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Inter-group Relations and Migrant Integration in European Cities

Changing Neighbourhoods

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"Co-funded by the European Union"

Editors
Ferruccio Pastore
FIERI
Torino, Italy

Irene Ponzo
FIERI
Torino, Italy

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Introduction

Ferruccio Pastore and Irene Ponzo

1 Tackling the Dilemma of Local Variations in Ethnic Conflict and Integration

This is a book about social change in European cities as brought about by international migration. Among the many aspects of such long and complex waves of transformations what interests us in particular is how relations are structured and how they evolve in different and increasingly diverse local societies. The main research questions addressed in this book are thus the following ones: why do origin-based categories emerge much more clearly and powerfully as practical and symbolical boundaries in certain local contexts rather than in others within the same national and regional space or even within the same city? How much do urban contexts count in shaping inter-group relations and specifically in making ethnic categories more or less salient?

Given the fact that central aspects of our research questions, such as relations between the majority population, immigrants and their descendants and the salience of ethnic boundaries are generally considered to be key dimensions of integration processes though with a different emphasis in American and European literature (Gans 1992; Portes and Zhou 1993; Massey 1995; Esser 2001; Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Alba and Nee 2003; Zincone 2009), this is also meant to be a volume on immigrant integration in European cities.

Since ethnic tensions and conflict have been a major concern in the urban policies of several European cities over the last two decades, we pay special attention to these dynamics in our understanding of integration. Specifically, though we agree

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Ferruccio Pastore is the author of Sects. 1 and 4, Irene Ponzo of Sects. 2 and 3.

F. Pastore (✉) • I. Ponzo
FIERI, Torino, Italy
e-mail: ferruccio.pastore@fieri.it; ponzo@fieri.it

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that positive relations and loss in salience of ethnic boundaries are crucial aspects of successful integration, we understand the latter not as a rigid state of peaceful coexistence conceptually opposed to conflict but as a dynamic achievement, a process that implies ongoing negotiations on the idea of 'us', whereby re-negotiation is possible. Accordingly the research project upon which this book is based is titled 'Concordia Discors',[1] an expression originating in the epistles of the Latin poet Horace, now paradigmatic of a dynamic state of 'discordant harmony'. Actually, the idea that conflict is part of the dynamic process of social change that integration entails has belonged to the sociology of migration since the very beginning. The school of urban ecology of the University of Chicago, which began to deal with immigration in the early 1920s as part of an analysis of urban transformations, maintained that conflict does not necessarily have negative implications but, on the contrary, is an important step of the integration process through which groups become aware of their identity and their specific needs, and are able to make claims in terms of access to resources and rights (Park and Burgess 1921). However, in distinction to the Chicago school, here the function of conflict in the process of integration is not taken for granted or located within a staged path. We started from the assumption that conflict does not always progressively disappear and sometimes breaks out, even suddenly. Conflict can sometimes be an opportunity to know each other, to cross and eventually change group boundaries thereby enlarging the concept of 'us'. At other times it makes such boundaries neater and more impermeable.

Like all societal phenomena, integration varies through time and space. The degree of integration between individuals or groups is unquestionably affected by the course of time and by the succession of generations. But it is also deeply

[1] The research project 'Concordia Discors', funded by the EU's European Integration Fund, was aimed at investigating the dynamics of integration through the analysis of inter-group relations at neighbourhood level in five European cities. In each city, a research partner was in charge of carrying out the empirical fieldwork: the Forum of International and European Research on Immigration (FIERI) in Turin, the European Forum of Migration Studies (efms) of the University of Bamberg in Nuremberg, the Migration Research Group of Autonomous University of Barcelona's Geography Department in Barcelona, the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) of the University of Oxford in London and the Social Research Institute TARKI in Budapest. Finally, the Brussels-based European Policy Centre (EPC) was involved in the project with specific tasks of dissemination of research findings and networking with decision-makers and civil society organizations at EU level. The project lasted from December 2011 until October 2012. For further details see: www.concordiadiscors.eu. Specific funding from the private foundation Compagnia di San Paolo allowed FIERI to expand the project to include two additional Italian cities, Milan and Genoa, which in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s constituted, together with Turin, the Italian 'industrial triangle', a massive basin of internal labour migration which is still one of the main destinations of foreign migration nowadays. The cases of Genoa and Milan are only analyzed here with a specific focus on media in the chapter by A. Pogliano. More detailed analyses for these two cities are provided in another book edited by Ferruccio Pastore and Irene Ponzo in 2012 (Pastore and Ponzo 2012).

influenced by the particularities of place,[2] as clearly integration is powerfully shaped by the specificities of the economic, political and spatial context in which the encounter occurs. However, problems arise when one tries to be more specific in determining the respective influence of different geographic scales on integration processes.

Throughout the 1990s, immigration scholars in Europe focused on the nation state as the key level for understanding processes and policies of immigrant integration (Brubaker 1992; Castles and Miller 2003; Schnapper 1992; Soysal 1994; Zincone 1991; Böhning 1984; Heckmann and Schnapper 2003). In the mid-1990s this focus on the national level started to shift, following a growing scientific and political awareness of the fact that most immigrants live in cities and their integration takes place primarily at the local level.

Since then, empirical migration studies have increasingly been focusing on the city level. This is in line with broader trends which have been making cities ever more crucial to understanding social and political phenomena, especially since the crisis of Fordism at the end of the 1970s opened the way to economic restructuring and new forms of governance (Kazepov 2005). The increasing complexity of society and social demands has indeed made it more difficult for central governments to impose rules from the top, thus fostering a 'hyperlocalisation of the social', i.e. the relegation of the treatment of complex social problems – including the integration of minorities – to the local sphere (Body-Gendrot and Martiniello 2000).

However, not only states but also contemporary cities have proved to be too internally fragmented and heterogeneous to be investigated as undifferentiated units: suburban nineteenth century working-class neighbourhoods are very different from inner gentrified districts, social housing areas built in the 1960s are hardly comparable to more recent business city centres and so on.

From our standpoint, this means that the integration outlook may vary significantly from one place to another, even within short distances. As Wallman (2003, 2005) highlights, in any city there are areas where diversity leads to private and public benefits and to sustainable development, while in others it may bring about social tensions, segregation and economic stagnation. Neighbourhoods do indeed play a decisive role within each city as high-visibility testing grounds of integration, i.e. as concrete contexts where integration 'succeeds' or 'fails', 'microcosms at the epicentre of larger problems' (Body-Gendrot and Martiniello 2000, p. 2). In positive terms, despite globalization, neighbourhoods as a social arena perform an important however specialized role as, for instance, the site of routinized practice and 'repair work' for everyday life and a source of social identity in addition to other functions (Forrest and Kearns 2001; Guest and Wierzbicki 1999; Henning and Lieberg 1996).

Given these assumptions, we believe that it is time to go beyond not only methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), but also what could be

[2] If 'space' is understood as a generic abstraction, 'place' is linked to the specific actions and experiences of individuals. As we explain in detail in the final chapter, places exist not only as physical entities but also as a result of people's different experiences (Buttiner 1976; Pred 1984; Tuan 1977).

called methodological 'city-ism' (meant as a rigid and sometimes exclusive focus on the city level as the context for immigrant integration), and to regard neighbourhoods and even specific sites of interaction within neighbourhoods as a primary and crucially important level for integration. Some steps in this direction have already been taken. In European migration research the neighbourhood level initially gained attention in the field of segregation studies. Transferring frames and interests from North American literature, with its long history of investigating the formation of urban ghettos, that strand of research clearly showed that European cities, generally more heterogeneous than those in the US, experience lower levels of segregation (Musterd and Ostendorf 1998; Fortuijn et al. 1998; Peach 1996, 1998; Phillips 1998; Barbagli and Pisati 2012; Fainstein et al. 1992; Mollenkopf and Castells 1991).[3]

Nevertheless, spatial segregation has become and remains an important issue on the political agenda of many European cities and it is increasingly accompanied by attention to immigration issues since in disadvantaged neighbourhoods the share of migrant population is often higher than the city average. Moreover, both segregation and diversity are usually framed as 'problems' because of tensions between people of different backgrounds that can sometimes turn into riots, so that policies are often aimed at reducing social and ethnic homogeneity rather than social inequality (Musterd et al. 2000).

Actually, as Forrest and Kearns (2001) pointed out, not only the policies but also the literature on neighbourhoods is still much focused on disadvantaged areas reflecting the policy agenda and providing a rather partial view. In this work we have adopted a partially different perspective using the level of diversity rather than the degree of disadvantage as the key criterion for selecting areas to investigate, and including both deprived and affluent neighbourhoods, with high and low shares of foreign residents. Given the above-mentioned focus on ethnic tensions, we have also made an effort to investigate neighbourhoods with differences in the salience of immigration and ethnic minorities issues, at least in public debate and collective representations, in order to make some empirically-grounded hypotheses on how urban and social dynamics influence the salience of ethnic boundaries and foster conflict or cooperation within the context of everyday life.

In analyzing 'neighbourhood effects', we look at the impact of the neighbourhood context on relations rather than on the aspirations, opportunities and actual achievements of individual residents as the neighbourhood effects literature does. As a matter of fact, neighbourhoods may be regarded as a series of overlapping social networks but little is known about differences in local patterns of social interaction within different types of neighbourhoods (Forrest and Kearns 2001).[4]

[3] More generally, the distinctive features of European cities have been identified by various scholars (Andersen and van Kempen 2001; Bagnasco and Le Galés 2000; Le Galés 2002; Kazepov 2005; Marcuse and Van Kempten 2002; Moulaert et al. 2003).

[4] A detailed analysis on neighbourhood social networks has been conducted by the project GEITONIES (see *Finisterra* special issue, XLVIII, 96, 2013 and specifically, Fonseca et al. 2013).

Nevertheless, far from disregarding the literature on neighbourhood effects, we have paid specific attention to the main factors that this literature considers, such as the distribution of population per housing regime, education and employment status, on which data were collected and summarized in the Tables in Annex I. These data have been mainly used to sketch the contexts of interaction and were integrated with qualitative analysis of spatial dimension, social infrastructures, modes of economic development and integration, political and mass media discourse, history and patterns of migration of investigated neighbourhoods.

Neighbourhoods are here conceived of not just as containers, portions of urbanized land hosting certain amounts and types of population, but also as places with social, institutional, symbolical and physical dimensions (Amin 2002; Galster 2001; Simon 2000; Wessendorf 2010; Tyler and Jensen 2009; Ray et al. 2008; Robinson and Reeve 2006). Partly in opposition to segregation studies, this kind of approach starts from the observation, well made by Wallman (2005), that similar amounts of population mix can lead to very different kinds of diversity. As a matter of fact, the city chapters of this book clearly show that among the several factors impacting on ethnic tensions, migration-generated ethnic diversity itself is far from being the most significant. What matters more is how diversity is framed and played so that stereotypes and xenophobia may be higher in neighbourhoods with a very low proportion of migrants, as in the Hungarian neighbourhoods, or may decrease while the share of ethnic minorities increases as in British neighbourhoods.

Finally, it is worth saying that the focus on the neighbourhood level has also been crucial for the boundary-making approach adopted in this book and explained in the next section. In fact, as Wimmer suggests (2013), using territorial and spatial units such as neighbourhoods – rather than ethnic units and social groups, in general – as units of observation, allows us to observe patterns of everyday boundary-making and group formations without presuming ex-ante that these necessarily cluster along ethnic lines.

2 Eleven European Neighbourhoods: On the Diversity of Diversity

The majority of this book's chapters present in-depth analyses on specific neighbourhoods located in five European cities: Bermondsey and Camberwell in London (United Kingdom), Poble Sec and Sagrada Família in Barcelona (Spain), Barriera di Milano and San Paolo-Cenisia in Turin (Italy), Werderau, Langwasser and Gostenhof in Nuremberg (Germany), and Józsefváros and Kőbánya in Budapest (Hungary). Not all of them are administrative units and they are part of different institutional settings. In Nuremberg, for instance, the lowest local institutional level is the City – although district coordinators have recently been introduced in some areas. In the case of Turin, too, neighbourhoods (*Quartieri*) as such are not administrative units as they were merged into ten larger institutional entities (*Circoscrizioni*) in the

1980s. In contrast, Hungarian, Spanish and British target areas have a more or less significant level of administrative autonomy: Józsefváros and Kőbánya are two Districts of Budapest, i.e. the lowest administrative level below the City; Poble Sec and Sagrada Família are *Barris*, i.e. the administrative units into which the Districts are divided; Camberwell and Bermondsey are Community Council Areas, i.e. the administrative level below the Borough.

Based on key features of their socio-economic history, our target neighbourhoods can be classified in two broad groups: the first and larger one is made up of former industrial neighbourhoods while the other consists of central neighbourhoods where the service sector (trade, leisure, museums and tourist destinations, etc,) prevails. The latter category includes Camberwell (London), Sagrada Família (Barcelona), Gostenhof (Nuremberg), and Józsefváros (Budapest). The first category encompasses Bermondsey (London), Poble Sec (Barcelona), Barriera di Milano and San Paolo (Turin), Werderau and Langwasser (Nuremberg), and Kőbánya (Budapest).[5] These neighbourhoods are reacting to the dismantlement of industrial sites differently: some of them seem to manage this change quite successfully, developing alternative social and economic organizational settings while others are trapped in the Fordist economic and social model, and are strongly affected by its decline. We will examine the significance of this more thoroughly in the concluding chapter. Here we will discuss the broader bi-type categorization and its relevance for inter-group relations since it seems to hold significance despite the ongoing transformations.

Indeed, the dissimilarities between these two categories of neighbourhoods produce different settings for inter-group relations. First, in former industrial neighbourhoods people you meet in public places are almost always residents since these areas do not offer special attractions. Furthermore, they are generally rather isolated and disconnected from the rest of the city due to urban barriers mostly related to the industrial past such as abandoned factories, railways which once served plants or huge and heavily congested roads which can hamper relations between people residing in different areas of the neighbourhood and even produce fragmented perceptions of the latter with the subsequent development of strong sub-neighbourhood identities. In contrast, central service-oriented neighbourhoods are characterized by substantial daily inflows of people coming from outside to use services and entertainment facilities. As a consequence, migrants tend to be just one category of outsiders among others, not always the most significant in neighbourhood narratives on the Other and in everyday practices. Furthermore, the centrality of these neighbourhoods usually produces a higher turnover not only in neighbourhood users but also in residents, making them used to settlement of migrant populations from other regions and from abroad.

Secondly, neighbourhoods' economic and urban functions in addition to their degree of isolation have an impact on their social composition. Former industrial neighbourhoods are usually more socially homogenous both in terms of class and

[5] For description of urban, housing, economic, social and ethnic features of neighbourhoods see the Comparative Overview section of the website http://www.concordiadiscors.eu/overview.

ethnicity, whereas central service-oriented neighbourhoods are more socially mixed as a consequence of differentiated economic activity and a higher turnover of population. The latter are used to diversity in its various forms and have developed socio-economic strategies to cope with it. In former working-class neighbourhoods, on the other hand, social cohesion may constitute an asset for migrant integration, but the nostalgic memory of a cohesive community with a shared history can also foster hostility towards outsiders, who are regarded as a threat.

As we will discuss further in the concluding chapter, these differences in the economic and social history of the neighbourhoods, as well as in their urban texture and the permeability of their borders greatly affect the everyday experience of diversity.

The 11 neighbourhoods analyzed in this book also display differences and similarities in demographic terms.[6] As we can see in Fig. 1, the demographic balance of all target neighbourhoods is essentially positive, as negative figures generally appear as 1-year exceptions.[7] The most steady and consistent growth is reported in the Italian and British neighbourhoods and, to a lesser degree, in the Hungarian ones, whereas the Spanish and German neighbourhoods show more swinging trends which alternate positive and negative values.

It is worth adding that the migratory balance (see Fig. 2) is positive in all target neighbourhoods except for Gostenhof, whereas the natural balance (Fig. 3) is positive only in Barriera di Milano, Werderau, Gostenhof and marginally in Poble Sec. This means that the population increases shown in Fig. 1 are more often the result of new resident inflows rather than births. Consistently with the broader demographic landscape of an ageing Europe, these neighbourhoods are producing fewer children but since they are still able to attract residents from outside they are avoiding population decline.

If we narrow the focus to foreign residents, we see that their share of the overall population (see Fig. 4) varies significantly even between neighbourhoods of the same city, being highest in Barriera di Milano, Gostenhof and Poble Sec, and very low in other German neighbourhoods and in Hungarian ones. As a matter of fact, compared to the city they belong to, neighbourhoods may be concerned by very different migration dynamics and similarities may be greater between neighbourhoods located in different cities than within the same city, as we said in the previous sections.

Nevertheless, we should consider that these data also reflect very different international migration histories of the cities and countries where our target neighbourhoods are located: the foreign population is less numerous both in mature immigration countries, such as Germany, where the bulk of the population with a migratory background has now acquired the nationality of the country of settlement,

[6] More detailed statistics are contained in city chapters and in Annex I.

[7] The demographic balance is the result of the combination of natural balance, indicating birth and deaths, and migratory balance, indicating outflows and inflows of residents (be they international migrants or just people moving from other cities or neighbourhoods).



Fig. 1 Demographic balance rate (%) (2006–2010)



Fig. 2 Migratory balance rate (%) (2006–2010)

and in countries such as Hungary, which are not – or at least, not yet – attracting very substantial migratory inflows.

Generally, whereas in most recent immigration countries data on nationality actually mirror the level of origin-based diversity, this is not the case in older immigration countries such as the UK and Germany. Indeed, in these latter countries, data on the residents' migration background are systematically collected and show a rather different picture from the one revealed by data on nationality. Whereas in our German neighbourhoods the share of foreign residents ranges from 3 % to 11 %, the proportion of people with a migratory background as defined by the Statistik Nürnberg Fürth is 37 % in Langwasser, 48 % in Werderau and 54 % in Gostenhof; similarly the share of residents with an ethnic minority background as defined by



Fig. 3 Natural balance rate (%) (2006–2010)



Fig. 4 Proportion of people with foreign citizenship in total population – year 2010 (%) (Note: The figure is not available for the two London neighbourhoods)

the UK Census ranges from 37 % to 44 % in different parts of Bermondsey (Grange, Riverside and South Bermondsey) and from 48 % to 60 % in Camberwell's wards (Brunswick Park, Camberwell Green, South Camberwell).

Not only the number of foreigners, but also the number of countries of origin is significant. Figure 5 aims at measuring and comparing the degree of 'statistical ethnic diversity' in target neighbourhoods by aggregating the first five nationalities in terms of number of residents and calculating their incidence in the total foreign population. Differences are evident: in Hungarian neighbourhoods foreigners are few but come from many different countries since the first five nationalities do not even account for 10 % of the foreign population whereas in Italian neighbourhoods foreigners account for a larger share of the residents but the level of diversity is rather low since the first five nationalities amount to more than 70 % of the total foreign population, primarily as a consequence of the very substantial presence of



Fig. 5 First five nationalities (as proportion of total foreign population)* (%) (2006–2010)
*Data on foreign residents are not available for British neighbourhoods while in German neighbourhoods are grouped by geographical areas instead of by nationality

Romanian citizens. We can assume that these differences between neighbourhoods impact on collective representations of diversity and inter-group relations as well as on the policies dealing with these issues. On the other hand, as briefly discussed above in Sect. 1 and illustrated in greater detail in the following chapters, 'statistical ethnic diversity' is often less crucial than expected since its perception is affected by many other factors capable of emphasizing or disguising it in collective perceptions, so to present it in more positive or negative terms.

Finally, it is worth remembering that these differences in statistical categories are also specifically significant to our analysis of boundary-making, the key tenets of which are illustrated in the next section. As a matter of fact, statistical categories and classification criteria, as part and expression of a given institutional setting, are as much a means of boundary-making as are informal everyday relations (Wimmer 2013). In this sense, public statistics can be seen as macro-frames exactly like the political and media narratives which represent the specific objects of our research. In the same way, statistics reflect the unequal distribution of power among groups who struggle over the boundaries of belonging. As a consequence, they are usually native-biased since the majority population is usually legally, politically and symbolically advantaged compared to immigrant minorities thanks to its privileged relationship with institutions. In fact, categories employed to gather and elaborate data for official statistics have usually been defined by the majority population and they are usually taken for granted with little or no concern about the degree to which immigrant minorities self-identify with those categories. In Great Britain, for instance, this is evident in the use of the category BME (Black and Minority Ethnic). In Italian statistics, those born abroad have traditionally been distinguished into two main groups, i.e. people from developed countries (Western Europe, North America, Oceania, Israel and Japan) and people from 'high-migration pressure countries', a totally inconsistent and strongly Western-centric category which basically coincides

with the rest of the world. People from Serbia are classified as Serbians in Budapest, but as former Yugoslavs in Nuremberg. It is then clear that who is counted in the diversity statistics, and how, is a matter of definition and boundary-making and ultimately of power. Bourdieu (1985) would have used the concept of symbolic capital and efficacy, i.e. the 'action that is performed through signs capable of producing social things and, in particular, groups' (Bourdieu 1985, p. 741). Statistics taken for granted as objective measurements are certainly a clear example of the use of effective symbolic power to build groups.

3 Beyond 'Groupism'

In most of the empirical literature on ethnicity and migration, ethnic and origin-related boundaries are not treated as outcomes to be explained, but rather, as an independent variable, i.e. something used to explain. In this regard, Brubaker (2002, 2006) speaks about 'groupism' to refer to the tendency to take discrete and bounded groups for granted in the study of ethnicity and in social analysis in general. Here we have instead adopted the boundary-making perspective originally proposed by Fredrik Barth (1969) and more recently further developed and applied to empirical research by Brubaker (2004, 2009) and Wimmer (2007, 2008, 2013). According to this approach ethnic distinctions have a relational nature and they may (or may not) coincide with objective cultural differences. We look at ethnicity as a 'cognitive phenomenon, a way of seeing and interpreting the world' (Brubaker 2002, p. 184) rather than a substantial entity or feature.

In this perspective, ethnicity can then be regarded as the result of actors defining social relations and constructing social networks and institutions through references to ethnic elements (nationality, culture, language) rather than through other elements such as profession, class or place of residence (Taboada Leonetti 1989). In other words, it is one of the possible ways to apprehend social situations (Esser 2004). Therefore, we did not pre-cluster individuals into ethnic groups since the existence and the configuration of such groups is itself part of our empirical research findings.

In this line of thought a fundamental distinction is the one between *categories* and *groups*. While *groups* can be defined as bounded collectivities with a sense of solidarity, shared identity and sense of belonging, and capacity of collective action, *categories* are cognitive frames (Wimmer 2013; Brubaker 2002, 2006; Jenkins 1994, 1997). Therefore, as Brubaker (2002, 2006) points out, *ethnic categories can exist without groups*. In any case, ethnic categories can have real consequences since they influence – in some cases quite strongly – ways of seeing, thinking, talking and behaving.

Considering this assumption, the analyses presented in the following chapters have not started with 'groups', but with 'categories' asking how, why and in what contexts ethnic categories are used to make sense of everyday life, events, issues addressed in public debate, and so on. In this sense, ours has been a category-centred as opposed to group-centred approach to the study of ethnicity. This approach

obviously does not exclude the presence of groups but starts from the idea that 'bounded and solidary groups are one modality of ethnicity' (Brubaker 2004, p. 3). Actually, we found many categories and few groups.

As social constructions, groups' boundaries are situationally defined, and intergroup representations and behaviours do not develop following general rules but vary according to the context (Jenkins 1994; Lamont 2000; Wimmer 2004; Galaty 1982). Therefore, the boundary-making perspective is also consistent with the approach explained above which gives particular relevance to the specific characteristics of places – in our case neighbourhoods, each with its own socio-economic profile, urban texture, social history and identities which all concur in providing a specific setting and specific stakes for social interaction.

Given this perspective, we have chosen not to focus on groups legally or statistically defined on the basis of country of origin or citizenship; nor have we always used the same categories in the city chapters since 'boundarying' and labelling activities are themselves objects of analysis, and to import cognitive frameworks from one context to another would have been in contradiction with our initial assumptions. Categories such as 'minorities', 'black' and 'white' belong to everyday frameworks and speech in London's neighbourhoods but not in Turin's neighbourhoods where 'migrants', 'Muslim', 'Senegalese', 'Peruvians' or other national identities are more usual terms while 'white' is regarded as an expression of racist views by a large part of the population. As a result, the following chapters refer to different 'ethnic categories' reflecting the most salient boundaries in the investigated urban contexts.

Furthermore, we have tried to develop a broader perspective than the one usually adopted by migration studies, looking at migration as just one facet, however crucial, of the social and urban transformations of contemporary European cities. In keeping with our ambition to go beyond a narrow definition of migration studies we have looked not only at migration-generated ethnic cleavages but also at other cleavages which have emerged from the fieldwork as relevant in structuring groups and reinforcing, weakening or blurring the ones produced by migration. This approach is consistent with the super-diversity paradigm (Vertovec 2006) according to which the interplay between different 'profiles' of diversity is a crucial aspect of contemporary societies. As the following city chapters illustrate, the main cleavages that emerged from the city chapters run along age, socio-economic status and length of stay in the neighbourhood. These were not identified a priori, but were the result of empirical fieldwork starting from the above-mentioned assumption that social situations can be defined on the basis of many different criteria of which ethnicity is just one. As a matter of fact, we found not only that the ethnic groupings emerging from the field are different from those we would have expected but even that ethnic belonging is not always particularly relevant in structuring the social life of the researched neighbourhoods.

4 A Multilevel and Multi-focused Analysis of Inter-group Relations

It is commonly acknowledged that the processes through which social cleavages and neighbourhood representations are constructed are influenced not only by everyday experiences and practices but also by wider political and media discourses (Petersson and Tyler 2008; Ray et al. 2008; Simon 2000, 2005; Taboada Leonetti 1989; Wessendorf 2010). We have therefore tried to provide an insight into the relationship between these different levels by investigating macro-frames as generated by local media and policy communities; representations of groups and narratives; social practices and relations among groups as observable in everyday situations.

These three levels are evidently related to one another: everyday behaviours and performances depend on the identity and status that we attribute to the interlocutor on the basis of more general factors (Goffman 1959) including media and policy macro-frames.[8] However, the relation between these levels should not be seen as linear, made up of dependent and independent variables, but as a cycle which integrates both the macro and micro level (Wimmer 2008). In the meantime, the analysis is made more challenging by possible mismatches between these levels of analysis. First of all, everyday practices and narratives may not coincide with the general picture of inter-group relations as provided by macro-frames. Secondly, representations, i.e. 'what people have in mind' about groups, and practices, i.e. 'what people do', may or may not overlap and converge. Positive perceptions of other groups do not in fact always trigger positive interactions, just as negative perceptions may not prevent cooperation. All these are questions that will be specifically explored in the next chapters.

These theoretical assumptions required mixed methodologies derived from different disciplines and fields of study, as well as the use of different sources. Starting from the assumption that the urban context constrains the available options for identity-building and the structuring of social relations (Wallman 2005; Lamont 2009), we reconstructed the urban and social context of the investigated neighbourhoods. This empirical background is provided in Sect. 2 of this Introduction, partially integrated in Annex I, and in the single city chapters.

We then investigated the macro-frames looking at 'neighbourhood policy communities' and local mass media. 'Neighbourhood policy communities' are meant here as the sum of all actors involved in policymaking regardless of their legal status, i.e. public, non-profit and profit actors (Jordan 1990; Rhodes 1990; Marsh and Rhodes 1992). Therefore, we considered the neighbourhood-level representative institutions (where existing) as well as housing associations, spontaneous groups of residents, NGOs, etc., paying special attention to policy frames because, as already emphasized, ethnic categories may imbue, to a varying extent, institutional cognition and recognition processes and organizational routines (Brubaker 2002; Tilly

[8] In the USA, for instance, race remains an important factor of mobilization and immigration is often perceived and interpreted through the Black/White lens (Steinberg 1989; Winant 2000).

1998). The analysis of mass media was focused on local newspapers or local pages of nationwide newspapers and it covered the decade 2001–2010. The main aims were to see to what extent the investigated neighbourhoods were associated with immigration and to identify the dominant representations of inter-group relations there. Given that the contribution of these analyses is strongly valued by comparison, the findings of this strand of research are jointly presented in the chapter on media and further elaborated and discussed in the final chapter.

Finally, local ethnographies which constitute the core of the city chapters, were the main ways to explore the actual working of society and to understand how diversity is experienced and negotiated on the basis of the everyday situation by adopting the approach of what has been called 'everyday multiculturalism' (Berthoud and Gershuny 2000; Amin 2002; Watson 2006; Wise and Velayutham 2009; Semi et al. 2009). Specifically, interviews[9] with residents and 'neighbourhood-users' and direct observation in specific sites of interaction allowed us to catch residents' representations of differences as well as everyday practices and daily encounters.

A systematic and more detailed illustration of the timing and articulation of our fieldwork methodology can be found in the Methodological Annex (Annex II) at the end of this volume.

Though based on the same overarching questions and on the same research methodology, each chapter develops a distinct thematic core consistent with the multi-focused approach inspiring this work.[10] The chapter by O. Jensen and B. Gidley, comparing two neighbourhoods in the London borough of Southwark, has a special focus on housing stock composition and its management in shaping social and ethnic diversity and therefore inter-group-relations. This issue is further developed in the chapter by C. Köhler on three neighbourhoods of Nuremberg characterized by different locations within the city and various degrees of 'permeability' and housing mix which turn into different patterns of ethnic diversity, collective identities and inter-group relations. The chapter by C. Köhler also pays particular attention to processes which lead to framing material conflicts as ethnic conflicts. The chapter on Budapest allows us to see how inter-group relations work in a context marked by low immigration rates and strong stigmatization against an internal minority (Hungarian Roma) rather than against foreigners. Moreover, this chapter offers deep insight into inter-group dynamics within a small business environment, showing how immigrant communities largely employed in this sector, such as Arabs and Chinese, might be represented in very different ways by the Hungarian majority. Albeit analyzed throughout the volume, everyday interactions in micro-sites, such as public gardens and open markets, together with the relevance of identity-building processes and embedded social capital in shaping the transition from

[9] In the following chapters interviewees are quoted anonymously and only the following details are provided: the neighbourhood where the interview was conducted, the role or profession of the interviewee, whether he/she is resident in the neighbourhood, and his/her ethnic or national background, sex and age. More details on sample composition are contained in each city chapter.

[10] A detailed comparative analysis is provided in reports available on the research project's website. See (www.concordiadiscors.eu).

mono-ethnic industrial districts with considerable doses of diversity generated by internal migration to multi-ethnic and economically diverse neighbourhoods, emerge as central themes, especially in the chapters on Barcelona and Turin. The chapter by A. Pogliano carries out an analysis of local media narratives focusing on the neighbourhood dimension, something which is usually disregarded by media studies and which shows how local policy communities can shape media narratives on neighbourhoods. The final chapter proposes some interpretative hypotheses on inter-group relations and the role played by urban context and policy communities based on a comparative analysis of the empirical contents of the previous chapters.

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They've Got Their Wine Bars, We've Got Our Pubs': Housing, Diversity and Community in Two South London Neighbourhoods

Ole Jensen and Ben Gidley

1 The Making of Inner-City Diversity

This chapter explores the constituents and dynamics of diversity, community and boundary-making in two South London neighbourhoods, Bermondsey and Camberwell. The analysis will in particular focus on how settlement patterns and residential geographies have been impacted by the nature of the housing stock and policies regulating access to social housing (Fig. 1).[1]

Despite their relative proximity in the London Borough of Southwark, the two inner-city neighbourhoods of Bermondsey and Camberwell are characterized by significant differences in terms of the built-up urban landscape and their place in the historical development of London. In Camberwell, class was built into the landscape from the late eighteenth century when city merchants built Georgian houses in the southern part of Camberwell, located on a slope above the slums and smells of northern Camberwell. Bermondsey, on the other hand, was a much more homogeneous, white working-class area, with livelihoods sustained by local employment

[1] The empirical material presented in this chapter derives from fieldwork carried out in Bermondsey and Camberwell from March 2011 to January 2012. In stage 1, a total of 20 key informant interviews were carried out. Stage 2 consisted of 36 semi-structured interviews with local residents in six sites of inter-action, three in each neighbourhood. After conclusion of the field work, Neighbourhood Forums were staged in Bermondsey and Camberwell in March 2012 in order to discuss preliminary research findings and engage the audience in a discussion of future prospects for the neighbourhood.

O. Jensen (✉) • B. Gidley
COMPAS – University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
e-mail: ole.jensen@compas.ox.ac.uk; ben.gidley@compas.ox.ac.uk

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

Fig. 1 Bermondsey and Camberwell, in the London Borough of Southwark

in the docklands or related industrial areas. What emerged was a tight-knit community characterized by a strong sense of local belonging and a them-us distinction on territorial grounds.[2]

These differences are even more clear-cut in terms of the historical patterns of immigration and settlement. Camberwell has long been an area of arrival and diversity. An area of settlement for early nineteenth century German immigrants, it emerged as one of the destinations for post-World War 2 Windrush immigrants, and then, as now, was characterized by one of the highest black minority concentrations in London. Bermondsey, in contrast, was often avoided by non-white minorities,

[2] As Feinstein also argues in his description of Bermondsey: 'Bermondsey was more akin to a typical English village occupied by a group of people closely tied to a particular location through a specific economic history and in marrying links of kinship and residence' (Feinstein 1998).

Table 1 Population by ward and ethnicity, 2011 (percentage points change from 2001 in brackets)

	Bermondsey			Camberwell		
	Grange	Riverside	South Bermondsey	Brunswick Park	Camberwell Green	South Camberwell
White British	43.8 (−12.3)	47.7 (−15.6)	39.3 (−21.9)	34.8 (−9.1)	26.7 (−13.7)	42.9 (−8.4)
White other	14.2 (5.8)	18.4 (7.0)	14.1 (7.2)	10.3 (3.1)	10.3 (3.5)	10.8 (3.5)
Black Caribbean	3.6 (−0.3)	1.9 (−0.3)	3.5 (−1.0)	9.2 (−2.8)	8.7 (−2.9)	7.4 (−3.7)
Black African	12.4 (−3.7)	9.2 (−1.4)	17.8 (3.2)	20.4 (0.2)	28.1 (3.5)	14.5 (0.0)
Other Black	2.9 (1.8)	2.5 (1.7)	4.5 (3.4)	5.5 (2.6)	5.5 (2.9)	4.3 (2.5)
Others	23.1 (8.7)	20.3 (8.6)	20.8 (9.6)	19.8 (6.0)	20.7 (4.1)	20.1 (5.9)
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

(ONS 2013)

and remained overwhelmingly white up into the 1980s, with Irish immigrants constituting the only significant minority population (Table 1).

As is evident from the comparison of the 2001 and 2011 census figures, these differences have, in terms of demography and ethnic diversity, become increasingly muted, with Bermondsey and Camberwell wards being characterized by similar inter-censal trends. But the decrease in the White British population is generally much more pronounced in Bermondsey, as is the increase in 'White Other'. At the same time, the increase in the categories 'Others' and 'Other Black' suggests that the proportion of the local population that does not identify with any of the main groupings is increasing significantly throughout all the wards. Together, these shifts portray a changing face to diversity, with the white majority now a minority, and the major long-settled postcolonial groups declining in significance. Altogether, both neighbourhoods are characterized by a multiplication of the axes of difference: in short, the deepening of what has been named 'super-diversity' (Vertovec 2005).

2 Why Housing Matters

Many past and present settlement dynamics are, in Bermondsey/Camberwell as well as in other parts of London, related to the availability of housing. In order to explain these differences, we will explore in this chapter how the diverse nature of, and control over, housing stock at neighbourhood level have affected local dynamics of settlement patterns and inter-group relations in the two neighbourhoods. There are two aspects to this analysis.

One addresses broader urban dynamics as well as the policy framework that has served to curtail or open access to specific kinds of housing. This concerns the manner in which access to housing in Bermondsey and Camberwell has conditioned the settlement patterns of both majority and minority populations. Of relevance here is both the impact of policy changes to social housing allocation and the post-industrial reconfiguration of urban space expressed in processes of gentrification and the redevelopment of riverside docklands into expensive housing units. As will be discussed, these developments have contributed to different narratives of community and diversity, with us/them distinctions expressed according to ethnic/racial, socio-economic and generational markers.

The other aspect concerns the nature of inter-group relations and everyday diversity at the very local level. The level of analytical interference here is, first and foremost, the estate. Defined for this purpose as a piece of land built over with houses, either privately or – as it is the case here – by a local authority, the estate constitutes a very prominent spatial form in the post-World War 2 urban landscape of inner London, typically built in the inter-war and post- World War 2 period. The estate thus provides a semi-public space of social interaction which may extend into a site of belonging and identification, the changing role of which we will examine here in the light of generational differences and the changing nature of diversity.

In the following sections we will first outline the broader housing dynamics, with particular reference to the London Borough of Southwark. Against this backdrop we will explore the housing pathways of immigrant and ethnic minority populations in the two neighbourhoods, as well as the effect of post-industrial changes to the housing stock. Moving on to the very local level, we will then analyze how post-industrial drivers and housing pathways have affected neighbourhood dynamics at estate level over time.

2.1 Social Housing: Outline of the Broader Picture

In her analysis of the history of council estates in Britain, Lynsey Hanley argues that '…class is built into the physical landscape of the country' (Hanley 2007: 18). That is probably even more the case in an urban context where the distinction, however stereotypical, between middle-class home owners and working-class tenants is manifest in the built-up landscape, most significantly housing estates developed to house the industrial working classes (ibid.: 20).

The push to end the slums and re-build bombed-out residential areas took place after the second world war, with one million houses built in the UK in the period 1945–1950 (Hanley 2007:83). Fluctuating between 100,000–200,000 units per year, the construction of social housing kept increasing until 1979 (ibid.: 100). This development was put in reverse by the Housing Act of 1980 that gave council tenants the right to buy council-owned properties while barring local authorities from building replacement houses. This has had a significant impact, so while 42 % of the British population lived in council housing in 1979, this figure had been reduced to

12 % by 2008, with a total of four million people in the UK on the waiting list for either a council or a housing association home (The Guardian 30.09.2008). As a result of decreasing stock and needs-based assessment, social housing became an increasingly narrow welfare tenure, '…increasingly the preserve of the poor, the unemployed, the elderly and the desperate' (Hamnett and Randolph 1987: 50). Such processes of residualization have in turn led to an increasing stigmatization of council estates, with popular narratives conflating council renting with moral decline and the emergence of a parasitic 'chav' culture (Jones 2011; Hanley 2007).

There is in many parts of London a co-incidence of high levels of deprivation and high proportions of immigrants and ethnic minority populations in areas where social housing constitutes a high percentage of the housing stock. In inner London the proportion of immigrants and ethnic minorities in private and social housing has been increasing since 1991, while at the same time there is increasing overall demand for a pool of affordable housing that has been shrinking since 1981 (Hamnett and Butler 2010: 71–72). In addition, the decreasing (though increasingly contested) stock of social housing has also become central to 'backlash' narratives, with white working class populations protesting against perceived favouritism towards immigrants and ethnic minorities (Hewitt 2005).

With a total of 39,000 council homes, Southwark council is the largest social landlord in London. Southwark also has the highest proportion of council housing to homes of any local authority in Britain, owning a third of all housing units and providing housing for nearly half the population in the borough (Independent Commission 2012: 11). In addition, 16,700 properties are owned by leaseholders. As in other parts of Britain, the construction of council housing kept increasing until the 1980 Housing Act. In Southwark, two-thirds of current tenants are not economically active, and have a median income which is five times lower than that of home owners (Independent Commission 2012: 11). But at the same time, a waiting list totalling 18,724 in 2012 also illustrates the continuing severity of the housing challenge.

3 Housing and Settlement in Bermondsey and Camberwell

Previously known as the 'larder of London', Bermondsey's present day socio-economic landscape has its basis in the nineteenth and early twentieth century development of the riverside docks, and industries associated with it, such as food processing – e.g. biscuits, jams, confectionary – in which many Bermondsey women worked, while many men were employed as casual labourers on the dockside (Evans 2006). Despite thriving industries in the area, the working and living conditions of most people were extremely poor, so much so that Bermondsey was known as 'the black patch of London'[3] in the early twentieth century (de la Mare 2008).

[3] The phrase is attributed to Mary Macarthur, organizer of the National Federation of Women Workers (De la Mare 2008)

While the northern part of Camberwell shares many characteristics with Bermondsey, both in terms of its industrial history and the low standards of local housing, most of Camberwell evolved as a destination and residence area for middle-class families who started building large houses in the southern part of Camberwell in the late eighteenth century. During the nineteenth century, however, the village became a suburb: 'From a straggling suburban parish of about 4000 inhabitants, Camberwell has become a congeries of streets, part of the great metropolis itself. Bricks and mortar, and universal stucco, have invaded the place' (Blanch 1875, in Boast 2000: 33). Perhaps most indicative of the rapid development was the 30-fold population increase in Camberwell parish (Camberwell, Peckham and Dulwich) in the period 1801–1901, due to both the growth of the city of London and the development of public transport, enabling people to work in central London and live at some distance from the centre of the city.

In post-World War 2 Bermondsey the vast majority of housing stock was social housing, mostly controlled by the Bermondsey Metropolitan Borough. Under a principle informally known as 'sons and daughters', housing units would first and foremost be made available to the offspring of tenants who already lived in the borough.[4] In this manner, the structure of housing allocation would serve to root local belonging in localized kinship links in the immediate neighbourhood, thus reinforcing the properties of a 'closed' system with strong internal bonds. An example of this link between spatial proximity and familiarity was provided by a lifelong resident:

> I've lived in this particular street for the last 44 years, literally moved in about two minutes from where I was born. I'm one of three, I'm in the middle, I have an older and a younger brother. Older brother is six years older than me; younger brother is three years younger than me. Both now live in Kent. I was educated locally, went to the school about 30 seconds from where we are sitting [....] parents born minutes away from here. My mother was born on the Dickens Estate 80 years ago, my dad was born in a place called New Church Street which is now Llewellyn Street, 84 years ago, in 1927 [....] so we have kind of always been in this tiny little area for a number of years, although we are now the last. [The] family have moved out, aunts and uncles used to live across the road, great uncle used to live locally, cousins you know, but they have now all gone, all dispersed to Kent. (White British Bermondsey resident, aged 47)

These properties of the local community slowly came undone during the second half of the twentieth century. The structural reform of 1965, that saw the metropolitan councils of Bermondsey, Southwark and Camberwell amalgamated into the London Borough of Southwark, meant that the social housing stock in Bermondsey became available to residents from other parts of Southwark. This was of particular significance in Bermondsey where 90 % of dwellings in 1981 were council-owned, as opposed to 50 % in Camberwell (Carter 2008: 165). Accordingly, the nature of

[4] Early ethnographies from London have described this practice in more detail – e.g. Young and Willmott (1957), pp. 31–43.

Table 2 Households by type of tenure, 2011 (percentage point change from 2001 in brackets)

	Bermondsey			Camberwell			
	Grange	Riverside	South Bermondsey	Brunswick Park	Camberwell Green	South Camberwell	Southwark
Owns outright	5.8 (0.7)	9.9 (0.6)	6.2 (−0.2)	9.7 (−0.3)	4.6 (0.1)	13.5 (0.3)	9.8 (0.1)
Owns w. mortgage or loan	16.1 (0.0)	18.8 (−2.4)	15.0 (−5.0)	20.4 (0.4)	10.8 (0.4)	26.2 (0.3)	19.5 (−0.8)
Social housing	45.1 (−17.8)	34.3 (−14.2)	52.3 (−3.3)	46.5 (−8.9)	63.5 (9.0)	37.9 (−6.7)	43.7 (−9.8)
Private renting	29.8 (15.3)	32.3 (11.9)	21.7 (6.5)	20.5 (6.7)	18.5 (6.5)	20.2 (5.5)	23.6 (8.5)

(ONS 2013)

the housing stock made it more difficult for outsiders to access housing in Bermondsey.

Overall, housing in Camberwell presents a much more heterogeneous picture, with owner-occupancy as well as private and social renting. Accordingly, the impact of the policy changes outlined above has not been as dramatic in Camberwell as in Bermondsey. Furthermore, as noted previously, newcomers from abroad and from other parts of Britain have had access to housing in Camberwell for a much longer period of time than in Bermondsey.

Table 2 sums up the more recent tenure changes in Bermondsey and Camberwell in the period 2001–2011. Whereas there is very little overall change to the proportion of households that own property, the decreasing proportion of households in social housing has been matched by an increase in private renting, particularly in the Bermondsey wards. It has been argued that the increase in the proportion renting privately is likely to reflect buy-to-let landlords purchasing many of the properties which have come on the market (Independent Commission 2012: 26).

3.1 Immigrant Settlement Patterns and Housing Pathways

It follows from the previous section that the spatial distribution of early immigrants would correlate with the availability of private housing, and this initially led to a concentration of ethnic minorities in the centre of the borough, in particular in the Camberwell-Peckham area (Carter 2008: 157). As a result, the immigrant population has been part of the social and cultural fabric here for much longer. In conversation, Greek and Greek-Cypriot shopkeepers in Camberwell would mention how Camberwell Green in the early 1970s was referred to as 'Camberwell Greek' as the majority of local shopkeepers were of Greek, or Greek-Cypriot, origin. Similarly,

residents would buy into cultural practices of the incomers, recalling how '…on summer's evenings you could hear West Indian steel band music floating in Camberwell'.

Such visible displays of minority presence contrast Bermondsey experiences from the same period, the early 1970s, as remembered by a Black Caribbean resident on Bermondsey's Dickens Estate:

> I'll tell you something. Over the shops, there was a man and his daughter and there was another African woman that moved back to Africa soon after, there was two black people living in Copperfield and myself. There wasn't hardly any black people living round here at all. You go down Tower Bridge Road and you wouldn't see another black person. (Black Caribbean Bermondsey resident, aged 73)

But despite this early accommodation of difference in Camberwell, there were nevertheless experiences of racial discrimination, in particular among Black Caribbean immigrants who constituted the most significant proportion of non-white immigrants in the post-World War 2 period. As remembered by a Camberwell resident who arrived in South London aged 13 in the early 1970s:

> A lot of people felt as well that their step-mother or the mother country, what you felt was your nice mother turned out to be the wicked step-mother (laughs) [....] I remember seeing those signs you know when I came 'No Dogs'… you know for renting accommodation, 'No Dogs, No Blacks'…well 'No Coloured' actually, coz that's what they used to call it, and sometimes 'No Blacks' as well. (Black Caribbean Camberwell resident, aged 56)

From the 1970s, as equality legislation opened up for ethnic minorities and new allocation rules gave priority to applicants in greatest need, ethnic minorities gradually got access to council housing schemes. But as they were steered towards less favoured estates – the 'second wave' of council housing – in the central part of Southwark, the borough was still markedly ethnically divided in the early 1990s (Carter 2008: 174). In addition, there were reports of harassment and intimidation to stop black families from settling when the council offered them homes in the northern part of the borough, thus initially making black families reluctant to move to Bermondsey and Rotherhithe (Carter 2008: 177; Evans 2012).

There has, however, been a significant shift over the past 20 years, and by 2011 the non-white proportion of the population in Bermondsey exceeded 40 % (ONS 2013). This increase in the immigrant and ethnic minority population in the neighbourhood has also, in particular over the past 10 years, coincided with a decrease in racial harassment and overtly racial positioning – as expressed by a resident who moved to northern Bermondsey in 1999:

> This was in 1999. Every Easter, for the five years after we came here, the British National Party did their march along the Jamaica Road. And each year, it got a bit smaller, and in 2004 or 2005 they gave it up. What's been happening here is that the ethnic and racial mix is coming to this area, so now you've got a much more mixed area, and that has all happened in the last ten or eleven years […] As soon as you get black and brown neighbours, then the whole game changes, because then, well, they are OK, some of them are good, some of them are bad, just like us, so the whole thing withers away. (White British Bermondsey resident, 60s)

This observation, made by a relative newcomer to Bermondsey, was similar to views expressed by many other local residents and service providers, stressing how racial incidents and overt racism in public areas had decreased over the past 10 years – though 30 % of the minority ethnic population in 2008 still saw racial harassment as a serious problem (Communities and Local Government 2008). There is also, as experienced by residents, evidence of the decreasing presence of the British National Party (BNP).

Significant here is also the way in which local residents were able to 'manage' friendly and cordial relationships across ethnic/racial divides at an individual level and at the same time maintain racial stereotypes. As experienced by the first black councillor to be elected in South Bermondsey:

> Now I have become part of Bermondsey. When I have my surgery [consultation with constituents] down The Blue, people come to complain to me, [saying] "they are giving the houses to black people". "We don't mean any offence", that's what one lady who comes and says, she won't say "I'm not racist", she will say "I am not racialist, but I don't like them" (laughs). (Black African Bermondsey resident, 70s)

Whereas there is an obvious irony to the situation – complaining about 'black people' to a black councillor – the exchange also demonstrates the continuing significance of housing shortages in the area. But while many white residents considered housing allocation unfair, the blame would first and foremost be on those who manage the allocation – 'they are giving the houses to black people', as stated in the quote above.

Such sentiments were also articulated in particular in the Neighbourhood Forum in Bermondsey, an event dominated by middle-aged and elderly White British residents. Here there was a strong sense that 'community' was being eroded, and that this was seen as closely related to council housing policies. But the Neighbourhood Forum also provided examples of how local residents were able to 'manage' friendly and cordial relationships across ethnic/racial divides at an individual level and at the same time maintain racial stereotypes.

3.2 Emerging Generational Divides

Overall the changing housing patterns have also impacted the demographic profile, particularly in Bermondsey where outsiders have been settling for a much shorter period of time. Whereas the older generation of White British residents have held on to their council flats, their children are often unable to find social housing locally, and they tend to move further away from London, typically to Kent, while an increasing number of ethnic minorities and immigrants are being allocated social housing in Bermondsey. There is, accordingly, a demographic imbalance, as social housing estates increasingly are inhabited by an ageing White British population and a younger minority population, as observed by a long-term community activist.

> You have the kind of pensioners who lived there and then you had the equivalent of their grandchildren who were people from all over who had been allocated those housing. So there were younger kind of black families coming in whereas there was none of the…there was no old black generation you felt in the area. There also wasn't the middle-aged people and what I've found as a community worker here was pensioners were saying what had happened was their children had not been able to get housing in the area. (White British Bermondsey resident, 50s)

Furthermore, as a final twist in the narrative of immigration and settlement, an increasing number of houses in Camberwell have become available due to return migration. As Black Caribbeans who had migrated to Britain in the 1960s and 1970s reached retirement age, many of those who had invested in houses would sell up, mostly making a handsome profit, and return to their countries of origin. The buyers of such houses, typically late nineteenth century Victorian terraces, would mostly be white professionals, self-identifying as middle-class and attracted to Camberwell because of its proximity to central London.

3.3 Wine Bars and Pubs

Whereas the trajectory outlined above constitutes the conclusion to a migrant trajectory at one level, it also testifies to the local impact of the post-industrial development that inner London is undergoing. In both Camberwell and Bermondsey, proximity to central London in combination with improved means of transportation are seen as key drivers behind the residential mobility and settlement patterns that have emerged over the past 10–20 years. But as gentrification concerns the ways in which existing residential areas become attractive to a more affluent subset of the population, these are also processes that serve to create or enhance socio-economic divides at neighbourhood level, thus bringing the underlying, classed stratifications of the urban landscape to the fore again.

