ 1. Continue from the rudiment above.

‘2. Next give the principal sorts of fictitious entities?’

‘3. Then the double sense of all names of real entities, and of qualities and relations: so that as real beings and no otherwise can fictitious entities be spoken of: and without them Discourse could not have place—viz. human: secus between men or brute and brute.’

Systematical Sketch of the Parts of Speech

Under the universally applying appellation of Parts of Speech are included the whole number of the words of which the language in question is composed; classed and denominated according to the several relations which they bear or are capable of bearing one to another in the composition of a grammatical sentence.

Sentence in the language of grammar is not the same thing with a proposition in the language of logic. A sentence, when all the words belonging to it are inserted, can not contain less than an entire proposition. But it may contain any number of propositions. The different species of relations which, for the purposes of discourse, have need of so many different classes of words for giving expression to them are the same in all languages. The parts of speech are therefore the same in all languages:—the scantiest and most inconveniently constructed as well as the richest and most cultivated: the Hottentot and Chinese as well as the Greek and English.

Universal grammar is that sort of Grammar which treats of those relations in so far as common to all languages.

When upon a correct foundation an institute of universal Grammar has once been framed, supposing it framed with that degree of skill which has been exemplified in so many particular grammars, it will serve as a common standard of reference and as a source of explanation of all languages, and as a foundation for the several particular grammars which take for their respective subjects those same languages.

Without and therefore before the discoveries made by Horne Tooke, no such Universal Grammar (it will be seen) could have been formed. By him ground has been brought into a state of preparation for a work of this sort.

But for the framing of it, one of the requisites has been a clear view of that logic in which, when taken in its most extended sense, Grammar, even Universal Grammar, has its own foundation: and so it has happened that no professed Grammarian seems as yet to have given himself this qualification.

An acquaintance with universal grammar, as above described, will naturally be among the acquisitions to be made in a Chrestomathic School. So far from adding to, it will substract from the quantity of labour necessary to the acquisition of a clear view of the matter [of] the particular languages therein proposed to be taught.¹

Words are the signs of *thought*. Proportioned to the degree of correctness and compleatness with which thoughts themselves

¹ Bentham has marked the following paragraph for possible deletion.

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are conceived and arranged can be the degree of correctness and compleatness given to their respective signs.

Ranged in the order of simplicity and conceptibility, and denominated by their usual names, the several parts of speech that are essentially different from one another, and not included any one of them under any other, will stand as follows:

1. Substantive (Noun Substantive).
2. Adjective (Noun Adjective).
3. Verb (Verb Substantive), called also the (Copula).
4. Preposition.
5. Conjunction.

If considered as distinct from all the above, and not including in itself the import of several of them, the interjection does not form a part of organized language. It is no more than part and parcel of that unorganized language which is common to man and the inferior animals.

In the above list, the word Substantive must be considered as unfurnished [with] those several additaments and other modifications by which the relations designated by the words gender, case and number are expressed.

So likewise the Noun adjective.

So likewise the Verb as distinct from those by which the relations designated by the words person, number, Mood or *Mode*, and *Tense* are expressed.

The Pronoun substantive will be found to coincide in its import and properties with the Noun Substantive:—and that as perfectly as any one Noun Substantive with another Noun Substantive, that is the sort of relation it bears to the several other parts of speech is the same.

The Pronoun Adjective will in like manner be found to coincide in its import and properties with the Noun Adjective.

The article, whether definite or indefinite, will be found in like manner to be but a species of Noun Adjective.

Of speech, though the correction, extension and improvement of thought be, and that to a prodigious degree, a consequence, the more immediate and only universally regarded object is but the *communication* of thought.

But by any thing less than an entire proposition, i.e. the import of an entire proposition, no communication of thought can have place. On language, therefore, the *integer* to be looked for is an entire proposition: that which logicians mean by the term logical proposition. Of this integer, no one part of speech, not even that which is most significant, is any thing more than a fragment: and, in this respect, in the

many-worded appellative part of speech, the word *part* is instructive. By it, an intimation to look out for the integer of which it is a part may be considered as conveyed. A word is to a *proposition* what a *letter* is to a word.

A sentence—in that which by grammarians is meant by the word sentence—the matter either of no more than a single proposition or that of any number of propositions may be contained.

Not unfrequently, by no more than a single word the import of an entire proposition is expressed. But the case in which this happens is that in which, as to all that is not supplied by *modification*, as above, that omission of words of which at the same time, on pain of non-intellection, it is necessary that the import should be present to the mind, that omission which by grammarians is called *ellipsis*, has place.

Of the existence of an ellipsis on any occasion, the test is this. Look out for the words the import of which, though the terms themselves are not inserted, is supposed to be intended to be conveyed. In so far as this is the case, then so it is that by the insertion of these words no addition will appear to have been made to the sense.

Without a gap in the sense, an ellipsis can no otherwise be made, i.e. left, than in so far as by the nature of the subject or of the context, i.e. the words of which the circumjacent propositions are composed, the import of the omitted words is suggested.

A part of Speech (the collection of them being understood as composed of the above list) is either 1. Aptonoetic, simple in its import, or 2. Syncraticoetic, composite in its import.

A part of speech, simple in [its] import, [is]¹ either—1. significant by itself, or 2. not significant by itself.

The only part of speech which is perfectly simple in its import and at the same time integrally significant of itself is the noun Substantive: the noun Substantive, not as it exists in Greek and Latin complicated with literal modifications indicative of logical relations—such as Gender, Case and number, but such as it exists in English: as in the words *Man*, *Woman*, *Horse*.

A noun substantive, as in the Latin the word *noun* truly imports, is a *name*.

The entity of which it is the name belongs either to the class of *real* entities or to the class of *fictitious* entities.

Incorporeal as well as corporeal substances being included, real entities are those and those alone which belong to that universal class designated by the logicians by the name of substances.

¹ MS orig. 'Those simple in their import are'.

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Substances are divided by them into corporeal and incorporeal. Under the name of [corporeal]¹ are included all masses of matter howsoever circumstanced in respect of form, bulk, and place.²

Of corporeal substances the existence is made known to us by *sense*: they may on that account be termed perceptible: of incorporeal no otherwise than by *ratiocination*: they may on that account be termed *inferential*. To the class of inferential entities belong: 1. The soul of man in a state of separation from the body. 2. God. 3. All other and inferior spiritual entities.^a

Substantives are either proper names or common names. A proper name is a name by which some individual object is alone signified. A common name is a name by which some class of objects is signified.

In the order of time, the use of proper names can not but have preceded the use of common names. Common names can not have been formed without a course of experience whereby that identity or resemblance of properties or qualities as between individual and individual among all such individuals as belong to the class so constituted and designated has been made known.

The import of a proper name is accessible to the inferior animals, to all animals, for example, who, for the purpose of their being fed, are accustomed to be called. If it be never addressed on any other occasion or for any other purpose, the sound by which it is called becomes, in the animal's mind, the animal's name. To the animal indeed, howsoever to the man, who on that occasion uses it, a common name, it is but a proper name. To the man who, intending to give food to a cat, cries Puss, Puss may be a common name, and be accordingly applied to the purpose of feeding several cats at once. But to each respective cat, it is but a proper name. What each cat understands is that itself is named by it. What no cat understands is that any other cat is named by it.

