Chapter 3 ‘Can we distinguish the sheep from the wolves?’: Émigrés, Allies, and the Reconstruction of Germany

Around half a million people fled Germany and Austria in the years after the National Socialists took power and spent the next decade or longer in exile in a number of countries. This chapter looks at a minority among them: the German émigrés who wanted to return to Germany after the war. It juxtaposes their ideas about the reconstruction of the defeated country with the ways in which the Allied governments thought about and dealt with them. Their relationship is crucial to understanding what happened in the occupation zones after 1945, and in no field was this so visible as in medicine and public health.

The chapter seeks to remedy a long-standing omission. The study of emigration and exile is by now a well-established academic field, and the German-speaking emigration after 1933 has received more attention than any other, not least by historians of science and medicine. However, the return of émigrés after 1945 has not featured in this literature. Only in recent decades have historians begun to examine the phenomenon at all systematically, and have coined the term ‘re-emigration’ or ‘remigration’. These studies have identified psychological factors which shaped individuals’ experiences of return, and argued that it was primarily the individual personalities and inclinations of the returning émigrés that were the most significant determinants of their post-exile lives. This chapter, by contrast, tries to understand the structural constraints within which émigrés acted, and the extent to which their choices about their return to Germany were confined or encouraged by the Allies.

Who wanted to return voluntarily to a defeated, bombed-out country under Allied control? Numbers are difficult to estimate, but it is clear that only a fraction of émigrés expressed an interest in returning permanently to Germany after the war. It was particularly those who had left because of political persecution under the Nazi regime, who were most likely to go back: around half of the 30,000 German political émigrés eventually returned to Germany. The Jewish-Italian writer and political activist Laura Fermi, who emigrated to the US with her Nobel Prize-winning husband, Enrico Fermi, wrote a study of the intellectual migration from Europe. The earliest group of ‘returnees’, she wrote, consisted of ‘statesmen, political leaders, and others who hoped to assist in the reconstruction of their countries’. She observed that they were in the minority, and even many of those formerly in the political limelight now preferred to ‘remain quietly’. This reluctance to return characterized large sections of the émigré communities all over the world, but applied particularly to those of German origin. If half of political exiles returned to Germany, that rate was significantly lower among those who had left because of racial or religious persecution; only around 5 per cent returned. Some professions were more likely to consider a return, but doctors did not feature prominently in the move back. The historian Hans-Peter Kröner estimated that between 9,000 and 10,000 German-speaking émigrés had worked in the medical professions, and only around 5 per cent went back after the war.

Many of those who returned to Germany were motivated by an absence of opportunities for medical practice in their countries of exile. Others, however, were driven by their desire to take an active part in the reconstruction of Germany and its public health system, and it is those that this chapter examines. It contrasts the different occupants’ responses to their requests to assist in the rebuilding of Germany: British and American authorities frequently rejected cooperation with these émigrés, usually regardless of their political orientations; the Soviet government liaised with a set of politically useful Germans in Soviet exile who worked under Moscow’s direction. The French authorities were between these two approaches: although they distrusted and rejected many of the émigrés’ claims, they were prepared to work with individuals and groups who supported their aims. All four occupants’ attitudes to collaboration with exiles were shaped by their diagnosis of the German problem.

Émigré organizations: The ‘Free Germany’ movement

A complex network of émigré groups and organizations developed in countries across the world between 1933 and 1945. Most political shades and convictions were represented, and there were also many non-political groups: cultural and self-help associations. These organizations were the forum where many exiles examined and debated the possibilities of a regenerated and reconstructed Germany and prepared programmes for the future, some of which dealt specifically with a public health system. A useful example of émigrés’ activities, and the occupants’ responses to them, is the various branches of the so-called ‘Free Germany movement’, a network of communist-run groups.
The Free Germany movement was a series of multi-party associations that developed in many of the prominent countries of exile, including the Soviet Union, France, Mexico, the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Sweden. Most of these groups were organized and directed by communists, but they also contained various socialist, liberal, and even conservative émigrés. Following the 1935 Comintern congress and its new popular front strategy, communists had been attempting to build such multi-party alliances.

The initial template for groups in the movement came from the Free German National Committee (Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland, NKFD) in Moscow, made up of exiled German communists and 're-educated' prisoners of war. It got off the ground after the German defeat at Stalingrad, through which large numbers of German soldiers entered Soviet captivity. Some were willing to renounce fascism, and as such were seen as suitable material for communist re-education. In July 1943, thirteen communist émigrés and twenty-five POWs signed a manifesto, calling on the German population and the Wehrmacht to join the fight against Hitler, and supporting a democratic and socialist renewal of Germany. The signing of the NKFD's manifesto was intended to initiate the formation of similar groups across the globe, but as Georgy Dimitrov, general secretary of the Communist International, noted in his diary in August 1943, the creation of similar groups in Hungary, Romania, and Italy was considered but, 'owing to unfavourable discussions in England and America regarding the German Free Germany committee', never took place.

The NKFD's strategy was to encourage opposition to Hitler within Germany and the Wehrmacht through radio, newspapers, and leaflets, and to set up antifascist schools in POW camps. From January 1944 onwards, members also worked with the Red Army, using loudspeakers or leaflets to call directly on German units to desert and surrender. Precisely what the Kremlin's intentions were with the NKFD was much debated in London, Washington, and Paris. Some analysts watched with alarm what they feared was the beginning of a separate Soviet peace with Germany; others saw the NKFD as a merely a propaganda tool, which the other Allies would do well to imitate. According to Dimitrov, Stalin initially seemed to have envisaged a more far-reaching role for the group, including '[t]he struggle to save Germany from ruin, for restoring the democratic rights and freedoms of the German people, for the establishment of a parliamentary order, and so on'. But as the war wore on, the Soviet government lost interest in the committee, partly because the failed coup of July 1944 had ended hopes for a revolution within Germany. Nonetheless, it closely monitored its activities, and, once the occupation of Germany was about to commence, drew upon the NKFD's plans and preparations.

German émigrés in the NKFD were often also active in several different, overlapping institutions. Some worked in the German Communist Party's (KPD) exile organization, others worked as instructors in German POW camps. Others were active in the Soviet Army or in the Seventh Department of the Political Administration of the Army. A number were also involved in the Comintern, or, after its dissolution, in the Department of International Information of the Soviet Party's Central Committee. These overlapping networks of both formal organizations and informal gatherings were an important characteristic of the world of the German exile. In Moscow, they helped to anchor some émigrés in Soviet institutions and connected them, directly or indirectly, to Soviet officials and authorities. One of the most prominent was Maxim Zetkin, a German doctor who later became a leading authority of the Soviet zone's health system. In the 1920s he had accompanied his mother, the well-known German communist leader Clara Zetkin, to several Comintern congresses, and worked for a number of Comintern missions. He qualified as a doctor in 1909 in Stuttgart. After working at a number of German clinics immediately after the First World War, he was invited to practise surgery in Moscow. For several years, he moved between Germany and the USSR, before emigrating in the late 1920s. He worked at prestigious Soviet medical institutes such as the First and Fourth Moscow City Hospitals and the surgical clinic of the Second Moscow Medical Institute. From 1936 to 1939, he served as a doctor in the International Brigades in Spain, and from 1942 to 1945 as a military surgeon in the Caucasus. Along with only a very small number of German-born émigrés, Zetkin even joined the Soviet Communist Party.

The leadership of the KPD in Moscow, particularly Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, directed the work of the NKFD and its post-war plans. The KPD had been supervising the propaganda used for German soldiers in Soviet captivity, and had emphasized the need to train personnel to return to Germany. Pieck and Ulbricht, together with the NKFD, constructed plans for future appointments of individuals to specific jobs and functions, producing long cadre lists in the process. Apart from its work with the NKFD, the KPD leadership was active in the context of the Comintern-organized German commission which was to investigate policy for the post-war period. It also formed its own work commissions and task forces to prepare for German reconstruction. A number of émigrés assisted the Soviet commanders in dealing with civilian populations of the German regions overrun by the Red Army, and, finally, in April and May 1945, several groups of them returned to Germany.
Although not officially sanctioned by the Soviet authorities or those of the host countries, the NKFD stimulated the foundation of similar groups elsewhere, and gave new direction to existing organizations. One of the largest Free German groups to be established after July 1943 operated in France, under the name of ‘Free Germany Committee for the West’ (often referred to by its French name, Comité Allemagne Libre Pour l’Ouest, CALPO). Its president, an émigré communist from the Saar, Otto Niebergall, later remembered that hearing about the establishment of the NKFD was of ‘enormous political significance’ for him and his fellow émigrés. Listening to the manifesto being read out on the radio, they copied, printed, and distributed it among German soldiers in France, and began to think about similar associations in France. An appeal to found CALPO was published in the October issue of the émigré communist propaganda paper *Volk und Vaterland*, and its inaugural meeting took place in November 1943. In spite of Niebergall's influence, communists formed a minority in this group, and social democrats (particularly from the Saar), former members of the Zentrum Party and the Deutsches Volkspartei (DVP), and German officers of the Wehrmacht were all well represented. The group became the centre of German popular front work in France (including Free German committees in Toulouse, Lyons, and Marseilles), Belgium, and Luxembourg. It focused on encouraging Wehrmacht deserters, and published several newspapers and pamphlets for this purpose.

Members of CALPO also participated in several overlapping political institutions and networks in France. CALPO was supported by the French Communist Party (PCF), who had in autumn 1940 created a special branch of the Resistance dedicated to infiltrating the German fascist and Vichy authorities—the Travail Allemand (TA, also known as Travail Anti-Allemand)—and had recruited German-speaking émigrés to work in this body. Even older was the Main d’Œuvre Immigrée (MOI), a group created by the PCF in 1924 as an umbrella organization for refugees living in France. Its German sub-branch was flooded with émigrés who came to France after 1933 and 1935. Discussions between members of the KPD exile group, the PCF’s central committee, the TA, and the MOI pre-dated the creation of CALPO, and signalled the degree to which this body, like that in Moscow, was connected with certain French political institutions. Both the PCF and MOI recognized CALPO as a legitimate German resistance group. In April 1944, CALPO was also recognized as an official German branch of the resistance by the Conseil National de la Résistance (CNR, which existed from May 1943 as the official authority of the various Resistance groups in France), which meant that it could now join the Maquis in southern France.

