

# The Contemporary Reader of Feminist International Relations

---

Edited by Catherine Goetze and  
Khushi Singh Rathore

First published 2026

ISBN: 9781032418711 (hbk)

ISBN: 9781032422688 (pbk)

ISBN: 9781003362012 (ebk)

## Chapter 31

---

### Women and Peacebuilding in Authoritarian and Hybrid Regimes

Elisabeth Olivius

(CC-BY 4.0)

DOI: 10.4324/9781003362012-36

The funder for this chapter is Arts and Humanities  
Research Council UK.



**Routledge**  
Taylor & Francis Group  
LONDON AND NEW YORK

# 31

## WOMEN AND PEACEBUILDING IN AUTHORITARIAN AND HYBRID REGIMES

*Elisabeth Olivius*

### **Introduction**

In liberal peacebuilding policy and practice, gender equality is represented as an intrinsic aspect of peace, and women's organizations are represented as important peacebuilding partners. The adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, and the evolution of the policy architecture now known as the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, have spurred a wealth of feminist scholarship exploring the implementation and localization of the WPS agenda, which has often highlighted how relationships between local women and international actors are fraught with tensions and reproduce unequal relations of power (Shepherd 2020).

However, while existing feminist IR and peace studies literature focuses its critique on the 'frictional encounters' (Björkdahl and Höglund 2013) between local women's organizations and international liberal peacebuilding, it has largely overlooked that in many empirical contexts, peace is not pursued through liberal means, or primarily by international actors. Instead, in many conflict contexts, stability is upheld through illiberal peacebuilding practices employed by authoritarian or hybrid regimes. Authoritarianism is the most common regime type in post-war states (Lewis et al. 2018). Thus, the domestic political contexts in which women's organizations seek to build peace, and where frameworks such as the WPS agenda are supposedly implemented, are insufficiently understood and theorized. This means that little is known about how authoritarian governments mobilize gender in their illiberal peacebuilding practices, or about how women's organizations and activists navigate state policies that frequently seek to restrict the space for civil society and control the direction of post-war societal change.

This chapter explores the relationship between state practices of illiberal peacebuilding and the activism of women's organizations in Myanmar. Successive authoritarian and hybrid regimes in Myanmar have employed varying types of illiberal peacebuilding practices, with different effects for the space for civil society peacebuilding. Bringing together feminist scholarship and illiberal peacebuilding literature, the analysis traces dynamics of resistance, change, and co-optation in the work of women's organizations in relation to the state over time, exploring change from the pre-2011 era of direct military rule to the hybrid regime of the decade of political transition from 2011 to 2021. The analysis builds on insights and data drawn from research on and with women's organizations in and from Myanmar from 2016 and onwards, as well as reports and other secondary sources reflecting their work.

Next, the growing literature on illiberal peacebuilding is introduced to provide an overview of how peacebuilding scholars have started to explore strategies to manage conflict and ensure stability in authoritarian and hybrid regimes, beyond the dominance of international liberal peacebuilding paradigms. However, this literature remains largely gender-blind. The analysis that follows therefore explores the case of Myanmar in order to examine the gendered dynamics of illiberal peacebuilding, and illustrate how these practices have shaped the activism of women's organizations and their engagement with peace. In conclusion, implications and key insights of relevance beyond the case of Myanmar and for further feminist research on peacebuilding are discussed.

### **Beyond liberal peacebuilding: but where are the women?**

During the past decade, a global rise in illiberal ideas, norms, and governing practices has been widely noted across multiple scholarly fields and societal arenas. Democratic backsliding, right-wing populism, and the expansionism of illiberal regimes such as China and Russia demonstrate that the model of liberal democracy, and the legitimacy of liberal international norms, are being challenged (Sájo, Uitz, and Holmes 2022). This global political context is also reshaping approaches to manage violent conflicts and build peace. Liberal paradigms, which have long dominated international peacebuilding policy and practice, are increasingly fragmented and displaced by illiberal approaches where peace is pursued through coercion and co-optation rather than negotiation, inclusion and compromise (Smith et al. 2020; Lewis 2022).

