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Integration Processes and Policies in Europe

Contexts, Levels and Actors

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Blanca Garcés-Mascreñas • Rinus Penninx
Editors

Integration Processes and Policies in Europe

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This book brings together two developments. First, it presents the new state of the art of research on migration and integration in Europe, thereby constituting a follow-up to the first IMISCOE Research Network book *Dynamics of International Migration and Settlement in Europe*, edited by R. Penninx, M. Berger and K. Kraal and published by Amsterdam University Press. Second, the initiative for this book was triggered by the INTERACT research project, led by the Migration Policy Centre of the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence and financed by the European Commission's European Investment Fund. The INTERACT project's aim is to study 'the impact of origin countries on the integration of migrants in host countries' and to identify and analyse 'the links established between migrants and their countries of origin, [including] their nature, the actors involved (individual and collective, state or non-state) and their impact on the various dimensions (economic, civic and political, cultural, social) of migrants' integration in the host country' (EIF grant application form, December 2012).

Within the INTERACT project, this book has a specific task and function. While a major activity of the project has been to collect data on how actors in countries of origin seek to influence migrants in destination countries (reported on extensively at <http://interact-project.eu>), the editors of this book were asked in the name of IMISCOE to capture the state of the art of research relevant to the questions raised by the INTERACT project.

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Chapter 1

Introduction: Integration as a Three-Way Process Approach?

Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas and Rinus Penninx

The EU Concept of Integration: From a Two-Way to a Three-Way Process

The reference to integration as a three-way process in the title of this chapter relates to the European Commission's recent departure from viewing integration as a strictly two-way process (between migrants and the receiving society) to now acknowledge 'that countries of origin can have a role to play in support of the integration process' (EC 2011, 10). Where does this change in policy perspective come from? The Europeanization of immigration and integration policy has followed different rhythms. During the 5 years of the Tampere Programme (1999–2004), immigration policies dominated the agenda. Integration was defined in a rather limited way in that early phase: until 2003 EU policies started from the implicit assumption that if the legal position of immigrants was equal (in as far as possible, as the Tampere programme stipulated) to that of national citizens and if adequate instruments were in place to combat discrimination, integration processes could be left to societal forces. Thus, legal integration (= equality) was to be ensured by means of the directives on family reunification and free movement after 5 years and by comprehensive anti-discrimination directives.

In 2003 the European Commission came up with a more comprehensive view on integration policies in its Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment (EC 2003). This defined integration as 'a two-way process based on reciprocity of rights and obligations of third-country nationals and host societies

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[and foreseeing] the immigrant's full participation'. Integration was conceived as a balance of rights and obligations, and policies took a holistic approach targeting all dimensions of integration (including economic, social, and political rights; cultural and religious diversity; and citizenship and participation).

One year later, in November 2004, the Council of Ministers responsible for integration agreed on the Common Basic Principles (CBPs) for integration as a first step towards a shared framework for a European approach to immigrant integration and a point of reference for the implementation and evaluation of current and future integration policies (Council of the EU 2004). The first article of the CBPs defines integration as 'a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States'.

Within this common EU framework the Commission set up a quasi-open method of coordination (Geddes & Scholten 2014) based on the exchange of information on integration policies, networks of experts, and EU-wide evaluation mechanisms. National Contact Points on integration were designated by the ministries responsible for immigrant integration policy to promote information exchange, to monitor progress, and to disseminate "best practices" at the national and EU levels. With a similar purpose, the European Integration Forum was established. This EU platform of representatives of civil society and migrant organizations was a forum for consultation, exchange of expertise, and identification of policy recommendations. Even more significantly, the European Integration Fund (EIF) was put in place to finance national programmes and community actions with a total budget of €825 million from 2007 to 2013. All of these mechanisms have stimulated member states to implement the CBPs (at least, three of the priorities) in multi-annual programmes on integration. These measures clearly illustrate the EU's efforts to build a common approach to integration through the use of 'soft pressure', thus outside traditional EU decision-making procedures (Carrera & Faure Atger 2011, 13).

In this process the EU has gradually expanded its definition of immigrants' integration. In the 2005 EU Communication *A Common Agenda for Integration: Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union*, the Commission states that involvement of stakeholders at all levels—migrant organizations, human rights organizations, and social partners—is essential for the success of integration policies. In 2010, the third multi-annual programme on an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), the so-called Stockholm Programme, insisted once more that integration requires 'not only efforts by national, regional and local authorities but also a greater commitment by the host community and immigrants' (EC 2010).

A major shift in policy framing came in 2011 with the renewed European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, which added the countries of origin as a third key actor in the process of immigrants' integration, thereby introducing the three-way process.

Countries of origin can have a role to play in support of the integration process in three ways: 1) to prepare the integration already before the migrants' departure; 2) to support the migrants while in the EU, e.g. through support via the Embassies; 3) to prepare the migrant's temporary or definitive return with acquired experience and knowledge (EC 2011, 10).

Several questions are raised by this shift from a two-way to a three-way process approach, which basically means a shift in focus from two actors (immigrants and host community) to three actors (immigrants, host community, and countries of origin). A first question is why this shift took place; that is, what did it respond to. The second, more fundamental question is whether the three-way process is a relevant way to look at integration. It is this question that underpins this book. Our attempt to respond to this question should be understood as an academic assessment *a posteriori* of a political definition that does not seem to have been directly supported by previous academic research.

In order to answer these concrete questions on EU policies, we take a step back to consider three somewhat broader and interconnected issues: (i) the way integration is conceptualized and studied in Europe; (ii) the way integration policies are studied and how the concept of integration is used in policy formulation and practice; and (iii) the way new perspectives and actors (e.g., those in countries of origin) are incorporated in analyses of integration processes and policies.

The Academic Approach to Integration and Policies

How does the development of the concept of integration in policies, as outlined above, reflect academic work on integration of newcomers in a society? Are the conceptual changes in EU policies inspired by academic approaches? Or, is the academy saddled with the task of legitimating a new concept divined by policymakers? Historically, the forerunners of integration studies, classical assimilation theories, defined settlement and incorporation as a more or less linear process in which immigrants were supposed to change almost completely to merge with the mainstream culture and society. For instance, Warner and Srole (1945), who introduced this concept at the end of the Second World War, assumed that all groups in US society would evolve towards the American way of life. While this was seen as a straight-line process, these authors noted that the pace might vary depending on factors such as cultural distance (the Anglo-conformity gap) and racial categorizations, thus mostly depending on the characteristics of immigrant groups.

The main criticisms of this one-sided perspective explain the gradual shift towards the currently dominant two-way process to integration. Safi (2011) classifies these criticisms in three categories. The first centres on the problematic nature of the notion of “mainstream”, as it implies existence of a more or less homogeneous and cohesive social environment. The second emphasizes the importance of structural inequalities (e.g., discrimination on the housing and labour markets), which could slow or even bar immigrants’ integration. The third category of criticism points to the plurality of integration processes, as they depend on collective actors (such as the state and its policies, public opinion, ethnic communities, and civil society) and contextual factors (such as the economic situation). Common to these areas of criticism is the claim that the receiving society, including civil society organizations and the state, does matter in immigrants’ integration (Unterreiner & Weinar 2014, 2).

This claim has gradually been confirmed by empirical research on immigrants' integration. While most studies before the 1980s focused on the micro-level of individual migrants and their households, research since the 1990s has given increasing attention to the meso-level of organizations (of migrants themselves and of civil society in general) and the macro-level of structural factors (see Penninx 2013, 15). These studies coincide in concluding that the receiving society matters at three levels: that of individuals (e.g., the attitudes and behaviour of native individuals); that of organizations (which can be more or less open towards immigrants); and that of institutions, both general public institutions and institutions "of and for" immigrant groups (Penninx 2005, 2007). Cross-national comparisons that examine the same immigrant group in different national and local contexts enable researchers to assess the role of contextual factors (e.g., citizenship and welfare policies, integration policies, and labour market arrangements), adding further explanatory power for differences in immigrants' integration outcomes.

Several developments in integration studies have contributed significantly to improve understanding of the role of the receiving society in immigrants' integration. Firstly, research has shown that policy matters, not only policy at the national level but also that at the regional and local levels. Indeed, these might differ considerably from one another, and stem from very different and even opposed policy rationales, such as priorities of immigration control and sovereignty at the national level versus the preservation of social cohesion at the local level. Secondly, while most studies focus on a specific policy dimension (e.g., the legal-political, the socio-economic, or the cultural-religious), recent research has highlighted the need to examine these different policy domains together and take into account *other* policies, beyond those specifically targeting immigrants and including those regulating broader societal institutions. Thirdly and finally, the shift in focus from government to governance, from policy to policymaking, allows us to conclude that what matters is not only policy frames and policy measures (i.e., policies as written on the books) but also how these policies are organized and implemented by the different actors involved (thus policies in practice) (see Penninx & Garcés-Mascreñas in this volume).

In recent years, two new approaches have incorporated the perspective of immigrants' countries of origin: transnationalism and the migration and development framework. The first, transnationalism, transcends the assimilationist assumptions of earlier migration research (Dunn 2005) to shed light on the ties and activities developed between individual, collective, and governmental actors located in two or more countries, mostly in immigrants' sending and destination countries. Individual activities range from remittances, investments in the homeland, and donations to migrant organizations to participation in homeland elections (see Mügge in this volume). Though the focus on the meso-level is much more limited, the literature on transnationalism also points to the growing development of linkages between local governments in sending and destination countries and more or less institutionalized forms of cooperation between civil society actors, such as immigrant organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (see Van Ewijk & Nijenhuis in this volume). Finally, transnationalism has looked at the role of sending states, which

have increasingly sought to strengthen relations with emigrant populations, facilitating emigrant return, providing overseas consular assistance, and inviting emigrant economic and political engagement from afar (see Østergaard-Nielsen in this volume).

The literature on migration and development considers the effects of migration on development and vice versa. As demonstrated by King and Collyer in this volume, a key question is whether migration stimulates development or if there is instead a reverse causal link, with development leading to migration. Or, perhaps the relationship is a recursive one, with migration leading to a virtuous circle of development. Alternatively, we could ask whether underdevelopment produces migration or migration leads to underdevelopment. Or, perhaps they reproduce one another, this time in a vicious cycle. If we focus on the effects of migration on development, other key questions arise. We might ask who or what is experiencing the effects: the receiving society, the sending society, the migrants themselves—or all three in the aspired-for “triple-win” scenario. Are these hypothesized relationships stable over time? Or, are they likely to change according to historical context, as well as the geographical setting and scale of analysis (household, community, nation, etc.)?

While both transnationalism and the migration and development framework have brought the sending countries into the picture, they have hardly considered their effects on immigrants’ integration. Similarly, the literature on immigrants’ integration has paid little attention to the theoretical developments in these two fields. This book seeks to bridge these areas of research by reviewing the existing literature on integration, integration policies, transnationalism, and the migration and development framework while considering the role of sending states in immigrants’ integration. Two key questions are posed: First, do immigrants’ transnational activities reinforce integration and, conversely, is integration facilitated by transnational links? In other words, is there a trade-off between transnational activities and integration, meaning that the more focused migrants are on their country of origin, the less they might identify with and support their country of residence and vice versa? Second, what is the role of sending states? Are their outreach policies toward emigrants abroad counterproductive to policies on migrant incorporation? Or, might they reinforce each other?

Structure of the Book

Whereas the European Commission has shifted to a three-way process approach which aims to promote the role of sending countries in immigrants’ integration, the academic literature has so far continued its almost exclusive focus on the interplay between immigrants and the receiving society. Drawing on existing studies, this book addresses this disconnect between policy and academic research by considering the extent to which the EU’s three-way process approach to integration finds legitimation in what we know about integration, integration policies, and the role of

sending states in immigration and integration processes. In that sense, this book should be understood as a state-of-the-art volume that takes stock of and presents existing knowledge to assess the relevance of incorporating the sending states into analyses of immigrants' integration processes and policies.

In line with recent approaches to the concept of integration, Chap. 2 by Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas sets up an analytical framework for the study of integration processes and policies. The first part focuses on the concept of integration, introducing an open, non-normative analytical definition and identifying the main dimensions, parties involved, levels of analysis, and other relevant factors such as time and generations. The second part defines integration policies and proposes a distinction between policy frames and concrete policy measures as well as a shift from government to governance so as to account for the complex, multilayered and often contradictory character of integration policies. In the broader context of this book, the analytical framework proposed in this chapter leads us to a twofold conclusion: the concept of integration and integration policies is made dramatically more complex, in particular, by taking a disaggregated approach that considers not only multiple reference populations but also distinct processes occurring in different dimensions and domains. At the same time, immigrants' integration continues to be seen essentially as a two-way process involving the immigrants themselves and the receiving society.

In Chap. 3, Van Mol and De Valk provide a general background to help us to understand the first key actor of the abovementioned binomial, that is, the immigrants themselves. In particular, the authors analyse the main socio-demographic changes in migration patterns towards and within Europe since the 1950s. Making use of secondary literature and available statistical data, they first describe the main phases in immigration, its backgrounds and determinants, depending on immigrants' origins and reasons to migrate and with regard to different European regions. In the second part of the chapter, the authors narrow the focus to the specificities of recent patterns of mobility within Europe. Analysing both migration flows and the residing migrant population across Europe, they distinguish different socio-demographic characteristics of migrants depending on countries of origin and destination. For instance, while Polish migration to Germany seems to be dominated by men aged between 20 and 50 years old, Polish immigrants in the Netherlands are significantly younger and more equally balanced in terms of gender. The analysis of intra-European mobility shows that in North-Western Europe (e.g., in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands) intra-European migrants account for more than the half of total immigration, meaning that a substantial proportion of new immigrants falls outside those categorized as target groups of EU integration policies.

The subsequent three chapters focus on the second actor of the binomial, that is, the receiving society, particularly the characteristics and main developments of immigration and integration policies. In Chap. 4, Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo distinguish between different immigration and integration policy regimes in Europe. The first is that of North-Western European countries, which evolved from guest worker policies that considered immigrants only as temporary workers to national integration policies that recognize them as permanent citizens and, more recently, to

policies that promote and even increasingly demand immigrants' cultural assimilation. The second integration regime is that of the Southern European countries, characterized mainly by labour considerations with much lesser welfare provisions and a limited number of bottom-up integration initiatives implemented mostly at the local level. The third regime is that of most Eastern European countries, with their very low immigration flows and nascent integration policies resulting from the availability of EU funds rather than from any real societal or political demand. Finally, the authors refer to a fourth model developed for asylum seekers at the EU level. Here, there is a clear disconnect between the immigration and integration regimes. While the EU is developing a common approach to asylum seekers, reception facilities and integration policies differ considerably among member states. This chapter's historical and comparative overview of immigration and integration regimes in Europe allows the authors to conclude that the reception context can change tremendously depending on the historical and national contexts.

Chapter 5 by Mügge and Van der Haar focuses on the basic mechanism of categorization in policymaking and implementation. They show how laws and policies construct explicit and implicit categories by distinguishing, for instance, between "wanted" and "unwanted" immigrants or between immigrants "in need of integration" and immigrants "already integrated" or "beyond integration". Interestingly, the chapter concludes that whereas laws and policies distinguish between European citizens and third-country nationals (TCNs), important hierarchies exist within each category based on a combination of identity markers such as gender, class, and ethnicity. Under what conditions do these policy categories and terms render stereotypes, prejudices, and potential discrimination, and how does this impact immigration and integration trajectories? Based on several concrete cases, the authors propose that immigrants' integration is shaped not only by explicit integration policies (e.g., more or less access to welfare provisions) but also by the way policies explicitly and implicitly perceive, problematize, and categorize immigrants. This leads, among other things, to significantly different categorizations of who is in need of integration at different policy levels (i.e., the EU, national, and local).

Whereas Chaps. 4 and 5 mainly focus on national policies, Chap. 6 by Scholten and Penninx analyses migration and integration as multilevel policy issues and explores the consequences in terms of multilevel governance. The fact that both migration and integration are increasingly becoming multilevel policy issues has brought opportunities as well as significant challenges, such as the constant struggle between national governments and the EU about the amount of discretion that states have in interpreting EU directives and, more recently, involvement of local and regional governments in debates about intra-EU migration and migrant integration. With these questions in mind, this chapter offers an analysis of the evolution of migration and integration policies at various levels over the last decades. This equips us to understand the factors that drive policies, the extent to which these create convergence or divergence, and how we can better describe and categorize the relations between different levels of government.

The last four chapters shift the focus to the sending states and their relationship with immigrants' integration. Chap. 7 by Mügge provides a state-of-the-art

exposition of European scholarship on the transnationalism–integration nexus. In particular, it examines how the existing literature views the relation between immigrants’ transnational activities and ties to the country of origin, on one hand, and immigrants’ integration in the receiving country, on the other. The literature review is guided by a popular political question: Can transnationalism and integration coexist, or is it a zero-sum relation?

In Chap. 8, Van Ewijk and Nijenhuis examine the link between local governments in sending and destination countries and the role of immigrant organizations in translocal connections and activities. Drawing on existing research, the chapter is guided by three interconnected questions: (i) What kinds of relations can be observed between local governments and immigrant organizations? (ii) What are the main driving factors for these relations? (iii) What is the impact of these relations on sending and receiving societies?

Focusing on sending-country policies, in Chap. 9 Østergaard-Nielsen explores the twin central questions of how and why countries of origin reach out to their expatriate populations. This is done, first, by outlining the basic concepts and typologies of sending-country policies with a particular focus on some of the key countries of origin of migrants settled within the EU and, second, by reviewing core explanations for the emergence of sending-country policies. The last part of the chapter discusses the nexus between sending-country policies and immigrants’ integration.

Finally, Chap. 10 by King and Collyer looks at the relationship between migration, development, and integration. Focusing on remittances, return migration, and diaspora involvement, these authors describe analysis of the migration and development nexus as having swung between positive and negative interpretations over the seven decades of the European post-war era. Then the conceptual lens of migration and development is redefined: first by refocusing migration and return to encompass a diversity of transnational mobilities, second by reconceptualizing development as being less about economic measures and more about human wellbeing, and third by broadening the analysis of remittances from financial transfers to include social, cultural, and political elements. The final part of the chapter evaluates the relation between the migration and development frame and the integration frame. In so doing, it asks how the multifaceted process of integration impacts migrants’ capacities to stimulate development in their home countries and communities. For those migrants who return or who lead multi-sited transnational lives, what challenges does integration present for their reintegration in their countries of origin?

On the basis of the main findings presented on the role of immigrants, the receiving society, and the sending countries, the concluding chapter returns to the main issues addressed by this book: (i) how is integration conceptualized and studied in Europe; (ii) how are integration policies studied, and how is the concept of integration used in policy formulation and practice; (iii) and how are new perspectives and actors incorporated in analyses of integration processes and policies. The answers to these more general questions provide us the background to understand the shift from a two-way to a three-way process approach in EU policies.

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Chapter 2

The Concept of Integration as an Analytical Tool and as a Policy Concept

Rinus Penninx and Blanca Garcés-Masareñas

Introduction

The term integration refers to the process of settlement, interaction with the host society, and social change that follows immigration. From the moment immigrants arrive in a host society, they must “secure a place” for themselves. Seeking a place for themselves is a very literal task: Migrants must find a home, a job and income, schools for their children, and access to health facilities. They must find a place in a social and cultural sense as well, as they have to establish cooperation and interaction with other individuals and groups, get to know and use institutions of the host society, and become recognized and accepted in their cultural specificity. Yet, this is a two-way process. The host society does not remain unaffected. The size and composition of the population change, and new institutional arrangements come into existence to accommodate immigrants’ political, social, and cultural needs.

The scientific study of the process of settlement of newcomers in a host society has a long history. Popularized by the Chicago School of urban sociology in the early twentieth century, it has been approached from different perspectives and using a variety of concepts. A first area of variation has to do with the object of study. Whereas some researchers have focused primarily or solely on the newcom-

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ers and (changes in) their ideas and behaviour, others have concentrated instead on the receiving society and its reactions to newcomers. A second area of differentiation lies in the dimensions of the process of settlement that are considered. Whereas some researchers have examined the legal and political dimensions of becoming part of a host society (e.g., legal residence, citizenship, and voting rights), others have concentrated on the socio-economic dimension (e.g., immigrants' access to health care, education, housing, and the labour market) or on cultural-religious aspects. Finally, the level of analysis has varied from that of individual newcomers and collective groups of newcomers and civil society to the institutional level, with questions being asked such as whether immigrant collectives have established their own institutions in the new society and, conversely, to what extent and how have institutions of the receiving society reacted to newcomers. While concepts such as adaptation, acculturation, and assimilation have tended to be focused on the cultural dimension of immigrants' settlement, others, such as accommodation, incorporation, and inclusion/exclusion, have shifted the focus to the host society and concentrated on the legal-political and socio-economic dimensions.

All of these approaches and concepts are highly contested within the academic literature. As for any term that stems from policy documents and debates, their definitions and the related discussions have been highly normative in nature. In relation to the concept of integration, the major point of criticism is the fact that it continues to assume—as did the old conception of assimilation—that immigrants *must* conform to the norms and values of the dominant majority in order to be accepted. This assumption elevates a particular cultural model, in the USA that of middle-class, white Protestants of British ancestry, and in many European countries that of a collectively claimed national language, culture, and tradition; a model that expresses the normative standard towards which immigrants should aspire and by which their deservingness of membership should continuously be assessed.

Integration is presented not only as a must but also as a straight-line process. Again, informed by policy discourses and policy goals, many studies of immigrant integration assume a more or less linear path along which the minority group is supposed to change almost completely while the majority culture is thought to remain the same. Nonetheless, as Lindo (2005, 11) observes, taking integration as a self-evident and inescapable process ignores that the 'complex interplay of cultururation, identification, social status and concrete interaction patterns of individuals may produce many different "outcomes", much more varied in fact than a more or less linear shift from "immigrant" to "host" ways of doing things'.

Finally, the mainstream into which immigrants are expected and said to merge is seldom clearly defined (Favell 2003; Waldinger 2003). Some scholars argue that the concept of integration continues to adhere to an essentially functionalist vision of society in which immigrant success is still charted against a set of taken-for-granted mainstream norms bounded by the notion of a host society as a wholly self-contained unit of social processes (Gibney and Hansen 2005). Similarly, Joppke and Morawska (2003, 3) observe that this concept 'assumes a society composed of domestic individuals and groups (as the antipode to "immigrants") which are integrated normatively by a consensus and organizationally by a state'. More recently, in the

Dutch context, Schinkel (2010) coincides to note that the very notion of *society* is problematic, as it implies the existence of a more or less homogeneous and cohesive social environment in which only certain types of people—namely migrants—need to integrate.

Despite being a contested concept, integration continues to be central in many studies and debates on the settlement of newcomers in host societies. In Europe, several authors have attempted to strip the concept of its normative character and build a more open and analytical definition (Hoffmann-Novotny 1973; Esser 1980; Heckmann 1981, 2015; Penninx 1989, 2005; Bommers 2012). Esser (2004, 46) defines integration as ‘the inclusion [of individual actors] in already existing social systems’. For Heckmann (2006, 18), integration is ‘a generations lasting process of inclusion and acceptance of migrants in the core institutions, relations and statuses of the receiving society’. According to Bommers (2012, 113), ‘the problem of migrant assimilation refers to no more (and no less) than the conditions under which they succeed or fail to fulfil the conditions of participation in social systems’. In order to work or to gain access to goods, education, rights, and social welfare, Bommers (ibid.) argues, every individual must have some knowledge of what it means to work or how to behave as a patient, a client, a pupil, a student, or an applicant. From this perspective, there is no alternative to integration.

Interestingly, all of these approaches have in common the assumption that actors (immigrants in this case) are partially engaged in multiple autonomous and interdependent fields or systems. This implies a shift away from a holistic approach that conceptualizes integration into a taken-for-granted reference population—the “core culture” or national society as a whole—towards a disaggregated approach that considers not only multiple reference populations but also distinct processes occurring in different domains (Brubaker 2001, 542–544). For instance, Esser (2001, 16) refers to four dimensions: cultururation (similar to socialization), placement (position in society), interaction (social relations and networks), and identification (belonging). Similarly, Heckmann and Schnapper (2003) distinguish between structural integration, cultural integration (or acculturation), interactive integration, and identificational integration. From this perspective, integration dynamics and tempos are viewed as different for each dimension, and processes of structural marginalization and inequality become key.

In line with these more recent approaches to the concept of integration, this chapter aims to set up an analytical framework for the study of integration processes and policies. For this purpose, we focus in the first part on the concept of integration, introducing an open non-normative analytical definition and identifying the main dimensions, parties involved, levels of analysis, and other relevant factors such as time and generations. In the second part, we define integration policies and propose a distinction between policy frames and concrete policy measures as well as a shift from government to governance in order to account for the complex, multi-layered, and often contradictory character of integration policies. The conclusion returns to the concepts of integration and integration policies and suggests lines for further research.

The Study of Integration Processes¹

A Definition of the Concept

We define integration as “the process of becoming an accepted part of society”. This elementary definition is intentionally open in two regards. First, it emphasizes the process character of integration rather than defining an end situation. Second, in contrast to the normative models developed by political theorists, it does not specify beforehand the degree of or even the particular requirements for acceptance by the receiving society. This makes the definition highly useful for empirical study of these processes. Measuring the degree of becoming an accepted part of society will allow us to capture the diversity of (stages of) the process. We do need to specify within this basic definition what should be measured; that is, what are the indicators of integration and where might we find them.

Three Dimensions

The basic definition of integration encompasses *three analytically distinct dimensions* in which people may (or may not) become an accepted part of society: (i) the legal-political, (ii) the socio-economic, and (iii) the cultural-religious. As pointed out by Entzinger (2000), these dimensions correspond to the three main factors that interplay with immigration and integration processes: the state, the market, and the nation. Focusing on these dimensions instead of the ones mentioned earlier (e.g., cultururation, placement, interaction, and identification) allows us to shift the focal point from immigrants to their relationship with a host society. The question is not only what immigrants do, with whom do they interact, and how do they identify themselves, but as much whether they are accepted and how they are positioned in each of our three dimensions.

The *legal-political* dimension refers to residence and political rights and statuses. The basic question here is whether and to what extent are immigrants regarded as fully-fledged members of the political community. The position of an immigrant or the “degree of integration” has two extreme poles. One of these is the position of the irregular immigrant who is not part of the host society in the legal-political sense, though perhaps being integrated in the other two dimensions. The other is the position of the immigrant who is (or has become) a national citizen. In between there is enormous variety, which has increased in recent decades as a consequence of attempts of European states to “regulate” international migration and the new statuses and rights stemming from the EU migration regime (among others, EU nationals versus third-country nationals or “TCNs”).

¹This section expands on Penninx 2005 and 2007.

The *socio-economic* dimension refers to the social and economic position of residents, irrespective of their national citizenship. Within this dimension, the position of immigrants can be analysed by looking at their access to and participation in domains that are crucial for any resident. Do immigrants have equal access to institutional facilities for finding work, housing, education, and health care? Do they use these facilities? What is the outcome of immigrants' participation compared to that of natives with the same or comparable qualifications? Since needs and aspirations in these domains are relatively universal (basic needs are largely independent of cultural factors), access to and participation of immigrants and natives in these areas can be measured comparatively. The outcomes, particularly when they are unequal, provide useful inputs for policies.

The *cultural-religious* dimension pertains to the domain of *perceptions and practices* of immigrants and the receiving society as well as their reciprocal reactions to difference and diversity. If newcomers see themselves as different and are perceived by the receiving society as culturally or religiously different, they may aspire to acquire a recognized place in these respects. For their part, the receiving society may or may not accept cultural or religious diversity. Here again we find two extremes. At one extreme, new diversity may be rejected and immigrants required to adapt and assimilate into mono-cultural and mono-religious societies. At the other extreme, ethnic identities, cultures, and worldviews may be accepted on an equal level in pluralistic societal systems. Between these two extremes again are many in-between positions, such as accepting certain forms of diversity in the private realm but not, or only partly, in the public realm.

This third dimension, and the specific positions of immigrants and immigrant groups, is more difficult to measure, basically for two reasons. Firstly, it is less about objective differences and diversity (ethnic, cultural, and religious) than about perceptions and reciprocal normative evaluations of what is defined as different and the consequences of such categorizations. Categorizations may become stereotypes, prejudices, and ultimately part of immutable racist ideologies. Moreover, the basis of categorizations may change. For example, in the guest worker period (1960–1975), the fact that an increasing share of immigrant workers were Muslims was not seen as relevant. It was only from the 1990s forward that such migrants and their families were categorized as coming from Muslim countries. Secondly, categorizations and reciprocal perceptions manifest differently at different levels (i.e., at the individual, collective, and institutional levels), and their consequences may also differ. If contacts between individuals are coloured by prejudice, interactions may be uncomfortable but have a limited impact. Yet, at the institutional level, if employers base their recruitment of workers on stereotyped or prejudiced perceptions and procedures, the consequences for individual immigrants may be quite negative.

It is important to realize that these three dimensions are not fully independent of one another. The legal-political dimension may condition the socio-economic and the cultural-religious dimensions (represented by arrows in Fig. 2.1). From the perspective of individual immigrants, factors such as illegal residence, extended uncertainty about future residence rights (compounded in the case of asylum seekers by long-term dependence on charity or the state), and lack of access to local and/or

national political systems and decision-making processes have negative implications for opportunities and participation in the socio-economic and political realms. From the perspective of the receiving society, exclusionary policies are an expression of a general perception of immigrants as outsiders, which inevitably adversely affects immigrants' integration. The cultural-religious dimension may similarly impact the socio-economic dimension (represented by another arrow in Fig. 2.1). For example, negative perceptions of certain immigrants may lead to prejudice and discrimination by individuals, organizations, or institutions in the receiving society, and this may reduce immigrants' opportunities—even if access is legally guaranteed—in domains such as housing, education, health care, and the labour market.

Two Parties

Having defined the dimensions of the process of integration of newcomers into an established society and how to measure them, the next question is *who* are the relevant parties involved? Firstly, there are the *immigrants themselves*, with their varying characteristics, efforts, and degrees of adaptation (the left part of Fig. 2.1). Secondly, we find the *receiving society*, with its characteristics and reactions to




Fig. 2.1 A heuristic model for the empirical study of integration processes (Source: Authors)

newcomers (the right part of Fig. 2.1). It is the interaction between the two, however, that determines the direction and the temporal outcomes of the integration process. However, these two “partners” are fundamentally unequal in terms of power and resources. The receiving society, especially its institutional structure and reaction to newcomers, is far more decisive for the outcome of the process than the immigrants themselves are.

Three Levels and Indicators

Processes of immigrants’ integration take place and can be measured at different levels. The first level is that of *individuals*, both migrants and natives of the receiving society. For the first dimension, immigrants’ integration at the individual level can be measured in terms of their legal status and political participation. For the second dimension, we can look at their socio-economic integration and position in the “hard” domains of housing, work, education, and health. For the third dimension, we would measure their identification with a specific cultural-religious group and with the receiving society, as well as their cultural and religious practices and how these are valued. In our conceptual definition of integration, we should also measure the attitudes and behaviour (or acceptance) of native individuals towards newcomers and the consequences of these.

The second level is that of *organizations*. There are the organizations of immigrants, which mobilize resources and ambitions of the group. These organizations may be strong or weak; they may orient themselves primarily towards (certain aspects of participation in) the receiving society or to specific cultural and religious needs of the group. They may become an accepted part of civil society—and a potential partner for integration policies—or isolate themselves or be excluded by the host society. There are also organizations of the receiving society. Their extent of openness to newcomers, their perceptions of and behaviour towards individual immigrants, and their organizations might be of crucial importance for immigrants’ integration. Research has shown, for example, that with the absence of governmental integration policy in Germany until 2002, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), particularly trade unions and churches, played a crucial role in the integration processes of guest workers and their families (Penninx and Roosblad 2000).

The third level is that of *institutions*, understood as standardized, structured, and common ways of acting in a socio-cultural setting. Two kinds of institutions are of particular relevance. The first are the general public institutions of the receiving society in the three dimensions: institutional arrangements of the political system; institutional arrangements in the labour market, housing, education, and public health; and institutional arrangements for cultural and religious diversity. Laws, regulations, and executive organizations, but also unwritten rules and practices, are part of these institutions. Though general institutions are supposed to serve all citizens in an equal manner, they may impede access or equitable outcomes for immigrants. They may exclude immigrants formally, either completely—as does the

political system of most countries—or partially—as when social security and welfare systems offer only limited services to non-citizens. Yet, even if access for all residents is guaranteed by law, institutions may hamper access or equitable outcomes by virtue of historically- and culturally-determined ways of operating, for instance, by failing to take into account immigrants' history, their cultural and religious backgrounds, or their language abilities. Thus, adequate functioning of general public institutions—and their potential to adapt to growing diversity—is paramount. At this level, integration and exclusion are “mirror concepts” (see Penninx 2001).

The second type of institution that is particularly relevant for immigrants' integration is institutions specifically “of and for” immigrant groups, such as certain religious or cultural ones. Unlike general institutions, the value and validity of any group-specific institution is confined to those who voluntarily choose and adhere to them. Although their place is primarily in the private sphere, group-specific institutions may also manifest themselves as civil society actors in the public realm, as shown by the history of churches, trade unions, and cultural, leisure, and professional institutions in European cities and states. Some migrant-specific institutions may become an accepted part of society, equivalent to institutions of native groups. Others, however, might either isolate themselves or remain unrecognized or even excluded.

Different mechanisms operate at the individual, organizational, and institutional levels, but the outcomes at all of these levels are clearly interrelated. Institutional arrangements largely determine organizations' opportunities and scope for action, and they may exert significant influence on how immigrant organizations develop and orient themselves. Institutions and organizations, in turn, together create the structure of opportunities and limitations for individuals. Conversely, individuals may mobilize to change the landscape of organizations and may even contribute to significant changes in general institutional arrangements. In view of the uneven distribution of power and resources noted above, such examples are scarce but they are not nonexistent.

Time and Generations

The heuristic model developed and explained above may be used as a tool to describe and analyse the position of individual immigrants and groups of immigrants at a certain point in time. But an important element in the logic of integration processes is the time factor. Integration of newcomers is a long-term process by its very nature. This immediately becomes apparent if we look through the lens of newcomers. At the individual level, adult immigrants may adapt cognitively and adjust their behaviour when they learn how things are done, by whom, and so on. This part is relatively easy and pays off quickly. However, their adaptation in the aesthetic (relating to the five senses) and normative realms takes more time. Feelings, likes, dislikes, and perceptions of good and evil remain rather persistent

over a lifetime. Though this may be a general pattern for all human beings, it becomes especially manifest in those who have changed their environment through migration (for an overview of these aspects of the adaptation process see Van Amersfoort 1982, 35 ff.).

The situation of the descendants of immigrants generally differs in this respect. Although they do become familiarized with the immigrant community and possibly its pre-migration background through their primary relations in family and immigrant community networks, they simultaneously become thoroughly acquainted with the culture and language of the society of settlement, not only through informal neighbourhood contacts starting in early childhood but especially through their participation in mainstream institutions, particularly the education system. If such a double process of socialization takes place under favourable conditions (in which policies can play an important role), these second-generation young people develop a way of life and lifestyle that integrates the roles, identities, and loyalties of these different worlds and situations. Because the ways of doing this are manifold, more and more differentiation develops within the original immigrant group. At the group level, this means that the litmus test for integration as an end result (being an accepted part of society)—and hence for the success or failure of policies in this field—lies in the situation of the second generation in the host society.

In principle we can grasp the time factor by carrying out and comparing descriptive analyses of individuals and groups of immigrants at different points in time. In doing this, we should be cognizant of findings of previous historical comparative analyses. First, research indicates that integration processes are neither linear nor unidirectional. Although we have indicated before that the situation of migrants (first generation) differs significantly from that of their children and grandchildren, this does not imply that integration is the inevitable eventual outcome. On the contrary, the literature shows that setbacks may occur. Second, we should keep in mind that integration may progress at different paces in the three dimensions and even within a single dimension—for example, labour market integration may take longer than integration in the health care system. Third, we should not forget the receiving society, which changes with immigration and has to adapt its institutions to immigrants' needs. For societies without a recent history of immigration or diversity, the process may be more demanding and therefore require more time than in immigration societies.

The Study of Integration Policies

A Definition of the Concept

The study of policies is fundamentally different from the study of integration processes. The essence of policies is the intention to guide and steer processes in society, in our case, integration processes of immigrants. Explicit integration policies are part of a normative political process in which the issue of integration is

formulated as a problem, the problem is given a normative framing, and concrete policy measures are designed and implemented to achieve a desired outcome. Other generic policies not specifically targeting immigrants (such as the education and health care systems, housing, the labour market, and the public regulation of religion) may exert strong influence (positive or negative) on integration processes of immigrants. Therefore, a systematic analysis of integration policies should go beyond integration policies in the strict sense.

Frames

When studying integration policies, the first question to be analysed is *how different political and social actors perceive immigrant integration in terms of policy frames and policy shifts*. A frame is a reconstruction of the problem definition of a policy issue, including the underlying assumptions of the problem's causes and possible remedies for it. This means looking at how the problem is actually defined and explained and at what is thought could and should be done about it. The problem definition takes into consideration how immigration is perceived: Is it seen as a problem or as opportunity? Who has the moral or legal right to be or become an immigrant? Who are the wanted immigrants, and who are the unwanted? For those immigrants already present in the host society, a basic question is whether they are seen as “foreigners”, as “temporary guests”, or as permanent members of society for whom the state accepts the same responsibilities as for native citizens, guaranteeing the same rights and providing the same facilities.

Once the problem has been defined, the next step is considering *what should be done*. In some cases, a state or a city may choose to ignore immigrants' presence and therefore avoid any special responsibility for them. This choice for a non-policy response should be understood as a policy in itself (see Hammar 1985, 277–278; Alexander 2007, 37 ff). In other cases, new policies may be formulated to cater for certain immigrants' needs but under specific conditions due to the alleged temporary nature of their stay. Under this guest worker approach immigrants' otherness may be “tolerated” and even encouraged though their residence rights may be curtailed in the long run. Finally, if immigrants are perceived as permanent residents, inclusion is the main response. This takes different forms, however. Coinciding with the model on integration policies proposed by Entzinger (2000), integration policies may differ significantly with regard to the three dimensions of immigrants' integration identified earlier; that is, the legal-political dimension, the socio-economic dimension, and the cultural-religious dimension.

In terms of the first dimension, legal recognition and political participation, policies may recognize immigrants as permanent foreign residents (the so-called “denizens”), thus incorporating them socially but limiting their political rights, or immigrants may be accepted as full citizens, thus removing all barriers for and even promoting naturalization. In terms of equality, the socio-economic dimension, specific policy measures may be devised catering for immigrants' interests and

needs, or policies may merely address the common interests of citizens in general. Finally, in terms of diversity, the cultural-religious dimension, policies may be designed under two very different premises. The first is that integration demands the adaptation and learning of immigrants but also significant changes in access to and the working of institutional structures of the host society. The second is that societal rules and structures, including underlying norms and values, should be taken as a given and immigrants should (voluntarily or even as a mandatory task) adapt to them.

Finally, the third question to be addressed is *for whom are integration policies meant*. Migrant integration policies that designate specific groups of immigrants as target groups are different from policies that focus on all immigrants and are even more distinct from policies targeting all individuals regardless of their origin or targeting natives, established civil society, and the general institutions of society. In practice, these different approaches result in very different policies, again with regard to the three dimensions of integration: Political rights can be granted to immigrants as individuals, for instance, by granting voting rights, or as groups, which often means the creation of representative bodies. Policies may seek to promote equal opportunities for all citizens, meaning equal access to housing, education, health care, and the labour market, or they may seek to promote an equal share in access to these goods and services. Finally, cultural diversity can be promoted as an individual or group right, the latter often implying state support to immigrants' own organizations and institutions.

Frames cannot always be analysed directly; they often have to be reconstructed from policy documents and political discourse. When a policy is defined, it generally includes an explicit formulation of the perceived problem and the desired outcome of the specific efforts encompassed by the policy. Thus, politically debated statements in and about policy documents contain the essential elements of policy frames. The most important elements to be studied and compared are the general assumptions and orientations about the causes of the problem and remedies as well as basic concepts used (or explicitly rejected); the general aims of policies and dimensions of integration addressed; and the definition of the main target groups.

Policy Measures

Policy documents may be closer to policy discourse than to policy practice. In this regard, it is fundamental to complement any study of policy frames with a concrete and detailed analysis of actual policy measures. This means looking at the programmes in place and again identifying in which of the three dimensions of integration they are to be categorized, what their main goals are, and who they target. As said before, the study of integration policies cannot in general be limited to analysis of explicit integration policy measures. Programmes addressing the population as a whole or specific socio-economic groups within it, regardless of whether they are of immigrant origin, as well as general institutional arrangements in areas such as

education, health care, housing, and the labour market, may be as fundamental (or even more) in fostering (or not) the integration of immigrants. Neither should we overlook how these policy measures are implemented in practice or to what extent and how street-level bureaucrats, practitioners, and professionals adapt them to their own goals and possibly limited resources.

In this regard, the study of policy measures entails a triple difficulty: (i) we must go beyond integration policy measures in the strict sense, which greatly expands the field of study; (ii) policy measures are seldom described in official documents and therefore are difficult to trace; and (iii) programmes are often constituted of a set of unwritten norms and practices which may vary across time and space. A way to overcome these difficulties is by conducting extensive fieldwork and, especially, interviews with the main actors involved: policymakers at the different administrative levels, practitioners and professionals in the different social areas, NGOs, and immigrant organizations. When focusing on policy measures, it is also key to examine the budgets allocated in each programme in order to get a concrete picture of what actually is being done. Interestingly, policy frames and policy measures may differ significantly in their goals, the dimensions of integration addressed, target groups, actors involved, and resources available.

Governance

Once we have identified the main policy frames and policy measures, the next question is how integration policies are organized and implemented. Regarding organization, two aspects are relevant. The first is whether the implementation of policies by civil servants and other actors is directly steered and controlled by politics or whether there is a relatively large gap between politics and policy. In highly politicized contexts, what politicians say and what actually is being done may differ significantly. The second aspect of concern is the location of the initiating and coordinating force for migrant integration within the governmental administration: Is it centrally located and coordinated by a specific ministry or department (i.e., home affairs, social affairs, or employment)? Or is it decentrally organized across all of the areas relevant to integration policies. Such questions also apply to regional and local policies (Caponio and Borkert 2010).

If we want to examine not only how policies are organized but also how they are formulated and implemented, we should shift the focus from government to governance. This means taking into account a wider range of actors, including other administrative levels such as regional and local governments; other institutions, agencies, and practitioners within the state apparatus; and other relevant actors, such as politicians, NGOs, and private institutions. The vertical dimension of integration policymaking, that is, the relationship between the national, regional, and local levels, is of particular importance, as both municipalities and the European Union (EU) level have become increasingly involved in the making of immigrant policies. This multiplicity of levels should be analysed in detail so as to understand

how new tensions have come to the fore but also how new alliances and forms of cooperation (e.g., between the local and the EU level) have developed. Various key questions can be asked: Who is in charge of integration policies? How are the different levels coordinated? Do they respond to different political and social imperatives? Do they complement or contradict one another?

Also to be considered is the horizontal dimension of integration policymaking, meaning whether and how integration policies are implemented by the full range of relevant actors, from private institutions to NGOs, immigrant organizations, and professionals. The central question here is who is supposed to be a relevant actor in policies. With respect to immigrants, are individual immigrants seen as primary actors? Are their organizations and other collective and institutional resources regarded as relevant? Looking at the receiving society, what main actors are involved, again at the individual, organizational, and institutional levels? Research on Southern Europe has shown that when governmental integration policies are absent, civil society actors (such as trade unions, NGOs, charities, and civil movement associations) may become key in providing various services and offering political support for immigrants' rights claims (Campomori 2005; Zincone 1998). At the same time, as noted by Caponio (2005), such mobilization may produce a "crowding out" effect wherein native associations mobilizing on behalf of immigrants actually become the main recipients of municipal funding and partners in policymaking. Immigrants may thus be prevented from forming their own organizations.

Politics and Time

In democratic societies, policies are part of a political system in which the majority decides. This brings an inherent danger of either a virtual absence of explicit integration policies and an avoidance of issues related to immigrants or one-sided patronizing policies reflecting mainly majority interests and disregarding the needs and voices of immigrants. Whereas in some European countries policymakers have been able to craft policies "behind closed doors" to extend political and social rights to migrants (Guiraudon 2000), in others anti-immigrant political parties have succeeded in vetoing liberal reforms and urging their governments to adopt more restrictive immigration and integration policies. An extreme case is Switzerland, where referendums can even overrule the supreme court and possibly mandate reform of the constitution, thus undermining the main tools that protect religious and ethnic minorities of immigrant origins against discrimination (D'Amato 2012).

