

Philosophy of Globalization

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Edited by
Concha Roldán, Daniel Brauer
and Johannes Rohbeck

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Preface

Taking a critical and nuanced position on the phenomenon of globalization has become increasingly difficult in our time. Only recently, it seemed the positions were clear. When the opening up of the world market and the emergence of new digital networks palpably increased the pace of globalization in the 1970s, and when this process again accelerated to breathtaking speed after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, advocates and opponents of globalization made their respective cases in clearly contrasting terms.

On one side were the proponents of globalization, who saw free trade and cross-border communication as a gain for the development of humankind. After the notion of the 'global village' had made the rounds, 'one world' gained currency as a slogan for the promotion of worldwide cooperation. However, what drove this was, above all, the marketing of global corporations in opposition to trade restrictions. Politically, this corresponded to radical neoliberalism celebrating thirty years of victories. Its message was that the process of 'deregulation' ought to be carried on into the future.

In opposition to this apologia for globalization, the so-called 'anti-globalists' soon made their voices heard with the help of their own, in part globally active, organizations. These critics pointed out the negative consequences of unbounded capitalism: the mounting inequality between the wealthy industrial nations of the north and the poor countries of the south; the emergence of new kinds of wars and globalized terrorism, with their resulting migrations; the exploitation of natural resources; and, not least, the catastrophic effects on the global climate. Under the new umbrella term 'global governance', transnational organizations would serve to mitigate such damages.

Recently, however, the fronts between the apologists and the opponents of globalization have shifted dramatically. At least since the resurgence of populist parties and Great Britain's exit from the European Union, as well as the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States of America, a novel repudiation of globalization has emerged. The critique comes no longer exclusively from the left in its opposition to capitalism; it comes, rather, from the far right, which sees the open world market as a threat to its domestic economies and longs for a return to the old nation states. The irony here is that such nostalgia is obviously an unintended and undesired side effect of globalization itself.

How are we to respond to this? If the new opponents of globalization are nationalists, racists and fascists, the constellations have shifted. Neoliberals believe they can and should simply cling to the idea of free trade. But this is to overlook the fact that the objections to particular effects of globalization will

not resolve themselves simply because they are raised by the ‘wrong’ side. Precisely because globalization has begun to provoke dangerous reactions, the anxieties to which such reactions give expression must be taken seriously. This presents the old critics of globalization with a twofold task: on the one hand, it is essential that they not give up on their critique of neoliberalism and continue decrying the exploitation of human beings and nature. On the other hand, they must clearly distinguish themselves from the new resistance by showing how a critical alternative to nationalism can be developed on the basis of the theoretical conception and practical advancement of alternative forms of globalization.

As we aim to demonstrate in this volume, this is a project to which philosophy too can contribute. The goal is to present a critical concept of globalization that is as comprehensive as possible, by taking into account economic, political, ethical, social and cultural aspects, according to a methodology of philosophically grounded reflection. The historical dimension receives special emphasis, including the history of globalization, the topic of globalization in the history of philosophy, and the philosophy of history’s contribution to a systematic theory of globalization. As a collection of contributions from authors from Europe and Latin America, this volume offers an opportunity to depict the topic from diverse perspectives and in an intercultural frame of reference.

The first chapter addresses the process of globalization in the areas of economy, politics and society. In the course of economic transformation, political institutions change in such a way that social actors lose influence. It is thus necessary to investigate the remaining conditions of the possibility of intervention (Griselda Gutiérrez), a question that also bears on the political action of persons with complicated citizenship status (Alejandro Alba). The complex structures of action that ultimately arise can be designated as ‘cooperative cognition’ (María Navarro). Yet such social phenomena can only be sufficiently explained if globalization is conceived first and foremost as an expansion of western capitalism (Franz Heilgendorff). In light of such a conception, it becomes evident that capitalistically constituted nation states use the exportation of democracy as a pretext to wage wars and expand their power (Constanze Demuth). The bellicose notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’ is contradicted by a ‘soft’ or ‘critical’ universalism that acknowledges cultural differences while also trying to conciliate them (Markus Tiedemann, Omar Acha).

The process of globalization leads to social inequalities and thus to demands for global justice—the topic of the second chapter. This calls for political and ethical standards, which are being deformed in the global age (Concha Roldán). There is a practical need for global institutions that fight injustices in the world (Elisabetta Di Castro). Instead of merely demanding the fulfillment of char-

itable aid obligations, it ought to be considered whether, for instance, the right to health can be legitimated as a human right (Julia Muñoz). Such ethical challenges give rise to the question of who are the subjects of global justice (Alberto Ruiz). These include generations whose impact reaches into the future, which invites contemplation of intergenerational justice (Irene Gómez). Nevertheless, the fact that the injustices in the world were created in the past, and must be compensated in the present, indicates the historical import of the topic (Johannes Rohbeck).

The history of globalization is also the focus of the third chapter. Examples range from the colonial history of Latin America (Nicholas Miller)—in particular the Jesuit mission in Paraguay (Rolando Carrasco) in the eighteenth century—to the urbanization of Mexico City in the nineteenth century (Sergio Miranda). Case studies from Turkey include intercultural hiring practices in the Ottoman Empire’s engineering sector (Darina Martykánová and Meltem Kocaman), the cartography of the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea (Kaan Üçsu), and contrasting theories of ‘modernization’ and ‘dependency’ (Rıdvan Turhan). These are followed by a contribution on the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Poland (Agnieszka Pufelska).

As the fourth chapter shows, globalization is also a topic in the history of philosophy. This begins in the historical Age of Enlightenment, during which the idea of cosmopolitanism first took on concrete form. In this regard, it can be shown that Raynal’s and Diderot’s critiques of colonialism influenced Kant (Ricardo Gutiérrez, Roberto Aramayo), who, with his concepts of hospitality and world peace, is among the pioneers of a philosophical theory of globalization (Efraín Lazos). The debate around such an Enlightenment philosophy persists into the present (Iwan-Michelangelo D’Aprile). The political economy of Marx is also to be counted among the first theories of globalization (Facundo Nahuel Martín). The idea of globalization is also contained in Heidegger’s metaphysics, since both are directed at the world in its totality (Marco Kleber). Following Ernst Cassirer, globalization can be understood as a symbolic form that in contemporary discourses functions as a worldview (Lucas von Ramin).

Finally, the fifth chapter investigates how philosophy of history may contribute to the systematic analysis of the phenomenon of globalization. The interdisciplinary conception of ‘Global History’ is well suited for the establishment of a post-narrative and post-ethnographic historiography of globalization (Daniel Brauer). To this end, historians can invoke both Koselleck’s theory of history—as well as Foucault’s critique thereof (Eliás Palti)—without naively upholding the Enlightenment notion of progress (Adrián Ratto). Following Benjamin, it is much more a matter of rethinking the historical space of the global (Francisco Naishtat). In the end, the question of the future also belongs to philosophy of

history, since historical awareness involves not only experience with the past, but also expectation directed towards the future (Rosa Belvedresi). These investigations bring the discussion full circle to the initial descriptions of the economic and political process of globalization, and the subsequent explorations of the ethical challenges faced by the utopia of global justice.

The articles presented here form the core output of the confluence of two international research projects led in the last four years by Concha Roldán: (IFS-CSIC) “Philosophy of History and Globalisation of Knowledge. Cultural Bridges between Europe and Latin America” (WORLDBRIDGES: F7-PEOPLE-2013-IRSES: PIRSES-GA-2013-612644); and “The Philosophical-Moral Prisms of Crises. Towards a New Socio-Political Pedagogy” (PRISMAS: FFI2013-42935-P, co-directed with Professor of the Institut of Philosophy of Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, IFS-CSIC, Roberto R. Aramayo).

All the authors of this volume are members of the project WORLDBRIDGES.¹ In this sense, this book represents the scientific results of this joint project, which was sponsored by the European Union’s 7th Framework Program on Research, and which has made possible the exchange between more than forty researchers from Europe and Latin America.

The following institutions have participated in the project on the European side: The Spanish National Research Council (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, CSIC: located in Madrid, under the direction of Professor Concha Roldán), the University of Potsdam (Universität Potsdam, UP: under the direction of Professor Iwan-Michelangelo D’Aprile), the University of Dresden (Technische Universität Dresden, TUD: under the direction of Professor Johannes Rohbeck) and the University of Istanbul (UI, under the direction of Professor Meltem Kocaman); and on the Latin American side: the Center for Philosophical Research (Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas, CIF: Buenos Aires, Argentina, under the direction of Professor Daniel Brauer) and the National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México: UNAM, under the direction of Professor Griselda Gutiérrez).

The project PRISMAS, financed by the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness (MINECO), has allowed us to carry out some other meetings and activities necessary for our objectives beyond the financing of the European project.

¹ The following authors also belong to the PRISMAS project: Roberto R. Aramayo (IFS-CSIC), Daniel Brauer (UBA), Iwan D’Aprile (UP), Irene Gómez Franco (UP), Griselda Gutiérrez (UNAM), Ricardo Gutiérrez Aguilar (IFS-CSIC/UCM), María G. Navarro (USAL), Johannes Rohbeck (TUD), and Concha Roldán (IFS-CSIC).

The stereotype of an economic crisis has become a pretext that has permitted the creation of apocalyptic political designs with a specific ideological bias undermining the welfare state. Our aim in PRISMAS was to analyze the concept of crisis from several different perspectives: philosophical, sociological, historical, juridical, political and ethical ones. This is reflected in the title of the project, ‘The Philosophical-Moral Prisms of Crises’—in plural. We base our thinking on the hypothesis that crises always respond to changes of paradigm, and that the humanities, being intrinsically interdisciplinary and transversal, permit us to analyze the crises conceptually, providing a plural diagnosis that is complementary to the scientific-technical ones, in order to design scientific, education and labor policies. Therefore, our team brings together conceptual historians, philologists, historians, sociologists and political scientists coming from different cultural traditions. In our opinion, it is necessary to rehabilitate politics and produce new collective actors, in accordance with concepts such as *isogoria* and *isonomy*, without leaving aside the necessary gender perspectives. This seems to be a suitable contribution to the Horizon 2020, since the rules of the democratic system are in jeopardy.

We pursue a multifaceted approach, the methodology of which examines the more or less hidden axiological backgrounds of every crisis, to show that crises are not a fateful destiny, but instead depend on many different factors and facilitate radical changes. Revising the history of thought in light of this aim can provide us with keys that can help us understand and face more actively and efficiently the issues of the present—because as Koselleck pointed out in his *Critique and Crisis*, concepts can be normative. In this sense, let us remember the empathy that according to Rousseau was an indispensable pillar of a political community, or the Kantian principle of publicity that served to discriminate injustice.

The analysis of the above-mentioned issues requires a good diagnosis, and etymology itself is useful for such a complex inquiry. After all, besides separation and dispute, crisis also means process and even justice in Greek; from *divide* (*krínein*) comes *kritikós*, the one that distinguishes or passes judgment, and from there comes the critique or the aptitude to judge. The assertion of the critical spirit and of the values of the Enlightenment can help us to counterbalance the hegemonic way of thinking, which is riddled with prejudices that prevent independent thinking. To recover the Enlightenment ideal of republican cosmopolitanism could serve to re-direct the dangerous drifts of globalization.

It is here that WORLBRIDGES takes up the torch to develop in detail the ethical-political aspects of globalization, which for a few decades now has ceased to be a concept with a univocal meaning. We have tried to refine the assumptions that operate at its base from the history of philosophy itself, but without ignoring

aporetic aspects of the philosophy of science and philosophy of history. These are aspects that we have tried to accomplish with an adequate gender perspective—which flourishes in some of the works presented here (Griselda Gutiérrez, Irene Gómez, Concha Roldán)—but that also need to be revised in detail in order to unravel the real depth that feminism brings to an adequate treatment of the problem of globalization.

The bridges built by globalization enable the interchanging not only of goods, but also of knowledge, received historical heritage and ethical-political projects that can complement one another. International cooperation can be fruitful only if based on real dialogue, interaction and engagement. In our specific case, this concerns that of Europe, the Euro-Mediterranean and Latin America.

Not only the three editors of this collective volume (Concha Roldán, Daniel Brauer and Johannes Rohbeck), but also many of its authors have been part of both projects. In truth, the results here are also an innovative development of previous results and projects, such as the International Marie Curie Project “Enlightenment and Global History” (ENGLOBE: Marie Curie Initial Training Network: FP7-PEOPLE-2007-1-1-ITN), or the Spanish Project “Philosophy of history and Values in Europe of XXI Century” (FFI2008-04279//FISO). In this context, we would like to devote special mention to remembering Günther Lottes—researcher and professor at Potsdam University, unfortunately deceased in Berlin on 28 January 2015—who co-directed with Iwan D’Aprile ENGLOBE during 2010–2013, and whose dissertations planted the seed of these new projects that united a group of researchers who have since worked as a team for almost a decade.

The cooperation that was initiated mainly between philosophers and historians has been gaining an increasingly interdisciplinary spirit. As such, we wish to thank especially Darina Martykánová for the initial impulse given to the request of these projects and for her invaluable support in organizing them. Scientific cooperation in the humanities—especially in philosophy—is one of the main goals of this international team, as a way to escape from a conceptual solipsism, which also leads to an ethical-political stagnation. Following Leibniz’s motto “*Theoria cum praxi*”, we strive to use multiple theoretical instruments of the humanities to correct their own erroneous applications; in other words, our projects aims to use multiple theoretical tools from the humanistic domains to overcome any misguided practical applications. Therefore, the result of these two projects (besides having been part of several publications—the perfect end) is that they are also becoming future projects, since our objective is none other than a genuine and positive globalization of knowledge, which we claim here, demanding new approaches and disseminating the results at an international level.

In this regard, we are grateful to the project WORLBRIDGES for having favored the approach of our research and the exchange of ideas—and to the project PRISMAS for funding the English-language revision of this volume by Greg Gottlieb, whom we thank for his work and dedication. Last but not least, we are very grateful to the Walter de Gruyter publishing house for its invaluable support in this publication.

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Concha Roldán
Daniel Brauer
Johannes Rohbeck

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1 Global Economy and Politics

Griselda Gutiérrez Castañeda

The Political Subject in Globalization: the Discussion Agency

Abstract: From the defining trends of a globalized world, I expose an analysis of the systemic effects they produce in different spheres of social life, such as the guidelines that structure, in a systemic sense, the insertion of social agents, as well as the way they influence their traditional forms of intervention and participation in the course of social processes and decision-making. The trends of increasing complexity and indeterminacy inherent to globalization produce changes in the economic dynamics of the world market and effects that disrupt the institutional, legal-political frameworks of states. So, when analyzing such transformations, I take on the radicalization of the questions about the possibilities of inclusion or exclusion of the social agents, and the density of the fragmentary effects on the formation of collective identities (and, therewith, of the debate on the opportunities or restrictions of political intervention, organization and mobilization—in other words, the range of probability of their constitution as political subjects). These social and structural transformations update the basis of the theoretical, philosophical and sociological debate on the quality of the agency of social subjects, for which I consider the task of asking whether the dynamics of globalization block the possibilities of intervention of some relevance or, on the contrary, there is scope for resistance and even ways of influencing constructively.

An approach to globalization

Sociological research set out to characterize the organizational structures of modern-contemporary social systems tends to privilege the logic of a growing differentiation that –beyond the segmentary historical forms, or through forms of stratification—has the modality of functional differentiation, in which each subsystem (economic, political, juridical, cultural, scientific, etc.) operates according to specific languages, techniques and values, which are not commensurable, and allows for their autonomous specialty (Luhmann / De Giorggi 1993, pp. 279 – 339). In line with subsystems differentiation, processes of interdependence occur through functional couplings that integrate the social system, which

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reveal a flexible and diffuse dynamic, which in turn leads to the break in the concert of the specific weight of each functional domain with causal, hierarchic or centered standards, giving rise instead to a polycentric tendency.

Following this logic, the increasing processes of complexity and indeterminacy in post-industrial societies are explained, and their effects may be noticed at the level of understanding, disposition, adaptation, organization and practical control by social agents. Danilo Zolo's interpretation in this respect (with which I agree) notes that the plurality of spaces and practices in their differentiation and semantic specialization, while diversifying and increasing the flexibility of social behavior, introduces an increase in the number of intervening variables that deplete the established intellectual resources operability and makes understanding more precarious. Likewise, increasing interdependencies, and the contingent and diffuse nature of interaction between these spaces, obstructs forms of social intervention when predictions are unlikely, since the known intelligibility and control schemes (e.g. causal, linear schemes, etc., or criteria such as centralization, domination/subordination)—effective until very recently as hierarchical structures and defined attributions—lose validity; there is an unfolding of the referents of certainty. Indeed, it is possible to predict why they are considered regularities, tendencies according to causal schemes; or of a similar nature, if this possibility is diluted, then, in a reflexive sense, we speak of indeterminacy.

In light of the so-called 'spheres of social action' (Weber) that were regulated by basic criteria and norms or accepted and routine techniques, according to which defined roles and possible schemes of action were stipulated, in the now characterized 'functional domains', these are replaced by contingent and flexible criteria. With the displacement of shared and institutionalized beliefs, or of positive or negative motivation schemes to encourage or discourage behaviors, their place is occupied by polyvalent value scales that generate difficulties of accommodation and location within these spaces. In turn, the ranges of social mobility are enhanced as a result of the differentiation of experiences that, by blocking routines or opening new options, can generate insecurity, along with destabilizing effects.

The repercussion of these tendencies is that diverse experiences tend to be shaped by the dynamics of functional domains rather than being an expression of the purposes of social agents, for whom the roles they must play are increasingly unstable, and for whom the diversity of functional needs and expectations to be met, the possible options of profusion of services, the lack or abundance of information to be processed, and the urgency to respond are all greater, which generates uncertain choices regarding opportunities or risks, as opposed to "a kind of 'selective overload'" (Zolo 1994, pp. 19–21).

In order to abound in some of these systemic effects on the perception and practices of the social agents, I will approach those macro trends that account for the functioning of the social system in a globalized world, which are relevant for our analysis. Based on the internationalization of exchanges between countries and regions that has been characteristic of market societies, what today prevails in the intensification and complexity of cross-border and transnational interconnections, is a displacement of the space referent, starting from a reconfiguration of the temporal referent (Held 1996, pp. 380–381), which takes on centrality by the impulse of what is justifiably called ‘revolution in communication’. Techno-scientific developments in communication—which reach the level of IT, robotics and ‘mass media’—boost the production and processing of information, the speed and expansion of its distribution and the plasticity in its forms and in the different levels of use, in such a way that when applied to the execution of projects and commercial, scientific and technological exchanges, they practically erase frontiers and permeate all levels of activity: economic, political, technological, military, legal, cultural and environmental areas.

Among the systemic tendencies that globalization entails (such as complexity, indeterminacy, interdependence, mobility), I am interested in highlighting the flexibility of connections and the widespread effect of deregulation. The extensive use of new technologies that impels (by intensifying the financial transactions according to trade flows, the investment and the migration) a great dynamism and complexity to the markets, requires—while it feeds back—conditions of flexibility. As a defining criterion of the current capitalist regime, it displaces traditional forms of production and privileges tertiarization, and with this, the organization of enterprises is decentralized and merchandized. This, in the face of greater competition and uncertainty, diversifies organizational and transactional modalities, so that this criterion has an impact on the regulations established for the sake of greater openness and release of restrictions.

Such transformations have a substantial impact on the labor market (as precarious salary conditions prevail), as well as on stability in work, and the conditions under which it develops; tertiarization powers sectors such as services and *maquilas*, increases forms of outsourcing and a tendency to “*deslaborizar las relaciones de trabajo*” (Yáñez 2004, pp. 85 and 103)—which translates to say that it dilutes or blurs the labor nature of work relations, as informality increases both in the relationship and in the labor spaces.

Flexibility, beyond the extension of the range of investment and profit opportunities, and when coming into tension with the established legal routines, standards and procedures, exerts pressure for a relaxation or open fracture of the same, which in turn leads to the establishment of highly permissive legal reforms (of investment, commercialization and labor) or the imposition of practi-

ces of open illegality. Certainly, common regulatory and procedural forms operate with temporalities that short-circuit the potential and speed of new technologies—but the latter, together with the current modalities of organization and competition as resources of neoliberal economic policies, produce an effect that (oxymoronically) ‘institutionalizes’ deregulation, prioritizing the logic of the market and reducing the policies of intervention and regulation on behalf of the State.

The combination of global trends and neoliberal adjustment policies, by prioritizing the extraction of benefits for global corporations, accentuates inequality in the development of entire countries and regions, as well as high costs in human development, reflected in the increase of unemployment rates, the rising costs of services and an exponential growth of migratory flows.

Mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion in a globalized world

The confluence of the aforementioned factors and their consequences explains why practical and theoretical debates about the effect on the conditions of social agents’ insertion in these scenarios revolve around the notions of ‘expulsion’ and ‘social exclusion’ (Sassen 2015; Saraví 2009). In my opinion, the interpretations given to each of them are not in contradiction. With regards to ‘expulsion’, the problem is analyzed from the logic underlying the organization of functional domains, which is why a homeostatic dynamics that operates in terms of preserving the social system’s own equilibria tends to prevail, which filters and expels the disrupting factors (Zolo 1994). It is a dynamic that would allow us to understand that in the practices of advanced capitalism’s accumulation, its axis is the procurement of stability, investment and extraction of benefits—even when the expulsion by way of ‘collateral effects’ implies intensification of unemployment rates, of extreme poverty and the naturalization of the absence of any link with educational training and the labor market of broad social sectors; as well as the displacement of populations derived from the predation of their lands by the extractive industry, and a trend of mass migration (particularly that which results in statelessness) and openly illegal practices, such as people trafficking.

Likewise, the theory of ‘social exclusion’ seeks to interpret the diversity of these extreme cases of deprivation and marginality of some groups, along with the broad social sectors whose situation is one of ‘unfavorable integration’, as a result of the accumulation of disadvantages, since they seek forms of integration in the labor market despite the deficiencies and obstacles. Its theoretical

performance is of interest because, apart from recording extreme cases of exclusion, it tries to understand the new forms of social configuration based on contemporary forms of inequality, differentiation and polarization (Saraví 2009, p. 24), and allows us to problematize the new forms of integration and social agents.

I consider that these interpretations are key to appreciating the effects of the transformations referred to above. In that sense, it is important to point out that among the criteria that gave support to the integration of the modern western political-social ordinances was inclusion, in terms of freedoms and protection, and codified in the formal character of juridical-political membership. Nevertheless, inclusion was always materialized in terms of opportunities that may be of different types, but, relevantly, in economic opportunities. And it is precisely this that is now diluted or made precarious by prevailing conditions of labor instability, forms of outsourcing, low wages, and as a whole, lack of protection and job insecurity of people as workers. This implies that as a result of the uncertain and reduced opportunities and poor quality, agents fragmentarily face, derived from disappointment and restructuring of expectations, their attempts to insert and adapt to new scenarios. This is intensified by recording those sectors that operate from the informality or open illegality to those who access social fringes in a marginal condition, including the masses of undocumented migrants in a significant proportion.

The subsumption of the political subsystem to the logic of the economy is, among other reasons, what underlies many of the transformations of its attributions and competences; it explains the weak presence, and even the absence of the State in the mediation and interlocution tasks able to set limits to the abuses of the business sector, as well as in its nature as a demand referent.

Historically, the compliance of government tasks by nation-states required the construction of a system of attributions and competences according to legal, authority and control capacity regulations. This implied, in a functional sense, operating in a centralized and binding manner within defined territorial frameworks, the faculty for the distribution of resources, along with the creation and regulation of conditions and opportunities for economic, political and social exchanges aimed at political integration and, of course, conflict management—as well as the sovereign attribution with respect to deciding between peace and war, and determining who should be members of that community and who should not. The link between the State and members of the political order according to the status of citizenship was to determine the levels of responsibility to provide welfare, protection and scope of rights, and the type and enforceability of obligations, their compliance outlining criteria of membership, creating an institutional framework capable of functionally generating stability and continu-

ity, and in a relevant way a civil connection that socially and symbolically would have guided forms of socialization, belonging and the integration of individuals according to roles.

Today, growing interdependencies tend to dilute territorial boundaries and centralized operation, given the proliferation of power and decision-making centers—such as hegemonic states or regions, transnational institutions, and legal and illegal profitable corporations—according to the influence of functional connections that exert global market sectors such as financial, technological and service sectors. This, as a whole, produces an inflation of the states' capacity for resolution and a tendency to outsource their authority and decision-making—in other words, their loss of sovereignty.

As Jacobson points out in his analysis of how the State is taking on new forms by losing primary qualities of its institutional tasks: "... the state remains critical as the mediating mechanism, the *node*, of a variety of international institutions and global processes" (Jacobson 1997, p. x, my italics). This 'node' is one in which corporate interests and transnational political agreements are crossed, and whose mediation takes place under conditions of flexibility and deregulation, which impairs its institutional functioning in and on its borders, such as the loss of control of its borders in relation to migratory flows.

When the State submits to the pressures of agents and global dynamics and gives rise to the systematic disengagement towards its governed ones (since, far from dosing the effects of these tendencies, it contributes to the intensification and cancellation of opportunities), an overload that people face under conditions of lack of protection and uncertainty takes place. The effects of this overload are diverse, not only at the level of generating strategies of survival, but also in the fracture of the citizen-State pact, as the instances of interlocution dilute. Typically, productive work as a structuring of existence has led to the political codification of mobilization, organization and communication initiatives aimed at demanding inclusion and redistribution (Garretón 1997). Instead, there is a growing dispersion of organizational initiatives and the disarticulation of traditional collective actors—in fact, not only a significant reduction in forms of union organization, but also a weakening of the labor movement and a culture of the working class is registered, that at the time could provide some protection against the corporate interests (Castles / Miller 2003, p. 36).

A political reading of the fracture of the pact leads us in two directions. The first is one in which, by operating according to a self-referential dynamics, the party system and the state institution, through prioritizing its self-preservation and restricting its functions to the mere conservation of stability and the complexity of the social system, causes its programs and decisions to be foreign to the social requirements of its governed ones, which in turn accentuates the def-

icits of its representation function. The effect is twofold: from the level of the governed, it is the loss of the civic bond, given the experience that the channels of political communication are inoperative and exhausted—that they are affected and mere observers of the course of political decisions; and from the political subsystem level, the effect is a ‘deinstitutionalization’ (Santiago 2015; Zolo 1994)—i.e., the loss of its political capacity to structure forms of identity and integration of political community.

In the other direction, when the states operate under the pressure of the global economy and the systemic effect of expulsion (in which migratory flows increase), the tendencies of flexibility and deregulation that manifest in a loss of control of the borders lead to the application of ambiguous strategies (in which the economic benefits of these presences are extracted, but the political integration of the immigrants is reluctant; in practice, forms of insertion are given due to the need to offer some services, which can be interpreted as rights for those who do not have membership) that fuel a competitive struggle for access to services between citizens and resident migrants. They also lead to a devaluation of citizenship for the local ones when facing the displacement of the bond between membership and rights, as well as for immigrants whose access to services does not go hand in hand with loyalty to the political institution. In addition to the resignification of the civic link in the form of a utilitarian link, if the State proceeds in this way, in relation to border control as well as to the meaning of migratory policies, it is interpreted by citizens as incapacity in the exercise of its sovereign power, which puts in question its authority and legitimacy (Jacobson 1997, p. 6).

We know that the figure of the pact has been, both symbolically and practically, the guideline for institutionalizing forms of political communication, and that *fictio juris* has had a theoretical and practical performance, which allows us to conceive of the construction of an order as a product of concerted sovereign wills, and which in turn is concomitant with the conception of the active role of its members and the practical forms of organization and participation. For this reason, it is no minor fact, but rather of the greatest transcendence, that the political frameworks of containment tend to weaken and the political referents of interlocution are erased—because it leads to the fact that the policy of the nation-State loses relevance, as well as to the prevailing of a disaffection with politics.

The role of the agency under debate

The consequences that these processes generate are very complex, due to the type of problems, the diversity of reactions and the proliferation of social and political presences marked by fragmentation and disarticulation—multiple presences such as:

- actors that in a more conventional way maintain politics as the axis, more as an expression of survival than for a management or articulation capacity;
- social movements that are by right territorial or ethnic, with different degrees of articulation;
- large sectors involved in generating strategies of survival, whether politically passive or whose conjunctural appearance is disorganized and defensive;
- others that are far from the traditional forms of political integration, and that tend to be guided by symbolic and expressive ways in order to explore and affirm identity in a self-referential way, or to generate solidarity relations and groups by affiliation with subjects of the vital or daily sphere, as well as by ascriptive identity (age, sexual, religious, etc.);
- civil groups such as NGOs and CSOs, with varying degrees of organizational capacity and expertise, according to thematic agendas such as human rights, gender, environmentalism and pacifism (among others), exploring ways of recomposing and reframing intervention and political communication that are not constrained to the interlocution with the political system;
- groups as transnational actors such as anti-globalization movements; and
- extra-institutional presences such as factual powers.

There is no doubt that complexity, increased differentiation and greater mobility contribute to this proliferation of presences. At first glance, this can be read as a symptom of plurality and an expression of new alternatives, but a more in-depth approach is needed, since they are phenomena that go hand in hand with important transformations and the radicality of certain problems that make politics and the State appear as insufficient or impotent to face them, to the point where there is an increase of behaviors of detachment from the traditional forms of socialization and integration that contribute to the dilution of the public sphere.

In terms of the political system, the problem may be a question of governability—but in terms of the governed ones, the problematic acquires greater density because the weakening of binding decisions, the non-adherence to institutional channels, and the transformation/dilution of political communication all have repercussions on the quality of the protective and binding functions

that are the responsibility of institutions, and whose consequences affect the various spheres of social life. Moreover, in a practical sense, justified doubts arise about the relevance of any initiative of participation, since the current tendencies seem to impose a dynamic in which the action, the initiative, the intentionality or the pretensions of control (both practical and political) tend to lack effectiveness or even sense, by neither influencing the agendas (thus translated into political decisions) nor affecting the dynamics of the system.

These doubts, in a reflexive and political sense, reposition: firstly, the theoretical conceptual debates on the role of political agency, on its relation to the structure or social system, on the validity of subjectivist-mentalist traditions of action in its instrumentalist and/or normative modality, or on the functionalist tradition and the weight of the constraint of the structure; secondly (within societies of great complexity and indeterminacy), the unavoidable questions about the nature of the individual and collective agency, as a symptom of what the explanation of its occurrence may be; and finally, to decipher the tenor of new collective actors, as well as the potential of their mobilizations.

In order to continue developing the last two problems, in a non-exhaustive approach, I will address the first one, by contrasting them with some of the theses of Giddens's structuration theory (in which the author tries to reconcile the dimension of the action and the system), and with the systems theory in the version of Luhmann and Zolo, of whose theses I have developed some throughout these pages. But first I must refer to a condensed image of the contemporary reality of which, with their variants, both theories give us an account, and that in Melucci's words could be called "'planetarization' of the system", by which he indicates that the system has already found its limits, and that the intervention of the agents is restricted thereto. Melucci conceives of a planetarization in which there is no longer space (because the system was transformed into a single space), nor is there:

... time beyond the system. We know that the great project of industrial capitalism was oriented towards the future, a project for a society that would come, that of the wealth of nations, of the progress or the kingdom of freedom. We now know—and the dramatic reminders of the possible catastrophe contribute to this—that there is no time beyond the internal time of the system, that there is no longer any society that awaits us beyond that which we are capable or not of building; better still, in which we are already immersed; only one that we can make exist from now, within the tensions of the systemic balance. (Melucci 1996, p. 294)

Indeed, contemporary analyses have transcended the disjunctive as to whether the heuristic key is the 'action' or the 'agency' to account for the processes of socialization of the individual and processes of social change—a disjunctive encod-

ed between subjectivist and objectivist traditions, such as that of a strong individualism and a powerful conception of action, for which the dimension of the context seems to be subsidiary; or those in which the emphasis is placed on the structure or the system that frames the subjects according to positions and roles, displacing the autonomous and rational ‘action’ according to ends, by the ‘agency’ of subjects as carriers (*Träger*) of structures.

Giddens’s theoretical intervention is an example of this. In his structuration theory, the constitution of agents and that of structures are not independent phenomena and “do not form a *dualism* but represent a *duality*” (Giddens 1995, p. 61). He seeks to explain that the structure integrates rules (guidelines and codes of meaning) and resources (of authority and allocation and control) that intervene recursively in the reproduction of social systems, which are not alien to human action and its reflexive record, although this may be limited; the crucial argument is that “Structure should not be assimilated to constraint but is both constrictive and enabling” (Giddens 1995, p. 61).

The core of this argument, in which Marxian echoes are present, is that if action is associated with intentionality, it is an incontrovertible fact that social processes are not an intentional product. This does not prevent them from being the work of practical intervention of men within objective conditions; without ruling out the action in the practical and reflexive sphere of the individual, Giddens makes a theoretical shift towards the term ‘agency’, understood as the capacity to do things, as a matter of power, to produce effects, to abstain or to act otherwise—an interpretation with which he would bet on maintaining the active role of social agents. In the spirit of dismissing pretensions of structural causation that determine social action, while at the same time recording that the resources of the structure generate forms of social reproduction (and thus stabilize relations in an institutionalized form that give rise to a systemic reproduction, as well as to the production and reproduction of a social action), Giddens is interested in highlighting that such properties and structural resources are eventually used and reproduced by agents in the course of their interactions, which may result in “processes of selective ‘filtering information’, whereby strategically located actors seek to reflexively regulate the general conditions of a systemic reproduction, either to maintain things as they are or to change them” (Giddens 1995, p. 64).

In order to reinforce this proposal, he applies the strategy of refuting some approaches of the functionalist tradition, in which he encompasses very diverse perspectives (structuralist, poststructuralist, evolutionist, systemic) with regard to the emphasis he attributes to them in terms of the constraints produced by social structure and which, in his opinion, make subjects appear as non-reflexive constraints, as an undisputed causal force that restricts or cancels options, be-

fore which action is diluted and at the very least gives rise to mere reactions—a strategy that, despite the expanded nature of its analysis, is not without simplifying dyes.

I consider that this position does not necessarily strengthen his interpretative proposal. Certainly, neither do those who support the thesis of the decentralization of the subject (Althusser) omit the reflexive contest of the agents (which does not exempt them from subjection), nor do the adaptive forms by which the agents respond to systemic and structural tendencies that overload them, cancel the reasons and the motifs that agents give themselves to process their ‘options’, with which the role of structural tendencies are in no case equated with natural forces. For Giddens, the form of arguing against those formulations that conceive that systemic reproduction dilutes the place of action (by holding that functional needs only produce functional consequences), is to hold that “[s]tructural constraints do not operate independently of agents’ motifs and reasons to act” (Giddens 1995, p. 211)—an argument that he considers strong enough to restore a place for the agency to be conceived of as a power, such as the capacity and the possibility of producing a disruptive, or a novelty effect.

In general terms, I consider that the systemic perspective would be far from maintaining a dualism between system and agents in their interpretations of the system integration process. This would agree with Giddens that in this globalized world, there is a kind of “rupture between systemic integration and social integration” (Giddens 1995, p. 213), and wouldn’t contest the fact that human action has contributed to the generation of this scenario. These points of convergence present no obstacle for this theory to support the line of argument that it is precisely tendencies of increasing complexity and indetermination (as well as uncalculated evolutionary pressures) that make complex societies operate according to a systemic logic of homeostasis, with the effect that the action appears as something irrelevant to a self-produced reality (Zolo 1994, p. 148–149). Such an interpretation, far from omitting the consideration of how social agents are reflexively and emotionally involved, and with pretensions to influence, instead re-frames the questions: what kind of ‘action’ is at stake; what kind of symptom (or a symptom of what) are these interventions; and, of course, what is the potential of the agency?

At this point it is important to dwell on the mechanism of ‘adaptation’ and the use of the term by Luhmann and Zolo, in contrast to Giddens’s questioning of the application of some of the theories of social change (particularly his debates with Parsons, to whom he attributes an update of the evolutionary theory), criticisms of which revolve around the empty, illusory and narrow use of the concept, which makes it limited to account for changes in the social plane.

Of course there may be cases in which its use lacks precision and explanatory value—but it is certainly its commitment to the potential of agency that gives rise to the categorical tone of his criticisms. It is only plausible if one aspect, or both, of its meaning is extended: if other societies (i. e., the ‘social environment’) are included in the term ‘environment’ and/or if any important social process that seems to increase the chances of maintaining a society in a form that can be considered stable is virtually considered as ‘adaptation’. But once that step has been taken, the concept becomes so vague that it is useless as a means to explain anything (Giddens 1995, p. 262).

From the systemic perspective, although it is emphasized that the functionality of the social system as a self-produced reality operates outside our rational and technical control and our ethical-moral idealizations, this does not mean that the system can dispense with its ‘environment’, which can be internalized as system information. The implications of this operation are double: on the one hand, that it contributes to the stabilization or equilibrium of the system; and on the other hand, that agents, as part of the environment, generate patterns of assimilation and accommodation in the form of learning. So, if one considers the self-referential tendency of the political system and the distortion of the criteria attributed to ‘political action’, such as its reflexive, critical and powerful nature, it is necessary to think about which mechanisms of insertion come into play—especially if we take into account the fact that social agents systematically deal with adverse conditions for the possibility of rational choices, to make meaningful interactions at the level of political communication, and to achieve some relevant influence on the control of procedures, as well as generalized possibilities of forming an informed opinion or developing a reflexive judgment, allowing them to evaluate the problems and options presented.

This is where the explanatory performance of the adaptation mechanism is noticeable, leading to the transformation of frustration into learning, and of disappointments into adaptive behaviors, which (although they reserve a certain place for human agency, as Zolo emphasizes) does not mean that the integration of the agents is not in accordance with functional tendencies that preselect possibilities, limit alternatives and over determine social expectation (in terms of ‘opportunities’)—and with that, the nature of ‘decisions’ is shaped.

Examples abound that may seem extreme, but are far from extraordinary in these times, when precariousness and deregulation lead to the expulsion of migrant masses, and the devaluation of this type of work and the advantages that can be extracted attract them to certain countries or regions. There is no doubt that objective factors and systemic tendencies are put at risk to explain these massive flows, nor is there any doubt with respect to the contest of subjective factors such as the expectation of the ‘opportunities’ represented by the destina-

tion, or by fulfilling the purpose of family unification, including cultural and religious motivations. Therefore, it cannot be argued that agency has a role in this framework (Castles / Miller 2003, p. 9)—but it is not outside the discussion to resolve what kind of ‘decision’ it is.

When the conditions of vulnerability and precariousness in the countries of destination lead immigrant groups to form alternative networks of solidarity, the debate arises as to whether these initiatives are an expression of ‘emerging political subjects’ (Sassen 2003, p.26). This discussion is, of course, inescapable; it cannot be ignored that in an adverse context these networks are aimed at solving material and psycho-social needs, such as preserving identity and forms of belonging, through which in such networks the nature of survival strategies prevails.

Confronted with expressions of this nature, many questions arise. If we start from the fact that politics is a type of strategic action aimed at remedying something more than immediate needs (i. e., that it is guided by more far-reaching objectives such as recognition, inclusion and rights), then we have to ask ourselves: what is the political nature of these expressions; what is their political potential; what is politically possible at these times; or, what are we talking about today, when we talk about politics?

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Alejandro Roberto Alba Meraz

Complex Citizenship and Globalization

Abstract: This chapter reflects upon the importance the notion of citizenship has acquired in the context of globalization. I will defend the idea that the citizen and his or her actions correspond to the political domain; specifically, in a way that confronts the problem of social order. To accomplish my objective, I have divided the chapter into three parts: a) I will define the idea of the citizen inherited from the Enlightenment; b) I will present an idea of complex citizenship and suggest why we should consider it as an alternative; and c) I will offer an interpretation designed to understand political actions from the perspective of complex citizenship.

Introduction

This chapter reflects upon the importance the notion of citizenship has acquired in the context of globalization. I will defend the idea that the citizen and his or her actions correspond to the political domain; specifically, in a way that confronts the problem of social order. This previous statement may seem unnecessary to repeat; however, I will show that it is worthy of close attention. It is a common idea to consider politics, as enacted by government officials, as a remedy to those conflicts that need a negotiated solution. Within the social aspect, many conflicts require negotiated solutions, but not all of them are political, e.g., the conflicts between parents and their descendants, or many bureaucrats' actions concerning issues of their private lives.

Instead, politics consists of actions directed towards bringing closer those who differ in their visions of the world or perspectives that coexist in the aspect defined as public. As Bernard Crick mentions, "politics may be defined as the activity through which divergent interests reconcile within a determined government unit" (2001, p. 22). That said, the origins of politics in societies organized under the Nation States model has restricted them to the domain of the state. In this way, a citizen's actions, whenever they are political, are related to state matters (Clarke 1996).

Certainly, political actions aim to bring together diverging positions with the purpose of generating order. Until the 1980s, the State was in charge of this task. Nevertheless, at the present time order is produced in different bodies other than

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the State. There are various levels of authority under which citizens feel obliged, such as local, regional, national, or supranational authorities. Additionally, there are non-state entities that contribute to generating order, such as non-governmental organisations like the UN, or civil society organizations. As a result, we can say that politics no longer determine the State's figure per se.

Consequently, political actions have been understood in two different ways: firstly, as goal-oriented intentional actions, with specific objectives (In the case of state politics, it would be any action that questions the State.); and secondly, as actions that produce a meaning. Examples of the latter appear in concession manifestations through non-institutional means, made by the society aiming to make visible a topic that does not exist for the State. The two need not be incompatible—we can instead understand them as complementary:

This means that an action cannot be completely understood if the matrix of such is not known. But also, that an action cannot be graded as belonging to a certain category if the intention and meaning associated with it are not acknowledged. In other words, an event cannot be defined as political, social, musical, sportive or any other kind if the social matrix, as well as intentional, into which it fits is not known. (Clarke 1999, p. 99)

The notion of citizenship acts in conjunction with seeking goals and generating significance according to the social order. However, classical interpretations, such as the Illustrated, restricted their horizons for the sake of consolidating the goal-oriented perspective. In contrast, the response to this vision was the meaning-oriented perspective, as evidenced by communitarianism. This chapter will talk about another possibility, which I think is more complete—that of complex citizenship.

Recent literature has again referred to the topic of citizenship because of the recurring crisis of the state-political model—considered from the end of Welfare until the rise of the Workfare. However, there is no consensus, neither between academics nor political analysts, of which may be the main attributes of the concept of citizenship. On one side, the dominant postures understand citizenship as a legal status given as a privilege by the State, to which citizens owe loyalty for the fact that it warrants certain prerogatives within a delimited space made by concrete physical frontiers (Carrasco 2009). Politics in this case are preceded by a relationship with the State (Rawls 2001). On the other side, there are those who consider the idea of legal citizenship as obsolete. They appeal to substantial aspects of identity—culture, language, blood, etc.—with the purpose of giving more importance to the citizen's identity roots. In this case, politics would be based on its relationship with the roots of the community (McIntyre 2007).

Regardless of whether one is in favor of the legal formal posture, or the substantial vision, both sides restrict understanding of citizens' actions. There are

two difficulties of the previous approaches that stand out as limitations. The first is related to the right of assistance given on behalf of the States to illegal migrants groups. The second is the type of social benefit program focused on guest workers in nations such as Germany or Canada, which originated from the need to hire workers from other countries temporarily to satisfy labor demand. Given the impossibility of making migrants or guest workers return to their native countries, there are two suggested main solutions—integration into the State through naturalization processes or Workfare.

Integrated people lose substantial aspects of their original culture, conferring it to the private domain. This represents one of the main complaints from minority defender groups, because they consider that forcing the new members to break away from their language or regional habits (such as dressing or public religious practice) to adopt the hegemonic culture of the host country violates a fundamental aspect of identity that nourishes the citizen.

The second solution comes from new work demands, incarnated by the so-called Workfare. This perspective, with neocommunitarist origins, appeals to a bottom-up process. In this process, citizenship is determined by the culture, particularly the one represented by the spirit of ‘civil society’:

Such approaches convey a new hegemonic conception of governance, an instrument for forging ‘social cohesion’, a distinct ideological and political alternative to the corporative compacts between the social partners (unions and employers) which were still dominant in the Western European countries in the 1980s. (Schierup, Hansen, & Castles 2006, p. 58).

The problem with the way of understanding citizenship has to do, then, with knowing which actions count as political. The protests made by legal or illegal foreigners are not considered political. Our reflection up to this point tries to show the difficulties that entail the conceptions of state citizenship—but also, to expose the problems generated in globalized societies.

Now, to accomplish our objective I have divided the chapter into three parts: a) I will define the inherited idea of the citizen from the Enlightenment; b) I will present an idea of complex citizenship and why we should consider it as an alternative; and c) I will offer an interpretation to understand political actions through the complex citizenship’s perspective.

Citizenship and its enlightenment heritage

The idea of citizenship is, according to Pierre Rosanvallon (1999), one of the greatest achievements of Enlightenment modernity, something unparalleled

that did not exist at any other previous time. Rosanvallon's concept of citizenship is more focused on the importance of human action in politics than on other kind of extra-human or divine forces. This fact allowed people to transfer human action to an autonomous domain never before reached. Certainly, in the political thought of classical Greece and Rome, there were citizenship ideals, but they were circumscribed to the polis, beyond the borders of which people did not have any legal rights. Besides, prerogatives were limited to a reduced group—free men.

Dante (2006) and Machiavelli (1985) exemplify two different ways to understand citizenship and political action. Both showed the need to extend the political conception, by separating the agendas of power and secularizing it. They also stated the possibility of projecting a *dual* Roman citizenship, which could be passive (a person with rights) or active (a person who could exercise rights). Dante discerned citizenship as the joy of exercising the political action, whereas Machiavelli discerned it only as the response of the subject towards the governor.

When Enlightenment arrived, Hobbes' citizenship idea—stating that the mere ownership of rights did not translate into an effective exercise—had matured. Therefore, only those who fulfilled residency and administrative requirements, and who exercised autonomy, could become citizens. Women, for example, could not do it (Roldan 2008; Westheimer 2008). Consequently, the scaffolding of State was required (Skinner 1999).

The requirements to determine what it takes to make politics, how a political community is formed, and how can one participate in it were elaborated during the Enlightenment. During this period, politics became independent from social domains, producing contradictory consequences. On the one hand, political actions were redefined as different from moral or economical because they are related to the State. On the other hand, there is the aspect of the fragmentation of subjectivity because when clarifying who are citizens, a part of humanity is discriminated against. This concept of citizenship is of “[...] a bounded population, with a specific set of rights and duties, excluding ‘others’ on the grounds of nationality” (Soysal 1994: p. 2).

Once established that the State is the only reference to politics, it was defined at the same time what was important and what counted in the public domain (Clarke 1996). In this way, during the Enlightenment a subjectivation mode emerged, which fractured the man, privileging a universal way of being (Pérez-Luño 1989, p. 27). The transformation-subject, or the individual's conversion into an intelligible subject before a political regime, generated the suppression of the action's enjoyment, as Dante would think. The citizen's condition as a holder of political participation rights led to exclude important social groups by definition: women, children, indigenous people and foreigners.

Citizenship as an abstract unit, ideal for a procedural republic (as defined by Michael Sandel), reduced a part of the contingency of the conflicts produced by cultural identity features. But, legal identity increased the complexity in many other ways (Follesdal 2014).

I will now focus on the *cognitive capacity* of the Enlightenment ideal (Pettit 1990). This is the citizen's capacity to generate actions according to specific aims. The fact that we may choose and know the consequences of that choice, as well as the corresponding responsibility when acting, is a consideration of principle. This particular attribute of subjectivity emphasizes the following four points:

1. the citizen has a pattern to recognize the actions orientated to decision-making (so that the deliberative function becomes a virtue and damage prevention measure simultaneously);
2. the citizen's cognitive capacity can generate a codification register that optimizes the information that reaches the electoral subsystem;
3. such a capacity results in accordance with a temporality and speciality of the political process (Palti 2007); and
4. rationality from the political information channels allow the elimination of excessive information that may destabilize the system.

The cognitive capacity of the citizen expresses the impartiality principle necessary to making a political election (Allard-Tremblay 2012). Thus, any decision made shall be fair, as it will go through a depuration system of conversion from private interest into public opinion. Consequently, the citizen becomes a reflective agent, capable of 'mediating interests and making decisions' (Melucci 2002, p. 168). Judgment capacity, derived from the cognitive component, is appreciated because it produces choices, deliberation and decision while it reactivates options to link to the system—despite its lack of spontaneity (Pettit 1990). The epistemic capacity consists of:

[...] favoring the open circulation of relevant information, allowing intersubjective interests to participate, even with censorship bias. As it is known, they open the alternative option field that could not be considered under the system's formal restrictions and mainly, allows the alternatives that may have negative consequences to be exposed and submitted to test. (Alba-Meraz 2016)

The citizen's cognitive capacity is a type of cognition placed to elucidate practical objectives; it is a virtue (Pettit 1990). Now I will move on to the perspective of complex citizenship.

Complex citizenship

In the Enlightenment conception, the definition of citizenship was more or less clear. It was restricted to the legal-political, so its debates were related to privilege concession—the acquisition of freedoms. However, this view omits the complaints of those who submit that there are other actions, which do not pass through the State and still, have a political value (Cfr. Franco de Sá 2017, pp. 28–29). As such, political concepts face challenges in the globalization context. Globalization is understood as “the processes of widening and deepening relations and institutions across space. Increasingly, our actions and practices systematically and mutually affect others across territorial borders.” (Sterri 2014, p.71). Regarding the relationship between citizenship and global (mainly economic) forces, it expresses a dispute between real forces for the hegemony of meaning (Zolo 2007) between the variables: a) a market’s competitive and selective logic; b) corporate logic generated by the political-state structure; and c) the logic of identity cultural processes. In view of this tension, the dynamics of the meaning of the political concepts seem to be facing a fragmentation.

In summary, the ground-breaking condition of globalized complex societies raises contradictions between citizenship conceptions generated from the legal, economic and political orders. A pertinent definition of citizenship needs to confront the tensions between the competitive logic of the global market, the configuration of an identity sense and loyalty towards politics, and the need to construct a plural us. In the words of Zolo (2007), the citizenship concept has, within the individual and the collective, the axis of complexity.

With the new globalized scenarios, politics only develops instrumental solutions that answer to the market’s logic. For example, negotiated solutions based on the private with universalization pretensions contrast with what is the proper feature of politics—the creation of a human order or an approach of them towards common interest (Arendt 2005). The current vision of politics is unable to generate future possibilities within the contingency context to which societies are exposed because of globalization (Inneraty 2012; Franco de Sá 2007). As such, it lacks the possibility of establishing a thrust of social coordination (Huysman 2006: p.10; cfr. Bell & Shaw, 1994). Consequently, the question is whether it is possible to motivate citizens with political commitment.

When politics was considered the central articulator of social life, the citizen’s integration commitments were linked to one single authority. Now that the borders are thin and politics is decentralized, loyalties are weak. This state of affairs has produced the appearance of a phenomenon called ‘flexible citizenships’ (Ong 1999). In the Asian continent, the Chinese are a noticeable example

of this phenomenon. As it has been documented, a significant number of (middle and upper class) Chinese people have more than one nationality and possess multiple passports accordingly. Such documents become the instruments of their flexibility. With them, Chinese people can change their residence, nation, and commitments according to the country's circumstances. The reasons for seeking new nationalities are mainly economic and political, but there can be others (referred to in Ong 1999). Interestingly, even in cases when Chinese people seek new nationalities, they maintain a sense of cultural belonging that transfers to their businesses or communities outside of China, making the 'Chinese' concept a truly transnational currency—a local-global product. Another case of flexibility is that of 'guest workers' who, through extraterritorial working programmes, incorporate themselves into public life in other nations. These workers are not formal citizens, but generate public structures that recognize them through social, economic, and legal benefits.

From this cultural deepening of human rights, guest nations have limited capacities to make those workers return to their countries of origin or to suspend their benefits (Soysal 1994, pp. 6–7). Flexibility, then, has become another way of producing subjectivity. It is the result of "the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel and displacement that induce the subject to respond fluidly and opportunistically to change political-economic conditions." (Ong 1999, p. 6) Thus, subjectivation processes (mechanisms expressed through a globalizing logic that provide intelligibility to the individual) introduce the capital mobility pattern to practices that give meaning to things; particularly, the ones related to loyalty, political commitment and obligation towards the authority (Savransky 2011).

The flexible citizen facing structural conditions is supposed to have a clear understanding of his or her interests. This allows establishing strategically planned objectives and having support for the advantages offered by the context, thus conditioning the citizen to express obligations and loyalty to whoever ensures his or her particular interests. However, this presents a contradiction, because it assumes that the aims and advantages that give sense to this identity are stable and do not require others' mediation (Wisniewsky 2008).

Asian experience is an example of how interaction ranges (between local and transnational matters) give unfair privileges, because a guest worker and a transnational investor do not have the same advantages. This makes public authority sources precarious (Massey 2008, 52). Regarding this, Ong says that the citizen's "very flexibility in geographical and social positioning is itself an effect of novel articulations between the regimes of the family, the state, and capital, the kinds of practical-technical adjustments that have implications for our understanding of the late modern subject." (1999, p. 3)

Defenders of globalization respond to critics posing a fallacy. They admit as a premise that the market does not have as an objective the destruction of politics. The market has as purpose to make available to people a wide variety of options, and those options are subjected to people's choice. Then, not admitting the diversification of the authority sources becomes a bottleneck that uniforms motivation and therefore impoverishes the decision's scheme. In this way, only the market could favor the plurality that enriches politics. The citizen "[...] embodies the split between state-imposed identity and personal identity caused by political upheavals, migration, and changing global markets." (Ong 1999, p. 2)

The promoters of flexibility omit the historical and material conditions of structural context. They assume that they can manipulate citizenship according to their interests and omit that such abstraction produces simultaneously a variety of forms of exclusion, hidden in the constitution processes of identity (Savransky 2011). Globalization theorists point out that flexibility improves the notion of citizenship by endowing it with particular features. However, flexibility also produces fragmentation—it makes identity precarious. While flexibility certainly multiplies differences, it does not find a way to generate an axis that articulates those differences for the sake of public affairs. Putting it simply, flexible citizenship makes the citizens of poor countries pay for rich citizens' advantages facing a 'differentiated world economy' (Zolo 2007, p. 49).

In response to the flexible postures, I suggest the perspective of complexity. I subscribe to Zolo's definition of complexity as:

[...] the cognitive situation in which agents, whether they are individual or social groups, find themselves. The relations which agents construct and project on their environment in their attempts at self-orientation—i. e. at arrangement, prediction, planning, manipulation—will be more or less complex according to circumstance. (Zolo 1992, p. 2)

Citizenship as a complex phenomenon admits the presence of a deep global logic in identity processes—besides the meanings generated by transnational and imaginative political practices. Under this approach, politics are not derived from subordination to the State. It is an affair of strategic 'practices' that consist of:

[...] the exercise and mobilization of social demands through a certain performance. Then, these can act *intramarco* and in consequence, reproduce parameters by which the recognition, distribution and, of course, cultural identity are defined. But it can also be *extramarco*. Hence, to (per)form in confrontation with recognition's own terms, giving rise to even more radical social and identity transformations and, opening space for intercultural identification and the debate about citizenship terms. (Savransky, 2011: p.120)

The functionality of complexity is to show the areas of uncertainty generated by the accumulation of information (security, property, prestige, money, power, time, information, etc.) that nourishes identity, without leaving aside the ‘prescriptive structure of possibilities preselection’ (Zolo 1992, p. 39). This mechanism of selective regulation of social conflicts and value distribution makes it possible to “operate on the basis of stable behaviour expectations, according to collective rules” (Zolo 1992, p. 40). The aforementioned focuses on the objective of political actions—the expectations of the creation of paths to make men closer in conflict contexts—rather than on administrative criteria of immediate security. I will now offer an analysis from the perspective of complex citizenship.


The Enlightenment notion of citizenship, seen as a legal status, is insufficient to address the three variables mentioned in the previous section: market, state and pertinence. This being the case, neither individuals nor collectives can act in isolation, without the support of structures and variables. In this sense, as I have claimed, citizen identity can be explained as the result of agent’s practices, and within them, the subjects and structures that are integrated into a relational, reflexive and strategic context. It does not seem excessive to emphasize that the constitution of the citizen’s identity is not governed only by the broadening of the conventional political frame. It must include the acquisition of new freedoms, because, refining the political subsystem does not transform by itself the nature of our debate. This is why Nancy Fraser has started to reinterpret politics from a three-dimensional perspective.

Under our perspective of complexity, the subjectivation process occurs through the practices in which the subject is. This implies that relevance should be given to the “‘subjective’ adherence to an order’ (Savransky 2011, p. 118). Individualization—the attribution of a sense to the subject through social action—is double-edged: if people exist within an organized world, then all aims come from interaction. There is clearly a presence of social control in this interaction, which increases according to the different levels of ‘socializing’ pressure. This social control is then transferred to the motivational and cognitive structures of individuals (Melucci 2002, p. 171). It is important to consider the asymmetries that subjects and collectives face when interacting with different authority systems.

Let us return to the essential component of politics. Such activity has to do with the conciliation forms of divergent interests within a government unity orientated towards the common good. I will now describe the ways in which this goal is pretended to be reached.


The case I propose is far from antagonistic postures that we shall name ‘top-bottom’ or of the ‘bottom-top’ through which citizenship is presented, or rather as the result of a decision orientated from the elites for the sake of a predeter-

mined general conception beyond social practices. When citizenship is conceived as a process directed by social movements—from bottom to top—it encourages changes directed by homogenizing social forces:




Top-Bottom Citizenship Scheme or order constitution starting from the idea

Here citizenship is the result of the ideal construction of an order produced from the decisions of elites. Social performers are interrelated with power in a permanent way, within a wider social system that demands interaction as a unit beyond their internal divisions and generates an orientation towards the inferior layers. Here the authority is in charge by decree. We can find an example in the conversion process from subjects to citizens, as in the Spanish colonies, during the enactment of the Constitution of Cadiz in 1812.



Bottom-Top Citizenship Scheme (or Rousseau's 'General will')


This scheme could be adjusted to the imagination of social revolutions, where an apparently stable organization system is transformed by the complainants' demands, in order to secure advantages in a context run by weak rules, maintained by a general state of injustice. Examples in Latin America are within the Mexican constitutions of Apatzingán in 1814 or the Constitution of 1857.



Citizenship of Particularist Interest Scheme

(in which the conditions are formed by violent or defensive, damage or protection reasons)

In this scheme, citizenship is in permanent reprocessing and unable to be established, due to its lack of unity regarding its objectives. In this scheme, the political value of citizenship is usually mistaken for consumable goods of other dimensions— economic, legal or cultural. Former Yugoslavia can be considered a particular case within this scheme, in which the fragmentation of identities cannot generate an orientation to form a unity due to the competence of powers.



E, I, T, R and L are examples of social demands.

Complex Relational Citizenship Scheme

In this scheme, the concept of subject lacks a strong denomination for identity constitution. The conflicts are produced by a formal framing of institutions, one of which is the political structure. Within this political structure, displacements can be made because there are different relevant aspects to consider—personal, local, regional or global interests. Additionally, a citizen's circumstances are temporally and spatially defined, and his or her knowledge of context and possibilities are conceivable, but not completely unknown. The demands of a particular citizen match the objectives of other individuals. In this scheme, the parties are involved in the constitution of different identities that have differentiated performances. The concept of citizenship is the result of the interaction between the chain of social demands, the social structure and the elites' perspective. This interaction develops a structure, which promotes a demand that can be more or less integrating. In this moment, the demands could be the supplies for social structures. These resources are integrated to an imaginary, but the structure is invaded by the limits of elites. Here there are two moments:

1. In the first moment, the structure of demands is constituted. This structure links events that are usually antagonistic—for instance, 'who faces whom' or 'who is who'—establishing with it an identifiable polemic, in which the formation of identities is necessary (Laclau & Mouffe 1985).
2. Once these links are established, the identity is then transferred to the contexts that created it. This kind of identity can be further broken down into two moments: a) a definition of citizenship is constituted that usually seems to be unitary (for example, it can be called liberal citizenship, equalitarian citizenship, etc.); and b) the definition then loses its content—freedom, equality or inclusion—and becomes a floating concept.

I appeal to the idea of Laclau. The different contexts change the use of concepts making them more restrictive. For example, during the nineteenth century in Mexico, the notion of a liberal citizen (driven by the Cadiz Cortes after Ferdinand VII's abdication) was interpreted in a negative way by the Mexican indigenous people. They considered such status harmful for the autochthonous communities and thought that the implications only benefitted those who adjusted to an individualistic ideal. The more European you were, the closer you were to citizenship. This triggered the quest for shelter in domestic networks, in order to be supported by a collectivist citizenship, even though they did not fulfil the requirements to be called a citizen.

What can we extract from this scheme? It can be inferred that concrete historical events dispute for the configuration of an identity, not necessarily linked to a specific context or claim. The identity of a demand can come together from another event or series of events, which allows the founding of a concept.

This scheme is an analytical exercise that shows how certain practices aim to reclaim the identity of citizenship, facing exclusion. It can be modelled from different demand platforms. The requests for inclusion can be highly diverse. Some concepts expressed from the interior of the demands chain can be employment, political recognition, migration conflicts, economical inclusion, etc. One of these demands may be presented like the flag of a social identity that gets to reunify different interests or to make them coexist. This positioning puts a ‘mark’ upon diversity—it ‘enriches the chain’s content’, because it generates a dialectic effect in which apparently the chain is fulfilled; obtaining more thickness, it acquires a politically relevant sense.

In this way, the social conflict expressed in the struggles for citizenship acquires a fundamentally political aspect, in which it is determined how power is distributed according to the possible coalitions that can be formed by agents that pursue their demands. The idea of political power is a relational notion. Everything refers to the obtaining of resources in a wide sense to reduce risks. However, power is not absolute, but relative. The use of power requires the possibility to evaluate whether it is more appropriate to perform cost-benefit calculations, or to construct symbolic resources in order to form the identity.

I find this scheme to be the most adequate way to understand the effect of power constituting a coalition. The idea is that the elites’ threats do not determine the chain of demands. However, they introduce an element in this chain, which is the spectre of ‘the who’. That is, both demands and limits imposed by elites become supplies for social structures. In this perspective, those elements conform the social imaginary whose elements orientate the concept of citizenship.

My scheme shows that the structure of demands emerges from complex practices that constitute and organize social relationships. Within these demands, the concepts are regulated by a principle that does not remain just in aggregation. In this sense, citizenship is an ‘overdetermined’ identity—i.e., it contains a process that cannot become universal, because in a certain sense, it is formed by fragments. For the same reason, identity cannot become essence.

Finally, following this consideration, it can be accepted that there is nothing pre-determined in the social aspect: there is no meaning; ‘the’ citizen does not exist. There are citizenships—or, following Savransky, there are ‘forms of subjectivity and political investiture’ (2011, p. 120) susceptible to revision and critical reformulation.

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María G. Navarro



A Defense of Cooperative Cognition

Abstract: This article explores the extent to which our deliberative culture determines our capacity to recognize relevant knowledge, to select and value epistemic authority, or to recognize the importance of individual and/or collective epistemic achievements in a deliberative context. This investigation is especially relevant in a moment in which the formation of public opinion no longer depends exclusively on political parties. This leads to a paradoxical situation in which the diffuse energy issued by the electorate is not easily subjected to the discipline of party-oriented proposals or by media disputes that, despite their projection, may be ignored by many people. Thus, it is unclear in which sense social networks act as an alternative to the traditional system of intermediation set up by trade unions and pressure groups. By combining the approaches of deliberative democracy and social cognition theories, this essay sustains the relevance of what is defined here as ‘cooperative cognition’ in order to face this challenge.

Introduction

The thematic field of politics (or, at least, its perception) has grown considerably in recent years, and this trend is not expected to decline. This socio-political phenomenon poses a challenge to public institutions at different levels of government (i.e. local, national and supranational or global). In the public space, perception vis-a-vis institutions’ legitimacy depends on the value deriving from their effective capacity for mediation (Innerarity 2006). When the thematic field of politics is enlarged and, at the same time, vehiculated in an accelerated manner, the following phenomena occur: (i) difficulty in channelling not only all the information but, above all, the demand for it; (ii) difficulty in determining who are the agents responsible for taking decisions; and (iii) increasing complexity in actual levels of government and, consequently, of decision-taking. To these, we may add another, no less important phenomenon: namely, greater opportunity and motivation to participate in public life. There is a causal explanation for this increase experienced by numerous collectives, both in opportunity and motivation to participate, which can be found in the theoretical framework of the

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research conducted by Putnam (1993) on civic traditions in modern Italy. The concept of 'social capital' is generally accepted as an explanatory factor of the potential for development in a society and in a nation. Furthermore, society perceives the experience of participation as an instrument for orienting the benefits (symbolic or otherwise) deriving from the existence and operation of networks, bonds of confidence, and underlying social norms.

Despite the absence of a theory on risk of participation, the theoretical framework referred to above allows us to establish that the feasibility of a participative experience goes—necessarily—hand in hand with a situation of inequality: inequality of access to information, and inequality in the sharing of capabilities for processing not only such information, but also the diagnoses that stem from it; inequality in the personal, collective and group resources acquired during the associative and participative action itself; inequality that, essentially, likewise affects representability in political themes, as well as the theoretical articulation of demands and even the social profile of the groups expressing diagnoses and demands. Unequal representation derives from the fact that, in every participatory experience, people and groups appoint themselves as agents for collective actions. Because of this, the social function that can rightfully be attributed to participation (understood as an instrument for increasing the social capital of collectives) ultimately causes friction with the principle of representativeness. Even in cases where this can be understood as an expression of the collective need to increase the social capital, mere participation fails to guarantee public representativeness of political diagnoses or their frameworks.

'Frame alignment' is an example of a means to detect the existence of participative bias and to demonstrate the difficulty involved in identifying and building authoritative voices in the public space. Some political scientists (Snow et al. 1986) use the expression 'frame alignment' to refer to the socio-political phenomenon by means of which social movements develop a series of complex mechanisms that allow a progressive number of followers to adopt the aims of an organized collective or, in more general terms, of an organisation. Frame alignment exemplifies how, as they unfold within a society, participation processes give rise to hybrid new forms of participation, to solve legitimacy problems that derive from the challenge of representativeness. Today, professionals, groups and sectors from a broad range of society types form part of a frame alignment phenomenon whose immediate political action is herein linked to the enlargement of the thematic field of politics. This transnational political phenomenon draws our attention to the need to analyse and propose cooperative rationality models to solve the normative and practical problems of modern societies. In my defence of a cooperative cognition model and its rationality, I will focus on the following questions: (1) what kind of leadership is compatible with

the mentioned proposal; (2) what does social cognition means and why does it matter; and (3) in what sense is deliberation a specific kind of cooperative cognition?

Types of leadership

Analysts of deliberative behavior, aiming to measure and automate deliberative communication in order to programme and design platforms adapted to these communicative ends, usually establish three levels in defining deliberation. The first is the macro-level, in which deliberation is linked to deliberative democracy, a type of democracy in which collective decision-making is based to a large extent on a consensus-oriented discourse and on argumentative discourse rather than on the rule of majority. At the second or meso-level, we find specific types of deliberative forum (e.g. public addresses, round tables, citizens' conferences or consensus conferences). Deliberative forums of this nature are created to make a decision on the adoption of a collective norm or the resolution of a local conflict. The third or micro-level describes a form of political communication that, for instance, is opposed to the various modes of rhetoric and strategic communication, and is present at parliamentary forums, political speeches and, to some extent, at certain moments during political negotiation processes. These three levels can be distinguished thanks to the assumption of (i) regulatory attributes of the institutional environment, (ii) interpersonal communications and (iii) the presence of individual deliberative behavior.

Deliberation is not only a form of political communication, but also the expression of a regulated form of communication on issues of public interest, implying a form of epistemic organization of the spaces for intermediation between civil society and the governmental structures generally identified with the State. If deliberative democracy can be understood as a specific model of democracy, then we must consider that certain initial epistemic assumptions exert an influence on the environment of deliberation. What are these presuppositions and what are the grounds for their legitimacy? Why is deliberative democracy a form of epistemic organization of socio-political environments? Deliberation is a political communication model open to analysis from an epistemic point of view because it is a space for the organization of subjects of knowledge, in which to examine truly epistemic aspects (e.g. epistemic virtues pertaining to the environment, epistemic values that strengthen and regulate this communicative practice, or epistemic and heuristic biases that, in certain spheres, may weaken the epistemic values and virtues of deliberation).

An image that conveys this position is found in the distinction commonly made in political science between three types of leadership: foundational leadership, moral leadership and creative leadership (Barber 1984, 1988). This image may seem somewhat paradoxical—after all, the capacity for leadership is usually attributed firstly to individuals, and, on counted occasions, to groups and human collectives.

The deliberative model exerts creative leadership in that it applies the principle of encouraging and reinforcing the will, the skills and the deliberative behavior of citizens in order to prevent them from seeing themselves as mere spectators of the capabilities displayed by those in governing roles. Creative leadership in the deliberative democracy model is embodied by the set of epistemic rules, principles and values used to design the political game in which the players are engaged. To a certain extent, we can say that leadership, in this scenario, is not only creative but foundational, too. Nevertheless, it can also be stated that it is creative, strictly speaking, given that it fixes its quasi-therapeutic attention on the citizenry, enhancing the latter's civic commitment to the task of examining proposals, weighing the epistemic authority of proposers, opponents and proposals, and, finally, pondering the decisions to be taken.

In contrast to the foundational and creative leadership associated herein with the deliberative democracy model, moral leadership describes the skills of those advocating a specific awareness of the responsibility taken over any issue, but (seemingly) without becoming involved in the mobilizations and claims of a given proposal. Generally speaking, the people or collectives exercising this type of leadership inspire and encourage mobilizations by imbuing citizens' social and political perception with a moralizing endeavor. Just as deliberative democracy is a vehicle for creative leadership, so is radical democracy for moral leadership. For instance, in the proposal put forward by Chantal Mouffe (1993), both the idea of rational consensus and the idea that there is a substantive good on which to found a community display traits of moral leadership. According to this model, the antagonistic character of the political is irreconcilable with the idea that pre-constitutive individual identities and collective identities may exist.

In accordance with Mouffe's model of radical democracy, the identification and presentation of preferences is exogenous, or stemming from origins that are external to deliberative practice. This is not the case in the deliberative model, which is grounded, precisely, in a process—namely deliberation, oriented toward the identification and readjustment of preferences in an endogenous manner, which means that adjustments and/or readjustments originate in the interior of the deliberative process. Mouffe uses the dyad 'friend/foe' (Schmitt 1932) to evoke the impossibility of eliminating the antagonism between 'we' and 'they'

in construction processes of political identity. In fact, her proposal implies that ‘affective dimensions’ act as a detonator for collective political identities. Individual, group and/or collective identification alike are constituted through the intervention of certain ‘political rivalry emotions’ stemming from a (radical) sense of belonging to antagonistic social and economic classes. One weakness that can be observed in Mouffe’s approach is that it does not consider the possible impact of the dynamism of beliefs, or the processes by which preferences are adjusted and calibrated, on her model of radical democracy. Her model provides information regarding the causal relationship existing between the discovery of an agonic identity (e. g. that of each among one’s own and opposed to that of the others) and its mobilizing effect. Hers is a model that does not accommodate spaces for the formation of preferences, but rather spaces for confrontation understood as vehicles of polarization and politicization, driven by the perception that the dominant group, i. e. the elites, is identified with non-convergent antagonistic preferences.

Democracy is told in many ways, and although the radical or radicalized representative democracy model can be seen—as I propose herein—as a paradigmatic example of moral leadership, it nevertheless presents a clear deficit in creative leadership. We may indeed ask, for instance, to what extent this model of radical democracy encourages a political culture favorable to the emergence of ‘vigilant societies’, an expression that describes the civil society of democracies such as those of Denmark or Norway, in which people display a higher degree of intolerance toward political practices that deviate from their function. Nevertheless, one of Mouffe’s many merits is that she allows us to establish a relationship between the antagonism with which each citizen experiences their individual and collective (political) identity, and their predisposition for protest, denouncement and social vigilance. Experiencing this antagonistic effect is dependent on individuals’ opportunity to identify the traits of their social and political identity when participating in collective vindication processes.

Opportunities and challenges in a deliberative democracy

Bearing in mind the many variables in the crisis currently affecting democratic institutions, it would seem only fair to recognize the value of moral leadership in this definition of democracy. However, moral leadership is not enough to build a political culture tied to a deliberative democracy model. This model does not share the deliberative notion of the shaping function of personal and

institutional identity exercised by political culture. Such a scenario, in which radical and deliberative democracy are counterposed—subject to nuances, no doubt—may serve to lead us to the epistemic dimensions of a deliberative model of democracy.

Some of the factors involved in the epistemic dimension of deliberation are not only *factors* but also *the materials* necessary to secure the epistemic organization of democracy. According to the cognitivist thesis shared by most theorists, deliberation causes (1) problems in the statutes of individual preferences and opinions, (2) rationalizes preferences and (3) filters them. “Every successful deliberation impacts on individual opinions and preferences, significantly transforming them or providing an incentive for their deeper justification, and this epistemic character contributes to the very legitimacy of democracy”.

Research on the epistemic dimension of democracy may be regarded as an extension of traditional epistemology. Generally, it can be stated that the objects of such research are the doxastic decision processes in the case of institutional agents, processes and environments. Furthermore, it is initially assumed that, as pointed out by Broncano, the *demos* becomes something greater than a ‘mass’ when it recognizes itself as a ‘distribution’ of voices and capacities, and consequently, when it establishes a principle according to which citizens—on the strength of their citizenship—acknowledge each other’s authority (Broncano 2003, 2008). Citizens’ epistemic capacities are apportioned, but these capacities cannot be assessed independently of the environments produced by the (fallible) design of educational, political, economic or other institutions. It is therefore in social epistemology that we find the best arguments to understand the relationship between epistemology and democracy.

The existence of epistemic capacities, and of institutional environments associated with their configuration and confirmation, implies that these capacities present a public dimension when deployed in deliberative processes. The capacities to (1) formulate questions genuinely aimed toward safeguarding or representing public interests, to (2) make proper use of cultural resources, or to (3) make use of cognitive skills in order to articulate and defend claims in a persuasive manner, are samples of the many aspects open to research from the point of view of social epistemology.

How should we define intersubjective correction criteria that are not based solely on the (proper) use of argumentative ways of thinking? How should we distinguish beliefs from personal preferences when engaged in deliberation? Are the phases in deliberation effective to ensure the correct adjustment for beliefs? Does deliberation suffice to detect logical errors and to make use of intellectual virtues? In light of these and other questions, many authors query whether this model does not impose heavy restrictions and demands, as it involves

assuming as valid that its citizens possess sophisticated cognitive capabilities and are endowed with the necessary skills and criteria to make advantageous use of them. It would be interesting to verify whether this is the case, by assuming at the outset a certain epistemic paternalism with an analytical perspective. However, it is also reasonable to state that deliberative inequity is related not to the absence of a capability, but rather to the manner in which it is distributed—that is, with the institutional design that should guarantee the equilibrium between, on the one hand, the relational dimension (i. e. the social and democratic dimension of deliberation) and the logical and dialectic dimension associated with the consistent use of practical reasoning and argumentative lines of thinking. Furthermore, deliberative inequity is also related to the ignorance of reason shown in accessing the truth in beliefs; for instance, when giving justification for beliefs exclusively on the grounds of the reasons for holding that something is true, or to display sufficient skills as argumentative agents when making use of practical reasoning.

Deliberative and epistemic inequities

One of the greatest difficulties consists in failing to detect deliberative inequities promoted by institutional designs that inhibit the capacity to recognize the epistemic merits of proponents and opponents in a deliberation. Murguía Loes (2014, 2016) recalls, for example, the thesis of Smith and Semin (2007), according to which human cognitive systems produce situated versions of concepts, because said versions have specific functions within each context. If this is the case, then to what extent will the influence of our deliberative culture determine our capacity to recognize the relevant knowledge in a deliberative context, to select and value epistemic authority, or to recognize the importance of individual and/or collective epistemic achievements?

Bearing in mind the analyses performed by certain political scientists (Fricke 2007; Byung-Chul Han 2014; Subirats / Vallespín 2014; Ausín 2014), we can affirm that the crisis areas our political culture is crossing are related to eminently epistemic spaces, functions and dimensions of democracy. It is fundamental that we acknowledge this fact, if we accept the theoretical position in which the recognition of epistemic merits and achievements occurs in a situated manner—for example, within specific deliberative environments threatened by crises of all kinds. We can distinguish at least three major crisis areas: (A) the area comprising mediation mechanisms; (B) the communications area; and (C) the area of representation. These affect the following:

- A) a crisis in the mechanisms for mediation between society and politics, which can be appreciated in the representation crises of political parties (which appear to represent themselves);
- B) a crisis in the sphere of traditional communication that does not monopolize the traditional communication channels, but is shared by the new virtual community in the new debating scenarios (e. g. blogs, social networks); and
- C) the difficulty to articulate a party model that satisfies the functions all parties need to fulfill (i. e. relative aperture and closure to gain identity, and to act as a stable, predictable political agent forming an institutional identity).

Social cognition

The term ‘social cognition’ is used in human and social sciences to refer to theories, categories and principles that explain and interpret issues relating to human beings’ knowledge of the social world. It also refers to a complex of epistemic and neuropsychological processes that are deployed by human beings in the acquisition, processing and institutionalization of knowledge and information in social contexts. While we generally use ‘cognition’ to refer to learning and processing information in an individual and autonomous manner, the social perspective of cognition is based on the assumption that the nature and evolution of the processes of reasoning, memorizing, perception, learning, judgment, etc. are configured collectively, i. e. through personal interaction, and as a consequence of our exposure to the problem of extracting meaning from the behavior of other human beings.

The distinction between individual and social cognition lies in the fact that, in the latter, prototypically collective processes intervene (e. g. interaction, communication, social reasoning and inference, social categorization, adoption of perspectives and interpretations, causal attribution, and also the natural disposition of human beings to relate to each other and communicate among themselves their history). The convergence of all these factors renders social cognition an area of research in which such different disciplines as social psychology, evolutionary psychology, social epistemology, sociology of institutions, philosophy of the mind, evolutionary anthropology, social ontology and neuropsychology necessarily concur.

The field of research concerned with the study of social cognition has developed over the last 30 years (Higgins / Bargh 1987; Schneider 1991; Higgins 2000; Fiske et al. 2007; Nichols 2004). There is a degree of consensus regarding certain important assumptions shared by specialists; for example, that according to one such assumption, social cognition is presented as an activity that allows people

to understand other human beings and to interact successfully. We can say that denial of this presupposition is only partial, and only expressed by those who consider that social cognition, rather than an activity or an action, constitutes a methodological perspective whose aim is to study social interaction (Ostrom 1994).

If this is taken as a methodological orientation of social psychology, the aim is to measure and analyze situated social cognition, i.e. perceptions, judgments and memories. It is also worth noting that some authors consider that there is consensus over the two questions central to the debate on social cognition (Fiske / Marcræ 2012). The first of these is how to establish a distinction between social and non-social knowledge; the second is whether there is any aspect or element of cognition that can be presented as fundamental to the acquisition and configuration of social knowledge. When examining these questions, some authors consider that action is precisely the determining factor in the response to both questions, and that there are two reasons for this: because action is a property that we assume as exclusive to social cognition agents, to the exclusion of non-social objects; and because action expresses the dynamism and reciprocity generated between the person and the social environment (Ostrom 1984; Marsh / Richardson / Schmidt 2009).

One of the distinctive features of human cognition is the dynamic participation in collaborative activities that help the human race to develop a shared intentionality in pursuing objectives in a collective manner. To participate in this kind of collaborative activity, it is necessary (i) to gain the capacity to guess the intentions of other members of the species; (ii) to have sufficient prior motivation to share mental states; and (iii) to develop and recognize ways of representing cognition. As a result, one of the human race's distinguishing features is a radically cultural dimension of cognition, which is manifested through the creation and use of linguistic symbols and material artifacts, the construction and definition of social rules, and the establishment of social institutions (Tomaseello et al. 2005; Searle 1995).

A majority of authors find that there is sufficient empirical evidence to affirm that the capacity to read others' intentions and sociocultural cognition go hand in hand. For example, both in the sphere of social psychology and in psychology and evolutionary anthropology, mention is made of the use of linguistic symbols in infancy that the child must necessarily understand, engaging with other people as agents of their intention, as well as paying attention to entities that exist in the social world. However, although social cognition specialists maintain the thesis that an inextricable relationship exists between humans' capacity for reading others' minds and cultural cognition, it is currently assumed that understanding intentionality in other agents can neither be presented as the sole fea-

ture of cultural cognition nor be considered enough to produce *skills of cultural cognition*. Instead, the research hypothesis that only human beings are biologically adapted to participate in collaborative activities involving shared objectives, socially coordinated plans of action ('we-intentionality') and dialogic forms of cognitive representation, seems more feasible (Tomasello et al. 2005, p. 676).

The above argument is linked to the idea that social phenomena cannot be reduced to the sum of the wills of individuals. The element of individual intentionality is not sufficient to explain phenomena such as the existence of rules and social conventions, or the social cognition hypothesis itself. Rather, the reverse seems to be true. We find that complex social structures allow human beings to reason and act in collective scenarios. In such scenarios, intentionality is expressed and structured in a collective manner, and is closely related to representations and interpretations of the world. Consequently, social cognition is not merely a social phenomenon, but is also related to the social expression of other phenomena.

Of these, one of the most outstanding has been named by John Searle 'institutional fact(s)'. Searle claims that social reality is made up not only of raw facts, i. e. facts constituted solely by physical bodies, but of complex institutional facts, for the recognition and determination of which the following constitutive rule must be applied: 'Given a raw fact *P*, let us say that *P* counts as *Q* in the context *C*.' A commonly used example is money, that can be identified, let us say, with the raw fact associated with the exclusively physical properties of the paper that bank notes are made of. Applying the constitutive rule proposed by Searle, we can state that although *P* is equivalent to the raw fact associated with money, when the raw fact *P* occurs in the context *C* (equivalent, for example, to the USA Federal Reserve that issues the currency), it is counted as *Q* because, in that case, it represents money as a store of value. Therefore, a social environment or context exists in which certain raw facts may count as institutional facts, i. e. facts that are ontologically subjective.

Ontologically subjective facts determine and exhibit a collective dimension both in intentionality and in cognition. It can likewise be said that as these are facts whose objectivity, value, consistency, adequacy, etc. can be contextualized and evaluated by human collectives, both institutional facts and the cognitive contexts or environments to which they are associated (and from which they emerge) have a social dimension, and can be addressed from an epistemic point of view.

Considering the latter, some authors argue that social cognition in a narrow sense must be distinguished from its broad sense. Social cognition in a narrow sense is required to understand the attitudes and intentions of a person in every

specific context. In a broad sense, however, social cognition is that which takes place when we need to understand the intention shared by the members of social groups that in each case constitute determined institutional contexts (Fiebich 2014). These distinctions reinforce one of the fundamental theses in the contemporary development of cognitive science: that intelligent behavior depends on people's cognitive systems to manipulate, transform and produce information when they develop in the social environment. Despite all this evidence, it can be said that all of us are immersed in social environments in which emblematic models of cooperative rationality are faced with institutional designs that not only do not favor, but also impede cooperation. Nevertheless, there is enough political and social evidence to think that there may be a clear opportunity in the future for the emergence of cooperative cognition.

Cooperative cognition

Political parties are ruled by the imperative for organization, but the formation of public opinion is no longer dependent exclusively on them. The diffuse energy issued by the electorate is not easily subjected to the discipline of party-oriented proposals, or of media disputes that, despite their projection, may be ignored by many people. Social networks have become a new public space emancipated from traditional communication media and from the channels open between citizens and those in government. However, it is unclear in which sense social networks act as an alternative to the traditional system of intermediation set up by trade unions and pressure groups. It is early to offer a diagnosis or assessment of the place that social networks will occupy in democratic practice. Nevertheless, despite the difficulties experienced today in establishing favorable forecasts, different authors have concluded that the communicative practices within social networks imply a type of presence that is perhaps excessively chaotic, because it:

- offers a fragmented public in disorganized public spheres;
- favors dispersion and rivalry in a great number of chat-rooms;
- foments centrifugal attitudes, through the absence of filters to screen reliable information;
- works by reaction, and is liable to be reactionary as it encourages currents of praise/criticism;
- produces 'clusters' that fail to conform to a 'we'; and
- hinders the cohesion and unification necessary for preferences and proposals to reach the political system.

Facing these challenges, the stance of some authors (e.g. Subirats / Vallespín 2014) is clear, and forebodes that the media have not yet been ousted from their function as intermediaries of political information. This would explain how, today, they continue to ‘seek and break news’. Will the media promote the rehabilitation of political culture and its new operativeness? For Subirats and Vallespín, the answer to this question may be the affirmative—but to achieve this, it is necessary to devise an alternative action plan, applied especially to what I have called ‘ABC crisis areas’ and whose basic program items can be summed up as follows:

- A) to increase traffic on networks whose line of political information is more informative and expressive than deliberative;
- B) which might lead to a revival of traditional communication media, given the need to screen this higher level of noise by means of a return to the division of tasks; and
- C) which might also lead to the appearance of alternatives to Facebook and Twitter that promote other forms of communicative intermediation at present unimagined, and consequently, the reinvention of the press and other aspects regarding communicability and expressiveness in political representation.

Nevertheless, to wield strategic competence on such a complex stage, it is necessary to re-state the aim of politics, that is, on what its rationality depends. For Innerarity (2011), it is necessary to set in motion forms of ‘cognitive cooperation’ to “optimally combine heterogeneous forms of functional logic, governance structures and knowledge resources to promote collective learning processes”. Underlying this notion of politics is a model of rationality that springs from the diagnosis and prognosis of opportunities and failures in a ‘democracy of knowledge’. We could call this model ‘cooperative rationality’. According to this model, one of the factors of configuring the space for opportunities and limitations in any democracy is that societies “must develop certain concepts of democracy itself” (Innerarity 2011, p. 100). However, it is impossible to put into practice such an objective in any manner *but* a cooperative one, through collective learning processes and self-observation that must be reflected in permanent advisory processes:

If there is a demand to our societies, it is the need to modify the rules governing collective learning and to programmatically raise their mechanisms for self-observation and their capacity for learning. There is a need to institutionalise greater reflexiveness through structures and procedures. Learning takes place under conditions of great uncertainty, which is a difficult task not exempt from controversies. The deliberative theory of democracy points precisely in this direction, in the awareness that, faced with these collective chal-

lenges, the political discussion process must generate knowledge and not only tactics. (Innerarity 2011, p. 102)

Thus far, we have seen that deliberation is an appropriate environment for the deployment of a model of cooperative rationality with which to enlarge the field of social and political opportunities for citizens. However, to follow this model of cooperative rationality, in which ideas of collective learning and of advice in a democracy of knowledge find inspiration, it is first necessary to overcome quite a few ‘cognitive complications’ (Rescher 2015), such as those relative to the standards of suitability and effectiveness that can be established by applying heuristics to social cognition processes.

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Franz-J. Heilgendorff

Conceptualizing Capitalist Globalization

Abstract: The philosophical theory of globalization is predominantly comprised of a critique of modern globalization, which is based on a theory of equal distribution of goods and guided by universal ethical principles. I argue that philosophical ethics cannot approach the problem in a different way, because of a lacking concept of society. The lack of a theory of society necessitates arguing with universal principles: philosophers focus on poverty and suffering as such, rather than on poverty and suffering generated by the process of globalization. From the perspective of Marx's critique of political economy, the empirical perception of human society leads to a mystified and overly simplistic analysis of social interaction. This means that only a conceptual theory of society can reveal the hidden relationship between economical categories. It thereby enables a more complex and adequate critique of globalization than the positivistic theory and its solution to the problems provided by philosophical ethics. Based on a theory of capitalist society, the universalist promises of philosophy will not simply be criticized as illusions, but are recognized as realistic opportunities based on cooperative productive capacities to be liberated from their current alienated forms. Thus, globalization ultimately—in its alienated form—generates the basis for the universal principles that are used by philosophy for its critique of globalization.

Introduction

Globalization and its scientific explanation are relevant today not only theoretically. Regarding the enduring global crisis since the 1970s and the continuing, immeasurable poverty, it is also important (for political reasons) to clarify what globalization is and to what extent it is the cause of these phenomena. Facing these challenges, a concept of globalization is a scientific necessity and it is reasonable to place this inquiry within philosophy.

However, in philosophy, approaches to globalization are formulated primarily from the point of view of ethics. The existing philosophical theory of globalization predominantly consists of a critique of modern globalization, which is based on a theory of equal distribution of goods and guided by universal ethical principles. Above all, it is practical philosophy that responds to the phenomena

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of globalization and is guided by the following principle: an economic and technical globalization needs to be regulated politically and should be guided towards a civilized and environmentally friendly coexistence (Niederberger / Schink 2011, p. 144). For Niederberger and Schink, the main hurdle in the realization of this goal appears to be the lack of a global society's identity, caused by the non-simultaneity of global development. Nevertheless, philosophers insist that the aforementioned problems and the lack of a common value system could be compensated for by philosophy, with its claim of universal reason (Figueroa 2004, p. 346; Reeder 2009, p. 15).

Accordingly, globalization is primarily problematized from the perspective of ethics, as justice problems cannot be solved due to the lack of institutionalization of the global arena (Hahn 2009, p. 16)—or solutions would fail because of the subjects' unwillingness to help (Singer 2007). All attempts to establish reason as the foundation of a global order, as well as the different proposals to limit global poverty, have had only limited effects in the past. This leads to the question of why the variety of philosophical responses to the multiple crises of the global order has been so unsuccessful.

Philosophy and globalization

Philosophers referring to globalization tend to uphold moral-philosophical positions, rather than developing an appropriate concept of globalization. Globalization is not analyzed in its totality; instead, individual sides of it are taken as isolated, presupposed and accepted as given.

As the reference to globalization appears to be made by acknowledging the discrepancy between philosophical ideas and the factual, rather than by a conceptual theory of globalization, philosophical theory of globalization usually starts with a commonsense definition, instead of developing a concept of globalization. That definition's origin is often trapped in everyday experiences. The solutions thus remain on a general level. It is merely suggested that "a political regulatory competence must regain the global markets", with the aim of "the cooperation of political regimes and a new form of integration of cosmopolitan solidarity" (Habermas 1998, p. 79).¹

But on this general level, the historical specificity of the capitalist era disappears. The lack of impact of philosophical reflections on globalization seems to be a result of this superficial approach, which relies on mere juxtaposition of reg-

¹ For all quotations given here from German-language sources, I present my own translation.

ulatory principles. Even critics of individualized concepts of justice contribute to a further individualization by means of their counter-argument of the overburdening of the individual, and thus to the lack of success in limiting world poverty. In order to avoid these shortcomings, it is necessary to clarify the constitutional principles and thus the genesis of the social formation called globalization instead of arbitrarily presupposing them.

If globalization is taken only as an external reason to argue about general issues of justice and morality, the results will remain deficient, as will be shown below. The self-image of political philosophy as a ‘theory of global distributive justice’ is already symptomatic of this (Kersting 1998, p. 11). The ethical reflections associated with it remain on a general level and they are centered on the question of the responsibility of the richer towards the poor in the world (Beck 2016, p. 14). Considering that one third of all annual deaths are caused by poverty (i. e. by a lack of disposition of essential commodities), it seems “important to change the social structures that influence the distribution of such goods” (Beck 2016, p. 14). Valentin Beck insists that the responsibility for this lies not least in the mutual economic and ecological dependency due to globalization (Beck 2016, p. 15).

However, the meaning of globalization beyond this interdependence remains remarkably imprecise, and something which calls for debate. Multiple attempts are oscillating around the phenomenon of “an intensification of global social relations, connecting distant places in such a way that events at one place are shaped by events taking place at a distance of many kilometers and vice versa” (Giddens 1995, p. 85). There is a lack of orientation among academics—often openly admitted—“which expresses itself in the feeling that systematic knowledge about the organization of society is not available” (Giddens 1995, p. 10). The point of intervention of philosophical ethics consists in the proposal of organizing the existing processes ‘above all equitably’ (Lenk /Maring 2007, p. 16). In this discussion, globalization is what Osterhammel and Petterson call only the ‘name of an epoch’. This name is based on the direct experiences of the people, in order to articulate easily comprehensible everyday experiences as well as complex interdependencies of global economic relationships (Osterhammel / Petterson 2004, pp. 7–8). The attractiveness of the concept of globalization for philosophy seems to be explained in this abstractness, since the questions of classical theories of justice or political philosophy could be transferred to the level of international politics. One can find this exemplified in the essay by Julia Nida-Rümelin and Martin Reichenauer on international justice (Nida-Rümelin / Reichenauer 2009, pp. 302,310). Instead of a conceptual reconstruction of what is called globalization, the focus is on the experience of borderless eco-

nomics, politics, ecology, technology or cultural conflicts, to transfer their own or traditional philosophical constructions to an international level.

This abstract-empirical version of a concept of globalization is problematic, because in it, according to Hegel, thinking “is satisfied with characteristics, i. e. determinations in which the essentiality [*Wesentlichkeit*]² is indifferent to the object itself [*Gegenstand*] and which, on the contrary, has the only purpose of being a mark for external reflection” (HW 6/516). At this level of empirical methodology, there exists “no other criterion [for the generality [*Allgemeinheit*]] than the existence [*Dasein*] itself” (HW 6/515). This is particularly problematic because the being [*Dasein*] of an object [*Gegenstand*] like globalization does not expose in any way its essential purpose, which lies in the social nexus. This results in the abovementioned individualization and moralization of social contradictions, and culminates in “the unsolved question of what the more fortunate owe to people in extreme poverty” (Beck 2016, p. 15).

This question is symptomatic for the world poverty debate that has been going on since the 1970s. It is based on empirical findings, such as the observation of an ‘insurmountable gap’ between the living conditions of the richest and poorest countries in the world (Birnbacher 2007, p. 131), often taken into consideration when scholars try to justify ethical aid commitments through moral-philosophical constructions.

This can be illustrated by an article by Peter Singer, who opened this debate. It begins with the words: “While I am writing this, in November 1971, people in East Bengal are dying because of the lack of food, shelter and medical care” (Singer 2007, p. 37) But shortly afterwards, he relativizes the example of Bengal in order to emphasize that suffering in general caused by poverty should be avoided: “I begin with the assumption that suffering and death due to lack of food, homelessness or the lack of medical care are bad” (Singer 2007, p. 39). In this way, the individual case serves only as an illustration of the general principle that suffering should be avoided; and this task should be the responsibility of the better-off, i. e., the ‘western’ world. This principle is then explained from a moral point of view by the example of a child who is in danger of drowning (Singer 2007, p. 39). A number of other arguments subsequently formulate the moral principle that anyone who can help is obliged to help, i. e., to donate money to fight world poverty (Singer 2007, p. 50). As a result, the problem of world poverty is faced with superficial moral-philosophical speculation and a posterior regulation of unenlightened problems is claimed. There is neither a se-

² Italicized terms enclosed in square brackets [...] refer to specific German (in the majority of cases, Hegelian or Marxian) concepts of philosophy, which are difficult to translate.

rious reflection on the social nexus that causes these conflicts, nor an analysis of the social relationships that are intensifying these tensions. The debate also fails to outline the difference between suffering as such and suffering in capitalism.

By considering these historical and concrete problems as individuation [*Besonderung*] of a general, timeless problem (poverty), only abstract solutions remain, such as the requirement of equal opportunities on the basis of human rights (Kesselring 2003, pp. 25, 51–52). The starting point is indeed the everyday experience of the complex global structure of suffering and misery—but the described version of the problem leads to rather ahistorical expression of it, in which the specific nature of the present situation (and with it its own origin) is obscured. In this way, the philosophical approach to globalization tends towards ideology. In view of the highlighted shortcomings, the question arises of how to move from an empirical approach to a scientific concept of globalization, avoiding the aforementioned problems.

Above all, the main challenge arises from the fact that philosophy operates without a theory of the society that generated globalization in the first place: the capitalist society. One of the authors who developed a conceptual theory of the capitalist society was Karl Marx. Based on the perspective of Marx's critique of the political economy, the following section attempts to show how to avoid turning philosophical considerations of globalization into abstract ethical and moral reflections. Central to this are the remarks on the constitution of objects through social praxis, which are developed in the 'Capital' and in the *Grundrisse*. On the basis of this concept, social forms result from the unconscious socialization of work or social praxis. In this way, globalization can be addressed as a form that mediates the contradictions of the social nexus. Thereby, the production of global relations becomes the focus of the analysis. This demands a scientific analysis of globalization capable of reproducing in theory the social nexus as a mental reproduction of the object which constitutes the form of globalization. This approach is the epistemological consequence of Marx's critique of political economy as a theory of distribution. It can be stated that the division of the distributional sphere from the production sphere in capitalist society is symptomatically expressed in a criticism based on distributive justice. Thus, only the way of exchanging products is considered an issue that appears as changeable. The distribution of the means of production is ignored in this context, leading to the result that "history is banished into the field of distribution" (MEW 42, p. 32).

The debate on global justice, the attempts at a universalist justification of ethical principles and the explication of the morally scandalous nature of the current world situation should not be underestimated—but the debate can be criticized by pointing out a methodological error that explains the ineffectiveness of its arguments against factual problems. It does not suffice to confront

the world with external moral principles (such as in Singer 2007, p. 39); rather, it is necessary to explain the inevitability of the world's dilemma from its own principles (MEW 1, p. 344). Contrary to the ethical and moral approaches towards globalization by philosophers, it shall now be shown that philosophy can contribute to a philosophically reflected conceptualization of globalization in the context of a comprehensive theory of society, whose goal is the enlightenment of its unconscious preconditions (Stapelfeldt 2004, p. 14–15).

Approaches to a materialist theory of globalization

A systematic theory of capitalist production, which goes beyond the unconsciously presupposed categories of political economy and on which more concrete forms of the capitalist mode of production such as globalization can be determined, can be built upon the analyses of Marx's *Capital*. A number of works already exist (Sandleben 2003; Silver 2005; Harvey 2001, 2005 and 2007) that can serve as a starting point for a critical theory of globalization.

Beverly Silver (2005) analyzes globalization in terms of the contradiction between capital and labor. The contradiction between the efforts of capital to reduce labor costs on the one hand, and the struggle of workers for a decent standard of living on the other, would force capital to constantly migrate and reorganize production sites all over the world, in order to remain profitable or maximize profits. Using the textile and automotive industries, she showed that shifts of capital are a reaction to the crisis-ridden relationship between capital and labor, but that the conditions for the emergence of crises are reproduced along with the movements expected to solve them. Capital is therefore forced to move restlessly around the globe. For this reason, Silver can analyze globalization as a form of the generalization of the fundamental contradiction between capital and labor.

David Harvey starts with the reproduction process of capital to show how the crisis processes of the capitalist economy constitute the global space that is experienced as globalization (Harvey 2005). Harvey adopts Marx's concept of fixed capital to analyze the economic processes that are mediated by a built infrastructure. The category of fixed capital thereby becomes the pivotal point in the analysis of global time and space by using the two meanings of 'fixing something'. On the one hand, capital is tied up for a certain time at a certain location on which the global space has its bases; and on the other hand, economic crises are fixed in the short term through relocation of capital.

Günther Sandleben (2003) uses these categories for the analysis of statehood and international relations. He criticizes the widespread perception of globalization, according to which a highly mobile financial capital on the basis of deregulated financial markets would provoke crises in a supposedly smoothly operating real economy (Sandleben 2003, p. 18–19). In contrast, Sandleben demonstrates that globalization consists of the expanding and limiting processes of a total capital. In both the commonsense and the macroeconomics analyses, the concept of total capital is not present, but rather appears as the economy of a people's nation. These total capitals as entities of closest economic interdependencies are commonly perceived as regional units (like the *Rheinischer Kapitalismus*) or states (Sandleben 2003, pp. 73–74, 110).

As total capital itself is a non-political, functional-economic entity, according to Sandleben, societal questions are being detached from their economic origin and the states are therefore “continuing the work of their corresponding total capital with other, now political methods” (Sandleben 2003, p. 129). In this analysis, Sandleben somehow follows Poulantzas's critique of the ‘thingification’ [*Verdinglichung*] of the state, by recalling and reproducing mentally the materialized social struggles that are mediated within the state and the state apparatuses. The problem is that, on the social surface, this mediation [*Vermittlung*] appears immediate [*unvermittelt*] in the state as an everlasting thing [*Ding*]. Transferred to the nexus of total capital and state, the total capital as a functional economic unit could not exist without separating the political momentum in the form of a state and the establishment of borders, whereby the states—independently but not self-sufficiently—nevertheless remain bound to the movements and struggles within total capital. He argues that a theory of financial capital, which in one form or another still forms the basis of globalization theory, leads to misconceptions about the significance of political action and the state as an autonomous, self-sufficient actor. The inaccuracy of globalization theory is to presuppose a constant ‘urge to expand’ of the states, as well as the contrary—an external pressure on them—without linking it to the immanent movements that are produced by the underlying total capitals. Politics is therefore not a “freely manageable instrument [...] against the forces of economic globalization [..., but determined and defined in last instance] by the content of the economy itself” (Sandleben 2003, p. 130). Thus, a ‘globalization trap’ of the state is doubtful—as is currently becoming apparent from the return of protectionist policies.