Apart from its propaganda work, CALPO's military commission also trained military cadres for the resistance and a possible partisan war on German soil. The British and American authorities turned down its offer of collaboration, but the French Forces of the Interior (Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur, FFI—the unified and centralized army of the French armed resistance) supported it. Around 100 German émigrés fought with the FFI in the battle for Paris. In August 1944, CALPO was allowed to send its members into the German POW camps. And in early September 1944, some CALPO delegates went to the western front and fought with the First Paris Regiment. It seems to have prepared fewer detailed studies for the post-war period than other Free German groups, probably as a result of its concentration on military and POW work. Only after the liberation of Paris in August 1944 did this become more important. Niebergall later recalled how the liberation changed the nature of CALPO's work, not least because it received offices on the Boulevard Montmartre from the CNR and an official paper ration for its publications from the FFI. It now prepared plans to assist the management of territory under Allied control, and its war crimes department compiled a list of 1,366 German individuals suspected of having committed war crimes because of their leading positions in the Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst. Although in late 1944 and early 1945 CALPO's relationships with the French authorities cooled significantly, many former CALPO members returned to Germany, some of them to the French occupation zone.

The group in Britain—the ‘Free German Movement in Great Britain’ (Freie Deutsche Bewegung in Großbritannien)—also prepared plans for the reconstruction of post-war Germany. Its inaugural meeting took place in September 1943 in London, during which a twenty-three-member committee was elected (roughly half of whom were communists) and the manifesto was unveiled. In its London base, in a series of regional groups throughout Britain, and in a variety of ‘study groups’ it attempted to prepare plans for the immediate post-war period. One of the movement's leading members was the former KPD Reichstag deputy Wilhelm Koenen; another was the head of KPD Landesgruppe, Heinz Schmidt. But although communists dominated here, the membership, like that of CALPO, was more complex than was the case in Moscow. The social democrats in London had so far always rejected communist proposals to put the popular front strategy into action. This time, while the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) leadership again rejected collaboration, stating that the old animosities between KPD and SPD had not been resolved, a significant proportion of SPD members nonetheless joined the organization, even without the support of their leadership. The group's new chairman, Dr Karl Rawitzki, left the SPD as a result of their disagreements.
Many of the ideas of the British group were similar to those of the NKFD and CALPO. Their manifesto pledged support of Allied policy on the defeat of Germany and its future occupation. Their aim, the manifesto stated, was to bring about the speedy fall of Hitler and to contribute to the reconstruction of an independent, healthy, and undivided Germany, purged of all remnants of Nazism and militarism. The group addressed the British government in countless appeals, memoranda, and letters. Like in Moscow and Paris, POW work was considered crucial, because ‘the largest reservoir of the forces for a democratic reconstruction of Germany is to be found among the German prisoners of war.’ They were to be targeted through radio broadcasts, books, and other propaganda work. However, this work was not endorsed by the British government.

Another group inspired by the NKFD was the Council for a Democratic Germany, which was founded in May 1944 in New York by a number of German émigré intellectuals and politicians from various political backgrounds. As a result of disputes very much like those in London, the right-wing of the SPD was not represented, but overall, the Council included a number of Catholics from a wing of the Zentrum Party, socialists from a range of affiliations, communists, non-partisan democrats, and a few Protestants. Although communists were much less represented here than in the British and French groups, accusations regarding its closeness to Moscow persisted. The Council supported Allied policy and the earliest possible defeat of Germany, but at the same time also voiced concern that the ‘good, non-fascist’ Germany had not been given a proper voice. To counter this, it proclaimed, it was necessary to unify anti-Nazi forces abroad, and to identify representatives of a new Germany who could contribute to its reconstruction.

Although the New York Council welcomed the Soviet use of émigrés in principle, it dismissed the Moscow Committee as lacking in independence. The council argued that its most important role was to advise and influence the US administration's preparations for a future occupation of Germany, and to provide informed and politically aware background briefings. Within the council, until its formal dissolution in June 1945, a number of specialist committees dealt with specific features of the new Germany. POW work was also considered essential here. Convinced of the need to separate Nazi POWs from the other soldiers who could be re-educated—and dismayed by reports of the failure of American officials to contain attacks on antifascist prisoners—the council urged the US War Department to cooperate. However, just as was the case in Britain, none of the council's proposals were recognized or used by the American authorities, nor did they consider cooperation with other groups of German exiles.

In sum, here were four similar-minded sets of German émigrés in four different environments. Politically active doctors were represented in many Free German groups, including those not discussed here. (Kurt Winter, for example, was active in the Swedish group and Rudolf Neumann in Mexico—both men will appear again in later chapters since they worked for the health service in the Soviet zone). Each of those groups sought to cooperate with its host country's authorities, and each attempted to participate in the future German reconstruction. A comparison of their results highlights crucial differences between the different Allies.

**Plans for the reconstruction of Germany**

Many émigré groups and individuals never lost sight of what they perceived to be their function in the new Germany (see, for example, the cover page of the émigré paper *Inside Nazi Germany*, Fig. 3.1). Their work accelerated in early 1943, in direct response to the Casablanca conference and its call for an unconditional surrender. In émigré circles this announcement was greeted with relief, since it made the defeat of Germany only a matter of time. But it also posed a direct threat to their legitimacy as representatives of any future Germany. They had not been recognized by most Allied authorities as legitimate representatives of German interests, and they had not been officially included in the planning process. An internal German revolt, which might have justified their claims, had not happened. Nonetheless, even without this official backing the plans developed in émigré circles looked at what ought to happen to Germany. Some focused on ways of toppling the Hitler regime from the inside. Many tried to explain the mistakes of the Weimar period, and made recommendations for a second post-war reconstruction. Many also concentrated on some of the immediate problems likely to arise in the aftermath of war, such as the huge population movements and expulsions of Germans from Eastern European countries, the management of German POWs, the implementation of denazification procedures, and the issue of restitution. Some plans looked specifically at the reconstruction of the German public health system, as the following two examples show.

The first comes from the Council for a Democratic Germany in New York. Among the various committees and study groups of the Council was a welfare committee (*Fürsorgeausschuß*), which looked at questions ranging from the care of POWs in the United States to public health reforms in post-war Germany. Its president was the endocrinologist Felix Boenheim, a Jewish communist, who had formerly been a senior consultant for internal medicine at the Hufeland
Käte Frankenthal (a former member of the Prussian Diet and Berlin City Council, and one of the main SPD health policy specialists) and Kurt Glaser (a dermatologist who had been a long-serving SPD city councillor) were also actively involved. In the autumn of 1944, Boenheim, Frankenthal, and Glaser composed a draft on medical and health policy issues. It began by stating that the total destruction of all remnants of Nazism and militarism was an obvious precondition for any democratic reconstruction. First measures would have to be directed towards the containment of epidemics, both among the military and the civilian populations, for which adequate provision of clean water, soup kitchens, basic food and medical supplies would be essential. It would also be crucial to develop centralized medical clinics in each region, equipped with the necessary apparatus and the full range of medical specialists. Destroyed hospital buildings would have to be rebuilt as soon as possible. Shortages in medical supplies would have to be contained in the first instance by using stocks in German military depots. The authors anticipated a shortage of doctors and trained medical personnel as the central problem. This could be overcome, they argued, through the reinstatement of those sacked after 1933 for racial or political reasons, particularly those currently in exile or imprisonment. This point was made repeatedly, but also generated the greatest disagreements with the future occupiers.

In the spring of 1945, Glaser, Frankenthal, and Boenheim completed a more substantial memorandum on the reconstruction of the German health system. Beginning with a detailed description of Nazi reforms and the likely state of the health service after the war, the authors listed measures which, they claimed, were not overly idealistic but explicitly ‘practical’ and ‘pragmatic’, and which built upon the flourishing native German public health traditions before 1933. Measures for the transitional post-war period mirrored those formulated earlier. It would be in the Allies’ interest, the authors argued, to maintain the health of the civilian population, since epidemics would not stop outside the quarters of their own troops. There would be an immediate need for food, and released concentration camp victims and political prisoners were to be given higher rations than the population at large. Basic utilities such as gas, water, and electricity would have to be restored. Medical supply and services should be centralized into ‘treatment centres’.

In the 1920s, all three authors had been active in the multi-party Association of Socialist Doctors, and their 1945 memorandum developed many of those older ideas. They acknowledged the Beveridge Report, the work of the US National Resources Planning Board, and the proposals of the American Public Health Association as important influences on their proposals, but in substance their recommendations drew upon their interwar public health work in Germany. They urged the formulation of a centrally directed, integrated, and socially oriented health policy. Proposals included the creation of a central ministry of health and the replacement of the various insurance bodies by a single new institution, run by the members themselves. Both demands had featured frequently in the association's work. They recommended that insurance bodies become much more involved with preventive medicine, just as had partly been the practice in 1920s Berlin. Other demands in this programme also rearticulated older concerns, such as a new kind of occupational medicine. The ‘treatment centres’ were to become the main components of the new health system, in which most important medical disciplines and specialties were to be represented and accessible. The programme also contained recommendations on how the medical profession was to be dealt with under Allied control. The authors unequivocally condemned Nazi medicine and argued that even in the face of the likely grave shortages of medical personnel in post-war Germany, the temptation to relax denazification efforts would have to be resisted. Doctors’ responsibility for the barbarous acts that had been committed could not be ignored, they insisted, and their programme demanded the strictest punishment and permanent controls, as well as a complete restructuring of the medical syllabus. Similar plans were drawn up in other émigré quarters and outside the Free German groups. A second example is Dr Hugo Freund, who in October 1945 approached the British Foreign Office with a proposal for the reconstruction of the German health service. Freund, a member of the SPD, had emigrated from Germany to Palestine in 1933, and, he assured Philip Noel-Baker, certainly had enough experience with German public health: he had been in a leading position in the German state health administration. Although less detailed, his proposals mirrored the New York programme. Freund, too, argued that the necessary emergency measures would have to be accompanied by a strategy for a lasting reorientation of the public health system. Because the German population was likely to be at its physical and psychological limits a properly coordinated health policy was crucial for the success of all other Allied measures. Moreover, lessons would have to be learnt from the interwar years. While the health system developed after the First World War contained a number of ‘progressive elements’, Freund argued, ‘in decisive points it proved to be unsatisfactory and defective. The mistakes committed then must not be repeated once more.’ Failures included, above all, the lack of a central ministry of health, and the over-representation of physician's interests particularly with regard to the insurance funds, as a result of which ‘the great opportunity to develop a social physicianship was carelessly thrown away’ and the ‘mercantile interest [had] gained the upper hand’. The ‘progressive parties and the unions [had
been insufficient[ly] advised in questions of health policy.\textsuperscript{50} but now, a uniform and centralized health policy could be developed, not least because ‘progressive German doctors’ in exile were more than willing to assist the Allies. Their first step should be the formation of a central health department, to oversee all further work. Strict denazification of the medical profession was crucial, and new doctors should be appointed from among those who had been active before 1933, doctors like himself. Communal and social medicine was to become a compulsory component of the medical syllabus, and all medical faculties ought to have chairs in this. Preventive medicine had to become the guiding principle in health administration, Freund argued.