Liberal peacebuilding is characterized by a normative commitment to values such as democracy, rule of law, human rights and free markets, and peace is envisioned as coming about through negotiation, compromise, and political inclusion. Measures in pursuit of these goals are often implemented in a top-down manner, with international actors playing a key role (Paris

2004; Mitchell 2023). Liberal peacebuilding has been the focus of scholarly critique for many years. Critical literature has explored how hybrid, or post-liberal, forms of peacebuilding can enhance the agency of local actors and potentially be emancipatory (Richmond 2010; Mac Ginty 2011). However, while critical, this literature remains focused on international peacebuilding interventions by the UN and Western states, thus failing to account for how peacebuilding is conducted in settings where national governments and other local elites, not international agencies, are the dominant actors (Smith et al. 2020).

In recent years, there has been an increasing scholarly interest in exploring how conflict is managed in such settings, in ways which frequently deviate from liberal norms and policy prescriptions (Lewis et al. 2018; Smith et al. 2020; Mitchell 2023). Here, illiberal peacebuilding has been described as an approach to post-conflict reconstruction, which departs from liberal peacebuilding in three key respects:

In place of Western powers, illiberal peace-building is dominated by domestic actors. In place of economic neo-liberalism, illiberal peacebuilding runs on clientelism, cronyism and corruption. In place of liberal ideals of equality and liberty, illiberal peace-building emphasizes illiberal norms of inequality and order.

*(Smith et al. 2020, 4)*

A growing literature has demonstrated how variants of these illiberal peacebuilding characteristics have manifested in a range of cases. Informal economic institutions, clientelism and corruption are used by regimes to co-opt oppositional elites through economic incentives and maintain stability, for example in Kyrgyzstan (Lewis and Sagnayeva 2021) and Nepal (Jarvis 2020). In Rwanda and Sri Lanka, stability after government war victories has been sustained through the suppression of ethnic grievances, identities, and histories in favour of a hegemonic narrative of national unity and identity (Piccolino 2015). However, this growing field of research on illiberal peacebuilding has until now remained largely gender-blind, and as noted above, feminist peacebuilding scholarship has primarily focused on the relationship between local women and international peacebuilding actors and policy frameworks.

While feminist peacebuilding scholarship has paid limited attention to the impact of authoritarian governance on women's agency, feminist comparative politics scholars have examined how and why autocracies adopt women's rights policies, for example gender quotas for parliamentary representation. Here, the term 'autocratic gender-washing' has been coined to describe the promotion of women's rights as an opportunistic legitimization strategy, which may make autocracies seem more inclusive and democratic in the eyes of

international and domestic audiences (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2022). Such women's rights policies may have political utility, but achieve little change on the ground. Yet, even instrumental, superficial adoption of women's rights reforms can open space for change through mobilization and subversion by women's movements and other local actors (Tripp 2019).

However, instrumental, opportunistic mobilization of gender equality norms by authoritarian regimes can also co-exist with conservative resistance against women's rights. Scholars in comparative politics and gender studies have demonstrated how the global upsurge of illiberalism is widely associated with conservative gender norms and a backlash against women's rights (Laruelle 2022; Korolczuk and Graff 2018). While the dynamics of autocratic gender-washing and illiberal anti-gender backlash may appear contradictory, a recent study of Turkey demonstrates that they can be interlinked. Ehrhart (2022) shows how the Turkish government has mobilized government-operated women's organizations to appear progressive in the eyes of international audiences, while at the same time closing down space for independent women's organizations and promoting a conservative, government-sponsored gender ideology. In this way, an authoritarian government can appropriate women's rights issues and reinterpret them in accordance with illiberal ideologies, while at the same time appearing as actively implementing women's rights policies and supporting women's organizations.

These insights indicate that the gendered dynamics of peacebuilding in authoritarian states can be complex and contradictory. As authoritarian governance and illiberal approaches to manage conflict characterize the typical peacebuilding context today, it is critical to better understand how these political dynamics are gendered, and how they shape women's peacebuilding practices. Below, I turn to the case of Myanmar to explore the intersection of illiberal peacebuilding and women's mobilization for peace.