Bermondsey & Proud
'Mum and dad remember the Bermondsey streets,
Where the front doors were open, no one needed their keys.
Everybody trying to forget the war
But that big pile of bricks was the house next door.
Stevedores and dockers waiting on the quays
For the next big ship full of spices and teas
But the ships are no more and the docks are all flats
Now there's rich people running round instead of the rats.'[5]

[5] This is the first verse of 'Bermondsey and proud', a song written by Tony Moorcroft and Nigel of Bermondsey in 2010.

The contrasts between past and present Bermondsey are captured in the text box above, the first verse of a song written by two local artists in 2010, with strong references to hospitality and honesty. The final line – 'now there's rich people running round instead of the rats' – refers to how the docklands, previously the mainstay of local livelihoods, have been converted into expensive housing on the riverside of the Thames in northern Bermondsey.

Riverside, the northernmost and least deprived ward, is also the part of Bermondsey that has seen the most significant housing-related changes. It is here that the former docklands – traditionally the mainstay of local livelihoods –have been redeveloped into exclusive residential areas since the late 1980s. Furthermore, the extension of the Jubilee Line to Bermondsey meant that access to central London was greatly enhanced. These new estates, some of them gated, are attractively located near the riverfront and close to the city of London, but also adjacent to deprived council estates. This resonates with a recent 'snap-shot' of Bermondsey in a nationwide newspaper: 'A tale of two cities: it is either hyper-gentrified or hyper-ungentrified, and never the twain shall meet. This makes for a peculiar patch of city where poverty and affluence jar' (Guardian 14.01.2012). Or as a resident on the Dickens Estate, immediately next to the developments, put it: 'They've got their wine bars – we've got our pubs'.

What was frequently expressed by white residents in both Bermondsey and Camberwell was the experience of an increasingly clear-cut, spatially manifest, socio-economic differentiation. While this gentrification process in Camberwell constituted a 'remake' of a historically well-defined demarcation that could be traced back to the early nineteenth century and was part of the architectural imprint of the neighbourhood, in Bermondsey the development was perceived much more as an affront to the old 'common as muck' community,[6] celebrated by old residents.

> Bermondsey's a two tier system really isn't it – them and us. There's people I speak to who live in the river side flats that I've got to know over the years. But there is the thing about building these flats and shoving great big walls and gates round them so they become gated communities […] And let's face it, the only reason they want to come here is because the city is on the door. I've seen the other day on George Road, they're building some flats on what used to be the John Fell Hall, 1 and 2 bedroom apartments, starting from £325,000. I'm sorry, that's not aimed at people round here. And yet again, it's this communities thing, 1 and 2 bedroom apartments, that's not family – you know, so you kind of get this twilight zone full of thrusting executives from the city who probably spend money here and go home to their shire homes. (White British Bermondsey resident, aged 47)

[6] Literally translated into 'common as shit' (or farm yard manure), 'common as muck' has historically held strong negative connotations, often referring to aspects of working-class behaviour. But in Gillian Evans' ethnographic study from Bermondsey, 'common as muck' has interestingly been re-appropriated by one of her key informants who uses the term to refer to 'true' working-class people: 'Sharon, who is clearly not a member of the 'new working class', revels in being 'common-as-shit', and emphasises, therefore, equality between people as an affirmation of the value of the lowest common denominator' (Evans 2006: 31).

So while living in immediate proximity, there is altogether very limited common ground – in terms of shared spaces and shared interests – in this part of Bermondsey. Whereas many residents appreciated the redevelopment of the derelict docklands, there was also resentment that most of the housing that had been constructed during the 1980s and 1990s was way beyond the means of the local population. To many, the resulting socio-economic divide was perceived as the most significant obstacle to the idea and reality of Bermondsey as a community. Furthermore, the present-day reality of 'old Bermondsey' is situated uncomfortably between the memory of the 'we was all one' community of the past and the contemporary perception of a run-down and deprived area.

4 Housing and Community

Whereas the previous sections aimed to provide an outline of settlement patterns and housing pathways within overall urban dynamics, the remaining part of the chapter will explore the nature of everyday diversity and conviviality at the level of everyday life, thereby exploring aspects of previously identified themes of ethnicity/race, generation and class in more detail. In doing this, we will be using the *estate* as the linchpin of the analysis. As argued, the estate constitutes a very prominent spatial form in the urban landscape of inner London, in particular in relation to housing built in the inter-war and post-World War 2 periods. Estate rather than street, so to speak, and residents would routinely refer to the name of their estate as their point of reference and belonging.

The estate, as a semi-public space constituted and controlled by those who live there, may then extend into an organizational form, as an estate typically is represented by a tenants and residents association (TRA). A TRA is typically set up and owned by the tenants and leaseholders living on a specific estate. The TRA thus constitutes a vehicle for the planning and execution of site-based community activities at estate level as well as a platform for communication with service providers, typically housing officers, and locally elected councillors.

While the TRAs thus are persistent elements of social organization at local level, their role has generally been diminishing over the past decades due to declining support from residents. This was also the general experience among residents who lived on estates in Bermondsey and Camberwell. There was a nostalgic memory of a past characterized by strong community relations which contrasted with the present day, in particular among older residents. This development was attributed to a stronger sense of individualism among residents, the changing ethnic profile of the estates, and a generally more rapid population turnover combined with increasing subletting. Furthermore, there was evidence of an increasing expectation, in particular among younger residents, that those who volunteered for TRA-related activities should receive financial remuneration.

4.1 The Estate as Community

For many, in particular elderly, residents, the experience of community and neighbourliness on the estate was characterized by a memory of a strong and stable community that always compared favourably with the present, as explained by a long-term resident on the Lettsom Estate:

> When we were young, well, there wasn't a lot of coloured people. They were around, but we all got on together. If they moved in next door, you used to knock on the door and say "excuse me – would you like a cup of tea?" because they hadn't got their cooker on or their electric on. You would make a pot of tea and take it in to them. And when they finished, they used to fetch it back and say 'thank you very much', and you made friends. I couldn't go to my neighbours here if they'd just moved in and say "would you like a cup of tea". They'd look at you and say "what do you want", like you were being nosy. Which you're not. You're just doing, the way I was fetched up, that was what I would do. But as I said, the society has gone completely […] They sell these properties off to people, in these rooms you don't know, the next one is let as rooms. You don't know who is the actual tenant of that, you don't know. (White British Camberwell resident, 67 years)

These are also memories where it is the *white* community of yesteryear that compares favourably with the present situation where the majority of tenants on the estate are black. Furthermore, the Right to Buy has over time led to an increase in private renting, with many flats being let as rooms. This typically leads to a high level of turnover, and this in turn leads to alienation, as experienced above. The resident in question looked forward to moving away from the Lettsom Estate, after 38 years, and 6 months after the interview she and her husband moved to Kent.

It was the perception of the resident, herself Camberwell-born and for many years an active member of the TRA committee, that many of the black tenants who had moved on to the estate over time did not want to be part of the existing TRA committee and instead wanted their own committee. A Black Caribbean former resident, who had moved on to the estate in 1989, had witnessed how the ethnic mix on the estate had changed:

> When I first went there, it was a lovely hall. They had a bar there and pool […] it was basically just whites, and then it was closed down for a while and then blacks take it over now as you can see what it is there now […] the problem with the estate as well is there is no unity because I mean "this don't like that", "that don't like that", everyone keeps themselves to themselves, the Caribbeans are arguing there are more Africans come, you know, on the estate now, you know, the same old thing. And most of the whites who live there have moved to Essex or Kent. (Black Caribbean ex-Camberwell resident, 53)

Accordingly, the dynamics between white and black residents were experienced in terms of a succession rather than a confrontation, with the white-led TRA ceasing to operate. This was accompanied by the experience of a generationally much more disjointed resident population, with the notion of 'keeping themselves to themselves' as perhaps the most widespread description of contemporary British neighbourhood relations. The suggested tensions between 'Caribbeans' and 'Africans' resonate well with the experiences of other residents. They reflect the scars of colonial history – 'they say we sold them' was how a Nigerian businessman put it – but

also how length of stay was a source of tension between well-established and newer immigrant populations.

The generational aspect and the changes to the nature of community relations on the estate were also touched on by a female resident in her early 20s. Of Ghanaian origin but born in Camberwell, she had lived on the estate all her life.

> Well, I'm not too sure about the race thing but in terms of the old and the young, it's like a lot of old people, they've been living here, so I can understand their frustration, how things have changed, and it is not as community based as it was. But a lot of people now, because they're not that much into community as much as people were a long time before when they used to do street parties, you know. For me, that's enjoyable, but a lot of people don't see that, a lot of people are into making money as well, so that comes before communities, it's more about individualism. (Black British Camberwell resident, aged 23)

It was generally immigrant and ethnic minority tenants who would be most positive about life on the estates. This is the experience of a Spanish woman who had lived on Dickens Estate with her Mexican partner since 1999. Their children went to local schools, and she was overall positive about the multi-ethnic nature of their everyday life on the estate:

> Well, I think a lot of people, well a lot of people are African, and I'm very happy with that. Also, my friends, I think they are the only white ones, but they play around down there because we got a basketball pitch, so sometimes they go there and, yeah, they are always with Africans, and they're fine. I really like them, they go and play with them and they're good. They have a good relationship with them […] I think my kids are very free from all this racist things, they don't think about black or I think well that's what I teach them no, so that's what I try to do. (Bermondsey resident, aged 35)

As opposed to residents who had spent all their life on the estate – and thus measured the present against a memory of the past – her experience was based on the friendships she had made during her time on the estate as well as the experience of her children. It is, however, also important to emphasize that local boundaries and distinctions are experienced differently by younger generations, and local respondents in Camberwell would point to the role of locally specific notions of territoriality and belonging. As explained by a D'Eynsford Estate resident:

> There was some kind of gang warfare that was in the offing, and one of the women on the estate was going 'oh no', she was crying, you know, and getting worried. There were some youths gathering on the estate, and they were youths from African parents, Caribbean parents, they were linking together because they are from here. (Black Caribbean Camberwell resident, aged 56)

So rather than organizing according to ethnic origin it is in this instance local belonging to the estate that served to structure social organization, at least for youth groups. This significance of local territory refers to phenomena popularly known as 'turf wars' fought by 'postcode gangs'. At the same time there was also evidence of an emerging, less local and less 'colour-coordinated' but more inclusive notion of being Londoners on an equal footing:

> Before, there used to be tension between black and black as in, you know, even Nigerians and Ghanaians which are Africans and there was definitely a problem within all the races

> but now we've come to a common ground of not seeing it as Black African, Caribbean, White. It's just 'oh we're Londoners'. (Black British Camberwell resident, aged 23)

It is also worth pointing out that the Black British respondent – while born and bred in Camberwell and a resident on the Lettsom Estate throughout her life – had pursued educational and professional trajectories that were different from most of her peer group on the estate. She acknowledged that her university education had impacted the composition of her friendship group, and as a result she was interacting less with her peer group on the estate:

> Not to say that you have to go to uni, but obviously, if I am in uni and you're not, there's not really that much we can talk about.

In summary, the idea of the estate as a social space, a community shared and reproduced by the residents of the estate, would seem to belong to the memories of elderly, white residents. It is thus a nostalgia discourse – with the present comparing unfavourably with the past – that brutally contrasts with the experiences of newer residents unburdened by a memory of what the estate used to be like. They have different expectations of the geography and nature of community, and therefore view the present situation more favourably.

4.2 Gentrification and the Estate

In this final section we will explore a different set of experiences of community and inter-group relations at estate level. Located literally a 5 min walk from Lettsom, D'Eynsford Estate is also situated centrally in Camberwell, just off Camberwell Church Street, the main thoroughfare. A red brick low-rise, developed in the late 1960s and consisting of around 400 flats, the estate constitutes a stark contrast to both the tired looking Victorian buildings on Camberwell Church Street and the sought-after Georgian terraces on Camberwell Grove, leading off the other side of the street.

A more accurate understanding of the ethnic composition and housing tenures could be established thanks to a door-to-door survey, designed and implemented by the TRA in January 2011. Around 40 % of the households on the estate participated in the survey, and of these approximately one-third self-identified as 'Black African'or 'African', one-third as White British, with the final one-third comprising a very wide range of ethnic identities (including 'human being'). Sixty nine per cent of those taking part in the survey self-identified as council tenants, with leaseholders constituting 22 % and private tenants the remaining 9 %. More than 50 % had been residents on the estate for more than 5 years.

The D'Eynsford Estate TRA is, as opposed to the TRA on Lettsom Estate, characterized by a mix of long-term and more recent residents, with two of the present committee members – one locally born and bred, and one originating from Jamaica – involved in the TRA for approximately 30 years. One of these members has, since

retiring early in the mid-80s, invested most of his time in community work on the estate. This has ensured continuity within the TRA as well as a significant familiarity with local service providers and the broader policy community in Camberwell.

The TRA thus aims to engage with, and mobilize, residents on the estate. Monthly newsletters are distributed, children's events are organized, for example, at Halloween and Christmas, and the TRA organizes a 'big lunch' on the estate during the summer. Thanks to the TRA, the estate is characterized by a comparatively high level of community activities. At the same time, the composition of the committee does not reflect the mix on the estate, as the co-chairperson observed:

> I am quite conscious that our committee is quite white-dominated, which doesn't really reflect our estate. But at the same time, who's going to do it? That's always the tension. I am often chairing a meeting and I'm looking and thinking 'is this really mixed, diverse? Does this really represent our estate?' If not, why not? (White British Camberwell resident, aged 33)

But the composition of the resident population of the estate, as well as the profile of the TRA committee, also reflects wider changes in Camberwell. Whereas council tenants only have limited say as to where they are allocated housing, the estate is – similar to other parts of central Camberwell – becoming a destination of choice for residents who chose to move to Camberwell and who have the means to invest in housing. This residential choice is, for some, also motivated by the intention to be part of the local community. The co-chairperson, originally from Devon, had moved on to the estate 5 years previously:

> I'm quite a strong believer in trying to live where there are more problems and where I can make a difference. I'm very, very interested in young people and community. (White British Camberwell resident, aged 33)

In contrast to the very clear-cut distinction between new developments and social housing estates in northern Bermondsey, and the classed imprint on the urban landscape in Camberwell, the move of well-educated white middle classes onto housing estates cuts across well-established socio-spatial demarcations. This was also the

The Secret Garden

The 'secret garden' on D'Eynsford Estate is a narrow strip of land at the very edge of the estate. The woman who masterminded the garden is not a resident of the estate, but lives in a house adjacent to the estate. Having looking down on the empty bit of land for more than 20 years, in 2008 she contacted the council as well as the chairman of the D'Eynsford TRA in order to take forward the idea of establishing a community garden. A community consultation was then carried out in order to pull together ideas for the design of the garden and also take potential objections into account. Subsequently, funding

(continued)

was secured from different sources, and the garden started taking shape in 2009.[7]

Due to reservations voiced by residents in ground-floor flats adjacent to the Secret Garden, it is only open on Thursday afternoons, and occasionally during the weekend. An estimated 40 residents make use of the garden on a regular basis. In addition, the volunteers who run the garden have also started doing outreach work on the estate, working in the gardens of elderly residents who live in sheltered accommodation.

The secret garden is altogether less of a secret. It is also open to Camberwell residents who do not live on D'Eynsford Estate, and it was part of the 'Open garden' event staged in Camberwell in September 2011.

case on the estate, and the co-chairperson referred to events on the estate where residents had taken her for a council worker rather than a fellow resident.

Despite the continuing efforts of the TRA committee and the successful creation of the 'secret garden' as a very visible community place (see text box), there was nevertheless a limited uptake on the estate, and it has proved challenging to encourage users and volunteers much beyond the largely White British core activists.

Altogether the initiatives undertaken on D'Eynsford Estate both mirror and bridge some of the divides that characterize Camberwell. The majority of newcomers who play an active role in the TRA are leaseholders, and they can be categorized as white and middle-class, with a positive view of ethnic diversity. But the move onto a council estate and the active involvement in community building at estate level are practices that are different from the more generalized gentrification process. At the same time the lack of more widespread uptake and engagement on the estate resonates with experiences from other parts of the neighbourhoods.

5 Housing Pathways and the Un-Making of Community

In this chapter, we have set out to explore how access to housing has impacted ethnic/racial and socio-economic diversity as well as narratives of community in Bermondsey and Camberwell. We will here first summarize our findings and then outline some of the lessons concerning the potential for conviviality and conflict at the local level.

Both Bermondsey and Camberwell are small parts of a London housing market that works regionally. Both neighbourhoods are characterized by a scarcity of affordable housing, a massive reduction in social housing stock since the 1980s and

[7] For a summary and photos of the 'secret garden' project, see http://deynsfordsecretgarden.blogspot.co.uk/

exponential rises in land values and private rents since the late 1990s. But they also have very different patterns of residence and tenure. Camberwell is characterized by a very mixed housing stock that includes owner-occupation as well as different types of private and social letting, and the availability of relatively inexpensive housing is one of the factors that have attracted immigrants to Camberwell in the post-World War 2 period. The contrast to Bermondsey is striking in that almost the entire housing stock here until the 1980s consisted of social housing controlled by the local authorities. It was only after Bermondsey became part of Southwark Borough in 1965 that the social housing stock gradually became available to residents from the entire borough, including immigrants and residents with an ethnic minority background.

The post-industrial redevelopment of the former docklands into expensive private housing units also served to re-position the social and territorial markers of Bermondsey. The new, typically affluent residents were attracted to the neighbourhood due to its proximity to central London, and there is only little interaction between them and 'traditional' Bermondsey residents. In Camberwell, the socio-economic differentiation between the industrial working classes in northern Camberwell and the middle classes in southern Camberwell is a characteristic that has historically defined the urban landscape, with well-maintained Georgian terraces contrasting against deprived housing estates. But the socio-economic disparities in Camberwell has been accentuated over the past decades, as larger parts of the neighbourhood have been gentrified, with the majority of new residents being white middle class. In both Bermondsey and Camberwell, the socio-economic differentiation can be translated into an overlaying of class with race/ethnicity, as the majority of incomers can be categorized as white and middle-class.

The two contrasting case studies have important lessons for understanding diversity, contact, and the possibilities for conviviality and conflict at micro-local level. In particular, they reveal the significance of demographic change but also of urban form and housing pathways in making patterns of interaction possible or impossible. In Bermondsey, we found a dominant note of melancholy and lament, as residents narrated the decline of a tight-knit community based on a moral economy founded on trust, reciprocity and kinship – 'we was all one'. This had been based on the isomorphism between different elements of the local urban system: housing, work, family and urban space. In the post-industrial moment, as the foundations of community were eroded, the closed system revealed its brittleness. This melancholy in the face of multicultural drift is often associated with the emergence of a politics of resentment and backlash. Nonetheless, we can see a conditional inclusion of some minority ethnic others in the imagined community, and a day-to-day muddling along with difference that produced the possibility of intercultural intimacy and trust. Negative representations of the other were often belied by positive interactions. In fact, the cleavage with gentrifiers, living parallel lives in their gated communities and wine bars, emerged as the more significant social divide.

Camberwell, in contrast, displayed a more open urban system marked by a long history of demographic churn and migrant settlement and by a more heterogeneous urban form, more connective urban morphology and more diverse housing pathways.

At first glance, this mapped on to a stronger sense of cosmopolitan urbanism and hospitability to difference. But this more positive trajectory was shadowed by a sense of social entropy in the interviews, with civic engagement and neighbourhood cohesion blocked by a lack of solidarity. Positive representations of the other, in short, were often belied by the lack of interaction: 'living together apart'. Nonetheless, where a shared locally focused and future-oriented project came about – as with the example of the Secret Garden – more profound patterns of interaction could emerge.

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Rise and Resolution of Ethnic Conflicts in Nuremberg Neighbourhoods

Claudia Köhler

This chapter is based on case studies carried out in three neighbourhoods of the German city of Nuremberg.[1] In the next pages, the general focus of this book on inter-group relations at neighbourhood level is combined with a more specific thematic focus on *inter-group conflict*. This choice is meant to illustrate and deepen the general understanding of integration as a form of 'discordant harmony' which inspires all the essays contained in this volume (see chapter "Introduction"). Through a detailed analysis of processes of emergence, development and settlement of neighbourhood conflicts in two neighbourhoods (Werderau, Langwasser) – contrasted against a case where peaceful interethnic relations prevail (Gostenhof) – this chapter shows the ambivalent nature of neighbourhood-level interethnic conflict,

[1] Besides the general methodological features of the studies collected in this volume, and illustrated in the Introduction and in the Methodological Annex, the Nuremberg case studies were based on the following mix of research tools:

Ethnographic interviews were the primary instrument. A total of 34 interviews were conducted with residents of each neighbourhood. The interviewees were chosen on the basis of a sampling method aimed at giving qualitative representation to the different groups of society in rough proportion to their distribution in each neighbourhood. The sampling criteria included: migration background (direct, indirect, none), gender, age (18–35, 36–65 and 65+ years), and participation in social life (none/low, user of measures/activities, conductor of measures/activities). The interviews were conducted in German, with the exception of two interviews in Turkish, between October 2011 and January 2012.

Expert interviews were conducted with 12 stakeholders and policy makers between March and April neighbourhood 2011.

Policy and stakeholder interviews were conducted with eight people with specific policy expertise on one or more of the target neighbourhoods between October 2011 and January 2012.

Quantitative socio-demographic and economic data was collected for relevant dimensions and a **neighbourhood forum** was conducted in the Werderau neighbourhood in March 2012.

C. Köhler (✉)
European Forum for Migration Studies (EFMS), University of Bamberg, Bamberg, Germany
e-mail: claudia.koehler@uni-bamberg.de

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which can certainly disrupt but also ultimately promote inter-group relations depending on a plurality of factors among which an important role is played by the capacity and will of local policy communities to interpret, face and manage conflicts.

Before starting our analysis of specific cases of inter-group conflict (or lack thereof), we will first illustrate some essential figures on Nuremberg's migration history and the key features of the three target neighbourhoods, which justify their selection as case studies.

With slightly more than half a million inhabitants, Nuremberg is the second largest city in the *Land* of Bavaria. Its total population has increased by about 25 % (100,000 people) in the last 55 years. At the same time, the proportion of foreign inhabitants has risen sharply. While foreigners constituted 2 % of the total population in 1956, their proportion in 2012 amounted to 18 %. But if we take a wider look at immigrants and their descendants, irrespective of nationality, almost 40 % (38.8) of Nuremberg's population can be identified as having a migration background (Statistik Nürnberg Fürth 2011a, b, 2012).

In 2009, the migratory inflow to Nuremberg was around 30,000 with an immigration rate of 5.7 % and a migratory balance rate of 0.02; the annual outflow has been around 28,000 per year since 2000 (Statistik Nürnberg Fürth 2011a: 32–34). Fifty nine per cent of migrants arrived in the last 5–10 years. Migrants and foreigners have mainly settled in the downtown and surrounding areas. In most statistical sectors of those areas, foreigners constitute between 15 % and 30 % or more of the total population, while in most statistical sectors of the northern, southern and eastern areas of Nuremberg, the proportion of foreigners is 10 % or less (Statistik Nürnberg Fürth 2011a).

The largest groups of foreigners are from the EU (35 %; mainly from Greece, Italy, Poland and Romania) and from Turkey (23 %), followed by Ukraine, Russia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq (Statistik Nürnberg Fürth 2011c). The distribution of foreigners across the statistical sectors and the location of the statistical sectors of Nuremberg are illustrated in Fig. 1.

Of the two neighbourhoods selected as arenas of manifest neighbourhood conflicts, Werderau was also chosen because of the particularly strong increase in foreign population over the last decade and its above-city-average share of foreigners (27 % in 2009) (Statistik Nürnberg Fürth 2011a). Foreigners and residents with a migration background in Werderau primarily originate from Turkey and in lesser numbers from Italy. As we will see in much greater detail, the conflict process that we researched in this neighbourhood evolved around the sale of housing allotments leading to a migration into and out of the neighbourhood. The consequent change in the composition of the neighbourhood's population caused serious tensions at different levels which were explicitly framed by important local actors in ethnic terms. Our analysis focuses on the structure of this conflict and on subsequent developments in inter-group relations in the neighbourhood.

As shown below in Fig. 2, the residential part of Werderau is classified as a 'hardly socially challenged' 'residential areas for families with children' (Social space type 5) according to the official social space analysis of the city of Nuremberg (Statistik Nürnberg Fürth 2010).



Fig. 1 Proportion of foreigners in the statistical sectors of Nuremberg, 2009

The Langwasser neighbourhood was primarily selected as the arena of a neighbourhood conflict that evolved in a residential area affected by the project to create an Intercultural Garden. The project aimed at fostering inter-group relations and



Fig. 2 Social space types in Nuremberg, 2010 (Statistik Nürnberg Fürth 2010)

integration but in its initial phase it led to conflicts along ethnic and origin lines. Thematically, our focus will not be on the project itself, but on the ways in which it was perceived by the residents of the area and on the influence of third parties on local conflict dynamics. Spatially, the focus is on the area surrounding the garden project.

The choice of Gostenhof as a specific area of investigation originates from the high diversity of its residents which shapes the whole neighbourhood, and from the absence of manifest conflicts in spite of such a high level of diversity. Gostenhof is one of the city's neighbourhoods with the highest and most rapidly increasing shares of foreign population (39 % in 2009) (Statistik Nürnberg Fürth 2011a). This is reflected in the official classification of the whole area as a social space type 2 which stands for 'downtown area, highest social challenge, highest proportion of population with a migration background' (see Fig. 2). The area around the neighbourhood's main street (Gostenhofer Hauptstrasse) is characterized by an even more pronounced diversity. This area was chosen as an interaction site in order to analyze inter-group relations in a context of high diversity.

While two of the selected neighbourhoods entirely coincide with one statistical sector (no. 46 for Langwasser, no. 4 for Gostenhof), Langwasser – by far the largest of the three – stretches over four statistical sectors (nos. 32, 33, 36 and 37). For the purposes of our analysis, we assume that statistical sectors can be considered as 'neighbourhoods' and we will refer to them as such throughout the chapter. As a matter of fact, Nuremberg statistical sectors usually correspond with socially perceived neighbourhood boundaries, as is evident from the ethnographic analysis. An exception to this is Langwasser where, as just explained, the neighbourhood consists of four distinct statistical sectors, corresponding to its northern, southern, eastern and western parts.

1 Ethnicization of Neighbourhood-Level Conflicts

The analysis in Nuremberg placed a particular focus on the development of and underlying reasons for conflicts in neighbourhoods which, at first sight, appear to be migrant-native or interethnic conflicts.

In the tradition of inter-group relations research, conflict can be defined as strife between two (or more) groups for the control of goods that each urgently desires, but which can be attained by one group only at the expense of the other(s) (Sherif and Sherif 1969: 239). Goods may be material goods and rights, but also values, beliefs, norms and lifestyles.

We identified such conflicts in Werderau and Langwasser and in the next pages we will reconstruct the details of the development, the different stages and the solutions of these cases of neighbourhood conflicts. A descriptive approach has been combined with a theoretical analysis. The latter is based on elements of inter-group relations theory (Sherif and Sherif 1969) and a reformulation of Esser's theory of interethnic conflict (Esser 2000: 418–423).

The basic theoretical proposition we work with is that there is no 'genuine' interethnic conflict. Conflicts of the type analyzed in the two researched neighbourhoods arise from a 'structural conflict' of interests and are framed as ethnic conflicts in a series of stages. Based on Esser's (2000) model and slightly reformulating it, we have distinguished the following stages of conflict development that we will apply to explain the conflicts in Werderau and Langwasser.

- *Development of the structural conflict*: Structural conflicts can have both a material and a cultural dimension. On the material side, opposite interests collide with each other whereas on the cultural side different modes of behaviour and different values and rules compete.
- *Framing and ethnicization of the conflict*: In the stage of the framing of the conflict, a definition is formed of the situational context in which people can be mobilized over a conflict. The main ways in which structural conflicts can be defined are along cleavages of class, ethnicity and religion. The framing of a situation has important implications: it is a process in which individuals change their perspective from an individual-rational orientation to a collective-emotional

orientation. This may take the form of an ethnic identification or of religious or other *Gemeinschaft*-like framing of the situation with feelings of collective solidarity (Esser 2000: 420). Ethnicization implies that the conflict is defined as group conflict, hence boundaries are being constructed: we and they, Germans and Turks. Ethnicization brings into play existing stereotypes about the groups that help to intensify the conflict, even though they have nothing to do with the structural conflict.

- *Mobilization and intensification of conflict*: Ethnic framing has a strong emotional component and increasingly drives people on both sides to take part in the conflict. Such mobilization can be further increased by outside intervention.
- *Solution of conflict*: Conflicts can be solved in different ways: by compromise between the parties, mediation, mutual exhaustion of the parties or by one side winning over the other. At this stage, the integration process can resume in a more constructive direction.

2 Village-Like Lifestyles Within the City: Werderau

The structure and lifestyles of Werderau, strongly reminiscent of a village, have historically had a profound influence upon the development of inter-group relations in the neighbourhood and continue to do so. The analysis of this development in the next section is combined with the analysis of the identified conflict and is structured in line with the conflict stages illustrated above. The following sections discuss the role of places and of organized collective action in inter-group relations as well as group formations and boundary-making in the neighbourhood (Fig. 3).

2.1 Are Migrants to Blame for the Neighbourhood Conflict?

Early Characteristics of the Neighbourhood Are Setting the Stage for the Development of a Structural Conflict

The Werderau conflict is related to characteristics of the neighbourhood which arose with the very foundation of the settlement shortly before World War I. In 1911 a non-profit association was formed and the construction of houses began for the new settlement. The MAN company – a producer of cars and car parts – and a house building cooperative of MAN workers were the shareholders of the association. Employment in the factory was a precondition for renting a house; therefore, the Werderau population consisted of MAN workers and their families. Situated outside the city, the neighbourhood had a rural character and the appearance of a village. Each house had a garden. The MAN workers' council played a central role in community life. In sociological terms, Werderau matched Ferdinand Tönnies' classical definition of a *Gemeinschaft*. An interviewee even went as far as to describe the neighbourhood of these early days as 'an island of the saints'.

Fig. 3 Main square of Werderau (Photo by L. Batrla)

In 1941 the workers' housing cooperative was dissolved and the MAN company remained as the single owner of the settlement and the houses. In the 1950s additional houses were built, some without gardens. New MAN workers moved in and enlarged the population. The MAN workers' council had a strong position; it ruled over housing and living conditions, took the decision on who was eligible to move into the neighbourhood, organized leisure time activities for residents and regulated disputes among the tenants.

The 1960s saw the construction of a large multi-storey building with single apartments in addition to the existing one and more family houses which characterized the neighbourhood. A number of the guest workers recruited by MAN from the 1960s on, most of whom were from Turkey and some from Italy, moved to the neighbourhood and became part of the Werderau population. Later on, their families followed. These migrants were seen as colleagues and neighbours and were well-integrated.

The idyllic character of the neighbourhood was somewhat disturbed in the 1970s, when a motorway was built close to it. Whereas this environmental issue could be settled by the construction of anti-noise and anti-pollution walls, a very different kind of issue developed in 1990, which would become a major cause for the Werderau conflict: the Werderau building company that owned the houses abolished its non-profit status. One of the consequences was that people other than MAN employees were allowed to rent Werderau houses. The other consequence was that

severe fears arose among residents that the MAN-controlled building company would sell the houses to outside investors and that their housing rights and low rents were threatened.

These fears were realized in 1998 when MAN sold their housing stock to the real estate company Telos. With the new owners, the MAN workers' council's influence on housing and living conditions in Werderau ended. Telos aimed at reselling the housing area as a whole or by single houses and started forcing some tenants to move out and reselling the houses. New tenants and new owners moved into Werderau, mainly migrants of Turkish origin.

In 2001, Telos went bankrupt and a series of ownership changes among different investors occurred, in which more houses were sold to single households and new inhabitants came to Werderau, again mostly of Turkish origin.

On the material side of the structural conflict, we find the opposing interests of investors and of old inhabitants. The old inhabitants wanted to keep their housing rights (the right to life-long residence, low rent, some control over who moves into the neighbourhood), while the different waves of new owners wanted to pursue their interests as investors, e.g., reselling the houses. Regarding the cultural dimension of the structural conflict we find that the new inhabitants had different patterns of behaviour and the old inhabitants felt that the new neighbours were not 'keeping to the rules' (noise, garbage, children's behaviour). Hence, boundaries were constructed along cleavages of the time of residency in the neighbourhood whereby these partly overlap with ethnic cleavages: new residents are often migrants, many of them of Turkish origin, whereas old residents are natives and migrants of mainly Turkish and Italian origin.

Framing and Ethnicization Leads to the Definition of the Conflict as Group Conflict Between Germans and Migrants

The framing of the structural conflict in Werderau took place along ethnic lines. The incoming new residents were perceived as threatening the established residential status of old Werderau inhabitants and as endangering the old order in the neighbourhood. The structural conflict was ethnicized as a group conflict between Germans and migrants, primarily Turkish ones.

One interviewee describes the perception of old-established German residents as follows:

> The Turks are now buying the neighbourhood of Werderau and are destroying our beautiful old culture and our cooperation. (Werderau, children caregiver, 40 years old)

Another interviewee went on to explain:

> They [old-established Germans] considered this as a hostile take-over. They complained about another culture coming in. Up until then it used to be normal that everything went by our [old-established Germans] rules. All of a sudden everything changed. (Werderau, resident, 53 years old)

Whereas old-established residents seemed not to mind new migrants (of Turkish origin) in the neighbourhood in general, the larger numbers of them moving in within a short period of time led to growing worries on their behalf:

> Some people have a different perception of life than me, and the more there are of them in my neighbourhood, the more I separate myself from them. (Werderau, resident, 61 years old)
>
> The Turks in our building are really cool, but there are just too many of them here [in the neighbourhood], they don't belong here. (Werderau, resident, 53 years old)

However, not only migrants of Turkish origin were involved in this process. Besides small numbers of migrants of different origins, a considerable number of those originating from Italy were involved as well. But taking account of the fact that Turkish migrants represented by far the largest group among migrants in the neighbourhood, the terms 'migrant' and 'Turk' appeared to be used interchangeably in the framing of the conflict.

Outside Intervention Intensifies the Conflict Mobilization Process

Stereotypes about Germans and Turks were brought into play, even though they had nothing to do with the actual conflict, leading to intensification of the conflict. This in addition to the ethnic framing with strong emotional components, drove more and more people to become involved in the conflict. This mobilization process was further increased by outside intervention in 2002: the mobilization and intensification of the conflict was mirrored in the fast growing media coverage of Werderau, increasingly portrayed as a 'problematic neighbourhood'. The ethnicization of the conflict had already been partly stimulated by nativist right-wing forces of the neo-Nazi party NPD and a regional group called 'Ausländerstopp'. They claimed to be supporting the old inhabitants' interests and blamed migrants for driving people out as tenants, selling the houses to mostly Turkish families and threatening the 'old order' of the neighbourhood. Inhabitants of the neighbourhood felt addressed through this narrative since many of them felt neglected by the city administration of Nuremberg which did not seem to care about what was happening in the neighbourhood. The media coverage was particularly concerned with the high shares of votes for NPD by Werderau residents which was recorded in the same period. This has to be understood against the background of Werderau residents being used to being taken care of by the MAN company and the workers' council in the past. No alternative structures, such as a strong policy community, active civil society groups had been put in place after the demise of these structures.

Political Change and Mediation Lead to Conflict Solution

In 2002 a new mayor was elected and the Social Democrats became the leading political force in Nuremberg. The new administration installed a district coordinator in the neighbourhood who initiated a round table of citizens and voluntary

associations which led to the start of communication between the conflict groups. A citizens' association was founded. The conflict, which had not been violent anyway, started de-escalating. After 2 years, in 2004, the district coordinator could be withdrawn from the neighbourhood. In the same year a youth centre was opened which partly took over some of the functions of the district coordinator.

After several changes in the ownership of the Werderau housing association, in 2008, the remaining property – houses that had not been sold to outside families – was bought by the non-profit city housing company WBG. This led to a further calming of the situation in the neighbourhood. However, major changes in property ownership had already taken place. Therefore, the remaining property taken over by WBG and the impact of this change of ownership on inter-group relations in the neighbourhood was not very significant.

As a result of the many changes in the neighbourhood in the last decade, the old working class village-like *Gemeinschaft* no longer exists. Divisions and ethnically based distinctions persist but disputes between the groups have eased and they have learned to communicate and respect one another. The city continues to support stakeholders in their community work. On this basis, the integration process in the neighbourhood can resume on a more positive path.

2.2 The Double Nature of Space in Werderau: Connecting Potential and Subject of Dispute

The arrangement of housing in a village-like shape with small garden units connected to each building provides plentiful opportunities for residents of various groups, to interact, e.g., on the main square and in their gardens. Additionally, the fact that all the people living in the neighbourhood used to be (and many still are) employees of the nearby MAN factory meant that they met each other on their way to work on a daily basis. This enabled intensive and stable contacts. The small gardens around the apartment buildings, which are part of the neighbourhood's village-like structure, are a point of shared interest for residents and provide further opportunities for interaction. At one point in time, as seen above (Sect. 2.1), housing in Werderau became a source of considerable inter-group tensions; recent years, however, have seen a clear improvement in neighbourly relations.

Besides housing, the areas related to shopping activities seem to offer potential for connection in Werderau. Due to the limited number of shops in the neighbourhood, it is unavoidable that people will meet. However, people have lately been making increasing use of the larger shopping malls in the uninhabited part of Werderau, leading to a decrease in interactions on the street.

Obviously, shared interests carry the potential of bringing people together. In this sense the school, as the place where people share an interest in the education and well-being of their children, emerges in Werderau as a relevant place for positive and frequent inter-group relations. People, especially mothers, of different origins meet in and around the school and discuss issues related to their children. These

encounters are experienced primarily in a positive way. At the same time, a lack of space where people, especially young people, who share similar interests, can come together has been identified in the neighbourhood. A youth centre with very limited space and an unsecured future existence is the only such place in Werderau and does not have the potential to meet the needs of the whole neighbourhood.

2.3 Group Relations in Werderau: Who Do People Associate with?

In Werderau, with foreigners making up 27.2 % of the total population in 2009 (Statistik Nürnberg Fürth 2011a), in residents' perception and relations we find the main cleavages between ethnic majority and minorities as well as along lines of age and length of stay.

Most residents with a migrant background are of Turkish origin, with a smaller group of migrants with Italian origins. In this context, the main cleavage is between a majority made up of native German residents and residents with Turkish and Italian origins. The minority group is sometimes referred to in a unitary way as 'the Turks' and sometimes as 'foreigners' by the majority. Neither term is correct primarily because a large share of the population with a Turkish background has acquired German citizenship and/or were born in Germany and thus are not foreigners. Furthermore, residents of Italian origin are frequently included among 'the Turks'.

Moreover, we find cleavages not only between minority and majority, but also within minority groups. In the case of Werderau, there appears to be a division between residents with a Turkish background who have recently arrived in the neighbourhood and are more traditionally oriented in religious matters, and those who have been living there for a longer time and take a more secular approach to religion. The criteria of length of stay and religion will be the subject of further discussion below.

Regarding the relevance of age groups, we find that intergenerational cleavages overlap with majority-minority cleavages in Werderau: elderly long-established residents of German origin blame young 'Turkish' people in the neighbourhood for not sticking to the 'old order', e.g., by making noise, not taking care of the neighbourhood properly, etc. However, the group they are referring to is not exclusively of Turkish origin, although young people in the neighbourhood are indeed predominantly of Turkish origin.

In relation to *intergenerational cleavages*, depending on the context, we find children operating alternatively as a factor of tensions or as a bridge. In Werderau, mothers with children are identified as a group on their own. The church in Werderau organizes meeting groups for mothers with small children. These are well-attended and welcomed, regardless of the cultural and religious background of the mothers. In the daytime, mothers with small children use the playgrounds, whereas young people, in the absence of other meeting places, use them in the evening time. There

is hardly any encounter between these mothers and representatives of older or younger generations. Children here connect mothers of different backgrounds. Their daily habits differentiate them from other groups.

Elderly Germans perceive that it is 'the Turks' who behave inappropriately in the neighbourhood. Due to the over-representation of Turkish families among the socially disadvantaged and the over-representation of youngsters of Turkish origin among young people in the neighbourhood, young people with a Turkish background are particularly over-represented in the group about whom elderly Germans typically complain more. At the same time, young people complain about the elderly being too critical towards their lifestyles:

> They [the elderly] start stressing immediately and are very intolerant towards minor issues. (Werderau, resident, 17 years old)

These complaints seem to be based on culture as well as on generation. Hence, ethnic and intergenerational boundaries are overlapping, which may lead to a reinforcement of cleavages.

During our fieldwork, *religion* has not emerged as a cleavage in 'everyday' inter-group relations, although it was used as a marker of ascription when conflicts arose. Although religion had not been a cleavage in inter-group relations in Werderau in the past, in the early 2000s the presumed Muslim identity of newly-arrived Turkish residents in the neighbourhood was instrumentalized, primarily by external actors (e.g., the media and right-wing groups), in order to steer the conflict between newly-arrived residents and long-established ones. As described above, these tensions were primarily about control over the housing stock and the rules and order in the neighbourhood, but were framed in ethnic and religious dimensions.

At the same time, the way in which religion is interpreted and lived sometimes also generates divisions within the same confessional group: among residents with a Turkish background in Werderau we identify a cleavage between long-established individuals who interpret Islam in a more open manner, e.g., wear no head scarves and do not attend a mosque on a regular basis, and the newly-arrived who tend to stick to a more traditional way of understanding and living Islam. The two groups appear to have hardly any contact.

As for *length of stay*, we found it operating both as a bridging factor and as a boundary. This applies to the residents in general, but also within minorities. In the past, most residents – migrants as well as natives – had been living in the neighbourhood for a similar length of time. They perceived themselves as one group where everybody knew each other. When the composition of the population changed, cleavages between long-established and new residents appeared. As noted above (Sect. 2.1), long-established residents perceived new residents as a threat to the 'old order' and as competitors for housing stock. Since people with a migrant background were underrepresented among the long-established residents and over-represented among the newly-arrived residents, at first sight, the division appeared to be along ethnic lines. However, the main criterion for boundary-making was

indeed length of stay. It is also notable that the group of long-established residents complains about the present inter-group and social relations and contrasts them to an ideal-typical past, while newly-arrived residents are content with the relations in the neighbourhood.

2.4 The Policy Community: Promoters or Disablers of Inter-group Relations?

The main policy actor in the past used to be the MAN workers' council and the MAN building company. After their withdrawal, the present policy community in Werderau primarily comprises a citizens' association, the local church community and youth workers. In the stage of conflict resolution, a district coordinator was temporarily involved. A small migrants' organization exists but cannot be considered influential.

As a whole, the policy community in Werderau appears to be in a developing rather than an advanced stage, as for example in Gostenhof. In earlier times the policy community used to be rather weak, which can also be attributed to the small size of the neighbourhood. This former lack of a strong policy voice contributed to the neighbourhood's low resilience in the face of xenophobic approaches, whereby the conflict around the sale of housing units was framed and ethnicized. No district coordinator was in place at the time and associations were hardly present in the neighbourhood. The conflict was solved by the negotiations of a district coordinator who was temporarily placed in the neighbourhood by the City. At the same time a citizens' association and a youth centre were founded in order to permanently provide the neighbourhood's residents with a medium to voice their interests and with a meeting place, at least for the youth. After the termination of the temporary district coordination, both two organizations, together with other institutions of Werderau, have received support from the city council with their networking activities and independent advocacy of the neighbourhood's interests. The policy community is still facing challenges in Werderau and is not as strong and well-represented by associations and other actors as other neighbourhoods of Nuremberg. However, the policy community seems to be organized enough now to represent different interest groups, negotiate between different interests when necessary, and communicate neighbourhood concerns to the city level. This organizational level of the policy community, which was not in place at the time of the mentioned conflict, now seems to make the neighbourhood more resilient to potential xenophobic external influences.

2.5 Lessons for Werderau's Future

Werderau is an example of a former structural conflict between investors and long-time house renters, who felt that their housing rights ('property rights') were under threat. The conflicts arose because of different perceptions of the rules that regulate the use of space, interactions and behaviour in the neighbourhood. Hence, the root of the conflicts was a competition in the use of place and control over housing stock, but was interpreted as an ethnic or cultural conflict. Since it was primarily families of Turkish origin who bought houses sold by the investors, it was rather easy to ethnicize and emotionalize the conflict and extend it to this group. A second dimension of property rights – the desire to have control over one's environment – was cultural and confronted old and new residents with very different values and behaviour, lifestyles and senses of order. The material side of the conflict could have been avoided or solved earlier by political intervention and by having a non-profit housing company take over the old MAN housing stock.

One interviewee puts it as follows:

> The residents of these apartments should have been informed better and earlier, instead MAN and the City were keeping the plan a secret. (Werderau, resident, 70 years old)

And another one recommends:

> The residents should have been given realistic chances to buy the apartments themselves. The City should have taken better care. (Werderau, resident, 61 years old)

Earlier mediation by a community worker and/or a strong policy community might have avoided the ethnicization of the conflict and the anti-immigrant group's intervention from outside.

One interviewee describes this as follows:

> After the sales [of the housing stock] the sense of togetherness should have been fostered more and politicians should have responded more to the calls for help that came out of the neighbourhood. (Werderau, resident, 61 years old)

Hence, the functioning of the policy community appears to be a key factor in avoiding conflicts and contributing to harmonious inter-group relations. The neighbourhood, with the support of the City, is now in the process of strengthening this function.

Length of stay was an important component in the positioning of groups and boundary-making within the conflict. This component not only led to divisions between long- established Germans and newly-arrived migrants with a Turkish background, but led also to the division of the group of residents with a Turkish background into those who had arrived in the neighbourhood recently and those who had been living there for a longer period of time. The latter tended to associate rather with long-established Germans. These boundaries are still visible but since the conflict situation was solved, inter-group relations have become more positive, and consequently it appears that integration processes have been enabled.

3 High Diversity in an Urban Structure: Langwasser

Langwasser is an area of the city with a highly diverse urban structure. We focus our analysis on a neighbourhood within the broader Langwasser district, in which a project was initiated for the improvement of inter-group relations. In its initial phase this project led to a conflict. We will first analyze the development of this conflict following the different stages of conflict as identified in Sect. 1. The subsequent sections discuss the role of places and of organized collective action in inter-group relations as well as boundary-making in the neighbourhood (Fig. 4).

3.1 Why Did a Project for the Promotion of Inter-group Relations Lead to a Conflict?

The Intercultural Garden conflict in Nuremberg-Langwasser is a case of unintended consequences of social action, whereby a project that was intended to promote inter-group relations, mutual tolerance and cooperation, actually led to an ethnic neighbourhood conflict.

Fig. 4 Main square separating the four sectors of Langwasser (Photo by L. Batrla)

Intercultural Gardens are gardening projects developed with the purpose of fostering the positive framing of diversity and intercultural learning and understanding and in doing so, fostering integration in the neighbourhood. The concept and the practice of Intercultural Gardens originated in the US and have been transplanted in a number of cities across Europe.

People of different origins, including native German, attend to their own small vegetable and flower patches (around 25 m^2) in such gardens. There are no fences between neighbours; this is intended to encourage them to talk to each other about gardening and everyday issues. The goal of this exchange is to get to know each other, to diminish fears of contact, to develop mutual tolerance and respect, and even to promote friendships (Interkultureller Garten Nürnberg Langwasser e.V. 2010).

The quality of a city's integration policy has become a major indicator of a city's overall political competence and is a factor in its attractiveness to foreign migrants. Since Intercultural Gardens had been reported to be a successful method for improving inter-group relations between migrants and native majority, Nuremberg's integration policymakers took the decision to install such a garden as well in 2008 (Fig. 5).

Insufficient Involvement of Residents and Subsequent Fears Lead to the Development of a Structural Conflict

A site in the neighbourhood, which has a substantial share of inhabitants with a migration background and lots of green space, was chosen in the summer of 2009. The site was part of a park-like area, but close to multi-storey apartment buildings. City community workers set up a committee for the establishment of the garden, consisting of neighbourhood associations and individuals. The district coordinator held a meeting to inform the neighbourhood about the Intercultural Garden project that was about to be established nearby. The meeting was not well attended. During the meeting some residents in the neighbourhood of the site expressed fears about the project and disagreed with it.

One interviewee comments:

> They are putting something there and I was not asked before, so my first reaction is objection. (Langwasser, director of neighbourhood association, 50 years old)

And another one firmly declares:

> We don't need this, so we are against it. (Langwasser, director of neighbourhood association, 50 years old)

The fears were based on feelings that the garden would be too close to their houses, that gardeners would make noise, produce garbage and dirt, that parking space would become scarce, that safety in the neighbourhood would decrease together with the value of their property. For several months, the meeting remained the only dissemination of official information about the project. In the meantime,

Fig. 5 Intercultural garden with neighbouring apartment building (Photo by L. Batrla)

rumours about the garden project were spreading in the neighbourhood. Residents felt there were similarities in the city's proceedings in the garden project and the recent process of planning and building a nearby sports park that was carried out without properly informing the neighbours. People felt 'run over' by the city's approach and the media sided with the residents' complaints.

The structural conflict that ensued was driven by the residents' desire to keep their environment intact and unchanged and to maintain control over it. In their perception, they had a kind of legitimate right to control the surroundings of their houses. This was in conflict with the city's planning sovereignty to choose a site for developing a project at a location that seemed appropriate for it. The conflict was kindled by the residents' recent frustrating experiences with the construction of the sports park.

Right-Wing Activists Contribute to the Framing and Ethnicization of the Conflict

In this situation a neighbour of the planned garden site with right-wing political preferences started a campaign among residents of Langwasser and neighbours of the project site based on collecting signatures against the Intercultural Garden. As a result, the Intercultural Garden was increasingly considered by residents to be a project for migrants; few people realized that the project was intended for people with a migration history and residents of native origin to meet and better get to know one another. The residents' perception was further reinforced by anti-immigrant right-wing activists from outside Langwasser who intervened, putting up banners against the garden and distributing leaflets against the project. The different activities succeeded in defining the conflict as a migrant-majority conflict. The potential gardeners were portrayed as migrant intruders into the peaceful environment of the local residents, who did not respect the property rights of residents.

Mobilization Turns into Counter-Mobilization

The framing of the conflict as a migrant-native conflict had strongly emotionalized and politicized the case and drew more people into it, hence ethnic boundaries were reinforced in this stage. The person who started the signature campaign decided to file a lawsuit against the project and received a great deal of support from Langwasser residents and project neighbours. However, the residents supporting this lawsuit seemed to be largely unaware of its right-wing background. The majority of them withdrew their support when they became aware of who they were supporting:

> In the meantime, they publicly distanced themselves from it [the support of the right-wing argumentation]. They were quite shocked, when they found out who they were sitting next to in the hearing [of the lawsuit]. All of a sudden, they were placed in the right-wing corner. Many of them were shocked. They did not like being associated with this at all. (Langwasser, director of neighbourhood association, 50 years old)

This indicates a case of unintended positioning where people were not fully aware of the nature of the cleavage they were associating with.

In this situation the district coordinator held a second public meeting to inform residents about the planned garden and to counteract the many rumours about the

project. She also appealed to the media not to give the anti-immigrant groups publicity and support for their propaganda.