These two programmes converged from, even clashed with, Allied decisions on many issues.\textsuperscript{51} While Boenheim’s group and Hugo Freund argued for a centralized health organization, a major emphasis of Allied plans was one of decentralization, and the country’s division into zones had already been agreed. French policy-makers, in particular, stressed the importance of decentralization, more so than the British, Americans, or Soviets. Apart from these disagreements, however, both plans were essentially compatible with much of Allied occupation policy: they supported the Allied occupation in principle; they emphasized the need for extensive denazification of the medical profession; and they focused on some of the achievements of the public health system in 1920s Germany and wanted to redevelop these traditions. The proposals were compatible with the notion of indirect control, but they disagreed most with the occupiers’ intentions about the kinds of Germans to be appointed to the civilian authorities.

Two features are significant in these proposals. The first, which Chapter 4 will explore further, regards the émigrés’ perception of the significance of a number of German traditions, both medical and political, which they now tried to develop; the health policy debates of the 1920s in particular were to form a starting point for future work. But secondly and much more generally, they claimed to represent the better, and new, denazified Germany. Their appeals and memoranda, regardless of their political affiliations, read as tracts on why émigrés were best suited to lead the reconstruction efforts: they represented ‘the other Germany’, untainted by fascism and Nazism, and they had sampled the ‘wealth of experience of democratic countries’.\textsuperscript{52} They were, they said, the only Germans with any political legitimacy and credibility. A memorandum by the Free League of Culture in Britain stated that help of ‘qualified and conscientious’ émigrés in the ‘rebuilding of German civilisation’ was vital.\textsuperscript{53} A later circular by the British Free German group argued that in the necessary purge of Nazis and Nazi sympathizers, the return of antifascist refugees would be crucial.\textsuperscript{54} The message was clear: it was exiled Germans, the good Germans scattered across the globe, who would be needed most once the war was over.

It was in this spirit that numerous émigré organizations and individuals contacted the various Allied authorities to offer their services. As Niebergall put it: their work in France was done, and ‘Our place was now in Germany’.\textsuperscript{55} The Free German branches were particularly active organizers for the return of émigrés. In summer 1944, the British group sent questionnaires to register those who were willing to return after the war and carry out ‘important jobs’.\textsuperscript{56} In spring 1945, it announced in a press statement that it had ‘amongst its members lawyers, doctors, technicians and a considerable number of persons with wide administrative experience. They have all fine anti-Nazi records to their credit. Many of them are prepared to go to Germany at once to assist in the administration’.\textsuperscript{57} In June 1945, Karl Rawitzki, the group’s chairman, presented the Foreign Office with a list of 567 people who were willing to return at once. ‘All concerned are proven opponents of Nazism’, he wrote, and ‘many of them with a fine record of underground work, others have spent years in concentration camps. Most of them have been officers of democratic institutions and organisations. Some have years of practical experience behind them but there are also those whose lack of professional qualifications will amply be compensated for by organisational and political experience in the fight against Nazism.’ He thought that their repatriation would alleviate the ‘scarcity of reliable anti-Nazi Germans in Germany itself’.\textsuperscript{58}

Wading through these letters and appeals, Foreign Office staff seemed grudgingly impressed by their organizational efficiency and diligence. Commenting on Heinz Schmidt, secretary of the Free German movement in Britain, R. W. Selby from the German Section of the Foreign Office minced that ‘[h]e has pestered us a good deal about the return of his refugees and he has the hide of a rhinoceros, but he has been extremely efficient’. Moreover, he thought, the ‘Free German Movement’ had been ‘extremely efficient over this question [of repatriation], and the refugees who have applied to them in connexion with their repatriation to Germany will undoubtedly have an advantage in effect over refugees who have not’.\textsuperscript{59}

Numerous individuals also offered their services. Hugo Freund, who sent a plan for a new German public health service, also applied to work in Germany. Freund felt, he said, ‘the obligation of submitting my services’ and considered himself ‘the more justified as I have been a member of the Social Democracy (since 1912) and the trade unions in Germany. I am in touch with the London office of the SPD … My friends of the SPD are able to give
Other offers included those from three German doctors, Carl Coutelle, Herbert Baer, and Rolf Becker, who were working as health officers with the Red Cross and the US army at the war fronts in Burma and India, and who had run training schools for lay civilian personnel to deal with famine conditions and epidemics—a scenario which they thought likely in Germany. All had served in the Spanish Republican Army Medical Corps, and were seeking to work for the British authorities in the new Germany, in whichever occupation zone or area they were needed most.61

The American authorities received similar offers. One of many examples was that of the well-known lawyer Robert Kempner, a former German government counsellor, who was twice detained in concentration camps before arriving in the US in September 1939.62 In March 1945, Kempner wrote to General Lucius Clay, Eisenhower’s deputy in the American occupation zone, with a list of German émigrés currently living in the US (some of whom had already been naturalized), whom he considered to be potentially useful. The list included public health officials such as Franz Goldmann, Alfred Korach, and Heinrich Brieger, as well as a number of welfare officers and health insurance specialists. All of them, Kempner wrote, ‘possess invaluable personal contacts and inside information. Many of them also have experience in U.S. Government service’, and all ‘were dismissed by the Hitler regime for political or racial reasons and legally admitted to the U.S.’.63 Despite their political differences, these émigrés agreed on one thing: they saw themselves as different from, and more legitimate than, the mass of Germans at home. But the future occupiers disagreed.

**Allied Policy**

The problems faced by German émigrés were similar in all countries of exile. Unlike refugees from other nations, they lacked a unifying centre and were unable to turn themselves into a homogenous, unified force. While there were several attempts to organize broad groups, everywhere they were ridden by factionalism, particularly among the various sections of the Left. Even more serious was the issue of legitimacy. The Nazis were not simply occupying their home country; the reality of ‘the other Germany’, which the émigrés claimed to represent, remained contested. Many Allied planners thought that active German participation in the decision-making process was to be avoided at all costs. As a result, German émigrés did not establish themselves successfully or influentially in exile. At no point anywhere was there a German government in exile; even a much more minor participation of émigrés was ruled out in principle.

But there were differences in the ways in which the four occupiers dealt with and utilized émigrés. The American and British governments refused contact with the Free German groups on principle; political organizations such as the British Labour Party went to some effort to distance themselves from them.64 The French, although sceptical, were willing to support at least some of those who shared French occupation aims. The Soviet authorities maintained steady contact with the Free German Committee in Moscow throughout the later war years, and, after 1945, organized repatriation drives for Free German members to Germany.

**(i) Britain and the United States and German émigrés**

Peter Ludlow and other historians have written persuasively on the ‘revolution in British foreign policy’ that took place between 1938 and 1940. Appeasement tendencies were accompanied by a belief in the inherent reasonableness of Germans. In response, people like Robert Vansittart emphasized the inherent unreasonableness of Germans, their long-standing militarism and disregard of other peoples. In the context of this ‘general unwinding of appeasement’,65 the prevalent views on the nature of the German character now made any serious distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Germans obsolete, removing legitimacy from even the most active antifascist supporters of Allied aims. In the United States, too, the possibility that émigrés, or at least some of them, could be useful in the post-war occupation contradicted prevalent notions of what the Germans were like. Both countries used German émigrés as advisers to their government authorities, but the idea of using them in Germany was something quite different. By 1941, the British and American authorities approached the problem of Germany in essentially the same manner.66 tied together in such organizations as the Combined Chiefs of Staff and SHAEF, they were jointly committed to securing the military defeat of Germany and its subsequent occupation. In both countries public opinion, if often confused, played a role, since organizations such the British ‘Never Again Association’ and the American ‘Society for the Prevention of World War Three’ drummed up some support for a harsh stance on Germany, and had some influential advocates.

Both countries also faced similar internal conflicts. The Roosevelt administration was fractured by a long-standing debate about the relative spheres of responsibility of the State and the War Departments. This clash over the military as opposed to civilian sphere of influence was mirrored by differences between the British War and Foreign Offices, and
responsibility for the administration of Germany was frequently passed between them. As a result, both governments were constrained by the prevailing uncertainty about the future of Germany and refused to commit themselves to any specific directions too early, whether they involved émigrés or not. It was only clear that the needs of the German civilians featured long after the requirements of Allied military governments, displaced persons, United Nations nationals, and the demands of the military operations in the Far East. 67

British sources occasionally suggested that American policy was more lenient towards German émigrés, especially with regard to their employment in advisory positions, and expressed concern that American authorities might be exhibiting a dangerously ‘soft’ attitude. There were concerns over reports that the American military authorities had been ‘whisking off’ some 300 German émigrés resident in the UK for jobs in Germany. 68 Or as Lt. Col. Thornley from SOE wrote to the Foreign Office: although it had been agreed that ‘it was undesirable that political émigrés should be allowed into the Occupied Zone at an early stage where they might be a source of considerable embarrassment’, he had ‘good reason to believe’ that the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was ‘asking various émigrés to proceed to Allied Occupied territory (presumably the American Zone) in order “to combat the Nazi Underground movement, assist in the reconstruction of German Trades Union, etc” ’. 69 Similarly, A British draft cabinet paper on the issue of repatriation noted that the US seemed to have ‘adopted a different policy from ourselves in regard to the employment of German refugees on their Control Commission’: they had ‘openly clothed German refugees (including many from the U.K.) in American uniforms and sent them out to Germany for limited periods’, even if they had hitherto refrained from repatriating them permanently. 70 Most of the cases mentioned here regarded émigrés who had acquired American citizenship. During the first occupation years, American authorities in Germany did indeed seem to become more relaxed about the use of returning émigrés than the British. But throughout the war and immediate post-war period, British and American policy towards émigrés was fundamentally similar and shared a number of assumptions.

Many people in both the Foreign Office and the State Department saw German politicians in exile as representatives of a failed political system. They were discouraged by the messiness of German politics, and particularly by the fact that leftists were splintered into countless factions, none of whom were representative on their own. Even the New York Council could not claim any mandate to represent German exiles, let alone Germans more generally. Another consideration was that all contacts with this ‘other Germany’ were to be avoided so as not to come under suspicion of planning a compromise peace or otherwise endangering the fragile anti-Hitler coalition. The fact that some of the social democratic and conservative émigrés repeatedly warned about the Soviet Union made them troublesome, even if British and American views on communist affiliations were often no different. 71 Most of all, any promises that would limit future freedom of action were to be avoided. For a while, it still seemed possible that Hitler could be overthrown by Wehrmacht generals, and they were not to be discouraged; and a delegation of exiled leftist antifascists would seem absurd to them. By the time an internal German resistance had been ruled out, cooperation with Germans had become even more inadvisable.