^a According to those who agree with Bishop Berkeley, matter belongs to the class of those entities of which the existence is but inferential: impressions and ideas being in that case the only perceptible entities.³

But in the case of matter, the justness of the inference is determinable, at all times determinable, by experimental proof: if of the wall opposite me I infer the non-existence, and run that way as if there were no wall, the erroneousness of the inference will be but too plainly perceptible on my forehead: which is not the case in any one of those other instances.

¹ MS 'incorporeal'.

² In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: 'u' In a note give the contents of the Porphyrian tree.' For the Porphyrian tree see p. 62 n. above.

³ George Berkeley (1683–1753), Irish philosopher, Bishop of Cloyne 1734–53, was author of *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Part I. Wherein the chief Causes of Error and Difficulty in the Sciences, with the Grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion, are inquir'd into*, Dublin, 1710.

Among names of fictitious entities, the foremost, and those the designation of which is of most immediate necessity to mind-expressing converse, are qualities.^a

Taking the word *proposition* in its simplest acceptation, by every proposition the existence of some quality in some subject is asserted. A proposition is any portion of discourse by which the existence of some quality in some subject is asserted. The name of the substance is the noun substantive: the name of the quality is the noun adjective. The word by which the relation between the quality and the substance is indicated—viz. the existence of the one in the other—is by logicians called the copula.

By grammarians, on some of the occasions on which by logicians the term copula is employed, the term *verb* is employed. But it would not by any means be true to say that the word *copula* and the word *Verb* are synonymous—interconvertible—indicative of precisely the same object and nothing more. By the word *copula* no more than one single class of words is indicated, viz. the class of words by which intimation is conveyed that, in the opinion of the speaker, the quality named by him exists in the subject the name of which is pronounced by him at the same time. By the word *verb* is indicated the cluster of objects the names of which are by grammarians put together and spoken of as constituting all of them together but one *Verb*.

The import of the word copula is the same in all languages. The import of the word verb is different in different languages. In the copiously inflected languages it includes a much greater number of words than in the sparingly inflected languages.

In the import of the copula is included nothing more than the one just brought to view.

In the language of Grammarians, by the name of the verb substantive, one verb is distinguished from all others: it may be termed the verb in which are contained indications of simple existence. In Latin the verb *sum*: in English the verb *to be*: for in Latin one of the many species of conjugates included under that complex denomination, in English another of those species of conjugates, is employed as the name of the whole aggregate.

In every other verb, throughout all its modifications, with the import of the copula is added the import of some name of a quality. In the verb substantive no such additament has place: unless the objects designated by the words person, number, mood, tense, be

^a *Qualities* being taken in the largest sense of which the word is susceptible. It is that which in its import is co-extensive with the applicability of the word so much used in the Aristotelian Logic School—*prædication*.

APPENDIX. SYSTEMATICAL SKETCH

regarded as capable of being included under and designated by the word *quality*.^a

^a A sign designative of present time, is it to be considered as designative of a relation? Is not the present the standard of all relation of time? The copula, it should seem, must be considered as including the designation of present time, unless in so far as intimation is given of the contrary.

APPENDIX.
FRAGMENTS
ON
LOGIC AND LANGUAGE
(AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1813)

Disciplines

Of things capable of being *known*, there is not any thing that may not be considered as the subject of a *science*.

Of things capable of being *done*, there is not any thing that may not be considered as the subject or object of an *art*.

Amongst things capable of being known, between such as are considered as subjects of science and any which are considered as not being subjects of science, the only distinction that can be assigned is this, viz. that in the one case the thing is supposed to be capable of being known without *effort*, exertion, study; in the other case, not: effort, viz. either when considered in and by itself, or when considered in respect of some relation to other things, without the knowledge of which relation it is regarded as not being, properly speaking, capable of being known—and the relation being such as not being capable of being known without effort.

But by this account of it, every such distinction, it is seen, can not but be an indeterminate one: efforts vary in degree, down to 0: and on the occasion of the knowledge of that object of which effort is in the instance of this or that individual necessary, in the instance of this or that other individual, no perceptible effort will have place.

So in the case of arts.¹

In so far as among an assemblage of things there exists such a relation, as has the effect of causing such assemblage to be considered as constituting a whole, in so far as in the case of the class of men in question, the knowledge of that whole or of any considerable portion of it is considered as requiring a considerable degree of effort for the possession of it, this whole will naturally be considered as constituting the subject of a science.

And so in the case of any thing which by a man has occasion to be done.

To a considerable extent, different assemblages of these *noscenda* and *facienda*—of these subjects or objects of *discipline*—of these disciplines—have received names—appellatives in general use: and of these disciplines respectively, certain portions have received separate and specific names. And in some of these instances, the discipline has been commonly spoken of and considered as a science; in others, as an art.²

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘~~Go on to say actual cause of distinctions, having or not having a separate name.~~’

² Bentham has marked the following paragraph for possible deletion.

Where the effort considered as necessary to the knowing what is to be known is considered as greater than d^o to do what is to be done, the discipline has been put upon the list of *science*: in the opposite case, of *art*.

The use of these observations is to obviate perplexing doubts and useless and interminable disputation: doubts and disputes, the effect of which is, so far and so long as they have place, to keep involved in clouds the whole field of intellection, including not only the whole field of art and science, but the whole field of ordinary life and conversation.

The several disciplines being each of them so many means of happiness or well-being—considered with relation to mankind taken in the aggregate, the thing to be desired with a view to their happiness, [is that] the quantity of *discipline* should at all times be as great as possible. Say for shortness, subservient to the maximum of *happiness* is the maximum of *discipline*.

But each portion of discipline requiring for the acquisition of it a corresponding portion of time, and various disciplines being of such a nature that the acquisition of them requires, in the character of a condition precedent and *sine quâ non*, the possession of a particular *situation in life*, such, that the number of those within whose reach the faculty of occupying it is comparatively inconsiderable, hence it is—that to no one individual is the possession of this maximum of discipline, at any point of time, possible.

Of Disciplines in general—their primary division

Physics—Ethics—Semeiotics—Of Locke's division of disciplines under the name of knowledge, a division given by him in the character of an all-comprehensive one—these are the three branches.¹

Under Physics, he includes: 1. what may be termed Somatology—the knowledge or science which has for its subject the properties of bodies, and the arts whereby they are applied to use, and which aim at applying them to the best advantage. 2. what is termed Psychology—the science which has for its subject the faculties of mind, and the arts by which they are applied to use and which aim at applying them to the best advantage.²

¹ See Locke, *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Bk IV, Ch. XXI, pp. 720–1, where the sciences are divided into first, 'φυσική, or natural Philosophy', second, 'Πρακτική', under which the 'most considerable' element was 'Ethicks', and third, 'σημειωτική, or the Doctrine of Signs'.

² According to the pagination, an unidentified sheet should follow at this point. The context suggests that it contained a list of the faculties of the human mind.

For its instrument—its immediate instrument—to work *with*, it has that self-same *subject*—the human mind—as composed of and distinguishable into those same several distinguishable *faculties*.

For a sort of secondary instrument, it has that assemblage of signs for which, in English, there exists not any all-comprehensive and adequate denomination, but of which that portion which is most in use has received the name of *language*.^a

In general, language is seldom considered in any other point of view than that of an instrument of communication: an instrument employed by one mind in making communication of its contents to another mind.