### **Women and illiberal peacebuilding in Myanmar**

In Myanmar, successive regimes have employed illiberal peacebuilding practices to co-opt challengers, suppress political dissent, and maintain regime control (Stokke et al. 2022; Olivius and Hedström 2021; McCarthy and Farrelly 2020; Hedström and Olivius 2020). This has periodically generated a degree of stability and minimized armed violence, at least in some parts of the country. However, armed conflict in Myanmar never ceased entirely, and the resumption of large-scale violence across the country after a military coup in 2021 could be seen as evidence of the failure of illiberal approaches to maintain stability in the long run. Women's activism in pursuit of peace and political change in Myanmar also has a long history, but the shape of women's peacebuilding practices has shifted in response to changing political

conditions over time. In the following sections, I describe the relationship between women's activism and regime practices of illiberal peacebuilding during two historical periods: direct military rule up until 2011; and during the political transition and hybrid regime between 2011 and 2021.

### ***Women's activism and illiberal peacebuilding under military rule***

The history of independent Myanmar is marked by the dominant political role of the military. After a short parliamentary period between 1947 and 1958, the military took power first as an interim measure, and then more permanently in 1962. The military saw itself as a guarantor against the disintegration of the Union of Myanmar, which it feared that ethnic minority aspirations to self-determination might bring about. Democracy, in the eyes of the military, was a system which invited disorder (Callahan 2004). Direct military rule by successive juntas persisted until 2010.

During this era of military rule, civil war, fluctuating in intensity, persisted across vast swathes of the country. From the 1980s and onwards, a major strategy used by the military regime to attempt to co-opt armed opponents and manage conflict was through ceasefire agreements underpinned by economic incentives. These ceasefire deals provided insurgent leaders and other ethnic minority elites with lucrative business opportunities, for example through resource extraction concessions granted by the military. As examples of illiberal peacebuilding strategies (Stokke et al. 2022; McCarthy and Farrelly 2020), these agreements did serve to decrease armed violence and ensure a level of stability in some areas of Myanmar through the creation of mutual economic interest between competing elites. Simultaneously, government control was extended into previously rebel-held territories through measures such as infrastructural projects and economic investments, leading analysts to argue that development initiatives were used as a form of counterinsurgency by other means (Brenner 2015).

While these illiberal strategies to contain conflict and co-opt armed opponents did minimize fighting, they did not resolve the political issues at the heart of armed conflict or address the grievances of ethnic minority populations (Brenner 2015). Moreover, they created an extractive, clientelist economy where profit was captured by male, military elites (Woods 2011). Women were rarely involved in ceasefire negotiations, or in a position to benefit from these deals (Hedström and Olivius 2020).

However, women were nevertheless mobilized both politically and symbolically by the military regime in its efforts to legitimize its rule. In its international relations, a rhetoric about Burmese women's 'inherent equality' with men was used to portray Myanmar as a progressive nation (Ikeya 2011). Efforts to maintain the chimera of women's equality, and to mobilize women's labour in support of the military regime, also led to the formation

of a number of different government-controlled organizations (so-called GONGOS) in the early 2000s. Organizations such as the Myanmar National Committee for Women's Affairs (MNCWA) promoted a traditional idea of complementary gender roles, and engaged in community service such as organizing vaccination campaigns, but also performed ceremonial duties and support work for local political and military officials. The leadership of the GONGOS were mainly made up by the wives of senior military commanders, while lower-based membership were, at times, forcibly recruited (Olivius et al. 2022).

At the same time, independent women's organizations were banned from operating openly in the country. Women's organizing for peace and in opposition to military rule during the period therefore primarily took place in exile, in particular in the Thai border areas. Here, women's organizations were formed within ethnic minority self-determination movements, as well as by democracy activists who had fled regime crackdowns. This led to the formation of a multi-ethnic women's alliance, the Women's League of Burma (WLB), in 1999. At this time, international advocacy around abuses of women's human rights in conflict areas became an important strategy for women activists, as opportunities to push for change inside the country were very limited. By documenting gender-specific impacts of armed conflict on women, such as trafficking and sexual violence, women's group were able to challenge and contest the government from the relative safety of neighbouring countries. Through participation in UN forums such as the CEDAW reporting process, women's organizations countered the government's official rhetoric. This led to international pressure, contributing to sanctions against the Burmese regime (Cardénas and Olivius 2021). Thus, these strategies prevented the military government's attempts at autocratic gender-washing (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2022) from being credible and successful in relation to international audiences.