The Churchill government rejected a compromise peace and began a general distancing from émigré groups in Britain, which was shared by American officials once they joined the war. Political developments in Germany were now analysed purely with the aim of weakening Germany militarily, and so even conservative émigrés lost their political attraction. Official opinion in both countries was opposed to the idea of negotiating with any anti-Nazi groups, either inside Germany or through exiled Germans. Although in many points émigré plans were compatible with Allied schemes, policy considerations dictated that no use of émigrés could be made. While in practise the British and American authorities’ refusal to recognize the Free German groups had a clear anticommunist rationale, 72 their relationship to other émigré groups was little different. The multitude of socialist, centrist, and liberal German émigré groups, among them vocal anticommunists, experienced the same treatment. The SPD in exile, which, after a period in Prague and Paris set up its headquarters in London in 1941, or the German People's Socialist Movement, were treated essentially no different than the Free Germans. 73 British and American refusal to work with or recognize German émigré groups extended far beyond a suspicion of communists.

The archives of the British and American authorities document that, from the start, officials refused to draw a consistent distinction between émigrés and Germans at large. Many enemy aliens in Britain first encountered such a lack of distinction in the internment scare of spring 1940. Although throughout 1939 tribunals had assessed hundreds of thousands of enemy aliens and allocated them into one of three security categories, after the fall of Holland and the ensuing fifth column panic, many of those who had been assessed as safe were interned together with those of medium and serious risk, and in the makeshift internment camps Nazis and Nazi-sympathizers were now assembled together with antifascists and Jews. 74 Here, at the height of concerns about British national security, efforts to distinguish
between different kinds of Germans collapsed. Similarly, as far as émigrés were concerned, there were no attempts to group them into different categories of reliability or usefulness.

As Con O'Neill, Foreign Office adviser on Germany, explained in his memorandum entitled ‘Talking Points’: ‘Talking good and bad Germans misses the point. Of course they are not all bad. But the trouble is that the vast majority of them are indifferent. Only, they have a deeply ingrained proclivity to respect authority, no matter how acquired; to admire the use of force, no matter for what purpose; to ask no questions; and to accept no responsibilities. The Germans are the weakest people in the world—morally.’ A direct corollary was to prevent any ‘influence of émigrés’, since, O’Neill argued, to ‘expect an impartial or unprejudiced opinion from an émigré is like expecting grapes from a pear tree’. Because they were ‘Germans first and émigrés second’, they might be conditioned to ‘work against the regime that kicked them out, but they’ll never work against Germany’. Their expulsion from Germany was no guarantee of an anti-German position, and there were no reliable groups among the émigrés. The German Jews, O’Neill wrote, ‘always were the most patriotic Germans, and they will be again—what's left of them’. Claims of underground resistance were similarly unreliable: there ‘is not and has never been a German “Underground movement”. It's a pure legend invented by the German émigrés.’

Neither here nor in other statements of this nature was it acknowledged that Jews could not actually be ‘German’ according to Nazi racial criteria, or that any real opposition to Germany was possible from those who had been rejected by and expelled from Germany. The fact that this was not simply a public façade is documented by comparable statements in the privacy of Foreign Office minutes, such as the rhyming minute below, which evocatively illustrates the prevalent British approach. It responded to the application by a Mr Sass, a former managing director of the Rheinwerke in Düsseldorf, now in exile in Columbia, to work for the British control authorities:

From Africa's shore, from Colombia's sun-drenched strand
Urgent there streams an eager Hebrew band.
Imbued with pure desire to serve their aims
Of Allied justice, see them stake their claims
To jobs in Germany. They know the ropes.
And their control will answer all our hopes.
‘Let us but serve, and we will prove our worth.
‘Till Hitler came and rudely thrust us forth
‘We helped the men who laid the powder train,
‘So you can trust us not to help again.
‘Good Germans, we? Perhaps, but all the same,
‘Profit or lose, we’ll play the allies’ game.’
Such altruistic offers shall we spurn,
Nor rather, trusting, to these helpers turn.
Loose them like vultures on the German scene
And hope they will not pick the carcass clean
Or, worse, revert to type and aid the Hun
To germanise the world with tank and gun?
Prudence invites we leave them where they are
And hitch our wagon not to David's star…

Apart from its anti-Semitic undertones, statements such as these contained a particular notion of German nationalism: not evidence of a certain kind of political engagement, but an invariable constant exhibited by all Germans by their very nature. Their political affiliations only came second. The harder the émigrés protested against this kind of analysis and the more altruistic their offers to help seemed, the more suspect they became.

Cooperation with any émigrés or émigré faction was also seen as inadvisable and undesirable because of the public relations problems that would entail. As a Foreign Office minute spelled out, the government would ‘certainly have parliamentary difficulties if we started this sort of thing … Unless there is something very concrete to gain it is a mistake to commit ourselves to any German body.’ When the Free Germans submitted their lists of people willing to return and work in Germany, a Foreign Office minute stated, somewhat regretfully, that the ‘list would be quite useful if we could use it, but I do not think that we can’.
Émigré medical personnel were not excluded from this blanket rejection. When the Public Health Branch of the British Control Commission for Germany suggested it get in touch with the Free German Institute of Science, which was reported to have compiled dossiers of German doctors and scientist waiting to return after the war, the Foreign Office warned against this contact. Troutbeck, another Foreign Office adviser, stated that while the institute ‘may well be an estimable body’, whether or not it has a recognisable political colour itself, it is affiliated with other organisations which definitely have. It is indeed almost inevitable that émigré organisations, even if predominantly technical in their interests, should have a political tinge. This being so I am afraid we should not like to see any initiative taken by the British Element in order to obtain the advice of the Institute. I may say for your future guidance that we see objection in general to consulting émigré groups or institutions. Apart from the point I have already made, it is undesirable that these bodies should gain the impression that they are in our confidence, or that they or their members can count on any official consideration for their interests in the future.  

The Society for the Protection of Science and Learning (SPSL), a British charity involved in the placement of refugee academics in positions in Britain and abroad, directed by notables such as William Beveridge, Henry Dale, and Friedrich von Hayek, had some contact with the British Control Commission in spring and summer 1945. The Secretary had prepared lists for the Public Health Branch of displaced university medical teachers registered with the SPSL, a fact which he—unlike the British and American authorities—regarded as ‘prima facie evidence of [their] reliability’. But after an initial welcome of such work, contact soon lapsed, and the secretary was eventually informed by the Control Commission that ‘a high level decision here has ruled against direct contact with refugees’.  

Underneath this rhetoric, a number of more subtle analyses of émigrés were coming together as the war wore on. Apart from the problem of their representativeness, British officials argued that these émigrés were ‘out of touch with developments in Germany’. The psychiatrist Henry Dicks, who later worked for the British Control Commission in Germany, expressed this well:

The old democratic trade-unionist may well be found to be useless, to cut no ice, in a community as disrupted as Germany will be. His very aloofness from the process of bitter disenchantment through which his people have passed, may have made him into an anachronism, a sort of émigré. It can be said that the émigré, or the political deserter, is not often the foundation of a new beginning, useful though he may be, and congenial as his views may be to us.  

On these grounds, émigré preparations were neither useful nor necessary. As one official observed, past experiences showed that the British had ‘no reason to think that such material will prove useful and there is no reason to believe that the Free German Movement are better qualified than the various Departments of H.M.G to undertake work of this kind’. Some also rejected the notion that émigrés could be anything other than passive guests. As A. V. Hill countered the claim that German émigré scientists had ‘played their role in the fight against fascism’: ‘They didn’t take part in the fight except as victims for the most part. They were sacked, robbed and persecuted.’  

As a result, when individual requests for employment and offers to assist in reconstruction tasks were received by the British and American authorities, the vast majority were rejected. Of course, both the British and American governments did make some use of émigrés in advisory capacities, particularly in their psychological propaganda efforts. But while émigrés worked for institutions as the American Office of Strategic Services, the British Foreign Office Research Department, and the BBC, in practice German politicians in British or American exile were impotent and helpless. Most of their initiatives were ignored and they had no influence on any of the central political decisions of the time.

Many individual cases document this policy. Hugo Freund, who had submitted a plan for the reconstruction of the health service, was told in November 1945 that little could be done to grant his request to help in Germany. By May 1946, he had still not been successful and his plan was simply filed away. The list of German health officials in the United States experienced a similar fate, and none of the public health officials on this list returned to Germany. The three Germans in Burma—Rolf Becker, Carl Coutelle, and Herbert Baer—faced similar difficulties, even after the British China Medical Committee took up their case. ‘We have had nothing but praise of their work and their integrity from the Chinese Red Cross, the U.S. Army and the Friends Ambulance Unit who have worked alongside them’, their sponsors wrote. All three had ‘excellent anti-Nazi records’ as well as ‘the medical qualifications required to do good
work in their own countries. And since Europe is short of doctors and we really have none to spare here it would seem more sensible to get these doctors back again.\textsuperscript{91} But the committee was told that one possible employer, UNRRA, was ruled out by the fact that it would not employ Germans, ‘no matter how good their qualifications are’,\textsuperscript{92} and because of transport shortages it was at any rate ‘not yet possible for German and Austrian refugees to return to their countries’. Nor could the doctors travel through Britain as the Home Office refused to issue them transit visas.\textsuperscript{93} As the MP Kenneth Younger observed, ‘the British are not particularly interested in employing these men either in China or Germany at the moment. No doubt transport is difficult but it has not been suggested that that is the real obstacle to their return to Germany.’\textsuperscript{94}

Another case was that of Dr Lucie Adelsberger. She was a specialist in internal medicine and immunology, and an Auschwitz survivor. During a period of recuperation in Holland she applied for jobs at medical schools in the USA. But when told that it was unlikely that they would employ a middle-aged German when there was ample supply of young American medical students, she decided to seek employment in Germany, with the British Control Commission, UNRRA, or similar organizations. Via the SPSL, who had taken up her case, she, too, received the by-now-familiar rejection. ‘[T]hey tell us rigidly that they cannot employ Germans or Austrians’, wrote the SPSL secretary, and commented that in ‘a case like this it is manifestly foolish and wrong’.\textsuperscript{95} A referee from the Harvard Medical School wrote to UNRRA in protest: ‘She is a German; obviously she is not a Nazi. She is in complete sympathy with the Allies and the principles of democracy. She is very much on our side.’\textsuperscript{96} None of this mattered.