But upon an attentive view, it will be found that when perception has been excepted, of the several distinguishable faculties that have just been enumerated, there is scarcely one in the use of which it is not habitually employed—scarcely one which without it could be exercised with any considerable advantage or to any considerable extent.¹

Of the several observations which apply to these several disciplines, by thus bringing together and, as it were, [placing] under one view those which are most extensive, considerable light, it has been supposed, may be kept pointed in the whole field of mental discipline, and the several mental faculties employed upon it proportionately invigorated and improved.

Language—Propositions

1. To be subservient to any use or purpose, language, every assignable portion of it, must on each occasion be enuntiative or suggestive of at least some one proposition.

^a *This* not properly applicable to any but audible *signs*. Semeiology, per Locke. Semeiotics includes signs that are visible without being audible. Letters are visible signs of audible signs.—Not so all chinese characters.

To a deaf man there exists not any audible language: to a man born *blind* as well as *deaf* and in consequence *dumb*, there would not exist any means of mental intercourse. In respect of intelligence he would be inferior to the most meanly endowed among quadrupeds.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘[Ⓔ] Compare in this respect men with the other animals.

‘[Ⓔ] Particularize through the several faculties.’

For a discussion of the mental faculties see, for instance, ‘Essay on Logic’, Ch. 5, pp. 42–54 above.

APPENDIX. FRAGMENTS (1813)

2. This proposition will consist either of one word only or of divers words—be either *mono-epic* or *poly-epic*.

3. When it is polyepic, the proposition has the several words for its component elements.

4. A proposition is either *simple* or *composite*.¹

5. Every *composite* proposition is resolvable into a number of simple ones.

6. Every monoepic proposition has for its equivalent a polyepic one, of which it is the abridged expression.

7. Examples of monoepic propositions are the several conjugates (the infinitive mood excepted) which are usually contained in what is called *a verb*: one and the same verb.

8. A simple proposition is either 1. physical: 2. psychological: 3. or compounded of the two.

9. Every psychological proposition has for its archetype a physical proposition.

10. Physical are thence the propositions the mention of which requires to precede that of the other.

11. By every simple physical proposition, the subject of it is stated either as being in a state of motion, or in a state of rest.

12. In every simple physical proposition, if compleat, are contained a word or term designative of the subject of the proposition, a word designative of the predicate of the proposition, and a word expressive of the copula or bond of connection between the two—a word by which the operation called *predication* is performed.^a

13. This copula is either affirmative or negative.

14. By the copula, if affirmative, the subject is averred to be in some state, for the designation of which the predicate is employed.

15. This state is either a state of rest or of motion.

16. If in a state of rest, either included in or appended to the proposition is a designation of some portion of *time* as being that *in* which the subject is meant to be asserted as being *in* the state in question. This leads to the consideration of the various modifications of *time*.

^a Aristot.²

¹ In a rudiment, Bentham has noted: 'Every proposition of which either a conjunction, a preposition or an adverb makes a part is a composite proposition.'

² Bentham may have had in mind Sanderson's discussion of the elements in a proposition which he criticizes in 'Universal Grammar', Appendix, Ch. 2, § 2, pp. 412–13 above.

Propositions what—why brought to view before single words

In the first place *words*—single words—in the next place propositions formed by putting together some of those words, lastly discourse formed by putting together some of those propositions. Such is the order that has been pursued by the founders of the science and art called Logic, viz. Aristotle and his followers, down to the present time: synthetic is the name by which this method has been distinguished.

The more complex they are, objects being in general the more difficult to apprehend and comprehend, in a work comprehending in its design the giving an explanation of the human faculties and of the several subjects to which they are capable of applying themselves, no wonder that this synthetic method should have presented itself as best adapted to the purpose.

But in this as in every course of instruction, those things are most proper to begin with which are most readily comprehended: and the more familiar an object is, *cæteris paribus*, the more readily it is comprehended. Now in all ordinary discourse propositions come entire. It is only on the occasion of some science or art that, unless where employed as above instead of a proposition, and by ellipsis or abridgment containing in it the import of an entire proposition, any term is presented by itself. As often as he speaks, every man who speaks, speaks in propositions: the roughest savage not less than the most polished orator: terms taken by themselves are the work of abstraction, the produce of a refined analysis; ages after ages must have elapsed before any such analysis was ever made.

Propositions before words is therefore in the present case the historical order of the discipline: and in the present instance, as in some others, bringing to view the order in which the art was formed, in which the parts of the subject succeeded one another, is the method in which the nature of it, when compleat, can more clearly and perfectly than in any other be made manifest.

In this analytic course, however, a single step, and that at the outset, will be found to suffice. At that one step, the subject-matter is already resolved into its smallest component parts, viz. single words. Under the very next head¹ those smallest component parts will be separately taken up, their different species distinguished from each other, and the mode and order in which each species came into existence brought to view. And thus in the analysis and synthesis and explanation will be

¹ Bentham evidently intended to go on to discuss the parts of speech.

given the history of language—the history of the manner and order in which the elements of language must among all nations have taken their rise: in other words, the *history* and, by means of the history, the *principles*, of universal grammar.

After the discoveries made, though unhappily as yet but imperfectly developed, by John Horne Tooke,^a this history will, comparatively speaking, be an easy task. Without that discovery, any such history would have been impossible.

In the way of discourse never does a man open his mouth but he thereby gives expression to some persuasion: gives to understand that to this or that effect a persuasion has place in his mind.

Except in the case of a fiction, delivered as such, never does a man open his mouth to give expression to a persuasion as above, but in so doing he uses his endeavours to produce in the mind of every person addressed a correspondent persuasion: viz. at the least a persuasion of the existence of the persuasion so expressed.

To bring to view the example of a form of speech such as at first view will be more apt than any other to present itself as standing in contradiction to the above rule.

I have a servant¹ whose name is *George*. Seeing him at a distance and wishing him to come near to me, I pronounce his name in a tone suited to the purpose, uttering the word *George*. By the pronuntiation of this word, how (it may be asked) is the existence of a persuasion to any effect expressed, and if to any, to what? Answer. The persuasion which I entertain, and of the existence of which in my mind it is my wish that this *George* should on his part entertain a correspondent persuasion, is—that it is my wish and my desire that he come to me in consequence of such my call.

Nay (says somebody) but in the case as thus described the term persuasion is not properly applied. On each occasion what a man's wish is, is to himself at least matter of entire certainty: the case admits not of an opposite state of things: and where no other than such a word as persuasion is employed, a possibility at least of the erroneousness of that persuasion is implied.

Answer. By the word *persuasion*, the truth of any matter of fact

^a viz. of the real nature of the parts of speech called prepositions and conjunctions: the relation borne by them respectively to substantives, i.e. to names of substances, and to verbs:² of which however the relation to substantives is in his work but imperfectly explained.³

¹ MS alt. 'son', but Bentham failed to make the appropriate emendation in the remainder of the passage.

² The remainder of the sentence has been marked by Bentham for possible deletion.

³ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Examine.' Horne Tooke had intended to deal in detail with the verb in the projected third volume of *Diversions of Purley*.

which may happen to be the object of it is neither affirmed nor denied: it is, therefore, adapted to the case where such matter of fact is false as well as where it is true: and this is exactly what, for the present purpose, was required.