What characterizes all of these approaches is that they trace the way of the social constitution of what is experienced as globalization. In this way, they are guided by Marx's understanding of science, “to develop from the actual social relations the corresponding celestialized forms of those relations” (MEW 23,

p. 393). By reconstructing this production based on a theory of capital, it is possible to differentiate between the manifestations [*Erscheinungsformen*] that determine everyday experience (such as the compression of time and space, or the continuous transformation of the social environment) and their underlying nature [*Wesen*].

Towards a philosophical concept of globalization

In order to transcend the sheer appearance of an object, like the state or globalization, a systematic conceptualization is required. According to this, it is clear that in the predominant empirical comparison of external attributes, the social context in which globalization is located remains obscured. So globalization appears as an external threat, just like a natural disaster that has little to do with human activity and whose destructive forces people try to regulate afterwards. The feeling of being at the mercy of naturalized societal conditions is reflected in a language, which develops its terms in analogy to natural disasters (such as the uncontrollable stock market climate, different waves of globalization, or that globalization is unstoppable like a tsunami) to describe the current situation of the global social nexus.

The process of inversion taking place here is that globalization does not produce these contradictions and crisis tendencies of the social metabolism, but (in order to modify a remark made by Marx about money) the contradictions of the capitalist accumulation process are appearing as globalization and giving it an allegedly transcendental power (MEW 42, p. 81). It almost seems that the term globalization is actually used to avoid naming the real problem: capitalism.

So how can thinking approach reality in such a way that the concepts approximately reflect it? This can be realized by reproducing the production process of these social forms in thought as a rehearsal [*Probehandeln*], which means a mental reproduction of the vanished constitution process of the object. According to this interpretation, the conditions of the possibility of current globalization and world poverty are based on a specific social praxis: the accumulation of capital. Globalization and the categories of political economy therefore exist only in a specific dependency on each other. They are an unconscious “product of the human hand” (MEW 23, p. 86) as an expression of a historically specified social praxis. Globalization in this way refers to an unconscious social nexus that could be named the capitalist mode of production. In this approach, it is necessary to intervene consciously to illuminate the necessity [*Notwendigkeit*] of the determinate being [*Dasein*] of the actual form of global social relations.

Through this illumination of the genesis of the determinate being, it is possible to reveal the points at which social change can be initiated (MEW 42, p. 373).

As an example of this approach, one can consider the still controversial (see Beck 2016, p. 28–29) postulation of Singer that we are obliged not to spend money on trivialities, but to donate it in order to limit poverty (Singer 2007, especially p. 43, 49). This statement summarizes the central attributes of globalization: locating actions on the world horizon, an intensification of social relations and the tendency of space and time disappearance in money as immediate aid. The object that mediates this process is money. On the level of the social surface, it seems obvious that monetary aid could solve the problem of world poverty. Given the current form of social relations, money solves the problem of world poverty in the form of hunger by interacting with commodities that can serve as food. However, this is a fetishized form of reflecting the social conditions. In this way, the essence of social relationship appears in a mystified form. The stages of the process that obscures the relations of this essence [*Wesensverhältnisse*] can be revealed using the concepts of reification [*Versachlichung*] and thingification [*Verdinglichung*], as elaborated by Tairako Tomonaga on the basis of Marx.³

Reification [*Versachlichung*] means that the social relations of persons to each other are expressed in the social relations of objects [*Sachen*] to each other (Tomonaga 1987, p. 111). This is evident in the category of globalization as such, insofar as it is always mediated by objects; the intensification of social relations is mediated through global goods and financial flows, through transport and communication. In globalization, these relations of objects are obvious, insofar as the compression of time and space is always mediated objectively [*sachlich*], i.e., materially. In order to remain in the generalized picture of the world's poverty debate, the relationship between a fortunate person from the western world and a deprived person from the southern hemisphere appears in the form of a ratio of a certain amount of money to another and thereby de-

³ For a precise understanding, it is important to familiarize oneself with and understand the differences between Marx's concepts of thing [*Ding*], object [*Sache*] and object as such [*Gegenstand*]. Object as such [*Gegenstand*] is an object that is simply present. Thing [*Ding*] and object [*Sache*] synthesize the forms in which an object as such [*Gegenstand*] appears. When Marx speaks of object [*Sache*], he means that the object as such acts in the context of a mental reproduction of social relationships (MEW 23, pp. 87–88). Marx speaks of the object as such as a thing [*Ding*], when the formerly present relationship of the object has disappeared and reappears as a characteristic property of the thing itself. So, in the thing [*Ding*] the aspect of mediation or processing has disappeared or is obscured and the properties set by this process are claimed by the object as its natural attributes (MEW 23, pp. 71–72, 86; Tomonaga 1982, p. 72 and 1984, p. 94).

termines the degree of quantitative participation from social wealth in the form of commodities. In this common definition, globalization appears specifically in the fact that monetary aid makes space and time disappear. Money enables one to satisfy (almost) any need at (almost) any point in time and space, if the object of desire exists in the social form of a commodity.⁴ Starting from the generalized capitalist society, it becomes apparent that in terms of satisfying needs, it is not the persons themselves that are related to each other in a social nexus, but products in the social form of commodities mediated by money. In other words: the process of reification [*Versachlichung*] inherent in capitalist society transforms working products as things [*Dinge*] into “independent entities in relation to each other and to the people” (MEW 23, p. 86), and these things [*Dinge*] “become independent subjects who actively establish social relationships” (Tomonaga 1987, p. 111).

The first process of mystification is the process of reification [*Versachlichung*] described above, which turns both people and the things [*Dinge*] they have produced into objects [*Sache*] within social relations. This is where the process of thingification [*Verdinglichung*] begins—where “the social relationships of objects to each other [are] turning into self-conversion, into real-object-related properties that are adhered to things [*Dinge*]” (Tomonaga 1982, p. 112). In other words, things [*Dinge*] as products of human work merge with their economic form-determination.⁵ This process transforms the working product considered as useful into a commodity, with its supposed properties of use-value and exchange value expressed as a money-price. According to Marx, the existence of the money form of an object is determined by the fact that it mediates in general the abstraction from the concrete use-values and organizes their reduction to abstract labor as a value measurement. This means that the money form that is attached to a specific object is set by the development of the contradiction between value and use-value. If this objectified relationship is generalized, as in the capitalist economy, it is constituted “as an object, becomes objectified by symboliz-

⁴ The fact that the expropriation of the immediate producers is a precondition for this situation, and that this possibility includes the entire history of colonialism and imperialism, which had helped to release these ‘eternal natural laws’ of capitalist production (MEW 23, pp. 787–788), is ignored by philosophical debates about the necessity of financial aid.

⁵ Working products are also things, because as an existing object the product vanishes its production process. How exactly it has been produced by the unification of work and nature in the working process is obscured and extinguished in the manufactured product, in which nature is transformed into an intended useful object—except in the case of malfunction: then, “a blunt knife or weak thread forcibly remind us of Mr. A., the cutler, or Mr. B., the spinner.” (MEW 23, p. 197)

ing itself in a space-time sign” (Krahl 2008, p. 64). As a result, the contradictions of the social nexus which produced the forms of value, commodity and money as forms in which these contradictions can move, are obscured and mystified in money as a thing and its capacity as a savior on the global scale.

The difference between reification [*Versachlichung*] and thingification [*Verdinglichung*] is therefore that in the latter, the social definition of form is transformed into a material attribute of the thing. In our case, a piece of metal, a paper note, or any other commodity becomes the permanent form of money and has the quality to decide about the degree of participation from the already produced social wealth in the form of priced commodities. In this constellation, the existence of time and space becomes irrelevant when an amount of money is transferred from one person to another. Money therefore is the materialized power of disposition over dead work, which is already preserved in a commodity as the social form of the working product. What is striking here is that the attempt to overcome world poverty through monetary aid only operates on the surface of society by reproducing the objective forms of the capitalist economy.

How does this solution of monetary aid emerge? At the layer of appearance, it is assumed that there is an unequal distribution of wealth, and that this unequal distribution is the essence of the appearing world poverty. But in this perspective, it remains unconscious that the appearances on the social surface are mystified manifestations of essential social relationships. This leads to the fact that an adequate understanding of the social nexus is lacking, and so in (philosophical) attempts to globalization it remains unrecognized that the circulation of money in it “represents social relations of production, but in the form of a natural thing with certain attributes” (MEW 42, p. 22.). Once exposed, it becomes apparent that the solutions offered by philosophy are reproducing the underlying problem: the ownership structure of society and its accompanying forms. Money is perceived as a natural form of wealth—in other words, the specific character of bourgeois wealth and, accordingly, the exclusion from it, is not understood at all. In particular, it remains unclear what the universal concept of suffering and poverty actually mean in relation to capitalism. Poverty and suffering in capitalism are no abstract quantities or mere lack of money—they are a result of the exclusion from ownership of means of production. That means that as long as the stated social nexus and the ownership structures exist, people will be controlled by the unconscious products of their social praxis, as well as its negative impacts. In consequence, globalization must be understood as a specific manifestation of the capitalist world economy—in Marx’s words, “as the theoretical expression of those material relations which rule over them [the people]” (MEW 42, p. 97). At this point, it is evident that the solutions produced by philosophy are insufficient, and that the criticism that Singer’s postulations “put

unrealistically high expectations on the individual subject of responsibility” (Beck 2016, p. 29) also does not address the real deficit of the argumentation.

A conceptual theory should therefore not simply presuppose globalization, but must analyze it as a product of historical and specific conditions. In this sense, it does not need an external point of view from which globalization is considered destructive and dangerous, in order to oppose globalization with moral principles. Instead, in the above-mentioned mental reproduction of the systematic context, in which the materialization of social relations emerges with all of its consequences and which is perceived as globalization, the critique is preserved in the representation of the systematic context, which is at the same time the critique of the matter itself (cf. MEW 29, p. 550). The critique has been preserved by identifying the destructive forces and shortcomings as a necessity of the object itself. The principles for social change therefore do not need to be derived from universalistic or moral principles, but result from the matter itself.

Systematic development of concepts in relation to historical development

In globalization, the contradictions and crises of the capitalist mode of production are intensifying on a global scale. Globalization is the materialized form in which the contemporary global contradictions of capitalist society are moving, such as the conflict between capital and labor. However, not only the destructive forces are shown in it, but also the tendencies which transcend the current form of society and the organization of the metabolism between human and nature.

As mentioned, it is problematic that globalization in the philosophical debate is taken as an occasion to point out that a global horizon of reflection is increasingly opening up. Moral and ethical obligations are then attached to these, and forms of political participation and supranational organizations are imagined. Ultimately, it is from this external reference to the factual that the attempt of practical philosophy results to actively influence and shape globalization. However, since philosophy does not have a concept of social formation (cf. Lefebvre 1969, pp. 74–75), philosophers remain bound to these antagonisms in their attempts to take sides for certain tendencies. In the end, only the distribution sphere appears to be changeable and addressable for historical progress or the overcoming of poverty and suffering, because of the lack of understanding of what wealth in capitalist society means. Philosophical considerations in this way

remain limited to a simple modification of the distribution of goods by state or ethical-moral coercion.

But, based on a theory of capital, an alternative space of global experience appears that transcends the present social conditions. If the utopian elements are limited to human rights, supranational organizations or the hopes of a universalist ethics, then an important area of social reality fades out of focus: production. Not only in philosophical reflection, but also and especially in the cooperative work flow, it is possible to generate political and social consciousness. In cooperation, according to Marx, in “planned interaction with others, the individual overcomes [or better could overcome] his individual limitations and develops his general capabilities” (MEW 23, p. 349). In the division of labor and cooperation, a global horizon of reflection and action is thus also emerging, which Marx refers to within the concept of the ‘collective worker’. Within capitalism, however, individuals as laborers develop this competence only externally in relation to and through capital as a ‘collective laborer’. But at the same time, it also reveals the utopian possibility of a conscious socialization of the social nexus and the division of labor.

The antagonistic character of cooperation, in its two spheres of intra-company and societal division of labor, consists in the fact that, on the one hand, the capitalist mode of production “does not appear to the individuals as their own, united power, but as a foreign, external force” (MEW 3, p. 34). They only form the ‘building block’ of a combination of labor set by capital. On the other hand, the “forms of transition from capitalist mode of production to a socialized and associated mode of production” (MEW 25, p. 456) become apparent in the form of stock corporations and cooperatives.

Even if the cooperative system alone is not capable of reshaping the globalized capitalist society, a new perspective of social transformation is emerging in this context: “the organizing idea of a network of direct producers that anticipates the collective worker as the truly organizing subject of history” (Negt / Kluge 1974, p. 21). A precondition for such a project, which could shape globalized human relations, is the understanding of the social nexus. This approach avoids the idea of a society that negates the existing destructive forces as being only voluntarily opposed to the current one. Therefore, the phenomena, which are collected under the concept of globalization in the philosophical debate, should be conceptualized by their real nexus. For this approach, it is essential to develop a social philosophy that is able to analyze the appearing immediacy of social objects as mediated by revealing the vanished social relationships in these materialized forms of a social nexus. From a methodological point of view, this could be achieved by the previously developed concepts of reification [*Versachlichung*] and thingification [*Verdinglichung*], which are ca-

pable of illuminating the hidden mediation processes by analyzing the social form-determination merged with the object itself. As it is prototypically formulated in the critiques of the separation of mental and manual labor by Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge (Negt / Kluge 1974), as well as Nicos Poulantzas (Poulantzas 2002), the precondition of this approach is the reappropriation of the social organization capabilities separated from the individuals by the capitalist mode of production into the state and politics, as well as the competence of coherent conceptual thinking, which has been monopolized by intellectuals.

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Liberalism's All-inclusive Promise of Freedom and its Illiberal Effects: A Critique of the Concept of Globalization

Abstract: The narrative of globalization is twofold: it refers to the hope for the export of democratic state forms and values from the Western world to the states of the so-called global south; it also refers to the aim of worldwide economic growth and extension of capitalist ways of production and consumption. But paradigmatic cases of action of democratic liberal states in international politics throw a twilight on this double hope. In certain cases, aggressive interventions of Western democratic states are legitimized using precisely the norms of non-intervention that claim universal validity, but turn out to follow an agenda of particular interests of economy and power. This article argues that these universal norms are not contingently transgressed, but in light of the second paradigm of globalization—of the economic spread of market relations—the process of self-constitution of democratic states here takes not a self-limiting, but an aggressive and exclusive turn. In addition, the so-called ‘new wars’ and ‘failed states’ (apparently opposing phenomena to the international agency of democratic and liberal Western states) show surprising parallels to late modern democratic liberal society. The ‘management of fear’ typical of these political situations aims at a regularization, through internalized habits and attitudes, of the population—including their agreement to the terror regime. In light of these considerations, the relationship between the aims of global growth and global democratization seems highly ambiguous.

It is considered to be a distinguishing mark of modern and democratic societies that they limit the use of violence by the state as a means to enforce its authority. Deliberative processes, practices and institutions limit and control as self-government the exercise of the monopoly of power of the state. Thus, democratic government is a continuing self-constitution. Violence/power is used only as counter-violence outwards to defend against outer threats—a use that is in turn controlled by the governmental measuring of its proportionality.

The narrative of globalization claims, on the one hand, the substitution of this dichotomy of outside and inside with an extension of the intrastate nonvio-

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lent structures, resulting in an increasingly peaceful cooperation of democratic states. On the other hand, it also refers to the spread of capitalist forms of production to a ‘world market’ and the connected economic regulation of social order beyond the borders of nation states. This view is not without a teleology—in fact, it postulates a progress of the political structures of the world including the global south, directed towards peaceful and evermore rational forms of organization of capitalist democracies.

Nevertheless, there are political phenomena which invite us to question this apparently evident narrative, especially in the periphery of the core states of democratic liberalism. They prove wrong the assumption that prosperity and democracy for all are the beckoning aim of the global integration of economies; as if the realization of this aim posed only minor applicatory problems, which could be easily overcome. For these cases show the acceptance and relevance of national borders diminishing without the expected result of peaceful cosmopolitanism. Instead, relations of power spread, are restructured and newly established; the disadvantage of the global south deepened and not remedied.

A sketch of a critique of theories of democratic peace

In order to investigate this thesis further, let’s start with a critical look at the basic assumptions of the so-called ‘theory of democratic peace’ (Geis / Müller / Schörnig 2010). According to this theory, the liberal states have incorporated higher normative demands—specifically norms claiming universal validity—than undemocratic states. They internationally codified these norms, for instance in International Humanitarian Law. The theory of democratic peace doubles this observation with a hypothesis: that democratic states, with their ambitious ideals of human rights and universal values, fight fewer wars than undemocratic ones.

Different authors, such as Yves Winter, Anna Geis, Oliver Eberl and others, have shown that this correlation doesn’t hold up to the test. In fact, democratic states fight fewer wars with other democratic states, but more wars with undemocratic ones, and in total about the same amount. In addition and maybe even more significantly, the standards of conduct of war of the former (for instance, with regard to the protection of civilians or of prisoners of war) are not higher; that is, the legal, respectively moral commitment to universal norms neither improves the quality nor the quantity of military conduct of democratic states.

How can we account for the failure of this hypothesis? Without a doubt, principles that claim universal validity are the mirror of everyday life of the Western world, which incorporates the respect of the other as other into its practices. It is increasingly transformed into the political structures and institutions of liberal and democratic states. The codified and institutionalized ideal of the participation and respect of everybody, including the marginalized and minoritized, requires the ongoing democratic process of self-constitution of the community as community. This process takes place in practices of the deliberation and participation of potentially everybody. This normative commitment to processual all-inclusion has, by definition, global applicability. Internationally, this claim finds its codification in the principle of non-intervention of International Humanitarian Law.

But the normative level is not only (as theories of democratic peace claim) guiding for an increasing degree and extension of global democratization and peaceful cooperation. It is precisely the incorporation of universal claims that creates a new function of legitimatizing aggression against non-democratic states. Liberalism has an aggressive aspect that annuls precisely these standards, even while invoking them. Oliver Eberl even spots a 'new liberal antipluralism' (Eberl 2016, p. 364, my transl.). He considers it as a successor of Christianization and colonization.

Internationally, the democratic practice of self-constitution is mediated by the construction of an image of the undemocratic other, irrational and dangerous. This construction works by the utilization and, at the same time, transgression of norms with universal claims (such as the abovementioned International Humanitarian Law of non-intervention). These are reformulated and transformed into an instrument of rule and power. The reconstitution and self-affirmation of the Western states as democratic here takes place precisely through this exclusion. The history of the term 'rogue state', coined by George W. Bush, exemplifies how the pretext of protective motives according to international laws can be turned into a function of the enforcement of power interests.

Indeed, the acceptance and relevance of national borders is decreasing under the democratic pretext of the increase of processual self-government. But this democratic stance is coupled with the conception of a peaceful, global economic cooperation launched by the democratic states of the Western world. This second aspect transforms the very meaning of the processual reconstitution of liberal states. The result is a paradigm of cooperation in the terms of market rationality that raises doubts about the presumed effect of democratization and extension of nonviolent relations of globalization. Globalization, here, turns out not to lead to increasingly homogenous cosmopolitanism via all-inclusive political practices. For the universal norms that correspond to the democratic princi-

ple are utilized as a legitimization of exclusion, oppression and violence motivated by vested interests that they help to veil.

The incorporation of these universal principles into the political structures and institutions of liberal and democratic states brings about its own tendency to repress and oppress, which has to be reflected and criticized. In late capitalism, the economic interpretation of the democratic ideals of equality and participation of all is a very influential one. Thus, the fight for power on the one hand and the fight for legitimization on the other become blurred. The claim to all-inclusion implies here the utilization of the contribution of all and its own radicalized exclusion. Whatever is detracted from this utilization is excluded; it is first imagined as wholly other, and is then imagined on all conceptual levels to be excluded from humanity and rationality as such. This creates the impossibility of the conception of individual and collective ‘agents’ to whom the rules of armed conflict and the right to autonomous self-government do not apply.

‘New Wars’ and ‘Failed States’—cases of dysfunctional state capacity or extreme examples of neoliberal forms of regulation?

I now want to take a look at the so-called ‘New Wars’ and their relation to globalization. New Wars are usually considered as a peripheral phenomenon of the globalized world—a form of war activity turned completely irregular. Theories of international politics tend to depict these phenomena as dysfunctional exceptions in contrast to the democratic state capacity with ambitious norms. But this account overlooks or even veils the exemplary character of New Wars within the organization of an increasingly globalized late modern world. They don’t establish chaotic violence as opposed to the political organization within the clear borders of nation states. Rather, again, the fight for power on the one hand, and the fight for legitimization on the other become blurred—and this entanglement proves to be a specifically late modern condition in a globalized world.

Authors such as Mary Kaldor or Herfried Münkler draw a clear line between the New Wars and interstate wars. Presumably, these new forms of conflict occur from the beginning under the radar of International Humanitarian Law of armed conflicts, since they do not limit themselves to classic military action. These new forms, according to the authors, are constituted by an “indirect war conduct, where the use of traditional military means and the use of political strategies merge. In addition, excessive and broadly spread violence occurs whose agents

are mainly private entrepreneurs of war with economic interests.” (Münkler 2002, p. 7, my transl.) According to the authors, the reason for this restructuring of armed conflict is an internal lack of function of state capacity concerning law and state apparatus. This lack of function is in contrast to the functioning of regular state force in Western states. The latter are affected by this development only derivatively: they suffer from an export of globalization by the destabilized regions in the opposite direction, which transports chaos and amorality in the form of terrorism.

But this opposition is not as convincing as it seems at first glance. Key to the critique is the following observation: the combination of forms of violence with political strategies of conviction is a form of war not only against the population, but also to win the population. In this respect, it is the equivalent of neoliberal rule. Thus, the conventional military conflict steps back and is replaced in the New Wars by a ‘management of fear’ exercised on the natives, which continually and excessively terrorizes them, economically exploits them and psychologically forms them into allies. This form of terror is neither acceptable under the rules of war conduct of international law, nor does it follow rules of economical and appropriate use of violence. It is nevertheless highly effective. Yves Winter comments on this entanglement of a militarization of politics and a politicization of war under the economic paradigm:

The battle of decision is replaced by the massacre and by a systematic sexual violence which are used as instruments of *fear management*. [...] The disestablishment of war undermines the limits of international law and initiates an era of commercialization of violence with private entrepreneurs of war, warlords and international mercenary companies. War becomes a form of life. (Winter 2008, p. 54)

This ‘form of life’ is marked not by the fading of state control, but by the blurring of state control and state dysfunction—of deregulated forms of economy and ‘regulated’ enforcement of the interests of global companies. It is far from ineffective and follows its own rationality.

This specific structure is also typical for so-called ‘failed states’ like Mexico. From the perspective of Western democracies (which international political theory usually assumes), the nationwide influence of drug cartels appears as the powerlessness of the state. The cartels preclude resistance against their criminal activities by means of organized murder, blackmail and rape. But this apparently apolitical violence spreads even further: independent journalists, trade unionists and representatives of indigenous people who act as opponents of capitalist forms of privatization, land robbery and exploitation become victims of atrocities as well. This terror is used to enforce the interests of politically and economically influential groups, without the intervention of the control of the state ex-

ecutive. Paramilitary groups act as private armies of great landowners (Zelik 2009, p. 205–206). Activities of cartels are supported, protected and veiled by police actions and politically motivated assaults. The different groups of agents become more and more indistinguishable.

Eventually, in this situation in Mexico, the population have formed armed militias. Initially, they try to replace the lost monopoly of power of the state and resist the attacks of drug cartels organized paramilitarily. But their procedures of self-justice themselves become quickly delimited, irregular and economically corrupted, assimilating to the forms of actions of the original agents of excessive violence. (The documentary *Cartel Land* by Matthew Heinemann follows this development.)

That is, in New Wars and ‘failed states’, the population becomes both victim and agent of violence; it is formed by and takes over the maintenance of the structures of transgression. This is not accurately conceived of as an opposition between destabilized state government on the one hand and boundless organized crime and private agents of violence on the other hand (the latter making use of the gap of order). Rather, the entanglement of economic interests, government interests and entrepreneurship of violence achieves thorough stability in a regime of violence and forms the population into its participants and supporters.

Authors such as Münkler depict this situation as contingent and theatricalize it. A case in point is the figure of the southern warlord, who appears in Münkler’s account as the emblematic Other of state-ruled order. Diefenbach critically takes this depiction to an extreme: “There he is: de-limited, de-disciplined, corrupted by money and pop culture [...]—a monstrous irregular killing machine.” (Diefenbach 2003, p. 186, my transl.) This theatricalized image veils the fact that this state of affairs is not a contingent failure of state rule, but a necessarily occurring symptom. It is the symptom of the entanglement of universal claims of freedom and equality on the one hand and of the paradigm of market rationality on the other. The consequence of this entanglement is a particular structure of the development and implementation of habits and ways of action—turning the civil population into a resource that continually needs to be worked on by shaping and transgressing their form of life. It needs to be permanently formed and coaxed into practical compliance, and to achieve this aim terror (or ‘fear management’) is not an irrational monstrosity, but precisely rational.

Classic theories such as Münkler’s assume that ‘failed states’ and the New Wars are phenomena of state collapse that are not only geographically but also conceptually peripheral. According to them, the source of these developments is that state institutions lose their monopoly of violence including the power to protect their citizens. In fact, this loss of power is radically ambivalent: the monopoly of violence of private war entrepreneurs weakens the state out-

wards. At the same time, these proxies push state interests. It is a kind of *irregular regulation by violence*, in which the state suffers from *and* profits from its own weakness (Zelik 2009). For governments thus don't have to face the problems of legitimation, neither with regard to the violent means the proxies use nor with regard to the aims thus furthered. In Mexico, this is the case, for instance with regard to the capitalist opening of markets and the privatization of common goods connected to land robbery, which thus become available to global capital investors after native peasants are violently dispossessed.

By now, this structure of excessive violence appears not as an opposite to the functioning state capacity; rather, it appears as exemplary of the principles of neoliberal organization, insofar as it is a government aiming at self-government. The population subjected to these conditions also acts as their agents. It is an extensive, all-present, inner political police-regulation, which integrates methods of convincing and questions of legitimacy into processes of incorporating compliant forms of practice. The excessive violence is an effective means for this subject formation. Therefore, it assumes both liberating *and* dispossessing traits. Military power mingles with traits of police violence, managing of health care and the control of secret services. Their joint activities record all details of life, regulate and form them. As a training of the population it is at the same time an economical government, since it assigns the work of disciplining to the subjects themselves. These aspects seem contradictory, but they turn into the condition of each other.

Authors such as Zelik (see also Winter 2008; Comaroff / Comaroff 2012) claim a special relevance for these phenomena of delimited violence in our increasingly global, liberal world. They assume that the developments in the so-called periphery of the core states of democratic liberalism point to a constitutive aspect of globalization and its entanglement of democratic political organization, open markets and deregulation.

This development is often accounted for in very positive terms. Its down side becomes apparent in the New Wars and so-called 'failed states'. That is, to depict the supposedly enlightened core countries of liberalism as 'stable' and committed to universal rights for humans and people is already one-sided. This result yields the following suspicion: the rule with instability and contingency is precisely typical for the neoliberal shaping of societies and its claim on the individual. It forms the individual to conceive of her- or himself as 'entrepreneur of himself' (Bröckling 2007, my transl.) and to act accordingly.

Thus, the central question turns out to be how exactly the phenomena described so far connect to the globalization development of the world and the West in particular—to those developments we are used to seeing as gains of freedom and political liberalization.

Governing with security according to Foucault as a type of judgment

The narrative of globalization assumes a historical development from the nation state (which increasingly limits and controls state violence, but executes it outwards) towards global, democratic cooperation. The consequences of globalization are, according to the narrative, global relations of peaceful and egalitarian cooperation in economy and politics. The corresponding loss of relevance of local forms of government and of nation states to transregional democratic political structures appears as unquestionable gain of freedom and progress.

Without a doubt, it is accurate to see this development as a story of emancipation from historically specific forms of ruling and tradition. But to uncritically read it within the mentioned frame of a narrative of globalization is to fall victim to an ideology. On the one hand, this history of emancipation is by no means the history of a progress without setbacks in terms of peaceful and free cooperation. It is in fact a history of emancipation of people and minorities who increasingly could (and had to) *fight* for their own voice and political representation. On the other hand, there is the implied equation of an ongoing spreading of democratic state forms with a spreading of *economically liberal* state forms. In fact, the increasing overlap of these two levels (the political and the economic) not only results in post-democratic signs of fatigue like new nationalisms, which can be witnessed in all Europe—it also leads to a form of illiberal rule of its own which finds its current extreme but paradigmatic manifestation in the New Wars and ‘failed states’.

The work of Michel Foucault describes the development of rule, law and norms becoming more and more immanent within the society of late modernity. He is highly critical in his evaluation of this development against the framework of the increasing entanglement of politics and economy. Many phenomena of the by now globalized world disclose themselves particularly clearly in light of Foucault’s critical observations of the ever more self-limiting and self-delimiting liberal society of late modernity. Correspondingly, a lot of authors by now adopt this frame of interpretation (such as the aforementioned Opitz, Winter, Eberl and others). I will now briefly explore the ways in which Foucault’s theory of governmentality seems to be a useful tool to analyze developments of globalization.

Neoliberal governing is not without ambivalence, as neoliberalism’s account of itself suggests. Indeed, its landmark theme is the restriction of state intervention. But it has a dubitable successor: the organization and operationalization by the judgment and calculation of reality. This approach is far from the apparently

objective and neutral accounting, but is constitutively the continual transgression of rules and rights set so far. That is the case, since it always sets its own standards *with* its actions.

According to Foucault, characteristic of this structure of overcoming rules and structures is the paradigm of security; the model of it is police action. The 'police government' of social processes creates one state of exception after the other. It is "the permanent state of exception, which proceeds in the name and in dependence of the principles of its own rationality without being based upon the rules of law." (Foucault 2004, GG I, p. 488, my transl.) This characterization shows an uncanny resemblance to the terror management carved out as typical for the New Wars and 'failed states' before it.

A faculty of judgment that is shaped by police action and bureaucracy appears in correspondence to a government of in-security. It rules via sub-legal techniques and thus enacts and provisions every detail of social life. It counts with insecurity insofar as it works with a non-codified situational knowledge, which is formed out of and applied to precisely these details of everyday life and its subjects. It is thus always working on its own limit; that is, it is always integrating it.

With respect to the political subjects, this structure is *democratic*, because it takes into account everybody and turns everybody into an agent of this accumulation of knowledge. But at the same time, this concept of equality shapes it as an *economic* equality of market agents. This paradigm of the organization of society is characterized by an interplay between discourses and practices. Knowledge production identifies dangers and develops forms to react to them in ways of conduct. These ways of conduct form the material of an ongoing investigation by these discourses and of a continuous regulation. Society's agents now have to turn all their ways of being and their prospects into valuable goods *for the refinement of regulation*. The regulation of conduct aims at a normalization of the totality of our ways of being. In fact, this aim appears to be just technical, but it is thus veiled, naturalized and its normative, political dimension is concealed (Meyer 2009, p. 29).

For within this paradigm, the 'freedom of all' takes on a peculiar meaning. It is the freedom of all subjects who realize their own possibilities to full capacity as subjects of their own self-management and self-interpretations of the market of life scripts and symbolic value. This corresponds to a radical disenfranchisement of the subject who doesn't conform to this market organization. On the one hand, the very emphasis on everyday forms of life and the formulation of common understandings of selves has an aspect of (democratic) generalizations and democratic equality. But on the other hand, this formulation and formation here takes on the shape of a practice of dominion.

Though the calculating with constructions of danger seems, according to liberal ideology, maximally self-limiting, it is illiberal at the core. It is self-limiting and self-delimiting, since it proceeds by forming its own legitimation *and* object. Its calculation registers ‘reality’ first of all, as a potential and as a virtuality—and at the same moment, it reduces and calculates it. The procedures measure everybody and the future possibilities emanating from their conduct as surplus value, and enforces them to realize this future potential. It is thus a calculation of profit and a calculation of risk that binds as if it had factual *and* normative power.

According to Ulrich Beck’s theory of risks, social risks *de facto* have increased exponentially. Supposedly, these risks are barely to be anticipated and accounted for (Beck 2007). In contrast, François Ewald considers the contemporary attempts to determine and keep in check a potential danger as a play with the imaginary. It doesn’t aim at a control of the given, but at a certain way of constituting the other and, therewith, one’s own (Ewald 1993). This achievement construes the world by reacting to it with adapting institutional forms; that is, it is inherently self-exceeding. This order-transgressing ordering is a ‘political strategy’ in the broader sense, precisely since the entanglement of constitution and depiction in this world figuring activity is concealed by a positivist self-image of natural science.

A case in point is the means of automatic face detection. It speaks of this entanglement of universal norms turned into institutions on the one hand and, on the other, of a regulation of the life world according to statistical calculus. At the core of it lies an emphasis on the permanent adaption of practice rules guided by their limit: the potential and upcoming. It obliges anticipation and prevention; that is, to register not particular subjects according to fixed attributes, but all subjects according to their unrealized potential. This consideration supplies the means to then classify all and everyone according to their utilizability. In case of doubt (i. e., in the border case of non-calculability or non-utilizability *necessary to this method*), it figures them and treats them as monstrous threats. According to Sven Opietz, this means is an ‘imaginary technology’ that grasps the Other and constitutes it as an ‘amorphous, fetishized Other’ (Opietz 2008, p. 223–224, my transl.).

Within this apparently liberal frame, the self-development of the individual is considered at the same time as his or her participation in the social totality. That is, just by ‘going on’, a person develops the possibilities and ways of life of the whole, and the knowledge of it. It thereby affirms and stabilizes this totality. This convergence turns the contingencies of the particular situation and its outcome into the material of the regulating operation that constitutes the order as such. What is yet unaccounted for is its limit and condition of possibility. It is this limit which here needs to be always constructed and thus integrated;

as far as it stays unattained, it is to be controlled and violently mastered as a monstrous threat. This technique of government as a matter of principle even allows the exclusion of individuals from the protection of human rights—as the case of the human rights violations in Guantanamo showed (see Butler 2004, on the emblematic relevance of this political ‘state of exception’). These exclusions, using the techniques of torture, rape and murder, signify a transgression of universal norms by democratic government executives of state power—norms that are by definition non-tradable and non-negotiable. But, as Butler has shown, this is within this paradigm a ‘constitutive’ transgression (Butler 2004, p. 50–51).

In question is precisely an appeal to the highest, universal norms, which at present have to become practical in institutional forms. This requires their *interpretation and transgression* over and over again. The semblance of presumably endangered rights of protection and freedom that necessarily accompanies this process is then used to legitimize precisely their most blatant violation: the paradigm of social interaction of peaceful, market-shaped cooperation makes a productive handling of dissent and conflict impossible—for it is accompanied by a Hobbesian, omnipresent assumption of the danger of the lapse of these interactions into a fight of all against all. This assumption is quite literally formulated in the metaphor of war prominent in public discourse in the US in regard to all aspects of social life (Winter 2008, p. 70).

This rhetoric of danger lowers the acceptable standards for a breach of law in all areas. It legitimizes the decentering and delimiting of practices and considerations of security in favor of an increasing integration into the chain of consumption of goods. Potentially risky subjects are identified and their behavior anticipated, and a-human identities are thus not only registered, but presupposed and first of all constructed. It is a calculation of the cost of freedom, which constitutes the Other as un-economic and irrational (Opitz 2008, p. 223–224).

In this frame of thought, the protection of the population necessitates not first of all military measures directed outwards, but police regulation and practices of knowledge directed inwards. Security is considered a scarce good. Against appearances, further demand for this good, which is offered by different, increasingly private providers, is precisely and ceaselessly created. For it is not a lack of functioning, but a necessary aspect of this paradigm that a subjective feeling of insecurity needs to be increased further and further, and thus the product ‘security’ is more and more in demand. In fact, the limit of the current shape of society is its working task, always aiming at a potentially global scope.

Singularity as a commodity and the possibility of emancipation

It is precisely the overlap of juridical, moral, economic and epistemic aspects within the ongoing self-construction of the social whole that creates a violence at the core of the liberal society itself. For it is potentially global only as a structure further and further integrating and exploiting its own limits. Evidently, this fact concerns the organization of economy itself, but more radically, it concerns all forms of individual activity as self-realization, including the activity of democratic, political deliberation. Within these forms of democratic participation, everybody is supposed to be able to contribute to the shaping of the democratic society. But at the same time, in the course of neoliberal progress, these forms themselves are economized and thus exclude precisely the individual as such, as irreducible and unaccountable, which they are supposed to express. It is this unaccountability of the individual itself that is now turned into a source of profit.

The ideal of a spirited democracy is the idea of a community that develops norms and forms of life in its course, by the activity and participation of all of its free subjects, and realizes them consensually. This idea is conceived here under the paradigm of freedom shaped as self-interested self-government according to a calculation of costs. Thus, each and every subject, in all their speeches and actions, works to continually transform and shape precisely their own unaccountability as individuals into a productive, functioning social unity.

Late modern civic life is characterized by gains of freedom that have to be analyzed and acknowledged as such. But neoliberal logic not only requires the minimization of state intervention in social processes and structures—it also models these processes and structures thoroughly after the model of the market. Even political deliberation and civic engagement are pictured as calculations of contingencies that are considered as potentials of profit. This calculus is illiberal at the core, not just contingently at the periphery (Opitz 2008, p. 223). For it declares difference, conflict and social fights to be at the outer zone of democratic society in need of control. Thus, Balibar points to the “*irreducibility of the phenomenon of extreme violence* as a structural determinant of capitalism” (Balibar 2001, col. 1287, my transl., highlighting orig.).

Late modernity values the individual ‘as him- or herself’, not due to rights which are owed to class membership, tradition and privileges. This is the result of a far-reaching implementation of universal claims of freedom and of a democratic sphere of civic interaction and discourse. However, it is precisely this individual freedom to shape one’s own life that is defined, utilized and ruled in

this form of regime. Neoliberalism designs a model of humanity which pictures the individual as rational and singular only insofar as he or she contributes to and affirms the social whole by adding one more utilizable possibility to it. He or she has to follow the logic of the market in the realization of his or her individual and societal possibilities. Otherwise he or she is pictured as a violent, irrational monstrosity.

Paradoxically, it is precisely the individuality of identities and life scripts that turns into a material of integration, affirmation and processes of stabilization. Any activity—even giving and taking arguments, contesting and resisting—is seen as a practical design of meaning. Figured in this way, whatever an individual undertakes is always productive and ‘value creating’ insofar as it is read within *and* creates new patterns and forms of life to be read and understood. To realize oneself is at the same time a process of creating rules and designs of one’s own *and* of shaping new general forms of human identity and conduct. This dimension of any activity—at once individualizing and generalizing—now constitutes a necessary effect that works as the affirmation of the structures of society and as its own integration. On the other hand, these effects pose a permanent threat to a society conceived as such.

The legitimation of the hegemony of neoliberalism consists in the promise of freedom to participate offered to everyone under the conditions of a world society. It has been argued that this promise has not been fulfilled, at least for the population of the global South, which has been subjected to massive violence and impoverishment. But the problem of the economization of all areas and democratic procedures in neoliberalism is not restricted to the periphery. Neoliberalism is constitutively illiberal, for what is at stake here is always the representation and depiction of the individual and groups in an ongoing construction of both identities and a consensus of social forces. But at the end of the day, this is not modeled as peaceful and liberal, but as forcefully integrating.

What is at stake here is a concept of unrestricted judgment and freedom of radical democratization, which is distorted into the normalization of precisely this faculty of judgment by itself. Judith Butler points to this problem as the late modern ‘ghostly’ creation of rules always to be adapted by a ‘*managerial power*’. What is at stake are “rules that are not binding by virtue of established law or modes of legitimation, but fully discretionary, even arbitrary, wielded by officials who interpret them unilaterally and decide the condition and form of their invocation.” (Butler 2004, p.62)

Through this lens, the situation of the late modern subject appears as radically disenfranchised precisely in communal processes of deliberation. Its only perspective on itself as capable of free judgment beyond the demand for conformity seems to be completely irrational and excessively violent. But it is pre-

cisely this supposedly amorphous subject that points to the manifold of human life scripts as irreducible to calculation. Balibar calls it the ‘non human’ and ‘all too human’: “but taken together (and they certainly do not form a *tout*, an ‘all’ or a ‘whole’), all these singularities are the majority, the quasi-totality of mankind.” (Balibar 2012, p. 226)

This critique opens up a new meaning of globalization and, at the same time, of the concept of a ‘human right’. A ‘Human right’ now appears as the right to a receptive acknowledgment of difference. The idea of cosmopolitan interaction gives up the paradigm of cooperation in favor of a conception of the other as withdrawn, never grasped and determined. In fact, it shows the need for the interruption of the activity of a continuing world interpretation and practice. This interruption reveals another figure of practice as requiring the bearing of dissent and of confrontations.

Instead of deliberating and calculating as a basis of human practice and interaction, this conception of ‘self-determination against oneself’ implies a critique as the renouncement and interruption of one’s habitual ways of acting and judging. Foucault coins the concept of “the *art of not being governed* or, better, the art of not being governed like that and at that cost” (Foucault 1997, p. 29). This account allows a development of a concept of globalization and a practice of it in which freedom figures as contra-dominion—not as a cooperation of potentially all under the same calculus, but as an endurance of incomprehension and even of aversion against the other.

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Markus Tiedemann

Defense of ‘Soft’ Universalism or ‘Clash of Civilizations’

Abstract: Even the politically more tolerant parts of the world are in no way immune to cultural and national delimitation. The world seems to identify with Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*. International organizations like the United Nations try to push back. One attempt is the UNESCO program ‘Philosophy, a School of Freedom’, the declared aim of which is to provide a prophylaxis against radicalization and dogmatism. This article points out three specific accomplishments of philosophical education and their significance for the impending ‘clash of civilizations’: (i) philosophical education as differentiation and critique; (ii) philosophical education as a defense for universalism; and (iii) philosophical education as transcendental tolerance education.

The Struggle of Cultures and the role played by philosophical education

Both the awareness and the configuration of the political international situation have undergone a dramatic paradigm shift. As to how greatly the asserted or actual ‘struggle of the cultures’ dominates minds in general and politics in particular can be shown by citing an optimistic ‘spirit of the times’ of a previous era. 26 years ago, Fukuyama’s assertion of the ‘End of History’ elicited enthusiastic acknowledgement from broad circles of people: scientists, the public at large and politicians (Fukuyama 1992). There were, after all, sufficient grounds for optimism: the ‘bloodless’ revolution of 1989 led to the fall of the Berlin Wall and put an end to the division of the European continent. The so-called ‘Cold War’ was at an end and the successor nation states of the U.S.S.R. were aspiring to democracy. Parliamentaryism in the countries of the newly founded Commonwealth of Independent States proved to be sufficiently resistant. Long despaired-of disarmament agreements were ratified. The Republic of South Africa overcame ‘Apartheid’ and the world celebrated presidents such as Nelson Mandela or Vaclav Havel. The conflict in Northern Ireland was pacified and Israelis and Palestinians extended each other the hand.

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However, this stage was concluded by September 11th 2001, at the latest. This was the greatest symbolic scenario of an open attack on Western life and culture, and demanded new explanation and categorization. A suitable exponent was already available: Huntington's lecture, article, paper and book, all linked by titles containing *Clash of Civilizations*. A paradigm shift was again introduced. The 'Struggle of the Cultures' became the predominant interpretative sample for national and international conflicts. Dramatic, politically adverse decisions and wars against international law became an expression of as well as a catalyst for such developments.

The United Nations, which has become an organization of coagulated ideas of global international understanding, has very little to offer as counteraction to such disturbing developments. One initiative is the UNESCO program 'Philosophy, a School of Freedom'. Philosophical education, the declared aim of the global project, is to act as a prophylaxis against any form of radicalization and dogmatism. The idea is to promote a 'world citizen' of majority age, who does not perceive plurality as a threat, but proceeds to participate in collective opinion-forming by means of critical judgment. Federico Mayor Zaragoza couched this idea in the following terms:

Philosophy and Democracy urge each of us to exercise our capacity for judgement, to choose for ourselves the best form of political and social organisation, to find our own values, in short, to become fully what each of us is, a free being. Among so many dangers, we have no other hope. (Mayor 1995, p. 12)

But what can philosophical education achieve amidst the increasing 'clash of civilizations'? I will highlight in this article three specific accomplishments of philosophical education and their significance for the impending 'clash of civilizations': (i) philosophical education as differentiation and critique; (ii) philosophical education as a defense for universalism; and (iii) philosophical education as transcendental tolerance education.

A differentiated image of the 'clash of civilizations'

When Samuel P. Huntington published his article "The Clash of Civilizations?" in 1993 in the journal *Foreign Affairs*, the publishers claimed that he triggered more debates in the first three years thereafter than any other contribution published since the 1940s (cf. Huntington 1996, p. 11). Huntington's principal claim maintains that coherence, disintegration and conflict in a world after the end of the

Cold War is no longer emphasized through ideologies and/or individual nation states, but by borders and the interplay of so-called 'cultural spheres', which can be defined by the eight great cultures of the globe (cf. Huntington 1996, p. 19).

The 'One-World Theory', as expounded at the end of the Cold War, and the triumph of liberal democracy by leading politicians and intellectuals, are considered by Huntington to be naïve and unrealistic. Furthermore, he believes that the universal hegemony claim of the West will lead not towards harmony but to conflict with other cultural spheres. Increasing integrational pressure in the global world, he maintains, will increase withdrawal into the own cultural identity of nation states and their individuals, and although the nation states will remain the more important actors, their negotiations will be more and more influenced by cultural awareness. "The world will decline into a Western civilization and many Non-Western civilizations" (Huntington 1996, p. 95).

Fukuyama's assertion of the 'End of History' is considered by Huntington to be a great error. In no way, he maintains, will Western culture automatically become a future universal world culture. Western consumer goods are well known and appreciated throughout the world through economic networking and communication, but the 'central characteristics of the West' are neither industrialization nor lifestyle products. Huntington moreover points to the separation of spiritual and political power, the rule of law, social pluralism, representative organs and individualism (Huntington 1996, p. 99). Such attributes were not necessarily exported with the modernization of other nation states. Modernization is not the same as 'Westernization', but only reinforces the resistance of other cultures towards the West and tends to reduce its worldwide influence. According to Huntington, the survival of Western culture will depend on the appreciation that one's own culture is 'unique but not universal' and is to be understood as worthy of both protection and renewal (Huntington 1996, p. 20).

No matter what one's attitude may be towards Huntington's theories, his forecasts have arrived and are being received to a breath-taking extent. In actual fact, cultural conflicts have predominated the twenty-first century. Economic and power-political aspects have played important roles. The separating characteristics of individual groups have always been central fault lines. Huntington describes such fault-line conflicts from which controversies can emerge (Huntington 1996, p. 253). According to Huntington, the Ukraine is a culturally split country. The western half has been dominated partially by Poland, Lithuania and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, whilst the eastern half has been dominated by Russian Orthodoxy. These differences can be found at the political and language level (Huntington 1996, p. 264). Huntington uses the Ukraine as an example of a constitution no longer being able to unite a country; what is instead

needed is a reorganization on the basis of cultural values. He states that “the differences between West and East Ukraine are manifested in the attitudes of the people” (Huntington 1996, p. 264), and that for this reason, “the Ukraine will devolve into two portions along its fault line, and the eastern part of the Donbas will merge with Russia.” (Huntington 1996, p. 266)

Despite the admiration for Huntington’s astuteness and acumen, his interpretation of world affairs is neither mandatory nor without alternatives. Furthermore, the query presents itself as to whether *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* turns out to be an objective phenomenon, or only presents one possible explanation of world events. In the latter case, an additional query presents itself, namely that of causality. Has the actual effect of world affairs generated this theory, or does an all-dominating interpretation of world affairs have the effect of producing corresponding political power-awareness and decision-taking as self-fulfilling prophecies? A philosophical reflection has the assignment of inspecting such aspects and thereby of investigating the use of terminologies, and the coherence and consistency of the resultant inferences and conclusions.

It is of interest to note that Huntington’s *Civilizations* has been translated into German as *Kulturen*. As a matter of fact, Huntington’s understanding of the term seems to originate from that metaphysically ‘weighted’ context, which is allocated to the sphere of the German cultural concept. It is not necessary to enter into the details of the largely superfluous German-French Culture-Civilization dispute. In fact, Immanuel Kant was using the term *Kultur* (culture) to demarcate ‘moral advance’ from technical and organizational progression (‘civilization’). In this manner, Kant does not propound a ‘cultural concept’ characterized by ‘blood and soil’, but takes up a position close to the French civilization concept of the Enlightenment. Of interest above all is that the civilization concept of the Enlightenment has an ‘including’ aspect, whereas the alleged German culture concept has an ‘excluding’ effect (Fisch 1992). From the time of the Enlightenment up to the catastrophe of the First World War, this civilization concept stood for the ethical progression of all rationally gifted beings. Huntington tends to fade out this tradition of the French civilization concept, or rejects this out of hand as the ‘Davos Culture’ of a disappearing ‘small educational elite’ (Huntington 1996, p. 78). International successes as well as the power of the individual are left unmentioned. People have always succeeded in overcoming their cultural emphasis in favor of a universal perspective. Ethical universalism in the sense of the Enlightenment needs neither a common religion nor a common language. The United Nations are a case in point, and the European Union has, over decades, succeeded in converting the most warlike of continents into a community of peace and common values.

It would also appear questionable to deny economic interdependence and communication from any form of peace-promoting effects. Of course, the dissemination of Western consumer goods and pop culture does not equate to correspondence with Western values, but their effects go beyond techniques and fashion. Films, according to Huntington, are only entertainment and not cultural conversions, and have always been otherwise interpreted and evaluated (Huntington 1996, p. 80). But could not emancipated female protagonists, for example, generate the idea of 'equal rights' and their attractiveness for women, via dancing and sports films? If it were otherwise, numerous nation states could waive the censoring of their press and media. More communication means more information on what moral values exist in the world, and how life would look with them. The ability to know alternatives represents the basis for a reflective observation of one's own life conditions, and can be a trigger for discussion (Baumann 1992, p. 1966–1983). Moreover, the justification is missing, that values like separation of power or freedom of speech cannot be attractive to people of different cultural persuasions.

For example the 'Global Ethic Project' of Hans Küng (Küng 1990) rests upon the assumption that the cultures and religions of the world are not all that dissimilar, and that similar basic values exist. 'Murder' is almost always negatively connoted, while other institutions such as the family, on the other hand, are given positive significance. Huntington does not dispute this diagnosis, but draws attention to the fact that humanity's warlike past is also proved by history (Huntington 1996, p. 76). The hope, however, that sooner or later identical universal cultural values will be generated in all cultural spheres is decidedly denied by Huntington. He sends a clear denial to the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment. Progression in the cultural spheres is primarily of a demographic, technical and military, but not of an ethical nature. Civilization is thus reduced to the level of 'technical' accomplishments, whilst identity is coupled with the metaphysical concept of 'culture'.

The civilization concept in the French tradition is thus not substantially invalidated. The core of this understanding of civilization is embedded in the demarcation to barbarism, as a higher degree of refinement and sophistication, which can be measured by the objective standards of 'bourgeoisie'. Civilization thus restricts itself to formal ethical criteria, without negating cultural backgrounds. If rules could be instituted so that people could live together as kind of 'worldcitizens', then a universal culture would not be necessary; a form of civilization along French lines would be sufficient. The 'clash of the civilizations' is thus, at least in the concept itself, not at all without alternatives.

Conceptual proof for an alternative may not be deemed to vouch for its ethical consistency. For this purpose, an explicit defense of universalism is required.

The defense of a ‘soft’ universalism

Huntington is a ‘cultural relativist’. The West is perhaps ‘unique’, but represents no ‘universal’ culture (Huntington 1996, p. 513).

Whoever seeks to defend universalism will be confronted with a variety of reproaches. These will extend from scientific theoretical ignorance all the way to cultural intolerance. In this respect, the representatives of ‘relativism’ are also altogether ambivalent. In day-to-day discussions, people who represent the argument ‘other cultures, other morals’ suddenly understand that they give up the possibility of a cross-border cultural and moral understanding. Science theorists who declare metasciences, such as philosophy, to be superfluous then regret that a real exchange between the individual scientific disciplines is thus impossible. However, the regret of such consequences is no argument against the truth of an existent matter of fact.

Any defense of universalism must therefore be practiced on the theoretical as well as the practical level. Any sort of truth-theoretical discussion would go beyond the limits of this paper. For this reason, the following statements are based upon an epistemic concept of truth. Truth is the case, independent of insight or acceptance. At the same time, rational beings should be in a position to recognize portions of such transcendently perceived truths, and to show their validity intersubjectively. Consensus constitutes no truths in itself, but can enhance the probability of truthful and justified opinions in the form of a non-hierarchical dialogue, by way of the maximization of information. Wittgenstein’s or Foucault’s difference between ‘being true’ and ‘being in the truth’, is nothing more than the difference between truth with or without recognition.

The following statements occupy themselves with the defense of a ‘soft’ universalism. An attempt is made here to show that (A) a participation in epistemic oriented discourses is culture-independent, and that (B) generally binding values can be achieved during such discourses.

A culture-independent participation in an epistemic discourse (A) is a matter, of course, in discourse theory, and has experienced concrete form in philosophical didactics. According to Martens, philosophy is an elementary cultural technique of human life. As a result, not every culture, but every human being can participate in the philosophical search for truth. Philosophy and/or philosophizing is a ‘cultural technique’ because it is a characteristic of human culture in general, and of the Greek-European culture in particular (Martens 2003, pp. 30–31). Its etiology may well be strongly European influenced, but its essence is not. Philosophy as ‘cultural technique’ means craftsmanship or artistry, as well as knowledge of suitable materials and theories. A cultural technique is

teachable and learnable for every human being. Philosophizing is thus a cross-cultural act of intellectual orientation. All people are equipped with the capability of abstracting themselves from cultural influences via pure reason. A discourse on concrete moral questions is seldom realizable without cultural influences and misunderstandings. Such, however, is not valid for the transcendental criterion of 'good'. An intersubjective discourse on the circumstances of the possibility of being able to say whether an action or a motive is 'good' can be adopted by any human being whose reason is able to differentiate between reality and norms. A cross-cultural participation in epistemic discourses is therefore possible of consistent thinking. For this purpose, it is not necessary to raise oneself independently into the position of an intelligible person. It is sufficient to provide, adopt and verify justifications. A universal perspective can either be promoted by the rules of discourse or by experiments like Rawls's 'veil of ignorance'.

The same could apply for the possibility of generally binding topics (B). Verities (even the normative type) tend to go beyond the context in which they are discovered. In the descriptive sciences, the differentiation between claim and etiology is a matter of fact. Many mathematical principles were defined in the Maghreb sphere without losing their validity in Europe. Architectural principles are valid on all continents independent of the cultural sphere of their proponents. It is rather more a fact of life that numerous inventions and knowledge have been discovered and recognized independently of each other at various locations of the Earth concurrently—a fact to indicate 'multi-genre' verities.

In fact, the epistemic, normative and emotional confusions inherent in the modern have led in many places to a Renaissance of 'closed' concepts and world outlooks. Huntington interpreted this development as a withdrawal into the cultural identity and the cultural sphere. Such analysis, however, does not indicate that cultural relativism is without alternatives. Just because we find it difficult to redeem our epistemic self-pretension does not mean that this has to be given up. Authorities such as Wittgenstein, Lyotard or Zygmunt Bauman may have lastingly destroyed the hope of a final justification of ethical standards, but this does not mean 'anything goes', like Feyerabend suggests. We can still differentiate between the quality of arguments (Tetens 2004, p. 23), or between sophisticated and unreflected self-interest (Gosepath 1992, p. 49). Whoever undertakes such efforts ends up like Tugendhat—in no final certainty, but in a thick tissue of motives and reasons (Tugendhat 1993, p. 89). Martha Nussbaum mentions a vague but strong and resilient concept of 'good' (Nussbaum 1993, pp. 323–363). The possibility of an 'overlapping consensus' (Rawls 1971, p. 340) is thus not bound to an expansion of a cultural sphere. It is rather more dependent on the extent to which self-discipline, social background and

education enable anyone to approximate to the viewpoint of an intelligible person.

The option of procedure-ethical universalism is demonstrated by different theories. One is Otfried Höffe's justification for human rights. The claim to 'human rights' can today no longer be taken for granted. In February 2014, a flyer was passed from hand to hand among the student community in Berlin, in which human rights were described as the 'European centrist concoction of a post-colonial system of repression.' Huntington would probably disapprove of such a vulgar, Marxist background of the student authors—but at the same time, similarities can be recognized. According to the student authors then, human rights would be a 'product of the West'. They are unique, but not universal. Such an assessment has been resisted by numerous authoritative authors. One of the more important contributions originates from Höffe and was published in 1996, the same year as the book version of Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations*.

Although the ethics behind human rights may pose no final justification, they are certainly not arbitrary or imperialistic. Höffe builds his argumentation upon a minimalistic anthropology. It matters not how independent and divergent our cultural 'imprint' may be; we can certainly agree that we are bodily, purely rational, social and political beings. Any intervention into such necessities will restrict our 'freedom of action', and will thus prevent us from realizing our understanding of a successfully led life. Any build-up of differentiability presupposes the capacity to act. Since human rights seek to protect such a 'capacity to act', they become a guarantee for diversity and disparity (Höffe 1996, p. 67). This has nothing to do with the 'imperialism' of an 'American way of life', but instead with the circumstances of the possibility of a diversity. Höffe mentions a 'transcendental exchange' that, similar to Rawls's 'veil of ignorance', constructs an intelligible decision-taking situation:

Transcendentality is that which one implicitly affirms, provided that one always seeks what one wills; transcendental means the circumstances, that one can have and pursue normal interests. (Höffe 1996, p. 77)

To put it another way, whoever claims the entitlement to be otherwise in society, must also claim 'human rights'. The concept propounded by Höffe should not be seen as a final justification. Nevertheless the criteria of reciprocity (as propounded by Forst) and of intersubjective communicability are fulfilled.

Transcendental tolerance education

In 1995, two years after the first appearance of Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*, UNESCO published its explanation of tolerance:

Article 1: Meaning of tolerance

1.1 Tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in difference. It is not only a moral duty, it is also a political and legal requirement. Tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace. (UNESCO 1995)

In this definition, UNESCO lays great hope upon school education in general, and philosophical teaching in higher education in particular. This was underscored by the publication of the UNESCO program 'Philosophy, a School of Freedom' (UNESCO 2007). Even in the curriculums in the schools of many European countries, 'tolerance' is recognized as an educational objective in philosophical schooling (Bruening 1998). The representatives of the subjects for school curriculums themselves even promoted such expectant behavior. The possibility is emphasized of bringing together young people of various cultures and origins in a mutual, normative discourse.

But, what exactly can philosophy education and the cultivation of tolerance contribute to society? Essentially, two forms of tolerance education can be differentiated: the first model represents 'tolerance educational content', in which a 'canon' of behavior and forms of life to be tolerated and accepted is communicated; and the second model can be designated as 'transcendental tolerance education'. The latter concept provides no obligatory content, but attempts to promote the circumstances of the possibilities of discernment and tolerance. Basically, the matter revolves around a 'reorientation' of attitudes and thinking, understood as an explanation of terminology and categories, as well as any non-preconceived results of the discussions of individual queries.

A contextual education in tolerance, understood as a presentation of explicit norms, may be indispensable. This applies to instructions in legal and statutory affairs, as well as to integration in already existing social and cultural circumstances. Philosophical reflection is, however, *a priori* unbiased. In 'teaching methodology', this difficulty is, however, described as a 'values communicative dilemma' (Tiedemann 2015, pp. 23–29).

"We love people who say straight out what they mean, provided they think on lines like us". This was said to be propounded by Mark Twain and shows that

it requires several mutes to conduct real philosophic education. Philosophy is not the administrator of a selective level of ideas: it is the call to thinking for ourselves, and the cultivation of that habit. The radicalism of the philosophical *sapere aude* manifests itself in its principle of incompatibility with normative targeted goals. This also applies to the issuance of legislative and constitutional texts.

Whoever postulates that philosophical reflection leads to a primacy of democracy, human rights and humanism is in error. Of course, antidemocratic drafts can be convincingly justified and many philosophers were definitely not democrats. Is Plato's idea of the philosophical tyrant unacceptable because it is antidemocratic? Should a school pupil who, after thorough reconstruction and critical reflection, aligns him- or herself with Plato, receive a 'bad' grade? Certainly not. The dogmatic communication of a basic-value canon and the naturalness of philosophical education are contradictorily opposed. A philosophical accomplishment can be measured by the quality of its argumentation and not by compliance with 'political correctness'.

What effect, therefore, does transcendental tolerance education produce? Let us commence with the explanation of categorical terminology and differentiations. An example might be the differentiation propounded by Immanuel Kant between 'knowledge, opinion and faith'. Even the understanding of this differentiation alone can cultivate the circumstances for the possibility of tolerance. Whoever has perfectly understood that the essence of faith is the fact that it is sufficiently credible for the faithful, without requiring any form of substantiation by others, obtains a strongly effective dogmatism prophylaxis.

It is also possible that for an understanding of tolerance itself, philosophical education can provide valuable perceptions. The initial benefit is the possibility of being able to counteract the inflationary, non-binding and thus worthless application of the term 'tolerance'. Its derivation from the Latin root *tolerare* shows the necessity of having to bear or suffer an unliked issue. Therefore, tolerance must be justified. It is the same for both those who claim tolerance, and those who reject tolerance: both have to explain their reasons in discussion. Only those arguments that can be communicated reciprocally or intersubjectively will be acknowledged. 'We always did it like that' or 'I do not want that' are, in fact, no arguments at all. Provided that the arguments are sufficiently convincing, the dispute is then settled. In the case of tolerance, a tendency to a rejection of the disputed issue remains. The argument is in itself acceptable, but not its claim.

Of particular relevance in this respect, is the unbiased discussion of concrete cases of conflict: May a hijacked aircraft be shot down? Is the circumcision of boys and youths unacceptable without medical indication? Are burkas a sign

of cultural diversity or an attack on a liberal society? Should 'consuming embryonic research' be permitted? Should a liberal democratic nation state be allowed to impose obligatory healthcare insurance upon its citizens? How voluntary may marriages be? Are honor and respect benefits that need to be earned, or is everyone entitled to them? When and where can public religious ceremonies be tolerated? How much tolerance should a state-run school system display for immigrant traditions and customs? May an individual be a dual citizen of both a democratic and an undemocratic nation state? Queries such as these can be explained, analyzed and interpreted between parties of different cultural and religious traditions.

Within the context of a multi-cultural society, philosophical teaching in the curriculums of schools obtains a quite particular significance for the arbitration of conflicts. How can the voluntary action of an individual way of life and collective integration be guaranteed? How can incursions be hindered? Does not history show that political and cultural communities tend to bind their members to themselves all too often by the selection and manipulation of information or by primitive compulsion? Who is going to protect the individual from his own community? Pascal Bruckner reproached those representatives of a naïve multiculturalism for being anti-racist racists. Bruckner speaks of a 'paradox of multiculturalism', in which all the various communities are granted the same treatment, but not their members, because they refuse them the freedom of renouncing their own traditions (Bruckner 2007, p. 58).

Indeed, an example of negative dialectic looms at this point. The heart of racism is to reduce the individual down to its affiliation to an ethnic or cultural sphere. There is also a differentiation between 'persecution racism' and 'neglect racism'. Recent German history produced an example of the cruelest persecution racism in form of the Holocaust. The human rights of millions of individuals were trampled on, because of a reduction to members of a target group of hostility. The rule of persecution racism says: 'We infringe upon your human rights, because you belong to a certain group of people'. In order to prevent such barbarism from ever again raising its head, meticulous efforts are made, especially in Europe, at not discriminating against racial or cultural groups. This is quite right and desirable, as the primacy of individual rights may not be relativized. Otherwise, 'neglect racism' is encouraged, which again reduces an individual down to his affinity to a group. The rule of neglect racism says: 'We will not protect your human rights, because you belong to a certain group of people'.

Even UNESCO takes up the position that tolerance and multicultural cohabitation should be subjected to binding rules and regulations. In its Declaration of Principles on Tolerance, the following is pronounced:

1.2 Tolerance is not concession, condescension or indulgence. Tolerance is, above all, an active attitude prompted by recognition of the universal human rights and fundamental freedoms of others. In no circumstance can it be used to justify infringements of these fundamental values. (UNESCO 1995)

Nevertheless, such a proclamation is far from being a legitimization. The indication that numerous nation states had voluntarily obligated themselves to complying with such principles is, of course, a proper contractual argument—but it loses its binding quality with the arrival of every new generation after the ratification, who did not personally and actively politically ratify the voluntary obligation. The binding effect of human rights may be quite natural for some, but it is unfortunately not self-evident. “Reasonable people have no doubt about certain things”. Julian Nida-Rümelin used this citation from Wittgenstein at the end of his speech to the Congress of the German Philosophical Society in 2014. But even if this remark can be applauded as a position of ‘ethical realism’, the problem is far from being resolved. Do not reasonable people reveal their reasonableness by providing accountability for their decisions and values, and seek to reach others with the unconstrained constraint of a better argumentation? Should not perhaps pure reason be developed and trained?

In this sense, philosophical education is the communication of an elementary ‘cultural technique’ of human way of life (Martens 2003). The teaching of philosophy and ethics are forums for training of ‘giving and taking reasons’. Their aims are not to indoctrinate values, but to negotiate these on the basis of reciprocal argumentation. In this aspect, ethics are more important for the Dalai Lama than religion (Dalai Lama 2015).

For the representatives of a conservative communication of values, all this may well be too little. From the aspect of didactical theory, transcendental tolerance education remains without an alternative. The nurturing of attitudes and philosophical education are not compatible with one another. In addition, the outlook on success far exceeds even speculation: the previously mentioned ‘moral judgment test’ of Georg Lind measures the willingness and capability of appreciating arguments that are directed against one’s own standpoint. On this basis, numerous empirical studies were able to show that the aforementioned capabilities were able to be significantly enhanced (Lind 2003). In the teaching of philosophy and ethics, exactly this happens. The school pupils justify their position and then explain what arguments of the counterparty they can accept or reject. With a little good fortune, an attitude is formed that Voltaire called ‘the philanthropy of intelligence’. The way in this direction leads philosophical education towards being a form of transcendental tolerance education.

The hope and adumbration of UNESCO is anything but unjustified. Philosophical education by itself cannot stop the 'clash of civilizations'—but its contribution is, however, indispensable. Without any critical analysis of a dominant paradigm, without a defense of universalism and without any education of discernment and transcendental tolerance, a further induration of the clash of cultures is not to be avoided.

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The Places of Critical Universalism: Postcolonial and Decolonial Approaches in Context

Abstract: This paper argues that the validity of universalism in the era of global capitalism does not imply a smooth, undifferentiated spatiality, in which particularity is eliminated. The contemporary systemic logic is reproduced in *places* where the universal and the particular are dialectized. This new dynamic raises the possibility of a *critical universalism* capable of evading the objection to Eurocentrism. In order to elaborate the conditions of critical universalism, I consider the debates on postcolonial studies, the proposed decolonial option in Latin America and the discussions that it raises.

Introduction

This chapter proposes a contemporary discussion of universalism. It is argued that a concept of ‘critical universalism’ allows us to understand decisive features of current debates on the legacy of the Enlightenment within a different historical framework defined by globalization.

The critical character of universalism does not refer only to its re-composition after a prolonged period of rejection by a context strongly influenced by particularist notions. Also and above all, it is aimed at showing its derivative, secondary and reactive character regarding a universal order of domination that precedes it. This order is based on the emergence and prevalence of a capitalist logic that subsumes the contradictory lines structuring the global world in which we live today.

The first section elaborates the notion of ‘places of universalism’ in order to show that the re-composition of universalism is not a return to the old monological universalism. I will not analyze whether the monologism attributed to universalism as established from the Enlightenment is historically accurate (although historical studies have provided a panorama of differences and nuances far from the flat Eurocentrism with which universalism wanted to be identified). Rather, to move forward more quickly, I will explain why *critical universalism* cannot be adequately developed without considering its ‘places’.

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The second section shows the peculiarities of critical universalism, such as that it is comprehensible from the Latin American and Latin Americanist receptions of postcolonial and decolonial theories. I explore the tensions inherent in postcolonialism as a rejection of Eurocentrism and the non-essentialist quest for a critical conception of universalism. One of the features of postcolonialism as it has been received in Latin American cultural spaces is to exceed mere copying or translation without modification. The most well-known intellectual movement of the active reception attempts has been the so-called ‘decolonial option’. Rather than enter into the study of the transformations operated by the decolonial perspective (of which I will nonetheless offer some analytical considerations), I am interested in placing it in the series of an endless tension inherent in the rejection of universalism. That rejection can only be a moment of universalism itself. In other words, even beyond the fantasies of an ‘own’ thought, emancipated from Eurocentric intellectual oppression, the issues and problems presented by the decolonial option reveal the demands of a critical universalism. A brief visit to the considerations of Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui will show that the debate is far from exhausted.

In the conclusion, I suggest why the understanding of universalism in its ‘places’ requires both a philosophical approach that can conceive its logic (not accessible only empirically or scientifically) and a historical reconstruction—i.e., a historiographical genealogy.

The places of universalism

For many decades, at least in this broad and ambiguous cultural space called the West, universalism has been rejected. The re-evaluation of ‘difference’ or ‘particularity’, especially in the postmodernist moment of thought, led to a blurring of positive evaluations of universalism. Universalism was seen as the more or less immediate expression of a process of domination of the Other; of the subjugation of otherness to the Same.

It is not the aim of this discussion to subject to criticism this attribution to all universalism of an imperial and monological destiny. While some philosophies of history were constructed according to unilineal and evolutionary patterns, resulting in an indisputable normativity that consecrated a path to the best without alternatives, it is equally true that other approaches revised the oppressive pretensions evident in such historical-philosophical narratives. What is important is that the monological and colonial/imperial image was the one that governed, by opposition, the vindication of the particular before the oppression of the universal.

During the last quarter of the twentieth century, particularism claimed the rights of a weak critical thinking—a *pensiero debole*: first, thanks to the moderate relativism of culturalist and structuralist theories especially active after the second post-war period; then, since the late 1960s, in an ontological fragmentarism deployed by poststructuralism, in which the minor and the different hold the moment of validity.

The postmodern moment of thought contained the main themes against a universalism stripped of any emancipatory aspiration and identified with a hidden or manifest oppressive will. Postmodern slogans are well known and it is unnecessary to reiterate their main topics. Instead, I want to recover the postmodernist challenge of the whole, or of totality. Indeed, the main objection against the totality in that order of reasons consists in attributing to it a systematic connection with the oppression of the totality on the parts.

Of course, it is possible to submit to the sieve of logical consistency the postmodern statement of particularity, and to show how it is possible only in contradistinction to a regretted totality. In other words, how difference and ‘the other’ are unthinkable without the shadow of wholeness. This was perceptible from the beginning in Jean-François Lyotard’s book on *The Postmodern Condition* (1979), a ‘condition’ that happened to the one where the modern condition had prevailed. It was observed on numerous occasions that the postmodern rejection of totality and its solidary terms (Sense, History, Evolution) implied a philosophy of history.

The theoretical weakness of postmodernism then lies in the absence of a theory of its own possibility, since particularism leads to a relativism by which both the aspirations of modernity and those of postmodernism are undermined. However, logical inconsistency does not invalidate the discursive and cultural existence of postmodernism.

It was Fredric Jameson (1991) who best placed its reality and its historical reason. By postulating it as “the cultural logic of late capitalism,” Jameson allowed us to represent the true aspects and false aspects of postmodernism within an enriched explanatory framework. Postmodernism thus ceased to be a mistake or a decline in radical relativism to constitute a moment of the expansion of capitalism in its most novel phase.

With globalization, theoretical ‘actuality’ reaches a new challenge because we can understand, in the face of the failure of the analytical capacities provided by postmodernism to account for what is happening, the need for a re-composition of an understanding to which totality and particularity do not constitute an irreducible opposition.

My thesis is that postmodernism prevents the development of an active and comprehensive thinking on globalization. This is certainly not the time to at-

tempt a description, however succinct, of what globalization is, but I offer some general features to follow in my argument.

I understand by globalization a multi-dimensional historical process of global interconnection mediated by the world market. In a stricter sense, it is the world market that constitutes globalization. It is not by chance that globalization has attained a clearer intelligibility after the collapse of the Soviet Union and China's definitive passage into the market economy: globalization was made possible by the victory of the capitalist market in expanding to fully cover the globe. I do not think that the so-called 'really existing socialism' (Kurz, 1994) freed itself from the internal pressures of the capitalist market, but I want to highlight that since the events of 1989–91, the continuous development of the mercantile dynamic has advanced by leaps and bounds. This dynamic is not only economic. It is crucial to neutralise any economic reductionism.

Globalization is also internally interwoven between its economic aspects, cultural dimensions, communications and wars, with political and migratory expressions. The common thread, as I have mentioned, is mercantile mediation. But if such mediation is possible, it is due to the reproduction of a global subject, without will or consciousness—a purely automatic subject, which is what Marx called 'the logic of capital'.

It is important to note that the logic of capital is not only economic, and in that sense the concept of globalization is enriching because it far exceeds the economicist reduction of capital. As Pierre Bourdieu pointed out (although in his time he did it in debate with the economism of 'historical materialism'), there are 'capitals' in other orders, such as social and cultural. Bourdieu (1986) perceived, in his sociological and anthropological inquiries, the flexibility of a capitalist logic that long ago exceeded the competition for monetary accumulation.

In his analysis of postmodernism, Jameson points to another trait, later taken up in an anti-dialectical approach by authors such as Antonio Negri, who modifies the notion of Fordist society in the expansive period of capitalism (Negri and Hardt, 2000): the flexibility and structured destructuring of capitalist production, where totality and part, identity and difference, are no longer incompatible. The social decomposition by the end of full employment, the fracture of identities, the flows of people and goods, the mixtures of subjects and the defensive reactions to the loss of a stable sense of reality form a very different experience than the one forged during the nineteenth century and the first two thirds of the twentieth century. That is precisely what postmodernism cannot think: that a logic of domination is particularist and totalist at the same time. It deprives itself of something more than its formalist rejection of totality: it rests on a mistaken or, rather, antiquated social theory, for it supposes the determin-

istic framework of Fordist capitalism as the antithesis of a radically fragmented and disconnected actuality. On the other hand, the intellectual challenge behind the crisis of the alternatives posed to capitalism in the twentieth century is to think that the complexity and globality of the planet follow a logic that encompasses them, and that makes their contradictions the engine of their conflictive growth.

Capitalist globalization replaces in new terms the denounced universalism. If it is true that, as Alain Badiou (2003) proposed in his interpretation of the origins of universalism at a certain point in Christianity, a history of universalism can be traced in the *longue durée*, it is a discontinuous history. What is interesting to note here is that at the end of the twentieth century we experienced the fall of the universalism proper to the 'bourgeois world' that emerged around 1800 in much of the world, with very different historical figures. The emergence of 'the rights of man', with its lights and shadows, was an expression of that universalism that was rational and emancipatory.

The present moment of universalism is not merely a continuation of its modern episode. It is certainly historically linked to it, but not its immediate derivation. If, on the one hand, the universalism raised by globalization is incomprehensible without the modern era of the 'bourgeois world', on the other hand it constitutes a novel phase. In order for the transition to be not arbitrary, it should be considered as a self-transformation of capital in its unsurpassed crisis that has dragged on since the mid-1970s and the factual novelty of its triumph over bureaucratic socialism.

The novelty of the universalism of the twenty-first century global order (at least in what we can see in its initial stages) lies in its reconversion of the national constitution of the real that prevailed during the nationalist framework of world-market configuration during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It should be made clear that while nationalisms affirmed the substantive and non-transferable character of each national experience, the state-based nation was a modern invention.

Today, it is not that national boundaries have ceased to exist, or that they lack a decisive role in the construction of economic-social and political-cultural systems. It happens that they are organized differently in the concert of global flows of greater vigour. How? To clarify this is the task of, to put it in Foucault's terms, an ontology of our actuality (Foucault, 1984).

It is precisely here that the question of universalism is presented as an impulse of thought. Irreducible to the already obsolete theoretical coordinates of postmodernism, an ontology of the present time requires an account of the decisive tendencies of globalization and its systemic orientations. The aspect of

these tendencies that I have proposed to analyze is the situation of a universalism that requires to be conceived of as a chapter of globalization.

To move to the more 'localized' phase of my argument, I will summarize in just a few lines (for reasons of space) why, in my opinion, the thematization of universalism as it is today is still possible to elucidate through a reinterpretation of Marx's critical legacy.

It is beyond dispute that the capitalist structure studied by Marx in *Capital* has as an empirical reference a historically constituted logic. This generates a real problem in the reconstruction of the validity or relevance of the Marxist critique of capital as an alienated subject when its social condition has changed. Indeed, Marx's capitalism is very close to its initial formations among which, for example, cartelization is in its infancy. The 'intervening' state plays a marginal role compared to the one it will have in the next century.

Again, summing up an idea that would merit further development, I argue that the logic of the expanded reproduction of capital is still valid in the epoch of globalization—or more precisely, by its extension to a geopolitical order different from that in force in Marx's time, that the logic of capital endures its transformation. The concept of its re-composition is the metamorphosis and not the radical rupture towards a postcapitalist reality. Capital does not entail a specifically economic reason in its monetary empirical figure, but the generation of 'the social as such', with its many facets, including the seemingly more subtle and immaterial.

The universality of capital preserves the political-cultural universalities that have usually been considered by political philosophy and by philosophy *tout court*. Democracy as an empty place of power that must be endorsed periodically by the citizens' vote as separate atoms, the constitution of individuals as subjects of rights and the formation of a public sphere in unlimited expansion are among other terms of the universality that has been maintained, despite the fact that the advance of global capitalism has also been accompanied by a privatizing tendency.

The devaluation of mass politics, the particularization of communication through the Internet, the multiplication of media and networks that mediate even sexual and affective relations, transform the ideals of universality that in the eighteenth century had a strong imprint provided by Antiquity. There are no exemplary models for conceiving contemporary universality. Studies of globalization have convincingly shown that this process is not a simplification of what was once complex. On the contrary, in globalization the success of the globalizing dynamic comes from its ability to mutate *in the particular* and return to the global by incorporating, or metabolizing, the particularity as a singularity of the globally valid.

I return to what I had begun to unfold in regard to the exhaustion of post-modernism. The theoretical and philosophical challenges of our day can no longer take refuge in the seemingly radical agenda of the proliferation of difference, nor can they be addressed naively now that the difference has been shown as incorporable to the logic of self-valorization (aesthetic, political, economic, geopolitical) of capital. Hence it is unfeasible to renounce universalism in order to define a site of resistance in the particular. It is important, rather, to rethink an opposition that may have been inadequately elucidated.

Once the universal and the particular are dialectized by globalization, the universal is no longer only unique, but multiple. In his discussion of universalism, from which I have adopted the notion of ‘critical universalism’, Etienne Balibar (2012) continues to analyse the pluralization of universalism as a distancing from self-reproduction of the same. Balibar defends the idea of the passage from a *universum* to a *multiversum*. However, this distance is obscured by the very singular materiality of global capitalism, where ‘glocalities’ are deployed. It is here that the supposedly radical alternatives of the partial or peculiar, devalued by assuming an old idea of social domination, are wrecked: they defend the particular as a space of resistance when that same particularity is no longer confronted with globality, but is instead produced for this and in this.

The universality of capital continues to provide the social fabric of theoretical, juridical, philosophical and conceptual universalisms, but modulates them according to the ‘places’ of the universal. In this sense, the critical promise of the ‘place of culture’ proposed by Homi Bhabha (1994) is ‘put’ and neutralized by the logic of capital, which makes the localization of culture an input of its valorization.

The universalism that for two centuries, from the mid-eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, founded its emancipatory promises in the removal of the particular as a place of tradition, of hierarchies and continuities of the past, is today revealed as possible only as a product of the contradictions of the universal domination of capital. The critical universalism that I want to support in this text is not a regulative ideal nor the vindication of an essence mutilated by globalization, but the radicalization of some perspectives enabled by the same global domination of capital.

The particularity can not be, in this conceptual context, a defensive or evasive refuge, because it is crossed by a universality that incorporates into its own logic that which in previous centuries appeared as the greatest danger: the positivity, the irreducible. In globalization there are no positivities that threaten the capitalist empire. However, that empire is not completely self-regulated. The contradictions of globalization do not emerge from a collision between the universal

and the particular, but from the way of placing itself, in its various places, with its consequent specificities, in the materiality of situated universality.

I leave here the broader theoretical considerations to interpolate a transition towards what I propose to elaborate in the following section: the definition of a critical theory of globalization. The re-composition of the relation between universalism and particularism as a moment of globalization itself enables ‘negative’ interstices that emerge on the very contradictions of the tension inherent in the global capital and defined in its ‘places’. These places constitute ‘the subjects’ in the discussion that I have been carrying out.

A shortcoming of the notions presented so far is that they lack subjectivities, wills and traditions, knowledge and desires, feelings and politics, as well as emotional and cultural orientations. This introduces the possible places of the universalized in their contexts. Today it seems unworkable to rethink universalism without its ‘places’.

Situated receptions of postcolonial and decolonial “theories”

The efficacy of the places of universalism must be evaluated in different situations. Here I will concentrate on the places that are most familiar to me, relative to the ‘south’ and especially to that southern complex space called Latin America. First, however, I need to look at Indian postcolonial studies.

The fundamentally historical research identified with postcolonial studies had a Gramscian beginning, and soon incorporated Foucaultian and Derridian perspectives. The essence of their historiographical profile did not reside in these intellectual influences but in the conviction that materials from Indian colonial and postcolonial history required particular theoretical and methodological precaution. European historiographical schools were inadequate for problems arising in India after the Independence of 1947 and its historical background.

The postcolonial studies approach, as early as the early 1980s, prioritized the ‘subaltern classes’, and their experiences and resistances, both in the colonial period and in the nationalist state-building process of a nation. The peasantry, the communities and working class making were the issues of their historical accounts. A specificity of postcolonial studies lay in the theoretical sensitivity of their concepts and procedures, which called into question the seemingly universal historiographical traditions of the West.

By the early 1990s postcolonial studies became a ‘postcolonial theory’ that had repercussions even on the faculties of the universities of humanities and social sciences of the Global North. With this theoretical legitimacy (i. e., universal validation), it entered in the spectrum of Latin American conceptual options, to the point that a ‘Latin American Subaltern Studies group’ briefly emerged (Latin American Postcolonial Studies Group, 1993). After a foundational manifesto, these postcolonial studies vanished after producing some works, perhaps the most relevant of which is the *Peasant and nation* by Florence Mallon (1995).

The deferred translation effect of the subaltern studies came from the Latin American and Latin Americanist reinterpretations known today as the ‘decolonial option’, with authors such as Walter Dignolo, Aníbal Quijano, Edgardo Lander, Enrique Dussel and Catherine Walsh. Arturo Escobar (2002) organized the clearest exposition of the project of a critique of coloniality, one aspect of which is particularly relevant for what I am discussing here: the epistemological dimension.

The decolonial option calls for a history of thought, organized chronologically and politically, prior to that outlined by postcolonial studies. It argues that the paradigm of universal reason was constituted by a non-rational subject in America, from 1492: the local cultures reduced to the incomprehensible or in need of acculturation. The Western subject is then the product of a colonial operation that has lasted for centuries and somehow continues today. In fact, for Dignolo (2005) the decolonial option implies a rewriting of the Frankfurtian critical theory beyond its European-universalist cleavages.

The Bolivian intellectual Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, who played a prominent role in the first diffusion of postcolonial studies in Latin America (Barragán and Rivera Cusicanqui, 1997), has objected to the definition of a new decolonial theory generated and legitimized from the academic places of the Global North.

The most interesting aspect of Rivera Cusicanqui’s approach, which is connected with some precisions of the decolonial option (despite her political-academic objections to a university hegemony that speaks for subordinate subjects) is that it does not result in a particularistic variant. As in postcolonial studies, and with the conceptual emphasis of Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000), it is by no means a question of opposing an uncontaminated essence to Eurocentric universalism. Rather, it is about negotiating the relevant aspects of universalism in its liberating strands (for example through the very ‘Western’ demand for ‘rights’, autonomous communities, women’s agency, etc.), with local implementations that involve long and located traditions of social power building. The centrality of the Bolivian case referred to in citing the above-mentioned author is important because it not only exceeds the nationalist argument, but also puts into debate

the multiple levels, scales and temporalities of global places. In that sense, it anticipates issues that will have a huge presence in the coming.

For Rivera Cusicanqui, modernity is present in the same experience of the 'indigenous world', even if it is not within a vision of linear or teleological history. What happens to the universalism inherited from the French Revolution and the Enlightenment? Here I would like to cite some passages from Rivera Cusicanqui:

Today, the rhetoric of equality and citizenship becomes a caricature that conceals tacit political and cultural privileges, notions of common sense that make inconsistency tolerable and allow the reproducing of structures of Colonial oppression. (2010, p. 56–57).

In Rivera Cusicanqui's view, the Bolivian, liberal, populist, postmodern and even postcolonial elites share this rhetoric. From a broad multiculturalism, the notion of the indigenous people as 'minorities' is imposed, in an approach that domesticates and displaces the *pachakuti*, the radical change. Thus, the indigenous demands of 'the issues of modernity' (*las lides de la modernidad*) are excluded and they are confined as peculiarities and stereotypes close to the 'noble savage'. They are deprived of their status as majorities and of the possibility of achieving a 'state effect' (2010, p. 60), i. e., they continue to be 'represented'. They are subordinated as a 'multicultural adornment of neoliberalism' (2010, p. 59). Rivera Cusicanqui distinguishes between the 'modernizing discourse' of the elites and the variegated modernity of indigenous productive activities. Decolonial scholars then reiterate in the epistemological field the 'internal colonialism' that subalternizes indigenous knowledge and especially practices. It is a new colonization in the speaking and knowing by others that they are without voice and whose practices are not effective nor produce reality.

The Aymara term *ch'xi* means the mixed, variegated in the sense elaborated by the Marxist sociologist René Zavaleta Mercado. Rivera Cusicanqui clarifies that, "it raises the parallel coexistence of multiple cultural differences that do not merge, but antagonize or complement each other" (2010, p. 70). It moves away from the masculine notions of identity that are hardly accessible to the *tejido* (fabric) that characterizes the attitude of the women of the communities. For Rivera Cusicanqui, the genre is introduced as a difference of the manifold within the variegated modernity to neutralise the temptation of identity. Rather than a counter- or anti-modernity, it would be a question of building a modernity of the *tejido*, "more organic and self-sufficient" than that driven by elites with Western categories.

Finally, Rivera Cusicanqui proposes another geopolitics of knowledge than that suggested by the decolonial option. She aims for a south-south dialogue in-

stead of the hierarchical and neocolonial north-south connection, of which the aforementioned option would be a masked form.

These debates, outlined here, suggest that contemporary elaborations are situated within an order of reasons where the pure difference has been displaced by a recomposition of the question for universalism in mixture with the particular. Once all access to an authentic and uncontaminated nucleus is no longer possible, the theoretical conceptions in the times of globalization are oriented towards what I call a critical universalism.

It is an analytic of the actuality underpinning the recognition of the mercantile framework and the complexity of the contradictions that inhabit it, where the values of the Enlightenment are not absolutely denied. The question is not about the stage of modernization at which a given national state or community finds itself, but about how they are settled in a concrete situation, with their histories, traditions and conflicts; universal themes such as citizenship, recognition or rights, become unthinkable without their places and subjects. A historiographical sensitivity, freed from the unifying and evolutionary trends of a nationalist historical narrative, is then required to grasp the genealogies of actuality.

Conclusion

With globalization, we witness the re-emergence of universalism, but not in terms of a restoration of its previous figures. Universalism returns as a problem, and in critical terms, as an aspect of the social domination that prevails in the new global order. Critical universalism is characterized not by the unlimited unity of a clear and distinct set of principles, but by the way in which global hegemony happens in local terms, overcoming an opposition between the universal and the particular.

This re-composition that I call a critical universalism does not have a general formula. It requires an insertion of incorporated local histories (not without antagonisms) into an indisputable integration of the globe. This integration is not that of an absolute spirit that 'posits' its particular features as moments of upward evolution, but of one that posits them as crises, tensions, projects and alternatives. These are not derived from an uncontaminated alterity, but from the very contradictions of the global process that must deal infinitely with the subjects, situations and impossibilities immanent to a globalization without command.

This means that viable universalism is not the product of an authentic meaning. It is the internal and troubled reaction of the possibilities stimulated by a blind and generalized universality that we call globalization; a universality

that is incomprehensible without a conception of the ‘new spirit of capitalism’. In any case, it arises as a set of reactions situated with respect to a dominant universal that finds its general explanatory key in the logic of capital—one which still finds in the mature approach of Marx its most convincing basic explanation.

Critical universalism is not then the mere external repulsion of a global domination structured in the flexible flows of capitalism, but the reverse of such flows. Or, more accurately, it is the set of dilemmas that the same domain generates in its contradictory dynamics. It opens the space for a reconsideration of emancipatory possibilities within a critical universalism that demands philosophical reflections, but also inquiries of the *tejidos*, in which local histories are linked to the new global history that dominates universally the contemporary experience.

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2 Ethical Duty: Global Justice



Concha Roldán

The Thinning and Deformation of Ethical and Political Concepts in the Era of Globalization

Abstract: In contemporary literature, it is acknowledged as a fact that while we currently find ourselves facing the ‘Era of Globalization’, still very little work has been done to analyze this concept, which rather appears as a *deus ex machina*; as a product of the contemporary crisis, lacking political history and semantic genealogy, wanting nevertheless to become an explanatory wildcard for all present events, both in a positive and negative sense. The initial thesis of this article is that the current concept of globalization is an empty one that has been stripped of its historical content. This emptying is part of the ‘postmodern’ processes of thinning and deformation afflicting ethical-political concepts (freedom, equality, democracy) by depriving them of their ‘modern’ content without endowing any other. Taking this into account, I defend the consequent thesis that the suppression of these concepts’ semantic history implies in turn the eradication of the ethical commitment that they entailed, whose inheritance by contrast should not be renounced. I conclude that there is the need for a socio-political pedagogy that contributes to transmitting ‘responsibility for the concepts’ that are the true shapers of collective identities. Without this responsibility, our ability to adopt any other type of historical, ethical or political responsibility would be impeded. With this proposal, I want to recover in its true ‘universal’—not ‘global’—sense the Leibnizian motto ‘*Theoria cum praxi*’ taken up by the Enlightenment, in which a renewed philosophy of history acts as a bridge between history (memory) and politics (action), endowing both with ethical content.

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Introduction: Globalism, globalization, crisis and conceptual reductionism

The great debate on globalization burgeoned two decades ago with the turn of the century, unifying at least three different phenomena that in the collective imagination converged under the name of ‘global threat’: planetary ecology, free market economy and information technology. I will not delve here into the details of the debate maintained by sociologists Ulrich Beck and Niklas Luhmann (among others) on the global threats that were themed around the so-called ‘risk society’ (Beck 1986; Luhmann 2003). Yet I do want to reiterate a distinction that Beck made between three different concepts that has become somewhat blurred: ‘globality’ (we live in a world in which no country or group can live on the fringes of global society); ‘globalism’ (a conception defending that the world market dislodges or replaces political action); and ‘globalization’ (the processes by virtue of which the sovereign nation states intermingle and interweave through transnational actors). In my opinion: (i) this distinction has become increasingly blurred to the extent that the intuition that different economic, political and cultural forms do not cease to interweave has overlapped with the ideology of world market domination (liberalism and neoliberalism), crystallizing in the idea of an inevitable and impersonal process that will affect the whole planet whether we want it to or not—a process called ‘globalization’; and (ii) in sociological approaches, we have forgotten a perspective that years before the philosophers of ethics Hans Jonas (1979) and Agnes Heller (1988) had shown, aiming to emphasize the indissoluble relationship of individual and collective actions with the degree of responsibility of the actors of these actions, as I have highlighted previously (Roldán 1999). For this reason, we face a globalization that, on the one hand, inherits the deterministic and dehumanized characteristics of the oft-criticized classic idea of ‘progress’—with a component of greater threat by the ‘historical acceleration’ that it introduces (Koselleck 2000)—and that, on the other hand, by adopting such a polysemic character (economic, ecological, political, cultural, etc.), evolves to become an empty concept.

Less than a decade ago, the economic crisis of 2008 further polarized the so-called ‘debate on globalization’—both towards a negative sense of the concept globalization, and towards its identification with its economic content. It seemed, in this way, that there was only one crisis—an economic crisis—and that it was the only and inevitable result of the process of globalization. I have been working (together with some of the colleagues that publish in this collective book) on the analysis of this simplification as the main leader of the project ‘The Philosophical-Moral Prisms of Crises: Towards a New Socio-Political

Pedagogy’, and can verify both that we are facing a plurality of crises, and that this phenomenon is not as novel as commonly believed, but rather recurrent throughout history. To take a concrete example of the latter, Leibniz mentions in his writings ‘a crisis that ravages Europe’, while Koselleck devotes in Heidelberg his doctoral thesis to the subject: *Kritik und Krise: Eine Studie zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt* (1954), referring respectively to a moral and a political crisis. The stereotype of economic crisis has become a pretext that has allowed the creation of apocalyptic political designs with a specific ideological bias undermining the importance of the welfare state. Using the metaphor of a ‘prism’, our aim was to examine the concept of crisis from several perspectives—philosophical, sociological, historical, juridical, political and ethical—in order to approach the complexity of this phenomena. Therefore, our team brought together sociologists, conceptual historians, philologists, historians and political scientists, from different cultural traditions. The analysis of the above-mentioned issue required a correct diagnosis facilitated by the etymology itself. After all, in addition to ‘separation’ and ‘dispute’, ‘crisis’ also means ‘process’ and ‘justice’ in Greek; from ‘divide’ (*krínein*) comes *kritikós*—the one that discerns or judges—and from there derives the critique or the aptitude to judge.

The etymological background of the concept of ‘crisis’ has further channeled my latest research towards the objective of tracking both its continuities and ruptures in the history of our concepts. The historical inflections that thinkers like Thomas Kuhn call ‘paradigm shifts’ are in fact warning us of a semantic renewal concerning certain concepts that compel them to abandon some referents in favor of adopting others. This process always takes place gradually, but we nonetheless become aware of it at a certain moment, in the same way, for instance, that happens with aging: though growing old is a gradual process, there is a moment at which we ‘suddenly’ notice it, after seeing our image in the mirror. The medical meaning that the concept of ‘crisis’ also has in Spanish and English (we can say: ‘the disease has become critical’) seems to me a very adequate complement to explain this phenomenon. In every disease we witness a ‘critical’ moment that enables the healing of the same if the diagnosis has been successful. Re-directing this metaphor to the issue at hand: we witness a time in which concepts are becoming ‘empty’ of their previous content, to begin being filled with others (hence the title of this article). As I see it, the ethical-political concepts we use, including the one of globalization, are undergoing a critical period in which, as in a disease, they are losing weight and deforming, so far without finding an articulation that will lead them to be filled with univocal meaning, granting that this would ever be possible. It is precisely in this sense that in recent decades we have witnessed an inflation of ‘turns’ in philosophical inquiry: the ‘linguistic turn’, ‘contextual turn’, ‘iconic turn’, etc. All this twisting, coupled

with the historical acceleration that we are experiencing, has placed us in a situation of ‘vertigo’ (Böhme 2008), thanks to which we no longer know where we are going.

In moments of loss of balance, it helps to step on firm ground and to hold on to a structure sufficiently anchored such that it does not fall with us. In the definition of the current moment, thinking about ‘perspectives’ (as Leibniz and Ortega y Gasset already advocated) instead of ‘turns’ helps us to find our way to a new conceptual articulation of reality. Different perspectives of the same reality become implemented from an interdisciplinary perspective, involving us in the complexity of the real, which can only be accessed through scientific cooperation, by virtue of the complementarity provided by collective effort. Besides being complex, the concepts are not neutral; rather they transmit certain ethical-political values—something always attempted by established powers (be they political, religious and/or cultural), and which different communities or citizenships try to resist.

In what follows, I will try to show these two movements in two small sections. I will refer to the restorative process of ethical-political concepts within the framework of a new philosophy of history, from an ethical and semantic perspective respectively. I will conclude by pointing to some of the tasks that now lie before the new philosopher of history, in the so-called ‘Era of Globalization’ and on the road to becoming responsible for concepts.

The ‘ethical perspective’ in the face of ‘historical-political prescription’: valuing from history

In his work on the *Begriffsgeschichte* (history of concepts), Reinhart Koselleck evidenced that historical experiences had been leaving their mark on language—one that the historian can trace and try to interpret. However, not insignificantly, the possibility of living such experiences presupposed in turn that the actors of history necessarily had to have certain notions and categories around which they organized their lived experiences, since social reality is linguistically constituted and only what has been previously conceptualized is visible and intelligible to the actors. It is precisely this dialectic between notions and experiences that conceptual history strives to bring to light around its two well-known expressions: ‘space of experiences’ and ‘horizon of expectations’ (Koselleck 1988).

Seen in this way, everything seems to have gone by calmly and smoothly. But actually, far from being objective, exhaustive and common accounts of a society

or people, histories are the subjective, incomplete and partial or biased accounts presented by the established powers with hegemonic pretensions. It becomes not only a ‘conceptual description’ of the past, but also a ‘valuation prescription’ for how the society in question should continue to be. Thus, the ‘collective memory with claims of universality’ attempts to build by the force of semantics a ‘collective identity’ that ultimately is ‘fictitious’. And in each coming back that each individual or group makes to that history—as if it were a trip to Narnia—it can be verified that this alleged universal history was neither so universal nor so all-encompassing, but rather local and biased: the history of the aristocratic, liberal and patriarchal groups (Roldán 2013a) of the most powerful and dominant emerging western cities.

Reinhart Koselleck contemplated in his works what he calls ‘*Sattelzeit*’ (‘saddle period’)—the period from the end of the eighteenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century,¹ in which the same concept of ‘society’ was being forged, and the idea of ‘nation’ was gaining great strength against the more neutral idea of ‘state’ developed in the first modernity. ‘Nationalism’ gained great relevance at this time in Europe, North America and Latin America, becoming the new subject of political life against more federalist and pro-European streams of thought that were reclaiming the ideas of Saint-Pierre, Leibniz, Rousseau and even more cosmopolitan approaches like the Kantian one, to which the reflections of contemporary authors have been returning in an effort to emphasize solidarity among all the peoples of the earth (Habermas 1998, p. 79). Aside from some divergences in focus (on which I will not dwell now), regarding the German perspective of Reinhart Koselleck, authors such as Quentin Skinner (who gives an Anglo-Saxon interpretation), Giuseppe Duso (Italian interpretation), Jacques Guilhaumou (French interpretation) and Javier Fernández Sebastián (Spanish and Ibero-American interpretation, especially for the IBERCONCEPTOS project of 2004) have been unanimous in stressing that political and semantic processes are interwoven in this era to such an extent that when authors speak of history, nation or society, they are referring to the same thing from different perspectives.

Most human groups—comprising both the ‘actors’ of history, and its ‘interpreters’ (historians)—possess and cultivate some kind of relationship with the past, especially with what they imagine is their genealogy, *their own* collective past, as Álvarez Junco (2013) has shown. In this way, history has normally been erected as the discipline that collects and thematizes these collective pasts—although often we forget that the hegemonic powers write and present the typical and the most spread histories, tending to unify them as the stories

1 For my criticism of this periodization, see: Roldán 2013b.

of just one of the many human groups that conform collectivities and to silence the ‘real multiplicity’ of different groups’ voices. These told histories thus constitute what we call a ‘narrow mindset’ that originates from the ‘hegemonic group’ or ‘victor’, forgetting the voices of the ‘defeated’—as Reyes Mate points out (Mate 1991; 2011)—of the marginalized and of the invisibilized, as has been the case of women in all the histories of knowledge (Roldán 2013a), earning mention in political histories only by merit of their social status.

In short: on the one hand, from a false historical unity (Belvedresi 2012), the plurality of collective imaginaries was usurped; on the other hand, a number of dominant political concepts, inheritors of a modern tradition, were imposed as hegemonic, when they were actually an expression of de facto powers of the origins of modernity—what I have called in my work the ‘triumphant line of the Enlightenment’ (Roldán 2005; 2012). These concepts were not neutral, but rather transmitters of particular ethical-political values. For centuries, protagonism was entrusted to some concepts of the Enlightenment that nurtured a way of interpreting the meaning of history in a finalistic and deterministic way, leading to a craving for explaining historical events that we call the ‘universal history’ through an all-encompassing, scientific discourse, rendering these concepts predominant: *rationality*, *teleology*, *continuity* and *perfection (progress)*. At the same time, other elements present in the works of authors of the Enlightenment were relegated. They did not triumph and were hidden for almost two centuries in the ‘blind spot’ (that part that cannot be seen in the rear-view mirror when we are driving) of history—blind spots to which Israel (2010) also refers, but which now, however, begin to break through and lay the foundations for a new philosophy of history doubly concerned with ethics: the one that I want to defend and uphold here.