The British and especially the American armies contained a number of individuals of German origins, now naturalized, who temporarily worked for the occupation authorities, before returning to Britain or the United States. But for many others even temporary work in Germany proved impossible because of the difficulty of obtaining permits. Dr Hans Schlossmann, a former lecturer at the Pharmacological Institute of the Düsseldorf Medical Academy, who had been dismissed on racial grounds and who had lived in Britain since 1934, tried in January 1946 to go with a team of biochemists to the British zone to advise the occupation authorities on nutrition problems, but ‘was eventually turned down because he was not yet naturalised’.\textsuperscript{97} Those who had become naturalized Allied citizens were often in no better situation. The SPSL was in September 1946 dealing with the case of a German émigré, already an American citizen, who wanted to accept a guest appointment at the University of Hamburg, but had been told that there was ‘no likelihood of citizens of Allied countries being allowed to take up employment in Germany Universities. The question has been under discussion for some time, but no satisfactory solution has been found as it involves the employment of Allied Nationals by German Masters, which is a major difficulty under the existing conditions of Control.’\textsuperscript{98} Nor could he simply become a German citizen again, ‘since grant of nationality is always a discretionary matter, and there is at present no central authority for Germany which could exercise such discretion’.\textsuperscript{99}

The involvement of the China Medical Committee illustrates that it did not make much difference whether the émigrés had British or American sponsors or not. Dr Hugo Freund was apparently supported by the MP Richard Crossmann; others by other MPs and political figures, but to no avail.\textsuperscript{100} Roger Wilson of the Society of Friends was in the same situation: in September 1945 he tried to organize a relief mission to Germany, and approached the Foreign Office with the suggestion to use Germans currently in Britain. Relief work would have to fall more and more upon the Germans, he wrote, and the society knew at least a hundred suitable people with whom they had worked since 1933. He urged Bevin to give ‘urgent attention’ to ‘the possible use of people of German nationality for relief work under the auspices of British voluntary societies in Germany’.\textsuperscript{101} However, he was told repeatedly that even when Germans with the right qualifications had been found and no suitable Englishmen were available, it was still impossible to employ them in Germany.\textsuperscript{102}

These examples put the later observation by occupation officials such as Robert Murphy, who expressed surprise and dissatisfaction at not having enough German-speakers who could be assigned to administrative posts in Germany, into a new light.\textsuperscript{103} The debate over the employment of returning émigrés continued well into the occupation, and even after the Americans seemed to have relaxed their opposition somewhat.\textsuperscript{104} In June 1946, General Clay commented in a letter that ‘[i]n the functional field, we have recruited a number of men of German origin and some of them have proved to be very good indeed. However, much depends on what is meant by German origin. If these men are second or third generation Americans, their knowledge of Germany is usually very remote even though they may speak the language.’ In this context,

The Germany refugee who left Germany to go to the United States and subsequently became a citizen of the United States, is not always a good representative of military government. We have found that many of them


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understand Germany better than America and, as such, fail to represent America in Germany. It is difficult to estimate their reactions on their return to Germany, as, in fact, it will vary from the reaction of Dr. Brandt, who became extremely sympathetic to the German plight and an open opponent of Potsdam, to the view of Professor Lowenstein in our Legal Division who believes that the re-education and democratisation of Germany are completely hopeless.105

In April 1947, in the context of a review of the continued employment of Germans who had acquired American citizenship and worked for OMGUS in any capacity, the deputy military governor Major-General Keating paraphrased Clay's view of German émigrés as being politically unreliable, stating that 'many of these individuals have not been sufficiently indoctrinated in American ideologies to warrant their retention in our employment. It is anticipated that, with few exceptions, their contracts will be terminated.'106

(ii) France and German émigrés

France was in a very different position to Britain and the United States. On the one hand it had long been a major country of refuge for people fleeing fascism and Nazism. By 1936, 2.2 million foreign refugees lived within France.107 German refugees often went first to France, before moving on eventually to Britain or the United States, if they could overcome American immigration restrictions. Politically active German émigrés of many affiliations, who had been coming to France since 1933 and the reintegration of the Saar into Germany in 1935, were well organized in bodies such as the Central Association of German Emigration (Zentralvereinigung der deutschen Emigration), which represented twenty-two émigré groups in France, and which was recognized in October 1938 by the League of Nations as an official representation of German refugees.108 Many exiled political parties set up their headquarters in Paris, where a number of French parties and trade unions had declared their solidarity with the German exiles. These favourable conditions for political collaboration with German émigrés seemed to prosper further when Léon Blum's Popular Front government was elected in May 1936.109

But on the other hand, France was the first of the future occupiers to be attacked and invaded, and the only one to be fully occupied by Germany and partly run by a collaborationist government. It did not take part in the important Allied wartime conferences; it did not officially become an occupying power until 1944; and the borders of its occupation zone were not finally settled until the summer of 1945.110 Its post-Vichy government, a multi-party coalition which contained communists, socialists, and Christian democrats, was unelected for over a year. Throughout this time, the country was riven by deep internal struggles—between the Vichy regime and the Free French, between followers of General de Gaulle and General Giraud, and between the various factions of the Left and the Right. Like the Anglo-American planners, those in Paris had to negotiate conflicting spheres of responsibility between the military and the civilian authorities, but France was at the same time marred by far more acute divisions and uncertainties over future policies.

As a result, the French position on German émigrés was less categorical than the British or American. After the outbreak of war, German refugees were interned indiscriminately and regardless of their political affiliations.111 It is also true that public support for German exiles in France waned radically after 1939, and many public figures shared Anglo-American views of German nationalism and militarism. But where émigrés in Britain and the United States failed to be recognized as legitimate representatives of an alternative to Nazism, a number of German groups in France had more success. CALPO was not just closely connected with institutions and networks of the PCF and the trade union movement, it was also recognized as an official resistance organization, and its members fought alongside the French forces on the western front and in the battle for Paris.112 The group, and many individual members, were recognized as Resistance fighters, and a number of French figures vocally supported them. In October 1944, in a speech in Toulouse, Vincent Auriol—head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Consultative Assembly, and later to become first president of the Fourth Republic—emphasized CALPO's contribution to the speedy capitulation of German troops on French soil.113

Nonetheless, by late 1944 and early 1945, CALPO's relations with the French authorities began to deteriorate, and eventually France declined cooperation with CALPO on post-war Germany. By February 1945 the French Foreign Ministry laid down the line that authorities had to show greater distance from CALPO, and all embassies were instructed to maintain distance towards German émigré organizations and to enquire discreetly about their political orientation.114 The group's activities were increasingly supervised, restricted, and ultimately prohibited, until it was disbanded in August 1945.115 The reasons for this cooling of relations did not simply lie in the group's communist
affiliations, since (unlike in Britain and America) support of the Soviet Union alone did not warrant suspicion. Until 1947 it was a major pillar of French foreign policy to mediate between Soviet and Anglo-American approaches. Why did French officials have doubts about CALPO? At least in part their response can be understood as an effort to bring French policy in line with American and British standards and to assure them, often still sceptical about France's role as an occupying power, that it was up to the job. The distancing from CALPO was also partly testimony to the increased marginalization of French communists in occupation affairs. As in Britain and America, there were real worries about a premature commitment to any particular German faction which would limit future freedom to operate.

All these factors offer partial reasons for the French position on CALPO, but the most important was a clash with crucial elements of the French agenda. As CALPO began to agitate for a reconstructed, centralized, and unified Germany, it contradicted the basic security premise of French policy. France's central priority was that the defeated Germany had to be radically and permanently decentralized (perhaps even dismembered), and militarily and economically weakened. The proclamations by members of CALPO and other émigré groups (such as the SPD in exile) on a future centralized country—even if it was demilitarized and denazified—were thus entirely unacceptable in French officials' eyes. These proclamations represented, they argued, Germans' desire to see Germany 'regain its full place in the sun, even, if possible, in the distant future, and the realisation of the aims of Hitler and his followers'.

French views on CALPO's plans for Germany were to a large degree shaped by its concerns about the shape of post-war Germany. Their increasingly negative position was further entrenched by the arrival of members of the Swiss Free German group in the territory of the French occupation zone in the last weeks of the war, who began to agitate for centralized German reconstruction. Like other Free German groups, the Swiss movement called not just for the arrest of all war criminals, the denazification of German authorities, and the democratization of German public life, but also demanded the 'recovery of the German people's sovereignty' and the 'unity of the Reich, under free development of the historically determined particularities of the German regions'. Where the Free Germans fought 'for the salvation of the German nation', French occupation policy was to prevent just that—there was to be no salvation of the nation and no unity of the Reich, and the German particularities were to be suppressed and remoulded. To the French authorities, these émigrés were therefore not simply representatives of the failed Weimar regime, but, more disturbingly, they continued to share the basic premises of German unity, centralization, and German recovery represented in both Bismarck's and Hitler's world views. The French official position towards the Free German émigrés was thus not the product of a blanket rejection of the use of émigrés, but a calculated move.