Within Myanmar, despite the difficulty of more overt political mobilization, women played key roles in facilitating everyday peace and meeting community needs at the grassroots level. These efforts were frequently informal or framed as humanitarian or non-political (Pepper 2022). To an extent, community-level work was in some areas facilitated by ceasefire agreements, as they contributed to less direct violence and opened some space for civil society (South 2008). Women's organizations have also documented how in areas of ongoing armed conflict, women often stepped in as village leaders because they were considered to be less at risk in this position as women were perceived as apolitical, submissive, and diplomatic (Karen Women's Organization 2010).

Thus, under military rule up until 2011, women were rarely considered or included in ceasefire negotiations aimed at ending armed conflict, but they were important symbols mobilized in efforts to uphold and legitimize military

rule in local communities as well as in relation to international audiences. However, in exile and at the grassroots, women created alternative arenas to oppose military rule and push for political change, and to improve women's lives in local communities.

### ***Women's activism and illiberal peacebuilding in a hybrid political order***

As part of the military regime's roadmap to 'discipline flourishing democracy', elections were held in 2010. Not considered free nor fair, the poll was won by the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). As the new government, led by General Thein Sein, took office in 2011, many observers were surprised by the extent of reforms set in motion. This new order was a hybrid regime, adopting features of democratic and civilian governance yet retaining significant military influence in politics (Simpson and Farrelly 2023). Political and economic reforms led to a significant influx of international donors, the establishment of a peacebuilding and development industry and the lifting of sanctions (Thant Myint-U 2019). Legal reforms increased freedom for civil society as well as the media, and led to a return of political exiles, a rapid increase in media outlets, and widespread and affordable access to the internet. The transition from direct military rule to semi-civilian rule was further cemented in the 2015 elections, when the National League for Democracy (NLD), headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a landslide victory in the first openly contested, and respected, elections in decades. Many women's organizations in exile moved their operations into Myanmar, seeking to take advantage of the new political opening, and new organizations and networks were formed in urban centres such as Yangon (Olivius 2019). Crucially, engagement with state institutions, and opportunities to shape new legislation, emerged as a new avenue for women's activism (Aye Thiri Kyaw 2022). At the same time, the role of the military as a key political actor was protected by the 2008 constitution, which granted the military 25 per cent of all seats in parliament as well as control over key ministries of the state (Simpson and Farrelly 2023).

In this hybrid political order, which combined democratic processes and institutions with autocratic features, approaches to conflict management and peacebuilding were characterized by continuity as well as significant change. President Thein Sein initiated a new round of bilateral ceasefires with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), which, much like the ceasefire deals of the 1990s, rested on economic incentives and the construction of clientelist elite relationships (Stokke et al. 2022; McCarthy and Farrelly 2020). The economic orders created by these deals often compounded wartime legacies where women had shouldered the brunt of reproductive and subsistence work, which made them less able to benefit from new economic opportunities. In

addition, top-down economic development led to widespread land grabbing, which disproportionately affected rural women, whose land tenure was rarely formalized on paper (Hedström and Olivius 2020).

However, Thein Sein also initiated a multilateral nationwide peace process, through which eight EAOs signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with the government in 2015 (Thawngmung 2017). This process more closely resembled liberal ideas about peace negotiations, and emerged as a key focal point for support provided by the international peacebuilding and development industry which moved into Myanmar after 2011. Here, international actors advocated for women's representation in the peace negotiations, which reinforced the efforts of women activists working to impact the official peace process. The presence of international peacebuilding actors and their resources contributed to reshape the political landscape and diversify government peacebuilding strategies. Navigating donor relationships and seeking to steer donor funding in ways that facilitated the extension of state control while marginalizing critical actors became one key strategy for maintaining the power of the regime. Notably, international approaches often aligned quite well with this goal: the default liberal peacebuilding orientation towards building the capacity and institutions of the state meant that the state became the gatekeeper of much international peacebuilding support (South 2018; Olivius et al. 2022).