In other words, alongside these concepts that we may categorized as ‘rigid’, there appears in the origin of modernity another group of ‘flexible’ concepts (Roldán / Navarro 2007) that are instrumental in introducing diversity, gradualism and pragmatism (Ausín 2006) into our reflections. These concepts are none other than those of contingency, freedom (autonomy), equality and tolerance (Roldán 1997)—all of them placed under the umbrella of the broader principle of ‘plurality’, which Leibniz describes from an ontological-gnoseological point of view as ‘perspectivism’ in his *Monadology*, recaptured by Ortega y Gasset as ‘historical perspectivism’.

I aim to show that a philosophy of history with a new conception is possible (Roldán 2005, 2006; Rohbeck 2007, 2014). Ankersmit (1986) coined the expression ‘new philosophy of history’, referring to a new movement that, on the one hand, radically questions the epistemological presuppositions of traditional historiography (especially its ideal of reaching a true account about the past and

its consideration of history as a science) and, on the other hand, proposes new forms of historical writing as an alternative to the traditional ones. From my point of view, this new philosophy of history, in its complexity, plurality, modulation and detail, is not something alien to the enlightened spirit, with its emancipatory breath (Muñoz 2002)—both in its ethical commitment and in its pure narrativity of the contingent. Perhaps these are the genuine roots of an Enlightenment, hidden by the rationalistic and scientific excesses of the triumphant enlightened line, but that nevertheless continue to nourish the new offshoots of historical reflection in our postmodernity with even more radicality (Bloom 2010). It is my contention that it is an urgent task to rehabilitate politics and produce new collective actors, in accordance with concepts such as isogoria and isonomy, including the necessary gender perspectives. The claim for a critical spirit fleshed out with values of the Enlightenment can help us to counterbalance the hegemonic way of thinking, which is riddled with prejudices that prevent independent thinking. Reprioritizing the Enlightenment ideal of republican cosmopolitanism would serve to redirect the dangerous drifts of globalization.

At this point, let me briefly recapitulate: we have considered concepts that represent, so to speak, the ‘negative inheritance’ of the Enlightenment, and a problematic conception of the philosophy of history that focuses on the idea of progress: rationality, teleology, continuity and perfection. These are concepts that, on the other hand, have been weakening and losing their semantic strength to the point of being nothing more than empty terms that, nevertheless, are useful in the description of phenomena, processes and, ultimately, concepts such as globalization. Also, what happened to the other concepts that did not play a leading role at the time, but which we are currently recovering for philosophy of history—the ‘positive inheritance’—such as contingency, freedom, equality or tolerance? Are these concepts not also becoming weaker?

The semantic perspective: sense and objectivity in the narrative margins; towards a new hermeneutical rationality

In addition to the question of the semantic weakening of the concepts that I want to recover for the new philosophy of history, I believe that we can not leave aside in these considerations the other great horse of history: namely, the historical veracity and objectivity that other contemporary theorists qualify (downgrading in this way their pretensions) as ‘*reliable* information about the past’ (White 1999),

leading reflection on the meaning of history into the margins of narrativity. Let's briefly review the development of the problem.

The notion of 'narration' has been introduced into philosophy of history hand in hand with analytic philosophy, filling the central role that 'explanation' had previously played. That is, the narrative structure emerges as an alternative to causal explanation—as an alternative to a scientific historiography. Thus, the philosopher of history seems to have stopped considering conclusively whether history makes sense or, on the contrary, lacks it. That sense, as well as objectivity and historical truth, must be sought in the statements that historians make in their accounts. Is the philosopher of history, once dismissed from her trades as prophet and meteorologist, perhaps being relegated to the role of literary critic? The historian has become only a narrator (for without a narrator there can be no history), losing her role as ἵστωρ (*hístōr*), i. e. as witness of a factual history. Reflections on history exhibit, in turn, a similar narrative structure. Then, the difference between a history—and I say 'a history' because there will be as many histories as narrations of an event will be written—and a philosophy of history cannot be that the latter provides relationships based on detailed findings on facts, while the former does not. If there is any mission of the philosopher of history that is different from that of the historian, this will consist in problematizing the interpretation that the historian suggests of her own account, criticizing her approaches, her references, her omissions—of all things that are reflections of her intentions. In a word, the philosopher of history acquires the status of a 'metanarrator' and her work will be presented as a metanarration.

Historical narration organizes and, at the same time, by applying its selection criteria, interprets. It is not a mere vehicle for the transmission of information, but is instead a procedure for the production of meaning and, therefore, has an explanatory function. As Fina Birulés has pointed out, although Danto's work attributes an explanatory function to narration, we should not forget that history can only be known *from within*; we are subjects historically located at a later time than the events recounted (Birulés 1989, pp. 26–27). Thus, the histories we tell say as much about our past as they do about our present interests; to a certain extent, we are a microcosm of the stories we are able to tell. This is what prompts Habermas to state that Danto brings analytic philosophy to the very threshold of hermeneutics. The historian does not speak from outside; history is not an impersonal reflection. So Danto's work moves away from Hempel's covering law model and gives rise to a possible dialogue between the hermeneutic and analytical traditions, allowing the problematizing of the links between historical understanding and philosophy of action.

The new narrative structure stressing the importance of the present emerges as an alternative to a scientific historiography, though it is condemned to leave

the concepts of truth and objectivity in the very margins of the different narratives. From these margins (this limit), there is the impulse to control different narrators' subjective and particular experiences, narrowing down the sense of their necessarily fragmentary perspectives (Roldán 2005, pp. 175–180).

It is not a question of renouncing the truthfulness and sense in historical narrative—although this unfortunately seems to be the (increasingly widespread) practice in the speeches of our politicians. Should the new philosopher of history renounce the role of 'metanarrator' or 'metahistorian'; of guardian of the veracity of the narrated sense and of historical interpretations of the past (Roldán 2005, p. 176); and of tracing the limits between the literary imagination and historical veracity? It cannot be otherwise if philosophy acquires its 'ethical commitment', which is how it seems to me that we have to interpret Agnes Heller's words in *A Theory of History*—i. e., in favor of giving sense to history and looking for the sense in history:

[D]espite severe criticism of the false consciousness of the philosophy of history, despite all scepticism in regard to its achievement, despite awareness of the dangers inherent in this undertaking, both theoretical and practical [...] one has to repeat with Herder: '*Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit*' (a philosophy of history, too, is needed for the education of mankind). (Heller 1982, p. 190)

(Provisional) conclusion: responsibility for concepts of philosophy of history in the 'Era of Globalization'

In concluding these pages, we find that the problem that reappears in the so-called 'Era of Globalization' is not very different from the gap between language and reality opened by the work of Kant at a time when concepts described not only universal abstractions, but also states of things. Koselleck's proposals (like Rawls's in the area of justice) do not depart much from the Kantian orbit. The promoter of conceptual history develops Gadamer's idea of the centrality of language in the articulation of historical experience, but moves away from the Gadamerian influence by highlighting the irreducibility of the second (historical experience) to the first (language). Social factors—the extralinguistic plot—exceed language insofar as the implementation of an action always exceeds its mere enunciation or symbolic representation. Still, an action that is not narrated—orally or in writing—is condemned to ostracism and invisibility: it is *as if* it had

not happened. To narrate is to conceptualize and to conceptualize is, in turn, to structure, interpret and value the contingent.

Everything in the universe is contingent, but history is contingent *par excellence*, insofar as it immediately depends on human action. To narrate an event that is itself contingent means to try to transmit the plurality of the points of view expressed in it, for which a ‘hermeneutical rationality’ is needed that focuses on the grasping of the *part of truth* present in each perspective of reality. The plurality of perspectives will be the best safeguard for an approach to truth, free from prejudice and dogma, which prioritizes none of them. In this approach, however, a commitment will need to be found for avoiding falling into relativism: a commitment that is nothing more than the individual or social group’s ethical responsibility when acting; the political responsibility of every citizen aware of the history of his/her own political concepts (Gómez Ramos 2007), but still willing to review its use and meaning to overcome the inherent fragility of human actions (in the most Arendtian tradition); in short, if we take up the original meaning of politics (understood as ‘conceptual elaboration of experiences’), it is all about taking on responsibility for concepts, since reflection on history calls us to return to ethics—to action. The philosopher of history can no longer devote herself to making terrifying or hopeful predictions of the future, though nor must she renounce making any estimative assessments about it; she cannot announce what it will be, but she can propose *how it should be*—or in any case, *how it should never be* (Roldán 2005, p. 16).

The new philosophy of history has a complex task ahead. It is concerned with, on the one hand, the problems suggested by its historical present, and on the other, directing itself to questioning the received philosophical tradition, knowing that its interpretation is only one more *perspective* that provides an incomplete truth (from its subjectivity and present) in the framework of a *dynamic* history of philosophy. Just as the future cannot be predicted, nor is the past something fixed, closed, finished—a view for which Danto reproached Peirce: “We are always revising our beliefs about the past, and to suppose them ‘fixed’ would be unfaithful to the spirit of historical inquiry” (Danto 1985, p. 145). We are always reviewing our research on the past, which is only intelligible to us in the light of the present and with our eyes on the horizon, since without a future project our concept of humanity would vanish. Therefore, reflection on history does not pursue specialization in a philosophical discourse, but rather advocates *interdisciplinarity*—an interdisciplinarity in which ethics, politics, literature and sociology are perhaps the starring protagonists. It is all about an evolving thinking that is ever more interested in defending a ‘living history’ (with a critical perspective from both an omnivorous past, pluperfect, and a

rickety future) than in elucidating how many degrees far to the starboard side of postmodernity it is.

Ars inveniendi thrives only from *complexity*, just as the crossroads are the best places at which to exchange experiences or knowledge, to enrich ourselves. Human history is, like human life, a ‘complex adaptive system’ that develops by trial and error. But we mustn’t forget that the idea of a ‘continuous increasing complexity’ is a myth (Rivera 2000, p. 29) that demonstrates that the idea of history as progress is false, just as one can not presuppose a ‘natural’ or ‘cultural’ selection that always favors optimal solutions or the best possible ones. History is a collective event, but is also none other than the desires and beliefs that shaped those human actions. In fact, we could affirm that history is a ‘collective by-product’, the result of ‘multiple multi-personal games’, sometimes the collateral effect of what we are doing guided by other ends (Rivera 2000, p. 47).

This new philosophy of history requires, ultimately, a *new rationality*: flexible, gradual and ‘hermeneutically imperfect’. It would be a concept of rationality in the line of that defended by Stephen Toulmin (2003) as situated rationality, which would move away from ‘arrogance of reason’ in an inversely proportional relationship to its approximation to a concept of ‘perspectivism’ à la Leibniz: what Marcelo Dascal (2001) has termed a *blandior ratio*. It would be a rationality that is no longer based on absolute truths, but rather on the graduality of them; i.e., ordered in different steps, ‘modulated’, so that ‘true’ and ‘false’ lose their static and abstract character, but without falling into relativism; in which the values of truth are not only housed in the propositions themselves, but in their ‘intervals’ (as fuzzy calculus defends) or in its ‘intermediate steps’, supported by the relational character of truth, as the ontological and moral point of view of Dewey’s pragmatism holds. It would be a rationality for whose definition we could also borrow from the field of legal logic the concepts of ‘weighting’ and ‘presumption’ (Ausín 2006). It would be an argumentative rationality, in short, that is the recovery of a certain ‘heterodox’ enlightened tradition that we can find in the ‘nuanced’ rationalism of Leibniz, in Marie de Gournay’s discourse on equality; in the one on sympathy by Sophie de Grouchy (excluded from the usual histories of philosophy, as is Marquise de Châtelet’s *Lessons in Physics*), or in Lessing’s concept of tolerance.

A new philosophy of history would not pretend, therefore, to dispute Clio’s favors to history, nor to emulate Cassandra in her prophetic gifts, but more modestly to remind us that we are all moral subjects of a history that, whether we want to recognize it or not, concerns all of us—as Javier Muguerza notes (Roldán 2005, pp. 6–7); a history that does not do or say anything by itself, but always through human beings, who are its actors, narrators and interpreters. No history will ‘tell’ or ‘give us reason’ as the misnamed popular wisdom affirms, regardless

of what we all do (or do not do) and say (or do not say). It is time to abandon the exaggerated victimhood, the perverse age of innocence in which we have fallen asleep, and try to grasp the reins of our destiny—because when the facts go beyond language, the intellectual can not ignore her task: she has to take responsibility for the concepts. We cannot and should not wait with arms crossed hoping that history, like a gracious sea, will return to us the remains of our shipwreck.

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Globalization, Inequalities and Justice

Abstract: The considerable inequities and exclusions that exist in our globalized world call for a global framework to deal with them. In particular, the problem of methodological nationalism, citizenship and exclusion from the entitlement to many basic rights (both social and political) in national constitutions is stressed. The consolidation of a global institution (or network of institutions) is presented as necessary; one that, overcoming the discrimination between person and citizen, might watch over and defend fundamental rights, enabling them to become effective rights for all persons, irrespective of the place where they were born and the place where they happen to be. The aim of a just distribution not only of wealth but, in general, of the benefits that globalization has to offer requires institutional reforms that depend on a renewed perspective of global constitutionalism. This in turn demands a new approach leaving behind the confrontation between uniform universalist visions and closed multiculturalisms.

Globalization is one of the most controversial phenomena of the contemporary world. Since the end of the last century, it has been regarded by some as a source of prosperity of nations; others, by contrast, see it as the origin of new inequalities between and within nations, hence as fostering global injustice. Yet others view it as a space of power, negotiation and cooperation for the construction of a new global order.

We cannot conceive of the development of globalization without the scientific-technological revolution that required a redesigning of nation states, whose frontiers were being eroded as a result of the development of digital information and communication technologies (Castells 1996). These gave rise to information flows and knowledge networks that surpassed the territorial controls of states, and these, in order to maintain their international competitiveness and quotas of power in the world system, had to opt for the formation of regional blocs. Hence, the world was restructured with growing international economic interdependence and an increasing differentiation in development between regions.

In the final decades of the twentieth century, the division of global power between two parts—capitalist and socialist—became a thing of the past and, although the United States has continued to exert a strong presence, other impor-

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tant nuclei of power have emerged. Likewise the East-West conflict took on new characteristics and was joined by a new disjunction: the North-South divide (Kennedy, 1993 and 2008). The nation states were obliged to promote the liberalization of national markets in goods and services, as well as liberalizing their financial systems, although it must be stressed that national labor markets remained within the narrow margin of each nation state. The great world power intensified its control over the arbitration of regional conflicts—with actions that on many occasions violated international law—and the nation states gave impulse to the creation of supra-national centers of regulation, such as the WTO, and strengthened others, such as the IMF.

One of the consequences of the globalization process has been the crisis of the nation state, which questions the traditional significances of sovereignty and citizenship that are implicated in it and which were once a factor of inclusion and equality, present since its origins.¹ While the nation state and citizenship came to be regarded as global norms (to the degree that a considerable proportion of the world's population was living in democratic nation states), the end of the Cold War heralded the appearance of a new world order in which a hierarchy between states became manifest (Castles and Davidson 2000; Castles 2003).

The hierarchy of states that characterizes this emerging world order is in accordance with the level of dependence of each in relation to the superpower, as likewise the differing degrees of power they have among themselves, which may vary considerably. Stephen Castles called this new order the 'hierarchical nation-state system'; its structure can be understood as a set of concentric circles around a dominant superpower. In correspondence with the differing degrees of power (in cultural, economic, military and political terms) wielded by nation states, their populations are subject to a similar hierarchy of rights and freedoms—a situation that Castles refers to as one of 'hierarchical citizenship'. In this sense, we may say that the dominant development in our globalized world is one of hierarchization, and hence of inequality and exclusion.

In contrast with the liberal supposition that all citizens are equal and free persons (irrespective of their belonging to specific groups), in reality, citizenship has always been differentiated in nation states, based on criteria of origin, ethnic identity, race, class and gender. This tendency has become more acute with globalization, and in particular with the increase in international migration and

¹ As Luigi Ferrajoli has pointed out, the changes linked to this crisis should not lead us to the advent of new types of sovereignty and citizenship as many have proposed, but rather, in the long term, to a change of paradigm—both at the international and state levels—to the extent that the concepts of sovereignty and citizenship will inevitably remain connected to relations of inclusion-exclusion in states and between peoples and persons (Ferrajoli, 1998 and 2001).

transnationalism. The typical categories of differentiation of citizenship within nation states are: 'full citizens' born in the country, 'naturalized migrants', 'legal residents', 'undocumented residents', 'asylum seekers', 'ethnic minorities', 'indigenous peoples' and 'groups discriminated against on the basis of gender'.² In the differentiation of citizenship rights in the international sphere, five levels can be distinguished: the citizens of the United States; the citizens of other highly developed countries; the citizens of countries in transition and recently industrialized; the citizens of less developed countries; and non-citizens (without doubt the worst possible situation in a world made up of nation states).³ There is a close link between these two types of hierarchization of citizenship, that is to say the intra-state and the international hierarchies: being a native of a country with a high position on the international citizenship hierarchy may well lead to a high position in the hierarchies of other nations; thus, while few migrants from highly developed countries end up as undocumented migrants or asylum seekers, many people from low levels of the international hierarchy do end up in a low position on the national scale of their country of destination. Besides, it must be considered that the greater prevalence of discourses about the naturalness of violence and chaos, and transnational racism, clearly play a role in the assignation of groups to a subordinate national status (Castles 2003).⁴

In view of this situation it is worth remembering that, at least on the normative plane, since the 1940s, with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both the concept of citizenship and the principle of state sovereignty have been superseded by the creation of a supranational order in which nation states became subject to norms, and citizenship ceased to be the sole basis of rights conceived of as vital (and which are those that allow the enjoyment of other rights, such as may even include that of citizenship); rights that ought to belong to each person, irrespective of where he or she was born or happens to be. Obviously, this occurred only on the normative plane since, as we have seen, in international relations today the principle of

² While legal discrimination against women is now less common (although still found in some parts of the South), institutional and informal discrimination against them persists.

³ Persons can be non-citizens for various reasons: because they live in a country in which the state has disintegrated and lack any kind of protection against rival armed factions; because their country is defined by the United States as a 'proscribed country'; or because they are refugees that were deprived of their original citizenship when fleeing, and the state where they are seeking asylum denies them citizenship or even the right to remain.

⁴ For a broader development of the relation between migration and rights, see Di Castro (2012b).

sovereignty and the exclusive vision of citizenship still hold sway. In this respect, as Luigi Ferrajoli has remarked:

[...] sovereignty is now no more than a legal black hole, its rule being the absence of rules or, in other words, the law of the strongest. As regards citizenship, this has become the ultimate personal privilege, the ultimate factor of discrimination and the last surviving pre-modern relic of differentiations by status; as such, it contravenes the much acclaimed universality and equality of fundamental rights. (Ferrajoli 1998, p. 178)

In spite of their deficiencies and of the critiques that can be directed against them, the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be seen as comprising an embryonic global constitution. Of course, this constitution, though formally established, still lacks institutional guarantees—that is to say the adequate instruments for activating those rights—these comprising precisely one of the main pending tasks of global justice. To achieve that, a change of paradigm would be required, which in the long term leads to the ‘superseding’ of citizenship and the ‘denationalization’ of rights because, as Ferrajoli had already glimpsed before the turn of the century, it will not be feasible in the long run to maintain the coexistence of “rich and comfortable democracies with secure standards of living alongside famine and misery in the rest of the world” (1998, p. 183).

This superseding of citizenship and denationalization of rights ought to lead to the future consolidation of a global constitution in which fundamental rights would be universal, recognized for all persons as such; hence, having lost their moorings in citizenship, they would have to be supervised not only within, but beyond and even in opposition to nation states. Here, fundamental rights are to be understood as not only the classical human rights or first-generation human rights, but also later formulations, such as:

[...] all those rights which must be guaranteed in order to ensure equality in relation with the faculties, needs and expectations that are assumed as essential; to link the forms and contents of democracy to those faculties, needs and expectations; to ensure peaceful coexistence; and finally to operate as laws of the weakest as against the law of the strongest that would rule in their absence. (Ferrajoli 2007, p. 284)

Ferrajoli explains how modern law was characterized initially by the principle of ‘formal legality’: a legal norm, whatever its content, exists and is valid on account of the way in which it was formulated, thus leaving aside the traditional visions of legality as conferred by the justice or rationality intrinsic in the norm. Later, the principle of ‘substantial legality’ was incorporated, by which law is subject to conditions not merely formal but also substantial, imposed by the fundamental principles and rights established in constitutions. The incor-

poration of this second principle took place following the Second World War when, both on the national and international plane, the meaning ‘arose’ of a ‘constitution’ as the limit and bond to which the public powers are subject, as substantive norms guaranteeing both the division of powers and the fundamental rights of all individuals, which had been negated by fascism. As a consequence, rigid constitutions were to become a regular feature of the legal systems of democratic states, along with the subjection of nation states to conventions on human rights in international law (which, as has already been pointed out, do not yet enjoy the legal force that would be accorded a global constitution). Hence, in a system with a rigid constitution, a norm is valid not only because of being in force and having been issued in accordance with the forms predisposed for its production, but also because its substantial contents respect the fundamental principles and rights established in the constitution.

It must be underlined that the entitlement to rights plays a crucial role in the subject we are dealing with because existing legal systems have not included all persons as enjoying that status. Although various criteria have existed for setting some human beings apart from the status that would enable them to be title-holders of a recognized normativity—which historically has been subject to different limitations and discriminations—today only two basic differences exist that still delimit the equality of persons: citizenship and capacity to act. On the basis of these differences, nowadays two important divisions can be distinguished in constitutions: the division between ‘rights of the person’ and ‘rights of the citizen’ (whether entitlement belongs to all persons or only to citizens); and the division between ‘primary (or substantial) rights’ and ‘secondary (instrumental or of autonomy) rights’ (whether entitlement belongs to all persons or only to those who have capacity to act). Hence, an initial classification is formed that is subjective to the degree that it attends to subjects to whom are attributed, and who receive, the expectations of a right (whether they are persons or citizens); and a second classification is formed that is objective in the sense that it rests on the behavior of subjects that make up the selected category (whether or not they have capacity to act).

When we cross these two basic divisions, four classes of fundamental rights come into view:

1. The primary rights of persons, whether or not they are citizens or have or do not have capacity to act (These include the right to life and the integrity of the person, personal liberty, freedom of conscience and freedom to express their opinions, the right to health and education and the penal guarantees.);
2. The primary rights accorded only to citizens, whether or not they enjoy capacity to act (These include the right to movement within the national terri-

- tory, to meeting and association, the right to work, to subsistence and assistance for those who are unable to work.);
3. The secondary rights ascribed to all persons having capacity to act (among which stand out the power to negotiate, freedom to sign a contract, to choose and change jobs, economic freedom, and in general all the potestative rights in which private autonomy is manifested and upon which the market is founded); and
 4. The secondary rights reserved only to those citizens with capacity to act (among which are the right to vote, the right to accede to public office and, in general, all the potestative rights in which political autonomy is manifested and upon which representation and political democracy are founded).

Thus, the distinction between person and citizen that underlies the fundamental rights recognized in the local constitutions of each nation state is a source of considerable inequalities and exclusions;⁵ to which must be added, as we have seen, those derived from the hierarchical system of the nation state that characterizes our globalized world. Hence, the proposal for a global justice in accordance with our times ought to include, even if in the long term, the formulation of a global constitution (or equivalent) in which the fundamental rights are guaranteed for all persons without exceptions. In this way, for Ferrajoli, justice could finally stop being a matter relegated to individual morality, to acts of benevolence and sentiments of solidarity.⁶

But how can we arrive at the construction of this global justice? One must set off from the fact that basic questions regarding justice arise when we evaluate a present situation as unjust. Luis Villoro (2007) proposed a negative path for understanding justice from the awareness of its absence: reflection on justice must set off from some concrete reality, an experience of suffering caused by injustice and the consequent perception that the damage suffered in our relation with others has no justification, thus eliciting the rejection of an unjust situation and the

⁵ This is based on the assumption that the rule of law really exists with its corresponding administration of justice—an assumption that also harks back to problems that are crucial for the subject of inequality and exclusion that remain beyond the matters dealt with here.

⁶ Many others have also suggested this—the most outstanding being Nozick (1974), in the context of a minimal state, and Rawls (1999), as regards international relations. To relegate justice to individual morality, acts of benevolence and sentiments of solidarity also takes us back to crucial problems for the subject of inequality and exclusion, since many atrocities and arbitrary acts were committed using that as their pretext. For a broader development of the relation between rights and global justice, see Di Castro (2010).

determination to resist it. This negative route for understanding justice from the point of view of its absence has the virtue of concentrating on concrete and diverse situations of injustice, rather than abstract universalisms that ignore the historical, social and cultural differences that influence the way people live their daily lives. Likewise, Amartya Sen (2009) stresses the need to take specific situations of injustice as the starting point: the awareness that manifest injustices can be overcome is what impels social actors to promote changes in society. Nevertheless, the feeling of injustice that may serve as a signal for mobilization always demands a critical examination. A theory of justice that aims to serve as a basis for practical reasoning must include ways of judging how injustice is to be reduced and how to advance towards justice. The possibility also exists of different arguments regarding justice passing the scrutiny of criticism and leading to divergent conclusions. This should, however, not weaken the commitment to the need for reasoning.

This negative approach to justice has various antecedents—for example, the historical study by Barrington Moore (1978) of the sentiment of injustice that on occasions, though not always, leads to the rejection of an existing situation and the promotion of change. The starting point of Moore's study is that social coexistence has always implied problems of coordination, among which those related with authority, the division of labor and the distribution of goods and services stand out—problems that the members of society must resolve, since otherwise that society would cease to exist. Among social needs, Moore distinguishes three aspects in particular: a causal relation as regards the ordinary temporal order (i.e., if the need is not satisfied something serious will happen); an element of inevitable choice (i.e., the society may satisfy the need or fail to do so); and, in the case of managing to satisfy the need, a variety of forms may exist for achieving this (which may generate, in turn, diverse social inequalities which, it is hoped, will be accepted). This study concludes that social needs or imperatives lead to moral imperatives and, through these, when they are violated, to moral outrage and the feeling of injustice. But social rules and their violation are not sufficient as fundamental components of moral affront and the sentiment of injustice. The latter also has to be 'uncovered': people must perceive and define their situation as a consequence of a human injustice—as a situation that must not, cannot and need not be borne. This enables us to understand how there can be long periods in the history of peoples in which large social groups accept humiliating and unjust situations, and other periods in which they reject these situations and rebel.

Here, the difference between law and justice takes on its full meaning: not every positive law is just, nor is every demand for justice transformed into law. As Javier Muguerza (2004) has pointed out, moral demands, which are

prior to law, are stated in the name of justice and it is intended that they materialize in a just law. Nonetheless, not even in the latter do justice and law coincide perfectly, since there is always the possibility of arriving at a fairer law than any so far known. Muguerza points out that in the history of how the demands for justice have come to take form in positive law, the most important thing has been not so much consensus on the fairness of such laws (thereby making a clear reference to the cornerstone of the principal contemporary theories of justice), but rather the dissent in view of the injustice undergone by those who were excluded from its enjoyment. Hence, when we speak of law, we are thinking of an institutional fact; on the other hand, when we speak of justice we are thinking in ‘utopian’ terms, of that horizon that urges us to ‘go forward’, to ‘make the law advance’ so as to become fairer.

One of the most relevant examples of this fundamental difference is the history of the struggle for human rights—before their legal recognition, these were only ‘moral demands’ claiming justice. In this sense, for Muguerza, as long as justice is an ideal to be attained (like other ideals of humanity, such as peace or democracy), utopian thinking will remain alive, accompanying societies in their development. What is involved is a utopian form of thinking that does not confuse ideals with illusions, or whose struggle is distant from efficacy—one that is, rather, closely linked to the ‘here and now of reality’ setting off along a ‘negative path’. In other words, a struggle for ideals takes place through the rejection of its opposites. In the case of justice what is aimed at is the eradication of injustices (just as peace is opposed to war and democracy to tyrannies). But even in the case of these struggles finally achieving success, utopian thinking ought not to disappear because, as Muguerza points out:

[...] if by good fortune some day our world were to see the instauration of a peace, a justice and a democracy widespread and reasonably stable, we would still have to be on our guard against somebody or something with the power to summon up regressions, causing the return of humanity to prehistory or its falling into dystopia. In other words, we must ensure that nobody nor any material situation be capable of transforming the dreams of reason into nightmares. (Muguerza, 2013, 31)

As we have already seen with Sen, a theory of justice that aims to serve as a basis for practical reasoning must include ways of judging how injustice is to be reduced and how to advance towards justice, without ignoring the possibility of mutually opposing claims arising, or of reasonable arguments leading to divergent conclusions. Thus, a reflection on justice should acknowledge the relevance of differences between social groups, as well as the concepts of domination and oppression. In this sense, it is worth mentioning authors such as Iris Marion Young (1990) who, far from pretending to elaborate a comprehensive and neces-

sary theory of universal justice, proposes a rational discourse on justice, the arguments of which cannot be considered definitive because they are directed at other persons and must remain open to their replies in a situated political dialogue—they form a normative reflection characterized by historical and social contextualization. In fact, constitutions and declarations of fundamental rights can be conceived of as syntheses of specific historic-socio-cultural dynamics. As Giacomo Marramao (2008 and 2009) has pointed out, far from reflecting simple abstractions or ideal dimensions, these respond to actual processes of conquest and acquisition of values obtained, whether by hard-fought conflicts or compromise solutions.

The theories of justice of the past century centered basically on *what* had to be equaled between the citizens of a state, what sphere was to be prioritized for seeking equality (in turn legitimating inequalities in other spheres) and *who* are those to be included and who are to remain excluded. Suggestions have been made to equalize primary goods (Rawls 1971 and 2001), capacities (Sen 1992 and Nussbaum 2006), incomes (Van Parijs 1995), opportunities (Roemer 1998), and resources (Dworkin 2000), to mention just some of the main proposals. But today, it is insisted, the citizens and the state have ceased to be relevant because the living conditions of the subjects of justice do not depend solely on the political community of which they are citizens; there are extraterritorial and/or non-territorial structures that have an important impact on those conditions (Fraser 2008).

As we have seen, citizenship and states are not homogeneous but rather differentiated and hierarchized, which leads to serious inequalities, discriminations and exclusions. Hence it is necessary to overcome ‘explanatory nationalism’ in order to understand the principal contemporary injustices, which can no longer be reduced to domestic causal factors—such as the dominion of the local elites and the political weakness of the impoverished majority—and which incorporate, for example, international economic and power relations (Pogge 2009). Likewise, in our globalized world, in which a transition is taking place between a modernity characterized by an inter-state order under the hegemony of the West and one characterized by a new supranational order in the process of being constructed multilaterally, the standard conception of the processes of universalization has been questioned. That conception takes as its reference two conditions linked to the beginning of modernity: equivalence of culture and identity, and the uniform conception of universalism. The latter in particular needs rethinking if it is to be applicable in a world of multiplicity and difference: “it must be newly formulated, taking as its starting point the awareness that—to borrow the celebrated words of Hamlet—there are more ways towards liberty and

democracy than are dreamt of in our poor philosophy” (Marramao 2009, pp. 14–15).

Let us take it by stages. There are two basic ways of conceptualizing the problem of cultural differences: on the one hand, there is what has been called strong or mosaic multiculturalism, according to which human groups and cultures are well-delineated and identifiable totalities that coexist (although with clear frontiers) as if pieces of a mosaic; on the other hand, different cultures can be regarded as constant creations, recreations and negotiations of imaginary frontiers between an ‘us’ and the ‘other(s)’ (Benhabib 2002). In the latter case, the ‘other’ is always linked to the ‘us’; we cannot lose sight of the fact that ‘oneself’ can only exist as such in distinction from ‘another’. Hence, we can conceive the various struggles of persons and groups as a demand for respect, freedom and equality, while each maintains a sense of ‘oneself’. In view of the cultural differences that characterize everyday coexistence in almost all corners of the planet—the exchange of which has increased and accelerated with the process of globalization—two perspectives can be adopted to accompany the conceptions already mentioned. The first is a vision of cultures as clearly definable totalities: a view of the culture under study as seen from the outside which generates a coherent image of it with the aim of understanding it, and at times also of controlling it. In the second, on the contrary, the vision is from within the culture, in which the participants experience their traditions, histories, rituals and symbols, tools and material conditions of life through shared narrative accounts, although also subject to controversy and even susceptible of being overturned.⁷

The globalization process is not only characterized by the increasing interdependence of all nations and, in this sense, by a strong impulse towards homogenization—it has also led to a process of localization, and hence an insistence on differences. In response to this, the term ‘glocalization’ has made its appearance in recognition of the fact that the tendencies toward homogenization and heterogenization, far from confronting each other, take each other’s existence for granted. In fact, as Roland Robertson (2000) has emphasized, in various areas of contemporary life, both homogeneity and heterogeneity combine, as do universalism and particularism. The dichotomies ‘we/others’, ‘West/East’ and ‘North/South’ mask a considerable diversity in each of these poles; there is no single ‘we’, nor ‘West’, nor ‘North’ confronting a discrete ‘other’, ‘East’ or ‘South’. Such simplifying stereotypes must be left behind, with the understanding that they are mere indicators that include within each extreme a plurality of

7 For a broader development of the relation between identities and justice, see Di Castro (2012a).

phenomena. As Marramao has pointed out, the monolithic representation of culture postulates a reified image of civilizations as monolithic entities, thus preparing a fertile soil for the arising of fundamentalisms. Hence, the need arises to go beyond these visions and to confront the crisis of the two models of modern democratic inclusion: both the republican model that assimilates differences in a neutral space of citizenship without belonging, and the strong multicultural model in the ‘mosaic’ sense. Thus, against the universalism of identity postulated by the conceptions of citizenship by assimilation and the anti-universalist differentialism postulated by the strong versions of multiculturalism, the author proposes a cosmopolitanism of difference that, drawing on multidisciplinary studies of comparative law and cultural anthropology, sets about outlining possible codes for an intercultural democracy based on multi-polar and *mestizo* law.

The identity characteristic of present global conflicts cause them to manifest a greater proximity to the fundamental conflicts that had marked the civil wars of religion in the phase before Westphalia than those typical conflicts of the industrial era (Marramao 2003 and Sen 2006). Against this, the tradition of modern rationalism—even in its noblest forms, such as the Kantian ethical universalism and legal guaranteeism—seems to lack by itself the capacity to find a solution to the conflicts of our times and to contribute to building a ‘cosmopolitan republic’. In a similar sense to Sen’s reflections on the concept of democracy,⁸ Marramao states, quoting Raimon Panikkar (2008), that:

[...] the house of the universal is still not ready; it has to be constructed multilaterally. We cannot say to others: ‘come on and be guests in our house; integrate and let yourselves be annexed to our civilization of law’. On the contrary, it is necessary to negotiate a new common space: together to build a new house of the universal. If our view of other contexts of experience were less vitiated by prejudices, we might become aware of the existence in other regions of the world of conceptions of liberty and dignity of persons just as noble as ours (or at least not less respectable). (Marramao 2009, p. 26)

One characteristic that accompanies the history of the nation state is the process of assimilation that has tended to blot out community identities, but which in many cases has led to these resisting in underground forms, with occasional explosions of violence. Hence, we should not be surprised that one of the main problems of contemporary political theory has to do with the conflicts of recognition and their relation with conflicts of redistribution. If we set off from a rad-

⁸ Sen has pointed to the undue appropriation of values by the West, which responds to “a serious lack of attention to the intellectual history of non-western societies, on the other, to the conceptual defect of conceiving democracy substantially in terms of votes and elections, instead of the broad perspective of public discussion” (Sen 2010, p. 40).

ical democratic interpretation of the principle of equal value, as does Nancy Fraser (2008), the most general significance of justice ought to be parity in participation, and overcoming injustice would be a matter of dismantling institutionalized obstacles that prevent some from being able to participate in equality with others. It is here that the political takes on a special relevance, to the degree that it provides the scenario in which to develop struggles for both redistribution and recognition. This has to be thought out on a global level, giving particular emphasis to the problems of inequality and exclusion, not only between nations but also within them. Hence, far from remaining confined within the narrow sphere of the state, rethinking justice today requires considering it on different scales and levels, both above and below the state, which introduces also the recognition of a diversity of agents and powers, not only political parties and public agencies.

History has also shown that the attempt to impose a standard model, ethnocentric and hegemonic, of modernization is doomed inevitably to produce an extension and deepening of conflicts. Thus, an adequate policy towards the 'others' cannot be the 'exportation of freedom', but should instead be a policy favoring the emergence of processes fostering rights and democracy, on the basis of autonomous paths and methods:

[...] we should be more open to what an old and illustrious anthropology called 'functional equivalents', taking as our program a subsequent, decisive theoretical task: to graduate from the method of comparison to the politics of translation... We should be capable of detecting in other cultures principles, values, normative criteria, of equal value although defined in different ways from our own: without yielding to the temptation of imposing upon them our own definitions, once again fraudulently positing the old Manichean division between good and bad. (Marramao 2009, pp. 29–30)

The principal contemporary conflicts and injustices, therefore, demand that historical dynamics be oriented towards a path transcending identities postulated as closed or homogeneous. A politics of translation and a cosmopolitanism of difference could make the globalization process a space for negotiation and cooperation oriented towards the construction of a less unjust world.

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Julia Muñoz Velasco

From a Bounded View to a Globalized Perspective: Considerations on a Human Right to Health

Abstract: In this essay, I will argue that even when there are important difficulties concerning the possibility of a human right to health that must be addressed, it is nonetheless a better strategy for promoting global health than the ones relying entirely on States' duties or on a duty to charity. The idea that there is such thing as a right to health is very controversial. One of the most important difficulties has been to determine if a right to health can be considered as a human right, as an institutional right or just as a humanitarian charitable cause. Which of these we take it to be will shape the possibility of a global demand for health.

The idea that there is such thing as a right to health is very controversial, and “there is no single universally agreed-upon interpretation of the right to health.” (Lawrence 2014, p. 257) One of the most important difficulties has been to determine if a right to health can be considered as a human right, as an institutional right or just as a humanitarian charitable cause. Which of these we take it to be will shape the possibility of a global demand for health.

One can argue that, in fact, there is already a human right to health, stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 25 (1) of the Universal Declaration states that:

Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. (UN General Assembly 217 A (III), art. 25(1))

Another formulation of the human right to health is provided by article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which states that everyone has the right to “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, art. 12) The ICESCR points out that this goal can be achieved by provid-

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ing medical care for all, assuring the improvement of environmental conditions, reducing the stillbirth-rate and infant mortality, and with prevention and treatment of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, art. 12).

Despite being recognized as such by the Universal Declaration and being reaffirmed by the ICESCR, there have been many arguments that intend to show that both formulations are too vague, too demanding or even damaging (Wolff 2012a), and that consequently, they do not offer a good account of what a human right to health could be. Although the ICESCR offers us a more precise account, both formulations face several problems and have been considered as posing a spurious demand that cannot be legitimately considered as a human right.

In this essay, I will argue that even when there are important difficulties concerning the possibility of a human right to health that must be addressed, it is nonetheless a better strategy for promoting global health than the ones relying entirely on States' duties or on a duty to charity. To show this, I will present two strong objections that have been made against the possibility of a human right to health. The first corresponds to Onora O'Neill, who has pointed out that it is incoherent to propose a human right to health because to every right there must be a correspondent duty and in this case, it is not possible allocate *who* should bear the correspondent duties. The second belongs to Gopal Sreenivasan. Although he has presented different arguments to reject the possibility a right to health, here I will discuss only his argument regarding the 'doubly universal' condition for every human right, and how this condition cannot be met by a pretended right to health. After reviewing these objections, I will explain what would be a strategy that relies on a duty to charity for the global promotion of help. I will also argue how this contrast allows us to appreciate the advantages of a human rights narrative.

Onora O'Neill's objection to a human right to health

There are two main arguments that O'Neill poses against the possibility of a human right to health. The first stresses the interdependence between rights and obligations and denounces the incoherence of defending a human right to health that aims to be universally claimable, but that cannot allocate *who* is responsible for the claimed demands. The second argument focuses on the distinction between liberty and welfare rights to claim that a right to health is properly

a welfare right and that as such, it cannot be regarded as a human, pre-institutional right. Together, these two arguments constitute a strong objection to the defendants of a human right to health.

Firstly, I will address the argument about the interdependence between rights and obligations. O'Neill contends that some discourses about human rights have abused a cosmopolitan rhetoric making rights the center of the discussions about justice and leaving behind concerns about the allocation of the correspondent obligations. After all, it is more promotable and certainly easier to propose that some demand must be universally claimable as a human right than stating precisely how—and especially, by *whom*—that demand is supposed to be met. O'Neill says that:

... only if we jettison the entire normativity understanding of rights in favour of a merely aspirational view, can we break the normative link between rights and their counterpart obligations. If we take rights seriously and see them as normative rather than aspirational, we must take obligations seriously. (O'Neill 2016, p. 196)

It would be one thing to defend a human right to health if we only pretend to point out an aspirational or humanitarian goal that would serve as an ideal, without any kind of normative force—but this weak scenario is not what is expected from a human right to health. For example, the ICESCR has made it possible—through the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESC)—to receive reports from its State parties and to make some suggestions about what they can improve (Gostin 2014, p. 252). Although considered an important step, this has also been regarded as insufficient. The main problem with focusing too much on the rights and leaving behind their counterpart obligations is that even if there is an individual claim to health, there is no one that is accountable for meeting that demand—and after all, 'rights are *demands on others*' (O'Neill 2000, p. 126). From O'Neill's reading, it is incoherent to think about a human right to health if we cannot offer an account of who is responsible for what is being claimed. But this question about *who* is responsible in the specific case of a human right to health is what leads us to the second part of O'Neill's objection: the distinction between liberty and welfare rights.

Liberty rights have also been named 'civil and political rights' (Gostin 2014, p. 246) and 'negative rights' (Nagel 2005, p. 127), because they only demand that others do not interfere with these rights. It has also been assumed that these liberty rights, precisely because they are negative rights, demand "no positive action or resource commitments from government." (Gostin 2014, p. 246) In contrast, welfare rights have been considered a kind of 'positive right', because they demand more than just a non-interference policy from States and from

the international community. Welfare rights are also identified as ‘economic, social and cultural rights’ and, unlike liberty rights, it has been assumed that they imply a much bigger commitment on behalf of the State (both in terms of positive action and resources) in order to meet the claims of welfare rights.

The idea that one of the most striking differences between liberty and welfare rights is the level of commitment that is being asked from the States has been widely criticized. If we think of this contrast in terms of individual liberties and socioeconomic rights to public goods, this certainly can lead us towards this conclusion—but “the idea that civil and political rights impose no affirmative State obligations, while socioeconomic rights impose costs on societies, is vastly oversimplified.”¹

Departing from this explanation of the difference between liberty and welfare rights in terms of positive or negative rights, and of the commitment assumed by the States, O’Neill explains the difference between liberty and welfare rights² in terms of a right’s universality and its independence from any given institution. Liberty rights have a universal scope, regarding both their right-holders and their duty bearers. That is, any human being has a right to freedom of speech or to freedom of religion. Equally, every human being has the duty to respect these rights of others, and States must assure that this condition is met. Liberty rights assume the whole international community both as the right-holder and the duty-bearer. Welfare rights, however, cannot have this universal scope. Even if we consider that every human being has the right to health, its correspondent duty cannot also rely on the whole international community. Providing health care, or preventive care such as vaccinations, is not a task that can be

1 For more detail on how this has been used as an argument against the possibility of welfare rights (and especially against a human right to health), see: John Tasioulas and Effy Vayena (2015a). They argue that there is not an antagonistic relation between these rights, and that both liberty and welfare rights, require an important commitment in resources and in positive action by the government.

2 This distinction has also been explained as a contrast between individual and collective rights. The existence of collective rights has been widely discussed (Spicker 2001, p. 9). Even if O’Neill does not appeal to the distinction between individual and collective rights to explain liberty and welfare rights, I consider that this is also an important distinction because both pairs of rights have been regarded as equivalent—liberty rights being individual rights, while welfare rights are collective rights. If we accept that for something to count as a right it must be individually claimable, this equivalency would prove to be detrimental to the defense of welfare rights and thus, to a human right to health. This has raised arguments that there are no collective rights and that there cannot be individual claims to collective public goods such as health or food. Thus, this individualist feature of human rights has been important to distinguish what can count as a human right and what should be excluded. For more detail, see: John Tasioulas and Effy Vayena (2015a; 2015b).

done by every individual around the world. For conditions of health to be met it is necessary to appeal to certain institutions—in this case, States as primary agents of justice and other institutions like hospitals or clinics, as secondary agents of justice.³

For O’Neill, the right to health cannot be regarded a human right because it does not have a universal scope regarding the duty bearers; that is, we cannot allocate its correspondent duties to the international community even if we want to ascribe the claimable individual right to every human being. Moreover, it cannot be a human right because it necessarily relies on the existence of certain institutions. Its alleged universality as a human right cannot in fact be independent from institutional structures, and for this reason, O’Neill concludes that welfare rights, such as the right to health “must be special, institutional rights rather than universal human rights.” (O’Neill 2016, p. 199)

O’Neill’s objection does not stop there. The first part of her objection affirmed that it is incoherent to normatively sustain human rights without allocating the duties implied in them. But from what I have said here, it would appear that this challenge can be dismissed because O’Neill recognizes the States as primary agents of justice and other institutions (from hospitals to NGOs) as secondary agents of justice. At least, this is the standard position when thinking of who is responsible for guaranteeing and protecting human rights, and this is how it is managed by the ICESCR and its State parties. But O’Neill not only considers that welfare right are institutional and not human rights—she also strongly criticizes this standard position for both human and welfare rights, and discusses the great difficulties of allocating the duties of welfare rights.

If a right to health is institutional given its dependency on being fulfilled only by certain given institutions, then the success of this kind of rights depends on the reliability of its institutions. But O’Neill, challenging the standard view, affirms that States are ill suited to being primary agents of justice for welfare rights. The same cosmopolitan rhetoric denounced by O’Neill for focusing too much on defending rights and too little on allocating duties is also responsible for idealizing States’ agency regarding the institutional right to health. She dis-

³ The distinction between primary and secondary agents of justice is used by O’Neill to identify who has the greater responsibility regarding the realization of rights. Simon Caney explains O’Neill’s distinction, saying that while primary agents of justice have a legislative and an executive role, secondary agents limit themselves to the tasks assigned to them by the primary agents of justice. Caney further claims that this distinction is very important to thinking of how human right’s correspondent duties can be allocated, but he claims that we could understand this difference as two compatible roles that can be adopted by different institutions, rather than different kinds of agents (Caney 2013, pp. 133–156).

tinguishes between an abstract and an idealized theory: abstraction, on the one hand, is indispensable, because only by leaving some act-descriptions indeterminate can we offer a proposal that is suitable for a plurality of diverse agents; idealization, on the other hand, does not leave indeterminate certain predicates and rather, it erroneously asserts or denies some predicates about the agents involved (O'Neill 2000, p. 68).

The standard view regarding the States' role as primary agents of justice for welfare rights is guilty of idealizing States' agency. O'Neill thinks that every idealization leads us to a 'rosy view' in which individual rights are guaranteed by the State, and reminds us that:

... we do not inhabit an ideal world. Idealized conceptions of justice simply do not apply to international relations, social relations or individual acts in a world in which states, men and women always lack the capacities and the opportunities of idealized agents. (O'Neill 2000, p. 162)

One way to avoid this idealization is to recognize that States are ill suited for being the primary agents of justice for welfare rights, because they lack either the capacities or the resources (or even both) needed to accomplish this. O'Neill identifies three possibilities that not only aren't farfetched, but are rather common, and that could severely undercut the efforts towards realizing an institutional right to health. States can be: (1) unjust with their own people, such as tyrannies and rogue States; (2) incapable of securing justice for their citizens because they either lack the capabilities to enforce their law successfully or because they lack the minimal infrastructure needed to secure welfare rights, such as schools or hospitals; or (3) weakened by different processes of globalization that give international agencies more power within their boundaries (O'Neill 2016, pp.164–165).

In light of these difficulties, O'Neill suggests that we cannot continue with our idealized conception of States' agencies, but nor can we wait until all these problems are solved to continue the realization of institutional or human rights. To wait until States can be sufficient primary agents of justice would amount to returning to an aspirational or humanitarian conception of rights, disregarding their normative role.

Instead of abandoning their normative role, O'Neill invites us to consider the possibility of replacing States in their role as primary agents, and to be more flexible regarding who can be responsible for the duties entailed in institutional and human rights. She argues that for the realization of an institutional right to health, it is indispensable to recognize the importance of globalization and how it has shaped the way we think about epidemics, contagious diseases,

the availability of vaccinations and health services around the globe. For example, some NGOs have been able to substitute for or substantially aid different States in providing all the services that a right to health implies. O'Neill asks us to consider more global agents to whom we could allocate the correspondent duties of a right to health. This strategy has the advantage of not relying on an idealized conception of States' agency, and because it is not territorially bounded, it can better address global health problems.

Gopal Sreenivasan's objection to a human right to health

Gopal Sreenivasan has given several arguments to refute the possibility of a right to health.⁴ In this section, I will only explain why Sreenivasan thinks that there cannot be a *human* right to health. Although he does not deny the existence of a State's duty to take care of the conditions for its citizen's health, he denies that we can find a correspondent right to this duty. For Sreenivasan (as well as for O'Neill⁵), the relation between rights and duties can be explained in the following way: for every right, there must always be a correspondent duty and a duty

⁴ Sreenivasan has been a strong and extensive critic of a pretended right to health. I consider it important to briefly say here why he considers that any right to health is unattainable. One of Sreenivasan's most devastating arguments against the possibility of a right to health is to appeal to the 'nature of health'. This argument claims that health is an outcome that depends on many factors, among them, luck and biology. From this, he affirms that there cannot be any duty that can be held against the State to assure that all the relevant factors of health are met. Given that there can be no rights if there is no allocation of the proper duties, a right to health cannot be understood as an outcome. He also considers the arguments that try to replace 'health' for 'health care' in the formulation of this human right to dismiss the 'nature of health' argument, and to claim that what is being demanded is not an outcome but a service. He discredits this too, by pointing out that health care is just one part of what a right to health pretends to claim, so that it would be a morally defeating strategy to falsely equate health to health care. These arguments are very important to understand Sreenivasan's position, but I have decided to focus just on his argument against the possibility of a human right to health, and not against a right to health in general, because I consider that it emphasizes an important difficulty entailed by a common conception of what it takes for something to be regarded as a human right. See: Sreenivasan (2012; 2016).

⁵ "While claim rights are mirror images of obligations, not all obligations have mirror images (...) This thought by itself is reason enough to *begin* with obligations and not with rights." (O'Neill 2000, p. 99)

bearer, even if not every duty entails a right. Sreenivasan explains this thought with the following example. Even if one accepts that:

... there is a moral duty to provide—or even, that some agent has a moral duty to provide—individuals in a given population with herd immunity against contagious disease (...) [one can still deny] that any individual has a moral claim-right that correlates with any agent's moral duty to provide herd immunity. (Sreenivasan 2016, pp. 347–348)

He assumes that the agent who could bear this duty is the 'domestic state' (Sreenivasan 2016, p. 360), but even with this consideration, he rejects that from this duty we could conclude the existence of a right to health.

First of all, he takes human rights to be a special kind of moral rights rather than international legal rights. Then, he asks what distinguishes human rights from other kinds of moral rights, and what makes them "more than a random label for any old universal standard of justice." (Sreenivasan 2016, p. 360) The answer is what he calls the 'doubly universal' (Sreenivasan 2016, p. 355) condition of every moral *human* right. As the name suggests, it alludes to two universality requirements that must be met by a moral right in order for it to be considered a *human* right.

The first universality requirement is called the 'synchronic universality' and it demands that "if any human being has a given human right, then every other contemporary human being also has that right." (Sreenivasan 2016, p. 355) This entails that every human being on earth has the same claim-right to health. Even if we overlook the difficulty (outlined by O'Neill) of the allocation of the correspondent duties, there is another problem when we consider whether a right to health can meet this first universality requirement. That any human being on earth can claim her or his right to health regardless of the correspondent State's resources would be an idealization, if not a serious mistake. One cannot claim a right to health without considering the specific socioeconomic conditions that shape one's access to health care, vaccinations, clean water or food. From this, it seems problematic to assert that a right to health could meet the synchronic universality requirement, because even if we want to assert that every human being has a right to health, actual economic conditions will determine whether each one of them actually has the possibility of claiming and receiving what is guarded by this right.

This consideration leads us to what Sreenivasan identifies as the 'moral substance' universality requirement, which he explains through the slogan: "One world, one standard." (Sreenivasan 2016, p. 355) This second requirement affirms that "for any particular human right that all contemporary human beings have, the moral substance conveyed by the right is the same for every right-holder."

(Sreenivasan 2016, p. 355) The difference between the first and second universality requirement is that this last one adds a temporal criterion on how a *human* right should be realized. For Sreenivasan, moral *human* rights should always rule out “the doctrine of ‘progressive realisation.’” (Sreenivasan 2016, p. 355) The realization of a moral *human* right to freedom of speech is not a goal that must be gradually achieved. Rather, it is a moral rule that states how we should act towards others’ rights and what we could individually claim as our right to do. But this is not the case with a human right to health. It is impossible for it to be realized at once. Rather, it would seem that what we consider to be the defining characteristics of a human right to health, such as access to some services and goods, is inherently relative to a plan of progressive realization, depending on the limited resources and capacities that any State (as duty bearer) would have. As an example, Sreenivasan says “the state of Senegal simply cannot afford to spend \$1038 (PPP) annually per capita on health.” (Sreenivasan 2016, p. 360) If we concluded that the State of Senegal cannot realize the human right to health as other States are doing it during the same period, would this be enough to blame the State of Senegal for the failing of the human right to health? Could we hold accountable all those States that, due to their limited resources, fall behind on the ‘moral substance’ universality requirement?

The most fundamental idea to Sreenivasan’s second universality requirement seems to be that human rights should exclude the possibility of different States implementing the same “right at different levels or to different standards without infringing on their correlative moral duties.” (Sreenivasan 2016, p. 355) As stated by the ICESCR, a human right to health entails that every human being has the right to “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, art. 12) The kind of health care that one can receive and claim varies greatly from country to country. It would seem that ‘the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ can only be determined within each State’s boundaries. If this is true, there can be no universally claimable human right to health, because the duties that correspond to this claim are dependent on the limited resources and capacities of the State as the morally responsible duty bearer.

Moreover, we can conclude that States with the most limited resources are not the only ones that cause this failure to meet the second universality requirement. Even in those countries that can guarantee access to health care to all its citizens, and that regulate access to clean water, food and preventive goods such as vaccinations, there is always room for improvement. Unlike other human rights like the right to freedom of expression, a human right to health can be pro-

moted more fittingly, according to the needs of the people, by better infrastructure, resources and education.

The difficulty arising from the second universality requirement has led to the consideration of welfare rights as secondary rights, and this is reflected by international agreements:

Scholars sometimes frame civil and political rights as “first generation” and economic, social, and cultural rights as “second generation”. Despite the unity and equal status of human rights in the UDHR, international treaties reflect this divide. The ICCPR demands immediate state compliance, while the ICESCR is progressively realizable. The collective nature of socioeconomic rights, the progressive realization, and connection to resources meant that they would not be as rigorously enforced. The second generation of rights —although of equal value— has in practice been relegated to secondary status. (Gostin 2014, p. 246)

Unlike human rights that can be enforced right away (for example, to prevent the obstruction of liberty rights), a right to health can only be achieved progressively. The ICESCR recognizes this in its second article by stating that:

Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, art. 2)

This article leads us to accept what Sreenivasan denounces—that is, that a right to health cannot meet the second universality requirement: “‘One world, one standard’ turns out to be a rather challenging requirement for a right to health to satisfy.” (Sreenivasan 2016, p. 361) If human rights are characterized by virtue of their doubly universal nature, and a right to health cannot satisfy these requirements, it follows that, just as O’Neill also concluded, a pretended right to health cannot be regarded as a human right. Furthermore, even when O’Neill accepts that it can be an institutional right, she points out severe difficulties entailed in its realization. In the same way, Sreenivasan’s criticisms lead us to question whether it is a worthy strategy to keep trying to defend the existence of a right to health, even when it would not be considered as a human right. Along the lines of both authors’ arguments, we could ask now whether it would be better to just consider a certain duty towards health, that States should bear, even if this does not have a correlate claim-right. What would that duty be?

Taking global health seriously: the insufficiency of a duty to charity

O'Neill's and Sreenivasan's arguments have pointed out the difficulties of realizing a right to health even within a State's boundaries. As long as this right depends on institutional structures and these are insufficient, the realization of this right will be at risk. When we consider these difficulties from a global point of view, the problem seems to amplify. If a State cannot successfully bear its duty towards its own citizens, what kind of duty could be enforced between different States to promote health globally?

If we decide to abandon the human rights narrative, and even the defense of an institutional right to health, it would still be possible to say that every State bears a duty to its own citizens to provide conditions for their health.⁶ But here I want to suggest that the strategy of considering States' duties is also insufficient for promoting health conditions for every human being.

The question about what kind of States' duties could promote health globally has raised a debate between cosmopolitans and communitarists about the existence of international duties to justice and, in this case, of international duties to promote health. I will not discuss this debate here. Instead, I want to point out how unsatisfactory it is to establish a duty to charity as an international strategy to promote health.

One of the main problems regarding international relations of justice is that it recognizes each State's sovereignty as fundamental, up to the point that it does not necessarily entail any enforceable duties towards other States—or even towards human beings that are not citizens, even if they are within that State's boundaries. One strategy to avoid the problems corresponding to international duties of justice has been to appeal to a duty to charity between States. This strategy has had important outcomes, and has been more easily adopted because a duty to charity is less demanding for States than the recognition of an enforceable human right to health. This duty to charity only supposes that: "one can help others in serious distress without excessive cost to oneself." (Nagel 2008, p. 52) It does not impose how many resources should be invested towards pro-

⁶ I do not intend to address here the degree up to which a State should care and provide for the conditions of health of its citizens; nor whether this would have to involve every State providing universal access to health care, or even to vaccinations and clean water and food. I consider simply that all States should bear this duty, even if we accept that there could be varying degrees of each State's level of commitment.

moting global health—rather, it can be left up to each State to decide how to manage their aid towards other countries.

Although this duty to charity has been carried out with fewer problems than the strong enforcement of an alleged human right to health, it faces serious objections when regarded as a solution or as a way to promote global health. Two strong criticisms of the duty to charity as a replacement of the human rights strategy are: firstly, that a duty to charity always entails a dubious distinction of who is most in need and thus most deserving the correspondent aid, creating more inequality; and secondly, that charity neither remedies nor corrects the underlying structures from which many health problems arise at an international level—it merely reaffirms the dependence of some States on others.

A duty to charity is flawed from its very conception as a viable way to promote global health. Firstly, it could be argued that all foreign aid should be directed towards helping those most in need. This leads to the distinction between the ‘very poor’ and the ‘relatively poor’ (Millum 2012, p. 27), which creates more inequality: the international community can leave behind those who are not most in need—even when they face severe health problems—because their aid is not (yet) intended for them. But how can it be decided who is most in need? And *who* decides where the aid should go? This undetermined structure of charity has promoted that biased political and economic interests become the factors that decide who receives help now, and who should wait until their situation worsens to receive it.

The second problem with charity is that even when regarded as a duty, it necessarily entails a relation between unequal partners—one in desperate need and one with enough resources to help others without compromising its own interests. If we rely on this structure to promote global health, there can be no real progress; just momentary relief for those in the most vulnerable positions, but without an actual solution. The point of these criticisms is not that a duty to charity is useless. Instead, it emphasizes that it is not an actual solution because it does not challenge the causes that obstruct the realization of the conditions for health.

Every action that can be regarded as charity assumes from the start a parallel between inequality of wealth and inequality of power (Nagel 2008, p. 52). From this starting point, global health does not stand a chance, because the resources needed to promote it are still being withheld from those in need. Furthermore, weak States could argue that they are not able to perform their duties towards their citizens due to lack of donations, and given that aid is not mandatory and it is not a reliable source of resources, this attitude could lead to a worsening of the conditions of health for citizens of these countries (Gostin 2014, p. 19).

Appeals to charity, even when regarded as a special international duty, may still seem a more feasible way to promote global health than posing a human right to health, which faces the criticisms presented earlier. But in fact, a duty to charity would not accomplish much towards this global goal, because:

Rich donors remain rich (...) the poor remain poor, though, for the moment, not in desperate need. Humanitarian aid is essentially conservative; it preserves existing power structures (...) By contrast recognizing someone's rights is (...) to put them in control (...) It is to accept another person's legitimate claims to power. Rights claims are not restricted to needs, but also extend to liberties and opportunities (...) Humanitarianism is, therefore, attractive to those who are in power and like to keep things that way. (Wolff 2012a, p. 8)

If we take seriously the thought of global health, it seems that there are important reasons to recover the human rights narrative, even with all its problems. Here, I will present what I consider to be three of the most relevant reasons to continue with the human rights narrative.

First, one weighty flaw of a duty to charity is that it disentangles global health from a correspondent sense of responsibility. From the point of view of charity, wealthier States do not have an obligation to make donations or provide aid to others, and weak States may excuse themselves and disregard their responsibilities towards their citizens just by maintaining that they have not received enough resources. In this scenario where no one is responsible, charity leaves us with a far more diminished hope of achieving global health. A human rights narrative, although having the problem of allocating specific duties, recognizes the need of asking who would be responsible for achieving those rights.

Second, if we consider global health to be 'a globally shared responsibility' (Golin 2014, p. 19), we must make explicit the damaging effect of international omissions. A duty to charity cannot address the lack or insufficiency of donations as a morally worrisome omission, precisely because it does not recognize any inherent responsibility for donors. The human rights narrative, by contrast, makes visible the impact of omissions:

Individuals may have been wronged through neglect, but no rights would have been violated, on such a view. However, once the claim is made that rights will be violated if assistance is not forthcoming, the argument has shifted to one of justice: that we neglect or violate people's rights by failing to help. (Wolff 2012b, p.79)

Unlike a duty to charity, an appeal to human rights can point out the need to find agents that are responsible for global health. It can also help to denounce what is *not* being done to promote it, and to emphasize the need to repair this failure.

A third advantage of the human rights narrative is that it does not presuppose a hierarchic structure in which what motivates global health is not a human entitlement but, on one hand a never ending need and, on the other, mere philanthropic donations. Given that charity has as its core the idea of need as its motive, it cannot end it; charity's aim is just to briefly mitigate it.

These three reasons offer an important counterweight to criticisms of human rights and of the possibility of a human right to health. One of the most relevant flaws of a human right to health, as regarded by O'Neill and Sreenivasan, is that it does not meet certain universality requirements that are usually considered to be the defining features of any human right that can be legitimately regarded as such. But these criticisms do not necessarily force us to abandon this narrative. Instead, they can be seen as good motives to revise what we consider fundamental about human rights and, perhaps, to reconsider how have we been thinking about their universality.

Concluding remarks

One way in which globalization has shaped theoretical discussions about health is that it has shown how flexible and limited boundaries are, when we consider health problems and the resources and capabilities we have to address them. The multitudinous factors that are relevant to people's health around the globe cannot be bounded within States. Certain "situations can only really make sense from a global perspective that takes in the structure that affect people's lives (...) And it is only from a global perspective that options for addressing their difficulties can be identified." (Millum 2012, p. 2)

This change of perspective, which is necessary to address contemporary problems of health, has not yet found an appropriate theoretical justification. One way it has been defended is by posing a human right to health. But this idea has received strong objections that question whether it is actually possible to claim a *human* right to health, and whether this would be the best strategy to promote health. In this essay, I have intended to show that although it is not free from difficulties, it still is the best strategy available in order to continue to defend a global perspective on health. Much still needs to be said about how a right to health can be considered a human right if it does not possess the universal requirements that we have ascribed to other human rights since their inception. I consider that these objections raise an important challenge to the way we think not only about global health, but about human rights in general. Perhaps, in adopting this global perspective, we could reconsider the way we think about

the relationship between universal requirements and global demands regarding health.

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Alberto Ruiz Méndez



Who Are the Subjects of Justice in a Globalized World?

From the ‘Unidimensional Identity’ to the ‘Diversity of Identities’

Abstract: This article states that the idea of national citizenship, bound to rights and duties circumscribed to a State, is no longer fit to reflect upon the political challenges of a globalizing world. Instead, I argue in favor of the ‘diversity of identities’ as a ‘political heuristic’ that offers an alternative frame to the question about who is the subject of justice.

Our current understanding of the political and social action lacks of something: the concept of a citizen that we inherit from Modernity—the citizen as the subject of rights and duties—doesn’t let us explain its current dynamics in a globalizing world. Problems such as migration, refugees and contemporary social movements, among others, have led us to problematize two ideas associated with that concept: a) citizenship is defined based on exclusively national rights and duties, that is, those which are circumscribed to a politically and geographically well limited territory; and b) a State’s citizens are the only subjects for whom justice is understood as the equal distribution of those rights and duties. But the paradigms of national citizenship and just distribution are being undermined by globalization’s dynamics, since we are shown that their effects are transnational and that the expressions against these effects can also have a global character. This context rushes us to find new forms of understanding for those transformations, as well as the political action of people. To meet this challenge, this work argues in favor of the idea of the ‘diversity of identities’ as a way to understand people close to their concrete experiences of injustice, and as a ‘political heuristic’ that lets us offer an alternative frame to national citizenship as an answer to the question about who are the subjects of justice in a globalizing world.

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A first answer: the ‘national who’

The concept of citizenship has a long tradition, from its formulation until its most recent criticisms. It is not my intention to make a critical balance of this long tradition or its different meanings. Instead, I will adopt as a reference point the political idea of ‘person’ developed by John Rawls (who interprets citizenship in a specific way, which I will hereafter call ‘unidimensional identity’), to argue that such an interpretation contributes to the theoretical *impasse* in which we currently find ourselves: having to reflect upon the political dynamics of global and diverse effects using homogenous concepts from national frames; or, as Benhabib would write, discovering ourselves as “travelers sailing an unknown territory, with the help of old maps, made in different moments and in response to different needs.” (Benhabib 2005, p. 117) Those ‘old maps’ are the concepts of citizenship and the Nation-State as the frames through which people’s political action has been interpreted, and on which the struggles for justice have been staged. Let us see then the distinctive notes of the person as citizen in the Rawlsian theory.

Within Rawls’s wide conceptual plot that puts together theory of justice as equity, the political conception of the person is key, because its characteristics enable political agreement about basic justice questions that consolidate the construction of a reasonably fair society. According to this purpose, Rawls models his political understanding of the person as “someone who can be a citizen, that is, a normal and cooperative member of society through a lifetime.” (Rawls 1996, p. 18) Rawls tells us that this is a conception that starts in the public political culture, impressed on the fundamental texts of a democracy, and also comes from our daily notion of people as basic units of thought, choice and responsibility. What turns it into a normative conception is that it emphasizes certain characteristics that allow making people as citizens a key element to achieve a reasonably fair society. One of these characteristics is the distinction between ‘public identity’ and ‘moral identity’. The former is conceived of only in reference to the political rights and duties according to its shared status of citizenship, whereas the latter includes deeper commitments in people bound to values and principles of a reasonable, comprehensive doctrine (religious, moral, philosophical).

Values and principles that form moral identity are so important to people that they could even represent an obstacle to the agreement upon a political conception of justice fit to a democracy. To overcome this hurdle, Rawls states that public identity has a priority function to reach such an agreement, because only from its perspective could we make the distinction between our commitments

derived from a reasonable, comprehensive doctrine and those that we acquire as citizens. This doesn't mean that we are supposed to be two different persons; we all are at the same time a moral person within a comprehensive doctrine and a citizen in the public environment—but to Rawls:

[...] we can only hope to achieve a constitutional liberal democracy if we manage to distinguish between a private sphere and a public sphere or, as he says, between the shared culture (*background culture*) and the public environment (*public forum*). (Dreben 2002, p. 325)

Out of the priority of public identity above moral identity, the political conception of the person is a key element to agreeing upon a political conception of justice, because people, as citizens, by prioritizing their public identity assure the fulfilling of their freedom and political rights, as well as the freedom to practice their own understanding of good. This priority guarantees, on the one hand, the full preservation of their person irrespective of any alleged wellbeing and, on the other hand, that their ideas of good may have the same consideration and respect as those of any other. The fact of reasonable pluralism also forces them to privilege public identity, because in the same measure they are not able to reach an agreement on any base or moral rank (and even doing so would bring undesirable consequences)—only their goals and political commitments would allow the finding of a point of shared agreement. This doesn't mean that people as citizens must abandon all comprehensive doctrines in the quest for agreement. Priority states that they must be framed inside the limits of the political conception of justice, to promote that the social order guarantees a diagram of liberties and equal rights for all, and to avoid that their comprehensive doctrines can get to exercise a coercive power through the State. Distinguishing the field of influence of both identities, and giving priority to the public identity, is a strategy that helps guarantee a shared status as free and equal citizens within the frame of a Nation-State that will be in charge of solving every conflict of basic justice, by means of the political idea of justice agreed by the people conceived of as citizens.

The political conception of the person and its emphasis on public identity is thus a paradigmatic example of citizenship as the 'national who' of justice, because the latter, understood as a measure of distribution (of income, liberties, rights among others), is exclusively addressed to those on the inside of the Nation-State, which in due time becomes the legitimate scale for expressing and solving possible conflicts of justice—even if a widening of rights and liberties is demanded or the current measure of distribution is questioned. The only relevant subjects of justice in both cases are the people conceived of as national citizens. Further, this 'national who' not only determines the rights and duties

of the people considered citizens, but also the language with which these people express themselves and formulate their demands for justice, so that an argument between people thus conceived of and the State is valid only if they interrogate it about the measurement of distribution; that is, the current conception of justice. Whatever is found outside this environment, such as the cultural dimensions of acknowledgement, the problems of economic inequity, or the political exclusion due to gender reasons, are not conceived of as matters of basic justice.

John Rawls's political conception of person justifies itself within his theory of justice, but we must admit that it was created in a political and social context that was already in transformation. Before taking on its criticism and stating the need for new categories, we will take a short stroll through the characteristics of that transformation.

Nevertheless, it's suitable to depict that even the characterization made of those who compound the old and the new social movements was in consonance with the 'national who'. In the so-called old social movements, even though they had international repercussions (Tilly 2009), the working class had as a range of action and protest the Nation-State, and the paradigm of justice as distribution. And in the case of the so-called new social movements (ecologists, pacifists, among others), although their objectives and vindications (world peace, preservation of nature) sought repercussions outside the Nation-State, what is true is that they didn't achieve the level of global coordination required to leave that range, and hence their actions or protests stayed inside the Nation-State, refuting more the symbolic terrain than the political (Melucci 1999). We must look to the transformations surrounding the national frame to explain how the movements that followed let through to what is global and contributed to the theoretical *impasse*.

The context of globalization

At dawn of the twenty-first century, Albert Melucci described the political and social arena as a global stage, based on a 'hypothesis of discontinuity' (Melucci 2001). To him, we were being witnesses of structural phenomena that would radically modify social and political life on a planetary scale. That hypothesis stated that while the global map was changing based on new phenomena, the modern categories we used to attempt to describe them remained the same. So there was a discontinuity between the tools of analysis and the phenomena that they tried to explain, such that to him those were "crucial years that see emerge, at a planetary scale, unforeseen actors and struggles, but that have also shown the inadequacy of the instruments [allegedly] capable of catching and interpreting the

emergent forms.” (Melucci 1999, p. 176) Those structural phenomena and the theoretical discontinuity associated with them are collectively what today we have agreed to call globalization.

Beginning at a simple definition, we can say that globalization is a phenomenon of history in which relationships among countries, societies and people have soared, and time-space boundaries have been reduced through the flux of goods, services, products, knowledge and financial capital. Of course, globalization as a concept is a much more complex phenomenon, but that basic description allows us emphasize the fact that its effects have been so widespread that we face a double challenge: ‘how to understand the global society’ and ‘how to think of the global society’ (Campillo 2015); in other words, how to elaborate a philosophical and political reflection that enables us to comprehend the current world, and how to reflect upon the impact that this kind of society is having on our understanding of intellectual philosophical work and its role in such a society. Without trying to exhaust the complexity of globalization, but hoping to build an understanding of the same that adds to the purposes of this work, I will briefly expose three characteristic dimensions.

Firstly, one of the factors that stimulated this phenomenon was the revolution of information and technology that lets us stand in a digital space from which we can establish relations regardless of physical or time barriers. The Internet is the main tool of this revolution, because its most important technological innovation was turning that digital space into a platform from which almost anybody can produce and publish content in a simple way, using basic technical knowledge and skills. This innovation allowed digital applications to thrive in almost every dimension of life, keeping us in a non-synchronized but nevertheless coordinated state of interconnection. That innovation created a whole new process of “hypersocialization [by which the] new technologies of information create the possibility of action detaching from space and time, thus letting through to the appearance of time and the virtualization of space” (Melucci 2001, p. 32), and introducing to our actions both the global dimension and simultaneity, by separating them from lineal space and time. In the same way that content on the Internet can be hypertextual (audio, video and text all at the same time), so too can human action, by occurring in various spaces and times simultaneously through its global dispersion on the great digital spider web.

Secondly, besides the interconnection, globalization also implies interdependence at different scales, because decisions made within a State can come to have an influence on the life of those who are not part of it. For example, the economic measures that a country undertakes related to agriculture could affect the migrant workers and the families in their country of origin; or if a coun-

try decides to close its borders to legal or illegal migration, this would have consequences in diverse regions of the world. Interdependence is also part of the inter-, trans- and supranational organizations that thrust agendas with objectives and actions that are framed beyond any one Nation-State. For example, the implementation of certain economic politics that the International Monetary Fund demands in exchange for loans has regional and global repercussions; or in the case of organizations such as Reporters Without Borders that champion freedom of speech worldwide, we are shown the shared responsibility we have regarding such topics as ecological disasters, refugee crises or famine. Interdependence created by globalization points out how impossible any ‘reversibility’ (Bauman 2004) of our mutual dependence appears.

Thirdly, interconnection and interdependence also reveal to us that globalization is built upon a series of relations marked by the exercise of power that entail the generation of deep inequity among and within countries. While it is true that with globalization the positive flow of capitals towards developing countries has thrived, it is also true that with the global consolidation of financial elites and the supranational institutions that back up and take care of their interests, less developed governments and local markets exhibit their inability to recover from economic crises and their incapacity to fix the inequities that result from being subordinated to the benchmarks dictated by those elites. While the number of countries with prosperous economies that develop a stronger immunity to crises diminishes, the number of countries with poorer welfare and greater political uncertainty soars. This uncertainty increases their internal inequity by increasing the gap between those who have access to social benefits and those who don’t, those who can access education and those who cannot, etc. The inequity spawned by these global relations of power makes visible the constitutive injustice of our world.

Each of the three dimensions pointed out implies the need for reckoning both its specific complexity and also their communicating links, because it is in them that the fight for justice is taking place. The wide range of political languages by means of which that fight is expressed represents a problematic horizon of reflection. Because the space of our actions is broader, the common objectives are restated, the distinction between what is global and local stops being clear, and the involved and affected actors increase in number. As a consequence, “globalization is changing our way of speaking about justice” (Fraser 2010, p. 12), by being the stage of the political and social battles of our time, and demanding new strategies that enable us to explain and analyze a variety of languages and vindications in the social and political environment that can’t be approached through a homogenizing lense.

In the previous section, I stated that the old and the new social movements didn't reach a global impact because, among other things, they didn't account for the digital tools that could allow them to overcome time-space barriers. But it is important to also point out that the sociological and philosophical theories that explained them conceived of them within the frame of Nation-State, and refuted justice in terms of the distribution, either of labor or symbolic—but always within that frame and without considering their possible effects on a wider scale. That is the reason why whenever the alterworld and networked social movements following the former first appear, the need for restating our modern conceptual diagrams arises, because in their protests they involved a wide range of vindications and actions that are only understandable without the tight frames of the Nation-State and citizenship—precisely because the dynamics of their action and the content of their protest had a global character that went beyond those frames and those theories. Thus, before proposing new forms of understanding, we must first undertake a criticism of the 'national who' and thereby identify the milestone for remaking the map.

The 'unidimensional identity' of the 'national who'

The conception we have inherited of people as citizens framed by the Nation-State is 'unidimensional' insofar as it emphasizes their 'political identity' to turn them into subjects of justice. But under the circumstances of a globalizing world, this unidimensional conception of people produces more questions than it ever offered certainties. Let us consider the case of the aforementioned social movements.

There was a time in which we could clearly identify who demanded some vindication of justice and their opponent: the struggle of the workers' movement (mainly formed by the workers themselves) fought against capitalism and the educated property owner (bourgeois) State; the feminist movements gathered persons, without gender distinction, who shared the diagnosis of the patriarchy represented by the State as an oppressive power; and to these can be added many ecological or peace movements. It can also be said that, despite their global repercussions, these struggles were always framed within the Nation-State. But with the emergence of antiglobalization movements (Juris 2004) and subsequently, of networked social movements (Castells 2015), that break with the Nation-State frame, "the movements lose their condition as a character [giving] individuals and groups a benchmark to rebuild divided identities among different

memberships, functions and times of the social experience.” (Melucci 1999, p. 118)

‘Unidimensional identity’ no longer seems to be the adequate category to conceive of people, nor to explain their social action, because in those movements the opponent was no longer the Nation-State but, for example, supranational organizations such as the International Monetary Fund. Additionally, the members of each movement no longer conceived of themselves just as workers or feminists or ecologists, but all of their particular belongings gathered in a common indignation due to the negative effects of the world politics or economy, and, in some cases, not only did they refute the conception of justice as a scale, but also demanded a ‘radical democracy’ that implied a change in our conception of justice. I will return to this topic later. I will now explain the errors of the inherited conception of the ‘national who’, to show the reason why this response cannot help us deal with the contemporary challenge of simultaneously managing the difference and the integration within the frame of globalization, and hence our need for an alternative point of view.

In her book *Scales of Justice*, Nancy Fraser tells us that the contemporary philosophical theories in matters of justice (such as Rawls’s) are based on two given ideas, which she identifies with the images of a scale and a map. The first image evokes the intention of impartially, assessing different vindications of social justice based on a ‘distributive’ measure that makes them measurable; whereas the image of the map sends us back to the metric resource of the geographer, with which it is possible to limit and represent spatial relations through which those social demands would take place. (For the case of such theories the adequate scale or frame is the Nation-State and its citizens.) But given the problematic context of globalization, we must ask ourselves what is their pertinence as normative categories: because in the case of the scale, the complexity and variety of the current political language on which the vindications of justice are formulated take to trial the paradigm of distribution; and, concerning the map, because cases like the ones I have mentioned regarding social movements refute the frame of Nation-State, since their demands of justice succeeded to transcend the national scale thanks to their dynamics and the content of their protest.

Globalization, especially because of the three dimensions I have highlighted, is then the stage on which the vindications of justice and the claims of injustice demand us to discuss yet again the question: who are the subjects of justice? The ‘national who’ reassured by theories like Rawls’s was the agreed answer for a long time, but since today the negative or positive effects of political decisions are global, dynamics of protest and political action that can be carried out by people are global too. Based on this certainty, I add to Fraser’s statement—according to which those theories of justice can’t offer a guide for analyzing the

problems derived from these challenges for having fallen into a ‘dogma of egalitarianism’ (Fraser 2010, Chapter 3)—that the Nation-State is the correct frame for the reflection of justice, and that its citizens are the subjects to whom it is addressed. In democracies based on the idea of the Nation-State, the arguments about justice agreed that distribution was the measurement to solve justice demands. Although they debated *what* should be equally distributed (rights, liberties, capacities, cultural identity), they agreed on the *who*: the national citizens to whom distribution was addressed. Given the challenges of globalization, both coincidences are being questioned and the national scale with the citizens bound to it no longer seems fit to set justice the relevant questions. Having assumed the ‘national who’ dogma, theories like Rawls’s can’t help us determine *who* should count as a relevant justice subject in a globalizing world, because the dynamics of political subjects, as well as those of social movements, escape from their theoretical diagrams; they set sail from the experience of injustice of both the ones on the inside and the ones on the outside of the national frame, which recoils in a dynamic of global protest and starting from different identities.

But besides having fallen into this dogma, the point of view both traditions offer about the ‘national who’ is also limited. In Rawls, the conception of identity is ‘unidimensional’ by limiting it to its political aspect, in which it is only possible to take part of the public affairs and formulate vindications of justice from the language of rights and duties, forgetting that those same vindications can only be made from concrete positions of exclusion, and that expressing them just in political terms can imply its perpetuation when not taking into account their specificity. In this way, Rawls’s political conception of person as the ‘national who’ of justice leaves voiceless those who demand the amendment of an injustice that has had global effects. In this sense, the theory of Rawlsian justice not only has assumed without reckoning the idea of the ‘national who’, but also offers us a limited understanding of it by presenting it in terms of a political identity that encloses people within the same interests and the same needs, rendering the political dialogue unnecessary.

From the challenges before us in a globalizing world, those ‘monological theories’ of justice (Fraser 2010, p. 27) lack the necessary concepts to analyze and understand the political dynamic of those who are both on the inside of the national scale and on the outside of it, and who need to express their demands in another language which is not that of distribution. When blindly assuming the framing of the Nation-State and of national citizenship, this dogma turns into an instrument of manipulation of the public space, because from it the rules of political decision unfairly exclude people who belong to the community, and because the boundaries of community exclude those affect-

ed by the inner decisions. This phenomenon, which Fraser (2010) calls a ‘misrepresentation’, denies people the possibility of denouncing an injustice and participating in its amendment; by conceiving of them from a ‘unidimensional identity’ perspective, an unjustified exclusion is performed and we are left with a conceptual gap that appears unavoidable.

Today’s political and social conflicts are the result of many factors, and the struggles for justice are no longer only for the widening of rights and liberties; hence, political action of protest by people is also the result of multiple inner and outer factors. Conceiving of people as having a unidimensional identity has made us think that what is important is explaining, analyzing and solving conflicts, since the actors are already given—but in reality, the multiplicity of the actors that appear at a local and (sometimes simultaneously) global level demands us paying attention to the diversity of people. Amartya Sen has pointed out this same need by demonstrating that beginning at a unidimensional identity (or a ‘singular affiliation’ of the identity, as he calls it) opens an unbridgeable abyss between the ideal conception and the real behavior of people (Sen 2009), because the ‘singular affiliation’ of identity mistakes its perspective about people by putting them in very tight circumstances for their action. In his opinion, only the acknowledgement of our different commitments and adhesions could allow us “a bigger understanding of the plurality of human identity and the acknowledgement that such needs overcome across and act against a strict separation along a unique rigid line of impregnable division.” (Sen 2006, p. xiv) The conception of unidimensional identity creates an idealized vision of people, and consequently, leaves us without a proper guide for thinking the dynamic of the conflicts and people in their political action. As a result of this conceptual gap, the ‘right to the word (Melucci 2001, p. 57) and to ‘parity of participation’ (Fraser 2010, p. 28) of groups of individuals to decide what they are and what they want to be, has been limited. These authors consider this to be an injustice, both within and beyond the frame of Nation-State, and contemplate what it takes to remediate it.

To get over the conception of unidimensional identity, we must undertake the following challenge: provided that people don’t exhaust their identity nor their action under the idea of citizenship, we must be able to find a conception of the same that transcends that conceptualization through analytical instruments that describe and analyze what people are or can be and what people do or can do. The person as citizen within the Nation-State is no longer the starting point, as supposed by theories of justice like Rawls’s. Instead, within the frame of the challenges that a globalizing world presents, it is a phenomenon to be explained by some dynamic model that facilitates catching the complexities of the actors and the conflicts derived from them.

A second answer: the ‘diversity of identities’ as ‘political heuristic’

I now return to the aforementioned social movements, to exemplify this challenge and to derive from their experience the idea of ‘diversity of identities’.

Digital interconnection allowed the creation of a different dynamic in social movements from the last years of the twentieth century until the movements of the outraged. Internet, text messages from mobile phones and digital social platforms like *Facebook* or *Twitter* made possible a wider diffusion of protest, which allowed other networks and people to support protest speeches that might be territorially distant, but brought emotionally near thanks to digital interconnection. Pioneers in this dynamic were the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional and the so called ‘Battle of Seattle’, since in both cases they used the digital communication tools of their time to broadcast their message and coordinate their own and third parties’ actions. But the ones who maximized the usage of those tools were the social movements that occurred between 2009 and 2012 in Iceland, the movement of the Outraged in Spain, the occupation of Wall Street in New York and the movement #YoSoy132 in Mexico. Each of these has its specificity and would require a particular study, but from the common characteristics that Castells (2015) has proposed, we can abstract one that helps the purposes of this research: the identity of the people who took part in those movements.

Since mobilization was organized through communication and coordination networks to which anybody could materially or virtually access, participants didn’t have to be identified exclusively as workers, feminists, ecologists, global-phobes, pacifists or any other discrete group. In the context of these networked social movements, people could assume demands, protests or indignation as their own, even though they didn’t belong to their immediate context, and without having to compromise their own identity or goals in case of belonging to another movement. Characterization of earlier movements had a tendency to centralize the identity of their members, but in these new movements, each individual gets involved from a ‘diversity of identities’ that favors union around a common objective. The global injustice present in our world affects us in different areas of our lives—we don’t need to see ourselves exclusively as workers or ecologists to mobilize. It was precisely the confirmation of that injustice through the diversity of identities that we acquired and affirmed as persons that led the participants of these movements to mobilize and protest.

Based on what has been exposed about the context of globalization, the mistakes of theories of justice such as Rawls’s, and the dynamic of social movements as an example of the political and social challenges of that context, the

conception of the citizen now appears before us as a reductionist vision of people's identity within democratic societies. In particular, Rawls's theory of justice created a conception of the person based on a 'public identity' that favored the language of rights and duties to express demands that at the same time were valid only within the frame of the Nation-State. Nevertheless, this conception entails singularizing its identity to certain needs or interests valid in resolving questions of basic justice—but that cannot include the demands of justice that people make based on their social position, their economic situation or their cultural identity at a global scale, because the effects of globalization transcend the national frame. Therefore, we can say that no philosophical reflection of politics that alleges a 'unidimensional identity' in people conceived of as citizens can be a useful guide for reflecting upon the conflicts of global character, because conceiving of people as a 'national who' doesn't take into account that people act from different positions, adhesions and indignations that go beyond the political language exclusive to rights and duties, nor that they are even aware that the formality of such language is no longer adequate to express their discontent. In consequence, the unidimensional identity keeps us from understanding that "contemporary individuals act in the confinement of diverse systems and have the increasing need of pregnable identities that allow them to transit through the different regions of meaning and the different institutional frames." (Melucci 2001, p. 47)

To overcome this conceptual gap, it is necessary to factor in a conception of people's identities that reflects the 'diversity of identities' that constitute us, and which are built from the influence that the different adhesions, loyalties and commitments—both political and moral—that set up our demands of justice and that encourage us to mobilize against some kind of injustice have in the course of our lives. This idea of the diversity of identities appears as a 'political heuristic' that could serve, on one hand, to make possible critical reflection on the categories of the political philosophy we have inherited, and, on the other hand, as an alternative point of view about the people opposite to the 'national who' that could help us break out of the rigid conceptual structures that have been passed on to us, so that we could design a map to guide us accurately through a globalizing world.

By 'political heuristic', I understand a knowledge that appears as an alternative method to solve a problem when all the other existing methods generate more confusion than solutions (Navarro 2015). Regarding the question about who counts as a subject of justice, the answer of the 'national who' generates more problems than satisfactory explanations when we try to approach global phenomena like networked social movements. For this reason, I propose using the idea of the diversity of identities as a political heuristic to redesign a relevant

and reliable starting point; to help us determine who counts as a subject of justice in each case—but not in such a singular way that in the long term would generate more uncertainty rather than options to think about the conflicts. The heuristic I am trying to build from this idea of the diversity of identities is political because it would only apply to the analysis of subjects that refute the frames of State-Nation and citizenship from the global perspective of injustice and inequities; thus it justifies its characterization as a tool for the creation of new knowledge concerning the political problems of a globalizing world by assuming, on one side, that inherited political philosophy doesn't guide us correctly in its examination, and, on the other side, that that world is complex, interactive and interdependent enough to elaborate exhaustive analysis or seek exact solutions.

The way in which the question about who counts as a subject of justice is answered is crucial, because by doing so from the perspective of the diversity of identities, we are set on the inverse course within the map; in other words, while inherited theories of justice determined monologues like the goal and the path to reach it, setting sail from the diversity of identities means instead to begin with the concrete experiences of the people (such as the ones we find in social movements) to determine the steps to take towards justice. Beginning from the diversity of identities would mean acknowledging that the different spheres within which we define our actions, responsibilities and additions represent a different political language that we have the right to vindicate, because it is precisely this diversity of identities—national citizens, workers, defenders of animal rights, or all of these at once—that favors and sustains collective action in a globalizing world. Those “multiple identities get past national frontiers, and the people do things they feel they really ‘have’ to do, instead of accepting them by virtue.” (Sen 2009, p. 129).

Of course, none of the problems that the three dimensions of globalization entail can be solved just with a change of perspective about the people—but I think it would be much more difficult to propose an adequate view if we don't incorporate a conception of the person based on their diversity of identities, and which reflects the variety of commitments and adhesions that are part of their interpretation of the injustices that could affect them in one or more aspects of such a variety. The diversity of identities seems to be a good starting point to reflect upon the refutations of justice at a global level because, on one side, it lets us bear witness of the injustice of the current system in different ambits, and, on the other side, it also lets us associate with common actions derived from injustice, such that we can experiment in different aspects of social life. Its pertinence as a political heuristic is that, in opposition to the ‘national who’, it allows us to “open a way for the acknowledgement of the plurality of meanings and forms of action present in the concrete collective phenomena.”

(Melucci 1999, p. 59) The conception of people from their diversity of identities seeks to contribute to the creation of a theory according to our time that serves to undertake the task of drawing the proper map to guide us from the inside of the complexity of a globalizing world. Its success will depend on our capacity to think from the global frame, and to explain how the political action of the people from the convergence of their diversity of identities is configured.

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Sustainable Intergenerational Justice and its Ends

Abstract: The primary concern of this work is to ask what we want to leave to future generations. The argumentation is grounded in two premises: firstly, that there is an intrinsic interdependence between justice and sustainable development; and secondly, that the capabilities approach proposed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum has made the crucial contribution of pointing out that for social justice, it is ‘ends’ that are fundamental and not just ‘means’. The idea behind this hypothesis is that people transform resources into valuable ways of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ differently, so the informational focus should be shifted onto ‘freedoms to’, or the real opportunities that people have. Thus, compared to theories that place the emphasis on income or needs in relation to development and sustainable justice, the capabilities approach presents a more promising framework for correcting intergenerational injustices. However, this theory must also deal with problems unique to prospective justice, in addition to the limitations of its own incompleteness. In this sense, it could be very helpful to complement it with an idea of intergenerational responsibility and a specification of the content of capabilities, for its implementation in the intergenerational context.

Introduction

Goethe said that, “to grasp that the sky is blue everywhere, one does not need to travel around the world” (1836, p. 266). Indeed, every human being, I believe, shares Goethe’s strong intuition: it is not necessary to travel widely to know that we all live under the same sky. Nevertheless, it is very likely that to admire a blue sky from some corners of the planet may present challenges. Imagine trying to view a pure blue sky from Delhi or Cairo, the most polluted mega-cities in the world.¹ Apart from constituting a statistical fact, it is also basic intuition that

¹ For a ranking of the most world’s air polluted cities, see the recently released WHO Global Urban Ambient Air Pollution Database: http://www.who.int/phe/health_topics/outdoorair/databases/cities/en/

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we have not been very respectful of our ecosystem in the global process of industrialization, still in its premature stages in many developing countries. Under this sky, sustainability has become one of the most pressing issues for theories intended to conceptualize justice in intergenerational terms.²

This Promethean era, to use Jonas's adjective (1979), has given rise to unprecedented volatility between human action and ecological fragility. Contemporary predictive knowledge, epistemological tools and the practical range of human activity have evolved to a level patently superior to any past incarnations. Taking this into account, I shall argue that sustainable development requires a thinking rooted in praxis regarding the effects of our present actions on the future, considering not only the ecological level but also, moral and socio-political sustainability (Avner de-Shalit 1997, p. 130). Theories of justice deal with the questions of how to distribute resources and what is essential for human well-being, and recognize the importance of identifying a concept of justice that extends towards the future. There can be no intergenerational justice without human sustainable development; equally, sustainable development can not take place without thinking of justice for the future.

With this premise in mind, I will present a brief genealogy of the concept of sustainable development (and its consanguinity with human development). I will limit this overview to show the origins of sustainable development, recognizing its historical and ideological connection with the paradigm of economic growth. The bias that considers development and economic growth to be nearly identical still prevails in mainstream economics. Although it is proven true that there is a positive correlation between the increase of economic variables and social progress, the two should not be confused as identical. It is imperative to recognize the excessive emphasis that many economists place on economic growth as the only driving force for development, and the corresponding belief that growth axiomatically results in the benefit of all population sectors. These hypotheses are considered so apodictic that they prevent consideration of what

2 In the literature devoted to the topic, it is usual to find the concepts of 'sustainable development' and of 'sustainability' used interchangeably. The difference is subtle: sustainability refers to the end of a process (longevity of the planet), while sustainable development refers to the process itself (the ways to reach such an end). That is why sustainable development can ultimately consist of many different means, such as sustainable consumption, sustainable production, sustainable agriculture, sustainable transport and so on. I will use both concepts without making any further distinction, prioritizing the fluidity of the reasoning. To explore the differences between both concepts, see the UNESCO portal on sustainable development:

<http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/education-for-sustainable-development/sustainable-development/>

is really substantive in people's lives, and do not commonly lead to a reflection on the principles of development.

In *Development as Freedom*, Amartya Sen argued that, “[d]evelopment consists of the removal of various types of unfreedoms that leave people with little choice and little opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency” (1999, p. xii). It is clear that there is the temptation among an important sector of neoliberal economics, with strong influence in public policies of countries with economic and military power, to perpetuate a thinning, a devaluation of the notions of development and well-being. For this reason, I aim to defend that while economic growth can be an important factor for development, development is not grounded solely in economic growth.

I believe that this conceptual map is a useful first step for thinking about justice for the future and the spaces of social responsibility. The human actions that constitute the current third wave of globalization have produced a fragility in both human and environmental terms (Ricoeur 1997). The evolution of the normative basis of development is the prelude to the primary concern here: to bring to the fore the central question of what we want to leave to future generations.³ Answering this question is neither a simple nor an immediate task. As a second step, I shall examine contemporary mainstream conceptions of sustainable development, and highlight their limits in comparison to the capabilities approach in the *intragenerational* sphere. In the *intergenerational* sphere, the stakes involve what we consider valuable for our descendants and future individuals to inherit. The claim is that the substantive elements for a human life are the ones that should be preserved and proliferated (Sen 2013), so the analysis of the ends and means of sustainability is fundamental to extending notions of justice across generations.

I propose that, while the capabilities approach has proven to be absolutely prolific in praxis and a superior alternative to resource-based or utility-based approaches, in the context of prospective justice it still needs to be philosophically complemented beyond the schema of coexisting generations. The last part of this study is devoted to outlining some elements that can inform a deeper investiga-

³ In this work, I use the terms ‘next generations’ and ‘future generations’ interchangeably. However, in terms of obligations or duties between generations, they have subtly different connotations that are explored elsewhere. The norm among works on future ethics is to consider that the temporal space of obligations and responsibility extends forward two generations. Thus, the popular tendency is to focus on the sentiments that we have for our children and grandchildren. It constitutes the primary source of responsibility in Jonas (1979) and is found in the work of contemporary contractualists (John Rawls 1971, 1993, 2001; Kumar 2003), contractarianists (Gauthier 1986), communitarists (Thompson 2009), and in Solow (1992) and Van Parijs (1998).

tion in this sense. In particular, I will underline the need for examining our obligations towards future generations, and investigate the process of selecting valuable capabilities and their content, in the domain of intergenerational justice.

The question of development

From the point of view of the North, interest in how nations grow and how this can benefit individuals is not new at all. Something similar can be found in the writings of the classical economists: Adam Smith, David Ricardo, the Marquis of Condorcet, Thomas Malthus and John Stuart Mill, not forgetting the great utopian Karl Marx. In the absence of the term ‘development’, they wrote of civilization and decay, of wealth, evolution and poverty, of capital and population growth. Curiosity related to knowing the causes of prosperity was the engine of their hypotheses regarding economic expansion and international trade. The study of modern development did not arise until after World War II with the evolution of economic growth theories that dated back to the 1930s and 1940s.

In the context of anticolonialism in the late 1940s, governments in Asia and Africa began to approach the economists of Britain and the United States to seek advice on the appropriate methods to boost their economies. First World economists, encouraged by the idea of making the emerging countries flourish like their own, perceived in the implementation of their economic model the perfect solution. The diagnosis *grosso modo* of why some countries were poor and others rich was expressed as the former having a problem of low income that would be easily correctable by expansion of their GDP: more income, more well-being. A new line of very fertile thought emerged in this way, which finds in the model of neoclassical economics the panacea of development. Nonetheless, the prescriptions of wealthy country economists who pushed population control, foreign investment, the promotion of education and the availability of loans and debits to underdeveloped countries, turned out to be not only misleading in most cases, but totally disastrous in many (Easterly 2001, p. xi-xii). The failure of this model motivated a number of economists to provide a more accurate measure of what makes a human life considered to be a *good* human life, and the idea of human development was born during the 1970s.

The first human development report, commissioned two decades later to Mahbub ul-Haq by the United Nations, proposed that:

Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. The most critical ones are to lead a long and healthy life, to be educated and to enjoy a decent standard of living. Ad-

ditional choices include political freedom, guaranteed human rights and self-respect. (UNDP 1990, p. 10)⁴

In comparison with the previous ideological archetype, this approximation represents a more comprehensive assessment of quality of life, because the informational focus is not goods and/or resources, but the well-being of people. Similarly to the capabilities approach, the concept of human development is a perspective inspired by the Kantian conception of human dignity; human beings should be recognized as ends and not only as means.⁵

The term ‘sustainable development’ first appeared in the publication of the *World Conservation Strategy* by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN 1980). However, the expression did not become popular until the publication of the Brundtland report, which advocates for conceptualizing development as the fulfillment of individuals’ needs:

Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs. (WCED 1987, p. 43)

Income, needs and capabilities

GDP (or its counterparts, income or wealth per capita) is a precise quantifying measure that is quintessential to economic analysis. This is certainly useful for explaining how production could be maximized, formulating an idea of the availability of goods and services, and measuring levels of occupation. Often, wealth is also the gateway to having a voice in political decision-making. However, this type of assessment also hides a trap difficult to circumvent, because taking the shortcut of reductionism can have real consequences for people’s lives. The question of income is ineluctable in measuring gender inequality

⁴ The imprint of Sen’s idea of justice is absolutely patent in this flagship report (on which he collaborated), as is the concept of capability.

⁵ The capabilities approach of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen extends the conception of human development maintained by the United Nations: while both conceptions recognize the fundamental role of human rights, the capabilities framework entails a philosophical investigation that goes beyond the simple measurement and results of concrete variables used by the United Nations for assessing quality of life.

and intergenerational justice. For instance, women generally have less access to the job market than men and are occupied in sectors in which wages are lower—something that translates into both the limitation of the full and autonomous realization of their freedoms, as well as hindering wider economic development. But income, wealth and resources are *means* to something else, so sustainability that aims only at sustainable income and/or consumption should not avoid the question about what we want to create, preserve and transmit to next generations—the *ends* of sustainability.⁶

Consider the following illustration: Alma has a high income level and holds a leadership position in a company where gender pay discrimination does not take place. In terms of income (interpersonal income per capita comparison), we can say that Alma is well-positioned and that this helps her not only to satisfy her basic needs, but also to enjoy other aspects of her life that she considers significant. When widening the informational focus to establish that Alma lives in Mexico City, one of the most dangerous cities for women in terms of public transport (VAWG, p. 2), and that the probability of suffering verbal and/or physical abuse is very high, then it seems relevant that her set of freedoms is not entirely satisfactory. Alma is being prevented from realizing the primal capabilities of physical integrity (Nussbaum 2011), bodily integrity and security, as well as the ability to be respected and treated with dignity (Robeyns 2003).⁷ One could still claim that Alma's income would make opting for private transportation a feasible option, but defending this statement would mean to fall into the trap of reducing the set of possible options for Alma, and thus her freedom to choose.

⁶ I agree with Sen's (2013) main conclusion, that theories of sustainable consumption replicate the same shortcomings as those based on people's needs. Neither goods nor income alone can endow people's lives with what is fundamental. It is crucial to consider the different ways in which resources are transformed into freedoms because of individuals' differences in age, sex, race, abilities, environmental circumstances, socio-cultural context or family structure. Focusing on the sustainability of resources as well as consumption, leads us to Rawls' 'primary goods' problem, as criticized by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.