The media became increasingly critical of the right-wing campaign and reported more favourably about the project. In early 2010, a counter-mobilization set in with political parties and district organizations lending increasing support to the garden project. To counteract the fears of residents, the Intercultural Garden committee developed a set of rules to protect neighbours from possible disturbances, particularly referring to opening hours, parties, hygiene, parking and other provisions all of which were intended to prevent problems for the neighbours of the garden. These rules provided a basis for peaceful coexistence of gardeners and neighbours.

Because of the politicization and unwanted publicity only a rather small number of families (12) applied to have a lot in the garden and signed up.

Right-Wing Agitation Loses Sympathisers, Garden Project Gains Sympathisers: A Conflict Solution Develops

Two critical events are mainly responsible for the solution of the conflict: during a council hearing in the city hall heavily attended by residents from Langwasser, these residents began to realize that they were being misused by right-wing anti-immigrant neo-Nazi groups. Media reports about the hearing helped to change the perception of the garden conflict. People started disengaging from the campaign against the project. The other critical event was a decision of a local court dealing with the lawsuit against the garden. The court clearly rejected the lawsuit as unjustified and this took away much of the legitimation of the campaign and weakened the movement against it. The involvement of right-wing parties also had another kind of boomerang effect as it pushed associations and political parties to clearly take position for the project in order not to support the right-wing agitation in any way. All of these actors wanted to avoid being accused of sympathising with right-wing opinions due to their reluctance to take sides. In the meantime, an association for the garden had formally been established and a few months later the construction of the garden began. Tensions eased and in 2012 the garden association had 22 members with 18 active gardeners from 9 different countries. The gardeners are very careful to keep the garden clean and to give neighbouring residents no reason for complaints. In this scenario, the integration process, which had been temporarily hindered by the neighbourhood conflict, can continue.

The analysis of the series of events shows how residents generally do not want a ‘new neighbourhood’ to be forced upon them; instead they want to be involved in planning the change of their environment. The initially insufficient involvement of residents was one of the triggering factors of the conflict in the analyzed case. The later support from the media and the strong support from the policy community of Langwasser contributed considerably to the easing of the conflict. The case study illustrates the high relevance of the media and of policy actors for inter-group relations and for the resilience of a neighbourhood to right-wing agitation.

3.2 The Policy Community in Langwasser: Mediating Functions

The policy community in Langwasser can be considered as quite diverse and well structured. A well-organized network of associations work with welfare organizations, youth centres, neighbourhood centres and municipal institutions such as the youth office and the social office. The district coordinator was recently replaced by a coordinating board. The cooperation of the neighbourhood actors and other neighbourhood activities are coordinated by the coordinating board. The well-functioning policy community makes a valuable contribution to inter-group relations in the neighbourhood. The impact of that contribution emerged with particular evidence in the responses to the conflict around the Intercultural Garden. A large number of associations and institutions joined together in that conflict led and coordinated by the district coordinator, in rejecting the involvement of right-wing groups and the ethnicization of the conflict, and at the same time supported the project of the Intercultural Garden as a valuable means for fostering inter-group contact and connections in Langwasser.

4 High Cultural and Ethnic Diversity: Gostenhof

Gostenhof is one of the most culturally and ethnically diverse neighbourhoods in Nuremberg. This traditional working-class neighbourhood is located near the city centre and is characterized by high housing density. This analysis focuses on the main street (Gostenhofer Hauptstrasse) where a large variety of shops and gastronomy can be found, most of them owned by people with a migration background (Fig. 6).

4.1 The Function of Places: The Main Street as 'the' Place for Interactions

In the following sections, we analyze the function of different types of places for inter-group relations in Gostenhof. *Housing* appears to connect people but also lead to insecurities: the relatively cheap housing units combined with the proximity to the downtown area attract artists as well as families with lower incomes, including a large number of migrants. The synergies which result from the mingling of these groups are part of the peculiarities of the neighbourhood. Moreover, the high density of the neighbourhood contributes to frequent contacts. In this sense, one interviewee asked 'How can I not be in contact with others in Gostenhof?' (Gostenhof, entrepreneur, 38 years old), indicating that contacts are unavoidable given the structure of the neighbourhood. However, housing is also a factor of fears in Gostenhof: due to the age and condition of buildings, renovations have been necessary. This has

Fig. 6 Main street of Gostenhof (Gostenhofer Hauptstrasse) (Photo by L. Batrla)

led to an increase in quality of life but also in rents. Due to this development, some residents have had to move out and others are afraid they will have to do so in the future. Non-profit associations and other activity groups, as well as artists, are expected to be particularly affected by the rising rents. As a reaction to this development, some left-wing activists, among others, have been spraying graffiti in order to keep up the 'grubby' image of the neighbourhood.

Regarding *public places* in Gostenhof, the texture of the neighbourhood lacks green spaces and open areas (e.g., parks and playgrounds) and related opportunities of meeting in public. Although interviewees confirm this, they also describe a neighbourhood rich in social life and contact opportunities. Certain squares have become regular meeting places and festivities are frequently organized in backyards. At the same time, organizations offer regular events for social encounters in their venues. The variety of international stores, especially Turkish stores, in the main street (Gostenhofer Hauptstrasse), attracts people from inside and outside the neighbourhood and they have thus developed into places where connections can be made. Residents turn places not initially intended as meeting places into such, and hence assign a social function to them through their perception and habits. In line with this finding, public space in general, and shopping and leisure time facilities in particular, emerge from the ethnography as spaces of frequent and positive encounters between groups with different backgrounds (Fig. 7).

Moreover, *schools* and *workplaces* clearly emerge from our ethnography as zones of frequent and positive interaction between groups. The shared interests that

Fig. 7 A fast food stand at the corner of Gostenhofer Hauptstrasse that has gained the function of a popular meeting place (Photo by L. Batrla)

are associated with these zones seem to foster interactions. In Gostenhof, in stressing the irrelevance of the cultural background, interviewees consistently assert that shared interests are their main criterion for selecting the people they interact with. Hence, boundaries are constructed along lines of personal interest and characteristics rather than of culture.

Besides their connecting function, the case of Gostenhof shows that zones of encounter can also be a source of fears: residents perceive the recent opening of numerous casinos around the main street as a serious social issue. These premises have been frequented mainly by people (both from majority and minorities) who live in difficult social circumstances. Gambling addiction is increasingly leading to problems in families within the neighbourhood. Interviewees consider it urgently necessary for the city to intervene and impose restrictions on these casinos in order to maintain the social peace in the neighbourhood.

4.2 Social Relations and Diversity in Gostenhof: Migrants Are No Longer a Minority

> People of the most different origins, religions and perceptions are peacefully living together here. (Gostenhof, entrepreneur, 38 years old)

Gostenhof has a high proportion of foreigners among the total population (39.4 % in 2009) (Statistik Nürnberg Fürth 2011a) and an even higher proportion of residents with a migrant background. Native Germans are not a majority in the neighbourhood anymore, whereby the relevance of the majority-minority cleavage has nearly disappeared. More relevant cleavages are erected, among other criteria, along the lines of age and socio-economic status. The migrant population here is highly diverse and their size does not place them in the category of 'minority' anymore. On the contrary, the group of natives is in the process of becoming a minority itself. Some natives, especially those of the older generation, have fears of being part of a minority in the near future and some of them are considering moving out of the neighbourhood for this reason.

Among the young generation, ethnic boundaries appear to have lost relevance while other criteria, e.g., the identification with a territory, gain relevance. The analysis suggests that here, the relevance of 'other criteria' by far overweighs the relevance of ethnic boundaries. We find that particularly within groups of young people, the identification with the neighbourhood of Gostenhof and the city of Nuremberg is much more relevant than that of ethnic origin. In fact, young interviewees of Gostenhof refused to refer to ethnic or national origins when speaking about inter-group relations in the neighbourhood, arguing that these criteria do not matter to them or impact interactions in the neighbourhood in general. Among the young generation in Werderau and Langwasser there are tendencies towards this approach, but it is not as explicit as in Gostenhof.

Similar to the other neighbourhoods in Nuremberg, *children* in Gostenhof are in some contexts a marker of ethnic groupings and in others a bridge to inter-group relations. The bridging function finds confirmation in the high relevance of the school for contacts and interactions, whereas, in spite of the overall high appreciation of cultural diversity and cosmopolitanism in Gostenhof, we find a particular group of natives who seem to have 'double standards.' These families intentionally move to Gostenhof because of the above-mentioned attributes but send their children

to schools out of the neighbourhood in order to avoid Gostenhof's schools which have a high proportion of migrants and a reputation for low- quality education. Parental school choices for their children in this case tend to enforce ethnic boundaries.

Religion in the context of religious and cultural diversity is perceived as enrichment and an opportunity for mutual exchange and learning in Gostenhof. This exchange and learning appears to be bearing fruit, as minorities perceive people from the majority as competent and experienced in communicating and interacting with people of different religious and cultural backgrounds. In this sense, one interviewee describes:

> The people here know how Jews or Muslims celebrate their festivities. This is the peculiarity of Gostenhof. (Gostenhof, entrepreneur, 38 years old)

Socio-economic status and education appear to be relevant identification criteria in Gostenhof, where middle-class intellectual families are identified as a group, as opposed to those with a lower social and educational status. Both groups are represented in the neighbourhood for different motives: the latter group represents the original population base of Gostenhof, a traditional working-class neighbourhood with low housing prices. However, over the years, the state of the buildings deteriorated and with it the reputation of the neighbourhood. In order to improve both – reputation as well as quality of living of the neighbourhood – the city initiated extensive renovation measures. Consequently, middle-class intellectual families were attracted by the combination of modern renovated apartments, the proximity of the neighbourhood to the downtown area and the rich and vivid social and cultural life of the neighbourhood. These two groups – both composed of majority and minorities members – appear to have little contact with each other. Education as such is described as a crucial factor for inter-group relations in Gostenhof: more highly educated people are generally perceived as 'the easiest to get along with' (Gostenhof, policymaker and resident, 41 years old), regardless of their origin.

The *occupational field* seems to be a further relevant cleavage. This is particularly the case when a certain occupational field is highly represented. We find this phenomenon in Gostenhof, where there are numerous artistic venues and shops, many of them owned by people with a migrant background. The groups of artists and shopkeepers are here identified as groups who tend to socialize within their own group.

4.3 The Policy Community: Contributions to the Positive Image of Gostenhof

In Gostenhof, we find a strong and well-represented policy community with strong support from both the district coordinator and the city of Nuremberg. The rich and diverse network of associations and social institutions is supported by the engagement of the district coordinator. The Neighbourhood Centre in Gostenhof is a

central space for social life: many associations, including a large share of migrant associations, have their coordinating office in this building. Facilities such as meeting rooms can be used by all associations. Hence, the Neighbourhood Centre is a place where people come together in a cooperative manner, and where contributions to the rich social life in Gostenhof are made. The positive narrative in this sense contributes to the positive perception of inter-group relations inside and outside of the neighbourhood. At the same time, policy interventions contributed to an improvement of the reputation of the neighbourhood: due to the old building structure and the social challenges of the neighbourhood, its reputation used to be rather negative. Following targeted pressure by neighbourhood-level policy makers, the city took the decision to intervene through large-scale renovation projects which contributed to improving the neighbourhood's overall reputation.

It appears that the strong policy community with the well-organized network of associations and positive framing of policies, in combination with the high diversity of Gostenhof's population, make the neighbourhood more resilient to exogenous xenophobic influences than other neighbourhoods.

5 Lessons Learned from the Neighbourhood Analysis

In investigating *places* in the context of inter-group relations in the three neighbourhoods in Nuremberg we found two main functions of space: space can connect people and lead to interactions, but it can also be the object of disputes and conflicts. The same space can have both functions at the same time, but in different contexts. For the prevention of conflicts, frameworks of rules that are jointly agreed upon are essential.

The two functions of space as well as the high relevance of the rules for the use of space were found with regard to housing and the use of public places: housing as such, depending on how it is arranged, carries the potential of bringing people together and fostering interaction, but it can also be the object of conflicts, as analyzed in the case study of Werderau. We find that the rules on the use of space, as a result of social productions and perceptions, are more relevant for the actual use of public spaces than the existence and availability of these spaces as such. The extent to which the connecting potential of public spaces can be taken advantage of depends much on the rules of their usage. Clear and joint agreements on these rules as well as their communication to all people concerned are necessary to prevent potential conflicts.

The case studies of Werderau and Langwasser illustrate that conflicts over space can turn into ethnically framed conflicts. The overlapping of length of stay and ethnic belonging as well as external interference, e.g., by right-wing groups and biased media reportage, are identified as enabling factors of this ethnic framing and as enforcing factors for boundary-making. Mediation activities are often an effective tool to ease ongoing conflicts.

Zones of encounter were found to be of particular relevance for connecting people and fostering targeted and deeper interactions. In such zones, people get together for a particular purpose and they share at least one field of interest. Additionally, rules of interaction are quite fixed in these zones and persons with mediating functions are mostly present. These elements are identified as facilitators for social and inter-group interactions. However, positive and frequent interactions within zones of encounter do not necessarily mean that the same people interact in the same manner in other places. Particularly in the cases of Werderau and Langwasser, the public space was not found to be very relevant for encounters between different groups. We assume that in these neighbourhoods, inter-group relations rather tend to be limited to zones of encounter where people meet for a particular purpose. A different picture emerges in the case of Gostenhof: the public space here is found to be a relevant and actual context for positive encounters between groups. Hence, in Gostenhof, inter-group relations seem to be not limited to zones of encounter but are transferred to the public space.

In analyzing *barriers and bridges to inter-group relations*, we find that the *cleavage between minority and majority groups* takes on different shapes in the analyzed neighbourhoods. We found a strong correspondence between the construction of these groups and the composition of the population in the neighbourhoods. *Intergenerational cleavages* appear relevant and sometimes overlap with majority-minority cleavages. This is particularly the case in Werderau. For the identification of a group, as well as for its formation, the *group size* clearly emerges as an influential factor. Bigger groups are more precisely identified and formed than smaller groups. In the case of Germany, the largest migrant minority originates from Turkey; hence they are clearly identified as 'Turks', as in the neighbourhood of Werderau. Other groups, who are smaller in numbers, are instead identified by their region of origin: for example, people of African origin, being altogether few, are usually not identified by their country of belonging but the broader African origin. Moreover, we find cleavages *within minority groups*. These divisions result from the high diversity of minority groups themselves, especially of big minority groups such as Turks and their descendants.

Language proficiency and language usage may also represent a barrier for interactions and a cleavage between different groups. As such, they may – but not necessarily – overlap with minority-majority ethnic cleavages. From this point of view, one interviewee explains the situation in Werderau in these terms: 'In the neighbourhood of Werderau one understands only little, if one is not proficient in several languages.'

Among y*oung generations*, ethnic boundaries appear to have lost relevance while other criteria, e.g., the identification with a territory, have gained in relevance. The degree to which this process has taken place seems to depend on the local context. Whereas in some areas it is in an early stage, elsewhere the relevance of 'other criteria' by far overweighs that of ethnic boundaries.

In all three neighbourhoods, we find people who simultaneously associate themselves with different groups: they tend to identify with one group regarding some criteria, e.g., socio-economic status, age, national origin, and with another group

regarding other criteria. For example a young man of Turkish origin may identify with the group of young people in his neighbourhood, possibly with the group of students of his school, with the group of Turkish people of the neighbourhood and also with the group of men. At the same time, group belonging can be ascribed, independent of what people 'feel' their identity is. This was illustrated by the example of Italians who live in Werderau but are perceived as 'Turkish' in generalizing Turkish origin to all ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood. Hence, group belonging cannot clearly be assigned but is dependent on the context. Group identities therefore carry the potential of connecting people and of representing boundaries and cleavages. Within and between these groups, we find various types of interaction, much dependent on the context and perceptions of their members.

On a general note, our findings indicate that the cleavage between ethnic majority and minorities remains relevant, depending on the context. At the same time, other cleavages are increasingly significant. The *policy community* is found to have a relevant impact on inter-group relations and the capacity to shape and disseminate narratives about them in a neighbourhood. In Nuremberg, the lowest institutional level is the City. In selected neighbourhoods, generally those facing social challenges, the City appoints district coordinators ('Stadtteilkoordinatoren'). These ad hoc institutional figures play both a 'horizontal' and a 'vertical' role: their function is, on the one hand, to better connect institutions and actors on the neighbourhood level for the improvement of structures and services. On the other hand, they are also charged with facilitating stronger links between the neighbourhood and the city and with placing neighbourhood issues on the City agenda. The related activities of these district coordinators were found to be meaningful for inter-group relations and for channelling positive narratives about these relations in the three investigated neighbourhoods.

In regard of the central topic of the chapter – neighbourhood conflicts within integration processes – it can be noted that both of the conflicts identified in Werderau and Langwasser represented barriers for integration processes in the stages of the 'framing and ethnicization' and the 'mobilization and intensification of the conflict'. In the case of Werderau, previous progress in neighbourhood integration was even reversed in these conflict stages. In both cases, the stage of 'conclusion of the conflict' brought stakeholders and residents of the neighbourhoods closer together, thereby enabling cooperative action. In the case of Langwasser, this stage was successful because of the strong policy community whereas in Werderau this stage gave rise to the development of a policy community. However, in both cases, the conflicts could have been prevented through early policy interventions whereby neighbourhood integration could have progressed without barriers. In Gostenhof, a strong policy community has been in place and is identified as one of the enablers for well-functioning integration and positive inter-group relations in the context of high diversity. In this regard, we have been able to identify the following policy implications:

To conclude, we can affirm that there is a potential for conflicts to arise when sudden changes occur within the environment which residents of a neighbourhood have become used to. In our case studies the determining factors have been the

following: (a) a lack of early information to notify residents of the planned changes caused rumours and fears leading to objections against the plans; (b) a lack of communication with and inclusion of the residents regarding the planned changes caused residents to feel excluded and ignored in their rights and concerns, leading to objections against the plans; (c) reluctance of the city administration to consider the concerns of residents and take action where necessary, leading to mobilization processes. When structural conflicts were framed in ethnical dimensions, determining factors appear to be ascriptions from outside of the neighbourhood, especially by right-wing forces. These forces seem to be particularly successful in contexts of residents' uncertainties, with a lack of intervention by the policy community and a strong established order.

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Comfortably Invisible: The Life of Chinese Migrants Around 'The Four Tigers Market' in Budapest

Boglárka Szalai and Krisztina La-Torre

Although in Hungary – as in most Eastern European countries – the foreign population is rather small, i.e., less than three per cent of the total population (KSH 2011), and consists primarily of ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries with the same cultural background and mother tongue, there are a few urban areas where the presence of immigrants is 'visible' and significantly influences the local communities' everyday life. According to the latest census (KSH 2011), immigrants coming from Asia – including around 7000 Chinese and 2000 Vietnamese citizens – constitute around 16,000 people within Hungary.

In this chapter we will provide an overview of the inter-group relations between Hungarians and non-EU immigrants – in particular those from China and Vietnam – who settled in two districts of Budapest. Although there are many districts within the capital that host smaller Asian communities, we chose Józsefváros (8th district) and Kőbánya (10th district) for our investigation as Chinese and Vietnamese migrants have the highest territorial concentration here (Kőszeghy 2010). In addition, these two districts were the first ones where non-EU immigrants settled down historically, hence various forms of inter-group relations can be observed here right up to the present day. While being both relatively old settlement areas, these two districts represent two distinct types of urban environment: Kőbánya is a large, peripheral former industrial area, while Józsefváros is a small central district with a more mixed population.

Among the economic and social factors that have led to the over-representation of these immigrant groups in these two particular districts, a key role is played by the large Chinese Market situated at the boundary between Józsefváros and Kőbánya. While the relations between host society and immigrants are at the core of our investigation we also consider other aspects of inter-group dynamics.

B. Szalai (✉) • K. La-Torre
Independent researcher, Budapest, Hungary
e-mail: szalaiboglarka@gmail.com; kri.la.torre@gmail.com

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The presence of a sizeable Roma population in the selected districts – especially in the 8th district – must be pointed out as a specific additional factor in the fragmentation of the host society along ethnic lines given the spreading of discriminatory attitudes towards this national minority in Hungarian society, especially since the extreme right-wing party, Jobbik – and its ideas – have gained momentum in the last decade.[1]

After introducing Józsefváros and Kőbánya, the interaction sites studied in our research, with a brief discussion of their historical heritage, current economic and social circumstances, and the situation of their Roma inhabitants, we will give an overview of the main characteristics of Chinese migration to Hungary based on relevant literature, statistics and interviews conducted in the summer of 2011. Before analyzing the main features of inter-group relations in the two neighbourhoods, we will focus on the institutions' role in the representation and discourse formation of each group (Roma, non-Roma and the different migrant groups). Finally, taking the empirical evidence from the fieldwork in the selected interaction sites as a starting point, we will discuss the nature of relationships among immigrants and Hungarians.

1 Inter-group Relations in Statistics and Inhabitants' Perceptions[2]

In spite of their difference in location and size, the two neighbourhoods show some important similarities in key economic and social parameters, all of which help to explain both the relatively high concentration of immigrants and their degree of

[1] According to a recent study (Simonovits-Szalai 2012) almost half of Hungarians would not accept a Roma person either as a family member, a neighbour, or a colleague, and almost 60 % would not allow their child to play with a Roma child.

[2] Methodological footnote: The chapter is based on relevant literature, data provided by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH), Immigration Office of Hungary (BAH) and the results of the interviews conducted within the framework of the 'Concordia Discors' project. In total 37 semi-structured interviews (20 with natives and 17 with immigrants) were conducted during the summer of 2011. The language of the interviews was mainly Hungarian except for one in Orczy Square with a Vietnamese resident, conducted in English, another one, conducted in French with an Angolan immigrant, and a third one conducted in Chinese with the assistance of an interpreter. Within Józsefváros 9 interviews were held in 'Four Tigers Market', 15 in Népszínház Street, and 6 in Orczy Square. In Kőbánya, 3 in Taraliget Residential Park, 4 in Hungária Avenue. Mental maps were also created by the interviewees in order to analyze the subjective evaluation of the living environment and the urban space and to explore the assumption that there is a hidden association between space and migrants. When conducting the interviews we faced two main difficulties; the first one was the lack of presence and availability of Hungarian-speaking Chinese migrants. The second challenge came from a terminological uncertainty that is a telling example of the neglect of the topic of immigration in Hungary, namely that the Hungarian vocabulary for immigration issues is very vague and controversial. While conducting the interviews we had difficulties in finding a shared and effective Hungarian term to indicate immigrants as the term 'immigrant' ('bevándorló') has pejorative connotations, and when

segregation from natives. In particular, a key feature shared by both neighbourhoods is a sizeable Roma presence, which strongly influences local integration dynamics and has thus pushed us to extend our research focus to the triangular relations between native Roma, native non-Roma, and non-EU immigrants.

For more than a century, Józsefváros has been undergoing a process of slow but steady decline that is also reflected in the changing composition of its population. During the last decades of the nineteenth century, when large-scale construction projects thrived throughout the capital, the growing industry (railway, factories) had lured workers to the district while those better off could afford to build the prestigious houses of the Palotanegyed (Palace Quartier – the inner circle of Józsefváros). The local society, mainly composed of petite bourgeoisie, craftsmen and workers, then had to face the downfall which started shortly before the First World War. During the 1920–1930s the district already had major problems with prostitution, poverty and housing. Roma migration from the countryside also boomed in this decade (György 2012). The damage after World War II was severe and the official discourse regarding the district was soon narrowed down to two main narratives: a developmental and a criminal one (which was not without antecedents; see Dupcsik 2009). The latter – opposing the socialist, 'colour blind' propaganda – suggested a causal relation between the number of Roma inhabitants and the severity of crimes and social problems (György 2012). The uneven social housing programs in the socialist era (see Szelényi-Konrád 1978) led to more severe marginalization in the district, resulting in a vicious circle. The only exceptions – present both in official documents and in scholarly literature (Solt 1975) – were the 'musician gypsies' who had a sort of elite status in the district and among the Roma community. When their numbers gradually dropped in the area, this symbolized both a cultural change and the growing ghettoization of Józsefváros.

Kőbánya's case is different in many respects and less symbolic at a discourse level. During the nineteenth century, vineyards and mines gradually gave way to industries (iron foundries, breweries and pharmaceutical plants) (Kasza 2005). Up until the end of the nineteenth century, another important aspect of the local economy was the swine and livestock market. Historically, this part of the city had a

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we used it people often thought we were referring to the Roma. 'Foreigner' ('külföldi' in Hungarian) was not the appropriate term either, since some immigrants have obtained Hungarian citizenship, and in everyday language the term 'foreigner' also includes tourists. Therefore, we often said 'foreigner who lives in Hungary' to describe immigrants, but this did not feel right either because it is too wordy. During our interviews this terminological issue caused only minor inconvenience but the lack of a widely understood and used terminology for this topic shows the neglect and ignorance of both public opinion and everyday discourse. Some of the interviewees refused to tell us their age and thus in those cases we have provided a rough estimate based on our perception and on the information received during the interviews. Four of our interviews were carried out as 'walking interviews', to gain information about the inter-group relations among specific individuals, focusing on the everyday experience of their sites in order to single out residents' representations of differences, on the one hand, and to investigate everyday practices and daily encounters on the other. The route of the interview was discussed in advance with the interviewee, and during the walk the interviewee was asked to tell stories about the sites, the buildings and inter-group relations.



Fig. 1 The location of the five interaction sites in this study: (1) Four Tigers Market; (2) Orczy Square; (3) Taraliget Residential Park; (4) Hungária Avenue; (5) Népszínház Street. As we will see in greater details below, (1) and (5) are essentially commercial sites, while the other ones have a predominantly residential nature

strong agricultural and working-class image and was populated by vendors and labourers. Housing problems were already quite severe in the 1920–1930s due to the rapid population growth of the previous decades – mainly from labour migration driven by industrial development (Szalai 1970). A solution came in the form of blocks of flats erected in the socialist era, which helped to increase the general comfort level of the habitants while irreversibly changing the landscape and atmosphere of the district (Kasza 2005). The interaction sites we investigate in this chapter are all located in the inner part of Kőbánya, and they have important features in common with the 8th district, such as the presence of Chinese communities.

While Józsefváros and Kőbánya host almost the same number of inhabitants today – around 80,000 people each – Józsefváros with a surface area of 6.9 km^2 is the fifth smallest centrally located district, while Kőbánya with a surface area of 32.5 km^2 is one of the largest peripheral districts of Budapest. As a result, Józsefváros is one of the most congested districts of Budapest, with more than 11,000 inhabitants per square km (Fig. 1).

Both Józsefváros and Kőbánya are strongly affected by poverty, unemployment, homelessness and short life expectancy compared to other districts of Budapest and Hungary as a whole. Based on Józan's (2006) calculations regarding average income and life expectancy Józsefváros and Kőbánya are lagging behind the rest of the capital; a child born in one of these districts is very likely to grow up in one of the poorest families of Budapest and to die 10 years earlier than those born in the most prestigious district of the city (2nd district).

Unemployment rates for both Kőbánya and especially Józsefváros are significantly higher than that of Budapest (14.9 % in Józsefváros and 10.8 % in Kőbánya, 9 % in Budapest as a whole). More than half of the jobseekers of Józsefváros are

long-term ones,[3] which is 10 % higher than that of Kőbánya and the city as a whole. Furthermore, almost 80 % of all job seekers from Józsefváros and Kőbánya are unskilled workers, a figure which is almost 20 % higher than at city level.

The distribution of jobseekers by education level also reveals the working and lower class background of both districts; the proportion of jobseekers with lower than secondary education is 10 % higher in Józsefváros than in Kőbánya, which in turn is 5 % higher than in Budapest. One piece of striking evidence of the disadvantaged situation of these districts is the critically low number of tax-payers and payed taxes; almost half of the working age population in Józsefváros does not pay any kind of income-related tax while this percentage is 10 % lower in Kőbánya and 20 % lower in Budapest. The disadvantaged economic situation of both Józsefváros and Kőbánya is also reflected in the depressed property prices compared to the rest of the city,[4] which is a decisive factor for the poorer strata to choose these districts as their place of residence and a burden for those who would like to move from these neighbourhoods. According to the Integrated Social Rehabilitation Study of the municipality of Józsefváros (2012) criminality, including crime committed by young people (under 18), is a major problem of the district which is highly correlated to the fact that almost four out of ten children are living in a disadvantaged situation. Based on a survey conducted by the municipality between 2003 and 2005, 15 % of all households have been victims of burglary. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Home Affairs (ORFK 2008) on the number of registered perpetrators per 100,000 inhabitants, Józsefváros (with 1856 people) has the second highest ranking and Kőbánya (with 1137 people) comes in fifth out of the 23 districts of Budapest (2008).

The image of the two districts studied, especially that of Józsefváros, is rather degraded, both in the media and in the public discourse. Although 10 % of registered criminal offenders are from Józsefváros (KSH 2011), and not more than 10 % of all registered crimes in Budapest are perpetrated here, the local and national media put a disproportionate emphasis on crime-related news, thereby constantly reinforcing the negative image of the district. As an inhabitant explained:

> I have a straight stroke when I hear on the TV about the "infamous" Józsefváros. Please show me a district, which is as diverse as this one. (Józsefváros, municipal representative, 39 years old)

Józsefváros has recently been going through the initial stages of a gentrification process, and some parts – such as the Corvin area – are now a residential target for young and wealthy settlers while the poorest inhabitants are sidelined and pushed towards the outskirts (Benedek 2007). In spite of this ongoing process, the dominant view of the neighbourhood at city level is still far from positive. Many locals share a desperate and pessimistic common attitude towards the district and its future prospects:

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[3] A long-term jobseeker is defined here as an unemployed person who could not find a job for over 180 days.

[4] According to the data of OTP Residential Property Value Map the average flat price in Józsefváros is more than 25 % lower, 34 % lower in Kőbánya compared to the prices of the capital (in Budapest in 2011 is ~980 EUR/ m^2 300.000 HUF/m^2), in Józsefváros the average prices are lower than 720 EUR (2221.000 HUF)/m^2, and in Kőbánya ~650 EUR (200.649 HUF)/m^2).

> Every evening, my daughter asks me when we are moving, but I say I do not know, perhaps when this house will explode" (44 year-old Hungarian woman, shop assistant). However the unique atmosphere has its power: 'Shopkeepers often sit in front of their shops, it cannot be compared with other parts of the district. It is very unique, that strangers here say Hey brother, what's up, like in the villages and I really like it. (Józsefváros, municipal representative, 39 years old)

The most frequently mentioned problems during our interviews were homelessness and the Roma presence. Both groups are systematically used by our interviewees as living evidence of the decay of their neighbourhood. They are mostly mentioned within a context consisting of nostalgia for the past system and criminalizing poverty:

> I do not like Józsefváros. Well, how is it possible to like a Roma neighbourhood? It was not different many years ago, but there were not so many unemployed people because those who did not work were arrested. Now the Roma have rights but they do not have any duties. (Józsefváros, owner of a bakery, 71 years old)

Within deprived and marginalized areas, the cohabitation of Roma and non-Roma neighbours is strongly marked by conflicts. Public safety is one of the main frameworks through which this conflict is displayed. Asian immigrants seemed to be especially concerned about their own safety and threats that, according to them, may come from Roma – a few have already been a victim of petty crime – and they only go to places they trust and consider safe.

> I do not like walking on the streets in the evening alone in the darkness because the dark people [she points at a Roma man through the café window] sometimes make a pass at me and they are watching me suspicious. I do not like this. We always go home together, I like moving in groups for that reason it is good that I live together with my colleague. (Józsefváros, waitress, around 30 years old)

It is mainly the Roma who are blamed for the deterioration and unfavourable image of the area, as clearly expressed by one of our interviewees:

> There are protective iron bars everywhere on buildings, but when I was a young assistant, these barred doors did not even exist, though there was a crisis for a long time, and there were already gypsies there. […] Nowadays they toss the trash here, in front of the shop, they spit, they lie drunk in front of the shop; this is in their blood, this society is abysmal. (Józsefváros, jeweller, around 60 years old)[5]

Regarding the Roma's point of view, we must say they feel that they are discriminated against, especially in the labour market, as a Roma woman explains:

> If you wanted to hear all of my stories about being a victim of discrimination, you had to sit here until midnight. If you are Roma, you have to work ten times as much to be accepted by employers and colleagues. For example, in the restaurant where I used to work, I was the most hardworking among the colleagues, and still sometimes I heard some murmurs about my blood. (Józsefváros, shop assistant, 44 years old)

[5] The empirical results of our qualitative fieldwork are consistent with the results of a public opinion survey conducted by TÁRKI in 2011, which reported on the highly discriminatory attitudes of Hungarians. According to that survey, more than 6 out of 10 Hungarians share the opinion that criminal traits are biologically determined - as one of our interviewees puts it: "it's in one's blood".

It seems that they are less accepted than immigrants most of the time, serving as the main scapegoats for problems, and the main target of prejudice. According to one of our Roma interviewees the prejudice of Hungarians materializes in everyday situations, including the labour market, where immigrants are preferred over Roma. This perceived preference by employers contributes in turn to generating a sort of 'reflected' anti-immigrant prejudice among Roma which feeds itself with economic arguments.

> Honestly, I do not really like the way foreigners anchor themselves in the district as residents. The time will come when they will look at the people living here – the rooted ones – as if they were nothing. That's why ignoring the Roma workforce is a huge mistake. The Roma should be counted as a really important inside reserve of workforce. Because if you do not invest now in developing the human capital of the Roma people, you will regret it seriously. Our culture, our religion, the language is common. And you could make a decision to ignore Roma people, but then the Chinese, Arabs, and Muslims will have no intention to know about Hungarian culture. (Józsefváros, municipal representative, 39 years old)

2 Chinese Migration to Hungary[6]

Before we examine the present situation of inter-group relations in the Four Tigers Market area, it is first necessary to look back to the transition period in which Hungary emerged as one of the main destinations for Chinese migration to Eastern Europe. Historical memories are still decisive factors in shaping the Hungarians' perceptions of the Chinese who were among the first international migrants to appear in the early 1990s, at a time of severe economic difficulties for natives.

Chinese migration to Hungary was driven by multiple push and pull factors, including a short period of liberal immigration policy in the early 1990s. Hungary's newly adopted market economy and transitional redistribution of goods made the country an attractive destination for the entrepreneurially-minded. During this time in China, a massive economic change was just about to gain momentum as a result of the 'Reform and Openness', (*Gaige Kaifang*, 改革开放) which began under Deng Xiaoping and had started to take effect. Thanks to the short visa-free period between 1990 and 1991, the number of Chinese immigrants rose to about 30–40,000 persons. The Chinese began to appear in 'Comecon' open-air markets – as it happened at the 'Four Tigers Market' – soon forcing out Hungarian vendors with their extremely low prices and larger variety of goods.[7] According to Nyíri (2001) many of the Chinese present here today are early settlers, who originally came from the Fujian region (Fig. 2).

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[6] We would like to thank Mounia Utzeri for her contributions to this chapter.

[7] Comecon: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was an economic organization between 1949 and 1991 set up by the Soviet Union that aimed to unite the countries of the Eastern block. The open air markets of the era had an important function in the shortage economy as rare and imported goods could be purchased under almost free market conditions regarding the price setting. For more details about the transformation process of the Hungarian markets see Sik (2010).

Fig. 2 Entrance of the 'Four Tigers Chinese Market' (Photo by J. Sebő)

Our findings confirm Nyíri's (2010) arguments: Chinese migration to Hungary has been mainly driven by economic motives. All of our Asian interviewees mentioned business as the main reason for their move. As explained by Tilly (2007 [1993]) and Nyíri (2010) their migration was supported by extremely strong transnational ethnic bonds; the final decision to migrate to a given country is generally initiated and supported by relatives or acquaintances already settled in the target country. On arrival many of our interviewees knew nothing about Hungary or Budapest in general or about Kőbánya or Józsefváros in particular, except for the existence of the Four Tigers Market: this is *hyper-localized transnational migration* from a specific Chinese region to a specific area in Budapest. A common practice among first-wave migrants was to leave their children in China and send for them a few years later when the circumstances were appropriate.

> Before I came here, I did not know anything about Hungary, but my parents said 'come', and now we are here. At that time I did not think whether I liked it or not, my parents just said 'come', and I came. (Józsefváros, entrepreneur, 29 years old)

Intentions vary, but they are mainly determined by the working conditions and profitability of business especially for those with a stronger mainland Chinese background.

> I have no idea on what will happen in the future, but I am not afraid about going to work anywhere in the world, I will always find a job. For me it's no question. (Józsefváros, age approx. between 40 and 50 years old).

Whereas the early Chinese migration is characterized by high transnational mobility due to a widespread and well-established European network, the immigrants arriving in the past few years tend to share fewer provincial ties with China and identify themselves more with the whole country. These newcomers – mostly from Shanghai or the north-eastern provinces – differ from their predecessors in seeing themselves not as local minorities, but as a 'global majority' (Nyíri 2001) with a strong national attachment to their homeland. The greater ethnic confidence and national pride may be a factor in intra-group tensions between the new generation of migrants and old settlers.

The first generation of Chinese migrants say that they do not feel the need to learn Hungarian because they do not associate with Hungarians, either in their private life or in business. This lack of assimilation is demonstrated by the limited language acquisition of vendors at the Four Tigers Market. Here a so-called 'market-language', a '*lingua franca*' has developed. It is mostly used by Asian migrants to communicate with Hungarian customers, employees and other traders with a limited vocabulary, and only contains words used in business situations (i.e., numbers, sizes and quantities). For this reason Hungarians often perceive Chinese as being self-segregating:

> Immigrants do not seek Hungarians' company. They do their business with each other. (Józsefváros, owner of a shop, 33 years old)

The negative effect is also problematic for those younger Chinese who try to seek Hungarian friends:

> Good, the neighbour is good, everything good, but no friend, no girl because it is difficult for me, don't speak well Hungarian. (Józsefváros, owner of a shop, age approx. between 40 and 50 years old)

The lack of social interaction with Hungarians strongly influences the perception of the majority. A telling example of such a one-dimensional if not outright distorted perception is the opinion, held by a significant number of Hungarians, that the Chinese will 'invade' the country:

> The time will come when they will look at the host society as if they were nothing. They do not want to know about Hungarian culture. If they come into the country, they will develop their own institutional systems, and they will push us out of this country. This time will come, believe me. (Józsefváros, municipal representative, 39 years old)

Although the majority of Chinese immigrants – especially those from older generations – do not speak Hungarian, those who were born in Budapest or are from the second generation of migrants, speak the language and want to be considered Hungarian to reinforce relations with their native Hungarian peers.

> Kids already speak both Hungarian and Chinese very well. The two older ones have already been to China, they like it a lot, but they like Hungary more. They live in Hungary, they think they are not Chinese, but Hungarian. I don't mind, even if they wouldn't know the culture so much, I don't care, I just want them not to be sad, let them be happy kids. (Józsefváros, entrepreneur, 29 years old)

Some can see the changes this new life made on their personality:

> I have changed a lot here, but not only my outlook has changed, I am also much more open. I think that Hungarian people like me because I am very different from other Chinese because I love talking and I would like to make Hungarian friends so much. (Józsefváros, waitress, around 30 years old)

Business thus plays a central role in constructing and structuring the community: economic, social and, to a certain extent, cultural relations are built around an entrepreneurial basis. Almost all of these businesses are run and supported by a network of ethnic solidarity in financing, supplying, and personnel recruiting. A fundamental distinction can be drawn between intra-community activities (sale of goods and services of an ethnic nature, often with a function of identity consolidation and reproduction, such as in the food and leisure sectors) and extra-community activities targeted at native Hungarians with no migratory background (essentially catering, consumer goods, and supplying local companies). Through an internal supply and demand system, the Chinese economic web generates an elaborate Chinese ethnic labour market, which is a manifestation of a process of striving to achieve economic and social autonomy. The most striking consequence of this is the lack of contact with the host society, something which was frequently criticized by the Hungarian interviewees. It seems, however, that the classic ethnic economy is turning into an enclave economy, thriving in a diversification of its activities (i.e., finance, insurance and professional services) increasingly integrated in the mainstream economy.

3 Does Place Really Matter? Inter-group Relations in Commercial and Residential Areas

Immigrants settling down in our sites of interaction showed two distinct strategies of coexistence. Some follow a peaceful, but isolationist approach whereby encounters with the host society are reduced to a minimum; others opt for an active involvement in shaping their environment and engagement in encounters. We argue that these strategies depend on the urban function of the place where the encounters take place. The five sites of interaction we examined are situated close to each other, yet they have different urban functions (see above, Fig. 1). While three of them – Orczy Square, Taraliget Residential Park and Hungária Avenue 5-7 – serve as residential areas for those working on the Chinese market (‘residential sites’), two of them – Népszínház Street and the ‘Four Tigers Market’ itself – mainly perform productive functions and are where a significant proportion of the foreign immigrants earn their living (‘commercial sites’).

3.1 The Two Commercial Interaction Sites

The ‘Four Tigers Market’ – the most important of our sites as a key area for early economic insertion of Chinese migration to Budapest – has been operating since the early 1990s and has been lent by the owner of the area (Hungarian State

Railways – MÁV) to the entrepreneurs who have actually operated it since 1997. Due to the absence of any residential buildings within its premises, this is an exclusively commercial area. This feature strongly influences the integration process of immigrants working there by shaping how they are perceived by the Hungarians. Furthermore, the market has given rise to several urban legends and has become the symbol of the Hungarian black market because a wide range of illegal products can be purchased there. Police raids and tax-controls on the market are very common, and for more than a decade Hungarian media reported every year on the closure and relocation of the market, which eventually happened in the summer of 2014.[8] Its total closure was explained by the right-wing mayor of Józsefváros to be for security reasons. He stated in the Hungarian media that *"the market is a centre for criminal activity"*.[9]

The particularly high level of interethnic tension in this area can be attributed to several factors. At one level the market is regarded by most natives as the main reason why Józsefváros is at the top of the statistics for criminal activity, while tax evasion and black market activity are often blamed for jeopardizing the economic interests of the local majority population. As evidence of the negative effect of the market on the criminal situation, every interviewee could recall crime stories on the market.

> In the Chinese market, there are criminal gangs specialized in stealing and pick-pocketing, or they sell VAT invoices if you want to cheat on taxes. In that place everybody steals from everybody, but the Chinese people do not steal the usual way. They steal in the way that they do not pay taxes and that their products are counterfeit. For this reason immigrants who work on the Market can just be harmful to the district because they do not pay taxes. (Józsefváros, bakery owner, 71 years old)

In the meantime, the market as a working place also gives rise to other conflicts mainly originating from diverging attitudes towards work and private property. According to both experts and Asian interviewees, Chinese work standards are very high. Taking too many breaks or being less punctual and dedicated is poorly tolerated: the image of a strict Chinese boss is shared by many interviewees. First encounters were often based on trying to match Chinese employers' demand for work and the vast low-skilled Roma labour supply. According to most interviewees, many of these employment relations were short-lived due to allegedly irreconcilable differences in work ethics.

> I personally never have had any conflict with immigrants but in the past one and a half years I have seen at least five massive brawls when Asians beat the Roma. The cause is always the same. Either the Roma steal from them, or they cheat by doing the work slowly. (Józsefváros, shop assistant, 42 years old)

Issues regarding stealing often resulted in physical conflict, and if the vendors could find the thief they would not refrain from vigilantism.

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[8] According to Gergely Salát (2013) the closure of the market will not significantly affect the everyday life of the Chinese community who will be able to move to a nearby area.

[9] Source of the citation: http://index.hu/belfold/2014/06/16/jozsefvarosi_piac/.

Fig. 3 Chinese restaurant in Népszínház Street (Photo by B. Szalai)

At the same time, one positive feature cannot be disregarded, not even by the most prejudiced Hungarians: the market plays a crucial social function for Hungarians since in Józsefváros there is a segment of residents that would not be able to afford new items if the market did not exist (Fig. 3).

Népszínház Street, situated in a central part of Józsefváros, is a mixed site combining commercial and residential features. Although it is also a residential area, its market serves as one of the most important wholesale centres for the Chinese and Vietnamese retailers working in Népszínház Street, while some retailers prefer to live in the area due to its proximity to their workplace such as many petty native retailers, who own small shops on this street. Home to a flea market since the early twentieth century, the street has always been a site for small family-owned shops. In the aftermath of the political and economic transition of 1989–1990, shopkeepers from East-Asia, the Middle-East and Africa converted this area into one of the few multicultural sites of Budapest. This 'multiculturalism' however is tense and prejudiced rather than mutually enriching and community-forming. Here local Hungarians often explain the tensions as a result of the dumping by Chinese and Vietnamese businesses, which has basically forced them out of the market. They suspect that these low prices are only possible because of semi-legal or outright illegal commercial practices, such as tax evasion and privileged commercial conditions for mem-

bers of the community.[10] These rumours obviously tend to reinforce the discontent of local businessmen towards their Asian peers.

> I have my own opinion about the Chinese and the Vietnamese. I buy at higher prices from the wholesale trader than he sells it for, which is funny. It is not acceptable that in the TESCO, a Milka chocolate tablet is 250 forints, and he can sell it for 159 forints here. We reported this unfair competition to the Tax Office, saying that this is likely to be a tax evasion, but they do not care about this. (Józsefváros, shopkeeper, 33 years old)

This street also serves as a working place for several shopkeepers, who are mainly from North Africa and are often indistinctly labelled as "Arabs"[11] by the Hungarians. This enables us to compare Chinese-Hungarian and Arab-Hungarian interactions. Some dubious competition behaviour by North African shopkeepers was reported but according to the interviewees, the typically "Arab practice" of reducing potential competition by buying shops just in order to keep them shut to prevent competition is more tolerable than the Asians' price dumping practices. Hungarian shopkeepers feel that they can compete with this practice as it is a fair form of competition (at least it is not illegal, as they don't cheat on taxes or set too low prices). They also have the idea that the closed shops mean less competition for them as well.

Besides their commercial practices, interviewees from the host society and other immigrant groups also mentioned better knowledge of the Hungarian language and a higher propensity to mixed marriages and partnerships as reasons why "Arabs" are more integrated than other groups.

3.2 Residential Interaction Sites

The importance of urban space in shaping inter-group relations can be further illustrated by the case of the three residential sites (Hungária Avenue 5-7, Taraliget Residential Park, and Orczy Square), all situated in close proximity to the Market (Fig. 4).

The first Chinese migrants in the 1990s moved to low prestige real estates, such as Hungária Avenue 5-7, inhabited mostly by working class citizens. As a layer of Chinese immigrants succeeded in saving enough money to change their place of living, they moved to newly built and more prestigious buildings, such as Taraliget

[10] For example interest-free credits, or arrangements whereby the shopkeeper can bring the products back to the wholesale trader if they are not able to sell them, and the wholesale trader returns the shopkeeper's money.

[11] From now on we will adopt the oversimplified terminology used by native inhabitants who call "Arabs" all those coming from a wide region stretching from the Middle East (Syria) to North Africa, mainly Egypt and Tunisia, without making any further distinction based on the country of origin.

Fig. 4 The three residential sites: Orczy Building (marked no. 2 on Fig. 1), Taraliget Residential Park (marked no. 3 on Fig. 1) and Hungária Avenue 5-7 (marked no. 4 on Fig. 1) (Photo by B. Szalai)

Residential Park and the Orczy Building. Though surrounded by unused industrial buildings and the ruins of Communist era construction, these two buildings are considered as quite trendy and 'fancy'. The Orczy Building – situated less than one kilometre from the market – was built in the early 2000s. Taraliget Residential Park, the newest of the researched sites of interaction, is a high prestige residential park built by a Chinese company, surrounded by a fence, and also situated less than one kilometre from the market.

The conflicts between majority residents and Asian migrants occurring in these residential areas, especially in Taraliget and the Orczy Building, often refer to behaviours that natives are not used to, such as "smelly Chinese food". These minor problems arising from coexistence cannot, however, be compared to the conflicts observed at the Market.

To better understand the frame of the coexistence in residential areas, we have to focus again and more closely on Chinese attitudes towards work. According to both Hungarian and Chinese interviewees, business is the most important area of Chinese migrants' life. As the common stereotype goes, they work hard for their money, and often subordinate private life to business. According to the residents' representative of Taraliget Residential Park, who is in charge of all the operational issues of the Residential Park such as collecting overhead and common costs, taking care of small repairs, mediating between the residents when arguments arise, etc., Asian residents live in small flats, even if they are wealthy and have an expensive car, because their flats only perform the function of accommodation for the night. According to our key informants that is the reason why they do not buy luxury houses in more attractive parts of Budapest. When choosing a place of residence, the most important criterion is the short distance to the workplace.

> I think their attitude to all kind of economic activities is very different from what we are used to. I'm sure that they work much more than us, it means 12 hours a day, but their demands are lower than ours. For example, it's a common thing among them that two families live together in a small 60 m^2 flat which we could not imagine. It's a really different frame of mind than ours. (Budapest,[12] leader of NGO called EDIKTUM, age unknown)

[12] The NGO does not operate in any of our sites but has clients mainly from our target areas.

Among the residential sites, we found the most intense native-immigrant relationships in Taraliget Residential Park and Hungária Avenue 5-7. Since Chinese adults usually work at least 10 h a day, they have no time to look after their children, so they hire Hungarian 'grannies' aged about 50–60 to baby-sit their children. These ladies, who all live nearby, but not in the same buildings, often take care of their own grandchildren and the Chinese children at the same time. This kind of relationship is considered highly beneficial for both sides. Hungarian 'grannies' can supplement their incomes, and babysitting the children gives them a feeling of usefulness, thus they begin to live more actively. From the Asian parents' point of view, these ladies can help their children to improve their knowledge of the Hungarian language and culture. In these cases, children seem to assume a key importance in shaping inter-group relations since they often spend more time with the Hungarian helper than with their own parents. After a while, these nannies become like distant relatives and their relationship becomes less formal (e.g., mutual invites and presents, discussing the upbringing of the children).

Another case of cooperative relations concerns Hungarian 'cleaning ladies' who are hired by the better-off Chinese and Vietnamese residents. Although relations of this sort do not necessarily imply that these groups are fully integrated, since they are labour relations principally based on economic considerations as the Hungarian labour force is cheap and easily available, they are meaningful and they can be starting points for the development of wider and deeper interaction, as in the case of Hungarian nannies.

4 "A Marginal Question": The Policymakers' Point of View on Immigration

"Frankly speaking, immigration is a marginal question in Hungary". This sentence was uttered by a senior researcher at a conference on migrants' chances in the labour market. This viewpoint is very typical among policymakers and experts. The neglect of immigrants by policymakers and the under-representation of Roma, Chinese and Vietnamese in local media within a society that shows highly xenophobic attitudes also widen the gap among these groups and aggravate inter-group relations. Even though the number of migrants is not very significant in Budapest, in the observed interaction sites it is far from negligible. This dichotomy was evident in our interviews. The excuse that 'there are not enough migrants', often sounds like a strategy to dissimulate and justify sheer ignorance of the issue. As the ex-mayor of one of our districts said:

> The municipality has never worked on the immigration issue because immigrants do not cause politically relevant problems for the moment. (Kőbánya, ex-mayor in his 50s)

The only municipal-level organization dealing with the equality of chances – a broad and rather heterogeneous basket including the integration of migrants – has one rapporteur in charge of migrants, but they do not have migrant-specific programs

as they declare that they deal with only one or two migrant-related issues per year. In theory each district of Budapest has its own rapporteur who is also in charge of immigrants at district level but they could hardly be reached during our fieldwork, and, in the few cases when we managed to schedule an interview, they had hardly any information on immigrants living in the districts.[13] The other sign of political indifference is the inability of politicians working in the districts that host the largest immigrant communities to express their opinions as policymakers; instead they talked about their private xenophobic views.[14] This example, just one of many, is striking evidence of the low level of tolerance and competence within Hungarian municipalities on questions related to migration. Politicians seem to have no framework within which to form their thoughts and were only able to speak about immigration as a problem that has to be solved by getting rid of all the foreigners. In fact, political parties in Hungary have no explicit policies on the issue, with the exception of Jobbik, the extreme right-wing parliamentary party that swept up 20 % of the votes in the latest elections in 2014 and ranked as the second biggest opposition party. Jobbik stands out in the political arena in that it openly advocates an anti-immigrant policy and it has explicitly introduced the term "Roma criminality" into public speech.