The fact that the French authorities evaluated the degree to which the émigrés' programmes matched their own priorities, rather than refusing cooperation on principle, is demonstrated by evidence that they utilized those individuals and groups who supported French policy, and were politically useful to it. A revealing (even if peculiar) case is that of the Saar, a region which had changed hands several times between Germany and France, but which had been under German control since the plebiscite of 1935, and was now part of the French occupied territory in Germany. The Saar became something of an 'émigré state' even before it was given autonomous status and was economically integrated into France after 1947. Gilbert Grandval, who in August 1945 became the Saar's military governor, found in the returning émigrés a useful means to strengthen the cooperation between his military and their civilian administrations, and from the start they assumed vital positions in the Saar civilian authorities. The German Catholic democrat Johannes Hoffmann, a vocal opponent of the return of the Saar to Germany in 1935, had emigrated first to France and then to Brazil, where he kept in close contact with members of the French Resistance. In September 1945, he returned to Saarbrücken via Paris with help from the Interministerial Committee on German and Austrian Affairs (Comité Interministériel des Affaires Allemandes et Autrichiennes, CIAAA)—the new liaison office between the French occupation authorities in Germany and the ministries in Paris. Shortly afterwards he became head of the newly licensed Christian People's Party of the Saar (CVP), and later minister president of the Saar. Hoffmann was no isolated example. More émigrés were appointed to the new Saar administrative commission after the first communal elections on 8 October 1946, among them Richard Kirn as director for work and welfare, and Emil Straus as director for education. German émigrés also played a vital role in the political parties of the Saar; most of them—such as the CVP, the Social Democratic Party (SPS), and the Communist Party (KPS)—were in fact run by returning émigrés. Another influential political movement run by émigrés was the Mouvement pour la Libération de la Sarre (MLS), founded in March 1945 by German exiles in Paris, and which demanded the complete annexation of the Saar by France. Members of this movement, and its later reincarnation as the Mouvement pour la Rattachement de la Sarre à la France (MRS), were appointed by the military authorities to a number of influential positions. In all these cases, the preference for émigrés was a component of the French political programme for the Saar, which included calls for the separation of the Saar from Germany and its economic integration with France.
The French authorities’ relationships with German political émigrés were thus shaped by their support of French policies. A party which initially did not share this programme and which did not have an émigré leader, the DPS (Democratic Party of the Saar), was licensed later than the other parties, only after Grandval and his staff had coaxed its leaders into agreement with a separation of the Saar. Conversely, the émigré-headed parties of the Saar (except for the KPS) had from the start assured their compliance with French occupation policy.\textsuperscript{127} CALPO, by contrast, disagreed over the issue of the separation and decentralization in the Saar, and founded its own organization for Saar refugees, and trained its members for administrative duties there, without abandoning its calls for the full integration of the Saar with the rest of Germany.\textsuperscript{128} The importance of émigrés’ affinity with the French occupation programme as a precondition for their political success is also illustrated by those CALPO members who did return to the Saar, but left again thereafter—such as Otto Niebergall, CALPO’s president, who was expelled by the military authorities in 1947 and moved to Rheinland-Pfalz (a different Land in the French zone), and Fritz Nickolay, who presided over the KPS, but moved to the GDR in 1950 after being accused of causing public unrest at a May Day demonstration.\textsuperscript{129}

Elsewhere in the French zone, there were few returning émigrés in leading administrative positions, proportionately even fewer than in the British and American zones. In the media the numbers were surprisingly low: only 7.6 per cent of all returning émigrés who worked in the media went to the French zone, compared to over 40 per cent in the Soviet zone, 26 per cent in the American zone, and almost 17 per cent in the British.\textsuperscript{130} The French zone's health authorities, too, were not significantly shaped by émigrés. Since French policy prioritized decentralization, this absence of émigrés can be explained to a large degree by the fact that the main German political parties and movements—unlike those in the Saar—had no history of lobbying for separation or decentralization of the cobbled-together regions in the French zone. In fact, in all zones (apart from the Saar) both the SPD and the KPD opposed any decentralization or dismemberment of Germany, and continually tried to develop inter-zonal party programmes. Similarly, German doctors active in the SPD or KPD had since the 1920s argued for greater centralization in the German health service and the establishment of a central ministry of health. In the French case, this, rather than any communist affiliations, would have made them extremely unpopular with the occupation authorities.

A revealing exception in the French zone's health sector is the case of Frédéric Falkenburger, a German Jewish doctor who had studied medicine at the University of Strasbourg before the First World War, and subsequently worked in Berlin in a venereal disease clinic and local health insurance body. He emigrated to France in 1933. In 1936–7 he spent some time working in Moscow, before returning to France and taking French citizenship in 1937. In the same year he also began to work at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in Paris. He returned to Germany in 1945 as an officer in the French military government's Public Health Branch in Baden-Baden. Later he became head of the health service of the French high commissioner in Germany, and was for some time based at both the universities of Mainz and Paris.\textsuperscript{131} His value to the French authorities was no doubt highlighted by the fact that he had been educated at French institutions, and was bilingual and naturalized. Like Maxim Zetkin in the Soviet zone, Falkenburger was an “intermediary” between French and German officials, and unlike most other Germans who came back in French uniform and as French citizens, Falkenburger continued to work in Germany until his death.

(iii) The Soviet Union and German émigrés

The Soviet scenario was different again. The community of political exiles in the Soviet Union was much more homogenous in its interests than those in France, Britain, or the United States. German representatives in the Comintern’s executive committee estimated in 1936 that of the roughly 4,600 Germans with ‘political émigré’ status, the vast majority were communists. In 1938 and 1939 their number was increased further by the arrival of communists who had fought in the Spanish Civil War or who came from French internment camps.\textsuperscript{132} Because of non-communists’ reluctance to emigrate to the Soviet Union—and even if they did, because of countless problems in being granted asylum status and establishing themselves in exile\textsuperscript{133}—there were fewer competing factions among the political émigrés. Doctors were strongly represented among both the communist émigrés and those who initially arrived as ‘Jewish’ refugees, and many were employed in the Soviet health service to alleviate a serious shortage of doctors. Whereas in Britain and America German doctors often had to retrain and requalify before they could work, here they were easily absorbed. This proved particularly important for the post-war years because, at least in German eyes, émigré doctors were valuable in the future German reconstruction after the war. As Lothar Wolf—himself a communist doctor from Berlin, and in exile in the Soviet Union since 1934—explained to Wilhelm Pieck: ‘the emigration and use of such a large number of doctors has a great political significance (not just in terms of health policy) for the KPD and its training of cadres. These doctors, as highly qualified forces, will be very useful once in Germany.’\textsuperscript{134}
The émigrés faced undeniable difficulties in Soviet exile. They had to undergo rigorous checks into their past and present activities. Only a minority of them were based in Moscow, while many more were scattered across the Soviet Union, including Siberia. They had to stay silent during the German–Soviet pact, many had died in Spain, and many more were deported or executed during the Stalinist purges. Lothar Wolf was arrested by the state security service (NKVD) in 1937 and died shortly afterwards. His wife Martha Ruben-Wolf, also a politically active doctor from Berlin, committed suicide in 1939. There were many similar cases. Nonetheless, Soviet policy on the use of German nationals for future work in Germany was more flexible than that of Britain and the United States. The Soviet government supported and worked with those émigrés who were useful to its priorities in Germany, even more actively than the French. A number of exiles were able to draw upon older émigré infrastructures, such as political groups, as well as some of the institutional remainders left behind by the German minorities in the Soviet Union (newspapers, periodicals, publishing houses, and theatres).

And just as communist émigrés in France benefited from their connections to the French Communist Party, émigrés here were more embedded in Soviet political institutions and networks than those in either British or American exile—in the orbits of the Comintern, the Soviet Communist Party's training schools, universities, and the Red Army.

The recognition that émigrés could be of assistance to the occupying powers was thus not at issue. The situation was in some ways simpler than it was in the West. Many communists, émigrés and Russians alike, agreed with a distinction in principle between the German working class, who suffered under the small clique of Nazis and who had been used as cannon fodder to fight their war, and those responsible for the war. For many non-communists, this distinction between apparently good and bad Germans was much harder or even impossible to maintain. A diary entry by Georgy Dimitrov offers a glimpse of this position. In 1938, in the context of developments in Czechoslovakia, he commented that ‘a nation is not some gang of traitors willing for the sake of its class privileges to offer up its own people to be torn to pieces by German fascism. A nation is millions of workers and peasants, working people, who are being betrayed by the Chamberlains and Daladiers.’

In discussions with German comrades in subsequent years, Dimitrov applied this notion to Germany. A diary entry from January 1943 recorded a meeting with Wilhelm Pieck and the German writer Johannes R. Becher, both of whom he advised to be clear about the differences between the Nazis and the German population at large—if not from conviction then for reasons of political expediency: ‘I explained to Becher’, he wrote, ‘that it is politically inexpedient to represent the German people in its entirety as corrupt, with bad and dangerous qualities. You have to differentiate and show the positive qualities to be found in the depths of the German people, on the strength of which the German people could rise up and rid themselves of the Hitlerite clique, washing away their shame and the bad and dangerous qualities. There is a need for serious national self-criticism, but not for indiscriminate self-flagellation.’ In March 1945, Dimitrov noted that while Hitler was trying to drag ‘the German populace down with him into the abyss’, what they needed was ‘for some Germans to appear who are capable of salvaging what could still be salvaged for the survival of the German people. Organise the municipality … , re-establish the economy, etc., on the German territory taken and occupied by the Red Army. Establish local government agencies out of which would eventually develop a German government’.

In addition to being willing to distinguish between good and bad Germans (or at least between those who were useful and those who were not), Comintern officials had long been involved in the German Communist Party, whose leading individuals identified themselves as communists first and Germans second. Although the Comintern was officially disbanded in 1943—just days before the formation of the NKFD—its equipment and operations were taken over by a number of Soviet agencies, and aspects of its approach informed official activities. Soviet priorities at this point lay strictly with winning the war and conducting military operations, but their interests overlapped with those of the Comintern, not least because the lack of preparations for the occupation dictated that they use Germans’ help in rebuilding Germany wherever they could. This was also exactly what Ulbricht and the KPD leadership had in mind. The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party had, at any rate, long been involved in the training of German communists who were in Soviet exile, and memoirs of the period of exile in the Soviet Union often record the many training schools and cadre programmes.

Some time before the French authorities (and in contrast to those in London and Washington), the Soviet government decided to make use of German émigrés for the implementation of their German policy. Where in France it was émigrés’ affinity with the French occupation agenda that mattered most, Soviet officials were more interested in broader questions of political reliability and party training. With the plurality and changeability of Soviet plans for the future occupation, insisting on adherence to any principles was not very practical. Even after Stalin’s proclamations at the Teheran conference in November 1943 on the harshest possible treatment of Germany the Soviet authorities did...
not rule out a collaboration with German émigrés. Throughout the war they maintained close contacts with people such as Pieck and Ulbricht. Although by the end of the war Dimitrov was not as influential as he had been in the late 1930s, through him something of the old Comintern mentality found its way into the spring 1945 preparations for the Soviet administration of their national zone. Significantly, it was Dimitrov (himself a Bulgarian) who regularly met the Germans, as well as all the other national groups of the Comintern, to discuss their future tasks. When in November 1943 a group of German émigrés came to see him about a range of German issues, he ‘[B]rought to their attention’, he wrote in his diary, ‘that they are to proceed on the basis of the most likely prospect, the destruction of fascist Germany under the blows of the armed forces of the Sov[iet] Union and its allies, [and] thereafter the temporary occupation of Germany, with all the ramifications of this fact. Therefore the task of the German Com[munist] party (as regards the postwar period) lies first of all in creating the sort of organised national force that, with the help of the Soviet Union, would be capable of taking upon itself the rebirth of Germany as a genuinely democr[atic] country.’ During the last days of the war, it was primarily Dimitrov who, with the help of Pieck and Ulbricht, prepared lists for Stalin of the German émigrés and POWs who were to be sent back for work in the occupied territory. When the Red Army approached the German border, Pieck made a formal request to Dimitrov to send a group of German communists with the Red Army to liberate Berlin. Dimitrov approved this, and on his recommendation the Central Committee sent three groups to Germany, one with each of the major armies. During June 1945, roughly 70 German communists and 300 POWs from the antifascist schools were sent back to Germany for administrative work.