⁷ In 2008 the program *Viajemos Seguras* (We Travel Safely) was launched in Mexico, which introduced buses and train compartments to be used only by women. Similar initiatives exist in other countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates. Every step made in the direction of raising awareness of the problem and showing political commitment signifies the global effort to eradicate gender injustices. Nonetheless, although meant to ensure safety and dignity in transportation, these initiatives do more to 'segregate' women than to actually widen the range of their real freedoms, or to create real opportunities to choose valuable lives. Of course the problem needs different kinds of policy measures—a sustainable educational plan, for instance. (See: VAWG, p. 6)

This idea is perhaps shown even more clearly in the context of someone suffering from a serious disease. It is salient to compare how well a severely ill person can lead his/her life possessing a high level of wealth, but needing constant medical treatment, to the real set of opportunities of another person with less wealth, but good health. In this context, it is wise to ask which of the two people is the ‘poorest’ (Sen 1999, p. 124). It should be noted that it is not a terminological problem that has to do with the word ‘poverty’, but rather a deep problem that implies a certain conception of well-being and human life. It is clear, then, that sometimes having a high income does not mean having more freedoms. What we do with income and wealth, the opportunities they provide us, and how they contribute to our good life is affected by a series of circumstances that explain the heterogeneity of the human sphere. Without capabilities, individuals could have a generous income, yet remain unable to transform it into valuable functionings –achieved ‘beings’ and ‘doings’. The global initiative that promotes basic income, which seems to be producing encouraging results in a pilot experiment started this year in Finland, is directed towards achieving a minimum threshold of income (economic egalitarianism) and also ensuring long-term sustainability of that crucial element for quality of life. Even this initiative has limitations, overemphasizing values that flow through the veins of the economic system and neglecting others.

Compared to the frameworks of thought built on the priority of resources, income or consumption, the most solid alternative is undoubtedly the one proposed by the Brundlandt Report. It is the result of a normative trajectory in line with the principles that inspire human rights as universal guarantees, and ultimately in favor of a more ‘human’ development. A possible criticism of this perspective is that it ignores the point that needs considered as mental states can sometimes be an unreliable criterion for intergenerational justice. Individuals sometimes struggle to identify their ‘real’ and complex needs, beyond those most basic to survival. Frequently, we adapt our preferences and expectations to cultural, social, political or religious circumstances that appear to be natural and good for ourselves. The political implication of this mechanism is that the frontier between real needs and conditioned mental states is usually very vulnerable; consequently, policies often collapse in preserving people’s autonomy and identifying real preferences. Secondly, there is the problem of *who* decides what are the relevant needs, a recurrent question in social justice theories. In addition, we must understand *what* are the minimum needs to be fulfilled, and then *how* to solve the tension between present people’s needs and those of future persons: what is the intergenerational threshold that requires political protection? To fulfill needs for the sake of needs cannot be a complete answer to the problem of human sustainable development—not only because of the aforementioned re-

flections, but also because a solely needs-based perspective does not embrace other essential aspects, such as the freedom to choose whether to satisfy those needs or not (Sen 2013, p. 11–12).

Capabilities and principles for intergenerational justice

It is clear that there is an elusive element to developing a more inclusive view of current and future human flourishing—one that is worthy of being promoted and transmitted. This criterion might well be the currency of capabilities, offering a relevant informational space to assess and compare individual advantages and social injustices.

I contend that there is strong justification for normative orientation based on capabilities compared to other current proposals, of which I have reviewed here only those based on income and wealth, or human needs as a source of responsibility and sustainability. The capabilities approach gives attention to human diversity and embraces the coexistence of different impartial reasons of justice, by understanding that the action of specifying capabilities consists of a *poiesis*, and in this sense constitutes what John Rawls called ‘the exercise of public reason’. The real opportunities that individuals have, or the ‘freedom to’ do and be what they consider of value, are the criteria to be complemented with other fundamental elements for human life. In this sense, the capabilities approach is a perfect example of an incomplete theory with a pluralist view of values. This starting point might be crucial for a future-oriented ethics. What is involved is the *possibility*, and not only the factual realization, of a personal set of freedoms. In terms of intergenerational justice, focusing only on achievements can perpetuate a dominant set of ways of doing, policies and status quo, which may lead us to an undesirable state of things.

Focusing attention on real opportunities can help us diagnose new forms of inequality that are born out of the progress of technoscience. Equally, the way to advance a correct conception of intergenerational justice from a sustainable point of view, is to place the attention on the role that individuals have as agents of their own lives and not merely as passive recipients of others’ will: this idea constitutes the bedrock of the capabilities framework. A perfect example of this, in the context of reinforcing women’s agency, is that the education of women in India has proven to be effective in many different aspects, such as decreasing infant and neonatal mortality, improved family nutrition, increasing women’s autonomy within the home and the prolongation of life expectancy (Saidi

Reddy 2014, p. 229). In countries where women are better educated and more integrated into the workforce, those women also tend to have fewer children, which has positive implications for global climate issues (Sen and Drèze 2013, p. 15–17).

Nevertheless, I believe that there is a cardinal absence within the literature of capabilities of subjects strictly linked to prospective responsibility. The most interesting attempts at complementing the approach by including an idea of intergenerational justice have been confined, in most cases, to the frontiers of the concept of sustainable development. Broadly speaking, critics agree that the conditions lacking in the basic theoretical framework for the possibility of intergenerational justice are twofold: firstly, more attention must be paid to the preservation of nature and the relationships between people and environment; and secondly, there is also a marked concern to explain the links between systems and individuals, and to emphasize that motivational problems are alleviated if the individual burden is shifted to the political character of the system.⁸

In my view, and in light of the above, the notion of responsibility should take center stage not only for intragenerational human relations, but also for justice between generations. An idea of justice anchored in a future-oriented ethics should analyze rights and obligations (as well as their scope and limits) in the creation of capabilities. That is: to whom are these obligations established; whose are the responsibilities; and, what nature do they have? I also consider that in the task of defining obligations towards future generations, it is important to add to the initial theoretical framework some explanation of the reasons people may have for giving more weight to some capabilities than others. Going beyond the empirical description of capabilities can give a greater impetus to the creation of public policies aimed at intergenerational justice. In principle, there should be no conflict between the freedom to choose the life that one considers valuable to live and deliberating upon which are the components that allow us to affirm that a life is ‘good’. Focusing only on freedom as ‘the freedom to choose’ is undoubtedly a political end, but when it comes to addressing the issue of what we want to leave to future generations, we must reinforce the debate by suggesting some elements that may be intrinsically good for the lives of human beings.⁹ Even if we cannot immediately articulate what it means to achieve a ‘good human life’, we do feel a strong indignation when we come into con-

⁸ See, for instance; Holland (2008, Jun.); Lessmann / Rauschmayer (2013); Schultz / Christen / Voget-Kleschin / Burger (2013).

⁹ In the works of Amartya Sen, while there is no explicit rejection of the idea of a ‘good life’, he chooses to leave in the plane of public discussion the exercise of endowing capabilities with more specific content.

tact with an injustice, as the philosophies of Ricœur and Sen have taught us. The identification of what prevents many human lives from being considered ‘good’ could be a prosperous point of departure for conceptualizing responsibility for the future.

A central issue, frequently the object of controversy, is the necessity of a pre-conceived list of capabilities. In this matter, Nussbaum’s proposal shows some advantages. This is an especially sensitive issue in intergenerational justice. If it is problematic in the present to establish whether it is morally or politically legitimate for someone to generate one list with universal validity (with all the nuances Nussbaum considers necessary: being always open to discussion, revisable, and sufficiently abstract), at the intergenerational level emerge the added difficulties that these choices can not be discussed with the unborn, and that such a list cannot mitigate epistemological uncertainty.¹⁰ At the very least, it is essential to understand that any such list must, by its very nature, change with time. Additionally, we need one type of list for addressing concrete problems and another for more universal and abstract levels of implementation. We must also ask what conflicts could arise between the capabilities of individuals of different generations and what are the priority rules in these cases of conflict. Furthermore, some capabilities are exhaustible (Basu / López-Calva 2011) by present generations, and must therefore be reexamined for the sphere of intergenerational justice. Conversely, some capabilities are very fertile (Wolff / de-Shalit 2007), and could well expand across many generations.

These and other related questions show clearly the enormous complexity of the subject. I have tried to contribute an outline of valuable itineraries for investigating the ends of sustainable justice, as well as some guiding principles for a research agenda for intergenerational justice, embedded with the notions of responsibility and capabilities. While we may not yet have a full grasp of what intergenerational justice demands, we have an intuition that tells us that we should *at least* leave the world as we have found it, if not with more and better options (Barry 1977, p. 275). This is common sense, which we all share beyond philosophical positions (Visser’t 1999, p. 2–3). Thus, in terms of obligations, we are beneficiaries—we use the resources of the planet that we have inherited—but we are also responsible, because we have duties in relation to future people’s well-being. The intuition is also that humans across generations (as well as, recalling Goethe’s poetic words, around the world) are not going to want fundamentally different things. This should remain foremost in our minds as we further develop theories of intergenerational justice.

¹⁰ Interesting works on this subject are those of Claassen (2011) and Fibieger Byskov (2017).

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Johannes Rohbeck

Global Responsibility in a Historical Context

Abstract: Contemporary theories of globalization seldom mention history. This is surprising, because ‘globalization’ is essentially a historical term, describing as it does a historical process. There is less mention still of the philosophy of history, especially given that it has been discredited. And yet, if one probes the accounts in question more deeply, there is no overlooking that nearly all of the relevant discourses operate more or less explicitly with patterns of interpretation borrowed from the philosophy of history. The authors speculate upon which general tendencies of globalization are recognizable, and whether it is more indicative of ‘progress’ or of the ‘downfall’ of human civilization. Moreover, the questions of when globalization actually began, what is ‘new’ about the state of globality achieved thus far and what developments can be expected in future cannot possibly be answered without reflecting on history. After all, the ethical problem of global justice, which demands compensatory measures to alleviate historic harms, requires us to take into account the course of history thus far. Such topics underline that recourse to history, with all of its historico-philosophical implications, is essential if we are to resolve the problems resulting from globalization.

Globalization and history

Considering the phenomenon of globalization from a philosophical viewpoint, one must first note that the global has always been a theme in philosophy (Figuera 2004, p. 9; cf. Negt 2001, pp. 42; Toulmin 1994, p. 281). The search for universal concepts and principles that could claim validity for all of humankind is part of the philosophical tradition. From the (early) modern period onward, philosophically grounded human rights were intended to apply to all of the earth’s inhabitants equally and universally. In particular, the history of philosophy as it has developed since the Enlightenment proclaimed the existence of a universal or world history in which all peoples and cultures participate (Rohbeck 2010, p. 54; Brauer 2012, p. 19; Roldán 2012, pp. 83–84). This also applies to subsequent philosophies of history that distanced themselves from the ideas of prog-

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ress and teleology, and even to the later position of *posthistoire*, which posits the 'end' of history.

Contemporary theories of globalization seldom mention history. There is less mention still of the philosophy of history, especially given that it has been discredited. And yet, if one probes the accounts in question more deeply, there is no overlooking that nearly all of the relevant discourses operate more or less explicitly with patterns of interpretation borrowed from the philosophy of history. The authors speculate upon which general tendencies of globalization are recognizable, and whether it is more indicative of 'progress' or of the 'downfall' of human civilization (Scholte 2005, p. 49; versus Hardt / Negri 2003, p. 296; Keohane / Joseph 2005, p. 76; Baudrillard 2007, p. 22; Groß 2007, p. 16). This shows that globalization is largely understood as a historical process. The very questions of when globalization actually began, what is 'new' about the state of globality achieved thus far, and what developments can be expected in future cannot possibly be answered without reflecting upon history.

This global history perspective in turn changes the way history is viewed. In traditional theories of history, the focus was on historical time, whose concepts and structures the authors explored (Koselleck 1979/2004; Ricœur 1984). History was equated with 'temporalization', and corresponding studies focused on historical times with their continuities and ruptures, as well as changes in the tempo of history such as stagnation and acceleration. In the context of globalization, the focus is increasingly on historical spaces, so that history is not merely 'temporalized' but also 'spatialized' (Osterhammel 1998, p. 374; Schlögel 2003, pp. 12–13). When we analyze how economic, political, social and cultural spaces are created with time, history comes to appear as a spatial-temporal construct.

My thesis is that the ethics of globalization, too, could benefit from the reflections of historiography and the philosophy of history. For there can be no doubt that catastrophic climate change and global poverty, which are to some degree connected, were 'made' by human beings in the course of their history. From this we may draw the ethical conclusion that the harms caused should be rectified through compensatory measures. The current debate over such measures shows what a central role the treatment of history plays. Those who generally reject the industrial nations' moral duty towards the poor countries already consider the historical context to be irrelevant. But even those who believe that rich countries have an obligation to help make their arguments independent of history. A farther-reaching responsibility that includes compensation for the effects of harmful behavior, in contrast, can only be justified with reference to the course of history thus far. For that reason, I call this type of responsibility 'historical responsibility'. It follows, in turn, that the recourse to history, with all of

its historico-philosophical implications, is indispensable for a resolution of the problems resulting from globalization.

Historical responsibility

Leaving aside extreme libertarian and nationalist positions, there is a consensus that people living in rich countries have an obligation to help the needy in poor countries. This expressly also applies to states on a global scale. To be sure, one can distinguish between certain degrees of remedial responsibility, allowing for special obligations towards members of one's own family or nation, which produces a graduated conception of justice (Walzer 1999, p. 38; Zurbuchen 2005, p. 139; Nida-Rümelin / Rechenauer 2009, p. 314, 319). It does not follow, however, that there is no basis for farther-reaching obligations towards people who live in distant parts of the world. The objection that such a redistribution of goods from rich to poor countries presupposes a 'world state', with all its potential for abuses (Nusser 1997, p. 92), is also not convincing, because, as was explained, individual states and transatlantic organizations are also in a position to do this.

Nevertheless, we need to ask why people are obligated to help other people. Opinions on this question differ: on the one side, we have the position of so-called remedial duties, based on the argument that human beings as such are obliged to help others to the extent that they are able (Previous cooperation or even historic connections between these people expressly play no role here.); and on the other side, we find the position of outcome responsibility, which assumes that the plight of individuals in poor countries should be viewed as the 'consequence' of acts performed by the inhabitants of rich or powerful countries (At this point the historical aspect comes into play, for such an outcome responsibility is, after all, rooted in a historical process that led to great injustices in the past.). I propose that global responsibility for unjustly treated people and peoples is, in turn, in need of both historical and historico-philosophical reflection.

If one examines the argumentation on remedial duties more closely, its position on history appears paradoxical. One argument is that human suffering and death is something fundamentally bad that needs to be overcome in all cases, without creating a practical-historical relationship between the givers and seekers of assistance (Singer 2007, p. 39; Schlothfeld 2007, p. 77; Schaber 2007, p. 139). Those with a duty to assist function merely as witnesses capable of helping, who observe the needy from afar. Because what is at stake is ultimately an anthropological principle (and thus the unity of the human species, which has a duty to assist) this is a case of abstract cosmopolitanism. The meta-ethical approach of universalist morality, which calls for general assent to the moral norm of reme-

dial measures from an impartial perspective, offers a similar argument (Birnbacher 2007, p. 139). According to this approach, the global moral community assumes responsibility, as efficiently as possible, for the well-being of all human beings, whose standard of living must not fall below the minimum subsistence level.

A further argument states that people are obligated to prevent or alleviate suffering, whatever its origins, as far as possible. The pragmatic boundary consists in limiting remedial duties to preventing the bad rather than promoting the good, so as to demand no excessive sacrifices. Repressed history reappears in this argument; for the power to assist even distant people is largely dependent on the technological means of communication and transport as they have evolved (Singer 2007, p. 40). It is therein that the real conditions for the possibility of global remedial duties exist. And because these conditions change over the course of history, the position of the remedial duty assumes an unanticipated historical dimension. In contrast to traditional ethics, which was limited to the narrow circles of family, region or nation-state, a new ethics of global remedial duty is emerging.

Reversing this argumentation, one could also formulate it as follows: because people have access to novel technological means for assisting very distant people, they should do so. To the extent that one assumes that the alleviation of suffering is desirable in general, this entails no naturalistic fallacy, but it does imply recognition that the new technological instruments create new moral aims or historically conditioned norms, which amounts to a technologically mediated transformation of values. Thus, from this position, the historical refers not to the previous history of the sufferer's plight, but rather to the historically evolved power of the helper.

The second position of outcome responsibility raises the question of whether the argument of pure remedial duties is sufficient, and whether farther-reaching duties cannot be justified.

On the side of the helpers, the problem already exists in the subjects who are obligated to assist. The impression arises here that it is primarily individuals who decide to provide assistance without any previous agreement. Moreover, there is no social differentiation among the affluent or assignment to social systems. One could object that collective actors have far greater significance in global aid actions. Even an appeal for donations to which individuals spontaneously respond represents a coordinated action (Schlothfeldt 2007, p. 77). This applies all the more to states and trans-state organizations, which take action as social institutions.

On the side of those requiring assistance, the problem is that the needy appear solely as victims. They remain passive and anonymous sufferers (moral

strangers), to whom no particular relationship of responsibility exists (Birnbacher 2007, p. 132). They figure as mere objects of a donation, which therefore risks becoming authoritarian and arbitrary. It is striking above all that while this assigns particular obligations to the wealthy, it accords no rights to the poor. Duties are thus accompanied by no rights that could be asserted in the form of legitimate demands. There is in fact no preceding interaction between givers and takers. This also cancels all criteria of commutative justice.

If, however, one insists that the poor have certain rights beyond universal human rights, one is referred to concrete contexts associated with the social imbalance that stands to be remedied or alleviated. People frequently speak of cooperation here, which can establish a global obligation (Nida-Rümelin / Rechenauer 2009, p. 316). Those who balk at referring to interactions with the poor as cooperation (Birnbacher 2007, p. 135) can speak neutrally of an action context that precisely encompasses discrimination against foreign peoples, including their exploitation. Positive or negative cooperation forms the basis of rich, industrialized nations' moral responsibility towards poor, developing countries.

This relationship yields obligations that extend beyond mere remedial duties. To be sure, wealthy citizens and states have the positive moral obligation to assist people in conditions of life-threatening poverty. At the same time, however, they have the negative obligation to minimize the harms they cause (Pogge 2003, p. 243). Because the world order is not just, the poor must be compensated for the disadvantages they suffer. Such compensation is not aid, but the lessening of harm; it is not redistribution from the rich to the poor, but a corrective to an unjust social structure between poor and rich. Not helping the disadvantaged is less reprehensible than denying them justified profits by exploiting their disadvantaged condition (Pogge 2003, p. 244).

This conception of outcome responsibility, however, has historical implications—so I would like to speak of a historical responsibility; for behind this argument is the recognition that world poverty is the consequence of an historical process, which since colonialization has included enslavement, genocide, and exploitation (Pogge 2003, p. 222). To limit oneself, in contrast, to mere assistance, is to overlook the roots of the West's enormous economic superiority over centuries of common history that devastated four continents (Nida-Rümelin / Rechenauer 2009, p. 300). The great majority of property rights came about in an unacceptable manner, through violence, conquest and oppression. From this derives the call to demand farther-reaching duties to compensate for the injustices suffered. The legal principle of fault-based liability applies here: those who actively cause distress are responsible for alleviating it, for the creation of an evil generates a particularly high degree of responsibility.

A number of objections have been raised to the historical argument in particular. The scope of the duty to compensate is allegedly limited. On the one hand, it presupposes that the previous harms are actually demonstrable. On the other, it must be proven that past damages continue to affect the present. The first objection states that present-day governments in the developing countries are as much to blame for current poverty as past colonialists. Moreover, the duty to compensate for harmful behavior applies only to those states that actually participated in the injustices committed at an earlier time (Birnbacher 2007, p. 136). Finally, there is the problem of moral subjects, if one holds only individuals and not collective actors accountable.

A particularly widespread objection cites so-called internal causes, stating that the essential factors for global poverty should be sought within present-day developing countries and thus in domestic difficulties. This objection seems to be underlined by the significant differences between the developing countries stemming from local factors, so that in the end the entirety of local factors were the cause of global poverty (quoted in Pogge 2003, p. 224, 229; Rawls 2002, p. 134; Nagel 2005, p. 123). This appears to be confirmed by the frequency of brutal and corrupt regimes in developing countries today. By implication, the successes of some developing and newly industrialized countries seem to demonstrate that the harmful effects of past colonialization have since faded. Aside from the fact that the thesis of ‘internal causes’ serves as an excuse for the rich countries, this impression is also the product not least of historians’ and sociologists’ tendency to focus more on national and regional factors than on worldwide developments.

Conversely, the duty to compensate is justified by the fact that local circumstances cannot adequately account for global poverty. The world economic order, with all its inequities, remains responsible for the failure to thrive of economies in developing countries. Thus, even with continuous economic growth, Africa today has no chance of catching up with Europe’s lead of 30 to 1. Given this massive advantage, current inequality is not simply the effect of free choice. In addition, so-called domestic factors are themselves conditioned by the global order, because the current world order contributes significantly to corruption and oppression in developing countries (Pogge 2003, p. 233). This includes the international resource privilege, the disequilibrium between rich natural resources and economic growth, as well as dependence on the global realm (Pogge 2003, p. 235; Kesselring 2005, p. 48). The consequence is that it is not merely a matter of distributing goods fairly, but above all also of eliminating unfair conditions of production.

If nothing else, we need to repudiate the fallacy that the duty to compensate calls remedial responsibilities into question, as if the two types of duties were

mutually exclusive. Naturally all rich countries have a duty to help, even if they feel no guilt, or do not accept the concept of outcome responsibility. But according to the farther-reaching argument, those states that were involved in past harm have a particular duty to compensate in the present.

The whole debate underlines how essential the historical aspect is. After all, it rests on the elementary insight that global poverty was ‘made’ by certain people in the course of history. And ultimately, it is precisely this manner of ‘making’ history that is subject to debate. Even historical details about which global and local factors should be weighted to what extent and with which spatial and temporal scope play a role here. This harnesses the entire arsenal of historical research, down to methodological questions about the explanatory function of certain data. Even the method of counterfactual explanation comes into play, for example in discussions of whether people in developing countries are better off today than they would have been had they persisted in a fictional state of nature, and had colonialization processes never taken place (Pogge 2003, p. 237).

Finally, there is the pragmatic question of to what extent referring to the past produces quantifiable compensatory measures. With respect to actual assistance, it is far removed from any practical dimension where the theoretical distinction between remedial and outcome responsibilities might play a role. But in fact, the historical aspect is important in the discourses because it leads to payments that, while not truly compensations, can still be understood as partial acknowledgements of injustices suffered. This is clearly connected with the intention to heighten awareness of specifically historical responsibility. Even if such an argument is not directly reflected in appropriate figures, it can contribute to doing more for the poor countries than strictly required in a given situation. Above all, the historical argument calls upon us not just to alleviate suffering, but also to attack its causes by promoting a more just world than the one that has evolved over the course of history. This presents us with the task of seeking alternative possibilities for global developments in the future.

Conclusion

The problem with most ethics devoted to the problem of global poverty is that they are conceived without reference to history. This lack of history represents a double difficulty. On the one hand, universal principles provide no sufficient argument for the remedial duties invoked. On the other, these principles remain so abstract that it is impossible to differentiate both those who need help and those who have a duty to provide it. The fight against global poverty should not be mistaken for universalism. Rather, to assume the global ethical stand-

point is to analyze the historical process of globalization, and to derive concrete and differentiated responsibilities from the conditions in which global poverty arises.

As we have seen, the globalization process takes place in diverse historical spaces and times. In the field of the world economy, this means envisioning the new spatial economy of capitalism with the development of natural resources, the increase in sales markets, and the search for favorable conditions of production in distant lands. While it is legitimate to point to local factors as well when making international comparisons, this should not tempt us to underestimate the influence of the world economic system. In the political arena, this means that the role of nation-states needs differentiation. This also applies in particular to developing countries, which were and still are dependent in specific ways on the old colonial powers. Thus, if one points to the inadequacies of these states in order to shift the blame for global poverty onto them, one should equally recall that these domestic deficiencies are also conditioned by the global order. In order to overcome hardship, associations of states are increasingly emerging within the groups of developing and newly industrialized countries that fulfill a similar function to the European Union. In these cases, too, the national and transnational levels overlap to form a supra-territorial space-time structure. It is precisely these new assemblages that require special support from the old industrial nations.

Thus when we consider the history of globalization, we no longer need only to enquire into the historical beginnings of the process, but also to determine more precisely where and when to seek the roots of global poverty. If this question is in the foreground, we can surely place the beginning of globalization earlier—if not already in the earliest phases of colonialization from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, then at least in nineteenth-century colonialism. And if we declare the emergence of electronic networks in the twentieth century as the birth of modern globalization, we need to ask to what degree these networks promote or hinder development in the poor countries. There is no question that this development, too, disadvantages or excludes entire regions.

Finally, addressing the long-term effects of these developments on living conditions in poor countries raises the historico-philosophical question of the continuities and discontinuities in the globalization process. It makes sense that postulating historical responsibility is possible only if one assumes a minimum of historical continuity, for those who treat the ruptures in the globalization process as absolute run the risk of underestimating their long-term effects and playing into the hands of those who deny any historical responsibility. Adhering to sustained development in no way means naively believing in a linear process of modernization, let alone in homogeneous progress. Affirming a histo-

ry with shared responsibility is perfectly compatible with criticism of the downsides of the course taken by history. Ultimately, the struggle against global poverty presupposes a conviction that living conditions can be improved in the long term. The world's poor are not the only ones who consider such improvements 'progress'. An ethics of global responsibility is quite inconceivable without this regulative idea. These considerations show the fundamental nature of historical patterns of interpretation, and demonstrate just how indispensable historical and historico-philosophical reflections on globalization are.

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3 On History of Globalization

Nicholas B. Miller

Philosophical History at the Cusp of Globalization: Scottish Enlightenment Reflections on Colonial Spanish America

Abstract: This article contributes to the evaluation of how historical philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment reflected upon incipient processes and forces of globalization. Drawing upon assessments of colonial Spanish America by late eighteenth-century Scottish philosophical historians, including William Robertson, Lord Kames, John Millar, Adam Smith and David Hume, the article considers the challenges Enlightenment-era thinkers encountered in balancing universal accounts of mankind with extensive human difference in a context particularly defined by European-managed trade and migration flows. By emphasizing the challenges that individual philosophical historians confronted in narrating processes of cultural and national change in the Americas during the early modern period, this article reveals a core tension between two basic components of Enlightenment-era historiography: national character and progress.

The ‘discovery’ of the New World has long been heralded as an epochal event. Thinkers from the sixteenth century onwards judged it a sacred historical milestone. Spanish historian Francisco López de Gómara [c.1511–c.1566] went so far as to declare it “the greatest thing since the creation of the world, excluding the Incarnation and the death of He who created it” (Gómara 1552, dedication; Burke 1995, pp. 40–41). In the eighteenth century, Adam Smith recast this narrative in terms of global trading relations, naming this discovery as one of the “two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind” (Smith 1776, vol. 2, p. 235), the other being the Portuguese rounding of the Cape of Good Hope. He likewise drew upon circulating early modern paradigms in designating ‘the sacred thirst of gold’ as the force “that carried Cortez to Mexico, and Almagro and Pizarro to Chili [sic] and Peru” (Smith 1776, vol. 2, p. 154). Smith situated the discovery and conquest of the New World as landmark events in the initiation of mercantile globalization, both being driven on by the rapacious desire of Europeans for profit. Yet other Enlightenment thinkers remained compelled by the events as watersheds in the global spread of Christianity. During the

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1760s and 1770s, the clerical historian William Robertson, Smith's friend and associate in Edinburgh, engaged in a systematic attempt to appraise the history of the New World as one of the planting of European social, cultural and religious forms overseas. First published in 1777 in two volumes as the *History of America*, Robertson's work placed its attention particularly on "the most splendid portion of the American story": that of "the discovery of the New World, and of the progress of the Spanish arms and colonies there" (Robertson 1777, vol. 1, p. vi).

While the contributions of the Scottish Enlightenment to the practice of history have recently been subjected to renewed attention, the engagement of its historical thought in reference to Spanish America has yet to be considered at length (Sebastiani 2013, pp. 1–102; Allan 2013, pp. 307–342; Quiro Chueca 2005, pp. 160–163). This article addresses this gap by examining discussion of colonial Spanish America in historical works composed by a range of Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, including Henry Home (Lord Kames), John Millar, James Dunbar and James Beattie—along with Robertson and Smith—and thereby offers new insights into the comparative horizons of historical knowledge in the Scottish Enlightenment. In particular, they reveal aspects of these thinkers' contributions to what David Hume heralded the 'science of man', which ostensibly sought to derive practical political lessons from the philosophical synthesis of empirical evidence about societies across the globe and throughout history. The case study of Spanish America affords particular insights into how practitioners of the 'science of man' engaged in inter-regional comparison and grappled with the question of conquest-induced change in collective identities, or, as they rendered it, national character.

Modes of narrating the Spanish conquest

Latin America has tended to be marginalized in historical accounts adopting global frames of analysis. Budding world or global historians—and universal historians before them—have found it difficult to reconcile comparative methodologies based on relatively static core cultural zones (civilizations) with Latin America's *mestizo* formation. Rather than constituting a distinct core culture, Latin America tends to be viewed as a contact point of competing traditions: linked on the one hand, through many cultural similarities—from religion to language—to Europe and North America; and perceived on the other hand as a region with a distinct character, separated in terms of economic power and geopolitics from the Western core encapsulated in organizations like NATO (Feres Jr. 2008).

In the age of Enlightenment, trajectories towards the ‘two Americas’ binary—a wealthy, Protestant, English-speaking North opposed to a poorer, Catholic, Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking South—were still only embryonic. Two alternative paradigms predominated. One, championed by natural historians such as George-Louis Leclerc de Buffon and Cornelius De Pauw, took its lead from climatic and geological speculations to polemically dismiss America as a literally ‘newer’ world, defined by degenerative climatic conditions retarding the development of all living creatures. In the case of humans, this likewise impacted their intellectual and psychic faculties (Carbia 1943; García Cárce1 1992). Alternatively, America was taken as a laboratory of comparative settler colonialisms. In the case of Spanish America, the *leyenda negra* dovetailed with physical theses of American degeneration, subjecting Spanish American creoles to double demerits in the eyes of various European publics, borne from a decadent, un-Enlightened home culture (Spain) and as natives of a degenerative continent. Intriguingly, this led to a macrohistorical vision during the eighteenth century contrasting the glory of the two most extensive pre-Columbian civilizations (Mexico, represented by the Aztecs; and Peru, by the Incas) with a supposedly decadent and baroque Spanish colonial present. Contemporary anti-Spanish polemics of the Enlightenment, which saw Spain as the embodiment of all that was ill with the *ancien régime*, thus rendered the history of Spaniard influence in the New World as one of decadence and decline.

The history of European colonialism and expansion excited great interest in the Enlightenment for a diverse range of figures, from novelists and playwrights to historians and political economists. Spanish America held particular appeal as a shining example of these processes. In Abbé Raynal’s critical history of European colonialism, the *Historie des deux Indes*, America featured as a poster child of the ills of conquest, plantation slavery and imperial rivalry. Scottish Enlightenment discussion of these phenomena tended to be less vociferous, in line with its generally conservative political orientation. Smith critiqued American plantation slavery as being economically counter-productive due to discouraging investments in productivity, but failed to voice much sympathy for the human lives it destroyed. His protégé John Millar was more vocal in this regard, concluding the third edition of his *Origin of the Distinction of Ranks* with hopes of the imminent abolition of slavery.

Whereas Smith and Millar discussed contemporary American conditions within their treatises on political economy and historical jurisprudence, Raynal and his co-writers, including Denis Diderot, did this through a politicization of the genres of the travel narrative and accounts of foreign lands. These genres had been the primary disseminators of information about the world beyond Europe ever since the first great drama of Columbus’s stumbling upon the islands

of the Caribbean. Jesuits and missionary learned men, soldiers like Bernal Díaz (who accompanied Cortés's invading force) and hybrid figures such as Garcilaso de la Vega (who defended the honor of his Inca ancestors by writing a description of the Inca empire before its fall) all produced descriptions of the distant lands they had the occasion to visit or belong to, covering matters ranging from epic battles to descriptions of government and attire. In the eighteenth century, imperial bureaucrats and natural scientists such as La Condamine, Antonio de Ulloa and Jorge Juan continued the practice of offering extensive descriptions of the inhabitants of the lands through which they travelled. These accounts contained much useful information, but for the most part lacked a historical dimension. They represented the political and economic orders of non-European and past societies (as was the case with the Aztecs and Incas) as basically static entities. The travel narrative offered a description of the conditions of a different place, not the patterns or processes of change operative in these places. Information about the Americas was additionally provided through early modern, 'great man'-focused historical narration, with the discovery as well as the conquests of Mexico and Peru presented as heroic endeavors led by Columbus, Cortés and Pizarro (Burke 1995, pp. 31–51).

Staging Americans in stadial history

Building upon the works of seventeenth-century French historian Jean Baudouin, a coterie of British historians from the mid eighteenth century onward (David Hume, Edward Gibbon, John Millar and William Robertson) sought to compose a different sort of history (Miller 2017). Rather than focusing on specific battles or illustrious leaders of the past, they charted broader stories of the rise and fall of empires and the transition of societies to different governmental, legal, economic and property orders. For our purposes here, the contribution of the cleric-turned-historian William Robertson is of prime interest. Robertson served as Principal of the University of Edinburgh for three decades during the height of the Scottish Enlightenment, and was well connected with all its major figures. Following the success of his *History of Scotland* (1759) and *History of Charles V* (1769), Robertson turned his attention west to engage with Europe's expansion into America and the amalgamation of the Western Hemisphere into the European sphere of power (Lenman 1997, pp. 200–201).

Events in the 1770s undermined the basic premise of Robertson's *History*. The American Revolution left it unclear how linked the western hemisphere would remain with Europe. In terms of public demand, the events certainly promised great public interest in a new history of the Americas—but at the same time,

any critical comments about British colonial policy could be interpreted as acts of sedition, as unpatriotically siding with colonial rebels over a unified transoceanic British commonwealth. Striking a cautious balance between the two, Robertson limited coverage to Spanish America when he released the work in 1777. His broader ambition went unfulfilled. His son posthumously published his unfinished work on the British North American colonies in 1796 (Robertson 1796); Robertson never made much progress with the histories of the colonies of the other European powers. In any case, Robertson's main interests had already been oriented to Spanish America—as having the longest history in the region and as site to the most significant events. Robertson benefitted in this endeavor from a unique assortment of manuscript documents, direct testimony (via questionnaires) and an array of earlier published works that no historian of his generation had yet explored in such depth (Cañizares-Esguerra 2002, pp. 38–59). Crucial were Robertson's close connections with the British Ambassador to Spain, Lord Grantham, and the collaboration of his chaplain Waddilove (Leman 1997, pp. 202–06).

Robertson's history of Spanish America ran to two volumes and eight chapters, but corresponded to three basic phases: the state of American peoples before the Spaniards (books IV and VII); the decisive turning points of discovery and conquest (I–III, V–VI); and the aftermath (VIII). Robertson began with discovery and conquest—unsurprisingly, given that they had long proven their power to captivate reader interest. The majority of Robertson's history of Spanish America consisted of exciting and well documented (albeit rather conventional) narratives of the adventures of Columbus, Cortés and Pizarro. Robertson's most innovative historiographical contributions came after these narratives, wherein he recounted the condition of the inhabitants of the Americas prior to the arrival of the Europeans. He separated the Aztecs and the Incas from the rest of pre-Columbian Spanish societies, categorizing the latter as 'savage' and the former as 'half-civilized'. He thereby situated American peoples within the framework of stadial history, which assigned various societies around the world to different temporal stages of development within a universal historical schema of material, moral and social progress (Sebastiani 2014; Berry 2011, pp. 2–19; Miller 2017). Stadial history aspired not to understand the unique, internal historical processes of change within individual societies, but rather to synthesize a universal process of social development out of dissonant testimony—one culminating at an end of history located in contemporary 'commercial' European society. Robertson and other practitioners of stadial history refurnished the ahistorical tendency of travel narration, providing putatively empirical evidence for a universal history of mankind.

The development of the Spanish colonial order in the Americas was by Robertson's time a story centuries old. James Dunbar [1742–1798], Professor of Moral Philosophy at King's College, Aberdeen, described colonial society as a humiliating disaster for the natives of America, whom the Spaniards had shunted to a position below African slaves (Dunbar 1780, pp. 394–96). Dunbar wondered if the inhabitants of 'the empires of Peru and Mexico' would have chosen extinction over such a disgrace, should they have known their eventual destiny (Dunbar 1780, pp. 394–96). Dunbar did not tender a response to the famous essay competition of 1785 on whether the discovery of America had been beneficial or harmful to the human race, but was adamant about the devastating impact of discovery for the indigenous inhabitants of the Americas: "The pen drops from my hand, in reciting the enormities acted by Europeans in the new hemisphere" (Dunbar 1780, p. 396). Dunbar here pointed, albeit darkly, to the emergence of Spanish America out of the ashes of destruction, and the founding of a colonial society upon the basis of a racialized order that forced the indigenous inhabitants to perpetually relive their defeat.

There are at least two ways to understand why Dunbar expressed more sympathy for the plight of the descendants of the Inca and Aztec empires than for their European counterparts, the Spanish conquerors. One could ground his comments within a local, intra-European political context, attributing them variably to the *leyenda negra*, inter-imperial rivalry and Enlightened contempt for the Spanish Empire. Going deeper into the history of medial representations of other societies, we could alternatively emphasize the function of the Aztecs and Incas as compelling thinking devices for eighteenth-century thinkers to contemplate alternative forms of social order and governance.

Henry Home, Lord Kames [1696–1782], a prominent figure in the Edinburgh legal establishment and a vital link between wealthy Scottish patrons and philosophers, admired both the Aztecs and Incas, noting that "there never was a country destitute of iron, where arts seem to have been carried higher than in Mexico" (Kames 1774, vol. 2, pp. 97–98). Kames further wrote that the Incas held "an absolute monarchy [...] but the farthest in the world from being despotic: on the contrary, we find not in history any government so well contrived for good of the people" (Kames 1774, vol. 2, p. 96). Kames was relatively restrained in his praise. Aberdonian poet and moral philosopher James Beattie [1735–1803] declared that "every body has heard of the magnificence, good government, and ingenuity, of the ancient Peruvians" (Beattie 1771, p. 509). Farther afield, in Germany, the Cameralist thinker Johann Heinrich Gottlob Justi [1717–1771] brilliantly evidenced the potency of pre-Columbian American civilizations as exemplars of government. Admiring the efficacy of collectivist practices of national granaries and land redistribution, Justi praised the supposed lawgiver of the

Incas as ‘the second Lycurgus’, going so far as to call him the better Lycurgus! (Justi 1762, p. 546)

Robertson’s lengthy discussion of the ‘Mexicans and Peruvians’ began with the dismissive preface that neither society could be compared with the Romans, nor were either entitled to rank reproduced most of what had been written about their institutions and accomplishments without qualification (Kontler 2014, p. 140). It is likely that an early form of the chapter constituted the source base for Kames’ commendation of both societies in his *Sketches* (1774). Adam Smith may have been the decisive factor behind Robertson’s rhetorics, given that he was one of their greatest skeptics in the eighteenth century. As Christian Marouby has explored, Smith’s marginalization of the achievements of pre-Columbian American societies arose from the contradiction they posed to his model of agricultural progress in his rendition of stadial history (Marouby 2007, pp. 85–102). Smith, inspired by local Scottish conditions, claimed that the domestication of animals was a necessary precondition to extensive agriculture. The empirical record of the indigenous inhabitants of the Americas openly contradicted this thesis. Not only was it widely noted that various tribes raised crops while lacking domesticated livestock, but the Aztecs and Incas were famed to have ruled over great empires of millions of inhabitants. In terms of the former groups, Smith suggested that plant-based sustenance was mere ‘seasoning’ to game, constituting simply a local variant of savagery. As for the Inca and Aztec, Smith mocked the limits of their contribution to the global economy. In the *Wealth of Nations*, he wrote that in spite of “all the wonderful tales which have been published concerning the splendid state of those countries in ancient times [...] all the ancient arts of Mexico and Peru have never furnished one single manufacture to Europe” (Smith 1776, vol. 1, p. 254). Robertson’s fidelity to standing historical testimony prevented him from making such a brazen move as openly contradicting it. He affirmed that most of what had been written about the Aztec and Inca had been credible. Yet, in forcing a stadial interpretation of their societies, he stumbled into contradictions at the intersection of his competing ambitions of a providentialist history of America, an exhaustively documented history of the region, and a stadial history of the indigenous inhabitants of the Americas.

Robertson's millenarian and colonial disappointments

As the Scottish Enlightenment's greatest advocate of global evangelization and the civilizing mission, Robertson was captivated by the early modern Spanish attempt to convert the inhabitants of the Americas. While incomplete, it marked the greatest extension of Christianity's global footprint in a millennium. In Robertson's providentialist understanding of human history, Spain's conquest of the Americas was part of a divine plan to extend Christianity globally. Like Smith and Millar, Robertson was highly critical of the colonial practices of plantation slavery, but his religious convictions made him sympathetic to European colonialism as a means of achieving the conversion of all mankind to Christianity.

The shortest part of the *History of America* was that which recounted the contemporary state of Spanish America. It was, however, the only extended treatment by a Scottish Enlightenment thinker of the colonial social order produced in the aftermath of conquest. Robertson was unsparing in his contention that Spain had failed to properly Christianize the indigenous people, blaming the spontaneous actions of men on the ground, rather than imperial design. Additionally, he was adamant that the Spaniards had squandered their fortune of American domination through economic incompetence and mismanagement. Robertson made sure to note that the tide seemed to have turned with the coming of the Bourbon kings. He lauded the administrative reform efforts of Carlos III and his father Felipe V, as well as their promotion of freer trade between the different lands of America (Robertson 1777, vol. 2, pp. 415–418). On a personal level, Robertson's praise of the Bourbon reforms might also be attributed to gratitude to Carlos III for tolerating his project of a history of the New World—though Robertson never managed to obtain access to manuscript materials sequestered at Simancas (Armitage 1995, p. 66).

Robertson recounted the social world of Spanish America through the prism of the *sistema de castas*, a complex status system that featured a spectrum of racial categories assigned mainly on the basis of racial descent, but also of individual distinction (Miller 2013, pp. 21–32). Robertson balanced two theories surrounding the emergence of mixed-race 'casta' peoples—an intentional politics of national integration on the one hand, and basic lust on the other:

As the court of Spain, solicitous to incorporate its new vassals with its ancient subjects, early encouraged the Spaniards settled in America to marry the natives of the country, several alliances of this kind were formed in the infant colonies. But it has been more owing to licentious indulgence, than to compliance with this injunction of their sovereigns, that this

mixed breed has multiplied so greatly, as to constitute a considerable population in all the Spanish settlements. (Robertson 1777, vol. 2, p. 368)

Robertson sought to rigorously document his study and offered precise footnotes, including page numbers, to his sources. However, as was typical in the Scottish Enlightenment, these citations frequently held only a tenuous connection with the original claim of the source. Robertson cited three references in support of the claim that Spanish sovereigns ordered their subjects to mix; none, however, had actually made this claim themselves. In his citation of a re-compilation of the Laws of the Indies carried out under Carlos II in 1680, and his two citations from Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas's *Historia general de los hechos de los Castellanos en las islas, y tierra-firme de el mar océano* (1601–15), the closest assertion one can find is the order given to the early Governor of Hispaniola Nicolás de Ovando to promote Christianization through intermarriage—not explicit political vassalization!

Robertson speculated that Spaniards maintained the *sistema de castas* to intentionally excite racial tensions for their own advantages, fomenting hatred between Africans and Indians for purposes of colonial order. Dunbar repeated the point (Dunbar 1780, p. 394–95). The Spaniards “endeavored to prevent every intercourse that might form a bond of union between the two races” (Robertson 1777, vol. 2, p. 370). Unlike in other parts of the hemisphere, the black population in Spanish America allegedly resented native people and viewed themselves as closer to the white population than to the native population (Robertson 1777, vol. 2, pp. 369–70). Robertson saw this as emanating both from the black community itself as well as from Spaniard design: “By an artful policy”—both laws and injunctions—“the Spaniards derive strength from that circumstance in population which is the weakness of other European colonies” (Robertson 1777, vol. 2, pp. 369–70). The center of interracial tension in Spanish America for Robertson was Peru. Although the peninsular leadership persistently sought to have Indians accepted to priesthood and religious orders, Peruvian orders continually ignored them (Robertson 1777, vol. 2, p. 506). To Robertson, nothing demonstrated more the insurmountable ‘hatred and contempt of the Indians among the Peruvian Spaniards’ (Robertson 1777, vol. 2, p. 506). He thought this discord also defined relations between Indians and black people: “[although the] negroes seem to be more numerous [...] they maintain their ascendant over the Indians, and the mutual hatred of one to the other subsists with equal violence” (Robertson 1777, vol. 2, p. 369).

Robertson also emphasized cleavages within the white (or Spaniard) population of Spanish America, beginning his discussion of the *sistema* with a distinction between *peninsulares* (Spaniards born in Europe) and *criollos* (Spaniards

born in the Americas). It was here where he damned Spanish America as a decayed society. Robertson described creoles as:

languid and unenterprising: by the enervating influence of a sultry climate, by the rigour of a jealous government, and by their despair of attaining that distinction to which mankind naturally aspire, the vigour of their minds is so entirely broken, that a great part of them waste life in luxurious indulgences, mingled with an illiberal superstition still more debasing. (Robertson 1777, vol. 2, p. 367)

Due to their superiority complex derived from living in a caste-ridden society, they were unwilling to do any manual labor, and unlike *peninsulares*, who actually created new fortunes in the Americas, creoles merely lived off the inheritance of their predecessors (Robertson 1777, vol. 2, pp. 366–368). Robertson's discussion pointed to a great polemic that played out further afield in the Enlightenment in the 1760s and 1770s, following Cornelius de Pauw's publication of *Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains* in Berlin in 1767. As evidence that America was a degenerative land, de Pauw pointed to the inability of any American creole to make a single significant intellectual achievement! Robertson's rendering did not go this far, but recycled the general opinion in eighteenth-century Europe of the decadence of Spanish American creoles.

Conclusion: Patriotism and the dilemma of the historical formations of national character

Around the turn of the nineteenth century, contexts across America witnessed the rise of patriotic creole discourses that countered the degeneration thesis with patriotic celebrations of their own localities and communities (Entin 2013, pp. 19–34; Cañizares-Esguerra 2002). This refutation of climatism via regional identity formation was paralleled in the Scottish Enlightenment with the attempt to de-prioritize environmental explanations of human difference in favor of national character. While Scottish historians of the second half of the eighteenth century followed David Hume in understanding national character as a principal differentiator of peoples across the world, they did not possess a rigorous explanation of the effects of time and historical processes upon the emergence, formation and evolution of these characters. This followed in good part from their inability to fully escape climatic and geographical explanations of human difference. Hume's infamous speculations upon essential racial inequalities—that black people were naturally inferior to other varieties of man—did not constitute the path taken up by most of his Scottish Enlightenment suc-

cessors. It betrayed, however, the limits of his own methodological consistency in his proposition of a science of man, given that it took the synthesis of all human experience as its starting point. The famously eclectic (and self-contradicting) Henry Home enthusiastically resorted to climate as one of many possible causes for any given historical facet, yet even the more rigorous Glaswegian Professor of Civil Jurisprudence John Millar was unable to fully escape its rhetorical power. In the introduction to the third edition of his *Distinction of Ranks*, Millar claimed that climate had little explanatory power: “How many nations are to be found, whose situation in point of climate is apparently similar, and, yet, whose character and political institutions are entirely opposite?” (Millar 1779, p. 13) Nevertheless, his natural history of mankind was unable to offer a convincing explanation for why national characters themselves changed outside of historical accident (Millar 1779, p. 14).

In the case of William Robertson, the absence of a historicized conceptualization of collective identity formations led to a conventional portrayal of Spanish American creoles and mixed peoples as crude versions of peninsular models. Rather than paying attention to how forces such as conquest and intermarriage could produce new national characters, Robertson drew upon two older discourses: (i) decadence, via latent civic humanist strictures of the consequences of extreme inequality; and (ii) heat-induced indolence, via climatism. Although Robertson noted with hope the recent reforms of the reformist Bourbon monarch Carlos III, he conjured a dismal image of contemporary Spanish America, rife with ethnic tensions, dominated by degenerate creoles and decayed from centuries of administrative and economic mismanagement. He had received more sympathetic testimony from people with actual experience in the Americas through a series of questionnaires he commissioned, but chose to ignore this testimony and to rely instead upon contemporary tropes. What Robertson reveals above all is the depth to which colonial American societies lacked concrete cultural identities in the eyes of eighteenth-century European observers. This lacuna was soon confronted. His original project of a magnum opus recounting the spread of European nations to the Western hemisphere was disrupted mid-composition by white elites in the British North American colonies. A generation of Spanish American creole thinkers reared in their would soon join their ranks. Incipient globalization processes would indeed deepen the mark of European institutions and epistemologies upon the rest of the world—but in different ways than Robertson anticipated.

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Jesuit Mission and the Globalization of Knowledge of the Americas: Florian Paucke's *Hin und Her* in the Province of 'Paraquaria' During the Eighteenth Century

Abstract: This article addresses the early globalization phase of the Jesuit Order in America through Florian Paucke's work *Hin und Her*.¹ Special attention is given to the analysis of the field of tensions underlying the proto-globalization processes of the Spanish empire and the frontier mission, for which three narrative components are considered: 'Paraquaria'² and the cartography of the spiritual 'mission'; a reflection on intercultural stereotypes (indigenous, Spaniards and Germans); and the deconstruction of the autonomist myth of Nicolás I, King of Paraguay.

In current research, the history of globalization and its accelerated impact on the economic, political, sociological, juridical and technological sciences, among others, demonstrates the multidisciplinary resonances that this category has attained—not solely in the scholarly field, but also in everyday speech. Thus, the complexity of the components that converge in the conceptualization of global-

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1 Hereafter, whenever referring to *Hin und Her* I will quote from the 1959 edition of the *Zwettler-Codex 420* and abbreviate these references as **HH** (see bibliography for an explanation of the abbreviations used).

2 According to Becker (1987, p. 233, note 15), the province of 'Paraquaria' (equally archaic variants of which are 'Paraquiaría' or 'Paracuaria') included all the territory of the present-day states of Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, southern Brazil, and adjoining parts of Bolivia. In 1625, Chile was separated from the Province of Paraquaria and made a Sub-Province of the Province of Peru.

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ization, as well as the dimensions and the respective phases of its evolution, have been the objects of diverse theoretical approaches. This has been particularly true since global transformations accelerated after the end of the Cold War. Multi-dimensional and international changes in the market economy, cosmopolitanism and technological connectivity intertwined with the reshaping of a new global village (cf. Fäßler 2007; Osterhammel 2003, 2017; Conrad 2013). Amid the coordinates of this global history, the necessity of re-thinking this category in its apparent unity as a historical phenomenon of the West opens up the question of what Romanist Ottmar Ette terms the ‘archaeology of globality’:

For speech about an archaeology of globality implies a singular, but nevertheless does not define whether an ur- or early history are supposed to be analyzed as a pre-history of globality, or if the object of such archaeology may also include earlier forms of the former which are not part of a pre-history, but constitute an essential element of globality in its temporal and spatial transition. To what extent we will wish to attribute a spatial and historic phenomenon (and our knowledge about it) to a history of globality or, alternatively, “only” to its pre-history, will depend decisively on how globality is defined and exactly what phenomena we are trying to investigate. How could we, then, conceptualize globality in the plural? (Ette 2010, p. 22)

This question about the distinction already drawn by sociologist Ulrich Beck between ‘globality’ and ‘globalism’ (the ideology of the world market) takes us back in time to the early modern age of the sixteenth century (Beck 1997). As an early phase—or ‘proto-globalization’,³ to employ Fäßler’s term—it is characterized by the colonial expansion of the Iberian powers, modern nautical technologies, the search for overseas routes with the ‘Asian invention’ of America (Dussel 1994) and the Catholic missionary project in the two Indies; in short, by components that contributed to the political-spiritual, economic, cartographic and anthropological redesigning of new spaces of interaction in the Atlantic world, with the ensuing debate on and redefinition of European hegemony (Guérin 1992). For Ette, the distinction between four phases of accelerated globalization (Ette 2010, pp. 24–25) and in particular his interest in the analysis of the early philosophical reflections by De Pauw, Forster, Raynal and Humboldt on the Americas and Europe during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, delineate an archaeology of globality open to a permanent revision of its actors, dynamics, and modes of representation and reflection, within the framework of the hetero-dis-

³ Fäßler suggests the periodization: until 1500—‘pre-global epoch’; 1500–1840—‘protogloblization’; 1840–1914—‘first phase of globalization’; 1914–1945—‘period of contrary developments’; 1945–1990—‘second phase of globalization’; and 1990 until today—‘third phase of globalization’ (Fäßler 2007, pp. 46–51).

cursivities that moved through this global *Aufklärung* [‘Enlightenment’] (D’Aprile 2016).

One of the distinctive components of this process of accelerated proto-globalization was the expansion of the Catholic church to the four corners of the world, especially by the Jesuit Order (cf. Koschorke 2012, pp. 4–5; van der Heyden 2012). Ever since its foundation in 1540 by Saint Ignatius of Loyola, the Jesuit Church’s structures and transcontinental networks of communication—true to their pastoral motto ‘*urbi et orbi*’—have made them excellent examples to be studied as a globalizing model of multidimensional (scientific, historical, economic, philosophical, etc.) and international knowledge,⁴ born of the missionary norms of the Society of Jesus (apostolic mobility, human adaptation and advancement of indigenous peoples) and its intercultural experiences in India, Asia and the New World (Banchoff 2016). Within this broad chapter of the Jesuit spiritual conquest, this essay aspires to determine the specific modalities of representation of and reflection on Spanish colonialism in the Americas during the eighteenth century, examining in this early phase of globalization German-Silesian Jesuit Florian Paucke’s contribution, known as *Hin und Her*. My objective is to problematize, from the evangelist experience and narrative memoir of this expelled traveler, some of the issues that underlie this proto-history of globalization and the utopian Christian-social project that the Jesuits represented in the New World.

***Hin und Her:* memoire and itinerary of an expelled traveller**

The text by Paucke known as *Hin und Her* [‘*There and Here*’] constitutes one of the most representative chronicles of the frontier ministry carried out by the Ibero-American missions in the Chaco region. Written in German, the manuscript is preserved in the Cistercian monastery in Zwettl (Austria) and was published in a complete edition in German in 1959. The work offers a narrative and visual portrayal—in over 1000 pages, 104 watercolors integrated into the text, and ten very large scrolls—of diverse aspects of the life and customs of indigenous peoples, of a missionary experience lasting 21 years in the north of the present-day Argentinian province of Santa Fe, and of the rich geographic and natural environment of the region (Furlong 1973; Binková 2001). Paucke’s legacy complements that of

⁴ For more on this multidimensional and international knowledge produced by Christian missionaries, see: Koschorke 2012; van der Heyden 2012.

the Bohemian Jesuit Martin Dobrizhoffer, who after returning to Austria composed his *Historia de Abiponibus* (1772–1775) in Latin. Dobrizhoffer's *Historia* was soon translated into German and published in Vienna (Dobrizhoffer 1784), adding to the corpus of literature on the expulsion of the Central-European Jesuits from the interior frontier of South America (Meier 2007a).⁵ In Hans Jürgen Lüsebrink's opinion, the chronicles by the expelled missionaries from Central Europe who had a Germanic language and culture, such as Johann Jakob Baegert (missionary in the southern California peninsula) and Martin Dobrizhoffer, testify to a twofold effort: on the one hand, "to understand the alterity of the values and forms of behavior of the indigenous peoples" (Lüsebrink 2007, pp. 384–385); and on the other, to furnish a counter-discourse, since they sought—just like the expelled *criollos*—to correct mistaken conceptions in Europe regarding the reality of the New World (Lüsebrink 2014). Such intentions can be identified in Paucke's work in those that impact on a specific perspective of his narrative of the political-spiritual conquest of the New World.

The adverbial use in the manuscript's title *Hin und Her* indicates, according to Edmundo Wernicke,⁶ less a static understanding and identification of the places visited by the traveler, 'but rather the emotions encountered in going there (*hin*) and returning (*her*)'. The pendularity of this pathos, as expressed by Paucke—'*hin*' (there, sweet and pleased) and '*her*' (here, bitter and sorrowful)—corresponds to his trans-Atlantic itinerary (via Olmütz [Olomouc], Malaga, Lisbon, Buenos Aires, Cordoba), with a clear focus on his missionary experience in Santa Fe and San Javier until the enacting of the decree of expulsion in 1767, which obliged him to retrace his maritime journey from Montevideo to Spain and ultimately Germany.⁷ The compositional complexity of Paucke's text (autobiography, spiritual, ethnographic, linguistic chronicle and natural history) for the Chaco region is lent coherence by the unifying thread of his 'memory' (Zanetti 2013) in the 'Province of Paraquaria':

No one should be surprised that in the 59th year of my life, after suffering the heat of the sun and the exhaustion of my travels, after 21 years of laboring in Paraguay without ever having, before I went there, at least briefly noted something down on paper, I perceive a considerable loss of memory. Instead, I marvel that I have preserved in my memory all the things I write about. If I had cherished the hope of ever seeing Europe again, then I would not have so carelessly let my notation quill dry up, for my will was to remain eternally with my Indians. (HH, V2/P6/C9, p. 730)

⁵ See also: Schatz 2000; Meier 2007b.

⁶ Wernicke translated *Hin und Her* into Spanish in 1942 under the title *Hacia allá y para acá*.

⁷ Furlong (1973, p. 11) explains that 'Germany' refers to the Jesuit province of Bohemia, where Paucke died in 1780.

Despite the enforcement of the punishment of expulsion, Paucke's narrative memory is synonymous with the recording of his evangelistic experience among the indigenous Moco'vis in the Chaco region and his re-encounter with Europe. The narrative self-referentiality of this subject, whose *Hin und Her* embraces the autobiographical pathos, is distinguished not merely by the pendularity of his emotions, but also of his own understanding. In other words, he has a reflective consciousness, whose act of writing revives the successes as well as the tragedies of his individual—and the Order's collective—missionary experience in the Province of Paraquaria. At the same time, I aim to place his historical revisionism, as regards the colonial project in the Americas. For this reason, it is worthwhile to determine how his narrative stages the framework of submerged tensions in this process of the proto-globalization of the colonial empire and the frontier mission of the Jesuits later expelled from Ibero-America.

'Paraquaria', frontier mission and trans-continental communication networks

From the dawn of globalization's first phase, the exploration of the American territory and the concurrent creation of the 'frontier' were part of a process of inventing an unknown alterity. The traditional paradigm of civilization/barbarism operated as an interpretative matrix during the early representations and interpretations in the colonial textual and visual heritage, as an expression of the Europeanizing and ethnocentric authority of the early modern age. Within this context, the geostrategic significance of northern Mexico (due to the Chichimeca War and the exploitation of the silver mines) or the Chaco region (due to its importance in livestock supply for Peru and as a border against Portuguese 'bandeirantes'), for example, already demonstrated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the frontier conflicts on the borders of the Spanish empire in the Americas and the active role played by the religious Orders.⁸

In Manuel Lucena Giraldo's opinion, the changes triggered around 1740 by 'geographic territorial consciousness' (Lucena Giraldo 1996, p. 268) led the Bourbon state to impose greater social, political and economic control of the American space at the southern margins of its empire. These measures affected the so-called 'Jesuit state' in Paraguay through the Order's expulsion from Portugal

⁸ Cf. Lázaro Ávila (1996). Kohut (2007) further distinguishes between the geopolitical importance of the exterior border in the North (Nueva España), the exterior border in the South (Chile, Río de la Plata) and the interior borders (el Chaco, el Altiplano Andino, la Amazonía).

(1759), France (1763), Spain (1767), Naples, Parma and Malta, as well as from the overseas colonies. Despite anti-Jesuit propaganda in Europe and America, the establishment of missions and their intervention in the ‘parliaments’ or ‘peace councils’ contributed to a ‘sphere of consensus’ that regulated the intercultural friction between Spaniards and indigenous peoples in the frontier space. According to Guillaume Boccara, one should accentuate a critical perspective that conceptualizes the frontier zones as dynamic and dialogical spaces, and as “an immense ‘laboratory’ for the study of the processes of *mestizaje* and for the creation of new historical subjects” (quoted in Battcock 2004, p. 2). This latter perspective certainly breaks with the apparent geometric linearity of the space of frontier confrontation that for centuries justified the expansionist policies of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns in the human (‘savage’, ‘cannibal’, ‘pagan’ Indians) and natural (inaccessible jungle, gold, rivers, mountains) landscapes of the New World.⁹ On the contrary, it means the ‘conjugation of cultural heritages’ (in Gruzinski’s terms) that allow the frontier to be ‘porous, permeable and flexible’. The constitution of the Jesuit utopia of the ‘reductions’ alerts us to the efforts put into the conquest of this fluid territorial dimension of South America and of the mobility of diverse indigenous groups in the so-called Province of Paraquaria.

As is well known, the projection of utopian ideals in the so-called *pueblos de indios* or ‘reductions’ has intensely captivated the attention of scholars, in particular of the ‘doctrines’ of Jesuit missions in Paraguay (cf. Cro 1990; Armani 1996), which have been regarded as a “materialization of the Augustinian ‘Civitas Dei’ on earth, given the strongly theocratic character that the Jesuits imposed on these civic groups in the reductions in Paraguay” (Rodríguez de Ceballos, p. 162).¹⁰ The debate in the eighteenth century was marked on the one hand by their defense by Ludovico Muratori and José Manuel Peramás,¹¹ and on the

9 The combination of military and religious frontier again occurred in the relationships established on the border of the Gran Chaco, with the Jesuits as the principal mediators between the indigenous peoples and the de facto powers of the vice-regal administration (Lázaro Avila, p. 284).

10 References to the Guaraníes of Paraguay in early modern sources are frequent. Of special importance are: Antonio Ruiz de Montoya’s *Conquista espiritual* (1639); Nicolás del Techo’s *Historia de las Provincias del Paraguay* (1673); Francisco Jarque’s *Insignes misioneros* (1687); Anton Sepp’s *Viajes* (1696); and Ludovico Muratori’s *Il Cristianismo felice* (1743). See also Voltaire’s famous *Candide ou l’optimisme* (1759), as well as his *Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations* (1756).

11 See Muratori’s *Il cristianesimo felice nelle missioni de padri della Compagnia di Gesù nel Paraguai* (1743–1749) and Peramás’s *De Vita Et Moribus Sex Sacerdotum Paraguaycorum* (1791). With regard to utopian thought in the works of Peramás, see: Hudde (1983).

other by their negative evaluation by authors such as Ibañez de Echevarri, Thomas Raynal and Cornelius de Pauw.¹²

The circulation of geographic knowledge of the Chaco frontier can already be discerned in Martin Dobrizhoffer's *Historia de Abiponibus*, which mapped the immense extension of that region in South America, from Brazil to Peru and Chile, and from the southern delta of the Río de la Plata to the northern Amazon area (fig. 1).

Paucke's work likewise focuses on the so-called province of Paraquaria. The geographical immensity and the identification of unknown lands—i.e., beyond the reductions (HH, V2/P3/C3, p. 146)—demonstrate the will to inform and rectify previous letters and to transmit 'true' knowledge of the imperial Spanish-Portuguese frontier and of spiritual conquests, thanks to the reduction of San Javier. For this reason, the categorical visual certification of Paucke's knowledge is not surprising:

I draw solely on what I have seen with my eyes and trodden with my feet in the maps made of America. Oh, how mistaken the far-away cartographers have been! I will report later on how we Paraquarian missionaries, when we were expelled from America by order of the king of Spain, were commanded to draw up a genuine iconographic map of the Grand Chaco, where we have worked, one for the king, the second for the viceroy in Lima, and the third for the governor of Buenos Aires. If one compares these maps against the ones made beforehand, then one will discover how erroneous they were. (HH, V2/P3/C3, p. 458)

Paucke's missionary-exploratory work and his criticism of the '*Geometers und Ichnographisten*' [cartographers] of the American realms confirms the lack of concurrence between the political colonial territory and the spiritual dominion (Fernández Bravo 2014). This acquires greater relevance when the discourse enumerates the diversity of 'Indian nations' in the regions of Chaco, Mocovías, Abipones, Tobas, Mataguayos, etc. (HH, V2/P3/C3, p. 456), thus visualizing the multi-ethnic, cultural and especially linguistic condition in the space of this mission. The corrective function of Paucke's narrative refutes the supposed unity of language, customs, nature and physiognomy of the American indigene (HH, V2/P3/C1, p. 447). At the same time, he argues for the indigenous people's capacity of understanding and ability (HH, V2/P3/C17, pp. 562–575). Ultimately, the Jesuit intervention not only confirms that in these Spanish possessions "one finds more differences in nations and languages than in the remaining three parts of the world" (HH, V2/P3/C3, p. 457). Moreover, it underlines the preeminence and rec-

12 For an general overview of the subject of Jesuit reductions in the works of authors of the European Enlightenment, cf. Fernández Herrero (1992, Ch. 5, pp. 393–431).




Fig. 1 *Mappa Paraquariae/ In multis a me Correcta./ Quid si in pluribus porro peralios Corrigenda?/ Authore M.D. eius provinciae Misionario.* Source: (Furlong 1936, Vol. I, pp. 120–121).

ognition of the service of the indigenous peoples and ‘soldiers of God’ for the colonial project, since “the king of Spain alone possesses many more countries than all the princes and kings of Europe” (HH, V2/P3/C3, p. 146).

However, it must be emphasized that the cartographic, natural and ethnographic investigation of the vast American realm undertaken by the Jesuits ac-

quired special relevance in Europe thanks to the knowledge transfer facilitated by their networks of transcontinental communication during this first phase of globalization. This component deserves to be highlighted, thanks to the publication of the cultural ethnographic periodical *Neue Welt-Bott* [*New World Messenger*], edited by the Jesuit Joseph Stöcklein between 1725 and 1761, and subtitled, “Letters, Writings, and Travel Descriptions, Most of them from the Missionariis Societatis Jesu from Both Indies and Other Overseas Lands which since 1692 Until this Year Have Arrived in Europe (...)” This collection of letters—the majority of which originated from the overseas missions in the Orient—also included the narrative and cartographic production of the Jesuits from South America (Furlong 1936, Vol. I, p. 49). A representative example is the map and report¹³ on Paraquaria that appeared in the 1730 volume of *Neue Welt-Bott* (fig. 2).

Galaxis Borja González has demonstrated the significant role the German press played in the diffusion and reception of literature by the Jesuits in America. In particular, Dobrizhoffer’s abovementioned *Historia de Abiponibus* (1784) and other Jesuit writings in German contributed to the emergence of a ‘global awareness’ without the need of translators or mediators. They also played an important role in the construction of an imagined political community in eighteenth-century Germany:

In this manner, the Jesuit missionary narratives are inserted into the efforts of German scholarly elites to define an early national identity, constructed on the idea—or in reality on the desire—of possessing a common language and of sharing a determined canon of virtues, attitudes, and values. This positive and inter-confessional handling of the notions of “the German” was possibly the reason why the Enlightenment authors of the second half of the eighteenth century were interested in the missionary texts and referred to them when approaching [...] the issue of the nation. (Borja González 2012, p. 188)¹⁴

Borja González’s proposal seems particularly interesting within the context of an accelerated proto-globalization, since it highlights the circulation and reception of sources (in Latin or German) written by the Jesuits during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In contrast to the ‘proto-national’ identity awareness of the Jesuit *criollos* expelled from Mexico or Peru, the narratives of central-European Jesuits allow us to critically examine the folds of this process of early globalization by means of two questions: 1) is it possible to postulate possible divergences in the missionary perspectives within the Jesuit Order itself during its eighteenth-

¹³ For a digital version of both, see <http://digital.ub.uni-duesseldorf.de/ihd/content/pageview/3017735> (visited 25 July 2017). I have also been able to trace a report possibly written by Paucke in *Neue Welt-Bott* Vol. 4, 2/563, a copy of which is held at the Iberi-American Institute in Berlin.

¹⁴ For a more detailed description of these ideas, see: Borja González (2011); Friedrich (2011).

century colonial project in the Americas?; and 2) does an identity proto-consciousness exist in Paucke's work, based on the attitudes, values and virtues that define him as a European subject? The following shall address these two questions.

Archetypical constructions in Paraquaria: a Prussian Jesuit among Spaniards

As mentioned above, in the context of the foundational postulates of the Jesuit Order, 'travel' and 'mission' are almost synonymous. The term 'mission' expresses the aspirations of universality and of the knowledge and conversion of 'pagan' peoples, but also specifically the truncated (by expulsion) project of Jesuit evangelism in the deserts, jungles and plains of Spanish America. *Hin und Her* is not only marked by the missionary vow of preaching the faith in this phase of proto-globalization, but also by the loss of his own patriotic identity in the Old World:

As everyone must know, we Jesuits, in particular those from German lands, who by the zealous soliciting of our superiors succeed in being allowed to travel to these pagan lands, go there voluntarily and completely perish for our fatherland. If I have left out many things that in certain passages have escaped my weak memory, then if they return to me I will, as long as God gives me life, add an appendix at the end. (HH, V2/P6/C9, pp. 730–731)

In sharp contrast, the discourse of the expelled *criollos* Jesuits—such as Francisco Javier Clavijero, Juan Ignacio Molina and Juan de Velasco—was placed in the context of the debate on the New World (Gerbi 1982). They identified themselves with the interrupted *criollo* 'homeland' that formed part of Peruvian Jesuit Juan Pablo de Viscardo y Guzmán's idea of independence (Pinedo 2010; Hachim 2008).

Paucke seems to experience the symptoms of a double crisis during his return to Europe: on one hand, the crisis of the foundational and corporative postulates of the subject who obeys the punishment of expulsion and suppression of the Order (Fernández Arrillaga 2013, p. 16); on the other hand, that of his own patriotic identification with the central-European countries as former subjects of the Holy Roman Empire. No less relevant in Paucke's 'memory' is his self-representation as a globalized *passseur*, relativizing the prejudices and civilizatory preponderance of one nation over others:

I will admit that inclinations, habits, and customs are not the same all over the world and I have experienced this myself. But to believe that all the people in a country are subject to their natural inclinations, to the enjoyment of their passions, and permit all their desires, is

a prejudice. I have travelled around the greatest part of our Europe, except for the realms in the far north and in the east near Turkey, and have experienced and known all of those peoples who are more moral than others. Nevertheless, although the Germans are praised above others in the sciences, arts, and skills, my experience has convinced me that none of these are lacking in other lands (...). I will continue to speak from my experience and dispassionately report the truth. (HH, V1/P1/C1, p. 107)

Paucke's movements blur the binary opposition between civilization/barbarism by means of distancing ('expulsion') as an instrument of knowledge (Fernández Bravo 2014, p. 178). From the beginning of *Hin und Her*, Paucke advocates a broad knowledge of the New World, emphasizing the archetypal and civilizatory traits of the 'Germans' (scientific knowledge, arts, technology) in comparison to Spaniards and indigenous peoples. One should recall that this reference to 'Germans' and to the loss of a 'patriotic' sentiment in Paucke is expressed in the age of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation—not from the political-national map of the twentieth century—and contains the underlying question regarding the identity of those Jesuits from Bohemia, Moravia, Croatia, Silesia, Hungary, Austria and the Palatinate.¹⁵ This is a topic of enormous complexity, if one considers that the geopolitical, linguistic and cultural landscapes of these central-European states already encompassed a heterogeneous space whose ethnic, linguistic and national boundaries were for centuries experiencing transformation and redefinition.

This complicates the debate on the imagological, ethnographic and cultural components inscribed in the early reflection on (inter)national stereotypes in Enlightenment discourse.¹⁶ During the first half of the eighteenth century:

... the double condition of the Habsburgs as emperors of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and Kings of Austria, Hungary, Croatia, and Bohemia, meant that a large share of Jesuits belonging to German monasteries were at the same time subjects of two crowns: the imperial and the Austrian. (Borja González 2012, p. 186, note 37)

It can be supposed that this inner polarity for a member of the Jesuit provinces of Silesia (Paucke) or Bohemia (Dobrizhoffer) affected the construction of a differ-

¹⁵ Meier (2007b, p.163) states that "knowledge of the Americas in German during the 18th century comes to a great extent from the works of the Central-European Jesuits who worked in this continent and communicated with the distant homeland. It is not incorrect, when referring to them, if we speak of the first Americanists in the German language, decades before the famous voyage by the Prussian researcher Alexander von Humboldt (1799–1804)".

¹⁶ See, for example: Friedrich Leopold von Augsburg's *Völkertafel* (1725); Johann Zedler's *Universallexikon* (1723–1750); or Benito Jerónimo Feijoo's "Mapa intelectual, y cotejo de Naciones" (1728). Also, cf. Raposo (2011) and Stanzel (1999).

entiated narrative perspective in relation to the imperial program of the Spanish crown in the Americas (Valle 2009, note 22; Nebel (2007). Czech scholar Zdeněk Kalista has highlighted how in comparison to their Spanish companions in the Order, Jesuit missionaries from the province of Bohemia “could not believe themselves owners of the colonies in New Spain in a sense similar to the conception of the immediate subjects of the Spanish king” (Kalista 1968, p. 156) and condemned the methods, the treatment of indigenous peoples, and the colonial systems of both the Spanish and the Portuguese (Kalista 1968, pp. 156–157). Paucke offers a clear counterpoint to any presumed heterogeneity of perspectives within the Jesuit Order.

Firstly, his representation of the practical skills of the exemplary industry of the Catholic world, thanks to the ‘gift of works and trades’ (HH, V2/P3/C17, p. 568),¹⁷ was a virtue that distinguished him to the indigenous people and contributed to the acculturative and productive achievements resulting from the reduction. This is expressed in the comment made by the Austrian missionary José Brigniel:

He soon understood me, returned to his room, and said: ‘Yes, my God! This is a powerful miracle, God bestow on this *Mestre de Camp* sufficient energies; he is a Prussian (he said this because I come from Lower Silesia) and makes the impossible possible, like his king’. (HH, V2/P3/C17, p. 569)

In addition to strengthening Paucke’s virtues and attitudes, the praise of his miraculous action—convincing the young indigenous men to undertake manual work in the reduction—openly contradicts the colonial prejudices of an alleged lack of intelligence, reason and ability for manual production among the indigenous peoples. In his opinion, “solely the absence and dearth of all instruction and doctrine lies at the fault of this” (HH, V2/P3/C17, p. 562). Paucke ultimately deconstructs the entire history of European civilization: “And if the Europeans had been raised with neither doctrine nor education, without the opportunity of knowing anything, in forests, among peoples of equal ignorance, Europe would be an India just like America” (HH, V2/P3/C17, p. 573).

Secondly, no less revealing is the negative stereotyping of the Spaniard (whether European or American) in the space of the mission:

¹⁷ It is noteworthy that the knowledge of languages was also of prime importance, since “there was no other nation that was more gifted to study indigenous languages than the German one.” (HH, V1/P1/C6, p. 175)

This occurs in those new peoples: if the missionary can do something, if he is skilled and determined to do such things, then the Indians learn what they see; if he is not, then they remain dullards. For who else could they learn from? The Spaniards themselves are hardly eager to learn a trade, everything is only commerce. They regard practicing a trade the most contemptible activity. One will not find any American Spaniards who are tailors, shoemakers, carpenters, or suchlike, all of these trades, and many others, are practiced by their slaves and mulattos. (HH, V2/P3/C17, pp. 571–572)

Paucke here emphasizes the intercultural conflict between the Spanish *criollo* secular, the clerical and the indigenous worlds in the reductions, counterposing the advancements of Christianization—such as the case of chief Aletín and the defense of the reduction of San Javier (HH, V1/P2/C1, p. 268)—against the disgrace of those ‘dissolute Spaniards’, that ‘vulgar rabble’ whose sole aims were commerce and profit, and the slave exploitation of the indigenous peoples. He rejects the accusations that “the Jesuits, as men greedy for possessions and gold, sought to make Paraquaria their own kingdom” (HH, V2/P3/C18, p. 575), and enumerates the warrior services (provided by the missions against the enemies of the Spaniards) and the tributes paid by the Indians to the crown. Paucke underlines “the conspiracy engendered in the court against the missions” in the province of Paraquaria (HH, V2/P3/C20, p. 603),¹⁸ and rejects any accusation of insurrection orchestrated by indigenous peoples and Jesuits against the colonial regime.

An Indian king in the Republic of Paraguay: deconstructing an imagined global fiction

Finally, within the context of those Jesuit travelers and their contribution to a universal ‘geography of knowledge’ (Harris 1999), the informative collections of the Order and the printing of their letters, news reports and travel descriptions permits the consideration of their counter-discursive character in regards to the anti-Jesuit propaganda of the eighteenth century. The texts by Dobrizhoffer, Peramas and Paucke not only aimed to establish and rectify the imperial discourse on the frontier, but also to oppose the libels and defamatory texts against the Society.¹⁹ They strove to deconstruct the fictional global imagining of the Jesuit

¹⁸ For a similar discussion, see also: HH, V2/P3/C19, pp. 579–582.

¹⁹ One of the most influential works with regard to the expulsion and suppression of the Jesuit Order was *El reyno jesuítico del Paraguay por siglo y medio negado y oculto, hoy demostrado y descubierto* (Madrid, 1770), authored by the ex-Jesuit Bernardo Ibañez de Echavarrí.

state in Paraguay, disseminated in the press in the Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy and Spain, such as in the case of the *History of Nicholas I, King of Paraguay and Emperor of the Mamelukes*. Paucke states:

Although everything was glorious and peaceful in our new missions, there was no peace and no tranquility in the old and large missions due to the persecution they suffered at the hands of the Spaniards and Portuguese. They wanted to completely exterminate all the missionaries. The persecution had already been carried out for more than ten years with the greatest zeal. A variety of reports came from Portugal and Spain that more and more claimed that the Jesuits had a separate kingdom in Paraguay and had elected a new king, whose name was Nicholas I. (HH, V1/P4/C10, p. 373)

The impact of this libel (widely translated from French into German and Spanish) from 1755 about ‘Nicolas I’,²⁰ and its representations of the ambitious ‘delinquent’ Nicolás Roubiouni is of enormous interest. Born in Andalucía, this clever libertine schemed his way into the Jesuit Order and obtained permission to travel to the Americas, learned an indigenous language and fomented the indigenous rebellion against the Spanish-Portuguese domination. His imaginary kingdom in Paraquaria rejected the power of the absolutist state and created the space for the realization of the autonomist aspirations of indigenous peoples, black slaves, mestizos and ‘barefoot’ subjects (thieves, murderers). In a relevant chapter of his work (“Of the pseudo king Nicholas”: HH, V1/P1/C6, pp. 167–178), Paucke not only denies the existence of this monarch²¹ but also categorically rejects this vision of the reductions as regimes that are temporally autonomous, as claimed by defamatory propaganda. For Félix Becker, the myth of Nicholas I can be inscribed in the framework of accusations of a Jesuit plot against the Treaty of Madrid (1750) between the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. It required Spain to cede the territories of seven reductions from the province of Paraguay, which triggered the armed opposition of the indigenous peoples and the alleged leadership of the Jesuits in 1754.²²

20 Becker mentions that the first reports of Nicholas I date from the *Gazette d’Amsterdam* and from the coins minted in Paraguay by a Nicholas I: “Three French editions, two Italian, and one German were published in 1756, a Dutch version in 1758, and a French one in 1761” (Becker 1987, p. 34). This rumor was denied by the Gazette itself.

21 Other Jesuits contributing to this rejection are José Cardiel (*Breve relación de las misiones del Paraguay*, 1771), Martin Dobrizhoffer (*Geschichte der Abiponer*, 1783) and José Manuel Peramás (*De administratione guaranica comparate ad Rempublicam Platonis comentarius*, 1793) (Becker 1987).

22 Portugal renounced the Sacramento colony, but Spain had to give up the territory north of the river Ybycuí and east of the river Paraguay. Seven Jesuit reductions were located there, which meant that the missionaries left the territory with the indigenes and moved to the Spanish

In spite of this historical rectification and of the extensive analysis of sources to date, there exists little critical attention towards the configuration and circulation of these fictional identities in the space of the frontier and their impact on Paucke's narrative. In particular, in addition to the supposed figure of Nicholas, the savage and rebellious condition of the Indian, the African and of the troupe of mestizos that made up this new overseas power was repeatedly emphasized. A notable example is that Nicholas I was reportedly the emperor of the 'Mamelukes', a name originally designating a lineage of warrior slaves in the Middle East, which in Brazil was applied to the mestizo population and the Spanish hunting of indigenous peoples in the Jesuit reductions. In this invented human geography indigenous and mestizo resistance against the troops of Spain and Portugal completely obscures the advances of the angelical project of Jesuits such as Paucke. In this manner, king Nicholas' ambition for power, arising from the European fantasy of an imaginary dissidence within the colonial project of the Spanish-Portuguese empire, exposes one of the components that transcends the phases of early globalization: the struggle for self-determination and independence of indigenous peoples in the colonial and post-colonial Americas.

Conclusion

The phenomenon of the Christian mission's proto-globalization in the province of Paraquaria allows us to recognize the significance of sources like Paucke's *Hin und Her*, which together with Dobrizhoffer's *Historia de Abiponibus* represents a chapter from the central-European spiritual memory of South America. In his dimension as a global player, Paucke's narrative not only distinguishes him by its efforts to appreciate American alterity, but also by his clearly counter-discursive component that seeks to rectify the epistemological racism of Spanish colonialism, as well as to contest the circumstances and the reasons for the forced expulsion of the Order. From such a perspective, *Hin und Her* immerses the field of underlying tensions in the pathos of the Indian missionary experience, as the triumph and loss of the individual and collective identity memory of the Jesuits.

lands (Becker 1987, p. 24). One can imagine the resistance of the fathers of the province of Paraquaria and the armed opposition of the indigenous people against this international settlement. See: Mörner 1966, 1968.

One can distinguish in Paucke's narrative the enunciation of a reflective awareness in relation to three distinct fields within the dynamics of globalization. Firstly, his writings on Paraquaria allow us to analyze not only his rectifying vision of the territorial and spiritual cartography of the Americas, but also to identify the possible impact of this mission on the transcontinental communication networks of the Jesuit press in the eighteenth century, and the formation of a German national proto-identity. Secondly, Paucke elaborates and puts into circulation an assortment of intercultural stereotypes that counter the prestigious and exemplary industry of the Catholic world, and the achievements of the mission against the vices of Spanish commerce and the colonial interests of a Habsburg monarchy, which for Central-European Jesuits was a double monarchy: imperial and Austrian. Thirdly, we can acknowledge his fruitless efforts to deconstruct, in addition to the historical circumstances of the expulsion, the autonomist and libertine imagination (Nicholas I) of anti-Jesuit propaganda in Europe. On the whole then, these are elements that I believe strengthen the reflective and corrective awareness of Paucke's work, as a result of the lens of a revisionist (even skeptical) perspective of his own European history and of the 'civilizational' project of the modern age in the so-called era of Enlightenment.

Abbreviated References

HH = Paucke, P. Florian (1959): *Zwettler-Codex 420 von P. Florian Paucke S.J. Hin und Her. Hin süsse, und vergnügt, Her bitter und betrübt (...)*. 2 Vols, Becker-Donner, Etta / Otruba, Gustav (Eds.). Wien: Wilhelm Braumuller. References will be given in the format (HH, V?/P?/C?, p. ?) in which V indicates the Volume number, P is the Part number and C is the Chapter number, followed by the page number/s.

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Urban Globalization and its Historicity: The Case of the Global Sanitary City in Mexico in the Nineteenth Century

Abstract: Medicine and sanitary engineering were applied gradually during the nineteenth century as solutions to the terrible conditions of life and habitat that prevailed in the cities of the capitalist world—but also with the purpose of regenerating the human work force necessary to reproduce wealth. This essay shows how this global sanitarian effort was applied in Mexico City during the government of President Porfirio Díaz (1876–1880, 1884–1910), exemplifying the conceptions and prejudices about health, disease, environment and urban government shared by Mexican elites and their international peers, and with which they justified reforms aimed at controlling and disciplining nature and the social environment.

During the inaugural ceremony of the Mexico Valley drainage system on March 17, 1900, Mexico's president General Porfirio Díaz—on his fifth term in office—declared it “such an important and transcendent occasion for our future that it has to be registered in the annals of the Mexican people beside and at the same level of our independence day” (“Una de las más grandes fiestas del progreso. Inauguración de las obras del Desagüe”, *El Popular*, México City, 19/3/1900). The Drainage Project, set out in 1886, consisted of a main conduit 47.58 km long and between 5 and 21 meters in depth, which spanned from the San Lázaro gate through the Guadalupe range towards Lake Texcoco, where it twisted towards the west, traversing diagonally Lake San Cristóbal and a portion of Lakes Xaltocan and Zumpango, to finally connect to the ovoid (10,021 meters long, 4.28 meters high and 27–98 meters deep) Tequisquiac tunnel, through which the waters flowed through the Tequisquiac river and finally to Atilalauca, to be used to generate power and irrigate land in Actopan, in Hidalgo state. Residual waters went to the Tula River, a branch of the Pánuco River, from which it flowed into the Gulf of Mexico, south of Tampico. Its main goal was apparently to get Mexico City's water and sewage out of the valley, while preserving the valley's drinkable water.

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In the mindset of the Mexican president, the significance of such a gigantic hydraulic infrastructure being tantamount to that of Mexico's independence, doubtless stemmed from the fact that both enterprises had liberated the Mexican people from, on the one hand, oppression from the Spanish Empire and, on the other hand, from material harm to its health and prized possessions from the constant flooding that for centuries ravaged Mexico City and other nearby valley communities. Consequently, from this standpoint, at the onset of the twentieth century, Mexicans faced a very promising future: they belonged to a sovereign and independent nation, and under Díaz's leadership, they had vanquished the dictatorship of the environment, thus placing themselves in the sphere of progress and modernity, just like the United States and any nation in Europe. Henceforth, Mexico would have the modern water supply and disposal systems required to improve the material state of public health in the capital.

Yet, from another standpoint, the conception and completion of the Mexico Valley drainage works may be interpreted as an updating and modernization of a material, technical and environmental scheme supported by an absolute political power (such as Díaz's), through which the elites had since colonial times enforced and tried to control the social, political and environmental milieu, so as to reproduce and increase the own wealth along with the income of their firms, situated in Mexico City and allied to the regional, national and global markets. By then, urbanization had become capitalism's main force for economic, social, political and environmental change, and cities were not just stages of capitalist modernization, but means and gears of the new globalization of wealth making.

Nevertheless, driven by the recent industrial development of production systems and the dramatic impoverishment of workers and peasants upon which it stood, throughout the nineteenth century cruel realities dwelt within cities, constituting severe conflicts and threats to the reproduction of capitalist wealth. Along with class conflicts, political struggles and revolutionary outbreaks, nineteenth-century elites agonizingly lived and faced the conflict between health and wealth existing in most countries, as the world raced toward an urban civilization during the nineteenth century.

As Bruno Latour says, by the middle of the century the battle between health and wealth had reached a breaking point:

The consumption of human life as fuel for wealth production led, firstly on English cities and henceforth on other European cities, to an actual *energy crisis*. Men, as it was often and widely stated, were of bad quality. That could not go on. Cities could no longer be death chambers and sewers, neither do the poor go on being miserable, ignorant, surrounded by vermin and infectious vagrants. The reactivation and broadening of exploitation (or prosperity, for that matter) demanded a better educated and cleaner population, well ven-

tilated, as well as rebuilt cities, with drains, fountains, schools, parks, gymnasiums, clinics, nurseries. (following Latour 1988, p.18)

Medicine and sanitation engineering were thus the gradual solution to end the dire habitat and living conditions in cities across the capitalist world; but likewise to revive the human workforce vital for reproducing wealth, as health and urban policies helped to consolidate the social and spatial segregation that existed in cities since the *ancien regime*.

In this context we can interpret the completion of the Mexico Valley drainage works implemented by the Díaz government as part of the expansion of the health-oriented urban model of capitalism. As we will try to demonstrate in the following pages, Mexican elites shared with their pairs from other countries certain concepts about health, disease, the environment and urban government by which they justified reforms that imposed control and discipline on both nature and the social milieu.

Sanitary urbanization

During the nineteenth century, certain technological advances made possible the wild urbanization of the planet, or, in other terms, the wild colonization of nature. One of these technological developments was the removal of the wastewater produced by workshops, industries and homes in cities, which could be collected and later expelled from the urban milieu, as demanded by the principles of urban hygiene then in vogue. Such principles, along with their technological groundwork, were also supported by social, cultural and historical perceptions about human waste. In certain Asian countries and in Medieval Europe, at least until the eighteenth century, human feces and urine were used advantageously in crops and workshops, until people became prejudiced against their look and scent. In those times, as stated by Verena Winivarter, human litter was regarded as a useful (albeit foul-smelling and ugly) resource for farming and industry, and not dreadful trash or waste that had to be hidden from sight and evicted from the city, in accordance with the morals of nineteenth-century industrialized societies in which a new social and urban order was institutionalized, bound to public health medical and sanitary policies. Drainage became thus the technological vehicle for promoting the healthy, but also comfortable, urban life demanded by the new capitalist bourgeoisie (Winiwarter 2010).

Vienna, Paris, London and Venice, as Alexander Cowan and Jill Steward posit, were capital cities that in the nineteenth century instilled their spaces

and population with a strong trade and management activity, as well as with public rituals, and thus with an intense and spectacular cultural dynamism unseen in lesser cities. Likewise, capital cities enticed huge crowds of immigrants, hence nourishing the cultural and social inequalities cast upon the social layout of their spaces. In time, their growth brought about major changes in the urban environment, and physical and demographic expansion furthermore affected the sensorial experience significantly. The stresses on space came from the development of industrial activity that made towns denser, intensified assorted olfactory experiences and forced authorities to intervene by controlling foul smells and fecal waste (Cowan and Stewart 2007, pp. 9–10).

When modern drainage systems were introduced in Europe's capitals and main cities by mid-nineteenth century, the thinking on public health was dominated by the miasma theory, according to which wastes and foul stench were the main cause of disease (Schott 2004). For centuries, the 'pestilence' was regarded as an illness that fouled the air, soil, water, animals and men. Its causes, symptoms and treatment were identified by fifteenth century physician and philosopher Marsilio Ficino, founder of Florence's Platonic Academy. According to him:

[Whenever visible and tangible] the air of that place leaves its nature, declining from hot and humid, when there are many dense clouds, dust clouds, dense and hot wind [...]; when fields and water turn into steam and emit a foul smell, fish do not taste or smell good; there is an abundance of animals breeding in corruption, foul funguses and pastures, fruits of the land and insipid animals, and stored for very little time; wines tend to become muddy, animals escape and birds fly away; disease ensues with continuous, hidden, furious, deceitful, unusually hot fevers, with suffering of the chest, exhaustion of the pulse, agitation, darkened urine, skinning of the palate and the intestines, stinging in the eyes, worms, smallpox and measles, miscarriages and stillborn babies, rages, wild laughter, cruel wars and quite new miracles of nature or God. (Ficino 1564, p. 50)

Therefore, it was high time to run away—and for a long time—from places and spaces wherein the hints of 'pestilence' were obvious. Moreover, it was best to do so at the first warning, because if one should linger further, there was a risk of contagion by 'someone injured' or "that the quality of that air would become familiar and almost natural." The suitable place to escape to was wherever no person or thing infected by the pestilence was present and, if possible, "where there is neither sound, listened or felt, nor news from the spoiled place, and there are high mountains to forestall the fumes from coming either through the incoming wind or air to spread the poison."

How feasible were Marsilio's recommendations? In early modern cities, families from the nascent bourgeoisie could perhaps follow them. Getting away from

the sources of pestilence meant having resources to travel and sustain oneself at the chosen place, either temporally or definitely, besides covering the expenses entailed in getting a cure. For many, the only option was staying put, hoping that luck or God's will ('the only safe and true health,' according to Ficino) would free them from the pestilence's onslaught.

Nonetheless, cities grew in size and population, and so their authorities and inhabitants had to take measures to prevent diseases and fight their probable causes—mainly corruption of the air brought by emissions from foul stagnant water, in addition to animal and human feces. Even though physicians who faced the sixteenth and seventeenth century plagues in the western Mediterranean cities believed that animals (besides the poor) were the source of infection, the circulation of water and air was the guideline for medical practice both in European and in American cities since the sixteenth century (Villar 2005; Valderama 2005). The city was then regarded as an organism, whose health largely depended on the flow and expulsion of filthy water and air from graveyards, landfills, canals and sewer mains, filled with mud, feces, carcasses, and generally, with refuse from hospitals, convents, churches, slaughterhouses, farmyards, tailor shops, taverns and inns.

Although bacteriology disproved the miasma theory by the 1880s, belief in the adverse effects of bad odors on health remained dominant across Europe and the rest of the world well into the twentieth century, as could be seen in the importance bestowed upon scrubbing streets and introducing tap water and water closets in households. Technical advances in sanitation engineering—like those devised by Sir Joseph Bazalgette in mid nineteenth-century London (Halliday 1999), or those made in Paris (Barnes 2006) in the latter part of the century—to expel refuse and waste out of the urban environment enticed other cities into adopting water and sewer systems, which eventually were integrated into a comprehensive water supply and disposal system, which was in turn quite successful in improving urban cleanliness and reducing water-transmitted diseases (Schott 2004; Melosi 2008).

So, Ficino's recommendation of leaving the city to escape from the plague and preserve health became moot by the early twentieth century. Conversely, bacteriology and its ally, sanitary engineering, fought against popular beliefs regarding the origin of diseases and the ways to treat them, and sponsored a new reordering of the urban space, thereby rendering old and traditional waste disposal and recycling systems in garden and farmlands obsolete.

However, the battle against rubbish that cities were winning did not take into consideration the negative offshoots on the environment the expulsion of refuse would have, both on the cities themselves and on those lands and rivers that would collect and store the garbage. Worse still, changes in the urbanites'

mindset, habits and culture would finally cause a major unanticipated environmental impact. Energy and resource consumption (and depletion) for every city dweller grew dramatically. To satisfy such demand, it became necessary to increase spending on infrastructure and maintenance, as well as taxes, besides rises in the prices of houses, rents and urban land. All of this would strengthen, in the end, the very longstanding social inequalities that the modernization of the water supply and sewer system was supposed to eradicate.

Mexico City and its valley: drainage and power in the nineteenth century

In nineteenth century Mexico City, sanitation works to preserve and improve health conditions for its inhabitants had to be undertaken on several levels. Cleaning up streets, rivers, ditches, canals and water mains within the city, in addition to rivers, land and lakes in the surrounding valley became paramount, since stagnant water and sewage were deemed the main cause of the infectious diseases that repeatedly struck the population throughout the century. Natural conditions of soil and climate in the valley and city made that stagnation possible. On the one hand, according to Manuel Orozco y Berra, the Mexico Valley spanned across a vast extension of land situated at the center of a mountain range then called Anahuac. This range limited the valley to the north, wherein the terrain rose to form huge hills that merged with those of the Pachuca and Atotonilco ranges.

The structure of the soil and the influence of volcanic activity created a pond into which the northern mountains spilt their waters. However, this natural draining was finally closed due to geological action, thus forming a lake system in the middle of which the Indian city of México Tenochtitlan would eventually be built. There were several lakes in the Mexico Valley (as opposed to the city) whose surface was unstable. In 1864, the southern lakes, Chalco and Xochilmilco, measured 5.98 and 2.68 leagues respectively; to the east was Texcoco (10,395 leagues); and to the north, San Cristóbal (0.63), Xaltocan (3.08) and Zumpango (0.98). Those lakes did not have fixed boundaries. During the rainy season, the water level rose quickly and it spilled over a wide even plain that seemed like a wide basin, but which was not so, since during the dry season water evaporated or was absorbed into the land, and consequently the basin almost disappeared.

In particular, the Texcoco Lake was the most unstable. Since the terrain that surrounded it to the west was almost flat and very shallow, deposits, torrential

rains and different water flows that spilled into it could flood the city; sometimes it was enough just for the wind to blow from the west to flood the basin. Afterwards, water leaked and flowed back into the center: “it was not odd that the place now swamped tomorrow might be located at a distance of three to four thousand meters from the lake shore.” (Orozco y Berra 1864, pp. 108–115) In times of torrential rains, the southern lakes of Chalco-Xochimilco also threatened to leak water into the city and engulf it, which happened more than once.

Given the purposes for which the Mexico Valley drainage system was planned in the seventeenth century, it could drain the water from these lakes out of the valley as well as sewage from the city out of the Texcoco Lake basin. However, the works took too long, due to stoppages. It wasn’t until the 1880s that they were resumed and they were finally finished in 1900. Meanwhile, flooding and the pestilence, ensuing from stagnant water and putrid sewage in the summer, besides the dust storms that carried rotting particles, constantly threatened the people’s health.

Regarding Mexico City’s drainage, it must be said that throughout the century, it suffered from severe flaws, as the canals were in utter disrepair and were not at the same level as the Texcoco Lake. Overall, small street canals at ground level performed the city’s drainage; there were oriented from west to east, being the direction from which the terrain slanted more regularly, whereas from north to south the pitch was more variable and less pronounced.

In the downtown streets, the canals were 2.5 feet (c. 76 cm) wide and 5.5 feet (c. 1.67 m) deep. At the upper part they were covered, but they also had several openings through which garbage used to slip and from which rotting matter oozed. The waters went to the Square Ditch (*Zanja cuadrada*), exiting to the canal crisscrossing the city, the Paseo de la Viga, which took them to the San Lázaro gate, and then toward the Texcoco Lake where they ended up after accumulating all the refuse the population had littered into them. Beyond the downtown area, the canals were irregular. They were mostly rough, makeshift, exposed, uneven gullies—some so deep and wide they hindered traffic and flooded streets with putrid fecal matter.

According to M. L. Smith, an American engineer, in 1848 the transit of liquid matter through the canals stalled, because the elevation of the city’s ground floor in relation to the surface of Texcoco Lake was quite short. The distance from the Main Square (now called *Zócalo*) to the point where the water was dumped in the lake was 6.5 feet (c. 1.98 m), but from the point where the city water drained into the Canal de la Viga, near the San Lázaro gate, the elevation was barely 3 feet (c. 0.91 m) in relation to the lake. Therefore, the bottom of the canals were barely one foot over the lake’s level, hardly two feet below the canal water that drained into the lake. As a result, the canals were always filled with a

semifluid muck that released ‘noxious miasmas,’ harbingers of the city’s and the valley’s unhealthiness.

Because of its malfunction, throughout the century, the city and valley drainage was regarded as the cause of the insalubrity and pestilence that the people suffered. However, despite the fact that there were other political, economic, institutional, educational, social and environmental realities that deserved to be attended to in order to solve this very complex problem, neither citizens nor authorities had a comprehensive picture of the reasons for the unhealthiness of the city and valley, nor consequently an outlook on a long-lasting solution. Every authority, either local or federal, and every social or professional sector had their own, often biased, perceptions of the causes and the likely solutions that the city’s insalubrity demanded.

Even though the 1604 master plan contemplated draining the valley lakes, by the mid-nineteenth century new projects, based on studies and experiences from other cities, offered, on the other hand, to restore and preserve the valley’s hydrological balance, while avoiding flooding and further health hazards. However, a centralized political power structure—displayed in the figures of Austrian Emperor Maximilian of Hapsburg (who ruled Mexico from 1864 to 1867), and presidents Benito Juárez (1858–1872) and Porfirio Díaz (1876–1880; 1884–1910)—combined with urbanization projects underwritten by foreign investment and promotion of pasteurization, forced upon public opinion the idea that draining the valley was the solution that the government and society’s expectations had to look forward to. Lack of resources, in addition to the indolence and discord of authorities and the community, also helped to further this idea.

This was endorsed by the medical, engineering, geographical and farming guilds gathered at the 1878 Medical Congress—even though one year earlier another physician, José María Lobato, reporting on the positive results of 17 years of studying the problem, recommended the preservation of the city’s and the valley’s hydrological balance in order to eradicate epidemics and favor agriculture. In his studies, Lobato stated that he replicated Hans von Pettenkoffer’s experiments of years earlier in Munich, where the medical community and municipal authorities had successfully adopted them in their struggle against typhus. According to Lobato:

In Mexico as in Munich, the quantity of rainwater fallen during the rainy season and distributed proportionally on a monthly basis must be perfectly related to what flows through the underground veins of the haulage terrains within the city’s groundwork. If the hydrological balance were looked after, typhus would disappear since organic matter that cover the soil would not decompose or be uncovered; otherwise, typhus will appear. [Pettenkoffer] infers that the miasmatic principle causing typhus is absorbed or fixed on the surface permeable layers of the ground, and when the drop in the groundwater level un-

covers these layers, typhus appears with the assorted pathological forms we know (José María Lobato, “Estudio higiénico sobre el tifo exantemático”, *Gaceta Médica de México*, 1/2/1877).