As integration policies are adopted and implemented in practice, another aspect of the logic of policymaking emerges. Although integration processes are long term in nature—they take at least a generation—the political process in democratic societies requires that policies bear fruit within much shorter timeframes: the spaces between elections. Such a policymaking context may lead politicians to make unrealistic promises that cannot be fulfilled in such a short period. This "democratic

impatience” in turn often produces disappointment and backlash effects (Vermeulen and Penninx 1994). The debate on the alleged failure of integration policies—and of immigrants to integrate—that has been taking place in the Netherlands since 2000 is a good example (Prins and Saharso 2010). Even more difficult than democratic impatience are situations in which anti-immigrant sentiments are translated into political movements, leading to strong politicization of the topics of immigration and integration.

Comparison as a Tool

Integration Processes

If the immigrant integration process is propelled by interactions between immigrants and the receiving society at the different levels, within the three dimensions and taking into account the time factor, the best way to explain diversity in outcomes is through comparative empirical studies. There are two main types of comparisons, each measuring different elements of our heuristic model. In the first category are studies that compare the integration processes of different immigrant groups in the same institutional and policy context of a nation or a city. Such studies reveal that different immigrant groups may follow different paths of integration. For example, in the Netherlands, Vermeulen and Penninx (2000) show that Moluccan, Surinamese, Antillean, Southern European, Turkish, and Moroccan immigrants differ in the speed of their integration and in the pathways they follow. Whereas some groups (e.g., the Chinese and Portuguese) have been quick to use the education system as a route to social mobility, other groups (such as the Turks) were more strongly involved in entrepreneurship. The consequence of such comparison is that the factors found to explain differences lie primarily in the characteristics of the various immigrant groups (thus, the left side of our heuristic model), simply because the national or local context into which immigrants are being integrated is the same.

A second category of comparative studies examines the integration of the same immigrant groups in different national or local immigration contexts. Koopmans (2010), for example, investigates the effects of integration policies and welfare state regimes on the socio-economic integration of immigrants in eight European countries. The comparison leads this author to conclude that multicultural policies, when combined with a generous welfare state, produce low levels of labour market participation, high levels of segregation, and a strong overrepresentation of immigrants among those convicted for criminal behaviour. Another study of this kind is The Integration of the European Second Generation (TIES) project, a comparative analysis of the position of the children of Turkish, Moroccan, and Yugoslavian immigrants in 15 cities in eight European countries (Crul et al. 2012). That research asked how we might explain the higher educational attainment of second-generation Turks in Sweden and France compared to that in Germany and Austria, and why attainments are different when it comes to access to and integration into the labour

market. One of its conclusions is that the contextual conditions created by institutions (e.g., schooling arrangements and labour market, citizenship, and welfare policies) are paramount to explain differences in educational and labour outcomes. Comparisons examining the same groups in different contexts tend to find the main explanatory factors residing in the receiving society and mostly at the institutional level (the right side of Fig. 2.1).

Integration Policies

Comparative studies are also a tool to understand what conditions account for the emergence of different integration policy models as well as the factors that explain recent trends of convergence in both policies and practices. To explain such differences, various typologies have been developed. One of the most cited is the study by Brubaker (1992) of citizenship policies in France and Germany arguing that the different nation-building histories of France and Germany have led to distinctive conceptions of citizenship. Focusing on the degree of accommodation or acceptance of minority group cultures, another highly cited categorization is that by Castles (1995), which distinguishes between differential exclusion, assimilation, and pluralism. Though these typologies are based on rich historical accounts of integration policy development in different European countries, their relevance has been increasingly questioned. The multitude of national models of integration policies in existence has been criticised for overlooking the importance of the transnational and local levels as well as for minimizing internal incoherencies and changes over time.

During the past decade, comparative studies have rendered the analysis and explanation of integration policies significantly more complex by taking into account the supranational (particularly European), regional, and local levels; by focusing on particular policy domains; and by examining the impact of a set of compound factors such as politics and the party system, the constitutional courts and judiciary power, welfare state regimes, and the role of civil society, the media, experts, and civil servants. At the local level, Alexander (2003, 2007) was one of the first scholars to look at the city as the central unit of comparison, building a theoretical model to explain local policy reactions to migrant settlement over time and across a wide spectrum of cities and policy domains. Based on the concept of “host–stranger” relations, he distinguished four types or phases of local policies: a non-policy, a guest worker policy, an assimilationist policy, and a pluralist policy. Though Alexander’s typology has been criticised as teleological, as well as for paying insufficient attention to policymaking and implementation (Caponio 2010), his comparative model is still a key reference in the literature on local integration policies.

An early example of comparative studies on particular policy domains is the comparison of the institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands, Belgium, and the UK in the post-war period by Rath et al. (2001). Among the questions posed by that research were to what extent are Muslims being given the opportunity to set up their

institutions according to their own agenda and how are public manifestations of Islam regulated, like mosque building and Islamic religious education in schools? These authors find significant variation in the institutionalization of Islam in timing, content, and direction in the three countries considered and between different cities. Looking at policy implementation and bureaucratic practices, comparative studies show important trends towards convergence. Particularly with regard to access to services, civil servants, NGOs, and professionals seem to respond similarly to similar everyday pressures, regardless of very distinct policy contexts. For instance, in a study of how Amsterdam and Berlin policymakers and policy practitioners deal with youth unemployment among immigrant groups, Vermeulen and Stotijn (2010) point to important similarities in terms of targeting relevant groups regardless of whether local governments pursued general or targeted policies.

Conclusion

We opened this chapter with a paradox: While many scholars reject the concept of integration arguing that it is highly normative and teleological in nature, the concept of integration nonetheless continues to be central in many studies and academic debates. How can we solve this contradiction? How can we study the process of settlement of newcomers in host societies and policies aiming to foster this process without falling into the pitfalls of the old assimilation/integration approach? With these questions in mind, this chapter presented a heuristic model for the non-normative, analytical study of both integration processes and policies. First, we proposed a disaggregated approach to the concept of integration, distinguishing three dimensions (the legal-political, the socio-economic, and the cultural-religious), two parties (the immigrants and the receiving society), and three levels (individuals, organizations, and institutions). Second, for the study of integration policies, we suggested taking into account policy frames, concrete policy measures, and both the vertical and horizontal aspects of integration policymaking.

While the use of this heuristic device enables a systematic and analytic description of integration processes and policies, comparison is key when aiming to explain differences (and similarities) in outcomes. In the past decade, a number of research projects have compared integration processes by focusing either on different immigrant groups in the same national or local context or on the same immigrant group in different contexts. Integration policies have also been objects of comparison. While most early studies focused exclusively on the national level, more recent approaches have taken into account the supranational and local levels, particular policy domains, and concrete implementation practices by street-level bureaucrats and practitioners. Though these researches have significantly contributed to the understanding of integration processes and policies, there is still much to be done.

Looking at integration processes, new systematic comparative analyses might shed more light on how particular immigrant cultures and migratory histories on the one hand, and general public institutions and immigrant policies on the other, shape

integration outcomes. If we look at integration policies, comparisons between different cities and regions in the same country and in different countries are key to enable us to understand not only local and regional policy responses but also the relationship between the national, regional, and local levels. Despite difficulty in terms of fieldwork, more research is also needed on policy implementation practices. Comparisons of these will enable us to elucidate and understand important differences between policies as written and policies as practised as well as to identify and explain trends of convergence in this regard. Finally, while comparative research on integration processes has been done in North America and Europe, most comparative research on integration policies has been limited to Europe. Going beyond these traditional geographies of comparative studies will be essential to understand how more significant differences in terms of nationhood, welfare state, or public and immigrant policies can lead to different outcomes in terms of integration processes. Looking in from the geographic outside may help to definitively strip the concept of integration of its normative and, above all, Western-centric character.

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Chapter 3

Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective

Christof Van Mol and Helga de Valk

Introduction

This chapter outlines the general developments of migration within and towards Europe as well as patterns of settlement of migrants since the 1950s. We take as our starting point the bilateral labour migration agreements signed by several European countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Three main periods can be distinguished from this point onwards. The first, up to the oil crisis in 1973–1974, was characterized by steady economic growth and development and deployment of guest worker schemes, (return) migration from former colonies to motherlands, and refugee migration, mainly dominated by movements from East to West. The second period started with the oil crisis and ended with the fall of the Iron Curtain in the late 1980s. During this time North-Western European governments increasingly restricted migration, and migrants' main route of entrance became family reunification and family formation. Furthermore, asylum applications increased. By the end of this period, migration flows had started to divert towards former emigration countries in Southern Europe. The third period is from the fall of the Iron Curtain until today, with increasing European Union (EU) influence and control of migration from third countries into the EU and encouragement of intra-European mobility.

The historical overview presented here stems from a comprehensive literature study, complemented by an analysis of available statistical data for trends in the last

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decade. It should be noted, however, that statistical data on migration and mobility in Europe is mostly incomplete, as they are based mainly on reports and registrations of the individuals concerned. Besides, data on immigration and emigration are not always fully available and are not consistently measured across countries and time (see, e.g., EMN 2013). This means that the quality of migration data is often limited (Abel 2010; Kupiszewska and Nowok 2008; Nowok et al. 2006; Poulain et al. 2006). Several initiatives and projects have been launched to overcome these problems and promote comparable definitions, statistics, and estimations of missing data (Raymer et al. 2011). Most of the EU's current 28 member countries produce annual statistics on immigration and emigration. However, the information and level of detail is not yet comparable across countries (for an overview of databanks and limitations, see Raymer et al. 2011). The final section of this chapter presents figures on migration and migrants relying mainly on data from three research projects which aimed to create and improve harmonized and consistent migration data (Abel and Sander 2014; Raymer et al. 2011, see www.nidi.nl for more information on the MIMOSA and IMEM projects). The conclusion summarizes the main patterns and discusses some implications of our findings.

Three Periods of Migration in Europe

From the 1950s to 1974: Guest Worker Schemes and Decolonization

In the period after the Second World War, North-Western Europe was economically booming. Industrial production, for example, increased by 30 % between 1953 and 1958 (Dietz and Kaczmarczyk 2008). Native workers in this region became increasingly educated, and growing possibilities for social mobility enabled many of them to move up to white-collar work (Boyle et al. 1998). Local workers could not fill the vacancies, as labour reservoirs were limited. Furthermore, the local native population was no longer willing to take up unhealthy and poorly paid jobs in agriculture, cleaning, construction, and mining. As a result, North-Western European governments started to recruit labour in peripheral countries. The main destination countries were Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. The recruited foreign workers were expected to return home after completing a stint of labour. They therefore tended to be granted few rights and little or no access to welfare support (Boyle et al. 1998). At the end of this period, most migrants in North-Western Europe originated from Algeria, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

Initially, geographical proximity played an important role in the development of specific migration flows. For example, Sweden recruited labour from Finland, the UK from Ireland, and Switzerland from Italy. A migration system emerged whereby peripheral—especially Southern European—countries supplied workers to North-Western European countries. Migration flows were strongly guided by differences in economic development between regions characterized by pre-industrial

agrarian economies and those with highly industrialized economies (Bade 2003; Barou 2006), both internationally and nationally (e.g., with unskilled workers moving from Southern Italy towards the industrial centres in Northern Italy). Within the origin countries, most migrant workers were from poor agricultural regions where there was insufficient work, such as Northern Portugal, Western Spain, Southern Italy, and Northern Greece (Bade 2003). However, European governments gradually enlarged their zones of recruitment to countries outside Europe. One of the main reasons was the Cold War division of Europe which severely restricted East-West labour mobility. In West Germany, for example, there was a significant inflow of workers from Greece, Italy, and Spain, as well as from East Germany. The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, however, put a stop to the latter. As a result, West Germany reoriented its recruitment towards elsewhere. Bilateral agreements were signed with Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968). Other destination countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Switzerland followed, also signing labour migration agreements with these countries in the 1960s.

In this period, international migration was generally viewed positively because of its economic benefits (Bonifazi 2008), from the perspective of both the sending and the receiving countries. In the Mediterranean region, for example, emigration helped to alleviate pressures on the labour market, as the region was characterized by significant demographic pressure, low productivity and incomes, and high unemployment (Page Moch 2003; Vilar 2001). A comparison of annual gross national product per capita in the 1960s illustrates this with US \$353 for Turkey, \$822 for Spain, and \$1272 for Italy; \$1977 for the UK and \$2324 for France (Page Moch 2003, 180). Furthermore, migrants' remittances were expected to benefit the national economy. In Turkey, for example, the monetary returns of migrants became a vital element of the economy: the country even experienced economic destabilization when labour migration to Germany ended in 1974 (Barou 2006). However, reasons for origin countries to support emigration went beyond the economic. The Italian government, for example, considered the labour migration programmes of North-Western European countries as a way to 'get rid of the unemployed and to deprive the socialist and communist parties of potential voters' (Hoerder 2002, 520).

Estimates of the numbers of individuals that left Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal between 1950 and 1970 vary from 7 to 10 million (Okólski 2012). As can be seen from Table 3.1, in 1950 immigrant populations were most numerous in France, the UK, Germany, and Belgium.

Twenty years later, at the beginning of the 1970s, these numbers had increased substantially in both absolute and relative terms (Table 3.1). One in seven manual labourers in the UK and one in four industrial workers in Belgium, France, and Switzerland were of foreign origin in the mid-1970s (Page Moch 2003, not in table). Eighty per cent of the total foreign stock in 1975 was concentrated in four countries, namely France, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK (Bonifazi 2008).

At the same time, the process of decolonization gave rise to considerable migration flows towards Europe's (former) colonial powers. A significant number of people from the colonies came to Belgium, France, the Netherlands, the UK, and in the 1970s, Portugal. Many of these (return) migrants were juridically considered

Table 3.1 Minority populations in the main Western-European countries of immigration, 1950–1975 (thousands and last column % of total population)

Country	1950	1960	1970	1975	As per cent of total population 1975
Belgium	354	444	716	835	8.5
France	2128	2663	3339	4196	7.9
West Germany	548	686	2977	4090	6.6
Netherlands	77	101	236	370	2.6
Sweden	124	191	411	410	5.0
Switzerland	279	585	983	1012	16.0
United Kingdom	1573	2205	3968	4153	7.8

Source: Castles et al. (2014, 108). See Castles et al. (1984, 87–88) for detailed sources

Notes: Figures for all countries except the UK are for foreign residents. They exclude naturalized persons and immigrants from the Dutch and French colonies. UK data are census figures for 1951, 1961, and 1971 and estimates for 1975. The 1951 and 1961 data are for overseas-born persons and exclude children born to immigrants in the UK. The 1971 and 1975 figures include children born in the UK, with both parents born abroad

citizens; estimates suggest that between 1940 and 1975 the number of people of European origin returning from the colonies was around 7 million (Bade 2003). The main (return) migration flows were from Kenya, India, and Malaysia to the UK, from Northern Africa to France and Italy, from Congo to Belgium (although in smaller numbers), and from Indonesia to the Netherlands (Bade 2003). Some of these migrants, as for example from the new Commonwealth, came for economic reasons (Page Moch 2003). Others, such as the Algerian *harkis* (auxiliaries in the French colonial army) in France, Asian Ugandans in Britain, and a substantial share of Surinamese in the Netherlands, arrived during or after independence (ibid.). In the 1970s, Portugal received a significant number of citizens “returning” from its former colonies, fleeing from violent combats in the struggle for independence. Although European migrants returning from the colonies were often quickly able to insert themselves into the social fabric of the mother country, this was less the case for those of non-European origin who were economically and socially deprived and also often discriminated (Bade 2003).

Lastly, the Iron Curtain severely limited East-West mobility. Nevertheless, it did not bring East-West migration to a complete halt (Fassmann and Münz 1994). Straddling our period demarcations we discuss these migrations patterns here, as they started in this period. Between 1950 and 1990, 12 million people migrated from East to West (Fassmann and Münz 1992), many of them to Germany. Between 1950 and 2004, for example, 4.45 million *Aussiedler*—ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe—returned to Germany (Dietz 2006). Until 1988, most of these *Aussiedler* migrated from Poland (Dietz 2006; Münz and Ulrich 1998). Nevertheless, the largest share of these *Aussiedler* (63 %) arrived after 1989 (Dietz 2006). The vast majority who came after the fall of the Iron Curtain originated from the former Soviet Union (Dietz 2006; Münz and Ulrich 1998). Occasionally, however, there were larger inflows of Eastern Europeans, following political crises such as from Hungary (1956–1957), Czechoslovakia (1968–1969), and Poland (1980–1981)

(Castles et al. 2014; Fassmann and Münz 1992, 1994). In line with the logic of the Cold War, whatever the motives of those who moved to the West, they were considered to be political refugees (Fassmann and Münz 1994).

From 1974 to the End of the 1980s: The Oil Crisis and Migration Control

The oil crisis of 1973–1974 had considerable impact on the economic landscape of Europe. The crisis gave impetus to economic restructuring, sharply reducing the need for labour (Boyle, Halfacree & Robinson 1998). During this period, belief in unbridled economic growth diminished. Switzerland and Sweden were the first countries to invoke a migration stop, respectively, in 1970 and 1972. Others followed: Germany in 1973 and the Benelux and France in 1974. Policies aiming to control and reduce migration, however, transformed rather than stopped migration. The number of foreign residents kept rising, due to a change in European migration systems from circular to chain migration and the related natural growth of migrant populations. Migrants from non-European countries who had come under labour recruitment schemes increasingly settled permanently, as returning to their home country for long periods now entailed a significant risk of losing their residence permit. Many migrants started to bring their families to Europe. Although governments initially tried to limit family migration, this met little success (Castles et al. 2014; Hansen 2003). After all, family reunification of migrant workers was considered a fundamental right, anchored in article 19 of the European Social Charter of 1961.

The composition of the residing migrant population also changed during this period. Whereas in the first period, European migrants were most numerous, the share of non-European migrant populations significantly grew during the second period. In Sweden, for example, 40 % of the foreign born were non-European by 1999, compared to only 7.6 % in 1970 (Goldscheider et al. 2008). This reflected the continuing immigration and natural growth of these populations. But it was also the result of a larger extent of return migration among Southern European populations, given the increased quality of life and employment opportunities in Southern Europe (Barou 2006). In countries on the other side of the Mediterranean, population pressure continued to be substantial, due to high fertility and unemployment rates. During this period, the number of Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Yugoslavian foreigners in Europe diminished (except in Switzerland, where the number of Portuguese and Yugoslavians grew), and a significant increase was observed in the number of Turks and North Africans across Europe (Bade 2003).

After the migration stop, countries increasingly controlled entries of foreigners, and migration became an important topic in national political and public debates (Bonifazi 2008; see also Doornik & Bruquetas in this volume). Increasing unemployment levels due to the economic recession fuelled hostility, racism, and xenophobia towards certain “visible” groups of resident migrants. In several European

countries, violent anti-foreigners incidents occurred. In France, for example, Le Pen's *Front National* acquired considerable political support for its simple message that '2 million unemployed=2 million immigrants too many' (Boyle et al. 1998, 27). During this period, however, awareness also grew that immigrant populations were here to stay. As a result, the need for adequate integration policies became apparent, and such policies slowly started to develop (see Doomernik and Bruquetas in this volume).

In this same phase, numbers of asylum applications started to rise in Europe (especially in the 1980s and after the fall of the Berlin Wall; Hansen 2003). Between the early 1970s and the end of the twentieth century the number of asylum applications in the EU, at that time 15 member states, increased from 15,000 to 300,000 annually (Hatton 2004). Germany was the largest recipient of asylum applications in Europe in all periods (Table 3.2). From the 1980s onwards, significant increases were also observed in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK. The different attractiveness of particular European countries over time is related to historical events that have induced new refugee flows. The dramatic increase in asylum applications from within Europe in the early 1990s, for example, accompanied the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslavian wars (Hatton 2004, see also further on in this chapter).

The restrictions on the entrance of foreigners into North-Western Europe also had another effect. From the mid-1980s onwards, migration flows increasingly diverted towards Southern Europe, especially gaining momentum in the 1990s.

Table 3.2 Asylum applications to the EU-15 by destination country, 1970–1999 (thousands)

	Years					
	1970–74	1975–79	1980–84	1985–89	1990–94	1995–99
Total EU applications	64.5	213.7	540.2	1012.3	2419.8	1613.5
Austria	8.7	14.7	63.2	64.4	76.1	53.5
Belgium	1.7	6.6	14.5	32.1	87.0	93.4
Denmark	3.7	1.3	5.6	42.1	76.4	36.0
Finland	–	–	0.1	0.3	11.4	6.9
France	5.1	40.5	106.3	178.7	184.5	112.2
Germany	34.3	121.8	249.6	455.3	1374.7	749.6
Greece		9.2	6.4	24.0	12.8	11.8
Ireland	–	–	–	–	0.5	21.2
Italy	11.0	9.2	16.5	26.3	40.8	48.8
Luxembourg	–	–	–	–	0.1	5.7
Netherlands	–	5.3	8.8	46.4	151.1	170.4
Portugal	0	1.7	4.3	1.3	3.9	1.7
Spain	–	–	5.4	15.7	53.1	30.4
Sweden	–	–	41.9	97.1	197.0	48.5
United Kingdom	–	3.4	17.5	28.5	150.8	223.3

Source: Hatton (2004, 10). The numbers in Hatton (2004) are based on UNCHR (2001, Tables I.2, II.2, III.2, IV.2, VI.4, and VI.5)

Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain had long been emigration countries. As a result, they did not dispose of well-developed immigration legislation and entrance control systems. Furthermore, these countries were experiencing economic growth and falling birth rates, resulting in labour shortages (Castles et al. 2014). The jobs available were often irregular ones, characterized by unfavourable labour conditions and low pay, making them unattractive to the local population. Southern Europe thus became an attractive destination for non-European migrants, especially those from North Africa, Latin America, Asia, and—after the fall of the Iron Curtain—Eastern Europe (Castles et al. 2014).

Besides migration flows from non-European countries, the favourable economic conditions in Southern Europe also resulted in return migration among those who had moved to Northern Europe. Spain, for example, registered the return of 451,000 citizens during this period, of which 94 % had resided in another EU country (Barou 2006). Portugal, in contrast, experienced return migration from its former colonies, where fierce and violent struggles for independence were under way. Greece was the last country to transition from an emigration into an immigration country. Until 1973, some 1 million Greeks were working abroad (Bade 2003). Half of them returned in the period after the oil crisis (ibid.).

From the 1990s to 2012: Recent Trends in Migration towards and Within Europe

Patterns of migration from, towards, and within Europe underwent significant changes and further diversification starting in 1990. The collapse of the Iron Curtain and the opening of the borders of Eastern Europe induced new migration flows across Europe. The end of the Cold War, as well as the wars in the former Yugoslavia led to new flows of asylum seekers to Western Europe. Between 1989 and 1992, for example, asylum applications increased from 320,000 to 695,000, to decline to 455,000 by the end of the decade (Hansen 2003) and increase again to 471,000 in 2001 (Castles et al. 2014). The top-five countries of origin during this period were the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (836,000), Romania (400,000), Turkey (356,000), Iraq (211,000), and Afghanistan (155,000) (ibid.). In the first decade of the twenty-first century, new asylum applications followed the conjuncture of admission restrictions and numbers of violent conflicts (ibid.). Between 2002 and 2006, asylum applications in the EU-15 decreased from 393,000 to 180,000 (ibid.). From 2006 onwards, however, asylum applications rose due to the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and more recently, the Arab Spring. By 2010, the EU-25 plus Norway and Switzerland had received 254,180 applications, and humanitarian migration accounted for 6 % of newcomers to the EU (ibid.). Most applications were made in France (47,800), Germany (41,300), Sweden (31,800), the UK (22,100), and Belgium (19,900) (OECD 2011, Table A.1.3., cited in Castles et al. 2014, 229).

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty's abolition of borders considerably eased intra-EU movements (see also next sections of this chapter). At the same time, entrance into the EU became progressively restricted due to the unification of the European market, which imposed strict border controls and visa regulations. These controls on the entrance of foreigners went hand in hand with increased irregular migration (Bade 2003; Bonifazi 2008; Castles et al. 2014). Migrants' countries of origin as well as their migration motives became increasingly diversified.

[Nowadays migrants] come to Europe from all over the world in significant numbers: expatriates working for multinational companies and international organizations, skilled workers from all over the world, nurses and doctors from the Philippines, refugees and asylum seekers from African, near Eastern and Asian countries, from the Balkan and former Soviet Union countries, students from China, undocumented workers from African countries, just to single out some of the major immigrant categories (Penninx 2006, 8).

During this third period, integration issues became a central policy concern (see Doornik & Bruquetas in this volume). Many European countries stepped up attempts to attract highly skilled or educated migrants. This goal is still reflected in a number of national programmes today, for example, in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the UK. The EU established its Blue Card Scheme, an EU-wide residence and work permit (Eurostat 2011). Moreover, student migration from outside the EU became increasingly important in some parts of the EU (ibid.). Some countries' governments have actively recruited students with the intention of incorporating the "best and brightest" into their domestic labour market upon graduation (Lange 2013). Institutions of higher education have joined these efforts, stimulated by the economic benefits of attracting international students in the form of high tuition fees (Findlay 2011). In this context, several European countries, such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK simplified procedures for international students to make the education-to-work transition (Tremblay 2005; Van Mol 2014).

In the last section of this chapter, we differentiate between intra-EU mobility of European citizens and migration within and towards the EU of third-country nationals, as these groups are subject to different legislation. Intra-European mobility is often considered in positive terms, as contributing to the EU's 'vitality and competitiveness' (e.g., EC 2011, 3–4). European citizens, moreover, are entitled to move freely within the EU without the need for a visa, and hence may face fewer institutional barriers in migration trajectories. Migration into the EU, in contrast, remains largely associated with active measures of access restriction and border control (see, e.g., Council of the EU 2002). In recent decades, European migration policy has thus represented 'different intersecting regimes of mobility that normalise the movements of some travellers while criminalising and entrapping the ventures of others' (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, 189). The global economic crisis that started in 2008 might be considered the end of this third period, as it brought, at least temporarily, an end to 'rapid economic growth, EU expansion and high immigration' (Castles et al. 2014, 103). However, as Castles, De Haas and Miller (ibid.) observe, the decline in immigration from non-European countries has been rather modest, and the anticipated mass returns to migrants' home countries have not

occurred as yet. The crisis mainly seems to have affected intra-European migration, with a decrease in overall free movement within the EU and with the peripheral countries hardest hit by the crisis—particularly Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain—again becoming emigration countries (Castles et al. 2014).

Migration Towards and from Europe

We first analyse general trends in migration towards Europe, based on new estimates of global migration flows by Abel and Sander (2014). Their figures are based on stock statistics published by the United Nations. Note, however, that using stock data might be misleading for measuring flows. Furthermore, although the tables below represent the best estimates available, they are far from complete, as they are based on national statistics and thus reflect different legislation and definitions. This causes, for example, difficulties in comparability between countries as well as over time. The presented figures should thus be seen as indicative of larger patterns. The circular plots present migration flows from different world regions towards Europe and vice versa (Fig. 3.1) for four five-year periods between 1990 and 2010. Broader lines indicate more sizeable migration flows, while the arrow indicates the direction of the flow. As can be observed, migration from former Soviet Union countries to Europe gained momentum after the fall of the Berlin Wall but gradually decreased thereafter. Migration from Africa to Europe increased, especially in the mid-1990s. Furthermore, migration from East, South, and South-East Asia and from Latin America significantly rose, particularly after the start of the twenty-first century. Finally, migration from North America, Oceania, and West Asia remained relatively stable. Additional Eurostat data (not in the plots) show that between 2009 and 2012, the influx of non-EU migrants into the EU decreased slightly, from 1.4 million in 2009 to 1.2 million in 2012 (Eurostat 2014a).

In terms of the stock, 4 % of the total EU population in 2013 was a non-EU national, accounting for about 6 % of the EU's total working age population (Eurostat 2014a). Non-EU nationals were evenly split between men and women (*ibid.*). Note, however, that these data by nationality do not include all foreign-origin European residents (meaning those born abroad or having a foreign-born parent), as they cover only those who did not hold the nationality of the country they resided in. We further deconstruct these general trends below with a main focus on the last decade.

Looking at the top-15 countries of origin of newly arrived immigrants in 2009 and 2012, we find large numbers of migrants from India and China, followed by Morocco and Pakistan (Table 3.3). Based on figures from 2008, the majority of Indian and Pakistani migrants seems to have headed to the UK. Most Chinese migrants seem to have gone to Spain (Eurostat 2011), and Moroccan migrants were mainly attracted to Italy and Spain.

In addition to the data on newly arriving immigrants (flow statistics), it is also relevant to know the main countries of origin of non-European migrants residing in the EU (stock statistics). When considering the top-10 countries of origin of non-EU




Fig. 3.1 Circular plots of migration flows towards and from Europe, per 5 year period between 1990 and 2010 (*Source: www.global-migration.info*)

nationals residing in the EU (Table 3.4), it can be noted that the largest residing populations are from countries where Europe recruited labour in the post-war period (Morocco and Turkey), as well as from former colonies (India and Pakistan), and countries near the EU’s eastern border (Albania, Russia, and Serbia). The large Chinese diaspora is also prominent as well as the—mostly highly-skilled and life-style (Castles et al. 2014)—migrants from the USA.

Until the 1990s, the vast majority of migrants could conveniently be classified under the categories “family reunification”, “labour migration”, and “asylum”. Since the 1990s, however, migration motives have become increasingly diversified, including a growing number of young people migrating to attend higher education. According to Eurostat (2014a), in 2012, 32 % of migrants received a residence per-

Table 3.3 Top-15 countries of origin of newly arrived non-EU migrants in the EU, 2009 and 2012

	2009		2012	
	Country of origin	Number of migrants	Country of origin	Number of migrants
1.	India	92,575	China (incl. Hong Kong)	87,889
2.	Morocco	78,729	India	64,416
3.	China (incl. Hong Kong)	65,367	Morocco	53,121
4.	Ukraine	47,747	Pakistan	43,108
5.	Pakistan	35,969	United States	38,587
6.	United States	32,072	Russia	28,807
7.	Philippines	29,800	Ukraine	26,068
8.	Albania	28,153	Nigeria	21,130
9.	Bangladesh	25,611	Australia	19,331
10.	Peru	24,740	Brazil	18,307
11.	Moldova	24,222	Albania	16,775
12.	Brazil	24,204	Philippines	16,748
13.	Colombia	23,274	Turkey	16,198
14.	Nigeria	21,657	Bangladesh	13,880
15.	Russia	21,057	Afghanistan	13,060

Source: Eurostat (2014a)

Note: Numbers refer to non-EU nationals whose previous place of residence was in a non-EU country and who had established their residence in a EU member state in the respective year

Table 3.4 Top-10 countries of nationality of non-EU migrants residing in the European Union, 2012

	Country of origin	Number of migrants
1.	Turkey	1,983,240
2.	Morocco	1,384,935
3.	China (incl. Hong Kong)	724,428
4.	India	650,710
5.	Ukraine	634,851
6.	Russia	589,634
7.	Albania	464,149
8.	Serbia	408,491
9.	Pakistan	407,133
10.	United States	406,266

Source: Eurostat (2014a)

Note: Numbers refer to non-EU nationals whose previous place of residence was in a non-EU country and who had established their residence in a EU member state for a period of at least 12 months

mit for family reasons, 23 % for work, 22 % for education, and 23 % for other reasons including asylum. Moreover, it should be noted that these categories report only the main migration motive as captured in the official statistics. In practice, these categories reflect migration motives as accepted in admission labels. Both may shift in the course of time. International students, for example, might become labour migrants upon graduation, and subsequently seek family reunification.


Lastly, migration is often not limited to moving from Country A to Country B but may involve several successive destinations. Considering intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals, an upward trend is observed between 2007 and 2011. This trend is most prominent in Germany, where the number of third-country nationals arriving from European Economic Area countries more than tripled, from 3784 in 2007 to 11,532 in 2011 (EMN 2013). A similar rise is also observed in the UK, where numbers increased from 1000 to 3000 (ibid.). Increases seem to be more modest in other EU countries, such as Austria (33.6 %), Finland (17.1 %), the Netherlands (53.7 %), and Sweden (30.2 %) (ibid.). However, whereas these percentages are high, absolute numbers are generally low. Compared with European citizens, intra-EU moves of third-country nationals are found to form only a small share of total intra-EU mobility between 2007 and 2011. The share of non-EU nationals in these movements barely surpasses 4 % in the countries for which statistics are available: 1.8 % in Germany, 3.6 % in Austria, 3.7 % in Finland, 2.3 % in the Netherlands, and 1.2 % in the UK (ibid.). Third-country nationals, moreover, move to geographically close countries, for example, from Germany and Italy to Austria, from Estonia and Sweden to Finland, from the Czech Republic and Germany to Poland, from Austria and the Czech Republic to Slovakia, and from Denmark and Germany to Sweden (ibid.). In sum, although it is often assumed that linear migration trajectories between two countries are less common now (see, e.g., Pieke et al. 2004), non-EU migrants do not seem to move frequently within the EU. This might be due to the legal restrictions often imposed on this group of migrants, or it could be more related to factors such as language similarities between bordering countries (De Valk and Díez Medrano 2014).

Mobility of EU Citizens

Numbers and Destinations

Previous studies indicate that only a small share of the European population is mobile (Bonin et al. 2008; Pascouau 2013). Favell and Recchi (2009), for example, show that less than one in fifty Europeans lives abroad, and around 4 % have some experience of living and working abroad. Nevertheless, the scale of intra-EU mobility clearly increased between 2000 and 2011 (Fig. 3.2). Data from Eurostat (2011), for example, show that nearly 2 million EU citizens moved within the EU in 2008. In absolute numbers, Polish migration made up the greatest share of intra-EU flows in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Fig. 3.2). Migration between Poland

a



i = according to country of immigration; e = according to country of emigration;

DE: Immigration 2000–2003 = 2000, 2002, and 2003;


FR: Immigration and emigration 2000–2003 = 2002–2003;

IT: Immigration and emigration 2000–2003 = 2001–2003;

ES: Emigration 2000–2003 = 2002–2003

Data source: Eurostat, own calculations by NIDI

b



i = according to country of immigration; e = according to country of emigration

UK: Immigration 200–2007 = 2004–2006

Data source: Eurostat

Fig. 3.2 Top-ten intra-European migration flows, 2000–2011 (absolute numbers)




Fig. 3.2 (continued)

and Germany was most prevalent, and consists of movements from as well as to Poland. The prevalence of Polish-German migration might be explained by the fact that such migration has been regulated since 1990, when the German and Polish governments signed a bilateral agreement allowing Polish citizens to engage in legal seasonal employment for 3 months in specific sectors of the German economy (Dietz and Kaczmarczyk 2008). This led to a sharp increase in the inflow of Polish seasonal workers in Germany, from approximately 78,600 in 1992 to 280,000 in 2002 (*ibid.*). From 2004 to 2007, after Poland's EU accession, we observe a similar increase in population movements from Poland to the UK. This can be attributed to the fact that—unlike other EU member states—Ireland, Sweden, and the UK did not restrict migration from the new member states. Of these three destinations, Ireland and the UK were the most popular, in part due to favourable labour market conditions (Castles et al. 2014). In more recent years, however, many Polish migrants have left the UK, indicating increasing return migration, perhaps related to the economic crisis, as the Polish economy has kept growing (Castles et al. 2014). Apart from the migration flows from and towards Poland, similar inflows and outwards movements from Romania were observed between 2000 and 2011. Whereas

between 2000 and 2003 some 39,000 Romanians migrated to Italy and Spain, these numbers increased to about 110,000 in the subsequent years. Furthermore, Romanian migration to Italy remained relatively stable, in sharp contrast with the migration flow towards Spain, which dropped sharply between 2008 and 2011. This can be attributed to the more difficult labour market conditions in Spain, because of the economic crisis, which has redirected the movement of Romanian migrants towards other EU countries (OECD 2013).


Besides migration between Eastern Europe and several other EU countries, migration flows have been considerable between the UK, France, and Spain. These movements likely include retirement migration from Northern to Southern Europe, but also point to increased labour mobility between these countries, especially considering the flows towards the UK, as will be further discussed later.

Finally, in recent years, the global economic crisis seems to have impacted patterns of intra-EU migration. Data from the OECD (2013) show, for example, an increase in emigration from countries heavily affected by the crisis (Table 3.5). Cases in point are Greece and Spain where unemployment rose to unprecedented levels—27.3 % in Greece and 26.1 % in Spain in 2013, with youth unemployment rates of, respectively, 58.3 and 55.5 % that same year (Eurostat 2014b). Countries that eased their way into economic recovery, such as Iceland and Ireland, have already registered declines in the numbers of individuals leaving these countries (OECD 2013). Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK appear to be popular destination countries, as intra-European migration flows towards these countries almost doubled in the 5 years prior to 2012. The crisis, however, also led to migration to

Table 3.5 Migration from specific European countries to main European and other OECD destination countries, 2007–2011

	Index					Number (thousands)
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2011
<i>Country of origin</i>						
Greece	100	106	102	143	236	39
Iceland	100	111	163	165	135	4
Ireland	100	104	174	210	181	21
Italy	100	116	111	132	142	85
Portugal	100	120	98	103	125	55
Spain	100	114	123	173	224	72
<i>Country of destination</i>						
Germany	100	105	116	133	188	78
United Kingdom	100	120	113	174	195	88
Switzerland	100	116	96	102	121	33
Belgium	100	142	146	169	193	15
Netherlands	100	138	144	157	184	12
All other OECD countries	100	109	116	124	129	50
<i>Total</i>	100	115	114	140	165	275

Source: OECD (2013, 23)



PL: immigration 2008–2011 = 2008 and 2010; emigration 2008–2011 = 2008;
 RO: emigration 2008–2011 = 2008
 (Source: Eurostat, own calculations by NIDI)

Fig. 3.3 Share of intra-European migrants in total emigration and immigration for selected European countries, 2008–2011 (%)

non-European countries, such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Turkey, the USA, and in the case of Portugal, to former colonies in Africa (Castles et al. 2014).

It is important to keep in mind that most of the previous analyses are based on absolute numbers, whereby EU member states with larger populations are logically more visible. We now consider the relative importance of migration flows as a share of countries’ total immigration and emigration figures. Figure 3.3 shows the relative share of EU migration for selected EU countries.

Intra-EU migration forms a substantial share of movements to and from the majority of the countries in Fig. 3.3. Based on these numbers, we can discern several groups. The first group consists of countries where intra-EU immigration and emigration comprises the largest share of migration movements. It includes Austria, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, and Denmark. The attraction of these countries is explained by their well-developed economies. Particularly significant within this group are Polish and Lithuanian migrants moving on to other European destinations. The second group is made up of countries where more than half of emigration moves are directed towards other European countries, and immigration is mostly non-European. This group is comprised of Finland, Italy, Latvia, and Romania. Their geographical location at the borders of Europe might explain this pattern, as these countries receive immigrants from neighbouring (non-European) countries and function as transit countries.

Furthermore, these countries might be less attractive to migrants from other EU countries because of their limited economic opportunities and relatively low wages (except for Finland). The third group consists of countries where both emigration and immigration from and to non-European countries is still of considerable importance. This group includes Spain, Sweden, and the UK. For Sweden, the most popular destinations for migrants are (besides the Nordic neighbours) English-speaking countries such as the UK and the USA (Mannheimer 2012). In terms of the arriving population, humanitarian refuge and family reunification are the main channels of immigration in Sweden, which explains the large share of non-European migrants (Fredlund-Blomst 2014). Spain's and the UK's migration balances might reflect continuing migration from former colonies and historical links with various world regions which include, for example, language similarities. The UK attracts a considerable number of migrants from ex-colonies such as India and Pakistan (Office for National Statistics 2011). Furthermore, the principal non-European destinations for UK migrants are English-speaking countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA (Murray et al. 2012). For Spain, non-European migrants mainly originate from Morocco and Latin American countries, and Spanish migrants emigrate to Latin American countries such as Argentina and Venezuela (INE 2014).

Demographic Characteristics of Intra-EU Movers


It has been suggested that free movement within the EU is particularly availed of by the highly educated (Favell 2008). We therefore investigate the demographic characteristics of those who move within Europe, focusing on selected cases and the period 2008–2011. Contrasting these cases, for which we have detailed information, suggests the diversity of migration flows and motives within Europe. Obviously this analysis does not do justice to more recent moves from Southern Europe to North-Western Europe, but data to make similar analyses are not yet at hand.

We start with characteristics of those who move. Figure 3.4 shows population pyramids for Polish migrants heading to Germany and vice versa. As we demonstrated previously (see Fig. 3.2), Polish-German migration is the most prominent intra-European migration flow in absolute numbers. The population pyramids are indicative of the trend in the preceding years. Mobility between both countries is clearly dominated by men, particularly those between 20 and 50 years of age. This strongly male-dominated movement of Polish workers towards Germany appears temporary, as a similar population moves back again (compare Fig. 3.4a and b).

When we compare Polish migration to Germany with Polish migration to the Netherlands, we find a different panorama (Fig. 3.5). Polish migrants in the Netherlands are significantly younger, the majority being between 20 and 35 years of age. Moreover, there is a more equal gender balance. The coincidence of these migration flows with other life transitions, such as having children and forming a union, is crucial to gain insight into the way intra-European mobility develops over the life course.


Recent research on Polish migrants based on Dutch population registers shows that having children as well as the choice of partner are important determinants of permanent settlement (Kleinepieter et al. 2015). Similar findings have been reported on intra-EU migrant groups in other destinations such as Belgium and the UK (see, e.g., Levrau et al. 2014; Ryan and Mulholland 2013). Where generally circular and return migration of intra-EU movers is high, this seems especially so for those who are young, single, and do not have children (see, e.g., Bijwaard 2010; Braun and Arsene 2009; Kleinepieter et al. 2015; Nekby 2006).

The relationship between life course and migration becomes more apparent when we compare migrants from Romania and those from the UK residing in Spain (Fig. 3.6). Romanian migration to Spain is clearly dominated by young people, with an overrepresentation of the 20–24 year category. Most of these men and women arrived in Spain for work or study. The population pyramid of British residents in Spain has a totally different structure. Some of the British migrants are 30–40 years old, and many are in the older age groups, from 55 years and older. Thus, British migrants in Spain seem to be free movers coming to work in Spain alongside retirement migrants.



Data source: Eurostat; calculations by NIDI

Fig. 3.4 Population pyramid of migrants from Poland to Germany (a) and Germany to Poland (b), 2008 (%)




Data source: Eurostat; calculations by NIDI

Fig. 3.4 (continued)

In sum, patterns of intra-EU migration are becoming increasingly diverse. European citizens enjoy the right of freedom of movement, and might decide to temporarily or permanently settle in another European country for a variety of reasons, including family formation, retirement, study, and work. Finally it is crucial to realize that categorization of migrants into certain migration motives is rather difficult as very often multiple different reasons overlap (see, e.g., Gilmartin and Migge 2015; Santacreu et al. 2009; Verwiebe 2014).

Conclusions

In this chapter we addressed the first key actor of the binomials presented in Chap. 1 of this volume, namely migrants themselves. We first of all presented a historical overview of trends in international migration to and within Europe since the 1950s. Furthermore, we examined the demographic characteristics of these migration flows



NB. NL 2009: break in series due to new regulation
 Data source: Eurostat; calculations by NIDI

Fig. 3.5 Population pyramid of Polish migrants to the Netherlands, 2009 (%)


as well as the characteristics of residing migrants across Europe using recent data. We looked at both immigration and emigration in the European context to do sufficient justice to the dynamic nature of migration. Yet, our findings provide only a general overview, as the complexity of migration to and from Europe extends well beyond the scope of a single chapter. Three historical periods were distinguished. It is important to bear these different periods in mind when studying current migration flows in Europe. They help to frame but also for analysing the (demographic) behaviour of migrant populations. The distinguished periods may help us to structure and understand the socio-demographic situations which migrants face today. In addition, this distinction into different periods enables us to appreciate the current and ongoing political and public debates on migration in Europe.

The first period was characterized by labour migration and a favourable stance towards migration, covering the years from the beginning of the bilateral guest worker agreements until the oil crisis. European governments first recruited guest workers in Southern Europe, but quickly expanded towards countries at Europe’s borders. Apart from labour migration, a significant postcolonial migration flow char-

acterized this period. Due to struggles for independence in former colonies, many European countries received return migrants as well as migrants fleeing hostile conflict environments. The Cold War limited East-West mobility during this period.