In the case of the persuasion thus expressed, what may without [doubt] have place is that in fact it had not any existence. I have no such wish as that this my servant George should come to me. But a wish that I really entertain is that a person whom for a particular purpose I am desirous of deceiving in this particular should be persuaded of my entertaining that same wish. Observing that at the moment the attention of this my servant is engaged by something else, I call to him, as above, by his name, but in such a tone of voice, as, occupied as he is, appears to me not to be likely to attract his notice.

A man can not give expression to a persuasion as existing in his mind, but he thereby utters what, in the established language of logicians, is a *proposition*: a proposition of which he himself is in that same language the subject, and the fact of his entertaining that proposition, i.e. of his mind's being in that state—is the predicate.

I feel (which is as much as to say, a persuasion of the highest possible degree of intensity has place in my breast) I feel that in my mind a wish has place having for its object the nearer approach of my servant George, whose name for that purpose I pronounce.

Displayed at length, such is the import of the proposition which, by means of one of those forms of abridgment which, being so necessary, are in all language so frequent, is reduced to the compass of a single word—that word, the name by which the person whose approach is desired stands distinguished.

A persuasion either of the existence or of the non-existence of this or that object or collection of subject-matters—its existence or non-existence either simply or in this or that *state* also designated.¹ To the object of every persuasion that can be announced, this one general description will be found applicable.

For the designation of that object either one single word may be sufficient and employed accordingly, or a number of words may be requisite and accordingly employed: and so for the designation of that *state*.²

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Quere whether this description will serve for all cases?'

² The text appears to have been abandoned at this point. An alternative draft, which also appears to have been abandoned, is at UC cii. 140 (24 August 1813): 'The persuasion the existence of which is affirmed or denied (which persuasion may again be in affirmance or negation of the existence of its object) this persuasion being common to all modifications of discourse—to all propositions—the express enuntiation of it may henceforward be omitted.'

Of Propositions in general—their component parts and species

Proposition is a name that may be given to any portion of discourse which is compleatly significant of itself. A name of a thing is what has been called *a term*: but of itself a term can not with propriety be said to be compleatly significant.

By every proposition is expressed some persuasion: a persuasion in affirmance or negation of the existence or non-existence of at least some one object.

The part of speech by which such persuasion is expressed is in the language of the Aristotelians termed a *copula*—the *copula*: inasmuch as it operates as a bond of connection to such other parts of speech as it may happen to the other parts of the proposition to contain.

In respect of the number of parts of speech employed in the formation of it, the most simple proposition is that by which a copula indicative of existence or non-existence, and the name of an object of the existence or non-existence of which a persuasion [is entertained], is expressed. Example. Day exists, or Day does not exist: Night exists or does not exist: or to use a form of expression more familiar—It is day: it is night.

But, of the occasion for uttering any proposition of such extreme simplicity, instances are not frequent; and on a closer examination, of which further on,¹ the title of this proposition to the character of a proposition of the highest degree of simplicity may perhaps not appear altogether so clear as at present.

Day and night are portions of time—relative time; and *time*, it will be seen,² is itself but an article belonging to the catalogue of fictitious entities.

The name of a thing is either the name of a real entity or of a fictitious entity.

Under the appellation of the name of a real entity is here to be understood the name of some object of the existence of which, of and in itself, a serious persuasion is, on whatsoever grounds, commonly entertained.

1. At the head of the list stands the whole aggregate of objects comprehended under the denomination of bodies—body—corporeal substance.

¹ Bentham does not return to this point in the present material, but for simple and complex propositions see 'Universal Grammar', Part II, § 1, pp. 384–7 above.

² See 'Essay on Logic', Ch. 9, § 2, p. 109 above.

2. Next to that comes the whole aggregate of objects comprehended under the denomination of souls—or minds. True it is, that by a denomination of Logicians, viz. those termed *materialists*, the existence of any such ingredient in the composition of any species of animal, man not excepted, in the character of a distinct and separate or separable ingredient is denied. But forasmuch as by so many others it is believed, hence on this consideration, even in the mind of a materialist, the title of the objects represented by the words *soul* and *mind* may be admitted without dispute.

3. To the being meant to be represented by the term *God* may be applied a similar observation: to the appellative *Materialist*, the appellative *Atheist* being substituted.¹

By a certain set of philosophers, of body itself—or in other words of all objects which the word body is commonly used to designate—the existence has been a subject of dispute, and, as it should seem, of disbelief. Of this notion mention will be made in another place.^a

After these explanations, of the term *name of a fictitious entity* the signification will not, it is hoped, appear exposed to doubt or difficulty. Under this denomination may be comprised all names employed for the bringing to view any of those sorts of objects which, though spoken of as being endowed each of them with a separate existence, would not upon reflection, even by those by whom they are spoken of in this character, [be] considered as possessing any such separate existence.

Of the whole number of the objects of this description, Aristotle conceived himself to have given a compleat list. Under one or other of ten classes or *genera* of greatest amplitude termed by his translators predicaments,² all imaginable objects were by him considered as included. Under the name of the first, viz. substance, he designated those which have here been brought to view under the character of names of real entities.

Physical class, psychological class, ethical or moral class—under one or other of these divisions may be comprized, it is supposed, whatsoever number of these names of most comprehensive amplitude as any language will be found to contain, including as many as for any useful purpose there can be any occasion for employing.

^a | ³

¹ In a rudiment, Bentham has noted: 'Entities of disputed existence—Soul. God. Caloric. Phlogiston. Light—whether any separate existence belonged to them.'

² See Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 19, which lists the ten genera as '*Substantia, Quantitas, Qualitas, Relatio, Actio, Passio, Ubi, Quando, Situs, Habitus*', and p. 216 n. above.

³ See, for instance, 'Systematical Sketch of the Parts of Speech', p. 419 n. above.

I. Class the first of names of fictitious entities—names of physical fictitious entities.

To this class belong all those which will be found included in Aristotle's list—included in his *ten predicaments*:—the *first* excepted.

In the order in which he has placed and considered them they stand as follows—

1. Substance.
2. Quantity.
3. Quality.¹

From this list of Aristotle's, the list of names of physical fictitious entities, will, as here presented, be found to be in a considerable degree different, viz. in the first place in respect of the particulars of which it is composed, in the next place in respect of the order in which they are brought to view. Of these differences, the grounds will successively be brought to view.

1. Quantity. Quantity can not exist without some substance of which it is the quantity. Of substance, no species, no individual, can exist without existing in some certain quantity.

2. Quality. Quality can not exist without some substance of which it is the quality. Of substance, no species can exist without being of some quality: of a multitude of qualities, of which the number is in every instance indeterminate, capable of receiving encrease, and that to an indefinite degree, according to the purposes for which, and the occasions on which, the several substances of which they are qualities may come to be considered.

3. Place. Of place, the notion can not be entertained without the notion of some substance considered as *placed*, or capable of existing, or, as we say, being *placed*, in it.

Place may be considered as *absolute* or *relative*. Supposing but one substance in existence, that substance would be in some place, that place would be absolute, relative place there would be none. Suppose two substances, then in addition to its own absolute place, each substance would have a *relative* place—a place constituted by the position occupied by it in relation to the other.

Of no individual substance is any notion commonly entertained without some notion of a place—a relative place—as being occupied by it.