Regarding the civil sphere, the problem is of a different nature. Although some NGOs have the competence to deal with immigrants, have knowledge of their basic needs and deal with them on a daily basis, their resources and therefore also their margins of action are limited. As one of our key informants said when only a few NGOs showed up at a conference organized for municipality members and NGOs to discuss the issue of immigration:

> No wonder why they aren't here. Everybody is running after their money. They have no time for meetings like this, they must be working on some tenders at the moment. (Józsefváros, project manager at an NGO dealing with immigrants, 39 years old)

The issue of immigration is neglected not only by the policymakers, but also by the national and local media. In 2008 a study by the Fundamental Rights Agency monitored the two main national daily newspapers[15] and two tabloids for a 4-week period in order to investigate the representation of minorities and migrant groups.

[13] In order to illustrate the attitude of these rapporteurs, it is worth giving a brief account of our attempts to establish contact with them and obtain information on the immigrants living in the districts. We sent out test e-mails to each of the 22 rapporteurs in which we inquired about the number and nationality of immigrant groups living in the districts. Eight answers arrived, five of which contained no information about immigrants.

[14] One of our interviewees, who is a member of the local government envisioned a very dark future by showing his highly oversimplified and stereotypical opinion on the Chinese, saying that they are harmful in taking away jobs from the Hungarians, cheating on taxes, and forcing the Hungarians out of their own country by developing their own institutions. When we asked him why, if this is such a problem, the municipality does not take care of it, we heard another representative of the local government behind us laugh and say 'What could we do about this? We can't do anything, do you think it is possible for us to kick all the foreigners out of the country?' Both of the representatives laughed.

[15] Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet.

Most coverage dealing with minorities was about the Roma.[16] News in tabloids was generally concerned with a specific Roma celebrity or with supposed "Roma criminality". In the quality newspapers the most relevant issues concerning the Roma were the activities of Roma politicians, the integration of the Roma, topics about social benefits, crime and violence, and finally cultural news. A recent study of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (Prischetzky and Szabó 2011) based on 300 articles collected from 70 national homepages examining the negative stereotypes related to migrants in the Hungarian media found that migrants are often reported as criminals and homeless, while their personal life-stories, which would be crucial for understanding them more and for building bridges, hardly appear.

5 Concluding Remarks

After the transition to a market economy, Hungary faced an economically challenging era. This transition resulted in a massive social change, leaving many people behind. The Roma and the working class population were severely hit by the downfall of socialism and the consequences of market liberalization. In Józsefváros and Kőbánya most of the inhabitants were from these groups, therefore it came as no surprise that many problems surfaced here sooner and more seriously than in other districts of the capital, amidst greater frustration. The Asian immigrants who settled here in the 1990s mainly saw the chance that the transition period and VISA free entry offered them. Today the coexistence of immigrants and Hungarians is not as conflictual as relations between the Roma and non-Roma. Therefore, we could say that the relations between the host society and immigrants is 'peaceful yet somewhat isolated coexistence', whereby they don't engage in much interaction with the other group.

From a closer perspective, we can conclude that this kind of integration in our neighbourhoods is highly influenced by the urban, economic and social context in which interactions between the host society and migrants take place. We found that the most conflictual relations are the ones in which the immigrants are the most active, namely in commercial sites – the 'Four Tigers Market' and Népszínház Street – due to the Hungarian traders' discontent with what they consider as unfair competition, and the conflicts related to employment issues. The relationship of migrants and Hungarians in residential sites is more peaceful since open conflict seldom erupts and at worst only small problems occur, mainly originating from the cohabitation of people with different cultural backgrounds (i.e., controversies about smelly food or a different lifestyle). On the other hand, the inter-group interactions are less frequent. It is worth underlining that in residential contexts relations developed in the labour market have been of a very different nature than the ones occurring in market sites: these are trust-based relations stemming from care

[16] FRA – European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2008.

service provided by members of the more deprived layers of the host society to Chinese families.

The perception and judgement of non-EU immigrants in Józsefváros and Kőbánya is highly influenced by the standard of living and social conditions of the host society members. Due to the sharp profit-driven competition on the labour market, ethnic minorities and immigrants working in the area find themselves in a highly complex net of inter-group relations, where competition for scarce resources is the main driving force. To overcome these barriers and balance the economy-driven solutions, it would be desirable to have thoughtful and well-planned policies which seek to profit from the diverse communities that live in these districts. As the competencies of the local policymakers and the potential of the NGOs are grossly limited, and issues of immigration and integration are either scarcely or negatively documented in the media, the jury is still out regarding when the situation will change.

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Inter-Group Perceptions and Representations in Two Barcelona Neighbourhoods: Poble Sec and Sagrada Família Compared

Ricard Morén-Alegret, Albert Mas, and Dawid Wladyka

He andado muchos caminos
He abierto muchas veredas;
He navegado en cien mares
Y atracado en cien riberas (…)
Y en todas partes he visto
Gentes que danzan o juegan,
Cuando pueden, y laboran…

(Antonio Machado/Joan Manuel Serrat)

1 The Deep Roots of Diversity in a Mediterranean Metropolis

Barcelona is a coastal city that had 1,619,337 inhabitants on 1 January 2010, according to the Official Local Continuous Census (*Padrón Municipal*), 17.46 % of whom were foreigners. Furthermore, Barcelona city is the core of a metropolitan region (RMB), which is the home to around five million inhabitants. Barcelona is also the capital of Catalonia, where Catalan and Castilian-Spanish are co-official languages. From an economic point of view, since the 1980s Barcelona has mainly been relying on services, including retail commerce, tourism, international trade and

Quote from a song written by Joan Manuel Serrat, known as 'the Poble Sec boy', based on Antonio Machado poetry. A rough translation into English is: "I have walked many ways/I have opened many paths/I have sailed one hundred seas/I have docked in many shores (…) And everywhere I have seen/People dancing or playing/When they can, and labouring…".

R. Morén-Alegret (✉) • A. Mas • D. Wladyka
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
e-mail: ricard.moren@uab.cat; albert.mas@uab.cat; dawid.wladyka@uab.cat

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Fig. 1 Overview of densely populated Poble Sec, including the Three Chimneys' Park, and surroundings from Montjuïc Mountain (Photo by R. Morén)

construction industries that have attracted a variety of unskilled and medium-skilled immigrants. Since the 2000s, however, innovative sectors linked to cultural, educational and scientific activities, ITCs and the knowledge economy have also been attracting highly-skilled immigrants (Fig. 1).

The main focus of this chapter is on two Barcelona neighbourhoods: Sagrada Família (in the Eixample District) and Poble Sec (in the Sants-Montjuïc District).[1] At the social level, both neighbourhoods have had a very active local civil society during the last decades and today they are the only neighbourhoods in their respective districts where official Community Plans[2] have been implemented. As it will be explained in the following sections, the profile of both neighbourhoods constitutes an intersection of a wide variety of religions, languages, cultures and socio-economic statuses stemming from several waves of migration. Additionally, in Catalonia, as noted above, the native population is also linguistically and culturally diverse. In order to understand how all those groups are living together (or not), one needs to gather various experiences and opinions among multiple actors who are living or working in the studied areas. In particular, as noted in the Introduction to this book, this chapter takes the super-diversity paradigm perspective into account.

This paradigm emerged from the studies of Steven Vertovec (2007) on the complex social structure in today's United Kingdom (and later in other countries). The super-

[1] Our fieldwork was mainly carried out from April 2011 to April 2012.

[2] The Community Plan (*Pla Comunitari*) is a mostly public-funded, neighbourhood-based, bottom-up umbrella organization. The plan's goals are to diagnose the neighbourhood's basic needs and to address its most serious problems. Members of various organizations meet up on a regular basis to coordinate their organizations in order to improve their neighbourhood together (see: http://placomunitari.barrisagradafamilia.org/, and http://pcpoble-sec.org/).

diversity paradigm has helped not only to capture a wider variety of immigration waves than before, but also to highlight that, within all immigrant groups (as well as native groups), there is a mosaic of individuals characterized by distinct gender, socio-economic statuses, experiences, patterns, motives for migration, etc. A growing number of studies insist on the need to take super-diversity more into account, especially in local policymaking (e.g. Ram et al. 2013; Blommaert and Rampton 2011).

However, analyzing reality while putting a value on diversity and processes of diversification was not always a primary perspective for neighbourhood studies. As highlighted in the introductory chapter, for years researchers often linked neighbourhood studies to segregation studies. Nevertheless, as time went by, neighbourhood diversity became the central focus of research[3] increasingly often.

This sub-municipal level is particularly relevant in Barcelona, where neighbourhood associations have a long history (e.g. in the 1960s and 1970s these associations channelled Spanish internal immigrants' participation) and where already in the mid-1990s the Barcelona federation of neighbourhood associations, FAVB, intended "to increase the incorporation of foreign immigrants in neighbourhood associations and in the neighbourhoods as a whole" (Morén-Alegret 2002b: 169). Since 2000, FAVB has been implementing a socio-educational program named 'neighbourhood, space for living together' (*Barri Espai de Convivència BEC*[4]).

In any case, however, even though both Sagrada Família and Poble Sec belong to Barcelona city and share some commonalities, in this chapter we shall show that these two neighbourhoods are quite different with regard to their urban fabric, social dynamics, economic activities and immigration flows. As noted in the Introduction to this book, these neighbourhoods belong to two broad different groups: the first and larger group is made up of former industrial areas while the second consists of relatively central neighbourhoods where the service sector (trade, leisure, museums and tourist destinations, etc.) prevails.

In toponymic and historical terms, the Sagrada Família neighbourhood was named after the homonymous Catholic church that has been under construction there since the late nineteenth century following architect Antoni Gaudí's designs. In the Catalan and Castilian languages, the toponym 'Sagrada Família' means 'Holy Family', and construction started in 1881 in former crop fields belonging to *El Poblet* ('little village' in Catalan), a small semi-rural setting within the boundaries of the former municipality of Sant Martí de Provençals. Those and other building activities started to attract internal rural immigrants (Ligüerre 2007). In 1897, the sparsely populated municipality of Sant Martí was absorbed by Barcelona. Historically, Poble Sec shares with Sagrada Família the fact that in the early nineteenth century it also

[3] In the European context, see for instance the EU-funded GEITONIES project (Fonseca and McGarrigle 2012).

[4] The BEC programme was initially mainly devoted to tackle the arrival of foreign immigrants to Barcelona neighbourhoods, but later the focus has widened to tackle any issue that neighbours consider as a challenge to overcome. BEC has two main aims: to carry out a participative diagnosis of the neighbourhood and to foster debates among neighbours. BEC was implemented in Sagrada Familia during 2002–2003 and in Poble Sec in 2008. See: http://barriespaideconvivencia.wordpress.com.

had pockets of semi-rural activity. In the Catalan language, the toponym 'Poble Sec' means 'Dry Village'. In the past, this was an agricultural area supplying fresh vegetables to Barcelona, and it is ironic that an area that was rich in water until the early nineteenth century is known today as a dry area. From 1830 onwards, several textile industries were set up nearby, due to its proximity to the seaport, and in just 20 years the subterranean water sources were exhausted. Most of the Poble Sec neighbourhood had been protected from urban expansion because it was a military area linked to the castle located at the top of Montjuïc Mountain, but the ban on construction was lifted in the mid-nineteenth century, paving the way to housing construction, urbanization and immigration (Badenas 2006). Regarding historical ethnic-religious diversity and connections between the Poble Sec and Sagrada Família neighbourhoods, it is interesting to note that, according to several historians, the term 'Montjuïc' means 'Jewish Mountain', a toponym coined due to the Jewish cemetery located there during the Middle Ages (others, however, believe that the toponym 'Montjuïc' comes from another religious connection, from the Latin *Mons Iovis*, i.e., Jupiter Mountain). As another curious connection, it may be mentioned that the Sagrada Família temple, just like many other high-profile historical buildings in Barcelona, was originally built using stones from the Montjuïc Mountain quarry.

In the analysis that has been carried out during the past years, we have taken into account both differences and common factors affecting Sagrada Família, Poble Sec and Barcelona as a whole. In previous studies, the working classes have been associated with the concept of 'community' and place attachment, while in contrast the middle classes have been considered to be more individualistic and relatively less place-attached (see Halfacree and Boyle 1993). One may wonder whether a similar pattern is also emerging in Barcelona's neighbourhoods, and whether the local associative networks and institutions are relevant for immigrants' integration and, if so, how (Bruquetas et al. 2011). In this sense, it may be helpful to consider how the passage of time has affected immigrants' participation in associations (Layton-Henry 1990; Morén-Alegret 2002a, b). But before providing more information about the focus neighbourhoods, some methodological notes might be helpful in order to grasp the research project upon which this chapter is based. In the following sections, the Poble Sec and Sagrada Família neighbourhoods will be approached as contexts of social interaction (Sect. 2), the main inter-group representations occurring there will be analyzed (Sect. 3), the two neighbourhoods will be studied as objects of media representation (Sect. 4) and, finally, some further reflections on these Barcelona neighbourhoods will be offered (Sect. 5).

1.1 Methodological Considerations

The research project that has yielded this chapter started with documental and statistical work in order to learn from previous research and available databases on international immigration in Barcelona. It then set up a general framework and selected two sub-municipal units which were then studied in depth. Regarding the sub-municipal units of analysis considered in this research project, the selection



Fig. 2 Foreign registered residents in the neighbourhoods of Barcelona municipality, 1 January 2012 (Elaborated by D. Wladyka. Georeferenced data provided by ICC and IGN. Population data source: INE, 2012)

process took into account the official administrative subdivisions of the Barcelona urban area. In Barcelona there are 10 districts, subdivided into 73 neighbourhoods that are officially recognized as geographical and administrative units (see www.bcn.cat/estadistica/angles/terri/index.htm) (Fig. 2).

Our fieldwork was mainly carried out from April 2011 to April 2012. The first stage was mainly devoted to preliminary explorations and interviews with key informants and stakeholders in order to prepare a background report (available at www.concordiadiscors.eu). The second stage of the fieldwork included ethnographic activities at three 'interaction sites' in each neighbourhood (see *Barcelona Final*

Report, also available on the project's website) and the organization of 'neighbourhood forums' (for more details, see the Introduction to this book by Pastore and Ponzo). An exploratory study on the local elections that took place in May 2011 was also carried out in the spring and summer of 2011, with additional interviews with representatives of the five main political parties and coalitions being carried out in both neighbourhoods (see Morén-Alegret et al. 2011).

2 The Urban and Social Context of Social Interaction in Words and Numbers

Poble Sec can be defined as a semi-peripheral working-class neighbourhood, with a percentage of foreign residents clearly above the Barcelona average. Sagrada Família, instead, is a semi-central lower-middle class neighbourhood, with a percentage of foreign residents around the Barcelona average (Fig. 3).

2.1 Narrow Streets Promoting Interactions versus Busy Wide Arteries Separating Crowds

Poble Sec has four very clearly defined boundaries: Espanya Square-Lleida Street, Montjuïc Mountain, the main seaport and Parallel Avenue. In fact, this is one of its key geographical characteristics, together with its peripheral status within the Sants-Montjuïc district, the largest district in Barcelona. In contrast, Sagrada Família is part of the Eixample district, a vast city enlargement built on Barcelona plain when the walls of the old city were demolished in the nineteenth century. The boundaries of



Fig. 3 Population density (population/km2) in Sagrada Família, Poble Sec and Barcelona as a whole (01.01.2010) (Continuous Census. Departament d'Estadística. Ajuntament de Barcelona)

the neighbourhood are relatively well-known, although slightly varying depending on whom you ask, but they are easily crossed. In this sense, in Sagrada Família, the inflow of people from outside the neighbourhood is massive and particularly noticeable in the area of the Sagrada Família temple: tourist inflows and car traffic are underscored by many informants. On the other hand, in Poble Sec, there are generally few visits from people from outside the neighbourhood. It is perceived by some as a cul-de-sac because it is connected to the rest of the Sants-Montjuïc district by just a narrow corridor near Espanya Square – Lleida Street and by Montjuïc Mountain. The main routes to Montjuïc Mountain do not cross the heart of the neighbourhood:

> Another characteristic that I would say about the neighbourhood is that it is a not very permeable. I mean, luckily not a lot of people come here. And I see that positively. (B-PS-KI-3-Poble Sec, association member, 28 years old)

However, during recent years there has been a process of ongoing change in a few streets that are becoming part of the city's 'bohemian' leisure and nightlife scene. In contrast, in Sagrada Família there are just a few nightlife establishments and a handful of activities for young people.

Sagrada Família and Poble Sec are both densely populated neighbourhoods compared to Barcelona as a whole, but while the former is an area of transit with wide streets and a lot of car traffic, the latter has narrow streets and very little car traffic, with the exception of Parallel Avenue, one of the borders of the neighbourhood.

Sagrada Família lacks open and green spaces, especially for celebrating local festivities and for social activities in general. On the other hand, Poble Sec also has the same dearth of open and green spaces within the neighbourhood, but it borders the Montjuïc Mountain Park at one end and *Tres Xemeneies* Park at another. One similarity between the two neighbourhoods is a widespread perception of a lack of public services, particularly with regard to spaces and resources for children, youngsters and elderly people. Some basic services are not available within the neighbourhood, especially in the case of Poble Sec: for example, there is no adult school, and the health centre and the library are too small for the needs of the neighbourhood. In Sagrada Família, there are complaints and requests to improve short distance transport with a neighbourhood bus ('*bus de barri*') in order to increase accessibility for elderly people. Interviewees also mentioned the lack of a civic centre devoted solely to youth activities.

Regarding housing stocks, Sagrada Família is mostly made up of tenements of up to six floors, which house generally good quality apartments, some of which are divided into smaller flats. They were built in different periods, mainly from the urbanization of the neighbourhood in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century to the 1970s and 1980s. Some parts of the neighbourhood, especially the squares' inner areas, were remodelled during the last decade by creating new gardens with the *Pla de Barris* (i.e. the Neighbourhood Plan implemented by previous centre-left Catalan governments, 2003–2010). On the other hand, Poble Sec is made up of a mixture of different kinds of housing stock. In the northern part, which touches Parallel Avenue, there are big blocks of medium-quality flats built during 1970s and 1980s. The central part contains little blocks of flats built during different periods and of varying quality, dating from the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, but generally older than in the northern sector. On the

other hand, in the most southern part, on the side of Montjuïc Mountain, one can find more expensive flats and houses with gardens built during the early twentieth century. Some parts of the neighbourhood have been remodelled during the last decade as part of the Neighbourhood Plan.

With regard to the local economy, while in Sagrada Família most shops and bars in the area surrounding the cathedral – the most important touristic spot in Barcelona according to number of visitors – are devoted to mass tourism, in Poble Sec tourism is generally not very relevant (except in Montjuïc Mountain). It must be added that in recent years, the economic crisis has led to the closure of several commercial establishments in both neighbourhoods.

2.2 *A Neighbourhood with Soul' versus an Impersonal Dormitory Area with a Big Cathedral*

Both neighbourhoods are very densely populated areas, clearly above the 2010 Barcelona average of about 16,000 inhabitants/km^2,[5] but from a social point of view they display very different characteristics (Fig. 4).



Fig. 4 The most important touristic spots in Barcelona by number of visitors in 2010, with Sagrada Familia Temple as the top of the pops (Source: Elaborated by GRM, based on data from Departament d'Estadística. Ajuntament de Barcelona. Institut Cultura Barcelona. Turisme de Barcelona)

[5] Sagrada Família has a population of about 52,000 inhabitants, a density of approx. 47,000 inhabitants/km^2, and 16.9 % of the population was foreign (2010). On the other hand, Poble Sec has a population of about 40,000 inhabitants, a density of approx. 43,000 inhabitants/km^2, and 27.9 % of the population was foreign (2010).

Table 1 Percentage of foreign and national population, 01.01.2010 (INE database, municipal census official figures [elaborated by GRM] (retrieved: 24.02.2011)

	Sagrada Família (%)	Eixample district (%)	Poble Sec (%)	Sants-Montjuïc district (%)	Barcelona (%)
Spanish	83.14	81.96	72.1	80.26	82.54
Total foreigners	16.86	18.04	27.9	19.74	17.46
Non-EU foreigners	11.86	11.71	21.77	15.61	12.83

Source: INE database, municipal census official figures [elaborated by GRM] (retrieved: 24.02.2011)

Both neighbourhoods, however, have been steadily changing with the influx of young Spanish families from other parts of Barcelona and foreign immigrants from abroad, though with some substantial differences. Sagrada Família can be considered mainly as a middle-class neighbourhood, with relatively high real estate prices that inhibit the arrival of young families and immigrant residents. In contrast, Poble Sec is a predominantly working-class neighbourhood with lower real estate prices. During the last decade, however, it has attracted growing numbers of young middle-class residents who have contributed to a more mixed social environment.

According to data from the Local Continuous Census for 2010, in both Poble Sec and Sagrada Família, the proportion of the elderly population is high, but to different degrees: in Sagrada Família, the population over the age of 64 accounts for over 22.0 % of the total, while in Poble Sec it represents just 18.5 %. Both neighbourhoods, however, have been steadily changing with the inflow of young Spanish families from other parts of Barcelona and foreign immigrants from abroad (Table 1).

Although in both neighbourhoods there are many associations, the quality and intensity of participation in local social life can be identified as one of the main differences between the two neighbourhoods. Sagrada Família has many associations, but only a few neighbours participate in their activities: most of the residents participate little in the local social life. Many of them only sleep in the neighbourhood and spend their spare time and working hours outside of it. The neighbourhood has lost its historical identity because of its residential nature and the lack of social participation. This can be identified as one of the main differences between the two neighbourhoods.

In Poble Sec, however, there is a vivid social life: the participation in associative activities is very well-developed and involves a wide range of people and activities. It is often described as a 'friendly' neighbourhood (*barrio familiar*). The sense of closeness among its inhabitants is strong, and most informants interviewed during the fieldwork reported the feeling that, although the arrival of new population groups has affected the former 'chummy' social relations in the neighbourhood, there is still a balance that has allowed Poble Sec to maintain warm social relations and some degree of distinct place identity compared to other parts of the city. In the words of a young resident:

> This is a neighbourhood where there is a lot of local life, warm social relations [‘caliu de barri’]. Everybody knows each other, residents, shopkeepers… There is a tight social feeling among its inhabitants. And, even with the recent arrival of many newcomers – foreigners and people from other parts of Barcelona – there is still a balance with the people who have been residing in Poble Sec all their lives. (B-PS-KI-3-Poble Sec, association member, 28 years old)

However, a few informants suggested that the neighbourhood’s identity is disappearing due, among other factors, to the inflow of immigrants:

> It was a very united neighbourhood and with very good relationships (…), but precisely during these last ten years, when all these people from the outside have come, ‘the newcomers’ we call them, this has disappeared. There is no warm coexistence. (B-PS-KI-2-Poble Sec, residents’ association, 58 years old)

Despite these negative opinions, in Poble Sec there are many dynamic associations to promote intercultural harmony. As clearly emerging from the gallery of cases studied in this book, social cohesion and strong neighbourhood identity play an ambiguous role since they can foster both openness and closure to outsiders. This is another difference with Sagrada Família, where there are many associations, but only a few participants in their activities. In contrast, community participation in Poble Sec is very well-developed and involves a wide range of people and activities.

2.3 Visible and Invisible Immigrants

In both cases, internal migration was already sizeable in the nineteenth century, when Sagrada Família, which was then called ‘El Poblet’, was already home to mainly rural immigrants attracted by manufacturing jobs that were better paid and more stable than agricultural work. In addition to immigrants from Catalan mountains and plains, workers also came from other regions of Spain such as Valencia, Andalusia, Aragon, Murcia and Galicia. Although the pressure of residential housing triggered the disappearance of many manufacturing businesses, several factories were still active as late as the 1960s and 1970s. During this time, there were immigrants from other parts of Catalonia and Spain in the neighbourhood, as well as from Valencia, Murcia, the Balearic Islands, Andalusia, Castile, Extremadura, Aragon, the Canary Islands and North Africa (Spaniards), as well as a few foreigners (Ligüerre 2007). Recent decades have witnessed the arrival of foreign immigrants from a wider variety of nationalities, mainly Europeans, Latin Americans and, lately, Asians.

On the other hand, Poble Sec has welcomed people from all of the different migratory waves that have settled in Barcelona during the past century. In addition to the internal rural–urban Catalan migration movements to the Barcelona metropolitan region during the twentieth century there were two major periods of growth due to internal migration: from 1916 to 1930 industrial expansion and public works required workers, who arrived principally from geographically close areas within Spain; from the 1950s to mid-1970s, the massive immigration into the Barcelona



Fig. 5 The timeline of changes in the proportion of foreign residents in the total population of the Sagrada Família and Poble Sec neighbourhoods compared to Barcelona as a whole (1991, 1996, 2001, 2004–2010) (Source: GRM, based on Continuous Census, Ajuntament de Barcelona; Cens de Població i Habitatge 1991, 1996, 2001, INE. IDESCAT)

region was from more distant Spanish regions. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, another inflow began, made up of international immigrants, mainly from Morocco, a variety of Latin American countries and Asian countries such as Pakistan and China (Fig. 5):

> And just like in the 1950s and 60s or the 1930s we were a neighbourhood hosting other migrations, this time we have been a neighbourhood hosting these new immigrants. And we've withstood it, we have paid a price, of course we have paid a high price, because the last time we had many immigrants among us we put them on Montjuïc Mountain in cardboard or brick barracks. With totally unhealthy conditions, no medicine, no doctors, no schools … Now it is different. Now what we have done is to shelter them among us. Maybe you knew that in your neighbour's house next door, ten people were living there, when maybe it was built for six… And this is the issue. We have paid the price of having them among us. But at the same time we did our best to prevent them from living in barracks, because it has not happened again. And we've worked with them. An important part of what the associative movement has done is trying to work with them… (B-PS-KI-11 Poble Sec, association member, 50 years old)

In Sagrada Família, according to the local continuous census, in 2010 the most numerous foreign nationalities were Italians (10.5 % of the foreign population), Peruvians (8.3 %), Chinese (7.9 %), Ecuadorians (6.8 %) and Colombians (6.3 %).[6]

[6] According to the Barcelona City Council's Statistics Department, in 2012 Chinese immigrants became the most numerous national group residing in Sagrada Família (908 inhabitants), followed by Italians (899) and Peruvians (625); see: http://www.bcn.cat/estadistica/catala/dades/inf/barris/a2012/barri6.pdf.

Table 2 Main foreign nationalities in the areas studied, 1.01.2010)

Sagrada Família	Eixample district	Poble Sec	Sants-Montjuïc district	Barcelona
Italy 909	Italy 5,538	Pakistan 1,357	Ecuador 3,187	Italy 22,684
Peru 779	China 4,143	Morocco 1,012	Morocco 2,372	Ecuador 22,210
China 722	France 3,206	Philippines 982	Pakistan 2,267	Pakistan 17,735

Sources: http://www.bcn.es/estadistica/angles/dades/inf/barris/a2009/pdf/dte022.pdf (retrieved: 05.02.2011) and http://www.bcn.es/estadistica/angles/dades/inf/barris/a2009/pdf/dte031.pdf (retrieved: 05.02.2011)

On the other hand, in Poble Sec the first group were Pakistanis (11.5 %), followed by Filipinos (9.2 %), Moroccans (8.1 %), Italians (6.4 %), Dominicans (5.9 %) and Ecuadorians (5.6 %) (Table 2).[7]

In the next pages this official data will be compared with the perceptions of the interviewees.

According to the interviewed stakeholders, one of the main differences between the two neighbourhoods is that in Sagrada Família the immigrants are not very visible on the streets because of the massive presence of tourists, the wide main streets and the residential nature of the neighbourhood. The above-mentioned share of foreign population residents is not perfectly reflected by the actual perception of their presence in the neighbourhoods. In fact, alongside differences in figures, the two neighbourhoods also differ in terms of immigrants' visibility in public spaces. According to the interviewed stakeholders, in Sagrada Família the immigrants are not very visible on the streets since it is a touristic destination and a residential area with a limited number of public spaces and both characteristics have an impact on the visibility of immigrants because they become merged with the mass of tourists. On the contrary, in Poble Sec immigrants are very visible on some streets, as there are few neighbourhood users from outside both during the week and at weekends, and the heart of the neighbourhood is not crossed by wide traffic lanes.

Building on all these perceptions and statistics, and data from interviews with other local actors and other relevant sources of information, inter-group representations and behaviours in both neighbourhoods will be analyzed in the following sections.

[7] Also according to the Barcelona City Council's Statistics Department, in 2012 Pakistani immigrants were still the most numerous national group residing in Poble Sec (2,120 inhabitants), followed by Filipinos (1,095) and Italians (1,008); see: http://www.bcn.cat/estadistica/catala/dades/inf/barris/a2012/barri11.pdf.

3 Neighbours Talking About Neighbours: Who, What, and Where?

In this section, the main inter-group perceptions and representations occurring in both Barcelona neighbourhoods will be analyzed.

3.1 Sagrada Família: Dense but Cold

As we explained, according to the official figures, Italians are the most numerous group of foreign residents in the neighbourhood. Nonetheless, they are not the most visible ones according to the neighbours interviewed. Besides general phenotypical reasons, this is due not only to the lack of clear distinguishability of this national group but also to the fact that a substantial share of such Italians are in fact Argentineans *jure soli* who have been able to enter Spain and settle there after acquiring Italian citizenship *jure sanguinis* as descendants of Italian emigrants.

Official statistics show Peruvians and Chinese as the next largest nationalities. Both of these nationalities are mentioned by interviewees as having a major presence in the neighbourhood. Peruvians are often included within larger categories such as 'Latin Americans' or 'South Americans'. Additionally, some interviewees also include Colombians, Mexicans, Ecuadorians and Argentineans as a part of those groups. Although frequently mentioned as being present in the neighbourhood, Mexicans are not in the list of main foreign nationalities. This might correspond with some interviewees' comments that a number of Latin American immigrants do not live in the Sagrada Família neighbourhood, but only work there.

Latin Americans are predominantly seen as 'the immigrants who have paid jobs'. They rarely own bars or shops, or are self-employed in other forms. Their presence is sometimes related to the ageing of the neighbourhood: many of them are in fact reported as working in the personal services sector, especially taking care of the elderly. In contrast to the apparently quiet Chinese community, young Latin Americans were portrayed by some informants as being responsible for noisy street life until late hours and the lack of safety on the streets. We should also mention that these allegations were not confirmed during the ethnographic fieldwork.

In contrast, Chinese immigrants are seen as a closed but peaceful community that does not cause problems in the neighbourhood. Still, it seems that the issue of the rapid growth in Chinese-owned commercial establishments is becoming a possible hot topic in the immigration debate within the neighbourhood. The Chinese residents' strong purchasing power and the supposed poor quality of their shops and products seem to be the most disturbing issues, especially, but not only, for native shopkeepers.

The other immigrant groups 'labelled' by interviewees as prominent in the neighbourhood are 'Muslims' (specified as Pakistanis and Moroccans), 'Senegalese',

'East Europeans' (detailed as Romanians, Ukrainians and Russians), and 'European migrants' (mainly Italians).

Pakistanis are perceived as less numerous and somehow more socially open than Chinese immigrants. However, the general perception is that they, also, are a closed community:

> A neighbourly relation between a Spanish woman and a Pakistani man is impossible in the neighbourhood. Between man and man, yes, there are some relations (…) For example: there is a Pakistani child in the school, and the school needs to speak with the parents. The mother never goes. It is always the father that responds to the call… The school director is a woman, and so there is no dialogue because the father needs to speak to a man. If there is no man, the dialogue ends. (B-SF-NF-34 Sagrada Família, social organization member, 44 years old)

Just like the Chinese, Pakistanis are known to run small businesses (mainly kebab joints and grocery stores) that are open long hours. They are also recognized as working in gift shops for tourists in the area of Sagrada Família cathedral. Their presence is not described using terms such as 'flood', but they are seen as a large group.

The so-called 'people from the East' (i.e. Belarusians, Ukrainians, Russians and Romanians) have a bad reputation related to alcohol consumption, conflict, a lack of safety and discomfort. Romanians are portrayed as perennial beggars and delinquents prone to committing petty crimes (Fig. 6).

Fig. 6 Multicultural Interaction Group stall during a local street festival, a poster imitating non-smoking signs announces a 'Space without [xenophobic] rumours' (Photo by D. Wladyka)

The Sagrada Família neighbourhood is a tourist destination and residential area with a limited number of public spaces. Both characteristics have an impact on the visibility of immigrants, as they become merged with the mass of tourists. Concerning the opportunities of interaction, the daily and often superficial inter-group relations take place mainly in bars (mostly owned by Chinese and some Peruvians) and shops (grocery shops owned by Pakistanis and multi-purpose shops owned by Chinese):

> If you walk through the neighbourhood […] you notice that there are a lot of bars and restaurants […] run by Chinese people […] Peruvian bars, Colombian bars […] None of them has a presence in the street […] since this is a dormitory neighbourhood not for [social] life […] This a very touristic neighbourhood […] The [immigrants'] presence is not very obvious […] In other sites you see it like: wow! But not here. (B-SF-KI-06-Sagrada Família, social organization technician, 34 years old)

There are no well-developed immigrant organizations in the Sagrada Família neighbourhood. There is a Chinese Evangelical church, but it does not seem to interact much with the other organizations in the neighbourhood. There were some attempts to set up a Peruvian immigrants' association, but ultimately it was transferred to another neighbourhood. In a way, it is possible to acknowledge a sort of isomorphism in Sagrada Família: the relative low degree of immigrant participation in associations is similar to the relative low degree of native participation.

However, some organizations have become meeting places for immigrants and natives alike. One example is the Multicultural Interaction Group (*Grup d'Interacció Multicultural*, GIM),[8] an organization located in a socio-cultural space called *Espai 210* that seems to be the most prominent of its kind in the entire neighbourhood (see Photos Figs. 7 and 8). Its core activities include organizing cultural activities and fighting stereotypes. Immigrants of Latin American origin (Peruvian, Cuban, and Argentinian) are especially active in the organization.

There is a space for newcomers' integration in the neighbourhood's public library. But what seems particularly important and effective in promoting integration is the coexistence in one single building of a public library, a civic centre, the local market place, social services, an excursionists' club and other organizations which are all located side by side. In this building, one can gain access to cultural and educational services, free internet, a variety of organized activities and everyday basics such as shopping. The result is an area of encounter that fosters everyday interactions, albeit often superficial, between immigrants and natives. Furthermore, some of the activities (e.g. Chinese New Year's celebration) held in the Civic Centre seem to also have a significant and positive role in promoting immigrant participation.

Some interviewees also noted the participation of immigrants in other organizations. Among them, we should highlight the *Associació de Veïns i Veïnes de la Sagrada Família*[9] (i.e., Neighbours' Association, providing mainly free Catalan

[8] See: http://www.gimsagradafamilia.blogspot.com.es

[9] See: http://www.avvsagradafamilia.net/

Fig. 7 Multicultural Interaction Group stall during a local street festival, a debate on multicultural interaction (Photo by D. Wladyka)



Fig. 8 Timeline of changes in the five most populous foreign nationalities (2010) in percentage of total population in the Sagrada Família neighbourhood (2000, 2004–2010) (Source: GRM, based on the Continuous Census, Ajuntament de Barcelona)

language lessons), *Aula Ambiental de la Sagrada Família*[10] (i.e. Environmental Classroom, located near the temple and offering activities and short courses on sustainability, etc.), *Castellers de la Sagrada Família*[11] (the traditional Human Towers movement, where immigrants and natives can climb on each other's backs to form human pyramids), as well as language and music schools in the neighbourhood. However, there are differences in participation by national groups. The perceived explanatory elements are manifold, with national origin as a decisive variable. Chinese immigrants are perceived as the least participative, and Latin Americans are seen as the most actively involved in the life of the neighbourhood. The interviewees put this down to differences in linguistic skills, cultural background, daily working hours and knowledge about how the neighbourhood operates, which is dependent on length of residence.

> The ones from South America participate, although not the young ones but those who are mature […] they probably have already spent some time here […] they know how the neighbourhood works. (B-SF-KI-03-Sagrada Família, socio-cultural activist, 28 years old)

Generational belonging also seems to matter. The informants noticed that the second generation of people of Chinese origin do relate more to natives. They go to schools with natives and other immigrants and maintain friendships with them:

> You cannot see them shopping in the stores […] maybe now you can start to see it […] some young Chinese girls do, sometimes; I saw one buying in the shops, in the market […] so you say it is not so bad. (B-SF-I-01-Sagrada Família, shop keeper & traders' association, 51 years old)

> The Chinese do not participate a lot. But I had a Chinese classmate in the Catalan language course. The girl was completely integrated. You can find all kinds of people. (B-SF-NF-31-Sagrada Família, social organization member, 64 years old)

Finally, the third element cited by interviewees to explain immigrants' participation in civic life is the type of organization: traditional organizations such as *Castellers* and the board that organizes local traditional festivities seem to attract immigrants' attention and participation the most; in contrast, the shopkeepers' or excursionists' associations seem to be ignored by immigrants. Two main reasons for this different degree of participation arose from ethnographic observations. Firstly, organizations such as the *Castellers* and the committees of the local traditional festivities are usually the most popular organizations in the neighbourhood among both younger and older residents, whereas the shopkeepers' associations in the neighbourhood are visibly divided and often have distinct aims that cannot be easily understood by new or prospective members. Secondly, while there is a fee for participating in shopkeepers' and excursionists' organizations, participation in traditional activities, Catalan language courses or other short courses is often free of charge.

[10] See: http://aulambientalsf.blogspot.com.es/

[11] See: www.castellerssagradafamilia.com. Furthermore, for a general introduction to the importance of the human towers movement regarding foreign immigrants' integration in Catalonia, also see Morén-Alegret (2007).

In any case, the lack of participation is not exclusive to immigrants: the interviewees generally saw young people as not participating. Therefore, the inter-generational gap is relevant in terms of inter-group relations. In many organizations, such as the Neighbours' Association, it became quite visible during the ethnographic observation that the majority of day-to-day active participants are elderly or mature people. There seem to be many reasons for this situation, such as the fact that some important organizations are controlled by the same group of neighbours for years on end. Another related reason could be the lack of openness to new ideas and to young people.

Another issue related to inter-group representations in Sagrada Família has to do with formal education. Some interviewees noted that recently most students in public schools appear to be immigrants or immigrants' children. According to them, native people tend to go to semi-private[12] schools because immigrants 'lower' the level of public education. Immigrant students in private or semi-private schools are mainly from China because they can afford it. Latin Americans and Africans primarily attend public schools:

> I had five or six [foreign classmates] in a class of twenty-five people. My brother had over 50 % […] Immigrants lower the schooling level. It is somehow ugly to say it… but it is true. (Sagrada Família, B-SF-KI-10-sports instructor & cultural organizations member, 24 years old)

The perception of the increasing number of immigrants' children in the public schools corresponds with the data about the average household age according to nationality. The households made up of foreign members are, on average, 17 years 'younger' than Spanish nationality households. However, while immigrants' households are relatively younger than the rest, their number is not high enough to explain the perception that schools are being 'flooded' with foreign immigrants. This can be seen in the statistics about the proportion of young foreigners to the total population in their age group, which does not show an especially high number of foreign youths. In particular, during the last 4 years, this figure did not exceed 20 % in any of the age groups. The primary data about schooling in Barcelona shows that 4 out of 16 public schools and 2 out of 29 semi-private schools in the Eixample district have more than 30 % foreign students. The data on the education of the children between the ages of 3 and 16 show that most of the foreign students are from Latin American and Asian backgrounds (Consorci d'Educació de Barcelona 2010). The difference between the number of immigrants' children in the neighbourhood and the perception of their increasing presence in public schools might be tentatively explained, based on the fieldwork, by the greater popularity of private and semi-private schools among native parents (also those located in other Eixample neighbourhoods) than among immigrant parents. However, further research and analysis focused on this specific issue should be carried out in order to provide comprehensive explanations.

[12] In Catalonia and other Spanish regions, there are numerous semi-private schools known as 'escoles concertades'. They are privately run schools co-funded by the regional government. In this way, the regional government may have a say in some 'escola concertada' issues. The fees are lower than in private schools but higher than in public schools.

Box 1: 'Encants Vells': No-man's Land

One of the Sagrada Família areas specifically studied during the project was *'Encants Vells'* (in Spanish, '*Encantes Viejos*'). This toponym refers to its most significant place: the homonymous open-air flea market. A common feature of the area is the perception that it is distinct and somehow outside both Sagrada Família and other surrounding neighbourhoods. Some people who work or live in the area even describe it as 'no-man's land'. According to some neighbours, foreign immigrants have had a major impact on the area in the last decade. There are four key issues that residents see as problematic which they relate to the increasing number of immigrants: (a) Illegal street vending is described as littering the area and increasing the sense of insecurity. Moroccan, Senegalese and Romanian immigrants are mentioned as participating in this activity; (b) The squatted houses and supposedly illegal warehouses are described as areas with no control, inhabited by suspicious people, creating noise and fire hazards and littering the area. Immigrants from other European countries – especially Portugal and Romania – and Morocco as well as some natives are mentioned in this context; (c) Robberies and assaults on the streets are described as alarming, but they are regarded as rare incidents. Moroccan immigrants and natives are mentioned as delinquents in this context; (d) Overpopulated flats, mostly rented by immigrants, are cited as being disturbing to other neighbours and creating unhygienic conditions. It is important to mention that although residents of Encants Vells are disturbed by the aforementioned issues, they believe that the area is less dangerous than those who live in other parts of the neighbourhood think. Nevertheless, the interviewees related to Encant Vells often ascribe the illegal street vending and robberies to some residents in this area. These activities are often explained by the current economic crisis, which is described as being equally challenging for both immigrants and natives. Finally, for some interviewees, there is lack of interaction between native and immigrant neighbours since the flea market attracts a lot of outsiders and it can hardly be considered a neighbours' area of encounter. It will be interesting to analyze the evolution of the area after the opening of the new flea market in Autumn 2013 (see: http://www.encantsbcn.com) and the renewal project of Glories square planned for the 2014–2018 period (see: http://glories.bcn.cat).

3.2 'Caliu de Barri': Dense and Warm Poble Sec

When considering Poble Sec inter-group representations, the differences between the immigrant communities in the neighbourhood seem to be a relevant issue. According to most interviewees, Moroccans, Pakistanis, Dominicans and Gypsy-Romanians stand out as the most numerous groups in Poble Sec. This observation is relatively accurate: as we explained above, according to official data, as of 1 January

2010, Pakistanis were the largest group of foreign nationality in the neighbourhood with 1,290 inhabitants, followed by Filipinos and Moroccans. We should furthermore consider that many shops in the Poble Sec neighbourhood are owned by Pakistani immigrants, which makes them quite visible in the streets and increases residents' perception of their presence. Dominicans, also perceived by the interviewees as one of the most numerous nationalities in the neighbourhood, rank fifth behind Italians. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that Dominican immigrants are often regarded as 'South Americans', although the Caribbean is obviously a distinct and profoundly different entity from the South American continent. Other residents attach the label 'Latin American' to all immigrants from former Iberian colonies in the Americas as a whole. In the same way, sometimes the interviewees confuse Filipinos with Chinese nationals, or they are grouped under the umbrella of 'Asians' without people knowing their exact country of origin.

In contrast, the interviewees' perception regarding Romanians seems to be quite inaccurate. There are only 177 official residents with Romanian nationality but they often popped up during interviews and conversations with residents.

Figure 9 shows the evolution from 2000 to 2010 of the ten most populous foreign nationalities in Poble Sec in 2010. It should be noted that all the nationalities have risen in numbers, but nationalities such as Moroccans, Dominicans and Colombians have undergone different fluctuations throughout this period. The increase in the number of Pakistanis is especially noteworthy, with a spectacular influx during the first part of the decade. The rise in Filipino immigrants over these years is also



Fig. 9 Timeline of changes in the five most populous foreign nationalities (2010) in percentage of total population in Poble Sec neighbourhood (2000, 2004–2010) (Source: GRM, based on data from the Continuous Census, Ajuntament de Barcelona)

remarkable. It is worth underlining that among the top nationalities, they are the ones mentioned least often in the interviews. Sometimes the interviewees confuse them with Chinese nationals, or they are grouped under the umbrella of 'Asians' without people knowing their exact country of origin. A similar case, although to a lesser degree, occurred with some interviewees when talking about South American nationalities.

Shifting to the content of perceptions on different groups, the general perception of Pakistanis is that they are regarded as being mainly concerned with their businesses and there is no conflict between them and the natives or other immigrant collectives. For instance, a man aged 58 who has lived in Poble Sec since he was 10 years old, mentions the Pakistanis as 'positive immigrants', in contrast to other nationalities:

> These ones [Pakistanis] don't cause problems. The problematic ones are the others […] [Pakistanis] open at 8 am and close at midnight, but well, they do not cause problems. (Poble Sec, B-PS-KI-2-neighbours' association, 58 years old)

Although it is difficult to speak with Pakistani residents, they seem to corroborate the idea that they are almost only concerned with their jobs and businesses. In this sense, when asked about the neighbourhood's situation, an immigrant from Pakistan, the owner of a grocery shop, said:

> If you just come here to work, it doesn't matter what the neighbourhood is like. (B-PS-I-9-Poble Sec, Pakistani grocery owner)

In a similar vein, when asked to draw a map of the neighbourhood, another Pakistani immigrant who owns a similar business added the following:

> I don't go out [of the grocery shop]. I stay here inside…people buy… (B-PS-I-7-Poble Sec, Pakistani business owner)

Both of these representatives of the local Pakistani entrepreneurial middle class share the natives' annoyance over problems of noise and dirtiness on Blai Street, as well as the perception that Dominicans are a prominent presence on that street. It is also worth quoting a few words from a more socially integrated Pakistani shop owner who participated in the Neighbourhood Forum:

> I do participate in the shopkeepers' association of Poble Sec – *Associació de Comerciants del Poble Sec* – (…) the neighbourhood has improved a lot. I arrived [from Pakistan] in 1996 and I started my business in 2002 (…) A person who comes anew, with another skin colour, people treat you differently, of course. 'Ah, these newcomers, who knows what they are like…', this is normal. Later, as time goes by and people visit your business, they start to get used to us, and now they are already used to us. (B-PS-NF-42-Poble Sec, shopkeepers' association member, 38 years old)

A different perception arises when talking to residents about Latin American communities, especially regarding the Dominicans who are often strongly stigmatized. For instance, the same 58-year-old man quoted above claimed that there are no problems at all with the other communities, but

> the problematic ones are the South Americans […] People here want these people to get integrated. But they do not want to integrate… No, I don't know if it is their culture, or a lack of will, or … I don't know. (B-PS-KI-2Poble Sec, neighbours' association, 58 years old)

Some Dominican immigrant leaders even see this street life issue as a challenge to overcome:

> The street life is really the main issue. To be truthful, street life brings a lot of joy to the neighbourhood and a lot of headaches too, both to the neighbourhood and to the community […] In the case of Dominicans, I would say that our street life brings a lot of headaches because it is true that it sometimes causes a disturbance… […] People like me who have a business do not support those people who are in the street, I do not support them… (Poble Sec, B-PS-NF-40-shopkeepers' association member, 37 years old)

The last quotation confirms that Dominicans are far from being a homogenous group (as natives too often tend to assume) and that their degree of internal solidarity, their behaviour and (self) perceptions may vary enormously.

As noted above, Poble Sec is characterized by a powerful associative network and a so-called 'friendly atmosphere' that contributes to relatively strong ties among many residents. In this sense, spaces such as the Civic Centre 'El Sortidor' play a key role in socializing processes and inter-group relations (see Photos Figs. 10 and 11).

As we explained above, Poble Sec has had a history of welcoming new waves of immigrants over the past last two centuries. These factors are supposed to have contributed to a satisfactory integration process into Barcelona society, helping to overcome conflicts and facilitating cooperation.

On the other hand, it should be taken into account that the 'friendly atmosphere' of the neighbourhood can also become a potential source of conflict. The changes

Fig. 10 Civic Centre 'El Sortidor' (guia.bcn.cat) (Photo by A. Mas)

Fig. 11 Plaça del Sortidor during an activity organized by the Community Development Plan, 2011 (Photo by A. Mas)

triggered by the arrival of newcomers can be seen as a threat to this 'friendly' atmosphere, neighbourhood life or the aforementioned '*caliu de barri*'. '*Caliu de barri*' goes beyond mere representations, as it also pertains to actual social relations. It may mean that you come across and greet the same people in your daily life in the neighbourhood. It means that native neighbours can get used to their foreign neighbours more quickly and easily and, consequently, false stereotypes can be eliminated more easily. The same can happen among foreigners, who can also get used to their native neighbours or other foreign neighbours more easily. On the other hand, if some neighbours do not like or do not tolerate the attitudes or activities of specific neighbours or groups of neighbours, this '*caliu de barri*' can play a negative role, facilitating conflicts or fuelling the growth of latent conflicts.

In other words, a strong local identity and social cohesion, a powerful associative network and a so-called 'friendly atmosphere' contributing to relatively fluid relations among some neighbours are regarded by some interviewees as positive factors for integrating their residents and as a sort of vaccine against possible exclusion processes. But, on the other hand, those same characteristics of the neighbourhood may also cause some native neighbours to view the arrival of a new population as an intrusion on the so-called 'friendly atmosphere' (until they may get to know the newcomers).

Specific issues such as noise and dirt in the streets were mentioned in the interviews as potential sources of conflict. However, these issues do not exist in isolation. As underlined by a 28-year-old woman who is a member of a local association, some people explicitly say that arising conflicts are often linked to both the arrival of immigrants and the lack of policies aimed at improving interrelations between communities. However, this interviewee expressed doubts about linking this issue to the arrival of foreigners and suggests another explanation that is more closely related to socio-economic aspects:

> I would link the cleaning issue to … rather than immigration, it can be linked, I don't know, maybe I'm going to say something politically incorrect, but I associate it with a low socio-educational level. You know, not showing respect, not valuing having a clean place, not considering the fact that having a person coming to sweep once a week costs money, right? So, many times the profile of newcomers who come is people – as is logical, this is not a criticism – who have a low socio-educational profile and therefore do not value the public space the way other people do. But this has always been a working-class neighbourhood, so I don't think immigrants are the ones [to blame]… […] It is not the fact of immigration, but the failure to take care of the place where you live. (Poble Sec, B-PS-KI-3-association member, 28 years old)

Another source of conflict that appeared in some of the interviews is the feeling that there is a lack of safety in the neighbourhood. But looking at the number of crimes per 1,000 inhabitants in 2009, we can observe that the Sants-Montjuïc district (6.1) has lower numbers than the Eixample district (8.2) and the Barcelona average (7.07).[13] It is also worth mentioning that both districts have much lower crime rates than the Ciutat Vella district, which has the highest crime rate in Barcelona city (33).