However, it was too late to override the scientific consensus obtained by the Mexican government, which rather than sanction a scientific-environmental truth, actually authorized the conclusion of the works to drain the Mexico Valley. The new Díaz government deemed crucial to pursue the urban, social, political and economic reforms needed to discipline and control not just the water from rivers, canals and lakes, as well as waste water from the city, but especially the city’s dwellers, and bound their fate to the same processes of modernization with which the major capital cities in Europe and the United States were experimenting. Liberals and conservatives had ceaselessly criticized the city’s unhealthy conditions, and the regime supported by both factions throughout the nineteenth century promoted urbanization and favored private urban business ventures; so for them, continuing the valley’s drainage works was essential.

In the 1870’s (in particular since the beginning of the Díaz regime) the city’s expansion and urbanization tended to accelerate at an even and sustained pace, being the outcome of the public and private interests and projects regarding real estate and urban land that began decades earlier, even before independence. As soon as the American invasion ended in 1848, several urbanization projects were set forth on land west of the city—thought the most suitable, as it was the least exposed to flooding, being on higher ground—in order to build new urban neighborhoods and set railway tracks between the city and other valley townships. Some were indeed built, but Maximilian’s imperial government, though it launched manifold urbanization projects planned by both the oligarchy and the emperor himself, hesitated in adopting the draining of the valley.

As the valley dried out—a process sanctioned and legitimized as a scientific and urgent necessity by the 1878 Medical Congress—urbanization projects multiplied during the Díaz regime, becoming a juicy business that the revolutionary government took over and sustained. Lawyers and engineers, architects and physicians, were the professional groups leading the political, material, health and environmental changes the valley and the city experienced during the nineteenth century, and their power and influence spanned across the entire country, the twentieth century and the regimes established by the Mexican Revolution.

During the nineteenth century, these professionals, both as individuals and as a group, disparaged the municipalities’ anachronism and inability to establish an orderly and healthy urban regime, denounced the squalor and immoral habits of the poor in the press, demanded the draining of the valley and the city, and benefited politically or economically, through occupying positions of author-

ity or being related to them, from the reforms to urban and rural property. They demanded and wrote projects for social, healthcare and penal control, and authorized and planned huge real estate developments on the land west of the city, so as to move to where the city was least unhealthy. Meanwhile, the rest of the population, incapable of buying a land plot on which to build their own houses, went to live in old houses and neighborhoods downtown, or on plots already dried out in the east, where the federal and local government and business interests allowed the construction of illegal, very unhealthy tenements. Therefore, by the end of the Porfirian Age, as the draining of the valley was over, spatial segregation was evident in many of the capital's quarters.

The decision to drain the valley was purportedly made by the colonial regime to protect New Spain's capital from floods, but actually became a way to exploit and expropriate natural resources as well as peasant land within the valley, whose communities had preserved the necessary hydrological balance to sustain themselves for generations. As proven by Eva Candiani (2015), the drainage works' purposes and uses put New Spain in the reproduction sphere of a worldwide capitalist system. Nineteenth century liberal and conservative regimes maintained the drainage works' original purpose, as well as the reproduction of the capitalist interest of a new national urban, liberal and conservative elite, solidly related, politically, economically, urbanistically and morally to foreign oligarchies, especially those of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Germany.

Even though the colonial drainage had affected the valley's hydrological and social balance (and consequently the health of the population) deeply, during the nineteenth century, some engineers (M. L. Smith, Gargollo, Orozco y Berra, Río de la Loza) and physicians (Lobato) scarcely discussed the inconvenience and harm to the environment and the people's health the full draining of the valley would cause. From their standpoint, the restoration, repair and expansion of the old draining system, both in the city and the valley, might have helped to reestablish the now-lost environmental balance, in addition to improving the housing and health of the city's increasingly impoverished population, which would have helped create a less adverse urban environment.

However, Mexico's wars and conflicts, and the interests the winning side forced upon the direction of national affairs, as well as the fears and prejudices regarding the origin and effects of the diseases that secularly ravaged the health of the inhabitants of the valley, were in favor of draining it. Certainly, as the century progressed, fear of flooding subsided as riverbeds and lakebeds dried off—but at the same time, health hazards began to grow. The correlation between both phenomena could barely be understood, when at the close of the century a new correlation emerged: as the city's population grew, socio-environmental

prejudices developed regarding the causes of the valley and the city's unhealthiness. In that context, the discourse of physicians and engineers was used to sanction an environmental policy based upon elements not discussed or debated enough within the circle of the scientific community of the age. However, seduced by power, it supported draining the valley and thus a bourgeois environmental dream became a nightmare.

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Darina Martykánová and Meltem Kocaman


A Land of Opportunities: Foreign Engineers in the Ottoman Empire


Abstract: Hundreds of foreign engineers worked in the vast lands of the Ottoman Empire from the eighteenth to the early twentieth century. These engineers and the works they carried out are worth exploring from the perspective of the circulation of experts in a global context. A closer look at the patterns of their employment contributes to developing a better understanding of the formation of engineering as a profession in the Ottoman context. This article studies the motives of foreign engineers for moving to the Ottoman lands, the projects they were involved in, their countries of origin and their relationships with local engineers. We argue that the presence of foreign engineers in the Ottoman lands was beneficial to all parties involved. Foreign engineers obtained prestigious jobs and brought with them access to a kind of expertise that distinguished them from their less mobile colleagues. The Ottoman Empire in turn benefited from their work and expertise at many different levels of administration, in public works, in upgrading infrastructure and in education.

Foreigners had served Ottoman sultans since the early years of the Empire. There was nothing exceptional in that; anyone whose skills were considered useful could establish a relationship of personal loyalty with the sovereign, independently of his or her origins. This does not mean that being part of a specific ethnic or religious group was of no importance. While being non-Muslim could be a barrier to accessing many posts and ranks (particularly in the armed forces), certain groups were nevertheless associated with desirable knowledge and skills, and their members were sought after and their services prized for that reason.

In the eighteenth century, the idea that Europe (*Avrupa*) was gaining important advantage over the Ottomans in specific strategic areas—such as arts and sciences linked to warfare (e.g., military drills, artillery, fortification, shipbuilding and cartography)—gained ground among the Ottoman ruling elites. This had major repercussions for the practice of employing foreigners. People coming from European countries became associated with this superior knowledge and skills, and were thus offered advantageous conditions of service. At the same time, the notion of European superiority in terms of knowledge and skills was

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becoming deeply rooted in the minds of the Europeans themselves, which made them more self-confident, more demanding and less willing to fully shift their allegiance and sense of belonging from a European sovereign and country to the Ottoman ruler and lands. These trends subsequently shaped patterns of recruitment and of service (Ágoston 2005; Aksan 2002; Kaçar 1996).

As in the past, foreign individuals, including technicians and military experts, continued to offer their skills to the sultan—sometimes moved by the need to seek refuge from a dangerous situation they faced in their own country, or from shameful personal circumstances. In these cases, conversions to Islam were still common for those who wished to integrate into the Ottoman military structures—although since the Hungarian baron Ferenc Tóth (François de Tott) undertook a partial reform of Ottoman military training in the 1770s, many foreign experts were commissioned to carry out military and naval tasks without the requirement of conversion. This trend was further strengthened when official inter-governmental collaboration was established between France and the Ottoman Empire, and Louis XVI sent several groups of expert officers and craftsmen to improve the performance of the Ottoman navy and armies by introducing new shipbuilding techniques, reshaping and enhancing military education and training, and innovations in weapon production, artillery and fortifications. This collaboration continued under the French revolutionary government and, later, several other countries followed France's example and put their experts at the sultan's disposal (Kaçar 1996; Firges 2014). In their turn, the Ottoman rulers (as well as their highly autonomous Egyptian vassals) began to send students, apprentices and experts of all ethno-religious origins to foreign—mostly European—schools, workshops and military establishments, as did Ottoman families. Ottoman Christian elites (particularly the Greeks, and some Jewish groups—mainly those with ties to Italian lands) had always sent their sons to European universities, but by the second half of the nineteenth century, this practice was being adopted by Ottomans of all ethno-religious groups. Several sons of powerful Ottoman pashas were educated in prestigious engineering schools in Europe and went on to actually work as engineers: this was the case of Mehmed Refik, Yusuf Razi and Kamuran Sirri.

Employing foreign experts via intergovernmental collaboration had important advantages, the most significant being that, unlike in the case of individual 'fortune-seekers'—who tended to exaggerate their knowledge and skills, or to fashion themselves as experts in strategic fields despite their limited experience—the expertise of the men sent by foreign governments was guaranteed. Among the disadvantages of this practice was the fact that these foreign experts gave detailed reports on Ottoman military issues (including maps of strategic places and plans of fortifications) to their governments—and their missions

were sometimes abruptly interrupted when their country switched its alliances and/or entered in war with the Ottoman Empire. This type of intergovernmental collaboration continued until the end of the Ottoman Empire (and beyond): high-ranking officials of the French corps of *ponts et chaussées* engineers were employed as technical advisors at the Ottoman ministry of Public Works; officers of the British Royal Navy served in the Ottoman Navy for many years; and German and Austrian officers not only trained Ottoman officers and advised Ottoman officials, but even came to command Ottoman troops (Martykánová 2016–2017; Soydemir 2007; Ortaylı 1981). Sometimes, the nationals of small states were explicitly preferred, such as when Belgian general Henri Alexis Brialmont was commissioned in 1892 by Ottoman imperial authorities to draft plans for an improvement of the fortifications of the Straits (Alloul 2017, pp. 21–22).

Occasionally, foreign engineers might have found themselves in the midst of highly delicate political issues. Their tasks could create a conflict of political and economic interests involving different parties, including their own countries. Between 1845 and 1858, the region of Mount Lebanon experienced severe political turmoil. The region's social structures began to dissolve due to multi-directional struggles, including ethnic and religious conflicts, center versus province rivalry, and inter-communal struggles and tensions between feudal lords and villagers. In addition to the Ottoman administration, France, the British Empire, Austria, Russia and Prussia were actively involved in the region. The Ottoman government had been searching for solutions to stabilize the region, to provide security for its people and also to collect taxes by negotiating with local forces and their 'protector' countries. In these circumstances, with the expectation of solving political problems, the government created a commission to make a cadastral survey of the region that would lead to a more equitable distribution of taxes among subjects. Two Prussian engineers were appointed to carry out a cadastral survey of the region. Nonetheless, different actors and groups who did not agree with the project or with the way it was supposed to be carried out fiercely opposed the engineers' presence in the region. Even the Prussian consul was annoyed with the Ottoman government for placing Prussian subjects under the command of the Ottoman governor, and he made his discomfort clear to the engineers. The Ottoman authorities made an effort to minimize these tensions by appointing local men to escort the Prussian surveyors while they were making their reconnaissance. In spite of these measures, the lives of the two foreign engineers were threatened many times during the course of their duty (Farah 2000, pp. 477–487).

With the growing integration of the Ottoman Empire into the European concert of powers, and increasing contacts between the sultan's subjects on the one hand, and nationals of different European countries on the other hand, the Otto-

mans often took the initiative and recruited skilled persons themselves. Such an initiative played a pivotal role in the story of the Polish engineer ‘Vankovitch’, recorded by British Army intelligence officer Fred Burnaby (1842–1885). This Pole, who was to become a chief engineer in several provinces of the Ottoman Empire, was most probably Teodor Wańkowicz, born in 1846 into a Polish noble family from a region near Minsk in today’s Belarus, and also known as Teodor Bej (Bey). Wańkowicz, who was a subject of the tsar of Russia, graduated as a military engineer from the Military College of St. Petersburg. When the Polish insurrection against Russian rule (the January Uprising of 1863–1864) had broken out, he joined the rebels. He fought against Russia as a commander of a group of insurgents. After the revolt was suppressed, Wańkowicz escaped and, after a troublesome journey, he found himself in Istanbul, penniless. To make his own living, he started to work on the construction of roads. The engineer who supervised the work noticed that Wańkowicz knew as much about road-building as did he himself. Thus, he promoted him to assistant-engineer. His skills took Wańkowicz (or Teodor Bey) to provinces such as Yanya (Ioannina) in the Ottoman Balkans, and Yozgat in Asia Minor, where he worked in the service of the Ottoman state as a chief engineer of the province (Burnaby 1877, pp. 185–186; Konstantynowicz 2013).

In turn, foreign engineers spotted and trained local talented men. During his employment as chief engineer at the Ottoman Imperial Arsenal, a British engineer named Shanks was assisted by local mechanical engineer Ahmed Besim. After Shanks’s resignation from the post, Ahmed Besim was appointed as his replacement (Tekeli / İlkin 2010, p.143). Émile Lacoine, a French engineer who enjoyed a long and fruitful professional career in the Ottoman administration of Posts and Telegraphs, set his eyes on the young Salih Zeki, a talented technician who had been educated in the *Darişşafaka*—a state-funded school for orphans that was known for its good technical and scientific curriculum. Lacoine arranged for Salih Zeki to be sent to study in France and, after he returned to Constantinople, the young man went on to have a remarkable career as a mathematician, including teaching posts at prestigious state schools (Günergun 2005, pp.117–118).

The government or particular institutions sometimes asked the Ottoman embassy in a specific country to contact and recruit experts that were needed. In other cases, the Ottomans who (had) lived, studied or travelled abroad, approached the candidates and proposed to them the idea of working in the Empire, be it for the government, for a public institution or for a private company. Thus, for example, when the above-mentioned Ottoman electrical engineer Mehmed Refik, who had studied in the *Institute de Montefiore* in Liège, became director of the Civil Engineering School (*Hendese-i Mülkiye Mektebi*, later *Mühen-*

dis Mektebi), he recruited Belgian engineers to teach in this Ottoman public institution (Akbaş 2007–2008, pp. 101–119).

Personal recommendations and networking proved to be an important force shaping individual professional trajectories, and an efficient means of recruitment. The Austrian engineer and expert in hydraulics Philipp Forchheimer (1852–1933) obtained his diploma in engineering at the Technical *Hochschule* of Zürich in Switzerland and received his *Habilitation* in the Prussian city of Aachen. In 1874, he worked on the construction of the railway from Rakovník to Protivín in Bohemia, which was then part of the Austrian Empire. We do not know how exactly he came to teach the ‘sciences of Public Works’ at the Civil Engineering School in Constantinople in 1891–1892, but he soon returned to Aachen as a professor and subsequently taught at the Technical *Hochschule* of Graz, where he became a rector in 1896/7. In 1913, he was back in Constantinople: the Ottoman authorities appointed him a *ders nazırı*, or director in charge of the lectures (academic director) of the School of Engineers (*Mühendis Mektebi*); that is, the reformed Civil Engineering School where he had taught more than twenty years before. Besides his administrative tasks, he lectured on hydraulics, canals, bridges and similar subjects. Forchheimer’s motivations for his professional involvement in the Ottoman Empire are unknown, but we know that, at least according to his Ottoman students and colleagues, he felt comfortable in Constantinople and had a good relationship with local staff and students. Moreover, he might have been attracted by the opportunity to pursue his interest in Byzantine hydraulics and architecture: he is an author, together with the art historian Josef Strzygowski (later infamous for his Nazi activism), of the book *Die Byzantinischen Wasserbehälter von Konstantinopel*, published in Vienna in 1893, soon after Forchheimer returned from his first teaching engagement in the Ottoman Empire (Kozeny 1961, pp. 295–296; Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften 1957, p. 336; Uluçay / Kartekin 1958).

During the Great War, when Austria and the Ottoman Empire were allies, Forchheimer contacted another Austrian engineer, Karl Terzaghi, and asked him to join him. Terzaghi, born in 1883 in Prague, had studied at the Technical *Hochschule* of Graz—the school where Forchheimer had taught and served as rector. Terzaghi accepted Forchheimer’s offer, probably using it as an opportunity to escape the meat-grinder of the Great War. In 1915, he became a professor of the ‘tolerance of railway instruments’ and of the ‘principles of civil engineering’ at the School of Engineers in Constantinople, training some of the members of what was to become the first generation of civil engineers of the Turkish Repub-

lic.¹ In the following decades, this young man was to become a famous engineer who worked and taught on several continents (he became a lecturer at Harvard University in 1938), and is considered the father of soil mechanics (Goodman 1999). Terzaghi's mentor Philipp Forchheimer did not seek talent only in Europe, though. During his appointment as academic director at the School of Engineers, he recruited an Ottoman Muslim, Salih Murad (who later adopted the surname Uzdilek), who taught at the Ottoman Naval Academy, to teach physics to his engineering students (Uluçay / Kartekin 1958).

As we have already observed in the case of Teodor Wańkowicz, the willingness of Ottoman authorities to grant exile to refugees from European countries had collateral benefits for Ottoman engineering. In such cases, the Ottomans did not have to go and seek skilled men in Europe; these experts came to the sultan's domains on their own, thirsting for an opportunity to earn their living by making use of their expert knowledge and skills. There were several major waves of refugees in the long nineteenth century that brought in useful expertise, the first of which was linked to the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars and the Restoration of absolutist regimes. The partition of Poland and the uprisings that followed from time to time throughout the following century also created several refugee waves, as did the revolutionary wave of 1848 and the struggle for Italian unification. Italians, Poles and Hungarians came in noteworthy numbers and were often willing to fully commit to the Ottoman Empire and become Ottoman subjects. This was the case, for instance, of a Polish engineer called Franciszek Sokulski, who was a distinguished member of the Polish émigré community that gathered and organized themselves in the early 1850s in the city of Shumla in the Ottoman Balkans. Realizing that he had little chance of returning back to his homeland, Sokulski decided to permanently settle in the Ottoman Empire. Apparently, he discussed this issue with Omar (or Ömer) Pasha (1806–1871), a high-ranking and successful Ottoman military man who was himself of Serbian origin, born as Mihajlo Latas in an Orthodox Christian family in the Austrian Empire—though in his case, his exile to the Ottoman lands (and subsequent conversion to Islam) was motivated by embezzlement charges, rather than by the sort of noble political reasons that most probably caused the flight of Franciszek Sokulski. Omar Pasha encouraged Sokulski to apply to the Ottoman grand vizier for a job as a civil (*ponts-et-chaussées*) engineer, building roads in the Ottoman provinces of the Balkan Peninsula. It

¹ The term 'civil engineer' is highly polysemic. In this article, we do not use it in the way *ingénieur civil* is generally used in French to denote an engineer working in the private sector, but rather in the sense of the Turkish *inşaat mühendisi*, the French *ingénieur de ponts-et-chaussées* or the Spanish *ingeniero de caminos*.

seems that he finally achieved his aim and was even able to retire—still a Catholic—with a state pension, as an engineer of a convincingly similar name appears in Ottoman documents during the several following decades (Martykánová 2010, p. 169). In this context, it is no surprise that their Ottoman peers and students cherished the memory of these exiles, particularly of the Poles.² Unlike their French, British or German colleagues, these engineers did not benefit from the backing of a great power with strategic interests in the Ottoman lands, nor had they their national companies operating in the Ottoman Empire and willing to systematically discriminate in their favor.

In most cases, foreign engineers in the service of the sultan were better paid than their local counterparts. Their term of employment was extended annually, or for longer periods if the agreement proved mutually beneficial. The expansion and consolidation of the administrative apparatus in charge of public works broadened and stabilized the career opportunities for both Ottoman and foreign engineers, as there existed no principle of national exclusivity that would establish Ottoman nationality as a requirement for all Ottoman public employees. Thus, for example, Italian engineer Luigi Storari was commissioned by the Ottoman government to work on specific tasks in different cities of the Empire, and ended up appointed to a permanent post as a specialist in cartography and measurements in the Direction of Buildings (*ebniye idaresi*) of the newly founded municipal government of Istanbul.³ However, the extension of service over decades might not have been so advantageous for foreign engineers, because in comparison to a local citizen it was often more difficult for foreign subjects to obtain the right to a retirement pension from the Ottoman government. Thus, for instance, British engineer Frederick Taylor worked in various industrial facilities of the state from 1833 on, only to become unemployed after 23 years of service and denied a retirement pension (Özbay / Bülbül 2009, p. 209).

One should not suppose that all initiatives to employ engineers came from officials of the central government. The central administration received demands for engineers from almost all regions of the Empire. Those engineers were sought for major and minor projects in cities, towns and villages. For the period between

² For such an acknowledgment, see the speech on the anniversary of the School of Engineers, delivered by its director Sami Bey on 20 November 1920. It is reproduced in full in: Uluçay / Kartekin 1958, pp. 637–639.

³ State Archives of the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey (BOA): A.AMD, file 68, sheet 13, 1855/6; A.DVN, file 141, sheet 77, 1855/6; A.VN.MHM, file 28, sheet 4, 1858/9; A.MKT.MHM, file 139, sheet 11, 1858/9; A.MKT.NZD, file 178, sheet 31, 1855/6; A.MKT.NZD, file 377, sheet 35, 1861/2; A.MKT.NZD, file 350, sheet 82, 1860/1; A.MKT.NZD, file 351, sheet 28, 1860/1; I.DH, file 395, sheet 26165, 1857/8; I.DH, file 410, sheet 27159, 1858/9; I.DH, file 430, sheet 28443, 1858/9.

1854/55 and 1864/65, we have identified ninety-five projects for which engineers were requested in provinces and towns. In fact, the real number may be much higher, as our analysis was limited to the documents included in the online catalogue of the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives. These engineers were employed in short-term works, upon completion of which they were immediately employed in another task. In case of an emergency, engineers could even be taken away from their posts and sent to another region of the Empire, leaving their current work unfinished. The existence and frequency of such demands points to the growing consolidation of the figure of the engineer in the social imagination of the ruling elites. The need for technical expertise was becoming widely acknowledged, and the social legitimacy of engineers expanded drastically. In this context, the authorities were in desperate need of experts: they tried to tackle this need by employing both Ottoman and foreign engineers.

For example, for the period between 1854/55 and 1864/65, we have identified at least 47 foreign engineers who were appointed by the Ottoman authorities to work on different civil projects, in state institutions, or for provincial and local administrations. Bearing in mind that this number does not include all of the foreign engineers who worked in the Empire at that time, we may nevertheless affirm that these engineers came mainly from Great Britain, France, Austria and Italian states. Besides other tasks, they were employed mainly for the construction of roads, the installation of telegraph lines, for mining, the construction of railways and for other tasks (including the amelioration of rivers, lakes and marshes, map-making, the construction of ports, docks and lighthouses, the refurbishing of urban areas destroyed by fire, the construction of buildings, etc.). The conditions of their employment varied from temporally limited contracts to a full integration into the Ottoman administration.

The growing presence of foreigners—be they recruited individually or via inter-governmental collaboration—at all levels of the Ottoman administration shaped and molded bureaucratic practice. One of the most obvious manifestations of the impact of their presence was that French became one of the languages of official communication, along with Ottoman Turkish. Many institutions, bureaus and departments, as well as territorial administration schemes, were inspired by European institutions and arrangements—but rarely were they an exact copy of a foreign model. Rather, foreign experts and Ottomans who had become acquainted with specific foreign establishments and practices, proposed, created and implemented institutions and arrangements that resembled what they knew from abroad, but included *ad hoc* adaptations to local circumstances and solutions to specific challenges, and often integrated local administrative and institutional traditions and routines. Foreign experts—even the most powerful and influential ones—could not create, reform and redesign the Otto-

man military forces and institutions of government at their whim; they had to get support and funding from Ottoman dignitaries and keep it long enough for their innovations and reforms to take root. Case studies show that creating working relationships and alliances with their local peers, including immediate superiors as well as junior colleagues or students, was often the most efficient way for foreign experts to ensure that their projects would survive long after their initial contribution.

Besides being recruited by governments and public institutions, foreign technicians were often sent by foreign companies to the Ottoman domains together with new technology (machines, iron bridges), or hired by those companies to build a particular element of infrastructure (port works, railways) in the Ottoman lands. These practices multiplied after the Crimean War, when an unprecedented number of European foreigners from all social classes arrived in Ottoman lands throughout the nineteenth century. British documents concerning foreign affairs recorded that 66 British engineers were working in İstanbul in 1886, while the total number of British subjects residing in the city was 640. That is, more than 10% of British residents were engineers, engineering being the most frequently registered profession among the local British population (Kocabaşoğlu 2004, pp. 170–171). The number of French engineers residing in İstanbul in 1906–1907 was close to 30. This figure includes engineers who were working in İstanbul or its hinterland, as well as those who worked as managers at the headquarters of several French private companies. These numbers, however, are far too low to realistically constitute the total number of French engineers working all around the Empire (Giraud 2002, pp. 25–27).⁴ Engineering and business activities further expanded and diversified from the 1880s on, during the so-called First Era of Globalization (1880–1913), which implied massive penetration of foreign capital into the Empire and direct European intervention into Ottoman affairs, including the establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration in 1881, following the sovereign default of 1875 (Pamuk 1987; Thobie 1977; Geyikdağı 2011). Foreign engineers socialized with their fellow countrymen resident in the Ottoman lands, but also with their colleagues—foreign and local engineers and architects, be they Christian, Muslim or Jewish. After the Young Turk Revolution (1908), freedom of press and association vastly expanded the opportunities for professional activism and foreign engineers did not lag behind their Ottoman colleagues in taking part in the process. Together

⁴ For instance, while there was only one French engineer from the mining company *Société Héracle* residing in İstanbul (he was the general manager) in the above-mentioned statistics, the number of foreign field engineers working in Zonguldak was five.

with their Ottoman (mainly non-Muslim) peers, foreign engineers and architects of various nationalities co-founded and joined the *Association des architectes et ingénieurs en Turquie* (1913–1914), in which, as the press stated, “Ottomans, Germans, French, Austrians, Italians, Swiss, Egyptian(s) and English fraternise under the presidency of Mr. Joseph Aznavour, architect” (GCO 1914, pp. 45–48). In fact, the statutes of this professional society clearly acknowledged the key role foreign experts played in Ottoman engineering and architecture, stating that its council was to be composed of two Armenians, two Greeks, two Jews, two Turks, and two of all other Ottoman ethno-religious groups, and that seven were to be foreigners of different nationalities. Moreover, several journals were published in Constantinople to which foreign engineers actively contributed, including the above-mentioned Association’s journal *Génie Civil Ottoman*, the *Revue Technique d’Orient* and the trilingual German–French–Ottoman *Zeitschrift für Technik und Industrie in der Türkei* (published during the Great War, in 1916–1917).

Vast Ottoman territories were also lands of opportunity concerning the renovation and expansion of communications and infrastructures, and their adaptation to the latest technologies. This stimulated foreign presence in many ways; the engineering projects themselves were appetizing investments for foreign companies, whilst simultaneously contributing to European countries having more economic and political control of the territory. Foreign companies, local entrepreneurs, the Ottoman government and regional authorities all engaged in an unprecedented level of building activity. Ottoman government officials had an undecided attitude towards infrastructural construction projects. On the one hand, they understood them as means to economic prosperity and to a better control of the territory, as well as symbols of what they understood as the *progress of civilization*—an inevitable process resulting from humankind’s striving for perfection, in which, however, no country or group had a guaranteed place and in which an active effort had to be made to participate, and to avoid the danger of falling victim to stagnation or decline. On the other hand, Ottoman statesmen were well aware of potential risks and liabilities, such as providing easy access for foreign armies, or investments being shaped by foreign rather than Ottoman interests. Furthermore, public investment in separatist regions could be lost once these became independent.

Besides the clashing strategic interests of local elites, Ottoman authorities and foreign governments, the rivalry among foreign companies/investors over infrastructure projects was unavoidable, even in cases of relatively minor works. The construction of the quay of İzmir is an example of such rivalry between the British and the French. Although the quay was originally a project of the British settled in İzmir, the company they founded, Smyrna Quay Company, could

not overcome financial difficulties to execute the project. So, the Dussaud brothers, French engineers, bought the company and completed the quay in 1880. It was a success among projects of its kind, for its scale and modernity (Frangakis-Syrett 2001). French companies doing business in Ottoman lands made use of French and foreign engineers who had graduated from French engineering schools. Thus, for instance, Joseph Volay from Lyon, who had received his diploma at the prestigious *École centrale des arts et manufactures* in 1897, worked as a railway engineer in China, the Ottoman Empire (at the Soma-Bandırma railway that employed several *centraliens* of this generation), Spain, Cuba, Syria and France, before becoming (by 1920) the engineer-in-chief of the *Régie général de chemin de fer et travaux publics* in Beirut. Cairo-born Eugène Girard, who had graduated from the same school in 1899, worked as assistant-engineer of the chief engineer at the construction of the Homs-Tripoli (in Ottoman Syria) and the Soma-Bandırma (in Asia Minor) railway lines. Another *centralien*, Félix Courras (grad. 1880), born in the Uruguayan capital of Montevideo, worked in Ottoman Syria for the *Compagnie des chemins de fer de Beyrouth-Damas-Hauran et Biredjik sur l'Euphrate* in 1897 (*Annuaire des anciens* 1920).

While European economic domination grew exponentially, this was also a period of collaboration, joint ventures and multinational teams of workers and experts, cooperating to carry out projects of unprecedented nature, size and complexity. Foreign engineers not only advised Ottoman ministers and other officials of central, provincial and municipal administrations, and taught Ottoman students and trained local apprentices—they also worked in ministerial departments side by side with Ottoman Armenian and Muslim technicians, managed companies owned by Ottoman Jews and Greeks, and founded joint enterprises and applied for concessions with their Ottoman Muslim and non-Muslim colleagues. For instance, another French *centralien*, Émile Foucart (grad. 1879), began his professional career in a family business, *Maison Joly et Foucart*, machine-builders and producers of ceramic products. By 1897, however, he was the manager of a ceramics factory in Karaagaç near Constantinople, an establishment owned by the Camondo family, Ottoman Jewish bankers and entrepreneurs who had moved to Paris in the late 1860s, while they continued to run several businesses in the Ottoman Empire (*Annuaire des anciens* 1897). Foreign and Ottoman engineers worked together on the construction of the Hejaz Railway—the emblematic public works project and propaganda operation of Abdülhamid II's reign, and the first Ottoman railway on which Muslim engineers who had graduated from Ottoman engineering schools worked in significant numbers (Gülsoy 1994).

The multitude of examples of efficient collaboration did not prevent a sense of rivalry. As mentioned above, foreign engineers were often offered much better

contracts and salaries than their local counterparts, who were well aware of this and, particularly after the Young Turk Revolution, felt free to complain. Europeans' knowledge and skills were often taken for granted. It is true, however, that towards the end of the Empire, Ottoman public institutions began to check the engineers' credentials and let them apply only for posts that were considered suitable for their level of qualification, or adapted their salaries accordingly.⁵ Managers of foreign companies tended to seek expert technicians among their fellow-countrymen and among other Europeans, though there was a growing trend to hire Ottoman subjects who had studied abroad—particularly the non-Muslims among them.

There were advantages in employing locals, not only as expert technicians, but also as executive managers: they knew better how to negotiate with the different levels of Ottoman administration, they had useful contacts and they were better at handling local workers than the often arrogant foreign engineers, who expected obedience and were unaware of important and potentially dangerous power dynamics on the construction sites—particularly in rural areas where villagers were employed in the framework of a scheme designed in the mid-nineteenth century, according to which villagers paid their taxes by working in mines, or building and maintaining public works (Martykánová 2010, p. 148; Atayman 1984). Nonetheless, particularly Ottoman Muslim engineers who graduated from Ottoman schools complained bitterly of heavy discrimination, as foreign companies proved extremely reluctant to hire them, even for posts below their qualifications (Uluçay / Kartekin 1958, p. 583).

Public institutions did not always do better in this respect, preferring to import outstanding—and expensive—foreign experts for a specific project, rather than train and employ local technicians, be they Muslim, Armenian, Jewish or Orthodox (Martykánová 2014). On the other hand, the posts of military engineers were staffed exclusively by Muslims, and non-Muslims had very limited options to access the 'technical' posts within the Navy, too. Moreover, during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, policies were put in place striving for an Islamization of public service: putting the newly-founded School of Civil Engineering (1883) under military supervision made it inaccessible to Ottoman non-Muslims. This meant that Ottoman non-Muslims (particularly Armenians) and foreigners that, together with Ottoman Muslims, staffed the administration of Public Works, were to be gradually replaced by Muslim technicians. In practice, howev-

⁵ An example is the 1917 case of the Ottoman authorities' concern over the credentials of Italo Fazanotti. An Italian citizen, Fazanotti applied for the post of engineer in the Istanbul Municipality. As his diploma was of the second class, he was only allowed to apply for the post of assistant-of-the engineer. (BOA, DH.UMVM, file 71, sheet 39, 10 February 1917)

er, the demands of the expanding public works administration made this intention inapplicable, as the government proved to give priority to a swift realization of specific projects, rather than to long-term policies, including the replacement of non-Muslims with Muslims.

The principle of ‘national preference/exclusivity’, defined in terms of Ottoman citizenship and thus including people of all ethno-religious allegiances, shaped the demands of the Ottoman engineers, although they never went so far as to claim that foreigners should be excluded from public employment (a principle that, by the way, was becoming the norm in European countries). When freedom of association was established after the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the newly created *Osmanlı Mimar ve Mühendis Cemiyeti* (OMMC: Society of Ottoman Architects and Engineers) accepted as members all Ottoman citizens who had a diploma from an engineering school in the Empire or abroad, or who were generally acknowledged as engineers for their work. One of the grievances the Society wished to highlight was the continuing discrimination against Ottoman engineers by companies operating in the Empire, as well as the preference Ottoman public institutions (state or municipal) showed regarding foreign experts. It is no coincidence that this professional association, whose dealings were conducted in Ottoman Turkish, accepted only Ottoman members (most of them Muslims and Armenians), while the francophone *Association des ingénieurs et architectes en Turquie* was open to all professionals who worked in the Ottoman lands, but whose membership was heavily skewed towards foreigners of all nationalities and Ottoman Greeks.

Once the Ottoman Empire became integrated into European power politics and the structures of global capitalism, and opened up to the influx of foreigners of all nationalities and social strata, it became a true land of opportunity for European technicians and entrepreneurs. Despite the growing numbers and self-confidence of local men trained in modern engineering, foreigners never lost their privileged access to engineering works in the sultan’s domains. Even constitutional governments that operated under the notion of national sovereignty preferred their modernizing projects being carried out as quickly and as cheaply as possible to the enforcing of mid- and long-term policies, such as the creation of local schools and training programs driven by the nationalist principle of *kendi ihtiyaçlarımızı kendimiz betaraf etmek*: “to cater for our needs ourselves” (Martykánová 2014, pp.143 – 144).

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Kaan Üçsu

Cartographies of the ‘Eastern Question’: Some Considerations on Mapping the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea in the Nineteenth Century

Abstract: The Sea of Marmara, the Black Sea, and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits have always been geographically and, therefore, politically crucial for the state ruling Istanbul. Centuries of intermittent warring between the Ottoman Empire and their enemies often pivoted on the quality of naval knowledge of this region. In this article, I aim to give an overview of how cartographical developments progressed alongside the geo-political struggles in this area, and sometimes played a role in them. I suggest that map-making was particularly important during the ‘long’ nineteenth century of the ‘Eastern Question’, which can be dramatized as a play entitled ‘The Balance of Power’, in which the Ottomans, France, Russia and Britain were the main actors to take the stage. This period was full of struggle and conflict, treaties and alliances, and ended in 1895 with establishment of the first modern cartography unit within the Ottoman military.

Introduction

Historically, the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea constituted an integral geographical unit, along with the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Most importantly, the state ruling Istanbul always needed to control this unit for its food supplies, security and commerce. Indeed, the Byzantine Empire and the Ottoman Empire were aware of this phenomenon and acted accordingly to seek control of the entire unit (İnalçık 1979, p. 74).

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Ottomans had begun to settle around the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles soon after their emergence onto the stage of history. They began to populate the eastern shores of the Bosphorus during the Battle of Pelekanon in 1329, and around Dardanelles through the conquests of Gallipoli in 1354 and Adrianopoli in 1361 (İnalçık 2008a, p. 65). They then initiated a fortification process in order to maintain their existence in these areas. Although these activities and the fate of the region preoccupied Byzantine-European alliances, the dominance of the straits by the Ottomans after a series of conflicts, brought this era, inevitably, to an end with the conquest of Istanbul in 1453 by Mehmed II (1451–1481).

The conquest of Istanbul by the Ottomans dramatically changed politics in the west. Upon realizing that Europe would not like to leave Istanbul and its environs to the Ottomans, Mehmed II hurried to consolidate his power to impede probable attacks from enemies. To this end, his navy set sail in the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea in 1454 and 1455 respectively. Its venturesome campaign in the Aegean Sea resulted in the capture of some crucial northern Aegean islands. In response, the Venetian endeavor to establish a crusade against Ottoman expansion actualized on 1 March 1456. In the early years of this crusade, Western allies captured some islands in the Aegean Sea. However, the Ottoman navy strengthened its presence in the region by the conquest of Midilli in 1462 and by the construction of fortresses on both sides of the Gallipoli Strait in 1463–1464 (İnalçık 2008b, pp. 45–49). Ottoman expansion continued in the Black Sea. They imposed a duty on Genoese colonies in 1454 and on the Pontus Empire in 1456. By the conquest of Amasra and Trabzon in 1459 and 1461 respectively, they dominated the southern part of the Black Sea. Thus, the Ottoman State secured the protection of Istanbul and emerged as an imperial power within ten years (İnalçık 2008b, pp. 51–52)

In the face of this Ottoman success, the Venetians constituted an alliance in 1463 with Uzun Hasan, sultan of the Aq Qoyunlu dynasty—enemies of the Ottomans in the east. That started a new war that lasted almost 16 years, and ended with the resounding defeat of the Venetians in 1479 (İnalçık 2008b, pp. 50–51). Meanwhile, Mehmed II continued to struggle for control in the Black Sea. Having closely monitored the problems between the Crimean Khanate and the Golden Horde Empire, and the emergence of Russia as a power, he eventually sent the navy to conquer Caffa and annexed the Crimean Khanate in 1475 (İnalçık 1944, p. 206). Even though the conquest of Caffa rendered the Ottomans the most powerful actor in the Black Sea, they continued to expand by capturing Copia and Anapa in Circassia in 1479, and Akkerman and Kilia in Moldavia in 1484. Finally, the conquest of Southern Bessarabia (Budjak) in 1538 rendered the Black Sea an Ottoman lake (İnalçık 1979, p. 108).

The emergence of Russia

This Ottoman dominance over the Black Sea region threatened Poland and the emerging power Russia. Therefore, these two states tacitly (and sometimes overtly) supported Kazakh tribes consisting of Tatars and Circassians against the Ottomans and the Crimean Khanate from the seventeenth century onwards (İnalçık 2008c, pp. 60–61). Assaults by these tribes forced the Ottomans to war with Poland and Russia in the second half of the seventeenth century. These attacks and wars burdened the Ottoman Empire, causing the failure of its Vienna Campaign in 1683.

Taking advantage of the situation, Russia attended the Holy League in order to realize its ambitions over the Black Sea. Sixteen years of war ended in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the Treaty of Karlowitz was signed in 1699. However, Russia did not accede to an agreement with the Ottoman Empire. The two empires decided to continue peace talks in Istanbul, where they signed a treaty in July of 1700 leaving the castle of Azov, its dependent castles and the body of water between them to Russia. In return, the Ottomans imposed their conditions regarding territorial issues and rejected Russia's demand for free trade in the Black Sea (Özcan 2001, pp. 504–507).

That Russia's first attempt to rule the Black Sea was blocked by diplomacy did not eradicate its ambitions. From then on, Russia built a comprehensive plan for the Black Sea and, accordingly, the Mediterranean Sea. A new war started between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1735. During the four-year course of the war, the Russian foreign minister Heinrich Andrei Ostermann (1686–1747) elaborated a program to install Russia's presence in the Black Sea, and its expansion towards Moldavia and Wallachia. Although Russia's failure in this war denied them the chance to realize it during his lifetime, Ostermann's program later bore fruit in the 1768–74 war (Ledonne 2006, pp. 3–4, 8). This six-year, intermittent war ended with Russia's triumph and constituted a landmark regarding the destiny of the so-called 'Eastern Question'.

According to the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, signed in 1774 at the war's end, Russian commercial ships would be able to sail the Black Sea and the Straits (Beydilli 1992, p. 266). These developments prompted indignation throughout the West and a 'play' called the 'Balance of Power' begun to be enacted upon the stage of the aforementioned historically and geographically significant unit comprising the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea. Russia's destruction of the Ottoman fleet in Çeşme in 1770 had turned the tables on the Ottoman Empire (Aktepe 1993, p. 288–289). This overwhelming defeat prompted the Ottoman court to carry out radical reforms in education, as well as in the navy.

Explicit France, implicit Russia

In this context, I suggest this turning point as the beginning of a ‘long’ nineteenth century for the Ottoman Empire, which ended in 1895 with its establishment of a modern unit for cartography within the ministry of war. In fact, the Ottoman Empire had already initiated a modernization project within its army in the second quarter of the eighteenth century, but was unable to maintain it due to diverse political and economic reasons, and the lack of a qualified labor force (Kaçar 2008, p. 71). The Ottomans undoubtedly needed help in order to realize the modernization of their army and education system. An opportunity thus arose, and the first actor to take the stage was France. They lent a hand to their old friend in organizing and servicing the institutions needed to prevent Russia from emerging as a power. They deployed French engineers and cartographers to the newly established military schools in Istanbul, and provided those schools with educational materials and instruments (Günergun / Üçsu 2016, p. 148).

One of the first outcomes of this new collaboration was a map of Princes’ Islands, which was made by copying a Turkish map acquired in 1772 (BnF, GE SH 18 PF 98 BIS DIV 6 P 6D). In the same year, a French engineer named Bellin produced a map of the Black Sea in which its southern part is excessively distorted (BnF, GE SH 18 PF 99 DIV 0 P 18). It appears that he had not used Turkish maps, since one that represented the southern region and the Sea of Azov far more precisely had already been published by Ibrahim Müteferrika almost 50 years earlier, in 1724. In fact, Müteferrika’s map had already been copied and translated into French in 1768 by a French dragoman named Chabert, in the service of a Neapolitan diplomatic envoy (Ucsu 2017). Apparently, a patron of Müteferrika named Mehmed Said Pasha did not give this map as a present to the royal library of France during his mission to Paris in 1742, presenting instead the ‘officially’ published books, including Katip Çelebi’s *Cihannüma* (Aubaile et al. 1999, pp. 326–327).

Likewise, Müteferrika’s had not reached the Russians either. Thus, Bellin’s chart was probably the one in greatest use among the Russian navy too (Scho-kalsky 1907, p. 632). When war erupted in 1768, Catherine the Great (1729–1796) ordered her ambassador to obtain maps. Thereupon, the Russian ambassador in London, Count Ivan G. Chernyshov (1726–1797), had a famous London-based map seller called Andrew Dury prepare a map of the Black Sea in 1769, using the maps Chernyshov provided him (Zaytsev 2000, p. 114; Bulatov / Delano-Smith / Herbert 2001, pp. 72–76). Although we do not know which maps the

ambassador gave Dury to work with, we can conclude from the resulting map's inadequacy that they did not include Müteferrika's.

Towards the end of the war, in 1773, Russia sent a small squadron to survey the northern Black Sea, of which a map did not reach their Admiralty until 1782. While serving in the Russian navy during the war, Dutch officer Jan-Hendrik van Kinsbergen produced a map of the Crimean peninsula and the Sea of Azov, which was then the most reasonable map of the related area despite its lack of detail concerning the bay and inlets west of Balaklava, where the harbor of Sevastopol would later be located (Zaytsev 2000, pp. 114–116).

Meanwhile, Russia began in 1769 an expedition in the Aegean Sea, which was their "first large-scale strategic naval campaign conducted at a distance from Russian shores" (Bulatov 2000, p. 101), lasting until 1774. This expedition was of great importance in terms of the ongoing war and the destruction of the Ottoman fleet in Çeşme; it also "laid the foundation of the future Black Sea fleet". Russia most probably could not chart the Straits and the Sea of Marmara during this expedition, since they lacked sufficient time to do so (ibd.). Nevertheless, immediately following the signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, Russia made a considerable number of charts of the Sea of Marmara and the Straits, which contravened the terms of the treaty. Its disguised surveying activities until late 1778, when their output was published as the *Atlas of the Archipelago* (Bulatov 2000, p. 108). Over the course of these voyages, as well as using French and English charts, Russian surveyors acquired and used Ottoman charts unhesitatingly, despite their Admiralty's contempt for Ottoman scientists (Postnikov 2000, p. 86).

Out of gratitude to the French government for their aid during the war and for the foundation of new schools, the Ottomans provided French scientists with the privilege of surveying the Straits and the Sea of Marmara. Choisseul Gouffier (1752–1817) in particular was employed as ambassador to Istanbul in 1784, and the officers he patronized made many measurements and maps of those waters. The scientists in his team—most notably Achille Tondu, Jean François Truguet (1752–1839), Jean Baptiste Lechevalier (1752–1836) and François Kauffer (c1751–1801)—taught at the new Ottoman engineering schools and published works in Turkish as well (Vagnon / Hofmann 2016, pp. 39–47; Zorlu 2011, pp. 79–80).

François Kauffer merits special mention here for the sake of this paper. He had come to Istanbul in 1776 for no more than a month in the entourage of Gouffier's famous *Voyage Pittoresque de la Grèce*. From his map of Istanbul published in 1786, it can be understood that he had also prepared a map in 1776. However, considering the limited duration of his visit, the earlier one must have been a cursory map. His second venture to Istanbul occurred in 1784, when Gouffier

was appointed ambassador. This time, Kauffer conducted a six-month triangulation survey of Istanbul in collaboration with Lechevalier, beginning in December 1785. As a consequence, a revised version of abovementioned 1776 map was published (Pedley 2012, pp. 32–36) In 1788 he published a map for the Ottomans of the northern part of their territory, annotated in both French and Turkish.

When his patron returned to France due to the French Revolution in 1789, Kauffer was stuck in a difficult situation. In 1792, after losing the Grand Vizier's letter to his patron, he was arrested and imprisoned for some time. Upon his release, he returned to Istanbul to serve the Ottoman court. However, according to recently discovered information, it appears that Kauffer served not only the Ottomans: he also sold spatial knowledge about Ottoman domains to the Russian ambassador in Istanbul for six times more than his Ottoman court earnings. Kauffer's service to Russia was not limited to his own maps and surveys—he also used his position to offer Turkish government maps and surveying reports to the Russian Empire (Frumin 2016, pp. 95–102). Meanwhile, Kauffer's former patron Gouffier was exiled to Russia, where he was warmly welcomed by Russian officers in St. Petersburg. Their excessive hospitality has raised suspicions that Gouffier may also have provided Russians with spatial knowledge. Taking into consideration that Russia and the Ottoman Empire formed an alliance in reaction to the invasion of Egypt by France in 1798, it is hard to say whether these activities constituted espionage or diplomatic maneuvers (Pedley 2012, p. 37, note 23).

The invasion of Egypt and new mapping activities

The French invasion of Egypt also gave an opportunity to the British, who sent a military mission to Istanbul in 1799 to assist the Ottomans. During this mission, the British navy examined the defensive capacity of the Dardanelles (Chasseaud / Boyle 2005, p. 50). According to the report filed by Major M. Hope, the situation was quite poor to defend the Dardanelles and, accordingly, Istanbul (Hope 1918, pp. 118–119).

The Ottoman-Russian coalition against France did not last long, and a new war between them erupted in 1806. Russia and France came together to negotiate plans to share the Ottoman domains. The Ottoman Empire in turn approached Britain, and signed the Treaty of the Dardanelles in 1809. With this treaty, Britain accepted that the Ottoman Empire had the right not to permit warships to pass through these straits (Beydilli 1992, p. 266). This treaty granted Britain its

invitation to appear onstage—and their entry heralded France's exit. French expeditions in Ottoman territories dramatically diminished. One of their few important mapping activities that warrants mention here is Antoine François Andreossy's (1761–1828) book, which was translated into English in 1818 (Lebouteiller 2016, pp. 85–87).

Meanwhile, Russia's keen interest in the area continued apace. The Ottoman Empire had abolished its Janissaries in 1826 and had been trying to reorder its army. Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839) was thus inclined to make an agreement with Russia, so as to gain time and to prevent a probable Russian assault. The Akkerman Convention treaty was signed in this context, re-asserting the right of Russian ships to pass through the Straits and sail on the Black Sea for commercial reasons (Beydilli 1992, p. 266). Russia launched an expedition under the command of Captain Egor Pavlovich (1796–1859) in the Black Sea in 1826, which lasted ten years. This expedition's output, titled *Atlas of the Black Sea*, was published in 1842, and was subsequently used for more than 30 years thereafter (Grinevetsky et al. 2015, p. 59, 511–512; Komaritsyn / Miroshnikov 2002, p. 105).

In the meantime, Britain was eager to survey the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea after establishing their presence on the region's stage by their alliance with the Ottomans. British intellectual Edmund Goodenough, writing of the British expedition conducted in 1829 on the Black Sea, noted that "Of all the waters of the deep which have been penetrated by the enterprise of British sailors, there are none so little known to us, by actual observation, as the Black Sea" (Goodenough 1831, p. 101). The situation was slightly better regarding the Sea of Marmara. In 1833, a British expedition had started in the north of the Aegean Sea under the tutelage of Thomas Graves (1802–1856). Among its team was Thomas Abel Brimage Spratt (1811–1888), who was later charged with a crucial survey of the Dardanelles and of Troy in 1840, which resulted in a map published in 1844 (Chasseaud / Boyle 2005, p. 50).

Another map of the Sea of Marmara, with the inlets of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus marked, was printed on 29 August 1840 by the publishing house of the Ottoman Navy (Günergun / Üçsu 2016, p. 154). Considering that, according to the extant records, the Ottoman navy did not conduct an independent expedition on the Sea of Marmara at that time, and that the Sea of Marmara had then yet to be adequately surveyed, we could infer either that some Ottoman officers had participated in aforementioned British expedition, or that they had acquired its results immediately thereafter and compiled this map. The Ottomans' first independent expedition on the Sea of Marmara took place under the command of Ahmet Hoca in 1841 and was completed in three years, resulting in a map in 1844 (Algül 1985, p. 64). Immediately following this expedition, Russia made an offer to the Ottoman Empire to survey the Sea of Marmara together. This survey, of




Fig. 1a State Archives of Prime Ministry BOA HRT 706

which the commander was E. P. Manganari, began in 1845 and lasted three years. The results of this expedition were published in the *Marmara Guide* and used by seamen and navies for a considerable time thereafter (Aygün 1936, pp. 63–64). (Fig. 1a and 1b)




Fig. 1b State Archives of Prime Ministry BOA HRT 706

Mapping during the Crimean War

This quiet period came to an end in 1853. Russia declared war against the Ottoman Empire on the pretext that they would protect the Christian people living in the Balkans. The deteriorating Ottoman State would not have been able to resist Russia alone. Thus, Britain and France began preparing to support the Ottomans against Russia once more. At the beginning of 1854, allied navies began surveying the Gallipoli Peninsula with the thought that they would stop Russia there. However, they were unaware of maps made previously by French and British cartographers, and made no request for Ottoman maps, since they did not appreciate the Ottoman surveyors' work. In fact, those were quite good pieces of work—thus, the allied navies' ignorance and arrogance caused them to repeat work unnecessarily (Débarre 2016, pp. 141–142). Ottoman officers, on the other hand, were keen to acquire the maps that their allies had made. For instance, during the Crimean War they immediately adapted a British map into Turkish, and translated an atlas showing the Bosphorus and the fortresses along it (Istanbul University Library, 92688 and 92924). They also ordered cartographic instruments from Vienna, with a view to mapping Crimea (BOA, A.} AMD 60.12.01).

British seamen played an important role during the Crimean War. Thomas Spratt and his team surveyed Balaklava and noted the positions of the allied fleet for the bombardment of Sevastopol (Chasseaud / Boyle 2005, pp. 50–51). Since the Russians assault on Varna instead of the Gallipoli peninsula was contrary to expectations, the surveying work finished earlier. Russia was defeated with the aid of France and Britain, and a treaty was signed in Paris in 1856. Accordingly, the Black Sea became neutral. The political atmosphere was again calm, despite Russia's dissatisfaction.

On the occasion of this peace, the Ottomans fortified the Straits and produced new maps. A manuscript map made by senior captain Nuri Efendi in the military school in 1863 combined all the cartographical resources I have mentioned so far (BOA, HRT 706). (Fig. 2a and 2b) Evidently, this map showing the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, along with Tenedos Island and Troy, is a copy of the map produced after the Ottoman-Russian joint expedition of the Marmara Sea. The depths are given in the Russian measurement unit *sazhen* as in the original map—an unusual choice since their equivalent values in British feet was more useful. In the legend, some symbols are also written in French. As it turns out, Nuri Efendi did not want to lose time by calculating all of the depth values in another unit, so he instead stated the foot equivalent of one *sazhen*. This was probably intended to ease the map's reading and comparisons for Ottoman naval officers, who were presumably using British maps, since they had



Fig. 2a State Archives of Prime Ministry BOA HRT 706

their education from British officers. As for the French symbols in the legend, this is likely because the first modern cartography teachers of Ottoman officers were French, and as such they had learned the basic rules and technical terms of map-making from them.



Fig. 2b State Archives of Prime Ministry BOA HRT 709

Preparations for a new concept

The Russian Empire took the opportunity to deny the conditions of the Paris treaty by exploiting the instability caused by the German-French war 1870. In response to this, the Ottoman Grand Vizier Âli Pasha (1815–1871) approached Britain and a conference was organized in London in 1871, which abolished the neutrality of Black Sea and gave the Ottomans the right to permit ships of allied navies to sail on it whenever they wished. This was a very important advantage for the Ottoman Empire and a new threat for Russia (Beydilli 1992, p. 267). Subsequently, British commander William J. L. Wharton (1843–1905) led his ship towards the Sea of Marmara, surveyed a small portion of its western part and explored the strong under currents running counter to the surface currents (Dawson 1885, p. 153).

In this context, a second international geographical congress was organized in 1875. All the actors in the 'play' were there to exhibit their geographical productions. However, Russia was the only country exhibiting artifacts concerning the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara. They exhibited Manganari's aforementioned atlases and maps, alongside some earlier maps (Fournier 1875, p. 16). The absence of newly produced maps at this congress seems to imply that they tried to hide their recent knowledge of those seas in the lead-up to the approaching war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. This war erupted in 1877 and lasted almost one year. France and Britain only tried to stop this war from afar. The Ottoman Empire was overwhelmed. Russia sought advantages from their absolute victory, but Britain's position ensured the conditions of 1871 London Congress (Beydilli 1992, p. 268).

After this war, the Ottoman State was now well enough aware that its existence was at risk. Hence, it produced and copied new maps of the Sea of Marmara, the Black Sea, and the Straits. An atlas of the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea consisting of 47 charts was published in the publishing house of the Ottoman Navy in 1878 (Ülkekel 2009, pp. 80–82). Meanwhile, a new British expedition on the Sea of Marmara was run by Captain William Wharton from 1879 to 1880 (Dawson 1885, pp. 188–189). He elaborated the map made in the early nineteenth century by Thomas Graves and Thomas Spratt (Istanbul University Library, 93432). The rocks he circumnavigated in the Sea of Marmara are named after him as the 'Vortonoz Rockies'.

From then on, Britain shifted its attention from the Ottoman territory to the emerging power of Germany, while nevertheless continuing to keep an eye on the 'Eastern Question' (Chasseaud / Boyle 2005, p. 55). The Russian Empire conducted a physical exploration of the Black Sea in 1890 and 1891 and produced charts

(Andrusoff 1893, p. 49). In 1892 the Ottoman government sent a team to survey and fortify the Straits under the direction of Henri Alexis Brialmont, a Belgian general—but this mission produced no maps (Kış 2015, pp. 365–373).

Concluding/opening remarks

The year of 1895 was another landmark for Ottoman cartography: an independent cartography office was founded within the army. Additionally, the political atmosphere changed in a way that would eventually lead to the First World War. These two phenomena combined to herald a different era in cartographic production (Özkale ve Şenler 1980, p. 51).

In essence, the ‘long’ nineteenth century that I have highlighted here witnessed many alliances, treaties and enmities in the context of the ‘Eastern Question’. All of the actors taking part in the ‘Balance of Power’ play that dealt with this question needed profound knowledge of the Marmara Sea, the Black Sea and the Straits. Motivated by a lack of knowledge of this geographical unit, and powered by progress in modern science and technology, a hefty production of cartographical knowledge was accomplished throughout this period. However, these productive map-making activities entailed their share of coalitions and hostilities. The production output of each country fluctuated according to their relations with the other actors. Therefore, even though I have given an overview of this ‘long’ nineteenth century by touching upon its essential activities and the fruits it bore, this period in history nevertheless serves to corroborate Yves Lacoste’s famous statement ‘La géographie, ça sert, d’abord, à faire la guerre’ (‘Geography is used, first and foremost, to make war’).

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Rıdvan Turhan

The Effect of Dependency Theory on Discussions of ‘Underdevelopment’ in Turkey

Abstract: Since the establishment of the Republic regime in 1923, one of the main discussion topics of intellectuals and of people who govern in Turkey has been ‘development’. Even though these two groups mostly had different approaches with respect to development strategy, they had a common belief that development would be achieved through industrialization. In a similar manner, the suggestions for development strategy put forward by different intellectual circles were not homogeneous. Despite all their differences, the clarity of Western paradigms forms the common point of these suggestions. Even the theoretic endeavors that have the claims of authenticity and of being domestic are not free from this effect. Approaches that try to understand and explain underdevelopment in Turkey within the theoretical frame of ‘dependency theory’ constitute one of the most typical examples of this.

Introduction

In this essay, I aim to examine the approach of Turkish intellectuals to the problematic assessment of underdevelopment and development that has been one of the main discussion topics throughout the history of the Republic, with respect to its relation with ‘dependency theory’, which was popularized in Turkey after 1960. The essay consists of three sections. In first chapter, the main claims of dependency theory, which are manifested in the context of historical studies in Latin America, will be presented with respect to their criticisms of existing progress/development strategies. Even though dependency theory was effective in 1960s, it is predicable that the theses (about underdevelopment, dependency and development strategies) of the authors of *Kadro Dergisi* (*Kadro* [Cadre] *Journal*) in first half of 1930s in Turkey foreshadowed the theses of dependency theory in some ways. Hence, the second section will deal with the resemblance between the theses of dependency theory and of *Kadro Journal* and the possible sources of this resemblance. In the third section, I will discuss the effect of de-

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pendency theory on the literature of underdevelopment and development in 1960s Turkey.

A brief history of dependency theory

During the post World War II era, ‘modernization theory’—the theoretical frame of the USA’s process of organizing intersocietal relations—defined the status of being underdeveloped not as the opposite of being developed/advanced, but as the state of not entirely appearing as such. According to this theory, the difference between underdeveloped societies and developed societies was just one phase; underdeveloped societies could also develop if they carefully analyzed the phases that developed societies went through and followed the same route.¹ This theory, which had held influence in the 1950s and 60s, was the subject of staggering criticisms after the late 60s, and lost its being dominant appeal soon thereafter. In this period, hectic criticism was being leveled at the negative sides of capitalist industrialism and development plans, which failed to ensure economic growth. These criticisms, which were intensely salient in the texts first of several Latin American authors, then of social scientists such as Andre Gunder Frank and Paul Baran, uncovered the frame that became known as ‘dependency theory’ (Altun 2005, p. 13).

Dependency theory, which can also be identified as harmonically increasing the voice of the Third World, became the dominant point of view in many countries that are identified as underdeveloped—particularly Latin American countries in the 1970s. The main objective of the theory is to put forth the idea that the dependence of Latin American countries (or more generally, countries identified as underdeveloped) on other countries cannot be overcome without a qualitative change in the former’s microstructures and foreign affairs. Dependence indicates that certain countries’ economies are conditioned by the development and expansion of economics to which they are subjected. According to the theory, while two or more economies and the relationships of dependence between them and world trade evolve for the benefit of the dominant ones, the dependent ones can only execute this development as the reflection of others’ evolution (Dos Santos 1970, p. 231).

It can be asserted that the dependency theory, as briefly identified above within the scope of its objective and key notion, is fundamentally nourished

¹ W.W. Rostow’s work titled *The Stages of Economic Growth* (subtitled “A Non-Communist Manifesto”) is the presentation of this belief with the claim of being scientific.

from two different sources: structuralism and Marxism. The approach of structuralism was developed by Raul Prebisch and Celso Furtado. Both philosophers agree that de facto economy is not proficient enough to explain the Latin America truth. Prebisch, who held the presidency between 1950 and 1963 of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) subsidiary to United Nations, states that the international division of labor scheme is not valid in its indication that the specific role of Latin America among the order of world economies is producing raw material for industrial centers. Prebisch presents that center and periphery countries don't benefit from technical developments equally, and demonstrates with empirical data that there was a decreasing ratio of end item price to raw materials price from the 1860s to the end of World War II. Thus, he claims that in this relationship, industrialized countries are always the main beneficiaries and international trade always works against underdeveloped countries. Briefly, according to Prebisch, who handled the developing problem associatively with international trading, there is a close link between economic progress and foreign trading. This economic situation in which Latin America finds itself can be only understood through this relationship (Prebisch 1950, pp. 8–14).

The main concept of Paul Baran, who is one of the most important representatives of the Marxist approach that influenced dependency theory, considers the reason for underdevelopment is *exploitation*. According to Baran underdeveloped countries that provide raw materials and investment areas to developed capitalist countries always represent an essential hinterland for the West. That is the exact reason why the exploitation of underdeveloped countries played a vital role in the development of capitalism in West. Baran openly identifies Western European countries as looters and freebooters when he explains this exploitative relationship. This exploitation was hidden behind the curtain of trade while the West stole the world's treasure from everywhere within its reach (Baran 1957, p. 142). In this way, a big portion of the economic surplus created in those countries that were exposed to exploitation was transferred to the West, and the exploited countries' chance to build up an accumulation of capital was taken away (Baran 1957, pp. 142–143). In this framework, Baran states that economic development in underdeveloped countries contrasts with advanced capitalist countries' economic interests. In other words, according to Baran the price of capitalist development is the others' not being able to grow (Baran 1957, p. 162).

Thanks to the work of Andre Gunder Frank, who shared Baran's point of view on development and underdevelopment topics, dependency theory became popular worldwide in the 1970s. Frank was impressed by Baran's conceptual framework correlating the feature of being developed and underdeveloped directly with capitalism. According to Frank, the historical development of capital-

ism as a whole system has a critical importance for the comprehension of these facts. In other words, the reasons for these facts of development and underdevelopment should be sought through the dialectic of this total system. When the historical development of capitalism is inspected in this frame, it can be seen that cases of development and underdevelopment came to light as a result of some inner contradictions. The West's development and others' underdevelopment throughout historical processes arose because of the West's exploitation others and usurping economic surplus values. In other words, capitalism rose on others' devastation. This situation is the first contradiction that Frank underlines. The second contradiction to which he drew attention is the hierarchical structure on the world scale that capitalism created. He explains this hierarchical structure with metropolis and satellite concepts, and links the development of the metropolis to its withdrawing of the economic surplus from satellites and using it for its own development. As a result, satellites can't use their economic surplus for their own development and hence remain underdeveloped. Frank didn't limit this analysis of metropolis-satellite to international relations—he says that capitalism embeds this contradiction into each satellite's internal economy and hence a similar polarization is also created within the satellite (Frank 1966, pp. 17–31).

Dependency theory, which takes its shape and main theses from its aforementioned important representatives, develops a method of analysis that plots broader external factors and the international capitalist system against the progress perspective, which links the reasons for underdevelopment to internal, specific conditions. It draws attention to the imperialist relations between countries, asymmetrical relations between classes and unequal trading relations. Dependency theory was effective in the 1960s and 1970s, especially in third world countries defined as underdeveloped, and deeply affected the analyses put forward by intellectuals in those countries in the context of subject matters like dependency on imperialism, problems of development and the reasons for underdevelopment.

In this context, dependency theory was also effective in Turkey as an account of the global capitalist system, and as a challenge to that system, or at least an endeavor of changing the balance of power within it. In the 1960s, the theory led the searches by various Turkish intellectuals for a strategy by which to understand their country's economic and social structure, and to overcome underdevelopment. But even before the 1960s—in fact, already at the beginning of 1930s—a group of intellectuals who had started to publish the *Kadro Journal*, asserted theses very similar to dependency theory on subject matters like the development of capitalism, development, underdevelopment and dependency on imperialism. In the following chapter, the similarities and differen-

ces between the theses of dependency theory and those asserted in *Kadro Journal* will be discussed.

Discussions of imperialism, dependency theory and *Kadro Journal*²

The modern Republic of Turkey was established in 1923 after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. One of the main problems facing the new government, which retained no economic legacy from the Ottoman one, was how economic development would take place. When the effects of the Great Depression—which manifested before even 10 years had passed since the establishment of modern Turkey—added to the existing economic problems, and the problem of economic development became the most important discussion topic of the intelligentsia and the people who governed. While trying to construct a new ideological frame for the Turkish revolution according to the genuine conditions of the era, a group of intellectuals who started to publish *Kadro Journal* in the first half of the 1930s emphasized the need for a new development strategy and alleged authentic and extensive opinions about this matter. Their theoretic frame didn't just include Turkey, and they discussed the facts that had universal aspects—such as national liberation movements, the crisis of 1929, capitalism, colonialism, dependency on imperialism and the historical reasons for underdevelopment—with respect to their endeavors of determining Turkey's position within the international system. It is thus predicable that there are critical resemblances between their theses and those of dependency theory.

While a total overlapping of these two doctrines is beside the point, their delivered perspectives on the subjects of dependency on imperialism, reasons for underdevelopment, progress of capitalism and the exploiter-exploited contrast

² *Kadro Journal* was published between 1932–1934 by an intellectual group whose founding members were Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, Vedat Nedim Tör, Burhan Asaf Belge and Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu. Apart from Karaosmanoğlu, the mentality of the group's members was significantly influenced by Marxism. The *Journal*, which was published in the times when discussions of development and statism were most intensive, didn't just join the ideological and economic discussions, but also undertook as its agenda to give Turkish revolution a theoretical frame by interpreting it. *Kadro* was shut down by Atatürk, who didn't lean toward any idea of modernization other than his own. Hence *Kadro Journal* passed into history as a concrete example in which the pathological relation between Turkish intellectual and state can be traced. For further information about *Kadro Journal*, see: Türkeş 1998, pp. 92–119; Türkeş 1999, pp. 47–68.

are all analogous to one another. All these facts are the cornerstones of the theoretic frame of the *Kadro* movement. In its totality, this theoretic frame considers each fact as taken on the basis of its causal relation with the other. The international aspect of this approach—which can also be seen as a macro theoretical endeavor—is built on the qualitative differences and contradictions between industrialized countries and non-industrialized ones. In this contradiction, defined by Burhan Asaf Belge³ as the relation of metropolis-exploited, non-industrialization/underdevelopment of some countries relates to exploitation by Western imperialism, just as in dependency theory (Belge 1934, p. 38). At the center of the doctrine's national aspect were the national independence wars. *Kadro* claimed to offer the scientific explanation of all national independence wars, including the Turkish one. In this context, its authors claimed that the theory of revolution in Turkey hadn't been established, and that for the revolution to reach success required that the objective acts of this movement must be known and its ideology created. According to Şevket Süreyya Aydemir,⁴ who was the lead ideologist of *Kadro*, Turkish revolution was a national independence movement, and national independence movements were the main decisive progresses of twentieth century (Aydemir 1932, pp. 6–12). The future of both the Turkish revolution and the international order was bound to the scientific explanation of these movements. This is the main object and claim of the *Kadro* movement.

3 Belge was one of the students sent to Germany in service of the Turkish-German Friendship Association established in the atmosphere of World War I. While studying architecture there, he met with the Spartacist movement led by Rosa Luxemburg and leaned toward socialist thought. In 1923, he returned to Turkey for good. In 1928 he wrote columns in the *Hakimiyet'i Milliye* newspaper that had an organic connection with the new regime. In 1931, at the same newspaper, he met the other authors of *Kadro*—Aydemir, Tör and Karaosmanoğlu—and while analyzing the huge economic collapse of 1929, he began to search for ways to get out of the crisis. Eventually, this endeavor turned into the idea of publishing a journal: this journal was *Kadro* (Yıldız 2011, pp. 29–59).

4 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1897–1976) was the child of a landless peasant and studied to become a teacher. In 1919, upon the Azerbaijan government demanding teachers from Turkey, he went to the Nuha district. He attended the Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku in 1920, and as a Nuha teacher representative he met with members of the Turkish Communist Party based there. Influenced by their anti-colonialist vision, he began to lean toward socialism. From 1921–1923, he studied at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow. During his time in Baku and Moscow, he followed the discussions (that included names like Lenin, Trotsky and Zinoviev) about how to struggle against Western imperialism. Throughout this process, one of the most important issues that bothered Aydemir was how the peoples of the east would be freed of Western imperialism's oppression. For Aydemir's biography and the progression of his thoughts, see: Aydemir 1965; 2003.

The authors of *Kadro* used historical materialism as a method while building such an assertive and extensive theory, and brought it into connection with Marxist theory. But it must be said that this connection is a limited one. The theoretic authenticity of the authors of *Kadro* becomes evident at this point. According to *Kadro*, even though the historical materialism based on the class struggle was functional for understanding Western European societies in nineteenth century, it is insufficient for understanding national liberation wars. Hence, historical materialism is taken as a method independent from Marxist theory. Even though this approach doesn't mesh with the main principles of Marxist theory, this did not concern the authors of *Kadro*. Besides, this is not the only point on which they differ from Marxist theory. Even though they accepted that Marx had made the most thorough analyses of capitalism (Belge 1932, p. 29), they nevertheless criticized those analyses. They contended that Marx was wrong to say that capitalist accumulation occurred by means of exploitation of the working class. The *Kadro* authors instead primarily base the development of capitalism upon colonialism (Tökin 1934c, p. 17–21; Aydemir 1933, p. 5–10). In other words, accumulation of capital is based upon the exploitation of other countries *before* the exploitation of the immediate producer, who turned into the wageworker. In this process, capitalist accumulation took place in Europe beginning with the exploration of America in fifteenth century (Aydemir 1933, pp. 5–10). This emphasized precedence of colonialism with respect to the development of capitalism is the second main point shared by the theses of *Kadro* and dependency theory. Accordingly, the development of capitalism didn't cause interclass contradiction to become universalized, as Marx claimed, but instead caused colonialism to locate itself across the world, and the contradiction between exploited countries and exploiter countries to become universalized. So according to the *Kadro* authors, the national independence movements of the twentieth century emerged as a result of this contradiction.

As can be seen, the *Kadro* authors adopted a dialectical approach when explaining historical progress; but on the other hand, they construct their theory on the axis of their discussions—implicit or explicit—of Marx. In this context, they claim that the contradiction between exploited and exploiter countries (which they determine as the decisive element of twentieth century) wouldn't resolve with class struggle, as Marx had alleged. The *Kadro* authors replace the class struggle—a key concept of Marxist theory—with national independence wars (Aydemir 1932, pp. 7–12; Belge 1934a, pp. 28). In developing an alternative approach to Marx with regard to explaining historical progress, they again foreshadowed dependency theory. The unequal distribution of modern technology that emerged worldwide with industrial revolution is one of the main points that the *Kadro* authors underlined, as would dependency theory three decades

later. According to the *Kadro* authors, unequal distribution of modern technology changed the structure of production and international tradership, after which the economies of non-industrial countries began to be transferred to the metropolises of Europe. This process not only hindered the progress of non-industrialized countries, but also began the process of exploitation (Tökin 1932, pp. 19–32; Belge 1933, pp. 22–28).

Aydemir emphasized that for this unequal structure to be destroyed, ‘the relations of dependency’ between industrialized and non-industrialized countries should first be destroyed (Aydemir 2003, pp. 43). According to the *Kadro* authors, this unequal structure can be made to disappear by establishing modern techniques in countries that succeed in their national independence wars (rather than by class struggle within the capitalist system), and the main contradictions that emerge at the international level can thus be resolved.⁵ The suggestion of the *Kadro* authors for establishing modern techniques in these countries is clear: instead of the chaotic production structure based on the private enterprise system of capitalism, a planned development model in which the government is the engine should be adopted as a development strategy that won’t cause any class differentiations or class struggle. More clearly, they suggested a development strategy that wasn’t capitalist. But it should be mentioned that it was not socialism either. Among the *Kadro* authors, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin,⁶ who evinced the most advanced analyses of class structure in Turkey, clearly mentions that a socialist development model can’t be applied to Turkey because it didn’t have a developed working class like those in the West (Tökin 1934a, pp. 34–37; Tökin 1934b, pp. 20–26). Another *Kadro* author, Vedat Nedim Tör,⁷ took things one

⁵ They also mention that the 1929 economical crisis created a good opportunity for non-industrialized countries like Turkey: it prompted industrialized countries to undersell their companies, the purchase of which could help Turkey to make a move to become industrialized. According to Mustafa Türkeş, the *Kadro* authors expressed these theses thirty years in advance of dependency theory (Türkeş 2001b, pp. 464–476).

⁶ İsmail Hüsrev Tökin (1902–1994), who was a child of a middle class family, had graduated from an Austrian high school in Istanbul. In 1922, he decided to study in Moscow with a scholarship granted by the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Turkey, and enrolled in the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. There he met with Marxist concepts like historical materialism, capital and surplus value, and with the works of Marx, Lenin and Buharin. After graduating, he stayed in Moscow until 1926 and continued his education in economics (Tökin 1990; Türkeş 2001a).

⁷ Vedat Nedim Tör (1897–1985) graduated from Galatasaray High School in 1916 and went to Germany to study economics. In 1922, he wrote a PhD dissertation titled *Turkey, Being Subjected to Imperialism*. Tör mentions in his memoirs that he met with the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Kautsky and Sombart during his time in Berlin.

step further, claiming that Turkey would build a classless society by overcoming the capitalist and socialist experiences (without living these experiences), and stating that history refutes Marx (Tör 1933, p. 24). If we remember that dependency theory saw socialism as its development model, it should be noted that this is the most essential theoretical point on which the *Kadro* authors and the 'dependency school' differ.

With respect to this endeavor, the *Kadro* authors, who were ultimately trying to create the ideology of the Turkish revolution that took place after the national war of independence, built an extensive and complicated theory around how Turkey would develop away from being an underdeveloped country dependent on imperialism, and how the economic development would be established. The *Kadro* movement can be seen as an endeavor to understand the world system and Turkey's place in it; for them, dependency on imperialism as a critical factor in the matter of development constituted the central problem of an extensive and systematic theory for the first time in Turkey. In this context, it can be claimed that the *Kadro* authors alleged in the 1930s rather similar theses to those of the dependency school (which appeared in 1960s), with regard to subjects like the progress of capitalism, colonialism, underdevelopment, unequal distribution of modern technology, metropolis-exploited contradiction and dependency on imperialism.⁸ In the 1930s, the *Kadro* authors contributed new topics of discussion to development literature, especially in Turkey. Their ideological approach became a source for understanding socialism in various underdeveloped countries in that particular era. In the 1960s, this ideology found its counterpart in Turkey in the *Yön hareketi* ['*Yön* movement'], lead by Doğan Avcıoğlu. In the following chapter, the effects of dependency theory in Turkey between 1960 and 1980 will be discussed, placing the *Yön* movement at the center of this discussion.

An endeavor of macro theory to overcome underdevelopment: The *Yön* movement

In the 1960s, even though almost half a century had passed since the foundation of modern Turkey, its development still didn't measure up. Underdevelopment and the problem of how to develop were still the most important discussion top-

⁸ The main reason for these theoretical similarities can be shown to be that both the *Kadro* authors and those of the dependency school read and were influenced by the same intellectual sources, such as Marx, Engels, Lenin, Buharin and Luxemburg.

ics occupying both social scientists and those who govern. This topic's centrality was of course related to more than just the condition of Turkey's development not measuring up. In the 1960s, the global rising of the left wing found its counterpart in Turkey, and the political and financial dependency on West—especially on the USA—began to be questioned radically.⁹ This questioning also touched on the huge social transformation occurring in Turkey during these years. Since the 1950s, industrialization and urbanization in Turkey had been rapidly growing, and in parallel to this, contradictions between social classes (which are peculiar to modern capitalism) were sharpening, and unfairness in distribution of income was increasing. All these developments had turned Turkey into an unusual arena for social and political struggle. In these conditions, especially subjects like development, apportionment and economic order, underdevelopment, imperialism and dependency set the agenda in the social sciences.

In the 1960's, dependency theory presented a convenient frame for Turkish intellectuals who were trying to explain in details these matters that set Turkey's intellectual agenda. These effects can be clearly seen acting on the authors of the *Yön Dergisi* [*Yön Journal*],¹⁰ also known as the 'Yön movement' in Turkish social science circles. In his *magnum opus* titled *Türkiye'nin Düzeni*¹¹ [*Order of Turkey*], Doğan Avcıoğlu,¹² who was one of the founders of the movement, makes connec-

9 In the 1960s, one of the most important features of the Turkish economy was its dependency on foreign capital. But it must be said that this dependency met the needs of the consumer goods industry (Bulutoğlu 1970, p. 162).

10 The *Yön Journal*, published weekly between 20 December 1961 and 30 June 1967, is seen as one of the most important intellectual movements. The *Yön Journal*, published articles about Turkey's economical, social and political progress, covering two hundred years of progress from the seventeenth century to mid-1967. Among its authors wide-ranging interests, it can be said that topics like the historical reasons of underdevelopment, development strategies, third world countries, dependency on imperialism and socialism in Turkey stand out. For further information on *Yön Journal*, see: Özdemir 1986.

11 *Türkiye'nin Düzeni* [*The Order of Turkey*] incited reactions to its handling of economical, social and political subject matters. Published in 1968, it was a popular work that corresponds to the search for a common left wing thought among young generations until the end of the 1970s. The work, which reached its 13th printing within 10 years, argumentatively examines the historical roots of Turkey's underdevelopment and its dependency on imperialism, and offers a rapid, non-capitalist, nationalist-revolutionist development model by which Turkey might overcome this dependency.

12 Doğan Avcıoğlu (1926–1983), after studying political sciences and economics in France, returned to Turkey in 1955 and worked as a research assistant in the Public Administration Institute for Turkey and Middle East, which was founded based on a technical assistance agreement between Turkey and the United Nations. He wrote for dissident media organs when the Democratic Party was in power, and participated in the group commissioned to prepare the 1961 con-

tions between underdevelopment and dependency on imperialism, referring to the works of Furtado and Baran, and presents analyses that correspond to the theses of dependency theory. In this context, Avcıoğlu, who defines Turkey as a country under the oppression of imperialism, links the growing difference (in progress) between Turkey and the West to a couple of external historical events. The West, with its geographical explorations connected to colonialist pillage, expedited its accumulation of capital, and with the driving force of the class that made this accumulation possible, the pre-capitalist order was dissolved and merchant capitalism (developed within that order) gave way to industrial capitalism. Avcıoğlu stated that the balance of power between East and West went in the West's favor, and mentions that Turkey was affected by this process: roles had changed in the world system, Turkey had lost its limited supervision over international tradership and the structure of commerce within Europe had shifted (Avcıoğlu 1969, pp. 105–106). He highlights the trading deal signed in England in 1838 as turning Turkey into Europe's open market and raw material store, and thus preventing development, which is only possible if the economy moves along its own path (Avcıoğlu 1968, pp. 50–53). According to Avcıoğlu, if Turkey—as one of the most developed countries in its heyday—hadn't come under the oppression of imperialism, it possessed the features that could have enabled it to initiate industrial capitalism before Western societies did (cf. Baran 1957, pp. 139–141). But Turkish society stumbled, restrained by the West, and never had the chance to develop set against a Western capitalism entering the imperial stage; and so Turkey created a semi-colonized order dependent on European imperialism. Thus, Avcıoğlu clearly states that Turkey is not an underdeveloped country but *a country whose development was hindered by imperialism* (Avcıoğlu 1968, p. 106).

In the 1960s, the relation between dependency on imperialism and development propounded by intellectuals in *Yön Journal* overlapped with the theses put forward by dependency theory. In his efforts to enhance the perspective on dependency and underdevelopment, Avcıoğlu especially used Baran's *The Political Economy of Growth*. Baran's identification of economic surplus as one of the most important elements determining underdevelopment also has critical importance in Avcıoğlu's work. Avcıoğlu states that even though the crofter, the sharecropper and the agricultural worker were the main creators of national revenue, they were entitled to consume a very small portion of what they produce. The

stitution. He was the lead author of *Yön Journal* and one of the most influential intellectual personalities of the era. He passionately defended the idea of a socially and financially independent Turkey and the principle of anti-imperialism—not just in his writings for *Yön Journal*, but throughout his life (Macar 2001, pp. 162–169).

bigger portion of the economic surplus went to the proprietors, usurers and middlemen. On this point, Avcioğlu especially pointed towards the Rûm and Armenian minority groups who exported Anatolian farmers' products. Just like proprietors and usurers, those Rûms and Armenians (Avcioğlu defines them as compradors) also used the economic surplus they gained by their mediation for luxury consumption rather than for investment. According to Avcioğlu, these groups wasted the main sources of economy, thus obstructing the development, and were the weak collaborators in the coalition of conservative powers in cooperation with imperialism. The strong collaborator of this coalition was the industrial bourgeoisie. The industrial class rising in Turkey, as distinct from the one in Western societies, didn't have the ability to play a progressive role in development. On the contrary, it was in alliance with the abovementioned undeveloped class of the pre-capitalist order, which refused the change of order. Hence a coalition of conservative dominant classes consisting of industrialists, usurers, squires and comprador minority groups was detected as the prevailing power of the Turkish economy (Avcioğlu 1968, pp. 402–412).

Avcioğlu's analyses of imperialism's class structure is rounded out by a definition of the international aspects of dependency relations. Developed capitalist countries (the USA foremost among them) and their companies were the strong allies of this coalition that defended the status quo. For this coalition, the USA, as well as being a source of enrichment through foreign capital and partnership, was a safety fuse against revolutionist tendencies. Such alliances aimed at protecting the status quo were constructed within all the undeveloped countries within the USA's orbit. Avcioğlu, referring to the works of Furtado, mentions Mexico as one of the most brilliant examples of the American model of development, and emphasizes that even though there were foreign investments and millions of dollars of capital transferred to this country, development was still not achieved and Mexico remained an underdeveloped country (Avcioğlu 1968, pp. 466–473). Hence Avcioğlu states that because of such dependency relations, which appear both on the international and the domestic level, enterprises of capitalist development weren't and never will be successful—in Turkey or in any other country.

Avcioğlu's views, summarized above, can actually be seen as a frame of an analysis that emphasizes the historical perspective. He explains Turkey's underdevelopment in terms of dependency on imperialism, while emphasizing the relations between domestic and foreign structures. Avcioğlu clarifies the nationalist-revolutionist model of development that he believes should be adopted for development to be achieved. According to this model, the capitalist development model should first be abandoned and new colonialist dependency relations (in which capitalist countries are dominant) should be terminated such that their

bases within the country would fail. Thus, the sources that are wasted in the hands of the coalition of conservative powers that is dominant in tradership and industry should rapidly be nationalized. While agriculture should lean on huge cooperative farms, non-agricultural land should be subjected to public economic organizations (Avcioğlu 1968, pp. 477–492). The details of his explanation also clearly reveal Avcioğlu's understanding of development: by development, what is meant is *industrialization*. According to this nationalist-revolutionist development model, to be applied by a leading revolutionist party, a big portion of the financial sources should be used for establishing heavy industries. Turkey would thus develop, overcoming its dependency on imperialist countries by achieving economic independence within 15–20 years, and would reach the level of contemporary civilizations that Atatürk—the founder of the Republic—had determined as the main goal (Avcioğlu 1968, p. 508).

The relation between underdevelopment and dependency also has central importance for other authors of *Yön Journal*. According to Erol Ulubelen, imperialism makes countries that have yet to complete their industrialization fall into its clutches by means of tradership and financial aid, and exploits them in both material and nonmaterial ways. This exploitation is not just limited to the transfer of economic surplus from underdeveloped peripheries to advanced capitalist countries; it also includes the transfer of a qualified work force, specialized in areas like medicine and engineering. The mission of the comprador class in the aforementioned dependency relations in underdeveloped countries is also an important and decisive element in Ulubelen's analysis (Ulubelen 1966, p. 12).

İdris Küçükömer explains the reasons for underdevelopment in terms of international tradership. After World War I, prices of industrial products rose to the detriment of raw material's prices, and the limits of foreign trading went in favor of developed countries. Thus, world foreign trade turned into a mechanism for robbing the undeveloped countries that were trying to become industrialized by exporting raw material. Under these circumstances, the way of development that was offered to undeveloped countries was, according to Küçükömer, both utopic and to their detriment. He emphasizes that firstly, the dependency relations present in foreign trading should be annihilated. After that, he states that an endeavor of industrialization with its trust placed in the domestic market is necessary for Turkey to develop (Küçükömer 1964, p. 10).

Fellow *Yön* author Fethi Naci, who drew attention for his aggressive discourse, states that imperialism—which he defines as a special, historical phase of capitalism and as a monopolist capitalism—turned Turkey into a semi-colonized country (Naci 1965b, p. 16). According to Naci, this process had started with the trading deal signed in 1838 in England, which opened the

wide Ottoman market to Western European capitalism. The Ottoman Empire was weakened politically and economically, leading to its collapse after World War I, after which Western imperialist countries virtually occupied Anatolia. Even though the Turkish national war of independence that began with this occupation had an anti-imperialist character, Turkey became a country dependent on imperialist powers once again after World War II (Naci 1965c, pp. 8–9). Imperialism was exploiting Turkey's sources and by transferring economic surplus, it was blocking the accumulation of capital. Also, by putting up the prices for the goods sold to Turkey, and cutting down the prices of agricultural products bought from Turkey, it was robbing Turkey and forcing it to trade only with capitalist countries (Naci 1965a, p. 5).

According to Naci, after World War II economical foreign aid from capitalist countries to underdeveloped ones were a new form of imperialism. Naci, who states that it seemed impossible for Turkey to overcome its dependency on imperialist powers with the existing foreign politics and method of economy at the time of his writing (Naci 1964a, p. 10), concludes that the only available way to achieve true independence is through a development that isn't capitalist, and that trusts in its own resources rather than in foreign investments and aids. He explains that the first precautions to be taken are the nationalization of foreign monopolies, developing the public sector, planned economy, and industrial and agricultural reforms (Naci 1965d, pp. 8–9). However, Naci doesn't forget to mention that he doesn't mean *socialism* by a development that is 'not capitalist'—because socialism is only possible through achieving true independence in underdeveloped countries, by democracy becoming functional in society, and by the rapid spreading of advanced methods of production that are not inherently capitalist. Thus, the development model that Naci suggests seeks to both overcome dependency and to clear the way leading to socialism (Naci 1964b, p. 6).

Niyazi Berkes emphasizes that examining the process of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire should reveal the reasons for Turkey's underdevelopment, moving the search's frame back to the seventeenth century (Berkes 1965, p. 12). He connects the underdevelopment of Turkey with the rise of modern capitalism in the West. In this context, Ottoman history is defined as a process of decline and dissolution under the effects of Western development. Like his *Yön* colleagues, Berkes considers the 1838 Trade Agreement as a breaking point. The agreement led to the dissolution of many Turkish industrial branches, foremost among them the cotton industry, and hence to Turkey's dependence on imperialist nations (Berkes 1970, pp. 370–372). According to Berkes, the underdevelopment of Turkey can't be explained away as an idiosyncrasy of Eastern society, as alleged by modernization theories, but must instead be understood as intercon-

nected with dependency (Berkes 1966, pp. 12–13). Therefore, he defines imperialism as one of the fundamental determinants that restrained social and economic progress in Turkey, rendering those endeavors inefficient or detrimental (Berkes 1963b, pp. 7–8). Consequently, he states that Turkey must eliminate reactionist factors in the country that collaborate with imperialist powers, and must abolish its dependency on those powers in international relations, in order to actualize social and economic progress (Berkes 1963c, pp. 8–9).

Conclusion

As stated above, the subject of development has been of fundamental concern to Turkish intellectuals since the constitution of Turkey. Associating Turkey's underdevelopment with imperialism was not an unfamiliar perspective, as evidence by *Kadro Journal's* authors. However, in the 1950s, development discussions in Turkey came under the influence of modernization theory, the framework of which was established by W. W. Rostow. This paradigmatic effect can be observed clearly in the social sciences, especially in discussions of agriculture and urban planning. The left-wing intellectuals gathered in *Yön Journal* criticized this linear/unilateral perspective for its emphasis on the effects and importance of inner dynamics for development, in contrast to dependency theory. They reinitialized discussion of underdevelopment and imperialism with their synthesis of various approaches into the form of dependency theory. Avcıoğlu—the most important theoretician of the *Yön* movement—reproduced the arguments from both neo-Marxist and structuralist factions pursuant to Turkey's underdevelopment. The other *Yön* authors mentioned above were also diligent agents of a similar endeavor of synthesis. Therefore it can be stated that the essential references of their domain of thought come from Western paradigms, even though they claim their analyses to be peculiar to Turkey.

The modalities regarding this phenomenon of rejecting underdevelopment as a state of nature (explained by modernization theoreticians as simply a 'delay') have held an important place in treatises on left-wing development in 1960s Turkey. Nevertheless, it is an exacting task to find in this body of work any radical investigation of development itself; analysis of the causes, factors and historical backgrounds of underdevelopment or progression take center stage. There is notable attitude of agreement among the writers of the *Kadro* and especially of *Yön* journal on the subject of development and on the explanation this phenomenon (industrialization); where they differ is on the proposed methods to achieve the determined objectives. From this point on, development gains a contested character and thus any interrogation of the subject becomes

impossible. This situation, which can be called an epistemological imprudence, resulted in the unquestioned acceptance of the hypotheses related to the subject of development. *Yön Journal* authors in particular clearly express that their means of development is through industrialization itself.

As detailed above, underdeveloped or oppressed Turkey was considered to be able to reach the level of contemporary Western civilizations aimed at by Atatürk only based on its degree of independence from imperialism through industrialization. At this point, the paradoxical structure of all these debates referring to dependency theory becomes more evident. The theories that are put forward are so contradictory: on the one hand, the ‘delay’ argument of modernization theory is being criticized; while on the other hand, the competition metaphor, the traditional-modern duality and a typology of societies sorted according to their development levels within a linear course of history are preserved intact.

Then in all these analyses, just as in dependency theory, what is considered undeveloped is still being defined according to the West. The main cornerstone of these acts of definition is the perception of the phases of development and social formation undergone by the West. In other words, in these analyses, a Eurocentric approach dominates. It seems to have escaped these authors’ notice that even characterizing one country as developed and another as underdeveloped means positioning them within the very same paradigm as the modernization theory that they criticized, and accepting the same presuppositions of linearity/unidirectionality. Hence it can be said that both *Kadro* and *Yön* authors, while they were producing ideas about Turkey’s economic and political *dependency*, despite their claim of authenticity, were *dependent* on Western concepts and paradigms, and so they reproduced the West’s economic and political domination at an epistemological level. Moreover, it is true that this epistemological dominance is also one of the main problems of the Turkish intellectual world today. So, it should not be forgotten that dependency is not just an economic and political problem, but really begins when we need others’ concepts and categories of analysis to comprehend and to produce solutions for our own society and social problems.

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Agnieszka Pufelska

The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism and the Problem of Temporalization—on the 100th Anniversary of Witold Kula’s Birth

Abstract: The Marxist social historian *Witold Kula* (1916–1988) demonstrated more thoroughly than any other scholar that the changes in the conditions of agricultural production also changed ‘historical time’. Kula describes the period between 1770 and 1880 as a transition zone in which an acceleration of historical time occurs because it does not yet correspond to experience. The historical process bursts open the old European continuum of experience, and the first category in which the temporal difference between experience and expectation is conceptualized is the term ‘progress’. He does not, however, consider this transition from the feudal to the capitalist movement pattern to be fluent. *According to Kula*, capitalism in most countries did not develop out of the feudal economy or as a consequence of gradual changes within the system, but developed above it as an autonomous system in the form of a superstructure.

Stability through cyclicity

In the last century, the transition from feudalism to capitalism has been the subject of a number of debates on both sides of the Atlantic. This was particularly the case in the 60s and 70s when the topic served to position economic history firmly within the historical sciences and philosophy. As part of this quest for the realignment of economic history as a field of research, some historians favorably disposed to philosophy were resolute in their insistence on the philosophical roots of the economic sciences, in an endeavor to secure a firm place for philosophy—or, to be more precise, for Marx’s philosophical categories—within historical studies (see as an example: Kittsteiner 1980). Those historians, on the other hand, who favored researching socio-economic structures endeavored to establish the economic sciences as a subdivision of social history, and to strip them of any budding historical-philosophical tendencies (cf. Wehler 1973).

If one were to ask today any scholar of modern history interested or involved in these past debates whether he or she had been aware of an Eastern European position on this discussion, the answer would most certainly be in the affirma-

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tive (in the case of Marx readers, not without a degree of cheer), and Witold Kula would be named. His books, and first and foremost his *An Economic Theory of the Feudal System*, were read, valued and criticized by both camps. Whereas social historians were interested in Kula's analyses of the feudal social order, their adversaries concentrated mainly on his universal historical model of economic theory, or his dynamic functional model of the feudal economy.

But who was this Polish scholar, whose feudalism theory won recognition far beyond the borders of Europe? Witold Kula was born in Warsaw in 1916 into a Protestant family of German descent. After graduating in Economics and History from the University of Warsaw, he lectured at a private university, where he defended his doctoral thesis in 1939. During the Second World War, he was a member of the Home Army and was taken prisoner by the Germans. In 1945 he returned to Poland and immediately took up his academic career. He obtained his post-doctoral degree (Habilitation) from the University of Łódź in 1947, following which he received a scholarship for two years in Paris, where he was influenced by the Annales school. Shortly after his return, he was appointed Professor at Warsaw University where he held the Chair for Economic History until 1975. By then seriously ill, he had to give up his academic teaching at the age of just 60. Witold Kula died in Warsaw on 12 February 1988.

Kula's academic work consists mainly of studies on Polish economic history, but he also worked intensively on the methodological and theoretical problems of the historical sciences. His most well known work in this field is the book that appeared in 1963 entitled *The Problems and Methods of Economic History*. It is in this almost 800-page work of a universalist nature that Kula most clearly formulates his methodology. He accepts, not only in a formal sense, the progressive tenets of Marxist methodology and assumes the position of Marxist periodization that is based on the development of socio-economic formations. "For the Marxists," Kula writes, "the periodisation of history is, therefore, equally a synthesis of historical cognition and a tool thereof" (Kula 1963, p. 175).

One of the central problems in Kula's work is the question of synthesis in economic history. He emphasizes the essential differences between the courses of many economic processes in diverse social orders and draws attention to the limited comparability of these processes. The disparity between the socio-economic systems necessitates a different methodological approach that, in turn, should result in a synthesis determined by time and space. In the most renowned of his works, the above-mentioned *An Economic Theory of the Feudal System*, Kula uses the Polish transition from feudalism to capitalism to describe how this research method could be applied. The book was first published in 1962 but only became known in Western Europe in the 1970s when it was translated,

first into French and then into English. What, in Kula's opinion, were the conditions that such a theory should fulfill?

We can say that the task of every economic theory of a system consists in formulating the laws governing the volume of the economic surplus and its utilization and that these problems have to be explained in the short-term and in the long-term. (Kula 1976, p. 27)

However, in order to speak of the conclusion or the climax of an economic theory, Kula argues that it has to be able to explain the transformation of one given system into another (Kula 1976, p. 27).

Clearly, Kula attempts in his feudalism research to investigate what Marx did not achieve—at least not as an independent analysis—and that he only analyzed based on what was apparent to him from the viewpoint of the emerging capitalist mode of production. It is not in vain that Kula's temporal framework of the 16th to the 19th centuries covers Marx's history of 'primitive accumulation', i.e. the history of the separation of the direct producers from their means of production and nourishment, which was for Marx the core of the history of the transition from feudalism to capitalism.¹

In Kula's historical reconstruction, the first signs of economic decline in Poland are evident in the 16th century, otherwise seen as the 'golden century', characterized by economic, cultural and political development. Kula sees the causes for this in the strengthening of serfdom and the corresponding increase in the power of the nobility. Their high standard of living was supported by an economy that guaranteed Poland the position of a European granary and enabled the aristocracy to import luxury goods from abroad. Whilst the aristocracy thus had close connections with the international market, also through the 'term of trade', the peasants remained excluded and increasingly tied to feudal dependencies. This process reached its climax in the so-called 'crisis of the 17th century', which was heightened in Poland by external influences such as the wars against the Cossacks and Sweden.

The country fell into a state of economic backwardness characterized by a concentration of land ownership in the form of estates ruled by the wealthy nobility. All types of feudal dues, both ordinary and extraordinary, were fully developed and the peasants' obligations had become very oppressive. An analysis of surviving invoices showing income and expenditure of several feudal estates led Kula to conclude that, when considering only monetary expenditure and income,

¹ Marx writes: "The economic structure of capitalist society has grown out of the economic structure of feudal society. The dissolution of the latter set free the elements of the former." (Marx 1972, p. 743.)

these estates must have produced a substantial yield, but that if the material effort (not measured in terms of money) in the form of *corvées* obligations was calculated into this, the result would be a large deficit: “The average peasant does not take into account the cost of family labor nor interest on capital because he has not knowledge of such categories and does not know how to make accurate calculations” (Kula 1976, p. 41). The farms were inefficient without knowing it.

In Kula’s opinion, this is not simply an invoicing problem: he derives from it a ‘two-sector system’, i. e. the side-by-side existence of a monetary and a natural economy. The peasants who belonged to the nobility had to pay them dues, mostly as payment in kind, but they were also obliged to perform certain services for the nobility. The activities of the noble landowners on the other hand, were oriented around a market where they exchanged the peasants’ dues for money, such that their calculations were focused on increasing income from the manorial estate. Under manorial rule, the production of commodities was successfully developed: the ruling class used their privileges to secure cheap labor power, raw materials and advantages in selling their goods. The feudal lords were thus able to make good use of the economic advantages of peasant agriculture; that is, of low labor costs, high labor intensity and low unproductive expenses. The lower the intensity and productivity of agricultural labor, the more the manorial lords attempted to reduce production costs by increasing feudal labor obligations. Feudal labor service reduced production and transport costs and secured the continued existence of the manorial estate even when market prices for grain and other products were low. Even more to the point, Kula argues that the income from grain was more dependent on the harvest yield than on the actual price, because when harvests were poor the price increase only offset to a limited extent the reduced amount of saleable goods. Lords and peasants both benefited when they sold larger amounts of grain at low prices than when prices increased and they were only able to sell less:

Under capitalism, an increase in prices is the stimulus that sets reserves in motion and brings about an increase in national income. In the feudal system, on the other hand, a reduction in the social income leads to an increase in price [generally due to non-economic factors such as failed harvests or wars]. (Kula 1976, p. 110)

The material situation of a manorial estate and the serfs who lived there was thus determined to a greater extent by the harvest than by price fluctuations (Kula 1976, p. 56).

Bad harvests also had a negative effect on town-dwellers as they were then forced to pay higher prices for food. In order to meet their needs for essential goods, they had to do without other things, and the demand for the products

and services of tradesmen sank accordingly. For this reason, and because the peasants were not able to buy as much, trade and commerce stagnated. Hardship abated when harvests improved. The prices of agricultural products went down, the peasants' income increased, and the tradesmen in the towns were able to sell more of their products. The economic upturn continued until poor harvests again brought crisis to the towns and country.

"The peasant," Marcus Sandl writes in his essay on the concept of circulation and the cameral sciences knowledge system in the 18th century, "did not have sufficient means to control nature and thus was not able to autonomously shape production processes, but was obliged to rely on 'means with which he artificially supported nature for economic purposes.' In this sense, there are almost as many agricultural times as there were manorial estates" (Sandl 2002, p. 69). Translated into temporal categories, this might mean: up to and even beyond the mid-18th century, the alternating rhythm of 'good' and 'bad' years shapes a concept of an oscillating history with a re-occurrence of the same or similar situations. The long-term dynamics are subject to recurring short-term setbacks, but people have no experience of any tendency that would indicate improvement or continuous progress in their life situation as a whole. There is no overall historical dynamic or development that can impress itself on experience. Expectations are determined by previous experiences. In 1797 Kant noted that most people lived in a system of the 'abderitism of history'; things do not move forwards, nor do they move backwards—the ordinary run of things is marked by a haphazard up and down (Kant 1995, p. 99).

The peasants begin to move

Despite the feudal balance that, although subject to marked secular fluctuations, stabilizes time and again on a barely altered level, Kula sees in feudalism (and here he is closely following Labrousse's crisis theory) a general weakness and proneness to crisis.² Insofar as feudal society remains within the limits of an exchange of agricultural sector surpluses, its development is not compromised—provided these surpluses are indeed generated and exchanged. It is only when

² The French economic historian Ernest Labrousse postulated, primarily for the 18th century, a link between high prices of grain used for bread and market stagnation in the manufacturing, pre-industrial sector: "La crise cyclique de sous-production agricole ne reste pas agricole dans ses conséquences. Elle gagne toute la vie industrielle. La sous-production agricole déclenche une crise de sousconsommation industrielle, de surproduction industrielle relative." (Labrousse 1933, p. 528)

this system, by reason of its immanent long-term dynamics, reaches its productivity limits that its instability becomes apparent. And it is precisely this problem that Kula observes in Poland from the middle of the 18th century onwards, when the grain prices and ground rents in Central Europe began to rise and greater profits were zealously generated. The burden on the peasants was too large and far exceeded their production potential. This method of production, determined as it was by feudal appropriation, reaches an impasse. As does Marx, Kula sees the changes in the dominant form of appropriation of the surplus product as marking the transition from feudalism to capitalism.