After Germany's unconditional surrender, the Free Germany committee in Moscow was disbanded and many of its members were appointed to positions in the state and security apparatus of the Soviet zone in Germany. Local administrations were put into the hands of returning émigrés, most of whom had been members of the NKFD or active in its orbit, in the antifascist schools, or in some of the other organizations mentioned above. Maxim Zetkin was among those who returned from Moscow to Berlin in 1945, and participated in the construction of the Soviet zone's Central Health Administration. As its vice-president, he was responsible for the all-important organizational and personnel matters, as well as for liaison with the Soviet Military Administration. Zetkin, perhaps even more so than Falkenburger, was a useful ‘intermediary’, because he was known in both Soviet and German circles. As Max Klesse (a colleague of Zetkin's in Berlin) noted in October 1946, 'from the returning émigrés only the name of Zetkin was known well by all Germans, even by non-communists, and—this is more important still—was revered everywhere. Ulbricht, Wandel, and Wintzer, who in spite of their intelligence and engagement were not widely known, would have acquired resonance, especially among the German proletariat, if associated with Zetkin's name.'

Nor were Soviet initiatives to bring back émigrés and appoint them to key positions restricted to those in Soviet exile. Officially sanctioned returns included the arrival of a large group of KPD functionaries from Scandinavia in January 1946 of communists from Mexican exile in May 1946, and of some communists from Britain in the summer of 1946. Many of the individuals active in the orbits of the Free German groups ended up in the Soviet zone/GDR. Heinz Schmidt returned from the UK in 1946, together with his Austrian wife Eva Schmidt-Kolmer, who joined the Central Health Administration. Rudolf Neumann came back from Mexico in 1947, and became Oberarzt at the Hufeland Hospital in Berlin. Kurt Winter arrived from Sweden in 1945, and after working as a district physician in Teltow directed the Brandenburg public health department and subsequently became a vice-president of the Central Health Administration. Felix Boenheim returned from the United States and went to Leipzig in 1948, where he became a professor for internal medicine and director of the Medizinisch-Poliklinisches Institut at the University of Leipzig. Rolf Becker, Carl Coutelle, and Herbert Baer all returned in 1948 and worked in the Central Health Administration and in other leading capacities in the health service. Conversely, those who had to rely on support from the British, American, or French authorities often did not return. Käte Frankenthal, Franz Goldmann, Alfred Korach, and Heinrich Brieger all remained in the United States.

The only exceptions of émigrés in this chapter who flourished in the British or American zones are Robert Kempner, who assisted the US chief counsel during the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and worked temporarily at the German Foreign Office (but never settled permanently in Germany), and Kurt Glaser, who returned in 1948 and later joined the local health service in Hamburg, and later still became a member of the Federal Health Council (Bundesgesundheitsrat) in the FRG.

Conclusions

At the same time as the Allied governments began to draw up plans for the post-war period and their dealings with Germany, German émigrés across the world tried to take part. In the many branches of the Free German groups, and in countless other organizations, they drafted proposals for the reconstruction of Germany after the war and lobbied the
future occupying powers to be allowed to participate. Their relations with the British, American, French, and Soviet authorities were consequently often fraught. The Big Four dealt with them very differently. The British and American governments formally refused to acknowledge a distinction between Germans at large and those who had emigrated, or between different sections of the émigré community. They viewed them as ineffective and out of touch with developments in Germany, and insisted that cooperation with them was politically undesirable. Both the Soviet and the French governments, by contrast, proved more willing to differentiate between different kinds of Germans. Partly this was a result of émigrés’ closer links with a number of Soviet and French political institutions (and the absence of those associations in Britain and the United States), and especially in France it reflected internal divisions. To some degree it was also a feature of the greater requirement for collaborators by the two occupying powers who were most in need of material and political support. As a result, the Soviet authorities recognized some émigrés as a potentially useful means to advance Soviet aims. French authorities made similar calculations and made use of émigrés who supported their policies of separation and decentralization in the territory of the Saar, and to a lesser degree in other parts of their occupation zone.

None of the three western occupation zones (apart from the region of the Saar) showed great numbers of returning émigrés in leading positions, but this observation disguises significant differences between them. In the French case it was a feature of the disagreements between French and German views on the future of Germany, whereas in the other two western zones it was rooted in a blanket rejection of cooperation with the émigrés and their claim to represent ‘the other Germany’. Conversely, the vast majority of returning émigrés worked in the Soviet zone and in the Saar, and in both cases the occupiers had decided early on that the émigrés were useful for their own agendas. Where British and American planners justified their decisions by pointing to likely tensions between the returning émigrés and the native population, the Soviet and French authorities were most concerned about the Germans’ relationships with the occupation authorities, and some also saw the potential of émigrés to convert and teach the German population. In all four cases, the Allies’ position on German émigrés appeared as a facet of their approach to Germany and the future occupation.

All of this is significant, even if during the first year of occupation the stance of some American occupation authorities softened and they brought back a number of people from exile—such as the SPD politician Wilhelm Hoegner and a group of journalists from Switzerland and Britain. Such instances notwithstanding, the Anglo-American reluctance to work with German émigrés lived on in the restrictive repatriation measures. Émigrés who sought to return were in most cases prevented until 1947 or later. The reasons given, such as a lack of transport to Germany, often hid a multitude of political considerations. And even after the ban was officially relaxed, a return was often a complicated procedure with endless bureaucratic obstacles, which took years to overcome. The consequences for public health work of this absence of trusted German collaborators in the first months after the war will be examined in Part II.

Footnotes

1 TNA, FO 371/46835, D. Carter (Trading with the Enemy Department) to J. M. Troutbeck (German Department), 24 Aug. 1945.


5 Krauss, Heimkehr in ein fremdes Land, 11.


See Krauss, *Heimkehr in ein fremdes Land*.


There is a large historiography on the NKFD. For an overview see Hartmut Mehringer, ‘Deutsche Emigranten im Nationalkomitee “Freies Deutschland” ’, in Krohn et al. (eds.), *Handbuch der deutsch-sprachigen Emigration*, 629–37.


Jentzsch estimated that 300 of 4,000 NKFD members in 1944 were doctors, see Jentzsch in Kurt Kühn (ed.), *An der Seite der Arbeiterklasse: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Bündnisses der Deutschen Arbeiterklasse mit der medizinischen Intelligenz* (Berlin, 1973), 157.

Clara Zetkin had played a crucial role in the establishment of the Communist Party of Germany and the Comintern. She was a friend of Lenin, and married a Polish revolutionary, Maxim’s father.


Helmut Müller-Enbergs et al. (eds.), *Wer war wer in der DDR?* (Bonn, 2001).

BBAB, Zetkin Nachlaß, ‘Lebenslauf von 1946’, 22 Sept. 1946. Another example was Frida Rubiner.


Banac (ed.), *Diary of Georgi Dimitrov*, Nov. 1942, 212.

BAB, SgY12 files, also Wolfgang Leonhard, *Das kurze Leben der DDR: Berichte und Kommentare aus vier Jahrzehnten* (Stuttgart, 1990), 13–14.

See Ch. 7 for more details.


Members included Karl Hoppe (SPD from Saar), Dr Wilhelm Leo (SPD), Wilhelm Tesch (DVP), Prof. Dr Heinrich W. Friedemann (Zentrum), D. Kümmel (Zentrum), R. Klein (trade unionist), Feldwebel Arno Müller (DNVP), Obermaat Hans Heisel (KPD), Karl
Mössinger (SPD from Saar) and his wife Luise Schiffergans (SPD), Fritz Glauben (SPD from Saar), and Paul Hertzberg (SPD). See Werner Röder, *International Biographical Dictionary of Central European Emigres/Biographisches Handbuch der Deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933* (Munich, 1983). Niebergall had long been involved in popular front groups such as the ‘Working committee for the preparation of a public front for the Saarland’ (Arbeitsausschuss zur Vorbereitung einer Volksfront für das Saargebiet) in 1937.

Initially *Soldat im Westen*, then *Volk und Vaterland* and *Unser Vaterland*. In Belgium and Luxembourg it published *Die Wahrheit*. Also see Free German Movement in Great Britain, *Free Germans in the French Maquis: The Story of the Committee ‘Free Germany’ in the West* (London, 1945).

‘Maquis’ (shrubland, underground) was used as a collective term for all units and groups of armed resistance fighters and partisans. According to Bungert the first written recognition dates from June 1944, after the CALPO representative for the southern zone met the CNR representative for the Toulouse region, see Bungert, *Das Nationalkomitee und der Westen*, 133. See also Henri Nogères, *Histoire de la Résistance* (5 vols., Paris, 1967). Gerhard Leo, *Frühzug nach Toulouse: Ein Deutscher in der französischen Résistance* (Berlin, 1992).

Barbara Vormeier, ‘Frankreich’, in Krohn et al. (eds.), *Handbuch der deutsch-sprachigen Emigration*.

Niebergall, ‘Der antifaschistische deutsche Widerstandskampf in Frankreich’.


FO 371/39119, Count Potulicki (Secretary-General of the Inter-Allied Research Committee) to Mr Roberts (Foreign Office), ‘Activities of the Free German Movement in Britain’, London, May 1944. On its views on the NKFD, see Siegbert Kahn, *The National Committee ‘Free Germany’: Background, Tasks, Men* (London, 1943).

c.g. Association of Anti-Nazi Doctors and Medical Workers, Study Group of German Children's Nurses, Study Group of Anti-Nazi Social Workers.

BL, 1884.b.25, ‘Open letter from the London representative of the German Social Democratic party Wilhelm Bander to Mr Kuczynski’ [Sept. 1943].


e.g. see the correspondence of the Free Germans with the British Foreign Office. FO 371/39119, ‘Manifesto of the Free German Movement in Great Britain’, 5 June 1944; ‘Memorandum on proposed activities of the Free German Movement in Great Britain for mobilising anti-Nazi refugees from Germany in support of the Second Front’, [June 1944]; ‘The Free Germans to the British People’, 7 June 1944. FO 371/39120, ‘The Co-operation of the movement “Free Germany” in the re-building of democratic institutions in Germany’, 31 Oct. 1944.