The second period extended from the oil crisis in the early 1970s to the fall of the Iron Curtain in the late 1980s. It was characterized by a cessation of guest worker migration and stringent entry restrictions for new migrants. Nevertheless, migration flows were transformed rather than halted. Whereas previously labour migration had been the main migration channel, family reunification (and family formation) now took over the primary role, and asylum applications were also on the rise. European governments became aware that migrant populations were likely to remain on their territory, and they slowly began to develop integration policies. This continues to be an important issue in the discourse today.

The third period dates from the 1990s to the present day. During this time, we find substantial diversification in terms of countries of origin, destinations, flows, migration motives, and structure of migrant populations. One of the most important elements in this period has been the removal of barriers to intra-European mobility, while migration into the EU has become more restricted. As such, intra-EU mobility



Data source: Eurostat; calculations by NIDI

Fig. 3.6 Population pyramid of Romanian (a) and British (b) migrants in Spain, 2008–2011 (%)



Data source: Eurostat; calculations by NIDI

Fig. 3.6 (continued)

and migration into the EU have become embedded in different and often opposing discourses. The end of this third period might be the economic crisis, which so far seems to have affected mainly intra-European mobility patterns. Peripheral countries have been hit particularly hard by the crisis, and an increasing tendency towards emigration can be observed from countries such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Immigration of non-EU migrants, however, seems less affected. This is perhaps because many migrants from outside Europe have found other routes of arrival, including irregular entrance and stay. Moreover, European countries are interested in highly skilled migrants in the context of a global competition for talent.

As a result, it seems that comparable to the “migration stop” after the oil crisis of the 1970s or during the Cold War, migration towards Europe will be transformed rather than come to a complete halt in the coming years. Mobility within Europe, in this regard, cannot be seen as separate from migration from outside the EU. Studying migration systems rather than focusing exclusively on one aspect of mobility is thus called for. At the same time, our analyses in this chapter also suggest an increasing dichotomy between migrants who are in a favourable situation with easy access and rights in Europe (e.g., EU free movers and highly skilled migrants) and those in less

favourable situations (mainly those arriving from outside Europe for other reasons). Development of this dichotomy has important consequences for the lives of individual migrants and for social cohesion. European societies must demonstrate awareness of this with policies crafted to acknowledge the diverse nature and dynamic character of migration that we have shown in this chapter.

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Chapter 4

National Immigration and Integration Policies in Europe Since 1973

Jeroen Doomernik and María Bruquetas-Callejo

Introduction

Migration of workers and refugees has long been an integral part of the European continent's history. Nonetheless, Europe's appreciation of migration as a serious societal and governmental concern is relatively recent. Among the countries with a colonial history, migration became an issue at the time of the independence of these Asian, African, and South American nations. North-Western European countries furthermore witnessed sizeable labour migration from Southern Europe, Turkey, and Northern Africa. This occurred from the 1950s into the 1970s, though it was long considered merely an issue of labour supply and demand, and not one posing social or other challenges. Only after the economic recession of the mid-1970s did migration, or rather the restriction thereof, become a topic of debate. Integration of these migrant workers and their children is an issue that took longer to arrive on the political agenda. In some countries this happened from the late 1970s; in others it came about only decades later.

From the 1990s onwards, the European countries bordering the Mediterranean, which had primarily been suppliers of labour for the growing economies of North-Western Europe, themselves became attractive destinations for migrants. Improvements in their economies and living conditions opened the way for the arrival of considerable numbers of workers from Central Europe, Northern Africa, and Latin America. A precondition for membership of the (then) European Economic Community was enactment of stringent migration controls; hence integration issues long took a secondary place.

The Communist Eastern Bloc had been cordoned off from the rest of the world until 1989 and had thus seen very little migration since the end of the Second World

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War. The main exceptions consisted of “guest workers” from socialist developing countries. These workers resided in isolation from the native populations. Vietnamese migrants remained and these days are a clear presence in the eastern parts of Germany and the Czech Republic. During the 2000s labour migration developed from farther east, such as the Ukraine, to Central Europe, while the nationals of these new destination countries themselves benefited in varying numbers from the freedom to go and work elsewhere in the European Union (EU).

From the early 1990s, refugees and asylum seekers became an issue of great urgency in North-Western Europe. Many states in this region felt overburdened and took steps to restrict asylum seekers’ access to their territories and to limit asylum seekers’ eligibility, thus shifting the burden to other member states. Since then, political consensus has emerged within Europe on the need for a joint approach towards asylum seekers and refugees, but so far national interests have persisted, and European solidarity on this issue has remained incomplete. More successful has been the development of EU-wide policies on migration for the purpose of family reunion and on the rights of long-term resident third-country nationals. EU law in the field of general integration policies is not on the political agenda but the Union has made efforts to stimulate social cohesion and integration of immigrants and minority groups by means of “soft” law.

In short, European countries’ experiences with immigration have been diverse and related to geographical location, economic context, political history, and also to notions of nationhood, national belonging, and organization of government. Beyond these, European political integration has created an additional level of policy development, supplementing and sometimes challenging national policymaking either by subsidizing local initiatives to foster the integration of immigrants which would otherwise remain unfunded (e.g., by national governments) or by limiting objectives that are at odds with EU law (e.g., restricting nations’ power to limit the rights of third-country nationals). These issues are explored further in the next two sections. The first addresses Europe’s four main types of migratory experiences. The second discusses the integration policies applied in the context of these experiences. The chapter seeks to clarify how the concept of integration is used in policy formulation and policy practice, in line with the second question guiding this book: *What are the main factors driving the kinds of relations observed between local governments and immigrant organizations?*

Immigration Experiences and National Policy Responses

Postcolonial, Labour, and Asylum Migrants in North-Western Europe

Among the first immigrants that European countries witnessed in modern times were members of the colonial middle classes who came to the “motherland” to work or to study. Their numbers grew considerably when the colonies gained

independence. These members of the middle classes felt uneasy under their postcolonial governments or expected a more secure future upon resettling in Europe. Although at some point these European countries of destination imposed restrictions on such resettlement, it was generally understood that these migrants belonged to the nation and that the nation had a moral obligation towards them. Even though migrants still arrive from these countries as family migrants today, postcolonial migration was predominantly from the 1950s to the late 1970s.

In the 1960s, employers in countries including Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands recruited labour from abroad. Unskilled and semi-skilled workers were brought in for the service industry, construction, and manufacturing to meet the growing demands of the booming economies. At the same time, such jobs lost their attraction to native workers, whose educational levels were on the rise. The intention was to hire such workers on a temporary basis. With the exception of France, governments had no ambition to develop settlement policies (Martin and Miller 1980, 316). The term “guest worker” was used to underline this stance. Once demand for guest workers ebbed as a result of the recession following the 1973 oil crisis, facts and conceptions took diverging paths. Further recruitment was halted—in Germany by law—and the guest workers’ return home seemed a logical consequence of the economic downturn. Yet a large share remained. Despite the recession, demand for their work remained sizeable (*ibid.*, 320; Castles 1986, 765). Moreover, these workers themselves preferred to stay, as their countries of origin likewise were going through hard times. For their part, “host” governments were unable or unwilling to force their erstwhile guests to go home. Welfare arrangements and entitlements were an additional disincentive for return migration. As a consequence, many guest workers became immigrants. Because this gave cause for spouses and children to join them, the end of the guest worker era actually meant the beginning of substantially larger migration flows. As a rule, governments did not applaud this ongoing migration of family members, but their ability to curb arrivals was restricted by humanitarian, economic, and legal obligations.

The example of the Netherlands illustrates this. Some 74,000 Moroccan and Turkish workers lived in this country in 1973, but ethnic communities ten times this size arose over the next 40 years (Doomernik 2011, 73). In Germany the rise was less steep. While in 1973 the country had 910,000 Turkish inhabitants, in 2012 some 3 million German residents had a Turkish background.¹

Over time, some governments acknowledged that continuing migration produced ongoing challenges in terms of integrating the newcomers into mainstream society. In no small part, this was a result of the nature of the recruitment policies, as they had been biased towards poorly educated migrants (Castles 1986, 773). The bias towards those with little formal education also put migrants’ children in a disadvantaged position in education and, subsequently, the labour market (Crul and Doomernik 2003). This situation, in conjunction with an increased politicization of migration, brought about a growing interweaving of migration controls and integration requirements in countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands (from the late

¹Data from Lederer (1997, 47) and Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2012, 138).

1990s on). Permanent residence was made conditional on the acquisition of language proficiency and knowledge of the host country's law and society. Even though this touches all non-EU citizens, these measures were designed to target immigrants from former guest worker countries of origin. In general it can be observed that "immigration", if not directly serving the interests of the receiving states, had taken on a negative connotation in public discourse.

During the 1990s, migration from the former guest workers' countries became overshadowed—in numbers and in popular perceptions—by the arrival of large numbers of asylum seekers and refugees. In two senses this arrival resulted from the end of the Cold War. First, restrictions were removed on mobility from Eastern Europe to the rest of the world. Second, the end of the Cold War indirectly caused the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The former led to massive displacement and refugee movements. Many Bosnians ended up seeking security in Western Europe, especially in Germany, where they were given temporary protection. By 2005 the largest Bosnian populations in Western Europe were found in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands (Valenta and Ramet 2011, 4). Asylum migration from the fringes of the Soviet Union, especially the Caucasus, also became significant, as did flows from Romania, Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, and from African states tormented by civil war and lawlessness (Castles et al. 2014, 228). These asylum seekers did not end up more or less randomly distributed among European states. They sought refuge predominantly in North-Western Europe, and within this region first and foremost in Germany. Already in 1992 the German parliament saw itself forced to alter the constitution in order to severely curtail access for asylum claimants. The effect was a drop in overall numbers, yet it also created considerable spill-over of asylum requests into neighbouring states (Grutters 2003, 165). This set in motion a dynamic by which countries sought to avoid being more attractive than others to asylum seekers, while also creating impetus for the integrated European approach that became part of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. Joint policies were to take effect from May 2004 at the latest.

Meanwhile two further developments took on prominence. Firstly, among policymakers a new consensus gradually emerged about the demographic and economic contributions that selective labour migration might bring. In 2000, the German chancellor proposed seeking to attract information technology (IT) specialists by means of a "green card" (Doomernik et al. 2009). The scheme was unsuccessful, but the change in rhetoric did have impact. The German government established an expert committee to rethink the hitherto dogmatic position against significant labour immigration. In other countries, such as the UK, France, and the Netherlands, soon thereafter similar schemes were devised, all geared towards attracting skilled foreign workers (*ibid.*). Some measured skill levels using the proxy of a high previous income (as did the UK); others applied human capital endowment measures (e.g., a university degree was used by France and the Netherlands). At the European level, too, this ambition found support and resulted in the joint Blue Card programme.

The second key development was the increasing dominance of irregular migration as a public issue. Here, North-Western Europe faced a particular challenge.

These countries had long been characterized by inclusive welfare systems that were also open to non-nationals, alongside highly regulated labour markets in which informal labour was outlawed. This implied relative closure to immigrants, whose contribution to the economy could not be guaranteed a priori. Restrictions, however, led to situations in which an alien, for instance, upon a failed asylum request, ended up without any state support, which is diametrically opposed to the essence of the welfare state. In order to avoid such paradoxical and politically troublesome situations, these states tended to devise measures against unsolicited arrivals. At the same time, lack of legal opportunities for unskilled immigrant workers encouraged illegal migration and unwarranted asylum requests. States in North-Western Europe tended to respond with increased detention of aliens and forced return measures (Doomernik and Jandl 2008).

From Emigration to Immigration in the Southern European Countries

Once North-Western European recruitment policies were discontinued in 1973–1974 and the period of mass emigration from Southern Europe came to an end, Mediterranean countries began their gradual transformation to countries of immigration. Changes were spurred by unprecedented economic growth and political stability brought about by the end of the dictatorships in Portugal, Greece, and Spain, as well as by the accession of these countries to the European Economic Community during the 1980s. Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece presented from the beginning particular patterns of migration and migration regulation that distinguished them from North-Western Europe (Baldwin-Edwards 1997; King et al. 1997; Arango and Finotelli 2009). The “Mediterranean model of immigration” (King et al. 1997) is characterized by a predominance of labour and family migration, a scarcity of asylum seekers, illegality as an endemic feature, and the combination of restrictive admission and citizenship policies with frequent amnesties. Migration to Southern Europe is closely related to its colonial past, linked to former African and Latin American colonies, and to the opening up of Central and Eastern Europe. Similarities in migration trends and policies among these countries must thus be seen in light of their common historical developments and analogous socio-economic conditions.

The start of immigration flows caught Southern European countries unprepared, lacking immigration experience and an adequate legal framework. Southern European countries reacted by developing policies to fence off immigration and established *ius sanguinis* as the principle defining who belonged to the nation. Spain passed its first foreigners law in 1985, pushed by the obligations acquired with its accession to the European Economic Community. The end of the Cold War and the gradual incorporation of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU migration system brought about a sharp increase of migration from Albania and the former Soviet Union to Italy and above all to Greece in the first half of the 1990s. In that period,

policymakers across Europe shared a fear of an imminent “invasion” of Central and Eastern European migrants, which stimulated the introduction of stricter control and admission measures. It was in this spirit that Greece and Italy developed their first alien laws, respectively, in 1991 and 1998.

From the mid-1980s through the 1990s, Southern Europe experienced a period of intense economic growth with substantial labour shortages in low-skilled sectors. This created a strong demand for migrant labour during a time of restructuring of the global economy, resulting in a remarkable increase of foreigners’ presence in Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece. Flows in Spain showed the most spectacular growth. The percentage of foreign population increased from 2.2 to 12.2 between 2000 and 2010, according to National Institute of Statistics figures. Despite these large flows, the issue of migration remained relatively depoliticized until recently, with foreign workers generally perceived as contributors to the national economy (except in Greece).²

As a result of the strong segmentation of the labour market that was characteristic of these countries, migrants were incorporated in low-status, low-paid jobs that natives tended to reject. Typically, those sectors with a strong need for low-skilled labour fell within the large informal economy of Southern European countries, estimated in 2002–2003 as 28.3 % of gross domestic product (GDP) in Greece, 26.2 % of GDP in Italy, and 22.2 % of GDP in Portugal and Spain (Schneider and Klingmair 2004). Other niches of migrant labour are closely associated with the features of the Mediterranean welfare regime, particularly the large informal market for domestic work and care-giving services, which employs primarily migrant women. Gradually, governments saw the need to regulate labour migration, with Spain being the first to introduce a scheme based on a labour market test (known as the *Regimen General*, as established in the 1985 Foreigners Law), followed by Greece in 1991 with its invitation scheme. Ultimately, all four countries ended up introducing a system of annual quotas for labour migrants—representing all skill levels—Italy in 1990, Spain in 1993, Greece in 2000, and Portugal in 2001. These systems were a forerunner of the current EU position that recognizes the need to open new legal ways to enter the EU given the crucial role that immigration plays in the European economy.³ Implicitly, Southern European countries have bet on immigrants to maintain the low-productivity sectors that form the core of their economies (González-Enriquez and Triandafyllidou 2009).

At a certain point, governments acknowledged that migration recruitment procedures were ineffective, as shown by the large presence of irregular migrants. To cope with the discrepancy between planned legal inflows and the actual needs of the

²Data from the European Social Survey between 2002 and 2008 show that while Southern Europeans are reticent towards the entry of “many” immigrants they generally acknowledge that immigrants bring about positive consequences for their national economies (Moreno Fuentes and Bruquetas-Callejo 2011, 162–165).

³In 2000, EU Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs Antonio Vitorino declared that ‘new legal ways for immigrants to enter the EU’ were needed because ‘the zero immigration policies of the past 25 years are not working’ (cit. in Martin et al. 2006, 74–75).

economy they have applied regularization programmes “ex post” with a certain degree of periodicity, though governments presented them each time as exceptional “one time only” measures (Arango and Finotelli 2009, 31). Regularizations have been applied by governments of different colour, showing a considerable continuity in the policies of the main political parties in all four countries, despite rhetorical differences (González-Enriquez and Triandafyllidou 2009; Zincone 2006). However, by 2005 regularizations had become highly controversial among North-Western European partners who claimed that immigrants regularized in Southern Europe tended to move to Northern Europe to benefit from the generous welfare systems there (Chauvin et al. 2013). Interestingly, research shows rather the opposite effect: regularizations in Italy and Spain have “stabilized” a large part of the immigrant population (Carafagna 2002; Blangiardo 2004; Arango and Finotelli 2009; Cachón 2007).⁴ In any case, from the mid-2000s, increased European integration has put more pressure on improving migration controls, and the European Council has agreed to limit regularizations to individual and ad hoc measures.

In sum, migration policies in the Southern EU member states have primarily set out to fight illegal migration. Massive migration flows to the Mediterranean countries occurred in a period combining restrictive policies and sizeable labour demand, and this partly explains why illegal migration is so predominant.⁵ The four Southern European countries followed a similar path of policymaking: starting with the lack of an adequate legal framework for the influx of migrants, soon after adopting strict control measures, then establishing measures to manage migrant labour, and subsequently resorting to regularizations to “repair” ex post the poorly functioning recruitment procedures.

Due to the peculiarities of the Mediterranean model of migration, illegal migration poses other challenges to Southern European countries than to North-Western European ones. Illegal migration in Southern Europe is mainly a result of visa-overstaying or losing work permits, not illegally entering the country (Monzini et al. 2006; Arango and Finotelli 2009). Southern European policymakers are thus mainly concerned with how to handle large concentrations of irregular migrants while at the same time curtailing the shadow economy and collecting taxes and social security contributions. From this perspective, regularization programmes seem to be win-win opportunities that transform irregular migrants into regular ones, making them taxpayers and social-security contributors. However, it leaves unresolved the question of how to prevent regular migrants from falling into irregularity when they have to renew their temporary residence permits and cannot prove they hold a formal job. It also fails to tackle the informal economy, which created and reproduces the South European irregular migration system.

⁴In fact, an Italian study observed that Eastern European citizens such as Moldavians and Ukrainians who lived in Italy had obtained their visas in Germany (Colombo and Sciortino 2004).

⁵Arango (2005) summarizes the factors involved in the “equation of irregularity” as intensive flows, restrictive regulations, attractiveness of the informal economy, geographical proximity, weakness of controls, and effectiveness of smuggling activities.

Central and Eastern Europe

During the decades in which Eastern and Central Europe were under Communist rule migration was a rare phenomenon. Insofar as it occurred, it concerned people leaving for Western countries. There were some highly publicized cases of dissidents who managed to flee, and others who were forced into exile, but quantitatively much more important were the ethnic Germans who, by the thousands and year after year, left Poland and Romania to resettle in the German Federal Republic. Between 1950 and 1989 this led to the resettlement of, respectively, some 240,000 persons.⁶ After the end of the Cold War the former states of the Eastern Bloc were confronted with three challenges. The first was emigration to Western and Southern Europe. Indeed, migration triggered the fall of the Iron Curtain. Almost as soon as the Hungarian government opened its borders to Austria in the summer of 1989 large numbers of East Germans used this opportunity to travel to West Germany. Significant also was that the Hungarian government had signed the Geneva Refugee Convention thus signalling that it would not return fleeing foreigners to their countries of origin (because of the Convention's prohibition against *refoulement*). The desire to move West did not diminish once all restrictions on departure had been lifted. The nature of the movements did change however. Fewer people settled abroad, and forms of brief mobility and temporary labour migration took on greater importance (Favell 2008). Until the 2004 accession of 10 new member states to the EU, much of this mobility was irregular. Afterwards, it became regular as part of the EU's freedom of movement. Generally speaking, emigration from the new member states poses no policy challenges in countries of origin. The main exceptions are found in the Baltics. Upon independence in 1991, nearly half of Latvia's population was of Russian origin. This fact made development of nationality policies unavoidable. These, in effect, transformed sizeable segments of the population into foreigners, many of whom felt compelled to "return" to Russia or go elsewhere (e.g., Jews could opt for a future in Israel or Germany) (Doomernik 1997). Another consequence of ethnic state-building in the Baltics was considerable governmental concern about emigration of co-ethnics and ensuing attempts to formulate effective and inclusive diaspora policies that would ideally lead to their return once the nation's economy had recovered from its crisis (Lace 2013). In Poland, too, maintaining the diaspora's connection with the fatherland was viewed as a strategic political objective, as was the promotion of employment in the wider EU (Kicinger and Koryś 2011, 367).

Secondly, immigration, be it of refugees or workers, until today has tended to be of minor political concern. In Poland, for instance, refugee numbers have been relatively small (mainly people fleeing Chechnya) whereas most other migrants arrive for work (OECD 2013, 284). Moreover, with the exception of Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics net migration is negative, in Latvia and Lithuania even dramatically so (*ibid.*, 271, 273). Early migration policies were, where needed,

⁶Own calculations based on Worbs et al. (2013, Table 2.2).

fashioned on an ad hoc basis. Such policy responses were required towards the presence of de facto guest workers from (predominantly) Vietnam who had arrived during the Communist era. These were typically granted leave to remain. There was also regional migration to regulate from the Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and the Russian Federation (ibid.), but few attempts at restriction were made. This changed once accession to the EU came into view, as Kicinger and Koryś (2011) show for the Polish case. Regarding third-country nationals, directives such as those on family reunification, long-term residents, and refugees had to be turned into national law. Existing migration patterns (often of a temporary nature) from eastern neighbours were not easily reconciled with the EU logic of border management, especially the Schengen Agreement. But finally border commuting could be exempted from a strict implementation of the Schengen regime (ibid.). For labour migrants from eastern neighbouring states, simplified rules were introduced in 2006 (exempting them from labour market testing) (OECD 2013, 284). Most of these workers were employed in construction and agriculture (ibid.).

According to Čaněk and Čížinsky (2011), reporting on the Czech experience, this happened somewhat naively and in the expectation that adopting the EU *acquis* would automatically mean the introduction of a comprehensive migration regime. However, the fact that this was not the case has not attracted much political attention. Since migration issues are not a salient political priority, and political parties lack distinctive positions and clear views about migration, migration policymaking has remained in the hands of specialized civil servants.

Among the Central European countries, first and foremost the Czech Republic became an attractive destination for economic migration from Russia, Ukraine, and Slovakia (Drbohlav 2012, 185). In the Czech case, increasing demand for migrant labour has been documented, especially in booming areas like Prague and Mladá Boleslav, where some authors report that the social welfare system offers insufficient motivation for unemployed Czechs to seek work (Jířková 2005 in Čaněk and Čížinsky 2011). Like most countries in the region, the Czech government has aspired to attract highly skilled migrant workers by means of a special scheme (Doomernik et al. 2009). Success, however, seems to have been limited (Drbohlav n.d.). In 2011, 244 migrants made use of the Czech scheme; 80 % of these were Ukrainian nationals (OECD 2013, 244).

Towards a European Approach to Asylum Seekers, Refugees, and Labour Migrants

With the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, migration and asylum were formally defined as a common policy concern. As noted earlier, at the time, asylum migration stood high on the political agenda of the EU's North-Western member states. A first step towards a common approach was to limit eligibility for protection to the first safe country the asylum seeker set foot in. This principle became codified in the Dublin Convention (and was later incorporated into the EU Treaty). In effect, this put the

obligation to receive asylum seekers on the member states at the EU's periphery. Alternative mechanisms by which to achieve more even burden-sharing have yet to be developed. Presently, some member states are unable (notably Greece) or unwilling (notably Italy) to abide by the agreements based on "Dublin". At the same time, member states farther north consider the existing arrangements as satisfactory. Political solidarity between member states is thus not easily achieved. Instead modest compensatory measures have been introduced to reward states for their efforts in accommodating refugees; the European Refugee Fund offers subsidies for their integration.

By 1997 political ambitions had progressed towards truly common policies in the field of refugee protection, asylum, and migration. The Amsterdam Treaty concluded that year (and coming into force in 1999) turned these issues into communitarian ones, and the Commission was asked to propose a comprehensive approach. By 2004 this had led in the field of asylum to directives on minimum norms regarding asylum-seeker reception and asylum procedures and on common definitions of who qualified as a refugee (which were recast in 2011). In many instances this simply permitted member states to continue existing practices. The Common European Asylum System (CEAS), as it is commonly referred to, gained new momentum from the publication in 2008 of the European Commission's Policy Plan on Asylum. This sought to build on the European political consensus regarding the need for more practical collaboration, further harmonization, and increased solidarity among member states. Yet, collaboration has since become most visible in increased border controls, the deployment of Frontex, and in 2011 the establishment of the European Asylum Support Office in Malta. Prospects for a truly joint asylum system (i.e., having joint processing facilities and redistributive measures) remain beyond the present horizon (Thielemann and Armstrong 2012).

Arguably, a common European asylum system would be born out of managerial and political necessity. However, as already noted, when the Amsterdam Treaty was drafted, the political ambition was to go much farther and devise a comprehensive European migration regime. To this end, the European Commission produced an ambitious proposal in 2001 (COMM 757/2001) going in the direction of managed and forward-looking labour immigration schemes to fulfil current and future demand and to curb irregular migration, human smuggling, and trafficking. It found support in Southern Europe but much less up north. Indeed, in subsequent steps, the willingness among member states to surrender their sovereignty in the admission of foreign workers evaporated (if it ever had truly existed).

Nevertheless, some consequential directives are now part of EU law. A 2003 directive grants long-term residents the same freedom of movement as is enjoyed by EU nationals (after five years of legal residence in one member state) (Council Directive 2003/109/EC). Also concluded in 2003 is a directive on family reunification (Council Directive 2003/86/EC) which determines the conditions under which third-country nationals can bring in their family members. In the subsequent years, this led to practices that were more liberal than some of the member states had intended. Coming into force more recently was the Blue Card Directive (Council Directive 2009/50/EC), detailing common rules for the admission of highly skilled workers. It aims to

simplify and standardize admission requirements for skilled workers from outside the EU and to ease their mobility between member states. The idea here is to increase the EU's competitive edge in the global competition for "brains". Hence, it hardly challenges member states' sovereignty (Doomernik et al. 2009).

Integration Regimes: Who Is to Integrate into What and by Which Means

Integration Policies in North-Western Europe

Since postcolonial immigration was generally understood as a collective inheritance and to comprise members of the nation, most North-Western European countries did not develop policies for the integration of migrants from the colonies.⁷ Nevertheless, in countries like the Netherlands, migrants were exposed to fierce re-education programmes aimed at acculturating them into the mainstream.

Migrants arriving within post-war recruitment schemes were seen as "guest workers" and therefore ideas about integrating them into society hardly surfaced. When they did, national reactions differed considerably. States varied in their basic conception of citizenship, which shapes the rules of belonging to the community. In Germany and other countries where membership to the nation is defined by descent (*ius sanguinis*), permanent settlement of non-Germans was politically daunting and, on the part of the migrant, required many years of patience and almost complete assimilation into society. Countries having a political definition of the nation provided easier admission of new members to the polity, as long as newcomers adhered to the constitution, laws, and political rules. Among the countries that applied such an approach to integration, some, including France, required more cultural adaptation, while others, such as Sweden, the UK, and the Netherlands, tolerated or even promoted a higher degree of cultural and ethnic diversity. Newcomers in France were considered 'individuals who had to disappear into the pre-defined political model by renouncing their own attributes—cultural, religious or otherwise—in the public sphere' (Wihtol de Wenden 2011, 67). In the UK, on the contrary, integration was officially defined as 'not a flattening process of uniformity but as cultural diversity coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance' (Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, cited in Rex 1995, 248). According to different ways of understanding citizenship and nationhood, European countries developed integration policies that have been coined "differential exclusionist", "assimilationist", or "pluralist".⁸

⁷The UK, for instance, in 1965 created the Race Relations Act which outlawed racial discrimination.

⁸Castles and Miller's (1993) classification of conceptions of citizenship as "republican", "ethnic", or "multicultural" is one of the most frequently cited. Recent criticisms challenge the usefulness of such national integration models (Thränhardt and Bommes 2010).

The timing of the development of integration policies has also been influenced by such conceptions of citizenship. For states in North-Western Europe that relied on exclusive notions of nationhood, it took a very long time to acknowledge the permanent character of migration. In Germany, for instance, the presence of non-German immigrants remained ignored until 2001, when a government-appointed committee concluded that migration henceforth should be actively promoted. Other countries in the region recognized relatively early on that what had seemed to be temporary migration had turned into long-term settlement. They, hence, developed integration policies and sought to limit discriminatory effects of immigration law by offering ways towards rapid naturalization. Two countries that had formulated early responses towards the settlement of non-nationals were the Netherlands and Sweden. In the Dutch case, from 1980 onward the government pursued an active integration policy whereby the precise definition of who was targeted by the policy evolved in sync with overall societal evolution. Elsewhere, realization of the permanent character of migrant settlement did not lead to formal integration policy; rather, integration was addressed under general welfare policies or shaped by less formalized arrangements and implemented by non-state actors.

Even in states that adopted explicit integration policies, the general institutional framework shaped the socio-economic integration of immigrants. Particularly, the welfare regime (and the corresponding economic-industrial configuration and type of labour market) together with immigration law have proven crucial for the position of immigrants. While the residential and legal status of immigrants determines, directly and indirectly, their access to public welfare and to the labour market as long as they remain foreigners, the distinct welfare regime in place shapes both the opportunity of access and the form and extent of benefits (Dorr and Faist 1997; Morissens and Sainsbury 2005). The systems that provide more extensive coverage for immigrants are the universal ones that include the whole residential population, like those in Scandinavian countries and, in some policy areas, in other countries (such as old-age pensions in the Netherlands and health care in Spain and the UK). Insurance systems based on contributions during times of regular employment, typical of conservative-corporatist welfare states like Germany, France, and the Benelux, tend to exclude some migrant categories from benefits. Among the selective security systems typical of liberal welfare states, such as the UK and Ireland, coverage for immigrants very much depends on the degree of governmental regulation of the market.

With time, some states that had previously excluded migrants from formal (i.e., legal) participation opened up by offering *ius soli* and relaxed conditions for naturalization, whereas others that were previously relatively open, started to become less inclusive in legal terms, matched by more assimilationist conceptions of “integration”. Obtaining permanent residency status has in some cases been made conditional on fulfilling such integration requirements. The Dutch pioneered testing of language skills before a visa is granted to spouses seeking to join their husband or wife in the Netherlands. Upon arrival, substantial language proficiency must be demonstrated. Mandatory integration courses and contractual obligations to acquire basic language and cultural skills, first developed by Denmark and the Netherlands,

have become widespread in this part of Europe (e.g., in France, Germany, and Austria), albeit not always aimed at the same segment of the immigrant population. In effect, admission and integration have increasingly become intertwined.

In spite of the relevance of the national level, local authorities and local actors across North-Western Europe have been and still are key in the formulation and implementation of integration policies. Even in the countries that developed highly centralized schemes, like the Netherlands and Sweden, the importance of the local level is undeniable, bringing about a distinctive view on integration oriented by rather pragmatic goals. This has sometimes led to open discontinuities or opposition between national and local policies.

Integration Policies in Southern European Countries

In Southern Europe, integration measures followed long after the attempts to regulate admissions and migrant labour. Italy launched in 1998 its first migration law including integration; Spain did so in 2000, followed by Greece and Portugal in 2001. Up to then Southern Europe's management of migration resembled in many ways that in Northern Europe during the guest worker period in the 1960s. Despite the fact that immigration to Southern Europe was neither mediated nor planned by the receiving states, a labour-oriented approach prevailed in which immigration control and labour regulation were the main priorities and integration was relegated to a second place (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). This explains the economic conception of migration that guides Southern European policies, in contrast to the humanitarian-oriented commitment that still weighs heavily in North-Western European policies (Finotelli 2009). In this view, regularizations are legitimized as a mechanism allowing the legal inclusion of formally unwanted (irregular) immigrants, provided that they enhance the utility of immigration for the receiving country's economy and society. Above all, those who contribute positively to the countries' economies become the Mediterranean answer to the question of who should be integrated.

Characteristic of Southern European countries is that integration policies have been elaborated from the bottom up, starting with local and regional initiatives in the 1990s. Policies diverged from city to city and region to region. Since the turn of the millennium, we have witnessed in all countries initiatives to produce national frameworks of integration in an effort to coordinate the policies produced at sub-national levels. Greece and Portugal have been relatively successful in this regard, with national plans that are managed in a more centralized way than those in Spain and Italy. Moreover, EU initiatives and financial instruments (e.g., the European Social Fund and European Integration Fund) have promoted the application of integration projects initiated by immigrant organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), municipalities, and universities. The outcomes of these EU programmes for the promotion of the social and economic integration of immigrants have been positive though limited (Triandafyllidou 2009).

Southern European countries have continued to think of themselves as emigration countries (Zincone 2011, 390), which is reflected in their more open integration policies. With the exception of Greece, Southern European countries are very inclusive in legal terms, especially towards migrants with a cultural or ethnic link. Regular immigrants in Southern Europe have access to basic rights (e.g., work, welfare services, health care, and education) on equal footing with natives, while irregular migrants' access depends on local authorities' will and the discretionary practices of street-level bureaucrats (González-Enriquez and Triandafyllidou 2009; Moreno Fuentes and Bruquetas-Callejo 2011). Spain is a case in point, as since 2000 irregular migrants registered in the municipal census have been entitled to basic social rights such as health care, education, and welfare allowances, although with the reform of the health care law in 2012 (Royal Decree 16/2012) health care rights were restricted to foreigners legally residing in the country and contributing to the social security system.⁹

As a consequence of their labour-oriented approach to migration, immigrant integration in Southern European societies takes place mainly through labour market insertion. Typical of the Mediterranean welfare regime, Southern European countries offer coverage for unemployment and old-age pensions proportionate to labour participation and contributions to the social security system. This contributive logic, which is also common among the conservative-corporatist systems of North-Western Europe, usually implies that foreign-born citizens have less coverage since they tend to hold temporary jobs. Similarly, their old-age pensions tend to be less, since most immigrants have contributed to the social security system for fewer years. Thus, Mediterranean welfare states are characterized by a combination of contributive and universal schemes. While immigrants are entitled to universal benefits in areas like health care and social services, the amount of other benefits (e.g., basic income allowances) is linked to contributions, meaning they tend to be more meagre than those of the native populations.

This also means that the process of integration is less directly mediated by explicit policies of integration but rather by immigrants' agency and interaction with local network and clientelistic relations that structure the labour market and interaction with the state in Southern Europe (Triandafyllidou 2009). Immigrants find their local niches of life and work and take part in local life and networks regardless of their legal situation. Nevertheless, as we read above, the segmentation of the labour market determines that migrants are incorporated in the less protected segments and often in very precarious situations.

Moreover, immigrants are tolerated to reside and work in these countries but are generally seen as outsiders, not belonging to the nation even after many years of residence. Restrictive citizenship policies in Southern Europe make naturalization especially difficult. Third-country nationals in Italy, Greece, Spain, and (until 2006) Portugal are required to have resided in the country at least ten years in order to apply for naturalization. Yet, for immigrants who can prove ethnic descent or colonial ties, naturalization is relatively easy, creating two differentiated roads to integration.

⁹Then again, regional governments are in charge of implementing this, which leads to variation. So far, several regions have publicly declared that they will not implement this reform.

Southern European societies produce a different answer to the question of who should be integrated. Contrary to the North-Western European situation, Southern Europeans are rather tolerant to irregular immigrants (González-Enríquez and Triandafyllidou 2009). This can be explained by the prevailing labour migration rational, as well as the roles played by various actors. The Catholic Church in three of the four countries, for example, has lobbied for soft policies towards irregular migration (while in Greece, the Orthodox Church has not played an important role). Trade unions, too, have adopted a cooperative stance towards immigrants. While the middle classes provide a broad base of social support (partly due to the services that migrants provide for them), there are negative feelings among low-skilled workers, since their salaries and labour conditions have been affected by the arrival of immigrants.

Integration Policies in Central and Eastern Europe

The former Eastern Bloc countries still have relatively small numbers of migrants from third countries. Foreign-born residents are most prevalent in the Czech Republic at 3.8 %, whereas in Poland only 1.2 % is foreign-born (Vasileva 2011). For Hungary the figure is 4.4 %, but includes many ethnic Hungarians who resettled from neighbouring countries. Accordingly, throughout Central Europe little has been done in the design of national integration policies (Dbrohlav 2012, 196). In fact, the incipient policy initiatives in this field are largely EU-driven. Central European countries' accession to the EU pushed them to develop policies in this area, despite their scant migration figures. This has implications for the policies produced, since launching integration policies in countries where there are relatively few migrants is an abstract process, and EU policymaking applies only soft measures.

In Poland, for example, integration policies have so far been limited to asylum seekers, while other categories of migrants are covered by scattered European-funded initiatives. Poland's ratification of the Geneva Convention in 1991 afforded it international recognition as a democracy; therefore, refugee protection has become the most important area of integration policies (Kicinger 2009, 91). Integration policies are being articulated in the Czech Republic too, and updated yearly, with policy initiatives stressing both the acquisition of rights by foreigners and immigrants' acquisition of the Czech language and basic civic knowledge (Barsová and Barsa 2005). Since 2009, language tests have been introduced as a requirement to obtain permanent residence status. In addition, the government has since 2011 established regional integration centres where third-country nationals and refugees can find practical support. The government explicitly mentions its reliance on European resources (e.g., the European Integration Fund) to fund these centres and their activities. Writing about Poland, Stefanska (2011) asserts that without such EU funds, integration measures would be absent.

A number of these states recently reformed their naturalization laws to facilitate the legal inclusion of migrants. In the Czech Republic, for instance, five years of

legal residence presently suffices to attain Czech citizenship. This is more liberal than the naturalization laws in Poland and Hungary. In these latter countries, respectively, ten and eight years of residence is the standard requirement, while more relaxed conditions apply for spouses of nationals and refugees. A reflection of the growing importance of migration in the Czech Republic is that from 2014 forward, naturalization will no longer require relinquishing one's original nationality.

Top-down processes of policymaking such as those promoted by EU funds may lead to inconsistencies, piecemeal policymaking, and a growing need for development of a more comprehensive integration system. In Poland, introduction of a comprehensive policy is under discussion (Pawlak 2015). In the Czech Republic responsibilities for integration policymaking are being concentrated in the Department of Asylum and Migration (Čaněk and Čížinsky 2011). In Central and Eastern Europe, overall, development of comprehensive integration policies takes place against the backdrop of the transformation of the communist regime. As any process of such deep institutional change, this transition constitutes both an opportunity for introducing new policymaking and a challenge, because brand new policies must grow in an institutional framework full of incongruities. Above all, there is a fundamental inconsistency in the logic of Central European economic and welfare institutions by which 'neo-liberal economic institutions coexist with outdated, malfunctioning distributive institutions, which are fundamentally socialist in nature' (Szelenyi and Wilk 2010, 583 in Pawlak 2015).

Conclusion

Obviously, we do not know what directions migration and integration regimes in Europe would have taken if these topics were still the sole domain of national governments. Perhaps they would have converged anyway as a consequence of other macro developments. In any event, a first general observation that can be made is that migration regimes have become similar, and where EU *acquis* rule, even identical. These developments have secured the position of third-country nationals and provided for uniform rules regarding family reunification. In other cases, however, convergence has not taken place along the lines of equally shared interests or fair compromise, but rather the concerns of the old EU-15 member states, particularly the North-Western ones, have set the tone. This has resulted in restrictive measures instead of burden-sharing in the EU's joint dealings with asylum seekers and refugees, to the dislike of Southern European members. With the exception of highly skilled migration, joint labour migration policies have not materialized. Furthermore, EU accession has forced member states that previously had relaxed (or few) migration policies to take controls seriously.

Convergence is furthermore in evidence when it comes to integration regimes. Countries that initially had multicultural policies have gradually developed policies with an assimilationist slant. There is also evidence of countries going in the opposite direction: from ethnically justified exclusion to more openness towards

ethnic diversity. Those member states for which the immigration experience is fairly fresh do not tend to have comprehensive approaches towards settlers from third countries. Integration policies instead tend to be a local matter, often stimulated by EU funding. In effect, where national political agendas are less inclined towards the support of immigrant integration, these can be bypassed by municipal governments. In Central and to some extent Southern Europe, integration is not necessarily on the national political agenda to begin with. Indeed, it finds expression mainly in networks such as Integrating Cities, Intercultural Cities, CLIP (the European Network of Cities for Local Integration Policies for Migrants), and ECCAR (the European Coalition of Cities against Racism), which receive subsidies from a European Commission programme for the integration of third-country nationals. Because these networks bring together a large number of cities to work together and share practices, much of the resulting integration dynamic appears to be local.

This brings us to a third trend (and a final question): not only in new countries of immigration but also in the older member states, local governance appears to be rising in importance. As also noted by others (e.g., Barber 2013; Saunders 2010) migration is predominantly an urban affair, and local governments are keenly aware of the opportunities and challenges resulting from it. At the same time, at the national level political responses to migration can be critical, and at times downright unfriendly. This may prompt local policymakers to look elsewhere for support, for example, to the EU. Whether this actually undermines the importance of the national level in dealing with such sensitive issues as national identity and belonging is still an open question.

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Chapter 5

Who Is an Immigrant and Who Requires Integration? Categorizing in European Policies

Liza Mügge and Marleen van der Haar

Introduction

The formulation of immigration and integration policies is indispensably tied to the naming of immigrants, thereby differentiating between them. Categories form the backbone of policies, as they formally define (i) *who* is a wanted and *who* is an unwanted immigrant and (ii) *who* requires integration and *who* does not. “Immigrants” are far from homogeneous. They differ in characteristics such as migration motives (e.g., for work, political asylum, or family reunification), type of homeland (e.g., Western versus non-Western), and gender and ethnicity. Consequently, some immigrants are considered part of an intractable policy issue (Rein and Schön 1977; Schön and Rein 1994), whereas others are not. Whether a group is problematized or targeted as in need of integration depends on the combination of characteristics and statuses attributed to it. Such characteristics and statuses provide the basis of categories that define which immigration and integration policies a group is subjected to. For instance, integration policies tend to frame ethnic minority women, especially Muslims, as victims, while their male spouses and family members may be regarded as a threat to the state’s ideals of gender equality since they are presumed to oppress

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women (Bracke 2011; Roggeband and Verloo 2007). Such a framing leads to different policy outcomes for different groups of immigrants. Emancipation is generally seen as the main vehicle for the integration of Muslim women, while integration of Muslim men tends to focus on surveillance and control (Razack 2004).

This chapter draws on a literature review to examine the implications of categorization for immigration and integration trajectories. It examines how categories formalized in laws and regulations construct explicit as well as implicit target groups. For policy purposes, formal target groups tend to be treated as mutually exclusive (Yanow 2003). However, policies implicitly differentiate within target groups as well, for instance, along lines of religion and class (see also Schrover and Moloney 2013, 255). This chapter is guided by three questions. First, how do policies construct categorizations? Second, who do policies target explicitly, and who do they target implicitly? Third, under what conditions do policy categories (e.g., the groups that are considered problematic and “in need of integration”) and terms (e.g., guest workers, allochthones, illegals, and asylum seekers) unintentionally render stereotypes, prejudices, and potential discrimination? The first section outlines theoretical perspectives on categories in policymaking. The second section analyses who is targeted explicitly and who is targeted implicitly by immigration and integration policies. In particular, it looks at the two main tracks of European citizens and third-country nationals (TCNs). Although policymaking—and therefore the use of categories—takes place at multiple levels that sometimes clash (e.g., rejected asylum seekers may be categorized as “unwanted” at the national level, but at the same time be accommodated at the local level), this chapter concentrates on the literature addressing the supranational and national levels.

The Study of Categories and Its Relevance for Policymaking

Categories are central organizing structures in all human societies (Hancock 2007, 64). They are key in attributing sameness and difference (Stone 2002, 308), based on a combination of ‘achieved and ascribed traits’ (Massey 2007, 1). Achieved characteristics are acquired in the course of living (e.g., being a member of a particular income class or a university graduate), while ascribed characteristics are set at birth (e.g., age and sex) (ibid.).

The study of categories is well developed in sociology and public policy. Gender studies and migration and ethnic studies focus on categories in their critical assessments of processes of exclusion and discrimination of women, migrants, and ethnic minorities. In doing so, scholars in these fields examine social stratification, referring to ‘the unequal distribution of people across social categories that are characterized by differential access to scarce resources’ (ibid.). These resources may be material (e.g., wealth), symbolic (e.g., social standing), or emotional (e.g., love). Stratification systems, Massey (2007) argues, order people vertically from a top to a bottom. A society’s degree of stratification is typically measured in terms of inequality, ‘which assesses the degree of variability in the dispersion of people among ranked social categories’ (ibid., 2).