The place considered as being occupied by an individual substance is different, according to the purpose for which and the occasion on which the substance is taken into consideration.

Expressive of the notion of place, taken in their original physical,

¹ Bentham failed to complete the list, but goes on to discuss eight of the predicaments.

OF PROPOSITIONS IN GENERAL

original archetypal, significations are the several words termed prepositions of place and adverbs of place. These are:

1. In.	1. Out—Out of.
2. On or upon.	2. From above.
3. Under.	3. From under.
4. At.	4. From.
5. Above (Adverb).	
6. Below (Adverb). Underneath.	
7. Round.	
8. Around (Adverb).	

4. Time. Time is, as it were, on an ulterior and double account a fictitious entity: its denominations, so many names of fictitious entities.

Compared with substance, and in particular with body, place is, as hath been [seen], a fictitious entity. Without some body placed in it or considered as capable of being placed in it, place would either not have existence, or what, with reference to use, would amount to the same thing, there could be no purpose for which, no occasion on which, it would be considered as having existence.

But if, putting out of consideration body, place is a fiction, time is, so to speak, a still more fictitious fiction, leaning upon nothing more substantial than the fiction of place.

To be capable of being spoken of, time itself must be—is—can not but be—spoken of as a species of space. Witness the prepositions *in*—and at and in such a portion of time—*at* such a portion of time: in an hour: at 12 o'clock: in such a year: in such a month: on such a day: at such an hour: at so many minutes after such an hour: at so many seconds of such a minute of such an hour.

Witness again the common expressions—a short time—a long time—a space of time.

By a line it is that every portion of time, every particular time, is represented and spoken of: by a line, i.e. by body of which the length alone is considered without thickness: i.e. without breadth or depth.

5. Motion. 6. Rest. 7. Action. 8. Passion.

At each step the subject of consideration becomes more and more complicated.

Rest is the absence or negation of Motion. Every body is either *in* motion, or at rest. Here *place*, i.e. *relative space*, is still the archetype. Motion is a thing, a momentarily imagined substance, within which the body is conceived as being placed: *rest* a like body *at* which the real body is considered as being placed.

In the notion of *motion*, that of time is moreover involved; and again that of place, as being that in which the idea of time is by the like necessity involved.

In *motion* a body can not have been, but it must have been in two different places, at or in two different, which is as much as to say in two successive, portions of time.

For the space of time in question—i.e. for a portion of time composed of portions of the same length which were operative in the case of the body [in]¹ motion—the body has been at rest—in so far as in all that space or length of time it has not changed its place with reference to any other.

Taken in the aggregate, in so far as can be concluded either from observation or in the way of inference from analogy, no body whatsoever is, or ever has been, or ever will be, in a state of rest absolutely, i.e. without being in motion with reference to some other body or bodies.

The earth which we inhabit is not at rest: the sun himself, about which she moves, is not at rest: being but so many suns, the stars called *fixt* are themselves no more at rest than he is.

Considered as a *whole*, the *parts* of our earth are, as far as appears, with reference to one another, some of them always *at rest*—others, especially those near the surface, a considerable proportion of them, occasionally *in motion*: and so in regard to the several separate bodies, consisting of such portions of the matter of which the earth is composed, as are detached and separate of one another, each of them having between itself and every other, with the exception of the base on which it stands, and upon which, by the principle of attraction under the several forms under which it operates, it is kept at that place, certain portions of intervening space.

Of such of them as are in a state of solidity, rest—relative rest—rest with relation to each other—in so far as they are in that state, is the naturally constant state: *in motion* they are not *put*, but by some accident supervening from without: of such of them as are in a state of fluidity, liquidity and gaseous[ness] included, motion—relative motion—is, in every instance, a natural state exemplified to a greater or less extent, depending partly on the particular qualities of the several fluids, partly upon the accidents *ab extra* to which, individually taken, they happen to have been exposed.

In addition to the notion of motion, in the notion of *action* and *passion*, the notion of causation or causality is superadded. The body *E* is in motion: of such motion, what is the cause? Answer: the action

¹ MS 'of'.

of another body, the body S: which, by the exercise—exertion—
influence of a correspondent power which it possesses, becomes
productive of that effect.

In themselves, the two fictitious entities action and passion are not
only correspondent but inseparable. No action without passion: no
passion without action: no action on the one part without passion on
the other.

In case of action, and thereupon on the part of the one of two bodies,
motion—perceptible motion, on the part of the other body is relative
motion in every instance a never-failing consequence? To judge from
analogy, the probability seems to be in the affirmative.^a

In so far as on the part of one of the two alone any motion is percep-
tible, on the part of the other no motion being perceptible, the one
of which the motion is perceptible is most commonly considered and
spoken of as the agent, the other as the patient: a state of motion is the
state in which the former is said to be *in*; a state of passion, the state
in which the other is said to be *in*.

Relation. Under this head, such is its amplitude, several of the others
seem, totally or partially, to be included: viz.

1. Quantity.—All quantities bear some relation or other to each
other.

2. Quality.¹

Copiousness—Conciseness—Tractability

Of language the use and the sole use—being the communication of
ideas—in proportion to its copiousness will be the usefulness, and in
so far the excellence, of every language.

But, be the particular language what it will, at no one point of time will
it contain within itself a stock of words such as, without prejudice to the
perfection of all those other desirable properties, shall be capable of
giving expression to all the ideas for the expression of which a demand
is capable of having place at a succeeding point of time. Hence in the
property of copiousness, if considered as a constantly existing property
or quality, the idea of tractability is necessarily included.

^a 1. The earth and a projected stone.

2. A larger and a lesser magnet.

3. Liquids and Gasses.

¹ The text has been abandoned at this point.

Opposite to *copiousness* is *poverty* or *scantiness*.

Scantiness may be distinguished into *absolute* and *relative*.

Absolute is that which has place in so far as, for the proposition for which a man has occasion to find expression, no expression can be found by any means: relative, where such expression may indeed be found, but not without prejudice to conciseness; to wit, by employing, instead of a single-worded term in the form of a noun substantive, either a definition or a description more or less loose and diffused.

In so far as in language copiousness is a perfection, scantiness can not but be an imperfection.

Copiousness may be distinguished into useful or serviceable, and useless or unserviceable.

In respect of any given words, copiousness is *serviceable*, in so far as, to the idea or proposition in question, without the employing of that word, expression either can not be given at all, or not without preponderant prejudice to this or that other one of the properties desirable in language;

—*unserviceable*, in so far as, without preponderant prejudice to this or that desirable property in language, expression may be given to the idea or proposition in question, without the employing of that word.

Scantiness and useless copiousness—i.e. redundancy—are properties very capable of co-existing in conjunction with one another in the same language.

For one very simple species of act, the act of sexual copulation, in I forget what book of sports, I remember meeting with a separate verb for every species of animal, to the amount of perhaps half-a-hundred, there spoken of.¹ To the sort of copiousness thus exemplified, the epithet *unserviceable* may surely without much injustice be applied.

For the act of sowing as applied to plants, with equal use and reason might as many different words be employed as there are species of plants.

In the vocabularies of the several arts, liberal and manual—in addition to such as [are] serviceable, others which, according to the explanation above given to the word, may with strict propriety be termed unserviceable, will in almost every instance, to an amount more or less considerable, be found mixed.