Myanmar's partial move towards democracy and international partnerships made gender equality issues a more salient aspect of peacebuilding. However, the implementation of the UN WPS agenda in Myanmar exemplifies how in a hybrid regime, international peacebuilding frameworks oriented towards the state can reinforce illiberal peacebuilding strategies. As international peacebuilders arrived, a pool of resources as well as a cadre of international experts dedicated to WPS issues also emerged. This created new opportunities for women's organizations, but also made the government keen to establish ownership and position itself as taking the lead in localizing the WPS agenda. As a result, a technical working group with participation by women's organizations as well as international agencies was established under the Department for Social Welfare. Moreover, military-era GONGOs were reinvented as a decentralized structure of women's committees tasked with implementing policies regarding women at regional, township, and village level. This architecture was seen by some donors, including UN agencies, as a suitable structure to support to reach ordinary women in the localization of the WPS agenda. However, independent women's organizations were greatly frustrated by the concentration of support towards these committees, as they argued that the women's committees still consisted mainly of wives of male local leaders, who had no interest in engaging with politics or peacebuilding work (Olivius et al. 2022).

At the same time, the government successfully used various seemingly technical rules and restrictions to ensure that women's organizations from conflict-affected, ethnic minority areas, and women's organizations based in exile, could not easily benefit from international funding. Travel restrictions prevented international actors from engaging with local women in conflict-affected areas. Legislation regarding official registration for civil society organizations and bans against collaboration with organizations considered to be associated with armed groups excluded many organizations from ethnic minority areas from eligibility. As international donors largely complied with government regulations, women critical of the government, for example those struggling to draw attention to continuing state-sponsored sexual violence against ethnic minority women, were less able to fund their work and have their voices heard in national peacebuilding processes (Olivius et al. 2022). This placed many women's organizations in a difficult position where they had to balance between continued critique and the risk of co-optation and silencing (Olivius 2019).

Thus, the political transition propelled gender issues higher up on the peacebuilding agenda and increased its salience, which empowered some women's organizations. In a more open and less repressive political context, the women's movement also expanded rapidly in numbers and diversity. However, in the formal peace process and beyond, the government were rather successful in constraining the agency of international actors and steering them towards facilitating the regime's pursuit of political control. This perpetuated established patterns of exclusion of ethnic minority, conflict-affected and rural people, and their political perspectives. This was true also in sectors of peacebuilding specifically focused on women, peace and security issues. While the government actively engaged with gender equality issues during this period, it managed to appropriate them in a way that facilitated its illiberal peacebuilding practices and suppressed critical voices.

### **Concluding reflections**

On 1 February 2021, hopes for continued political change towards peace and democracy in Myanmar were brutally crushed by a military coup, which ousted a democratically elected government and prevented the assembly of the newly elected parliament (Thawngmung and Noah 2021). The coup spurred widespread protests all over the country, which were met by increasingly lethal violence by the military. As many protesters turned to armed resistance to defend themselves and the military turned to indiscriminate force, such as air strikes, against civilian communities, large parts of the country descended into a state of war, economic collapse, and escalating humanitarian crisis (Chambers and Dunford 2023). While this might be seen as a dramatic

illustration of the failure of illiberal peacebuilding practices to maintain stability in the long run, women's peacebuilding tactics developed during periods of authoritarian and hybrid rule have proven to be continuously useful in resisting military rule and providing for everyday needs in the aftermath of the coup. While the military regime has arguably turned from strategies of illiberal peacebuilding towards a heavier reliance on violent coercion as an approach to conflict, women have continued to build peace in the shadow of war through international advocacy, alternative political institutions as well as community-based structures for caregiving and service provision (Hedström et al. 2023; Chambers 2023).

The case of Myanmar demonstrates how over time, different varieties of authoritarian and hybrid regimes have mobilized gender as part of their strategies to establish stability and maintain their power, but also how these changing political contexts constrain and shape the space for women's peacebuilding work. While analysis of illiberal peacebuilding practices to date is largely gender-blind, the case of Myanmar illustrates how such practices both generate inadvertent gendered effects, and frequently make strategic use of gendered ideas and norms. For example, practices such as economic co-optation through clientelist networks and patronage structures reinforce the position of male (military) elites, and marginalize women's voices and livelihoods. Ideas about women's roles and rights have been mobilized as tools for international legitimation as well as grassroots mobilization – and thus regime control – both during military rule and as part of efforts to appropriate and manipulate international peacebuilding support.