Some of those interviewed thought that the perception of a lack of safety and security in Poble Sec is linked to the increase in the foreign population. According to some stakeholders, having more police officers patrolling could change that perception. In fact, some interviewees related an improvement in safety and security problems during recent years to an increased police presence and a better attitude among residents.

Divergent opinions about immigration can themselves become a source of conflict along ideological lines among natives. For example, a 28-year-old woman who belongs to a neighbourhood association quite clearly describes two contrasting and seemingly opposed visions that can be voiced by individuals with close relations and, in some cases, by the same individual:

> At the same time they say […], that life is much better. That years ago there were many more problems of.... I don't know if I should use the word delinquency, but of drug use, of .... Well, you know, such as some social unrest, the old residents say. And they say that now life is so much better. But there are others who say that, obviously, with so much immigration, the neighbourhood is in a very bad situation. (B-PS-KI-3-Poble Sec, Association member, 28 years old)

[13] Data is not available at the neighbourhood level.

Cultural differences are sometimes perceived as potential sources of conflict. This issue becomes particularly important when talking about residents of Latin American extraction, especially Dominicans, due to their particularly pervasive daily presence on the street. Different ways of life, more intensive everyday uses of the street, engaging in louder conversations and enjoying louder music are just some of the behaviours noted by some interviewees to explain controversies regarding Dominican immigrants.

Box 2: Tres Xemeneies Gardens: A Multifunctional Space at the Edge of the Hood

The *Three Smokestacks Gardens* (*Jardins de les Tres Xemeneies*, JTX) was one of the areas studied in Poble Sec. This interaction site is frequented not only by residents, but also by passers-by, such as office workers and patrons of theatres and disco-clubs. Skateboarders, mostly young males, are one of the most visible groups of users. Most of them live elsewhere. Some are tourists or temporary residents. Every day, there are several skateboarders in the park. Still, it seems that they do not interact with the rest of the neighbourhood and barely interact with other JTX users. Another key collective is made up of residents who go to the park to relax, read, stay outside, have a chat, etc. This group includes various genders, ages, and nationalities. The elderly are the majority among them, and they express discontent with the skateboarders' presence. The users of the 'pétanque' courts situated here are also mostly elderly and may have similar feelings regarding the skateboarders. Parents that visit the park with children are the third group of daily users. Although some are residents of the nearby Raval neighbourhood, most of them live in Poble Sec. The children's playground is where peaceful coexistence can be replaced by closer ties and deeper interactions. Another collective that frequently uses the park consists of Muslim youngsters – mainly of Pakistani origin – who use the football and basketball courts to pray on Fridays. Although some of them sit on the benches before and after praying, they barely interact with others, but do not cause any problems either (this situation is different than in other cities, perhaps due to the fact that this park is relatively big and separated from houses and commerce and, additionally, the intense car traffic in Parallel Avenue puts a noisy veil to Friday's Muslim soundscapes). Pakistani immigrants also used to gather here to play cricket at the weekend, but recently they prefer the distant Forum Park. Celebrations, festivals, concerts, etc., involve neighbourhood residents and associations, but usually attract people from other neighbourhoods and even other cities. Latin American and Pakistani associations, among others, have also held events here. Several interviewees believe that there are too many activities here, and this high demand can raise conflicts. Also youth drinking alcohol in JTX at the weekend is an emerging issue linked to the park's location in a popular nightlife area (that also produces noise and refuse). However, the biggest

(continued)

Box 2: (continued)
conflicts are related to the presence of the homeless and to the dealing and consumption of drugs. Although the two issues are not necessarily linked, the interviewees usually relate them both to insecurity. According to several interviewees, some of the homeless are foreigners, mainly from Eastern Europe (especially Romanians), and they relate those homeless immigrants to security problems. Although these opinions cannot be generalized, it should be noted that even the interviewees with positive opinions on the neighbourhood, point to JTX as being a problematic spot at times.

4 (Un)Covering the Neighbourhoods: Bad News Sells Best

As in the research undertaken in other target cities of the Concordia Discors project, an additional research tool we used was a quantitative and qualitative media analysis, based on a sample of the contents of two newspapers over the previous decade. Issues of *La Vanguardia* and *El Periódico de Catalunya* were surveyed from the years between 2001 and 2010 to see how often the target neighbourhoods were mentioned in association with immigration and to identify the dominant representations of inter-group relations and policy interventions on immigration and integration issues in the target neighbourhoods.[14]

The coverage of immigration in the local media we analyzed has become more intensive over time: the number of articles with references to immigration per year for each neighbourhood grew in the second part of the decade, in parallel with the growing percentage of immigrants living there. More attention was paid to immigration issues in Poble Sec than in Sagrada Família: 41 out of 248 articles dealing with the former include references to immigrants (16.5 %), whereas this percentage is much lower in the case of Sagrada Família (30 articles out of 634 articles, equivalent to just 4.7 %). Several interlinked explanations can be suggested. First, there are factors related to the importance of the Sagrada Família cathedral within the city, which makes it a news item in itself. The second factor may be the different percentage of foreign residents in each neighbourhood (27.9 % in Poble Sec as opposed to 'only' 16.8 in Sagrada Família) which is understandably reflected in the intensity of targeted coverage. A third factor might be that Poble Sec is a working-class neighbourhood with an average income significantly lower than that in Sagrada Família, so the social service needs of the neighbourhood are greater than in other neighbourhoods. The arrival of immigrants with lower incomes, 'impoverishes' the neighbourhood in income or economic terms and fosters perceived competition

[14] For more details about analyzing these two newspapers and the methodological aspects of the media analysis, see the Barcelona Final Report at the *Concordia Discors* project web page: www.concordiadiscors.eu/

between natives and immigrants, which attracts media attention. Fourthly, the location of Poble Sec, which is very near the so-called 'conflictive' neighbourhood of Raval, is also a relevant factor. At times, this geographical proximity can contribute to spreading social alarm from Raval to Poble Sec.

The analysis also showed that the two newspapers pay more attention to conflict than to cooperation when covering immigration. This is true in both neighbourhoods, but especially in Poble Sec and especially in reference to conflicts related to poverty, degradation of public space, insecurity, dirtiness, coexistence and accident and crime reports. It should be said that some of the articles featuring Poble Sec highlighted economic, social and cultural cooperation.

In the Sagrada Família neighbourhood, the interviewees primarily believe that the neighbourhood's everyday life or its problems are not sufficiently covered by the media. According to the interviewees, the neighbourhood only appears in the media when there are events or problems related to the Sagrada Família cathedral itself. The only exception to this rule is the outrageous crimes that take place in the neighbourhood from time to time. Several neighbours noted that the media do not mention immigrants' supposed involvement in conflictive issues related to the neighbourhood because of 'political correctness'. On the other hand, in Poble Sec, most interviewees complained that the neighbourhood usually appears in the mass media in connection with negative news, as shown, for instance in the months before the ethnographic fieldwork, by the very intensive coverage of a case involving a gang of thieves operating in the underground network.

Last but not least, we should mention the neighbourhood newspaper *ZonaSec* (www.zonasec.cat/). This monthly newspaper is managed by the *Coordinadora d'Entitats del Poble Sec* (the umbrella organization including most associations based in Poble Sec) and it has been in circulation for over 15 years. During the interviews, *ZonaSec* was mentioned as a positive factor for cooperation and resolving conflicts. This newspaper is distributed for free at the neighbourhood level in a variety of places, and it counteracts the role played by some mass media, which normally pay attention to the neighbourhood only when there are sensationalist news stories offering a negative image of Poble Sec and its foreign population. This newspaper is very popular among the neighbourhood's residents and some regular visitors, and almost all the interviewees mentioned it when we asked them about the media issue. In Sagrada Família, there is no neighbourhood newspaper comparable to *ZonaSec*.

As a final reflection, we should note an apparent paradox that emerged from the media analysis. On the one hand, there seems to be a general social agreement among the media, residents and the policy community about the need for cooperation and integration policies. However, on the other hand, interviewees frequently emphasized that conflict is flashier and sells more newspapers than cooperation or reflection about policies.

5 A Growing Demand for More Spaces of Encounter

Barcelona is increasingly an actor on the international stage for a number of reasons, including assets located in or around demographically dense neighbourhoods like Sagrada Família and Poble Sec. As described and analyzed throughout this chapter, the two neighbourhoods examined in this study have a number of differences and commonalities that are worth reviewing here in order to point out the main explanatory factors.

In the Sagrada Família neighbourhood, both cooperation and conflict between groups are rather scarce, and they are not as important to the neighbourhood's life and the residents' perceptions as in Poble Sec. While the difference in the percentage of foreigners is an important factor, the urban fabric is equally crucial. The wide streets with heavy through-traffic in the Sagrada Família neighbourhood are seen by the residents as significant obstacles to the development of the neighbourhood's social life. The dearth of open public spaces, the spatial configuration of the open spaces that do exist which make them unconducive to activities, and their occupation by massive influxes of tourists are other characteristics of the neighbourhood that hamper neighbour-to-neighbour relations in Sagrada Família. In fact, the Eixample district as a whole would need a kind of 'central park' in order to foster social life and outdoor activities.[15] In contrast, in Poble Sec, the neighbourhood's narrow streets invite or even force people to interact.[16] The general lack of conflict in the Sagrada Família neighbourhood does not amount to a positive example of cooperation; rather it can be better understood as a consequence of scarce interactions. Importantly, the few large public places that do exist – Gaudí Avenue, Gaudí and Sagrada Família squares, and *Encants Vells* flea market – still seem to provoke multi-layered conflict rather than cooperation between residents and outsiders (tourists, street-sellers, etc.) and between native and immigrant residents. Furthermore, the lack of 'sharp' boundaries of the centrally located Sagrada Família neighbourhood, together with the very good transport connections to other parts of the city, have contributed to a weakening of the neighbourhood's identity.

As noted at the beginning in this chapter's introduction, previous studies have associated the working classes with the concept of 'community', in contrast to the more individualistic and relatively less place-attached middle classes (Halfacree and Boyle 1993). Our findings are consistent with such assertions. The aforementioned features in Sagrada Família, coupled with the 'bedroom community' and lower-middle class nature of the neighbourhood have limited the development of social networks there. In contrast, the Poble Sec neighbourhood is a working-class area with a strong local identity, clear boundaries and rich social networks that are

[15] For some, the renewal projects of Glories Square aim to develop a kind of Central Park there, see: http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2014/01/10/catalunya/1389388248_623867.html and http://hicarquitectura.com/2014/02/agence-ter-ana-coello-de-llobet-1r-premio-concurso-plaza-de-les-glories-barcelona/

[16] According to plans, the future reform of Parallel Avenue will develop several new squares along this key Poble Sec boundary, see: 'El nou Paral·lel', *La Vanguardia*, 9 January 2014.

important agents of inter-group relations. The 'community' feeling expressed by the Poble Sec stakeholders and informants is very strong.

Due to the aforementioned 'intensive' interactions and street life in Poble Sec there are more chances for cooperation but also for conflictive situations. At the same time, this greater 'opportunity' for conflict provides greater opportunities for solving both implicit and explicit conflictive situations than a context of peaceful coexistence, thus confirming the idea of '*concordia discors'* that forms the basis of this book (see Introduction). In this sense, one can argue that a 'peaceful' neighbourhood where individualism or group separation is the norm needs more cooperation in order to be socially sustainable in the long run, otherwise it may become a social desert where tensions are hidden rather than resolved.

In accordance with this idea, in both Barcelona neighbourhoods, public places appear not only as areas of encounter, but also as areas of multi-layered conflicts over their use, which directly influence inter-group relations: in various cases, the space as such constitutes a context for various dimensions of conflict, mainly cultural, demographic and economic. As Tim Creswell (1996) notes, studying the relation between place and behaviour helps to identify behaviours that are judged as inappropriate or out of place in a particular location. Furthermore, the kind of conflict that seems to trigger the most emotional responses is based on behaviour in public places: loud music, talking and yelling during the night or quarrels which involve particular groups of users of the space seem to bother many residents.

Place and space do not only play a secondary role as the setting of the interaction; rather the configuration of areas where encounters occur has a significant influence on conflict and cooperation in the neighbourhood. Thus, a clear practical recommendation emerging from our research is that immigrants' integration policies should be designed with space and place in mind not only as settings but also as objects of those same policies. These social policies could be inspired by what some planners have been doing deliberately when creating or preserving 'memorable and singular structures to make a space distinctively different […] to encourage in the residents an attachment to that place' (Mayhew 2004: 444).

While during some interviews the different national origins of immigrants were evoked in order to indicate their supposed 'guilt' and to underscore their cultural 'otherness' as a source of conflict, some interviewees are aware that explanations for some immigrants' 'unusual' behaviour can lie beyond the bounds of nationality: their focus is not on the national origin but on the geographical origin. As highlighted by previous research (Morén-Alegret 2008), the transfer from rural or mountainous sparsely populated areas to a densely populated metropolitan neighbourhood is underlined as a problem in some cases because in such places the definitions of 'polite' and 'rude' behaviours and 'street life' differ. This finding is in tune with previous research on senses of place and migration (Mendoza and Morén-Alegret 2013).

In other cases, age difference is another acknowledged explanation. Native elderly are often very impervious to changes (such as evening activities, musical events, bars being open long hours, street-life culture) brought about by young residents and other 'innovators'. But such resistance seems to be driven by generational

factors much more than cultural or ethnic ones. Economic status is yet another explanation, and the lack of jobs and other productive activities is often mentioned as a factor that brings youth to public places, where they hang around spending their daily lives in ways that are often criticized by other neighbours.

On the other hand, the interactions found in those areas of encounter are of varying depths. They range from a rather superficial level, such as daily use of the library or the marketplace, to more profound levels in cases such as organized seminars, courses or working groups. In general, goal-oriented public spaces and organizations which are seen as providing tangible benefits attract immigrants' attention. In the same way, when immigrants perceive that participation offers added value, it is especially appreciated. Immigrants and native youth alike seem to avoid organizations with tight hierarchical power structures that are not open to new input and ideas. Another important variable is the cost of participation. Organizations with expensive membership fees seem to attract immigrants less than groups without fees or with low fees. Still, this is probably more a collateral effect of the current economic crisis and general social class divides than a question of specific geographical origins.

The importance of civil society organizations is another crucial factor in shaping inter-group relations (Joly 1998; Morén-Alegret 2002b). The existence of a close-knit coordinated associative network of social organizations at neighbourhood level can be seen as a very useful tool. Firstly, it can facilitate the settlement process of the foreign-born population; secondly, it can contribute to managing and solving conflictive situations; and, thirdly, when it is impossible to find a quick solution to a neighbourhood problem, the associative network can work as a 'safety-valve' institution leading 'to a displacement of goal in the actor' (Coser 1956). As Lewis Coser argues, in the latter cases, when the coordinated associative network acts as a safety-valve institution, it helps to release tensions: the social actor 'needs no longer aim at reaching a solution of the unsatisfactory situation, but merely at releasing the tension which arose from it … the conflict itself is channelled away from the original unsatisfactory relationship into one in which the actor's goal is no longer the attainment of specific results, but the release of tension' (Coser 1956: 155–156).

In fact, it should be taken into account that these associative networks have been performing functions that, in another time or another country, would be performed by the public administrations. This network of social organization is especially prominent in the Poble Sec neighbourhood and, to a much lesser extent, in the Sagrada Família neighbourhood. However, in general, the generational replacement in these associations and the cuts in funding due to the economic crisis are key challenges for the future.

Besides civil society organizations, schools, public libraries and civic centres emerge as spaces where encounters and interrelations take place in both neighbourhoods. Commercial relations, especially in little grocery shops and 'bazaars', have also been identified as being important for interethnic relations. In the specific cases of the Chinese and the Pakistani communities, both communities that are often perceived as being quite 'closed' beyond the economic sphere by the rest of the population, ownership of numerous businesses in the neighbourhoods has contributed to bringing them closer to some of their neighbours, albeit often in a superficial way.

To conclude, we must once more emphasize the importance of maintaining projects that have been working to improve the social situation in both Barcelona neighbourhoods in the future. In particular, the Community Plans and public facilities such as civic centres and public libraries have been performing crucial tasks during a period during which millions of foreigners arrived in Spain, and their efforts have helped both natives and immigrants' social integration at the neighbourhood level. We are left wondering what mid and long-term effects current economic policies will have on social cohesion, based, as they are, upon sharp cuts in public and private funds to community projects and organizations active in the field of integration.

Last but not least, another issue concerning general city policies, which strongly impacts on inter-group relations at neighbourhood level, is tourism, which is raising other issues beyond the ones pointed out when analyzing the Sagrada Família case study. Today the impact of mass tourism is not just found in a few central neighbourhoods, as was the case in the past, but in a growing number of areas. During summer 2014, while the editing process of this book was underway, there were protests in some neighbourhoods of Barcelona against supposedly 'uncivilized' foreign tourists (and other kind of visitors, mainly from North-Western Europe) living in the profit-making 'illegal' apartments mushrooming across the city. The conflict emerged in the Barceloneta neighbourhood, but later spread to other places, including Poble Sec and Sagrada Família.[17] In some places, after years of economic crisis and housing problems, apart from the inter-group tensions noted along this chapter, a conflict may be emerging between wealthy mobile north-western Europeans (whether or not they are tourists) who have bought or rented bargain apartments in some Barcelona neighbourhoods (sometimes as a second home, part-time residence or business) and the impoverished permanent resident population. However, according to a report quoted by *La Vanguardia* on 2 September 2014,[18] some members of the former centre-right-wing local government felt that the problem is that many Barcelona residents are not 'cosmopolitan' enough. This strange statement would need further research but, in any case, it is urgent to tackle this and other challenges related to life in super-diverse neighbourhoods seriously, or inter-group tensions could emerge in various and unexpected ways. During the 24 May 2015 municipal elections campaign, these and other issues tackled in this chapter crucially emerged in the political debates. As an outcome of those elections, on 13 June 2015 a new left-wing Barcelona local government was elected with key supports from neighbourhood-based social movements. For the first time in history, the Barcelona Mayor is a woman and the first Vice-Mayor is a non-EU immigrant born in Argentina. In Barcelona, the times they are a-changing.

[17] See: http://www.elperiodico.cat/ca/noticias/politica/loposicio-lajuntament-barcelona-suneix-les-protestes-contra-lincivisme-3463834 and http://www.btv.cat/btvnoticies/2014/08/30/manifestacio-turisme-barceloneta-pisos-turistics-veins/

[18] http://www.lavanguardia.com/local/barcelona/20140902/54414202233/pisos-turisticos-inspeccionados-barcelona-ilegales.html

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Turin in Transition: Shifting Boundaries in Two Post-Industrial Neighbourhoods

Pietro Cingolani

1 Different Paths out of the Industrial Era

Ethnographic studies on immigration carried out in urban areas in Italy share common features. These studies can be divided into two main groups: the "migrant focused" and the "space focused" (Cancellieri and Scandurra 2012). The first one takes specific national groups of immigrants as the unit of its analysis. This group is further divided into two: on the one hand, there are studies focused on the transnational dimension, which highlight the nature of multi-sited social relations of specific immigrant communities, with little or no attention to the dynamics of micro-territorial inclusion (Caselli 2009). On the other hand, there are studies that analyze specific national groups and their level of integration, paying attention to the perception of the presence of these groups among the natives (Carter 1997; Ceccagno 2007). These "migrant focused" studies give little value to intersectionality and have produced – even if unintentionally – an ethnic reification of social relations.

"Space focused" studies are based instead on the analysis of specific neighbourhoods and nearly all of them focus on poor and problematic neighbourhoods, in which levels of immigrant segregation and ghettoization are very high (Fava 2007; Pompeo 2012). For this reason there is very little available literature analyzing urban immigrants belonging to the middle class and living in the most affluent districts of Italian cities, exploring in depth the intersectionality across several dimensions such as gender, class and generation, and the link with processes of urban settlement.

The theoretical assumption of our study is to simultaneously assume a "space focused" and a "people focused" perspective, and to include in our sample not only

P. Cingolani (✉)
FIERI, Torino, Italy
e-mail: pietro.cingolani@fieri.it

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the immigrant population and poor and problematic neighbourhoods. Ceteris paribus, people with the same migration background can build different social relationships in different neighbourhoods of the same city; likewise migrants and natives behave in the same way within the same neighbourhoods. Following the methodological assumptions presented in the first chapter we used the level of diversity rather than the degree of disadvantage as the key criterion for selecting neighbourhoods – both deprived and affluent – with different shares of foreign residents.[1] Looking at the growing literature around the concept of super-diversity, we can say that this concept has been coined to describe capital cities such as London, New York and Paris. Although provincial cities across Europe are increasingly characterized by a diversification of diversity (Berg and Sigona 2013; Erel 2011), the concept of super-diversity can be applied less to cities like Turin, where the level of diversity is lower. From the demographic, socio-economic and even ethnic point of view, Turin's neighbourhoods are more homogeneous than neighbourhoods of other European cities. In this perspective, we have chosen neighbourhoods where the processes of social change are more pronounced than in other areas of the city.

In the same city and also in the same neighbourhood we have observed multiple and contradictory paths to integration. As Gidley pointed out, integration is a situated and lived experience, 'a set of processes across a number of related, but ultimately autonomous, domains' (Gidley 2014). In the following pages we will try to explore these various domains in detail. To understand why social relations within these two neighbourhoods are different, we started with a theoretical hypothesis which sees social cohesion as a product of the balance between different factors.

There is a spatial factor, which concerns the urban structure of the neighbourhoods; there is a social factor, which concerns the socio-demographic characteristics of the population; there is a historical factor, which concerns the individual and collective memory, and last but not least, there is a subjective dimension, which concerns the agency of urban residents. Only by taking all these factors into account at the same time can we avoid every form of social and cultural determinism. Individual choices must be analyzed if we want to promote a non-mechanistic vision of integration which must be considered as a dynamic process (Brettel 2000).

In this sense, a micro perspective, based on ethnographic works is the only one that allows us to overcome simplistic analysis. That said, there are some structural

[1] We interviewed 29 experts (14 in Barriera di Milano and 15 in San Paolo) in the preparation phase for the ethnographic interviews between February 2011 and March 2011, in order to identify relevant aspects for the analysis of the neighbourhoods. Thanks to the information gathered, we identified ten interaction sites within the target neighbourhoods (squares, open air markets, roads, meeting centers). After that, we conducted 102 qualitative interviews with people who attend, live or work in the two neighbourhoods (56 in Barriera di Milano and 46 in San Paolo). In the selection of respondents we tried to balance the sample, taking into account gender, nationality, age and role. All interviews were conducted in the respective neighbourhoods at different locations (in the street, at homes, in restaurants etc.) between March 2011 and November 2011. Interviews were conducted in Italian, English and Romanian. We also interviewed 20 policy makers and stakeholders N10 in Barriera di Milano and 10 in San Paolo), aimed at reconstructing the policy perspective. Two neighbourhood forums were organized in Barriera di Milano and in San Paolo in April 2012 in order to discuss the first results with our informants, residents and stakeholders.

factors that are very important in determining urban relations like the amount and quality of urban public spaces accessible in the two neighbourhoods. A good quality of life depends not only on the presence of public spaces but also upon their management and maintenance (Akkar Erkan 2007). Small public spaces well managed can meet people's needs more than wide, abandoned spaces. Social groups use spaces differently and at different times of the day. The more differentiated these uses are, the easier it is for conflicts between social groups to appear (Valentine 2008 and Webster 1996).

We also must take into account relations between neighbourhoods and the wider urban system. A high level of infrastructural and economic interconnection allows residents to choose where to perform certain activities and where to use certain services. An open neighbourhood attracts people from other parts of the city and promotes the circulation of resources and ideas, while a closed neighbourhood is like a ghetto, where inhabitants are encapsulated.

The historical memory of the people is another important factor. We wondered if inhabitants know about local history and if they bind their own individual biography to the history of the neighbourhood. A shared collective memory helps to increase the feeling of belonging to the territory and to reduce conflicts (Altman and Low 1992).

Turin is one of the Italian cities that, over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, has seen the most significant demographic, social, and cultural changes linked to the arrival of foreign populations. After World War II, with the development of large factories, Turin witnessed the arrival of hundreds of thousands of workers from poorer, mainly southern Italian regions; from the 1980s onwards, with the post-Fordist transformation, immigrants arrived from around the world, the majority of them from Eastern Europe and Northern Africa. Often these new immigrants have gone to live and work in the same neighbourhoods that had welcomed immigrants from Southern Italy 50 years earlier, although this process did not occur in the same way and with the same results in all of the city's neighbourhoods. However, the socio-economic structure of the city has profoundly changed. If in the years of the great immigration from Southern Italy there was full employment and many immigrants worked in large factories, today unemployment rates are among the highest in the Italian cities. For this reason, Turin can be considered a unique laboratory for understanding social dynamics related to migration and integration, and the roles played by urban space and city actors in this respect.

The two selected neighbourhoods, San Paolo and Barriera di Milano, are located a few kilometres apart from each other. From a geographical point of view both neighbourhoods are very close to the city's historical centre but for different reasons they are both perceived by public opinion as being quite distant from it. The following map illustrates the location of the neighbourhoods within the city (Fig. 1).

Barriera di Milano is a former working class neighbourhood, located in the north of Turin. It is quite isolated from neighbouring areas by urban barriers: the Spina 4, the railway's track now undergrounded, runs along its western border; the northern border is marked by another dismissed railway and the eastern border is delineated by the cemetery.

Fig. 1 Barriera di Milano and San Paolo on the map of the city of Turin

Table 1 Share of foreign population in Barriera di Milano (31 December) (City of Turin)

Area	2006	2007	2008	2009	2011
Barriera di Milano	18.4	22.7	25.6	28.0	29.0
San Paolo	9.5	11.2	12.6	13.5	14.0
City average	9.4	11.4	12.8	13.7	14.2

San Paolo is a service-oriented neighbourhood in the western part of the city of Turin. Its geographical boundaries are formed by four major roads: Corso Vittorio in the north, Corso Trapani in the west, Corso Castelfidardo in the east and Via Tirreno in the south. The older heart of San Paolo is Piazza Sabotino, the centre of the quarter both geographically and economically. It is also the point of departure of the quarter's main streets, which are developed in a star-like topographical way that is a very unusual feature for the city planning of Turin, where almost all quarters follow a grid plan.

If we consider the demographic characteristics of the two neighbourhoods, we can say that they are quite different. In Barriera di Milano the share of foreigners is 29 % of the total population, much higher than the city average. This share has enormously increased in the last few years. In San Paolo the share of foreigners is lower, at around 14 %, which is similar to the city average, as shown by the Table 1.

Table 2 Share of main nationalities of foreign residents in Barriera di Milano (1 January 2011) (City of Turin)

Citizenship	Share on foreign population
Romanian	33.2
Moroccan	24.3
Chinese	7.1
Albanian	3.8
Egyptian	3.7
Other nationalities	27.9

Table 3 Share of main nationalities of foreign residents in San Paolo (1 January 2011) (City of Turin)

Citizenship	Share on foreign population
Romanian	43.52
Peruvian	13.90
Moroccan	11.01
Albanian	3.86
Moldavian	3.01
Other nationalities	24.64

If we consider the nationalities of foreign residents, Barriera di Milano is more heterogeneous: there are more than 40 nationalities there, a third of them are Romanians, nearly one fourth Moroccans and one fifth Chinese (Table 2).

San Paolo is less diverse in terms of the national origins of foreign residents. A peculiarity of this area is instead the presence of a large Peruvian community, the most numerous in the city (Table 3).

The two neighbourhoods share a working-class history and a strong political mobilization that created social cohesion and a strong local identity as well as promoting the positive inclusion of internal immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s. The subsequent history of the post-industrial urban transformation has been very different in San Paolo and Barriera di Milano. In the first neighbourhood the conversion process happened quickly and can now be considered to be completed. In the second neighbourhood, however, this process is just beginning and remains uncertain because of the current economic crisis.

Today new immigrants arriving in San Paolo and Barriera di Milano are confronted with very different urban and socio-economic contexts characterized by different views about immigration, inter-group relations, types of conflicts and resolution.

We have organized the chapter into four parts. The first part of the chapter is devoted to presenting images of the two districts as they emerge from the descriptions of the residents: San Paolo is a peaceful urban village, with well-integrated families and little conflict; Barriera di Milano is a ghetto full of contradictions and poverty, with tensions that pit immigrants against the native residents along ethnic as well as intergenerational divides.

The second part of the chapter switches to a more detailed description of urban spaces, with particular attention to public areas, which analyzes their accessibility,

the presence of specific services, and their ability to include and address the needs of different social groups.

The third part is devoted to an analysis of a few cases of conflicts: in Barriera di Milano, although problems are often traced to the presence of immigrants, it is clear that they are often generational conflicts regarding the use of space. Even the elderly residents who have organized themselves into spontaneous committees to combat drug dealing denounce the passivity and lack of interest among young natives. In San Paolo one of the few social problems of the neighbourhood involves groups of young Peruvian immigrants; here, however, the problem was solved by a mobilization within the Peruvian community which has minimized the involvement of institutions and the native population, lowering the threshold of ethnic tension.

In the last part we will return to Barriera di Milano to analyze how cooperation between different social groups can develop within 'zones of encounter,' spaces in which people develop lasting relationships based on participation in joint activities (Wood and Landry 2007). We will see how, in a multifunctional space that has been one of the specific contexts of our ethnographic observation, people of different ages, social and cultural backgrounds meet, get to know each other, and produce new forms of cooperation that challenge preconceived identity barriers.

2 The Residents' Voices

2.1 'The Village in the City': The Peaceful Image of San Paolo

San Paolo is a relatively new neighbourhood in Turin which was located outside of the city's duty boundary until the end of the nineteenth century. This boundary was removed in the 1920s, but the railway still isolated the area because the tracks separated San Paolo from the rest of the city, keeping it socially, culturally, and politically isolated for a rather long time, so that it developed into a sort of microcosm with its own identity and social environment.

The actual building development of San Paolo took place after 1910 and was led by a high number of small, medium, and large industrial settlements in the area, mostly in the metallurgic, steel, and automotive sectors. With the heavy flow of internal (mostly rural) immigrants, San Paolo grew in every direction like a spider's web. The tendency towards isolation remained until after the Second World War, thereby reinforcing a strong sense of belonging to the neighbourhood within the population (Donna 2010).

This identity has been strongly linked to the neighbourhood's industrial nature. It has always been referred to as the 'red neighbourhood' for its deeply-rooted left-wing parties and the battles carried out for better working conditions. Both Catholic and secular groups in the local society have generally shared what Jalla (1978) defined as "utopian communism," which allowed them to create a compact alliance in the fight against fascism.

According to Diego Novelli, a former mayor of Turin who has always lived in the neighbourhood: "San Paolo is a village deeply rooted in working class traditions. Socialists like Gramsci had a big following in the district. In addition to being working class, San Paolo also has a long anti-fascist and partisan tradition. Dante Di Nanni, for example, was an anti-fascist. In general, the unions were always full of people, the true reference points for the inhabitants of the area and beyond."

During the economic boom that followed the post-war reconstruction, San Paolo kept growing demographically and in urban development, while still preserving its working-class identity. As a symbol of this productivity, the Lancia skyscraper in Via Lancia was built between 1951 and 1956. Lancia was one of the main reference points for the life of the neighbourhood, not only because of the factory, but also because it developed many social activities, such as housing and recreational activities for employees, sporting infrastructures, summer camps for children, etc. (Calosso and Ordazzo 2009). The productive structures have generated strong social capital, both bonding (based on common belonging to the working class) and bridging (integrating internal migrants). It has primarily been families rather than individuals who have immigrated to the neighbourhood. Families decided to settle in this area because, in addition to the presence of the industries, there were many services for citizens. Since the 1980s, foreign immigrants have begun to arrive: mostly Moroccans, Romanians and Peruvians. This new phase, too, is comprised primarily of immigrant families. Their arrival has been greeted by the natives not as a rupture with the past, but as a strong continuity, as if it were a new chapter of a common history.

The inhabitants of San Paolo are fond of their neighbourhood and still live today as if it were a country town inserted into the city, where everyone knows everyone and where cultural differences are not perceived as problematic. The sense of belonging, solidarity, and social cohesion are themes that emerged in many interviews. In the words of many of the inhabitants, San Paolo is first of all a quiet place, clean, and well served by public transport, with schools, sports facilities and green areas, and where the sense of security is cushioned by good management of the territory not only by institutions but by the citizens themselves. This image is reaffirmed, especially in contrast to the problematic image of other districts of the city.

Many locals stress that the migratory tradition which has always characterized this neighbourhood has fostered its spirit of acceptance and openness to newcomers. Foreigners in San Paolo are described by Italian residents as '*working families, with a good level of education, internal organization, and social cohesion*.' (San Paolo, Italian journalist, 26 years old).

The ones who fear and stereotype the newcomers tend to be shopkeepers and the elderly. Business owners mainly refer to the risk of excessive economic-productive competition, due to the opening of new businesses. Moroccans, along with the Chinese and Romanians, are considered immigrants with great entrepreneurial spirit and are often portrayed as aggressive and unfair competitors.

A shopkeeper in Piazza Sabotino said:

> The Moroccans open and run shops and other venues or lease licenses to market stalls. Many Italian shops in via Di Nanni or in the square are closing and many Arab stores are opening, especially food and phone centres. (San Paolo, shopkeeper, 45 years old, M)

Fig. 2 Rotonda Frejus. Pensioners and migrants (Photo by M. Pinto)

In an area with a high commercial vocation, foreigners frighten residents not because they are involved in criminal activity, but because they are considered 'too' assimilated; they have learned the rules of the place so well that they have become dangerous competitors.

The elderly, in their discussions, are especially alarmed by the different use of public spaces. Nevertheless, while they underscore the tensions related to the presence of foreigners, at the end of their narratives they often change their accusatory tone to a much more inclusive and open attitude towards the often harsh living conditions endured by immigrants. With some compassion they admit that the Italians themselves often take advantage of foreigners by employing them in strenuous, dangerous, and poorly paid work (Fig. 2).

> Those who work at the market stalls, for example, are all underpaid. They come to work practically for free. Whoever takes a stall pays a lot of rent, works like a mule, and pays taxes. Before recouping their expenses they must spit blood. In addition they pay the rent on their house. They should be admired! (San Paolo, pensioner, 76 years old, M)

When the natives of San Paolo speak of the immigrant presence, they often tend to emphasize a gradual and reassuring assimilation. A shopkeeper in the covered market, speaking of Moroccans, makes an interesting comparison between those who arrived in Italy in the 1990s and those who have come in the last few years:

> The Moroccans who arrived in Italy 20 years ago were very different from those who arrived in recent years. Whereas before this group was particularly involved in petty criminal activities such as drug dealing, now the Moroccans tend to come with their families, to perform honest work and try to fit into the Italian culture. In general, the influx today seems

> more sound. There is a better relationship between 'us' and 'them' even though the cultures are very different. (San Paolo, shopkeeper, 45 years old, M)

Even from the immigrants interviewed, a peaceful and non-confrontational vision of inter-group relations emerges. An Albanian man who arrived in the neighbourhood in 2002, explains:

> The whole area is very quiet compared to other neighbourhoods such as Barriera di Milano and Porta Palazzo. Those areas are not very clean and the people are poorly educated. The immigrants are too concentrated. In those areas there is a lot of drug dealing and crime and law enforcement agencies do not control it; they close their eyes and pretend nothing is happening. The dealers, however, have no other choices. … Many foreign families live in this district and this creates fewer problems for society. Whoever has a family like me has a lot more responsibilities. … I know a lot of Italians, Albanians, Romanians, and Moroccans. They are all people who are working or looking for work like me. They are not people who want to break the law and many of them are planning to settle in this area. I know that many people want to buy a house with a mortgage. I personally have never heard of intolerant or violent attitudes in our encounters. (San Paolo, unemployed, 56 years old, M)

In a meeting held with residents to discuss the problems of the neighbourhood (the 'Neighbourhood Forum' described in the Introduction), none of the participants raised the aspect of interethnic relations. Foreigners and locals, however, agreed with each other in lamenting the lack of parking, poor street lighting, and the early closing times of supermarkets. Such a peaceful image of the relations between natives and immigrants is also found in public discourse conveyed by the neighbourhood policy community and media, exemplified, for instance, when political refugees squatted the San Paolo Clinic (see chapter "News Media and Immigration in the EU: Where and How the Local Dimension Matters"). Actually, one of the few situations which in San Paolo has raised concerns and alarm among residents is the presence of gangs of Peruvian teenagers who made intensive use of public gardens, often quarrelling violently with each other. In this case senior members of the same Peruvian community intervened to resolve this alleged social emergency – a very different situation from what developed in Barriera di Milano.

2.2 'We are the People of the Ghetto': Stigma and Pride in Barriera di Milano

> I do not know exactly where my neighbourhood begins and where it ends. But I know that Barriera di Milano is seen by many people as a ghetto. We are the people of the ghetto, because there are many poor people here, there are 17-year-old kids who live in homes alone, without parents; for me it is a ghetto because there are more poor people than rich … I see Barriera this way, but I would not leave it for anything in the world. (Barriera di Milano, rapper, 19 years old)

These words of a 19-year-old immigrant of Moroccan origin are representative of the perception that many Barriera di Milano residents have of their neighbourhood; here the recent immigration has been accommodated differently and has

Fig. 3 Piazza Foroni. Religious procession for Holy Mary of Cerignola (Photo by P. Cingolani)

produced very different reactions than in San Paolo. In recent years, Barriera di Milano has experienced great social and economic transformations. To understand what Barriera di Milano is today, however, it is useful to reconstruct its history through the memories of the oldest residents.

Like San Paolo, the neighbourhood started to develop in the second half of the nineteenth century as an unplanned built-up area outside of the toll gates, i.e., passages that ensured the payment of the duty by those who entered the city. This is the origin of the name "Barriera di Milano" (Toll Gate of Milan). From the end of the war through the economic boom, a rapid urbanization process started at the expense of the residual rural areas: from 1951 to 1963 more than 7,000 apartments were built. However, the land use plans were approved late, when the building process had already ended. The consequence was disorganized urban and housing growth and an underdevelopment of services and public spaces (Beraudo et al. 2006).

The first big increase in immigration took place during the economic boom of the late 1950s and 1960s, with large inflows from Southern Italy and substantial transfers from other city areas induced by the increasing demand for labour and the rapid expansion of housing (Beraudo et al. 2006).

These immigration flows produced structural and long-lasting effects. The signs of internal migration are still visible in the urban landscape, where streets have names of villages in Southern Italy and open markets and shops sell goods from those regions, such as in the area of Piazza Foroni, where a large community from Apulia is settled (Fig. 3).

In the past many people both lived and worked in the neighbourhood and this created close-knit social networks. It was a closed urban system (Wallman

2003) in which the inhabitants tended to share many symbolic and material resources. According to a pensioner who had worked in Barriera di Milano for more than 20 years:

> Once upon a time there was a big factory, you worked for the great Fiat motors and then found your house not far away, in the same neighbourhood. Besides the large factories, there were many small workshops making mechanical parts in the courtyards of the houses. They remained until the 1980s when the neighbourhood converted to an almost exclusively residential one. Then people looked for homes close to work for two reasons: because it was cheaper and because transportation to the rest of the city was not well developed. You made friends with colleagues from work, who could also be your neighbours and then you also spent your free time with them. (Barriera di Milano, pensioner, 76 years old, M)

Even after World War II, Barriera di Milano, like San Paolo, was described as a village within the large industrial metropolis. The notion of 'We southern immigrants' has been important in defining the identity of the neighbourhood. But in Barriera di Milano, unlike San Paolo, this 'we' is currently almost always being used by the natives to oppose the new immigrants. Many senior residents from Mezzogiorno do not hide the difficulties and prejudices they themselves encountered, yet they are the first to criticize the newcomers.

Memories of the past in Barriera di Milano are very divided. People today still have the perception of being marginalized from the rest of the city. While the sense of marginality in the past was offset by a strong internal identification, today they are living in a much more fragmented way, with no points of reference:

> I was born and raised in Barriera di Milano. Once we kids said, 'we are from Barriera,' and we had our gangs. For us it was a point of pride when you came from the neighbourhood. Then there were those of Falchera, Vallette, Via Artom [other working-class neighbourhoods with high internal immigration]. We bumped into each other in clubs and the mess broke out there. And we had to uphold the name of the neighbourhood. (Barriera di Milano, unemployed, 54 years old, M)

The most recent immigration is often associated with images of disorder and chaos. Many speak of a real invasion, a slow process of population resettlement from Porta Palazzo, the district which first saw the arrival of immigrants, to Barriera. Often this invasion "from the outside" is accompanied by a picture of invasion "from within." The native people are noticing a growing demographic imbalance between themselves and immigrants, mainly related to higher fertility rates among foreigners:

> There are more and more of them here, not only because they come from outside, but because they have more children than we Italians. When I see these Moroccan moms with all these children I worry and I think that soon we will be overwhelmed. My son is thirty-five and not yet married! (Barriera di Milano, barman, 54 years old, M)

In Barriera di Milano, where many live with precarious housing and employment conditions, competition is particularly strong. "We" impoverished and unprepared Italians are contrasted against "their" united and well-organized immigrant solidarity in sharing information and "stealing" public resources.

Foreigners are also accused of not respecting social rules and cleanliness, silence during the night hours, or traffic regulations. The most recurrent theme in the

narratives of the Italian population is the link between immigrants and crime, especially petty theft, pick-pocketing, and the drug trade. This link is often found in newspapers and the local media and has produced a stereotyped and degraded image of Barriera di Milano.[2]

The difference between "us" and "them" is not exclusively based on ethnicity, but also reflects length of time in the neighbourhood. Immigrants who arrived earlier are the most widely accepted because they are believed to be better adapted to a specific model of social order, an urban way of life based on control, decorum, and work ethic (Wimmer 2004). On the contrary, newcomers are perceived as non-integrable. A barber from Apulia reflects upon his Moroccan customers:

> There used to be many Moroccans, but even they are leaving the area. They were my clients up until 2000. They worked in the mechanic workshops, in trade. Everybody worked. They went away to get themselves out of delinquency. They were solid people, who could improve the area. But just like many Italians they wondered 'why do we have to stay here, we'd better go!' And then new ones arrived, the real desperate ones, those who are willing to do anything because they have nothing to lose. (Barriera di Milano, barber, 55 years old, M)

Even in the narratives of immigrants, cleavages emerge related to the time of their arrival in the neighbourhood. Earlier immigrants offer evidence to differentiate themselves from later groups of immigrants, with whom they associate behaviour that contradicts the social order. For example, among Senegalese immigrants (Castagnone et al. 2005):

> Among us Senegalese much has changed. The marabout [Spiritual leader among Senegalese Mourid Muslims] say it is not good, because drugs ruin those who use them and who sell them; it is against religion. Many young people do not listen to the elderly people and they have also moved away from the Dahira [Local organizational structure of the Mourid brotherhood]. Now it's not like when my sister arrived, then they helped us a lot. There are guys who get together in small groups and only run at night. There are many young people who take things and do not give back. They do not try to learn the language or get closer to the Italians, as I did. (Barriera di Milano, student, 28 years old, M)

These internal differences are also reflected in the geography of the neighbourhood and the ways public spaces are used. There are areas described by earlier immigrants as more "decent" and "respectable", that correspond to the ideal of social order into which they want to insert themselves, and areas from which they want to keep a distance, both physically and symbolically. A good example is the Porta Palazzo market. For many immigrants who live in Barriera di Milano the market has been and continues to be a key reference point where they build social networks, find information, and make purchases (Semi 2006). But Porta Palazzo is also a site of disorder, increasing crime and insecurity. Moving away from that location means asserting one's own social respectability in front of Italians as well as

[2] Barriera di Milano is not new to the phenomenon of social deviance; petty crime today is nothing in comparison to the 1960s, when armed robberies, burglaries, and shootings were common. Even the problem of drug dealing and drug use today has a much less dramatic profile than in the 1970s and 1980s, when many families lost their children due to heroin overdoses. Nevertheless, both petty crimes and drug dealing remain significant compared to other city neighbourhoods.

your countrymen. According to a man of Moroccan origin, who has lived in Italy for nearly 20 years:

> Porta Palazzo is an area of transit, even in France it is known, even out in the world, everyone says 'at Porta Palazzo'. There you will find everything for your business, if you need to meet a friend you say, 'I'll see you at Porta Palazzo.' But I must admit that I would never live in Porta Palazzo, there is too much personal discomfort and in recent years I stopped going. There are these desperate young people. We had a serious mentality, but these people are different. And not only Moroccans. There is everything, Senegalese, Romanians, Tunisians, Algerians. (Barriera di Milano, workman, 52 years old, M)

3 Urban Spaces and Social Management

3.1 The New Birth of the San Paolo 'Village'

San Paolo was the subject of conversion and regeneration policies long before Barriera di Milano. In San Paolo in the 1990s the abandoned industrial buildings began to be torn down and replaced by housing and service complexes. In the south-east part of the neighbourhood, for instance, we can find a former tire plant which is now the well-known Sandretto Re Rebaudengo Foundation for contemporary art, established in 1995. A former automotive components factory was completely converted into the Urban Eco Museum. In this area of the neighbourhood we can also find a Health Unit, Social Services and the Giardini SPA, which has many services for children, teenagers, and elderly people (Fig. 4).

In San Paolo services and meeting places are rather evenly distributed since they are located not only in the newly constructed areas but also in the older heart of the neighbourhood. One of the most popular youth meeting points in the area is the San Paolo Salesian Parish Recreation Centre; this centre hosts an average of 2,000 people every week, many of them from Morocco, Albania, Romania, South America and Pakistan. It is a meeting point for the youth of the area because of its large sport facilities, and the educational and training courses it offers (Calosso and Ordazzo 2009).

Behind the oratory there are numerous services for public use, such as the Permanent Territorial Centre for adult education, which offers courses for school diplomas, as well as brief courses on specific subjects (foreign languages, computing) and job counselling. The majority of the users of this centre are foreigners, with a high proportion of women migrants. Commercial services, which are, in general, quite numerous in this neighbourhood compared to the city as a whole, are concentrated in the central area. Probably the strongest commercial area outside the city centre of Turin is located here, with its branded stores, historical shops, and entrepreneurial activities, including those run by minorities of migrant origin which have developed during the last five years. Aside from the commercial streets, there are three big open-air markets. The market of Corso Racconigi is the most important and popular in the area. Two kilometres in length and with 370 stands, it is the second largest market in Turin and allegedly 'the longest one in Europe'.

Fig. 4 Sandretto Re Rebaudengo foundation (Photo by M. Pinto)

Another asset of the neighbourhood are its public parks, the result of the redevelopment projects implemented in the district from the 1980s to today. The neighbourhood has many green spaces, gardens, and playgrounds for children and sports. Public gardens, in Turin's history, have always been a fundamental space for creating social cohesion, because of their accessibility to all categories of people and openness to many different uses. A basic condition for the maintenance of this function is management of the space in a way that mediates conflicts between different users and supports social and cultural diversity (Low et al. 2005). In this regard, an educator emphasizes:

> We need to promote and enhance the use of public spaces such as gardens. Because public spaces are physical places that belong to both no one and everyone. At one time the public spaces were much used. Because people stayed in the neighbourhood more, in the summer there was no air conditioning in homes, we went out more. … Now use of the gardens has changed, immigrants appeared, but Italians resist them as they perceive these spaces as their own, even if they were no longer using them. (Barriera di Milano, association president, 32 years old, M)

The Giardini SPA are clean, safe, and frequently used by residents; they are not very large but are well served. There is a play area for children, two basketball courts, tables where you can play cards, an area reserved for dogs, and a kiosk selling drinks and sandwiches. The various groups use the space separately. During the morning hours it is mostly seniors who use the space. They usually gather on the same benches to chat and discuss the news. In the afternoon, in addition to pensioners sitting on "their" benches, in the area used for children's games there are many Italian and foreign mothers who bring their children to play. The relationships are

Fig. 5 Giardini SPA (Photo by M. Pinto)

very friendly and the mothers of different nationalities chat and exchange advice regardless of their various origins. A Romanian mother stated:

> We have all known each other for some time. We do not care about our origins, because our children play together without thinking about where their parents come from. (San Paolo, secretary, 39 years old, F)

The basketball courts are used by many young people, both Italian and foreign, and especially by Moroccans, Romanians, Egyptians, and Albanians, but also by young Chinese. As a 27-year-old man explains (Fig. 5):

> Sport is an excellent vehicle for relations and integration between the various groups. At best, you fight for the ball or over a foul but never for any other reason. (San Paolo, student, 27 years old, M)

A young Moroccan man who arrived in Turin in 2004 says:

> In the summer and in the afternoons there are always people who go to Ruffini Park to play football. There is no drug dealing or anything in either the gardens or the park. They are quiet places and always full of people. (San Paolo, student, 19 years old, M)

The tables where you can play chess or cards are used primarily by older people and, in the evening or on weekends, by Romanian men who meet to drink beer. The relationships between Italian pensioners and Romanian men are sporadic but friendly, as explained by one of the former:

> We all live in this area and the spaces must be for everyone. The important thing is to respect each other and respect the public space. In addition, as we know, in the city there are not a lot of green spaces and those that exist must be available for all patrons without distinction. (San Paolo, pensioner, 78 years old, M)

In the evening the garden is frequented almost exclusively by young people. The various ethnic groups divide themselves into different zones. Each group has its own bench or table of preference from which it rarely moves. In this case the groups scarcely communicate. There have never been clashes, quarrels, or scuffles here and interactions, although rare, are still described as being relaxed and friendly.

In general, the relations between the different groups of users of the garden are rare and sporadic but never antagonistic. Each group (young Italians, retired men, Romanians, etc.) is usually in the same area or on the same benches, almost as if there were an unwritten, but implicit agreement by all on how to handle the public spaces.

3.2 Barriera di Milano, a Never-ending Construction Site

In Barriera di Milano the urban fabric looks much more fragmented than that of San Paolo. Over the years the relationship of residents with their neighbourhood has changed significantly. In recent decades the percentage of residents who use it as a dormitory area has in fact increased because many more work and spend their free time elsewhere. Barriera di Milano has been impacted by changes that have also occurred in many other European cities, i.e. a shift from a traditional model, where the inhabitants worked, lived, and ate all in the same neighbourhood to new models in which these functions are separate; more or less dense groups of individuals have appeared who frequent the city to varying degrees in order to pursue equally differentiated activities (Martinotti 1993).[3] We can also relate the use of the neighbourhood by the inhabitants to specific modes and types of urban and architectural interventions. For instance, the disappearance of large industrial factories has left gaps in the territory which certainly affect how the inhabitants live the city.

The last building wave started after major changes to the land use plan were adopted in 1995 and it is still ongoing. It included the construction of new public housing settlements in the abandoned industrial sites (Fig. 6).

However, the share of public housing in the neighbourhood has remained lower than the city average: in the city it is 3.9 %, while in Barriera di Milano it is only 1.8 % (Cooperative Progest 2008). Compared with other de-industrialized neighbourhoods in the city, urban regeneration has been limited in Barriera di Milano. This was also due to the above-mentioned small public housing stock and highly fragmented private home-ownership, both of which have strongly hindered the local administration from taking action (Ciampolini 2007). The result is widespread urban blight and low-quality housing stock. Furthermore, welfare services are

[3] Martinotti identifies different types in the cities – from traditional types, to first, second, and third generation – and he matches the appearance of urban populations with different characteristics: the people who live, work and consume in the same part of the city; the commuters who work and sometimes consume; the city users who consume; and finally the metropolitan businessmen who work and consume.