Stratification can be traced in two powerful mechanisms: ‘the allocation of people into social categories, and the institutionalization practices that allocate resources unequally across these categories’ (ibid., 5–6). These mechanisms produce categorical inequality, which is ‘a pattern of social stratification that is remarkably “durable” in the sense that it is reproduced across time and generations’ (Tilly 1998 cited by Massey 2007, 6). Stereotypes evolving from categorization are usually produced by those located at the top of the stratification system, namely, the people who control the most resources. For instance, whites in the USA have perpetuated negative stereotypes of African-Americans as unintelligent, hypersexual, and violent (Massey 2007, 15). Individual members of the stereotyped out-group tend to experience discrimination and exclusion over centuries (ibid.). Categorical mechanisms are thus deeply embedded within both the infrastructure of social institutions and cultural practices (ibid., xvi). As a result, categorical distinctions affect not only formal public settings, but also private life (ibid., 7).

States and policymakers use categories to describe social phenomena and turn them into policy problems on which they can intervene (Yanow 2003). Categories in this sense can be considered framing devices, with a frame defined as an ‘organizing principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a structured and meaningful problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly included’ (Verloo 2005, 20). Categories *reflect* social realities, but at the same time *construct* reality (Yanow 2003). State-defined categories used in policymaking may construct, implicitly or explicitly, ethnicized, gendered, or classed target groups. For instance, as a result of labour and postcolonial migration, the Netherlands government identified among others Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antilleans as a categorical target group and developed specific integration policies for them. Despite the internal ethnic, racial, and religious diversity within this group, these policies *reflected* reality at a certain point in time as immigrants started to organize themselves along the categorical units of Dutch integration policy. However, the naming of these groups also resulted in the monitoring of them in official statistics. As a result, their children—the so-called “second generation”—are also categorized on the basis of the country of birth of their parents. In this way their identity is *attributed*.

Categories are crucial for the formulation of policies, and they are a central point of departure in studies of inequality. Categorical inequality may result when those in power enact policies that give certain groups more access to resources than others and systematically channel social and cultural capital to particular categories of people (Massey 2007, 23). In the context of migration and integration, categories are used to define target groups for policies. In some countries such categories are ascribed, while in others they are based on “self-identification”. We described above the Netherlands’ use of categories based on the birth country of immigrants or their parents. In the UK people are asked to themselves choose between a number of broad race-based categories and subcategories based on ethnicity.¹ Censuses are a powerful tool for states to collect information about the “origin” and mobility of their residents. The European Union (EU) 2008 census regulation requires member

¹ www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/measuring-equality/equality/index.html, accessed 13 July 2014.

states to collect information about residents' country of birth (distinguishing between EU and non-EU member states) and country of citizenship (EC 2011). This has enabled the EU to produce statistics about resident foreigners and foreign-born EU citizens. Although this may appear to be a neutral activity, state institutions may reorganize these data and allocate identities to residents that are not at all neutral. For instance, the Netherlands and Flemish (Belgium) governments have used the term "non-Western allochthon" to demarcate the target group for integration policies (Jacobs and Rea 2012; Yanow and Van der Haar 2013). In the Netherlands, the term is officially reserved for persons who themselves or at least one of their parents were born in Turkey, Africa, Latin America, or Asia. In practice, this means that especially migrants from Muslim countries are considered the problem category (Groenendijk 2011, 22; see also Yanow and Van der Haar 2013). The concept of allochthon first appeared in a 1971 report on post-Second World War migration (Verwey-Jonker 1971). The term gained ground in 1984 when the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics started to monitor the lives of migrants and their children. The term appears in policy discussions from 1989 onwards (WRR 1989). The taxonomy it implies, and especially the distinction between Western and non-Western allochthones, creates a hierarchy between individuals based on their country of birth (Yanow and Van der Haar 2013). Much analysis of categories has been inspired by the interpretive study of what is considered to be the problem (diagnosis) and the proposed solution (Verloo 2005). Studying the diagnostic part of policy texts is a useful way to uncover why particular groups are problematized and singled out as target groups, while others are not. The target group is usually formulated in reference to existing social categories, such as race/ethnicity, religion, class, and gender. The proposed solution then is captured in policymaking. To understand who are targeted explicitly and implicitly by immigration and integration policies the following section examines what we term the "policy chain", which determines which policies immigrants are subjected to from the moment of their arrival.

Explicit Target Groups and Implicit Hierarchies in the Policy Chain

Problematizing the mobility of persons is inherent to the idea of the nation state that presupposes unity of territory, state, and citizens (Geiger 2013, 17). European nation states and EU institutions have built systems to regulate who can enter their respective territories and under what conditions. Increasingly, not only immigration but also the integration of migrants is a policy issue. This section discusses the legal categories used to define mobile persons and the effect of these categories in directing a migrant's route in the policy chain (Fig. 5.1). The starting point is a categorization by the EU based on a person's country of origin. Is the person in question a citizen of an EU member state or a TCN. This dichotomy leads to divergent paths determining whether or not migrants do eventually become the subject of integration policy and whether they will gain access to social, political, and economic rights.




Fig. 5.1 Migrants' routes in the categorical policy chain (Source: Authors)

Route 1: EU Citizens

The first step in the policy chain establishes whether a migrant is a member-state national or a TCN (Rea et al. 2011, 10). The legal term “TCN” is based on nationality and residence status, not on ethnic origin or culture (Groenendijk 2011, 34). Introduction of the right to free movement of EU citizens (based on the 1985 Schengen Agreement and 1990 Schengen Convention) and the harmonization of migration law and policy (via the Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 1999) had substantial impact on the distinction between migrants who are considered in need of integration and those who are not. Yet, although these agreements

reduced the legal distance between national citizens and member-state nationals (*ibid.*), this does not mean that all Europeans gained equal status.

EU policies start from the assumption that EU citizens, when moving to another member state as Europeans, are integrated by default. Consequently, integration policies and facilities have been designed and implemented for TCNs only. Nonetheless, policy debates, and in some cases policies, at the national level and even more so at the local level do distinguish between EU citizens. For instance, migrant workers from relatively new EU members, such as Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, are to be excluded from integration policies according to EU definitions, but their lack of “integration” has nonetheless been criticized in public and political fora. Migrants from the newer EU member states often face highly nationalized demands for integration, including language competence requirements and culturalized and moralized citizenship tests (Favell 2013, 5). Prior to Britain’s lifting of restrictions on migrants from Bulgaria and Romania in January 2014, UK politicians—in direct opposition to the EU’s integration definition—proposed a cap on social services for European migrants.²

In fact, tensions may result from differences in policy aims between the EU and its member states. A striking example is the treatment of the Roma from Bulgaria and Romania in France. Whereas EU institutions have, in the context of enlargement policy, continuously argued for measures to promote the social inclusion of the Roma (Parker 2012, 476), this was disregarded by the French authorities. Following riots and clashes between Roma and the French police in July 2010, President Sarkozy ordered half of the country’s 539 Roma camps to be cleared to restore ‘the republican order’ (*ibid.*, 478). Shortly after, the French government expelled more than 1,000 camp inhabitants, sending them back to their countries of origin.³ These actions led to a direct confrontation with the European Commission, which interpreted the French actions as an existential threat to the European peace project. The EU warned France that it would pursue infringement procedures. The Commission’s proceedings against France hinged on

the fact that France had not fully transposed aspects of the 2004 Directive on free movement into its national legislation. This had enabled the country to avoid deploying various safeguards specified within this Directive in order to protect EU citizens targeted for removal either on the basis of their being a ‘threat to public order or security’ or on the basis of their ‘insufficient [economic] means’ (*ibid.*, 479–480).

This example illustrates the clear hierarchy between EU citizens from the West and those from Eastern Europe. Favell (2013) argues that next to familiar targets, such as Muslims and undocumented Africans, currently Eastern Europeans (e.g., Poles and Romanians) and Southern Europeans (Greek, Portuguese, and potentially highly qualified Spaniards and Italians) are included in what he calls the anti-immigration tide. Free movement and equal treatment may be guaranteed in legal

² www.spiegel.de/international/europe/western-europe-fearful-of-roma-immigrants-from-romania-and-bulgaria-a-884760.html, accessed on 8 June 2014.

³ www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frances-expulsion-roma-migrants-test-case-europe, accessed on 13 July 2014.

and political terms, but it is not a ‘sociological reality’ (ibid., 4). Indeed, ‘not all citizens are equal and some passports are better than others’. Hierarchies between citizens lead to a ‘new system of global economic stratification’ (Castles 2004, 223).

Route 2: Third-Country Nationals

TCNs are categorized on the basis of their admission labels, such as labour migrants, asylum seekers, family migrants, refugees, and postcolonial migrants (Schrover and Moloney 2013, 257). Labour migrants are characterized in economic terms. They migrate for reason of employment, either on a temporary or permanent basis. Family migrants come to form a family (marriage migration) or to be reunited with family members (family reunification). This type of migration is highly and explicitly feminized (Bonjour and De Hart 2013). Postcolonial and colonial migrants are those originating from countries formerly colonized by the country of destination. In many cases, they have—or had—a legal right to settle in European countries (Hampshire 2013, 18). Policymakers use these categorizations as mutually exclusive groups. But in reality, these broad classifications overlap. People may move between categories (ibid., 257) or they may use the policy labels available for their migration project. For instance, many of the guest workers who left Greece, Spain, and Portugal in the 1960s and early 1970s had political motives to flee the regimes of colonel Papadopoulos and Makarezos, Franco, and Salazar, respectively. Applying for asylum in North and West European countries was cumbersome and risky. In those days it was easier to apply for a residence permit for work.

Many scholars point to the disproportional problematization of non-European immigrants (Rea et al. 2011; Favell 2013; Schmidtke 2012). Schmidtke (2012, 32) argues that the term TCN creates a non-European “other” by which the EU reproduces a ‘hiatus between the wanted, highly-qualified, ideally Western migrants, and the unwanted ones from the non-European world’. The distinction made between wanted and un-wanted follows a ‘utilitarian logic’ of the country’s economic competitiveness (ibid.). The difference between wanted and unwanted TCN immigrants comes clearly to the fore through visa procedures. Rules of visa application make use of so-called “positive” and “negative” lists to distinguish between TCNs that need a visa to travel to the EU Schengen area and those who do not (Groenendijk 2011, 24). Central databases have been created to collect information about non-nationals, especially since the 2004 and 2007 directives on legal migration. The introduction of these immigration databases⁴ is legitimated as a security and safety

⁴Groenendijk (2011, 33–34) refers to three databases. The first, the Schengen Information System (SIS; SIS-II is the new version which includes the possibility of using biometrics) enables exchange of data about suspected criminals, people who may not have the right to enter the EU, missing persons, and stolen, misappropriated, or missing property. Second, EURODAC is a system for comparing fingerprints of asylum seekers and some illegal migrants. Third the Visa Information System (VIS) enables Schengen countries to exchange visa data.

measure linked to the political context of the fight against terrorism, other serious crime, and illegal immigration (ibid., 33). The lists are said to be based on criteria such as potential security risk, illegal immigration, and economic relations. The result is that the “positive” list consists of ‘rich countries and countries in Europe and the Americas with predominantly white populations’ (ibid.). Besides the implied distinction based on class and race/ethnicity, the lists also mark a religious watershed, as in practice they also distinguish between Muslim and Christian populations (ibid.).

Route 2a: Legal Immigrants and Target of Integration Policy

The group of immigrants that is allowed formal access becomes legal and a target of integration policy. Particular measures in current integration and immigration policy practice appear to spotlight female migrants (on women marriage migrants, see Bonjour and De Hart 2013; on gender inequality as an ethnicized problem see Roggeband and Verloo 2007; Prins and Saharso 2008), while migrant masculinity is often problematized (Van der Haar 2013; Scheibelhofer 2012). Bonjour and De Hart (2013) suggest that the Netherlands’ policymaking on marriage migration is shaped by the idea of transnational marriages being fraudulent and forced, and (Muslim) migrant women being the victims of these practices. Scheibelhofer (2012) sets out how the image of an “archaic migrant masculinity” is used to legitimate restrictive migration laws in Austria: the human capital, norms, and values of migrant men have become criteria for their classification as wanted or unwanted. The general discourse that becomes clear from the abovementioned studies is that women migrants need to be protected by the “receiving state”, whereas migrant men mainly need to be controlled. In these cases, “marked identities” (Yanow 2003) again based on homogenized social categories like race/ethnicity, gender, class, and religion (often replicated in research as static analytical categories) are reproduced. Furthermore, negative and pejorative assumptions about groups are especially highlighted, resulting in a singling out of particular immigrants to be targeted by particular measures.

Religion and most certainly Islam is another important factor in prioritizing women migrants as a target group in policies. These women are associated with problems ranging from honour related violence, forced and arranged marriages, genital mutilation, and domestic violence to low labour market participation. Migrant women with a Muslim background are portrayed as victims of patriarchal cultures informed by Islam. As many European states perceive themselves as liberal, these women are targeted in family-related migration policies and integration policies that aim to transmit norms of gender equality (see Bonjour and De Hart 2013 on the Netherlands; for a comparative study on seven EU countries, see Kofman et al. 2013). But again, assumptions about class, in the form of low education and backwardness, are used to legitimize restrictions in family migration and strict measures of cultural assimilation into the destination society through state

integration policies. Razack (2004), for example, argues that Norway's culturalist approach to forced marriages enables the stigmatization and surveillance of Muslim communities and feeds the idea of European superiority. The assumed causalities in the diagnoses underlying policy issues may thus have highly exclusionary consequences.

Critical scholars have stressed the risk of homogenizing, and hereby essentializing, identities in policy and research (e.g., Rath 1991; Ghorashi 2006; Schinkel 2007; Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012; Jacobs and Rea 2012). The main concern is that categories defined in policies at the supranational or state level produce or reinforce stereotypes that foster prejudices and potential discrimination. The following examples show how the dichotomy allochthon and autochthon and subcategories in the Netherlands and Flanders have produced durable stereotypes. These stereotypes are products of the formal policy chain and—as Massey (2007) reminds us—affect private life, but are increasingly contested by the children and grandchildren of immigrants.

“Allochthon” and its counterpart “autochthon” have taken on a for-granted character in Dutch and Flemish politics, administration, and society (Jacobs and Rea 2012; Van der Haar and Yanow 2011; De Zwart 2012). However, changes are visible at the local level, at the insistence of a new generation of “allochthones”. The city of Ghent, for instance, declared the twin concepts “dead and buried” on the international day against racism (Severs 2014). This marked the official end of the allochthon-autochthon distinction in the administrative jargon of the municipality.

Since the 1980s, the Netherlands has developed an international reputation as a multicultural society due in part to its efforts to promote integration of ethnic minorities while also enabling them to maintain their culture. This resulted in group-specific policies for the largest immigrant groups, among them Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, Antilleans, Moluccans, and Southern Europeans (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). Both the general term “ethnic minorities” and its various subcategories became deeply rooted in daily life, though they have not gone uncontested by substantial numbers of the people labelled in these terms. For instance, during a local election rally in March 2014, Geert Wilders, the leader of the Dutch populist right-wing party PVV, asked the gathered crowd whether there should be “fewer Moroccans” in the Netherlands. In an indignant response, Dutch citizens of Moroccan descent started a Twitter campaign under the hashtag “BornHere”. They posted “selfies” defiantly showing their Dutch passports.⁵ In the ensuing days, Dutch politicians, organizational leaders, comedians, and individual citizens of Moroccan descent mobilized and filed thousands of discrimination complaints against Wilders.⁶ This attracted wide support of the established white political elite in praise of the outspoken Moroccan-Dutch activism. This activism takes on even greater symbolic weight in light of Morocco's citizenship law: Moroccans cannot renounce their Moroccan passport. The Dutch-Moroccan activists thus made a

⁵ See www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2014/03/dutch-far-right, accessed on 4 April 2014.

⁶ See www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/20/dutch-politician-geert-wilders-moroccans-outrage-pvv-party-anti-islam, accessed on 4 April 2014.

public choice for the Netherlands. They were fed up with being seen as Moroccan. Ethnic minority students at academic institutions across Western countries, such as Harvard, Oxford, and the University of Amsterdam launched a similar campaign: “I too am [name of the university].” Here, ethnic minority students were portrayed holding handwritten signs quoting implicit or explicit discriminatory comments they experienced on a daily basis (e.g., on forced marriage, skin colour, and language skills).⁷

The message is clear: the children and grandchildren of immigrants represent a new generation of highly educated and eloquent citizens who no longer accept being seen as second-class citizens judged merely on their immigrant backgrounds. They are not *different*. The #BornHere and “I too” campaigns point to the development of stereotypes based on assumptions of a poorly integrated first-generation immigrant who lived in a parallel society and aimed to return home as soon as possible. These are not stand-alone examples, but are part of a broader ethnic minority stance against being seen and treated as outsiders by the majority population, “even after two generations” (Andriessen et al. 2007, 107; Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008 cited by De Zwart 2012, 312).

Route 2b: Legal Immigrants and Target of Return Policy

Undocumented migration and the entry of asylum seekers are driven by forces—such as transnational networks—that governments cannot control (Castles 2004, 205). Although the issue of asylum was actually an important incentive for the EU to harmonize migration-related policies (see Penninx and Scholten in this volume), it has proven difficult to address the root causes of migration, not least because of the different objectives of the various EU bodies and member states (Castles 2004, 223). Undocumented immigrants and asylum seekers who are not granted residence permits become the target of return policies. In many European states, unsuccessful asylum seekers may be transferred to “detention and removal centres” (on the UK see Sales 2002; on Sweden see Khosravi 2009); others become “illegals” trying to live their lives without formal papers. The EU deportation regime has received particular public attention regarding the position of women (as mothers) and children. In Norway, the UK, Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands media have featured stories of children who have been sent “back”—sometimes forcibly (Fekete 2005). Scholars also point to an increasing proportion of asylum seekers being trafficked as a result of restrictive policies (Koser 2000). Here again, women and children are especially targeted in protective policies, for example, as a result of the 2000 United Nations Protocol to Suppress, Prevent and Punish Trafficking, Especially Women and Children (Hastie 2013).

Undocumented immigrants are vulnerable and caught in between different policy layers. Formally they are excluded from integration policies, but at the same

⁷ See <http://itooamuva.tumblr.com/>, accessed on 15 April 2014.

time many are informally incorporated by local institutions such as schools, churches, and associations (for an overview of literature on this category see Chauvin and Garcés-Mascreñas 2012). As Castles (2004, 223) argues, '[policies] that claim to exclude undocumented workers may often really be about allowing them in through side doors and back doors, so that they can more readily be exploited'. At the same time, expelled migrants are attracted by the demand for the flexible labour facilitated by the large informal economy in countries such as Greece (Fakiolas 2003).

The presence of undocumented migrants and opportunities for them to settle vary widely across European member states. Hellgren (2014) argues that undocumented migrants are more accommodated in Spain than in Sweden. Until 1 July 2013 undocumented migrants in Sweden had—in contrast to recognized asylum seekers—no right to basic healthcare and schooling for their children. This was amended under pressure of the United Nations, which criticized Sweden for violating human rights conventions (*ibid.*, 1180). In Spain undocumented migrants are documented at the *local level*. They have the same access to schooling and, up to 2012, healthcare as anyone else (Garcés-Mascreñas 2012, 121, 209). Moreover, Spain has a larger informal population than Sweden. Undocumented migrants in the former fill a major “care gap”, providing cheap labour in healthcare, childcare, and domestic services. While in Sweden undocumented migrants ‘reflect a moral dilemma and challenge to the principles of the welfare state’, in Spain ‘the presence of individuals without permission to stay may not be problematic for any moral reasons, or by principle’ (Hellgren 2014, 1184).

Conclusion

Categories form the backbone of policies. This chapter examined how categories are constructed in immigration and integration policies, alongside who policies target and in what ways categorizing may lead to stereotypes and exclusion. Processes of categorization both reflect reality and construct identities as they are understood by the ethnic majority. Categories furthermore determine the policy route migrants are subjected to upon their arrival. At the EU level the basic binary categorization is EU citizen versus TCN, and this defines who requires integration (TCNs) and who does not (EU citizens). Although European citizens are not formally subject to integration policy, Western European immigration countries do make implicit distinctions between migrants from “new” and “old” member states. In other, words, not all intra-European migrants are as equal in daily life as they are on paper. Migrants from the Eastern European member states are categorized differently. TCNs—i.e., migrants from outside the EU—form the general target group of EU integration policies as well as return and deportation measures. TCNs who are legal, or at least admitted, become the target of integration policies. Others become the object of increasingly exclusionary social policies and deportation.

Hierarchies within the categories European citizens and TCNs produce implicit and sometimes explicit unequal treatment at the national and local levels. Some groups, such as Muslims, are more problematized than others, and hierarchies are often based on a combination of identity markers such as gender, class, and ethnicity. Hierarchies are bound to national contextual factors, such as the mode of categorization used (top-down or based on self-identification), the type of welfare state, the scope of certain types of immigration, and the extent to which immigrants are “needed” to fill gaps in the labour market. Categories create stereotypes that persist over generations, resulting in patterns of social stratification. Categories cannot be abandoned in policymaking, but to make policies more effective scholars and policymakers alike should be alert to their use, scope, and impact.

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Chapter 6

The Multilevel Governance of Migration and Integration

Peter Scholten and Rinus Penninx

Introduction

Migration and migrant integration policies have become increasingly dispersed over various levels of government. Besides the national level, the European Union (EU) level and the regional and local levels have become more involved. In the area of immigration, EU member states have handed over significant power to the EU, particularly in the context of the Common European Asylum System. The EU's Family Reunification Directive, for instance, significantly limits member states' policy discretion in family migration policies. With regard to migrant integration there has been some Europeanization as well, but this has been overshadowed by a sharp "local turn" in policymaking. Local governments, large cities in particular, are becoming increasingly entrepreneurial in developing their own integration philosophies and policies. This has led to cities having markedly different approaches to migrant integration, even within the same countries.

This chapter focuses on migration and integration as multilevel policy issues and explores the consequences in terms of multilevel governance. The fact that both migration and integration have become multilevel issues presents both opportunities and challenges. Immigration policymaking has been characterized by a constant struggle between national governments and the EU about the amount of discretion states have in interpreting EU directives. The involvement of local and regional

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governments in debates about intra-EU migration, particularly East–west migration from new member states, has further complicated the situation. With regard to migrant integration, even more complex relations have emerged between local, regional, national, and EU institutions. The superdiverse cities of Europe, such as Barcelona, London, Berlin, and Rotterdam, have taken policy directions very different from their national governments, resulting in a “decoupling” of national and local policies. While politicization of migrant integration continues to drive policies in many countries, the EU has developed various soft governance measures aimed at promoting policy learning between local governments.

This chapter offers an analysis of how migration and integration policies have evolved at various levels during the past decades, including at the EU, national, and local levels, as well as in some cases at the regional level. This enables us to understand the factors that drive policies at the different levels and the extent to which these lead to convergence or divergence between the levels. We analyse the relations—or absence of relations—between the levels of government. To make sense of these, we apply a framework that allows for different arrangements of the relations between levels of government. This is where the notion of “multilevel governance” comes in as one possible way of structuring relations between various government levels.

A Framework for the Study of Multilevelness

Regulation of international migration has traditionally been a competency of the nation state, with the voluntary transfer of competencies to the EU being only a recent exception to this rule. Migrant integration, similarly, has largely been a purview of the nation state, as ideas about how to integrate migrants are often strongly correlated with ideas about national identity or the “national imagined community”.

Various scholars have argued that such nation-based views (Favell 2005) have also affected migration research. Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002: 301) describe this as “methodological nationalism”. Bommers and Thränhardt (2010) show that migration research has evolved in distinct national paradigms or national models of integration (Thränhardt & Bommers 2010). These models are national ‘not just because of their context dependency and insufficient clarifications on the conditions of generalizability, they are national because the modes of presenting and questions are politically constituted by the nation-states for which migration becomes a problem or a challenge’ (ibid.: 10). Favell (2005: 47) argues that national models have been sustained in policy and politics as ‘self-justificatory discourses’, and that this is to some extent also true of migration research because of the strong policy orientation during the development of this research field. Indeed, in some countries, nation state-centeredness has been reinforced by strong institutional relations between researchers and policymakers in the fields of migration and integration (Scholten 2011; Scholten and Verbeek 2014; Scholten et al. 2015). A national

orientation, however, could hamper the comparative and theoretical development of migration research. National paradigms of migration and integration reduce complexity and also introduce a historical-institutionalist bias in explaining and inadvertently reifying national differences. Bommes (2010) in particular argues that this has restricted the urge of migration scholars to look for more generalizable theoretical accounts of differences as well as similarities between countries. Furthermore, national frameworks obscure views of developments at other levels. Only in the 2000s did, due to concerted efforts of EU institutions, attention to the European level increase. For instance, the European Integration Fund and European framework programmes have promoted cross-national comparative research in the European setting. Attention to the local level is of a more recent date, and many times seems to be supported by EU research funding in particular.

Thus, while our understanding of how policies develop at various levels has increased, there is still a layering of knowledge per level. Studies and literature, too, tend to focus on just one level, rather than seeking an understanding of the interactions between levels. A next step to widen the scope of studies of migration and integration policies at different levels would be to explore their consequences in terms of the relations between the different levels. What sorts of interactions or relations (or absence thereof) can be identified between various levels of government, and what are the consequences? The literature on governance in multilevel settings defines various ways of configuring relations between government levels. Scholten (2013) brings these different ways together in a typology that distinguishes between four ideal type configurations of relations between government levels: centralist (top-down), localist (bottom-up), multilevel, and decoupled.

First of all, the *centralist* ideal type exhibits a clear hierarchy and division of labour between government levels. In a multilevel setting, this involves a top-down relationship between the different levels of government, such as a clear central codification of the division of labour between levels and control mechanisms to ensure that policy implementation at the local level follows central rules and reflects the central policy frame. This implies a strong institutional structure for policy coordination, for instance, at the European or the national level. The centralist type is expected to produce policy convergence between the different levels of government. As such, this type of governance setting corresponds with the idea of national paradigms of migration or integration.

The second ideal type involves a more *localist* and bottom-up perspective on governance in multilevel settings. In this type, policy competencies follow the principle of subsidiarity; that is, what can be done locally should be done locally. Local governments do more than just implement policy; they formulate policies, respond to local policy agendas, and exchange knowledge and information horizontally with other local governments. The localist type may lead to greater policy divergence between the national and the local level. It speaks to what some scholars describe as “the local dimension of migrant integration policies” (Alexander 2007; Caponio and Borkert 2010; Penninx et al. 2004), which stresses that local governments are often confronted with integration problems in different ways than the national or European level. This leads them to frame migrant integration policies in a specific local way.

As distinct from these centralist and localist types, *multilevel governance* refers to interaction and joint coordination of relations between the various levels of government without clear dominance of one level. This means that “vertical venues” are needed where governments from different levels jointly engage in meaningful policy coordination. These might involve forums or networks in which organizations from different government levels meet. Multilevel governance is thought to be most effective when the idea of there being different government levels shifts to the background, or in other words, when in terms of power a degree of “levelling” takes place between the different government levels. In terms of policy frames, the multilevel governance type is likely to engender some convergence between policy frames at different levels, produced and sustained by their mutual interaction.

The fourth type is *decoupled* relations between government levels. Such a situation is characterized by the absence of any meaningful policy coordination between levels. Thus, in any single policy domain, policies at different levels are dissociated and may even be contradictory. This type can lead to policy conflicts between government levels. It can also send conflicting policy messages to the policy target groups, thereby diminishing policy effectiveness. It is associated with divergence between different levels of policy, reflected in studies finding that national and local integration policies have increasingly become “two worlds apart” (Jørgensen 2012; Poppelaars and Scholten 2008).

Immigration Policies

Classic immigration countries, like the USA and Canada, have defined themselves as nations of immigrants. In contrast, North-Western European countries have not seen themselves as immigration countries, although they received large numbers of newcomers from abroad between 1950 and 1974: refugees from the East, immigrants from onetime colonies, and guest workers. As we read in Chap. 3, after 1974, when the first oil crisis precipitated the restructuring of economies and labour markets and new hands were no longer needed, these countries responded by adopting restrictive immigration policies. These new policies were framed in the 1980s (regarding labour migrants and family migrants) and 1990s (on asylum migrants). Only very recently have countries like the UK and Germany adopted new active immigration policies—for the first time since the 1960s and early 1970s—to recruit labour for certain sectors suffering shortages of workers. The immigration policies developed in the 1980s and 1990s were mostly framed in a nation state-centred way. For instance, Nordic and North-Western European countries often framed immigration policies in relation to the welfare state. In the UK, they were framed in particular by the history of the British Empire. Germany’s immigration policies cannot be understood without reference to its long history as a “divided nation” and its consequential reluctance to become a country of immigration. In some countries, arguments of overpopulation (the Netherlands) or population decline due to ageing have played an important role.

Europeanization

A cornerstone of migration policy in the European setting is the principle of free movement for EU citizens. This principle, which applies to intra-EU migration only, has been at the heart of European integration since its inception. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) established, already in 1951, a provision of free mobility for workers in this industry. Since then, the free movement principle has been extended and firmly anchored in EU treaties. It is a key supranational element of the Europeanization of immigration policies, and has had a clear binding effect on member states. Intra-EU mobility increased significantly after the accession of Central and Eastern European countries in 2004 and 2007. Europeanization of policies on immigration from outside the EU has occurred much more incrementally. First, immigration and border security were discussed intergovernmentally in the so-called Trevi Group in the late 1970s. A major step followed in the 1980s when a group of member states moved to abolish border controls and adopt joint immigration policy measures with the Schengen Agreement (1985). The Schengen group numbered 26 countries as of 2014. In 1999, the Schengen Agreement was incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam, though exceptions and opt-outs have continued to apply to several countries. Thus, a form of cooperation between nation states eventually arose and contributed to the anchoring of common regulations in the supranational treaties of the EU.

Asylum migration in the 1990s became an important impetus for the Europeanization of asylum and immigration policies. With the Dublin Convention of 1990, EU member states formalized arrangements to address the problem of “asylum shopping”. The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 established a broader framework for intergovernmental cooperation in the field of asylum and migration, under the so-called Third Pillar “non-binding” cooperation. Perhaps the most important step towards a common EU policy was taken in 1997, when asylum and migration were moved to the First Pillar, which involved a much stronger role for the European Commission and a legal basis for EU activity. This was further reinforced by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, which “normalized” immigration policy as a core EU issue, introducing qualified majority voting in this domain and strengthening the role of the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

It is fair to say that by the 2010s a strongly Europeanized policy field had emerged on asylum and migration. This encompassed numerous elements: joint border controls (Frontex), the Returns Directive regulating the return of illegal migrants, standardization of asylum procedures, the EU Blue Card Directive on selective labour migration, the Family Reunification Directive, which had strong impact on national family migration policies, and a series of cooperation agreements with migrant-sending countries to address the root causes of migration. Particularly important in terms of multilevel governance has been the step by step strengthening of the role of EU institutions like the ECJ and Parliament, marking a real transfer of competencies to supranational institutions. Nevertheless, via the EU Council, various intergovernmental working groups, and to some extent also the Commission, the member states continue to play a key role.

Patterns of Multilevel Relations in Immigration Policies

Geddes and Scholten (2014a) distinguish three patterns of Europeanization of immigration policies, closely corresponding to the different types of government relations discussed earlier. One of them is that Europeanization clearly involves *loss of control* for nation states, given the supremacy and direct effect of EU directives. In our typology, this is closest aligned to the centralist ideal type, with EU institutions exerting top-down control over immigration policies throughout Europe. Starting as a spin-off from major steps in European integration, like creation of the internal market and freedom of movement within the EU, immigration was Europeanized primarily for functional reasons; if there is freedom of movement, then there should also be a common immigration policy. This is in line with the broad literature on the gradual erosion of national control over borders and migration caused by globalization and economic and political interdependencies between nation states (see Sassen 1999). Here, it might also be mentioned that European institutions, in particular the ECJ and more recently the European Commission, have played important “activist” roles in the Europeanization of immigration policies.

A second pattern, described by Geddes and Scholten (2014a) as the “escape to Europe thesis”, counters the argument that states have lost control due to the Europeanization of immigration. Reflecting a literature on how European cooperation might rather strengthen the nation state (see Moravcsik 2013), countries may seek cooperation with their European neighbours to jointly fortify their grip on international migration. Thus, working together might increase their control rather than weaken it. Furthermore, seeking cooperation at the EU level might allow governments to find ways around the political and legal constraints they face within their own countries. The escape to Europe thesis provides a good account of the intergovernmentalist evolution of the EU’s immigration policies. Many EU migration and asylum measures were first introduced as forms of cooperation involving subsets of EU member states and discussed in intergovernmental working groups (such as the Trevi Group) rather than at the level of EU institutions. In our typology, this comes closest to what was termed the localist model, with the nation state being the “local” actor seeking cooperation in an EU setting for the benefit of the nation state while not ceding any substantial degree of control.

Finally, Geddes and Scholten (2014a) identify a third pattern of the evolution of EU immigration policies that stresses a *transgovernmentalist* form of Europeanization. This means that governments seek cooperation in a European setting, even ceding some power and control to EU institutions, in order to gain a firmer grip on immigration, to the benefit of the nations as well. In fact, this form of transgovernmentalism comes close to our ideal type of multilevel governance, with the national and European levels systematically connected rather than one or the other being in control. Such a transgovernmentalist account gives a very good explanation for the strong involvement of EU member states (rather than EU institutions) in development of several key EU directives in this area, such as the Family Reunification Directive. It also accounts for the delicate balancing of national and

EU interests; for instance, the Dutch government, together with several other governments, recently tried to renegotiate the Family Reunification Directive in order to realign national and EU interests in this policy area.

Apart from the three patterns of Geddes and Scholten, we also observe our fourth type, “decoupling” in multilevel settings and absence of coordination. The struggles between nation states and EU institutions, and sometimes even between subnational governments and national and EU institutions, signal that policy interests are not always aligned. Conflicts do take place. An issue that has become particularly prominent in recent decades is that of intra-EU mobility, especially East–west migration within the EU after the accession of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries such as Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. Migration from CEE countries is now by far the largest migration flow to some North-Western European countries, such as the UK and the Netherlands. Although transition arrangements were made which postponed free movement for a number of years, the borders have now opened to all new member states. Many CEE migrants appear to be permanently settling in other EU member states, raising concerns about how to incorporate these EU citizens into their new home countries. However, policy measures that would impose an obligation in terms of integration efforts (such as a language requirement) are considered at odds with the principle of freedom of movement of EU citizens within the EU. In France, this conflict was brought into sharp focus when the French government decided to deport large numbers of Roma migrants to Romania and demolish their camps, thereby engaging in direct confrontation not just with Romania but also with the European Commissioner on Immigration.

This brief review of types of relations demonstrates that rather than a single pattern, there are various patterns of interaction and relations taking place simultaneously between national and EU institutions. It is undeniable that some competencies have been transferred, but many of these transfers came about at the initiative or with the consent of national governments and in fact strengthened member states’ control over immigration flows (of third-country nationals). There is no clear dominance of the centralist or localist pattern. Rather, there appears to be a delicate balancing between nations and EU institutions, as evident in the recent efforts to renegotiate the Family Reunification Directive and the conflict around Roma deportations. Although this is to some extent a matter of interpretation, we propose that the evolution of patterns of interaction fits our description of multilevel governance. There is certainly a high degree of interaction between nation states and the EU in the formulation of immigration policies.

Besides national–EU relations, there are some indications of involvement of subnational governments in these already complex relations. Subnational governments rarely have immigration policy competencies, but they do have policy interests in this area. For instance, economic and demographic characteristics of regions may increase or decrease their demand for immigration. Scotland, for example, advocates a much more open and active immigration policy than the UK government. Cities, too, have been important actors, especially in relation to policy implementation, as they may be particularly affected by the consequences of immigration policies. For instance, the human consequences of deportation and irregular migration are often

most evident at the local level. Hence, many local governments have offered forms of assistance to irregular migrants even though this may be distinctly at odds with national policies. Local governments have furthermore been important advocates of “pardons” or regularizations of undocumented migrants. Some cities have even developed their own “urban citizenship”, counterbalancing exclusionist effects of national definitions of citizenship (see Chauvin and Garcés-Mascreñas 2012).

Integration Policies

The multilevel dynamics of migrant integration policies have been very different from those of immigration policies. Rather than the turn towards Europe described above, a “local turn” seems primarily at play. This involves a shift away from historically rooted models of integration strongly related to nationally specific models of identity and belonging (see also Ireland 1994). Such models would imply, in our typology, strongly state-centric (centralist) modes of governance. Brubaker (1992), for instance, shows that French and German policies have their respective roots in deep historic notions of the French “Staatsvolk” (*ius soli*) and German “Volksstaat” (*ius sanguinis*). This idea of national models of integration has been strong not just in policy but also in academic discourse (for a critical discussion see Bertossi 2011; Bertossi et al. 2015; Joppke 2007). Yet, as argued earlier, this has led to an overemphasis on differences between national integration models, such as the British race-relations model, the German differentialist model, the French Republicanist model, and the Dutch multiculturalist model.

The politicization of migrant integration that took place in many European countries in the 1990s and 2000s revealed the resiliency of such national models. In this period, there was a revival of ideas of cultural integration, especially in national political and policy discourses. Throughout Europe this led to policy initiatives that strengthened the importance of national history, culture, values, and norms in relation to immigrant integration. For example, during this period the Netherlands, France, Germany, and the UK introduced civic integration programmes including tests of basic knowledge about society. Joppke and Morawska (2003) speak in this respect of an assimilationist turn in migrant integration policies.

The Local Turn in Migrant Integration Policies

Local governments, especially those in Europe’s larger cities, have become increasingly active in developing their own integration philosophies. From a sociological perspective, this development makes sense as it is at the local level that migrants meet others, find a job, have children, et cetera. It is also at this level that negative as well as positive aspects of diversity are experienced most concretely. Also, we know from research that migrants identify much more with the city they live in than

with the nation. Hyperdiverse cities like Berlin, Amsterdam, and London embrace diversity as part of the city's identity and as a positive anchoring point for local policies, sometimes in spite of their respective national models. Industrial cities like Manchester and Rotterdam have linked their traditional emphasis on work and housing to the new challenge of diversity. This supports sociologist Benjamin Barber's suggestion that it is precisely the inability of national democracies to develop effective responses to migration and diversity that prompts cities to develop their own strategies with a much greater emphasis on pragmatism, trust, and participation.

Various scholars, including Alexander (2007) and Penninx et al. (2004), illustrate how cities in particular started developing their own integration philosophies, often in response to the specific local situation. For instance, various successive mayors of the Greater London Authority were particularly proactive on migrant integration. Similarly, the City of Berlin had an integration strategy in place long before Germany developed a national strategy. Penninx (2009) demonstrates that in many countries policies evolved in large and diverse cities before national integration policies were developed, as attested to by Birmingham and Bradford in the UK, Berlin and Frankfurt in Germany, Vienna in Austria, and the Swiss cities of Zurich, Bern, and Basel. In our typology, this fits best with the localist or decoupled models, depending on whether these local philosophies are in line with national policy contours (as in Germany) or contrast and possibly even conflict with national policies (as in various cases in the Netherlands). As we will read below, only in some cases has it led to what we describe as multilevel governance.

The local turn in migrant integration policies has several implications in terms of vertical relations between national and local governments. Under the centralist model, local governments would play a role but this would be confined primarily to policy implementation. Indeed, in many countries we find top-down structures for policy coordination. In France policy coordination is strongly state-centric, and countries including Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands have long had strong national policy coordination frameworks. Often, the way funds are distributed and allocated is indicative of the division of labour between the national and the local level. Even in the UK, a country with relatively active local actors, significant funds are allocated from the national level (including funding for courses in English for speakers of other languages). However, many studies suggest that the top-down or centralist model has become much less applicable to the practice of migrant integration policymaking in many European countries (see also Entzinger and Scholten 2014). Local integration policies tend to differ from national policies in various respects. Caponio and Borkert (2010: 9) even speak of a distinctly "local dimension of migrant integration policies". Some scholars argue that local policies are more likely than national policies to be accommodative of ethnic diversity and work together with migrant organizations, due in part to the practical need to manage ethnic differences in a city (Borkert and Bosswick 2007; Vermeulen and Stotijn 2010). Thus, in contrast to the often symbolic tendencies of national policies, local policies are driven by pragmatic problem-solving (Poppelaars and Scholten 2008). For instance, cities might work more closely with migration representatives and

organizations than a national government would (see also Boussetta 2000). Cities may also be more inclined to accommodate and support cultural and religious activities of minorities in response to migrants' needs and demands.

Others contend that, rather than being characteristically more accommodative, local policies are driven by specifically local factors in very different directions. Significant variation in local policies can therefore be expected. Mahnig (2004) concludes that local integration policies in Paris, Berlin, and Zurich have very much responded to local political circumstances, often in ad hoc ways and leading to accommodation in some instances and exclusion in others. According to Alexander (2003, 2007), differences in local social situations have triggered different policy responses, with some cities adopting a more culturalist and others a more socioeconomic approach. A recent study of integration policies in Amsterdam and Rotterdam found that these two cities within the same country and with similar migrant populations produced very different policy outcomes in terms of migrant integration. Rotterdam stressed work and housing, whereas Amsterdam was much more oriented towards promoting intercultural relations (Scholten 2013). In other studies (e.g., Garbaye 2005; Boussetta 2000), a key factor identified as a trigger of specifically local responses is the political mobilization of migrants at the local level. Garbaye (ibid.), for example, found more significant political mobilization and ethnic elite formation in Birmingham than in Lille. This could not be explained only by differences between the groups involved (mainly South Asians in Britain and North Africans in Lille). Another factor was the difference between the liberal British citizenship regime and openness of the local labour party towards ethnic elite formation compared to the French citizenship regime, which had barred access to many Maghrébins, and the local socialist party, which had remained very restrictive in admitting migrants to local political elites.

The local turn of integration policy has a number of implications for governance. In some cities, it has led to what can be described as a decoupling of national and local policies. Thus, policies at these levels were not mutually coordinated and sometimes sent very different policy messages to the same policy target groups. Poppelaars and Scholten (2008) speak, in this respect, of national and local policies being "two worlds apart" in the Netherlands, because of their divergent logics of policy formulation (politicization at the national level and pragmatic problem-solving at the local level). Similarly, Jørgensen (2012) observes a growing disconnect between national and local integration policies. Collett and Gidley (2013) find that in several countries local governments feel they have to repair some of the centripetal forces unleashed by national political and policy discourses. As such, politicized debates at the national level can have a performative effect at the local level as well.

In other situations, more localist types of relations have emerged. Local governments have become increasingly active in what has been described as "vertical venue shopping" (Guiraudon 1997). This refers to efforts by local governments to lobby for policy measures at the national (and increasingly also European) level. Scholten (2013) cites the example of the City of Rotterdam, which managed to get a special law passed at the national level allowing it to adopt stricter policies aimed

at spatial dispersal of migrants in the city. The city has also been active at the European level, lobbying for integration measures for intra-EU labour migrants. Establishment of networks among European cities has become a particularly powerful strategy for vertical venue shopping in the field of migrant integration. We will look at this in more detail later.

In contrast to the examples above, which fit the localist or decoupled types of relations, institutionalized relations between national and local governments have evolved in several countries over the past decade towards our definition of multi-level governance. Germany, in particular, has established multilevel venues for coordination of integration policies, with a key role for national integration conferences. These conferences bring together actors from various government levels as well as nongovernmental actors to align efforts to promote integration. The UK's tradition of coordinated vertical relations includes its delegation of policy coordination at the national level to the Department of Communities and Local Government. Even France, a country known for its state-centric approach, has developed dedicated structures for organizing relations with local governments. Although often not framed explicitly in terms of coordinating migrant integration policies (still reflecting the French colour-blind Republicanist approach), integration clearly plays a role in France's so-called Urban Social Cohesion Contracts and Educational Priority Zones. These allow the Parisian government to adopt tailored, localized approaches within the context of national policy. The Netherlands' government has established a "common integration agenda" for national and local governments, though it appears to have been rendered hollow by a lack of central funding.