While the freedom and security for women's organizations to operate in Myanmar have varied over time, navigating authoritarian military rule as well as a hybrid political order have required them to make difficult choices with regards to their strategies, messages, and advocacy styles. Being overtly political and critical was until 2011 only possible in exile; after 2011, such organizations, for example those speaking out about continuing violations of ethnic minority women in conflict areas, found themselves marginalized by government regulations coupled with dominant donor practices and priorities. Avoiding such a fate meant opting for an 'apolitical' profile, engaging in humanitarian and community-based social work and after 2011, policy advocacy with a carefully crafted, diplomatic and 'soft' approach. This illustrates that negotiating risks of repression on the one side and co-optation on the other is an ever-present feature of the conditions for women's organizations seeking to achieve change and build peace in authoritarian and hybrid conflict-affected contexts.

As an ongoing global, illiberal shift is reinforcing authoritarianism in conflict contexts, it is increasingly critical to better understand how authoritarian governance and illiberal approaches to managing conflict shapes the space for women as agents of peace. Such a research agenda is also motivated by the

importance of analysing the role of the state in feminist IR and peacebuilding scholarship, which has disproportionately focused its attention on the role of international actors, and their interactions with local women and gender dynamics. As the Myanmar case study highlights, examining the role of the (authoritarian) state is critical to understanding the political conditions that shape the peacebuilding practices of women's organizations, and the ways in which they mobilize to navigate these conditions.

## References

- Aye Thiri Kyaw (2023) Women's Mobilization, Activism, and Policy-Making in Myanmar's Transition. In: Hedström, J. and Olivius, E. (eds) (2023) *Waves of Upheaval in Myanmar: Gendered Transformations and Political Transitions*. NIAS Press.
- Bjarnegård, E., & Zetterberg, P. (2022). How Autocrats Weaponize Women's Rights. *Journal of Democracy*, 33(2), 60–75.
- Björkdahl, A., & Höglund, K. (2013). Precarious Peacebuilding: Friction in Global–Local Encounters. *Peacebuilding*, 1(3), 289–299.
- Brenner, D. (2015). Ashes of Co-optation: From Armed Group Fragmentation to the Rebuilding of Popular Insurgency in Myanmar. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 15(4), 337–358.
- Callahan, Mary P. 2004. *Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma*. NUS Press.
- Cardenas, M. and Olivius, E. (2021) 'Building Peace in the Shadow of War: Women-to-Women Diplomacy as Alternative Peacebuilding Practice in Myanmar'. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 15(3), 347–366.
- Chambers, J., & Dunford, M. R. (eds). (2023). *Myanmar in Crisis: Living with the Pandemic and the Coup*. Yusof Ishak Institute.
- Chambers, J. (2023). Our Htamein, Our Flag, Our Victory: The Role of Young Women in Myanmar's Spring Revolution. *Journal of Burma Studies*, 27(1), 65–99.
- Ehrhart, A. (2022). Women's Rights vs. Gender Justice? Exploring Oppositional Women's Organizations and the Reshaping of Feminist Engagement in Democratizing Turkey. *Zeitschrift für Mittelmeerstudien (ZfM)*, 2.
- Hedström, J., Faxon, H. O., Phyo, Z. M., Pan, H., Kha Yae, M., Yay, K., & Mi, M. (2023). Forced Fallow Fields: Making Meaningful Life in the Myanmar Spring Revolution. *Civil Wars*, 1–25.
- Hedström, J and Olivius, E. (2020). Insecurity, Dispossession, Depletion: Women's Experiences of Post-War Development in Myanmar. *European Journal of Development Research*, 32(2), 379–403.
- Ikeya, C. (2011). *Refiguring Women, Colonialism, and Modernity in Burma*. University of Hawai'i Press.
- Jarvis, T. (2020). The Stabilising Impacts of Corruption in Nepal's Post-Conflict Transition. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 20(1), 165–189.
- Karen Women's Organization. (2010). *Walking amongst Sharp Knives. The Unsung Courage of Karen Women Village Chiefs in Conflict Areas of Eastern Burma*. Karen Women's Organization. <https://karenwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/walkingamongstsharpknives.pdf>