Fig. 6 New housing settlements in Via Cigna (Photo by P. Cingolani)

unevenly distributed and mainly located in the eastern part of the neighbourhood, which is not easy to reach. Social services and schools (especially preschools) are few and insufficient if we consider that Barriera di Milano has a density of population and a proportion of poor families and young people higher than the city average. Moreover, there is a lack of meeting spaces and premises for non-profit organizations and cultural and recreation activities, so that their location depends more on the availability of space than on the distribution of demands and urban planning (Ascolto Attivo and Zaltron 2010).

Another major problem of Barriera di Milano is the lack of green spaces. This is the consequence of a particular urban history, with the oldest zone densely built around narrow streets, with very few squares, no green space and a lot of disused industrial areas. The average amount of public green space available to each inhabitant of Barriera di Milano is 1.64 square metres, much lower than in the city, where it is 20.13 square metres. Public gardens are few, small, ill-equipped, and their use has changed over the years. Today, they are primarily used by residents who are not able, due to time, mobility or economic resources, to spend their free time outside of the neighbourhood. There are many elderly people who do not have a car or are unable to move independently, as well as many immigrant mothers with young children who live in small apartments with no yard. A typical example is that of the gardens of Via Montanaro, a narrow strip of land, located between two busy roads. The gardens are surrounded by a wall and an abandoned building that block the view and make it difficult to access from one side. There are just a few, dilapidated benches (Fig. 7).

Fig. 7 The gardens of Via Montanaro (Photo by P. Cingolani)

The different categories of users who frequent the gardens have very different perceptions. A visible discomfort and a sense of disorientation often emerge among the elderly Italians in contrast to a sense of self-confidence among immigrants. Dirt and litter is a sensitive issue and it is almost always attributed by elderly Italians to the supposedly uncivilized behaviour of immigrants, who even accuse the latter of urinating in the corners of the gardens. The senior citizens also experience discomfort due to the presence of groups who are appropriating specific parts of the gardens exclusively for their own use. These are young Romanians of various ages who have met for years in a section of the gardens around the ping-pong table. They talk to each other, listen to music, play cards or video games. The young Romanians emphasize their sense of belonging and the role of social control they exercise in these public spaces. However, in the eyes of some Italian residents this presence has become so disturbing that they have asked for checks by the police for alleged drug dealing activities. The owner of the tobacco shop that overlooks the gardens attributes petty thefts in the neighbourhood to these men, although he cannot provide any proof to support his allegations. Other residents of the area underscore, on the other hand, how the presence of these young people – who live in the neighbourhood and are known by all – in fact constitutes a defence of the territory that has marginalized other disturbing presences, such as drug dealers and addicts.

In the gardens of Via Montanaro there are conflicts between the elderly and youngsters, natives and immigrants. During the fieldwork we met a group in the gardens that is committed to crossing social boundaries. It is an association that provides employment for people with mental illnesses. The members organize

games with the kids and clean the grounds of the gardens. Italian and foreign mothers show confidence in these individuals, know them, and often put their children in their hands. Even the elderly Italians are turning to this group to report the problems present in the gardens, such as a broken street lamp, a damaged bench, or garbage abandoned in a corner.

Their neutral position, outside the established social boundaries, makes this group particularly suitable for the resolution of conflicts that may erupt between those who frequent the gardens. The positive effect that this group has on the relationship in the park is also linked to the cleaning job. What is important to the development of cooperative relationships, in fact, is not just the amount of public spaces available, but also their quality.

4 Daily Conflicts in Public Spaces

4.1 Young Versus Elderly in Barriera di Milano: The Fight Against Drug Dealing

Analysis of the conflicts in Barriera di Milano often reveals that the opposing parties are different not so much because of ethnicity but because of age. The phenomenon of drug dealing in Barriera di Milano is highly visible and has prompted some elderly Italian residents to mobilize and develop self-organized patrolling strategies. Almost every night they walk the streets hanging out in small groups with the aim of intimidating the drug dealers. It is not hard to find them between 9 and 10 o'clock around the gardens of Via Montanaro and in the narrow streets that wind through Corso Giulio Cesare and Via Cigna, in the western part of Barriera di Milano. These old men have different regional origins; they are from Apulia, Calabria, and Piedmont. They belong to different social classes and also claim different political affiliations. In general, they are very dissatisfied with politics that have proved unable to tackle what they perceive as the 'real problems' of everyday life. Their group was formed through spontaneous congregation:

> The strongest recent change in Barriera has been immigration. So many people come here to commit crimes. We found ourselves with drug addicts and drug dealers on the doorstep. It all started here in 2007. We formed spontaneous groups, we met in the evenings, we were a group of people who did not know each other, we looked at each other from the balcony and we did not know what to do. One evening, exasperated, I threw an orange from the window on the heads of some African children, to chase them away. After the first contact a group of 15 people was born. (Barriera di Milano, pensioner, 64 years old, M)

After they gathered these men began to patrol the streets. The strategy adopted was to approach alleged drug dealers, to draw attention to them with shouts and insults, and to threaten to call the police. Young people, especially Nigerians, moved away immediately and a chase would begin through the streets of the neighbourhood. There were also small fights, because some of the elderly residents carried sticks. On more than one occasion these seniors raided the shops of Africans that

were considered centres of criminal organizations which resulted in nothing but furious quarrels with the owners. In 2010, the members were given a more structured organizational form, with a charter, a secretariat, and specific internal functions and they became part of a coordinated network of spontaneous committees in Turin which deal with similar situations in the various districts of the city. In December 2010, the committee staged a candlelight vigil against drug dealing on the streets of Barriera di Milano. The objectives of their battles were extended to other topics related to the protection of safety, with the collection of signatures against the opening of a new Islamic prayer hall (i.e. not a proper mosque) in the neighbourhood, which they consider a serious danger to residents. The foreign presence is regarded as not just a material threat but also a symbolic threat to the neighbourhood's identity.

The members of the committee accuse other elderly residents of having abandoned the area out of resignation. More than once, they have criticized them because they remain closed up in their houses. Young Italians are not spared criticism either:

> Young people do not participate in the committee, because they have other ideas, they just want to go and have fun. We are all senior citizens. Thirty years ago it would have been entirely different, when we were young and strong we would have sat in a group and made all these blacks disappear by force! Now young people are not at home, they get drunk and do not participate at all. (Barriera di Milano, pensioner, 64 years old, M)

What emerges, once again, is a strong generational divide, with grandfathers who say they are rooted in the neighbourhood, and children and grandchildren who appear passive and unconcerned.

The story of the candy store "Shenanigans" is another example of intergenerational conflict. The few Italian shops that remain in Barriera di Milano today have lost the role that they played in the past as places to meet and socialize. In 2009, a young woman opened a candy and garments store. In a large room with shelves full of sweets she also put a ping-pong table, a computer with an internet connection, and a play-station. The store began to attract many teenagers from the neighbourhood, both Italian and foreign-origin, who spent whole afternoons there. The kids talked with the owner about their problems, some carried out tasks and helped out in a self-organized after-school activity. Even parents started turning to the owner to learn about their children's problems and concerns. On some summer days, up to 50 people gathered in the store. The store's website has become a virtual space where photographs of the young customers are uploaded, along with their thoughts and dreams for the neighbourhood. Since June 2011, these thoughts have also been merged into a serial novel, which chronicles the lives of six young people in the neighbourhood, Italians and children of immigrants. The presence of the store and young people, Italians and foreigners, however, has sparked anger among neighbours.

> At first I wanted this to be a place to drop by and not a meeting place as it has become. When I decided to open here I had many problems. In August there were a lot of kids, the neighbours began to complain, saying that there was drug dealing here…The religious leaders have accused us of distributing pills, they are very reactionary. They cannot stand our presence, the administrator cannot wait for me to go. In fact, if the kids see that adults look

> at them as bad, they also react rudely. Several of them have been turned in to the police. The brigade arrived, and we were told that we cannot leave bikes in the street, we cannot even play football. The kids cannot even go in the inner courtyard of the building. Those who are boycotting are middle-aged people. (Barriera di Milano, shopkeeper, 33 years old, F)

The opening of the store, one of the few alternatives for young people to the nearby oratory and sports centre, has encountered so many obstacles that the owner has been driven to seek another location in the neighbourhood. Despite the accusations of drug dealing, however, the first visible effect of the presence of the store has been the disappearance of the drug dealers from the street, intimidated by the presence of young people until late at night. The same complaints against the Italian candy store are aimed at African grocery stores. Their clients, with their behaviour, do not fit into the picture of a consolidated social order. In other areas of the city, rather than being hampered, these forms of spontaneous meeting have been supported and promoted by institutions for several years and today struggle less to take root in the neighbourhood.

4.2 Peruvian Immigrants as the 'Social Problem' of San Paolo

San Paolo hosts the highest concentration of Peruvian immigrants in Turin. The reasons are manifold: in this area there are many institutions that have greatly facilitated both their initial reception and their professional and residential integration. The San Paolo village has a high concentration of elderly people, a factor that has undoubtedly contributed to the demand for care work favouring Peruvian immigrant women. Latin American immigration in general, and from Peru, in particular, has shown a significant capacity for building support networks. It is important to emphasize the role of women's networks in the development and maintenance of transnational social spaces through remittances sent to the family, access to social services in the host society, and the interweaving of permanent family contacts. Although female migration has never created social alarm in San Paolo, there is concern about the presence of Peruvian youngsters, most of them arriving to be reunited with their families, who are organized into gangs and occupy public spaces in noisy and violent ways.

The behaviour of these young people is denounced by the Peruvian migrants who, having spent more time living in the neighbourhood, consider themselves well-integrated and worry about the weakening of the intergenerational dialogue between parents and children. A 50-year-old woman, who has lived in Turin since 2003 and has two children in Peru, commented on the death of a boy after a fight at a restaurant:

> A lot of guys like these do not listen to their parents. In Peru, however, it is not so. These guys do not work, they have grown up far away with their grandparents and uncles and now that they are here their parents are always out of the house and cannot give advice. … They fought, they were all drunk and beat this guy; they even took a knife and in the end they killed him. But it is also the parents' fault! (San Paolo resident, housekeeper, 45 years old, F)

The problem of the second generation is one of the most strongly felt issues in the Peruvian community. When talking to some Peruvian young people, their feelings of isolation and loneliness are clear: *"We only hang out with Peruvian guys; with Italians we only have relationships in school."*

These youngsters often arrived as adolescents and were then quickly labelled as a problematic group. A 20-year-old student, in Turin for 5 years, speaks about his experience in a violent group:

> When I was younger, a few years ago, I was part of a violent group. We drank, smoked, and shoplifted. I do not go anymore. My uncle convinced me to come here to an association and leave them alone. Many of those guys already hung out together in Peru and were part of some thugs' group. (San Paolo, student, 20 years old, M)

To address these issues in San Paolo an ad hoc working group was established, in which numerous Peruvian associations, public institutions (schools, police, the Peruvian consulate), and Catholic institutions (San Paolo oratorio) took part. The group sought to understand the problem and organized an educational cooperative. However, the role played by the elderly Peruvians themselves was even more critical. The creation of activities for young people as well as music and dance courses enabled the regulation of the young people from entirely within the immigrant community, which has dissolved the tensions. The young association members have also been entrusted, by the President of the District, with the management of a summer meeting spot with free activities for all citizens.

The successful management of this situation has prevented a circumscribed internal conflict from developing into a much larger conflict between natives and immigrants. This solution was made possible because San Paolo has a much more cohesive policy community than Barriera di Milano.

5 The Public Baths, the Moroccan Rapper, and the Italian Wood Engraver

The conflicts in both San Paolo and in Barriera di Milano involve social groups that differ not only on the basis of ethnicity, but also, and especially, by age, and by the use they make of public spaces and neighbourhood services (Vanderbeck 2007). These conflicts are exacerbated when the object of the dispute is public space. The case of the Public Baths of Via Agliè in Barriera di Milano is a significant example in this regard.

The Public Baths are a big red brick building built by the city of Turin in the 1950s. In the period of the great industrial development and massive arrival of the immigrant population, public baths were an essential service to the many families who had no plumbing in their homes. At the end of the 1980s the Via Agliè baths were closed because residents no longer frequented them. However, in 2004 they reopened as demand, stemming mainly from recent and young immigrants (espe-

Fig. 8 The public baths of Via Agliè. Exterior (Photo by P. Cingolani)

cially Moroccans), rapidly increased. The image of the baths was by then highly stigmatized and linked to social deviance, so the Italian residents of the area initially protested against it. Word spread gradually and immigrant mothers with children and elderly Italians began to use the baths. This heterogeneity among the visitors normalized the image of the baths. In some cases the use of the baths is routine. In other cases, people use them when they are going through a period of great difficulty, linked to job loss.

The manager and personnel did not just monitor admission, but also listened to the visitors' stories. To meet the visitors' needs for a place to socialize, the reception hall was equipped with chairs and a hot drinks machine. According to a member of the staff:

> Many people come here just to be together, to have someone to chat with. We are also a bit like psychologists because we listen. … This is a place where beautiful friendships can also be born between very different people. (Barriera di Milano resident, social worker, 50 years old, M)

The managers of the baths decided to offer a laundry service, which was followed by a tailoring service. On the first floor of the baths a desk was opened to assist people with looking for work, and on the second floor, various associations have exhibition spaces and offices. These spaces constitute a resource for an area of the neighbourhood that suffers particularly from the lack of civic and social life (Fig. 8).

The practices developed in the baths seem to be successful in healing the rift between the generations and combating prejudice towards foreigners. One of the visitors to the baths is a 76-year-old wood engraver, a native of Piedmont. His workshop is the only one on the street still open, a witness to an almost bygone world of high-quality craftsmanship and manual knowledge. There are often complaints about the presence of young immigrant drug dealers but also about the younger generations' lack of interest in traditional craftsmanship. The wood engraver, who learned his art as an apprentice in a shop close to home, is deeply concerned by the fact that he cannot pass on his skills to his grandchildren because they are not interested in learning them. Within the public baths this man has organized a free restoration workshop, funded by the District and the City. Here he met a 22-year-old Chinese woman from the neighbourhood, who came to Italy with her parents when she was very young. This year she will finish art school and hopes to continue working with wood. The engraver appreciates the deftness and the great patience that she shows in her work. This type of experience, backed by an institutional project, is still sporadic in the neighbourhood, but it clearly represents an interesting form of crossing ethnic and generational lines.

In addition to the wood engraver, a group of young rappers have also used the public baths to cross social divides. This is a group of about 30 young men – Italian, immigrants, and children of immigrants – who met in the streets and gardens of the neighbourhood. They share a passion for music and live in diverse social conditions: some work, some study, some live alone, others live with their families. The baths have free rehearsal rooms, and this is a very convenient alternative to renting expensive private facilities. Thanks to the relationships of trust built over time with the managers of the baths, some of these young men have been entrusted with managing the rehearsal rooms. They also contribute to many of the activities offered to the residents of the neighbourhood, such as festivals on summer evenings. On these occasions, they work as mediators, informing passers-by and shopkeepers of initiatives. A group that is particularly stigmatized in public discourse, as young, aggressive idlers, has thus gained currency in the eyes of many residents, reducing the perceived distances.

> In the gardens we improvise, we do free-style, in the afternoon and evening, where the fountain is. If we then have to rehearse we come here. Free-style is an exercise for the head, it's like a workout for football players, which brings together Italians and foreigners. .... Rap is a way to let off steam, to say what we feel inside, to figure out what you like and what you dislike. Not everyone has had the same childhood, not everyone has the same ideas of the future. The common goal, however, is to externalize the suffering, to say that we are angry. The Italian seniors see us as bad, from a distance they think we do who knows what. Now that we are here at the baths, we also have some responsibility and for this we are also more accepted. (Barriera di Milano, rapper, 21 years old, M)

Many of these young people have strong roots in the neighbourhood, either because they were born here, or because they arrived when they were very young. In their lyrics they sing about the difficulties of living in Barriera di Milano but also their pride in it and have made belonging to this area their hallmark.

6 Barriera di Milano and San Paolo: So Near, Yet So Far…

Barriera di Milano and San Paolo have both similarities and differences. They both developed outside of the city's duty boundaries over the course of the nineteenth century as a consequence of the industrialization process. In both neighbourhoods, the presence of large factories and specific housing opportunities was a pull factor for large immigration influxes from other Italian regions during the economic boom of the late 1950s and 1960s. In both areas, the social composition of the resident population, made up mostly of workers and immigrants, fostered the development of a common cultural and social background, promoting a strong sense of belonging to the neighbourhood. These common features encouraged mobilizations in order to obtain better working and living conditions and sustained intense civic participation and association forming. At the same time, they stimulated public and religious service providers to develop innovative responses, leaving a legacy that is still visible today.

Since the 1970s both neighbourhoods have undergone deindustrialization processes and the factories located there have closed or moved out of the city, whereas the importance of the service sector has increased. This process has generated both challenges and opportunities. San Paolo has showed a greater capacity to take hold of the opportunities associated with the post-Fordist transition.

Barriera di Milano is indeed more socially disadvantaged: its share of poor families, individuals dependent on social services, and those with employment difficulties is higher than in San Paolo and the average education level is lower. Furthermore, services are inadequate and unevenly distributed within the neighbourhood. From an urban perspective, most of the abandoned areas are still there, representing obstacles to mobility within the neighbourhood and contributing to urban blight and a sense of insecurity among residents. Sociability is also hampered by the lack of spaces: meeting places and green areas are insufficient and the demand for room for cultural, recreational, and social activities cannot be satisfied. On the contrary, most of the vacant areas in San Paolo have been reconverted into service, office, commercial, and residential units contributing to the improved endowment of welfare services, meeting places, and the cultural supply of the neighbourhood. Furthermore, the economic transition has not generated such severe consequences in San Paolo, probably also thanks to the stronger cultural and social capital of the resident population.

It is thus evident that international immigration in the two neighbourhoods has interacted with two different contexts and has therefore produced different effects on inter-group relations. Urban blight, being more marked in Barriera di Milano, attracts more immigrants who are looking for cheap apartments, thus favouring segregation processes. However, the very presence of foreign residents is often regarded as the cause of urban blight rather than the other way around. The economic decline of Barriera di Milano has intensified the process in which traditional small shops and crafting activities are rapidly being replaced by ethnic businesses, contributing to the diffusion of a 'sense of invasion.' The shortage of welfare services and meeting

places seems to reinforce competition with immigrants, which is made harsher by the social weakness of natives who tend to compete for the same jobs, services, and spaces the immigrants ask for.

In light of this general framework, we have demonstrated that integration is a situated and lived experience, the product of the balance between different factors. Within the same area there are places where people live together apart and places in which people conflict. These conflicts are not always between natives and immigrants, but often between groups of people with different ages. Conflict resolutions depend on the presence of individuals who are able to mediate, as was the case with the Via Montanaro gardens in Barriera di Milano or with Giardini SPA in San Paolo. Mediation works well when there is a bottom-up approach, which is implemented by people living in the territory, such as the elderly members of the Peruvian Community or mentally ill persons employed by the local association. In order to produce an enduring change in the neighbourhoods, the initiatives spontaneously generated from below need to be supported by local institutions, as was the case with the public baths. This is a place where the diversification of the differences is not a threat but a value for the area and it can become a replicable practice elsewhere.

Despite these differences, both neighbourhoods seem to benefit from the strong identity and social cohesion that flourished during the industrial development, so that conflictual inter-group relations have thus far been channelled into organized solutions promoted by local institutions or citizens. Nevertheless, the leeway for managing antagonistic dynamics through formal and informal mediation seems to be decreasing due to the economic transition, the current crisis, and social changes.

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News Media and Immigration in the EU: Where and How the Local Dimension Matters

Andrea Pogliano

Due to their quasi-monopoly in the articulation of symbolic power (Thompson 1995), the media play a key role in the production of public discourses on most public issues, including those associated with immigration and ethnic minorities. They provide frameworks of explanation. They also furnish codes that label and classify. The media are therefore privileged sites for the production of differences in the public discourse and for the provision of moral judgements related to several publicly relevant issues. Although these claims have few, if any, opponents they are unfortunately only rarely corroborated by research on the effects of media representations on immigration and ethnic minority issues. The relatively few studies available on this topic are unevenly distributed across countries. They are quite numerous in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, in France, Denmark and Sweden, but they are completely missing in many of the EU states (ter Wal 2002; Bennett et al. 2011). Due to the impossibility of comparing studies on media effects, the section of this chapter devoted to showing commonalities and differences in the EU regarding the contribution of the news media to discourses on immigration and ethnic minority issues will concentrate on the texts, i.e., on the journalistic representations, and partly – and mainly indirectly – on typical news-making mechanisms.

The general aim of this chapter is to analyze selected empirical data from that collected for the media section of the *Concordia Discors* project[1] within a

[1] For the *Concordia Discors* project a keyword search was conducted on two daily newspapers for every neighbourhood considered, samplling issues every fifth day for the period 2001–2010 (with variations for practical reasons in the cases of London and Budapest). For this particular strand of *Concordia Discors* research, 14 newspapers overall were examined: 5 in Italy, 3 in Germany, 2 in the UK, 2 in Spain and 2 in Hungary. The newspapers include the following: in Italy, the local pages of the national dailies *La Stampa* and *La Repubblica* for the two neighbourhoods in Turin,

A. Pogliano (✉)
Università del Piemonte Orientale, Alessandria, Italy
e-mail: andrea.pogliano@sp.unipmn.it

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comparative European framework in order to examine the role played by the local dimension in media representations of immigrants and ethnic minorities. Local media have often been the target of studies examining the representations of immigrants and ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, these studies lack a comparative framework at both the national and international levels. Furthermore, only very few analyses of local media have focused on the hyper-local level of the neighbourhood. In those few cases, the aim was very often to analyze a single event covered by the local media over a brief period of time. This is partly explained by the fact that a number of studies focusing on local media dealt with local policies. In this regard, it is well known that news production is structured in relation to the political-administrative organization of local communities and their institutionalized relations with different levels of state bureaucracy (Ekström et al. 2012). This usually means an over-representation of the municipality and of larger scale administrative organizations (i.e. the Province and the Region) and an under-representation of the hyper-local level, which is generally seen as having little, if any, power in implementing policies.

The media analysis element of the *Concordia Discors* project is a first attempt towards a comparison of neighbourhoods in local media representations of migration issues. Such an approach is aimed at questioning the impact of a series of variables implied in the media-making of symbolic boundaries. The process involves localities at different scales, groups of residents, non-residents, local organizations and city administrators. Our approach raises questions such as the power of neighbourhoods in determining or countering media narratives and labelling. As a result of the comparative analysis of neighbourhoods in local media representations, we argue against the typical claim that a more balanced (less negative) representation of immigrants and ethnic minorities can necessarily be achieved through the involvement of these actors in the production of news, referring to them both as news sources and as actors to be quoted. We see this point as absolutely urgent and important, but we do not see it as the *only solution* to the problem. We argue that matters are more complex and problematic. What we see from our data is a picture in which neighbourhoods that share a vital narrative (renewed through rituals and events) are more able than others to control and frame the news referring to them – including that which refers to immigrants and ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood. This capacity to keep control of the narrative does not necessarily mean enhanced visibility for immigrants and minority groups. It could even mean just the opposite, depending on the context.

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the local pages of *La Repubblica* for the two neighbourhoods in Genoa; and the local pages of *La Repubblica* and *Corriere della Sera* for the neighbourhood in Milan. In Germany, the local dailies *Nürnberger Zeitung* and *Nürnberger Nachrichten*. In Spain, local pages of the national daily *La Vanguardia* and city pages of the regional daily *El Periódico de Catalunya*. In the UK, the local bi-weekly *South London Press* and city pages of the regional weekday daily *Evening Standard*. In Hungary, the hyper-local bi-weekly *Józsefváros* and the hyper-local monthly *Kőbányai Hírek*. We do not deal with all these data but only with that relevant to the main topics to be discussed in this chapter.

The structure of this chapter is as follows: the first section is on common trends and major differences on this topic across EU countries. Although a serious comparison is far from being accomplished, and is, perhaps, even impossible due to significant differences in their histories, policies, media environments and social contexts, we nevertheless describe key commonalities and differences that seem to emerge from important studies in the field.

The second section is devoted to investigating the scale of these representations, questioning the geographic level of the framing of the news on immigration. We consider national, local and hyper-local levels in their reciprocity, looking at their clear divergences, overlaps, and mutual reinforcements. We then present a framework for reasoning on this topic.

We investigate different modalities used to produce news stories related to neighbourhoods and migration, labelling or not labelling the neighbourhoods in relation to the presence of immigrants or ethnic minorities settlements, by providing empirical data from the media section of the *Concordia Discors* project. We stress the opposing notions of narrative cohesion and narrative fragmentation by comparing the data about local media representations from *Concordia Discors* case studies. Narrative cohesion and narrative fragmentation at a hyper-local level are part of a wider process determining and being determined by the images of neighbourhoods resulting from the news. These images may be the product of a labelling process involving immigrants and ethnic minorities.

Thereafter, we discuss – with data from local media representations of four neighbourhoods – successful and failed episodes of 'moral panic' as ambiguous and controversial processes in which, we argue, narrative cohesion and narrative fragmentation within a given neighbourhood are key variables.

The main concepts used in the analysis are those of 'labelling' and 'moral panics'. The importance of labelling in media representations of persons, groups and places has been repeatedly evoked in media studies, especially following the 'cultural turn', and it is undoubtedly a very fruitful concept for studying the production of differences (related to class, gender and ethnicity) in the media. Both in studies adopting a quantitative content analytical approach and in those adopting a qualitative discourse analytical approach, the question of how the media uses labels to construct social categories and trace symbolic boundaries is critical. In the study of media representations of immigrants and ethnic minorities, we might assert that the concept of labelling together with that of stereotyping are the most commonly used in the analyses of the discursive boundaries separating natives and immigrants and/or different racial or ethnic groups. Conceptualizing labelling as a social production involving the media and other actors who have some power in publicly challenging or restoring the social order generally means giving careful consideration to the power of discourses and symbols in shaping reality. The symbolic order is both a product of the interactions among media, authorities, administrations, organizations and public opinion, and a powerful reality in itself, triggering feedback loops from all of the aforementioned actors. The process of labelling is an important component of several media-driven phenomena when analyzed within a social constructionist approach. Among these phenomena, moral panic takes centre stage. In its

first formulation by Cohen (1972), the supporting theory was indeed the symbolic interactionist theory of 'labelling' (cf. Becker 1963; Wilkins 1964), delineating deviant behaviour as interactive, i.e., the outcome of complex chains of social interactions in which the media plays a pivotal role. In further reformulations under different theoretical frameworks (i.e. ideology and hegemony; structural functionalism), the boundary-making approach produced within a labelling process remains key.

In moral panics, moral entrepreneurs play a key role, in some cases by being *primary definers* (Hall et al. 1978), offering journalists a frame within which to represent events. Among the moral entrepreneurs are politicians and government, police and law enforcement agencies, pressure groups and claims makers. These groups own the power to temporarily drive media narratives, especially when they form alliances. The ultimate function of successful moral panics is to shore up the existing moral order, reacting to social change. This is why studies of moral panic phenomena have focused on a wide and heterogeneous series of issues that are portrayed, at specific times and places, as threats to the moral order within a given society. They include the introduction of new technologies, the emergence of threatening viruses, such as AIDS in the 1980s, child abuse and other forms of physical abuse and new forms of deviance or criminality (for an overview of themes see Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994; Thompson 1998; Critcher 2003). Immigrants and asylum seekers are often reported as being labelled as *folk devils* in some moral panic episodes, as will be described in Sect. 1.

In our analysis, moral panics on immigration are identified as an especially effective way of shaping the symbolic boundaries of interethnic societies. By labelling some groups as folk devils and by labelling some events with phrases such as 'interethnic clashes', moral panics gain a discursive legacy which is capable of triggering a series of national and local actors in a recursive game of representations, prescriptions and (political) actions. Furthermore, we argue that moral panics are very interesting phenomena to be studied in order to explore the geographic level of news framing on immigration and ethnic minority issues and the role played by neighbourhoods in determining the success or failure of a panic.

1 News Media and Migration in EU States

Although a large number of studies on journalistic representations of immigrants and ethnic minorities have been carried out in many EU states, very few works have attempted to conduct a comparative review of these studies. For our specific purposes, in this section we rely mainly (but not exclusively) on two reports in order to identify the main similarities and differences on the topic across Europe. The first report was edited by ter Wal in 2002 under the title *Racism and cultural diversity in the mass media*. Its conclusions offer a synthesis of common trends and differences reported in studies from 1995 to 2000 in 15 states. The second is the *Mediva thematic report (Media Content)*, published in 2011, authored by Bennett et al. and

which is partly intended as a temporal continuation of the previously mentioned report.

This section mainly focuses on Northern and Southern Europe. It lacks discussion of the potential specificity of East-Central Europe because only a very limited number of studies have been published on the topic of media and migration in this area. This also makes it difficult to conduct a rigorous comparative study of all of Europe.

1.1 The Criminalization of Migrants and Media Self-Criticism

A very generalized trend in the media representations of migrants and ethnic minorities across the EU is the over-emphasis on ethnic and immigrant crime. This means an over-representation of ethnic minority offenders in the news and, at the same time, a tendency – reported in studies carried out in different countries – to overlook the problems experienced by ethnic groups, including episodes of racist violence in which immigrants are the victims.

Analyzing five approaches in media research – the content analytical, the discourse analytical, the news-making, the social constructionist and the 'news and public attitudes' – Maneri and ter Wal tried to answer the "question of how and why, as research consistently shows, news on migrants is so often negative and so often about crime" (Maneri and ter Wal 2005: 2). Each of the five approaches offers a contribution to the discussion, by examining the extent to which migrants are over-represented in the coverage of 'problem areas', by quantifying the topics on which the news stories tend to focus or not focus when dealing with immigrants and ethnic minorities, by discussing the importance of news-values and production routines, by qualitatively analyzing the ideological biases embedded in language, the role of political actors in producing biased reporting, the agenda-setting role of media effects on public opinion, and so on.

The news-making approach linked to the content analytical approach is particularly useful when thinking about news sources and the use of quotations. Indeed, another notorious general finding across the EU is that immigrants and 'ethnic, cultural, religious minorities [and NGOs supporting their voices] are not quoted very frequently and are not treated as regular news sources' (ter Wal 2002: 40). As an effect of a news-making mechanism, news and feature articles on immigrants rely heavily on politicians, official figures and the police as sources of information and explanation. 'With regard to news on deviance and crime, this means that official definitions of the situation (by the police and other officials) are likely to be prioritized and to receive prominent coverage as well as high credibility' (van Dijk 1988, in Maneri and ter Wal 2005: 6).

Important factors of differences between countries on this key topic of media representations are self-criticism and third actor (NGOs and/or local authorities) driven media practices. Self-criticism refers to 'initiatives of media organizations and individual journalists to elaborate (or demand the elaboration of) non-

discriminatory texts' (Banon-Hernàndez 2002: 191). Journalists' associations and unions have tried to change reporters' attitudes about ethnic, cultural and religious differences, by promoting the use of guidelines and training facilities. This has happened sometimes nationally, sometimes locally, and with significant differences – both in terms of the period in which they were introduced and of their effectiveness – between localities and nations. In some cases some code of conduct on the topic is shared within a 'journalistic community' even in the absence of written guidelines. This sharing may be recognized as a journalistic tradition in some countries (i.e. the tradition of not mentioning nationality or ethnic origins in crime news in the Netherlands). Quoting the *Mediva thematic report*, 'German and Dutch media do not mention nationality generally, in Germany this appeared to be a recent practice attributed to greater awareness among journalists. Although in the Dutch media this tradition is long, interviews with journalists conducted for this project show that the practice is changing and some newspapers appeared less reluctant to mention nationality in reports' (Bennett et al. 2011: 12). In Spain a deontological code approved by the professional association of Catalan journalists referring to these practices has existed since 1992.[2] Since then, the association has published a *Stylebook on the Treatment of Ethnic Minorities* and a guide entitled *The Treatment of Multiculturalism in Journalism*. In Italy, the negative practice of mentioning ethnic origins in crime news notoriously still prevails, but in 2008 a new non-discriminatory text was promoted by a group of stakeholders including the Council of Journalists.[3] The text furnishes guidelines for the adoption of proper terminology and also indirectly condemns the widespread practice of mentioning ethno-national origins in the news when not strictly necessary for informational purposes. In London and in other metropolitan areas in Northern Europe local newspapers often have an unwritten code of conduct discouraging the mention of individuals' ethnicities.

In general terms, some studies – particularly from the UK and Germany – support the thesis of a general increased awareness of these concerns among journalists and editors, which has resulted in more positive reporting practices. More cautiously, the 2010 EU Handbook of Integration (Niessen and Huddleston 2010) restated that the existence of journalistic codes and self-regulation does not in itself prevent unfair and discriminatory discourse about immigrants and immigrant groups.

In an often quoted study on the British news media (Law 1997), the findings prompted the author to argue that news on ethnic minorities had 'become the scene of an "anti-racist show", where increasing amounts of space were being given to the opinion of accredited minority actors' (Maneri and ter Wal 2005: 4).

Although these findings show inevitable ambivalences, they nevertheless trace a line between countries with recent histories of immigration and those with longer histories, reflecting improvement in media narratives on immigration and ethnic minority issues which appear to be, to some extent, directly proportional to the

[2] http://www.periodistes.org/cic/html/body_codi_s.htm

[3] http://www.odg.it/content/carta-di-roma

length of time that migrant groups have been present in a given country. Although some local practices tell a different story (i.e. the deontological code of Catalan journalists), one might see these practices as the few exceptions confirming the rule.

1.2 Newcomers and the Asylum Issue

In the *Mediva thematic report* it is argued that in the UK "the media, especially tabloid, fail to distinguish sufficiently between economic migrants, asylum seekers and refugees" (Bennett et al. 2011: 12). Asylum seekers are often labelled as illegal immigrants. A similar finding emerges from the analysis of German TV discourse (Thiele 2005). We might argue that the label 'illegal immigrants' implies different levels of generalization in different countries. In countries of recent immigration, and in Italy in particular, it is used within a context of media reporting on immigration, which conspicuously over-represents landings, and the presence of illegal immigrants (*clandestini*). This label produces – especially but not exclusively in the conservative press – an arbitrary distinction between legal immigrants (perceived as good workers) and illegal immigrants (perceived as criminals or deviants), where the latter gain greater visibility than the former. Furthermore, in relatively recent immigration countries, the 'illegal immigrant' label does not imply the construction of, or necessarily overlap with a symbolic boundary between newcomers and older residents.[4] On the contrary, in countries with a longer immigration history, it seems that the label of illegal immigrants runs precisely along the established resident/newcomer boundary. Studies 'register a different treatment of the refugee and immigrant issue, on the one hand, and the issue concerning longer established ethnic minority communities, on the other' (ter Wal 2002: 42–43). For instance, scholars noticed that the general anti-racist tone of the British press (particularly the broadsheet press) on ethnic minorities is not extended to recent migration.

As has been emphasized in several studies, the news media typically adopt a double standard in framing stories of people fleeing persecution or escaping wars and disasters. In the foreign news they are always described as victims within a humanitarian framework, while in the domestic news they are very often described as intruders within a law and order framework (see, among others, Article 19: 2003).

This type of double standard is also typical within domestic news. In his analysis of the Belgian press coverage of the asylum issue, Van Gorp found that the representations of asylum seekers were almost equally distributed between 'a frame that referred to the archetypical role of the innocent victim… [and] a frame that referred to the stereotype "all strangers are intruders"' (Van Gorp 2005: 489). The first frame was found to be more frequently used in the quality broadsheet press while the second was more frequently used in the popular press. The two frames have been

[4] This is not to say that media coverage has never led to stigmatization of various national groups during periods of high immigration of those groups (for example, of Albanian migrants to Italy in the 1990s and of Romanians in the following decade).

described as radically distinct and each one develops a specific chain of connected reasoning devices (i.e. problem definition, problem source, responsibility, moral judgement, policy solution), news sources used and quotes referred to by journalists.

1.3 Muslim Migrants and 'the Muslim Community'

The *Mediva thematic report* found that in the 2000s one major theme in press reporting 'was that of Islam, linked with terrorism, cultural (in)compatibility, and Islamophobia (…) with a focus on aggression and threat' (Bennett et al. 2011: 12–13). The increase of studies on media and Islam after *9/11* and *7/7* is unsurprising, especially in the UK (among the most recent studies: Alsultany 2012; Flood et al. 2012; Hutchings et al. 2011; Karim 2011; Morey and Yaqin 2011). Islam has become such a central theme in the representations of immigration that, to some extent and mostly in Northern Europe, one could say – as Roggeband and Vliegenthart (2007) have with regard to the Netherlands – that immigration is now represented through the frame of Islam. This carries a shift from an emphasis on the ethno-nationalist dimension to the religious dimension. This shift has been described in the media representations of the Turkish minority in Germany, Austria and Switzerland (Krzyzanowski 2012; Yildiz 2009). This is particularly relevant in countries such as Germany, where 'Turks have tended to be covered as if they were representative of the entire range of 'foreigners' in the country' (Maneri and ter Wal 2005). A general increase in news reports about Muslims is documented in studies from many countries, but this seems to be more marked in Northern Europe.

This does not mean that before *9/11* Muslim migrants and Islam in the EU were not relevant themes in media representations. For instance, '[a]nti-Islamic tendencies in the Dutch press were particularly strong in the first half of the 1990s: for example, distinctions between religion and nationality were blurred, [and] Muslims were represented as a depersonalised collectivity' (ter Wal 2002: 48). We may find the same evidence in the studies conducted in Italy, where, apart from an increase in the number of news items on Muslim migrants (due to the connection with terrorism), the same stereotypes and tendencies to report on Muslims as part of a homogeneous community are found across the decades (Binotto and Martino 2004; Marletti 1995; Pogliano 2010; Pogliano and Zanini 2010; Soravia 2000).

2 Re-articulating the Local/National Nexus in the News

Analyzing the local in news media studies usually means analyzing local media. For immigration and ethnic minority issues the point is often to see if local media ascribe to these persons and groups the same negative portrayal that is typically found in the representations of national media. Local media vary from locally based

TV and press to the local coverage offered by the national media. The local usually refers to a city or a broader area (the province or the region), but there are examples of more narrow-scale media, as in the case of the Budapest municipal free neighbourhood-level newspapers analyzed for the *Concordia Discors* project. In some cases, local media have been shown to be highly influential in defining local politics in relation to citizenship (Franklin and Murphy 1991, who however consider a peculiar context where a local newspaper enjoys a monopolistic position, which is less and less the case in the current media environment).

There is a sort of consensus in media studies in claiming that local media usually offer a more positive representation of immigrants and ethnic minorities than the national media. This claim has recently been made in the *Mediva thematic report* (see Bennett et al. 2011: 20). In particular, it is argued that migrants are more likely to receive positive coverage by local newspapers *in metropolitan areas* where the presence of migrants and ethnic minorities is stable and balanced (i.e. 'non majoritarian'). Notwithstanding this general consensus, studies show that while this finding applies to some northern European countries, it merits more critical discussion, particularly in reference to southern European countries. In Italy, the local media were found in some studies (Belluati 1998; Maneri 1998; Stopfner 2010; Stopfner and Vorhover 2011) to focus heavily on crime news and the mobilization of intolerance, using predominantly conflict and problem frames. According to these studies, the local media do not seem to be more sensitive than the national media in representing ethnic and cultural diversity. In contrast, other studies show a very different picture, revealing local media in some areas (i.e. the Emilia-Romagna and the Tuscany regions) to be more sensitive and to offer a more positive picture of immigration (Grossi 1995). It is often claimed that the local and regional media in Spain have been more sensitive towards solidarity and diversity than the national media, which nonetheless has also started to introduce more programmes reflecting cultural diversity. However, in both the Italian and Spanish regional cases, we notice that the studies producing these findings often refer to the tendency of local media to cover community events, festivals and other hyper-local events usually promoted by associations, NGOs and/or local authorities. The claim that the local media gives a voice to immigrants by quoting them more frequently than the national media do is very often based on news coverage of events that are unlikely to be the focus of national coverage. The local media has in some cases been more sensitive than the national media in promoting good practices. The cases of the Catalan Region in Spain and those of the Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany Regions in Italy are examples of practices of auto-regulation and media openness to new sources of information (i.e. grassroots associations, local NGOs) that anticipated and in some ways fostered innovations in the national media's sensibilities towards cultural diversity. Nevertheless, analysis of local and national media coverage of conflict events dealing with immigration has uncovered few significant differences. This is a topic that seems to be overlooked.

In the following pages, we will try to further examine the distinction between the national and the local in the media. We use *events* and *images* as key concepts. We are particularly interested in the process of de-localization and re-localization in

describing and interpreting local events and in the images of localities (neighbourhoods in particular) that emerge from the media representations.[5]

To do so, we first need a framework for thinking about this reciprocity. We will therefore turn to the empirical data collected from the local media representations of four neighbourhoods, two from Turin and two from Barcelona.

2.1 National, Local, Hyper-Local and the News Events: A Framework

Not all news is local but all the *events* covered in the news are somehow local, in the self-evident sense that they happen in specific places. However, there are differences in their journalistic presentation. The difference we are interested in here is the geographical level of framing. Certain local events are presented from their first appearance in the news within a national frame, others are conceived to be local in the first instance. Still others are presented as hyper-local. We argue that in the construction of the national, local (usually the city level) and hyper-local (generally the neighbourhood level) what matters is the interrelation of three variables.

The first variable concerns *the level of the discussion implied by a local event*. Building a mosque is a local event inscribed in a national debate on multiculturalism, so it is an event that is more likely to be narrated within a national frame than, for instance, an episode of petty crime. Nevertheless, such distinctions are not easily drawn. Under particular circumstances a petty crime episode may be interpreted within a national frame. Two intervening variables are, in this case, news sources and the role played by moral/political entrepreneurs, as we will see below when discussing so-called 'moral panics'.

The second variable consists in *the greater or lesser capacity of specific places to claim representativeness of a whole country*. For instance, an event taking place in a big city that is also the headquarters of major media companies is more likely to be presented within a national frame than a similar event taking place in a small and peripheral city. Here again, the distinctions are not clear-cut. Some peripheral places have become central in the representation of an issue. For instance, the island of Lampedusa in Italy has become an intensely covered symbolical locus for the landing of undocumented immigrants and asylum seekers from North Africa. Lampedusa is a typical – and perhaps even extreme – case that sheds light on a common trend in media representations: very often the national centrality of local

[5] By de-localization we mean the process leading to the production of local news stories in which the local context is totally or partially omitted in favour of a national framework. By re-localization we mean the capacity of the local context to strike back, as a consequence of a visibility acquired by local actors or stakeholders gaining voice in local journalism. These processes may even be studied by taking the city and the neighbourhoods as elements to focus on, instead of a national and a – vaguely interpreted – local dimension.

events, far from reinforcing the visibility of local concerns, instead produces an impressive lack of these concerns in the news.

A local variant of this second variable concerns the relationship between neighbourhoods and cities. As will be seen below, some neighbourhoods are described in the local news not only as part of the city but as its ideal. By contrast, other neighbourhoods are often described as foreign entities. The central or peripheral status of a given neighbourhood may have to do with the consonance or dissonance between the idealized image of the city in the rhetoric of local journalists and editors and the public image of the neighbourhood that local media contribute to producing and re-producing over time. We argue that the ethnic issue may function as a key variable in the media construction of the status of a neighbourhood in relation to the image of the city.

The third variable concerns *the general relevance of hyper-local contexts in public debates and collective narratives*. What interests us here is the relevance of neighbourhoods in general terms, rather than the particular relevance of specific neighbourhoods. One finding from the media section of the *Concordia Discors* project is that the general relevance of neighbourhoods in the public discourse is clearly higher in southern European cities.

2.2 Images of the Neighbourhoods and 'Their Migrants/ Minorities' in the Local Media: Turin and Barcelona

Before exploring the local/national nexus by focusing on extraordinary media phenomena such as moral panics, we will start by analyzing empirical data collected by surveying the local/hyper-local nexus (i.e. the conjunctions and differences among the images of neighbourhoods and the images of cities) in ordinary media coverage and the role played by the news dealing with immigrants in shaping discursive images of given places. The choice of neighbourhoods – two from Turin and two from Barcelona – was determined by the comparability between the data, which is enhanced by the similarities in both the social contexts (in both Italy and Spain neighbourhoods are significant and subject to specific recurrent media narratives) and the collected news items (in both cases items were taken from dailies gathered within an identical sample of one every five days in the period 2001–2010).

In the *Barriera di Milano* neighbourhood of Turin, 163 out of 257 news items deal with the neighbourhood by mentioning migrants, accounting for 63.4 % of local coverage of the neighbourhood. In *San Paolo* in Turin, in contrast, the share of migrant-related items is just 17.4 % (29 out of 167). In Barcelona's *Poble Sec* neighbourhood it is 16.52 % and in *Sagrada Família* it is 4.72 %. What accounts for such differences?

One factor may be the previously mentioned deontological code adopted in Catalunya. If we compare the contents of local news dealing with immigration in *Barriera di Milano* and *Poble Sec*, we see that, despite a similar propensity to

emphasize poverty and urban decay when dealing with immigrants, there is a huge difference in reporting crime news. In *Poble Sec*, we count only three items out of 41 (7.3 %). In *Barriera di Milano* crime news dealing with immigrants accounts for 48 out of 163 (29.4 %).

A second factor may be found in the image of neighbourhoods constructed by the media in relation to the city. In *Making Local News*, Kaniss (1991) showed 'how local journalists define what should be understood as local, namely by emphasizing issues which can be regarded as symbols of local identity. For example, by giving media attention to central city development projects' (Ekström et al. 2012: 256–257). We argue that the embeddedness of such symbols in specific neighbourhoods might have consequences for the news-making mechanisms enacted by local journalists upon these neighbourhoods. The central idea is that journalists tend to preserve consolidated images in their work. This process of preservation and promulgation is effected through the routines of news selection and news framing.

If we consider the relationships that symbolically link the neighbourhoods to the cities, as they emerge from media analysis, the four neighbourhoods considered in this section are characterized by being central in two cases (*Sagrada Família* and *San Paolo*), peripheral in one case (*Barriera di Milano*, in spite of it being geographically semi-central, as we will see in more details below) and neither central nor peripheral in the last case (*Poble Sec*). In one case, the centrality acquired by the neighbourhood in relation to the city in media reports depends on the presence of a very important tourist attraction (the *Sagrada Família* church), whereas in the other (*San Paolo*), it depends on the neighbourhood's historical and ideological background. What we are claiming is that an image of a neighbourhood's centrality in the city narrative, shared by journalists, local politicians and other stakeholders alike, may influence the news-making mechanism adopted when dealing with it. In these cases, narrative cohesion at the neighbourhood level corresponds to the idealized image of the city that local journalists tend to preserve. This process may explain in part the huge difference between the frequency with which local news in *San Paolo* and *Barriera di Milano* covers immigrants within a conflict frame.

In *San Paolo,* many news stories about the neighbourhood produce a historical narrative, both in memorials/celebrations (of Liberation, Resistance and the young anti-fascist hero Dante Di Nanni), and through constant references to the past, evoking the industrial period. The neighbourhood is described as a working-class district, a cradle of values among which solidarity stands out. A series of events that took place in *San Paolo* have been journalistic opportunities to write and talk about the projects to transform Turin from an industrial city to a city of culture and tourism. At the same time, the area seems to become an ideal location for the narrative of historical events which Turin claims with pride. In Ruffini Park there is also an annual celebration for left-wing parties, another moment of celebration of a history that unites some of the residents and, foremost, for administrators who for years led both the city and the district in which the quarter is located. *San Paolo* thus becomes a location made up of places that transcend it. A symbol is created which continually projects the quarter beyond its borders. We claim that once this image is established, problematic events involving migrants are less likely to be selected and

emphasized by journalists. This means that these events are less newsworthy than comparable events taking place in neighbourhoods with a peripheral narrative status.

This is the case of the *Barriera di Milano* neighbourhood in Turin, whose image presented in the media is clearly peripheral, despite its geographically semi-central position and the important role it played in Turin's great industrial history. News reports concerning this neighbourhood fail to mention its celebrated heroes or major historical events. The only historical figure whose name has been associated with the neighbourhood in the media is Pietro Cavallero, an infamous bandit from the 1960s, and that was in conjunction with the release of a film and exhibit dedicated to him. There is a conspicuous absence of any historical discourse that frames the neighbourhood in the light of its industrial and working-class past. No significant stories – those able to establish a shared memory and, ultimately, an image recognized by residents and recognizable to others – are evoked by the local media. The past exists only as a vague nostalgia that fuels discontent, not as history that can shed light on the present. In this context, which we could define as a historical memory void, the immigration issue emerges as the key issue in representing the neighbourhood. The vast majority of stories about the neighbourhood emerge within the framework of news referring to immigrants (72 %). These stories describe *Barriera di Milano* as a 'problem area', 'tough neighbourhood', 'poor neighbourhood', 'robbery district', 'quarter with many illegal immigrants', 'drug dealing and theft area', 'unsafe place', 'slum', 'neglected area', and so forth.

It is worth noting that this difference is not related to the capacity of immigrant groups or associations to gain a voice in the local media. Immigrants are not quoted frequently in the news, either in *Barriera di Milano* or in *San Paolo*. Furthermore, if we consider the case of *San Paolo*, we notice that the presence of immigrants remains marginal in the stories about the neighbourhood and, when they appear, it is on the occasion of specific celebrations, such as the Feast of the Peruvian Community. We may take this data as evidence of a journalistic effort to offer a peaceful narrative of *San Paolo*. Despite its frequent representation as a 'place of solidarity', immigrants are not only largely unvoiced in the media but also excluded as referents in the media construction of the neighbourhood's image.

It is interesting to compare this data with that related to *Poble Sec*. In *Poble Sec* the distribution of news dealing with immigrants both within a conflict frame and a cooperation frame are similar to those in *San Paolo* (with a slightly larger number of stories on conflict, but also more stories on integration policies). In *Poble Sec*, however, immigrants are more often given a voice in the news: residents with non-Spanish origins are quoted 16 times, compared with the nine times residents of Spanish origins are quoted. As for local stakeholders and local politicians, they are quoted 8 times each.

This brings us to the third element worth accounting for: the role played by organized official and unofficial sources, whether local or hyper-local, in the news-making process. In *Barriera di Milano*, an absence of organized voices at the hyper-local level gave rise to the predominance of both official voices from law enforcement actors and the voices of single residents or temporary committees and

protest groups. In a smaller but significant proportion, the comments negatively labelling the neighbourhood are from journalists, mostly aimed at summarizing the findings from meetings in which demographic or crime statistics are provided. In *San Paolo* and *Poble Sec* organized groups of residents (associations and other hyper-local stakeholders) are both quoted and taken as sources in the news, while in *Sagrada Família* they are absent. These data contribute to explaining both the endogenous/exogenous nexus – which see some of the neighbourhood's problems represented as if they were always generated elsewhere and others as if they were always produced inside the neighbourhood – and the local/hyper-local nexus, which produces for some neighbourhoods a sense of being both a city symbol and a place with its own identity, while for other neighbourhoods the symbolization produces a de-contextualisation at the hyper-local level.