¹ The book in question has not been traced, though *The Sportsman's Dictionary; or, the Gentleman's Companion: for Town and Country*, 2nd edn., London, 1782, [unpaginated], s.v. Terms, gives such words for ten animals.

Enrichment—Modes of Enrichment

On the occasion of the ways in which a language is capable of being enriched, two objects require to be considered: viz. 1. the *source* from which the addition is derived; 2. the mode in which it is made.

Say enrichment *ab intrà*, or home-drawn, in so far as the addition is drawn from the same language: *ab extrà*, in so far as it is drawn from any foreign language.

Simple modes of enrichment are:

1. Indication of particular properties applied to a given genus as expressed by a generic name of any degree of amplitude.

Examples of this mode of enrichment are afforded by the several branches of natural history and natural philosophy.

2. Spiritualization or psychologization: in so far as of any name of any physical substance, operation, or quality, application is made to the purpose of giving designation of any correspondent, or supposed correspondent, psychological substance, operation, or quality.¹

When the composite mode in which the enrichment is performed is *per inequalitatem*, the words conjoined being in their import of unequal characteristicness with relation to each other, the one may be considered as the principal, the other as being, with relation to it, the accessory word.

In this case, let the number of words thus related and entering into the composition of the compound word be supposed to be no more than two, the place of the accessory word will either be anterior or posterior to that principal: if anterior, it may be termed with relation to it a *prefix*; if posterior, it has been called in Latin a *suffix*.

Where the mode of enrichment is by composition, the mode of composition may be distinguished into:

1. composition by simple aggregation or coalition, viz. without change in the signification of either of the two constituent elements, and without the need of supposing the addition of any other word as necessary to compleat the sense.

Of this sort is that which has place between the name of a subject in the grammatical form of a *substantive*, and the name of an epithet or adjunct in the grammatical form of an adjective:—as in the case of the words vain-glory, fee-simple, plain-dealing.

2. by aggregation with need of ellipses.

¹ In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Give examples, the psychological object being modelled from the physical archetype, as a bust in clay from any part of a human figure.’

Examples:

1. Church Yard: i.e. Yard of the Church. Words omitted by ellipsis—*of* and *the*.
2. Foot-ball—Ball for the foot to play with by kicking it.
3. Mother-Country—Country which was, as it were, a mother to the person or persons in question.

Obstacles to the enrichment of language

To the enrichment of language various obstacles will in various cases be found opposing themselves:—various interests, various interest-begotten prejudices.

In so far as the mode of enrichment is unserviceable, all mankind—mankind in general—have an interest in opposing the performance of it.¹

Of Improvement, considered in relation to language.

Of deterioration by words imported

Displeasing, to some tastes at least, is the effect—disgusting to the degree of nauseousness—where, for the giving expression to the idea in question, the language in question, the English for example, furnishing a word by which the import intended is exhibited compleatly and without ambiguity, a foreign language, the French for example, is resorted to, and instead of the proper English term, another English term is employed by which one sense alone is expressed out of some two for the expression of both which the supposed correspondent term in French is, by reason of its poverty, employed in that language.

Take, for instance, in English the verb *to relish* and the participle or adjective *affecting*.

In English there exist two verbs—to taste, and to relish. By the verb to taste what is indicated is simply the having the perception without any intimation given of a sensation of *pleasure* as forming an accompaniment to it—by the verb to relish, the perception or sensation and the agreableness of it are both expressed.

¹ The text has been abandoned at this point. In a rudiment, Bentham indicated the subjects that he intended to consider: '1. Grammarians' prejudices. 2. Lawyers. 3. Divines. 4. Artists and Professional men in general—quære if any?

'Sinister interest, promotion of unserviceable enrichment.'

In French, the same verb *goûter* is employed for both these purposes: nor for the agreeable perception or sensation, in contradistinction to the neutral, has the language any single-worded appellative.

In English the word *relish* [is] in very frequent use as the verb to relish, the substantive relish. Notwithstanding which—in conversation—even in deliberate writing—men are not wanting who, instead of to relish, say to taste.

Of so glaring an impropriety, where is the cause to be looked for? Can it be in ignorance? can it be in inadvertence? Is it not rather in vain-glory? To shew that forsooth, so familiar to them is the idea of this foreign and fashionable language, it occurs to them more readily than even their own.

Of words *principal* and *accessory*:—and herein of
conjugates—i.e. clusters of conjugates—grammatical
and logical

On looking over the materials of which language is composed, two distinguishable classes of words will be found observable: one, which possess a sort of independent import, and suggest each of them an idea without the assistance of any other word: the other, which, not suggesting, each of them, signification of itself, serves no other purpose than that of modifying in some way or other the idea suggested by those of the abovementioned independent cast.

The former may be distinguished by the name of *principal*, the other by that of *accessory*, words.¹

Taken together, a principal when considered in connection with any one of these accessory words may be termed a conjugate.

With each such principal term will be found connected accessory words in great number and variety: hence in the case of each principal, as many different conjugates as there are accessory words found in connection with it: and as among these accessory words different classes will be found distinguishable, hence to each such principal, so many clusters of conjugates.

In some instances the accessory term is found attached to the principal, forming but one word with it, in others, not: hence the distinction—accessory words attached—accessory words detached. Conjugates in the *attached* form—conjugates in the *detached* form.

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘viz. for the present at least—quere whether there may be need of any others more *particular* and *determinate*.’

Where the accessory word is attached, in some instances it precedes the principal word, in others it follows it. Hence the distinction—accessories prefixed, or in the way of prefixion, accessories suffixed: or where the word *accessory* is understood to be in question, leaving out that word, one may say for shortness *prefixes* and *suffixes*, as in established use it has already in some instances been said.

Accessories which in one language are attached, are in another not attached.

Accessories which in one part of the same language are attached, are in another part of the same language not attached.

In this respect, taken in the aggregate, infinite are the diversities which language brings to view.

Of Tenses—or designations of *time*

In the mind of every man, on every occasion, time naturally divides itself into three portions: the present, the past, and the future. The designation of these three portions respectively is the only mode of designation that can be termed *simple*.

But past and future constantly are words of reference, and even present may be such.

Hence out of these three simple modes of designation arise six compound ones: making in the whole nine.

1. Simply present—I am.
2. Simply past—Past without reference—I struck, I did strike.
3. Simply future—I shall be, I shall strike.
4. Present with reference to a portion of time past—I was.
5. Present with reference to a portion of time considered as future.¹
6. Past with reference to a portion of time past—I had been.
7. Past with reference to a portion of time considered as future—I shall have been.
8. Future with reference to a portion of time past—I was about to be, I have been about to be, I had been about to be.
9. Future with reference to a portion of time considered as future—I shall be about to be.²

¹ By analogy, Bentham might have added: 'I am about to be.'

In the text, Bentham inserted a further mode of designation at this point: 'Past with reference to present time—I have been.'

² In the text, Bentham has noted at this point:

'Continuations { 1. I am striking. This applies to all the tenses.
2. I was striking.

'Exemplify these several tenses.'

But of whatsoever is considered as having place in these several portions of time respectively, the existence may be considered as categorical or as hypothetical.

Adding to these 9 absolute tenses so many conditional ones, we have thus 18 different designations applicable to so many differently considered portions of time.