European Involvement and Nascent Multilevel Governance

Besides the local turn in migrant integration policies, the past decade has also witnessed a gradually increasing involvement of the European level. Nonetheless, compared to the strong trend towards Europeanization that we found in the field of migration and asylum, the Europeanization of migrant integration has come much later and been more modest and hesitant (Goeman 2013). There is as yet no common European policy aimed at migrant integration. This reflects the persistence of the connection between migrant integration and the nation state. The way that countries integrate "their" migrants appears strongly related to conceptions of national identity, history, culture, and values and norms—especially since the "assimilationist turn" described above. Several steps have been taken towards greater EU involvement in this area. Some of these involve EU directives, primarily as a spin-off of the communitarization of immigration policies. Because of the binding effect of EU directives, one could say that they to some extent signal our top-down centralist model of migrant integration, as significant policymaking power is transferred to the EU level. Particularly important in this respect are two 2003 directives: the Directive on the Status of Non-EU Nationals Who Are Long-Term Residents, which provides a framework for policies toward third-country nationals in the EU, and the

earlier-mentioned Directive on the Right to Family Reunification, which provides a framework for admittance of family migrants to the EU. Both directives have been influential as a framework for development of civic integration policies for third-country nationals (many of whom are family migrants), as they stipulate what integration measures may be demanded of migrants.

An additional key area in which Europeanization has been significant is anti-discrimination policy. Two directives issued in 2000—the Racial Equality Directive and the Employment Equality Framework Directive—establish a binding structure within which member states can develop their anti-discrimination policies. These directives are yet another example of vertical venue shopping, as they were formulated in response to lobbying by the UK and Dutch governments in particular.

Besides such “hard” and “binding” measures, which may suggest an EU-centric approach (fitting our centralist type), specific frames and definitions have been developed and various non-binding measures put in place which can be described as softer or more open methods of coordination (see also Geddes and Scholten 2014b). In 2003, the European Commission formulated its first comprehensive view on integration policies in the Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment (EC COM (2003) 336 final). It defines integration as ‘a two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident third country nationals and the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant’ (ibid.: 17). Integration is conceived as a ‘balance of rights and obligations’ (ibid.: 18). The holistic approach of policies encompasses all dimensions of integration, from economic, social, and political rights to cultural and religious diversity, citizenship, and participation.

In November 2004, the EU Conference of Specialised Ministers responsible for integration agreed on a set of 11 Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy (CBP) as a first step towards a European framework for immigrant integration and a point of reference for implementation and evaluation of current and future integration policies. These principles define integration as a two-way process of accommodation and stress the importance of language, interaction, and participation. They furthermore call for the mainstreaming of migrant integration in other policy areas. Importantly, this step towards a more comprehensive framework was accompanied by continuation of the limited definition of the integration target group following directly from migration policies: integration policies are aimed at third-country nationals only and do not target immigrants who are citizens (or long-term residents) of another EU member state. They are supposedly already integrated, by definition, though this assumption has been criticized by local authorities in regions that have received numerous immigrants from the EU’s newest member states (e.g., Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria).

Although rather broad and not binding, the CBPs provide a foundation for more EU involvement in this policy area (primarily intergovernmentalist and thus, in the EU setting, fitting our “localist” type). Following the CBPs, the European Handbook on Integration was published in 2004. In 2005, the Common Agenda for Integration by the European Commission and The Hague Programme were formulated to promote implementation of the CBPs primarily via soft governance means like persuasion,

networking, and exchange of best practices. In 2013 the Common Agenda for Integration was developed further into the European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, which stresses the importance of socioeconomic participation and the relevance of the local level in its promotion.

This evolving EU policy framework reflects the EU's distinctive internal organizational setting for integration policies. First, there is DG Freedom, Security and Justice (also responsible for migration policies), which targets particularly the early reception and integration of recent newcomers, of refugees and accepted asylum seekers, and also of third-country nationals until they have become long-term residents. It is in this particular part of EU policies that West European countries have increasingly “uploaded” their cultural integration requirements for new third-country immigrants into EU integration policies (Goeman 2013). The second setting from which integration is promoted is DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. Its programmes aim to promote social inclusion and cohesion. Its sizeable funding is—again—used quite extensively by local and regional authorities (and their policies) and by nongovernmental civil society partners at all levels. Equality and anti-discrimination are key concepts (for this reason the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) and its successor the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) were associated with this DG). Target groups include not only immigrants but also ethnic minorities and the disabled. Priority domains are equal access to and long-term integration in employment, education, housing, and health. The new Commission in place since autumn 2014 has complicated the picture even more: DG FSJ has been split into the DG Migration and Home Affairs (Immigration, Asylum, and Borders) and Justice and Consumers (Union Citizenship, Free Movement, Equality legislation, and Anti-discrimination).

In the absence of a clear division of formal policy competencies in the area of migrant integration, the very incremental Europeanization of this area of policy has been based on two main resources: expertise and cities (see also Penninx 2015). Regarding the first, migration scholars from the Netherlands and USA played a key role in formulation of the CBPs (*ibid.*). Furthermore, the EU has used various funding schemes to mobilize comparative research on policy topics that it considers relevant. From 2003 to 2006, this involved, in particular, the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (INTI) Fund and from 2007 to 2013 the European Integration Fund. As Geddes and Scholten (2014b) observe, the initial objective was mainly to promote the horizontal exchange of relevant information, knowledge, and policy best practices. Gradually, with the formulation of the CBPs and the Common Agenda for Integration, these funding schemes have increasingly mobilized expertise to help substantiate the nascent EU policy framework. A clear example in this respect is the EU-sponsored Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). Though first established to promote comparison and exchange of best practices, the MIPEX has evolved into a tool for monitoring member states' compliance with EU integration principles, enabling “naming and shaming” of those that do not comply. In the context of our discussion of multilevel governance, this bears out the potentially strategic role that knowledge and expertise can play in multilevel governance, acting

in “soft” but sometimes impactful ways (open method of coordination), especially in the absence of more structural “vertical” relations between levels.

Regarding the second EU resource deployed in this area, European programmes have sought to establish a strong relation between the EU and the city level. It is in these efforts that, according to our typology, we can distinguish the contours of an emerging multilevel governance framework. With various means, including some of the funding schemes mentioned above, the European Commission in particular has actively promoted various city networks on a European scale. These networks primarily involve cross-national horizontal forms of cooperation between cities, but with strong connections to the Commission. One example is the CLIP Network (Cities for Local Integration Policies), which since 2006 has brought together some 30 European cities in conferences to systematically exchange knowledge and experience regarding local integration policies.

Integrating Cities is another network (also established in 2006) organized under the Eurocities’ working group on migration and integration, a large network of some 140 major European cities. The Integrating Cities initiative includes a policy dialogue between Eurocities and the European Commission, a conference series, the Eurocities Charter on Integrating Cities, and other EU-funded projects.

Another example is Intercultural Cities, which is a joint activity of the Council of Europe and the European Commission. It emerged from the 2008 White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue contributed by the Council of Europe to the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue that same year. Intercultural Cities advocates pluralistic city identities that respect diversity. The Intercultural Cities Programme was developed and first applied in 11 European pilot cities and has since evolved. It has developed the Intercultural Cities Index for cities to evaluate and develop their policies, and it organizes international conferences for cities to exchange experiences.

Other more specifically horizontal cooperation initiatives have been undertaken as well, such as the European Coalition of Cities against Racism (ECCAR), established in 2004 at the initiative of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The aim of this coalition of cities is to share experiences in order to improve policies against racism, discrimination, and xenophobia. Some 104 municipalities from 22 European countries have joined the network and adopted its 10-point plan of action.

Besides making a direct connection between the nascent European policy framework on migrant integration and the local level of government, thereby constructing the most distinct multilevel governance structures in this area today, the focus on the local level also feeds into the local turn in migrant integration policy described above. Horizontal exchanges of knowledge and best practices between cities, promoted by the EU, has increased cities’ entrepreneurship in developing their own integration philosophies. In a number of cases such integration philosophies encompass relations with cities from which migrants originated, as Chap. 10 will show. One might interpret this as the “three-way process” proposed by the European Commission in its 2011 European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, but one should be aware that the local policy actors involved might have quite different intentions and motives.

Conclusion

The analysis presented in this chapter shows that immigration and integration policies have not shifted unidirectionally upward. Rather, we observe a growing complexity of policies in both areas being formulated at various levels of government, including the EU and national levels as well as the local and in some cases also the regional level. We observe substantial fragmentation as well, imposing the risk of “layering”; that is, policies are being developed at different government layers without structural connections. We provided various examples of such “layering” leading to a decoupling of policies, resulting in potential policy contradictions and even conflicts between different levels. Regarding migration, we mentioned as one example the lack of acceptance of Roma as fully integrated EU citizens. As for integration, we mentioned the potential effect of national symbolic discourses on integration processes at the local level. Local governments may move to rectify such effects in order to prevent interethnic tensions within city boundaries. We also saw the tension that has arisen from the EU definition of integration being applicable only to third-country nationals, as local and national governments have expressed a desire to integrate EU migrants into their host societies in a similar way.

At the same time, various and increasingly effective efforts are being made to institutionalize vertical relations between different levels of government. Following our definition of multilevel governance—that it should involve real vertical structures for policy coordination—we believe that we can speak to some extent of a multilevel governance structure for migration that has come in existence in a rather long struggle between national and EU forces, though still in the absence of regional and local governmental agents. Even in the strongly Europeanized field of migration and asylum policies—where one would expect centralist policy relations—we observe that most policies have been developed in a strongly intergovernmental way. Rather than states losing control to Brussels, they are working together and institutionalizing their cooperation, particularly that aimed at better control over immigration flows. However, the coordinated multilevel governance structure described here pertains mainly to restrictiveness and control of migration. Efforts to establish a more comprehensive, proactive immigration policies, as envisaged and proposed by the European Commission, have failed.

With regard to integration policies, partners’ competencies at different levels are clearly different from those in the migration policy field, and there seems to be no dominant level. Local governmental agents have claimed and are acquiring a more prominent position in relation to their national governments, and the EU level seems to be playing a mediating role. Relations across levels have intensified over the past decade, and they are both horizontal and vertical, top-down and bottom up. Some countries are developing vertical structures between the national and local levels, such as localized policy measures and joint integration conferences. At the same time, some countries are transferring their strict integration policies to the European level. Cities are applying pressure on their national governments to support local integration policies, and they are “venue shopping” at the EU level. An intriguing

direct relationship has developed between the European Commission and city networks on a cross-European scale. All of this is recent and difficult to evaluate, but in view of the absence of clearly centralist and localist dominance in this process, the result could be a multilevel governance structure that, more than in the field of migration, includes nongovernmental partners in the process.

A final observation on the state-of-the-art of the study of multilevel governance as surveyed in this chapter is that so far multilevel governance has been framed, by definition, as an EU-internal phenomenon—that is, it includes only levels and actors within the EU as relevant components. What has been called the “external dimension” of immigration and integration policymaking—that is, relations, negotiations, and agreements with countries of origin of migrants and with international organizations and institutions in the field of international migration and development—does not have a place in this frame (yet). Consequently, the EU’s (re-)definition of integration as a three-way process does not resonate in studies of the multilevel governance of migration and integration. The concluding chapter of this book comes back to this external dimension of EU policymaking and its relevance for both immigration and integration policies.

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Chapter 7

Transnationalism as a Research Paradigm and Its Relevance for Integration

Liza Mügge

Introduction¹

Interest in the transnational involvement of immigrants has grown rapidly since 1994, when Bash, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc published their pioneering book *Nations Unbound*. This book is considered the first major study of migrant transnationalism. In it, the authors stress the various forms of contact that a substantial group of migrants maintain with their country of origin. The study of transnationalism is strongly rooted in anthropology. Its early authors, like Basch et al. 1994, were US-based anthropologists with fieldwork experience in migrants' host country and country of origin (Foner 2000, 49). In Europe, transnational research gained firm ground in 1997 when the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology of the University of Oxford hosted a five-year research programme on transnational communities (Transcomm, see www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk). Linked projects were conducted in single disciplines or were multidisciplinary. Transcomm marked the emergence of a flourishing research field spanning a range of disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, including sociology, anthropology, political science, law, history, media studies, and geography. Top European journals, like *Global Networks*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, and the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, have featured numerous studies and special issues on migrant transnationalism. Despite the field's interdisciplinary approach and scope, disciplinary flavours remain traceable in the topics selected, research designs, and the methodologies applied.

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Fuelled by securitization and politicization of migration, transnationalism also began to attract considerable attention in public debate around the turn of the millennium. Politicians, journalists, and policymakers questioned whether transnationalism might undermine immigrants' integration. During the past decade, European leaders across the political spectrum have expressed concern about migrants' loyalties and involvements that could potentially compromise their territorial borders (Mügge 2012a). Loyalty towards the country of origin (or that of parents) became the litmus test of integration. According to Østergaard-Nielsen (2011), citizens who live their lives across borders pose distinct challenges to policymakers. The idea of "integration here" and "development there" forces governments to rethink their integration models.

This chapter reviews the state of the art of scholarship on the transnationalism-integration nexus. It examines the view emanating from the existing literature on the relation between immigrants' transnational activities and ties to the country of origin, on the one hand, and "integration" in the receiving country, on the other. The review is guided by the popular political question: Can transnationalism and integration be mutually beneficial, or is it a zero-sum relation? The next section outlines the emergence of transnationalism as a research paradigm and its relation to academic research on integration. The chapter then dedicates a section to each of the main dimension of transnationalism in Europe: economic, political, and sociocultural. Finally, routes are suggested for future policy-oriented research.

New Ways of Thinking About Integration: The Transnationalism Paradigm²

Over the past 20 years, transnationalism emerged as one of the major research paradigms in migration and ethnic studies (Dunn 2005; Mügge and De Jong 2013). Transnationalism is a container concept and is applied to reveal and understand the ties and activities developed between individual, collective, or governmental actors located in two or more countries. 'A transnationalism paradigm encourages holistic analysis of movement (including immigration but also subsequent visitation and communication), and it transcends some of the assimilationist assumptions of earlier migration policy and research' (Dunn 2010, 3).

To study transnationalism empirically, scholars have attempted to classify transnational activities by differentiating between economic, political, and sociocultural aspects and whether these take place in the home country or host country (Portes et al. 1999, 222; Al-Ali et al. 2001, 618–626; Portes 2001, 187). Table 7.1 presents various examples of such classification. Economic activities include remittances to and investments in the homeland as well as donations to migrant organizations. Transnational sociocultural activities encompass, for instance, visits to friends and

²The first part of this section draws on Mügge (2010, 36–39), though the text has been reorganized and reinterpreted for the purpose of this contribution.

Table 7.1 Classification of transnational activities and their degree of institutionalization

	Economic	Political	Sociocultural
Low institutionalization High institutionalization	Informal trade between home and host country	Home town community groups created by migrants	Amateur sports matches between home and host country
	Small businesses created by returned migrants	Alliances of immigrant committees with home country political associations	Homeland folk music groups giving presentations in immigrant centres
	Circular international labour migration	Fundraisers for home country electoral candidates	Priests from the hometown visit and organize parishioners abroad
	Investments by multinationals in the homeland mediated by migrants	Consular officials and representatives of national political parties abroad	Imams sent by homeland institutions to visit and preach in migrant mosques
	Tourist locations developed in the homeland by migrants	Dual nationality granted by home country governments	Major artists from the home country perform in countries where compatriots live
	Home country banks in immigrant centres	Migrants elected to home country legislatures	Regular cultural events organized by home country embassies

Source: Adapted from Portes et al. (1999) and Mügge (2010, 37)

family. Participation in homeland elections is a form of transnational political activity. The distinction between economic, sociocultural, and political activities is an analytical one; in reality they overlap (see Van Amersfoort 2001).

To examine the durability of transnational activities, scholars assess their degree of *institutionalization*. Activities are institutionalized when they become predictable, constant, and structured (see Beerling 1978, cited in Penninx 1988). Activities are highly institutionalized when they are held on an organized and regular basis, such as annual festivals and congresses or weekly discussion groups governed by written or unwritten rules and attendance norms. Activities can also be distinguished by whether they are initiated and institutionalized from “above” or “below”. Political initiatives institutionalized from above include governments’ allowing migrants to be elected to home country legislatures. Initiatives from below include fundraising among migrants for hometown committees. The durability or persistence of transnational activities is important, since many scholars argue that the majority of migrants who are not—or are only weakly—attached to the homeland “are clearly here to stay” (Kasinitz et al. 2002, 117).

Scholars have further categorized transnational activities by distinguishing between various types of transnationalism (Koopmans et al. 2005; Mügge 2010). In particular, transnational activities may be said to take five forms (Table 7.2). The first is *transplanted homeland activities*, where habits or conflicts between ethnic groups in the homeland are transplanted to the immigrant community (see Koopmans et al. 2005, 126–127). The second type is *transplanted immigrant activities*, which emerge when migrants return to the homeland with skills and ideas acquired in the host country (Nell 2007). The third type is *homeland-directed transnational activities*. Here, migrants in the country of settlement direct their activities towards their country of origin. Homeland-directed politics generally consist of attempts to improve the legal, economic, and political status of particular groups in the homeland. Activities take place either in the host country or in the country of origin. The fourth type, *diaspora activities*, is a subset of homeland-directed transnational activities for groups that do not have a homeland. The fifth category is *country of residence-directed transnational activities*. Here, homeland-based groups mobilize to intervene on behalf of the group’s interests in the country of settlement (see Koopmans et al. 2005, 127). This typology transforms the straightforward question “is transnationalism harmful for integration?” into “what types of transnational activities are harmful for integration?” It also underlines—to paraphrase Bivand Erdal and Oeppen (2013, 878)—the fact that transnationalism happens not only “there” but also “here” (e.g., via country of residence-directed transnationalism or transplanted homeland activities). Likewise, integration may happen both “here” and “there”, through transplanted immigrant or homeland-directed activities.

Scholars take different positions in describing the relation between transnationalism and integration. Bivand Erdal and Oeppen (2013, 872–875) distinguish four positions in the current literature: alarmist, less alarmist but pessimistic, positive, and pragmatic. First, the *alarmist perspective* views transnationalism as challenging or even preventing migrant integration (ibid., 872). Such fear is particularly great with respect to violent forms of transplanted homeland transnationalism, when homeland conflicts are imported to receiving societies and expected to threaten national security. Koopmans et al. (2005, 142) argue that strong transnational orien-

Table 7.2 Typology of transnational activities

General type	Example
Transplanted homeland activities	Homeland political conflicts are transplanted to the host country
Transplanted immigrant activities	Organizations set up in the host country are transplanted to the country of origin
Homeland-directed activities	Host country-based groups support or oppose groups or institutions in the homeland
Diaspora activities	Homeland-directed politics among groups without a homeland or who consider their homeland occupied
Country of residence-directed transnational activities	Homeland-based actors set up institutions for their (former) compatriots in the host country

Source: Adapted from Koopmans et al. (2005, 126–127) and Mügge (2010, 37)

tations may be responses to exclusionary citizenship regimes in host states that limit migrants' access to the political community. Comparative studies of migrants in several European countries have found that at a collective level, migrant homeland-directed activism often takes violent forms. Strong homeland orientations are therefore argued to be detrimental to integration (Koopmans et al. 2005, 142). At a more symbolic level, authors suggest that exclusion by the dominant groups due to transnationalism being perceived as a sign of disloyalty is likely to reinforce migrants' diasporic or transnational ties with their own ethnic group (Wessendorf 2007 cited in Bivand Erdal and Oeppen 2013, 872; Nagel 2009). Transnationalism triggered by exclusion from the receiving society is not expected to foster migrants' integration, as they are kept out regardless of their legal status.

Second, the *less alarmist but also pessimistic position* views migrants as engaging in transnationalism because it is their only option to survive in a new country where their 'cultural and human capital are not immediately applicable' (Bivand Erdal and Oeppen 2013, 872). This perspective foresees transnationalism as weakening over time, as its value diminishes as a survival mechanism.

The third view is termed the *positive position*. This is 'the idea that processes of integration and transnationalism [can] be mutually supportive' (ibid.). However, empirical findings differ on this issue. Studies in the USA have found migrants involved in transnational activities to be better-educated, longer-term residents of the host society, often active in local politics (Guarnizo et al. 2003, 1239; Portes et al. 2007, 276). In a study of integration and transnationalism among Canadian business migrants, Marger (2006, 898) concludes that adaptation of groups with sufficient human, financial, and cultural capital is more individualistic and approaches assimilation. In contrast, traditional labour migrants lacking such capital follow a more collectivist trajectory, using transnational ethnic networks in the adaption process. Snel, Engbersen, and Leerkes (2006) conclude in their comparative study of individual transnational involvement in the Netherlands that the more highly educated and employed respondents engaged in just as many transnational activities as those who were poorly educated, unemployed, and dependent on welfare (ibid., 304).

The final perspective is the *pragmatic approach*, which holds that 'the likely reality for the majority of migrants is more nuanced than an either/or choice between transnationalism and assimilation' (Bivand Erdal and Oeppen 2013, 873). The pragmatic approach is dominant in academic work. It states that transnationalism and integration (or in North American scholarship "assimilation") are not mutually exclusive. Influential in this respect are Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004, 1003), who argue that 'assimilation and enduring transnational ties are neither incompatible nor binary opposites'. Connections with the homeland and the receiving society occur *simultaneously*. Migrants may thus be integrated and transnational at the same time.

Presenting a less static view on transnationalism and integration, without geographically-bound outcomes (transnationalism=there; integration=here), Bivand Erdal and Oeppen (2013, 878) propose three alternative ways to capture the interaction between transnationalism and integration at the individual level: 'as *additive* (the result of the interaction is the sum of the two parts), as *synergistic* (the

result is greater than the sum of the two parts) and as *antagonistic* (the result is less than the sum of the two parts, or one part even cancels out the other)'. For instance, feelings of belonging in both countries is additive. Synergistic interaction then occurs when feelings of belonging in one place render confidence to develop connections—and thus to invest in new feelings of belonging—in the other. Antagonistic interaction occurs when feelings of belonging in one place diminish feelings of belonging in the other (ibid.).

A focus on the *interaction* of integration and transnationalism offers a finer-grained perspective than the alarmist, less alarmist but pessimistic, positive and pragmatic view. It shifts the question “are integration and transnationalism a zero-sum game” to “how do integration and transnationalism influence one another”. For instance, integration in one domain (e.g., economic) may change the type and form of transnationalism in that domain. However, Bivand Erdal & Oeppen (ibid.) limit their typology to the individual level. This is constraining because—as the examples in Table 7.1 suggest—both integration and transnationalism involve collective and state actors (on integration see Penninx and Garcés-Masareñas in this volume; on transnationalism see Mügge 2010). Moreover, organizations and states are often eager and highly motivated to invest in either transnationalism or integration in order to gain support for their own projects. Likewise, states and organizations may try to intervene in migrants' private lives if their integration or transnational route is going in the opposite direction of theirs. As Tables 7.1 and 7.2 indicate, one should differentiate between the forms and types of transnationalism as well as clearly specify how integration is defined in relation to a specific form and type of transnationalism. Integration, like transnationalism, is a multidimensional term (Ley 2013). The next sections review European scholarship from this perspective, drawing on the three main dimensions of transnationalism.

Empirical Findings: Transnationalism and Integration in Europe

Transnational scholarship developed in the USA earlier than in Europe. Much theory in this field is therefore based on the experiences of US immigrant groups that navigated in a context that is very different from the European (cf. Martiniello and Lafleur 2008). European research on transnationalism has matured during the past decade; this section takes stock of the recent empirical studies of economic, political, and sociocultural transnationalism. The field incorporates studies with a range of research questions and aims, a diversity of countries of origin and destination, and a variety of methodologies, from ethnography to surveys. Studies focus on a single ethnic group or are comparative in nature, focusing on one or more aspects of transnationalism. Authors agree that it is problematic to propose a causal relation between transnationalism and integration. For instance, following Kivisto (2001) and Vertovec (2009), Bivand Erdal and Oeppen (2013, 873) argue that a positive

relationship between the two could be the result of the confidence migrants gain from social interaction, either transnational or not, which then becomes self-perpetuating.

Instead of looking for causality, this chapter presents an organized inventory of findings directed by the question of how integration and transnationalism might influence one another. Where studies have differentiated types and forms of transnationalism, this is taken into account. Despite tremendous variation in the studies reviewed in this chapter, most if not all point out the need to be attentive to diversity in transnationalism and integration: who—in terms of characteristics such as socio-economic status, educational level, gender, ethnicity, religion, and migration motives—is involved in transnationalism, and who is not (cf. Mügge 2011)?

Economic Transnational Activities

Remittances are the form of transnationalism that is perhaps best monitored by supranational institutions as well as by sending and receiving countries. The World Bank estimates that global remittance flows, including those to high-income countries, reached US \$542 billion in 2013. That number is expected to have increased to \$581 billion in 2014, of which \$436 billion flowed to developing countries.³ Europe's top five remittance-sending countries are Switzerland (\$19.6 billion), Germany (\$15.9 billion), Italy (\$13 billion), Spain (\$12.6 billion), and Luxembourg (\$10.6 billion).⁴ In view of the large amounts involved, sending states have shown great interest in trying to regulate remittances through formal channels. Classic labour-exporting countries, such as Turkey, have long been keen to manage these flows (Mügge 2013a). But “newer” sending countries too, such as Romania, have attempted to exercise significant state control over the money, people, and goods that cross its borders. In Romania this control diminished with the weakened macroeconomic situation in the 1990s, opening more opportunities for private and informal actors (Ban 2012). This is not a standalone pattern. Levitt and De la Dehesa (2003) found that Brazil and Mexico extend more state services to emigrants than Haiti and the Dominican Republic, in part due to the greater capacity of the former. Although countries like Haiti are heavily reliant on remittances, policy efforts to regulate these flows have been hindered by financial limitations and political instability. Portes, Escobar, and Radford (2007) present a similar conclusion for Colombia and the Dominican Republic.

Governmental regulation of remittances requires a well-functioning bureaucratic apparatus. Remittances from Europe to weak states are therefore largely informal. For instance, an estimated half of the population of Surinam receives material

³ <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20648762~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html>, accessed, 1 July 2014.

⁴ <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/Top10.pdf>, accessed 1 July 2014.

remittances, sent by 63.9% of the Surinamese residing in the Netherlands (Unger and Siegel 2006, 120). Unregistered remittances might equal the amount of remittances officially registered (*ibid.*, 118). These inflows are one of the most stable sources of income for poverty relief at the household level in Surinam (Kruijt and Maks 2003). Informal remittance transfer channels are used by illegal migrants who may feel uncomfortable with established money transfer services or not know how to use them (Ban 2012, 137). Remittances may also be *reverse*. A study of Romanian immigrants in Italy found that migrants who were unemployed or had medical or legal problems received financial aid from their families back home (*ibid.*).

How do economic transnational activities relate to economic integration? Several European studies argue that there is a positive relation between upward social mobility in the country of destination and transnational commitments (e.g., Snel et al. 2006) or at least that these are not mutually exclusive (Mazzucato 2008). Drawing on findings from a comparative case study of remittance practices among two North African groups in France and one North Indian group in the UK, Lacroix (2013, 1023) argues that economic transnational activities hinge on (i) material and social resources resulting from social integration and (ii) patterns of identity formation. According to Lacroix (*ibid.*), Punjabis in the UK, benefitting from their relatively good economic integration, have been able to build public infrastructure such as hospitals and schools in their region of origin in India. Though the economic integration of Moroccan Berbers has been less favourable, these immigrants' integration into French civil society enabled them to link informal collectives of hometown citizens with external funding bodies (*ibid.*, 1033). Kabyles have been incapable of establishing similar connections, due to a fragmented civil society resulting from the civil war in Algeria (*ibid.*). Carling and Hoelscher (2013) argue that migrants need both the *capacity* and the *desire* to send remittances. Capacity emerges from economic integration (e.g., secure employment and sound household finances), while desire may be fostered by identity formation. A quantitative survey of more than 3,000 immigrants in Norway (*ibid.*) and an ethnographic study of Somalis in the UK (Hammond 2013) both confirm that economic integration is decisive for remittance sending.

Political Transnational Activities

Transnationalism raises questions regarding the territoriality of citizenship and political participation (Collyer 2014).⁵ From a transnational perspective, political opportunities for participation are potentially shaped by both the receiving country and the sending country. Opportunities in the host country include aspects of legal status such as national asylum regimes, citizenship, voting, and access to legal representation, but also the migrant organizational landscape (Vertovec 2003, 654).

⁵This subsection draws on Mügge (2010, 28–30), though the text has been reorganized for the purpose of this contribution.

The political opportunity structure in the country of origin refers to rights that enable the political participation of settled migrants, emigrants, and circular and return migrants, such as dual citizenship, external voting rights, and encouraging or discouraging the creation of political organizations (Mügge 2010, 30). Scholars have argued that strong transnational orientations are responses to exclusionary citizenship regimes in host states that limit migrants' access to the political community (Koopmans et al. 2005, 143). But sending states through the extension or denial of citizenship rights can include or exclude their (former) citizens from political participation as well (Freeman and Ögelman 1998). Depending on the citizenship regimes of both sending and receiving states, migrants may come to hold "dual" citizenship (Faist and Kivisto 2007).

Some studies of the political dimension of transnationalism find that transnational political participation goes hand in hand with political participation—and thus political integration—in the host country. Morawska (2003, 161–165), for example, argues that incorporation in local politics in the receiving society and political involvement in the country of origin are often successfully combined. There are numerous examples of diaspora groups that in response to homeland political developments have attempted to influence foreign policy in the country of settlement or a supranational level (see among others Weil 1974; Garrett 1978; Arthur 1991; Jusdanis 1991; Shain 1999; Berkowitz and Mügge 2014). Not all agree that this is a good thing. Huntington (1997), for instance, argues that US foreign policy has become unduly dominated by migrants' interests. More positively, Mathias (1981) argues that such interests would otherwise be overlooked. Either way, migrant groups' ability to work the political system to the point of being able to influence foreign policy is itself a type of political integration. Certain types of transnational political activity thus seem to facilitate political integration.

European scholarship on transnational political activities and ties is particularly well developed on migrants from Turkey, most notably on the Kurds in Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK (Wahlbeck 1999; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001; Van den Bos and Nell 2006; Eliassi 2013; Baser 2014; Alinea et al. 2014). The Kurds are spread over several European immigration countries. Due in part to the large number of political refugees among them, many Kurds have remained politically active around the situation in their homeland (Gunter 2008; Baser 2011). In the 1990s, when the Kurdish conflict in Turkey peaked and the Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan was arrested, Kurds across Europe protested against the Turkish state. Mass mobilization of Kurds and their "transplanted homeland politics" became a concern of European states. Koopmans et al. (2005) argue that such violent forms of transnationalism are detrimental to migrants' integration. However, the scope of such activities should not be overestimated. They are an exception rather than the rule (Mügge 2012b; on Sweden see, e.g., Khayati and Dahlstedt 2014). Beyond protesting at Turkish companies, embassies, and consulates, Kurdish organizations tried to influence Dutch foreign policy towards Turkey. To this end, many activities were organized, including hunger strikes, which imply profound knowledge of Dutch protest instruments. As such, these activists can be viewed as politically integrated into the Dutch system. Moreover, Kurds are extremely well

organized at the European level. Dense networks have been established between organizations across Europe to facilitate joint homeland-directed politics. These networks are increasingly used as a platform for discussing common issues facing Kurds in Europe.

Sociocultural Transnational Activities

Research on sociocultural transnationalism and integration can be divided roughly into studies that quantitatively measure contacts with the country of origin and studies that focus on feelings of belonging. Engbersen et al. (2013) focus on attachment to the country of origin and attachment to, or integration in, the destination country of a relatively new group: post-accession migrants from Central and Eastern Europe. Based on a survey (N = 654) among labour migrants in the Netherlands from Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania, these authors conclude that the strength of transnational ties and integration are influenced by patterns of labour migration. They propose four types (ibid., 976–978):

- *Circular migrants strongly attached to the country of origin and weakly attached to the country of destination.* Most migrants in this category were Polish and Romanian seasonal workers who had migrated at an older age, had a partner in the home country, and had no intention to stay for the long term. These migrants hardly spoke Dutch, had few contacts with native Dutch, did not regularly follow Dutch news, had a weak labour market position, and were unlikely to have a Dutch bank account.
- *Bi-national migrants strongly attached to both countries.* This category was made up mainly of highly skilled Polish migrants, who earned a relatively higher income and had no intention to stay for the long term. Though socially and economically integrated, they nonetheless maintained contacts with friends and relatives in the homeland, sent remittances, and had property there. Their transnational connections were fostered by their higher income.
- *Footloose migrants with weak attachment to both countries.* These tended to be relatively young, less-skilled migrants without a working permit and intending to stay less than a year. They did not speak Dutch, had little contact with the Dutch, and were unemployed or worked informally.
- *Settlement migrants with weak attachment to the country of origin and strong attachment to the country of destination.* This category consisted mainly of highly educated Romanians and Bulgarians who intended to stay at least five years and worked in skilled professions. They spoke fluent Dutch and engaged in Dutch social life.

These findings, Engbersen et al. (2013, 978) argue, demonstrate that there is no strong connection between homeland attachment and integration. However, the analysis shows that integration can go hand in hand with either strong or weak forms of transnationalism.

A quantitative study of 1,270 immigrant respondents belonging to “old” immigrant groups in the Netherlands (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antilleans) showed that 90% of them maintained contact with relatives in the country of origin (Schans 2009). The type of family ties, however, differed. Moroccans and Turks were more inclined to have face-to-face contact with relatives than Surinamese and Antilleans. Since Suriname and the Antillean islands can be reached only by plane from the Netherlands ‘this might indicate that the costs of travelling are too high for many respondents’ (ibid., 1178). Another explanation mentioned is that transnational practices result from migrants’ dissatisfaction with their life in the Netherlands. In the past decade, Turks and Moroccans as Muslim groups have ‘faced increasingly negative perceptions regarding their culture and religion. Under such circumstances, family ties and identification with their country of origin remain or may even become more important’ (ibid., 1179). Similar patterns are found among other groups, such as Albanian youngsters in Tuscany (Vathi 2013).

Bivand Erdal (2013) qualitatively studied the relation between social integration and engagement in sociocultural transnational activities from migrants’ own perspective. This author asked Pakistanis in Norway their thoughts about possible links between transnationalism and integration. Most respondents indicated seeing ‘integration primarily as a structural and functional issue’ and considered transnational activities a cultural issue with no direct relation to ‘integration’ (ibid., 994). The Pakistani respondents in this study considered sentiments of dual loyalty—feeling Pakistani and helping the homeland while at the same time working and raising children in Norway—to be perfectly compatible. However, they felt that this perspective was not shared by the Norwegian majority. For respondents, cultural issues were largely outside the realm of integration (ibid., 995).

Nagel and Staeheli (2008) studied 45 Arab activists in the UK. Though they had different backgrounds, they had a shared political and cultural commitment to the Arab world—enacted through their engagement with Arab organizations and politics. They expressed their feelings of responsibility towards their countries of origin and to Arab people as a whole (ibid., 422). Yet, despite strong emotional attachments to the Arab world, there was also ‘a strong sense of realism among them that “here”—their local neighbourhoods, their city, and Britain as a whole—is where they send their children to school, where they work, and where they should have a voice in policies that affect them and their families’ (ibid., 424). Respondents suggested that integration is a “two-way affair” involving different but equal groups. Their position was pragmatic: they had transnational feelings of belonging but spoke of the need to combat minority self-segregation and isolation from mainstream life.

Dahinden (2009) conducted a network analysis of 250 persons in Neuchâtel, a small city in Switzerland, to understand how transnationalism is practised through social relations. Overall 30 % of the subjects’ networks consisted of personal relations. The findings first show that ‘being born outside Switzerland and not having Swiss nationality enhances network transnationalism’ (Dahinden 2009, 1375). Second, the author found that transnationalism diminishes with length of stay. This study furthermore emphasizes that mobility—having lived in different countries—as well as high cultural capital—a good education—was associated with strong

transnationalism. Others who engaged in what Dahinden labels as pronounced transnationalism were the ‘transnational outsiders’: third-country nationals with low education who find themselves in ‘unprivileged and disadvantaged socioeconomic situations’ (ibid., 1377–1388). They had applied for asylum but been granted only annual residence permits. Strong transnational networks may signify a favourable social position for the highly skilled, even though they may not be locally integrated. But for the less skilled—the outsiders—it may reflect social exclusion and a lack of integration. Medium transnational networks were maintained by so-called guest workers. Their networks were both localized and transnational. The respondents with the weakest transnationalism were those born in Neuchâtel who had not been internationally mobile. Their networks were therefore locally focused (ibid., 1376).

Does transnationalism wane over time? Put differently, does the second generation feel less connected to the parental country of origin than the first generation? In her ethnographic work among Italians in Switzerland, Wessendorf (2007) concludes that transnational feelings of belonging among the second generation sometimes lead to a “return” to their “roots”. Such return migration paradoxically was characterized as the ‘loss of roots’: While still in Switzerland, an important part of their identity was based on the longing for, and belonging to, their parents’ homeland. Once in Italy, they lose this feeling and feel trapped in a place which they once hoped would be their homes, but in which they feel like strangers (ibid., 1097).

The Kurdish experience in Sweden is different. As “Kurdistan” is not an official country, the diasporic community and movement established over various locations have become the ‘diasporic home where [Kurds] can find a sense of continuity and belonging’ (Alinea and Eliassi 2014, 79). For the older generation identity is not constructed in opposition to the Swedish identity, but in opposition to identities in their cultures of origin (Turkish, Arabic, and Persian). For the younger generation, the Swedish context is more influential. For them, feelings of exclusion from Swedish society strengthen essentialist notions of Kurdish identity (ibid.). Thus, for the older generation feelings of exclusion in the country of origin determine feelings of belonging, while for the younger generation the context of the host country is more significant. Despite differences in identification, the Italian and Kurdish cases underline that feeling excluded in the (parental) country of origin is as influential for transnationalism and integration as feeling excluded in the host country.

Challenges for Future Policy-Oriented Research

The breadth of approaches and foci on actors and types of transnationalism provide insight into some broad patterns. The joint reading of the current literature on transnationalism in Europe points to two main observations. First, transnationalism is *costly*. Economic transnationalism requires financial capital, for instance, for remittances or investments. Sociocultural transnationalism requires social capital in the form of available contacts, but also money to buy phone cards or airplane tickets. Political transnationalism requires political capital in the form of skills, knowledge,

and contacts to work politics in the homeland. Put differently, immigrants who are low on economic, sociocultural, or political resources are less likely to engage in transnationalism. How this relates to integration depends on the type and form of transnationalism. For instance, it is relatively inexpensive for immigrants to respond to country of residence transnational activities since this is paid by homeland based actors (such as political parties or religious organizations). But only those who earn enough to send money to relatives or invest in property—and thus who are economically integrated in the host country—can afford to engage in homeland-directed economic transnational activities. Second, many studies show that what happens “there” has consequences for what happens “here”. Feelings of exclusion in the homeland may foster integration in the host county, while factual exclusion from politics may trigger more radical forms of transnationalism to change the situation in the homeland. Either way, homeland developments are decisive for the form and direction of transnationalism. It is therefore surprising that it is so often left out of typologies and reviews on transnationalism (but see Pitkänen et al. 2012).

The current state of the art suggests two avenues for future policy-relevant research. First, comparable data on transnational activities should be collected in European Union member states. National governments have thus far tended to take transnationalism into account reactively, when they believe transnationalism is undermining integration. However, many European countries do monitor citizens’ social, cultural, and economic positions and, in one way or another, examine their ethnic minorities’ integration. While issues related to the country of origin are prominent in public and political debates, they are poorly reflected in official statistics. Hence, our knowledge about the transnational orientations of individual migrants remains limited.

The second issue that merits scholarly attention is the role of gender and sexuality in transnationalism. Despite scholarly agreement that gender matters in all social, economic, and political spheres, little research has addressed gender outside of typically “female” spaces, like the household (Mahler 1998; but see Sinatti 2013). Existing scholarship suggests that involvement in social networks and transnationalism takes very different forms for migrant men and women (De Tona and Lentin 2011; Hagan 1998; Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2005, 896). The general perception is that migrant men play a role in public, formal, and institutionalized domestic networks of migrant organizations and in the transnational ties these maintain with homeland-based actors. In contrast, women seem to play an important role in informal networks consisting of friends and family. In other words, migrant women do not succeed in getting out of the transnational “private sphere” (Mügge 2013b). Thus, gendering transnationalism raises new questions about who is involved in what role and in what type of transnationalism. Finally, a sexuality prism opens routes to study the transnational experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, and queer (LGBTQ) groups. This would be particularly welcome, given the salience of inclusion and exclusion of these groups across the globe and the prominence of LGBTQ issues on the European policy agenda. Promising topics for study are, for instance, same-sex marriage migration, adoption of children by same-sex couples, and transnational political activism by migrants who escaped oppression on the basis of their sexual preference.

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Chapter 8

Translocal Activities of Local Governments and Migrant Organizations

Edith van Ewijk and Gery Nijenhuis

Introduction

Linkages between migrant source and destination countries can take many forms, ranging from informal remittances sent by individual migrants to relatives “back home” to diaspora engagement policies of sending countries. These relationships are often locally specific (Nell 2007). After all, migrants send remittances not to some random village, but to their villages of origin. Some authors refer to linkages at the local level as “translocal”:

[W]hile people are indeed more and more connected to others in different localities, including distant ones, the essence of this integration lies in linking ‘the local’ to ‘the local’ elsewhere and only partly in integration at the level of nation states (Zoomers and Van Westen 2011, 377).

This chapter examines the translocal relationships that link local governments and migrant organizations in a country of origin with those in a country of destination. We define translocal linkages as local-to-local connections across national boundaries created through local governments (villages, cities, or regions) and migrant organizations. As such, we take a meso-level perspective. At the meso level, actors play a specific role. They are often involved in more or less institutionalized linkages through which individual migrants and other actors pool resources, share experiences, exchange knowledge, and engage with one another. These linkages are usually rather structural and stable, and relatively flexible, and they are able to respond to local needs (Robertson 1994; Pries 2001; Nell 2007; Penninx 2005; Bockhove 2012).

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The bulk of the literature on transnational practices focuses on either the macro level, such as the policies of sending countries (see Østergaard-Nielsen in this volume; Østergaard-Nielsen 2011), or the micro level, for example, the remittance behaviour of individual migrants and the impact of remittances on countries of origin (see Mügge in this volume). So far, few researchers have looked specifically at the meso level. Those who have done so have mainly focused on the linkages of US-based migrant organizations (e.g., Mexican hometown associations) with Latin America (Fauser 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2011).

This chapter reviews the literature on the linkages of, respectively, local governments and migrant organizations between countries of origin and countries of destination. Three questions are central: (i) What are the main characteristics of these relationships and what kinds of activities can be observed? (ii) What drives local governments and migrant organizations to implement these activities? (iii) How can we assess these activities?

In addressing these questions, this chapter touches upon two overarching debates that are central in this publication. The first is the increasing prominence of the migration and development framework (see King and Collyer in this volume). Related to this, several European countries have established co-development programmes aimed at linking immigrants and their organizations to development processes in the region of origin, often with the aim of stimulating integration processes in destination countries as well. The second debate is related to this and centres on whether translocal linkages between migrant source and destination countries and integration in destination countries reinforce each other or are a zero-sum proposition (see also Mügge in this volume).

Local Governments as Actors in Transnational Exchange

Numerous governments in European countries of destination support migrant initiatives or maintain linkages with municipalities in origin countries. These linkages are often associated with policies for strengthening social cohesion and integration in their own societies. The connection between international cooperation policies and policies on citizenship and integration at the local level is a relatively new phenomenon in Europe. Reflecting this, there is little scientific research on international cooperation between cities in origin and destination countries. Although several studies mention the existence of these bonds and the main reasons for establishing them, empirical evidence on these partnerships is scarce. There are also few policy-oriented studies.¹

¹One policy-oriented study describes 16 cases of European-based city-to-city partnerships including bonds between Pajkot (India) and Leicester (UK), Nanino (Colombia) and Catalonia (Spain), and Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) and Lyon (France). According to the description, the focuses of these partnerships were on strengthening development and capacity building in the Global South only, and no reference was made to involvement of migrants or their organizations. Only in the Leicester case was reference made to engagement of the community in Leicester and new skills in cross-cultural work (Smith n.d.).

Before discussing the role of local governments, it is important to note that government structures vary widely within Europe, in terms of their extent of decentralization and the mandates of local governments. These differences have a strong effect in the shaping of immigration and immigrant policies, as well as on international cooperation policies (Juzwiak et al. 2014). Beyond the extent of decentralization, the kind of local government entities involved in international cooperation varies widely. Whereas in Spain and Italy regions fulfil an important role, in the Netherlands international exchange is usually executed by municipalities, with regions playing only a minor role. Two general observations can be made: (i) not all European destination countries have experienced engagement of local governments in international cooperation with origin countries, (ii) in those countries where they do engage, only a limited number of local governments are involved.