For the endogenous/exogenous nexus we may refer again to *San Paolo* and *Poble Sec* on the one hand, and to *Barriera di Milano* on the other. In the former two, news reports on conflict situations are often described as external: muggers and drug dealers who do not live in the neighbourhood but who periodically "target" it. Regarding *Poble Sec*, these exogenous narratives are often related with the neighbourhood's proximity to the neighbourhood of *Raval*, where, 'at least during the past 20 years, some form of conflict linked by some stakeholders to immigrants have taken place (e.g., prostitution, drug dealing, dirtiness, noise, infections, etc.). At some moments, this geographical proximity can contribute to spreading social alarm from *Raval* to *Poble Sec*' (Morén-Alegret et al. 2012: 62). The contrary happens for *Barriera di Milano*, where many news stories that have been presented as news about the neighbourhood actually refer to places that, in strict administrative terms, lie outside the neighbourhood, such as the Roma camps of Lungo Stura and Arrivore. These places have been characterized in terms of problems and marked by the presence of foreigners (Roma, African drug dealers, etc.). These stories have turned *Barriera di Milano* into the epicentre of the city's "security problem". We argue that the absence of organized voices other than temporary protest groups in the neighbourhood is part of the symbolic production of a stigma affecting *Barriera di Milano*.

For the local/hyper-local nexus we refer to *Sagrada Família* and to *San Paolo*. The central role occupied by the two neighbourhoods in the narratives related to their respective cities has often been marked in the local media in explicit ways, but the majority of the news items mentioning *San Paolo* produce an image of the neighbourhood and its residents, while the vast majority of news items mentioning *Sagrada Família* do not. In *Sagrada Família* the stories about the neighbourhood are stories about the church. The labelling of the location is a function of its international role in conferring a touristic image to the city of Barcelona. The values contained in the image of *Sagrada Família* are found in the church, not in the neighbourhood. Out of 30 news items dealing with immigrants in *Sagrada Família*, only four took place exclusively in the neighbourhood. In the vast majority of cases (26 out of 30), news stories mention *Sagrada Família* in conjunction with other neighbourhoods. This data can be taken as evidence of the media's tendency to avoid focusing on the neighbourhood. Far from reinforcing the visibility of the local concerns in the news, the centrality of *Sagrada Família* tends instead to obscure them.

2.3 *Moral Panics and the Ethnic Issue: The Local Goes National?*

A Sequential Structure for Moral Panics

Cohen (1972: 9) opened his classic study of moral panics with these words:

> Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerge to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylised and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnosis and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and become more visible (…) Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself.

In the original formulation, Cohen (1972) traced a sequential structure for moral panics, derived from disaster research. The stages indicated by Cohen are Warning, Impact, Inventory and Reaction. In a recent work, Maneri (2013: 172) remarks that 'the stages seem to work at disjointed analytical levels'. Confronting Cohen's stages with those indicated for the study of media hypes (Vasterman 2005), Maneri (2013) reworks the sequential structure in order to offer a useful tool for empirical studies of media-driven moral panics. The reformulation includes five stages: Warning, Impact, Propagation, Reaction and Latency. In the Warning stage, events are covered according to routine journalistic norms. In the Impact stage, coverage is disproportionately high compared to usual journalistic norms. In the Propagation stage, 'otherwise minor events gain strong visibility thanks to the newsworthiness of the established news theme, making them appear – to journalists as well as the public – to be new occurrences of the ongoing emergency' (Maneri 2013: 176). In the Reaction stage, diagnoses and solutions are offered from experts and moral entrepreneurs, and 'extraordinary law enforcement measures are taken'. The Latency stage means a return to the usual level of media coverage.

(Serial) Moral Panics and the Ethnic Issue

The first study of moral panics to deal with ethnic and racial issues was the now classic analysis of episodes of mugging in Britain during the 1970s, published under the title *Policing the Crisis* (Hall et al. 1978). After *Policing the Crisis*, the concept of moral panic was explored in several studies dealing with the journalistic representations of immigration and ethnic minority issues, particularly analyzing inner-city riots in Britain, and then in France in the coverage of the *banlieues*.

Moral panics on immigration are reported to be more frequent nowadays in southern European countries (ter Wal 2002). Italian, Greek and Spanish studies

have found examples of the media phenomenon of moral panic in the 1990s and in the following decade.

Critcher made a distinction between individual and serial moral panics, with serial moral panics starting and ending more than once in cyclical ways, supported by a script that, once activated, works as a prototype. Among serial moral panics on immigration there are panics over the massive arrivals of undocumented migrants and crime panics. Between the two, there is a typical serial panic of more local interest, related to clashes, riots or protests over urban decay involving natives and immigrants in neighbourhoods.

As Critcher (2006: 12) points out, '[m]oral panics also have a discursive legacy. They establish the terms in which the issue has to be debated now and for the foreseeable future. Recurrent episodes will be mapped onto the established discursive framework, often connoted by a phrase'. In other words, local differences need to be silenced in order for the particular local events to unambiguously fit the framework. This does not mean that the local is not a key factor in moral panics, as we shall see below.

The Failures of Moral Panics: Discussing the Neighbourhood's Power

McRobbie and Thornton (1995) have argued that in modern polyphonic societies 'classic' consensual moral panics are now unusual.

> The proliferation and fragmentation of mass, niche and micro-media and the multiplicity of voices, which compete and contest the meaning of the issue subject to moral panic, suggest that the … models are outdated in so far as they could not possibly take account of the labyrinthine web of determining relations which now exists between social groups and the media, 'reality' and representation (in Critcher 2006: 267).

This argument is partly accepted in the recent literature but it does not seem to be supported by empirical data, if we accept the general finding that cases of moral panic over immigration are not reported to have diminished in recent years. As mentioned above, they are reported to have diminished in some countries but they have become more frequent in southern European countries. Maneri (2013) argues for an analytical distinction between the representation of events and the reaction to the perceived threat. It is largely a distinction between the media sphere and the social sphere. In this critical view, McRobbie and Thornton over-emphasize the plurality of voices characterizing the social environment by under-estimating the integration of the information system.

The interdependence between various media platforms and channels, their cutting and pasting of each other's content, and their reliance on the same organized sources seems to enhance rather than reduce a consensual representation of the 'important hard facts' that journalists think are the epistemological basis of reality. The Propagation stage ensures that an amplification spiral occurs as a consequence of an established general consensus about which facts deserve the most attention in a given situation. Neither citizen journalism, blogs, nor ethnic media can counter a

consensual representation of dramatic events, especially in the first crucial few weeks (Maneri 2013: 185–186).

One of the first studies dealing with the failure of a moral panic is by Curran (1987), who analyzed cases in London during the period 1981–1986. Since then, the conditions for the failure or success of moral panics have been called into question in several studies. There is now a general consensus in the literature about the factors leading to the failure of a moral panic. Critcher (2006: 11) has summed up these factors in the following six points:

- A failure to establish an issue as sufficiently new or threatening to provoke the formulation of a new label or the resuscitation of an old one;
- A lack of media unanimity in accepting the legitimacy of the label and its connotations;
- An attempt to brand as folk devils groups whose social status precludes such vilification;
- Opposition to the moral panic from an alliance of effectively organized pressure groups (counter-claims makers);
- Divisions among elite groups over the seriousness of the problem or its causes and remedies when its seriousness is agreed;
- The absence of available and effective remedies.

We may add to this list the eventual absence of further events which the media and moral entrepreneurs are able to put into the same discursive category, so as to interpret them as new episodes of the ongoing phenomenon.

A common finding in moral panic studies dealing with immigration and ethnic minority issues is that moral panics are typically built around local events and protests and – if accomplished – are constructed as a national social problem by downplaying the local context in favour of a fixed *repertoire* built within a national frame. Notwithstanding this finding, in the debate about the conditions for the success or failure of a panic, the local/national nexus has rarely been discussed in detail. For instance, for the 'effectively organized pressure groups' scholars usually refer to national actors. When the local is considered, the actors considered are mayors or other prominent city-level politicians and organizations. In the cases of moral panics dealing with immigration, the studies often underline the difficulty for immigrants or refugees to be organized in such a way as to become a collective voice for the media. This has been taken as an explanation for the decrease in the number of moral panics in countries with a longer history of immigration and the increase in countries with a shorter history. In the former, it is supposed that immigrant communities are better organized than in the latter. The only hyper-local actors considered by researchers are protest groups.

The absence of local protesters contributing to the identification of a folk devil might be cited as a key element in countering the consensual representation needed in moral panics. For instance, some events related to immigrants that are represented as being problematic might have no evident implication for the natives, despite the existence of a media consensus in creating an image of immigrants as a

social pathology. Nevertheless, the presence of a pressure group of protesting native residents given a voice by the media might be a sufficient condition to start a moral panic.

Case Studies from the Neighbourhoods

In the following pages we present four episodes, all related to the immigration issue and defined as social problems, characterized by peaks in local media coverage of four different neighbourhoods. The episodes which started the tentative panics vary from a fight involving two groups of immigrants of different ethnic origins, followed by a street protest, to structural conflicts framed as interethnic conflicts, to the presence of an informal settlement of refugees. Although these episodes differ widely and are to some extent incomparable, a common process nevertheless emerges which is typical of moral panics and which serves as the focus of our analysis. We consider these episodes as examples of complete or partial failures of moral panics and we argue that the neighbourhoods played important roles in countering exogenous narratives from moral entrepreneurs. The concept of narrative cohesion at the hyper-local level is pivotal, but we claim that the multiple meaning inscribed in this concept needs further investigation, which we attempt in the conclusion. The four neighbourhoods are the German neighbourhoods of *Werderau* and *Langwasser* in Nuremberg and the Italian neighbourhoods of via *Padova* and *San Paolo*, respectively in Milan and Turin. Analysis of news items related to via *Padova* was carried out for the Italian section of the Concordia Discors project (Pogliano 2012) and is drawn on to inform the discussion presented in the following pages. Nevertheless, a brief description introducing the neighbourhood will prove helpful.

Via *Padova* is fairly centrally located in the city of Milan and, although not officially a neighbourhood, is usually considered as such by its residents and the media. The number of foreign residents in via Padova has tripled over the past decade and accounts for about 30 % of the total, almost twice the city average. The percentage of single men is also higher, evidence of the ongoing process of foreigners settling in the area. Also of note is the large number of foreign-run businesses in the neighbourhood. The number of foreign business owners in via Padova, already higher than in the rest of the city, is constantly on the upswing, making it one of the most socially and economically dynamic areas of the city (Ponti and Pozzi 2012).

Unlike other studies that map the development of a moral panic through news analysis alone, here we present a case of media analysis largely supported by the ethnographic studies reported in this volume. This approach allows us to observe the failure of a media-driven moral panic not just subsequent to an initial process of panic in the media (according to the above-mentioned stages first introduced by Cohen), but also when there has been no remarkable spike in the frequency of media coverage. In our analysis of the last two cases (*Langwasser in Nuremberg and San Paolo in Turin*), the failure of moral panic cannot be accounted for by quantitative media analysis alone, but can easily be understood by taking a qualitative approach.

Via Padova in Milan

Via *Padova* has been characterized by a relatively low level of coverage by local media since 2005. The frequency has increased since that year, accelerating in 2007, and peaking in 2010. The visibility of the neighbourhood in the media for the 11 years analyzed (2001–2011) consisted almost entirely of news dealing with immigrants, the vast majority of which was reported in a social conflict frame. From 2007 onwards, news from via *Padova* presented two main frames, each with its supporters. The first and more frequent frame was about interethnic conflict caused by the excessive presence of illegal immigrants. This frame was supported by local politicians from right-wing parties who administered the city of Milan and by a protest group of native residents accusing immigrants of being the main cause of decay and crimes. The second and less frequent frame was about blaming the city administration for not promoting integration policies and, so to speak, for discriminating against the neighbourhood. It was supported by an alliance of civil society organizations originating from interethnic schools and by charismatic priests managing an oratory attended by young people primarily of non-European origins. A series of minor episodes of conflict in the neighbourhood have been covered by the local media for years (with the mentioned increase since 2007), portraying the facts within a conflict frame supported and reacted to by all of the actors involved. We may see this period as the Warring stage of a moral panic phenomenon. On the 13th of February 2010, two small groups of young residents, one of North African and the other of Latin American origins, were involved in a fight during which a young man originating from Egypt was killed. That night, numerous people of North African origins protested in the neighbourhood's streets. Some of them burned cars and broke shop windows. This key event and its media coverage may be presented as the Impact stage of a moral panic phenomenon. In the aftermath, the Reaction stage saw moral entrepreneurs embark upon a serial labelling of the area as a homogenous environment where the native residents were largely damaged by the massive presence of illegal immigrants. The event was immediately framed by the city administration as an intolerable riot denoting the high degree of danger in the area.

The case of via *Padova* in Milan is an example of a partial failure of a moral panic for a variety of reasons among which the narrative cohesion of the neighbourhood plays a role. In via *Padova* a shared narrative emerged and gained visibility partly as a consequence of the reactions by moral entrepreneurs and the law and order solutions imposed by the mayor, both of which were perceived as excessive and unsuitable to the context. Although other elements contributed to the failure of the moral panic (i.e. the divisions among elite groups at the national level over the seriousness of the problem and the absence of further events to be placed by the media under the label of neighbourhood insecurity, which would have produced a Propagation stage) there is no doubt that endogenous counter-claims by organized groups of residents played a key role and were partly triggered by the panic construction itself. Many residents identified not the immigrants but key figures in the city administration and the media as being the out-group. The event titled "Via

Padova è meglio di Milano" (Via *Padova* is a better place than Milan), organized by a group of local associations and NGOs a few months after this event is a clear sign of this oppositional narrative.

Werderau in Nuremberg

In *Werderau* interethnic conflicts developed at the beginning of the 2000s, after many years of peaceful relations. As described in detail in the chapter by C. Köhler, the *Werderau* conflict has been framed as an interethnic conflict between Germans and Turks, downplaying both the structural dimension of the conflict (between investors and long-term house renters) and the divisions between old and new Turkish inhabitants. In other words, the structural conflict has been ethnicized. In framing the conflict this way, a key role has been played by anti-immigrant groups from outside the neighbourhood. An activist movement associated with the neo-Nazi party NPD and the regional group called 'Ausländerstopp' both interfered in the conflict and increased the interethnic tensions. Moral entrepreneurs found the proper terrain for localizing the anti-immigrant sentiment in the inhabitants' shared sense of having been abandoned by the city administration for years. This mechanism of reframing an already existing oppositional feeling (i.e. being abandoned by wider-scale local politicians) emerges as an important part of the moral entrepreneurs' initiatives.

In 2002 we can observe a spike in news from *Werderau* in the newspapers analyzed, accompanied by the increased labelling of the area as a 'problem quarter' within a social conflict frame. The extraordinary rate of coverage decreased quickly in the following year and became very low in 2004, along with a decrease of the conflict frame and an increase in the cooperation frame.

The first element in the partial failure of the *Werderau* moral panic was the absence of a law and order solution. In *Werderau* the moral panic escalation was countered primarily through a mediation coordinated by a conflict manager appointed by the mayor. His task was to ease the tensions and to end the open conflict in the neighbourhood (see Köhler 2012). Another element for the partial failure of the moral panic came from the relative absence of a key event carrying strong emotional connotations in the frame of the interethnic conflict. Only minor events and pseudo-events were reported, forming a sense of Propagation without Impact. Nevertheless, the episode of *Werderau* is – among the cases we are discussing here – the one most likely to be described as a successful case of moral panic. The reason for this partial success, in our view, can be attributed to the relative incapacity of the neighbourhood residents and civil associations to counter the moral entrepreneurs' narratives which dominated media coverage in the first months of the panic.

Langwasser in Nuremberg

In *Langwasser*, an interethnic conflict developed in 2009 in reaction to the development of the Intercultural Gardens (see the chapter by C. Köhler for details). Word of the project spread quickly after it was first presented, and the neighbourhood became increasingly disgruntled with what it considered to be an imposition by city government. A petition against the garden project was circulated in *Langwasser* and a protest was mounted by a right-leaning local resident living near the proposed garden site. The growing public opinion was that the project favoured migrants, who, in the guise of gardeners, would be able to invade the property rights of the quiet community's residents. Anti-immigrant right-wing activists from outside *Langwasser* echoed and reinforced this perception. The conflict was coming to be viewed more and more as a migrant-majority conflict. Media support of right-wing agitation contributed to the ethnic framing of the dispute, accelerating the spread of inter-group conflict.

As in *Werderau*, a mechanism of reframing an already existing feeling of opposition emerges as an important component of the moral entrepreneurs' initiatives.

A second meeting was called between the district coordinator and the local residents to dispel the many rumours circulating about the garden project. The district coordinator appealed to the media not to give anti-immigrant protesters coverage or support for their propaganda. The media complied, becoming harsher in its criticism of the right-wing protests and providing a more favourable image of the Intercultural Gardens. This, along with mediation between the stakeholders, contributed to easing the conflict. A counter-force was mustered, and political parties and district organizations stepped up in favour of the garden project. Numerous organizations and associations joined in to protest against the involvement of right-wing organizations and the ethnicization of the conflict. A detailed analysis of the *Langwasser* Intercultural Gardens conflict can be found in chapter "Rise and Resolution of Ethnic Conflicts in Nuremberg Neighbourhoods" by C. Köhler.

Regarding media coverage, one observes a spike in news from *Langwasser* in 2009. The general tendency to present the news from *Langwasser* within a social conflict frame of reference – which also emerges from an analysis of previous years' coverage of the neighbourhood – is clearly maintained in 2009. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that this tendency had been partially subverted by the end of the year. In 2010, as a response to the growing risk for panic, the social conflict frame was being displaced by greater output within a cooperation frame. The most important element precluding a moral panic was that no violent events occurred. But, together with this missing element, there is also evidence supporting the thesis that the strong policy community of *Langwasser* and the emergence of narrative cohesion (expressed mainly in terms of political orientation) in response to the right-wing propaganda was able to influence the local media, reframing the events through the introduction of new voices to be quoted and focused on in the news. Instead of directing attention to the issue of migrants and integration, what emerges here from the media narratives is the symbolic need to distinguish one group (the majority in the neighbourhood) from another (the moral entrepreneurs from outside the

neighbourhood). In other words, the local shared narrative can be considered a key reason for which moral panic failed to materialize in *Langwasser*. The narrative emerged and gained visibility thanks to the strength of the policy community. As with the via *Padova* case discussed above, the media in *Langwasser* acted as a sort of mirror that allowed the residents to see in its reflection how far their true concerns were from those being portrayed as their concerns by the actors in the spotlight (i.e., the moral entrepreneurs from outside the neighbourhood), who were actively influencing the media's framing of the events.

San Paolo in Turin

The case of African refugees (from Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea) who occupied the former *San Paolo* clinic, situated in the homonymous Turin neighbourhood, in 2009 may be taken as an example – perhaps the most impressive – of the capacity of a neighbourhood to counter exogenous narratives and pseudo-event production. This local conflict did not find significant space in the news media we analyzed, despite the fact that moral entrepreneurs from outside the neighbourhood tried to frame the event as both a case of urban decay and of local disorder involving the natives in clear opposition with the refugees. In *San Paolo*, the refugees were not quoted in the media as an organized group, and the associations advocating for the refugees failed – at least in part – to obtain a serious role in the narrative. The refugees did not obtain visibility other than the typical use of images showing the 'desperate conditions' in which they lived and sound-bites from brief interviews in the regional TV news reports. Nevertheless, in *San Paolo* moral entrepreneurs did not gain local support for their claims, either from the city administrators or the residents.

There is no spike in local news coverage in 2009. The unaltered level of the coverage is an essential element supporting the claim that the moral panic in *San Paolo* blew beneath the surface.

It is evident that the local reasons for this clear failure of moral panic are different from those registered in the Milan neighbourhood of via *Padova*. In via *Padova* the opposition to the moral panic was carried out mainly by an alliance of effectively organized pressure groups to which the media attributed the role of counter-claims makers – in opposition to administrators and national right-wing politicians – but also to protest groups at the hyper-local level. In *San Paolo*, coherent narratives emphasizing neighbourhood solidarity have long been shared by residents, local politicians and most local journalists.

3 Conclusions

As ter Wal (2002: 36) observes, 'several studies have remarked that inhabitants of neighbourhoods that become the object of special issue reporting (because of conflict, protests or decay) did not recognize themselves or their positions in the way

their problems or lives were shown in the media'. This typically happens because the local dimension is under-investigated in the media construction of a moral panic. As Maneri (1998) pointed out, local protest groups are taken by the media as representative of the entire neighbourhood, silencing native as well as immigrant residents' critical voices. We argue that this is often the case in neighbourhoods where a shared narrative offering a basis for resisting and countering official voices from a larger scale (the city, the region or the state) is absent or weak, as in the case of *Werderau*. In most of the episodes of failed moral panic described above, we have discussed the local factor. Without denying the importance of other factors, we argue that what we propose to call 'narrative cohesion' within a neighbourhood may be key in some contexts.

Nevertheless, narrative cohesion may be constituted in different ways. It may include both local journalists and local politicians (*San Paolo*) or exclude both of them (via *Padova*). It may be, at least in part, the product of inhabitants' reactions to politicians' and journalists' claims (via *Padova*). It may be seen as the result of a strong presence of associations and local NGOs which are well-organized and considered reliable by the media (via *Padova*), or it may be seen as an informally shared, though not officially advocated, agreement in finding causes for the neighbourhood malaise other than those proposed by moral entrepreneurs (*Langwasser*). It may refer to cohesion among natives and immigrants leading to greater visibility of the latter (via *Padova*), or it may signify a narrative where immigrants remain largely invisible and their role appears to be of little importance in countering the threat of moral panic (*Langwasser* and *San Paolo*).

To conclude, we may say that narrative cohesion derives from the strength of a policy community on a local scale, but that the community itself may be reinforced or weakened in its public efforts to communicate by media narratives and their legacy. This can take the form of a wave of attention that temporarily affects the neighbourhood and its image, but it can also be the product of a long-term definition of the neighbourhood and its status in the 'tale of the city'. The empirical data we have accounted for in this chapter demonstrate the complexity and circularity of the relationship between the policy community and the media image of a given neighbourhood. In the construction of such an image, immigration is often key, but the role played by immigrants is far from being clearly defined. What we noticed is an over-emphasis on migrants in the news but a lack of their voices in reports from neighbourhoods which journalists consider to be peripheral in producing the ideal image of a city and which are characterized by a weak policy community unable to produce a shared counter-narrative. The cases of *San Paolo* and *Poble Sec* appear to be evidence of the essential role played by strong policy communities in normalizing the presence of migrants in media narratives. When policy communities are effective, the media tends to present negative events concerning interethnic relationships as incidents that do not diminish the neighbourhood's general image as a place in which conflict is marginal and under control.

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Boundaries, Barriers and Bridges: Comparative Findings from European Neighbourhoods

Ferruccio Pastore and Irene Ponzo

1 Five Key Ingredients of Neighbourhood-Level Boundary-Making

In our boundary-making perspective, ethnicity (regarded as the result of actors' interactions and definitions) is just one among several possible lenses used to apprehend social situations, alongside others such as profession, class, and place of residence (Taboada Leonetti 1989; Lamont 2009; Lamont and Small 2008). Informed by this assumption, we have looked not only at migration-generated ethnic cleavages but also at other divisions emerging in the empirical fieldwork. Consistently with what has also been suggested by theorists of 'super-diversity' (Vertovec 2006), we have focused particularly on the way in which these different divisions interact with those generated by migration in structuring groups, considering how and to what extent they overlap, and whether they weaken or reinforce each other.

Before analyzing the boundaries found through our fieldwork, it is worth remembering that they by no means have the same significance and relevance everywhere. First of all, the significance of the various boundaries and their salience in structuring mobilization and conflicts varies across countries (Lamont 2009; Lamont and Small 2008). Also within countries, and indeed within the same city, it emerges clearly how boundaries have different relevance in different situations making it a matter of empirical analysis to determine how these boundaries concretely work in specific circumstances (Wimmer 2008). This is precisely what we have attempted in analyzing and comparing the role of recent, and less recent, migration flows in

Sections 1 and 2 are by Irene Ponzo, Sects. 3 and 4 are by Ferruccio Pastore.

F. Pastore (✉) • I. Ponzo
FIERI, Torino, Italy
e-mail: ferruccio.pastore@fieri.it; ponzo@fieri.it

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shaping, shifting or blurring boundaries among groups in the eleven European neighbourhoods analyzed in previous chapters.

According to our findings*, ethnicity remains one of the most relevant inter-group cleavages. However, this is experienced differently in different contexts, depending on nationally and locally specific histories.* The majority and minorities can indeed have very different profiles which, even at neighbourhood level, are strongly influenced by national, regional or city-level cognitive frames and rhetoric. In more recent immigration countries (Italy, Spain), the cleavage is predominantly understood as being between a 'native' majority and one or several 'migrant' minorities. In older immigration countries (UK, Germany), ethnic minorities are less closely associated with migration: in British neighbourhoods, for instance, 'black' is altogether a well-established marker of identity and in German neighbourhoods former Soviet Union citizens who mostly have German origins and German nationality are nevertheless perceived as a minority group. In countries still in an embryonic phase of the immigration cycle, such as Hungary, immigration is not really an issue and the main cleavage is between an ethnic majority and historic *national* minorities (e.g. Roma) rather than migrants as such. From this point of view, the eccentricity of Budapest neighbourhoods in our gallery of case studies confirms the persisting specificity in the framing of international immigration in Eastern Europe as opposed to both established western and northern European destinations, and to more recent southern European receiving countries (Okólski 2012; Tryandafillidou and Gropas 2014).

Within these macro and well-known frames, we identified finer cleavages by looking ethnographically at inter-group relations in everyday experience and in specific places. One of the most evident results is that *the visibility* of a certain group influences the criteria of its identification: the more visible a group is, the more precise are the criteria of its identification. For instance, the most visible groups are often identified with countries of origin whereas smaller groups are identified with broader geographical areas. South Americans, for instance, are not distinguished by country of origin in most neighbourhoods, except for some Barcelona areas and for San Paolo in Turin, where they are numerous. Chinese, who represent a sizeable minority almost everywhere, are addressed as such. In Budapest's neighbourhoods, however, where the presence of foreigners is still low, people are less likely to distinguish groups by country of origin and they usually use 'Asians' and 'Chinese' interchangeably to refer to all migrants from the Asian continent including for instance Vietnamese. Visibility, however, does not depend only on the group's size but also on its presence in public places. For instance, in Sagrada Família the number of registered Pakistani residents is very low (0.2 % of total population) but they are well recognized due to the presence of several Pakistani grocery stores. Also Romanians, who account for only 0.4 % of neighbourhood residents, are identified as such by residents due to their visibility, often associated with negative stigmas (begging, pick-pocketing tourists).

While the cleavage between ethnic majority and minorities remains central, age, length of stay and socio-economic conditions have also emerged as being specifically relevant in most of our target neighbourhoods. *Intergenerational cleavages*, in

particular, have been registered across several case studies: elderly people frequently portray both majority and minority young generations as less willing to take care of public places or actively engage in the neighbourhood's civic life. For instance, in many Sagrada Família associations, like the Residents' Association, the majority of day-to-day active participants are elderly or mature people who blame young people for not actively participating in local civic life. In Barriera di Milano, several elderly residents lament the communication difficulties with the new generations, for, among other reasons, the decline in the transfer of handicraft know-how and skills that were once important neighbourhood assets. In Bermondsey the majority of the White British population is made up of elderly residents who often perceive themselves in opposition to a younger population of immigrants and ethnic minorities, often with children, who have arrived in recent years and do not share their memory and ideal of estates as social places. Similarly, in the German neighbourhood of Werderau long-established elderly residents accuse the youth, mainly of Turkish origin, of not sticking to the 'old order', for instance by not keeping the neighbourhood clean, making noise and adopting other 'uncivil' behaviours. In both cases, elderly people paradoxically stand out as among the least integrated groups since they do not feel at home in their own changing neighbourhood and are strongly and nostalgically linked to a mythical past now disappeared.

Their feeling of distance from younger residents is largely independent from ethnicity, but where they overlap, ethnic and generational cleavages can indeed be mutually reinforcing. As for ethnic boundaries among youngsters, they are usually more blurred, with some notable exceptions. Inter-group tensions can be intensified by mediatization of origin-based groupings, as in the cases of 'Latin American gangs' in Sagrada Família and Poble Sec or 'black gangs' in Camberwell. Yet, local belonging and specific notions of territoriality seem to be very important in shaping and structuring these youth groups, often more than ethnic origin or belonging.[1]

Socio-economic conditions are certainly another crucial factor in structuring cleavages, but they may operate in very different and sometimes counter-intuitive ways. For instance, in Barcelona's Sagrada Família, economic difficulties shared by natives and immigrants living in the area called Encants Vells seem to foster reciprocal understanding so that immigrants there generally do not seem to be stigmatized. This goes against easy and widespread prophecies that the economic crisis, which was getting more acute during our fieldwork, would necessarily fuel interethnic tensions starting from the most severely hit local contexts, such as some of our southern European target neighbourhoods. In the final part of this chapter we will come back to some possible explanations for this crucial and puzzling question, which is, however, certainly deserving of continued monitoring and additional research.

In Bermondsey, in the former docklands area occupied by the Jacob's Island development, a key issue is the juxtaposition of the affluent gated communities and

[1] It is worth noting that Body-Gendrot (2002) has found the same attachment to local territories among young people in French banlieues: religious and ethnic differences are perceived as secondary to belonging to the collective space of the neighbourhood.

the relatively deprived housing estates nearby. This divide is generated by economic disparities but also by the deeply rooted stigma concerning council housing. So while they live in immediate proximity, there is altogether very limited common ground – in terms of shared spaces and interests – between these two communities in this part of Bermondsey. Finally, in our comparative fieldwork, we also identified cases of immigrants living in a gated community. In Kőbánya the wealthiest group is made up of Asians rather than Hungarians. Thus, it is primarily more affluent people of Asian origin who live in a residential compound like Taraliget, which is enclosed by a high fence.

Religion is another relevant criterion of identification and grouping, although it appears less crucial at the local level than it has become, especially with regard to Islam, in national-level political and public discourses in Europe during the last two decades. In Werderau, despite the relevant presence of Turkish immigrants, religion was not regarded as a cleavage in the past and it only became a marker of identity when conflicts arose between old residents and new Turkish residents. The tensions seem to be mainly related to control over the housing stock but have been framed as ethnic and even religious cleavages. Due to these housing tensions that crosscut the Turkish minority itself, intra-community religious tensions also emerged between, on the one hand, old-established residents with a Turkish background who interpret Islam in a more open manner, and newly-arrived residents who follow stricter and more traditional rules of religious behaviour (headscarf, regular mosque attendance etc.), on the other hand. The role of religion as a marker of identity was also emphasized by residents in both of the London neighbourhoods that were studied. While some of the White British volunteers and community activists working locally in Bermondsey referred to their Christian belief as a major motivating factor, in Camberwell affiliation to West African churches was seen as an important and structuring aspect of everyday life and social organization, particularly by Black African respondents.

In southern European neighbourhoods, religion and nationality often overlap, and are usually evoked in a conflated and confused manner. In Barriera di Milano, natives often create confusion when they assign people to various categories: religious identity (being a Muslim) is used interchangeably with national belonging (being a Moroccan) and language (being Arabic-speaking). In Sagrada Família, the term 'Muslims' constitutes a group label applied by interviewees in an encompassing way to cover both Pakistanis and Moroccans.

Finally, the *length of stay* can separate or unite residents across geographical and/or ethnic lines. In Werderau established residents, of both native and Turkish background, tend to disagree with the lifestyle of new inhabitants of Turkish origin. In Italian neighbourhoods, differences emerge within larger and long-established minorities. In San Paolo, native residents frequently state that the earlier Moroccan immigrants were more inclined to incivilities and even crime whereas Moroccan newcomers are considered to be individuals who strive to legalize their situation and be fully included in the host community. In contrast, in Barriera di Milano, the Moroccans who arrived at the end of the 1970s are depicted by natives as honest and hardworking, while recently arrived Moroccans are portrayed as menacing, immoral

and unscrupulous. This difference between the two Italian neighbourhoods is probably due to the fact that San Paolo has become a sort of second-step destination for settled families whereas Barriera di Milano has increasingly become a first destination for newcomers regarded as less integrated than long-established migrants who are rather assimilated and have started families there.

Usually, even immigrants classify themselves according to the period of their arrival in the neighbourhood. In Barriera di Milano the early-comers depict themselves as being more open to interactions and less problematic, differentiating themselves from latecomers to whom they attribute behaviours more disturbing for the established social order. A meaningful example is found in the Senegalese community: those who migrated in the first wave emphasize their work ethic and their rigid compliance with the religious norms of the Mourid Brotherhood (Carter 1997), to which they all belong, and they complain that such good habits have been abandoned by their young fellow countrymen, some of whom are involved in drug-pushing.

Similarly, in British neighbourhoods, the term 'black' refers to a number of ethnic and national categories – Black Caribbeans, West Africans, Somalis – characterized by significant divides as well as occasional tensions. These distinctions based on origin usually overlap with those based on length of stay. The Black African population in Camberwell has been growing rapidly since the 1980s. By 2001 it was approximately twice the size of the Black Caribbean population which, dating back to the Windrush generation of the 1950s, historically constituted the dominant minority in the neighbourhood. Whereas some of the West Indians have adopted religious and/or cultural practices connecting them to an ideal African heritage – such as converting to Rastafarianism, collecting and displaying African artefacts, or wearing West African garments – there is also a history of tensions between them and West Africans, with some of the latter claiming that 'they say we sold them'. Another component, and the most significant one among recent black immigrants, is that of the Somalis, most of whom arrived in the late 1990s and 2000s. Somali respondents have described feeling othered, and at times stigmatized, by other black residents on account of their religion and immigrant status. We can then see that, especially in old migration countries such as Britain, the very concept of 'majority' is a slippery and unstable construction which cannot be equated to whiteness, and also that within minorities we constantly find ongoing negotiations of racial and cultural sameness and difference (Ray et al. 2008). Therefore, we can say that *groups are never homogeneous and are rarely perceived as such, especially by their own members*.

These boundaries have different significance not only between neighbourhoods, but also within the same neighbourhood, between 'sites of interactions' in concrete urban places and everyday experience. Here we just give some examples drawn from the previous chapters and final city reports of the Concordia Discors project (www.concordiadiscors.eu), with reference to specific interaction sites among those researched in-depth. In order to go beyond an anecdotal description of concrete cases, we have sketched a typology of relations based on the distinction, explained in the Introduction, between representations (what people have in mind) and

Table 1 Patterns of inter–group relations and representations

	Representations		
Relations	Positive	Indifference	Negative
Cooperation	Different ethnic groups in the secret garden on D'Eynsford Estate in Camberwell (UK)	Chinese families and elderly Hungarian nannies in Taraliget Residential Park in Kőbánya (HU)	Chinese traders and Roma employees in Four Tigers Market in Józsefváros (HU)
Lack of contact	Elderly people, teenagers and mothers with children in SPA garden in San Paolo (ITA)	Pakistanis and natives in Poble Sec (SPA)	Affluent middle-class residents in redeveloped docklands and working-class residents on council estates, North Bermondsey (UK)
Conflict/competition	Arabs and Hungarian shopkeepers in Józsefváros (HU)	Tourists and residents in Sagrada Família (SPA)	New Turkish residents and old German and Turkish residents in MAN's housing stock in Werderau (GE)

behaviours and actual relations (what people actually do) (Table 1). More precisely, although aware of the over-simplification, we consider three types of relations (cooperation, lack of contact, conflict), and three types of representations (positive, neutral/indifferent, negative). A caveat, perhaps obvious, is that the schematic representation provided below is static, whereas in reality circular dynamics are constantly operating by which representations are shaped by social interactions, which in turn affect representations.

The first interesting point reflected by the presented evidence is that the market seems to have the capacity to foster competition as well as cooperation and to produce unusual matches of representations and interactions. Collaboration develops even between groups with reciprocal negative representations as a consequence of economic rationales. For example, Chinese traders in the Four Tigers Market in Józsefváros employ Roma people because they constitute cheap manpower even though they complain about their attitude towards work. On the other hand, groups who carry reciprocal positive representations may compete, as in the case of Arab shopkeepers who are regarded as fair competitors by their Hungarian peers, in spite of their sometimes ruthless practices, including, for instance, buying many shops solely to keep them closed and thus secure the area from commercial rivals.

Sometimes, relations developed in the labour market and in estates overlap, as in the case of elderly Hungarian baby-sitters hired by Chinese families in Taraliget Residential Park. Having very little time to look after their children due to their intensive work pace, Asian immigrants often hire retired Hungarian women to baby-sit their children. These women who also live in the neighbourhood often take care of their own grandchildren and of Chinese children at the same time. In this

case, children play a key role in creating more personal social relations between the two groups, as the economic dimension gradually loses importance and these women become almost like distant relatives.

This was the only example among the investigated Hungarian sites where small signs of cooperation are not matched with negative representations. One could hypothesize that such scarcity of cooperative interethnic behaviours in the case of Budapest neighbourhoods is related to the strongly xenophobic discourse propagated in Hungarian politics by parties such as Jobbik. Such a hypothesis, however, has not been explicitly corroborated by local fieldwork and would need supplementary targeted research to be formulated more precisely.

Among 'outsiders' migrants are not always the most evident or significant subjects or objects of neighbourhood conflicts. In Sagrada Família, for instance, the main concern of residents and the focus of their protests towards local authorities are city-users, i.e. the crowds of tourists flooding the neighbourhood and hampering its everyday life.

Finally, it is worth remembering that *actual relations are also contingent on time*. This means that different groups may interact well during the day but not at night, as is often the case in public gardens or commercial areas. For instance, in Via di Nanni in San Paolo the open market offers an opportunity for amiable contact between majority (especially elderly) and minority residents during the morning whereas at night the emptied area becomes a car park and the few existing bars attract single migrant men who are regarded as disturbing and even dangerous by elderly people.[2]

To conclude on this point, we can maintain that *different types of inter-group relations can be found not just in the same city but also within the same neighbourhood, according to site and time*. Inter-group relations are not given, they are played out in concrete situations by the actors in the field and are influenced by factors related to multiple levels: the nation, the city, the neighbourhood, the single site of interaction, the situation.

2 The Role of Places in Boundary-Making and Inter-Group Relations

The concept of place in geography and urban sociology emphasizes the relations between subjective and objective perspectives since it encompasses both space and the experience that gives space an identity; in distinction to space, place also refers to memories, identities and relations (Abrahamson 1996; Soja and Hooper 1993; Greif and Cruiz 1997). We can then say that places are social constructions too, like group boundaries, and that both are objects of making-work. Furthermore, processes of place-making and group-making are related. As Amin (2012) underlines,

[2] See http://www.concordiadiscors.eu/assets/Turin-final-report_integrated_12_10_2012-1.pdf

everyday encounters and interactions construct and, at the same time, are shaped by urban habitat, understood as the assembly of technologies, built environment and layout of public spaces, infrastructures and services, rules of order and symbolic culture.

In this perspective, public places – defined as 'places accessible to the public' – play a crucial role since they can be regarded as the main element from which people derive their representations of cities and neighbourhoods (Tonnelat 2010; Lynch 1960). They are the places where urban representation and sociality are displayed and built at the same time (Amin 2012; Massey 2005). For these reasons, in our analysis we have given special attention to public places and most of the 'sites of interaction' where ethnographic work was carried out belong to this category.

The second assumption on which we based our analysis is that every place comes with its embedded set of principles of public organization and order, permissibility and possibilities, and terms of engagement between subjects (Amin 2012). Whereas public places are 'the world in the streets where one meets strangers', (Wessendorf 2010, p. 22), 'micropublics', as defined by Amin (2002) are spaces of associations where habit of practice replaces mere co-presence, and dialogue and 'prosaic negotiations' are compulsory; they are similar to what Wood and Landry (2007) define as 'zones of encounter', i.e. places where deeper and more enduring interactions between people engaging in shared activities and common goals can take place, such as housing associations, parents' groups, schools, workplaces, youth centres, sport clubs, etc. Therefore, despite the prevalent attention given to public places, in this research book we have tried to analyze inter-group relations also in 'micropublics' as well as in housing estates and apartment buildings, starting from the hypothesis that the different characteristics of these places foster the development of different kinds of relations (Wessendorf 2010).

Finally, in addition to being zones of encounters, places can simultaneously be stakes of conflict. In particular, places can be viewed as stakes both in material and in symbolical terms since conflict over them can hinge upon the feeling and 'right to belong', beliefs and values, social norms of behaviours and lifestyles. The construction of ethnic categories is shaped by local struggles for material and symbolic resources (housing, jobs, public places) which sometimes take an ethnic form and may interplay with social divisions of gender, class and age (Ray et al. 2008; Esser 2002). Furthermore, when looking at urban places as stakes of conflict, we have also to consider that the urban infrastructure and building environment impact processes in which resources and opportunities are allocated. Urban investment defines how much spaces, activities and people count and reflect the decision to recognize and accommodate certain demands and claimants and disregard others (Amin 2012; Subiròs 2011).

As Wimmer (2013) underlines, it would make little sense to debate whether ethnicity is mostly about interests and material benefits or identities and immaterial goods since ethnic boundary-making intersects these different levels and mobilizes both sets of resources. For the sake of clarity, however, in the next sections we will analyze the two spheres separately.

2.1 Places as Material Stakes for (Ethnic) Conflict

The nature of place as a stake of conflict is evident when we consider *housing estates*. Housing constitutes a key determinant for immigration settlement at the local level and it is one of the fundamental urban social goods over which conflict can be staged. As studies have shown (Dench et al. 2006; Ray et al. 2008), allocation of social housing often becomes a key issue around which ethnic resentment may coalesce by distinguishing the deserving from the undeserving and thereby activating a sense of entitlement grounded in length of stay and sets of moral values.

This is particularly evident in neighbourhoods where access to housing stock suddenly changed, such as Bermondsey and Werderau. In post-World War 2 Bermondsey, the vast majority of housing stock was social housing, primarily controlled by the Bermondsey Metropolitan Borough. Under a principle informally known as 'sons and daughters', housing units would first and foremost be made available to the offspring of tenants who already lived in the borough. The structural reform of 1965 that saw the metropolitan councils of Bermondsey, Southwark and Camberwell amalgamated into the London Borough of Southwark meant that the social housing stock in Bermondsey became available to residents from other parts of Southwark. Furthermore, the allocation of social housing became needs-based, conditional upon an assessment of personal circumstances rather than local family links. Thus from the early 1970s, immigrants and ethnic minorities increasingly gained access to social housing. At the same time, the social housing stock began to decline due to the introduction of the right to buy in 1980, while demand for the decreasing stock increased. Since new residents often belong to minorities, this situation has raised conflicts which often run along ethnic lines or at least are framed in such a way by old residents belonging to the white working class.

A similar situation occurred in Werderau where most of the inhabitants worked for the nearby MAN factory and lived in housing stock owned by the same company. With the arrival of wives and children of guest workers in the late 1960s and 1970s, sizeable numbers of these reunited families, mostly of Turkish origin, moved to Werderau and quickly integrated into the neighbourhood life centred on the factory. In 1998 MAN sold the housing stock to the real estate company Telos, which soon after went bankrupt (in 2001). This triggered a series of ownership changes among different investors and, as a result, new tenants and new house owners, mainly migrants of Turkish origin, moved into the neighbourhood. In contrast to past waves of local migration, in the new context of uncertainty this change has produced divisions between old and new residents, with tensions growing between German and Turkish residents, as well as between old and new Turkish inhabitants. Although the origin of the conflict seems clearly rooted in competition for control over housing stock, it has been framed by residents predominantly as an ethnic and cultural conflict, given that the new residents are largely Turkish and perceived as having different norms of behaviour. As a matter of fact, this conflict has partially been weakened by the intervention of the Municipality on the material set of interests by

the acquisition of part of the housing stock by a city non-profit housing company in order to partially restore the residents' control and the pursuit of public well-being in the management.

Therefore conflicts over places are not necessarily framed as such and can turn into ethnic conflicts especially when length of stay and ethnic belonging overlap. When such ethnic and cultural tensions hide material conflicts, these can often be managed and partially overcome, as in Werderau, by changing the set of interests.

2.2 Places as Symbolic Stakes: Ethnic Tensions in Post-Industrial Neighbourhoods

The kind of conflict illustrated above between long-established mainly native working-class residents and newly settled ethnic minorities seems to depend not only on housing-related interests, but also on more general socio-economic trends. In fact, the ways in which groups position themselves and sometimes collide are also grounded in the everyday material realities of living in a declining urban neighbourhood.

In these neighbourhoods, narratives of longstanding residents reflect material changes caused by economic decline and convey a sense of symbolic loss, embodied in nostalgia for the allegedly cohesive community of the past. This negative epic is often related with stories about ethnic difference and constructions of majority and minorities are deployed to manage material and symbolic fears and conflicts over scarce resources and space (Ray et al. 2008; Fenton and Mann 2006; Watt 2006).

In a situation of longstanding and apparently overwhelming downward urban and social mobility caused by the end of Fordism and the inability to find alternative social and economic organizational settings, there seems to be a higher likelihood of decline becoming racialized. Body-Gendrot (2002), for instance, highlights that in French *banlieues* the clash of ethnic cultures is being exacerbated by the threat of downward mobility experienced by white working class families, the stigma attached to these areas and the decay of the physical landscape. According to the French author, the areas which have suffered the most are the ones locked – like some of our target neighbourhoods – to the Fordist system since they appear to be too functionally designed to be able to adapt to the economic and social changes. The structural changes, loss of status and downward mobility experienced by blue-collar workers thus nurture racist attitudes which find root in the decomposition of the working class (Body-Gendrot 2002). As Lamont (2000) underlines, in this post-industrial society the idea of social success may appear particularly unreachable to the working class compared to other social classes, as their living standards are undergoing a process of steady decline.

As a matter of fact, we found conflicts between older working-class residents (predominantly native but sometimes with a background of internal or international

migration) and newly settled ethnic minorities in those former industrial neighbourhoods (Bermondsey, Werderau, Barriera di Milano) which are facing difficulties in the transition to a new economic and social landscape and whose collective identities appear trapped in a glorious but obsolete past. Older working-class residents feel that both their material well-being and their identity and sense of worth are threatened and they find it difficult to identify how this situation can be successfully overcome.

Whereas in most of the post-industrial neighbourhoods described in previous chapters, ethnic minorities are regarded by the majority as a factor of decline, in other investigated neighbourhoods, diversity is viewed as a positive asset. This more positive attitude seems to be related to the ability of neighbourhoods to cope with new global economic and social trends which are often associated with the increasing presence of 'new middle-class multiculturals' (Simon 2005), i.e. middle-class professionals and cultural workers, usually with a high level of civic engagement.[3] This is the case in Camberwell and Gostenhof where middle-class multiculturals are rather rooted, as well as in Poble Sec and San Paolo, traditional working-class neighbourhoods now shifting towards a more mixed social composition thanks to economic reconversion and urban renewal processes.

In Camberwell, gentrification, like ethnic diversity, is long-established, and the earlier waves of gentrifiers, most of whom belong to a multicultural middleclass which regards diversity as one of the appeals of the area, are committed to the neighbourhood.

In Gostenhof, during the last ten years, extensive renovation works were initiated in order to improve the quality of living and the image of the neighbourhood which, although still socially challenged, has developed a positive reputation for being a multicultural and 'artistic' area. The result is that in Gostenhof there is a cosmopolitan atmosphere and, as in Camberwell, many inhabitants are actively engaged in voluntary work in the neighbourhood. The numerous international Delikatessen shops, which reflect the diverse ethnic backgrounds of the residents, play a meaningful role in the lives of Gostenhof's residents and also attract people from other city areas as places to meet, interact and spend leisure time. The diverse social and ethnic composition is perceived as a key characteristic of the neighbourhood and most of the people interviewed, as well as the media, emphasized the high level of acceptance of, and even desire for, diversity.

A similar process seems to be occurring in Poble Sec which has been undergoing a process of change during recent years which has seen a few streets become an important location in the city's 'bohemian' leisure and nightlife scene. Although it is mainly a working-class neighbourhood with lower than average real estate prices, during the last decade Poble Sec has also attracted some young middle class residents and the neighbourhood's increasing – and increasingly appreciated – diversity is also the product of this process. Similarly, in San Paolo, another of our investigated neighbourhoods where diversity is generally valued, in the 1990s work

[3] In fact, there is evidence that people in higher socio-cultural positions are more likely to take part in civic associations (Li et al. 2003).

started on tearing down abandoned industrial buildings and converting them into residential units, commercial outfits (shopping malls), public services and infrastructures, and cultural sites. Furthermore, in contrast to Barriera di Milano – where post-industrial urban regeneration is just beginning and the socio-economic impact of de-industrialization has become heavier and heavier over the last two decades – the socio-economic profile of San Paolo-Cenisia is not particularly worrying and, in some respects, even better than the city average (due, for instance, to higher than average education levels), thereby confirming its capacity to move beyond Fordism.

To sum up, *the likelihood of conflict development along ethnic lines seems to depend more on patterns of socio-economic mobility, whether improving or declining, of the long-established majority than on their socio-economic status per se* and, when specifically referring to post-industrial neighbourhoods, on their overall ability to reinvent and emancipate themselves from the rigidities of the Fordist economic and social model.

2.3 Places as 'Connecting Opportunities': Is Integration Transferable?

Places can be conceived, beyond stakes, as 'connecting opportunities' which offer the chance to meet and know the 'Other'. As we have maintained, they are not just containers: they are embedded with identities and rules which shape the encounters and relations occurring within them and, conversely, are themselves shaped by these relations.

In the investigated neighbourhoods, we found that the lack of 'connecting opportunities' (e.g. meeting places, venues for organized activities, etc.) tended to generate a fragmented social fabric and less cooperative inter-group relations. We must, however, consider that the viability of connecting places is not simply a matter of how many such places are in a given neighbourhood. Certainly, neighbourhoods such as Barriera di Milano, Werderau, Kőbánya and Sagrada Família have few public gardens, squares, centres and associations compared to the other target neighbourhoods. Despite this scarcity, the available areas, such as public greens in Kőbánya or Sempione Park in Barriera, are neglected since they are not properly equipped and are regarded as unsafe. In contrast, the well-equipped *Tres Xemeneies* park which borders Poble Sec and Ruffini Park which borders San Paolo are used intensively by residents and compensate for the lack of large green areas within these two neighbourhoods. *It is therefore evident that meeting places, being socially produced, cannot be measured only in terms of square metres but also of concrete use and experience*.

Furthermore, the symbolic values of places make them arenas where moral order is displayed and boundaries between 'us' and 'them' are constantly in the making. In this regard, Ray, Hudson and Phillips (2008) point out how racialized narratives of neighbourhood decline may be expressed through the affirmation of the moral

superiority of 'we' who care and keep the environment clean and 'they' who do not. Similarly, Wimmer (2004) highlights that the use of places often reflects or is employed for exemplifying a sort of moral order. According to him, the discourse of order does not represent a hidden way of excluding groups on an ethnic basis, but rather, a pure logic of boundary-making. As a matter of fact, in the Swiss neighbourhoods that Wimmer investigated, exclusionary sentiments and discourses were not directed towards immigrants per se but towards outsiders seen as undermining the established social and cultural order. In that case, immigrant residents were regarded as belonging to the 'us' or not depending on whether they were seen as complying with the rule of order and keeping common and public places tidy. Therefore, anti-migrant attitudes may be nourished by the feeling of loss of social order often reflected in migrants' use of places according to different and unfamiliar rules.