Whatsoever be the species of action, and whatsoever be the portion of time, in which, by the representation given of it, it is placed, if in the nature of it, it was susceptible of continuance, and if for the purpose for which it is brought to view it be required that such its continuance be brought to view, it is a matter of no small convenience that the structure of the language is such as admits of the bringing the fact of such continuance decidedly and pointedly to view.

The existence of this feature of convenience may be seen in the English language: its non-existence in the French.

I am now walking to Charing [C]ross.

I was walking yesterday in the St James's Park.

I shall be walking tomorrow in St James's Park.

Many are the occasions on which the importance of an action depends on its continuance.

If the structure of the language admits of it, the bringing to view this continuance is, on an occasion of this sort, frequently a great beauty: the not being able so to do, a great defect.¹

The French language admits not of the giving in this manner continuance to any portion of time—nor therefore to any action.

In a translation made from that language into English, the advantage thus attached to the English is apt to be overlooked: and the word employed in English being in this respect the literal translation of the French word, the poverty and inexpressiveness of the French language is thus transferred into the English.

This designation of *continuance* may be applied to or withholden from any one of the abovementioned designations of time: to the beforementioned 18 distinguishable designations of time adding 18 others, 36 is thus the number we have in the whole.²

¹ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Look out for an occasion in which designation of continuance is of importance—they are to be found every where.'

² In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: '☞ Examine whether all these modes are employable without inconsistency.'

Of proper moods, or moods properly so-called

The existence affirmed may be either absolute or conditional: absolute, Aristotelic categorical; conditional, Aristotelic hypothetical.¹

The mood employed in the giving expression to the absolute mode of affirmation is by the Latin Grammarians termed the *indicative*: the mood employed in giving expression to the conditional mode, the potential.²

Of improper moods: or moods improperly so-called,
viz. the imperative in most languages: the hithpahal in
Hebrew

Absoluteness and *conditionality*—under the name of *moods*, these are two modes of designation actually established by antient use for the designation of time. Of the forms that occur in language, these are the only two to which the term mood can with propriety be applied. Not but that in itself, for any one thing, any one term is just as applicable as any other. But that, after its having been applied to this purpose, to apply it to others so widely different and disparate from it—in *that* it is that the impropriety consists.

Of these improper moods, the usage of language affords two examples.

One is that which by the Latin grammarians is so improperly termed the *imperative*: the *optative*—a term applied by them in certain cases to another mood—would for this, it will be seen, have been the more proper adjunct, supposing the substantive *mood* properly applied.

¹ Cf. Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, p. 65: 'Quoad substantiam Propositionis dividitur in *simplicem, sive Categoricam*; & *Compositam*, quæ & Synecdochicè *Hypothetica*. *Simplex sive Categorica* est, quæ constat unico subjecto, unico prædicato, & unica verbali copula; ut *homo est animal*. Ejus materia immediata sunt simplices termini: Forma, unio terminorum per verbum. *Composita (seu hypothetica late sumpta)* est, quæ constat ex pluribus *Categoricis* per conjunctionem unitis; ut *si homo sit Animal, tum homo est Corpus*. Ejus materia immediata sunt *Categoricæ* Propositiones: forma, unio *Categoricarum* per conjunctionem', i.e. 'As regards the substance, the proposition is divided into simple, or categorical; and composite, which by synecdoche is hypothetical. It is simple or categorical when it consists of a single subject, a single predicate, and a single verbal copula; as man is an animal. Its immediate matter are categorical terms: its form, the union of terms by a word. It is compound (or molecular, taken broadly), which consists of several categoricals united by conjunction; so that if man is an animal, then man is a body. Its immediate matter are categorical propositions: its form, the union of categoricals by conjunction.'

² In the text, Bentham has noted at this point: 'Note here the mood termed *subjunctive*: which in Greek has a different termination from that of the potential; in Latin, not.'

The other is a form which may be termed the *causal* mode: in the Hebrew language it is exemplified and is denominated *hithpahel*: in the Scottish dialect of the English language, though there is no denomination for it, it is exemplified in the phrase *he caused make*. So in French, *il fit faire*.

What by the Latinists is termed the *imperative* form seems to be improperly put upon the same line with and designated by the same name as those other forms which, as above, are termed *moods*.

That which it expresses is in all cases the existence of a *will*, an act of *volition*, to a certain effect on the part of the speaker or writer.

For the designation of this will, the term *imperative* considered as applied to the modifications of which the expression of that will is susceptible is in a remarkable degree defective, and by reason of that deficiency, improper: improper in three out of four cases.

Be the case what it may, such will so expressed will have for its object either some event or some state of things. In speaking of this event or state of things, either some person will be considered in the light of a person by whose will and consequent agency it will or would be made to take place, or not: if not, the will expressed is of that sort which is called a wish, and the mood by which expression is given to it has been termed the *optative*.

In the other case, the person in consequence [of] whose agency it is supposed that the event or state of things in question would be made to take place is either the person to whom the discourse is addressed, or some other person: in this latter case likewise, the mood comes under the same denomination—the *optative*.

When the person by whose agency it is supposed that the event or state of things in question would be produced is a person to whom the discourse is addressed, the relation borne by him in the order of power to him who speaks may either be that of a *superior*, that of an *equal* or that of an *inferior*. It is in that case alone in which the relation borne by him, as above, is that of a superior, nor that in that but where the superiority is so decided and acknowledged as to give to the expression of his wish so directed the character and denomination of a command, that the term *imperative* can with propriety be applied to it.

It is where the person by whose agency it is desired that the event or state of things in question should be produced is the Almighty, that the imperfection and absurdity of this denomination presents itself in a striking point of view. Grant us, O Lord!—Hear us, O Lord! Taken in themselves, and without a thought bestowed upon the grammarians by whom a common appellation has been bestowed upon these forms, there is nothing to which any such idea as that

of impropriety appears to attach itself. But when to such a form of speech—when to any form of speech—addressed to a person conceived to be in such a situation, any such appellation as that of *imperative* is applied, then it is that the impropriety—and that rising to a degree of absurdity—involving a virtual contradiction in terms, manifests itself beyond dispute.

Of the imperative¹ future

Such as it is, under the restrictions above brought to view, the form of speech brought to view under its trivial name the imperative mood, may be termed the imperative mood.

All this while there exists a form of speech which, though not termed *imperative*, is not only *imperative*, but more strongly and pointedly and forcibly imperative than that which alone hath as yet been ever stiled imperative. I speak of that which may be termed the *imperative* future: a form of speech which requires to be placed in contradistinction to that other which may be termed the *predictive* or *simply predictive* future.

This is the form of speech which in the English language is in some cases designated by the word *shall*: as where a man says *thou shalt* or *you shall*.

Go to school again tomorrow. You shall go to School again tomorrow. In and by both these forms of speech the mode of optation properly termed *imperation* is plainly enough expressed. But neither is it less undeniable that by the latter the form in which [the] command is expressed is a much more forcible one than in the former. Speaking to a child of mine, and using the first-mentioned of these forms, all that I give him to understand is that, at the time in question, it is my will—my desire—that he should repair to the place in question: of the expected efficacy of the will or desire thus notified, I say nothing. But if I say, tomorrow you shall go to school, that which I give intimation of is—not only that such is my will and desire, but that in my own persuasion such will be [the] effect of the notification made of such will or desire—so strong, so irresistible, the force and influence of the command so notified, that upon and [in] consequence of the notification so made of it, obedience—that obedience in and by which the wish and desire will have received its accomplishment—can not but take place.