In Kula's feudalism model, however, the loss of efficiency experienced by the farms in the 18th century is by no means unexpected or determined solely by external factors. On the contrary, he sees this as something that had persistently accompanied the feudal manorial economy and which, as such, was testimony to its instability: the short-term crises of feudalism that caused recurring slumps in long-term dynamics are, for Kula, an inner component of the feudal system, and are also transformed with the system. In a polemical attack on Fernand Braudel's concept of crisis, Kula asks: "Nobody doubts for a moment that a general crisis is also a direct crisis of history. But is all this so new? Is crisis not a permanent feature? Has it not always existed?" (Kula 1983, p. 236)

He expounds the transforming proneness to crisis of feudal manorial society in his theory on the lord-peasant-struggle in Poland and, *cum grano salis*, in Prussia between the 16th and 18th centuries. Kula assumes that the lord of the manor had to exert pressure on the peasants—who dominated the production process—in order to generate the surplus that determined his own level of existence. The reason for this, Kula argues, was the permanent resistance of the peasants in the form of sabotage or flight. The lords' greatest losses in collecting the surplus were incurred, however, through the peasants' contact with the market. There was a bitter struggle as to the "market quota" between the peasant, who was obliged to pay his dues in produce, and his lord. Whereas the peasant attempted to sell a part of the surplus remaining over and above what he required for subsistence, the lord strove equally resolutely to sever all the peasants' market relations. He attempted to achieve this by exchanging the peasants' money for goods produced on his own manor as well as by reducing the size of the farms. From the 16th century onwards, the Polish peasants who were obliged to pay rent to their lords in money and *in natura* were able to consume or to market with profit their own harvest surplus. In order to stop the flow of money from the estate and thus to compensate for the loss of natural produce sold by the peasants, the lords began to create their own markets. Even though there were new developments aimed at increasing the monetary income through direct and indirect monetization of the peasants' produce, it remained the goal of

the rulers to ensure that buying and selling continued to be in their hands. Monetary revenue came primarily from the sale of the farmers' own produce, such as vodka. It should be borne in mind, however, that the peasants were obliged to source their vodka from their lords. To illustrate this, Kula quotes a letter from Prince Czartoryski who complained in about 1780 that, without propination, he was unable to obtain a regular monetary income and that, particularly in the 'bad' years, the distilleries had taken on the function of mints (Kula 1976, p. 137). This letter shows more than simply the lords' share of responsibility in securing the Polish predilection for vodka. Above all, it draws attention to the peasants' money reserves, and thus also to their market connections, which persisted despite the bad years and the lords' attempts to prevent those connections.

Another method employed by the lords to isolate peasants from the market was the above-mentioned reduction in the size of the farms. The nobility clearly had no interest in the ruin of their subjects. But, the smaller the average farm, the less use the peasant could draw from favorable market conditions. If the good harvest years were used as a measure of this size, the number of bad years increased for the peasant, because even slight harvest fluctuations meant that his agricultural reproduction was no longer secure. Also, the lords of the manor had to provide material support for the peasants to the extent that they were unable to produce a surplus themselves. In the long term, this conflict pushed the feudal system to its limits. The efficiency of manorial estates sank continuously from the 16th to the 18th century, resulting in rising indebtedness. The estates, in turn, were unable to bear the burden of the amassed debts of their owners.

The capitalization of agriculture slowly began to take over towards the end of the 18th century. The Polish nobility chose to follow the 'Prussian path' and gradually adopted the 'rent system', the consequence of which was the infamous 'struggle for rent'. The lords fought to raise the rent so as to be able to assert themselves in competition with their peers. For the peasants, on the other hand, it was important to be able to appropriate for themselves a part of the surplus they produced. The only means they had of doing this was through lower rents, resistance, increase in the area of land they cultivated or greater labor productivity. Peasant families also strove to use other means to make up for the income deficit which arose from their agricultural labor. They generally supplemented their income by work in the various trades or other non-agricultural sectors; this, in turn, tied them more and more closely to the market. The peasants had spread their labor power as 'entrepreneurs' across several fields of work that promised cash income, and this 'obligation' to become market players doubtless widened their action radius. Over and beyond this, they developed

their own strategies to avoid being subjected entirely to the constraints of the market, or of their rulers, by pursuing mixed economic activities and allowing themselves some flexibility. Farms now became businesses geared towards achieving an economic balance, while the lords of the manor became capitalist landowners who understood—as Kula noted ironically—that ‘money makes money’, and that land is a commodity (Kula 1955, p. 34).

With these changes in the conditions of agricultural production, ‘historical time’ also changed; that is to say there was a change in the ‘tempus’ of social reproduction, and the income of the manorial estates began to depend on investments and market prices rather than on weather conditions:

Finally, we might risk a generalization: in precapitalist societies many economic indices are subject to great fluctuations in the short run and only to very slow change in the direction of the trend; in industrial societies, however, the range of short-run fluctuations is reduced, but the trend of changes in direction is accelerated and becomes more pronounced (for example, the demographic coefficients, returns to land etc.). (Kula 1976, p. 183)

The entire society becomes an accelerated society. The period between 1770 and 1880 can thus be considered a transition zone in which an acceleration of historical time occurs because it does not yet correspond to experience. The historical process bursts open the old European continuum of experience, and the first category in which the temporal difference between experience and expectation is conceptualized is the term ‘progress’.³

Back to Kula

Kula does not, however, consider this transition from the feudal to the capitalist movement pattern to be fluent. “There is no doubt,” he states, “that certain elements change rapidly, others slowly or very slowly, and certain elements can be

³ ‘Experience’ and ‘expectation’ are two central historical conceptual categories for Reinhart Koselleck. Similarly to Kula, he sees what is new in modernity as the increasing gap between experience and expectation. He argues (though without giving examples) that the reason for this change is the transition from a circular to a linear view of history: “The peasant world, which two hundred years ago comprised up to 80 percent of all persons in many parts of Europe, lived with the cycle of nature. Excepting the structure of social organization, fluctuations in market conditions, especially long-distance trade in agricultural products, and monetary fluctuations, the everyday world was marked by whatever nature had to offer. [...] Technical developments, which did exist, took so long to become established that they did not cause a rupture in the pattern of life.” (Koselleck 1989, p. 360)

regarded as constant” (Kula 1976, p. 182). The emphasis on the non-contemporaneity of change is related to Kula’s thesis on the various adaptation options of the respective systems to new conditions. This, in turn, testifies to the ‘elasticity’ of the feudal system, which allows it to retain its character although changes have taken place. Kula divides the adaptation processes to which the feudal system is subject into avoidable and unavoidable changes. He sees the latter as being of a cumulative nature, whereby they triggered the transition of one structure into another or stretched the feudal system beyond its limits, only to replace the old structure by a new one. In other words, in long-term dynamics, Kula differentiates between elements that operate ‘periodically’ or ‘continuously’, and that in their cumulative effect have led to structural transformations from the mid-18th century onwards (Kula 1976, p. 118).

Following this line of argumentation, then, capitalism in Poland (as in most other countries) did not develop out of the feudal economy or as a consequence of gradual changes within the system, but developed above it as an autonomous system in the form of a superstructure. “Feudalism was pregnant with capitalism,” Kula writes at one point (Kula 1983, p. 242). With the exception of England, the industrialization of European culture resulted from the ‘pressure’ of an already existing capitalism:

Capitalism only emerged spontaneously once in the history of the world [: in England]. The same is true of socialism. But there are various feudalisms around the world. They have come about independently of one another in diverse societies and epochs. (Kula 1983, pp. 68–69).

This thought is central to Kula’s development theory. He sees a twofold course for the historical cultural process: it develops in one particular direction and also in several different directions simultaneously. He calls this cultural theory a ‘dialectic theory of unity and diversity for the course of time and for change’. Contrary to the course of time, change never takes place in one direction only—a position that contradicts those of Adam Smith and even Karl Marx. For this reason, Kula also suggests that we should assume the multilinearity of the historical process and regard its dynamics as a wide range of comparable changes:

It is only possible to develop an overall theory of feudalism if analyses of feudalism in Japan, China or India are consulted [...] Only in the light of such comparisons can we determine what may be generally valid or meaningful for our [European] feudalism. (Kula 1958, p. 35)

As a reminder: Kula made this call for comparative global history at the end of the 1950s, long before Jürgen Osterhammel’s groundbreaking work on universal

history. The thesis that a number of trade capitalisms blossomed in various parts of the world in the developing global economy of the 17th and early 18th centuries runs through all of Kula's economic analyses; capitalism functioned from the start as a global economy—and globalization is thus a process that has been in progress for centuries. Kula's development theory of unity and diversity presupposes the global connectivity but concurrent fragmentation of trade, politics and cultures. This principle was the reason for his appeal to historiography:

If the fundamental problem of our epoch is the unity of the planet in the face of industrial civilisation, then it may be the duty of contemporary historiography to ask of the past what leads us to this unity. Let us not hesitate, let us contemplate the long periods of time and large spaces. (Kula 1983, p. 255)

In his plea for the 'great narration', Kula also attempts to point out the dangers of using the concept of totality. Criticism of teleological historical concepts à la Hegel plays a large part in Kula's theory on the course of the historical process. Extremely well-read in German philosophy of history, he now no longer assumes that a perfect, but rather an *imperfect* 'whole' is mediated. For Kula, this imperfection results from the non-availability of history, and he thus places people, who consciously act in and endure history, in a process of which they are not conscious—one which results from their actions, but which is outside of their control. Yet his criticism of purposive conceptions of development is in no way contradictory to his conviction that the historical process takes a directional course.⁴ He speaks of a "directional development without a teleological vision of an earthly paradise" (Kula 1958, pp. 215–216). Such a statement from the mouth of a professor living in the 'best of all communisms' was not a matter of course. For Kula, Soviet-style Communism was an integrative component of the prevailing capitalism.

To sum up: Kula sees a strong accumulation of century-long tendencies that appeared insignificant as long as the feudal system remained intact and func-

⁴ Heinz-Dieter Kittsteiner, a cultural historian who died in 2008, was of a similar view. Following Kant and Marx, he assumes that people can extend their idea, but not their actions, to the whole: "Man does not readily 'make' his history, history evolves—in the context of society, admittedly—unconsciously, so to speak, when uncoordinated actions encounter one another." (Kittsteiner 1997, p. 83) Unlike Kula, Kittstein has a distinct historical-philosophical approach. He looks for non-teleological options in a philosophy of history that maintains insight into the non-availability of events. To this end, he strives to subject certain key categories of the history of philosophy to a rational analysis; his last book, *Die Stabilisierungsmoderne: Deutschland und Europa 1618–1715*, represents such an endeavor. For an in-depth analysis, see: Pufelska 2010, pp. 173–195.

tional, but which played a decisive role in the period of its transition to capitalism. These include the advance of industrialization, cuts in interest rates for loans, increasing mobility among the population, and the peasants' attempts at market involvement. Because the resulting changes arose from all previous experience, they gave reason to hope for continuous progress: and this hope was great, for "if a structure is destroyed, nobody is in a position to predict what the new structure which arises from the ruins of the old will look like" (Kula 1983, p. 296).

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4 Globalization in the History of Philosophy

Ricardo Gutiérrez Aguilar

Globalization and Crisis of Values: Promise and Total Disappointment

Abstract: What should be called (at least according to the views supported by modern moral philosophy schools) the ‘modern moral world’ can be depicted nowadays as an environment in which we consider relations to the community to be morally significant, even when the individuals within the reach of these duties are in fact unknown. So we can blame or we can praise, even in the notorious absence of any identifiable subject of ‘moral obligation’. The fundamental difference is in perceived obligations, not in entitlements: duties versus rights. At first glance, moral entitlement is nothing but an abstract right seeking recognition. Not so the obligation, as the ‘right-bearer’ is waiting for the commitment to be honored. The work of Onora O’Neill, Charles Fried and Thomas M. Scanlon rounds out the argumentation of the normative frame that operates in today’s strongly supererogatory moral world.

Men may seem detestable as joint stock-companies and nations; knaves, fools, and murderers there may be; men may have mean and meagre faces; but man, in the ideal, is so noble and so sparkling, such a grand and glowing creature, that over any ignominious blemish in him all his fellows should run to throw their costliest robes. That immaculate manliness we feel within ourselves, so far within us, that it remains intact though all the outer character seem gone; bleeds with keenest anguish at the undraped spectacle of a valor-ruined man [...] To meanest mariners, and renegades and castaways, I shall hereafter ascribe high qualities, though dark; weave round them tragic graces; if even the most mournful, perchance the most abased, among them all, shall at times lift himself to the exalted mounts. (Melville 1988, pp. 117–118)

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Introduction: *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*

Let me, for argument's sake, recall here a treasured memory of a prolonged and enjoyable research stay in Berlin. I landed there in the early winter of 2010, when journalists were especially attached to the term *außergewöhnlich* ('extraordinary') —'an extraordinary winter'. A born-and-raised Berliner (let alone a German columnist) would not dare to use these words lightly. I remember leaving my apartment in the frigid morning, flakes drifting here and there, to find my dorm's threshold clearly isolated from the world by means of a vast snow blanket. Flabbergasted, I looked around in search of help. Then I looked down—and there they were, those thin layers of snow-soaked paper at my door that promised the first solid step out of the cave. Day after day, the brochure left almost unnoticed on my doorstep helped me out into Berlin life, clearing the initial path to tackling the day's meetings and readings.

That very stitched-together set of pages constitutes to this day—or so they tell me, as I'm now far from Berlin—the *Boulevardzeitung* (*BZ*). But don't be fooled by its described weight. A quick view of its history points out to those of us who don't yet know, that even in its slenderness we have before us a hundred-and-forty-year newspaper in its prime. The *BZ* was awarded 'Paper of the Year 2016'—a well deserved prize, considering its half-million readership. On 12th October 2009, the merry people of Berlin woke up to a brand new social initiative within the pages of the 132nd anniversary edition: the *Berliner Helden* [*Heroes from Berlin*], devoted to good deeds and to be featured six times a week.¹ The one-page feature is an homage to all those citizens who render service to the Berlin community, who it names *Ehrenamter* ('honorary civil servants'). It offers particular cases of unselfish civilian management, educational ventures for disadvantaged children, or social inclusion projects. In 2016, for example, the lists of awards were crammed with references to the Syrian refugees. Other mentions include recycling and sustainability initiatives, the implementation of new green areas in the city's neighborhoods. and people who out of sympathy help others in need of medical aid, not to mention those who find animal shelters for our four legged friends. The awarded are always among the aforementioned 'merry people of Berlin'—private citizens with some extra motivation and implication in what makes a city a shared space. Space creates a 'shared life' beyond the matter of simply occupying it. Rather than a matter of mere presence, it is a space thought to be administered in common, jointly—and these are its 'heroes'.

¹ The project can be checked on-line at <http://www.bz-berlin.de/berliner-helden> (visited 23rd December 2017).

In German, this type of engagement is called *Aktion(-en)*, in a way that would have made Hannah Arendt herself proud.² An action merits being called an *Aktion* when it has as its aim a certain type of social or communal commitment in which not necessarily disinterested altruism, but rather what could recall the phrase ‘the greatest good for the greatest number of people’, is accomplished. This tension between ‘private-public obligations’ is key here: not entitlement, but obligation. Why do we sometimes bear such a burden for the fashion of an impersonal need; a voluntary obligation to an allegedly joint stock-company; and furthermore, one with whom we are not acquainted in the least? For in most of the stories in *Berliner Helden*, the local heroes do not know their beneficiaries. The supposed normative content carried on their shoulders is intended to symbolize the living community in which they are immersed. Publicity and transparency are virtues to be counted on, of course—but they are not emblematic of the common behavior. ‘Knaves, fools and murderers’ can equally live there in the imperium of *homo homini lupus* if they please, in the open, recognizing that they live in the jungle and knowing that the game is like that.

‘Berliners’ are not, on the other hand, called ‘heroes’ for nothing, since it is implied that their endeavor is as private and as personal as that of the ‘knaves’, but does not seek an outcome for the self. For some, this is just a special case of craziness; their interest in the commonwealth ends here. Melville’s diagnosis (quoted above) is perhaps apt for our times. It implies that as common individuals, we live in some sort of ‘joint-stock company’. We are laden by our private motivations, but none of them points to the particular fellow on the other side of the table. If we get frustrated in our private goals, ‘with mean and meagre faces’ we always feel like we have at least the right to moan. Only in what we envisage as ‘the ideal’ case are our better angels moved—an *außergewöhnlich* event, in any

² In *The Human Condition* (1958), Arendt displays her ontology of agency regarding human activities in their various forms. ‘Labor’ is the craft by means of which we take care of our biological needs, and ultimately serve the chain-of-being incarnated in reproduction. The *genus*, the *species*, overlaps the individual. There is no end to it as activity; we are talking about ‘work’ if our labor has an end; a beginning impregnated by an idea, a purpose, some disposed means and lastly an end. Here, the human world comes into play, as production transforms the inertia of the natural realm. The *genus* is slowly substituted by individuality and its teleology; ‘action’ is the highest and most significative activity a human can endeavor to undertake. For by an ‘action’, we are individuals among other individuals, and *for the sake of* individuals in a community. By ‘action’, we make a place for us as unique members of a shared *res publica* and seek to recognize and be recognized. The 1998 edition of *The Human Condition* (University of Chicago Press), with substantial text additions and an introduction by Margaret Canovan, is worthy of consultation.

case. In contrast, for *Berliner Helden*, ‘where some simply moan, they get involved’ (*‘Wo anderen nur jammern, packen sie an’*), as the *BZ* chief board urges. It is something of an ironic trope to use such a motto, since Berlin citizens are famous indeed for their special way of moaning. They gripe so earnestly that they have created their own special term for it: *jammern*. Its origins are in the dumb gesticulations of the jaw while complaining—no word, all pose. Of course, if you *jammerst*, you are playing the *Berliner*.

“The question of who must blame [versus] the question of who has standing to do so” is a tricky one (Scanlon 2008, p. 175). As an analogy, consider the similar question: who is entitled to praise and who is not? “A judgment of blameworthiness is an impersonal one. It is a judgment that anyone can make, whatever his or her relation to the agents in question, while blame, as I interpret it, is more personal” (Scanlon 2008, p. 175). Both cases contemplate the presence of conceptual judgment. There is a criterion to be held up against in order to judge, and the judges wield it in cases of both personal and impersonal blame. You can blame, in T.M. Scanlon’s view, *if and only if* you are first assuming the possibility of an identifiable ‘blameworthiness’. Equally, you can praise *if and only if* you are assuming the possibility of an identifiable quality that makes something or somebody ‘praiseworthy’.

I agree with Scanlon that anyone can make such judgments as a ‘private or public citizen’, but my views differ on the conceptual independence of personal bias. This is the very view in which the abovementioned *Berliners* are seen as ‘heroes’ for getting involved personally in something taken to be impersonal; they went the proverbial extra mile. But is it not an assumption central to Scanlon’s argument that ‘whatever his or her relation to the agent in question is’, what has changed is in fact a ‘morally (committal) binding’ relation of some kind? Whether the situation seems personal or impersonal, we are affected by our sense of the relation changing. If by ‘personal’ we mean ‘intimate’, then Scanlon’s reasoning is well understood. If not, then he or she who shares the judgment assumes they share a communal relation as well—something *gewöhnlich* (‘customary’). The difference regarding change is non-existent. *Berliner Helden* consider morally significant their relation to the community, even when the individuals comprising the ‘stock’ are unknown. So they can blame and they can praise—but so too can *Jammerers*. The cognitive judgment always comes with a performative effect, because it judges a human relation, with persons and subjects. The fundamental difference is in perceived obligations, not in entitlements.

In what follows, I will address the problem intrinsic to that vision encapsulated in the *BZ*’s motto. It seems to make plausible a discrepancy between ‘innocuously moaning/praising’ and ‘being compromised’ by that moaning/praising. It is a difference that passes almost unnoticed, but that I hold to have a significant

normative drive. While both activities are personally driven in a sense, I will advocate for a strong normative drive, though one diffused into the community. That is, I will defend a position in which there is in fact some means of explaining what kind of moral force we assume or attribute to an *Aktion*, and how it can be conceptually articulated. Onora O'Neill will have the floor in the first place; Charles Fried and Thomas M. Scanlon will round out the argumentation.

'Entitlements', rights and utter suspicion

Apparently, we have and will always have a sovereign right to moan—or so we are told. It is a perk attached to the position, unassailable, and perhaps even an ontological fact of being individuals. If there is a shared space, or shared life, it begins with the matter of occupying it and claiming one's presence in it. Blaming and moaning are the expressions of noticing someone trespassing—the defense and call to order of the owned ontological niche. The trespassers are also private persons with expectations that can be deceived by none but personally attributed entities. We perceive that their actions damage our rights.

In Berlin, whenever neighbors are too loud for our taste when brushing their teeth, the oft-anthropomorphized *U-Bahn* or *S-Bahn* commits the sin of being late (the *außergewöhnlich Verspätung*), our charcoal heating breaks on the coldest of the evenings, or the local ice-hockey team (another type of 'joint stock-company') loses an easy match against the eternal rival, we feel like moaning. Always in the mood for blaming, we are triggered by these events. We gladly go along with the game; it is so simple. The mere detection of a possible rights infringement is enough to satisfy the cognitive need to *jammern*. This 'epistemic judgment'—of 'what should not be done' and thus, in earnest, 'what must not be done'—is allowed to anyone. This creates an aggravated state of righteousness, in which we defend what we think is and should be *gewöhnlich* ('customary'). Any explanation or verbal expression comes later—detection and reaction comes first, and is sometimes overeager.

However, things being as they are, "by what metric are we to determine the 'size' of a right [or of its far-reaching violation,] or of the 'territory' that is constrained by the counterpart obligations the right imposes?" (O'Neill 1995, p. 196) A right is defined according to the duties it imposes on others, indirectly, on the basis of constraints and obligations. Both sides of the equation are blurred. Furthermore, we must also ask: who is the one that freely and voluntarily picks up the imposed commitment, and why? The journey towards the exalted amounts to the ideals of pretended warrants, and of due 'entitlements'. A 'right' is here a positive interpretation of liberty that entails some kind of posses-

sion: property. Its breach constitutes theft. But on what basis is this property recognized? Such a vision “construes rights as entitlements [and entitlements as a contracted debt] to whatever goods or services [that is, promised and then expected actions], as well as forbearances [when][...] needed.” (O’Neill 1995, p. 196) Property is in our right, and constitutes it, in the form of either goods, services, or our merry fellows’ indulgence—matters in which we entertain expectations. We must then ask: was there any promise made to begin with? Perhaps. There must be; or at least when we struggle to find it, we should try to explain where the error lies in that assumption. For a promise—a social contract—is what seems implied in the demand.

The scope of the domain is uncertain, though; its description unclear. From where should we draw the perimeter, the circumference: from the inside out, positively; or from the outside in, based on constraints and counterpart obligations? What is the ‘size’ to such a right-thing (asks O’Neill), and how do we measure it in view of building frontiers, apart from out of complaints?

Unfortunately, without an idea of the metric or an awareness of its build, we have problems with its accommodation of the rights of an imagined ‘fellow’. In the ideal, one individual’s rights are an unsatisfactory abstraction, because “there is no unique way of accommodating different rights” within this understanding of the issue (O’Neill 1995, p. 196). We can overwrite any possible conflict by redefining the traits involved in the description to accommodate the tensions, just as we can look for conflict by means of the same strategy:

There are indefinitely many ways of describing possible actions [and deducing counterpart obligations], and hence indefinitely many ways of picking out sets of copossible, equal[ly valid] rights. (O’Neill 1995, p. 196)

These rights may collide (or not), as in the case of our ‘moaner’. “Without a metric for rights we could count a set of rights *maximal* [regarding liberties] only if it dominated all other sets of rights” (O’Neill 1995, p. 196). As we are still talking about ‘cognitive judgment’, the counting is nothing but a (rights) pretension—a brute exercise of demanding recognition. It is no big surprise that the ‘moaner’ feels that his or her cause is just—the ideal immaculate one—and should be recognized as such. How could we dare to refuse? Who else can lay blame? Who has the standing necessary for blaming? Only he or she who feels entitled to. Hence, it approaches the ‘maximal’.

The negative expression of moaning, or of blaming, is the visible counterpart of the metric we seek—a particular pole for the fence; the constraint. It is a private normative drive, ascribed regardless of adoption. But for what alleged reason can we ascribe an obligation to a fellow? ‘Men owe’; ‘society owes’—these

are the basic assumptions of the ‘moaner’. “People is [sic] very angry... Believe me, very angry”, pronounced Donald Trump in one particularly belligerent speech before Election Day in November 2016. He set himself up as a unique spokesman for ‘the people’. He adopted the most prevalent position of domination: symbolic representation of the extension of all possible subjects of rights. His voice was the means by which ‘we the people’ moaned, and by which they blamed. Trump provided the standing for their blaming, feeling entitled and establishing an ‘us-them’ divide, with the right-holders facing the right-bearers with contempt. People were sovereignly entitled, and someone had to be held accountable for pressing that logic further. Expectations had been let down and amendments and retribution were demanded in response.

Onora O’Neill controversially describes this situation as generalized. Society wanders on the higher planes of morality, on the exalted mounts—in *the ideal*. Of the common yearning for retribution, O’Neill asks: “is it true that we have stopped trusting? Has untrustworthy action made trust too risky? Is trust obsolete?” (O’Neill 2002, p. vii) And what about its constraining counterpart? Are we prone to cast doubt on the expected actions of others, so severely as to create a constant expectation of failure? We are told constantly that we are living through a so-called ‘revolution in accountability’, in which measures against mistrust are set in motion. Control reaches all spheres of public life nowadays. The era of evaluation and immediate feedback is in full flow.

Sadly, the fact is that we don’t “know whether we have a crisis of trust or only a [promoted] culture of suspicion” (O’Neill 2002, p. 17). Suspicion leads to blame, and blame leads to indignation and outrage—the usual reaction to a damaged right. ‘Moaners’ do not run to their fellows to ‘throw their costliest robes’ over their ignominy in the service of deeply-felt, ‘sparkling’ nobility. Instead, they enterprise an ascension of standards, a raising of the bar—indeed, a pretended ‘moral ascension’. They do so by an escalation of both ‘moral obligations’ and ‘moral duties’—that is, the deduced counterpart constraint. These obligations are thus transformed. They suffer from supererogation both in quality and quantity, in intension and extension—but it is a special type of supererogation. No one can bestow upon me any obligation beyond what is meant in my positive duties, whatever they may be. Let us say that they have a certain content, and that they have a size. Supererogatory actions are (as their Latin name points out) actions in which we ‘overpay’—*supererogare*. Goods, services, and forbearances have a ‘price’, and we ‘pay’ over and above it, to whatever extent we deem proper. Supererogatory actions are and must always be voluntary ones. Otherwise, they are compulsory by definition—they fall within our positive duty or obligation, and are thus not supererogatory at all. As we might infer, this subtle difference is what makes the extra mile a praiseworthy merit. When we

walk the extra mile, we are praised for being ‘so noble and so sparkling’; for being honorable. There is no counterpart here—no blaming if the supererogatory action is not initiated—for it is necessarily considered as separate from due rights.

Consider the notorious (to use an epithet already laden with bias) case of Justine Sacco. It is December 2013. Sacco, a (now, alas, former) Public Relations Consultant is about to board a flight to South Africa. Before boarding, she feels like tweeting in the meager hundred and forty characters the app allows. Soon, the ill-thought-out tweet passes from her 170 followers to almost fifteen thousand: “Going to Africa. Hope I don’t get AIDS. Just kidding. I’m white!” (Waterlow 2015, par. 2). During the eleven-hour flight, an emotional breeding ground under the hashtag ‘#HasJustineLandedYet’ prepares a less than warm welcome in Africa for the thirty-year-old publicist. The news spread rapidly, and by the time Sacco’s flight landed, her job, reputation and privacy had been blown up—worldwide. “I thought there was no way that anyone could possibly think it was literal,” (Waterlow 2015, par. 12) Sacco later claimed. The reverence of literality—the suspicion and prohibition of any indirect use of language, of any trope—amounts to a call for strictness. We are that serious: you will be held accountable for the literality of your words. Joking or not, non-literal uses of language have no moral quality. For many, chastising Sacco seemed a matter of ‘moral obligation’ (Ronson 2015). Her humiliation became a global task. Among the consequences were not only the loss of her professional and personal credibility—the foundations of any possible trust that could have been bestowed on her—but also the forbidding of any attempt to characterize Sacco, at any stage of the process, as a victim. Being deprived of the status of victim amounts to an elimination of the rights that go with it, as well as of any right to appeal.

Indirect uses in speech, humor and even orthographic mistakes can become statements bound to personal and impersonal ‘off the record’ legal claims. The literal is equated with the positive—but it simultaneously invites suspicions, demands and requirements. We are living an era ready and ripe for the newly-coined term that some intellectuals already use as common currency: ‘post-censorship’ (Soto Ivars 2017). Global justice has a gloomy side when it comes to reprimanding. What is supererogatory has its counterpart concept in a pretended ‘compulsory supererogation’—this being an obvious oxymoron. Escalating obligations imposed on others lead to the hypertrophy of the size of positive rights on the part of the right-holders. The scope of entitlement has reached global proportions, of which there is no ‘outer’ part: no one is apart from it; there are no limits. Nothing escapes the reach of that right, and so everything can be made an obligation and everyone is obliged by its total nature. For some claims (and some blames), there is then a correct way of behaving. There is a correct

way in which one conducts his or her life and thus a strong recommendation implicit in such practices. Actions deemed exemplary function as a form of ‘advice’ that, however blurry, had better be taken into account.

The boundaries between justice and animosity are also uncertain. Political correctness is required and in social media instruments, ‘trigger warnings’ are becoming more and more popular. They are letters of safe-passage; they are cautionary posts at the beginning of articles, blog entries and other social network-based forms of expressing personal opinions in public. These ‘warnings’ are intended to prepare the reader, based on the assumption of particular paradigms of moral correctness, and in this way end up criticizing them. They assume a disproportionate ‘trigger effect’ of anger and self-righteous wrath that the expressed opinion could cause. It is not hard to do the math and conclude the age of ‘post-censorship’ goes hand in hand with the age of ‘auto-censorship’: the cognitive judgment of the watchful global agora is assimilated and internalized. Of course, no individual is off limits when pertaining to the universal community. The ‘world wide entanglement’—the so-called ‘revolution of accountability’—raises doubts about whether we are not really in an ‘inquisitorial revolution’. Inquiry and inquisition ask for responses. That is what we have here: the requirement of an ‘all-encompassing responsibility’.

Morally speaking, when no one should be entitled to the supererogatory action of other, and having no right to expect it, here this logic shatters. The last frontier in responsibility is that in which one is unable to label him or herself as a victim, or as a hurttable being, meaning a ‘being in an unassailable (sacred, respected at all costs) position’—his or her last resort. One cannot adopt such a label for her or himself, nor occupy such a position, nor be the recipient of that right. And it is a fundamental right! ‘Man in the ideal’ can follow a slippery slope to abstraction. Abstraction is sometimes tantamount to the vanishment of one’s importance, and of one’s real position. In such an abstraction, no one merits consideration as worthy of the terms ‘human being’ or ‘person’, meaning that communities emerge as the real winners of the old ‘social ontology’ debate: communities and not individuals are the main constituents, the real right-holders and the real right-claimers. Men are those who are detestable, with ‘unbearably mean and meagre faces’; joint-stock companies, on the other hand, are such grand and glowing creatures as to be considered sacred entities. Juridically, they are in fact the *only* right-retainers in these cases—they behave as real persons, ‘real beings’.

But the real question here is: who has standing to label? In June 2015, Spain witnessed the makings of one of these ideological crowds intent on defending publicly via Twitter the honor of a victim—in spite of her own attitudes. In October 1991, twelve-year-old Irene Villa was severely wounded by a car bomb in Ma-

drid planted as a terrorist attack by Basque nationalist terrorist group ETA. Now a well-known journalist and writer in Spain and professionally active in numerous media, Villa participated in a 2015 Twitter debate on the limits of humor, which ended with her in the role of protagonist. Public personalities made some jokes, intended as black humor, about Villa's wounds, inciting outrage among certain crowds of public opinion. Villa herself participated in an effort to end the controversy for good: "My favorite joke is that which defines me as an explosive woman" (La Vanguardia 2015, par. 2). Personally, she had not felt dishonored or offended at all. Furthermore, she did not want others to represent her as if in her absence. Nevertheless, some Twitter users thought otherwise. They seized the opportunity to chastise the jokers and contested the validity of their humor. Consider O'Neill's assertion that:

[w]ithin an account of justice it may seem unimportant whether we adopt the perspective of agents and their obligations, or of recipients and their entitlements. The set of obligations and the set of entitlements will presumably be reciprocally defined. [...] [But] the perspective of recipience and entitlement has other difficulties that obstruct the project of construction. (O'Neill 1995, pp. 214–215)

She further states that even when, ideally, justice would guarantee reciprocity:

[i]n the tradition of the social contract theory but not in its contemporary descendants, principles of justice define obligations rather than entitlements. A return to this perspective is, I believe, required for a nonidealizing constructivism because obligations of justice, unlike entitlements, can be constructed without assuming a metric either for liberty or more generally for actions. (O'Neill 1995, pp. 214–215)

'Obligations', rights and trust

Are we building up and living in a global society populated only by fellows who are not really fellows, but rather mere 'recipients and their entitlements'? Is there any 'agent', with his or her obligations, attentive enough to replenish the content of such demanding rights? If not, it is dubious at best what the content if any could be for the thing designated by the word 'right'. Right-holders reciprocally entail right-bearers—Hohfeld's *salva veritate*.³ The perspective constructed from

3 In the domain of classical rights theory, the work of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld is paradigmatic. For Hohfeld, rights are in fact entitlements to perform certain actions and to be positioned in certain legal states; and also for the contrary—to not perform certain actions and to avoid certain states. His theory highlights the reciprocity between rights and duties, and proposes a logic of

the easy-to-handle position of the right-holder leads to problems arising from the would-be forbidden operation of idealizing, inviting gluttonous receivers with no apparent duties to others. This fundamental idealization happens in the determining of 'size'. Construction from this perspective grants access to an unprecedented unleashing of rights, and permits a 'maximal set of copossible entitlements'—one which, sadly, would reveal itself to be sometimes contradictory, since no metric has been established to limit the reach of those rights. "Abstraction, taken strictly, is unavoidable and in itself innocuous" (O'Neill 1995, pp. 214–215). It is a formal operation of selection for the purpose of highlighting certain traits, and is dependent on the simple selection of characteristics. On the other hand:

Idealization is another matter. Objections to supposedly 'abstract' ethical principles and reasoning are often objections to idealization. The objection is not to reasoning that is detached from certain predicates that are true of the objects discussed, but to reasoning that assumes predicates that are false of them. Reasoning that abstracts from some predicate makes claims that do not depend on the predicate's either being satisfied or not being satisfied by the objects to which the reasoning applies. Reasoning that idealizes makes claims that apply only to objects that live up to a certain ideal. (O'Neill 1995, p. 209)

The 'metric' being sought is disappointingly 'ideal' in this case. The predicates in question—'supererogatory predicates', 'higher duties' and 'shortly-expected predicates'—are ideal: they do not yet exist; are imagined, pretended and (in most cases) desired. This is the positive moment that reciprocally urges for the consideration of its counterpart obligation—the 'entitlement'. But beyond this point, this construction is founded on a house of cards, applied and attributed—'attribute' here meaning that essential predicate ascribed in ontology, which functions as constitutive of the being—by force, independent of satisfaction.

Evidently, attributed responsibility is a precondition for blaming (Holgado González 2015, p. 79). The 'moaner', the 'blamer' and the 'hater' in social networks all feel an entitled urge for satisfaction after the target of his or her anger fails to honor their commitment. For Scanlon, as 'rational beings' we are in a necessary 'relationship' with each other. It is a class of shared responsibility in a shared ideal community, in light of all that we have the capability or possibility of reasoning. This relation among recognized peers is described in terms of care. There is a preference, concern and care for those identified as

legal relations ordered into eight categories: *jural opposites*—'right-no-right', 'privilege-duty', 'power-disability' and 'immunity-liability'; and *jural correlatives*—'right-duty', 'privilege-no-right', 'power-liability' and 'immunity-disability' (Saunders 1989–1990, pp. 465–506).

fellow members. We care in some sense for each other. Thus, recognition is comprehension, allowing in oneself attitudes, emotions, feelings and reactions—and assumptions. In fact, it gives rise not only to assumptions, but to anticipation as well. “A relationship, in the sense I am concerned with, is a matter not only of what one does, or intends to do, but also of the reasons for which one does these things” (Scanlon 2008, p. 173). I would change the order of elements. A relationship implies a set of facts about the parties in it, which involve a shared experience: desire and its instance in intentions; expectations; and finally their justification in the form of reasons (Scanlon 2013, p. 86). The expression of this relationship is just the propositional form; its explanation is constituted by the very attitudes and dispositions involved. These are indeed the forms of ‘care’ in which Scanlon is interested. Relationships of this nature have a normative character, which is reciprocal. From shared facts in the past to expectations of the future, there is an assumed standard of continuity, which is ‘prospective’. Cognitive judgment is rooted in the moment at which the relationship has changed—something expected does not happen, reciprocity fails and recognition is broken. From what is *gewöhnlich*, we have moved to what is *außergewöhnlich*. ‘To blame’ is nothing but the blunt restating of the old standards in the face of new events, once the former balance of what is expected has been disrupted. Blaming is a reaction calling for the modification of the intention (reciprocal balance) and disposition (future forbearances) of the affronted. Scanlon borrows an expression from Peter F. Strawson: blaming—as is moaning—‘is the partial withdrawal of good will’ (Scanlon 2008, p. 227).

And what about ‘impersonal blaming’? What type of conceptual articulation are we constructing when it comes to fellows who do not have a direct or personal acquaintance with us? Let’s keep it simple: what standard is in play when we blame, moan, or *jammern* every time neighbors are too loud, the *U-Bahn* is delayed, our heating breaks in winter, or the local ice-hockey team loses?

It may seem to make no sense to speak of our having attitudes toward people we have no knowledge of, or about what their attitudes may be toward us, of whom they are similarly unaware. But when we do become aware of others and are in actual or potential interaction with them, we generally assume that even if they are strangers they will manifest at least the basic elements of this ideal concern. We assume that this default relationship of mutual regard and forbearance holds between us and the strangers we pass on the road or interact with in the market. When someone does not manifest this concern, it is this relationship that is the standard relative to which our actual relation with them is seen as impaired. (Scanlon 2008, pp. 140–141)

Scanlon calls it a ‘moral relationship’. For him, this type of relation is ‘inescapable’. It is a fundamental condition: just as there is no explicit act by which we

enter the relation, and thus no expression of willingness to do so, nor can there be any way for us to abandon the community. For Scanlon, we are inside the shared community by default, as we are humans, and as rational beings. It is an unconditional compromise (Scanlon 2013, p. 87).

Let's say for the sake of the argument that 'rationality' is a rather restrained condition. If the arguments I have expressed here hold true, then perhaps a better condition for 'reasonable responsibility' is *expectation* rather than rationality. We are bound to those of our fellows who can expect something from us, and we bind ourselves to those of whom we have expectations—to those whose actions have implications for us in both respects.

Charles Fried will help me to conclude my argumentation, and to respond to the moaner, *jammerer* and hater: "The promise principle [...] is the moral basis of contract law [the very core of social contract theory], is that principle by which persons *may impose on themselves obligations where none existed before*" (Fried 2015, p. 1, emphasis added). There is an essential difference between the institution of 'promise' and the institution of 'contract'. Fried's 'promissory logic' states that: (i) 'to promise' is a self-imposing practice, such that no one can promise in my place, nor in my name; (ii) therefore, promise has some moral grounds, for in spite its normative foundations, the difference between it and sheer obligation is that its value is lost whenever I am *forced* to promise; and (iii) related to the latter, promise is the conventional instrument for utilizing *trust*. Promise in the form of a linguistic artifact is an invitation to confidence, and confidence always takes into account and envisions (i. e. *assumes*) future behavior (Fried 2015, pp. 7–8).

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Roberto R. Aramayo

Radical and Moderate Enlightenment? The Case of Diderot and Kant


Abstract: I propose the hypothesis that, just as Hume woke him from his dogmatic slumber, and Rousseau revealed the universe of morality to him, Diderot left his mark on the political philosophy of Kant (as George Cavallar and Sankar Muthu note) upon detecting the coincidences between the two authors regarding their cosmopolitanism and anti-imperialism. Here, I begin with the distinction between a radical Enlightenment and a moderate Enlightenment, in order to show that in Kant both tendencies could have coexisted; which would explain the different readings of his thought, as is borne witness to by Heine's famous parable or Kant's continual dialogue with Spinoza. Despite having very different styles, the Kant of the 1790s could have been strongly influenced by the anonymous Diderot of the *Encyclopédie* or the *History of the Two Indies*. It seems quite clear that the critique of colonialism of Diderot-Raynal could have had a notable influence on the Kant of that decade—he of *Theory and Praxis*, *Perpetual Peace*, *The Conflict of the Faculties* and the *Doctrine of Right* (that is, the second part of the *Metaphysics of Morals*).

Die Wesen, deren Dasein zwar nicht auf unserm Willen, sondern der Natur beruht, haben dennoch, wenn si vernunftlose Wesen sind, nur einen relative Werth, als Mittel, und heissen daher *Sachen*, dagegen vernünftige Wesen *Personen* genannt werden, weil ihre Natur ist schon als Zwecke an sich selbst, d.i. als etwas, dass nicht bloss als Mittel gebracht werden darf, auszeichnet, mithin so fern als Willkür einschränkt (und ein Gegenstand der Achtung ist). (Immanuel Kant, *Grundlegung*, AA 04: 428).

Ces préceptes singuliers, je les trouve opposes à la nature, contraires à la raison. Contraires à la nature, parce qu'ils supposent qu'un être sentant, pensant et libre peut être la propriété de'un être semblable à lui. Sur quoi ce droit serait fondé? Ne vois-tu pas qu'on a confondu dans ton pays la chose qui n'a ni sensibilité, ni pensée, ni désir, ni volonté, qu'on quitte et on prend, qu'on garde, qu'on n'échange pas sans qu'elle souffre et sans qu'elle se plaigne, avec la chose qui n'échange point, qui ne s'acquiert point, qui a liberté, volonté, désir, qui se plaint et qui souffre, et qui ne saurait devenir un effect de commerce sans qu'on oublie

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son caractère et qu'on fasse violence à la nature? (Denis Diderot, *Supplément au voyage de Bougainville*, OC 03: 555).

Two Enlightenments?

Authors such as Philipp Blom and Jonathan Israel note that one should distinguish two Enlightenment traditions, one moderate and another much more radical. This thesis has been presented in two relatively recent books, both from 2010. I am referring to *A Wicked Company: The Forgotten Radicalism of the European Enlightenment* and *A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy* (by Blom and Israel respectively).

According to Blom, Kant and Voltaire are the representatives of a moderate Enlightenment (reformist and deist), while the Encyclopedists, led by Diderot and D'Holbach, were committed to a materialist and revolutionary worldview that encouraged an enjoyment of living and promoted the right to live with dignity and in freedom, on the basis of a deeply immanentist philosophy. This second current was inspired by the Western tradition of freethinking, which extends from Epicurus and Lucretius up through Spinoza and Bayle, uses scepticism as a philosophical method and takes the analysis of the passions as the best guide for the understanding of human affairs.

Jonathan Israel further emphasizes that Bayle and Spinoza inspired the most radical ideas of the Encyclopedists, highlighting the fact that Robespierre and the Jacobins viewed the *philosophes* as being courtesans of absolutism, and instead glorified Rousseau and Voltaire, buried in the Pantheon as champions of the French Revolution. However, Israel notes that in reality, the change in mentality had been achieved by the Diderot of the *Encyclopédie*, together with other works that had a huge media impact on that era. This was especially the case for the *Philosophical and Political History of European Settlements and Commerce in the Two Indies*—a true engine of war against the structures of the Ancien Régime, particularly in the last section of the work, where its texts are both quantitatively and qualitatively significant.

According to the readings that Blom and Israel propose, these two contrary Enlightenment traditions had very little to do with one another, with the more radical current having impeded the success of the more moderate path. Nevertheless, although I sympathize greatly with their historiographical strategy, and even more with the effort to highlight the radical nature of the Enlightenment project in its totality, it seems to me that this emphasis should not overshadow the role played by presumably more moderate thinkers. We must redeem Diderot, who is without doubt the thinker that is the most contemporary to us

among the philosophers of his age (Diderot 2009, p. 13–48)—but this should not mean forgetting about the decisive influence exercised on our chaotic times by such important authors as Rousseau and Kant.

As a result, it will be of interest to compare the possible confluences of these two contrary Enlightenment traditions and ask ourselves, for example, whether two of their most outstanding representatives, i.e. Kant and Diderot, are in fact completely antagonistic thinkers, as would be suggested by the strict distinction between the moderate and the radical currents of the Enlightenment; or is there, as I venture to suggest in this inquiry into the possible traces left by Diderot's thought in Kantian philosophy, some family resemblance that reveals a common ancestry?

Indeed, the intellectual circle close to Kant included Raynal, especially thanks to the presence of the abbé at the court of Frederick II (Barcarel 2011, p. 91). Kant himself cited the German translation of the *History of the Two Indies* in one of the editions of his *Physical Geography* (Kant 1816, p. 223: AA 26.1: 280), commenting on the Dutch East Indies Company, which he criticized so much in *Perpetual Peace*. Reconstructing Kant's access to the work of Diderot-Raynal is a tremendously arduous task—one already begun in Jean Ferrari's work *Les sources françaises de la philosophie de Kant* (Ferrari 1979). Simone Goyard-Fabre calls it a mysterious path, and suggests that the researcher will need the investigative skills of a detective due to the very few precedents we have (Goyard-Fabre 1996, p. 127; Quintili 2009, p. 75–89).

Spinoza inside both Enlightenment traditions

Just as many authors of the radical Enlightenment did, Kant maintained a continual dialog with Spinoza (De Flaviis 1986), beginning with his pre-critical writings and continuing through the *Opus postumum*, and featuring in his *Lectures* and in the *Reflections* he noted down for himself. Spinoza, the *alma mater* of the radical Enlightenment, remained for Kant the example of the virtuous atheist, the possibility of whose existence Pierre Bayle had upheld, as we read in the 87th paragraph of the third *Critique*—a paragraph added to its second edition (KU, AA 05, p. 427). On many occasions, Kant described Spinoza as someone of a good heart who behaved as a religious man would do; an atheist who acted morally despite not believing that any superior being would reward his good behaviour with the gift of the supreme good.

On the other hand, that substrate of nature that goes beyond the sensible, and which would be common to mechanism and teleologism, that Something (*Etwas*, with the capital letter; KU, AA 05, p. 466) that Kant referred to in the *Cri-*

tique of Judgment, would relax Kant's famous dualism and bring him closer to the monism of Spinoza (KU, AA 05, pp. 392–393). Indeed, he would recreate the latter's famous *Deus sive Natura* when, in the *Opus posthumum*, he identifies God with self-legislating ethical-practical reason (OP, AA 21, p. 145), since the moral law resides within us and merits worship comparable to that historically rendered to divinity.

One of the sources through which Kant had access to Spinoza may have been the article on Spinozism in the *Encyclopédie*, where Diderot ascribes his own materialism to modern Spinozism (which should not be confused with the older variety, since for the modern thinker there is nothing but matter). Beginning in his first work, *The Sceptic's Walk*, Diderot uses Spinozism to mediate between deists and atheists (Diderot 2016, p. 115). The deist reproaches the atheist for leaving everything in the hands of chance; the atheist responds that one cannot describe the author of an infinite composite whose beginnings, current and final state are unknown; and the Spinozist seeks the origin of the universe within himself, via a careful study of the place that we occupy in it, just as Kant would do with moral law. One might also ask whether Spinoza's *Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order* isn't one of the reasons that Kant wrote part of the Analytics of his *Critique of Practical Reason* in a mathematical style, employing definitions, theorems, scholia, problems, demonstrations and postulates (Aramayo 2013a, p. 22), even when they led to a thesis completely opposed to that of Spinoza's essay.

Spinoza does not seem to serve well as a criterion for distinguishing the radical Enlightenment thinkers from the moderates, given that both Diderot and Kant share an admiration for and interest in him, as has been the case for a good portion of modern thinkers. In some way, the case of Spinoza bears witness—as I stated earlier in regard to Raynal—to the fact that the walls between the representatives of both tendencies of the Enlightenment project are quite porous. It would thus be wrong to treat the thought of the thinkers on each side as residing in sealed or even contradictory compartments.

Heine's testimony

Of course, it would be difficult to make Kant fit entirely within the limits of the moderate Enlightenment if one accepts how Heine describes him in *On the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany*. The passage in question is well-known, thanks to its extraordinary rhetorical appeal. Heine tells the French that they are much more prudish than the Germans. After taking the Bastille, the only thing the French managed to do was kill a king, who had in fact already lost his head long before he had been decapitated. In reality, Heine continues,

one does too much honour to Robespierre when one compares him to Kant. Robespierre could lose his temper in bloody fashion, but when it came to the Supreme Being, he washed his bloody hands and put on his Sunday clothes. In contrast, the ruthless Kant was able to storm the heavens, annihilating their entire garrison and even the soldiers of their ontological, cosmological and psycho-theological corps. God himself, now lacking even a demonstration of his own existence, has succumbed, and there is no longer any divine mercy, nor a Father's goodness, nor even any future recompense for present-day privations. The immortality of the soul is on its death bed. One hears nothing but moans and death rattles. In the face of this spectacle, the faithful servant Lampe becomes frightened and breaks out in tears. So Kant has pity on him and shows that he is not merely a great philosopher, but also a good man, using the magic wand of the practical reason to resuscitate the God that had been condemned by theoretical reason. It is very possible, adds Heine, that Kant undertook that resurrection not only because of compassion for Lampe, but also because he feared the police.

To finish off his clever and instructive piece of satire, Heine noted another subtle parallelism. Just as some had claimed that Robespierre was an agent of the British prime minister, there were also those who, in a totally confused manner, thought that Kant had made a secret pact with his adversaries, and that he had destroyed all the philosophical proofs of the existence of God in order to let the world know that one could never arrive at knowledge of God via one's reason, so as to imply that we should instead rely on revealed truth. This is the point of Heine's story that I wished to recall.

Family resemblance between Diderot and Kant

My hypothesis is that, while it might be very difficult to prove, it would not be strange if the influence of Diderot on Kant were similar to that of Rousseau (Aramayo 2015a, p. 53; 2005, p. 237–252; 2006, p. 17–54; 2016, p. 11–60; cf. 2017, p. 123–135), which Kant himself recognizes, and which is easy to trace in his texts, as I myself have emphasized on various occasions. Indeed, I have become ever more convinced that if the scepticism of Hume was able to wake Kant from his dogmatic slumber (Prol, AA 04, p. 260) and Rousseau opened the moral universe to him (HN AA 20, p. 44; cf. Aramayo, 2013b, p. 16–36), Diderot might have been the one who opened his eyes to the world of politics, through certain articles in the *Encyclopédie* and his anonymous contributions to the *History of the Two Indies*. In this view, Diderot may have had a great influence on Kant's political and even legal reflections—despite the fact that Kant did not cite him, be-

cause he did not know of his role in the authorship of these two collective works (which we nevertheless know that Kant read).

Recently more attention has been paid to the paradoxical intensity of this indirect relationship. Georg Cavallar, in a recent book about Kantian cosmopolitanism, relates that he was very surprised to discover that, in regards to hospitality and cosmopolitanism, Diderot was so close to Kant, despite the fact that “his publications did not form part of [Kant’s] library, and it is not clear that he influenced him” (Cavallar 2015, p. 60).

It was certainly not unusual that Kant lacked a copy of the *Encyclopédie* in his personal library, given how much it cost, but it would have been highly unlikely that he did not have access to it via the library of his university. The presence of the preliminary discourse attributed to D’Alembert, noted at the beginning, offers proof of the attention dedicated to this immense collective work. It is worth bearing in mind that as early as 1759, Kant had recommended to his students and correspondents (such as Herder and Hamann) that they read Diderot and the articles he wrote for the *Encyclopédie*—although he certainly lacked any knowledge of his authorship—and even proposed that Hamann translate some of them (cf. the letter of Georg Hamann to Kant of July 27, 1759, Br, AA 10, p. 9). This exchange of letters indirectly tells us that Kant knew the first volumes of the *Encyclopédie* and might have had access to such articles written by Diderot as “Political Authority”, “Citizen”, “Eclecticism”, “Encyclopédie” and “Philosopher”—and it is equally likely that he paid attention to the later volumes that appeared up through 1765.

Let us take a look at these lines of the article “Eclecticism”:

The eclectic is a philosopher who, treading on prejudice, tradition, authority, in a word, everything that subjugates the masses, *dares to think for himself*, to trace things back to the clearest general principles, examine them, discuss them, *to admit nothing except what the testimony of his experience and his reason tells him*; and on the basis of all the philosophies that he has analysed without partiality creates a philosophy that is his own. He is not at all a man who plants or sows, but rather one who gathers and *winnows* [italics RRA].

This text is later echoed by Kant, beginning with that ‘winnowing’ that must subject everything to the sieve and strainer of reason itself (albeit without forgetting experience) and putting aside the prejudices that arguments from authority invariably involve, since everything must be subjected to critique and to the tribunal of reason.

Diderot and Kant explicitly share one of the principal goals of the Enlightenment program. This daring to rely on one’s own understanding, which Kant identifies as the banner of the Enlightenment, corresponds closely to the ‘dar[ing] to think for yourself’ that Diderot had formulated some years previously in his *En-*

cyclopédie article. Both Kant and Diderot want to free the human being from all moral or political tutelage and to advocate an Enlightenment that allows us to leave behind our ‘guilty minority of age’, to use the Kantian expression. Diderot envisages the *Encyclopédie* as having this same objective: its mission is to change the common way of thinking, promoting thinking for one’s self thanks to those cross references that permit each reader to extract his own conclusions, by combining different perspectives on a single problem (Aramayo 2012, p. 357–385; 2015b, p. 319–338). In *What is the Enlightenment?*—a text from 1784, the year in which Diderot died—Kant advocates an ‘authentic reform in our way of thinking’ that would annihilate prejudices. The dynamic of the public use of reason, together with the Kantian consciousness of the pragmatic reality of our human condition, could well reflect an attempt to compose something analogous to what Diderot designed with the great project of the *Encyclopédie*.

In *Pro and Contra*, Diderot holds that “posterity is for the philosopher what the other world is for the religious man”—something that, as I have maintained elsewhere, Kant would subscribe to with his philosophy of history, where the postulate of the immortality of the soul is translated to that asymptotic meeting of the species with its destiny that marks the handover to the new generation (Aramayo 1992, p. 114–115). Similarly, the end of the *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* proposes a ‘philosophical history’ with a clearly political purpose, i.e. the channelling of the ambition of the heads of State and their servants towards the only means that can enable them to ‘conquer a glorious memory in posterity’ (WA, AA 08. p. 31). Here Kant is speaking very like Diderot, who speaks of monuments carved in the memories of men, consecrated to the champions of freedom and technical inventions, who he personifies at one point in the figures of Las Casas and Benjamin Franklin respectively (Skrzypeck 1995, p. 79–88).

Another set of traits that might reveal a family resemblance between Diderot and Kant are the esoteric and exoteric aspects of our two authors. After the traumatic experience of being imprisoned at Vincennes, Diderot decided to fool the censors with the cross references of the *Encyclopédie* and his anonymous pages in the *History of the Two Indies*, abandoning his novels and other writings in a drawer, hoping that they might be enjoyed by posterity. Kant also used a different style in his classes (in which, apart from his most lay-oriented courses, he was obligated to follow a textbook) than he did in his published writings and in the *Reflections* that he wrote strictly for himself. It is as though he had wanted his *Nachlass* to find another kind of readership with the passage of time—something very much in agreement with his distinction between a public use of reason (intended for an educated universe of readers) and a private use in the exercise of a trusted function (WA, AA 08, p. 37).

Cosmopolitanism, anticolonialism¹ and the Rights of Man

Whatever the case may be, there is at least one author who has clearly highlighted the Kantian debt to a Diderot immersed in political intervention. Sankar Muthu, in his book *Enlightenment against Empire*, argues that Diderot's radical political and historical writings appear to have had an influence on Kant, and goes so far as to hold that "in many regards Kant represents the spirit, and on occasion the letter, of Diderot's anti-imperialism" (Muthu 2003, p. 123)—so much so that certain aspects of his political philosophy can be said to be cut from the same cloth. Georg Cavallar, despite not providing any conclusive proofs, also emphasizes the analytic coincidences between the idea of cosmopolitanism in Kant and in Diderot (Cavallar 2015, p. 60–63). For the latter also distinguishes, in his contribution to the *History of the Two Indies*, between a right of necessity, a right of visitation, a right to be a guest and a right to establish oneself in a territory, making the right of visitation a perfect right in the case that the traveller's life is in danger. In contrast, the right to be the guest of a foreigner would be imperfect and contingent, and would only be activated if there was an agreement between the two parties. This is a classification very close to what Kant provides in *Perpetual Peace*, where he distances himself substantially from the principles of traditional international law, which tended much more strongly to legitimate the right of European peoples to settle in the New World.

Another point at which Diderot and Kant fully coincide is their clear anticolonialism (Benot 1970), which in the case of the latter really began to flower beginning in the second half of the 1790s. Furthermore, what Pauline Kleingeld has called *Kant's second thoughts on colonialism*—and, a little earlier, *Kant's second thoughts on race* (Kleingeld 2007, p. 573–592; 2014, p. 43–67)—which she sees as a somewhat capricious change in approach on his part, could have been due to his reading of the Diderot-Raynal work.

Of course, the symmetry of their approaches must be viewed through the prism of two different styles that respond to equally diverse personalities and circumstances. This occurs when Kant, in his *Doctrine of Right*, rejects as reprehensible the colonization of new lands that had been previously occupied by force or by fraudulent purchase, making use of European superiority, and without taking into account their prior possession, in order to give the savage peoples a legal

¹ For a more extensive treatment of what I have noted here, I refer the reader to my forthcoming work coauthored with Nuria Sánchez Madrid.

status, something that would validate the use of any dishonourable means whatsoever, and which he judges to be a cloak for injustice, or 'Jesuitism' (MS, A 06, p. 266). For his part, the Diderot of the Supplement refers to Jesuitism with a very different style, offering this description of the Jesuits in Paraguay:

Those cruel Spartans in black habits behaved with their Indian slaves like the Lacedaemonians with their helots: they condemned them to continual work, they gave them no right to property, they kept them brutish and tied down with superstition, they demanded deep veneration from them, walked among them with a whip in hand and lashed every age and sex without distinction. (Supplement, OC II., p. 542)

The critique that Kant directed at colonialist practices at the end of his life parallels in good measure the demand that should be made of the traders, missionaries and emissaries of European powers, i.e. that they behave in a respectful way towards the law that should rule over their contacts with the so-called 'savages'. In Diderot's view, European nations should judge their behaviour by placing themselves in the place of the other. Just as Kant does, he criticizes the fact that when European voyagers come to a region of the New World that is not occupied by any people of the Old World, they immediately decide that that land belongs to them.

What would they think if some savages, upon landing upon their coasts, did something similar? How can they claim any right at all over men who are similar to them, or over the products of their lands?

For isn't the nature of property the same in every land, based on taking possession through work, and on a long and pacific enjoyment? Europeans, can you tell me at what distance from your residence this sacred title becomes invalidated? At twenty paces? At ten leagues? You say not. Well then, neither does it lose effect at ten thousand leagues. (*Of the Colonies in General*, OC III, p. 697)

Subscribing *avant-la-lettre* to one of the pillars of Kantian cosmopolitan law, Diderot speaks to us of the 'hospitality' that voyagers have had the occasion to enjoy, for instance in Brazil. He also coincides with Kant in holding that the spirit of commerce is a guarantee of peace, since a war between nations of traders is like a devastating fire, when bankruptcies become a question of State. Although Kant is not as explicit in his theses concerning non-European cultures, it is perhaps precisely for that reason that his reflections have a deeper theoretical basis and have been as much or more fecund than those put forth by Diderot. Without doubt, the Kantian approach pays more attention to the legal difficulties that the European powers encountered in justifying their occupation and annexation of territories on other continents, which leads him to emphasize the rights acquired over their territories by peoples without States. As K. Flikschuh has emphasized,

what is most characteristic of Kant's legal cosmopolitanism is his attention to the form, i. e. to the mere formality of the contact that should take place between different peoples, independently of their degree of civil maturity.

A final coincidence that I would like to emphasize, in this inquiry into a possible family resemblance between the political philosophies of Diderot and Kant, is the enthusiasm they had for the American and French revolutions. In a famous note to paragraph 65 of the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant refers to the French Revolution as an example of the transformation of a political body into a true organism (although we do not have any evidence of any similar reactions to the American Revolution). Diderot, who could not opine on the French Revolution, since he had died five years prior, did comment on the American one, which in his judgment could provide:

... all the inhabitants of Europe with a refuge against fanaticism and tyranny, and instruct those who govern men on the legitimate use of authority, aiding in the prevention of an extremely unequal distribution of wealth and the corruption of morals. (*Essay on the Reigns of Claudius and Nero*, OC I, p. 1197)

For his part, as is well known, the Kant of the *Conflict of the Faculties* makes the French Revolution into a landmark of the moral progress of humanity; and he goes on in even more depth in Reflection 8077, but I will refrain from going into greater detail regarding these well-known texts.

Conclusion

In my view, the Kant of the 1790s, i. e. the author of *Theory and Practice*, *Perpetual Peace*, *The Metaphysics of Morals* and *The Conflict of the Faculties*, becomes more intelligible if we postulate that he knew (though in what was surely an unconscious manner) the battle writings of Diderot—those two intellectual engines of war that are the *Encyclopédie* and the *History of the Two Indies*.

I would like to say that Kant read Diderot, without knowing he did so, and that the latter revealed to him the global condition of politics, just as Rousseau had done for him regarding the moral universe. Thus, I believe that it is plausible to claim that Diderot had an impact on the political thought of Kant. “Force me to be silent about religion and government, and I will have nothing else to say”, says Diderot in *The Sceptic's Walk*, and it is precisely to these two topics—the throne and the altar—that Kant dedicates his writings of the 1790s, probably under the unknown influence of Diderot.

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- Br *Briefe*, AA 10–13.
 HN *Handschriftlicher Nachlass*, AA 14–23.
 KU *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790), AA 5: 167–485.
 MS *Die Metaphysik der Sitten* (1797), AA 6: 205–492.
 OP *Opus postumum*, AA 21–22.
 ProI *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysique* (1783), AA 4.
 WA *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?* (1784), AA 8: 35–42.

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Efraín Lazos

Hospitality, Coercion and Peace in Kant

Abstract: In this essay, I discuss Kant's right of hospitality in *Toward Perpetual Peace*. In the proposed reading, the right of hospitality protects foreigners from the xenophobic practices of the locals, while protecting the locals from the colonial practices of foreigners. The main question guiding this paper is whether hospitality is for Kant a moral injunction calling for a 'humane' treatment of foreigners; or whether it is rather a right *sensu strictu*—namely, one that entails full coercive authority against violations. I argue that once the connections between the dilemma of coercion and the so-called 'institutionalization dilemma' are properly understood, they may be resolved in favor of the first option, namely, coercion. Additionally, by examining the notions of non-centralized coercion and transnational political participation, this paper explores a way to match hospitality's need of coercion with Kant's federalist proposal.

Hospitality, as we know, is about what is due to strangers. By its very nature, hospitality lives at the threshold of the polity; it appears at the geographical and political borders, at the fringes, and overlaps between those who share a civil space and those who are alien to it, between resident communities in a given territory and the individuals who show up in that space. Thus, hospitality occupies the space between what is due to persons as members of a specific community, and what is due to them independently of that, merely as human agents. It is precisely this interstitial character of hospitality that opens it up to a decisive ambivalence. Is hospitality a sort of moral obligation that is somehow grounded in our common humanity, or is it a strict right, a coercive norm to which individuals, groups, and—notice—autonomous political entities are subject? This interrogation is the subject of this essay.

The right to hospitality

That strangers ought not to be treated with hostility is perhaps the least one can accord to the concept of hospitality. That they should be given rights, even political rights, is not, however, what most people in today's nationalistic times would grant. Although Kant said relatively little concerning the nature of hospi-

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tality in general, the *right* to hospitality is, for him, what defines cosmopolitanism as a world political project (*ZeF* 8:349).¹ Indeed, Kant found a normative void in the relations between foreigners, considered individually, and collective political entities, or receptor states. This void, as he saw it, could not be filled by the traditional law of peoples, centered as it was on the conditions for just war. Kant's focus is not on just any form of hospitality, but on that arising in the clearly asymmetrical situation in which foreign persons individually encounter the authority and power of national states. The philosopher's proposal to the European powers of his time (in his 1795 philosophical masterpiece, *Toward Perpetual Peace*) was not to have them agree on certain by-laws for waging war and for a new balance of power (*MdS* 6:352).² Rather, it lay in the idea that peace and hospitality must go together. For Kant, as is well known, *perpetual* peace is the idea of a peaceful, 'even if not necessarily friendly', community of peoples.³ It is precisely this sort of peace that demands the protection of strangers.

Here, however, Kant's text opens itself up to two diverging interpretations as to how exactly the protection of strangers is to be understood.⁴ In one interpretation, his proposal would be a sort of moral call on the powers of Europe of his time not to treat foreign visitors with hostility, and perhaps to grant material assistance (asylum and refuge) to those persons who were displaced by the wars those same powers undertook. In this reading, more generally, this is not a call for the full, legal protection of foreigners, but an attempt at encouraging 'humane' treatment of foreigners in disgrace.⁵ Compliance or non-compliance, if it

1 (See bibliography for abbreviated references) From Francisco de Vitoria to Hugo Grotius, Kant is far from being alone in considering hospitality as some sort of right of strangers. See also: Cavallar 2002.

2 Perhaps the main historical reference of Kant's political intervention in this text is the peace treaty between France and Prussia, known as the Peace of Basel, signed in April 1795. As a result, Prussia lost territory on the left bank of the Rhine, and post-revolutionary France became recognized as a contending party in the power game of the European monarchies of the time. *Toward Perpetual Peace* was published in Königsberg in August 1795.

3 In contrast to a truce or an armistice, perpetual peace is not conditioned by the satisfaction of certain demands and claims. It is, furthermore, the earthly peace of the living, not the eternal peace of the dead. As an idea of reason, perpetual peace has normative force for individual and collective agents even if the political state of affairs it purports to represent is never fully attainable. See: Anderson-Gold 2010.

4 To my knowledge, Kant's right of hospitality as such has not received the attention it deserves among Kantian scholars, nor among those in the orbit of international law theories and 'humanitarian' studies.

5 Although he does not talk directly about hospitality as such, Jürgen Habermas suggests that Kant is here "forced to rely exclusively on each government's own moral self-binding" (Habermas 1997, p. 118).

is at all a consideration, is always up to the agents' will. An alternative interpretation takes the call to protect foreigners as a call to design and erect the political institutions that would realize that protection. Such a realization would include encouragement and active recognition of hospitality (e.g., in public programs), *as well as* a legal expression, with coercive authority over violators.

These two interpretations may also be put in the form of a dilemma. Let us bear in mind that for Kant, although any strict right (*jus strictum*) is “connected with an authorization to use coercion”, sometimes people think of a right in a wider sense (*jus latium*), such that “no law by which an authorization to use coercion can be determined” (*MdS* 6:234). Thus, we see the dilemma of coercion: hospitality is either a right merely in a manner of speaking, so that a violation of it would not carry punishable consequences (it would instead be up to the violating agent's conscience to recognize the damage and to repair it); or it is a strict right, in which case a group of competent judges (together with a whole juridical system) is required to enforce it.

It is not to be assumed that the issues raised by these mutually exclusive readings of Kant can be settled only by textual evidence. This paper aims to show that, despite their historical limits, Kant's thoughts on cosmopolitan rule are fully consistent with the second horn of the dilemma—namely, the idea that hospitality requires foreigners to be *legally* protected. Furthermore, I argue that the *way in which* Kant conceives of such legal protection has important lessons to teach us for today's planetary politics of peace. While the role of the right to hospitality may appear on the surface to be merely to enable the legal protection of strangers, the theoretical complexity required to design the institutions that would provide such protection is enormous. While these institutions—the institutions of peace—are meant to be expressions of practices that are in line with categorical morality and republican political ideals, they must inevitably be erected in conditions of intersubjective and collective violence. Here, too, Kant's contribution remains wide and deep. In particular, Kantian hospitality points at a mode of cosmopolitan institution-building that combines full coercive authority with clear respect for the autonomy of peoples. As we shall see, his proposal continues to challenge received ideas about state borders, political power and what is due to strangers.

Neither xenophobia nor colonialism

In *Toward Perpetual Peace*, Kant refers to hospitality as a general restriction (*Einschränkung*) that applies to certain agents within a cosmopolitan right. Those limits combine, at least potentially, the possibility of an immense variety

of hospitality practices, with principles that cover the treatment of foreigners by public authorities and private citizens. Such principles concern both the objects of hospitality (foreign nationals as well as stateless persons) and the subjects of it (states or political collectives, and individual agents acting in their name). Under the general principle of hospitality, foreigners have the right to appear, to present themselves, in the space of another people and not to be treated with hostility; the receptor state, in turn, is endowed with the power to refuse admission. This power, however, has limits: if the foreign person has fallen into disgrace and presents herself as being in a precarious situation, it is not permissible for the receptor state to reject admission, nor to undertake any action which would increase the person's vulnerability. Put otherwise, the foreign person enjoys certain immunities *vis-à-vis* the power of the state—not to be treated with hostility, and not to have her vulnerability increased. Although this immunity is limited to her attempt to make contact with the local community, the state in turn has a limited power to expel foreigners, namely, to use violence and force them out. One can see here, in a nutshell, the sense in which a cosmopolitan right may be seen as *limited* to conditions of hospitality (*ZeF* 8:357).

Notice that such a restriction has momentous implications in understanding the status of foreign individuals, as well as the nature of state power under a cosmopolitan world order. And notice that, within the framework of Kantian hospitality, the admission of a foreign person is mandatory in those cases (at a physical border such as a river or an ocean) where rejection would likely lead to her demise. Hence, in that case admission is enforced—at least until the circumstances change. Now the principle of hospitality also limits the right of access to a territory, for no foreign individual or collective has an *a priori* right to *establish* itself in a foreign territory—unless there is an *ex professo* treatise or contract. Interestingly, this includes, for Kant, the territories of so-called stateless peoples. In other words, the establishment of foreign colonies in the space of a people is only possible under conditions of mutual consent. Otherwise, the situation is *colonialism*, and colonialism is evidently opposed to perpetual peace.

At this point, one might already appreciate that hospitality is a dual principle: on the one hand, a people's political autonomy draws a limit for the foreign cosmopolitan traveler; on the other, the autonomy of persons (and presumably, such universal properties of human agency as rationality and dignity) puts a limit on the treatment of foreign persons by state power. Hospitality as a cosmopolitan principle is at once a protection for foreign persons against the xenopho-

bic practices of the locals, and a protection for the locals against the colonial practices of foreigners.⁶

Two grounds for Kantian hospitality?

How is this unique principle of a cosmopolitan right justified, according to Kant? One direct, yet complex answer is twofold: by the rational nature of human agency, and by the planetary condition of human life. The former explains the innate right to freedom, which in turn is the basis of any justified claim to a right; the latter explains the contingent fact that, ultimately, we are all neighbors, so that sooner or later we are bound to interact with those who are different from us—strangers. Here we have a combination of two important and complex theories whose details we cannot delve into in much depth here: Kant's moral theory, and his historic-geographic theory of the human species on planet Earth.

Concerning the former, let us briefly recall that, for Kant, our moral duties are not derived from our somewhat incidental, personal bonds with others, even though they apply to our coordinated actions with others. Furthermore, recall that the source of moral bindingness lies only in human rationality. This is not only the capacity for setting oneself certain ends and acting accordingly, but, first and foremost, a capacity for self-governance in acting purposefully: autonomy. In the *Doctrine of Right*, Kant gives this idea of human agency a particular expression:

Freedom (independence from being constrained by another's choice), insofar as it can co-exist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity. (*MdS* 8:238)

Given that human action, by its own nature, presupposes the capacity of the agent for setting and pursuing ends in a self-governed way, an absence of coercion may be seen as a non-acquired right of all human agents. Coercion—being forced to act for the ends and maxims of others—is a threat to what humans are, namely, creatures capable of autonomy. This is why the right to freedom, understood as an absence of coercion, may be seen as a pre-contractual right—and in this sense, as an innate or non-acquired right. In other words, human agents have the right to freedom just by virtue of being the rational, autonomous beings that they are. Freedom in this sense—lawful non-domination, one may say—is

⁶ Kleingeld has emphasized the anticolonial aspect of Kant's hospitality in *Toward Perpetual Peace*, but she appears to miss the anti-xenophobic one. See: Kleingeld 2012, p.72.

the source of all other (acquired) rights. We may say, then, that our rational nature is the source of all duties and all rights for human agents.

On the other hand, in Kant's work on history, as well as in his lectures on pragmatic anthropology and physical geography, there appears the important notion of a planetary condition: the fact that the surface of the Earth is round needs to be taken into account as an indispensable element in the social arrangement leading to peace—what could be called the 'civil condition', in which social coordination enjoys a maximum of freedom for individual agents, together with a maximum of order or security. In *Toward Perpetual Peace*, the fact that the extension of the Earth that is adequate for human life is finite, and the fact that humans cannot just indefinitely disperse themselves along the surface of the planet, are grounds for the belief that, sooner or later, we are bound to meet human difference. Hence a possible motto for the planetary condition could be: In the end, we are all neighbors. In the *Doctrine of Right* (1797), the planetary condition shows up in the idea of an original community of the land (*ursprüngliche Gemeinschaft der Bodens*). This ought not to be understood as a communal possession of the surface of the Earth, but rather as the idea that all humans "are originally (namely, prior to any act of choice that establishes a right) in legitimate possession of land, that is, they have the right to be wherever nature or chance (apart from their will) has placed them..." (*MdS* 8:262)⁷

In another paper, I suggested that Kantian cosmopolitanism may be understood as an answer to the question of how autonomous agents deal with difference and, ultimately, with violence.⁸ Here, in the discussion of the right to hospitality, one may find another example of such an idea. Freedom—the innate right of human agents to act independently of another's choice—together with the planetary condition, warrants the derivation of the two previously identified aspects of Kant's right of hospitality: anticolonialism and anti-xenophobia. It is clear that, under the planetary condition, there is bound to be interaction, or *commercium*, among individuals and peoples. Non-domination, in turn, provides the theoretical space for the notion that persons (and groups) need not stay in the same place of residence in which the contingencies of geography and history have put them, and have the non-acquired right to seek the satisfaction of their needs and goals wherever their talents and resources may take them. From the planetary condition and the innate right to freedom, individual persons have the

⁷ This is sometimes referred to with the expression 'the right to have rights', covering stateless persons and peoples. See: Derrida 2001; Höffe 2006.

⁸ See: Lazos, "Contextos del cosmopolitismo kantiano". In: Rivera, F. / Rodríguez Aramayo, R. (Eds.): *La filosofía práctica de Kant*. México, Bogotá: UNAM / UNC (forthcoming).

right of visitation, namely, the right to present themselves in the space of another people and not to be treated with hostility. Visitors, in turn, are not therefore authorized to interfere in the sphere of freedom of the hosting people, just as the receiving individuals and collectives are not authorized to reject visitors when such rejection would endanger them. In the latter case, Kant goes as far as saying that receiving states have the duty to accept them as visitors for as long as the external conditions remain, no matter what the material costs are. There is little doubt that Kant is here pointing to what we now know as the right of asylum.

Utopianism and the dilemma of coercion

In the text of the third definitive article of *Toward Perpetual Peace*, there seems to be little doubt that the practical principle of hospitality bears the possibility of coercion of certain types of actions. In this, hospitality seems to be like any other right in the narrow sense. It is true, however, that Kant aims at distinguishing a right that is created by a contract (e.g., at a hotel's front desk) from the right of hospitality understood as a right of visitation. It is relatively easy to jump from there to the conclusion that hospitality is a right without the possibility of claiming it [*ohne Anspruch*]; and from there in turn it is easy to draw the conclusion that hospitality is a right *latio sensu*, namely, a right without coercion.

There is an answer—or, better put, a glimpse of an answer—in these celebrated and perhaps moving words:

Since the (narrower or wider) community of peoples of the earth has now gone so far that a violation of right in one place of the Earth makes itself felt in all others, the idea of a cosmopolitan right is no fantastic and exaggerated way of representing that right; it is, instead, a supplement to the unwritten code of the right of the state as well as that of peoples for the sake of any public rights of human beings and so for perpetual peace. (*ZeF* 8:360)

It must not be forgotten that, in this passage, Kant has already denounced 'the litany of evils' inflicted by European powers on the colonized peoples of America and Africa. This indicates that Kant was not naïve at all in his political-philosophical proposal, and that he clearly recognized asymmetries in power relationships. In one of its aims, the quoted passage is directed at preventing a possible accusation of utopianism in the proposal of cosmopolitan hospitality. Utopianism in this context would consist of imposing the satisfaction of certain goals or duties without giving a clue as to how to reach them. Hence, the Kantian cosmopolitan proposal would be utopian if it proposed a planetary juridical order restricted to hospitality without giving a clue as to how to reach it—especially

in those situations in which the colonial European powers impose their conditions on the rest of the world. Kant's answer is what could be called the 'political condition' of perpetual peace.

Not only does this political condition refer to the necessary coordination between rational agents (i. e., as legislative members of a kingdom of ends), but also, and above all, to the requisite of building up a world community on the basis of the active political participation of cosmopolitan citizens. In other words, the political condition is composed of the idea of the community of peoples of the Earth, and of the idea of cosmopolitan political participation. For Kant, it is this community of peoples—one in perpetual construction—that may counteract the colonialist and expansionist undertakings of European powers; and it is the existence of this community that allows for a certain historical optimism. Sooner or later (this may be Kant's hidden optimistic reasoning), the right of hospitality will be backed by the possibility of effective coercion by cosmopolitan authorities that are fully legitimized by the community of peoples. This is what would constitute the project of making explicit the implicit code generated by the human right to freedom, and what would complete the project of creating peace through rights.

Kantian optimism in relation to the political condition springs, at least in part, from the conviction that, being more visible for free citizens and self-governed peoples, violations of a public cosmopolitan right will tend to decrease. The extent to which moral indignation in the face of violations of the right of persons and of peoples move the citizens of the world to political participation, and to force their authorities to take an active role in the prevention and punishment of those violations, is the extent to which we may expect the rise of cosmopolitan institutions that promote a peaceful future.

It would be anachronistic to share Kant's optimism on his same historical grounds. He may well have been allowed to be optimistic in his own times, so as to think that extraterritorial political participation (which is the ultimate meaning of the construction of a community of peoples) could attenuate and counteract the unmeasured ambitions of European powers. The political and moral violence of the last century may or may not warrant skepticism *vis-à-vis* Kant's historical optimism.

In retrospect, the groundbreaking idea that the violation of a right in one part of the world is felt everywhere seems to presuppose that there is no distance between what agents feel (e. g., moral indignation in the face of an atrocity) and what they actually do (i. e., actively participate in the defense and expansion of political freedom for persons and peoples all over the world). Indeed, the innate right to freedom, which dictates the unwritten codex of the rights of humanity, finds its political expression in the republican mode of governance by a people.

The republic, understood, as Kant does, as collective self-governance, is the mode of social coordination that makes political freedom possible. Political freedom is freedom under external laws. This is then how the idea may be understood that the violation of republican law in one place is felt in all other places: if the right of a single human is injured, the rights of all others are also injured—an instant generalization, through political means, of the effects of an attack on human freedom. Presumably, although this is more conjectural, a successful defense of, or even an advancement in the expansion of human freedom would make itself felt in all places.

If the latter is correct as a sketch, in the details we find important difficulties. The republican mode of social coordination allows the communicability of feeling in the face of a violation of the right to hospitality. This means that only those agents living in and organized under a republic are able have that feeling. The republican feeling, as it may be called, is not of course a natural feeling; it is cultivated and, in part, a product of a revolution or turn in the self conception of persons, of peoples, and of the community of peoples. It becomes evident, then, that for Kant, the republican institutions—with their separation of powers, their principle of publicity and their equalitarian conditions of membership and participation—are the ones that can uphold the principle of hospitality. What, then, is the problem of institutionalization?

Jürgen Habermas has clearly described this situation: at the beginning of the twenty-first century, there are international institutions that enjoy relatively high moral authority and consensus among peoples, but have very scarce capacity of enforcement, while at the same time the logic of the equilibrium of forces prevails among military powers that have a high capacity of enforcement (Borradori 2003). Briefly, the problem of the institutionalization of cosmopolitanism lies in the fact that the possibilities of execution of the right to hospitality are manifestly insufficient *vis-à-vis* its reiterated and systematic violations by military powers.⁹

It should be obvious that, for Kant, cosmopolitan rule is not meant as a substitute for national rule, but to supplement it. Supplementation, however, leads directly to the institutionalization dilemma: either an expanding federation of republics is the way to reconcile the national and the cosmopolitan orders, and no public law is established; or a world state is instituted, but law is not realized on the basis of the right to freedom (Höffe 2006, p.140). It is well known that Kant,

⁹ See: Kleingeld 2012, p.86. Habermas is currently an advocate for the ‘constitutionalization of international law’; i. e., for “the process of extending democracy and the rule of law beyond national borders” (Habermas 2014, p.5).

in the second definitive article of *Toward Perpetual Peace*, adopts the first horn of the dilemma. Thus, federalism is a way of avoiding the need for special cosmopolitan institutions—judges and enforcement apparatuses with transnational jurisdiction. Sometimes this is seen as a sort of concession on Kant’s part to political realism or expediency; he was so keenly aware of the barriers to cosmopolitan institution-building erected by national sovereignty, that “he conceived of the cosmopolitan community as a federation of states, not of world-citizens” (Habermas 1997, p. 117).

At this point one can appreciate that the dilemma of coercion arises from the first horn of the institutionalization dilemma. Notice that here, the right to hospitality cannot be enforced, because there is actually no institutional authority to do so. This encourages the following reasoning: since under federalism there are no special cosmopolitan institutions to appeal to in case of a warranted claim to hospitality, hospitality is not enforceable; but if it is not enforceable (the reasoning continues) then it cannot be a strict right, and the cornerstone of cosmopolitanism amounts to nothing more than a moral injunction directed at otherwise unchecked state agents.

Things are, however, more complex. It is evident that from the contingent fact that a certain law cannot be enforced at a given point of time, it does not follow that the law is invalid, nor that it carries no coercion. The link between the two dilemmas—that of coercion and that of institutionalization—hangs fundamentally on how federalism and cosmopolitanism are seen to be articulated in *Toward Perpetual Peace*. While federalism is the answer to the question of lawful interstate relations, cosmopolitanism answers the question of the lawful relations between states and foreign individuals. The usual understanding of that articulation takes states (in the sense of unified peoples under republican laws) to be the basic agents of federalism, and takes cosmopolitanism to be only a supplement of federalism, covering a residue of normativity that was not previously contemplated. Note, however, that if Kant’s second definitive article does not solve the question of the legitimacy of interstate coercion, then there will evidently be a pending problem with cosmopolitan coercion in the case of a violation of hospitality. In such a case, the dilemma of coercion insists and persists.

There is another possible understanding of such an articulation—if one takes individual persons to be the basic agents of the process towards perpetual peace. While it is true that federalism grapples with the problem of the legitimacy of coercion among states, in this reading, however, it is federalism that requires cosmopolitanism. In other words, the legitimacy of coercion under a federation of republican peoples—a *faedum pacificum*—depends on the possibility of fully exercising the right to hospitality. On the path to perpetual peace, there would be little sense in declaring interstate relations lawful and peaceful

when individuals coming from outside the community have no protection from natural or human-caused disasters, and when there is no cosmopolitan restriction to the exploitation and private appropriation of the resources of other peoples. Federal coercion, under this reading, depends on cosmopolitan coercion. In other words, interstate coercion can only be legitimate if the rights of foreigners as such enjoy some sort of warrant.

Non-centralized coercive power and transnational political participation

My own position is aligned with the latter understanding of the articulation between federalism and cosmopolitanism. The problem of the legitimacy of coercion, under republican conditions, does not get solved once and for all. On the one hand, this is due to the desideratum that the republic may be perfected by learning from its errors; on the other hand, and most importantly, legitimacy is not a totalizing concept referring to a property that something has or has not, once and for all. Kant considers this problem from different angles in his political thought. One may say that legitimacy lies in the simultaneous realization of the idea of self-government in diverse contexts or frameworks. In the context of what is true about the individual agent, legitimacy is present as a process by which a given inhabitant of the Earth becomes a world citizen; in a collective framework, as the transformation of a mere aggregate of persons and groups (sustaining among themselves a war with some degree of intensity) into one republican people; in the context of the community of peoples, by the transformation of permanent interstate war into a *cosmopolis*—a political and juridical order that is structurally able to admit conflict and dissent, and which potentially includes all the peoples of the Earth. There is a logic of this sort in the three definitive articles of *Toward Perpetual Peace*—a logic that leads to two quite innovative elements of political philosophy in Kant's time, and are perhaps uncomfortable in our times: the idea of a non-centralized coercive power, and the idea of transnational political participation. I will now take up these two ideas in turn.

The idea of a non-centralized coercive power springs from the break of the republican reductivist maxim according to which many peoples under one law are one people (*ZeF* 8:354; *MdS* 6:343). In a republic, political power (*Gewalt*) comes from the unified will of the people, so there is a vertical relation (one of subordination) between individual agents—the citizens with political privileges—and the republican power whose purpose is to uphold those privileges. Ver-

ticality, however, becomes a serious problem for interstate relations. This is one of the reasons why the formula of a *Weltrepublik*—a republic of republics—is ultimately unable to capture the desired, peaceful relations among peoples. The main problem with that proposal is not that, given its long-term dimensions, a world republic would become unmanageable (scientific and technological developments have already answered to that objection), nor that a world republic would run the risk of becoming a ‘heartless despotism’, for in any case, that danger is also present at the local, republican level. The deeper problem is that different and diverse unified collective wills cannot transform themselves into one single people. Using the rhetoric of the state of nature that Kant employs to describe situations of intersubjective and interstate violence, we may observe that the analogy between the individual and collective contexts is maintained as to the motivations to coalesce; but the analogy is broken regarding the structure of coercive power. In interstate relations coercion cannot be vertical, for otherwise the unified collective will of *each* people would disappear.

In my reading, federalism is presented by Kant as a solution to the problem of verticality within the republican mode of political coordination. But verticality is not the only condition under which coercion may occur. As has already been pointed out, Kant was consistent throughout his work in pointing out that the local problem of ‘how to administer justice universally’ (*IzE*) can only be solved on the condition that interstate relations become lawful, namely, when humanity abandons the planetary state of nature in which violence (intersubjective and among collectivities and peoples) prevails. All forms of despotism belong, in this sense, to a state of nature. This already indicates that Kant does not understand that mode of political power which arises from the self-governance of a people as self-sufficient, nor as absolute. It is not a feat that one lonely people can realize on its own, and it is not a capacity that a collectivity may have or not have, once and for all. Federalism, that surrogate of a world sovereign power, solves the problem of the verticality of coercion among republican peoples, which in the extreme would mean the disappearance of each people; but it does not solve the problem of the legitimacy of coercion. Precisely that, I submit, is the role of the second important idea—transnational political participation.

The notion of transnational political participation is an element of what I have called here the ‘political condition’, which is an answer to the charge of utopianism in the presentation of cosmopolitan hospitality. The political condition has two mutually related components: the community of peoples, and transnational political participation. The latter may take several forms; in accordance with federalism, however, participation must be horizontal, in conditions of freedom and equality among persons and peoples. This means that political participation, which for Kant is tied up with the feeling of indignation in the face of a

violation of a right in any part of the world, is independent of the privileges of local political participation. In turn, the formation of a community of peoples must be understood as the process by which coercion is legitimized. Such a process indeed includes an institutional scaffolding—but this does not constitute the whole process. In particular, the sort of political participation that carries with it the formation of world-citizenship is centered on the individual agent, contingently located in a given space and time, and on what she can make for herself—in contrast to what nature has made for her (*APS*; *MdS*; *ZeF*). In other words, the formation of world citizenship belongs to the same process by which a community of peoples is formed: both call into question those impediments to political action that are due to the contingent origins of a person or of a collectivity. This is relatively easy to understand in the context of foreign residents (people of foreign origin residing in a country)—of which there was no lack in Kant's Königsberg—but not so in the context of the participation of foreign nationals (persons and groups from foreign countries living in foreign countries). One should say that the forms that such a political participation could adopt are only subject to speculation if attributed to Kant.

This being the concept of transnational political participation, why would self-governed peoples give up power to it? Firstly, the group of agents involved in the process (the citizens of the republic and the citizens of the world) is potentially one and the same: so the group of people who would give up power and the group of people to whom power is being given is one and the same. Secondly, the citizens would have republican control over local authorities through local institutions and mechanisms, but also over cosmopolitan authorities through planetary institutions and mechanisms. Cosmopolitan authority will be answerable to individual citizens, but also to local authorities; and these in turn will be answerable to cosmopolitan authorities and to their 'own' peoples. In brief, what this means is that doubts concerning horizontal coercive power among peoples may be dispelled by observing that state power, when conceived under republican principles, is neither self-sufficient nor absolute. It ought to respond to the will of the equals, so that it cannot be arbitrarily enforced, for example, on foreign residents and on peoples or individuals in other parts of the world; and it is not self-sufficient since, as we have shown, the legitimacy of vertical republican coercion depends on that of a federation of republics; and, beyond this, they both depend on the horizontal coercion characteristic of a cosmopolitan condition.

Final remarks

The charge of utopianism regarding the right to hospitality may be answered in one of two ways: with a story about the institutionalization of the moral and political ideals of cosmopolitanism; or with a story about the source of cosmopolitan coercion. The former responds to the problem of the execution or enforcement of cosmopolitan law, the latter to the problem of the legitimacy of coercion. While it is true that they both involve what I have here called the political condition—that form of social coordination that is characteristic of self-governed agents roaming the finite surface of the Earth—it is important not to confuse these two problems.

My claim in this paper may be understood as an attempt to critically evaluate the last paragraph of the third definitive article of *Toward Perpetual Peace*. I have argued that the right to hospitality is for Kant both an anti-xenophobic and an anti-colonial principle, which carries with it full coercive force. Not only does the right to hospitality stem from the unconditional command not to instrumentalize other agents (where noncompliance is sanctioned by the agent's own moral conscience)—it constitutes a cosmopolitan legal command whose breach brings about systematic and negative consequences for the external freedom of noncomplying agents. So the dilemma of coercion is solved by affirming the first horn (justified coercion of external freedom) and denying the second (a moral reprimand). It may be open to debate what are the proper jurisdictions and overlaps of the institutions involved, but the validity of the right of hospitality demands the possibility of effective coercion.

It is vital to stress here the role of transnational political participation as an element of a global political condition with peaceful intent. This is crucial in order to understand under what conditions coercion of *state* actions that violate hospitality is justified. It is by virtue of the political condition that the implicit code generated by lawful freedom can be made explicit; and this gives substance to the project of creating peace through rights. That project is, as we saw, inseparable from a multileveled political participation of individuals and collectivities, and is the source of the legitimacy of cosmopolitan coercion of those state actions that contravene the principle of hospitality. As we have seen, interstate coercion under federalism is only legitimate if the rights of foreigners as such have some sort of generalized trans-border warrant.

The other component of the political condition in Kantian cosmopolitanism is the construction of a community of peoples. We might find in Kant some clues for such a construction in a kind of theory of republican political sentiments that, in analogy with aesthetic taste, we hope to share with diverse and distant

persons and peoples. Republican sentiments—including the feeling of indignation—are an important part of the process of constructing a community of peoples. It is not enough, in such a process, to form groups or organizations with an affinity of interests and relatively independent from state agencies—so-called ‘non-governmental organizations’. In every case, and especially when it comes to corporations such as the religious and the military, the public use of one’s own reason would have to be upheld if such organizations aspire to be part of the community of peoples.

Finally, let us briefly turn to the question concerning the scope of cosmopolitan authority, and whether it supplements or substitutes national authorities. The key seems to lie in one more sense in which cosmopolitan coercion may be *reduced* to conditions of hospitality. It is true that, to the extent that republican constitutions incorporate the cosmopolitan protection of foreigners into their principles, the traditional difference between foreign and domestic policies will tend to blur out. So the extent to which national jurisdiction ought to be supplemented by cosmopolitan law depends on the extent to which the local jurisdiction protects foreigners. The idea here is: one clear domain in which national authority needs to be supplemented is the enforcement of the principle of hospitality. That is, even a perfect republic, in which power would be at once disseminated (e.g., in the assembly of free agents) and concentrated (in the united will of the people represented by the sovereign), is not self-sufficient when it comes to protecting the rights of foreigners as such—including undocumented and stateless persons and peoples. Since the treatment of foreigners is the space in which national governments may be most evidently prone to a conflict of political interests, it is precisely there where functioning cosmopolitan institutions are needed.

Beyond interpretive matters, one possible lesson of this essay is that suspicion is commendable in the face of the recurring attempts to bring up to date Kant’s historical optimism. If cosmopolitan penal justice (e.g., the International Criminal Court) had full coercive force to process the crimes against humanity that have been committed for the interests and by the state agents of the strongest military power in history, then perhaps Kant’s historical optimism could be renewed. In the meantime, it is perhaps advisable to substitute optimism with a sober critique of humanitarian reason.

Abbreviated References

In this paper, all references to Immanuel Kant's works are in accordance with the *Akademie Ausgabe* (AA), Vols. 1–29 of *Kants Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin, Leipzig, 1902). References indicate the volume number followed by the page number. Unless otherwise indicated, the English language translations are from the *Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). The following abbreviations are used throughout this paper.

- APS *Anthropologie pragmatischer Hinsicht* (1798), AA 6:119–333.
 IZE *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* (1784), AA 8:17–31.
 MdS *Die Metaphysik der Sitten* (1797), AA 6:205–492.
 ZeF *Zum ewigen Frieden* (1795), AA 8:343–386.

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Critical Global Studies and Planetary History: New Perspectives on the Enlightenment

Abstract: Though doing so invites methodological problems, the concept of ‘the Enlightenment’ is nevertheless in need of widening: it can no longer be reduced to any one historical period; nor can it be restricted to Europe. As a process of rationalization, scientification, technification, secularization, or democratization, forms of Enlightenment can be identified in many periods and regions. I wish to argue here that an expanded meaning opens up opportunities for an enhanced and interdisciplinary Enlightenment research. On the basis of two recent approaches to the Enlightenment—by Felicity A. Nussbaum and Dipesh Chakrabarty—I will try to show the interdependency of period and process notions, and ponder the ways in which they inform one another. A combined reading of both approaches shows how they might serve as models for a specific form of interdisciplinary global history in the heritage of the Enlightenment.

It has often been remarked that—more than other period concepts of history—the concept of the Enlightenment is characterized by a semantic double structure: it signifies on the one hand the historical period of the eighteenth century, and a transepochal and still ongoing process of rationalization on the other. This double meaning (or even double concept) was given its canonical formulation by Jürgen Habermas’s notion of the ‘project of Enlightenment’ (Habermas 1990). Whereas historians and philologists in recent decades have tried to narrow down the concept and to radically historicize the Enlightenment by limiting it to objects of the eighteenth century, the broader understanding of the Enlightenment was left to sociologists, political scientists or the field of literary studies. Robert Darnton’s attempt to reduce the Enlightenment to a specific movement in Paris and a specific type of historical agent against an ‘industry of the Enlightenment’ (Darnton 2003)—or Quentin Skinner’s methodological remarks, already formulated in the late 1960s against the myth of continuity of (not only Enlightenment) ideas (Skinner 1969)—are only the most prominent examples of these attempts. In the decades after the 1980s, one often emphasized the distances between now and then in an attempt at warding off the danger of an ideological

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misuse of the Enlightenment: the non-Enlightened aspects of the eighteenth century have been stressed, and occultisms, esotericisms, and the persistence of religions and superstitions have been examined to show the discontinuities, rather than a simple scheme of plain modernization since the eighteenth century.¹

Nonetheless all these pleadings for historicization and contextualization could not prevent the Enlightenment being understood in its broad meaning: as a process of rationalization, scientification, technification, secularization, or democratization. In this sense, forms of Enlightenment can be identified in periods or regions other than the European eighteenth century: one can speak of Islamic Enlightenments in the eleventh century as well as considering that perhaps, nowadays, the Enlightenment has its place in Latin America rather than in Europe.² Especially the broader and science-transcending discussions in the public sphere refer to a wide understanding of the Enlightenment and indicate the ongoing social relevance of the concept of the Enlightenment as a project.

Indeed, despite all the methodological problems that professional historians have with such a widening of the concept, they on the other hand know that there are no naked facts that can be reduced to the eighteenth century, or any historical period. Positivism might be a methodological presupposition, but can also turn into an ideology of mere facts. Historization alone doesn't prevent ideology, and can be even more ideological than constructions that make explicit their cognitive interest and standpoint. From its questions posed to the past about the theories that are applied, to questions of reception and impacts, historiography is always transcending the narrow context of the examined period. This is especially true when questions of intellectual history are touched upon, and when the ideas of a period—as in case of the Enlightenment—have a normative surplus that transcends the end of the eighteenth century. It is not by chance, that in the very last years, beneath a vivid positivist research on details of the eighteenth century, some of the most inspiring approaches have been based on a broad understanding of the Enlightenment that aims to think of the concept of period and the concept of project together. The newly emerging global history discourse has proved especially fruitful in this respect.

Authors from postcolonial, postmodern, and subaltern studies discovered the Enlightenment. Jacques Derrida tried in some of his last essays to mediate

1 See, for instance Neugebauer-Wölk (1999). Most recently, Luise Schorn-Schütte argued against a plain narration of modernity (2009).

2 In an interview with the *New Left Review* in January 2010, Eric Hobsbawm answered the question if there are any vivid Enlightenment traditions with a reference to Latin America: "Certainly in Latin America, politics and general public discourse are still conducted in the old Enlightenment—liberal, socialist, communist—terms." (*New Left Review*, 61, 2010, p. 13–14)

between a critique of Enlightened universalism and a salvation of reason through the concept of an ‘Enlightenment to come’ (“*Le ‘Monde’ des lumières a venir*”) (Derrida 2003). Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak made a similar attempt with her concept of the Enlightenment as an ‘enabling violation’ (Spivak 2008, pp. 8–9). From a different perspective, Zev Sternhell tries to show in his engaged study on *The Anti-Enlightenment Tradition* that there is not only a transtemporal process of Enlightenment, but also a Counter-Enlightenment tendency that is defined by a cultural and national essentialism, starting in the eighteenth century with Edmund Burke and Herder and lasting until today (Sternhell 2006). Last but not least, Daniel Fulda and his team at the Interdisciplinary Centre for Research on the European Enlightenment (IZEA) in Halle have examined underlying ‘cultural patterns of the Enlightenment’ emerging in the eighteenth century and lasting until the present day (Fulda 2010).

In my contribution, I wish to argue that the double meaning of the Enlightenment is not only a danger but at the same time opens up opportunities for an enhanced and interdisciplinary Enlightenment research that goes beyond the narrow borders of an academic historical or philological reconstruction of a past period that is presumed to have nothing to do with our contemporary concerns. On the basis of two recent approaches to the Enlightenment—by Felicity A. Nussbaum and Dipesh Chakrabarty—I will try to show the interdependency of period and process notions, and ponder the ways in which they inform one another. Felicity A. Nussbaum pleads for an enhanced and globalized view of the eighteenth century in order to overcome traditional Euro-centric interpretations of that period. She argues that such a reinterpretation of the pre-history of globalization in the period of the Enlightenment also allows us to modify our contemporary understanding of these processes in the direction of a pluralized view of multiple ways to modernity (1). Whereas Nussbaum’s starting point is thus a historical reinterpretation of the eighteenth century, one of the most prominent current postcolonial critics of the Enlightenment’s Eurocentrism, Dipesh Chakrabarty, rediscovers certain universal notions of the eighteenth century—namely the idea of a universal history of mankind as a species—in order to face contemporary global challenges such as climate change, and tries to reformulate them with respect to a modification of basic postcolonial methodological assumptions. He argues that the cultural diversity and plurality axioms of post-colonialism have to be mediated with an anthropological and biological deep history of the human species as a whole (2). Both approaches can serve as models for a specific form of interdisciplinary global history in the heritage of the Enlightenment.