Characterizing the Transnational Activities of Local Governments

Local governments in migrant destination countries are said to have certain advantages over national authorities in stimulating integration and strengthening social cohesion: they are better at engaging with migrant organizations due to their closer proximity, and they are thought to be more capable of identifying the relevant integration priorities and devising tailored policies (Penninx 2009). Migrants, moreover, often feel more emotionally connected to the city than the country they live in. Whereas the city is associated with a diverse group of people, the country is more associated with one nationality (Bockhove 2012; Van der Welle 2011; Entzinger 2006). Local governments are also likely to be more open to migrant transnational affiliations compared to national governments (Bauböck 2003a, b in Østergaard-Nielsen 2011).

In the literature on city-to-city partnerships, several authors emphasize the power of these partnerships in terms of strengthening local governance processes, while two-way knowledge exchange also occurs (Johnson and Wilson 2009; Van Ewijk 2013).

There are two main types of linkages between cities, villages, or regions. The first is local governments—the administrative bodies, town halls, or policy departments—in origin and destination countries working together in city-to-city or town-to-town partnerships. The bodies involved (e.g., social affairs, police, or fire department) typically work either with other local government bodies or in collaboration with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector. The second type of linkage is that in which a local government supports co-development² initiatives of the nongovernmental actors in their jurisdiction without being actively involved in the transnational exchange (Van Ewijk 2013). The engagement

²We define co-development as the involvement of migrants and migrant organizations in development cooperation programmes linked to the migration and development policies of European donor countries.

of immigrants in such cooperation projects is generally thought to enhance their integration in the destination country. The practices of municipalities differ widely between countries. For example, direct local government support is central in linkages based in the Netherlands, whereas support to NGO initiatives is central in those based in Spain (Acebillo-Baqué and Østergaard-Nielsen 2011; Van Ewijk 2013; Fauser 2007).

Local governments involved in transnational exchanges with countries of origin might focus on the countries where specific groups of migrants originate from or have an open policy towards all migrant groups. Most of the initiatives studied include the migrant groups that have been living in the countries of destination for a relatively long period of time, like labour migrants who migrated to Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Moroccan and Turkish migrants in the Netherlands) or migrants originating from former colonies (e.g., people from Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Morocco, and Tunisia migrating to France). Linkages with “new” emigrant countries, like Afghanistan and Sudan, are not mentioned in the literature. Ties between Eastern and Western European countries linked to the presence of migrants originating from Eastern Europe and residing in Western Europe, are similarly not discussed, and therefore fall outside the scope of this review.

Motives and Frames of the Transnational/Translocal Activities of Local Governments

Five factors explain why municipalities that host large migrant groups undertake transnational activities. First, stimulating integration and strengthening social cohesion in response to increased heterogeneity were important reasons for European municipalities to start cooperating with migrant origin countries (Schep et al. 1995; Shuman 1994; Van Ewijk 2013; Østergaard-Nielsen 2011). Bilgili and Agimi (2015) argue that integration has consistently been a goal for German municipalities to start cooperation with origin countries, although it is not always explicitly addressed. Strengthening community coherence has also been cited as a reason for local authorities to be involved in international exchange programmes (Green et al. 2005; Bilgili and Agimi 2015). Cities started transnational activities in the 1990s, a few decades after the first large-scale migration to Western Europe. Many initiatives were established between 2000 and 2008, against a background of economic growth coupled with increased societal tensions due to 9/11 (2001) and the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). Most partnerships were set up in destination countries, although some local governments in origin countries took the initiative to establish partnerships. A group of Moroccan municipalities, for instance, took the lead in seeking cooperation with Dutch local governments through the Association of Dutch Municipalities (Van Ewijk 2013). Most West European municipalities already had experience with international cooperation that they could build on, and linking with migrant source countries was a logical next step (Østergaard-Nielsen

2011; Van Ewijk 2013). Budget cuts and fragile political and public support for international cooperation meant that some municipalities were seeking ways to benefit from international cooperation. Strengthening social cohesion was considered a way to do so. For these municipalities, the question was “why don’t we link our international cooperation policies to integration policies so that we can gain something from the international exchanges” rather than “can international cooperation provide a new, creative way to stimulate integration”. Local authorities in sending countries are often restricted by limited capacity and insufficient legal competence to be involved in international cooperation (Bilgili and Agimi 2015; Van Ewijk 2013).

Second, migrant groups often catalyse transnational activities.³ In municipalities that host large migrant populations, the translocal linkages already established at the civil society level may stimulate local governments to also get involved in international cooperation. In some cases, representatives of local governments with roots in origin countries (like Dutch or German city councillors and policy advisors of Moroccan and Turkish descent) have taken the lead in establishing local government initiatives (Bilgili and Agimi 2015; Van Ewijk 2013).

Third, national government policies or organizations operating at a regional or national level have played a stimulating role. According to Van Ewijk (2013), nationally funded support programmes have had a strong impact on the partnerships between Dutch municipalities and municipalities in Morocco and Turkey. Most of these programmes have focused on transferring knowledge from destination to origin countries, to strengthen local governance processes in the latter. Østergaard-Nielsen (2011) observes that a development cooperation agency of the municipalities in Catalonia fulfilled an important role in stimulating transnational engagement.

Fourth, the mobility of people between origin and destination countries creates particular challenges, which have motivated local governments to start cooperating. To combat cross-border criminal activities and transnational terrorism, for example, international cooperation between actors operating at the local level may be required (Piperno and Stocchiero 2005).⁴

Finally, Grillo and Riccio (2004) point out that ambiguity might accompany co-development initiatives, as local-level actors, including local governments, may use linkages to stimulate remigration. Diatta and Mbow (1999, 254) observe that an AIDS project with Senegal was linked to an examination of the possibilities for the voluntary return of Senegalese migrants, while Schmidt di Friedberg (2000) notes that the anti-immigrant regional party in Italy (the Northern League) encouraged

³In the Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish partnerships studied by Van Ewijk (2013), migrants also acted as translators and facilitators in the process of knowledge exchange and learning, and as resource persons for knowledge and networks.

⁴Terrorism and security are also directly linked to integration policies. Piperno and Stocchiero (2005) introduce the term “transnational integration”, referring to the requirement for more effective integration policies at the local level, based on intercultural dialogue and the sharing of human and democratic rights and obligations. They argue that local governments can fulfil a specific role in promoting new forms of governance and partnerships with migrants, civil society organizations, and the private sector.

NGOs to engage in development with the objective of halting immigration (Grillo and Riccio 2004). In 2011, the right-wing Belgian political party Vlaams Blok established contacts with Emirdağ (Turkey) and launched a campaign to stimulate the remigration of citizens of Turkish descent from Gent to Emirdağ called “Emirdağ Needs You”. The campaign provoked strong negative reactions from people of Turkish descent living in Gent (Van Ewijk 2013).

It should be noted that economic motives have also played a role in initiating cooperation between migrant origin and destination countries. Local governments hope to stimulate transnational investments from companies. The literature, however, contains few examples where these motives were central.

Impacts of Local Governments’ Transnational Activities

Before discussing the impacts of local governments’ transnational activities, it is important to note that because these policies peaked between 2000 and 2008, most research focuses on this period. Furthermore, empirical evidence of impacts is scarce. A few studies indicate that the city-to-city linkages have indeed helped to strengthen social cohesion in destination countries, although they do not discuss impacts in detail. Examples include cooperation between two London boroughs and partners in Sierra Leone and Bangladesh, respectively (Evans 2009). Grillo and Riccio (2004) discuss the work of Cuffini and colleagues (1993), who argue that the city-to-city linkages between French and African countries (including several countries of origin) were relevant in combating racism in France. Similar impacts are reported for city-to-city linkages connecting the Netherlands with Morocco and Turkey (Van Ewijk 2013).

According to Van Ewijk (ibid.), Dutch actors have learned about issues related to integration through exchanges and, moreover, linkages between institutions and citizens of Moroccan and Turkish descent were to some extent also strengthened. The international programmes either functioned as “icebreakers” between formal institutions and migrant groups, or facilitated learning on sociocultural issues. For instance, teachers involved in an exchange programme with Turkey said they could now communicate more easily with the parents of Turkish children at their school. Police officers who had visited a Moroccan partner municipality reported that they could now better relate to migrant groups, as they had acquired an understanding of the challenges faced by migrants living in their municipality. The cooperation between the police department of Rotterdam and that of Casablanca is an example of transnational exchange on terrorism and transnational crime. This programme has enabled the Rotterdam police to build networks and knowledge about how the Moroccan police operate (e.g., its hierarchical organization), facilitating cooperation with Morocco in tracing people suspected of criminal activities (ibid.). Knowledge about impacts in origin countries is extremely limited. According to Van Ewijk (ibid.), several of the Dutch–Moroccan and Dutch–Turkish municipal partnerships she studied had a dual focus: to strengthen social cohesion in the

Netherlands and to strengthen local governance processes in Morocco and Turkey (usually in terms of service delivery and citizen participation). The partnerships were particularly important in promoting multi-stakeholder collaboration, as the exchanges stimulated cooperation between governmental and nongovernmental actors in both Morocco and Turkey. In the cases studied, few linkages between governmental and nongovernmental actors had existed before the partnership was created. For instance, in a partnership between Haarlem (the Netherlands) and Emirdağ (Turkey), the University of Afyon worked together with a primary school, an environmental NGO, a provincial environmental organization, and the municipality to improve the waste management system and introduce a waste collection system. These arrangements should be viewed against the background of the decentralization processes that are taking place in many countries, including Turkey, whereby responsibilities and budgets are being transferred from the central to the local government level. Hence, local governments are increasingly seeking to work in multi-actor arrangements (Pierre 2000; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2001).

There are few examples of local governments in North-Western Europe supporting NGO co-development initiatives without being actively involved in the exchange. Nonetheless, the idea of co-development was well established by the late 1990s in France, where it received official acknowledgement and also influenced governments and policies elsewhere in Europe (Grillo and Riccio 2004). The approach was central in Catalonia where a large number of local governments were engaged in supporting the initiatives of community-based organizations and NGOs (Østergaard-Nielsen 2011). This phenomenon was also observed in Italy, although few Italian local authorities actually engaged in co-development projects (Grillo and Riccio 2004). Research on the impacts of these activities is scarce. According to Østergaard-Nielsen (2011, 36), it will only be possible to evaluate the dynamics of co-development policies once more programmes have run their course. Most studies refer to various initiatives or analyse the impacts of these programmes on the groups of migrants who undertake the activities. Although most co-development programmes are open to all migrant groups living in municipalities in destination countries, among initiatives in origin countries those of West African migrants are clearly dominant. The migrant collectives with the highest participation rates in Catalonia were comprised of migrants from Senegal, Equatorial Guinea, and Gambia, though the migrant populations originating from these countries represents only 3 % of the total migrant population. The two largest groups in Catalonia (Moroccan and Ecuadorian migrants) were less involved, and representatives of these groups indicated that they were focusing more on integration processes within Catalonia (Østergaard-Nielsen 2011). The literature describes several other initiatives by West African migrants, including those of Malian migrants living in Saint Denis, a suburb of Paris (Petiteville 1995; Grillo and Riccio 2004). A limited number of initiatives by Italo-Senegalese organizations and Senegalese organizations linked to or supervised by Italian organizations are also mentioned (Grillo and Riccio 2004). Grillo and Riccio discuss the importance of transnational networks but also note problems of control and misunderstandings related mainly to naive expectations and the idealization of partners. Policies are sometimes also received with scepticism by migrants,

as they feel they are ‘token participants without any real influence’ (Østergaard-Nielsen 2011, 32). Grillo and Riccio (2004, 109) conclude that co-development is ‘no better nor worse than more conventional forms of development’.

An interesting “three-way” integration process is that of some municipal partnerships, whereby countries of origin play a role in supporting the integration process in destination countries. Gilgili & Agimi (2015) refer to examples of direct subnational support for emigrant employment, health care, and political participation. Van Ewijk (2013) reports, for instance, that administrative staff and policy advisors of municipalities in northern Morocco were willing to dedicate time and knowledge to strengthen the integration of Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands, as they felt the Moroccan migrants were trapped between two countries with different cultures. As the former mayor of Al Hoceima (Morocco) put it, ‘It was obvious that these people did not have a good relationship with their father or their mother. It’s not their fault; it is the parents’ (cited in Van Ewijk 2013, 207). The limited engagement of parents of Moroccan descent with their children’s Dutch schooling was one of the key issues discussed, and Moroccan officials were also involved in stimulating migrants to participate in elections. Community-based organizations that have been part of a city-to-city partnership have also been actively involved in exchanging knowledge on issues related to integration. An example is an exchange between women’s organizations in Meppel (the Netherlands) and Al Hoceima, whereby women of Moroccan descent in Meppel were challenged by women in Al Hoceima to play a stronger role in their own municipality.

As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, few examples of these “three-way” integration process are described in the literature, and there is limited knowledge about the role of local authorities in sending countries. These activities are hampered by the limited capacity and mandates of local authorities in origin countries, and obviously they can only contribute to immigration integration in cooperation with local authorities in destination countries (Bilgili and Agimi 2015).

Linking the Local Level “Here” and “There”: Migrant Organizations

There is an impressive number of migrant organizations in Europe (see Riccio 2008, 227; Cebolla Boado and López-Sala 2012; Van Heelsum and Voorthuysen 2002; Van Heelsum 2004). These organizations are highly diverse. Some have a religious function (e.g., the Ghanaian migrant churches in the UK and the Netherlands), while others focus on sports and leisure. Specific groups may also be targeted, such as youth, women, and particular ethnic groups. Moreover, migrant organizations perform multiple roles. They may facilitate the integration of their members in the destination country by providing information, for example, about housing, daycare, and health services, as well language and integration courses (they sometimes also deliver such courses). By connecting migrants with one another in destination countries, they help to build the migrant network.

Another role played by many migrant organizations, and particularly hometown associations, is to link a region of origin with the destination country. It is this role that we examine in this section, addressing the main characteristics of the transnational activities of migrant organizations, discussing the background of these activities and the factors that explain the start of these activities, and analysing these activities. The transnational engagement of migrant organizations is a relatively new field of study that began in the USA with research on Latin American (Portes et al. 2007; Orozco and Garcia-Ganella 2009), Chinese (Portes and Zhou 2012), and Indian migrant collectives (Agarwala 2015). Until recently, few studies were available on the European context; but that body of literature is growing rapidly.⁵

Characterizing the Transnational Activities of Migrant Organizations

Most migrant organizations have some form of contact with the country of origin. The intensity of this contact varies from rather incidental to structural. As such, not all migrant organizations can be considered “transnational” or “translocal”. The core business of the great majority is focused on the country of destination, to facilitate the integration of migrants in the host society. The relationship of migrant organizations with the country of origin can take many forms, and several categories of activities can be distinguished. For instance, organizations can play the role of broker or political activist, or be a charity or a professional development organization. These roles are not mutually exclusive.

Many migrant organizations perform the role of a broker between the migrant and the country of origin in the practical organization of essential lifecycle events, such as marriage, child birth, and funerals. Examples are migrant organizations that assist in repatriation of the deceased. Migrants often prefer to be buried in the country of origin, which is a costly and complex practice for families, as it requires extensive paperwork and knowledge of the system (Mazzucato and Kabki 2009). Lacroix (2010a) describes how in France the organizations of Algerian Kabyle fulfilled this role to build a bridge between the host society and the region of origin. Another example of an intermediary role played by migrant organizations is in payments of migrants’ community taxes in the country of origin to compensate for not performing communal duties. Migrant organizations collect this money and forward it to the community in the region of origin.

Migrant organizations may embark on political activism, as a strategy to change political structures in the country of origin. This may range from advocacy work to

⁵ See also Mazzucato and Kabki (2009) on Ghanaian migrant associations; Nijenhuis and Zoomers (2015) on Ghanaian, Surinamese, and Moroccan organizations in the Netherlands; Godin et al. (2012) on Congolese and Moroccan associations in Belgium; Lacroix and Dumont (2012) on Moroccan associations in France; Cebolla Boado and López Sala (2012) on various migrant associations in Spain; Van Naerssen et al. (2006) on African migrant organizations in the Netherlands; and Grillo and Riccio (2004) on Senegalese initiatives in Italy.

electoral participation and features strong affiliation with particular political parties and a questioning of governance systems. Several political parties in origin countries have established branch organizations in countries of destination to reach out to the diasporas. Associations of migrants of Moroccan decent offer an example of strong political involvement, and several of these organizations have argued for political reform and democratization (Bakewell 2009). Related to political involvement is the claim for an improved rights position and the quest for improved conditions of return migration.

Migrant organizations may also be involved in charities, targeting their villages or region of origin. For some, the charity is their main activity and raising resources to support a specific project is their core business. They do so by organizing information meetings within their community, holding fairs to raise money, and approaching companies in their networks. These resources can be in-cash or in-kind. An example of the latter is computer equipment sent to schools in Surinam, or shipping the complete contents of a hospital to Ghana. Charities are often relatively short-term, small-scale activities with a limited scope and are comparatively simple to implement. They aim to provide direct relief, for example, after an emergency and to satisfy certain needs. This kind of activity is very common among migrant organizations and has been a central practice from the time the first migrants set foot in Europe. Lacroix (2005) recalls, in this respect, the construction of a mosque in Morocco in the 1960s by migrants based in France.

A final category of activities can be classified as more professionally developed international development cooperation. These activities aim explicitly to stimulate development beyond the individual level in the country or village of origin. This category differs from the previous one in terms of the professionalization, budget, scale, and scope of activities. They are often implemented in the form of programmes and projects to stimulate development with a structural character. Resources to finance these activities may stem from state agencies and NGOs working in development cooperation. Sankofa is one such organization. It is based in the Netherlands and implements activities such as a family poultry project in Ghana.

The transnational activities of migrant organizations require the involvement of third parties. The local counterpart in the region of origin facilitates implementation of activities, keeps an eye on progress, and negotiates with stakeholders. The great majority of migrant organizations collaborate with a partner in the country or locality of origin, sometimes through a local NGO, sometimes through relatives, and sometimes through a counterpart organization established by the migrant organization especially for this purpose (Nijenhuis and Zoomers 2015; Godin et al. 2012; Lacroix and Dumont 2012). Besides these direct partners in the country of origin, migrant organizations collaborate with local and national governments there. Such collaboration is often mandatory to obtain permits for constructing schools and health posts, and is often considered “a necessary evil”. However, positive collaborations with local governments are also mentioned, such as the partnership between Stichting Twiza Fonds (in the Netherlands) and the Moroccan municipality of Dar El Kebdani (Nijenhuis and Zoomers 2015) and, as mentioned earlier, various initiatives being implemented under the umbrella of municipal partnerships.

Motives and Frames of Translocal Activities of Migrant Organizations

Although studies of the transnational activities of migrant organizations are advancing, few address the question of why migrant organizations, as collectives, become transnationally active (Morales and Jorba 2010; Lacroix 2010a). The motives that do emerge encompass four categories: moral, political, economic, and philanthropic. Moral bonds lie at the basis of many of the transnational activities of migrant organizations. These bonds are strongly associated with the relationship between migrants in the destination country and the non-migrants remaining in the village of origin. Migration impacts the identity of a community and changes the roles or the status of the individuals attached to that community. Migration both separates and binds people. Villagers may support each other by providing money, offering places to stay, and establishing care systems for those who remain. As such, migration shapes a “moral framework” (Lacroix 2010a, 10). The role of migrant collectives, hometown associations in particular, is to guarantee that migrants comply with all kinds of communal duties while they are abroad, as “long-distance villagers” (Lacroix 2010a, 10; Godin et al. 2012; Fox and Bada 2008). Moreover, migrants’ participation in development projects gives them a certain legitimacy towards the non-migrants (Lacroix 2009; see also Henry and Mohan 2003, 615).

The quest by migrant organizations to engender political change in their country of origin can be a driver of transnational activities. In this respect, the question is to what extent the activities of migrant organizations can be considered political transnationalism. Some authors consider almost all activities to be political, as they change the local development scene and force local actors to react. Here, we use a narrower interpretation of the concept of political transnationalism as those activities that are directly related to political participation. Examples are efforts to extend political rights to migrant communities, to reincorporate returnees into home-country politics, to empower local communities as a starting point for wider political change, and calls for democracy and political reform (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Itzigsohn 2000). Lacroix and Dumont (2012) mention in this respect the emergence of “a political voice” of Moroccan associations abroad. Moroccan migrant organizations have called attention to the contradiction between the impossibility of renouncing the Moroccan nationality and the lack of the right to vote and be represented in parliament. Economic motives of migrant organizations can be confined to the country of origin or extend to other developing countries. For instance, by pooling funds for investments in income-generating activities, migrant organizations may expect economic profit in the long run. Furthermore, by investing in the local economy, migrant collectives (e.g., hometown associations) might seek to improve the conditions for their own return (Schüttler 2008; Lacroix 2005; Henry and Mohan 2003).

Altruistic motives are another driver of the transnational activities of migrant organizations. Several studies point to the fact that migrant organizations, as collectives, want to do something for their communities back home. They feel privileged

because of the opportunities offered to them in their new home country, such as access to education, good health services, and a relatively high standard of living, and they want to share some of this acquired wealth with their relatives in the country of origin. This is distinct from the moral motive, as it is less focused on maintaining specific relationships with the village of origin, as set in a moral framework with migrants still being considered part of the village of origin. Philanthropy is particularly mentioned among recently established migrant organizations and among organizations involved in charities (Lacroix 2010b; Nijenhuis and Zoomers 2015).

Over time, changes have occurred in the character of the transnational orientation of migrant organizations. The emergence of co-development schemes, and the funding opportunities derived from them, has influenced migrant organizations in two ways. First, it has led to a reorientation of the objectives of migrant organizations, resulting in an increase in the number of migrant organizations that focus on development activities within the realm of international development cooperation. Examples of countries where this is observed are France (Lacroix and Dumont 2012), Spain (Cebolla Boado and López-Sala 2012), and the Netherlands (Nijenhuis and Zoomers 2015).

Second, co-development schemes have resulted in the establishment of new migrant organizations that focus almost exclusively on development-oriented activities. Nijenhuis and Zoomers (*ibid.*) mention the establishment by Ghanaian migrants of several new migrants organizations in the Netherlands. The greater availability of funding has enabled these organizations to become professional development NGOs. A number of new Moroccan organizations have emerged since 2000. These organizations are dedicated solely to development activities in Morocco, and the availability of co-development funds (from the Dutch government) was an important incentive for their establishment (*ibid.*).

The policies of origin countries have also contributed to change the roles of migrant organizations. According to Godin and colleagues (2012), country-of-origin policies (Morocco in this case) play an important role in enabling associations of migrants (in Belgium) to gain funding. Although funds coming from the Moroccan government through the “Moroccan Citizens from Abroad” association were limited in absolute terms, they served to increase the political and symbolic legitimacy of these organizations and thus enhanced transnational development activities.

Transnational Activities by Migrant Organizations: What Difference Do They Make?

With the increasing prominence of the migration and development framework, assessments of the transnational activities of migrant organizations seem to be narrowing to a somewhat output-oriented and normative interpretation of “development”, expressed in quantitative terms (e.g., the amount of money remitted, the number of schools built, or the number of laptops shipped). In this framework, migrant organizations are reduced to a tool for development—one that

policymakers are increasingly encouraged to use. The overall picture, according to this view on development, is that the transnational activities of migrant organizations remain relatively small in scale and focused mainly on infrastructural projects in the social sectors (e.g., construction of a health post or school or the improvement of a village square) (Sinatti and Horst 2014; Portes et al. 2007; Nijenhuis and Zoomers 2015). Much of the academic literature takes a broader perspective, analysing the role of migrant organizations while also paying attention to other dimensions of development (e.g., political and social).

It is evident that the transnational activities of migrant organizations do affect the local context in the country of origin. They change this local context and also affect the relationship between the state and civil society. First, when implementing infrastructural projects, migrant organizations seek the consent of local authorities, which are not always willing or able to provide such support. Second, migrant organizations may initiate a discussion about the relationship between the state and civil society. Some organizations are rather critical about the role of the state, as shown by Fox and Bada (2008), who studied Mexican hometown associations in the USA. These associations blamed local governments in villages of origin for failing to provide necessary basic services to the local population. These migrant associations claimed a voice in municipal investments, as their collective investments had freed up part of the municipal budget, which could then be allocated to other investments.

Studies on the impact of the transnational activities of migrant organizations in destination countries are scarce. A few observations can be made, though, in particular on the relationship between transnational activities and integration. First, implementing transnational activities in the country of origin provides migrants who are not fully integrated in the host society a “refuge”, that is, access to a social environment linked to their own culture and identity (Marini 2014). Second, through transnational activities, members of the organization get to know one another and exchange information and knowledge, which supports integration among those recently arrived. Third, the transnational activities of migrant organizations often depend on the support of other stakeholders, such as private organizations, public sector entities, and other migrant organizations. This collaboration could have leveraging effects, for example, increasing access to information and networks. This might foster social cohesion (JMDI 2010) and increase opportunities for collaboration in other policy fields (Marini 2014; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011).

The direction in which migrants’ collective transnational activities will develop further is rather uncertain. It is likely that not only the orientation of transnational activities of migrant organization will change, but so too will the intensity of these activities, due to the emergence of a second and even third generation and increased integration. Second and third generations might no longer be supportive of transnational initiatives in the country of origin, an issue mentioned by various authors (Nijenhuis and Zoomers 2015; Lacroix 2010a, b). Young people who were not born in their parents’ country of origin may not share their parents’ feelings of belonging to that specific locality. As a result, they might be disinclined to engage in transnational activities oriented towards their parents’ birthplace. Another hypothesis is

that they will retain a feeling of connection to their country of origin, but not to the specific locality their parents originated from. In that case, we could expect to see a decrease in specific translocal activities in favour of transnational activities in the country of origin, or in other developing countries. Moreover, younger generations may not feel connected to or represented by organizations established by their parents' generation (Open Society Foundations 2014). The extent to which migrants are embedded in the country of destination is important too. If migrants over the course of time integrate and spread geographically within the destination country, the rationale to be a member of a hometown association decreases, as Henry and Mohan (2003, 618) found in their study on Ghanaian migrant organizations in Milton Keynes (UK).

Conclusion

This chapter has examined translocal relationships at the meso level, in particular, those linking local governments and migrant organizations in the country of destination with those in the country of origin. Our review shows that both types of linkages produce a gamut of activities, from knowledge exchange through municipal partnerships to the subsidizing of migrant civic organizations, provision of charity goods, and lobbying for migrant rights.

A few observations can be made regarding the main characteristics of these activities. First, translocal activities by migrant organizations are sometimes funded by local governments, and municipal partnerships with countries of origin are sometimes mediated by migrant organizations. Second, translocal activities are usually initiated by local governments and migrant organizations in countries of destination. Third, translocal activities are generally not the core business of local governments and migrant organizations; their focus is typically on the migrant destination country.

This raises the question why actors at the meso level engage in translocal activities. Our analysis found that the desire to strengthen social cohesion and stimulate integration at the local level is usually the main driver for local governments. Local governments start partnerships with cities in countries of origin or support initiatives of migrant organizations in their own municipalities mainly because they expect to reap added value from connecting their integration policies to international cooperation. In addition, they are involved in processes aiming at strengthening local governance in partner municipalities. For migrant organizations, the picture is more diffuse, with a mixture of moral obligations, political and economic objectives, and philanthropy as central features.

Additionally, local government partnerships between migrant origin and destination countries suggest an equal relationship, having a two-way character, with potential benefits for both parties. Such an explicit two-way character is often absent from local governments' support to translocal activities by migrant organizations and initiatives of migrant organizations.

From an economic perspective, the development impact of activities is relatively limited, as they are relatively small in scale and mainly related to social infrastructure, such as the construction of schools or the provision of hospital equipment (by migrant organizations), or waste management and public safety (by local governments). More important, however, is the impact these linkages have on other dimensions of development, like the relationship between the state and civil society. This applies to both municipal partnerships and the initiatives of migrant organizations. Examples include the effect of municipal partnerships in improving the interface between local government and civil society actors in countries of origin and the results of lobbying by a migrant organization for an improved position of women in the country of origin. Moreover, our review of the literature suggests a positive relationship between translocal activities at the meso level and integration in the country of destination.

Although the literature is sparse on strengthening social cohesion through local governments' international activities, the available findings confirm previous research suggesting that engagement in international exchange programmes enhances integration in the destination country. Similar effects can be observed for the activities of migrant organizations, as translocal activities force them to become active members of society in the country of destination. However, the relationship between integration and transnational activities depends on the characteristics of diasporas and policies and funding opportunities in the country of destination. Moreover, the added value of these policies should not be overstated. Most synergy between translocal activities and integration is created by activities that actively link translocal efforts to the country of destination, for example, in multi-actor collaborations, such as those encompassing migrant organizations, NGOs, and other civic and public sector organizations (see also Marini 2014).

Adding to this, an interesting form of “three-way” integration is reported whereby actors at the meso level in a country of origin play a role in supporting integration processes in the country of destination. Moroccan municipalities, for instance, dedicated their time and knowledge to stimulate the participation—political and otherwise—of Moroccan migrants in Dutch municipalities.

Our review found that policies and funding opportunities are crucial elements. Various national and local governments have implemented co-development policies (accompanied by funding schemes) to support initiatives by migrant organizations within the framework of migration and development. This has shifted the orientation of local governments and migrant organizations towards a more development-oriented approach and triggered the emergence of new migrant organizations. The emphasis on translocal activities from a migration and development perspective has implications for the interpretation of these activities. To start with, policymakers have tended to consider migrants and their organizations mainly as a “development tool”, ignoring other, perhaps more important, roles. Moreover, from this perspective, development is often narrowed down to a rather output-oriented and normative view focused on, for example, the size of collective investments or the number of schools built, rather than on processes of social transformation (see also Sinatti and Horst 2014). Finally, one might question the motives underlying this framework.

Some municipalities, for instance, have had controversial objectives like encouraging remigration. Questions could also be asked about the way initiatives are set up, executed, and assessed.

The economic crisis and resulting budget cuts in Western Europe since 2008 has put co-development programmes under pressure, threatening along with them some migrant organizations' funding for translocal activities. Funding constraints have also affected the activities of local governments in origin countries, as all levels of government have had to slash budgets. Nationally funded support programmes have been phased out, which has had an impact at the local level (Van Ewijk 2013). According to Van Ewijk (ibid.), linking to countries of origin remains on the agendas of those local governments that have already established linkages, but financial resources dedicated to these partnerships have been reduced, and government actors are playing a less intensive role, creating more room for civil society to step in. Some local governments have shifted their international cooperation focus to economic objectives and increasingly focus on partnerships with cities in emerging economies like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). As such, the transnational linkages of local governments and migrant organizations represent a highly dynamic form of relationship between countries of destination and countries of origin.

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Chapter 9

Sending Country Policies

Eva Østergaard-Nielsen

Introduction

Migrant origin countries have come to play an increasingly important role in research on processes of migration, migrant belonging, and migrant settlement. Especially since the late 1990s, sending countries have moved from a somewhat marginal position to a more central place in migration studies. During this period, the field of migration studies has seen a growth in single case research and comparative analyses of sending country perceptions and policies towards their emigrants and diasporas. This trend accompanies an empirical development wherein more and more countries of origin seek to strengthen relations with their emigrant populations by facilitating emigrant return, providing overseas consular assistance, and inviting emigrant economic and political engagement from afar. Furthermore, the emergent transnational optic in migration studies has encouraged researchers to consider the interests and politics of the country of origin in analyses of migration flows, migrant settlement, and transnational practices.

Studies of sending countries highlight the growing power of sending states in the context of globalization and transnational migration. When reaching out to their emigrant populations, sending countries have tried to shape processes of migration and migrant transnational practices (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Levitt and De la Dehesa 2003; Chin and Smith 2014; Guarnizo 1998). Indeed, sending country outreach policies aimed at bonding with and facilitating long-distance engagement of diasporas have been depicted as a process of redefining the state and its borders (Levitt and De la Dehesa 2003; Mügge 2012a; Chin and Smith 2014). Two issues are worth highlighting in this regard. First, this phenomenon is not entirely new, as noted by much of the literature. States have long catered to and invited the support

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of their expatriate populations through consular services and strategically placed chambers of commerce. What is arguably different today is the scale and intensity of these outreach policies and initiatives (R. C. Smith 2003b). Second, sending country policies towards emigrants may intersect with migration and migrant incorporation policies in countries of residence. This renders the interests and policy-making of receiving states an important factor for understanding the potential and limits of sending country policies towards their emigrant populations.

Sending countries do not reach out to their emigrants in equal measure. The variance in outreach policies is interesting because any analysis of these issues needs to confront the transnational political agency of migrants and states within broader national and international political developments and structures. This chapter explores the twin central questions of how and why countries of origin reach out to their expatriate populations, focusing mainly on studies related to Europe. It first outlines some basic concepts and typologies of sending country policies with a particular emphasis on some of the key countries of origin of migrants settled within the European Union (EU). It subsequently reviews some of the core explanations for the emergence of sending country policies. Finally, it discusses the impact of sending country policies on migrant settlement from the perspective of political authorities in countries of residence.

In so doing, this analysis addresses a research field that spans all social science disciplines, and consequently a wide range of methodologies. Research on sending countries is still dominated by single case studies and comparisons focused within a particular region. European-based research has centred on the countries of origin of the larger migrant collectives from outside of the EU, such as Turkey (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009, 2003c; Mügge 2012b) and Morocco (De Haas 2007; Brand 2002), or on the Eastern European countries that recently became EU members (Waterbury 2006). Of course, there are also studies on Latin American sending country policies, such as those of Ecuador (Boccagni 2014; Maisonave 2011), Bolivia and Mexico (Lafleur 2012), and Argentina and Uruguay (Margheritis 2014), as well as Asia (China) (Pieke et al. 2004). Recently, several studies have attempted a broad cross-regional comparison in order to evaluate some of the core assumptions often made regarding why sending states reach out to their populations (Ragazzi 2014; Gamlen et al. 2013; Gamlen 2008).

It should be noted that two of the central terms within this literature are not straightforward to use. First, the term 'sending state' or 'sending country' implies that these countries or states actively send or export their emigrants, which is often not the case. Alternative concepts include 'emigration countries', 'emigration states' (Gamlen 2008), and 'emigration nations' (Collyer 2014), but they appear less in the literature. Second, the frequently used term 'diaspora engagement policies' includes the word diaspora, the definition and significance of which is the object of a long-standing debate. Despite these reservations, this chapter follows the general trend of using the terms 'sending country' or 'sending state'. It refers to expatriate populations as both diasporas and emigrants. In any case, it is worth emphasizing that most countries are not either countries of origin or reception, but experience both types of flows.

Mapping the Outreach Policies of Countries of Origin

The history of state-sponsored attention to emigrants and expatriates is as long as the history of consular services. The introductory note to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations traces consular activities back to ancient Greece and the Italian city-state of Genoa, where specially appointed notables residing abroad looked out for merchants and citizens in their locality.¹ The growth in consular institutions followed globalization and intensification of foreign trade and migration. Especially during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, consulates added the tasks of protecting and servicing citizens residing temporarily or permanently abroad to their work on promoting trade-relations. Today when we talk about sending country policies, the scope of institutions and policies involved is much more diverse. The following sections illustrate some of the broader categories of sending country policies as well as their complexity.

One set of outreach policies of sending countries falls within the *economic domain* and aims primarily at attracting the economic resources of the emigrants. This type of policies has received attention not only from emigrant states but also from all major international organizations involved in migration policies. In particular, the topic of remittances has been central in the renewed policy debate on migration and development. Certainly, the sums involved are substantial and on the increase. In 2013, global remittance flows were estimated at US \$542 billion.² Remittances are a welcome source of foreign income for the local, regional, and national economy of the country of origin, but there is concern that those countries where remittances constitute a substantial part of gross domestic product (GDP) are vulnerable to fluctuations in remittance inflows. Consequently, there is no shortage of sending country policies aimed at encouraging and facilitating remittances. For instance, sending countries may facilitate special banking arrangements that make remittance transfers easy and more affordable. Some countries, such as India, have tried to attract foreign investment from diasporas by issuing special government bonds (Lall 2003). There are also examples of sending countries granting tax exemptions and fiscal advantages to non-resident citizen investors or to business ventures of return migrants, as is the case in Ecuador and Senegal. Another example is to allow return migrants to buy property otherwise off-limits to foreigners and to ease taxation of second residences in the country of origin, as in the case of India and the Philippines (Aguinas and Newland 2012). Other initiatives to encourage emigrant spending in the country of origin include the promotion of emigrant tourism. Through special offers, Morocco encourages generous holiday spending among its up to one million citizens who return for holidays each summer (De Haas 2007). In the Philippines, advertisements in the mass media encourage migrant parents to purchase gifts for their family at home (Alcid 2003).

¹ Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Vienna, 24 April 1963, Introductory note, <http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/vccr/vccr.html>, accessed 18/4 2014.

² World Bank, Migration and Remittances, April 2014, at <http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/news/0,,contentmdk:20648762~pagepk:64257043~pipk:437376~thesitepk:4607,00.html> (accessed April 2014).

Some policies aim more directly at creating or reinforcing synergies between migration and development. An often-cited example is the policy of attracting collective remittances dedicated to development projects in migrants' hometowns. Mexico is famous for its "three for one" programmes, in which the three levels of government (municipal, state, and federal) match the amount of money donated by hometown associations to development projects (Williams 2012). Sending countries may also seek to tap into diaspora business and scientific networks. These policies aim to reverse brain drain by encouraging emigrant scientists to return to their country of origin, as in the case of Italy, or to lead joint academic networks from afar, as in the case of Morocco (Aguinas and Newland 2012).

A second set of sending countries policies falls within the *political domain*. These can be categorized as an extension of political rights to non-resident nationals or attempts to influence and control expat political activities abroad. In terms of the extension of political rights, sending country governments may facilitate emigrants' retention and passing on of their citizenship by reforming rules of citizenship acquisition and loss, including dual citizenship (Jones-Correa 2001). Another trend is for emigrant states to create an "emigrant citizenship" that gives more rights to non-resident citizens than to other foreigners. The overseas citizenship of India, the Pakistan Overseas Card, and the Turkish Pink Card (later replaced by the Blue Card) are examples of identity cards granting a particular set of rights. These arrangements do not usually include voting rights (Aguinas and Newland 2012; Mügge 2012b). However, voting rights for non-resident citizens are on the increase. By 2007, no less than 115 states granted long-distance voting rights in homeland elections to non-resident citizens (Ellis et al. 2007). These rights come in a variety of forms. The most inclusive allow all citizens to vote in all elections (legislative, local, and presidential), via personal, postal, or Internet voting procedures and with no prior registration required before each election (Lafleur 2012; Collyer 2014; Bauböck 2007). A major distinction is between those electoral systems where emigrants can elect their own representatives and are accordingly divided into external districts and those electoral systems where the emigrant vote is counted in an electoral district in the homeland. Only 13 countries currently allow their non-resident citizens to elect their own candidates. Of these, five are EU member states (Croatia, Romania, Portugal, Italy, and France) and eight are not (Algeria, Cape Verde, Columbia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Macedonia, Mozambique, and Tunisia) (Collyer 2014).

Political rights can also take the form of councils established for dialogue with emigrants. A number of emigration countries with significant populations of citizens residing within the EU have such councils. For instance, Turkey set up an advisory board from 1997 to 2000 that included 45 Turkish citizens residing abroad as well as representatives of political parties and the state minister responsible for Turks abroad (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003c). Morocco established its Council for the Moroccan Community Abroad in 2007, with Moroccan emigrants being appointed by the Palace (De Haas 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2012). Yet, these councils cannot be considered a univocal success in terms of allowing emigrants a voice in diaspora engagement policies. The representativeness of the councils was criticized by migrant associations in both cases (Østergaard-Nielsen 2012, 2003b).

In terms of sending country policies aimed at influencing and controlling emigrant political activities abroad, studies have revealed that sending countries may seek to convey a particular political agenda and to build an emigrant lobby in their favour. This may be done through consulates or by funding cultural institutions or emigrant associations, or simply by communications via various types of media. This strategy is especially pertinent when a sizeable and visible emigrant group resides in a country that is important to the country of origin, as is the case of Mexicans in the USA and Turkish citizens in Germany. For instance, the Turkish state actively sought to mobilize Turkish citizens in protest against the recognition of the Armenian Genocide and in favour of Turkey's EU membership (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009). This strategy of "courting the diaspora" is a departure from the more defensive tactic of policing the diaspora and trying to curb dissidence abroad through withdrawal of citizenship or the consular control of migrant associations (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; De Haas 2007).

A third set of policies falls within the *domain of welfare and social rights*. Sending country governments may respond to emigrant calls for assistance by extending welfare provisions to non-resident citizens. For instance, Spain extends pensions to Spanish citizens abroad, and some regional governments allow emigrants access to health services when home on holidays (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2013). Some of the sending countries with the largest numbers of nationals residing within the EU have negotiated bilateral social security agreements covering their citizens abroad. As such, Turkey and Morocco have secured full portability of benefits for, respectively, 68 % and 89 % of their workers abroad (Avato et al. 2010). Social security cooperation between countries of residence has also taken place within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Indeed, recent research has counted 594 bilateral or multilateral social security agreements between EU member states and countries outside of the EU (ibid.).

A related area is the *cultural and religious domain*, in which sending countries sponsor and facilitate a range of services to emigrants and their descendants. Some states offer educational programmes for emigrant descendants. This might be in the form of partial or complete funding for schools abroad. Both Italy and France have extensive networks of public schools in cities with larger concentrations of emigrants. In other cases, sending country governments may sponsor after-school classes. The Turkish government and ministry of education, for example, organize classes in Turkish language, history, and culture for emigrant descendants (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003c).

Sending countries may also facilitate religious services for their citizens abroad. This is especially relevant for emigrants residing in countries where their religion is a minority. In these situations, sending countries have sponsored the presence of religious leaders and places of worship. For instance, in the wake of labour emigration, the Turkish Ministry for Religious Affairs supported establishment of religious associations in places with large concentrations of Turkish emigrants. These organizations have Turkish government-funded imams, a physical space for religious practices, and infrastructure for potentially complicated issues, such as funerals in the country of origin (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003c). Morocco, too, facilitates

religious services for its citizens abroad. For instance, 176 imams were dispatched to Europe during Ramadan in 2008 (Østergaard-Nielsen 2012).

Since sending country outreach policies may span different policy aims and ministries, some sending countries have undertaken significant ministerial or consular reforms (Table 9.1). This entails creation of special ministries or departments for emigrants to strengthen the overall coordination of emigrant policies. A recent report identified 22 ministries and 17 subministry-level offices for diasporas in a sample of 77 sending countries (Aguinas and Newland 2012). In the case of Ecuador, the establishment of the National Secretary for the Migrant (SENAMI), originally with an emigrant returning from the USA at the helm, is a case in point. SENAMI was set up to identify needs for Ecuadorian intervention, to promote emigrant livelihoods within the “Fifth Region”, thus sending a strong message of government support to nationals overseas (Boccagni 2011). Indeed, the creation of such national-

Table 9.1 Examples of sending country policies

Category	Dimensions
Economic domain	Facilitating transfer of remittances through discounts on bank transfers Investment policies, e.g., special government bonds for diaspora investors Tax exemptions and fiscal advantages to attract expat investment National, regional, and local government programmes to match funding provided by emigrants for development-oriented projects in their hometowns Property rights allowing emigrants and expatriates to buy land that is otherwise not available to non-residents. Easing of taxation on property for non-resident citizens Encouraging business and scientific networks
Political domain: Extending political rights	Dual citizenship policies External voting rights Setting up platforms for consultative dialogue, such as councils of emigrants
Political domain: Influencing political activities abroad	Encouraging lobbying for country of origin interests in country of residence
Social domain	Welfare provisions, extending social security (pension, access to healthcare during holidays) to emigrants Bilateral agreements on social rights with countries of residence
Religious and cultural domain	Sponsoring religious institutions or personnel abroad Funding cultural centres abroad Government-sponsored schools abroad Broadcasting of national media abroad
Other policies of recognition	Including diaspora in national calendar of celebrations Diaspora conferences Honouring expats with awards

Source: Based on especially Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Ragazzi 2014; Levitt and De la Dehesa 2003; Gamlen 2008; Aguinas and Newland 2012

level institutions has been interpreted as sending a message to emigrants that their plight is being taken seriously (Levitt and De la Dehesa 2003).