By the mention made of the particle *shall* as employed in alternation with the particle *will* in the designation of future tenses, a demand

¹ MS alt. 'insulting'.

is created for an explanation of the several particular cases in which respectively they are properly employed.

This is the more necessary inasmuch as compleat instruction adequate to this purpose is in the ordinary rules of English Grammar still a desideratum.

The consequence is that in this particular not only do foreigners, after all the instruction they can obtain from the grammars employed by them for the learning of the English language, remain much at a loss, but even among the best informed classes, natives of the two minor kingdoms united to that of England are on this occasion apt to give into such forms of speech as expose them to ridicule at the hands of a native of the major kingdom: and what is curious is—that slight and delicate as are the shades of distinction by which the words proper to each occasion are distinguished, yet in England the most ignorant and uninstructed Englishman is perhaps never known to fall into those improprieties in this particular from which the most learned and highest ranks among the Irish and Scotch are seldom altogether free.¹

Where the event or state of things spoken of as the object regarded as future [is] meant to be represented as dependent on the will of him who speaks, the manner of employing the particles *shall* and *will* pursues one of two courses.

Where the event or state of thing[s] spoken of as about to have place is *not* meant to be represented as dependent on the will of him who speaks, the manner of employing the particles *shall* and *will* pursues another of two courses.

The following is the course pursued where the event or state of things²

Under the particular structure of the English language, the future tense, including its modifications as above, admitts of an additional modification almost, if not altogether,³ peculiar to itself.

¹ Cf. *New Joe Miller; or, the Tickler. Containing upwards of Five Hundred Good Things, many of which are original, and the others selected from the best authors*, 2nd edn., London, 1800, pp. 66–7: ‘A Scotch gentleman having a conversation with Mr. *Horne Tooke*, observed that he, in common with his countrymen, was apt frequently to confound *shall* and *will*, and that he wished to have from so great a grammarian some rule respecting the use of these verbs. “I shall,” said Mr. Tooke, “give you an extremely simple rule. When you sit down to write, go on as your pen leads you: then revise what you have written, and wherever you find *will* substitute *shall*, and where you find *shall* substitute *will*.”’

² The text has been abandoned at this point. The following passage supersedes this and the preceding five paragraphs.

³ In the margin, Bentham has noted at this point: ‘Examine the German &c. in this view.’

APPENDIX. FRAGMENTS (1813)

In consequence of this modification it requires to be distinguished into two species—1. the simply predictive future; 2. the dominative future.

The simply predictive future is that which it has in common with other languages in general.

The dominative future is that which is peculiar or almost peculiar to it, as above.

The future may be termed dominative, where the event predicted is spoken of as being the result of the power and will of him who speaks.

This dominative future may be termed *imperative*, where the event so predicted is spoken of as being an action about to be performed by a person or persons to whom the discourse is addressed.

In the absolute mode or form for the giving expression to these two modifications of the future tense, the two words *will* and *shall* are employed, with their respective conjugates.

But in the performance of this function they make a mutual exchange in a manner which, to persons who are not perfectly familiarized to it by incessant use, is in a high degree perplexing.

In the two cases respectively, the mode in which expression is given to the intended import is as follows.

In both cases, let the action in question be that of *speaking*.

I. Simply predictive future expressed throughout the three modifications of personality, multiplied each according to the two modifications of number.¹

I. Singular Number.

1. First person—I shall speak.
2. Second person—Thou wilt speak.
3. Third person—He will speak.

II. Plural Number.

1. We shall speak.
2. Ye will speak.
3. They will speak.

¹ An alternative rendition of this case appears on a cut sheet attached to UC cii. 572: 'Case 2. Case in which the event is not meant to be represented by me (the speaker) as dependent upon my will.

'Singular Number.

- '1. First person singular. I *shall* perish.
- '2. Second person singular. Thou wilt perish.
- '3. Third person singular. He, she or it will perish.

'Plural Number.

- '4. First person plural. We shall perish.
- '5. Second person plural. Ye will perish.
- '6. Third person plural. They will perish.'

OF GENDERS

II. Imperative or dominative future expressed under the same modifications.

I. Singular Number.

1. First person—I will speak.
2. Second person—Thou shalt speak (imperative).
3. Third person—He shall speak.

II. Plural Number.

1. We will speak.
2. Ye shall speak (imperative).
3. They shall speak.

Here in the singular number, the measure of power of the existence of which intimation is given is greater than in the plural it is possible to be. Be the power of him who speaks ever so great, there exists not any person of the state of whose will he can have an assurance altogether so perfect as of the state of his own will.

In both numbers, where the *dominative* future is *imperative*, the measure of power expressed by it is greater than that which is expressed by the formal modification stiled hitherto by all grammarians the *imperative* mode.

Employing the imperative mood—addressing myself to any person and saying *Speak thou*—or *Speak*—all that I give intimation of is that it is my desire that he should speak. Employing the dominative and imperative future—saying *thou shalt speak*, besides giving intimation of the existence of a desire on my part that he should speak, I moreover give intimation of a persuasion on my part that so irresistible is the influence exercised by my will on his, that the fulfilment of it is an event that can not but take place: such beyond doubt will be his conduct, and that conduct will have had for its cause either on his part the bare knowledge of my will, or else my agency in some other mode.

Of Genders

In the languages of classical antiquity—the Greek and the Latin—and in most of the modern languages that are chiefly derived from them—not to speak of others—in the form of the *conjugalional* suffixes and in that of the *pronominal adjuncts*, one or both, in speaking of the subject, be it what it may, real or fictitious entity—if real, thing or person, intimation is given that it is of one or other or neither of the two sexes.

Where true, the intimation thus given is superfluous and useless: where not true, besides being superfluous and useless, it is a fertile source of confusion and of indistinct and erroneous conception: in every case a blemish and a nuisance.

Upon the conception and memory of the learner of the language, it is a load, and that a very burthensome one.

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Note. The following is a unified index that refers to the texts of all the essays included in the present volume, without identifying the particular work in question.

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This new volume of Bentham's philosophical writings deals with his most fundamental ideas concerning logic, language, ethics, and grammar. It includes four major essays written between 1814 and 1816, namely 'Essay on Logic', 'Essay on Ethics', 'Didacologia', and 'Universal Grammar', all of them closely related to *Chrestomathia*, Bentham's major work on education.

In 'Essay on Logic', Bentham contrasts the *præcognita* of Aristotle with his own 'characteristics' of logic and deals with methodization, ontology, and the relationship between logic and language. In 'Essay on Ethics', he offers a critique of the Aristotelian virtues and outlines his own division of ethics into prudence, probity, and benevolence. In 'Didacologia', he presents an outline of a comprehensive plan for the division of the arts and sciences based on the method of exhaustive bifurcation and a new nomenclature. In 'Universal Grammar', Bentham deals with language as the basis for thought and communication and investigates the nature of the different parts of speech. The volume is completed with an Appendix containing fragmentary material, written in August and September 1813, with a focus on language. All the texts are based on Bentham's original manuscripts and have never before been published in authentic form.

PHILIP SCHOFIELD is Director of the Bentham Project, Faculty of Laws, UCL, and General Editor of the new authoritative edition of *The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham*.

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