FO 371/39120, ‘Draft of a 4 weeks’ broadcasting programme (of daily 15 minutes), and some additional programme suggestions’, 17 July 1944.


FO 371/39119, report by J. Wheeler-Bennet on the Council for a Democratic Germany, 3 May 1944.


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46 ‘Aufbau eines demokratischen Gesundheitswesens in Deutschland’, in Langkau-Alex and Ruprecht (eds.), *Was soll aus Deutschland werden?*, 230–47.

47 ‘Aufbau eines demokratischen Gesundheitswesens in Deutschland’, 121.


49 See exchange in FO 371/46885. He had also been an executive member of the Hygiene Museum in Dresden, see *Sozialistische Mitteilungen der London-Vertretung der SPD*, No. 104–5 (Oct.–Nov. 1947).

50 FO 371/46885.


52 FO 371/46745, Free German League of Culture in the UK, ‘Memorandum on the Rebuilding of German Cultural Life’, undated [7–8 July 1945]. Of course, the existence of ‘the other Germany’ was fiercely debated, not least by émigrés themselves, see Thomas Mann, *Deutsche Hörer: 55 Radiosendungen nach Deutschland* (Stockhold, 1945), and Thomas Mann, ‘New Year Address on the BBC’, 30 Dec. 1945, in J. F. Grosser (ed.), *Die große Kontroverse: ein Briefwechsel um Deutschland* (Hamburg, 1963), 79.

53 e.g. FO 371/46745, Free German League of Culture, Memorandum, [undated].

54 FO 371/46804, Memorandum, Aug. 1945.

55 Niebergall, ‘Der antifaschistische deutsche Widerstandskampf in Frankreich’, 69. CALPO's last meeting took place in Aug. 1945.


57 FO 371/46802, Press statement by the Free German movement in Great Britain, 30 Apr. 1945.

58 FO 371/46803, Memorandum and List on the Repatriation of Refugees from Germany, [undated].

59 FO 371/55487, minute by R. W. Selby (German Section of the Foreign Office), 26 Feb. 1946.

60 FO 371/46885, ‘Plan for the reconstruction of the German Health Organisation’ by Hugo Freund. Also see letter Dr Hugo Freund (Haifa, Palestine) to Mr Noel-Baker (Foreign Office), 26 Oct. 1945.

61 FO 371/46844 and FO 371/46846, Foreign Office correspondence with China Medical Aid Committee, June 1945 to Jan. 1946.

62 Paul Weindling, *Nazi Medicine and the Nuremberg Trials: From Medical War Crimes to Informed Consent* (Basingstoke, 2004), 138. Also see files in NYPL, Displaced German Scholars, Box 19: Kempner.


68 FO 371/46803, draft letter Harrison to Captain Watson (MPO), [26 June 1945].


FO 371/46842, draft cabinet paper (3rd draft) [undated], ‘Draft Paper for the O.R.C. Committee—The Return of Refugees and Internees to Germany and Austria’.

FO 371/39119, Parliamentary Question by Lt. Col. Sir Thomas Moore, 7 June 1944. Minutes by D. Allen, 6 June 1944.

e.g. see Glees, Exile Politics, 6. TNA, FO 371/46802, Memorandum by the German People’s Socialist Movement/Deutsche Volkssozialistische Bewegung [Mar. 1945].


FO 371/39919, Con O’Neill, draft ‘Talking Points’ [June 1944], a copy was to be sent to the British Embassy in Washington. Also see FO 371/39119, ‘Possibility of Council for Democratic Germany carrying out a soft-peace campaign’, minute by Harrison, 13 July 1944.

FO 371/40816, ‘Offer of services by Mr Sass for post-war work in Germany’, minute by J. Chaplin, 15 June 1944.

FO 371/39120, ‘Suggestion of Free German broadcast to Germany’, minute, 25 July 1944.

FO 371/46803, ‘Return of German refugees to Germany’, minute by R. W. Selby, 26 June 1945.


Bod SPSL, 91/1, J. B. Skemp (SPSL secretary) to Ernest Cowell (CCG(BE), Health Branch), 21 June 1945.

FO 371/46844, ‘Proposed repatriation of nine doctors sent out to China by the China Medical Aid Committee’, Mary Gilchrist (honorary secretary) to Mr Harrison (German Section, Foreign Office), 18 June 1945.

FO 371/46885, J. S. Tahoudin (Foreign Office) to Hugo Freund (Haifa), 12 Nov. 1945.

FO 371/46885, Hugo Freund, 26 May 1946.


FO 371/46844, ‘Proposed repatriation of nine doctors sent out to China by the China Medical Aid Committee’, Mary Gilchrist (honorary secretary) to Mr Harrison (German Section, Foreign Office), 18 June 1945.

See n. 91.


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Bod. SPSL, 415/6, J. B. Skemp (Secretary of SPSL) to Sir Will Spens (Master of Corpus Christi College Cambridge), 17 Apr. 1946, regarding Schlossman's application for naturalization.

Bod. SPSL, 111/5, Bertha Bracey (COGA) to Ilse Ursell (SPSL secretary), 28 Sept. 1946.

Bod. SPSL, 111/5, Bertha Bracey (COGA) to Ilse Ursell (SPSL secretary), 10 Oct. 1946.

FO 371/46885, Hugo Freund to Foreign Office, 26 May 1946. For other examples, see Susan Pedersen, Eleanor Rathbone and the Politics of Conscience (New Haven, 2004).

FO 371/46806, Roger Wilson (General Secretary, Friends Relief Service) to Major Kenneth Younger, MP (House of Commons), 21 Sept. 1945.


Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (London, 1964), 306.

Not least in response to reports such as this: Memorandum by OSS (Wiesbaden), ‘Views of a group of reliable and democratic Germans’, June 1945, in Heideking and Mauch (eds.), American Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler, 406–12.

BAK, Z45F, 3/177-1/6, Clay to Major General Oliver R. Echols (Director Civil Affairs Division, War Department, Washington), 25 June 1946.


Vormeier, ‘Frankreich’, 213.


CALPO also must have been partially funded by the PCF, as in Jan. 1945 it claimed to have 34 million francs at its disposal. See ‘Minutes of OSS-Inter Branch Meeting: OSS Relations with the CALPO Resistance Group’, 10 Jan. 1945, printed in Heideking and Mauch (eds.), American Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler, 357.

Vincent Auriol, Oct. 1944, in Bungert, Das Nationalkomitee und der Westen, 131. CALPO had some very positive press coverage in a number of French papers, see e.g. extracts in Free German Movement in Great Britain, Free Germans in the French Maquis: The Story of the Committee ‘Free Germany’ in the West (London, 1945), 22–4.


e.g. The Times, ‘French influence in Europe’, 14 July 1949.

Bungert, Das Nationalkomitee und der Westen, 136. On OSS relations with CALPO, see ‘Minutes of OSS-Inter Branch Meeting: OSS Relations with the CALPO Resistance Group’, 10 Jan. 1945, printed in Heideking and Mauch (eds.), American Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler.

My trans., AN, F1A, Dossier 2246, ‘Conférence a l’Hotel Matignon, dans l Cabinet de M. Joxe, au sujet de l’activité sur notre

See Wolfgang Langhoff, Die Bewegung freies Deutschland und ihre Ziele (Zurich, 1945), 20. Also see Karl Hans Bergmann, Die Bewegung ‘Freies Deutschland’ in der Schweiz, 1943–1945 (Munich, 1974).

Langhoff, Die Bewegung freies Deutschland und ihre Ziele.

Gerhard Paul, ‘Saarland’, in Krohn et al. (eds.), Handbuch der deutsch-sprachigen Emigration, 1176. See essays in Rainer Hudemann et al. (eds.), Grenz-Fall: das Saarland zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland, 1945–1960 (St Ingbert, 1997).

Dieter Marc Schneider, ‘Gilbert Grandval: Frankreichs Prokonsul an der Saar’, in Stefan Martens (ed.), Vom ‘Erbeind’ zum ‘Erneuerer’: Aspekte und Motive der französischen Deutschlandpolitik nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Sigmaringen, 1993), 210. Between Mar. and July 1945, the territory was still controlled by American troops, and some émigré appointments dated from this period.


Incl. the politicians Edgar Hector, Thomas Blanc, and Friedrich Pfordt (the latter a communist), the lawyer Charles Levy, the journalists Claus Becker and Walter Gebelein, and the police official Jacques Becker. See Röder and Strauss (eds.), Biographisches Handbuch.

Schneider, ‘Gilbert Grandval’, 211.

See Bungert, Das Nationalkomitee und der Westen, 135.

Röder and Strauss (eds.), Biographisches Handbuch.


He died in Mainz in 1965. See Joseph Walk, Kurzbiographien zur Geschichte der Juden, 1918–1945 (Munich, 1988), and Röder and Strauss (eds.), Biographisches Handbuch. He may have converted to Catholicism after divorcing his Jewish wife (Else Joseph) and marrying a Roman Catholic woman, Herta Friedrich.

Hans Schafranek, ‘Sowjetunion’, in Krohn et al. (eds.), Handbuch der deutsch-sprachigen Emigration, 384. Carola Tischler quotes estimates in 1936 of ‘four to five thousand émigrés’, and thinks that the number was probably higher. Tischler, Flucht in die Verfolgung: Deutsche Emigranten im sowjetischen Exil, 1933 bis 1945 (Münster, 1996), 26.

Tischler, Flucht in die Verfolgung, 26.

My trans., Wolf to Pieck, 27 July 1936, quoted in Tischler, Flucht in die Verfolgung, 78.

Tischler, Flucht in die Verfolgung, 78.


Schafranek in Krohn et al. (eds.), Handbuch der deutsch-sprachigen Emigration, 387.


On the changing Soviet thoughts on the occupation of Germany, see Ch. 6.

Banac (ed.), *Diary of Georgi Dimitrov*, 20 Nov. 1943, 287. See also meetings recorded on 9 Sept. 1944 (334), 5 Jan. 1945 (352), 1 Apr. 1945 (365), 6 June 1945 (372), 7 June 1945 (372), 8 June 1945 (372), and 9 June 1945 (372–3).


Naimark, *Russians in Germany*, 42.

BBAW, Max Klesse to Genosse Zetkin, 26 Oct. 1946. He was talking about Walter Ulbricht, Paul Wandel (minister for public education and youth), and Otto Winzer (minister for foreign affairs).


See Röder and Strauss (eds.), *Biographisches Handbuch.*

Krauss, *Heimkehr in ein fremdes Land.*

Figures

Figure 3.1.

‘Germany is Not Hitler’, *Inside Nazi Germany*, February 1940

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