Felicity A. Nussbaum's research program of Critical Global Eighteenth Century Studies

In the introduction to her standard volume on questions of Enlightenment and Globalization, *The Global Eighteenth Century*, Felicity A. Nussbaum gives an outline of the possibilities and limits of non-Eurocentric eighteenth century studies. She develops her approach to what she calls 'critical global studies' in opposition to a linear narrative of globalization and modernization. She calls this narrative—starting in the Enlightenment and ending up in today's globalized world—a kind of European victory history. Based on some insights taken from postcolonial studies and the postmodern critique of the Enlightenment's universalism, she pleads for a pluralization, specification, and modification of the traditional triad of European Enlightenment, modernity, and globalization. This, she contends, is a precondition for a critical view on imperial forms of globalization and gender hierarchies, as well as for the acknowledgement of indigenous forms of knowledge or for giving a voice to subalterns or minorities: "In particular, postmodern thinkers, Marxist theorists, and, more frequently, feminists and historians of race, have significantly complicated our understanding of the genealogy of human difference." (Nussbaum 2003, p. 6)

What makes Nussbaum's approach an important argument in our context is her assumption that it is just such an enhanced understanding—a broader historical reconstruction of the eighteenth century and the Enlightenment—that enables at the same time a genealogical deconstruction of monocausally structured Eurocentric understandings of globalization:

Critical global studies helps us to understand that the unmodified term 'globalization'—like 'modernity'—is inadequate in reflecting its many historical meanings, and imprecise in conveying the complexities of varied social, economical, and cultural conditions in their specific geographical locations. (Nussbaum 2003, p. 5)

The tasks of such a program of enhanced study of the eighteenth century would be:

[to] analyze the European encounter with other populations throughout the world and offer ways to think critically about the imperative of that [European] imperial project... [and to] query the boundaries of national histories and literatures that have limited our understandings to reconsider sexual and racial intermingling, religious encounters, the exchange of goods and diseases, indigenous knowledge, and the real and imagined mapping of the earth's domain. (Nussbaum 2003, p. 1)

These global crossings, encounters, exchanges, transfers, appropriations and diffusions are at the root of the European Enlightenment, which can itself be defined as an accelerated and enhanced “movement of ideas across borders and over time” (Nussbaum 2003, p. 2), rather than as a fixed set of genuinely European ideas. European travelers, emperors and scientists didn’t come to the extra-European world with ready-made models of an Enlightened society, but rather, the global experience is at the root of concepts that are generally seen as genuinely European and/or Enlightened. World travelers such as James Cook, Louis Antoine de Bougainville, Georg Forster, or Alexander von Humboldt and their reports initiated broad debates about the state of nature and the critique of European societies that otherwise would not have taken place. In addition, ‘defining elements’ of the Enlightenment such as state sovereignty, nation-based citizenship, and modern economic institutions were, even in eighteenth-century Europe, far from being fully elaborated, and even farther from actual implementation.

Examining these exchanges can show that distinctions between centers and peripheries, European and non-European, and modern and premodern societies are often retrospective divisions that have no reference to the specific historical situation. For example, as Jürgen Osterhammel has remarked, eighteenth century agricultures and so-called premodern societies in Europe as well as elsewhere (his example is China) are based on similar structures, and may have had more in common than they do in the era of industrialization and capitalism (Osterhammel 2009, p. 21). Often the borders are drawn within Europe—e.g., in respect to Ireland or Eastern Europe where ‘savages’ were identified in one’s own country—but also, Great Britain was often not seen as part of Europe.

Since ideas about Europe have never been homogenous or uncontested, there are no fixed borders between Europe and non-Europe, but always, historically as in the present, constructions against the background of specific interests. In the eighteenth century, the world was not composed of essentially distinct cultures—of a European or western center and a non-European periphery. Rather, it would be much more precise to speak of hybrid and transeuropean cultural spaces, such as the Eurasian Russian or the Ottoman Empire in the East, the United States or Latin America as transatlantic spaces, or Mediterranean regions such as the Maghreb, with its mixture of Turks, Christians, and Jews, or of Moors, Arabs, Bedouins, Berbers, and Kabyles in the South.

In this way the center-periphery distinction and traditional forms of empire and world systems-theory can be shown as Eurocentric shortcomings. Empire-building has not been a European monopoly: there are and have always been various forms of non-European empires, such as the Arab, Ottoman, Mughal

and Qing empires (and many more), as John Darwin has shown in his recent comprehensive history of global empires (Darwin 2008).

While the center-periphery formula is problematized, the concept of modernity becomes pluralized within critical global studies. In the place of a single model of progress, one can speak of different phases of globalization. In critical global studies, the emphasis would be put on discontinuities and historical ruptures rather than on linear conceptions of progress. The models underlying this approach are the concepts of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt 2002) and of different phases of globalization. Walter Mignolo and Ottmar Ette, for example, interpret the Enlightenment as a second phase of European expansion after the conquests of the 15th and 16th Centuries (Mignolo 1998). Following this periodization, the Enlightenment can be defined as a specific form of reflection on—and partly also a critique of—the earlier European expansion projects and of previous forms of colonialism (Muthu 2003; D'Aprile). In addition, it can be seen as a not only politically but also scientifically motivated measurement of a world that had already been widely discovered before (Despoix 2009).

What Nussbaum formulates for eighteenth century studies has been undertaken in a similar way by authors like Christopher Bayly, Jürgen Osterhammel and John Darwin in the general field of global historiography (Osterhammel 2009; Darwin 2008; Bayly 2005). All these recent approaches can be seen as critical global studies following the insight that a non-Eurocentric perspective is a crucial necessity in global history.

Dipesh Chakrabarty's research program of Planetary History

Whereas Felicity Nussbaum applies insights from modern postcolonial theories to the study of the eighteenth century in order to come to a modified understanding of current globalization, historian Dipesh Chakrabarty goes the other way around. In a series of recent articles, Chakrabarty, one of the most important and prominent founding fathers of postcolonialism (along with Edward Said, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak Homi Bhaba), tries to reformulate or even rehabilitate aspects of the Enlightenment's historical thinking in the face of current environmental challenges and crises.

According to Chakrabarty, these challenges require a rethinking of the Enlightenment's project of a common universal history of mankind or of the human species, first developed in the eighteenth century. In this respect, Chakrabarty claims that the Enlightenment's universalism cannot only be seen as an

expression of the Euro-Atlantic world's claim to hegemony, but is at the same time a very important means for criticizing the consequences of this hegemony—among them, today's Climate crisis as an effect of the industrializing the world: "I'm against any ideas of hierarchies of civilizations but the idea of one common civilization of humanity on this planet seems to me an important part of our anti-colonial heritage." (Chakrabarty 2010, p. 10, my transl.)

In his article on *Humanism in an Age of Globalization*, Chakrabarty points to a crucial difference between the 20th and the 21st Centuries (Chakrabarty 2008, pp. 74–90): whereas the 20th Century was characterized by the question of race, the 21st will be shaped by the global challenge of climate change. Because of this new situation, he claims, every reflection on globalization processes has to take into account questions of planetary history. Whereas (postcolonial) thinking on globalization is concerned with the historical and cultural differences, questions of colonialisms, racisms, and classisms on the one hand and tolerance, cosmopolitanisms and intercultural dialogue on the other, planetary history instead always thinks of humanity in the sense of a unity of the species. Human beings are construed in the latter as members of a species who are characterized by a general—even if unequal and diverse—pursuit of happiness, through which they destroy their own biosphere and thus the foundations of their existence (Chakrabarty 2010, p. 146). This leads Chakrabarty to the conclusion that his former theoretical approaches to globalization, such as "Marxist analysis of capital, subaltern studies, and postcolonial criticism over the last twenty-five years, while enormously useful in studying globalization, had not really prepared me for making sense of this planetary conjuncture within which humanity finds itself today." (Chakrabarty 2010, p. 199)

In his 2009 article in the journal *Critical Inquiry*, bearing the title *The Climate of History*, Chakrabarty gives the most explicit outline of his program of a new planetary history (Chakrabarty 2009, pp. 197–222). What makes our current situation different from all other periods in history, according to Chakrabarty, is the fact that humans are able to destroy the foundations of their own existence, and thus that the old distinction between natural history and human history cannot be upheld any longer. Humans are no longer simply part of nature, or 'biological actors', but have now gained the status of 'geological actors'. Therefore, it is not enough to write an environmental history (*Umweltgeschichte*) in which the interdependencies between humans and their environment are described; rather, what is needed is a new kind of planetary history. Chakrabarty calls this new period of history, in which mankind has become a geological actor, 'Anthropocene'—a term that is intended to convey its planetary significance through analogy to geological periods like Holocene or Pleistocene. Earth processes and questions of human or cultural history have gained a new status of interdepend-

ence in this new era. This different situation requires us to bring together deep structures of history with cultural and often very short-term developments, thus compelling a collaboration of the natural sciences (such as biology or anthropology) with history. The traditional categorical separation between them two cannot be kept up any longer:

'Human behavior is seen as the product not just of recorded history, ten thousand years recent, but of deep history, the combined genetic and cultural changes that created humanity over hundreds of [thousands of] years.' [...] Without such knowledge of the deep history of humanity it would be difficult to arrive at a secular understanding of why climate change constitutes a crisis for humans. Geologists and climate scientists may explain why the current phase of global warming—as distinct from the warming of the planet that has happened before—is anthropogenic in nature, but the ensuing crisis for humans is not understandable unless one works out the consequences of that warming. The consequences make sense only if we think of humans as a form of life and look on human history as part of the history of life on this planet. (Chakrabarty 2009, pp. 205–6; quoting Wilson, Edward O. [1996]: *In Search of Nature*)

Chakrabarty uses two arguments to refute the objection advanced by historians that culture and nature (the history of mankind and the history of nature) are categorically different things since the former is based on freedom and agency, whereas the latter is not—an argument that has been part of the basic assumptions of the theory of history since Vico's axioms. In the amalgamation of biological and cultural models, they see a biologist reduction and essentialism of cultural and social processes. Firstly, Chakrabarty (quoting Daniel Lord Smail) points out that the historical deep structure models of natural sciences are not determinist models, as can already be shown in the most prominent example, the Darwinian evolutionary model:

Species, according to Darwin, are not fixed entities with natural essences imbued in them by the Creator. ... Natural selection does not homogenize the individuals of a species. ... Given this state of affairs, the search for a normal ... nature and body type [of any particular species] is futile. And so it goes for the equally futile quest to identify "human nature." (Chakrabarty 2009, pp. 214–215)

Secondly, natural scientists also concede that the capacity of reflection changes with changing environments. Just as Karl Marx and others assumed that with changing classes in society, a class consciousness would develop, these natural scientists think that the same is true for changing geo-biological environments. They are convinced that on the basis of environmental change, different learning processes and experiences of failures and catastrophes, humans will learn to develop a self-consciousness of species. In this respect, natural scientists also

speak the ‘language of Enlightenment’, as Chakrabarty calls it (Chakrabarty 2009, p. 215).

Nonetheless, Chakrabarty’s aim is not that we should all become natural scientists. Rather, he believes that the contribution of natural scientists to the understanding of deep structures of species history has to be accompanied by a critical genealogy of global capitalism since the eighteenth century. After all, it was the process of capitalized and industrialized globalization that led to climate catastrophe, without being planned by a specific actor. So global reflection on the height of the challenges has to bring together planetary history with a critical history of globalization. As it is sketched by Felicity A. Nussbaum, one could add:

The task of placing, historically, the crisis of climate change thus requires us to bring together intellectual formations that are somewhat in tension with each other: the planetary and the global; deep and recorded histories; species thinking and critiques of capital. (Spivak 2003, p. 213)³

At the end of his article, Chakrabarty outlines his program of a new global reflection, which he calls ‘negative universal history’. Even if we don’t have any historical experience of mankind as a geological actor, we have to face the fact that we have become one. Despite all inequalities in dealing with the costs of climate change, and even if it is an unintended consequence of human actions, climate change is characterized by the fact that everyone will be affected by it. In contrast to the universal history of the eighteenth century, we have come to know that there is no “Hegelian universal arising dialectically out of the movement of history, or a universal of capital brought forth by the present crisis.” We always have to start with the perspectives and experiences of local actors and thus the universal that ‘cannot subsume particularities’ exists only in a negative way: in the common consciousness and knowledge that take the form of a ‘shared sense’ of the possibility of a geological catastrophe. In this situation, the Enlightenment becomes increasingly significant: “in the era of the Anthropocene, we need the Enlightenment (that is, reason) even more than in the past.” (Spivak 2003, p. 211) Only through scientific analysis—meaning the collaboration of natural and cultural sciences—can the effects of the actions of the species as a whole be understood.

³ For the difference between ‘globality’ and ‘planetaryity’ from another perspective, see also Spivak’s concept of ‘planetaryity’ in: Spivak (2003, pp. 1–102).

Conclusions

Nussbaum and Chakrabarty both operate with a wide concept of the Enlightenment, and both approaches show interesting and promising ways of overcoming the fruitless opposition in Enlightenment research of historical-philological to theoretical-systematical approaches. Nussbaum elaborates to what extent a differentiated, widened, and more complex study of the eighteenth century can lead to a modified understanding of our own ideas of globalization. Chakrabarty, in his model of planetary history, outlines an overarching conception combining postcolonial theory with geo- and life-sciences.

Both open up interdisciplinary fields for Enlightenment research. As Peter Reill has shown, the “close correspondence between nature and humanity” (between nature and culture) is one of the crucial significances of Enlightenment thinking and acting, from the beginning of the paradigm of mathematics and physics in the late 17th century up to the vitalist theories at the end of the eighteenth century (Reill 2005). The key concepts and main projects of the Enlightenment—such as the history of species, holistic models of natural and human history, pre-evolutionary theories, or conceptualizations of world markets, political economy, or of a society of knowledge, as developed by Maupertuis, Buffon, Diderot, Herder, Kant, A. Smith and many other Enlightenment authors—could thus be reread with respect to systematic questions related to what Chakrabarty calls the Anthropocene. At the same time, these questions have to be combined with a critical history of knowledge. The key concepts of the Enlightenment can be shown in their genealogy as results of enhanced global circulations, as well as of specific relations of power. Their presumed universality (in the sense of trans-temporal truths) can be deconstructed in order to make way for a view of these concepts as constructions and narrations produced in a specific historical situation. Models of natural history, natural philosophy or natural sciences can be shown in their interdependency with social, cultural and economical interpretations as well as with leading metaphors and narrations of their times.

As one example for a critical genealogy and discourse analysis of current challenges, one could refer to Joseph Vogl's works on the *poesis* of capitalism, of the *homo economicus*, and of global financial crises since the eighteenth century (Vogl 2008; 2010). In a historical-systematical vein, Göran Therborn tries to give an introduction to planetary thinking in his most recent publication, combining insights from geology, biology, economy, sociology, and history to form a ‘beginner's guide’ to the world, addressed to all of us who are used to identifying with our family, country or continent, but among whom “most of us are beginners on the planetary terrain of humankind” (Therborn 2011, p. ix). Such re-

flections pay tribute to what Eric Hobsbawm calls a ‘genuinely global history’ in the spirit of the Enlightenment: “neither within the humanities nor the natural and mathematical sciences, nor separated from them, but essential to both.” (Hobsbawm 2002, p. 297)

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Facundo Nahuel Martín

Globalization and Modernity in Marx and Postone


Abstract: In this article, I intend to show that a categorical analysis of the Marxian concept of wealth may prove useful for understanding the contradictory effects of globalization. Authors like Douglas Kellner point out that globalization is a dual process, containing both positive and negative aspects. Moishe Postone has developed an immanent critique of capitalism that contrasts the forms of domination in modern society with its emancipatory potential. I intend to pursue Postone's categorical reading, addressing in particular the concept of wealth. I will try to show that social wealth involves the possibility of a multilateral social form, based on the universal spread of knowledge, and freed from the 'unilateral' form of production in capitalism.

Introduction: critical theory of modernity and globalization

Douglas Kellner calls for a 'critical theory of globalization' capable of understanding its positive or negative aspects. He rejects optimistic visions, such as that of Francis Fukuyama, who ignores negative aspects of globalization such as wars, poverty and economic crises. On the other hand, unilateral Marxist interpretations are equally reductionist, since they only analyze globalization in terms of the imposition of capitalism. These views ignore the possibilities for radical politics and alternative forms of globalization, embodied in a 'globalization from below' (Kellner 2002, p. 286). A critical theory of globalization should prove capable of understanding both its oppressive logics and liberating possibilities.

I propose that Moishe Postone's categorical reading of Karl Marx's mature work can provide the foundations for a critical theory of globalization. Capitalist modernity as such can be interpreted as a form of domination (constituted by the fetishistic mediation of labor) and as the source of emancipatory potentials (since the alienated dynamic of value creates the possibility of its eventual overcoming). The contradiction between wealth and value can give an account of the

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dialectic between domination and emancipation in global society. Capitalism is based on a specific form of social domination, which is not based on personal authority but on impersonal, abstract and quasi-objective compulsions. Capitalism contradictorily creates the possibility of what I will call ‘social wealth’. This possibility aims towards a different form of production and social mediation—one that would no longer be based on the reproduction of value as a fetishistic compulsion imposed on individuals. Globalization, from this perspective, is *both* the universalization of capitalist domination (based on the mediation of society by the value form) *and* the ground for liberating possibilities.

Postone’s categorial reading of Marx

In *Time, labor and social domination*, Postone presents a reformulation of critical theory grounded in the contradictory forms of social mediation under capitalism. Labor as a specifically capitalist social form produces an alienated social universal, opposed to the individuals as an independent power. Capitalist social mediation possesses an impersonal and objective nature: “[s]ociety, as the quasi-independent, abstract, universal Other that stands opposed to the individuals” (Postone 1993, p. 159). Capitalism configures an oppressive society by its characteristic ‘form of labor’, which generates alienated forms of social mediation.

Capitalist social relations mediated by labor compose a historically specific totality governed by value and labor as self-mediating principles. Totality involves the lack of freedom of its subjects, but also entails the inherent possibility of its transformation. “The categories of the adequate critique, as I have argued, must grasp not only the contradictory character of the totality but also the basis of the sort of unfreedom that characterizes it” (Postone 1993, p. 125).

Labor as a social mediating principle imposes an alienated goal for human activity that must be attained, disregarding the concrete needs of the subjects. “Labor is separated from its concrete purpose and becomes a means toward a goal given by the alienated structures constituted by (abstract) labor itself” (Postone 1993, p. 325). Value-producing labor posits itself as a compulsive social goal that disregards any other particular needs or purposes, constituting a self-mediating totality.

Capital’s global dynamic is self-contradictory as well. It both undermines the basis of its own development and creates the foundations for its possible overcoming. Capital possesses a dynamic of transformation and restitution of the labor hour. It constantly increases the productivity of labor. Thus, the social labor hour becomes increasingly ‘dense’ in terms of the amount of commodities produced. This is the ‘concrete’ aspect of the capitalist temporal process. Yet, the

transformations in production do not lead to an increase in value; or rather, they only bring about temporary increases (extraordinary surplus value). Value depends ultimately on the labor time employed, not on its productivity: “although increased productivity does result in more material wealth, it does not result in more value per unit of time” (Postone 1993, p. 195). The ‘abstract’ aspect of the capitalist temporal dynamic (empty, homogeneous time) is therefore restored after every concrete transformation of the social labor hour. Once a productive level is socially generalized, the magnitude of value created during the labor hour remains stagnant, regardless of the amount of material wealth it represents.

Capitalism’s temporal dynamic leads to a growing discrepancy between wealth and value. If capital must constantly increase the productivity of labor, it also restores value, each time, as a uniform and abstract measure:

This process of the reciprocal determination of the two dimensions of social labor in capitalism occurs on the level of society as a whole. It is at the heart of a dialectical dynamic intrinsic to the social totality constituted by commodity-determined labor. (Postone 1993, p. 289)

The dialectic of transformation and restitution of the social labor hour also inherently makes capitalism increasingly anachronistic. As technical developments grow, ‘direct’ labor becomes ever less relevant in production. Instead, the socially general powers of science and technique become the leading factors of production. “[Capitalism] renders the production of material wealth essentially independent of direct human labor time expenditure” (Postone 1993, p. 339). The generation of material wealth and that of value enter into contradiction. This opens up the possibility for the overcoming of capitalism.

In the following sections, I will attempt to show how the contradiction between wealth and value can shed light on some emancipatory potentials of globalization. In order to do this, I will attempt a categorical analysis of the concept of wealth in Marx’s *Grundrisse*. Wealth should not be defined only by the creation of greater masses of goods, but by the social determinations under which those goods are produced and consumed.

Unilateral social forms and wealth

I aim to show that Marx, in his *Grundrisse* manuscripts, provides a historically determinate concept of social wealth. Marx, I will claim, regards both capitalism and pre-capitalist societies as unilateral. The former is one-sided because it is based on production for the reified goal of value. The latter appear as unilateral

because they are based on determined forms of tradition and authority. The idea of social wealth, as a multilateral development of human needs and capacities, confronts both. Let us first consider Marx's account of what social wealth could mean:

But in fact, when its narrow [*bornierte*] bourgeois form is eliminated, what is wealth but the universality of needs, capacities, enjoyments, etc. of individuals, generated by the universal exchange? The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, both the so-called nature and their inner nature? The absolute elaboration of their creative assets, without any other presupposition than the previous historical development, which makes this totality of development, that is the development of all human forces as such, not measured by a previous standard, an end in itself. Where it does not reproduce itself in a determinateness [*Bestimmtheit*], but produces its totality. [Where] it does not seek to remain as anything that has become [*Gewordnes*], but in the absolute movement of its becoming. In the bourgeois economy—and the production era that corresponds to it—this complete elaboration of the human interior appears as complete emptying; this universal objectification [*Vergegenständlichung*] as total alienation [*Entfremdung*]; and the destruction of all determinate unilateral ends [*bestimmten einseitigen Zwecke*] as the sacrifice of the end in itself [*Selbstzwecks*] under a completely external end. Therefore, on the one hand the childish old world appears as the higher. On the other hand it is so in everything where closed shape, form and given limitation is sought. It is satisfying from a narrow [*bornierte*] point of view; while the Modern remains unsatisfying or, where it appears satisfied in itself, it is vulgar [*gemein*]. (Marx 1983, p. 411)¹

Marx uses the expression 'narrow' [*bornierte*] twice in this passage. Firstly, he is addressing capitalism (wealth in its narrow bourgeois form). Secondly, he refers to the non-capitalist 'old world', which is only satisfying from a narrow point of view (the point of view of closed shape, closed form and given limitations). The idea of wealth beyond its capitalist form (or value) stands in opposition to these two forms of narrowness. Marx is thus counterposing narrow social forms (capitalist and non-capitalist) with an idea of wealth as an open, multilateral and 'totally elaborated' social form. This idea of wealth contains the emancipatory intent of his social critique.

The contradiction between wealth and value involves four aspects of the concept of wealth that have been posited by capitalism but are also blocked by it: 1) the full development of human mastery over internal and external nature; 2) the absolute elaboration of human creative dispositions; 3) the reproduction, not of a human determinate character, but of a totality of determinations; and 4) the absolute movement of becoming, and the possibility not to remain in a limited form that has come to be. These four qualitative determinations of

1 All quotes from German-language texts are my own translations.

wealth become understandable under a categorical analysis, showing that capitalism produces an abstract form of social mediation, based on value and independent from previous qualitative forms of production and consumption.

Now, these four dimensions of social wealth (which I will summarize as the concept of a ‘multilateral social form’) are confronted with both capitalist and non-capitalist forms of one-sidedness. Non-capitalist societies appear as unilateral as long as they are mediated by qualitatively determined social forms, such as relations of direct domination and tradition. These social relations are unilateral as long as they embed people under the very determinateness [*Bestimmtheit*] of their particular and traditional forms of existence. Capitalism, on the other hand, is also a form of social unilaterality, though it is based not on particular traditions or personal authority, but on the tautological movement of self-reproducing value. The mediating character of labor grounds modernity’s basic features, as modern forms of social relations are based on quasi-objective, anonymous compulsions. Marx states that only in capitalism is the goal of the reproduction of value imposed over social life. By contrast, in non-capitalist forms, the satisfaction of needs stands as the goal of production. “So the old view, in which man—whatever the narrow national, religious or political determination—always appears as the aim of production, seems to be very exalted against the modern world” (Marx 1983, p. 411). Capitalism replaces the unilaterality of previous national, religious or political determinations [*Bestimmungen*] with a new form of one-sidedness, based on production for the sake of production itself.

The opposition between capitalist and non-capitalist forms of one-sidedness can be analyzed categorically departing from the features of value and capitalist labor. With the transition to capitalism, according to Postone, the very nature of social mediation changes. This transition is associated with the passage from overt social relations to a set of quasi-objective relations, which appear not as social, but as objective and abstract. Social mediation in capitalism is structured as a set of impersonal dynamics, alien to individuals and fundamentally self-moving. In non-capitalist societies, Postone claims, labor as such does not mediate society, but is embedded in activities otherwise determined:

This is quite different from social formations in which commodity production and exchange do not predominate, where the social distribution of labor and its products is effected by a wide variety of customs, traditional ties, overt relations of power, or, conceivably, conscious decisions. (Postone 1993, p. 149)

In non-capitalist societies, labor does not mediate social relations, but is dependent on other aspects of practice such as tradition, customs and even con-

scious decisions. Capitalist society, on the other, is articulated by forms of distorted praxis in which the very activities of human beings appear as something alien to them, governed by objective and impersonal laws:

Central to Marx's analysis is the argument that the relations that characterize capitalist society are very different from the forms of overt social relations –such as kinship relations or relations of personal or direct domination—that characterize noncapitalist [sic.] societies. The latter sorts of relations are not only manifestly social, they are qualitatively particular; no single, abstract, homogeneous sort of relation underlies every aspect of social life. (Postone 1993, p. 153)

The transition to capitalism is also the transition to modern society, in which overt social relations recede. Bonds of personal dependence sanctioned by tradition lose their mediating nature. Now, labor itself (and its expression in its products, commodities and value) comes to mediate society. This transformation gives rise to a new, specifically capitalist form of social domination, which is based not on bonds of direct dependence, but on a universal system of social interdependence which assumes a set of reified and fetishistic forms:

The hallmark of modern, or capitalist society is that, because the social relations that essentially characterize this society are constituted by labor, they exist only in objectified form. (Postone 1993, p. 154)

When Marx speaks about 'total alienation [*Entfremdung*]' and 'the sacrifice of the end in itself [*Selbstzwecks*] under a completely external end' with the rise of capitalism, he is addressing these new forms of social domination. He provides a double-sided account of capitalism. Since it is based on a quasi-objective, abstract form of social mediation, capitalism confronts individuals as a set of independent social powers that it cannot control or change by political decision or otherwise. Yet on the other hand, capitalism confronts other forms of social reproduction that are based on direct relations of personal domination with 'qualitatively particular' (Postone 1993, p. 153) forms of mediation.

Social wealth, as opposed to both the extant unilateral forms of capitalism and non-capitalist societies, aims towards the development of a multilateral form of social mediation and production, no longer based on determinate traditions or personal authority, nor on the abstract mediation of value and labor. Social wealth should be regarded as an *emancipatory potential of modernity*—a possibility that has been created by the immanent dynamic of capitalism, but that could only be realized through the overcoming of value and labor as social mediators.

Social wealth and the emancipatory potentials of modernity

The idea of social wealth not only involves the increasing accumulation of goods, but is grounded in the dynamics of social interaction. This is related to a process of universalization of human interaction by which the capacities and needs of individuals come to be socially produced in a historically unprecedented manner. This movement of universalization is made possible by the dynamic of capitalism. Yet, its full realization would involve moving beyond capitalism and the objective compulsions of value and labor.

With the transition from overt social relations to the quasi-objective and impersonal constrictions of labor and value, significant transformations take place in the sphere of production. As Postone states, forms of social mediation and concrete forms of production are intertwined. “Marx analyzes the basic social relations of capitalism, its form of wealth, and its material form of production, as interrelated” (Postone 1993, p. 27). What fundamentally changes with the capitalist form of production is that the creation of goods tends to rest ever less on the direct expenditure of labor and becomes increasingly dependent on the productive use of socially generated knowledge. This new form of production, while it makes labor more one-sided and winding for the worker, also creates the conditions for a different form of wealth (capable of transcending value), which could be grounded in universal social interaction rather than direct labor. The idea of social wealth, qualitatively understood, aims at this transformation of the very process of production.

Capitalism entails a dual transformation of the relation between individuals, production and society as a whole. On the one hand, with the capitalist form of mediation, the modern individual as an independent person appears, as previous forms of direct domination recede. On the other hand, production for self-consumption or immediate subsistence tends to disappear. Capitalism makes people both more independent (from direct forms of authority) and more dependent (on the universal process of social exchange). This dual process is carried out in an alienated form through the dynamic of capital, which people cannot control. The overcoming of capitalism would involve the collective appropriation of the productive forces created by capital itself.

The individual emerges socially under capitalist social relations. “The more we go back in history, the more the individual (and also the productive individual) appears as dependent [unselbständig] and belonging to a greater whole” (Marx 1983, p. 34). The modern, independent individual is a historical result: “Man (...) is not only a social animal, but an animal that can individualize itself

only in society” (Marx 1983, p. 35). In non-capitalist social forms, the creation of consumable goods or use values is the direct goal of production. In that context, the individual appropriates his conditions of labor under the framework of the community. Marx speaks of the “existence of the individual as a member of a community—his nature-like existence [*naturwüchsiges Dasein*] as member of a tribe, etc.” (Marx 1983, p. 409). In non-capitalist forms, there is a more direct link between the individual and the community, which mediates between him and his conditions of existence or property: “[s]o ownership means belonging to a tribe (community)” (Marx 1983, p. 415). The origin of capitalism involves the dissolution of the communal forms in which labor stands as the owner of its conditions. “The behavior of labor towards capital, or towards its objective conditions of labor as capital, presupposes a historical process that dissolves the different forms in which the worker is an owner, or in which the owner works” (Marx 1983, p. 420). The dissolution [*auflösung*] of communal forms gives rise to ‘free’ labor—free of both communal direct bonds and of property, confronted by capital as an alien power. The result of this historical process of dissolution is the appearance of a mass of free *and* dispossessed workers, “whose only property is their labor power and the possibility to exchange it against existent values” (Marx 1983, p. 420).

Capitalism displaces a communitarian nexus and also produces a new form of social mediation developed along with the social division of labor. Individuals, now independent from personal or communal ties, become completely dependent on one another through exchange. Under capitalism, “my product is only a product as long as it is so for others; so it is a superseded individual [*aufgehobnes einzelne*], a universal [*allgemeine*]” (Marx 1983, p. 143). Productive units now work for a universal system of exchange. At the same time, new needs appear that are socially created by the global process of interaction itself.

When production for exchange (for the creation of value instead of use values) is thoroughly established, it also comes to modify the material process of production itself. This becomes evident with the growth of fixed capital and machinery. Mechanized production entails the radical subordination of labor under capital, but also lays the foundations for the possible overcoming of capitalism. “Inserted into the production process of capital, the means of labor pass through different metamorphoses, whose culmination is the machine or, rather, an automatic system of machinery (...), set in motion by an automaton” (Marx 1983, p. 610). This ‘automaton’ is created by the powers of socially developed knowledge. The worker appears here as the ‘conscious organ’ of the automated machine, so he is no longer a mere manual worker. Yet, this does not immediately turn his work into something less unilateral or unpleasant: he has been turned into an appendix of the machine as an embodiment of capital. “The develop-

ment of the means of labor into machinery is not fortuitous for capital, but is the historical transformation of the traditionally established means of labor, converted into means adequate to capitalism” (Marx 1983, p. 612).

Traditional tools are subordinated to the worker in the labor process, since they merely transmit ‘the activity of the worker to the object’ (Marx 1983, p. 610). The means of production are formally turned into fixed capital when they confront labor as an alien property. Nevertheless, there are no *material* differences between the traditional instrument as fixed capital and as a property of the worker. With the development of machinery, capital transcends formal domination and comes to materially govern production. “The production process has ceased to be a work process in the sense of being controlled by work as its dominant unit” (Marx 1983, p. 611). Machines, far from being mere instruments of human labor, turn labor into an instrument of their own self-generated movement. Capital, in this way, comes to transform material production, positing itself as its subject.

This process, nevertheless, also creates the possibility of social wealth as outlined in the previous section. The development of machinery leads to a radical ‘socialization’ of production based on the general introduction of universally formed productive forces into the process of production. While independent villages or communities may have local, traditional, particular and determinate forms of production, production for exchange tends to homogenize, through competition, productive techniques and methods. Now the ‘social and universal’ powers of science and technology become the dominant productive forces, while direct labor loses importance. “The immediate work is both quantitatively reduced to a lesser proportion and qualitatively reduced to an essential, but subaltern moment against the *general scientific labor [allgemeine wissenschaftliche Arbeit]*” (Marx 1983, p. 614, emphasis added).

With the development of machinery and automation: a) knowledge, science and technology, and not direct labor, come to be the determining factors of production; and b) the knowledge that grabs hold of production is inherently social and possesses a universal character, since it is the result of the global development of production for exchange and is not tied to particular traditions or customs. The idea of a total elaboration of human abilities and needs not only opposes unilateral forms of existence (whether determinate, based on direct domination, or abstract, based on labor)—it also entails that *every productive unit now works with socially general means and resources, which have been created through a universal process of human interaction involving knowledge and science.*

The social powers of knowledge and science, developed under the alienated conditions of capitalism, could be the basis of a post-capitalist society. This so-

ciety would no longer be based on labor time as the measure of value and would therefore be free of the quasi-objective and impersonal compulsions this brings about. Yet it would not recede to previous forms of personal domination. Instead, it would be ‘free’, structured neither by direct forms of domination nor by abstract coercions. This possibility is also created by the development of wealth under capitalism, which could dialectically go beyond value.

The social individual that arises with social wealth has multilateral needs and capacities, since they have been produced by social knowledge in a universal process of social interaction. This process, while it has been made possible under capitalism, points beyond it. “*Real wealth is the developed productive power of all individuals*. It is then no longer labor, but disposable time that is the measure of wealth” (Marx 1983, p. 622, emphasis added). The basis for this shift is that the driving productive factor is no longer direct labor, but the socially created power of science and technology, embedded in machines. In this way, wealth can be understood categorically: it is not just determined by the growing amount of goods produced, but also by the social characteristics of their production and consumption. Social wealth is related to an individual whose needs and capacities are universal, since they have been produced by social interaction, knowledge and exchange.

Conclusion: globalization and philosophy of universal history

Johannes Rohbeck, who is otherwise critical of Postone, has pointed out that Marx attempted to ‘free philosophy of history from metaphysical assumptions’ (Rohbeck 2006, p. 83). Marx grounds world history in the global development of ‘economic exchange’; in a ‘historical process that today is called globalization’ (Rohbeck 2006, p. 85). Marx could be regarded as ‘one of the first theorists of globalization’ (Rohbeck 2006, p. 86). World history is not, in this reading, an ahistorical and intemporal given in which capitalism can simply be located. On the contrary, world history is determined under very specific historical conditions—namely, those of the world market and the global production for exchange.

Rohbeck’s considerations may allow us to understand how a critical theory of globalization could be developed from the foundations of the categorical critique. This critique is itself concerned with modernity as such. It understands that social domination is embedded in the fundamental structures of the social mediation of capitalist modernity. Globalization, from this perspective, involves

the universalization of an impersonal and quasi-objective, alienated form of mediation.

Yet, capitalist modernity is nevertheless a form of domination as much as it is creative and generative. It posits, along with its alienated movement, historical possibilities that could transcend it. These possibilities are contained in social wealth and in the social individual. While capitalist technologies are not emancipatory in themselves, they involve emancipatory possibilities because they render direct human labor less and less relevant in production.

Social wealth and the possibility of the social individual arise from a process of the globalization of knowledge, human capacities and needs. Under capitalism, productive units tend to lose their independence. This means that the goal of production and consumption involves the whole world. Productive forces become social: they are no longer specific to a single productive unit, nor based on a particular custom or traditional method.

Finally, capitalist production also transforms human needs. The creation of new needs by capitalism certainly involves forms of compulsive consumerism with irrational sides, but their flipside is the fact that individuals are confronted with the possibility of appropriating the historical results of cultures other than their own. So production for value also brings about emancipatory potentials, related to the idea of a multilateral form of human interaction and production, based not on particular traditions nor on value and labor, but on universal knowledge and the general growth—both quantitative and qualitative—of socially created, universal wealth.

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The Metaphysics of Globalization in Heidegger

Abstract: By referring to Heidegger's understanding of metaphysics in his later philosophy, a fundamental relationship between the tradition of metaphysical thinking and the globalization of the principles of modernity may be considered. Both metaphysics and globalization share the same concept of world, which since the beginnings of modernity is understood as the accessibility of beings in their entirety. The principles of modernity—such as world-accessibility, quantification, energy-funding, accumulation and dominance—are grounded in a metaphysical understanding of the human condition that is characterized by the subject-object division. This metaphysical understanding of the man-world relationship is considered to be the deeper rationale of all essential phenomena of the modern age—such as philosophy, technology, natural science, economy, politics of power, and even humanism—which all tend to globalize their fundamental principles. Investigating the Heideggerian criticisms of metaphysics helps in understanding the deeper meaning of the notion of 'world', as this term is used in the discourse about globalization.

Globalization and the concept of world

Metaphysics is in all its forms and historical stages a unique but perhaps necessary, fate of the West and the presupposition of its planetary dominance. The will of that planetary dominance is now in turn affecting the center of the West. (Heidegger 1973, p. 90)

Here, Heidegger connects the planetary dominance of the western hemisphere (the globalization that originates from within Europe in the context of western imperialism and colonialism, but which became a connected systemic order and, therefore, turns back affecting its center) with a certain 'way of thinking'—'metaphysics'—that is meant to be the presupposition and deeper rationale of global modernity. What metaphysics and globalization do have in common is precisely this 'will to domination'. Metaphysics 'as philosophy' is a discourse about what is *meta*, 'over' the *physis*; the certain beings in the world, and about what is 'transcendent' to those beings (Heidegger 1998, p. 93). What goes beyond the certain 'beings in' the world was interpreted by the tradition

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of metaphysical thinking as ‘the world itself’—the ‘totality’ of all beings. “‘World’ serves, here, as a name for beings in their entirety.” (Heidegger 2002, p. 67) Since its beginnings in ancient philosophy, metaphysics has given thought to this totality called ‘world’, and, by doing so, attempted to subordinate the totality of beings to this thinking, to make it accessible to human thought. Otherwise, metaphysics would not have been able to think about beings in their entirety, and, if so, there would be no metaphysical philosophy at all. It is indeed of necessity to the logic of thought to refer to this entirety, and, therefore, metaphysics became the ‘fate’ of the west. Though, thinking of the world as a whole at first leads to ‘dominating’ it. Thereby, the same problematic reference to the totality of all beings is inherent both to metaphysics and to globalization: the world as a whole is affected by globalization and needs to be made available and connected within the ongoing process of globalization.

Metaphysics and globalization do indeed have the same will to domination, because they both share the same concept of ‘world’: as a totality that is accessible to human will and thinking. The notion of world, precisely as this term is used in contemporary discourse about globalization (world society, world market, world trade, world bank, world system, world order, world currency, world war, world fair, world citizenship, worldwide networking and orientation) is actually a metaphysical concept; it originates from the history of metaphysical thinking. The history of the concept of cosmos (κόσμος), *mundus* and world starts with Pre-Socratic philosophy (like Heraclitus) and can be retraced through the Gospel of John and in Christian philosophy (Augustine, Thomas Aquinas) to modern times (Kant) and, from its beginnings, shows certain kinds of ambivalences (Heidegger 1998, pp. 111–121). These ambivalences also concern the globalized principles of modernity. Modernity always tends to totalize the will to make the world accessible: to expand towards all spots of the globe (including the seabed), towards interplanetary space, as well as into the inner cores of atoms and the biological micro-structures of life, and towards all aspects of human society.

Phenomena of the age

Modern metaphysics, according to Heidegger, is based in the philosophical principle of subjectivity and, therefore, is characterized by radical subject-object division. The fact that man is now philosophically interpreted as a subject (from the Latin *subiacere*, which means ‘to lie below’) says that he now understands his own existence and reasoning as the instance in which all beings are grounded:

The word names that-which-lies-before, that which, as ground, gathers everything onto itself. This metaphysical meaning of the concept of the subject has, in the first instance, no special relationship to man, and none at all to the I. (Heidegger 2002, p. 66)

Therefore, to understand oneself as a subject means to realize a specific relationship to the world of beings: for those, ‘to be’ now means to be an object that may be represented and known by the subject. *All* beings are (and *the world* is) now defined by the principle of subjectivity and its corresponding principle of objectification. “Beings as a whole are now taken in such a way that a being is first and only in being insofar as it is set in place by representing-producing [*vorstellend-herstellenden*] humanity.” (Heidegger 2002, pp. 67–68) Because the world is now defined by its capability of being representable by the subject, and as far as a ‘representation’ is synonymous with a ‘picture’, Heidegger can re-name modernity as *The Age of the World Picture*, which is the title of his famous essay from 1938 (Heidegger 2002, p. 57).

This essence of modernity—that all beings exist as representable objectivity and that the world itself is understood as such a representation—is the ‘ground’ of all so-called ‘essential phenomena’ of the age. That means, with regard to all those basic “phenomena [*Erscheinungen*], their metaphysical ground must allow itself to be recognized in them” (Heidegger 2002, p. 57). This recognition of the phenomena must be the only argument to justify the assumption of a metaphysical ground of an age, or, of modernity being the age of the world picture. What are, according to Heidegger, these essential phenomena of modernity?

Firstly, there is metaphysics itself, as the philosophy of the 17th to up to the 20th century. It is precisely “the guiding thought of modern philosophy” that “something ‘is’ only insofar as a founded cognition has secured it for itself as its object.” (Heidegger 1991, p. 27) This can be found in Heidegger’s Interpretation of Leibniz’s *principium rationis* – the principle of sufficient reason—that is essential to early-modern philosophy and which says that “Nothing is without reason. The principle now says that every thing counts as existing when and only when it has been securely established as a calculable object for cognition.” (Heidegger 1991, p. 120) To say that everything exists only with reason, and nothing without reason, implies that everything, every being is accessible to human cognition (as the criteria of this being), which can always represent the reason why this being exists. Metaphysics, which, throughout its history, more and more tended to interpret ‘being’ at all as ‘being an object’, is understood by Heidegger as the effect of an ‘erroneous trend’ within western culture, with global modernity as its final manifestation. Its preconditions go back to Parmenides and his famous assessment “that, namely the same, is perceiving as well as being” (Heidegger 1991, p. 73), but this seed sprouted only when it was “in the

metaphysics of Descartes that, for the first time, the being is defined as the abject of representation, and truth as the certainty of representation” (Heidegger 2002, p. 66). Heidegger even includes his own philosophy of his earlier writings into his criticism of objectivizing metaphysical thoughts, when he, in 1929, implicitly argues against his first major work *Being and Time* from 1927. This approach, by mistake, identified the ontological context of object-usage with the phenomena of the world (cp. Heidegger 1998, pp. 121, 370, footnote 52).

Secondly: Because of metaphysics defining ‘world’ as the totality of beings, which is ‘accessible’ to human thought, modern technology is the most consistent realization and materialization of the essence of metaphysical thinking (Luckner 2008, pp. 59, 93). What distinguishes ‘modern’ from ‘traditional’ technology—for example, a hydroelectric power plant from a traditional watermill—is that the mill indeed uses the water flow of the river, but that the power plant represents the idea of ‘whole’ nature being an accessible resource for the demand of accumulating energy. Modern technology, like the power plant, “puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it suppl[ies] energy that can be extracted and stored as such.” (Heidegger 1977, p. 14) Unlike the movement of the mill that is built into the river, energy is—like money—an abstract category that can, in principle, be accumulated infinitely (Luckner 2008, p. 114). ‘Whole’ nature, then, becomes primarily a resource for technology. Thus, modern technology is, indeed, not essentially defined as a useful means to an end, but as a (metaphysically determined) conception of what nature *in its entirety* is.

Thirdly: Insofar as modern ‘natural science’ understands nature in its entirety as a calculable coherence of forces and energies (which can be anticipated by referring to natural law and made controllable by experiments using measurement and mathematical calculation as its basic methods) it totally complies with the essence of modern technology (Heidegger 2002, pp. 61–66; 1977, p. 21). By referring to ‘nature’ as quantifiable, mathematized and, therefore, secured to human disposal, the world of natural sciences is nothing other than the entirety of potential technological (and economic) resources. If anything cannot be represented and imagined as a calculable coherence of forces and, thus, cannot become open to technological and/or economical access, it is not at all ‘nature’ in the sense of modern ‘natural’ science.

Fourthly: Heidegger addresses the ‘economy’ as an essential phenomenon of the modern age in the context of his reception of Marx and Hegel. He points out that Marx’s concept of ‘dialectical materialism’ “does not consist in the assertion that everything is simply matter but rather in a metaphysical determination according to which every being appears as the material of labor” (Heidegger 1998, p. 259). The metaphysical background of labor was, before Marx, first thought in “Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the self-establishing process of un-

conditioned production, which is the objectification of the actual through the human being, experienced as subjectivity” (Heidegger 2008, p. 295). Every being—the whole metaphysical world—appears as the material of labor, which transforms natural being into technology and, by this, labor produces the added-value which is needed for the self-establishing process of capital accumulation in modern societies. Capitalism is exactly that kind of economic system that can at its best execute the metaphysical objectification of world and the essence of technology.

Fifthly: The metaphysical trinity of technology, science and economy effectuates that politics have to give rise to the claim to make the world accessible to objectification and technological access. Thereby, politics transforms itself into ‘politics of power’ and, from a global perspective, into ‘geopolitics’. The political leaders of nation states, inside and outside, have to push forward mechanization and technological progress, which causes the clash of nations and leads, according to Heidegger, to geopolitical conflicts, including the world wars (Vietta 2015, p. 163). The newly-published *Black Notebooks* by Heidegger deal, among other things, with the global political power blocks after World War II—the Soviet Union and the United States—which seem to have oppositional political ideologies, but are indeed driven by the same concept of power (Heidegger 2014, p. 173–174; Vietta 2015, p. 164).

The struggle between those who are in power and those who want to come to power: On every side there is the struggle for power. [...] This struggle is of necessity planetary and as such undecidable in its being because it has nothing to decide [...]. (Heidegger 1973, p. 102)

There is a thinking related to spheres of influence and global supremacy in geopolitical situations, driven by technological and economical constraints, in which this planetary struggle, with power being an end in itself and its object being the entire world, has not necessarily anything to decide, because the categories of power itself and its ‘understanding’ of the world as accessible to men—the ‘metaphysical’ approach of technology and economy—is never questioned as such.

Sixthly: The aforementioned aspects and consequences of metaphysical thinking about the world ultimately result from the self-understanding of man as a subject and, therefore, relate to humanism and its anthropology. Humanism intends to moralize man and, with this, to let him recognize his own dignity. Indeed, all variants of humanism “presupposed the most universal ‘essence’ of the human being to be obvious. The human being is considered to be an *animal rationale*.” (Heidegger 1998, p. 245) Regarding this definition, the subject-object

distinction is repeated and duplicated *within* the human being itself. Man is ‘animal’, i. e. a living creature understood as a biological organism; in addition to this, man is *rational*, with the ability to be rational and reasoning. In the formula *man = organism + rationality*, ‘human being’ divides itself into being a subject and being an object. Human existence itself is now understood as being-an-object to a subject and enters the realm of accessibility to the metaphysical subjectivity. Man himself becomes a resource on behalf of technology: “Man, who no longer conceals his character of being the most important raw material, is also drawn into this process.” (Heidegger 1973, p. 104) With this being an implication of the humanist understanding of man, the basic ideas of humanism, such as freedom and human dignity, are (not in an unproblematic way) simply *oppositional* to the exploitation or even self-exploration of humans. Heidegger relates these negative dialectics of humanism to the idea of the absolute value, which is regarded as human dignity:

Rather, it is important finally to realize that precisely through the characterization of something as ‘a value’ what is so valued is robbed of its worth. That is to say, by the assessment of something as a value what is valued is admitted only as an object for human estimation. [...] Every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does not let beings: be.” (Heidegger 1998, p. 265)

The paradox of human dignity is that, by attributing an absolute value to himself, man attributes to himself and transforms himself into an object that is relative to this attribution, and, therefore, does not seem to relate to himself anymore as absolute. On the contrary, this does not mean that it is possible to deny human dignity, but rather that “Humanism is opposed because it does not set the *humanitas* of the human being high enough” (Heidegger 1998, p. 251). Furthermore, this means that we have to think about the essence of human dignity in a new and more radical way, by considering the negative aspects that the ideas of humanism may have.

These abovementioned aspects of the phenomena of the age—modern philosophy, technology, science, economy, politics of power and humanism—are related to metaphysics, because metaphysics refers to the world of beings in their entirety, or to nature—and because this entirety is also addressed within the phenomena that are essentially defined as concepts about what ‘being’ or ‘world’ actually means. Heidegger’s basic intention is to fulfill the so-called ‘Turning’ (Heidegger 1977, p. 36), which means to think both of beings in their entirety and of the relation of human existence to this entirety in a new way: to think the “transition from metaphysics to the thinking of being in its historicity” (Heidegger 2012, p. 5). At first, this means to consider that the phenomena of an age are grounded in a deeper understanding of the world. Be-

cause, concerning the age of modernity, an understanding of the world as ‘accessible’ to man appears as essential to *all* phenomena of modernity, modernity as such tends to globalize its principles, such as power, quantification, mathematization, technologization and energy production. The metaphysical concept of the world is indeed inherent to modernity. The age of the ‘world picture’ is the age of globalization.

Two concepts of world: the universe and the globalization

According to the humanistic definition of man—which, according to Heidegger, is ‘not false’ but ‘conditioned by metaphysics’ (Heidegger 1998, p. 246)—the human being is an *animal rationale*; a definition that appears within ancient and medieval philosophy as the Latin translation of the Grecian *zoon logon echon* (ζῷον λογὸν ἐχόν)—the living creature that is able to think and to talk. To be rational means to be able to have thoughts, and this implies the ability to form sentences and phrases, or, to use language. One of the most fundamental logical principles of language is predication: the possibility to say that any being is another determination, like, for example, a ‘quality’ of this being. What does this ‘is’ mean? In contrast to the ‘certain’ being *in* the world (which is defined by a summary of its actual or possible determinations and can be separated and distinguished from other beings), the ‘is’—which appears within human language and, by this, must be meaningful—has no certain qualities. *That* the being is, must be something else than *how* and *what* it is.

This is what Heidegger calls the ‘ontological difference’: the distinction between “*beings in* their being, and *being of* beings” (Heidegger 1998, p. 105). Because man can understand ‘is’ or ‘to be’ within the usage of language, the ‘being of all’ beings is related to his existence. And because this ‘being’ does not mean something special—no particular fact or thing *in* the world—but *that* being is, human existence is not limited to certain areas of beings, but has an essential relationship to the entirety of beings, to the world. Indeed, this world is not an object to a human subject, like ‘certain’ beings could be objectivized. This marks the erroneous trend both within the tradition of metaphysical thinking, and the cultural history that leads to the principles of modernity—to the age of the ‘world picture’—that always tends to subordinate the entirety of beings to an object of calculation and disposal. But the turning to a different way of thinking concerning the world can be made throughout the metaphysical definitions. To Heidegger, human being (*Dasein*) now stands in a relationship to world

that is defined as the ‘transcendence’ to certain beings: “We name *world* that *toward which* Dasein as such transcends, and shall now determine transcendence as *being-in-the-world*.” (Heidegger 1998, p. 109) As the hyphens in Heidegger’s new phrase indicate, ‘being-in-the-world’ is meant to be a structure in which there is a fundamental unity concerning the relationship between human existence (which is called *Dasein*) and being of beings, called world. The emphasis of this unity avoids the subject-object division of early modern philosophy up to the 20th century, which complies with the problematic principles of modernity as such. Again: what is the problem concerning the modern understanding of ‘world’?

Heidegger explains why there always appears a problem when the essential human-world relationship—the ‘being-in-the-world’—is divided into subject and object, or, equally, when the unity of the world is ‘abstracted’ atwain:

It is therefore equally erroneous to appeal to the expression world either as a designation for the totality of natural things (the natural concept of world), or as a term for the community of human beings (the personal concept of world). Rather, what is metaphysically [52] essential in the more or less clearly highlighted meaning of κόσμος, *mundus*, world, lies in the fact that it is directed toward an interpretation of human existence [*Dasein*] in its relation to beings as a whole. [...] World belongs to a *relational* structure distinctive of Dasein as such, a structure that we called being-in-the-world. (Heidegger 1998, pp. 120–121)

The fundamental man-world relationship is undermined by subject-object division, and by the understanding of world as representational. This leads to an understanding of ‘world’ in which there are actually two totally different usages of the notion: the *natural* concept of world and the *personal* concept of world. The two are equally erroneous—the former as a designation of the totality of all natural objects (without the human subject), and the latter as a name for the community of human beings (to which nature is accessible).

We can recognize these two usages of the notion of ‘world’ in the discourse about modernity and globalization. Modernity, firstly, describes the ‘natural’ world in its entirety, including its most distant phenomena, which can only be visualized due to the invention of the astronomic telescope, and which are meant to be explained by referring to the basic principles concerning the behavior of matter. This understanding of the world is named the ‘universe’. In this so-called universe there is nothing like the phenomena of humanity. The universe is not the human world. Human existence—Heidegger’s *Dasein*—is not a relevant object to those sciences that have the authority to define the concept of the universe.

In his book *Mind and Cosmos*, Thomas Nagel points out that the “great advances in the physical and biological sciences were made possible by excluding the mind from the physical world. This has permitted a quantitative understand-

ing of that world, expressed in timeless, mathematically formulated physical laws.” (Nagel 2012, p. 8) The main thesis of his book is that this leads to an aporia, “since mind is the product of a partly physical progress”—even the mind of the scientist who works with the theory—but these physical sciences “have been developed for a mindless universe” (Nagel 2012, p. 12). Opposing the supreme paradigms of Neo-Darwinism and materialism, and for the sake of the future development of our scientific culture and theory, the question should be asked of how a more comprehensive understanding of the physical reality, which includes the mind (phenomena such as consciousness, cognition, value, conclusion), might be possible (cp. Nagel 2012). It could be true that it is the most important characteristic of matter or of the physical universe that it can bring mind into reality and that matter should be re-thought in categories of the mind.

While the paradigms of modern natural science are only made possible by excluding fundamental aspects of existence and life from these sciences, the human self-understanding is always implicitly in the background. The universe that is defined as pure objectivity is determined by man who, since the beginnings of modernity, exists as a subject. The ‘natural’ world is defined as the entirety of the behavior of pure matter. This is the metaphysical world, accessible to human disposal. The universe, a concept that ‘underdetermines’ human being in the world by excluding the principle of subjectivity, is actually linked to an ‘overdetermination’ of the human will within the modern understanding of ‘world’. Then, man suddenly stands above all other natural things, which are reduced to their capacity to be objectivized and manipulated as energy resource, as experiment, and as commodity. This is expressed by a different usage of the notion of world: the world that is connected and made accessible by or within the world society, the world market, the world trade, the world bank, the world system, the world order, the world currency, the world wide web, etc. This concept of ‘world’, which defines it as the summary of all human involvements, is the world-concept of globalization, which is without doubt present in all current discourses about what globalization might be.

While the ‘natural’ concept of world excludes human activities and relationships from its definition of the universe, the second concept of world, by contrast, excludes nature from what is meant to be the world. However, this is so only if ‘nature’ is understood in the old, Aristotelian way—as that which is inaccessible to human disposal and manipulation, because it exists and moves on its own, a concept which is remarkably different to the understanding of ‘nature’ as a resource for energy production and economic growths (cp. Luckner 2008, pp. 103–104). With this, the two concepts of world are obviously linked; they result from the same abstractness that divides the essential relation and openness

of human existence to the cosmos—a relational structure that is named being-in-the-world by Heidegger— into a pure object-side and a pure subject-side.

Globalization's understanding of the world arises during the beginning of European modernity with the exploration of North America, the decentralization of the globe in the Copernican revolution, the development of the central perspective within art, and the Cartesian philosophy. All these events have in common that the world (which is quite often imagined as the planetary globe) is objectivized by an external perspective. Since this, globalization expands towards all areas of the natural world, including man's own bodily nature and life, tending to make this world accessible. This process of globalization is understood by Heidegger as the quantification of the world, which can be seen in the "destruction of great distances by the airplane, in the representations of foreign and remote worlds in their everydayness produced at will by the flick of a switch" (Heidegger 2002, p. 71).

As shown, global modernity and metaphysics share the same concept of world. With this, metaphysics is the necessary presupposition of the planetary dominance of the West (the globalization of the European principles of world-accessibility) and the rise of a connected systemic order that in turn affects the center of the West.

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Lucas von Ramin

Globalization as a Symbolic Form: Ernst Cassirer's *Philosophy of Symbolic Form* as the Basis for a Theory of Globalization

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to investigate and problematize the present status of theories of globalization. Because of the actual diversity of these theories, a philosophical definition must be able to include this diversity without becoming meaningless. This paper claims that Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of culture—especially his *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (1923–1929)—is particularly suitable for providing a uniform access. The first part therefore examines an understanding of such symbolic forms; it shows on the one hand the problems of classical theories, and on the other hand the advantage of a functional access of cultural production, provided through the concept of Cassirer's elaboration of the conditions of possibility of culture and meaning. The paper then identifies the different aspects of globalization as a symbolic form, including the way it became a picture of the world, changed the understandings of space and time, is an interpretive paradigm and myth, and finally has consequences for the construction of subjectivity and identity. In a summarizing section, the paper highlights the paradoxical structure of globalization as its constituent moment. With the concept of symbolic forms, this awareness of contingency can be understood as a specific way of comprehending, related to our time and its cultural processing and managing strategies. In conclusion, there is much to suggest that the concept of globalization should be treated as a world image. Only then can one understand why globalization has become a symbol of our time: on the one hand, it occupies itself with universalistic claims; on the other, it is permeated by particular anxieties.

It has become difficult to escape the concept of globalization. Not only does it consistently shape the media and academic discourse—our lives are also directly affected by the consequences of globalization. However, more detailed inquiries reveal that the phenomena to which globalization relates vary widely. This is true for everyday use, as well as for scientific use: a uniform definition of globalization does not exist. Therefore, the aim cannot be to search for a unique definition or something that all things meant by globalization have in common. Equally,

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the use of this term in philosophical approaches is not self-evident. Instead, the question arises: what are the conditions of the possibility of a common meaning of globalization?

An author whose life's work and philosophy are in exactly that relationship of epistemology, conceptual theory and cultural philosophy is Ernst Cassirer. He was the first Jewish director of a German university, and he subsequently escaped from National Socialism, went into exile and died in New York; he fell into academic oblivion for a long time, until his theoretical approach saw a revival from the 1980s on. This is due to his magnum opus, *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (Cassirer 2010). The aim of this project was to develop a theory of the cognitive functions and expressions of human beings. Cassirer's approach is thus predestined to on the one hand, fill the methodological gap of the formation of a concept of globalization, and on the other hand, to build a bridge between cultural philosophy and ethics. The question was no longer how we recognize the world, but: how do we understand it?

From a functional theory of experience to the philosophy of symbolic forms

Cassirer's starting point was a critique of the classical and formal process of abstraction, which also forms the starting point of knowledge for the concept of globalization. The common understanding was that a definition or essence could be made or found by finding commonalities and differences between the term-related objects, which are then constitutive for the term itself. In order to enrich the criticism in content, it is helpful to show that 'classical approach' in reference to globalization. Roughly understood, globalization is the intensification of worldwide relations in the fields of politics, economy and culture.

Whether concerning provisions of the European Union, the Böhmermann-Erdogan debate in Germany or the international refugee crisis, for all examples it is true that they cannot be explained without supranational influences. Due to growing interdependencies, the autonomy of the nation state has reached its limits (Osterhammel / Petersson 2007). Jürgen Habermas described this as the 'post-national constellation' (Habermas 1998, p. 91). He argues that the national state alone cannot fill the new gaps of legitimacy. Global and trans-national institutions such as the UN and the EU should undertake this task. The hope was an increasing legalization. The most obvious discussion was the tendency towards universalization in terms of human rights. For example, Martha Nussbaum as-

sumes that pre-state claims provide a plausible foundation for a global human rights regime (Nussbaum 1999).

This is even more noticeable in the area of economics. Production, price development, employment relationships, etc. can no longer be understood without global references. In every book about globalization, the claim is made that the economic constraints comprise the driving force behind the delimitation movement, and that the market is the determining factor over all other existing systems (politics, social affairs, culture). It is not without cause that the renowned economist Jagdish Bhagwati defends himself against globalization critics when he highlights globalization as the “most powerful source for social good in the world” (Bhagwati 2007). For example, pertaining to the issue of child labor, institutionalization can be a helpful way to end it. Border crossing is not only evident at the level of organizations such as WTO or large global corporations, but also on a small scale. Most products we buy were produced under completely different conditions in other countries. Not only does the western market depend on extra-state production—it furthermore influences the living conditions in Third World countries, as scandals about productions in Bangladesh (for example) show. Exploitation, cheap labor, child labor and poverty are consequences of global production. Hence, it seems that the economy has developed its own dynamics and logic. Under the term ‘capitalism’ and in the context of the economic crisis of 2008, the problem of such trends was revealed. However, it became clear that these problems can only be controlled and addressed on a global level.

In the field of culture, the rapid development of information and communication technologies blurs the self-containment of cultural identities. Like the appropriation of mangas in the west or the takeover of Bavarian beer house culture in Asia, cultural products are detached from their context and free for adaptation. Byung-Chul Han therefore speaks of ‘hyperculture’: “The limits or fencing, to which the appearance of a cultural authenticity or originality is imprinted, dissolves. Culture is bursting at the seams.” (Han 2005, p. 16) Rather, cultures coexist and change each other at the same time. Nevertheless, attempts to speak of a ‘world society’ are common (Beck 1998; Luhmann 1975). The coincidence of the two viewpoints leads not only to productive mixing and pluralization, but also to severe cultural conflicts (occident/orient), as well as to reciprocal transformation of cultures.

Overall, the lowest common denominator is that all definition or description of globalization focuses on the delimitation thesis. They only differ in that some see this as a weakening (interdependence, globalization as a network) or strengthening (homogenization, universalization) process. The examples given

here are only a fraction of the current discussion, but sufficiently serve the purpose of giving an empiricism of the delimitation of boundaries.

However, it would not be sufficient to simply follow Cassirer's critique of the 'classical' approach of abstraction. In his view, the most general terms are those with the least content, and thus the importance of the phenomenon cannot be grasped. Globalization is not simply a generic term, but is only understandable in the context of different concepts and theories like trans-nationalization, denationalization, capitalism, economization, multiculturalism or deterritorialization. Concepts, as Cassirer quite Kantianly says, "cannot be taken from the realm of subject matter that they are supposed to explain." (Paetzold 2008, p. 29) The philosophy of the symbolic forms seeks to clarify this overall connection between constitution (what characterizes the concept and makes it functional) and construction (the function that the concept itself takes over). Therefore, terms are representations and parts of an overall system. Following Gerald Hartung's analysis of Cassirer: "Instead of a theory of scientific thinking, an analysis of all paths is necessary on which reality is merged into a cognitive cosmos [i.e. globalization]." (Hartung 2006, p. 219)

Symbolic forms are forms that help us to understand and to create an understanding of the world. Man becomes the creator of the world through his own mental activity. The comprehensive approach of the project is reflected in the determination of the human being as an 'animal symbolicum'. Then, culture is understood as an organic whole: "Whenever man becomes aware of and perceives the world, things and oneself, it requires mediation through symbolic forms." (Müller 2010, p. 15) Therefore, the philosophy of symbolic forms, understood as 'cultural criticism', allows us to understand different spaces of experience; in the specific language, these are myth, religion, science, technology and lastly politics. Returning to the concept of globalization, it is true that with the concept of delimitation, the core of that movement is grasped—but this explanation is one-dimensional. That means, the moments of globalization "cannot be listed in isolation or even divided into different kinds of globalization which we then work through accordingly." (Gedinat 2015, p.7)

Globalization as a symbolic form

It is no small claim to understand globalization as a 'symbolic form'. As part of the Cassirer-examined forms like language, myth, religion, science and technology, globalization seems not to be taken for granted. Nevertheless, so the thesis, the basic functions can also be found. Globalization has become a form between constitution and construction, through which specific phenomena of economy,

technology, politics or society can be interpreted. In other words: globalization comes necessarily to one's mind when thinking about such spheres. The term is used to explain everything and thus has become a non-explanation. Everything would actually already have been said with the answer: 'It's all about globalization'—but nothing would have been understood.

We live in the 'age of globalization' (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 2016), the dawning of which the BMWi dates with the year 1998, and in which processes of internationalization, acceleration and interdependence are omnipresent. However, reference is not made to concrete forms of globalization, nor to the necessity that arises due to it—a necessity that already created a discourse about the end of this era (Straubhaar 2016), because internationalization set countermovements in motion, which undermine the original processes of globalization (nationalism, protectionism). Nevertheless, maybe this is not the end, just the other side of the coin. If globalization is a symbolic form, both sides can be connected in a productive way. It is no longer about the search for the core or similarities of all the things related to globalization, but rather the attempt to understand the meaning of the term. Such an attempt is analogous to Cassirer's investigations and can be roughly divided into four levels: Globalization as a worldview, void, myth and the consequences for the subject.

Globalization as a worldview

Firstly, it must be discussed which function the term 'globalization' has besides a reduction to the lowest common denominator. It is important to ask how the meanings of specific phenomena were changed by globalization, and thus also changed the meaning of the term itself. Globalization is therefore not only determined through its *differentia specifica*, it is furthermore a normative pattern of interpretation—a worldview. This view is especially characterized by its paradoxical structure: "Depending on the perspective, it appears either positively as a de-ideologizing, liberating tendency, or negatively as a violence which infiltrates the remnants of human life and completely changes social systems and cultures." (Schweppenhäuser / Gleiter 1999, p. 6) This can be easily shown by looking at the aforementioned areas of politics, economy and culture.

There was the hope that through the processes of globalization values such as democracy and human rights would spread worldwide. 'Cosmopolitan city', 'world system' and 'cosmopolitanism' were the terms on which such a debate focused. Worldwide entanglements were considered as possibly producing the civilization of the world. Thus, with the statement of the 'end of history' (Fukuyama 1992), Francis Fukuyama represented the thesis that with democracy, liberalism

and market economy, the dominant models of world order had prevailed, and alternatives no longer seemed plausible. That lack of alternatives only leads to gradual distortions within the dominant system. The core of these theses can be pinpointed, on the eve of the popularity of globalization, to the prevailing dominance of modernization theories. These theories assumed that history has to be understood as a progressive and rational process, which leads to social, political and economic improvements; and furthermore, that the movement of delimitation and globalization are among the categories of modernity itself (Giddens 1995). It is stressed as a criticism of these concepts that on the one hand, they hide the dark sides of globalization, like poverty or the rapid degradation of the environment, while on the other hand, an increasingly Eurocentric perspective legitimizes western hegemony (from colonialism to capitalism).

That, 25 years after the appearance of Fukuyama's thesis, the world has not developed into unity illustrates the problem of such a project. The crises are striking: whether politically, such as the Ukraine crisis or the conflicts in the Middle East; economically, such as the finding that the living conditions "between and within individual world regions and societies have remained extremely unequal or even diverging" (Debiel / Roth / Ulbert 2010, p. 16); or culturally, such as the lack of equality between men and women. Therefore, current globalization theories try to thematize that contradiction.

In this sense, it is not accidental that Ernst Bloch's description of the 'simultaneity of the non-simultaneous' (Bloch 1985, p. 104) got a revival in the context of globalization. The sociologist Armin Nassehi expresses this interaction in terms of ethical questions:

It [globalization] denotes both a specter, which threatened our beautiful social peace and the reasonably functioning model of tamed capitalism, and the possibility of reversing regional particularisms in favor of that state two hundred years ago, as mankind as an inclusion formula should provide those forces that can liberate us from self-inflicted immaturity. The talk of globalization legitimates both social atrocities in political decisions and the hope that the One World, of which the 1970s alternative and third world movements spoke as a provocation, have now become reality. (Nassehi 1999, p. 21)

In Robert Robertson we can find a similar representation. In his article "Glocalization: Homogeneity and heterogeneity in space and time" (Robertson 1998), he said that globalization mainly comes from a coexistence of different effects and dimensions. For example, smartphones and internet access are now widespread worldwide, even in the poorest regions. Simultaneously, much of the production of these devices is based on the exploitation of raw materials in developing countries. Ironically, amazement at the image of a refugee with a smartphone

shows how much western thinking is still arrested in the modernization paradigm.

Ulf Engel and Matthias Middell therefore used the term ‘fracture zones of globalization’ (Engel / Middell 2010, p. 23) in their book about the similarities and differences among 26 globalization theorists, to represent the doubt that all the different phenomena can be meaningfully brought together. It shows a differentiated picture of delimitation, which can be only understood in its plurality and contradictoriness:

[The] world in the sense of shared values and universally accepted principles and standards for tackling global challenges only exists in a rudimentary state. Despite global communication, transnational migration, technology transfer and the proliferation of Western consumption patterns, the worlds still remain alien to one another. (Debiel / Roth / Ulbert 2010, p. 25)

In recent years, the opposite trend has been particularly clear in the rise of populist movements in the western world. They are considered as the voice of ‘globalization losers’ (Titz 2016)—people who understand their loss of work, reduced income or general slipping into precarious situations as an outcome of globalization. As the example of the smartphone and, furthermore, research on consequences of global warming make visible, vulnerabilities are unfairly distributed (Reder 2009, pp. 130–131).

It is useful to ask whether this type of ‘western globalization loser’ is not in fact a special cohort, since it is located within the large cohort of globalization winners. If this thesis is correct, it reveals more obviously the changed meaning of globalization. A recently published study by the Bertelsmann Foundation shows that about half of the citizens of Europe fear globalization. The word has become a cipher for ‘automation, migration and international banking’ (Titz 2016). It is no longer a principle of hope, but a threat. The same can be said for the United States, if the election of Donald Trump can be referred back to his critical positions on globalization. These examples show that globalization also includes movements back to the local, to nationalism and protectionism.

As mentioned above, not only are the experiences of globalization different, but so too are the associated normative criteria. Globalization is thus not only local, in terms of a center-periphery thesis, but also temporally and normatively contradictory. Even more striking is the desire previously associated with this process of control and security, now changed to the experience of fear of being out of control. Globalization stands symbolically for a worldview at the end of the expiring twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. Overall, the commonality is based on the experience of helplessness and of

being exposed to a structure—one that obeys only its own logic and is beyond the control of human powers. Gedinat states: “We do not control the process of globalization. For us it is out of control. At the same time it determines our living conditions in principle.” (Gedinat 2015, p.16)

Globalization as a void

Secondly, this implies that globalization contains a kind of surplus or transcendental moment. It is not just the reservoir of individual phenomena—it is also in its entirety beyond our reach. This becomes obvious when looking at the explanations of the global financial crisis of 2008. Despite attempts to make the interrelations comprehensible to everyone through the use of words like ‘financial bubble’ or ‘hedge funds’, the concrete mechanisms remain understandable to only a very small percentage of experts. Rather, the traceability of whatever provoked the crisis is no longer be achievable.

The aforementioned complexity and diversity of using the term ‘globalization’ now becomes a problem. The empirical process itself is withdrawn or unavailable to us. If the concept of globalization remains unavailable, why do we need and use such a term at all? At this point, many assertions about anthropological questions and questions of transcendence can be made. However, with Cassirer’s functional theory of experience and aspect of meaning, two theses can be highlighted.

On the one hand, Cassirer emphasizes that human beings are dependent on something like meaning. Although it is initially a circular argument, since the search for meaning is proved by the elaboration of symbolic forms, evidence can nevertheless be found in psychology and philosophical anthropology. Passive perceptions must primarily be transformed in reality. Acting is not just a reaction; it assumes a meaningful understanding. On the other hand, it should be noted that the functional necessity of a superordinate phenomenon such as globalization is simply a response to the rampant excess of information. Changed material conditions and the ever-increasing de-bordering and interconnectedness of the world lead to the development of a term like globalization, in order to be able to understand and order them. As a ‘historical *a priori*’, the term then affects the interpretation of the singular phenomena.

According to Cassirer, precisely this is the function of meaning of symbolic forms:

In the meaning function these two moments, the constant change and the constancy of things, become dialectical counterpoints. [...] The meaning structure relates no longer to

objects of the illustrative world, but their constancy underlying links, to their intrinsic structure. (Kralemann 2000, p. 47).

The definitions of globalization and the emphasis on its paradoxes outlined above strikingly match Cassirer's conception. Theoretically, Hartmut Rosa's notion of 'acceleration' is an analogy in which he describes the 'silent, normative violence' of modern life (Rosa 2005, p. 481).

Globalization as a myth

Thirdly, Cassirer provides analogies of globalization and the concept of myth. This does not mean to show that globalization is a myth, which would 'negate' the mythical understanding by looking at these things from a scientific standpoint (Cassirer 1990, p. 119). Rather, to understand myth means to develop an understanding within the mythical framework. This is also true for globalization. Utilizing a strictly scientific perspective, we only grasp a part of its purpose. Even if the concept itself is empirically a myth, the actual use of the term is not. Without giving a detailed summary of Cassirer's theory of myth, some points can be highlighted.

In the first place, Cassirer identifies the same goal in myth as in science. Both try to develop an appropriate and reasonable understanding of the world. "For even magic argues and acts upon the presupposition that in nature one event follows another necessarily and invariably without the intervention of any spiritual or personal agency." (Cassirer 1972, p. 76) It is also possible to view globalization as a result of forces and actions beyond the realm of human influence. Especially in the case of economics, an independent process can be identified. If Elmar Altvater writes that "the inner pressure of global market is relentless" (Altvater 2009, p. 206), then his criticism is directed against an apparent necessity or naturalness that connects globalization with a lack of alternatives.

Furthermore, essential for mythical thinking is the emotional nature of perception. Instead of the experience through senses, it is primarily the experience of passions. 'Physiognomic qualities' are in opposition to 'qualities of perception' (Cassirer 1972, p. 77). The usual explanations of globalization inevitably fall short, because they do not treat the emotional part of this debate seriously. The political approach toward globalization in particular is in itself evidence that emotional understanding has priority. "The world of myth is a dramatic world—a world of actions, of forces, of conflicting powers" (Cassirer 1972, p. 67)—much like the reactions to globalization. It also seems to be an interplay of forces:

we do not judge from an observer's perspective; rather the effects of globalization are directly experienced.

According to Cassirer, the most important point of mythological thinking is the dissolution of the interplay of forces to form a picture of the whole. Myths integrate all things from social to natural phenomena:

Life is not divided into classes and subclasses. It is felt as an unbroken continuous whole, which does not admit to any clean-cut and trenchant distinctions. The limits between the different spheres are not insurmountable barriers; they are fluent and fluctuating. (Cassirer 1972, p. 81)

A similar description can be found in books about globalization. For example, Giddens and Reder both show that the process of globalization is defined as a process of border transgression or automatic leveling. It is more a perceived than a factual dissolution.

However, by looking at Cassirer's terms like 'solidarity of life', 'unity of life' and 'society of life' (Cassirer 1972, pp. 82–83), it can be doubted that myth and globalization are the same. The former refers to forms of equality and support, while the latter displays a lack of solidarity. Inequality increases even more. The unity of globalization is a unity of differences.

Globalization and subjectivity

Lastly, it is necessary to ask which consequences can be drawn for the subject from the previous. If Cassirer's belief that our categories of knowledge and concepts form the basis of our view of the world is true, then it has to be taken for granted that the idea of globalization has an influence on our self-conception.

However, globalization not only means the dissolution of the forms described above—it also puts conventional ideas of 'subjectivity' and 'identity' into question. In the sense of postmodern diversity, the stabilizing unity of the subject is in danger. The idea of always being and having to be at one with oneself in this world only leads to disappointment and the feeling of failure. As shown in the context of space and time, the increasing instability of the concepts leads to a deterioration of values. Human beings are bound to physical abilities, and thus when compared to technology are no longer in a competitive position. Cases like this show that people start to feel helpless and overburdened, which is the reason for a retreat into fixed identities. This is the attempt to preserve the individual status quo with a greater awareness of the roots of the accident, the re-discovery of religion or the German discussion about a dominant

culture—things that follow from a ‘disorientation of the subjective world’ (Figueroa 2004, p. 11).

Interestingly, difference occurs less in already non-homogeneous cities than in rural areas. Of course, economic factors and education still play a crucial role, but roughly, through the expanded mobility and the inclusion of supraregional cultural products, the appropriation of new perspectives is more widespread than in history so far. Even if the media in the western world focuses on cultural conflicts, the change is small by comparison to other world regions. The increase of migration movements in particular show that with the consciousness of a globalized world and the knowledge of the other, a life outside the regional framework and under new and better conditions is possible.

The attempt to preserve the particular is not only found in a rising nationalism—Colin Crouch speaks of a nationalism that is itself globalized (Crouch 2017, p. 1)—but rather also as a tendency of globalization research. Due to the danger of leveling and disorientation, it is important to emphasize the individual and the special. Byung-Chul Han radicalizes the individual approach when he understands the expanded and huge ‘fund of life forms and practices’ (Han 2005, p. 55) as enabling a new dimension of individualization. Hence, the new openness is not just a drive back to regional homogeneity—it is an extended possibility of freely living out one’s own ideas.

However, Cassirer’s adaptation of Ernst Kapp’s philosophical theses can be read similarly. Kapp’s thesis of ‘organ projection’ describes technology as an outsourced form of human wish fulfillment (Kapp 1877, p. 30). As Cassirer states, technology not only negatively changes the cognitive conditions of man—it can also expand these conditions in a positive way. Technology creates new possibilities of self-experience. It forms the basis of an opening to the other by exceeding the otherwise limited communication radius. Globalization as a worldview can be interpreted in two directions: on the one hand, as a thinking of withdrawal and delimitation; and on the other hand, as a cosmopolitan attitude and an appearance of equal individualization. This ambivalence becomes obvious in the political trench fights of western societies: management of contingency vs consciousness of contingency. However, both worldviews have delimitation and associated powerlessness as a basis. They only differ significantly in their handling of this.

Both are consequences of the break with the identity concepts proclaimed by postmodern theories and the changes in the living world through globalization. In this respect, it belongs to the modern or post-modern self-understanding to be variable at the core: on the one hand, to keep it consistent to be one at that moment and another in the next moment; and on the other hand, this leads to radicalization by maintaining and defending identity. Whether or not the individual

faces the task, the question of the ‘self’ is no longer taken for granted. A good example is Richard Rorty’s description of the ‘liberal ironist’ (Rorty 1992, pp. 14–15). In this figure, self-creation and solidarity are equivalent and incommensurable at the same moment.

Globalization as a consciousness of paradox

As the concluding result, all the different aspects of globalization have to be brought together on an abstract level to understand globalization as a concept as such. According to Cassirer, the importance of globalization can only be understood when we concentrate on its function in the overall system. Such a process allows reflection on the constitutional conditions of such a term, and does not simply interpret it as a collection of different phenomena.

Classically, with globalization it is said that everything is in some way connected with everything. This is how Anthony Giddens formulates it in his book *Consequences of Modernity*:

The term globalization can be defined in the sense of an intensification of worldwide social relationships in that remote places are connected in such a way that events in one place are influenced by events that are located many miles away and vice versa. (Giddens 1995, p. 85)

According to Hamid Reza Yousefi, globalization is thus the change of one consciousness, by no longer assuming that singular areas can be understood on their own. As he states, they instead “overlap in many ways, contradict, complement or combat.” (Yousefi 2010, p. 27) The striking conclusion began to spread that a purely substantive definition of globalization cannot be given. Angelika Epple recommends that we cease trying to use the concept of globalization universally:

Globalization is considered a pluralistic, non-linear, non-teleological and as a multi-layered and asymmetric interconnecting process of different speeds, which is driven forward by individual and collective actors, slowed down, transformed and changed. To analyze the different layers, it makes sense to use the term in plural. (Epple 2014).

I have attempted above to characterize the definitions alluded to here. Even if different authors agree in principle with the dissolution thesis, when trying to formulate it they end up with an emphasis on overlaps and contradictions. As banal as this may sound, a certain understanding of the world is evident. As a ‘connection without contour’, the meaning of globalization lacks the order that serves as a meaning-giving element. The concepts of border crossing and

unification remain disordered. In more complicated terms, globalization is an ‘understanding network’ through which, as stated above, not a concrete or causal relationship is understood. Rather, it gives us an awareness of what we are: on the one hand, powerless against the contingency and the changing structures of the world; on the other hand, through the freedom of contingency empowered to act in and create the world.

The aforementioned contourlessness then becomes more precisely described as a ‘consciousness of paradox’. Whether speaking about ‘condition and process’ (Osterhammel, Petersson), ‘Simultaneity of the non-simultaneous’ (Bloch, Nassehi), ‘dismay without involvement’ (Reder), ‘overcoming the overwhelming’ (Gedinat), ‘Glocalization’ (Robertson), ‘non-solidarity unity’, ‘space-dependent spatial independence’ (Harvey) or ‘contourless connection’, it is always necessary to refer to opposing elements to understand globalization. The emphasis on paradoxes and contradictions has now become a scientific commonsense, and is promoted as the end of the globalization paradigm. A singular concept dissolves everything in a comprehensive movement, which is why it only makes sense to understand globalization as a ‘symbolic form’—a function of human world development. Therefore, much can be said for treating the concept of globalization as a worldview. Only then can one understand why globalization has become the symbol of our time: on the one hand occupied with universalistic claims, on the other hand permeated by particular fears. Globalization as a symbolic form is not, as presented in the Encyclopedia of globalization, the mere “continuation and continuity of a long-standing process” (Kreff / Knoll / Gingrich 2011, p. 16). Rather, globalization—with the thesis of the ‘historical *a priori*’ and the acceptance of Foucault’s adoption and further development of the philosophy of symbolic forms—is a historically changeable condition of possibility of the visible, the expressible, the knowable. It is a picture of our time. To refrain from a uniform understanding of globalization, the benefit of the term must lie in its linguistic and meaningful assistance in communicating and understanding a paradoxical structure. What remains doubtful is whether globalization can retain the intention of enlightenment, as Cassirer hoped.

Nevertheless, as Cassirer puts it, it is a matter of philosophy to ask not just what role globalization plays, but also what role it *should* play. Only in the analysis of a symbolic consciousness can globalization be understood and criticized. Globalization can then be understood as a task itself. In the spirit of Cassirer, this task means to take globalization as self-empowerment and to take responsibility for shaping the world positively and seriously, in order to free oneself from powerlessness through critical reflection. As paradoxical and contradictory as the figure of globalization may be, it is not only necessary, but also changeable. Radically speaking, by the obviousness of the contradictions, one must not seek

them out for a long time. They are ready for modification. Viewed positively, globalization can be understood—as a symbolic form—as a chance to convey the idea of plurality.

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5 Theory of Globalization and Philosophy of History

Daniel Brauer

Theory and Practice of Historical Writing in Times of Globalization

Abstract: In recent years, radical changes have taken place to the ways of thinking of historical writing, its methodology and its meaning as a specific field of knowledge. These changes are connected with the historical situation of which it is itself a part, and are also concerned both with a dispute within the discipline and with the current ethical-political debates that cannot accurately be removed from attempts to better understand today's world. As part of these changes, we are faced with a radical review of historiographical paradigms. These changes concern not only the practice of historical writing, but also the role of history as a source of political legitimation and as a way in which individuals understand their belonging and commitment to the political-institutional frameworks within which they lead their lives.

Like no other human science, history is an essentially interdisciplinary field whose boundaries are hard to define. Its repertoire of concepts not only has to do with the detailed and documented empirical reconstruction of what happened—it also has an interdependent relationship with other social disciplines concerning the topics involved in each case, so that any innovations in the theories of those disciplines have an impact on historical narratives (just as historical reconstructions can help to test and reconfigure them). On the other hand, historiography itself is also situated in a historical context, which it tries to understand simultaneously with shaping its concepts.

The normative dimension of the historical account concerns not only the values a historian shares with her contemporaries, but also the secular role of history as a source of legitimation of power and of the identity policies for civic education. The changes in this role also entail modifications to the way individuals understand their belonging and commitment to the political-institutional frameworks within which they lead their lives.

While recent debate in historical theory has revolved around two main themes—namely, the narrative structure of historical discourse and what we might call the ‘memory paradigm’—with globalization (and the thematization thereof in the context of the new ‘global history’), we enter a postnarrativist stage of the debate, in

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which, as regards the first theme, the *empirical* character of historical research is recovered. In this way, it becomes possible to exit the blind alley of historiography understood as a purely linguistic construction, consisting in a matrix of timeless rhetorical and narrative devices, independent of any cognitive claim. As regards the second theme, by placing history in the context of the debate concerning a better understanding of its own time, it is possible to account for its role in the exploration of the past as well as in the diagnosis of the present and the attempts to think of and act in future events. One of the consequences of the post-ethnocentric ‘global history’ project is a critical rehabilitation of key aspects of the vilified ‘speculative’ philosophy of history.

I

History has undergone, at least for the last fifty years, a crisis and successive transformation of the traditional canons that used to dominate its self-understanding as a discipline and which had been established following its final ‘professionalization’ (Iggers 2008, p. 108) in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European university spaces. This current crisis can be compared to that of the foundations of mathematics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Both in the case of historiography and in that of its epistemological theory, the reasons for this transformation are not purely internal to the historian’s workshop, but have to do with changes in the structure of the contemporary world to which her interpretation of the past belongs.

These changes cannot, in fact, be separated from the ongoing globalization process, on which various factors converge and whose consequences are not yet altogether clear. It is an epochal process that challenges the premises of modern thought as well as those of the so-called postmodern narrativism, insofar as the latter refuses—in its radical versions—to establish a cognitive connection between historical experience and historiography. Concomitantly with the questioning of traditional theoretical assumptions, there emerge paradoxically new forms of historical writing that imply unconventional paradigms whose theory is only beginning to arise.

The topics I will address next involve the historical situation of historiographical practice under globalization, the changes concerning the subject or theme of traditional history, and the changes brought about by all this regarding its conceptual repertoire, as well as key aspects of its methodology and postulates that used to be considered decidedly ahistorical. These changes, as we will see, also involve historical metatheory and some rehabilitation, though with strong caveats from the long vilified ‘speculative’ philosophy of history. Fi-

nally, we should consider the consequences of the foregoing for the internal re-arrangement of the discipline, the way of organizing how it is taught and, more importantly, its cognitive and normative contribution in the context of contemporary societies, with a view to an extended public sphere at the global level.

First of all, we should start by specifying the realm of history against other fields of knowledge based on its specific object of study. As is generally known, the term ‘history’ has many meanings. Usually a distinction is drawn between its reference to the objective course of events, on the one hand, and its narrative manifestation, on the other—but the polysemy does not end here (Brauer 2009, pp. 19–38). In any case, it is significant that the word ‘history’ should always be accompanied by a genitive—the ‘history of...’ – and it would seem that any object or subject could take the place of these suspension points, from the ‘history of the Peloponnesian War’ to the ‘history of Roman painting’. It is this flexibility of the term that has triggered the view that history, rather than having a specific object of study is simply one approach to any object, perceived through its changes over time. While there is certainly some truth in this, it is also true that we mainly associate the word ‘history’ with a specific theme (though it is usually taken for granted): the changes in collective life and its forms of social and political organization.

A key example of this theme in the modern world (at least since the emergence of history chairs at universities) has been that of the ‘nation state’, fulfilling a similar role to those previously played by monarchies or religions. This is shown by the fact that the need for constructing historical accounts and teaching them went hand in hand with the demands for a retrospective legitimation for the establishment of states, and that it ran parallel to the creation of archives, museums and ‘sites of memory’ (Nora 2001, pp. 23–43). In the case of the histories of states—like in those of nations, religions and the more or less vague concept of ‘peoples’—there is usually (besides any theoretical interest in how the events took place) a political mandate concerning the justification of power, as well as the development of criteria for citizens’ belonging and identification (Berger / Donovan / Passmore 1999; Berger / Lorenz 2010). This can clearly be seen in the role of history at school, beyond its claim of providing ‘objective’ knowledge of the past. Therefore, when we talk simply about ‘history’, we tend to think of national histories or of human history in general, where the former would be protagonists in a wider context.

While it is true that history is implicitly associated with the transformation of the collective life of nations and their political and social organizations, another one of its non-thematized assumptions is some idea of a common framework integrating the most diverse human activities, as belonging to the same ‘period’. This assumption of totality may be a byproduct of the construction of

History with a capital initial, but it should not necessarily be interpreted as suggesting a hypostatized collective subject, but as a possible space for interaction among various factors

This presupposition of a history common to humanity, shaped by the presence of multiple states organized around a limited territory with a horizon of contemporaneity, remains at the basis both of the historiography of nations and of teaching curricula, and is also shared by the view of history still held by the reader of a historiographical text. Precisely this relationship with the public is also an undeniable aspect of historical discourse, which distinguishes it from that of other disciplines to the extent that understanding a historiographical text does not seem to require any specialized knowledge. Accordingly, history has privileged access to public opinion—and it is no coincidence that most disputes, particularly about recent history, have to do with contemporary political struggles. However, over the last few years these assumptions have been moving away from the central stage of historical narratives—which does not actually mean that they are no longer written.

This shift of the nation-state axis is due to several factors. These certainly include the fateful experiences of the role of totalitarian and dictatorial states, particularly after the Second World War, which have led us to question the scope and limitations of state power as such and, at the same time, the globalization process under which they have in fact lost some of their sovereignty in economic, military, communicational and political terms, given their growing interdependence and international regulations. Simultaneously, academic history has not only increasingly abandoned its role as a source of legitimation of power but in many cases it has adopted a critical function that erodes identity accounts, delegating to a discredited popular historical literature or an ‘official history’ the various attempts to legitimize the present by the past.

If we now ask ourselves about the subjects that are today likely to replace national secular exploits, we cannot avoid mentioning three—two of which have a long tradition, though they appear with different features in contemporary historiography. I am referring to the notions of ‘civilization’ (Fisch 1992, pp. 679–774), ‘empire’ (Walther 1992, pp. 171–236) and thirdly – the main topic I seek to address—to the concept of ‘global’ (Brauer 2016, pp. 51–65). A multiplicity of subjects should be added, which go beyond traditional histories (insofar as they include concepts previously considered ahistorical), such as: childhood; insanity; women; death; ‘mentalities’ (Duby 1961, pp. 937–966); and hence also the history of the very ‘concepts’ (Palti 2011, pp. 227–248) governing historical reconstructions, which were previously taken for granted. But also worthy of addition to the list are geographical areas such as the Mediterranean, the Caucasus, etc., or subjects such as bread, silk, wine, etc. However heteroge-

neous these subjects may seem, they have in common that their historical path transcends changing national borders and that they do not focus on states.

Some of these subjects have given rise to the development of new disciplines such as ‘conceptual history’, ‘women’s history’ or later ‘gender history’, etc.; others, such as ‘environmental history’, transcend the traditional division between human and natural sciences. Concerning the first two subjects mentioned above, the notions of ‘empire’ and ‘civilization’, both retain features of what Koselleck calls ‘asymmetrical’ (Koselleck 1989, pp. 211–259) relational concepts insofar as they inevitably establish a contrast regarding certain peoples or nations as inferior to others, even when historians seek to adopt a neutral perspective or write from the victim’s point of view.

But, before addressing these, we should mention a key subject matter that emerged from the beginning of historiography and that implies by its nature a ‘transnational’ approach. I refer to ‘war’ as the subject of historical accounts—even when it has generally been narrated from the winners’ point of view or by those who believe they have been unjustly defeated. ‘War’ will undoubtedly remain one of the main topics of historical narratives, but it is also possible to verify here a major change precisely in that it is no longer a source of legitimation in itself for states, empires and civilizations—a change in values that becomes apparent in the significant renaming in most countries of the ‘Ministry of War’ as ‘Ministry of Defense’, around the end of the Second World War.

While the notion of ‘empire’ has recently undergone a revival because of its reformulation in postmodern Marxist social theory by Hardt and Negri (2000), still it has not inspired meaningful historical reconstructions, while the concept of ‘civilization’ has, on the other hand, been rehabilitated in contemporary historiography. We can notice a recent rebirth of the term ‘civilization’, which was already present in Spengler and Toynbee’s metanarratives, and extensively discredited by professional historians, from the points of view of both historiography and political theory in the 1990s (Conrad 2016, pp. 175–179). It is a somewhat vague notion that, on the one hand, was already designed by Herder to avoid the *aporias* and constraints of a concept of ‘progress’ that held Europe and the so-called ‘Western and Christian world’ as its main protagonists and sidelined other cultures—but that on the other hand, regardless of its alleged descriptive character, did not always expressly involve normative aspects that both imply a positive assessment against opposing concepts (such as ‘barbarism’, ‘primitivism’, ‘savagery’, etc.) and grant its own ‘civilization’ a privileged status. In its updated versions, the aim is to overcome the distortions of Eurocentrism to the extent that ‘civilizations’ are portrayed as closed, incommensurable containers, with an untainted original identity—but at the same time they run the risk of advocating the identity they consider their own as a standard, based on which it

is sufficient to interpret global developments (e.g., Sinocentrism, Afrocentrism, Islamocentrism, Latin-American-centrism). I think it is with good reason that Sebastian Conrad considers these variants nothing but “a response to current experiences of globalization” (Conrad 2016, pp. 175). As is generally known, global and ‘glocal’ are merely two sides of the same phenomenon.

II

After around the second half of the twentieth century, besides (1) the shift of the nation-state axis toward other collective entities, such as the aforementioned notions of ‘empire’ and ‘civilization’, there has occurred a gradual but increasingly rapid (2) fragmentation of the history field—like a cracked mirror into multiple topics and problems which are hard to classify—and subsequently, (3) the attempt to reunify that diversity around a main theme and to establish as far as possible a general perspective, based on which internal connections might be set up. It is precisely in this context that, along with other similar attempts, a new historiographical field has taken shape—namely, ‘global history’.

To account for this phenomenon, we could start by contrasting two relatively new disciplines, ‘global history’ and ‘microhistory’ (Ginsburg 1993, p. 10–35—for a very different view closer to postmodernism, see: Szijártó / Magnússon 2013). Despite first appearances, these are not diametrically opposed, but rather complementary, genres. In both cases there occurs a ‘change in time scale’ *vis-à-vis* traditional history. Regarding the former, it involves reconstructing (based on short time fragments or portions of individuals’ lives in specific social and cultural contexts) the way of life in a given period that thus becomes iconic. The emergence of this type of approach converges with others, such as that of the ‘history of private life’ or of ‘daily life’, ‘oral history’, ‘history from below’, and all of them with the emergence of the ‘memory paradigm’, the rise of which has been led at least since the 1990s (judging by its impact on public opinion, though its theoretical development began earlier) by the studies of the Shoah and studies of ‘genocide’ in general.

But the extensive debates about the scope and limitations of the opposition between the memory and the history paradigms (Tamm 2013, pp. 458–473) should not lead us to ignore the impact of the studies of memory in historiographical practice itself. What these new fields have in common is precisely the increasing inclusion in their narratives of the first-person perspective—both that of the victim (or victimizer) and of the witness, which used to go unnoticed in traditional impersonal histories and even in social history.

Of course, what is noticeable is the emergence of historical themes such as those above, which establish new narration subjects such as ‘women’, ‘childhood’, ‘the Mediterranean’, ‘death’, ‘madness’, and ‘sexuality’ (not forgetting Michel Foucault’s pioneering works, even though they cannot be considered strictly historiographical). Here, fragmentation has to do with historical subjects that cannot be detached from contemporary political struggles claiming for rights, or from certain nations, regions or minorities whose histories have been silenced and are expressly or implicitly written from the standpoint of an emancipatory project.

The emergence of ‘conceptual history’ has been established as a large, recent field of studies that shows the temporal dimension of a repertoire of categories that were considered ahistorical, ‘natural kinds’, with which historians used to read the past. Something similar can be said of the ‘history of the present’ (*Zeitgeschichte*), whose emergence as a discipline is also recent. With its establishment as a research field of its own, the traditional canon of the necessary ‘historical distance’ is broken (Bevernage / Lorenz 2013, pp. 7–25). We should add to this a series of historical narratives dealing with new historical fields, such as the birth of ‘environmental-’ or ‘eco-history’, which straddles the boundaries between human and natural sciences.

Concerning ‘global history’, we should distinguish the emergence of at least two subject areas: on the one hand, ‘globalization history’, about which there is already extensive literature, involving a series of disputes over the criteria for establishing its periods and dates; and on the other, the birth of so-called ‘global history’ as a genre of its own, different from ‘world history’ and its close relatives, ‘transnational history’ and the so-called ‘big history’, ‘intercultural history’, etc. ‘Global history’, as shown by the bibliographic boom over the last years, has established itself as a specific discipline representing a new point of view of ‘world history’ after the criticism of Eurocentrism and Poscolonilism.

However, unlike the notion of the nation-state, or that of imperialism, ‘globalization’ means, rather than an entity, (1) a process, whose contours are difficult to establish and, simultaneously, (2) a space for multicausal interaction. Unlike the notion of ‘capitalism’ (which is undoubtedly one of its key aspects and about which there have been many theories and discussions for at least two hundred years), in the case of globalization, its theory—much like its objective development—is a work in progress, and it would be unilateral to consider it merely a phase of late capitalism. It seems to potentially hold forces leading to new forms of dependence and marginalization, as well as to a new era of Enlightenment and emancipation of a citizens’ network that covers the whole planet, with both things being probably true at least at the current stage.

But from the point of view of historiography and its theory, the aim is to establish a kind of system of interconnections covering various aspects of the sociopolitical, military, technological, communicational and cultural scenarios, which may in turn help to explain the increasing homogenization at the international level, both of consumption habits and of the mainstream representations of the ways of life considered appropriate for today's world.

However, unlike the concepts of 'universal history', 'world history' or the 'history of humanity', whose sense is highly vague and seldom defined, 'global' history refers to objective processes involving changes in economics, in the mass media and the means of transportation, in the available techniques for transforming nature, in health systems, and in institutionalized standards in national and international agencies, as well as in many NGOs— but it also involves the standards of scientific knowledge and, in this case, of what may be considered by consensus an 'objective' historical narrative. What takes place in labeling a history as 'global' is not only a larger-scale, and hence more comprehensive, approach, but also a search for the explanation of processes that cannot be understood solely from an endogenous perspective. This concept refers to a space of interaction among many factors and differs from the notions of both 'dialectical totality' in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition and from the notion of 'world-system' suggested by Immanuel Wallerstein (Wallerstein 1974–2011), insofar as in this space there is room both for causality and for contingency, both for intentional action and for dysfunctionality.

In any case, it is necessary to distinguish the discussion about the meaning of globalization (and of 'anti-globalization' movements) from what constitutes for historiography a subject area in itself, for empirically exploring changes and events that are taking place in the world and which could subsidiarily help either to confirm or to test theoretical approaches.

In fact, the larger the scale, the bigger the difference between historical discourse and literary narrative, since historical discourse involves anonymous processes (such as the increase in birthrates, the increase in economic growth, the changes in institutional forms, etc.), whereas literary narrative seems to be associated with certain characters, their actions and their fate. While this happened already with social history, it is especially the case with global history.

While narrativism has contributed to the rediscovery of the narrative dimension of historical texts, it has failed to set forth, in its more radical versions, a theory of the specific structure of historical narratives. In Hayden White's school, historiography is thereby deprived of its cognitive claim as an empirical discipline. While history thus comes closer to literature (which proves, by some quirk of thought, more useful in its more recent postmodernist versions—and particularly in 'docudrama' (White 2014, p. 29)—for bringing us closer to 'real'

events), historiographical theory moves further away from historiographical practice and its most recent developments. White's metahistory of the historical imagination in the nineteenth century does not seem to be able to find its equivalent for twentieth- and twenty-first-century historiography, into which social and political theory has burst, just as new genres have emerged that are increasingly difficult to reduce to literary narrative. It seems to be more concerned with establishing what history should be, rather than with accounting for its latest developments.

III

There have been attempts to characterize the historical situation of contemporary man, both as regards the most significant changes in society and mainstream ideas, using different terms such as postmodernism, postmetaphysics, 'postnational constellation', 'post-traditional society' or post-history. All these epithets seek to show the new contours of today's world for the purpose of examining its causes and consequences. Instead, the 'globalization' concept has prevailed since the 1980s and exponentially more so since the 1990s (Mooney / Evans 2007). In fact, today nobody hesitates to associate the notion of globalization with an objective historical phenomenon and not with a specific theory that may and must be discussed. Furthermore, we could still say that the aforementioned terms represent—along with others, such as, for instance, the 'environmental' movement, the revival of 'cosmopolitanism' or 'multiculturalism', and the rise of a culture of 'human rights'—different attempts to understand and redefine political alternatives in the context of a 'globalized' world. What appears as controversial are the different ways of understanding globalization as such, but not the fact that it designates a series of phenomena characterizing today's world and the irreversible scenario in which future generations will live.