Other initiatives aim more directly at strengthening real and symbolic ties with emigrants and diasporas. “Diaspora conferences”, have been organized by Armenia, Cyprus, and Turkey to create and strengthen networks and loyalty among emigrant notables (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). Some countries hold festivals, such as the Gathering in Ireland (Collyer 2013), have an institutionalized “day of the diaspora”, or honour emigrants with awards (Gamlen 2008; Ragazzi 2014).

It is worth highlighting that these policies refer only to state-sponsored initiatives, leaving aside the outreach and mobilization of other actors from the country of origin, such as political parties, religious organizations, and charity or development foundations. Moreover, the focus on government policies bypasses the important aspect of government rhetoric towards emigrants. Several studies note that policy measures are often preceded or accompanied by a shift towards a more celebratory discourse regarding emigrants (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Levitt and De la Dehesa 2003; Collyer 2013; Smith 2008). The long and complex list of sending country policies includes not only policies that encourage emigrants to support their country of origin but also some policies aimed at improving migrants’ livelihoods in their countries of residence, such as by extending social rights. Moreover, sending country government leaders may call for stronger protection of their workers abroad in terms of labour market conditions and anti-discrimination policies. For instance, during the Ecuadorian electoral campaign in 2006, presidential candidate Rafael Correa lamented that emigrants were ‘the biggest victims of the long neoliberal night, but also the biggest heroes’ and promised that ‘never again will the protagonists of the big national disaster called emigration be abandoned’. Consequently his electoral programme included a range of social assistance measures and protection of workers abroad.³ However, many of these topics fell outside the bilateral agreements between Ecuador and the countries of residence of Ecuadorian emigrants. Rather, this level of protection of workers abroad falls within the receiving country’s political jurisdiction. In such cases, the sending country’s scope of action is limited and subject to approval of and agreement with the receiving state.

Explaining Sending Country Policies: Transnational Interests, National Politics, and the International Diffusion of Ideas

The twin questions of what motivates emigrant countries to formulate and implement outreach policies and why sending country policies tend to differ or converge have been approached in a number of ways. Again, it is worth noting that most of

³ http://ecuadorinmediato.com/index.php?module=Noticias&func=news_user_view&id=39940&umt=rafael_correa_lanza_propuesta_para_emigrantes_ecuatorianos and http://elpais.com/diario/2007/10/21/espana/1192917613_850215.html (accessed April 2014, translation of author).

this literature is based on single case or country studies. These studies provide a good contextualized understanding of the perceptions and processes leading to outreach policies, but they fail to test hypotheses systematically across a larger number of cases. Moreover, the first wave of studies of migrant transnationalism exhibited a tendency to sample on the dependent variable (Portes 2001). This extends to the analysis of sending country policies as well, since few studies have included emigration countries with little or no political or administrative attention to emigrants (Mügge 2012a). Finally, studies do not necessarily operate with the same dependent variable. Comparative analyses of sending country policies have tended to focus on only one set of outreach policies, such as political rights, without positioning them within the wider context of policies towards emigrants (Ragazzi 2014). Yet, different sets of policies may derive from different motivations, rendering the findings from one policy field less applicable to another.

A first step towards understanding sending country policies is to elaborate a typology of sending countries based on the scope and intensity of a broad range of outreach policies. A basic categorization is between states that do reach out to emigrants, such as Italy, and those that do not, such as Denmark. In addition to this distinction between engaged and disengaged states, there is a category of “strategically selective states”, which encourage emigrants to stay in touch but extend to them only a subset of rights and services (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Some studies have based their classification on the motives underlying policies. For instance, Gamlen (2008) builds a classification on the distinction between diaspora creating and diaspora integrating policy mechanisms, concluding that those states that employ one set of policies but not the other are emigration states “on paper” or in an incoherent way (*ibid.*). In a somewhat similar vein, studies of sending countries have employed notions of governance, or the Foucauldian notion of “governmentality”, as the dependent variable, identifying types and forms of extraterritorial sending country policies aimed at creating, mobilizing, or controlling emigrant populations from afar (Délano and Gamlen 2014; Gamlen 2008; Maisonave 2011).

Recent analyses base their classification of sending country policies on the different configurations of policies. This results in a classification that distinguishes not only between the disinterested and engaged states, but also between the expatriate state (which directs cultural and educational policies at high-income expats who reside temporarily abroad) and the managed labour state (which maintains policies to attract remittances and extend welfare provisions to lower income emigrant workers) (Ragazzi 2014). The distinction between policies directed at migrants perceived as temporarily abroad and those considered permanent expatriates is important and echoes the classification of R. C. Smith (2003b) between emigrant policies and global nation policies. There is a key difference between those countries that primarily want to facilitate labour export and those that aim mainly to keep in touch with overseas nationals and their descendants. Both sets of countries may be interested in keeping remittances flowing, but the existence of a broader set of “bonding” policies is more likely among the latter.

When it comes to explaining why states reach out to their emigrant populations, the literature points to a broad range of historical and (geo) political variables that

account for differences in emigrant state policies. Recent studies group the explanations according to research area, such as migration and development, transnationalism, and citizenship or governance (Collyer 2013; Délando and Gamlen 2014). Others focus on overall conceptual approach, distinguishing between interest maximization, national ideologies, traditions of governance, and policy diffusion (Ragazzi 2014; Gamlen et al. 2013; Délando 2013). The sections below build on these distinctions, though the main variables and hypotheses are grouped in a slightly different way according to the weight and significance placed on transnational and domestic actors, interests, and types of processes. The first section discusses the understanding of sending country policies as an outcome of the different configurations of interests and power in transnational state–emigrant relations. The second section focuses on an analysis of sending country policies as a result of political processes within the countries of origin, such as broader democratization, national identity, and partisan policy interests. Finally, the last sections discuss the conceptualizations of sending country policies as being shaped by processes of policy diffusion at the global, regional, or even bilateral level. These approaches emphasize different sending country policies. Yet, all of them seek to link a specific set of actors, interests, or processes with the broader scope and level of sending country outreach policies.

Transnational Relations as an Outcome of the Balance of Interests and Power between Sending Countries and Diasporas

A dominant trend in research has been to view sending state policies as an outcome of the balance of interests and power between sending countries and diasporas. From this perspective, sending states reach out to their diasporas in recognition of the economic and political contributions that emigrants might make via remittances, foreign direct investment, or political support (Sheffer 1986; Bauböck 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Guarnizo 1998). Consequently, sending country outreach policies constitute a particularly attractive strategy for states that occupy a marginal position in the global economic and political system (Guarnizo 1998). For these countries, diaspora engagement policies are, so to speak, a foot in the door to the economic benefits of globalization. Other analyses emphasize the political significance of diasporas, in particular, when a sizeable proportion of the sending country’s population resides in a receiving country or region important for its foreign policy or when a dissident voice is unwanted by the homeland.

Thus, one overall hypothesis of why countries reach out to their diasporas is based on a rational cost-benefit analysis by the political elite of the sending country; that is, the more important the diaspora is for the economy and domestic and foreign policy of the country of origin, the more likely that country is to seek to “tap into” diaspora resources through outreach policies. This might be with policies aimed directly at maximizing remittance flows or via broader policy reforms to encourage

the continued loyalty of the diaspora. Indeed, the role of remittances is given significant weight in this strand of analysis as outreach policies are seen as ‘part of a broader effort to attract or channel migrant remittances’ (Levitt and De la Dehesa 2003, 595). Similarly, Waterbury (2006) argues that some emigrant states reach out to their diasporas residing in countries with assimilatory migrant incorporation regimes in order to retain loyalty and keep remittances flowing.

The notion of diaspora engagement policies as the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis related to the economic and political strength of sending countries’ overseas nationals is straightforward but ultimately fails to offer a comprehensive analytical framework. First, it does not explain why some of the countries most dependent on migrant remittances have not implemented the most comprehensive sending country policies. Arguably, the answer could be that those countries that already receive a large and steady flow of remittances need not do anything further to attract such funds, except keep facilitating labour export. Second, it does not explain why a variety of countries that are not dependent on emigrant economic and political support have reached out to their emigrants, as have Spain, Italy, and France.

Moreover, emigrants and diasporas are not passive entities merely waiting for their country of origin to approach them. Another notion is that of sending country outreach policies being a response to demand from an organized and powerful diaspora (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). Such demands from a diaspora may be backed by the expatriates’ economic and political strength. The role of the Armenian diaspora in the first set of Armenian outreach policies after independence is a case in point (Panossian 2003). However, this perspective does not view outreach policies as stemming from a dictate from the diaspora. Instead it highlights the domestic politics of the country of origin, as diaspora demands and potential support enter power struggles among main political actors in the country of origin.

The Politics of the State and Nation

Most analysis has drawn on the domestic political situation in the country of origin to explain why sending countries reach out to their emigrants. One argument is that the degree of democratization and political competition in the homeland determine the extent to which this competition spills over into the transnational realm. To illustrate, during processes of democratization and increased political competition, political parties may vie for the diaspora’s support. For instance, political parties believing themselves to have support among emigrants might push for the extension of dual citizenship and political rights, as happened in Mexico and the Dominican Republic (M. P. Smith 2003a; Itzigsohn 2014; Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010). This argument is complicated by the fact that some emigrant states, albeit democratic, tend to largely ignore their emigrants; and emigrant states that are not democracies, or at least not experiencing a linear process of democratization or political liberalization, have been known to reach out to their emigrant populations. In the case of

the latter, the desire for extra-territorial control of citizens and civil society has been identified as a core incentive (R. C. Smith 2003b; Østergaard-Nielsen 2012). Outreach policies under Mussolini's fascist regime were considered part of an overall strategy to keep dissident mobilization in check (R. C. Smith 2003b; Lafleur 2012). With these policies, Italy extended a range of political rights (including state-sponsored return tickets to vote in homeland elections) and social and cultural rights (e.g., Italian schools abroad and the organization of emigrant associations).

A second line of argument suggests that sending state outreach policies are shaped by forms of nationhood and processes of nation-building in the country of origin (Bocagni 2014). This view is especially related to the extension of citizenship to overseas nationals. One hypothesis in this regard is that an understanding of the nation based on ethnic rather than territorial criteria would render emigration states more likely to reach out to and include their nationals abroad in what has been termed a process of re-ethnicization of citizenship (Joppke 2003). Such a path-dependent approach to understanding policy outcomes as dependent on types of civic or ethnic national models of citizenship has, however, been criticized as unable to explain why states shift their policies towards emigrants (and immigrants). As argued by Bauböck (2013, xv), we should see understandings of nationhood not as independent variables but as 'discourses through which states legitimate their policies that may be driven by quite different motives'. Indeed, a more constructivist approach to the complex relationship between homeland narratives of the nation and those of emigrants has been highlighted in recent work on sending country policies (Collyer 2013; Bocagni 2014). It could be added that this type of research requires an analysis that distinguishes which set of political actors in the sending countries frames their support or opposition to outreach policies towards emigrants. For instance, Joppke (2003) in an analysis of three EU member states—Spain, France, and Italy—demonstrates that centre right to extreme right wing parties have pushed for a more inclusive approach to emigrant citizenship while maintaining a restrictive line towards immigrant naturalization criteria.

A further perspective pertaining to the political characteristics of the country of origin emphasizes the type of political and economic governance (Ragazzi 2014; Gamlen 2008; Gamlen et al. 2013). According to Ragazzi (2014), there is a relationship between the political-economic model of a state and the development of state policies. The more closed an economy is (in foreign trade and control of the financial system) the more closed its attitude towards emigrants will be. More open (neoliberal) states, will be more inclusive. In an analysis of 35 countries, Ragazzi (ibid.) concludes that this best explains the development of diaspora policies.

A look at the politics underlying policies in countries of origin emphasizes that these policies are also the product of domestic political power configurations, including not only political parties but also interest organizations and emigrants in their powerbase. Comparative studies examining the roles of these actors could further clarify how emigrant policies relate back not just to the broader characteristics of the political system but also to negotiation and contestation between the main political actors in the country of origin.

Global Norms and the International Diffusion of Ideas

Another set of explanations of why sending countries reach out to their citizens abroad positions emigrant and diaspora policies within processes of idea and norm diffusion through international organizations (Levitt and De la Dehesa 2003; Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010), regional networks of states (Délano 2013), and even bilateral exchanges of information (Iskander 2010). Norms are here understood as collective understandings of appropriate behaviour (Guiraudon 2012). The basic idea is that there is an evolution of norms of how sending country policies can optimize the externalities of international migration. Formulation and implementation of sending country policies take cues from this process of norm evolution. For instance, the emergence of new international norms of nationhood and citizen protection has been argued to influence emigrant state policies within the domain of citizenship and political rights. States liberalize their citizenship policies in step with globalization and adhere to more post-national or cosmopolitan notions of nationhood. Such a deterritorialization of citizenship, coupled with a stronger commitment to human rights norms, may arguably translate into more inclusive policies towards both immigrants and emigrants (Joppke 2008; Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010; Soysal 1994; Levitt and De la Dehesa 2003).

A broader set of outreach policies can be understood in the context of evolving norms of global migration governance. Here, the role of emigrant countries in recovering lost resources, especially in the policy fields of migration and development, is lauded as a “best practice”, because it allows not just the migrant receiving states but also emigrant states to partake in bilateral or multilateral cooperation on migration issues (Gamlen et al. 2013). This view is reflected in the agenda and recommendations of the Global Forum on Migration and Development and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) sponsored *Handbook on Diaspora Engagement*, which provides ‘a user-friendly accessible and practical guide on the state of the art in governmental diaspora initiatives...designed to help policy makers and practitioners fit the many elements of diaspora policy into a coherent strategy’ (Aguinas and Newland 2012, 14). Indeed, there are strong indications that sending states which move in the same international circles are picking up on this advice. From 2000 to 2008, 20 % of all poverty reduction strategies published by developing states included a call for engaging expatriate communities (Gamlen et al. 2013).

In terms of the regional and national politics of policy diffusion, Délano (2013) identifies a convergence of practices and policies of emigrant states in Latin America as a result of dialogue and information sharing among Latin American governments. Three factors are identified as crucial to this process: the influence of the Mexican example, the ideological convergence of Latin American governments, and finally the fact that these countries largely share the same emigrant destination country, the USA (ibid.). Iskander (2010) traces policy diffusion across regions, demonstrating that Morocco and Mexico learned from each other (and the emigrants) through a creative process of policy innovation. The overall suggestion is that domestic resistance to outreach policies among segments or all of the homeland

political elite can be overcome with a consolidating example from another sending country that has successfully implemented such policies (Délano 2013).

The perspective on norms and policy diffusion adds an interesting dimension to our understanding of the complex interplay between processes within and beyond the nation state. It highlights the fact that ideas travel and that international, regional, and bilateral relationships matter (Délano 2013). Moreover, it calls for further analyses of what domestic factors matter for the incorporation of international or regionally evolving norms of state-emigrant policies (Guiraudon 2012).

All in all, these different approaches place different emphases on different actors and processes. Few would argue that emigration policies can be understood only with reference to either the strength and potential of the emigrants, the political situation in the country of origin, or the diffusion of policy norms. Instead qualitative studies have tended to look at the particular configuration of several or all of these factors across a limited number of cases, and broader systematic statistical studies have increasingly tested these different predictors in a particular policy area or a broader set of policies. The study of relations between the sending country and its emigrants has been criticized as being largely a-theoretical (Délano and Gamlen 2014). Yet, overall the field appears to have increasingly taken up the challenge of developing theory on the roles of actors, norms, and processes at the national, transnational, and international level.

Perceptions of Sending Country Policies in Countries of Residence

An important aspect of sending country policies aimed at reaching out to nationals abroad is their impact on both the emigrants and the political authorities of the country of residence. Indeed, the role of sending countries in the integration of their citizens abroad is central to the European Commission's "three way approach to integration of third country nationals" (EC 2011, see Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx in this volume). The actual impact of sending country policies on the scope and direction of migrant transnationality is still an evolving research field. There is a growing body of literature on the nexus between migrant transnationality and integration (see Mügge in this volume). Yet, there is still work to do regarding the impact of sending country policies on both migrant transnationality and migrant processes of settlement. Regarding migrant transnationality, it can be difficult to determine to what extent emigrant state efforts to bond with their non-resident citizens are directly responsible for migrant transnational practices related to their country of origin. These practices are embedded in broader political and economic processes as well. For instance, a recent report on remittances to Latin American emigrant countries explains changes in remittance flows by labour market conditions in the country of residence and by changing macroeconomic conditions in the sending country, but without mentioning sending country policies aimed at

increasing these flows (Guiraudon 2012). Moreover, several cases suggest that emigrants respond only reluctantly to outreach policies of the homeland. Turnout in homeland elections is a notorious case in point, as it is usually nowhere near domestic electoral participatory rates, because the cost of voting in terms of both access to information and the logistics of voter registration is rather high (Lafleur 2012). Emigrants may in general be sceptical towards the outreach of a homeland regime, since lack of trust in that very regime may have been an incentive for emigration in the first place (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Boccagni 2014). Indeed, a recent handbook on bonding with the diaspora repeatedly emphasizes the importance of fostering trust in the country of origin among emigrants and diasporas — an indication that diasporas are not necessarily confident in the political institutions of their homeland (Aguinas and Newland 2012).

Sending country policies may, more or less explicitly, try to link with processes of migrant settlement. Overall, the strengthening of upward social mobility of emigrants in their country of residence is usually interpreted as a win-win scenario for sending countries and emigrants, as wanting the best for your citizens abroad is not incompatible with having a financially and politically significant expatriate lobby abroad (Bauböck 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; R. C. Smith 2003b; Kirişçi 2008). Still, emigrant state policies that aim to attract the attention and resources of emigrants have been viewed with ambiguity by governments of countries of residence, particularly those with a more assimilatory migrant integration regime (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009). Again there is little systematic research on how emigrant state policies are perceived in the receiving countries.

Within Europe, the idea of the sending country having a role to play in the integration of third country nationals, present in policy documents at the European level, is somewhat ambiguous at the national level. Research indicates that there are, very generally speaking, two quite opposite perceptions of the challenges posed and opportunities offered by emigrant state outreach policies (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009). There is the perception that outreach policies pose a challenge to migrant integration within the so-called “zero-sum” understanding of migrant loyalty; that is, the more focused migrants are on their country of origin, the less they will identify with and support their country of residence. This perspective considers sending country policies aimed explicitly at bonding with and tapping into the resources of a migrant collective as counterproductive to policies of migrant incorporation in the country of residence. More in tune with the policy vision of the European Commission is recognition of the potential of emigrant state policies aiming to tap the development potential of collaboration with emigrants and their associations. The understanding here is that migrants, either through return or from afar, can be important actors in local and national development dynamics in their countries of origin.

In terms of the perceptions of how sending country outreach policies intersect with migrant integration, some examples of sending country rhetoric related to “don’t forget me” attitudes have been unpalatable to countries of residence. For instance, during the 1980s, Turkish officials criticized German lack of dual citizenship often in very strong terms, and consular staff berated Turkish emigrants for

trading their Turkish passport for a German one (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003c; Özdemir 1997). In a later development, Turkey provides an illustrative case of a country of origin seeking to balance the desire to retain emigrant interest and loyalty in their country of origin while encouraging them to integrate in their country of residence. During the 2014 presidential electoral campaign, in which Turkish emigrants could vote for the first time, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan encouraged them to learn the language of their country of residence and ‘not live like foreigners’ but also to preserve their mother tongue and cultural links to the homeland.⁴ This message of “integration, but not assimilation” was, however, received with some caution among German and Austrian political leaders wary of the impact of country of origin leaders’ patriotic calls for loyalty.⁵

In terms of the policy field of migration and development, emigrant state policies of bonding with their citizens abroad is considered “best practice” (Aguinas and Newland 2012), and a growing number of policy initiatives have sought to strengthen partnerships with sending countries in order to tap into migrant transnationality. An example is the German aid agency, GIZ, which, among other things, has worked with Serbian migrant associations in Germany to build stronger trust in the Serbian financial sector, in order to strengthen flows of remittances and foreign direct investment (ibid.). The question is to what extent such instances of international cooperation among sending and receiving countries, which focus on how public policy can assist migrants in supporting their homeland, are matched by cooperation aimed at strengthening the integration of migrants in their receiving countries.

One important dimension in this respect is the protection of emigrant labourers in precarious work situations. As mentioned, sending countries have called for protection of their workers abroad. Ecuador’s government strongly criticized the Spanish and Italian governments for this reason (Boccagni 2014). The Philippines, too, has called for the protection of and proper salaries for especially domestic workers in the Gulf and Asia, and has secured a minimum wage for Philippine domestic workers in Malaysia (Ezquerro and Garcés-Mascreñas 2008). However, in most cases sending country governments lack the power to follow up these calls with any substantive policy measures. In this regard, sending country policies appear to be limited by the sovereign right of receiving states to define labour market conditions within their own borders (subject to international conventions) reinforced by the often very asymmetric power relations between sending and receiving countries.

⁴Turkish PM Erdoğan slams German media, calls for ‘integration’ but ‘no assimilation’ in Cologne, in *Hurriyet Daily news*, May 24 2014, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-slams-german-media-calls-for-integration-but-no-assimilation-in-cologne.aspx?PageID=238&NID=66901&NewsCatID=510> (accessed July 2014).

⁵<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/19/us-austria-turkey-idUSKBN0EU1ZI20140619> (accessed July 2014)

Concluding Remarks

Sending countries have taken an important leap from eking out a largely marginal existence to being recognized as a significant player in European-based (transnational) migration research. The overall field of sending country policies includes a complex and fairly comprehensive range of initiatives aimed at assisting and attracting support from emigrants and diasporas. These policies are recognized as interesting in and of themselves because they challenge the basic idea of congruence between political communities and state borders. An increasingly methodologically sophisticated analysis of especially single case studies and focused comparisons and recently also comparative statistical analyses have highlighted a series of core explanatory frameworks for understanding the motivations of sending countries for reaching out to their emigrants.

Understanding the scope and rationale of sending country policies towards emigrants is an important and ongoing research field. There is still a challenging research agenda ahead in terms of the transnational, national, and international politics of sending country policies. The policy field of migration and development stimulates partnership and collaboration among countries of residence and origin (and the migrants themselves). Yet, more studies are needed to understand the overall dynamics of how sending country outreach policies designed to keep or rekindle a relationship with nationals abroad impact processes of settlement and how they square with receiving country interests. In that respect, it is worth bearing in mind that emigrants and diasporas may not immediately respond to sending countries' outreach, because they are wary of the motives and credibility of these efforts and the extent to which they are sensitive to emigrant needs. Moreover, we still need to explore the extent to which European governments are moving away from the zero-sum debate and the securitization optic on migrant transnationality to a more integrated three-way approach as envisioned by the European Commission. Such a shift may enable us to better understand the extent that sending country outreach policies aimed at both bonding with and supporting citizens abroad challenge territorial policy sovereignty and the strength of receiving countries in agenda-setting in international cooperation on migration and migrant settlement.

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Chapter 10

Migration and Development Framework and Its Links to Integration

Russell King and Michael Collyer

Introduction

Both historically and still today, migration is driven by economics. One of Ravenstein's famous laws of migration went simply thus: 'The major causes of migration are economic'.¹ Whilst it is true, in this late-modern era, that people migrate for a greater diversity of reasons, including education, lifestyle, love, or a warmer climate, the primacy of "economic migration" remains, not least in political discourse and in discussions over how migration should be managed. In the UK, for instance, the term "economic migrants", said with emphasis on the "economic", is applied to people whose influx should be rigidly controlled, even suppressed, except when there is an anticipated benefit to the economy, as in the aftermath of European Union (EU) enlargement in 2004.²

This continuous stress on migration as a fundamentally economic process is an enduring explanation of *why* most migration takes place (to escape poverty and unemployment, to improve incomes and life-chances, etc.), but it says very little about the *effects* of migration, especially on the countries, regions, and communities of origin of the migrants, and on their family members left behind. The economic

¹Ravenstein's original papers were published in 1885 and 1889. For an accessible and sympathetic critique see Grigg (1977).

²After the 2004 enlargement, the UK, Ireland, and Sweden immediately opened their labour markets to the entry of workers from the ten accession countries. A much larger influx than expected took place, especially of Poles to the UK and Ireland. Nevertheless, these labour migrants helped to underpin the economic boom that lasted until the 2008 financial crisis. For an in-depth analysis of this East–west development-inducing migration, see Black et al. (2010), Galgoczi et al. (2009), and Glorius et al. (2013).

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frame of reference, with its emphasis on (un)employment, incomes, and labour markets, says even less about other important dimensions of migration, such as migrants' social integration in the host country and what this, in turn, might mean for their relationship with their home country.

The connection between the succinct interpretation of integration set out by Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas in Chap. 2 of this volume (on the process of becoming an accepted part of society) and the predominantly economic understanding of migration and development is not always clear. One of our central arguments in this chapter is that the overall approach to migration and development in both applied and theoretical terms has fluctuated with different understandings of the nature, forms, and processes of integration. We follow other theoretical overviews of migration and development in characterizing this relationship as a swinging pendulum (De Haas 2012; Gamlen 2014).

We first look at how the relationship between migration and development (henceforth M&D) has been seen theoretically, tracing how this analysis has swung between positive and negative interpretations over the seven decades of the European post-war era. Throughout this historical-theoretical treatment, we privilege three processes as potential triggers of home-country development: remittances, return migration, and diaspora involvement. We then broaden the dual conceptual lens of M&D: we refocus migration and return as encompassing a diversity of transnational mobilities; we reconceptualize development as being less about economic measures and more about human wellbeing; and we broaden our analysis of remittances from financial transfers to include social, cultural, and political elements. The final part of the chapter aims at a synthesis between the M&D frame, on the one hand, and the integration frame, on the other. Here, we ask two questions. First, how does the multifaceted integration process impact on migrants' capacity to stimulate development in their home countries and communities? Second, for those migrants who return-migrate or who lead multi-sited transnational lives, what are the challenges to their reintegration in their countries of origin?

Theoretical Perspectives on the M&D Nexus

Any social scientist with a contemporary global perspective will surely agree that the phenomenon of migration and the challenge of development are vigorously debated topics. How do these two mega-processes interface with each other? We start with definitions and move to theory. Bakewell (2012: xiv) contrasts 'solid' migration with 'slippery' development.

Migration is observable and measurable, despite the invisibility of clandestine migration and the challenges of collecting good migration statistics. The global *stock* of migrants—people residing in a country different from their birth country—stands at 232 million, 3.3% of the world's population of 7.2 billion (UN 2013). But stock figures are static measures; they reflect the culmination of previous

migrations. Given that both migration and development are dynamic processes, *flows* of migrants are often seen as the more relevant variable—either one-way or net flows over a certain time span, such as a year or a decade. The notion of net migration, intuitively attractive in the gravitational logic of economic push and pull factors, is problematic, however, as it is the residual product of five types of migration flows: emigrants going out of a country, and those returning; immigrants coming into a country, and those returning; and finally, transit migrants passing through. Moreover, if migration is seen as the product of individual human decision-making events, then it has to be pointed out that there is no such individual as a net migrant! Fischer et al. (1997: 94–96) engage in a simple but interesting correlation analysis between the “net stock” of migration for each country (the balance between that country’s immigrants and its emigrants, expressed as a percentage of total population) and the “dependant” variable of development (gross domestic product (GDP) per capita measured in purchasing power parities). For the world as a whole, the correlation is +0.46. Overall, then, the more immigrants the higher the GDP, and the more emigration the lower the GDP.³

Compared to “solid” migration, the conceptualization and measurement of development are contentious, with a diversity of perspectives. Bakewell (2012: xiv–xvi) notes two older ideas of development. The first is the European Enlightenment belief in the capacity of humanity to progress towards a stable and rational social and economic order, which implies a duty of “advanced” countries to help and “civilize” the “unenlightened” parts of the world. In practice, this was no more than a ‘moral cover for colonial expansion’ (ibid.). Second, the mid-twentieth-century collapse of colonial empires, combined with the Cold War, set the frame for an ideological battle between, on the one side, the West’s policy of “development” as modernization and economic growth within the capitalist global order and, on the other, the heterogeneous communist or socialist ideas about development espoused by the Soviet bloc, China, Cuba, etc. We return to this ideological duel presently.

Over time, narrowly *economic* interpretations of development (i.e., economic growth measured in trends in GDP per capita as the magical indicator) broadened to a wider vision of *human* development. This is now well established (since 1990) in the Human Development Index used in successive annual reports of the United Nations Development Programme to synthesize, alongside per capita GDP, quality-of-life variables like literacy, health, life expectancy, infant mortality, human rights, and gender equality into composite indices. Such measures take their cue from Sen’s (1999) pioneering work on reconceptualizing development as the capacity of people to exercise autonomy and control over their lives.

³The correlations are higher when the analysis is applied to groupings of countries linked by regional immigration systems: +0.81 for Europe, Turkey, and the Maghreb and +0.73 for the Americas (Fischer et al. 1997, 95).

Migration Studies and Development Studies

Until relatively recently the two interdisciplinary fields of migration studies and development studies remained separate: migration scholars said little about development, and development specialists said little about migration. Policy debates likewise were kept largely separate. Some significant forays were made into the interlinkages, at both the local-regional level (Abadan-Unat et al. 1976) and on a more global scale (Skeldon 1997; Zelinsky 1971), but little attempt was made at formal theorization of the relationship.

For most of the post-war period until the early 1990s, the predominant European discourse focused on labour-market needs, “guest worker” immigration, and “integration”. There was almost no acknowledgement of migrants’ links to their home countries and their developmental impact there. There was, however, an implicit assumption that migration would be beneficial to migrants’ home countries through savings and remittances sent back, and through the innovative stimulus of return migration. However, several studies carried out in various return-destination contexts in the 1970s and 1980s found this return-development mechanism to be largely lacking.⁴ What was clear then, and what has emerged with renewed clarity as a result of the westward migration of Poles and other accession-country migrants since 2004, is the developmental contribution of labour migration to the receiving country, the continued growth of which was sustained and accelerated by extra supplies of flexible and willing labour. Both the guest worker migration and the recent East–west migration vindicate Piore’s (1979) thesis on the crucial role of migrant labour in fuelling growth in advanced industrial economies. Indeed Castles and Kosack (1973, 8), in their classic treatise on immigrant workers in Western Europe, go so far as to say that labour migration was a form of development aid given by the poor to the rich countries of Europe.

The nature of the M&D debate changed around 2000, prompted by a constellation of changing migration contexts, new policy initiatives, and an academic reappraisal of what came to be called the migration–development nexus (Van Hear and Sørensen 2002). This substantial change can be framed in terms of the three distinct levels set out in Chap. 2—individuals, organizations, and institutions—plus a fourth factor, which is the theoretical shift in keeping with empirical findings and political developments. *First*, at the individual and human-behaviour level, there was a clear understanding that global migration accelerated, globalized, and diversified after the 1980s, through the era that Castles and Miller (2008) refer to as the ‘Age of Migration’. Beyond the classic “guest worker” origins in Southern Europe and the Maghreb, migrants were now arriving in Europe from a far wider geographical spread of source countries. The destinations in Europe shifted too, expanding from the “first generation” of North-Western European receiving countries to include new “second-generation” immigration countries (the southern EU countries plus Ireland). This new immigration wave received fresh impetus after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the subsequent eastward expansion of the EU.

⁴See, amongst others, the results of the REMPLOY project in Turkey (Abadan-Unat et al. 1976), research by Cerase (1974) and King et al. (1986) on Southern Italy, and by Rhodes (1978) on Spain.

Second, at the organizational level, there was recognition that the way migrants are organized was significant. The various forms that migrant collectives took, particularly hometown associations, underlined the importance of forms of integration in *both* the origin and the destination country. Portes' (1998) notion of "globalization from below" highlights the existence of grassroots networks of migrants, connected transnationally. The effectiveness of these organizations was dependent on their ability to "be accepted" as parts of two societies, as globally networked citizens with access to key expertise in their countries of destination and as purveyors of international financial support in their communities of origin (Lacroix 2005). In many cases, the societies in which migrants were accepted were highly localized. At the national level their presence was challenged in both origin and destination; acceptance came in villages of origin and professional networks in destination countries.

Third, at the institutional level, there were several new initiatives at the international policy and political level. Countries of migrant origin were accepted as partners or were drawn into debates on the international management of migration through such arenas as the Global Forum on Migration and Development, the High-Level UN Dialogues on Migration, and the increasing recognition of migration's developmental potential in EU policy documents.⁵ A parallel developmentalist thrust was prominent in publications emanating from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UNDP, notably the latter's Human Development Report for 2009, entitled *Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development* (UNDP 2009). Meanwhile the IOM's 2013 World Migration Report also focuses on migration and development as its main theme (IOM 2013). Another aspect of the changing political context is the pressure coming from some European countries for the return or repatriation of migrants, especially those deemed "illegal". Part of the justification for this pressure for return is cloaked in a rhetoric of contributions to home-country development. The spread of assisted voluntary return programmes is a clear indication of this development.

Finally, from a theoretical perspective, publication of the collection of papers edited by Van Hear and Sørensen (2002) on the migration–development nexus refocused the academic debate, highlighting in particular the role of remittances in stimulating home-country development. This is consistent with a more "bottom-up" view of migration and development, drawing on the "new economics" of labour migration, which foregrounds migration as a family or household decision leading to the temporary or circulating absence of key workers to generate remittances and investment for the homeland-based residual household or extended family, both for

⁵The European Commission's first Communication on Migration and Development was published in 2002 (COM (2002) 703 final) and presented development as little more than a means of migration control. This had changed by the next Communication in 2005 (COM (2005) 390 final) (see Collyer 2011). The most recent Commission paper, *Maximising the Development Impact of Migration*, published in October 2013 (COM (2013) 292 final), marks a further step-change in EU discourse. It focuses on internal migration, the impact of climate change, country-of-origin perspectives, and the mobility turn, amongst other things, and is framed by a discourse on the rights of migrants. This is not to say that this change is reflected in EU practice, but it marks an important shift in emphasis of the political dialogue, which is now radically different from a decade earlier.

its survival and growth, and as a risk-averting hedge against unforeseen “market failures” such as a crop wipe-out (Taylor 1999).

Unpacking the M&D Nexus

We identify two diagrammatic representations of the M&D relationship, the second of which substitutes “underdevelopment” for “development”. Figure 10.1 sets these out as two simple causal models. The questions are easy to pose but difficult to answer given conflicting ideological and theoretical stances and a lack of consistency across the mountain of empirical evidence that exists. So, does migration stimulate development; or is the causal link the reverse, with development leading to migration? Or is the relationship recursive, leading to a virtuous circle? Taking the alternative model, does underdevelopment produce migration; or does migration lead to underdevelopment? Or do they reproduce each other, this time in a vicious cycle? When we talk about development, who or what is experiencing this? The receiving society, the sending society, the migrants themselves—or all three in the aspired-for “triple-win” scenario? Are these hypothesized relationships stable over time, or are they likely to change according to historical context as well as the geographical setting and scale of analysis (e.g., household, community, nation)? Castles’ (2009) view is that simple one-way causality is impossible to infer, and that both migration and (under)development are part of the same interactive process, which he labels “global social transformation” (Castles 2010). This argument, at one level, is persuasive and probably true, but at another level it is perhaps too glib, allowing us to opt out of asking and responding to certain realist questions. Such questions reflect the fact that migration is not necessarily a continuous and stable process (and nor is development). Many migration events occur with particular intensity in certain places, at certain times, and under certain conditions, such as economic crisis, civil strife, and environmental stress. Four questions seem particularly relevant, bearing in mind that our primary focus in this chapter is on migration from poorer countries to richer ones.

1. Does underdevelopment cause outmigration?
2. Does outmigration then lead to further underdevelopment?
3. Or, does outmigration lead to development of the source areas?
4. If outmigration leads to development of the source areas, does this development lead to less or further outmigration?





Fig. 10.1 Migration and (under)development: two scenarios (Source: Authors)

We feel that evidence exists to support a positive answer to the first question. Studies from around the world have repeatedly shown that people migrate to escape poverty and other difficult life situations, although it is not necessarily the “poorest of the poor” who leave (De Haan 1999; Skeldon 2002). Contrasts also exist between those who see poverty migration as a voluntary act stimulated by the economic push-pull factors of unemployment and minimal incomes at home and better jobs and incomes abroad; and on the other hand, those who see this kind of migration as a forced move driven by the dictates of the globalized but segmented labour market supported by the predatory behaviour of corporate and individual employers. The question is, what happens next? If outmigration leads to further underdevelopment and impoverishment of the home area, then the vicious-cycle model applies. But if outmigration leads to the source area’s development through resource reallocation or the inflow of vital remittances, then migration becomes an endogenous factor in development and we switch to the other, “virtuous” model.

The final question in the set above begs two alternative answers. If development leads to reduced migration, then this is vindication of the “root causes” argument whereby, if a state of underdevelopment can be steered towards development, then the fundamental driver of outmigration will be removed. But this is far from the whole story, since evidence is accumulating that migration-led development can also stimulate further emigration through the demonstration effect (the success of some migrants tempts others to move) and the fact that, as a result of development, more people have access to the financial resources and social networks necessary for successful emigration (De Haas 2007). The positive correlation between migration and development continues until such time as the country or region reaches a level of development whereby poverty-induced migration no longer occurs, thereby producing an inverted U-curve, labelled by Martin and Taylor (1996) as the “migration hump” (Fig. 10.2).

Fig. 10.2 Migration and development: “root causes” versus “the hump” (Source: Adapted from Martin and Taylor (1996))



Virtuous and Vicious Circles: Theoretical Underpinnings

Figure 10.1 portrays two simple models of the M&D relationship, representing respectively a virtuous and a vicious circle. The virtuous version relies on orthodox economic arguments but exhibits two variants, based in turn on neoclassical and “new” economics of migration. According to neoclassical equilibrium theory, people make rational, well-informed calculations of the costs of, and returns to, migration (Sjaastad 1962). They migrate as individual decision-makers responding to differential wage rates, real incomes, and (un)employment rates in different regions or countries. They move from high-unemployment, low-wage economies to places where wages are significantly higher (sufficiently higher to discount the costs of migration) and jobs are widely available. By transferring labour from a high-supply, low-marginal-productivity country to one which has high demand and high marginal productivity of labour, migration increases aggregate economic welfare and eventually equalizes wage and employment differences through factor-price convergence. An equilibrium is reached, and migration ceases; the system is self-regulating and self-correcting. The developmental effects accrue especially to the destination country, which receives an extra supply of labour to boost growth (Borjas 1995). For the sending country, according to equilibrium theory, incomes should rise as the downward pressure on wages wrought by an over-supply of labour is removed, and other resources—such as land and housing—are reallocated accordingly. The neoclassical model has its own internal economic logic, but is based on many unrealistic assumptions, including “perfect information” and no barriers to migration. It also “assumes away” the social context of families and kinship, and says nothing about integration. Under this model there is no return migration—returnees are simply “failures” who miscalculated the costs and benefits of their migration (Cassarino 2004).

Remittances are rarely mentioned in the neoclassical interpretation of M&D, but they are central to the new economics of labour migration (NELM) model (Taylor 1999). Still essentially an orthodox economic model, NELM shifts focus from the individual to the household and stresses migrants’ agency within the family setting. Moreover, migration takes place not just to maximize income from labour but to minimize the risk of “market failures” such as a natural disaster or a collapse in the price of a key product. Under the NELM model, one or more family members migrate (usually those whose labour power is most marketable abroad, such as a young male construction worker or a female domestic worker), leaving others behind to continue the household’s business (e.g., a small farm holding). In this way a portfolio of income and subsistence sources is created, cushioning the effects of a possible failure in one of the sources. Remittances are sent to support the residual family in the home country, and may be deployed in a variety of uses: setting up a new enterprise, educating young family members, or responding to an emergency (e.g., a drought or medical bills). Once the target is reached, return migration can take place—hence, under this model returnees are successes, not failures—although other household members may continue the tradition of migration in order to preserve the flow of remittances.

Completely opposite to the neoclassical and NELM visions of M&D is the vicious cycle interpretation. Drawing on Marxist political economy, historical-structuralism, the Latin American *Dependencia* School (Frank 1969) and Wallerstein's (1974) world systems theory, this framework sees migration between poor and rich countries as part of the "development of underdevelopment" in the economic periphery. Migrants are the pawns of global capitalism, part of capital's search for a "reserve army" of cheap, exploitable, and expendable labour. Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias (2011) view migration as integral to the reproduction of global and regional inequality and as reinforcing the structures of spatial uneven development. These authors see such labour transfers as forced migration between unequal partners (e.g., Mexico and the USA, Morocco and Europe) bound together in a system of profoundly asymmetric integration. Such migration contributes to the development of the advanced receiving society but impoverishes the already-poor sending country. Under this optic, migration is self-perpetuating, via mechanisms of cumulative causation, not self-correcting to an equilibrium state. Peripheral countries or regions in the global economic and geopolitical system are condemned to remain peripheral, their main function being to supply whatever raw materials (including labour) they have to the countries of the "core". In this model, remittances and return migration do not feature as exogenous stimuli for development. Remittances are argued to be largely "wasted" on housing and consumer goods, resulting in "modernization without development", and return migration is said to bring back only the sick, the exhausted, and the retired.

Optimism, Pessimism, and the Neoliberal Agenda

The theoretical-ideological models outlined above have held sway in three alternating periods of more or less 20 years each. The optimism of the 1950s and 1960s, the decades of mass labour migration in Europe, was replaced by the pessimism of the 1970s and 1980s. Renewed optimism came with the rise of the transnationalist and new economics paradigms in the academic study and policy framing of migration in the 1990s and 2000s. In two important papers, De Haas (2010, 2012) maps these swings of the "migration and development pendulum" as follows (see also Faist and Fauser 2011; Gamlen 2014).

The 1950s and 1960s saw economic reconstruction and industrial expansion in North-Western Europe. Labour migration transferred workers, initially temporary "guest workers", from labour-surplus to labour-deficit regions of Europe. Little attempt was made to integrate these migrant workers, since it was assumed that their stay would be temporary. True, they were economically integrated into the host country's production system, but they were not encouraged to integrate socially and culturally, and they were given limited legal and civic rights. From a developmental perspective, the general view, at least on the part of many economists and policymakers, was that this labour migration not only helped North-Western European economies to rebuild, industrialize, and modernize, but also upgraded

living standards in the sending areas through rising wages, capital transfers (remittances and some capital investments facilitated by low-cost labour and fiscal incentives), and re-skilled returnees (Kindleberger 1967).

Critical voices played down these achievements. They claimed that remittances failed to stimulate development beyond consumption and that returnees, who had mostly done menial jobs in factories and on construction sites, brought little relevant knowledge and skills. Few returnees invested in viable enterprises that spawned economic multiplier effects, like creating new employment for the local economy (Böhning 1975). At the same time, it was noted that migrants had “failed” to integrate largely because of the host society’s barriers of exclusion and racism (Castles and Kosack 1973). This pessimism widened to a more general critique of migration-led development after the oil crisis brought a halt to labour-migrant recruitment in Europe in 1973. Seers et al. (1979) applied the core–periphery model to the European case, the result being that “developmentalism” gave way to “dependency” and “underdevelopmentalism” as characterizations of the theoretical and empirical outcome of the post-oil crisis years. It was argued that emigration not only took away the youngest, fittest, and most ambitious of the less-educated workers from the peripheral regions, it also produced a brain drain of the more highly educated, leading to an overall decline in the periphery’s endowment of human capital.

During the 1990s the pendulum swung again, back towards the optimistic view of migration’s contribution to development. Both ideological shifts and a large volume of empirical evidence lay behind this new optimism. First, there was a critique of the deterministic neo-Marxist model of migration, which now seemed old-fashioned and illogical. The downward spiral of cumulative causation—for example, underdevelopment produces migration, which leads to further underdevelopment and thus more migration—could not continue forever; and the accumulating evidence of the migration hump—for instance, the way that the Southern European countries transitioned from mass emigration to mass immigration—was more convincing. Moreover, an increasing body of empirical studies carried out at the time revealed that, under certain conditions, migration *could* positively contribute to the development of regions and countries of origin, and that a more positive integration outcome often correlated with better home-country development feedbacks (De Haas 2010, 240). Inspired by NELM thinking, migration came to be seen as an effective route out of poverty, and as a rational strategy for household sustenance and improvement. Remittances took centre stage in this M&D neo-optimism. Indeed, they became a kind of mantra for economists and policymakers working in this sector of development (Kapur 2005). Against the pessimists’ claim that remittances were “wasted” on extravagant housing and social-status performances, studies traced productive and development-inducing effects (see Adams and Page 2005; Gammeltoft 2002; Lucas 2005, 145–206; Ngoma and Ismail 2013). Remittance spending on housing and consumption, after all, did improve the quality of life and generate multiplier effects in the local economy, creating employment and stimulating demand for goods and services. Improved housing not only raised social status, but also contributed to general wellbeing, health, and safety (De Haas 2012, 13). Once basic needs were met, some remittances were invested in farming,

small enterprises, and services, especially in regions where such investments could bear fruit, such as agriculturally productive lands or areas undergoing tourism development.