In this regard, an episode that happened in San Paolo is particularly enlightening. Here, groups of Peruvians used the volleyball field of the SPA gardens until late at night listening to music and speaking loudly, raising complaints from people living nearby. Then meetings aimed at defusing the tensions were organized with the support of the District administration. Surprisingly, the more inflexible positions were held by long-established Peruvians residents who – as they themselves admitted – were in favour of the implementation of strict rules whereas native residents were more open to negotiation and compromise. The conflict was finally solved thanks not just to rules being agreed for the use of this place, but also to a light re-planning which made it possible to move the fields farther from the apartment buildings. This episode confirms Wimmer's view that conflict does not necessarily express latent racist attitudes but may actually just be about accepting the established local order.

A specific lesson from our case studies in the city chapters is that the connecting potential of public places also depends on *rules of use*, the absence or ineffectiveness of which can generate conflicts quickly turning into 'moral clashes' along ethnic lines. From our fieldwork, we can derive some hypotheses on how to improve the effectiveness of site-specific sets of rules. In the first place, these rules can be partially embedded in spaces. Indeed, sometimes the very setting of the place suggests the ways in which it should be used thereby limiting negotiation and preventing conflicts; in other cases, places are very open to different uses and the agreement on them is completely delegated to users who could be unable to find a satisfying arrangement. If the first option tends to limit conflicts, overly neat distinctions between areas designed for specific purposes can also limit contacts. For instance, in the SPA gardens in San Paolo or the Tres Xemenies Park in Poble Sec specialized areas (a skateboarding area and basket or football fields for adolescents, playgrounds for children, benches for elderly people, etc.) certainly prevent conflicts but also seem to prevent meaningful interactions since each group uses a specific area without contacts with others.

This sort of space planning conducive to inter-group encounters should not, however, be seen as something mechanical or deterministic and it can also be the object of negotiation, as in the case of SPA gardens in San Paolo mentioned above.

The second element which can help to identify common rules of use for places is formal or informal mediation facilitated by organized actors such as associations,

open market organizations, housing associations, etc. In fact, several authors who have investigated interactions in urban places have underlined the crucial importance of the intermediation of third parties (Amin 2010, 2012; Wood and Landry 2007; Sandercock 2003). For instance, in our case studies from the investigated London estates, tenants' and residents' associations (TRAs) – elected bodies that manage social activities on estates and dialogue with service providers – seem to soften potential conflicts among residents. In Montanaro Gardens in Barriera di Milano, conflicts are often solved thanks to a social cooperative that employs mentally ill persons in tasks such as gardening, cleaning the park and organizing children's activities. Mothers, both native and foreign, entrust them to oversee their children while they play and elderly persons turn to this group for help when problems arise over park use. The neutral position of this group, being anomalous and eccentric with regard to established social order, makes it a very useful tool for conflict resolution.

The relevance of both rules of use and mediating action is also evident in the case of Langwasser where the opening of an Intercultural Garden raised fears and protests among the resident population. In that case, the mediating role of the Municipality was generally very important in overcoming the conflict, but in practical terms the key development was the capacity of the locally established Intercultural Garden committee to counter anxieties and concerns by developing a set of rules to regulate opening hours, hygiene and garbage, parking and all other practical issues that could potentially generate disturbance for the neighbours. It is worth underlining that this brokerage role can be assumed formally in the organization's mission, as in Langwasser, or informally, as in the other cases described above.

Inflows of neighbourhood users attracted by leisure opportunities or touristic sites have an ambivalent effect as they may either foster or hamper the use of public places as connecting opportunities by residents. In Sagrada Família public places and facilities are perceived as being totally overwhelmed by tourists. Most shops and bars cater to them rather than to residents who as a result have few places to meet. According to some residents, the flea market in Encants Vells (at the border of Sagrada Família), also attracts a lot of outsiders and is therefore not used as a meeting area by neighbours. Also in Józsefváros, a centrally-located neighbourhood and one of the most congested districts of Budapest, the crowds of tourists seem to hamper contacts and relations among residents despite the existence of a multitude of meeting places.

On the contrary, in the inner neighbourhood of Gostenhof the high population density and the increasing number of shops and restaurants are perceived by interviewees to have fostered a trend away from mutual ignorance towards greater harmony and cooperation among residents: the everyday interactions involved in activities such as shopping, leisure time pursuits, courtyard festivals as well as participation in associations, the local district committee, and neighbourhood centres are considered crucial in fostering encounters between migrants and natives. Similarly, in Camberwell the high density of restaurants, cafés and shops is predominantly perceived as an asset for inter-group relations. To take one last example, in Poble Sec the transformation of Blai Street into a pedestrian street and other

urban transformations have attracted people from outside the neighbourhood thereby increasing, according to the residents, positive interactions across cultural, social and origin cleavages.

Finally, in all investigated neighbourhoods, *cooperation is generally easier in what Wood and Landry* (2007) *call 'zones of encounter' and Amin* (2002) *defines 'micropublic'*, where deeper and more enduring interactions between people engaging in shared activities and common goals can take place. Such places are, for instance, associations, schools, youth centres, sport clubs, etc. This is exemplified in the case of 'Laboratorio Territoriale', managed by the municipal administration in San Paolo, which houses the internet point together with the headquarters of several native and migrant associations. Here the social and cultural heterogeneity of the users is not a cause of conflict, but rather, a starting point for positive and even cooperative interactions. The Public Baths of Aglié Street in Barriera di Milano work in a similar way: here friendly relations and cooperation clearly prevail over conflict. The Sagrada Família multi-purpose centre where a library, civic centre, local marketplace, social services, and organizations' premises are located and where activities (e.g. Chinese New Year's celebrations) and courses are organized, generates opportunities of encounter between immigrants and natives that allow positive everyday interactions, albeit often superficial. In Langwasser, the Intercultural Gardens – which are gardens with no fences between neighbours in order to facilitate encounters and foster mutual tolerance and respect – bring together migrants of different origins and natives through the shared activity of gardening. These kinds of examples are actually rather numerous and cannot be listed in full here (for further examples see the Concordia Discors project's city reports on www.concordiadiscors.eu).

The potential of these places to facilitate positive interactions is hard to deny. These are places where rules about the use of the space are usually clear and often codified, and where collective actors with explicit or implicit mediating functions are present: two factors that, as outlined above, facilitate positive group interactions. Furthermore, these places are usually selective, i.e. users go there with specific purposes and sometimes share similar lifestyles and even values, all of which also makes the development of contacts and positive inter-group relations easier.

What is less obvious is that *the integration (essentially understood here as peaceful and even cooperative interethnic coexistence) achieved in these places is not completely transferable to the rest of the neighbourhood*. Often the same groups develop different relations in different places. They may cooperate in schools, ignore each other in public gardens, and maybe even fight in apartment buildings. For instance, in Bermondsey majority and minority groups may meet and positively interact in the public library but ignore each other in Dickens Estates. In San Paolo, elderly people and migrant men may get on well together in SPA gardens and confront each other with apprehension in via Di Nanni at night. These examples illustrate that although these 'zones of encounters' are crucial to fostering positive inter-group relations, the integration produced within them will not spontaneously expand beyond them. In order to enhance their positive impact on neighbourhood

sociability, specific measures are needed. Otherwise, they risk becoming little 'pacific' isles of integration, where many occasionally visit but few settle for good.

3 Policy Community Cohesion as a Factor of Narrative Autonomy

As we explained in the Introduction, although the core of the book consists in the analysis of inter-group boundaries and relations in everyday life, we have also analyzed the macro-frames within which everyday relations and narratives are developed, with special attention to neighbourhood policy communities and local media, as well as the relation between these two actors. As illustrated across the city-centred chapters, neighbourhood policy communities – meaning all actors involved in local policymaking regardless of their legal status, i.e. public, no-profit and profit actors (Jordan 1990; Rhodes 1990; Marsh and Rhodes 1992) – play a role in shaping local 'imagined communities'[4] by contributing to the production of 'cultural repertoires' that define what makes one part of the local community (Lamont 2000). Such cultural toolkits help shape the notions of citizenship and identity that determine which perceptions of relations between immigrants and majority are considered sensible, realistic and legitimate, and which collective identities and demands are more likely to gain legitimacy in public discourse (Koopmans et al. 2005). In other words, policy communities hold what Bourdieu (1985) defines as symbolic capital, i.e. 'autonomy of the field of symbolic production' (p. 731). Indeed, he writes, 'politics is the site par excellence of symbolic efficacy, the action that is performed through signs capable of producing social things and, in particular, groups' (p. 741), it is the site arena where the power of narrative, of conserving or transforming the categories through which the world is perceived is displayed.

As Andrea Pogliano points out in the chapter on media, this symbolic power seems to be greater in neighbourhoods with more cohesive policy communities. Here we mean cohesion both in terms of the degree of consistency among different actors' representations and of the operational coordination among them. This is a very important point that we would like to develop further here. Our comparative inquiry suggests that, throughout very different urban contexts, more cohesive local policy communities appear more resilient to the exogenous influences of city-level or national media and/or political movements and better able to produce self-representations of the local community. Given that exogenous narratives are often broadly critical towards migration, such narrative autonomy is often synonymous with community resilience towards xenophobic thinking and practices.

To give a concrete example, we can point at the prevalent 'stories about the neighbourhood' of San Paolo-Cenisia proliferating in local media which are very

[4] 'Imagined community' (Anderson 1991) can be meant as symbolic communities whose members share categorisation systems to differentiate insiders and outsiders and common vocabularies through which they create common identities (Gusfield 1975).

different from those in Barriera di Milano. The former are strongly permeated with references to the neighbourhood's history of anti-fascist insurgency and workers' struggles. The neighbourhood is still systematically described as a working-class district, characterized by a strong solidarity towards immigrants from other Italian regions in 1950s–1960s and from abroad nowadays. It is worth also noting that in this case the sources more frequently used by journalists to write about the neighbourhood are usually the neighbourhood's stakeholders (District councillors, NGOs, service providers, etc), i.e. actors who belong to the local policy community. On the other hand, in the case of Barriera di Milano, a collection of brief comments from bystanders – who describe the neighbourhood as a 'problem area', 'robbery district', 'neighbourhood with many illegal immigrants', 'unsafe place', and 'slum' – is often the journalistic solution to the scarcity of strong and consistent local voices. Our hypothesis to make sense of such striking difference is that in San Paolo-Cenisia the presence of strong stakeholders and a well-organized policy community helps to give voice to the neighbourhood and to generate and channel positive narratives about inter-group relations. As Simon (2000) argues in his analysis of Belleville, a highly diverse Paris neighbourhood, the working-class past of the neighbourhood and the longstanding immigrant presence are historical facts but they probably had neither the impact nor the importance which is now attributed to them in narratives of the neighbourhood. So in the case of Belleville narratives are also of great importance in shaping today's inter-group relations: by associating them with the neighbourhood's collective memory, immigrants cease to be unfamiliar and potentially threatening outsiders.

In the same way, the more positive framing of policy interventions in Poble Sec can be seen as the result of a very rich network of associations fostering a dynamic civic and social life. In promoting such strong neighbourhood activism an important role has been played by the *Pla de Desenvolupament Comunitari del Poble Sec* (Communitarian Development Plan), a project created in 2005 and led by the *Coordinadora d'Entitats del Poble Sec* (Coordination of the neighbourhood's associations) with the support of the *Taula de Convivència del Poble Sec* (Table for Peaceful Coexistence in Poble Sec) set up by the local administration. In contrast, in Sagrada Família there are many associations, but just a few residents participate in their activities so they are not as strong as in Poble Sec.

Elaborating further on what is implicit in Pogliano's analysis, in Werderau the mobilization of conflict is mirrored in the intensification of media coverage. Looking at the distribution of articles dealing with migrants over time, it is remarkable that there was a sudden rise of such articles in 2002, corresponding with a wave of moral panic, followed by a rapid fall: in the next year only three out of 13 articles explicitly touched upon the issue. This development seems to be a result both of the broader political change in the City of Nuremberg and of the appointment in Werderau of a district coordinator who mobilized the local policy community and put pressure on the local media.[5] In Langwasser this influence was even more explicit: the framing

[5] The case of Werderau demonstrates how institutional changes may have consequences for the structure of public discourse and vice versa (Koopmans et al. 2005).

of the conflict over the Intercultural Gardens as a migrant minority-majority conflict had strongly emotionalized and politicized the debate and had drawn more people into it. In this situation the district coordinator appealed to the media not to give the anti-immigrant groups publicity and support for their propaganda. The media therefore became increasingly critical of the right-wing campaign and covered the project more favourably.

The cases of Werderau and Langwasser clearly show also how a cohesive local policy community can reject anti-immigrant political campaigns organized by external actors. In Werderau, the ethnicization of the conflict was indeed partly stimulated by the nativist, right-wing forces of the neo-Nazi party NPD and 'Ausländerstopp', a regional group coming from outside, which in both municipal and federal elections obtained better electoral results in Werderau than elsewhere in the city. In Langwasser fears about the Intercultural Gardens were also reinforced by the anti-immigrant agitation of right-wing groups. After the intervention of the City-appointed community workers and a change of perspective in the media, the opposition campaigns slowly weakened.

Similar although less evident dynamics were registered in Bermondsey. Events to celebrate St. George's Day have been staged in different parts of northern Southwark since 2006. The celebrations have, particularly in South Bermondsey, been framed as part of an effort to 'reclaim' St George (whose cross is on the English flag) from the anti-immigrant British National Party and the National Front, both of which had used the area around The Blue to stage marches.[6] By mobilizing and networking the neighbourhood civil society organizations and schools, it appears that Southwark Borough has been successful in re-claiming St. George's Day as this is now a community celebration rather than a stage for BNP demonstrations. This saint's day now brings together the local community around the celebration of the English flag meant as the symbol of a mixed British society rather than a white-only one.

The British and, especially, the German cases are particularly revealing about the role of what Brubaker (2002, 2006) calls 'ethno-political entrepreneurs'. The American author points out how dramatic events can crystallize a potential group so that undertaking a strategy of provocation, often by a very small number of persons, can sometimes be an effective strategy of group-making.[7] In this case, the protagonists of ethnic conflicts are not ethnic groups as such but various kinds of organizations including institutions, political parties, associations and movements, and mass media, all of which compete for the right to represent the same (putative) group. Furthermore, these dynamics highlight that claim-making and conflicts are

[6] See the following thread with views from local residents concerning the BNP and different experiences of racism and multiculture in Bermondsey: http://www.london-se1.co.uk/forum/read/1/61972 (accessed 18.04.2012).

[7] Conflict can then be both the cause and the consequence of a high level of 'groupness' (Brubaker 2002, 2006)

interactive processes, confirming once again that ethnic conflict is often far from being rooted in actual cultural differences[8] (Koopmans et al. 2005).

This does not mean that the conflict does not exist but, as the German cases clearly show, it may assume the form of 'meta-conflict' or 'conflict over the nature of conflict' (Horowitz 1991), a struggle over the framing and narrative used to label and explain the conflict. As we said at the beginning of this section, the symbolic capital held by neighbourhood policy communities gives them a role in this process. We can thus conclude that *the ability of any given local policy community to construct its own narrative is crucial to making a neighbourhood resilient against disruptive external narratives and thus to building a more cohesive local society*.

4 A Wider Look: Integration as a Threatened Local Public Good

After more than half a decade since its outburst, all indicators show us that the current economic crisis is burdening and weakening the social fabric of European cities, albeit not in an even way. Even if there are significant local variations, the recession is everywhere eroding the primary economic and political foundations of integration, namely, a sufficient degree of labour market inclusion of immigrant workers and a sustainable (or perceived as such by the autochthonous majority) level of welfare consumption by those workers and their families. At the same time, spontaneous shock-absorbing mechanisms – among which one could include migrant returns and secondary migration to other, more promising, destinations – are operating only to a limited, though hard to measure, extent.

In this context, the public budget crisis is dramatically reducing (although here too in a very asymmetrical way across Europe) the states' capacity to address gaps in integration through targeted policy programmes and measures. Local authorities are increasingly being left alone to face the social consequences of the crisis and, in particular, its impact on the integration between foreign immigrants and the receiving society. But local authorities are themselves in deep financial difficulties, and integration policies are often the first casualty of spending reviews and cuts. This is especially true in southern Europe, where the transfer of finances from central states and regions to municipal authorities is being subjected to particularly heavy budget cuts.

In such a bleak overall context, one could hypothesize that immediate repercussions would be felt at the local level, including on social ties and inter-group

[8] Wimmer reminds us that group closure ('groupness') and clarity of boundaries ('boundedness') may vary in degree from one social situation or institutional context to another. Therefore, the stability of boundaries may vary and some ethnic boundaries are more resistant to strategic reinterpretation than others: thick identities reduce the range of strategic options that actors have at their disposal, while where boundaries are not salient, classification ambiguity and complexity is high and boundary shift for strategic purpose is easier (Wimmer 2008).

dynamics at the neighbourhood and street level. As in other historical periods marked by trends of societal impoverishment and growing inequality, one could hypothesize that neighbourhood communities would emerge as the first level where gaps in integration manifest themselves, generating tensions which are easily framed as interethnic. One could expect, and fear, that, due, among other factors, to the apparently harshening socio-economic stratification of housing markets, such ethnically framed neighbourhood conflicts would increasingly resemble 'wars among poors'.

Such hypotheses and expectations are certainly legitimate in the current European circumstances. And they indeed stood prominently among the initial empirical research questions for the comparative project presented in this book. At the end of our fieldwork, though, we have to revise these initial hypotheses, at least in part. Worries and complaints about the impact of the crisis were, of course, voiced in our research fields, for instance by local policymakers or bureaucrats having to cope with budget reductions, but in a less pervasive and insistent way than we expected. Above all, in none of our target neighbourhoods did crisis-related anxiety seem to crystallize into explicit and widespread immigrant and/or minority scapegoating capable of providing cheap combustible for interethnic conflict.

Given the overall, highly uneven European geography of the impact of the crisis, such apparent lack of clearly crisis-related interethnic tensions is particularly striking in the case of Barcelona. This unexpected negative finding is consistent, however, with available broader evidence on the impact of the crisis on immigrant integration and native-immigrant relations in crisis-stricken Spain. As a matter of fact, several researchers have pointed out, often with a mix of surprise and relief, the lack of xenophobic reactions even in the context of the ever harsher competition in the lower layers of the Spanish labour market (Arango 2013; Rinken and Velasco Dujo 2010; Rinken 2011). How to explain such a puzzling and mildly reassuring outcome? Based on the evidence presented in the chapter on Barcelona, a few hypotheses can be formulated. One could, perhaps, argue that we were lucky, or maybe biased, in the selection of the target cities and neighbourhoods: if fieldwork had been carried out, for instance, in a city like Athens, a worsening in inter-group relations associated with the crisis would almost certainly have emerged. But, in the meantime, one has to acknowledge that some of the researched neighbourhoods – in Turin, Barcelona or Budapest, to mention only the most evident cases – are far from immune to the negative impacts of the crisis on prosperity, equality and security. So, we have to consider other possible explanations for the relatively reassuring lack of spectacular findings in terms of crisis-related interethnic conflict.

A possible factor could have to do with timing and, more specifically, with the length of time that is generally needed before financial and macroeconomic downturns produce occupational and social repercussions, and then before these trigger the processes of social construction of ethnic conflict that have been analytically described by Claudia Köhler in her chapter.

The time factor is certainly influential, and the landscape of inter-group relations might indeed look worse if we return to our research fields in 1 or 2 years, especially if glimmers of economic recovery remain so few and so weak. But we cannot rule

out another, less pessimistic, explanation for the relatively peaceful outlook that was revealed by our case studies: that there is a sort of intrinsic resilience within neighbourhood societies facing potentially disrupting pressures. As delineated in the previous paragraph, we understand the capacity of local policy communities to maintain control over the image of their neighbourhood in the media and in the broader public sphere, and to resist and counter potentially harmful exogenous narratives, to be a key attribute and an important corollary of community cohesion.

In presenting the results of research which was also supported by the Integration Fund of the European Union, we believe it is appropriate to conclude by trying to draw some additional conclusions with specific regard to the concept of integration from the arguments above. Research carried out in rapidly evolving, sometimes unquestionably fragile but nevertheless resilient neighbourhoods, suggests to us that, in contemporary European cities, the integration of immigrants (especially in its relational dimension, which primarily consists of the absence of grassroots ethnic conflict) can fruitfully be conceived as a *local public good*. A 'public good' because integration, if rigorously understood as a two-way process, can indeed be argued to be a *non-excludable* and *non-rivalrous* good (i.e. the two key requisites according to the standard micro-economic definition of public goods). But it is also a '*local* good', in the sense that successful integration in today's immigration neighbourhoods can hardly be achieved without a strong, diffuse and proactive engagement of local communities themselves.

If integration had ever been something which could be imported (which is highly questionable), produced at national level and locally distributed from above, this is not the case anymore. In US society, where the degree of collective reliance on the role of the state as an 'integration/cohesion provider' is historically lower than in Europe, the importance of grassroots community building (and more recently 'community organizing', as a distinct and more politically aware form of mobilization) for societal cohesion is traditionally greater and better understood. The comparative research carried out in European neighbourhoods that we have presented in this book suggests to us that it is time for Europe to learn from that tradition, avoiding, however, any naïve illusion of a quick and easy socio-cultural transplant. Indeed, we must be aware that European societies are deeply different from North American ones and we cannot expect a sudden change in attitudes, ideas and values built and consolidated over centuries. Furthermore, community activism requires structural conditions starting from what we called 'interaction sites' where cross-cultural groups have the chance to form and strengthen themselves. But it is precisely these interaction sites – such as public libraries, public parks, NGOs' premises, and other similar places of potential encounter – that are now at particularly high risk of disappearance, due to the sharp retreat of public actors.

Cautious voices, warning, for instance, that deprived, and sometimes conflicted, neighbourhoods might not be conducive to community involvement and partnership (Salmon 2002), should not be ignored. Nevertheless, we still believe that without a more direct, intensive and continuous engagement of local communities, with neighbourhoods as a pivotal level for both analysis and mobilization, integration is probably destined to become an ever more elusive reality.

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Annex 1: The Investigated Urban Contexts. Comparative Tables

The statistical overview of our 11 neighbourhoods is hampered by some fundamental differences in data collection. While in some countries such as the UK neighbourhood-level demographic data are scarce while information on the socio-economic profile of the population is abundant (health conditions, education, benefit claimants, housing conditions, crimes, etc.), in southern European cities it is the opposite. Furthermore, when indicators on certain dimensions are available, reference populations and collection criteria are often diverse, hampering full comparability. For instance, in London neighbourhoods and boroughs data refer to foreign-born or ethnic minorities, not to foreign residents. Another example is Nuremberg where data on foreign nationals are collected not by single nationality but by larger geographical areas, such as EU citizens or former Yugoslavs. Finally, it is worthwhile specifying that when neighbourhoods are not administrative units we aggregated data collected on a smaller scale. In the Table below we provide the available data specifying when referring to different objects or population categories.

F. Pastore, I. Ponzo (eds.), *Inter-group Relations and Migrant Integration in European Cities*, IMISCOE Research Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-23096-2

	Barcelona		Budapest		Numerberg			London		Turin	
	Poble Sec	Sagrata Família	Józsefváros	Kőbánya	Gostenhof	Langwasser	Werderau	Bermondsey	Camberwell	Barriera di Milano	San Paolo-Cenisia
Total population	40,340 (2010)	52,167 (2010)	83,465 (2010)	80,357 (2010)	8,079 (2009)	32,879 (2009)	4,650 (2009)	42,841 (2010)	41,124 (2010)	50,990 (2010)	76,096 (2010)
Population composition by sex											
Male	48.74 % (2009)	45.79 % (2009)	46 % (2010)	47 % (2010)	54 % (2009)	47 % (2009)	48 % (2009)	52 % (2010)	51 % (2010)	50 % (2010)	47 % (2010)
Female	51.26 % (2009)	54.21 % (2009)	54 % (2010)	53 % (2010)	46 % (2009)	53 % (2009)	52 % (2009)	48 % (2010)	49 % (2010)	50 % (2010)	53 % (2010)
Population/km2	44,822 (2010)	47,424 (2010)	12,184 (2010)	2,473 (2010)	15,600 (2009)	ca. 4,625 (2009)	3,100 (2009)	13,519 (2011)	12,531 (2011)	17,348 (2010)	16,211 (2010)
Natural balance rate [(birth-death)/ total population]*100	0.1 % (2009)	−3.6 % (2009)	−1.2 % (2010)	−2.6 % (2010)	4.0 %	ca.−5.25 % (2009)	4.0 %	n.a.	n.a.	0.4 % (2010)	0.0 % (2010)
Demographic balance rate [(population t1–population t0)/population t0]*100	0.29 % (2009–2010)	−0,88 % (2009–2010)	1.5 (2009–2010)	1.4 (2009–2010)	−1.6 (2008–2009)	−0.3 (2008–2009)	−0.3 (2008–2009)	n.a.	n.a.	0.3 (2010)	−0.1 (2010)
Proportion of people with foreign citizenship in total population	27.9 (2009)	16.9 (2009)	7.2 (2010)	6.6 (2010)	39.4 (2009)	10.5 (2009)	27.2 (2009)	n.a.	n.a.	29.0 % (2010)	14.0 % (2010)

Proportion of people born in foreign countries in total population	32.8 (2009)	21.0 (2009)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	39.9 (2011)	41.5 (2011)	n.a.	n.a.
Proportion of people with an ethnic minority background in total populations	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	53.7 (2009)	36.7 (2009)	48.0 (2009)	56.3 (2011)	65.7 (2011)	n.a.	n.a.
Unemployment rates	12.4 % (Estimate based on data for residents aged 16–64 and postcode areas, January 2012)	9.4 % (Estimate based on data for residents aged 16–64 and postcode areas, January 2012)	n.a.	n.a.	12.0 % (2009)	7.3 % (2009)	5.1 % (2009)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

(continued)

	Barcelona		Budapest		Numerberg			London		Turin	
	Poble Sec	Sagrata Família	Józsefváros	Kőbánya	Gostenhof	Langwasser	Werderau	Bermondsey	Camberwell	Barriera di Milano	San Paolo-Cenisia
Percentage of population enrolled in higher education (senior high school, college, university)	20.2 % of the resident population who are 16 years old and older (2012)	30.6 % of the resident population who are 16 years old and older (2012)	n.a.	n.a.	30 %* (2008–2008) * transition rates from primary school to higher secondary schools	30–50 %* (2008–2008) * transition rates from primary school to higher secondary schools	30 %* (2008–2008) * transition rates from primary school to higher secondary schools	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Sources:
Barcelona: *Departament d'Estadística de l'Ajuntament de Barcelona* (www.bcn.es); Continuous Municipal Census (*Padrón Municipal*)
Budapest: Statistical Yearbooks of Budapest
Nuremberg: Stadt Nürnberg, Amt für Stadtforschung und Statistik für Nürnberg und Fürth, 2009, 2010/10 and 2011/01; Registerauszug Bevölkerungsstand, Nürnberg 31.12.2009. (own calculations); Statistik aktuell für Nürnberg und Fürth, Statistischer Monatsbericht für August 2010, M392, Nürnberg; Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Nürnberg 2010; Bildungsbüro der Stadt Nürnberg, 2011: 1. Nürnberger Bildungsbericht, Teilbericht D1: Allgemeinbildende Schulen, 02/20119
London: Office for National Statistics
Turin: City of Turin

Prevailing Urban and Economic Functions	
London (Bermondsey)	Bermondsey's present day socio-economic landscape has its basis in the nineteenth and early twentieth century development of the riverside docks, and industries associated with it such as food processing. Associated with the post-second world war closure of the docks, parts of present day Bermondsey remain some of the most socio-economically deprived areas of London, juxtaposed with and in contrast to other parts of Bermondsey along the river that have seen up-market housing and commercial development
London (Camberwell)	Camberwell is, historically as well as in the present day, characterized by a class divide that has left a lasting imprint on the urban landscape. While the northern part of the neighbourhood has shared an industrial past with Bermondsey, southern Camberwell is characterized by Georgian terraces from the early nineteenth century – an area that today is subject to gentrification processes. Compared to surrounding neighbourhoods, there are fewer high street shops in Camberwell, but there is an important 'night economy', i.e. restaurants and clubs, and two large hospitals are situated in Camberwell
Budapest (Józsefváros)	Józsefváros can be divided into three main parts characterized by different functions. The smallest sector called "Palotanegyed" includes several remarkable buildings such as the National Museum. This area belongs to one of the most fashionable parts of Budapest with lots of tourists. The second part, beyond Nagykörút has a worse reputation: traditionally a craftsmen's neighbourhood, it then became a slum and is currently under redevelopment. Part of the dilapidated housing stock was demolished to make room for large office blocks and housing developments (the Corvin-Szigony project is reported to the biggest urban renewal project in Central Europe). The third part called "Tisztviselőtelep" is a suburban area for higher status groups
Budapest (Kőbánya)	Kőbánya (named after a limestone mine) has always been an industrial area and almost the entire area is full of unused industrial buildings. Nowadays the pharmaceutical industry and beer manufacturing are the leading industries of Kőbánya
Turin (Barriera di Milano)	Barriera di Milano is a former industrial area. Now industries have been moved out of the city and Barriera is mainly a residential neighbourhood. Small shops are very numerous. There is a lack of leisure spaces and activities in the neighbourhood
Turin (San Paolo-Cenisia)	San Paolo is a former industrial area. It is characterized by a good functional mix and a balanced distribution of welfare services, meeting places and green spaces, residential settlements and commercial area (small shops and open markets)
Nürnberg (Langwasser)	Langwasser Nordwest and Langwasser Nordost are primarily residential areas, while 50 % of Langwasser Südwest and Langwasser Südost is not inhabited
Nürnberg (Werderau)	Nearly all commercial functions in Werderau are located around Volckamer Platz – the centre of the housing development. The factory MAN, located in the neighbouring sector of Gibitzenhof, has a particular relevance as an employer for large parts of the inhabitants of Werderau

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Nürnberg (Gostenhof)	Gostenhof consists primarily of housing areas. Small commercial areas are spread all across Gostenhof. Shops and restaurants/bars represent a mixture of long-established ones, migrant-run, and newly opened ones with an alternative or artistic image
Barcelona (Sagrada Família)	Sagrada Família is a dormitory-residential area but also hosts the most visited tourist spot of Barcelona, the Sagrada Família church. It includes a commercial area, and the civic centre and other services attract residents from other neighbourhoods
Barcelona (Poble Sec)	Poble Sec is a residential quarter with some areas developing as leisure areas and nightspots. Montjuïc Mountain includes an Olympic area and several services for the whole city (theatres, playgrounds, etc.)
Housing Stock, Decaying and Regeneration Processes	
London (Bermondsey)	Bermondsey is dominated by social housing of a variety of styles. Nearer the riverside, much of it is low-rise red brick housing built by the London County Council (LCC) in the wake of slum clearances between the wars. Along the riverside, a lot of social housing and industrial land has been converted into expensive residential accommodation, mainly luxury apartments. Riverside accommodation tends to have better pedestrian links along well-developed riverside paths to transport hubs and across the river into central London
London (Camberwell)	Housing in Camberwell is extremely diverse. It includes large Georgian townhouses, many formerly squatted or in multi-occupancy but brought back to owner-occupation in the housing boom that began in the late 1990s. There are also several smaller social housing estates, with a wide variety of styles including both inter-war red brick LCC housing and concrete post-war high-rise and low-rise, and nineteenth century terraced street housing that remains un-gentrified
Budapest (Józsefváros)	The image of Józsefváros shows a great heterogeneity. The buildings of the inner part preserved their aristocratic features. Apartments built for the middle class are bigger here than the Budapest average. The central part (Palotanegyed) includes several remarkable buildings such as museums and universities. But the biggest part of Józsefváros consists of old and dilapidated buildings. Prices of flats are lower than the average of Budapest. There are nine homeless shelters in Józsefváros which determine its image strongly. Some neighbourhoods are currently under redevelopment. The dilapidated part of the housing stocks was partly demolished to make place for large office blocks and housing estates
Budapest (Kőbánya)	Since this is one of the largest district of Budapest it is not surprising that all sorts of urban areas can be found in Kőbánya. However, the landscape is dominated by brown areas, deteriorating parks, and high-rise (often ten-storey high) buildings (made of concrete blocks). A constant effort of the Municipality is to change the industrial image of the area and encourage young people to move there by providing favourable housing and educational conditions
Turin (Barriera di Milano)	In Barriera di Milano the dismissed former industrial areas have been only partially converted, therefore urban blight is extensive. The housing stock is extremely heterogeneous. In the heart of the neighbourhood, housing quality is low. In the East part, there are buildings constructed in the 1970s–1980s and a quite large social housing complex. In the West part, dismissed industrial areas are being reconverted and new houses are being constructed. The northern area is characterized by houses of higher quality

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Turin (San Paolo-Cenisia)	The heart of San Paolo is mainly made up of old and cheaper houses. The ring around the neighbourhood centre is made up of newer and good quality buildings. The two public housing settlements of the neighbourhood are quite small and located in Cenisia
Nürnberg (Langwasser)	Between 2005 and 2009, about 5000 m^2 of flats (primarily consisting of five and more rooms) were built in Langwasser Nordost. Comparing the four sectors by the types of flats, we find more recently built flats (after 1991) mainly in Langwasser Nordost; the large majority of flats in the other three sectors were built between 1949 and 1990. Larger proportions of one- and two family houses are mainly located in Langwasser Nordost (18.3 %) and Langwasser Südwest (15.5 %), while in Langwasser Nordwest and Südost the large majority of flats are located in blocks of seven or more flats
Nürnberg (Werderau)	The inhabited area of Werderau nearly exclusively consists of a housing development that was built over several construction periods (about 60 years) beginning in 1911 and consisting of about 1,260 housing units. The MAN factory, which is located in the bordering sector Gibitzenhof, initiated the construction with the purpose to provide housing for the workers and employees of MAN. The model for the design of the housing development was a garden city with rather rural structures. The proportions of the types of flats by the construction and the type of building reflect the history of Werderau: nearly all flats were built before 1990, about half of them before 1948, over one-fifth of housing units are one-family houses and over one-third is in blocks of three to six flats. The whole housing development was sold by MAN to a real estate company in 1998. This resulted in a meaningful change of the composition of the population of Werderau
Nürnberg (Gostenhof)	In the nineteenth century Gostenhof was a commercial and trading suburb with a dense population. Since the sector was left almost intact by WW II, the majority of buildings nowadays still originate from construction periods long before 1948. After the war, Gostenhof developed into an area which was inhabited mainly by socially disadvantaged people and migrants due to low rents for rather old flats and an unattractive environment in the vicinity of downtown with hardly any green areas. About one-third of the presently existing flats were built between 1949 and 1990
Barcelona (Sagrada Família)	In Sagrada Família there are mostly tenements of up to six floors. In general, the apartments are of good quality, in some cases divided into smaller flats. They have been built, from the urbanization of the neighbourhood in late nineteenth century – early twentieth century to 1970s and 1980s. Some parts of the neighbourhood, especially the squares' inner spaces, have been remodelled by building new gardens during the last decade thanks to Pla de Barris
Barcelona (Poble Sec)	Poble Sec is characterized by a mixture of different kinds of housing stock. In the northern part, touching Parallel Avenue, big blocks of flats of medium quality built during the 1970s and 1980s prevail. In the central part, you find little blocks built in different periods, from the first half of the twentieth century, mainly older than the first ones. In the higher part, on the side of Montjuïc Mountain, there are more expensive flats, and also houses with gardens build during the early twentieth century. Some parts of the neighbourhood have been remodelled during the last decade with the Pla de Barris

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Class Composition	
London (Bermondsey)	Bermondsey has historically been perceived as a relatively homogenous working-class area. But due to the redevelopment of the former docklands, there has been an influx of a relatively affluent, ethnically mixed middle-class population to the northern part of Bermondsey
London (Camberwell)	Camberwell has historically been characterized by a divide between the working-class northern part and the more affluent middle-class southern part. Whereas the development of social housing in all parts of the neighbourhood has watered down the spatial distinction somewhat, socio-economic disparities are perceived to be increasing due to ongoing gentrification processes
Budapest (Józsefváros)	At the beginning of the twentieth century Józsefváros was home to artisans, musician gypsies and a low middle-class Jewish minority. The number of inhabitants reached its peak in 1910. By the 1950s the heterogeneity of the population had declined, and poorer strata of rural immigrants and workers dominated the scene while the upper middle class moved out. Nowadays the high proportion of Roma population, immigrants and poor Hungarians characterizes certain parts of the area
Budapest (Kőbánya)	Kőbánya has always been an industrial area, but due to the shutdown of many factories in the 1990s skilled workers left Kőbánya and only lower social classes remained behind. Immigrants are present here as well because of the proximity of the Four Tigers Market
Turin (Barriera di Milano)	Barriera di Milano is mainly a working-class neighbourhood. It is more densely inhabited, multi-ethnic, young and socially weaker compared to the city average: it is characterized by higher-than-city-average rates of low educated people, school drop-outs, low-skilled workers, unemployed young people seeking for the first employment and families characterized by multiple social weaknesses
Turin (San Paolo-Cenisia)	San Paolo is a working-class and low middle-class neighbourhood. Its socio-economic profile is not particularly worrying and, in some respects, it looks even better than the city average (e.g. the educational level is slightly higher than the city average)
Nürnberg (Langwasser)	The class composition of Langwasser is very diverse. Members of all classes can be found in the neighbourhood, but in some housing areas members of a certain class are more represented than others, e.g. the working class in multi-storey buildings and the upper class in privately owned one-family houses
Nürnberg (Werderau)	The history of Werderau is that of a housing development for factory workers of MAN. This pattern still remains. Some people work outside of the neighbourhood but most of them are part of the working class
Nürnberg (Gostenhof)	Gostenhof is a traditional working-class neighbourhood. The working class is still the largest group in the neighbourhood but there are also considerable numbers of intellectuals, artists and self-employed people among Gostenhof's residents
Barcelona (Sagrada Família)	Sagrada Família is mainly a middle-class neighbourhood. High prices of real estate slow down the arrival of young families and immigrant residents
Barcelona (Poble Sec)	Poble Sec is mainly a working-class neighbourhood but during the last decade it is attracting young middle class population (e.g. bohemian style newcomers)

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Population Inflows	
London (Bermondsey)	Traditionally Bermondsey was a white working class neighbourhood, with Irish immigrants as the only significant immigrant population. But the past decades have seen increased inflows of both immigrants and a middle-class population
London (Camberwell)	Camberwell has been characterized by different types of inflows for several hundred years. Historically a London destination for leisure and recreation, immigrants from abroad have moved to Camberwell, especially since WW2. The night economy – restaurants and clubs – also attracts outsiders. A concentration of mental health, drug and alcohol treatment centres attract users who are seen as an outsider/anti-social presence by many residents
Budapest (Józsefváros)	Inflow of third country immigrants – who mostly work in the Four Tigers Market – is very high compared to the other parts of Budapest. They are present in the whole of Józsefváros, but they show a high concentration in the area of the Four Tigers Market and the Népszínház Street. Since Palotanegyed hosts several museums this part of Józsefváros attracts tourists
Budapest (Kőbánya)	The situation of Kőbánya is similar to that of Józsefváros. Third world immigrants mostly operate wholesale shops or sell goods on the Four Tigers Market. Kőbánya does not attract tourists due to the lack of meeting places, museums and any other entertainment possibilities
Turin (Barriera di Milano)	Barriera di Milano is characterized by very high inflows of immigrants compared to the city average, while it does not attract tourists and neighbourhood users because of the lack of meeting and recreational places. For this same reason, its residents, mainly young people, often spend their free time outside the neighbourhood
Turin (San Paolo-Cenisia)	Inflows of immigrants are similar to the city average. New residents, mainly native, are moving towards the south-east area, where good quality buildings have been constructed. San Paolo-Cenisia does not attract huge inflows of neighbourhood users, except for some leisure and cultural sites such as cinemas and contemporary art centres
Nürnberg (Langwasser)	There are not many outsiders in Langwasser, but the shopping centre "Frankencetrum", the hospital and some other shopping and recreational facilities do draw outsiders to Langwasser. Inhabitants of Langwasser frequently commute to other parts of the city to work
Nürnberg (Werderau)	Werderau is a rather isolated neighbourhood. There are no outsiders in the neighbourhood at all. Most residents of Werderau work for the MAN factory, more recent internal immigrants more frequently work in other parts of the city
Nürnberg (Gostenhof)	Gostenhof is famous for its Turkish-owned shops and restaurants. Many migrants with a Turkish background as well as other residents of Nurmeberg come to Gostenhof for these venues. Moreover, the artistic shops and the neighbourhood centre "Nachbarschaftshaus" are pulling visitors from other parts of the city to Gostenhof. Many residents of Gostenhof work in the nearby city centre or in the shops of the neighbourhood as employees or owners

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Barcelona (Sagrada Família)	The most perceived outsiders are the tourists that are massively present in the central and most important open space of the neighbourhood. The number of tourist interferes with the perception of the immigrants. The latter are visible mainly in commercial establishments (Chinese and Pakistani) or as the people taking care of elder residents (Latin Americans). Also some non-resident Latin American immigrants seem to be visible and are seen as a threat in public places. Senegalese and Romanian squatters and Eastern European homeless people are also present. Nightlife leisure is perceived as scarce. The good transport facilities enable people, especially young ones, to travel to other parts of the city in order to socialize
Barcelona (Poble Sec)	In Poble Sec different inflows of immigrants coexist, ranging from immigrants who arrived from other parts of Spain during the first and the second part of the last century, to the new inflow of international immigrants during the 2000s. During the last decade, the neighbourhood has become a leisure and nightlife area, attracting a few tourists and settling citizens that could be qualified as gentrifiers. Some of the latter are immigrants from wealthy EU countries
Immigrants' Profile	
London (Bermondsey)	Overall a highly diverse profile, as there are immigrants/minorities living in both the more affluent and the more deprived parts of Bermondsey. Furthermore, most shopkeepers in Bermondsey are of immigrant/ethnic minority background
London (Camberwell)	As Camberwell has been an immigrant destination for a long time, many well-established minorities have lived here for 2–3 generations, with very diverse employment and livelihood profiles. Like in Bermondsey, most shopkeepers in Camberwell are of immigrant/ethnic minority background
Budapest (Józsefváros)	The primary reason for which most immigrants come to Józsefváros is the proximity of the Four Tigers Market. Either they work at the area of the market or operate a shop or a restaurant in the district. Most of them work in the field of commerce, and they are believed to be richer than the average locals in Józsefváros
Budapest (Kőbánya)	Since the Four Tigers Market is situated on the border of Józsefváros and Kőbánya immigrants living in Kőbánya mostly work in the area of the market in the field of commerce and can be characterized with the same parameters as immigrants living in Józsefváros
Turin (Barriera di Milano)	Foreign immigrant families often move to Barriera di Milano following family reunion and in relation to their first house purchase due to low housing prices in this area. Single migrants co-housing and buildings completely inhabited by foreigners from the same geographical area are however concentrated in the oldest part of the quarter. The quarter also attracts foreigners who run small businesses
Turin (San Paolo-Cenisia)	Immigrants move to San Paolo-Cenisia mainly as a result of family reunifications. The presence of Latin American single women employed in domestic work or care work and well-integrated, has always been significant. They are now reuniting with their children who, on the contrary, are facing difficulties with integration

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Nürnberg (Langwasser)	The proportion of foreigners among the total population of Langwasser is relatively low, compared to the city average. The major group of migrants in Langwasser originates from the former Soviet Union. The profile of migrants in Langwasser is as diverse as that of the whole population of the quarter; there are quite a number of workers and shopkeepers. Some parts of the quarter, especially multi-store buildings, are inhabited by high proportions of migrant families
Nürnberg (Werderau)	Compared to the city average, the proportion of migrants in Werderau is high. Due to the long history of foreign migrants in Werderau, there are large proportions of descendants of early migrants in the quarter; they originate mainly from Turkey and Italy. Similar to all residents of the quarter, most migrants in Werderau are members of the working class. In former times, all of them used to be MAN factory workers. Nowadays MAN is not the only but the prevalent employer of Werderau's residents – migrants as well as natives. With the sale of housing units, many migrants had the chance to acquire housing property for reasonable prices in Werderau
Nürnberg (Gostenhof)	Gostenhof is among the districts with the highest proportions of foreigners in Nürnberg. Migrants of Turkish origin used to be the dominant migrant group. The pattern still exists but the quarter has been developing into a more multicultural quarter. Other relevant groups are migrants from other EU countries and from African countries. Among migrants in Gostenhof, there are several shopkeepers, as well as workers and blue-collar employees
Barcelona (Sagrada Família)	Latin American (especially women) care workers are an important part of the quarters' landscape. The Chinese traders (mostly families) run many shops, bars and restaurants in the quarter. Some Pakistani and Latin American grocery stores can be found. There is also a number of high skilled workers (singles and families), mostly EU citizens and Latin Americans. Some social tensions have risen as a consequence of Latin American young people who spend spare time in the streets and squares and some Eastern European homeless (single men) in Sagrada Família square
Barcelona (Poble Sec)	Women (mostly Latin Americans) work mainly in domestic services, while men (especially Moroccan) are concentrated in construction or related activities. Pakistanis usually run little food shops, but also cyber-cafés, employing other Pakistanis. The jobs related to services like restaurants and hotels are quite widespread among non-EU nationals

Annex 2: Methodological Annex

In the research we used mixed methodologies derived from different disciplines and fields of study. In the following, we briefly describe the main fronts of our territorial empirical analysis.

Analysis of Social and Urban Context

The first step of this strand of analysis consisted in reconstructing the urban and social context of the target neighbourhoods and in identifying common qualitative and quantitative indicators describing the urban, social and migration contexts (see para 2 of Introduction and Annex 2). As we discussed in the Introduction, this work was hampered by the well-known differences in data collection among countries which become sharper when shifting to smaller units of analysis such as neighbourhoods.

Local Policy Communities' Perceptions and Media Representations

In each of our 11 investigated neighbourhoods we carried out interviews and focus groups with neighbourhood policy communities. We considered the neighbourhood-level representative institutions (where existing) as well as housing associations, spontaneous groups of residents, NGOs, and other relevant actors depending on each local context.

In each city we carried out an analysis of the contents of local newspapers or local pages of nationwide newspapers over the last decade (2001–2010), sampling

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newspapers every 5 days. In this case, we have carried out both a quantitative analysis (to see how often the investigated neighbourhoods were mentioned in association with immigration) and a qualitative one (to identify the dominant representations of inter-group relations and of policy interventions on immigration and integration issues in the target neighbourhoods).

The following newspapers were analyzed in the investigated cities:

Barcelona: *La Vanguardia* (a senior newspaper founded in 1881) and *El Periódico de Cataluña* (founded in 1978, during the transition to democracy) are daily newspapers with a section devoted to Barcelona local news.

Budapest: *Józsefváros* is a free newspaper boasting a circulation of 55,000 copies for each issue (every second week), the newspaper is owned by the local government. *Kőbányai Hírek* (Kőbánya News) is a free monthly newspaper owned by the local government. *Helyi Téma* is a free weekly independent newspaper owned by "Théma Lap-és Könyvkiadó Kft". From 2005 every district in Budapest has had its own *Helyi Téma*, including Józsefváros and Kőbánya. *Helyi Téma* has two local pages about city-related news.

London: *South London Press* is a twice-weekly newspaper. *London Evening Standard* comes out every evening and is a regional rather than local newspaper. *Southwark News* is the local weekly in Southwark Borough (as a digital version is not available, Southwark News could not be made part of the comparative thematic analysis).

Nuremberg: *Nuremberger Zeitung* and *Nuremberger Nachrichten* are local daily newspapers.

Turin: *La Repubblica* and *La Stampa* are national daily newspapers with local pages on Turin.

Ethnographic Fieldwork

Ethnographies represented the core of the fieldwork at city level. At the same time, comparative ethnographies across cities represented the main challenge we had to face since ethnography is a qualitative method *par excellence* and comparison is therefore particularly problematic. We coped with this challenge by forging common research tools summarized in shared written guidelines and by improving them step by step through a continuous dialogue between fieldwork and methodological reflection. Specifically, we tried to achieve a qualitative understanding of how ethnicity works in everyday life and the experienced inter-group relations through interviews that allowed us to focus on residents' representations of differences, and through direct observation aimed at investigating everyday practices and daily encounters in specific sites of interaction.

Residents, neighbourhood-users, shopkeepers and service providers were asked open-ended questions about experiences of living in the neighbourhood and its changes over time, perceived social groups within the neighbourhood, attitudes

within and relationships between these groups, paying special attention to meanings given to cleavages associated with ethnicity and migration in comparison with other cleavages. However, consistent with the approach already discussed, according to which immigration background and ethnicity may have different relevance for different people or may even not be relevant at all, we primarily focused our interviews on people's perceptions of neighbourhood changes and of demographic and spatial transformations and their consequence for everyday life, rather than directly on immigration and majority-minorities relations. Interviews were carried out on a non-representative sample of 351 persons distributed across the 11 investigated neighbourhoods, selected to include both majority and minorities members, as well as individuals showing various degrees of involvement in local social life and different modes of use of urban resources (e.g. residents who frequently use public places or with high civic engagement and persons who spend most of their time at home). We further differentiated the sample by including persons who reside in the target neighbourhoods and others who just work there. Finally, we ensured that local samples were balanced in terms of age and gender. Further details on city samples and ways of contacts with interviewees are provided in the city chapters.

To avoid too dispersive an approach, we focused direct observation not on neighbourhoods as such but on a limited number of 'interaction zones' in each neighbourhood, i.e. on geographically circumscribed places regarded by key informants as significant in terms of inter-group relations (such as public gardens, youth centres, housing estates).

Participatory Tools

We also reconstructed collective narratives of the neighbourhoods' recent social and urban transformations through what we called Neighbourhood Forums, i.e. half-day participatory events engaging residents from different socio-economic groups (among which local administrators, NGOs' and ethnic associations' representatives, residents of various ages, shopkeepers, etc.). An organization specialized in the management of participatory processes, 'Avventura Urbana',[1] was in charge of supporting researchers in building up an agreed participatory format and training them in managing the events at the local level. The format was structured in two parts: a presentation and discussion of the preliminary results of the research and group discussions triggered by two simple and non-ethnically biased questions ('What would you change about your neighbourhood, if you were the "Neighbourhood Mayor" for 1 day? And what would you not change for any reason on earth?)'. An important added value of these events was the involvement of people who do not usually take part in public life and often shun face-to-face in-depth interviews, thereby allowing us to bring together and analyze very different perspectives on the research topics.

[1] See www.avventuraurbana.it

A further tool to enhance participation and the communication of results in the target neighbourhoods was a short documentary based on the same questions posed in the Neighbourhood Forums and made through a close collaboration between a professional film-maker, Rossella Schillaci, and the researchers who collected the materials (photographs and audio recordings). The documentary, subtitled in English, is now uploaded on the Concordia Discors project web site (http://www.concordiadiscors.eu). It is meant both as a medium among others to communicate research results and as a tool for local social and policy actors to trigger further discussion and exchanges on diversity and inter-group relations at the neighbourhood level.

Advisory Committee

An Independent Advisory Board was set up to monitor the research and evaluate the intermediate and final results and to provide feedbacks to improve the fieldwork and the analysis of empirical findings. Its members were the following: Maria Lucinda Fonseca (IGOT, University of Lisbon), Marco Martiniello (University of Liège), Walter Siebel (University of Oldenburg), Giuseppe Sciortino (University of Trento).