From the perspective of historical theory, the ongoing globalization process has many consequences. The first of these is (1) a return to topics belonging to the classical philosophy of history as a concern for the objective path of worldwide events. Of course, the aim here is not to advocate a 'speculative' philosophy of history that used to interpret the past as a one way street toward a promising (or eschatological) future, but simply to account for an increasingly interdependent world in which historical events cannot be explained in the limited context of autonomous nation-states and in which (albeit for different reasons from those Kant or Hegel had in mind) the globe assumes a common 'destiny'. In fact, the so-called ecological crisis, the destructive power of nuclear weapons, the proliferation of social media (partly beyond governmental control), the homoge-

nization of consumption habits and of forms of industrial organization and collective institutions, as well as the advent of para- and supra-governmental institutions, etc., but also (and not least) the emergence of an extended public opinion that is not indifferent to the process of critical review of the ways of organizing social and political life, all portray a changed scenario that theory cannot ignore. Incidentally, in fact, the idea of the nation-state had already been a successful global export product from the West at an earlier stage, and where state structures did not exist or were only partially present, the rebellions against colonialism and imperialism were paradoxically part of its introduction.

Secondly (2), with the emergence of the new historical genres, a new form of universalism also appears. On the one hand, what occurs in historiographical theory, as in many other areas, is a standardization of the forms of discourse—what Sebastian Conrad calls the ‘formatting’ (Conrad 2016, p. 203)—of what is deemed an acceptable historical narrative, as shown in the guidelines for the submission of papers for international conferences and ‘publications’. On the other hand, disciplines such as global history, contemporary history or women’s history transcend the scheme of national histories because of their very subject. This brings about the gradual dismissal of a particularistic, endogenous perspective. It is significant that, even in the histories of certain peoples, the fact that their author or reader should be a foreigner may prove irrelevant or make them even more interesting, to the extent that their point of view does not seem conditioned by prejudices of belonging. The well-known precept about the necessary ‘distance’ as a requirement for the objectivity of the historical account (Salber Philipps 2013) is based on two grounds that need distinction: the first has to do with the possible distortion of the facts according to the narrator’s involvement; and the second is that events are considered to be still in progress, so it is not yet possible to assess their consequences. (Of course, concerning this latter point, boundaries are really hard to define.) But, as regards the former, the criterion of ‘distance’ can be applied not only chronologically, but also simultaneously based on the ‘foreigner’s’ view, to the extent that comparative history written from a global perspective relativizes the local representations of the meaning of events.

Thirdly (3), the establishment of these new historical genres makes explicit not only the link between theory of history and political theory and, hence, the *normative* dimension of the historical discourse, but also of its *cognitive and explanatory* claim. ‘Global history’ does not seek to be something like a synthesis or point of convergence of different historical approaches, but proposes a space for interaction and ‘integration’ (Conrad 2016, pp. 67–68) that expands the synchronicity and diachronicity spectrum to explore possible causal relationships among past events and helps to place them on a wider horizon.

In conclusion, we can distinguish five levels for anchoring the process of transformation of the field of historical studies. The first has to do with the historical situation of the contemporary world in the context of the ongoing globalization process. The impact of this situation is directly shown by the emergence of ‘global history’ as well as by the different attempts to establish the ‘history of globalization’ or ‘globalization in history’. Also, we should mention the ‘global’ perspective of historical studies concerning the most varied subjects. The second level involves the changes within the discipline of history itself—the emergence of new subjects and fields that transcend nation-states, as well as the review of basic concepts that used to dominate the canon of the professionalization of historical studies.

The third level refers to a rehabilitation of a philosophy of history from a planetary point of view, to the extent that the question arises again (based on various developments, such as climate change, the nuclear threat, the emergence of para- and supra-national organizations) about the global meaning of events, without falling for this reason into a speculative or teleological theory about an inescapable fate for humanity. Thinking from a global perspective has become a must, given today’s challenges, as is an ethical commitment to future generations. The fourth involves the recovery and redefinition of the notion of ‘historical totality’, understood not as a substantive subject independent of collective actions and institutions or as a ‘system’, but rather as a space for multiple possible causalities and interactions to be empirically examined.

The fifth and last level refers to the role of history in the ethical-political debate *vis-à-vis* an enlarged, worldwide public sphere. As the discussion about the so-called Holocaust (mentioned here because of its iconic ‘global’ role, as a negative ‘historical sign’ [Kant] of times that accompany the contemporary world as a shadow) shows, the historian’s historical description of what happened not only puts ‘the limits of our representation’ (Friedländer 1992) to the test, but precisely for that reason, it is part of a contemporary debate that leads to a review of the normative assumptions that may go beyond their mere application.

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Elías Palti

Koselleck—Foucault: The Birth and Death of Philosophy of History

Abstract: According to Reinhart Koselleck, the period he calls *Sattelzeit*, which spans from 1730 through 1850, witnessed a crucial conceptual transformation. It was associated with a new, ‘modern’ way of experiencing temporality, which in turn gave rise to the emergence of the concept of History as a singular collective noun and, consequently, to the philosophies of history. Koselleck’s perspective converges, besides, with Michel Foucault’s view in *The Order of Things*, in which Foucault also remarked on the great conceptual break that occurred around 1800 and gave rise to the emergence of what he called the ‘Age of History’. However, our attempt at matching Koselleck’s *Begriffsgeschichte* with Foucault’s archaeological perspective will also reveal why the former is not yet sufficiently attentive to the diversity of the modes of conceiving of temporality during the four centuries that modernity spans. Lastly, it will allow us to better understand what was the intellectual ground on which the philosophies of history were founded, and also how it eventually became undermined, along with the concept of temporality that was at its basis.

I am always terrified when I hear in a few words a whole nation or a time, for what a great multitude of differences does not comprehend the word nation, or the middle ages or antiquity and the modern epoch!

(Johann Gottfried Herder)

Reinhart Koselleck’s concept of *Sattelzeit* has become an inevitable point of reference whenever one seeks to understand the origin of modernity from the perspective of intellectual history. It offers a highly suggestive view of the great conceptual transformation produced between 1750 and 1850—the period he calls *Sattelzeit*. According to Koselleck, this conceptual transformation was closely associated with a given way of experiencing temporality, which gave rise to the emergence of the concept of History, as a singular collective noun. As he shows, that concept would have been incomprehensible before 1750. To speak of ‘History’ without further ado, as if it were a kind of macrosubject, would have been simply unintelligible for a person of the fifteenth or even the seventeenth century. The emergence of the philosophies of history was the consequence of this conceptual transformation, as the two were closely tied: as Hein-

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rich Köster then said, “History means the same as historical theory or philosophy of history or as the logic of history” (quoted in Koselleck 2006, p. 74). Historical philosophy thus has a precise historical-conceptual basis, and becomes meaningful only within that given intellectual configuration; it has no meaning outside of it. In short, what this reveals is the contingent nature of the foundations of the philosophies of history, and of the concept of temporality that underlies them.

Koselleck’s perspective converges with Michel Foucault’s view in *The Order of Things* (Foucault 1970). In it, Foucault also remarked on the great conceptual break that occurred around 1800 and gave rise to the emergence of what he called the ‘Age of History’. Foucault associated it, in turn, with the appearance of a certain concept of ‘Subject’. Both concepts (Subject and History) would be closely linked. The latter would be no more than another translation of the former, and ultimately the two are the expression of the new way of experiencing the temporality that both Foucault and Koselleck identify as distinctive of ‘modernity’.

However, our attempt at matching Koselleck’s *Begriffsgeschichte* with Foucault’s archaeological perspective will also reveal why the former is not yet sufficiently attentive to the diversity of the modes of conceiving of temporality during the four centuries that modernity spans. Actually, it can discern only two possible time-concepts, each of which will be separated by that great epochal rupture that he calls *Sattelzeit*. This dichotomic perspective leads him to confuse and place under the same category (that of ‘modernity’) many very different modes of conceiving and experiencing temporality; and this confusion necessarily has consequences in the historical-conceptual recreation he proposed. In short, to perform the very goal of Koselleck’s project of a *Begriffsgeschichte*—of preventing conceptual anachronisms and understanding the intellectual foundations of the philosophies of history—a number of historical precisions are in order.

Foucault was, besides, more emphatic in pointing out the contingent nature of this ‘modern’ regime of knowledge, in the sense that, for him, it is not only very recent, but also it will not last indefinitely. In fact, he believed we were at the verge of its dissolution. That is what was implicit in his provocative announcement of the imminent ‘death of man’. In any case, as we will see in this work, beyond the divergences of their contents, the convergence between Koselleck’s conceptual history and Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge regarding the nature of the conceptual break produced around 1800 is deeply significant, and the attempt at matching their perspectives will allow us to better understand what was the intellectual ground on which the philosophies of history were

founded, and also how it eventually became undermined, along with the concept of temporality that was at its basis.

The idea of *Sattelzeit* and the new consciousness of temporality

According to Koselleck, the emergence of the philosophies of the history is indicative of a fundamental break with respect to the premodern modes of historical figuration articulated within the frameworks of the Ciceronian concept of *historia magistrate vitae*. He points out the two premises upon which that pedagogical ideal of history was based. The first of these is the idea of the iterability of history; that is, that the same basic situations are repeated at different times, since only that assumption permits us to draw general laws applicable to every historical epoch. That assumption of the iterability of events made it impossible to conceptualize the idea of ‘History’ in the singular. What existed, in the context of that perspective, were ‘histories’, in the plural; that is, a series of situations, events and phenomena, which are eventually repeated in different times, places and circumstances, but which preserve their basic structures and meanings.

The second premise highlighted by Koselleck is that the era of exploration (which opened the horizon of Europeans to the diversity of cultures on the planet) and technological progress finally triggered the crisis of the pedagogical concept of history. Both phenomena combined provide the historical basis for the emergence of the modern idea of ‘progress’. Time would then have a directionality, which would make the iterability of history impossible. The future would no longer be readable in the experiences of the past. A gap now divided the ‘space of experience’ and the ‘horizon of expectation’. But the fundamental fact that marked the definitive breakdown of the concept of *historia magistrate vitae* was the outbreak of the French Revolution, insofar as it affirmed, for Koselleck, the idea of the constructability of history; that is, it engendered a new awareness of the subject’s agency. Temporality thus became an immanent dimension—something that subjects unleash with their own action.¹ As Koselleck points out: “There always occurs in history more or less than that contained in the given conditions. Behind that ‘more or less’ are to be found men” (Koselleck 1985, p. 212). The modern concept of history would thus arise from the combination of the ideas of progress of the Enlightenment with that of the constructed character of it determined by the revolutionary event.

¹ See Hayden White’s “Introduction” in Koselleck 2002, ix-xiv.

In turn, the temporalization of history would allow us to place in sequential order the cultural diversity that the overseas expansion had revealed; that is, to place diachronically that which appears synchronously. The notion of progress would provide the objective parameter for establishing a 'before' and an 'after', situating each phenomenon as a particular moment in the immanent logic of the development of History. It thus gave rise to the idea of the coexistence of infinite temporalities at each single moment, the simultaneity of the non-contemporary (*Gleichzeitigkeit der Ungleichzeitigen*). As Herder said in his *Metakritik of Kant* (a text that Koselleck repeatedly cites as the best synthesis of the 'modern' idea of historical temporality):

In actuality, every changing thing has the measure of its own time within itself... No two worldly things have the same measure of time. There are therefore (one can state it properly and boldly) at any one time in the universe innumerable many times.²

Lastly, the dissolution of the old ideal of *historia magistrate vitae* forces historical thought to its self-reclusion. To the extent that the temporalization of historical structures prevents generalizations and extrapolations between different epochs, regarding their contents, the idea of historical law can only now refer to the empty forms of temporality; to the transhistorical conditions of change. It is here that Koselleck introduces what he calls the fundamental meta-categories that define the basic forms of historical temporality: 'space of experience' and 'horizon of expectation'. The progressive distance between 'space of experience' and 'horizon of expectation' determines the acceleration of historical time, which is the hallmark of modernity. This allows him to establish a fundamental historical law: the 'law of acceleration', which states that change "occurs at increasingly shorter intervals of time" (Koselleck 1985, p. 314).

In this way, Koselleck reframed intellectual history, insofar as he made it possible to establish a link between conceptual changes and concrete historical experience. However, at this point some of his interpretations demand a number of clarifications and precisions. The question arises of what led him to situate that rupture at a so late moment, which in turn led him to leave out of modernity the whole array of philosophies that emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. From this perspective, the line of thought that goes from Descartes to Leibniz, through Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, Smith, etc. should be considered as 'premodern', since they are all placed before the *Sattelzeit*; that is, they would be grouped together under the same category as the philosophies of St.

² Herder, J. G. (1955): *Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 68; quoted in Koselleck 1985, p. 247.

Augustine or St. Thomas, which is clearly untenable. Furthermore, it contradicts what Koselleck himself remarked in his doctoral thesis (written in 1954 and published in 1959), *Critique and Crisis* (Koselleck 1988). Lastly, that chronological incongruity makes manifest much deeper problems of a conceptual order.

These conceptual problems send us back to the issue of historical temporality. Koselleck actually confuses two completely different concepts of it: the one implicit in the Enlightenment's notion of 'progress'; and the idea of 'evolution', arising only later, during the nineteenth century. It is only along with this latter that time became conceived as irreversible. On the contrary, the most characteristic and determining achievement of the scientific revolution and of the Enlightenment, that many plainly associate with the coming of the so-called 'Modern Age' (although Foucault prefers calling it the 'Classical Age', to distinguish it from the 'Modern Age' whose origins he places, in coincidence with Koselleck's *Sattelzeit*, around 1800) was precisely the development of the notion of temporal reversibility. This notion was perfectly formulated by Ferdinand Laplace (the leading astronomer of the late eighteenth century, who completed the Newtonian system) and symbolized in his idea of the 'little demon'. He stated that one who was able to know the whole universe in its present state "would have the entire past and the entire future before his eyes."³ With this idea, Laplace only led the Newtonian astronomical concept to its ultimate logical consequences. According to it, temporality is not a constituent element of the physical universe. If we could know the exact current position of all planets and stars, we could perfectly know where they were a thousand years ago and where they will be a thousand years from now. The asymmetry between past and future here appears as merely a subjective illusion resulting from the limitations of our cognitive capacities.

The kind of idealization that allowed seventeenth and eighteenth century minds to conceive of the world as lacking a temporality of its own was the culmination of a sustained and prolonged intellectual effort. Irreversibility was, in fact, the most characteristic feature of the medieval-Christian notion of secular time (a notion that did not rule out the possibility of the mutation of living species or the spontaneous generation of new ones). Since every change in the world required providential intervention that marked a radical difference between present and past, the idea of a homogeneous temporal flow was still inconceivable.

The Enlightenment's idea of historical progress as an accumulation of knowledge entailed, instead, continuity; that is, the assumption of a homogeneous human nature providing a unitary substrate for this process. The idea of rad-

3 On Laplace's idea of 'little demon', see: Cassirer 1956, pp. 3–25.

ical mutation, both in animal species and in cultural processes, was completely foreign to Enlightenment thought. The breakdown of this linear and homogeneous conception of time leads us, in fact, beyond the horizon of the Enlightenment. Foucault's analysis of *The Order of Things* is revealing in this regard, and allows us to introduce a number of precisions into Koselleck's perspective of the *Sattelzeit*.

The archaeology of knowledge and the emergence of philosophy of history

Although Foucault does not make it explicit, it is clear that the aim of *The Order of Things* was to rebuke the standard view of the link between modernity and subjectivity that was best synthesized by Heidegger in "The Age of the World Picture", and to introduce into it a fundamental historical precision. Unlike Heidegger, for Foucault the idea of 'subject' that Heidegger believes he finds in Descartes is in fact a later conceptual construction—one that would emerge in the nineteenth century, when the 'Modern Age' (or the 'Age of History', as he calls it) actually began. Foucault's perspective thus converges with Koselleck's in locating the origin of modernity two centuries later than Heidegger does. However, unlike Koselleck's perspective, Foucault's does not ignore the presence of a conceptual break produced around 1600, as Heidegger affirmed, though Foucault disagrees with the latter regarding its content and meaning. He thus introduces a distinction between the two.

In short, Foucault's archaeological perspective is more attentive than Koselleck's to the occurrence of a conceptual break before the *Sattelzeit*, but, unlike Heidegger, instead of projecting this break back in time, he remarks on the profound difference between the two systems of knowledge to which they respectively gave rise. In this way, Koselleck compels us to revise the dichotomous schemes—the either/or that articulates the entire tradition of the history of ideas and permeates also the perspectives of both Koselleck and Heidegger (either premodern or modern)—leading to the unification of very different forms of thinking under a common label. Yet, as we shall see, we also meet here the fundamental shortcoming in Foucault's archaeology of knowledge. If it is more perceptive of the conceptual transformations produced before the *Sattelzeit*, it misses other, no less radical, transformations that took place after it. That is, that not all forms of thought and historical views that emerged after 1800 can be considered as equally 'modern'—a lack of acknowledgment of which also leads him to confuse and unify under a common category very different concepts of historical

temporality. Yet, in order to observe this problem, we must first to go back and see Foucault's archaeological project and, in particular, his criticism of Heidegger's view that associates modernity with the emergence of the concept of 'subject'.

In "The Age of the World Picture", Heidegger elaborated on the etymological roots of the term *subjectum*. As he says, it is the Latin translation of the Greek term *hypokeimenon*, to which Aristotle referred in his *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. It indicates the substrate of the predication; that which underlies and holds together all its predicates. In principle, all that (either a thing or a living being) of which something could be said is a 'subject'. The identification of the 'subject' with the 'I', initiated by Descartes, is precisely, for Heidegger, what marks the emergence of the modern world.⁴ With modernity, man becomes the premise for the intelligibility of the world, which is then reduced to the condition of merely a material for its action.

This entailed, for Heidegger, a fundamental conceptual rupture. Man then separates from the world and becomes the one who represents it and provides a meaning to it. In the Middle Ages, man and world were only different phases in the plan of Creation; the two participated in the order of correspondences of what is, which always referred back to their ultimate Cause (God). In antiquity, the world was not something to which the subject represented, but something that presented itself, which was shown to the subject and, ultimately, it was in the act of disclosing itself that it was constituted as such. Man and world thus co-belonged in the *repraesentatio* (etymologically, to become present) of what exists.

In *The Order of Things*, Foucault both discusses and takes on this concept, introducing to it a fundamental distinction. What he calls the 'classical' episteme (of whose emergence *Don Quixote* serves as a symbol and expression) was born, in effect, out of the break of the order of correspondences. In the regime of knowledge that dominated until the sixteenth century, all that existed (the chain of being), including language, was conceived as the visible mark of that hidden force that constituted them and rendered them visible. The space of similarities would form a system of 'signatures' for the unveiling of the hidden plan of Creation. As Heidegger said, in this system of knowledge the world shows itself, and "all that remains is to decipher it" (Foucault 1970, p. 27).

⁴ "However, when man becomes the primary and only real *subjectum*, that means: Man becomes that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being and its Truth. Man becomes the relational center of that which is as such" (Heidegger 1977, p. 128).

By the end of the sixteenth century, that natural link—by which the visible immediately refers back to its last, hidden source—is broken, and words are distanced from things. Language becomes an artifice to articulate the whole out of the fragments deployed on the surface of the visible forms. The subject now has the task of reconstructing the logic of their dispersion of forms in the play of their similarities and differences. Things, then, no longer speak of anything beyond them, but refer to each other, tied as they are to the ground of Order that distributes them in the world and connects them with each other.

However, within the framework of this episteme, Foucault points out, there was still no place for any idea of 'subject' nor, ultimately, for the notion of temporal irreversibility (nor, therefore, of History in the singular). Foucault refers here to the expression with which Hegel opens his *Phenomenology of Mind*: "everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well" (Hegel 2003, p. 9). The 'subject' referred to here—which is no longer merely substance, as it was in classical times—is a reflexive concept; an in-itself and for-itself.

Only in light of this could we properly speak of a modern Subject (and, ultimately, a modern episteme), at least in the sense attributed by Foucault: that type of Being whose interiority gives rise to History, constituting a dimension inherent in it. It is, more precisely, the premise for the conceptual transformation analyzed by Koselleck under the rubric of *Sattelzeit*. The Subject, unlike the Substance, is no longer merely the substrate of predication (that which remains immutable below the changes of form imposed upon it) but a dynamic force; what defines it as such is the fact of containing within itself the principle of its own transformations. This conceptual redefinition is closely linked, in turn, to the emergence of the idea of the living organism as associated with the capacity for self-generation and self-development, which marks the transition from the 'natural history' of the classical age to modern 'biology'. The point here is that the emergence of this concept marks a rupture no less crucial than that which occurred two centuries earlier with the break of the system of correspondences. Heidegger thus confused two conceptions of subjectivity (and temporality) very different from each other, placing both under the common label of 'modern subject'. Lastly, he would project back towards the sixteenth century a concept that would only emerge at the end of the eighteenth century. The passage from the 'natural history' of the Enlightenment to 'biology' illustrates how this later conceptual transformation occurred.

The idea of the subject in the classical era was forged in a fixist-preformationist matrix of thinking, which was at the basis of the 'natural history' of the Enlightenment. The preformationist concept of the organism, which emerged in the sixteenth century and dominated the natural thought of the seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries, asserted that the forms of adult individuals were preformed in the embryo. The gestation process was only the growing up of traits and forms already discoverable in the origin of that process. The fact is that only that hypothesis made possible the idea of an immanent, self-generated development. Only the developments produced in the early nineteenth century in the field of embryology provided a new model of ‘organic’ evolution. Karl Ernst von Baer (the ‘founding father’ of modern embryology) is the key figure in this process of conceptual redefinition. According to the theory formulated in his *History of the evolution of animals* (1828 and 1837), what would be preformed in the embryo would no longer be a set of visible traits, but the principle for the formation of them; that is, a certain logical order of coordinated transformations oriented towards the realization of an immanent purpose (something similar to what we call a ‘genetic program’). Time, then, would no longer be a circumstance external to beings but a dimension intrinsic to them. The ‘subject’ would then come to designate this compound, that which displays a temporality by itself, placing itself beyond the plane of visible forms as its hidden formative force. And this explains one of the phenomena that Koselleck points out in relation to the modern philosophies of history: the idea of the coexistence of plurality of temporalities. It is here also where Koselleck’s confusion between progress and evolution becomes more manifest, which leads him to misinterpret Herder’s expression.

For Koselleck, the idea of the simultaneity of the non-contemporary that he (erroneously) attributes to Herder arises from the possibility of ordering the variety of realities existing in space in a linear sequence of development. As he affirms, the idea of historical progress allows us to identify what comes ‘before’ and what ‘after’. This, in fact, is the premise that lies at the base of the Enlightenment notion of the coexistence of pluralities of temporalities—but not of evolutionary thought. When Herder said that “In actuality, every changing thing has the measure of its own time within itself... [and that therefore] no two worldly things have the same measure of time”⁵, he was precisely denying the possibility of establishing any absolute temporal criterion—an objective parameter that allowed distinguishing the former from the later. The plurality of temporalities derived from the fact that, for him, there was not an empty becoming; a purely objective temporality, independent of something (a subject) that evolves. Time becomes a dimension intrinsic to the subject; it is something that ‘comes to beings from within’, to put it in Foucault’s words—a function of the differential evo-

5 Herder, J. G. (1955): *Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 68; quoted in Koselleck 1985, p. 247.

lutionary process of organisms. In short, there is not a single (objective) temporality, but as many temporalities as existing beings. We find here the nucleus of the historicist concept. History thus becomes a reflexive concept; an in- and for-itself; that is, a ‘Subject’ (which is no longer ‘Substance’, according to Hegel).

As we can see, within the period that Koselleck designates as *Sattelzeit*, two very different views of time coexist. Yet, there is a third concept of it that becomes collapsed under the brand of ‘modern time’. The definition of the idea of the ‘constructability’ of history that then arises has a very different meaning from that which Koselleck believes to find there. This leads us to introduce a second historical precision. His view of the relativity of time actually emerged later, and corresponds to a subsequent moment in intellectual history. Here too, Koselleck’s dichotomous interpretative scheme pays its price, since it again leads him to confuse another very different concept of historical temporality, besides the two mentioned above, grouping all three of them under the common category of ‘modernity’. Actually, within his perspective, we cannot think of the possible existence of conceptual changes in the modes of experiencing historical temporality, except in terms of the antinomy premodern/modern. In fact, the fundamental law which, for him, governs the whole conceptual history of the modern age—the ‘law of acceleration of time’—allows us to perceive only quantitative differences; it would be only a matter of degree: what changed between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would be the measure of the interval of time in which change occurs, and the same between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and so on. However, unlike the previous historical precision (between the ideas of ‘progress’ and ‘evolution’), Foucault no longer serves as a guide to understand how this new break occurred at the end of the nineteenth century.

The end of the ‘Age of History’ and the ‘Death of the Subject’

In the concept of History that arose in the nineteenth century (which is the one that Koselleck analyzes), change and permanence are combined in a particular way. Although for nineteenth-century evolutionary thought every fact was absolutely singular (that is, unlike *historia magistrate vitae*, history now never repeats itself), it did not mean that the future was not somehow contained in germ form in the present as an immanent *telos*. It was thought that, in the same way as the present is born out of the past, the future must also be somehow already contained in it as one of its potential alternatives of development. This imposed strict limits to the ‘constructability’ of history. That the subject ‘constructs’ His-

tory does not mean that its action does not obey, in turn, a more general evolutionary logic that encompasses it. This is precisely what paved the way in the nineteenth century to the thinking of History as a system (and led Hegel to speak of ‘the work of history’). It would be even more appropriate to say that, within this concept, it is History that makes man, rather than the other way around. A ‘stronger’ view of temporality founded on the assumption of subjective agency involved the absolute contingency of historical development; that is, the radical constructivism of history. This view only emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, with the break of the evolutionary pattern that dominated the preceding century. The emergence of this new view of time marked a conceptual rupture no less profound than that produced in the period that Koselleck called *Sattelzeit*.

Ultimately, Koselleck incurs a conceptual anachronism: just as Heidegger projects onto the sixteenth century a concept of the subject that only emerges in the nineteenth century, Koselleck projects onto the end of the eighteenth century a concept of historical temporality that actually emerged later, in the twentieth century. Koselleck’s idea of historical thinking as referring to an empty structure of temporality is the result of the break of the evolutionary concept of history. The idea of the radical contingency of evolutionary processes then permeates the entirety of Western thinking, crossing through the ‘great divide’ between natural and social sciences. We see here the horizon of thought from which Koselleck’s very historical perspective emerged—and that he projects back in time to the nineteenth century.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the view of systems as containing within them an immanent purpose—the unity between system and end—had broken, and only thus the idea of the radical indeterminacy of history was born, and its cognate concept of the agency of the subject along with it. The conceptual crisis produced at the end of the nineteenth century thus offers the ultimate framework for understanding the meaning of the intellectual project around which Koselleck’s own work unfolds. Here too, the reference to a series of developments produced in the field of natural sciences reveals the emergence of that new paradigm of temporality.

A then-newly emerged discipline, electrodynamics, is indicative of the transformations occurred in the modes of thinking the historicity of physical, and, by extension, social systems. In the theory developed by Maxwell and Faraday, magnetic fields are no longer mere aggregates of elements, but sets of relations that form integrated systems of interacting forces. These systems appear as constellations of elements whose composition and recomposition are spontaneous and sudden, without obeying any genetic pattern of progressive formation. The notion of totality (structure) was then detached from that of purpose (function),

thus dissociating diachrony from synchrony, the evolutionary processes from the inherent dynamics of systems, which would be oriented solely towards their self-reproduction, the perpetuation of their own internal balance or *homeostasis*.

A convergent path was followed by different disciplines, like biology. In 1900, Hugo de Vries gave the final blow to the nineteenth-century holistic-functionalistic conceptions of evolution, paving the way to the formulation of the theory of the ‘Great Synthesis’. For de Vries, evolutionary phenomena at the phylogenetic level result from sudden transformations or random global mutations. In this way, mutations (change) are reduced to unpredictable, internally generated occurrences, but with no perceivable goal or purpose: even though they serve an adaptive process of the species to their environment, selection occurs only *a posteriori*, without any immediate impact on genetic processes themselves.

These developments, as mentioned, contributed the rise of a new paradigm of time. Non-teleologically ordered processes, insofar as they involve the occurrence of the sudden recombination of elements, break the linearity of the developments of matter. Each discreet moment in the sequence of the transformations operated in a system introduces a real novelty; that is, it entails the total reconfiguration, according to a new and peculiar arrangement, of its constituent elements. Only then does the problem of the agential character of the historical subject emerge.

From the moment that systems lose any inner teleological impulse, any principle to their self-transformation, change, or contingency could only come from an instance transcendent to them; it would be the emanation of a Being that pre-exists them, and allegedly institutes them. We thus get Koselleck’s claim that: “there always occurs in history more or less than that contained in the given conditions. Behind that ‘more or less’ are to be found men” (Koselleck 1985, p. 212). The subject’s action, which until then had served as the guaranteed for the rationality of the sequential order of historical transformations, now appeared, on the contrary, as introducing an element of ‘irrationality’ that breaks the linearity of properly ‘historical’ processes—a concept that now, but only now, became associated with the idea of radical contingency. The ambiguous relationship between Koselleck’s idea of modernity and that of his master, Heidegger, is particularly significant in this respect.

The claim that behind all historical change lies intentional action would be, in principle, taking on the Heideggerian notion of modernity as the era in which man becomes the *subjectum*. However, if we look closely at Koselleck’s claim, the ‘modern’ subject to whom he refers no longer has anything in common with the one of which Heidegger spoke. It rather meant its complete reversal. The self is no longer a *subjectum*, the unitary substrate that underlies the changes of form that are imposed upon it, but, on the contrary, the origin and source of contin-

gency in history. In short, within the new episteme that was born at the end of the nineteenth century, in whose framework there emerged the concept of subjectivity that Koselleck retrospectively attributes to modernity as a whole, the transcendental subject (intentional action) is no longer a guarantee of order, and becomes the one that destroys all identity in history, which breaks the linearity of evolutionary processes and makes the radically new to emerge—that which cannot be thought from the present ‘space of experience’. In sum, it gave rise to that which was unthinkable not only within the frameworks of the Enlightenment’s idea of ‘progress’, but also of nineteenth-century’s evolutionary concept: the radical contingency of historical developments.⁶

As we see, Koselleck’s account fails to avoid relapsing into the kind of anachronisms that he attempted to prevent. This inevitably has consequences in his historical recreation of the origins of modernity. On the one hand, it leads, as we have observed, to establishing a too drastic distance between the first modern philosophies of history and the Ciceronian pedagogical ideal of it; and, on the other hand, it confuses very divergent social and historical imaginaries, placing them all under one common category (that of modernity). In fact, as I have already pointed out, its fundamental law for understanding modern temporality—that of ‘acceleration of time’—makes inconceivable the possible emergence of other ways of experiencing temporality that are qualitatively different to that which is at the basis of the concept of History that emerged in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries.

However, it is clear that these historical-conceptual precisions are only possible within the horizon opened by Koselleck’s own historical-conceptual project. Ultimately, the point toward which the history of concepts and the archeology of knowledge converge (and of which that requirement of conceptual rigor is only a by-product) consists in the fact that they introduce a displacement of the *locus* of reflection. They cease to be philosophies of history, different to the rest but placed on their very same terrain, and become meta-philosophies of history; their emergence represents a turn to a second-order level of historical consciousness, which no longer seeks to discover a meaning in history, but rather to understand what were the precise historical-epistemological conditions that led to imagining such a project—the historical-conceptual conditions for the inception of the very philosophies of history; in short, to recreate the underlying substrate of thinking upon which they were historically based, and how the particular concept of temporality implicit in them eventually became undermined.

⁶ On the difference between the concepts of time in the philosophies of history of Romanticism and Neokantianism, see: Palti 1977.

These theories can no longer be considered as philosophies of history, and indeed render it no longer possible to think of them. From the moment in which they seek to disclose the fact that philosophies of history are situated within a particular regime of knowledge, and therefore lack meaning if they are detached from it, they move reflection to a plane already completely alien to that which was proper to them. In short, they mark a turning point that renders impossible a regression to the kind of idealizations on the basis of which philosophies of history rested, and which currently have lost their symbolic ground. Doing so today would entail a kind of historical naivety, or, more precisely, a certain historical-conceptual blindness to the epistemic conditions on which the historical-philosophical discourse itself is founded; the contingent nature of the regime of knowledge within—and only within—which they became meaningful. Once it has become undermined, they lose any substantive sense, in historical-conceptual terms.

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Where is History Heading? Concerning the Idea of Progress

Abstract: In recent times, the question of the sense of history, the future and what is to come seems to have become an obsolete issue. The aim of this paper is to assess, in light of a series of considerations about the idea of ‘progress’, the possibilities of restoring this question in the context of discussions in the field of the philosophy of history, which have relegated these kinds of issues to the background and have confined specialists to the area of the epistemology of history or literary theory.

Introduction

The collapse of the idea of ‘progress’ at the beginning of the twentieth century precipitated a serious crisis in the field of what can be called ‘speculative philosophy of history’¹; that is, of the theories about the course of time. In that context, history studies swerved towards the area of research methodology or literary theory, setting aside the questions of its sense, its future, utopias, etc. Lately, however, as indicated by Chris Lorenz, ontological and political questions seem to have gained a certain strength in the field of historical theory, as the result of developments regarding the topics of ‘memory’, ‘trauma’ and ‘presence’ (Lorenz 2012, p. 21).

In this context, the aim of this paper is to assess whether the question of progress in the area of history—an issue that has been deemed obsolete several times in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries—can still be restored. I am resolved to prove that the idea of progress can still be supported in the field of history studies in two ways: methodologically and normatively.

The framework of this paper is as follows: firstly (i), I will reconstruct the criticisms of the idea of progress that occurred throughout the twentieth century, and which seem to have turned the concept into a museum piece; secondly (ii), I will demonstrate that the idea of progress is not a univocal term, and argue that

¹ According to William Henry Walsh’s famous distinctions between ‘speculative philosophy of history’ and ‘critical philosophy of history’. (Walsh 1983, p. 9)

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the criticisms made of it are insufficient or, at most, only apply to some of its aspects; finally (iii), I will evaluate the current possibilities of restoring the concept at hand.

The closure of the future

The idea of ‘progress’, which first appeared in the seventeenth century² and reached its peak in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the works of Condorcet, Kant, Hegel and Marx, among others, faced a crisis in the twentieth century, particularly after World War I. In fact, the traumatic events of the twentieth century (wars, crises, and the failure of ‘real socialism’) marked the end of this concept in the eyes of many authors. Critical theorists Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno denounced the connection between the idea of progress and the traumatic events of the twentieth century; that is to say, the negative consequences of progress, the ‘dialectic of Enlightenment’:

The Enlightenment, in its fullest sense as thought in continuous progress, has always aimed at freeing men from fear and making them their own masters. But the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant. (Horkheimer / Adorno 2006, p. 59)

According to Horkheimer and Adorno, the Enlightenment aimed to elevate men above the shadows, but finally fell into darkness, into a new kind of ‘barbarism’ (Horkheimer / Adorno 2006, p. 59). The school of analytic philosophy, on the other hand, argued that a thesis on the evolution of humankind is best suited for the field of ‘prophecy’, and therefore does not have any scientific character (Popper 1959, pp. 276–284; Danto 1965, p. 42). It was considered that a law about the sense of history could not be extracted from events; that is to say, that when historians make teleological statements (of any kind), they are stepping out of their field of competence. In the area of hermeneutics, Gianni Vattimo and Karl Löwith referred to the idea as a ‘metaphysical illusion’ derived from Christian and Jewish eschatology (Löwith 1968, p.10; Vattimo 2000, p. 16); and poststructuralist Jean-François Lyotard alluded negatively to the concept, calling it a ‘metanarrative’—a totaling and homogenizing discourse (Lyotard 1979, p. 63).³

² Some specialists believe, however, that there was already an idea of progress in Antiquity (Dodds 1973; Guthrie 1957; Mondolfo 1955).

³ For in-depth analyses of the history of the idea of progress and the criticisms it has endured, see: Taguieff 2004; Schlobach 1997.

In light of this, it does not seem strange that some people have stated that the idea of progress was an ‘obsolete’ category or, even more, a ‘dead idea’ (Pfaff 1996, p. 385):

The great moral promise that accompanied progressive ideology hasn’t been kept. On the contrary, not only have we gone back to barbarism, which invalidates Condorcet’s prediction at once, but this regression has taken place in a country which had reached a high level of civilizing development. [...] Since then, the “religion of progress” is dead. (Julliard 1996, p. 4)

Pierre Taguieff similarly refers to the crisis of the concept as a ‘crumbling’ or ‘sinking’ of the idea of progress (Taguieff 2004, p. 26).

As a consequence of this questioning, a generalized skepticism emerged not only regarding the idea of progress, but also the scope and value of the considerations about the ‘speculative philosophy of history’ in general. This is how history theory left the area of questions about the sense and the motivating forces of history—about progress or decadence, and about the future—and stuck to methodological and epistemological discussions, as well as literary and psychological ones about the range and limits of historical knowledge.⁴

The future was no longer a concern for historians, who, in the context of what Andreas Huyssen calls a ‘turn to the past’ (Huyssen 2007, p. 13), became obsessed with what had been: memory, commemorations, museums. Manuel Cruz refers to this obsession with the past (in a recent paper that continues the work of historian Peter Novick) as a ‘civil religion’:

[...] a religion with its commandments (the duty of memory) and its sins (forgetting), with its holidays (commemorations, anniversaries) and its martyrs (the ones who died in the Holocaust), with its faith (human rights, democracy), with its sacred places (monuments, museums) and its priests. (Cruz 2013, p. 181)

He asserts in this way how empty the present is, and how ‘volatile every idea of a project or a future’ is as well (Cruz 2013, p. 181).

It may seem foolish to pose the question of the validity of the notion of progress after such criticisms. However, as I will endeavor to prove, critics have created a ‘scarecrow’ that has nothing to do with the concept or, at most, concerns only some of its aspects.

⁴ Regarding debate in the area of the philosophy of history in the last few years, see: Brauer 2009, pp. 19–39; Lorenz 2012.

The idea of progress: a troublesome concept

The idea of ‘progress’ (and its equivalents in other languages: *progrès*, *Fortschritt*, *progreso*, *progresso*) can be traced back to the Latin verb *progredior*, which means ‘to go forward, to advance’. The notion in its modern sense comes from a metaphorical use of that Latin root. The concept dates back to the seventeenth century, to the works of Francis Bacon, and reaches its peak in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. After this high, it entered a crisis in the twentieth century. Having said this, of what do we speak when employing the notion of progress? The detractors of the concept, despite the differences that their questionings expose, suppose a univocal idea of progress—a teleology that would trace the steps of mankind, and would take it to a state of moral and material development. Based on this assumption, it seems rightful that they would speak of a ‘prophecy’, of a ‘metaphysical illusion’, or, in light of the traumatic events of the twentieth century, of a ‘failure’.

In any case, I believe this is a simplistic interpretation in that it overlooks the semantic undertones of the concept. The idea of progress can be interpreted in three different senses: the concept can refer (i) to advances in the knowledge of an area—a methodological approach; (ii) to the necessary course of history—an ontological characteristic; or (iii) to a regulatory ideal—a normative aspect.

Firstly (i), the concept was used initially by Francis Bacon in *Augmentis Scientiarum* (1623) and *Novum organum* (1620). In the latter, Bacon proposes the idea of a ‘progress of knowledge’ (Bacon 1984, p. 54) and notes the causes that hindered it in his time: the admiration for Antiquity and the respect for authority. Bacon believed, in light of the new empiricist epistemology, in the advances of science and technology, and in a dynamic conception of knowledge. It would not be until authors like Turgot and Voltaire that ‘progress’ would be extended to apply to areas like the one concerning traditions and arts. Furthermore, the concept of progress did not yet involve a sense of history, but only referred to methodological aspects.

Secondly (ii), the notion was employed by thinkers such as Fontenelle, Condorcet, Turgot, Hegel and Marx, among others, to present the course to which human actions were necessarily prescribed; that is to say, it was an aspect of the structure of reality. Thus the classic image that associated time with corruption and decadence was left behind. Turgot, for instance, pointed out that “natural phenomena are subdued to constant laws and are locked in a circle of revolutions that are always the same [...] the succession of men offers, on the other hand, an ever-changing show” (Turgot 1808, p. 52). Mankind, like an individual, he claims, “has his infancy and his progresses” (Turgot 1808, p. 53) but, unlike

the biological life of men, does not have a declining phase. Mankind, he concludes, “is always going towards a greater perfection” (Turgot 1808, p. 54).

Now, we should make a distinction within this interpretation between those who considered that progress was continual, and those who believed it was a process with constant ups and downs. While Turgot perceived a progressive improvement of history even in periods of apparent regression like the Middle Ages (“in the midst of destruction, traditions soften and the human spirit is uplifted,” he claims [Turgot 1808, p. 53]), another advocate for the concept, Condorcet, did not hesitate to describe the Middle Ages in his *Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain* (1795), as a dark period—a time of ignorance, superstition and bigotry. Just like Turgot, he believed that progress was something irreversible,⁵ but he set himself apart from him by denying that it was continual:

In this disastrous period [Middle Ages] we shall see how the human spirit falls rapidly from the height to which it had been elevated, and how ignorance comes with, in this case, ferocity, in others, a refined cruelty, and always corruption and treachery. (Condorcet 1847, p. 109)

Europe, he points out, fell back into ‘a dark night’, in which ‘teleological fantasies’, ‘superstitions’, ‘intolerance’ and ‘despotism’ were always lurking. Furthermore, when he talks about the progresses of the human spirit in the first lines of *Esquisse*, he is sure to mention the existence of “general mistakes which have more or less set them back or suspended them and which, frequently, have made man go back to ignorance” (Condorcet 1847, p. 21).

On the other hand, among those who saw the key to the development of humankind in the idea of progress, we should separate those who considered that history was heading towards the development of science and technology but not necessarily of the moral values and legal standards (Rousseau, Diderot, etc.), from those who considered that this development would be material as well as spiritual (Voltaire, Condorcet, etc.). In *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (1750), Rousseau proposes the famous thesis according to which the development of the sciences and arts has been inversely proportional to spiritual development: “Our souls have been corrupted just as our sciences and our arts have progressed” (Rousseau 1964, p. 9). According to Condorcet, however, material advances are key to reaching the time in which “the sun will shine but on free men, who won’t answer to any master but their own reason” (Condorcet 1847, p. 244).

⁵ “Traditions are sweetened [...] by the slow but sure effect of the general progress of enlightenment.” (Condorcet 1847, p. 174)

Finally (iii), the concept of progress was used as a normative principle by authors such as Immanuel Kant and, at times, Voltaire. In his famous *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* (1784), Kant presents history as the result of an ‘intention’ or ‘plan of nature’, and sets himself the task of discovering the ‘guiding thread’ able to order the apparently chaotic life of men (Kant 2013, p. 41). He shows that history consists of the slow and hard formation of a ‘cosmopolitan state’, an environment in which reason can germinate, and a natural disposition of men destined to fully develop at some point (Kant 2013, p. 61). As we know, Kant finds in men’s ‘unsocial sociability’ the medium through which nature carries on this plan that would take humankind ‘from coarseness to culture’, which to Kant means the development of talents, of taste, and the transformation from people’s original coarseness into morality (Kant 2013, p. 46). Kant believes that, like in Bernard Mandeville’s *The Fable of the Bees* (1714), where vices are the driving force of prosperity, it is war—the antagonism of inclinations—that brings about progress. Without that dynamic brought about by selfish pretensions, he claims that ‘talents would stay forever hidden’ (Kant 2013, p. 47). Having said that, it is not Kant’s intention to describe an inevitable process, but to simply present an idea, a kind of hypothesis about the course of history (Kant 2013, p. 63). This idea also works as a utopian horizon or regulative ideal. Kant calls it a ‘future-shaping perspective’ (Kant 2013, p. 63) that could be used as a guideline for the actions of men.

The different questionings to the idea of progress mentioned in the previous section assume, as I have pointed out, a unitary, teleological idea of progress that overlooks the differences here shown. They may touch upon the second sense of the concept, but seem to neglect the first and the third ones. Regarding the last one in particular (progress as a normative principle), it could be stated that this does not imply an ontological or prophetic aspect and that, furthermore, as a practical project it can neither be proved nor rejected empirically. As Daniel Brauer postulates regarding Kant’s historical theory, “the moments in which everything seems to be lost are not enough to reject an ideal” (Brauer 2005a, p. 104).

The fragility of the past and the future

The forbidding that prevents historians from discussing the future stems from the attempt at making history a scientific discipline. This agenda is rooted, as we know, in the epistemological separation in the field of historiography that took place between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and which distanced history from the *belles lettres* and the moral, turning it into an independ-

ent discipline (Dufays 1990, pp. 15–16; Pomian 1975, pp. 937–938). History, like physics and biology, gradually became, in its effort to define itself as a professional discipline, an objective sphere of knowledge, and the historian became a neutral, aseptic researcher. The past became a distant object—*otherness* for the historian—due to its distance and difference from the present, and the future became something to which the historian could not refer without risking the neutrality that defined him as such.

Meanwhile, as Karl Popper stated some time ago, the ‘selective character’ of history is inevitable given the “endless richness and variety of the aspects of the facts of the world that surround us” (Popper 1995, p. 151). This means that the historian cannot help but to introduce a ‘point of view’ in his own material (Popper 1995, p. 151). If the events to describe are endless, then our description will always be incomplete, forming a mere selection of the data that we were able to collect.

From this we can assert that the historian cannot avoid including in their work some idea about the future (if they were to try, as Popper puts it, they would only succeed in fooling themselves by uncritically applying an irresponsible point of view [Popper 1995, p. 150]). Indeed, the historian can never be a mere narrator of events ‘exactly like they occurred’, nor an ‘ideal chronicler’, as Arthur Danto proved (Danto 1965, p. 149–150). The point of view they offer will depend on their stance on current problems, such as war, inequality, religion clashes, etc. The past is delivered, then, according to that point of view about the present, which always carries an idea of what the future ought to be. In the words of Concha Roldán, we can only revisit the past by the light of the problems of the present and with our sights set on the future (Roldán 2006, p. 544).

Both the past and the future are fragile. No history can narrate the past exactly as it happened, nor anticipate where history is going. The future is unwritten and the past is unsealed. The discovery of new data, the appearance of new theories and the shifting of problems that concern historians (each generation has its own problems and difficulties and, subsequently, its own interests and points of view) generate a reordering of events and the possibility of new perspectives for the future, by which I mean that they modify the way history is interpreted.

According to Popper, ‘individual events have got no meaning’. Meaning is given to them by historians’ ‘decisions’ and points of view, which permeate history, whether consciously or unconsciously (Popper 1995, p. 172).⁶ However, the

6 Popper criticizes those who overlook this dualism of ‘events’ and ‘decisions’, since it is pre-

fact that events have no meaning on their own does not imply that they are not relevant, since they are the ones to determine how fertile historians' theories are. The best history will be the one that manages to connect, and thus explain, the most events without contradicting the already established connections of events to that date. In this sense, we could talk about the 'progress' of a theory over another one from an epistemological-methodological point of view (Martin 1998). According to Daniel Brauer, the fact that the 'framework' of the events is re-touched and modified by historians over and over again should not necessarily lead to a skeptical conclusion about the status of historical knowledge (Brauer 2005b, p. 52). To say that it is the historian's job to give a sense to history is not to imply (as do narrativist theorists, who replace a naive realism with an even more naive idealism) that the historian shapes the past, but rather that they place in their writings certain empirical data, theoretical terms, interpretative models, etc.

In this context, the distinction between a speculative philosophy of history and a critical one—or, as Johannes Rohbeck puts it, between a 'material' philosophy of history, focused on the problem of the sense of history, and a 'formal' one, attaining to epistemological issues (Rohbeck 2014, p. 161)—is pointless, given that form needs a material or content. Although that material is changeable and fragile, it is always present. In other words, writing about history implies expressing interests and points of view, and making decisions about which way history should go; that is, according to Rohbeck, it implies material aspects that can be more or less explicit. In *The Content of the Form. Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (1987), Hayden White claims that, in historical discourse, 'form' implies ontological choices (White 1992, p. 12)—in other words, that historical narration is not neutral because it is responsible for the forming of historical reality. Form, he says, always has a content (White 1992, p. 13). However, this is not what I believe to be the connection between material and form. I believe, based on what has already been shown, that content and form are not inseparable because form dictates reality, as is White's conviction, but rather because every history requires empirical data, methodological tools, theoretical terms, models of interpretation, etc. The answer to a naive realism should not necessarily be, as I have already pointed out, a radical constructionism that is, perhaps, even more naive.

cisely there that he finds the origin of 'historicist' interpretations, which neglect the responsibility the author has when writing history (Popper 1995, p. 173).

Conclusion

As Concha Roldán claims, historians can no longer work as ‘prophets or meteorologists’. The teleological vision of history is discarded since, as I have shown, no sense emanates from events; empirical data does not speak for itself. However, Roldán agrees that they cannot work as mere literary critics either, because this would confuse reality and fiction, as well as neglect the different dimensions of history (Roldán 2006, p. 539).

Meanwhile, the impossibility of continuing to pursue a teleological vision of history does not mean that every discussion about the future—about what is to come—should be taken off historians’ tables. On the contrary, I have shown that it is only in light of the present and with a glimpse of the future that historians can reconstruct the twists and turns of the past.

Following this, we can conclude that historians cannot help but to depict in their writings an image of what the future should be. Many specialists from the fields of history and historiography, committed to the ideal of scientific objectiveness, react negatively when they perceive discussions of a practical nature in historical pieces of writing. Morals, however, belong in the realm of history. They can be more or less explicit, but they cannot be absent (Cotkin 2008, p. 294; Lorenz 2014, p. 60). If the idea of progress is placed within this context, and not within the framework of a teleological vision of history, it can still be restored. In other words, it seems viable provided that it is accepted as a ‘point of view’ from which historians can orient their work, and not as the inevitable fate of humankind. (It would be pertinent to ask if it is desirable to maintain this idea, but that is not the purpose of this present work.) Finally, as can be observed in the previous section, it seems possible to talk of progress in history in terms of an evolution of historical writing that stems from the effectiveness of the arguments that they encompass.

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The Crisis of Historical Time at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century: An Early Counterpoint Between Benjamin and Heidegger as a Crucial Issue for Thinking Modernity, Globalization and its Historical Space

Abstract: In this article, I intend first to clarify the controversy over the concept of time between the early Heidegger and the young Benjamin, referring to a seminar given by Heinrich Rickert in the summer of 1913 in Freiburg and attended by both young thinkers. Secondly, I intend to indicate further developments of this first constellation through the texts of 1915 and 1916 on time. Finally, after establishing resulting derivations in later fundamental texts of both philosophers, I will conclude by considering their differentiated perspectives on modernity and on the pre-phenomenon of globalization.

I

We may say that it would be bold and adventurous to connect Martin Heidegger with Walter Benjamin, whose thoughts (and lives), in spite of belonging to the same generation of German intellectuals, show such different profiles and with such acute contrasts. The rift is explicitly declared in Walter Benjamin's correspondence, where a considerable number of letters, which range from frank discretion to the harshest criticism, speak of an undeniable distance, expressed throughout the timeframe between his early commentaries on Heidegger in 1916 up to the end of the 1930s.¹ The gap is reinforced by the fact that Heidegger, on

¹ Letter to Gershom Scholem of November 11, 1916, (BR I, p. 344); letter to Gershom Scholem of December 1, 1920, (BR II, p. 108); letter of January 20, 1930, (BR III, p. 503). Lastly, though this does not exhaust a long list of references, we should mention a letter of Benjamin to Scholem of April 25, 1930, where Benjamin tells his friend that "[in association with Brecht] We were planning to annihilate Heidegger (*"Heidegger zu zertrümmern"*) here in the summer in the context of

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his side, never mentions Benjamin— except in his letter of August 10th, 1967, in which he writes to Hannah Arendt about a quotation by Benjamin on Mallarmé, some weeks after attending Arendt’s speech in Freiburg on Benjamin (Arendt / Heidegger 1999). Nevertheless, in spite of these strong first impressions favoring an apparent total abyss between both thinkers, it is possible to discover a secret and silent constellation, which is worth exhibiting and exhuming.

Several commentators, whose number has increased in recent years, favor the idea of a deep complementarity between both German philosophers, at least around some polarities, such as the discontinuity of time, ruin, technology, the work of art, tradition and destruction. To begin with, we must mention here Hannah Arendt, who was among the first readers to emphasize the connection of both thinkers.² Ten years later, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben—who attended the *Le Thor Seminar* given by Heidegger in Provence in 1969, and whose philological and philosophical contributions to the studies on Benjamin’s work are universally recognized—specifically emphasized the articulations between Benjamin and Heidegger on the issue of the discontinuity of time and some other central topics (Agamben 1978, III.8). During the last three decades, the contingent of scholars and prominent specialists that have paid attention to some aspects of the relations between Benjamin and Heidegger has expanded considerably.³

However, there is one remarkable piece of information that only in the past five years has been attentively noticed (Fenves 2013; Giuliani 2014, pp. 45–164; Eiland / Jennings 2014, pp. 32–75; Lavelle 2013, pp. 373–383). It takes us back to the years 1912–1913. In the summer of 1913, Heidegger and Benjamin attended together, at the Albert Ludwig University in Freiburg im Brisgau, a lecture given by the Neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert on the idea of ‘the perfected/accomplished life’ (*vollendete Leben*). If in 1913 Heidegger was already an advanced

a very close-knit critical circle of readers led by Brecht and me” (BR III, p. 522; Benjamin 1994, p. 193).

² In her introduction to the famous American edition of Benjamin’s *Illuminations* (1969), Arendt already pointed to this unapparent connection between Heidegger and Benjamin, using the suggestive figure of the ‘pearl diver’: “Without realizing it, Benjamin actually had more in common with Heidegger’s remarkable sense for living eyes and living bones that had sea-changed into pearls and coral, and as such could be saved and lifted into the present only by doing violence to their context in interpreting them with ‘the deadly impact’ of new thoughts, than he did with the dialectical subtleties of his Marxist friends” (Arendt 1969, p. 46).

³ Here I mention, chronologically, only those most relevant to our topic of time: Fabrizio Desideri (Desideri 1983); Howard Caygill (Caygill 1994); Andrew Benjamin (Benjamin, A. 1994); Marc Sagnol (Sagnol 2003); Peter Fenves (Fenves 2011); Hans Ruin (Ruin 2012); Mathias Giuliani (Giuliani 2014); Andrew Benjamin and Dimitris Vardoulakis (Benjamin / Vardoulakis 2015).

student, working under the direction of Rickert,⁴ Benjamin, three years younger than Heidegger, was a newly arrived student in Freiburg. Indeed, in April 1912, the 20-year-old Benjamin, having completed high school at the Kaiser-Friedrich Schule in Berlin-Charlottenburg, began his university studies at the above-mentioned prestigious university in Freiburg (Eiland / Jennings 2014, pp. 12–31; Witte 2012, pp. 17–30). He matriculated at the department of philology in view of literary studies, but early on began attending the university's most renowned philosophical and historiographical seminars, such as those lectured by Heinrich Rickert and Friedrich Meinecke (Eiland / Jennings, 2014, pp. 32–33).⁵ It was above all in that seminar of Rickert on the notion of 'perfected life', together with Rickert's parallel lectures on Bergson (attended by Benjamin and Heidegger), that both young thinkers were introduced to the novel Rickertian categories of *Voll-Endung* and *Un-Vollendung* through Rickert's fresh system of values,⁶ as formulated in *Logos* (a magazine founded by Rickert) in 1912–1913 (Rickert 1911/12; Rickert 1913; Rickert 2007, pp. 133–171; Rickert 2013).

We can resume his central idea of *Voll-Endung*, through what Rickert called "the three stages of our [tendency to] full-completion" (*Voll-Endung*), or "the tendency of every meaningful behavior, oriented to the effective realization of values" (Rickert 2007, p. 140). Firstly, we obtain a dominium of goods that will be designated as the 'uncompleted totality' (*Un-endliche Totalität*), as an incompleteness or absence of actual end, opposed to the full completion (Rickert 2007, p. 141). This is the first plan of Rickert's axiological stages, modeled after the figure of evolution, and corresponding to the masculine dimension of life (Rickert 2013, pp. 375–379). In terms of time, it falls under the future (*Zukunft*),

4 The relation between the young Heidegger and Rickert was already well established, especially since Heidegger's 1915 Habilitation Dissertation titled "On the doctrine of categories and signification in Duns Scotus" (Heidegger 1916), written under the direction of Rickert; furthermore, Heidegger's Conference (*Vortrag*) of 1915 in Freiburg for his *Venia Legendi* finished with an explicit reference to Rickert's notion of *Wertbeziehung*—'value relevance' (Heidegger 1978, p. 433). Finally, the recently published correspondence between Heidegger and Rickert of the period 1912–1933, together with the edition of a number of previously unpublished documents written by Heidegger on different aspects of Rickert's philosophy, also attest to this early relation (Heidegger / Rickert 2002).

5 "I am after all studying philosophy" Benjamin says in letter to Carla Seligson of June 5th, 1913 (Benjamin 1994, p. 29; BR I, p. 108).

6 See also Benjamin's correspondence of that period, mostly addressed to his young friend Herbert Blumenthal, but also to Carla Seligson and to Gustav Wyneken: especially his letters to Blumenthal of Jun 7th 1913 (BR I, pp. 111–112) and Jun 23rd 1913 (BR I, pp. 122–129); to Carla Seligson of September 15th 1913 (BR I, pp. 174–176); and to Gustav Wyneken of Jun 19th 1913 (BR I, pp. 115–119).

and the privileged models corresponding to this first plan are those of *science and education*, as infinite evolution processes. The second plan of axiological goods defines a dominium that may be characterized as ‘fully completed particularity’ (*Voll-endliche Partikularität*) (Rickert 2007, p. 142). The examples corresponding to this plan are related to the present dimension (*Gegenwart*), and are composed of the figures of *love and art*. Rickert modeled it after the pole of woman, which he fits typically with an achieved life (Rickert 2013, pp. 375–379). Thirdly, the Baden philosopher presents a dominium of goods that is defined by the plan of a totality that at the same time is fully completed (*Voll-endliche Totalität*): “in it, we have the final goal that may be set by an aspiration to the effective realization of values”. This third figure corresponds to the *religious sphere*. Its temporal dimension, says Rickert, is timeless: it is not in the present, nor in the future, but in eternity (*Ewigkeit*) or in the ‘eternal goods’ (*Ewigkeitsgüter*) dimension (Rickert 2013, pp. 379–381). Lastly (although he recognizes it from a strictly formal and combinatory point of view), Rickert considers a fourth plan, namely one of the ‘un-completed particularity’ (*Un-endliche Partikularität*)—but he immediately discards this form: he cannot conceive the possibility of a particularity that is unachieved, in the way that he cannot conceive the idea of the past dimension of time as actual incompleteness (Rickert 2007, p. 142).

The abovementioned seminar on the idea of *Voll-Endung* may have provided a conceptual frame for a first Benjaminian sketch on the idea of time through the polarities of ‘(un)fulfillment’ (*Un-vollendung, unerfüllt*) and ‘messianic completion’ (*Voll-Endung, Erfüllen*). Nevertheless, Benjamin developed his own view, in dissidence with Rickert, specifically through his affirmation of an ‘unachieved and unfulfilled past’, which was not admitted in Rickert’s system of values. Actually, there is a group of Benjamin’s texts of the period 1913–1915, mostly unpublished during his lifetime, in which appears a first outline of both the messianic and the failed secular time. It is worth indicating here that this first version of Benjaminian messianism predates the ulterior connection of Benjamin with the other side of German neo-Kantianism (namely the so called ‘Marburg School’ founded by Hermann Cohen), with which it is customary to associate Benjamin’s main trends of messianism.⁷

To begin with, Benjamin wrote a brief dialogue on love in 1913, titled *Gespräch über die Liebe* and published posthumously for the first time in 1989 (GS VII.1, pp. 15–19), which was clearly influenced by Rickert’s seminar (Giuliani 2014, pp. 85–88). Nevertheless, it is already clear here that love seems not only

⁷ This is valid also for the consideration of the influence of Gershom Scholem, actually not encountered by Benjamin until July 1915 (Scholem 1981, p. 14).

related (as in Rickert) to a plan of particularity (GS VII.1, p. 16), but also to a plan of profane or immanent eternity (GS VII.1, p. 18), which contradicts Rickert, and seems to connect Benjamin with Kierkegaard.⁸ That is to say, love is understood as a particularity, which is clearly distinguished from the figure of universally oriented aspiration, such as a love of humanity. Through the voices of Vincent and Sophia (who undoubtedly incarnate the voices of wisdom in Benjamin's *Gespräch*), in contrast with Agathon (whose positions seem affected by misjudgment), Benjamin says that an abstract universal concept like humanity may mobilize 'aspiration' (*Ziel*), but fails to mobilize desire (*Sehnen*), which is constitutive of love (GS VII.1, p. 16). Love, at the same time, reaches through 'declaration' (*Äußerung*) an eternal 'immanent' plan (GS VII.1, pp. 17–19) that can neither be increased nor weakened, as Sophia says at the end of the *Gespräch* (GS VII.1, p. 18). This particular crossroads between particularity and eternity functions as a messianic comprehension of time that draws Benjamin nearer to Kierkegaard, who connects the idea of eternity (*Evige*) with the notions of Paulinian *Kairos* and of a 'redemptive instant' (*Ojeblik*, in Danish) (Kierkegaard 1935, pp. 87–96).⁹ I mention Kierkegaard here because in 1916, in *Trauerspiel und Tragödie*, Benjamin writes of *erfüllt* and *unerfüllt*, in relation to time: *erfüllen* corresponds in Benjamin to the idea of consummation, which is the sense of the term *Fylde* in Kierkegaard (GS II.1, pp. 133–137; SW I, pp. 55–58). Therefore, in 1916 Benjamin achieved a juxtaposition of the ideas of *Vollendung* from Rickert and of *Fylde* from Kierkegaard. However, at the same time Benjamin admitted a figure that Rickert did not: the unachieved or unconsummated particularity (*unerfüllt*). This figure corresponds in Benjamin to the experience of frustration and failure, which became a fundamental plan in his understanding of baroque time.¹⁰

8 Benjamin's early reading of Kierkegaard is clearly attested through in his correspondence from Freiburg of 1912–1913: in his letter to Carla Seligson of April 30th 1913, he recounts the lecture on Kierkegaard's *Either/Or* (*Entweder-Oder*) (Benjamin 1994, p. 20; BR.I, p. 92); and in his letter to Herbert Blumenthal of July 17th of 1913, Benjamin accounts for the reception of Kierkegaard's *Concept of Anxiety* (*Begriff der Angst*) (Benjamin 1994, p. 44; BR I, p. 148).

9 On the other hand, Kierkegaard elaborates the idea of completion according to the Danish term *Fylde*, which corresponds to the German word *Fillen*. He thus creates the idea of *Tidensfylde*, which in Danish means 'time fullness', and is implied in his notion of instant (*Ojeblikket*). Kierkegaard also notes the antecedents for the notion of instant in I, Corinthians, 15,52, in which Paul writes that 'in the twinkling of an eye' (an instant—*Exaifnes*), the dead shall be raised (Kierkegaard 1935, pp. 87–115).

10 Actually, in his *Goethe's Elective Affinities* (*Goethes Wahlverwandschaften*), Benjamin not only admits the consecrated love, but also the unconsummated love, which allows him to admit the unachieved particularity (*unerfüllt Partikularität*, or *unvollendete Partikularität*). He

In *Gedanken über Gerhart Hauptmanns Festspiel*, published by Benjamin under the provocative pseudonym ‘Ardor’ in the Magazine *Der Anfang* (Berlin: August, 4th 1913) during his stay in Freiburg (GS II.1, pp. 57–59), Benjamin introduces in the first section of his article the term ‘Illumination’ (*Erleuchtung*), which had a central role in his subsequent work of the 1930s, but referred here to ‘historical meaning’: “solche Erleuchtung als historischen Sinn zu bezeichnen” (GS II.1, p. 57). Benjamin declares that in fact, the meaning (*Sinn*) of Festivity (*Festes*) and of fight (*Kampfes*) is actually the same (GS II.1, p. 60). In the first section there is a programmatic emphasis on the notion of ‘task’ (*Aufgabe*), under a ‘vanguardist’ concept of youth and its historical fight for scholarly reform, and in connection with the precedent article *Experience* (*Erfahrung*), published by Benjamin in *Der Anfang* earlier in 1913 (GS, II.1, pp. 54–56). In the next section, Benjamin introduces his notion of ‘Idea’ (*Idee*) through its historical function as the only principle that can gather the historical as such, preannouncing his article *Trauerspiel und Tragödie* of 1916. The third section of the text, under the suggestive title of *Die Jugend und die Geschichte* (*Youth and History*), underlines not the fight for specific values, but the fight for ‘the possibility of values’ (GS II.1, p. 59). At the end of his article, Benjamin affirms the in-actuality of the present (GS II.1, p. 59), which prefigures the main affirmation of *Trauerspiel und Tragödie* two years later.

“The Life of Students”, an article written by Benjamin in 1914–1915 and published in *Der neue Merkur* in 1915, before being published in the *Gesammelte Schriften* (GS II.1, pp. 75–87), mentioned for the first time in any of his published texts the word ‘messianic’—and it is expressed not in connection with a religious or theological discussion, but in a totally secular and profane tone, confronting the idea of teleological progress:

There is a view of history that puts its faith in the infinite extent of time and thus concerns itself only with the speed, or lack of it, with which people and epochs advance along the path of progress. This corresponds to a certain absence of coherence and rigor in the demands it makes on the present. The following remarks, in contrast, delineate a particular condition in which history appears to be concentrated in a single focal point (*Brennpunkt*),

spent his life obsessed with the problem of failure. As Giuliani observed (2014, p. 52), Benjamin once regarded with some admiration Kant’s Philosophy of History as one that emphasized failure, by separating the meanings of History and causal effectiveness. I believe that the well-known paragraph of the second section of Kant’s *Streit der Fakultäten*, on the French Revolution as a symbol of a moral disposition of humanity beyond its effectiveness in terms of success or failure, is a fundamental example of this issue. For the ‘Elective Affinities’ and the subject of love in Benjamin, I owe to Caroline Sauter some crucial insights (Sauter, Caroline: “Love, Marriage and Experience: Elective Affinities between Benjamin, Kant and Goethe”, unpublished).

like those that have traditionally been found in the utopian images of the philosophers (...). The historical task (*geschichtliche Aufgabe*) is to disclose this immanent state of perfection (*immanenten Zustand der Vollkommenheit*) and make it absolute, to make it visible and dominant in the present (...) the task is to grasp its metaphysical structure, as with the messianic domain (*wie das messianische Reich*) or the idea of the French Revolution (*französische Revolutionsidee*). (SW I, pp. 37–38; GS II.1, pp. 75–76)

We can appreciate here how the idea of crisis (*Krisis*) in terms of a ‘mutilated form’ of the present and a ‘deformation of life’ already leads the young Benjamin to a new understanding of time itself through the messianic, something that here evokes ‘the idea of the French Revolution’. In connection with this article, it is relevant to mention here two subsequent texts, both unpublished in Benjamin’s lifetime: *Metaphysik der Jugend* (*The metaphysics of youth*) of 1913–1914 (GS II.1, p. 91–104); and *Dialog über die Religiosität der Gegenwart* (*Dialogue on the religiosity of the present*) of 1912–13 (GS II.1, p. 16–35), which is absent from the English edition of the *Selected Writings* of Benjamin. Both texts accept that modernity has broken up the old religions, but nevertheless consider that the present circumstances do not permit to celebrate it without trouble; indeed, a new religiosity is preconized as capable of confronting positivism and the lack of determined feelings for the youth.

II

Heidegger elaborates the notion of time in his *Vortrag* of 1915, a lecture for his *Venia Legendi* in Freiburg. Initially, we can notice some distance from Rickert’s ideas: Rickert spoke, as we saw above, of the ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’ in relation to human goals, also understood as ‘particularity’ and ‘totality’; Heidegger, however, clears the notion of ‘time’ implied in the pursuit of goals, and problematizes the notion of historical past, which is implied in historical knowledge. Heidegger’s first step is to separate the time of mechanics and the time of history. Concerning the function of time in mechanics, he asserts that it is the quantitative measurement of movement. On the contrary, the function of time in history, according to Heidegger, is not a measurement, but a fully qualitative notion, which shall be understood through the idea of meaning, since the time of history allows carving out an event as a meaningful historical individuality. When we inscribe an event on a certain date, we are not measuring, but rather placing that event in a unit of meaning in relation to a ‘before’ and an ‘after’. To this comment, Heidegger adds yet another more radical observation through which he shows his particular approach:

The historical object, as historical, is always past: in the strict sense it no longer exists. A temporal divide [*Zeitferne*] separates the historian from the past. The past has its meaning always and only when seen from the present. When viewed from our standpoint, the past not only no longer *is*; it also *was* something other than we and our present-day context of life are. This much has already become clear: time has a completely original meaning in history. Only when this qualitative otherness between past times and the present moment breaks into consciousness does the historical sense awaken. (Heidegger 2011, pp. 68–69; Heidegger 1978, p. 427).

Heidegger extracts from this premise two fundamental conclusions: (i) the past has meaning only in the present; (ii) this past is not for us what it was ‘for itself’ (Heidegger 1978, p. 427). He thus asserts that: (iii) therefore, there is a temporal distance (*Zeitferne*)—even an abyss (*Kluft*)—between the historian and the past, which can only be covered by means of the values (*Werte*) of the present and a resolution of existence mediated by value-relevance (*Wertbeziehung*) in the present; in the same way that Heinrich Rickert had presented since 1902 the selection and knowledge of the historiographical object (Rickert 1986; Heidegger 1978, p. 433).

Thus, Heidegger encounters a temporal abyss between past and present; since 1915 he starts from a radical ontological gap concerning the past. In addition, he wonders how historians mind and fulfill this gap. His answer in 1915, already moving towards the idea of temporalization in *Sein und Zeit* (1927), is that it is through the future—namely by means of our present value-orientation allowing historiographical selection—that it is possible to cover the historical gap between present and past.

Benjamin, in his letter to Gershom Scholem of November 11, 1916, commenting on Heidegger’s *Vortrag*, points out (without mentioning or quoting), that the Conference “documents precisely how this subject should *not* be treated” (BR I, p. 344; Benjamin 1994, p. 82 [emphasis in original]). This brings us back to Benjamin’s *Trauerspiel und Tragödie* (1916), unpublished during his lifetime. Although setting the issue of historical time as his focal point, Benjamin nevertheless refers to the consideration of death in Tragedy and death in *Trauerspiel* (‘mourning play’). These forms therefore lead to two dramatic genres, in which the aforementioned notions of *Un-Vollendung* and *Voll-Endung* fulfill a central function.

Here, Benjamin recognizes that “to obtain a deeper understanding of the tragic, we should perhaps look not just at art but also at history” (SW I, p. 55). Indeed, this could also be interpreted the other way around: to obtain a deeper understanding of historical time, we should perhaps look not just at historiography but also at the tragic. In fact, Benjamin recognizes that the trajectories of tragedy and of historical time intersect—something that is grounded in the ac-

tions of heroes (SW I, p. 55). But here follows a consideration that will completely take another turn: observing that “Historical time is infinite (*unendlich*) in every direction (*in jeder Richtung*) and unfulfilled (*unerfüllt*) at every moment (*in jedem Augenblick*)” (SW I, p. 55; GS II.1 p. 134), Benjamin radically distinguishes two sorts of time-fulfillment—namely individual heroic time, and messianic historical fulfillment. Only the latter could properly lead to historical time. Therefore, despite the above affirmation concerning the tragic genre, no individual fulfillment of time could by itself determine historical meaning, which instead could only be constituted through messianic fulfillment. This is why Benjamin says here that:

This feature naturally changes the meaning of fulfillment completely, and it is this that distinguishes tragic time from messianic time. Tragic time is related to the latter in the same way that an individually fulfilled time (relates to a divinely fulfilled one. (Benjamin 2015, p. 134)

So we have here two forms of time—the tragic and the messianic—that for Benjamin fit with two forms of fulfillment: the individual and the divine respectively. It seems as if the tragic, restricted to the individual plan of the hero, could neither achieve nor fulfill the historic, whose fulfillment relates to the messianic.

Benjamin complicates this first sketch with the introduction, in the second part of his text, of a third form—the mourning play, or *Trauerspiel*—as a transitional device: “the mourning play is in every respect a hybrid form” (SW I, p. 57). The specification of this form is obtained through the contrast between two figures of death, the ‘tragic’ and the *Trauerspiel*’s ‘figure of death’. While the former is governed by the law of fate and corresponds to the individual fulfillment of time by the hero’s death (SW I, p. 56), the latter is governed by the law of repetition, where death is only the spectral transition to a form of continuity mediated by a mirror image, defined by Benjamin with Aristotle’s ‘Metabasis of life’ (*Eis allo genos*)—transformation into another type or sort (SW I, pp. 56–57). This defines *Trauerspiel*’s ‘death’ as a non-conclusive death. It means that *Trauerspiel* corresponds to a form of expansion and dissemination (SW I, p. 57) that is typical not only of baroque time, but of modern time, as one which lacks meaning and conclusiveness, and as a time of desolation and dissolution (Caygill 1994; Sagnol 2003). It is as if the messianic, from then on, remained for Benjamin a joker card, used since his earliest phases until the latest context of his *Thesis on history* (1940), in order to counterbalance, through a plan of immanence, the complete vanishing of meaningful individual heroes, as well as the lack of future-oriented subjectivity.

III

Heidegger did not publish anything between 1916 and 1927. In the latter year's *Sein und Zeit* (*Time and Being*), the second section is dedicated to the temporalization of *Dasein*, and here he reformulates his approach to historical time, further distancing himself from the epistemological context of his work of 1915. In *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger distinguishes the past as 'ontic', meaning a time that would simply be a 'succession of nows' (*Jetztfolge*), from a past that Heidegger calls 'ontological', meaning one kept in the present of oneself, in the process of having-been, as a past that is being for a self that temporalizes himself, into the projection that Heidegger called *Ekstasis*—being at the same time its own past and anticipating its future, but in a way that being projected (*Entwurf*) is the possibility of gathering its own time. Here, Heidegger takes from Wilhelm Dilthey the expression 'connection of a life', (*Zusammenhang des Leben*) for this continuance of the past in the present under the possibility of projection.

As Agamben comments (1978), Heidegger's originality is to propose historical time from the assumption of the temporalization of *Dasein*, and this latter through the figures of resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) and instant (*Ekstasis*), as attached to the same being of *Dasein*. Then, the figures of *Zeitigung* and *Entschlossenheit* are linked to the care (*Sorge*) and authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) of the figure of being-towards-death (*Sein zum Tode*), which is the keystone to the projectivity of *Dasein*. We exist towards death, and that allows us to live our past as being from birth to death within the structure of finitude. Death is not an event: it is a phenomenon that must be understood existentially (SuZ, p. 251). The issue of death lies at the center of temporalization, and therefore, of Heideggerian historicity—something that Adorno noticed in his famous *The Jargon of Authenticity*. Being-towards-death is inherent to the *Geworfenheit*, of our being thrown and our finitude as facticity. The authentic choices of *Dasein* projected in a singular destiny (*Schicksal*) are interwoven in order to form the fate (*Geschick*) of a people (*Volk*). The coincident interweaving of fates finds its locus in the generation (*Generation*). Some scholars agree nevertheless that there is a vagueness and incompleteness in the term 'generation' as used by Heidegger (Barash 2003, pp. 170–173).

But here we ask ourselves: isn't there an abyss when we go from the level of individual identity to something like a collective identity, precisely in relation to matters such as past, future, and even the idea of death? Actually, the collective level seems to generate an ontological asymmetry in relation to the existential dimension of death. There is a tale by Kafka (included in the stories that compose *The Great Wall of China*) that Benjamin selected during his radio shows

on the Czech writer, in which a messenger is summoned to the Chinese emperor's deathbed. The prominent court men around the emperor open his way and the emperor tells him a secret in his ear—words that no one else hears—and asks him to transmit those very same words to someone else, who awaits the message on the other side of the empire. After saying these words, the emperor dies. The Chinese messenger's dread is proportional to the immensity of his urgent task, since just to leave the capital of the empire he must go through countless human barriers composed of the subjects of the crown, cramming to be with the emperor during his last breath. The difficulty multiplies as the messenger tries to open his way, and he rapidly realizes that he will never be able to personally deliver the message to the recipient.

Concerning this story, we could also think about the problem that has often been disregarded by hermeneutic tradition, which is no longer the problem of interpretation, but the problem of the mere material transmission of the message. The problem concerning the break of the transmission may be presented focusing on the subject of survival (as opposite to death at the level of personal existence) and on the matter of collective identity, considered as a way of understanding tradition—not as derived from personal experience in the form of a present that takes over the past, but as inherent to a union of experiences that are heterogeneous, yet at the same time articulated or scattered in a mesh of experiences in time that relate not so much to the survival of oneself, but to the translation of different languages, the survival of different strata of time, or of different disposals and ruins from the past.

This is the way in which Benjamin pursued his research during the years after that initial period: trying to think a decentralized notion of experience based on transmission rather than on self-consciousness; on languages and translation rather than on authenticity and selfhood; and on materials and ruins under danger, rather than on meaning and the meaningful horizon of the world. Heidegger, after the *Kehre* (U-Turn) of 1935, nevertheless approached a linguistic turn and a spatiality-turn, in such a way that space and language intertwined with our common world, making it possible to reformulate the task of philosophy—perhaps in a way that bridges this last period of Heidegger's thinking with Benjamin's own thinking on modernity and the global world.

Abbreviated References

- GS Benjamin, Walter (1989): *Gesammelte Schriften*. 7 volumes, 14 books. Tiedemann, Rolf / Schweppenhäuser, Hermann (Eds.), Frankfurt a. M.: Surkamp. [Abbreviated titles are followed by a roman number from I to VII to note the volume, then an Arabic number when a volume contains more than one book.]
- BR Benjamin, Walter (1995): *Gesammelte Briefe 1910–1940*. 6 volumes. Göde, Christoph / Lonitz, Henri (Eds.), Frankfurt a. M.
- SW Benjamin, Walter (1996): *Selected Writings 1913–1940*. 4 volumes. Bullock, Marcus / Jennings, Michael W. (Eds.) Cambridge (MA): The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
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Rosa E. Belvedresi

A Philosophical Inquiry into the Future as a Category of Historical Time



Abstract: The significance of future as a category of historical time necessarily refers to the classical Koselleck's study about the origins of history as *Geschichte*. Indeed, history proper is only possible when the time is released from the divine power, then history appears as the result of the human actions. This idea reformulates a Kantian thesis about the plan of history. As it is known, according to Kant history has a meaning and a direction but this cannot put at risk the freedom of humans as moral agents. The future plays here a main role because it allows thinking about the progress of mankind as a regulative ideal. The concept of hope is its necessarily counterpart. In the realm of practical reason the hope works as the basis for our belief in a better world caused by our collaboration (when the good and the virtue go together). In history, this hope is expressed through the expectation of perpetual peace. It is obvious that the future cannot be an object of history because to talk about it would be to make prophecies (as Danto says). But it can be said that without future there is not history in its proper sense. Our aim here is to analyze the role of future as a component of historical consciousness and consequently to show its importance to understand why the human groups build their memories as a legacy for the next generations. In order to do this I intend to identify the political aspects of the hope displayed when the communities seek to conform and keep their collective memory as a heritage to leave for future generations.

Introduction

Every community relies on the future as a temporal dimension that organizes its present and, at the same time, gives meaning to its past. Human communities, whose expectations are often related to a better future for those to come, trans-

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mit to 'the newcomers' a stock of accumulated knowledge that will prove useful in the further advancement of their lives (Arendt 1968). Within this social dynamic, the past and future function as indispensable temporal dimensions. New generations represent the future in the here and now, and they are the ones who ensure the continuing survival of the group in time. What they deem important and choose to transmit to other new generations constitutes a set of skills, meanings and worldviews, preserved from an earlier time (past) with the hope that it will be passed on to the future.

We shouldn't conclude from these statements that such communities are homogeneous; it is possible for that which they deem important to transmit to be composed of heterogeneous sets of the 'goods', which different groups value differently, which are not organized in a hierarchical manner and which are not consistent with each other. Nor should it be assumed that the transmission of what is considered significant happens 'democratically'. The goods to be transmitted are, in the end, symbolical and cultural resources, which, like any other resource, are unequally distributed. We will return to this issue below.

What I am concerned with analyzing here is the availability of the future as a dimension of historical consciousness, in relation to the ways in which social communities choose to conserve that which they wish to transmit to coming generations. I am referring to what I denominate, in general terms, 'inheritance'. By this, I understand that which is transmitted from generation to generation and constitutes the common backdrop that enables the group to conserve its identity and strengthen the sense of belonging of its members. I believe that, in this manner, it will be possible to recover the concept of hope in a political and historical sense, stripped of its religious connotations (insofar as it remits to the theological virtue).

It's clear that since the eighties we have been living in a world immersed in what is referred to as the 'memory boom'. This situation has been critically analyzed by such authors as A. Huyssen and F. Hartog, who think that the emphasis on memory in current Western societies doesn't shed sufficient light on the complex ways that symbolic constructions (which communities pass on as their inheritance) are constituted. Huyssen has established connections between the excess of memory and a certain risk of amnesia, whereas Hartog has identified the oppressive danger in the current attempt to turn everything into something worth remembering. Having said that, what interests me here is the possibility of understanding the current state of collective memory as a symptom of modes of conceptualizing the future, for which the aforementioned notion of 'inheritance' will prove useful.

Future and history

The future is a temporal dimension that remits to that which could occur in a moment that hasn't yet transpired. It is a characteristic specific to the human consciousness of time; for Kant it is the anticipation of the future that distinguishes human beings from other species. This anticipation does not only include the more or less specific prediction of what is to come, but it is also molded by an important degree of uncertainty. (Later, we will return to this dual character of the future.)

The association of the future with history is nothing new. A. Danto (1985) had already pointed this out when he critiqued the prophetic aspect of speculative philosophies; in other words, he criticized them for concerning themselves with that which is outside of the scope of history, namely that which has yet to occur. Danto dealt the last blow to the aspirations of historical teleologies by formulating the following 'puzzle': "If I can do something about the future, the future cannot be known; and if it can be known, we can do nothing about it" (1985, p. 11). While it's true that he rejects the idea of formulating historical prophecies, on the other hand he gives the future a positive meaning within historical comprehension. Firstly, he exposes the uselessness of the 'Ideal Chronicler' who, lacking perspective on the future, is incapable, strictly speaking, of accounting for what happens. Thus, he reaches the following conclusion: "not being witness to the event is not so bad a thing if our interests are historical" (1985, pp. 152–3), since without this perspective on the future it is impossible to comprehend what it is that happened. Secondly and related to the first, not only do we not know the future, but we don't even know which history will be written of the moment that we are living, because the selection, description and interpretation of the events that are considered historical are dependent upon interests that we ignore. The historians of the future will have to be the ones who relate these events to others that haven't yet happened (1985, p. 169).

In this way, Danto considers that the thesis that history is constantly being re-written is justifiable, which enables us to assert that historicism, in a certain sense, is trivially true. His analysis also enables us to account for something that is often underestimated in the study of collective memory, such as the fact that the distinction between events that are 'worthy of remembering' and those considered unworthy doesn't have to do with any fixed aspect or inherent condition, but rather with the ways in which they are deemed meaningful by those who evaluate them.

So far, we can identify a double valuation of the future. As a perspective on predictions concerning the actions we are currently involved in, it is necessary to

depend on the future in order to make descriptions that correspond to what we are doing in the present. Without a minimum prediction of what would occur as the result of our present actions, it wouldn't be possible to account for the set of movements of which they are comprised. But, secondly, the future is also open and unpredictable, and any attempt to delimit it or to speak about it causes us to run the risk of reverting to prophecy.

Koselleck, for his part, identifies different ways in which the future can be accounted for in the comprehension of history. It no longer has only to do with the distance between expectation and experience—as in his celebrated thesis about modernity—but rather with the degree to which we can speak reasonably about the future, about that which is to come. That capacity, which he denominates 'prognosis', is a part of history as a discipline, since it is history's job to study why some of these prognoses have come true and others have not. In order to do this, he appeals to his theory of the strata of time, since it enables him to determine what possibility a prognosis has of being fulfilled. The more levels a prediction encompasses vertically, the higher its probability of being accurate. He identifies different types of prognosis, according to the range of future alternatives they offer to the historical agents. There are those that he describes as 'wishful prognoses', which is to say those that are the product of the optimism (or pessimism) of an agent, without taking the pertinent factors adequately into account; then, there are those that he characterizes as 'compulsory prognoses', which present only one possible course of action and exclude any alternative; and, finally, come the 'alternative conditional prognoses' that contain instructions for a course of action for the purpose of avoiding certain results (such as the repetition of a war).

Desire—which is to say the expectation that events pan out in the way that the agent wants—is an important component of each of these, but what differentiate the three prognoses are the relationships that they have with previous historical experiences. The third type of prognosis is the one that seems to make the best use of historical experiences, insofar as it is able to present a future state of affairs that should be avoided, such as the (possible but not inevitable) repetition of a past that it would be desirable to overcome. When certain past events have been damaging to a social group, this type of prognosis attempts to extrapolate them to the future by presenting them as an outcome that can be avoided if the correct courses of action are taken (Koselleck 2002b). This observation is accurate and Koselleck expressed it in other terms in reference to the way in which social groups interpret their experiences and rewrite their history once they have been defeated. As he states in "Transformation of Experience and Methodological Change: A Historical-Anthropological Essay": "the experience of being vanquished contains an epistemological potential that transcends its cause, espe-

cially when the vanquished are required to rewrite general history in conjunction with their own” (2002a, p. 77).

As I pointed out earlier, the factor that Koselleck stresses, in order to gauge the precision of the prognoses, is the temporal strata that they encompass. Here, he is referring to the different structures, processes and factors that constitute historical reality, which have varying rates of change and don't respond to human action in a uniform manner. While long term factors don't directly or immediately depend upon human action, there are other short or medium term actions that can indeed be affected by it, which is why historical agents can include their modifications, to a certain degree, in the prediction of the outcomes of their actions.

I'm not going to focus on the characteristics of each of the different strata that Koselleck identifies, because what interests me here is something else. What is important is their relationship to human actions, because this is what leads to historical contingency, which is a central factor in conceiving the future in non-prophetic terms. All historical events are more or less new, which is to say more or less unpredictable, but what is important for historical comprehension is to grasp the contingent nature of their relationship to the events that came before them. It is in relation to historical contingency that the gap between prediction (the imaginable future) and its actual fulfillment can best be approached. Historical contingency enables us to conserve intact the two characteristics of future as historical time: its open condition and the degree of uncertainty that necessarily comes with it (inseparable from its availability); and, on the other hand, the fact that it is restricted to a set of options that are in a certain sense pre-determined, since that which occurs is always the product of a set of conditions, imprecise and complex, that preceded it.

As I said earlier, Koselleck is interested in how the future can be an object of study for historians, as 'future past', but some observations can be found in his analysis that in general allow us to think of the future in terms of historical time. Human beings think about the past extrapolating their experiences, but not all historical experiences are equally valuable in predicting the future. There are some, Koselleck says, that possess 'prognostic power' (2002b, p. 148) which he calls 'meta-historical' (even if they aren't timeless). These seem to be general references to the characteristics of human action and, although they are derived from experience, they have a supra-historical value. He includes in this group what could be described as 'popular knowledge', or 'folk wisdom', often expressed through proverbs. But, these types of extrapolation from past situations to future ones possess a high level of vagueness. A prognosis with a greater possibility of turning out to be accurate will be that which includes the highest number of strata of time, which is to say that which includes a vertical temporal grad-

uation and therefore possesses a higher number of precise references to the contexts in which the action had taken place.

This analysis should be put alongside Koselleck's thesis that in history there are processes and structures that repeat themselves, which enables him to postulate 'the formal repeatability of history'. Once again, this permits us to see to what degree the future presupposes a conjunction between novelty and repetition. The human capacity for predicting the future through prognosis requires an accurate assessment of how both factors (the new and the repeated) interact and, in addition, the capacity of the agent involved to bring about the conditions necessary for the predicted future to come to pass. It is inevitable at this point to bring Kant back into the discussion, since for him the possibility of a prophetic history necessarily implied that the person who made the prophecy was also involved in the conditions of making it come true (which doesn't seem so far-fetched if we think of the world of finance and international politics).

I'm interested in the relationship between the new and the repeated because it enables us to analyze to what degree the thought future is a dimension that is relevant for understanding how human agents and societies, in developing means to achieve what they desire, interpret available historical experiences. In the end, Koselleck concludes that in our current conditions, the variety of factors that influence our actions (as well as an increase in the rate at which those factors change) makes it difficult to formulate prognoses (2002b, p. 148). There is an interesting asymmetry here. As a historian, Koselleck is capable of accounting for future past, which is to say the way past actors were able to predict with greater or lesser precision and greater or lesser success that which would happen. As a historical actor, however, Koselleck finds himself in complete uncertainty. This asymmetry expresses, once again, the dual value of the future: as prediction and as risk.

One of the ways to evaluate the role of the future in human groups is to analyze their ways of conserving the past. In fact, the conservation of the past is necessarily related to its transmission, which is why every strategy for conserving the past takes the future into consideration. This, once again, implies a dual valuation: in first place, as risk—what is yet to come is unknown and can therefore threaten that which we treasure; and secondly, as hope—that which is to come in the future will permit us to keep the past alive. In what follows, I will continue to analyze the past in relation to these two sides of the future: as that which enables us to conserve the past, but at the same time represents the threat of losing it.

Future and memory: the past as inheritance

The relationship between future and memory becomes clear if collective memory is conceived of as an attempt to transmit that which has been valued as a memory to new (which is to say future) generations. The origin of this line of analysis can be traced back to M. Halbwachs's studies of the 'social frameworks' of memory. The transmission of collective memory, determined by the different groups to which the individuals belong, implies an operation of bequeathing, in the sense of leaving something so that another may have access to it in the future. In this way, memory, the trace in the present of an absence and that which is 'from the past' (to use the terminology of Ricoeur 2000), contains within its structure an intention that is oriented towards the future. This is where the principal challenge of memory resides: in transmitting an experience to those who haven't had it (Vezzetti 2002, p.19). Collective memory implies a set of practices that are related to the consolidation of cultural identities that strengthen the tie between individual and community. This tie places the tension between the pretension of truthfulness (which distinguishes it from mere imagination) and loyalty to the group (without which there would be no collective memory) at the very center of collective memory. It is a practice that is consolidated through storytelling and communally shared meanings that have already been established by the time new subjects are born.¹

Following this line of argumentation, the connection between the concepts of memory and inheritance starts to become visible. Inheritance, as a social mode of transferring material and cultural assets, is in itself a historiographical object of study. (Here, I dismiss inheritance in the biological sense, to the extent that what is transmitted is done so without our consent or even being aware of it, a point I will elaborate on later.) The ways in which the transferences are executed and what it is that is being transferred force us to consider the social and cultural context in which they were produced. This is why, for example, if we understand inheritance to be the practice of land transferal, Thompson points out the risk of assuming that we are dealing with a 'historical constant', when in reality what is being inherited is not only property (land in this case) but also a web of social relationships (Thompson 2000, p. 45). Cultural anthropology studies in-

¹ "“Being part of” requires a narrative in which we locate ourselves and are located in. These narratives, which are seldom of our own making, are constituted through representations and performance, conveying not only who we are but also who we will come to be.” (Somers 1994), quoted from: (Anico & Peralta 2009, p. 1)

heritance as the transmission of objects (relics and remains) and of meanings (traditions).²

In addition to these historiographical and anthropological resonances, inheritance can be conceived of as Koselleck's experiential space, that is, as a cultural reserve that one generation attempts to transfer to another. Even when experiences crystallize into a 'space', the availability of that space is not synonymous with its actual use. In a similar fashion, inheritance contains within it uncertainty regarding its own future. One generation may leave a memorial legacy, but is faced with the uncertainty of not knowing whether or not the next generation will accept it. As Hassoun indicates, the 'adventure' of the transmission of an inheritance is the product of the difference between our ancestors and ourselves, a dynamic that will then be repeated between us and our descendants, which means that there is never 'an eternal return' of the legacy to be transmitted and that a considerable part of it is composed of oversights and annexes (Hassoun 1996). In complex societies like our own, in which traditions come into conflict and it becomes impossible to integrate past events into a singular social narrative, inheritance is a symbolic and cultural space where identities in contention within the common space are put into question.³ More than a fixed and closed repertoire of shared meanings, inheritance should be thought of in this manner—as an attempt to solidify identities and meanings that are unstable and fragmentary (Betts & Rose 2015, p. 2). The construction of collective memory, as with all forms of social inheritance, is also riddled with conflicts and threatened by a proliferation of contents and formats that con-

2 In the introduction of the issue of the publication "Past and Present" with monographs about relics and remains, it is stated that the essays presented in the issue "explore the political, economic and social dimensions of the identification, preservation and fabrication of relics and remains, and their meaning and function in the spheres of *memory, history and heritage*" (Walsham 2010, p. 10, italics added). The supplement corresponding to July of 2015 of the same publication is dedicated to inheritance in the modern world and, while it focuses on the study of historical preservation, its origins and re-significations throughout time, a quick look at the table of contents is enough to see the close relationship that exists between inheritance and collective memory (Betts & Rose 2015).

3 In the case of Argentina, think of the debates concerning the monuments to Julio A. Roca, the general who headed the 'desert campaign'—which in reality consisted of the extermination of the indigenous populations that had inhabited Patagonia during the nineteenth century. Today, there are many efforts to remove the monuments that commemorate Roca in different cities throughout the country, a movement that cancels the idea that our country was established peacefully upon an enormous, uninhabited territory—an idea created and strengthened by traditional historiography.

tribute to its consecration or banalization (Todorov 2002—in particular, chapter 3).

(Preliminary) conclusions

The concept of ‘inheritance’ contains various meanings, but it essentially implies something that people take with themselves and which comes from others before them, their ancestors. The construction of an inheritance implies the hope that the temporal and generational gap can be bridged and that it is possible to be able to use today that which has been passed on to us.⁴

Inheritance also refers to that which human beings carry within themselves without being conscious of it. Oakeshott, for example, refers to genetic inheritance, the information coded in our DNA, which has accumulated throughout centuries of evolution and which we haven’t done anything to receive nor made an effort to preserve. It’s just there, available to us without our even knowing (Oakeshott 1999). This notion of biological inheritance does not apply to history. Another form of inheritance would have to be postulated, understood in, say, ‘biographical’ terms. I’m referring to an inheritance which includes an enormous number of conducts, valuations, meaning constructs, etc. that people acquire throughout a long learning process that begins at birth and continues all throughout life.

There is a third form of inheritance, which is the one that I would like to analyze here and which has to do with everything that subjects receive through their social and community context. Understood in this way, inheritance is properly historical, and it is composed of a great variety of what we can call ‘goods’, which historical agents are able to apprehend more or less consciously and whose meanings are more or less explicit to them. The historical inheritance that I’m referring to here implies capital that is composed of dissimilar goods being passed from one generation to another. It is important to stress that social actors can be beneficiaries of more than one inheritance, as long as there are, in our society, different groups to belong to, with varying degrees of intimacy or distance (Halbwachs classifies ‘belonging groups’ as the near, the dear and the far). This historical inheritance, which is close to different manifestations of collective memory, operates with varying degrees of opacity. In the same way as genetic inheritance, this historical memory is also handed down to new generations without their consent but, in contrast to genetic inheritance, it requires some

⁴ I owe some of these ideas about inheritance to Prof. Estanislao Antelo.

level of acceptance on behalf of the recipients in order to be put into action. It is an offer available to new subjects that would then have to be activated by them.

In all historical inheritance, there are those who bequeath and those who receive the legacy. This inheritance demands a particular attitude from both parties to ensure that its reception takes place. There are cases of legacies lovingly prepared by one generation for the next that nonetheless sink into oblivion. But there are also cases in which the successors lay claim to a legacy that their ancestors did not make available to them. There could be many reasons why these kinds of cases might happen, from the fact that the inheritance is rendered useless or embarrassing in its new context to the fact that the present raises new questions concerning the past from which the inheritance comes. The questions we have to ask ourselves, then, are about how shared inheritances are constituted, how they are composed and how available they are to those who intend to use them.

As I already mentioned while discussing A. Danto's thesis concerning historians (we can't know what history will be written in the future because we don't know which interests will guide coming historians nor which questions they will address), we can also approach historical inheritance in this same way. Societies can more or less consciously use symbolic constructs, examples, moral tales, lineages, etc. to compose the heritage that they wish to transmit to coming generations. They cannot predict, however, the course that these inheritances will take in the future; it isn't possible to predict in detail how future generations will use them, if they even use them at all. It is in historical inheritance that the way in which communities attempt to deal with the future in its dual aspect, as risk as well as prediction, can be observed. In the first case, the future may bring the loss of value, a fall into disuse or the distortion of an inheritance. In the second case, the future becomes a necessary condition for the possibility of the transmission of that which is being preserved. The words that R. Kent, an Auschwitz survivor, spoke in January of 2015 are worth remembering here: "we do not want our past to be our children's future". He is referring to an inheritance, that of hardships suffered, trying to be preserved for the future (in order to prevent it from being repeated) but that, in addition, acknowledges the open character of the future, since that which is to come may or may not do justice to that inheritance.⁵

⁵ In the manner of Koselleck's aforementioned 'alternative conditional prognosis'. R. Kent's speech was given on 25th January, 2015 and is available at: <http://www.auschwitz.info/en/essentials/essential-speeches/2015-roman-kent.html>, date of register: 09/09/15

While it's true that the historical inheritance presented here bears resemblance to collective memory, it is important to point out some of the differences. The latter, generally speaking, is the product of the effort of a community, or even a state, to constitute shared symbolic assets and through which several more or less successful mechanics of transmission can be identified (especially through, but not limited to, the educational system). As such, the features of what I am calling historical inheritance aren't as defined and its modes of transmission aren't as lineal. Its constitution and regulation consolidate the generational and intergenerational bond, and the possibility of its transmission implies challenging the ever-present risk of being forgotten. Historical inheritances are formally instituted in order to be handed down through established mechanisms of construction and, even more importantly, of transmission and conservation. At the same time, though, they can be re-created (re-signified) with each new generation, who will take from this inheritance what they deem useful.

It seems to me that the idea of historical inheritance that I am presenting here sets a limit to the uses of the concept of collective memory. Actually, the latter always runs the risk of being substantialized, of losing sight of its polemic and plural character, and at the same time it has a complex relationship with official memory. Historical inheritance, on the other hand, displays several characteristics that I think would be revealing to explore:

1. it is shared by social groups of varying size, within which the intensity of the bonds that hold them together range from subtle to close, in the same way that the bond can either be explicitly sustained or not;
2. it has a potential value that can either be activated or not according to the contexts within which it is advocated; and
3. it possesses an open meaning whose future re-significations are impossible to determine *a priori*.

In other words, inheritance is defined not only by its relationship to the past that it seeks to preserve and transmit, but also by its orientation towards the future, since this is what characterizes every inheritance, that is to say its future availability. What defines inheritance is the fact that it is made available to others, those of the future, with whom those who compiled it intend to share it. Yet, at the same time that it offers the possibility of historical comprehension, like a bridge between two temporal (generational) moments, it also exposes its limits. The open condition expressed in the meaning of inheritance prevents us from being certain that it will be used towards the same end for which it was intended. What's more, it prevents us from being certain that it will even be useful at all in the future. In this manner, the construction of a historical inheritance that intends to be shared implies the instituting gesture of the giver while it, inevitably,

leaves the decision regarding its use and pertinence in the hands of the receiver. The construction of an inheritance in itself presupposes and at the same time problematizes the temporal continuity expressed through generational continuity.

But there is another characteristic that I wish to point out. Historical inheritance, in contrast to other, ‘legal’ inheritances, cannot avoid being appropriated by those who feign (or truly believe), to be its heirs, without being the originally intended recipients. Historical inheritance contains an aporia: it is the result of the conscious and deliberate effort of previous generations to pass on to others a body of specific symbol capital without being able to guarantee who its actual heirs will be. Even further, they cannot even guarantee that the inheritance handed down will be transmitted in the way it had been intended, given that younger generations are capable of constructing new, contingently defined ties to the past—ties, in other words, that are neither authorized by nor contained in the original meaning intended to be associated with that inheritance. This idea of the past as inheritance enables us to characterize the relationship that social communities establish with their past, while simultaneously helping us to avoid thinking of the past only in terms of its ontological or referential persistence (which I don’t dispute).

As a result, I would like to conclude by claiming that the past exists in the form of an inheritance that is reclaimed by those who were not its contemporaries. Since this reclamation cannot be controlled *a priori*, it is impossible to define the past *a priori*, independent of the meanings by which it becomes operative. Rather than an object in an attic or a territory to be explored, the past emerges as symbolic capital to be inherited (accepting or disputing its meaning). In other words, the past will be that which the future allows it to be.

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