The new optimism described above reflects neoliberal ideas about individual initiative: the migrant is constituted as the key agent, even the hero, of development. Faist and Fauser (2011, 7) draw parallels with the French policy notion *co-development*, which positions the migrant as a partner in development cooperation. But it is also clear that the preferred type of migration has also changed, shifting back to an emphasis on temporary or circular migration—a return to the guest worker (Castles 2006) without, however, using that term. Circular migration is presented as the ideal type in order to maximize remittances and home-country commitment, as well as (though this is rarely made explicit) to prevent long-term settlement and consequent “integration problems”. This shift in thinking about migration is currently receiving considerable academic attention (e.g., Ruhs 2006; Skeldon 2012) and has become enshrined in the terminology and policy thrusts of many prominent international policy actors. We cite three examples to make this point. The Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), set up by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, noted in its report, ‘the old paradigm of permanent migrant settlement is progressively giving way to temporary and circular migration’ (GCIM 2005, 31). The GCIM stressed ‘the need to grasp the developmental opportunities that this important shift in migration patterns provides for countries of origin’ and went on to encourage ‘countries of destination [to] promote circular migration by providing mechanisms and channels that enable migrants to move easily between their countries of origin and destination’. Second, successive volumes of the IOM’s World Migration Report have likewise proposed that more circular migration can bring developmental benefits to developing countries (see, e.g., IOM 2008). Third, the UNDP’s 2009 Human Development Report paired “human mobility” and “development” in its subtitle and argued strongly for ‘overcoming the barriers’ to mobility, thereby releasing the potential for temporary migration to contribute ‘large gains to human development’ (UNDP 2009, 3).

These landmark statements by key international actors reflect different variants of the so-called “triple-win” scenario whereby migration is said to be “good” for the receiving *and* the sending countries, as well as for the migrants themselves. However, doubts about the attainability of the win-win-win situation lead us towards a more critical stance and a possible backswing of the pendulum towards a fourth stage, ‘neo-pessimism’ (De Haas 2012, 22; Gamlen 2014), based on a two-pronged reappraisal of the optimistic view of M&D. First, empirical evidence on migrants’ real lives, either when they are working in exploitative conditions abroad, or from the perspective of their still-poor home communities, often reveals that the over-celebratory discourse of M&D is misplaced. The second reframing comes from questioning the ideology underlying the neoliberal agenda. Bronden (2012, 3) sees the ‘positive’ M&D initiatives and policies discussed above as the ‘human face of neoliberalism’, masking more repressive agendas driven by the global North relating to migration control, securitization, and the necessity of preserving the hegemony of the dominant economic and geopolitical powers. This encourages us to redirect

our gaze to the structural forces that are obscured by neoliberal rhetoric about migrants as the “best” agents for development—which for Glick Schiller (2012, 93) is little more than ‘spin’. As Harvey (2005) among others shows, neoliberalism has created new wealth but only by destroying previous spatial structures and social relations of production, changing distribution and consumption patterns, and generating new forms of desire (see also Glick Schiller 2011, 37). These transformations and translocations, whilst opening up new opportunities for migrants within segmented, gendered, and sexualized fractions of the global labour market, have at the same time subjected many migrants to regimes of control, social exclusion, and denial of rights. Migrants’ vulnerability has been increased rather than reduced, as the latest economic crisis has demonstrated, especially in countries like Greece and Spain that have been harshly affected by financial meltdown.

Towards a Broader Framing of Migration and Development

Over the past 20 or so years, two major paradigm shifts have affected the way we theorize and operationalize the concept of migration: these are the transnational perspective of the 1990s and the mobility turn of the 2000s, based respectively on foundational studies by Glick Schiller et al. (1992, 1995) and Urry (2000, 2007). Taken together, these opened up for study the transnational mobilities enfolded within longer term and more stable migration and integration systems—mobilities not only of people (e.g., visiting “home” or trading back and forth) but also of money, goods, ideas, and images, which circulate within, and indeed construct and constitute, transnational social and economic space (Faist 2008). Remittances remain a key part of the economics of transnational life (Guarnizo 2003), but they need to be understood in a wider context of, first, transnational social, kinship, and gender dynamics, and second, state macroeconomic policy and institutional structures. Thanks to Levitt (1998, 926), our understanding has broadened to include *social* remittances: ‘the ideas, behaviours, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities’ and which are dependent on the level of integration achieved by migrants in host countries. Subsequent thinking about social remittances has benefited from a yet broader light. Political and cultural remittances include ideas about democracy, entitlement, transparency, morality, and cultural codes that move not just from host to sending country but are circular, building on the social and cultural capital that migrants start out with before migration (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011).

The transnational lens also creates the framework for adding a third M&D mechanism to return and remittances: the recent emphasis on “mobilizing the diaspora” for homeland development (Brinkerhoff 2008; Collyer 2013; Newland and Tanaka 2010; Sørensen 2007). Migrants and their descendants who are residentially based abroad can become geographically mobile “transnational agents” and “diasporic actors” stimulating development in homeland communities by setting up businesses, investing in growth enterprises, and becoming politically or philanthropically active

(Faist and Fauser 2011, 8). The issue of diaspora-led development is receiving increasing attention from home-country governments, international bodies, and donor agencies. Among the prescriptions for capitalizing on this development resource are the need to create an information-rich enabling environment that offers incentives for the diaspora to invest and “get involved” and the recommendation that homeland governments target certain segments or members of the diaspora who have the most to offer (Brinkerhoff 2009). Having said this, emigrants and diasporic people do not always have good relations with homeland authorities. There may be political cleavages and low levels of trust in the ability of governments to act transparently and efficiently. Therefore much diasporic activity in the homeland is individualistic or administered through nongovernmental organizations. Nevertheless, diasporic actors have the capacity to move “beyond remittances” through their entrepreneurial activities, including investment, venture capital partnerships, and training and mentoring visits (Newland and Tanaka 2010).

Not only has the meaning of migration become stretched and diversified, the same applies to understandings of development. The most recent trend is to look at development through a human wellbeing perspective. The IOM’s 2013 World Migration Report shifted the developmental focus onto the happiness and wellbeing of migrants and their family members. Gough and McGregor (2007, 34) in their study of wellbeing in developing countries offer the following definition of human wellbeing: ‘a state of being with others, where human needs are met, where one can act meaningfully to pursue one’s goals and where one enjoys satisfactory quality of life’. A key distinction made in the literature is that between objective and subjective wellbeing (Wright 2012, 9–11). The former concentrates on statistical indicators of, for example, income, health, and employment, whereas the latter is based on subjective experience and evaluation, including both perceptions of the objective measures and culturally embedded meanings and understandings, for example, of what is a “nice” or “large” house. A review by the IOM of several studies reveals mixed results depending on context, but generally supports the view that migrants experience enhanced wellbeing compared to non-migrants (IOM 2013, 114–170).

How Does the M&D Frame Relate to the Integration Process, and Vice Versa?

In this final part of the chapter we link the discussion on M&D to the main theme of this book, integration. In doing so, we investigate a relationship between two areas of policy discussion—that on the integration of migrants in Europe and other advanced countries, and that on development in poor countries—that are usually kept separate. We also need to remind ourselves that integration is a multi-sphered process, including amongst others the legal-political, socio-economic, and cultural-religious realms, each of which contains various aspects, for example, housing, employment, education, voting rights, membership in ethnic organizations, and so on. We start by continuing the framing of migration within a transnational

perspective, as this allows us to consider migrants' simultaneous acceptance as part of different social worlds—those of their origin and destination society and possibly, too, of a third, diasporic social space. From an integration perspective, two questions then arise. First, what is the relationship between migrants' integration process, or their "state" of integration, in the host society, and the impact this has on their capacity or willingness to instigate or participate in development in their countries, regions, and communities of origin? Second, for those who return migrate, how does the reintegration process proceed? This latter question has been little studied.

In their essay on African migrants in Europe, Grillo and Mazzucato (2008) argue that such migrants are "doubly engaged" in both places, "here" and "there". It must be stressed that not all migrants lead transnational lives. Some eventually become assimilated and detached from their origin countries, while others, refugees, may not be able to engage with their homeland which, for them, may no longer exist as such. However, those who do live transnationally experience this double engagement in three domains: material livelihoods, family relations, and socio-cultural identity (Grillo and Mazzucato 2008, 185–191). In her more detailed study of Ghanaian migrants based in the Netherlands, Mazzucato (2008) shows that they are active in the labour market and participate in the Dutch economy at the neighbourhood, city, and national levels. At the same time, and more importantly for them, they invest back in Ghana in housing, businesses, and family members' wellbeing and education, including donations to funerals. They are thus economically (as well as socially and culturally) integrated in both places. In one sense this is a zero-sum relationship: economic resources invested in the Netherlands, for instance, on accommodation, living costs, and consumer goods, cannot be deployed in Ghana. On the other hand, there is also a positive synergy in that the more economically successful a migrant is in the Netherlands, the more resources are generated for "development" back home. This leads us directly to a more formal theoretical and empirical examination of the key question: How does "integration" impact on home-country development?

One interesting framework for answering this question is Cerase's (1974) model of the relationship between integration and return migration. Based on a case study of Italian return migration from the USA in the early post-war decades (243 returnees were interviewed in various parts of Italy), Cerase tried to demonstrate that the impact of return was dependent on the time spent abroad and, in particular, on the stage of the integration process that the migrant had reached at the time when the return took place. The author proposed a model with four outcome phases. The first phase is when the migrant fails to adjust to the new society (integration is thus minimal) and return takes place after a very short time (within a year or so). Upon return, such migrants are absorbed as if they had never left. Cerase calls this the *return of failure* and posits that this has no impact on development. In phase two, the immigrant stays abroad longer, but remains oriented towards the homeland and the notion of return there. Some integration in US society takes place, but not much. This type of returnee has their sights fixed on a return to the old ways, but with an improved socio-economic status due to the ability to purchase agricultural land or to build a new house. Whilst some new attitudes and behaviours have been absorbed from the

USA, such as a greater respect for social justice and a more open and informal mentality, the developmental effects of this kind of return remain limited. This is termed the *return of conservatism*. For those who remain abroad yet longer, the integration process becomes more advanced and migrants become increasingly attuned to US society and its ways of life and values. This also diminishes the likelihood of return, but for those who do go back, the potential for real developmental impact is greater. This third phase, the *return of innovation*, brings new ideas, energies, and business practices which, provided there is fertile terrain for their application in the homeland context, can indeed stimulate development. Such returnees are, however, a minority in the overall return-migrant population, and their desire and potential for change are often stifled by the entrenched power of local non-migrant elites. The final stage of return is that of *retirement*, when well-integrated migrants feel the pull of nostalgia at the end of their working lives; but, being economically inactive, their developmental impact is limited.

Although the Cerase model is intuitively attractive and logical, and has been much cited, its limitations are obvious. Its interpretation of development is largely “economic modernization”, and it reduces integration to a one-dimensional linear process. A more robust and nuanced conceptualization of integration is developed in studies that statistically model various dimensions of integration according to a variety of transnational orientations towards the home country including remittance-sending, paying regular visits, and attitudes towards return migration (see Cela et al. 2013; De Haas and Fokkema 2011; Fokkema et al. 2013). What these studies tend to demonstrate is that migrants who are *economically* well integrated in the host country are more likely to have meaningful transnational engagement with their origin-country society, including sending remittances and other actions with positive developmental outcomes, such as business investment. On the other hand, migrants who are *socio-culturally* well integrated are more likely to become detached from their home country and therefore less actively involved in transnational activities that might lead to development. This contrasting correlation—positive between economic integration, transnationalism, and development and negative for socio-cultural integration’s impact—seems to hold for both first- and second-generation migrants, according to the studies cited above, which are based on a variety of migrant groups in different countries.⁶ Alongside these quantitative analyses are studies that take a more intuitive approach. Erdal and Oeppen (2013) describe the relationship between integration and transnationalism as a “balancing act” whereby the migrant straddles two societies. Reviewing the literature, Erdal and Oeppen (2013, 875) find that outcomes are highly context-specific, depending on place, type of migration, and within the same migration system, also varying over time (see also Snel et al. 2006). One issue with Erdal and Oeppen’s analysis,

⁶To be specific, Cela et al. (2013) look at Eastern Europeans (Poles, Ukrainians, Moldovans, Romanians, and Albanians) in Italy; De Haas and Fokkema (2011) study African migrants in Southern Europe (Moroccans and Senegalese in Spain, Egyptians and Ghanaians in Italy); whilst Fokkema et al. (2013) examine the remittance behaviour of second-generation Turks, Moroccans, and people of Yugoslav heritage in several European cities.

and with other studies that examine the integration–transnationalism interface, is the extent to which transnationalism equates to “development” of the origin society. Where remittances and investments are involved, the link is fairly clear (albeit dependent on how these financial flows are utilized), but given that some authors (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Vertovec 1999) view transnationalism as both “ways of being” and “ways of belonging”, the developmental aspect is less obvious.

The fact remains that further research is sorely needed on the relationship between integration (and its multifaceted elements) and engagement in home-country development. Shifting understandings of what integration actually is, and what policies should be applied along the spectrum from multiculturalism to assimilation, serve only to complicate the M&D relationship. Critics of multiculturalism argue that it has proven detrimental to economic integration, leading instead to cultural and religious separatism, which threatens national identity. The widespread view that multiculturalism has somehow “failed” leads many countries to adopt more assimilationist-oriented policies towards immigrants. What implications this has for the developmental potential of migration is not clear. There is the argument, advanced by Castles et al. (2014, 80):

[I]mmigrant-receiving governments can increase the developmental potential of migration by lowering the thresholds for immigration... and through favouring the socioeconomic integration of migrants by countering discrimination and racism on the labour market and giving them access to housing and education as well as residency and (dual) citizenship rights.

Yet, as we also noted, recent trends towards more demand-driven temporary and circular migration ignore the integration dimension and do nothing to foster long-term settlement rights.

The final question addressed in this chapter concerns the phenomenon of migrants’ *reintegration* in their home countries, and the developmental context of this process. This question was broached early on in the return–development debate (see, e.g., Van Gendt 1977) but, to the best of our knowledge, it has never been thoroughly investigated, neither at the theoretical nor at the empirical level.⁷ Theoretically, the key questions would seem to be the following: Does integration into the immigration country’s host society imply a process of “de-integration” from the home-country society? Is gradual re-acceptance as part of the (home) society contingent on a gradual loss of acceptance in the former destination? Or does the opposite apply, namely, that the personal skills and social and human capital required for rapid and successful acceptance as part of a new host society are also effective in enabling a smooth reintegration upon return? Early sociological studies of return migration—for example, by Saloutos (1956) on returning Greek-Americans and Lopreato (1967) on the impact of return migration on a South Italian village—tend to show that long-absent migrants face difficulties in reintegrating back home.

⁷Indicative of this lacuna is the recent Metropolis public seminar Migrant Reintegration and Homeland Development, Ottawa, 14 March 2014, designed to ‘discuss the development potential offered by the continuum of migrant integration, return, and reintegration into the homeland’.

At best they formed a *nouveau riche* group interposed between the traditional elites and the peasant or working class from which they had been drawn. Local people often viewed them with a mixture of suspicion and jealousy. But these studies are from an earlier era of long-distance migration, when the socio-economic and cultural divide between sending and receiving countries constituted a wider time–space gap. Nowadays, with many migrants engaged in more intense transnational circuits of personal travel, financial flows, and other transactions, as well as the globalization of information and cultural codes, the outcome is likely to be different. However, the wealth of theoretical concepts and analytical tools that have been applied to study the process of migrant integration in Europe and elsewhere has yet to be turned to the study of return migrants' reintegration. Here is a major empirical challenge for migration studies scholars working in a developmental context.

Conclusion

Researchers, analysts, and policymakers continue to struggle in comprehending the nature of the multiple relationships between migration, development, and integration. As we have seen, at least three obstacles stand in the way of a mature and nuanced understanding: problems of definition and measurement of all three phenomena; ideological positions that are impossible to reconcile; and the conflicting and hence inconclusive nature of the empirical evidence, too much of which is based on narrowly defined case studies. The way forward is not easy to identify. Migration, (under)development, and (non-)integration are all “facts of global life”, which are not easily managed towards desired positive outcomes, except perhaps at a fairly local level. Individual linkages, for instance, between emigration and home-country development or between different models of integration and willingness to invest time and resources in developing hometown communities, are difficult to isolate within the matrix of collateral processes such as economic cycles, different and dynamic host-country politics, and the new post-9/11 security environment. The mid-2014 round of European and local elections, furthermore, was marked by a sharp rise in voters' support for anti-immigration parties in some countries (particularly the UK, France, and Greece). In an increasingly xenophobic climate, rhetoric obscures analysis, and migration's potential contribution to home-country development is pushed to the background.

Proponents of the virtuous-circle view of M&D thus find themselves squeezed between those who call ever-louder for migration control and those who criticize the entire edifice of the M&D nexus in the neoliberal era and are moving the pendulum towards its fourth, neo-pessimistic swing (Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias 2011; Gamlen 2014; Kunz 2008; Page and Mercer 2012; Raghuram 2009). A key question thus becomes how to stop the pendulum swinging. An obvious answer is to move towards a more rigorous evaluation of existing research evidence, downgrading the significance of small-scale case studies and privileging larger scale and especially comparative studies. Even so, challenges remain, given

the diversity of types of migration (e.g., short and long term, high and low skilled) and of historical and geographical contexts. Undoubtedly, there is more scope for analysis of global-scale socio-economic datasets and migration variables related to development outcomes (e.g., Czaika 2013; Ngoma and Ismail 2013; Sanderson 2013) and perhaps also of socio-economic and legal-political integration variables.

The way forward is also for more collaboration and cross-fertilization to take place across three main areas of scholarship and policymaking that hitherto have not spoken much to each other: those who study migration as a process of transnational movement; those who study development; and those who study integration and social cohesion. This conversation needs to take place across disciplines, between those with research and policy experience in different parts of the world, and at multiple scales of analysis, from the global down through the regional (such as the EU), to countries, cities, communities, and households.

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Chapter 11

Analysis and Conclusions

Rinus Penninx and Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas

Introduction

This state-of-the-art volume taking stock of and presenting existing research on integration processes and policies in Europe was triggered by European Union (EU)-level policymaking on integration. A 2011 European Commission policy document proposes that integration policies should involve not only immigrants and the society of settlement but also actors in immigrants' countries of origin (EC 2011). Compared to the Commission's earlier definition of integration (EC 2003), this constituted a shift from a two-way to a three-way process approach. The current volume has reformulated the EU's policy shift into a broader question for academia and integration research: What does research have to say about (the study of) integration processes and, in particular, about the relevance of actors in origin countries for integration? What does the existing literature say about integration policies in Europe and use of the concept of integration in policy formulation and practice? Does the proposal to include actors in countries of origin as important players in integration policies find legitimation in empirical research?

With the purpose of answering these questions, we asked experts in the relevant subfields to write state-of-the-art chapters. Chapter 2, by Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas, examined development of the concept of integration in the academic study of settlement processes of migrants and in policies. Chapter 3, by Van Mol and De Valk, analysed changes in migration patterns and characteristics of immigrants as a potential explanatory factor for changes in integration processes and policies.

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Chapters 4, 5 and 6 covered basic aspects of policy development: Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo wrote on national policies of EU countries, Scholten and Penninx analysed the multilevel governance of migration and integration, and Mügge and Van der Haar scrutinized the categorization and target groups of policies. The following Chaps. 7, 8, 9 and 10 shifted the focus to migrants' countries of origin and the relevance of these for immigrants' integration: Mügge took stock of the transnational activities of individual migrants and the relation of these to integration; Van Ewijk and Nijenhuis reviewed the literature on transnational–local relations and the role of migrant organizations, as well as the relation of these with integration; and Østergaard-Nielsen outlined how governments of countries of origin relate to their citizens abroad and what this could potentially mean for their integration. Finally, King and Collyer examined the migration–development nexus in search of a possible relation between it and immigrant integration.

How do these elements of analysis come together to answer the questions posed above? This final chapter first considers how the concept of integration has been (and can be) used as an analytical tool in academic research on integration processes of immigrants. Second, it reviews the way integration as a concept has been used in policies at various levels. This leads into an analysis of how integration is perceived by actors at different levels in origin countries. These steps enable us to draw some final conclusions on the European Commission's proposal to move from a two-way to a three-way process approach.

The Concept of Integration

Integration is a rather specific post-war European term. As a field of research, the study of settlement processes of immigrants in Europe has an ambivalent relation with an earlier tradition of settlement studies: that in the USA. Europe borrowed from North America the essential framing of such studies, as how immigrants as newcomers find their place in the society in which they settle. Yet, the concept of assimilation that was developed by US researchers was rejected in Europe as lopsided in two respects: (i) in seeing the process of settlement as primarily one in which newcomers undergo a progression of cultural change and (ii) in seeing settlement as a linear process towards assimilation in mainstream society.

The concept of integration as it developed in European research during the past half century remained focused on the settlement of newcomers, but became more complex and rich. First, research on integration looked systematically at both the society of settlement and at immigrants as the two parties involved in the settlement process, often recognizing a dominance of the receiving society in this process. Second, research spelled out several dimensions of the integration process: the legal/political, the socioeconomic, and the cultural/religious.

The legal/political dimension of integration was exhaustively studied in two main respects. First, studies explored the legal status attributed by admission policies and the consequences of that status (or the absence thereof) for integration.

Second, immigrants' participation in politics (or the lack of such participation) was investigated in the broadest sense, with this second strand of research often labelled citizenship studies.

In the socio economic dimension, research looked at the position of immigrants in key fields of societal stratification: work and income, education, housing, and health. Where the benchmarks were natives or non-immigrants, these studies were called equality studies. If they were longitudinal within a group, they were labelled (intergenerational) social mobility studies.

In the cultural/religious dimension, study of the cultural and religious adaptation of newcomers has long been central. Nowadays, however, the perception and acceptance of newcomers by natives has become increasingly important. Immigrants' culture and religion are, furthermore, studied as collective phenomena, as is the political and societal organization of cultural and religious diversity and its recognition in the society of settlement. This branch of research has been incorporated under equity studies.

The study of integration has also gained by distinguishing between levels at which integration processes take place and by studying the different mechanisms involved. Firstly, there is the micro-level of individual immigrants and their households and kin, and the comparable micro-level of native individuals in the society of settlement, with research examining how they perceive and react to one another. Secondly, there is the level of collectivities of both immigrant groups and natives and how they relate to each other. Thirdly, there is the level of institutions, both general institutions relevant to all residents and specific ones of and for immigrants.

Chapter 2 traced the development of the concept of integration as a rich analytical tool with great potential, particularly when it is used in combination with systematic comparisons. This tool can also serve to map and look critically at integration research in Europe. In a review of the state of the art of European research on integration, Penninx et al. (2006) observe that most studies are strongly embedded in national contexts. Furthermore, they note that European research on migration and integration has been fragmented in three ways: a lack of comparative research, a lack of cooperation among disciplines, and a lack of integration of the different levels at which phenomena are studied.

In recent years, significantly more international comparative research has been accomplished, often financed by the EU, remedying to some extent the methodological nationalism (Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002) that went hand-in-hand with a strong embeddedness of research in the national (policy) arena. Such comparisons may also help to overcome space-based forms of fragmentation by including more than one spatial unit (e.g., a borough, city, region, nation state, or supra-national or international arena). While the nation state was dominant in research from the beginning, there is now a growing body of research on both the local and the international and supra-national levels. The relations between these levels and the complex ways in which they influence each other, however, have yet to be explored.

At the same time, fragmentation continues. Divisions are still strong along disciplinary lines, with particularly legal and economic studies remaining largely autonomous and employing self-contained approaches. Furthermore, new

fragmentation has arisen, for example, in specializations within the three dimensions of integration sketched above, such as citizenship studies, equality and social mobility studies, racism and xenophobia studies, and equity studies. Such specializations do have merit, as they deepen insights on the specific dimension concerned; but they may also bypass the larger integration picture. Holistic studies that take all three dimensions into account and look at interrelations between them are rare, though much needed for further theoretical development.

The Concept of Integration in Policies

The development of the concept of integration in policies (i.e., the specific meaning that is given explicitly or implicitly to integration in policy formulation and practice) must be understood against the backdrop of immigration's framing in Europe. Here again, the transcontinental comparison between Europe and North America accentuates the differences. While the USA and Canada define themselves as countries built by immigration and immigrants, North-Western European countries in the post-war period did exactly the opposite. Their guest worker policies set out to attract hands for their booming economies but on a temporary basis, ideally without guest workers' families and with an explicit expectation of return. From this perspective, there was no need for integration policies in the legal/political and cultural/religious sense, and integration in the socioeconomic dimension was pursued only as far and as long as required by immigrants' presumably temporary stay.

National Integration Policies

Since the 1970s, and particularly after labour migration stopped in the mid-1970s, a contradiction has grown between the facts of immigration and countries' self-perceived norm of not being a nation of immigration. In a few countries this tension led to comprehensive integration policies pertaining not only to the socioeconomic domain but also the political and cultural spheres. Sweden started such integration policies in 1975 (Hammar 2004) and the Netherlands followed suit in the early 1980s (Penninx 1981). However, most national governments in Europe maintained the illusion of immigrants' temporariness and return up to the late 1990s and 2000s, therefore confining themselves to ad hoc adaptive measures. In practice, this left the responsibility for integration to the local level of cities and to parties in civil society such as trade unions, churches, and welfare organizations (Penninx 2005).

When the increasingly politicized climate of the late 1990s and early 2000s pushed for the implementation of integration policies at the national level, the term integration started to acquire a different meaning. Whereas early policy conceptions such as those used in Sweden and the Netherlands had been rights-based, aimed at structural integration in the socioeconomic domains and framed in a liberal cultural atmosphere (later called "multicultural"), the new approach focused increasingly on the cultural

dimension of integration as an obligation of immigrants, as cultural and value-based commonalities were thought to be essential for social cohesion. Acquisition of national citizenship—promoted in early Swedish and Dutch policies as an instrument that would facilitate structural integration—was increasingly redefined as the crown on a finalized process of cultural adaptation. This new cultural conception of integration policies went hand in hand with a redefinition of the identity of North-Western European countries. The claims and outcomes of discussions on the “identity” of receiving societies (as modern, liberal, democratic, laïcist, equal, enlightened, etc.) were translated into civic integration requirements for immigrants and civic integration courses of an assimilative nature. The latest development—compulsory pre-immigration courses, such as those developed in the Netherlands—extends this logic even further. Under the label of integration, such courses actually function as instruments to make immigration more restrictive and selective (Guild et al. 2009).

The picture thus sketched is one that holds for the “first generation immigration countries” in North-Western Europe. As Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo assert in Chap. 4 of this volume, this North-Western European model became dominant and influential, as the immigration regulations of these countries became the formal standard for the EU and, through the *acquis*, the blueprint for all EU countries that acceded later. Similarly, these same countries tried in the 2000s to transpose their new national integration policies and civic integration courses to the European level as exemplary for other EU countries (Goeman 2012). Notwithstanding these pressures, quite different immigration and integration policies developed in practice in the “second generation immigration countries”, particularly in Southern Europe. Most immigration to those countries has been legalized ex-post by regularizations. Integration measures and policies have been initiated since the mid-1990s, predominantly at the local and regional levels, based on rights of access to important social services irrespective of one’s immigrant status. Such local policies have aimed primarily at insertion of migrants into the labour market and were embedded in a liberal cultural atmosphere that has tended to use interculturality as a strategy.

Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo note a third model of integration policies emerging in the Central and East European member states. There the number of immigrants is still low and immigration and integration issues are not high political priorities. Mostly supported by European funding, civil society actors, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and local authorities have developed reception and integration activities while pressuring national governments to develop integration policies.

Local Integration Policies

Local integration policies have been either in the shadow of national integration policies or developed independently in the absence of national policy. This is largely due to the fact that migration policies (decisions on who is allowed to enter and stay) are predominantly a national competence. If immigration policy is followed by a national integration policy, as happened early on in Sweden and the Netherlands,

then local integration policies are stimulated and facilitated by these preceding national frameworks. This is why Dutch and Swedish cities have a relatively long history of local integration policies (Scholten et al. 2015; Penninx 2015). But, as we have seen, factual immigration is not necessarily followed by an integration policy at the national level. Most North-Western European countries did have sizeable immigration but did not develop national integration policies until the turn of the century. In the absence of national policies, many cities developed integration policies, to give just a few examples, Birmingham and Bradford in the UK, Berlin and Frankfurt in Germany, Vienna in Austria, and the cities of Zurich, Bern, and Basel in Switzerland (Penninx 2009).

Local integration policies became much more visible during the past decade. Cities organized themselves internationally in networks. These networks have been strongly supported and funded by the European Commission, and their activities have been studied extensively, often at the networks' or the cities' own request. Systematic comparison of local policies reveals significant variation in the framing of policies and in the meaning of integration underlying local policies. Some initiatives, such as the Intercultural Cities Network, focus strongly on the cultural dimension of integration, using diversity as a strength and diversity management as a strategy. Other cities have framed integration policies primarily as a socioeconomic issue, using antidiscrimination and equality as strategies and mainstreaming as their governance principle. Still other cities have stressed the participation dimension of integration, looking at accessibility and opportunity structures, on one hand, and active "citizenship" of immigrants, on the other. Some cities have even developed a local concept of citizenship, as opposed to national citizenship.

Whatever the history of local integration policies or their basic orientation, tensions have increasingly developed between the local and national levels. Some of these tensions may be attributable to the different views on how to implement immigration policies—restrictive or otherwise. For instance, how are government administrators to handle migrants' illegality in practice? What are the consequences of implementing restrictions on access to facilities and services in the domains of employment, housing, education, and healthcare to combat illegal residence? Friction may also arise on the new civic integration courses and the increased cultural knowledge required for continued residence and naturalization. While national policies may be quite ideological, local practitioners typically seek more feasible solutions. Tensions also arise when the financing of integration facilities is at stake, particularly when national policies prescribe new actions but fail to deliver the financial and other resources needed to implement them.

EU Integration Policies

EU-level policies on migration are double-edged. EU citizens are granted full freedom of mobility within the EU, while common and restrictive immigration and asylum policies apply to third-country nationals (TCNs). This duality, established

from the very beginning with the 1999–2004 Tampere Programme, had three important consequences for integration. First, integration policies at the EU level were aimed exclusively at TCNs while immigrants from within the EU were viewed as already integrated. Second, integration of TCNs was defined in a rather limited way in the early phase. As noted in the introduction to this book, EU policies started from the assumption that if the legal position of immigrants was equal to that of national citizens and if adequate instruments were in place to combat discrimination, then integration processes could be left to societal forces. The third consequence was that, unlike immigration policies, EU integration policies were defined as non-binding, consensus policies, since national governments wanted to retain sovereignty in key domains associated with immigrant integration.

In 2003, the European Commission formulated its first comprehensive and explicit view on integration policies based on a conceptualization of integration as a two-way process involving both immigrants and the receiving society. The Hague Programme (2004–2009) and the Stockholm Programme (2009–2014) marked a gradual expansion of the definition of immigrants' integration, increasing the actors and stakeholders involved and the issues covered. This definitional expansion occurred along two main lines: an internal line and an external one.

The internal line encompasses two main national elements. First, more levels of integration governance were activated within destination countries. In this context, the networks of European cities that exchanged knowledge and best practices on integration policies (see Scholten et al. 2015), all funded by the European Commission, raised the visibility of local governmental actors. In countries such as Spain, regional-level governments also profiled themselves as important policy-makers in the field of immigrant integration. The conceptualization of and interests around immigrants' integration have differed, however, even across different government levels within the same country. Second, more and more stakeholders at all levels became involved in and mobilized for policies, including migrant organizations, human rights organizations, NGOs, and social partners.

The external line of expansion of the definition of immigrants' integration occurred when actors and stakeholders in countries of origin came into the picture. This happened in two ways, stemming from quite different sources and interests. First, after the turn of the century new international initiatives—stemming from the renewed Migration and Development (M&D) perspective—sought to establish a regulatory framework for international migration that would render migration beneficial for countries of origin and destination as well as for migrants themselves (see King and Collyer in this volume). The Global Commission on International Migration, the High-Level UN Dialogues on Migration, and the Global Forum on Migration and Development created frameworks in which both countries of origin and countries of destination were represented and their interests balanced and coordinated. Both the EU and all major immigration countries in Europe were involved in these international developments.

A second way in which countries of origin became involved derived from the increased difficulty experienced by European countries in controlling and regulating immigration without the help of countries of origin (and of countries of transit

to Europe). Several European countries, such as Spain, established bilateral agreements with countries of origin in which cooperation on admission and, particularly, on return of irregular migrants was exchanged for development assistance or improved facilitation of regular migration—often temporary—to Europe (Garcés-Mascareñas 2012, 171–173). The terminology of co-development emerged in this context, combining the renewed M&D perspective with the immigration and integration policy interests of European countries. The EU became increasingly involved in such cooperation programmes, many of which included local governments and NGOs in countries of origin (see Chaps. 8 and 10 in this volume).

The renewed European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals of 2011 proposed to anchor these two external lines of policy development in the integration agenda, thereby adding the countries of origin as a third key actor in the process of immigrants' integration. As stated in the Commission document, 'Countries of origin can have a role to play (...) in three ways: (1) to prepare the integration already before the migrants' departure; (2) to support the migrants while in the EU, e.g. through support via the Embassies; (3) to prepare the migrant's temporary or definitive return with acquired experience and knowledge' (EC 2011, 10). The first element responds to the pre-migration courses and requirements that some European immigration countries have recently developed in order to anticipate integration of those still to be admitted. The second legitimizes and encourages support for migrants from countries of origin during their stay elsewhere, a practice that governments in countries of origin have developed more systematically in order to bond with their compatriots abroad (see Østergaard-Nielsen in this volume). The third seems to include in its euphemistical formulation only voluntary return of legal migrants, as such referring primarily to the re-migration and development theme. Yet, if we look at concrete policies and policy implementation, one might readily assume that involuntary return of irregular migrants constitutes an important part of this policy stream.

This brief analytic description leads us to a few general conclusions on the meaning of integration in policies in Europe. The first is that integration policies—or policies under the flag of integration—have developed at many levels of government: at the national level; at the local level of cities and municipalities; in some cases, at the level of (autonomous) regions or *Länder*; and at the supra-national level of the EU. This last is a relative newcomer, but nonetheless an increasingly important platform for all. This “multilevelness” is a characteristic that will be present in the future.

The second conclusion is that—partly parallel to governmental multilevelness—a multitude of stakeholders has become involved in integration as policy designers and implementers. This includes not only governmental and quasi-governmental actors but also and increasingly nongovernmental agents from immigrant collectives, civil society in general, social partners, and NGOs.

Both the vertical multilevelness of policies and the horizontal involvement of an increasing number and diversity of stakeholders bring more varied interests to the policy table. Such different interests may not always be aligned, and may even clash. They may also lead to quite different views on what integration is, what

integration policies should promote, and who needs what assistance in the integration process. If multilevel governance is normatively defined as the process through which policymaking and policy implementation is coordinated vertically between levels of government and attuned horizontally across governmental and nongovernmental actors (see Scholten et al. 2015), we can then conclude that we have only just started out, and that much more multilevel governance is needed in practice in the field of integration.

Finally, our examination of the development of integration policies and definitions of integration at the EU level enable us to place in context the shift from the original definition of integration as a two-way process to the EU's new definition of integration as a three-way process. That shift finds its legitimation primarily in efforts to bring together the policy activities of different parties (i.e., in countries of origin and destination) in the different but related fields of integration, immigration control, and M&D. Policies in these three fields had previously developed simultaneously but separately. It is the logic of policymaking—and not an evidence-based scientific argument—that has guided this redefinition.

Integration from the Perspective of Origin Countries

The fact that it was primarily a policymaking logic that guided the redefinition of integration from a two-way to a three-way process does not necessarily mean that there is no scientific basis in support of such a shift. Chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10 sought empirical answers to a number of questions relevant in this regard: How is integration viewed by actors in the countries of origin? To what extent and how do countries of origin contribute to immigrants' integration? Can integration in the country of destination be expected to contribute to development in the country of origin?

Migrants' Transnational Activities

A first way of answering such questions is to look systematically from the perspective of migrants themselves. Transnational studies decouple the concept of integration from its unique immigrant and society of settlement frame, looking at it instead as a process that takes place simultaneously in the country of settlement, (still) in the country of origin, and possibly even within a transnational community that is located in neither of the two.

Actors and policymakers within migrant receiving countries may not always accept such a frame shift (and in the politicized contexts of Europe it may increasingly be rejected). The double or triple orientation is also seen as problematic in national(istic) thinking, which deems it “disloyal” to the nation and an “abuse” of the welfare state. Moreover, energy spent in transnational activities may be perceived and defined—based on a zero-sum assumption—as being at the expense of

integration efforts in the country of settlement. Nonetheless, from the perspective of migrants, simultaneous integration and participation in these different worlds is not problematic. Indeed, it is unavoidable, as Mügge's inventory of transnational activities in Chap. 7 indicates. The assumption that a transnational orientation and activities may come at the expense of integration (efforts) in the country of settlement has no basis in empirical research. On the contrary, there is ample evidence that transnational orientations and activities may co-exist with integration in the country of settlement without negative effects on one another. Though conclusions are based on a still limited number of case studies, for certain migrants transnational activities and integration may even reinforce each other.

Mügge (in this volume) points out that the same capital that equips immigrants for transnationalism may facilitate their structural integration in the receiving society too. She observes that (i) economic integration of migrants in the settlement country is an important condition for remittances; (ii) the more financial, social, and political capital immigrants have (acquired), the more capable they may be of developing transnational activities; and (iii) political transnational activities are very much shaped by the political opportunity structure of the country of settlement. Alternatively, feelings of exclusion in the homeland may foster integration in the host country while factual exclusion of migrants from politics in the homeland may trigger more radical forms of transnationalism to change the situation in the homeland. Either way, homeland developments seem to be decisive for the form and direction of both integration and transnationalism.

Migrant Organizations, NGOs, and Local Governments

Transnational studies also demonstrate that more and more relations are developing between countries of settlement and countries of origin at the local level, through local authorities on both sides and through immigrant organizations. These studies have found that immigrants identify more easily with the local level and that local governments present themselves as more open to migrants' transnational affiliations. Van Ewijk and Nijenhuis, in Chap. 8, describe the efforts of local authorities to promote engagement of migrants in international cooperation projects as a means of positively impacting their integration in destination societies. This perspective renders the concept of integration rather participatory with an important entrepreneurial component, which supposedly has a social function and promotes social cohesion at the local level.

Van Ewijk and Nijenhuis also point to the mushrooming numbers of co-development programmes, aimed at linking immigrants and immigrant organizations with hometowns in origin countries for the purpose of development projects. These again seem clearly related to and embedded in integration policies at the local level. While the literature seems to confirm a positive correlation between engagement in international exchange programmes and becoming more active in

the receiving society, the authors also conclude that the extent and nature of local-to-local projects and relationships are very much dependent on policies and available funding opportunities in destination countries.

Governments of Origin Countries

Sending countries have increasingly developed policies to bond with their citizens abroad. Østergaard-Nielsen (Chap. 9) suggests that such policies involve the economic/socio-economic, the political, and the cultural/religious dimensions, often in combination. Motivations of origin-country governments for such activities may vary but the integration of their citizens in the country of settlement can ultimately only be a topic if the interests of the country of origin are served through its migrants. The specific content of what integration then should mean was well expressed by Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan, who during a visit in Germany called for a ‘better integration of Turks in Germany’, meaning essentially better economic opportunities ‘but not assimilation’. These workers should, he said, continue to be ‘ambassadors for Turkey’, to speak Turkish, to vote for him as the new President of Turkey, to be good Muslims, and to contribute to the economic development of Turkey.

While the strengthening of upward social mobility of emigrants in their countries of residence is usually interpreted as a win-win scenario for both sending countries and immigrants, it is still difficult to assess the exact impact of sending country policies on both migrant transnationality and migrant processes of settlement. First, it is difficult to determine to what extent emigrant state efforts to bond with their non-resident citizens are directly responsible for migrant transnational practices related to their country of origin. Second, it is difficult to determine the real impact of these policies on immigrants’ integration in the societies of settlement. In both respects, Østergaard-Nielsen (Chap. 9 in this volume) notes that emigrants and diasporas may not immediately respond to sending countries’ outreach. Moreover, she observes, it remains to be seen whether and to what extent European governments actually do move away from the zero-sum discourse and securitization optic on migrant transnationality towards the more integrated three-way approach envisioned by the European Commission.

The M&D Nexus

The overall approach to migration and development seems to have fluctuated, according to King and Collyer in Chap. 10. Different understandings abound of the nature, forms, and processes of development, migration, and integration, in both applied and in theoretical terms. History has been marked by a series of “pendulum movements” from optimistic to pessimistic scenarios, depending more on the political assumptions of the time than the concrete empirical evidence at hand. Since the

late 1990, a new favourable context has been born, pushing an optimistic upswing of the pendulum. The accompanying view is that migration could and should be turned in a triple-win scenario for all: the countries of origin, the countries of destination, and the migrants themselves. A number of elements has contributed to this perspective: the global acceleration of migration and shift to more fluid forms of mobility (see Van Mol & De Valk in this volume), the rise of immigrants' organizations in both places of origin and destination (see Mügge, and Van Ewijk and Nijenhuis in this volume), and the birth of an institutional framework at the global level within which countries of origin have been drawn and developed clout (e.g., the Global Commission on International Migration, the United Nations High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Integration, and the Global Forum on Migration and Development).

But how and where does integration come into this M&D approach? In principle, integration could come into the picture if we adopted the concept of transnational mobility (instead of migration) and shifted the focus to migrants' integration in the place of origin, the place of destination, and possibly also the transnational community (instead of the classic framing of integration as a process involving migrants and the receiving society). From this perspective, the settlement of immigrants could be studied empirically in all of its dimensions (economic, social, cultural, and political) to assess as an open question whether it results in immigrants' integration or the opposite. However, such a new approach to integration does not exist (yet).

From the M&D perspective, two concrete questions on integration then remain. The first is how does integration impact on migrants' capacity to stimulate development in the countries of origin. Though much more research is still needed, some studies show that (successful) integration in the destination country is not necessarily a zero-sum game but rather a condition for successful integration in the country of origin. Chapters 7 and 8 both reach this conclusion in very similar wordings. The second question is what meaning does integration in the destination country have for immigrants' reintegration in the country of origin. Research presented in this volume suggests that there are many patterns of return and reintegration, resulting from the fact—among others—that integration is just one of the multiple factors that determine reintegration chances and challenges. The literature seems to suggest that a return of failure (which can be interpreted as failed integration in the destination country) might be a predictor of a failed reintegration, particularly when development criteria are part of the reintegration concept. The so-called “return of innovation” seems to correlate with previous successful integration in the country of destination.

From a Two-Way to a Three-Way Process Conception of Integration

The European Commission has proposed a new way of looking at the integration process of immigrants in European societies—though by “immigrants” the Commission means third-country nationals (TCNs) only. The Commission's shift in thinking can best be understood within the logic of EU-level policy development on

migration and integration and the M&D framework. Furthermore, creation of new institutional structures—bilateral ones between emigration and immigration countries, as well as those at the EU level and globally—has led to new policy initiatives by which different topics, actors, and interests have been brought to the table in relation to each other. Although the outcome of these developments is still uncertain, one could interpret them as a step forward towards better multilevel governance. It is questionable, however, to what extent these new policy developments should go under the flag of integration policies targeting immigrants in European countries.

We established that the political process has been the driving force behind the incorporation of the countries of origin as a third actor in the concept of immigrants' integration. There is no indication in the European Commission documents that research or any form of academic advice played a role in the proposal and in the argumentation used. When asked, researchers working in various subfields of immigration, integration, transnationalism, and the M&D nexus could not determine on an empirical basis the exact role of countries of origin in immigrants' integration and vice versa. What does clearly emerge is the relevance of integration for development in the countries of origin. Furthermore, transnational studies point to the need to look simultaneously at immigrants' integration (or lack thereof) in the place of origin, place of destination, and possibly also within a socially-relevant transnational migrant community. From this perspective more research is needed to assess whether and how these processes of integration relate to each other.

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