- Korolczuk, E., & Graff, A. (2018). Gender as 'Ebola from Brussels': The Anticolonial Frame and the Rise of Illiberal Populism. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 43(4), 797–821.
- Laruelle, M. (2022). Illiberalism: A Conceptual Introduction. *East European Politics*, 38(2), 303–327.
- Lewis, D. (2022). Contesting Liberal Peace: Russia's Emerging Model of Conflict Management. *International Affairs*, 98(2), 653–673.
- Lewis, D. G., and Sagnayeva, S. (2020). Corruption, Patronage and Illiberal Peace: Forging Political Settlement in Post-conflict Kyrgyzstan. *Third World Quarterly*, 41(1), 77–95.
- Lewis, D., Heathershaw, J., & Megoran, N. (2018). Illiberal Peace? Authoritarian Modes of Conflict Management. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 53(4), 486–506.
- Mac Ginty, Roger (2011). *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*. Macmillan.
- McCarthy, Gerard, and Nicholas Farrelly. (2020). Peri-Conflict Peace: Brokerage, Development and Illiberal Ceasefires in Myanmar's Borderlands. *Conflict, Security and Development* 20(1): 141–63.
- Mitchell, C. (2023). 'Illiberal' Peace and the Nature of 'Illiberality': Concepts and Cases. *International Negotiation*, 1–33.
- Olivius, E., Hedström, J., & Phyo, Z. M. (2022). Feminist Peace or State Co-optation? The Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Myanmar. *European Journal of Politics and Gender*, 5(1), 25–43.
- Olivius, E. & Hedström, J. (2021). Spatial Struggles and the Politics of Peace: the Aung San Statue as a Site for Post-War Conflict in Myanmar's Kayah State. *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*.
- Olivius, E. (2019). Time to Go Home? The Conflictual Politics of Diaspora Return in the Burmese Women's Movement. *Asian Ethnicity*, 20(2), 148–167.
- Paris, Roland (2004). *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pepper, M. (2022). Feminist Peacebuilding at the Grassroots: Contributions and Challenges. In *Waves of Upheaval in Myanmar: Gendered Transformations and Political Transitions*, Jenny Hedström and Elisabeth Olivius (eds). NIAS Press.
- Piccolino, G. (2015). Winning Wars, Building (Illiberal) Peace? The Rise (and Possible Fall) of a Victor's Peace in Rwanda and Sri Lanka. *Third World Quarterly*, 36(9), 1770–1785.
- Richmond, Oliver (2010). Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace. *Millennium*, 38, 665–692.
- Sajó, A., Uitz, R., & Holmes, S. (Eds.). (2021). *Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism*. Routledge.
- Shepherd, L. J. (2020). Situating Women, Peace and Security: Theorizing from 'the Local'. *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 22(4).
- Simpson, A., & Farrelly, N. (eds). (2023). *Myanmar: Politics, Economy and Society*. Routledge.
- Smith, Claire Q. Lars Waldorf, Rajesh Venugopal & Gerard McCarthy (2020) Illiberal Peace-Building in Asia: A Comparative Overview. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 20(1), 1–14.
- South, A. (2018). 'Hybrid Governance' and the Politics of Legitimacy in the Myanmar Peace Process. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 48(1), 50–66.

- Stokke, K. et al. (2022). Illiberal Peacebuilding in a Hybrid Regime. Authoritarian Strategies for Conflict Containment in Myanmar. *Political Geography*, 93.
- Thant Myint-U. 2019. *The Hidden History of Burma – Race, Capitalism, and the Crisis of Democracy in the 21st Century*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Thawngmung, A. M., & Noah, K. (2021). Myanmar's Military Coup and the Elevation of the Minority Agenda? *Critical Asian Studies*, 53(2), 297–309.
- Thawngmung, A. M. (2017). Signs of Life in Myanmar's Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement? Finding a Way Forward. *Critical Asian Studies*, 49(3), 379–395.
- Tripp, A. M. (2019). *Seeking Legitimacy: Why Arab Autocracies Adopt Women's Rights*. Cambridge University Press.
- Woods, K. (2011). Ceasefire capitalism: Military–Private Partnerships, Resource Concessions and Military–State Building in the Burma–China Borderlands. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38(4), 747–770.